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GOV DOC

BOSTOISI
PUBLIC
UBl^RY

THE OFFICIAL WI

-ID OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1723

July 3, 1972

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS 1

THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT:

GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE AND COMPLEXITY

Address by Under Secretary Irwin 16

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES POLICY ON PROVIDING
INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS

Statement by Assistant Secretary Abs/iirjPj,-,,,,f^.„.,|; , , ,,,..,...

For index see inside back cv "r

DtPOSlTORY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1723
July 3, 1972

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
O/Rce of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Transmitted to the Congress

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures
with respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms were transmitted to the Con-
gress by President Nixon on June 13.^ Fol-
lowing are texts of President Nixon's mes-
sage to the Senate; his letter to Speaker of
the House Carl Albert; Secretary Roger's
report to the President of June 10; and agreed
interpretations and unilateral statements.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE

White House press release dated June 13

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith certified copies of the
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement
on Certain Measures with respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies
of these agreements are also being forwarded
to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent
to ratification of the Treaty, and an expres-
sion of support from both Houses of the
Congress for the Interim Agreement on
Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major
effort of this administration, are a significant
step into a new era of mutually agreed re-
straint and arms limitation between the two
principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are ex-

' For texts of the treaty and interim agreement
and associated protocol, see Bulletin of June 26,
1972, p. 918.

plained in detail in the Report of the Secre-
tary of State, which I attach. Their main
effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the
deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems
to two designated areas, and at a low level.
The Interim Agreement limits the overall
level of strategic offensive missile forces.
Together the two agreements provide for a
more stable strategic balance in the next sev-
eral years than would be possible if strategic
arms competition continued unchecked. This
benefits not only the United States and the
Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step
in checking the arms race, but only a first
step; they do not close off all avenues of stra-
tegic competition. Just as the maintenance of
a strong strategic posture was an essential
element in the success of these negotiations,
it is now equally essential that we carry for-
ward a sound strategic modernization pro-
gram to maintain our security and to ensure
that more permanent and comprehensive
arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United
States are second to none in the world today.
I am determined that they shall remain so.
The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim
Agreement will permit the United States to
take the steps we deem necessary to main-
tain a strategic posture which protects our
vital interests and guarantees our continued
security.

Besides enhancing our national security,
these agreements open the opportunity for a
new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet rela-
tionship, characterized by negotiated settle-
ment of differences, rather than by the hos-
tility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that

July 3, 1972

mankind need not live forever in the dark
shadow of nuclear war. They provide re-
newed hope that men and nations working
together can succeed in building a lasting
peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve
one of this Nation's most cherished purposes
— a more secure and peaceful world in which
America's security is fully protected — I
strongly recommend that the Senate sup-
port them, and that its deliberations be con-
ducted without delay.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, June 13, 1972.

LETTER TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

White House press release dated June 13

The White House,
Washington, June 13, 1972.

Dear Mr. Speaker: I transmit herewith
copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the In-
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with
respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26,
1972. Copies of these agreements are also
being forwarded to the President of the
Senate. I am asking the Senate's advice and
consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an
expression of support from both Houses of
the Congress for the Interim Agreement on
Strategic Offensive Arms.

The provisions of the agreements are ex-
plained in detail in the Report of the Secre-
tary of State, which I attach. Their main
effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the
deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems
to two designated areas, and at a low level.
The Interim Agreement limits the overall
level of strategic offensive missile forces.
Together the two agreements provide for a
more stable strategic balance in the next sev-

President Nixon Asks Prompt Approval
of Agreements Limiting Nuclear Arms

Following is a statement by President Nixon
which was filmed for television and radio
broadcast on June 13.

white House press release dated June 13

I am sending to the Congress today the
nuclear arms limitation agreements that I
negotiated with the Soviet leaders in Moscow.

I am convinced that these agreements are
in the security interest of the United States.
They will enable the United States to maintain
defenses second to none, defenses that will
protect the interests of the United States at
home and abroad.

I believe that prompt approval by the Sen-
ate of the treaty limiting defensive weapons
and prompt approval by the Congress of the
agreement limiting certain classes of offensive
weapons will contribute to the goal that I
know all Americans share — a goal of ending
the arms race and building a more peaceful
world.

eral years than would be possible if strategic
arms competition continued unchecked. This
benefits not only the United States and the
Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first
step in checking the arms race, but only a
first step; they do not close off all avenues
of strategic competition. Just as the main-
tenance of a strong strategic posture was an
essential element in the success of these nego-
tiations, it is now equally essential that we
carry forward a sound strategic moderniza-
tion program to maintain our security and to
ensure that more permanent and comprehen-
sive arms limitation agreements can be
reached.

The defense capabilities of the United
States are second to none in the world today.
I am determined that they shall remain so.
The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim
Agreement will permit the United States to
take the steps we deem necessary to maintain
a strategic posture which protects our vital
interests and guarantees our continued se-
curity.

Department of State Bulletin

These accords offer tangible evidence that
mankind need not live forever in the dark
shadow of nuclear war. They provide re-
newed hope that men and nations working
together can succeed in building a lasting
peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve
one of this Nation's most cherished purposes
— a more secure and peaceful world in which
America's security is fully protected — I
strongly recommend that the House of Rep-
resentatives support The Interim Agreement
on Strategic Offensive Arms, and that its
deliberations be conducted without delay.
Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.

Honorable Carl B. Albert

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

REPORT OF SECRETARY ROGERS

Department of State,
Washington, June 10, 1972.

The President,
The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to
you the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
(ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between
the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with
respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated
Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM
Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is
an agreement limited in scope and time. It is de-
signed to limit the aggregate number of intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers,
and the number of modern ballistic missile subma-
rines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering
more complete limitations of strategic offensive

arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to
you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which
is an integral part of the Agreement), with the
recommendation that they be transmitted to both
Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolu-
tion.

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter
into force only upon the exchange of written notices
of acceptance by both countries and only when and
if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signa-
tories understand that, pending ratification and ac-
ceptance, neither will take any action that would be
prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agree-
ment and Protocol, in the absence of notification by
either signatory of its intention not to proceed with
ratification or acceptance.

ABM Treaty

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May
26, 1972, provides that:

— A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for
such deployment, are prohibited;

— An ABM deployment for defense of an individ-
ual region is prohibited, except as specifically per-
mitted;

— Permitted ABM deployments will be limited
to two widely separated deployment areas in each
country — one for defense of the national capital,
and the other for the defense of ICBMs;

— For these purposes no more than 100 ABM
launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor
missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each
150-kilometer radius ABM deployment area, for a
total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200
deployed ABM launchers for each Party;

— ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars
to support the ABM defense of the national capital
may be deployed only in a specified number of small
radar complexes within the ABM deployment area;
radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited
to a specified number within the ABM deployment
area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint.

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic
provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corol-
lary provisions were also agreed:

— Development, testing and deployment of ABM
systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air-
based, space-based or mobile land-based are pro-
hibited;

— Deployment of ABM systems involving new
types of basic components to perform the current
functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is
prohibited;

— The conversion or testing of other systems, such
as air defense systems, or components thereof to
perform an ABM role is prohibited.

July 3, 1972

The Treaty also contains certain general provi-
sions relating to the verification and implementa-
tion of the Treaty and to further negotiations:

— Each side will use national technical means for
verification and the Parties agree not to interfere
with such means and not to take deliberate conceal-
ment measures;

— A Standing Consultative Commission will be
established to facilitate implementation of the
Treaty and consider questions arising thereunder;

— The Parties will continue active negotiations
for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and six-
teen Articles. As indicated in Article 1(1), it pro-
vides for limitations on anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems as well as certain related measures. In the
course of the negotiations, agreement was reached
on a number of interpretive matters related to the
Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations
and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

Preamble

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set
forth common premises and objectives of the United
States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for
entering into this Treaty.

The first preambular paragraph states the basic
premise that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences for all mankind.

The second and third preambular paragraphs indi-
cate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the ac-
companying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on
anti-ballistic missile systems will be an important
factor in curbing competition in the strategic offen-
sive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak
of nuclear war, and will, together with certain agreed
measures on the limitation of strategic offensive
arms, create a favorable climate for future negotia-
tions on limiting strategic arms.

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indi-
cate the relationship of this Treaty to the under-
taking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nu-
clear disarmament", and express the intention of the
Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament
at the earliest possible date.

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad inter-
national consensus that effective measures to limit
strategic arms will assist in relaxing international
tensions and strengthening trust between nations.
As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear
powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty
and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic
steps toward these broader political goals.

A. Limitations on ABM Systems

(1) Deployment

Article 1(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM sys-
tems which would provide defense covering sub-
stantially the whole of the territory of a Party.
ABM defenses of individual regions are also pro-
hibited except as specifically set forth in Article III.
As more fully explained below, that Article limits
not only the number, size and location of the per-
mitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but
also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launch-
ers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places
restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect
of precluding thick regional ABM defenses.

Article 1(2) also includes an undertaking not to
provide a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense.
This would, for example, prohibit the construction
and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capa-
ble radars deployed for other purposes, that could
provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Ar-
ticles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints
that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does
not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence
or other non-ABM systems per se. However, it does
prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems
or their components to perform an ABM role; more-
over, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any
phased-array radars over a certain size except as
otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for
the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or
for use as national technical means of verification.
This would prevent the possible use of such radars
as a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements
in flight trajectory". It indicates that such systems
currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor mis-
siles are interceptor missiles constructed and de-
ployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested
in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers con-
structed and deployed for launching ABM inter-
ceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an in-
terceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM
mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.)
ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for
an ABM role (including target tracking or missile
control, but not early warning), or of a type here-
after tested in an ABM mode.

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear
that the ABM system components listed in the first
paragraph of the Article include not only those
which are operational, but also those under construc-
tion, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, re-
pair or conversion, or mothballed.

Article III prohibits the deployment of any ABM

Department of State Bulletin

systems or their components except as provided
therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy
only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited de-
ployment of such systems described in the next two
paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one
deployment area centered on the nation's capital
and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b)
within one other deployment area having the same
radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The cen-
ters of the two deployment areas will be separated
by no less than 1,300 kilometers.

In each of these deployment areas a Party may
deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no
more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch
sites. These totals would include any deployments
within such areas for training purposes and, as
indicated in Article 11(2), would not be confined to
those in operational status. In view of Article V(l),
discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM com-
ponents may be deployed.

The restrictions on ABM radars cover radars of
both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern
type which scans by electronic means, a capability
especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical-
scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are
as follows:

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment
area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative
or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed,
but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party
may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM
radar complexes, the permitted area of each com-
plex being circular and having a diameter of no
more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars
may not be located outside such complexes, regard-
less of when they become operational. Mechanical-
scan ABM radars that become operational after May
26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties un-
derstand that in addition to the ABM radars which
may be deployed in accordance with this provision,
the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational
on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for
defense of its national capital may be retained.

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment
area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location
of radars is not circumscribed, but qualitative and
quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may
have:

— 2 large phased-array ABM radars comparable in
potential to corresponding ABM radars operational
or under construction on the date of signature of the
Treaty in such a deployment area; and

— no more than 18 ABM radars each having a
potential less than that of the smaller of the 2 large
phased-array ABM radars referred to above.

The only two large phased-array ABM radars opera-

tional or under construction in such a deployment
area on the date of signature were the Perimeter
Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar
(MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air
Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand
that the potential — the product of mean emitted
power in watts and antenna area in square meters —
of the smaller of these two radars (the MSR) is con-
sidered for purposes of the Treaty to be three mil-
lion.

The impact of Article III on ABM systems cur-
rently deployed or under construction would be as
follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system
deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being
deployed by the United States in the vicinity of
Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it
would preclude the completion or retention of the
ABM complex on which construction had been started
in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in
Montana. (The signatories understand that, pend-
ing ratification and acceptance of the agreements,
neither will take any action that would be prohibited
thereby in the absence of notification by either sig-
natory of its intention not to proceed with ratifica-
tion or approval.)

The United States has not started construction at
a deployment area centered on its national capital,
and the Soviet Union has not started construction at
a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launch-
ers.

(2) Development, Testing, and Other LAmitations

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article
III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM com-
ponents used for development or testing, and located
within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It
is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the
area within which ABM components are located for
test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of
types used for range safety or instrumentation pur-
poses may be located outside of ABM test ranges.
Article IV further provides that each Party may
have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at
test ranges. The current United States test ranges
for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New
Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The cur-
rent Soviet test range for ABM systems is located
near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM compon-
ents are not to be deployed at any other test ranges
without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well
as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and
components. Paragraph V(l) limits such activities
to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by
prohibiting the development, testing or deployment
of ABM systems or components which are sea-based,
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is
understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM sys-

Joly 3, 1972

tems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars
which are not permanent fixed types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, test-
ing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching
more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time
from each launcher; modification of deployed launch-
ers to provide them with such a capability; and the
development, testing or deployment of automatic or
semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid
reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that
this Article includes an obligation not to develop,
test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more
than one independently guided warhead.

(3) Future ABM Systems

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is
that which would be created if an ABM system were
developed in the future which did not consist of in-
terceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty
would not permit the deployment of such a system
or of components thereof capable of substituting for
ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars:
Article 11(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its
function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory",
noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM
radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the
deployment of ABM systems or their components
except as specified therein, and it permits deploy-
ment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launch-
ers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM
system, provided that such devices were not
capable of substituting for one or more of these
components. Finally, in the course of the negotia-
tions, the Parties specified that "In order to insure
fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM sys-
tems and their components except as provided in
Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in
the event ABM systems based on other physical
principles and including components capable of
substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future,
specific limitations on such systems and their com-
ponents would be subject to discussion in accord-
ance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance
with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained
below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a
Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV
deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

(4) Modernization and Replacement

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions
of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of
ABM systems or their components may be carried
out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM

systems or components is constrained by the various
limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See para-
graph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and
Article VI.)

(5) Destruction and Dismantling

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their
components in excess of the numbers or outside the
areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM sys-
tems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall
be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures
within the shortest possible agreed period of time.
Since no more than one ABM system deployment
area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted
by Article III, this Article will apply, when the
Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components
previously under construction in the vicinity of
Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

B. Other Related Measures

(1) Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Compo-
nents

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the
effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM sys-
tems and their components provided by the Treaty.
To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article

(a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other
than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and
ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballis-
tic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory;

(b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers
and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy
in the future radars for early warning of strategic
ballistic missile attack except at locations along the
periphery of its national territory and oriented out-
ward.

The first of these undertakings would, for exam-
ple, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles
(SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic
ballistic missiles.

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor
missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode
subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty
would prohibit testirvg of non-ABM components for
ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of
ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM
components for non-ABM purposes.

With respect to the third of the undertakings in
Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while
not intended to prohibit the further deployment of
radars for early warning of strategic ballistic mis-
sile attack, requires their location along the periph-
ery of each Party's national territory and oriented
outward in order to minimize the possibility that
they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of
points in the interior.

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the

Department of State Bulletin

future deployment in third countries of radars for
early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack.
Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would
not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on
radars for national means of verification.

In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars
with more than a certain potential, though deployed
for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air
traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for
ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-
array radars having a potential exceeding three mil-
lion watt-square meters, except as provided in Ar-
ticles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the
purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use
as national technical means of verification. Deploy-
ment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the
United States would not be affected.

(2) International Transfers

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability
and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party under-
takes not to transfer to other States, and not to
deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems
or their components limited by the Treaty. The
Parties understand that the first undertaking in-
cludes an obligation not to provide to other states
technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked
out for the construction of ABM systems and their
components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the
United States Delegation made clear that the pro-
visions of this Article do not set a precedent for
whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty
on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the
question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a
far more complex issue, which may require a differ-
ent solution.

(3) Conflicting Obligations

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties
not to assume any international obligations which
would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in
this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obliga-
tion of the United States under any international
agreement.

C. Verification and Consultation
(1) Verification

Article XII relates to verification of compliance
with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accom-
plished by national technical means. Paragraph 1
states that each Party will use national technical
means of verification at its disposal in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law for purposes of providing assur-
ance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It
does not require changes from current operating
practices and procedures with respect to systems

which will be used as national technical means of
verification.

The second paragraph of this Article provides
that each Party agrees not to interfere with the
national technical means of verification of the other
which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1
of the Article. This provision would, for example,
prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used
for verification of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use
deliberate concealment measures which impede veri-
fication by national technical means. This para-
graph expressly permits continuation of current con-
struction, assembly, conversion and overhaul prac-
tices.

(2) Standing Consultative Commission

Article XIII provides that the Parties shall estab-
lish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission
(hereafter referred to as the Commission) to pro-
mote the objectives and to facilitate the implemen-
tation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further
agreed to use the Commission to promote the ob-
jectives and implementation of the Interim Agree-
ment. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.)
The Commission will provide a consulting frame-
work within which the Parties may consider various
matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim
Agreement. The Parties may also consider these
matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to
consider questions of compliance with the obliga-
tions assumed under this Treaty and the Interim
Agreement and also related situations Which may be
considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily
provide through the Commission information it con-
siders necessary to assure confidence in compliance.
Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance
based on information gathered by national tech-
nical means of verification and the other Party could
provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in
Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with
national technical means of verification operating in
accordance with its provisions. The Commission is
charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to
consider any questions of interference with such
means. The Commission may also consider questions
of concealment impeding verification by national
means. The Commission may consider changes in
the general strategic situation which have a bearing
on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is
the Commission's authority to consider proposals to
further increase the viability of the Treaty — such
as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has
entered into force — and to consider proposals for
amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the
Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Ar-

July 3, 1972

tides XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also
consider other appropriate measures, not specifically
enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limit-
ing strategic arms. Finally, through the Commis-
sion the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates
for the implementation of Article VIII concerning
destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM
components. (For corresponding responsibility of the
Commission under the Interim Agreement, see sec-
tion C of the discussion thereof.)

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for
the establishment of regulations for the Commis-
sion governing procedures, composition and other
relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out
early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any
consultation desired by either side under these Ar-
ticles can be carried out by the Delegations during
such negotiations or, when they are not in session,
through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facili-
tate the implementation of the agreements and
would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of
other diplomatic channels.

D. Duration, Withdrawal and
Further Negotiations

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of
unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause
of the type that has become standard in post-war
arms control treaties. This clause provides that each
Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall
have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it
decides that extraordinary events related to the sub-
ject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its su-
preme interests. Notice of such decision is to be
given to the other Party six months prior to with-
drawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to
include a statement of the extraordinary events in-
volved.

In this connection, the United States has stressed
the unique relationship between limitations on
offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interre-
lationship lends extraordinary importance to the un-
dertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotia-
tions for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relation-
ship was reflected in the following formal statement
relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head
of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972:

The US Delegation has stressed the impor-
tance the US Government attaches to achieving
agreement on more complete limitations on stra-
tegic offensive arms, following agreement on an
ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on
certain measures with respect to the limitation
of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation
believes that an objective of the follow-on nego-

tiations should be to constrain and reduce on a
long-term basis threats to the survivability of
our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The
USSR Delegation has also indicated that the
objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled
without the achievement of an agreement pro-
viding for more complete limitations on strate-
gic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that
the initial agreements would be steps toward the
achievement of more complete limitations on
strategic arms. If an agreement providing for
more complete strategic offensive arms limita-
tions were not achieved within five years, US
supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should
that occur, it would constitute a basis for with-
drawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not
wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we
believe that the USSR does. It is because we
wish to prevent such a situation that we empha-
size the importance the US Government attaches
to achievement of more complete limitations on
strategic offensive arms. The US Executive will
inform the Congress, in connection with Con-
gressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and
the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the
US position.

E. Other Provisions

Article XIV deals with amendments and review.
Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose
amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments
shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments
of ratification. The second paragraph of Article
XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by
the Parties at five year intervals. Paragrraph 2
does not preclude agreement on proposed amend-
ments of the Treaty during the first five years, or
between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects
recognition of the possibility of changes in the
strategic relationship and the development of new
strategic systems. These questions are also within
the purview of the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion.

Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty
contain standard provisions on entry into force,
registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter,
and equal authenticity of the English and Russian
lang^uage texts.

Interim Agreement and Protocol

The Interim Agreement between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on Certain Measures with respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim
Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral
thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim
Agreement consists of a preamble and eight opera-

Department of State Bulletin

tive articles. In the course of the negotiations,
agrreement was reached on a number of interpretive
matters related to the Interim Agreement. En-
closure 3 contains agreed interpretations and cer-
tain noteworthy unilateral statements.

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five
years on strategic offensive missile launcher deploy-
ments pending negotiation of more complete limi-
tations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects
of the Interim Agreement will be that:

— the aggregate number of fixed, land-based
ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers will be limited;

— starting construction of additional fixed, land-
based ICBM launchers is prohibited;

— the number of launchers for modem heavy
ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to
that number currently operational and under con-
struction;

— ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM
launchers and modem ballistic missile submarines
operational on each side; and

— up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of addi-
tional SLBM launchers above a specified number for
each Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM
launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on
older ballistic missile submarines.

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the
Agreement the Parties express the conviction that
the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will
contribute to the creation of more favorable condi-
tions for active negotiation on limiting strategic
arms and will improve international relations. In
the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the
relationship between strategic offensive and defen-
sive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their
obligations under Article VI of the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations.

A. ICBM Launchers

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits
starting construction of additional fixed land-based
ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I pre-
scribes July 1, 1972 as the freeze date, the United
States and the Soviet Union understand that, pend-
ing ratification and acceptance of the agreements,
neither will take any action that will be prohibited
thereby, in the absence of notification by either
signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratifi-
cation or approval.

This construction freeze covers all fixed land-
based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but
does not include test and training ICBM launchers
or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and
training launchers are, however, subject to other
constraints. The United States has made clear to
the Soviets that we would consider the deployment
of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during
the period of the Interim Agreement to be incon-

sistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The
Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes
any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable
of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between
the northeastern border of the continental United
States and the northwestern border of the conti-
nental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional or-
bital bombardment systems are considered to be
ICBM launchers.

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054
operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none
under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union
had a total of land-based ICBM launchers opera-
tional and under active construction estimated to be
about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and train-
ing purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the
freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction
of ICBM launchers under active construction on May
26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in
effect, neither Party may start new construction
(nor resume previously suspended construction) of
fixed ICBM launchers except test and training
launchers.

B. Heavy ICBM Launchers

Article II provides that the Parties shall not con-
vert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy,
ICBMs into land-based launchers for modem heavy
ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9. All currently op-
erational ICBMs other than the SS-9 are either
"light" (the United States Minuteman and the
Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or "older" ICBM launch-
ers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United
States Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of
a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13
ICBM into a launcher for an SS-9 or any new
modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit
the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or
Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM.
The Parties agree that in the process of moderniza-
tion and replacement the dimensions of land-based
ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly in-
creased, and that this means that any increase will
not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present
dimensions. The United States has also made clear
that it would consider any ICBM having a volume
significantly greater than that of the largest light
ICBM now operational on either side (which is the
Soviet SS-11) to be a heavy ICBM.

C. SLBM Launchers and Modern Ballistic
Missile Submarines

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modem
ballistic missile submarines to the numbers opera-
tional and under construction on May 26, 1972.

In addition. Article III and the Protocol permit
launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM
launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the

July 3, 1972

Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear-
powered submarines for the United States, subject
to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launch-
ers may become operational only as replacements
for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types
first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on
older nuclear-powered submarines or for modem
SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second,
such substitution may not result in:

— the Soviet Union having operational more than
62 modem ballistic missile submarines or more than
950 SLBM launchers, including all SLBM launchers
on nuclear-powered submarines and all modem
SLBM launchers on any type of submarine;

— the United States having operational more than
44 modem ballistic missile submarines or more
than 710 SLBM launchers.

Constmction of replacement SLBM launchers up
to the limits under the Protocol would require the
dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures,
of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older
types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered
submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers de-
ployed on any type of submarine would count
against the total ceiling on SLBM launchers. Dis-
mantling or destruction would be required to com-
mence no later than the date on which sea trials
of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin
and to be completed in the shortest possible agreed
period of time. Thus the Soviets will have to be-
gin dismantling older ICBM or SLBM launchers no
later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a
nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dis-
mantling or destruction, as well as timely notifica-
tion thereof, are to be carried out in accordance
with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing
Consultative Commission.

D. Test and Training Launchers

The Parties agree that the number of test and
training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, includ-
ing "modem heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased
significantly above the current number of test and
training launchers for such missiles. It is under-
stood that construction or conversion of ICBM
launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only
for the purposes of testing and training. It is also
understood that ICBM launchers for test and train-
ing purposes may be constructed at operational sites.

E. Modernization and Replacement

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions
of the Interim Agreement, modernization and re-
placement of strategic ballistic missiles and launch-
ers covered by the Interim Agreement may be
undertaken. The conversion of current United
States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III
missiles, the conversion of current submarine

launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the
construction of new submarines as replacements
for older submarines, are not prohibited by the
Agreement.

F. Other Provisions

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the
same provisions on verification as appear in Article
XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried
out by national technical means operating in ac-
cordance with generally recognized principles of in-
ternational law. Interference with, or deliberate con-
cealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither
Party is required to change its current practices of
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul.

Article VI provides that in order to promote the
objectives and implementation of the Interim Agree-
ment, the Parties shall use the Standing Consulta-
tive Commission to be established pursuant to Arti-
cle XIII of the ABM Treaty.

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue ac-
tive negotiation for limitations on strategic offen-
sive arms. This Article also provides that the
terms of this Interim Agreement will not preju-
dice the scope and terms of the limitations on stra-
tegic offensive arms which may be worked out in
the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that
these subsequent negotiations will start in the near
future.

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the In-
terim Agreement provides that it shall enter into
force upon the exchange of written notices of ac-
ceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of in-
struments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the In-
terim Agreement shall remain in effect for five
years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more
complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

The third paragraph of this Article provides each
Party with a right, parallel to that contained in
paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to
withdraw upon six months' notice if such Party
decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized
by extraordinary events related to the subject mat-
ter of the Interim Agreement.

Conclusion

I believe the Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile
systems, together with the accompanying Interim
Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic
offensive arms, constitute the most important step
in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In
these agreements, the two most powerful nations
on earth are adopting measures designed to curb
the deployment of strategic arms.

The Parties have protected their vital interests
during the careful negotiation and elaboration of
these agreements. We did not agree to anything

Department of State Bulletin

adversely affecting the national interests of our Al-
lies, who were regularly consulted during the ne-
gotiations. The Congress has been kept closely in-
formed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador
Smith and other Delegation members conducted a
total of thirty executive session briefings for Con-
gressional Committees.

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet-
American relations and preserve and strengthen
international security and world order. The entry
into force of these measures should significantly ad-
vance the cause of peace in the world, and I hope
that they can be brought into force as soon as prac-
ticable.

Respectfully submitted,

William P. Rogers.

Enclosures:

1. The ABM Treaty.

2. The Interim Agreement and associated Protocol.

3. Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements.

AGREED INTERPRETATIONS AND
UNIUTERAL STATEMENTS

1 . Agreed Interpretations.

(a) Initialed Statements.

The texts of the statements set out below were
agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Dele-
gations on May 26, 1972.

ABM Treaty

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the
ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance
with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty,
those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on
the date of signature of the Treaty within the
ABM system deployment area for defense of the
national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the
product of mean emitted power in watts and an-
tenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the
two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in
subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is
considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three
million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM
system deployment area centered on the national
capital and the center of the ABM system deploy-
ment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each

Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen
hundred kilometers.

[D]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars
having a potential (the product of mean emitted
power in watts and antenna area in square .meters)
exceeding three million, except as provided for in
Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except
for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space
or for use as national technical means of verifica-
tion.

[E]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not
to deploy ABM systems and their components ex-
cept as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the
Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based
on other physical principles and including compo-
nents capable of substituting for ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created
in the future, specific limitations on such systems
and their components would be subject to discus-
sion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement
in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[F]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty
includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy
ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each
ABM interceptor missile of more than one inde-
pendently guided warhead.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article tX of the Treaty
includes the obligation of the US and the USSR
not to provide to other States technical descriptions
or blueprints specially worked out for the construc-
tion of ABM systems and their components limited
by the Treaty.

Interim Agreement

[H]

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM
launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are
understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic
missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest
distance between the northeastern border of the
continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the
continental USSR.

[I]

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM
launchers under active construction as of the date
of signature of the Interim Agreement may be
completed.

[J]
The Parties understand that in the process of mod-

July 3, 1972

ernization and replacement the dimensions of land-
based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly
increased.

[K]

The Parties understand that dismantling- or destruc-
tion of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior
to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older sub-
marines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on
modern submarines will be initiated at the time
of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement sub-
marine, and will be completed in the shortest pos-
sible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or de-
struction, and timely notification thereof, will be
accomplished under procedures to be agreed in
the Standing Consultative Commission.

[L]

The Parties understand that during the period of
the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant
increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and
training launchers, or in the number of such launch-
ers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties
further understand that construction or conversion
of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken
only for purposes of testing and training.

(b) Common Understandings.

Common understanding of the Parties on the
following matters was reached during the negotia-
tions:

A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions

Ambassador Smith made the following statement
on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term
'significantly increased' means that an increase will
not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present
dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

Minister Semenov replied that this statement cor-
responded to the Soviet understanding.

B. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement
on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty
provides for each side one ABM system deployment
area centered on its national capital and one ABM
system deployment area containing ICBM silo
launchers. The two sides have registered agree-
ment on the following statement: 'The Parties under-
stand that the center of the ABM system deployment
area centered on the national capital and the center
of the ABM system deployment area containing
ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be sep-
arated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.'
In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM
system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo
launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will

be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher
deployment area." (See Initialed Statement [C].)

C. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement
on April 26, 1972: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty
provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article
III shall not apply to ABM systems or their com-
ponents used for development or testing, and lo-
cated within current or additionally agreed test
ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that
there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test
ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges
encompass the area within which ABM components
are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM
test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and
at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM
test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We
consider that non-phased array radars of types used
for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be
located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret
the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed
test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not
be located at any other test ranges without prior
agreement between our Governments that there will
be such additional ABM test ranges."

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that
there was a common understanding on what ABM
test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-
ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was
not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in
Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges
was sufficiently clear, and that national means per-
mitted identifying current test ranges.

D. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made
the following statement: "Article V(l) of the
Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an
undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile
land-based ABM systems and their components. On
May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its
view, a prohibition -on deployment of mobile ABM
systems and components would rule out the deploy-
ment of ABM launchers and radars which were not
permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for
the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the
Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation
put forward on May 5, 1971 ?"

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there
is a general common understanding on this matter.

E. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement
on May 24, 1972: "The United States proposes that
the sides agree that, with regard to initial imple-
mentation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of

Department of State Bulletin

the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement
on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement ',
agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out
early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that
is completed, the following arrangements will pre-
vail: when SALT is in session, any consultation
desired by either side under these Articles can be
carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when
SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any
desired consultations under these Articles may be
made through diplomatic channels."

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referen-
dum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement
corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

F. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the
following statement: "In an effort to accommodate
the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation
is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides
will in fact observe the obligations of both the
Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning
from the date of signature of these two documents."

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following
statement on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in
principle with the Soviet statement made on May
6 concerning observance of obligations beginning
from date of signature but we would like to make
clear our understanding that this means that, pend-
ing ratification and acceptance, neither side would
take any action prohibited by the agreements after
they had entered into force. This understanding
would continue to apply in the absence of notification
by either signatory of its intention not to proceed
with ratification or approval."

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with
the U.S. statement.

2. Unilateral Statements.

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements
were made during the negotiations by the United
States Delegation: —

A. Withdraival from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the
following statement: "The U.S. Delegation has
stressed the importance the U.S. Government at-
taches to achieving agreement on more complete
limitations on strategic offensive arms, following
agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim
Agreement on certain measures with respect to the
limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S.
Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-
on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on
a long-term basis threats to the survivability of
our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The

USSR Delegation has also indicated that the ob-
jectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without
the achievement of an agreement providing for
more complete limitations on strategic offensive
arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agree-
ments would be steps toward the achievement of
more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an
agreement providing for more complete strategic
offensive arms limitations were not achieved within
five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopard-
ized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis
for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S.
does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we
believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish
to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the
importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieve-
ment of more complete limitations on strategic
offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the
Congress, in connection with Congressional con-
sideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement of this statement of the U.S. position."

B. La7id-Mobile ICBM Launchers

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement
on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important
subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the in-
terest of concluding the Interim Agreement the
U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that
Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit
the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launch-
ers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while
agreeing to defer the question of limitation of op-
erational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the sub-
sequent negotiations on more complete limitations
on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider
the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM
launchers during the period of the Interim Agree-
ment as inconsistent with the objectives of that
Agreement."

C. Covered Facilities

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement
on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the impor-
tance that the United States attaches to the pro-
visions of Article V, including in particular their
application to fitting out or berthing submarines."

D. "Heavy" ICBMs

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement
on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that

' See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of
Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, signed September 30, 1971. [Footnote in
original; for text of the agreement, see Bulletin of
Oct. 18, 1971, p. 400.]

July 3, 1972

the Soviet; Delegation has not been willing to agree
on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under
these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it
necessary to state the following: The United States
would consider any ICBM having a volume signifi-
cantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM
now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM.
The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet
side will give due account to this consideration."

E. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the
following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft
Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in de-
fining ABM components, and Article VI includes cer-
tain obligations concerning such testing. We believe
that the sides should have a common understanding
of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing
provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply
to testing which occurs after the date of signature of
the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have
occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the
remarks we have made on this subject during the
previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the ob-
jectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject,
namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM com-
ponents for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing
of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of
non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To
clarify our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM
mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher,
missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if,
for example, any of the following events occur:
(1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM inter-
ceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight
tested against a target vehicle which has a flight
trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic
missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in con-
junction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile
or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is
flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with inter-
ception of targets against which air defenses are de-
ployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a
cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in
item (2) above during the reentry portion of its
trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction
with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an
ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for
purposes such as range safety or instrumentation
would be exempt from application of these criteria."

F. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the
following statement: "In regard to this Article [IX],
I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory state-
ment to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear
that the provisions of this Article do not set a
precedent for whatever provision may be con-

sidered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive
Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive
arms is a far more complex issue, which may re-
quire a different solution."

G. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the
following statement: "Since Hen House radars
[Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can
detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great
distances, they have a significant ABM potential.
Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase
in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air
missiles as inconsistent with an agreement."

(b) The following noteworthy unilateral state-
ment was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and
is shown here with the U.S. reply: —

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the
following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side:"
"Taking into account that modern ballistic missile
submarines are presently in the possession of not
only the U.S., but also of its NATO allies, the
Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effective-
ness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S.
and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines
with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers
thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656
ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the
period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies
in NATO should increase the number of their mod-
ern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines
they would have operational or under construction
on the date of signature of the Agreement, the
Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding
increase in the number of its submarines. In the
opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the
question of modern ballistic missile submarines pro-
vided for in the Interim Agreement only partially
compensates for the strategic imbalance in the de-
ployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines
of the USSR and th? U.S. Therefore, the Soviet
side believes that this whole question, and above all
the question of liquidating the American missile sub-
marine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately
resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations."

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following
reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side
has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side'
of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine
basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third
countries. The United States does not accept the
validity of the considerations in that statement."

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilat-
eral statement made on May 17. Ambassador Smith
also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.

Department of State Bulletin

Signing of Final Protocol Brings
Berlin Agreement Into Force

On June 3 at Berlin, Secretary Rogers
and the Foreign Ministers of France, the
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom signed
the final quadripartite protocol to the quadri-
partite agreement on Berlin of September 3,
1971.^ Following is a statement made by Sec-
retary Rogers at the signing ceremony.

Press release 132 dated June 5

The signing of the final protocol to the
Berlin agreement is an act with profound
meaning for the people of Berlin and Ger-
many. It is an act with equally profound
meaning for the people of Europe and for
the cause of peace in the world. For over 25
years Berlin has been a major focus of ten-
sions between East and West, tensions which
at times threatened the stability of Europe
and the world. The agreement we have just
signed could corve to put those tensions to
rest.

For the people of Berlin the agreement of-
fers an improvement in daily life. Once only
the stark effects of division could be seen in
Berlin. Now the start of a healing process is
in sight. Once virtually no visits to East Ber-
lin and the German Democratic Republic
were feasible. Now over a million Berliners
have made such visits in onVy a few weeks,
many of them seeing relatives ana £viends
from whom they have been separated ti«
years. For those who live here, Berlin is no
longer an isolated island.

For the people of Europe, this agreement
is a step in reducing barriers to contact —
barriers which have too long divided this
continent and this city. The success of these
negotiations will spur further efforts on be-
half of a Europe at peace and at one with it-
self. Berlin, for a quarter of a century a sym-
bol of Europe's division, could become a
symbol of hooe for Europe's future.

For all who value pcaoe, this agreement

' For texts of the agreement and draft protocol,
see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1971, p. 318.

demonstrates that the most stubboi'n issues
can yield to realistic and patient negotiation
and that when the cause of peace is advanced
there are no losers, only winners.

The four governments who today signed
this protocol can take satisfaction in the work
they have done. The German authorities, in
concluding their indispensable supplemen-
tary agreements, have also contributed fun-
damentally to the outcome. They now en-
visage additional negotiations, negotiations
which we earnestly hope will further improve
the relationship between them and will fur-
ther remove obstacles to freer movement of
peoples.

I cannot let this occasion pass without pay-
ing tribute to the courageous people of Ber-
lin. It is their spirit and their fortitude that
have made it possible for us to be here today.
This agreement is in a real sense their
achievement. Those who sign it and those who
are charged to carry it out undertake solemn
responsibilities to Berliners.

This protocol commits each government to
inoui-e thut tJiR agrteement is faithfully car-
ried out. That, of course, is the heart of the
matter; for it is in the implementation of the
words of the agreement that true progress
will come. The United States will fulfill its
responsibilities under the agreement. And we
will maintain our commitment to assure the
security and viability of Berlin.

The people of America — who have a deep
bond with the people of Berlin — share the
hope that this day will be viewed in history
as v,v,a -vvhich marked a better life for mil-
lions 01 Berliners and Germans. We hope it
will be loo^g(j upon as a day when decisive
progress was ^^de in reconciliation among
the peoples of all ^ Europe. We hope that to-
day will be viewed as ^. ^ ^^^ ^^^^ .^^^^^_
tant days in the history of u , ,^g^ j^^j^ ^^ ^j^^
20th century.

Whether June 3, 1972, will hold u. , ^j^^^
in history depends on the determined ei. ,^
of governments in both East and West. On
behalf of President Nixon and the American
people, I pledge the United States Govern-
ment to that effort.

July 3, 1972

The Future International Political and Economic Environment:
Growing Interdependence and Complexity

Address by Under Secretary John N. Irwin II ^

It is pleasing to see that so many of you
have taken time from normal responsibilities
to attend this conference. In my year and a
half in the State Department, I have come
to have the highest regard for the expert
knowledge and judgment about foreign af-
fairs which is available here. Your day listen-
ing to Department experts as well as to emi-
nent speakers from other agencies should
be a most interesting one.

Speaking selfishly, we in the Department
also hopQ to benefit from your views and
judgments and to learn about your concerns.
How can the administration operate best to
further U.S. interests — best to further the
interests of U.S. business? In the decade
ahead, all of us in the foreign affairs com-
munity— very much including international
business in that community — will find in-
creasingly that we must work closely to-
gether if we are to maintain the vital inter-
ests of the United States overseas.

Because later speakers will be coverin^'^'is
current world scene rather thorough'-^' ^ "^"
cided to speculate a little about tr'*'*^^ ^^ the
evolution of the international c-^ation which
our foreign policy must ^^^ ^" ^^^ coming

One art of d^-^^^^V' I learned long ago,
even befor'"^'"^"^ *^® Department of State,
somet.'-^'^ consists of putting the best face
^^ diflicult situation. I remember the story

' Made before the national foreign policy con-
ference for senior business executives at the De-
partment of State on June 8.

of the young man troubled about how to
explain in later life that his father had been
hung as a horse thief. At last he hit upon
a "diplomatic" formulation. "My father," he
learned to say, "died in a fall from a public
conveyance while taking part in a civic cere-
mony in which he was a central partici-
pant." If my speculations seem too couched
in such "diplomatic" formulations, I will
count on your questions to get closer to the
essential facts.

The International Environment

As we look at the future international en-
vironment, one of the few things that can
be said with any degree of certainty is that
interaction between all nations and peoples
will increase substantially and become much
more complex- Interaction begets interde-
pendence, not only between us and our allies
iiut also, as the Moscow summit demon-
strated, between the two major antagonists
of the postwar world. Interdependence, and
awareness of interdependence, have been
growing. We see this interdependence most
clearly when we worry about gaining access
to or preserving the world's resources, pre-
venting the pollution of the oceans and at-
mosphere, or controlling the arms race. But
interaction reaches many other fields. It is
a rare business, institution, or government
agency of any size which does "ot have some
international activity' or connection. By 1980
this activity' will be incomparably greater.
More importantly, international inter-

Department of State Bulletin

action will become more complex. The i-ela-
tively simple bipolar days of the cold war will
have given way to a less predictable situation
in which there will be different constituencies
and groupings for different issues. To take
hypothetical examples: While the United
States and the Europeans have been united,
and I hope will remain united, to oppose
Soviet designs on Europe, it is not too diffi-
cult to imagine a situation in which the
Europeans and the Soviets might find a com-
mon interest in opposing some U.S.-backed
trade or investment policy or, conversely,
in which the United States and Soviets might
join in questioning trade policies of the Euro-
pean Community (EC). Traditional align-
ments, in other words, may become more
flexible and subject to change on specific ad
hoc issues.

Further elements of this increasing com-
plexity will be more issues on the inter-
national agenda and more parties in interest
for each issue. Issues now dealt with in a
pu.^'ly domestic context will acquire an in-
ternaCiunal character. Take tKo o%.-^,,ipip ^f

narcotics: A problem which once seemed do-
mestic has now been clearly recognized as
a serious international one that cannot be
attacked with hope of success solely within
the United States.

Along with the '^mergence of new issues
will come new participants- .more coun-
tries, more multilateral governm^rital and
nongovernmental organizations, more inter-
national corporations, and more private .^.
tors. The major international actors of the
present, politicians and diplomats, will be
forced to accept the increasingly important
role of such functional specialists as econo-
mists and engineers, nutritionists and weath-
ermen (of the scientific, rather than the
revolutionary, variety).

An awareness of the complexities of inter-
dependence should have a moderating in-
fluence on the international behavior of all
countries. The participants should begin to
realize that without a commitment to agreed
procedures — i.e., to some underlying rules
to govern this interaction — the mutually ben-

eficial but highly complex new game we
will all be trying to play will not be play-
able. The players' interest in the long-term
stability of these rules should become greater
than their interest in winning on the sub-
stance of any particular play.

Some of the implications of increased in-
terdependence for our security are fairly
clear. The power and dominance of the two
superpowers should decline in relative im-
portance. Nuclear parity should tend to di-
minish the political significance of our nu-
clear weapons. Both powers will not only
have to continue to get along with each other
but also pay even more attention to getting
along with the new emerging power centers
in western Europe, Japan, and China.

The Communist World

The slower development of interdepend-
ence on the part of the Communist countries
will be one of the most difficult problems
of the transition period ahead. The Soviet

Union and China are the most autaichlually

inclined countries ot any size in the world to-
day. Soviet and Chinese autarchic proclivi-
ties are in large part due to the requirement
for tight control in their domestic systems,
perhaps in some part to their historical mem-
ories of negative experiences with the out-
side world.

I doubt that we will see more than a modest
liberalization of the Chinese and Soviet
domestic systems by 1980, but there may be
■ substantial improvement in their view of
the t-uernal threat. At the same time they
s lou Q r^gi-ceive increasing advantages to
cooperatiu jj^ such fields as science and
technology, tx.,^^ ^^^ ^^,^^ ^^^^^^j ^^
as an indication g^^.^^ ^^^ ^^.^^^^

trade is growing fastei ,.,, -j. ,• .

i.1 -^i^^u ri 'th capitalist coun-

tries than with other Com.. .

Both the Soviet Union and Chi.- } "®^"
ably be increasingly concerned abo. ^ .
left out of a developing international s\^^"?
and may be willing to reach a significantly
higher level of interaction mth the non-Com-
munist world.

July 3, 1972

By 1980 China and the Soviet Union are
quite likely to consider one another, rather
than the United States, their principal an-
tagonist, if indeed they do not do so already.
The issues between them — the border, dis-
puted leadership of the world's "progressive
forces," and the traditional state-to-state
rivalry of neighboring powers — are likely to
pei'sist. Relations are likely to continue to be
competitive and tense with cooperation only
in isolated fields.

Both China and the Soviet Union seem to
be basing their actions on pragmatic assess-
ments of their national interests and capabil-
ities. This should lead to gradual improve-
ment in their relations with the United
States. While ideology seems at times to be
waning in both countries, it can be expected
to wane slowly, so that by 1980 U.S.-Soviet
and U.S.-Chinese relations will probably still
retain a sharply competitive edge.

The commitment of the two Communist
powers to leftward movements in the world
will remain an important factor in inter-
national relations. They may, ho-wrcver. be
less willing to take major risks solely on this
account. China's capability for military ac-
tions much beyond her immediate border
will probably continue to be limited through
the 1970's. Her worldwide political influence,
however, seems likely to increase. By 1980
the Soviets will probably have achieved a
worldwide political and military presence
and a substantially more flexible capability
for military operations in distant areas.
Even though our general bilateral relatio--"
with the two Communist powers mi^' ™'
prove, therefore, the number of.""^^^ ^^
which we will compete with botb -^'^i^ese and
Soviet influence will have i -^"^^sed.

Western Europe f-

The Uni*^ 'States and the Soviet Union are
likelv 'Continue to be the only countries
^ . . worldwide strategic and conventional
capabilities, but this fact should be of de-
creased importance as local powers become
more significant in particular regions. China
and Japan will undoubtedly be increasingly
important in East and Southeast Asia; India

already seems able to play a decisive role in
South Asia; and the enlarged European Com-
munity will assume a larger role in all as-
pects of European affairs.

While the Soviets and the Chinese could
find themselves fully extended abroad in a
few years, the Japanese and Europeans have
only begun to exercise their enormous po-
tential influence. Thus, a primary interest of
our foreign policy must continue to be the
maintenance of close relations with these two
emerging power centers.

Paradoxically, as we move away from bi-
polar confrontation with the Communists,
there will be greater need for confidence
and consultation among our allies. As the
period when the United States was a domi-
nant leader recedes into the past and part-
nership among our allies becomes more
completely equal, the route to decision by con-
sensus may seem more tortuous and slow.
Present allied relationships and institutions
must either become more flexible to cope
with these now complexities or thev- 'ill
otiophy ana eventually die. We should ex-
pect, and be prepared to accept, differences
on specific issues among the allies in order to
maintain our common commitment to larger
principles of national and international be-
havior.

The Thirr' World

m\e Third World of Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and Latin America could be a
primary focus of conflict and possible con-
frontation in the years ahead. A trend toward
radical nationalist solutions may well con-
tinue throughout the Third World. Looking
into the future, we will have to weigh the
somewhat decreased eagerness of the Soviets
and Chinese to support irresponsible extrem-
ist behavior against their increased capa-
bility to do so and the ready supply of op-
portunities an unstable Third World will
provide. While working to reduce conflict in
such situations between ourselves and the
Communist powers, prudence dictates that
we assume that there will be further con-
frontations.

Department of State Bulletin

Increased economic nationalism, particu-
larly in the form of opposition to foreign in-
vestment, will probably continue to present
the United States and our major allies with
serious problems. Our need for the raw ma-
terials and energy resources which these
countries possess will increase substantially.
The less developed countries have already
united on oil, and it should not come as a
surprise if they try to work together on other
primary commodities.

Era of Negotiations

Some of the implications of this brief
look into the future for our policy toward
China and the Soviet Union are clear. Their
increasingly pragmatic behavior and the con-
tinuing fragmentation of the Communist
world have offered us the opportunity to
make them fuller participants in an inter-
dependent world. The President's trips to
Peking and Moscow were dramatic and sig-
nificant achievements in this process.

Both trips were painstakingly prepared
over a long period with a view toward con-
crete achievements. Both were designed with
particular care to try to avoid exacerbating
relations between the two Communist pow-
ers. They aimed at developing good relations
with both powers at the expense of neither.

With China we have finally established a
dialogue in which our differences are being
dealt with in honesty and candor. Movement
may be slow, but in the continuing consulta-
tions between our two Ambassadors in Paris
both of us are at last looking for and pursu-
ing areas of common interest. We have
agreed to initiate and facilitate exchanges
in such fields as culture, science, technology,
sports, and journalism. We are working to-
gether to establish mutually beneficial trade.

The balance of nuclear terror long ago
forced a certain degree of interdependence
upon the Soviet-American relationship. From
his first days in office. President Nixon sys-
tematically analyzed this relationship to de-
termine areas in which cooperation seemed
possible. In those areas where our views and
interests seemed almost inevitably to con-

flict, he searched for ways to defuse the ad-
versary relationship, to move from an era of
confrontation to an era of negotiation.

The Moscow summit opened a new chapter
in the complex history of U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions. It may be seen by historians as the
symbolic end to the cold war. It should re-
sult in an intensification of mutually bene-
ficial cooperation in such fields as medicine,
space, the environment, and science and tech-
nology. As you know, agreements in many of
these fields were signed in Moscow. An
agreement was signed between our armed
services — the first since World War II — de-
signed to reduce the dangers of incidents at
sea.

We have also been working for some time
to expand trade between our two countries
from its presently modest level. This effort
continued at the summit. Among other things
we are hopeful that the Soviets will agree
to substantial grain purchases, but a num-
ber of interrelated elements must be worked
out first. The Soviets are seeking most
favored-nation treatment, access to Exim-
bank credits, and more liberal terms for their
purchases than we are prepared to concede.
We in turn are insisting on a satisfactory
lend-lease settlement. Secretary [of Com-
merce Peter G.] Peterson will be heading a
team to Moscow in July to work further on
these problems.

The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-
ment on Offensive Nuclear Weapons are per-
haps the most significant concrete results of
the Moscow summit. They bring a new ele-
ment of stability to the Soviet-American
competition in strategic arms. The SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree-
ments reached thus far are only a first step.
Their importance as a precedent for coopera-
tion, however, cannot be overemphasized. To
be fully effective, SALT I must be followed
by further discussions in SALT II, looking
toward reductions of both offensive and de-
fensive strategic arms below the limits set
by the present agreements.

There is an obvious danger in trying to go
too far too fast in our relations with China
and the Soviet Union. In the past, moments

July 3, 1972

of optimism have been shattered by sub-
sequent Communist intransigence. In the
President's recent summit meetings, how-
ever, an attempt has been made to involve
the self-interest of each side in such a way
as to establish a solid foundation for im-
proved relations.

U.S. Policy and Our Major Allies

As my earlier speculations on the future
implied, improved relations with the Soviet
Union and China will not lessen in any way —
at least over the next decade — the need to
maintain our own and our allies' economic,
political, and military strength and unity of
purpose.

Among the most immediate challenges to
allied unity and strength are the tensions
caused by economic issues. We have already
reached a level of economic interdependence
with Canada, Japan, and the countries of
western Europe at which each country's
monetai-y and trade policies can either se-
riously disrupt or materially assist all of the
others' economies. These allied countries are
by far the best customers for our exports,
they sell us most of our imports, and they are
the host countries to two-thirds of our over-
seas investments. We play an even more
substantial role in their economies than they
do in ours.

As you know, 1971 found our trade and
payments situation on the critical list. Major
adjustments to the postwar international ec-
onomic system were needed quickly. To that
end. President Nixon announced his new eco-
nomic policy on August 15. This was followed
by the so-called Smithsonian agreement in
December, establishing a new pattern of ex-
change rates more favorable to the United
States.

The Smithsonian agreement, in the U.S.
view, is only a first step toward a more flex-
ible monetary system and a more open envi-
ronment for trade. Last month, however, I
was in Brussels for consultations with the
Commission of the EC, and a week or so ago I
was in Paris for the annual ministerial meet-

ing of the OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development]. In both
places there was considerable uneasiness
among our allies at where the United States
is going. My colleagues and I tried to re-
assure our allies that the United States will
continue to follow an outward-looking eco-
nomic policy. We also stressed how important
it was that a uniting western Europe not
turn inward on itself. The world cannot af-
ford an attempt to break up into closed trad-
ing systems even if this were possible. We
argued in favor of approaching the problems
between us — and none of us would deny that
there are specific problems — from this per-
spective.

The Moscow summit has given new im-
petus to the much-discussed Warsaw Pact
proposal for a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and to the allied pro-
posal for mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions (MBFR). Wc believp that the Euro-
pean Security Conference, now probably to
be held in 1973, must have substantive mean-
ing and not just add to a false sense of
detente or serve the propaganda aims of the
Soviet side. We are particularly interested in
having the conference agree to concrete
measures to facilitate the freer movement of
people, ideas, and information between East
and West.

Toward MBFR we will follow a cau-
tious, analytical approach, mindful that the
presence of our troops has resulted in 25
years of relative stability in central Europe.
In an era of nuclear parity, moreover, strong
conventional forces in Europe may become
even more important. We do not expect dra-
matic withdrawals in the near future. If
agreement can be reached on certain safe-
guards and principles, however, so that sta-
bility can be maintained at lower levels of
forces confronting each other on each side,
limited reductions may be achieved. The
President remains firmly committed to main-
taining whatever level of troop strength in
Europe is required to guarantee undimin-
ished security.

Department of State Bulletin

The future, like the past, will compel an
active American involvement in the less de-
veloped part of our shrinking globe. A policy
of "benign neglect" is impossible — and not
only for humanitarian reasons. In April I
had the opportunity to lead the U.S. delega-
tion to the opening of the third session of
UNCTAD— the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development. The insistence on the part
of the less developed countries that their con-
cerns not be neglected by the developed world
was clear, and their needs were persuasive. A
policy that is not responsive to these needs
would very soon endanger our substantial
investments in the less developed world,
hinder our access to increasingly vital energy
and raw material resources, and create the
conditions in which radical and irresponsible
regimes would thrive. The policies which this
administration is evolving — sometimes re-
ferred to as the Nixon doctrine — provide for
an active American role while avoiding our
previous tendency to assume too much of the
economic and security burden. Our emphasis
upon self-help and an equitable sharing of
responsibility has been welcomed by our
friends and allies. Many small countries have
become more self-reliant and have demon-
strated that development is possible.

At the same time there is little room for
complacency. Many in this country are ques-
tioning the need for the very economic and
security assistance which make possible such
self-reliance — and the complementary lessen-
ing of the American burden. We cannot af-
ford to weaken either our support of our
industrialized allies in western Europe and
Japan or our commitments in the Third
World. Only by such commitments, clearly
recognizing the growing interdependence of
all nations, can we build what the Presi-
dent has aptly described as "a structure of
peace to which all nations contribute and in
which all nations have a stake." ^

'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; "Part I: 1971— The
Watershed Year — An Overview" begins on p. 314.

North Atlantic Ministerial Council
Meets at Bonn

Secretary Rogers was head of the U.S. dele-
gation to the regular ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council which was held at
Bonn May 30-31. Following is the text of a
final communique issued at the close of the
meeting on May 31.

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
Session in Bonn on 30th and 31st May, 1972.

2. Ministers reaffirmed that the purpose of the
Alliance is to preserve the freedom and security of
all its members. Defence and the relaxation of
tension are inseparably linked. The solidarity of
the Alliance is indispensable in this respect. Allied
Governments seek an improvement in their rela-
tions with the countries of Eastern Europe and aim
at a just and durable peace which would overcome
the division of Germany and foster security in
Europe.

3. Ministers noted progress in relations between
Western and Eastern countries, increasing contacts
between the leaders of these countries, and the con-
clusion of important agreements and arrangements.
They welcomed these developments flowing from
major initiatives undertaken by their governments,
which had full and timely consultations on these
subjects. Such consultations will continue.

4. Ministers welcomed the signing by the United
States and the USSR of the Treaty on the Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the in-
terim agreement on Certain Measures with Respect
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
They believe these two agreements limiting the
strategic arms of the United States and the USSR
will contribute to strategic stability, significantly
strengthen international confidence, and reduce the
danger of nuclear war. Ministers also welcomed the
commitment by the United States and the USSR
actively to continue negotiations on limiting strate-
gic arms. They expressed the hope that these two
agreements will be the beginning of a new and
promising era of negotiations in the arms control
field.

5. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the
Treaty of 12th August, 1970, between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and the
Treaty of 7th December, 1970, between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Re-
public are to enter into force in the near future.
They reaffirmed their opinion that these treaties
are important, both as contributions towards the
relaxation of tension in Europe and as elements of
the modus vivendi which the Federal Republic of
Germany wishes to establish with its Eastern neigh-
bours. Ministers welcomed the Declaration of 17th
May, 1972, in which the Federal Republic of Ger-
many confirmed its policy to this end and reaffirmed
its loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance as the basis of
its security and freedom. They noted that it re-

July 3, 1972

mains the policy of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many to work for circumstances of peace in Europe
in which the German people, in free self-determina-
tion, can recover their unity; and that the existing
treaties and agreements to which the Federal Re-
public of Germany is a party and the rights and
responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to
Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected.

6. Ministers also welcomed the progress made
since their last meeting in the talks between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. They
regard the conclusion of the agreements and ar-
rangements between the competent German Author-
ities, which supplement the Quadripartite Agree-
ment on Berlin of 3rd September, 1971, as well as
the signature of a Treaty on Questions of Traffic
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
GDR, as important steps in the effort to improve
the situation in Germany. They thus feel encour-
aged in the hope that, in further negotiations
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
GDR, agreement might be reached on more com-
prehensive arrangements which would take into
account the special situation in Germany.

7. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the Gov-
ernments of France, the United Kingdom, the
United States and the Soviet Union have arranged
to sign the Final Protocol to the Quadripartite
Agreement. The entry into force of the entire Berlin
Agreement being thus assured, the Ministers hope
that a new era can begin for Berlin, free of the
tension that has marked its history for the past
quarter century.

8. In the light of these favourable developments.
Ministers agreed to enter into multilateral conver-
sations concerned with preparations for a Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe
[CSCE]. They accepted with gratitude the proposal
of the Finnish Government to act as host for such
talks in Helsinki at the level of Heads of Mission
under the conditions set out in its aide-memoire of
24th November, 1970. Accordingly, they decided to
work out with other interested governments the
necessary arrangements for beginning the multi-
lateral preparatory talks.

9. Ministers stated that the aim of Allied Gov-
ernments at the multilateral preparatory talks
would be to ensure that their proposals were fully
considered at a Conference and to establish that
enough common ground existed among the partici-
pants to warrant reasonable expectations that a
Conference would produce satisfactory results.

10. Prepared in this way, a Conference on Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe should constitute an
important factor in the process of reducing tension.
It should help to eliminate obstacles to closer rela-
tions and co-operation among the participants while
maintaining the security of all. Allied governments
look forward to a serious examination of the real
problems at issue and to a Conference which would
yield practical results.

11. Ministers considered that, in the interest of
security, the examination at a CSCE of appropriate
measures, including certain military measures,
aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing
stability would contribute to the process of reduc-

ing the dangers of military confrontation.

12. Ministers noted the Report of the Council in
Permanent Session concerning a Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Report
examined the issues which might be included on the
Agenda of a Conference as set forth in paragraph
13 of the Brussels Communique of 10th December,
1971, as well as the procedural questions relating
to the convening of a Conference.^ Ministers di-
rected the Council in Permanent Session to develop
further its substantive and procedural studies in
preparation for a Conference.

13. Ministers representing countries which par-
ticipate in NATO's Integrated Defence Programme
recalled the offers to discuss mutual and balanced
force reductions which they had made at Reykjavik
in 1968, at Rome in 1970, and subsequently
reaffirmed."

14. These Ministers continue to aim at negotia-
tions on mutual and balanced force reductions and
related measures. They believe that these negotia-
tions should be conducted on a multilateral basis
and be preceded by suitable explorations. They
regretted that the Soviet Government has failed to
respond to the Allied offer of October 1971, to enter
into exploratory talks. They therefore now propose
that multilateral explorations on mutual and
balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as
practicable, either before or in parallel with multi-
lateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe.

15. These Ministers noted the studies conducted
since their last meeting on political, military and
technical aspects of mutual and balanced force re-
ductions. They instructed the Permanent Represent-
atives to continue this work in preparation for
eventual negotiations.

16. These Ministers stated that the present mili-
tary balance of forces in Europe does not allow a
unilateral relaxation of the defence efforts of the
Allies. Unilateral force reductions would detract
from the Alliance's efforts to achieve greater sta-
bility and detente and would jeopardise the pros-
pects for mutual and balanced force reductions.

17. Ministers took note of a Report by the Coun-
cil in Permanent Session on the situation in the
Mediterranean. They expressed their concern re-
garding the factors of instability in the area which
could endanger the security of the members of the
Alliance. They instructed the Council in Permanent
Session to follow closely the evolution of the situa-
tion and to report to them at their next meeting.

18. The next Ministerial Session of the North
Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in Decem-
ber 1972.

19. Ministers requested the Foreign Minister of
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to transmit this
Communique on their behalf through diplomatic
channels to all other interested parties, including
neutral and non-aligned governments.

^ For text of the communique, see Bulletin of
Jan. 3, 1972, p. 1.

' For background, see Bulletin of July 15, 1968,
p. 77, and June 22, 1970, p. 775.

