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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

GOV DOC 




BOSTOISI 
PUBLIC 
UBl^RY 




THE OFFICIAL WI 



-ID OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



3: 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1723 




July 3, 1972 



STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS 
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS 1 

THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: 

GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE AND COMPLEXITY 

Address by Under Secretary Irwin 16 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES POLICY ON PROVIDING 
INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Abs/iirjPj,-,,,,f^.„.,|; , , ,,,..,... 



For index see inside back cv "r 



DtPOSlTORY 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1723 
July 3, 1972 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing OfBce 
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Single copy 30 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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ment and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
O/Rce of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Transmitted to the Congress 



The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the Limita- 
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the 
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures 
with respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms were transmitted to the Con- 
gress by President Nixon on June 13.^ Fol- 
lowing are texts of President Nixon's mes- 
sage to the Senate; his letter to Speaker of 
the House Carl Albert; Secretary Roger's 
report to the President of June 10; and agreed 
interpretations and unilateral statements. 



MESSAGE TO THE SENATE 

White House press release dated June 13 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith certified copies of the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement 
on Certain Measures with respect to the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies 
of these agreements are also being forwarded 
to the Speaker of the House of Representa- 
tives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent 
to ratification of the Treaty, and an expres- 
sion of support from both Houses of the 
Congress for the Interim Agreement on 
Strategic Offensive Arms. 

These agreements, the product of a major 
effort of this administration, are a significant 
step into a new era of mutually agreed re- 
straint and arms limitation between the two 
principal nuclear powers. 

The provisions of the agreements are ex- 



' For texts of the treaty and interim agreement 
and associated protocol, see Bulletin of June 26, 
1972, p. 918. 



plained in detail in the Report of the Secre- 
tary of State, which I attach. Their main 
effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the 
deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems 
to two designated areas, and at a low level. 
The Interim Agreement limits the overall 
level of strategic offensive missile forces. 
Together the two agreements provide for a 
more stable strategic balance in the next sev- 
eral years than would be possible if strategic 
arms competition continued unchecked. This 
benefits not only the United States and the 
Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world. 

The agreements are an important first step 
in checking the arms race, but only a first 
step; they do not close off all avenues of stra- 
tegic competition. Just as the maintenance of 
a strong strategic posture was an essential 
element in the success of these negotiations, 
it is now equally essential that we carry for- 
ward a sound strategic modernization pro- 
gram to maintain our security and to ensure 
that more permanent and comprehensive 
arms limitation agreements can be reached. 

The defense capabilities of the United 
States are second to none in the world today. 
I am determined that they shall remain so. 
The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim 
Agreement will permit the United States to 
take the steps we deem necessary to main- 
tain a strategic posture which protects our 
vital interests and guarantees our continued 
security. 

Besides enhancing our national security, 
these agreements open the opportunity for a 
new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tionship, characterized by negotiated settle- 
ment of differences, rather than by the hos- 
tility and confrontation of decades past. 

These accords offer tangible evidence that 



July 3, 1972 



mankind need not live forever in the dark 
shadow of nuclear war. They provide re- 
newed hope that men and nations working 
together can succeed in building a lasting 
peace. 

Because these agreements effectively serve 
one of this Nation's most cherished purposes 
— a more secure and peaceful world in which 
America's security is fully protected — I 
strongly recommend that the Senate sup- 
port them, and that its deliberations be con- 
ducted without delay. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, June 13, 1972. 



LETTER TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE 

White House press release dated June 13 

The White House, 
Washington, June 13, 1972. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: I transmit herewith 
copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the In- 
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with 
respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offen- 
sive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 
1972. Copies of these agreements are also 
being forwarded to the President of the 
Senate. I am asking the Senate's advice and 
consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an 
expression of support from both Houses of 
the Congress for the Interim Agreement on 
Strategic Offensive Arms. 

These agreements, the product of a major 
effort of this administration, are a significant 
step into a new era of mutually agreed re- 
straint and arms limitation between the two 
principal nuclear powers. 

The provisions of the agreements are ex- 
plained in detail in the Report of the Secre- 
tary of State, which I attach. Their main 
effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the 
deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems 
to two designated areas, and at a low level. 
The Interim Agreement limits the overall 
level of strategic offensive missile forces. 
Together the two agreements provide for a 
more stable strategic balance in the next sev- 



President Nixon Asks Prompt Approval 
of Agreements Limiting Nuclear Arms 

Following is a statement by President Nixon 
which was filmed for television and radio 
broadcast on June 13. 

white House press release dated June 13 

I am sending to the Congress today the 
nuclear arms limitation agreements that I 
negotiated with the Soviet leaders in Moscow. 

I am convinced that these agreements are 
in the security interest of the United States. 
They will enable the United States to maintain 
defenses second to none, defenses that will 
protect the interests of the United States at 
home and abroad. 

I believe that prompt approval by the Sen- 
ate of the treaty limiting defensive weapons 
and prompt approval by the Congress of the 
agreement limiting certain classes of offensive 
weapons will contribute to the goal that I 
know all Americans share — a goal of ending 
the arms race and building a more peaceful 
world. 



eral years than would be possible if strategic 
arms competition continued unchecked. This 
benefits not only the United States and the 
Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world. 

The agreements are an important first 
step in checking the arms race, but only a 
first step; they do not close off all avenues 
of strategic competition. Just as the main- 
tenance of a strong strategic posture was an 
essential element in the success of these nego- 
tiations, it is now equally essential that we 
carry forward a sound strategic moderniza- 
tion program to maintain our security and to 
ensure that more permanent and comprehen- 
sive arms limitation agreements can be 
reached. 

The defense capabilities of the United 
States are second to none in the world today. 
I am determined that they shall remain so. 
The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim 
Agreement will permit the United States to 
take the steps we deem necessary to maintain 
a strategic posture which protects our vital 
interests and guarantees our continued se- 
curity. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Besides enhancing our national security, 
these agreements open the opportunity for a 
new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tionship, characterized by negotiated settle- 
ment of differences, rather than by the hos- 
tility and confrontation of decades past. 

These accords offer tangible evidence that 
mankind need not live forever in the dark 
shadow of nuclear war. They provide re- 
newed hope that men and nations working 
together can succeed in building a lasting 
peace. 

Because these agreements effectively serve 
one of this Nation's most cherished purposes 
— a more secure and peaceful world in which 
America's security is fully protected — I 
strongly recommend that the House of Rep- 
resentatives support The Interim Agreement 
on Strategic Offensive Arms, and that its 
deliberations be conducted without delay. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon. 

Honorable Carl B. Albert 

Speaker of the House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 



REPORT OF SECRETARY ROGERS 

Department of State, 
Washington, June 10, 1972. 

The President, 
The White House. 

The President: I have the honor to submit to 
you the Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 
(ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between 
the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with 
respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated 
Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM 
Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice 
and consent to ratification. 

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is 
an agreement limited in scope and time. It is de- 
signed to limit the aggregate number of intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and sub- 
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, 
and the number of modern ballistic missile subma- 
rines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering 
more complete limitations of strategic offensive 



arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to 
you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which 
is an integral part of the Agreement), with the 
recommendation that they be transmitted to both 
Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolu- 
tion. 

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter 
into force only upon the exchange of written notices 
of acceptance by both countries and only when and 
if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signa- 
tories understand that, pending ratification and ac- 
ceptance, neither will take any action that would be 
prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agree- 
ment and Protocol, in the absence of notification by 
either signatory of its intention not to proceed with 
ratification or acceptance. 



ABM Treaty 

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 
26, 1972, provides that: 

— A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for 
such deployment, are prohibited; 

— An ABM deployment for defense of an individ- 
ual region is prohibited, except as specifically per- 
mitted; 

— Permitted ABM deployments will be limited 
to two widely separated deployment areas in each 
country — one for defense of the national capital, 
and the other for the defense of ICBMs; 

— For these purposes no more than 100 ABM 
launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor 
missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each 
150-kilometer radius ABM deployment area, for a 
total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200 
deployed ABM launchers for each Party; 

— ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars 
to support the ABM defense of the national capital 
may be deployed only in a specified number of small 
radar complexes within the ABM deployment area; 
radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited 
to a specified number within the ABM deployment 
area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint. 

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic 
provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corol- 
lary provisions were also agreed: 

— Development, testing and deployment of ABM 
systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air- 
based, space-based or mobile land-based are pro- 
hibited; 

— Deployment of ABM systems involving new 
types of basic components to perform the current 
functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is 
prohibited; 

— The conversion or testing of other systems, such 
as air defense systems, or components thereof to 
perform an ABM role is prohibited. 



July 3, 1972 



The Treaty also contains certain general provi- 
sions relating to the verification and implementa- 
tion of the Treaty and to further negotiations: 

— Each side will use national technical means for 
verification and the Parties agree not to interfere 
with such means and not to take deliberate conceal- 
ment measures; 

— A Standing Consultative Commission will be 
established to facilitate implementation of the 
Treaty and consider questions arising thereunder; 

— The Parties will continue active negotiations 
for limitations on strategic offensive arms. 

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and six- 
teen Articles. As indicated in Article 1(1), it pro- 
vides for limitations on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
systems as well as certain related measures. In the 
course of the negotiations, agreement was reached 
on a number of interpretive matters related to the 
Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations 
and certain noteworthy unilateral statements. 

Preamble 

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set 
forth common premises and objectives of the United 
States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for 
entering into this Treaty. 

The first preambular paragraph states the basic 
premise that nuclear war would have devastating 
consequences for all mankind. 

The second and third preambular paragraphs indi- 
cate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the ac- 
companying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on 
anti-ballistic missile systems will be an important 
factor in curbing competition in the strategic offen- 
sive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak 
of nuclear war, and will, together with certain agreed 
measures on the limitation of strategic offensive 
arms, create a favorable climate for future negotia- 
tions on limiting strategic arms. 

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indi- 
cate the relationship of this Treaty to the under- 
taking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Pro- 
liferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nu- 
clear disarmament", and express the intention of the 
Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament 
at the earliest possible date. 

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad inter- 
national consensus that effective measures to limit 
strategic arms will assist in relaxing international 
tensions and strengthening trust between nations. 
As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear 
powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty 
and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic 
steps toward these broader political goals. 



A. Limitations on ABM Systems 

(1) Deployment 

Article 1(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM sys- 
tems which would provide defense covering sub- 
stantially the whole of the territory of a Party. 
ABM defenses of individual regions are also pro- 
hibited except as specifically set forth in Article III. 
As more fully explained below, that Article limits 
not only the number, size and location of the per- 
mitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but 
also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launch- 
ers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places 
restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect 
of precluding thick regional ABM defenses. 

Article 1(2) also includes an undertaking not to 
provide a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense. 
This would, for example, prohibit the construction 
and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capa- 
ble radars deployed for other purposes, that could 
provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Ar- 
ticles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints 
that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does 
not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence 
or other non-ABM systems per se. However, it does 
prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems 
or their components to perform an ABM role; more- 
over, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any 
phased-array radars over a certain size except as 
otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for 
the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or 
for use as national technical means of verification. 
This would prevent the possible use of such radars 
as a base for a nationwide ABM defense. 

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements 
in flight trajectory". It indicates that such systems 
currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM 
launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor mis- 
siles are interceptor missiles constructed and de- 
ployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested 
in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers con- 
structed and deployed for launching ABM inter- 
ceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an in- 
terceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM 
mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.) 
ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for 
an ABM role (including target tracking or missile 
control, but not early warning), or of a type here- 
after tested in an ABM mode. 

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear 
that the ABM system components listed in the first 
paragraph of the Article include not only those 
which are operational, but also those under construc- 
tion, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, re- 
pair or conversion, or mothballed. 

Article III prohibits the deployment of any ABM 



Department of State Bulletin 



systems or their components except as provided 
therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy 
only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, 
ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited de- 
ployment of such systems described in the next two 
paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one 
deployment area centered on the nation's capital 
and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b) 
within one other deployment area having the same 
radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The cen- 
ters of the two deployment areas will be separated 
by no less than 1,300 kilometers. 

In each of these deployment areas a Party may 
deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no 
more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch 
sites. These totals would include any deployments 
within such areas for training purposes and, as 
indicated in Article 11(2), would not be confined to 
those in operational status. In view of Article V(l), 
discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM com- 
ponents may be deployed. 

The restrictions on ABM radars cover radars of 
both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern 
type which scans by electronic means, a capability 
especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical- 
scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are 
as follows: 

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment 
area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative 
or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed, 
but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party 
may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM 
radar complexes, the permitted area of each com- 
plex being circular and having a diameter of no 
more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars 
may not be located outside such complexes, regard- 
less of when they become operational. Mechanical- 
scan ABM radars that become operational after May 
26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties un- 
derstand that in addition to the ABM radars which 
may be deployed in accordance with this provision, 
the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational 
on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for 
defense of its national capital may be retained. 

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment 
area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location 
of radars is not circumscribed, but qualitative and 
quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may 
have: 

— 2 large phased-array ABM radars comparable in 
potential to corresponding ABM radars operational 
or under construction on the date of signature of the 
Treaty in such a deployment area; and 

— no more than 18 ABM radars each having a 
potential less than that of the smaller of the 2 large 
phased-array ABM radars referred to above. 

The only two large phased-array ABM radars opera- 



tional or under construction in such a deployment 
area on the date of signature were the Perimeter 
Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar 
(MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air 
Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand 
that the potential — the product of mean emitted 
power in watts and antenna area in square meters — 
of the smaller of these two radars (the MSR) is con- 
sidered for purposes of the Treaty to be three mil- 
lion. 

The impact of Article III on ABM systems cur- 
rently deployed or under construction would be as 
follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system 
deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being 
deployed by the United States in the vicinity of 
Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it 
would preclude the completion or retention of the 
ABM complex on which construction had been started 
in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in 
Montana. (The signatories understand that, pend- 
ing ratification and acceptance of the agreements, 
neither will take any action that would be prohibited 
thereby in the absence of notification by either sig- 
natory of its intention not to proceed with ratifica- 
tion or approval.) 

The United States has not started construction at 
a deployment area centered on its national capital, 
and the Soviet Union has not started construction at 
a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launch- 
ers. 

(2) Development, Testing, and Other LAmitations 

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article 
III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM com- 
ponents used for development or testing, and located 
within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It 
is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the 
area within which ABM components are located for 
test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of 
types used for range safety or instrumentation pur- 
poses may be located outside of ABM test ranges. 
Article IV further provides that each Party may 
have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at 
test ranges. The current United States test ranges 
for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New 
Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The cur- 
rent Soviet test range for ABM systems is located 
near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM compon- 
ents are not to be deployed at any other test ranges 
without prior agreement between the Parties. 

Article V limits development and testing, as well 
as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and 
components. Paragraph V(l) limits such activities 
to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by 
prohibiting the development, testing or deployment 
of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, 
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is 
understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM sys- 



Joly 3, 1972 



tems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars 
which are not permanent fixed types. 

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, test- 
ing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching 
more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time 
from each launcher; modification of deployed launch- 
ers to provide them with such a capability; and the 
development, testing or deployment of automatic or 
semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid 
reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that 
this Article includes an obligation not to develop, 
test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more 
than one independently guided warhead. 

(3) Future ABM Systems 

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is 
that which would be created if an ABM system were 
developed in the future which did not consist of in- 
terceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty 
would not permit the deployment of such a system 
or of components thereof capable of substituting for 
ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars: 
Article 11(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its 
function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic 
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory", 
noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM 
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM 
radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the 
deployment of ABM systems or their components 
except as specified therein, and it permits deploy- 
ment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launch- 
ers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM 
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM 
radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM 
system, provided that such devices were not 
capable of substituting for one or more of these 
components. Finally, in the course of the negotia- 
tions, the Parties specified that "In order to insure 
fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM sys- 
tems and their components except as provided in 
Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in 
the event ABM systems based on other physical 
principles and including components capable of 
substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM 
launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, 
specific limitations on such systems and their com- 
ponents would be subject to discussion in accord- 
ance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance 
with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained 
below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a 
Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV 
deals with amendments to the Treaty.) 

(4) Modernization and Replacement 

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions 
of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of 
ABM systems or their components may be carried 
out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM 



systems or components is constrained by the various 
limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See para- 
graph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and 
Article VI.) 

(5) Destruction and Dismantling 

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their 
components in excess of the numbers or outside the 
areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM sys- 
tems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall 
be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures 
within the shortest possible agreed period of time. 
Since no more than one ABM system deployment 
area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted 
by Article III, this Article will apply, when the 
Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components 
previously under construction in the vicinity of 
Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. 

B. Other Related Measures 

(1) Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Compo- 
nents 

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the 
effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM sys- 
tems and their components provided by the Treaty. 
To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article 

(a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other 
than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and 
ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballis- 
tic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; 

(b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers 
and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy 
in the future radars for early warning of strategic 
ballistic missile attack except at locations along the 
periphery of its national territory and oriented out- 
ward. 

The first of these undertakings would, for exam- 
ple, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles 
(SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic 
ballistic missiles. 

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor 
missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode 
subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty 
would prohibit testirvg of non-ABM components for 
ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of 
ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM 
components for non-ABM purposes. 

With respect to the third of the undertakings in 
Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while 
not intended to prohibit the further deployment of 
radars for early warning of strategic ballistic mis- 
sile attack, requires their location along the periph- 
ery of each Party's national territory and oriented 
outward in order to minimize the possibility that 
they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of 
points in the interior. 

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the 



Department of State Bulletin 



future deployment in third countries of radars for 
early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. 
Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would 
not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on 
radars for national means of verification. 

In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars 
with more than a certain potential, though deployed 
for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air 
traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for 
ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased- 
array radars having a potential exceeding three mil- 
lion watt-square meters, except as provided in Ar- 
ticles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the 
purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use 
as national technical means of verification. Deploy- 
ment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the 
United States would not be affected. 

(2) International Transfers 

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability 
and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party under- 
takes not to transfer to other States, and not to 
deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems 
or their components limited by the Treaty. The 
Parties understand that the first undertaking in- 
cludes an obligation not to provide to other states 
technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked 
out for the construction of ABM systems and their 
components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the 
United States Delegation made clear that the pro- 
visions of this Article do not set a precedent for 
whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty 
on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the 
question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a 
far more complex issue, which may require a differ- 
ent solution. 

(3) Conflicting Obligations 

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties 
not to assume any international obligations which 
would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in 
this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obliga- 
tion of the United States under any international 
agreement. 

C. Verification and Consultation 
(1) Verification 

Article XII relates to verification of compliance 
with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accom- 
plished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 
states that each Party will use national technical 
means of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognized principles of 
international law for purposes of providing assur- 
ance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It 
does not require changes from current operating 
practices and procedures with respect to systems 



which will be used as national technical means of 
verification. 

The second paragraph of this Article provides 
that each Party agrees not to interfere with the 
national technical means of verification of the other 
which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 
of the Article. This provision would, for example, 
prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used 
for verification of the Treaty. 

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use 
deliberate concealment measures which impede veri- 
fication by national technical means. This para- 
graph expressly permits continuation of current con- 
struction, assembly, conversion and overhaul prac- 
tices. 

(2) Standing Consultative Commission 

Article XIII provides that the Parties shall estab- 
lish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission 
(hereafter referred to as the Commission) to pro- 
mote the objectives and to facilitate the implemen- 
tation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further 
agreed to use the Commission to promote the ob- 
jectives and implementation of the Interim Agree- 
ment. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) 
The Commission will provide a consulting frame- 
work within which the Parties may consider various 
matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim 
Agreement. The Parties may also consider these 
matters in other channels. 

A principal function of the Commission will be to 
consider questions of compliance with the obliga- 
tions assumed under this Treaty and the Interim 
Agreement and also related situations Which may be 
considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily 
provide through the Commission information it con- 
siders necessary to assure confidence in compliance. 
Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance 
based on information gathered by national tech- 
nical means of verification and the other Party could 
provide information to clarify the matter. 

Attention was called above to the provisions in 
Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with 
national technical means of verification operating in 
accordance with its provisions. The Commission is 
charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to 
consider any questions of interference with such 
means. The Commission may also consider questions 
of concealment impeding verification by national 
means. The Commission may consider changes in 
the general strategic situation which have a bearing 
on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is 
the Commission's authority to consider proposals to 
further increase the viability of the Treaty — such 
as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has 
entered into force — and to consider proposals for 
amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the 
Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Ar- 



July 3, 1972 



tides XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also 
consider other appropriate measures, not specifically 
enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limit- 
ing strategic arms. Finally, through the Commis- 
sion the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates 
for the implementation of Article VIII concerning 
destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM 
components. (For corresponding responsibility of the 
Commission under the Interim Agreement, see sec- 
tion C of the discussion thereof.) 

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for 
the establishment of regulations for the Commis- 
sion governing procedures, composition and other 
relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out 
early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any 
consultation desired by either side under these Ar- 
ticles can be carried out by the Delegations during 
such negotiations or, when they are not in session, 
through other diplomatic channels. 

The Commission is intended as a means to facili- 
tate the implementation of the agreements and 
would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of 
other diplomatic channels. 

D. Duration, Withdrawal and 
Further Negotiations 

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of 
unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause 
of the type that has become standard in post-war 
arms control treaties. This clause provides that each 
Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall 
have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it 
decides that extraordinary events related to the sub- 
ject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its su- 
preme interests. Notice of such decision is to be 
given to the other Party six months prior to with- 
drawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to 
include a statement of the extraordinary events in- 
volved. 

In this connection, the United States has stressed 
the unique relationship between limitations on 
offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interre- 
lationship lends extraordinary importance to the un- 
dertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotia- 
tions for limitations on strategic offensive arms." 

The special importance we attach to this relation- 
ship was reflected in the following formal statement 
relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head 
of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972: 

The US Delegation has stressed the impor- 
tance the US Government attaches to achieving 
agreement on more complete limitations on stra- 
tegic offensive arms, following agreement on an 
ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on 
certain measures with respect to the limitation 
of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation 
believes that an objective of the follow-on nego- 



tiations should be to constrain and reduce on a 
long-term basis threats to the survivability of 
our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The 
USSR Delegation has also indicated that the 
objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled 
without the achievement of an agreement pro- 
viding for more complete limitations on strate- 
gic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that 
the initial agreements would be steps toward the 
achievement of more complete limitations on 
strategic arms. If an agreement providing for 
more complete strategic offensive arms limita- 
tions were not achieved within five years, US 
supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should 
that occur, it would constitute a basis for with- 
drawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not 
wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we 
believe that the USSR does. It is because we 
wish to prevent such a situation that we empha- 
size the importance the US Government attaches 
to achievement of more complete limitations on 
strategic offensive arms. The US Executive will 
inform the Congress, in connection with Con- 
gressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and 
the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the 
US position. 

E. Other Provisions 

Article XIV deals with amendments and review. 
Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose 
amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments 
shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments 
of ratification. The second paragraph of Article 
XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by 
the Parties at five year intervals. Paragrraph 2 
does not preclude agreement on proposed amend- 
ments of the Treaty during the first five years, or 
between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects 
recognition of the possibility of changes in the 
strategic relationship and the development of new 
strategic systems. These questions are also within 
the purview of the Standing Consultative Commis- 
sion. 

Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty 
contain standard provisions on entry into force, 
registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, 
and equal authenticity of the English and Russian 
lang^uage texts. 



Interim Agreement and Protocol 

The Interim Agreement between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics on Certain Measures with respect to the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim 
Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral 
thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim 
Agreement consists of a preamble and eight opera- 



Department of State Bulletin 



tive articles. In the course of the negotiations, 
agrreement was reached on a number of interpretive 
matters related to the Interim Agreement. En- 
closure 3 contains agreed interpretations and cer- 
tain noteworthy unilateral statements. 

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five 
years on strategic offensive missile launcher deploy- 
ments pending negotiation of more complete limi- 
tations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects 
of the Interim Agreement will be that: 

— the aggregate number of fixed, land-based 
ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers will be limited; 

— starting construction of additional fixed, land- 
based ICBM launchers is prohibited; 

— the number of launchers for modem heavy 
ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to 
that number currently operational and under con- 
struction; 

— ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM 
launchers and modem ballistic missile submarines 
operational on each side; and 

— up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of addi- 
tional SLBM launchers above a specified number for 
each Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM 
launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on 
older ballistic missile submarines. 

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the 
Agreement the Parties express the conviction that 
the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will 
contribute to the creation of more favorable condi- 
tions for active negotiation on limiting strategic 
arms and will improve international relations. In 
the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the 
relationship between strategic offensive and defen- 
sive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their 
obligations under Article VI of the Non-Prolifera- 
tion Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations. 

A. ICBM Launchers 

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits 
starting construction of additional fixed land-based 
ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I pre- 
scribes July 1, 1972 as the freeze date, the United 
States and the Soviet Union understand that, pend- 
ing ratification and acceptance of the agreements, 
neither will take any action that will be prohibited 
thereby, in the absence of notification by either 
signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratifi- 
cation or approval. 

This construction freeze covers all fixed land- 
based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but 
does not include test and training ICBM launchers 
or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and 
training launchers are, however, subject to other 
constraints. The United States has made clear to 
the Soviets that we would consider the deployment 
of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during 
the period of the Interim Agreement to be incon- 



sistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The 
Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes 
any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable 
of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between 
the northeastern border of the continental United 
States and the northwestern border of the conti- 
nental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional or- 
bital bombardment systems are considered to be 
ICBM launchers. 

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 
operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none 
under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union 
had a total of land-based ICBM launchers opera- 
tional and under active construction estimated to be 
about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and train- 
ing purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the 
freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction 
of ICBM launchers under active construction on May 
26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in 
effect, neither Party may start new construction 
(nor resume previously suspended construction) of 
fixed ICBM launchers except test and training 
launchers. 

B. Heavy ICBM Launchers 

Article II provides that the Parties shall not con- 
vert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, 
ICBMs into land-based launchers for modem heavy 
ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9. All currently op- 
erational ICBMs other than the SS-9 are either 
"light" (the United States Minuteman and the 
Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or "older" ICBM launch- 
ers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United 
States Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8). 

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of 
a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13 
ICBM into a launcher for an SS-9 or any new 
modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit 
the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or 
Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. 
The Parties agree that in the process of moderniza- 
tion and replacement the dimensions of land-based 
ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly in- 
creased, and that this means that any increase will 
not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present 
dimensions. The United States has also made clear 
that it would consider any ICBM having a volume 
significantly greater than that of the largest light 
ICBM now operational on either side (which is the 
Soviet SS-11) to be a heavy ICBM. 

C. SLBM Launchers and Modern Ballistic 
Missile Submarines 

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modem 
ballistic missile submarines to the numbers opera- 
tional and under construction on May 26, 1972. 

In addition. Article III and the Protocol permit 
launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM 
launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the 



July 3, 1972 



Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear- 
powered submarines for the United States, subject 
to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launch- 
ers may become operational only as replacements 
for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types 
first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on 
older nuclear-powered submarines or for modem 
SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second, 
such substitution may not result in: 

— the Soviet Union having operational more than 
62 modem ballistic missile submarines or more than 
950 SLBM launchers, including all SLBM launchers 
on nuclear-powered submarines and all modem 
SLBM launchers on any type of submarine; 

— the United States having operational more than 
44 modem ballistic missile submarines or more 
than 710 SLBM launchers. 

Constmction of replacement SLBM launchers up 
to the limits under the Protocol would require the 
dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures, 
of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older 
types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered 
submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers de- 
ployed on any type of submarine would count 
against the total ceiling on SLBM launchers. Dis- 
mantling or destruction would be required to com- 
mence no later than the date on which sea trials 
of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin 
and to be completed in the shortest possible agreed 
period of time. Thus the Soviets will have to be- 
gin dismantling older ICBM or SLBM launchers no 
later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a 
nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dis- 
mantling or destruction, as well as timely notifica- 
tion thereof, are to be carried out in accordance 
with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing 
Consultative Commission. 

D. Test and Training Launchers 

The Parties agree that the number of test and 
training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, includ- 
ing "modem heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased 
significantly above the current number of test and 
training launchers for such missiles. It is under- 
stood that construction or conversion of ICBM 
launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only 
for the purposes of testing and training. It is also 
understood that ICBM launchers for test and train- 
ing purposes may be constructed at operational sites. 

E. Modernization and Replacement 

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions 
of the Interim Agreement, modernization and re- 
placement of strategic ballistic missiles and launch- 
ers covered by the Interim Agreement may be 
undertaken. The conversion of current United 
States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III 
missiles, the conversion of current submarine 



launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the 
construction of new submarines as replacements 
for older submarines, are not prohibited by the 
Agreement. 

F. Other Provisions 

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the 
same provisions on verification as appear in Article 
XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried 
out by national technical means operating in ac- 
cordance with generally recognized principles of in- 
ternational law. Interference with, or deliberate con- 
cealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither 
Party is required to change its current practices of 
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul. 

Article VI provides that in order to promote the 
objectives and implementation of the Interim Agree- 
ment, the Parties shall use the Standing Consulta- 
tive Commission to be established pursuant to Arti- 
cle XIII of the ABM Treaty. 

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue ac- 
tive negotiation for limitations on strategic offen- 
sive arms. This Article also provides that the 
terms of this Interim Agreement will not preju- 
dice the scope and terms of the limitations on stra- 
tegic offensive arms which may be worked out in 
the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that 
these subsequent negotiations will start in the near 
future. 

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the In- 
terim Agreement provides that it shall enter into 
force upon the exchange of written notices of ac- 
ceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of in- 
struments of ratification of the ABM Treaty. 

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the In- 
terim Agreement shall remain in effect for five 
years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more 
complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. 

The third paragraph of this Article provides each 
Party with a right, parallel to that contained in 
paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to 
withdraw upon six months' notice if such Party 
decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized 
by extraordinary events related to the subject mat- 
ter of the Interim Agreement. 



Conclusion 

I believe the Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile 
systems, together with the accompanying Interim 
Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic 
offensive arms, constitute the most important step 
in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In 
these agreements, the two most powerful nations 
on earth are adopting measures designed to curb 
the deployment of strategic arms. 

The Parties have protected their vital interests 
during the careful negotiation and elaboration of 
these agreements. We did not agree to anything 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



adversely affecting the national interests of our Al- 
lies, who were regularly consulted during the ne- 
gotiations. The Congress has been kept closely in- 
formed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador 
Smith and other Delegation members conducted a 
total of thirty executive session briefings for Con- 
gressional Committees. 

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet- 
American relations and preserve and strengthen 
international security and world order. The entry 
into force of these measures should significantly ad- 
vance the cause of peace in the world, and I hope 
that they can be brought into force as soon as prac- 
ticable. 

Respectfully submitted, 



William P. Rogers. 



Enclosures: 



1. The ABM Treaty. 

2. The Interim Agreement and associated Protocol. 

3. Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements. 



AGREED INTERPRETATIONS AND 
UNIUTERAL STATEMENTS 



1 . Agreed Interpretations. 

(a) Initialed Statements. 

The texts of the statements set out below were 
agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Dele- 
gations on May 26, 1972. 

ABM Treaty 

[A] 

The Parties understand that, in addition to the 
ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance 
with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, 
those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on 
the date of signature of the Treaty within the 
ABM system deployment area for defense of the 
national capital may be retained. 

[B] 

The Parties understand that the potential (the 
product of mean emitted power in watts and an- 
tenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the 
two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in 
subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is 
considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three 
million. 

[C] 

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM 
system deployment area centered on the national 
capital and the center of the ABM system deploy- 
ment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each 



Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen 
hundred kilometers. 

[D] 

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars 
having a potential (the product of mean emitted 
power in watts and antenna area in square .meters) 
exceeding three million, except as provided for in 
Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except 
for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space 
or for use as national technical means of verifica- 
tion. 

[E] 

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not 
to deploy ABM systems and their components ex- 
cept as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the 
Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based 
on other physical principles and including compo- 
nents capable of substituting for ABM interceptor 
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created 
in the future, specific limitations on such systems 
and their components would be subject to discus- 
sion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement 
in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. 

[F] 

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty 
includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy 
ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each 
ABM interceptor missile of more than one inde- 
pendently guided warhead. 

[G] 

The Parties understand that Article tX of the Treaty 
includes the obligation of the US and the USSR 
not to provide to other States technical descriptions 
or blueprints specially worked out for the construc- 
tion of ABM systems and their components limited 
by the Treaty. 

Interim Agreement 

[H] 

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM 
launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are 
understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic 
missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest 
distance between the northeastern border of the 
continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the 
continental USSR. 

[I] 

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM 
launchers under active construction as of the date 
of signature of the Interim Agreement may be 
completed. 

[J] 
The Parties understand that in the process of mod- 



July 3, 1972 



11 



ernization and replacement the dimensions of land- 
based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly 
increased. 

[K] 

The Parties understand that dismantling- or destruc- 
tion of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior 
to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older sub- 
marines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on 
modern submarines will be initiated at the time 
of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement sub- 
marine, and will be completed in the shortest pos- 
sible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or de- 
struction, and timely notification thereof, will be 
accomplished under procedures to be agreed in 
the Standing Consultative Commission. 

[L] 

The Parties understand that during the period of 
the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant 
increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and 
training launchers, or in the number of such launch- 
ers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties 
further understand that construction or conversion 
of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken 
only for purposes of testing and training. 

(b) Common Understandings. 

Common understanding of the Parties on the 
following matters was reached during the negotia- 
tions: 

A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions 

Ambassador Smith made the following statement 
on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term 
'significantly increased' means that an increase will 
not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present 
dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers." 

Minister Semenov replied that this statement cor- 
responded to the Soviet understanding. 

B. Location of ICBM Defenses 

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement 
on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty 
provides for each side one ABM system deployment 
area centered on its national capital and one ABM 
system deployment area containing ICBM silo 
launchers. The two sides have registered agree- 
ment on the following statement: 'The Parties under- 
stand that the center of the ABM system deployment 
area centered on the national capital and the center 
of the ABM system deployment area containing 
ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be sep- 
arated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.' 
In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM 
system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo 
launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will 



be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher 
deployment area." (See Initialed Statement [C].) 

C. ABM Test Ranges 

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement 
on April 26, 1972: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty 
provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article 
III shall not apply to ABM systems or their com- 
ponents used for development or testing, and lo- 
cated within current or additionally agreed test 
ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that 
there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test 
ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges 
encompass the area within which ABM components 
are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM 
test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and 
at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM 
test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We 
consider that non-phased array radars of types used 
for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be 
located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret 
the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed 
test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not 
be located at any other test ranges without prior 
agreement between our Governments that there will 
be such additional ABM test ranges." 

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that 
there was a common understanding on what ABM 
test ranges were, that the use of the types of non- 
ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was 
not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in 
Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges 
was sufficiently clear, and that national means per- 
mitted identifying current test ranges. 

D. Mobile ABM Systems 

On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made 
the following statement: "Article V(l) of the 
Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an 
undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile 
land-based ABM systems and their components. On 
May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its 
view, a prohibition -on deployment of mobile ABM 
systems and components would rule out the deploy- 
ment of ABM launchers and radars which were not 
permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for 
the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the 
Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation 
put forward on May 5, 1971 ?" 

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there 
is a general common understanding on this matter. 

E. Standing Consultative Commission 

Ambassador Smith made the following statement 
on May 24, 1972: "The United States proposes that 
the sides agree that, with regard to initial imple- 
mentation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the 
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement 
on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement ', 
agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out 
early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that 
is completed, the following arrangements will pre- 
vail: when SALT is in session, any consultation 
desired by either side under these Articles can be 
carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when 
SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any 
desired consultations under these Articles may be 
made through diplomatic channels." 

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referen- 
dum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement 
corresponded to the Soviet understanding. 

F. Standstill 

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the 
following statement: "In an effort to accommodate 
the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation 
is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides 
will in fact observe the obligations of both the 
Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning 
from the date of signature of these two documents." 

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following 
statement on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in 
principle with the Soviet statement made on May 
6 concerning observance of obligations beginning 
from date of signature but we would like to make 
clear our understanding that this means that, pend- 
ing ratification and acceptance, neither side would 
take any action prohibited by the agreements after 
they had entered into force. This understanding 
would continue to apply in the absence of notification 
by either signatory of its intention not to proceed 
with ratification or approval." 

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with 
the U.S. statement. 



2. Unilateral Statements. 

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements 
were made during the negotiations by the United 
States Delegation: — 

A. Withdraival from the ABM Treaty 

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the 
following statement: "The U.S. Delegation has 
stressed the importance the U.S. Government at- 
taches to achieving agreement on more complete 
limitations on strategic offensive arms, following 
agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim 
Agreement on certain measures with respect to the 
limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. 
Delegation believes that an objective of the follow- 
on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on 
a long-term basis threats to the survivability of 
our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The 



USSR Delegation has also indicated that the ob- 
jectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without 
the achievement of an agreement providing for 
more complete limitations on strategic offensive 
arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agree- 
ments would be steps toward the achievement of 
more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an 
agreement providing for more complete strategic 
offensive arms limitations were not achieved within 
five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopard- 
ized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis 
for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. 
does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we 
believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish 
to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the 
importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieve- 
ment of more complete limitations on strategic 
offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the 
Congress, in connection with Congressional con- 
sideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim 
Agreement of this statement of the U.S. position." 

B. La7id-Mobile ICBM Launchers 

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement 
on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important 
subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the in- 
terest of concluding the Interim Agreement the 
U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that 
Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit 
the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launch- 
ers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while 
agreeing to defer the question of limitation of op- 
erational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the sub- 
sequent negotiations on more complete limitations 
on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider 
the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM 
launchers during the period of the Interim Agree- 
ment as inconsistent with the objectives of that 
Agreement." 

C. Covered Facilities 

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement 
on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the impor- 
tance that the United States attaches to the pro- 
visions of Article V, including in particular their 
application to fitting out or berthing submarines." 

D. "Heavy" ICBMs 

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement 
on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that 



' See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of 
Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, signed September 30, 1971. [Footnote in 
original; for text of the agreement, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 18, 1971, p. 400.] 



July 3, 1972 



13 



the Soviet; Delegation has not been willing to agree 
on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under 
these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it 
necessary to state the following: The United States 
would consider any ICBM having a volume signifi- 
cantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM 
now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. 
The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet 
side will give due account to this consideration." 

E. Tested in ABM Mode 

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the 
following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft 
Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in de- 
fining ABM components, and Article VI includes cer- 
tain obligations concerning such testing. We believe 
that the sides should have a common understanding 
of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing 
provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply 
to testing which occurs after the date of signature of 
the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have 
occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the 
remarks we have made on this subject during the 
previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the ob- 
jectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, 
namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM com- 
ponents for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing 
of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of 
non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To 
clarify our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM 
mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, 
missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if, 
for example, any of the following events occur: 
(1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM inter- 
ceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight 
tested against a target vehicle which has a flight 
trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic 
missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in con- 
junction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile 
or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is 
flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with inter- 
ception of targets against which air defenses are de- 
ployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a 
cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in 
item (2) above during the reentry portion of its 
trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction 
with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an 
ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for 
purposes such as range safety or instrumentation 
would be exempt from application of these criteria." 

F. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty 

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the 
following statement: "In regard to this Article [IX], 
I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory state- 
ment to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear 
that the provisions of this Article do not set a 
precedent for whatever provision may be con- 



sidered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive 
Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive 
arms is a far more complex issue, which may re- 
quire a different solution." 

G. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars 

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the 
following statement: "Since Hen House radars 
[Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can 
detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great 
distances, they have a significant ABM potential. 
Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase 
in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air 
missiles as inconsistent with an agreement." 



(b) The following noteworthy unilateral state- 
ment was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and 
is shown here with the U.S. reply: — 

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the 
following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side:" 
"Taking into account that modern ballistic missile 
submarines are presently in the possession of not 
only the U.S., but also of its NATO allies, the 
Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effective- 
ness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S. 
and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines 
with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers 
thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 
ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the 
period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies 
in NATO should increase the number of their mod- 
ern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines 
they would have operational or under construction 
on the date of signature of the Agreement, the 
Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding 
increase in the number of its submarines. In the 
opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the 
question of modern ballistic missile submarines pro- 
vided for in the Interim Agreement only partially 
compensates for the strategic imbalance in the de- 
ployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines 
of the USSR and th? U.S. Therefore, the Soviet 
side believes that this whole question, and above all 
the question of liquidating the American missile sub- 
marine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately 
resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations." 

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following 
reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side 
has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' 
of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine 
basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third 
countries. The United States does not accept the 
validity of the considerations in that statement." 

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilat- 
eral statement made on May 17. Ambassador Smith 
also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



Signing of Final Protocol Brings 
Berlin Agreement Into Force 

On June 3 at Berlin, Secretary Rogers 
and the Foreign Ministers of France, the 
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom signed 
the final quadripartite protocol to the quadri- 
partite agreement on Berlin of September 3, 
1971.^ Following is a statement made by Sec- 
retary Rogers at the signing ceremony. 

Press release 132 dated June 5 

The signing of the final protocol to the 
Berlin agreement is an act with profound 
meaning for the people of Berlin and Ger- 
many. It is an act with equally profound 
meaning for the people of Europe and for 
the cause of peace in the world. For over 25 
years Berlin has been a major focus of ten- 
sions between East and West, tensions which 
at times threatened the stability of Europe 
and the world. The agreement we have just 
signed could corve to put those tensions to 
rest. 

For the people of Berlin the agreement of- 
fers an improvement in daily life. Once only 
the stark effects of division could be seen in 
Berlin. Now the start of a healing process is 
in sight. Once virtually no visits to East Ber- 
lin and the German Democratic Republic 
were feasible. Now over a million Berliners 
have made such visits in onVy a few weeks, 
many of them seeing relatives ana £viends 
from whom they have been separated ti« 
years. For those who live here, Berlin is no 
longer an isolated island. 

For the people of Europe, this agreement 
is a step in reducing barriers to contact — 
barriers which have too long divided this 
continent and this city. The success of these 
negotiations will spur further efforts on be- 
half of a Europe at peace and at one with it- 
self. Berlin, for a quarter of a century a sym- 
bol of Europe's division, could become a 
symbol of hooe for Europe's future. 

For all who value pcaoe, this agreement 



' For texts of the agreement and draft protocol, 
see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1971, p. 318. 



demonstrates that the most stubboi'n issues 
can yield to realistic and patient negotiation 
and that when the cause of peace is advanced 
there are no losers, only winners. 

The four governments who today signed 
this protocol can take satisfaction in the work 
they have done. The German authorities, in 
concluding their indispensable supplemen- 
tary agreements, have also contributed fun- 
damentally to the outcome. They now en- 
visage additional negotiations, negotiations 
which we earnestly hope will further improve 
the relationship between them and will fur- 
ther remove obstacles to freer movement of 
peoples. 

I cannot let this occasion pass without pay- 
ing tribute to the courageous people of Ber- 
lin. It is their spirit and their fortitude that 
have made it possible for us to be here today. 
This agreement is in a real sense their 
achievement. Those who sign it and those who 
are charged to carry it out undertake solemn 
responsibilities to Berliners. 

This protocol commits each government to 
inoui-e thut tJiR agrteement is faithfully car- 
ried out. That, of course, is the heart of the 
matter; for it is in the implementation of the 
words of the agreement that true progress 
will come. The United States will fulfill its 
responsibilities under the agreement. And we 
will maintain our commitment to assure the 
security and viability of Berlin. 

The people of America — who have a deep 
bond with the people of Berlin — share the 
hope that this day will be viewed in history 
as v,v,a -vvhich marked a better life for mil- 
lions 01 Berliners and Germans. We hope it 
will be loo^g(j upon as a day when decisive 
progress was ^^de in reconciliation among 
the peoples of all ^ Europe. We hope that to- 
day will be viewed as ^. ^ ^^^ ^^^^ .^^^^^_ 
tant days in the history of u , ,^g^ j^^j^ ^^ ^j^^ 
20th century. 

Whether June 3, 1972, will hold u. , ^j^^^ 
in history depends on the determined ei. ,^ 
of governments in both East and West. On 
behalf of President Nixon and the American 
people, I pledge the United States Govern- 
ment to that effort. 



July 3, 1972 



15 



The Future International Political and Economic Environment: 
Growing Interdependence and Complexity 

Address by Under Secretary John N. Irwin II ^ 



It is pleasing to see that so many of you 
have taken time from normal responsibilities 
to attend this conference. In my year and a 
half in the State Department, I have come 
to have the highest regard for the expert 
knowledge and judgment about foreign af- 
fairs which is available here. Your day listen- 
ing to Department experts as well as to emi- 
nent speakers from other agencies should 
be a most interesting one. 

Speaking selfishly, we in the Department 
also hopQ to benefit from your views and 
judgments and to learn about your concerns. 
How can the administration operate best to 
further U.S. interests — best to further the 
interests of U.S. business? In the decade 
ahead, all of us in the foreign affairs com- 
munity — very much including international 
business in that community — will find in- 
creasingly that we must work closely to- 
gether if we are to maintain the vital inter- 
ests of the United States overseas. 

Because later speakers will be coverin^'^'is 
current world scene rather thorough'-^' ^ "^" 
cided to speculate a little about tr'*'*^^ ^^ the 
evolution of the international c-^ation which 
our foreign policy must ^^^ ^" ^^^ coming 

One art of d^-^^^^V' I learned long ago, 
even befor'"^'"^"^ *^® Department of State, 
somet.'-^'^ consists of putting the best face 
^^ diflicult situation. I remember the story 



' Made before the national foreign policy con- 
ference for senior business executives at the De- 
partment of State on June 8. 



of the young man troubled about how to 
explain in later life that his father had been 
hung as a horse thief. At last he hit upon 
a "diplomatic" formulation. "My father," he 
learned to say, "died in a fall from a public 
conveyance while taking part in a civic cere- 
mony in which he was a central partici- 
pant." If my speculations seem too couched 
in such "diplomatic" formulations, I will 
count on your questions to get closer to the 
essential facts. 

The International Environment 

As we look at the future international en- 
vironment, one of the few things that can 
be said with any degree of certainty is that 
interaction between all nations and peoples 
will increase substantially and become much 
more complex- Interaction begets interde- 
pendence, not only between us and our allies 
iiut also, as the Moscow summit demon- 
strated, between the two major antagonists 
of the postwar world. Interdependence, and 
awareness of interdependence, have been 
growing. We see this interdependence most 
clearly when we worry about gaining access 
to or preserving the world's resources, pre- 
venting the pollution of the oceans and at- 
mosphere, or controlling the arms race. But 
interaction reaches many other fields. It is 
a rare business, institution, or government 
agency of any size which does "ot have some 
international activity' or connection. By 1980 
this activity' will be incomparably greater. 
More importantly, international inter- 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



action will become more complex. The i-ela- 
tively simple bipolar days of the cold war will 
have given way to a less predictable situation 
in which there will be different constituencies 
and groupings for different issues. To take 
hypothetical examples: While the United 
States and the Europeans have been united, 
and I hope will remain united, to oppose 
Soviet designs on Europe, it is not too diffi- 
cult to imagine a situation in which the 
Europeans and the Soviets might find a com- 
mon interest in opposing some U.S.-backed 
trade or investment policy or, conversely, 
in which the United States and Soviets might 
join in questioning trade policies of the Euro- 
pean Community (EC). Traditional align- 
ments, in other words, may become more 
flexible and subject to change on specific ad 
hoc issues. 

Further elements of this increasing com- 
plexity will be more issues on the inter- 
national agenda and more parties in interest 
for each issue. Issues now dealt with in a 
pu.^'ly domestic context will acquire an in- 
ternaCiunal character. Take tKo o%.-^,,ipip ^f 

narcotics: A problem which once seemed do- 
mestic has now been clearly recognized as 
a serious international one that cannot be 
attacked with hope of success solely within 
the United States. 

Along with the '^mergence of new issues 
will come new participants- .more coun- 
tries, more multilateral governm^rital and 
nongovernmental organizations, more inter- 
national corporations, and more private .^. 
tors. The major international actors of the 
present, politicians and diplomats, will be 
forced to accept the increasingly important 
role of such functional specialists as econo- 
mists and engineers, nutritionists and weath- 
ermen (of the scientific, rather than the 
revolutionary, variety). 

An awareness of the complexities of inter- 
dependence should have a moderating in- 
fluence on the international behavior of all 
countries. The participants should begin to 
realize that without a commitment to agreed 
procedures — i.e., to some underlying rules 
to govern this interaction — the mutually ben- 



eficial but highly complex new game we 
will all be trying to play will not be play- 
able. The players' interest in the long-term 
stability of these rules should become greater 
than their interest in winning on the sub- 
stance of any particular play. 

Some of the implications of increased in- 
terdependence for our security are fairly 
clear. The power and dominance of the two 
superpowers should decline in relative im- 
portance. Nuclear parity should tend to di- 
minish the political significance of our nu- 
clear weapons. Both powers will not only 
have to continue to get along with each other 
but also pay even more attention to getting 
along with the new emerging power centers 
in western Europe, Japan, and China. 



The Communist World 

The slower development of interdepend- 
ence on the part of the Communist countries 
will be one of the most difficult problems 
of the transition period ahead. The Soviet 

Union and China are the most autaichlually 

inclined countries ot any size in the world to- 
day. Soviet and Chinese autarchic proclivi- 
ties are in large part due to the requirement 
for tight control in their domestic systems, 
perhaps in some part to their historical mem- 
ories of negative experiences with the out- 
side world. 

I doubt that we will see more than a modest 
liberalization of the Chinese and Soviet 
domestic systems by 1980, but there may be 
■ substantial improvement in their view of 
the t-uernal threat. At the same time they 
s lou Q r^gi-ceive increasing advantages to 
cooperatiu jj^ such fields as science and 
technology, tx.,^^ ^^^ ^^,^^ ^^^^^^j ^^ 
as an indication g^^.^^ ^^^ ^^.^^^^ 

trade is growing fastei ,.,, -j. ,• . 

i.1 -^i^^u ri 'th capitalist coun- 

tries than with other Com.. . 

Both the Soviet Union and Chi.- } "®^" 
ably be increasingly concerned abo. ^ . 
left out of a developing international s\^^"? 
and may be willing to reach a significantly 
higher level of interaction mth the non-Com- 
munist world. 



July 3, 1972 



17 



By 1980 China and the Soviet Union are 
quite likely to consider one another, rather 
than the United States, their principal an- 
tagonist, if indeed they do not do so already. 
The issues between them — the border, dis- 
puted leadership of the world's "progressive 
forces," and the traditional state-to-state 
rivalry of neighboring powers — are likely to 
pei'sist. Relations are likely to continue to be 
competitive and tense with cooperation only 
in isolated fields. 

Both China and the Soviet Union seem to 
be basing their actions on pragmatic assess- 
ments of their national interests and capabil- 
ities. This should lead to gradual improve- 
ment in their relations with the United 
States. While ideology seems at times to be 
waning in both countries, it can be expected 
to wane slowly, so that by 1980 U.S.-Soviet 
and U.S.-Chinese relations will probably still 
retain a sharply competitive edge. 

The commitment of the two Communist 
powers to leftward movements in the world 
will remain an important factor in inter- 
national relations. They may, ho-wrcver. be 
less willing to take major risks solely on this 
account. China's capability for military ac- 
tions much beyond her immediate border 
will probably continue to be limited through 
the 1970's. Her worldwide political influence, 
however, seems likely to increase. By 1980 
the Soviets will probably have achieved a 
worldwide political and military presence 
and a substantially more flexible capability 
for military operations in distant areas. 
Even though our general bilateral relatio--" 
with the two Communist powers mi^' ™' 
prove, therefore, the number of.""^^^ ^^ 
which we will compete with botb -^'^i^ese and 
Soviet influence will have i -^"^^sed. 

Western Europe f- 

The Uni*^ 'States and the Soviet Union are 
likelv 'Continue to be the only countries 
^ . . worldwide strategic and conventional 
capabilities, but this fact should be of de- 
creased importance as local powers become 
more significant in particular regions. China 
and Japan will undoubtedly be increasingly 
important in East and Southeast Asia; India 



already seems able to play a decisive role in 
South Asia; and the enlarged European Com- 
munity will assume a larger role in all as- 
pects of European affairs. 

While the Soviets and the Chinese could 
find themselves fully extended abroad in a 
few years, the Japanese and Europeans have 
only begun to exercise their enormous po- 
tential influence. Thus, a primary interest of 
our foreign policy must continue to be the 
maintenance of close relations with these two 
emerging power centers. 

Paradoxically, as we move away from bi- 
polar confrontation with the Communists, 
there will be greater need for confidence 
and consultation among our allies. As the 
period when the United States was a domi- 
nant leader recedes into the past and part- 
nership among our allies becomes more 
completely equal, the route to decision by con- 
sensus may seem more tortuous and slow. 
Present allied relationships and institutions 
must either become more flexible to cope 
with these now complexities or thev- 'ill 
otiophy ana eventually die. We should ex- 
pect, and be prepared to accept, differences 
on specific issues among the allies in order to 
maintain our common commitment to larger 
principles of national and international be- 
havior. 

The Thirr' World 

m\e Third World of Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East, and Latin America could be a 
primary focus of conflict and possible con- 
frontation in the years ahead. A trend toward 
radical nationalist solutions may well con- 
tinue throughout the Third World. Looking 
into the future, we will have to weigh the 
somewhat decreased eagerness of the Soviets 
and Chinese to support irresponsible extrem- 
ist behavior against their increased capa- 
bility to do so and the ready supply of op- 
portunities an unstable Third World will 
provide. While working to reduce conflict in 
such situations between ourselves and the 
Communist powers, prudence dictates that 
we assume that there will be further con- 
frontations. 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



Increased economic nationalism, particu- 
larly in the form of opposition to foreign in- 
vestment, will probably continue to present 
the United States and our major allies with 
serious problems. Our need for the raw ma- 
terials and energy resources which these 
countries possess will increase substantially. 
The less developed countries have already 
united on oil, and it should not come as a 
surprise if they try to work together on other 
primary commodities. 

Era of Negotiations 

Some of the implications of this brief 
look into the future for our policy toward 
China and the Soviet Union are clear. Their 
increasingly pragmatic behavior and the con- 
tinuing fragmentation of the Communist 
world have offered us the opportunity to 
make them fuller participants in an inter- 
dependent world. The President's trips to 
Peking and Moscow were dramatic and sig- 
nificant achievements in this process. 

Both trips were painstakingly prepared 
over a long period with a view toward con- 
crete achievements. Both were designed with 
particular care to try to avoid exacerbating 
relations between the two Communist pow- 
ers. They aimed at developing good relations 
with both powers at the expense of neither. 

With China we have finally established a 
dialogue in which our differences are being 
dealt with in honesty and candor. Movement 
may be slow, but in the continuing consulta- 
tions between our two Ambassadors in Paris 
both of us are at last looking for and pursu- 
ing areas of common interest. We have 
agreed to initiate and facilitate exchanges 
in such fields as culture, science, technology, 
sports, and journalism. We are working to- 
gether to establish mutually beneficial trade. 

The balance of nuclear terror long ago 
forced a certain degree of interdependence 
upon the Soviet-American relationship. From 
his first days in office. President Nixon sys- 
tematically analyzed this relationship to de- 
termine areas in which cooperation seemed 
possible. In those areas where our views and 
interests seemed almost inevitably to con- 



flict, he searched for ways to defuse the ad- 
versary relationship, to move from an era of 
confrontation to an era of negotiation. 

The Moscow summit opened a new chapter 
in the complex history of U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tions. It may be seen by historians as the 
symbolic end to the cold war. It should re- 
sult in an intensification of mutually bene- 
ficial cooperation in such fields as medicine, 
space, the environment, and science and tech- 
nology. As you know, agreements in many of 
these fields were signed in Moscow. An 
agreement was signed between our armed 
services — the first since World War II — de- 
signed to reduce the dangers of incidents at 
sea. 

We have also been working for some time 
to expand trade between our two countries 
from its presently modest level. This effort 
continued at the summit. Among other things 
we are hopeful that the Soviets will agree 
to substantial grain purchases, but a num- 
ber of interrelated elements must be worked 
out first. The Soviets are seeking most 
favored-nation treatment, access to Exim- 
bank credits, and more liberal terms for their 
purchases than we are prepared to concede. 
We in turn are insisting on a satisfactory 
lend-lease settlement. Secretary [of Com- 
merce Peter G.] Peterson will be heading a 
team to Moscow in July to work further on 
these problems. 

The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree- 
ment on Offensive Nuclear Weapons are per- 
haps the most significant concrete results of 
the Moscow summit. They bring a new ele- 
ment of stability to the Soviet-American 
competition in strategic arms. The SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree- 
ments reached thus far are only a first step. 
Their importance as a precedent for coopera- 
tion, however, cannot be overemphasized. To 
be fully effective, SALT I must be followed 
by further discussions in SALT II, looking 
toward reductions of both offensive and de- 
fensive strategic arms below the limits set 
by the present agreements. 

There is an obvious danger in trying to go 
too far too fast in our relations with China 
and the Soviet Union. In the past, moments 



July 3, 1972 



19 



of optimism have been shattered by sub- 
sequent Communist intransigence. In the 
President's recent summit meetings, how- 
ever, an attempt has been made to involve 
the self-interest of each side in such a way 
as to establish a solid foundation for im- 
proved relations. 

U.S. Policy and Our Major Allies 

As my earlier speculations on the future 
implied, improved relations with the Soviet 
Union and China will not lessen in any way — 
at least over the next decade — the need to 
maintain our own and our allies' economic, 
political, and military strength and unity of 
purpose. 

Among the most immediate challenges to 
allied unity and strength are the tensions 
caused by economic issues. We have already 
reached a level of economic interdependence 
with Canada, Japan, and the countries of 
western Europe at which each country's 
monetai-y and trade policies can either se- 
riously disrupt or materially assist all of the 
others' economies. These allied countries are 
by far the best customers for our exports, 
they sell us most of our imports, and they are 
the host countries to two-thirds of our over- 
seas investments. We play an even more 
substantial role in their economies than they 
do in ours. 

As you know, 1971 found our trade and 
payments situation on the critical list. Major 
adjustments to the postwar international ec- 
onomic system were needed quickly. To that 
end. President Nixon announced his new eco- 
nomic policy on August 15. This was followed 
by the so-called Smithsonian agreement in 
December, establishing a new pattern of ex- 
change rates more favorable to the United 
States. 

The Smithsonian agreement, in the U.S. 
view, is only a first step toward a more flex- 
ible monetary system and a more open envi- 
ronment for trade. Last month, however, I 
was in Brussels for consultations with the 
Commission of the EC, and a week or so ago I 
was in Paris for the annual ministerial meet- 



ing of the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development]. In both 
places there was considerable uneasiness 
among our allies at where the United States 
is going. My colleagues and I tried to re- 
assure our allies that the United States will 
continue to follow an outward-looking eco- 
nomic policy. We also stressed how important 
it was that a uniting western Europe not 
turn inward on itself. The world cannot af- 
ford an attempt to break up into closed trad- 
ing systems even if this were possible. We 
argued in favor of approaching the problems 
between us — and none of us would deny that 
there are specific problems — from this per- 
spective. 

The Moscow summit has given new im- 
petus to the much-discussed Warsaw Pact 
proposal for a Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and to the allied pro- 
posal for mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions (MBFR). Wc believp that the Euro- 
pean Security Conference, now probably to 
be held in 1973, must have substantive mean- 
ing and not just add to a false sense of 
detente or serve the propaganda aims of the 
Soviet side. We are particularly interested in 
having the conference agree to concrete 
measures to facilitate the freer movement of 
people, ideas, and information between East 
and West. 

Toward MBFR we will follow a cau- 
tious, analytical approach, mindful that the 
presence of our troops has resulted in 25 
years of relative stability in central Europe. 
In an era of nuclear parity, moreover, strong 
conventional forces in Europe may become 
even more important. We do not expect dra- 
matic withdrawals in the near future. If 
agreement can be reached on certain safe- 
guards and principles, however, so that sta- 
bility can be maintained at lower levels of 
forces confronting each other on each side, 
limited reductions may be achieved. The 
President remains firmly committed to main- 
taining whatever level of troop strength in 
Europe is required to guarantee undimin- 
ished security. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



The future, like the past, will compel an 
active American involvement in the less de- 
veloped part of our shrinking globe. A policy 
of "benign neglect" is impossible — and not 
only for humanitarian reasons. In April I 
had the opportunity to lead the U.S. delega- 
tion to the opening of the third session of 
UNCTAD— the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development. The insistence on the part 
of the less developed countries that their con- 
cerns not be neglected by the developed world 
was clear, and their needs were persuasive. A 
policy that is not responsive to these needs 
would very soon endanger our substantial 
investments in the less developed world, 
hinder our access to increasingly vital energy 
and raw material resources, and create the 
conditions in which radical and irresponsible 
regimes would thrive. The policies which this 
administration is evolving — sometimes re- 
ferred to as the Nixon doctrine — provide for 
an active American role while avoiding our 
previous tendency to assume too much of the 
economic and security burden. Our emphasis 
upon self-help and an equitable sharing of 
responsibility has been welcomed by our 
friends and allies. Many small countries have 
become more self-reliant and have demon- 
strated that development is possible. 

At the same time there is little room for 
complacency. Many in this country are ques- 
tioning the need for the very economic and 
security assistance which make possible such 
self-reliance — and the complementary lessen- 
ing of the American burden. We cannot af- 
ford to weaken either our support of our 
industrialized allies in western Europe and 
Japan or our commitments in the Third 
World. Only by such commitments, clearly 
recognizing the growing interdependence of 
all nations, can we build what the Presi- 
dent has aptly described as "a structure of 
peace to which all nations contribute and in 
which all nations have a stake." ^ 



'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; "Part I: 1971— The 
Watershed Year — An Overview" begins on p. 314. 



North Atlantic Ministerial Council 
Meets at Bonn 

Secretary Rogers was head of the U.S. dele- 
gation to the regular ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council which was held at 
Bonn May 30-31. Following is the text of a 
final communique issued at the close of the 
meeting on May 31. 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
Session in Bonn on 30th and 31st May, 1972. 

2. Ministers reaffirmed that the purpose of the 
Alliance is to preserve the freedom and security of 
all its members. Defence and the relaxation of 
tension are inseparably linked. The solidarity of 
the Alliance is indispensable in this respect. Allied 
Governments seek an improvement in their rela- 
tions with the countries of Eastern Europe and aim 
at a just and durable peace which would overcome 
the division of Germany and foster security in 
Europe. 

3. Ministers noted progress in relations between 
Western and Eastern countries, increasing contacts 
between the leaders of these countries, and the con- 
clusion of important agreements and arrangements. 
They welcomed these developments flowing from 
major initiatives undertaken by their governments, 
which had full and timely consultations on these 
subjects. Such consultations will continue. 

4. Ministers welcomed the signing by the United 
States and the USSR of the Treaty on the Limita- 
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the in- 
terim agreement on Certain Measures with Respect 
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 
They believe these two agreements limiting the 
strategic arms of the United States and the USSR 
will contribute to strategic stability, significantly 
strengthen international confidence, and reduce the 
danger of nuclear war. Ministers also welcomed the 
commitment by the United States and the USSR 
actively to continue negotiations on limiting strate- 
gic arms. They expressed the hope that these two 
agreements will be the beginning of a new and 
promising era of negotiations in the arms control 
field. 

5. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the 
Treaty of 12th August, 1970, between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and the 
Treaty of 7th December, 1970, between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Re- 
public are to enter into force in the near future. 
They reaffirmed their opinion that these treaties 
are important, both as contributions towards the 
relaxation of tension in Europe and as elements of 
the modus vivendi which the Federal Republic of 
Germany wishes to establish with its Eastern neigh- 
bours. Ministers welcomed the Declaration of 17th 
May, 1972, in which the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many confirmed its policy to this end and reaffirmed 
its loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance as the basis of 
its security and freedom. They noted that it re- 



July 3, 1972 



21 



mains the policy of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many to work for circumstances of peace in Europe 
in which the German people, in free self-determina- 
tion, can recover their unity; and that the existing 
treaties and agreements to which the Federal Re- 
public of Germany is a party and the rights and 
responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to 
Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected. 

6. Ministers also welcomed the progress made 
since their last meeting in the talks between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. They 
regard the conclusion of the agreements and ar- 
rangements between the competent German Author- 
ities, which supplement the Quadripartite Agree- 
ment on Berlin of 3rd September, 1971, as well as 
the signature of a Treaty on Questions of Traffic 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
GDR, as important steps in the effort to improve 
the situation in Germany. They thus feel encour- 
aged in the hope that, in further negotiations 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
GDR, agreement might be reached on more com- 
prehensive arrangements which would take into 
account the special situation in Germany. 

7. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the Gov- 
ernments of France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the Soviet Union have arranged 
to sign the Final Protocol to the Quadripartite 
Agreement. The entry into force of the entire Berlin 
Agreement being thus assured, the Ministers hope 
that a new era can begin for Berlin, free of the 
tension that has marked its history for the past 
quarter century. 

8. In the light of these favourable developments. 
Ministers agreed to enter into multilateral conver- 
sations concerned with preparations for a Confer- 
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
[CSCE]. They accepted with gratitude the proposal 
of the Finnish Government to act as host for such 
talks in Helsinki at the level of Heads of Mission 
under the conditions set out in its aide-memoire of 
24th November, 1970. Accordingly, they decided to 
work out with other interested governments the 
necessary arrangements for beginning the multi- 
lateral preparatory talks. 

9. Ministers stated that the aim of Allied Gov- 
ernments at the multilateral preparatory talks 
would be to ensure that their proposals were fully 
considered at a Conference and to establish that 
enough common ground existed among the partici- 
pants to warrant reasonable expectations that a 
Conference would produce satisfactory results. 

10. Prepared in this way, a Conference on Secu- 
rity and Co-operation in Europe should constitute an 
important factor in the process of reducing tension. 
It should help to eliminate obstacles to closer rela- 
tions and co-operation among the participants while 
maintaining the security of all. Allied governments 
look forward to a serious examination of the real 
problems at issue and to a Conference which would 
yield practical results. 

11. Ministers considered that, in the interest of 
security, the examination at a CSCE of appropriate 
measures, including certain military measures, 
aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing 
stability would contribute to the process of reduc- 



ing the dangers of military confrontation. 

12. Ministers noted the Report of the Council in 
Permanent Session concerning a Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Report 
examined the issues which might be included on the 
Agenda of a Conference as set forth in paragraph 
13 of the Brussels Communique of 10th December, 
1971, as well as the procedural questions relating 
to the convening of a Conference.^ Ministers di- 
rected the Council in Permanent Session to develop 
further its substantive and procedural studies in 
preparation for a Conference. 

13. Ministers representing countries which par- 
ticipate in NATO's Integrated Defence Programme 
recalled the offers to discuss mutual and balanced 
force reductions which they had made at Reykjavik 
in 1968, at Rome in 1970, and subsequently 
reaffirmed." 

14. These Ministers continue to aim at negotia- 
tions on mutual and balanced force reductions and 
related measures. They believe that these negotia- 
tions should be conducted on a multilateral basis 
and be preceded by suitable explorations. They 
regretted that the Soviet Government has failed to 
respond to the Allied offer of October 1971, to enter 
into exploratory talks. They therefore now propose 
that multilateral explorations on mutual and 
balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as 
practicable, either before or in parallel with multi- 
lateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Se- 
curity and Co-operation in Europe. 

15. These Ministers noted the studies conducted 
since their last meeting on political, military and 
technical aspects of mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions. They instructed the Permanent Represent- 
atives to continue this work in preparation for 
eventual negotiations. 

16. These Ministers stated that the present mili- 
tary balance of forces in Europe does not allow a 
unilateral relaxation of the defence efforts of the 
Allies. Unilateral force reductions would detract 
from the Alliance's efforts to achieve greater sta- 
bility and detente and would jeopardise the pros- 
pects for mutual and balanced force reductions. 

17. Ministers took note of a Report by the Coun- 
cil in Permanent Session on the situation in the 
Mediterranean. They expressed their concern re- 
garding the factors of instability in the area which 
could endanger the security of the members of the 
Alliance. They instructed the Council in Permanent 
Session to follow closely the evolution of the situa- 
tion and to report to them at their next meeting. 

18. The next Ministerial Session of the North 
Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in Decem- 
ber 1972. 

19. Ministers requested the Foreign Minister of 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to transmit this 
Communique on their behalf through diplomatic 
channels to all other interested parties, including 
neutral and non-aligned governments. 



^ For text of the communique, see Bulletin of 
Jan. 3, 1972, p. 1. 

' For background, see Bulletin of July 15, 1968, 
p. 77, and June 22, 1970, p. 775. 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



CENTO Council of Ministers Meets 
at London 

The 19th meeting of the Council of Min- 
isters of the Central Treaty Organization was 
held at London June 1-2. Following is a state- 
ment made on June 1 by Joseph J. Sisco, As- 
sistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs, who was acting head of the 
U.S. observer delegation, together with the 
text of a communique issued at the close of 
the meeting. 

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO 

Secretary Rogers regrets that he is unable 
to be here today, but as you know, he is ac- 
companying President Nixon on the first 
visit an American President has ever made 
to Poland. The Secretary has asked me to 
speak on his behalf at this opening session. 
And he is looking forward to meeting with 
you at the Council's session tomorrow. 

I should like to express our welcome to 
Secretary General [Nassir] Assar. We were 
pleased to have seen him in Washington ear- 
lier this year and want to extend to him our 
best wishes for what I am confident will be 
a successful stewardship in his new position. 

Since the Council of Ministers last met a 
year ago, we have seen momentous events of 
interest and concern to all of us. It has been a 
year of profound change in world affairs — of 
change to which the United States, in the in- 
terests of peace, has sought to make its con- 
tribution. 

President Nixon's unprecedented visits to 
China and the Soviet Union have established 
the beginnings of a new dialogue with one 
and have set what we expect to be a more 
cooperative framework for our existing re- 
lationship with the other. 

We trust that our efforts with the two lead- 
ing Communist countries will be beneficial to 
the cause of peace and to all the world's peo- 
ples. And we are confident that the initial 
agreements to limit strategic arms, and the 
more comprehensive agreement on which the 



United States and the Soviet Union must now 
concentrate, will help to increase the stabil- 
ity of the global environment in which we 
all live. 

The past 12 months have also been a time 
of change in the area of most immediate con- 
cern to CENTO. Here constructive achieve- 
ment has been mixed with tragedy, the 
preservation of peace with the descent into 
war. 

From today's perspective, the year in 
South Asia was dominated by tragic events. 
Looking to the future, what is needed is a 
durable peace settlement, an era in which the 
energies and talents of the people of South 
Asia can be devoted in peace to constructive 
endeavors. 

As President Nixon said earlier this year: ^ 

The 700 million people of the subcontinent de- 
serve a better future than the tragedy of 1971 
seemed to portend. It is for them to fashion their 
own vision of such a future. The world has an in- 
terest in the regional peace and stability which are 
the preconditions for their achieving it. 

In keeping with the President's remarks 
on the need for a better future, we are 
pleased to note that the emissary-level talks 
between Pakistan and India have been suc- 
cessfully completed. We sincerely hope that 
the forthcoming summit meeting between the 
leaders of these two nations will be held in an 
atmosphere of mutual understanding and re- 
spect and will pave the way toward recon- 
ciliation and peaceful accommodation in the 
subcontinent. 

In the Middle East, the cease-fire along the 
Suez Canal now nears its second anniversary. 
None of us has had any illusions about the 
difficulties which would have to be resolved 
if the parties to the conflict were to move 
from cease-fire to a permanent peace settle- 
ment based on the U.N. Security Council 
resolution of 1967. Those difficulties are real 
and formidable. There have been too many 
lost opportunities in the tragic history of the 



' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled 
"South Asia" begins on p. 383. 



July 3, 1972 



23 



Middle East. However, to dwell on them 
would distract us from the search for oppor- 
tunities for peacemaking, which remains an 
overriding imperative. Diplomatic opportu- 
nities are available. Progress will depend on 
whether the countries of the Middle East 
exert the will, the vision, and the spirit of 
accommodation to grasp those opportunities. 
Others can help but cannot do this for them. 

So long as the cease-fire continues in the 
Middle East, as in South Asia, it preserves 
the opportunity for diplomacy to concen- 
trate on the search for peaceful reconcilia- 
tion. Surely, the time has come for genuine 
negotiations looking toward the peaceful 
resolution of the disputes in both areas. 

In our view, it is the antagonists in these 
disputes who must bear the primary respon- 
sibility for the construction of durable peace 
arrangements; for the solidity of arrange- 
ments to prevent future conflicts must de- 
pend in the final analysis on the will for peace 
among the parties to past conflicts. 

Let me expi-ess at this point, on behalf of 
my government, our profound shock at the 
senseless attack at Israel's international air- 
port Tuesday. All of us who have sought a 
peaceful settlement in the Middle East are 
aware that deep passions and hostilities are 
involved. But this is no justification for vio- 
lence. It is particularly outrageous, and par- 
ticularly tragic, when innocent people are 
indiscriminately made the victims. This trag- 
edy was brought home with special impact to 
Americans because so many of our own citi- 
zens were killed and wounded. The horror of 
the attack undei'scores the urgency of the 
need for greater effectiveness, by govern- 
ments and by the international community, 
in measures to deal with such threats to 
travelers, in the Middle East and elsewhere 
as well. 

In the Persian Gulf, a third area of direct 
concern to CENTO, the developments of the 
past year on the whole have been encourag- 
ing. 

At the end of 1971 the British Government 
terminated its special treaty arrangements 
in the gulf. First Bahrain, then Qatar, and 
later the United Arab Emirates emerged as 



independent states. The consolidation and 
strengthening of independence is one of their 
more important tasks. Progress is being 
made, and we welcome the continued inter- 
est of the British Government in assisting 
these small states. 

We believe that the security of these small 
states and other countries in the gulf area 
can best be maintained through regional co- 
operation. 

Yesterday in Tehran President Nixon and 
His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Iran 
agreed in their joint communique "that the 
security and stability of the Persian Gulf is 
of vital importance to the littoral states. 
Both were of the view that the littoral states 
bore the primary responsibility for the secu- 
rity of the Persian Gulf. His Imperial Maj- 
esty reaffirmed Iran's determination to bear 
its share of this i-esponsibility." ^ We welcome 
this determination. 

In this connection. President Nixon yes- 
terday confix-med that the United States 
would, as in the past, continue to cooperate 
with Iran in strengthening its defense. 

Similarly, as a result of recent meetings 
which President Nixon held with then-Prime 
Minister Erim, the friendship and coopera- 
tion between our two countries, and in par- 
ticular support for Turkey's security, have 
been strengthened. 

At the same time, the United States has 
entered direct diplomatic relations with new 
states of the gulf. Our policy is to assist them 
where possible in the development of their 
societies, their, economies, and their new po- 
litical institutions. 

At times of change in the world it is nat- 
ural that nations should examine carefully 
many of their existing obligations and inter- 
ests. My country, like many others, has been 
involved in such examinations. This is a good 
time, therefore, to state the United States 
position on CENTO, which we have sup- 
ported since its inception and with which we 
have cooperated for 14 years: 

—We believe that CENTO continues to 



" For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of 
June 26, 1972, p. 908. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



contribute measurably to stability and secu- 
rity in the area of its concern. 

— We believe that it is a useful forum for 
consultation on problems affecting that area 
and, indeed, on broader problems. 

— We believe that it contributes to respect, 
understanding, and cooperation among its 
members. 

— And we believe that, in its practical rec- 
ognition that security does not depend on 
military means alone, it plays a valuable role 
in promoting the economic and social well- 
being of the peoples in the area. 

For these reasons, the United States con- 
tinues to support CENTO and will continue 
to participate in its cooperative regional en- 
deavors. We are sympathetic with the desire 
of the CENTO regional countries for further 
regional development and are ready to give 
serious consideration to new initiatives in 
the economic field within CENTO which are 
truly regional in scope. 



TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE 

London, June 2, 1972— The Council of Ministers 
of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held 
their 19th Session at Lancaster House on June 1 
and 2, 1972. 

2. The leaders of the national delegations from 
the five CENTO countries were: 

1. H.E. Mr. Abbas Ali Khalat- 
bary, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs Iran 

2. H.E. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, 
Minister for Education, Cul- 
ture and Provincial Co-ordina- 
tion Pakistan 

3. H.E. Mr. Haluk Bayulken, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs Turkey 

4. The Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Doug- 
las-Home, KT, M.P., 
Secretary of State for Foreign 

and Commonwealth Affairs United Kingdom 

5. The Hon. William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State United States 

3. H.E. Mr. Nassir Assar, Secretary General of 
the Central Treaty Organization, opened the Ses- 
sion. 

4. Following an address by the Rt. Hon. Mr. Ed- 
ward Heath, Prime Minister of the United King- 
dom, in which he conveyed a message of welcome 



from Her Majesty the Queen, opening statements 
were made by the leaders of the delegations and 
the Secretary General of CENTO, in which they ex- 
pressed their appreciation of the Queen's gracious 
message and the warm hospitality of the host coun- 
try. 

5. As the leader of the delegation of the host 
country, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Sec- 
retary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Af- 
fairs of the United Kingdom, presided at the Ses- 
sion. 

6. In a wide-ranging exchange of views marked 
by traditional cordiality and understanding, the 
Council of Ministers reviewed the international de- 
velopments since they met a year ago, with special 
reference to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and the 
neighbouring areas. 

7. Regretting the recent clash of arms between 
Pakistan and India, the Ministers expressed the 
hope that the two countries would in the near fu- 
ture be able to arrive at an honourable and equita- 
ble settlement of their outstanding disputes, so 
essential for ensuring lasting peace in the sub-con- 
tinent. They reaffirmed their support for the Secu- 
rity Council Resolution No. 307 of 21 December, 
1971. The Ministers also wished success to the forth- 
coming meeting between the President of Pakistan 
and the Prime Minister of India. 

8. Expressing their concern at the continuing 
tense situation in the Middle East, the Ministers re- 
iterated their hopes for an early resolution of the 
Middle East dispute and for the continuation of ef- 
forts aimed at attaining a just and enduring peace 
in the area, in accordance with the principles of in- 
ternational law, the Charter of the United Nations, 
and the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 
22 November, 1967. 

9. The Ministers also discussed other problems of 
peace and security in the area, including subversive 
activities. They expressed the hope that efforts 
would continue to be made to find solutions to these 
problems in order to contribute to stability and 
progress for the nations of the area. 

10. Concluding the review, the Ministers reaf- 
firmed their faith in the importance of the Organi- 
zation for its partners, especially for peace and 
progress in the Region. 

11. In approving the Report of the Military Com- 
mittee, the Ministers took note of the continuing 
collaboration among the CENTO countries. 

12. Reaffirming their agreement that the pro- 
gramme of economic collaboration constitutes an im- 
portant element of CENTO partnership, the Minis- 
ters noted with satisfaction the accelerated rate of 
economic expansion in the Regional countries as 
well as the increasing economic cooperation among 
them. 

13. In reviewing the Report of the Economic Com- 
mittee, the Ministers noted with pleasure the com- 
pletion of the rail-link between Iran and Turkey. 



July 3, 1972 



25 



They also noted with satisfaction that the commu- 
nications projects had stimulated economic coop- 
eration among the nations of the CENTO Region. 

14. The Ministers directed the Economic Com- 
mittee to give timely and sympathetic attention to 
projects submitted for consideration by the regional 
governments. They also endorsed recommendations 
for the expansion of the scope of the Multilateral 
Technical Cooperation Fund to provide greater 
intra-regional training. 

15. The Ministers expressed their appreciation of 
the Annual Report of the Secretary General, who 
was attending the Ministerial Council for the first 
time, and wished him every success. 

16. The Council accepted the invitation of the 
Government of Iran to hold the next session in 
early May, 1973, in Tehran. 



Secretary Rogers Cautions Travelers 
About Strict Drug Laws Abroad 

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^ 

As the travel season begins, I want to em- 
phasize — and cannot emphasize too strongly 
— to young Americans that a passport is a 
travel document; it is not a license for "bad 
trips" abroad. Quite apart from the obvious 
fact that all of us have an obligation to rep- 
resent the best of American society when we 
are traveling in other countries, there is the 
simple fact that when Americans travel in 
another country they are subject to the laws 
of that land. In part because of our own ef- 
forts to carry out President Nixon's drug 
control program, many foreign countries 
have adopted or are implementing exceed- 
ingly strict laws. Americans who use or traf- 
fic in drugs abroad are subject to harsh pen- 
alties and, frequently, the most unpleasant 
possible conditions. 

I hope all Americans — and particularly 
young Americans — will have this stark fact 
in mind if they are tempted to enter the 
drug scene on their travels. While our em- 
bassies and consulates will offer their assist- 



' Read to news correspondents on May 17 by John 
F. King, Deputy Director, Office of Press Relations. 



ance to any American in difficulty, I hope 
that those Americans who get involved with 
drugs abroad understand that the law is the 
law wherever it is written and that those who 
break it must expect to pay the penalty. 



Department Approves Exchange Grants 
to Predominantly Black Colleges 

Press release 125 dated May 24 

The Department of State announced on 
May 24 the approval of several educational 
grants to predominantly black American 
colleges. 

The awards are being made in recognition 
of the black college community's unique 
cultural background and of its special inter- 
est in enlarging cross-cultural contacts, 
particularly in the African area, according 
to John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary 
for Educational and Cultural Affairs, who 
made the announcement. 

These grants, Mr. Richardson said, will 
enable black colleges to fulfill a larger and 
more realistic role in U.S. foreign affairs, 
especially in furthering friendly relations 
with educational, cultural, and artistic 
groups abroad. 

To provide opportunities for those inter- 
ested particularly in Africa, the Department 
of State has just allocated $100,000 to in- 
crease black faculty participation in three 
study-travel projects beginning this summer. 

One program, administered by the Insti- 
tute of International Education, New York 
City, will enable about 40 American educa- 
tors to attend a 4-week seminar on African 
affairs at the University of Legon in Ghana 
followed by 2 weeks of educational travel. 
A grant from the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs provides funds for fellow- 
ships for 20-30 teachers from predominantly 
black secondary schools and colleges. 

Another project, being set up by the 
Phelps-Stokes Fund, will bring top African 
professors to the United States. They will 
lecture and hold seminars at both predomi- 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



nantly black and white colleges, with pri- 
ority for the former. 

The third, organized by the African 
American Institute in New York City, in- 
vites about 75-125 American educators to 
travel and study this summer in East and 
West Africa. The Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs is funding travel and 
other costs for 20-30 faculty members from 
predominantly black schools throughout the 
country. 

The travel portions of the program include 
visits to the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Togo, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tan- 
zania. There will be symposia, university 
lectures, briefings by national and local offi- 
cials, and visits to both the cities and the 
countryside. 

Exchange arrangements have also been 
made with three academic consortia (the 
Nashville University Center Council, the 
Piedmont University Center of North Caro- 
lina, and the Atlanta University Center) to 
provide greater opportunities for cultural 
communications with overseas communities. 
Funding is provided for student and faculty 
exchanges and for seminars on international 
topics. These arrangements will be expanded 
to include other such consortia later this 
year. 

Individual black universities are also ob- 
taining grants for cultural activities. Spel- 
man College has received funds to develop a 
creative writing workshop at the University 
of the West Indies at Jamaica ; Morgan State 
College has a grant for art and archeological 
contacts in Nigeria; Morehouse has sent its 
glee club on a singing friendship tour of 
Africa; and several other colleges (Shaw, 
North Carolina Central, and St. Augus- 
tine's) have been included in a South Asian 
Fulbright lecture series with Duke Uni- 
versity. 

All these activities are funded under the 
Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, which promotes 
mutual understanding and the strengthening 
of ties between the people of the United 
States and those of other nations. 



Finland To Purchase Chancery Site 
in Planned International Center 

Press release 136 dated June 8 

In a signing ceremony held on June 8 at 
the State Department, the United States 
Government concluded an agreement with the 
Government of Finland giving it the first 
option to purchase the lot of its choice in the 
International Center planned for the south- 
ern half of the old National Bureau of Stand- 
ards site in Washington. Ambassador Olavi 
Muiikki signed for Finland, while Marion 
H. Smoak, Deputy Chief of Protocol, signed 
for the United States. 

As the element which represents the host 
state in matters affecting foreign embassies 
in Washington, Protocol is the action office 
within the State Department for carrying 
out the responsibility given the Department 
by Public Law 90-553 to develop the Inter- 
national Center. The approved master plan 
for the Center makes 14 lots available for 
purchase by interested foreign governments 
for the erection of the chanceries, or office 
complexes, of their embassies. Finland is the 
first country to enter into a formal agree- 
ment with the United States looking to the 
purchase of one of these lots. 

Plans are now complete for accomplishing 
the relocation of Washington Technical In- 
stitute, currently lodged in temporary quar- 
ters on part of the area reserved for chancery 
development, in its new campus on the north 
half of the site by 1976, the Bicentennial 
Year. The problem of determining how such 
a shift should be effected with minimum dis- 
ruption of the institute has until recently 
constituted the major source of delay for the 
International Center project. The State De- 
partment now expects to complete a sales 
contract with Finland, which already has au- 
thorized money for its purchase of a lot, as 
soon as it has available the funds required 
for site improvement of the entire chancery 
section of the Center. 



July 3, 1972 



27 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses Policy on Providing Information to the Congress 



Statement by David M. Abshire 

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations ^ 



I wish first to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
the opportunity to appear before this subcom- 
mittee, which over the years has done such 
substantial and thoughtful work in the area 
of government information. My office was 
established at the recommendation of the 
1949 Hoover Commission to create a coor- 
dinated program of two-way liaison with the 
Congress. For something over two years I 
have wrestled with the business of trying to 
provide more information to the Congress on 
behalf of the executive branch. Consequently, 
I welcome this first opportunity to discuss in 
a public congressional forum the broader as- 
pects of information policy and specifically 
the policy by which the administration, the 
Secretary of State, and the Department of 
State are guided. 

At the outset I want to tell you of the ra- 
tionale that underlies our information pol- 
icy. I realize that public policy cannot be 
made nor effective government conducted un- 
less both the legislative and the executive 
branches of our government are well in- 
formed about national issues. I am fully 
aware that the Congress is the first branch 
created by the Constitution. It is the politi- 
cal and legal peer of the judiciary and the 
executive. Moreover, I am aware of the diffi- 



' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Op- 
erations and Government Information of the House 
Committee on Forei^ Operations on May 31. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 
20402. 



culty faced by the Congress in matching the 
executive branch in its resources of staff and 
in its access to information. In recent years 
the Congress has increased its staff support 
to cope with this very real problem. I be- 
lieve that is a constructive contribution to 
the maintenance of the de facto parity of the 
three branches of our government about 
which there can be no doubt de jure. 

I say this by way of preface to underscore 
my sensitivity to your needs for adequate ac- 
cess to information about the activities of 
the executive branch and to the information 
that the executive branch is constantly ac- 
quiring. I might add that in the decision- 
making process within the executive branch 
on a congressional request, the Congressional 
Relations representatives almost always are 
the proponents of greater sharing of infor- 
mation with the Congress. There are other 
consideration^ affecting the decision on dis- 
closure, however, that are important ones 
and at times must be overriding. It is for 
this reason that I would ask you to consider 
with me some of the traditional concerns of 
the executive branch before discussing spe- 
cific policies and cases. 

The Separation of Powers 

I believe that we must frankly recognize 
the dilemma that has faced legislators, the 
courts, and Presidents since the founding of 
the Republic. In our government of separate 
powers based upon checks and balances, the 
precise sphere of each is never clearly, fi- 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



nally, or satisfactorily delineated. For al- 
most two centuries, men of good will and 
intense dedication have debated the bound- 
aries. Although, and perhaps because, there 
has never been a final agreement, our gov- 
ernment has been effective, creative, and re- 
sponsive. 

A parliamentary form of government was 
tried in this country for approximately 10 
years during the Revolution. During that 
decade of trial and testing there were re- 
vealed serious practical shortcomings, in- 
cluding those within the areas of diplomacy 
and military affairs. The Constitutional Con- 
vention, meeting in Philadelphia in 1787, 
adopted in its place the tripartite system of 
three coordinate but independent branches 
of government that has formed the basis of 
our government for nearly 200 years. 

In considering the development of our sys- 
tem it is revealing to compare the provisions 
of the Constitution to those of the Articles 
of Confederation with respect to the furnish- 
ing of foreign affairs information to the 
Congress. Consistent with a parliamentary 
form of government, the Continental Con- 
gress under the Articles of Confederation 
created a Department of Foreign Affairs un- 
der the direction of a Secretary by resolution 
of February 21, 1782, providing: 

That the books, records and other papers of the 
United States, that relate to this Department be 
committed to his custody, to which . . . any mem- 
ber of Congress shall have access; . . . 

That letters (of the Secretary) to the ministers of 
the United States, or ministers of foreign powers 
which have a direct reference to treaties or conven- 
tions proposed ... or other great national objects, 
shall be submitted to the inspection and receive the 
approbation of Congress. ... 

A much different scheme of things has 
been legislated under our present constitu- 
tional system. The Constitution, in article 
II, section 2, provides expressly that the 
President "may require the Opinion, in writ- 
ing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any subject re- 
lating to the Duties of their respective Offi- 
ces . . ." 

This provision parallels the initial clause 
of article II, section I, which provides that 



"The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America." 

No similar provision exists in the Consti- 
tution by which Congress may necessarily 
"require" any information from the execu- 
tive branch. Indeed, the constitutional re- 
quirements in this regard appear to be lim- 
ited to the provision in article II, section 3, 
that the President "shall from time to time 
give to the Congress Information of the 
State of the Union, and recommend to their 
Consideration such Measures as he shall 
judge necessary and expedient . . ." 

This constitutional form is clearly re- 
flected in the act of July 27, 1789, which first 
established a "Department of Foreign Af- 
fairs" in the new government. The act pro- 
vided: 

. . . That the Secretary . . . shall forthwith after 
his appointment, be entitled to have the custody and 
charge of all records, books and papers in the of- 
fice of Secretary for the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, heretofore established by the United States 
in Congress assembled. 

There is no mention of congressional ac- 
cess to those "records, books and papers." 
This was a decisive and deliberate departure 
from the system created by the Articles of 
Confederation. 

I think that this history is important. But 
I cannot emphasize too much that I am not 
citing it to put in doubt the right and the 
need of the Congress to know in order to 
carry out its legislative functions. 

In fact, it has long been held that Con- 
gress, by virtue of the powers entrusted to 
it by the Constitution, has certain implied 
powers of inquiry and oversight even though 
these are not explicitly stated in the Consti- 
tution. Thus, Congress is entitled to obtain 
information from the executive branch rea- 
sonably necessary to enable it to carry out 
its constitutional functions. But this, not an 
unlimited right, must be balanced against 
the requirement of the executive branch in 
carrying out its constitutional responsibili- 
ties. 

Our system can function satisfactorily 
only when each of the branches acts respon- 
sibly and constructively. Any wise President 
knows, as you and I know, that he cannot 



July 3, 1972 



29 



sustain a public policy that does not enjoy 
public and congressional understanding and 
support. Nor does the President want to 
carry out policies lacking democratic ap- 
proval. The continuing affirmation of that 
approval depends upon ample public and 
congressional knowledge of the choices be- 
fore the Nation. This means assuring that, 
to the greatest degree possible, the Congress 
and the public have the facts which have in- 
fluenced the President and his executive 
branch. 

In the field of foreign affairs, this need 
often gives rise to the dilemma to which I 
earlier alluded. 

The executive branch does have confiden- 
tial information not equally accessible to the 
Congress and the public. In some cases, to 
divulge confidential information may be 
harmful to the very interests which the Con- 
gress, the courts, and the executive branch 
are sworn to uphold and defend. 

That is a profound dilemma that no Con- 
gress and no President has ever fully re- 
solved, nor is any likely to do so. At this very 
time, however, Representative Patsy Mink 
is awaiting Supreme Court consideration of 
her suit under the Freedom of Information 
Act, which she has explained is designed "in 
part to secure a judicial construction of the 
Freedom of Information Act that would 
guarantee Members of Congress the unlim- 
ited right to seek and obtain information in 
the hands of the Executive." ^ 

The Court's ruling will be illuminating and 
may settle a number of the problems with 
which we are now wrestling. 



Congressional Liaison 

Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote of the motiva- 
tion for our unique system when he ob- 
served in 1926 that: 

The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted 
by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency, 
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The 
purpose was not to avoid friction but, by means of 
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of 
governmental powers among three departments, to 
save the people from autocracy. 



If a certain amount of friction is part and 
parcel of our machinery of government, as 
Justice Brandeis says, I see the role of con- 
gressional liaison as one of trying to provide 
enough lubrication to see that that machin- 
ery does not break down. Communication 
among the branches is the lubricant of the 
machinery of government which keeps fric- 
tion to tolerable limits. Communication is 
the essential ingredient that permits the sep- 
arate branches to understand each other, 
even while engaged in an adversary process. 
It gives the opportunity for the national in- 
terest to emerge from conflicting conceptions 
of it. 

You and I, from our daily experiences with 
government, know how many times deadlock 
arises when communication has broken down. 
We both know how many times deadlock has 
been resolved when the parties have finally 
understood one another. On the other hand, 
the final failure to achieve a compromise 
that would have permitted the Senate to give 
its advice and consent to the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles came from a breakdown in delicate 
communications between the President and 
the Senate. 

I have tried to outline the philosophy that 
must guide our day-to-day efforts to try to 
assure that the Department of State fully 
understands the views of the Congress and 
that the Congress understands those of the 
Department. 

Now let me turn to the practical means 
by which the executive branch is endeavor- 
ing to meet your need and our need that the 
Congress have adequate foreign affairs in- 
formation to perform its functions. 

At the top of the list are the President's 
comprehensive reports to the Congress. They 
constitute the most authoritative, complete, 
and rationally defined statements of the 
President's foreign policy and of his ap- 
praisal of the world situation. 

The most ancient and most widely studied 
is the traditional annual state of the Union 
message. It provides the Congress and the 
Nation with the President's synthesis of 



' Cong. Rec, May 18, 1972, p. E 5505. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



our domestic and international posture. 

This administration has gone much far- 
ther. The President has also made a com- 
prehensive, scholarly, and precise annual 
report to the Congress on his foreign policy. 
These annual reports have given a concep- 
tual approach to this administration's for- 
eign policy that I believe has been a signifi- 
cant step forward. 

The President's reports, in turn, have been 
supplemented by even more detailed submis- 
sions from the Secretary of State, who on 
March 26, 1971, submitted a 617-page report 
to the Congress entitled "United States 
Foreign Policy 1969-1970" and on March 8, 
1972, submitted a 604-page report on 
"United States Foreign Policy 1971." 

These reports constitute an effort to draw 
together the entire skein of our foreign 
relations at the highest policy level and to 
relate the numerous aspects of our foreign 
affairs to a single coherent approach to our 
external relations. As such, they capture our 
foreign policy in its most authoritative sense 
and offer Congress and public alike a precise 
formulation of the administration's position. 

If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, I don't 
believe that the administration has received 
the credit due it by the Congress or the press 
for these major steps forward. This is 
purely unintentional, I know, but the danger 
is that future administrations might not be 
encouraged to follow suit. I do hope that any 
final report of this able subcommittee will 
examine these important improvements in 
executive-to-legislative and in executive-to- 
public communications in the field of infor- 
mation policy. 

To move to more traditional forms of in- 
formation policy. Secretary Rogers, and the 
Department of State generally, have pro- 
vided Congress with a large volume of in- 
formation, through formal testimony in both 
public and executive sessions, through in- 
tensive briefings, personal meetings, and 
correspondence. 

The Secretary of State in the first three 
years of his service has appeared on 43 
different occasions to testify formally before 
the committees of Congress. Other senior 



officers of the Department also have testified 
frequently. Their appearances totaled 181 
last year alone. 

An enormous number of congressional in- 
quiries are received and replied to each year 
by the Department. For the year 1971 alone, 
we received 18,964 congressional letters. 

I consider this correspondence of the 
greatest importance, and I want you to know 
of the very considerable attention which the 
Department of State very gladly gives to 
providing the Congress with full, clear, and 
timely replies. Just this spring I began a 
new campaign to improve our responses by 
stressing clarity, appreciation of differing 
points of view, and responsiveness. I spelled 
out the need for improvement in an article 
circulated to all officers of the Department 
in Washington and throughout the world.* 
At the same time we began a continuing 
series of meetings with Department officers 
to explain the importance of congressional 
correspondence and the need to make the 
extra effort to satisfy congressional in- 
quiries. 

In addition to correspondence, in 1971 an 
average of approximately 220 telephone in- 
quiries from Congress were handled each 
working day by our Bureau of .Congressional 
Relations and an additional uncounted num- 
ber by other offices in the Department of 
State. 