Department of State Bulletin

CENTO Council of Ministers Meets
at London

The 19th meeting of the Council of Min-
isters of the Central Treaty Organization was
held at London June 1-2. Following is a state-
ment made on June 1 by Joseph J. Sisco, As-
sistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, who was acting head of the
U.S. observer delegation, together with the
text of a communique issued at the close of
the meeting.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

Secretary Rogers regrets that he is unable
to be here today, but as you know, he is ac-
companying President Nixon on the first
visit an American President has ever made
to Poland. The Secretary has asked me to
speak on his behalf at this opening session.
And he is looking forward to meeting with
you at the Council's session tomorrow.

I should like to express our welcome to
Secretary General [Nassir] Assar. We were
pleased to have seen him in Washington ear-
lier this year and want to extend to him our
best wishes for what I am confident will be
a successful stewardship in his new position.

Since the Council of Ministers last met a
year ago, we have seen momentous events of
interest and concern to all of us. It has been a
year of profound change in world affairs — of
change to which the United States, in the in-
terests of peace, has sought to make its con-
tribution.

President Nixon's unprecedented visits to
China and the Soviet Union have established
the beginnings of a new dialogue with one
and have set what we expect to be a more
cooperative framework for our existing re-
lationship with the other.

We trust that our efforts with the two lead-
ing Communist countries will be beneficial to
the cause of peace and to all the world's peo-
ples. And we are confident that the initial
agreements to limit strategic arms, and the
more comprehensive agreement on which the

United States and the Soviet Union must now
concentrate, will help to increase the stabil-
ity of the global environment in which we
all live.

The past 12 months have also been a time
of change in the area of most immediate con-
cern to CENTO. Here constructive achieve-
ment has been mixed with tragedy, the
preservation of peace with the descent into
war.

From today's perspective, the year in
South Asia was dominated by tragic events.
Looking to the future, what is needed is a
durable peace settlement, an era in which the
energies and talents of the people of South
Asia can be devoted in peace to constructive
endeavors.

As President Nixon said earlier this year: ^

The 700 million people of the subcontinent de-
serve a better future than the tragedy of 1971
seemed to portend. It is for them to fashion their
own vision of such a future. The world has an in-
terest in the regional peace and stability which are
the preconditions for their achieving it.

In keeping with the President's remarks
on the need for a better future, we are
pleased to note that the emissary-level talks
between Pakistan and India have been suc-
cessfully completed. We sincerely hope that
the forthcoming summit meeting between the
leaders of these two nations will be held in an
atmosphere of mutual understanding and re-
spect and will pave the way toward recon-
ciliation and peaceful accommodation in the
subcontinent.

In the Middle East, the cease-fire along the
Suez Canal now nears its second anniversary.
None of us has had any illusions about the
difficulties which would have to be resolved
if the parties to the conflict were to move
from cease-fire to a permanent peace settle-
ment based on the U.N. Security Council
resolution of 1967. Those difficulties are real
and formidable. There have been too many
lost opportunities in the tragic history of the

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled
"South Asia" begins on p. 383.

July 3, 1972

Middle East. However, to dwell on them
would distract us from the search for oppor-
tunities for peacemaking, which remains an
overriding imperative. Diplomatic opportu-
nities are available. Progress will depend on
whether the countries of the Middle East
exert the will, the vision, and the spirit of
accommodation to grasp those opportunities.
Others can help but cannot do this for them.

So long as the cease-fire continues in the
Middle East, as in South Asia, it preserves
the opportunity for diplomacy to concen-
trate on the search for peaceful reconcilia-
tion. Surely, the time has come for genuine
negotiations looking toward the peaceful
resolution of the disputes in both areas.

In our view, it is the antagonists in these
disputes who must bear the primary respon-
sibility for the construction of durable peace
arrangements; for the solidity of arrange-
ments to prevent future conflicts must de-
pend in the final analysis on the will for peace
among the parties to past conflicts.

Let me expi-ess at this point, on behalf of
my government, our profound shock at the
senseless attack at Israel's international air-
port Tuesday. All of us who have sought a
peaceful settlement in the Middle East are
aware that deep passions and hostilities are
involved. But this is no justification for vio-
lence. It is particularly outrageous, and par-
ticularly tragic, when innocent people are
indiscriminately made the victims. This trag-
edy was brought home with special impact to
Americans because so many of our own citi-
zens were killed and wounded. The horror of
the attack undei'scores the urgency of the
need for greater effectiveness, by govern-
ments and by the international community,
in measures to deal with such threats to
travelers, in the Middle East and elsewhere
as well.

In the Persian Gulf, a third area of direct
concern to CENTO, the developments of the
past year on the whole have been encourag-
ing.

At the end of 1971 the British Government
terminated its special treaty arrangements
in the gulf. First Bahrain, then Qatar, and
later the United Arab Emirates emerged as

independent states. The consolidation and
strengthening of independence is one of their
more important tasks. Progress is being
made, and we welcome the continued inter-
est of the British Government in assisting
these small states.

We believe that the security of these small
states and other countries in the gulf area
can best be maintained through regional co-
operation.

Yesterday in Tehran President Nixon and
His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Iran
agreed in their joint communique "that the
security and stability of the Persian Gulf is
of vital importance to the littoral states.
Both were of the view that the littoral states
bore the primary responsibility for the secu-
rity of the Persian Gulf. His Imperial Maj-
esty reaffirmed Iran's determination to bear
its share of this i-esponsibility." ^ We welcome
this determination.

In this connection. President Nixon yes-
terday confix-med that the United States
would, as in the past, continue to cooperate
with Iran in strengthening its defense.

Similarly, as a result of recent meetings
which President Nixon held with then-Prime
Minister Erim, the friendship and coopera-
tion between our two countries, and in par-
ticular support for Turkey's security, have
been strengthened.

At the same time, the United States has
entered direct diplomatic relations with new
states of the gulf. Our policy is to assist them
where possible in the development of their
societies, their, economies, and their new po-
litical institutions.

At times of change in the world it is nat-
ural that nations should examine carefully
many of their existing obligations and inter-
ests. My country, like many others, has been
involved in such examinations. This is a good
time, therefore, to state the United States
position on CENTO, which we have sup-
ported since its inception and with which we
have cooperated for 14 years:

—We believe that CENTO continues to

" For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of
June 26, 1972, p. 908.

Department of State Bulletin

contribute measurably to stability and secu-
rity in the area of its concern.

— We believe that it is a useful forum for
consultation on problems affecting that area
and, indeed, on broader problems.

— We believe that it contributes to respect,
understanding, and cooperation among its
members.

— And we believe that, in its practical rec-
ognition that security does not depend on
military means alone, it plays a valuable role
in promoting the economic and social well-
being of the peoples in the area.

For these reasons, the United States con-
tinues to support CENTO and will continue
to participate in its cooperative regional en-
deavors. We are sympathetic with the desire
of the CENTO regional countries for further
regional development and are ready to give
serious consideration to new initiatives in
the economic field within CENTO which are
truly regional in scope.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

London, June 2, 1972— The Council of Ministers
of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held
their 19th Session at Lancaster House on June 1
and 2, 1972.

2. The leaders of the national delegations from
the five CENTO countries were:

1. H.E. Mr. Abbas Ali Khalat-
bary,

Minister for Foreign Affairs Iran

2. H.E. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada,
Minister for Education, Cul-
ture and Provincial Co-ordina-
tion Pakistan

3. H.E. Mr. Haluk Bayulken,

Minister for Foreign Affairs Turkey

4. The Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Doug-
las-Home, KT, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign

and Commonwealth Affairs United Kingdom

5. The Hon. William P. Rogers,

Secretary of State United States

3. H.E. Mr. Nassir Assar, Secretary General of
the Central Treaty Organization, opened the Ses-
sion.

4. Following an address by the Rt. Hon. Mr. Ed-
ward Heath, Prime Minister of the United King-
dom, in which he conveyed a message of welcome

from Her Majesty the Queen, opening statements
were made by the leaders of the delegations and
the Secretary General of CENTO, in which they ex-
pressed their appreciation of the Queen's gracious
message and the warm hospitality of the host coun-
try.

5. As the leader of the delegation of the host
country, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Sec-
retary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Af-
fairs of the United Kingdom, presided at the Ses-
sion.

6. In a wide-ranging exchange of views marked
by traditional cordiality and understanding, the
Council of Ministers reviewed the international de-
velopments since they met a year ago, with special
reference to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and the
neighbouring areas.

7. Regretting the recent clash of arms between
Pakistan and India, the Ministers expressed the
hope that the two countries would in the near fu-
ture be able to arrive at an honourable and equita-
ble settlement of their outstanding disputes, so
essential for ensuring lasting peace in the sub-con-
tinent. They reaffirmed their support for the Secu-
rity Council Resolution No. 307 of 21 December,
1971. The Ministers also wished success to the forth-
coming meeting between the President of Pakistan
and the Prime Minister of India.

8. Expressing their concern at the continuing
tense situation in the Middle East, the Ministers re-
iterated their hopes for an early resolution of the
Middle East dispute and for the continuation of ef-
forts aimed at attaining a just and enduring peace
in the area, in accordance with the principles of in-
ternational law, the Charter of the United Nations,
and the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of
22 November, 1967.

9. The Ministers also discussed other problems of
peace and security in the area, including subversive
activities. They expressed the hope that efforts
would continue to be made to find solutions to these
problems in order to contribute to stability and
progress for the nations of the area.

10. Concluding the review, the Ministers reaf-
firmed their faith in the importance of the Organi-
zation for its partners, especially for peace and
progress in the Region.

11. In approving the Report of the Military Com-
mittee, the Ministers took note of the continuing
collaboration among the CENTO countries.

12. Reaffirming their agreement that the pro-
gramme of economic collaboration constitutes an im-
portant element of CENTO partnership, the Minis-
ters noted with satisfaction the accelerated rate of
economic expansion in the Regional countries as
well as the increasing economic cooperation among
them.

13. In reviewing the Report of the Economic Com-
mittee, the Ministers noted with pleasure the com-
pletion of the rail-link between Iran and Turkey.

July 3, 1972

They also noted with satisfaction that the commu-
nications projects had stimulated economic coop-
eration among the nations of the CENTO Region.

14. The Ministers directed the Economic Com-
mittee to give timely and sympathetic attention to
projects submitted for consideration by the regional
governments. They also endorsed recommendations
for the expansion of the scope of the Multilateral
Technical Cooperation Fund to provide greater
intra-regional training.

15. The Ministers expressed their appreciation of
the Annual Report of the Secretary General, who
was attending the Ministerial Council for the first
time, and wished him every success.

16. The Council accepted the invitation of the
Government of Iran to hold the next session in
early May, 1973, in Tehran.

Secretary Rogers Cautions Travelers
About Strict Drug Laws Abroad

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^

As the travel season begins, I want to em-
phasize— and cannot emphasize too strongly
— to young Americans that a passport is a
travel document; it is not a license for "bad
trips" abroad. Quite apart from the obvious
fact that all of us have an obligation to rep-
resent the best of American society when we
are traveling in other countries, there is the
simple fact that when Americans travel in
another country they are subject to the laws
of that land. In part because of our own ef-
forts to carry out President Nixon's drug
control program, many foreign countries
have adopted or are implementing exceed-
ingly strict laws. Americans who use or traf-
fic in drugs abroad are subject to harsh pen-
alties and, frequently, the most unpleasant
possible conditions.

I hope all Americans — and particularly
young Americans — will have this stark fact
in mind if they are tempted to enter the
drug scene on their travels. While our em-
bassies and consulates will offer their assist-

' Read to news correspondents on May 17 by John
F. King, Deputy Director, Office of Press Relations.

ance to any American in difficulty, I hope
that those Americans who get involved with
drugs abroad understand that the law is the
law wherever it is written and that those who
break it must expect to pay the penalty.

Department Approves Exchange Grants
to Predominantly Black Colleges

Press release 125 dated May 24

The Department of State announced on
May 24 the approval of several educational
grants to predominantly black American
colleges.

The awards are being made in recognition
of the black college community's unique
cultural background and of its special inter-
est in enlarging cross-cultural contacts,
particularly in the African area, according
to John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary
for Educational and Cultural Affairs, who
made the announcement.

These grants, Mr. Richardson said, will
enable black colleges to fulfill a larger and
more realistic role in U.S. foreign affairs,
especially in furthering friendly relations
with educational, cultural, and artistic
groups abroad.

To provide opportunities for those inter-
ested particularly in Africa, the Department
of State has just allocated $100,000 to in-
crease black faculty participation in three
study-travel projects beginning this summer.

One program, administered by the Insti-
tute of International Education, New York
City, will enable about 40 American educa-
tors to attend a 4-week seminar on African
affairs at the University of Legon in Ghana
followed by 2 weeks of educational travel.
A grant from the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs provides funds for fellow-
ships for 20-30 teachers from predominantly
black secondary schools and colleges.

Another project, being set up by the
Phelps-Stokes Fund, will bring top African
professors to the United States. They will
lecture and hold seminars at both predomi-

Department of State Bulletin

nantly black and white colleges, with pri-
ority for the former.

The third, organized by the African
American Institute in New York City, in-
vites about 75-125 American educators to
travel and study this summer in East and
West Africa. The Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs is funding travel and
other costs for 20-30 faculty members from
predominantly black schools throughout the
country.

The travel portions of the program include
visits to the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Togo,
Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tan-
zania. There will be symposia, university
lectures, briefings by national and local offi-
cials, and visits to both the cities and the
countryside.

Exchange arrangements have also been
made with three academic consortia (the
Nashville University Center Council, the
Piedmont University Center of North Caro-
lina, and the Atlanta University Center) to
provide greater opportunities for cultural
communications with overseas communities.
Funding is provided for student and faculty
exchanges and for seminars on international
topics. These arrangements will be expanded
to include other such consortia later this
year.

Individual black universities are also ob-
taining grants for cultural activities. Spel-
man College has received funds to develop a
creative writing workshop at the University
of the West Indies at Jamaica ; Morgan State
College has a grant for art and archeological
contacts in Nigeria; Morehouse has sent its
glee club on a singing friendship tour of
Africa; and several other colleges (Shaw,
North Carolina Central, and St. Augus-
tine's) have been included in a South Asian
Fulbright lecture series with Duke Uni-
versity.

All these activities are funded under the
Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, which promotes
mutual understanding and the strengthening
of ties between the people of the United
States and those of other nations.

Finland To Purchase Chancery Site
in Planned International Center

Press release 136 dated June 8

In a signing ceremony held on June 8 at
the State Department, the United States
Government concluded an agreement with the
Government of Finland giving it the first
option to purchase the lot of its choice in the
International Center planned for the south-
ern half of the old National Bureau of Stand-
ards site in Washington. Ambassador Olavi
Muiikki signed for Finland, while Marion
H. Smoak, Deputy Chief of Protocol, signed
for the United States.

As the element which represents the host
state in matters affecting foreign embassies
in Washington, Protocol is the action office
within the State Department for carrying
out the responsibility given the Department
by Public Law 90-553 to develop the Inter-
national Center. The approved master plan
for the Center makes 14 lots available for
purchase by interested foreign governments
for the erection of the chanceries, or office
complexes, of their embassies. Finland is the
first country to enter into a formal agree-
ment with the United States looking to the
purchase of one of these lots.

Plans are now complete for accomplishing
the relocation of Washington Technical In-
stitute, currently lodged in temporary quar-
ters on part of the area reserved for chancery
development, in its new campus on the north
half of the site by 1976, the Bicentennial
Year. The problem of determining how such
a shift should be effected with minimum dis-
ruption of the institute has until recently
constituted the major source of delay for the
International Center project. The State De-
partment now expects to complete a sales
contract with Finland, which already has au-
thorized money for its purchase of a lot, as
soon as it has available the funds required
for site improvement of the entire chancery
section of the Center.

July 3, 1972

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Policy on Providing Information to the Congress

Statement by David M. Abshire

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations ^

I wish first to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
the opportunity to appear before this subcom-
mittee, which over the years has done such
substantial and thoughtful work in the area
of government information. My office was
established at the recommendation of the
1949 Hoover Commission to create a coor-
dinated program of two-way liaison with the
Congress. For something over two years I
have wrestled with the business of trying to
provide more information to the Congress on
behalf of the executive branch. Consequently,
I welcome this first opportunity to discuss in
a public congressional forum the broader as-
pects of information policy and specifically
the policy by which the administration, the
Secretary of State, and the Department of
State are guided.

At the outset I want to tell you of the ra-
tionale that underlies our information pol-
icy. I realize that public policy cannot be
made nor effective government conducted un-
less both the legislative and the executive
branches of our government are well in-
formed about national issues. I am fully
aware that the Congress is the first branch
created by the Constitution. It is the politi-
cal and legal peer of the judiciary and the
executive. Moreover, I am aware of the diffi-

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Op-
erations and Government Information of the House
Committee on Forei^ Operations on May 31. The
complete transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C.
20402.

culty faced by the Congress in matching the
executive branch in its resources of staff and
in its access to information. In recent years
the Congress has increased its staff support
to cope with this very real problem. I be-
lieve that is a constructive contribution to
the maintenance of the de facto parity of the
three branches of our government about
which there can be no doubt de jure.

I say this by way of preface to underscore
my sensitivity to your needs for adequate ac-
cess to information about the activities of
the executive branch and to the information
that the executive branch is constantly ac-
quiring. I might add that in the decision-
making process within the executive branch
on a congressional request, the Congressional
Relations representatives almost always are
the proponents of greater sharing of infor-
mation with the Congress. There are other
consideration^ affecting the decision on dis-
closure, however, that are important ones
and at times must be overriding. It is for
this reason that I would ask you to consider
with me some of the traditional concerns of
the executive branch before discussing spe-
cific policies and cases.

The Separation of Powers

I believe that we must frankly recognize
the dilemma that has faced legislators, the
courts, and Presidents since the founding of
the Republic. In our government of separate
powers based upon checks and balances, the
precise sphere of each is never clearly, fi-

Department of State Bulletin

nally, or satisfactorily delineated. For al-
most two centuries, men of good will and
intense dedication have debated the bound-
aries. Although, and perhaps because, there
has never been a final agreement, our gov-
ernment has been effective, creative, and re-
sponsive.

A parliamentary form of government was
tried in this country for approximately 10
years during the Revolution. During that
decade of trial and testing there were re-
vealed serious practical shortcomings, in-
cluding those within the areas of diplomacy
and military affairs. The Constitutional Con-
vention, meeting in Philadelphia in 1787,
adopted in its place the tripartite system of
three coordinate but independent branches
of government that has formed the basis of
our government for nearly 200 years.

In considering the development of our sys-
tem it is revealing to compare the provisions
of the Constitution to those of the Articles
of Confederation with respect to the furnish-
ing of foreign affairs information to the
Congress. Consistent with a parliamentary
form of government, the Continental Con-
gress under the Articles of Confederation
created a Department of Foreign Affairs un-
der the direction of a Secretary by resolution
of February 21, 1782, providing:

That the books, records and other papers of the
United States, that relate to this Department be
committed to his custody, to which . . . any mem-
ber of Congress shall have access; . . .

That letters (of the Secretary) to the ministers of
the United States, or ministers of foreign powers
which have a direct reference to treaties or conven-
tions proposed ... or other great national objects,
shall be submitted to the inspection and receive the
approbation of Congress. ...

A much different scheme of things has
been legislated under our present constitu-
tional system. The Constitution, in article
II, section 2, provides expressly that the
President "may require the Opinion, in writ-
ing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any subject re-
lating to the Duties of their respective Offi-
ces . . ."

This provision parallels the initial clause
of article II, section I, which provides that

"The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America."

No similar provision exists in the Consti-
tution by which Congress may necessarily
"require" any information from the execu-
tive branch. Indeed, the constitutional re-
quirements in this regard appear to be lim-
ited to the provision in article II, section 3,
that the President "shall from time to time
give to the Congress Information of the
State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient . . ."

This constitutional form is clearly re-
flected in the act of July 27, 1789, which first
established a "Department of Foreign Af-
fairs" in the new government. The act pro-
vided:

. . . That the Secretary . . . shall forthwith after
his appointment, be entitled to have the custody and
charge of all records, books and papers in the of-
fice of Secretary for the Department of Foreign
Affairs, heretofore established by the United States
in Congress assembled.

There is no mention of congressional ac-
cess to those "records, books and papers."
This was a decisive and deliberate departure
from the system created by the Articles of
Confederation.

I think that this history is important. But
I cannot emphasize too much that I am not
citing it to put in doubt the right and the
need of the Congress to know in order to
carry out its legislative functions.

In fact, it has long been held that Con-
gress, by virtue of the powers entrusted to
it by the Constitution, has certain implied
powers of inquiry and oversight even though
these are not explicitly stated in the Consti-
tution. Thus, Congress is entitled to obtain
information from the executive branch rea-
sonably necessary to enable it to carry out
its constitutional functions. But this, not an
unlimited right, must be balanced against
the requirement of the executive branch in
carrying out its constitutional responsibili-
ties.

Our system can function satisfactorily
only when each of the branches acts respon-
sibly and constructively. Any wise President
knows, as you and I know, that he cannot

July 3, 1972

sustain a public policy that does not enjoy
public and congressional understanding and
support. Nor does the President want to
carry out policies lacking democratic ap-
proval. The continuing affirmation of that
approval depends upon ample public and
congressional knowledge of the choices be-
fore the Nation. This means assuring that,
to the greatest degree possible, the Congress
and the public have the facts which have in-
fluenced the President and his executive
branch.

In the field of foreign affairs, this need
often gives rise to the dilemma to which I
earlier alluded.

The executive branch does have confiden-
tial information not equally accessible to the
Congress and the public. In some cases, to
divulge confidential information may be
harmful to the very interests which the Con-
gress, the courts, and the executive branch
are sworn to uphold and defend.

That is a profound dilemma that no Con-
gress and no President has ever fully re-
solved, nor is any likely to do so. At this very
time, however, Representative Patsy Mink
is awaiting Supreme Court consideration of
her suit under the Freedom of Information
Act, which she has explained is designed "in
part to secure a judicial construction of the
Freedom of Information Act that would
guarantee Members of Congress the unlim-
ited right to seek and obtain information in
the hands of the Executive." ^

The Court's ruling will be illuminating and
may settle a number of the problems with
which we are now wrestling.

Congressional Liaison

Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote of the motiva-
tion for our unique system when he ob-
served in 1926 that:

The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted
by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency,
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was not to avoid friction but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy.

If a certain amount of friction is part and
parcel of our machinery of government, as
Justice Brandeis says, I see the role of con-
gressional liaison as one of trying to provide
enough lubrication to see that that machin-
ery does not break down. Communication
among the branches is the lubricant of the
machinery of government which keeps fric-
tion to tolerable limits. Communication is
the essential ingredient that permits the sep-
arate branches to understand each other,
even while engaged in an adversary process.
It gives the opportunity for the national in-
terest to emerge from conflicting conceptions
of it.

You and I, from our daily experiences with
government, know how many times deadlock
arises when communication has broken down.
We both know how many times deadlock has
been resolved when the parties have finally
understood one another. On the other hand,
the final failure to achieve a compromise
that would have permitted the Senate to give
its advice and consent to the Treaty of Ver-
sailles came from a breakdown in delicate
communications between the President and
the Senate.

I have tried to outline the philosophy that
must guide our day-to-day efforts to try to
assure that the Department of State fully
understands the views of the Congress and
that the Congress understands those of the
Department.

Now let me turn to the practical means
by which the executive branch is endeavor-
ing to meet your need and our need that the
Congress have adequate foreign affairs in-
formation to perform its functions.

At the top of the list are the President's
comprehensive reports to the Congress. They
constitute the most authoritative, complete,
and rationally defined statements of the
President's foreign policy and of his ap-
praisal of the world situation.

The most ancient and most widely studied
is the traditional annual state of the Union
message. It provides the Congress and the
Nation with the President's synthesis of

' Cong. Rec, May 18, 1972, p. E 5505.

Department of State Bulletin

our domestic and international posture.

This administration has gone much far-
ther. The President has also made a com-
prehensive, scholarly, and precise annual
report to the Congress on his foreign policy.
These annual reports have given a concep-
tual approach to this administration's for-
eign policy that I believe has been a signifi-
cant step forward.

The President's reports, in turn, have been
supplemented by even more detailed submis-
sions from the Secretary of State, who on
March 26, 1971, submitted a 617-page report
to the Congress entitled "United States
Foreign Policy 1969-1970" and on March 8,
1972, submitted a 604-page report on
"United States Foreign Policy 1971."

These reports constitute an effort to draw
together the entire skein of our foreign
relations at the highest policy level and to
relate the numerous aspects of our foreign
affairs to a single coherent approach to our
external relations. As such, they capture our
foreign policy in its most authoritative sense
and offer Congress and public alike a precise
formulation of the administration's position.

If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, I don't
believe that the administration has received
the credit due it by the Congress or the press
for these major steps forward. This is
purely unintentional, I know, but the danger
is that future administrations might not be
encouraged to follow suit. I do hope that any
final report of this able subcommittee will
examine these important improvements in
executive-to-legislative and in executive-to-
public communications in the field of infor-
mation policy.

To move to more traditional forms of in-
formation policy. Secretary Rogers, and the
Department of State generally, have pro-
vided Congress with a large volume of in-
formation, through formal testimony in both
public and executive sessions, through in-
tensive briefings, personal meetings, and
correspondence.

The Secretary of State in the first three
years of his service has appeared on 43
different occasions to testify formally before
the committees of Congress. Other senior

officers of the Department also have testified
frequently. Their appearances totaled 181
last year alone.

An enormous number of congressional in-
quiries are received and replied to each year
by the Department. For the year 1971 alone,
we received 18,964 congressional letters.

I consider this correspondence of the
greatest importance, and I want you to know
of the very considerable attention which the
Department of State very gladly gives to
providing the Congress with full, clear, and
timely replies. Just this spring I began a
new campaign to improve our responses by
stressing clarity, appreciation of differing
points of view, and responsiveness. I spelled
out the need for improvement in an article
circulated to all officers of the Department
in Washington and throughout the world.*
At the same time we began a continuing
series of meetings with Department officers
to explain the importance of congressional
correspondence and the need to make the
extra effort to satisfy congressional in-
quiries.

In addition to correspondence, in 1971 an
average of approximately 220 telephone in-
quiries from Congress were handled each
working day by our Bureau of .Congressional
Relations and an additional uncounted num-
ber by other offices in the Department of
State.

Extensive briefings are given to the Con-
gress as a whole, to committees, to less
formal groups, to individual Members, and
to congressional staff members. For many
years regular Wednesday morning briefings
have been provided for Members of Congress
while Congress is in session. There were
31 of these Wednesday briefings given last
year, and the Secretary of State himself has
recently appeared twice.

Early this year I started special monthly
luncheons for congressional staff members to
meet with top Departmental officers, usually
at the Assistant Secretary level, for off-the-
record discussions of current issues and to
enable these officials to become better known

^Department of State Newsletter, April 1972,
p. 10.

July 3, 1972

on the Hill in order to aid in more frequent
and informal communications ; i.e., increased
access to the bureaucracy.

In addition to these regularly scheduled
exchanges, the Department of State has
hosted breakfasts, lunches, and coffees to
bring to Members and staff our best and
most informed officials in off-the-record dis-
cussions. We have also brought countless
foreign visitors to meet with Members and
staff as a means to give the Congress direct
access to information about important for-
eign affairs questions.

The inauguration this session of Congress
of annual authorization legislation for the
Department of State marks the beginning
of still another forum for the provision of
information to the Congress. The hearings
held in both Houses could become a major
annual forum for a systematic revievi^ of our
entire foreign policy and of our foreign re-
lations by the Congress.

The volume of information provided to
Congress by the Department of State is con-
siderable. During the first session of the 92d
Congress, for example, only 29 legislative
proposals were submitted for congressional
action. Congress itself, on the other hand,
has actively solicited the Department's views
on legislation proposed by others. Thus, in
the first session of the 92d Congress, the De-
partment received and processed 1,172 re-
quests for its views on pending or proposed
legislation, not including private immigra-
tion bills.

We arranged early in this session of Con-
gress to provide systematic special briefings
for the various subcommittees of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on matters of
particular interest to them. These are in ad-
dition to the various special briefings for both
Members and staff on such crisis situations
as Cambodia and the India-Pakistan hostili-
ties. At present, a special briefing paper on
current developments is prepared periodi-
cally, usually weekly, for two of the sub-
committees. In addition, new arrangements
have been made for the Department's Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research to make
more of its "finished intelligence" available

to Senators, Members of Congress, and com-
mittee personnel.

The Secretary of State has taken the lead
in proposing new means of conveying foreign
policy information to the Congress. In his
testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations a little over a year ago, on
May 14, 1971, Secretary Rogers offered to
instruct each of our geographic Assistant
Secretaries regularly to provide a full brief-
ing on developments in his area.^ This offer
was expressly renewed by the Secretary in a
letter of July 6, 1971, addressed to the com-
mittee chairman.

During the course of that same testimony
Secretary Rogers spoke of an imaginative
proposal later incorporated in a bill intro-
duced by Congressman Frank Horton, when
the Secretary said that:

Suggestions have come from a number of quar-
ters for the establishment of a joint congressional
committee which could act as a consultative body
with the President in times of emergencies. If, after
study, you believe this idea has merit, we would be
prepared to discuss it with the committee and
determine how best we could cooperate.

Here, too, the Department remains ready
to respond to a congressional request.

Executive Privilege

There are occasions when the President
must conclude that the proper exercise of
his functions as Chief Executive, responsible
for the conduct of our Nation's foreign rela-
tions, precludes the disclosure of some item
of information. I think it fair to say, how-
ever, that these instances are rare.

I would not presume to review the exten-
sive legal and scholarly literature on the pre-
rogatives of the several branches of our gov-
ernment with which I know you distinguished
Members are familiar. But I would suggest
that while the President's denial of informa-
tion to the other branches is commonly re-
ferred to as "executive privilege," it is in a
sense exercised by all branches and might
more properly be known as "constitutional

* Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 721.

Department of State Bulletin

privilege." In fact, of course, the concept is
recognized by the courts and by the Con-
gress, which has recognized the exercise of
executive privilege as an executive option in
certain of its legislation. Section 634(c) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, is an example with which most of
us are familiar. Then-Assistant Attorney
General [William H.] Rehnquist cited a num-
ber of examples of congressional recognition
of executive privilege in his testimony before
this subcommittee on June 29, 1971.

In like manner, judges do not make avail-
able to Congress or to the President the pre-
liminary memoranda prepared by their law
clerks suggesting the disposition of cases.
Nor do they make their draft conclusions or
opinions publicly available. Likewise, Con-
gress does not make the President or the
courts privy to its confidential proceedings.
Congressional committee or subcommittee
chairmen do not provide the President or the
judiciary with internal memoranda ad-
dressed to them by staff members. The Con-
gress has always carefully maintained the
inviolability of its proceedings from tres-
pass by the courts or the executive. Nor
would the President or the courts expect to
share such confidential communications.
Those charged with decisions on public pol-
icy in the courts, in the Congress, and in the
executive branch need to receive advice and
information. They must be confident that
those who are providing it do so with abso-
lute candor and freedom from fear of ex-
posure to undue external pressures.

Secretary Rogers stated the problem in an
address delivered in 1956 when, as Attorney
General, he pointed out that:

. . . Government could not function if it was
permissible to go behind judicial, legislative or
executive action and to demand a full accounting
from all subordinates who may have been called
upon to make a recommendation in the matter. Such
a process would be self-defeating. It is the President,
not the White House staff, the heads of departments
and agencies, not their subordinates, the judges, not
their law clerks, and members of Congress, not their
executive assistants, who are accountable to the
people for official public actions within their juris-
diction. Thus, whether the advice they receive and

act on is good or bad there can be no shifting of
ultimate responsibility. Here, however, the question
is not one of non-disclosure as to what was done,
but rather whether the preliminary and develop-
mental processes of arriving at a final judgment
needs to be subjected to publicity. Obviously, it can-
not be if Government is to function.

It is because of these considerations that
the President does sometimes conclude that
a particular document or specific informa-
tion should not be disclosed. But even in
these cases, accommodations have usually
been worked out so that Congress has re-
ceived the substantive information it has
sought while the confidentiality of sensitive
details and the documents themselves have
been preserved. For example, when the De-
partment concluded that it could not prop-
erly furnish certain cables related to the situ-
ation in Pakistan to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, other means were
found to provide the basic substantive infor-
mation requested.

In my experience, in short, almost all con-
gressional requests for information are hon-
ored. And of the very few requests which
raise a problem for the executive branch, the
vast majority are met with the kind of prac-
tical compromise that is essential for our sys-
tem to function effectively.

As you know, President Nixon announced
early in this administration that he would de-
cide personally before any congressional
request for information should be finally de-
nied. He made that rule because he is con-
scious of the need of Congress for substan-
tial information in order properly to carry
out its functions. Specifically on March 24,
1969, the President stated, "The policy of
this Administration is to comply to the full-
est extent possible with Congressional re-
quests for information." He went on to say
that the executive branch authority to with-
hold information the disclosure of which
would be incompatible with the public inter-
est would be invoked "only in the most com-
pelling circumstances, and after a rigorous
inquiry into the actual need for its exercise"
and then only with "specific Presidential ap-
proval."

July 3, 1972

In the field of foreign affairs executive
privilege has been invoked by President
Nixon only on two occasions:

The first was on August 30, 1971, when
the President concluded that ". . . it would
not be in the public interest to provide to the
Congress the basic planning data on military
assistance as requested by the Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
. . . ." These data were described as ". . . in-
ternal working documents which would dis-
close tentative planning data on future years
of the military assistance program which are
not approved Executive Branch positions."

The second was on March 15 of this year,
when the President directed that "internal
working documents concerning the foreign
assistance program or international informa-
tion activities, which would disclose tenta-
tive planning data, such as is found in the
Country Program Memoranda and the Coun-
try Field Submissions, and which are not ap-
proved positions" not be made available as
requested by the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations and this subcommittee, re-
spectively. In both instances the President
noted that substantial information on these
subjects had been provided and would con-
tinue to be provided to Congress, and he em-
phasized the limited nature of these two di-
rectives.

I ought to note here, should there be any
doubt, that the President's invocation of ex-
ecutive privilege on these two occasions did
not constitute a blanket delegation of the au-
thority to his subordinates to claim this priv-
ilege. Its exercise remains personal and,
therefore, restricted to the most essential is-
sues.

Before I close, please permit me to lay be-
fore you several thoughts about the long-
term relationship of the three branches.

We all know that the demarcation be-
tween the legislative and the executive is not
static. It is a dynamic feature of our system
shifting in response to the needs and the de-
mands of the day to provide responsible, ef-

fective, and democratic government to the
Republic. During periods of great threat to
the Nation, in war or in economic crisis, the
pendulum has swung to greater executive
prerogative. But after each crisis the pen-
dulum has swung back to greater legislative
power. After the Civil War and after the
First World War, the reaction to Presiden-
tial power was at times dangerously destruc-
tive. Since World War II we have for the
most part escaped a similar destructive reac-
tion. But we have without doubt seen a steady
return to the Congress of power in the area
of international affairs.

Your subcommittee is making a significant
contribution to this readjustment of power
in the Federal Government. Your concentra-
tion upon the process of government rather
than upon specific foreign policy issues offers
us all a new opportunity to examine how to
rebalance our system without the destructive
overtones of earlier readjustments.

We are all conscious that our meeting here
today is a part of the dynamic process of our
system of checks and balances. The existence
of three separate branches supposes a con-
tinuing testing among them of public policy.
We believe that in such a process we will
come closer to the wisest policy — closer to
discovering the national interest that no one
of the three branches can be sure to know.

It is entirely understandable and right that
the Congress should expect to be informed
about foreign developments and about the
President's policy toward them. It is my dif-
ficult job to help to meet that need. Because
of the rapid pace of current events, because
of the many new departures now being taken
in our foreign policy, because of the extraor-
dinary complexity and the far-reaching im-
plications, and because of the delicacy of the
preparations surrounding them, we are not
always able to get to the Congress as much
information as rapidly as we should like.
With your help, encouragement, and imagina-
tion, I believe that we can do better. We wel-
come your efforts to help us find ways to do
so.

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April
3, 1952.^

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 12,
1972.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (bi-
ological) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972.=

Signatures: Cuba, April 12, 1972; Ecuador, June
14, 1972; Iraq, May 11, 1972; Yemen (Aden),
April 26, 1972.

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September
16, 1955. TIAS 3324;

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention concerning the application of that conven-
tion to the works of stateless persons and refu-
gees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered
into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324;

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention concerning the application of the conven-
tion to the works of certain international organi-
zations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. En-
tered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324;

Protocol 3 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention concerning the effective date of instru-
ments of ratification or acceptance of or accession
to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6,
1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954; for the
United States December 6, 1954. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Morocco, February 8, 1972.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March
18, 1970.=

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 13,
1972.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vi-
enna February 21, 1971.=
Ratification deposited: Chile, May 18, 1972.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS
6839.

Accession deposited: Khmer Republic, June 2,
1972.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at

Washington June 19, 1970.=

Accession deposited: Malawi, May 16, 1972.
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international

patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March

24, 1971.=

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 26,
1972.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regula-
tions with final protocol and annex, and the uni-
versal postal convention with final protocol and de-
tailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14,

1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for
article V of the additional protocol, which entered
into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Accessio7is deposited: South Africa, April 5, 1972;

Yemen (Aden), April 4, 1971 (with reservations
and declaration).

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12
entered into force May 19, 1970.' Articles 13
through 30 entered into force April' 26, 1970; for
the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Accession deposited: Australia, May 10, 1972
(with a declaration).

Nice agreement concerning the international classi-
fication of goods and services for the purposes of
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered
into force March 18, 1970; for the United States
May 25, 1972.
Accession deposited: Australia, May 10, 1972.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14,
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accessio7i deposited: Australia, May 10, 1972.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.=
Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, June 14, 1972;
Mali, June 29, 1972.

' Not in force for the United States.
= Not in force.

July 3, 1972

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1724.

July 10, 1972

PRESIDENT NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER BRIEF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS 37

SECRETARY ROGERS URGES SENATE SUPPORT OF THE ABM TREATY

AND INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 50

PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA OF MEXICO MAKES STATE VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES 57

COORDINATION OF UNITED

Statement by Secretary

STATES FOREKJN ECp,^QMiC POLICY
I Secretary Rd^'^^'W^

1 \^Tl

For index see inside back e(BiP^^^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1724
July 10, 1972

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The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
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and news conferences of the Presi-
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well as special articles on various
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functions of the Department. Infor-
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and international agreements to which
the United Slates is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Members of Congress
on Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements

Following are remarks made by President
Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs,
at a briefing for 122 members of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services
Committee, and House Armed Services Com-
mittee in the State Dining Room of the
White House on June 15.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 19

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT NIXON

Ladies and gentlemen: We are beginning
a little late because I understand traffic is
quite heavy around the White House this
morning due to the arrival of the President
of Mexico. We, however, must go forward
with the schedule, because there is a joint
session, as you know, today and we do want
the members of the committees present here
to be able to attend that session. We will
have to adjourn this meeting at approxi-
mately 12 o'clock, or at best, 5 minutes after
12, and we want to give you plenty of time
for questions.

A word about the format of this meeting.
I will make a statement, and then I will
have to depart in order to prepare for the
arrival of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kis-
singer will then make a statement and then
will be open to questions to the members of
the committees that are present here.

In order to get some recognition factor
developed by someone who knows all of the
Members who are here, Clark MacGregor

[Counsel to the President for Congressional
Relations] will moderate the question-and-
answer period, but we will try to be just
as fair as possible among the members of
the committees and between the House and
the Senate, and Clark, of course, will be
responsible in the event that it isn't fair.

In any event, let me come directly now to
my own remarks, which will not be too
extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will
be presenting the Presidential views. He
will be telling you what the President's par-
ticipation has been in these negotiations.
The views he will express I have gone over
with him in great detail, and I will stand
by them.

I noted in the pi-ess that it was suggested
that I was calling down the members of
these committees for the purpose of giving
you a peptalk on these two agreements. Let
me lay that to rest right at the outset. This
is not a peptalk, and Dr. Kissinger is not
going to make you a peptalk either.

When I came back from the Soviet Union,
you will recall in the joint session I said
that we wanted a very searching inquiry of
these agreements.! I want to leave no doubt
about my own attitude.

I have studied this situation of arms con-
trol over the past 31/2 years. I am totally
convinced that both of these agreements are
in the interest of the security of the United
States and in the interest of arms control
and world peace. I am convinced of that,
based on my study. However, I want the

^ For President Nixon's address before the Con-
gress on June 1, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p.
855; for texts of the agreements, see ibid., p. 918.

July 10, 1972

Members of the House and the Members of
the Senate also to be convinced of that. I
want the Nation to be convinced of that.

I think that the hearings that you will
conduct must be searching, because only in
that way will you be able to be convincing
to yourselves and only in that way will the
Nation also be convinced.

In other words, this is not one of those
cases where the President of the United
States is asking the Congress and the Nation
to take on blind faith a decision that he has
made and in which he deeply believes.

I believe in the decision, but your questions
should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and
others in the administration for the purpose
of finding any weaknesses that you think in
the negotiations or in the final agreements
that we have made.

As far as the procedures are concerned,
as you know, you will be hearing the Secre-
tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
head of the CIA, and of course. Ambassador
Smith [Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. dele-
gation to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT)] in your sessions of the
various committees.

I know that a number have suggested that
Dr. Kissinger should appear before the com-
mittees as a witness. I have had to decline
that particular invitation on his part, due to
the fact that executive privilege, I felt, had
to prevail.

On the other hand, since this is really an
unprecedented situation, it seemed to me
that it was important that he appear before
the members of the committees in this for-
mat. This is on the record.

All of you will be given total transcripts
of what he says. All of you will have the
opportunity to ask these questions, and in
the event that all of the questions are not
asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be
available to answer other questions in his
office from members of the committees as
time goes on, during the course of the
hearings.

What we are asking for here, in other
words, is cooperation with and not just rub-
berstamping by the House and the Senate.

That is essential because there must be fol-
lowthrough on this, and the Members of
the House and Senate, it seems to me, must
be convinced that they played a role, as they
have up to this point, and will continue to
play a role in this very, very important field
of arms control.

Now, let me go to the agreements them-
selves and express briefly some of my own
views that I think are probably quite fa-
miliar to you, but which I think need to be
underlined.

I have noted a great deal of speculation
about who won and who lost in these nego-
tiations. I have said that neither side won
and neither side lost. As a matter of fact,
if we were to really look at it very, very
fairly, both sides won, and the whole world
won.

Let me tell you why I think that is im-
portant. Where negotiations between great
powers are involved, if one side wins and
the other loses clearly, then you have a
built-in tendency or incentive for the side
that loses to break the agreement and to
do everything that it can to regain the ad-
vantage.

This is an agreement which was very
toughly negotiated on both sides. There are
advantages in it for both sides. For that
reason, each side has a vested interest, we
believe, in keeping the agreement rather
than breaking it.

I would like for you to examine Dr. Kis-
singer, and our other witnesses before the
committees, on that point. I think you also
will be convinced that this was one of those
cases where it is to the mutual advantage
of each side, each looking to its national
security.

Another point that I would like to make
is Presidential intervention in this particu-
lar matter — Presidential coordination — due
to the fact that what we have here is not
one of those cases where one department
could take a lead role. This cut across the
functions of the Department of State, the
Department of Defense; it cut across, also,
the AEC, and of course, the Arms Control
Agency.

Department of State Bulletin

Under these circumstances, there is only
one place where it could be brought together,
and that was in the White House, in the
National Security Council, in which all of
these various groups participated.

There is another reason, which has to do
with the system of government in the Soviet
Union. We have found that in dealing with
the system of government in the Soviet
Union, that where decisions are made that
affect the vital security, in fact, the very
survival of a nation, decisions and discus-
sions in those cases are made only at the
highest level. Consequently, it is necessary
for us to have discussions and decisions at
the highest level if we are going to have
the breakthroughs that we have had to make
in order to come to this point of a successful
negotiation.

The other point that I would make has to
do with what follows on. The agreement
that we have here, as you know, is in two
stages: one, the treaty with regard to ABM
[antiballistic missile] defensive weapons;
and second, the offensive limitation, the
executive agreement, which is indicated as
being, as you know, not a permanent agree-
ment— it is for five years — and not total.
It covers only certain categories of weapons.

Now, we are hoping to go forward with
the second round of negotiations. That sec-
ond round will begin, we trust, in October.
That means that we can begin in October,
provided action is taken on the treaty and
on the offensive agreement that we have
before you at this time sometime in the
summer months; we would trust before the
1st of September. I don't mean that it should
take that long, but I would hope you can
finish by the 1st of September so we can go
forward with the negotiation in October.

The other point that should be made with
regard to the follow-on agreements is not
related to your approval of these agreements.
It is related to the actions of the Congress
on defense. I know there is disagreement
among various Members of the Congress
with regard to what our defense levels ought
to be. I think, however, I owe it to you and
to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev

[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Soviet Communist Party] and his col-
leagues made it absolutely clear that they
are going forward with defense programs
in the offensive area which are not limited
by these agreements.

Under those circumstances, since they will
be going forward with their programs, for
the United States not to go forward with
its programs — and I am not suggesting
which ones at this point; you can go into
that later — but for the United States not to
go forward with its offensive programs, or
worse, for the United States unilaterally to
reduce its offensive programs would mean
that any incentive that the Soviets had to
negotiate the follow-on agreement would be
removed.

It is for that reason, without getting into
the specifics as to what the level of defense
spending should be, as to what the offensive
programs should be, I am simply saying that
if we want a follow-on agreement, we have
to have two steps: We need first, of course,
to approve these agreements; and second,
we need a credible defensive position so that
the Soviet Union will have an incentive to
negotiate a permanent offensive freeze. That
is what we all want.

These are just some random thoughts that
I had on this matter. I will simply close by
saying that as one stands in this room and
in this house, one always has a tendency to
think of some of the tragedies of history
of the past. As many of you know, I have
always been, and am, a great admirer of
Woodrow Wilson. As all of you know, the
great tragedy of his life was that after he
came back with the Treaty of Versailles and
the League of Nations, due to ineffective con-
sultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and
rejected the League.

We, of course, do not want that to happen.
We do not think that it will happen, because
we have appreciated the consultation we
have had up to this point, and we are now
going forward with this meeting at this time.

I will only say that in looking at what
Wilson said during that debate, when he
was traveling the country, he made a very,

July 10, 1972

it seemed to me, moving and eloquent state-
ment. He said : "My clients are the children.
My clients are the future generation."

This is an election year, and I realize that
in an election year it is difficult to move as
objectively as we ordinarily would move on
any issue, but I would respectfully request
the Members of the House and Senate, Re-
publican and Democratic, to approach this
in the spirit that Wilson explained in that
period when they were debating whether
they should go forward with the League of
Nations, remembering that our clients are
the next generation, that approval of these
agreements — the treaty limiting defensive
weapons, the agreement limiting offensive
weapons in certain categories — and also the
continuation of a credible defense posture,
will mean that we will have done our duty
by our cliehts, which are the next genera-
tion.

Thank you.

REMARKS BY DR. KISSINGER

Gentlemen: The President has asked me
to present to you the White House perspec-
tive on these agreements and the general
background, with the technical information
and some more of the details to be supplied
by the formal witnesses before your various
committees.

I will read a statement to you which we
will distribute. It is still in the process of
being typed.

In considering the two agreements before
the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of
antiballistic missile systems and the interim
agreement on the limitation of offensive
arms, the overriding questions are these:
Do these agreements permit the United
States to maintain a defense posture that
guarantees our security and protects our
vital interests? Second, will they lead to a
more enduring structure of peace?

In the course of the formal hearings over
the coming days and weeks, the administra-
tion will demonstrate conclusively that they

serve both of these ends. I will begin that
process this morning by offering some gen-
eral remarks on the agreement, after which

I will be happy to take your questions.

U.S.-Sovlet Relations in the 1970's

The first part of my remarks will deal
with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these
agreements. The agreement which was
signed 46 minutes before midnight in Mos-
cow on the evening of May 26 by President
Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev is
without precedent in the nuclear age, indeed,
in all relevant modern history.

Never before have the world's two most
powerful nations, divided by ideology, his-
tory, and conflicting interests, placed their
central armaments under formally agreed
limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask:
What new conditions now prevail to have
made this step commend itself to the calcu-
lated self-interests of both of the so-called
superpowers, as it so clearly must have done
for both willingly to undertake it?

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of
the broad design of what the President has
been trying to achieve in this country's re-
lations with the Soviet Union, since at each
important turning point in the SALT nego-
tiations we were guided not so much by the
tactical solution that seemed most equitable
or prudent, important as it was, but by an
underlying philosophy and a specific per-
ception of international reality.

The international situatio/i has been un-
dergoing a profound structural change since
at least the mid-1960's. The post-World War

II pattern of relations among the great
powers had been altered to the point that
when this administration took office, a major
reassessment was clearly in order.

The nations that had been prostrate in
1945 had regainsd their economic strength
and their political vitality. The Communist
bloc was divided into contending factions,
and nationalistic forces and social and eco-
nomic pressures were reasserting themselves
within the individual Communist states.

Department of State Bulletin

Perhaps most important for the United
States, our undisputed strategic predomi-
nance was declining just at a time when
there was rising domestic resistance to mili-
tary programs and impatience for redistri-
bution of resources from national defense to
social demands.

Amidst all of this profound change, how-
ever, there was one important constant — the
continuing dependence of most of the world's
hopes for stability and peace upon the ability
to reduce the tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry
remain real and deep:

— We are ideological adversaries, and we
will in all likelihood remain so for the fore-
seeable future.

— We are political and military competi-
tors, and neither can be indifferent to ad-
vances by the other in either of these fields.

— We each have allies whose association
we value and whose interests and activities
of each impinge on those of the other at
numerous points.

— We each possess an awesome nuclear
force created and designed to meet the threat
implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Each of us has thus come into possession
of power singlehandedly capable of exter-
minating the human race. Paradoxically, this
very fact and the global interests of both
sides create a certain commonality of out-
look, a sort of inter-dependence for survival
between the two of us.

Although we compete, the conflict will not
admit of resolution by victory in the classical
sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have
an inescapable obligation to build jointly a
structure for peace. Recognition of this
reality is the beginning of wisdom for a
sane and effective foreign policy today.

President Nixon has made it the starting
point of the United States policy since 1969.
This administration's policy is occasionally
characterized as being based on the princi-
ples of the classical balance of power. To
the extent that that term implies a belief

that security requires a measure of equi-
librium, it has a certain validity. No national
leader has the right to mortgage the survival
of his people to the good will of another
state. We must seek firmer restraints on the
actions of potentially hostile states than a
sanguine appeal to their good nature.

But to the extent that balance of power
means constant jockeying for marginal ad-
vantages over an opponent, it no longer
applies. The reason is that the determination
of national power has changed fundamental-
ly in the nuclear age. Throughout history,
the primary concern of most national leaders
has been to accumulate geopolitical and mili-
tary power. It would have seemed inconceiv-
able even a generation ago that such power
once gained could not be translated directly
into advantage over one's opponent. But now
both we and the Soviet Union have begun
to find that each increment of power does
not necessarily represent an increment of
usable political strength.

With modern weapons, a potentially de-
cisive advantage requires a change of such
magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it
can produce disaster. The ^mple tit-for-tat
reaction to each other's programs of a decade
ago is in danger of being overtaken by a
more or less simultaneous and continuous
process of technological advance, which
opens more and more temptations for seeking
decisive advantage.

A premium is put on striking first and on
creating a defense to blunt the other side's
retaliatory capability. In other words, mar-
ginal additions of power cannot be decisive.
Potentially decisive additions are extremely
dangerous, and the quest for them very
destabilizing. The argument that arms races
produce war has often been exaggerated.
The nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril.

All of this was in the President's mind as
he mapped the new directions of American
policy at the outset of this administration.
There was reason to believe that the Soviet
leadership might also be thinking along simi-
lar lines as the repeated failure of their
attempts to gain marginal advantage in lo-

July 10, 1972

cal crises or in military competition under-
lined the limitation of old policy approaches.

The President, therefore, decided that the
United States should work to create a set of
circumstances which would offer the Soviet
leaders an opportunity to move away from
confrontation through carefully prepared
negotiations. From the first, we rejected the
notion that what was lacking was a cordial
climate for conducting negotiations.

Past experience has amply shown that
much-heralded changes in atmospherics, but
not buttressed by concrete progress, will re-
vert to previous patterns at the first subse-
quent clash of interests.

We have, instead, sought to move forward
across a broad range of issues so that prog-
ress in one area would add momentum to
the progress of other areas.

We hoped that the Soviet Union would
acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of nego-
tiations and that it would become convinced
that its interests would be best served if
the entire process unfolded. We have sought,
in short, to create a vested interest in mutual
restraint.

At the same time, we were acutely con-
scious of the contradictory tendencies at
work in Soviet policy. Some factors — such as
the fear of nuclear war, the emerging con-
sumer economy, and the increased pressures
of a technological, administrative society —
have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek
a more stable relationship with the United
States. Other factors — such as ideology, bu-
reaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of
turmoil in peripheral areas — have prompted
pressures for tactical gains.

The President has met each of these mani-
festations on its own terms, demonstrating
receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives
and firmness in the face of provocations or
adventurism. He has kept open a private
channel through which the two sides could
communicate candidly and settle matters
rapidly. The President was convinced that
agreements dealing with questions of arma-
ments in isolation do not, in fact, produce
lasting inhibitions on military competition

because they contribute little to the kind of
stability that makes crises less likely. In
recent months, major progress was achieved
in moving toward a broadly based accommo-
dation of interests with the U.S.S.R., in
which an arms limitation agreement could
be a central element.

This approach was called linkage, not by
the administration, and became the object
of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three
years later, the SALT agreement does not
stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the
relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any
moment to the shock of some sudden crisis.
It stands, rather, linked organically to a
chain of agreements and to a broad under-
standing about international conduct appro-
priate to the dangers of the nuclear age.

The agreements on the limitation of stra-
tegic arms is, thus, not merely a technical
accomplishment, although it is that in part,
but it must be seen as a political event of
some magnitude. This is relevant to the
question of whether the agreements will be
easily breached or circumvented. Given the
past, no one can answer that question with
certainty, but it can be said with some as-
surance that any country which contemplates
a rupture of the agreement or a circumven-
tion of its letter and spirit must now face
the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy
not only a limited arms control agreement
but a broad political relationship.

Preparations for the Arms Talks

Let me turn now to the more specific de-
cisions we had to make about what the
agreement should do and how it could be
achieved.

We knew that any negotiations on arms
control, especially ones involving those cen-
tral weapons systems which guarantee each
side's security, were found to be sensitive
and complicated, requiring frequent high-
level decisions.

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever
present, and the repercussions of a deadlock
could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations

Department of State Bulletin

across the board. We had to begin, therefore,
by assessing what the situation was in terms
of armaments in place and under construc-
tion, what realistic alternatives we had at
the negotiating table, and how a tentative
or partial agreement would compare with no
agreement at all.

For various reasons during the 1960's, the
United States had, as you know, made the
strategic decision to terminate its building
programs in major offensive systems and to
rely instead on qualitative improvements.
By 1969, therefore, we had no active or
planned programs for deploying additional
ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles],
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or
bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other
hand, had dynamic and accelerated deploy-
ment programs in both land-based and sea-
based missiles. You know, too, that the inter-
val between conception and deployment of
strategic weapons systems is generally five
to 10 years.

At the same time, both sides were in the
initial stage of strategic defense programs,
each approaching the antimissile problem
from a different standpoint. The Soviets
wanted to protect their capital. The United
States program concentrated on protecting
our retaliatory forces. Both sides also pos-
sessed weapons which, although not central
to the strategic balance, were nevertheless
relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at
forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet
Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate-
range missiles able to attack our forward
bases and devastate the territory of our
allies.

A further complication was that the com-
position of forces on the two sides was not
symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given
priority to systems controlled within its own
territory while the United States had turned
increasingly to sea-based systems.

The result was that they had a panoply of
different ICBM's while we essentially had
one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman,
together with a more effective and modern
submarine force operating from bases over-

seas and equipped with longer range missiles.

All of this meant that even arriving at a
basic definition of strategic equivalency
would be technically demanding and politi-
cally intricate.

Looking beyond to the desired limitations,
it appeared that neither side was going to
make major unilateral concessions. When
the national survival is at stake, such a
step could not contribute to stability. The
final outcome would have to be equitable and
to offer a more reliable prospect for main-
taining security than could be achieved
without the agreements.

With these facts in view, the President
in the spring of 1969 established a group of
senior officials responsible for preparing and
conducting the SALT negotiations.

I acted as chairman, and the other mem-
bers included the Under Secretary of State,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency.

This group, called the Verification Panel,
has had the task of analyzing the issues
and factors and submitting for the Presi-
dent's decisions those options which com-
manded support in the various departments
and agencies.

The Verification Panel analyzed each of
the weapons systems which could conceivably
be involved in an agreement. It compared
the effect of different limitations on our
program and on the Soviet programs and
weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed
the possibilities of verification and the pre-
cise risk of evasion, seeking to determine
at what point evasion could be detected and
what measures would be available for a
response. This was done in various combina-
tions so that if one piece of the equation
changed, say the ABM level, the government
would be able to determine the effect of that
change upon the other components of a par-
ticular negotiating package.

Our aim was to be in a position to give
the negotiations a momentum. We wanted

July 10, 1972

to be sure that when stalemates developed,
the point at issue would not be largely tac-
tical and that the alternative solutions would
be analyzed ahead of time and ready for im-
mediate decision by the President.

Summary of the Negotiations

In the first round of the talks, which began
in November of 1969, the two sides estab-
lished a work program and reached some
tentative understanding of strategic prin-
ciples.

For example, both sides more or less
agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM
system could be a destabilizing factor, but
that the precise level of ABM limitations
would have to be set according to our success
in agreeing on offensive limitations.

In the spring and summer of 1970, each
country put forward more concrete pro-
posals, translating some of the agreed prin-
ciples into negotiating packages. During this
period, we, on the American side, had hopes
of reaching a comprehensive limitation.
However, the initial search for a compre-
hensive solution gradually broke down over
the question of defining the scope of the
forces to be included.

The Soviets believed that "strategic"
meant any weapons system capable of reach-
ing the Soviet Union or the United States.
This would have included our forward-based
aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded
Soviet intermediate-range rockets aimed at
Europe and other areas.

We opposed this approach, since it would
have prejudiced our alliance commitments
and raised a distinction between our own
security and that of our European allies.

We offered a verifiable ban on the deploy-
ment and testing of multiple independent
reentry vehicles. The Soviets countered by
offering a totally unverifiable production ban
while insisting on the freedom to test, thus
placing the control of MIRV's effectively out
of reach.

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the
stalemate threatening, the President took a
major new initiative by opening direct con-
tact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the

SALT discussions and for that matter, the
Berlin negotiations and, providing progress
could be achieved on these two issues, to
explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders' first response was to
insist that only the ABM's should be limited
and that offensive systems should be left
aside. But as far as we were concerned, the
still incipient ABM systems on both sides
were far from the most dynamic or danger-
ous factors in the strategic equation. It was
the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead
at the average rate of over 200 land-based
and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we
felt constituted the most urgent issue. To
limit our option of developing the ABM
system without at the same time checking
the growth of the Soviet offensive threat
was unacceptable.

Exchanges between the President and the
Soviet leaders embodying these views pro-
duced the understanding of May 20, 1971.^
As any workable compromise in the field
must do, that understanding met each side's
essential concerns. Since the offensive sys-
tems were complex and since agreement with
respect to all of them had proved impossible,
it was agreed that the initial offensive set-
tlement would be an interim agreement and
not a permanent treaty and that it would
freeze only selected categories at agreed
levels.

On the defensive side, the understanding
called for negotiations toward a permanent
ABM solution with talks on both issues to
proceed simultaneously to a common con-
clusion.

This left two major issues for the negotia-
tors, the precise level of the allowed ABM's
and the scope of the interim agreement, spe-
cifically what weapons would be included in
the freeze.

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's
proved extremely difficult. The United States
had virtually completed its ABM site at
Grand Forks, and we were working on the
second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we pro-
posed freezing deployments at levels opera-
tional or under construction ; that is to 'say,

- Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 741.

Department of State Bulletin

two ICBM sites on our side and the Moscow
defense on the other.

The Soviets objected this would deny them
the right to have any protection for their
ICBM's. A new formula was then devised
allowing each side to choose two sites, one
each for national capital and ICBM defense
or both for ICBM defense. The resolution
of the ABM issue was completed after our
Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary
of Defense, decided that a site in Washing-
ton to defend the national command author-
ity (NCA) was to be preferred over the
second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom.
They reasoned that while a limited defense
would not assure the ultimate survival of
the national command authority, it would
buy time against a major attack while the
radars in both the NCA defense and the
defense of ICBM's would provide valuable
warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would
protect the national command authority in
the event of a small attack by some third
country or even an accidental or unauthor-
ized launch of a weapon toward the United
States. The President accepted their recom-
mendation.

What about the offensive weapons freeze?
Early in the discussions about the imple-
mentation of this portion of the May 20
understanding between the President and the
Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude
from the freeze bombers and so-called for-
ward-based systems — to exclude, that is, the
weapons in which this country holds an
advantage.

We urge the Congress to keep this fact in
mind when assessing the numerical ratios of
weapons which are subject to the offensive
freeze.

There was also relatively rapid agreement
following the May 20 breakthrough that
intercontinental ballistic missiles would be
covered. This left the issue of the inclusion
of submarines.

With respect to ICBM's and submarines,
the situation was as follows: The Soviet
Union had been deploying at the average
annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic
missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles
a year. The United States had completed

deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Po-
laris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you
know, we are engaged in increasing the
number of warheads on both our ICBM's
and submarine-launched missiles. We were,
and are, developing a new submarine sys-
tem, although it cannot be deployed until
1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In
other words, as a result of decisions made in
the 1960's and not reversible within the
time frame of the projected agreement, there
would be a numerical gap against us in the
two categories of land- and sea-based missile
systems whether or not there was an agree-
ment. Without an agreement, the gap would
steadily widen.