Extensive briefings are given to the Con- 
gress as a whole, to committees, to less 
formal groups, to individual Members, and 
to congressional staff members. For many 
years regular Wednesday morning briefings 
have been provided for Members of Congress 
while Congress is in session. There were 
31 of these Wednesday briefings given last 
year, and the Secretary of State himself has 
recently appeared twice. 

Early this year I started special monthly 
luncheons for congressional staff members to 
meet with top Departmental officers, usually 
at the Assistant Secretary level, for off-the- 
record discussions of current issues and to 
enable these officials to become better known 



^Department of State Newsletter, April 1972, 
p. 10. 



July 3, 1972 



31 



on the Hill in order to aid in more frequent 
and informal communications ; i.e., increased 
access to the bureaucracy. 

In addition to these regularly scheduled 
exchanges, the Department of State has 
hosted breakfasts, lunches, and coffees to 
bring to Members and staff our best and 
most informed officials in off-the-record dis- 
cussions. We have also brought countless 
foreign visitors to meet with Members and 
staff as a means to give the Congress direct 
access to information about important for- 
eign affairs questions. 

The inauguration this session of Congress 
of annual authorization legislation for the 
Department of State marks the beginning 
of still another forum for the provision of 
information to the Congress. The hearings 
held in both Houses could become a major 
annual forum for a systematic revievi^ of our 
entire foreign policy and of our foreign re- 
lations by the Congress. 

The volume of information provided to 
Congress by the Department of State is con- 
siderable. During the first session of the 92d 
Congress, for example, only 29 legislative 
proposals were submitted for congressional 
action. Congress itself, on the other hand, 
has actively solicited the Department's views 
on legislation proposed by others. Thus, in 
the first session of the 92d Congress, the De- 
partment received and processed 1,172 re- 
quests for its views on pending or proposed 
legislation, not including private immigra- 
tion bills. 

We arranged early in this session of Con- 
gress to provide systematic special briefings 
for the various subcommittees of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on matters of 
particular interest to them. These are in ad- 
dition to the various special briefings for both 
Members and staff on such crisis situations 
as Cambodia and the India-Pakistan hostili- 
ties. At present, a special briefing paper on 
current developments is prepared periodi- 
cally, usually weekly, for two of the sub- 
committees. In addition, new arrangements 
have been made for the Department's Bu- 
reau of Intelligence and Research to make 
more of its "finished intelligence" available 



to Senators, Members of Congress, and com- 
mittee personnel. 

The Secretary of State has taken the lead 
in proposing new means of conveying foreign 
policy information to the Congress. In his 
testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations a little over a year ago, on 
May 14, 1971, Secretary Rogers offered to 
instruct each of our geographic Assistant 
Secretaries regularly to provide a full brief- 
ing on developments in his area.^ This offer 
was expressly renewed by the Secretary in a 
letter of July 6, 1971, addressed to the com- 
mittee chairman. 

During the course of that same testimony 
Secretary Rogers spoke of an imaginative 
proposal later incorporated in a bill intro- 
duced by Congressman Frank Horton, when 
the Secretary said that: 

Suggestions have come from a number of quar- 
ters for the establishment of a joint congressional 
committee which could act as a consultative body 
with the President in times of emergencies. If, after 
study, you believe this idea has merit, we would be 
prepared to discuss it with the committee and 
determine how best we could cooperate. 

Here, too, the Department remains ready 
to respond to a congressional request. 



Executive Privilege 

There are occasions when the President 
must conclude that the proper exercise of 
his functions as Chief Executive, responsible 
for the conduct of our Nation's foreign rela- 
tions, precludes the disclosure of some item 
of information. I think it fair to say, how- 
ever, that these instances are rare. 

I would not presume to review the exten- 
sive legal and scholarly literature on the pre- 
rogatives of the several branches of our gov- 
ernment with which I know you distinguished 
Members are familiar. But I would suggest 
that while the President's denial of informa- 
tion to the other branches is commonly re- 
ferred to as "executive privilege," it is in a 
sense exercised by all branches and might 
more properly be known as "constitutional 



* Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 721. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



privilege." In fact, of course, the concept is 
recognized by the courts and by the Con- 
gress, which has recognized the exercise of 
executive privilege as an executive option in 
certain of its legislation. Section 634(c) of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, is an example with which most of 
us are familiar. Then-Assistant Attorney 
General [William H.] Rehnquist cited a num- 
ber of examples of congressional recognition 
of executive privilege in his testimony before 
this subcommittee on June 29, 1971. 

In like manner, judges do not make avail- 
able to Congress or to the President the pre- 
liminary memoranda prepared by their law 
clerks suggesting the disposition of cases. 
Nor do they make their draft conclusions or 
opinions publicly available. Likewise, Con- 
gress does not make the President or the 
courts privy to its confidential proceedings. 
Congressional committee or subcommittee 
chairmen do not provide the President or the 
judiciary with internal memoranda ad- 
dressed to them by staff members. The Con- 
gress has always carefully maintained the 
inviolability of its proceedings from tres- 
pass by the courts or the executive. Nor 
would the President or the courts expect to 
share such confidential communications. 
Those charged with decisions on public pol- 
icy in the courts, in the Congress, and in the 
executive branch need to receive advice and 
information. They must be confident that 
those who are providing it do so with abso- 
lute candor and freedom from fear of ex- 
posure to undue external pressures. 

Secretary Rogers stated the problem in an 
address delivered in 1956 when, as Attorney 
General, he pointed out that: 

. . . Government could not function if it was 
permissible to go behind judicial, legislative or 
executive action and to demand a full accounting 
from all subordinates who may have been called 
upon to make a recommendation in the matter. Such 
a process would be self-defeating. It is the President, 
not the White House staff, the heads of departments 
and agencies, not their subordinates, the judges, not 
their law clerks, and members of Congress, not their 
executive assistants, who are accountable to the 
people for official public actions within their juris- 
diction. Thus, whether the advice they receive and 



act on is good or bad there can be no shifting of 
ultimate responsibility. Here, however, the question 
is not one of non-disclosure as to what was done, 
but rather whether the preliminary and develop- 
mental processes of arriving at a final judgment 
needs to be subjected to publicity. Obviously, it can- 
not be if Government is to function. 

It is because of these considerations that 
the President does sometimes conclude that 
a particular document or specific informa- 
tion should not be disclosed. But even in 
these cases, accommodations have usually 
been worked out so that Congress has re- 
ceived the substantive information it has 
sought while the confidentiality of sensitive 
details and the documents themselves have 
been preserved. For example, when the De- 
partment concluded that it could not prop- 
erly furnish certain cables related to the situ- 
ation in Pakistan to the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, other means were 
found to provide the basic substantive infor- 
mation requested. 

In my experience, in short, almost all con- 
gressional requests for information are hon- 
ored. And of the very few requests which 
raise a problem for the executive branch, the 
vast majority are met with the kind of prac- 
tical compromise that is essential for our sys- 
tem to function effectively. 

As you know, President Nixon announced 
early in this administration that he would de- 
cide personally before any congressional 
request for information should be finally de- 
nied. He made that rule because he is con- 
scious of the need of Congress for substan- 
tial information in order properly to carry 
out its functions. Specifically on March 24, 
1969, the President stated, "The policy of 
this Administration is to comply to the full- 
est extent possible with Congressional re- 
quests for information." He went on to say 
that the executive branch authority to with- 
hold information the disclosure of which 
would be incompatible with the public inter- 
est would be invoked "only in the most com- 
pelling circumstances, and after a rigorous 
inquiry into the actual need for its exercise" 
and then only with "specific Presidential ap- 
proval." 



July 3, 1972 



33 



In the field of foreign affairs executive 
privilege has been invoked by President 
Nixon only on two occasions: 

The first was on August 30, 1971, when 
the President concluded that ". . . it would 
not be in the public interest to provide to the 
Congress the basic planning data on military 
assistance as requested by the Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
. . . ." These data were described as ". . . in- 
ternal working documents which would dis- 
close tentative planning data on future years 
of the military assistance program which are 
not approved Executive Branch positions." 

The second was on March 15 of this year, 
when the President directed that "internal 
working documents concerning the foreign 
assistance program or international informa- 
tion activities, which would disclose tenta- 
tive planning data, such as is found in the 
Country Program Memoranda and the Coun- 
try Field Submissions, and which are not ap- 
proved positions" not be made available as 
requested by the Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations and this subcommittee, re- 
spectively. In both instances the President 
noted that substantial information on these 
subjects had been provided and would con- 
tinue to be provided to Congress, and he em- 
phasized the limited nature of these two di- 
rectives. 

I ought to note here, should there be any 
doubt, that the President's invocation of ex- 
ecutive privilege on these two occasions did 
not constitute a blanket delegation of the au- 
thority to his subordinates to claim this priv- 
ilege. Its exercise remains personal and, 
therefore, restricted to the most essential is- 
sues. 

Before I close, please permit me to lay be- 
fore you several thoughts about the long- 
term relationship of the three branches. 

We all know that the demarcation be- 
tween the legislative and the executive is not 
static. It is a dynamic feature of our system 
shifting in response to the needs and the de- 
mands of the day to provide responsible, ef- 



fective, and democratic government to the 
Republic. During periods of great threat to 
the Nation, in war or in economic crisis, the 
pendulum has swung to greater executive 
prerogative. But after each crisis the pen- 
dulum has swung back to greater legislative 
power. After the Civil War and after the 
First World War, the reaction to Presiden- 
tial power was at times dangerously destruc- 
tive. Since World War II we have for the 
most part escaped a similar destructive reac- 
tion. But we have without doubt seen a steady 
return to the Congress of power in the area 
of international affairs. 

Your subcommittee is making a significant 
contribution to this readjustment of power 
in the Federal Government. Your concentra- 
tion upon the process of government rather 
than upon specific foreign policy issues offers 
us all a new opportunity to examine how to 
rebalance our system without the destructive 
overtones of earlier readjustments. 

We are all conscious that our meeting here 
today is a part of the dynamic process of our 
system of checks and balances. The existence 
of three separate branches supposes a con- 
tinuing testing among them of public policy. 
We believe that in such a process we will 
come closer to the wisest policy — closer to 
discovering the national interest that no one 
of the three branches can be sure to know. 

It is entirely understandable and right that 
the Congress should expect to be informed 
about foreign developments and about the 
President's policy toward them. It is my dif- 
ficult job to help to meet that need. Because 
of the rapid pace of current events, because 
of the many new departures now being taken 
in our foreign policy, because of the extraor- 
dinary complexity and the far-reaching im- 
plications, and because of the delicacy of the 
preparations surrounding them, we are not 
always able to get to the Congress as much 
information as rapidly as we should like. 
With your help, encouragement, and imagina- 
tion, I believe that we can do better. We wel- 
come your efforts to help us find ways to do 
so. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952.^ 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 12, 
1972. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (bi- 
ological) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.= 

Signatures: Cuba, April 12, 1972; Ecuador, June 
14, 1972; Iraq, May 11, 1972; Yemen (Aden), 
April 26, 1972. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva 
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 
16, 1955. TIAS 3324; 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention concerning the application of that conven- 
tion to the works of stateless persons and refu- 
gees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered 
into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324; 

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention concerning the application of the conven- 
tion to the works of certain international organi- 
zations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. En- 
tered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324; 

Protocol 3 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention concerning the effective date of instru- 
ments of ratification or acceptance of or accession 
to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 
1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954; for the 
United States December 6, 1954. TIAS 3324. 
Accession deposited: Morocco, February 8, 1972. 

Judicial Procedures 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil 
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 
18, 1970.= 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 13, 
1972. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vi- 
enna February 21, 1971.= 
Ratification deposited: Chile, May 18, 1972. 



Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 
6839. 

Accession deposited: Khmer Republic, June 2, 
1972. 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at 

Washington June 19, 1970.= 

Accession deposited: Malawi, May 16, 1972. 
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 

patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 

24, 1971.= 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 26, 
1972. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regula- 
tions with final protocol and annex, and the uni- 
versal postal convention with final protocol and de- 
tailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 

1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for 
article V of the additional protocol, which entered 
into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Accessio7is deposited: South Africa, April 5, 1972; 

Yemen (Aden), April 4, 1971 (with reservations 
and declaration). 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970.' Articles 13 
through 30 entered into force April' 26, 1970; for 
the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Accession deposited: Australia, May 10, 1972 
(with a declaration). 

Nice agreement concerning the international classi- 
fication of goods and services for the purposes of 
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as 
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered 
into force March 18, 1970; for the United States 
May 25, 1972. 
Accession deposited: Australia, May 10, 1972. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accessio7i deposited: Australia, May 10, 1972. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.= 
Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, June 14, 1972; 
Mali, June 29, 1972. 



' Not in force for the United States. 
= Not in force. 



July 3, 1972 



35 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



3' 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1724. 




July 10, 1972 



PRESIDENT NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER BRIEF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 
ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS 37 

SECRETARY ROGERS URGES SENATE SUPPORT OF THE ABM TREATY 

AND INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 

Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 50 

PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA OF MEXICO MAKES STATE VISIT 
TO THE UNITED STATES 57 



COORDINATION OF UNITED 

Statement by Secretary 



STATES FOREKJN ECp,^QMiC POLICY 
I Secretary Rd^'^^'W^ 

1 \^Tl 



For index see inside back e(BiP^^^ 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1724 
July 10, 1972 



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President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Members of Congress 
on Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements 



Following are remarks made by President 
Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, 
at a briefing for 122 members of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services 
Committee, and House Armed Services Com- 
mittee in the State Dining Room of the 
White House on June 15. 



Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 19 

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

Ladies and gentlemen: We are beginning 
a little late because I understand traffic is 
quite heavy around the White House this 
morning due to the arrival of the President 
of Mexico. We, however, must go forward 
with the schedule, because there is a joint 
session, as you know, today and we do want 
the members of the committees present here 
to be able to attend that session. We will 
have to adjourn this meeting at approxi- 
mately 12 o'clock, or at best, 5 minutes after 
12, and we want to give you plenty of time 
for questions. 

A word about the format of this meeting. 
I will make a statement, and then I will 
have to depart in order to prepare for the 
arrival of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kis- 
singer will then make a statement and then 
will be open to questions to the members of 
the committees that are present here. 

In order to get some recognition factor 
developed by someone who knows all of the 
Members who are here, Clark MacGregor 



[Counsel to the President for Congressional 
Relations] will moderate the question-and- 
answer period, but we will try to be just 
as fair as possible among the members of 
the committees and between the House and 
the Senate, and Clark, of course, will be 
responsible in the event that it isn't fair. 

In any event, let me come directly now to 
my own remarks, which will not be too 
extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will 
be presenting the Presidential views. He 
will be telling you what the President's par- 
ticipation has been in these negotiations. 
The views he will express I have gone over 
with him in great detail, and I will stand 
by them. 

I noted in the pi-ess that it was suggested 
that I was calling down the members of 
these committees for the purpose of giving 
you a peptalk on these two agreements. Let 
me lay that to rest right at the outset. This 
is not a peptalk, and Dr. Kissinger is not 
going to make you a peptalk either. 

When I came back from the Soviet Union, 
you will recall in the joint session I said 
that we wanted a very searching inquiry of 
these agreements.! I want to leave no doubt 
about my own attitude. 

I have studied this situation of arms con- 
trol over the past 31/2 years. I am totally 
convinced that both of these agreements are 
in the interest of the security of the United 
States and in the interest of arms control 
and world peace. I am convinced of that, 
based on my study. However, I want the 



^ For President Nixon's address before the Con- 
gress on June 1, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 
855; for texts of the agreements, see ibid., p. 918. 



July 10, 1972 



37 



Members of the House and the Members of 
the Senate also to be convinced of that. I 
want the Nation to be convinced of that. 

I think that the hearings that you will 
conduct must be searching, because only in 
that way will you be able to be convincing 
to yourselves and only in that way will the 
Nation also be convinced. 

In other words, this is not one of those 
cases where the President of the United 
States is asking the Congress and the Nation 
to take on blind faith a decision that he has 
made and in which he deeply believes. 

I believe in the decision, but your questions 
should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and 
others in the administration for the purpose 
of finding any weaknesses that you think in 
the negotiations or in the final agreements 
that we have made. 

As far as the procedures are concerned, 
as you know, you will be hearing the Secre- 
tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
head of the CIA, and of course. Ambassador 
Smith [Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation to the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT)] in your sessions of the 
various committees. 

I know that a number have suggested that 
Dr. Kissinger should appear before the com- 
mittees as a witness. I have had to decline 
that particular invitation on his part, due to 
the fact that executive privilege, I felt, had 
to prevail. 

On the other hand, since this is really an 
unprecedented situation, it seemed to me 
that it was important that he appear before 
the members of the committees in this for- 
mat. This is on the record. 

All of you will be given total transcripts 
of what he says. All of you will have the 
opportunity to ask these questions, and in 
the event that all of the questions are not 
asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be 
available to answer other questions in his 
office from members of the committees as 
time goes on, during the course of the 
hearings. 

What we are asking for here, in other 
words, is cooperation with and not just rub- 
berstamping by the House and the Senate. 



That is essential because there must be fol- 
lowthrough on this, and the Members of 
the House and Senate, it seems to me, must 
be convinced that they played a role, as they 
have up to this point, and will continue to 
play a role in this very, very important field 
of arms control. 

Now, let me go to the agreements them- 
selves and express briefly some of my own 
views that I think are probably quite fa- 
miliar to you, but which I think need to be 
underlined. 

I have noted a great deal of speculation 
about who won and who lost in these nego- 
tiations. I have said that neither side won 
and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, 
if we were to really look at it very, very 
fairly, both sides won, and the whole world 
won. 

Let me tell you why I think that is im- 
portant. Where negotiations between great 
powers are involved, if one side wins and 
the other loses clearly, then you have a 
built-in tendency or incentive for the side 
that loses to break the agreement and to 
do everything that it can to regain the ad- 
vantage. 

This is an agreement which was very 
toughly negotiated on both sides. There are 
advantages in it for both sides. For that 
reason, each side has a vested interest, we 
believe, in keeping the agreement rather 
than breaking it. 

I would like for you to examine Dr. Kis- 
singer, and our other witnesses before the 
committees, on that point. I think you also 
will be convinced that this was one of those 
cases where it is to the mutual advantage 
of each side, each looking to its national 
security. 

Another point that I would like to make 
is Presidential intervention in this particu- 
lar matter — Presidential coordination — due 
to the fact that what we have here is not 
one of those cases where one department 
could take a lead role. This cut across the 
functions of the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense; it cut across, also, 
the AEC, and of course, the Arms Control 
Agency. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



Under these circumstances, there is only 
one place where it could be brought together, 
and that was in the White House, in the 
National Security Council, in which all of 
these various groups participated. 

There is another reason, which has to do 
with the system of government in the Soviet 
Union. We have found that in dealing with 
the system of government in the Soviet 
Union, that where decisions are made that 
affect the vital security, in fact, the very 
survival of a nation, decisions and discus- 
sions in those cases are made only at the 
highest level. Consequently, it is necessary 
for us to have discussions and decisions at 
the highest level if we are going to have 
the breakthroughs that we have had to make 
in order to come to this point of a successful 
negotiation. 

The other point that I would make has to 
do with what follows on. The agreement 
that we have here, as you know, is in two 
stages: one, the treaty with regard to ABM 
[antiballistic missile] defensive weapons; 
and second, the offensive limitation, the 
executive agreement, which is indicated as 
being, as you know, not a permanent agree- 
ment — it is for five years — and not total. 
It covers only certain categories of weapons. 

Now, we are hoping to go forward with 
the second round of negotiations. That sec- 
ond round will begin, we trust, in October. 
That means that we can begin in October, 
provided action is taken on the treaty and 
on the offensive agreement that we have 
before you at this time sometime in the 
summer months; we would trust before the 
1st of September. I don't mean that it should 
take that long, but I would hope you can 
finish by the 1st of September so we can go 
forward with the negotiation in October. 

The other point that should be made with 
regard to the follow-on agreements is not 
related to your approval of these agreements. 
It is related to the actions of the Congress 
on defense. I know there is disagreement 
among various Members of the Congress 
with regard to what our defense levels ought 
to be. I think, however, I owe it to you and 
to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev 



[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of 
the Soviet Communist Party] and his col- 
leagues made it absolutely clear that they 
are going forward with defense programs 
in the offensive area which are not limited 
by these agreements. 

Under those circumstances, since they will 
be going forward with their programs, for 
the United States not to go forward with 
its programs — and I am not suggesting 
which ones at this point; you can go into 
that later — but for the United States not to 
go forward with its offensive programs, or 
worse, for the United States unilaterally to 
reduce its offensive programs would mean 
that any incentive that the Soviets had to 
negotiate the follow-on agreement would be 
removed. 

It is for that reason, without getting into 
the specifics as to what the level of defense 
spending should be, as to what the offensive 
programs should be, I am simply saying that 
if we want a follow-on agreement, we have 
to have two steps: We need first, of course, 
to approve these agreements; and second, 
we need a credible defensive position so that 
the Soviet Union will have an incentive to 
negotiate a permanent offensive freeze. That 
is what we all want. 

These are just some random thoughts that 
I had on this matter. I will simply close by 
saying that as one stands in this room and 
in this house, one always has a tendency to 
think of some of the tragedies of history 
of the past. As many of you know, I have 
always been, and am, a great admirer of 
Woodrow Wilson. As all of you know, the 
great tragedy of his life was that after he 
came back with the Treaty of Versailles and 
the League of Nations, due to ineffective con- 
sultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and 
rejected the League. 

We, of course, do not want that to happen. 
We do not think that it will happen, because 
we have appreciated the consultation we 
have had up to this point, and we are now 
going forward with this meeting at this time. 

I will only say that in looking at what 
Wilson said during that debate, when he 
was traveling the country, he made a very, 



July 10, 1972 



39 



it seemed to me, moving and eloquent state- 
ment. He said : "My clients are the children. 
My clients are the future generation." 

This is an election year, and I realize that 
in an election year it is difficult to move as 
objectively as we ordinarily would move on 
any issue, but I would respectfully request 
the Members of the House and Senate, Re- 
publican and Democratic, to approach this 
in the spirit that Wilson explained in that 
period when they were debating whether 
they should go forward with the League of 
Nations, remembering that our clients are 
the next generation, that approval of these 
agreements — the treaty limiting defensive 
weapons, the agreement limiting offensive 
weapons in certain categories — and also the 
continuation of a credible defense posture, 
will mean that we will have done our duty 
by our cliehts, which are the next genera- 
tion. 

Thank you. 



REMARKS BY DR. KISSINGER 

Gentlemen: The President has asked me 
to present to you the White House perspec- 
tive on these agreements and the general 
background, with the technical information 
and some more of the details to be supplied 
by the formal witnesses before your various 
committees. 

I will read a statement to you which we 
will distribute. It is still in the process of 
being typed. 

In considering the two agreements before 
the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of 
antiballistic missile systems and the interim 
agreement on the limitation of offensive 
arms, the overriding questions are these: 
Do these agreements permit the United 
States to maintain a defense posture that 
guarantees our security and protects our 
vital interests? Second, will they lead to a 
more enduring structure of peace? 

In the course of the formal hearings over 
the coming days and weeks, the administra- 
tion will demonstrate conclusively that they 



serve both of these ends. I will begin that 
process this morning by offering some gen- 
eral remarks on the agreement, after which 

I will be happy to take your questions. 

U.S.-Sovlet Relations in the 1970's 

The first part of my remarks will deal 
with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these 
agreements. The agreement which was 
signed 46 minutes before midnight in Mos- 
cow on the evening of May 26 by President 
Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev is 
without precedent in the nuclear age, indeed, 
in all relevant modern history. 

Never before have the world's two most 
powerful nations, divided by ideology, his- 
tory, and conflicting interests, placed their 
central armaments under formally agreed 
limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: 
What new conditions now prevail to have 
made this step commend itself to the calcu- 
lated self-interests of both of the so-called 
superpowers, as it so clearly must have done 
for both willingly to undertake it? 

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of 
the broad design of what the President has 
been trying to achieve in this country's re- 
lations with the Soviet Union, since at each 
important turning point in the SALT nego- 
tiations we were guided not so much by the 
tactical solution that seemed most equitable 
or prudent, important as it was, but by an 
underlying philosophy and a specific per- 
ception of international reality. 

The international situatio/i has been un- 
dergoing a profound structural change since 
at least the mid-1960's. The post-World War 

II pattern of relations among the great 
powers had been altered to the point that 
when this administration took office, a major 
reassessment was clearly in order. 

The nations that had been prostrate in 
1945 had regainsd their economic strength 
and their political vitality. The Communist 
bloc was divided into contending factions, 
and nationalistic forces and social and eco- 
nomic pressures were reasserting themselves 
within the individual Communist states. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



Perhaps most important for the United 
States, our undisputed strategic predomi- 
nance was declining just at a time when 
there was rising domestic resistance to mili- 
tary programs and impatience for redistri- 
bution of resources from national defense to 
social demands. 

Amidst all of this profound change, how- 
ever, there was one important constant — the 
continuing dependence of most of the world's 
hopes for stability and peace upon the ability 
to reduce the tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry 
remain real and deep: 

— We are ideological adversaries, and we 
will in all likelihood remain so for the fore- 
seeable future. 

— We are political and military competi- 
tors, and neither can be indifferent to ad- 
vances by the other in either of these fields. 

— We each have allies whose association 
we value and whose interests and activities 
of each impinge on those of the other at 
numerous points. 

— We each possess an awesome nuclear 
force created and designed to meet the threat 
implicit in the other's strength and aims. 

Each of us has thus come into possession 
of power singlehandedly capable of exter- 
minating the human race. Paradoxically, this 
very fact and the global interests of both 
sides create a certain commonality of out- 
look, a sort of inter-dependence for survival 
between the two of us. 

Although we compete, the conflict will not 
admit of resolution by victory in the classical 
sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have 
an inescapable obligation to build jointly a 
structure for peace. Recognition of this 
reality is the beginning of wisdom for a 
sane and effective foreign policy today. 

President Nixon has made it the starting 
point of the United States policy since 1969. 
This administration's policy is occasionally 
characterized as being based on the princi- 
ples of the classical balance of power. To 
the extent that that term implies a belief 



that security requires a measure of equi- 
librium, it has a certain validity. No national 
leader has the right to mortgage the survival 
of his people to the good will of another 
state. We must seek firmer restraints on the 
actions of potentially hostile states than a 
sanguine appeal to their good nature. 

But to the extent that balance of power 
means constant jockeying for marginal ad- 
vantages over an opponent, it no longer 
applies. The reason is that the determination 
of national power has changed fundamental- 
ly in the nuclear age. Throughout history, 
the primary concern of most national leaders 
has been to accumulate geopolitical and mili- 
tary power. It would have seemed inconceiv- 
able even a generation ago that such power 
once gained could not be translated directly 
into advantage over one's opponent. But now 
both we and the Soviet Union have begun 
to find that each increment of power does 
not necessarily represent an increment of 
usable political strength. 

With modern weapons, a potentially de- 
cisive advantage requires a change of such 
magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it 
can produce disaster. The ^mple tit-for-tat 
reaction to each other's programs of a decade 
ago is in danger of being overtaken by a 
more or less simultaneous and continuous 
process of technological advance, which 
opens more and more temptations for seeking 
decisive advantage. 

A premium is put on striking first and on 
creating a defense to blunt the other side's 
retaliatory capability. In other words, mar- 
ginal additions of power cannot be decisive. 
Potentially decisive additions are extremely 
dangerous, and the quest for them very 
destabilizing. The argument that arms races 
produce war has often been exaggerated. 
The nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril. 

All of this was in the President's mind as 
he mapped the new directions of American 
policy at the outset of this administration. 
There was reason to believe that the Soviet 
leadership might also be thinking along simi- 
lar lines as the repeated failure of their 
attempts to gain marginal advantage in lo- 



July 10, 1972 



41 



cal crises or in military competition under- 
lined the limitation of old policy approaches. 

The President, therefore, decided that the 
United States should work to create a set of 
circumstances which would offer the Soviet 
leaders an opportunity to move away from 
confrontation through carefully prepared 
negotiations. From the first, we rejected the 
notion that what was lacking was a cordial 
climate for conducting negotiations. 

Past experience has amply shown that 
much-heralded changes in atmospherics, but 
not buttressed by concrete progress, will re- 
vert to previous patterns at the first subse- 
quent clash of interests. 

We have, instead, sought to move forward 
across a broad range of issues so that prog- 
ress in one area would add momentum to 
the progress of other areas. 

We hoped that the Soviet Union would 
acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of nego- 
tiations and that it would become convinced 
that its interests would be best served if 
the entire process unfolded. We have sought, 
in short, to create a vested interest in mutual 
restraint. 

At the same time, we were acutely con- 
scious of the contradictory tendencies at 
work in Soviet policy. Some factors — such as 
the fear of nuclear war, the emerging con- 
sumer economy, and the increased pressures 
of a technological, administrative society — 
have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek 
a more stable relationship with the United 
States. Other factors — such as ideology, bu- 
reaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of 
turmoil in peripheral areas — have prompted 
pressures for tactical gains. 

The President has met each of these mani- 
festations on its own terms, demonstrating 
receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives 
and firmness in the face of provocations or 
adventurism. He has kept open a private 
channel through which the two sides could 
communicate candidly and settle matters 
rapidly. The President was convinced that 
agreements dealing with questions of arma- 
ments in isolation do not, in fact, produce 
lasting inhibitions on military competition 



because they contribute little to the kind of 
stability that makes crises less likely. In 
recent months, major progress was achieved 
in moving toward a broadly based accommo- 
dation of interests with the U.S.S.R., in 
which an arms limitation agreement could 
be a central element. 

This approach was called linkage, not by 
the administration, and became the object 
of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three 
years later, the SALT agreement does not 
stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the 
relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any 
moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. 
It stands, rather, linked organically to a 
chain of agreements and to a broad under- 
standing about international conduct appro- 
priate to the dangers of the nuclear age. 

The agreements on the limitation of stra- 
tegic arms is, thus, not merely a technical 
accomplishment, although it is that in part, 
but it must be seen as a political event of 
some magnitude. This is relevant to the 
question of whether the agreements will be 
easily breached or circumvented. Given the 
past, no one can answer that question with 
certainty, but it can be said with some as- 
surance that any country which contemplates 
a rupture of the agreement or a circumven- 
tion of its letter and spirit must now face 
the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy 
not only a limited arms control agreement 
but a broad political relationship. 

Preparations for the Arms Talks 

Let me turn now to the more specific de- 
cisions we had to make about what the 
agreement should do and how it could be 
achieved. 

We knew that any negotiations on arms 
control, especially ones involving those cen- 
tral weapons systems which guarantee each 
side's security, were found to be sensitive 
and complicated, requiring frequent high- 
level decisions. 

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever 
present, and the repercussions of a deadlock 
could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



across the board. We had to begin, therefore, 
by assessing what the situation was in terms 
of armaments in place and under construc- 
tion, what realistic alternatives we had at 
the negotiating table, and how a tentative 
or partial agreement would compare with no 
agreement at all. 

For various reasons during the 1960's, the 
United States had, as you know, made the 
strategic decision to terminate its building 
programs in major offensive systems and to 
rely instead on qualitative improvements. 
By 1969, therefore, we had no active or 
planned programs for deploying additional 
ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles], 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or 
bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, had dynamic and accelerated deploy- 
ment programs in both land-based and sea- 
based missiles. You know, too, that the inter- 
val between conception and deployment of 
strategic weapons systems is generally five 
to 10 years. 

At the same time, both sides were in the 
initial stage of strategic defense programs, 
each approaching the antimissile problem 
from a different standpoint. The Soviets 
wanted to protect their capital. The United 
States program concentrated on protecting 
our retaliatory forces. Both sides also pos- 
sessed weapons which, although not central 
to the strategic balance, were nevertheless 
relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at 
forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet 
Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate- 
range missiles able to attack our forward 
bases and devastate the territory of our 
allies. 

A further complication was that the com- 
position of forces on the two sides was not 
symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given 
priority to systems controlled within its own 
territory while the United States had turned 
increasingly to sea-based systems. 

The result was that they had a panoply of 
different ICBM's while we essentially had 
one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, 
together with a more effective and modern 
submarine force operating from bases over- 



seas and equipped with longer range missiles. 

All of this meant that even arriving at a 
basic definition of strategic equivalency 
would be technically demanding and politi- 
cally intricate. 

Looking beyond to the desired limitations, 
it appeared that neither side was going to 
make major unilateral concessions. When 
the national survival is at stake, such a 
step could not contribute to stability. The 
final outcome would have to be equitable and 
to offer a more reliable prospect for main- 
taining security than could be achieved 
without the agreements. 

With these facts in view, the President 
in the spring of 1969 established a group of 
senior officials responsible for preparing and 
conducting the SALT negotiations. 

I acted as chairman, and the other mem- 
bers included the Under Secretary of State, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chair- 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Direc- 
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
the Director of the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency. 

This group, called the Verification Panel, 
has had the task of analyzing the issues 
and factors and submitting for the Presi- 
dent's decisions those options which com- 
manded support in the various departments 
and agencies. 

The Verification Panel analyzed each of 
the weapons systems which could conceivably 
be involved in an agreement. It compared 
the effect of different limitations on our 
program and on the Soviet programs and 
weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed 
the possibilities of verification and the pre- 
cise risk of evasion, seeking to determine 
at what point evasion could be detected and 
what measures would be available for a 
response. This was done in various combina- 
tions so that if one piece of the equation 
changed, say the ABM level, the government 
would be able to determine the effect of that 
change upon the other components of a par- 
ticular negotiating package. 

Our aim was to be in a position to give 
the negotiations a momentum. We wanted 



July 10, 1972 



43 



to be sure that when stalemates developed, 
the point at issue would not be largely tac- 
tical and that the alternative solutions would 
be analyzed ahead of time and ready for im- 
mediate decision by the President. 

Summary of the Negotiations 

In the first round of the talks, which began 
in November of 1969, the two sides estab- 
lished a work program and reached some 
tentative understanding of strategic prin- 
ciples. 

For example, both sides more or less 
agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM 
system could be a destabilizing factor, but 
that the precise level of ABM limitations 
would have to be set according to our success 
in agreeing on offensive limitations. 

In the spring and summer of 1970, each 
country put forward more concrete pro- 
posals, translating some of the agreed prin- 
ciples into negotiating packages. During this 
period, we, on the American side, had hopes 
of reaching a comprehensive limitation. 
However, the initial search for a compre- 
hensive solution gradually broke down over 
the question of defining the scope of the 
forces to be included. 

The Soviets believed that "strategic" 
meant any weapons system capable of reach- 
ing the Soviet Union or the United States. 
This would have included our forward-based 
aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded 
Soviet intermediate-range rockets aimed at 
Europe and other areas. 

We opposed this approach, since it would 
have prejudiced our alliance commitments 
and raised a distinction between our own 
security and that of our European allies. 

We offered a verifiable ban on the deploy- 
ment and testing of multiple independent 
reentry vehicles. The Soviets countered by 
offering a totally unverifiable production ban 
while insisting on the freedom to test, thus 
placing the control of MIRV's effectively out 
of reach. 

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the 
stalemate threatening, the President took a 
major new initiative by opening direct con- 
tact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the 



SALT discussions and for that matter, the 
Berlin negotiations and, providing progress 
could be achieved on these two issues, to 
explore the feasibility of a summit meeting. 

The Soviet leaders' first response was to 
insist that only the ABM's should be limited 
and that offensive systems should be left 
aside. But as far as we were concerned, the 
still incipient ABM systems on both sides 
were far from the most dynamic or danger- 
ous factors in the strategic equation. It was 
the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead 
at the average rate of over 200 land-based 
and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we 
felt constituted the most urgent issue. To 
limit our option of developing the ABM 
system without at the same time checking 
the growth of the Soviet offensive threat 
was unacceptable. 

Exchanges between the President and the 
Soviet leaders embodying these views pro- 
duced the understanding of May 20, 1971.^ 
As any workable compromise in the field 
must do, that understanding met each side's 
essential concerns. Since the offensive sys- 
tems were complex and since agreement with 
respect to all of them had proved impossible, 
it was agreed that the initial offensive set- 
tlement would be an interim agreement and 
not a permanent treaty and that it would 
freeze only selected categories at agreed 
levels. 

On the defensive side, the understanding 
called for negotiations toward a permanent 
ABM solution with talks on both issues to 
proceed simultaneously to a common con- 
clusion. 

This left two major issues for the negotia- 
tors, the precise level of the allowed ABM's 
and the scope of the interim agreement, spe- 
cifically what weapons would be included in 
the freeze. 

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's 
proved extremely difficult. The United States 
had virtually completed its ABM site at 
Grand Forks, and we were working on the 
second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we pro- 
posed freezing deployments at levels opera- 
tional or under construction ; that is to 'say, 



- Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 741. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



two ICBM sites on our side and the Moscow 
defense on the other. 

The Soviets objected this would deny them 
the right to have any protection for their 
ICBM's. A new formula was then devised 
allowing each side to choose two sites, one 
each for national capital and ICBM defense 
or both for ICBM defense. The resolution 
of the ABM issue was completed after our 
Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary 
of Defense, decided that a site in Washing- 
ton to defend the national command author- 
ity (NCA) was to be preferred over the 
second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom. 
They reasoned that while a limited defense 
would not assure the ultimate survival of 
the national command authority, it would 
buy time against a major attack while the 
radars in both the NCA defense and the 
defense of ICBM's would provide valuable 
warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would 
protect the national command authority in 
the event of a small attack by some third 
country or even an accidental or unauthor- 
ized launch of a weapon toward the United 
States. The President accepted their recom- 
mendation. 

What about the offensive weapons freeze? 
Early in the discussions about the imple- 
mentation of this portion of the May 20 
understanding between the President and the 
Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude 
from the freeze bombers and so-called for- 
ward-based systems — to exclude, that is, the 
weapons in which this country holds an 
advantage. 

We urge the Congress to keep this fact in 
mind when assessing the numerical ratios of 
weapons which are subject to the offensive 
freeze. 

There was also relatively rapid agreement 
following the May 20 breakthrough that 
intercontinental ballistic missiles would be 
covered. This left the issue of the inclusion 
of submarines. 

With respect to ICBM's and submarines, 
the situation was as follows: The Soviet 
Union had been deploying at the average 
annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles 
a year. The United States had completed 



deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Po- 
laris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you 
know, we are engaged in increasing the 
number of warheads on both our ICBM's 
and submarine-launched missiles. We were, 
and are, developing a new submarine sys- 
tem, although it cannot be deployed until 
1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In 
other words, as a result of decisions made in 
the 1960's and not reversible within the 
time frame of the projected agreement, there 
would be a numerical gap against us in the 
two categories of land- and sea-based missile 
systems whether or not there was an agree- 
ment. Without an agreement, the gap would 
steadily widen. 

The agreement would not create the gap. 
It would prevent its enlargement to our dis- 
advantage. In short, a freeze of ICBM's and 
sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly 
in the United States interest. 

These basic considerations undoubtedly 
impelled the recommendation of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was 
to command their support must include the 
submarine-based system. The only possible 
alternative was a crash program :for building 
additional missile-launching submarines. The 
President explored this idea with the Secre- 
tary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations. Their firm judgment was that such 
a program was undesirable. It could not pro- 
duce results before 1976 — that is, toward 
the very end of a projected freeze — and only 
by building a type of submarine similar to 
our current fleet, and without many of the 
features most needed for the 1980's and 
beyond. 

The President once again used his direct 
channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to 
urge the inclusion of missile-launching sub- 
marines in the offensive agreement. 

After a long period of hesitation, the So- 
viet leaders agreed in principle at the end 
of April. Final details were worked out in 
Moscow between the President and the So- 
viet leaders. 

My purpose in dwelling at such length 
upon the details of our internal deliberations 
and negotiations has been to make one 



July 10, 1972 



45 



crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBM's 
nor the freeze of submarine-launched mis- 
siles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not 
an American concession. On the contrary, 
in both cases it was the Soviet Union which 
reluctantly acceded to American proposals 
after long and painful deliberation. 

Provisions of the Agreements 

I will not spend this group's time in 
further review of the frequently arduous 
negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during 
the summit in Moscow, leading to the final 
agreement. I do want to pay tribute on 
behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith 
and his delegation, whose dedication, nego- 
tiating skill, and patience contributed de- 
cisively to the outcome. 

Let me summarize the principal provisions 
of the documents as signed. The ABM Treaty 
allows each side to have one ABM site for 
the defense of its national command au- 
thority and another site for defense of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, 
or 800 miles, apart in order to prevent the 
development of a territorial defense. Each 
ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors. 

The treaty contains additional provisions 
which effectively prohibit either the estab- 
lishment of a radar base for the defense of 
populated areas or the attainment of capa- 
bilities to intercept ballistic missiles by 
conversion of air-defense missiles to anti- 
ballistic missiles. 

It provides for withdrawal by either party 
on six months' notice, if supreme national 
interests are judged to have been jeopardized 
by extraordinary events. By setting a limit 
to ABM defenses the treaty not only elimi- 
nates one area of potentially dangerous 
defensive competition, but it reduces the 
incentive for continuing deployment of of- 
fensive systems. 

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces 
have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. 
Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, dif- 
ferences in numbers are therefore not con- 
clusive. 

The interim agreement on offensive arms 



is to run for five years, unless replaced by 
a more comprehensive permanent agreement 
which will be the subject of further nego- 
tiations or unless terminated by notification 
similar to that for the treaty. 

In essence this agreement will freeze the 
numbers of strategic offensive missiles on 
both sides at approximately the levels cur- 
rently operational and under construction. 
For ICBM's, this is 1,054 for the United 
States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. With- 
in this overall limitation the Soviet Union 
has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM 
launchers, the weapons most threatening to 
our strategic forces. 

There is also a prohibition on conversion 
of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These 
provisions are buttressed by verifiable pro- 
visions and criteria, specifically the prohibi- 
tion against any significant enlargement of 
missile silos. 

The submarine limitations are more com- 
plicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to 
their claimed current level, operational and 
under construction, of about 740 missiles, 
some of them on an older type nuclear sub- 
marine. They are permitted to build to a 
ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but 
only if they dismantle older ICBM's or sub- 
marine-based missiles to offset the new 
construction. 

This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's 
and some 30 missiles on some nine older 
nuclear submarines. Bombers and other air- 
craft are not included in this agreement. 

In sum, the interim offensive agreement 
will keep the overall number of strategic 
ballistic missile launchers both on land and 
at sea within an agreed ceiling which is 
essentially the current level, operational or 
under construction. It will not prohibit the 
United States from continuing current and 
planned strategic offensive programs, since 
neither the multiple-warhead conversion nor 
the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze 
and since the ULM's [undersea long-range 
missiles] submarine system is not, or never 
was, planned for deployment until after 
1977. The agreement will stop the Soviet 
Union from increasing the existing numeri- 
cal gap in missile launchers. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



Finally, there are a number of interpreta- 
tive statements which were provided to the 
Congress along with the agreements. These 
interpretations are in several forms : agreed 
statements initialed by the delegations, 
agreed interpretations or common under- 
standings which were not set down formally, 
and initialed unilateral interpretations to 
make our position clear in instances where 
we could not get total agreement.^ 

In any negotiation of this complexity, 
there will inevitably be details upon which 
the parties cannot agree. We made certain 
unilateral statements in order to insure that 
our positions on these details was included 
in the negotiating record and understood by 
the other side. 

The agreed interpretations and common 
understandings for the most part deal with 
detailed technical aspects of limitations on 
ABM systems and offensive weapons. For 
example, it was agreed that the size of mis- 
sile silos could not be significantly increased 
and that "significantly" meant not more than 
10 to 15 percent. 

In th*^ more important unilateral declara- 
tions we made clear to the Soviets that the 
introduction of land-mobile ICBM's would 
be inconsistent with the agreement. Since 
the publication of the various unilateral in- 
terpretative statements, suggestions have 
been heard that the language of the treaty 
and agreement in fact hide deep-seated dis- 
agreements. But it must be recognized that 
in any limited agreements which are between 
oldtime adversaries there are bound to be 
certain gaps. 

In this case the gaps relate not so much 
to the terms themselves but rather to what 
it was impossible to include. The interpreta- 
tions do not vitiate these agreements, but 
they expand and add to the agreements. 



What Do the Agreements Mean? 

Taking the longer perspective, what can 
we say has been accomplished? 

First, it is clear that the agreement will 
enhance the security of both sides. No agree- 
ment which fails to do so could have been 
signed in the first place or stood any chance 



of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to 
gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic 
field must be self-defeating. 

The President has given the most careful 
consideration to the final terms. He has asked 
me to reiterate most emphatically this morn- 
ing his conviction that the agreements fully 
protect our national security and our vital 
interests. 

Secondly, the President is determined that 
our security and vital interests shall remain 
fully protected. If the Senate consents to 
ratification of the treaty and if the Congress 
approves the interim agreement, the admin- 
istration will therefore pursue two parallel 
courses. 

On the one hand, we shall push the next 
phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks with the same energy and conviction 
that have produced these initial agreements. 

On the other hand, until further arms 
limits are negotiated, we shall push research 
and development and the production capacity 
to remain in a fully protected strategic pos- 
ture should follow-on agreements prove un- 
attainable and so as to avoid giving the 
other side a temptation to break out of the 
agreement. 

Third, the President believes that these 
agreements, embedded as they are in the 
fabric of an emerging new relationship, can 
hold tremendous political and historical sig- 
nificance in the coming decades. For the first 
time, two great powers, deeply divided by 
their divergent values, philosophies, and 
social systems, have agreed to, restrain the 
very armaments on which their national sur- 
vival depends. No decision of this magnitude 
could have been taken unless it had been part 
of a larger decision to place relations on a 
new foundation of restraint, cooperation, and 
steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of 
agreements on joint eff'orts with regard to 
the environment, space, health, and promis- 
ing negotiations on economic relations pro- 
vides a prospect for avoiding the failure of 
the Washington Naval Treaty and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, which 



° For texts of the agreed interpretations and uni- 
lateral statements, see Bulletin of July 3, 1972, 
p. 11. 



July 10, 1972 



47 



collapsed in part for lack of an adequate 
political foundation. 

The final verdict must wait on events, but 
there is at least reason to hope that these 
accords represent a major break in the pat- 
tern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation 
which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations 
for a generation. The two great nuclear 
powers must not let this opportunity slip 
away by jockeying for marginal advantages. 

Inevitably an agreement of such conse- 
quence raises serious questions on the part 
of concerned individuals of quite different 
persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of 
them here. Let me deal with some of the most 
frequently asked since the agreements were 
signed three weeks ago. 

Who won? 

The President has already answered this 
question. He has stressed that it is inappro- 
priate to pose the question in terms of victory 
or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, 
either both sides win or both sides lose. This 
will either be a serious attempt to turn the 
world away from timeworn practices of 
jockeying for power or there will be endless, 
wasteful, and purposeless competition in the 
acquisition of armaments. 

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. 
strategic disadvantage? 

We reject the premise of that question on 
two grounds. First, the present situation is 
on balance advantageous to the United 
States. Second, the interim agreement per- 
petuates nothing which did not already exist 
in fact and which could only have gotten 
worse without an agreement. 

Our present strategic military situation is 
sound. Much of the criticism has focused on 
the imbalance in number of missiles between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. But, 
this only examines one aspect of the problem. 
To assess the overall balance it is necessary 
to consider those forces not in the agree- 
ment: our bomber force, which is substan- 
tially larger and more effective than the 
Soviet bomber force, and our forward-base 
systems. 

The quality of the weapons must also be 
weighed. We are confident we have a major 



advantage in nuclear weapons technology 
and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our 
MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in 
numbers of warheads, and this lead will be 
maintained during the period of the agree- 
ment, even if the Soviets develop and deploy 
MIRV's of their own. 

Then there are such factors as deployment 
characteristics. For example, because of the 
difference in geography and basing, it has 
been estimated that the Soviet Union re- 
quires three submarines for two of ours to 
be able to keep an equal number on station. 

When the total picture is viewed, our stra- 
tegic forces are seen to be completely suffi- 
cient. 

The Soviets have more missile launchers, 
but when other relevant systems such as 
bombers are counted there are roughly the 
same number of launchers on each side. We 
have a big advantage on warheads. The 
Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage. 

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is 
the trend of new weapons deployment by the 
Soviet Union and the projected imbalance 
five years hence based on that trend. The 
relevant question to ask, therefore, is what 
the freeze prevents; where would we be by 
1977 without a freeze? Considering the cur- 
rent momentum by the Soviet Union in both 
ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles, the ceiling set in the interim agree- 
ment can only be interpreted as a sound 
arrangement that makes a major contribu- 
tion to our national security. 

Does the agreement jeopardize our se- 
curity in the future? 

The current arms race compounds num- 
bers by technology. The Soviet Union has 
proved that it can best compete in sheer 
numbers. This is the area which is limited 
by the agreement. 

Thus the agreement confines the competi- 
tion with the Soviets to the area of tech- 
nology. And, heretofore, we have had a 
significant advantage. 

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to 
bring the technological race under control. 
Until these negotiations succeed, we must 
take care not to anticipate their outcome by 
unilateral decisions. 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



Can we trust the Soviets? 

The possibility always exists that the So- 
viets will treat the Moscow agreements as 
they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as 
just another tactical opportunity in the pro- 
tracted conflict. If this happens, the United 
States will have to respond. This we shall 
plan to prepare to do psychologically and 
strategically and provided the Congress 
accepts the strategic programs on which the 
acceptance of the agreements was predicated. 

I have said enough to indicate we advocate 
these agreements not on the basis of trust 
but on the basis of the enlightened self- 
interests of both sides. This self-interest is 
reinforced by the carefully drafted verifica- 
tion provisions in the agreement. Beyond the 
legal obligations, both sides have a stake in 
all of the agreements that have been signed 
and a large stake in the broad process of 
improvement in relations that has begun. 
The Soviet leaders are serious men, and we 
are confident that they will not lightly aban- 
don the course that has led to the summit 
meeting and to these initial agreements. For 
our own part, we will not abandon this 
course without major provocation, because 
it is in the interest of this country and in 
the interest of mankind to pursue it. 

Prospects for the Future 

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, 
the President and General Secretary Brezh- 
nev signed a declaration of principles to 
govern the future relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. These 
principles state that there is no alternative 
to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age. 
They commit both sides to avoid direct 
armed confrontation, to use restraint in local 
conflicts, to assert no special claims in der- 
ogation of the sovereign equality of all 
nations, to stress cooperation and negotia- 
tion at all points of our relationship. 

At this point, these principles reflect an 
aspiration and an attitude. This adminis- 
tration will spare no effort to translate the 
aspiration into reality. We shall strive with 



determination to overcome further the mias- 
ma of suspicion and self-confirming pre- 
emptive actions which have characterized 
the cold war. 

Of course the temptation is to continue 
along well-worn paths. The status quo has 
the advantage of reality, but history is 
strewn with the wreckage of nations which 
sought their future in their past. Catastrophe 
has resulted far less often from conscious 
decisions than from the fear of breaking 
loose from established patterns through the 
inexorable march toward cataclysm because 
nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis 
of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 
would surely destroy the world if we let it 
happen again in the nuclear age. 

Thus the deepest question we ask is not 
whether we can trust the Soviets but 
whether we can trust ourselves. Some have 
expressed concern about the agreements, not 
because they object to their terms but be- 
cause they are afraid of the euphoria that 
these agreements might produce. 

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain 
unavoidable tension just to carry out pro- 
grams which our national survival should 
dictate in any event. We must not develop 
a national psychology by which we can act 
only on the basis of what we are against and 
not on what we are for. 

Our challenges then are: Can we chart a 
new course with hope but without illusion, 
with large purposes but without sentimen- 
tality? Can we be both generous and strong? 
It is not often that a country has the op- 
portunity to answer such questions mean- 
ingfully. We are now at such a juncture 
where peace and progress depend on our 
faith and our fortitude. 

It is in this spirit that the President has 
negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit 
that he asks the approval of the treaty and 
the interim agreement and that I now stand 
ready to answer your questions.'' 



' For a transcript of the question-and-answer ses- 
sion whicli followed, see White House press release 
dated June 15. 



July 10, 1972 



49 



Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the ABM Treaty 
and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms 

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^ 



I am pleased to appear before you today in 
support of the treaty on the limitation of 
ABM [antiballistic missile] systems and the 
interim agreement on the limitation of stra- 
tegic offensive arms.^ 

In his letter to the Senate of June 13 trans- 
mitting my report and its enclosures, the 
President urged your support so that the two 
agreements can be brought into force as soon 
as practicable.^ These agreements are impor- 
tant not just for our people; they are impor- 
tant for all people. They are important not 
only for the achievements they represent but 
also for the opportunities they present. Stra- 
tegic arms limitation is not a one-time effort, 
but a continuing process. 

These agreements are a significant achieve- 
ment. 

They constitute an unprecedented step in 
controlling strategic arms. They are tangible 
evidence that both sides are moving into an 
era of negotiation. The tw^o sides now have an 
important investment in cooperation which 
they are not likely to risk lightly. The United 
States and the Soviet Union have thus indi- 
cated a recognition that their relations can 
be improved by cooperation in some areas 
even though there remain important differ- 
ences in others. 

This success in SALT [Sti-ategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] recognizes that global se- 
curity is interdependent and that uncon- 
strained weapons competition is contrary to 
the interests of the nuclear powers, and of 
the world. 

During the SALT negotiations over the 
last 21/2 years we have kept in mind the need 
for wide support, both nationally and inter- 
nationally, for any agreements reached. To 



that end the administration has closely con- 
sulted the Congress. We have also regularly 
consulted with our allies. 

I believe there is wide support for these 
agreements. The administration welcomes 
this opportunity to consider them with you. 
We are pleased to know that the Congress 
plans full consideration of these two docu- 
ments, both with officials of the executive 
branch and with the public. This is a process 
that is fundamental to our American system. 
It will broaden the base of understanding and 
support for what has been achieved and will 
assist in the search for additional strategic 
arms limitations. 

Let me place the SALT agreements in per- 
spective. 

When this administration entered office 
early in 1969, we faced a strategic situation 
in which the U.S.S.R. was engaged in a broad 
and dynamic buildup of its strategic offen- 
sive missile launchers. It was clear that a 
rough balance in strategic forces between 
the United States and the Soviet Union was 
approaching. However, there was not then — 
and there is not now — any question that the 
United States could and would maintain stra- 
tegic forces adequate to meet its security re- 



' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on June 19 (press release 142). The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

" For texts, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 918. 

' For texts of President Nixon's message of June 
13, Secretary Rogers' report of June 10, and texts 
of agreed interpretations and unilateral statements, 
see Bulletin of July 3, 1972, p. 1. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



quirements, forces second to none. As Presi- 
dent Nixon stated in his foreign policy re- 
port of February 1971, "both sides would al- 
most surely commit the necessary resources 
to maintain a balance." * The President fur- 
ther noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain 
a large advantage "would spark an arms race 
which would, in the end, prove pointless." 

Through negotiation — rather than compe- 
tition — we had an opportunity to achieve a 
more stable strategic relationship with the 
U.S.S.R. and to seek, over time, to create a 
situation in which both sides could use more 
of their resources for purposes other than 
building more strategic weapons. 

Negotiation of the Agreements 

After thorough preparations by the new 
administration, SALT began in November 
1969 in Helsinki. Initially, the talks concen- 
trated on exploration of strategic principles 
and development of an agenda for future 
work. The next phases focused on compre- 
hensive proposals. However, problems over 
definition of strategic systems and over the 
basis for limitation of such systems made 
clear that it would be extremely difficult to 
negotiate a single comprehensive agreement. 
The Soviets then pressed for an initial agree- 
ment limiting only antiballistic missile sys- 
tems. We believed that such an agreement 
would not make as great a contribution to 
stability as limitations on both offensive and 
defensive strategic systems. 

This impasse was resolved by the break- 
through announced by the President on May 
20, 1971.^ The two governments agreed to 
work out arrangements limiting deployment 
of ABM's and at the same time to agree on 
certain measures with respect to the limita- 
tion of strategic offensive arms. 

After the May 20 understanding, the prin- 
cipal issues were how broad a coverage of of- 
fensive forces could be agreed and how to 
frame in concrete terms agreement in princi- 
ple to limit ABM's to a low level. These gen- 
ei-al questions contained numerous and com- 
plex specific issues, which took another year 
of hard negotiating to work out. The two 



agreements before you are the successful re- 
sult of that work. 

Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the 
two agreements was made in my letter of sub- 
mittal to the President. I believe it would be 
helpful this morning to consider what these 
agreements would do. I will touch on certain 
of their most important provisions. Follow- 
ing my statement. Ambassador Smith [Ge- 
rard Smith, head of the U.S. delegation to 
SALT] is prepared to join me in answering 
questions you may have. 

Let me say as a preface to this discussion 
that in both agreements the United States 
has sought, where necessary, to set forth de- 
tailed obligations in the texts of the agree- 
ments themselves. Where one of the sides 
preferred to put clarifying material or elab- 
oration in agreed interpretations, and where 
this was sufficient, that approach was used. 
These agreed interpretations have been 
transmitted to the Congress; they include 
initialed statements and other common 
understandings. In certain cases where agree- 
ment could not be reached, U.S. views were 
stated formally in unilateral statements. 
Those, too, have been transmitted to the Con- 
gress. There are no secret agreements. 

Undertakings in the ABM Treaty 

I would like to address first the ABM 
Treaty. 

Under this treaty, both sides make a com- 
mitment not to build a nationwide ABM de- 
fense. This is a general undertaking of ut- 
most significance. Without a nationwide 
ABM defense, there can be no shield against 
retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have 
recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain, 
mutual deterrence. 

Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt 
that the possibility of nuclear war has been 
dramatically reduced by this treaty. 



* The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25, 1971, ap- 
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 22, 1971 ; the section 
entitled "Strategic Policy and Forces" begins on 
p. 406. 

^ Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 741. 



July 10, 1972 



51 



A major objective of SALT has been to re- 
duce the tensions, uncertainties, and high 
costs which flow from the upward spiral of 
strategic arms competition. While the cost 
savings from these first SALT agreements 
will be limited initially, over the long term 
we will save the tens of billions of dollars 
which might otherwise have been required 
for a nationwide ABM defense. 

Furthermore, with an interim limitation on 
offensive weapons — which we hope will lead 
to a more comprehensive and permanent lim- 
itation — there will be a break in the pattern 
of action and reaction under which each 
side reacts to what the other is doing, or may 
do, in an open-ended situation. This cycle un- 
til now has been a major factor in driving 
the strategic arms race. 

The heart of the treaty is article IH, which 
spells out the provisions under which each of 
the parties may deploy two limited ABM 
complexes, one in an ICBM [intercontinental 
ballistic missile] deployment area and one at 
its national capital. There can be no more 
than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated 
interceptors, at each complex — a total of 200. 

The two ABM deployment complexes per- 
mitted each side will serve different purposes. 
The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM de- 
ployment area will afford some protection 
for ICBM's in the area. ABM coverage at the 
national capitals will permit protection for 
the national command authority against a 
light attack, or an accidental or unauthor- 
ized launch of a limited number of missiles, 
and thus decrease the chances that such an 
event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In 
addition, it will buy some time against a ma- 
jor attack, and its radars would help to pro- 
vide valuable warning. 

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are 
also important limitations on the deployment 
of certain types of non-ABM radars. The 
complex subject of radar control was a cen- 
tral question in the negotiations because ra- 
dars are the long leadtime item in develop- 
ment of an ABM system. 

The treaty provides for other important 
qualitative limitations. The parties will un- 
dertake not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 



systems or components which are sea-based, 
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 
They have also agreed not to develop, test, 
or deploy ABM launchers for launching more 
than one ABM interceptor missile at a time 
from each launcher, nor to modify launchers 
to provide them with such a capability; nor 
to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi- 
automatic or other similar systems for rapid 
reload of ABM launchers; nor to develop, 
test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than 
one independently guided warhead. 

Perhaps of even greater importance as a 
qualitative limitation is that the parties have 
agreed that future exotic types of ABM sys- 
tems, i.e., systems depending on such devices 
as lasers, may not be deployed, even in per- 
mitted areas. 

One of the more important corollary provi- 
sions deals with prohibiting the upgrading 
of antiaircraft systems, what has been called 
the "SAM-upgrade" [surface-to-air missile] 
problem. The conversion or testing of other 
systems, such as air-defense systems or com- 
ponents thereof, to perform an ABM role is 
prohibited as part of a general undertaking 
not to provide an ABM capability to non- 
ABM systems. 

The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and 
in the interim agreement, have been devised 
so as to assure that they can be verified by 
national technical means of verification. For 
the types of arms control measures in these 
agreements, modern national technical means 
of verification are the most practical and a 
fully effective assurance of compliance. The 
treaty also contains the very important land- 
mark commitments not to interfere with each 
side's national technical means of verification 
and not to use deliberate concealment meas- 
ures to impede the effectiveness of these 
means. 

The treaty contains another significant 
"first" in Soviet-American arms control. A 
Standing Consultative Commission will, on a 
regular basis, consider the operations of the 
treaty as well as questions of compliance. The 
Commission will also have the function of 
considering proposals for further increasing 
the viability of the treaty. It will assure that 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



even after the completion of the follow-on ne- 
gotiations there will be a continuing stra- 
tegic dialogue between the two powers. 

The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlim- 
ited. But it contains a withdrawal clause of 
the kind which has characterized postwar 
arms control agreements. Each party can 
withdraw if it decides that extraordinary 
events relating to the subject matter of the 
treaty have jeopardized its supreme inter- 
ests. Notice of such a decision, including a 
statement of the extraordinary events in- 
volved, must be given six months prior to 
withdrawal. 

The interrelationship between limitations 
on offensive and defensive strategic arms 
which the United States has repeatedly 
stressed is reflected in the expressed inten- 
tion to continue active negotiations for limi- 
tations on strategic arms. As was pointed out 
in my submittal letter, the special importance 
attached by the United States to this relation- 
ship was set forth in a formal statement by 
Ambassador Smith recording the position of 
the United States Government that if an 
agreement providing for more complete stra- 
tegic offensive arms limitations were not 
achieved within five years, U.S. supreme in- 
terests could be jeopardized, and should that 
occur it would constitute a basis for with- 
drawal — not necessarily withdrawal, but a 
basis for withdrawal — from the treaty. I be- 
lieve that this withdrawal right, which is 
exercisable on our judgment alone, fully pro- 
tects our security interests in the event that 
the follow-on negotiations were not to suc- 
ceed and that the strategic situation became 
such that we felt obliged to exercise it. 



Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons 

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to 
the interim agreement and its protocol. 

This agreement freezes at approximately 
current levels the aggregate number of in- 
tercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and 
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
launchers operational and under construction 
on each side for up to five years. We hope that 
it will be replaced well before that time by a 



more complete agreement in treaty form cov- 
ering strategic offensive weapons. 

Under the agreement, in articles I and II, 
the parties undertake a commitment not to 
construct additional fixed ICBM launchers 
and not to convert launchers for light or 
older ICBM's into launchers for modern 
heavy ICBM's. This undertaking by the So- 
viet Union should be viewed in terms of the 
concern in this country during the past sev- 
eral years about the continued buildup in 
numbers of Soviet ICBM's, particularly the 
heavy SS-9 ICBM's. The growth in num- 
bers of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM 
launchers has now been stopped. 

The agreement does not specify the num- 
ber of ICBM's operational and under con- 
struction when it was signed. We have made 
it abundantly clear to the Soviets, however, 
that we consider this number for the U.S.S.R. 
to be 1,618. Specifying the number of ICBM's 
in the agreement is not important, since na- 
tional means of verification will reveal if any 
new ICBM construction, which is prohibited 
by the agreement, were to take place. 

Article III and the protocol limit SLBM 
launchers and modern ballistic missile sub- 
marines. The agreement contains undertak- 
ings not to build such launchers and subma- 
rines above a given number. 

A ceiling of 62 has been set for the 
U.S.S.R. on the number of operational mod- 
ern submarines (Y-class nuclear-powered 
submarines). A ceiling of 950 SLBM launch- 
ers has been set for the U.S.S.R. This ceiling 
is to include all launchers on nuclear- 
powered submarines (Y-class and H-class 
submarines) and modern launchers on older 
submarines (G-class diesel-powered subma- 
rines). 

In effect, the agreement freezes SLBM 
launchers at present levels except that addi- 
tional SLBM launchers can be built if they 
replace older strategic launchers on a one- 
for-one basis. 

The Soviets are permitted to have no more 
than 740 launchers on nuclear-powered sub- 
marines of any type, operational and under 
construction, unless they effect replacement 
in accordance with agreed procedures. The 



July 10, 1972 



53 



purpose of the figure 740 is to establish a 
clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids 
uncertainty or debate over the definition of 
"under construction." 

To reach 950 SLBM's on modern subma- 
rines, the U.S.S.R. must retire older ballistic 
missile launchers — specifically, those for 
SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's and on H-class sub- 
marines. The first SLBM launcher after the 
740th launcher must be a replacement. The 
older ICBM or SLBM launchers being re- 
placed will be dismantled beginning no later 
than the date on which the submarine con- 
taining the 741st launcher begins sea trials. 

I might add that this one-way mix con- 
cept — permitting replacement of land-based 
launchers with submarine-based launchers — 
was first suggested by the United States early 
in SALT as a way of achieving greater stra- 
tegic stability. 

The U.S.S.R. could retain the existing older 
launchers on G-class submarines, in addition 
to 950 launchers on modern submarines. 
However, any launchers for modern SLBM's 
on these older diesel-powered submarines 
would have to be included in the 950 ceiling. 

The modernization and replacement provi- 
sions of the interim agreement will permit 
both sides to improve their missile forces, but 
the restrictions on converting launchers for 
light ICBM's or older heavy ICBM's to 
launchers for modern heavy ICBM's will 
place important qualitative restrictions on 
Soviet programs. The conversion of current 
U.S. ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman 
III missiles and the conversion of current 
Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon mis- 
siles, as well as the construction of new sub- 
marines as replacement for older ones, will 
not be prohibited. 

The agreement provides for application of 
the same verification procedures and com- 
mitments about nonconcealment and nonin- 
terference as contained in the ABM Treaty. 
The Standing Consultative Commission will 
also be used to promote the objectives and 
the implementation of the interim agi-eement. 

There is a commitment to continue active 
negotiations for more complete limitations on 
strategic offensive arms. The agreement also 



stipulates that its terms will not prejudice 
the scope and terms of the limitations on 
strategic offensive arms which may be 
worked out in the follow-on negotiations. 

The offensive arms limitations are tempo- 
rary and not comprehensive. They do not 
cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For ex- 
ample, strategic bombers, where the United 
States already has a very large advantage, 
are not limited by the interim agreement. 

The interim agreement does not limit on- 
going U.S. offensive arms programs. It does 
stop the Soviet Union from increasing the 
number of its strategic offensive missile 
launchers. These limitations on Soviet stra- 
tegic offensive forces, in conjunction with 
very low limits on ABM's on both sides, 
clearly advance U.S. security interests. 

Looked at overall, our forces are clearly 
sufficient to protect our, and our allies', secu- 
rity interests. U.S. strategic forces are quali- 
tatively superior to and more effective than 
Soviet strategic forces. The U.S.S.R. has 
more missile launchers. The United States 
has more missile warheads. We have many 
more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers 
alone are not an illuminating or useful meas- 
ui-e for judging the strategic balance. 



A New Era in Arms Control 

With these two agreements, we should have 
a more secure and stable strategic relation- 
ship with the U.S.S.R. 

Both sides gain assurance that their stra- 
tegic missile deterrent forces will not be ren- 
dered ineffective by the other's ABM system. 

But even with the advantages that these 
two agreements will bring, we must keep our 
strategic forces up to date if these are to con- 
tinue their central role for deterrence. Our 
forces must be adequate to deter attack on — 
or coercion of — the United States and its al- 
lies. The relationship between U.S. and So- 
viet strategic forces must be such that our 
ability and resolve to protect our vital inter- 
ests and those of our allies will not be under- 
estimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress 
agrees. 

Mr. Chairman, I have presented an over- 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



view of the basic undertakings of these 
agreements and of their significance. 

I think it wrong to ask who "won" or "lost" 
the initial SALT negotiations. In matters in- 
volving the central security interests of two 
great powers, any arms limitation agreement 
must respond to each side's interest or it will 
not last very long. Both sides must gain from 
SALT or neither does. 

With these two agreements we enter a new 
era in arms control, and what may have been 
difficult or impossible in the past may now be 
attainable. It should now be possible for both 
sides to agree to additional limitations, in- 
cluding reductions. 

The security of the United States will be 
strengthened by these two agreements. 

They will make possible a more rational 
and stable strategic relationship. 

They should help to improve American- 
Soviet relations and preserve and strengthen 
international security and world order. 

The threat of nuclear war will be dramati- 
cally reduced. 

The?" agreements will give the world 
greater hope for the future. 

Mr. Chairman, I urge that this committee 
and the Senate support the ABM Treaty and 
its accompanying interim agreement. 



President Nixon Urges Senate Passage 
of Foreign Aid Authorization 

Following is the text of a letter dated 
June 9 from President Nixon to Senate 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. An iden- 
tical letter was sent to Senate Minority Lead- 
er Hugh Scott. 

White House press release dated June 10 

June 9, 1972. 

In my special report to the joint session of 
the Congress on June 1, the evening of my 
return from the summit discussions in Mos- 
cow, I said that the door to the agreements 
that we reached there had been opened be- 
cause the United States had maintained the 
strength it needed to protect its interests. A 



vital and indispensable element of that 
strength has been our continuing security 
assistance program. 

The Foreign Assistance Authorization bill 
for fiscal year 1973, a significant portion of 
which is devoted to security assistance, is of 
direct and fundamental importance to the 
continued maintenance of our strength and 
the protection of our interests. As you know, 
the Senate will soon begin consideration of 
this bill, S. 3390. 

At Guam in 1969, I made clear that the 
United States would look increasingly to its 
friends and allies to play a greater role in 
providing for their own defense.^ Since that 
time we have moved forward steadily to- 
ward that objective with full recognition 
that our own security depends importantly 
upon the independence, the progress and the 
stability of our friends. But if we are to 
reach that goal, we must help others to de- 
velop the ability to defend themselves. My 
Foreign Assistance program requests for fis- 
cal year 1973 are based on these imperatives. 

The severe cuts in my fiscal year 1972 re- 
quests, and the restrictive amendments 
which were imposed, significantly limited 
our ability to move toward the basic ob- 
jectives of the program — the maintenance 
of the strength necessary to secure a last- 
ing peace. 

When I forwarded my fiscal year 1973 re- 
quests on March 10 [14], 1972, I reported 
that the foreign assistance appropriations 
for fiscal year 1972 were below the minimum 
level required to attain our foreign policy 
and national security goals. Such reductions 
and restrictions, if imposed by the Congress 
again in 1973, will call into serious question 
the firmness of our commitments abroad. 
Such Congressional action could have a de- 
stabilizing effect at a time when confidence 
in our support and perseverance will be 
critically needed. 

In recent months we have taken bold and 
decisive steps in our continuing search for 
peace. I believe that through these efforts 



' For President Nixon's remarks to news corre- 
spondents at Guam on July 25, 1969, see Public 
Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon, 1969, p. 
544. 



July 10, 1972 



55 



we have done much to enhance America's 
security and that of the entire world, pri- 
marily by diminishing the likelihood of di- 
rect confrontation with the Soviet Union and 
the Peoples Republic of China. Though we 
are making every effort to expand on these 
initial and significant steps, the process of 
building the structure of lasting peace will 
be long and arduous. 

I share with you the desire to withdraw 
our remaining forces from Indochina in a 
timely and honorable manner. But Con- 
gressional amendments which can be mis- 
construed by our adversaries to be hostile 
to my peace proposals of May 8 do not serve 
this objective. As I have reported to you 
and to the people of the United States, we 
are continuing to pursue every possible 
avenue toward peace in Southeast Asia. I 
have made clear to the North Vietnamese 
that we are fully prepared to participate in 
meaningful negotiations to achieve a settle- 
ment and I am hopeful that they will be con- 
vinced that such negotiations are in the 
best interests of all parties. 

I am firmly convinced that the achieve- 
ment of our purposes — in Vietnam and else- 
where — will be far more likely if this bill is 
passed in substantially the form in which 
I submitted it. As brought to the floor, how- 
ever, the bill is incompatible with these ob- 
jectives. 

I have always appreciated the assistance 
you have given me in formulating programs 
to ensure this nation's welfare and security. 
We seek the same ends — the maintenance of 
our strength and will, a lessening of ten- 



sions and an amelioration of the plight of 
the less privileged. I am confident that I can 
count on your firm support in the further 
pursuit of the goals. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon. 



United States and United Kingdom 
Sign New Extradition Treaty 

Press release 135 dated June 8 

An extradition treaty between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, which con- 
tains a number of new extraditable offenses 
not previously covered, was signed at Lon- 
don June 7. Ambassador Walter H. Annen- 
berg signed on behalf of the United States, 
and Minister Anthony Kershaw, M.C., M.P., 
signed for Her Majesty's Government. 

The new treaty, when ratified, will ter- 
minate and replace the existing extradition 
treaty between the United States and the 
United Kingdom of December 22, 1931. 

In addition to clarifying procedural as- 
pects of the extradition process, the new 
agreement includes aircraft hijacking as an 
extraditable offense. It also expands the pro- 
visions presently in effect regarding narcot- 
ics violations. 

The treaty will enter into force three 
months after the date of exchange of ratifi- 
cations. In the case of the United States, the 
treaty will require advice and consent to rati- 
fication by the United States Senate. 



56 



Department of Stole Bulletin 



President Echeverria of Mexico A^kes State Visit to the United States 



Luis Echeverria Alvarez, President of the 
United Mexican States, made a state visit 
to the United States June H-21. He met 
with President Nixoyi and other govermnent 
officials in Washington June 15-16. Follow- 
ing are an exchange of greetings between 
President Nixon and President Echeverria 
at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn 
of the White House on June 15 and their 
exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White 
House that evening; an address by President 
Echeverria made before a joint session of 
the Congress that day; an announcement is- 
sued that day concerning agreements signed 
by Secretary Rogers and Mexican Secretary 
for Foreign Relations Emilio 0. Rabasa; 
and the text of a joint communique issued 
June 17. 



EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 19 

President Nixon 

Mr. President, Senora Echeverria, all of 
our distinguished guests: Mr. President, 
we welcome you very warmly on your first 
official visit to Washington. We welcome 
you as the head of state of a great nation, 
our great and friendly neighbor to the 
south. And we welcome you also as a world 
leader of the first rank. 

During the course of our discussions we 
will have the opportunity to talk about bi- 
lateral issues between our two countries. I 
will be extremely interested in getting your 
views on hemispheric problems, particularly 
in view of your very eloquent comments in 
which you enunciated the Echeverria doc- 
trine in Santiago a short time ago. 

And since you are the first head of gov- 
ernment or head of state to visit Washing- 



ton since my visit to Moscow, I shall look 
forward to the opportunity to talk with you 
about international problems of mutual in- 
terest. We shall discuss these problems with 
great frankness and great candor. But what 
is even more important, we will discuss 
them as friends. 

Mr. President, the people of the United 
States of America have a very warm place in 
their hearts for the people of Mexico. I 
personally, and my wife, have a warm place 
in our hearts for your country, and we feel 
that as we meet you today, we meet not only 
as official friends but also as personal 
friends. We believe that Mexican-Ameri- 
can friendship is an indispensable corner- 
stone to our foreign policy, and we believe 
that our talks will contribute to that friend- 
ship and to the cause of peace and progress 
for all people in the world. 

President Echeverria ^ 

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon: A few 
yards away from us we can turn and see 
young mothers holding children in their 
arms, and as we see them we must think 
of young mothers all over the wprld hold- 
ing children in their arms, the children 
that are the new generation, the new hope 
for the world. 

These mothers look toward the future 
with either uncertainty or with hope. They 
want to see how the present leaders of this 
changing world are going to act and thus 
affect the future of these new generations. 

The great powers will be working and 
making decisions that will affect the future 
of these mothers and these children, and 
they will want to know what the future is. 



' President Echeverria spoke in Spanish on all 
occasions. 



July 10, 1972 



57 



This is what we must think of, all the 
leaders of the world today, that we have 
the fate of the world in our hands and 
that we are changing the world, that we will 
affect the course of history; and let us 
hope our contributions will be toward a 
world of peace, of security, and prosperity. 

Mr. President, we should never forget — 
and as we look around we are reminded 
by these young mothers and their children — 
how we are responsible for the conditions 
facing this new generation and we will be 
the ones responsible for deciding whether 
this will be a world for them of anguish 
or a world for peace. 

Mr. President, the people of Mexico bring 
to you and to the people of the United 
States, this great and friendly neighbor, our 
best and most cordial greetings from all of 
us, and I am certain that out of our conver- 
sations will come agreements that will be 
positive and will contribute toward the fur- 
ther progress of peace and prosperity in 
this changing world. 

We hope that we will be able to do this 
so that, no matter what our ideologies, the 
young of the small and great countries of 
the world will work together with a hope to 
contributing to peace in a better world to- 
day, that we may have an international or- 
der that will enable us to face the future 
with greater hope so that we will benefit 
these new generations that are the essence 
and the heart of our preoccupations, of our 
concern, and of our work. 

My warmest thanks to you, Mr. President, 
and to the great people of our friendly 
neighboring country, the United States, and 
in closing I express the hope, and I have 
no doubt, that out of our conversations will 
come agreements that will be mutually 
beneficial for both peoples. 

[At this point President Echeverria called to the 
platform two mothers and their daughters who had 
been viewing the ceremony.] 

Mr. President, in the whole world you 
can see beautiful scenes like this, children 
held in the arms of the mothers, and these 
young generations should be always on our 
minds, and I like to think, I wonder, what 



will be the world — what will be the world 
that we will leave to them, what will 
conditions be like in the year 2000 when 
these two beautiful young girls are grown 
up, and what will be the world for their 
children and their grandchildren? 

Will there be years of danger because of 
man's technological progress, or will we turn 
this technological progress into a better 
world and into better living conditions for 
all people? 

This is a thought, Mr. President, we 
should also bear with us — the thought of 
these young mothers with children in arms, 
of this new generation that we are working 
for. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 

White House press release dated June 15 

President Nixon 

Mr. President, Senora Echeverria, our 
very distinguished guests: As all of you 
know, Mrs. Nixon and I during this year, 
along with the Secretary of State, have 
traveled a great deal. We traveled halfway 
around the world to Peking. And then we 
traveled almost halfway around the world 
the other way to Moscow. 

And on this occasion in this house, we 
want all of you, our guests tonight, to know 
that it is very good to be home in the 
United States and to welcome our very good 
and dear friends from our great neighbor 
to the south, the President of Mexico and 
his wife. 

I would like to tell a little story as to 
how we feel about the President and his 
wife. This is not their first visit to this 
house. When he was President-elect, we had 
the honor of receiving them in the family 
dining room upstairs. And that was appro- 
priate, because whenever the President of 
Mexico visits the President of the United 
States, we feel that they are part of our fam- 
ily. We are all part of the American fam- 
ily in this hemisphere. 

But the story that I want to tell you re- 
lates to a very unfortunate experience. Just 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



before I went to Moscow, when we enter- 
tained in this room the parliamentarians 
from Mexico, on that occasion the distin- 
guished Ambassador to the United States 
from Mexico was held up at the gate. He 
was not a parliamentarian. He was not a 
Senator. He had no invitation. 

When he told me why he was delayed, 
I said to him, "The Ambassador from Mex- 
ico is always welcome in this house. He 
needs no invitation." 

And I say to the President of Mexico, 
to his wife and all of our friends from 
Mexico, you need no invitation. I will say 
to you, "Esta listed en su casa." 

And now returning to a more serious 
vein, I noted this morning in my remarks 
welcoming the President that we expected 
to discuss many things, bilateral problems, 
hemispheric problems, and international 
problems. We have had very good talks, 
and we will continue them tomorrow. 

But as I talked to the President of Mexico, 
I thought of what kind of man he was and 
what I could say about him in presenting 
him to our guests tonight. And I thought of 
another man whom it would be appropriate 
to mention, particularly in this room, as I 
stand below the only portrait that hangs in 
this room, the portrait of Abraham Lincoln. 

Lincoln was the great American President 
of the 19th century, and a contemporary of 
Lincoln was Benito Juarez. They did not 
know each other, but they respected each 
other. And each in his way kept his coun- 
try together at a time that it would other- 
wise have been torn apart. Both became 
revered national heroes. And we are re- 
ceiving the President of Mexico on the oc- 
casion of the 100th anniversary of the death 
of Benito Juarez, whose statue is just a few 
blocks from here in Washington, D.C. 

He said many interesting and very pro- 
found things during his life. But one very 
simple thing he said remains in my memory. 
He said, "Peace is respect for the rights of 
others." 

As I talked to the President of Mexico 
today, 100 years after the death of Juarez, 
I heard that theme expressed: Peace is re- 
spect by great nations for the rights of 



smaller nations. Peace is respect of the 
strong for the weak. Peace is respect of 
the rich for the poor. 

Never have I heard a more eloquent ex- 
pression on the part of a world statesman 
for the smaller nations, for the weaker 
nations, and the proud nations who are mov- 
ing upward toward progress and prosperity, 
hopefully in a world of peace. 

It has been my privilege in 25 years in 
government service, and as a private citizen, 
to meet and know personally over 100 heads 
of state and heads of government in the 
world. And I can say to my friends here 
from America, the United States of Amer- 
ica, and to our good friends and guests from 
Mexico, that in your President you have a 
man who because of his intelligence, his 
enormous energy, his humanity, and his 
understanding of the problems not only of 
his country but of the world, is in the first 
rank of the statesmen of the world that I 
have met in this last quarter of a century. 

That would be a high compliment to any 
man, but in proposing my toast tonight, I 
propose an even higher compliment. One 
hundred years after the death of Benito 
Juarez, we are fortunate to have in the 
great nation to the south of us a President 
who is in the great tradition of Juarez, who 
expounds eloquently the philosophy of 
Juarez, a man who has been and will be 
one of the great leaders not only of his 
own country but of this whole hemisphere. 

And so to the man who proudly and justi- 
fiably today wears the mantle of Juarez, 
President Echeverria of Mexico, I propose 
that we raise our glasses. 



President Echeverria 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon: We Mexicans 
cannot help but remember with great pleas- 
ure the fact that a few years ago — a little 
over 30 years ago — a young California law- 
yer who had just married a delicate and 
attractive schoolteacher picked our country 
for his honeymoon. They took a long jour- 
ney, made careful observations throughout 
their journey, without knowing that destiny 
would enable him someday to apply those 



July 10, 1972 



59 



observations more directly and more care- 
fully in this new relationship of ours that 
we are working at perfecting. 

We appreciate even more, however, the 
fact that 25 years after that wedding trip, 
the Nixons went back, with their children 
this time, went back over the trail of their 
honeymoon to show the children the various 
places where they had traveled on that oc- 
casion. 

And we believe, Mr. President, and Mrs. 
Nixon, that especially on this second journey 
when you went back with your daughters 
that this was a testimony of your affection, 
of a cordial expression of your sentiments 
that has nothing at all to do with politics 
but is just your personal opinion and senti- 
ments toward this country. 

Mr. President, you have recalled the fig- 
ures of Lincoln and Juarez. Both men 
emerged victorious from a very divisive civil 
war in their own countries, a war that had 
rendered deep divisions among their people. 

Both of them in practice led their peoples 
to the victory of the cause of what is right, 
and both of them consolidated the unity of 
their people. 

And what better than to recall them now 
when the world is trying to emerge from an 
era of deep divisions, is trying to find a 
path under law, so that with justice we, as 
we especially aspire to in the Americas, are 
trying to solve the problems that aff"ect us. 

And so daily, as we seek to find solutions 
to some of these terribly complex problems, 
some of them so complex as to seem insol- 
uble, I think it is positive, therefore, to find 
our inspiration in the best men produced 
by our history. And it is right then that 
we should look back upon these heroes of 
our past who with justice, recognizing how 
— through their very efforts, their arduous 
struggles, their daily sacrifices — how they 
won victory for their countries and served 
their people through that cause. Their best 
reward for them was to achieve a victory 
for the good cause that they espoused. 

You had invited us in December of 1970 
to a small friendly dining room on the 



second floor of the White House. On that 
occasion, Mr. President, you told me that 
after I took office that you would invite me 
and my wife to come to Washington on a 
full state visit, which is what we are in 
the process of engaging ourselves in now, 
and that on this occasion we would talk 
about a number of subjects that you have 
just mentioned which then, as President- 
elect, I was not in a position to discuss. 

Some might think that we have come to 
speak on behalf of Mexico with frankness, 
perhaps with excessive frankness, about 
some of our common problems. But your 
various journeys, Mr. President, to these 
two great world powers of recent months 
have shown that we are living new days 
indeed, and days in which problems must be 
faced, and when we say face problems it 
means show our face and face up to the 
problems that do exist. 

And so I ask — and I will answer in the 
affirmative before I even finish the question 
— is this a new style that is being introduced 
into international political life, is this a new 
diplomatic style that we are using that is 
coming from the Americas that will have 
effects on the entire world ? And the answer, 
as I said, is in the afl!irmative. 

Because this is a process of renewal, this 
new style, this new approach that we are 
showing in this hemisphere that will affect 
the entire world. This is a very special style, 
a very effective style, because it has a very 
great sense of realism. 

So we are in a sense rediscovering con- 
temporary realism and facing up to our 
problems close up, and I think this will per- 
mit us to overcome the crisis of our days. 

Mr. President, in thinking of your tem- 
perament as a fighter, and your will to fight 
and to win, we really could not find a full ex- 
planation of these virtues without looking at 
the moral strength that you derive from this 
delightful lady who is your wife. 

And so, ladies and gentlemen — and this is 
not a mere formula of courtesy and affection 
— but please, if you would, rise and join me 
in a toast to the President and to this dis- 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



tlnguished lady, with all of her high virtues, 
who has been a great companion to this 
great fighter, and as Mexicans we invite 
you to reiterate this expression of our deep 
affection for President and Mrs. Nixon and 
our great appreciation for their warm hos- 
pitality. 



ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA 
BEFORE THE CONGRESS- 

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Honorable 
Senators and Members of the House: I 
thank you for the honor of having invited 
me to speak before this assembly which 
represents the American people. 

The United States is the creator of one 
of the most significant experiences of con- 
temporary history. The establishment of a 
society based on equality before the law and 
on the principles of political democracy drew 
people from all corners of the globe and 
made this land the source of great advances 
in the intellectual and material progress of 
humanity. 

The United States was born during the 
era of the great ideological revolution of the 
18th century. The principles of liberalism 
were the source of its dynamic drive. How- 
ever, the growing complexities of its internal 
and external life brought about attitudes 
that were not always in accord with the 
values of a system based on the right of all 
persons, groups of persons, or nations to 
self-fulfillment within the framework of 
their own freedom. 

One of the virtues of the American society 
is its capacity for deep thought and self- 
criticism which seems to correct its errors 
and to renew its concept of the world. Now 
that it has a greater awareness of its 
strength and the careful manner in which 
it should be used, we trust that it will de- 
vise a policy to meet the real demands of 
our time. 

The United States is encouraging dia- 
logue with other world powers that have 



different ideologies. Apparently irrecon- 
cilable antagonisms have been attenuated, 
and lines of communication that were closed 
for many years have been opened. Never- 
theless, these changes have not yet been re- 
flected in the policy of the United States 
toward the Third World and toward the 
Latin American countries, in particular. 

The nuclear threat and arduous economic 
competition among the great powers have 
made them seek self-limitation in peaceful 
coexistence. However, the end of the cold 
war will not be the beginning of a period 
of peace as long as the weak countries are 
excluded from its benefits. 

The countries of the Third World are 
glad to see any negotiations and any agree- 
ment that tends to reduce international ten- 
sions, but they are suspicious of pacts be- 
tween great powers that ignore the rights 
and interests of less developed nations. 

We cannot be in agreement with those 
who try to reduce world politics to deal- 
ings among powerful nations. We agree 
even less with those who confuse power 
with the capacity to produce nuclear weap- 
ons. The possibility of oppressed nations to 
change is also a political fact whose impor- 
tance we cannot underestimate. 

Moreover, we understand that the solu- 
tion of the main problems we now face — 
peace, security, and development — lies not 
in the formation of closed international 
clubs, but in the participation of all the peo- 
ples of the world in the decisions that af- 
fect them all. 

A harmonious situation cannot be founded 
on the dissension of most of the inhabitants 
of the world. Our people are aware that 
their poverty produces wealth for others. 
The accumulated resentment against politi- 
cal colonialism is now reborn against eco- 
nomic colonialism. 

Peace and progress depend to an ever- 
increasing degree on the attitude that we 
adopt together to close the alarming gap 



' Reprinted from the Congressional Record of 
June 15, p. H 5658. 



July 10, 1972 



61 



that separates the rich nations from the 
poor ones. Political and demographic pres- 
sures of less developed countries endanger 
the stability of wealthy societies. If effec- 
tive policies of balanced development are not 
adopted, poverty will cross all borders. 

History shows that the most powerful 
empires were destroyed by the contradic- 
tions and social conflicts which their own 
power produced. It is more sensible to lay 
the foundations of security on a better dis- 
tribution of wealth than on the progressive 
stockpiling of arms and technological re- 
sources. 

It is necessary to end an era in which the 
immediate interest of a few has prevailed 
over the permanent interest of many. Real- 
ism in politics and economics consists in ob- 
taining constant and sound earnings and 
not in procuring quick profits, generally un- 
fair and frequently imaginary. 

With the same clearness of mind and 
pragmatism with which the need for mutual 
respect among powerful countries is recog- 
nized, it is necessary to understand that 
lasting peace depends on absolute respect for 
the way in which each country has chosen 
to achieve progress. 

Colonial attitudes that should have disap- 
peared still try to control international rela- 
tions. The centers of world influence im- 
pose their conditions for exchange on the 
other countries. Moreover, they reduce the 
capacity of action of weak nations by op- 
posing indispensable transformation of 
structures or by intervening in the political 
processes of these nations. 

The history of underdeveloped nations is 
a permanent struggle between the forces 
that seek social change and those that try 
to perpetuate injustice. The latter almost 
always have the support of powerful for- 
eign groups that try to impose inadequate 
systems on countries whose true reality they 
ignore. 

The great powers are beginning to un- 
derstand the danger that such an attitude 
implies for their own stability. And this 
fact coincides with a better organization of 
the poor nations in defense of their legiti- 
mate rights and interests. Therefore the 



moment is ripe to unite efforts. The weak 
nations must be convinced that the basis of 
change resides in their own attempts to im- 
prove their situation. The powerful nations 
must keep in mind that civilizations are 
strengthened and survive not when they sub- 
jugate, but when they share. 

Mexico participates in the problems, as- 
pirations, and demands of developing na- 
tions. The relations between our two coun- 
tries ai'e, in a certain way, a mirror of the 
American attitude toward nations that strug- 
gle for their liberation. 

The United States is finding the way to 
hai-monize its interests with those of the 
countries where the important revolutions 
of the 20th century were made. Now it is 
better equipped to understand Mexico not 
only as a neighbor but as a nation born 
from an ideological and social movement 
with its own characteristics. 

The foreign policy of Mexico toward the 
United States, as toward any other country, 
follows the nation's objectives: to strength- 
en its political autonomy, establish its cul- 
tural personality, extend the basis of its de- 
mocracy, surmount underdevelopment, and 
put an end to any system of exploitation. 

The main purpose of our visit to the 
United States on this occasion, in response 
to President Nixon's kind invitation, is to 
assess the relations between our nations and 
examine the real possibilities of establishing 
fairer treatment in the future. 

The best way for us to fulfill these ob- 
jectives is to express Mexico's points of view 
with clarity and firmness. To reach realistic 
and lasting agreements, we must define our 
respective positions. 

Mexico does not expect special treatment 
from the United States, but only asks that 
our contacts and exchanges be regulated by 
the standards of fairness and respect that 
should govern all international relations. 

We must proceed in our own way; we 
live our own life style and our own ideology. 
We do not try to impose our principles on 
anyone, but neither do we allow any foreign 
interference. We are respectful of the rights 
of others and want them to respect our 
rights. We are sure that a greater degree of 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



cooperation between our two countries is not 
only feasible but necessaiy. 

I do not think this is the time for a de- 
tailed examination of the problems that we 
should solve together, but I believe it is ad- 
visable to refer to some of current interest. 

To achieve a better understanding be- 
tween our two countries, it would be advis- 
able for you to consider certain problems 
which are not of great concern to American 
public opinion but which do have serious con- 
sequences for us. 

The artificial salinity of the Colorado River 
is the most delicate problem between our two 
countries. The water from the Wellton- 
Mohawk Canal has severely affected the ag- 
riculture of the Mexicali Valley and has 
brought poverty to thousands of farmers. 
The damage is enormous, and Mexican pub- 
lic opinion is becoming increasingly im- 
patient about this important matter that 
has been going on for more than a decade 
without any satisfactory solution. 

The Imperial Valley and the Mexicali 
Valley are part of the same river basin that 
the Colorado River irrigates. In the treaty 
of 1944 it was agreed that the quality of the 
water to be delivered to us would serve use- 
ful purposes, and therefore the only possible 
interpretation of this instrument is equal 
conditions for both parties concerned. Vol- 
untary pollution of the water that flows into 
our territory is an unacceptable form of dis- 
crimination. 

Mexico does not wish to bi'eak the prin- 
ciples of our neighborly friendship by re- 
sorting to litigation; however, it expressly 
reserves its rights in Act 218 [Minute No. 
218 dated March 22, 1965, of the Interna- 
tional Boundary and Water Commission, 
United States and Mexico] and will defend 
them vigorously under any circumstances. 

In any case, it is impossible to understand 
why the United States does not use the same 
boldness and imagination that it applies to 
solving complex problems with its enemies 
to the solution of simple problems with its 
friends. 

Indications that there are minority groups 
who want to limit the import of Mexican 
agricultural products and forbid entry of 



goods semimanufactured abroad with Amer- 
ican raw materials and products are also of 
concern to us. Both measures would be 
harmful to our already extremely unfavor- 
able trade balance with the United States 
and would also have negative effects on the 
American consumer. 

Any new limitation that might be estab- 
lished on Mexican imports would be a severe 
setback to our bilateral relations. Lack of 
foresight could raise a barrier between eco- 
nomic structures that would obtain impor- 
tant reciprocal benefits if they were to effec- 
tively combine their resources. This would 
be inadequate. 

We have made it clear in other forums 
that there can be no justification for the 
United States delay in the adoption of the 
general scheme of tariff preferences, sug- 
gested by the Second World Conference on 
Trade and Development. 

We do not aspire to special concessions 
in the field of foreign trade, but we consider 
it unfair that the exportation of our manu- 
factured goods should not be compensated 
advantageously in view of the high prices 
that we are obliged to pay for the capital 
goods and technology that we require. 

It is equally inexplicable, among countries 
solemnly dedicated to join forces in order 
that their peoples may attain a harmonious 
development, that measures such as the 
tariff reductions that have been granted by 
the United Kingdom, the European Eco- 
nomic Community, Japan, and other indus- 
trialized countries, both capitalistic and so- 
cialistic, should not be adopted. 

Let us not confuse private or local interests 
with national interests. Let us not permit our 
many contacts — the logical result of our geo- 
graphic proximity — to make us forget the 
order of importance of the different factors 
that determine relations among states. 

Mexico proposes to the people and Gov- 
ernment of the United States that we begin 
a new phase of our relations. Thus you would 
conform to the action you have taken in 
other areas, and we would attain the objec- 
tives that have always guided our foreign 
policy. 

The interdependence of countries opens 



July 10, 1972 



63 



unsuspected possibilities of progress, but it 
also exposes us to new subjections dangerous 
in the measure in which they are disguised. 
That is why cooperation among independent 
states demands the full exercise of their 
sovereign rights. 

Mexico has always defended the right of 
its people to freely forge their destiny. It 
searches incessantly for new social and eco- 
nomic formulas within the frame of its Con- 
stitution. 

We hold that true development derives 
the impulse toward production from an 
equitable distribution of wealth and the 
satisfaction of social demands. We believe 
that growth without justice ends in the 
annulment of democracy and that freedom 
is only possible through equitable progress. 

We do not want to negotiate, with other 
countries, advantages that favor economic 
minorities. The heritage of prolonged rela- 
tionships of dependence should be combated 
simultaneously at the international level and 
within the scope of our own countries. 

Autonomy before others and internal par- 
ticipation are inseparable goals of independ- 
ent development. We do not wish to consoli- 
date privileged groups that serve as obvious 
links with centers of power nor cause a 
breach that would isolate us from the cur- 
rents of progress. 

If we can expand the scope of our collabo- 
ration, if we use the law and our good will 
to reconcile our differences, if we rigorously 
apply the standards of fair international co- 
existence to our relations, we will have made 
great progress along the road of our friend- 
ship. We will have contributed to the cre- 
ation of a peaceful and prosperous future 
for both nations. 

I have come to speak with you Senators 
and Representatives on behalf of a neighbor- 
ing country and a friend of the United 
States. There is no true friendship without 
frankness; a frankness will lead us to the 
solution of common problems within a frame- 
work of justice. This means a renewal of 
our common faith in democracy using the 
unlimited possibilities of the human spirit, 



as long as it is developed within a frame- 
work of freedom, because the human spirit 
can develop only within an atmosphere 
which it needs. An atmosphere which it 
needs can be provided only within a frame- 
work of political, social, and economic de- 
mocracy. 

We cannot divide the personality of man 
and think that we can solve his material 
problems without solving the problems that 
make up his whole composition. The instru- 
ments that man has created within the eco- 
nomic industrial field and his whole con- 
temporary civilization in general in which 
he lives must be placed in the service of the 
whole man. That is why dictators attempt to 
divide man, to try to standardize him, and 
to try by compulsion to divide his very per- 
sonality. 

That is why in political relations within 
each country or in international relations 
among countries, if there is a predominance 
of the play of passing interests alone, we 
run the risk of interference with the full 
development of contemporary man. 

So let us seek in our internal political re- 
lations within our own countries and in our 
international relations among ourselves this 
new sense of a new humanism, and let us 
not confuse ends with means, because the 
nations of this hemisphere were born with 
a special destiny that needs to be nurtured 
within those fields which give man his great- 
ness, which is a greatness which we must not 
abdicate. 

Senators and Representatives, I have 
brought you the cordial and warm greetings 
of the people of the Government of Mexico, 
leaving aside the rules of protocol and diplo- 
macy that sometimes distract us from the 
very great truths of our time, in order that 
we may join together, working for our re- 
spective peoples, and I bring to you for the 
record Mexico's willingness and desire to 
speak with frankness to its great neighbor 
and friend, the United States, so we may 
obtain greater cooperation in the future and 
eliminate certain barriers that separate us 
now and perhaps in the future, so that in 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



the future we may achieve a balance of de- 
velopment within a framework of freedom, 
which is so necessary for the human spirit 
and the spirit of democracy, to which we 
may ever aspire, and so we may work to- 
gether in the future for the welfare of our 
peoples. 

Thank you very much. 



ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS 

White House press release dated June 15 

In a ceremony at the White House on the occasion 
of the state visit of President Luis Echeverria, Sec- 
retary of State William Rogers and the Mexican 
Secretary of Foreign Relations, Emilio 0. Rabasa, 
exchanged diplomatic notes bringing into effect a 
series of bilateral agreements between the United 
States and Mexico in the scientific, technological, 
and cultural fields. 

Agreement for Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation 

The agreement provides for a broad program of 
cooperation in areas of science and technology, with 
a view to contributing to the greater mutual prog- 
ress of the two countries. It envisions more specifi- 
cally the strengthening of economic and social de- 
velopment, the intensification of relations between 
the two countries' scientists and technicians, and 
through combined efforts facilitation and increase 
of the exchange of persons, ideas, skills, experience, 
and information. 

The two governments will establish a mixed com- 
mission for the formulation, orientation, and review 
of the programs promoted under the agreement, to 
meet alternately in the United States and Mexico. 
It will examine activities periodically and make rec- 
ommendations, suggesting useful specific projects or 
subjects under the program. 

Each government will appoint an executive agency 
to implement its part of the program, to work closely 
with its counterpart, and to report jointly and 
periodically to the mixed commission. 

The program may include the exchange of scien- 
tists and technicians, the execution of joint research 
and personnel training projects, joint meetings, and 
other activity which will, as with the exchange espe- 
cially of young technicians, advance the objectives 
of the program. 

Except in the case of particular understandings 
concerning the financing of certain agreements, each 
government will bear the cost of executing its re- 
sponsibilities under the program. The governments 



may invite participation when appropriate of inter- 
national organizations. All scientific and technologi- 
cal information derived from the cooperative pro- 
gram will be made available to the world's scientific 
and technological community. 

Technician Exchange 

This agreement contemplates the exchange of 
young technicians and scientists between the United 
States and Mexico. 

An outgrowth of President Echeverria's deep per- 
sonal interest in developing Mexico's technology to 
match and give impetus to her economic growth and 
to provide increased employment for her young peo- 
ple, the exchange will be carried out under the terms 
of the broader agreement on science and technology 
referred to above. 

Initially, the United States has offered to provide 
training for some 100 Mexican technicians and scien- 
tists, largely in government training facilities. The 
agencies ready to offer training include the Depart- 
ments of Agriculture; Health, Education, and Wel- 
fare; Transportation; Interior; and the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission. 

Mexico is prepared to offer a similar number of 
training positions to young technicians and scientists 
from the United States. 

Details of the United States and Mexican contri- 
butions to the program will be worked out jointly 
between the two governments. 

In implementing President Echeverria's philoso- 
phy, Mexico has established similar exchange pro- 
grams with several countries, including France and 
Japan. 

Cultural Agreement 

This new agreement, which revises and stream- 
lines the procedures of a 1949 agreement, calls for 
annual meetings by a Mexican-U.S. Commission on 
Cultural Cooperation. This joint commission will 
orient and review the cultural exchange programs 
between the two countries, and wfU provide informa- 
tion, advice, and recommendations to organizations 
which conduct activities in this field. 

In his note, Secretary Rabasa referred to the 
"fruitful interchange between the two countries in 
the fields of education and culture" which had been 
fostered by the earlier agreement and expressed the 
hope this new agreement will usefully update the 
functions of the joint commission and give added 
impetus to cultural relations between Mexico and 
the United States. 

Remote Sensing Agreement 

This agreement represents the extension until July 
1, 1974, of a 1968 agreement covering cooperative 
research in remote sensing for earth surveys. In 



July 10, 1972 



65 



addition, it modifies the earlier agreement by pro- 
viding that the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration will use its best efforts to acquire 
and process Earth Resources Technology Satellite 
data obtained over Mexico. Further, NASA will pro- 
vide training in remote sensing data techniques to a 
number of qualified Mexican technicians. 



TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE 

White House press release (Key Biscayne. Fla.) dated June 17 

President Richard Nixon and President Luis 
Echeverria Alvarez welcomed this opportunity to 
renew their personal friendship and the cordial dia- 
logue which began at their first meeting here in 
1970. They regarded this visit as particularly appro- 
priate at a time when the eyes of the world have 
been focused on President Nixon's recent visits to 
Peking and Moscow. The visit of the Mexican Presi- 
dent to the United States serves to direct broad 
attention to the equally important tasks of advanc- 
ing new approaches to Latin America and the less 
developed nations of the world. 

They also agreed that their meetings had con- 
tributed to the establishment of a new era, an open- 
ing characterized by a spirit of frankness, with 
Mexico and which they hoped would characterize 
intra-Hemispheric relations. 

The two Presidents exchanged impressions on 
world and Western Hemisphere affairs in consider- 
able detail. President Nixon described his talks with 
the Chinese and Soviet leaders. President Echeverria 
recounted his experiences on recent visits to Japan, 
Chile and Peru. They found this review informative, 
useful as well as stimulating. They were firmly 
united in the view that world peace with social 
justice is essential to the well-being of all mankind. 

The Presidents discussed overall relations between 
their two countries — political and economic affairs, 
and cooperation in the scientific, technical, cultural 
and other fields. 

The President of the United States recognized the 
important role developing countries could and should 
play in erecting a new international monetary sys- 
tem and in progressing toward a free and fair trad- 
ing system. In endorsing trade policies more respon- 
sive to the problems of both developed and develop- 
ing countries, he reaffirmed his intention to seek 
congressional authorization at the appropriate time 
for the United States to participate with other in- 
dustrialized countries in a system of Generalized 
Tariff Preferences for imports from developing 
countries. 

Regarding the problem of the salinity of the Colo- 
rado River, President Echeverria told President 
Nixon that Mexico reiterates its position as regards 
receiving its assignment of original waters from the 
Colorado River, to which the Treaty of February 3, 



1944 refers, and therefore, with the same quality as 
those derived from the Imperial Dam. 

To this, President Nixon replied that this was a 
highly complex problem that needed careful exami- 
nation of all aspects. He was impressed by the 
presentation made by President Echeverria and 
would study it closely. It was his sincere desire to 
find a definitive, equitable and just solution to this 
problem at the earliest possible time because of the 
importance both nations attach to this matter. 

As a demonstration of this intent and of the good- 
will of the United States in this connection, he was 
prepared to: 

(a) undertake certain actions immediately to im- 
prove the quality of water going to Mexico; 

(b) designate a special representative to begin 
work immediately to find a permanent, definitive and 
just solution of this problem; 

(c) instruct the special representative to submit 
a report to him by the end of this year; 

(d) submit this proposal, once it has the approval 
of this Government to President Echeverria for his 
consideration and approval. 

President Echeverria said that he recognized the 
goodwill of President Nixon and his interest in 
finding a definitive solution to this problem at the 
earliest possible time. He added that based on two 
recent trips to the Mexicali Valley and his talks with 
farmers there, his Government, while reserving its 
legal rights, had decided to stop using waters from 
the Wellton-Mohawk project for irrigation purposes 
while waiting for receipt of the US proposal for a 
definitive solution. 

Both Presidents agreed to instruct their Water 
and Border Commissioners to prepare and sign a 
Minute containing the above program and commit- 
ments as soon as possible. 

The Presidents discussed the many areas of on- 
going cooperation between Mexico and the United 
States, and their conviction that such cooperation 
serves to bind our people even closer together in 
mutual effort and understanding. They took note of 
the agreements concluded during the visit by their 
respective Secretaries for Foreign Relations: a bi- 
lateral agreement with regard to the exchange of 
information, training and research in the fields of 
science and technology; a subsidiary agreement 
which contemplates the exchange of young techni- 
cians and scientists (including the training of some 
100 young Mexican technicians and scientists 
through US Government agencies); renewal of the 
agreement on Cultural Relations. 

President Nixon and President Echeverria dis- 
cussed the serious nature of the illicit international 
traffic in narcotic drugs. They reviewed the joint 
enforcement measures which their countries have 
successfully undertaken over the past two years. 
President Nixon informed President Echeverria of 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



recent measures taken to combat the drug problem 
in the United States. They agreed to acquire and 
employ additional equipment in the antinarcotics 
campaign and to make available increased training 
of personnel for this purpose. 

With regard to the question of migratory Mexican 
workers, the two Presidents discussed the economic, 
social and political factors that produce this problem 
and agreed it was desirable for each government 
to undertake immediately a study of this question 
with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solu- 
tion. 

Recognizing the communality of many environ- 
mental problems and the need to seek cooperative 
solutions through the exchange of research and ex- 
perience, the two Presidents have agreed that ap- 
propriate policy level officials from Mexico and the 
US will meet on a regular basis for discussion and 
consultation concerning current and future environ- 



mental problems of mutual concern and the methods 
for dealing with them in a more systematic way. 

The conversations between Presidents Niicon and 
Echeverria were at all times cordial and marked by 
the spirit of good neighborliness which exists be- 
tween Mexico and the US. At the same time prob- 
lems were discussed frankly and openly as between 
true friends in an atmosphere of mutual respect and 
trust. President Echeverria particularly wished to 
convey on behalf of Mrs. Echeverria, his party and 
himself, his deep appreciation for the warm hospi- 
tality which was extended to them by President and 
Mrs. Nixon. 

President Nixon expressed his great pleasure that 
President and Mrs. Echeverria will now have an 
opportunity to visit other areas and cities of the 
United States and assured them they will receive a 
warm and friendly welcome from the American peo- 
ple. 



THE CONGRESS 



Coordination of United States Foreign Economic Policy 



Statement by Secretary Rogers 



I welcome this opportunity to expand on 
the brief exchange we had on this subject 
last March. Mr. Culver [Representative 
John C. Culver] asked me at that time 
whether I agreed that foreign economic 
questions had become more important in 
the context of our foreign policy and secu- 
rity interests. As I said then, I certainly do 
agree; indeed, in the introduction to my first 
foreign policy repoi't in March 1971, I said 
that economic relations would undoubtedly 
figure more largely in the foreign policy of 



' Made before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on June 20 (press release 144). The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



the United States and of other nations dur- 
ing the rest of the century. The subsequent 
events of last August and beyond have put 
into sharp relief the central role which eco- 
nomic policy must play in our international 
affairs. 

Mr. Culver also asked whether the admin- 
istrative arrangements within the U.S. Gov- 
ernment were adequate to cope with these 
issues and, in particular, with their foreign 
policy implications. I said that I was not en- 
tirely satisfied with the functioning of the 
present mechanism for dealing with these 
problems. It is to this that I will devote my 
remarks today. 

To place the matter in perspective, let me 
recall the economic and political develop- 
ments which underlie and explain the diflS- 



July 10, 1972 



67 



culties we have been experiencing in formu- 
lating and administering our international 
economic policy. 

Before World War II, governments did not 
pay enough attention to their foreign eco- 
nomic relations. In the State Department, 
we had only a handful of officers in the eco- 
nomic section, plus some people in the geo- 
graphic offices and embassies who dealt with 
such questions, generally on a part-time 
basis. The same was true of other foreign 
offices. This worldwide neglect of interna- 
tional economic relations did not produce 
very happy results. Nations tended to act uni- 
laterally according to what they considered 
to be their domestic imperatives, restricting 
trade and money transfers, dumping exports, 
and manipulating their currencies, with little 
regard for the damage they were doing to 
the interests of other countries. These "beg- 
gar-thy-neighbor" policies contributed sig- 
nificantly to spreading the Great Depression 
and prolonging its effects throughout the 
1930's. 

The first step to reverse the spiral of pro- 
tectionism was taken by the United States 
in 1934, with the passage of Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade pro- 
gram. Ever since that time the United States 
has been at the forefront of the drive to lib- 
eralize world trade. 

After the war we were determined to 
avoid a repetition of the errors of the early 
1930's. The United States took the initiative 
in negotiating the international agreements 
and institutions which have provided the 
foundations of our international economic 
system: GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade], the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund], and the World Bank. We 
launched the Marshall plan to help western 
Europe get back on its feet, and we assisted 
the economic recovery of Japan. We assumed 
a major part of the responsibility for the 
defense of the non-Communist world and for 
economic aid to the developing countries. 

Thus we helped pave the way for a period 
of unprecedented growth in production, 
trade, and investment. This growth bene- 
fited everybody. In our own case, between 
1950 and 1970 U.S. exports increased four- 



fold and our direct investment abroad six- 
fold. 

All this required both an increase in the 
human and financial resources devoted to 
foreign policy and an emphasis on economic 
aspects of our foreign policy. In the early 
postwar period our problems were simpli- 
fied by the convergence of our various in- 
terests: political, military, and economic; 
domestic and international ; short-term and 
long-term. We did not have to worry in those 
days about our balance of payments, nor did 
we have to concern ourselves greatly about 
our competitive position. The main obstacle 
to our exports was the dollar shortage of our 
trading partners. Our political and national 
security objectives were the predominant 
considerations in our foreign economic pol- 
icy. The role of the State Department, which 
— together with the aid agency — provided 
leadership and coordination in this field, re- 
mained unchallenged throughout the 1950's. 

The problems of our foreign economic re- 
lations became increasingly complex during 
the 1960's. The European Community and 
Japan became major centers of economic 
power and strong trading competitors as 
well as major trading partners. In the sec- 
ond half of the sixties, our competitive po- 
sition was eroded by inflation, which created 
problems for our exports and increased the 
pressure of imports on certain sectors of 
our economy. Our balance of payments de- 
teriorated. 

These developments underlined the close 
relationship which in today's world must 
exist between our domestic economy and our 
international economic position, and between 
our domestic and foreign economic policies. 
They also made more apparent the close link 
between events in the monetary field and 
developments in foreign trade. 

In the integrated world economy of the 
1970's, it is only natural that other depart- 
ments — Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, 
and Labor — should increase their interest 
and involvement in our international eco- 
nomic relations. Other agencies as well — 
such as Interior, Justice, Defense, the Coun- 
cil of Economic Advisers, the Federal Re- 
serve Board, the Federal Trade Commission, 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Federal Maritime Commission, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission — are becoming more concerned 
with some facets of our foreign economic 
policy. 

This development is both inevitable and 
welcome. It is inevitable because of the wide 
range of interests which must be heard and 
the specialized expertise that is required. 
It is welcome because, by increasing the 
stake of all United States agencies in a 
flourishing international economy, it helps to 
insure against the shortsighted "beggar- 
thy-neighbor" approach which hurt us all in 
the early 1930's. 

The problem has been how to take all 
these various interests into account and 
still provide effective coordination in the 
formulation and execution of our foreign 
economic policy. The importance of such 
coordination has never been so great as it 
is today. 

The National Security Council, to some 
extent, performed this role in the past, as 
have various special groups in more narrow 
fields, such as the Office of the Special Rep- 
resentative for Trade Negotiations. A more 
recent effort was the establishment last year 
of the Council on International Economic 
Policy (CIEP), which is chaired by the Pres- 
ident. I was one of those who recommended 
the establishment of the Council to facili- 
tate orderly procedures for dealing with 
different points of view and to enable the 
President to arbitrate differences among 
government departments and insure that de- 
cisions are carried out by all agencies con- 
cerned. 

There is no doubt in my mind, Mr. Chair- 
man, that all the different viewpoints must 
be brought into the decisionmaking process. 
We recognize that other government depart- 
ments are particularly attuned to various 
sectors of the domestic economy or have 
specialized knowledge in certain fields and 
thus have special contributions to make. 

It is often said that each agency has its 
special constituency — agriculture, business, 
labor, and, in the case of the State Depart- 
ment, the "foreign constituency." This, I 
submit, is a harmful misconception. 



Speaking only for the State Department, I 
can assure you that we have only one con- 
stituency, and that is the United States of 
America. We have only one basic concern, 
and that is to achieve our national objectives. 
In seeking to do so, we would not properly 
discharge our responsibilities if we did not 
look at all aspects of the U.S. national in- 
terest — domestic as well as foreign; eco- 
nomic as well as political — as we weighed 
a proposed course of action. 

Let me be a bit more specific. A common 
allegation about the State Department is 
that, where the United States has a com- 
plaint, the Department is reluctant to take 
a "tough" position with foreign govern- 
ments. The allegation is not true. In any par- 
ticular situation our job is to advance, as 
forcefully and effectively as we can, the 
overall U.S. interest. This requires us to 
place the matter in perspective; to think of 
all our interests at home and abroad ; to an- 
ticipate foreign reactions, including possible 
counteraction; to weigh benefits and costs; 
to consider the short term and the long 
term; to gauge how action in one area will 
affect our interests in another. It is also our 
task to explore alternative ways of taking 
care of the problem which may have the 
least damaging side effects. 

I realize that an approach which takes due 
note of the complexities of a problem will not 
always please everyone. But we would be 
remiss in our responsibilities to the Presi- 
dent if we did not bring to bear the full ex- 
tent of our knowledge of foreign conditions 
and attitudes as an important element of the 
overall assessment the President must make. 

I also take exception to the common alle- 
gation that the State Department has tended 
to neglect the domestic implications of our 
foreign economic policy. On the contrary, we 
are deeply convinced that the success of our 
policies abroad depends critically on a dy- 
namic and competitive economy at home. 
Such a dynamic economy is our primary as- 
set in all of our foreign relations. Thus the 
major objective of our foreign economic 
policy is to assure the international con- 
ditions of competition and cooperation which 
can keep our economy strong. 



July 10, 1972 



69 



We now have a mechanism to assess the 
vast complex of interrelated elements which 
go into the process of foreign economic 
policy formulation. For this mechanism to 
function properly, it is necessary that all 
agencies should use it and that they should 
devote adequate resources to it. 

The Council on International Economic 
Policy, of which I am Vice Chairman, has 
been in existence for little more than a year. 
A vast amount of work has been done under 
the auspices of the Council and of its Oper- 
ations Group, which is chaired by the Deputy 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Af- 
fairs, to analyze the manifold aspects of the 
problems which face us and to explore long- 
term solutions. Interagency groups chaired 
by the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, 
Commerce, State, and Treasury and the 
Office of the Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations have been engaged in 
this comprehensive program of interrelated 
studies and have made a number of specific 
recommendations for domestic and inter- 
national action. 

I believe we have now reached the stage 
where we can proceed from these analyses to 
the development of a comprehensive action 
program, including, in particular, the de- 
velopment of an overall strategy for inter- 
national monetary and trade negotiations, 
and recommendations for legislative action. 

We in the State Department believe that 
this can be done effectively in the present 
CIEP framework. I strongly support the re- 
quest for legislative authorization and fund- 
ing of the CIEP. 

So far, I have addressed myself to policy 
formulation. Mv general conclusion on this 
is that we should encourage wide and diverse 
participation in this process. This cannot 
apply, however, to the process of communi- 
cation and negotiation with foreign coun- 
tries. Here we must speak with one voice 
if we are to carry out an effective foreign 
economic policy. This is the area where there 
is the greatest need for improvement. For- 
eigners tend to be confused when faced with 
U.S. spokesmen taking different and some- 
times conflicting positions. And they may be 



tempted to take advantage of differences 
they may perceive among U.S. departments. 

The State Department has the responsi- 
bility under the President for the conduct 
of our foreign relations. This responsibility 
encompasses the conduct of our foreign eco- 
nomic relations, unless that is specifically 
delegated elsewhere — as with the Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations in 
the administration of the trade agreements 
program, the Treasury for certain interna- 
tional monetary and financial matters, or by 
Presidential directive in special cases. Lead- 
ership by the State Department is particu- 
larly necessary where we have a wide range 
of interrelated economic issues with other 
nations — issues which spill over into our po- 
litical and national security relations — and 
where it is necessary to bring the entire 
weight of U.S. influence to bear in support 
of our objectives. 

The State Department and the unified 
Foreign Service of the United States are 
uniquely equipped to do this job: 

— We have well-trained staff in the Bu- 
reau of Economic Affairs, vdth technical 
competence in all aspects of our foreign eco- 
nomic relations and with extensive experience 
in promoting U.S. international objectives. 

— We have economic specialists in the re- 
gional and functional bureaus. 

— We have strong economic/commercial 
sections at our important posts abroad, and 
we are in the process of strengthening the 
commercial aspects of our operations. I at- 
tach special importance to the responsibility 
of the Department and Foreign Service in 
promoting U.S. exports and in providing im- 
proved services for American businessmen. 
Our Ambassadors, under my instructions, 
are giving increased priority to commercial 
services. As you undoubtedly know, 0MB 
[Office of Management and Budget] is cur- 
rently engaged in a study of the organiza- 
tional arrangements of the U.S. Government 
in the economic/commercial area. 

— We have specialists in our Planning and 
Coordination Staff to assist in the coordina- 
tion of international economic policy within 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Department; to monitor economic assist- 
ance activities ; to staff the CIEP Operations 
Groups chaired by the Deputy Under Sec- 
retary for Economic Affairs; and to provide 
liaison vi^ith other agencies and the CIEP. 

— I am particularly gratified by the action 
of the conference committee on the State 
Department authorization approving the 
establishment of the position of Under Sec- 
retary for Economic Affairs — upgrading the 
present position of Deputy Under Secretary 
— to provide leadership and coordination for 
all of our foreign economic activities. 

Mr. Chairman, the State Department does 
not claim an exclusive role in assisting 
the President in the formulation and con- 
duct of our international economic policy. 
We are particularly anxious that, in policy 
formulation, all aspects should be considered 
and all interests should be heard. We have 
no desire to sacrifice our international eco- 
nomic interests to our international political 
interests. 

I believe that a mechanism such as CIEP 
provides is needed for an orderly process of 
analysis and policymaking. We also see a 
continuing role for other agencies in our 
negotiating teams abroad. We will continue 
to support the Special Trade Representative 
in his conduct of general trade negotiations 
under the trade agreements program. We 
recognize that there may be situations which 
call for special negotiating arrangements to 
accomplish particular tasks. 

We are working closely with Treasury and 
other agencies in developing proposals for a 
viable international monetary system and 
shall give our full support to Treasury in 
negotiations to this end. We and the De- 
partment of Commerce are collaborating to 
provide more vigorous support for U.S. ex- 
ports and improved services for U.S. busi- 
nessmen abroad. 

The international economic agenda before 
this country calls for statesmanship of the 
highest order. We must negotiate the first 
basic readjustment of the international eco- 
nomic system since the war without sacri- 
ficing the liberal trade and monetary prac- 



tices which made the old so successful for 
so long. We must improve our own competi- 
tive trading position without calling down 
retaliation which could cripple everybody. 
We must insist on greater access for our ex- 
ports without disrupting the sense of com- 
munity on which a viable international eco- 
nomic system depends. We must seek to 
enhance our own prosperity without neglect- 
ing our overall policy concern for the wel- 
fare of the world's majority who live in de- 
veloping countries. 

I am confident the United States Govern- 
ment will be equal to these challenges. And 
I believe that with effort on the part of all 
concerned, the executive branch can give 
proper weight to all interests involved and 
still present a coherent policy to the rest of 
the world. If this calls for some discipline, I 
firmly believe it can be accomplished without 
stifling dissent within the executive branch 
and without sacrificing the frank and open 
discussions with the Congress which are the 
sine qua non of any effective American 
foreign policy. 



Annual Report on World Weather 
Program Transmitted to Congress 

President Nixon's Letter of Transmittal i 

To the Congress of the United States: 

By monitoring and predicting weather 
over the globe and by assessing the impact 
of man's activities upon the atmosphere, the 
World Weather Program helps significantly 
to improve the quality of our life and the 
safety of the earth's inhabitants. 

I am pleased to report that the World 
Weather Program is making significant 
strides forward: 

— Through new satellites, telecommuni- 
cations, and computer technology, global in- 
formation for early predictions and hazard- 
ous weather warnings is "being acquired. 



'Transmitted on May 3 (White House press 
release). 



July 10, 1972 



71 



processed, and then distributed in increased 
volume and detail. 

— Under the Global Atmospheric Re- 
search Program intensive planning activi- 
ties are underway for a 1974 international 
experiment to be conducted in the tropical 
Atlantic. The experiment will attempt to 
discover what role tropical weather sys- 
tems play in maintaining the general cir- 
culation of the atmosphere. It will also 
probe tropical weather systems, with a view 
to improving weather prediction, including 
hurricane forecasts. Scientific data from 
this experiment will also help in making 
weather forecasts that are longer range, 
and in resolving important environmental 
problems. Many nations will participate in 
this experiment with ships, aircraft, satel- 
lites and other facilities. 

— Active international involvement in the 
program by many member nations has 
yielded peaceful collaboration on an impres- 
sive international scale. 

The World Weather Program is essential 
to a total environmental monitoring system 
for our planet. The program can serve as a 
model, moreover, for other environmental 
systems. The atmosphere is but one part 
of our global ecology. Data on other aspects 
of our environment can be collected and 
exchanged through a vehicle like the World 
Weather Program. 

In accordance with Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress, I am 
pleased to transmit this annual report which 
describes the advances of the World Weather 
Program made during the past year and the 
activities planned for the program by par- 
ticipating Federal agencies for the coming 
fiscal year. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, May 3, 1972. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 
Commission for 1971. S. Doc. 92-59. January 1972. 
260 pp. 

Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on 
International Monetary and Financial Policies. 
Letter from the Chairman of the Council trans- 
mitting the annual report for fiscal year 1971, 
pursuant to section 4(b), (5), and (6) of the Bret- 
ton Woods Agreements Act, as amended. H. Doc. 
92-256. February 21, 1972. 274 pp. 

Department of State Appropriations Authorization, 
Fiscal Year 1973. Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. March 8-10, 
1972. 841 pp. [Printed for the use of the Commit- 
tee on Foreign Relations.] 

Recog^iition of Bangladesh. Report to accompany S. 
Con. Res. 55. S. Rept. 92-694. March 15, 1972. 
7 pp. 

Universal Copyright Convention, as Revised, With 
Protocols. Message from the President of the 
United States transmitting the Universal Copy- 
right Convention as revised at Paris on July 24, 
1971, together with two related protocols. S. 
Ex. G. March 15, 1972. 69 pp. 

National Security Policy and the Changing World 
Power Alignment. Outline and bibliography for 
the spring 1972 hearing-symposium of the Sub- 
committee on National Security Policy and Sci- 
entific Developments of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. (Bibliography prepared by the 
Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress.) March 15, 1972. 
29 pp. [Committee print.] 

Vietnam Commitments, 1961. A staff study based 
on the "Pentagon Papers" prepared for the use of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations — 
Study No. 1. March 20, 1972. 43 pp. [Committee 
print.] 

Treaty With Honduras on the Swan Islands. Mes- 
sage from the President of the United States 
transmitting the Treaty on the S^an Islands Be- 
tween the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Honduras, signed 
at San Pedro Sula on November 22, 1971. S. Ex. 
H. March 28, 1972. 18 pp. 

Annual Report for 1971 on Activities and Accom- 
plishments Under the Communications Satellite 
Act of 1962. Message from the President of the 
United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 
92-279. April 10, 1972. 10 pp. 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences^ 



Scheduled July Through September 

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 2d Special Session .... Geneva 

IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 10th Session . . London 

ECE Committee on Water Problems Geneva 

IOC: 1st Session of the Executive Council Hamburg . 

U.N. ECOSOC: 53d Session Geneva . 

International Wheat Council: 64th Session Tokyo . . 

PAHO Executive Committee: 68th Meeting Washington 

ITU/CCIR Study Groups Geneva 

ECE Group of Experts on Data Requirements and Documentation Geneva 

OECD Ad Hoc Group on Industrial Innovation Paris . . 

OECD Invisibles Committee Paris . . 

Inter- American Nuclear Energy Commission: 8th Meeting . . . San Juan, 

Puerto Rico 

Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 14th Meeting Buenos Aires 

of the Directing Council. 

OECD Committee for Science and Technology Paris . . 

UNESCO International Bureau of Education: 7th Session of the Geneva 

Council. 

CCC Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Brussels . 

FAO European Commission on Agriculture, Working Party on Helsinki . 

Home Economics: 3d Session. 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Geneva 

Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 

3d UNESCO World Conference on Adult Education Tokyo . . 

U.N. Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences Geneva 

of Disarmament. 

Inter- American Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 8th Asuncion . 

Meeting. 

IAEA Board of Governors: Special Meeting Vienna . . 

ITU/CCITT Ad Hoc Group on the Future of the World Plan Com- Geneva . 

mittee. 

OECD Ad Hoc High Level Trade Meeting (Ministerial) .... Paris . . 

OECD Trade Committee Export Credit Group Paris . . 

3d International Sulfur Meeting Montreal . 

7th Inter-American Indian Congress Brasilia 



July 3-6 


July 3-7 


July 3-8 


July 3-8 


July 3-28 


July 5-11 


July 5-15 


July 5-21 


July 7-10 


July 10 


July 10-12 


July 12-14 


July 12-21 


July 13-14 


July 17-20 


July 17-21 


July 17-21 


July 17-Aug. 18 


July 25-Aug. 7 


July 31-Aug. 11 


July 


July 


July 


July 


July 


July 


Aug. 7-10 



' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, lists interna- 
tional conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July-September 
1972. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCIR, International Radio 
Consultative Committee; CCITT, International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee; CENTO, 
Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic 
Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; 
GARP, Global Atmospheric Research Program; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Inter- 
governmental Committee for European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi- 
zation; Interpol, International Criminal Police Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com- 
mission; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; UNCITRAL, United Nations Commission on In- 
ternational Trade Law; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World 
Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 



July 10, 1972 



73 



U.N. Population Commission: Special Session 

CENTO Budget Administration Conference 

FAO Caribbean Plant Protection Commission: 3d Session . . . 

U.N. Human Rights Commission Subcommission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 

Inter-American Special Conference on Tourism 

FAO/NORAD Symposium on Production, Handling, and Trans- 
port of Wood Chips. 

Inter-American Specialized Conference on the Integrated Educa- 
tion of Women. 

FAO Regional Conference for Latin America 

UNCT AD Trade and Development Board: 12th Meeting . . . . 

IAEA Safeguards Committee 

lA-ECOSOC (Special Committee for Consultation and Negotia- 
tion) 7th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Trade to Deal with 
Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers and Related Matters. 

IAEA Study Group on Nuclear Fuel 

ICAO Statistical Panel 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space .... 

FAO Regional Conference for the Near East 

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods .... 

FAO Regional Conference for Africa 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Revision of Madrid Trademark 
Agreement. 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 25th Session . . . 

IMCO Legal Committee 

FAO Regional Conference for Europe 

CCC Working Party of Permanent Technical Committee .... 

ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Revision of Warsaw Convention in 
Relation to Baggage, Cargo, etc. 

South Pacific Commission: 12th South Pacific Conference and 35th 
Session of the Commission. 

Interpol General Assembly 

Inter- American Commission of Women: 16th Assembly .... 

U.N. General Assembly: 27th Session 

OECD Trade Committee 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 60th Statu- 
tory Meeting. 

WIPO Administrative Meetings of WIPO and Paris Union . . . 

UNCITRAL Working Group on Shipping 

UNESCO Executive Board: 90th Session 

IAEA Board of Governors 

CCC Permanent Technical Committee 

ECE Committee on Development of Trade: 21st Session . . . . 

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 23d Session . 

ECAFE Joint Meeting of Planners and Statisticians 

U.N. ECOSOC: Resumed 53d Session 

Global Atmospheric Research Program Tropical Experiment 
Board: 4th Session. 

Global Atmospheric Research Program Tropical Experiment Coun- 
cil: 2d Session. 

IOC Coordinating Group for Cooperative Investigations of North- 
east Central Atlantic: 3d Session. 

Pan American Highway Congresses: Executive Committee . . . 

Pan American Highway Congresses: Special Congress 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Group of the Copyright Committee 
(IGCC): Ordinary Session. 

UNESCO IGCC: Study Group on International Regulations of 
Photographic Reproduction of Copyrighted Works. 

WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer: 10th Session 
of the Governing Council. 

WIPO Headquarters Building Subcommittee 

WMO Planning Conference on the First GARP Global Experiment 



New York . . 
Tehran . . . 
St. John's, 

Newfoundland 
New York . . 

Rio de Janeiro . 
Hurdal, Norway 

Buenos Aires 

Bogota . . . 
Geneva . . . 
Vienna .... 
Indefinite . . . 



Grenoble 

Montreal 

New York 

Kuwait 

London 

Libreville 

Geneva 

Geneva 

London 

Munich 

Brussels 

Montreal 



Apia, Western 

Samoa 
Frankfurt 
Washington 
New York 
Paris . . 
Copenhagen 

Geneva 
Geneva 
Paris . . 
Mexico City 
Brussels . 
Geneva 
Agana, Guam 
Alma Ata, 
U.S.S.R. 
New York 
Geneva . . 



Geneva or Dakar 

Copenhagen . . 

Brasilia . . . 
Brasilia . . . 
Paris .... 



Paris 



Lyon, France 

Geneva . . 
Geneva . . 



Aug. 7-15 
Aug. 12-17 
Aug. 14-21 

Aug. 14-Sept. 1 

Aug. 18-25 
Aug. 20-Sept. 2 

Aug. 21-25 

Aug. 21-Sept. 4 
Aug. 22-Sept. 15 
August 
August 



Sept. 4-15 
Sept. 5-15 
Sept. 5-15 
Sept. 9-19 
Sept. 11-15 
Sept. 14-30 
Sept. 18-19 

Sept. 18-20 
Sept. 18-22 



Sept. 
Sept. 
Sept. 



18-23 
18-25 
18-Oct. 



Sept. 18-Oct. 6 

Sept. 19-26 
Sept. 19-28 
Sept. 19-December 
Sept. 21-22 
Sept. 24-Oct. 4 



Sept. 
Sept. 



Sept. 
Sept. 



25-30 
25-Oct, 

Sept. 25-Oct. 

Sept. 25 

26-Oct. 6 
27-Oct. 1 

Sept. 27-Oct. 5 

September 

September 
September 

September 

September 

September 
September 
September 

September 

September 

September 
September 



6 
13 



74 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the prin- 
ciples and purposes of the Antarctic treaty. 
Adopted at Paris November 29, 1968, at the Fifth 
Consultative Meeting.' 

Notification of approval: Australia, May 26, 
1972, V-1 through V-4, V-7 through V-9. 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of 
the principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty. Adopted at Tokyo October 30, 1970, at 
the Sixth Consultative Meeting.' 
Notification of approval: Australia, May 26, 
1972, VI-1 through VI-7, VI-11 through VI-15. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 

of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 

1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 

7192. 

Ratification deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 

against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 

Montreal September 23, 1971.' 

Ratification deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972. 

Bills of Lading 

Protocol to amend the international convention for 
the unification of certain rules of law relating 
to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 
1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 
23, 1968.' 
Accession deposited: Singapore, April 25, 1972. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their de- 
struction. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow April 10, 1972.' 
Signatures: Indonesia, June 20, 1972; Singapore, 

June 19, 1972. 
Ratification deposited: Niger, June 23, 1972. 

North Atlantic Treaty — Status of Forces — 
Germany 

Agreement to amend the agreement of August 3, 
1959 (TIAS 5351), to supplement the agreement 
between the parties to the North Atlantic treaty 
regarding the status of their forces with respect 
to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. Done at Bonn October 21, 
1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972. 



Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at Lon- 
don May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 
1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. 
TIAS 4900, 6109. 
Acceptance deposited: Libya, Febniary 18, 1972. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New 
York December 21, 1965. Entered into force 
January 4, 1969." 

Ratification deposited: Austria, May 9, 1972 
(with a declaration). 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with 
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.' 
Ratifications deposited: Norway, June 20, 1972; 
Yugoslavia, June 22, 1972. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in 
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force 
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Malaysia, June 21, 1972. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.' 
Signatures: Nepal, New Zealand, June 19, 1972. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreaux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Accession deposited: Yemen (San 'a). May 12, 
1972. 

Trade 

Long-term arrangement regarding international 
trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva February 
9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 
5240. 
Acceptance : Argentina, June 5, 1972. 

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding inter- 
national trade in cotton textiles of Febsuary 9, 
1962, as extended (TIAS 5240, 6289). Done at 
Geneva June 15, 1970. Entered into force October 
1, 1970. TIAS 6940. 

Acceptances: Argentina, June 5, 1972; El Salva- 
dor, June 6, 1972. 

Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with 
annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Spain, May 16, 1972. 



' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



July 10, 1972 



75 



Wheaf 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with 
respect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Austria, June 22, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Republic of China 

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 

atomic energy. Signed at Washington April 4, 

1972. 

Entered into force: June 22, 1972. 
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 

atomic energy, as amended. Signed at Washington 

July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955. 

TIAS 3307, 4176, 4514, 5105, 5623, 6099. 

Terminated: June 22, 1972. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement 
between the United States Department of Agri- 
culture and the Costa Rican Ministry of Agricul- 
ture and Livestock for the prevention of foot-and- 
mouth disease and rinderpest in Costa Rica. 
Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose April 
5 and June 6, 1972. Entered into force June 6, 
1972. 

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement 
between the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture 
and the United States Department of Agriculture 
for the prevention of foot-and-mouth disease and 
rinderpest in Costa Rica. Effected by exchange of 
notes at San Jose December 29, 1970, and January 
7, 1971. Entered into force January 7, 1971. TIAS 
7040. 
Terminated: June 6, 1972. 

Guyana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of September 17, 1968 
(TIAS 6585). Signed at Georgetown June 8, 1972. 
Entered into force June 8, 1972. 

Korea 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Korea of 10 
percent of the value of grant military assistance 
and excess defense articles furnished by the 



United States. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul May 12, 1972. Entered into force May 12, 
1972; effective February 7, 1972. 

Mali 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Mali of 10 
percent of the value of grant military assistance 
and excess defense articles furnished by the United 
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Bamako 
April 18 and June 6, 1972. Entered into force 
June 6, 1972; effective February 7, 1972. 

United Kingdom 

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signa- 
ture, and exchange of notes. Signed at London 
June 8, 1972. Enters into force 3 months after the 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1946 Foreign Relations Volumes 
on China Released 

On May 25 the Department of State released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol- 
umes IX and X, The Far East: China. These volumes 
are the last of 11 to be published covering the year 
1946. 

All of volume IX and half of volume X are de- 
voted to documentation of the unsuccessful mission 
of General of the Army George C. Marshall to end 
civil strife in China and to bring about political 
unification of the Chinese Communists and the Na- 
tional Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai- 
shek. The remainder of volume X covers U.S. aid 
to China and a variety of other aspects of Sino- 
American relations. 

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volumes IX and 
X (Department of State publications 8561 and 8562) 
may be obtained from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402, for $7.00 and $6.75, respectively. 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 10, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 172A 



Congress 

Annual Report on World Weather Program 
Transmitted to Congress (Nixon) .... 71 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 72 

Coordination of United States Foreign Eco- 
nomic Policy (Rogers) 67 

President Echeverria of Mexico Makes State 
Visit to the United States (Echeverria, 
Nixon, announcement of agreements signed, 
text of joint communique) 57 

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem- 
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Agreements 37 

President Nixon Urges Senate Passage of 
Foreign Aid Authorization (letter to ma- 
jority and minority leaders) 55 

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the 
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on 
Strategic Offensive Arms 50 

Department and Foreign Service. Coordination 
of United States Foreign Economic Policy 
(Rogers) 67 

Disarmament 

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem- 
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Agreements 37 

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the 
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Stra- 
tegic Offensive Arms 50 

Economic Affairs. Coordination of United 
States Foreign Economic Policy (Rogers) 67 

Extradition. United States and United King- 
dom Sign New Extradition Treaty .... 56 

Foreign Aid. President Nixon Urges Senate 
Passage of Foreign Aid Authorization (letter 
to majority and minority leaders) .... 55 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences . . 73 

Mexico. President Echeverria of Mexico Makes 
State Visit to the United States (Echeverria, 
Nixon, announcement of agreements signed, 
text of joint communique) 57 

Presidential Documents 

Annual Report on World Weather Program 
Transmitted to Congress 71 

President Echeverria of Mexico Makes State 
Visit to the United States 57 

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem- 
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Agreements 37 

President Nixon Urges Senate Passage of 
Foreign Aid Authorization 55 

Publications. 1946 Foreign Relations Volumes 
on China Released 76 

Science. Annual Report on World Weather Pro- 
gram Transmitted to Congress (Nixon) . . 71 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 75 

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem- 
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Agreements 37 



Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the 
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Stra- 
tegic Offensive Arms 50 

United States and United Kingdom Sign New- 
Extradition Treaty 56 

U.S.S.R. 

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem- 
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Agreements 37 

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the 
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Stra- 
tegic Offensive Arms 50 

United Kingdom. United States and United 
Kingdom Sign New Extradition Treaty . . 56 

Name Index 

Echeverria, Luis Alvarez 57 

Kissinger, Henry A 37 

Nixon, President 37. 55, 57, 71 

Rogers, Secretary 50, 67 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to June 19 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 135 
of June 8. 

Subject 

U.S. pledge to U.N. Population 
Fund. 

Rogers: Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. 

U.S. action in ICAO and the U.N. 
on hijacking. 

Rogers: House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. 

Rogers: statement on ICAO reso- 
lution on hijacking. 

Advisory Committee on Interna- 
tional Organizations. 

U.S. and Denmark sign new 
extradition treaty. 

Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Le- 
gal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, 
presented distinguished honor 
award, June 22. 

Irwin: Joint Economic Committee, 
June 22. 

Irwin: foreign policy conference 
for business executives, June 8 
(printed in July 3 issue). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



No. 


Date 


+141 


6/19 


142 


6/19 


*143 


6/19 


144 


6/20 


tl45 


6/20 


+146 


6/21 


+147 


6/22 


*148 


6/23 


+149 


6/23 


153 


6/23 



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u.s. government printing office 

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3- 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



/7as' 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol.LXVII,No.l725 




July 17,1972 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 29 
Excerpts From Transcript 77 

THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS 
Address by Assistant Secretary Sisco 86 

U.S.-JAPAN CULTURAL CONFERENCE HOLDS SIXTH MEETING 90 

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS ON LEGISLATION ON FUNDING 

FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY 

Statement by Under Secretary Johnson 96 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT 



OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1725 
July 17 1972 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $16, foreign $23 
Single copy 30 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
witit information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of tlie Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, Unitet Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



President Nixon's News Conference of June 29 



Folloiving are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a neivs confer- 
ence held by President Nixon in the East 
Room at the White House on June 29. 

The President: Mr. Cormier [Frank Cor- 
mier, Associated Press] has the first ques- 
tion tonight. 

Q. . . . Mindful that ending the ivar was 
one of your major campaign themes in 1968, 
mindful that our bombings in Indochina now 
are at a five-year high, according to the 
Pentagon, mindful that troops are still com- 
ing Old, but even more are going into Thai- 
land and the 7th Fleet, I ivonder if you can 
say ivith any confidence that you can end 
the war by January 20 of next year. 

The President: Mr. Cormier, we have made 
great progress in ending the war and partic- 
ularly in ending American involvement in 
the war. 

Since you have recounted the record to 
an extent, let me recount it also from the 
positive side. 

When we came into office, there were 540,- 
000 Americans in Viet-Nam. Our casualties 
were running as high as 300 a week, the cost 
was $22 billion a year. We have taken out 
500,000 men since that time. Our casualties 
have been reduced 95 percent, down to two; 
that is too many, but from 300 to two. As 
far as the cost is concerned, instead of $22 
billion a year, it is down to $7 billion 
a year. 

As far as the situation on the negotiating 
front is concerned, instead of being in a 
position where we did not have a positive 
oifer on the table, we have made what Mr. 
[David] Brinkley of NBC characterized last 



night as being a very constructive offer, one 
in which in return for an all-Indochina 
cease-fire and the return of POW's and an 
accounting for all of our missing in action 
that we would stop all military activities in 
Indochina and we would withdraw all Amer- 
icans, all of those that remain, within four 
months. 

Now, having reached this position at this 
time, we believe that that is an excellent 
record. The only thing that we have not 
done is to do what the Communists have 
asked, and that is to impose a Communist 
government on the people of South Viet-Nam 
against their will. This we will not do, be- 
cause that would reward aggression, it would 
encourage that kind of aggression and re- 
duce the chances of peace all over the world 
in the years to come, and it would dishonor 
the United States of America. 

On the negotiating front, we have in- 
formed the North Vietnamese, after consul- 
tation with the Government of Viet-Nam, 
that we will return to the negotiating table 
in Paris on April [July] 13, Thursday; we 
have been informed by the North Vietnamese, 
the Viet Cong, that they, too, will return on 
that date. We have returned to the nego- 
tiating table, or will reurn to it, on the as- 
sumption that the North Vietnamese are 
prepared to negotiate in a constructive and 
serious way. We will be prepared to nego- 
tiate in that way. If those negotiations go 
forward in a constructive and serious way, 
this war can be ended and it can be ended 
well before January 20. If they do not go 
forward on that basis, the United States will 
continue to meet its commitments; our bomb- 
ing, as far as that is concerned, our mining, 
is for the purpose only of preventing Com- 



July 17, 1972 



77 



munist aggression from succeeding, to pro- 
tect the remaining Americans — 40,000 or so 
that are still in Viet-Nam — and to have some 
bargaining position in getting our POW's 
back. 

One last point with regard to the POW's : 
I know that every American is concerned 
about these men. I have been somewhat con- 
cerned about them. I will only say that I 
have had some experience, and a great deal 
of experience as a matter of fact in this past 
year, in dealing with Communist leaders. I 
find that making a bargain with them is not 
easy, and you get something from them only 
when you have something they want to get 
from you. The only way we are going to get 
our POW's back is to be doing something to 
them, and that means hitting military targets 
in North Viet-Nam, retaining a residual force 
in South Viet-Nam, and continuing the min- 
ing of the harbors of North Viet-Nam. 

Only by having that kind of activity go 
forward will they have any incentive to re- 
turn our POW's rather than not to account 
for them as was the case when the French 
got out of Viet-Nam in 1954 and 15,000 
French were never accounted for after that. 

I shall never have that happen to the 
brave men who are POW's. 

Q. Mr. President, before you ordered a 
resumption of the bombing of North Viet- 
Nam, General [John D.] Lavelle authorized 
or initiated some unauthorized strikes there. 
In your vieiv, did this affect any diplomatic 
negotiations going on at that time, and are 
you concerned that you apparently didn't 
know about it for several months ? 

The President: It did not affect the diplo- 
matic negotiations. As a matter of fact, a 
meeting took place, a private meeting, be- 
tween Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, 
Assistant to the President for National Se- 
curity Affairs] and the negotiators in Paris 
on May 2, during the period that General 
Lavelle's activities were being undertaken, 
and you can be very sure that had the North 
Vietnamese wanted any pretext to complain 
about, they would have complained about 
that particular matter. 



As far as this is concerned, as Admiral 
Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chair- 
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff] testified today, it 
wasn't authorized. It was directed against 
only those military targets which were the 
areas that were being used for firing on 
American planes, but since it did exceed au- 
thorization, it was proper for him to be re- 
lieved and retired. And I think that it was 
the proper action to take. And I believe that 
will assure that kind of activity may not oc- 
cur in the future. 



Response to North Vietnamese Offensive 

Q. Mr. President, on May 8, at the time 
of the mining of the harbors in North Viet- 
Nam, your assistant Dr. Kissinger predicted 
the mining would result in the drying up of 
supplies and the major offensive should be 
over around July 1. Is that estimate still 
valid, and if so, do you have a timetable for 
the ivithdratval of the support troops who 
have gone into the naval and into the air 
bases around Viet-Nam to support the South 
Vietnamese during this offensive? 

The President: Mr. Jarriel [Tom Jarriel, 
ABC News] , to date the effect of the mining 
and also the bombing of the military targets 
in North Viet-Nam, particularly the railroads 
and the oil supplies — the situation in Viet- 
Nam has been completely turned around. I 
was looking at some news magazines that 
came out the week before the mining was 
ordered, and I noted that each one of them 
has as its heading, "The specter of defeat 
in Viet-Nam." That was the situation when 
we started it. 

It has been turned around. The South 
Vietnamese are now on the offensive. It is 
not over. We expect, perhaps, some more 
North Vietnamese offensive, but I believe 
that now the ability of the South Vietnamese 
to defend themselves on the ground, with the 
support that we give them in the air, has 
been demonstrated. Their ability to defend 
themselves in An Loc and Kontum, and now 
in the area of Hue, is an indication that Viet- 
namization, as far as their ground activity 
is concerned, has proved to be a successful 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



action. Now, as far as the future is con- 
cerned, I have already indicated that we will 
be returning to negotiations in July. That is 
the important area to watch at this time, as 
well as the battlefield. And as far as any fu- 
ture announcements are concerned, that will 
depend upon progress at the negotiating table 
and on the battlefront. 

Q. . . . The background of this question is 
your own statements made dorvn in Texas, 
among other places, saying that you had not 
sanctioned and ivould not sanction the bomb- 
ing of the dikes and dams in North Viet-Nam 
because you considered it an inhumane act be- 
cause of what it would do to civilians.'^ 

Within the past week there have been re- 
ports of eyeioitnesses. One of these reports 
came from the French Press Agency and an- 
other, I think, was the Swedish Ambassador 
in Hanoi, eyewitnesses claiming to have seen 
American planes hit dikes and dams. The 
question is, has such bombing occurred? If 
so, what steps are you taking to see that it 
doesn't happen again? 

The President: Mr. Rather [Dan Rather, 
CBS News], we have checked those reports. 
They have proved to be inaccurate. The 
bombing of dikes is something, as you will 
recall from the gentleman who asked the 
question in Texas, was something that some 
people have advocated. The United States 
has used great restraint in its bombing pol- 
icy, and I think properly so. We have tried 
to hit only military targets, and we have been 
hitting military targets. We have had or- 
ders out not to hit dikes because the result 
in terms of civil casualties would be extraor- 
dinary. 

As far as any future activities are con- 
cerned, those orders still are in force. I do 
not intend to allow any orders to go out 
which would involve civilian casualties if 
they can be avoided. Military targets only 
will be allowed. 

Q. Mr. President, last year, or at least 
early this year, General Abrams [Gen. 



' For background, see Bulletin of May 22, 1972, 
p. 723. 



Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S. 
Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam] 
relayed to you his belief that the South Viet- 
namese could noiv "hack it" on the battle- 
field. The invasion from the North occurred, 
and we responded with bombing. When do 
you realistically think the South Vietnamese 
can do it alone without massive firepower 
from us? 

The President: Mr. Semple [Robert B. 
Semple, Jr., New York Times], I think that 
is being determined and also demonstrated 
at this time. 

First, as far as the ground activities are 
concerned, they are being entirely undertaken 
by the South Vietnamese. American ground 
combat action has totally been finished in 
Viet-Nam. As far as Americans in Viet-Nam 
are concerned, this war is over in the future 
for any future draftees. No more draftees 
will be sent to Viet-Nam. 

As far as air action is concerned, as Gen- 
eral Abrams or any military man will tell 
you, as they have told me, air action alone, 
without adequate fighting on the ground, can- 
not stop a determined enemy. 

What happened in this case was that the 
North Vietnamese launched a massive of- 
fensive with huge tanks, bigger than those 
against which they were arrayed, with new 
and modern weapons. In order to provide an 
equalizer — and it was needed — we provided 
air support. 

But I should also point this out, something 
that has been little noticed: 40 percent of 
all the tactical air sorties being flown over 
the battlefields of South Viet-Nam are now 
being flown not by Americans but by South 
Vietnamese. 

So we see the South Vietnamese not only 
doing all the ground fighting, but increasing 
their ability to do the fighting in the air. 

Finally, the success of our airstrikes on 
the North and on the battlefield, the suc- 
cess in turning this battle around, hastens 
the day when the South Vietnamese will be 
able to undertake the total activity them- 
selves. 

I am not going to put a date on it. I can 
only say the outcome of the present battle, 



July 17, 1972 



79 



how badly the North Vietnamese are hurt, 
will determine it, but I am very optimistic 
on this point. 

Q. Mr. President, ivhat role do you fore- 
see in the future months after he returns 
from his present trip, and after the election, 
for John Connally? 

The President: Mr. Horner [Garnett D. 
Horner, Washington Evening Star], first, 
the reports we have had on Mr. Connally's 
trip have been excellent. I think that his 
trip to Latin America — and incidentally also 
the trip that Dr. Arthur Burns has made to 
Latin America — came at a good time and 
allowed the Latin American heads of state 
to express their views just as vigorously as 
did Mr. Echeverria when he was here in this 
country. That is what we want — candid, vig- 
orous talk between the heads of state in the 
American Hemisphere. 

Also, the discussions he is presently having 
in Australia, in New Zealand, in Southeast 
Asia, India, Pakistan, and so forth, and later 
in Iran, I know will be helpful. When he 
returns he will not undertake a permanent 
government assignment, but he has agreed 
to undertake special government assignments 
at that time. I have one in mind, a very im- 
portant one, but I cannot announce it at this 
time. I will announce it when he returns 
and when he reports to me in San Clemente. 

U.S. Prepared for Constructive Negotiations 

Q. Can yoti tell us what took you back to 
the Paris peace table, and would you support 
a coalition government, formation of a coali- 
tion government, or ivould you discuss it in 
Paris ? 

The President: It would not be useful to 
indicate the discussions that took place in 
various places with regard to returning to 
the Paris peace table. 

Let it suffice to say that both sides con- 
sidered it in their interests to return to the 
Paris peace table. We would not have re- 
turned unless we thought there was a chance 



for more serious discussions and more con- 
structive discussions than we have had in the 
past, although I must be quite candid and 
say that we have been disappointed in the 
past with regard to these discussions. We 
have had 149 plenary sessions and no sig- 
nificant results. I do not believe it would be 
particularly helpful to, in a news conference, 
to negotiate with regard to what we are go- 
ing to talk about at the conference. That is 
a matter that we will negotiate with the 
enemy. 

As far as a coalition government is con- 
cerned, no. We will not negotiate with the 
enemy for accomplishing what they cannot 
accomplish themselves, and that is to impose 
against their will on the people of South 
Viet-Nam a coalition government with the 
Communists. 

However, we will be constructive, we will 
be forthcoming. An internationally super- 
vised cease-fire, a total withdrawal of all 
Americans within four months, a total cessa- 
tion of all bombing — these, we think, are 
very reasonable offers, and we believe the 
enemy should seriously consider them. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements 

Q. Mr. President, hardly had you signed 
the arms control agreements in Moscotv, 
than your administration asked for new 
money for new strategic weapons. Some of 
your critics are saying that this is almost a 
deception, giving the Pentagon what it 
wants; namely, concentration on developing 
quality weapons. Will you try to dispel this 
contradiction? 

The President: Mr. Morgan [Edward P. 
Morgan, ABC News], the problem with re- 
gard to arms control is that we do not deal 
with it in a vacuum. We have to deal with 
the problem as it affects the security of the 
United States. 

Now, first, let me say that if we had not 
had an arms control agreement, a limitation 
of ABM's and a temporary limitation for 
five years on certain classifications of offen- 
sive weapons, I would — and I am saying 



80 



Department of State Bulletin 



this conservatively — have had to ask the 
Congress of the United States to approve an 
increase in the defense budget for nuclear 
strategic weapons of at least $15 billion a 
year on a crash program. Reason: Had there 
been no arms control agreement, the Soviet 
Union's plans called for an increase of their 
ABM's to 1,000 over the next five years. The 
arms control agreement limits them to 200, 
as it does us. Had there been no arms con- 
trol agreement, the Soviet Union had a pro- 
gram underway in the field of submarines 
which would have brought them up to over 
90. The agreement limits them to 62. Had 
there been no arms control agreement — and 
this is the most important point — in the 
terms of offensive strategic weapons, the So- 
viet Union that has now passed us in offen- 
sive strategic weapons — they have 1,600; we 
have roughly 1,000 — they would have built 
1,000 more over the next five years. 

Now, under those circumstances, any Pres- 
ident of the United States could see that in 
five years the United States would be hope- 
lessly behind; our security would be threat- 
ened, our allies would be terrified, particu- 
larly in those areas, and our friends, like 
the Mideast, where the possibility of Soviet 
adventurism is considered to be rather great. 

Therefore, the arms control agreement at 
least put a brake on new weapons. Now, 
with regard to the new weapons that you 
refer to, however, let me point out they are 
not for the next five-year period. We are 
really talking about the period after that. 
And they are absolutely essential for the 
security of the United States for another rea- 
son; because looking at this not in a vacuum 
but in terms of what the other side is doing, 
Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General 
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party] 
made it very clear that he intended to go 
forward in those categories that were not 
limited. 

Now, in fairness to him, he also said and 
made it very clear — he made it perfectly 
clear, I should say — he said that he ex- 
pected that we would go forward. Now, 
under these circumstances, then, for the 



United States not to go forward in those 
areas that were not controlled would mean 
that at the end of the seventies we would be 
in an inferior position; and no President of 
the United States can take the responsibility 
of allowing the United States to be the second 
most powerful nation in the world, not be- 
cause of any jingoistic idea, but because if we 
are in that position our foreign policy, our 
commitments around the world, would be 
very, very seriously jeopardized. 

Now, the most important point I have 
saved for the last, and that is this: I think 
these agreements are in the interest of the 
United States. I think that they are very 
much in the interest of arms control and 
therefore in the interest of world peace. But 
they are only a beginning; they are only the 
foundation. Now what we have to do is to 
really go forward with the second step. That 
is why the phase 2 of the arms control limi- 
tation, which we hope will begin in October, 
provided the Congress approves the ones that 
we have before them at the present time, 
phase 2, which will be a permanent arms con- 
trol agreement on all offensive nuclear weap- 
ons — this is the one that we think can have 
far greater significance evert than phase 1. 
Phase 1 is the breakthrough, and phase 2 
is the culmination. And phase 2, if we can 
reach agreement with the Soviets — and it 
will take long and hard bargaining — but if 
we can reach it, it will mean, then, that we 
not only hold our arms budgets where they 
are but that in these new programs instead 
of going forward with them on the basis 
presently pi-ojected we will be able to cut 
them back. 

That is our goal; and I think we can 
achieve it provided we appi'ove phase 1 
and provided we continue a credible arms 
program, because, believe me, the Soviets 
are not going to agree to limit their future 
programs unless they have something to get 
from us. 

Q. Mr. President, in consideration of your 
argtiment on our need for offensive weapons, 
why then do you insist on development of 
the costly B-1 bomber ivhen in fact the So- 



July 17, 1972 



81 



viet Union has shown little interest in the 
bomber force in recent years and as far as 
we know has no netv bomber force on the 
drawing boards at this time? 

The President: Each power, the Soviet 
Union and the United States, must have 
those forces that are needed for its own 
security. We basically are not only a land 
power but a land and sea power. The Soviet 
Union is primarily a land power with certain 
definite requirements; having that in mind, 
we believe that the B-1 bomber is, for our 
security interest, necessary. 

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, 
the fact that they are not developing bomb- 
ers does not mean that they do not respect 
ours. And I would say, too, that had we not 
had our present advantage in bombers we 
could not then stand by and allow the So- 
viets to have a l,600-to-l,000 advantage in 
terms of missiles that are land based. So our 
bombers is an offset for that. 



Bombing and Negotiations 

Q. Mr. President, a clarifying question on 
the bombing, please. You have said that the 
sole purpose of your bombing and your min- 
ing, in your May 8 speech, u'as to protect the 
60,000 American troops there.' Did I under- 
stand you to say in ansiver to an earlier ques- 
tion that that bombing is noiv contingent 
upon the release of the prisoners? And I 
ivould like to ask an additional question that 
is slightly related: Were there any condi- 
tions attached by each side to the return to 
the Paris peace talks? 

The President: No, there are no conditions 
attached to either side. We are going back 
to the talks prepared to negotiate without 
conditions, which we think is the most con- 
structive way to obtain results. For example, 
the condition — I assume this is the implica- 
tion of your question — there was no condi- 



- For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see BULLETIN of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



tion that if we would go back to the talks we 
would stop the bombing. We do not intend to. 
We will stop the bombing when the condi- 
tions are met that I laid out in my May 8 
speech. 

In my May 8 speech, Mr. Lisagor [Peter 
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], as you i"e- 
call, I laid down three conditions. I said 
that we were bombing military targets in 
the North, that we were mining the harbor, 
and that we were doing so for three pur- 
poses : to prevent the imposition of a Com- 
munist government in South Viet-Nam, to 
protect our remaining forces in South Viet- 
Nam, which were then 60,000, and, in addi- 
tion, for the purpose of obtaining the release 
of our POW's. 

Those are the three conditions that we 
have as far as the bombing is concerned. 

But we are prepared to negotiate on those 
points with the enemy. We have no desire 
to continue the bombing for one moment 
longer than necessary to accomplish what 
we consider to be these very minimal ob- 
jectives. 



Q. Mr. President, the history of Ameri- 
can bombing of North Viet-Nam indicates 
that it has served to hinder negotiations 
rather than stimulate negotiations. Why do 
you think it is going to work now in view 
of that history ? 

The President: I am not sure that my eval- 
uation of the history is the same as yours. 
My own view is that we have tried every 
device possible over the past three years to 
get negotiations going. We have withdrawn 
forces, we have made very forthcoming of- 
fers, we have wound down combat activities 
on our part; and the result has been simply 
an ever-increasing intransigence on the part 
of the enemy. 

Believe me, it was only as a last resort 
that I made the very difficult decision of May 
8, knowing how much rode on that decision. 
But having made that decision, I think it was 
the right decision; and I think the fact that 
our summit meetings went ahead despite 



82 



Department of State Bulletin 



that decision, the fact that we are going 
back to the negotiating table despite that 
decision, indicates that it may be that those 
who feel that a strong hand at the negotiat- 
ing table is one that results in no negotiation 
may be wrong. 

It has always been my theory that in deal- 
ing with these very pragmatic men — and we 
must respect them for their strength and 
their pragmatism — who lead the Communist 
nations, that they respect strength, not bel- 
ligerence but strength; and at least that is 
the way I am always going to approach it, 
and I think it is going to be successful in 
the end. 



President Nixon's News Conference 
of June 22 

Following is an excerpt from the tran- 
script of a news conference held by Presi- 
dent Nixon in the Oval Office at the White 
House on June 22. 

The President: Ladies and gentlemen, next 
week before the Congress recesses, I am plan- 
ning to have a general news conference. . . . 

... I thought it would be useful this week, 
on this occasion, to have you here in the of- 
fice for the purpose of covering domestic is- 
sues only. . . . 

Q. Mr. President, this may be a border- 
line question in the domestic field, but I be- 
lieve it may fall there since the issues are 
before Congress. Could you tell us your view 
of the relationship between the development 
of offensive weapons, as proposed in your 
defense budget, and the SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] agreements? 

The President: I have noted the progress 
of the debate in the committee, and particu- 
larly the controversy or alleged controversy 
and contradiction which seems in some quar- 
ters to have been developed between the 



views of the Secretary of Defense and the 
views that I have expressed and the views 
that have been expressed by Dr. Kissinger 
[Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the Pres- 
ident for National Security Affairs] and Sec- 
retary Rogers. 

I think that I can put the thing in context 
best by first pointing out the Secretary of 
Defense's position and then relating that po- 
sition to the overall position of the United 
States in attempting to develop policy that 
will adequately protect the security of the 
United States and also move forward on the 
arms limitation front. 

The Secretary of Defense has a responsi- 
bility, as I have a responsibility, to recom- 
mend to the Congress action that will ade- 
quately protect the security of the United 
States. Moving on that responsibility, he has 
indicated that if the SALT agreement is ap- 
proved, and then if the Congress rejects the 
programs for offensive weapons not con- 
trolled by the SALT agreement, that this 
would seriously jeopardize the security of the 
United States. On that point he is correct. 

What I would suggest to the Congress and 
would recommend to individual Congress- 
men and Senators, who will have the respon- 
sibility of voting on this matter, is the fol- 
lowing course: First, the arms limitation 
agreements should be approved on their mer- 
its. I would not have signed those agreements 
unless I had believed that, standing alone, 
they were in the interest of the United States. 
As a matter of fact, the offensive limitation is 
one that is particularly in our interest, be- 
cause it covers arms where the Soviet Union 
has on-going programs which will be lim- 
ited in this five-year period and in which we 
have no on-going programs. 

So, consequently, I would recommend and 
strongly urge that the Congress approve the 
ABM [antiballistic missile] Treaty, and also 
the limited, temporary, offensive limitations 
curb. However, after the Congress moves in 
that field, all Congressmen and Senators — 
and this would, of course, include them all — 
who are concerned about the security of the 
United States should then vote for those pro- 



July 17, 1972 



83 



grams that will provide adequate offensive 
weapons in the areas that have been recom- 
mended by the Secretary of Defense and by 
the administration. 

Now, the reason for that is twofold : first, 
because if we have a SALT agreement and 
then do not go forward with these programs, 
the Soviet Union will, within a matter of a 
very limited time, be substantially ahead of 
the United States overall, particularly in the 
latter part of the seventies. 

If the United States falls into what is a 
definitely second position, inferior position to 
the Soviet Union overall in its defense pro- 
grams, this will be an open invitation for 
more instability in the world and an open in- 
vitation, in my opinion, for more potential 
aggression in the world, particularly in such 
potentially explosive areas as the Mideast. 

Therefore, it is important from the stand- 
point of the United States being able to play 
its role of maintaining peace and security in 
the world — a role that the United States, of 
all the non-Communist nations, is the only 
one capable of playing — it is essential that 
the United States not fall into an inferior po- 
sition. 

Therefore, the offensive weapons pro- 
grams — which, incidentally, were not con- 
ceived after the SALT agreements, they were 
recommended prior to the SALT agreements 
and stand on their own because the Soviet 
Union has programs in which they are mov- 
ing forward. As I pointed out to the lead- 
ers — and you ladies and gentlemen were 
present there, or some of you were and the 
rest of you, of course, covered it through 
the broadcasting system — the Soviet Union 
is moving forward. 

Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid L Brezhnev, Gen- 
eral Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party] made it absolutely clear to me that 
in those areas that were not controlled by our 
offensive agreement that they were going 
ahead with their programs. For us not to 
would seriously jeopardize the security of the 
United States and jeopardize the cause of 
world peace, in my opinion. 

Now, the second reason why those who 



vote for the arms limitation agreement should 
vote for an on-going program in those areas 
not covered by it is that this arms control 
agreement, while very important, is only the 
first step and not the biggest step. 

The biggest step remains. The biggest step 
is a permanent limitation on offensive weap- 
ons, covering other categories of weapons 
and, we trust, eventually all categories of 
weapons. This would be as dramatic as the 
one step that we have already taken — this 
would be an even more dramatic step in lim- 
iting arms overall between the two super- 
powers. 

In the event that the United States does 
not have on-going programs, however, there 
will be no chance that the Soviet Union will 
negotiate phase 2 of an arms limitation 
agreement. I can say to the members of the 
press here that had we not had an ABM pro- 
gram in being there would be no SALT 
agreement today because there would have 
been no incentive for the Soviet Union to 
stop us from doing something that we were 
doing and, thereby, agree to stop something 
they were doing. 

Now, in the event that we do not therefore 
have any new offensive systems underway or 
planned, the Soviet Union has no incentive 
to limit theirs. And so consequently — and I 
have studied this very, very carefully; I can 
assure you that there is nothing I would like 
better than to be able to limit these ex- 
penses — I am convinced that to achieve our 
goal, which is the goal, I think, of all Amer- 
icans, to achieve our goal of an offensive limi- 
tations curb, covering all types of nuclear 
weapons, that it is essential for the United 
States to have an on-going offensive pro- 
gram. For that reason, I think that the posi- 
tion of the Secretary of Defense, speaking 
for the security of the United States, is 
a sound one. 

I would hope that Members of the House 
and Senate, on reflection, would recognize 
that the SALT agreement, important as it is 
by itself, does not deal with the total defense 
posture of the United States. By itself it is 
in the interest of the United States and it 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



stands on its own, but by itself, without a 
continuing offensive program, we can be 
sure that the security interests of the United 
States would be very seriously jeopardized 
and the chances for a permanent offensive 
agreement would, in my opinion, be totally 
destroyed. 



U.S. Force Ceiling in Viet-Nam 

To Be Cut to 39,000 by September 1 

White House Announcement ^ 

As you know, we are withdrawing forces 
from South Viet-Nam currently at a rate de- 
signed to meet a 49,000-force-level ceiling by 
July 1 of this year. As we have said before, 
that target will be met. 

President Nixon, after consultation with 
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
and a thorough review of the situation in In- 
dochina, has decided to continue withdrawal 
of U.S. forces to an authorized level of 39,- 
000 by September 1, 1972. This will bring 
the total number of U.S. forces withdrawn 
from South Viet-Nam under President Nixon 
to more than a half million, specifically, to 
510,500. This figure, which will be achieved 
on September 1, as I said earlier, represents 
a 93-percent reduction of the authorized Viet- 
Nam force level that was in effect when Pres- 
ident Nixon took office. 

This decision is based on the assessment 
that such troop withdrawals can take place 



without jeopardy to the Vietnamization pro- 
gram or those United States forces remain- 
ing in South Viet-Nam. 

President Nixon is also announcing that, 
effective immediately, draftees will no longer 
be assigned for duty within South Viet-Nam 
unless they volunteer for service there. 
Draftees presently serving in that country or 
now under orders to go there will of course 
complete their normal tours of duty, but 
effective immediately, draftees will no longer 
be assigned for duty within South Viet-Nam 
unless they volunteer for service there. 



Dr. Kissinger Visits Peking 
for Talks With PRC Leaders 

Joint Statement ^ 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 26 

Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Re- 
public of China and other Chinese officials 
held discussions with Dr. Henry A. Kissin- 
ger, Assistant to the U.S. President for 
National Security Affairs, and his party 
from June 19 to 23, 1972. The talks were 
extensive, earnest, and frank. They consisted 
of concrete consultations to promote the 
normalization of relations between the two 
countries and an exchange of views on issues 
of common interest. 

Both sides agreed on the usefulness of 
these consultations which were foreseen in 
the Sino-U.S. joint communique of February 
1972 and on the desirability of continuing 
them. 



' Made to news correspondents on June 28 by 
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to President 
Nixon (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments dated July 3). 



' Issued simultaneously at Washington and Peking 
on June 24; read to news correspondents that day by 
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to President 
Nixon. 



July 17, 1972 



85 



The Middle East Today: Positive and Negative Elements 



Address by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs * 



This is an important week because it was 
five years ago that the June war was raging 
in the Middle East. It is therefore a good 
time to look at the situation today as com- 
pared to the situation in 1967. Interestingly 
enough, we have had a summit in 1972 and 
you will recall that we had a summit in 1967 
at Glassboro. Now, I think the situation in 
the Middle East today as compared to 1967 
contains both positive and negative elements. 

First, on the positive side, the cease-fire, 
tenuous as it is, continues. The cease-fire 
was negotiated by the United States in Au- 
gust of 1970. Hopefully, we will have a 
second anniversary in a couple of months. 
And while the cease-fire is accompanied by 
a good deal of strident rhetoric, the fact of 
the matter is that no one is particularly 
anxious to put his finger on the trigger, and 
certainly this is a positive element in this 
situation. 

A second point I would make is that, re- 
gardless of the difficulties, there is probably 
greater realism in the area today than five 
years ago. And by this I mean that the con- 
cept of "live and let live," even in its small 
embryonic way, has begun to emerge in part 
as a result of the experience of two years 
of the cease-fire and as a result also of a 
deeper realization as to what the significance 
and what the result would be if one or the 
other side decided to exercise the military 
option rather than to pursue an overall set- 
tlement or an interim agreement by peaceful 



'■ Made before the national foreign policy confer- 
ence for senior business executives at the Depart- 
ment of State on June 8. 



means. Certainly there is instability; cer- 
tainly there are divisions; certainly the unity 
of the Arab world continues to be a stated 
objective which has not been realized; there 
is a broad gulf between the Arabs and the 
Israelis with respect to both the substance 
and the procedure relating to an overall set- 
tlement — all of these things contribute to 
instability. But regardless of that fact, the 
reality is that both sides continue to try to 
find ways to coexist — to live alongside one 
another — and dwell less today on the idea 
of the destruction of this state or that state. 
And I would suggest that this, too, is a posi- 
tive element. 

Now, having said this, obviously violence 
has not been eschewed; militancy is still prev- 
alent. We only have to think of the tragic 
events that occurred at Israel's Lod Airport 
some 10 days ago. We only need to focus on 
that as the latest reminder. Moreover, it is 
fair to say that there is a deep feeling of 
frustration, particularly in the Arab world, 
over the lack of progress toward either an 
overall settlement or an interim agreement. 
The cease-fire is accepted and desired, and I 
think both sides want to see it extended. But 
realistically, it is important that there be 
a meaningful diplomatic process to help as a 
minimum to refurbish the cease-fire and, in 
more positive terms, to provide the instru- 
ment for some practical progress which gives 
more hope to the peoples in the area. 

And as if it were not enough to point to 
the fact that the diiferences over the Arab- 
Israeli dispute contribute to instability — as 
do, for example, the differences within the 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



Arab world, whether differences between es- 
tablished states or differences between the 
Palestinians themselves — the added factor 
today is that this is an area in which the 
major powers have a direct interest, and 
this, too, is a complicating feature in 1972 
which stands out in contrast to what the sit- 
uation was in 1967. There is no doubt that 
both major powers have strong positions in 
the area as well as considerable assets. We 
and the Soviet Union share in common, in 
my judgment, the need for the cease-fire to 
continue. Neither the Soviet Union nor the 
United States, in my judgment, wants to see 
a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities. It is im- 
portant that both of us do what we can to 
deter and to discourage such a development. 

While I think the parallelism in maintain- 
ing reasonable tranquillity in that area is 
clear, the difficulty has been that the United 
States has been much more anxious to try to 
achieve a stable peace agreement in the area, 
and we have worked to this end actively and 
assiduously. We do not see eye-to-eye with 
the Soviets either as to what might consti- 
tute a fair substantive overall settlement in 
the area or the appropriate means by which 
to achieve this end. 

Basically the difference, substantively, be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet Un- 
ion can be described as a fundamental differ- 
ence in the interpretation of the November 
1967 Security Council resolution.^ You will 
recall that that resolution embraces the prin- 
ciple of withdrawal of Israeli forces from ter- 
ritories occupied during the June war. It calls 
for freedom of navigation and the recogni- 
tion of the political independence and terri- 
torial integrity of all of the states of the area, 
as well as a just solution of the refugee 
problem. Now, the fundamental difficulty be- 
tween the Arabs and the Israelis has been 
territorial. Basically, the Arab position, and 
in particular the Egyptian position, has been 
that that resolution means total Israeli with- 



drawal to the pre-June 5 lines. The Israeli 
interpretation has been that the resolution 
calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces but 
neither endorses nor precludes any particu- 
lar line as the final line — that this line was 
to be a subject of negotiations between the 
two sides, a subject of negotiations the re- 
sults of which were to be included in a bind- 
ing agreement between the two sides in 
which each would undertake specific obliga- 
tions in relationship to the other. This was 
not the case in 1957, when, following the 
Suez crisis, the informal understandings that 
were reached, on which basis Israel with- 
drew, were not binding agreements between 
the two sides but rather we were the third- 
party repository of the understandings. This 
time the objective, based on the Security 
Council resolution, is an agreement, an agree- 
ment emanating from serious negotiation be- 
tween the two sides. 

So it's this broad chasm, this difference on 
territory in particular, that neither the mis- 
sion of Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special 
Representative Gunnar Jarring] nor, for that 
matter, the efforts of the United States, have 
been able to bridge over the past years. And 
it is against the background of parallel U.S.- 
Soviet interest in maintaining the cease-fire 
and within the framework of differences over 
the substance of a settlement as well as the 
procedure that the discussions at the sum- 
mit on the Middle East were held. 

Now, the Middle East was not a primary 
matter of consideration at the summit. It 
was thoroughly discussed, and basically the 
communique tells the story.^ The communi- 
que stressed two or three things. First, it 
said that both sides stated their positions. 
That's diplomatic language for saying each 
essentially expressed its substantive position 
along lines of its past position. There were 
no new agreements that were achieved or any 
new reconciliation in terms of the substance 
of the settlement. Secondly, both sides con- 
firmed in that communique that a peaceful 



" For text of Security Council Resolution 242 of 
Nov. 22, 1967, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 
843. 



' For text of a joint U.S.-Soviet communique is- 
sued at Moscow on May 29, see Bulletin of June 26, 
1972, p. 899. 



July 17, 1972 



87 



settlement based on the Security Council res- 
olution of November 1967 is the objective. 
This is important for the Soviet Union and 
the United States to have reaffirmed : that a 
political settlement is the objective, that the 
framework is the Security Council resolu- 
tion. However, one must bear in mind that 
there are differing interpretations as to what 
that resolution in fact means, because the 
resolution has never constituted an agree- 
ment as such. That resolution is a set of 
bare-bones principles which need to be nego- 
tiated in detail. Now, the significance of the 
emphasis on political settlement is this : that 
neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. 
sees it in its interest for there to be a re- 
newal of Arab-Israeli hostilities in the area. 
Now, having said this, I would recall also 
that alongside the specifics of the communi- 
que on the Middle East a set of important 
principles was also adopted at the summit in 
Moscow; and this declaration of principles, 
I believe, has relevance certainly to the Mid- 
dle East, which continues in our judgment to 
be one of the most dangerous trouble spots 
in the world.* In this declaration of princi- 
ples the major powers have committed them- 
selves not only to resort to peaceful means 
but to try to avoid confrontations in these 
trouble spots and to try to resist the tempta- 
tion of deriving unilateral advantage from a 
given tactical situation, whether it be in the 
Middle East or elsewhere. These principles 
are significant for this simple reason : They 
have a particular relevance to the Middle 
East, and over the coming weeks and the 
coming months this is one of the areas where 
these principles will, in fact, be tested. Prop- 
erly applied, I think they can be the vehicle 
for making progress toward either an over- 
all settlement or an interim agreement or 
both. To disregard these principles would 
heighten the risk of further instability and 
tension in the area. 

Now, the fact of the matter is that diplo- 
matic opportunities are available today; and 
of all the diplomatic opportunities that are 



' For text of the basic principles, see ibid., p. 898. 



available, we continue to feel that the most 
feasible approach is a step-by-step approach 
that would embrace an interim Suez Canal 
agreement between Egypt and Israel. We, 
of course, would like to see progress made 
at one fell swoop toward an overall settle- 
ment. But realistically we feel that the dif- 
ferences of view over territory as they relate 
to an overall settlement are so fundamental 
that a more realistic way to approach the 
problem is by means of some interim step. 
We believe that the diplomatic alternative of 
a first step that would involve the opening of 
the Suez Canal and some withdrawal of Is- 
raeli forces is today the most feasible ap- 
proach. 

Up to this point our difficulty has been to 
try to get the parties to say "yes" at the same 
time. Quite candidly, last October when we 
proposed the question of so-called proximity 
talks between Egypt and Israel, talks at 
close quarters, looking to some interim step, 
the Egyptian reaction was positive and the 
Israeli reaction was negative. We pursued 
the matter further and succeeded by Janu- 
ary of this year in getting an affirmative re- 
ply from Israel. By that time the situation 
had changed in Egypt, and the Egyptians 
were no longer as willing to move ahead as 
they appeared to be in October. 

And for our part, we intend to pursue this 
matter further. We continue to feel that it 
is the most feasible approach; we think it is 
a modest approach. We think such an agree- 
ment would be in the interest of both sides 
because it not only would divide the com- 
batants and thereby bring about a diminu- 
tion of tensions but it would involve some 
withdrawal, it would involve an extended 
cease-fire; and we think it would help cre- 
ate the kind of atmosphere which would be 
conducive to further efforts toward the 
broader settlement and getting at some of 
the more complicated and fundamental is- 
sues. This is the tack we intend to pursue in 
the days ahead. Obviously, nobody can pre- 
dict success. We are convinced it is impor- 
tant that a meaningful diplomatic process 
get started as soon as possible, because re- 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



gardless of the positive elements that do, in 
fact, exist in 1972 in the Middle East, the 
fact of the matter is that there are other 
less encouraging elements which continue to 
make the cease-fire quite tenuous and con- 
tinue to make this area one of the most dan- 
gerous trouble spots in the world. 



President Nixon Suspends 
Meat Import Restraints 

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON ^ 

To counter recent rises in the cost of meat, 
I have today [June 26] directed the Secretary 
of State to remove all quota restrictions on 
meat imported into the United States for the 
balance of 1972. Nations which export meat 
to the United States until today have been 
observing voluntary quotas. 

The recent rise in the price of meat is in 
part due to an improving economy here at 
home causing increased demands for meat 
which have not been matched by increased 
supplies. This action is intended to encour- 
age more meat imports into the United 
States, thereby increasing the supply avail- 
able here. 

This action alone may not fully solve the 
problem. Further measures will be taken as 
necessary and appropriate. 

I intend to monitor this situation closely, 
and I want to assure every American house- 
wife that this administration is firmly deter- 
mined to prevent unjustified increases in the 
cost of food. 

We have made significant progress in our 
battle against rising prices. We are going to 
do whatever is necessary to see that that bat- 
tle is won. 



' Issued on June 26 (White House press release). 



Earlier this year, we announced an import 
program to increase meat imports 11 per- 
cent over meat imports during 1971. Since 
that time, however, the continuing shift in 
demand and supplies has become much more 
pronounced. 

All meat imports, of course, will be sub- 
ject to the same high standards of sanitation 
that apply to domestically produced meat. 

This action is not aimed at the American 
farmer; his income has only begun to ap- 
proach reasonable levels. It is intended to 
remedy a short-term shortage which is be- 
yond the ability of our farmers to fill. 



LETTER TO SECRETARY ROGERS 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 3 

The White House, 
Washington, June 26, 1972. 

Dear Mr. Secretary: After careful study 
of the changed conditions in the U.S. and 
world markets in beef, I have determined 
that we should now take action to increase 
the importation of meat into the United 
States for the remainder of this year. 

I request that you take steps immediately 
with our foreign suppliers to remove re- 
straints established under present arrange- 
ments with these suppliers. I ask that you in- 
dicate to them that since we have now moved 
toward a freer market in meat for the re- 
mainder of this year, it is my hope that the 
effect of this action will be to increase the 
amount of imports entering the United 
States. 

I further request that you collaborate as 
closely as possible with the Secretary of Ag- 
riculture to insure that the steps I have 
taken are implemented with all possible 
speed. 

Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon. 



July 17, 1972 



89 



U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Holds Sixth Meeting 



The Sixth U.S.-Japan Conference on Cul- 
tural and Educational Interchange (CUL- 
CON VI) met at Washington June 21-22 and 
continued its meetings at Neio York June 
23-2^. Following are remarks made at the 
opening ceremony on June 21 by U. Alexis 
Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Af- 
fairs, the text of a final communique issued 
at New York June 2U, and a list of members 
of the U.S. and Japanese delegations. 



REMARKS BY UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON 

His Excellency Ambassador Ushiba [No- 
buhiko Ushiba, Ambassador of Japan], Mr. 
Maeda [Yoshinori Maeda, head of the Jap- 
anese delegation], Dr. Hall [John W. Hall, 
head of the U.S. delegation], ladies and 
gentlemen: I can give no better indication of 
the importance that we attach to this con- 
ference than to read to you the following mes- 
sage from the President of the United States: 

It gives me great pleasure to welcome to Wash- 
ington the distinguished delegates to the Sixth 
United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and 
Educational Interchange. 

The Conference comes at a time when the pro- 
liferation and complexity of ties between our two 
nations and cultures is greater than ever before. 
There are more Americans studying in Japan and 
more Japanese studying in America than at any 
previous time. The number of tourists and visitors 
in both directions has expanded phenomenally. Ex- 
changes in goods and information set new records 
year by year. 

But close association alone is not enough. We 
must also work for that deep mutual understanding 
which comes from the full communication of ideas 
and values between our peoples. We must try to 
remove misconceptions that may grow out of our 
cultural and linguistic differences. We must ex- 
pand the quality of our exchanges, even as we ex- 
pand their quantity. 



Only a relationship based on such a deepened 
understanding will enable us to find effective solu- 
tions to the shared problems of tomorrow. I wish you 
every success in your important deliberations. 

As the President has observed in his 
greeting, few countries today enjoy greater 
variety of or more extensive ties than do the 
United States and Japan. Our two countries 
engage in overseas trade on a scale unprece- 
dented in history. Interchanges in art, litera- 
ture, and philosophy have enriched both our 
cultures immeasurably. Our political and 
security policies have been closely inter- 
dependent for more than two decades. In 
fact, the U.S.-Japan relationship has be- 
come the keystone to peace and prosperity in 
Asia. 

Our two governments possess an elaborate 
structure for conducting our bilateral rela- 
tions, and the Japanese press corps in Wash- 
ington is larger than any other. American art 
and architecture frequently reflect Japanese 
esthetic principles. Yet as one with long ex- 
perience in nurturing this crucial relation- 
ship, I am aware of the deep gaps in our 
understanding of each other. 

Many of the misconceptions we have about 
one another, and the misunderstandings 
which sometimes arise over specific events, 
are deeply rooted in the makeup of our so- 
cieties and our very different historical ex- 
periences. 

Furthermore, since both societies engage 
the widest possible participation of their 
citizenry in political and economic decision 
making, problems in communication are not 
limited to a few officials or an economic and 
political elite. Information and understand- 
ing must reach all segments of our societies. 

It is here, of course, that cultural con- 
ferences such as this one play an important 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 



role. Culture, in the broadest sense, is a way 
of life. The cultures of Japan and America 
are not limited to masterpieces of music, 
art, or literature. They include our respective 
beliefs, daily activities, and habits of think- 
ing. Cultural interchange by itself naturally 
cannot solve difficult economic and political 
problems. But without it we will never fully 
appreciate the other's problems. And only 
when we understand the problems can we be- 
gin to find solutions. 

It is natural that some disorientation will 
occur as the United States and Japan ad- 
just to the fluid international environment of 
the 1970's. But I am confident that we are 
meeting and will meet these challenges con- 
structively and creatively. I am optimistic 
that we can build and strengthen our bonds 
rather than drift blindly apart. 

I note from your agenda that you intend 
this year to concentrate on certain specific 
problem areas which, although not easy, do 
not seem to me intractable. As a diplomat, 
I particularly welcome your efforts to im- 
prove the level of translation and interpre- 
tation. As a member of the American reading 
public, I hope you can successfully encourage 
our newspapermen to become better versed 
in the Japanese language and culture. Your 
efforts to strengthen programs of mutual 
study in our institutions of higher learning 
will do much to promote cooperative and 
complementary U.S.-Japan relations over 
the long term. Through your efforts and those 
of other concerned groups such as the Japan 
Society, I hope we will one day have many 
more businessmen, scholars, newspapermen, 
and public officials who will be able to, as I 
often say, operate "comfortably" in the 
other's environment. 

It will be a long and slow process, I 
know. But we have already come a long way 
in the last 25 years, and I know of few 
more important endeavors. The future of 
Asia — and indeed of the world — will, in 
large measure, key on the state of U.S.-Japan 
relations. And these relations will depend as 
much on the quality and depth of our cul- 
tural interactivity and understanding as on 



specific governmental contact. I join the 
President in wishing you continued success 
in your very important and truly funda- 
mental work. 



TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE 



New York, June 2U, 1972. 



The Sixth United States-Japan Conference on 
Cultural and Educational Interchange was held in 
Washington, D. C. and New York City from June 
21st to June 24th, 1972. Delegates representing the 
governments, the scholarly communities, the mass 
media worlds, and the business and political affairs 
communities of the two countries met to review the 
state of cultural and educational interchange over 
the past two years and discussed ways to expand 
interchange in the future. 

In its plenary sessions, the Conference concen- 
trated on the critical need to develop a much firm- 
er and broader basis of understanding between the 
United States and Japan. The problems of communi- 
cation between Japan and the United States stem 
from the fundamentally different historical and 
cultural heritage of the two nations. These differ- 
ences need to be acknowledged and respected, for 
each culture has its own value. The over-riding im- 
portance of close United States-Japan relations, 
however, requires much greater efforts to bridge 
the culture and communications gaps. The present 
wide variety of exchanges is helpful but not ade- 
quate to meet the overwhelming need for better 
appreciation of each other's patterns of thought and 
action. 

Consequently, the Conference greeted with special 
enthusiasm several new initiatives which were re- 
ported by the two delegations. 

1. The Japanese side announced the formation of 
the "Japan Foundation", a new Japanese prog:ram 
for the financing of cultural exchanges with other 
nations. The Japanese side noted the long-standing 
American efforts in this field under the provisions 
of the Fulbright-Hays Act and other programs 
and expressed pleasure that, with their new instru- 
mentality, the Japan Foundation, they would be 
able to expand exchanges in a spirit of equal part- 
nership between the two nations. The Foundation 
is due to become operational October 1, 1972 with 
an initial endowment of 10 billion yen ($32 mil- 
lion), which it is hoped will grow to 100 billion yen 
($320 million) through government and private 



' Issued at New York June 24 (press release 152 
dated June 26). 



July 17, 1972 



91 



support. The Japanese side also reported the es- 
tablishment by the Japan Society for the Promotion 
of Science of a new program of 53 million yen 
($175,000 dollars) for fellowships for Japanese 
scholars to study in the United States. This is 
also expected to grow. In addition, it reported that 
the Central Council for Education, supreme ad- 
visory body to the Minister of Education, had re- 
cently been asked to submit within two years its 
recommendations as to the basic principles and 
measures for further improvement in the fields of 
education, science and culture in Japan, aiming at 
more effective international exchange. The Ameri- 
can side welcomed these far sighted new initiatives 
and expressed their belief that these initiatives 
would make a major contribution to mutual under- 
standing. 

2. The American side reported that U.S. Govern- 
ment funds for cultural exchange with Japan have 
been increasing during the past two years. Ameri- 
can Government representatives also reported their 
intention to take new initiatives to increase the 
rate of use of the GARIOA [Government and Re- 
lief in Occupied Areas] fund for cultural exchange 
between the United States and Japan. This was 
warmly welcomed by the Japanese side. 

II. 

The Conference also met with invited Japanese 
and American experts in seven separate sessions 
and endorsed the recommendations of the special- 
ists: 

A. Improving the Level of Translation and Inter- 
pretation between Japanese and English. 

It is recommended that efforts be continued to 
identify and clarify specific words, phrases and 
types of expressions in both English and Japanese 
which offer difficulties for interpreters and trans- 
lators and which may lead to common misunder- 
standing. Towards this end, it was agreed that: 

1. "An Interpreters' Handbook for English-Japa- 
nese Translation" prepared by a Japanese sub- 
committee and a glossary prepared by the American 
side should be expanded, revised and published by 
the Joint Committee. 

2. A special Joint Sub-Committee should be ap- 
pointed by the Conference Co-Chairmen to edit this 
publication, to collect additional pertinent examples 
and to devise means for distribution to interpreters 
and translators. 

B. The Press. 

Representatives of the working press of both 
countries agreed that news reporting in the print 
media of each country has not adequately informed 
the home public on the problems of real concern 
in the other nation. Recognizing that both nations 
have a free and highly professional press, the fol- 



lowing ideas were suggested in the hope of improv- 
ing news coverage. 

1. Specialists in the language, culture, economy 
and life style of the other country be sent as 
foreign correspondents. 

2. Orientation programs in culture and society be 
established by appropriate institutions in the host 
countries for newly assigned or about-to-be-assigned 
foreign correspondents. 

3. Editors be encouraged to visit the other coun- 
try on familiarization trips. 

4. More news on cultural, scientific, and economic 
topics of Japan be reported in American newspapers. 
To assist in obtaining this coverage in Japan the 
possibility be explored of obtaining specialized in- 
terpretative services. 

5. Further opening of the press clubs of Japan 
to foreign reporters be encouraged. 

C. American Studies 

The conference made the following recommenda- 
tions designed to further strengthen and broaden 
the base for the study of American civilization in 
Japan: 

1. More Japanese scholars should be encouraged 
to be trained in American studies. 

2. Further attention should be given to the in- 
troduction of integrated, multi-disciplinary courses 
in American Civilization at Japanese universities. 

3. Team teaching and joint research in Ameri- 
can studies between Japanese and American schol- 
ars should be encouraged. 

4. American specialists in Japan and Japanese 
specialists in the U.S. need to expand their con- 
tact with each other and develop cross-cultural 
comparative area study teaching and research. 

5. Japanese university libraries in American civil- 
ization should be strengthened, inter-library lend- 
ing encouraged and the classroom use of films and 
video/oral tapes developed. 

6. The Conference urged continued attention to 
the teaching of English language in Japanese uni- 
versities either as part of or separate from Ameri- 
can civilization courses. 

7. The conference noted the need for revision of 
curricula at the undergraduate level in both coun- 
tries — with the aim of expanding the study of 
various foreign cultures, including the cultures of 
Japan and the United States. 

8. The American Studies Associations of both 
countries are encouraged to pursue these recom- 
mendations and to inform the Joint Committee 
from time to time of their progress. 

D. Broadcast Media 

The Conference endorsed the importance of ex- 
panded cultural broadcast interchange and agreed on 
responsibilities and procedures to carry out the fol- 
lowing projects. 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



1. A visit of certain American Broadcasting ex- 
ecutives to Japan in November 1972 and a return 
visit to the United States of Japanese broadcasters 
in April 1973. 

2. The expansion of Japan-United States sister 
station affiliations to increase exchanges of pro- 
grams, people and ideas. 

3. Annual binational television festivals alter- 
nately in the United States and in Japan. 

4. The further study of "magazine of the air" 
style programs (segmented 30 minute digest of se- 
lected items) for a periodic binational exchange. 

5. The establishment of a Secretariat in the Ban- 
gumi Center in Japan and in the Japan Society in 
New York to maintain liaison and assist in bina- 
tional broadcast media interchanges. 

E. Museum Loans 

An increase in the loan of art treasures would 
greatly enrich the two people's respect for each 
other's culture. To this end, the Conference en- 
dorsed the following recommendations of the spe- 
cialists. 

1. All possible effort should be made for preserva- 
tion during lending of western and oriental art ob- 
jects, and standards for preservation should be 
clarified through exchange of technical studies, and 
such other means as may be developed. 

2. Expanded training and exchange of personnel 
should focus on the development of technicians who 
can assure wider availability of proper care for ob- 
jects of oriental art. 

3. The American side should develop a non- 
governmental advisory and coordinating body which 
can serve as a counterpart for the Japanese Cul- 
tural Affairs Agency on the discussion of mutual 
problems. 

F. Japanese Studies 

The Japanese side reported in detail on the plans 
for the Japan Foundation on October 1, 1972 with 
a capital fund of ten billion yen ($32 million) to 
be donated in 1973 and increased further in the 
future. This report was received with great en- 
thusiasm by the American side and considered to 
be the most significant step taken by Japan in the 
past century towards the improvement of United 
States-Japanese cultural relations, and a stimulus 
to the future of CULCON. The American side was 
also grateful for the plan to make the operation 
of the fund as flexible as possible and to seek ad- 
vice from various Americans to assist those re- 
sponsible for the Foundation. It was hoped that 
this action by the Japanese Government would 
stimulate new funds being available from the United 
States as well as from Japanese private sources. 