The agreement would not create the gap.
It would prevent its enlargement to our dis-
advantage. In short, a freeze of ICBM's and
sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly
in the United States interest.

These basic considerations undoubtedly
impelled the recommendation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was
to command their support must include the
submarine-based system. The only possible
alternative was a crash program :for building
additional missile-launching submarines. The
President explored this idea with the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Op-
erations. Their firm judgment was that such
a program was undesirable. It could not pro-
duce results before 1976 — that is, toward
the very end of a projected freeze — and only
by building a type of submarine similar to
our current fleet, and without many of the
features most needed for the 1980's and
beyond.

The President once again used his direct
channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to
urge the inclusion of missile-launching sub-
marines in the offensive agreement.

After a long period of hesitation, the So-
viet leaders agreed in principle at the end
of April. Final details were worked out in
Moscow between the President and the So-
viet leaders.

My purpose in dwelling at such length
upon the details of our internal deliberations
and negotiations has been to make one

July 10, 1972

crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBM's
nor the freeze of submarine-launched mis-
siles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not
an American concession. On the contrary,
in both cases it was the Soviet Union which
reluctantly acceded to American proposals
after long and painful deliberation.

Provisions of the Agreements

I will not spend this group's time in
further review of the frequently arduous
negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during
the summit in Moscow, leading to the final
agreement. I do want to pay tribute on
behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith
and his delegation, whose dedication, nego-
tiating skill, and patience contributed de-
cisively to the outcome.

Let me summarize the principal provisions
of the documents as signed. The ABM Treaty
allows each side to have one ABM site for
the defense of its national command au-
thority and another site for defense of
intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers,
or 800 miles, apart in order to prevent the
development of a territorial defense. Each
ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors.

The treaty contains additional provisions
which effectively prohibit either the estab-
lishment of a radar base for the defense of
populated areas or the attainment of capa-
bilities to intercept ballistic missiles by
conversion of air-defense missiles to anti-
ballistic missiles.

It provides for withdrawal by either party
on six months' notice, if supreme national
interests are judged to have been jeopardized
by extraordinary events. By setting a limit
to ABM defenses the treaty not only elimi-
nates one area of potentially dangerous
defensive competition, but it reduces the
incentive for continuing deployment of of-
fensive systems.

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces
have, in effect, a free ride to their targets.
Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, dif-
ferences in numbers are therefore not con-
clusive.

The interim agreement on offensive arms

is to run for five years, unless replaced by
a more comprehensive permanent agreement
which will be the subject of further nego-
tiations or unless terminated by notification
similar to that for the treaty.

In essence this agreement will freeze the
numbers of strategic offensive missiles on
both sides at approximately the levels cur-
rently operational and under construction.
For ICBM's, this is 1,054 for the United
States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. With-
in this overall limitation the Soviet Union
has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM
launchers, the weapons most threatening to
our strategic forces.

There is also a prohibition on conversion
of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These
provisions are buttressed by verifiable pro-
visions and criteria, specifically the prohibi-
tion against any significant enlargement of
missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more com-
plicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to
their claimed current level, operational and
under construction, of about 740 missiles,
some of them on an older type nuclear sub-
marine. They are permitted to build to a
ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but
only if they dismantle older ICBM's or sub-
marine-based missiles to offset the new
construction.

This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's
and some 30 missiles on some nine older
nuclear submarines. Bombers and other air-
craft are not included in this agreement.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement
will keep the overall number of strategic
ballistic missile launchers both on land and
at sea within an agreed ceiling which is
essentially the current level, operational or
under construction. It will not prohibit the
United States from continuing current and
planned strategic offensive programs, since
neither the multiple-warhead conversion nor
the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze
and since the ULM's [undersea long-range
missiles] submarine system is not, or never
was, planned for deployment until after
1977. The agreement will stop the Soviet
Union from increasing the existing numeri-
cal gap in missile launchers.

Department of State Bulletin

Finally, there are a number of interpreta-
tive statements which were provided to the
Congress along with the agreements. These
interpretations are in several forms : agreed
statements initialed by the delegations,
agreed interpretations or common under-
standings which were not set down formally,
and initialed unilateral interpretations to
make our position clear in instances where
we could not get total agreement.^

In any negotiation of this complexity,
there will inevitably be details upon which
the parties cannot agree. We made certain
unilateral statements in order to insure that
our positions on these details was included
in the negotiating record and understood by
the other side.

The agreed interpretations and common
understandings for the most part deal with
detailed technical aspects of limitations on
ABM systems and offensive weapons. For
example, it was agreed that the size of mis-
sile silos could not be significantly increased
and that "significantly" meant not more than
10 to 15 percent.

In th*^ more important unilateral declara-
tions we made clear to the Soviets that the
introduction of land-mobile ICBM's would
be inconsistent with the agreement. Since
the publication of the various unilateral in-
terpretative statements, suggestions have
been heard that the language of the treaty
and agreement in fact hide deep-seated dis-
agreements. But it must be recognized that
in any limited agreements which are between
oldtime adversaries there are bound to be
certain gaps.

In this case the gaps relate not so much
to the terms themselves but rather to what
it was impossible to include. The interpreta-
tions do not vitiate these agreements, but
they expand and add to the agreements.

What Do the Agreements Mean?

Taking the longer perspective, what can
we say has been accomplished?

First, it is clear that the agreement will
enhance the security of both sides. No agree-
ment which fails to do so could have been
signed in the first place or stood any chance

of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to
gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic
field must be self-defeating.

The President has given the most careful
consideration to the final terms. He has asked
me to reiterate most emphatically this morn-
ing his conviction that the agreements fully
protect our national security and our vital
interests.

Secondly, the President is determined that
our security and vital interests shall remain
fully protected. If the Senate consents to
ratification of the treaty and if the Congress
approves the interim agreement, the admin-
istration will therefore pursue two parallel
courses.

On the one hand, we shall push the next
phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks with the same energy and conviction
that have produced these initial agreements.

On the other hand, until further arms
limits are negotiated, we shall push research
and development and the production capacity
to remain in a fully protected strategic pos-
ture should follow-on agreements prove un-
attainable and so as to avoid giving the
other side a temptation to break out of the
agreement.

Third, the President believes that these
agreements, embedded as they are in the
fabric of an emerging new relationship, can
hold tremendous political and historical sig-
nificance in the coming decades. For the first
time, two great powers, deeply divided by
their divergent values, philosophies, and
social systems, have agreed to, restrain the
very armaments on which their national sur-
vival depends. No decision of this magnitude
could have been taken unless it had been part
of a larger decision to place relations on a
new foundation of restraint, cooperation, and
steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of
agreements on joint eff'orts with regard to
the environment, space, health, and promis-
ing negotiations on economic relations pro-
vides a prospect for avoiding the failure of
the Washington Naval Treaty and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, which

° For texts of the agreed interpretations and uni-
lateral statements, see Bulletin of July 3, 1972,
p. 11.

July 10, 1972

collapsed in part for lack of an adequate
political foundation.

The final verdict must wait on events, but
there is at least reason to hope that these
accords represent a major break in the pat-
tern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation
which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations
for a generation. The two great nuclear
powers must not let this opportunity slip
away by jockeying for marginal advantages.

Inevitably an agreement of such conse-
quence raises serious questions on the part
of concerned individuals of quite different
persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of
them here. Let me deal with some of the most
frequently asked since the agreements were
signed three weeks ago.

Who won?

The President has already answered this
question. He has stressed that it is inappro-
priate to pose the question in terms of victory
or defeat. In an agreement of this kind,
either both sides win or both sides lose. This
will either be a serious attempt to turn the
world away from timeworn practices of
jockeying for power or there will be endless,
wasteful, and purposeless competition in the
acquisition of armaments.

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S.
strategic disadvantage?

We reject the premise of that question on
two grounds. First, the present situation is
on balance advantageous to the United
States. Second, the interim agreement per-
petuates nothing which did not already exist
in fact and which could only have gotten
worse without an agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is
sound. Much of the criticism has focused on
the imbalance in number of missiles between
the United States and the Soviet Union. But,
this only examines one aspect of the problem.
To assess the overall balance it is necessary
to consider those forces not in the agree-
ment: our bomber force, which is substan-
tially larger and more effective than the
Soviet bomber force, and our forward-base
systems.

The quality of the weapons must also be
weighed. We are confident we have a major

advantage in nuclear weapons technology
and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our
MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in
numbers of warheads, and this lead will be
maintained during the period of the agree-
ment, even if the Soviets develop and deploy
MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment
characteristics. For example, because of the
difference in geography and basing, it has
been estimated that the Soviet Union re-
quires three submarines for two of ours to
be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our stra-
tegic forces are seen to be completely suffi-
cient.

The Soviets have more missile launchers,
but when other relevant systems such as
bombers are counted there are roughly the
same number of launchers on each side. We
have a big advantage on warheads. The
Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage.

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is
the trend of new weapons deployment by the
Soviet Union and the projected imbalance
five years hence based on that trend. The
relevant question to ask, therefore, is what
the freeze prevents; where would we be by
1977 without a freeze? Considering the cur-
rent momentum by the Soviet Union in both
ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, the ceiling set in the interim agree-
ment can only be interpreted as a sound
arrangement that makes a major contribu-
tion to our national security.

Does the agreement jeopardize our se-
curity in the future?

The current arms race compounds num-
bers by technology. The Soviet Union has
proved that it can best compete in sheer
numbers. This is the area which is limited
by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competi-
tion with the Soviets to the area of tech-
nology. And, heretofore, we have had a
significant advantage.

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to
bring the technological race under control.
Until these negotiations succeed, we must
take care not to anticipate their outcome by
unilateral decisions.

Department of State Bulletin

Can we trust the Soviets?

The possibility always exists that the So-
viets will treat the Moscow agreements as
they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as
just another tactical opportunity in the pro-
tracted conflict. If this happens, the United
States will have to respond. This we shall
plan to prepare to do psychologically and
strategically and provided the Congress
accepts the strategic programs on which the
acceptance of the agreements was predicated.

I have said enough to indicate we advocate
these agreements not on the basis of trust
but on the basis of the enlightened self-
interests of both sides. This self-interest is
reinforced by the carefully drafted verifica-
tion provisions in the agreement. Beyond the
legal obligations, both sides have a stake in
all of the agreements that have been signed
and a large stake in the broad process of
improvement in relations that has begun.
The Soviet leaders are serious men, and we
are confident that they will not lightly aban-
don the course that has led to the summit
meeting and to these initial agreements. For
our own part, we will not abandon this
course without major provocation, because
it is in the interest of this country and in
the interest of mankind to pursue it.

Prospects for the Future

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit,
the President and General Secretary Brezh-
nev signed a declaration of principles to
govern the future relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union. These
principles state that there is no alternative
to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age.
They commit both sides to avoid direct
armed confrontation, to use restraint in local
conflicts, to assert no special claims in der-
ogation of the sovereign equality of all
nations, to stress cooperation and negotia-
tion at all points of our relationship.

At this point, these principles reflect an
aspiration and an attitude. This adminis-
tration will spare no effort to translate the
aspiration into reality. We shall strive with

determination to overcome further the mias-
ma of suspicion and self-confirming pre-
emptive actions which have characterized
the cold war.

Of course the temptation is to continue
along well-worn paths. The status quo has
the advantage of reality, but history is
strewn with the wreckage of nations which
sought their future in their past. Catastrophe
has resulted far less often from conscious
decisions than from the fear of breaking
loose from established patterns through the
inexorable march toward cataclysm because
nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis
of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914
would surely destroy the world if we let it
happen again in the nuclear age.

Thus the deepest question we ask is not
whether we can trust the Soviets but
whether we can trust ourselves. Some have
expressed concern about the agreements, not
because they object to their terms but be-
cause they are afraid of the euphoria that
these agreements might produce.

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain
unavoidable tension just to carry out pro-
grams which our national survival should
dictate in any event. We must not develop
a national psychology by which we can act
only on the basis of what we are against and
not on what we are for.

Our challenges then are: Can we chart a
new course with hope but without illusion,
with large purposes but without sentimen-
tality? Can we be both generous and strong?
It is not often that a country has the op-
portunity to answer such questions mean-
ingfully. We are now at such a juncture
where peace and progress depend on our
faith and our fortitude.

It is in this spirit that the President has
negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit
that he asks the approval of the treaty and
the interim agreement and that I now stand
ready to answer your questions.''

' For a transcript of the question-and-answer ses-
sion whicli followed, see White House press release
dated June 15.

July 10, 1972

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the ABM Treaty
and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^

I am pleased to appear before you today in
support of the treaty on the limitation of
ABM [antiballistic missile] systems and the
interim agreement on the limitation of stra-
tegic offensive arms.^

In his letter to the Senate of June 13 trans-
mitting my report and its enclosures, the
President urged your support so that the two
agreements can be brought into force as soon
as practicable.^ These agreements are impor-
tant not just for our people; they are impor-
tant for all people. They are important not
only for the achievements they represent but
also for the opportunities they present. Stra-
tegic arms limitation is not a one-time effort,
but a continuing process.

These agreements are a significant achieve-
ment.

They constitute an unprecedented step in
controlling strategic arms. They are tangible
evidence that both sides are moving into an
era of negotiation. The tw^o sides now have an
important investment in cooperation which
they are not likely to risk lightly. The United
States and the Soviet Union have thus indi-
cated a recognition that their relations can
be improved by cooperation in some areas
even though there remain important differ-
ences in others.

This success in SALT [Sti-ategic Arms
Limitation Talks] recognizes that global se-
curity is interdependent and that uncon-
strained weapons competition is contrary to
the interests of the nuclear powers, and of
the world.

During the SALT negotiations over the
last 21/2 years we have kept in mind the need
for wide support, both nationally and inter-
nationally, for any agreements reached. To

that end the administration has closely con-
sulted the Congress. We have also regularly
consulted with our allies.

I believe there is wide support for these
agreements. The administration welcomes
this opportunity to consider them with you.
We are pleased to know that the Congress
plans full consideration of these two docu-
ments, both with officials of the executive
branch and with the public. This is a process
that is fundamental to our American system.
It will broaden the base of understanding and
support for what has been achieved and will
assist in the search for additional strategic
arms limitations.

Let me place the SALT agreements in per-
spective.

When this administration entered office
early in 1969, we faced a strategic situation
in which the U.S.S.R. was engaged in a broad
and dynamic buildup of its strategic offen-
sive missile launchers. It was clear that a
rough balance in strategic forces between
the United States and the Soviet Union was
approaching. However, there was not then —
and there is not now — any question that the
United States could and would maintain stra-
tegic forces adequate to meet its security re-

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on June 19 (press release 142). The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

" For texts, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 918.

' For texts of President Nixon's message of June
13, Secretary Rogers' report of June 10, and texts
of agreed interpretations and unilateral statements,
see Bulletin of July 3, 1972, p. 1.

Department of State Bulletin

quirements, forces second to none. As Presi-
dent Nixon stated in his foreign policy re-
port of February 1971, "both sides would al-
most surely commit the necessary resources
to maintain a balance." * The President fur-
ther noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain
a large advantage "would spark an arms race
which would, in the end, prove pointless."

Through negotiation — rather than compe-
tition— we had an opportunity to achieve a
more stable strategic relationship with the
U.S.S.R. and to seek, over time, to create a
situation in which both sides could use more
of their resources for purposes other than
building more strategic weapons.

Negotiation of the Agreements

After thorough preparations by the new
administration, SALT began in November
1969 in Helsinki. Initially, the talks concen-
trated on exploration of strategic principles
and development of an agenda for future
work. The next phases focused on compre-
hensive proposals. However, problems over
definition of strategic systems and over the
basis for limitation of such systems made
clear that it would be extremely difficult to
negotiate a single comprehensive agreement.
The Soviets then pressed for an initial agree-
ment limiting only antiballistic missile sys-
tems. We believed that such an agreement
would not make as great a contribution to
stability as limitations on both offensive and
defensive strategic systems.

This impasse was resolved by the break-
through announced by the President on May
20, 1971.^ The two governments agreed to
work out arrangements limiting deployment
of ABM's and at the same time to agree on
certain measures with respect to the limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms.

After the May 20 understanding, the prin-
cipal issues were how broad a coverage of of-
fensive forces could be agreed and how to
frame in concrete terms agreement in princi-
ple to limit ABM's to a low level. These gen-
ei-al questions contained numerous and com-
plex specific issues, which took another year
of hard negotiating to work out. The two

agreements before you are the successful re-
sult of that work.

Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the
two agreements was made in my letter of sub-
mittal to the President. I believe it would be
helpful this morning to consider what these
agreements would do. I will touch on certain
of their most important provisions. Follow-
ing my statement. Ambassador Smith [Ge-
rard Smith, head of the U.S. delegation to
SALT] is prepared to join me in answering
questions you may have.

Let me say as a preface to this discussion
that in both agreements the United States
has sought, where necessary, to set forth de-
tailed obligations in the texts of the agree-
ments themselves. Where one of the sides
preferred to put clarifying material or elab-
oration in agreed interpretations, and where
this was sufficient, that approach was used.
These agreed interpretations have been
transmitted to the Congress; they include
initialed statements and other common
understandings. In certain cases where agree-
ment could not be reached, U.S. views were
stated formally in unilateral statements.
Those, too, have been transmitted to the Con-
gress. There are no secret agreements.

Undertakings in the ABM Treaty

I would like to address first the ABM
Treaty.

Under this treaty, both sides make a com-
mitment not to build a nationwide ABM de-
fense. This is a general undertaking of ut-
most significance. Without a nationwide
ABM defense, there can be no shield against
retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have
recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain,
mutual deterrence.

Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt
that the possibility of nuclear war has been
dramatically reduced by this treaty.

* The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25, 1971, ap-
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 22, 1971 ; the section
entitled "Strategic Policy and Forces" begins on
p. 406.

^ Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 741.

July 10, 1972

A major objective of SALT has been to re-
duce the tensions, uncertainties, and high
costs which flow from the upward spiral of
strategic arms competition. While the cost
savings from these first SALT agreements
will be limited initially, over the long term
we will save the tens of billions of dollars
which might otherwise have been required
for a nationwide ABM defense.

Furthermore, with an interim limitation on
offensive weapons — which we hope will lead
to a more comprehensive and permanent lim-
itation— there will be a break in the pattern
of action and reaction under which each
side reacts to what the other is doing, or may
do, in an open-ended situation. This cycle un-
til now has been a major factor in driving
the strategic arms race.

The heart of the treaty is article IH, which
spells out the provisions under which each of
the parties may deploy two limited ABM
complexes, one in an ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] deployment area and one at
its national capital. There can be no more
than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated
interceptors, at each complex — a total of 200.

The two ABM deployment complexes per-
mitted each side will serve different purposes.
The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM de-
ployment area will afford some protection
for ICBM's in the area. ABM coverage at the
national capitals will permit protection for
the national command authority against a
light attack, or an accidental or unauthor-
ized launch of a limited number of missiles,
and thus decrease the chances that such an
event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In
addition, it will buy some time against a ma-
jor attack, and its radars would help to pro-
vide valuable warning.

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are
also important limitations on the deployment
of certain types of non-ABM radars. The
complex subject of radar control was a cen-
tral question in the negotiations because ra-
dars are the long leadtime item in develop-
ment of an ABM system.

The treaty provides for other important
qualitative limitations. The parties will un-
dertake not to develop, test, or deploy ABM

systems or components which are sea-based,
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
They have also agreed not to develop, test,
or deploy ABM launchers for launching more
than one ABM interceptor missile at a time
from each launcher, nor to modify launchers
to provide them with such a capability; nor
to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-
automatic or other similar systems for rapid
reload of ABM launchers; nor to develop,
test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than
one independently guided warhead.

Perhaps of even greater importance as a
qualitative limitation is that the parties have
agreed that future exotic types of ABM sys-
tems, i.e., systems depending on such devices
as lasers, may not be deployed, even in per-
mitted areas.

One of the more important corollary provi-
sions deals with prohibiting the upgrading
of antiaircraft systems, what has been called
the "SAM-upgrade" [surface-to-air missile]
problem. The conversion or testing of other
systems, such as air-defense systems or com-
ponents thereof, to perform an ABM role is
prohibited as part of a general undertaking
not to provide an ABM capability to non-
ABM systems.

The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and
in the interim agreement, have been devised
so as to assure that they can be verified by
national technical means of verification. For
the types of arms control measures in these
agreements, modern national technical means
of verification are the most practical and a
fully effective assurance of compliance. The
treaty also contains the very important land-
mark commitments not to interfere with each
side's national technical means of verification
and not to use deliberate concealment meas-
ures to impede the effectiveness of these
means.

The treaty contains another significant
"first" in Soviet-American arms control. A
Standing Consultative Commission will, on a
regular basis, consider the operations of the
treaty as well as questions of compliance. The
Commission will also have the function of
considering proposals for further increasing
the viability of the treaty. It will assure that

Department of State Bulletin

even after the completion of the follow-on ne-
gotiations there will be a continuing stra-
tegic dialogue between the two powers.

The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlim-
ited. But it contains a withdrawal clause of
the kind which has characterized postwar
arms control agreements. Each party can
withdraw if it decides that extraordinary
events relating to the subject matter of the
treaty have jeopardized its supreme inter-
ests. Notice of such a decision, including a
statement of the extraordinary events in-
volved, must be given six months prior to
withdrawal.

The interrelationship between limitations
on offensive and defensive strategic arms
which the United States has repeatedly
stressed is reflected in the expressed inten-
tion to continue active negotiations for limi-
tations on strategic arms. As was pointed out
in my submittal letter, the special importance
attached by the United States to this relation-
ship was set forth in a formal statement by
Ambassador Smith recording the position of
the United States Government that if an
agreement providing for more complete stra-
tegic offensive arms limitations were not
achieved within five years, U.S. supreme in-
terests could be jeopardized, and should that
occur it would constitute a basis for with-
drawal— not necessarily withdrawal, but a
basis for withdrawal — from the treaty. I be-
lieve that this withdrawal right, which is
exercisable on our judgment alone, fully pro-
tects our security interests in the event that
the follow-on negotiations were not to suc-
ceed and that the strategic situation became
such that we felt obliged to exercise it.

Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to
the interim agreement and its protocol.

This agreement freezes at approximately
current levels the aggregate number of in-
tercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
launchers operational and under construction
on each side for up to five years. We hope that
it will be replaced well before that time by a

more complete agreement in treaty form cov-
ering strategic offensive weapons.

Under the agreement, in articles I and II,
the parties undertake a commitment not to
construct additional fixed ICBM launchers
and not to convert launchers for light or
older ICBM's into launchers for modern
heavy ICBM's. This undertaking by the So-
viet Union should be viewed in terms of the
concern in this country during the past sev-
eral years about the continued buildup in
numbers of Soviet ICBM's, particularly the
heavy SS-9 ICBM's. The growth in num-
bers of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM
launchers has now been stopped.

The agreement does not specify the num-
ber of ICBM's operational and under con-
struction when it was signed. We have made
it abundantly clear to the Soviets, however,
that we consider this number for the U.S.S.R.
to be 1,618. Specifying the number of ICBM's
in the agreement is not important, since na-
tional means of verification will reveal if any
new ICBM construction, which is prohibited
by the agreement, were to take place.

Article III and the protocol limit SLBM
launchers and modern ballistic missile sub-
marines. The agreement contains undertak-
ings not to build such launchers and subma-
rines above a given number.

A ceiling of 62 has been set for the
U.S.S.R. on the number of operational mod-
ern submarines (Y-class nuclear-powered
submarines). A ceiling of 950 SLBM launch-
ers has been set for the U.S.S.R. This ceiling
is to include all launchers on nuclear-
powered submarines (Y-class and H-class
submarines) and modern launchers on older
submarines (G-class diesel-powered subma-
rines).

In effect, the agreement freezes SLBM
launchers at present levels except that addi-
tional SLBM launchers can be built if they
replace older strategic launchers on a one-
for-one basis.

The Soviets are permitted to have no more
than 740 launchers on nuclear-powered sub-
marines of any type, operational and under
construction, unless they effect replacement
in accordance with agreed procedures. The

July 10, 1972

purpose of the figure 740 is to establish a
clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids
uncertainty or debate over the definition of
"under construction."

To reach 950 SLBM's on modern subma-
rines, the U.S.S.R. must retire older ballistic
missile launchers — specifically, those for
SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's and on H-class sub-
marines. The first SLBM launcher after the
740th launcher must be a replacement. The
older ICBM or SLBM launchers being re-
placed will be dismantled beginning no later
than the date on which the submarine con-
taining the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

I might add that this one-way mix con-
cept— permitting replacement of land-based
launchers with submarine-based launchers —
was first suggested by the United States early
in SALT as a way of achieving greater stra-
tegic stability.

The U.S.S.R. could retain the existing older
launchers on G-class submarines, in addition
to 950 launchers on modern submarines.
However, any launchers for modern SLBM's
on these older diesel-powered submarines
would have to be included in the 950 ceiling.

The modernization and replacement provi-
sions of the interim agreement will permit
both sides to improve their missile forces, but
the restrictions on converting launchers for
light ICBM's or older heavy ICBM's to
launchers for modern heavy ICBM's will
place important qualitative restrictions on
Soviet programs. The conversion of current
U.S. ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman
III missiles and the conversion of current
Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon mis-
siles, as well as the construction of new sub-
marines as replacement for older ones, will
not be prohibited.

The agreement provides for application of
the same verification procedures and com-
mitments about nonconcealment and nonin-
terference as contained in the ABM Treaty.
The Standing Consultative Commission will
also be used to promote the objectives and
the implementation of the interim agi-eement.

There is a commitment to continue active
negotiations for more complete limitations on
strategic offensive arms. The agreement also

stipulates that its terms will not prejudice
the scope and terms of the limitations on
strategic offensive arms which may be
worked out in the follow-on negotiations.

The offensive arms limitations are tempo-
rary and not comprehensive. They do not
cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For ex-
ample, strategic bombers, where the United
States already has a very large advantage,
are not limited by the interim agreement.

The interim agreement does not limit on-
going U.S. offensive arms programs. It does
stop the Soviet Union from increasing the
number of its strategic offensive missile
launchers. These limitations on Soviet stra-
tegic offensive forces, in conjunction with
very low limits on ABM's on both sides,
clearly advance U.S. security interests.

Looked at overall, our forces are clearly
sufficient to protect our, and our allies', secu-
rity interests. U.S. strategic forces are quali-
tatively superior to and more effective than
Soviet strategic forces. The U.S.S.R. has
more missile launchers. The United States
has more missile warheads. We have many
more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers
alone are not an illuminating or useful meas-
ui-e for judging the strategic balance.

A New Era in Arms Control

With these two agreements, we should have
a more secure and stable strategic relation-
ship with the U.S.S.R.

Both sides gain assurance that their stra-
tegic missile deterrent forces will not be ren-
dered ineffective by the other's ABM system.

But even with the advantages that these
two agreements will bring, we must keep our
strategic forces up to date if these are to con-
tinue their central role for deterrence. Our
forces must be adequate to deter attack on —
or coercion of — the United States and its al-
lies. The relationship between U.S. and So-
viet strategic forces must be such that our
ability and resolve to protect our vital inter-
ests and those of our allies will not be under-
estimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress
agrees.

Mr. Chairman, I have presented an over-

Department of State Bulletin

view of the basic undertakings of these
agreements and of their significance.

I think it wrong to ask who "won" or "lost"
the initial SALT negotiations. In matters in-
volving the central security interests of two
great powers, any arms limitation agreement
must respond to each side's interest or it will
not last very long. Both sides must gain from
SALT or neither does.

With these two agreements we enter a new
era in arms control, and what may have been
difficult or impossible in the past may now be
attainable. It should now be possible for both
sides to agree to additional limitations, in-
cluding reductions.

The security of the United States will be
strengthened by these two agreements.

They will make possible a more rational
and stable strategic relationship.

They should help to improve American-
Soviet relations and preserve and strengthen
international security and world order.

The threat of nuclear war will be dramati-
cally reduced.

The?" agreements will give the world
greater hope for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that this committee
and the Senate support the ABM Treaty and
its accompanying interim agreement.

President Nixon Urges Senate Passage
of Foreign Aid Authorization

Following is the text of a letter dated
June 9 from President Nixon to Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. An iden-
tical letter was sent to Senate Minority Lead-
er Hugh Scott.

White House press release dated June 10

June 9, 1972.

In my special report to the joint session of
the Congress on June 1, the evening of my
return from the summit discussions in Mos-
cow, I said that the door to the agreements
that we reached there had been opened be-
cause the United States had maintained the
strength it needed to protect its interests. A

vital and indispensable element of that
strength has been our continuing security
assistance program.

The Foreign Assistance Authorization bill
for fiscal year 1973, a significant portion of
which is devoted to security assistance, is of
direct and fundamental importance to the
continued maintenance of our strength and
the protection of our interests. As you know,
the Senate will soon begin consideration of
this bill, S. 3390.

At Guam in 1969, I made clear that the
United States would look increasingly to its
friends and allies to play a greater role in
providing for their own defense.^ Since that
time we have moved forward steadily to-
ward that objective with full recognition
that our own security depends importantly
upon the independence, the progress and the
stability of our friends. But if we are to
reach that goal, we must help others to de-
velop the ability to defend themselves. My
Foreign Assistance program requests for fis-
cal year 1973 are based on these imperatives.

The severe cuts in my fiscal year 1972 re-
quests, and the restrictive amendments
which were imposed, significantly limited
our ability to move toward the basic ob-
jectives of the program — the maintenance
of the strength necessary to secure a last-
ing peace.

When I forwarded my fiscal year 1973 re-
quests on March 10 [14], 1972, I reported
that the foreign assistance appropriations
for fiscal year 1972 were below the minimum
level required to attain our foreign policy
and national security goals. Such reductions
and restrictions, if imposed by the Congress
again in 1973, will call into serious question
the firmness of our commitments abroad.
Such Congressional action could have a de-
stabilizing effect at a time when confidence
in our support and perseverance will be
critically needed.

In recent months we have taken bold and
decisive steps in our continuing search for
peace. I believe that through these efforts

' For President Nixon's remarks to news corre-
spondents at Guam on July 25, 1969, see Public
Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon, 1969, p.
544.

July 10, 1972

we have done much to enhance America's
security and that of the entire world, pri-
marily by diminishing the likelihood of di-
rect confrontation with the Soviet Union and
the Peoples Republic of China. Though we
are making every effort to expand on these
initial and significant steps, the process of
building the structure of lasting peace will
be long and arduous.

I share with you the desire to withdraw
our remaining forces from Indochina in a
timely and honorable manner. But Con-
gressional amendments which can be mis-
construed by our adversaries to be hostile
to my peace proposals of May 8 do not serve
this objective. As I have reported to you
and to the people of the United States, we
are continuing to pursue every possible
avenue toward peace in Southeast Asia. I
have made clear to the North Vietnamese
that we are fully prepared to participate in
meaningful negotiations to achieve a settle-
ment and I am hopeful that they will be con-
vinced that such negotiations are in the
best interests of all parties.

I am firmly convinced that the achieve-
ment of our purposes — in Vietnam and else-
where— will be far more likely if this bill is
passed in substantially the form in which
I submitted it. As brought to the floor, how-
ever, the bill is incompatible with these ob-
jectives.

I have always appreciated the assistance
you have given me in formulating programs
to ensure this nation's welfare and security.
We seek the same ends — the maintenance of
our strength and will, a lessening of ten-

sions and an amelioration of the plight of
the less privileged. I am confident that I can
count on your firm support in the further
pursuit of the goals.
Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.

United States and United Kingdom
Sign New Extradition Treaty

Press release 135 dated June 8

An extradition treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom, which con-
tains a number of new extraditable offenses
not previously covered, was signed at Lon-
don June 7. Ambassador Walter H. Annen-
berg signed on behalf of the United States,
and Minister Anthony Kershaw, M.C., M.P.,
signed for Her Majesty's Government.

The new treaty, when ratified, will ter-
minate and replace the existing extradition
treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom of December 22, 1931.

In addition to clarifying procedural as-
pects of the extradition process, the new
agreement includes aircraft hijacking as an
extraditable offense. It also expands the pro-
visions presently in effect regarding narcot-
ics violations.

The treaty will enter into force three
months after the date of exchange of ratifi-
cations. In the case of the United States, the
treaty will require advice and consent to rati-
fication by the United States Senate.

Department of Stole Bulletin

President Echeverria of Mexico A^kes State Visit to the United States

Luis Echeverria Alvarez, President of the
United Mexican States, made a state visit
to the United States June H-21. He met
with President Nixoyi and other govermnent
officials in Washington June 15-16. Follow-
ing are an exchange of greetings between
President Nixon and President Echeverria
at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn
of the White House on June 15 and their
exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White
House that evening; an address by President
Echeverria made before a joint session of
the Congress that day; an announcement is-
sued that day concerning agreements signed
by Secretary Rogers and Mexican Secretary
for Foreign Relations Emilio 0. Rabasa;
and the text of a joint communique issued
June 17.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 19

President Nixon

Mr. President, Senora Echeverria, all of
our distinguished guests: Mr. President,
we welcome you very warmly on your first
official visit to Washington. We welcome
you as the head of state of a great nation,
our great and friendly neighbor to the
south. And we welcome you also as a world
leader of the first rank.

During the course of our discussions we
will have the opportunity to talk about bi-
lateral issues between our two countries. I
will be extremely interested in getting your
views on hemispheric problems, particularly
in view of your very eloquent comments in
which you enunciated the Echeverria doc-
trine in Santiago a short time ago.

And since you are the first head of gov-
ernment or head of state to visit Washing-

ton since my visit to Moscow, I shall look
forward to the opportunity to talk with you
about international problems of mutual in-
terest. We shall discuss these problems with
great frankness and great candor. But what
is even more important, we will discuss
them as friends.

Mr. President, the people of the United
States of America have a very warm place in
their hearts for the people of Mexico. I
personally, and my wife, have a warm place
in our hearts for your country, and we feel
that as we meet you today, we meet not only
as official friends but also as personal
friends. We believe that Mexican-Ameri-
can friendship is an indispensable corner-
stone to our foreign policy, and we believe
that our talks will contribute to that friend-
ship and to the cause of peace and progress
for all people in the world.

President Echeverria ^

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon: A few
yards away from us we can turn and see
young mothers holding children in their
arms, and as we see them we must think
of young mothers all over the wprld hold-
ing children in their arms, the children
that are the new generation, the new hope
for the world.

These mothers look toward the future
with either uncertainty or with hope. They
want to see how the present leaders of this
changing world are going to act and thus
affect the future of these new generations.

The great powers will be working and
making decisions that will affect the future
of these mothers and these children, and
they will want to know what the future is.

' President Echeverria spoke in Spanish on all
occasions.

July 10, 1972

This is what we must think of, all the
leaders of the world today, that we have
the fate of the world in our hands and
that we are changing the world, that we will
affect the course of history; and let us
hope our contributions will be toward a
world of peace, of security, and prosperity.

Mr. President, we should never forget —
and as we look around we are reminded
by these young mothers and their children —
how we are responsible for the conditions
facing this new generation and we will be
the ones responsible for deciding whether
this will be a world for them of anguish
or a world for peace.

Mr. President, the people of Mexico bring
to you and to the people of the United
States, this great and friendly neighbor, our
best and most cordial greetings from all of
us, and I am certain that out of our conver-
sations will come agreements that will be
positive and will contribute toward the fur-
ther progress of peace and prosperity in
this changing world.

We hope that we will be able to do this
so that, no matter what our ideologies, the
young of the small and great countries of
the world will work together with a hope to
contributing to peace in a better world to-
day, that we may have an international or-
der that will enable us to face the future
with greater hope so that we will benefit
these new generations that are the essence
and the heart of our preoccupations, of our
concern, and of our work.

My warmest thanks to you, Mr. President,
and to the great people of our friendly
neighboring country, the United States, and
in closing I express the hope, and I have
no doubt, that out of our conversations will
come agreements that will be mutually
beneficial for both peoples.

[At this point President Echeverria called to the
platform two mothers and their daughters who had
been viewing the ceremony.]

Mr. President, in the whole world you
can see beautiful scenes like this, children
held in the arms of the mothers, and these
young generations should be always on our
minds, and I like to think, I wonder, what

will be the world — what will be the world
that we will leave to them, what will
conditions be like in the year 2000 when
these two beautiful young girls are grown
up, and what will be the world for their
children and their grandchildren?

Will there be years of danger because of
man's technological progress, or will we turn
this technological progress into a better
world and into better living conditions for
all people?

This is a thought, Mr. President, we
should also bear with us — the thought of
these young mothers with children in arms,
of this new generation that we are working
for.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated June 15

President Nixon

Mr. President, Senora Echeverria, our
very distinguished guests: As all of you
know, Mrs. Nixon and I during this year,
along with the Secretary of State, have
traveled a great deal. We traveled halfway
around the world to Peking. And then we
traveled almost halfway around the world
the other way to Moscow.

And on this occasion in this house, we
want all of you, our guests tonight, to know
that it is very good to be home in the
United States and to welcome our very good
and dear friends from our great neighbor
to the south, the President of Mexico and
his wife.

I would like to tell a little story as to
how we feel about the President and his
wife. This is not their first visit to this
house. When he was President-elect, we had
the honor of receiving them in the family
dining room upstairs. And that was appro-
priate, because whenever the President of
Mexico visits the President of the United
States, we feel that they are part of our fam-
ily. We are all part of the American fam-
ily in this hemisphere.

But the story that I want to tell you re-
lates to a very unfortunate experience. Just

Department of State Bulletin

before I went to Moscow, when we enter-
tained in this room the parliamentarians
from Mexico, on that occasion the distin-
guished Ambassador to the United States
from Mexico was held up at the gate. He
was not a parliamentarian. He was not a
Senator. He had no invitation.

When he told me why he was delayed,
I said to him, "The Ambassador from Mex-
ico is always welcome in this house. He
needs no invitation."

And I say to the President of Mexico,
to his wife and all of our friends from
Mexico, you need no invitation. I will say
to you, "Esta listed en su casa."

And now returning to a more serious
vein, I noted this morning in my remarks
welcoming the President that we expected
to discuss many things, bilateral problems,
hemispheric problems, and international
problems. We have had very good talks,
and we will continue them tomorrow.

But as I talked to the President of Mexico,
I thought of what kind of man he was and
what I could say about him in presenting
him to our guests tonight. And I thought of
another man whom it would be appropriate
to mention, particularly in this room, as I
stand below the only portrait that hangs in
this room, the portrait of Abraham Lincoln.

Lincoln was the great American President
of the 19th century, and a contemporary of
Lincoln was Benito Juarez. They did not
know each other, but they respected each
other. And each in his way kept his coun-
try together at a time that it would other-
wise have been torn apart. Both became
revered national heroes. And we are re-
ceiving the President of Mexico on the oc-
casion of the 100th anniversary of the death
of Benito Juarez, whose statue is just a few
blocks from here in Washington, D.C.

He said many interesting and very pro-
found things during his life. But one very
simple thing he said remains in my memory.
He said, "Peace is respect for the rights of
others."

As I talked to the President of Mexico
today, 100 years after the death of Juarez,
I heard that theme expressed: Peace is re-
spect by great nations for the rights of

smaller nations. Peace is respect of the
strong for the weak. Peace is respect of
the rich for the poor.

Never have I heard a more eloquent ex-
pression on the part of a world statesman
for the smaller nations, for the weaker
nations, and the proud nations who are mov-
ing upward toward progress and prosperity,
hopefully in a world of peace.

It has been my privilege in 25 years in
government service, and as a private citizen,
to meet and know personally over 100 heads
of state and heads of government in the
world. And I can say to my friends here
from America, the United States of Amer-
ica, and to our good friends and guests from
Mexico, that in your President you have a
man who because of his intelligence, his
enormous energy, his humanity, and his
understanding of the problems not only of
his country but of the world, is in the first
rank of the statesmen of the world that I
have met in this last quarter of a century.

That would be a high compliment to any
man, but in proposing my toast tonight, I
propose an even higher compliment. One
hundred years after the death of Benito
Juarez, we are fortunate to have in the
great nation to the south of us a President
who is in the great tradition of Juarez, who
expounds eloquently the philosophy of
Juarez, a man who has been and will be
one of the great leaders not only of his
own country but of this whole hemisphere.

And so to the man who proudly and justi-
fiably today wears the mantle of Juarez,
President Echeverria of Mexico, I propose
that we raise our glasses.

President Echeverria

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon: We Mexicans
cannot help but remember with great pleas-
ure the fact that a few years ago — a little
over 30 years ago — a young California law-
yer who had just married a delicate and
attractive schoolteacher picked our country
for his honeymoon. They took a long jour-
ney, made careful observations throughout
their journey, without knowing that destiny
would enable him someday to apply those

July 10, 1972

observations more directly and more care-
fully in this new relationship of ours that
we are working at perfecting.

We appreciate even more, however, the
fact that 25 years after that wedding trip,
the Nixons went back, with their children
this time, went back over the trail of their
honeymoon to show the children the various
places where they had traveled on that oc-
casion.

And we believe, Mr. President, and Mrs.
Nixon, that especially on this second journey
when you went back with your daughters
that this was a testimony of your affection,
of a cordial expression of your sentiments
that has nothing at all to do with politics
but is just your personal opinion and senti-
ments toward this country.

Mr. President, you have recalled the fig-
ures of Lincoln and Juarez. Both men
emerged victorious from a very divisive civil
war in their own countries, a war that had
rendered deep divisions among their people.

Both of them in practice led their peoples
to the victory of the cause of what is right,
and both of them consolidated the unity of
their people.

And what better than to recall them now
when the world is trying to emerge from an
era of deep divisions, is trying to find a
path under law, so that with justice we, as
we especially aspire to in the Americas, are
trying to solve the problems that aff"ect us.

And so daily, as we seek to find solutions
to some of these terribly complex problems,
some of them so complex as to seem insol-
uble, I think it is positive, therefore, to find
our inspiration in the best men produced
by our history. And it is right then that
we should look back upon these heroes of
our past who with justice, recognizing how
— through their very efforts, their arduous
struggles, their daily sacrifices — how they
won victory for their countries and served
their people through that cause. Their best
reward for them was to achieve a victory
for the good cause that they espoused.

You had invited us in December of 1970
to a small friendly dining room on the

second floor of the White House. On that
occasion, Mr. President, you told me that
after I took office that you would invite me
and my wife to come to Washington on a
full state visit, which is what we are in
the process of engaging ourselves in now,
and that on this occasion we would talk
about a number of subjects that you have
just mentioned which then, as President-
elect, I was not in a position to discuss.

Some might think that we have come to
speak on behalf of Mexico with frankness,
perhaps with excessive frankness, about
some of our common problems. But your
various journeys, Mr. President, to these
two great world powers of recent months
have shown that we are living new days
indeed, and days in which problems must be
faced, and when we say face problems it
means show our face and face up to the
problems that do exist.

And so I ask — and I will answer in the
affirmative before I even finish the question
— is this a new style that is being introduced
into international political life, is this a new
diplomatic style that we are using that is
coming from the Americas that will have
effects on the entire world ? And the answer,
as I said, is in the afl!irmative.

Because this is a process of renewal, this
new style, this new approach that we are
showing in this hemisphere that will affect
the entire world. This is a very special style,
a very effective style, because it has a very
great sense of realism.

So we are in a sense rediscovering con-
temporary realism and facing up to our
problems close up, and I think this will per-
mit us to overcome the crisis of our days.

Mr. President, in thinking of your tem-
perament as a fighter, and your will to fight
and to win, we really could not find a full ex-
planation of these virtues without looking at
the moral strength that you derive from this
delightful lady who is your wife.

And so, ladies and gentlemen — and this is
not a mere formula of courtesy and affection
— but please, if you would, rise and join me
in a toast to the President and to this dis-

Department of State Bulletin

tlnguished lady, with all of her high virtues,
who has been a great companion to this
great fighter, and as Mexicans we invite
you to reiterate this expression of our deep
affection for President and Mrs. Nixon and
our great appreciation for their warm hos-
pitality.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA
BEFORE THE CONGRESS-

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Honorable
Senators and Members of the House: I
thank you for the honor of having invited
me to speak before this assembly which
represents the American people.

The United States is the creator of one
of the most significant experiences of con-
temporary history. The establishment of a
society based on equality before the law and
on the principles of political democracy drew
people from all corners of the globe and
made this land the source of great advances
in the intellectual and material progress of
humanity.

The United States was born during the
era of the great ideological revolution of the
18th century. The principles of liberalism
were the source of its dynamic drive. How-
ever, the growing complexities of its internal
and external life brought about attitudes
that were not always in accord with the
values of a system based on the right of all
persons, groups of persons, or nations to
self-fulfillment within the framework of
their own freedom.

One of the virtues of the American society
is its capacity for deep thought and self-
criticism which seems to correct its errors
and to renew its concept of the world. Now
that it has a greater awareness of its
strength and the careful manner in which
it should be used, we trust that it will de-
vise a policy to meet the real demands of
our time.

The United States is encouraging dia-
logue with other world powers that have

different ideologies. Apparently irrecon-
cilable antagonisms have been attenuated,
and lines of communication that were closed
for many years have been opened. Never-
theless, these changes have not yet been re-
flected in the policy of the United States
toward the Third World and toward the
Latin American countries, in particular.

The nuclear threat and arduous economic
competition among the great powers have
made them seek self-limitation in peaceful
coexistence. However, the end of the cold
war will not be the beginning of a period
of peace as long as the weak countries are
excluded from its benefits.

The countries of the Third World are
glad to see any negotiations and any agree-
ment that tends to reduce international ten-
sions, but they are suspicious of pacts be-
tween great powers that ignore the rights
and interests of less developed nations.

We cannot be in agreement with those
who try to reduce world politics to deal-
ings among powerful nations. We agree
even less with those who confuse power
with the capacity to produce nuclear weap-
ons. The possibility of oppressed nations to
change is also a political fact whose impor-
tance we cannot underestimate.

Moreover, we understand that the solu-
tion of the main problems we now face —
peace, security, and development — lies not
in the formation of closed international
clubs, but in the participation of all the peo-
ples of the world in the decisions that af-
fect them all.

A harmonious situation cannot be founded
on the dissension of most of the inhabitants
of the world. Our people are aware that
their poverty produces wealth for others.
The accumulated resentment against politi-
cal colonialism is now reborn against eco-
nomic colonialism.

Peace and progress depend to an ever-
increasing degree on the attitude that we
adopt together to close the alarming gap

' Reprinted from the Congressional Record of
June 15, p. H 5658.

July 10, 1972

that separates the rich nations from the
poor ones. Political and demographic pres-
sures of less developed countries endanger
the stability of wealthy societies. If effec-
tive policies of balanced development are not
adopted, poverty will cross all borders.

History shows that the most powerful
empires were destroyed by the contradic-
tions and social conflicts which their own
power produced. It is more sensible to lay
the foundations of security on a better dis-
tribution of wealth than on the progressive
stockpiling of arms and technological re-
sources.

It is necessary to end an era in which the
immediate interest of a few has prevailed
over the permanent interest of many. Real-
ism in politics and economics consists in ob-
taining constant and sound earnings and
not in procuring quick profits, generally un-
fair and frequently imaginary.

With the same clearness of mind and
pragmatism with which the need for mutual
respect among powerful countries is recog-
nized, it is necessary to understand that
lasting peace depends on absolute respect for
the way in which each country has chosen
to achieve progress.

Colonial attitudes that should have disap-
peared still try to control international rela-
tions. The centers of world influence im-
pose their conditions for exchange on the
other countries. Moreover, they reduce the
capacity of action of weak nations by op-
posing indispensable transformation of
structures or by intervening in the political
processes of these nations.

The history of underdeveloped nations is
a permanent struggle between the forces
that seek social change and those that try
to perpetuate injustice. The latter almost
always have the support of powerful for-
eign groups that try to impose inadequate
systems on countries whose true reality they
ignore.

The great powers are beginning to un-
derstand the danger that such an attitude
implies for their own stability. And this
fact coincides with a better organization of
the poor nations in defense of their legiti-
mate rights and interests. Therefore the

moment is ripe to unite efforts. The weak
nations must be convinced that the basis of
change resides in their own attempts to im-
prove their situation. The powerful nations
must keep in mind that civilizations are
strengthened and survive not when they sub-
jugate, but when they share.

Mexico participates in the problems, as-
pirations, and demands of developing na-
tions. The relations between our two coun-
tries ai'e, in a certain way, a mirror of the
American attitude toward nations that strug-
gle for their liberation.

The United States is finding the way to
hai-monize its interests with those of the
countries where the important revolutions
of the 20th century were made. Now it is
better equipped to understand Mexico not
only as a neighbor but as a nation born
from an ideological and social movement
with its own characteristics.

The foreign policy of Mexico toward the
United States, as toward any other country,
follows the nation's objectives: to strength-
en its political autonomy, establish its cul-
tural personality, extend the basis of its de-
mocracy, surmount underdevelopment, and
put an end to any system of exploitation.

The main purpose of our visit to the
United States on this occasion, in response
to President Nixon's kind invitation, is to
assess the relations between our nations and
examine the real possibilities of establishing
fairer treatment in the future.

The best way for us to fulfill these ob-
jectives is to express Mexico's points of view
with clarity and firmness. To reach realistic
and lasting agreements, we must define our
respective positions.

Mexico does not expect special treatment
from the United States, but only asks that
our contacts and exchanges be regulated by
the standards of fairness and respect that
should govern all international relations.

We must proceed in our own way; we
live our own life style and our own ideology.
We do not try to impose our principles on
anyone, but neither do we allow any foreign
interference. We are respectful of the rights
of others and want them to respect our
rights. We are sure that a greater degree of

Department of State Bulletin

cooperation between our two countries is not
only feasible but necessaiy.

I do not think this is the time for a de-
tailed examination of the problems that we
should solve together, but I believe it is ad-
visable to refer to some of current interest.

To achieve a better understanding be-
tween our two countries, it would be advis-
able for you to consider certain problems
which are not of great concern to American
public opinion but which do have serious con-
sequences for us.

The artificial salinity of the Colorado River
is the most delicate problem between our two
countries. The water from the Wellton-
Mohawk Canal has severely affected the ag-
riculture of the Mexicali Valley and has
brought poverty to thousands of farmers.
The damage is enormous, and Mexican pub-
lic opinion is becoming increasingly im-
patient about this important matter that
has been going on for more than a decade
without any satisfactory solution.

The Imperial Valley and the Mexicali
Valley are part of the same river basin that
the Colorado River irrigates. In the treaty
of 1944 it was agreed that the quality of the
water to be delivered to us would serve use-
ful purposes, and therefore the only possible
interpretation of this instrument is equal
conditions for both parties concerned. Vol-
untary pollution of the water that flows into
our territory is an unacceptable form of dis-
crimination.

Mexico does not wish to bi'eak the prin-
ciples of our neighborly friendship by re-
sorting to litigation; however, it expressly
reserves its rights in Act 218 [Minute No.
218 dated March 22, 1965, of the Interna-
tional Boundary and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico] and will defend
them vigorously under any circumstances.

In any case, it is impossible to understand
why the United States does not use the same
boldness and imagination that it applies to
solving complex problems with its enemies
to the solution of simple problems with its
friends.

Indications that there are minority groups
who want to limit the import of Mexican
agricultural products and forbid entry of

goods semimanufactured abroad with Amer-
ican raw materials and products are also of
concern to us. Both measures would be
harmful to our already extremely unfavor-
able trade balance with the United States
and would also have negative effects on the
American consumer.

Any new limitation that might be estab-
lished on Mexican imports would be a severe
setback to our bilateral relations. Lack of
foresight could raise a barrier between eco-
nomic structures that would obtain impor-
tant reciprocal benefits if they were to effec-
tively combine their resources. This would
be inadequate.

We have made it clear in other forums
that there can be no justification for the
United States delay in the adoption of the
general scheme of tariff preferences, sug-
gested by the Second World Conference on
Trade and Development.

We do not aspire to special concessions
in the field of foreign trade, but we consider
it unfair that the exportation of our manu-
factured goods should not be compensated
advantageously in view of the high prices
that we are obliged to pay for the capital
goods and technology that we require.

It is equally inexplicable, among countries
solemnly dedicated to join forces in order
that their peoples may attain a harmonious
development, that measures such as the
tariff reductions that have been granted by
the United Kingdom, the European Eco-
nomic Community, Japan, and other indus-
trialized countries, both capitalistic and so-
cialistic, should not be adopted.

Let us not confuse private or local interests
with national interests. Let us not permit our
many contacts — the logical result of our geo-
graphic proximity — to make us forget the
order of importance of the different factors
that determine relations among states.

Mexico proposes to the people and Gov-
ernment of the United States that we begin
a new phase of our relations. Thus you would
conform to the action you have taken in
other areas, and we would attain the objec-
tives that have always guided our foreign
policy.

The interdependence of countries opens

July 10, 1972

unsuspected possibilities of progress, but it
also exposes us to new subjections dangerous
in the measure in which they are disguised.
That is why cooperation among independent
states demands the full exercise of their
sovereign rights.

Mexico has always defended the right of
its people to freely forge their destiny. It
searches incessantly for new social and eco-
nomic formulas within the frame of its Con-
stitution.

We hold that true development derives
the impulse toward production from an
equitable distribution of wealth and the
satisfaction of social demands. We believe
that growth without justice ends in the
annulment of democracy and that freedom
is only possible through equitable progress.

We do not want to negotiate, with other
countries, advantages that favor economic
minorities. The heritage of prolonged rela-
tionships of dependence should be combated
simultaneously at the international level and
within the scope of our own countries.

Autonomy before others and internal par-
ticipation are inseparable goals of independ-
ent development. We do not wish to consoli-
date privileged groups that serve as obvious
links with centers of power nor cause a
breach that would isolate us from the cur-
rents of progress.

If we can expand the scope of our collabo-
ration, if we use the law and our good will
to reconcile our differences, if we rigorously
apply the standards of fair international co-
existence to our relations, we will have made
great progress along the road of our friend-
ship. We will have contributed to the cre-
ation of a peaceful and prosperous future
for both nations.

I have come to speak with you Senators
and Representatives on behalf of a neighbor-
ing country and a friend of the United
States. There is no true friendship without
frankness; a frankness will lead us to the
solution of common problems within a frame-
work of justice. This means a renewal of
our common faith in democracy using the
unlimited possibilities of the human spirit,

as long as it is developed within a frame-
work of freedom, because the human spirit
can develop only within an atmosphere
which it needs. An atmosphere which it
needs can be provided only within a frame-
work of political, social, and economic de-
mocracy.

We cannot divide the personality of man
and think that we can solve his material
problems without solving the problems that
make up his whole composition. The instru-
ments that man has created within the eco-
nomic industrial field and his whole con-
temporary civilization in general in which
he lives must be placed in the service of the
whole man. That is why dictators attempt to
divide man, to try to standardize him, and
to try by compulsion to divide his very per-
sonality.

That is why in political relations within
each country or in international relations
among countries, if there is a predominance
of the play of passing interests alone, we
run the risk of interference with the full
development of contemporary man.

So let us seek in our internal political re-
lations within our own countries and in our
international relations among ourselves this
new sense of a new humanism, and let us
not confuse ends with means, because the
nations of this hemisphere were born with
a special destiny that needs to be nurtured
within those fields which give man his great-
ness, which is a greatness which we must not
abdicate.

Senators and Representatives, I have
brought you the cordial and warm greetings
of the people of the Government of Mexico,
leaving aside the rules of protocol and diplo-
macy that sometimes distract us from the
very great truths of our time, in order that
we may join together, working for our re-
spective peoples, and I bring to you for the
record Mexico's willingness and desire to
speak with frankness to its great neighbor
and friend, the United States, so we may
obtain greater cooperation in the future and
eliminate certain barriers that separate us
now and perhaps in the future, so that in

Department of State Bulletin

the future we may achieve a balance of de-
velopment within a framework of freedom,
which is so necessary for the human spirit
and the spirit of democracy, to which we
may ever aspire, and so we may work to-
gether in the future for the welfare of our
peoples.

Thank you very much.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

White House press release dated June 15

In a ceremony at the White House on the occasion
of the state visit of President Luis Echeverria, Sec-
retary of State William Rogers and the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations, Emilio 0. Rabasa,
exchanged diplomatic notes bringing into effect a
series of bilateral agreements between the United
States and Mexico in the scientific, technological,
and cultural fields.

Agreement for Scientific and Technological
Cooperation

The agreement provides for a broad program of
cooperation in areas of science and technology, with
a view to contributing to the greater mutual prog-
ress of the two countries. It envisions more specifi-
cally the strengthening of economic and social de-
velopment, the intensification of relations between
the two countries' scientists and technicians, and
through combined efforts facilitation and increase
of the exchange of persons, ideas, skills, experience,
and information.

The two governments will establish a mixed com-
mission for the formulation, orientation, and review
of the programs promoted under the agreement, to
meet alternately in the United States and Mexico.
It will examine activities periodically and make rec-
ommendations, suggesting useful specific projects or
subjects under the program.

Each government will appoint an executive agency
to implement its part of the program, to work closely
with its counterpart, and to report jointly and
periodically to the mixed commission.

The program may include the exchange of scien-
tists and technicians, the execution of joint research
and personnel training projects, joint meetings, and
other activity which will, as with the exchange espe-
cially of young technicians, advance the objectives
of the program.

Except in the case of particular understandings
concerning the financing of certain agreements, each
government will bear the cost of executing its re-
sponsibilities under the program. The governments

may invite participation when appropriate of inter-
national organizations. All scientific and technologi-
cal information derived from the cooperative pro-
gram will be made available to the world's scientific
and technological community.

Technician Exchange

This agreement contemplates the exchange of
young technicians and scientists between the United
States and Mexico.

An outgrowth of President Echeverria's deep per-
sonal interest in developing Mexico's technology to
match and give impetus to her economic growth and
to provide increased employment for her young peo-
ple, the exchange will be carried out under the terms
of the broader agreement on science and technology
referred to above.

Initially, the United States has offered to provide
training for some 100 Mexican technicians and scien-
tists, largely in government training facilities. The
agencies ready to offer training include the Depart-
ments of Agriculture; Health, Education, and Wel-
fare; Transportation; Interior; and the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission.

Mexico is prepared to offer a similar number of
training positions to young technicians and scientists
from the United States.

Details of the United States and Mexican contri-
butions to the program will be worked out jointly
between the two governments.

In implementing President Echeverria's philoso-
phy, Mexico has established similar exchange pro-
grams with several countries, including France and
Japan.

Cultural Agreement

This new agreement, which revises and stream-
lines the procedures of a 1949 agreement, calls for
annual meetings by a Mexican-U.S. Commission on
Cultural Cooperation. This joint commission will
orient and review the cultural exchange programs
between the two countries, and wfU provide informa-
tion, advice, and recommendations to organizations
which conduct activities in this field.

In his note, Secretary Rabasa referred to the
"fruitful interchange between the two countries in
the fields of education and culture" which had been
fostered by the earlier agreement and expressed the
hope this new agreement will usefully update the
functions of the joint commission and give added
impetus to cultural relations between Mexico and
the United States.

Remote Sensing Agreement

This agreement represents the extension until July
1, 1974, of a 1968 agreement covering cooperative
research in remote sensing for earth surveys. In

July 10, 1972

addition, it modifies the earlier agreement by pro-
viding that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration will use its best efforts to acquire
and process Earth Resources Technology Satellite
data obtained over Mexico. Further, NASA will pro-
vide training in remote sensing data techniques to a
number of qualified Mexican technicians.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release (Key Biscayne. Fla.) dated June 17

President Richard Nixon and President Luis
Echeverria Alvarez welcomed this opportunity to
renew their personal friendship and the cordial dia-
logue which began at their first meeting here in
1970. They regarded this visit as particularly appro-
priate at a time when the eyes of the world have
been focused on President Nixon's recent visits to
Peking and Moscow. The visit of the Mexican Presi-
dent to the United States serves to direct broad
attention to the equally important tasks of advanc-
ing new approaches to Latin America and the less
developed nations of the world.

They also agreed that their meetings had con-
tributed to the establishment of a new era, an open-
ing characterized by a spirit of frankness, with
Mexico and which they hoped would characterize
intra-Hemispheric relations.

The two Presidents exchanged impressions on
world and Western Hemisphere affairs in consider-
able detail. President Nixon described his talks with
the Chinese and Soviet leaders. President Echeverria
recounted his experiences on recent visits to Japan,
Chile and Peru. They found this review informative,
useful as well as stimulating. They were firmly
united in the view that world peace with social
justice is essential to the well-being of all mankind.

The Presidents discussed overall relations between
their two countries — political and economic affairs,
and cooperation in the scientific, technical, cultural
and other fields.

The President of the United States recognized the
important role developing countries could and should
play in erecting a new international monetary sys-
tem and in progressing toward a free and fair trad-
ing system. In endorsing trade policies more respon-
sive to the problems of both developed and develop-
ing countries, he reaffirmed his intention to seek
congressional authorization at the appropriate time
for the United States to participate with other in-
dustrialized countries in a system of Generalized
Tariff Preferences for imports from developing
countries.

Regarding the problem of the salinity of the Colo-
rado River, President Echeverria told President
Nixon that Mexico reiterates its position as regards
receiving its assignment of original waters from the
Colorado River, to which the Treaty of February 3,

1944 refers, and therefore, with the same quality as
those derived from the Imperial Dam.

To this, President Nixon replied that this was a
highly complex problem that needed careful exami-
nation of all aspects. He was impressed by the
presentation made by President Echeverria and
would study it closely. It was his sincere desire to
find a definitive, equitable and just solution to this
problem at the earliest possible time because of the
importance both nations attach to this matter.

As a demonstration of this intent and of the good-
will of the United States in this connection, he was
prepared to:

(a) undertake certain actions immediately to im-
prove the quality of water going to Mexico;

(b) designate a special representative to begin
work immediately to find a permanent, definitive and
just solution of this problem;

(d) submit this proposal, once it has the approval
of this Government to President Echeverria for his
consideration and approval.