In reference to priorities in Japanese studies, em- 
phasis was given to the need for expansion of 
undergraduate courses on Japan for non-specialists, 



assistance to Japanese libraries and for the publi- 
cation of books on Japan, improved language train- 
ing and training of more specialists on Japan in 
the social sciences. It was agreed that a binational 
ad hoc committee should prepare a list of basic 
works and titles for library holdings in institutions 
in the United States offering undergraduate courses 
for the non-specialist. Studies also should be made 
of the content, outlines, bibliographies and method 
of teaching of current undergraduate courses on 
Japan to improve their effectiveness. The value 
of the work of the Interuniversity Center for Japa- 
nese Language Studies in Tokyo was recognized 
together with the need for its continuation. Finally, 
it was agreed that Japanese studies in the future 
should be considered in broader terms such as 
their integration into the main stream of compara- 
tive studies. 

G. Student Counseling 

The panel believed that a more effective and ex- 
panded program of student exchange will contribute 
significantly to an improvement of cultural aware- 
ness and understanding. To serve this objective, the 
following specific recommendations were endorsed: 

1. That the Fulbright Commission, recognized as 
the most accurate and reliable source of counseling 
data now existing in Japan, be strengthened by: 

a. The Japanese side moving at the earliest pos- 
sible date to provide a current and accurate "in- 
stitutional profile" for each of its colleges and 
universities, including such data as size, course 
offerings, admission requirements, costs, and insti- 
tutional history. 

b. The United States side moving similarly to 
seek to provide this data for colleges and uni- 
versities in the United States. 

2. That expanded efforts be made by the Japanese 
side to inform the appropriate constituencies of the 
counseling services provided by the Fulbright Com- 
mission and other reputable student counseling 
services. 

3. That a program be initiated by the appropriate 
agencies and institutions to improve the understand- 
ing of transferability of collegiate credit earned in 
the two countries. 

4. That a standardized testing program be created 
to determine the level of proficiency in the Japa- 
nese language on the part of students from the 
United States electing to study in Japan. 

5. That a vigorous program be launched to ex- 
pand the concept of "Junior Year Abroad" for un- 
dergraduate students from the two countries on a 
mutual exchange basis, with particular attention to 
selection, counseling, accommodations, and follow- 
up. The emphasis on any such program should be 
on the qualitative aspects, with arrangements for 
transfer of credit. 



July 17, 1972 



93 



6. That the above recommendations be carried out 
in so far as possible by cooperative efforts on both 
sides. 

III. 
In conclusion, the Conference noted that: 

A. CULCON VI marked the tenth anniversary 
of the Conference's work, and it was agreed that 
a benchmark publication for wider public distribu- 
tion should be developed from an edited combina- 
tion of the panels' background reports and other 
conference materials. 

B. The Conference gave considerable attention to 
the question of improving elementary and second- 
ary school education concerning the study of vari- 
ous foreign cultures. It was recommended that the 
topic of elementary and secondary education be con- 
sidered as an important theme for CULCON VII 
to be held in Japan in 1974. 

C. Finally, the Conference expressed its appreci- 
ation for the hospitality and arrangements of the 
Department of State in Washington and the Japan 
Society in New York and agreed that the Joint 
Committee should meet again in Hawaii in 1973, by 
which time every effort should be made by those 
responsible to render progress reports with regard 
to the above recommendations. 



MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS 

U.S. Delegation 

John W. Hall, professor, Yale University {chair- 
man) . 

Hugh Borton, former president, Haverford Col- 
lege. 

Elford a. Cederberg, U.S. Representative from 
Michigan. 

Robert Letts Jones, president, Copley News- 
papers. 

Henry Loomis, Deputy Director, U.S. Information 
Agency. 

Sidney P. Marland, U.S. Commissioner of Educa- 
tion. 

Elmer E. Rasmuson, president. National Bank of 
Alaska. 

John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State 
for Educational and Cultural Affairs. 

Isaac Shapiro, president, Japan Society. 

Thomas P. Shoesmith, Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary of State (Acting) for East Asian and Pa- 
cific Affairs. 

DURWARD B. Varner, president. University of Ne- 
braska. 

Japanese Delegation 

YOSHINORI Maeda, president, NHK network (chair- 
man). 



Kenji Adachi, Deputy Director General, Cultural 
Affairs Agency, Ministry of Education. 

Isao Amagi, chief director, Japan Scholarship Foun- 
dation. 

Takaaki Kagawa, Director General, Cultural Af- 
fairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

YoicHi Maeda, executive director, International 
House of Japan. 

Shigeharu Matsumoto, chairman, board of direc- 
tors. International House of Japan. 

Tatsuo Morito, professor emeritus and honorary 
president. University of Hiroshima. 

Kazuo Murakami, consul, consulate general of 
Japan, New York. 

Yoshio Okawara, Minister, Embassy of Japan, 
Washington. 

Makoto Saito, professor, Tokyo University. 

Naoya Uchimura, playwright. 

HiSANARl Yamada, Member, House of Representa- 
tives, Japanese Diet. 

Tadashi Yoshida, assistant to president and con- 
troller general of policy planning, NHK network. 

Masao Yoshiki, chief director, Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science. 



U.S. Pledges Up to $24 Million 
to U.N. Population Fund 

Press release 141 dated June 19 

Secretary Rogers and Dr. John A. Han- 
nah, Agency for International Development 
Administrator, anyiounced on June 19 that 
the United States has pledged up to $2U 
million to the United Nations Fund for Pop- 
ulation Activities for 1972. The U.S. pledge 
is contingent on pledges from other donors 
toward the Fund's total goal for 1972 of 
$iO to $50 million. The U.S. pledge will he 
funded from AID moneys appropriated by 
the Congress specifically for population as- 
sistance. Following is a statement by the 
Secretary and the Administrator of AID. 

In his July 1969 message to Congress on 
population, President Nixon emphasized the 
U.S. belief that the United Nations, its 
specialized agencies, and other international 
bodies should take the leadership in respond- 
ing to world population growth. The Pres- 
ident said that the United States would co- 
operate fully with these programs. 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Congress also has stressed the impor- 
tance of looking to the United Nations agen- 
cies for leadership in population programs 
and has emphasized the desirability of chan- 
neling U.S. support for these through U.N. 
and other international agencies. 

The U.N. Fund enjoys worldwide support. 
Since its establishment in 1969, 49 donor 
countries from all parts of the world, in- 
cluding the United States, have pledged 
about $55 million to finance technical assist- 
ance grants to developing countries and in- 
ternational agencies for a wide variety of 
projects in the field of population. These 
range from assistance in conducting cen- 
suses and demographic surveys to support of 
family planning programs. 

We believe this reflects two growing 
worldwide convictions: (1) that measures 
to curb excessive rates of population growth 
are urgent and necessary; and (2) that the 
U.N. Population Fund is financing eff"ective 
programs. 

The Executive Director of the U.N. Fund, 
Mr. Rafael Salas, has now set a 1972 pledge 
goal of $40 to $50 million and has asked 
the United States to contribute up to a max- 
imum of $24 million to match other pledges 
to the Fund at a ratio of 48 percent from 
the United States to 52 percent from other 
donors. 

We believe the Fund is demonstrating by 
its performance that it merits our continued 
support in 1972. The work of the Fund is 
all the more important because the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council has given it 
particular responsibility for financing proj- 
ects looking toward the U.N. World Popula- 
tion Year 1974 and the World Population 
Conference to be held in August 1974. 

We have, therefore, requested the U.S. 
Representative to the U.N., Ambassador 
George Bush, to inform the U.N. Fund Ex- 
ecutive Director, Mr. Salas, of our continued 
support in 1972 and of our favorable re- 
sponse to his request. 



U.S. and Venezuela Exchange Notes 
on Trade Arrangements 

Joint Statement ^ 

The Governments of the United States and 
Venezuela have today [June 26] exchanged 
notes to regularize the situation following 
Venezuela's notice of termination on June 30 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between 
the two countries. 

It has been agreed that the petroleum 
tariffs specified in the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement shall be maintained at their pres- 
ent low rate. At the same time, the most 
favored nation principle is reaffirmed, al- 
though an exception is made in the event that 
Venezuela should desire to enter into free 
trade pacts or customs unions. Either gov- 
ernment may terminate these provisions 
upon six months prior written notice. 

Following the exchange of notes, repre- 
sentatives of the two governments will 
continue, in the spirit of the exchange of 
letters between Presidents Caldera and 
Nixon, to explore the development of their 
petroleum and other economic relationships. 



George Shultz Named U.S. Governor 
of IMF and International Banks 

The Senate on June 26 confirmed the 
nomination of George P. Shultz to be U.S. 
Governor of the International Monetary 
Fund for a term of five years and U.S. Gov- 
ernor of the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development for a term of 
five years ; a Governor of the Inter-American 
Development Bank for a term of five years ; 
and U.S. Governor of the Asian Development 
Bank. 



' Issued at Washington and Caracas on June 26 
(press release 150). 



July 17, 1972 



95 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Comments on Legislation on Funding 
for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 



Statement by U. Alexis Johnson 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs * 



I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
appear before this committee in the wake 
of the President's report to the Congress 
last Thursday night which described several 
steps forward in our relations with the So- 
viet Union.- The Treaty on the Limitation 
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the In- 
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with 
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of- 
fensive Arms, the Quadripartite Agreement 
on Berlin, and others are important mile- 
stones along the path to a more secure and 
peaceful world and a more stable Europe. 
It is of paramount interest to us that we 
continue to move forward along this path. 

The more secure Europe which we have 
long envisaged is several steps closer to 
realization as a result of the agreements 
signed last week. 

However, we should not assume that be- 
cause both we and the U.S.S.R. want a 
more secure Europe, we would necessarily 
agree on the definition of what a more se- 
cure Europe is. In the Soviets, we have, 



^ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on June 7. The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. 

' For President Nixon's address before a joint 
session of tJie Congress on June 1, see Bulletin of 
June 26, 1972, p. 855. 



as the President has said, a dedicated com- 
petitor with which we can reach mutually 
useful agreements not by unilaterally aban- 
doning our assets but by showing a willing- 
ness to defend and promote our own interests 
and those of our allies and friends. 

It is within the framework of this view 
of recent developments and of our objectives 
in Europe that I would like to comment on 
the legislation before you. This legislation 
provides for U.S. Government grants total- 
ing $38,520,000 in fiscal year 1973 to two 
important instruments of communication in 
Europe, Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty, organizations on which your com- 
mittee has obtained exhaustive documenta- 
tion. 

Concurrently with the submission of this 
bill. President Nixon announced on May 10 
that he would appoint a Presidential Study 
Commission to carry out the further studies 
supported by the majority of Members of 
both Houses of the Congress and to make 
recommendations for the future relation- 
ship of the government to the two radio or- 
ganizations.3 That Commission will be 
made up of five distinguished private citi- 
zens. The Commission's mandate will be 
a short one, and it will be under the re- 
quirement to report its findings and recom- 
mendations to the President no later than 



' For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
May 10, see Bulletin of June 12, 1972, p. 816. 



96 



Department of State Bulletin 



February 28, 1973. That will provide time 
for the report and recommendations to be 
considered fully by Congress in the process 
of formulating legislation for fiscal year 
1974. In announcing the plan to appoint 
a Commission, the President stated that in 
making its study the Commission would be 
particularly concerned to consult with Mem- 
bers of Congress. 

In his statement, the President noted that 
a number of different views had been ex- 
pressed in Congress as to how the radios 
might best be funded for the future and 
that no consensus on this important matter 
had emerged. The Commission will be di- 
rected to conduct a full examination of that 
question. 

While the Department of State developed 
the proposal we submitted to you last year, 
we believe that this should be only one 
among a number of alternatives for the 
Commission to examine. We believe the 
Commission should be particularly sensitive 
to the problem of proposing a structure for 
the radios which would preserve their role 
as independent broadcasters. Only if the 
radios preserve that role can we legitimately 
hope to broaden the financial backing for 
them. 

In view of your familiarity with these 
radio organizations, I will refrain from de- 
scribing them again. Rather, I would like 
to touch upon a number of points about 
them before addressing the question of the 
legislation itself. 

An important point is the argument — 
which has been heard in this committee — 
that international radio broadcasting of the 
type provided by Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty obstructs the negotiation of 
important agreements such as strategic 
arms limitation agreements. I do not think 
that there is room now for any doubt that 
this administration's effort to achieve the 
first SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] agreements was a completely suc- 
cessful one. This success was in no way 
diminished by its continuing strong support 
for freedom of international communication, 
nor was the achievement of the agreements 



jeopardized by the continued broadcasting 
of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. 

It is not enough, however, to say that these 
radios do not impede "better understanding 
and more effective cooperation . . . among 
nations," as the President underlined in his 
May 10 statement, which I would like to 
submit for the record. It needs also to be 
said that they facilitate such understand- 
ing. We believe that all the peoples of 
Europe, both East and West, want to see 
the same thing we want: a workable struc- 
ture of security in Europe as a whole, rather 
than the division of Europe into separate 
spheres of influence. They want it both 
because they fear the nightmare of a new 
war and because it is a necessary base for 
the advancement of their own interests. So 
far as the peoples of eastern Europe are 
concerned, they are also greatly interested 
in such things as the implementation of 
meaningful economic reform, the applica- 
tion of increased resources to the satisfac- 
tion of their human needs, and, eventually, 
more open societies which will be in a better 
position to establish more normal trade, 
technological, cultural, and, finally, political 
relations with the rest of the world. 

Even in closed societies, public opinion 
can influence leaderships toward greater re- 
sponsiveness if people have the information 
which belongs in the public realm. We have 
no doubt that the peoples of eastern Europe 
want their countries to develop policies 
which are more responsive to their needs 
and welfare. They also want the knowledge 
on which to base intelligent judgments 
about what those policies should be. 

A clear indication of the thirst for this 
kind of knowledge was contained in an arti- 
cle which appeared in the Washington Post 
on June 2 about a public lecture in Moscow 
in the wake of the summit meeting. The 
author describes Soviet citizens asking why 
the published text of President Nixon's 
speech on Moscow TV omitted certain key 
passages and why the press conferences held 
by Soviet and U.S. spokesmen during the 
summit meetings were not broadcast. This 
latter question could not have been asked 



July 17, 1972 



97 



if those press conferences had not been fully 
reported in international radio broadcast- 
ing in Russian. That these questions were 
asked illustrates the thirst that these peo- 
ple have for more information about world 
events than they can get from their own 
media. They want to hear not only the 
official statements of other governments but 
also how world events may affect their own 
lives. Even more, they want to know what 
their officially controlled media will not tell 
them about what is happening in their own 
countries. 

The most dramatic proof of this latter 
point was the interview this spring in which 
the Nobel Prize-winning author, Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn, criticized the lack of fairness 
and completeness in the Soviet press and 
said about Radio Liberty, "If we learn any- 
thing about events in our own country, it's 
from there." 

A second point I would like to address 
is the notion that the frank recognition 
of divergent positions is incompatible with 
or even renders impossible the attempt to 
identify common interests through negotia- 
tion. The events of the week before last 
illustrate the complete untenability of such 
a contention in today's world. We had very 
frank discussions with the Soviets in Mos- 
cow. We negotiated useful agreements on 
some issues. We disagreed on others. We 
did not deceive ourselves that we were 
changing the other side's basic outlook. Nor 
did the Soviets. 

It is the Soviet view that disagreement 
about certain of the fundamental differences 
between us in no way precludes successful 
negotiation. The day after the President's 
departure from Moscow, Radio Moscow 
praised Soviet foreign policy for combining 
"a readiness to develop mutually advanta- 
geous relations with states possessing op- 
posite social systems if they display a real- 
istic, businesslike approach to settling exist- 
ing differences," on the one hand, with "ir- 
reconcilability in the ideological struggle," on 
the other. 

As the President emphasized in his ad- 
dress to the Congress last Thursday night, 



we should bear in mind that, while we 
have started to build a new structure of 
peace, we are only at the beginning of 
that process. In that process, accommoda- 
tion and competition will exist side by side 
for some time to come. 

A third point which has been made in 
this committee is one which I would be 
among the first to support. That point is 
that we should avoid prolonging habits 
dating from the depths of the cold war. "Ir- 
reconcilability in the ideological struggle" 
is Pravda's militant watchword. It is not 
ours. 

It is not our objective in presenting the 
legislation now before this committee to pro- 
long the cold war or to perpetuate cold war 
attitudes. In its studies of Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congres- 
sional Research Service has not found these 
two radio organizations permeated with any 
desire to prolong cold war hostilities, to 
overthrow any country's regime, or to take 
any role other than that of responsible 
media of information. The objective is to 
build contact through information because 
we seek a Europe stabilized by more pro- 
lific and peaceful interaction, and not by an 
Iron Curtain which isolates one half from 
the other. Information facilitates and is a 
part of such a peaceful interaction. Censor- 
ship, jamming, and dedication to an irrecon- 
cilable ideological struggle are the cold war 
relics which obstruct it. Division and 
isolation were hallmarks of the cold war. 
Communication, interaction, and freedom of 
information should be hallmarks of the 
structure of peace we have now begun build- 
ing. 

A fourth point is the suggestion that as 
a result of our acceptance last year of the 
initiative in this committee in favor of pub- 
lic funding of Radio Liberty and Radio Free 
Europe, we find ourselves speaking through 
two voices where one might do. In reality, 
the situation has not changed. We speak 
through only one official radio voice to the 
world, the Voice of America (VOA) ; and 
it is only the Voice of America which, in 
its commentaries to its many listening audi- 



98 



Department of State Bulletin 



ences, is required to present an official Amer- 
ican viewpoint. 

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
are independent news media. Their analysts 
and commentators represent only themselves 
or the radio which provides them with the 
microphone. They do not speak for the U.S. 
Government. This situation, by contrast 
with VOA, permits them to analyze a much 
wider range of developments, including key 
events in the country to which they are 
broadcasting. The value of this function is 
testified to by the listeners. 

Nobody is forced to listen to Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty in eastern Europe 
or the Soviet Union. To the contrary, there 
are often inhibitions of a social or political 
nature against doing so. Yet many millions 
of people choose to do so every day. Sophisti- 
cated audience-research techniques indicate 
that the average daily listenership of the 
five countries to which Radio Free Europe 
broadcasts is around 30 million people. To 
achieve this result Radio Free Europe must 
clearly be fulfilling a need for information 
not available from the more easily accessible 
domestic media or from official foreign radio 
broadcasting organizations, such as VOA or 
BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation]. 
It is certain that this unique function would 
be significantly attenuated if these radios 
were to accept the constraints of being offi- 
cial broadcasters. 

A fifth and final point is the question of 
the cost of these two radios and how it 
should be borne. The authorization amount 
requested for fiscal year 1973 is $38,520,000, 
as compared with an authorization amount 
of $36 million for fiscal year 1972 and an ap- 
propriation of $32 million. The requested in- 
crease is primarily to provide for mandatory 
wage and price increases. Notwithstanding 
the fact that during the past fiscal year 
both radios have cut personnel and pro- 
grams, the most important fiscal change was 
the adjustment in international rates of ex- 
change at the turn of the year. Because ap- 
proximately 75 percent of the expenditures 
of the radios are in foreign currencies, these 
adjustments represented a loss in overseas 



purchasing power of about 13 percent. Con- 
currently, the appropriation actually re- 
ceived for fiscal year 1972 was 20 percent 
below the requested amount. Thus, the 
radios found it necessary to postpone obli- 
gations and to terminate such important ac- 
tivities as the Institute for the Study of 
the U.S.S.R. in Munich. I will not attempt 
to cover the full financial details in this 
statement, because I believe the material 
prepared for the House and Senate Appro- 
priations Committees has already been sub- 
mitted to the committee. Both these com- 
mittees found the justifications submitted 
satisfactory and reported out the figure re- 
quested. 

In connection with financing, the question 
has been asked why these stations, broad- 
casting only to the Soviet Union and east- 
ern Europe, cost almost as much to operate 
as does the worldwide service of the Voice 
of America. The answer is that these are, 
in fact, networks. Radio Liberty broadcasts 
in 20 languages with each program tailored 
to a specific target audience. Radio Free 
Europe broadcasts in six languages to five 
countries. Each has to maintain its own 
research staffs, libraries, and news bureaus 
and meet their personnel costs. These sup- 
port facilities monitor and analyze the news 
from the countries to which the radios 
broadcast in order to tell the listener the 
most possible about how that news will af- 
fect him. By contrast, the Voice of Amer- 
ica has the mandate to describe American 
official policies in the world and in relation 
to the United Nations. It depends for its 
news on the wire services, and it has the 
use of USIA libraries and other support fa- 
cilities. Even if those USIA facilities could 
somehow be made available to the other 
radios, they would not serve the purpose 
since they are geared to American develop- 
ments rather than those of the target coun- 
tries. 

We are gratified to note that as a result 
of the study of the radios done at your 
request, the Comptroller General reached the 
conclusion that "the two radios and respec- 
tive corporations have exercised adequate 



July 17, 1972 



99 



fiscal controls over the Federal funds made 
available to them and that such funds have 
been used in an effective and efficient man- 
ner for the purposes intended." 

The question of who should be covering 
these costs is indeed a relevant one. I am 
aware, Mr. Chairman, of your interest in 
getting a greater participation in this fi- 
nancing from sources other than the U.S. 
Government. I fully share the view that, to 
the extent possible, funds other than U.S. 
Government funds should be solicited to 
support these programs. There has been for 
some years a corporate fundraising effort 
by the Free Europe Fund. It is continuing 
successfully this year under the leadership 
of Mr. Stewart Cort. There is now an effort 
by friends of the radios in Europe to exam- 
ine the possibilities for fundraising there. 
You have heard a statement from Mr. Dirk 
Stikker, who is leading this effort. I have 
assured Mr. Stikker, and I can assure you, 
Mr. Chairman, that we will be happy to 
cooperate with and support Mr. Stikker's 
effort in any way he feels useful. 

It is our view that the Commission which 
the President will appoint to present recom- 
mendations on a future legislative proposal 
for funding the radios will wish to consult 
with fundraisers on both sides of the At- 
lantic so that their recommended proposal 
is one which best facilitates contributions 
from outside the U.S. Government. 

Mr. Chairman, in considering what legis- 
lation should be submitted to Congress for 
fiscal year 1973, we took into consideration 
the legislative history of this year's bill. 
Public Law 92-264; the studies of the ac- 
tivities of the radios which had been carried 
out in answer to your request by the Con- 
gressional Research Service and the General 
Accounting Office; and the fact that there 
are further studies of the radios being pre- 
pared by the Congressional Research Service 
which focus on the methods for financing 
them and on their relationship to United 
States foreign policy goals. We took note 
of the fact that both the bill proposed last 
year by the House of Representatives and 
the sense-of-the-Senate resolution cospon- 
sored by Senators Percy and Humphrey and 



65 other Senators evidenced a strong desire 
that further study should be given to the 
radios and to methods of funding them be- 
fore the presentation of more definitive 
legislation. One way in which we have at- 
tempted to meet these concerns has been by 
the submission of the present legislation, 
which is, in effect, an interim bill. 

We remain convinced that these radios 
continue, as the President wrote in a De- 
cember 23 letter to the chairman of the Free 
Europe Fund, to "serve a fundamental na- 
tional interest." Their function remains 
thoroughly consistent with the process of 
building the new structure of peace which 
has been so significantly advanced in the 
past few weeks. 



Department Discusses National Security 
Aspects of Trans-Alaskan Pipeline 

Statement by John N. Irwin II 
Under Secretary of State ^ 

It is a pleasure to appear today before the 
Joint Economic Committee to present the 
Department of State's views with respect to 
the Alaska pipeline. My statement will con- 
centrate on the national security and foreign 
policy considerations. There were, of course, 
other considerations — particularly environ- 
mental considerations — which were weighed 
by the administration in reaching its decision 
on the Alaska pipeline, but other agencies 
have primary responsibility for evaluating 
these issues. 

Over the course of the last several years, 
the Department of State has been paying a 
great deal of attention to the energy issue. 
Our review of projected future patterns of 
consumption and production has led to some 
disturbing conclusions. By the end of this 
decade, unless steps are taken to increase 
domestic sources of energy, the United States 



' Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee on 
June 22 (press release 149 dated June 23). 



100 



Department of State Bulletin 



may be dependent on imports for as much 
as 50 percent of its total petroleum require- 
ments. As much as two-thirds of these im- 
ports may have to come from sources in the 
Eastern Hemisphere, largely from the Mid- 
dle East, which contains nearly three-fourths 
of the world's oil reserves. 

In the recent past, the United States has 
followed a policy of attempting to obtain 
as much as possible of its petroleum require- 
ments from domestic sources and from coun- 
tries in the Western Hemisphere. 

There is certainly no reason to depart 
from this policy today. Within the last two 
years some major producing countries have 
used the threat of supply interruptions in 
bargaining with the oil companies for better 
economic terms. There have also been calls 
in some of the producing countries to use 
oil to achieve political goals. Less than a 
month ago producing countries in the Middle 
East were asked by the Iraqi Government 
to impose limitations on production to pre- 
vent the oil companies from increasing pro- 
duction outside Iraq to make up for any 
shortages that might result from Iraq's na- 
tionalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company. 

Until recently the United States had been 
able to isolate itself to a large extent from 
developments abroad which affected petrole- 
um supplies. The United States was self- 
sufficient in petroleum, and there was 
enough spare capacity available to help other 
consuming countries in the event of supply 
interruptions. As most of you know, this 
is no longer the case. The United States 
today is importing more than 25 percent of 
its total petroleum requirements, mostly 
from the Western Hemisphere, but a sig- 
nificant amount also from the Eastern 
Hemisphere. 

We have on the whole enjoyed good rela- 
tions with the petroleum-exporting countries 
of North and South America and of the 
Eastern Hemisphere. We appreciate these 
good relations and hope that they will con- 
tinue to the mutual benefit of the countries 
involved. We are concerned, however, that 
a substantial increase of our dependence on 
overseas oil could put us in a difficult situa- 
tion, particularly when coupled with the 



worldwide grovii;h in demand for energy 
which we foresee. 

Demand for energy, particularly oil, will 
experience dramatic increases in coming 
years. Demand for oil in western Europe is 
projected to double over this decade, from a 
level of about 12 million barrels per day in 
1970 to 24 million barrels per day in 1980. 
For Japan, the increase will be even greater, 
from a level of about 3.8 million barrels per 
day in 1970 to over 10 million barrels in 
1980. The situation in western Europe and 
Japan is therefore similar to that which we 
foresee in the United States, with one im- 
portant difference : Lacking their own energy 
resources, Europe and Japan must continue 
to be dependent on the Middle East for near- 
ly all of their petroleum requirements. 

Our energy policy, therefore, is of great 
importance to the world's other consuming 
countries. Should we fail to take steps to 
develop expeditiously our own resources, 
more of our demand would have to be met 
from foreign sources — largely from the Mid- 
dle East — where we will be competing with 
other consuming countries. At the same time, 
the major producing countries, have begun 
to adopt policies placing limitations on pro- 
duction levels. Venezuela, Libya, and Kuwait 
have already imposed such limitations, and 
other countries are known to be considering 
similar measures. These limitations, coupled 
with naturally declining production in some 
countries as reserves peak out, could mean 
that the amount of oil which will be available 
will not be sufficient to meet the total re- 
quirements of the consuming countries. 
Under such circumstances, the competition 
for available supplies could become increas- 
ingly severe. Our relations with other con- 
suming countries could be seriously affected, 
and the ability of the producing countries 
to use oil to obtain not only economic but 
also political goals will be greatly increased. 
The national security implications of such 
a situation are obvious. 

Given this situation, the Department of 
State believes it is important to bring oil 
from the North Slope of Alaska to market 
as soon as possible. We favor, therefore, 
early construction of the Alaska pipeline. 



July 17, 1972 



101 



Construction of the Alaska pipeline will 
enable North Slope oil to get to market 
several years sooner than would be possible 
with a trans-Canadian route, for several 
reasons. First, the Canadian route is much 
longer than the Alaskan route. It would 
therefore presumably take longer to con- 
struct. Second, more preparatory work has 
been done for the Alaskan route than for a 
Canadian route. Third, and most important, 
the Government of Canada has only recently 
stated that it will be in a position to accept 
for consideration an application to construct 
a northern pipeline. The latest word we have 
is that Canada will not be able to accept 
such an application before the end of this 
year. We have no indications, moreover, of 
how long deliberations on the application 
might take or even if such an application 
would be approved. Given our own experi- 
ence, it would be imprudent to assume that 
a pipeline application in Canada would not 
encounter substantial difficulties, similar to 
those which have arisen in the United States. 
A pipeline through Canada would also in- 
volve detailed, and probably lengthy, negoti- 
ations on financing and throughput arrange- 
ments. 

The Department of State therefore be- 
lieves that it is in the best interests of the 
United States to bring North Slope oil to 
market as soon as possible and that this can 
best be accomplished through construction 
of the trans-Alaskan pipeline. We hope, how- 
ever, that in the future trans-Canadian pipe- 
lines can also be built and that the resources 
of both the United States and Canada can 
'-e developed expeditiously to meet growing 
energy needs in both countries. In this con- 
nection, we have been interested for some 
time in pursuing discussions with the Cana- 
dians on our energy and petroleum relations. 
We hope these discussions can move forward 
to serve the mutual interests of both our 
countries. 

I do not mean to suggest that Alaskan 
oil will solve all of our energy problems. 
It will not. But 2 million barrels per day 
from Alaska will mean 2 million barrels per 



day we will not have to import from the 
Eastern Hemisphere. In addition to the se- 
curity implications of such additional im- 
ports, the drain on our balance of payments 
could be considerable. With world oil prices 
continuing to rise, further delay in bringing 
oil from Alaska could, by the end of this 
decade, mean an additional dollar outflow of 
from $2 to $3 billion per year. 

At the same time, we should move on a 
number of other fronts to increase domestic 
supplies. As Senator Proxmire has sug- 
gested, there may be significant oil reserves 
in the Gulf of Alaska. This area, along with 
other offshore areas, should be opened up 
for development. There should also be 
further eff"orts to promote domestic produc- 
tion of conventional oil and gas, nuclear 
stimulation of gas, research into exotic ener- 
gy forms, and measures to conserve and use 
our available energy more rationally and 
more efficiently. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope the State Depart- 
ment's views will be helpful to the committee 
in its deliberations on the matter. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Japan Amend 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
May 27 (press release 127) that notes had 
been exchanged at Washington on May 26 
constituting an amendment of the bilateral 
agreement of January 28, 1972, governing 
exports of cotton textiles from Japan to the 
United States. Japanese Ambassador Nobu- 
hiko Ushiba and Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs Willis C. Armstrong 
signed the respective notes. (For text of the 
U.S. note, see press release 127.) 

The purpose of the amendment is to ac- 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



commodate within the basic agreement the 
limits for Okinawa previously provided for 
in a separate arrangement between the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and the High Com- 
missioner of the Ryukyu Islands. This 
amendment had been agreed upon in prin- 
ciple in a separate exchange of notes at the 
time the basic agreement was signed. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctic Seals 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, 
with annex. Done at London February 11, 1972. 
Enters into force on the 30th day following the 
date of deposit of the seventh instrument of rati- 
fication or accession. 

Signatures: Argentina, Belgium, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics, United Kingdom, June 9, 1972; 
United States, June 28, 1972. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vi- 
enna September 28, 1970.' 
Acceptaiice deposited: Haiti, June 26, 1972. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.' 
Signature: Rwanda, June 26, 1972. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (bi- 
ological) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 
Signature: Portugal, June 29, 1972. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international transit of 
goods (ITI Convention). Done at Vienna June 7, 
1971. Enters into force three months after five 
states which are members either of the Customs 
Cooperation Council, the United Nations, or spe- 
cialized agencies have signed without reservation 
of ratification or have deposited their ratifications 
or accessions. 

Signature: United States, June 5, 1972 (subject 
to ratification). 



Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En- 
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United 
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates, 
March 30, 1972. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol 
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo Novem- 
ber 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, 
except for article V of the additional protocol, 
which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 
7150. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, June 3, 1971. 

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, June 3, 1971. 

Privileges and Immunities 

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the 
United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for 
the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 
Accession deposited: Indonesia, March 8, 1972 
(with reservations). 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Senegal, April 19, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with 
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 27, 1972. 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, June 29, 1972. 

SeabecJ Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and 
in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into 
force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 23, 
1972. 



' Not in force. 

■ Not in force for the United States. 



July 17, 1972 



103 



Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.' 
Signatures: Algeria, April 20, 1972; Egypt, June 

6, 1972. 
Ratification deposited: Ireland, June 29, 1972 

(with declaration). 

Wheat 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with 
respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with re- 
spect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Accessio7i to the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Libya, June 21, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from 
Australia of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, 
goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar 
year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington May 17, 1972. Entered into force May 17, 
1972. 

Belgium 

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual de- 
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 
(TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Brussels June 13 and 21, 1972. Entered into force 
June 21, 1972. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Costa Rica of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat 
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during 
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 
at San Jose March 28 and June 12, 1972. Entered 
into force June 12, 1972. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the deposit by El Salvador 
of 10 percent of the value of grant military as- 
sistance and excess defense articles furnished by 
the United States. Effected by exchange of notes 
at San Salvador April 25 and June 15, 1972. En- 



tered into force June 15, 1972; eflfective February 
7, 1972. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement supplementing the agreement of Novem- 
ber 20, 1962, as supplemented (TIAS 5518, 6684, 
6892, 7086), for conducting certain educational 
exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godesberg June 7 and 9, 
1972. Entered into force June 9, 1972. 

Iran 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Iran of 10 
percent of the value of grant military assistance 
furnished by the United States. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tehran May 8 and 29, 1972. 
Entered into force May 29, 1972; effective Febru- 
ary 7, 1972. 

Saint Vincent 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and 
Saint Vincent May 15 and June 14, 1972. Entered 
into force June 14, 1972. 

Spain 

Provisional air transport agreement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Madrid June 28 and 30, 1972. 
Entered into force June 30, 1972. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending annex F of the agreement of 
February 10, 1961 (TIAS 4734), between the 
United States and the Federation of the West 
Indies concerning defense areas in the Federa- 
tion of the West Indies. Effected by exchange of 
notes at London June 15, 1972. Entered into force 
June 15, 1972. 




' Not in force. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on June 12 confirmed the nomination 
of Thomas Patrick Melady to be Ambassador to 
Uganda. (For biographic data, see Department of 
State press release 151 dated June 26.) 



104 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 17, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1725 



Agriculture. President Nixon Suspends Meat 
Import Restraints (statement, letter to Sec- 
retary Rogers) 89 

China. Dr. Kissinger Visits Peking for Talks 

With PRC Leaders (joint statement) ... 85 

Congress 

Confirmations (Melady) 104 

Department Comments on Legislation on 
Funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty (Johnson) 96 

Department Discusses National Security As- 
pects of Trans- Alaskan Pipeline (Irwin) 100 

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor of IMF 
and International Banks 95 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Melady) 104 

Disarmament 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 
29 (excerpts) 77 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 
22 (excerpt) 83 

Economic Affairs 

Department Discusses National Security As- 
pects of Trans-Alaskan Pipeline (Irwiii) . . 100 

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor of IMF 
and International Banks 95 

President Nixon Suspends Meat Import Re- 
straints (statement, letter to Secretary 
Rogers) 89 

United States and Japan Amend Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement 102 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.-Japan 
Cultural Conference Holds Sixth Meeting 
(Johnson, communique, list of delegations) 90 

Europe. Department Comments on Legislation 
on Funding for Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty (Johnson) 96 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor of IMF 

and International Banks 95 

Japan 

United States and Japan Amend Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement 102 

U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Holds Sixth 
Meeting (Johnson, communique, list of dele- 
gations) 90 

Latin America. President Nixon's News Con- 
ference of June 29 (excerpts) 77 

Middle East. The Middle East Today: Positive 
and Negative Elements (Sisco) 86 

Petroleum. Department Discusses National Se- 
curity Aspects of Trans-Alaskan Pipeline 
(Irwin) 100 

Population. U.S. Pledges Up to $24 Million to 
U.N. Population Fund (Hannah, Rogers) . . 94 

Presidential Documents 

President Nixon Suspends Meat Import Re- 
straints 89 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 

29 (excerpts) 77 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 22 

(excerpt) 83 

Trade. U.S. and Venezuela Exchange Notes on 

Trade Arrangements (joint statement) . . 95 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 103 

United States and Japan Amend Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement 102 



U.S. and Venezuela Exchange Notes on Trade 

Arrangements (joint statement) 95 

Uganda. Melady confirmed as Ambassador . . 104 

U.S.S.R. 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 29 
(excerpts) 77 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 22 

(excerpt) 83 

United Nations. U.S. Pledges Up to $24 Million 
to U.N. Population Fund (Hannah, Rogers) 94 

Venezuela. U.S. and Venezuela Exchange 
Notes on Trade Arrangements (joint state- 
ment) 95 

Viet-Nam 

President Nixon's News Conference of June 29 

(excerpts) 77 

U.S. Force Ceiling in Viet-Nam To Be Cut to 
39,000 by September 1 (White House an- 
nouncement) 85 

Name Index 

Hannah, John A 94 

Irwin, John N., II 100 

Johnson, U. Alexis 90, 96 

Melady, Thomas Patrick 104 

Nixon, President 77, 83, 89 

Rogers, Secretary 94 

Shultz, George P 95 

Sisco, Joseph J 86 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 26— July 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to June 26 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
127 of May 27, 141 of June 19, and 149 of June 
23. 

Subject 

U.S. and Venezuela exchange 
notes on trade arrangements. 

Melad sworn in as Ambassador 
to Uganda (biographic data). 

Sixth U.S.-Japan Cultural Con- 
ference communique, June 24. 

Rogers: SEATO Council, Can- 
berra. 

U.S. and Spain conclude provi- 
sional air transport agreement 
(issued June 30). 

Newsom: Mid- America Commit- 
tee. Chicago. 

SEATO Council communique 

Olson sworn in as Ambassador to 
Sierra Leone (biographic data). 

ANZUS Council communique. 

U.S. signs convention for conser- 
vation of Antarctic seals. 

Carter sworn in as Ambassador 
to Tanzania (biographic data). 



No. 


Date 


150 


6/26 


*151 


6/26 


152 


6/26 


tl54 


6/27 


tl55 


6/28 



tl56 6/28 



tl57 
*158 

tl59 
*160 



6/28 
6/28 

6/29 
6/29 



*161 6/30 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

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Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



mio 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1726 




July 2 A, 1972 



U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 
HELD AT STOCKHOLM 105 

SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSTANT THEMES IN U.S. POLICY 
Address by Assistant Secretary Newsom 119 



\ 



'U(y' 



^^P, 



^8fg?o 



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For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1726 
July 24, 1972 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washlt-Kton, D.C. 20102 

PRICE: 

62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic tl6, foreign $23 
Single copy 30 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



U.N. Conference on the Human Environment Held at Stockholm 



The U.N. Conference on the Human En- 
vironment was held at Stockholm, Stveden, 
June 5-16. Folloiving are a statement by 
Secretary Rogers issued at Washington June 
5; a statement by Russell E. Train, head of 
the U.S. delegation to the conference and 
Chairman, Council on Environmental Qual- 
ity, made in plenary session June 6; a state- 
ment by Robert M. White, U.S. delegation 
member and Administrator, National Oce- 
anic and Atmospheric Administration, made 
in Committee II (Environmental Aspects of 
Natural Resources Management) June 9; 
and the texts of a resolution on institutional 
arrangements adopted June 15 and a Declara- 
tion on the Human Environment adopted 
June 16. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Press release 133 dated June 5 

The United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, which opens today in 
Stockholm, marks the full emergence of an 
international concern which will increasingly 
occupy the world's peoples and governments 
in the years to come. The United States Gov- 
ernment will be second to none in applying 
its energies to the task of preserving and 
enhancing the global environment. 

We look for substantial progress at Stock- 
holm in three areas: 

First, the conference should spur efforts 
to acquire greater knowledge about what is 
happening to the world's environment. This 
requires a comprehensive monitoring sys- 
tem involving, for example, a global network 
of stations to measure the effect of air con- 
taminants. 



Second, the conference should encourage 
international conventions, agreements, and 
other arrangements to deal with problems 
where action, not research, is needed. We 
have particularly in mind conventions to 
control ocean dumping and to preserve herit- 
age areas of special natural, cultural, or his- 
toric importance. 

Third, because most environmental prob- 
lems must be solved at the regional, national, 
or individual level, the conference should en- 
courage and support regional and local 
efforts. 

To help realize these and other important 
objectives, the President has proposed the 
creation of a United Nations Fund for the 
Environment, to be financed by voluntary 
contributions from governments. We be- 
lieve the initial funding goal, over a five-year 
period, should be $100 million. The United 
States is prepared to contribute up to $40 
million to match the $60 million which we 
hope others will donate. 

Firm centralized control and an agreed 
setting of priorities are essential to the effec- 
tive administration of the United Nations 
environmental activities. Therefore, we will 
propose at Stockholm that a U.N. administra- 
tor be appointed. He should have authority, 
subject to policy guidance from an intergov- 
ernmental body within the ECOSOC [Eco- 
nomic and Social Council] framework, to 
administer the Fund to coordinate all U.N. 
programs on the environment. 

The United States Government believes 
that the 1970's should be a decade in which 
the United Nations gives conscious priority 
to the coupling of scientific advance with the 
welfare of all peoples. As peacekeeping was 
its basic concern in the 1950's, as develop- 



July 24, 1972 



105 



ment was added as a second concern in the 
1960's, we believe that in this decade the 
United Nations should adopt a third basic 
objective: to encourage, through cooperative 
international action, the application of sci- 
ence and technology to improving the quality 
of human life. In no area is this task more 
urgent than in the area of the human envi- 
ronment. 

It is sometimes alleged that environment 
is a rich man's issue and that developing 
countries have little to gain from interna- 
tional activity in this field. This allegation is 
refuted by the presence in Stockholm of 
representatives of the vast majority of the 
people of the developing world. 

It is natural that developing countries 
should show particular concern that steps to 
preserve the environment must enhance 
rather than hinder the development process. 
We in the United States share this concern, 
and in our own policies regarding the envi- 
ronment we are taking it into full account: 

— We pledge that environmental concerns 
will not be used as a pretext for trade dis- 
crimination against the products of develop- 
ing, or other, countries or for their reduced 
access to U.S. markets. There should be no 
economic protectionism in the name of en- 
vironmental protection. 

— We pledge that a commitment to en- 
vironmental improvement will not diminish 
our commitment to development. 

Environmental safeguards, far from being 
antithetical to development, are an integral 
part of it. This does not mean that they 
should be rigidly imposed by industrialized 
nations as a condition of their participation 
in development projects. The relative prior- 
ity to be given such safeguards must be 
worked out between donor and recipient 
countries. In our own assistance policy we 
are emphasizing the primary responsibility 
of aid recipients for setting development 
priorities. 

We regret that the Soviet Union and a 
number of its allies have apparently decided, 
for political reasons, not to join the countries 



meeting in Stockholm. We hope, however, 
that the Soviet Union and the others will par- 
ticipate fully in the international initiatives 
and efforts which will be necessary following 
the conference. The bilateral agreement we 
signed in Moscow May 23 — the most compre- 
hensive environmental agreement yet reached 
between major countries — is an encouraging 
indication that the Soviet Union shares our 
belief in the importance of this issue. 



STATEMENT BY MR. TRAIN 

U.S. delegation press release HE 3 dated June 6 

Mr. President [Ingemund Bengtsson, of 
Sweden], Mr. Secretary General, distin- 
guished ministers and delegates: On behalf 
of the United States I wish to congratulate 
you, Mr. President, on your election to lead us 
in our work during these two critical weeks 
and to express our appreciation to the Gov- 
ernment of Sweden as the original proposer 
and generous host of this very important 
United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. 

Let me also express our warm thanks to 
the distinguished Secretary General of the 
conference, Mr. Maurice Strong, for his able 
leadership during more than a year and a 
half of intensive preparations, the quality of 
which has much to do with the hopes for this 
conference. 

From the beginning of his administration, 
President Nixon has given high priority to 
environmental protection as a matter of both 
domestic and international policy. As he 
stated, we must act as one world to protect 
the human environment. This conference 
provides a unique opportunity for such a 
united effort. 

An immense diversity of nations is 
gathered here from every region of the earth. 
We are brought together by a common con- 
cern for the quality of human life, the every- 
day life of people throughout the world. Our 
subject is much broader than pollution. It in- 
cludes the kind of communities in which peo- 
ple live. It includes the way resources will be 



106 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Nixon Praises Success of Environment Conference 



Following is a statement by President Nixon 
issued on June 20. 

White House press release dated June 20 

I have just received a report on the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
concluded last Friday at Stockholm from Chair- 
man Train, who headed the large and distin- 
guished United States delegation. 

The United States has vi^orked long and hard 
over the past 18 months to help make the confer- 
ence a success. Representatives of 113 nations 
met together for two weeks to produce an im- 
pressive number of agreements on environmental 
principles and recommendations for further na- 
tional and international action in this important 
field. 

The United States achieved practically all of 
its objectives at Stockholm: 

1. The conference approved establishment of a 
new United Nations unit to provide continued 
leadership and coordination of environmental 
action, an important step which had our full 
support. 

2. The conference approved forming a $100 
million United Nations environmental fund, 
which I personally proposed last February. 

3. The conference overwhelmingly approved 
the U.S. proposal for a moratorium on commercial 
killing of whales. 

4. The conference endorsed our proposal for an 



international convention to regulate ocean 
dumping. 

5. The conference endorsed the U.S. proposal 
for the establishment of a World Heritage Trust 
to help preserve wilderness areas and other 
scenic natural landmarks. 

However, even more than in the specific agree- 
ments reached, I believe that the deepest signifi- 
cance of the conference lies in the fact that for 
the first time in history the nations of the world 
sat down together to seek better understanding 
of each other's environmental problems and to 
explore opportunities for positive action, indi- 
vidually and collectively. 

The strong concern of the United States over 
the fate of our environment has also been demon- 
strated in our direct dealings with individual na- 
tions. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
which I signed in Ottawa this April with Prime 
Minister Trudeau was evidence of the high prior- 
ity this administration places on protecting the 
environment. The environmental agreement which 
I signed in Moscow on May 23 is proof of the 
desire of our Nation to work together with the 
others on the common tasks of peace. 

I am proud that the United States is taking a 
leading role in international environmental co- 
operation, and I congratulate our U.S. delegation 
on its success at Stockholm. The governments and 
people of the world must now work together to 
make the objectives of the Stockholm Conference 
a reality. 



managed for billions of people today and still 
more billions in the future. Our concern is 
that all nations of the world should better 
understand and better control the interaction 
of man with his environment and that all 
peoples, now and in future times, should 
thereby achieve a better life. 

In addressing this universal subject of the 
human environment, every nation's view is 
conditioned by its own historical experience. 

When my country was very young and 
President Thomas Jefferson resided at the 
edge of the Virginia wilderness at Monti- 
cello, what distinguished our new Republic 
was not wealth or industry, in which we were 
not at all impressive, but the compelling 
force of an idea newly put into practice. This 



idea was that a nation of immigrants, equal 
under the law and exercising their right to 
"the pursuit of happiness," could settle and 
cultivate a continental wilderness and estab- 
lish in it their free institutions. For a cen- 
tury and more, we were largely preoccupied 
with that undertaking. 

Some 65 years ago, when the American 
frontier was a thing of the past, President 
Theodore Roosevelt wrote with admiration 
about this continental adventure — but he 
struck a new and more ominous note. Our 
natural resources, he said, were being rapidly 
depleted; and he continued with these words: 

The time has come to inquire seriously what will 
happen when our forests are gone, when the coal, 
the iron, the oil, and the gas are exhausted, when the 



July 24, 1972 



107 



soils shall have been still further impoverished and 
washed into the streams, polluting the rivers, de- 
nuding the fields, and obstructing navigation. These 
questions do not relate only to the next century or 
to the next generation. It is time for us now as a 
nation to exercise the same reasonable foresight in 
dealing with our great natural resources that would 
be shown by any prudent man in conserving and 
wisely using the property which contains the as- 
surance of well-being for himself and his children. 

Unfortunately, our country did not always 
follow that good advice. Particularly in the 
generation just past, we not only committed 
many of the faults Theodore Roosevelt criti- 
cized; we went further and, through inade- 
quate control of our increasingly powerful 
technology, imposed burdens on our environ- 
ment, urban and rural alike, such as he never 
dreamed of. 

Now the United States is altering its 
course. We have examined the costs of cor- 
recting the most obvious of these problems — 
pollution — and we have begun to pay the high 
price of corrective action too long delayed. 

Of course, the environmental afflictions we 
are coping with are largely those of an afflu- 
ent nation. My country enjoys economic 
blessings such as many another country 
earnestly desires to achieve. The United 
States Government remains convinced that 
other nations throughout the world can and 
must increasingly enjoy the same blessings 
of economic growth and overcome the curse 
of poverty. In this Second Development 
Decade it remains the firm purpose of the 
United States to assist in that global effort 
through the United Nations and otherwise. 

My country has learned that economic de- 
velopment at the expense of the environment 
imposes heavy costs in health and in the 
quality of life generally — costs that can be 
minimized by forethought and planning. We 
are learning that it is far less costly and 
more effective to build the necessary environ- 
mental quality into new plants and new com- 
munities from the outset than it is to rebuild 
or modify old facilities. 

This point bears repetition: The time to 
do the job of environmental protection is at 



the outset, not later. It is far cheaper and far 
easier. 

This point holds true for every country at 
every stage of development. Economic prog- 
ress does not have to be paid for in the degra- 
dation of cities, the ruin of the countryside, 
and the exhaustion of I'esources. 

And the converse is equally true: Environ- 
mental quality and resource conservation for 
the long future do not have to be paid for in 
economic stagnation or inequity. 

Environmental quality cannot be allowed 
to become the slogan of the privileged. Our 
environmental vision must be broad enough 
and compassionate enough to embrace the 
full range of conditions that affect the quality 
of life for all people. How can a man be said 
to live in harmony with his environment 
when that man is desperately poor and his 
environment is a played-out farm? Or when 
the man is a slumdweller and his environ- 
ment is a garbage-strewn street? I reject 
any understanding of environmental im- 
provement that does not take into account 
the circumstances of the hungry and the 
homeless, the jobless and the illiterate, the 
sick and the poor. 

President Nixon, in transmitting to the 
Congress the first annual report on the qual- 
ity of our Nation's environment, expressed 
this central thought when he said: "At the 
heart of this concern for the environment 
lies our concern for the human condition: 
for the welfare of man himself, now and in 
the future." 

This insight — the unity of environmental 
protection and economic well-being — is likely 
to be one of the most vitally important in- 
sights to emerge from this Stockholm Con- 
ference. No longer should there by any quali- 
tative difference between the goals of the 
economist and those of the ecologist. A vital 
humanism should inspire them both. Both 
words derive from the same Greek word 
meaning house. Perhaps it is time for the 
economist and ecologist to move out of the 
separate, cramped intellectual quarters they 
still inhabit and take up residence together 



108 



Department of State Bulletin 



in a larger house of ideas, whose name might 
well be the house of man. 

In that larger house, the economist will 
take full account of what used to be called 
"external diseconomies" such as pollution 
and resource depletion, and he will assign 
meaningful values to the purity of air and 
water and the simple amenities we once 
foolishly took for granted. He will develop 
better measures of true well-being than the 
conventional gross national product. The 
ecologist, in turn, will extend his attention 
beyond the balance of nature to include all 
those activities of man's mind and hand that 
make civilized life better than that of the 
cavedwellers. Both will collaborate to advise 
the planners and decisionmakers so that 
cities and countryside of the future will pro- 
mote the harmonious interaction of man with 
man and of man with nature, so that re- 
sources will remain for future generations, 
and so that development will lead not just to 
greater production of goods but also to a 
higher quality of life. 

This conference, then, is a great beginning. 
The many countries here have differing ex- 
perience and differing priorities, but all of us 
are reaching toward a new realization of 
truths taught us by science and by bitter ex- 
perience. Together we can now broaden our 
cooperation for the common good — to learn 
the facts about man's interaction with his 
earthly environment, to persevere in global 
development efforts while taking new steps 
to cleanse and protect the atmosphere, the 
oceans, the soil, and the forests. 

We are, of course, well aware of the limits 
of international cooperation. It is often fitful 
and troubled with false starts. The fact of 
national sovereignty entails frank recogni- 
tion that many or even most of the crucial 
environmental actions have to be taken 
freely by governments and by citizens in 
their own interest as they see it. In my own 
country we have taken vigorous measures in 
recent years to clean up our air and our 
waters, to reorganize our government struc- 
ture for more effective environmental man- 



agement, and to open up our courts and our 
processes of government to the invigorating 
energies of concerned private citizens. In 
the quest for environmental quality, no need 
is greater than the development and partici- 
pation of a concerned, informed, and respon- 
sible citizenry. 

We in the United States are definitely be- 
ginning to make progress in our war on 
pollution. For example, the level of major air 
pollutants such as particulates, carbon 
monoxide, and sulfur oxides has dropped 
significantly over the past three years in 
most of our cities. The level of automobile 
emissions is likewise going down. We still 
have a long way to go, and there is no room 
for complacency. But we are demonstrating 
that the problems of environmental pollution 
are not insoluble and that they can be dealt 
with through determined action by govern- 
ment and by citizens. 

On the international level, we believe that 
the United Nations itself has a vital role to 
play in providing coordination and leader- 
ship in the global quest for environmental 
protection and the quality of life. The Stock- 
holm Conference can help give direction and 
energy to this historic opportunity for the 
United Nations. 

We have high hopes for the Stockholm 
Conference. The United States has given its 
full support to the preparations for it. Of the 
nearly 200 recommendations submitted by 
the Secretariat for our consideration, the 
great majority have the general or specific 
support of the United States. 

This conference will do more than raise 
the level of national and international con- 
cern for environmental problems; indeed, it 
has already achieved that. We are confident 
that it will also generate national, regional, 
and global action to recognize and solve those 
problems which have a serious adverse im- 
pact on the human environment. 

Among the action proposals, in the view of 
the United States, certain ones stand out as 
of particular importance: 

1. Specifically, the United States supports 



July 24, 1972 



109 



the establishment of a permanent entity 
within the United Nations — a 27-nation Com- 
mission of the Economic and Social Council 
and a high-level Secretariat unit — to coordi- 
nate multinational environmental activity 
and to provide a continuing focus for U.S. 
attention to environmental problems. 

2. The United States supports the creation 
of a $100 million U.N. Environmental Fund 
financed by voluntary contributions from 
member governments. We are prepared to 
commit $40 million over a five-year period on 
a matching basis to the Fund. 

3. We support and urge vigorous regional 
action where this is necessary to adequate 
management of environmental resources. 
Last April the President of the United States 
and the Prime Minister of Canada signed a 
pioneering agreement committing both na- 
tions to a cooperative long-term program to 
protect the water quality of the Great Lakes. 
But many other major international bodies 
of water are in similar need. The Baltic, the 
North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caspian, 
the Rhine, the Danube, and many more in 
every continent cry out for effective regional 
environmental cooperation. In many of these 
areas the time for action is rapidly running 
out. 

4. We support efforts to strengthen moni- 
toring and assessment of the global environ- 
ment and to that end to coordinate and sup- 
plement existing systems for monitoring 
human health, the atmosphere, the oceans, 
and terrestrial environments. 

5. We support coordinated research to 
strengthen the capability of all nations to 
develop sound environmental policies and 
management. 

6. We support effective international ac- 
tion to help nations increase their environ- 
mental capabilities. This includes the 
strengthening of training, education, and 
public information programs in the field of 
environment, both to develop an environ- 
mentally literate citizenry and to train pro- 
fessional environmental scientists and man- 
agers. It also includes the establishment of 



improved mechanisms, such as an interna- 
tional referral system, by which nations can 
efficiently share their national experience 
concerning the best methods of solving spe- 
cific environmental problems in such fields as 
land use planning, forest and wildlife man- 
agement, urban water supply, et cetera. 

7. We support creation of a World Herit- 
age Trust to give recognition to the world 
interest in the preservation of unique natural 
and cultural sites. 

8. We support international agreement at 
the earliest practicable date to control the 
dumping of wastes into the oceans, and we 
also urge appropriate national action to sup- 
port this objective. The announcement by 
the delegate of the United Kingdom of the 
progress recently made toward agreement 
on an ocean-dumping convention is very 
welcome, and the United States strongly sup- 
ports prompt followup action. Marine pollu- 
tion generally should have a high priority 
for international cooperative action. 

I recall last Christmas standing on a mag- 
nificent stretch of lonely beach in the Baha-' 
mas, watching the great sea waves sweep in 
from the open Atlantic. Hardly a foot of that 
beach was without its glob of oil, and the 
upper reaches of the beach, at the limits of 
the tide, were littered with the plastic and 
other nondegradable detritus of our civiliza- 
tion. 

9. We support cooperative action to pro- 
tect genetic resources and to protect wildlife. 
For example, the United States hopes that 
this conference will support the objective of 
a moratorium on the commercial killing of 
whales. Such action would be especially 
timely in view of the scheduled session of the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) 
in London later this month. 

10. Recognizing that uniform pollution 
standards are not practical or appropriate at 
this time with respect to pollution which is 
without significant global impacts, we sup- 
port the establishment by the appropriate 
international agencies of criteria upon which 
national pollution control policies can be 



110 



Department of State Bulletin 



based. We believe all nations, in their own 
interest, will wish to establish and enforce 
the highest practicable environmental stand- 
ards needed to protect human health and the 
environment. Even though these levels will 
vary among nations, it is important that 
every effort be made to harmonize differing 
national environmental policies. 

11. We support the identification and eval- 
uation of potential environmental impacts of 
proposed development activities. Such eval- 
uations should normally lead to higher de- 
velopment benefits in the long term. Like- 
wise, we urge all nations and international 
organizations to undertake systematic en- 
vironmental analyses as a normal part of 
their planning and decisionmaking activities. 

12. Finally, we support the draft Declara- 
tion on the Human Environment as a fitting 
message from this conference to the world 
and a further proof of our serious intent. In 
particular, we support its important provi- 
sions concerning the responsibility of states 
for environmental damage and the obligation 
of states to supply information on planned 
activities that might injure the environment 
of others. We believe that every nation 
should adopt effective procedures to insure 
that its neighbors have adequate notice of 
plans and projects which could significantly 
affect their environment and that measures 
should be taken to assure that any such ad- 
verse impacts be avoided or minimized. 

The frustration of modern man is twofold. 
There are those who have not even the basic 
material equipment for a decent life and who 
rightfully desire very ardently to acquire it. 
But there are also those who get much of 
what they ask for and who for a while go on 
asking for more — more goods, more services, 
more electric power, more comfort — until 
some dark night, alone with themselves, they 
are moved to ask: Why? What is it all 
worth if the fields and the forests have been 
despoiled, the air befouled, the animals re- 
duced, and the broad oceans debased? 

The fabric of human happiness is as com- 
plex and as delicately balanced as natural 



processes themselves. Our immense and still- 
growing power over our surroundings must 
go together with a new responsibility and a 
new discipline, the discipline of conserving 
resources, of limiting our births, of living 
within the means of the natural support sys- 
tems on which we depend. 

Such thoughts raise difficult questions, and 
the answers will vary widely from one nation 
or region to another. But in other respects 
the environmental and economic problems of 
this one earth are truly global, and we need 
to begin systematic analyses of them on a 
global scale. 

Certainly one truth is already undeniable: 
In our use of resources we must have regard 
for the needs of those who will come after us. 
Our most fundamental obligation to future 
generations is to enhance the estate we trans- 
mit to them. Where once man saw himself 
as custodian of a body of goods and values 
and traditions, we now realize that he is also 
custodian of nature itself. Our children will 
not blame us for what we wisely use, but they 
will not forgive us for the things we waste 
that can never be replaced. 

Now that the natural order is increasingly 
subject to human design, our concern, our 
sense of co-responsibility, must grow com- 
mensurately with our new understanding. 
There is a great excitement in the new jour- 
ney we are on, a journey of understanding 
and cooperation, not of mastery and conquest. 
The essence of 20th-century achievement will 
lie in our success in the struggle, not with 
each other or with nature but with ourselves, 
as we try to adapt creatively to the realiza- 
tion that we are all hostages to each other on 
a fruitful but fragile planet. 

The nations of the earth have many oppor- 
tunities for working together to meet these 
challenges. The United States has joined in 
numerous active bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements for environmental protection. 
I have already mentioned the recent Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement with Can- 
ada. Two weeks ago, on May 23, President 
Nixon and President Podgorny signed a 



July 24, 1972 



111 



long-term agreement for close environmental 
cooperation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. By signing the agreement, 
both our countries have signaled to the world 
the priority attention that should be devoted 
to the environment and to working together 
on the great causes of peace. Both nations 
recognize the deep desire of all people to 
direct their resources to solving the pressing 
social problems of today. 

It will be the task of the United Nations to 
view all these environmental activities in a 
global perspective, to speak for the whole 
world on international environmental ques- 
tions. 

We know the United Nations cannot solve 
every problem, but it must not set its sights 
too low. It should be animated by the same 
essential fact that has brought us together 
in Stockholm: There is an environmental 
crisis in this world. The crisis differs, it is 
true, both in kind and in degree from one 
nation or region to another, but it is a world 
crisis nonetheless. 

President Nixon, discussing the tasks fac- 
ing the United Nations in his foreign policy 
report to the American Congress early this 
year, described the crisis and the response 
to it in these words: ^ 

Ours is the age when man has first come to realize 
that he can in fact destroy his own species. Ours is 
the age when the problems and complexities of tech- 
nological revolution have so multiplied that coping 
with them is, in many ways, clearly beyond the 
capacities of individual national governments. Ours, 
therefore, must be the age when the international 
institutions of cooperation are perfected. The basic 
question is — can man create institutions to save him 
from the dark forces of his own nature and from 
the overwhelming consequences of his technological 
successes ? 

I believe profoundly that the answer is yes. . . . 

Mr. President and fellow delegates to the 
Stockholm Conference, it is by our actions, 
both now and in the years to come, that we 
have a chance to justify that affirmative an- 



'■ The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled 
"The United Nations" begins on p. 403. 



swer. We need not act in hysteria, nor credit 
every prophecy of ecological doom — but act 
we must. If we act with vision and deter- 
mination, we will preserve for the children 
of all nations a chance to live in an earthly 
home worthy of their needs and hopes. 

STATEMENT BY DR. WHITE 

U.S. delegation press release HE 13 dated June 9 

The delegation of the United States con- 
siders the recommendation on whales, now 
befoi'e this committee, as being of the utmost 
importance. As it now appears before us, 
this recommendation requires considerable 
strengthening in light of the desperate situa- 
tion confronting the future of world whale 
stocks. These stocks must be regarded as the 
heritage of all mankind and not the preserve 
of any one or of several nations. It is the 
purpose of a conference such as this to take 
account of and to take action on critical 
environmental problems. We feel that strong 
action in restoring the world whale stocks is 
a matter of great urgency. 

It is not that whales should not be used as 
a resource, but we feel that this resource 
should be used wisely so that future genera- 
tions can also enjoy their bounty. It is 
equally important that, through our modern 
technology, we do not destroy this vital part 
of the oceans' ecosystem, the health of which 
is important to all mankind. 

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the steps 
which this committee can and should take 
will assure this end. For this reason we have 
submitted the amendment. Mr. Chairman, 
several questions have been raised in connec- 
tion with this amendment and with the 
recommendation as presented in the Secre- 
tariat document, and I believe I can best ex- 
plain our amendment by addressing these 
questions. With it, recommendation 86 
reads: 

It is recommended that governments agree to 
strengthen the International Whaling Commission, 
to increase international research efforts, and as a 
matter of urgency, to call for an international agree- 
ment under the auspices of the International Whal- 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing Commission and involving all governments con- 
cerned, for a ten-year moratorium on commercial 
whaling. 

First is the question of why a total mora- 
torium; why not just one on endangered 
species ? 

A moratorium limited to endangered spe- 
cies would represent no significant change 
from the present status. The only species on 
which there is agreement about endanger- 
ment are the five already protected by the In- 
ternational Whaling Commission. Conse- 
quently, if the recommendation is limited to 
endangered species only, it is meaningless, 
since it is recommending the status quo. And 
it is the status quo which has brought these 
species to their status of endangerment and 
has so depleted the other whales. 

Next, why recommend a moratorium at 
all? Why not maintain the present manage- 
ment? 

Our information indicates that fin, sei, 
Bryde's, and sperm whales are either still 
being excessively harvested, and conse- 
quently declining in numbers, or are being 
harvested at levels which preclude rebuild- 
ing of depleted stocks. 

Existing quota levels do not reflect the cau- 
tion required by our lack of knowledge con- 
cerning population structure and dynamics 
of most exploited species. This holds partic- 
ularly for newly exploited species such as 
Minke, which is being taken without restric- 
tion in absence of information on which to 
base quotas. 

It is not enough to seek protection for a 
species only after its numbers have been so 
reduced as to threaten its existence; when a 
species is that depleted it no longer repre- 
sents a resource for human welfare, nor can 
it play any role in the marine ecosystem. 

Whales are long-lived, relatively slowly 
reproducing animals, so if we reduce popula- 
tions overly, it takes a very long time for 
them to rebuild — in some cases no recovery 
has been observed even after 25 years of pro- 
tection. 

A moratorium would allow time for stocks 
to start rebuilding. A moratorium would 



allow time to develop a fund of knowledge as 
basis for effective long-term management. 
A moratorium would allow time to ade- 
quately truly strengthen the IWC to make it 
a more effective instrument. 

The next question is, "Does this action not 
undermine the IWC?" The answer is "No." 
Our amendment specifically assures that the 
IWC has the action responsibility. This rec- 
ommendation is to governments for action 
they can seek through the IWC, and IWC 
derives its authority from governments. The 
recommendation specifically gives IWC the 
operational responsibility and specifically 
urges strengthening of IWC. 

A further question involves the qualifica- 
tions of this conference to make a recommen- 
dation in this field. Should this group make a 
scientific judgment? Why not leave this to 
the IWC? 

The status of whales is vital to all nations. 
First, because of need for food resources. If 
adequate whale stocks exist in the future, 
countries which do not now whale may have 
the chance later, when the need will be 
greater. Secondly, because whales 'represent 
a variety of other values — scientific and es- 
thetic among them. Thirdly, because whales 
contribute to health and stability of the ma- 
rine environment and consequently are of 
significance to all nations. 

This recommendation is just that — a rec- 
ommendation for action by governments at 
the IWC. It expresses the recommendation 
of these nations which is to be taken into ac- 
count by the operating body — IWC — in their 
deliberations. Stockholm does not execute a 
moratorium; it recommends. 

The world is watching what we do on 
whales. The whales have become a symbol 
of the world's endangered life and of the suc- 
cess of this conference in being able to deal 
effectively with that part of our objectives. 

This conference is not formulating a scien- 
tific judgment. It is saying: "The nations of 
the world are concerned about whales and 
their contributions, now and in the future, to 
human welfare. All exploited whale popula- 
tions are reduced well below their original 



July 24, 1972 



113 



numbers. Available information is conflict- 
ing, but given the present situation, we do 
not want the whales' future contribution to 
mankind foreclosed by current exploitation. 
We recommend the moratorium as a prudent, 
cautious procedure to assure that we do not 
lose our future options." 

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we be- 
lieve that this conference not only has the 
right but has the obligation to take these 
steps to assure that the world as a whole 
does not lose the important resource repre- 
sented by these whales. 



RESOLUTION ON INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS - 

The United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, convinced of the need for prompt and 
effective implementation by governments and the 
international community of measures designed to 
safeguard and enhance the human environment for 
the benefit of present and future generations of 
mankind, recognizing that responsibility for action 
to protect and enhance the human environment rests 
primarily with governments and, in the first instance, 
can be exercised more effectively at the national and 
regional levels, recognizing that environmental prob- 
lems of broad international significance fall within 
the competence of the United Nations system, bear- 
ing in mind that international cooperative pro- 
grammes in the environment field must be under- 
taken with due respect to the sovereign rights of 
states and in conformity with the United Nations 
charter and principles of international law, mindful 
of the sectoral responsibilities of the organizations 
of the United Nations system. 

Conscious of the significance of regional and sub- 
regional cooperation in the field of the Human 
Environment and of the important role of the Re- 
gional Economic Commissions and other regional in- 
tergovernmental organizations, emphasizing that 
problems of the human environment constitute a new 
and important area for international cooperation and 
that the complex interdependence of such problems 
requires new approaches, recognizing that the rel- 
evant international scientific and other professional 
communities can make an important contribution to 
international cooperation in the field of the human 
environment, conscious of the need for processes 
within the United Nations system which would effec- 
tively assist developing countries to implement en- 



' Adopted by the conference on June 15 (unofficial 
text). 



vironmental policies and programmes compatible 
with their development plans and to participate 
meaningfully in international environmental pro- 
grammes, convinced that, in order to be effective, 
international cooperation in the field of the human 
environment requires additional financial and tech- 
nical resources, aware of the urgent need for a 
permanent institutional arrangement within the 
United Nations for the protection and improvement 
of the human environment, and governing council 
for environmental programmes, 

1. Recommends that the General Assembly estab- 
lish the governing council for environmental pro- 
grammes composed of fifty-four members, elected 
for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geo- 
graphical distribution. 

2. Recommends further that the governing council 
have the following main functions and responsi- 
bilities: 

A. To promote international cooperation in the 
environment field and to recommend, as appropriate, 
policies to this end. 

B. To provide general policy guidance for the 
direction and coordination of environmental pro- 
grammes within the United Nations system. 

C. To receive and review the periodic reports of 
the Executive Director on the implementation of 
environmental programmes within the United Na- 
tions system. 

D. To keep under review the world environmental 
situation in order to ensure that emerging environ- 
mental problems of wide international significance 
should receive appropriate and adequate considera- 
tion by governments. 

E. To promote the contribution of the relevant 
international scientific and other professional com- 
munities to the acquisition, assessment and exchange 
of environmental knowledge and information and, as 
appropriate, to the technical aspects of the formula- 
tion and implementation of environmental pro- 
grammes within the United Nations system. 

F. To maintain under continuing review the im- 
pact of national and international environmental 
policies and measures on developing countries, as 
well as the problem of additional costs that might be 
incurred by developing countries in the implementa- 
tion of environmental programmes and projects, to 
ensure that such programmes and projects are com- 
patible with the development plans and priorities of 
those countries. 

G. To review and approve annually the pro- 
gramme of utilization of resources of the environ- 
ment fund. 

3. Recommends further that the governing council 
report annually to the General Assembly through the 
Economic and Social Council, which would transmit 
to the Assembly such comments on the report as it 
may deem necessary, particularly with regard to 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



questions of coordination and to the relationship of 
environment policies and programmes within the 
United Nations system to overall economic and so- 
cial policies and priorities. 

Environment Secretariat 

4. Recommends that a small Secretariat be estab- 
lished in the United Nations, with headquarters in 

, to serve as a focal point for 

environmental actions and coordination within the 
United Nations system in such a way as to ensure 
a high degree of effective management. 

5. Recommends further that the Environment Sec- 
retariat be headed by the Executive Director, who 
shall be elected by the General Assembly on the 
nomination of the Secretary-General, and who shall 
be entrusted, inter alia, with the following responsi- 
bilities: 

(a) To provide substantive support to the govern- 
ing council. 

(b) Under the guidance of the governing council, 
to coordinate environmental programmes within the 
United Nations system, to keep under review their 
implementation and assess their effectiveness. 

(c) To advise, as appropriate and under the guid- 
ance of the governing council, intergovernmental 
bodies of the United Nations system on the formula- 
tion and implementation of environmental pro- 
grammes. 

(d) To secure the effective cooperation of, and 
contribution from, the relevant scientific and other 
professional communities from all parts of the world. 

(e) To provide, at the request of all parties con- 
cerned, advisory services for the promotion of inter- 
national cooperation in the field of the environment. 

(f) To submit to the governing council, on his own 
initiative or upon request, proposals embodying me- 
dium- and long-range planning for United Nations 
programmes in the environment field. 

(g) To bring to the attention of the governing 
council any matter which he deems to require con- 
sideration by it. 

(h) To administer, under the authority and policy 
guidance of the governing council, the environment 
fund. 

(i) To report on environment matters to the gov- 
erning council. 

(j) To perform such other functions as may be 
entrusted to him by the governing council. 

The Environment Fund 

6. Recommends that, in order to provide for addi- 
tional financing for environmental programmes, a 
voluntary fund be established in accordance with 
existing United Nations financial procedures. 

7. Recommends further that, in order to enable 
the governing council to fulfill its policy guidance 
role for the direction and coordination of environ- 
mental activities, the fund finance wholly or partly 
the costs of the new environmental initiatives under- 



taken within the United Nations system. These will 
include the initiatives envisaged in the action plan 
adopted by the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, with particular attention to 
integrated projects, and such other environmental 
activities as may be decided upon by the governing 
council. The governing council shall review these 
initiatives with a view to taking appropriate de- 
cisions as to their continued financing. 

8. Recommends further that the fund be used for 
financing such programmes of general interest as 
regional and global monitoring, assessment and 
data-collecting systems, including, as appropriate, 
costs for national counterparts, improvement of en- 
vironmental quality management, environmental re- 
search, information exchange and dissemination, 
public education and training, assistance for na- 
tional, regional and global environmental institu- 
tions; promotion of environmental research and 
studies for the development of industrial and other 
technologies best suited to a policy of economic 
growth compatible with adequate environmental 
safeguards; and such other programmes as the gov- 
erning council may decide upon. In the implementa- 
tion of such programmes due account should be 
taken of the special needs of the developing coun- 
tries. 

9. Recommends that the costs of servicing the 
governing council and providing the small core 
Secretariat be borne by the regular budget of the 
United Nations, operational programme costs, pro- 
gramme support and administrative costs of the 
fund shall be borne by the fund. 

10. Recommends further that, in order to ensure 
that the development priorities of developing coun- 
tries are not adversely affected, adequate measures 
be taken to provide additional financial resources on 
terms compatible with the economic situation of the 
recipient developing country. To this end, the Execu- 
tive Director, in cooperation with competent organi- 
zations will keep this problem under continuing re- 
view. 

11. Recommends that the fund, in pursuance of the 
objectives stated in paragraphs 7 and 8, be directed 
to the need for effective coordination in the imple- 
mentation of international environmental pro- 
grammes of the organizations of the United Nations 
system and other international organizations. 

12. Recommends that, in the implementation of 
programmes to be financed by the fund, organiza- 
tions outside the United Nations system, particularly 
those in the countries and regions concerned, also 
be utilized as appropriate, in accordance with the 
procedures established by the governing council; 
such organizations are invited to support the United 
Nations environment programs by complementary 
initiatives and contributions. 

13. Recommends that the governing council formu- 
late such general procedures as are necessary to gov- 
ern the operations of the fund. 



July 24, 1972 



115 



Coordination 

14. Recommends that in order to provide for the 
maximum efficient coordination of United Nations 
environmental programmes, an environmental co- 
ordinating board, chaired by the Executive Director, 
be established under the auspices and within the 
framework of the administrative committee on co- 
ordination. 

15. Recommends further that the environmental 
coordinating board meet periodically for the purpose 
of ensuring- cooperation and coordination among all 
bodies concerned in the implementation of environ- 
mental programmes and that it report annually to 
the governing council. 

16. Invites the organizations of the United Na- 
tions system to adopt the measures that may be 
required to undertake concerted and coordinated 
programmes with regard to international environ- 
mental problems, taking into account existing pro- 
cedures for prior consultation, particularly on pro- 
gramme and budgetary matters. 

17. Invites the regional economic commissions and 
the economic and social office in Beirut, in coopera- 
tion, where necessary, with other appropriate re- 
gional bodies, to further intensify their efforts aimed 
at contributing to the implementation of environ- 
mental programmes in view of the particular need 
for rapid development of regional cooperation in this 
field. 

18. Invites also other intergovernmental and those 
non-governmental organizations which have interest 
in the field of the environment to lend their full sup- 
port and collaboration to the United Nations with a 
view to achieving the largest possible degree of co- 
operation and coordination. 

19. Calls upon governments to ensure that ap- 
propriate national institutions shall be entrusted 
with the task of coordination of environmental ac- 
tion, both national and international. 

20. Recommends that the General Assembly re- 
view, as appropriate, at its Thirty-first Session, the 
institutional arrangements which it may decide 
upon in pursuance of this recommendation, bearing 
in mind, inter alia, the responsibilities of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council under the charter. 



DECURATION ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT ^ 

The United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, 

Having met at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972, 
and 

Having considered the need for a common outlook 
and for common principles to inspire and guide the 



' Adopted by the conference on June 16 (United 
Nations press release HE/144 dated June 20). 



peoples of the world in the preservation and enhance- 
ment of the human environment, 

Proclaims 

1. Man is both creature and moulder of his envi- 
ronment which gives him physical sustenance and 
affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, 
social and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous 
evolution of the human race on this planet a stage 
has been reached when through the rapid accelera- 
tion of science and technology, man has acquired the 
power to transform his environment in countless 
ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of 
man's environment, the natural and the man-made, 
are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment 
of basic human rights — even the right to life itself. 

2. The protection and improvement of the human 
environment is a major issue which aff^ects the well- 
being of peoples and economic development through- 
out the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples 
of the whole world and the duty of all governments. 

3. Man has constantly to sum up experience and 
go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing. 
In our time man's capability to transform his sur- 
roundings, if used wisely, can bring to all peoples 
the benefits of development and the opportunity to 
enhance the quality of life. Wrongly or heedlessly 
applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to 
human beings and the human environment. We see 
around us growing evidence of man-made harm in 
many regions of the earth: dangerous levels of pol- 
lution in water, air, earth and living beings; major 
and undesirable disturbances to the ecological bal- 
ance of the biosphere; destruction and depletion of 
irreplaceable resources; and gross deficiencies harm- 
ful to the physical, mental and social health of man, 
in the man-made environment, particularly in the 
living and working environment. 

4. In the developing countries most of the environ- 
mental problems are caused by under-development. 
Millions continue to live far below the minimum 
levels required for a decent human existence, de- 
prived of adequate food and clothing, shelter and 
education, health and sanitation. Therefore, the de- 
veloping countries must direct their efforts to de- 
velopment, bearing in mind their priorities and the 
need to safeguard and improve the environment. For 
the same purpose, the industrialized countries should 
make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves 
and the developing countries. In the industrialized 
countries, environmental problems are generally re- 
lated to industrialization and technological develop- 
ment. 

5. The natural growth of population continuously 
presents problems on the preservation of the envi- 
ronment, and adequate policies and measures should 
be adopted as appropriate to face these problems. 
Of all things, in the world, people are the most 
precious. It is the people that propel social progress, 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



create social wealth, develop science and technology, 
and through their hard work, continuously transform 
the human environment. Along with social progress 
and the advance of production, science and technol- 
ogy the capability of man to improve the environ- 
ment increases with each passing day. 

6. A point has been reached in history when we 
must shape our actions throughout the world with a 
more prudent care for their environmental conse- 
quences. Through ignorance or indifference we can 
do massive and irreversible harm to the earthly 
environment on which our life and well-being depend. 
Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser 
action, we can achieve for ourselves and our poster- 
ity a better life in an environment more in keeping 
with human needs and hopes. There are broad vistas 
for the enhancement of environmental quality and 
the creation of a good life. What is needed is an 
enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but 
orderly work. For the purpose of attaining freedom 
in the world of nature, man must use knowledge to 
build in collaboration with nature a better environ- 
ment. To defend and improve the human environment 
for present and future generations has become an 
imperative goal for mankind — a goal to be pursued 
together with, and in harmony with, the established 
and fundamental goals of peace and of world-wide 
economic and social development. 

7. To achieve this environmental goal will demand 
the acceptance of responsibility by citizens and com- 
munities and by enterprises and institutions at every 
level, all sharing equitably in common efforts. Indi- 
viduals in all walks of life as well as organizations 
in many fields, by their values and the sum of their 
actions, will shape the world environment of the 
future. Local and national governments will bear 
the greatest burden for large-scale environmental 
policy and action within their jurisdictions. Inter- 
national co-operation is also needed in order to raise 
resources to support the developing countries in 
carrying out their responsibilities in this field. A 
growing class of environmental problems, because 
they are regional or global in extent or because they 
affect the common international realm, will require 
extensive co-operation among nations and action by 
international organizations in the common interest. 
The Conference calls upon the Governments and peo- 
ples to exert common efforts for the preservation 
and improvement of the human environment, for the 
benefit of all the people and for their posterity. 

PRINCIPLES 

States the Common Conviction That 

1. Man has the fundamental right to freedom, 
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an en- 
vironment of a quality which permits a life of dig- 
nity and well-being, and bears a solemn responsi- 
bility to protect and improve the environment for 



present and future generations. In this respect, poli- 
cies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial 
segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms 
of oppression and foreign domination stand con- 
demned and must be eliminated. 

2. The natural resources of the earth including 
the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially 
representative samples of natural ecosystems must 
be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future 
generations through careful planning or manage- 
ment as appropriate. 

3. The capacity of the earth to produce vital 
renewable resources must be maintained and wher- 
ever practicable restored or improved. 

4. Man has a special responsibility to safeguard 
and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its 
habitat which are now gravely imperilled by a com- 
bination of adverse factors. Nature conservation 
including wildlife must therefore receive importance 
in planning for economic development. 

5. The non-renewable resources of the earth must 
be employed in such a way as to guard against the 
danger of their future exhaustion and to ensure that 
benefits from such employment are shared by all 
mankind. 

6. The discharge of toxic substances or of other 
substances and the release of heat, in such quantities 
or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the 
environment to render them harmless, must be 
halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible 
damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just 
struggle of the peoples of all countries against pol- 
lution should be supported. 

7. States shall take all possible steps to prevent 
pollution of the seas by substances that are liable 
to create hazards to human health, to harm living 
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or 
to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. 

8. Economic and social development is essential 
for ensuring a favourable living and working en- 
vironment for man and for creating conditions on 
earth that are necessary for the improvement of the 
quality of life. 

9. Environmental deficiencies generated by the 
conditions of under-development and natural disas- 
ters pose grave problems and can best be remedied 
by accelerated development through the transfer of 
substantial quantities of financial and technological 
assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of 
the developing countries and such timely assistance 
as may be required. 

10. For the developing countries, stability of 
prices and adequate earnings for primary commodi- 
ties and raw material are essential to environmental 
management since economic factors as well as eco- 
logical processes must be taken into account. 

11. The environmental policies of all States should 
enhance and not adversely affect the present or fu- 
ture development potential of developing countries, 



July 24, 1972 



117 



nor should they hamper the attainment of better 
living- conditions for all, and appropriate steps 
should be taken by States and international organi- 
zations with a view to reaching agreement on meet- 
ing the possible national and international economic 
consequences resulting from the application of en- 
vironmental measures. 

12. Resources should be made available to pre- 
serve and improve the environment, taking into ac- 
count the circumstances and particular requirements 
of developing countries and any costs which may 
emanate from their incorporating environmental 
safeguards into their development planning and the 
need for making available to them, upon their re- 
quest, additional international technical and financial 
assistance for this purpose. 

13. In order to achieve a more rational manage- 
ment of resources and thus to improve the environ- 
ment, iStates should adopt an integrated and co- 
ordinated approach to their development planning 
so as to ensure that development is compatible with 
the need to protect and improve the human environ- 
ment for the benefit of their population. 

14. Rational planning constitutes an essential tool 
for reconciling any conflict between the needs of 
development and the need to protect and improve the 
environment. 

15. Planning must be applied to human settle- 
ments and urbanization with a view to avoiding 
adverse effects on the environment and obtaining 
maximum social, economic and environmental bene- 
fits for all. In this respect projects which are de- 
signed for colonialist and racist domination must be 
abandoned. 

16. Demographic policies, which are without preju- 
dice to basic human rights and which are deemed 
appropriate by Governments concerned, should be 
applied in those regions where the rate of population 
growth or excessive population concentrations are 
likely to have adverse effects on the environment or 
development, or where low population density may 
prevent improvement of the human environment 
and impede development. 

17. Appropriate national institutions must be en- 
trusted with the task of planning, managing or con- 
trolling the environmental resources of States with 
the view to enhancing environmental quality. 

18. Science and technology, as part of their con- 
tribution to economic and social development, must 
be applied to the identification, avoidance and con- 
trol of environmental risks and the solution of en- 
vironmental problems and for the common good of 
mankind. 

19. Education in environmental matters, for the 
younger generation as well as adults, giving due 
consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in 
order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion 
and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises 
and communities in protecting and improving the 
environment in its full human dimension. It is also 



essential that mass media of communications avoid 
contributing to the deterioration of the environment, 
but, on the contrary, disseminate information of an 
educational nature on the need to enable man to 
develop in every respect. 

20. Scientific research and development in the 
context of environmental problems, both national 
and multinational, must be promoted in all countries, 
especially the developing countries. In this con- 
nexion, the free flow of up-to-date scientific informa- 
tion and transfer of experience must be supported 
and assisted, to facilitate the solution of environ- 
mental problems; environmental technologies should 
be made available to developing countries on terms 
which would encourage their wide dissemination 
without constituting an economic burden on the 
developing countries. 

21. States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of interna- 
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental poli- 
cies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 

22. States shall co-operate to develop further the 
international law regarding liability and compensa- 
tion for the victims of pollution and other environ- 
mental damage caused by activities within the juris- 
diction or control of such States to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction. 

23. Without prejudice to such criteria as may be 
agreed upon by the international community, or to 
the standards which will have to be determined 
nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider 
the systems of values prevailing in each country, and 
the extent of the applicability of standards which 
are valid for the most advanced countries but which 
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost 
for the developing countries. 

24. International matters concerning the protec- 
tion and improvement of the environment should be 
handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big 
or small, on an equal footing. Co-operation through 
multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other ap- 
propriate means is essential to effectively control, 
prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental 
effects resulting from activities conducted in all 
spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of 
the sovereignty and interests of all States. 

25. States shall ensure that international organi- 
zations play a co-ordinated, efficient and dynamic 
role for the protection and improvement of the 
environment. 

26. Man and his environment must be spared the 
effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of 
mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt 
agreement, in the relevant international organs, on 
the elimination and complete destruction of such 
weapons. 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S. Policy 



Address by David D. Newsom 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 



Interest here at home in a meaningful 
U.S. policy toward Africa has clearly been 
growing in recent years. We welcome this 
interest. We feel it should be accompanied 
by an accurate knowledge and an increased 
understanding of what our policy is. 

I regret to say that our policy and actions 
have been misunderstood on occasion and 
misinterpreted. It is not my purpose here 
today to make a partisan speech. As the 
steward of our African policy over the past 
three years, however, I should like to take 
this occasion to set the record straight. 

The growing interest in Africa in this 
country was manifested most dramatically 
during the last weekend in May when a 
conference of 400 black Americans at 
Howard University was followed by an im- 
pressive demonstration by over 10,000 per- 
sons in Washington on behalf of African 
liberation. As is natural to an occasion to- 
tally directed to one area of policy, there 
were many critical of official policies — not 
always, however, with a full knowledge of 
what the policies are and of the complexities 
of making those policies. Charges ranged 
from "neglect" of Africa to assertions that 
present policies represented a shift from the 
past purposely in favor of the white-domi- 
nated regimes of southern Africa. Quite 
understandably, because of the identity with 
racial problems, the focus of attention of this 
surging interest in Africa is on the southern 
portion of the continent. 



' Made before the Mid-America Committee at Chi- 
cago, 111., on June 28 (press release 156). 



There have been other manifestations of 
both rising interest and serious misconcep- 
tion. The New York Times of April 2 high- 
lighted what it called the deliberate increase 
of contacts and communication with the 
white-dominated regimes of southern Africa. 
A statement issued through the office of 
Congressman Diggs of the House Subcom- 
mittee on Africa spoke of "collaboration" 
with the white regimes. 

There has also been criticism from those 
who dislike our policies on the grounds that 
these policies do not sufficiently recognize 
certain of our interests in southern Africa. 
Motivated by concern over strategic or eco- 
nomic considerations, by basic sympathies 
with the white populations of the area, or by 
reluctance to see us become involved in prob- 
lems of distant regions, many express their 
disapproval of traditional U.S. restraint 
toward the regimes of southern Africa. 

Individual American attitudes toward this 
area vary widely. Those making policy are 
in the middle. 

To set the record straight on what our pol- 
icies can be and what they are, let us examine 
first those elements that have been constant 
in U.S. policy toward southern Africa since 
the late fifties: 

— First, the United States Government has 
consistently supported the principle of self- 
determination for all peoples in Africa. 

— Second, we have strongly and actively 
indicated our abhorrence of the institution of 
apartheid. 

— Third, we have consistently favored 



July 24, 1972 



119 



peaceful change in southern Africa through 
supporting constructive alternatives to the 
use of force. 

Our implementation of these principles has 
been governed, for more than a decade and 
through several administrations, by our rec- 
ognition of four realities: 

1. As a nation, we have complex world- 
wide relationships. Our response to the needs 
of one area frequently is limited by our in- 
terests in another. For example, the differ- 
ence between interests in Europe and in 
Africa has affected our position in both. 

2. We are dealing in southern Africa 
with governments which react strongly to 
outside pressures and are not easily suscep- 
tible to persuasion. 

3. We are dealing with complex socie- 
ties, not with the interest of one race, but of 
many. Justice requires a consideration of 
the future of all. 

4. There are many real limitations on 
the extent to which we can influence the situ- 
ation, both in terms of what might be sup- 
ported domestically and of what we might be 
able to do in Africa. 

The actions of the U.S. Government in this 
area over the past three years have been 
consistent with these general policy lines and 
limitations laid down in the years just after 
the emergence of independent Africa. 

By the strict maintenance of arms embar- 
goes toward both South Africa and the Por- 
tuguese territories, we have tangibly demon- 
strated our support for self-determination 
and our desire to avoid any support either 
for the imposition of apartheid or for the 
continuation of colonial rule. 

The maintenance of an arms embargo may 
sound like a passive act. It is not. It re- 
quires constant vigilance over shipments to 
the area. It means considerable sacrifice on 
the part of U.S. exporters who have seen sub- 
stantial sales in southern Africa go to coun- 
tries less conscientious about the embargo 
and less criticized by the Africans. It means 
a continuing effort on our part to explain to 
those in this country opposed to the em- 
bargoes the absolute necessity of maintain- 



ing them in terms of our wider interests in 
Africa. We believe this policy has been effec- 
tive. No proof has ever been presented that 
any weapons have gone from the United 
States to southern Africa since the embar- 
goes were established in 1963. 

The maintenance of the arms embargo has 
been accompanied, particularly in the case of 
South Africa, by a strict limitation on con- 
tact with that country's military. Because we 
have not wished to risk subjecting our men 
to apartheid, we have since 1967 avoided U.S. 
naval visits to South African ports despite 
the frequent need for U.S. Navy transit of 
this area. This has added to logistical prob- 
lems for the Navy. 

The U.S. Embassy and the U.S. consul- 
ates general in South Africa continue to con- 
stitute significant bridges between the races 
in that country. Multiracial entertaining, 
contact with South Africans of all races, and 
the facilitation of such contacts for Ameri- 
can visitors in the country leave little doubt 
as to where the United States stands with 
respect to apartheid. The record of the U.S. 
mission in this regard is in important re- 
spects a unique one. 

We have, further, during the past three 
years sought to add new dimensions to these 
efforts. 

We have expanded our contacts with all 
elements of the South African population. 
We have offered significant members of the 
South African majority the opportunity to 
visit this country. During the past three 
years, we have had 4.5 official visitors from 
South Africa, of whom 30 have been from the 
black, colored, and Indian communities. 
Many of the white as well as the black and 
colored South Africans whom we have in- 
vited here have been persons deeply involved 
in seeking alternatives to apartheid. 

It is, perhaps, pertinent that the Foreign 
Minister of South Africa felt obliged to 
point out to his Parliament on May 5 that 
present U.S. policy did not accept the South 
African approach to evolution within that 
country but sought, through persuasion, to 
bring about peaceful change. 
We have begun to break down racial bar- 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



riers regarding the assignment of American 
official personnel to South Africa. Black 
diplomatic couriers have now been placed on 
the runs to South Africa. Three black For- 
eign Service officers have, during the past 
year, been on temporary duty assignments in 
the Republic. Black Americans have been 
sent to South Africa under our official cul- 
tural exchange program. 

In the case of Namibia, or South West 
Africa, we strongly supported the proposal at 
the United Nations to have the International 
Court of Justice take up the question of 
South Africa's continued administration of 
the territory. We accepted the Court's con- 
clusions that South Africa's mandate over 
the territory was terminated and that South 
Africa's continued presence there is illegal. 

We alone among major countries have 
taken the position of discouraging any new 
investment in the territory. We encourage 
U.S. firms already in Namibia to set the pace 
in improved employee relations. We con- 
sistently have supported the U.N.'s responsi- 
bility in the territory. 

In our support for alternatives in south- 
ern Africa, we have increased our assistance 
dramatically to the smaller majority-ruled 
states of southern Africa: Botswana, Leso- 
tho, and Swaziland. We will in July be sign- 
ing a $12 million loan agreement for the con- 
struction of a road linking Botswana to 
Zambia and providing an economic outlet to 
the north for that nation. In 1971 for the 
first time we appointed an Ambassador — a 
black American — to represent us in these 
three countries. 

In the continuing interplay of U.S. inter- 
ests, decisions must be made in which one 
set of interests may prevail, in any specific 
case, over another. In the region of southern 
Africa there are five areas in particular 
where conflicting interests have affected 
policies — in every administration. For south- 
ern Africa has in the past 15 years presented 
particularly difficult policy problems: The 
Portuguese territories, relations with the 
liberation movements, pressures at the 
United Nations, Rhodesia, and investment in 
South Africa are some of these. 



Critics of U.S. policies seek to take isolated 
decisions in these problem areas and read 
into them a basic change in the course of 
U.S. African policy. In doing so they tend to 
neglect decisions which with equal logic point 
in the opposite direction. 

In the more extreme form, a few critics 
have claimed that there is a conscious effort 
on the part of the U.S. Government at this 
time to favor the white-ruled governments of 
southern Africa. I have had to deny both in 
Africa and in this country that we have 
chosen sides in the southern conflict and that 
the United States would intervene on the 
side of the white regimes in the event of 
trouble. 

There is no basis for such assumptions. 
They ignore the large and growing U.S. in- 
terest in black Africa and, particularly, our 
interest in the majority-ruled states in south- 
ern Africa. They ignore the fact that our 
one major intervention in Africa, in close 
collaboration with the U.N., was to preserve 
the unity of the Congo — against eff'orts to 
dismember it supported by the white-domi- 
nated regimes. This intervention was or- 
dered by President Eisenhower and fully 
supported and carried on by President Ken- 
nedy. 

Relations With Portugal 

The most difficult area relates to our rela- 
tions with Portugal. Portugal is an ally, a 
charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. For more than two decades 
we have enjoyed the use of base facilities in 
the Azores, Portuguese islands in the mid- 
Atlantic. These base facilities are of great 
importance to our antisubmarine defenses in 
the face of a growing Soviet submarine pres- 
ence in the area. 

Although our last formal agreement to 
continue stationing forces in the Azores 
lapsed in 1962, the Portuguese permitted us 
to stay on. When a new Portuguese Gov- 
ernment took office in 1968, it insisted that 
we formalize our presence in the Azores by 
renewing the lapsed agreement. We con- 
curred and also agreed to a related request 
that we examine areas in which the United 



July 24, 1972 



121 



states could assist Portugal in economic and 
social development. The final agreement did 
not follow the usual pattern of granting mili- 
tary assistance for military bases but was in- 
stead solely related to economic and educa- 
tional development in metropolitan Portugal. 

Now, this base agreement has drawn a 
great deal of attention and has attracted 
substantial comment both in the United 
States and in Africa.^ I am afraid that de- 
spite our best efforts at explaining the terms 
it has been greatly misunderstood, and even 
misrepresented. Much of the confusion has 
concerned Export-Import Bank credits for 
American exporters competing for contracts 
in Portugal. In a letter to the Portuguese on 
this subject, the Secretary of State said that 
we had reviewed a number of development 
projects that they had in mind and that the 
Export-Import Bank would consider financ- 
ing exports for those projects in accordance 
with the usual loan criteria and practices of 
the Bank. Export-Import Bank facilities 
have always been available for U.S. firms 
seeking business in Portugal, and this agree- 
ment represented absolutely no change in 
that policy. No commitment was made to 
extend credits in any amount, only to con- 
sider applications as before. 

The principal objection voiced against the 
agreement holds that it releases Portuguese 
resources for use in the African wars. But 
in fact, Portugal has large exchange reserves 
as the result of conservative fiscal policies. 
Our refusal to grant credit would not lead 
others to do the same. There is no evidence 
to suggest that our withholding credit would 
in any sense deter the Portuguese from pur- 
suing their present policies in Africa. 

Liberation Movements in Africa 

We recognize that the question of our rela- 
tions with Portugal and with Portuguese 
Africa is becoming increasingly an emotional 
issue in this country. Closely related to this 
is the question of our relations with all libera- 
tion movements in Africa. Many in Africa 
and America judge one's attitude toward the 



southern African issues as a whole by the 
attitude taken toward the liberation move- 
ments and their leaders. 

The African movements targeted against 
the several parts of white-ruled southern 
Africa vary widely in size, effectiveness, co- 
hesion, and activity. Those targeted against 
the Portuguese territories appear to be mili- 
tarily the most active. They are receiving 
help from the Soviets and Chinese. The lead- 
ers of the movements seek contacts with and 
help from the West. 

The question of U.S. official relations with 
leaders of opposition movements in colonial 
territories has always posed a dilemma for 
American policymakers. It was true in the 
fifties with respect particularly to North 
Africa. It has been no less true throughout 
the sixties and today in that part of Africa 
still under colonial or white domination. 

These movements are a political fact. On 
the one hand, the absence of contact or sup- 
port from us leaves the leaders subject to 
certain other outside influences. On the other 
hand, the United States has traditionally 
been unwilling to recognize opposition ele- 
ments in colonial territories until an inter- 
nationally recognized transfer of power has 
taken place. That situation still prevails 
today. Nevertheless, in such areas, as in the 
past, both U.S. Government and private or- 
ganizations seek opportunities to help with 
appropriate humanitarian and educational 
assistance to refugees affected by the con- 
flicts. 

African Issues in the United Nations 

The problem in the United Nations is par- 
ticularly difficult. 

We have a basic sympathy with the aspira- 
tions of the Africans to see an end to apart- 
heid and colonial government and to see a 
greater recognition of the need for racial 
justice and equality. Most African leaders 
understand and appreciate this. At the same 



' For background and texts of a U.S. note and 
U.S. letters dated Dec. 9, 1971, see Bulletin of 
Jan. 3, 1972, p. 7. 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



time, because of our own traditions and his- 
torical experience, they expect more of the 
United States — more than they expect of 
others. We cannot always meet these expec- 
tations. 

During 1971, if we take together General 
Assembly and Security Council votes on 
African issues, we voted for 15 specific Afri- 
can proposals, against 11, and abstained on 
12. 

Many Africans believe this record is in- 
adequate. Yet, underlying the careful con- 
sideration given each vote was a deep dedi- 
cation to many of the same principles 
motivating African representatives and our 
desire, whenever possible, to vote with the 
Africans. Ironically, we could have voted for 
most of these proposals if only one or two 
extreme or unrealistic features had been 
eliminated. We were able to negotiate, how- 
ever, in many cases, agreements on language 
changes so we could vote with the Africans. 
Many of the problems we had did not relate 
to Africa per se, but involved broader ques- 
tions. They related to: 

— Our desire to avoid establishing world- 
wide legal precedents which could affect 
broader U.S. and U.N. interests. 

— The need to verify facts before condemn- 
ing another state. 

— Our deep concern over increases in the 
budget of the United Nations. 

Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia 

With regard to Rhodesia, the U.S. Govern- 
ment has sought to support United Nations 
economic sanctions as an alternative to a vio- 
lent solution and as a form of pressure on the 
Smith regime to negotiate a new basis for 
independence. We closed our consulate in 
Rhodesia. We closed off all contact with the 
Smith regime. We enforced sanctions against 
Rhodesia as conscientiously as any nation, 
and more so than most. 

This has not been a universally popular 
policy in this country. There are those who 
dislike the idea of sanctions against anyone, 
those who are aware of extensive violations 



by other countries, those whose own interests 
have in some way been affected, and still 
others who are disillusioned with the United 
Nations and opposed to the concept of United 
Nations mandatory action infringing on the 
United States. 

There are those who deplore the fact that 
while other countries have been ignoring 
sanctions with impunity, the United States 
was forced to pay higher prices to the Soviet 
Union for strategic materials. These atti- 
tudes resulted in the action of the Congress 
last year to exempt strategic materials from 
Rhodesian sanctions and allow their importa- 
tion into the United States unless there is a 
similar embargo on such materials from 
Communist countries. Efforts this year to 
obtain the repeal of the resultant legislation 
have not been successful. 

This move has caused adverse reactions in 
Africa. It created a contradiction between 
our domestic and international obligations. 
It came at a time when Britain was seeking 
a settlement with Rhodesia and undoubtedly 
led the Rhodesians for a time to believe that 
sanctions as a whole were visibly crumbling. 
While there have been far more extensive 
sanctions violations by others, this open and 
official U.S. act has made us appear the prin- 
cipal culprit, in New York and in Africa, 
condemned by resolutions both in the U.N. 
and in the Organization of African Unity. 
I dislike deeply seeing ourselves in this posi- 
tion. 

U.S. Investments in South Africa 

Finally, there is the question of U.S. in- 
vestments in South Africa. There are those 
who see the failure of the U.S. Government 
to seek to restrict such investments as an 
indication of sympathy for the policies of 
South Africa. There are those who assume 
that the presence of these investments auto- 
matically means that we will intervene in the 
event of trouble in that area. Neither as- 
sumption is correct. Here, again, the record 
needs to be set straight: 

— First, U.S. investment in South Africa 



July 24, 1972 



123 



represents only 16 percent of total foreign in- 
vestment in that country. It represents only 
a fourth of total U.S. investment in Africa, 
a ratio that is decreasing all the time. It is 
not likely that U.S. withdrawal of this invest- 
ment, assuming this were feasible, would 
force change in South Africa. There is no 
valid basis for speculating that the United 
States would take extraordinary measures to 
protect this investment in the event of civil 
or other disturbance when, among other fac- 
tors, more substantial investment in the rest 
of the continent would need to be weighed in 
the balance. 

— Second, much of this investment is 
linked with South African business interests; 
withdrawal would not be easy even if the 
United States had authority to force with- 
drawal by American companies. New U.S. 
investment in South Africa comes to a large 
extent from current profits of U.S. firms 
operating there. 

— Third, the United States does not en- 
courage investment in South Africa nor ex- 
tend guarantees covering such investment. 
It is the economic situation in that country 
that attracts investment. 

— Fourth, while there is debate in the 
United States and in South Africa on this 
point, our soundings indicate that the black 
and colored populations of South Africa do 
not want to see U.S. investment withdrawn. 
The majority see U.S. investment as a con- 
structive force; they wish to see it remain 
and make an impact on that society. 

The United States Government, therefore, 
neither encourages nor discourages invest- 
ment in South Africa. It does encourage U.S. 
firms that are there to lead the way in up- 
grading the status of non-white workers and 
in contributions to social and educational 
improvement. It is a misleading oversimpli- 
fication to suggest that the presence of that 
investment either draws us into the conflict 
of races in that area or commits us to a policy 
favorable to apartheid. 

The southern African aspect, however, is 
not the only element in U.S. policy toward 
Africa. There are 41 independent African 
states other than South Africa. In many of 



them we have major interests and invest- 
ments. We desire satisfactory relations with 
all. 

Cliches exist about this aspect of our 
policy as well. People speak of "neglect," 
and "low priority." The facts do not bear 
this out. 

With patient effort, we have established 
reasonably satisfactory relations with all but 
one of these states. We have, in the past 
three years, resumed diplomatic relations 
with Mauritania; we have strengthened our 
relations with Algeria and the Sudan despite 
the continued absence of formal diplomatic 
ties. Of all the states in Africa, only in 
Congo (Brazzaville) do we not have reason- 
able access to the leadership and a reasonably 
I'espected relationship. 

African nations welcome the attention we 
have given to them and to their citizens as 
significant members of the world community. 
We have, from its inception, recognized the 
Organization of African Unity as a forward- 
looking institution representing the common 
interests and identities of Africans. 

Through visits, correspondence, and the 
work of our diplomatic missions, v/e have es- 
tablished bonds of friendship and common 
interest which belie any suggestion of ne- 
glect. The Ambassador of one of the most 
militant African countries recently told one 
of our officers that he was preparing a 
memorandum for his government emphasiz- 
ing the degree of attention given both per- 
sonally to him and to the needs and interests 
of Africa by those in the U.S. Government. 
We are in continuing correspondence with 
several African heads of state, including one 
from another militant government who, 
while not agreeing with all that we are doing, 
emphasizes his appreciation for the attention 
we give to him and to the needs of his 
country. 

In the last analysis, each African leader 
places the greatest emphasis on the needs of 
his own country, particularly in the des- 
perate search for the means of development. 
Here, there is neither neglect nor low prior- 
ity on the part of the United States. 

During a period of increasing disillusion- 



124 



Department of State Bulletin 



ment with foreign aid and of declining over- 
all appropriations, we have been able to main- 
tain assistance to the African countries at a 
constant level. In 1972, in fact, the overall 
sum was the highest since 1968. Our role 
was part of an international effort which 
gives the African Continent the highest per 
capita development aid in the world. 

The United States follows policies in 
Africa today which are consistent with the 
main themes of that policy since the late 
fifties. It follows policies which give us a 
meaningful relationship with a continent in- 
creasingly important in terms both of trade 
and investment and its role on the interna- 
tional stage. 



ICAO Resolution on Air Piracy 
Welcomed by Secretary Rogers 

Statement by Secretary Rogers * 



the innocent, both travelers and the crews 
that serve them. This determination of re- 
sponsible governments to join together in 
cooperative action to put a stop to these ugly 
threats is gratifying. Only through the con- 
certed action of governments can travelers 
be assured of the safety they require and 
to which they are entitled. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



92d Congress, 1st Session 

U.S. Foreign Service Grievance and Appeals Pro- 
cedure. Hearings before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on S. 2023, S. 2659 and 2662. 
October 7-18, 1971. 342 pp. 

Material Relating to United States Foreign Trade. 
Prepared at the direction of Senator Daniel K. 
Inouye, for the use of the Committee on Com- 
merce and the Subcommittee on Foreig:n Com- 
merce and Tourism. December 28, 1971. 41 pp. 



The Council of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) this after- 
noon, and by a very substantial majority, 
endorsed the proposal of the United States 
for a program of action to deal with the 
critical threat of air piracy. This resolution 
adopted by ICAO calls for immediate re- 
sumption of work to prepare an international 
convention that would establish multilateral 
procedures for deciding on joint action 
among governments when found necessary 
to deal with hijacking. The Council also 
called on all states that have not yet done so 
to become parties, as soon as possible, to 
the already existing international conven- 
tions that deal with hijacking, sabotage, and 
unlawful interference with civil aviation. In 
addition, the Council urged rapid action to 
put into effect security procedures against 
these threats. 

I welcome this action by the Council which 
reflects the mounting worldwide abhorrence 
of the acts of violence which criminal and 
irrational persons have been inflicting on 



'Issued on June 20 (press release 145). 



92d Congress, 2d Session 

Fishing Rights and United States-Latin American 
Relations. Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. February 3, 1972. 128 pp. 

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
for 1973. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations. February 
16-March 16, 1972. 978 pp. 

Department of State Authorization for Fiscal Year 
1973. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State 
Department Organization and Foreign Operations 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Feb- 
ruary 29-March 6, 1972. 165 pp. 

The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam. A 
compendium prepared for the Subcommittee To 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Feb- 
ruary 1972. 123 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1972. Hearings before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 
13759, to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, and for other purposes. Part 1; March 14- 
23, 1972; 247 pp.; part 2; March 28-April 11, 
1972; 154 pp. Hearings before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on S. 3390, to amend 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other 
purposes. April 17-19, 1972. 263 pp. 

Seeking Relief From Restrictions on Soviet Jews. 
Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 471. H. Rept. 
92-983. April 1972. 5 pp. 



July 24, 1972 



125 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Calls for Balanced Resolution 
on Israel-Lebanon Border Incidents 

Following are statements made in the U.N. 
Security Council on June 2U and 26 by U.S. 
Representative George Bush, together with 
the text of a resolution adopted by the Coun- 
cil on June 26. 



STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR BUSH 
Statement of June 24 

USUN press release 69 dated June 24 

The United States deplores the continuing 
violence which has marked recent events in 
the Middle East. We regret that those whose 
fortunes ultimately depend on the establish- 
ment of true peace and stability in that area 
have again chosen the path of terrorism, 
the path of armed force. 

As all of us in this Council well know, 
terrorism has been used in a senseless pat- 
tern of death and destruction. Innocent pil- 
grims, including 16 of my compatriots, 
Americans, have lost their lives at the Lod 
Airport. At that time, the Acting Secretary 
of State expressed the shock of the United 
States Government at that outrageous action, 
which he termed a "murderous and indis- 
criminate attack on innocent civilians, in- 
cluding women and children." For this state- 
ment some accused the United States Govern- 
ment of being anti-Arab. Terrorist acts 
have taken their toll of human life, and 
productive economic resources have been de- 
stroyed or diverted from serving the people 
of the area. We recognize that no government 
can remain unconcerned about the threat of 
such terrorism, and no peoples can remain 
insensitive to its consequences. 

Several here before us have mentioned the 
Lod Airport incident. I cannot let pass, Mr. 
President, the comments about this dreadful 



incident by our colleague the Ambassador of 
Egypt. Unless I misunderstood him, he re- 
ferred to the "crocodile" tears that had been 
shed about this incident. I can only speak 
for the people in the United States. The 
tears shed here were genuine; they flowed 
from the heart. They were not synthetic. 
They were not contrived. No, they were not 
the hypocritical tears of a crocodile. They 
genuinely reflected the grief, the horror, of 
families, friends, and just plain Americans 
who were heartbroken at the loss of lives of 
16 of their fellow citizens — and at the loss 
of the other lives involved. 

We have noted in contrast that many Arab 
spokesmen have refused to associate them- 
selves with the massacre at Lod. The perpe- 
trators of this terrorism should gain from 
others only revulsion for their cause. We 
denounce whatever forces sent these mur- 
derers on their maniacal mission. 

To be sure, terrorism in the Middle East 
breeds its own deplorable reactions. A U.S. 
Government spokesman stated on June 22 
that the United States deeply regrets "the 
loss of life in the Israeli attack on Lebanon 
of June 21." For this we have been accused 
in some quarters of unfairly censuring 
Israel. "It is particularly tragic when inno- 
cent civilians become victims of events 
growing out of the continued Arab-Israeli 
conflict." Let me add now we deplore any 
further loss of life from incidents that have 
occurred subsequently. 

As I stated last February in this Council, 
the United States fully supports the terri- 
torial integrity and political independence of 
Lebanon. 1 My government hopes and expects 
that the incidents of the type that have 
occurred along the Israel-Lebanon border 
will not recur; that all forces, regular or 
irregular, will remain on their own side of 



' For a statement by Ambassador Bush made in 
the Security Council on Feb. 27, see USUN press 
release 20. 



126 



Department of State Bulletin 



the frontier; and that quiet will be main- 
tained. 

We are aware that the Government of 
Lebanon has made efforts to control terrorist 
elements on its territory — elements whose 
activities are as inimical to the interests of 
many Arab governments as they are to 
Israel. We are pleased to note the absence 
of cross-border incidents for nearly four 
months. We hope that all authorities in the 
area, including particularly the Government 
of Israel, will facilitate and not impede these 
efforts by Lebanon to control terrorism. 

Mr. President, in these circumstances it 
is hard to find new suggestions, and I would 
revert to those of our government which I 
made here four months ago: 

. . . the United States believes that the way to 
solve the problem lies not in hortatory declarations 
or in further recourse to armed force. It lies, 
rather, in direct liaison and cooperation between 
the parties to provide the most reliable assurance 
possible regarding the security of each. It is the 
parties that must redouble their efforts to avoid 
a repetition of the cycle of attacks and coun- 
terattacks. 

The United States, therefore, urges that both 
Israel and Lebanon have more frequent recourse 
to the international facilities that exist for the ex- 
change of information and consultation on border 
matters. Above all, we ask for an end to cross- 
border attacks and terrorism, without which the 
cycle of action and reaction cannot be broken. 

Thus, Mr. President, we hope that the 
members of this Council will take only such 
action as will contribute to a practical solu- 
tion in the area. Clearly, we should deplore 
acts of violence and armed attack; but in 
the name of justice, in the name of fair play, 
we must do so from whatever quarter they 
may appear. But this is not enough; condi- 
tions must also be created that will put an 
end to these incidents which poison relations 
between Israel and Lebanon. During the last 
year several very significant steps toward 
world peace have been taken. New avenues 
of communication and dialogue have been 
opened and old antagonisms are being muted 
in the search for areas of agreement. These 
are the building blocks for a solid founda- 
tion of peace. Is it too much to ask — to 
expect — that in the Middle East the same 



process should get underway to end a quar- 
ter of a century of bitterness ? All sides must 
mute their weapons and get on with the 
important dialogue which is essential to re- 
solving the immediate issues, including the 
question of prisoners, and which would help 
to achieve an overall peaceful settlement in 
the area on the basis of this Council's reso- 
lution of November 22, 1967. 

Mr. President, we view any resolution to 
be adopted in the present situation as need- 
ing to be characterized by balance, by an 
effort to look beyond the immediate inci- 
dents, horrible as they are. In order to obtain 
our concurrence a resolution must have at 
least the following ingredients: 

It must be fair. It must be balanced. It 
must be concerned about terrorist acts as 
well as the Israeli attacks. It must show 
concern for those that lie dead or wounded 
on both sides of the border. It must at least 
carry the hope of moving this area closer 
to peace. 

At the appropriate time the United States 
delegation will offer a draft resolution which 
we feel will accomplish the ends outlined 
above. 



Statement of June 26 

USUN press release 70 dated June 26 

In my statement on Saturday I described 
the position of my delegation on the question 
of a Security Council resolution on this issue. 
I specified certain criteria by which the 
United States would test any resolution 
placed before us. Since then, a number of 
delegations have worked exceedingly hard to 
reach agreement on the resolution we have 
just voted upon. 

Unfortunately, however, that resolution 
did not meet the requirements which I dis- 
cussed two days ago. You will recall that 
my delegation felt that a resolution to be 
acceptable must be fair, must be balanced, 
must be concerned with terrorist attacks 
as well as the Israeli attacks, must show 
concern for casualties on both sides of the 
border, and most importantly, must at least 
carry the hope of moving this area closer 
to peace. 



July 24, 1972 



127 



We believe also that if the repatriation of 
all armed forces prisoners could be effected, 
this would have removed an inhibition to 
progress in this area and would also, of 
course, have had humanitarian benefits. 

Mr. President, that resolution did not ful- 
fill what we strongly believed are the needs 
of the situation, and my delegation therefore 
was obliged to abstain. 

Our resolution is no attempt to camou- 
flage, Mr. President.- Our resolution at- 
tempts to express condemnation over the 
moves into Lebanon, but it also rises above 
the ominous silence which at times surrounds 
the assaults on Israel — the assaults against 
the innocent in that country. I have in mind 
one such assault that only recently claimed 
16 American lives in a senseless, coldblooded 
slaughter. We worry about the deaths at 
Hasbayya; we worry, too, about those that 
died at Lod or those that died on the Israel 
side of the Israel-Lebanon border. 



with the previous resolutions of the Security Coun- 
cil calling on her to desist forthwith from any vio- 
lation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Lebanon (resolutions 262 (1968), 270 (1969), 280 
and 285 (1970) and 313 (1972), 

1. Calls upon Israel to strictly abide by the afore- 
mentioned resolutions and to refrain from all mili- 
tary acts against Lebanon; 

2. Condemns, while profoundly deploring all acts 
of violence, the repeated attacks of Israeli forces 
on Lebanese territory and population in violation of 
the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
Israel's obligations thereunder; 

3. Expresses the strong desire that appropriate 
steps will lead, as an immediate consequence, to 
the release in the shortest possible time of all 
Syrian and Lebanese military and security person- 
nel abducted by Israeli armed forces on 21 June 
1972 on Lebanese territory; 

4. Declares that if the abovementioned steps do 
not result in the release of the abducted personnel 
or, if Israel fails to comply with the present resolu- 
tion, the Council will reconvene at the earliest to 
consider further action. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 3 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the agenda contained in docu- 
ment S/Agenda/1650/Rev.l, 

Having noted the contents of the letter of the 
Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/10715), 
of the letter of the Permanent Representative of 
Israel (S/10716), and of the letter of the Permanent 
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/ 
10720), 

Recalling the consensus of the members of the 
Security Council of 19 April 1972 (S/10611), 

Having noted the supplementary information pro- 
vided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations 
Truce Supervisory Organization contained in the 
relevant documents S/7930/Add.l584 of 26 April 
1972 to S/7930/Add.l640 of 21 June 1972, and par- 
ticularly S/7930/Add.l641 to 1648 of 21, 22, 23 and 
24 June 1972, 

Having heard the statements of the representa- 
tives of Lebanon and of Israel, 

Deploring the tragic loss of life resulting from all 
acts of violence and retaliation. 

Gravely concerned at Israel's failure to comply 



= The U.S. draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/10723) 
was not pressed to a vote, because the Council had 
adopted Resolution 316. 

'U.N. doc. S/RES/316 (1972); adopted by the 
Council on June 26 by a vote of 13 to 0, with 2 ab- 
stentions (U.S., Panama). 



U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended 
Through December 1972 

Statement by W. Tapley Bennett ^ 

I am particularly gratified to be able to 
congratulate the Secretary General and the 
parties to the intercommunal talks for their 
statesmanlike efforts leading to the resump- 
tion of the intercommunal talks on June 8. 
It has long been the hope of this Council that 
the intercommunal talks would enable the 
parties to the Cyprus question to resolve 
their differences peacefully through negotia- 
tion. We appeal to the parties to the talks to 
exercise their best efforts to make progress 
as quickly as possible toward a settlement of 
Cyprus' intercommunal problems which will 
enable all elements of the Cypriot population 
to participate fully and without fear in the 
national life of a single independent and sov- 
ereign Cyprus. 

The United States delegation thanks the 



' Made in the U.N. Security Council on June 15 
(USUN press release 63). Ambassador Bennett is 
Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council. 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary General for his comprehensive re- 
port to the Security Council on the U.N. op- 
eration in Cyprus.^ We find it particularly 
heartening that the Secretary General and 
the Government of Cyprus have found effec- 
tive ways to cooperate in an arrangement 
for the safe storage and inspection by UNFI- 
CYP [United Nations Peace-keeping Force in 
Cyprus] of the arms and ammunition re- 
cently imported by the Government of Cy- 
prus. 

We, too, are encouraged by the Secretary 
General's report that although tensions 
greatly increased in Cyprus in recent months, 
"the period under review has seen the small- 
est number of shooting incidents since the 
establishment of UNFICYP." This is in no 
small measure due to the stabilizing pres- 
ence, the judgment, and the activity displayed 
on the ground by UNFICYP; and great 
credit is due also to the parties more directly 
concerned. We are glad to note that while 
some incidents have marred the peace of the 
island "there has been an encouraging im- 
provement in the co-operation extended to 
UNFICYP in this regard." On the other 
hand, all members of this Council must share 
the concern expressed by the Secretary Gen- 
eral that there has been no significant prog- 
ress toward normalization, particularly in the 
important areas of deconfrontation, freedom 
of movement, economic development, public 
works, and the resettlement of displaced per- 
sons. We hope that the resumption of the in- 
tercommunal talks will create the atmos- 
phere of mutual confidence required to arrive 
at mutually acceptable interim agreements on 
normalization measures. Such measures 
would enable the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities to enjoy greater security and 
prosperity while negotiations for a perma- 
nent settlement are underway. 

Mr. President, the Security Council has 
just approved the extension of the mandate 
of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for 
another six months.^ A U.N. peacekeeping 
force has been in Cyprus for over eight years 
and has done invaluable work in preventing a 
further outbreak of civil strife on the island. 
However, I think we are all aware that the 



Security Council cannot afford to continue to 
extend UNFICYP's mandate indefinitely. It 
is therefore imperative that the parties to 
the intercommunal talks move swiftly to- 
ward a negotiated political settlement of the 
Cyprus problem, with which the Security 
Council has been occupied for over a decade. 

Turning to the financial implications of the 
renewal of UNFICYP's mandate, the United 
States delegation notes with regret that the 
Secretary General's estimates of the costs 
of UNFICYP to the U.N. for the six-month 
period beginning June 16 come to approxi- 
mately $6.9 million. This figure represents an 
increase of about $400,000 over the last six- 
month extension period. In the face of the 
large UNFICYP deficit, which we and the 
other current contributors are working to 
eliminate, we hope that these costs can be re- 
duced. Otherwise, this increase will have to 
be completely absorbed by substantial addi- 
tional regular contributions to UNFICYP 
from governments which presently contrib- 
ute inadequately or do not contribute at all. 
At this juncture, no U.N. agency can afford 
to continue to operate on a deficit basis. 

We are pleased to note thatin paragraph 
82 of his report, the Secretary General 
pledges his efforts, working with all mem- 
bers of the organization, to find a way to get 
the current financial situation of UNFICYP 
on a sound basis and to begin to liquidate the 
deficit. The United States pledges its support 
to the Secretary General's efforts in this re- 
gard. We think that now is the time for all 
of the members of the United Nations to ac- 
cept their collective responsibilities for the 
maintenance of peace and security. The fi- 
nancial burden of U.N. peacekeeping mis- 
sions should not fall upon only a few. We 
urge all members of the United Nations, and 



' U.N. doc. S/10664. 

'In a resolution (S/RES/315 (1972)) adopted on 
June 15 by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention 
(China), the Security Council extended "the sta- 
tioning in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force . . . for a further period ending 15 
December 1972, in the expectation that by then 
sufficient progress towards a final solution will make 
possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the 
Force." 



July 24, 1972 



129 



in particular the members of the Security 
Council that have voted for the resolution ex- 
tending UNFICYP's mandate, to support the 
Secretary General's efforts to place UNFI- 
CYP financing on a sound basis by contrib- 
uting their fair share to this peacekeeping 
operation which continues to play such a 
significant part in averting a costly war in 
Cyprus. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Spain Conclude 
Interim Air Transport Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
June 30 (press release 155) that the United 
States and Spain had concluded that day at 
Madrid an exchange of notes establishing the 
basis for Pan American World Airways to 
continue its service from Miami and San 
Juan via Lisbon to Madrid and beyond to 
Rome and to permit Iberia Airlines to carry 
trafl[ic beyond San Juan to Miami and points 
in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
(For text of the U.S. note, see press release 
155.) 

The Pan American service is the same one 
which was authorized on an interim basis in 
a 1971 exchange of notes, while the new au- 
thority for Iberia is intended to replace an 
earlier counterpart authorization it had to 
carry traffic between Spain and Mexico City 
via San Juan. 

This agreement is an interim measure, 
valid during the 1972 summer season, which 
ends October 31, and pending the completion 
of civil aviation negotiations intended to 
amend and update the 1944 air transport 
agreement between the two countries. These 
negotiations are currently scheduled to re- 
sume sometime this fall. 



United States and Denmark Sign 
New Extradition Treaty 

Press release 147 dated June 22 

The United States and the Kingdom of 
Denmark on June 22 signed a new treaty 
on extradition. The treaty was signed at 
Copenhagen by Ambassador Fred J. Russell 
for the United States and by Foreign Min- 
ister K. B. Andersen for the Kingdom of 
Denmark. The treaty, which contains pro- 
visions for hijacking and narcotic offenses, 
was negotiated at Washington and Copen- 
hagen. The final round of negotiations was 
concluded at Copenhagen on June 16. The 
treaty will shortly be sent to the Senate for 
advice and consent. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, July 6, 1972. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 

Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into 

force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 

Accession deposited: Senegal, April 19, 1972 (with 
reservations) . 
Customs convention on the temporary importation 

of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 

4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. 

TIAS 3943. 

Accession deposited: Senegal, April 19, 1972 (with 
reservations). 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, July 5, 1972. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.' 



' Not in force. 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ratification deposited: Israel, July 6, 1972. 
Sigiiature: Turkey, July 5, 1972. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, April 28, 1972 (with 

reservation) . 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, March 8, 

1972. 
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular I'elations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. 
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United 
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, March 8, 

1972. 

Judicial Procedures 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil 
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 
18, 1970.' 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, June 20, 1972 
(with reservations and declarations). 

North Atlantic Treaty — Technical Information 

NATO agreement on the communication of technical 
information for defense purposes. Done at Brus- 
sels October 19, 1970. Entered into force February 
7, 1971. TIAS 7064. 
Ratification deposited: Norway, July 6, 1972. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the interaational convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London November 30, 1966.' 
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, May 17, 1972. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and 
Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force 
October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. 
Ratification deposited: Cyprus, July 5, 1972. 

Telecommunications 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as 
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), for space 
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
July 17, 1971.' 

Notification of approval: Australia, April 21, 
1972. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as 
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603) to put into effect a 
revised frequency allotment plan for the aeronau- 
tical mobile (R) sei-vice and related information, 
with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966. 
Entered into force July 1, 1967; for the United 
States August 23, 1967; except the frequency al- 



lotment plan contained in appendix 27, which 
entered into force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332. 
Notification of approval: Cuba, April 19, 1972. 

Trade 

Convention on transit trade of landlocked states. 
Done at New York July 8, 1965. Entered into 
force June 9, 1967; for the United States Novem- 
ber 28, 1968. TIAS 6592. 
Accession deposited: Australia, May 2, 1972. 

Wheat 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with re- 
spect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: El Salvador, July 5, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Grant agreement for relief and rehabilitation. 
Signed at Dacca May 30, 1972. Entered into force 
May 30, 1972. 

Colombia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
with annex. Signed at Bogota June 26, 1972. En- 
tered into force June 26, 1972. 

Denmark 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Copenhagen June 
22, 1972. Enters into force on the 30th day after 
the date of the exchange of instruments of ratifi- 
cation. 

Fiji 

Agreement continuing in force the agreement of 
June 25, 1968, relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in Fiji (TIAS 6515). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Suva and Wash- 
ington April 25 and June 27, 1972. Entered into 
force June 27, 1972. 

Guinea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of June 17, 1971 (TIAS 
7182). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry 
May 15 and 23, 1972. Entered into force May 23, 
1972. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Honduras of 
10 percent of the value of grant military assistance 
and of excess defense articles furnished by the 
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at 



' Not in force. 



July 24, 1972 



131 



Tegucigalpa April 4 and June 26, 1972. Entered 
into force June 26, 1972; effective February 7, 
1972. 
Treaty on the Swan Islands, with related notes. 
Signed at San Pedro Sula November 22, 1971.' 
Ratified by the President: July 1, 1972. 

Japan 

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial contri- 
bution for United States administrative and re- 
lated expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1972 
pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agree- 
ment of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2975). Eff^ected by 
exchange of notes at Tokyo June 20, 1972. Entered 
into force June 20, 1972. 

Venezuela 

Agreement terminating in part the reciprocal trade 
agreement of November 6, 1939, as supplemented 
(54 Stat. 2375, TIAS 2565, 5502). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Caracas June 26, 1972. 
Entered into force June 26, 1972. 



and Hungary; the publication of Nazi-Soviet Rela- 
tions; the status of the former Italian colonies in 
Africa; and political and economic relations with 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, and other countries of western 
Europe. Documentation on United States relations 
with eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will be 
included in volume IV. 

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume III may 
be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402, for $5.75 each (Department of State publi- 
cation 8625; Stock Number 4400-1411). 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



PUBLICATIONS 



Volume III in "Foreign Relations" 
Series for 1947 Released 

On June 1 the Department of State released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Vol- 
ume III, The British Commonwealth, Europe (xiv, 
1,131 pages). This volume, the first of eight to be 
published covering the year 1947, includes extensive 
documentation on the origins and early development 
of the Marshall plan, which was inaugurated 25 
years ago by Secretary of State Marshall's com- 
mencement address at Harvard University. The 
volume also includes compilations on the foreign 
exchange position of the United Kingdom; the 
emergence of the Dominions of India and Pakistan; 
the Kashmir dispute; the signature and ratification 
of treaties of peace with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, 



' Not in force. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on June 26 confirmed the following 
nominations: 

W. Beverly Carter, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
United Republic of Tanzania. (For biographic data, 
see Department of State press release 161 dated 
June 30.) 

Edwin M. Cronk to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Singapore. (For biographic data, see Department 
of State press release 169 dated July 7.) 

C. Robert Moore to be Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon. (For biographic data, see 
Department of State press release 165 dated July 6.) 

Clinton L. Olson to be Ambassador to Sierra 
Leone. (For biographic data, see Department of State 
press release 158 dated June 28.) 

Terence A. Todman to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Guinea. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated June 6.) 

Miss Jean M. Wilkowski to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Zambia. (For biographic data, see De- 
partment of State press release 164 dated July 5.) 

Robert L. Yost to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Burundi. (For biographic data, see White House 
press release dated May 17.) 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 2U, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1726 



Africa. Southern Africa: Constant Themes in 
U.S. Policy (Newsom) 119 

Aviation 

ICAO Resolution on Air Piracy Welcomed by 

Secretary Rogers (statement) 125 

United States and Spain Conclude Interim Air 
Transport Agreement 130 

Burundi. Yost confirmed as Ambassador . . . 132 

Cameroon. Moore confirmed as Ambassador . 132 

Congress 

Confirmations (Carter, Cronk, Moore, Olson, 
Todman, Wilkowski, Yost) 132 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 125 

Cyprus. U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended 
Through December 1972 (Bennett) ... 128 

Denmark. United States and Denmark Sign 

New Extradition Treaty 130 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Carter, Cronk, Moore, Olson, Todman, 
Wilkowski, Yost) 132 

Economic Affairs. Southern Africa: Constant 
Themes in U.S. Policy (Newsom) .... 119 

Environment 

President Nixon Praises Success of Environ- 
ment Conference (Nixon) 107 

U.N. (jonference on the Human Environment 
Held at Stockholm (Rogers, Train, White, 
resolution and declaration) 105 

Extradition. United States and Denmark Sign 
New Extradition Treaty 130 

Guinea. Todman confirmed as Ambassador . . 132 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
ICAO Resolution on Air Piracy Welcomed 
by Secretary Rogers (statement) .... 125 

Middle East. U.S. Calls for Balanced Reso- 
lution on Israel-Lebanon Border Incidents 
(Bush, text of resolution) 126 

Portugal. Southern Africa: Constant Themes 
in U.S. Policy (Newsom) 119 

Presidential Documents. President Nixon 
Praises Success of Environment Conference 107 

Publications. Volume III in "Foreign Rela- 
tions" Series for 1947 Released 132 

Sierra Leone. Olson confirmed as Ambassador 132 

Singapore. Cronk confirmed as Ambassador 132 

South Africa. Southern Africa: Constant 
Themes in U.S. Policy (Newsom) .... 119 

Southern Rhodesia. Southern Africa: Constant 
Themes in U.S. Policy (Newsom) .... 119 

Spain. United States and Spain Conclude In- 
terim Air Transport Agreement 130 

Tanzania. Carter confirmed as Ambassador 132 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 130 

United States and Denmark Sign New Extra- 
dition Treaty 130 

United States and Spain Conclude Interim Air 
Transport Agreement 130 

United Nations 

President Nixon Praises Success of Environ- 
ment Conference (Nixon) 107 



Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S. 
Policy (Newsom) 119 

U.N. Conference on the Human Environment 
Held at Stockholm (Rogers, Train, White, 
resolution and declaration) 105 

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended Through De- 
cember 1972 (Bennett) 128 

U.S. Calls for Balanced Resolution on Israel- 
Lebanon Border Incidents (Bush, text of 
resolution) 126 

Zambia. Miss Wilkowski confirmed as Am- 
bassador 132 



Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley 128 

Bush, George 126 

Carter, W. Beverly, Jr 132 

Cronk, Edwin M 132 

Moore, C. Robert 132 

Newsom, David D 119 

Nixon, President 107 

Olson, Clinton L 132 

Rogers, Secretary 105, 125 

Todman, Terence A 132 

Train, Russell E 105 

White, Robert M 105 

Wilkowski, Miss Jean M 132 

Yost, Robert L 132 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 3-9 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to July 3 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 133 of 
June 5, 145 of June 20, 147 of June 22, and 
155 and 156 of June 28. 



No. 

tl62 



Date 

7/3 



Sobject 



Exchange of remarks between Sec- 
retary Rogers and Yemen Arab 
Republic Prime Minister Al- 
Ayni, July 1. 

Rogers: arrival statement, Athens, 
July 4. 

Miss Wilkowski sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Zambia (biographic 
data). 
*165 7/6 Moore sworn in as Ambassador to 
Cameroon (biographic data). 

U.S.-Romania consular convention. 

Rogers: toast at luncheon hosted 
by Romanian President Ceau- 
sescu, Bucharest, July 6. 
tl68 7/7 Rogers : remarks at signing of con- 
sular convention and scientific 
and technical exchanges agree- 
ments, Budapest. 
♦169 7/7 Cronk sworn in as Ambassador to 
Singapore (biographic data). 



tl63 
*164 



tl66 
tl67 



7/5 
7/5 



7/6 
7/7 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



3*; 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1727 




July 31, i972 



AMERICA'S BICENTENNIAL INVITATION TO THE WORLD 
Address by President Nixon 133 

THE SALT AGREEMENTS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
Statement by Ambassador Smith H7 



THE BENEFITS OF FREER INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

AND THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO COMPETE 

by John C. Renner 139 



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For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1727 
July 31, 1972 



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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
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America's Bicentennial Invitation to the World 



Address by President Nixon 



Good morning. 

This Fourth of July holiday is an appro- 
priate time for every American to reflect on 
the deeper meaning of the momentous events 
at Philadelphia 196 years ago today. 

John Adams, later to be our second Presi- 
dent, summed up that meaning in a letter to 
his wife on the night of July 3, 1776. The 
Continental Congress, to which Adams was 
a delegate, was to complete its work on the 
Declaration of Independence the following 
day. About that event he wrote: 

I am well aware of the toil and blood and treas- 
ure that it will cost us to maintain this Declara- 
tion . . . Yet, through all the gloom, I can see 
the rays of ravishing light and glory. I can see 
that the end is more than worth all the means. And 
that posterity will triumph in that day's transac- 
tion . . . 

You and I and all of the 209 million Amer- 
icans living today are the posterity of which 
he spoke; and we have triumphed in ways the 
Founding Fathers scarcely dreamed of. 

Over the past two centuries our revolu- 
tionary heritage of self-government has 
helped to make the United States the freest 
and strongest nation history has ever seen. 
It has enabled us to bear with unfailing 
honor the responsibility of world leadership 
in the cause of peace. 

As we look back to America's beginnings, 
therefore, we are surely entitled to a feeling 
of pride and gratitude. At the same time, as 
we look forward to America's Bicentennial, 



' Made to the Nation on radio on July 4 (White 
House press release, San Clemente, Calif.). 



just four years from today, we also have a 
feeling of healthy impatience for change, a 
determination to make this good land even 
better. 

It is in this traditionally American spirit 
of pride in our past and present, and purpose 
for our future, that I would like to talk to- 
day about some of our preparations for the 
year 1976. 

In 1966, 10 years ago, the Congress estab- 
lished an American Revolution Bicentennial 
Commission. I have worked closely with this 
Commission and its Chairman, David Ma- 
honey. At our urging, its membership has 
recently been expanded to make it more 
broadly representative of all tlie American 
people. 

The Commission's excellent plans call for 
truly national participation in our Bicenten- 
nial observance. Thousands of communities 
in all 50 States will contribute to a celebra- 
tion as wide as America's land and as richly 
diverse as its people, within a framework of 
three interrelated programs. 

One is called Heritage '76. This will focus 
on the unfolding panorama of our Nation's 
history over the course of two centuries. 

Another is called Horizons '76. This will 
involve looking ahead into our third century, 
selecting goals to help make America the 
"more perfect Union" we all want it to be- 
come, and working together to achieve those 
goals. 

The third major program, the one I espe- 
cially want to talk about this morning, will 
be known as Festival USA. Its concern will 



July 17, 1972 



133 



be travel, discovery, and hospitality — hospi- 
tality by Americans to Americans and hos- 
pitality by Americans to millions upon mil- 
lions of visitors from nearly every other 
country of the globe. 

In the near future I will be sending, in the 
name of all the people of the United States, 
formal and official invitations to the govern- 
ments of nations around the globe, extend- 
ing a welcome to the people of those nations 
to visit the United States, as laws and cir- 
cumstances permit, during the Bicentennial 
Era, and especially during the year 1976. 

This unprecedented invitation to the world 
is particularly appropriate for two reasons. 

First, because America is and always has 
been a nation of nations. Patriots from 
France and Prussia and Poland helped us 
win our Revolution. Strong men and women 
of every color and creed from every conti- 
nent helped to build our farms, our industry, 
our cities. 

The blood of all peoples runs in our veins; 
the cultures of all peoples contribute to our 
culture; and to a certain extent, the hopes of 
all peoples are bound up with our own hopes 
for the continuing success of the American 
experiment. 

Our Bicentennial Era is a time for Amer- 
ica to say to the nations of the world: "You 
helped to make us what we are. Come and see 
what wonders your countrymen have worked 
in this new country of ours. Come and let us 
say thank you. Come and join in our celebra- 
tion of a proud past. Come and share our 
dreams of a brighter future." 

A second compelling reason for this invi- 
tation to the world relates to our hopes for a 
genuine and lasting peace among nations. 

Of course, we are all aware that a real 
structure of peace cannot be built on good 
will alone. Its foundation must be the resolu- 
tion of those basic national differences which 
can lead to war. 

The United States is doing everything in 
its power to lay down that kind of founda- 
tion for peace. It is in this cause that I have 
traveled to Peking and Moscow, worked for 
a just peace in Viet-Nam, acted to check the 



nuclear arms race, moved to revitalize our 
alliances. 

As we succeed in reducing the danger of 
war, however, we must also work at enhanc- 
ing the quality of peace. One of the best ways 
of doing this is through people-to-people con- 
tacts — contacts aimed at reducing the fear 
and the ignorance which have divided man- 
kind down through the ages and at fostering 
habits of trust and patterns of cooperation. 
That was one of the major purposes of the 
visits Mrs. Nixon and I made to the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and to the Soviet 
Union. 

Some of you have heard the story which 
Woodrow Wilson liked to tell about the Eng- 
lish writer Charles Lamb. "I hate that fel- 
low," Lamb said of another one day; to which 
a friend replied, "I didn't think you knew 
him." Then Lamb admitted, "Oh, I don't— I 
can't hate a man I know." 

The point is that nations, like individuals, 
stand a better chance of working construc- 
tively together if people on both sides can 
learn to respect one another as fellow human 
beings. Our invitation to the world can con- 
tribute significantly to that crucial process. 

As we move toward 1976, the American 
Revolution Bicentennial Commission will fol- 
low up on this invitation with a vigorous ac- 
tion program. I urge every American to join 
in support of that program. Here are some 
ways we can all help : 

Business and industry can expand their 
present efforts to bring the costs of travel, 
lodging, and meals within the reach of mil- 
lions of additional visitors. 

Air carriers and shipping lines can con- 
tinue exploring new ways of offering inex- 
pensive transportation to and from this 
country. 

Corporations with interests abroad, pri- 
vate organizations with foreign ties, can 
encourage the participation of their foreign 
colleagues in the Bicentennial. 

Cities which have sister communities in 
other countries can intensify contacts with 
them. 

Families which have relatives abroad, or 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



which speak a second language, or any fam- 
ily that wishes to do so can make special 
hospitality plans for foreign visitors. 

And volunteers young and old can serve 
as guides, as interpreters, as hosts and host- 
esses, to help greet a flood of Bicentennial 
guests which may be double the nearly 14 
million people who visited the United States 
last year. 

State and local governments, the Con- 
gress, and the Federal executive branch can 
assist the national and State Bicentennial 
Commissions in every way possible. 

In issuing this invitation to the world, the 
American people will also be issuing a chal- 
lenge to themselves. 

This is the time to open our hearts and 
our homes and our communities to those 
who come to America for the first time. This 
is the time not only for reaching outward 
but for reaching inward, for discovering and 
appreciating parts of our own land and peo- 
ple and heritage which we may not have 
known before. 

This is the time to put our best foot for- 
ward in every aspect of our national life to 
prove what America is and can be. 

My deepest hope for the Bicentennial Era 
is this: that all America and all the world 
can earn the name which Mrs. Nixon and I 
have chosen for our house here at San Cle- 
mente, "La Casa Pacifica," the House of 
Peace; and that the American people can 
open their arms to the people of the world 
with the traditional Latin welcome, "Estan 
ustedes en S2t casa" — you are in your own 
house. Let America be known throughout 
the world as the Land of the Open Door. 

Reaching out in this way, we can prove 
once again that the Spirit of '76 is a spirit 
of openness, of brotherhood, and of peace. 

We can share with all mankind the eter- 
nal message of the Fourth of July — the 
message of liberty, of opportunity, and of 
human dignity. 

I hope that each one of you will join me 
in extending and in wholeheartedly support- 
ing America's Bicentennial invitation to the 
world. 



150th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Ambas- 
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S. 
delegation, at the 150th plenarij session of 
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Jidy 
13. 

Press release 173 dated July 13 

Ladies and gentlemen: We are here to- 
day for one basic purpose — to explore with 
you the possibilities of starting serious and 
constructive negotiations for a settlement 
of the Viet-Nam conflict. We hope that the 
same considerations motivate your side and 
that together we may proceed to an inten- 
sive examination of concrete issues. 

Since the last plenary session, noteworthy 
contributions to peace have taken place 
through negotiations in several parts of the 
world. On July 4 the Republic of Korea and 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
pledged to base their future relations upon 
"peaceful means, and not through the use 
of force against each other." 

Meanwhile, progress continued in estab- 
lishing more friendly relations between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic. These develop- 
ments were the product of negotiations 
which the Federal Chancellor has termed 
an indication that "In spite of the existing 
antagonisms ... it is possible to arrive at 
practical arrangements which take into ac- 
count the special situation in Germany and 
are fitted to reduce tensions and areas of 
friction." 

On May 29 the United States and the So- 
viet Union recorded their "desire to 
strengthen peaceful relations with each 
other," in full awareness of the "need . . . 
to create conditions which promote the re- 
duction of tensions in the world." ^ The two 
nations stated their preparedness to "nego- 



' For text of the basic principles of relations 
signed at Moscow on May 29 during President 
Nixon's visit, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 
898. 



July 31, 1972 



135 



tiate and settle differences by peaceful 
means." 

These are deeply encouraging develop- 
ments. Without in any way minimizing the 
extreme complexity of the Viet-Nam prob- 
lem, we believe it possible that a parallel 
can be found at these talks. In any event, we 
invite your attention to yet another devel- 
opment in the search for peace which has 
occurred since the last plenary session here. 

On May 8 President Nixon proposed, in 
coordination with the Government of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam, just and generous 
terms which would provide the basis for a 
negotiated settlement advantageous to both 
sides.' There is, indeed, a history of con- 
structive proposals put forward from time 
to time by the Governments of the United 
States and the Republic of Viet-Nam. Those 
of May 8 are, we believe, especially notable 
for their clear-cut and generous features. 

As you know, they envisage, first, the re- 
turn of all American prisoners of war and 
an accounting for those missing in action; 
second, a cease-fire throughout Indochina 
under international supervision; third, as 
soon as points 1 and 2 have been achieved, 
the United States will stop all acts of force 
throughout Indochina; finally, the President 
said we will then proceed with a complete 
withdrawal of all American forces from 
Viet-Nam within four months. 

These proposals would end the killing. 
They would allow negotiations on a political 
settlement between Vietnamese themselves, 
consistent with the principle that the po- 
litical future of South Viet-Nam should be 
left for the South Vietnamese people to de- 
cide for themselves, free from outside in- 
terference. They would permit all the na- 
tions which have suffered in this long war 
— Cambodia, Laos, North Viet-Nam, South 
Viet-Nam — to start the urgent work of 
peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation. 
If these proposals are not satisfactory, what 
is wrong with them ? 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



Is it conceivable that anyone would prefer 
continuation of the present conditions of 
warfare in North Viet-Nam and South Viet- 
Nam to the opportunity for an honorable 
resolution of the conflict which these pro- 
posals offer? 

These proposals, in sum, deserve your full 
and measured consideration. For our part, 
we will give most careful attention to the 
views you may express and to any prelim- 
inary questions about our proposals you 
may wish to present before expressing your 
views. We are also entirely willing to go into 
any other matters you may wish to put for- 
ward for detailed discussion. 

Ladies and gentlemen, a mutual examina- 
tion of our respective positions, a serious 
and systematic dialogue on matters of sub- 
stance — that, in our view, is the way to 
make progress here. 



U.S. Supports Efforts To Ease Tensions 
on the Korean Peninsula 

Follo2ving is a Department statement is- 
sued July 3 with respect to the South Koreor- 
North Korea joint communique issued at 
Seoul and Pyongyang that evening (July U, 
Korean time). 

We welcome the joint announcement on 
South-North relations concerning meetings 
which have taken place between representa- 
tives of the two sides and agreement on prin- 
ciples for future contacts. This, by Korean 
leaders, is most encouraging and could have 
a salutary impact on prospects for peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula. 

The United States has long supported the 
constructive efforts of Republic of Korea 
leaders to ease tensions on the Korean Pe- 
ninsula. Our staunch friendship with the Re- 
public of Korea is well known, as is our com- 
mitment to the Republic's security. We wish 
its leaders every success in their current 
undertakings. 



136 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States and Poland To Expand 
Program of Scientific Cooperation 

Following is the text of a joint U.S. -Poland 
communique signed at Warsaw on Jtily 13 by 
Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser to 
President Nixon and Director, Office of Sci- 
ence and Technology, and Jan Kaczmarek, 
Polish Minister of Science, Higher Educa- 
tion, and Technology, at the conclusion of 
Dr. David's visit to Poland. 

Press release 175 dated July 14 

Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser 
to President Nixon and Director of the Office 
of Science and Technology in the Executive 
Office of the President, visited Poland from 
July 8 to July 13, 1972, at the invitation of 
Professor Jan Kaczmarek, Minister of Sci- 
ence, Higher Education and Technology of 
the Polish People's Republic. Minister Kacz- 
marek had visited the United States in April- 
May, 1971, at the invitation of Dr. David. 

During his stay in Poland, Dr. David 
visited academic, scientific, and technical in- 
stitutions in Warsaw and Krakow. He also 
reviewed with Minister Kaczmarek and other 
Polish officials the broad spectrum of exist- 
ing relationships in science and technology 
between the United States and Poland, and 
discussed means by which ties in these areas 
could be further expanded and strengthened. 
Dr. David's visit and his discussions follow 
the Joint United States-Polish Communique 
of June 1, 1972, issued at the conclusion of 
President Nixon's visit to Warsaw.^ 

During his visit Dr. David was received by 
Dr. M. Jagielski, Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, and S. Olszowski, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs. He also held talks 
with Professor K. Secomski, First Deputy 
Chairman of the Planning Commission of the 
Council of Ministers; T. Wrzaszczyk, Minis- 
ter of the Machine Industry; and Professor 



' For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of 
June 26, 1972, p. 913. 



W. Trzebiatowski, President of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences. 

Among the institutions visited by Dr. David 
were: the Scientific-Production Center for 
Semiconductors including the "TEWA" semi- 
conductor plant; the Institute of Cybernetics 
and the "UNIPAN" Scientific Apparatus 
Production Facility of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences; the Institute of Physics of Warsaw 
University; the Jagiellonian University in 
Krakow; and the Institute of Pediatrics of 
the Medical Academy in Krakow. 

Dr. David informed Minister Kaczmarek 
that as the first U.S. participation in the year 
commemorating the 500th anniversary of 
Copernicus' birth, the U.S. National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration will give 
the name "Copernicus" to its orbiting astro- 
nomical observatory satellite, OAO-C. This 
satellite, scheduled for launch from Cape 
Kennedy in August 1972, will record ultra- 
violet spectra from the stars and transmit 
the data to earth. Minister Kaczmarek ex- 
pressed his great appreciation for this ges- 
ture to the memory of Copernicus and for the 
fact that the data obtained by the satellite 
will also be available to Polish scientists. 

It was recognized that the contacts which 
have existed for many years between scien- 
tists and specialists of the two countries pro- 
vide a good foundation for development of 
closer cooperation in science and technology 
between academic, research, and industrial 
institutions and organizations of the two 
countries. 

The two sides concluded that firm and en- 
during basis for cooperation between the 
countries could be achieved through signing 
of an intergovernmental agreement on sci- 
entific and technical cooperation. They ex- 
changed views on the contents of such an 
agreement. It was decided that further nego- 
tiations would be held in the near future with 
a view to the conclusion of an agreement. 

Both sides also recognized the value of 
moving toward more programmatic relation- 
ships in their scientific and technical coop- 
eration on the basis of mutual benefit and 



July 31, 1972 



137 



shared funding- in areas of high priority for 
both countries. 

Both sides noted the significant progress 
which has been made to extend U.S.-PoUsh 
scientific and technical cooperation since the 
visit of Minister Kaczmarek to the United 
States last year. Areas of specific activity 
include intensified cooperation in medical 
sciences, health, and agriculture, where mu- 
tually useful concrete results have been 
achieved over the past decade. 

New areas in which visits between coop- 
erating institutions in both countries have 
taken place and specific projects are already 
under way or in preparation include: air 
and water pollution control, archeology, as- 
tronomy, astrophysics, biology, chemistry, 
construction technology, ecology, geology, 
linguistics, mathematics, mining, physics, 
transportation and urban planning, among 
others. 

The two sides particularly expressed rec- 
ognition of the fact that protection of the 
environment is a matter of great concern to 
their Governments and that mutual benefits 
can flow from cooperation and exchanges of 
information in this field. 

Technological cooperation on a commercial 
basis between U.S. firms and Polish enter- 
prises was mentioned as being of special sig- 
nificance for further development of U.S.- 
Polish economic relations, as well as offering 
commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and 
Polish enterprises. The two sides expressed 
their interest in furthering such cooperation 
by appropriate means. 

Possible forms of U.S. participation in es- 
tablishment of a Copernicus Astronomical 
Center in Poland were also reviewed in con- 
nection with the Copernicus year. Further 



discussions on the subject will take place in 
the near future. 

Mindful of the contribution that personal 
contacts in research and training make to 
mutual understanding and good relations 
between countries, both sides noted their de- 
sire to continue and expand the exchange of 
scholars, lecturers, and students in a wide 
variety of academic disciplines and activities 
and to encourage direct contacts between uni- 
versities and other institutions of higher 
learning. In this connection it was noted 
with satisfaction that the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences and the Polish Acad- 
emy of Sciences have recently agreed to a 
substantial increase in their exchange of 
scientists. 

The two sides expressed their intention to 
encourage and facilitate direct contacts and 
cooperation between scientific and technologi- 
cal organizations of the two countries and 
the conclusion, as appropriate, of agreements 
between them for cooperative research, de- 
velopment, and exchange of information of 
mutual interest and benefit. 

In addition, the two sides presented a num- 
ber of other proposals for cooperation which 
will be further examined in the near future. 

Minister Kaczmai'ek also informed Dr. 
David of the desire of the Polish side to estab 
lish a scientific branch of the Polish Academy 
of Sciences in the United States, and re- 
quested that this proposal be considered by 
the U.S. side. 

Dr. David praised the high quality of 
Polish science and technology and expressed 
his personal appreciation for the generous 
hospitality shown to his delegation by his 
Polish hosts. 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



In this article based on an address he made before the 
World Affairs Council of Boston on May 23, Mr. Renner, 
who xvas then Director of the Office of International Trade 
and subsequently became Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Trade Policy, looks at the reasons for liberaliz- 
ing international trade, ivith special emphasis on the rela- 
tionship betiveen trade and employment, and examines the 
American ability to compete with foreign products in their 
own markets and ours. 



The Benefits of Freer International Trade 
and the American Ability To Compete 

by John C. Renner 



The advantages of expanding international 
trade are considerable. Business, farmers, 
workers, consumers, and the Nation as a 
whole benefit. 

The fundamental reason for encouraging 
the liberalization and expansion of world 
trade is that resources will be used more effi- 
ciently and this will stimulate economic 
growth. Past experience shows that there is 
a definite correlation between international 
trade and economic growth. Between 1913 
and 1937, world trade increased by only one- 
quarter and the average annual rate of 
growth in i-eal output of the major industrial- 
ized countries was about 1.9 percent. Be- 
tween 1950 and 1970, world trade quintupled 
and the average annual rate of economic 
growth was 4.5 percent. This is an enor- 
mous difference. Although other factors were 
at work, the expansion of world trade cer- 
tainly played a large role in stimulating 
economic growth. Conversely, stagnation of 
international trade could be expected to work 
in the opposite direction, to the detriment of 
us all. 

Imports have great value. They provide 
the economy with essential raw materials. 
They give consumers — and all of us are 



consumers — a greater choice of goods and 
services. Imports help restrain inflation. 
Finally, they facilitate the reallocation of our 
resources to more productive uses. 

Exports are also important. They help 
finance needed and desired imports. The for- 
eign exchange earned by exports helps 
finance foreign investment, which in turn 
produces a continuing source of income. 

Exports enable businesses and farmers to 
expand their sales and profits. This has in- 
creasing significance. Exports of agricul- 
tural and industrial products are becoming 
relatively and absolutely more important. 
From 1953 to 1970, the value of agricultural 
exports jumped from $2.8 billion to $7.2 
billion and from 14 percent of gross farm 
product to 25 percent. Over the same period, 
the value of exports of manufactured prod- 
ucts almost trebled; they increased from 
$10.9 billion to $29.3 billion and from 9.7 
percent of gross manufacturing product to 
11.6 percent. 

Export industries also create more and 
better jobs than import-competing indus- 
tries. Economists have approached the rela- 
tionship between trade and employment from 
different standpoints. Nonetheless their 



July 31, 1972 



139 



lines of inquiry have led to a single conclu- 
sion: An equal expansion of exports and im- 
ports increases employment and income, and 
an equal contraction of exports and imports 
decreases employment and income. There 
are two reasons for this: 

First, American industries producing ex- 
ports are more labor-intensive than Ameri- 
can industries competing with imports, and 
the jobs in export industries are better 
paid than those in import-competing indus- 
tries. On the average, export-related manu- 
facturing industries pay about 9 percent 
higher wages than import-competing indus- 
tries. When we compare the most export- 
intensive industries with those facing the 
greatest import competition, the wage differ- 
ential is greater than 20 percent. 

Second, the imposition of import restric- 
tions by the United States would be matched 
by counteraction on the part of foreign 
governments. Reciprocity is the basic rule in 
international trade, and it operates whether 
trade is being freed or restrained. 

Let us apply these considerations to a con- 
crete case. There has been a good deal of 
talk recently about the advantages to Ameri- 
can workers of the Burke-Hartke bill. The 
proponents of this bill argue that its quota 
provisions would save many American jobs. 
We have subjected this contention to inten- 
sive analysis and have found the claim to be 
false. The quota provisions of the Burke- 
Hartke bill would not save jobs. They would 
cause a loss of jobs. We estimate that the net 
impact on jobs and income of the U.S. import 
restraints called for by the Burke-Hartke 
bill and of equivalent foreign action would be 
about 80,000 lost American jobs and $700 
million in forgone American income.^ 



Export Record of U.S. Agriculture 

From this short analysis, we see that the 
benefits of freer trade to farmers, workers, 
firms, and consumers are great. But some 
people question whether we can compete suc- 
cessfully in a world where trade barriers are 
much lower than they are now. To examine 



TABLE 1 




Value Added 


Per 


Worker 


IN Agriculture 


1967 


Country 




Amount 


United States 




$6,350 


Canada 




4,450 


Netherlands 




4,010 


Ireland 




3,430 


United Kingdom 




3,180 


Denmark 




2,780 


France (1966) 




2,220 


Sweden 




2,020 


Germany 




1,830 


Italy 




1,600 


Spain 




990 


Japan 




930 


Turkey 




330 



this question, let us look at our past and prob- 
able future performance in agricultural and 
industrial products. 

In the agricultural sector we are mani- 
festly competitive. Our country is richly en- 
dowed in land and climate; American farm- 
ers have taken the lead in the application of 
technology to production and distribution; 
and they have been able to realize major 
economies of scale. These and other factors 
have contributed to putting American agri- 
cultural products, especially field crops, in an 
exceedingly strong position internationally. 

The balance of commercial exports and 
imports of agricultural products shifted 
steadily from a deficit of $1.9 billion in 1955 
to a surplus of over $900 million in 1971. 
This is a remarkable record, especially in the 
face of increasing protection in one of our 
principal foreign markets, the European 
Community. 

A good indication of our competitive abil- 
ity where no foreign trade barriers exist is 
the growing value of our exports of soybeans 



' Single copies of a technical paper on which these 
estimates are based are available upon request from 
the Office of International Trade, Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Affairs, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



and soybean meal and cake to the European 
Community. The common external tariff of 
the European Community is zero, and there 
are no other import restraints. Our exports 
of soybeans and soybean meal and cake to 
this destination leaped from $68 million in 
1958 to $776 million in 1971 — an increase of 
more than tenfold. 

This excellent export record is accounted 
for, to a large degree, by differences in pro- 
ductivity. The American farmer is vastly 
more productive than his foreign counter- 
parts, as table 1, portraying the value added 
per worker in agriculture in 1967, shows. 

Trade Surplus in High-Technology Products 

To determine our ability to compete in 
manufactured products requires a more 
complicated analysis. In 1964 we had a trade 
surplus in manufactured products of about 
$7.9 billion. By 1970 this surplus had 
dwindled to roughly $3.5 billion. The ques- 
tions we need to examine are : What were 
the main contributing factors, and are they 
likely to persist? It will help us find the 
correct answers if we first determine which 
types of manufactured products did well in 
international trade and which did not. 

To get a more precise appreciation of the 
problem, our exports and imports of manu- 
factured products were divided into two 
categories, high- and low-technology prod- 
ucts. High-technology products were defined 
as those produced by industries in which the 
ratio of research and development expendi- 
tures to sales has been average or better. 
This is a more satisfactory way to look at 
the matter than in terms of the extent of 
capitalization because the newness and so- 
phistication of technology depends on inno- 
vation, which in turn depends in large meas- 
ure on R&D expenditures. 

Dividing our exports and imports this 
way, we see that the American trade surplus 
in high-technology products grew from $7.9 
billion in 1964 to $12.4 billion in 1970. 

The reasons for our excellent performance 
to date are found primarily in the levels of 
research and development expenditures and 



in the numbers of highly trained personnel 
engaged in R&D. 

U.S. expenditures on research and devel- 
opment in 1971 were about $28 billion, 
approximately 10 times greater than those 
of any other country. Even if research and 
development expenditures for defense and 
space are excluded, U.S. expenditures greatly 
exceed those of the other major industrial- 
ized countries. In 1970 American outlays for 
research and development other than for 
defense and space were about $15.5 billion, 
about six times more than Japan's and seven 
times greater than Germany's, to take the 
next two largest spenders. 

We have over 500,000 scientists and engi- 
neers engaged in research and development 
— more than three times as many as any 
other country. Our total R&D manpower is 
slightly less than 1.5 million — about four 
times as great as our nearest competitor. 

The absolute figures are the ones that 
count most. There are critical masses in some 
lines of research and development which 
many countries have not reached and may 
not be able to reach. Even foreign countries 
investing a relatively large part of their 
national income in R&D spending may not 
reach the economic scale of spending in spe- 
cific industries or product lines. 

Now to look at whether our large trade 
surplus in high-technology products is likely 
to continue to expand rapidly: 

The growth in U.S. R&D funding has 
slackened somewhat since 1966. However, 
the slackening of the rate of increase in U.S. 
R&D spending is largely attributable to a 
cutback in the rate of growth of Federal 
spending on research and development. Push- 
ing the analysis a little further, one sees 
that the real shift has been away from 
spending on defense and space R&D. R&D 
spending that is neither defense nor space 
related in 1967 exceeded defense-space R&D 
for the first time in a decade. Between 1966 
and 1971 it grew at an annual average rate 
of 9.6 percent. And research and develop- 
ment spending that was neither defense- 
space related nor federally funded rose by 
9.7 percent annually. 



July 31, 1972 



141 



Most other countries' R&D spending is 
growing at a rapid rate. This reflects the 
fact that their base is small; R&D spending 
except in the United States (and the United 
Kingdom) was quite small prior to 1960. 
But even if their rapid rate of increase in 
R&D spending continues, the United States 
in the next decade will increase its lead in 
R&D expenditures. 

In 1969 all four of the runners-up to the 
United States in R&D spending — France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan — 
were spending in the neighborhood of $2.5 
billion on R&D. If each of these countries' 
R&D spending continues to grow at the same 
rate as in the latter 1960's, they will attain 
the following levels in the year 1980 : Japan, 
$9 billion; Germany, $6 billion; France, $5 
billion; the United Kingdom, $3.5 billion. 

But by then, if recent trends continue 
(taking into account the falloff in defense 
and space R&D expenditures), the United 
States will spend $38 billion. 

Thus, we see that the gap in absolute 
terms between the R&D expenditures of the 
United States and its main competitors can 
be expected to expand rather than contract. 
The present gap is approximately $25 bil- 
lion. In 1980, the gap between the United 
States and Japan will be roughly $29 billion. 
At that time, the gap between Germany and 
the United States will be about $32 billion. 
With the other countries the gap will be 
even greater. 

In spite of this huge spending gap, there 
is and will continue to be a catching-up proc- 
ess at work in many areas of high-technology 
production. But the evidence of history is 
that the United States has succeeded in inno- 
vating successfully in the newest areas, while 
other countries are catching up in older ones. 

Over the last generation, for example, in 
some chemical industry products, such as 
low-density polyethylene, in which we pio- 
neered, we have ceased to rack up trade sur- 
pluses. At the same time enough new prod- 
ucts have been introduced, in categories 
such as pharmaceuticals, to swell the overall 
trade balance in chemical industry products. 



In consumer electronics, in which we had 
led the world, we moved into deficit in 1962; 
but in other electronics and machinery lines, 
our position has been strengthening. While 
computer production has spread widely 
through the world, U.S. manufacturers of 
computers and related parts have continued 
to develop new products, and the trade sur- 
plus in computer products has risen rapidly. 
Despite the swift diffusion of semiconductor 
technology from the United States, we have 
managed to maintain a favorable balance in 
semiconductor trade by continually introduc- 
ing innovations. There are two recent cases 
in point. Currently taking place is a shift 
back to the United States of electronic calcu- 
lator production. This is caused by both 
improved solid state technology and in- 
creased efficiency in the use of labor in 
assembling calculators. Also, American in- 
dustry is capturing a growing segment of 
the watch market with electronic watches, 
again making use of American solid state 
technology. 

The evidence is persuasive. American in- 
dustry has been and probably will continue 
to be an exceptionally strong competitor in 
high-technology products. 



Performance of Low-Technology Products 

The picture is totally different for low- 
technology products. From 1964 to 1970 our 
trade account in low-technology products 
worsened from rough balance to a deficit of 
$8.9 billion. The falloff in our performance 
in low-technology products is even more pre- 
cipitous than the climb in the performance 
of high-technology products. Why is this? 

To begin the search for an answer, we 
examined the relationship between changes 
in prices and exports. Statistical analysis 
showed that low-technology exports were 
quite responsive to price changes and that 
high-technology products were not. Common 
sense supports these findings. Price consid- 
erations could not be expected to figure as 
importantly in foreign decisions to purchase 
high-technology products, some of which are 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



TABLE 


2 






Average Annual Percentage 


Changes 


IN Unit Labor 


Costs 






IN Manufacturing 


Industries 




Country 1960-65 




1965-70 


United States 


-0.7 




3.9 


European Community 


3.9 




2.9 


Japan 


4.3 




0.8 


Canada 


-0.9 




4.6 


United Kingdom 


2.4 




3.8 


Sweden 


2.0 




2.5 


Switzerland 


5.2 




0.0 



not obtainable elsewhere, as with respect to 
low-technology products, which are more 
widely available. 

To carry the analysis further, let us look 
at indicators of relative cost and price move- 
ments. 

Table 2 compares unit labor costs in man- 
ufacturing industries in terms of average 
annual percentage changes. 

The most striking thing about these fig- 
ures is the shift in American performance. 
In the period 1960-65, American unit labor 
costs actually went down, giving us the sec- 
ond-best record among the major industrial- 
ized countries. Then the lid flew off. In the 
period 1965-70, American unit labor costs 
shot up by more than any other country's 
except Canada. 

A comparison of prices reveals a similar 
pattern. Table 3 portrays the export price 
indexes for manufactures in the United 
States and other major industrialized 
countries. 

Here again, we see that U.S. export prices 
increased very little through 1964 but then 
leaped up from 1965 to 1970. For the period 
as a whole, the American price performance 
was significantly worse than that of our 
major competitors. 

These cost and price developments go a 
considerable way to explain the deepening 
deficit in our trade in low-technology prod- 
ucts from 1964 to 1970. But what about the 
future? Can we hope for an improvement? 



The recent modifications in foreign ex- 
change rates should lead in time to a sub- 
stantial improvement in our trade account 
generally and in our performance in low- 
technology products especially. As we have 
seen, sales of low-technology products are 
quite responsive to price changes ; and there 
is no reason to suspect that the improved 
price position of American low-technology 
products will not result in an increase in the 
volume of sales of these products relative 
to foreign sales in our market and in theirs. 

There are some encouraging signs already. 

The number of automobiles from overseas 
sold in the United States decreased from 
506,199 in the first four months of 1971 to 
488,352 in the first four months of 1972. 
Over the same period, the number of Amer- 
ican cars sold domestically rose from 
2,713,327 to 2,852,217. 

A similar pattern is evident with respect 
to color TV sales. In the first quarter of 
1972, domestic sales of color TV sets in- 
creased by 24.6 percent as compared with 
the first quarter of 1971. At the same time, 
imports declined by 6.5 percent. 

The extent to which these initial favorable 
indications will be followed by a general im- 
provement in our trade account depends in 
large measure on what happens to prices and 
business activity here and abroad. 





TABLE 3 




Export 


Price Indexes for 


Manufactures 


Year 


U.S. Index 


Competitors' 
Index 


1960 


100 


102 


1961 


100 


101 


1962 


100 


100 


1963 


100 


100 


1964 


101 


102 


1965 


104 


103 


1966 


107 


104 


1967 


110 


106 


1968 


113 


105 


1969 


118 


109 


1970 


124 


116 



July 31, 1972 



143 



Most people are aware of the close rela- 
tionship between relative price movements 
and the rise and fall of exports and imports. 
Fewer people recognize the close correlation 
between overall economic activity and trade. 
In fact, changes in economic activity are 
the most important determinants of U.S. 
exports and imports. We estimate on the 
basis of statistical analysis of the data for 
the period 1953-70 that about 80 percent of 
the annual change in American imports can 
be explained by changes in U.S. gross na- 
tional product. About 55 percent of the 
annual change in American exports can be 
explained by changes in the GNP of Canada, 
Japan, and western Europe. 

U.S. Competitive Position 

From all this, what can we conclude about 
our ability to compete with foreign goods? 

The changes in parities of currencies 
should boost somewhat our already very 
strong competitive position in agricultural 
and high-technology products. The impact 
on low-technology products should be much 
greater; our competitive position in these 
products should improve markedly. How- 
ever, adverse movements in relative prices or 
in the business cycle would offset, partially 
or entirely, the improvement in our competi- 
tive position arising from the exchange rate 
modifications. 

I have attempted in this analysis to show 
that: 

— The advantages of freer trade to work- 
ers, farmers, consumers, firms, and the 
Nation are substantial. 

— The United States has been and is likely 
to continue to be very competitive in agri- 
cultural and high-technology products. 

— The poor American competitive position 
in low-technology products should be im- 
proved considerably by the recent change in 
exchange rates. 

— Our future ability to compete success- 
fully with foreign products will depend to a 
great extent on whether we can manage our 
economy as well as or better than our major 
trading partners manage theirs. 



Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed 
by the United States and U.S.S.R. 

An agreement with respect to purchases of 
grain by the Soviet Union in the United 
States ivas signed at Washington on July 8 
by Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, 
U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Soviet Commer- 
cial Commission; Secretary of Agriculture 
Earl L. Butz; and M. R. Kuzmin, First Dep- 
uty Minister of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. 
Following is a summary of the agreement 
issued by the Western White House on July 

White House press release <San Clemente, Calif.) dated July 8 

1. The President announced on July 8 the 
successful negotiation of a three-year grain 
agreement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union totaling $750 million of U.S.- 
grown grains (wheat, corn, barley, soi'ghum, 
rye, oats — at the Soviet Union's option) for 
the period from August 1, 1972, through July 
31, 1975. As part of the agreement, the 
United States will make available credit 
through the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) for repayment in three years from 
the dates of deliveries, with the total amount 
of credit outstanding not to exceed $500 mil- 
lion. Under the agreement the Soviet Union 
will purchase for deliveries during the first 
year, August 1, 1972, through July 31, 1973, 
at least $200 million of U.S.-grown grains. 

2. The purchases and sales will be as nego- 
tiated between the Soviet Union and the U.S. 
private commercial exporters. The credits 
on deliveries made through March 31, 1973, 
will carry CCC's present going interest rates 
(which are 61/^ percent per annum on letters 
of credit issued by U.S. banks and 7% per- 
cent on letters of credit issued by foreign 
banks). Under the CCC program, the prin- 
cipal is payable in three equal annual install- 
ments following the delivery and accrued in- 
terest is paid with each installment. 



' Two tables showing value of U.S. commercial 
exports for four feed grains and wheat to the top 
10 importing countries and farm value of produc- 
tion and value of exports, 1969-71, which were in- 
cluded in the press release are not printed here. 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



3. The Soviet Union purchased $150 mil- 
lion of feed grains (mainly corn) from U.S. 
grain traders in the fall of 1971. This was a 
cash transaction. In 1963 U.S. exporters 
sold the Soviet Union about $140 million of 
wheat. Thus, this is the largest Soviet grain 
purchase in history. 

4. This sale to the Soviet Union will put 
that country in a second position among pur- 
chasers of U.S. grain. Average annual grain 
purchases of these six grains over the last 
three years are: 



Japan 


$437 


million 


Netherlands 


135 


)» 


Canada 


126 


»» 


United Kingdom 


102 


" 


Italy 


86 


tt 


West Germany 


75 


tj 


Belgium-Luxembourg 


48 


ti 


Venezuela 


46 


»» 


Republic of Korea 


36 


tt 


Republic of China 


27 


it 



5. The average purchase rate of $250 mil- 
lion annually would increase U.S. exports of 
the six grains by almost 17 percent annually 
over the average of the three previous years, 
1969-71. 

6. Agricultural experts estimate that 
about 3,000 to 5,000 additional jobs are cre- 
ated for $100 million of grain exports. Since 
at least $750 million is involved, it could be 
estimated that a range of 22,500 to 37,500 
man-years of work for U.S. workers is in- 
volved in this deal. 



U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To Assist 
Refugees in Southern Sudan 

Following is a statement read to news cor- 
respondents on July 3 by Charles W. Bray 
III, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

Let me recall to you that in early May we 
announced in this room the readiness of the 
United States Government to assist in the 
relief and rehabilitation of refugees return- 
ing to their home areas in the southern 
Sudan as the result of the agreement between 
the government and rebel leaders which 



brought to an end some 16 years of fighting. 

I think I also said at that time that the 
United Nations was dispatching a survey 
team to the Sudan for the purpose of investi- 
gating the requirement for a resettlement 
assistance program on something of an emer- 
gency basis. The United Nations team has 
completed its survey. This fact was reported 
by Secretary General Waldheim to ECOSOC 
[Economic and Social Council] today in 
Geneva. In the course of his discussion, he 
said that he had asked the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Prince 
Sadruddin Aga Khan, to coordinate an im- 
mediate U.N. program for relief and rehabil- 
itation, and he appealed to the international 
community for contributions to the program, 
amounting to $22 million in cash and kind. 

The High Commissioner's field team, 
which completed the investigation in the 
Sudan, has reported needs for food, shelter, 
medicines, health and education facilities, 
and funds for transport of supplies to the 
refugee areas, which are in the remote south. 

The number of people involved — that is, 
those who fled from the area to neighboring 
countries or other parts of the Sudan — is es- 
timated at 680,000. 

In response to the Secretary General's 
appeal, all of today, the United States Gov- 
ernment is making an initial commitment of 
support and has informed the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees that the United 
States will provide $4.45 million in assist- 
ance. That sum breaks down as follows: 

— Into immediate, $200,000 in cash to the 
UNHCR for the purchase and transport of 
polyethylene shelter material — this is, I 
gather, an especially urgent need, since the 
rainy season has already started in the 
refugee area; and, as you recall, we pioneered 
in the use of this material for shelter pur- 
poses in Bangladesh. A test program has 
demonstrated its suitability in the Sudan as 
well. 

— $250,000 in cash to American voluntary 
agencies already involved in Sudan refugee 
relief. Catholic Relief Services, Church 
World Service, and Lutheran World Relief; 
this money will go primarily for trucks and 



July 31, 1972 



145 



other vehicles and for pontoons for tempo- 
rary bridges. 

— And, finally, from the Food for Peace 
program, through voluntary agencies, up to 
$4 million, principally to be used for cooking 
oils, milk, and high-protein cereal blends. 

This amount does not include the token ges- 
ture in early May of $25,000 for hand garden 
tools to assist refugees at reestablishing 
their own plots. These tools have now been 
delivered and are about to be distributed. 

Our assistance in this program is being 
administered by the Office of Refugee and 
Migration Affairs, headed by Frank L. Kel- 
logg, in coordination with the Food for Peace 
program, which is headed by Irwin R. 
Hedges. 

I might add to that our hope that other 
potential donors will respond generously to 
the Secretary General's appeal to meet the 
-needs of those in the southern Sudan. 



Civil Aeronautics Board Action 
With Respect to BOAC 

Press release 171 dated July 12 

The Civil Aeronautics Board on July 12 
released an order which requires that British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) file 
its schedules for approval with the Board. 
This action was taken in accordance with 
part 213 of the Board's Economic Regula- 
tions, which empowers it to require the filing 
and approval of schedules of foreign airlines 
when a foreign government, over the objec- 
tions of the U.S. Government, has restricted 
the services of U.S. airlines contrary to the 
provisions of the applicable bilateral air 
transport agreement. The Board has invoked 
these powers on three previous occasions: 
with respect to Qantas, the Australian air- 



line, in 1971; and in 1972, Aerolinas Argen- 
tinas, the Argentine airline, and Iberia, the 
Spanish airline. 

The Board decided to proceed with respect 
to BOAC because of a decision by United 
Kingdom aviation authorities to limit capac- 
ity scheduled by National Aii-lines, a U.S.- 
flag airline, on the London-Miami route. The 
U.S.-U.K. Air Services Agreement contem- 
plates that questions of the appropriate level 
of airline capacity be resolved bilaterally 
through intergovernmental review of actual 
airline operations. In this case, the British 
aviation authorities issued a unilateral order 
to National to reduce the number of weekly 
747 services in the Miami-London market 
from seven to four without an appropriate 
intergovernmental review of National's op- 
erating experience on the route. It is the U.S. 
Government's view that National's manage- 
ment decision to operate a daily 747 service 
has proven to be valid in terms of actual ex- 
perience in the market, that these services 
were fully consistent with the provisions of 
the bilateral agreement, and that the British 
authorities violated the agreement in taking 
unilateral action. 



U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text 
of Extradition Treaty 

Joint Armouncement, June 2 

Press release 131 dated June 2 

It is jointly announced in Washington and 
Dublin that following negotiations in Dub- 
lin between representatives of the two Gov- 
ernments, agreement has been reached on 
the text of an extradition treaty between 
Ireland and the United States. The treaty 
will enter into force when it has been signed 
and ratified on behalf of the parties. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



The SALT Agreements and U.S. National Security 



Folloiving is a statement made hefor'e the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services on 
June 28 by Ambassador Gerard Smith, who 
is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. 
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT).'' 

I am pleased to appear before your com- 
mittee today to discuss the two SALT agree- 
ments.- 

During the past 2\U years, my associates 
and I have briefed the Armed Services 
SALT Subcommittee and the committee's 
staff members a number of times on de- 
velopments in the negotiations. Today I 
would like to discuss with you the results 
of the negotiations, which I believe con- 
stitute a significant first step in limiting 
strategic arms. 

My understanding is that this committee 
is especially interested in getting a clear 
understanding of the terms of the agree- 
ments and in fully understanding their effect 
on U.S. security. I will today try to be 
responsive to these special concerns. 

First, Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly 
to discuss the basic provisions of the two 
agreements. The committee has before it 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

"For texts of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, In- 
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect 
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and 
protocol to the interim agreement, see Bulletin 
of June 26, 1972, p. 918; for texts of agreed inter- 
pretations and unilateral statements, see BULLETIN 
of July 3, 1972, p. 11. 



an article-by-article analysis, and I will try 
to avoid repetition. I will, however, touch 
on the basic undertakings and their effects 
and try to answer some questions that have 
been raised. 



Provisions of the ABM Treaty 

Starting with the ABM Treaty — this is 
a long-term definitive agreement, and the 
effects of its undertakings are basic to a 
realistic assessment of the merits of the 
two agreements taken together. 

The treaty contains a general commit- 
ment not to build a nationwide ABM defense 
nor to provide a base for such defense. This 
general undertaking is supplemented by cer- 
tain specific provisions. By this general 
undertaking and the specific commitments, 
both countries in effect agree not to chal- 
lenge the effectiveness of each other's mis- 
sile deterrent capabilities by deploying wide- 
spread defenses against them. This means 
that the penetration capability of our surviv- 
ing deterrent missile forces can be assured. 
This, to my mind, bears directly on concerns 
about a first strike against the United 
States. As long as we maintain sufficient 
and survivable retaliatory forces, this new 
assurance of their penetration capability 
makes "first strike" as a rational act incon- 
ceivable, in my judgment. I believe that 
this is a development of prime significance 
for U.S. security. 

The treaty, by permitting only a small 
deployment of ABM's, tends to break the 
offense-defense action-and-reaction spiral in 
strategic arms competition. The low ABM 
limits increase the deterrent value of each 
of our retaliatory offensive missiles. In the 



July 31, 1972 



147 



long run, we should be able to obtain more 
deterrence at less cost. 

In view of the low ABM levels agreed on, 
it should be possible in the future to agree 
on mutual reductions in offensive weapons 
without impairing strategic stability. 

The permitted ABM systems are spelled 
out in article III. Each party may have 
two ABM complexes, one in an ICBM [in- 
tercontinental ballistic missile] area and one 
to defend the national command authority. 
These complexes are limited in several ways 
— geographically, in numbers of ABM 
launchers and missiles (100 at each com- 
plex), and in specific constraints on ABM 
radars. 

The two ABM deployments would serve 
different purposes. ABM coverage of an 
ICBM area will afford some protection for 
the ICBM's. ABM coverage at the national 
capital will provide protection for the na- 
tional command authority against accidental 
or unauthorized launch of a small number 
of missiles and is consistent with the basic 
purpose of the 1971 U.S.-U.S.S.R. agree- 
ment on measures to reduce the risk of out- 
break of nuclear war. There would also be 
the additional benefit of increased warning 
time which should afford opportunity for 
command decisions if there were a large- 
scale attack. 

Other articles in the treaty supplement the 
basic provisions of article III. Of special in- 
terest are the limitations placed on ABM ra- 
dars. As the long leadtime item in develop- 
ment of an ABM system, ABM radar was 
the subject of intense and complex negotia- 
tion. There are also limitations on the deploy- 
ment of certain types of non-ABM radars in 
order to preclude their possible use as ele- 
ments of an ABM system. 

Qualitative Limitations on ABM Systems 

As a further restraint on ABM capabili- 
ties, there are three significant qualitative 
limitations on ABM systems. Both sides have 
agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 
launchers for launching more than one inter- 
ceptor missile at a time, not to modify launch- 
ers to provide them with such capability, nor 



to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi- 
automatic or other similar systems for rapid 
reload of ABM launchers. 

The development and testing, as well as de- 
ployment, of sea-, air-, space-based, and land- 
mobile devices is prohibited. Of perhaps even 
greater importance, the parties have agreed 
that no future types of ABM systems based 
on different physical principles from present 
technology can be deployed unless the treaty 
is amended. 

To further reinforce the ban on a nation- 
wide ABM defense, another major set of 
qualitative limitations is the provisions to 
deal with the SAM-upgrade [surface-to-air 
missile] problem. Both sides agree that con- 
version or testing of other systems, such as 
air-defense systems, or components thereof, 
to perform an ABM role is prohibited. This 
is part of the general undertaking not to 
provide an ABM capability to non-ABM sys- 
tems. 

I do not propose to speak about the con- 
fidence with which we can adequately moni- 
tor fulfillment of the obligations of these 
agreements, since I understand that this 
committee has discussed with previous wit- 
nesses the capabilities of our national techni- 
cal means of verification. We did not work 
out limitations and then check to see if na- 
tional technical means were adequate to ver- 
ify them. We tailored the limitations to fit 
the capabilities of national technical means 
of verification. 

There is a landmark commitment not to 
interfere with national technical means of 
verification. This provision would, for ex- 
ample, prohibit interference with a satellite 
in orbit used for verification of the treaty. 
The treaty also contains a commitment not 
to use concealment measures so as to impede 
the effectiveness of national technical means 
of verification. The world should be a more 
open place as a result of these two under- 
takings. 

The Standing Consultative Commission 
established by the treaty will permit consid- 
eration on a regular basis of the operations of 
the treaty, including questions of compliance. 
This is a significant new development in So- 



148 



Department of State Bulletin 



viet-American arms control arrangements. 
The Commission will also have the function 
of considering proposals to increase the via- 
bility of the treaty. We expect that the estab- 
lishment of the Commission will be a priority 
matter when SALT II begins. 

Although the treaty duration is unlimited, 
either party can withdraw whenever it de- 
cides that extraordinary events relating to 
the subject matter of the treaty have jeop- 
ardized its supreme interests. A six-months' 
notice of such withdrawal, including a state- 
ment of the extraordinary events involved, is 
required. 

The U.S. delegation indicated the special 
importance it attached to the relationship be- 
tween defensive and offensive limitations. A 
formal statement was made putting the 
U.S.S.R. on notice that if an agreement pro- 
viding for more complete arms limitations 
were not achieved within five years, U.S. 
supreme interests could be jeopardized, and 
should that occur, it would constitute a basis 
for withdrawal from the treaty. The right of 
withdrawal fully protects our security in- 
terests should the follow-on negotiations not 
succeed and should the strategic situation 
become such that we needed to exercise our 
right to withdraw. 

Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn to 
the interim agreement. 

Unlike the ABM Treaty, this is a tem- 
porary freeze limited in duration and scope 
and does not provide long-term comprehen- 
sive limitation on strategic offensive weapons 
systems. It is an interim "holding" device to 
prevent the aggregate number of ICBM and 
SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic mis- 
sile] launchers from rising while the nego- 
tiation to limit offensive systems continues. 
It in fact constrains a number of Soviet pro- 
grams and no U.S. programs. It is explicitly 
provided in article VII that the obligations of 
the interim agreement shall not prejudice 
the scope or terms of the limitations which 
may be worked out in the course of further 
negotiations. 

In article I the parties undertake commit- 



ments not to construct additional fixed ICBM 
launchers. The undertaking in article I does 
not just bar the addition of ICBM launchers; 
it also bars the relocation of existing ICBM 
launchers. 

The agreement would be violated if one 
more ICBM launcher for operational use 
were started. We are confident that such a 
violation would be detected. We also have 
confidence in our national means of verifica- 
tion's capability to reveal the current num- 
ber of Soviet ICBM's. We do not need Soviet 
confirmation of our intelligence. 

Under article II the parties agree not to 
convert launchers for light or older ICBM's 
into launchers for modern heavy ICBM's. 
This constitutes a qualitative constraint over 
and above the quantitative constraint not to 
construct any more launchers. 

On the issue of heavy versus light missiles, 
it is clear from oral exchanges during the ne- 
gotiations that both sides understand that 
Soviet SS-ll's and SS-13's are "light" and 
that SS-7's, SS-8's, and SS-9's are "heavy" 
and that U.S. Titans are "heavy" and Min- 
uteman are "light." The United States can- 
not replace Minuteman with missiles of the 
volume of Titans, and the Soviets cannot re- 
place SS-ll's with missiles of the volume of 
SS-7's, 8's, or 9's. 

But both sides want under this interim 
agreement to continue to modernize their 
ICBM forces. You will recall that in our 
current modernization program on Minute- 
man we are increasing missile volume, but 
not to the extent that would make "heavy" 
missiles of them. 

There are two aspects of this moderniza- 
tion question, launchers and missiles. The 
launcher aspect was handled by an agreed in- 
terpretation that in the process of moderni- 
zation the dimensions of silo launchers will 
not be significantly increased and with a 
further understanding that this bars an 
increase in launcher dimensions greater than 
10-15 percent. 

With regard to the missile aspect of the 
problem, after months of trying we were not 
able to negotiate a definition of what consti- 



July 31, 1972 



149 



tutes a heavy missile, the Soviets arguing 
that this was unnecessary for a short-term 
freeze and that both sides could tell the dif- 
ference between a light and heavy missile. 
We finally resorted, therefore, to a U.S. 
formal statement that we would "consider 
any ICBM having a volume significantly 
greater than that of the largest light ICBM 
now operational on either side to be a heavy 
ICBM." 

I anticipate that when SALT is resumed, 
hopefully in the fall, we will be negotiating 
for a treaty covering definitive levels on 
ICBM's as well as other strategic weapons. 
As opposed to the situation in negotiating a 
short-term freeze (that affected only Soviet 
programs), we found that agreement in 
greater specificity was possible when it was 
a matter of negotiating the ABM Treaty. 

The agreement does not cover mobile 
ICBM's. Neither side presently has such 
systems. The Soviets argued that a freeze 
should not apply to systems not now deployed. 
Probably their main interest was in not 
prejudicing their position on the legitimacy 
of mobile ICBM's in the follow-on negotia- 
tions by agreeing in effect to banning them in 
an interim freeze. The U.S. delegation stated 
that we would consider deployment of oper- 
ational land-mobile ICBM launchers during 
the period of the interim agreement as in- 
consistent with the objectives of that agree- 
ment. 



Effect of SLBM Arrangement 

Article III of the interim agreement and 
the protocol cover SLBM launchers and mod- 
ern ballistic missile submarines. 

The Soviet delegation long resisted in- 
clusion of limitations on SLBM's in the in- 
terim agreement. They argued that it was 
not appropriate because the main concern ex- 
pressed by the United States had been the 
Soviet ICBM program, particulai'ly the SS-9 
program, which they agreed to halt. The 
Soviets also argued that freezing SLBM's 
was complicated because of foreign bases, 
which they said gave the United States an 
advantage. 



The administration insisted that SLBM's 
be included in the interim agreement since 
they constituted a dynamic construction pro- 
gram and a significant part of the aggre- 
gate strategic missile forces that should not 
be increased while negotiations continue for 
definitive offensive limitations. 

The effect of the SLBM arrangement final- 
ly worked out is to freeze SLBM and ICBM 
launchers at current levels — coupled with an 
option to replace certain older ICBM's and 
SLBM launchers with new SLBM launchers. 
There are three levels involved in this ar- 
rangement: a numerical limit on SLBM 
launchers on modern nuclear submarines at 
which replacement must begin, a numerical 
limit on modern SLBM launchers, and a 
numerical limit on modern SLBM subma- 
rines each side may have under replacement 
procedures. 

After reaching 740 launchers on nuclear- 
powered submarines of any type, the U.S.S.R. 
must scrap older launchers under agreed pro- 
cedures. The purpose of the negotiated num- 
ber, 740, is to establish a clear and unambig- 
uous baseline which avoids uncertainty or 
debate over the definition of "under construc- 
tion." 

There is a ceiling of 950 for the U.S.S.R. 
on the total number of modern SLBM launch- 
ers. This ceiling is to cover launchers on 
nuclear-powered submarines (Y-class and H- 
class submarines) and any modern launchers 
on older submarines (G-class diesel-powered 
submarines). 

To reach 950 SLBM's on modern subma- 
rines, the U.S.S.R. must retire older launch- 
ers — specifically, those for SS-7 and SS-8 
ICBM's and on H-class nuclear submarines. 
The first SLBM launcher on a nuclear-pow- 
ered submarine after the 740th launcher 
must be a replacement. The older ICBM or 
SLBM launchers being replaced must start 
being scrapped no later than the date on 
which the submarine containing the 741st 
launcher begins sea trials. 

There is also a ceiling of 62 for the 
U.S.S.R. on the number of operational mod- 
ern submarines (Y-class or follow-on 
nuclear-powered SLBM submarines). 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



The committee will recall from previous 
briefings given during the SALT negotia- 
tions that this one-way-mix concept, which 
permits replacement of land-based with sea- 
based launchers, was suggested by the United 
States early in the SALT negotiations as a 
way of achieving greater strategic stability. 

Under these arrangements, the United 
States has the right to have 656 SLBM 
launchers and through replacement could 
have up to 710 SLBM launchers on 44 mod- 
ern submarines. 

The conversion of U.S. ICBM launchers to 
handle Minuteman III missiles and the con- 
version of current Polaris submarines to 
handle Poseidon missiles, as well as the con- 
struction of new submarines as replacement 
for older ones, are not affected by the freeze. 

The interim agreement provides for ap- 
plication of the same verification procedures 
and commitments about nonconcealment and 
noninterference as contained in the ABM 
Treaty. Also, the Standing Consultative Com- 
mission would be used to promote the objec- 
tives and implementation of the interim 
agreement. 

Meeting U.S. Strategic Concerns 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to com- 
ment on what would be the effects of these 
agreements on U.S. security. 

The administration's objectives in SALT 
are to achieve agreements maintaining and 
enhancing a sound U.S. strategic posture and 
to reach a more stable strategic relationship 
with the U.S.S.R. in order to improve the 
prospects for peace. I think these objectives 
have been met in these first limitation agree- 
ments. 

In assessing the agreements, the basic 
question is: Would not the United States be 
better off with them than without them? This 
question requires comparing the strategic 
prospects under the agreements with the 
prospects that would exist in their absence. 
Another way of putting the question is to ask 
how these agreements meet the strategic con- 
cerns that have existed in this country in the 
past few years. 



There were concerns about the dangers 
involved in a large, costly, destabilizing ABM 
competition. Under the terms of the ABM 
Treaty, those concerns should be sharply re- 
duced if not entirely eliminated. 

There was concern about the threat to our 
nuclear deterrent's high assurance of capa- 
bility to penetrate Soviet defenses. This con- 
cern rested not only on the prospect of large- 
scale Soviet ABM deployments but also on 
the possibility of upgrade of Soviet SAM 
systems to give them an ABM capability. 
Under the ABM Treaty the Soviets will take 
commitments not to deploy a widespread 
ABM system and not to upgrade SAM's and 
to have only 200 ABM's. U.S. penetration 
capability can be clearly assured. 

There was concern about the continuing 
growth in the numbers of Soviet ICBM's, es- 
pecially the SS-9. Under the interim agree- 
ment the U.S.S.R. is committed not to start 
any additional ICBM's and is limited to a 
number of SS-9's well below levels which 
seemed likely several years ago. 

There was concern about the overall 
growth of the aggregate number of Soviet 
strategic launchers, both land- and sea-based. 
The growth of that aggregate total will be 
stopped under the interim agreement. 

There was concern that our national capa- 
bilities to keep informed about Soviet deploy- 
ments might, by adversary action, be ren- 
dered ineffective. In the ABM Treaty, the 
Soviet Union has taken a landmark commit- 
ment not to interfere with our national 
means of verification. 

These concerns have been met without 
any restrictions being placed on on-going or 
programed U.S. strategic offensive programs. 

Opportunities for the Future 

Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee to 
give favorable consideration to these two 
agreements. I believe they are in the interest 
of the United States. I have spoken of the 
strategic concerns that exist in this country 
that are met by these agreements. Those are 
achievements of no small magnitude. It does 
not lessen the importance of having met 



July 31, 1972 



151 



those concerns to say that not every U.S. 
concern has been met. I can assure the mem- 
bers of this committee that it is clear from 
the negotiations that not every Soviet con- 
cern has been met. That is a principal reason 
why the interim agreement is temporary. We 
are, however, better off with the interim 
agreement in force while we negotiate a com- 
prehensive offensive limitation agreement. 

Under the agreement, U.S. forces will 
clearly be sufficient to protect our, and our 
allies', security interests. We are free under 
the interim agreement to pursue sound mod- 
ernization programs, and I believe we should 
do so. The offensive limitations on the 
U.S.S.R. in conjunction with the funda- 
mentally new element injected into the stra- 
tegic situation by the very low limits on 
ABM's for both sides will clearly enhance the 
security of the United States. 

We have kept our allies informed at all 
stages of the SALT negotiations. Since the 
Moscow signing, we have briefed them on 
these agreements, and I believe it is fair to 
say that they have met with their approval. 