President Echeverria said that he recognized the
goodwill of President Nixon and his interest in
finding a definitive solution to this problem at the
earliest possible time. He added that based on two
recent trips to the Mexicali Valley and his talks with
farmers there, his Government, while reserving its
legal rights, had decided to stop using waters from
the Wellton-Mohawk project for irrigation purposes
while waiting for receipt of the US proposal for a
definitive solution.

Both Presidents agreed to instruct their Water
and Border Commissioners to prepare and sign a
Minute containing the above program and commit-
ments as soon as possible.

The Presidents discussed the many areas of on-
going cooperation between Mexico and the United
States, and their conviction that such cooperation
serves to bind our people even closer together in
mutual effort and understanding. They took note of
the agreements concluded during the visit by their
respective Secretaries for Foreign Relations: a bi-
lateral agreement with regard to the exchange of
information, training and research in the fields of
science and technology; a subsidiary agreement
which contemplates the exchange of young techni-
cians and scientists (including the training of some
100 young Mexican technicians and scientists
through US Government agencies); renewal of the
agreement on Cultural Relations.

President Nixon and President Echeverria dis-
cussed the serious nature of the illicit international
traffic in narcotic drugs. They reviewed the joint
enforcement measures which their countries have
successfully undertaken over the past two years.
President Nixon informed President Echeverria of

Department of State Bulletin

recent measures taken to combat the drug problem
in the United States. They agreed to acquire and
employ additional equipment in the antinarcotics
campaign and to make available increased training
of personnel for this purpose.

With regard to the question of migratory Mexican
workers, the two Presidents discussed the economic,
social and political factors that produce this problem
and agreed it was desirable for each government
to undertake immediately a study of this question
with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solu-
tion.

Recognizing the communality of many environ-
mental problems and the need to seek cooperative
solutions through the exchange of research and ex-
perience, the two Presidents have agreed that ap-
propriate policy level officials from Mexico and the
US will meet on a regular basis for discussion and
consultation concerning current and future environ-

mental problems of mutual concern and the methods
for dealing with them in a more systematic way.

The conversations between Presidents Niicon and
Echeverria were at all times cordial and marked by
the spirit of good neighborliness which exists be-
tween Mexico and the US. At the same time prob-
lems were discussed frankly and openly as between
true friends in an atmosphere of mutual respect and
trust. President Echeverria particularly wished to
convey on behalf of Mrs. Echeverria, his party and
himself, his deep appreciation for the warm hospi-
tality which was extended to them by President and
Mrs. Nixon.

President Nixon expressed his great pleasure that
President and Mrs. Echeverria will now have an
opportunity to visit other areas and cities of the
United States and assured them they will receive a
warm and friendly welcome from the American peo-
ple.

THE CONGRESS

Coordination of United States Foreign Economic Policy

Statement by Secretary Rogers

I welcome this opportunity to expand on
the brief exchange we had on this subject
last March. Mr. Culver [Representative
John C. Culver] asked me at that time
whether I agreed that foreign economic
questions had become more important in
the context of our foreign policy and secu-
rity interests. As I said then, I certainly do
agree; indeed, in the introduction to my first
foreign policy repoi't in March 1971, I said
that economic relations would undoubtedly
figure more largely in the foreign policy of

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on June 20 (press release 144). The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

the United States and of other nations dur-
ing the rest of the century. The subsequent
events of last August and beyond have put
into sharp relief the central role which eco-
nomic policy must play in our international
affairs.

Mr. Culver also asked whether the admin-
istrative arrangements within the U.S. Gov-
ernment were adequate to cope with these
issues and, in particular, with their foreign
policy implications. I said that I was not en-
tirely satisfied with the functioning of the
present mechanism for dealing with these
problems. It is to this that I will devote my
remarks today.

To place the matter in perspective, let me
recall the economic and political develop-
ments which underlie and explain the diflS-

July 10, 1972

culties we have been experiencing in formu-
lating and administering our international
economic policy.

Before World War II, governments did not
pay enough attention to their foreign eco-
nomic relations. In the State Department,
we had only a handful of officers in the eco-
nomic section, plus some people in the geo-
graphic offices and embassies who dealt with
such questions, generally on a part-time
basis. The same was true of other foreign
offices. This worldwide neglect of interna-
tional economic relations did not produce
very happy results. Nations tended to act uni-
laterally according to what they considered
to be their domestic imperatives, restricting
trade and money transfers, dumping exports,
and manipulating their currencies, with little
regard for the damage they were doing to
the interests of other countries. These "beg-
gar-thy-neighbor" policies contributed sig-
nificantly to spreading the Great Depression
and prolonging its effects throughout the
1930's.

The first step to reverse the spiral of pro-
tectionism was taken by the United States
in 1934, with the passage of Secretary of
State Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade pro-
gram. Ever since that time the United States
has been at the forefront of the drive to lib-
eralize world trade.

After the war we were determined to
avoid a repetition of the errors of the early
1930's. The United States took the initiative
in negotiating the international agreements
and institutions which have provided the
foundations of our international economic
system: GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade], the IMF [International
Monetary Fund], and the World Bank. We
launched the Marshall plan to help western
Europe get back on its feet, and we assisted
the economic recovery of Japan. We assumed
a major part of the responsibility for the
defense of the non-Communist world and for
economic aid to the developing countries.

Thus we helped pave the way for a period
of unprecedented growth in production,
trade, and investment. This growth bene-
fited everybody. In our own case, between
1950 and 1970 U.S. exports increased four-

fold and our direct investment abroad six-
fold.

All this required both an increase in the
human and financial resources devoted to
foreign policy and an emphasis on economic
aspects of our foreign policy. In the early
postwar period our problems were simpli-
fied by the convergence of our various in-
terests: political, military, and economic;
domestic and international ; short-term and
long-term. We did not have to worry in those
days about our balance of payments, nor did
we have to concern ourselves greatly about
our competitive position. The main obstacle
to our exports was the dollar shortage of our
trading partners. Our political and national
security objectives were the predominant
considerations in our foreign economic pol-
icy. The role of the State Department, which
— together with the aid agency — provided
leadership and coordination in this field, re-
mained unchallenged throughout the 1950's.

The problems of our foreign economic re-
lations became increasingly complex during
the 1960's. The European Community and
Japan became major centers of economic
power and strong trading competitors as
well as major trading partners. In the sec-
ond half of the sixties, our competitive po-
sition was eroded by inflation, which created
problems for our exports and increased the
pressure of imports on certain sectors of
our economy. Our balance of payments de-
teriorated.

These developments underlined the close
relationship which in today's world must
exist between our domestic economy and our
international economic position, and between
our domestic and foreign economic policies.
They also made more apparent the close link
between events in the monetary field and
developments in foreign trade.

In the integrated world economy of the
1970's, it is only natural that other depart-
ments— Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce,
and Labor — should increase their interest
and involvement in our international eco-
nomic relations. Other agencies as well —
such as Interior, Justice, Defense, the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers, the Federal Re-
serve Board, the Federal Trade Commission,

Department of State Bulletin

the Federal Maritime Commission, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, and the Atomic Energy
Commission — are becoming more concerned
with some facets of our foreign economic
policy.

This development is both inevitable and
welcome. It is inevitable because of the wide
range of interests which must be heard and
the specialized expertise that is required.
It is welcome because, by increasing the
stake of all United States agencies in a
flourishing international economy, it helps to
insure against the shortsighted "beggar-
thy-neighbor" approach which hurt us all in
the early 1930's.

The problem has been how to take all
these various interests into account and
still provide effective coordination in the
formulation and execution of our foreign
economic policy. The importance of such
coordination has never been so great as it
is today.

The National Security Council, to some
extent, performed this role in the past, as
have various special groups in more narrow
fields, such as the Office of the Special Rep-
resentative for Trade Negotiations. A more
recent effort was the establishment last year
of the Council on International Economic
Policy (CIEP), which is chaired by the Pres-
ident. I was one of those who recommended
the establishment of the Council to facili-
tate orderly procedures for dealing with
different points of view and to enable the
President to arbitrate differences among
government departments and insure that de-
cisions are carried out by all agencies con-
cerned.

There is no doubt in my mind, Mr. Chair-
man, that all the different viewpoints must
be brought into the decisionmaking process.
We recognize that other government depart-
ments are particularly attuned to various
sectors of the domestic economy or have
specialized knowledge in certain fields and
thus have special contributions to make.

It is often said that each agency has its
special constituency — agriculture, business,
labor, and, in the case of the State Depart-
ment, the "foreign constituency." This, I
submit, is a harmful misconception.

Speaking only for the State Department, I
can assure you that we have only one con-
stituency, and that is the United States of
America. We have only one basic concern,
and that is to achieve our national objectives.
In seeking to do so, we would not properly
discharge our responsibilities if we did not
look at all aspects of the U.S. national in-
terest— domestic as well as foreign; eco-
nomic as well as political — as we weighed
a proposed course of action.

Let me be a bit more specific. A common
allegation about the State Department is
that, where the United States has a com-
plaint, the Department is reluctant to take
a "tough" position with foreign govern-
ments. The allegation is not true. In any par-
ticular situation our job is to advance, as
forcefully and effectively as we can, the
overall U.S. interest. This requires us to
place the matter in perspective; to think of
all our interests at home and abroad ; to an-
ticipate foreign reactions, including possible
counteraction; to weigh benefits and costs;
to consider the short term and the long
term; to gauge how action in one area will
affect our interests in another. It is also our
task to explore alternative ways of taking
care of the problem which may have the
least damaging side effects.

I realize that an approach which takes due
note of the complexities of a problem will not
always please everyone. But we would be
remiss in our responsibilities to the Presi-
dent if we did not bring to bear the full ex-
tent of our knowledge of foreign conditions
and attitudes as an important element of the
overall assessment the President must make.

I also take exception to the common alle-
gation that the State Department has tended
to neglect the domestic implications of our
foreign economic policy. On the contrary, we
are deeply convinced that the success of our
policies abroad depends critically on a dy-
namic and competitive economy at home.
Such a dynamic economy is our primary as-
set in all of our foreign relations. Thus the
major objective of our foreign economic
policy is to assure the international con-
ditions of competition and cooperation which
can keep our economy strong.

July 10, 1972

We now have a mechanism to assess the
vast complex of interrelated elements which
go into the process of foreign economic
policy formulation. For this mechanism to
function properly, it is necessary that all
agencies should use it and that they should
devote adequate resources to it.

The Council on International Economic
Policy, of which I am Vice Chairman, has
been in existence for little more than a year.
A vast amount of work has been done under
the auspices of the Council and of its Oper-
ations Group, which is chaired by the Deputy
Under Secretary of State for Economic Af-
fairs, to analyze the manifold aspects of the
problems which face us and to explore long-
term solutions. Interagency groups chaired
by the Departments of Agriculture, Labor,
Commerce, State, and Treasury and the
Office of the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations have been engaged in
this comprehensive program of interrelated
studies and have made a number of specific
recommendations for domestic and inter-
national action.

I believe we have now reached the stage
where we can proceed from these analyses to
the development of a comprehensive action
program, including, in particular, the de-
velopment of an overall strategy for inter-
national monetary and trade negotiations,
and recommendations for legislative action.

We in the State Department believe that
this can be done effectively in the present
CIEP framework. I strongly support the re-
quest for legislative authorization and fund-
ing of the CIEP.

So far, I have addressed myself to policy
formulation. Mv general conclusion on this
is that we should encourage wide and diverse
participation in this process. This cannot
apply, however, to the process of communi-
cation and negotiation with foreign coun-
tries. Here we must speak with one voice
if we are to carry out an effective foreign
economic policy. This is the area where there
is the greatest need for improvement. For-
eigners tend to be confused when faced with
U.S. spokesmen taking different and some-
times conflicting positions. And they may be

tempted to take advantage of differences
they may perceive among U.S. departments.

The State Department has the responsi-
bility under the President for the conduct
of our foreign relations. This responsibility
encompasses the conduct of our foreign eco-
nomic relations, unless that is specifically
delegated elsewhere — as with the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations in
the administration of the trade agreements
program, the Treasury for certain interna-
tional monetary and financial matters, or by
Presidential directive in special cases. Lead-
ership by the State Department is particu-
larly necessary where we have a wide range
of interrelated economic issues with other
nations — issues which spill over into our po-
litical and national security relations — and
where it is necessary to bring the entire
weight of U.S. influence to bear in support
of our objectives.

The State Department and the unified
Foreign Service of the United States are
uniquely equipped to do this job:

— We have well-trained staff in the Bu-
reau of Economic Affairs, vdth technical
competence in all aspects of our foreign eco-
nomic relations and with extensive experience
in promoting U.S. international objectives.

— We have economic specialists in the re-
gional and functional bureaus.

— We have strong economic/commercial
sections at our important posts abroad, and
we are in the process of strengthening the
commercial aspects of our operations. I at-
tach special importance to the responsibility
of the Department and Foreign Service in
promoting U.S. exports and in providing im-
proved services for American businessmen.
Our Ambassadors, under my instructions,
are giving increased priority to commercial
services. As you undoubtedly know, 0MB
[Office of Management and Budget] is cur-
rently engaged in a study of the organiza-
tional arrangements of the U.S. Government
in the economic/commercial area.

— We have specialists in our Planning and
Coordination Staff to assist in the coordina-
tion of international economic policy within

Department of State Bulletin

the Department; to monitor economic assist-
ance activities ; to staff the CIEP Operations
Groups chaired by the Deputy Under Sec-
retary for Economic Affairs; and to provide
liaison vi^ith other agencies and the CIEP.

— I am particularly gratified by the action
of the conference committee on the State
Department authorization approving the
establishment of the position of Under Sec-
retary for Economic Affairs — upgrading the
present position of Deputy Under Secretary
— to provide leadership and coordination for
all of our foreign economic activities.

Mr. Chairman, the State Department does
not claim an exclusive role in assisting
the President in the formulation and con-
duct of our international economic policy.
We are particularly anxious that, in policy
formulation, all aspects should be considered
and all interests should be heard. We have
no desire to sacrifice our international eco-
nomic interests to our international political
interests.

I believe that a mechanism such as CIEP
provides is needed for an orderly process of
analysis and policymaking. We also see a
continuing role for other agencies in our
negotiating teams abroad. We will continue
to support the Special Trade Representative
in his conduct of general trade negotiations
under the trade agreements program. We
recognize that there may be situations which
call for special negotiating arrangements to
accomplish particular tasks.

We are working closely with Treasury and
other agencies in developing proposals for a
viable international monetary system and
shall give our full support to Treasury in
negotiations to this end. We and the De-
partment of Commerce are collaborating to
provide more vigorous support for U.S. ex-
ports and improved services for U.S. busi-
nessmen abroad.

The international economic agenda before
this country calls for statesmanship of the
highest order. We must negotiate the first
basic readjustment of the international eco-
nomic system since the war without sacri-
ficing the liberal trade and monetary prac-

tices which made the old so successful for
so long. We must improve our own competi-
tive trading position without calling down
retaliation which could cripple everybody.
We must insist on greater access for our ex-
ports without disrupting the sense of com-
munity on which a viable international eco-
nomic system depends. We must seek to
enhance our own prosperity without neglect-
ing our overall policy concern for the wel-
fare of the world's majority who live in de-
veloping countries.

I am confident the United States Govern-
ment will be equal to these challenges. And
I believe that with effort on the part of all
concerned, the executive branch can give
proper weight to all interests involved and
still present a coherent policy to the rest of
the world. If this calls for some discipline, I
firmly believe it can be accomplished without
stifling dissent within the executive branch
and without sacrificing the frank and open
discussions with the Congress which are the
sine qua non of any effective American
foreign policy.

Annual Report on World Weather
Program Transmitted to Congress

President Nixon's Letter of Transmittal i

To the Congress of the United States:

By monitoring and predicting weather
over the globe and by assessing the impact
of man's activities upon the atmosphere, the
World Weather Program helps significantly
to improve the quality of our life and the
safety of the earth's inhabitants.

I am pleased to report that the World
Weather Program is making significant
strides forward:

— Through new satellites, telecommuni-
cations, and computer technology, global in-
formation for early predictions and hazard-
ous weather warnings is "being acquired.

'Transmitted on May 3 (White House press
release).

July 10, 1972

processed, and then distributed in increased
volume and detail.

— Under the Global Atmospheric Re-
search Program intensive planning activi-
ties are underway for a 1974 international
experiment to be conducted in the tropical
Atlantic. The experiment will attempt to
discover what role tropical weather sys-
tems play in maintaining the general cir-
culation of the atmosphere. It will also
probe tropical weather systems, with a view
to improving weather prediction, including
hurricane forecasts. Scientific data from
this experiment will also help in making
weather forecasts that are longer range,
and in resolving important environmental
problems. Many nations will participate in
this experiment with ships, aircraft, satel-
lites and other facilities.

— Active international involvement in the
program by many member nations has
yielded peaceful collaboration on an impres-
sive international scale.

The World Weather Program is essential
to a total environmental monitoring system
for our planet. The program can serve as a
model, moreover, for other environmental
systems. The atmosphere is but one part
of our global ecology. Data on other aspects
of our environment can be collected and
exchanged through a vehicle like the World
Weather Program.

In accordance with Senate Concurrent
Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress, I am
pleased to transmit this annual report which
describes the advances of the World Weather
Program made during the past year and the
activities planned for the program by par-
ticipating Federal agencies for the coming
fiscal year.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, May 3, 1972.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1971. S. Doc. 92-59. January 1972.
260 pp.

Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on
International Monetary and Financial Policies.
Letter from the Chairman of the Council trans-
mitting the annual report for fiscal year 1971,
pursuant to section 4(b), (5), and (6) of the Bret-
ton Woods Agreements Act, as amended. H. Doc.
92-256. February 21, 1972. 274 pp.

Department of State Appropriations Authorization,
Fiscal Year 1973. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. March 8-10,
1972. 841 pp. [Printed for the use of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations.]

Recog^iition of Bangladesh. Report to accompany S.
Con. Res. 55. S. Rept. 92-694. March 15, 1972.
7 pp.

Universal Copyright Convention, as Revised, With
Protocols. Message from the President of the
United States transmitting the Universal Copy-
right Convention as revised at Paris on July 24,
1971, together with two related protocols. S.
Ex. G. March 15, 1972. 69 pp.

National Security Policy and the Changing World
Power Alignment. Outline and bibliography for
the spring 1972 hearing-symposium of the Sub-
committee on National Security Policy and Sci-
entific Developments of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. (Bibliography prepared by the
Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress.) March 15, 1972.
29 pp. [Committee print.]

Vietnam Commitments, 1961. A staff study based
on the "Pentagon Papers" prepared for the use of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations —
Study No. 1. March 20, 1972. 43 pp. [Committee
print.]

Treaty With Honduras on the Swan Islands. Mes-
sage from the President of the United States
transmitting the Treaty on the S^an Islands Be-
tween the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Honduras, signed
at San Pedro Sula on November 22, 1971. S. Ex.
H. March 28, 1972. 18 pp.

Annual Report for 1971 on Activities and Accom-
plishments Under the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962. Message from the President of the
United States transmitting the report. H. Doc.
92-279. April 10, 1972. 10 pp.

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences^

Scheduled July Through September

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 2d Special Session .... Geneva

IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 10th Session . . London

ECE Committee on Water Problems Geneva

IOC: 1st Session of the Executive Council Hamburg .

U.N. ECOSOC: 53d Session Geneva .

International Wheat Council: 64th Session Tokyo . .

PAHO Executive Committee: 68th Meeting Washington

ITU/CCIR Study Groups Geneva

ECE Group of Experts on Data Requirements and Documentation Geneva

OECD Ad Hoc Group on Industrial Innovation Paris . .

OECD Invisibles Committee Paris . .

Inter- American Nuclear Energy Commission: 8th Meeting . . . San Juan,

Puerto Rico

Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 14th Meeting Buenos Aires

of the Directing Council.

OECD Committee for Science and Technology Paris . .

UNESCO International Bureau of Education: 7th Session of the Geneva

Council.

CCC Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Brussels .

FAO European Commission on Agriculture, Working Party on Helsinki .

Home Economics: 3d Session.

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Geneva

Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.

3d UNESCO World Conference on Adult Education Tokyo . .

U.N. Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences Geneva

of Disarmament.

Inter- American Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 8th Asuncion .

Meeting.

IAEA Board of Governors: Special Meeting Vienna . .

ITU/CCITT Ad Hoc Group on the Future of the World Plan Com- Geneva .

mittee.

OECD Ad Hoc High Level Trade Meeting (Ministerial) .... Paris . .

OECD Trade Committee Export Credit Group Paris . .

3d International Sulfur Meeting Montreal .

7th Inter-American Indian Congress Brasilia

July 3-6

July 3-7

July 3-8

July 3-28

July 5-11

July 5-15

July 5-21

July 7-10

July 10

July 10-12

July 12-14

July 12-21

July 13-14

July 17-20

July 17-21

July 17-Aug. 18

July 25-Aug. 7

July 31-Aug. 11

July

Aug. 7-10

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, lists interna-
tional conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July-September
1972. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCIR, International Radio
Consultative Committee; CCITT, International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee; CENTO,
Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic
Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization;
GARP, Global Atmospheric Research Program; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC,
Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Inter-
governmental Committee for European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation; Interpol, International Criminal Police Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com-
mission; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; UNCITRAL, United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World
Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

July 10, 1972

U.N. Population Commission: Special Session

CENTO Budget Administration Conference

FAO Caribbean Plant Protection Commission: 3d Session . . .

U.N. Human Rights Commission Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.

Inter-American Special Conference on Tourism

FAO/NORAD Symposium on Production, Handling, and Trans-
port of Wood Chips.

Inter-American Specialized Conference on the Integrated Educa-
tion of Women.

FAO Regional Conference for Latin America

UNCT AD Trade and Development Board: 12th Meeting . . . .

IAEA Safeguards Committee

lA-ECOSOC (Special Committee for Consultation and Negotia-
tion) 7th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Trade to Deal with
Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers and Related Matters.

IAEA Study Group on Nuclear Fuel

ICAO Statistical Panel

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ....

FAO Regional Conference for the Near East

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods ....

FAO Regional Conference for Africa

WIPO Committee of Experts on Revision of Madrid Trademark
Agreement.

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 25th Session . . .

IMCO Legal Committee

FAO Regional Conference for Europe

CCC Working Party of Permanent Technical Committee ....

ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Revision of Warsaw Convention in
Relation to Baggage, Cargo, etc.

South Pacific Commission: 12th South Pacific Conference and 35th
Session of the Commission.

Interpol General Assembly

Inter- American Commission of Women: 16th Assembly ....

U.N. General Assembly: 27th Session

OECD Trade Committee

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 60th Statu-
tory Meeting.

WIPO Administrative Meetings of WIPO and Paris Union . . .

UNCITRAL Working Group on Shipping

UNESCO Executive Board: 90th Session

IAEA Board of Governors

CCC Permanent Technical Committee

ECE Committee on Development of Trade: 21st Session . . . .

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 23d Session .

ECAFE Joint Meeting of Planners and Statisticians

U.N. ECOSOC: Resumed 53d Session

Global Atmospheric Research Program Tropical Experiment
Board: 4th Session.

Global Atmospheric Research Program Tropical Experiment Coun-
cil: 2d Session.

IOC Coordinating Group for Cooperative Investigations of North-
east Central Atlantic: 3d Session.

Pan American Highway Congresses: Executive Committee . . .

Pan American Highway Congresses: Special Congress

UNESCO Intergovernmental Group of the Copyright Committee
(IGCC): Ordinary Session.

UNESCO IGCC: Study Group on International Regulations of
Photographic Reproduction of Copyrighted Works.

WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer: 10th Session
of the Governing Council.

WIPO Headquarters Building Subcommittee

WMO Planning Conference on the First GARP Global Experiment

New York . .
Tehran . . .
St. John's,

Newfoundland
New York . .

Rio de Janeiro .
Hurdal, Norway

Buenos Aires

Bogota . . .
Geneva . . .
Vienna ....
Indefinite . . .

Grenoble

Montreal

New York

Kuwait

London

Libreville

Geneva

London

Munich

Brussels

Montreal

Apia, Western

Samoa
Frankfurt
Washington
New York
Paris . .
Copenhagen

Geneva
Geneva
Paris . .
Mexico City
Brussels .
Geneva
Agana, Guam
Alma Ata,
U.S.S.R.
New York
Geneva . .

Geneva or Dakar

Copenhagen . .

Brasilia . . .
Brasilia . . .
Paris ....

Paris

Lyon, France

Geneva . .
Geneva . .

Aug. 7-15
Aug. 12-17
Aug. 14-21

Aug. 14-Sept. 1

Aug. 18-25
Aug. 20-Sept. 2

Aug. 21-25

Aug. 21-Sept. 4
Aug. 22-Sept. 15
August
August

Sept. 4-15
Sept. 5-15
Sept. 5-15
Sept. 9-19
Sept. 11-15
Sept. 14-30
Sept. 18-19

Sept. 18-20
Sept. 18-22

Sept.
Sept.
Sept.

18-23
18-25
18-Oct.

Sept. 18-Oct. 6

Sept. 19-26
Sept. 19-28
Sept. 19-December
Sept. 21-22
Sept. 24-Oct. 4

Sept.
Sept.

25-30
25-Oct,

Sept. 25-Oct.

Sept. 25

26-Oct. 6
27-Oct. 1

Sept. 27-Oct. 5

September

September
September

September

September
September
September

September

September
September

6
13

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Measures relating to the furtherance of the prin-
ciples and purposes of the Antarctic treaty.
Adopted at Paris November 29, 1968, at the Fifth
Consultative Meeting.'

Notification of approval: Australia, May 26,
1972, V-1 through V-4, V-7 through V-9.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of
the principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty. Adopted at Tokyo October 30, 1970, at
the Sixth Consultative Meeting.'
Notification of approval: Australia, May 26,
1972, VI-1 through VI-7, VI-11 through VI-15.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure

of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,

1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS

7192.

Ratification deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts

against the safety of civil aviation. Done at

Montreal September 23, 1971.'

Ratification deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972.

Bills of Lading

Protocol to amend the international convention for
the unification of certain rules of law relating
to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25,
1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February
23, 1968.'
Accession deposited: Singapore, April 25, 1972.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their de-
struction. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow April 10, 1972.'
Signatures: Indonesia, June 20, 1972; Singapore,

June 19, 1972.
Ratification deposited: Niger, June 23, 1972.

North Atlantic Treaty — Status of Forces —
Germany

Agreement to amend the agreement of August 3,
1959 (TIAS 5351), to supplement the agreement
between the parties to the North Atlantic treaty
regarding the status of their forces with respect
to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Done at Bonn October 21,
1971.'
Ratification deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at Lon-
don May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26,
1958; for the United States December 8, 1961.
TIAS 4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Libya, Febniary 18, 1972.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New
York December 21, 1965. Entered into force
January 4, 1969."

Ratification deposited: Austria, May 9, 1972
(with a declaration).

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.'
Ratifications deposited: Norway, June 20, 1972;
Yugoslavia, June 22, 1972.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London,
and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Ratification deposited: Malaysia, June 21, 1972.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signatures: Nepal, New Zealand, June 19, 1972.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreaux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Accession deposited: Yemen (San 'a). May 12,
1972.

Trade

Long-term arrangement regarding international
trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva February
9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS
5240.
Acceptance : Argentina, June 5, 1972.

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding inter-
national trade in cotton textiles of Febsuary 9,
1962, as extended (TIAS 5240, 6289). Done at
Geneva June 15, 1970. Entered into force October
1, 1970. TIAS 6940.

Acceptances: Argentina, June 5, 1972; El Salva-
dor, June 6, 1972.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with
annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.'
Accession deposited: Spain, May 16, 1972.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

July 10, 1972

Wheaf

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig-
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3,
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re-
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with
respect to other provisions; for the United States
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de-
posited: Austria, June 22, 1972.

BILATERAL

Republic of China

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of

atomic energy. Signed at Washington April 4,

1972.

Entered into force: June 22, 1972.
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of

atomic energy, as amended. Signed at Washington

July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955.

TIAS 3307, 4176, 4514, 5105, 5623, 6099.

Terminated: June 22, 1972.

Costa Rica

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement
between the United States Department of Agri-
culture and the Costa Rican Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Livestock for the prevention of foot-and-
mouth disease and rinderpest in Costa Rica.
Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose April
5 and June 6, 1972. Entered into force June 6,
1972.

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement
between the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture
and the United States Department of Agriculture
for the prevention of foot-and-mouth disease and
rinderpest in Costa Rica. Effected by exchange of
notes at San Jose December 29, 1970, and January
7, 1971. Entered into force January 7, 1971. TIAS
7040.
Terminated: June 6, 1972.

Guyana

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
relating to the agreement of September 17, 1968
(TIAS 6585). Signed at Georgetown June 8, 1972.
Entered into force June 8, 1972.

Korea

Agreement relating to the deposit by Korea of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance
and excess defense articles furnished by the

United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Seoul May 12, 1972. Entered into force May 12,
1972; effective February 7, 1972.

Mali

Agreement relating to the deposit by Mali of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance
and excess defense articles furnished by the United
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Bamako
April 18 and June 6, 1972. Entered into force
June 6, 1972; effective February 7, 1972.

United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signa-
ture, and exchange of notes. Signed at London
June 8, 1972. Enters into force 3 months after the
exchange of instruments of ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

1946 Foreign Relations Volumes
on China Released

On May 25 the Department of State released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol-
umes IX and X, The Far East: China. These volumes
are the last of 11 to be published covering the year
1946.

All of volume IX and half of volume X are de-
voted to documentation of the unsuccessful mission
of General of the Army George C. Marshall to end
civil strife in China and to bring about political
unification of the Chinese Communists and the Na-
tional Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. The remainder of volume X covers U.S. aid
to China and a variety of other aspects of Sino-
American relations.

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volumes IX and
X (Department of State publications 8561 and 8562)
may be obtained from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402, for $7.00 and $6.75, respectively.

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX July 10, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 172A

Congress

Annual Report on World Weather Program
Transmitted to Congress (Nixon) .... 71

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 72

Coordination of United States Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy (Rogers) 67

President Echeverria of Mexico Makes State
Visit to the United States (Echeverria,
Nixon, announcement of agreements signed,
text of joint communique) 57

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem-
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements 37

President Nixon Urges Senate Passage of
Foreign Aid Authorization (letter to ma-
jority and minority leaders) 55

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on
Strategic Offensive Arms 50

Department and Foreign Service. Coordination
of United States Foreign Economic Policy
(Rogers) 67

Disarmament

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem-
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements 37

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms 50

Economic Affairs. Coordination of United
States Foreign Economic Policy (Rogers) 67

Extradition. United States and United King-
dom Sign New Extradition Treaty .... 56

Foreign Aid. President Nixon Urges Senate
Passage of Foreign Aid Authorization (letter
to majority and minority leaders) .... 55

International Organizations and Conferences.

Calendar of International Conferences . . 73

Mexico. President Echeverria of Mexico Makes
State Visit to the United States (Echeverria,
Nixon, announcement of agreements signed,
text of joint communique) 57

Presidential Documents

Annual Report on World Weather Program
Transmitted to Congress 71

President Echeverria of Mexico Makes State
Visit to the United States 57

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem-
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements 37

President Nixon Urges Senate Passage of
Foreign Aid Authorization 55

Publications. 1946 Foreign Relations Volumes
on China Released 76

Science. Annual Report on World Weather Pro-
gram Transmitted to Congress (Nixon) . . 71

Treaty Information

Current Actions 75

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem-
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements 37

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms 50

United States and United Kingdom Sign New-
Extradition Treaty 56

U.S.S.R.

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Mem-
bers of Congress on Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements 37

Secretary Rogers Urges Senate Support of the
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms 50

United Kingdom. United States and United
Kingdom Sign New Extradition Treaty . . 56

Name Index

Echeverria, Luis Alvarez 57

Kissinger, Henry A 37

Nixon, President 37. 55, 57, 71

Rogers, Secretary 50, 67

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to June 19 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 135
of June 8.

Subject

U.S. pledge to U.N. Population
Fund.

Rogers: Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.

U.S. action in ICAO and the U.N.
on hijacking.

Rogers: House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.

Rogers: statement on ICAO reso-
lution on hijacking.

Advisory Committee on Interna-
tional Organizations.

U.S. and Denmark sign new
extradition treaty.

Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Le-
gal Adviser for Treaty Affairs,
presented distinguished honor
award, June 22.

Irwin: Joint Economic Committee,
June 22.

Irwin: foreign policy conference
for business executives, June 8
(printed in July 3 issue).

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

No.

Date

+141

6/19

142

6/19

*143

6/19

144

6/20

tl45

6/20

+146

6/21

+147

6/22

*148

6/23

+149

6/23

153

6/23

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington, d.c. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

/7as'

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol.LXVII,No.l725

July 17,1972

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 29
Excerpts From Transcript 77

THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS
Address by Assistant Secretary Sisco 86

U.S.-JAPAN CULTURAL CONFERENCE HOLDS SIXTH MEETING 90

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS ON LEGISLATION ON FUNDING

FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

Statement by Under Secretary Johnson 96

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT

OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1725
July 17 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $16, foreign $23
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
witit information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of tlie Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, Unitet Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

President Nixon's News Conference of June 29

Folloiving are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a neivs confer-
ence held by President Nixon in the East
Room at the White House on June 29.

The President: Mr. Cormier [Frank Cor-
mier, Associated Press] has the first ques-
tion tonight.

Q. . . . Mindful that ending the ivar was
one of your major campaign themes in 1968,
mindful that our bombings in Indochina now
are at a five-year high, according to the
Pentagon, mindful that troops are still com-
ing Old, but even more are going into Thai-
land and the 7th Fleet, I ivonder if you can
say ivith any confidence that you can end
the war by January 20 of next year.

The President: Mr. Cormier, we have made
great progress in ending the war and partic-
ularly in ending American involvement in
the war.

Since you have recounted the record to
an extent, let me recount it also from the
positive side.

When we came into office, there were 540,-
000 Americans in Viet-Nam. Our casualties
were running as high as 300 a week, the cost
was $22 billion a year. We have taken out
500,000 men since that time. Our casualties
have been reduced 95 percent, down to two;
that is too many, but from 300 to two. As
far as the cost is concerned, instead of $22
billion a year, it is down to $7 billion
a year.

As far as the situation on the negotiating
front is concerned, instead of being in a
position where we did not have a positive
oifer on the table, we have made what Mr.
[David] Brinkley of NBC characterized last

night as being a very constructive offer, one
in which in return for an all-Indochina
cease-fire and the return of POW's and an
accounting for all of our missing in action
that we would stop all military activities in
Indochina and we would withdraw all Amer-
icans, all of those that remain, within four
months.

Now, having reached this position at this
time, we believe that that is an excellent
record. The only thing that we have not
done is to do what the Communists have
asked, and that is to impose a Communist
government on the people of South Viet-Nam
against their will. This we will not do, be-
cause that would reward aggression, it would
encourage that kind of aggression and re-
duce the chances of peace all over the world
in the years to come, and it would dishonor
the United States of America.

On the negotiating front, we have in-
formed the North Vietnamese, after consul-
tation with the Government of Viet-Nam,
that we will return to the negotiating table
in Paris on April [July] 13, Thursday; we
have been informed by the North Vietnamese,
the Viet Cong, that they, too, will return on
that date. We have returned to the nego-
tiating table, or will reurn to it, on the as-
sumption that the North Vietnamese are
prepared to negotiate in a constructive and
serious way. We will be prepared to nego-
tiate in that way. If those negotiations go
forward in a constructive and serious way,
this war can be ended and it can be ended
well before January 20. If they do not go
forward on that basis, the United States will
continue to meet its commitments; our bomb-
ing, as far as that is concerned, our mining,
is for the purpose only of preventing Com-

July 17, 1972

munist aggression from succeeding, to pro-
tect the remaining Americans — 40,000 or so
that are still in Viet-Nam — and to have some
bargaining position in getting our POW's
back.

One last point with regard to the POW's :
I know that every American is concerned
about these men. I have been somewhat con-
cerned about them. I will only say that I
have had some experience, and a great deal
of experience as a matter of fact in this past
year, in dealing with Communist leaders. I
find that making a bargain with them is not
easy, and you get something from them only
when you have something they want to get
from you. The only way we are going to get
our POW's back is to be doing something to
them, and that means hitting military targets
in North Viet-Nam, retaining a residual force
in South Viet-Nam, and continuing the min-
ing of the harbors of North Viet-Nam.

Only by having that kind of activity go
forward will they have any incentive to re-
turn our POW's rather than not to account
for them as was the case when the French
got out of Viet-Nam in 1954 and 15,000
French were never accounted for after that.

I shall never have that happen to the
brave men who are POW's.

Q. Mr. President, before you ordered a
resumption of the bombing of North Viet-
Nam, General [John D.] Lavelle authorized
or initiated some unauthorized strikes there.
In your vieiv, did this affect any diplomatic
negotiations going on at that time, and are
you concerned that you apparently didn't
know about it for several months ?

The President: It did not affect the diplo-
matic negotiations. As a matter of fact, a
meeting took place, a private meeting, be-
tween Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs] and the negotiators in Paris
on May 2, during the period that General
Lavelle's activities were being undertaken,
and you can be very sure that had the North
Vietnamese wanted any pretext to complain
about, they would have complained about
that particular matter.

As far as this is concerned, as Admiral
Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff] testified today, it
wasn't authorized. It was directed against
only those military targets which were the
areas that were being used for firing on
American planes, but since it did exceed au-
thorization, it was proper for him to be re-
lieved and retired. And I think that it was
the proper action to take. And I believe that
will assure that kind of activity may not oc-
cur in the future.

Response to North Vietnamese Offensive

Q. Mr. President, on May 8, at the time
of the mining of the harbors in North Viet-
Nam, your assistant Dr. Kissinger predicted
the mining would result in the drying up of
supplies and the major offensive should be
over around July 1. Is that estimate still
valid, and if so, do you have a timetable for
the ivithdratval of the support troops who
have gone into the naval and into the air
bases around Viet-Nam to support the South
Vietnamese during this offensive?

The President: Mr. Jarriel [Tom Jarriel,
ABC News] , to date the effect of the mining
and also the bombing of the military targets
in North Viet-Nam, particularly the railroads
and the oil supplies — the situation in Viet-
Nam has been completely turned around. I
was looking at some news magazines that
came out the week before the mining was
ordered, and I noted that each one of them
has as its heading, "The specter of defeat
in Viet-Nam." That was the situation when
we started it.

It has been turned around. The South
Vietnamese are now on the offensive. It is
not over. We expect, perhaps, some more
North Vietnamese offensive, but I believe
that now the ability of the South Vietnamese
to defend themselves on the ground, with the
support that we give them in the air, has
been demonstrated. Their ability to defend
themselves in An Loc and Kontum, and now
in the area of Hue, is an indication that Viet-
namization, as far as their ground activity
is concerned, has proved to be a successful

Department of State Bulletin

action. Now, as far as the future is con-
cerned, I have already indicated that we will
be returning to negotiations in July. That is
the important area to watch at this time, as
well as the battlefield. And as far as any fu-
ture announcements are concerned, that will
depend upon progress at the negotiating table
and on the battlefront.

Q. . . . The background of this question is
your own statements made dorvn in Texas,
among other places, saying that you had not
sanctioned and ivould not sanction the bomb-
ing of the dikes and dams in North Viet-Nam
because you considered it an inhumane act be-
cause of what it would do to civilians.'^

Within the past week there have been re-
ports of eyeioitnesses. One of these reports
came from the French Press Agency and an-
other, I think, was the Swedish Ambassador
in Hanoi, eyewitnesses claiming to have seen
American planes hit dikes and dams. The
question is, has such bombing occurred? If
so, what steps are you taking to see that it
doesn't happen again?

The President: Mr. Rather [Dan Rather,
CBS News], we have checked those reports.
They have proved to be inaccurate. The
bombing of dikes is something, as you will
recall from the gentleman who asked the
question in Texas, was something that some
people have advocated. The United States
has used great restraint in its bombing pol-
icy, and I think properly so. We have tried
to hit only military targets, and we have been
hitting military targets. We have had or-
ders out not to hit dikes because the result
in terms of civil casualties would be extraor-
dinary.

As far as any future activities are con-
cerned, those orders still are in force. I do
not intend to allow any orders to go out
which would involve civilian casualties if
they can be avoided. Military targets only
will be allowed.

Q. Mr. President, last year, or at least
early this year, General Abrams [Gen.

' For background, see Bulletin of May 22, 1972,
p. 723.

Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S.
Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam]
relayed to you his belief that the South Viet-
namese could noiv "hack it" on the battle-
field. The invasion from the North occurred,
and we responded with bombing. When do
you realistically think the South Vietnamese
can do it alone without massive firepower
from us?

The President: Mr. Semple [Robert B.
Semple, Jr., New York Times], I think that
is being determined and also demonstrated
at this time.

First, as far as the ground activities are
concerned, they are being entirely undertaken
by the South Vietnamese. American ground
combat action has totally been finished in
Viet-Nam. As far as Americans in Viet-Nam
are concerned, this war is over in the future
for any future draftees. No more draftees
will be sent to Viet-Nam.

As far as air action is concerned, as Gen-
eral Abrams or any military man will tell
you, as they have told me, air action alone,
without adequate fighting on the ground, can-
not stop a determined enemy.

What happened in this case was that the
North Vietnamese launched a massive of-
fensive with huge tanks, bigger than those
against which they were arrayed, with new
and modern weapons. In order to provide an
equalizer — and it was needed — we provided
air support.

But I should also point this out, something
that has been little noticed: 40 percent of
all the tactical air sorties being flown over
the battlefields of South Viet-Nam are now
being flown not by Americans but by South
Vietnamese.

So we see the South Vietnamese not only
doing all the ground fighting, but increasing
their ability to do the fighting in the air.

Finally, the success of our airstrikes on
the North and on the battlefield, the suc-
cess in turning this battle around, hastens
the day when the South Vietnamese will be
able to undertake the total activity them-
selves.

I am not going to put a date on it. I can
only say the outcome of the present battle,

July 17, 1972

how badly the North Vietnamese are hurt,
will determine it, but I am very optimistic
on this point.

Q. Mr. President, ivhat role do you fore-
see in the future months after he returns
from his present trip, and after the election,
for John Connally?

The President: Mr. Horner [Garnett D.
Horner, Washington Evening Star], first,
the reports we have had on Mr. Connally's
trip have been excellent. I think that his
trip to Latin America — and incidentally also
the trip that Dr. Arthur Burns has made to
Latin America — came at a good time and
allowed the Latin American heads of state
to express their views just as vigorously as
did Mr. Echeverria when he was here in this
country. That is what we want — candid, vig-
orous talk between the heads of state in the
American Hemisphere.

Also, the discussions he is presently having
in Australia, in New Zealand, in Southeast
Asia, India, Pakistan, and so forth, and later
in Iran, I know will be helpful. When he
returns he will not undertake a permanent
government assignment, but he has agreed
to undertake special government assignments
at that time. I have one in mind, a very im-
portant one, but I cannot announce it at this
time. I will announce it when he returns
and when he reports to me in San Clemente.

U.S. Prepared for Constructive Negotiations

Q. Can yoti tell us what took you back to
the Paris peace table, and would you support
a coalition government, formation of a coali-
tion government, or ivould you discuss it in
Paris ?

The President: It would not be useful to
indicate the discussions that took place in
various places with regard to returning to
the Paris peace table.

Let it suffice to say that both sides con-
sidered it in their interests to return to the
Paris peace table. We would not have re-
turned unless we thought there was a chance

for more serious discussions and more con-
structive discussions than we have had in the
past, although I must be quite candid and
say that we have been disappointed in the
past with regard to these discussions. We
have had 149 plenary sessions and no sig-
nificant results. I do not believe it would be
particularly helpful to, in a news conference,
to negotiate with regard to what we are go-
ing to talk about at the conference. That is
a matter that we will negotiate with the
enemy.

As far as a coalition government is con-
cerned, no. We will not negotiate with the
enemy for accomplishing what they cannot
accomplish themselves, and that is to impose
against their will on the people of South
Viet-Nam a coalition government with the
Communists.

However, we will be constructive, we will
be forthcoming. An internationally super-
vised cease-fire, a total withdrawal of all
Americans within four months, a total cessa-
tion of all bombing — these, we think, are
very reasonable offers, and we believe the
enemy should seriously consider them.

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements

Q. Mr. President, hardly had you signed
the arms control agreements in Moscotv,
than your administration asked for new
money for new strategic weapons. Some of
your critics are saying that this is almost a
deception, giving the Pentagon what it
wants; namely, concentration on developing
quality weapons. Will you try to dispel this
contradiction?

The President: Mr. Morgan [Edward P.
Morgan, ABC News], the problem with re-
gard to arms control is that we do not deal
with it in a vacuum. We have to deal with
the problem as it affects the security of the
United States.

Now, first, let me say that if we had not
had an arms control agreement, a limitation
of ABM's and a temporary limitation for
five years on certain classifications of offen-
sive weapons, I would — and I am saying

Department of State Bulletin

this conservatively — have had to ask the
Congress of the United States to approve an
increase in the defense budget for nuclear
strategic weapons of at least $15 billion a
year on a crash program. Reason: Had there
been no arms control agreement, the Soviet
Union's plans called for an increase of their
ABM's to 1,000 over the next five years. The
arms control agreement limits them to 200,
as it does us. Had there been no arms con-
trol agreement, the Soviet Union had a pro-
gram underway in the field of submarines
which would have brought them up to over
90. The agreement limits them to 62. Had
there been no arms control agreement — and
this is the most important point — in the
terms of offensive strategic weapons, the So-
viet Union that has now passed us in offen-
sive strategic weapons — they have 1,600; we
have roughly 1,000 — they would have built
1,000 more over the next five years.

Now, under those circumstances, any Pres-
ident of the United States could see that in
five years the United States would be hope-
lessly behind; our security would be threat-
ened, our allies would be terrified, particu-
larly in those areas, and our friends, like
the Mideast, where the possibility of Soviet
adventurism is considered to be rather great.

Therefore, the arms control agreement at
least put a brake on new weapons. Now,
with regard to the new weapons that you
refer to, however, let me point out they are
not for the next five-year period. We are
really talking about the period after that.
And they are absolutely essential for the
security of the United States for another rea-
son; because looking at this not in a vacuum
but in terms of what the other side is doing,
Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party]
made it very clear that he intended to go
forward in those categories that were not
limited.

Now, in fairness to him, he also said and
made it very clear — he made it perfectly
clear, I should say — he said that he ex-
pected that we would go forward. Now,
under these circumstances, then, for the

United States not to go forward in those
areas that were not controlled would mean
that at the end of the seventies we would be
in an inferior position; and no President of
the United States can take the responsibility
of allowing the United States to be the second
most powerful nation in the world, not be-
cause of any jingoistic idea, but because if we
are in that position our foreign policy, our
commitments around the world, would be
very, very seriously jeopardized.

Now, the most important point I have
saved for the last, and that is this: I think
these agreements are in the interest of the
United States. I think that they are very
much in the interest of arms control and
therefore in the interest of world peace. But
they are only a beginning; they are only the
foundation. Now what we have to do is to
really go forward with the second step. That
is why the phase 2 of the arms control limi-
tation, which we hope will begin in October,
provided the Congress approves the ones that
we have before them at the present time,
phase 2, which will be a permanent arms con-
trol agreement on all offensive nuclear weap-
ons— this is the one that we think can have
far greater significance evert than phase 1.
Phase 1 is the breakthrough, and phase 2
is the culmination. And phase 2, if we can
reach agreement with the Soviets — and it
will take long and hard bargaining — but if
we can reach it, it will mean, then, that we
not only hold our arms budgets where they
are but that in these new programs instead
of going forward with them on the basis
presently pi-ojected we will be able to cut
them back.

That is our goal; and I think we can
achieve it provided we appi'ove phase 1
and provided we continue a credible arms
program, because, believe me, the Soviets
are not going to agree to limit their future
programs unless they have something to get
from us.

Q. Mr. President, in consideration of your
argtiment on our need for offensive weapons,
why then do you insist on development of
the costly B-1 bomber ivhen in fact the So-

July 17, 1972

viet Union has shown little interest in the
bomber force in recent years and as far as
we know has no netv bomber force on the
drawing boards at this time?

The President: Each power, the Soviet
Union and the United States, must have
those forces that are needed for its own
security. We basically are not only a land
power but a land and sea power. The Soviet
Union is primarily a land power with certain
definite requirements; having that in mind,
we believe that the B-1 bomber is, for our
security interest, necessary.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned,
the fact that they are not developing bomb-
ers does not mean that they do not respect
ours. And I would say, too, that had we not
had our present advantage in bombers we
could not then stand by and allow the So-
viets to have a l,600-to-l,000 advantage in
terms of missiles that are land based. So our
bombers is an offset for that.

Bombing and Negotiations

Q. Mr. President, a clarifying question on
the bombing, please. You have said that the
sole purpose of your bombing and your min-
ing, in your May 8 speech, u'as to protect the
60,000 American troops there.' Did I under-
stand you to say in ansiver to an earlier ques-
tion that that bombing is noiv contingent
upon the release of the prisoners? And I
ivould like to ask an additional question that
is slightly related: Were there any condi-
tions attached by each side to the return to
the Paris peace talks?

The President: No, there are no conditions
attached to either side. We are going back
to the talks prepared to negotiate without
conditions, which we think is the most con-
structive way to obtain results. For example,
the condition — I assume this is the implica-
tion of your question — there was no condi-

- For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see BULLETIN of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

tion that if we would go back to the talks we
would stop the bombing. We do not intend to.
We will stop the bombing when the condi-
tions are met that I laid out in my May 8
speech.

In my May 8 speech, Mr. Lisagor [Peter
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], as you i"e-
call, I laid down three conditions. I said
that we were bombing military targets in
the North, that we were mining the harbor,
and that we were doing so for three pur-
poses : to prevent the imposition of a Com-
munist government in South Viet-Nam, to
protect our remaining forces in South Viet-
Nam, which were then 60,000, and, in addi-
tion, for the purpose of obtaining the release
of our POW's.

Those are the three conditions that we
have as far as the bombing is concerned.

But we are prepared to negotiate on those
points with the enemy. We have no desire
to continue the bombing for one moment
longer than necessary to accomplish what
we consider to be these very minimal ob-
jectives.

Q. Mr. President, the history of Ameri-
can bombing of North Viet-Nam indicates
that it has served to hinder negotiations
rather than stimulate negotiations. Why do
you think it is going to work now in view
of that history ?

The President: I am not sure that my eval-
uation of the history is the same as yours.
My own view is that we have tried every
device possible over the past three years to
get negotiations going. We have withdrawn
forces, we have made very forthcoming of-
fers, we have wound down combat activities
on our part; and the result has been simply
an ever-increasing intransigence on the part
of the enemy.

Believe me, it was only as a last resort
that I made the very difficult decision of May
8, knowing how much rode on that decision.
But having made that decision, I think it was
the right decision; and I think the fact that
our summit meetings went ahead despite

Department of State Bulletin

that decision, the fact that we are going
back to the negotiating table despite that
decision, indicates that it may be that those
who feel that a strong hand at the negotiat-
ing table is one that results in no negotiation
may be wrong.

It has always been my theory that in deal-
ing with these very pragmatic men — and we
must respect them for their strength and
their pragmatism — who lead the Communist
nations, that they respect strength, not bel-
ligerence but strength; and at least that is
the way I am always going to approach it,
and I think it is going to be successful in
the end.

President Nixon's News Conference
of June 22

Following is an excerpt from the tran-
script of a news conference held by Presi-
dent Nixon in the Oval Office at the White
House on June 22.

The President: Ladies and gentlemen, next
week before the Congress recesses, I am plan-
ning to have a general news conference. . . .

... I thought it would be useful this week,
on this occasion, to have you here in the of-
fice for the purpose of covering domestic is-
sues only. . . .

Q. Mr. President, this may be a border-
line question in the domestic field, but I be-
lieve it may fall there since the issues are
before Congress. Could you tell us your view
of the relationship between the development
of offensive weapons, as proposed in your
defense budget, and the SALT [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks] agreements?

The President: I have noted the progress
of the debate in the committee, and particu-
larly the controversy or alleged controversy
and contradiction which seems in some quar-
ters to have been developed between the

views of the Secretary of Defense and the
views that I have expressed and the views
that have been expressed by Dr. Kissinger
[Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the Pres-
ident for National Security Affairs] and Sec-
retary Rogers.

I think that I can put the thing in context
best by first pointing out the Secretary of
Defense's position and then relating that po-
sition to the overall position of the United
States in attempting to develop policy that
will adequately protect the security of the
United States and also move forward on the
arms limitation front.

The Secretary of Defense has a responsi-
bility, as I have a responsibility, to recom-
mend to the Congress action that will ade-
quately protect the security of the United
States. Moving on that responsibility, he has
indicated that if the SALT agreement is ap-
proved, and then if the Congress rejects the
programs for offensive weapons not con-
trolled by the SALT agreement, that this
would seriously jeopardize the security of the
United States. On that point he is correct.

What I would suggest to the Congress and
would recommend to individual Congress-
men and Senators, who will have the respon-
sibility of voting on this matter, is the fol-
lowing course: First, the arms limitation
agreements should be approved on their mer-
its. I would not have signed those agreements
unless I had believed that, standing alone,
they were in the interest of the United States.
As a matter of fact, the offensive limitation is
one that is particularly in our interest, be-
cause it covers arms where the Soviet Union
has on-going programs which will be lim-
ited in this five-year period and in which we
have no on-going programs.

So, consequently, I would recommend and
strongly urge that the Congress approve the
ABM [antiballistic missile] Treaty, and also
the limited, temporary, offensive limitations
curb. However, after the Congress moves in
that field, all Congressmen and Senators —
and this would, of course, include them all —
who are concerned about the security of the
United States should then vote for those pro-

July 17, 1972

grams that will provide adequate offensive
weapons in the areas that have been recom-
mended by the Secretary of Defense and by
the administration.

Now, the reason for that is twofold : first,
because if we have a SALT agreement and
then do not go forward with these programs,
the Soviet Union will, within a matter of a
very limited time, be substantially ahead of
the United States overall, particularly in the
latter part of the seventies.

If the United States falls into what is a
definitely second position, inferior position to
the Soviet Union overall in its defense pro-
grams, this will be an open invitation for
more instability in the world and an open in-
vitation, in my opinion, for more potential
aggression in the world, particularly in such
potentially explosive areas as the Mideast.

Therefore, it is important from the stand-
point of the United States being able to play
its role of maintaining peace and security in
the world — a role that the United States, of
all the non-Communist nations, is the only
one capable of playing — it is essential that
the United States not fall into an inferior po-
sition.

Therefore, the offensive weapons pro-
grams— which, incidentally, were not con-
ceived after the SALT agreements, they were
recommended prior to the SALT agreements
and stand on their own because the Soviet
Union has programs in which they are mov-
ing forward. As I pointed out to the lead-
ers— and you ladies and gentlemen were
present there, or some of you were and the
rest of you, of course, covered it through
the broadcasting system — the Soviet Union
is moving forward.

Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid L Brezhnev, Gen-
eral Secretary of the Soviet Communist
Party] made it absolutely clear to me that
in those areas that were not controlled by our
offensive agreement that they were going
ahead with their programs. For us not to
would seriously jeopardize the security of the
United States and jeopardize the cause of
world peace, in my opinion.

Now, the second reason why those who

vote for the arms limitation agreement should
vote for an on-going program in those areas
not covered by it is that this arms control
agreement, while very important, is only the
first step and not the biggest step.

The biggest step remains. The biggest step
is a permanent limitation on offensive weap-
ons, covering other categories of weapons
and, we trust, eventually all categories of
weapons. This would be as dramatic as the
one step that we have already taken — this
would be an even more dramatic step in lim-
iting arms overall between the two super-
powers.

In the event that the United States does
not have on-going programs, however, there
will be no chance that the Soviet Union will
negotiate phase 2 of an arms limitation
agreement. I can say to the members of the
press here that had we not had an ABM pro-
gram in being there would be no SALT
agreement today because there would have
been no incentive for the Soviet Union to
stop us from doing something that we were
doing and, thereby, agree to stop something
they were doing.

Now, in the event that we do not therefore
have any new offensive systems underway or
planned, the Soviet Union has no incentive
to limit theirs. And so consequently — and I
have studied this very, very carefully; I can
assure you that there is nothing I would like
better than to be able to limit these ex-
penses— I am convinced that to achieve our
goal, which is the goal, I think, of all Amer-
icans, to achieve our goal of an offensive limi-
tations curb, covering all types of nuclear
weapons, that it is essential for the United
States to have an on-going offensive pro-
gram. For that reason, I think that the posi-
tion of the Secretary of Defense, speaking
for the security of the United States, is
a sound one.

I would hope that Members of the House
and Senate, on reflection, would recognize
that the SALT agreement, important as it is
by itself, does not deal with the total defense
posture of the United States. By itself it is
in the interest of the United States and it

Department of State Bulletin

stands on its own, but by itself, without a
continuing offensive program, we can be
sure that the security interests of the United
States would be very seriously jeopardized
and the chances for a permanent offensive
agreement would, in my opinion, be totally
destroyed.

U.S. Force Ceiling in Viet-Nam

To Be Cut to 39,000 by September 1

White House Announcement ^

As you know, we are withdrawing forces
from South Viet-Nam currently at a rate de-
signed to meet a 49,000-force-level ceiling by
July 1 of this year. As we have said before,
that target will be met.

President Nixon, after consultation with
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam
and a thorough review of the situation in In-
dochina, has decided to continue withdrawal
of U.S. forces to an authorized level of 39,-
000 by September 1, 1972. This will bring
the total number of U.S. forces withdrawn
from South Viet-Nam under President Nixon
to more than a half million, specifically, to
510,500. This figure, which will be achieved
on September 1, as I said earlier, represents
a 93-percent reduction of the authorized Viet-
Nam force level that was in effect when Pres-
ident Nixon took office.

This decision is based on the assessment
that such troop withdrawals can take place

without jeopardy to the Vietnamization pro-
gram or those United States forces remain-
ing in South Viet-Nam.

President Nixon is also announcing that,
effective immediately, draftees will no longer
be assigned for duty within South Viet-Nam
unless they volunteer for service there.
Draftees presently serving in that country or
now under orders to go there will of course
complete their normal tours of duty, but
effective immediately, draftees will no longer
be assigned for duty within South Viet-Nam
unless they volunteer for service there.

Dr. Kissinger Visits Peking
for Talks With PRC Leaders

Joint Statement ^

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 26

Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Re-
public of China and other Chinese officials
held discussions with Dr. Henry A. Kissin-
ger, Assistant to the U.S. President for
National Security Affairs, and his party
from June 19 to 23, 1972. The talks were
extensive, earnest, and frank. They consisted
of concrete consultations to promote the
normalization of relations between the two
countries and an exchange of views on issues
of common interest.

Both sides agreed on the usefulness of
these consultations which were foreseen in
the Sino-U.S. joint communique of February
1972 and on the desirability of continuing
them.

' Made to news correspondents on June 28 by
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to President
Nixon (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments dated July 3).

' Issued simultaneously at Washington and Peking
on June 24; read to news correspondents that day by
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to President
Nixon.

July 17, 1972

The Middle East Today: Positive and Negative Elements

Address by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs *

This is an important week because it was
five years ago that the June war was raging
in the Middle East. It is therefore a good
time to look at the situation today as com-
pared to the situation in 1967. Interestingly
enough, we have had a summit in 1972 and
you will recall that we had a summit in 1967
at Glassboro. Now, I think the situation in
the Middle East today as compared to 1967
contains both positive and negative elements.

First, on the positive side, the cease-fire,
tenuous as it is, continues. The cease-fire
was negotiated by the United States in Au-
gust of 1970. Hopefully, we will have a
second anniversary in a couple of months.
And while the cease-fire is accompanied by
a good deal of strident rhetoric, the fact of
the matter is that no one is particularly
anxious to put his finger on the trigger, and
certainly this is a positive element in this
situation.

A second point I would make is that, re-
gardless of the difficulties, there is probably
greater realism in the area today than five
years ago. And by this I mean that the con-
cept of "live and let live," even in its small
embryonic way, has begun to emerge in part
as a result of the experience of two years
of the cease-fire and as a result also of a
deeper realization as to what the significance
and what the result would be if one or the
other side decided to exercise the military
option rather than to pursue an overall set-
tlement or an interim agreement by peaceful

'■ Made before the national foreign policy confer-
ence for senior business executives at the Depart-
ment of State on June 8.

means. Certainly there is instability; cer-
tainly there are divisions; certainly the unity
of the Arab world continues to be a stated
objective which has not been realized; there
is a broad gulf between the Arabs and the
Israelis with respect to both the substance
and the procedure relating to an overall set-
tlement— all of these things contribute to
instability. But regardless of that fact, the
reality is that both sides continue to try to
find ways to coexist — to live alongside one
another — and dwell less today on the idea
of the destruction of this state or that state.
And I would suggest that this, too, is a posi-
tive element.

Now, having said this, obviously violence
has not been eschewed; militancy is still prev-
alent. We only have to think of the tragic
events that occurred at Israel's Lod Airport
some 10 days ago. We only need to focus on
that as the latest reminder. Moreover, it is
fair to say that there is a deep feeling of
frustration, particularly in the Arab world,
over the lack of progress toward either an
overall settlement or an interim agreement.
The cease-fire is accepted and desired, and I
think both sides want to see it extended. But
realistically, it is important that there be
a meaningful diplomatic process to help as a
minimum to refurbish the cease-fire and, in
more positive terms, to provide the instru-
ment for some practical progress which gives
more hope to the peoples in the area.

And as if it were not enough to point to
the fact that the diiferences over the Arab-
Israeli dispute contribute to instability — as
do, for example, the differences within the

Department of State Bulletin

Arab world, whether differences between es-
tablished states or differences between the
Palestinians themselves — the added factor
today is that this is an area in which the
major powers have a direct interest, and
this, too, is a complicating feature in 1972
which stands out in contrast to what the sit-
uation was in 1967. There is no doubt that
both major powers have strong positions in
the area as well as considerable assets. We
and the Soviet Union share in common, in
my judgment, the need for the cease-fire to
continue. Neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States, in my judgment, wants to see
a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities. It is im-
portant that both of us do what we can to
deter and to discourage such a development.

While I think the parallelism in maintain-
ing reasonable tranquillity in that area is
clear, the difficulty has been that the United
States has been much more anxious to try to
achieve a stable peace agreement in the area,
and we have worked to this end actively and
assiduously. We do not see eye-to-eye with
the Soviets either as to what might consti-
tute a fair substantive overall settlement in
the area or the appropriate means by which
to achieve this end.

Basically the difference, substantively, be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion can be described as a fundamental differ-
ence in the interpretation of the November
1967 Security Council resolution.^ You will
recall that that resolution embraces the prin-
ciple of withdrawal of Israeli forces from ter-
ritories occupied during the June war. It calls
for freedom of navigation and the recogni-
tion of the political independence and terri-
torial integrity of all of the states of the area,
as well as a just solution of the refugee
problem. Now, the fundamental difficulty be-
tween the Arabs and the Israelis has been
territorial. Basically, the Arab position, and
in particular the Egyptian position, has been
that that resolution means total Israeli with-

drawal to the pre-June 5 lines. The Israeli
interpretation has been that the resolution
calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces but
neither endorses nor precludes any particu-
lar line as the final line — that this line was
to be a subject of negotiations between the
two sides, a subject of negotiations the re-
sults of which were to be included in a bind-
ing agreement between the two sides in
which each would undertake specific obliga-
tions in relationship to the other. This was
not the case in 1957, when, following the
Suez crisis, the informal understandings that
were reached, on which basis Israel with-
drew, were not binding agreements between
the two sides but rather we were the third-
party repository of the understandings. This
time the objective, based on the Security
Council resolution, is an agreement, an agree-
ment emanating from serious negotiation be-
tween the two sides.

So it's this broad chasm, this difference on
territory in particular, that neither the mis-
sion of Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special
Representative Gunnar Jarring] nor, for that
matter, the efforts of the United States, have
been able to bridge over the past years. And
it is against the background of parallel U.S.-
Soviet interest in maintaining the cease-fire
and within the framework of differences over
the substance of a settlement as well as the
procedure that the discussions at the sum-
mit on the Middle East were held.

Now, the Middle East was not a primary
matter of consideration at the summit. It
was thoroughly discussed, and basically the
communique tells the story.^ The communi-
que stressed two or three things. First, it
said that both sides stated their positions.
That's diplomatic language for saying each
essentially expressed its substantive position
along lines of its past position. There were
no new agreements that were achieved or any
new reconciliation in terms of the substance
of the settlement. Secondly, both sides con-
firmed in that communique that a peaceful

" For text of Security Council Resolution 242 of
Nov. 22, 1967, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p.
843.

' For text of a joint U.S.-Soviet communique is-
sued at Moscow on May 29, see Bulletin of June 26,
1972, p. 899.

July 17, 1972

settlement based on the Security Council res-
olution of November 1967 is the objective.
This is important for the Soviet Union and
the United States to have reaffirmed : that a
political settlement is the objective, that the
framework is the Security Council resolu-
tion. However, one must bear in mind that
there are differing interpretations as to what
that resolution in fact means, because the
resolution has never constituted an agree-
ment as such. That resolution is a set of
bare-bones principles which need to be nego-
tiated in detail. Now, the significance of the
emphasis on political settlement is this : that
neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R.
sees it in its interest for there to be a re-
newal of Arab-Israeli hostilities in the area.
Now, having said this, I would recall also
that alongside the specifics of the communi-
que on the Middle East a set of important
principles was also adopted at the summit in
Moscow; and this declaration of principles,
I believe, has relevance certainly to the Mid-
dle East, which continues in our judgment to
be one of the most dangerous trouble spots
in the world.* In this declaration of princi-
ples the major powers have committed them-
selves not only to resort to peaceful means
but to try to avoid confrontations in these
trouble spots and to try to resist the tempta-
tion of deriving unilateral advantage from a
given tactical situation, whether it be in the
Middle East or elsewhere. These principles
are significant for this simple reason : They
have a particular relevance to the Middle
East, and over the coming weeks and the
coming months this is one of the areas where
these principles will, in fact, be tested. Prop-
erly applied, I think they can be the vehicle
for making progress toward either an over-
all settlement or an interim agreement or
both. To disregard these principles would
heighten the risk of further instability and
tension in the area.

Now, the fact of the matter is that diplo-
matic opportunities are available today; and
of all the diplomatic opportunities that are

' For text of the basic principles, see ibid., p. 898.

available, we continue to feel that the most
feasible approach is a step-by-step approach
that would embrace an interim Suez Canal
agreement between Egypt and Israel. We,
of course, would like to see progress made
at one fell swoop toward an overall settle-
ment. But realistically we feel that the dif-
ferences of view over territory as they relate
to an overall settlement are so fundamental
that a more realistic way to approach the
problem is by means of some interim step.
We believe that the diplomatic alternative of
a first step that would involve the opening of
the Suez Canal and some withdrawal of Is-
raeli forces is today the most feasible ap-
proach.

Up to this point our difficulty has been to
try to get the parties to say "yes" at the same
time. Quite candidly, last October when we
proposed the question of so-called proximity
talks between Egypt and Israel, talks at
close quarters, looking to some interim step,
the Egyptian reaction was positive and the
Israeli reaction was negative. We pursued
the matter further and succeeded by Janu-
ary of this year in getting an affirmative re-
ply from Israel. By that time the situation
had changed in Egypt, and the Egyptians
were no longer as willing to move ahead as
they appeared to be in October.

And for our part, we intend to pursue this
matter further. We continue to feel that it
is the most feasible approach; we think it is
a modest approach. We think such an agree-
ment would be in the interest of both sides
because it not only would divide the com-
batants and thereby bring about a diminu-
tion of tensions but it would involve some
withdrawal, it would involve an extended
cease-fire; and we think it would help cre-
ate the kind of atmosphere which would be
conducive to further efforts toward the
broader settlement and getting at some of
the more complicated and fundamental is-
sues. This is the tack we intend to pursue in
the days ahead. Obviously, nobody can pre-
dict success. We are convinced it is impor-
tant that a meaningful diplomatic process
get started as soon as possible, because re-

Department of State Bulletin

gardless of the positive elements that do, in
fact, exist in 1972 in the Middle East, the
fact of the matter is that there are other
less encouraging elements which continue to
make the cease-fire quite tenuous and con-
tinue to make this area one of the most dan-
gerous trouble spots in the world.

President Nixon Suspends
Meat Import Restraints

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON ^

To counter recent rises in the cost of meat,
I have today [June 26] directed the Secretary
of State to remove all quota restrictions on
meat imported into the United States for the
balance of 1972. Nations which export meat
to the United States until today have been
observing voluntary quotas.

The recent rise in the price of meat is in
part due to an improving economy here at
home causing increased demands for meat
which have not been matched by increased
supplies. This action is intended to encour-
age more meat imports into the United
States, thereby increasing the supply avail-
able here.

This action alone may not fully solve the
problem. Further measures will be taken as
necessary and appropriate.

I intend to monitor this situation closely,
and I want to assure every American house-
wife that this administration is firmly deter-
mined to prevent unjustified increases in the
cost of food.

We have made significant progress in our
battle against rising prices. We are going to
do whatever is necessary to see that that bat-
tle is won.

' Issued on June 26 (White House press release).

Earlier this year, we announced an import
program to increase meat imports 11 per-
cent over meat imports during 1971. Since
that time, however, the continuing shift in
demand and supplies has become much more
pronounced.

All meat imports, of course, will be sub-
ject to the same high standards of sanitation
that apply to domestically produced meat.

This action is not aimed at the American
farmer; his income has only begun to ap-
proach reasonable levels. It is intended to
remedy a short-term shortage which is be-
yond the ability of our farmers to fill.

LETTER TO SECRETARY ROGERS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 3

The White House,
Washington, June 26, 1972.

Dear Mr. Secretary: After careful study
of the changed conditions in the U.S. and
world markets in beef, I have determined
that we should now take action to increase
the importation of meat into the United
States for the remainder of this year.

I request that you take steps immediately
with our foreign suppliers to remove re-
straints established under present arrange-
ments with these suppliers. I ask that you in-
dicate to them that since we have now moved
toward a freer market in meat for the re-
mainder of this year, it is my hope that the
effect of this action will be to increase the
amount of imports entering the United
States.

I further request that you collaborate as
closely as possible with the Secretary of Ag-
riculture to insure that the steps I have
taken are implemented with all possible
speed.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.

July 17, 1972

U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Holds Sixth Meeting

The Sixth U.S.-Japan Conference on Cul-
tural and Educational Interchange (CUL-
CON VI) met at Washington June 21-22 and
continued its meetings at Neio York June
23-2^. Following are remarks made at the
opening ceremony on June 21 by U. Alexis
Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs, the text of a final communique issued
at New York June 2U, and a list of members
of the U.S. and Japanese delegations.

REMARKS BY UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON

His Excellency Ambassador Ushiba [No-
buhiko Ushiba, Ambassador of Japan], Mr.
Maeda [Yoshinori Maeda, head of the Jap-
anese delegation], Dr. Hall [John W. Hall,
head of the U.S. delegation], ladies and
gentlemen: I can give no better indication of
the importance that we attach to this con-
ference than to read to you the following mes-
sage from the President of the United States:

It gives me great pleasure to welcome to Wash-
ington the distinguished delegates to the Sixth
United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and
Educational Interchange.

The Conference comes at a time when the pro-
liferation and complexity of ties between our two
nations and cultures is greater than ever before.
There are more Americans studying in Japan and
more Japanese studying in America than at any
previous time. The number of tourists and visitors
in both directions has expanded phenomenally. Ex-
changes in goods and information set new records
year by year.

But close association alone is not enough. We
must also work for that deep mutual understanding
which comes from the full communication of ideas
and values between our peoples. We must try to
remove misconceptions that may grow out of our
cultural and linguistic differences. We must ex-
pand the quality of our exchanges, even as we ex-
pand their quantity.

Only a relationship based on such a deepened
understanding will enable us to find effective solu-
tions to the shared problems of tomorrow. I wish you
every success in your important deliberations.

As the President has observed in his
greeting, few countries today enjoy greater
variety of or more extensive ties than do the
United States and Japan. Our two countries
engage in overseas trade on a scale unprece-
dented in history. Interchanges in art, litera-
ture, and philosophy have enriched both our
cultures immeasurably. Our political and
security policies have been closely inter-
dependent for more than two decades. In
fact, the U.S.-Japan relationship has be-
come the keystone to peace and prosperity in
Asia.

Our two governments possess an elaborate
structure for conducting our bilateral rela-
tions, and the Japanese press corps in Wash-
ington is larger than any other. American art
and architecture frequently reflect Japanese
esthetic principles. Yet as one with long ex-
perience in nurturing this crucial relation-
ship, I am aware of the deep gaps in our
understanding of each other.

Many of the misconceptions we have about
one another, and the misunderstandings
which sometimes arise over specific events,
are deeply rooted in the makeup of our so-
cieties and our very different historical ex-
periences.

Furthermore, since both societies engage
the widest possible participation of their
citizenry in political and economic decision
making, problems in communication are not
limited to a few officials or an economic and
political elite. Information and understand-
ing must reach all segments of our societies.

It is here, of course, that cultural con-
ferences such as this one play an important

Department of State Bulletin

role. Culture, in the broadest sense, is a way
of life. The cultures of Japan and America
are not limited to masterpieces of music,
art, or literature. They include our respective
beliefs, daily activities, and habits of think-
ing. Cultural interchange by itself naturally
cannot solve difficult economic and political
problems. But without it we will never fully
appreciate the other's problems. And only
when we understand the problems can we be-
gin to find solutions.

It is natural that some disorientation will
occur as the United States and Japan ad-
just to the fluid international environment of
the 1970's. But I am confident that we are
meeting and will meet these challenges con-
structively and creatively. I am optimistic
that we can build and strengthen our bonds
rather than drift blindly apart.

I note from your agenda that you intend
this year to concentrate on certain specific
problem areas which, although not easy, do
not seem to me intractable. As a diplomat,
I particularly welcome your efforts to im-
prove the level of translation and interpre-
tation. As a member of the American reading
public, I hope you can successfully encourage
our newspapermen to become better versed
in the Japanese language and culture. Your
efforts to strengthen programs of mutual
study in our institutions of higher learning
will do much to promote cooperative and
complementary U.S.-Japan relations over
the long term. Through your efforts and those
of other concerned groups such as the Japan
Society, I hope we will one day have many
more businessmen, scholars, newspapermen,
and public officials who will be able to, as I
often say, operate "comfortably" in the
other's environment.

It will be a long and slow process, I
know. But we have already come a long way
in the last 25 years, and I know of few
more important endeavors. The future of
Asia — and indeed of the world — will, in
large measure, key on the state of U.S.-Japan
relations. And these relations will depend as
much on the quality and depth of our cul-
tural interactivity and understanding as on

specific governmental contact. I join the
President in wishing you continued success
in your very important and truly funda-
mental work.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

New York, June 2U, 1972.

The Sixth United States-Japan Conference on
Cultural and Educational Interchange was held in
Washington, D. C. and New York City from June
21st to June 24th, 1972. Delegates representing the
governments, the scholarly communities, the mass
media worlds, and the business and political affairs
communities of the two countries met to review the
state of cultural and educational interchange over
the past two years and discussed ways to expand
interchange in the future.

In its plenary sessions, the Conference concen-
trated on the critical need to develop a much firm-
er and broader basis of understanding between the
United States and Japan. The problems of communi-
cation between Japan and the United States stem
from the fundamentally different historical and
cultural heritage of the two nations. These differ-
ences need to be acknowledged and respected, for
each culture has its own value. The over-riding im-
portance of close United States-Japan relations,
however, requires much greater efforts to bridge
the culture and communications gaps. The present
wide variety of exchanges is helpful but not ade-
quate to meet the overwhelming need for better
appreciation of each other's patterns of thought and
action.

Consequently, the Conference greeted with special
enthusiasm several new initiatives which were re-
ported by the two delegations.

1. The Japanese side announced the formation of
the "Japan Foundation", a new Japanese prog:ram
for the financing of cultural exchanges with other
nations. The Japanese side noted the long-standing
American efforts in this field under the provisions
of the Fulbright-Hays Act and other programs
and expressed pleasure that, with their new instru-
mentality, the Japan Foundation, they would be
able to expand exchanges in a spirit of equal part-
nership between the two nations. The Foundation
is due to become operational October 1, 1972 with
an initial endowment of 10 billion yen ($32 mil-
lion), which it is hoped will grow to 100 billion yen
($320 million) through government and private

' Issued at New York June 24 (press release 152
dated June 26).

July 17, 1972

support. The Japanese side also reported the es-
tablishment by the Japan Society for the Promotion
of Science of a new program of 53 million yen
($175,000 dollars) for fellowships for Japanese
scholars to study in the United States. This is
also expected to grow. In addition, it reported that
the Central Council for Education, supreme ad-
visory body to the Minister of Education, had re-
cently been asked to submit within two years its
recommendations as to the basic principles and
measures for further improvement in the fields of
education, science and culture in Japan, aiming at
more effective international exchange. The Ameri-
can side welcomed these far sighted new initiatives
and expressed their belief that these initiatives
would make a major contribution to mutual under-
standing.

2. The American side reported that U.S. Govern-
ment funds for cultural exchange with Japan have
been increasing during the past two years. Ameri-
can Government representatives also reported their
intention to take new initiatives to increase the
rate of use of the GARIOA [Government and Re-
lief in Occupied Areas] fund for cultural exchange
between the United States and Japan. This was
warmly welcomed by the Japanese side.

II.

The Conference also met with invited Japanese
and American experts in seven separate sessions
and endorsed the recommendations of the special-
ists:

A. Improving the Level of Translation and Inter-
pretation between Japanese and English.

It is recommended that efforts be continued to
identify and clarify specific words, phrases and
types of expressions in both English and Japanese
which offer difficulties for interpreters and trans-
lators and which may lead to common misunder-
standing. Towards this end, it was agreed that:

1. "An Interpreters' Handbook for English-Japa-
nese Translation" prepared by a Japanese sub-
committee and a glossary prepared by the American
side should be expanded, revised and published by
the Joint Committee.

2. A special Joint Sub-Committee should be ap-
pointed by the Conference Co-Chairmen to edit this
publication, to collect additional pertinent examples
and to devise means for distribution to interpreters
and translators.

B. The Press.

Representatives of the working press of both
countries agreed that news reporting in the print
media of each country has not adequately informed
the home public on the problems of real concern
in the other nation. Recognizing that both nations
have a free and highly professional press, the fol-

lowing ideas were suggested in the hope of improv-
ing news coverage.

1. Specialists in the language, culture, economy
and life style of the other country be sent as
foreign correspondents.

2. Orientation programs in culture and society be
established by appropriate institutions in the host
countries for newly assigned or about-to-be-assigned
foreign correspondents.

3. Editors be encouraged to visit the other coun-
try on familiarization trips.

4. More news on cultural, scientific, and economic
topics of Japan be reported in American newspapers.
To assist in obtaining this coverage in Japan the
possibility be explored of obtaining specialized in-
terpretative services.

5. Further opening of the press clubs of Japan
to foreign reporters be encouraged.

C. American Studies

The conference made the following recommenda-
tions designed to further strengthen and broaden
the base for the study of American civilization in
Japan:

1. More Japanese scholars should be encouraged
to be trained in American studies.

2. Further attention should be given to the in-
troduction of integrated, multi-disciplinary courses
in American Civilization at Japanese universities.

3. Team teaching and joint research in Ameri-
can studies between Japanese and American schol-
ars should be encouraged.

4. American specialists in Japan and Japanese
specialists in the U.S. need to expand their con-
tact with each other and develop cross-cultural
comparative area study teaching and research.

5. Japanese university libraries in American civil-
ization should be strengthened, inter-library lend-
ing encouraged and the classroom use of films and
video/oral tapes developed.

6. The Conference urged continued attention to
the teaching of English language in Japanese uni-
versities either as part of or separate from Ameri-
can civilization courses.

7. The conference noted the need for revision of
curricula at the undergraduate level in both coun-
tries— with the aim of expanding the study of
various foreign cultures, including the cultures of
Japan and the United States.

8. The American Studies Associations of both
countries are encouraged to pursue these recom-
mendations and to inform the Joint Committee
from time to time of their progress.

D. Broadcast Media

The Conference endorsed the importance of ex-
panded cultural broadcast interchange and agreed on
responsibilities and procedures to carry out the fol-
lowing projects.

Department of State Bulletin

1. A visit of certain American Broadcasting ex-
ecutives to Japan in November 1972 and a return
visit to the United States of Japanese broadcasters
in April 1973.

2. The expansion of Japan-United States sister
station affiliations to increase exchanges of pro-
grams, people and ideas.

3. Annual binational television festivals alter-
nately in the United States and in Japan.

4. The further study of "magazine of the air"
style programs (segmented 30 minute digest of se-
lected items) for a periodic binational exchange.

5. The establishment of a Secretariat in the Ban-
gumi Center in Japan and in the Japan Society in
New York to maintain liaison and assist in bina-
tional broadcast media interchanges.

E. Museum Loans

An increase in the loan of art treasures would
greatly enrich the two people's respect for each
other's culture. To this end, the Conference en-
dorsed the following recommendations of the spe-
cialists.

1. All possible effort should be made for preserva-
tion during lending of western and oriental art ob-
jects, and standards for preservation should be
clarified through exchange of technical studies, and
such other means as may be developed.

2. Expanded training and exchange of personnel
should focus on the development of technicians who
can assure wider availability of proper care for ob-
jects of oriental art.

3. The American side should develop a non-
governmental advisory and coordinating body which
can serve as a counterpart for the Japanese Cul-
tural Affairs Agency on the discussion of mutual
problems.

F. Japanese Studies

The Japanese side reported in detail on the plans
for the Japan Foundation on October 1, 1972 with
a capital fund of ten billion yen ($32 million) to
be donated in 1973 and increased further in the
future. This report was received with great en-
thusiasm by the American side and considered to
be the most significant step taken by Japan in the
past century towards the improvement of United
States-Japanese cultural relations, and a stimulus
to the future of CULCON. The American side was
also grateful for the plan to make the operation
of the fund as flexible as possible and to seek ad-
vice from various Americans to assist those re-
sponsible for the Foundation. It was hoped that
this action by the Japanese Government would
stimulate new funds being available from the United
States as well as from Japanese private sources.

In reference to priorities in Japanese studies, em-
phasis was given to the need for expansion of
undergraduate courses on Japan for non-specialists,

assistance to Japanese libraries and for the publi-
cation of books on Japan, improved language train-
ing and training of more specialists on Japan in
the social sciences. It was agreed that a binational
ad hoc committee should prepare a list of basic
works and titles for library holdings in institutions
in the United States offering undergraduate courses
for the non-specialist. Studies also should be made
of the content, outlines, bibliographies and method
of teaching of current undergraduate courses on
Japan to improve their effectiveness. The value
of the work of the Interuniversity Center for Japa-
nese Language Studies in Tokyo was recognized
together with the need for its continuation. Finally,
it was agreed that Japanese studies in the future
should be considered in broader terms such as
their integration into the main stream of compara-
tive studies.

G. Student Counseling

The panel believed that a more effective and ex-
panded program of student exchange will contribute
significantly to an improvement of cultural aware-
ness and understanding. To serve this objective, the
following specific recommendations were endorsed:

1. That the Fulbright Commission, recognized as
the most accurate and reliable source of counseling
data now existing in Japan, be strengthened by:

a. The Japanese side moving at the earliest pos-
sible date to provide a current and accurate "in-
stitutional profile" for each of its colleges and
universities, including such data as size, course
offerings, admission requirements, costs, and insti-
tutional history.

b. The United States side moving similarly to
seek to provide this data for colleges and uni-
versities in the United States.

2. That expanded efforts be made by the Japanese
side to inform the appropriate constituencies of the
counseling services provided by the Fulbright Com-
mission and other reputable student counseling
services.

3. That a program be initiated by the appropriate
agencies and institutions to improve the understand-
ing of transferability of collegiate credit earned in
the two countries.

4. That a standardized testing program be created
to determine the level of proficiency in the Japa-
nese language on the part of students from the
United States electing to study in Japan.

5. That a vigorous program be launched to ex-
pand the concept of "Junior Year Abroad" for un-
dergraduate students from the two countries on a
mutual exchange basis, with particular attention to
selection, counseling, accommodations, and follow-
up. The emphasis on any such program should be
on the qualitative aspects, with arrangements for
transfer of credit.

July 17, 1972

6. That the above recommendations be carried out
in so far as possible by cooperative efforts on both
sides.

III.
In conclusion, the Conference noted that:

A. CULCON VI marked the tenth anniversary
of the Conference's work, and it was agreed that
a benchmark publication for wider public distribu-
tion should be developed from an edited combina-
tion of the panels' background reports and other
conference materials.

B. The Conference gave considerable attention to
the question of improving elementary and second-
ary school education concerning the study of vari-
ous foreign cultures. It was recommended that the
topic of elementary and secondary education be con-
sidered as an important theme for CULCON VII
to be held in Japan in 1974.

C. Finally, the Conference expressed its appreci-
ation for the hospitality and arrangements of the
Department of State in Washington and the Japan
Society in New York and agreed that the Joint
Committee should meet again in Hawaii in 1973, by
which time every effort should be made by those
responsible to render progress reports with regard
to the above recommendations.

MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS

U.S. Delegation

John W. Hall, professor, Yale University {chair-
man) .

Hugh Borton, former president, Haverford Col-
lege.

Elford a. Cederberg, U.S. Representative from
Michigan.

Robert Letts Jones, president, Copley News-
papers.

Henry Loomis, Deputy Director, U.S. Information
Agency.

Sidney P. Marland, U.S. Commissioner of Educa-
tion.

Elmer E. Rasmuson, president. National Bank of
Alaska.

John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State
for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Isaac Shapiro, president, Japan Society.

Thomas P. Shoesmith, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State (Acting) for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs.

DURWARD B. Varner, president. University of Ne-
braska.

Japanese Delegation

YOSHINORI Maeda, president, NHK network (chair-
man).

Kenji Adachi, Deputy Director General, Cultural
Affairs Agency, Ministry of Education.

Isao Amagi, chief director, Japan Scholarship Foun-
dation.

Takaaki Kagawa, Director General, Cultural Af-
fairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

YoicHi Maeda, executive director, International
House of Japan.

Shigeharu Matsumoto, chairman, board of direc-
tors. International House of Japan.

Tatsuo Morito, professor emeritus and honorary
president. University of Hiroshima.

Kazuo Murakami, consul, consulate general of
Japan, New York.

Yoshio Okawara, Minister, Embassy of Japan,
Washington.

Makoto Saito, professor, Tokyo University.

Naoya Uchimura, playwright.

HiSANARl Yamada, Member, House of Representa-
tives, Japanese Diet.

Tadashi Yoshida, assistant to president and con-
troller general of policy planning, NHK network.

Masao Yoshiki, chief director, Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science.

U.S. Pledges Up to $24 Million
to U.N. Population Fund

Press release 141 dated June 19

Secretary Rogers and Dr. John A. Han-
nah, Agency for International Development
Administrator, anyiounced on June 19 that
the United States has pledged up to $2U
million to the United Nations Fund for Pop-
ulation Activities for 1972. The U.S. pledge
is contingent on pledges from other donors
toward the Fund's total goal for 1972 of
$iO to $50 million. The U.S. pledge will he
funded from AID moneys appropriated by
the Congress specifically for population as-
sistance. Following is a statement by the
Secretary and the Administrator of AID.

In his July 1969 message to Congress on
population, President Nixon emphasized the
U.S. belief that the United Nations, its
specialized agencies, and other international
bodies should take the leadership in respond-
ing to world population growth. The Pres-
ident said that the United States would co-
operate fully with these programs.

Department of State Bulletin

The Congress also has stressed the impor-
tance of looking to the United Nations agen-
cies for leadership in population programs
and has emphasized the desirability of chan-
neling U.S. support for these through U.N.
and other international agencies.

The U.N. Fund enjoys worldwide support.
Since its establishment in 1969, 49 donor
countries from all parts of the world, in-
cluding the United States, have pledged
about $55 million to finance technical assist-
ance grants to developing countries and in-
ternational agencies for a wide variety of
projects in the field of population. These
range from assistance in conducting cen-
suses and demographic surveys to support of
family planning programs.

We believe this reflects two growing
worldwide convictions: (1) that measures
to curb excessive rates of population growth
are urgent and necessary; and (2) that the
U.N. Population Fund is financing eff"ective
programs.

The Executive Director of the U.N. Fund,
Mr. Rafael Salas, has now set a 1972 pledge
goal of $40 to $50 million and has asked
the United States to contribute up to a max-
imum of $24 million to match other pledges
to the Fund at a ratio of 48 percent from
the United States to 52 percent from other
donors.

We believe the Fund is demonstrating by
its performance that it merits our continued
support in 1972. The work of the Fund is
all the more important because the U.N.
Economic and Social Council has given it
particular responsibility for financing proj-
ects looking toward the U.N. World Popula-
tion Year 1974 and the World Population
Conference to be held in August 1974.

We have, therefore, requested the U.S.
Representative to the U.N., Ambassador
George Bush, to inform the U.N. Fund Ex-
ecutive Director, Mr. Salas, of our continued
support in 1972 and of our favorable re-
sponse to his request.

U.S. and Venezuela Exchange Notes
on Trade Arrangements

Joint Statement ^

The Governments of the United States and
Venezuela have today [June 26] exchanged
notes to regularize the situation following
Venezuela's notice of termination on June 30
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between
the two countries.

It has been agreed that the petroleum
tariffs specified in the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement shall be maintained at their pres-
ent low rate. At the same time, the most
favored nation principle is reaffirmed, al-
though an exception is made in the event that
Venezuela should desire to enter into free
trade pacts or customs unions. Either gov-
ernment may terminate these provisions
upon six months prior written notice.

Following the exchange of notes, repre-
sentatives of the two governments will
continue, in the spirit of the exchange of
letters between Presidents Caldera and
Nixon, to explore the development of their
petroleum and other economic relationships.

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor
of IMF and International Banks

The Senate on June 26 confirmed the
nomination of George P. Shultz to be U.S.
Governor of the International Monetary
Fund for a term of five years and U.S. Gov-
ernor of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development for a term of
five years ; a Governor of the Inter-American
Development Bank for a term of five years ;
and U.S. Governor of the Asian Development
Bank.

' Issued at Washington and Caracas on June 26
(press release 150).

July 17, 1972

THE CONGRESS

Department Comments on Legislation on Funding
for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Statement by U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary for Political Affairs *

I am pleased to have the opportunity to
appear before this committee in the wake
of the President's report to the Congress
last Thursday night which described several
steps forward in our relations with the So-
viet Union.- The Treaty on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the In-
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms, the Quadripartite Agreement
on Berlin, and others are important mile-
stones along the path to a more secure and
peaceful world and a more stable Europe.
It is of paramount interest to us that we
continue to move forward along this path.

The more secure Europe which we have
long envisaged is several steps closer to
realization as a result of the agreements
signed last week.

However, we should not assume that be-
cause both we and the U.S.S.R. want a
more secure Europe, we would necessarily
agree on the definition of what a more se-
cure Europe is. In the Soviets, we have,

^ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on June 7. The complete transcript of
the hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.

' For President Nixon's address before a joint
session of tJie Congress on June 1, see Bulletin of
June 26, 1972, p. 855.

as the President has said, a dedicated com-
petitor with which we can reach mutually
useful agreements not by unilaterally aban-
doning our assets but by showing a willing-
ness to defend and promote our own interests
and those of our allies and friends.

It is within the framework of this view
of recent developments and of our objectives
in Europe that I would like to comment on
the legislation before you. This legislation
provides for U.S. Government grants total-
ing $38,520,000 in fiscal year 1973 to two
important instruments of communication in
Europe, Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty, organizations on which your com-
mittee has obtained exhaustive documenta-
tion.

Concurrently with the submission of this
bill. President Nixon announced on May 10
that he would appoint a Presidential Study
Commission to carry out the further studies
supported by the majority of Members of
both Houses of the Congress and to make
recommendations for the future relation-
ship of the government to the two radio or-
ganizations.3 That Commission will be
made up of five distinguished private citi-
zens. The Commission's mandate will be
a short one, and it will be under the re-
quirement to report its findings and recom-
mendations to the President no later than

' For a statement by President Nixon issued on
May 10, see Bulletin of June 12, 1972, p. 816.

Department of State Bulletin

February 28, 1973. That will provide time
for the report and recommendations to be
considered fully by Congress in the process
of formulating legislation for fiscal year
1974. In announcing the plan to appoint
a Commission, the President stated that in
making its study the Commission would be
particularly concerned to consult with Mem-
bers of Congress.

In his statement, the President noted that
a number of different views had been ex-
pressed in Congress as to how the radios
might best be funded for the future and
that no consensus on this important matter
had emerged. The Commission will be di-
rected to conduct a full examination of that
question.

While the Department of State developed
the proposal we submitted to you last year,
we believe that this should be only one
among a number of alternatives for the
Commission to examine. We believe the
Commission should be particularly sensitive
to the problem of proposing a structure for
the radios which would preserve their role
as independent broadcasters. Only if the
radios preserve that role can we legitimately
hope to broaden the financial backing for
them.

In view of your familiarity with these
radio organizations, I will refrain from de-
scribing them again. Rather, I would like
to touch upon a number of points about
them before addressing the question of the
legislation itself.

An important point is the argument —
which has been heard in this committee —
that international radio broadcasting of the
type provided by Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty obstructs the negotiation of
important agreements such as strategic
arms limitation agreements. I do not think
that there is room now for any doubt that
this administration's effort to achieve the
first SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] agreements was a completely suc-
cessful one. This success was in no way
diminished by its continuing strong support
for freedom of international communication,
nor was the achievement of the agreements

jeopardized by the continued broadcasting
of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

It is not enough, however, to say that these
radios do not impede "better understanding
and more effective cooperation . . . among
nations," as the President underlined in his
May 10 statement, which I would like to
submit for the record. It needs also to be
said that they facilitate such understand-
ing. We believe that all the peoples of
Europe, both East and West, want to see
the same thing we want: a workable struc-
ture of security in Europe as a whole, rather
than the division of Europe into separate
spheres of influence. They want it both
because they fear the nightmare of a new
war and because it is a necessary base for
the advancement of their own interests. So
far as the peoples of eastern Europe are
concerned, they are also greatly interested
in such things as the implementation of
meaningful economic reform, the applica-
tion of increased resources to the satisfac-
tion of their human needs, and, eventually,
more open societies which will be in a better
position to establish more normal trade,
technological, cultural, and, finally, political
relations with the rest of the world.

Even in closed societies, public opinion
can influence leaderships toward greater re-
sponsiveness if people have the information
which belongs in the public realm. We have
no doubt that the peoples of eastern Europe
want their countries to develop policies
which are more responsive to their needs
and welfare. They also want the knowledge
on which to base intelligent judgments
about what those policies should be.

A clear indication of the thirst for this
kind of knowledge was contained in an arti-
cle which appeared in the Washington Post
on June 2 about a public lecture in Moscow
in the wake of the summit meeting. The
author describes Soviet citizens asking why
the published text of President Nixon's
speech on Moscow TV omitted certain key
passages and why the press conferences held
by Soviet and U.S. spokesmen during the
summit meetings were not broadcast. This
latter question could not have been asked

July 17, 1972

if those press conferences had not been fully
reported in international radio broadcast-
ing in Russian. That these questions were
asked illustrates the thirst that these peo-
ple have for more information about world
events than they can get from their own
media. They want to hear not only the
official statements of other governments but
also how world events may affect their own
lives. Even more, they want to know what
their officially controlled media will not tell
them about what is happening in their own
countries.

The most dramatic proof of this latter
point was the interview this spring in which
the Nobel Prize-winning author, Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, criticized the lack of fairness
and completeness in the Soviet press and
said about Radio Liberty, "If we learn any-
thing about events in our own country, it's
from there."

A second point I would like to address
is the notion that the frank recognition
of divergent positions is incompatible with
or even renders impossible the attempt to
identify common interests through negotia-
tion. The events of the week before last
illustrate the complete untenability of such
a contention in today's world. We had very
frank discussions with the Soviets in Mos-
cow. We negotiated useful agreements on
some issues. We disagreed on others. We
did not deceive ourselves that we were
changing the other side's basic outlook. Nor
did the Soviets.

It is the Soviet view that disagreement
about certain of the fundamental differences
between us in no way precludes successful
negotiation. The day after the President's
departure from Moscow, Radio Moscow
praised Soviet foreign policy for combining
"a readiness to develop mutually advanta-
geous relations with states possessing op-
posite social systems if they display a real-
istic, businesslike approach to settling exist-
ing differences," on the one hand, with "ir-
reconcilability in the ideological struggle," on
the other.

As the President emphasized in his ad-
dress to the Congress last Thursday night,

we should bear in mind that, while we
have started to build a new structure of
peace, we are only at the beginning of
that process. In that process, accommoda-
tion and competition will exist side by side
for some time to come.

A third point which has been made in
this committee is one which I would be
among the first to support. That point is
that we should avoid prolonging habits
dating from the depths of the cold war. "Ir-
reconcilability in the ideological struggle"
is Pravda's militant watchword. It is not
ours.

It is not our objective in presenting the
legislation now before this committee to pro-
long the cold war or to perpetuate cold war
attitudes. In its studies of Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congres-
sional Research Service has not found these
two radio organizations permeated with any
desire to prolong cold war hostilities, to
overthrow any country's regime, or to take
any role other than that of responsible
media of information. The objective is to
build contact through information because
we seek a Europe stabilized by more pro-
lific and peaceful interaction, and not by an
Iron Curtain which isolates one half from
the other. Information facilitates and is a
part of such a peaceful interaction. Censor-
ship, jamming, and dedication to an irrecon-
cilable ideological struggle are the cold war
relics which obstruct it. Division and
isolation were hallmarks of the cold war.
Communication, interaction, and freedom of
information should be hallmarks of the
structure of peace we have now begun build-
ing.

A fourth point is the suggestion that as
a result of our acceptance last year of the
initiative in this committee in favor of pub-
lic funding of Radio Liberty and Radio Free
Europe, we find ourselves speaking through
two voices where one might do. In reality,
the situation has not changed. We speak
through only one official radio voice to the
world, the Voice of America (VOA) ; and
it is only the Voice of America which, in
its commentaries to its many listening audi-

Department of State Bulletin

ences, is required to present an official Amer-
ican viewpoint.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
are independent news media. Their analysts
and commentators represent only themselves
or the radio which provides them with the
microphone. They do not speak for the U.S.
Government. This situation, by contrast
with VOA, permits them to analyze a much
wider range of developments, including key
events in the country to which they are
broadcasting. The value of this function is
testified to by the listeners.

Nobody is forced to listen to Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty in eastern Europe
or the Soviet Union. To the contrary, there
are often inhibitions of a social or political
nature against doing so. Yet many millions
of people choose to do so every day. Sophisti-
cated audience-research techniques indicate
that the average daily listenership of the
five countries to which Radio Free Europe
broadcasts is around 30 million people. To
achieve this result Radio Free Europe must
clearly be fulfilling a need for information
not available from the more easily accessible
domestic media or from official foreign radio
broadcasting organizations, such as VOA or
BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation].
It is certain that this unique function would
be significantly attenuated if these radios
were to accept the constraints of being offi-
cial broadcasters.

A fifth and final point is the question of
the cost of these two radios and how it
should be borne. The authorization amount
requested for fiscal year 1973 is $38,520,000,
as compared with an authorization amount
of $36 million for fiscal year 1972 and an ap-
propriation of $32 million. The requested in-
crease is primarily to provide for mandatory
wage and price increases. Notwithstanding
the fact that during the past fiscal year
both radios have cut personnel and pro-
grams, the most important fiscal change was
the adjustment in international rates of ex-
change at the turn of the year. Because ap-
proximately 75 percent of the expenditures
of the radios are in foreign currencies, these
adjustments represented a loss in overseas

purchasing power of about 13 percent. Con-
currently, the appropriation actually re-
ceived for fiscal year 1972 was 20 percent
below the requested amount. Thus, the
radios found it necessary to postpone obli-
gations and to terminate such important ac-
tivities as the Institute for the Study of
the U.S.S.R. in Munich. I will not attempt
to cover the full financial details in this
statement, because I believe the material
prepared for the House and Senate Appro-
priations Committees has already been sub-
mitted to the committee. Both these com-
mittees found the justifications submitted
satisfactory and reported out the figure re-
quested.

In connection with financing, the question
has been asked why these stations, broad-
casting only to the Soviet Union and east-
ern Europe, cost almost as much to operate
as does the worldwide service of the Voice
of America. The answer is that these are,
in fact, networks. Radio Liberty broadcasts
in 20 languages with each program tailored
to a specific target audience. Radio Free
Europe broadcasts in six languages to five
countries. Each has to maintain its own
research staffs, libraries, and news bureaus
and meet their personnel costs. These sup-
port facilities monitor and analyze the news
from the countries to which the radios
broadcast in order to tell the listener the
most possible about how that news will af-
fect him. By contrast, the Voice of Amer-
ica has the mandate to describe American
official policies in the world and in relation
to the United Nations. It depends for its
news on the wire services, and it has the
use of USIA libraries and other support fa-
cilities. Even if those USIA facilities could
somehow be made available to the other
radios, they would not serve the purpose
since they are geared to American develop-
ments rather than those of the target coun-
tries.

We are gratified to note that as a result
of the study of the radios done at your
request, the Comptroller General reached the
conclusion that "the two radios and respec-
tive corporations have exercised adequate

July 17, 1972

fiscal controls over the Federal funds made
available to them and that such funds have
been used in an effective and efficient man-
ner for the purposes intended."

The question of who should be covering
these costs is indeed a relevant one. I am
aware, Mr. Chairman, of your interest in
getting a greater participation in this fi-
nancing from sources other than the U.S.
Government. I fully share the view that, to
the extent possible, funds other than U.S.
Government funds should be solicited to
support these programs. There has been for
some years a corporate fundraising effort
by the Free Europe Fund. It is continuing
successfully this year under the leadership
of Mr. Stewart Cort. There is now an effort
by friends of the radios in Europe to exam-
ine the possibilities for fundraising there.
You have heard a statement from Mr. Dirk
Stikker, who is leading this effort. I have
assured Mr. Stikker, and I can assure you,
Mr. Chairman, that we will be happy to
cooperate with and support Mr. Stikker's
effort in any way he feels useful.

It is our view that the Commission which
the President will appoint to present recom-
mendations on a future legislative proposal
for funding the radios will wish to consult
with fundraisers on both sides of the At-
lantic so that their recommended proposal
is one which best facilitates contributions
from outside the U.S. Government.

Mr. Chairman, in considering what legis-
lation should be submitted to Congress for
fiscal year 1973, we took into consideration
the legislative history of this year's bill.
Public Law 92-264; the studies of the ac-
tivities of the radios which had been carried
out in answer to your request by the Con-
gressional Research Service and the General
Accounting Office; and the fact that there
are further studies of the radios being pre-
pared by the Congressional Research Service
which focus on the methods for financing
them and on their relationship to United
States foreign policy goals. We took note
of the fact that both the bill proposed last
year by the House of Representatives and
the sense-of-the-Senate resolution cospon-
sored by Senators Percy and Humphrey and

65 other Senators evidenced a strong desire
that further study should be given to the
radios and to methods of funding them be-
fore the presentation of more definitive
legislation. One way in which we have at-
tempted to meet these concerns has been by
the submission of the present legislation,
which is, in effect, an interim bill.

We remain convinced that these radios
continue, as the President wrote in a De-
cember 23 letter to the chairman of the Free
Europe Fund, to "serve a fundamental na-
tional interest." Their function remains
thoroughly consistent with the process of
building the new structure of peace which
has been so significantly advanced in the
past few weeks.

Department Discusses National Security
Aspects of Trans-Alaskan Pipeline

Statement by John N. Irwin II
Under Secretary of State ^

It is a pleasure to appear today before the
Joint Economic Committee to present the
Department of State's views with respect to
the Alaska pipeline. My statement will con-
centrate on the national security and foreign
policy considerations. There were, of course,
other considerations — particularly environ-
mental considerations — which were weighed
by the administration in reaching its decision
on the Alaska pipeline, but other agencies
have primary responsibility for evaluating
these issues.

Over the course of the last several years,
the Department of State has been paying a
great deal of attention to the energy issue.
Our review of projected future patterns of
consumption and production has led to some
disturbing conclusions. By the end of this
decade, unless steps are taken to increase
domestic sources of energy, the United States

' Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee on
June 22 (press release 149 dated June 23).

100

Department of State Bulletin

may be dependent on imports for as much
as 50 percent of its total petroleum require-
ments. As much as two-thirds of these im-
ports may have to come from sources in the
Eastern Hemisphere, largely from the Mid-
dle East, which contains nearly three-fourths
of the world's oil reserves.

In the recent past, the United States has
followed a policy of attempting to obtain
as much as possible of its petroleum require-
ments from domestic sources and from coun-
tries in the Western Hemisphere.

There is certainly no reason to depart
from this policy today. Within the last two
years some major producing countries have
used the threat of supply interruptions in
bargaining with the oil companies for better
economic terms. There have also been calls
in some of the producing countries to use
oil to achieve political goals. Less than a
month ago producing countries in the Middle
East were asked by the Iraqi Government
to impose limitations on production to pre-
vent the oil companies from increasing pro-
duction outside Iraq to make up for any
shortages that might result from Iraq's na-
tionalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Until recently the United States had been
able to isolate itself to a large extent from
developments abroad which affected petrole-
um supplies. The United States was self-
sufficient in petroleum, and there was
enough spare capacity available to help other
consuming countries in the event of supply
interruptions. As most of you know, this
is no longer the case. The United States
today is importing more than 25 percent of
its total petroleum requirements, mostly
from the Western Hemisphere, but a sig-
nificant amount also from the Eastern
Hemisphere.

We have on the whole enjoyed good rela-
tions with the petroleum-exporting countries
of North and South America and of the
Eastern Hemisphere. We appreciate these
good relations and hope that they will con-
tinue to the mutual benefit of the countries
involved. We are concerned, however, that
a substantial increase of our dependence on
overseas oil could put us in a difficult situa-
tion, particularly when coupled with the

worldwide grovii;h in demand for energy
which we foresee.

Demand for energy, particularly oil, will
experience dramatic increases in coming
years. Demand for oil in western Europe is
projected to double over this decade, from a
level of about 12 million barrels per day in
1970 to 24 million barrels per day in 1980.
For Japan, the increase will be even greater,
from a level of about 3.8 million barrels per
day in 1970 to over 10 million barrels in
1980. The situation in western Europe and
Japan is therefore similar to that which we
foresee in the United States, with one im-
portant difference : Lacking their own energy
resources, Europe and Japan must continue
to be dependent on the Middle East for near-
ly all of their petroleum requirements.

Our energy policy, therefore, is of great
importance to the world's other consuming
countries. Should we fail to take steps to
develop expeditiously our own resources,
more of our demand would have to be met
from foreign sources — largely from the Mid-
dle East — where we will be competing with
other consuming countries. At the same time,
the major producing countries, have begun
to adopt policies placing limitations on pro-
duction levels. Venezuela, Libya, and Kuwait
have already imposed such limitations, and
other countries are known to be considering
similar measures. These limitations, coupled
with naturally declining production in some
countries as reserves peak out, could mean
that the amount of oil which will be available
will not be sufficient to meet the total re-
quirements of the consuming countries.
Under such circumstances, the competition
for available supplies could become increas-
ingly severe. Our relations with other con-
suming countries could be seriously affected,
and the ability of the producing countries
to use oil to obtain not only economic but
also political goals will be greatly increased.
The national security implications of such
a situation are obvious.

Given this situation, the Department of
State believes it is important to bring oil
from the North Slope of Alaska to market
as soon as possible. We favor, therefore,
early construction of the Alaska pipeline.

July 17, 1972

101

Construction of the Alaska pipeline will
enable North Slope oil to get to market
several years sooner than would be possible
with a trans-Canadian route, for several
reasons. First, the Canadian route is much
longer than the Alaskan route. It would
therefore presumably take longer to con-
struct. Second, more preparatory work has
been done for the Alaskan route than for a
Canadian route. Third, and most important,
the Government of Canada has only recently
stated that it will be in a position to accept
for consideration an application to construct
a northern pipeline. The latest word we have
is that Canada will not be able to accept
such an application before the end of this
year. We have no indications, moreover, of
how long deliberations on the application
might take or even if such an application
would be approved. Given our own experi-
ence, it would be imprudent to assume that
a pipeline application in Canada would not
encounter substantial difficulties, similar to
those which have arisen in the United States.
A pipeline through Canada would also in-
volve detailed, and probably lengthy, negoti-
ations on financing and throughput arrange-
ments.

The Department of State therefore be-
lieves that it is in the best interests of the
United States to bring North Slope oil to
market as soon as possible and that this can
best be accomplished through construction
of the trans-Alaskan pipeline. We hope, how-
ever, that in the future trans-Canadian pipe-
lines can also be built and that the resources
of both the United States and Canada can
'-e developed expeditiously to meet growing
energy needs in both countries. In this con-
nection, we have been interested for some
time in pursuing discussions with the Cana-
dians on our energy and petroleum relations.
We hope these discussions can move forward
to serve the mutual interests of both our
countries.

I do not mean to suggest that Alaskan
oil will solve all of our energy problems.
It will not. But 2 million barrels per day
from Alaska will mean 2 million barrels per

day we will not have to import from the
Eastern Hemisphere. In addition to the se-
curity implications of such additional im-
ports, the drain on our balance of payments
could be considerable. With world oil prices
continuing to rise, further delay in bringing
oil from Alaska could, by the end of this
decade, mean an additional dollar outflow of
from $2 to $3 billion per year.

At the same time, we should move on a
number of other fronts to increase domestic
supplies. As Senator Proxmire has sug-
gested, there may be significant oil reserves
in the Gulf of Alaska. This area, along with
other offshore areas, should be opened up
for development. There should also be
further eff"orts to promote domestic produc-
tion of conventional oil and gas, nuclear
stimulation of gas, research into exotic ener-
gy forms, and measures to conserve and use
our available energy more rationally and
more efficiently.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the State Depart-
ment's views will be helpful to the committee
in its deliberations on the matter.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Japan Amend
Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on
May 27 (press release 127) that notes had
been exchanged at Washington on May 26
constituting an amendment of the bilateral
agreement of January 28, 1972, governing
exports of cotton textiles from Japan to the
United States. Japanese Ambassador Nobu-
hiko Ushiba and Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs Willis C. Armstrong
signed the respective notes. (For text of the
U.S. note, see press release 127.)

The purpose of the amendment is to ac-

102

Department of State Bulletin

commodate within the basic agreement the
limits for Okinawa previously provided for
in a separate arrangement between the U.S.
Department of Commerce and the High Com-
missioner of the Ryukyu Islands. This
amendment had been agreed upon in prin-
ciple in a separate exchange of notes at the
time the basic agreement was signed.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctic Seals

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals,
with annex. Done at London February 11, 1972.
Enters into force on the 30th day following the
date of deposit of the seventh instrument of rati-
fication or accession.

Signatures: Argentina, Belgium, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, United Kingdom, June 9, 1972;
United States, June 28, 1972.

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at Vi-
enna September 28, 1970.'
Acceptaiice deposited: Haiti, June 26, 1972.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971.'
Signature: Rwanda, June 26, 1972.

Biological Weapons

Customs

Customs convention on the international transit of
goods (ITI Convention). Done at Vienna June 7,
1971. Enters into force three months after five
states which are members either of the Customs
Cooperation Council, the United Nations, or spe-
cialized agencies have signed without reservation
of ratification or have deposited their ratifications
or accessions.

Signature: United States, June 5, 1972 (subject
to ratification).

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En-
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates,
March 30, 1972.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu-
lations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo Novem-
ber 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971,
except for article V of the additional protocol,
which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS
7150.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, June 3, 1971.

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree-
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31,
1971. TIAS 7236.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, June 3, 1971.

Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the
United Nations. Done at New York February 13,
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for
the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, March 8, 1972
(with reservations).

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4,
1969.'
Ratification deposited: Senegal, April 19, 1972.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 27, 1972.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, June 29, 1972.

SeabecJ Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and
in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, Lon-
don, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into
force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 23,
1972.

' Not in force.

■ Not in force for the United States.

July 17, 1972

103

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signatures: Algeria, April 20, 1972; Egypt, June

6, 1972.
Ratification deposited: Ireland, June 29, 1972

(with declaration).

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig-
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3,
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with
respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with re-
spect to other provisions; for the United States
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Accessio7i to the Wheat Trade Convention de-
posited: Libya, June 21, 1972.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from
Australia of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle,
goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar
year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington May 17, 1972. Entered into force May 17,
1972.

Belgium

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual de-
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950
(TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at
Brussels June 13 and 21, 1972. Entered into force
June 21, 1972.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from Costa Rica of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes
at San Jose March 28 and June 12, 1972. Entered
into force June 12, 1972.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the deposit by El Salvador
of 10 percent of the value of grant military as-
sistance and excess defense articles furnished by
the United States. Effected by exchange of notes
at San Salvador April 25 and June 15, 1972. En-

tered into force June 15, 1972; eflfective February
7, 1972.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement supplementing the agreement of Novem-
ber 20, 1962, as supplemented (TIAS 5518, 6684,
6892, 7086), for conducting certain educational
exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes
at Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godesberg June 7 and 9,
1972. Entered into force June 9, 1972.

Iran

Agreement relating to the deposit by Iran of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance
furnished by the United States. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Tehran May 8 and 29, 1972.
Entered into force May 29, 1972; effective Febru-
ary 7, 1972.

Saint Vincent

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and
Saint Vincent May 15 and June 14, 1972. Entered
into force June 14, 1972.

Spain

Provisional air transport agreement. Effected by
exchange of notes at Madrid June 28 and 30, 1972.
Entered into force June 30, 1972.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending annex F of the agreement of
February 10, 1961 (TIAS 4734), between the
United States and the Federation of the West
Indies concerning defense areas in the Federa-
tion of the West Indies. Effected by exchange of
notes at London June 15, 1972. Entered into force
June 15, 1972.

' Not in force.

Confirmations

The Senate on June 12 confirmed the nomination
of Thomas Patrick Melady to be Ambassador to
Uganda. (For biographic data, see Department of
State press release 151 dated June 26.)

104

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX July 17, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1725

Agriculture. President Nixon Suspends Meat
Import Restraints (statement, letter to Sec-
retary Rogers) 89

China. Dr. Kissinger Visits Peking for Talks

With PRC Leaders (joint statement) ... 85

Congress

Confirmations (Melady) 104

Department Comments on Legislation on
Funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty (Johnson) 96

Department Discusses National Security As-
pects of Trans- Alaskan Pipeline (Irwin) 100

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor of IMF
and International Banks 95

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Melady) 104

Disarmament

President Nixon's News Conference of June
29 (excerpts) 77

President Nixon's News Conference of June
22 (excerpt) 83

Economic Affairs

Department Discusses National Security As-
pects of Trans-Alaskan Pipeline (Irwiii) . . 100

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor of IMF
and International Banks 95

President Nixon Suspends Meat Import Re-
straints (statement, letter to Secretary
Rogers) 89

United States and Japan Amend Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 102

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.-Japan
Cultural Conference Holds Sixth Meeting
(Johnson, communique, list of delegations) 90

Europe. Department Comments on Legislation
on Funding for Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty (Johnson) 96

International Organizations and Conferences.

George Shultz Named U.S. Governor of IMF

and International Banks 95

Japan

United States and Japan Amend Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 102

U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Holds Sixth
Meeting (Johnson, communique, list of dele-
gations) 90

Latin America. President Nixon's News Con-
ference of June 29 (excerpts) 77

Middle East. The Middle East Today: Positive
and Negative Elements (Sisco) 86

Petroleum. Department Discusses National Se-
curity Aspects of Trans-Alaskan Pipeline
(Irwin) 100

Population. U.S. Pledges Up to $24 Million to
U.N. Population Fund (Hannah, Rogers) . . 94

Presidential Documents

President Nixon Suspends Meat Import Re-
straints 89

President Nixon's News Conference of June

29 (excerpts) 77

President Nixon's News Conference of June 22

(excerpt) 83

Trade. U.S. and Venezuela Exchange Notes on

Trade Arrangements (joint statement) . . 95

Treaty Information

Current Actions 103

United States and Japan Amend Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 102

U.S. and Venezuela Exchange Notes on Trade

Arrangements (joint statement) 95

Uganda. Melady confirmed as Ambassador . . 104

U.S.S.R.

President Nixon's News Conference of June 29
(excerpts) 77

President Nixon's News Conference of June 22

(excerpt) 83

United Nations. U.S. Pledges Up to $24 Million
to U.N. Population Fund (Hannah, Rogers) 94

Venezuela. U.S. and Venezuela Exchange
Notes on Trade Arrangements (joint state-
ment) 95

Viet-Nam

President Nixon's News Conference of June 29

(excerpts) 77

U.S. Force Ceiling in Viet-Nam To Be Cut to
39,000 by September 1 (White House an-
nouncement) 85

Name Index

Hannah, John A 94

Irwin, John N., II 100

Johnson, U. Alexis 90, 96

Melady, Thomas Patrick 104

Nixon, President 77, 83, 89

Rogers, Secretary 94

Shultz, George P 95

Sisco, Joseph J 86

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 26— July 2

Press releases may be obtained from the
Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 26 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
127 of May 27, 141 of June 19, and 149 of June
23.

Subject

U.S. and Venezuela exchange
notes on trade arrangements.

Melad sworn in as Ambassador
to Uganda (biographic data).

Sixth U.S.-Japan Cultural Con-
ference communique, June 24.

Rogers: SEATO Council, Can-
berra.

U.S. and Spain conclude provi-
sional air transport agreement
(issued June 30).

Newsom: Mid- America Commit-
tee. Chicago.

SEATO Council communique

Olson sworn in as Ambassador to
Sierra Leone (biographic data).

ANZUS Council communique.

U.S. signs convention for conser-
vation of Antarctic seals.

Carter sworn in as Ambassador
to Tanzania (biographic data).

No.

Date

150

6/26

*151

6/26

152

6/26

tl54

6/27

tl55

6/28

tl56 6/28

tl57
*158

tl59
*160

6/28
6/28

6/29
6/29

*161 6/30

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington, d.c. 20402

OFFICIAI. BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

mio

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1726

July 2 A, 1972

U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
HELD AT STOCKHOLM 105

SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSTANT THEMES IN U.S. POLICY
Address by Assistant Secretary Newsom 119

'U(y'

^^P,

^8fg?o

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1726
July 24, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washlt-Kton, D.C. 20102

PRICE:

62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic tl6, foreign $23
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

U.N. Conference on the Human Environment Held at Stockholm

The U.N. Conference on the Human En-
vironment was held at Stockholm, Stveden,
June 5-16. Folloiving are a statement by
Secretary Rogers issued at Washington June
5; a statement by Russell E. Train, head of
the U.S. delegation to the conference and
Chairman, Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, made in plenary session June 6; a state-
ment by Robert M. White, U.S. delegation
member and Administrator, National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration, made
in Committee II (Environmental Aspects of
Natural Resources Management) June 9;
and the texts of a resolution on institutional
arrangements adopted June 15 and a Declara-
tion on the Human Environment adopted
June 16.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS

Press release 133 dated June 5

The United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, which opens today in
Stockholm, marks the full emergence of an
international concern which will increasingly
occupy the world's peoples and governments
in the years to come. The United States Gov-
ernment will be second to none in applying
its energies to the task of preserving and
enhancing the global environment.

We look for substantial progress at Stock-
holm in three areas:

First, the conference should spur efforts
to acquire greater knowledge about what is
happening to the world's environment. This
requires a comprehensive monitoring sys-
tem involving, for example, a global network
of stations to measure the effect of air con-
taminants.

Second, the conference should encourage
international conventions, agreements, and
other arrangements to deal with problems
where action, not research, is needed. We
have particularly in mind conventions to
control ocean dumping and to preserve herit-
age areas of special natural, cultural, or his-
toric importance.

Third, because most environmental prob-
lems must be solved at the regional, national,
or individual level, the conference should en-
courage and support regional and local
efforts.

To help realize these and other important
objectives, the President has proposed the
creation of a United Nations Fund for the
Environment, to be financed by voluntary
contributions from governments. We be-
lieve the initial funding goal, over a five-year
period, should be $100 million. The United
States is prepared to contribute up to $40
million to match the $60 million which we
hope others will donate.

Firm centralized control and an agreed
setting of priorities are essential to the effec-
tive administration of the United Nations
environmental activities. Therefore, we will
propose at Stockholm that a U.N. administra-
tor be appointed. He should have authority,
subject to policy guidance from an intergov-
ernmental body within the ECOSOC [Eco-
nomic and Social Council] framework, to
administer the Fund to coordinate all U.N.
programs on the environment.

The United States Government believes
that the 1970's should be a decade in which
the United Nations gives conscious priority
to the coupling of scientific advance with the
welfare of all peoples. As peacekeeping was
its basic concern in the 1950's, as develop-

July 24, 1972

105

ment was added as a second concern in the
1960's, we believe that in this decade the
United Nations should adopt a third basic
objective: to encourage, through cooperative
international action, the application of sci-
ence and technology to improving the quality
of human life. In no area is this task more
urgent than in the area of the human envi-
ronment.

It is sometimes alleged that environment
is a rich man's issue and that developing
countries have little to gain from interna-
tional activity in this field. This allegation is
refuted by the presence in Stockholm of
representatives of the vast majority of the
people of the developing world.

It is natural that developing countries
should show particular concern that steps to
preserve the environment must enhance
rather than hinder the development process.
We in the United States share this concern,
and in our own policies regarding the envi-
ronment we are taking it into full account:

— We pledge that environmental concerns
will not be used as a pretext for trade dis-
crimination against the products of develop-
ing, or other, countries or for their reduced
access to U.S. markets. There should be no
economic protectionism in the name of en-
vironmental protection.

— We pledge that a commitment to en-
vironmental improvement will not diminish
our commitment to development.

Environmental safeguards, far from being
antithetical to development, are an integral
part of it. This does not mean that they
should be rigidly imposed by industrialized
nations as a condition of their participation
in development projects. The relative prior-
ity to be given such safeguards must be
worked out between donor and recipient
countries. In our own assistance policy we
are emphasizing the primary responsibility
of aid recipients for setting development
priorities.

We regret that the Soviet Union and a
number of its allies have apparently decided,
for political reasons, not to join the countries

meeting in Stockholm. We hope, however,
that the Soviet Union and the others will par-
ticipate fully in the international initiatives
and efforts which will be necessary following
the conference. The bilateral agreement we
signed in Moscow May 23 — the most compre-
hensive environmental agreement yet reached
between major countries — is an encouraging
indication that the Soviet Union shares our
belief in the importance of this issue.

STATEMENT BY MR. TRAIN

U.S. delegation press release HE 3 dated June 6

Mr. President [Ingemund Bengtsson, of
Sweden], Mr. Secretary General, distin-
guished ministers and delegates: On behalf
of the United States I wish to congratulate
you, Mr. President, on your election to lead us
in our work during these two critical weeks
and to express our appreciation to the Gov-
ernment of Sweden as the original proposer
and generous host of this very important
United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment.

Let me also express our warm thanks to
the distinguished Secretary General of the
conference, Mr. Maurice Strong, for his able
leadership during more than a year and a
half of intensive preparations, the quality of
which has much to do with the hopes for this
conference.

From the beginning of his administration,
President Nixon has given high priority to
environmental protection as a matter of both
domestic and international policy. As he
stated, we must act as one world to protect
the human environment. This conference
provides a unique opportunity for such a
united effort.