I am convinced that with these two agree- 
ments in force, strategic stability will be in- 
creased, the threat of nuclear war will be 
reduced, the prospects for future arms ac- 
cords will be increased, and there will be 
increased hope for a peaceful future. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think the SALT 
process has proved useful in and of itself. 
SALT is not a one-time effort, but a continu- 
ing process which involves negotiating ex- 
changes between the two greatest nuclear 
powers and a continuing effort to move step 
by step. The very first results of SALT did 
not deal with the central issues of strategic 
competition between the two powers, but 
they were important. I refer to the 1971 
agreements on improving the direct com- 
munications link between the United States 
and U.S.S.R. and on measures to reduce the 
dangers of nuclear war. We have now taken 
a step toward curbing the competition in stra- 
tegic arms and laying a basis for greater 
strategic stability. That step must be judged 
on its own merits, but I think it should also 
be j udged in the context of the opportunities 



it presents for the future. Both the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. are making an in- 
vestment in this SALT process which, I be- 
lieve, they will want to preserve and increase 
and not risk lightly. 

I urge that this committee and the Senate 
support the ABM Treaty and its accompany- 
ing interim agreement. 



Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet 
Agreement on Cooperation in Space 

Statement by U. Alexis Johnson 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

It is a pleasure to meet with you to dis- 
cuss the agreement on cooperation in space 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union which was signed in Moscow on May 
24, 1972, by President Nixon and Premier 
Kosygin — a pleasure not only because of the 
importance which we attach to this agree- 
ment but also because of the sustained in- 
terest of this committee in the international 
aspects of our space program and because 
of the role which this committee has played 
ih encouraging the use of our space capabili- 
ties to serve the broad interests and objec- 
tives of the United States. - 

I intend to be brief, limiting myself to a 
few observations as to the content of this 
agreement and the opportunities which it 
presents from the viewpoint of U.S. policy 
abroad. I leave it to Dr. Low [George M. 
Low, Deputy Administrator, National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration], who is 
here this morning and is far more knowl- 
edgeable than I on such matters, to inform 
you as to the program arrangements them- 
selves, the technical prospects, the domestic 



' Made before the Senate Committee on Aero- 
nautical and Space Sciences on June 23. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

- For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of 
June 26, 1972, p. 924. 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



implications, and the needs which ensue from 
this agreement. 

The space agreement which the President 
signed in Moscow serves several significant 
purposes: 

— It endorses and confirms at the highest 
level of the two governments the under- 
standings reached between NASA and the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences over the past 18 
months for cooperation in such important 
areas of space science and application as 
space meteorology, the use of space tech- 
niques for the study of the earth's environ- 
ment, the further exploration of space and 
the moon and the planets, and space biology 
and medicine. 

— It enables the development of compatible 
rendezvous and docking systems and would 
subject these systems to a joint test mission 
in space which should enhance the safety and 
value of space flight. 

— It opens the possibility of yet further 
areas of cooperation of mutual interest. 

— It demonstrates in full view of the 
world that the two gi-eat space powers have 
both the will and the capability to work to- 
gether on important and difficult tasks. 

We have high hopes that this agreement 
will be a milestone in our relationship with 
the Soviet Union. It affords a unique oppor- 
tunity for cooperation between us. It serves 
our broad national purposes as well as our 
specific foreign policy objectives with respect 
to the Soviet Union. It is based on more than 
a decade of evolving discussion and collabo- 
ration in space matters between us which 
indicates, in our view, that the undertak- 
ings in the agreement can be fulfilled to our 
mutual benefit. 

With respect to our policy objectives, the 
United States has long pursued the foreign 
policy objectives of reducing tensions be- 
tween ourselves and the Soviet Union and 
seeking ways to develop a stable and mutu- 
ally constructive relationship. Over the past 
decade arrangements between U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies and our National Academy of 
Sciences, on one hand, and their Soviet coun- 
terparts, on the other, have enlarged the 
measure of useful contact between the two 



scientific communities and have made possi- 
ble a useful exploration of the state of sci- 
ence and technology in both countries. U.S. 
scientists have been attracted to the achieve- 
ments of Soviet science in many fields and 
have become convinced that deeper contact 
and working cooperation would serve our in- 
terests, both technological and political. In 
the field of space activity, as in others, there 
has been an apparent growing willingness on 
the part of the Soviet Union over the past 
two years to explore seriously the possibility 
for collaborative projects. It is these inter- 
ests and prospects on which this agreement 
is based. 

In his statement before the General As- 
sembly of the United Nations in September 
1969 — in the first year of this administra- 
tion — and again in his statement in March 
1970 as to the goals and purposes of our 
space program, President Nixon emphasized 
that we must encourage greater interna- 
tional cooperation in space. He stated his in- 
tention that the United States should take 
positive, concrete steps "toward internation- 
alizing man's epic venture into space" and 
his belief "that both the adventures and the 
applications of space missions should be 
shared by all peoples." He felt then, and 
feels now, that "our progress will be faster 
and our accomplishments will be greater if 
nations will join together in this effort, both 
in contributing the resources and in enjoy- 
ing the benefits." This agreement is a sig- 
nificant step toward achieving those pur- 
poses. 

You will note that in the preamble of this 
agreement both parties stipulate that this 
expansion of cooperation between them is to 
be for peaceful purposes and that its results 
are to be available not only for the benefit of 
the peoples of the two countries but also for 
the benefit of all peoples of the world. In ar- 
ticle 4 both the parties are committed to 
encourage international efforts to resolve 
problems of international law arising in the 
exploration and use of outer space and to co- 
operate to the end that legal order in space 
will be strengthened through further devel- 
opment of international space law. These 



July 31, 1972 



153 



provisions reflect basic American prerequi- 
sites for cooperation with other countries in 
the exploration and use of space. 

This agreement offers a unique opportu- 
nity because the United States and the So- 
viet Union are, and will remain for a long 
time, the world's leading space powers. It 
involves activities which have a high priority 
in both countries and in which the two coun- 
tries have a special expertise. It reflects the 
respect in which each holds the accomplish- 
ments of the other in this field and the op- 
portunity to achieve mutual benefit by work- 
ing together. It will require close working 
relationships and, particularly in the under- 
taking of a joint rendezvous and docking 
test mission, the highest level of confidence 
and reliability in the performance of both 
people and equipment on both sides. The ob- 
ligations are clear. The tasks are specific. 
And the benefits which can flow from these 
experiences are of corresponding value. 

This agreement is not based solely on pos- 
sibilities. Rather it rests on a long record of 
discussion and cooperative undertakings be- 
tween ourselves and the Soviet Union. You 
will recall that our earliest efforts to de- 
velop cooperation with the Soviet Union in 
space research go back to the initial planning 
of space projects for the International Geo- 
physical Year in the late 1950's. These ef- 
forts were followed by agreements between 
NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
in the early and mid-1960's for several lim- 
ited cooperative projects and led to the much 
more extensive agreements reached in Oc- 
tober 1970 and January 1971, which are the 
basis for the specific undertakings in arti- 
cles 1 and 3 of this agreement. The specific 
requirements and arrangements for develop- 
ing compatible rendezvous and docking sys- 
tems and an experimental test flight were, as 
noted in article 3 of the agreement, agreed 
in detail between NASA and the Soviet Acad- 
emy of Sciences in a summary of discus- 
sions between Dr. Low and Academician 
[V. A.] Kotelnikov, Acting President of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, on April 6, 1972. 

Our early relationships in space matters 
during the 1960's, as compared with these 



latter agreements, were very modest in scope 
and did not consistently meet our expecta- 
tions. Thus far, however, the implementa- 
tion of agreements reached since 1970 has 
exceeded our expectations. All of this prior 
experience has had a cumulative effect and 
has been important in assessing the pros- 
pects for success under this new agreement. 
It has not been easy to bring the Soviet Un- 
ion and ourselves to working cooperation in 
activities which bear so directly on national 
prestige and to which each country has ac- 
corded so high a priority. Nor will it be easy 
to realize fully the opportunities which this 
agreement offers. Nonetheless, we estimate 
that it will be possible to do so. American in- 
terests are adequately safeguarded and well 
served. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe that 
this agreement signed in Moscow is a pru- 
dent, workable, and highly desirable agree- 
ment which will serve both our foreign 
policy interests and our space program ob- 
jectives. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended' (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 
Acceptance deposited: Luxembourg, July 10, 1972. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.' 

Signatures: Chad, July 12, 1972; Romania, July 
10, 1972 (with a reservation and statement). 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 



Not in force. 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 

Ratifications deposited: Chad, July 12, 1972; 
Romania, July 10, 1972 (with a reservation). 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 9, 
1972 (with a declaration). 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. 
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United 
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Ratification, deposited: United Kingdom, May 9, 
1972. 

Law 

Statute of the Hague conference on private inter- 
national law. Done at the seventh session of the 
conference at The Hague October 9-31, 1951. 
Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the United 
States October 15, 1964. TIAS 5710. 
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, April 28, 1972. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964 ; for the United States June 
24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 
Accession deposited: Greece, June 6, 1972. 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, May 23, 1972. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 
6839. 
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, July 11, 1972. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New 
York December 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 4, 1969.-" 
Accession deposited: Mauritius, May 30, 1972. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done 
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967; for the United States November 
1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Brazil, April 7, 1972 (with 
a reservation). 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in 
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow February 11, 1972. Entered into 
force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 



Ratification deposited: Romania, July 10, 1972 
(with statements). 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.' 
Signature: Brazil, July 13, 1972. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Accessioyi deposited: United Arab Emirates, June 
27, 1972. 

War 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of pris- 
oners of war; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition 
of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of 
armed forces at sea; 

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 
force October 21, 1950; for the United States 
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 
3365, respectively. 

Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, May 
10, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Afghanistan 
of 10 percent of the value of grant military assist- 
ance furnished by the United States. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Kabul May 24 and June 29, 
1972. Entered into force June 29, 1972. 

Argentina 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Argentina of 
10 percent of the value of grant military assist- 
ance furnished by the United States. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 4 and 
June 8, 1972. Entered into force June 8, 1972. 

Australia 

Agreement on the limitation of imports of fresh, 
chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, 
except lambs, of Australian origin, other than 
imports which are direct shipments from Aus- 
tralia. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington December 28, 1971. Entered into force 
December 28, 1971. TIAS 7244. 
Discontim(ed: July 12, 1972. 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from 
Australia of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, 
goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar 



' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 



July 31, 1972 



155 



year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington May 17, 1972. Entered into force May 17, 
1972. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the grant agreement of May 
30, 1972, for relief and rehabilitation. Signed at 
Dacca June 26, 1972. Entered into force June 26, 
1972. 

Brazil 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Brazil of 10 
percent of the value of grant military assistance 
furnished by the United States. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Brasilia February 28 and June 
27, 1972. Entered into force June 27, 1972; effec- 
tive February 7, 1972. 

Ecuador 

Agreement amending the agreements for sales of 
agricultural commodities of June 30, 1969 (TIAS 
6867), and June 30, 1971 (TIAS 7179). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Quito May 18 and June 23, 
1972. Entered into force June 23, 1972. 

Ireland 

Agreement on the limitation of imports of fresh, 
chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, 
except lambs, of Irish origin, other than imports 
which are direct shipments from Ireland. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 24, 
1971. Entered into force December 24, 1971. TIAS 
7243. 
Discontinued: July 12, 1972. 

Agreement on the limitation of imports from Ire- 
land of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, 
goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar 
year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington March 16, 1972. Entered into force March 
16, 1972. TIAS 7307. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

New Zealand 

Agreement on the limitation of imports of fresh, 
chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, 
except lambs, of New Zealand origin, other than 
imports which are direct shipments from New Zea- 
land. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton December 23, 1971. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 23, 1971. TIAS 7242. 
Discontinued: July 12, 1972. 

Agreement relating to limitation of imports from 
New Zealand of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of 
cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during cal- 
endar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington April 14, 1972. Entered into force 
April 14, 1972. TIAS 7319. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

Poland 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 13, 
1970, as extended (TIAS 6890, 7264), regarding 
fisheries in the western region of the middle At- 
lantic Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Warsaw June 28 and 30, 1972. Entered into force 
June 30, 1972. 



Portugal 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
with annex. Signed at Lisbon June 30, 1972. En- 
tered into force June 30, 1972. 

World Health Organization 

Agreement relating to the facilities, services, and 
privileges and immunities afforded to the Organi- 
zation on the occasion of the holding in Guam of 
the 23d session of the regional committee of the 
Western Pacific, with annexes. Signed at Manila 
June 19, 1972. Entered into force June 19, 1972. 



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156 



Department of State Bulletin 



I INDEX July SI, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1727 



Agriculture. Three- Year Grain Agreement 

Signed by the United States and U.S.S.R. . 144 

American Principles. America's Bicentennial 

Invitation to the World (Nixon) .... 133 

Aviation. Civil Aeronautics Board Action 

With Respect to BOAC 146 

Congress 

Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet Agreement 

on Cooperation in Space (Johnson) . . . 152 

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National 

Security (Smith) 147 

Disarmament. The SALT Agreements and 
U.S. National Security (Smith) 147 

Economic Affairs 

The Benefits of Freer International Trade and 

the American Ability To Compete (Renner) 139 

Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed by the 

United States and U.S.S.R 144 

Extradition. U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text 
of Extradition Treaty (joint announcement) 146 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To 

Assist Refugees in Southern Sudan . . . 145 

Ireland. U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text of 
Extradition Treaty (joint announcement) . 146 

Korea. U.S. Supports Efforts To Ease Ten- 
sions on the Korean Peninsula (Depart- 
ment statement) 136 

Poland. United States and Poland To Expand 
Program of Scientific Cooperation (joint 
communique) 137 

Presidential Documents. America's Bicen- 
tennial Invitation to the World 133 

Publications. Recent Releases 156 

Refugees. U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To As- 
sist Refugees in Southern Sudan .... 145 

Science. United States and Poland To Expand 
Program of Scientific Cooperation (joint 
communique) 137 

Space. Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet 
Agreement on Cooperation in Space (John- 
son) 152 

Sudan. U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To Assist 
Refugees in Southern Sudan 145 

Trade. The Benefits of Freer International 
Trade and the American Ability To Com- 
pete (Renner) 139 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 154 

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National 

Security (Smith) 147 



Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed by the 
United States and U.S.S.R 144 

U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text of Extradi- 
tion Treaty (joint announcement) . . . 146 

U.S.S.R. 

Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet Agreement 

on Cooperation in Space (Johnson) . . . 152 

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National 

Security (Smith) 147 

Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed by the 

United States and U.S.S.R 144 

United Kingdom. Civil Aeronautics Board 
Action With Respect to BOAC .... 146 

Viet-Nam. 150th Plenary Session on Viet- 
Nam Held at Paris (Porter) 135 

Name Index 

Johnson, U. Alexis 152 

Nixon, President 133 

Porter, William J 135 

Renner, John C 139 

Smith, Gerard 147 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 10-16 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to July 10 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 131 
of June 2. 

No. Date Subject 

tl70 7/10 Joint U.S.- Yugoslavia release on 
talks held during Secretary 
Rogers' visit. 
171 7/12 CAB action with respect to 
BOAC. 

*172 7/13 Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs holds 43d 
meeting, July 13-14. 
173 7/13 Porter: 150th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

tl74 7/13 Shultz, Irwin: news conference, 
July 12. 
175 7/14 U.S.-Polish cooperation in science 
and technology: joint communi- 
que. 

tl76 7/14 Ropers: resumption of aid to 
Yemen Arab Republic. 

* Not printed. 

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i 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



•f 



ly^s 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1728 




Augtist 7, 1972 



SECRETARY ROGERS ATTENDS SEATO AND ANZUS MEETINGS 

IN AUSTRALIA AND VISITS 10 OTHER COUNTRIES 

Statements, News Confereyices, and Texts of Communiques 157 

A U.S. LOOK AT THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 
Statement by Ambassador Bush 176 



Boston Public Library 
S»"Pennte„dent of Documents 

SHP 1 4 1972 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1728 
August 7, 1972 



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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
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Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and ANZUS Meetings 
in Australia and Visits 10 Other Countries 



Secretary Rogers left Washington June 24 for an 18-day 
trip to 11 countries. He attended the SEATO and ANZUS 
Council meetings at Canberra, Australia, after which he visited 
Indonesia, Ceylon, the Yemen Arab Republic, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Greece, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy. 

Follotving are a transcript of a news conference held by 
Secretary Rogers at the Western White House after reporting 
to President Nixon on the trip, statements made by the Secretary 
during the trip, his exchange of remarks with Yemeni Prime 
Minister Muhsin al-Ayni at San'a, a joint U.S. -Yugoslavia press 
release, a transcript of the Secretary's news conference at Rome, 
and the texts of communiques released after the meetings at 
Canberra. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., 
JULY 15 

White House press release (San Clemente) dated July 15 

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec- 
retary to President Nixon] : As you know, 
Secretary Rogers has just returned from an 
1 1-nation around-the-world trip and reported 
to President Nixon this morning in a meeting 
which lasted more than an hour. The Sec- 
retary will make some comments to you 
about his visit and his trip and also take a 
few of your questions this morning. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Rogers: Ladies and gentlemen, 
I am very pleased to report to the President 
this morning on the trip I have just com- 
pleted. As Mr. Ziegler said, I visited 11 
nations around the world and also had a 
meeting with His Holiness Pope Paul in 
Rome. 

I can say as a result of these discussions 
I had and the discussions I had at the 
SEATO and ANZUS meetings in Australia 



that the prestige of the United States has 
never been higher. Without exception, the 
nations that I visited, not only the leaders 
but the public as well, spoke in the most 
complimentary terms about the initiatives 
that President Nixon has taken to bring 
about peace in the world. 

It is gratifying to me, as Secretary of 
State, to see and to hear the comments that 
have been made about our country and our 
foreign policy. The visit that I made to the 
Persian Gulf area was the first one by any 
Secretary of State of the United States. I 
was very well received by the countries in 
the areas. As you know, I visited eastern 
European countries, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
and Hungary. In the case of Romania and 
Hungary, I was the first Secretary of State to 
ever visit those countries. Without exception 
in those countries the President's programs 
were received with warmth and enthusiasm. 
I am sure that the response in those coun- 
tries, particularly in the case of Hungary 
and Romania, was largely because of the ini- 



August 7, 1972 



157 



tiatives that the President has taken for 
peace. 

I was very pleased to report to the Presi- 
dent on not only the success of the visit but 
the fact that his programs have been recog- 
nized in all of these countries as programs 
and policies designed to bring about peace 
in the world. 

I think it is fair to say, and I say it with- 
out any reservation, that President Nixon is 
regarded as the world leader in the cause of 
peace, and I think it should make all Ameri- 
cans very proud of this country and of its 
President for the efforts he has made to 
bring about peace in the world. 

I will take some questions now. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have had 
a chance to study the latest Communist peace 
proposal that loas made in Paris this past 
Thursday, is there anything new in it? Is 
there any reason to he encouraged that ive 
may get a negotiated settlement ? 

Secretary Rogers: I am always a little cau- 
tious about saying whether we are encour- 
aged or not, because sometimes when it is 
played back in the media it gets a little out of 
proportion. Yes, there are some slight nu- 
ances there that give us some slight encour- 
agement, but I don't want to hold out too 
much hope. We are encouraged by the fact 
that there is feeling, I think, throughout the 
world that the way this war should end is by 
the negotiating process and there is a great 
deal of diplomatic support for the efforts the 
President has made. 

In the discussions that I have had with 
many of the leaders in the world, and I 
don't want to single out any by name, with- 
out exception they feel the proposals we have 
made are fair and reasonable and should pro- 
vide a basis for a negotiated settlement. 

Q. Could you tell us what the nuances 
might be that are encouraging? 

Secretary Rogers: I wouldn't want to at 
this point. 

Q. Le Due Tho said he would be prepared 
to meet Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, 



Assistant to the President for National Se- 
curity Affairs] in further secret negotiations 
if the United States had something new to 
say or something new to offer. Can you tell 
us whether Dr. Kissinger will be going? 

Secretary Rogers: No, we have made it 
clear that we don't want to make that com- 
ment. Obviously, we are prepared to have 
any kind of diplomatic activity which holds 
out promise for success. We have said that 
repeatedly in the past. That is still our posi- 
tion. 

Q. Can you tell us where Dr. Kissinger is ? 

Secretary Rogers: Today? 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Rogers: In that building. 

Q. Former Secretary [of the Treasury 
John 5.] Connally said yesterday that Sen- 
ator McGovern's position on Viet-Nam was 
sabotaging President Nixon's efforts to 
achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement. Do 
you agree with this assessment? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I said when I re- 
turned to Washington that any proposal that 
gives the enemy exactly what he wants makes 
it very difficult for us to negotiate on any 
other terms. So that it is quite clear that, 
if I understand the proposals that have been 
made by Senator McGovern, he would give 
our adversaries exactly what they want with- 
out any negotiations. To that extent I think it 
makes it extremely difficult for us. 

On the other hand, I think there is a feel- 
ing that the negotiated settlement is desir- 
able, and we still have hopes that it might 
succeed. I think one of the things that is 
encouraging in that respect, based on my dis- 
cussions, is that there is a feeling that Pres- 
ident Nixon is going to win the election and 
therefore there is a feeling that maybe this 
is the time to negotiate a settlement. This was 
said to me in some of the eastern European 
countries. 

Q. Do you think that Hanoi believes that 
the President will iviyi the election and might 
base their response on this belief? 



158 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't know, be- 
cause we are not that close to Hanoi. But 
certainly other nations that are close to them 
have expressed that thought. 

Q. Which ones, sir? 

Secretary Rogers: I wouldn't want to name 
them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on Le Due Tho's point of 
being prepared to meet if there is something 
new that you have to say, do you see that 
as an obstacle to any of these private meet- 
ings, which I know you don't want to talk 
about? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think that 
the statements that are made publicly have 
much relevance in that sense. I think it is 
much more important what is said in diplo- 
matic circles and what is said when it gets 
down to serious discussions. I think that most 
of the things that are said on public occasions 
are really for propaganda purposes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any in- 
formation, sir, that Peking or Moscow might 
be encouraging or applying some form of 
pressure on Hanoi to enter negotiations in 
a way that would meet your specifications? 

Secretary Rogers: I really have nothing to 
add to what has already been said on that. 

Q. When you characterized the public 
statements as irrelevant, would you include 
the statement that Mr. Connally made yes- 
terday ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I was talking about 
the public statements by our adversary. We 
are not making public statements for propa- 
ganda purposes, and we have made our 
position clear. As I have said on numerous 
occasions, the proposals that we have made to 
end this war by negotiations are reasonable 
proposals and I think they are looked upon by 
other nations as reasonable proposals. 

I was talking about the adversary. You 
know what has happened in Paris ever since 
these talks have started has really been a 
propaganda exercise. That is all I had refer- 
ence to. 



Q. When you tvere in Australia and New 
Zealand — there have been a lot of reports 
that the people there are turning against the 
war and want their troops out of Viet-Nam 
— what did you find out about that? 

Secretary Rogers: Their troops are out of 
Viet-Nam. There aren't any Australian or 
New Zealand troops in Viet-Nam now. There 
may be a few, but no troops in combat. 

No, I think that the attitude of the Austra- 
lian public is very good toward the United 
States. I was very well received in Australia, 
and I think that the relations between our 
two countries are excellent. 

Q. The other side said they tvould resume 
the secret talks if there ivas something new. 
Do you have something new? 

Secretary Rogers: As I said, I don't want 
to make any further comments about that. 

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 



SEATO COUNCIL MEETING, CANBERRA 
Statement by Secretary Rogers, June 27 

Press release 164 dated June 27 

In the past four months the United States 
has participated with others in critical de- 
velopments which will leave their stamp on 
the history of this century. The success of the 
President's visits to Peking and Moscow, the 
signing of the U.S.-Soviet agi-eements to 
limit strategic arms, the entering into force 
of an agreement to eliminate Berlin as a 
source of international tension — singly and 
together, these events should make a pro- 
found contribution to the peaceful world 
which all of us in SEATO want. 

In the steps we have taken with our major 
adversaries, American goals have been 
straightforward and undeviating: a world 
free of the risks of nuclear war and the dan- 
gers of great-power confrontation; a Europe 
in which reconciliation progressively re- 
places division; an Asia whose peoples, large 
and small, can guide their own destinies in 
peace without outside interference. 



August 7, 1972 



159 



These goals will be approached more rapid- 
ly if the principles of international relations 
which emerged from the Peking and Moscow 
visits are scrupulously observed. Only time 
can tell how fully those principles will be 
given practical effect. With each country we 
will remain, in varying degrees and for some 
time to come, competitors and vigorous ideo- 
logical rivals with a diametrically different 
view of relations among human beings and 
among states. We believe, however, that a 
process has begun which could keep that com- 
petition peaceful and these rivalries re- 
strained and realistic. 

The paths to the summit meetings were not 
easy. For both China and the Soviet Union 
the ideological and practical barriers were 
formidable. We therefore assume that they 
have undertaken to improve relations with 
the United States with a seriousness of pur- 
pose. The changes of attitude on their part 
are no doubt of the head, not of the heart, 
as President Nixon has described it. But 
those changes offer the possibility of a more 
peaceful world for us all, and the United 
States will do its part, in that spirit, to see 
that possibility realized. 

It is our hope, and it is our intention, that 
the bilateral progress made at the summit 
meetings can also aid the transition to more 
normal relations among other countries di- 
vided or estranged by the cold war. Such 
a process is already underway both in Europe 
and in Asia. 

— In Europe, three weeks ago, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home and I participated in signing 
an agreement which will ease travel restric- 
tions and other conditions of life for the peo- 
ple of West Berlin, innocent victims of the 
division of their city and their country. That 
agreement has opened up further prospects 
for improvements in Europe through in- 
creased bilateral contacts and the forthcom- 
ing European conference. 

— In Asia, talks have been in progress for 
nearly a year between Red Cross representa- 
tives of the Republic of Korea and the Dem- 
ocratic People's Republic of Korea, initially 
directed toward reuniting families separated 
for decades. We share the hope President 



Park expressed at the recent meeting of the i 

Asian and Pacific Council that such conver- ) 

sations and communications will be contin- i 

ued and developed. ^ 

The Berlin achievement and the new open- I 
ings in Korea demonstrate the progress that 
negotiations can bring to intractable prob- 
lems. Unfortunately, in Viet-Nam — and 
areas of more direct concern to SEATO — 
such progress is still blocked by the refusal 
of North Viet-Nam to negotiate seriously. 
The Communist side even refuses to enter 
into talks with the Government of the Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam regarding a political settle- 
ment. The President's proposals of May 8 
have so far failed to move Hanoi from its in- 
sistence on terms which would prevent the 
people of South Viet-Nam from determining 
their own future.^ To this we cannot and will 
not agree. But our generous proposal for an 
equitable settlement is the basis for negotia- 
tion, whenever Hanoi is prepared to start. 
We have some reason to hope that the in- 
creased diplomatic pressure on Hanoi 
throughout the world will lead it to under- 
take serious negotiation. 

American foreign policy in Asia and in the 
world is based on fidelity to our commitments 
and firmness in our principles. It is also 
based on the conviction that a willingness to 
alter traditional patterns, to search for solu- 
tions through negotiations and dialogue, and 
to seek mutually beneficial compromises will 
serve the interest of peace. Just as we are im- 
proving our relations with traditional ad- 
versaries, we understand and welcome the 
similar approaches of our allies and friends. 
A willingness on all sides to move away from 
the rigidities of the last two decades can only 
have positive results. 

These changes can only develop within a 
matrix of stability. For our part the United 
States will continue to act in East Asia and 
the Pacific on these convictions: 

— First, our new relationships will not be 
achieved by sacrificing the interests of our 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



friends. We obtained explicit recognition of 
this fact in the principles to which we sub- 
scribed with China and the Soviet Union. 

— Second, we are well aware that these 
new relationships will improve our security 
and that of our allies only if, in pursuing 
them, we remain convincingly strong. That 
is why President Nixon insists on an ade- 
quate national defense budget even in an 
election year. That awareness is at the heart 
of our policies, in the Pacific as in Europe. 
And we are aware as well that continued 
military and economic assistance will be nec- 
essary as others take on responsibility for 
their own security. We are determined to 
provide that assistance. 

— Third, a peaceful Asia will not be sought, 
and could not be achieved, through U.S. 
abandonment of our obligations or our in- 
terests in this area. Our interests in Asia and 
the Pacific are fundamental. In our own self- 
interest and in the interest of our friends 
and allies, our involvement will not end with 
the end of our military involvement in Viet- 
Nam. 

It is the necessity for stability in a time of 
change which makes an organization like 
SEATO of continuing importance. That is 
why the United States continues to support 
this Organization and its purposes. Indeed, 
our initiatives in East Asia are directed to- 
ward the primary objective set forth by the 
signers of the SEATO Treaty 18 years ago: 
"to strengthen the fabric of peace and free- 
dom." On behalf of President Nixon I can 
give you our solemn assurance that in Asia 
the United States will remain engaged in 
that endeavor. 

I will now turn to Admiral [John S.] 
McCain, so that he can give you his analysis 
of the military threat to the treaty area. As 
you know, this is Jack's last Council meeting. 
I should like to express in this forum my per- 
sonal gratitude to him for a job well done. 
During his years as Commander in Chief, 
Pacific, he has been an unfailing source of 
advice and strength to me as Secretary of 
State. Certainly, SEATO has no more loyal 
friend than Jack McCain. 



SEATO Council Communique, June 28 

Press release 157 dated June 28 

The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Orga- 
nization held its Seventeenth Meeting in Canberra 
from 27 to 28 June 1972, under the Chairmanship 
of the Honorable Mr. Nigel Bowen, QC, the Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth 
of Australia. The Governments of Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States participated; France 
and Pakistan did not participate. The Republic of 
Vietnam, a protocol state, was represented by an 
observer. 

General Observations 

The Council discussed developments in South-East 
Asia during the fourteen months since it last met 
in London. The Council noted that two principal 
changes had been, on the one hand, the full-scale 
attack against the Republic of Vietnam by virtually 
the entire North Vietnamese army, supported by 
new sophisticated weapons and, on the other, the 
further reduction of American forces in the Republic 
of Vietnam to 49,000. It condemned the blatant vio- 
lation of the Geneva Agreements by North Vietnam 
and regarded the aerial and naval response to it as 
an appropriate and understandable measure against 
the flow of war material to North Vietnam which had 
made the attack feasible. The Council expressed the 
hope that this response would be helpful in bring- 
ing the invasion to an end and leading to meaning- 
ful negotiations. 

The Council noted that, despite setbacks suffered 
in the invasion, the armed forces and people of the 
Republic of Vietnam have demonstrated their grow- 
ing capacity to defend themselves effectively, notably 
in their determined defence of An Loc and Kontum. 
The Council also noted that the Khmer and Lao 
peoples and Governments have continued to resist 
North Vietnamese attacks. 

The Council recognized the continuing needs of 
the Republic of Vietnam, the Khmer Republic and 
Laos for assistance to support their relief and re- 
habilitation efforts and to meet other problems 
stemming from the North Vietnamese military in* 
vasion. A considerable amount of assistance has 
already been provided to these countries in the form 
of direct grants, imports of essential items, com- 
modity import assistance, exchange support and 
other programmes. The Council expressed the hope 
that all nations concerned with problems arising 
from the assault on the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of independent states in Indo-China would 
increase their efforts to assist in these fields. 

The Council noted with gratification that the 
President of the United States, while continuing 
to honour defence commitments in the treaty area, 
had visited the People's Republic of China and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view to 
improving both bilateral relations and the prospects 



August 7, 1972 



161 



for a world at peace. It welcomed these visits and 
expressed the hope that their success would open up 
opportunities for a lessening of the threat in the 
treaty area and for an equitable negotiated settle- 
ment of the war in Indo-China. 

The Council was pleased to note the conclusion of 
agreements between the United States and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics including those limit- 
ing defensive and offensive strategic weapons and 
setting the basis for further negotiations on stra- 
tegic arms. 

In keeping with the spirit of the Pacific Charter, 
the Council was pleased to note the progress made 
in regional co-operation in building up resilience 
amongst countries of South-East Asia. It noted the 
growing importance of various regional groupings 
and the initiatives they are taking towards progress 
and stability in the area. It observed that the growth 
of national self-reliance and increasingly close co- 
operation would promote the well-being and security 
of the countries of the region. 

The Council noted with satisfaction the significant 
contribution to security in the area provided by 
ANZUS and the Five Power defence arrangements. 
The Council also welcomed the statements in the 
Australian White Paper on defence, reaffirming 
Australia's commitments in South-East Asia and 
pledging its continuing aid to the countries of the 
area. 

The Council recognized the growing danger to the 
region from covert forms of communist intervention 
and interference, including externally-promoted in- 
surgency, subversion, infiltration and terrorism. It 
observed with concern that there has been an in- 
tensification of such activity in the region. It noted 
the disruptive effect on stability and the threat to 
vital social and economic development caused by 
these activities. It recognized the importance in 
the present circumstances of developing further 
SEATO's ability to provide advice and assistance 
to countries so threatened. 

The Council concluded that, on balance, the chances 
of building a lasting peace now seem better than 
they have been for a long time. It welcomed this 
situation and was strongly of the view that this was 
the moment to reaffirm collective security arrange- 
ments for the region, the existence of which had con- 
tributed to the improved climate. It recognized that 
no alliance could remain static and that it must be 
flexible and ready to respond to the challenges of a 
changing world and reflect the ideals and aspira- 
tions of the peoples of the area. 

Vietnam 

Developments in the Republic of Vietnam were 
described to the Council by the observer from that 
protocol state. He confirmed that the overwhelming 
majority of the South Vietnamese populace had 
remained loyal to the Government despite the mas- 
sive invasion of North Vietnamese troops which had 



overrun some areas and caused hundreds of thou- 
sands of civilians to flee before the enemy. The 
Vietnamese observer emphasized that the regular 
armed forces had been supported by regional and 
self-defence units in repulsing the North Vietnamese 
attacks, and that the Communists had not succeeded 
in winning popular support for the invasion. 

The Council expressed support for the people of 
the Republic of Vietnam in their search for a peace- 
ful solution to the war and for internal stability, 
and noted the progress being made towards even 
greater self-sufficiency in the face of enemy action. 
It noted, in particular, that the brunt of all fighting 
on the ground is now being borne by the South Viet- 
namese themselves, and that their increasing capa- 
bility and experience will enable friendly forces to 
continue to reduce their force levels. 

The Council expressed appreciation for the con- 
tinued assistance being given to the Republic of 
Vietnam in the economic and humanitarian as well 
as military fields by SEATO member countries and 
others, such as the Republic of Korea. 

The Council deplored the consistent failure of 
North Vietnam to negotiate meaningfully at the 
Paris Peace Talks or elsewhere a settlement for 
Indo-China. It agreed that the proposals presented 
by the United States, in conjunction with the Re- 
public of Vietnam, to North Vietnam in private dis- 
cussions in the latter part of last year offered a 
realistic and generous approach towards bringing 
about a negotiated settlement to the conflict by 
which the people of the Republic of Vietnam would 
be able to determine their own future. In particular, 
the Council endorsed the Eight-Point Plan made pub- 
lic by Presidents Thieu and Nixon in January last 
as an equitable basis for a settlement.^ It further 
commended the call for an internationally-supervised 
cease-fire throughout Indo-China and an exchange 
of all prisoners of war, to be followed by the with- 
drawal of all United States forces within four 
months, as a practical means of bringing the mili- 
tary conflict to an end. 

Laos 

The Council deplored the fact that North Viet- 
nam, in open violation of the 1962 Geneva Agree- 
ment, continues to transport troops and material 
through Laos to the Khmer Republic and the Repub- 
lic of Vietnam, make armed attacks on the forces 
of the Royal Lao Government, and support insur- 
gency in Thailand from bases and training camps in 
Laos. 

Repeating the call for full implementation by all 
signatories of the terms of the 1962 Geneva Agree- 
ment on Laos, including withdrawal of all foreign 
troops, the Council expressed support for efforts by 



- For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1972, 
p. 185. 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Royal Lao Government to secure peace and to 
preserve the neutrality of Laos. 

Khmer Republic 

The Council deplored the continued North Viet- 
namese aggression against the Khmer Republic. It 
reiterated its support for the sovereignty, independ- 
ence and territorial integrity of the Khmer Republic, 
and its respect for the desire of that Government to 
remain neutral. 

The Council expressed its sympathy for the plight 
of the Khmer people, and its gratification at the sub- 
stantial military and economic aid which is being 
given to the Khmer people and Government by their 
South-East Asian neighbours and other friendly 
countries. 

Philippines 

The Council was given a comprehensive account of 
the security situation in the Philippines and, in par- 
ticular, of increased subversive and insurgent ac- 
tivities by communist elements. 

The Council expressed its support for the continu- 
ing political, economic and social measures taken by 
the Philippine Government to raise living standards 
and to initiate social reforms in the country. 

Thailand 

The Council noted the increased level of commu- 
nist subversive and insurgent activity which had de- 
veloped in Thailand over the past year, more seri- 
ously in the northern and north-eastern provinces of 
the country bordering Laos. It observed that insur- 
gents in Thailand have stepped up the frequency and 
boldness of terrorist incidents against the local pop- 
ulace and authorities. It noted that the insurgents 
continued to receive political support and substan- 
tial material aid, including high-powered weapons, 
from sources outside the country. 

The Council also noted the importance of the in- 
tensified efforts of the Royal Thai Government and 
Thai people to counter insurgency and to further 
economic and social development in the country, 
particularly at the grass roots level. 

The Council was pleased that member countries, 
both individually and collectively, were lending as- 
sistance to the Royal Thai Government in these ef- 
forts. 

Counter -subversion and other Activities of SEATO 

The Council emphasized the importance of contin- 
ued efi'orts to assist regional members to cope with 
the problems raised by externally-promoted subver- 
sion and insurgency. Solutions depended on increased 
understanding of problems and vigorous action to re- 
solve them on the part of individual members as well 
as by SEATO. 

The Council decided that SEATO programmes in 
the areas of information and research as well as its 
economic, social and cultural activities should be in- 



creasingly complementary to and closely co-ordi- 
nated with its counter-subversion and counter-insur- 
gency activity. The Organization will assist wherever 
possible in training officials dealing with these prob- 
lems. 

The Council noted with satisfaction that member 
countries continued to provide aid to other member 
countries bilaterally in support of SEATO objectives. 

Co-operation in the Military Field 

The Council noted the report of the military ad- 
visers and commended the Military Planning Office 
for its continuing work in keeping plans up to date 
and in organizing military exercises. These exercises 
provide useful experience in co-operation between 
members as well as in the other aspects of military 
training. It commended the Civic Action Projects 
which were undertaken in the Philippines and Thai- 
land in connection with SEATO exercises "Sea 
Hawk" and "Mittraparb". 

Eighteenth Meeting of the Council 

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation 
of the Government of the United States of America 
to host the Eighteenth Council Meeting in 1973. 

Expression of Gratitude 

The Council expressed its gratitude to the Gov- 
ernment and people of Australia for their generous 
hospitality and warm welcome and its appreciation 
for the excellent arrangements made for the meet- 
ing. 

The Secretary-General 

The Council noted reports of the Secretary-Gen- 
eral and expressed its appreciation for the work of 
the Civil Secretariat. 

In taking note of the forthcoming retirement of 
the Secretary-General, the Council paid tribute to 
the active and devoted manner in which General 
[Jesus] Vargas has served SEATO over the past 
seven years. 

The Council appointed His Excellency Mr. Sun- 
thorn Hongladarom of Thailand as Secretary-Gen- 
eral and extended a warm welcome to him. 

Leaders of Delegations 

The Leaders of the Delegations to the Seventeenth 
Council Meeting were: 

Australia 

The Honorable Nigel Bowen, QC, MP, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 

New Zealand 

The Right Honorable Sir Keith Holyoake, GCMG, 
CH, MP, Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Philippines 

His Excellency General Carlos P. Romulo, Secre- 
tary of Foreign Affairs 



August 7, 1972 



163 



Thailand 

His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chair- 
man, National Executive Council 

United Kingdom 

The Right Honorable Sir Alec Douglas-Home, KT, 
MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Com- 
monwealth Affairs 

United States 

The Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of 
State 

Republic of Vietnam (Observer) 

His Excellency Mr. Tran Van Lam, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 



ANZUS COUNCIL COMAAUNIQUE, 
CANBERRA, JUNE 29 

Press release 159 dated June 29 

Continuing their series of meetings that began 
with the signature of the Security Treaty of 1 Sep- 
tember 1951, between Australia, New Zealand, and 
the United States, the ANZUS partners met as the 
ANZUS Council in Canberra on 29 June 1972. At- 
tending were the Honorable Nigel H. Bowen, Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs of Australia and the Honor- 
able David Fairbairn, Minister for Defence; the 
Right Honorable Sir Keith Holyoake, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of New Zealand; and the Honorable 
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State of the United 
States. 

As in the case of previous meetings of the ANZUS 
partners, the Council conducted a full and frank re- 
view of major issues in the Pacific area which could 
affect the security of the three nations. 

The Council reviewed the visits by President Nixon 
to the People's Republic of China in February 1972, 
and to the Soviet Union in May 1972, and underlined 
the role these visits played in the search for a reduc- 
tion in international tension and the prevention of 
conflicts between nations. The ANZUS partners dis- 
cussed the steps they have taken to normalize their 
respective relations with the People's Republic of 
China and reiterated that the search for new rela- 
tionships should not be at the expense of old friend- 
ships. 

The Council noted the continuing and indeed, in- 
creasing importance of Japan, both politically and 
economically, to the stability and welfare of the Pa- 
cific area and reaffirmed the importance of a contin- 
uing close partnership and confidence between Japan 
and each of the three ANZUS partners. 

The Council noted the growing solidarity among 
countries within the South East Asian region and 
steps being taken to strengthen Australia's and New 
2Sealand's bilateral relations with them, including 



the recent visit by Prime Minister McMahon to In- 
donesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The Council wel- 
comed the entry into effect as from 1 November 
1971 of the Five Power defence arrangements. 

The Council deeply regretted the decision by the 
North Vietnamese leaders to escalate their aggres- 
sion against the Republic of Viet-Nam, rather than 
to negotiate seriously a political settlement of the 
long and destructive war in Indo-China. The Council 
noted the valiant and successful efforts by the peo- 
ple and Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to 
defend themselves and the additional measures taken 
by the United States in response to the massive 
North Vietnamese invasion. It expressed the hope 
that North Viet-Nam and those who have facilitated 
its acts of aggression would at last realize that it is 
time to bring the war to a close and that North Viet- 
Nam would begin to negotiate seriously in Paris. In 
this connection it commended the generous proposals 
for a settlement made in January by Presidents 
Nixon and Thieu and the practical basis for ending 
the military conflict contained in President Nixon's 
proposal of 8 May. 

The Council deplored the fact that Laos and the 
Khmer Republic also continued to be the victims of 
North Vietnamese aggression. Not only have North 
Vietnamese troops continued their unjustified at- 
tacks, but they occupy areas farther west than ever 
before while maintaining a high level of hostilities. 
The ANZUS partners observed that numbers of 
North Vietnamese troops were withdrawn recently 
from areas of Laos and the Khmer Republic in order 
to attack the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 
Where this happened, hostilities significantly de- 
clined, thus underlining the true nature of the con- 
flict in both countries. A final and definitive with- 
drawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and 
the Khmer Republic would contribute greatly to the 
restoration of peace and security in Indo-China. 

The ANZUS partners reviewed their security in- 
terests in the Pacific Ocean. They also had an ex- 
change of views on their strategic interests in the 
Indian Ocean. The Council reaffirmed its hope that 
military competition in the Indian Ocean could be 
avoided and its belief that the area should remain 
under continuing surveillance. 

The Council welcomed the continuing growth of 
regional cooperation among the independent and 
self-governing states in the South Pacific. It noted 
that the second meeting of the South Pacific Forum 
was held in Canberra in February 1972, and that a 
third would be held before the end of the year. 

The Council observed that, notwithstanding the 
mounting opposition amongst countries of the Pa- 
cific, nuclear tests were still being conducted in the 
atmosphere. The ANZUS partners, being parties to 
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, affirmed their 
hope that there should be universal adherence to this 
treaty. It was noted that, in response to the deep 
and widespread concern felt throughout their com- 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



munities at the further series of tests in the South 
Pacific, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New 
Zealand had issued a joint call to the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament. It was agreed that 
progress in this area would respond to the deeply- 
held feelings and aspirations of the peoples of the 
Pacific area. 

The ANZUS partners reaffirmed the deep impor- 
tance that each of them continued to attach to the 
alliance. They emphasized that it is as vital to them 
in the changing circumstances of the 70's as it was 
during the Cold War of former years. The signifi- 
cant developments which had taken place in interna- 
tional relations since the Council last met, in Oc- 
tober 1971, and which would be long in the working 
out, underlined the need to continue to cooperate 
closely within the ANZUS Alliance in furtherance of 
the political and security interests of its members. 



DINNER HONORING SECRETARY ROGERS, 
SAN'A, YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, JULY 1 

Press release 162 (revised) date<l July 3 

Remarks by Secretary Rogers 

On behalf of President Nixon and the Gov- 
ernment and people of the United States, I 
welcome the renewal of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and the Yemen 
Arab Republic. 

This is a historic occasion for our two 
countries and peoples. 

It is a great honor for me to be the first 
Secretary of State to visit your country and 
to see at first hand the vitality of your peo- 
ple, to sense your independent spirit, and to 
appreciate your dedication to the betterment 
of your land and your citizens. 

It is an even greater honor for the occa- 
sion of my visit to be the occasion of resum- 
ing diplomatic relations between our coun- 
tries. 

Yours is a history of courage and deter- 
mination. Yours is a long and a noble history. 

Seeing San'a for the first time — with its 
magnificent architecture set in this beauti- 
ful valley — makes us all aware of your an- 
cient history etched in the timelessness of 
your land. 

What is the significance of this step that 
our two nations have taken today ? 

First, it will be a significant step toward 
building even closer and more friendly re- 



lationships between us, marking a new be- 
ginning of mutually beneficial ties. The 
United States believes that our relations 
should be based on mutual respect, sover- 
eignty, equality, and noninterference in each 
other's internal affairs. 

Second, we hope this step will contribute 
in a modest way to stability and tranquillity 
in the Arabian Peninsula, in the interest of 
Yemen and other states in the area, all of 
which have a common interest in contribut- 
ing and maintaining conditions in which 
peaceful pursuits can flourish. 

Third, this step reflects a U.S. policy of 
friendly relations toward all nations in the 
area. We look forward to the day when the 
few remaining states in the Arab world will 
take a similar step — in the interest of more 
normal relations and peace and stability in 
the area. 

Fourth, as we take this step we reafllirm 
the intention of the United States to con- 
tinue its efforts to promote a peaceful settle- 
ment of the Arab-Israeli dispute based on full 
implementation of the U.N. Security Council 
resolution of November 1967. The cease-fire 
was a signal achievement. However, we rec- 
ognize that a durable peace which meets the 
legitimate concerns of both sides and which 
redresses the injustices of the past is indis- 
pensable. 

In the past, our interest has been mani- 
fested not only by early recognition of the 
Republic but also by our subsequent grants 
for water projects, roads, and food contribu- 
tions to relieve hunger. We look forward to 
renewed cooperation in such fields. 

Tomorrow, in our private talks, I expect 
to discuss activities through which the 
United States may be able to make a modest 
contribution to Yemen's economic develop- 
ment. We will also want to discuss with 
your government our impressions of the sig- 
nificance of President Nixon's visits to Pe- 
king and Moscow. Finally, before going on 
to Bahrain and Kuwait, I want to discuss 
with your government the prospects for 
neighborly cooperation among countries of 
the peninsula and to seek its views on this 
important subject. 

In conclusion, I want to salute the wise 



August 7, 1972 



165 



President of Yemen, the able Prime Minis- 
ter, and distinguished President of the Con- 
sultative Assembly. I bring to them, and to 
the people of Yemen, President Nixon's per- 
sonal regards and best wishes and his hope 
that resumption of U.S.-Yemeni relations 
will help promote cooperation in the region 
and serve the cause of peace. 

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to say how 
pleased we are to have had such a wonder- 
ful dinner. We know how quickly it had to 
be planned. As some of you may know, we 
have been flying all day and were just able 
to land five minutes before it was too dark. 
But I want you, Mr. Prime Minister, to know 
how pleased we were to be able to come be- 
cause of the warm reception of the Yemeni 
people and the agreeable atmosphere of this 
dinner. We hope mankind will be able to live 
in peace ; there should be a way for all people 
to live in peace, and the United States is 
working toward that goal. It is my fervent 
hope that the resumption of relations will 
contribute to the cause of peace. 



Remarks by Prime Minister al-Ayni 

On behalf of the Government of the Ye- 
men Arab Republic, I extend a very warm 
welcome to His Excellency Mr. William Rog- 
ers, Secretary of State of the United States 
of America, and his honorable colleagues, 
who are visiting San'a after contact and 
talks were conducted between our two coun- 
tries. 

Although relations between our two coun- 
tries were severed five years ago, the Yemen 
Arab Republic never forgot that the United 
States was one of the first few countries 
which recognized our Republic after the rev- 
olution. In fact, due to this recognition on 
the 19th of December, 1962, we were able to 
occupy our seat in the United Nations, in 
spite of the fact that the General Assembly 
session was nearing its end. 

The Yemeni people also remembered the 
useful projects that were initiated by the 
United States in certain parts of our coun- 
try. 

Your Excellency, your visit to Yemen 
comes at a time of special importance in our 



history. If our country has played a major 
role in the past before Islam as one of the 
oldest countries of the world with great civ- 
ilization and heritage, it also played a sim- 
ilar role after the coming of our great Islamic 
faith; however, a period of isolation and 
darkness was later imposed upon Yemen 
where its participation in the fastly chang- 
ing world were completely cut off. This iso- 
lation has led Yemen to be one of the least 
developed countries in the world. 

As the winds of changes were sweeping 
our contemporary world following the Sec- 
ond World War, the people of Yemen at- 
tempted several times ever since to break 
the walls of isolation aspiring to share with 
the world in modern methods of develop- 
ment and progress. The last of these at- 
tempts occurred on the 26th of September, 
1962. 

In the revolution of 1962 the people of 
Yemen declared the noble aims and objec- 
tives which may be summarized as follows: 
to build and create a modern Yemen based 
on liberty, law, and order; to maintain our 
independence and adhere to the principle of 
neutrality and nonalignment; to cooperate 
with all the nations of the world on the basis 
of mutual respect and common interest; to 
respect the principle of noninterference in 
the internal affairs of other nations. 

After eight years of war, internal con- 
flict, and instability, Yemen was able to 
overcome its difficulties and accomplish com- 
plete national unity under peace and tran- 
quillity. Now our country enjoys normal and 
friendly relations with all Arab and foreign 
countries. 

Today we are building Yemen under con- 
stitutional authority and law. As we march 
toward creating a modern Yemen, events 
proof and success of our democratic experi- 
ment. Our Consultative Council, which rep- 
resents the people, carries out its normal 
functions; the Presidential Council, which is 
elected by the representatives of the people 
in the consultative body, also presides over 
the supreme functions of the state, while the 
executive branch of the government, which 
is appointed by the Chairman of the Presi- 
dential Council and receives the vote of con- 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



fidence from the legislative branch of the 
government, carries out the executive func- 
tions of the state. 

Consequently, Yemen, within the frame- 
work of law and the Constitution and the 
participation of the people, is embarking on 
a unique development process. Our country 
is witnessing a vast and far-reaching prog- 
ress in education, health services, communi- 
cation, agriculture, and national economy. 
All these developments are taking place 
within our limited resources and the help of 
our friends and the cooperation of some in- 
ternational organizations. 

Your Excellency, the Yemeni people, be- 
ing part of the Arab nation, cannot on this 
occasion but draw the attention to the impor- 
tant problem that affects all our Arab people 
and is threatening international peace and 
security; that is, the problem of Palestine. 

All we ask in this regard is the implemen- 
tation of the U.N. resolutions and complete 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied 
Arab land and the people of Palestine be 
given their legitimate rights. It is also our 
duty to ask the U.S.A. as a great nation and 
a permanent member of the Security Council 
to fulfill its responsibility by exerting greater 
efforts in this direction. Such efforts will re- 
ceive appreciation from the Arab nation. 

Yemen Arab Republic views and position 
with regard to the other international ques- 
tions is well known. All we hope in this re- 
spect is that summit meetings in both Pe- 
king and Moscow have been successful and 
that such meetings will in the end serve to 
lessen world tension and solve international 
problems. 

Your Excellency, as we declare today the 
resumption of diplomatic relations between 
the Yemen Arab Republic and the United 
States of America, we are opening a new 
page of cooperation between our two friendly 
nations based on sovereignty, national inde- 
pendence, equality, and mutual respect. These 
were in fact the basis of our relations in the 
past which both parties have always adhered 
to and respected. 

Your Excellency, in the name of His Ex- 
cellency Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, the Chair- 



man of the Presidential Council, I hope that 
you will convey to His Excellency Richard 
Nixon, the President of the United States of 
America, our greetings, respect, and the de- 
sire of establishing strong relations and 
fruitful cooperation that will serve our mu- 
tual interests. I also hope, Your Excellency, 
that you and your colleagues will accept the 
sincere thanks for your generous visit. Fi- 
nally, I wish for the relations between our 
two peoples and governments continuous 
flourishing and progress. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT, ATHENS, JULY 4 

Press release 163 dated July 6 

I am pleased to see your great capital city 
for the first time and particularly to arrive 
on the day when Americans celebrate our in- 
dependence. I recall that in classical times 
the free city-state of Athens was known as 
the School of Greece. In the history of West- 
ern civilization it was the school of individual 
liberty and democracy. And its example had 
a profound influence on the men who signed 
our own Declaration of Independence 196 
years ago today. 

It can be said, then, that the bond between 
Greeks and Americans has a heritage of 
2,000 years. That bond has been enriched by 
the close links between our peoples, extend- 
ing back to your own struggle for independ- 
ence 150 years ago. It was further strength- 
ened by our joint efforts, in the period of 
World War II and the Truman doctrine, to 
keep Greece free of foreign domination. And 
it exists in our ties in NATO, of which 
Greece has been a member for 21 years. 

Today, Greece is playing an important se- 
curity role on NATO's southern flank. We 
encourage and support that role, and we at- 
tach great importance to Greece's coopera- 
tive security relationship with the United 
States and with NATO. 

We also welcome Greece's efforts to 
strengthen peaceful relations with Turkey 
and with its Balkan neighbors. 

There are of course some differences of 
view between ourselves and the Government 
of Greece. On these, the attitude of the 



August 7, 1972 



167 



United States is well known. We have, at 
the same time, many areas in which we 
agree. I am looking forward to what I am 
sure will be useful and forthright talks with 
the Greek leaders. As befits allies of long 
standing, we must do everything we can to 
strengthen the ties between our countries. 
That is the purpose of my visit. 



SECRETARY'S TOAST AT LUNCHEON HOSTED 
BY PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU, BUCHAREST, JULY 6 

Press release 167 dated July 7 

Mr. President, Madame Ceausescu, ladies 
and gentlemen: We have just completed a 
morning of very successful talks. They con- 
firm that the relations between our two 
countries are good and that they will con- 
tinue to grow. 

Three years ago these relations were lim- 
ited. But the visit of President Nixon to Ro- 
mania in August 1969 and your visit to the 
United States in October 1970 have begun a 
new and significant era. 

In our talks yesterday and today we have 
demonstrated that this new era of coopera- 
tion will bring benefits to our peoples and 
closer relationships between our govern- 
ments : 

— We have signed the first consular con- 
vention between Romania and the United 
States since 1881. This convention will con- 
tribute to the growth of normal travel and 
commercial contacts between our two coun- 
tries. 

— The United States has taken steps which 
will cut by more than half the time required 
for entry of Romanian ships and crews into 
United States ports, the first such measure 
we have taken with respect to countries in 
this part of Europe. We hope that this ad- 
vance will lead to increased commerce and 
that American ships will soon be visiting Ro- 
manian ports as well. 

— We have decided to make Export-Im- 
port Bank facilities available to Romania 
for the purchase of American equipment, ma- 
terials, and technology. 

— We have removed travel restraints on 
Romanian diplomats in the United States 



which were remnants of a previous period 
of mutual restrictions. 

These advances build upon other progress 
in the relationship between our countries: 

— Our cultural exchange and relations are 
extensive and rapidly growing. The opening 
of a Romanian library in New York last De- 
cember and of an American library in Bucha- 
rest in January will help to increase under- 
standing between our peoples. 

— Our cooperation in science and technol- 
ogy is equally advanced. In the last three 
years, .more than 40 Romanian scientists 
have visited the United States. And just 
last week seven new areas of cooperation 
were approved, including work on control- 
ling exhaust pollution from automobile en- 
gines, a matter of major concern in the 
United States. We look forward to a sub- 
stantial increase both in areas of scientific 
cooperation and in numbers of projects. 

Mr. President, these specific advances in 
our bilateral relations are impressive. But 
they are not the whole story. 

Our bilateral trade has more than tripled 
in the past three years. To increase it still 
further, we have urged and will continue to 
urge our Congress to approve legislation 
which will make it possible for Romanian ex- 
ports to enter the United States on a most- 
favored-nation basis. 

Our political relations have also prospered. 
Most importantly, Romania and the United 
States share a community of interest in 
Europe and in the world at large. 

Last night Foreign Minister Manescu 
spoke of transforming Europe into "A zone 
of peace, cooperation, and good neighbor- 
hood between sovereign countries enjoying 
equal rights." We, too, support this objec- 
tive. Indeed, we would like to see the day 
when Europe is no longer divided. This will 
not be easy to achieve, but the Berlin agree- 
ment proves that marked progress is pos- 
sible. 

The conference next year on security and 
cooperation in Europe — if it takes concrete 
steps to increase contacts among Euro- 
peans — can also aid the process toward Eu- 
ropean reconciliation. 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



The United States and the Socialist Re- 
public of Romania pursue world policies di- 
rected to similar objectives: to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, to support for the 
United Nations, to the promotion of good 
relations with all countries. We also share a 
basic conviction that all countries, whatever 
their size or their location and whether they 
are in the same or in different social systems, 
are equally sovereign and equally independ- 
ent and have an equal right to run their own 
affairs free of outside interference. My visit 
here underlines the devotion of the United 
States to that basic principle of relations 
among states. 

Mr. President, President Nixon has asked 
me to bring this message to you and to the 
Romanian people: that the United States 
places a high value on its relations with your 
country and that it will do all it can to make 
those relations prosper in years to come. 

I ask you now to join me in a toast: to 
President Ceausescu; to the growth in ties 
between the United States and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania; to the friendship be- 
tween the American and the Romanian peo- 
ple. 



REMARKS BY SECRETARY ROGERS ON SIGNING 
OF AGREEMENTS, BUDAPEST, JULY 7 

Press release 168 dated July 7 

In the quest for peace the United States 
believes that understanding among peoples 
is fundamental. Thus we favor a more open 
world, open to trade, to greater contacts 
among people, and to a greater flow of ideas. 
Both the agreements signed today, in modest 
but important ways, contribute to this goal. 

The consular convention that Foreign 
Minister Peter and I have signed is a re- 
sponse, and an encouragement, to greater 
contact between Hungary and the United 
States. As American tourism to Hungary 
rises and as more Hungarians visit the 
United States, consular requirements are 
about to increase. We therefore have a mu- 
tual interest in developing a better basis 
for dealing with them. 



I am happy to be present at the signing of 
the agreement on scientific and technical ex- 
changes between the Institute of Cultural 
Relations and the National Science Founda- 
tion. This framework agreement will enable 
scientists in each country to share their 
knowledge and experience and to make the 
personal contacts which are so important to 
scientific progress. 

Speaking for the United States Govern- 
ment, I welcome both these agreements not 
only for their own sake but because they in- 
dicate the mutual desire and ability of our 
two countries to seek improvement in our 
bilateral relations in a serious and realistic 
way. 



JOINT U.S.-YUGOSLAV PRESS RELEASE, JULY 9 

Press release 170 dated July 10 

At the invitation of the Federal Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Mirko Tepavac, the Secretary of 
State of the United States of America, William P. 
Rogers, accompanied by Mrs. Rogers, paid an official 
visit to Yugoslavia from July 7-9, 1972. 

The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, received the Secretary 
of State at Brioni on July 9, 1972. Mr. Rogers was 
also received by the President of the Federal 
Executive Council, Dzemal Bijedic. 

In the course of the visit talks were conducted on 
the international situation and on bilateral coopera- 
tion between the two countries. 

The two Secretaries noted with satisfaction that 
relations between Yugoslavia and the United States 
have been traditionally good and mutually beneficial 
and are developing exceptionally well at the present 
time. They underlined the importance of the meet- 
ings of President Tito and President Nixon and of 
their joint statement of October 30, 1971, which pro- 
vides a long-term basis for cooperation between the 
two countries.' They expressed satisfaction that on 
the basis of this document a further development of 
the close mutual relations between Yugoslavia and 
the United States has been registered in all fields. 

The talks covered current international issues and 
developments, including recent visits made by the 
leaders of both countries, European cooperation and 
security, and the situations in the Middle East and 



' For text of a joint statement issued at Washing- 
ton on Oct. 30, 1971, see Bulletin of Nov. 22, 1971, 
p. 594. 



August 7, 1972 



169 



Southeast Asia. The activities of non-aliped and de- 
veloping countries were also discussed. 

In the course of the exchange of views on inter- 
national issues the two sides stated their respective 
positions in a candid and friendly manner. They 
agreed that solutions should be found for the prob- 
lems which are burdening the present-day world on 
the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty, 
equality, and non-interference among all States, 
whether they are in the same or in different social, 
economic or political systems. 

Emphasizing that the development of bilateral re- 
lations has been favorable in all fields, the Secre- 
taries agreed further to develop and promote mu- 
tually beneficial cooperation between Yugoslavia and 
the United States. Special attention will be devoted 
to economic relations, which have recently received 
new incentives. Both countries also expressed their 
intention to continue to develop and enrich scientific, 
technical and cultural forms of cooperation. They 
considered that an important contribution to the 
development of bilateral relations is provided by 
United States citizens of Yugoslav descent. 

The two Secretaries affirmed the importance of 
regular contacts and exchanges of views between 
representatives of the two countries in various 
fields, noting that they have been mutually useful 
and that they should be continued in the future, in 
the interest of the further development of relations 
and cooperation between the SFRY and USA, as 
well as of peace in the world. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, ROME, JULY 11 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. At 
the conclusion of my round-the-world trip, I 
thought to take this opportunity to meet you 
and answer a few questions, particularly 
about the visit that I had here in Rome. 

I had, I think, very satisfactory discussions 
with leaders of the Italian Government, 
President Leone and Prime Minister An- 
dreotti and Foreign Minister Medici, and 
this morning I had the privilege of an audi- 
ence with His Holiness. I think that the talks 
have gone very well, and I think it is particu- 
larly appropriate that I should end this visit 
in Rome, because the relations between Italy 
and the United States are very, very good. 
We have worked well together over the years, 
and I think particularly now the relations are 
especially good. We are both members of the 
alliance. We have the same policy toward the 
alliance; namely, its wide importance to the 



security of the world and particularly to the 
security here in Europe. The discussions I 
had were wide-ranging discussions dealing 
with the discussions I had throughout the 
world, and I convey the best wishes of the 
President to the new government and par- 
ticularly the appreciation that we feel for the 
expressions of support that the Italian Gov- 
ernment continues to have toward the alli- 
ance. 

I will answer the questions now. Yes. 

Q. Can you elaborate on the evaluation of 
the whole trip on which — that you have 
accomplished in the last two weeks? 

A. Well, I would rather not have a detailed 
discussion of the whole trip, because when I 
go back to the United States I want to report 
to President Nixon about the visit and at that 
time I may have a press conference dealing 
with the whole trip. I can really say that it 
is consistent with the policy that President 
Nixon has been following: on one hand to 
have discussions to attempt to improve our 
relations with the Soviet Union and with the 
People's Republic of China and at the same 
time make it clear that we are going to main- 
tain our treaty commitments, that we are 
going to continue the alliance that has served 
the cause of peace so well. 

We recognize the importance of smaller 
nations, nations who were not involved in 
those discussions, so we are trying to re- 
assure all the nations in the world, particu- 
larly allies and friends of the United States, 
that nothing that has happened in these visits 
is to their detriment and that we fully con- 
sidered their point of view and their interests 
in these discussions and that we also recog- 
nize that if we are going to have peace and 
stability in the world it can't be done just by 
the major powers but that all nations are 
involved. That's quite clear when you look 
around the world, because many of the areas 
of great tension involve smaller nations; so 
it is consistent with the policy that the Presi- 
dent has been following. 

I think this visit has been successful. I 
have been very gratified at the responses 



170 



Department of State Bulletin 



that we have had in the countries I visited. 
The media response has been excellent in all 
of the countries; I call to your attention par- 
ticularly the response that we received in 
Hungary and Romania and Yugoslavia, and 
I think if you ladies and gentlemen check on 
the coverage, the attention that was given to 
these visits, you will see that it has had a 
very beneficial effect. 

Q. We understand that with the Pope you 
were discussing Viet-Nam. We would like to 
have details of that discussion, if possible. 

A. Yes, I did discuss with His Holiness 
questions dealing with Viet-Nam and Indo- 
china generally. I again pointed out the posi- 
tion of the United States, which briefly can 
be stated as follows : that we are prepared 
to have a cease-fire in Viet-Nam with an 
exchange of prisoners, a cease-fire interna- 
tionally supervised, withdrawal of all forces 
of the United States in four months, and 
thereafter leave the political future of the 
area to the Vietnamese people themselves. Al- 
though I have been urged from time to time 
on this visit that the United States should 
take a more active role in finding political so- 
lutions to the problems in Indochina, I have 
suggested that what we have been asked to 
do previously was to leave those problems 
for the people in the area to solve and that we 
are doing that. Now, I don't want to quote 
His Holiness, but obviously he expressed to 
me, as he has in public statements, his great 
interest in peace, urging all concerned to do 
their utmost to bring about a peaceful 
settlement by negotiations. I expressed the 
view of my government to His Holiness that 
we supported his plea. We thought it was a 
very useful and constructive step to be taken, 
to make this very strong plea, and expressed 
the hope on the part of my government that 
the negotiations will result in a settlement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen you say you have 
been urged during your visits that the United 
States play an important role in seeking the 
political settlement in Viet-Nam, do you 
mean you could urge the imposing of a 
settlement on Saigon? 



A. Yes, I don't want to get into personal- 
ities, but there are always some pleas made 
to the effect that the proposal of a military 
solution — which I just referred to as a cease- 
fire and exchange of prisoners, a cease-fire, 
and an internationally supervised withdraw- 
al of forces from Indochina — will leave the 
political future obscure and that the United 
States should do something to prevent that 
from happening. Well, we have said that we 
prefer to have the solutions worked out by 
the people in Viet-Nam itself. What I did em- 
phasize was that the policy that President 
Nixon has been following we think is a 
very fair one and a very reasonable one; 
that is, the United States, under the condi- 
tions I just outlined, to leave Viet-Nam and 
let the future be determined by the people 
there. But in the specific case I didn't have 
this kind of discussion with His Holiness. I 
was talking about others, not the discussion 
I had this morning. 

Q. Would you like to clear up the matter on 
ivhether you were or were not going to Is- 
tanbul for the funeral [of Athenagoras I, 
Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox 
Church] this noon? 

A. No, I have never made any plans to go 
to the funeral. There was some discussion 
about whether it was possible for me to do 
that, but that was just a general discussion. 
It turned out it wasn't possible because I 
had this appointment with His Holiness here 
this morning, so it wouldn't have been pos- 
sible. So, on the idea that I canceled plans, 
that report is incorrect. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I assume you discussed 
the Middle East situation with the Italian 
leaders. Do you feel that Italy can play any 
role in persuading both sides in stop bomb- 
ing ? 

A. It is very difficult to know who can play 
useful roles. I would not exclude any nation's 
usefulness in this regard. I think that in the 
case of Italy that they do have a role to play. 
They certainly have great interest in it, and 
they have very good contacts in the area, so 
I certainly will take it that they might play a 



August 7, 1972 



171 



useful role. We discussed the matter in con- 
siderable depth because it is of some impor- 
tance to Italy. 

Q. Could you talk about your meeting with 
the Pope on what other subjects you dis- 
cussed ? 

A. Well, we have put out, what do you say, 
a statement — ah, I have been corrected by 
my very perceptive press spokesman, a state- 
ment is being put out by the Vatican which 
covers the subjects we discussed, and I don't 
want to add to that. I think you'll find it is 
a very good statement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Kissinger has been 
quoted saying that there may be some hope 
that there will be some movement in the 
negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Do 
you share this hope, or could you tell us your 
latest thinking on that? 

A. I share that hope, and for many reasons 
that I don't want to give in great length, I 
think that there are a lot of reasons to have 
some hope. Whether they will materialize or 
not remains to be seen, but I think there is 
reason for hope. 

Q. Can you give any of those reasons ? 

A. Well, I think we have been over them. 
The difficulty is that I don't want to appear 
too optimistic, and I don't want to appear 
pessimistic. I want to continue to express 
hope, and I think there is hope, obviously, 
with the developments in the region: the fact 
that the North Vietnamese have been un- 
successful in their attempt to overrun South 
Viet-Nam, the fact that mining the harbors 
has been effective and the bombings of the 
military targets in the North unusually ef- 
fective, the fact that we have had discussions 
in the Soviet Union about the matter, and 
the discussions in Peking about Indochina. 
I think because of the growing realization 
that the continuation of the war serves no 
one's interest that the United States is going 
to pursue the policy the President has an- 
nounced. We are going to continue it, because 
we think it is a fair policy and because we 
have had a great deal of diplomatic activity 



and a great deal of discussion about the mat- 
ter in numerous countries. It has gotten to 
the point now that it would seem to us that 
everyone would realize that the interests of 
all concerned can best be served by working 
out the settlement by the negotiating process, 
and therefore I do have hopes. When these 
hopes might materialize and if they will ma- 
terialize, of course, remain to be seen. 

Q. Do you also foresee private discussions 
running parallel to the formal ones as before? 

A. Well, we try not to discuss secret talks 
for the obvious reason that when we do they 
are not secret, but — well, we ought to expect 
that we will not have private talks that are 
public. Obviously we are going to have the 
discussions in Paris. Other channels are not 
excluded, obviously, but I don't want to say 
anything here that will lead you to the con- 
clusion that so-called private talks are being 
held. 

Q. Did the Prime Minister or Foreign 
Minister have any useful ideas for new ini- 
tiatives in the Middle East? 

A. No, not particularly new initiatives. We 
did talk about some courses that could be 
followed. I think we agreed that the best 
course is one that has not been tried yet: to 
discuss the problems of the area on a face-to- 
face basis or, if that's impossible for political 
reasons, indirectly, with some other methods. 
The reason for that is that the only way prob- 
lems can be solved in human aff'airs is to have 
discussions about them, and this can happen 
all over the world except in the Middle East. 
I mean, all the major areas in the world 
where there have been major controversies 
— India and Pakistan had summit meetings, 
North and South Korea hadn't discussed 
these problems since the end of the Korean 
war, Viet-Nam, talks in Cyprus, the East and 
West Germans are talking, we are talking to 
the People's Republic of China and Soviet 
Union. 

So, the only area in the world where there 
is a major conflict and no active discussions 
are underway is the Middle East. It is high 
time that everyone concerned realize the im- 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



portance of getting down to it. When you look 
at what has happened since 1967, it has been 
essentially argumentation. The United States 
did play a role in bringing about a cease-fire, 
but that was very indirect — a difficult, labo- 
rious process. They were finally able to work 
out a cease-fire, which has lasted almost two 
years, but what we are trying to do is en- 
courage the parties to be sensible and talk 
over the problems even if they can't solve 
them. We believe very firmly that even if 
they cannot find a complete solution, if they 
can't implement the Security Council Resolu- 
tion 242, that they can start toward imple- 
mentation of it. They can make some prog- 
ress that has not occurred since 1967. As you 
know, we have offered a formula that could 
provide a foundation for this progress, but 
nothing can happen unless the parties are 
willing to talk about it. We are not in a po- 
sition to impose a settlement. We may be able 
to have some influence; we may be able to 
express our views when discussion starts, 
but we cannot impose a solution on the 
parties. I had this kind of discussion with 
the Prime Minister, and I think he fully 
agrees that it will be a good course to follow 
if at all possible. 

Q. Who is right, and who is wrong? 

A. I don't know. This is the kind of thing 
that I don't want to get involved in. I mean, 
this is not a litigation; we're not deciding 
who's right and who's wrong. We're looking 
for the way to find a peaceful solution in the 
future of the Middle East. One of the prob- 
lems in the discussion is that this is the ap- 
proach that is so often taken. They say, well, 
he is wrong and I am right, or you forgot 
that we made this argument in 1971. Those 
are all arguments; it is like litigating in 
court. This is not what we see in the Four 
Power agreement about Berlin; that is not 
what we did in the SALT talks [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks]. We came to agree- 
ments because we sat down and said: Let's 
see if we can be sensible and find solutions 
to these problems ; let's talk it over ; let's not 
argue about who's right and who's wrong; 
let's see if we can work out a way to live 



together in peace. And this is what's been 
lacking. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you and the Pope dis- 
cuss the prisoners of war? 

A. Yes, we did discuss it, and I thanked 
His Holiness very much for the part the Vati- 
can has played. They've made every kind 
of an effort they reasonably could make, to 
no avail; and I expressed the very warm 
thanks of President Nixon and the American 
people for the efforts that His Holiness has 
made. 

Q. Did you discuss the possibility of open- 
ing the Suez Canal pending a final agree- 
ment? 

A. Yes, I did, because I think this is one 
of the proposals that are possibly viable, and 
I expressed the point of view that we've had 
for some time, that it would be better to 
start down the road and have a step taken 
even if you recognize that it is merely a step 
toward the full implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 242. But we do feel that 
it's important to make some progress, and we 
think this is one way it could be. done. Al- 
though there are still considerable differences 
between Egypt and Israel on this subject, 
there is a considerable number of areas of 
agreement. We think this is a very good 
prospect if the parties were willing to sit 
down and discuss it. And we've offered to 
play a role in that process. We've said we'll 
act as a mediator ; if you don't want to dis- 
cuss this directly, face-to-face, we'll consider 
acting in that role to keep the discussions ac- 
tive; we'll get together and have a very frank 
and aggressive exchange of views to see if we 
can make some accommodations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we understand that Sec- 
retary General Waldheim yesterday an- 
nounced that the Jarring mission [U.N. 
Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] has 
been reactivated. Do you see any prospects 
for any progress under the Jarring aegis? 

A. Well, I think that Jarring's role is an 
important role and that Security Council 
Resolution 242 that I referred to several 



August 7, 1972 



173 



times contemplates action on his part. We 
welcome any efforts that he can make to 
bring about the negotiations that I referred 
to. That is a good possibility. I don't think 
that it necessarily excludes other possibili- 
ties that I'm speaking about — proximity 
talks — and when we talk about proximity 
talks, I attempt to make clear that we are 
not doing it at the expense of the Jarring 
mission, because he is going to play a very 
important role in the full implementation of 
Council Resolution 242. We favor reactiva- 
tion of this mission, if that's possible; we 
think that he will play a very useful role in 
the future, and we feel that the proximity 
talks that I referred to are not mutually ex- 
clusive — one does not exclude the other. 

Q. Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei A. Gromyko] was talking in Brussels 
of postponing the negotiations for the MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reductions] until 
after the European Security Conference. 
What is your opinion on this ? 

A. Well, we think that they should occur in 
a parallel manner — we don't mean exactly 
simultaneously, but you'll see in the Moscow 
communique that both the Soviet Union and 
the United States expressed this view.* We 
would not want the talks on MBFR delayed 
until after the Security Conference. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the officials in NATO 
have expressed concern that the Soviet 
Union's detente posture is merely a mask, a 
camouflage, for getting the United States 
out of Europe, disbanding the NATO nations, 
throwing the European nations into disar- 
ray, so that they eventually could come in and 
dominate. Have either the Italians or any of 
the other officials that you've spoken to ex- 
pressed this vieiv ? And I would like to knoiv 
also what your feeling is. 

A. That view has not been expressed by the 
Italian Government, and it has not been ex- 



' For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow 
on May 29 during President Nixon's visit, see 
Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 899. 



pressed to me by any of our NATO allies. 
I think that it has not been expressed to me 
by any of our NATO allies because we made 
it clear that that is not going to happen. We 
think that the alliance is responsible in con- 
siderable measure for the success that we've 
had in our discussions with the Soviet Union. 
We think the alliance has been responsible 
for the maintenance of peace in this part of 
the world since World War II, and we have 
told our allies repeatedly that we are going to 
continue to maintain our strength, that we 
have no intention of abandoning our allies, 
and President Nixon made that very clear in 
his discussion with Chairman Brezhnev 
[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of 
the Soviet Communist Party]. We are going 
to maintain our alliance, we are going to 
maintain our strength. Any reduction of 
forces in Europe should be done on a mutual 
and balanced basis, and that's why we think 
the discussions about MBFR are important. 
Certainly we are not going to fall into the 
trap of having a euphoric attitude toward the 
world situation. We think the stability that 
at present exists, the fact that the world has 
made considerable progress in international 
affairs in the last years, is because we have 
been able to maintain the strength of these 
alliances and that the balance does exist; and 
we are not going to do anything to see that 
altered, and certainly if there is any Presi- 
dent or any man who is conscious of this, 
who is experienced in these types of matters, 
who has a firm conviction of the necessity of 
maintaining this strength, it is President 
Nixon. 

Q. Did you discuss with the Italian states- 
men the Italian plan of convoking the Medi- 
terranean conference? 

A. No, I did not. 

Q. Did you discuss with the Vatican the 
POW issue? 

A. I don't want to go into the specifics, but 
they have made several attempts to gradually 
and indirectly see if there is some way to 
have exchange of prisoners. They've also 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



made efforts to see if there could be more 
mail, more accountability for those who are 
missing; in other words, they've been very 
active in humanitarian ways to see that the 
rules of international law and the Geneva 
Convention are followed. So far, as I said, 
they have been to no avail. 

Q. Is there any intention from the Italians 
to take part in these MBFR talks? Does the 
United States agree to that? 

A. I did have the opportunity to explain 
to the Italian Government the United States 
position. We have not decided in our own 
minds exactly how these talks would take 
place. That's a matter now under considera- 
tion by our govei'nment. We think it is a 
practical matter, that when you are talking 
about matters that are as complex as the 
reduction of forces — and this is based to 
some extent on our experience in the SALT 
talks — that you can have too many people 
discussing it. You've got to have some limita- 
tion of the number; so that if all nations 
that have direct or indirect interest are in- 
volved in the discussion, it would be very 
cumbersome. 

On the other hand, we fully recognize that 
every nation in Europe has an interest in 
what happens in those talks, and therefore 
we would expect that however the talks are 
conducted the interest of all nations would be 
taken into account, fully taken into account. 
And I expressed to the Italian Government 
that certainly nothing will be done in those 
talks without full coordination and discussion 
with our NATO allies and that some method 
could be worked out so that the nations that 
did not have territories or forces involved 
could be represented in the talks; so that 
there is no interest on the part of the United 
States to exclude anybody. It is just a practi- 
cal matter, and I said we would be completely 
flexible about how to do it. We would con- 



tinue to talk to the Italian Government and 
others that have this concern to be sure that 
this concern is put to rest. 

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle- 
men. 



U.S.-Romania Consular Convention 
Signed at Bucharest 

Press release 166 dated July 6 

The Government of the United States and 
the Socialist Republic of Romania con- 
cluded a consular convention at Bucharest 
July 5. Secretary Rogers, who was paying 
an official visit to Romania, signed the con- 
vention for the United States. Foreign Min- 
ister Corneliu Manescu signed for Roma- 
nia. The treaty, which will be submitted to 
the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, 
is a significant step in the continued im- 
provement and expansion of U.S.-Romanian 
relations. 

The consular convention will make possi- 
ble improved consular services in both coun- 
tries. It will insure unhindered communica- 
tion between a citizen and his consul and 
prompt visits by consuls to citizens who are 
detained. The convention covers consular 
responsibilities and functions such as the is- 
suance of visas and passports and perform- 
ance of notarial services, and inviolability 
of consular communications, documents, and 
archives. 

As a result of this convention, American 
citizens will have a fuller degree of con- 
sular assistance and protection than ever 
before. American businessmen and shipping 
companies will be able to call upon U.S. 
consular officials to assist in representing 
their interests, and the means for dealing 
with a whole range of legal matters will be 
considerably enhanced. 



August 7, 1972 



175 



A U.S. Look at the United Nations System 



Statement by George Bush 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations * 



There is concern about and obvious mis- 
understanding in the U.N. family of the 
current U.S. attitude toward U.N. programs 
and budgets. We have been charged with 
downgrading the U.N. and reflecting dimin- 
ished confidence in the U.N.'s capacities to 
play a significant role in world affairs. Some 
of our own citizens have warned that we 
appear to be on a collision course with the 
very international agencies in whose future 
we have an important stake. The watch- 
word of "realism and candor" toward the 
U.N. has been interpreted by some as a sig- 
nal of waning U.S. financial, moral, and po- 
litical support for the organization. 

In particular, there is doubt about U.S. 
motivations and intent in moving to achieve 
as rapidly as possible a reduction in the 
U.S. assessment share of U.N. agency budg- 
ets to 25 percent and of the call for aus- 
terity in budgeting international programs, 
to which the United States has traditionally 
been and continues to be the biggest finan- 
cial contributor. There are vibrations ex- 
pressing — more in sorrow than anger — 
alarm that this turn in U.S. policy may lead 
to a massive disengagement from world 
concerns. Some have appealed to us to bal- 
ance realism with vision and magnanimity. 

I want to speak with candor about what 
is behind our policy. At the outset let me 



' Made before a joint meeting of the U.N. Com- 
mittee for Program and Coordination (CPC) and 
the Administrative Committee on Coordination at 
Geneva on June 29 (USUN press release 74 dated 
July 5). 



assure the heads of U.N. agencies gathered 
here that the United States is not weary 
of its world responsibilities. We are not 
disengaging from international agencies. 
Our dedication to and support for U.N. 
functions, in their fullest scope, continue. 
We recognize full well our vital interest in 
healthy, functioning U.N. agencies actively 
seeking to cope with mankind's common 
problems. 

Our "realism and candor" embrace the 
realization that we must build upon the 
present U.N. structure. We must improve 
what we have. And the realistic and candid 
picture of the future also means that, for 
the foreseeable future, the United States will 
continue to be the largest contributor to in- 
ternational organizations and programs. 

None can deny the importance of arrange- 
ments between the world's power centers. 
But anyone who takes the trouble to read 
fully the foreign policy reports of the Pres- 
ident and of the Secretary of State knows 
that in our scheme of things effective inter- 
national institutions will be crucial in meet- 
ing the challenges of peacekeeping, of coping 
with the consequences of the new technol- 
ogies and with the rising, legitimate de- 
mands of the impoverished for decent living 
standards. 

The real issue for the U.S. Government 
comprises dual concerns : how the effective- 
ness of U.N. agencies can be improved and 
how our taxpayers can be assured that bur- 
dens are shared equitably. Effectiveness de- 
pends not only on the capacity to carry out 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



functions efficiently and to adapt activities 
to changing world needs. It also depends on 
the support and confidence of member states, 
their parliaments and peoples. At least it 
does in the democracies. The public expects 
U.N. action to deal with vital world con- 
cerns and will lose confidence if interna- 
tional organizations fail to deliver. Obstacles 
to an effective world order are formidable, 
and demands are growing. But it is precisely 
because of growth and change that we must 
constantly reappraise priorities, try to avoid 
petty jockeying for preferred positions in 
pursuit of parochial concerns, and devise ef- 
fective means of financial, fiscal, and admin- 
istrative accountability. 

This is no recent or transitory concern of 
ours. Let us put our policy in perspective. 
After all, for almost a decade we and others 
have expressed our concern in the Fifth 
Committee [of the General Assembly] and 
in the ad hoc committee on finances, caution- 
ing time and again that as budgets grew 
governments would no longer tolerate an 
undisciplined attitude toward budgets and 
programs; that taxpayers in the larger con- 
tributing countries would look critically at 
inefficiencies and rigidities and logrolling 
tendencies that have prevailed in some agen- 
cies. I recall that early in 1966 President 
Johnson directed the Secretary of State to 
spur international organizations to achieve 
the greatest possible efficiency in the plan- 
ning and operation of programs. Pointing out 
that the United States is the largest single 
contributor to U.N. programs, the directive 
said : ^ 

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping 
to strengthen the international agencies so they can 
meet essential new needs, we must apply to them 
the same rigorous standards of program perform- 
ance and budget review that we do to our own Fed- 
eral programs. 

Essentially the rule then laid down still 
forms our policy : The U.N. system has now 
matured to the point where governments 
should expect more eflfective use of funds, 



better coordination, fair sharing, and the 
same budgetary discipline and accountability 
that modern governments expect in domestic 
affairs. 

Basically we seek a process that will as- 
sure optimum use of available resources, 
economy and efficiency in administration, 
and responsiveness to the policy objectives 
and priorities laid down by principal U.N. 
bodies. We propose not a narrow bookkeep- 
ing approach or a downgrading of U.N. 
functions. Quite the contrary, if the U.N. 
is to be taken seriously and if it is to be a 
dynamic and responsive institution with a 
potentially expanding role in world affairs, 
it must restore confidence in the U.N.'s ca- 
pacity to carry out important jobs. Reliabil- 
ity and accountability are keys to effective- 
ness and restored confidence. The ultimate 
goal and its purpose was stated by President 
Nixon in a part of his annual report that has 
apparently not been noticed. Let me quote 
it here : •'' 

Ours is the age when man has first come to realize 
that he can in fact destroy his own species. Ours 
is the age when the problems and complexities of 
technological revolution have so multiplied that 
coping with them is, in many ways, clearly beyond 
the capacities of individual national governments. 
Ours, therefore, must be the age when the interna- 
tional institutions of cooperation are perfected. The 
basic question is — can man create institutions to 
save him from the dark forces of his own nature 
and from the overwhelming consequences of his 
technological successes ? 

Can anyone ignore present inequities as 
between budgets, weakness in programs, and 
serious deficiencies in the operation and ad- 
ministration of U.N. agencies? 

The United States, other major contribu- 
tors, and indeed, all members of U.N. agen- 
cies cannot be indifferent to the state of 
affairs. Our financial stake in the operations 
of the U.N. system is sizable and growing, 
as are the programs themselves. Our total 
cumulative contributions from calendar 



' For text of President Johnson's memorandum of 
Mar. 15, 1966, see Bulletin of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 577. 



' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress of Feb. 9 appears in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled 
"The United Nations" begins on p. 403. 



August 7, 1972 



177 



year 1960 through 1970 (including both 
assessed and voluntary) amount to about 
$2.5 billion, rising from $160 million in 1960 
to over $300 million a year a decade later. 
In 1971, U.S. contributions through the 
U.N. (including humanitarian assistance) 
reached over $460 million out of a total of 
$1.23 billion. The overall U.S. contribution 
in 1971 for all programs accounted for 37.78 
percent. Budgets are rising at a rate which 
could mean a doubling during the next five 
or six years. While in terms of some of the 
larger national budgets this would appear 
to be modest, it is not inconsequential and 
it looms large in the public mind ; at least 
in the United States it does, because these 
sums for the U.N. system have to be added 
to those for our national concerns. Its main 
impact in my country and in our Congress 
is that accountability and budgetary disci- 
pline are now demanded of international 
organization budgets and programs just as 
they are of our domestic budgets and pro- 
grams. As we study this growth curve, all 
of us need to take a closer look at program 
content, administrative efficiency, and the ef- 
fective functioning of our organizations. 

Against this background we have urged 
the heads of agencies to reexamine the 
budgetary, administrative, and management 
practices that should govern international 
agencies for the next several years : 

Budget levels. First, we suggest that it is 
unrealistic and self-defeating to anticipate 
that the present growth rate of budgets can 
continue. Our belief is that, for the near 
future, consolidation should be the order of 
the day and more sensitivity shown to the 
financial implications of new programs. We 
concluded that expenditures — which have 
more than doubled in the past 10 years — 
will have to be kept as much as possible at 
their present level for the next several years. 
Of course, growth is inevitable. Increased 
costs are real; and the drive for new and 
worthy programs to maintain peace and to 
promote economic and social development 
and cooperation in a wide range of social, 
technical, and scientific activities is not to 
be stayed. Indeed, the United States has 



been responsible for many initiatives that 
obviously have budgetary consequences. We 
are not opposed to growth. Rather, a con- 
stant reassessment of priorities must be 
made as new programs are adopted. New 
and fully justified programs can and should 
be added, but whenever possible this should 
be at the expense of older programs of lesser 
priority which should be curtailed or abol- 
ished as their relative usefulness diminishes. 
Budget time should be the occasion for a 
hard look at program options and priorities. 

Program Budgeting. As is well known, 
my government has been in the forefront 
of those calling for increased efficiency of op- 
erations throughout the system. Our support 
for the work of the Committee of Fourteen 
[Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Exam- 
ine the Finances of the United Nations and 
the Specialized Agencies], the Joint Inspec- 
tion Unit, the Administrative Management 
Service, and many other instrumentalities 
created to improve the efficiency of the or- 
ganization bears this out. My delegation was 
pleased that the CPC, during its 12th ses- 
sion, was able to press forward in support 
of the new form of presentation of the U.N. 
budget as a basis of planning, programing, 
and budgeting for the U.N. and that the 
majority of its members were able to en- 
dorse the principle of program budgeting. 
We are convinced that the adoption of a sys- 
tem of program budgeting by the United 
Nations which is compatible to those in use 
by the major specialized agencies can only 
result in a clearer picture of program priori- 
ties and activities and their relationship to 
available resources. 

Inftation and Mandatory Expenses. We 
recognize the impact of inflation. However, 
inflation is a signal, and in many ways an 
opportunity, for raising the level of effi- 
ciency and performance. It can provide the 
impetus for introducing more rigor into 
management, for rationalizing staff require- 
ments, and for reappraising priorities. 
So-called mandatory expenses, i.e., those nec- 
essary to maintain the prior year's estab- 
lishment and activities, can be reduced in 
preparing new budgets. We are also con- 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



vinced that improved management practices 
— with consequent productivity gains and 
other savings — will enable organizations to 
absorb some, if not all, of the increases in 
mandatory expenses caused by inflation. In 
our own government, to cite an example, 
the Department of State has had to cut its 
personnel by more than 12 percent in the 
last five years. At the same time our activi- 
ties, like yours, have increased. We make 
up the difference by increasing our produc- 
tivity. In effect, inflation is not an irresist- 
ible force. We urge that all salary increases 
be held up until the Special Committee for 
Review of the U.N. Salary System (estab- 
lished in 1970) completes its deliberations. 
There is ample ground for holding the line, 
since U.N. professional staff salaries in New 
York, which are based on U.S. civil service 
as the highest paid national service, are al- 
ready 20 to 35 percent greater than U.S. 
civil service salaries. 

Conferences, Documentation, Building. To 
counter the impact of rising costs certain 
obvious economies are in order. Conferences 
should either be held at Headquarters or all 
extra costs defrayed from extra-budgetary 
sources, usually the host government. Most 
conferences could be reduced in length and 
the flow of documentation drastically cur- 
tailed. Meetings should be spaced at greater 
intervals. Too many hastily prepared meet- 
ings have taken place with late or missing 
documentation. Records of meetings should 
be kept as brief as possible. Moreover, is it 
unreasonable to ask that all new construc- 
tion and building costs be closely scrutinized 
while we take stock of the future? In the 
present period we do not favor any new con- 
struction that does not proceed from sound 
long-term planning based on need and does 
not result in budgetary economies in the 
long run. 

Working Capital and Contingency Funds. 
In some agencies working capital is viewed 
as a kind of windfall supplement to current 
resources rather than a device to tide agen- 
cies over periods when cash is low. We be- 
lieve working capital funds should be small 
and severely restricted to meeting operating 



expenses while current assessments are be- 
ing collected ; they should not be used to re- 
place contributions of members in substan- 
tial arrears. 

Scale of Assessments. We believe the time 
has come to take a new look at the criteria 
for and equity of scales of assessments. 
World agencies are of two kinds : those that 
meet common technical concerns and those 
with broad political, economic, and social 
aims. In worldwide organizations of a spe- 
cific technical nature we have suggested that 
the dominant criterion in determining the 
scale of assessments should be the degree of 
members' involvement in the relevant ac- 
tivity. Thus, for example, ocean tonnage is 
a legitimate basis for the scale of assess- 
ments of the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. In worldwide 
general-purpose organizations based on sov- 
ereign equality, a balance of political equity 
and economic equity should determine as- 
sessment shares. Furthermore, world eco- 
nomic growth and the great increase in U.N. 
membership now permit us to avert a danger 
that was foreseen early in U.N. history; 
namely, too great financial dependence on any 
one member. 

U.S. Assessment Rate. Concern about cri- 
teria for burden-sharing has raised strong 
doubts in my country about the level of U.S. 
financial contributions. These doubts have 
been aggravated by the persistent failure of 
the U.N. to come to grips with its deficit and 
its future fiscal needs — failure in spite of 
repeated initiatives by the Secretary Gen- 
eral. Let me be very frank. A majority of 
our Congress believes that U.N. budgets are 
rising excessively and that we are assessed 
at a disproportionate rate in certain organi- 
zations. One may question the reasoning ad- 
duced by some, but do not underestimate the 
strength of the feeling, as recent events have 
made clear. 

To establish more equitable burden-sharing 
and the principle that world organizations 
should not be overly dependent on any one 
member, we are seeking a reduction of the 
U.S. assessment to 25 percent in those cases 
where it exceeds that percentage. In cases 



August 7, 1972 



179 



where the United States is assessed 25 per- 
cent or less in smaller technical bodies, we 
will also seek reductions when justified 
either by virtue of the principle of compara- 
tive benefit or by application of technical 
criteria. The United States will wish to ob- 
tain the largest possible reduction in its own 
assessment as new members are admitted. 
It is our firm intention and the announced 
policy of the U.S. Government to proceed 
urgently but in an orderly and reasonable 
way in reaching this goal. Agency heads 
and other members should begin now to 
take into account the implications of such 
U.S. reductions. 

In looking at the assessment question let 
us have no doubt of U.S. interest in the 
U.N. system. Our contribution to that sys- 
tem is seven times our assessed contribution 
to the regular U.N. budget. Can there be 
any question that the United States is dedi- 
cated to the guts of this system — through 
UNDP [United Nations Development Pro- 
gram], the World Food Program, and other 
activities? We have proved and will con- 
tinue to prove that we are committed to 
real progress in the basic fields of develop- 
ment and humanitarian assistance and other 
programs. As an example, I submit that the 
U.N. operation in Bangladesh would be a 
rather small effort if the United States had 
not furnished 124 million dollars' worth of 
assistance. When you look at matters of as- 
sessment, please don't forget that the 
United States is making the largest single 
contribution to the operating programs of 
the U.N., the programs that most often get 
down to the people in real terms. 

Technical Assistance. Finally, we need 
to take a more rigorous look at the funding 
of technical assistance. In some agencies and 
in the U.N. itself a substantial portion of as- 
sessed budgets is being devoted to economic 
and technical assistance projects for devel- 
oping nations. We believe the assessed budg- 
ets should relate largely to the administra- 
tion of the organizations and to activities 
of common benefit. As a general rule, but 
allowing for exceptions of a constitutional 
nature, technical assistance activities that 



fall within the mandate of the U.N. Devel- 
opment Program should be financed by the 
UNDP and not by regular assessed budgets. 
The current preoccupation with technical 
assistance programs, which buys majority 
votes at the expense of support from some 
major donors, is a politically risky policy. 
It is also in some cases a distortion of the 
agencies' constitutional mandate. We expect 
UNDP funding to increase substantially, but 
this will not be likely insofar as the U.S. con- 
tribution is concerned if the agencies attempt 
to maintain, let alone increase, technical 
assistance from their regular budgets. 

We present the above for discussion, not in 
a take-it-or-leave-it spirit. 

Unlike the U.N., the directors of special- 
ized agencies by and large hold the levers of 
budgetary planning in their hands. I think 
we'd all agree that the governing bodies for 
the most part have not exercised a tight rein 
over the administration and normally have 
accepted the administrative logic and budget- 
ary requests of their director. Agency heads 
are naturally inclined to accept the justice of 
demands advanced by beneficiaries of pro- 
grams and are influenced by pleas from their 
own staffs to expand the services offered by 
their agencies. They often find it both just 
and comfortable to add worthwhile programs 
and to attempt to accommodate the initia- 
tives and constructive new programs with- 
out regard to the constraints that I men- 
tioned above. I believe that the longrun 
interests of the U.N. and the agencies them- 
selves counsel a tougher approach to new 
claims on the budget. Agency heads and 
staffs, whose competence and continuity pro- 
vide the necessary expertise and perspective 
to take the long view, should weigh carefully 
the merits of bigger and better programs in 
consideration of the effects on contributors 
as well as on beneficiaries. 