An immense diversity of nations is
gathered here from every region of the earth.
We are brought together by a common con-
cern for the quality of human life, the every-
day life of people throughout the world. Our
subject is much broader than pollution. It in-
cludes the kind of communities in which peo-
ple live. It includes the way resources will be

106

Department of State Bulletin

President Nixon Praises Success of Environment Conference

Following is a statement by President Nixon
issued on June 20.

White House press release dated June 20

I have just received a report on the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment
concluded last Friday at Stockholm from Chair-
man Train, who headed the large and distin-
guished United States delegation.

The United States has vi^orked long and hard
over the past 18 months to help make the confer-
ence a success. Representatives of 113 nations
met together for two weeks to produce an im-
pressive number of agreements on environmental
principles and recommendations for further na-
tional and international action in this important
field.

The United States achieved practically all of
its objectives at Stockholm:

1. The conference approved establishment of a
new United Nations unit to provide continued
leadership and coordination of environmental
action, an important step which had our full
support.

2. The conference approved forming a $100
million United Nations environmental fund,
which I personally proposed last February.

3. The conference overwhelmingly approved
the U.S. proposal for a moratorium on commercial
killing of whales.

4. The conference endorsed our proposal for an

international convention to regulate ocean
dumping.

5. The conference endorsed the U.S. proposal
for the establishment of a World Heritage Trust
to help preserve wilderness areas and other
scenic natural landmarks.

However, even more than in the specific agree-
ments reached, I believe that the deepest signifi-
cance of the conference lies in the fact that for
the first time in history the nations of the world
sat down together to seek better understanding
of each other's environmental problems and to
explore opportunities for positive action, indi-
vidually and collectively.

The strong concern of the United States over
the fate of our environment has also been demon-
strated in our direct dealings with individual na-
tions. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
which I signed in Ottawa this April with Prime
Minister Trudeau was evidence of the high prior-
ity this administration places on protecting the
environment. The environmental agreement which
I signed in Moscow on May 23 is proof of the
desire of our Nation to work together with the
others on the common tasks of peace.

I am proud that the United States is taking a
leading role in international environmental co-
operation, and I congratulate our U.S. delegation
on its success at Stockholm. The governments and
people of the world must now work together to
make the objectives of the Stockholm Conference
a reality.

managed for billions of people today and still
more billions in the future. Our concern is
that all nations of the world should better
understand and better control the interaction
of man with his environment and that all
peoples, now and in future times, should
thereby achieve a better life.

In addressing this universal subject of the
human environment, every nation's view is
conditioned by its own historical experience.

When my country was very young and
President Thomas Jefferson resided at the
edge of the Virginia wilderness at Monti-
cello, what distinguished our new Republic
was not wealth or industry, in which we were
not at all impressive, but the compelling
force of an idea newly put into practice. This

idea was that a nation of immigrants, equal
under the law and exercising their right to
"the pursuit of happiness," could settle and
cultivate a continental wilderness and estab-
lish in it their free institutions. For a cen-
tury and more, we were largely preoccupied
with that undertaking.

Some 65 years ago, when the American
frontier was a thing of the past, President
Theodore Roosevelt wrote with admiration
about this continental adventure — but he
struck a new and more ominous note. Our
natural resources, he said, were being rapidly
depleted; and he continued with these words:

The time has come to inquire seriously what will
happen when our forests are gone, when the coal,
the iron, the oil, and the gas are exhausted, when the

July 24, 1972

107

soils shall have been still further impoverished and
washed into the streams, polluting the rivers, de-
nuding the fields, and obstructing navigation. These
questions do not relate only to the next century or
to the next generation. It is time for us now as a
nation to exercise the same reasonable foresight in
dealing with our great natural resources that would
be shown by any prudent man in conserving and
wisely using the property which contains the as-
surance of well-being for himself and his children.

Unfortunately, our country did not always
follow that good advice. Particularly in the
generation just past, we not only committed
many of the faults Theodore Roosevelt criti-
cized; we went further and, through inade-
quate control of our increasingly powerful
technology, imposed burdens on our environ-
ment, urban and rural alike, such as he never
dreamed of.

Now the United States is altering its
course. We have examined the costs of cor-
recting the most obvious of these problems —
pollution — and we have begun to pay the high
price of corrective action too long delayed.

Of course, the environmental afflictions we
are coping with are largely those of an afflu-
ent nation. My country enjoys economic
blessings such as many another country
earnestly desires to achieve. The United
States Government remains convinced that
other nations throughout the world can and
must increasingly enjoy the same blessings
of economic growth and overcome the curse
of poverty. In this Second Development
Decade it remains the firm purpose of the
United States to assist in that global effort
through the United Nations and otherwise.

My country has learned that economic de-
velopment at the expense of the environment
imposes heavy costs in health and in the
quality of life generally — costs that can be
minimized by forethought and planning. We
are learning that it is far less costly and
more effective to build the necessary environ-
mental quality into new plants and new com-
munities from the outset than it is to rebuild
or modify old facilities.

This point bears repetition: The time to
do the job of environmental protection is at

the outset, not later. It is far cheaper and far
easier.

This point holds true for every country at
every stage of development. Economic prog-
ress does not have to be paid for in the degra-
dation of cities, the ruin of the countryside,
and the exhaustion of I'esources.

And the converse is equally true: Environ-
mental quality and resource conservation for
the long future do not have to be paid for in
economic stagnation or inequity.

Environmental quality cannot be allowed
to become the slogan of the privileged. Our
environmental vision must be broad enough
and compassionate enough to embrace the
full range of conditions that affect the quality
of life for all people. How can a man be said
to live in harmony with his environment
when that man is desperately poor and his
environment is a played-out farm? Or when
the man is a slumdweller and his environ-
ment is a garbage-strewn street? I reject
any understanding of environmental im-
provement that does not take into account
the circumstances of the hungry and the
homeless, the jobless and the illiterate, the
sick and the poor.

President Nixon, in transmitting to the
Congress the first annual report on the qual-
ity of our Nation's environment, expressed
this central thought when he said: "At the
heart of this concern for the environment
lies our concern for the human condition:
for the welfare of man himself, now and in
the future."

This insight — the unity of environmental
protection and economic well-being — is likely
to be one of the most vitally important in-
sights to emerge from this Stockholm Con-
ference. No longer should there by any quali-
tative difference between the goals of the
economist and those of the ecologist. A vital
humanism should inspire them both. Both
words derive from the same Greek word
meaning house. Perhaps it is time for the
economist and ecologist to move out of the
separate, cramped intellectual quarters they
still inhabit and take up residence together

108

Department of State Bulletin

in a larger house of ideas, whose name might
well be the house of man.

In that larger house, the economist will
take full account of what used to be called
"external diseconomies" such as pollution
and resource depletion, and he will assign
meaningful values to the purity of air and
water and the simple amenities we once
foolishly took for granted. He will develop
better measures of true well-being than the
conventional gross national product. The
ecologist, in turn, will extend his attention
beyond the balance of nature to include all
those activities of man's mind and hand that
make civilized life better than that of the
cavedwellers. Both will collaborate to advise
the planners and decisionmakers so that
cities and countryside of the future will pro-
mote the harmonious interaction of man with
man and of man with nature, so that re-
sources will remain for future generations,
and so that development will lead not just to
greater production of goods but also to a
higher quality of life.

This conference, then, is a great beginning.
The many countries here have differing ex-
perience and differing priorities, but all of us
are reaching toward a new realization of
truths taught us by science and by bitter ex-
perience. Together we can now broaden our
cooperation for the common good — to learn
the facts about man's interaction with his
earthly environment, to persevere in global
development efforts while taking new steps
to cleanse and protect the atmosphere, the
oceans, the soil, and the forests.

We are, of course, well aware of the limits
of international cooperation. It is often fitful
and troubled with false starts. The fact of
national sovereignty entails frank recogni-
tion that many or even most of the crucial
environmental actions have to be taken
freely by governments and by citizens in
their own interest as they see it. In my own
country we have taken vigorous measures in
recent years to clean up our air and our
waters, to reorganize our government struc-
ture for more effective environmental man-

agement, and to open up our courts and our
processes of government to the invigorating
energies of concerned private citizens. In
the quest for environmental quality, no need
is greater than the development and partici-
pation of a concerned, informed, and respon-
sible citizenry.

We in the United States are definitely be-
ginning to make progress in our war on
pollution. For example, the level of major air
pollutants such as particulates, carbon
monoxide, and sulfur oxides has dropped
significantly over the past three years in
most of our cities. The level of automobile
emissions is likewise going down. We still
have a long way to go, and there is no room
for complacency. But we are demonstrating
that the problems of environmental pollution
are not insoluble and that they can be dealt
with through determined action by govern-
ment and by citizens.

On the international level, we believe that
the United Nations itself has a vital role to
play in providing coordination and leader-
ship in the global quest for environmental
protection and the quality of life. The Stock-
holm Conference can help give direction and
energy to this historic opportunity for the
United Nations.

We have high hopes for the Stockholm
Conference. The United States has given its
full support to the preparations for it. Of the
nearly 200 recommendations submitted by
the Secretariat for our consideration, the
great majority have the general or specific
support of the United States.

This conference will do more than raise
the level of national and international con-
cern for environmental problems; indeed, it
has already achieved that. We are confident
that it will also generate national, regional,
and global action to recognize and solve those
problems which have a serious adverse im-
pact on the human environment.

Among the action proposals, in the view of
the United States, certain ones stand out as
of particular importance:

1. Specifically, the United States supports

July 24, 1972

109

the establishment of a permanent entity
within the United Nations — a 27-nation Com-
mission of the Economic and Social Council
and a high-level Secretariat unit — to coordi-
nate multinational environmental activity
and to provide a continuing focus for U.S.
attention to environmental problems.

2. The United States supports the creation
of a $100 million U.N. Environmental Fund
financed by voluntary contributions from
member governments. We are prepared to
commit $40 million over a five-year period on
a matching basis to the Fund.

3. We support and urge vigorous regional
action where this is necessary to adequate
management of environmental resources.
Last April the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Canada signed a
pioneering agreement committing both na-
tions to a cooperative long-term program to
protect the water quality of the Great Lakes.
But many other major international bodies
of water are in similar need. The Baltic, the
North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caspian,
the Rhine, the Danube, and many more in
every continent cry out for effective regional
environmental cooperation. In many of these
areas the time for action is rapidly running
out.

4. We support efforts to strengthen moni-
toring and assessment of the global environ-
ment and to that end to coordinate and sup-
plement existing systems for monitoring
human health, the atmosphere, the oceans,
and terrestrial environments.

5. We support coordinated research to
strengthen the capability of all nations to
develop sound environmental policies and
management.

6. We support effective international ac-
tion to help nations increase their environ-
mental capabilities. This includes the
strengthening of training, education, and
public information programs in the field of
environment, both to develop an environ-
mentally literate citizenry and to train pro-
fessional environmental scientists and man-
agers. It also includes the establishment of

improved mechanisms, such as an interna-
tional referral system, by which nations can
efficiently share their national experience
concerning the best methods of solving spe-
cific environmental problems in such fields as
land use planning, forest and wildlife man-
agement, urban water supply, et cetera.

7. We support creation of a World Herit-
age Trust to give recognition to the world
interest in the preservation of unique natural
and cultural sites.

8. We support international agreement at
the earliest practicable date to control the
dumping of wastes into the oceans, and we
also urge appropriate national action to sup-
port this objective. The announcement by
the delegate of the United Kingdom of the
progress recently made toward agreement
on an ocean-dumping convention is very
welcome, and the United States strongly sup-
ports prompt followup action. Marine pollu-
tion generally should have a high priority
for international cooperative action.

I recall last Christmas standing on a mag-
nificent stretch of lonely beach in the Baha-'
mas, watching the great sea waves sweep in
from the open Atlantic. Hardly a foot of that
beach was without its glob of oil, and the
upper reaches of the beach, at the limits of
the tide, were littered with the plastic and
other nondegradable detritus of our civiliza-
tion.

9. We support cooperative action to pro-
tect genetic resources and to protect wildlife.
For example, the United States hopes that
this conference will support the objective of
a moratorium on the commercial killing of
whales. Such action would be especially
timely in view of the scheduled session of the
International Whaling Commission (IWC)
in London later this month.

10. Recognizing that uniform pollution
standards are not practical or appropriate at
this time with respect to pollution which is
without significant global impacts, we sup-
port the establishment by the appropriate
international agencies of criteria upon which
national pollution control policies can be

110

Department of State Bulletin

based. We believe all nations, in their own
interest, will wish to establish and enforce
the highest practicable environmental stand-
ards needed to protect human health and the
environment. Even though these levels will
vary among nations, it is important that
every effort be made to harmonize differing
national environmental policies.

11. We support the identification and eval-
uation of potential environmental impacts of
proposed development activities. Such eval-
uations should normally lead to higher de-
velopment benefits in the long term. Like-
wise, we urge all nations and international
organizations to undertake systematic en-
vironmental analyses as a normal part of
their planning and decisionmaking activities.

12. Finally, we support the draft Declara-
tion on the Human Environment as a fitting
message from this conference to the world
and a further proof of our serious intent. In
particular, we support its important provi-
sions concerning the responsibility of states
for environmental damage and the obligation
of states to supply information on planned
activities that might injure the environment
of others. We believe that every nation
should adopt effective procedures to insure
that its neighbors have adequate notice of
plans and projects which could significantly
affect their environment and that measures
should be taken to assure that any such ad-
verse impacts be avoided or minimized.

The frustration of modern man is twofold.
There are those who have not even the basic
material equipment for a decent life and who
rightfully desire very ardently to acquire it.
But there are also those who get much of
what they ask for and who for a while go on
asking for more — more goods, more services,
more electric power, more comfort — until
some dark night, alone with themselves, they
are moved to ask: Why? What is it all
worth if the fields and the forests have been
despoiled, the air befouled, the animals re-
duced, and the broad oceans debased?

The fabric of human happiness is as com-
plex and as delicately balanced as natural

processes themselves. Our immense and still-
growing power over our surroundings must
go together with a new responsibility and a
new discipline, the discipline of conserving
resources, of limiting our births, of living
within the means of the natural support sys-
tems on which we depend.

Such thoughts raise difficult questions, and
the answers will vary widely from one nation
or region to another. But in other respects
the environmental and economic problems of
this one earth are truly global, and we need
to begin systematic analyses of them on a
global scale.

Certainly one truth is already undeniable:
In our use of resources we must have regard
for the needs of those who will come after us.
Our most fundamental obligation to future
generations is to enhance the estate we trans-
mit to them. Where once man saw himself
as custodian of a body of goods and values
and traditions, we now realize that he is also
custodian of nature itself. Our children will
not blame us for what we wisely use, but they
will not forgive us for the things we waste
that can never be replaced.

Now that the natural order is increasingly
subject to human design, our concern, our
sense of co-responsibility, must grow com-
mensurately with our new understanding.
There is a great excitement in the new jour-
ney we are on, a journey of understanding
and cooperation, not of mastery and conquest.
The essence of 20th-century achievement will
lie in our success in the struggle, not with
each other or with nature but with ourselves,
as we try to adapt creatively to the realiza-
tion that we are all hostages to each other on
a fruitful but fragile planet.

The nations of the earth have many oppor-
tunities for working together to meet these
challenges. The United States has joined in
numerous active bilateral and multilateral
arrangements for environmental protection.
I have already mentioned the recent Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement with Can-
ada. Two weeks ago, on May 23, President
Nixon and President Podgorny signed a

July 24, 1972

111

long-term agreement for close environmental
cooperation between the United States and
the Soviet Union. By signing the agreement,
both our countries have signaled to the world
the priority attention that should be devoted
to the environment and to working together
on the great causes of peace. Both nations
recognize the deep desire of all people to
direct their resources to solving the pressing
social problems of today.

It will be the task of the United Nations to
view all these environmental activities in a
global perspective, to speak for the whole
world on international environmental ques-
tions.

We know the United Nations cannot solve
every problem, but it must not set its sights
too low. It should be animated by the same
essential fact that has brought us together
in Stockholm: There is an environmental
crisis in this world. The crisis differs, it is
true, both in kind and in degree from one
nation or region to another, but it is a world
crisis nonetheless.

President Nixon, discussing the tasks fac-
ing the United Nations in his foreign policy
report to the American Congress early this
year, described the crisis and the response
to it in these words: ^

Ours is the age when man has first come to realize
that he can in fact destroy his own species. Ours is
the age when the problems and complexities of tech-
nological revolution have so multiplied that coping
with them is, in many ways, clearly beyond the
capacities of individual national governments. Ours,
therefore, must be the age when the international
institutions of cooperation are perfected. The basic
question is — can man create institutions to save him
from the dark forces of his own nature and from
the overwhelming consequences of his technological
successes ?

I believe profoundly that the answer is yes. . . .

Mr. President and fellow delegates to the
Stockholm Conference, it is by our actions,
both now and in the years to come, that we
have a chance to justify that affirmative an-

'■ The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled
"The United Nations" begins on p. 403.

swer. We need not act in hysteria, nor credit
every prophecy of ecological doom — but act
we must. If we act with vision and deter-
mination, we will preserve for the children
of all nations a chance to live in an earthly
home worthy of their needs and hopes.

STATEMENT BY DR. WHITE

U.S. delegation press release HE 13 dated June 9

The delegation of the United States con-
siders the recommendation on whales, now
befoi'e this committee, as being of the utmost
importance. As it now appears before us,
this recommendation requires considerable
strengthening in light of the desperate situa-
tion confronting the future of world whale
stocks. These stocks must be regarded as the
heritage of all mankind and not the preserve
of any one or of several nations. It is the
purpose of a conference such as this to take
account of and to take action on critical
environmental problems. We feel that strong
action in restoring the world whale stocks is
a matter of great urgency.

It is not that whales should not be used as
a resource, but we feel that this resource
should be used wisely so that future genera-
tions can also enjoy their bounty. It is
equally important that, through our modern
technology, we do not destroy this vital part
of the oceans' ecosystem, the health of which
is important to all mankind.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the steps
which this committee can and should take
will assure this end. For this reason we have
submitted the amendment. Mr. Chairman,
several questions have been raised in connec-
tion with this amendment and with the
recommendation as presented in the Secre-
tariat document, and I believe I can best ex-
plain our amendment by addressing these
questions. With it, recommendation 86
reads:

It is recommended that governments agree to
strengthen the International Whaling Commission,
to increase international research efforts, and as a
matter of urgency, to call for an international agree-
ment under the auspices of the International Whal-

112

Department of State Bulletin

ing Commission and involving all governments con-
cerned, for a ten-year moratorium on commercial
whaling.

First is the question of why a total mora-
torium; why not just one on endangered
species ?

A moratorium limited to endangered spe-
cies would represent no significant change
from the present status. The only species on
which there is agreement about endanger-
ment are the five already protected by the In-
ternational Whaling Commission. Conse-
quently, if the recommendation is limited to
endangered species only, it is meaningless,
since it is recommending the status quo. And
it is the status quo which has brought these
species to their status of endangerment and
has so depleted the other whales.

Next, why recommend a moratorium at
all? Why not maintain the present manage-
ment?

Our information indicates that fin, sei,
Bryde's, and sperm whales are either still
being excessively harvested, and conse-
quently declining in numbers, or are being
harvested at levels which preclude rebuild-
ing of depleted stocks.

Existing quota levels do not reflect the cau-
tion required by our lack of knowledge con-
cerning population structure and dynamics
of most exploited species. This holds partic-
ularly for newly exploited species such as
Minke, which is being taken without restric-
tion in absence of information on which to
base quotas.

It is not enough to seek protection for a
species only after its numbers have been so
reduced as to threaten its existence; when a
species is that depleted it no longer repre-
sents a resource for human welfare, nor can
it play any role in the marine ecosystem.

Whales are long-lived, relatively slowly
reproducing animals, so if we reduce popula-
tions overly, it takes a very long time for
them to rebuild — in some cases no recovery
has been observed even after 25 years of pro-
tection.

A moratorium would allow time for stocks
to start rebuilding. A moratorium would

allow time to develop a fund of knowledge as
basis for effective long-term management.
A moratorium would allow time to ade-
quately truly strengthen the IWC to make it
a more effective instrument.

The next question is, "Does this action not
undermine the IWC?" The answer is "No."
Our amendment specifically assures that the
IWC has the action responsibility. This rec-
ommendation is to governments for action
they can seek through the IWC, and IWC
derives its authority from governments. The
recommendation specifically gives IWC the
operational responsibility and specifically
urges strengthening of IWC.

A further question involves the qualifica-
tions of this conference to make a recommen-
dation in this field. Should this group make a
scientific judgment? Why not leave this to
the IWC?

The status of whales is vital to all nations.
First, because of need for food resources. If
adequate whale stocks exist in the future,
countries which do not now whale may have
the chance later, when the need will be
greater. Secondly, because whales 'represent
a variety of other values — scientific and es-
thetic among them. Thirdly, because whales
contribute to health and stability of the ma-
rine environment and consequently are of
significance to all nations.

This recommendation is just that — a rec-
ommendation for action by governments at
the IWC. It expresses the recommendation
of these nations which is to be taken into ac-
count by the operating body — IWC — in their
deliberations. Stockholm does not execute a
moratorium; it recommends.

The world is watching what we do on
whales. The whales have become a symbol
of the world's endangered life and of the suc-
cess of this conference in being able to deal
effectively with that part of our objectives.

This conference is not formulating a scien-
tific judgment. It is saying: "The nations of
the world are concerned about whales and
their contributions, now and in the future, to
human welfare. All exploited whale popula-
tions are reduced well below their original

July 24, 1972

113

numbers. Available information is conflict-
ing, but given the present situation, we do
not want the whales' future contribution to
mankind foreclosed by current exploitation.
We recommend the moratorium as a prudent,
cautious procedure to assure that we do not
lose our future options."

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we be-
lieve that this conference not only has the
right but has the obligation to take these
steps to assure that the world as a whole
does not lose the important resource repre-
sented by these whales.

RESOLUTION ON INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS -

The United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, convinced of the need for prompt and
effective implementation by governments and the
international community of measures designed to
safeguard and enhance the human environment for
the benefit of present and future generations of
mankind, recognizing that responsibility for action
to protect and enhance the human environment rests
primarily with governments and, in the first instance,
can be exercised more effectively at the national and
regional levels, recognizing that environmental prob-
lems of broad international significance fall within
the competence of the United Nations system, bear-
ing in mind that international cooperative pro-
grammes in the environment field must be under-
taken with due respect to the sovereign rights of
states and in conformity with the United Nations
charter and principles of international law, mindful
of the sectoral responsibilities of the organizations
of the United Nations system.

Conscious of the significance of regional and sub-
regional cooperation in the field of the Human
Environment and of the important role of the Re-
gional Economic Commissions and other regional in-
tergovernmental organizations, emphasizing that
problems of the human environment constitute a new
and important area for international cooperation and
that the complex interdependence of such problems
requires new approaches, recognizing that the rel-
evant international scientific and other professional
communities can make an important contribution to
international cooperation in the field of the human
environment, conscious of the need for processes
within the United Nations system which would effec-
tively assist developing countries to implement en-

' Adopted by the conference on June 15 (unofficial
text).

vironmental policies and programmes compatible
with their development plans and to participate
meaningfully in international environmental pro-
grammes, convinced that, in order to be effective,
international cooperation in the field of the human
environment requires additional financial and tech-
nical resources, aware of the urgent need for a
permanent institutional arrangement within the
United Nations for the protection and improvement
of the human environment, and governing council
for environmental programmes,

1. Recommends that the General Assembly estab-
lish the governing council for environmental pro-
grammes composed of fifty-four members, elected
for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geo-
graphical distribution.

2. Recommends further that the governing council
have the following main functions and responsi-
bilities:

A. To promote international cooperation in the
environment field and to recommend, as appropriate,
policies to this end.

B. To provide general policy guidance for the
direction and coordination of environmental pro-
grammes within the United Nations system.

C. To receive and review the periodic reports of
the Executive Director on the implementation of
environmental programmes within the United Na-
tions system.

D. To keep under review the world environmental
situation in order to ensure that emerging environ-
mental problems of wide international significance
should receive appropriate and adequate considera-
tion by governments.

E. To promote the contribution of the relevant
international scientific and other professional com-
munities to the acquisition, assessment and exchange
of environmental knowledge and information and, as
appropriate, to the technical aspects of the formula-
tion and implementation of environmental pro-
grammes within the United Nations system.

F. To maintain under continuing review the im-
pact of national and international environmental
policies and measures on developing countries, as
well as the problem of additional costs that might be
incurred by developing countries in the implementa-
tion of environmental programmes and projects, to
ensure that such programmes and projects are com-
patible with the development plans and priorities of
those countries.

G. To review and approve annually the pro-
gramme of utilization of resources of the environ-
ment fund.

3. Recommends further that the governing council
report annually to the General Assembly through the
Economic and Social Council, which would transmit
to the Assembly such comments on the report as it
may deem necessary, particularly with regard to

114

Department of State Bulletin

questions of coordination and to the relationship of
environment policies and programmes within the
United Nations system to overall economic and so-
cial policies and priorities.

Environment Secretariat

4. Recommends that a small Secretariat be estab-
lished in the United Nations, with headquarters in

, to serve as a focal point for

environmental actions and coordination within the
United Nations system in such a way as to ensure
a high degree of effective management.

5. Recommends further that the Environment Sec-
retariat be headed by the Executive Director, who
shall be elected by the General Assembly on the
nomination of the Secretary-General, and who shall
be entrusted, inter alia, with the following responsi-
bilities:

(a) To provide substantive support to the govern-
ing council.

(b) Under the guidance of the governing council,
to coordinate environmental programmes within the
United Nations system, to keep under review their
implementation and assess their effectiveness.

(c) To advise, as appropriate and under the guid-
ance of the governing council, intergovernmental
bodies of the United Nations system on the formula-
tion and implementation of environmental pro-
grammes.

(d) To secure the effective cooperation of, and
contribution from, the relevant scientific and other
professional communities from all parts of the world.

(e) To provide, at the request of all parties con-
cerned, advisory services for the promotion of inter-
national cooperation in the field of the environment.

(f) To submit to the governing council, on his own
initiative or upon request, proposals embodying me-
dium- and long-range planning for United Nations
programmes in the environment field.

(g) To bring to the attention of the governing
council any matter which he deems to require con-
sideration by it.

(h) To administer, under the authority and policy
guidance of the governing council, the environment
fund.

(i) To report on environment matters to the gov-
erning council.

(j) To perform such other functions as may be
entrusted to him by the governing council.

The Environment Fund

6. Recommends that, in order to provide for addi-
tional financing for environmental programmes, a
voluntary fund be established in accordance with
existing United Nations financial procedures.

7. Recommends further that, in order to enable
the governing council to fulfill its policy guidance
role for the direction and coordination of environ-
mental activities, the fund finance wholly or partly
the costs of the new environmental initiatives under-

taken within the United Nations system. These will
include the initiatives envisaged in the action plan
adopted by the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, with particular attention to
integrated projects, and such other environmental
activities as may be decided upon by the governing
council. The governing council shall review these
initiatives with a view to taking appropriate de-
cisions as to their continued financing.

8. Recommends further that the fund be used for
financing such programmes of general interest as
regional and global monitoring, assessment and
data-collecting systems, including, as appropriate,
costs for national counterparts, improvement of en-
vironmental quality management, environmental re-
search, information exchange and dissemination,
public education and training, assistance for na-
tional, regional and global environmental institu-
tions; promotion of environmental research and
studies for the development of industrial and other
technologies best suited to a policy of economic
growth compatible with adequate environmental
safeguards; and such other programmes as the gov-
erning council may decide upon. In the implementa-
tion of such programmes due account should be
taken of the special needs of the developing coun-
tries.

9. Recommends that the costs of servicing the
governing council and providing the small core
Secretariat be borne by the regular budget of the
United Nations, operational programme costs, pro-
gramme support and administrative costs of the
fund shall be borne by the fund.

10. Recommends further that, in order to ensure
that the development priorities of developing coun-
tries are not adversely affected, adequate measures
be taken to provide additional financial resources on
terms compatible with the economic situation of the
recipient developing country. To this end, the Execu-
tive Director, in cooperation with competent organi-
zations will keep this problem under continuing re-
view.

11. Recommends that the fund, in pursuance of the
objectives stated in paragraphs 7 and 8, be directed
to the need for effective coordination in the imple-
mentation of international environmental pro-
grammes of the organizations of the United Nations
system and other international organizations.

12. Recommends that, in the implementation of
programmes to be financed by the fund, organiza-
tions outside the United Nations system, particularly
those in the countries and regions concerned, also
be utilized as appropriate, in accordance with the
procedures established by the governing council;
such organizations are invited to support the United
Nations environment programs by complementary
initiatives and contributions.

13. Recommends that the governing council formu-
late such general procedures as are necessary to gov-
ern the operations of the fund.

July 24, 1972

115

Coordination

14. Recommends that in order to provide for the
maximum efficient coordination of United Nations
environmental programmes, an environmental co-
ordinating board, chaired by the Executive Director,
be established under the auspices and within the
framework of the administrative committee on co-
ordination.

15. Recommends further that the environmental
coordinating board meet periodically for the purpose
of ensuring- cooperation and coordination among all
bodies concerned in the implementation of environ-
mental programmes and that it report annually to
the governing council.

16. Invites the organizations of the United Na-
tions system to adopt the measures that may be
required to undertake concerted and coordinated
programmes with regard to international environ-
mental problems, taking into account existing pro-
cedures for prior consultation, particularly on pro-
gramme and budgetary matters.

17. Invites the regional economic commissions and
the economic and social office in Beirut, in coopera-
tion, where necessary, with other appropriate re-
gional bodies, to further intensify their efforts aimed
at contributing to the implementation of environ-
mental programmes in view of the particular need
for rapid development of regional cooperation in this
field.

18. Invites also other intergovernmental and those
non-governmental organizations which have interest
in the field of the environment to lend their full sup-
port and collaboration to the United Nations with a
view to achieving the largest possible degree of co-
operation and coordination.

19. Calls upon governments to ensure that ap-
propriate national institutions shall be entrusted
with the task of coordination of environmental ac-
tion, both national and international.

20. Recommends that the General Assembly re-
view, as appropriate, at its Thirty-first Session, the
institutional arrangements which it may decide
upon in pursuance of this recommendation, bearing
in mind, inter alia, the responsibilities of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council under the charter.

DECURATION ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT ^

The United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment,

Having met at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972,
and

Having considered the need for a common outlook
and for common principles to inspire and guide the

' Adopted by the conference on June 16 (United
Nations press release HE/144 dated June 20).

peoples of the world in the preservation and enhance-
ment of the human environment,

Proclaims

1. Man is both creature and moulder of his envi-
ronment which gives him physical sustenance and
affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral,
social and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous
evolution of the human race on this planet a stage
has been reached when through the rapid accelera-
tion of science and technology, man has acquired the
power to transform his environment in countless
ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of
man's environment, the natural and the man-made,
are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment
of basic human rights — even the right to life itself.

2. The protection and improvement of the human
environment is a major issue which aff^ects the well-
being of peoples and economic development through-
out the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples
of the whole world and the duty of all governments.

3. Man has constantly to sum up experience and
go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing.
In our time man's capability to transform his sur-
roundings, if used wisely, can bring to all peoples
the benefits of development and the opportunity to
enhance the quality of life. Wrongly or heedlessly
applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to
human beings and the human environment. We see
around us growing evidence of man-made harm in
many regions of the earth: dangerous levels of pol-
lution in water, air, earth and living beings; major
and undesirable disturbances to the ecological bal-
ance of the biosphere; destruction and depletion of
irreplaceable resources; and gross deficiencies harm-
ful to the physical, mental and social health of man,
in the man-made environment, particularly in the
living and working environment.

4. In the developing countries most of the environ-
mental problems are caused by under-development.
Millions continue to live far below the minimum
levels required for a decent human existence, de-
prived of adequate food and clothing, shelter and
education, health and sanitation. Therefore, the de-
veloping countries must direct their efforts to de-
velopment, bearing in mind their priorities and the
need to safeguard and improve the environment. For
the same purpose, the industrialized countries should
make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves
and the developing countries. In the industrialized
countries, environmental problems are generally re-
lated to industrialization and technological develop-
ment.

5. The natural growth of population continuously
presents problems on the preservation of the envi-
ronment, and adequate policies and measures should
be adopted as appropriate to face these problems.
Of all things, in the world, people are the most
precious. It is the people that propel social progress,

116

Department of State Bulletin

create social wealth, develop science and technology,
and through their hard work, continuously transform
the human environment. Along with social progress
and the advance of production, science and technol-
ogy the capability of man to improve the environ-
ment increases with each passing day.

6. A point has been reached in history when we
must shape our actions throughout the world with a
more prudent care for their environmental conse-
quences. Through ignorance or indifference we can
do massive and irreversible harm to the earthly
environment on which our life and well-being depend.
Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser
action, we can achieve for ourselves and our poster-
ity a better life in an environment more in keeping
with human needs and hopes. There are broad vistas
for the enhancement of environmental quality and
the creation of a good life. What is needed is an
enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but
orderly work. For the purpose of attaining freedom
in the world of nature, man must use knowledge to
build in collaboration with nature a better environ-
ment. To defend and improve the human environment
for present and future generations has become an
imperative goal for mankind — a goal to be pursued
together with, and in harmony with, the established
and fundamental goals of peace and of world-wide
economic and social development.

7. To achieve this environmental goal will demand
the acceptance of responsibility by citizens and com-
munities and by enterprises and institutions at every
level, all sharing equitably in common efforts. Indi-
viduals in all walks of life as well as organizations
in many fields, by their values and the sum of their
actions, will shape the world environment of the
future. Local and national governments will bear
the greatest burden for large-scale environmental
policy and action within their jurisdictions. Inter-
national co-operation is also needed in order to raise
resources to support the developing countries in
carrying out their responsibilities in this field. A
growing class of environmental problems, because
they are regional or global in extent or because they
affect the common international realm, will require
extensive co-operation among nations and action by
international organizations in the common interest.
The Conference calls upon the Governments and peo-
ples to exert common efforts for the preservation
and improvement of the human environment, for the
benefit of all the people and for their posterity.

PRINCIPLES

States the Common Conviction That

1. Man has the fundamental right to freedom,
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an en-
vironment of a quality which permits a life of dig-
nity and well-being, and bears a solemn responsi-
bility to protect and improve the environment for

present and future generations. In this respect, poli-
cies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial
segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms
of oppression and foreign domination stand con-
demned and must be eliminated.

2. The natural resources of the earth including
the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially
representative samples of natural ecosystems must
be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future
generations through careful planning or manage-
ment as appropriate.

3. The capacity of the earth to produce vital
renewable resources must be maintained and wher-
ever practicable restored or improved.

4. Man has a special responsibility to safeguard
and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its
habitat which are now gravely imperilled by a com-
bination of adverse factors. Nature conservation
including wildlife must therefore receive importance
in planning for economic development.

5. The non-renewable resources of the earth must
be employed in such a way as to guard against the
danger of their future exhaustion and to ensure that
benefits from such employment are shared by all
mankind.

6. The discharge of toxic substances or of other
substances and the release of heat, in such quantities
or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the
environment to render them harmless, must be
halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible
damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just
struggle of the peoples of all countries against pol-
lution should be supported.

7. States shall take all possible steps to prevent
pollution of the seas by substances that are liable
to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or
to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

8. Economic and social development is essential
for ensuring a favourable living and working en-
vironment for man and for creating conditions on
earth that are necessary for the improvement of the
quality of life.

9. Environmental deficiencies generated by the
conditions of under-development and natural disas-
ters pose grave problems and can best be remedied
by accelerated development through the transfer of
substantial quantities of financial and technological
assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of
the developing countries and such timely assistance
as may be required.

10. For the developing countries, stability of
prices and adequate earnings for primary commodi-
ties and raw material are essential to environmental
management since economic factors as well as eco-
logical processes must be taken into account.

11. The environmental policies of all States should
enhance and not adversely affect the present or fu-
ture development potential of developing countries,

July 24, 1972

117

nor should they hamper the attainment of better
living- conditions for all, and appropriate steps
should be taken by States and international organi-
zations with a view to reaching agreement on meet-
ing the possible national and international economic
consequences resulting from the application of en-
vironmental measures.

12. Resources should be made available to pre-
serve and improve the environment, taking into ac-
count the circumstances and particular requirements
of developing countries and any costs which may
emanate from their incorporating environmental
safeguards into their development planning and the
need for making available to them, upon their re-
quest, additional international technical and financial
assistance for this purpose.

13. In order to achieve a more rational manage-
ment of resources and thus to improve the environ-
ment, iStates should adopt an integrated and co-
ordinated approach to their development planning
so as to ensure that development is compatible with
the need to protect and improve the human environ-
ment for the benefit of their population.

14. Rational planning constitutes an essential tool
for reconciling any conflict between the needs of
development and the need to protect and improve the
environment.

15. Planning must be applied to human settle-
ments and urbanization with a view to avoiding
adverse effects on the environment and obtaining
maximum social, economic and environmental bene-
fits for all. In this respect projects which are de-
signed for colonialist and racist domination must be
abandoned.

16. Demographic policies, which are without preju-
dice to basic human rights and which are deemed
appropriate by Governments concerned, should be
applied in those regions where the rate of population
growth or excessive population concentrations are
likely to have adverse effects on the environment or
development, or where low population density may
prevent improvement of the human environment
and impede development.

17. Appropriate national institutions must be en-
trusted with the task of planning, managing or con-
trolling the environmental resources of States with
the view to enhancing environmental quality.

18. Science and technology, as part of their con-
tribution to economic and social development, must
be applied to the identification, avoidance and con-
trol of environmental risks and the solution of en-
vironmental problems and for the common good of
mankind.

19. Education in environmental matters, for the
younger generation as well as adults, giving due
consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in
order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion
and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises
and communities in protecting and improving the
environment in its full human dimension. It is also

essential that mass media of communications avoid
contributing to the deterioration of the environment,
but, on the contrary, disseminate information of an
educational nature on the need to enable man to
develop in every respect.

20. Scientific research and development in the
context of environmental problems, both national
and multinational, must be promoted in all countries,
especially the developing countries. In this con-
nexion, the free flow of up-to-date scientific informa-
tion and transfer of experience must be supported
and assisted, to facilitate the solution of environ-
mental problems; environmental technologies should
be made available to developing countries on terms
which would encourage their wide dissemination
without constituting an economic burden on the
developing countries.

21. States have, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental poli-
cies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

22. States shall co-operate to develop further the
international law regarding liability and compensa-
tion for the victims of pollution and other environ-
mental damage caused by activities within the juris-
diction or control of such States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction.

23. Without prejudice to such criteria as may be
agreed upon by the international community, or to
the standards which will have to be determined
nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider
the systems of values prevailing in each country, and
the extent of the applicability of standards which
are valid for the most advanced countries but which
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost
for the developing countries.

24. International matters concerning the protec-
tion and improvement of the environment should be
handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big
or small, on an equal footing. Co-operation through
multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other ap-
propriate means is essential to effectively control,
prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental
effects resulting from activities conducted in all
spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of
the sovereignty and interests of all States.

25. States shall ensure that international organi-
zations play a co-ordinated, efficient and dynamic
role for the protection and improvement of the
environment.

26. Man and his environment must be spared the
effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of
mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt
agreement, in the relevant international organs, on
the elimination and complete destruction of such
weapons.

118

Department of State Bulletin

Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S. Policy

Address by David D. Newsom

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

Interest here at home in a meaningful
U.S. policy toward Africa has clearly been
growing in recent years. We welcome this
interest. We feel it should be accompanied
by an accurate knowledge and an increased
understanding of what our policy is.

I regret to say that our policy and actions
have been misunderstood on occasion and
misinterpreted. It is not my purpose here
today to make a partisan speech. As the
steward of our African policy over the past
three years, however, I should like to take
this occasion to set the record straight.

The growing interest in Africa in this
country was manifested most dramatically
during the last weekend in May when a
conference of 400 black Americans at
Howard University was followed by an im-
pressive demonstration by over 10,000 per-
sons in Washington on behalf of African
liberation. As is natural to an occasion to-
tally directed to one area of policy, there
were many critical of official policies — not
always, however, with a full knowledge of
what the policies are and of the complexities
of making those policies. Charges ranged
from "neglect" of Africa to assertions that
present policies represented a shift from the
past purposely in favor of the white-domi-
nated regimes of southern Africa. Quite
understandably, because of the identity with
racial problems, the focus of attention of this
surging interest in Africa is on the southern
portion of the continent.

' Made before the Mid-America Committee at Chi-
cago, 111., on June 28 (press release 156).

There have been other manifestations of
both rising interest and serious misconcep-
tion. The New York Times of April 2 high-
lighted what it called the deliberate increase
of contacts and communication with the
white-dominated regimes of southern Africa.
A statement issued through the office of
Congressman Diggs of the House Subcom-
mittee on Africa spoke of "collaboration"
with the white regimes.

There has also been criticism from those
who dislike our policies on the grounds that
these policies do not sufficiently recognize
certain of our interests in southern Africa.
Motivated by concern over strategic or eco-
nomic considerations, by basic sympathies
with the white populations of the area, or by
reluctance to see us become involved in prob-
lems of distant regions, many express their
disapproval of traditional U.S. restraint
toward the regimes of southern Africa.

Individual American attitudes toward this
area vary widely. Those making policy are
in the middle.

To set the record straight on what our pol-
icies can be and what they are, let us examine
first those elements that have been constant
in U.S. policy toward southern Africa since
the late fifties:

— First, the United States Government has
consistently supported the principle of self-
determination for all peoples in Africa.

— Second, we have strongly and actively
indicated our abhorrence of the institution of
apartheid.

— Third, we have consistently favored

July 24, 1972

119

peaceful change in southern Africa through
supporting constructive alternatives to the
use of force.

Our implementation of these principles has
been governed, for more than a decade and
through several administrations, by our rec-
ognition of four realities:

1. As a nation, we have complex world-
wide relationships. Our response to the needs
of one area frequently is limited by our in-
terests in another. For example, the differ-
ence between interests in Europe and in
Africa has affected our position in both.

2. We are dealing in southern Africa
with governments which react strongly to
outside pressures and are not easily suscep-
tible to persuasion.

3. We are dealing with complex socie-
ties, not with the interest of one race, but of
many. Justice requires a consideration of
the future of all.

4. There are many real limitations on
the extent to which we can influence the situ-
ation, both in terms of what might be sup-
ported domestically and of what we might be
able to do in Africa.

The actions of the U.S. Government in this
area over the past three years have been
consistent with these general policy lines and
limitations laid down in the years just after
the emergence of independent Africa.

By the strict maintenance of arms embar-
goes toward both South Africa and the Por-
tuguese territories, we have tangibly demon-
strated our support for self-determination
and our desire to avoid any support either
for the imposition of apartheid or for the
continuation of colonial rule.

The maintenance of an arms embargo may
sound like a passive act. It is not. It re-
quires constant vigilance over shipments to
the area. It means considerable sacrifice on
the part of U.S. exporters who have seen sub-
stantial sales in southern Africa go to coun-
tries less conscientious about the embargo
and less criticized by the Africans. It means
a continuing effort on our part to explain to
those in this country opposed to the em-
bargoes the absolute necessity of maintain-

ing them in terms of our wider interests in
Africa. We believe this policy has been effec-
tive. No proof has ever been presented that
any weapons have gone from the United
States to southern Africa since the embar-
goes were established in 1963.

The maintenance of the arms embargo has
been accompanied, particularly in the case of
South Africa, by a strict limitation on con-
tact with that country's military. Because we
have not wished to risk subjecting our men
to apartheid, we have since 1967 avoided U.S.
naval visits to South African ports despite
the frequent need for U.S. Navy transit of
this area. This has added to logistical prob-
lems for the Navy.

The U.S. Embassy and the U.S. consul-
ates general in South Africa continue to con-
stitute significant bridges between the races
in that country. Multiracial entertaining,
contact with South Africans of all races, and
the facilitation of such contacts for Ameri-
can visitors in the country leave little doubt
as to where the United States stands with
respect to apartheid. The record of the U.S.
mission in this regard is in important re-
spects a unique one.

We have, further, during the past three
years sought to add new dimensions to these
efforts.

We have expanded our contacts with all
elements of the South African population.
We have offered significant members of the
South African majority the opportunity to
visit this country. During the past three
years, we have had 4.5 official visitors from
South Africa, of whom 30 have been from the
black, colored, and Indian communities.
Many of the white as well as the black and
colored South Africans whom we have in-
vited here have been persons deeply involved
in seeking alternatives to apartheid.

It is, perhaps, pertinent that the Foreign
Minister of South Africa felt obliged to
point out to his Parliament on May 5 that
present U.S. policy did not accept the South
African approach to evolution within that
country but sought, through persuasion, to
bring about peaceful change.
We have begun to break down racial bar-

120

Department of State Bulletin

riers regarding the assignment of American
official personnel to South Africa. Black
diplomatic couriers have now been placed on
the runs to South Africa. Three black For-
eign Service officers have, during the past
year, been on temporary duty assignments in
the Republic. Black Americans have been
sent to South Africa under our official cul-
tural exchange program.

In the case of Namibia, or South West
Africa, we strongly supported the proposal at
the United Nations to have the International
Court of Justice take up the question of
South Africa's continued administration of
the territory. We accepted the Court's con-
clusions that South Africa's mandate over
the territory was terminated and that South
Africa's continued presence there is illegal.

We alone among major countries have
taken the position of discouraging any new
investment in the territory. We encourage
U.S. firms already in Namibia to set the pace
in improved employee relations. We con-
sistently have supported the U.N.'s responsi-
bility in the territory.

In our support for alternatives in south-
ern Africa, we have increased our assistance
dramatically to the smaller majority-ruled
states of southern Africa: Botswana, Leso-
tho, and Swaziland. We will in July be sign-
ing a $12 million loan agreement for the con-
struction of a road linking Botswana to
Zambia and providing an economic outlet to
the north for that nation. In 1971 for the
first time we appointed an Ambassador — a
black American — to represent us in these
three countries.

In the continuing interplay of U.S. inter-
ests, decisions must be made in which one
set of interests may prevail, in any specific
case, over another. In the region of southern
Africa there are five areas in particular
where conflicting interests have affected
policies — in every administration. For south-
ern Africa has in the past 15 years presented
particularly difficult policy problems: The
Portuguese territories, relations with the
liberation movements, pressures at the
United Nations, Rhodesia, and investment in
South Africa are some of these.

Critics of U.S. policies seek to take isolated
decisions in these problem areas and read
into them a basic change in the course of
U.S. African policy. In doing so they tend to
neglect decisions which with equal logic point
in the opposite direction.

In the more extreme form, a few critics
have claimed that there is a conscious effort
on the part of the U.S. Government at this
time to favor the white-ruled governments of
southern Africa. I have had to deny both in
Africa and in this country that we have
chosen sides in the southern conflict and that
the United States would intervene on the
side of the white regimes in the event of
trouble.

There is no basis for such assumptions.
They ignore the large and growing U.S. in-
terest in black Africa and, particularly, our
interest in the majority-ruled states in south-
ern Africa. They ignore the fact that our
one major intervention in Africa, in close
collaboration with the U.N., was to preserve
the unity of the Congo — against eff'orts to
dismember it supported by the white-domi-
nated regimes. This intervention was or-
dered by President Eisenhower and fully
supported and carried on by President Ken-
nedy.

Relations With Portugal

The most difficult area relates to our rela-
tions with Portugal. Portugal is an ally, a
charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. For more than two decades
we have enjoyed the use of base facilities in
the Azores, Portuguese islands in the mid-
Atlantic. These base facilities are of great
importance to our antisubmarine defenses in
the face of a growing Soviet submarine pres-
ence in the area.

Although our last formal agreement to
continue stationing forces in the Azores
lapsed in 1962, the Portuguese permitted us
to stay on. When a new Portuguese Gov-
ernment took office in 1968, it insisted that
we formalize our presence in the Azores by
renewing the lapsed agreement. We con-
curred and also agreed to a related request
that we examine areas in which the United

July 24, 1972

121

states could assist Portugal in economic and
social development. The final agreement did
not follow the usual pattern of granting mili-
tary assistance for military bases but was in-
stead solely related to economic and educa-
tional development in metropolitan Portugal.

Now, this base agreement has drawn a
great deal of attention and has attracted
substantial comment both in the United
States and in Africa.^ I am afraid that de-
spite our best efforts at explaining the terms
it has been greatly misunderstood, and even
misrepresented. Much of the confusion has
concerned Export-Import Bank credits for
American exporters competing for contracts
in Portugal. In a letter to the Portuguese on
this subject, the Secretary of State said that
we had reviewed a number of development
projects that they had in mind and that the
Export-Import Bank would consider financ-
ing exports for those projects in accordance
with the usual loan criteria and practices of
the Bank. Export-Import Bank facilities
have always been available for U.S. firms
seeking business in Portugal, and this agree-
ment represented absolutely no change in
that policy. No commitment was made to
extend credits in any amount, only to con-
sider applications as before.

The principal objection voiced against the
agreement holds that it releases Portuguese
resources for use in the African wars. But
in fact, Portugal has large exchange reserves
as the result of conservative fiscal policies.
Our refusal to grant credit would not lead
others to do the same. There is no evidence
to suggest that our withholding credit would
in any sense deter the Portuguese from pur-
suing their present policies in Africa.

Liberation Movements in Africa

We recognize that the question of our rela-
tions with Portugal and with Portuguese
Africa is becoming increasingly an emotional
issue in this country. Closely related to this
is the question of our relations with all libera-
tion movements in Africa. Many in Africa
and America judge one's attitude toward the

southern African issues as a whole by the
attitude taken toward the liberation move-
ments and their leaders.

The African movements targeted against
the several parts of white-ruled southern
Africa vary widely in size, effectiveness, co-
hesion, and activity. Those targeted against
the Portuguese territories appear to be mili-
tarily the most active. They are receiving
help from the Soviets and Chinese. The lead-
ers of the movements seek contacts with and
help from the West.

The question of U.S. official relations with
leaders of opposition movements in colonial
territories has always posed a dilemma for
American policymakers. It was true in the
fifties with respect particularly to North
Africa. It has been no less true throughout
the sixties and today in that part of Africa
still under colonial or white domination.

These movements are a political fact. On
the one hand, the absence of contact or sup-
port from us leaves the leaders subject to
certain other outside influences. On the other
hand, the United States has traditionally
been unwilling to recognize opposition ele-
ments in colonial territories until an inter-
nationally recognized transfer of power has
taken place. That situation still prevails
today. Nevertheless, in such areas, as in the
past, both U.S. Government and private or-
ganizations seek opportunities to help with
appropriate humanitarian and educational
assistance to refugees affected by the con-
flicts.

African Issues in the United Nations

The problem in the United Nations is par-
ticularly difficult.

We have a basic sympathy with the aspira-
tions of the Africans to see an end to apart-
heid and colonial government and to see a
greater recognition of the need for racial
justice and equality. Most African leaders
understand and appreciate this. At the same

' For background and texts of a U.S. note and
U.S. letters dated Dec. 9, 1971, see Bulletin of
Jan. 3, 1972, p. 7.

122

Department of State Bulletin

time, because of our own traditions and his-
torical experience, they expect more of the
United States — more than they expect of
others. We cannot always meet these expec-
tations.

During 1971, if we take together General
Assembly and Security Council votes on
African issues, we voted for 15 specific Afri-
can proposals, against 11, and abstained on
12.

Many Africans believe this record is in-
adequate. Yet, underlying the careful con-
sideration given each vote was a deep dedi-
cation to many of the same principles
motivating African representatives and our
desire, whenever possible, to vote with the
Africans. Ironically, we could have voted for
most of these proposals if only one or two
extreme or unrealistic features had been
eliminated. We were able to negotiate, how-
ever, in many cases, agreements on language
changes so we could vote with the Africans.
Many of the problems we had did not relate
to Africa per se, but involved broader ques-
tions. They related to:

— Our desire to avoid establishing world-
wide legal precedents which could affect
broader U.S. and U.N. interests.

— The need to verify facts before condemn-
ing another state.

— Our deep concern over increases in the
budget of the United Nations.

Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia

With regard to Rhodesia, the U.S. Govern-
ment has sought to support United Nations
economic sanctions as an alternative to a vio-
lent solution and as a form of pressure on the
Smith regime to negotiate a new basis for
independence. We closed our consulate in
Rhodesia. We closed off all contact with the
Smith regime. We enforced sanctions against
Rhodesia as conscientiously as any nation,
and more so than most.

This has not been a universally popular
policy in this country. There are those who
dislike the idea of sanctions against anyone,
those who are aware of extensive violations

by other countries, those whose own interests
have in some way been affected, and still
others who are disillusioned with the United
Nations and opposed to the concept of United
Nations mandatory action infringing on the
United States.

There are those who deplore the fact that
while other countries have been ignoring
sanctions with impunity, the United States
was forced to pay higher prices to the Soviet
Union for strategic materials. These atti-
tudes resulted in the action of the Congress
last year to exempt strategic materials from
Rhodesian sanctions and allow their importa-
tion into the United States unless there is a
similar embargo on such materials from
Communist countries. Efforts this year to
obtain the repeal of the resultant legislation
have not been successful.

This move has caused adverse reactions in
Africa. It created a contradiction between
our domestic and international obligations.
It came at a time when Britain was seeking
a settlement with Rhodesia and undoubtedly
led the Rhodesians for a time to believe that
sanctions as a whole were visibly crumbling.
While there have been far more extensive
sanctions violations by others, this open and
official U.S. act has made us appear the prin-
cipal culprit, in New York and in Africa,
condemned by resolutions both in the U.N.
and in the Organization of African Unity.
I dislike deeply seeing ourselves in this posi-
tion.

U.S. Investments in South Africa

Finally, there is the question of U.S. in-
vestments in South Africa. There are those
who see the failure of the U.S. Government
to seek to restrict such investments as an
indication of sympathy for the policies of
South Africa. There are those who assume
that the presence of these investments auto-
matically means that we will intervene in the
event of trouble in that area. Neither as-
sumption is correct. Here, again, the record
needs to be set straight:

— First, U.S. investment in South Africa

July 24, 1972

123

represents only 16 percent of total foreign in-
vestment in that country. It represents only
a fourth of total U.S. investment in Africa,
a ratio that is decreasing all the time. It is
not likely that U.S. withdrawal of this invest-
ment, assuming this were feasible, would
force change in South Africa. There is no
valid basis for speculating that the United
States would take extraordinary measures to
protect this investment in the event of civil
or other disturbance when, among other fac-
tors, more substantial investment in the rest
of the continent would need to be weighed in
the balance.

— Second, much of this investment is
linked with South African business interests;
withdrawal would not be easy even if the
United States had authority to force with-
drawal by American companies. New U.S.
investment in South Africa comes to a large
extent from current profits of U.S. firms
operating there.

— Third, the United States does not en-
courage investment in South Africa nor ex-
tend guarantees covering such investment.
It is the economic situation in that country
that attracts investment.

— Fourth, while there is debate in the
United States and in South Africa on this
point, our soundings indicate that the black
and colored populations of South Africa do
not want to see U.S. investment withdrawn.
The majority see U.S. investment as a con-
structive force; they wish to see it remain
and make an impact on that society.

The United States Government, therefore,
neither encourages nor discourages invest-
ment in South Africa. It does encourage U.S.
firms that are there to lead the way in up-
grading the status of non-white workers and
in contributions to social and educational
improvement. It is a misleading oversimpli-
fication to suggest that the presence of that
investment either draws us into the conflict
of races in that area or commits us to a policy
favorable to apartheid.

The southern African aspect, however, is
not the only element in U.S. policy toward
Africa. There are 41 independent African
states other than South Africa. In many of

them we have major interests and invest-
ments. We desire satisfactory relations with
all.

Cliches exist about this aspect of our
policy as well. People speak of "neglect,"
and "low priority." The facts do not bear
this out.

With patient effort, we have established
reasonably satisfactory relations with all but
one of these states. We have, in the past
three years, resumed diplomatic relations
with Mauritania; we have strengthened our
relations with Algeria and the Sudan despite
the continued absence of formal diplomatic
ties. Of all the states in Africa, only in
Congo (Brazzaville) do we not have reason-
able access to the leadership and a reasonably
I'espected relationship.

African nations welcome the attention we
have given to them and to their citizens as
significant members of the world community.
We have, from its inception, recognized the
Organization of African Unity as a forward-
looking institution representing the common
interests and identities of Africans.

Through visits, correspondence, and the
work of our diplomatic missions, v/e have es-
tablished bonds of friendship and common
interest which belie any suggestion of ne-
glect. The Ambassador of one of the most
militant African countries recently told one
of our officers that he was preparing a
memorandum for his government emphasiz-
ing the degree of attention given both per-
sonally to him and to the needs and interests
of Africa by those in the U.S. Government.
We are in continuing correspondence with
several African heads of state, including one
from another militant government who,
while not agreeing with all that we are doing,
emphasizes his appreciation for the attention
we give to him and to the needs of his
country.

In the last analysis, each African leader
places the greatest emphasis on the needs of
his own country, particularly in the des-
perate search for the means of development.
Here, there is neither neglect nor low prior-
ity on the part of the United States.

During a period of increasing disillusion-

124

Department of State Bulletin

ment with foreign aid and of declining over-
all appropriations, we have been able to main-
tain assistance to the African countries at a
constant level. In 1972, in fact, the overall
sum was the highest since 1968. Our role
was part of an international effort which
gives the African Continent the highest per
capita development aid in the world.

The United States follows policies in
Africa today which are consistent with the
main themes of that policy since the late
fifties. It follows policies which give us a
meaningful relationship with a continent in-
creasingly important in terms both of trade
and investment and its role on the interna-
tional stage.

ICAO Resolution on Air Piracy
Welcomed by Secretary Rogers

Statement by Secretary Rogers *

the innocent, both travelers and the crews
that serve them. This determination of re-
sponsible governments to join together in
cooperative action to put a stop to these ugly
threats is gratifying. Only through the con-
certed action of governments can travelers
be assured of the safety they require and
to which they are entitled.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 1st Session

U.S. Foreign Service Grievance and Appeals Pro-
cedure. Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on S. 2023, S. 2659 and 2662.
October 7-18, 1971. 342 pp.

Material Relating to United States Foreign Trade.
Prepared at the direction of Senator Daniel K.
Inouye, for the use of the Committee on Com-
merce and the Subcommittee on Foreig:n Com-
merce and Tourism. December 28, 1971. 41 pp.

The Council of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) this after-
noon, and by a very substantial majority,
endorsed the proposal of the United States
for a program of action to deal with the
critical threat of air piracy. This resolution
adopted by ICAO calls for immediate re-
sumption of work to prepare an international
convention that would establish multilateral
procedures for deciding on joint action
among governments when found necessary
to deal with hijacking. The Council also
called on all states that have not yet done so
to become parties, as soon as possible, to
the already existing international conven-
tions that deal with hijacking, sabotage, and
unlawful interference with civil aviation. In
addition, the Council urged rapid action to
put into effect security procedures against
these threats.

I welcome this action by the Council which
reflects the mounting worldwide abhorrence
of the acts of violence which criminal and
irrational persons have been inflicting on

'Issued on June 20 (press release 145).

92d Congress, 2d Session

Fishing Rights and United States-Latin American
Relations. Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. February 3, 1972. 128 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
for 1973. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations. February
16-March 16, 1972. 978 pp.

Department of State Authorization for Fiscal Year
1973. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State
Department Organization and Foreign Operations
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Feb-
ruary 29-March 6, 1972. 165 pp.

The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam. A
compendium prepared for the Subcommittee To
Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Feb-
ruary 1972. 123 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1972. Hearings before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R.
13759, to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, and for other purposes. Part 1; March 14-
23, 1972; 247 pp.; part 2; March 28-April 11,
1972; 154 pp. Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on S. 3390, to amend
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other
purposes. April 17-19, 1972. 263 pp.

Seeking Relief From Restrictions on Soviet Jews.
Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 471. H. Rept.
92-983. April 1972. 5 pp.

July 24, 1972

125

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. Calls for Balanced Resolution
on Israel-Lebanon Border Incidents

Following are statements made in the U.N.
Security Council on June 2U and 26 by U.S.
Representative George Bush, together with
the text of a resolution adopted by the Coun-
cil on June 26.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR BUSH
Statement of June 24

USUN press release 69 dated June 24

The United States deplores the continuing
violence which has marked recent events in
the Middle East. We regret that those whose
fortunes ultimately depend on the establish-
ment of true peace and stability in that area
have again chosen the path of terrorism,
the path of armed force.

As all of us in this Council well know,
terrorism has been used in a senseless pat-
tern of death and destruction. Innocent pil-
grims, including 16 of my compatriots,
Americans, have lost their lives at the Lod
Airport. At that time, the Acting Secretary
of State expressed the shock of the United
States Government at that outrageous action,
which he termed a "murderous and indis-
criminate attack on innocent civilians, in-
cluding women and children." For this state-
ment some accused the United States Govern-
ment of being anti-Arab. Terrorist acts
have taken their toll of human life, and
productive economic resources have been de-
stroyed or diverted from serving the people
of the area. We recognize that no government
can remain unconcerned about the threat of
such terrorism, and no peoples can remain
insensitive to its consequences.

Several here before us have mentioned the
Lod Airport incident. I cannot let pass, Mr.
President, the comments about this dreadful

incident by our colleague the Ambassador of
Egypt. Unless I misunderstood him, he re-
ferred to the "crocodile" tears that had been
shed about this incident. I can only speak
for the people in the United States. The
tears shed here were genuine; they flowed
from the heart. They were not synthetic.
They were not contrived. No, they were not
the hypocritical tears of a crocodile. They
genuinely reflected the grief, the horror, of
families, friends, and just plain Americans
who were heartbroken at the loss of lives of
16 of their fellow citizens — and at the loss
of the other lives involved.

We have noted in contrast that many Arab
spokesmen have refused to associate them-
selves with the massacre at Lod. The perpe-
trators of this terrorism should gain from
others only revulsion for their cause. We
denounce whatever forces sent these mur-
derers on their maniacal mission.

To be sure, terrorism in the Middle East
breeds its own deplorable reactions. A U.S.
Government spokesman stated on June 22
that the United States deeply regrets "the
loss of life in the Israeli attack on Lebanon
of June 21." For this we have been accused
in some quarters of unfairly censuring
Israel. "It is particularly tragic when inno-
cent civilians become victims of events
growing out of the continued Arab-Israeli
conflict." Let me add now we deplore any
further loss of life from incidents that have
occurred subsequently.

As I stated last February in this Council,
the United States fully supports the terri-
torial integrity and political independence of
Lebanon. 1 My government hopes and expects
that the incidents of the type that have
occurred along the Israel-Lebanon border
will not recur; that all forces, regular or
irregular, will remain on their own side of

' For a statement by Ambassador Bush made in
the Security Council on Feb. 27, see USUN press
release 20.

126

Department of State Bulletin

the frontier; and that quiet will be main-
tained.

We are aware that the Government of
Lebanon has made efforts to control terrorist
elements on its territory — elements whose
activities are as inimical to the interests of
many Arab governments as they are to
Israel. We are pleased to note the absence
of cross-border incidents for nearly four
months. We hope that all authorities in the
area, including particularly the Government
of Israel, will facilitate and not impede these
efforts by Lebanon to control terrorism.

Mr. President, in these circumstances it
is hard to find new suggestions, and I would
revert to those of our government which I
made here four months ago:

. . . the United States believes that the way to
solve the problem lies not in hortatory declarations
or in further recourse to armed force. It lies,
rather, in direct liaison and cooperation between
the parties to provide the most reliable assurance
possible regarding the security of each. It is the
parties that must redouble their efforts to avoid
a repetition of the cycle of attacks and coun-
terattacks.

The United States, therefore, urges that both
Israel and Lebanon have more frequent recourse
to the international facilities that exist for the ex-
change of information and consultation on border
matters. Above all, we ask for an end to cross-
border attacks and terrorism, without which the
cycle of action and reaction cannot be broken.

Thus, Mr. President, we hope that the
members of this Council will take only such
action as will contribute to a practical solu-
tion in the area. Clearly, we should deplore
acts of violence and armed attack; but in
the name of justice, in the name of fair play,
we must do so from whatever quarter they
may appear. But this is not enough; condi-
tions must also be created that will put an
end to these incidents which poison relations
between Israel and Lebanon. During the last
year several very significant steps toward
world peace have been taken. New avenues
of communication and dialogue have been
opened and old antagonisms are being muted
in the search for areas of agreement. These
are the building blocks for a solid founda-
tion of peace. Is it too much to ask — to
expect — that in the Middle East the same

process should get underway to end a quar-
ter of a century of bitterness ? All sides must
mute their weapons and get on with the
important dialogue which is essential to re-
solving the immediate issues, including the
question of prisoners, and which would help
to achieve an overall peaceful settlement in
the area on the basis of this Council's reso-
lution of November 22, 1967.

Mr. President, we view any resolution to
be adopted in the present situation as need-
ing to be characterized by balance, by an
effort to look beyond the immediate inci-
dents, horrible as they are. In order to obtain
our concurrence a resolution must have at
least the following ingredients:

It must be fair. It must be balanced. It
must be concerned about terrorist acts as
well as the Israeli attacks. It must show
concern for those that lie dead or wounded
on both sides of the border. It must at least
carry the hope of moving this area closer
to peace.

At the appropriate time the United States
delegation will offer a draft resolution which
we feel will accomplish the ends outlined
above.

Statement of June 26

USUN press release 70 dated June 26

In my statement on Saturday I described
the position of my delegation on the question
of a Security Council resolution on this issue.
I specified certain criteria by which the
United States would test any resolution
placed before us. Since then, a number of
delegations have worked exceedingly hard to
reach agreement on the resolution we have
just voted upon.

Unfortunately, however, that resolution
did not meet the requirements which I dis-
cussed two days ago. You will recall that
my delegation felt that a resolution to be
acceptable must be fair, must be balanced,
must be concerned with terrorist attacks
as well as the Israeli attacks, must show
concern for casualties on both sides of the
border, and most importantly, must at least
carry the hope of moving this area closer
to peace.

July 24, 1972

127

We believe also that if the repatriation of
all armed forces prisoners could be effected,
this would have removed an inhibition to
progress in this area and would also, of
course, have had humanitarian benefits.

Mr. President, that resolution did not ful-
fill what we strongly believed are the needs
of the situation, and my delegation therefore
was obliged to abstain.

Our resolution is no attempt to camou-
flage, Mr. President.- Our resolution at-
tempts to express condemnation over the
moves into Lebanon, but it also rises above
the ominous silence which at times surrounds
the assaults on Israel — the assaults against
the innocent in that country. I have in mind
one such assault that only recently claimed
16 American lives in a senseless, coldblooded
slaughter. We worry about the deaths at
Hasbayya; we worry, too, about those that
died at Lod or those that died on the Israel
side of the Israel-Lebanon border.

with the previous resolutions of the Security Coun-
cil calling on her to desist forthwith from any vio-
lation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Lebanon (resolutions 262 (1968), 270 (1969), 280
and 285 (1970) and 313 (1972),

1. Calls upon Israel to strictly abide by the afore-
mentioned resolutions and to refrain from all mili-
tary acts against Lebanon;

2. Condemns, while profoundly deploring all acts
of violence, the repeated attacks of Israeli forces
on Lebanese territory and population in violation of
the principles of the United Nations Charter and
Israel's obligations thereunder;

3. Expresses the strong desire that appropriate
steps will lead, as an immediate consequence, to
the release in the shortest possible time of all
Syrian and Lebanese military and security person-
nel abducted by Israeli armed forces on 21 June
1972 on Lebanese territory;

4. Declares that if the abovementioned steps do
not result in the release of the abducted personnel
or, if Israel fails to comply with the present resolu-
tion, the Council will reconvene at the earliest to
consider further action.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 3

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in docu-
ment S/Agenda/1650/Rev.l,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/10715),
of the letter of the Permanent Representative of
Israel (S/10716), and of the letter of the Permanent
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/
10720),

Recalling the consensus of the members of the
Security Council of 19 April 1972 (S/10611),

Having noted the supplementary information pro-
vided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations
Truce Supervisory Organization contained in the
relevant documents S/7930/Add.l584 of 26 April
1972 to S/7930/Add.l640 of 21 June 1972, and par-
ticularly S/7930/Add.l641 to 1648 of 21, 22, 23 and
24 June 1972,

Having heard the statements of the representa-
tives of Lebanon and of Israel,

Deploring the tragic loss of life resulting from all
acts of violence and retaliation.

Gravely concerned at Israel's failure to comply

= The U.S. draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/10723)
was not pressed to a vote, because the Council had
adopted Resolution 316.

'U.N. doc. S/RES/316 (1972); adopted by the
Council on June 26 by a vote of 13 to 0, with 2 ab-
stentions (U.S., Panama).

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended
Through December 1972

Statement by W. Tapley Bennett ^

I am particularly gratified to be able to
congratulate the Secretary General and the
parties to the intercommunal talks for their
statesmanlike efforts leading to the resump-
tion of the intercommunal talks on June 8.
It has long been the hope of this Council that
the intercommunal talks would enable the
parties to the Cyprus question to resolve
their differences peacefully through negotia-
tion. We appeal to the parties to the talks to
exercise their best efforts to make progress
as quickly as possible toward a settlement of
Cyprus' intercommunal problems which will
enable all elements of the Cypriot population
to participate fully and without fear in the
national life of a single independent and sov-
ereign Cyprus.

The United States delegation thanks the

' Made in the U.N. Security Council on June 15
(USUN press release 63). Ambassador Bennett is
Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

128

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary General for his comprehensive re-
port to the Security Council on the U.N. op-
eration in Cyprus.^ We find it particularly
heartening that the Secretary General and
the Government of Cyprus have found effec-
tive ways to cooperate in an arrangement
for the safe storage and inspection by UNFI-
CYP [United Nations Peace-keeping Force in
Cyprus] of the arms and ammunition re-
cently imported by the Government of Cy-
prus.

We, too, are encouraged by the Secretary
General's report that although tensions
greatly increased in Cyprus in recent months,
"the period under review has seen the small-
est number of shooting incidents since the
establishment of UNFICYP." This is in no
small measure due to the stabilizing pres-
ence, the judgment, and the activity displayed
on the ground by UNFICYP; and great
credit is due also to the parties more directly
concerned. We are glad to note that while
some incidents have marred the peace of the
island "there has been an encouraging im-
provement in the co-operation extended to
UNFICYP in this regard." On the other
hand, all members of this Council must share
the concern expressed by the Secretary Gen-
eral that there has been no significant prog-
ress toward normalization, particularly in the
important areas of deconfrontation, freedom
of movement, economic development, public
works, and the resettlement of displaced per-
sons. We hope that the resumption of the in-
tercommunal talks will create the atmos-
phere of mutual confidence required to arrive
at mutually acceptable interim agreements on
normalization measures. Such measures
would enable the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities to enjoy greater security and
prosperity while negotiations for a perma-
nent settlement are underway.

Mr. President, the Security Council has
just approved the extension of the mandate
of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for
another six months.^ A U.N. peacekeeping
force has been in Cyprus for over eight years
and has done invaluable work in preventing a
further outbreak of civil strife on the island.
However, I think we are all aware that the

Security Council cannot afford to continue to
extend UNFICYP's mandate indefinitely. It
is therefore imperative that the parties to
the intercommunal talks move swiftly to-
ward a negotiated political settlement of the
Cyprus problem, with which the Security
Council has been occupied for over a decade.

Turning to the financial implications of the
renewal of UNFICYP's mandate, the United
States delegation notes with regret that the
Secretary General's estimates of the costs
of UNFICYP to the U.N. for the six-month
period beginning June 16 come to approxi-
mately $6.9 million. This figure represents an
increase of about $400,000 over the last six-
month extension period. In the face of the
large UNFICYP deficit, which we and the
other current contributors are working to
eliminate, we hope that these costs can be re-
duced. Otherwise, this increase will have to
be completely absorbed by substantial addi-
tional regular contributions to UNFICYP
from governments which presently contrib-
ute inadequately or do not contribute at all.
At this juncture, no U.N. agency can afford
to continue to operate on a deficit basis.

We are pleased to note thatin paragraph
82 of his report, the Secretary General
pledges his efforts, working with all mem-
bers of the organization, to find a way to get
the current financial situation of UNFICYP
on a sound basis and to begin to liquidate the
deficit. The United States pledges its support
to the Secretary General's efforts in this re-
gard. We think that now is the time for all
of the members of the United Nations to ac-
cept their collective responsibilities for the
maintenance of peace and security. The fi-
nancial burden of U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sions should not fall upon only a few. We
urge all members of the United Nations, and

' U.N. doc. S/10664.

'In a resolution (S/RES/315 (1972)) adopted on
June 15 by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention
(China), the Security Council extended "the sta-
tioning in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-
keeping Force . . . for a further period ending 15
December 1972, in the expectation that by then
sufficient progress towards a final solution will make
possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the
Force."

July 24, 1972

129

in particular the members of the Security
Council that have voted for the resolution ex-
tending UNFICYP's mandate, to support the
Secretary General's efforts to place UNFI-
CYP financing on a sound basis by contrib-
uting their fair share to this peacekeeping
operation which continues to play such a
significant part in averting a costly war in
Cyprus.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Spain Conclude
Interim Air Transport Agreement

The Department of State announced on
June 30 (press release 155) that the United
States and Spain had concluded that day at
Madrid an exchange of notes establishing the
basis for Pan American World Airways to
continue its service from Miami and San
Juan via Lisbon to Madrid and beyond to
Rome and to permit Iberia Airlines to carry
trafl[ic beyond San Juan to Miami and points
in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
(For text of the U.S. note, see press release
155.)

The Pan American service is the same one
which was authorized on an interim basis in
a 1971 exchange of notes, while the new au-
thority for Iberia is intended to replace an
earlier counterpart authorization it had to
carry traffic between Spain and Mexico City
via San Juan.

This agreement is an interim measure,
valid during the 1972 summer season, which
ends October 31, and pending the completion
of civil aviation negotiations intended to
amend and update the 1944 air transport
agreement between the two countries. These
negotiations are currently scheduled to re-
sume sometime this fall.

United States and Denmark Sign
New Extradition Treaty

Press release 147 dated June 22

The United States and the Kingdom of
Denmark on June 22 signed a new treaty
on extradition. The treaty was signed at
Copenhagen by Ambassador Fred J. Russell
for the United States and by Foreign Min-
ister K. B. Andersen for the Kingdom of
Denmark. The treaty, which contains pro-
visions for hijacking and narcotic offenses,
was negotiated at Washington and Copen-
hagen. The final round of negotiations was
concluded at Copenhagen on June 16. The
treaty will shortly be sent to the Senate for
advice and consent.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, July 6, 1972.

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.

Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into

force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Accession deposited: Senegal, April 19, 1972 (with
reservations) .
Customs convention on the temporary importation

of private road vehicles. Done at New York June

4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957.

TIAS 3943.

Accession deposited: Senegal, April 19, 1972 (with
reservations).

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.
Accession deposited: Cyprus, July 5, 1972.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971.'

' Not in force.

130

Department of State Bulletin

Ratification deposited: Israel, July 6, 1972.
Sigiiature: Turkey, July 5, 1972.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Fiji, April 28, 1972 (with

reservation) .
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, March 8,

1972.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular I'elations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, March 8,

1972.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March
18, 1970.'

Ratification deposited: Denmark, June 20, 1972
(with reservations and declarations).

North Atlantic Treaty — Technical Information

NATO agreement on the communication of technical
information for defense purposes. Done at Brus-
sels October 19, 1970. Entered into force February
7, 1971. TIAS 7064.
Ratification deposited: Norway, July 6, 1972.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the interaational convention for the
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted
at London November 30, 1966.'
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, May 17, 1972.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force
October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.
Ratification deposited: Cyprus, July 5, 1972.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), for space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva
July 17, 1971.'

Notification of approval: Australia, April 21,
1972.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603) to put into effect a
revised frequency allotment plan for the aeronau-
tical mobile (R) sei-vice and related information,
with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966.
Entered into force July 1, 1967; for the United
States August 23, 1967; except the frequency al-

lotment plan contained in appendix 27, which
entered into force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332.
Notification of approval: Cuba, April 19, 1972.

Trade

Convention on transit trade of landlocked states.
Done at New York July 8, 1965. Entered into
force June 9, 1967; for the United States Novem-
ber 28, 1968. TIAS 6592.
Accession deposited: Australia, May 2, 1972.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig-
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3,
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re-
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with re-
spect to other provisions; for the United States
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention de-
posited: El Salvador, July 5, 1972.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Grant agreement for relief and rehabilitation.
Signed at Dacca May 30, 1972. Entered into force
May 30, 1972.

Colombia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
with annex. Signed at Bogota June 26, 1972. En-
tered into force June 26, 1972.

Denmark

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Copenhagen June
22, 1972. Enters into force on the 30th day after
the date of the exchange of instruments of ratifi-
cation.

Fiji

Agreement continuing in force the agreement of
June 25, 1968, relating to the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in Fiji (TIAS 6515). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Suva and Wash-
ington April 25 and June 27, 1972. Entered into
force June 27, 1972.

Guinea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of June 17, 1971 (TIAS
7182). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry
May 15 and 23, 1972. Entered into force May 23,
1972.

Honduras

Agreement relating to the deposit by Honduras of
10 percent of the value of grant military assistance
and of excess defense articles furnished by the
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at

' Not in force.

July 24, 1972

131

Tegucigalpa April 4 and June 26, 1972. Entered
into force June 26, 1972; effective February 7,
1972.
Treaty on the Swan Islands, with related notes.
Signed at San Pedro Sula November 22, 1971.'
Ratified by the President: July 1, 1972.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial contri-
bution for United States administrative and re-
lated expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1972
pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agree-
ment of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2975). Eff^ected by
exchange of notes at Tokyo June 20, 1972. Entered
into force June 20, 1972.

Venezuela

Agreement terminating in part the reciprocal trade
agreement of November 6, 1939, as supplemented
(54 Stat. 2375, TIAS 2565, 5502). Effected by
exchange of notes at Caracas June 26, 1972.
Entered into force June 26, 1972.

and Hungary; the publication of Nazi-Soviet Rela-
tions; the status of the former Italian colonies in
Africa; and political and economic relations with
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, and other countries of western
Europe. Documentation on United States relations
with eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will be
included in volume IV.

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume III may
be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402, for $5.75 each (Department of State publi-
cation 8625; Stock Number 4400-1411).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

PUBLICATIONS

Volume III in "Foreign Relations"
Series for 1947 Released

On June 1 the Department of State released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Vol-
ume III, The British Commonwealth, Europe (xiv,
1,131 pages). This volume, the first of eight to be
published covering the year 1947, includes extensive
documentation on the origins and early development
of the Marshall plan, which was inaugurated 25
years ago by Secretary of State Marshall's com-
mencement address at Harvard University. The
volume also includes compilations on the foreign
exchange position of the United Kingdom; the
emergence of the Dominions of India and Pakistan;
the Kashmir dispute; the signature and ratification
of treaties of peace with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria,

' Not in force.

Confirmations

The Senate on June 26 confirmed the following
nominations:

W. Beverly Carter, Jr., to be Ambassador to the
United Republic of Tanzania. (For biographic data,
see Department of State press release 161 dated
June 30.)

Edwin M. Cronk to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Singapore. (For biographic data, see Department
of State press release 169 dated July 7.)

C. Robert Moore to be Ambassador to the Federal
Republic of Cameroon. (For biographic data, see
Department of State press release 165 dated July 6.)

Clinton L. Olson to be Ambassador to Sierra
Leone. (For biographic data, see Department of State
press release 158 dated June 28.)

Terence A. Todman to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Guinea. (For biographic data, see White
House press release dated June 6.)

Miss Jean M. Wilkowski to be Ambassador to the
Republic of Zambia. (For biographic data, see De-
partment of State press release 164 dated July 5.)

Robert L. Yost to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Burundi. (For biographic data, see White House
press release dated May 17.)

132

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX July 2U, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1726

Africa. Southern Africa: Constant Themes in
U.S. Policy (Newsom) 119

Aviation

ICAO Resolution on Air Piracy Welcomed by

Secretary Rogers (statement) 125

United States and Spain Conclude Interim Air
Transport Agreement 130

Burundi. Yost confirmed as Ambassador . . . 132

Cameroon. Moore confirmed as Ambassador . 132

Congress

Confirmations (Carter, Cronk, Moore, Olson,
Todman, Wilkowski, Yost) 132

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 125

Cyprus. U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended
Through December 1972 (Bennett) ... 128

Denmark. United States and Denmark Sign

New Extradition Treaty 130

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Carter, Cronk, Moore, Olson, Todman,
Wilkowski, Yost) 132

Economic Affairs. Southern Africa: Constant
Themes in U.S. Policy (Newsom) .... 119

Environment

President Nixon Praises Success of Environ-
ment Conference (Nixon) 107

U.N. (jonference on the Human Environment
Held at Stockholm (Rogers, Train, White,
resolution and declaration) 105

Extradition. United States and Denmark Sign
New Extradition Treaty 130

Guinea. Todman confirmed as Ambassador . . 132

International Organizations and Conferences.
ICAO Resolution on Air Piracy Welcomed
by Secretary Rogers (statement) .... 125

Middle East. U.S. Calls for Balanced Reso-
lution on Israel-Lebanon Border Incidents
(Bush, text of resolution) 126

Portugal. Southern Africa: Constant Themes
in U.S. Policy (Newsom) 119

Presidential Documents. President Nixon
Praises Success of Environment Conference 107

Publications. Volume III in "Foreign Rela-
tions" Series for 1947 Released 132

Sierra Leone. Olson confirmed as Ambassador 132

Singapore. Cronk confirmed as Ambassador 132

South Africa. Southern Africa: Constant
Themes in U.S. Policy (Newsom) .... 119

Southern Rhodesia. Southern Africa: Constant
Themes in U.S. Policy (Newsom) .... 119

Spain. United States and Spain Conclude In-
terim Air Transport Agreement 130

Tanzania. Carter confirmed as Ambassador 132

Treaty Information

Current Actions 130

United States and Denmark Sign New Extra-
dition Treaty 130

United States and Spain Conclude Interim Air
Transport Agreement 130

United Nations

President Nixon Praises Success of Environ-
ment Conference (Nixon) 107

Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S.
Policy (Newsom) 119

U.N. Conference on the Human Environment
Held at Stockholm (Rogers, Train, White,
resolution and declaration) 105

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended Through De-
cember 1972 (Bennett) 128

U.S. Calls for Balanced Resolution on Israel-
Lebanon Border Incidents (Bush, text of
resolution) 126

Zambia. Miss Wilkowski confirmed as Am-
bassador 132

Name Index

Bennett, W. Tapley 128

Bush, George 126

Carter, W. Beverly, Jr 132

Cronk, Edwin M 132

Moore, C. Robert 132

Newsom, David D 119

Nixon, President 107

Olson, Clinton L 132

Rogers, Secretary 105, 125

Todman, Terence A 132

Train, Russell E 105

White, Robert M 105

Wilkowski, Miss Jean M 132

Yost, Robert L 132

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 3 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 133 of
June 5, 145 of June 20, 147 of June 22, and
155 and 156 of June 28.

No.

tl62

Date

7/3

Sobject

Exchange of remarks between Sec-
retary Rogers and Yemen Arab
Republic Prime Minister Al-
Ayni, July 1.

Rogers: arrival statement, Athens,
July 4.

Miss Wilkowski sworn in as Am-
bassador to Zambia (biographic
data).
*165 7/6 Moore sworn in as Ambassador to
Cameroon (biographic data).

U.S.-Romania consular convention.

Rogers: toast at luncheon hosted
by Romanian President Ceau-
sescu, Bucharest, July 6.
tl68 7/7 Rogers : remarks at signing of con-
sular convention and scientific
and technical exchanges agree-
ments, Budapest.
♦169 7/7 Cronk sworn in as Ambassador to
Singapore (biographic data).

tl63
*164

tl66
tl67

7/5
7/5

7/6
7/7

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

3*;

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1727

July 31, i972

AMERICA'S BICENTENNIAL INVITATION TO THE WORLD
Address by President Nixon 133

THE SALT AGREEMENTS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Statement by Ambassador Smith H7

THE BENEFITS OF FREER INTERNATIONAL TRADE

AND THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO COMPETE

by John C. Renner 139

i>\\

,uc

^°!::^^^ '^ ""^^

u>^^-

^ 9 i V-

lO'

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1727
July 31, 1972

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a meekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

America's Bicentennial Invitation to the World

Address by President Nixon

Good morning.

This Fourth of July holiday is an appro-
priate time for every American to reflect on
the deeper meaning of the momentous events
at Philadelphia 196 years ago today.

John Adams, later to be our second Presi-
dent, summed up that meaning in a letter to
his wife on the night of July 3, 1776. The
Continental Congress, to which Adams was
a delegate, was to complete its work on the
Declaration of Independence the following
day. About that event he wrote:

I am well aware of the toil and blood and treas-
ure that it will cost us to maintain this Declara-
tion . . . Yet, through all the gloom, I can see
the rays of ravishing light and glory. I can see
that the end is more than worth all the means. And
that posterity will triumph in that day's transac-
tion . . .

You and I and all of the 209 million Amer-
icans living today are the posterity of which
he spoke; and we have triumphed in ways the
Founding Fathers scarcely dreamed of.

Over the past two centuries our revolu-
tionary heritage of self-government has
helped to make the United States the freest
and strongest nation history has ever seen.
It has enabled us to bear with unfailing
honor the responsibility of world leadership
in the cause of peace.

As we look back to America's beginnings,
therefore, we are surely entitled to a feeling
of pride and gratitude. At the same time, as
we look forward to America's Bicentennial,

' Made to the Nation on radio on July 4 (White
House press release, San Clemente, Calif.).

just four years from today, we also have a
feeling of healthy impatience for change, a
determination to make this good land even
better.

It is in this traditionally American spirit
of pride in our past and present, and purpose
for our future, that I would like to talk to-
day about some of our preparations for the
year 1976.

In 1966, 10 years ago, the Congress estab-
lished an American Revolution Bicentennial
Commission. I have worked closely with this
Commission and its Chairman, David Ma-
honey. At our urging, its membership has
recently been expanded to make it more
broadly representative of all tlie American
people.

The Commission's excellent plans call for
truly national participation in our Bicenten-
nial observance. Thousands of communities
in all 50 States will contribute to a celebra-
tion as wide as America's land and as richly
diverse as its people, within a framework of
three interrelated programs.

One is called Heritage '76. This will focus
on the unfolding panorama of our Nation's
history over the course of two centuries.

Another is called Horizons '76. This will
involve looking ahead into our third century,
selecting goals to help make America the
"more perfect Union" we all want it to be-
come, and working together to achieve those
goals.

The third major program, the one I espe-
cially want to talk about this morning, will
be known as Festival USA. Its concern will

July 17, 1972

133

be travel, discovery, and hospitality — hospi-
tality by Americans to Americans and hos-
pitality by Americans to millions upon mil-
lions of visitors from nearly every other
country of the globe.

In the near future I will be sending, in the
name of all the people of the United States,
formal and official invitations to the govern-
ments of nations around the globe, extend-
ing a welcome to the people of those nations
to visit the United States, as laws and cir-
cumstances permit, during the Bicentennial
Era, and especially during the year 1976.

This unprecedented invitation to the world
is particularly appropriate for two reasons.

First, because America is and always has
been a nation of nations. Patriots from
France and Prussia and Poland helped us
win our Revolution. Strong men and women
of every color and creed from every conti-
nent helped to build our farms, our industry,
our cities.

The blood of all peoples runs in our veins;
the cultures of all peoples contribute to our
culture; and to a certain extent, the hopes of
all peoples are bound up with our own hopes
for the continuing success of the American
experiment.

Our Bicentennial Era is a time for Amer-
ica to say to the nations of the world: "You
helped to make us what we are. Come and see
what wonders your countrymen have worked
in this new country of ours. Come and let us
say thank you. Come and join in our celebra-
tion of a proud past. Come and share our
dreams of a brighter future."

A second compelling reason for this invi-
tation to the world relates to our hopes for a
genuine and lasting peace among nations.

Of course, we are all aware that a real
structure of peace cannot be built on good
will alone. Its foundation must be the resolu-
tion of those basic national differences which
can lead to war.

The United States is doing everything in
its power to lay down that kind of founda-
tion for peace. It is in this cause that I have
traveled to Peking and Moscow, worked for
a just peace in Viet-Nam, acted to check the

nuclear arms race, moved to revitalize our
alliances.

As we succeed in reducing the danger of
war, however, we must also work at enhanc-
ing the quality of peace. One of the best ways
of doing this is through people-to-people con-
tacts— contacts aimed at reducing the fear
and the ignorance which have divided man-
kind down through the ages and at fostering
habits of trust and patterns of cooperation.
That was one of the major purposes of the
visits Mrs. Nixon and I made to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and to the Soviet
Union.

Some of you have heard the story which
Woodrow Wilson liked to tell about the Eng-
lish writer Charles Lamb. "I hate that fel-
low," Lamb said of another one day; to which
a friend replied, "I didn't think you knew
him." Then Lamb admitted, "Oh, I don't— I
can't hate a man I know."

The point is that nations, like individuals,
stand a better chance of working construc-
tively together if people on both sides can
learn to respect one another as fellow human
beings. Our invitation to the world can con-
tribute significantly to that crucial process.

As we move toward 1976, the American
Revolution Bicentennial Commission will fol-
low up on this invitation with a vigorous ac-
tion program. I urge every American to join
in support of that program. Here are some
ways we can all help :

Business and industry can expand their
present efforts to bring the costs of travel,
lodging, and meals within the reach of mil-
lions of additional visitors.

Air carriers and shipping lines can con-
tinue exploring new ways of offering inex-
pensive transportation to and from this
country.

Corporations with interests abroad, pri-
vate organizations with foreign ties, can
encourage the participation of their foreign
colleagues in the Bicentennial.

Cities which have sister communities in
other countries can intensify contacts with
them.

Families which have relatives abroad, or

134

Department of State Bulletin

which speak a second language, or any fam-
ily that wishes to do so can make special
hospitality plans for foreign visitors.

And volunteers young and old can serve
as guides, as interpreters, as hosts and host-
esses, to help greet a flood of Bicentennial
guests which may be double the nearly 14
million people who visited the United States
last year.

State and local governments, the Con-
gress, and the Federal executive branch can
assist the national and State Bicentennial
Commissions in every way possible.

In issuing this invitation to the world, the
American people will also be issuing a chal-
lenge to themselves.

This is the time to open our hearts and
our homes and our communities to those
who come to America for the first time. This
is the time not only for reaching outward
but for reaching inward, for discovering and
appreciating parts of our own land and peo-
ple and heritage which we may not have
known before.

This is the time to put our best foot for-
ward in every aspect of our national life to
prove what America is and can be.

My deepest hope for the Bicentennial Era
is this: that all America and all the world
can earn the name which Mrs. Nixon and I
have chosen for our house here at San Cle-
mente, "La Casa Pacifica," the House of
Peace; and that the American people can
open their arms to the people of the world
with the traditional Latin welcome, "Estan
ustedes en S2t casa" — you are in your own
house. Let America be known throughout
the world as the Land of the Open Door.

Reaching out in this way, we can prove
once again that the Spirit of '76 is a spirit
of openness, of brotherhood, and of peace.

We can share with all mankind the eter-
nal message of the Fourth of July — the
message of liberty, of opportunity, and of
human dignity.

I hope that each one of you will join me
in extending and in wholeheartedly support-
ing America's Bicentennial invitation to the
world.

150th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambas-
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S.
delegation, at the 150th plenarij session of
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Jidy
13.

Press release 173 dated July 13

Ladies and gentlemen: We are here to-
day for one basic purpose — to explore with
you the possibilities of starting serious and
constructive negotiations for a settlement
of the Viet-Nam conflict. We hope that the
same considerations motivate your side and
that together we may proceed to an inten-
sive examination of concrete issues.

Since the last plenary session, noteworthy
contributions to peace have taken place
through negotiations in several parts of the
world. On July 4 the Republic of Korea and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
pledged to base their future relations upon
"peaceful means, and not through the use
of force against each other."

Meanwhile, progress continued in estab-
lishing more friendly relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic. These develop-
ments were the product of negotiations
which the Federal Chancellor has termed
an indication that "In spite of the existing
antagonisms ... it is possible to arrive at
practical arrangements which take into ac-
count the special situation in Germany and
are fitted to reduce tensions and areas of
friction."

On May 29 the United States and the So-
viet Union recorded their "desire to
strengthen peaceful relations with each
other," in full awareness of the "need . . .
to create conditions which promote the re-
duction of tensions in the world." ^ The two
nations stated their preparedness to "nego-

' For text of the basic principles of relations
signed at Moscow on May 29 during President
Nixon's visit, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p.
898.

July 31, 1972

135

tiate and settle differences by peaceful
means."

These are deeply encouraging develop-
ments. Without in any way minimizing the
extreme complexity of the Viet-Nam prob-
lem, we believe it possible that a parallel
can be found at these talks. In any event, we
invite your attention to yet another devel-
opment in the search for peace which has
occurred since the last plenary session here.

On May 8 President Nixon proposed, in
coordination with the Government of the
Republic of Viet-Nam, just and generous
terms which would provide the basis for a
negotiated settlement advantageous to both
sides.' There is, indeed, a history of con-
structive proposals put forward from time
to time by the Governments of the United
States and the Republic of Viet-Nam. Those
of May 8 are, we believe, especially notable
for their clear-cut and generous features.

As you know, they envisage, first, the re-
turn of all American prisoners of war and
an accounting for those missing in action;
second, a cease-fire throughout Indochina
under international supervision; third, as
soon as points 1 and 2 have been achieved,
the United States will stop all acts of force
throughout Indochina; finally, the President
said we will then proceed with a complete
withdrawal of all American forces from
Viet-Nam within four months.

These proposals would end the killing.
They would allow negotiations on a political
settlement between Vietnamese themselves,
consistent with the principle that the po-
litical future of South Viet-Nam should be
left for the South Vietnamese people to de-
cide for themselves, free from outside in-
terference. They would permit all the na-
tions which have suffered in this long war
— Cambodia, Laos, North Viet-Nam, South
Viet-Nam — to start the urgent work of
peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation.
If these proposals are not satisfactory, what
is wrong with them ?

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

Is it conceivable that anyone would prefer
continuation of the present conditions of
warfare in North Viet-Nam and South Viet-
Nam to the opportunity for an honorable
resolution of the conflict which these pro-
posals offer?

These proposals, in sum, deserve your full
and measured consideration. For our part,
we will give most careful attention to the
views you may express and to any prelim-
inary questions about our proposals you
may wish to present before expressing your
views. We are also entirely willing to go into
any other matters you may wish to put for-
ward for detailed discussion.

Ladies and gentlemen, a mutual examina-
tion of our respective positions, a serious
and systematic dialogue on matters of sub-
stance— that, in our view, is the way to
make progress here.

U.S. Supports Efforts To Ease Tensions
on the Korean Peninsula

Follo2ving is a Department statement is-
sued July 3 with respect to the South Koreor-
North Korea joint communique issued at
Seoul and Pyongyang that evening (July U,
Korean time).

We welcome the joint announcement on
South-North relations concerning meetings
which have taken place between representa-
tives of the two sides and agreement on prin-
ciples for future contacts. This, by Korean
leaders, is most encouraging and could have
a salutary impact on prospects for peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States has long supported the
constructive efforts of Republic of Korea
leaders to ease tensions on the Korean Pe-
ninsula. Our staunch friendship with the Re-
public of Korea is well known, as is our com-
mitment to the Republic's security. We wish
its leaders every success in their current
undertakings.

136

Department of State Bulletin

United States and Poland To Expand
Program of Scientific Cooperation

Following is the text of a joint U.S. -Poland
communique signed at Warsaw on Jtily 13 by
Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser to
President Nixon and Director, Office of Sci-
ence and Technology, and Jan Kaczmarek,
Polish Minister of Science, Higher Educa-
tion, and Technology, at the conclusion of
Dr. David's visit to Poland.

Press release 175 dated July 14

Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser
to President Nixon and Director of the Office
of Science and Technology in the Executive
Office of the President, visited Poland from
July 8 to July 13, 1972, at the invitation of
Professor Jan Kaczmarek, Minister of Sci-
ence, Higher Education and Technology of
the Polish People's Republic. Minister Kacz-
marek had visited the United States in April-
May, 1971, at the invitation of Dr. David.

During his stay in Poland, Dr. David
visited academic, scientific, and technical in-
stitutions in Warsaw and Krakow. He also
reviewed with Minister Kaczmarek and other
Polish officials the broad spectrum of exist-
ing relationships in science and technology
between the United States and Poland, and
discussed means by which ties in these areas
could be further expanded and strengthened.
Dr. David's visit and his discussions follow
the Joint United States-Polish Communique
of June 1, 1972, issued at the conclusion of
President Nixon's visit to Warsaw.^

During his visit Dr. David was received by
Dr. M. Jagielski, Deputy Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, and S. Olszowski, Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs. He also held talks
with Professor K. Secomski, First Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission of the
Council of Ministers; T. Wrzaszczyk, Minis-
ter of the Machine Industry; and Professor

' For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of
June 26, 1972, p. 913.

W. Trzebiatowski, President of the Polish
Academy of Sciences.

Among the institutions visited by Dr. David
were: the Scientific-Production Center for
Semiconductors including the "TEWA" semi-
conductor plant; the Institute of Cybernetics
and the "UNIPAN" Scientific Apparatus
Production Facility of the Polish Academy of
Sciences; the Institute of Physics of Warsaw
University; the Jagiellonian University in
Krakow; and the Institute of Pediatrics of
the Medical Academy in Krakow.

Dr. David informed Minister Kaczmarek
that as the first U.S. participation in the year
commemorating the 500th anniversary of
Copernicus' birth, the U.S. National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration will give
the name "Copernicus" to its orbiting astro-
nomical observatory satellite, OAO-C. This
satellite, scheduled for launch from Cape
Kennedy in August 1972, will record ultra-
violet spectra from the stars and transmit
the data to earth. Minister Kaczmarek ex-
pressed his great appreciation for this ges-
ture to the memory of Copernicus and for the
fact that the data obtained by the satellite
will also be available to Polish scientists.

It was recognized that the contacts which
have existed for many years between scien-
tists and specialists of the two countries pro-
vide a good foundation for development of
closer cooperation in science and technology
between academic, research, and industrial
institutions and organizations of the two
countries.

The two sides concluded that firm and en-
during basis for cooperation between the
countries could be achieved through signing
of an intergovernmental agreement on sci-
entific and technical cooperation. They ex-
changed views on the contents of such an
agreement. It was decided that further nego-
tiations would be held in the near future with
a view to the conclusion of an agreement.

Both sides also recognized the value of
moving toward more programmatic relation-
ships in their scientific and technical coop-
eration on the basis of mutual benefit and

July 31, 1972

137

shared funding- in areas of high priority for
both countries.

Both sides noted the significant progress
which has been made to extend U.S.-PoUsh
scientific and technical cooperation since the
visit of Minister Kaczmarek to the United
States last year. Areas of specific activity
include intensified cooperation in medical
sciences, health, and agriculture, where mu-
tually useful concrete results have been
achieved over the past decade.

New areas in which visits between coop-
erating institutions in both countries have
taken place and specific projects are already
under way or in preparation include: air
and water pollution control, archeology, as-
tronomy, astrophysics, biology, chemistry,
construction technology, ecology, geology,
linguistics, mathematics, mining, physics,
transportation and urban planning, among
others.

The two sides particularly expressed rec-
ognition of the fact that protection of the
environment is a matter of great concern to
their Governments and that mutual benefits
can flow from cooperation and exchanges of
information in this field.

Technological cooperation on a commercial
basis between U.S. firms and Polish enter-
prises was mentioned as being of special sig-
nificance for further development of U.S.-
Polish economic relations, as well as offering
commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and
Polish enterprises. The two sides expressed
their interest in furthering such cooperation
by appropriate means.

Possible forms of U.S. participation in es-
tablishment of a Copernicus Astronomical
Center in Poland were also reviewed in con-
nection with the Copernicus year. Further

discussions on the subject will take place in
the near future.

Mindful of the contribution that personal
contacts in research and training make to
mutual understanding and good relations
between countries, both sides noted their de-
sire to continue and expand the exchange of
scholars, lecturers, and students in a wide
variety of academic disciplines and activities
and to encourage direct contacts between uni-
versities and other institutions of higher
learning. In this connection it was noted
with satisfaction that the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences and the Polish Acad-
emy of Sciences have recently agreed to a
substantial increase in their exchange of
scientists.

The two sides expressed their intention to
encourage and facilitate direct contacts and
cooperation between scientific and technologi-
cal organizations of the two countries and
the conclusion, as appropriate, of agreements
between them for cooperative research, de-
velopment, and exchange of information of
mutual interest and benefit.

In addition, the two sides presented a num-
ber of other proposals for cooperation which
will be further examined in the near future.

Minister Kaczmai'ek also informed Dr.
David of the desire of the Polish side to estab
lish a scientific branch of the Polish Academy
of Sciences in the United States, and re-
quested that this proposal be considered by
the U.S. side.

Dr. David praised the high quality of
Polish science and technology and expressed
his personal appreciation for the generous
hospitality shown to his delegation by his
Polish hosts.

138

Department of State Bulletin

In this article based on an address he made before the
World Affairs Council of Boston on May 23, Mr. Renner,
who xvas then Director of the Office of International Trade
and subsequently became Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Trade Policy, looks at the reasons for liberaliz-
ing international trade, ivith special emphasis on the rela-
tionship betiveen trade and employment, and examines the
American ability to compete with foreign products in their
own markets and ours.

The Benefits of Freer International Trade
and the American Ability To Compete

by John C. Renner

The advantages of expanding international
trade are considerable. Business, farmers,
workers, consumers, and the Nation as a
whole benefit.

The fundamental reason for encouraging
the liberalization and expansion of world
trade is that resources will be used more effi-
ciently and this will stimulate economic
growth. Past experience shows that there is
a definite correlation between international
trade and economic growth. Between 1913
and 1937, world trade increased by only one-
quarter and the average annual rate of
growth in i-eal output of the major industrial-
ized countries was about 1.9 percent. Be-
tween 1950 and 1970, world trade quintupled
and the average annual rate of economic
growth was 4.5 percent. This is an enor-
mous difference. Although other factors were
at work, the expansion of world trade cer-
tainly played a large role in stimulating
economic growth. Conversely, stagnation of
international trade could be expected to work
in the opposite direction, to the detriment of
us all.

Imports have great value. They provide
the economy with essential raw materials.
They give consumers — and all of us are

consumers — a greater choice of goods and
services. Imports help restrain inflation.
Finally, they facilitate the reallocation of our
resources to more productive uses.

Exports are also important. They help
finance needed and desired imports. The for-
eign exchange earned by exports helps
finance foreign investment, which in turn
produces a continuing source of income.

Exports enable businesses and farmers to
expand their sales and profits. This has in-
creasing significance. Exports of agricul-
tural and industrial products are becoming
relatively and absolutely more important.
From 1953 to 1970, the value of agricultural
exports jumped from $2.8 billion to $7.2
billion and from 14 percent of gross farm
product to 25 percent. Over the same period,
the value of exports of manufactured prod-
ucts almost trebled; they increased from
$10.9 billion to $29.3 billion and from 9.7
percent of gross manufacturing product to
11.6 percent.

Export industries also create more and
better jobs than import-competing indus-
tries. Economists have approached the rela-
tionship between trade and employment from
different standpoints. Nonetheless their

July 31, 1972

139

lines of inquiry have led to a single conclu-
sion: An equal expansion of exports and im-
ports increases employment and income, and
an equal contraction of exports and imports
decreases employment and income. There
are two reasons for this:

First, American industries producing ex-
ports are more labor-intensive than Ameri-
can industries competing with imports, and
the jobs in export industries are better
paid than those in import-competing indus-
tries. On the average, export-related manu-
facturing industries pay about 9 percent
higher wages than import-competing indus-
tries. When we compare the most export-
intensive industries with those facing the
greatest import competition, the wage differ-
ential is greater than 20 percent.

Second, the imposition of import restric-
tions by the United States would be matched
by counteraction on the part of foreign
governments. Reciprocity is the basic rule in
international trade, and it operates whether
trade is being freed or restrained.

Let us apply these considerations to a con-
crete case. There has been a good deal of
talk recently about the advantages to Ameri-
can workers of the Burke-Hartke bill. The
proponents of this bill argue that its quota
provisions would save many American jobs.
We have subjected this contention to inten-
sive analysis and have found the claim to be
false. The quota provisions of the Burke-
Hartke bill would not save jobs. They would
cause a loss of jobs. We estimate that the net
impact on jobs and income of the U.S. import
restraints called for by the Burke-Hartke
bill and of equivalent foreign action would be
about 80,000 lost American jobs and $700
million in forgone American income.^

Export Record of U.S. Agriculture

From this short analysis, we see that the
benefits of freer trade to farmers, workers,
firms, and consumers are great. But some
people question whether we can compete suc-
cessfully in a world where trade barriers are
much lower than they are now. To examine

TABLE 1

Value Added

Per

Worker

IN Agriculture

1967

Country

Amount

United States

$6,350

Canada

4,450

Netherlands

4,010

Ireland

3,430

United Kingdom

3,180

Denmark

2,780

France (1966)

2,220

Sweden

2,020

Germany

1,830

Italy

1,600

Spain

990

Japan

930

Turkey

330

this question, let us look at our past and prob-
able future performance in agricultural and
industrial products.

In the agricultural sector we are mani-
festly competitive. Our country is richly en-
dowed in land and climate; American farm-
ers have taken the lead in the application of
technology to production and distribution;
and they have been able to realize major
economies of scale. These and other factors
have contributed to putting American agri-
cultural products, especially field crops, in an
exceedingly strong position internationally.

The balance of commercial exports and
imports of agricultural products shifted
steadily from a deficit of $1.9 billion in 1955
to a surplus of over $900 million in 1971.
This is a remarkable record, especially in the
face of increasing protection in one of our
principal foreign markets, the European
Community.

A good indication of our competitive abil-
ity where no foreign trade barriers exist is
the growing value of our exports of soybeans

' Single copies of a technical paper on which these
estimates are based are available upon request from
the Office of International Trade, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.

140

Department of State Bulletin

and soybean meal and cake to the European
Community. The common external tariff of
the European Community is zero, and there
are no other import restraints. Our exports
of soybeans and soybean meal and cake to
this destination leaped from $68 million in
1958 to $776 million in 1971 — an increase of
more than tenfold.

This excellent export record is accounted
for, to a large degree, by differences in pro-
ductivity. The American farmer is vastly
more productive than his foreign counter-
parts, as table 1, portraying the value added
per worker in agriculture in 1967, shows.

Trade Surplus in High-Technology Products

To determine our ability to compete in
manufactured products requires a more
complicated analysis. In 1964 we had a trade
surplus in manufactured products of about
$7.9 billion. By 1970 this surplus had
dwindled to roughly $3.5 billion. The ques-
tions we need to examine are : What were
the main contributing factors, and are they
likely to persist? It will help us find the
correct answers if we first determine which
types of manufactured products did well in
international trade and which did not.

To get a more precise appreciation of the
problem, our exports and imports of manu-
factured products were divided into two
categories, high- and low-technology prod-
ucts. High-technology products were defined
as those produced by industries in which the
ratio of research and development expendi-
tures to sales has been average or better.
This is a more satisfactory way to look at
the matter than in terms of the extent of
capitalization because the newness and so-
phistication of technology depends on inno-
vation, which in turn depends in large meas-
ure on R&D expenditures.

Dividing our exports and imports this
way, we see that the American trade surplus
in high-technology products grew from $7.9
billion in 1964 to $12.4 billion in 1970.

The reasons for our excellent performance
to date are found primarily in the levels of
research and development expenditures and

in the numbers of highly trained personnel
engaged in R&D.

U.S. expenditures on research and devel-
opment in 1971 were about $28 billion,
approximately 10 times greater than those
of any other country. Even if research and
development expenditures for defense and
space are excluded, U.S. expenditures greatly
exceed those of the other major industrial-
ized countries. In 1970 American outlays for
research and development other than for
defense and space were about $15.5 billion,
about six times more than Japan's and seven
times greater than Germany's, to take the
next two largest spenders.

We have over 500,000 scientists and engi-
neers engaged in research and development
— more than three times as many as any
other country. Our total R&D manpower is
slightly less than 1.5 million — about four
times as great as our nearest competitor.

The absolute figures are the ones that
count most. There are critical masses in some
lines of research and development which
many countries have not reached and may
not be able to reach. Even foreign countries
investing a relatively large part of their
national income in R&D spending may not
reach the economic scale of spending in spe-
cific industries or product lines.

Now to look at whether our large trade
surplus in high-technology products is likely
to continue to expand rapidly:

The growth in U.S. R&D funding has
slackened somewhat since 1966. However,
the slackening of the rate of increase in U.S.
R&D spending is largely attributable to a
cutback in the rate of growth of Federal
spending on research and development. Push-
ing the analysis a little further, one sees
that the real shift has been away from
spending on defense and space R&D. R&D
spending that is neither defense nor space
related in 1967 exceeded defense-space R&D
for the first time in a decade. Between 1966
and 1971 it grew at an annual average rate
of 9.6 percent. And research and develop-
ment spending that was neither defense-
space related nor federally funded rose by
9.7 percent annually.

July 31, 1972

141

Most other countries' R&D spending is
growing at a rapid rate. This reflects the
fact that their base is small; R&D spending
except in the United States (and the United
Kingdom) was quite small prior to 1960.
But even if their rapid rate of increase in
R&D spending continues, the United States
in the next decade will increase its lead in
R&D expenditures.

In 1969 all four of the runners-up to the
United States in R&D spending — France, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan —
were spending in the neighborhood of $2.5
billion on R&D. If each of these countries'
R&D spending continues to grow at the same
rate as in the latter 1960's, they will attain
the following levels in the year 1980 : Japan,
$9 billion; Germany, $6 billion; France, $5
billion; the United Kingdom, $3.5 billion.

But by then, if recent trends continue
(taking into account the falloff in defense
and space R&D expenditures), the United
States will spend $38 billion.

Thus, we see that the gap in absolute
terms between the R&D expenditures of the
United States and its main competitors can
be expected to expand rather than contract.
The present gap is approximately $25 bil-
lion. In 1980, the gap between the United
States and Japan will be roughly $29 billion.
At that time, the gap between Germany and
the United States will be about $32 billion.
With the other countries the gap will be
even greater.

In spite of this huge spending gap, there
is and will continue to be a catching-up proc-
ess at work in many areas of high-technology
production. But the evidence of history is
that the United States has succeeded in inno-
vating successfully in the newest areas, while
other countries are catching up in older ones.

Over the last generation, for example, in
some chemical industry products, such as
low-density polyethylene, in which we pio-
neered, we have ceased to rack up trade sur-
pluses. At the same time enough new prod-
ucts have been introduced, in categories
such as pharmaceuticals, to swell the overall
trade balance in chemical industry products.

In consumer electronics, in which we had
led the world, we moved into deficit in 1962;
but in other electronics and machinery lines,
our position has been strengthening. While
computer production has spread widely
through the world, U.S. manufacturers of
computers and related parts have continued
to develop new products, and the trade sur-
plus in computer products has risen rapidly.
Despite the swift diffusion of semiconductor
technology from the United States, we have
managed to maintain a favorable balance in
semiconductor trade by continually introduc-
ing innovations. There are two recent cases
in point. Currently taking place is a shift
back to the United States of electronic calcu-
lator production. This is caused by both
improved solid state technology and in-
creased efficiency in the use of labor in
assembling calculators. Also, American in-
dustry is capturing a growing segment of
the watch market with electronic watches,
again making use of American solid state
technology.

The evidence is persuasive. American in-
dustry has been and probably will continue
to be an exceptionally strong competitor in
high-technology products.

Performance of Low-Technology Products

The picture is totally different for low-
technology products. From 1964 to 1970 our
trade account in low-technology products
worsened from rough balance to a deficit of
$8.9 billion. The falloff in our performance
in low-technology products is even more pre-
cipitous than the climb in the performance
of high-technology products. Why is this?

To begin the search for an answer, we
examined the relationship between changes
in prices and exports. Statistical analysis
showed that low-technology exports were
quite responsive to price changes and that
high-technology products were not. Common
sense supports these findings. Price consid-
erations could not be expected to figure as
importantly in foreign decisions to purchase
high-technology products, some of which are

142

Department of State Bulletin

TABLE

Average Annual Percentage

Changes

IN Unit Labor

Costs

IN Manufacturing

Industries

Country 1960-65

1965-70

United States

-0.7

3.9

European Community

3.9

2.9

Japan

4.3

0.8

Canada

-0.9

4.6

United Kingdom

2.4

3.8

Sweden

2.0

2.5

Switzerland

5.2

0.0

not obtainable elsewhere, as with respect to
low-technology products, which are more
widely available.

To carry the analysis further, let us look
at indicators of relative cost and price move-
ments.

Table 2 compares unit labor costs in man-
ufacturing industries in terms of average
annual percentage changes.

The most striking thing about these fig-
ures is the shift in American performance.
In the period 1960-65, American unit labor
costs actually went down, giving us the sec-
ond-best record among the major industrial-
ized countries. Then the lid flew off. In the
period 1965-70, American unit labor costs
shot up by more than any other country's
except Canada.

A comparison of prices reveals a similar
pattern. Table 3 portrays the export price
indexes for manufactures in the United
States and other major industrialized
countries.

Here again, we see that U.S. export prices
increased very little through 1964 but then
leaped up from 1965 to 1970. For the period
as a whole, the American price performance
was significantly worse than that of our
major competitors.

These cost and price developments go a
considerable way to explain the deepening
deficit in our trade in low-technology prod-
ucts from 1964 to 1970. But what about the
future? Can we hope for an improvement?

The recent modifications in foreign ex-
change rates should lead in time to a sub-
stantial improvement in our trade account
generally and in our performance in low-
technology products especially. As we have
seen, sales of low-technology products are
quite responsive to price changes ; and there
is no reason to suspect that the improved
price position of American low-technology
products will not result in an increase in the
volume of sales of these products relative
to foreign sales in our market and in theirs.

There are some encouraging signs already.

The number of automobiles from overseas
sold in the United States decreased from
506,199 in the first four months of 1971 to
488,352 in the first four months of 1972.
Over the same period, the number of Amer-
ican cars sold domestically rose from
2,713,327 to 2,852,217.

A similar pattern is evident with respect
to color TV sales. In the first quarter of
1972, domestic sales of color TV sets in-
creased by 24.6 percent as compared with
the first quarter of 1971. At the same time,
imports declined by 6.5 percent.

The extent to which these initial favorable
indications will be followed by a general im-
provement in our trade account depends in
large measure on what happens to prices and
business activity here and abroad.

TABLE 3

Export

Price Indexes for

Manufactures

Year

U.S. Index

Competitors'
Index

1960

100

102

1961

100

101

1962

100

1963

100

1964

101

102

1965

104

103

1966

107

104

1967

110

106

1968

113

105

1969

118

109

1970

124

116

July 31, 1972

143

Most people are aware of the close rela-
tionship between relative price movements
and the rise and fall of exports and imports.
Fewer people recognize the close correlation
between overall economic activity and trade.
In fact, changes in economic activity are
the most important determinants of U.S.
exports and imports. We estimate on the
basis of statistical analysis of the data for
the period 1953-70 that about 80 percent of
the annual change in American imports can
be explained by changes in U.S. gross na-
tional product. About 55 percent of the
annual change in American exports can be
explained by changes in the GNP of Canada,
Japan, and western Europe.

U.S. Competitive Position

From all this, what can we conclude about
our ability to compete with foreign goods?

The changes in parities of currencies
should boost somewhat our already very
strong competitive position in agricultural
and high-technology products. The impact
on low-technology products should be much
greater; our competitive position in these
products should improve markedly. How-
ever, adverse movements in relative prices or
in the business cycle would offset, partially
or entirely, the improvement in our competi-
tive position arising from the exchange rate
modifications.

I have attempted in this analysis to show
that:

— The advantages of freer trade to work-
ers, farmers, consumers, firms, and the
Nation are substantial.

— The United States has been and is likely
to continue to be very competitive in agri-
cultural and high-technology products.

— The poor American competitive position
in low-technology products should be im-
proved considerably by the recent change in
exchange rates.

— Our future ability to compete success-
fully with foreign products will depend to a
great extent on whether we can manage our
economy as well as or better than our major
trading partners manage theirs.

Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed
by the United States and U.S.S.R.

An agreement with respect to purchases of
grain by the Soviet Union in the United
States ivas signed at Washington on July 8
by Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson,
U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Soviet Commer-
cial Commission; Secretary of Agriculture
Earl L. Butz; and M. R. Kuzmin, First Dep-
uty Minister of Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.
Following is a summary of the agreement
issued by the Western White House on July

White House press release <San Clemente, Calif.) dated July 8

1. The President announced on July 8 the
successful negotiation of a three-year grain
agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union totaling $750 million of U.S.-
grown grains (wheat, corn, barley, soi'ghum,
rye, oats — at the Soviet Union's option) for
the period from August 1, 1972, through July
31, 1975. As part of the agreement, the
United States will make available credit
through the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) for repayment in three years from
the dates of deliveries, with the total amount
of credit outstanding not to exceed $500 mil-
lion. Under the agreement the Soviet Union
will purchase for deliveries during the first
year, August 1, 1972, through July 31, 1973,
at least $200 million of U.S.-grown grains.

2. The purchases and sales will be as nego-
tiated between the Soviet Union and the U.S.
private commercial exporters. The credits
on deliveries made through March 31, 1973,
will carry CCC's present going interest rates
(which are 61/^ percent per annum on letters
of credit issued by U.S. banks and 7% per-
cent on letters of credit issued by foreign
banks). Under the CCC program, the prin-
cipal is payable in three equal annual install-
ments following the delivery and accrued in-
terest is paid with each installment.

' Two tables showing value of U.S. commercial
exports for four feed grains and wheat to the top
10 importing countries and farm value of produc-
tion and value of exports, 1969-71, which were in-
cluded in the press release are not printed here.

144

Department of State Bulletin

3. The Soviet Union purchased $150 mil-
lion of feed grains (mainly corn) from U.S.
grain traders in the fall of 1971. This was a
cash transaction. In 1963 U.S. exporters
sold the Soviet Union about $140 million of
wheat. Thus, this is the largest Soviet grain
purchase in history.

4. This sale to the Soviet Union will put
that country in a second position among pur-
chasers of U.S. grain. Average annual grain
purchases of these six grains over the last
three years are:

Japan

$437

million

Netherlands

135

)»

Canada

126

»»

United Kingdom

102

Italy

West Germany

Belgium-Luxembourg

Venezuela

»»

Republic of Korea

Republic of China

5. The average purchase rate of $250 mil-
lion annually would increase U.S. exports of
the six grains by almost 17 percent annually
over the average of the three previous years,
1969-71.

6. Agricultural experts estimate that
about 3,000 to 5,000 additional jobs are cre-
ated for $100 million of grain exports. Since
at least $750 million is involved, it could be
estimated that a range of 22,500 to 37,500
man-years of work for U.S. workers is in-
volved in this deal.

U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To Assist
Refugees in Southern Sudan

Following is a statement read to news cor-
respondents on July 3 by Charles W. Bray
III, Director, Office of Press Relations.

Let me recall to you that in early May we
announced in this room the readiness of the
United States Government to assist in the
relief and rehabilitation of refugees return-
ing to their home areas in the southern
Sudan as the result of the agreement between
the government and rebel leaders which

brought to an end some 16 years of fighting.

I think I also said at that time that the
United Nations was dispatching a survey
team to the Sudan for the purpose of investi-
gating the requirement for a resettlement
assistance program on something of an emer-
gency basis. The United Nations team has
completed its survey. This fact was reported
by Secretary General Waldheim to ECOSOC
[Economic and Social Council] today in
Geneva. In the course of his discussion, he
said that he had asked the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Prince
Sadruddin Aga Khan, to coordinate an im-
mediate U.N. program for relief and rehabil-
itation, and he appealed to the international
community for contributions to the program,
amounting to $22 million in cash and kind.

The High Commissioner's field team,
which completed the investigation in the
Sudan, has reported needs for food, shelter,
medicines, health and education facilities,
and funds for transport of supplies to the
refugee areas, which are in the remote south.

The number of people involved — that is,
those who fled from the area to neighboring
countries or other parts of the Sudan — is es-
timated at 680,000.

In response to the Secretary General's
appeal, all of today, the United States Gov-
ernment is making an initial commitment of
support and has informed the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees that the United
States will provide $4.45 million in assist-
ance. That sum breaks down as follows:

— Into immediate, $200,000 in cash to the
UNHCR for the purchase and transport of
polyethylene shelter material — this is, I
gather, an especially urgent need, since the
rainy season has already started in the
refugee area; and, as you recall, we pioneered
in the use of this material for shelter pur-
poses in Bangladesh. A test program has
demonstrated its suitability in the Sudan as
well.

— $250,000 in cash to American voluntary
agencies already involved in Sudan refugee
relief. Catholic Relief Services, Church
World Service, and Lutheran World Relief;
this money will go primarily for trucks and

July 31, 1972

145

other vehicles and for pontoons for tempo-
rary bridges.

— And, finally, from the Food for Peace
program, through voluntary agencies, up to
$4 million, principally to be used for cooking
oils, milk, and high-protein cereal blends.

This amount does not include the token ges-
ture in early May of $25,000 for hand garden
tools to assist refugees at reestablishing
their own plots. These tools have now been
delivered and are about to be distributed.

Our assistance in this program is being
administered by the Office of Refugee and
Migration Affairs, headed by Frank L. Kel-
logg, in coordination with the Food for Peace
program, which is headed by Irwin R.
Hedges.

I might add to that our hope that other
potential donors will respond generously to
the Secretary General's appeal to meet the
-needs of those in the southern Sudan.

Civil Aeronautics Board Action
With Respect to BOAC

Press release 171 dated July 12

The Civil Aeronautics Board on July 12
released an order which requires that British
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) file
its schedules for approval with the Board.
This action was taken in accordance with
part 213 of the Board's Economic Regula-
tions, which empowers it to require the filing
and approval of schedules of foreign airlines
when a foreign government, over the objec-
tions of the U.S. Government, has restricted
the services of U.S. airlines contrary to the
provisions of the applicable bilateral air
transport agreement. The Board has invoked
these powers on three previous occasions:
with respect to Qantas, the Australian air-

line, in 1971; and in 1972, Aerolinas Argen-
tinas, the Argentine airline, and Iberia, the
Spanish airline.

The Board decided to proceed with respect
to BOAC because of a decision by United
Kingdom aviation authorities to limit capac-
ity scheduled by National Aii-lines, a U.S.-
flag airline, on the London-Miami route. The
U.S.-U.K. Air Services Agreement contem-
plates that questions of the appropriate level
of airline capacity be resolved bilaterally
through intergovernmental review of actual
airline operations. In this case, the British
aviation authorities issued a unilateral order
to National to reduce the number of weekly
747 services in the Miami-London market
from seven to four without an appropriate
intergovernmental review of National's op-
erating experience on the route. It is the U.S.
Government's view that National's manage-
ment decision to operate a daily 747 service
has proven to be valid in terms of actual ex-
perience in the market, that these services
were fully consistent with the provisions of
the bilateral agreement, and that the British
authorities violated the agreement in taking
unilateral action.

U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text
of Extradition Treaty

Joint Armouncement, June 2

Press release 131 dated June 2

It is jointly announced in Washington and
Dublin that following negotiations in Dub-
lin between representatives of the two Gov-
ernments, agreement has been reached on
the text of an extradition treaty between
Ireland and the United States. The treaty
will enter into force when it has been signed
and ratified on behalf of the parties.