We believe the development role, vital as 
it is, should not overshadow the core func- 
tion for which agencies were established; 
that is, to be coordinating and directing 
mechanisms to deal with areas of global con- 
cern in their special fields. Advancing the 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



frontiers of knowledge, setting standards, 
legulating, and in certain cases administer- 
ing, activities of common concern will re- 
main the primary tasks. 

Given the nature of the U.N. system, with 
autonomy vested in the loosely federated 
agencies of the U.N. family, we must look to 
the agency heads for leadership both to estab- 
lish programs and to insure budgetary re- 
sponsibility. There is great need throughout 
the system to improve management, to prune 
out obsolete and unproductive activities and 
unproductive staff, to counter built-in bureau- 
cratic resistance, and to provide central 
executive leadership to compensate for dis- 
array in some of the governing bodies. We 
hope you will articulate the claims of your 
own organizations in terms of the long-range 
purposes of the agencies and with full con- 
sciousness that they are integral parts of an 
evolving world order. 

Let me conclude with a rather personal ob- 
servation. 

I am a stronger believer in the U.N. for 
having served the last li/o years as U.S. 
Ambassador. I have seen some of its suc- 
cesses, and certainly I believe deeply in its 
potential. But I would not be a strong sup- 
porter if I came here and misrepresented or 
underrepresented the concern of the U.S. 
Government about the U.N. 

To shield the U.N. from constructive crit- 
icism today is to permit it to wither away 
tomorrow. Too many countries, not just 
mine, are now insisting that the U.N. be 
improved, and thus strengthened. Please do 
not dismiss this as niggardly rationalization 
induced by homefront financial pressures. 

The Secretary General has been trying 
with all the strength he can muster to stream- 
line and strengthen the bureaucracy. Fer 
these efforts in some quarters in the Secre- 
tariat he has received opposition and criti- 
cism. But the Secretary General is not only 
doing what is needed and long overdue; he is 
trying to solve problems that the member 
states all know exist. 

Let the record show that he has the strong 
support of our government as he approaches 
this most difficult task. 



151st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by William J. 
Porter, head of the U.S. delegation, at the 
151st plenary session of the meetings on 
Viet-Nam at Paris on July 20. 

Press release 181 dated July 20 

Ladies and gentlemen: We have examined 
your presentation at the 150th plenary ses- 
sion in order to determine whether it might 
reflect a desire on your part to adopt a con- 
structive and serious approach to negotia- 
tions. You spoke of the need to reflect upon 
the respective positions and responsibilities 
of each side in the task of seeking a settle- 
ment. We have done our best, keeping in 
mind all of your proposals, in our search for 
common ground. 

We want to speak again about our pro- 
posals of May 8, which were put forward at 
these talks for the first time last week.^ We 
asked you for your thoughts concerning them, 
for it is impossible, we think, to make prog- 
ress unless there is rational discussion of 
the difficulties we have with each other's po- 
sitions. What is wrong, for example, with 
the proposal for an internationally super- 
vised cease-fire throughout Indochina? Why 
not tell us frankly why it is difficult for you to 
entertain this proposal, which would end the 
killing promptly and which would sub- 
stantially contribute to a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict? 

We would also like to hear more from you 
on the subject of the four-month period we 
have proposed for the withdrawal of all our 
forces from South Viet-Nam once a cease- 
fire has begun and the prisoners of war are 
released. It appears logical to us to create 
an atmosphere which would facilitate, not 
hinder, political discussions among Vietnam- 
ese. 

Are there not contradictions in a position 
which advocates on the one hand self-deter- 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



August 7, 1972 



181 



mination for the South Vietnamese people 
and on the other insists that they be forced 
to accept this or that kind of government 
without consulting them? And have we not 
advocated, in order to meet that particular 
problem, that a national consultation take 
place under international supervision, and an 
election commission in which your friends 
could participate? 

Let me assure you that these questions are 
mentioned not with any desire to dispute but 
only with a desire to get into a rational ex- 
change of thought. Both of us could continue 
to have recourse to complaints which would 
fill more pages of the record, but complaint 
is sterile as compared to a businesslike con- 
sultation on each other's views, even if we do 
not agree. 

Last week I expressed our side's view that 
the best means of making progress here is 
mutual examination of our respective posi- 
tions and a serious dialogue on matters of 
substance. This remains our position. Let's 
begin. 



U.S. To Resume Economic Assistance 
to Yemen Arab Republic 

Statement by Secretary Rogers ' 

Subsequent to the discussions that took 
place during my July 1-2 visit to San'a, I am 
pleased to announce that the United States 
and the Yemen Arab Republic have agreed 
to renewal of cooperation for the economic 
development of the Yemen Arab Republic. 
Discussions have been initiated in order to 
define those areas where United States as- 
sistance can make the most beneficial impact. 

Following appropriate consultations with 
the Congress, we intend to resume economic 
assistance programs patterned on our previ- 
ous programs in Yemen. U.S. aid projects 
under consideration include the rehabilita- 
tion of the John F. Kennedy Water System 



^ Issued on July 14 (press release 176). 



in Ta'izz, assistance in developing potable 
water supplies for rural villages, and engi- 
neering studies for highway development and 
other infrastructure investments. Scholar- 
ships for Yemeni students at American edu- 
cational institutions will also be made avail- 
able. These will be in addition to funds for 
Yemeni students at the American University 
of Beirut. We look forward to early imple- 
mentation of these activities. In addition, 
U.S. food aid will continue to be distributed 
to needy Yemenis through an American vol- 
untary agency. 

As an indication of our desire to be respon- 
sive to Yemen's urgent needs and as an ini- 
tial step, the United States has agreed to fur- 
nish Yemen on a priority basis spare parts 
to permit repair of the generating equipment 
for the John F. Kennedy Water System in 
Ta'izz. 



Members of Advisory Committee 
on International Organizations Named 

Press release 146 (revised) dated June 21 

The Department of State announced on 
June 21 the appointment of 25 private citi- 
zens prominent in education, business, labor, 
law, and the foundations to serve on an Ad- 
visory Committee on International Organi- 
zations. 

The Committee is one of a series of advi- 
sory groups designed to bring together senior 
government officials and private citizens for 
informal discussions of foreign policy prob- 
lems. The President's Commission for the 
Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the 
United Nations, chaired by Ambassador 
Henry Cabot Lodge, recommended the 
establishment of such an advisory group to 
assist the Bureau of International Organi- 
zation Aff'airs. 

The key purpose of the Committee is to 
elicit citizen advice on how best to promote 
a strong and effective United Nations that 
has the confidence of the American people. 

The Advisory Committee will meet in 
Washington with State Department officials, 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



probably twice a year. Samuel De Palma, 
Assistant Secretary for International Orga- 
nization Affairs, was to convene the first 
meeting in July. 

Following are the Committee members : 

Nathan R. Berke, attorney, Severson, Werson, 
Berke & Melchoir, San Francisco, Calif. 

Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Center for Interna- 
tional Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology, Cambridge, Mass. 

Dr. Rosemary H. Cass, attorney, Bloomfield, N.J. 

Dr. Paul West Cook, Jr., special counsel to the 
president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, Mass. 

Justin W. Dart, president. Dart Industries, Inc., 
Los Angeles, Calif. 

John G. Detwiler, president, Alcan Cable Division, 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., Jersey Shore, Pa. 

Dr. Helen G. Edmonds, dean, Graduate School of 
Arts and Sciences, North Carolina Central Uni- 
versity, Durham, N.C. 

Dr. Larry L. Fabian, Foreign Policy Studies Pro- 
gram, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. 

Madge H. Fairbanks, civic leader. Salt Lake City, 
Utah 

Arthur A. Fletcher, executive director, United 
Negro College Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y. 

Harold Friedman, partner, Abraham and Co., New 
York, N.Y. 

Richard A. Hernandez, attorney, Los Angeles, 
Calif. 

Elmore Jackson, vice president for policy studies, 
United Nations Association of the USA, New 
York, N.Y. 

Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, president emeritus, Carne- 
gie Endowment for International Peace, New 
York, N.Y. 

David A. Kay, associate professor. Department of 
Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madi- 
son, Wis. 

Joseph Meyerhoff, chairman of the board, Monu- 
mental Properties, Inc., Baltimore, Md. 

Leslie Paffrath, president, Johnson Foundation, 
Racine, Wis. 

Joan Hickey Polivka, executive director, Minne- 
apolis People-to-People and Sister City Program, 
Minneapolis, Minn. 

Dr. Marshall D. Shulman, director, Russian 
Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 

Francis J. Sorg, Jr., president. North Shore Hos- 
pital, Manhasset, N.Y. 

Joseph A. Spaulding, attorney, Bingham, Dana and 
Gould, Boston, Mass. 

James A. Suffridge, international president emeri- 
tus. Retail Clerks International Association, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

Dr. Francis O. Wilcox, dean, School of Advanced 
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 
Washington, D. C. 



Bernard M. Windon, director, public affairs, G. D. 

Searle and Co., Chicago, 111. 
Dr. Stephen J. Wright, vice president. College 

Entrance Examination Board, New York, N.Y. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 

Acceptances deposited: Gabon, July 20, 1972; 
Ghana, July 20, 1972; Venezuela, July 18, 1972. 

Aviation 

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air 
navigation services in Iceland. Done at Geneva 
September 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 
1958. TIAS 4048. 
Accession deposited: Greece, May 26, 1972. 

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air 
navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. En- 
tered into force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4049. 
Accession deposited: Greece, May 26, 1972. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, July 19, 1972. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international transit of 
goods. Done at Vienna June 7, 1971.' 
Signatures: Austria, June 5, 1972;= Burundi, 
December 16, 1971 ;= Switzerland, June 8, 1972.' 

Disputes 

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Signature: Jordan, July 14, 1972. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 



Not in force. 
'■ Subject to ratification. 



August 7, 1972 



183 



Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Acceptance deposited: Greece (with a statement), 
June 8, 1972. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, June 14, 1972 (with 

reservations). 
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, May 18, 1972 (with 

reservation). 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London 
May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; 
for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 
4900, 6109. 
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, March 27, 1972. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Done at London Oc- 
tober 21, 1969.' 
Acceptance deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.' 
Signatures: Sierra Leone, July 17, 1972; Singa- 
pore, July 19, 1972. 

Weather Stations 

Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean stations, with 
annexes. Done at Paris February 25, 1954. En- 
tered into force February 1, 1955. TIAS 3186. 
Accession deposited: Greece, May 26, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Brazil 

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy, with appendix and related notes. 
Signed at Washington July 17, 1972. Enters into 
force on the date on which each government shall 
have received from the other written notification 
that it has complied with all statutory and con- 
stitutional requirements for entry into force. 



^ Not in force. 



Denmark 

Agreement relating to conservation of Atlantic 
salmon. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington July 6, 1972. Entered into force July 6, 
1972. 

Hungary 

Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7, 
1972. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange 
of instruments of ratification. 

Israel 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of January 13, 1972 
(TIAS 7268). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington July 18, 1972. Entered into force July 
18, 1972. 

Khmer Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of January 13, 1972 
(TIAS 7269). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Phnom Penh June 23, 1972. Entered into force 
June 23, 1972. 

Poland 

Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Warsaw July 19, 1972. Entered into 
force provisionally, July 19, 1972; definitively, 
upon the date of written notification from Poland 
to the United States that the agreement has been 
approved by the Polish Council of Ministers. 

Romania 

Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bucha- 
rest July 5, 1972. Enters into force on the 30th 
day following the date of the exchange of the in- 
struments of ratification. 

Turkey 

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Hugh 
Purvis to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ankara July 1, 1972. Entered into force July 1, 
1972. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement to establish on the Island of Grand Ba- 
hama a transportable Apollo unified S-band 
facility for the U.S. National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration to be used for tracking of 
and communication with space vehicles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at London April 26 and 
May 3, 1968. Entered into force May 3, 1968. TIAS 
6485. 
Terminated: June 30, 1972. 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX August 7, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1728 



Australia. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO 
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and 
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, news 
conferences, communiques) 157 

Consular Affairs. U.S.-Romania Consular 

Convention Signed at Bucharest .... 175 

Department and Foreign Service. Members of 
Advisory Committee on International Or- 
ganizations Named 182 

Foreign Aid. U.S. To Resume Economic As- 
sistance to Yemen Arab Republic (Rogers) 182 

Greece. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO 
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and 
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, news 
conferences, communiques) 157 

Hungary. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO 
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and 
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, news 
conferences, communiques) 157 

International Organizations. Secretary Rogers 
Attends SEATO and ANZUS Meetings in 
Australia and Visits 10 Other Countries 
(statements, news conferences, communi- 
ques) 157 

Italy. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and 
ANZUS Meetings in Australia and Visits 
10 Other Countries (statements, news con- 
ferences, communiques) 157 

Middle East. Secretary Rogers Attends 
SEATO and ANZUS Meetings in Australia 
and Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, 
news conferences, communiques) .... 157 

Romania 

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and ANZUS 
Meetings in Australia and Visits 10 Other 
Countries (statements, news conferences, 
communiques) 157 

U.S.-Romania Consular Convention Signed at 

Bucharest 175 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 183 

U.S.-Romania Consular Convention Signed at 

Bucharest 175 

United Nations 

Members of Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Organizations Named 182 

A U.S. Look at the United Nations System 

(Bush) 176 

Viet-Nam 

151st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 
Paris (Porter) 181 

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and 
ANZUS Meetings in Australia and Visits 
10 Other Countries (statements, news 
conferences, communiques) 157 



Yemen Arab Republic 

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and 
ANZUS Meetings in Australia and Visits 
10 Other Countries (statements, news con- 
ferences, communiques) 

U.S. To Resume Economic Assistance to 
Yemen Arab Republic (Rogers) .... 



157 



182 



Yugoslavia. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO 
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and 
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, 
news conferences, communiques) .... 157 



Name Index 

al-Ayni, Muhsin 157 

Bush, George 176 

Porter, William J 181 

Rogers, Secretary 157, 182 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to July 17 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
146 of June 21, 154 of June 27, 157 of June 
28, 159 of June 29, 162 of July 3, 163 of July 5, 
166 of July 6, 167 and 168 of July 7, 170 of 
July 10, and 176 of July 14. 

No. Date Subject 

tl77 7/17 Joint Department of State-Inte- 
rior release on agreement for 
improvement of Colorado River 
water delivered to Mexico. 

tl78 7/18 Rogers: Commonwealth Club, San 
Francisco. 

tl79 7/19 U.S. and Poland sign air trans- 
port agreement (rewrite). 

*180 7/20 Todman sworn in as Ambassador 
to Guinea (biographic data). 
181 7/20 Porter: 151st plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

*182 7/20 Rogers: House Committee on For- 
eign Affairs on SALT agree- 
ments. 

*183 7/20 Meeting of Advisory Committee 
on International Organizations, 
July 24-25. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
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diate attention if you write to: Director, Office of 
Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



I 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1729 




August Ih, 1972 



SEEKING A PEACEFUL WORLD 
Address by Secretary Rogers 185 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES POLICY TOWARD NORTH AFRICA 
Statement by Assistant Secretary Newsom 192 



Coston Public L 
Superintendent ol Document. 



AUG 2 5 \B/z 

DtPOSnOKr 



For index see inside back cover 



1 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN | 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1729 
August 14, 1972 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
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Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on development* in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Seeking a Peaceful World 



Address by Secretary Rogers ^ 



It is a great pleasure to be invited to 
appear before this distinguished club. I 
first addressed the Commonwealth Club 
some years ago as Attorney General in Pres- 
ident Eisenhower's administration. I know 
how important this forum is in the formula- 
tion of public views on important foreign 
and domestic matters. For that reason I 
am very happy to be here today to discuss 
the foreign policy of the United States. I 
believe it deserves the support of thought- 
ful Americans. 

Today let me begin with a conclusion. As 
a result of the initiatives taken by Presi- 
dent Nixon in international affairs, the pres- 
tige of the United States throughout the 
world has never been greater. Operating 
on the basic principle that there is no 
"greater gift that one age could make to the 
ages that follow than to forge the key to 
a lasting peace," the President has consist- 
ently directed every step to that end.- As a 
result, the world today is a much less hos- 
tile place than it was 3i/o years ago, and 
the foundations for a genuinely stable and 
lasting peace have been laid. 

The President has resisted the temptation 
to assume a national mortgage — to buy tem- 
porary peace at the cost of future instabil- 
ity. Real peace cannot be bought ivith the 
future; it must be built for the future. That 
takes patience and careful planning. It takes 
a willingness to break new ground in im- 



proving relationships with former adver- 
saries, and it takes strength and a continu- 
ing fidelity to solemn obligations to friends 
and allies. That is the path President Nixon 
has chosen. That is why our standing is at 
an alltime high, both with our friends and 
with our adversaries. That is why, in the 
vernacular of the day, the world is not so 
"uptight" as it was 3i/o years ago. 

In addition to the visit to China, Russia, 
and Poland, I have recently returned from 
a visit to 11 other countries on four con- 
tinents. 

On this most recent visit we began by 
meeting our Southeast Asian allies in Can- 
berra, Australia, where I confirmed the im- 
portance we attach to our close relationship 
with Australia and to all our security ties 
in Asia. 

We stopped in some of the oldest coun- 
tries in the world: in Greece, the cradle of 
our own democracy, and in Ceylon, which 
also had a flourishing civilization three cen- 
turies before Christ. 

We were in Indonesia, an important coun- 
try in Southeast Asia with a population as 
great as all the other countries in the area 
combined. And we were in two countries of 
the Persian Gulf, Kuwait and Bahrain, with 
a total population about that of San Fran- 
cisco, but nonetheless countries with a sig- 
nificant role to play in the world. 

Three of the countries we visited — Italy, 



' Made before the Commonwealth Club at San 
Francisco, Calif., on July 18 (press release 178). 



' For President Nixon's address before the U.N. 
General Assembly on Sept. 18, 1969, see Bulletik 
of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 



August 14, 1972 



185 



Greece, and Australia — are allies. Two, 
Hungary and Romania, are members of the 
Warsaw Pact, although of course they have 
marked differences in foreign policy. And 
a third Communist countiy, Yugoslavia, is 
a leader of nonalignment. 

With most of the countries we visited 
our relations are friendly and close. With 
Hungary, however, our relations have been 
limited, and I was the first American official 
ever to visit the Hungarian leader. First 
Secretary Kadar. And with Yemen, a beau- 
tiful republic on the Arabian Peninsula, we 
had had no diplomatic relations since 1967; 
my visit to Yemen's mountain capital of 
San'a was the occasion for their reestablish- 
ment and for underscoring the importance 
we attach to maintaining good relations 
with all Arab countries. 

That visit to Yemen was also a useful 
reminder of the importance of all the world's 
nations. We flew into the capital of this 
remote and poor country in gathering dark- 
ness to land on a runway with no lights or 
navigational aids of any kind. At that mo- 
ment it may have seemed difficult, particu- 
larly for our pilot, to think of Yemen as a 
significant factor in world affairs. And yet 
it is — with an important geographical posi- 
tion on the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula and 
with the largest population on the peninsula. 
We value the positive step Yemen has taken 
in welcoming an American Embassy back to 
San'a. And we hope that other Arab coun- 
tries which have been estranged from us 
since the Arab-Israeli conflict will consider 
similar steps. 

During my world trip I talked with a 
number of distinguished leaders. They 
ranged in age from the 39-year-old Amir of 
Bahrain to Yugoslavia's 80-year-old Presi- 
dent Tito, who participated in the Russian 
revolution 55 years ago. While in Rome, 
I had a useful talk with Burma's Prime 
Minister Ne Win, who was also visiting 
there. And I had an audience with one of the 
world's most tireless advocates for peace. 
Pope Paul VI. 

With all these leaders I explained our 



hopes and our efforts for a more peaceful 
world and sought their views on how such 
a world could best be achieved. Today I 
would like to discuss with you some of the 
things I discussed with them. 
What kind of world do we seek? 



Dialogue and Negotiations Between Adversaries 

First of all, it should be a world in which 
countries, whether friends or enemies, part- 
ners or competitors, talk to each other. 

During the cold war period the prevail- 
ing belief was that because we had impor- 
tant differences with our adversaries we 
could not talk. President Nixon has pro- 
ceeded from the opposite belief: that be- 
cause we have important differences we 
must talk. Of course the President knew 
that dialogue alone would not bridge the 
differences ; but he also knew that without 
dialogue they might never be bridged. 

Our foreign policy therefore is based on 
the conviction that communication between 
strangers, and negotiation between adver- 
saries, serves the cause of a more tranquil 
world. 

That is why the President's visit to China 
is so important; it established an essential 
dialogue between us. With the Soviet Un- 
ion, the task instead was to move to concrete 
negotiation. This was done. We now have 
agreements to limit offensive and defensive 
strategic arms. We have five other bilateral 
agreements, all signed during the Moscow 
summit, which expand our cooperation with 
the Soviet Union to a degree unknown since 
the time of our wartime alliance. Our new 
relationship with China and our growing 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, I be- 
lieve, are of great significance in creating a 
more stable international order. 

During my world tour, I found a general 
appreciation of this. And I made clear our 
belief that what is working for us can work 
for others. Nothing can be more productive 
than a willingness in all areas of the world 
to move away from the rigidities of the last 
two decades. 



186 



Department of State Bulletin 



It is remarkable, in fact, how much prog- 
ress is being made at this very moment be- 
cause antagonists of long standing are now 
talking to each other. Parenthetically I 
might point out that in many instances the 
United States has given quiet but effective 
diplomatic support to those efforts. They 
include the following: 

— Talks are underway between the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic on a broad range of 
issues. 

— Just two weeks ago in Korea an agree- 
ment was announced simultaneously in Seoul 
and Pyongyang on a set of principles to less- 
en tension and improve communications. 

— During the same week Pakistan and In- 
dia, which have fought three wars in 25 
years, signed an agreement which can begin 
a healing of their wounds. 

— The Greek and Turkish communities on 
the island of Cyprus, another hotbed of ten- 
sion, have just renewed talks looking toward 
a peaceful solution of their bitter differ- 
ences. 

— In Paris the Viet-Nam peace talks re- 
sumed last week. We have returned to them 
in the earnest hope that they can lead to 
a negotiated settlement. 

— There is only one major exception to 
the trend toward dialogue. That is the Mid- 
dle East. During my visit in the Middle 
East I emphasized the progress that nego- 
tiations had brought to difficult problems in 
other parts of the world. I urged a similar 
approach to the Arab-Israeli problem. As a 
result of the initiative by the United States, 
a cease-fire has been in effect for two years 
in the Middle East. But there will be no 
permanent peace until all concerned decide 
to live together in peace and begin to seek 
solutions to the complex and emotional prob- 
lems involved. I believe that eventually this 
will occur and that serious negotiations will 
take place. 

From these examples it can be seen that 
our policy of encouraging negotiation and 
opening avenues of communication in all 



areas of the world is paying off — that ten- 
sions have been relieved and that many 
local conflicts seem to be on their way to 
solution. 



The Free Flow of People, Ideas, and Goods 

The second characteristic of the peaceful 
world we seek is closely related to the first. 
As that world must be marked by dialogue 
and negotiation, so too must it be open to 
the free flow of people, ideas, and goods. 
We are convinced that the cause of peace is 
advanced by contact among people and by 
a free exchange of ideas on all levels. Thus, 
in areas where such contact has been limited, 
we are seeking to enlarge it. 

Two major aspects of our growing rela- 
tionship with China are the exchange of 
persons and the increase in trade contacts 
which we are now discussing with the Chi- 
nese in Paris. Following on the very suc- 
cessful visit of the Chinese table tennis 
team, we hope for other sports exchanges, 
for example, in basketball and gymnastics. 
We also look forward to exchanges in such 
diverse fields as medicine and music. The 
Commerce Department has recently granted 
an export license for the sale to China of 
$150 million in commercial jet aircraft. If 
consummated, this will be the first signifi- 
cant step toward what we hope will become 
in time a productive bilateral trade relation- 
ship. 

We believe, too, that the new generation 
of Chinese leaders should not be totally de- 
prived of the firsthand knowledge of Amer- 
ica and Americans that the present genera- 
tion has lacked, and vice versa. 

The extent to which the leaders of eastern 
Europe have lacked contact with the United 
States is also quite remarkable. Of the 22 
members of the Soviet Union's highest 
policymaking body — the Communist Party 
Politburo — only four, as I understand it, 
have ever visited America. Among the So- 
viet Union's allies, only President Ceausescu 
of Romania has ever been in any part of the 
United States except to attend the United 



August 14, 1972 



187 



Nations. Until my visit to Budapest, no 
United States Cabinet member had ever 
visited Hungary. In today's world one of 
the first priorities must be to increase the 
firsthand knowledge that leaders of states 
have of one another's countries. 

We also look forward to significant in- 
creases in our trade and other contacts with 
eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has re- 
cently agreed to buy from us more grain 
than has ever been sold anywhere in a single 
deal. And in Romania I assured our hosts 
that we would continue to press the Con- 
gress for the passage of legislation to allow 
Romanian exports to enter the United States 
on a most-favored-nation basis ; that is, 
without discriminatory tariffs. Throughout 
the area, we hope it will soon be possible to 
move toward a more normal trading rela- 
tionship. That is the reason for our trade 
mission which is presently on its way to 
Moscow, headed by our Secretary of Com- 
merce. 

We also believe that freer movement of 
persons and ideas should be an active prin- 
ciple in relations between the divided parts 
of Europe. Next year a Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe, involving 
nearly all Europe's nations as well as the 
United States and Canada, is expected to be 
held. We believe that to be truly useful this 
conference, rather than contenting itself 
with exhortations or declarations, should 
take concrete steps to facilitate the normal 
flow of persons and ideas across the conti- 
nent. In our view practical improvements 
leading to greater contact between all the 
peoples of Europe are the best way to speed 
the day when Europe is no longer divided. 

That is precisely why we place such im- 
portance on the agreement which — together 
with the Foreign Ministers of the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union — 
I signed last month in Berlin. This land- 
mark agreement will enhance the everyday 
lives of 2 million West Berliners by making 
it possible for them to travel more normally 
to East Berlin and the German Democratic 
Republic. We hope that the increase in con- 



tacts which the agreement insures will cre- 
ate positive momentum for Europe as a 
whole. 



Respect for Sovereignty of All Countries 

The third characteristic of the peaceful 
world we seek is that there must be uni- 
versal respect for the right of every country 
to independence, to sovereignty, and to its 
own internal development free of outside 
interference. 

In pressing for the removal of barriers to 
freer contact, we have no interest in med- 
dling in anybody's internal affairs. On the 
contrary, our policy springs from a differ- 
ent and positive conviction: that more open 
borders will release tensions and will pro- 
mote the normal human communication that 
encourages people and states to live, and let 
live, in peace and friendship. 

We in America feel strongly about the 
rights of countries to develop according to 
their own desires, because we fought a rev- 
olution to win those rights for ourselves. We 
respect them for others. Indeed, we regard 
those rights as fundamental to peaceful re- 
lations among states. They must apply all 
the time, not just some of the time. And 
they must apply in all cases, not just some 
cases. A country must not be denied full 
sovereignty simply because it is small or 
because the accident of geography has 
placed it next to a great power or because 
it has the same political, economic, or social 
system as other countries in its region. 

In eastern Europe I emphasized that this 
principle is basic to our foreign policy. We 
intend to deal with all the countries in that 
region — and elsewhere — as sovereign, inde- 
pendent entities. We are ready for an im- 
provement or expansion of relations at what- 
ever pace and in whatever manner they 
themselves are prepared to follow. During 
the President's visit to Moscow, the Soviet 
Union and the United States by written 
commitment agreed to "recognize the sov- 
ereign equality of all states" and to make 
no claim for ourselves or recognize the 



188 



Department of State Bulletin 



claims of anyone else to "any special rights 
or advantages in world affairs." ^ That com- 
mitment, seriously undertaken by both na- 
tions, will be of great importance to peace 
and security in the years ahead. 

Our long-term aim is to move beyond the 
passive relationship implied by the word 
"coexistence" toward a more active and co- 
operative relationship. Building on the rec- 
ognition of each country's right to run its 
own affairs, we are working for a world in 
which former adversaries can not only co- 
exist in peace but also cooperate in peace. 

Willingness To Limit the Use of Force 

The fourth major characteristic of the 
peaceful world we seek is a willingness 
among states to reduce their reliance on 
force as a viable instrument of national 
policy. Even today a growing willingness 
to limit the use of force is evident. 

I have already referred to the variety of 
negotiations currently underway on some of 
the most difficult problems of the whole post- 
war era. Moreover, while it is important 
to keep things in perspective, I believe that 
the initial SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] agreements have turned a cor- 
ner in international relations. For the first 
time the world's strongest nuclear powers 
have concluded ironclad verifiable agree- 
ments on an issue of vital importance to 
themselves and to the world as a whole. 

We therefore hope and expect that the 
principles of peaceful relations to which we 
and the Soviet Union committed ourselves 
in Moscow will be more than just words on 
a piece of paper. For our part we will cer- 
tainly do our best to translate them into 
practical realities. 

We look forward to the next phase of the 
SALT negotiations. We also hope that nego- 
tiations can soon begin toward reduction of 
military forces in central Europe. Except 



for the Soviet-Chinese border, this area is 
the site of the largest concentration of 
armed force in the world. We intend to press 
for negotiations dealing with this problem 
in parallel with the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. We will be pre- 
pared to negotiate specific reductions as 
long as they are mutual and balanced reduc- 
tions not jeopardizing the security of either 
side. 



' For text of the basic principles of relations 
signed at Moscow on May 29, see Bulletin of 
June 26, 1972, p. 898. 



Preserving a Matrix of Stability 

As we move toward new and more con- 
^<N ^^"^structive relationships with former adver- 
saries, it is all the more important that we 
preserve a matrix of stability. How can we 
do so? 

— First, by insuring that the search for 
new relationships will not be at the expense 
of our allies and friends. 

— Second, by recognizing that these rela- 
tionships will improve our security and that 
of our allies only if, in pursuing them, we 
remain convincingly strong. 

— Third, by affirming by word and action 
that a peaceful world will not be sought, 
as it could not be achieved, through U.S. 
abandonment of our obligations or our in- 
terests. 

It is the validity of those three principles 
that makes the manner of our withdrawal 
from Viet-Nam as important as the with- 
drawal itself. With the end of our involve- 
ment in the war in sight, we must never 
forget that the people of South Viet-Nam 
as allies and friends have fought and died 
with us. A I'easonable and honorable solu- 
tion to this tragic war must be worked out 
with their interests as well as our interests 
taken into account. 

It is the validity of those principles which 
requires us iii o»r otvn interest to maintain 
our commitments to NATO, in the Pacific, 
and in our own hemisphere. The stability 
which our alliances with 42 nations have 
brought is a major necessity for the peace 
we seek. 



August 14, 1972 



189 



Finally, it is the validity of those princi- 
ples which has caused President Nixon to 
insist on an adequate national defense budg- 
et. A $30 billion cut or any cut on that 
order of magnitude would undermine our 
alliances overnight and would very soon put 
us in a secondary military position. 

Continued improvement in our relation- 
ships with the Soviet Union and China does 
not depend on the abandonment of our al- 
liances or require a dangerously weakened 
defense capability. In fact, we could never 
have had an improved relationship if we 
had abandoned those alliances or weakened 
that capability. It is the strength of the 
United States and its allies that has made 
it possible for us to negotiate as we have 
with confidence. To forget this lesson now 
would be a tragic and retrogressive step 
and would hurt, not help, the cause of peace. 

This, then, is the kind of peaceful world 
which we would like to see and toward 
which President Ni.xon's policies are di- 
rected : 

— A world in which dialogue and negotia- 
tion have replaced confrontation and con- 
flict. 

— A world in which people can move 
freely and easily across national borders. 

— A world in which recognition of the 
sovereignty and independence of all coun- 
tries is the first principle of international 
relations. 

— A world in which force is relied on less 
and less as an instrument of national policy. 

A decade ago would anybody have thought 
such a world possible in our lifetimes? Even 
today no one would pretend that it will be 
achieved soon or that the problems and diffi- 
culties are not formidable. But for the first 
time since the war such a world has become 
a practical possibility. 

We cannot help to turn that possibility 
into a reality if we withdraw to our own 
shores. To help build an enduring peace we 
need to remain responsibly engaged in world 
aflfairs. The United States must and will 
remain so engaged. 



152d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Am.bas- 
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S. 
delegation, at the 152d plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on July 27. 

Press release 185 dated July 27 

OPENING REMARKS 

Ladies and gentlemen: Your remarks at 
the 151st plenary session have received our 
careful attention, and we continue to review 
them in the hope that at least they may be 
the prelude to specific discussion between 
all of the parties concerned. 

What our side has urged you to consider 
is a plan which would permit a rapid, com- 
plete dismantling of the war. There seems 
no more compelling task for us than that 
of ending the killing and doing so as soon 
as we can. Cease-fire is the key. It is diffi- 
cult to see how that and the exchange of 
prisoners could in any way damage the in- 
terests of the people of North and South 
Viet-Nam. We favor such a cease-fire. We 
urge it, because it would allow constructive 
political discussions to take place among 
Vietnamese, free of the dangers of combat. 

These proposals seem to us unassailable 
as principle, and we should discuss them 
together. 

If, for example, you find our proposal for 
a cease-fire unacceptable as stated, what 
variation of it would you care to discuss? 
Has the issue of negotiations not been re- 
duced to the simple matter of whether they 
are to take place in conditions of war or 
nonwar? Who can doubt that the people of 
Viet-Nam prefer, above all else, that there 
be a cease-fire now? 

Also, we see no valid reason why arrange- 
ments cannot be planned now for the time 
when our men will return to their country. 
What harm could it cause you to discuss 
with us arrangements for their eventual re- 
turn or the handling of their mail or meth- 



190 



Department of State Bulletin 



ods of checking their physical condition? It 
would be a fine sign of the good will you 
mention if work on such matters could be- 
gin. 

In all of these matters we await your 
comments, your views, or your objection. 
Within the context of the May 8 proposals 
put forward by President Nixon, what is 
your view of the four-month period for U.S. 
troop withdrawal ? > If you have an alterna- 
tive suggestion, may we consider it? 

We are here to examine concrete matters, 
and our May 8 program is a set of new 
concrete proposals. They are not at all a 
"step backward." They are in fact a step 
forward, a simplification of the matter, in 
that they would stop the fighting immedi- 
ately and thereby set the stage for Viet- 
namese to discuss the resolution of political 
problems by themselves. 

It is true that our proposals center upon 
the military situation. In the face of the 
retrogressive nature of your massive in- 
vasion of South Viet-Nam and your per- 
sistent refusal to consider our past proposals 
for a comprehensive settlement, we have re- 
sponded appropriately, to permit both you 
and us to emerge from the situation which 
now exists. But it cannot be done without 
your cooperation. 



lations were not emplaced near dikes or re- 
lated structures. 

You have two purposes, it seems to me, 
in mounting this campaign. As I pointed 
out during these talks last October and as 
the Mayor of Hanoi has confirmed recently, 
you did not repair the damage done by last 
year's floodwaters. Instead, at that time, 
you diverted your manpower and resources 
to build roads across the demilitarized zone 
into the South in preparation for the in- 
vasion which you were planning then. Now 
the danger of that policy is upon you, and 
you are seeking to protect yourselves from 
public criticism by pretending that the 
Americans are responsible for a possible 
disaster. The truth is that your own neglect 
of the dike system will be responsible. We 
hope your people will be spared such a 
disaster. 

A second reason for your propaganda 
campaign may be a desire to obscure the 
fact that you are resisting our efforts to 
have a meaningful discussion here. How 
much better it would be if, instead of taking 
up the time of this conference with com- 
plaints, you would agree to a cease-fire and 
accept the invitation of the Government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam to seek a settle- 
ment which would eliminate complaints and 
problems such as those you mention. 



ADDITIONAL REMARKS 

Ladies and gentlemen: I have a comment 
to make on the subject of dikes. 

I regret that propaganda themes on this 
subject have been introduced into these talks. 
The matter of dikes is clear on our side: 
We have not targeted the dikes. If anything 
happened to some of them, it had none of 
the deliberate calculation that characterized 
your efforts at Quang Tri and An Loc, to 
cite but two examples. I note that you make 
no claim that military equipment or instal- 



U.S. and Sudan Reestablish 
Diplomatic Relations 

Joint U.S.-Sudan Announcement ^ 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Sudan have decided to 
resume diplomatic relations as of this date 
[July 25] . An exchange of Ambassadors will 
take place in the near future. 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



^ Issued simultaneously at Khartoum and Wash- 
ington on July 25 (press release 184). 



August 14, 1972 



191 



Department Discusses Policy Toward North Africa 



Statement by David D. Newsom 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 



Mr. Chairmen : I welcome this opportunity 
to meet with you and the members of your 
subcommittees today to discuss our policy 
toward North Africa. Your joining together 
for this review is symbolic of the significant 
way in which the problems and the currents 
of the Middle East and Africa meet in this 
area. 

I have been associated with our relations 
with the Arab world for the better part of 
my career, going back to service in Iraq in 
1951. My North African experience began 
with my assignment as Deputy Director of 
the Office of Northern African Affairs in the 
Department of State in 1962 and continued 
with my appointment as Ambassador to 
Libya in 1965. I continue to follow events in 
the area closely against the wider backdrop 
of my present African responsibilities. I 
have visited each of the countries we are dis- 
cussing today several times. I have met all 
but one of the heads of state. 

As you know, responsibility for our rela- 
tions with the Arab states of North Africa, 
except for Egypt, falls within the Bureau of 
African Affairs. While there is no perfect 
way to divide the world for such purposes, 
this has proved a thoroughly feasible organi- 



' Made before a joint hearing of the Subcommit- 
tees on Africa and the Near East of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 19. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



zation and has recognized the special links of 
these countries with the rest of the continent. 
At the same time we coordinate closely with 
the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs to insure that our policies take fully 
into account the fact that these countries 
are also Arab and inextricably linked as well 
in culture and interests with the Near East. 

While there are common threads that run 
through these countries, they are distinct in 
character, culture, and background. In our 
policies, we recognize and encourage wider 
area links, but basically we treat them as 
individual countries. The actual relationships 
we have with each vary accordingly. 

Each of these states is sovereign and jeal- 
ously independent. No matter how close our 
relations may be, we recognize this as a fun- 
damental basis for our relations. Their in- 
ternal affairs are their own. While we may 
have some marginal influence on the imple- 
mentation of economic and developmental 
policies through our aid programs, this does 
not extend to internal political policies or 
organizations. The latter is an area in which, 
in this day and age, our involvement is 
neither feasible nor consistent with our 
respect for the national political institutions. 

With two of the states of the area, Algeria 
and the Sudan, we do not have diplomatic re- 
lations, a circumstance existing since the six- 
day Middle East war of 1967. We take the 
position with each that we are prepared to 
resume relations whenever they are. Never- 



192 



Department of State Bulletin 



theless, as I will show, our relations with 
each have steadily grown on the basis of de- 
veloping mutual interests. 

In the case of Mauritania, a state which 
has identified itself increasingly with North 
Africa because of its Arab and Islamic herit- 
age, the diplomatic relations that had been 
broken in June 1967 were restored in 1970 
with the reopening of a small American dip- 
lomatic mission in Nouakchott and of a small 
Mauritanian mission in Washington. Our 
relations with Mauritania are cordial but not 
extensive. In September 1971, President Ould 
Daddah visited Washington in his capacity 
as President of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) and held useful conversations 
with President Nixon regarding the status 
of Namibia. 

The leaders of the area have shown in the 
past several years a remarkable ability to re- 
solve problems existing among them. While 
actual economic or political unity may still 
be a distant dream, their practical relation- 
ships and understanding has steadily grown 
closer. What seemed like intractable prob- 
lems 10 years ago are now behind them. 

Morocco's recognition of Mauritania in 
1969 set aside centuries-old claims. Algeria 
and Tunisia found a common understanding 
on their frontier and on economic coopera- 
tion in 1969. The agreement concluded be- 
tween Morocco and Algeria in June of this 
year resolved problems which resulted in 
actual conflict between the two states in 
1963. Sudan, with the help of others, has 
resolved its 16-year-old internal southern 
problem. Each one of these, in a world of un- 
resolved disputes, is a remarkable achieve- 
ment that has received all too little attention 
in this country. 

One regional problem that remains is the 
status of Spanish Sahara, which both Mauri- 
tania and Morocco claim and in whose even- 
tual disposition Algeria is also interested. 
Discussions regarding the future of this ter- 
ritory have been held from time to time by 
the interested governments and in the United 
Nations. Spain has promised to hold a ref- 



erendum of the inhabitants of the area to 
ascertain the wishes of the population re- 
garding their political future, but a date 
for the referendum has not yet been fixed. 
One of the principal reasons for the interest 
of Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria in 
Spanish Sahara is the territory's economic 
potential, represented chiefly by its sub- 
stantial phosphate deposits. The territory 
might also provide a relatively nearby exit 
point for Algerian exports of iron ore from 
mines in southwestern Algeria should they 
be developed in the future. 

Now to take up the countries on an in- 
dividual basis. 



Close Relations With Morocco ancJ Tunisia 

Our relations have traditionally been 
closest with Morocco and Tunisia. Each has 
been going through a period of some political 
uncertainty. 

In Morocco, since the abortive coup at- 
tempt on July 10 of last year, the King has 
been seeking new constitutional arrange- 
ments which would widen the sharing of 
governmental responsibility. He has so far 
been unable to reach agreement on a more 
broadly based government with the leaders 
of the traditional political parties. An ad- 
ditional factor may be elements in the youth 
of the country who find identity neither with 
the traditional political parties nor the mon- 
archy. The King, a shrewd political leader 
in his own right and the inheritor of a very 
old monarchy, is still very much in control. 

Morocco remains one of the largest recip- 
ients of U.S. assistance in Africa. In fiscal 
year 1972, we provided $50 million in loans 
and grants, the largest part of this being in 
P.L. 480 commodities. At the same time, U.S. 
investment in Morocco, already at the $47 
million mark by December 1971, increased 
still further. 

In the military field, Morocco permits us 
to utilize frequencies and facilities for U.S. 
naval communications, although the size of 
our contingent is being reduced as part of a 



August 14, 1972 



193 



worldwide reduction of U.S. personnel at 
similar installations elsewhere. The Moroccan 
facilities, however, remain an important 
and integral link in our worldwide communi- 
cations system. We provide a limited amount 
of grant aid training for the Moroccan 
armed forces, as well as credit assistance for 
the purchase of U.S. military equipment 
that last year totaled $15 million. 

Morocco is also the site of one of the two 
principal Voice of America relay points in 
Africa. The transmitters at Tangier are 
shared with the Moroccans under arrange- 
ments made in 1963. 

In Tunisia, we have had a strong friend 
over many years in President Bourguiba. He 
recalls early American help to him as a per- 
son and to his nation. His moderate views 
on many issues have been close to ours. After 
a period of inactivity because of illness, he 
has returned to active leadership in Tunisia, 
manifested by a vigorous appearance at the 
Organization of African Unity meeting in 
Rabat and by a recent state visit to France. 
During this period, the Destourian Socialist 
Party organization has been considering the 
question of succession, and constitutional 
changes have been proposed. Under the cur- 
rent provisions of the Constitution the Prime 
Minister would fill out the remainder of the 
Presidential term; that is, until 1974. 

We have for many years made a substan- 
tial input into Tunisia's economic develop- 
ment, recognizing the potential of this ener- 
getic nation with relatively few natural 
resoui'ces. In fiscal year 1972, our assistance 
will total about $43 million, a large part of 
this representing continuing help to the agri- 
cultural sector. 



Relations With Algeria and Libya 

Three major political differences have 
affected us in our relations with Algeria since 
before Algerian independence: their view of 
our relations with France during the Al- 
gerian war of independence; different views 
on Viet-Nam, Cuba, and the Middle East; 
their activist role in Third World movements. 



Relations reached their lowest point when 
Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us 
in 1967. The break was further aggravated 
by the Algerian nationalization of the assets 
of nine U.S. companies. 

Since that time, we have worked slowly 
and realistically to find a common basis for 
improved relations. This has been found in 
the growing U.S. need for natural gas from 
external sources and the Algerian need for 
capital and markets for that country's ex- 
tensive hydrocarbon resources. 

Within the last few years we have, as a 
result, seen the settlement, with compensa- 
tion, of the nine U.S. nationalization cases, a 
growing involvement in Algeria of U.S. 
technology and technicians, and an increas- 
ing exposure of the Export-Import Bank 
in Algerian projects. The largest project is 
one in which the El Paso Natural Gas Com- 
pany proposes to purchase a very substantial 
quantity of gas for U.S. customers from 
Sonatrach, the Algerian national hydrocar- 
bon company. The U.S. customers have ob- 
tained preliminary approval from the Fed- 
eral Power Commission for the deal, but 
serious problems of future pricing remain 
to be worked out. Two other U.S. companies 
have contracted to purchase Algerian LNG 
[liquefied natural gas]. Conceivably, Algeria, 
by 1985, could be selling half of its natural 
gas output to the United States. 

Meanwhile, diplomatic contact has been de- 
veloping through the establishment and aug- 
mentation of interest sections in each coun- 
try. Algeria is under the flag of Guinea in this 
country, and we are under the Swiss flag in 
Algeria. 

The Libyan revolution of September 1969 
changed the character of Libyan-U.S. rela- 
tions. The new regime, under the leadership 
of Colonel Qadhaafi and a group of young 
military officers, sees its policies in exclusive- 
ly Arab terms. It seeks closer cooperation 
among Arab states and sees that cooperation 
focused primarily on the cause of the Pales- 
tinians and the struggle with Israel. Al- 
though strongly anti-Communist, the re- 
gime is at the same time cool to the United 



194 



Department of State Bulletin 



states and Britain because of the stand of 
these governments on Arab issues. 

The present Libyan Government has, at 
the same time, sought greater control, great- 
er revenue, and greater participation in the 
production of its basic resource, petroleum. 
U.S. companies which produce 90 percent of 
Libya's petroleum are under severe pressure 
as a result. 

The Libyan revolution also ended the pre- 
vious military relationship with the United 
States and Britain. We withdrew at the re- 
quest of the Libyans from Wheelus Air Base, 
as the British withdrew from their base at 
El Adem. In keeping with the 1954 agree- 
ment, permanent construction reverted to the 
Libyan Government. Movable property was 
removed except for a small amount which 
was sold to the Libyans after screening our 
worldwide requirements. By a recent ex- 
change of notes outstanding agreements were 
ended and conflicting claims canceled. The 
Libyans now use the former base as their 
principal military base in the Tripoli area. 

Slow Improvement in U.S. -Sudan Relations 

President Nimeri of the Sudan has, since 
he came to power in a military coup in 1969, 
been charting a delicate course among the 
various political tendencies of that country, 
the largest geographically in Africa. Coming 
to power originally with support from the 
Sudanese Communists, he broke with them 
after the abortive coup of July 1971. Rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union became particu- 
larly strained, although those with Com- 
munist China did not. 

Today he is seeking to build improved re- 
lations with all his neighbors, to the south 
and to the north. He desires to insure the 
success of the recent agreement on the south- 
ern Sudan, while at the same time keeping 
firm ties with Egypt and the Arab world. Be- 
cause of the complex political and ethnic 
makeup of the Sudan, he has avoided any 
commitment to join the Confederation of 
Arab Republics. 

The slow improvement in our own rela- 



tions with the Sudan began after Nimeri 
came to power, but predating his break with 
the Soviets. We see our improved relation- 
ship as stemming from a desire on Presi- 
dent Nimeri's part to resume effective re- 
lations with the United States and not only 
as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. 

Most recently we have demonstrated our 
admiration for the southern settlement and 
our hope for the future of the Sudan by giv- 
ing emergency assistance to the Sudan Gov- 
ernment for returning refugees in the south. 
We are making available more than $4 mil- 
lion in P.L. 480 title II food supplies and are 
also contributing some $18 million for food 
relief through the World Food Program. 
Much of our bilateral assistance will be fun- 
neled through U.S. voluntaiy agencies. 

Four Dimensions of North Africa's Policies 

North Africa is the hub of a wheel with 
spokes to the Near East, to Africa, to Eu- 
rope, and to us. Its policies need to be seen 
in all these dimensions. 

The countries are drawn to the Near East 
by their Arab language and culture and by 
their political concern over Near East is- 
sues. At the same time, other interests and 
priorities are present and none is as com- 
pletely absorbed in these issues as are the 
states directly contiguous to Israel. 

Each of these states points, also, toward 
Africa. Morocco and Mauritania are press- 
ing the question of the Spanish Sahara. King 
Hassan of Morocco has just succeeded Presi- 
dent Ould Daddah of Mauritania as Presi- 
dent of the Organization of African Unity. 
As such he will, for the coming year, be 
deeply involved in African issues. 

Algeria borders on Mauritania, Mali, and 
Niger. It has always taken an interest, and 
continues to do so, in the liberation move- 
ment in Africa. President Boumediene re- 
cently visited Guinea, before his attendance 
at the OAU meeting in Rabat. 

Tunisia has always taken a great interest 
in African issues and a significant role in the 
OAU. Libya has increasingly interested it- 



August 14, 1972 



195 



self in sub-Saharan Africa through expres- 
sions in the past of support for Moslem pop- 
ulations in other states and opposition to 
what it regards as Israeli influence detrimen- 
tal to the Arab cause in Africa. President 
Nimeri is striving to unite the Sudan, as the 
recent agreement with the southerners has 
shown. In this endeavor he has been aided by 
other African states, the good offices of the 
Imperial Ethiopian Government, and the per- 
sonal efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie. 

Relations with Europe have always been 
of great importance, particularly to the three 
states of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, 
and Tunisia. They remain so today. Europe 
is the principal market and the principal 
source of supplies. Relationships of these na- 
tions with the European Common Market 
become increasingly important to them. 

Common Market relations with Mediter- 
ranean countries are in a state of flux. Exist- 
ing trade arrangements are to be modified as 
a result of the enlargement of the Commu- 
nity and the proposed changes in relations 
between the Community and the European 
Free Trade Area countries remaining out- 
side. For the longer run, the Community has 
under active consideration a coherent "Med- 
iterranean policy" embracing the countries 
from Spain to Israel and including the Ai-ab 
states. 

Algeria, particularly, is also manifesting 
more and more interest in questions of Euro- 
pean and Mediterranean security and is ex- 
pressing a desire for Maghreb participation 
in any European Security Conference. 

I have already outlined how the relation- 
ship of each of these states with us is also im- 
portant, whether for reasons of investment, 
trade, or aid. I believe they will remain so. 
Though our direct relationship to the politi- 
cal events of this area may continue to dimin- 
ish, though these countries may become in- 
creasingly allied to Europe economically, 
strong bases of common interest with the 
United States will remain. Our policies for 
the future will be designed to develop those 
common interests into strong and realistic 
links across the Atlantic. 



Suspension of Meat Import Restraints 
Discussed With Producing Countries 

Acting Secretary Irwin, Secretary of the 
Treasury George P. Shultz, and other U.S. 
officials met on July 12 with represe^itatives 
of 12 meat-exporting countries. Following 
is the opening statement made by Acting 
Secretary Irwin at a neivs conference held 
after the meeting.^ 

Press release 174 dated July 13 

Ladies and gentlemen: I'm John Irwin, of 
the Department. We have just come from a 
useful and, I hope, productive meeting with 
the representatives of those countries which 
export meat to us under the Meat Import 
Quantitative Restraint Program. 

As you know, this restraint program was 
suspended by the President on June 26.^ He 
took this action after very substantial in- 
creases in meat prices over the first half of 
this year; and his hope, as well as ours, is 
that this action will contribute to increased 
supplies of meat for all American consumers 
as we look ahead. 

The thrust of the remarks made in this 
meeting just passed by Secretary Shultz and 
my other colleagues and myself was that this 
suspension offers a new opportunity to these 
supplying countries to increase their share in 
the American market and we hope very much 
that they will be able to take advantage of 
this to increase their supplies the rest of this 
year. 

Representatives of these countries indi- 
cated that they hoped to do just that and 
they will make a real effort to increase sup- 
plies to this country, although, as you know, 
they will have a variety of problems to con- 
tend with, particularly on what one could 
say was reasonably short notice. 

They also, some of them, emphasized their 
desire in seeing, in the future, a continued 



' For the transcript of Secretary Shultz' remarks 
and questions and answers, see press release 174 
dated July 13. 

' For background, see Bulletin of July 17, 1972, 
p. 89. 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 



liberal treatment by the United States in 
future years. 

But I think, in sum, we could say that this 
was a productive and informative meeting on 
all sides. It is a particular pleasure to ask 
Secretary Shultz if he will speak to you 
briefly of his thoughts, both on the meeting 
and of any other thoughts, both as to the 
background and the future. 



U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement 
on Colorado River Water Quality 

Following is a joint Department of State- 
Department of the Interior press release is- 
sued July 1 7. 

Department of State press release 177 dated July 17 

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT 

The Governments of the United States and 
Mexico have approved an agreement provid- 
ing for immediate improvement in the qual- 
ity of Colorado River water to be delivered 
to Mexico, it was announced by Secretary of 
State William P. Rogers and Secretary of 
the Interior Rogers Morton on July 14. 

This agreement will result in an estimated 
average annual reduction of at least 100 parts 
per million (ppm) of dissolved salts in the 
Colorado River waters made available to 
Mexico as compared to 1971. The agreement, 
called Minute No. 241 of the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), 
was signed by the U.S. and Mexican Com- 
missioners July 14, and they afterward ex- 
changed letters announcing the approval of 
the minute by their respective governments. 
The minute thereupon became operative 
through December 31, 1972. 

On June 17, the Presidents of the United 
States and Mexico jointly announced that 
the United States would undertake certain 
actions immediately to improve the quality 
of the Colorado River water going to Mexi- 
co.i They instructed the International Bound- 
ary and Water Commission to prepare and 



sign a minute to implement this announce- 
ment and to incorporate the program and 
commitments announced at the same time to 
find a definitive, equitable, and just solution 
to this salinity problem at the earliest possi- 
ble time. This minute complies with these in- 
structions. 

Under the minute the United States will 
discharge drainage waters from the Wellton- 
Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District of 
Arizona to the Colorado River below Morelos 
Dam, Mexico's diversion point, at the annual 
rate of 118,000 acre-feet. In place of these 
waters, amounting to 73,000 acre-feet dur- 
ing the remainder of 1972, the United States 
will substitute an equal quantity of other wa- 
ters, 41,000 acre-feet from above Imperial 
Dam, located about 22 miles upstream from 
the California-Baja California boundary, and 
32,000 acre-feet from 12 wells on the Yuma 
Mesa in southwestern Arizona. 

The United States will thus deliver to Mex- 
ico its annual allotment of 1.5 million acre- 
feet without including the drainage waters 
for which substitution is made. This substi- 
tution will reduce the annual average salinity 
of the water delivered to Mexico to an esti- 
mated 1,140 ppm from the 1,242 ppm experi- 
enced in 1971. 

The Government of Mexico has requested 
the United States also to discharge below the 
Mexican diversion point the rest of the drain- 
age from the Wellton-Mohawk District, 
amounting to a rate of approximately 100,000 
acre-feet annually, for which no substitution 
is being made. This will further reduce the 
salinity of the water used by Mexico. 

In making these special arrangements both 
governments reserve all rights under the 
Water Treaty of 1944 and the general prin- 
ciples of law. 

Minute No. 241 supersedes Minute No. 218, 
adopted on March 22, 1965, for a five-year pe- 
riod and twice extended for one-year peri- 
ods.2 Under it the United States constructed 



' For text of a joint communique issued on June 
17, see Bulletin of July 10, 1972, p. 66. 

^ For text of Minute No. 218, see Bulletin of 
Apr. 12, 1965, p. 556. 



August 14, 1972 



197 



works costing about $12 million and reduced 
the salinity of the water made available for 
Mexico from 1,375 ppm to about 1,242 ppm. 
The United States will continue to utilize 
these works in the execution of the new 
agreement. No new construction will be re- 
quired. 



TEXT OF IBWC MINUTE NO. 241 

Recommendations to Improve Immediately the 

Quality of Colorado River Waters 

Going to Mexico 

The Commission met in the offices of the United 
States Section, in El Paso, Texas, at 12:00 o'clock 
noon on July 14, 1972, in accordance with the in- 
structions which the two Governments issued to 
their respective Commissioners pursuant to the un- 
derstanding between President Richard Nixon and 
President Luis Echeverria A., expressed in their 
Joint Communique of June 17, 1972, which, with 
respect to the salinity problem, states: 

"Regarding the problem of the salinity of the 
Colorado River, President Echeverria told President 
Nixon that Mexico reiterates its position as regards 
receiving its assignment of original waters from 
the Colorado River, to which the Treaty of Febru- 
ary 3, 1944 refers, and therefore, with the same 
quality as those derived from the Imperial Dam. 

"To this, President Nixon replied that this was a 
highly complex problem that needed careful exam- 
ination of all aspects. He was impressed by the 
presentation made by President Echeverria and 
would study it closely. It was his sincere desire to 
find a definitive, equitable and just solution to this 
problem at the earliest possible time because of 
the importance both nations attach to this matter. 

"As a demonstration of this intent and of the 
goodwill of the United States in this connection, he 
was prepared to: 

(a) undertake certain actions immediately to im- 
prove the quality of water going to Mexico; 

(b) designate a special representative to begin 
work immediately to find a permanent, definitive 
and just solution of this problem; 

(c) instruct the special representative to submit 
a report to him by the end of this year; 

(d) submit this proposal, once it has the approval 
of this Government to President Echeverria for his 
consideration and approval. 

"President Echeverria said that he recognized the 
goodwill of President Nixon and his interest in 
finding a definitive solution to this problem at the 
earliest possible time. He added that based on two 
recent trips to the Mexicali Valley and his talks 



with farmers there, his Government, while reserv- 
ing its legal rights, had decided to stop using 
waters from the Wellton-Mohawk project for irri- 
gation purposes while waiting for receipt of the 
U.S. proposal for a definitive solution. 

"Both Presidents agreed to instruct their Water 
and Border Commissioners to prepare and sign a 
Minute containing the above program and commit- 
ments as soon as possible." 

The Commission, on the basis of the understand- 
ings expressed in the Joint Communique, adopts, 
subject to the approval of the two Governments, 
the following RESOLUTION: 

1. That, commencing on the date of the approval 
of the present Minute, the United States take the 
measures described in points 2 and 3 of this resolu- 
tion, to improve the quality of the waters of the 
Colorado River made available to Mexico at the 
Northerly Boundary, which it is estimated will re- 
duce the salinity of such waters by at least 100 
parts per million as an annual mean, compared with 
the mean annual salinity of the waters made avail- 
able to Mexico at the Northerly Boundary in calen- 
dar year 1971, under Minute No. 218; such improve- 
ment to be independent of the improvement in 
quality which may be achieved by discharging to the 
Colorado River below Morelos Dam the part of the 
drainage waters from the Wellton-Mohawk District 
described in point 5 of this resolution. 

2. That the United States continue to operate and 
maintain, at its expense, the extension of the 
Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage water convey- 
ance channel and its control structures, constructed 
pursuant to Recommendation 1 of Minute No. 218. 

3. That, commencing on the date of approval of 
the present Minute, the United States discharge to 
the Colorado River downstream from Morelos Dam 
volumes of drainage waters from the Wellton- 
Mohawk District at the annual rate of 118,000 acre- 
feet (145,551,000 cubic meters) and substitute there- 
for equal volumes of other waters, to be discharged 
to the Colorado River above Morelos Dam, with the 
understanding that during the second six months 
of 1972, the United States discharge the volume of 
73,000 acre-feet (90,044,000 cubic meters) of drain- 
age waters from the Wellton-Mohawk District down- 
stream from Morelos Dam and substitute therefor 
an equal volume of other waters to be discharged 
above Morelos Dam. 

4. That Mexico's requests for deliveries in the 
limitrophe reach of the Colorado River be not less 
than 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second, 
excluding the flows charged as part of Mexico's 
allotment under the Water Treaty of February 3, 
1944, in accordance with Minute No. 240, for 
emergency deliveries to the City of Tijuana. 

5. That, pursuant to the decision of President 
Echeverria, expressed in the Joint Communique, 
the United States discharge to the Colorado River 



198 



Department of State Bulletin 



downstream from Morelos Dam, the remaining vol- 
ume of drainage waters of the Wellton-Mohawk Dis- 
trict, which do not form part of the volume of the 
drainage waters referred to in point 3 of this reso- 
lution, with the understanding that this remaining 
volume will not be replaced by substitution waters. 

6. That, subject to the reservations of point 9 
of this resolution, the Commission account for the 
drainage waters of the Wellton-Mohawk District 
referred to in points 3 and 5 of this resolution as a 
part of those described in the provisions of Article 
10 of the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944. 

7. That the present Minute remain in effect until 
December 31, 1972. 

8. That the present Minute be expressly approved 
by both Governments and enter into force upon such 
approval. 

9. That the provisions of the present Minute not 
constitute any precedent, recognition or acceptance 
affecting the rights of either country with respect to 
the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944, and the 
general principles of law. 

10. That the life of Minute No. 218 of the Inter- 
national Boundary and Water Commission, as ex- 
tended by exchange of notes dated November 15, 
1971, terminate on the date that the present Minute 
enters into force. 



The meeting adjourned. 

J. F. Friedkin 
Commissioner of the 
United States 

Frank P. Fullerton 
Acting Secretary of the 
United States Section 



D. Herrera J. 
Commissioner of Mexico 

Fernando Rivas S. 
Secretary of the Mexican 
Section 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

Relief Problems in Bangladesh. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected 
With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary. February 2, 1972. 188 
pp. 

The United States and Vietnam: 1944-1947. A staff 
study based on the Pentagon Papers prepared for 
the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations. Study No. 2. April 3, 1972. 44 pp. 

Peace Corps Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal 
Year 1973. Hearing before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations. April 7, 1972. 32 pp. 

Convention Establishing an International Organiza- 
tion of Legal Metrology. Message from the Presi- 
dent of the United States transmitting the con- 
vention, signed at Paris on October 12, 1955, as 
amended. S. Ex. I. April 11, 1972. 17 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty 
of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at 
Tokyo October 30, 1970, at the Sixth Consulta- 
tive Meeting.^ 

Notification of approval: United States, July 25, 
1972, with the exception of VI-10. 

Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return 
of astronauts, and the return of objects launched 
into outer space. Opened for signature at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. En- 
tered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Notification it considers itself bound: Fiji, July 
18, 1972. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 

Acceptances deposited: Australia, July 24, 1972; 
Uganda, July 27, 1972. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971.' 

Ratification deposited: Brazil (with a reserva- 
tion), July 24, 1972. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 

Ratification deposited: Republic of China, July 
27, 1972. 

Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), re- 
lating to amendments to the convention. Done 
at Washington October 6, 1970.' 
Adherence deposited: Canada, July 27, 1972. 

Judicial Procedures 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil 
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 
18, 1970.' 
Ratified by the President: July 15, 1972. 



^ Not in force. 



August 14, 1972 



199 



North Atlantic Treaty — Technical Information 

NATO agreement on the communication of technical 
information for defense purposes. Done at Brus- 
sels October 19, 1970. Entered into force Febru- 
ary 7, 1971. TIAS 7064. 

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, July 24, 1972. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space, and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
Notification of succession: Fiji, July 18, 1972. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 
6839. 
Notification of succession: Fiji, July 18, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, July 27, 1972. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and 
Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. 

Notification it considers itself bound: Fiji, July 
18, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington Janu- 
ary 21, 1972.' 
Ratified by the President: July 21, 1972. 

Canada 

Agreement relating to the extension of the agree- 
ment of December 5, 1952 (TIAS 2730), relating 
to the lease of certain lands in Canadian Air 
Force Station, Goose Bay, Newfoundland. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 13, 
1972. Entered into force July 13, 1972. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from El Salvador of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat 
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during 
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 



at San Salvador March 15 and April 13, 1972. 
Entered into force April 13, 1972. TIAS 7382. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Guatemala of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat 
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during 
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Guatemala March 7 and April 28, 1972. En- 
tered into force April 28, 1972. TIAS 7354. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Haiti of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cat- 
tle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calen- 
dar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Port-au-Prince March 2 and May 30, 1972. En- 
tered into force May 30, 1972. TIAS 7370. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Mexico of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of 
cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during cal- 
endar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Mexico and Tlatelolco April 17 and 26, 1972. 
Entered into force April 26, 1972. TIAS 7373. 
Suspended: July 12, 1972. 

Minute No. 241 of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission (United States and Mexico) 
to improve immediately the quality of Colorado 
River waters going to Mexico. Adopted at El 
Paso, Tex., July 14, 1972. Entered into force 
July 14, 1972. 

Minute No. 218 of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission (United States and Mexico) 
concerning the salinity of the waters of the Colo- 
rado River which reach Mexico, as extended. 
Adopted at Ciudad Juarez March 22, 1965. En- 
tered into force March 22, 1965. TIAS 6988, 7214. 
Terminated: July 14, 1972. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



' Not in force. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on July 21 confirmed the nomination of 
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to be an Assistant Secretary 
of State [for European Affairs]. (For biographic 
data, see White House press release dated June 27.) 



200 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX August li, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1729 



Africa. Department Discusses Policy Toward 
North Africa (Newsom) 192 

Agriculture. Suspension of Meat Import Re- 
straints Discussed With Producing Coun- 
tries (Irwin) 196 

Algeria. Department Discusses Policy Toward 
North Africa (Newsom) 192 

American Principles. Seeking a Peaceful 
World (Rogers) 185 

China. Seeking a Peaceful World (Rogers) . 185 

Congress 

Confirmations (Stoessel) . . . . ^ . . . 200 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 199 

Department Discusses Policy Toward North 

Africa (Newsom) 192 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Stoessel) 200 

Economic Affairs 

Suspension of Meat Import Restraints Dis- 
cussed With Producing Countries (Irwin) . 196 

U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement on Colo- 
rado River Water Quality (State-Interior 
announcement, text of IBWC minute) . . 197 

Europe 

Seeking a Peaceful World (Rogers) .... 185 
Stoessel Confirmed as Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs 200 

Libya. Department Discusses Policy Toward 
North Africa (Newsom) 192 

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement 
on Colorado River Water Quality (State- 
Interior announcement, text of IBWC 
minute) 197 

Morocco. Department Discusses Policy Toward 
North Africa (Newsom) 192 

Sudan 

Department Discusses Policy Toward North 
Africa (Newsom) 192 

U.S. and Sudan Reestablish Diplomatic Rela- 
tions (joint announcement) 191 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 199 

U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement on Colo- 
rado River Water Quality (State-Interior 
announcement, text of IBWC minute) . . 197 

Tunisia. Department Discusses Policy Toward 

North Africa (Newsom) 192 

U.S.S.R. Seeking a Peaceful World (Rogers) . 185 

Viet-Nam. 152d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris (Porter) 190 

Name Index 

Irwin, John N., II 196 

Newsom, David D 192 

Porter, William J 190 

Rogers, Secretary 185 

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 200 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 24—30 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to July 24 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
174 of July 13, 177 of July 17, and 178 of July 
18. 

No. Date Subject 

184 7/25 Reestablishment of diplomatic re- 

lations with Sudan. 

185 7/27 Porter: 152d plenary session on 

Viet-Nam at Paris. 
*186 7/28 New York City Ballet to tour 

Soviet Union and Poland. 
*187 7/28 Rogers: statement on death of 

Senator Allen J. Ellender. 

* Not printed. 



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U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402 



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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
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diate attention if you write to: Director, Office of 
Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



Uil^V 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1730 




August 21, 1972 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 27 
Excerpts From Transcript 201 

NORTH VIET-NAM: THE DIKE BOMBING ISSUE 
Text of Report 207 



For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1730 
August 21, 1972 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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Washington. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a meekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
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international relations are ulso listed. 



President Nixon's News Conference of July 27 



Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Nixon in the Oval 
Office at the White House on July 27. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 31 

The President: Now, we will go forward 
with some questions if you like, please. 

Q. Mr. President, you have said that it is 
against U.S. policy to bomb the dikes and 
dams in North Viet-Nam. Yesterday the 
State Department acknowledged there had 
been incidental and inadvertent damage from 
the bombing nearby. My question is this : Is 
it worth the risk of possible flooding or of 
having world opinion turn against us to 
bomb military targets near the dikes and 
dams ? 

The President: I think your question per- 
haps could be better answered by my discuss- 
ing the policy toward bombing of civilian in- 
stallations in North Viet-Nam generally and 
then coming down to the specifics of your 
question in giving the general answer. 

Some of you who were in Texas with me 
will recall that that question was raised at the 
Connally ranch and it was raised, actually, by 
an advocate of bombing dikes, as to why we 
did not bomb dikes. And I said it had not 
been U.S. policy even before the bombing halt 
of 1968 to bomb the dikes, that it was not our 
policy now, that it would not be in the future, 
because it is the policy of the United States 
in all of its activities against North Viet- 
Nam to direct its attacks against military 
targets only. 

That was the policy in the sixties, and it is 
now the policy since we have had to resume 



the bombing for the purposes that I men- 
tioned in my speech of May 8.^ 

Now, with regard to the situation on the 
dikes, let us understand what we are con- 
fronted with here. This is approximately a 
2,700-mile chain of installations, including 
perhaps a half-dozen major dams which are 
the heart of the system and then peripheral 
areas getting down to mounds which have, 
of course, the purpose of controlling the 
floodwaters in that particular area. 

If it were the policy of the United States 
to bomb the dikes, we could take them out, 
the significant part of them out, in a week. 
We don't do so for the reasons that I have 
mentioned: because we are trying to avoid 
civilian casualties, not cause them. 

Now, with regard to the reports, reports 
that have come from Hanoi that there had 
been some damage to some parts of the dike 
system, I think it is important to note two 
things : One, there has been no report of any 
flooding; second, there has been no report of 
any strikes on the major dike areas. 

What I am referring to is the big dams 
which are the heart of the system. There 
have been reports of incidental damage to 
some of the peripheral installations in this 
2,700-mile system which covers the country 
of North Viet-Nam. 

Now, under these circumstances, I think 
that it is well to keep in context, first, what 
our policy is, and second, what its effect has 
been. Our policy is not to bomb civilian in- 
stallations, and second, our restraint, it seems 
to me, rather than being subject to criticisms, 



^ For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



August 21, 1972 



201 



should be subject to objective analysis and, it 
seems to me, a considerable amount of sup- 
port. 

As far as this matter is concerned, I think, 
too, it is time to strip away the double stand- 
ard. I noted with interest that the Secretary 
General of the U.N., just like his predecessor, 
seized upon this enemy-inspired propaganda, 
which has taken in many well-intentioned 
and naive people, to attack what he called the 
American bombing of civilian installations 
and risking civilian lives, and yet not raising 
one word against deliberate bombing of civil- 
ian installations in South Viet-Nam. 

Now, just so the record will be kept 
straight — and it should be stated at this 
point — all of you ladies and gentlemen of 
course are aware of it, and you have printed 
it, and perhaps you will see fit to again in 
this context: 

I just got a cable from Ambassador [Ells- 
worth] Bunker. I had asked him what had 
happened to civilians in the new offensive. 
You recall in my speech of May 8, I said that 
20,000 civilian casualties, including women 
and children, had resulted because of the 
deliberate shelling of the cities and the 
slaughtering of refugees indiscriminately by 
the North Vietnamese. 

The number is now 45,000, including 
women and children, of which 15,000 are 
dead. 

I asked him for the number of refugees. 
It is higher than I had thought. There have 
been 860,000 made homeless by the North 
Vietnamese invasion of South Viet-Nam, this 
newest invasion to date; 600,000 of them are 
still in refugee camps, away from their 
homes. 

Looking back over the period of this very 
difficult war, we find that since 1965 there 
have been 600,000 civilian casualties in South 
Viet-Nam as a result of deliberate policy of 
the North Vietnamese Communists, not acci- 
dental, but deliberate. 

And in North Viet-Nam, in the period 
from 1954 to 1956, in their so-called land 
reform program, a minimum of 50,000 were 
murdered, assassinated, and according to the 



Catholic Bishop of Da Nang, whom I talked 
to when I was there in 1956 in South Viet- 
Nam, in addition to the 800,000 refugees who 
came south, there were at least a half million 
who died in slave labor camps in North Viet- 
Nam. 

Now, I do not relate this series of incidents 
for the purpose of saying, because they did 
something bad we can do something bad. 

What I am simply saying is, let's not have 
a hypocritical double standard. The United 
States has been restrained — greater re- 
straint than any great power has ever shown 
— in handling this war. We will continue to 
be restrained. We have to do what is neces- 
sary against military targets in order to ac- 
complish the objectives that I have described 
in my goal — in my speech of May 8. 

But on the other hand, as far as this partic- 
ular matter is concerned, I can only say that 
if damage did occur that we are making 
every possible effort to see that it will not 
occur again, which gets to your question. 
Military commanders, aircraft commanders 
and so forth, in terms of where military tar- 
gets are, are instructed to avoid civilian 
damage where they can. 

That is why some targets in the heart of 
Hanoi, for example, major power installa- 
tions, fuel installations, in the heart of Hanoi 
have not been hit: because I have not wanted 
to have civilian casualties if we could possibly 
avoid it. 

I will simply close by sasang that this is a 
major propaganda campaign; it is one that 
does concern us. But let us keep the record 
straight. In the event that the United States 
followed the course of action recommended 
by some of those who have voted for the so- 
called end-the-war resolution in the Senate of 
the United States, it would mean that there 
would be visited upon South Viet-Nam the 
same atrocities that were visited upon North 
Viet-Nam, with perhaps at least a million 
marked for assassination because they had 
fought against the North Vietnamese attempt 
to conquer South Viet-Nam. 

I will add one other thing. As far as the 
negotiations are concerned, we are negotiat- 



202 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing. We have negotiated in public. We have 
had one private conference a week ago, last- 
ing approximately six hours. We hope to 
continue to negotiate. 

We have made fair offers on withdrawal, 
on cease-fire, on political settlement. We have 
not made them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 

We made fair offers on exchange of pris- 
oners of war and accounting for missing in 
action everyplace in Southeast Asia. 

But having done this, there is one thing 
that we have not offered, and this is the one 
hangup in the settlement today. That is the 
demand of the enemy indirectly or directly 
to do what they cannot accomplish them- 
selves, impose a Communist government in 
South Viet-Nam. That would be the height 
of immorality, to impose on the 17 million 
people of South Viet-Nam a Communist gov- 
ernment with the bloodbath that would 
follow. 

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned a politi- 
cal settlement. What do you foresee as a 
possibility withotit necessarily elections — do 
you see the two factions in South Viet-Nam 
coming together in some kind of an agree- 
ment without an election as one possible solu- 
tion in the Paris talks ? 

The President: That is a very perceptive 
question, but it is one that I think any of you 
here would agree that I should not comment 
upon for the reason that negotiations are 
now underway. I have read these long nego- 
tiating sessions — the public ones, of course, 
and even more important, the private ones — 
in great detail. At a time that matters are 
being discussed, it is not well for me to state 
anything with regard to what has happened 
in the negotiations. 

I will only say that we are negotiating with 
the desire of ending this war as soon as pos- 
sible. The fastest way to end the war and the 
best way to end it is through negotiation. We 
would hope that public figures in their com- 
ments will not do anything to undercut the 
negotiations, that Congress, in its actions, 
will not in effect give a message to the enemy, 
"Don't negotiate with the present adminis- 



tration; wait for us; we will give you what 
you want. South Viet-Nam." 

Q. Mr. President, to follow up the first 
question if I may, there had been reports that 
SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites have been 
put on top of some of those dikes or dams. 
Does your policy rule out the bombing of that 
particular area ivhere there are SAM sites? 

The President: I have seen those reports, 
Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily 
News]. As you know, the Secretary of De- 
fense has made some indirect comment about 
it. The situation there is one that we would 
lean against the taking out of SAM sites on 
targets that would result in civilian casual- 
ties of a substantial amount. 

However, I have not seen in recent days 
any reports indicating that any such SAM 
sites have been hit and in view of the present 
debate, I think we are going to be very care- 
ful with regard to hitting them. We would 
do so only if we had to do so in order to pro- 
tect American fliers who otherwise would be 
hit down by the SAM's. 



Q. Mr. President, are we to understand 
perhaps that now that "Stop Bombing the 
Dikes" has been made a political slogan this 
year, that perhaps those ivho have gotten 
behind it have not thoroughly checked the 
background of those accusations? 

The President: I did not use the word 
"naive" unintentionally. The North Vietnam- 
ese are very skillful at propaganda. They 
have, of course, brought those who have been 
invited into the country to the areas where 
they have found bomb damage. They have 
not gone to any great pains to fill those holes, 
which they would naturally want to do 
before the possibility of rain and flood again 
comes to the North. 

In my view, this is a deliberate attempt on 
the part of the North Vietnamese to create 
an extraneous issue, to divert attention from 
one of the most barbaric invasions in history, 
compounded by a violation of all concepts of 
international law in handling the prisoners 



August 21, 1972 



203 



of war. For them, with their policy of delib- 
erate murder and assassination, and other- 
wise attacks on civilians for the purpose of 
killing civilians, for them to try to seize on 
this and divert attention from them, first, to 
me it is a patent propaganda effort, and it is 
one that I think needs to be answered. 

We have to, of course, be responsible for 
what we do. But it is time that in this ter- 
ribly difficult war some Americans, or that 
most of us, should perhaps realize that when 
we talk about morality that it is never an 
easy question. 

If I can digress for a moment, then I will 
come to your followup question on the other 
matter. I remember one of the first conversa- 
tions I had with President Eisenhower about 
war. We were riding back from Quantico. 
You may remember it. Charlie Wilson [then 
Secretary of Defense] used to have those 
meetings in Quantico of the Defense Estab- 
lishment people. He asked me to ride back 
with him. It was very early in the adminis- 
tration, in the first year. 

He was talking a little about the decisions 
he had to make in World War II. One of the 
questions I raised with him was: Here, on 
our part, the deliberate bombing of German 
cities, the tragedy of Dresden, of Essen, of 
Hamburg, not to mention Berlin. General 
Eisenhower said that was a terribly difficult 
decision for us, the strategic bombing of ci- 
vilians in Germany. But he said, "On the 
moral question, we had to answer to our- 
selves this fundamental problem." He said, 
"The height of immorality would be to allow 
Hitler to rule Europe." 

Now, in our case we have not gone that far. 
We are not going to bomb civilian targets in 
the North. We are not using the great power 
that could finish off North Viet-Nam in an 
afternoon, and we will not. But it would be 
the height of immorality for the United 
States at this point to leave Viet-Nam and in 
leaving to turn over to the North Vietnamese 
the fate of 17 million South Vietnamese who 
do not want a Communist government, to 
turn it over to them. 

That is what this is about. That is the only 



issue that is left. Those who say "End the 
war" really should name their resolution 
"Prolong the war." They should name it 
"Prolong the war," not because they delib- 
erately want to; they want to end the war, 
just as I do. But we have to face this fact: 
We have only one President at a time, as I 
said in 1968. At that time, as you may recall, 
I was pressed quite often by you ladies and 
gentlemen, "What do you think we ought 
to do about negotiations?" I didn't think 
there was much chance for successful nego- 
tiations then. 

But I said, I thought quite correctly, we 
have only one President, and I didn't want to 
destroy any chance he might have to end this 
war. At this point, the chance for a nego- 
tiated settlement is better now than it has 
ever been. Oh, it is not sure, and I am not 
going to raise any false hopes, but the enemy 
is failing in its military offensive, although 
there is still some hard fighting to take place 
in the Quang Tri-Hue area, but the enemy 
also is, of course, suffering the consequences 
of our mining action and cutting the roads 
and the other systems that would bring in 
supplies to North Viet-Nam. 

Under these circumstances, the enemy — 
because also we have made a very fair offer 
— has every incentive to negotiate. But when 
you put yourself in the position of the enemy 
and then they hear that the Congress of the 
United States says, in effect, "We will give 
you what you want regardless of what the 
President has offered," why not wait? This 
is the problem, and I would hope that as 
Senators and Congressmen consult their con- 
sciences they would realize that we have just 
three months left before the election. In 
those three months we hope to do everything 
we can to bring this war to an end, and they 
should take no action which would jeopardize 
those negotiations. I can only say that the 
resolutions to this point cannot help. They 
can only confuse the enemy, at best; and at 
the worst, they will prolong the war. 



Q. What impact on American policy in the 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East is the xvithdrawal of Soviet per- 
sonnel from Egypt likely to have? 

The President: This question I noticed has 
been reflected on by some lower level ofiicials 
in the government, but not — because Secre- 
tary Rogers and I have talked about this mat- 
ter and Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, 
Assistant to the President for National Se- 
curity Affairs] and I— not by us. For this 
reason: Our goal, as you know, is a just 
settlement in the Middle East. The situation 
there is still one that is not clear; and any 
comment upon it, first, might possibly be er- 
roneous, and second, could very well be harm- 
ful to our goal of a just settlement. 

So I am not trying to dodge your question, 
but I just do not think it would be helpful to 
our goal of a just settlement in the Middle 
East. It might exacerbate the problem by 
trying to evaluate what happened between 
[Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat and the 
Soviet leaders. 



Q. Mr. President, on the bombing of the 
dikes and dams, ivould you say that you have 
been resisting pressure from the military to 
bomb such installations? 

The President: No. The pressure does not 
come from the military. I have talked this 
over with Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. 
Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] 
and naturally General Abrams [Gen. Creigh- 
ton W. Abrams, former Commander, U.S. 
Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam]. 
As a matter of fact, let me just say one thing 
about our military, because somebody ought 
to speak up for it now and then. 

We get the idea they are a bunch of sav- 
age flyboys and they love to get down and 
machinegun innocent little civilians and all 
the rest. 

We can be very proud of our military, not 
only the men that are flying, they are brave 
and courageous, but the men on the ground. 
We can be very proud of the Marines, all of 
them have gone now, for what they have 
done — the Marines, the Army, the ground 



soldiers — for the civilians and refugees 
there. It is a story of generosity in a country 
that has never been equaled by American 
fighting men or anybody else. 

As far as our military commanders are 
concerned, while they do give me their judg- 
ment as to what will affect the military out- 
come in Viet-Nam, they have never recom- 
mended, for example, bombing Hanoi. You 
have seen some of those signs "Bomb Hanoi," 
in fact, they were around in '68 even, a few, 
as well as '64. 

Our military don't want to do that. They 
believe it would be counterproductive, and 
second, they believe it is not necessary. It 
might shorten the war, but it would leave a 
legacy of hatred throughout that part of the 
world from which we might never recover. 
So our military have not advocated bombing 
the dikes; they have not advocated bombing 
civilian centers. They are doing their best to 
carry out the policy we want of hitting mili- 
tary targets only. 

When, as a result of what will often hap- 
pen, a bomb is dropped, if it is in an area of 
injury to civilians, it is not by intent, and 
there is a very great difference. 



153d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Ambassa- 
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 153d plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on August 3. 

Press release 190 dated August 3 

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 

Ladies and gentlemen: I have some pre- 
liminary remarks. 

It is a derogation of the serious purpose of 
these meetings that your statements today 
have resorted to invective against the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

Your attempts to vilify President Nixon, 



August 21, 1972 



205 



as well as your continual slanders against 
the person of President Thieu, neither en- 
hance your arguments nor strengthen the 
prospect of useful negotiations. 

You would be well advised to abstain from 
egregious insult and to concentrate instead 
on the issues. 

I have concluded these preliminary re- 
marks and will now take up other matters. 



OPENING REMARKS 

Ladies and gentlemen: Because the sub- 
ject is very important in terms of relief for 
the people of Viet-Nam from the terrible 
burdens which the war has imposed on them, 
I shall continue to stress the advantages 
which would result immediately to them — 
that is, to the people — if you would accept 
President Nixon's May 8 proposals for cease- 
fire and prisoner release.^ Just consider for 
a moment: Under international supervision, 
military activities in the South and against 
the North, and indeed throughout Indochina, 
would come to a halt. The general benefit to 
be derived is obvious. Vietnamese could then 
proceed among themselves to deal with the 
complex problems of a political nature in an 
atmosphere far more conducive to success 
than one in which military activities con- 
tinue unabated. Thus, a cooling-off period 
would enable all parties to approach each 
other in a rational search for common 
ground. 

By contrast, proposals such as those you 
have advocated in these meetings, which 
would put cease-fire at the end of a long, 
complex, and psychologically difficult process, 
seem to us to hold far fewer advantages. In- 
deed, they may contain the seeds of further 
strife. The need to cool off, to turn off the 
fighting, is made obvious even here in this 
very room where, because of the passions 
engendered by years of struggle, you refuse 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



to speak to and reason with the representa- 
tives of the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam. 

I cannot help thinking that you have lost 
great opportunities at this table. 

There are, additionally, many serious ob- 
stacles to progress in the process you have in 
mind. For example, you demand the dis- 
mantling of much of the state administration 
of the Government of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam as one of the preconditions to negotia- 
tions between your side and the government 
in Saigon. The psychological and practical 
obstacles to such change stagger the imagina- 
tion, but I understand that is your attitude 
toward the problem. If I misstate it, please 
correct me. 

To cite another problem, there are aspects 
in your proposals which most certainly bear 
adversely on both the principle of self-deter- 
mination for the South Vietnamese people 
and on the implementation of that principle. 

Weighing heavily on the entire process 
you have proposed here is the fact that you 
envisage no cease-fire until everything is 
agreed to your satisfaction. During the proc- 
ess of achieving preconditions to negotia- 
tions and then negotiations for a three- 
element government, you would leave tens of 
thousands of heavily armed men maneuver- 
ing as they are at present, and the killing 
would go on unchecked. 

For these reasons, I regret to say that 
with the passage of time your seven points 
and the two "clarifications" seem more re- 
mote than ever from political and military 
reality. To us, the simpler course offered by 
our proposals of May 8, with their built-in 
cooling-off period resulting from cease-fire at 
the outset and the immediate commencement 
of full exchanges between your side and ours 
on political and military matters, offers a far 
better probability of leading to an acceptable 
outcome of a lasting nature. Think of the 
Vietnamese people rather than of unattain- 
able goals. This is a time when even the great 
quality of courage should give way to com- 
mon sense. 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



North Viet-Nam: The Dike Bombing Issue 



Follotving is the text of a report released 
to the press by the Department on July 28. 

In recent weeks Hanoi has tried to con- 
vince the world that its elaborate dike sys- 
tem is a direct and deliberate target of US 
attacks. This is not true. Photographic evi- 
dence shows conclusively that there has been 
no intentional bombing of the dikes. A few 
dikes have been hit by stray bombs directed 
at military-associated targets nearby. The 
damage is minor and no major dike has been 
breached. The damage can be easily re- 
paired — in a matter of a few days — and has 
not been sufficient to cause any flooding. No 
damage has been observed in the Hanoi area 
or against the primary dike system protect- 
ing that city. Hanoi no doubt is genuinely 
concerned about the dike system. North 
Vietnam's rainy season will soon reach its 
peak and damage in the dikes caused by last 
year's very extensive flooding have not yet 
been fully repaired. 

North Vietnam's Water Control System 

1. North Vietnam's elaborate network of 
dikes, dams, and locks controls the water of 
the heavily populated Red River Delta. The 
delta farmland depends on irrigation during 
the dry months and is endangered by flooding 
in the wet months. The country's major 
transportation waterways — the Red River, 
the Thai Binh River, and the connecting 
Canal des Rapides and Canal des Bambous — 
link the principal urban centers. Fertilizer, 
foodstuffs, petroleum, and other commodi- 
ties are moved, in part, by these waterways, 
as is the coal mined in the Hon Gai and Cam 
Pha areas. Southern North Vietnam also 
contains rivers necessitating a dike and lock 
system for water control and navigation, but 



the system is less important than that of the 
delta. 

2. Dikes to control flooding and the course 
of the waterways are most fully developed 
along the Red River. The Red River system 
begins near Viet Tri, only 43 feet above sea 
level, although about 100 miles inland. The 
great amount of silt brought down from the 
mountains and deposited along the river beds 
in the delta has raised the waterways above 
the surrounding countryside in many places 
and requires a constant elevation of the re- 
straining walls. In some ai'eas — particularly 
around Hanoi — the height of the dikes 
reaches 40 feet. Some are as broad as 80 
feet at the flood line and spread to 200 feet 
at the base. A secondary system between 4 
and 22 feet high running parallel to the main 
dikes is designed to localize and minimize 
damage if the primary dikes are breached. A 
tertiary system of smaller dikes divides the 
rice-growing plains into compartments, as- 
sists irrigation, and controls the level of small 
streams and local waterways. In addition, 
small natural or man-made dikes along the 
coast keep out brackish sea water. 

3. Dams and locks play a lesser role. Only 
a few large dams are constructed of concrete 
with gates to permit passage of watercraft, 
and only one major waterway in the Red 
River Delta has navigation locks to control 
water levels and facilitate transport. 

Recurring Floods 

4. The rivers rise to a seasonal peak dur- 
ing July and August, when unusually heavy 
rains frequently cause breaches in the levees. 
Extensive floods and destruction to property 
and agricultural crops result. Although there 
have been only a few major breaches since 



August 21, 1972 



207 



the mid-1940s, minor breaks occur almost 
every year. 

5. The floods of last August rank with the 
most serious ever recorded. Four major 
breaches occurred in the primary dikes along 
the Red River. An estimated 1.1 million acres 
of riceland — a quarter of the country's rice 
acreage — were seriously flooded and the 
entire crop in that area destroyed. Storms 
took out a half-mile section of a levee outside 
Hanoi and closed the railroad north to Dong 
Dang. The area of heavy flooding continued 
to expand through late September, probably 
because prolonged soaking and high water 
pressure had undermined the secondary dike 
systems. 

6. Apart from immediate rice losses, the 
floods produced extensive longer term physi- 
cal damage. The enormous force of water 
unleashed through breaches in the primary 
dikes caused widespread erosion far beyond 
obvious scouring effects near the breaks. 
Long stretches of irrigation canals were cut, 
and the press reported many washed-out 
pumping stations. Flood water everywhere 
deposited silt in drainage ditches. The pro- 
longed inundation during the floods may have 
caused subtle undermining of the primary 
dike systems that will not show until late this 
summer. The possibility that the dike sys- 
tem has been weakened thus adds to this 
year's flooding threat. 

Resiliency of the System to Bombing 

7. North Vietnam's water control system 
includes a large number of widely dispersed 
individual components which could be sub- 
stantially affected only by a large-scale, coor- 
dinated air offensive. Such attacks would be 
necessary against specific locks, dams, and 
dike areas, and bomb damage would have 
effect only during the relatively short periods 
of high water. Even then, the North Viet- 
namese, long accustomed to battling against 
floods, could be expected to act promptly to 
mend breaches in the system. 

8. Damage to the locks would have little 
effect on either North Vietnam's transport or 
its water control systems. Inland craft could 



be diverted to waterways not dependent on 
locks, and some cargoes could be sent by the 
many alternative land routes. Accidental 
bomb damage during the 1965-68 period 
made some locks inoperative, but had little 
effect on water transport or flooding in the 
area. Similarly, breaching of dams, even 
during pei-iods of high water, would not 
cause significant disruption because most are 
small and easily repaired. 

9. Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb 
damage. Those in the primary system could 
be breached only by a series of overlapping 
craters across the entire top of a dike, and 
the lips of the craters would have to be suffi- 
ciently lower than the river surface to initi- 
ate the flow and subsequent scouring action 
of water rushing through the breach. The 
dikes along the Red River near Hanoi are 
approximately 80 feet wide at the flood line. 

Hanoi's Claims Versus Actual Damage 

10. North Vietnam's official press agencies 
and radio services have repeatedly described 
alleged US bombing attacks on the dike sys- 
tem. In April and May, the North Vietnam- 
ese made more than 40 specific allegations, 
and on 30 June the official press quoted the 
Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that 
20 bombing attacks had been made on dikes 
during that month. Foreign diplomats, news- 
men, and, most recently, actress Jane Fonda 
have been escorted to dikes to view damage — 
most of it around Hai Duong, southeast of 
Hanoi. 

11. A detailed examination has been made 
of photography of mid-July of the North 
Vietnamese Red River Delta and bomb cra- 
ters were detected at 12 locations. None of 
the damage has been in the Hanoi area, 
where destruction of the dikes would result 
in the greatest damage to North Vietnam's 
economy and logistics effort. Nearly all the 
damage has been scattered downstream from 
Hanoi, as well as downstream from the areas 
of major breaks resulting from the 1971 
floods. 

12. There are no signs of destruction of 
vital dike portions stretching to a length of 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



several kilometers — as reported by Hanoi- 
based newsmen. In comparison to the dikes, 
the craters are small, and no flooding has oc- 
curred as a result of the damage. Although 
water levels are not yet at their highest, the 
absence of leakage through the craters indi- 
cates that damage was limited. 

13. All identified points of dike damage 
are located within close range of specific 
targets of military value. Of the 12 loca- 
tions where damage has occurred, 10 are 
close to identified individual targets such as 
petroleum storage facilities, and the other 
two are adjacent to road and river transport 
lines. Because a large number of North Viet- 
namese dikes serve as bases for roadways, 
the maze they create throughout the delta 
makes it almost inevitable that air attacks 
directed against transportation targets cause 
scattered damage to dikes. 

14. The bomb craters verified by photog- 
raphy can be repaired easily with a mini- 
mum of local labor and equipment — a crew 
of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and 
hand tools could repair in a day the largest 
crater observed. Repairs to all the dikes 
could be completed within a week, as the 
necessary equipment is available throughout 
the delta. Local labor historically mobilizes 
to strengthen and repair dikes to avoid se- 
rious flooding. An occasional bomb falling on 
a dike does not add significantly to the bur- 
den of annual repair work normally required. 
North Vietnam must, however, complete the 
repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods 
before next month when this year's rainy 
season will reach its peak. 



Mr. Williams To Coordinate U.S. Aid 
for Philippines Disaster Relief 

Press release 188 dated July 31 

Secretary Rogers, reflecting the concern of 
President Nixon for the plight of millions of 
flood victims in the Philippines, announced 
on July 31 that Maurice J. Williams, Deputy 
Administrator of the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, has been designated to 



coordinate all U.S. Government relief and re- 
construction assistance to that country. 

The flood emergency in the Island of 
Luzon, described as the worst disaster to 
strike that nation since World War II, has 
caused almost 300 deaths, displaced more 
than 3 million people from their homes, and 
damaged public property, housing, and agri- 
cultural investment estimated at more than 
$300 million. 

President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Phil- 
ippines has declared the entire Island of 
Luzon a disaster area and has appealed for 
$50 million from the world community to 
help that island recover from the typhoons 
and floods resulting from almost continuous 
heavy rains since July 7. 

The Philippines Ambassador, Eduardo 
Romualdez, on July 27 visited Dr. John A. 
Hannah, AID Administrator, to transmit 
President Marcos' appeal for help. 

Mr. Williams was selected as coordinator 
for the humanitarian effort in the Philippines 
because of his experience as coordinator of 
relief and rehabilitation assistance for Ban- 
gladesh. Mr. Williams also was head of an 
interdepartmental disaster reljef working 
group appointed in November 1970 to pro- 
vide help to areas stricken by the great cy- 
clone wave which swept up from the Bay of 
Bengal at that time. 

Through July 31, AID had authorized 
$550,000 in disaster funds to finance the U.S. 
Government relief eff'ort in the Philippines 
and had diverted approximately 5,000 metric 
tons of Food for Peace from other programs 
for distribution in the stricken country. The 
food, valued at more than $1 million, is in 
addition to the more than 6,000 metric tons 
already programed for distribution in the 
Philippines. 

President Marcos' appeal for an additional 
$50 million was directed to countries and or- 
ganizations which attended the meeting in 
June of the Consultative Group for the Phil- 
ippines. The countries and organizations are 
Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Yugoslavia, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, the Asian Develop- 



August 21, 1972 



209 



ment Bank, the United Nations Develop- 
ment Program, and the World Bank. 

The 700-square-mile flooded area was first 
hit June 25 by a typhoon and then by severe 
rainstorms, which have destroyed most of 
the crops in Luzon, a major agricultural 
area, including the all-important rice crop, 
apparently a total loss. Serious food short- 
ages have resulted. 

The U.S. Government, through AID, al- 
ready is financing a U.S. naval air operation 
which is distributing food, clothing, and 
other emergency relief supplies to the flood 
victims. Under the AID-financed operation, 
the U.S.S. Tripoli, a helicopter carrier oper- 
ating in the Lingayen Gulf, is airlifting sup- 
plies to Luzon. 

Also as part of the relief program, the U.S. 
Navy is producing 10,000 nutri-buns a day 
at the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay for 
distribution to the flood victims. Nutri-buns 
are high-protein biscuits made of enriched 
and fortified wheat flour, vegetable oil, and 
non-fat dry milk. 



President Nixon Exchanges Greetings 
With Prime Minister Meir of Israel 

Following is the transcript of a telephone 
conversation between President Nixon and 
Prime Minister Golda Meir which was 
broadcast live in Israel on July 26 during a 
television program marking the inaugura- 
tion of a communications satellite ground 
station at Emeq Ha'ela. 

White House press release dated July 26 

The Prime Minister: Hello. 

The President: Hello, Madam Prime Min- 
ister. 

The Prime Minister: Mr. President, sha- 
lom. 

The President: Thank you very much. 1 
want you to know that as I speak here 
from the Oval Office, where you and I have 
met so many times, that I extend the very 
best wishes of all of the people of the 
United States to all of the people of Israel. 



I think this program, as I saw the coun- 
tries you were talking to, instead of being 
called "Around the World in 80 Days," 
could be called "Around the World in 60 
Minutes." 

The Prime Minister: That is right. Mr. 
President, it is extremely kind of you to 
take time off and speak to us. I can only 
tell you that the best wishes of all the peo- 
ple of Israel, appreciation, and all the 
friendship that we can express goes out to 
you and the people of the United States. 

I remember the Oval Room very well, 
always with a great feeling of satisfaction 
and appreciation and joy and thankfulness 
that you have always taken so much of your 
time to listen to my long stories of troubles 
and wishes and so on. But I must say I al- 
ways came out with the right answers. 

The President: Madam Prime Minister, 
I want you to know that you, needless to 
say, are always welcome here. I only regret 
that while I have visited Israel on other oc- 
casions I have never been able to do so as 
President, but you can be sure that we will 
continue to work together for what you are 
interested in, what we are interested in, and 
that is a just peace in the Mideast which 
will protect the integrity of Israel, for 
which your people have suffered so much 
and sacrificed so much. 

The Prime Minister: Thank you very, 
very much. It is easier to face difficulties 
when you speak as you do, and I know what 
you have done, so thank you very much. 
There is a large group here. They are all 
smiling, and they are all happy to hear your 
voice. 

The President: I want to say just one last 
thing. I think the fact that we do have this 
new television communication will mean 
that the programs that will be carried from 
Israel to the United States, and from the 
United States to Israel, will mean that more 
of our people here will have an opportunity 
not only to see Israel by television but per- 
haps to go there as tourists and we hope 
that more people from Israel can come here. 
We hope that will be one of the dividends 
of this new program. 



210 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



The Prime Minister: This is a commercial 
that will work both ways. 

The President: That's right. That's right. 
I know that I have enjoyed my visits, and 
we want you and any of your friends to 
know they are always welcome here in our 
country. 

The Prime Minister: Thank you very, 
very much. 

The President: Thank you. We look for- 
ward to seeing you. Goodby. 

The Prime Minister: Goodby. 



President Appoints John Connally 
to Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 

The President announced on August 3 
(White House press release) the appoint- 
ment of former Texas Governor John B. 
Connally as a member of the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The 
appointment was effective as of August 1. 
Governor Connally previously served on the 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 
December 1, 1970, until his appointment as 
Secretary of the Treasury February 11, 
1971. He served as Secretary of the Treas- 
ury until June 12, 1972. (For further bio- 
graphic data, see White House press release 
dated August 3.) 

The present Foreign Intelligence Ad- 
visory Board was reconstituted and reorga- 
nized by President Nixon on March 20, 1969. 
It was originally established by President 
Eisenhower in 1956 as the President's Board 
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac- 
tivities and was continued by Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson as the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

Composed of a nonpartisan group of dis- 
tinguished private citizens, the Board per- 
forms a continuing review of all foreign in- 
telligence and related activities conducted by 



the departments and agencies of the U.S. 
Government. It is responsible for advising 
the President on the overall national intelli- 
gence effort and for recommending to him 
appropriate measures to increase the effec- 
tiveness of the U.S. intelligence community. 

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
is composed of 11 members, including Gov- 
ernor Connally, and is chaired by Adm. 
George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), for- 
mer Chief of Naval Operations and U.S. 
Ambassador to Portugal. The Executive 
Secretary of the Board is Gerard P. Burke. 

In announcing the appointment of Gov- 
ernor Connally, the President noted the 
highly important role of intelligence in the 
overall national security of the United 
States and emphasized his reliance on the 
Board for nonpartisan objective appraisals 
of all the foreign intelligence activities of 
the government. 



Secretary Rogers Hails French Seizure 
of Heroin Laboratories 

Folloiving is a statement by Secretary 
Rogers, who is Chairman of President 
Nixon's Cabinet Committee on International 
Narcotics Control, ivhich was read to news 
correspondents on July 21 by Charles W. 
Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

The seizure yesterday of a third set of 
heroin-manufacturing equipment in France 
in less than a week represents an extraor- 
dinary achievement by French authorities 
and is a very substantial contribution to the 
effort to stop international narcotics traffick- 
ing. We are grateful to the French and to 
others who share with us an appreciation of 
the need for a united international effort to 
deal with what President Nixon has called 
"public enemy number one." 



August 21, 1972 



211 



International Aspects of Weather Modification 



Statement by Herman Pollack 

Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs 



My presentation this morning will first 
recount the interest and actions of the De- 
partment of State in recent years regarding 
policy on weather modification, a topic cen- 
tral to the resolution which is the subject of 
this hearing.- Against that background I 
will then comment on the broader scope of 
the resolution. 

The State Department follows closely the 
development of all new technologies which 
appear to have the potential of impacting on 
the international affairs of the United States. 

Quite frequently when a new branch of 
technology is in its early developmental 
phase it is not possible to define with any pre- 
cision its future impact, much less to be sure 
whether its impact will be primarily benefi- 
cial or primarily harmful. At early stages 
of development, the facts necessary to make 
such a judgment are simply not at hand. 
Under the circumstances, the formulation of 
general policy is premature and we estab- 
lish a "watching brief." When the develop- 
ment of the technology reaches an appropri- 
ate stage, the Secretary's attention is drawn 
to it and the analysis and formulation of 
policy gets seriously underway. 

The State Department approach to weather 



^ Made before the Subcommittee on Oceans and 
International Environment of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on July 26. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

° S. Res. 281 proposes an international treaty pro- 
hibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical 
modification activity as a weapon of war. 



modification has followed essentially that 
pattern. Parenthetically I might say that the 
art — if I may call it that — of climate, earth- 
quake, or ocean modification is not yet at a 
point where even a watching brief, as we use 
the term, is in order. These are areas of 
great paucity of scientific data and under- 
standing. 

Returning now to weather modification, as 
you know, experiments on the modification of 
clouds through seeding with various agents 
started shortly after the end of the Second 
World War, and by the early 1960's it 
seemed likely that this technology, when fur- 
ther developed and when more answers were 
known, might someday produce vast benefits 
through enhancing rainfall and might also 
pose new tasks in international relations. At 
about the same time, the first efforts to 
moderate the intensity of hurricanes through 
seeding were initiated. It was these develop- 
ments, nearly 10 years ago, that caused the 
State Department to establish its watching 
brief on weather modification; and responsi- 
bility for maintaining this brief was assigned 
to the Bureau which I head. 

In the period 1968 to 1970 several develop- 
ments occurred which made it clear that 
weather modification was progressing be- 
yond the early experimental phase and was 
approaching the stage where at least a few 
types of human intervention in weather proc- 
esses might well be approaching operational 
status. Among these developments I will 
mention three in particular: 

— The studies of the Department of the In- 
terior showed that proper seeding of winter 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



clouds might enhance the snowpack in the 
Colorado River Valley by perhaps 20 or 30 
percent. Such an achievement would en- 
hance the fresh water available in the whole 
river valley during the spring and summer 
months. 

— The experiments of Dr. Joanne Simpson 
and her associates at the NOAA [National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] 
laboratory in Miami produced manifold in- 
creases in the rainfall from isolated tropi- 
cal cumulus clouds. 

— The experiments known as Project 
Stormfury, aimed at moderation of violent 
hurricanes, appear to have produced their 
first substantially positive results in a series 
of experiments on Hurricane Debbie of 1969. 

This combination of events provided us 
with some of the information needed for the 
development of policy to control or facilitate 
the impact of this new technology. I have at 
hand the memorandum which I sent to Secre- 
tary Rogers on November 16, 1970, inform- 
ing him that the time had come for the 
watching brief on weather modification to be 
replaced by a more active study of the impli- 
cations for our foreign policy. It reported 
that: 

. . . U.S. scientists who have heretofore been very 
cautious and gruarded in their assessment of prog- 
ress in this field are now showing visible signs of 
excitement at recent events. This is especially so 
with regard to the highly successful seeding of 
cumulus clouds in tropical areas for the purpose of 
increasing rainfall. Equally a source of excitement 
is the mounting evidence that the force of hurricanes 
and typhoons can be lessened by seeding techniques. 

Clouds and storms are unconscious of sovereignty. 
International law on weather modification is prac- 
tically non-existent. The problems that operational 
weather modification technology will pose to this 
Department and the foreign offices of the world are 
therefore self-evident. 

Steps are under way to set up intra-Department 
and inter-agency committees to develop plans and 
policies for the international reception of this new 
technology. 

Shortly thereafter, in a statement to the 
House Committee on Science and Astronau- 
tics, Secretary Rogers made particular men- 
tion of weather modification as a potential 



boon in assisting the economic problems of 
the developing nations.^ He also pointed to 
the need to consider international arrange- 
ments to deal with the applications of this 
new phenomenon. I was pleased to note, Mr. 
Chairman [Senator Claiborne Pell] , that you 
quoted this section of Secretary Rogers' state- 
ment in your speech on the Senate floor last 
March 17. 

The interagency study to which I referred 
in my memorandum to the Secretary got 
underway in the spring of 1971. The study, 
which was completed earlier this year, came 
to certain conclusions regarding civilian as- 
pects of weather modification. 

The objective of our programs is to ad- 
vance civilian weather modification research 
and development eflforts and to apply this 
technology for human benefit. To this end, 
we will further international cooperation 
and understanding in this rapidly develop- 
ing field and conduct our programs with 
maximum openness and within the frame- 
work of clear safeguards designed to pro- 
tect the interests of the United States and of 
other countries. With regard to assisting 
other countries, we will cdnsider each re- 
quest on the basis of its own merits. We will 
not, in any case, encourage activities involv- 
ing a high risk of damage or where the 
eflFects cannot be foreseen with reasonable 
assurance. 

Since the science of weather modification 
is still experimental and at an early stage in 
its development, the U.S. Government will 
maintain continuing review of the interna- 
tional aspects of weather modification gen- 
erally. 

The Department of State, with appropri- 
ate interagency support, is instituting and 
overseeing implementation of appropriate 
guidelines for U.S. activities, will review any 
requests from other countries for assistance 
in weather modification activity, and will 
report on policy issues as the need develops. 

As was indicated in Mr. Abshire's [David 
M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congres- 



' For Secretary Rogers' statement on Jan. 26, 1971, 
see Bulletin of Feb. 15, 1971, p. 198. 



August 21, 1972 



213 



sional Relations] letter of May 15, 1972, to 
Senator Fulbright, the study came to no con- 
clusions with respect to international agree- 
ments on military aspects of weather modi- 
fication. 

With respect to climate modification, we 
shall continue research in this area in the 
hope that there may be a potential for human 
benefit. However, no climate modification 
experiment will be conducted until we can 
predict its total impact with great assur- 
ance, and of course, no such activity would 
be conducted without thorough consultations 
among interested agencies and approval at 
the highest levels of government. I might 
observe that it goes without saying that the 
administration would not use techniques for 
climate modification for hostile purposes, 
even should they come to be developed. 

In summary, with respect to S. Res. 
281 and simply stated, we believe that 
there is at present too much uncertainty 
about essential facts and that the factual 
basis itself is insufficient to make possible 
any fundamental decisions on whether a 
treaty dealing with military aspects is fea- 
sible and desirable. For example, how could 
we verify suspected violations or monitor 
compliance by other signatories of an inter- 
national agreement prohibiting the use of 
weather modification, much less climate, 
earthquake, or ocean modification, about 
which we know next to nothing? Further- 
more, how could we distinguish between 
weather modification research and develop- 
ment which is directed toward military appli- 
cation and that which is to be used for purely 
civilian purposes, since the techniques in- 
volved may be the same ? 

Relevant questions such as these will have 
to be answered through further study and re- 
search before it is possible to formulate a 
solid basis for decisions on issues such as are 
raised by S. Res. 281. 

It is therefore our conclusion that actions 
such as those recommended in S. Res. 281 are 
premature. Accordingly, the Department of 
State recommends that this resolution not 
be adopted. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific 
and Technical Cooperation 

Folloiving is an announcement issued by 
the Office of Science and Technology (OST), 
Executive Office of the President, on July 28, 
together tvith the text of the record of dis- 
cussions between U.S. and U.S.S.R. delega- 
tions drafted at Moscow July 7 and signed 
at Washington and Moscow Jidy 28. 



TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT 

Office of Science and Technology press release dated July 28 

American and Soviet officials outlined on 
July 28 six scientific and technological areas 
in which their nations will try to cooperate 
jointly in an attempt to solve common prob- 
lems. 

They are energy, agriculture, chemistry, 
water resources, microbiology, and computer 
usage. All will be taken up by the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation which was called for 
in the Agreement on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Science and Technology signed 
during President Nixon's Moscow summit. 
May 24. The Commission will hold its first 
meeting in Washington in the latter part of 
October. 

The science and technology agreement 
marks the first time the two nations have 
developed an intergovernmental mechanism 
by which they can jointly conduct a broad 
range of scientific and technological efforts 
directed toward common goals. 

A document establishing the framework 
for the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission 
was signed July 28. The document was a 
"Record of Discussions" held between U.S. 
and Soviet delegations in Moscow July 2-8. 

In addition to setting the framework for 
the Joint Commission, the discussions also 
opened the door to possible Soviet partici- 
pation in the U.S.-sponsored deep sea drill- 
ing program, a vastly successful effort to 
study the makeup of the earth's crust by bor- 
ing into the bottoms of the world's oceans. 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 



Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., President Nix- 
on's Science Adviser and the leader of the 
eight-man delegation which worked out the 
details in Moscow earlier in July, signed for 
the United States. The ceremony took place 
at the White House. V. A. Kirillin, Deputy 
Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Minis- 
ters and Dr. David's Soviet counterpart as 
Chairman of the State Committee for Sci- 
ence and Technology (SCST), signed a sim- 
ilar document in Moscow with U.S. Ambas- 
sador Jacob D. Beam in attendance. 

Until now, interactions between American 
and Soviet scientists and technologists were 
conducted under exchange agreements dat- 
ing back to 1958. Primarily, these have 
been exchanges of individuals or delega- 
tions. 

"The new agreement does not supersede 
the current Exchanges Agreement," Dr. 
David said. "In fact, it broadens the exist- 
ing arrangements as well as making possible 
new direct contacts between scientists, agen- 
cies within each government, and between 
American industrial firms and Soviet state 
enterprises." He emphasized that the Com- 
mission will approve and monitor the pres- 
ent areas proposed for cooperation and con- 
sider new possibilities. In all cases, he 
pointed out, the cooperation "will be on the 
basis of mutual benefit, equality, and reci- 
procity." 

The Science and Technology Agreement 
and the Commission are designed to "com- 
bine the efforts of . . . scientists and spe- 
cialists" involved in major problems. It is 
expected that solutions reached jointly will 
be achieved sooner and less expensively than 
if each nation attacked its problems alone. 

Working groups in all six areas have al- 
ready been established on both sides. Each 
group will develop specific proposals for co- 
operative work for consideration at the Com- 
mission's first meeting. 

Areas being considered in the energy 
field include magnetohydrodynamics, fusion 
(thermonuclear), atomic, solar, geothermal, 
and other forms of power generation, as well 
as power transmission and increased genera- 
tion efficiency. 



Agricultural research efforts will be drawn 
from a list of proposals already exchanged. 

Efforts in computer applications will be 
directed toward the use of computers and 
cybernetic techniques for management pur- 
poses. 

Water resources are of interest to both 
governments because of common concerns in 
irrigation, recycling, flood control, ground 
water levels, and other areas. 

In microbiology, the production of protein 
through microbial techniques will be looked 
at as a source of food for both human and 
animal consumption, along with the possible 
synthesis of other substances. 

The Commission's initial ventures into 
chemistry will be in the field of chemical 
catalysis in both basic and applied research. 

The governmental executive agencies re- 
sponsible for the Commission are Dr. David's 
Office of Science and Technology and Minis- 
ter Kirillin's State Committee for Science 
and Technology. 

Another outcome of the negotiations in 
Moscow will be a joint symposium on scien- 
tific and technical information. 

Named Joint Commission members on the 
American side were: Dr. David, Chairman; 
Dr. James B. Fisk, president of the Bell 
Telephone Laboratories; Dean Harvey 
Brooks, National Academy of Sciences and 
Harvard University; Dr. H. Guyford Stever, 
Director of the National Science Foundation ; 
and Herman Pollack, Director of the State 
Department's Bureau of International Scien- 
tific and Technological Affairs. 

Drs. David and Fisk were members of the 
U.S. delegation which went to Moscow July 
2-8, along with Dr. Eugene Fubini of the 
E. G. Fubini Consultants, Ltd., of Arlington, 
Va., and Dr. John V. N. Granger of the 
State Department. 

The Soviet side was represented during 
the July negotiations by Minister Kirillin; 
M. D. Millionshchikov, Vice President of the 
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; V. A. Trapez- 
nikov. First Deputy Chairman of the SCST ; 
and S. M. Tikhomirov, Deputy Chairman of 
the SCST. 

Minister Kirillin, Drs. Trapeznikov and 



August 21, 1972 



215 



Millionshchikov, First Deputy Minister of 
Higher and Secondary Specialized Education 
N. F. Krasnov, and D. N. Pronskiy, Direc- 
tor of the SCST Department of Foreign Re- 
lations, were named as the Soviet members 
of the Joint Commission. 



TEXT OF RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS 

Record of Discussions 

between Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser 
to the President of the United States of America 
and Director of the Office of Science and Tech- 
nology in the Executive Office of the President, 
and Academician V. A. Kirillin, Deputy Chairman 
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and Chairman 
of the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council 
of Ministers for Science and Technology (July 2- 
July 8, 1972). 

Discussions were held between Dr. David and 
Academician Kirillin concerning implementation of 
the Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation 
in the Fields of Science and Technology, signed on 
May 24, 1972, at the Moscow Summit meeting. 

Also taking part in the discussions were, from 
the U.S. side. Dr. James B. Fisk, President of Bell 
Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Eugene G. Fubini, 
President of Fubini Consultants, Ltd.; Dr. John V. N. 
Granger, Deputy Director, Bureau of International 
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of 
State; and other staff members of the Office of 
Science and Technology and of the Department of 
State. 

From the Soviet side participants included Acade- 
mician M. D. Millionshchikov, Vice President of the 
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; Academician V. A. 
Trapeznikov, First Deputy Chairman of the State 
Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for 
Science and Technology; Dr. S. M. Tikhomirov, 
Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the 
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Science and Tech- 
nology; and other staff members of the State Com- 
mittee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
U.S.S.R. 

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the 
Agreement of May 24, 1972, provides a good basis 
for the long-term development and expansion of 
scientific and technological cooperation between the 
two countries. For the purpose of implementing this 
Agreement, they considered a number of questions 
concerning the structure and organization of the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, to be created in ac- 
cordance with Article 7 of the Agreement, as well 
as possible areas and forms of cooperation. 

The two sides reaffirmed the objectives of their 



proposed scientific and technical cooperation, as set 
forth in the Agreement. These are to assist and 
develop scientific and technical cooperation between 
both countries on the basis of mutual benefit, 
equality and reciprocity, and to provide broad op- 
portunities for both sides to combine the efforts of 
their scientists and specialists in working on major 
problems, whose solution will promote the progress 
of science and technology for the benefit of both 
countries and of mankind. 

Recognizing that the achievement of common 
goals in the development of science and technology 
depends on a close working relationship between 
scientists and specialists, the two sides will encour- 
age and facilitate the development of direct contacts 
between qualified individuals and organizations of 
the two countries. 

The two sides discussed procedural questions con- 
cerning the work of the Joint Commission, the first 
meeting of which will be held in Washington, D.C., 
in October, 1972. 

The two sides also discussed a number of specific 
areas of common interest which show promise for 
direct cooperation. U.S.-U.S.S.R. ad hoc working 
groups will be established as soon as possible in the 
following areas: 

(1) Energy Research and Development, including: 

(a) magnetohydrodynamics; 

(b) fusion; 

(c) atomic energy and nuclear reactors; 

(d) solar energy; 

(e) geothermal energy; 

(f) energy transmission; 

(g) utilization of waste heat; and 

(h) increasing the efficiency of thermal power 

stations. 
(Working groups in the energy area will be 
convened only for topics not covered by the 
Memorandum on Cooperation Between the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the 
U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Utilization 
of Atomic Energy, to be renewed in July, 
1972.) 

(2) Application of Computers in Management; 

(3) Agricultural Research; 

(4) Production of substances employing micro- 
biological means; 

(5) Water Resources; 

(6) Research in the Field of Chemical Catalysis. 

These working groups will develop specific proposals 
for cooperative programs. Their reports and recom- 
mendations will be submitted to the Executive 
Agents in each country no later than two weeks 
before the date of the first meeting of the Commis- 
sion for its consideration. Working groups in addi- 
tional areas may be established by the Commission 
at its meetings or by agreement between the Execu- 
tive Agents on both sides, in the period between 
meetings of the Commission. 



216 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Commission will monitor the progress of 
joint programs established under the Agreement to 
assure that obstacles which may arise are promptly 
and effectively dealt with. 

Following an exchange of views between Dr. David 
and Academician M. V. Keldysh, President of the 
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, on cooperation ih 
oceanological research, it was decided that the U.S. 
National Science Foundation and the U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences would designate representa- 
tives to meet in the near future to discuss possible 
Soviet technical and financial participation in the 
program of deep ocean drilling to be carried out with 
the U.S. research vessel D/V Glomar Challenger 
operated by Scripps Institute of Oceanography. 

Desiring to achieve cooperation in the area of 
scientific and technical information, the two sides 
decided as a first step to convene in the near future 
a symposium on this subject between the National 
Science Foundation and the All-Union Scientific 
Research Institute for Scientific and Technical In- 
formation. 

The two sides emphasized their desire to realize 
as quickly as possible tangible results under the 
Agreement. In this connection, they will render 
assistance in establishing closer and more regular 
contacts between individual scientists and specialists, 
and also research institutions and technical organi- 
zations of the two countries. 

The subjects discussed in the course of this meet- 
ing will be reviewed by the Joint Commission in its 
first meeting. 



Edward E. David, Jr. 

Director, 

Office of Science 

and Technology, Executive 

Office of the President, 
United States of America 

Moscow, July 7, 1972. 



V. A. KiRILLIN 

Chairman, 

State Committee of the 

U.S.S.R. Council of 

Ministers for Science 

and Technology 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of 
Engineering, and National Research Council an- 
nual report covering the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1969. February 15, 1972. 414 pp. 

Creating an Atlantic Union Delegation. Report, to- 
gether with minority, additional minority, and op- 
posing views, to accompany H.J. Res. 900. H. 
Rept. 92-988. April 13, 1972. 10 pp. 

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near 



East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
April 19, 1972. 46 pp. 

Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. Re- 
port of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions, together with additional views, on S. 3526, 
to provide authorizations for certain agencies con- 
ducting the foreign relations of the United States, 
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 92-754. April 20, 
1972. 125 pp. 

Foreign Sale of Certain Passenger Vessels. Report, 
together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 
11589, S. Rept. 92-758. April 25, 1972. 12 pp. 

Inter- American Foundation: First Year of Opera- 
tions. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. April 25, 1972. 80 pp. 

Peace Corps Act Amendments of 1972. Hearing 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on H.R. 14149 authorizing continuing appropria- 
tions for Peace Corps, and for other purposes; 
April 27, 1972; 39 pp. Report, together with sup- 
plemental views, to accompany H.R. 14149; H. 
Rept. 92-1046; May 4, 1972; 12 pp. 

Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects: Analysis and Back- 
ground Data. Staff report prepared for the use 
of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences. May 1972. 76 pp. 

Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 7117. S. Rept. 92-769. May 1, 1972. 
5 pp. 

Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Nar- 
cotic Drugs, 1961. Message from the President 
of the United States transmitting the protocol 
opened for signature at Geneva on March 25, 
1972. S. Ex. J. May 4, 1972. 12 pp. 

Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
and Amendments to the 1954 Prevention of Pol- 
lution of the Sea by Oil Convention. Message 
from the President of the United States trans- 
mitting the convention done at Brussels on De- 
cember 18, 1971, and certain amendments to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 1954, relating to 
tanker size and arrangement and the protection 
of the Great Barrier Reef. S. Ex. K. May 5, 1972. 
41 pp. 

Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January 1972. A 
staff report prepared for the use of the Subcom- 
mittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Com- 
mitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. May 8, 1972. 39 pp. 

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation 
Bill, Fiscal Year 1973. Report to accompany 
H.R. 14989. H. Rept. 92-1065. May 15, 1972. 47 
pp. 

People's Republic of China: An Economic Assess- 
ment. A compendium of papers submitted to the 
Joint Economic Committee. May 18, 1972. 382 pp. 

Recent Soviet Emigration to Israel. Report of spe- 
cial study mission to Austria and Israel by Rep- 
resentatives Jonathan B. Bingham, chairman, and 
Seymour Halpern, April 2-8, 1972. Submitted to 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 18, 
1972. 32 pp. 



August 21, 1972 



217 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Poland Sign 
Air Transport Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
July 19 (press release 179) that the United 
States and the Polish People's Republic had 
that day signed at Warsaw an Air Transport 
Agreement between the two governments. 
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., signed 
for the United States and the Honorable Mie- 
czyslaw Zajfryd, Minister of Transportation, 
signed for the Polish People's Republic. Si- 
multaneously, the two governments ex- 
changed diplomatic notes incorporating 
certain understandings regarding implemen- 
tation of the new agreement. (For texts of 
the agreement and the U.S. note, see press re- 
lease 179.) 

The new bilateral agreement is the result 
of successful negotiations held this past May 
in Washington. It will provide the frame- 
work for the expansion of Pan American 
World Airways operations to Warsaw and 
the inauguration of service to the United 
States by LOT Polish Airlines. Pan Amer- 
ican has been operating between New York 
and Warsaw for approximately one year on 
the basis of a unilateral permit issued by the 
Government of Poland, while LOT plans to 
begin scheduled service from Poland to New 
York during 1973. 

Under the new agreement, U.S.-designated 
airlines will be authorized to serve Warsaw 
(and beyond Poland to Finland, the U.S.S.R., 
and beyond) via various intermediate points 
in Europe, and Polish-designated airlines will 
be able to operate to New York via inter- 
mediate stops at several European points and 
Montreal. The notes exchanged set forth the 
actual commercial opportunities to be en- 
joyed by the airlines of both sides under the 
agreement. The arrangements agreed to in 



these notes are designed to maintain a rea- 
sonable overall balance in the bilateral ex- 
change of benefits and to permit both sides 
to reevaluate this exchange after a period of 
operations by the airlines of the two coun- 
tries. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952.' 
Ratified by the President: July 25, 1972. 

Atomic Energy 

Protocol suspending the agreement of August 20, 
1969 (TIAS 6816), between the United States, 
Austria, and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the application of safeguards and pro- 
viding for the application of safeguards pursuant 
to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 
(TIAS 6839). Done at Vienna September 21, 
1971. 
Entered into force: July 23, 1972. 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 27, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970." 
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, August 2, 1972. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 
Ratification deposited: Fiji, July 27, 1972. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972." 
Signature: Nigeria, July 10, 1972. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement for facilitating the international circula- 
tion of visual and auditory materials of an educa- 
tional, scientific, and cultural character, and proto- 
col. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered 
into force August 12, 1954; for the United States 
January 12, 1967. TIAS 6116. 
Accession deposited: Jordan, July 7, 1972. 



' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 



218 



Department of State Bulletin 



Patents 

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy 
of inventions relating to defense and for which 
applications for patents have been made. Done 
at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force 
January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672. 
Ratification deposited: Canada, August 2, 1972. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done 
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967; for the United States November 
1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 

Notification that it continues to be bound: Fiji 
(with reservations), June 12, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4192, 5608, 6236), gov- 
erning tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington July 27, 
1972. Entered into force July 27, 1972. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Costa Rica of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat 
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during 
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 
at San Jose March 28 and June 12, 1972. En- 
tered into force June 12, 1972. TIAS 7376. 
Suspended: July 13, 1972. 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Guatemala of 
10 percent of the value of grant military assist- 
ance and excess defense articles furnished by the 
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Guatemala May 16 and July 19, 1972. Enters into 
force on the date Guatemala informs the United 
States that the agreement has been approved and 
ratified in conformity with its constitutional pro- 
cedures. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Honduras of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat 
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during 
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Tegucigalpa March 2 and May 3, 1972. 
Entered into force May 3, 1972. TIAS 7399. 
Suspended: July 13, 1972. 

Japan 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income, with related notes. Signed at Tokyo 
March 8, 1971. Entered into force July 9, 1972. 
Proclaimed by the President: July 25, 1972. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 18, 



1963, as amended (TIAS 5366, 5960, 7240), for 
financing certain educational exchange programs. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 1 
and July 10, 1972. Entered into force July 10, 
1972. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Nicaragua of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat 
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during 
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Managua March 14 and April 24, 1972. En- 
tered into force April 24, 1972. 
Suspended: July 13, 1972. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile sys- 
tems. Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972." 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: August 
3, 1972. 

Venezuela 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Venezuela of 
10 percent of the value of grant military assist- 
ance furnished by the United States. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Caracas July 19, 1972. En- 
tered into force July 19, 1972; effective February 
7, 1972. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Volume VI in "Foreign Relations" 
Series for 1947 Released 

On June 21 the Department of State released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^7, Vol- 
ume VI, The Far East (ix, 1,159 pages). This 
volume, the second of eight to be published on the 
year 1947, includes documentation on U.S. policies 
toward Far Eastern powers except China, which 
will be covered in a separate volume. 

Of particular interest are the compilations cover- 
ing American interest in nationalist opposition to 
the restoration of French rule in Indochina and 
Netherlands rule in the East Indies. 

There is also extensive documentation concerning 
U.S. occupation and control of Japan, including ef- 
forts to draft an acceptable peace treaty with Japan. 
Similarly, American efforts to achieve the peaceful 
unification of Korea are fully documented. 

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Of- 



' Not in force. 



August 21, 1972 



219 



fice, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VI 
may be obtained from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 20402, for $6.00 each (Department of 
State publication 8606; Stock Number 4400-1407). 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 20i02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments. A 25 -percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock (at least 125) — $6; 1-year subscrip- 
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new 
Notes— $.3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies 
of those listed below are available at 10«; each. 

Austria Pub. 7955 

Bahrain Pub. 8013 

Canada Pub. 7769 

Egypt Pub. 8152 

Gabon Pub. 7968 

Guyana Pub. 8095 

Iran Pub. 7760 

Jordan Pub. 7956 

Kenya Pub. 8024 

Macao Pub. 8352 

Paraguay Pub. 8098 

Qatar Pub. 7906 

Somali Pub. 7881 

Spanish Sahara Pub. 7905 

U.S.S.R Pub. 7842 

United Arab Emirates .... Pub. 7901 

The Inter-American Community in a Larger World. 

This pamphlet consists of the text of a statement by 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers before the 
General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States at Washington, D.C., on April 12, 1972. In- 
ter-American Series 100. Pub. 8654. 16 pp. 20^ 

Youth Travel Abroad — What to Know Before You 

Go. This booklet which contains information useful 
to all Americans traveling overseas is directed par- 
ticularly to the interests of young travelers. In- 
cluded are tips on visas, charters, consular aid, and 
study abroad as well as suggestions for avoiding 
problems. General Foreign Policy Series 263. Pub. 
8656. 19 pp. 204. 



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8 


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8 


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4 


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Stockholm and Beyond. Report of the Secretary of 
State's Advisory Committee on the 1972 United Na- 
tions Conference on the Human Environment. In- 
ternational Organization and Conference Series 101. 
Pub. 8657. 152 pp. 65('. 

Universal Postal Union — Money Orders and Postal 
Travelers' Checks. Agreement with other Govern- ' 
ments. TIAS 7236. 142 pp. 75<*. 

Training of FANK [Khmer National Armed Forces] 
Personnel in Viet-Nam. Australian Participation. 
Memorandum of understanding with Australia, the 
Khmer Republic, and Viet-Nam. TIAS 7277. 5 pp. 
10«f. 

Training of FANK Personnel in Viet-Nam. New 

Zealand Participation. Memorandum of understand- 
ing with New Zealand, the Khmer Republic, and 
Viet-Nam. TIAS 7278. 2 pp. 106 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the agree- 
ment of November 4, 1966, as amended. TIAS 
7287. 5 pp. 10^. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pur- 
suant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with 
Denmark and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency suspending the agreement of February 29, 
1968. TIAS 7289. 2 pp. lO^*. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pur- 
suant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol 
with Greece and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency suspending the agreement of June 15, 1964. 
TIAS 7290. 3 pp. 10(*. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet- 
Nam amending the agreement of June 28, 1971, as 
amended. TIAS 7292. 2 pp. 10^ 

Whaling. Amendments to the schedule to the Inter- 
national Whaling Convention of 1946 adopted at 
the twenty-third meeting of the International Whal- 
ing Commission. TIAS 7293. 5 pp. lO^*. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Switzerland Cooperation 
Agreement. Agreement with Switzerland and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7294. 
11 pp. 10(*. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Sweden Cooperation 
Agreement. Agreement with Sweden and the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7295. 11 
pp. 10^ 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Morocco. TIAS 7297. 
13 pp. lat 

Special Fund for Education — Agrarian Reform Edu- 
cation. Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7300. 
6 pp. 10^ 



220 



Department of State Bulletin 



^ INDEX August 21, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1730 

i 

iAyiation. United States and Poland Sign Air 
Transport Agreement 218 

■/•Congress 

jj Congressional Documents Relating to For- 

(j eign Policy 217 

tj International Aspects of Weather Modifica- 

( tion (Pollack) 212 

['Foreign Aid. Mr. Williams To Coordinate 

,'; U.S. Aid for Philippines Disaster Relief . 209 

J I France. Secretary Rogers Hails French Sei- 

) zure of Heroin Laboratories (Rogers) . . . 211 

\ ! Intelligence. President Appoints John Con 



nally to 
Board 



Foreign Intelligence Advisory 



211 



Israel. President Nixon Exchanges Greetings 
With Prime Minister Meir of Israel (tran- 
script of telephone conversation) .... 210 

Middle East. President Nixon's News Confer- 
ence of July 27 (excerpts) 201 

Narcotics Control. Secretary Rogers Hails 
French Seizure of Heroin Laboratories 
(Rogers) 211 

Philippines. Mr. Williams To Coordinate U.S. 
Aid for Philippines Disaster Relief . . . 209 

Poland. United States and Poland Sign Air 
Transport Agreement 218 

Presidential Documents 

President Nixon Exchanges Greetings With 
Prime Minister Meir of Israel 210 

President Nixon's News Conference of July 
27 (excerpts) 201 

Publications 

Recent Releases 220 

Volume VI in "Foreign Relations" Series for 

1947 Released 219 

Science 

International Aspects of Weather Modifica- 
tion (Pollack) 212 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation (announcement, text 
of record of discussions) 214 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 218 

United States and Poland Sign Air Trans- 
port Agreement 218 

U.S.S.R. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scien- 
tific and Technical Cooperation (announce- 
ment, text of record of discussions) . . . 214 

Viet-Nam 

North Viet-Nam: The Dike Bombing Issue 

(text of report) 207 

153d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 

Paris (Porter) 205 

President Nixon's News Conference of July 

27 (excerpts) 201 

Name Index 

Connally, John B 211 

Meir, Golda 210 

Nixon, President 201, 210 

Pollack, Herman 212 

Porter, William J 205 

Rogers, Secretary 211 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 31— August 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to July 31 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 179 
of July 19. 



No. Date 



Subject 



188 7/31 AID Deputy Administrator to co- 
ordinate U.S. Government relief 
aid for the Philippines. 
*189 7/31 Yost sworn in as Ambassador to 

Burundi (biographic data). 
1.90 8/3 Porter: 153d plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 



* Not printed. 



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u.s. government printing office 

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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
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diate attention if you write to: Director, Office of 
Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



of o 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 




SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 11 221 

)EPARTMENT URGES EARLY SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION 

OF REVISED UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION 

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Ladd 234 



5£yD 
For index see inside back cover 



"''''"t Of r^^'^ry 






ts 



'^6// 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVII, No. 1731 
August 28, 1972 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
and news conferences of the Presi- 
dent and the Secretary of State and 
other officers of the Department, as 
well as special articles on various 
phases of international affairs and the 
functions of tlie Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United Slates is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Rogers' News Conference of August 1 1 



Press release 195 dated August 11 

Secretary Rogers: Good morning, ladies 
and gentlemen. Thank you. 

I wanted to meet with you this morning to 
have a regular press conference. And I would 
like to begin by expressing the appreciation 
of the administration — the President, my- 
self, and all of us in the administration — 
for the action that was taken by the House 
of Representatives yesterday on the foreign 
aid bill. It was a very significant vote, as 
you know. The majority was a very substan- 
tial majority. And I want to express my per- 
sonal appreciation and the appreciation for 
the support for all of those who gave their 
vote for the Boiling amendment. 

I believe that as a result of this vote that 
the prospects for peace by the negotiating 
route remain hopeful. I think if the House of 
Representatives had voted the other way that 
our prospects for a negotiated settlement in 
Viet-Nam would have been damaged. And I 
express particularly the President's appre- 
ciation to the bipartisan support we received, 
from the Speaker and from the Majority 
Leader and from Mr. Boiling [Representa- 
tive Richard Boiling] and many others, be- 
cause it was, as I say, I believe, a very sig- 
nificant vote. And it shows that on important 
issues when the national interest is involved, 
that we do have bipartisan support and that 
the Nation functions — our system functions 
well. 

I would also like to say that we are pleased 
at the fact that the talks in Korea have been 
going well. They have now fixed a date — I 
think August 11 [August 30] — for renewed 
discussions, and we hope that that will lead 



to a reduction of tensions in the peninsula 
and, eventually, elimination of the hostility 
that exists there. 

Ladies and gentlemen, now I will be glad 
to answer any questions. Mr. Hensley [Stew- 
art Hensley, United Press International]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we haven't had an op- 
portunity to talk to you since the Russian 
forces ivere moved out of Egypt. And I ivould 
like to knoiv what you think about this. 
Were you gratified by Sadat's action in forc- 
ing them out? What do you think of the sit- 
uation as it exists notv? And ivhat is the 
United States diplomatic stance with regard 
to the Middle East at this time in the light 
of the recent developments? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, the decision, of 
course, to reduce the Soviet presence in 
Egypt was an internal matter, a decision 
made by the Government of Egypt, and I 
would not want to comment on it. 

I said after the decision was announced by 
President Sadat that we would have no 
comment on it because it is a matter for 
the Government of Egypt to determine. 

At the moment it is too soon, I think, to 
make any analysis or assessment of the sit- 
uation as it presently exists, and I think it 
would be a bad time to do it. 

We continue to hope that the Security 
Council Resolution 242 can be implemented. 
It provides the foundation, I think the only 
foundation, for the possibility of a peace- 
ful solution in the area. 

We also continue to favor, and particularly 
continue to favor at this time, active nego- 
tiations between Egypt and Israel, because 



August 28, 1972 



221 



unless there are active negotiations under- 
taken, the prospects for settlement are very 
dim. 

Now, as I said on my trip, and some of you 
heard this, I said that it is the only area in 
the world where there have been longstand- 
ing hostilities, where wars have occurred, 
and where there is a continuing state of hos- 
tility, where discussions are not undertaken 
by the parties. As you know, discussions are 
being undertaken in Korea, between the two 
Germanys, in Cyprus, India-Pakistan, in 
Viet-Nam — so that the only area of the world 
is the Middle East. 

Now, I am not necessarily at this stage 
talking about direct face-to-face negotia- 
tions, but negotiations, active negotiations. If 
progress is made in those negotiations, then 
the parties would have to negotiate even- 
tually directly, because it makes sense if they 
are going to get along together to negotiate 
directly. But in any event, we think it is 
vitally important now that active negotia- 
tions be undertaken. 

I want to close this answer by saying that 
we are particularly gratified, pleased, that 
the cease-fire which was initiated by the 
United States is now entering its third year. 
And it is certainly to everyone's interest that 
that cease-fire continue. And we are going to 
do what we can diplomatically to be sure that 
the cease-fire does continue. If we can play 
a useful role in negotiations, we are prepared 
to play it. 

On the whole, we think that the situa- 
tion is relatively stable, and we hope the 
cease-fire continues. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nixon mid 
President Sadat have recently exchanged 
messages in connection ivith the 20th anni- 
versa7'y of the Egyptian revolution. Presi- 
dent Sadat's message seemed to he a rather 
ivarm one. And I wonder if the administra- 
tion attaches any significance to it, whether 
it considers it a signal from President Sadat 
for any sort of action from the United States 
with regard to the Middle East. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we were pleased 



at the tone of President Sadat's letter, and of 
course President Nixon's letter was a very 
friendly letter. We think it is essential in the 
implementation of the policies that we have 
been following in this administration to seek 
to have good relations with all countries. I 
would not want to give any interpretation 
to the meaning of the letter beyond its words. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you, in talking about 
negotiations in the Middle East, said noth- 
ing about an interim settlement. Can you say 
tvhether you think prospects now for an in- 
terim settlement are any brighter with the 
move that President Sadat has taken, and 
do you think Israel can afford to make great- 
er concessions in a territorial pullback tvith 
the absence of the Russians? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, on the latter part 
of your question, I wouldn't want to make 
comments. That is a matter for the Govern- 
ment of Israel to decide. 

On the first part of your question, address- 
ing my comments to the first part of your 
question, we continue to believe that the so- 
called proximity talks hold out a prospect 
for a successful beginning to a complete so- 
lution in the Middle East. And we would 
hope that somewhere along the line the par- 
ties will agree to proximity talks. 

As you know, Israel has indicated a will- 
ingness to undertake such talks, to take part 
in such talks. And we would hope that for 
the reasons that I mentioned earlier, that 
such talks will begin. 

We do think that that provides maybe the 
most bright prospect for progress in the 
area. 

We have some reservation about whether 
a complete solution can be achieved in early 
negotiations. But we think a step should be 
taken, an interim step should be taken, and 
this is one that the parties have both indi- 
cated that they would be prepared to con- 
sider. Therefore we do hope that they will be- 
gin at some point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Sargent Shriver says 
that President Nixon had peace handed to 



222 



Department of State Bulletin 



him literally in his lap but that he blew it. 
Did he bloiv it? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I noticed what 
Mr. Shriver said with some interest. And I 
think it is political fantasy. 

I have undertaken since reading the state- 
ment to check, and I asked myself what Mr. 
Shriver would have done if there were any 
truth to what he said. 

Now, if it is true that he felt that there 
was a historic opportunity, the greatest in 
his lifetime, then certainly he would have 
done something about it. You don't sit there 
with a historic opportunity, the greatest in 
your lifetime, and fiddle with it. You do 
something about it. 

Now, he had access to anybody concerned. 

Now, I have checked this morning to find 
out whether he made any such reference 
while he was Ambassador in Paris to such a 
proposal, whether he made any recommenda- 
tions of any kind on the matter, whether he 
spoke to anybody at any time while he was in 
office or subsequent to that, to leaving office, 
on this matter. And so far I have not been 
able to find anything. 

I have checked with Henry Cabot Lodge, 
who was there, and certainly Mr. Shriver 
didn't say anything to him about any such 
proposal. 

I have asked all the members of the ne- 
gotiating team that I was able to reach, and 
they all say nothing like that ever happened. 

I checked the speeches that Mr. Shriver 
made, his press conferences, all the tele- 
gi'ams he sent in to the Department, includ- 
ing the no-distribution telegrams, and he 
never made any reference to anything of this 
kind at all. 

I talked to him on several occasions at 
the time he was about to leave the govern- 
ment. He never expressed any such thought. 
He never suggested any solutions that we 
were not pursuing. 

I have talked to Mel Laird [Secretary of 
Defense], and Mel Laird pointed out that 
he briefed Mr. Shriver in Paris about Viet- 
namization, and Mr. Shriver told him that 



he supported the Vietnamization program. 

So if there was such a historic opportu- 
nity, let me say Mr. Shriver was miraculous- 
ly quiet about it. 

He talked to many people in the White 
House. In his letter of resignation he ex- 
pressed the thought that his objective had 
been reached and the beginning of peace in 
Viet-Nam had been achieved, and that was 
one of the reasons he was leaving. 

So as I said to begin with, this, I think, is 
not really a fabrication. It is just a political 
fantasy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, apart from your person- 
al satisfaction about the domestic develop- 
ments yesterday in Congress, do you have 
any grounds for satisfaction regarding the 
way the talks are going in Paris right notv, 
public or private? 

Secretary Rogers: We have agreed with 
the other side not to make any comments 
about the private talks. We are going to an- 
nounce the sessions when they take place. 
But beyond that, we are not going to say 
anything. Obviously we continue to have 
hope that successful negotiations could be 
accomplished. That is why we are there. 
And I don't want to say anything beyond 
that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, China seems to be one 
of the chief topics of conversation ivhen the 
President and Prime Minister Tanaka meet 
in Honolulu. Can you say if there is a di- 
vergence in IJ.S.-Japan policy that will in- 
terfere with the operation of U.S. base rights 
in Japan as a result of this ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so. We 
are going to — as you know, the President 
is going to meet with Prime Minister Ta- 
naka in Hawaii. We are going to consult with 
him about many matters. And I am sure this 
will be one of the items on the agenda. We do 
not believe that there is any reason why the 
Japanese desire to improve their relations 
with the People's Republic of China should 
in any way conflict with the policy that we 
have been following. And I believe that the 



August 28, 1972 



223 



discussions that the President will have 
with Prime Minister Tanaka will serve to 
consolidate any possible differences — to 
avoid any possible differences that might 
cause any trouble in our relations. And I am 
very pleased that we are having this meeting 
in Hawaii. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to politics 
again, as you know. Secretary Laird has an- 
nounced he is going to resign his job after 
four years. And I wonder if you have any 
plans. 

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't have any 
plans. And I also think that it is important 
for all of us in the administration — I don't 
care who he is — to keep in mind that no one 
is elected in our country until the American 
people have spoken. 

Now, obviously things look very encour- 
aging for the administration, and all the in- 
dications are that the American people fully 
support the President. And the margin be- 
tween the President and his opponent is 
very great. 

But I have been around in government 
long enough to know that you can't be sure. 

And in any event, the American people 
will have the opportunity to look at the dif- 
ferences, to consider the record of this ad- 
ministration, and then decide. Now, the 
time to talk about the second administration 
is after the American people have spoken. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is our campaign 
against illegal drug traffic going these days? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we think it's go- 
ing about as well as it can. It's a very diffi- 
cult problem. As you know, we have made 
tremendous seizures of drugs, and we have 
put out a good deal of information about the 
success of those seizures. We think that it's 
making progress, but there are a lot of 
problems in connection with it. We have 
given a fairly full briefing on this, both to 
the Congress and to you ladies and gentle- 
men. 

We wish we could do more, but we are do- 
ing everything we can think of to do. 



Lew [Lewis Gulick, Associated Press]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to politics: With 
the campaign opening up oioiv, to ivhat ex- 
tent do you think foreign policy tvill play a 
role in the campaign discussion, and how do 
you see the issues? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think foreign 
policy will play a very important part in the 
campaign, and I say that because in the 
final analysis the American people are more 
interested in peace probably than anything 
else. 

It is an issue that is not necessarily spo- 
ken about all the time, because sometimes the 
more immediate problems are discussed at 
greater length. But the American people are 
very concerned about a peaceful world, and I 
think that is going to be a major issue in this 
campaign. And I am obviously prejudiced, 
but I think that President Nixon has brought 
about a condition in the world that makes 
the prospects for peace much better. I think 
the world is a more peaceful place than it 
was. I think it's a more peaceful world large- 
ly because of his leadership. 

Now whereas we had turmoil in the United 
States in our campuses and our ghettos and 
other places, to a large extent because of the 
concern of the American people about peace, 
most of that now has disappeared. I don't 
believe America's standing throughout the 
world has ever been higher. 

As you know, I just returned from a trip 
to 11 nations of the world, including both 
friends and adversaries, and in all instances 
there was great respect for the President 
and his foreign policy. 

So I believe it will be an issue, I believe it 
will be a very important issue, and I think 
that the American people will conclude that 
the President has been an outstanding leader 
in the cause of peace and he has provided a 
foundation which we hope will provide for 
a generation of peace. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hotv do you see the role 
of the Cabinet officers in the discussion of 
the issues during an election year? 



224 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that in the 
case of the Secretary of State and the Sec- 
retary of Defense that we should avoid 
partisan gatherings. We should avoid sup- 
porting particular candidates. We should 
avoid fundraising dinners, and we should 
avoid any pei'sonal attack, vitriolic attacks 
on persons engaged in the process. 

The fact is that the foreign policy of the 
United States that I just referred to could 
only have been achieved with the support of 
many leading Democrats in the Congress. 
We could not have accomplished what we 
have accomplished without the support of 
men like John Stennis and Carl Albert and 
Hale Boggs and others, many others — I 
can't name them all. But traditionally we 
have had bipartisan support for our foreign 
policy, so I think we have to approach it in 
that light. 

On the other hand, because this will be an 
issue and it is an issue, and because matters 
such as the Shriver thing will come to light 
from time to time, and I'm in the position 
that — I'm one of the few that can answer — 
we can't have Foreign Service officers an- 
swer — so I will answer those statements. I 
will make speeches at foreign affairs groups 
and other groups on foreign policy gener- 
ally, and I will have press conferences. 

In other words, I will do exactly what my 
predecessors have done. 

Now, I have checked that out. I have seen 
some comments to the effect that somehow I 
am acting differently than my predecessors. 
That is not the case. I have checked it out 
and they have all had press conferences; they 
all retorted to unfair attacks; they all cor- 
rected the record; they all made speeches at 
foreign affairs gatherings; they all made 
speeches at conventions of different groups, 
not political groups; they all had press con- 
ferences. So I am going to follow the prec- 
edents that have been established. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I folloxv up Lexv's 
question and some things that you were say- 
ing earlier, talking about bright prospects, 
specifically, are you saying, then, that the 



prospects are bright that President Nixon 
will be able to fulfill his campaign promise 
in 1968 that he will end the war, not only the 
American involvement, but the war in South- 
east Asia? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't have the 
exact quote in front of me, but what the 
President said at that time was said because 
he did not want to get involved in partisan 
discussion of the war. He did not want to do 
anything that would undercut the position 
of President Johnson. 

He did have a plan. That plan has been 
implemented. We have tried in every possi- 
ble way to bring the war to an end by nego- 
tiation and by making considerable conces- 
sions to the adversary — concessions certainly 
compared with what had been made up to 
the time of this administration. 

And we have — you know, yesterday we 
withdrew the last ground combat man from 
Viet-Nam, and we have very few left there 
now. Our casualties are way down, and we 
are going to have the American involvement 
continue to be limited. We have taken the 
American men out of ground combat. 

So I think that the record is a good one. 
Of course, we wish that the other side had 
been willing to negotiate a settlement so the 
war itself would end. But there is no way, 
actually, you could force an enemy to stop all 
activities unless it is willing to do it. It's pos- 
sible that it will continue guerrilla activities 
for some time, but we think for all practical 
purposes the American involvement in 
ground combat has ended. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have the lan- 
guage that Sargent Shriver used in his letter 
of resignation concerning the Vietnamiza- 
tion program and negotiations ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think he 
said anything about negotiations, but he said 
something about having achieved his objec- 
tives and reaching the beginning of peace 
in Viet-Nam. We will make it available 
to you, yes. There's no problem on that. 

Q. Sir, do you favor the Jackson amend- 



August 28, 1972 



225 



ment for approval of the SALT offensive — 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, we support the 
resolution — I mean the amendment, of Sena- 
tor Jackson. We, as you know, feel the in- 
terim agreement is a good agreement. The 
Jackson amendment expresses a view of the 
Congress, and it's consistent with the view 
of the administration. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, former Attorney Gen- 
eral Ramsey Clark is only the latest in a se- 
ries of Americans who have been to North 
Viet-Nam and who are criticizing American 
bombing policy over there. Would you just 
respond in general to Americans going to 
North Viet-Nam and the kinds of comments 
they have been making ? 

Secretary Rogers: I think there are two 
types of Americans — I suppose you can say 
there are a lot of types of Americans that 
go to [North] Viet-Nam, but there are two 
general classifications. 

One is the Jane Fonda type, and I think 
people understand the Jane Fonda types. 

Ramsey Clark is different. I listened to 
him — I think it was him — yesterday on a 
broadcast that was repeated here and that 
was alleged to be a broadcast that he made 
from Hanoi on Radio Hanoi. 

Now, having been in the government as 
Attorney General myself, I am frank to say 
that I was shocked. I was surprised when he 
went to [North] Viet-Nam. But to hear the 
voice of a former member of President John- 
son's Cabinet, a former Attorney General of 
the United States, a man who was involved 
in sending more than half a million Ameri- 
cans to Viet-Nam, a man who was part of 
the decisionmaking process that has resulted 
in the loss of so many American lives — to 
hear him on Radio Hanoi was, to me, con- 
temptible. 

Imagine going to a nation that we are at 
war with, taking their version of everything 
that is said, and then going on their radio 
and broadcasting back to the United States 
and around the world, at a time when Amer- 
ican men are flying over there and losing 
their lives. 



Now, I am not speaking about his views. 
Obviously, he has a right to have any view 
he wants to, and if he wanted to come back 
here and take a position, fine. But to me, 
it's — it's beyond belief, frankly, and I can't 
remember any time in our history when any- 
thing that is comparable has happened. And 
I would think that the American people 
would be shocked to hear his voice on Radio 
Hanoi while the war is in progress, while 
American lives are being lost, particularly a 
man who was involved in the very decisions 
that made the whole thing come about. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been talk of a 
possible North Vietnamese offensive again, 
coming sometime shortly before the election. 
Hoiv cnncer'ned are you about that — for the 
remaining Americans there, for the South 
Vietnamese, arid for the prospects in the 
election? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think it is pos- 
sible. The Secretary of Defense and the 
members of the Military Establishment feel 
that there is a real prospect that this might 
occur. 

We are, of course, watching for it care- 
fully. We are convinced that the South Viet- 
namese can handle any such activity on the 
part of the enemy. So we do not believe that 
it presents a threat to the lives of the Amer- 
icans under the present conditions. 

The United States will continue to support 
the South Vietnamese if that should happen, 
as we have been in recent months. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some people have won- 
dered about the feeling in the administration 
about the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam. 
With the elections only a few months off, 
why should North Viet-Nam be more con- 
ciliatory noiv than it would be after the elec- 
tion? In other tvords, ivhy doesn't it just 
ivait to see ivho wins the election? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it may be that 
that's what they have had in mind. I think 
that President Nixon referred to that in his 
last press conference. Once a political op- 
ponent says to the enemy, "We'll give you 



226 



Department of State Bulletin 



everything you want if I'm elected," then of 
course I think that does impair the prospects 
for successful negotiations. 

On the other hand, I wouldn't want to 
leave the impression that we think that the 
negotiations are hopeless, because I think 
that the enemy — and this is borne out by 
some of the intelligence that we have re- 
ceived and also some of the things that have 
been said in the press, I think — the enemy 
thinks, and I think many of the nations that 
are allied with them think, that the Presi- 
dent is going to win again. And if that is 
the case, they may decide that they would be 
in a better position to negotiate on favor- 
able terms if they did it now than to wait 
until after President Nixon wins again. 

Q. A corollary of that, Mr. Secretary. 
Would President Nixon be tougher in his 
terms after election than before election? 

Secretary Rogers: I couldn't answer that. 
He certainly isn't going to be any easier. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, again on Viet-Nam, I 
tvould like to ask a tivo-part question. Would 
you anticipate that the bombing of North 
Viet-Nam will continue indefinitely if noth- 
ing favorable does indeed develop in Paris? 
And the second part of the question: Hoiv 
tvould you assess the possibilities of a uni- 
lateral cease-fire at some time this year in 
Viet-Nam if the military situation develops 
in a favorable way? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, on the first ques- 
tion, I never like to answer a question about 
"indefinitely," because I don't suppose there 
is anything in life that is totally indefinite, 
that continues in perpetuity. Certainly we 
have no intention of changing our policy 
now, and I don't see it in the immediate fu- 
ture unless the other side decides to nego- 
tiate seriously. And I don't see any prospect 
of a unilateral cease-fire. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, from your reading of the 
documents, is it possible that Sargent Shri- 
ver ivas overly hopeful about the negotia- 
tions in Paris when he left the government 



and not fidly aivare of what the Vietnamiza- 
tion program was all about? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think you had 
better ask him. 

Q. That is \vhat he said yesterday, I think. 

Secretary Rogers: What did he say? 

Q. I think what he said ivas that when he 
left the government he left because he found 
that the President did not ivant to pursue 
peace through negotiations alone. 

Secretary Rogers: I really don't have any 
idea what he is talking about. As I said, I 
have looked through all the records that we 
could find so far. Maybe there is something 
else. But he never suggested anything like 
this at all at any time, in writing or orally. 
Certainly if the President of the United 
States is sitting with peace in his lap, as 
Mr. Shriver says, and Mr. Shriver knows 
that peace is in his lap, he could pick up the 
phone and call me, or call the President, or 
talk to Cabot Lodge or the other negotiators 
and say, "My God, peace is in the President's 
lap." He didn't mention anything of that 
kind. 

I really think it is, as I say, a political 
fantasy. I don't want to be unfair to him 
and say it's a total fabrication. Maybe in his 
own mind he sort of, now that he's a candi- 
date, he thinks it happened. But obviously it 
didn't happen. It's really bunk. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, just putting that an- 
other way, you're saying that he at no point 
disagreed with the Viet-Nam policy followed 
by the administration while he was Ambas- 
sador to France? 

Secretary Rogers: I am saying more than 
that. I am saying he not only didn't disagree, 
which I can understand — he says, "I am 
working for an administration; I don't want 
to disagree with them." I am not talking 
about why he shouldn't have said something 
publicly. That's a different matter; I think 
he has got a valid point there. But sup- 
pose it is true as he says that this was — I 
think he said this was the most historic op- 



August 28, 1972 



227 



portunlty in his lifetime — whatever he is 
talking about. Now, he would have told 
somebody. I mean, he had access to me. He 
could pick up the phone any time and say, 
"Bill, this is Sarge Shriver. The President 
has a historic opportunity for peace. Peace 
is in his lap. Why don't you do something 
about it?" And I would have said, "Sarge, 
what is it? Please tell me, quick." [Laugh- 
ter.] 

No, he didn't say anything like that. He 
didn't write anything; he didn't tell any- 
body. If he did, I can't find them. We are 
looking. We are asking everybody he talked 
to, did he know, did he ever hear Sargent 
Shriver say peace was in the President's 
lap? And did he ever say to anybody, this is 
my most historic opportunity? I'll tell you 
this: He missed it. If this was his most his- 
toric opportunity, he really missed it, be- 
cause he didn't speak to a soul about it. And 
he didn't speak to a soul about it when he 
came back here. He talked to me and a lot of 
other people in the Department. He talked 
to a lot of people in the White House and 
never mentioned it, to my knowledge. 

Now, maybe he talked to somebody I don't 
know about, but so far we haven't found out 
about it. He certainly didn't bring it to the 
attention of anybody who could have done 
anything about it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I clarify a remark 
you made on the Mideast, that both sides 
are prepared to consider this? In the past 
you have said that Egypt hadn't given a re- 
sponse to the U.S. proposal for close prox- 
imity talks. Have you received now a re- 
sponse from the Egyptians? 

Secretary Rogers: Not really. I said that 
both sides had talked to some extent about an 
interim agreement and about opening the 
Suez. So at one time it appeared that there 
were prospects that they would be willing to 
discuss this; now, whether they still are or 
not I am not sure. Israel- has indicated that 
they are prepared to engage in such talks. 
We have not had any definite answer really 
from President Sadat, and I'm not seeking 
one. I know he has problems in his country. 



We understand them. I'm not seeking any 
response, and I'm not sure that we will get 
one in the immediate future. 

I would hope that at some point along the 
line we can have discussions with him or his 
representatives on the subject. 

Q. What are we thinking of, something 
during the General Assembly session in New 
York, hotel talks? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, as you know, we 
have been thinking about the prospects for 
proximity talks for a long time. We haven't 
indicated where they would take place or 
how they would take place. That would be up 
to the parties themselves. We have indicated 
we would be willing to play a role in that 
process if it was desired. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, several weeks ago the 
State Department released a document ex- 
plaining the situation with regard to bombs 
falling on the dikes in North Viet-Nam. Have 
you today any further elucidation of how 
these bombs have come to fall on dikes in 
North Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Rogers: No. I think the story is 
told. I don't think there is any dispute about 
it now. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I go back to my 
original question on the Middle East just in 
order to clear up something in my own mind, 
possibly? You say this is an internal matter, 
having the troops out. But I'm thinking of 
the President's report on foreign policy early 
this year, in which it was said that the pres- 
ence of the Soviet forces in Egypt and the 
equipment there was a matter of great con- 
cern, posed a threat to the peace not only of 
the area but to the peace of the entire world. 
Now you are saying that the condition there 
looks relatively stable. Although you don't 
say so, the implication would be that the re- 
moval of the troops has gone a long ways to 
increasing the stability of the Middle East. 
And I am just trying to find out whether I 
should use the President's statement as a 
touchstone or your statement as a touch- 
stone, and if not, how do you reconcile them? 



228 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers: Well, that's an editorial 
judgment, Mr. Hensley. As you know, I don't 
want to make any further comment at this 
time about the significance of the decision. 
We do believe that the decision was made by 
Egypt as a matter of internal affairs. We 
think any comment by the United States 
might be misconstrued, however bland it 
might be. And for that reason I don't want 
to comment. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted as say- 
ing in Kuivait and Rome that there should 
be direct negotiations betiveen the Arabs and 
the Israelis. You seem to back away from 
that a bit here today. Has your thinking on 
that changed since your trip? 

Secretary Rogers: No. I didn't back away 
from it. It is quite consistent. I said the 
same thing in Kuwait as I said here today. 
I don't know if there is anybody here that 
was there or not. But I said in these other 
areas of the world there are direct negotia- 
tions. And I think it is the best and easiest 
way to discuss differences. 

On the other hand, I did say that I under- 
stood it might be difficult for Egypt to en- 
gage in direct negotiations to begin with, 
and we would hope that, if that was the case, 
that at least they would start in these prox- 
imity talks or some other way. In other 
words, we are very convinced that active ne- 
gotiation, so that there is an active ex- 
change of views on these subjects, is vital. 

Now, what form is followed is up to the 
parties. I think direct negotiations would be 
the better way to do it, but proximity talks 
would be another way to do it. Either way 
would be acceptable to the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, another point of clarifi- 
cation. You have indicated that there is some 
hope for the peace talks in Paris. You have 
also said that the bombing will continue un- 
til the other side indicates its willingness to 
negotiate seriously. There seems to be an in- 
ternal inconsistency. 

Secretary Rogers: No. If I said that, it 
was just a rhetorical slip. What I am talking 
about is, we plan to continue the present 



policy. Now, if some agreement is reached 
based — as a result of serious negotiations, 
that's a different matter. At the present time 
we intend to continue the present policy. If 
serious negotiations should — if we should 
arrive at some other conclusion by agree- 
ment in the negotiations, of course, that 
would be a different matter. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I ivant to go back to the 
Middle East. Does the policy, does your pol- 
icy as you advocated in 1969 on the Middle 
East, does it still stand? This is regarding 
the withdraivals. 

Secretary Rogers: Our policy in this area 
has not changed. We have been consistent. 
We haven't changed. 

Anything else? 

Q. That means that you continue to say 
that any changes in the Middle East should 
involve only insubstantial alterations of ter- 
ritory ? 

Secretary Rogers: As I say, because of the 
colloquy that has existed over the years, I 
am just saying that our position is the same, 
it hasn't changed any. I don't want to pick 
out any particular portion of it and refer to 
it alone. 



154th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Ambas- 
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S. 
delegation, at the ISJtth plenary session of 
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Au- 
gust 10. 

Press release 194 dat«d August 10 

Ladies and gentlemen: Careful analysis of 
your side's statements, and comparison be- 
tween these statements and the actions your 
side has undertaken, throw an instructive 
light on issues considered in these talks. 

Let us consider your insistent demands 
for what you term a comprehensive settle- 
ment embracing both political and military 



August 28, 1972 



229 



questions. You maintain that your aim is a 
simultaneous resolution of these two cate- 
gories of problems. In practice, however, you 
give absolute priority to military operations. 
You have sent as many as 12 regular North 
Vietnamese divisions to invade South Viet- 
Nam. You exhort those subject to your con- 
trol to intensify this offensive, to make still 
greater exertions toward the ever-elusive 
goal of final victory. It is clear that you 
subordinate all other considerations to the 
military imperatives of your attempt to 
conquer the South. 

It would seem logical that your position 
in this forum should reflect the primacy you 
give in practice to the military situation. 
Acknowledge that ending the combat is the 
foremost problem here, and we can begin to 
discuss concrete measures to restore peace. 
Your presentations here reveal the further 
incongruity that on the one hand you re- 
peatedly complain about certain aspects of 
the war and yet on the other hand you refuse 
to discuss the practical means to its termi- 
nation. Your statements have increasingly 
contained protests and allegations about sup- 
posed "war crimes" committed by the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam and its allies. This is un- 
convincing propaganda, especially when set 
beside your record of severity and harshness 
during your current massive offensive. 

Moreover, regarding United States air and 
naval activities against North Viet-Nam, 
you are fully aware that you have called 
down these measures upon yourselves by un- 
leashing your invasion of the South. Although 
an end of the warfare is readily attainable, 
through the internationally supervised cease- 
fire proposed by President Nixon on May 8, 
you are continuing your military aggression 
throughout Indochina. ^ How can this obses- 
sive pursuit of a military solution be recon- 
ciled with your claim to seek a comprehen- 
sive settlement? 

Moreover, your criticism that President 
Nixon's peace proposals do not address po- 
litical questions is rendered meaningless by 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



your refusal to begin the search for political 
solutions by discussions with representatives 
of the Government of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam. Instead, you make war upon that gov- 
ernment and the many millions of South 
Vietnamese who honor its legitimately con- 
stituted authority. Here again, your behavior 
clearly indicates that you give priority to the 
field of battle and that you relegate political 
discussion to an indefinite future. 

On the other hand, our proposals ad- 
dress the wartime situation which you have 
created. We offer an end to the killing, not 
through capitulation as you assert, but 
through a mutually acceptable cease-fire. We 
offer a complete withdrawal of all United 
States forces from Viet-Nam within four 
months of the internationally supervised 
cessation of hostilities and the return of 
American prisoners of war. With the sub- 
sidence of warfare, examination of political 
issues in their true perspective could take 
place, unimpeded by the dictates and hazards 
of military necessity. Vietnamese themselves 
could conduct their discussions on the politi- 
cal future of South Viet-Nam in calm and 
safety. Thus, reason could prevail over the 
animosities which your present military ag- 
gression only aggravates. Is there any rea- 
son why this approach, by Vietnamese among 
themselves, could not develop a lasting and 
equitable solution? 

In sum. President Nixon's proposals of 
May 8 would as a matter of priority remove 
the wartime hardships and obstacles hinder- 
ing eventual settlement of all problems in 
Viet-Nam, whether military or political in 
nature. These proposals meet your own pro- 
fessed objectives: peace and self-determi- 
nation for the South Vietnamese people. 
They relate in practical terms to the new 
situation your intensification of the war has 
occasioned. You should, therefore, under- 
take a reasonable examination of these pro- 
posals in a constructive effort to explore 
mutually satisfactory avenues of resolving 
this conflict. Let it not be said that reliance 
on arms for settlement of disputes is both 
the slogan of your leadership and the sorrow 
of your people. 



230 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Assistance to Bangladesh— 
the First Six Months 

Following is an AID announcement issued 
on August 2, together with the text of a six- 
moyith report on U.S. relief assistance to 
Bangladesh. 



AID press release 63 issued Augrust 2 

AID ANNOUNCEMENT 

A massive humanitarian response by the 
United States has helped avert starvation 
and widespread human suffering in recent 
months among millions of men, women, and 
children in Bangladesh. So declared Maurice 
J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the 
Agency for International Development, with 
the issuance on August 2 of a six-month 
report detailing U.S. relief assistance to 
June 30, coinciding with the first half year 
of Bangladesh independence. 

The total U.S. contribution to help that 
emerging nation cope with the staggering 
social and economic problems growing out 
of last year's civil strife amounted to $267.5 
million. That figure, Mr. Williams noted, 
represents about one-third of the combined 
contributions of all donor nations. 

To counter the threat of famine, the 
United States has committed, since March 
alone, 700,000 tons of Food for Peace (P.L. 
480) foodgrains and edible oil, valued at 
$88.2 million, according to the report. 

"But tonnage and dollar amounts hardly 
tell the whole story," Mr. Williams, who is 
also Coordinator of U.S. Relief Assistance to 
Bangladesh, pointed out. "What matters 
most is the people. They have suffered a 
tragedy of immense proportions. We are 
doing all in our power to help them." 

In the six months covered by the report, 
U.S. relief contributions were shown to be 
in the form of: food and logistical support 
totaling $132 million; grants to U.S. volun- 
tary agencies, $19.5 million; and economic 
assistance to the Government of Bangladesh, 
$115 million. 

"Here, too," Mr. Williams declared, "it 



is essential to translate the report figures 
into human terms." He gave these illustra- 
tions : 

—700,000 tons of Food for Peace wheat, 
rice, and vegetable oil will feed 4.4 million 
persons for a whole year. 

— 115,000 tons of fertilizer will increase 
Bangladesh's grain production by 690,000 
tons, enough to feed another 4 million per- 
sons for a year. 

— 100,000 bales of cotton will clothe more 
than 16 million Bengalees and provide em- 
ployment for additional thousands in mills 
and factories now shut down. 

— Repair to coastal embankments will give 
employment to 160,000 laborers this winter 
and provide protection from salt water dam- 
age to agricultural production while also 
protecting against cyclones following the 
present monsoons. 

— U.S. voluntary agencies have focused 
on rehabilitation of individual families who 
have lost their homes. Nearly 2 million Ben- 
galees who were without shelter have di- 
rectly benefited from such assistance. 

The U.S. aid report notes that "sustained 
international effort of rehabilitation assist- 
ance" will be required over the 1973 fiscal 
year and points out that the administration 
has requested a further $100 million "to 
permit the United States to do its propor- 
tionate share in this large scale humani- 
tarian endeavor." 



TEXT OF REPORT 

U.S. Assistance to Bangladesh — 
THE First Six Months 

Bangladesh came into existence facing stagger- 
ing difficulties. Its initial success in meeting these 
difficulties has been due in great measure to the 
generous humanitarian response of many countries 
which have provided foods, raw materials for in- 
dustry, transport and other urgent assistance 
amounting to about $800 million. 

The U.S. has provided $267.5 million or one-third 
of the total. 

Our response to the humanitarian needs of Ban- 
gladesh during its first six months of independence 
has been three-pronged: 



August 28, 1972 



231 



— PL 480 food and grants to move food, primarily 
under UN auspices, to counter the immediate 
threat of hunger ($132 million); 

— Grants to U.S. voluntary agencies to assist in 
resettlement of thousands of Bengalee families 
($19.5 million); 

— Help to the Government of Bangladesh to re- 
store basic facilities and rehabilitate the economy 
($115 million). 

Seven hundred thousand tons of PL 480 food- 
grains and edible oil, valued at $88.2 million, have 
been committed since March. At the discretion of 
the Government of Bangladesh, this food is dis- 
tributed free to returned refugees and other desti- 
tute families or sold so that the proceeds provide 
employment opportunities for the people on labor- 
intensive projects. 

A grant to the U.N. Relief Operation — Dacca 
(UNROD) of $35 million helps with the cost of 
logistical support directly related to the movement 
of food into the country. These funds have been 
spent largely for chartering river transport needed 
to supplement the extensively-damaged rail and 
road transport system. In addition, our grant — 
which has accounted for some 50 percent of 
UNROD's total cash resources — has been used for 
vacuvators and cargo handling equipment to ex- 
pedite food deliveries. 

More recently, A.LD. financed the services of the 
Manhattan, the U.S.'s largest merchant vessel, to 
serve as a floating silo and thus expedite the han- 
dling of incoming shipments of food. Also we have 
chartered aircraft to airdrop food in isolated vil- 
lages during the monsoons. Although these serv- 
ices are not included in our grant to the UN, they 
directly support the UN-sponsored food relief pro- 
gram and are under the control of UNROD. 

Through a series of grants totalling almost $20 
million, we have recognized the important role 
U.S. voluntary agencies perform in responding 
rapidly to urgent human needs. They have focussed 
on the rehabilitation of individual families who lost 
their homes, possessions and means of livelihood. A 
large part of these funds— through CARE, Catholic 
Relief Services, Church World Service, Medical As- 
sistance Programs and the Community Development 
Foundation — are to provide construction materials 
and other assistance in the rebuilding of thousands 
of homes. Almost two million Bengalees who were 
without shelter have directly benefited from this 
U.S. assistance. Voluntary agencies also are pro- 
viding medical care and distributing tools, bullocks 
and equipment to thousands of farmers, fishermen, 
tradesmen and small businessmen so that they can 
become self-sufficient. Through the International 
Rescue Committee we have supported the important 
work of the Cholera Research Laboratory and pro- 
vided stipends to permit students to resume their 
studies. A grant to the American Red Cross fur- 
thered the work of the International Committee of 



the Red Cross among the minority population and 
other specially needy groups in Bangladesh. 

The third prong of our assistance has been direct 
bilateral grant aid of $115 million to the Govern- 
ment of Bangladesh to finance the rehabilitation of 
basic facilities and to rehabilitate the economy. 
These funds are for the importation of commodi- 
ties — such as cotton, tallow, fertilizer, and pesti- 
cides — to revive local industry and to increase food 
production. Our grant also finances repair and 
construction of coastal embankments, restoration of 
power supplies, rebuilding of roads and bridges, 
rehabilitation of airports, reconstruction of schools 
and the procurement and printing of textbooks and 
library materials lost during the civil war. In these 
and other priority areas, A.I.D. funds have financed 
the services of U.S. contractors with the expertise 
and prior experience to do a job quickly and well. 
While the grant finances urgently needed project 
equipment from the United States, a significant 
amount of the grant funds are used for local costs, 
particularly for labor and locally available materials 
and services. But even the dollars used to purchase 
the local currency for such local costs are in turn 
utilized by the Bangladesh Government to buy ad- 
ditional priority commodities from the United 
States. By such arrangements our grant assistance 
serves directly to stimulate the economy and gen- 
erate employment, while also ensuring that many 
of the dollars we spend ultimately come back to 
the United States. 

In fiscal year 1972, the U.S. Congress appropri- 
ated $200 million for emergency relief in South 
Asia — $27.7 million was committed for relief needs 
prior to the emergence of Bangladesh as an inde- 
pendent country and $172.2 million since that event. 
Other U.S. commitments to Bangladesh include $4.6 
million from the fiscal year 1972 Contingency Fund 
and $90.7 million in PL 480 resources — for a total 
U.S. commitment to Bangladesh since independence 
of $267.5 million. 

For fiscal year 1973 the Administration has re- 
quested a further $100 million to permit the U.S. to 
do its proportionate share in this large scale hu- 
manitarian endeavor, which will require a sustained 
international effort of rehabilitation assistance over 
the next year. 

To summarize, U.S. Government assistance for 
Bangladesh during the first six months has been as 
follows: 

(in million f) 

Food and logistical support for mov- 
ing of food, mainly through the UN 

700,000 tons of Food for Peace .... $88.2 
High protein food for UNICEF 

Child feeding 2.5 

Grant to the UN 35.3 

S.S. Manhattan 4.0 

Airdrop Services (Southern Air) .. 2.0 

132.0 



232 



Department of State Bulletin 



(in million t) 



Grants to Voluntary Agencies 

CARE— housing 5.3 

Catholic Relief Services — housing 

and rehabilitation 8.0 

Church World Service — housing .. 1.0 

American Red Cross — nutritional 

and medical assistance 1.0 

Community Development Founda- 
tion — housing .2 

Medical Assistance Programs — 

medical and housing .9 

Foundation for Airborne Relief — 

airdrop services 1.5 

International Rescue Committee — 

educational and health services .. 1.6 



19.5 



115.0 



Grant to the Government of Bangla- 
desh for the following purposes: 

Essential commodity imports 34.4 

Repair of coastal embankments .... 15.0 

Rehabilitation of power stations 

and lines 16.3 

Rehabilitation of schools and li- 
braries 13.3 

Canal excavations, inland water- 
ways and dredging 6.0 

Rural health centers 5.0 

Reconstruction of bridges, roads, 
airports and other needs to be 
defined 25.0 

l: 

Other Relief Assistance 1.0 

Total 267.5 



President Signs Executive Order 
Continuing Regulation of Exports 

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER' 
Continuing the Regulation of Exports 

By virtue of the authority vested in the President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, 
including Section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, 
as amended (12 U.S.C. 95a), and in view of the con- 
tinued existence of the national emergencies declared 



by Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16, 1950, and 
Proclamation No. 4074 of August 15, 1971, and the 
importance of continuing (a) to exercise the neces- 
sary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of 
their significance to the national security of the 
United States; (b) to further significantly the for- 
eign policy of the United States and to aid in ful- 
filling its international responsibilities; and (c) to 
protect the domestic economy from the excessive 
drain of scarce materials and reduce the serious in- 
flationary impact of abnormal foreign demand, it is 
hereby ordered: 

Section 1. Notwithstanding the expiration of the 
Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, the 
provisions for administration of that act contained in 
Executive Order 11533 of June 4, 1970 shall continue 
in full force and effect and shall authorize the exer- 
cise and administration of export controls, under the 
authority vested in me as President of the United 
States by section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, 
as amended (12 U.S.C. 95a). 

Sec. 2. Except to the extent another basis is pro- 
vided in the second sentence of Section 3 of this 
order, all rules and regulations issued by the Secre- 
tary of Commerce, published in Title 15, Chapter 3, 
Subchapter B, of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
Parts 368 to 399 inclusive, and all orders, licenses and 
other forms, of administrative action issued or taken 
pursuant thereto, shall until amended or revoked by 
the Secretary of Commerce, remain in full force and 
effect, the same as if issued or taken pursuant to this 
order, except that the maximum fine which may be 
imposed under § 387.1(a)(1) shall not exceed $10,000 
and that the civil penalty provided for under § 387.1 
(b)(3) will not be applicable to any violation of the 
regulations under this order. 

Sec. 3. The delegations of authority in this order 
shall not affect the authority of any agency or official 
pursuant to any other delegation of Presidential 
authority, presently in effect or hereafter made, 
under Section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, as 
amended. Those regulations issued under the Export 
Control Act of 1949, as amended, to implement for- 
eign policy set forth in Executive Orders Nos. 11322 
of January 5, 1967 and 11419 of July 29, 1968, shall 
until amended or revoked by the Secretary of Com- 
merce continue to apply as regulations issued under 
such orders. 



C/h^^K^/^ 



' No. 11677; 37 Fed. Reg. 15483. 



The White House, 
August 1, 1972. 



August 28, 1972 



233 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Urges Early Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification 
of Revised Universal Copyright Convention 



Statement by Bruce C. Ladd, Jr. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities ^ 



The Department of State appreciates very 
much having this opportunity to present its 
views on the Universal Copyright Conven- 
tion as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. 
Accompanying me are George D. Cary, Reg- 
ister of Copyrights, Library of Congress, and 
Harvey J. Winter, Director, Office of Busi- 
ness Protection, Department of State. Mr. 
Cary also has a prepared statement on the 
revised Universal Copyright Convention 
which discusses some of the more technical 
aspects of the convention. 

Before taking up the substance of the Paris 
revision of the Universal Copyright Conven- 
tion, I believe that it is desirable and useful 
to set this revision in its proper historical 
perspective. 

Just 20 years ago, in August 1952, the In- 
tergovernmental Copyright Conference to 
negotiate a new worldwide copyright con- 
vention was convened in Geneva, Switzer- 
land, largely at the initiative of the United 
States. One of the primary reasons for con- 
vening this conference was to develop a new 
copyright agreement which would be ac- 
ceptable to those states that had not been 
able to join the only existing worldwide con- 



'■ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on Aug. 2. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. 



vention, the Berne Convention, for a variety 
of reasons. The major developed country in 
this category was the United States. 

The Universal Copyright Convention 
(UCC) was successfully negotiated, and the 
United States ratified the convention in 1954. 
It came into force in 1955 and has been the 
keystone of our international copyright rela- 
tions since that date. As of the present date, 
61 states are parties to the UCC. 

The next important development in the in- 
ternational copyright field was the Stock- 
holm Intellectual Property Conference in 
1967. One of the objectives of this confer- 
ence was to revise the Berne Convention and 
include special provisions for the benefit of 
developing countries. 

Since the United States was not a party to 
the Berne Convention, the United States del- 
egation attended the Stockholm Conference 
only in an observer capacity. The revision of 
the Berne Convention brought forth the so- 
called Stockholm Protocol, which contained 
special provisions for developing countries in 
acquiring rights to copyrighted works for 
educational purposes. The protocol gave de- 
veloping countries very broad and practically 
uncontrolled privileges regarding works 
copyrighted in Berne member states. Thus, 
there was a drastic shift in the direction of 
international copyright that threatened the 
foundations on which all multilateral copy- 
right protection had been built since the ne- 



234 



Department of State Bulletin 



gotiation of the Berne Convention in 1886. 
Many U.S. works which had been protected 
under this convention by simultaneous pub- 
lication in a Berne member state were di- 
rectly affected by this development. 

Generally, the Stockholm Protocol was 
considered unacceptable by the developed 
countries, and by the end of 1967 it was se- 
riously questioned whether any important 
developed countries would approve the pro- 
tocol. As a matter of fact, to date no major 
developed country has ratified or acceded to 
the Stockholm Protocol. 

When it became apparent during 1968 that 
developed countries were not going to accept 
the protocol, the developing countries, under 
the leadership of India, made their position 
clear. If positive steps were not taken to 
meet the legitimate needs of developing 
countries for copyrighted works for educa- 
tion, then these countries would seriously 
consider withdrawing from the Berne Con- 
vention. Because of a special clause in the 
UCC known as the Berne safeguard clause, 
countries renouncing Berne could not rely on 
the UCC for protection in countries that 
were parties to both conventions. The result 
of the renunciation of Berne would have been 
the exodus of the developing countries from 
both major copyright conventions and a vir- 
tual collapse of the international copyright 
system as we know it today. Undoubtedly 
the unauthorized use of copyrighted works, 
that is, "book piracy," would have become 
an accepted practice in these developing 
countries with resultant adverse effects on 
American authors and publishers and on our 
balance of payments position. The United 
States is the leading book-exporting country 
of the world and enjoys a strongly favorable 
balance of trade in books. The official De- 
partment of Commerce figures for 1971 show 
U.S. book exports in the amount of $177 mil- 
lion and U.S. book imports totaling $101 mil- 
lion. However, since these official statistics 
do not include shipments valued at less than 
$500, the true export figure is substantially 
greater. Further, these trade statistics do 
not include several million dollars a year in 



"invisible exports" in the form of royalties 
received for permission to translate or re- 
publish American works. 

To forestall such a development the United 
States and other developed countries includ- 
ing the United Kingdom, the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, and France took the initia- 
tive in carrying out a series of preparatory 
meetings in 1969 and 1970 which paved the 
way to the Paris Conference in July 1971 to 
revise simultaneously the UCC and Berne. 
This preparatory work was undertaken with 
the full cooperation of the developing coun- 
tries. 

The two basic objectives of this simultane- 
ous revision were set forth in the "Washing- 
ton Recommendation" of September 1969 : 

1. The level of protection in the UCC would 
be improved by the adoption of certain min- 
imum rights; that is, the rights of repi'oduc- 
tion, public performance, and broadcasting. 
At the same time, special provisions for the 
benefit of developing countries would be in- 
cluded in the UCC. Finally, the so-called 
Berne safeguard clause would be suspended 
to permit developing countries to leave the 
Berne Convention if they wished without 
penalty under the UCC. 

2. The Stockholm Protocol would be sepa- 
rated from the Berne Convention, and in 
turn, the developing countries would be able 
to substitute the special provisions included 
for their benefit in the UCC. However, as a 
protective measure, it was provided that the 
Stockholm Protocol would not be separated 
from the 1967 text of the Berne Convention 
until such time as France, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States had ratified 
the revised text of the UCC. The purpose of 
this was to make ratification or accession to 
the revised text of the UCC, which would 
contain new concessions for developing coun- 
tries, the quid pro quo for separation of the 
Stockholm Protocol from the Berne Conven- 
tion. 

Because of the interrelationship and, in 
certain respects, the interdependence of the 
two conventions, the diplomatic conferences 



August 28, 1972 



235 



for the revision of the UCC and the Berne 
Convention were held at the same time in 
Paris at UNESCO [United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization] , 
July 5-24, 1971. In all, 45 member states of 
the UCC participated in the conference, 30 
other states had observer delegations, and 
three intergovernmental organizations and 
16 nongovernmental organizations were rep- 
resented at the conference. 

At the Paris Conference there was a sig- 
nificant reversal in the trend represented by 
the Stockholm Protocol. A number of impor- 
tant demands of developing countries were 
abandoned at Paris with respect to broad- 
casting rights and broad uses of literary and 
artistic works for "teaching, study and re- 
search in all fields of education." Essen- 
tially, the concessions for developing coun- 
tries at the Paris Conference were limited 
to the rights of translation and reproduction. 

This revision of the UCC in Paris was the 
first since its adoption in 1952. It is gener- 
ally recognized that the UCC was improved 
by the introduction of certain basic rights 
of authors. This has been accomplished in 
the following way. Article IV bis makes spe- 
cific reference to article I. Article I, which 
remains unchanged from the 1952 conven- 
tion, sets forth the undertaking of each con- 
tracting state to provide for "the adequate 
and effective protection of the rights of au- 
thors and other copyright proprietors in lit- 
erary, scientific and artistic works, including 
writings, musical, dramatic and cinemato- 
graphic works, and paintings, engravings 
and sculpture." The new article IV bis pro- 
vides that "The rights referred to in Article 
I shall include the basic rights ensuring the 
author's economic interests, including the 
exclusive right to authorize reproduction by 
any means, public performance and broad- 
casting." These rights apply to works pro- 
tected under the convention either in their 
original form or in any form recognizably 
derived from the original. It is further pro- 
vided that any contracting state may, by its 
domestic legislation, make exceptions to such 
rights that do not conflict with the spirit and 



provisions of the convention, but that any 
state whose legislation so provides shall nev- 
ertheless accord a reasonable degree of ef- 
fective protection to each of the rights to 
which exception has been made. 

Article V bis, V ter, and V quater are the 
new articles in the revised UCC which par- 
allel articles in the revised Berne Convention 
providing special exceptions for developing 
countries. 

Article V bis sets forth the procedure 
whereby a contracting state regarded as a 
developing country in conformity with the 
established practice of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations may take advantage 
of the special translation and reproduction 
provisions. 

In connection with the two key provisions 
of the UCC revision, article V te?- on trans- 
lations and article V quater on reproduction, 
the following points should be stressed: 

1. Compulsory licenses under article V ter 
are to be granted in connection with "teach- 
ing, scholarship or research" and under arti- 
cle V quater for "systematic instructional 
activities." The emphasis obviously is on use 
of copyrighted materials for educational pur- 
poses. 

2. Article V ter reduces the present seven- 
year period of absolute exclusive translation 
rights to three years for a developing coun- 
try and "in the case of a translation into a 
language not in general use in one or more 
developed countries" that are party to either 
the 1952 or 1971 text of the UCC, the period 
can be further reduced to one year. 

3. The applicable periods of exclusivity, 
during which no license can be issued under 
article V quater, vary. In general, the period 
is five years, but a three-year period is ap- 
plicable to "works of the natural and physi- 
cal sciences, including mathematics, and of 
technology" and the term is seven years for 
"works of fiction, poetry, drama and music, 
and for art books." 

4. Certain provisions in articles V ter and 
V quater prohibit the export of copies and 
prescribe that the compulsory license shall 
be valid only for publication in the contract- 



236 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing state where it has been applied for. It 
follows that these provisions are considered 
as prohibiting a licensee from having copies 
reproduced outside the territory of the con- 
tracting state granting the license. However, 
as explained in the report of the General 
Rapporteur, this prohibition does not apply 
under certain carefully defined conditions; 
e.g., "the Contracting State granting the li- 
cence has within its territory, no printing or 
reproduction facilities, or, such facilities ex- 
ist but are incapable for economic or practi- 
cal reasons of reproducing the copies." 

5. Both articles V ter and V quater state 
that "due provision shall be made at the na- 
tional level to ensure" that compulsory li- 
censes provide for "just compensation that 
is consistent with standards of royalties nor- 
mally operating in the case of licences freely 
negotiated between persons in the two coun- 
tries concerned." 

The administrative and final clauses of the 
UCC were also revised. Among the more im- 
portant changes were the suspension of the 
Berne safeguard clause for developing coun- 
tries and an increase from 12 to 18 countries 
in the membership of the important Inter- 
governmental Copyright Committee. In ad- 
dition, UNESCO was asked to continue as 
the Secretariat for that Committee. 

The two protocols in the revised UCC cor- 
respond in effect to the two protocols of the 
1952 convention. Protocol 1 relates to the 
application of the convention to works of 
stateless persons and refugees, and protocol 
2 concerns the application of the convention 
to the works of certain international organi- 
zations. 

At the conclusion of the UCC revision con- 
ference, 26 states signed that convention, in- 
cluding the United States and other devel- 
oped countries such as the United Kingdom, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Sweden, and Japan. Subsequent to the 
conference, four additional states signed the 
convention. 

During the past year some concern has 
been expressed about the compulsory licens- 
ing provisions of the Paris revision of the 



UCC. In this connection we wish to point 
out that the concept of compulsory licensing 
in the revised UCC is by no means new. A 
provision for compulsory licensing for trans- 
lation rights has been an integral part of 
that convention since its negotiation in 1952. 
To the best of our knowledge, the right to a 
compulsory license has never been invoked 
in any UCC member state. Instead, accepta- 
ble terms have been worked out between the 
interested parties without recourse to a com- 
pulsory license. It is impossible to draw any 
firm conclusion from this past experience, 
but at least it suggests the possibility that 
compulsory licensing may not be resorted to 
on any widespread basis. 

As I have previously indicated, one of the 
basic purposes of the diplomatic conference 
in Paris was to effect revision of the Berne 
Copyright Convention parallel to that of the 
UCC. In this connection the Stockholm Act 
of Berne was replaced by the new Paris Act. 
Although the substantive copyright changes 
adopted at the Stockholm Conference were 
repeated without any changes in the Paris 
Act, the special exceptions for developing 
countries contained in the Stockholm Proto- 
col were replaced by an appendix to the 
Paris Act of the Berne Convention. Taking 
into account certain differences in structure 
between the Berne Convention and the UCC, 
these exceptions follow very closely the ex- 
ceptions in the revised text of the UCC. Once 
the Paris Act of Berne comes into force, a 
country may not ratify or accede to the 
Stockholm Act and the protocol. Because of 
the continuing concern of U.S. copyright in- 
terests about the protocol, this is a plus as 
far as the United States is concerned. In 
this connection it should be noted that one of 
the conditions for the entry into force of the 
new Paris Act is that France, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States be- 
come bound by the revised text of the UCC. 

The parallelism between the new texts of 
the UCC and Berne was carefully devised in 
order to give developing countries the option 
of staying in the Berne Convention. Further, 
the parallelism was designed to maintain the 



August 28, 1972 



237 



equilibrium between the two conventions. 

The Department of State and other inter- 
ested agencies believe that ratiiication of the 
revised Universal Copyright Convention is in 
the national interest. The principal and over- 
riding reason for this position is one that I 
have mentioned earlier in my statement: If 
the legitimate needs of developing countries 
for access to foreign copyrighted materials 
are not satisfied, then these countries may 
well exercise their sovereign right to de- 
nounce their international treaty commit- 
ments. Once they do this, they can, of course, 
quite legally reproduce or translate any and 
all copyrighted materials they desire without 
authorization, regardless of the use to which 
they are to be put, and without the require- 
ment of making any compensation. They 
can, in fact, go even further by exporting 
such materials. If such an eventuality oc- 
curs, it will mark the end of the interna- 
tional copyright system, with resultant ad- 
verse effects on the interests of all U.S. copy- 
right proprietors abroad. 

There is now clear evidence that such ac- 
tion is seriously being studied in a develop- 
ing country which is a party to both copy- 
right conventions. We have been informed 
by our Embassy in Islamabad that on May 
8, 1972, the Pakistan Minister of Education 
announced that his country was considering 
withdrawing from the Universal Copyright 
Convention and the Berne Convention. As a 
result of consultations between U.S. Embas- 
sy officials and officials of the Pakistan Min- 
isti-y of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Ed- 
ucation, we have ascertained that the pri- 
mary reason for considering withdrawal is 
dissatisfaction with the two copyright con- 
ventions that are now in force. However, the 
Pakistani officials consulted have indicated 
their satisfaction with the revised UCC and 
Berne Convention. They are concerned, 
nonetheless, that many years may pass be- 
fore these conventions will be ratified by a 
sufficient number of states so that they can 
go into effect. And, as I have noted above, 
four specific countries, including the United 
States, must ratify the revised UCC before 



the revised Berne Convention can enter into 
force. I would be very surprised if there are j 
not other developing countries that share 
the concern of Pakistan. 

We know that there are certain articles 
which do not entirely satisfy one group or : 
another. But the negotiation of an impor- fl 
tant convention with a large number of 
states in attendance involves give-and-take. 
It is the Department of State's belief that 
the revised UCC constitutes a fair and just 
compromise between the developed countries 
that produce the bulk of copyrighted mate- 
rials and the developing countries that wish 
to use these materials for educational and 
research purposes on the best possible terms. 

During the preparatory work for the re- 
vision of the UCC the Department of State 
and the Copyright Office consulted with the 
principal U.S. private copyright groups 
through the Department's International 
Copyright Advisory Panel to obtain their 
views on the proposed revision. Because of 
the diverse nature of these copyright groups, 
there were divergent views on some of the 
key points of the proposed revision. In the 
development of the U.S. position for the dip- 
lomatic conference all views were carefully 
considered, and we believe that we were suc- 
cessful in arriving at a position that was 
balanced and fair. 

The product of the conference, the revised 
Universal Copyright Convention, has been 
carefully studied by the interested private 
copyright groups in this country and has 
met with widespread approval. Following 
are the organizations that have endorsed 
United States I'atification of the revised con- 
vention: 

American Bar Association 

American Patent Law Association 

American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub- 
lishers 

Association of American Publishers 

Broadcast Music, Inc. 

Music Publishers Association of the United States, 
Inc. 

National Association of Broadcasters 

National Music Publishers' Association 

Recording Industry Association of America 



238 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Organizations 
and Institutions on Copyright Law Revision (Na- 
tional Education Association) 

Of these organizations, I would like to 
mention specifically the American Bar Asso- 
ciation and the fact that the ABA's House 
of Delegates believed the question of early 
U.S. ratification of the revised Universal 
Copyright Convention was important enough 
to be considered at an extraordinary session 
in February of this year. 

We believe that it is a matter of conse- 
quence for the United States to be among 
the first to ratify the revised Universal 
Copyright Convention. One major developed 
country, the United Kingdom, whose pub- 
lishers and authors have as much at stake 
as their American counterparts, has already 
ratified the UCC. It is well known that the 
United States played a very active part not 
only in the negotiation of the revised Uni- 
versal Copyright Convention but also in the 
initiation of this project. For this and other 
reasons that I have mentioned previously, 
early ratification of the UCC by the United 
States would be consistent with our leading 
role in behalf of international copyright pro- 
tection and would advance our basic foreign 
policy objective of more effective protection 
abroad for the intellectual property rights 
of American nationals. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

United States-Mexican Trade Relations. Hearing be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Feb- 
ruary 24, 1972. 65 pp. 

Northern Ireland. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. February 28-March 1, 1972. 639 pp. 

Law of the Sea and Peaceful Uses of the Seabeds. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Organizations and Movements of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. April 10-11, 1972. 
115 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, August 4, 1972. 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 10, 
1967 (TIAS 6583), for the application of safe- 
guards by the International Atomic Energy Agen- 
cy to the bilateral agreement between the United 
States and Braz