146

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National Security

Folloiving is a statement made hefor'e the
Senate Committee on Armed Services on
June 28 by Ambassador Gerard Smith, who
is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S.
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT).''

I am pleased to appear before your com-
mittee today to discuss the two SALT agree-
ments.-

During the past 2\U years, my associates
and I have briefed the Armed Services
SALT Subcommittee and the committee's
staff members a number of times on de-
velopments in the negotiations. Today I
would like to discuss with you the results
of the negotiations, which I believe con-
stitute a significant first step in limiting
strategic arms.

My understanding is that this committee
is especially interested in getting a clear
understanding of the terms of the agree-
ments and in fully understanding their effect
on U.S. security. I will today try to be
responsive to these special concerns.

First, Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly
to discuss the basic provisions of the two
agreements. The committee has before it

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

"For texts of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, In-
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and
protocol to the interim agreement, see Bulletin
of June 26, 1972, p. 918; for texts of agreed inter-
pretations and unilateral statements, see BULLETIN
of July 3, 1972, p. 11.

an article-by-article analysis, and I will try
to avoid repetition. I will, however, touch
on the basic undertakings and their effects
and try to answer some questions that have
been raised.

Provisions of the ABM Treaty

Starting with the ABM Treaty — this is
a long-term definitive agreement, and the
effects of its undertakings are basic to a
realistic assessment of the merits of the
two agreements taken together.

The treaty contains a general commit-
ment not to build a nationwide ABM defense
nor to provide a base for such defense. This
general undertaking is supplemented by cer-
tain specific provisions. By this general
undertaking and the specific commitments,
both countries in effect agree not to chal-
lenge the effectiveness of each other's mis-
sile deterrent capabilities by deploying wide-
spread defenses against them. This means
that the penetration capability of our surviv-
ing deterrent missile forces can be assured.
This, to my mind, bears directly on concerns
about a first strike against the United
States. As long as we maintain sufficient
and survivable retaliatory forces, this new
assurance of their penetration capability
makes "first strike" as a rational act incon-
ceivable, in my judgment. I believe that
this is a development of prime significance
for U.S. security.

The treaty, by permitting only a small
deployment of ABM's, tends to break the
offense-defense action-and-reaction spiral in
strategic arms competition. The low ABM
limits increase the deterrent value of each
of our retaliatory offensive missiles. In the

July 31, 1972

147

long run, we should be able to obtain more
deterrence at less cost.

In view of the low ABM levels agreed on,
it should be possible in the future to agree
on mutual reductions in offensive weapons
without impairing strategic stability.

The permitted ABM systems are spelled
out in article III. Each party may have
two ABM complexes, one in an ICBM [in-
tercontinental ballistic missile] area and one
to defend the national command authority.
These complexes are limited in several ways
— geographically, in numbers of ABM
launchers and missiles (100 at each com-
plex), and in specific constraints on ABM
radars.

The two ABM deployments would serve
different purposes. ABM coverage of an
ICBM area will afford some protection for
the ICBM's. ABM coverage at the national
capital will provide protection for the na-
tional command authority against accidental
or unauthorized launch of a small number
of missiles and is consistent with the basic
purpose of the 1971 U.S.-U.S.S.R. agree-
ment on measures to reduce the risk of out-
break of nuclear war. There would also be
the additional benefit of increased warning
time which should afford opportunity for
command decisions if there were a large-
scale attack.

Other articles in the treaty supplement the
basic provisions of article III. Of special in-
terest are the limitations placed on ABM ra-
dars. As the long leadtime item in develop-
ment of an ABM system, ABM radar was
the subject of intense and complex negotia-
tion. There are also limitations on the deploy-
ment of certain types of non-ABM radars in
order to preclude their possible use as ele-
ments of an ABM system.

Qualitative Limitations on ABM Systems

As a further restraint on ABM capabili-
ties, there are three significant qualitative
limitations on ABM systems. Both sides have
agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
launchers for launching more than one inter-
ceptor missile at a time, not to modify launch-
ers to provide them with such capability, nor

to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-
automatic or other similar systems for rapid
reload of ABM launchers.

The development and testing, as well as de-
ployment, of sea-, air-, space-based, and land-
mobile devices is prohibited. Of perhaps even
greater importance, the parties have agreed
that no future types of ABM systems based
on different physical principles from present
technology can be deployed unless the treaty
is amended.

To further reinforce the ban on a nation-
wide ABM defense, another major set of
qualitative limitations is the provisions to
deal with the SAM-upgrade [surface-to-air
missile] problem. Both sides agree that con-
version or testing of other systems, such as
air-defense systems, or components thereof,
to perform an ABM role is prohibited. This
is part of the general undertaking not to
provide an ABM capability to non-ABM sys-
tems.

I do not propose to speak about the con-
fidence with which we can adequately moni-
tor fulfillment of the obligations of these
agreements, since I understand that this
committee has discussed with previous wit-
nesses the capabilities of our national techni-
cal means of verification. We did not work
out limitations and then check to see if na-
tional technical means were adequate to ver-
ify them. We tailored the limitations to fit
the capabilities of national technical means
of verification.

There is a landmark commitment not to
interfere with national technical means of
verification. This provision would, for ex-
ample, prohibit interference with a satellite
in orbit used for verification of the treaty.
The treaty also contains a commitment not
to use concealment measures so as to impede
the effectiveness of national technical means
of verification. The world should be a more
open place as a result of these two under-
takings.

The Standing Consultative Commission
established by the treaty will permit consid-
eration on a regular basis of the operations of
the treaty, including questions of compliance.
This is a significant new development in So-

148

Department of State Bulletin

viet-American arms control arrangements.
The Commission will also have the function
of considering proposals to increase the via-
bility of the treaty. We expect that the estab-
lishment of the Commission will be a priority
matter when SALT II begins.

Although the treaty duration is unlimited,
either party can withdraw whenever it de-
cides that extraordinary events relating to
the subject matter of the treaty have jeop-
ardized its supreme interests. A six-months'
notice of such withdrawal, including a state-
ment of the extraordinary events involved, is
required.

The U.S. delegation indicated the special
importance it attached to the relationship be-
tween defensive and offensive limitations. A
formal statement was made putting the
U.S.S.R. on notice that if an agreement pro-
viding for more complete arms limitations
were not achieved within five years, U.S.
supreme interests could be jeopardized, and
should that occur, it would constitute a basis
for withdrawal from the treaty. The right of
withdrawal fully protects our security in-
terests should the follow-on negotiations not
succeed and should the strategic situation
become such that we needed to exercise our
right to withdraw.

Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn to
the interim agreement.

Unlike the ABM Treaty, this is a tem-
porary freeze limited in duration and scope
and does not provide long-term comprehen-
sive limitation on strategic offensive weapons
systems. It is an interim "holding" device to
prevent the aggregate number of ICBM and
SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic mis-
sile] launchers from rising while the nego-
tiation to limit offensive systems continues.
It in fact constrains a number of Soviet pro-
grams and no U.S. programs. It is explicitly
provided in article VII that the obligations of
the interim agreement shall not prejudice
the scope or terms of the limitations which
may be worked out in the course of further
negotiations.

In article I the parties undertake commit-

ments not to construct additional fixed ICBM
launchers. The undertaking in article I does
not just bar the addition of ICBM launchers;
it also bars the relocation of existing ICBM
launchers.

The agreement would be violated if one
more ICBM launcher for operational use
were started. We are confident that such a
violation would be detected. We also have
confidence in our national means of verifica-
tion's capability to reveal the current num-
ber of Soviet ICBM's. We do not need Soviet
confirmation of our intelligence.

Under article II the parties agree not to
convert launchers for light or older ICBM's
into launchers for modern heavy ICBM's.
This constitutes a qualitative constraint over
and above the quantitative constraint not to
construct any more launchers.

On the issue of heavy versus light missiles,
it is clear from oral exchanges during the ne-
gotiations that both sides understand that
Soviet SS-ll's and SS-13's are "light" and
that SS-7's, SS-8's, and SS-9's are "heavy"
and that U.S. Titans are "heavy" and Min-
uteman are "light." The United States can-
not replace Minuteman with missiles of the
volume of Titans, and the Soviets cannot re-
place SS-ll's with missiles of the volume of
SS-7's, 8's, or 9's.

But both sides want under this interim
agreement to continue to modernize their
ICBM forces. You will recall that in our
current modernization program on Minute-
man we are increasing missile volume, but
not to the extent that would make "heavy"
missiles of them.

There are two aspects of this moderniza-
tion question, launchers and missiles. The
launcher aspect was handled by an agreed in-
terpretation that in the process of moderni-
zation the dimensions of silo launchers will
not be significantly increased and with a
further understanding that this bars an
increase in launcher dimensions greater than
10-15 percent.

With regard to the missile aspect of the
problem, after months of trying we were not
able to negotiate a definition of what consti-

July 31, 1972

149

tutes a heavy missile, the Soviets arguing
that this was unnecessary for a short-term
freeze and that both sides could tell the dif-
ference between a light and heavy missile.
We finally resorted, therefore, to a U.S.
formal statement that we would "consider
any ICBM having a volume significantly
greater than that of the largest light ICBM
now operational on either side to be a heavy
ICBM."

I anticipate that when SALT is resumed,
hopefully in the fall, we will be negotiating
for a treaty covering definitive levels on
ICBM's as well as other strategic weapons.
As opposed to the situation in negotiating a
short-term freeze (that affected only Soviet
programs), we found that agreement in
greater specificity was possible when it was
a matter of negotiating the ABM Treaty.

The agreement does not cover mobile
ICBM's. Neither side presently has such
systems. The Soviets argued that a freeze
should not apply to systems not now deployed.
Probably their main interest was in not
prejudicing their position on the legitimacy
of mobile ICBM's in the follow-on negotia-
tions by agreeing in effect to banning them in
an interim freeze. The U.S. delegation stated
that we would consider deployment of oper-
ational land-mobile ICBM launchers during
the period of the interim agreement as in-
consistent with the objectives of that agree-
ment.

Effect of SLBM Arrangement

Article III of the interim agreement and
the protocol cover SLBM launchers and mod-
ern ballistic missile submarines.

The Soviet delegation long resisted in-
clusion of limitations on SLBM's in the in-
terim agreement. They argued that it was
not appropriate because the main concern ex-
pressed by the United States had been the
Soviet ICBM program, particulai'ly the SS-9
program, which they agreed to halt. The
Soviets also argued that freezing SLBM's
was complicated because of foreign bases,
which they said gave the United States an
advantage.

The administration insisted that SLBM's
be included in the interim agreement since
they constituted a dynamic construction pro-
gram and a significant part of the aggre-
gate strategic missile forces that should not
be increased while negotiations continue for
definitive offensive limitations.

The effect of the SLBM arrangement final-
ly worked out is to freeze SLBM and ICBM
launchers at current levels — coupled with an
option to replace certain older ICBM's and
SLBM launchers with new SLBM launchers.
There are three levels involved in this ar-
rangement: a numerical limit on SLBM
launchers on modern nuclear submarines at
which replacement must begin, a numerical
limit on modern SLBM launchers, and a
numerical limit on modern SLBM subma-
rines each side may have under replacement
procedures.

After reaching 740 launchers on nuclear-
powered submarines of any type, the U.S.S.R.
must scrap older launchers under agreed pro-
cedures. The purpose of the negotiated num-
ber, 740, is to establish a clear and unambig-
uous baseline which avoids uncertainty or
debate over the definition of "under construc-
tion."

There is a ceiling of 950 for the U.S.S.R.
on the total number of modern SLBM launch-
ers. This ceiling is to cover launchers on
nuclear-powered submarines (Y-class and H-
class submarines) and any modern launchers
on older submarines (G-class diesel-powered
submarines).

To reach 950 SLBM's on modern subma-
rines, the U.S.S.R. must retire older launch-
ers— specifically, those for SS-7 and SS-8
ICBM's and on H-class nuclear submarines.
The first SLBM launcher on a nuclear-pow-
ered submarine after the 740th launcher
must be a replacement. The older ICBM or
SLBM launchers being replaced must start
being scrapped no later than the date on
which the submarine containing the 741st
launcher begins sea trials.

There is also a ceiling of 62 for the
U.S.S.R. on the number of operational mod-
ern submarines (Y-class or follow-on
nuclear-powered SLBM submarines).

150

Department of State Bulletin

The committee will recall from previous
briefings given during the SALT negotia-
tions that this one-way-mix concept, which
permits replacement of land-based with sea-
based launchers, was suggested by the United
States early in the SALT negotiations as a
way of achieving greater strategic stability.

Under these arrangements, the United
States has the right to have 656 SLBM
launchers and through replacement could
have up to 710 SLBM launchers on 44 mod-
ern submarines.

The conversion of U.S. ICBM launchers to
handle Minuteman III missiles and the con-
version of current Polaris submarines to
handle Poseidon missiles, as well as the con-
struction of new submarines as replacement
for older ones, are not affected by the freeze.

The interim agreement provides for ap-
plication of the same verification procedures
and commitments about nonconcealment and
noninterference as contained in the ABM
Treaty. Also, the Standing Consultative Com-
mission would be used to promote the objec-
tives and implementation of the interim
agreement.

Meeting U.S. Strategic Concerns

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to com-
ment on what would be the effects of these
agreements on U.S. security.

The administration's objectives in SALT
are to achieve agreements maintaining and
enhancing a sound U.S. strategic posture and
to reach a more stable strategic relationship
with the U.S.S.R. in order to improve the
prospects for peace. I think these objectives
have been met in these first limitation agree-
ments.

In assessing the agreements, the basic
question is: Would not the United States be
better off with them than without them? This
question requires comparing the strategic
prospects under the agreements with the
prospects that would exist in their absence.
Another way of putting the question is to ask
how these agreements meet the strategic con-
cerns that have existed in this country in the
past few years.

There were concerns about the dangers
involved in a large, costly, destabilizing ABM
competition. Under the terms of the ABM
Treaty, those concerns should be sharply re-
duced if not entirely eliminated.

There was concern about the threat to our
nuclear deterrent's high assurance of capa-
bility to penetrate Soviet defenses. This con-
cern rested not only on the prospect of large-
scale Soviet ABM deployments but also on
the possibility of upgrade of Soviet SAM
systems to give them an ABM capability.
Under the ABM Treaty the Soviets will take
commitments not to deploy a widespread
ABM system and not to upgrade SAM's and
to have only 200 ABM's. U.S. penetration
capability can be clearly assured.

There was concern about the continuing
growth in the numbers of Soviet ICBM's, es-
pecially the SS-9. Under the interim agree-
ment the U.S.S.R. is committed not to start
any additional ICBM's and is limited to a
number of SS-9's well below levels which
seemed likely several years ago.

There was concern about the overall
growth of the aggregate number of Soviet
strategic launchers, both land- and sea-based.
The growth of that aggregate total will be
stopped under the interim agreement.

There was concern that our national capa-
bilities to keep informed about Soviet deploy-
ments might, by adversary action, be ren-
dered ineffective. In the ABM Treaty, the
Soviet Union has taken a landmark commit-
ment not to interfere with our national
means of verification.

These concerns have been met without
any restrictions being placed on on-going or
programed U.S. strategic offensive programs.

Opportunities for the Future

Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee to
give favorable consideration to these two
agreements. I believe they are in the interest
of the United States. I have spoken of the
strategic concerns that exist in this country
that are met by these agreements. Those are
achievements of no small magnitude. It does
not lessen the importance of having met

July 31, 1972

151

those concerns to say that not every U.S.
concern has been met. I can assure the mem-
bers of this committee that it is clear from
the negotiations that not every Soviet con-
cern has been met. That is a principal reason
why the interim agreement is temporary. We
are, however, better off with the interim
agreement in force while we negotiate a com-
prehensive offensive limitation agreement.

Under the agreement, U.S. forces will
clearly be sufficient to protect our, and our
allies', security interests. We are free under
the interim agreement to pursue sound mod-
ernization programs, and I believe we should
do so. The offensive limitations on the
U.S.S.R. in conjunction with the funda-
mentally new element injected into the stra-
tegic situation by the very low limits on
ABM's for both sides will clearly enhance the
security of the United States.

We have kept our allies informed at all
stages of the SALT negotiations. Since the
Moscow signing, we have briefed them on
these agreements, and I believe it is fair to
say that they have met with their approval.

I am convinced that with these two agree-
ments in force, strategic stability will be in-
creased, the threat of nuclear war will be
reduced, the prospects for future arms ac-
cords will be increased, and there will be
increased hope for a peaceful future.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think the SALT
process has proved useful in and of itself.
SALT is not a one-time effort, but a continu-
ing process which involves negotiating ex-
changes between the two greatest nuclear
powers and a continuing effort to move step
by step. The very first results of SALT did
not deal with the central issues of strategic
competition between the two powers, but
they were important. I refer to the 1971
agreements on improving the direct com-
munications link between the United States
and U.S.S.R. and on measures to reduce the
dangers of nuclear war. We have now taken
a step toward curbing the competition in stra-
tegic arms and laying a basis for greater
strategic stability. That step must be judged
on its own merits, but I think it should also
be j udged in the context of the opportunities

it presents for the future. Both the United
States and the U.S.S.R. are making an in-
vestment in this SALT process which, I be-
lieve, they will want to preserve and increase
and not risk lightly.

I urge that this committee and the Senate
support the ABM Treaty and its accompany-
ing interim agreement.

Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet
Agreement on Cooperation in Space

Statement by U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

It is a pleasure to meet with you to dis-
cuss the agreement on cooperation in space
between the United States and the Soviet
Union which was signed in Moscow on May
24, 1972, by President Nixon and Premier
Kosygin — a pleasure not only because of the
importance which we attach to this agree-
ment but also because of the sustained in-
terest of this committee in the international
aspects of our space program and because
of the role which this committee has played
ih encouraging the use of our space capabili-
ties to serve the broad interests and objec-
tives of the United States. -

I intend to be brief, limiting myself to a
few observations as to the content of this
agreement and the opportunities which it
presents from the viewpoint of U.S. policy
abroad. I leave it to Dr. Low [George M.
Low, Deputy Administrator, National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration], who is
here this morning and is far more knowl-
edgeable than I on such matters, to inform
you as to the program arrangements them-
selves, the technical prospects, the domestic

' Made before the Senate Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences on June 23. The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

- For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of
June 26, 1972, p. 924.

152

Department of State Bulletin

implications, and the needs which ensue from
this agreement.

The space agreement which the President
signed in Moscow serves several significant
purposes:

— It endorses and confirms at the highest
level of the two governments the under-
standings reached between NASA and the
Soviet Academy of Sciences over the past 18
months for cooperation in such important
areas of space science and application as
space meteorology, the use of space tech-
niques for the study of the earth's environ-
ment, the further exploration of space and
the moon and the planets, and space biology
and medicine.

— It enables the development of compatible
rendezvous and docking systems and would
subject these systems to a joint test mission
in space which should enhance the safety and
value of space flight.

— It opens the possibility of yet further
areas of cooperation of mutual interest.

— It demonstrates in full view of the
world that the two gi-eat space powers have
both the will and the capability to work to-
gether on important and difficult tasks.

We have high hopes that this agreement
will be a milestone in our relationship with
the Soviet Union. It affords a unique oppor-
tunity for cooperation between us. It serves
our broad national purposes as well as our
specific foreign policy objectives with respect
to the Soviet Union. It is based on more than
a decade of evolving discussion and collabo-
ration in space matters between us which
indicates, in our view, that the undertak-
ings in the agreement can be fulfilled to our
mutual benefit.

With respect to our policy objectives, the
United States has long pursued the foreign
policy objectives of reducing tensions be-
tween ourselves and the Soviet Union and
seeking ways to develop a stable and mutu-
ally constructive relationship. Over the past
decade arrangements between U.S. Govern-
ment agencies and our National Academy of
Sciences, on one hand, and their Soviet coun-
terparts, on the other, have enlarged the
measure of useful contact between the two

scientific communities and have made possi-
ble a useful exploration of the state of sci-
ence and technology in both countries. U.S.
scientists have been attracted to the achieve-
ments of Soviet science in many fields and
have become convinced that deeper contact
and working cooperation would serve our in-
terests, both technological and political. In
the field of space activity, as in others, there
has been an apparent growing willingness on
the part of the Soviet Union over the past
two years to explore seriously the possibility
for collaborative projects. It is these inter-
ests and prospects on which this agreement
is based.

In his statement before the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in September
1969 — in the first year of this administra-
tion— and again in his statement in March
1970 as to the goals and purposes of our
space program, President Nixon emphasized
that we must encourage greater interna-
tional cooperation in space. He stated his in-
tention that the United States should take
positive, concrete steps "toward internation-
alizing man's epic venture into space" and
his belief "that both the adventures and the
applications of space missions should be
shared by all peoples." He felt then, and
feels now, that "our progress will be faster
and our accomplishments will be greater if
nations will join together in this effort, both
in contributing the resources and in enjoy-
ing the benefits." This agreement is a sig-
nificant step toward achieving those pur-
poses.

You will note that in the preamble of this
agreement both parties stipulate that this
expansion of cooperation between them is to
be for peaceful purposes and that its results
are to be available not only for the benefit of
the peoples of the two countries but also for
the benefit of all peoples of the world. In ar-
ticle 4 both the parties are committed to
encourage international efforts to resolve
problems of international law arising in the
exploration and use of outer space and to co-
operate to the end that legal order in space
will be strengthened through further devel-
opment of international space law. These

July 31, 1972

153

provisions reflect basic American prerequi-
sites for cooperation with other countries in
the exploration and use of space.

This agreement offers a unique opportu-
nity because the United States and the So-
viet Union are, and will remain for a long
time, the world's leading space powers. It
involves activities which have a high priority
in both countries and in which the two coun-
tries have a special expertise. It reflects the
respect in which each holds the accomplish-
ments of the other in this field and the op-
portunity to achieve mutual benefit by work-
ing together. It will require close working
relationships and, particularly in the under-
taking of a joint rendezvous and docking
test mission, the highest level of confidence
and reliability in the performance of both
people and equipment on both sides. The ob-
ligations are clear. The tasks are specific.
And the benefits which can flow from these
experiences are of corresponding value.

This agreement is not based solely on pos-
sibilities. Rather it rests on a long record of
discussion and cooperative undertakings be-
tween ourselves and the Soviet Union. You
will recall that our earliest efforts to de-
velop cooperation with the Soviet Union in
space research go back to the initial planning
of space projects for the International Geo-
physical Year in the late 1950's. These ef-
forts were followed by agreements between
NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences
in the early and mid-1960's for several lim-
ited cooperative projects and led to the much
more extensive agreements reached in Oc-
tober 1970 and January 1971, which are the
basis for the specific undertakings in arti-
cles 1 and 3 of this agreement. The specific
requirements and arrangements for develop-
ing compatible rendezvous and docking sys-
tems and an experimental test flight were, as
noted in article 3 of the agreement, agreed
in detail between NASA and the Soviet Acad-
emy of Sciences in a summary of discus-
sions between Dr. Low and Academician
[V. A.] Kotelnikov, Acting President of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, on April 6, 1972.

Our early relationships in space matters
during the 1960's, as compared with these

latter agreements, were very modest in scope
and did not consistently meet our expecta-
tions. Thus far, however, the implementa-
tion of agreements reached since 1970 has
exceeded our expectations. All of this prior
experience has had a cumulative effect and
has been important in assessing the pros-
pects for success under this new agreement.
It has not been easy to bring the Soviet Un-
ion and ourselves to working cooperation in
activities which bear so directly on national
prestige and to which each country has ac-
corded so high a priority. Nor will it be easy
to realize fully the opportunities which this
agreement offers. Nonetheless, we estimate
that it will be possible to do so. American in-
terests are adequately safeguarded and well
served.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe that
this agreement signed in Moscow is a pru-
dent, workable, and highly desirable agree-
ment which will serve both our foreign
policy interests and our space program ob-
jectives.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended' (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'
Acceptance deposited: Luxembourg, July 10, 1972.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971.'

Signatures: Chad, July 12, 1972; Romania, July
10, 1972 (with a reservation and statement).

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,

Not in force.

154

Department of State Bulletin

1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.

Ratifications deposited: Chad, July 12, 1972;
Romania, July 10, 1972 (with a reservation).

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March
19, 1967; for the United States December 24,
1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 9,
1972 (with a declaration).

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification, deposited: United Kingdom, May 9,
1972.

Law

Statute of the Hague conference on private inter-
national law. Done at the seventh session of the
conference at The Hague October 9-31, 1951.
Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the United
States October 15, 1964. TIAS 5710.
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, April 28, 1972.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964 ; for the United States June
24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Greece, June 6, 1972.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, May 23, 1972.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS
6839.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, July 11, 1972.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New
York December 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan-
uary 4, 1969.-"
Accession deposited: Mauritius, May 30, 1972.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force
October 4, 1967; for the United States November
1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Brazil, April 7, 1972 (with
a reservation).

Seabed Disarmament

Ratification deposited: Romania, July 10, 1972
(with statements).

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signature: Brazil, July 13, 1972.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. En-
tered into force January 1, 1967; for the United
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Accessioyi deposited: United Arab Emirates, June
27, 1972.

War

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of pris-
oners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition
of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of
armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950; for the United States
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and
3365, respectively.

Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, May
10, 1972.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement relating to the deposit by Afghanistan
of 10 percent of the value of grant military assist-
ance furnished by the United States. Effected by
exchange of notes at Kabul May 24 and June 29,
1972. Entered into force June 29, 1972.

Argentina

Agreement relating to the deposit by Argentina of
10 percent of the value of grant military assist-
ance furnished by the United States. Effected by
exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 4 and
June 8, 1972. Entered into force June 8, 1972.

Australia

Agreement on the limitation of imports of fresh,
chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep,
except lambs, of Australian origin, other than
imports which are direct shipments from Aus-
tralia. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington December 28, 1971. Entered into force
December 28, 1971. TIAS 7244.
Discontim(ed: July 12, 1972.

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from
Australia of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle,
goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar

' Not in force.

^ Not in force for the United States.

July 31, 1972

155

year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington May 17, 1972. Entered into force May 17,
1972.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the grant agreement of May
30, 1972, for relief and rehabilitation. Signed at
Dacca June 26, 1972. Entered into force June 26,
1972.

Brazil

Agreement relating to the deposit by Brazil of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance
furnished by the United States. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Brasilia February 28 and June
27, 1972. Entered into force June 27, 1972; effec-
tive February 7, 1972.

Ecuador

Agreement amending the agreements for sales of
agricultural commodities of June 30, 1969 (TIAS
6867), and June 30, 1971 (TIAS 7179). Effected by
exchange of notes at Quito May 18 and June 23,
1972. Entered into force June 23, 1972.

Ireland

Agreement on the limitation of imports of fresh,
chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep,
except lambs, of Irish origin, other than imports
which are direct shipments from Ireland. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 24,
1971. Entered into force December 24, 1971. TIAS
7243.
Discontinued: July 12, 1972.

Agreement on the limitation of imports from Ire-
land of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle,
goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar
year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington March 16, 1972. Entered into force March
16, 1972. TIAS 7307.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

New Zealand

Agreement on the limitation of imports of fresh,
chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep,
except lambs, of New Zealand origin, other than
imports which are direct shipments from New Zea-
land. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton December 23, 1971. Entered into force Decem-
ber 23, 1971. TIAS 7242.
Discontinued: July 12, 1972.

Agreement relating to limitation of imports from
New Zealand of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of
cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during cal-
endar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington April 14, 1972. Entered into force
April 14, 1972. TIAS 7319.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

Poland

Agreement extending the agreement of June 13,
1970, as extended (TIAS 6890, 7264), regarding
fisheries in the western region of the middle At-
lantic Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at
Warsaw June 28 and 30, 1972. Entered into force
June 30, 1972.

Portugal

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
with annex. Signed at Lisbon June 30, 1972. En-
tered into force June 30, 1972.

World Health Organization

Agreement relating to the facilities, services, and
privileges and immunities afforded to the Organi-
zation on the occasion of the holding in Guam of
the 23d session of the regional committee of the
Western Pacific, with annexes. Signed at Manila
June 19, 1972. Entered into force June 19, 1972.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
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Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc-
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the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super-
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular offices, and a reading
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur-
rently in stock (at least 125) — $6; 1-year subscrip-
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new
Notes — $3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies
of those listed below are available at lO^i each.

Ethiopia Pub. 7785 5 pp.

Germany, Federal Republic of . Pub. 7834 8 pp.

Mauritius Pub. 8023 4 pp.

San Marino Pub. 8661 4 pp.

Tanzania Pub. 8079 8 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1959-
1972. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Pub. 62. 119 pp. 60^

Double Taxation — Earnings from Operation of Ships
and Aircraft. Agreement with the Republic of
China. TIAS 7282. 8 pp. lOc".

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as ex-
tended. TIAS 7283. 3 pp. 10<?.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Do-
minican Republic. TIAS 7285. 6 pp. 10<?.

Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground — Transfer of
Certain Areas to the United States Navy. Agreement
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. TIAS 7286. 3 pp. 10«(.

156

Department of State Bulletin

I INDEX July SI, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1727

Agriculture. Three- Year Grain Agreement

Signed by the United States and U.S.S.R. . 144

American Principles. America's Bicentennial

Invitation to the World (Nixon) .... 133

Aviation. Civil Aeronautics Board Action

With Respect to BOAC 146

Congress

Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet Agreement

on Cooperation in Space (Johnson) . . . 152

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National

Security (Smith) 147

Disarmament. The SALT Agreements and
U.S. National Security (Smith) 147

Economic Affairs

The Benefits of Freer International Trade and

the American Ability To Compete (Renner) 139

Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed by the

United States and U.S.S.R 144

Extradition. U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text
of Extradition Treaty (joint announcement) 146

Foreign Aid. U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To

Assist Refugees in Southern Sudan . . . 145

Ireland. U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text of
Extradition Treaty (joint announcement) . 146

Korea. U.S. Supports Efforts To Ease Ten-
sions on the Korean Peninsula (Depart-
ment statement) 136

Poland. United States and Poland To Expand
Program of Scientific Cooperation (joint
communique) 137

Presidential Documents. America's Bicen-
tennial Invitation to the World 133

Publications. Recent Releases 156

Refugees. U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To As-
sist Refugees in Southern Sudan .... 145

Science. United States and Poland To Expand
Program of Scientific Cooperation (joint
communique) 137

Space. Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet
Agreement on Cooperation in Space (John-
son) 152

Sudan. U.S. Commits $4.45 Million To Assist
Refugees in Southern Sudan 145

Trade. The Benefits of Freer International
Trade and the American Ability To Com-
pete (Renner) 139

Treaty Information

Current Actions 154

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National

Security (Smith) 147

Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed by the
United States and U.S.S.R 144

U.S. and Ireland Agree on Text of Extradi-
tion Treaty (joint announcement) . . . 146

U.S.S.R.

Department Discusses U.S.-Soviet Agreement

on Cooperation in Space (Johnson) . . . 152

The SALT Agreements and U.S. National

Security (Smith) 147

Three- Year Grain Agreement Signed by the

United States and U.S.S.R 144

United Kingdom. Civil Aeronautics Board
Action With Respect to BOAC .... 146

Viet-Nam. 150th Plenary Session on Viet-
Nam Held at Paris (Porter) 135

Name Index

Johnson, U. Alexis 152

Nixon, President 133

Porter, William J 135

Renner, John C 139

Smith, Gerard 147

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to July 10 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 131
of June 2.

No. Date Subject

tl70 7/10 Joint U.S.- Yugoslavia release on
talks held during Secretary
Rogers' visit.
171 7/12 CAB action with respect to
BOAC.

*172 7/13 Government Advisory Committee
on International Book and Li-
brary Programs holds 43d
meeting, July 13-14.
173 7/13 Porter: 150th plenary session on
Viet-Nam at Paris.

tl74 7/13 Shultz, Irwin: news conference,
July 12.
175 7/14 U.S.-Polish cooperation in science
and technology: joint communi-
que.

tl76 7/14 Ropers: resumption of aid to
Yemen Arab Republic.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1728

Augtist 7, 1972

SECRETARY ROGERS ATTENDS SEATO AND ANZUS MEETINGS

IN AUSTRALIA AND VISITS 10 OTHER COUNTRIES

Statements, News Confereyices, and Texts of Communiques 157

A U.S. LOOK AT THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
Statement by Ambassador Bush 176

Boston Public Library
S»"Pennte„dent of Documents

SHP 1 4 1972

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1728
August 7, 1972

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The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the worfc of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
piloses of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and ANZUS Meetings
in Australia and Visits 10 Other Countries

Secretary Rogers left Washington June 24 for an 18-day
trip to 11 countries. He attended the SEATO and ANZUS
Council meetings at Canberra, Australia, after which he visited
Indonesia, Ceylon, the Yemen Arab Republic, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Greece, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy.

Follotving are a transcript of a news conference held by
Secretary Rogers at the Western White House after reporting
to President Nixon on the trip, statements made by the Secretary
during the trip, his exchange of remarks with Yemeni Prime
Minister Muhsin al-Ayni at San'a, a joint U.S. -Yugoslavia press
release, a transcript of the Secretary's news conference at Rome,
and the texts of communiques released after the meetings at
Canberra.

NEWS CONFERENCE, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF.,
JULY 15

White House press release (San Clemente) dated July 15

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec-
retary to President Nixon] : As you know,
Secretary Rogers has just returned from an
1 1-nation around-the-world trip and reported
to President Nixon this morning in a meeting
which lasted more than an hour. The Sec-
retary will make some comments to you
about his visit and his trip and also take a
few of your questions this morning.

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Rogers: Ladies and gentlemen,
I am very pleased to report to the President
this morning on the trip I have just com-
pleted. As Mr. Ziegler said, I visited 11
nations around the world and also had a
meeting with His Holiness Pope Paul in
Rome.

I can say as a result of these discussions
I had and the discussions I had at the
SEATO and ANZUS meetings in Australia

that the prestige of the United States has
never been higher. Without exception, the
nations that I visited, not only the leaders
but the public as well, spoke in the most
complimentary terms about the initiatives
that President Nixon has taken to bring
about peace in the world.

It is gratifying to me, as Secretary of
State, to see and to hear the comments that
have been made about our country and our
foreign policy. The visit that I made to the
Persian Gulf area was the first one by any
Secretary of State of the United States. I
was very well received by the countries in
the areas. As you know, I visited eastern
European countries, Romania, Yugoslavia,
and Hungary. In the case of Romania and
Hungary, I was the first Secretary of State to
ever visit those countries. Without exception
in those countries the President's programs
were received with warmth and enthusiasm.
I am sure that the response in those coun-
tries, particularly in the case of Hungary
and Romania, was largely because of the ini-

August 7, 1972

157

tiatives that the President has taken for
peace.

I was very pleased to report to the Presi-
dent on not only the success of the visit but
the fact that his programs have been recog-
nized in all of these countries as programs
and policies designed to bring about peace
in the world.

I think it is fair to say, and I say it with-
out any reservation, that President Nixon is
regarded as the world leader in the cause of
peace, and I think it should make all Ameri-
cans very proud of this country and of its
President for the efforts he has made to
bring about peace in the world.

I will take some questions now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have had
a chance to study the latest Communist peace
proposal that loas made in Paris this past
Thursday, is there anything new in it? Is
there any reason to he encouraged that ive
may get a negotiated settlement ?

Secretary Rogers: I am always a little cau-
tious about saying whether we are encour-
aged or not, because sometimes when it is
played back in the media it gets a little out of
proportion. Yes, there are some slight nu-
ances there that give us some slight encour-
agement, but I don't want to hold out too
much hope. We are encouraged by the fact
that there is feeling, I think, throughout the
world that the way this war should end is by
the negotiating process and there is a great
deal of diplomatic support for the efforts the
President has made.

In the discussions that I have had with
many of the leaders in the world, and I
don't want to single out any by name, with-
out exception they feel the proposals we have
made are fair and reasonable and should pro-
vide a basis for a negotiated settlement.

Q. Could you tell us what the nuances
might be that are encouraging?

Secretary Rogers: I wouldn't want to at
this point.

Q. Le Due Tho said he would be prepared
to meet Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger,

Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs] in further secret negotiations
if the United States had something new to
say or something new to offer. Can you tell
us whether Dr. Kissinger will be going?

Secretary Rogers: No, we have made it
clear that we don't want to make that com-
ment. Obviously, we are prepared to have
any kind of diplomatic activity which holds
out promise for success. We have said that
repeatedly in the past. That is still our posi-
tion.

Q. Can you tell us where Dr. Kissinger is ?

Secretary Rogers: Today?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Rogers: In that building.

Q. Former Secretary [of the Treasury
John 5.] Connally said yesterday that Sen-
ator McGovern's position on Viet-Nam was
sabotaging President Nixon's efforts to
achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement. Do
you agree with this assessment?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I said when I re-
turned to Washington that any proposal that
gives the enemy exactly what he wants makes
it very difficult for us to negotiate on any
other terms. So that it is quite clear that,
if I understand the proposals that have been
made by Senator McGovern, he would give
our adversaries exactly what they want with-
out any negotiations. To that extent I think it
makes it extremely difficult for us.

On the other hand, I think there is a feel-
ing that the negotiated settlement is desir-
able, and we still have hopes that it might
succeed. I think one of the things that is
encouraging in that respect, based on my dis-
cussions, is that there is a feeling that Pres-
ident Nixon is going to win the election and
therefore there is a feeling that maybe this
is the time to negotiate a settlement. This was
said to me in some of the eastern European
countries.

Q. Do you think that Hanoi believes that
the President will iviyi the election and might
base their response on this belief?

158

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't know, be-
cause we are not that close to Hanoi. But
certainly other nations that are close to them
have expressed that thought.

Q. Which ones, sir?

Secretary Rogers: I wouldn't want to name
them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on Le Due Tho's point of
being prepared to meet if there is something
new that you have to say, do you see that
as an obstacle to any of these private meet-
ings, which I know you don't want to talk
about?

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think that
the statements that are made publicly have
much relevance in that sense. I think it is
much more important what is said in diplo-
matic circles and what is said when it gets
down to serious discussions. I think that most
of the things that are said on public occasions
are really for propaganda purposes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any in-
formation, sir, that Peking or Moscow might
be encouraging or applying some form of
pressure on Hanoi to enter negotiations in
a way that would meet your specifications?

Secretary Rogers: I really have nothing to
add to what has already been said on that.

Q. When you characterized the public
statements as irrelevant, would you include
the statement that Mr. Connally made yes-
terday ?

Secretary Rogers: No, I was talking about
the public statements by our adversary. We
are not making public statements for propa-
ganda purposes, and we have made our
position clear. As I have said on numerous
occasions, the proposals that we have made to
end this war by negotiations are reasonable
proposals and I think they are looked upon by
other nations as reasonable proposals.

I was talking about the adversary. You
know what has happened in Paris ever since
these talks have started has really been a
propaganda exercise. That is all I had refer-
ence to.

Q. When you tvere in Australia and New
Zealand — there have been a lot of reports
that the people there are turning against the
war and want their troops out of Viet-Nam
— what did you find out about that?

Secretary Rogers: Their troops are out of
Viet-Nam. There aren't any Australian or
New Zealand troops in Viet-Nam now. There
may be a few, but no troops in combat.

No, I think that the attitude of the Austra-
lian public is very good toward the United
States. I was very well received in Australia,
and I think that the relations between our
two countries are excellent.

Q. The other side said they tvould resume
the secret talks if there ivas something new.
Do you have something new?

Secretary Rogers: As I said, I don't want
to make any further comments about that.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SEATO COUNCIL MEETING, CANBERRA
Statement by Secretary Rogers, June 27

Press release 164 dated June 27

In the past four months the United States
has participated with others in critical de-
velopments which will leave their stamp on
the history of this century. The success of the
President's visits to Peking and Moscow, the
signing of the U.S.-Soviet agi-eements to
limit strategic arms, the entering into force
of an agreement to eliminate Berlin as a
source of international tension — singly and
together, these events should make a pro-
found contribution to the peaceful world
which all of us in SEATO want.

In the steps we have taken with our major
adversaries, American goals have been
straightforward and undeviating: a world
free of the risks of nuclear war and the dan-
gers of great-power confrontation; a Europe
in which reconciliation progressively re-
places division; an Asia whose peoples, large
and small, can guide their own destinies in
peace without outside interference.

August 7, 1972

159

These goals will be approached more rapid-
ly if the principles of international relations
which emerged from the Peking and Moscow
visits are scrupulously observed. Only time
can tell how fully those principles will be
given practical effect. With each country we
will remain, in varying degrees and for some
time to come, competitors and vigorous ideo-
logical rivals with a diametrically different
view of relations among human beings and
among states. We believe, however, that a
process has begun which could keep that com-
petition peaceful and these rivalries re-
strained and realistic.

The paths to the summit meetings were not
easy. For both China and the Soviet Union
the ideological and practical barriers were
formidable. We therefore assume that they
have undertaken to improve relations with
the United States with a seriousness of pur-
pose. The changes of attitude on their part
are no doubt of the head, not of the heart,
as President Nixon has described it. But
those changes offer the possibility of a more
peaceful world for us all, and the United
States will do its part, in that spirit, to see
that possibility realized.

It is our hope, and it is our intention, that
the bilateral progress made at the summit
meetings can also aid the transition to more
normal relations among other countries di-
vided or estranged by the cold war. Such
a process is already underway both in Europe
and in Asia.

— In Europe, three weeks ago, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home and I participated in signing
an agreement which will ease travel restric-
tions and other conditions of life for the peo-
ple of West Berlin, innocent victims of the
division of their city and their country. That
agreement has opened up further prospects
for improvements in Europe through in-
creased bilateral contacts and the forthcom-
ing European conference.

— In Asia, talks have been in progress for
nearly a year between Red Cross representa-
tives of the Republic of Korea and the Dem-
ocratic People's Republic of Korea, initially
directed toward reuniting families separated
for decades. We share the hope President

Park expressed at the recent meeting of the i

Asian and Pacific Council that such conver- )

sations and communications will be contin- i

ued and developed. ^

The Berlin achievement and the new open- I
ings in Korea demonstrate the progress that
negotiations can bring to intractable prob-
lems. Unfortunately, in Viet-Nam — and
areas of more direct concern to SEATO —
such progress is still blocked by the refusal
of North Viet-Nam to negotiate seriously.
The Communist side even refuses to enter
into talks with the Government of the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam regarding a political settle-
ment. The President's proposals of May 8
have so far failed to move Hanoi from its in-
sistence on terms which would prevent the
people of South Viet-Nam from determining
their own future.^ To this we cannot and will
not agree. But our generous proposal for an
equitable settlement is the basis for negotia-
tion, whenever Hanoi is prepared to start.
We have some reason to hope that the in-
creased diplomatic pressure on Hanoi
throughout the world will lead it to under-
take serious negotiation.

American foreign policy in Asia and in the
world is based on fidelity to our commitments
and firmness in our principles. It is also
based on the conviction that a willingness to
alter traditional patterns, to search for solu-
tions through negotiations and dialogue, and
to seek mutually beneficial compromises will
serve the interest of peace. Just as we are im-
proving our relations with traditional ad-
versaries, we understand and welcome the
similar approaches of our allies and friends.
A willingness on all sides to move away from
the rigidities of the last two decades can only
have positive results.

These changes can only develop within a
matrix of stability. For our part the United
States will continue to act in East Asia and
the Pacific on these convictions:

— First, our new relationships will not be
achieved by sacrificing the interests of our

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

160

Department of State Bulletin

friends. We obtained explicit recognition of
this fact in the principles to which we sub-
scribed with China and the Soviet Union.

— Second, we are well aware that these
new relationships will improve our security
and that of our allies only if, in pursuing
them, we remain convincingly strong. That
is why President Nixon insists on an ade-
quate national defense budget even in an
election year. That awareness is at the heart
of our policies, in the Pacific as in Europe.
And we are aware as well that continued
military and economic assistance will be nec-
essary as others take on responsibility for
their own security. We are determined to
provide that assistance.

— Third, a peaceful Asia will not be sought,
and could not be achieved, through U.S.
abandonment of our obligations or our in-
terests in this area. Our interests in Asia and
the Pacific are fundamental. In our own self-
interest and in the interest of our friends
and allies, our involvement will not end with
the end of our military involvement in Viet-
Nam.

It is the necessity for stability in a time of
change which makes an organization like
SEATO of continuing importance. That is
why the United States continues to support
this Organization and its purposes. Indeed,
our initiatives in East Asia are directed to-
ward the primary objective set forth by the
signers of the SEATO Treaty 18 years ago:
"to strengthen the fabric of peace and free-
dom." On behalf of President Nixon I can
give you our solemn assurance that in Asia
the United States will remain engaged in
that endeavor.

I will now turn to Admiral [John S.]
McCain, so that he can give you his analysis
of the military threat to the treaty area. As
you know, this is Jack's last Council meeting.
I should like to express in this forum my per-
sonal gratitude to him for a job well done.
During his years as Commander in Chief,
Pacific, he has been an unfailing source of
advice and strength to me as Secretary of
State. Certainly, SEATO has no more loyal
friend than Jack McCain.

SEATO Council Communique, June 28

Press release 157 dated June 28

The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Orga-
nization held its Seventeenth Meeting in Canberra
from 27 to 28 June 1972, under the Chairmanship
of the Honorable Mr. Nigel Bowen, QC, the Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth
of Australia. The Governments of Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United
Kingdom and the United States participated; France
and Pakistan did not participate. The Republic of
Vietnam, a protocol state, was represented by an
observer.

General Observations

The Council discussed developments in South-East
Asia during the fourteen months since it last met
in London. The Council noted that two principal
changes had been, on the one hand, the full-scale
attack against the Republic of Vietnam by virtually
the entire North Vietnamese army, supported by
new sophisticated weapons and, on the other, the
further reduction of American forces in the Republic
of Vietnam to 49,000. It condemned the blatant vio-
lation of the Geneva Agreements by North Vietnam
and regarded the aerial and naval response to it as
an appropriate and understandable measure against
the flow of war material to North Vietnam which had
made the attack feasible. The Council expressed the
hope that this response would be helpful in bring-
ing the invasion to an end and leading to meaning-
ful negotiations.

The Council noted that, despite setbacks suffered
in the invasion, the armed forces and people of the
Republic of Vietnam have demonstrated their grow-
ing capacity to defend themselves effectively, notably
in their determined defence of An Loc and Kontum.
The Council also noted that the Khmer and Lao
peoples and Governments have continued to resist
North Vietnamese attacks.

The Council recognized the continuing needs of
the Republic of Vietnam, the Khmer Republic and
Laos for assistance to support their relief and re-
habilitation efforts and to meet other problems
stemming from the North Vietnamese military in*
vasion. A considerable amount of assistance has
already been provided to these countries in the form
of direct grants, imports of essential items, com-
modity import assistance, exchange support and
other programmes. The Council expressed the hope
that all nations concerned with problems arising
from the assault on the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of independent states in Indo-China would
increase their efforts to assist in these fields.

The Council noted with gratification that the
President of the United States, while continuing
to honour defence commitments in the treaty area,
had visited the People's Republic of China and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view to
improving both bilateral relations and the prospects

August 7, 1972

161

for a world at peace. It welcomed these visits and
expressed the hope that their success would open up
opportunities for a lessening of the threat in the
treaty area and for an equitable negotiated settle-
ment of the war in Indo-China.

The Council was pleased to note the conclusion of
agreements between the United States and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics including those limit-
ing defensive and offensive strategic weapons and
setting the basis for further negotiations on stra-
tegic arms.

In keeping with the spirit of the Pacific Charter,
the Council was pleased to note the progress made
in regional co-operation in building up resilience
amongst countries of South-East Asia. It noted the
growing importance of various regional groupings
and the initiatives they are taking towards progress
and stability in the area. It observed that the growth
of national self-reliance and increasingly close co-
operation would promote the well-being and security
of the countries of the region.

The Council noted with satisfaction the significant
contribution to security in the area provided by
ANZUS and the Five Power defence arrangements.
The Council also welcomed the statements in the
Australian White Paper on defence, reaffirming
Australia's commitments in South-East Asia and
pledging its continuing aid to the countries of the
area.

The Council recognized the growing danger to the
region from covert forms of communist intervention
and interference, including externally-promoted in-
surgency, subversion, infiltration and terrorism. It
observed with concern that there has been an in-
tensification of such activity in the region. It noted
the disruptive effect on stability and the threat to
vital social and economic development caused by
these activities. It recognized the importance in
the present circumstances of developing further
SEATO's ability to provide advice and assistance
to countries so threatened.

The Council concluded that, on balance, the chances
of building a lasting peace now seem better than
they have been for a long time. It welcomed this
situation and was strongly of the view that this was
the moment to reaffirm collective security arrange-
ments for the region, the existence of which had con-
tributed to the improved climate. It recognized that
no alliance could remain static and that it must be
flexible and ready to respond to the challenges of a
changing world and reflect the ideals and aspira-
tions of the peoples of the area.

Vietnam

Developments in the Republic of Vietnam were
described to the Council by the observer from that
protocol state. He confirmed that the overwhelming
majority of the South Vietnamese populace had
remained loyal to the Government despite the mas-
sive invasion of North Vietnamese troops which had

overrun some areas and caused hundreds of thou-
sands of civilians to flee before the enemy. The
Vietnamese observer emphasized that the regular
armed forces had been supported by regional and
self-defence units in repulsing the North Vietnamese
attacks, and that the Communists had not succeeded
in winning popular support for the invasion.

The Council expressed support for the people of
the Republic of Vietnam in their search for a peace-
ful solution to the war and for internal stability,
and noted the progress being made towards even
greater self-sufficiency in the face of enemy action.
It noted, in particular, that the brunt of all fighting
on the ground is now being borne by the South Viet-
namese themselves, and that their increasing capa-
bility and experience will enable friendly forces to
continue to reduce their force levels.

The Council expressed appreciation for the con-
tinued assistance being given to the Republic of
Vietnam in the economic and humanitarian as well
as military fields by SEATO member countries and
others, such as the Republic of Korea.

The Council deplored the consistent failure of
North Vietnam to negotiate meaningfully at the
Paris Peace Talks or elsewhere a settlement for
Indo-China. It agreed that the proposals presented
by the United States, in conjunction with the Re-
public of Vietnam, to North Vietnam in private dis-
cussions in the latter part of last year offered a
realistic and generous approach towards bringing
about a negotiated settlement to the conflict by
which the people of the Republic of Vietnam would
be able to determine their own future. In particular,
the Council endorsed the Eight-Point Plan made pub-
lic by Presidents Thieu and Nixon in January last
as an equitable basis for a settlement.^ It further
commended the call for an internationally-supervised
cease-fire throughout Indo-China and an exchange
of all prisoners of war, to be followed by the with-
drawal of all United States forces within four
months, as a practical means of bringing the mili-
tary conflict to an end.

Laos

The Council deplored the fact that North Viet-
nam, in open violation of the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ment, continues to transport troops and material
through Laos to the Khmer Republic and the Repub-
lic of Vietnam, make armed attacks on the forces
of the Royal Lao Government, and support insur-
gency in Thailand from bases and training camps in
Laos.

Repeating the call for full implementation by all
signatories of the terms of the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ment on Laos, including withdrawal of all foreign
troops, the Council expressed support for efforts by

- For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1972,
p. 185.

162

Department of State Bulletin

the Royal Lao Government to secure peace and to
preserve the neutrality of Laos.

Khmer Republic

The Council deplored the continued North Viet-
namese aggression against the Khmer Republic. It
reiterated its support for the sovereignty, independ-
ence and territorial integrity of the Khmer Republic,
and its respect for the desire of that Government to
remain neutral.

The Council expressed its sympathy for the plight
of the Khmer people, and its gratification at the sub-
stantial military and economic aid which is being
given to the Khmer people and Government by their
South-East Asian neighbours and other friendly
countries.

Philippines

The Council was given a comprehensive account of
the security situation in the Philippines and, in par-
ticular, of increased subversive and insurgent ac-
tivities by communist elements.

The Council expressed its support for the continu-
ing political, economic and social measures taken by
the Philippine Government to raise living standards
and to initiate social reforms in the country.

Thailand

The Council noted the increased level of commu-
nist subversive and insurgent activity which had de-
veloped in Thailand over the past year, more seri-
ously in the northern and north-eastern provinces of
the country bordering Laos. It observed that insur-
gents in Thailand have stepped up the frequency and
boldness of terrorist incidents against the local pop-
ulace and authorities. It noted that the insurgents
continued to receive political support and substan-
tial material aid, including high-powered weapons,
from sources outside the country.

The Council also noted the importance of the in-
tensified efforts of the Royal Thai Government and
Thai people to counter insurgency and to further
economic and social development in the country,
particularly at the grass roots level.

The Council was pleased that member countries,
both individually and collectively, were lending as-
sistance to the Royal Thai Government in these ef-
forts.

Counter -subversion and other Activities of SEATO

The Council emphasized the importance of contin-
ued efi'orts to assist regional members to cope with
the problems raised by externally-promoted subver-
sion and insurgency. Solutions depended on increased
understanding of problems and vigorous action to re-
solve them on the part of individual members as well
as by SEATO.

The Council decided that SEATO programmes in
the areas of information and research as well as its
economic, social and cultural activities should be in-

creasingly complementary to and closely co-ordi-
nated with its counter-subversion and counter-insur-
gency activity. The Organization will assist wherever
possible in training officials dealing with these prob-
lems.

The Council noted with satisfaction that member
countries continued to provide aid to other member
countries bilaterally in support of SEATO objectives.

Co-operation in the Military Field

The Council noted the report of the military ad-
visers and commended the Military Planning Office
for its continuing work in keeping plans up to date
and in organizing military exercises. These exercises
provide useful experience in co-operation between
members as well as in the other aspects of military
training. It commended the Civic Action Projects
which were undertaken in the Philippines and Thai-
land in connection with SEATO exercises "Sea
Hawk" and "Mittraparb".

Eighteenth Meeting of the Council

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation
of the Government of the United States of America
to host the Eighteenth Council Meeting in 1973.

Expression of Gratitude

The Council expressed its gratitude to the Gov-
ernment and people of Australia for their generous
hospitality and warm welcome and its appreciation
for the excellent arrangements made for the meet-
ing.

The Secretary-General

The Council noted reports of the Secretary-Gen-
eral and expressed its appreciation for the work of
the Civil Secretariat.

In taking note of the forthcoming retirement of
the Secretary-General, the Council paid tribute to
the active and devoted manner in which General
[Jesus] Vargas has served SEATO over the past
seven years.

The Council appointed His Excellency Mr. Sun-
thorn Hongladarom of Thailand as Secretary-Gen-
eral and extended a warm welcome to him.

Leaders of Delegations

The Leaders of the Delegations to the Seventeenth
Council Meeting were:

Australia

The Honorable Nigel Bowen, QC, MP, Minister for
Foreign Affairs

New Zealand

The Right Honorable Sir Keith Holyoake, GCMG,
CH, MP, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Philippines

His Excellency General Carlos P. Romulo, Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs

August 7, 1972

163

Thailand

His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chair-
man, National Executive Council

United Kingdom

The Right Honorable Sir Alec Douglas-Home, KT,
MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs

United States

The Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of
State

Republic of Vietnam (Observer)

His Excellency Mr. Tran Van Lam, Minister of
Foreign Affairs

ANZUS COUNCIL COMAAUNIQUE,
CANBERRA, JUNE 29

Press release 159 dated June 29

Continuing their series of meetings that began
with the signature of the Security Treaty of 1 Sep-
tember 1951, between Australia, New Zealand, and
the United States, the ANZUS partners met as the
ANZUS Council in Canberra on 29 June 1972. At-
tending were the Honorable Nigel H. Bowen, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of Australia and the Honor-
able David Fairbairn, Minister for Defence; the
Right Honorable Sir Keith Holyoake, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of New Zealand; and the Honorable
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State of the United
States.

As in the case of previous meetings of the ANZUS
partners, the Council conducted a full and frank re-
view of major issues in the Pacific area which could
affect the security of the three nations.

The Council reviewed the visits by President Nixon
to the People's Republic of China in February 1972,
and to the Soviet Union in May 1972, and underlined
the role these visits played in the search for a reduc-
tion in international tension and the prevention of
conflicts between nations. The ANZUS partners dis-
cussed the steps they have taken to normalize their
respective relations with the People's Republic of
China and reiterated that the search for new rela-
tionships should not be at the expense of old friend-
ships.

The Council noted the continuing and indeed, in-
creasing importance of Japan, both politically and
economically, to the stability and welfare of the Pa-
cific area and reaffirmed the importance of a contin-
uing close partnership and confidence between Japan
and each of the three ANZUS partners.

The Council noted the growing solidarity among
countries within the South East Asian region and
steps being taken to strengthen Australia's and New
2Sealand's bilateral relations with them, including

the recent visit by Prime Minister McMahon to In-
donesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The Council wel-
comed the entry into effect as from 1 November
1971 of the Five Power defence arrangements.

The Council deeply regretted the decision by the
North Vietnamese leaders to escalate their aggres-
sion against the Republic of Viet-Nam, rather than
to negotiate seriously a political settlement of the
long and destructive war in Indo-China. The Council
noted the valiant and successful efforts by the peo-
ple and Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to
defend themselves and the additional measures taken
by the United States in response to the massive
North Vietnamese invasion. It expressed the hope
that North Viet-Nam and those who have facilitated
its acts of aggression would at last realize that it is
time to bring the war to a close and that North Viet-
Nam would begin to negotiate seriously in Paris. In
this connection it commended the generous proposals
for a settlement made in January by Presidents
Nixon and Thieu and the practical basis for ending
the military conflict contained in President Nixon's
proposal of 8 May.

The Council deplored the fact that Laos and the
Khmer Republic also continued to be the victims of
North Vietnamese aggression. Not only have North
Vietnamese troops continued their unjustified at-
tacks, but they occupy areas farther west than ever
before while maintaining a high level of hostilities.
The ANZUS partners observed that numbers of
North Vietnamese troops were withdrawn recently
from areas of Laos and the Khmer Republic in order
to attack the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam.
Where this happened, hostilities significantly de-
clined, thus underlining the true nature of the con-
flict in both countries. A final and definitive with-
drawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and
the Khmer Republic would contribute greatly to the
restoration of peace and security in Indo-China.

The ANZUS partners reviewed their security in-
terests in the Pacific Ocean. They also had an ex-
change of views on their strategic interests in the
Indian Ocean. The Council reaffirmed its hope that
military competition in the Indian Ocean could be
avoided and its belief that the area should remain
under continuing surveillance.

The Council welcomed the continuing growth of
regional cooperation among the independent and
self-governing states in the South Pacific. It noted
that the second meeting of the South Pacific Forum
was held in Canberra in February 1972, and that a
third would be held before the end of the year.

The Council observed that, notwithstanding the
mounting opposition amongst countries of the Pa-
cific, nuclear tests were still being conducted in the
atmosphere. The ANZUS partners, being parties to
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, affirmed their
hope that there should be universal adherence to this
treaty. It was noted that, in response to the deep
and widespread concern felt throughout their com-

164

Department of State Bulletin

munities at the further series of tests in the South
Pacific, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New
Zealand had issued a joint call to the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament. It was agreed that
progress in this area would respond to the deeply-
held feelings and aspirations of the peoples of the
Pacific area.

The ANZUS partners reaffirmed the deep impor-
tance that each of them continued to attach to the
alliance. They emphasized that it is as vital to them
in the changing circumstances of the 70's as it was
during the Cold War of former years. The signifi-
cant developments which had taken place in interna-
tional relations since the Council last met, in Oc-
tober 1971, and which would be long in the working
out, underlined the need to continue to cooperate
closely within the ANZUS Alliance in furtherance of
the political and security interests of its members.

DINNER HONORING SECRETARY ROGERS,
SAN'A, YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, JULY 1

Press release 162 (revised) date<l July 3

Remarks by Secretary Rogers

On behalf of President Nixon and the Gov-
ernment and people of the United States, I
welcome the renewal of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the Yemen
Arab Republic.

This is a historic occasion for our two
countries and peoples.

It is a great honor for me to be the first
Secretary of State to visit your country and
to see at first hand the vitality of your peo-
ple, to sense your independent spirit, and to
appreciate your dedication to the betterment
of your land and your citizens.

It is an even greater honor for the occa-
sion of my visit to be the occasion of resum-
ing diplomatic relations between our coun-
tries.

Yours is a history of courage and deter-
mination. Yours is a long and a noble history.

Seeing San'a for the first time — with its
magnificent architecture set in this beauti-
ful valley — makes us all aware of your an-
cient history etched in the timelessness of
your land.

What is the significance of this step that
our two nations have taken today ?

First, it will be a significant step toward
building even closer and more friendly re-

lationships between us, marking a new be-
ginning of mutually beneficial ties. The
United States believes that our relations
should be based on mutual respect, sover-
eignty, equality, and noninterference in each
other's internal affairs.

Second, we hope this step will contribute
in a modest way to stability and tranquillity
in the Arabian Peninsula, in the interest of
Yemen and other states in the area, all of
which have a common interest in contribut-
ing and maintaining conditions in which
peaceful pursuits can flourish.

Third, this step reflects a U.S. policy of
friendly relations toward all nations in the
area. We look forward to the day when the
few remaining states in the Arab world will
take a similar step — in the interest of more
normal relations and peace and stability in
the area.

Fourth, as we take this step we reafllirm
the intention of the United States to con-
tinue its efforts to promote a peaceful settle-
ment of the Arab-Israeli dispute based on full
implementation of the U.N. Security Council
resolution of November 1967. The cease-fire
was a signal achievement. However, we rec-
ognize that a durable peace which meets the
legitimate concerns of both sides and which
redresses the injustices of the past is indis-
pensable.

In the past, our interest has been mani-
fested not only by early recognition of the
Republic but also by our subsequent grants
for water projects, roads, and food contribu-
tions to relieve hunger. We look forward to
renewed cooperation in such fields.

Tomorrow, in our private talks, I expect
to discuss activities through which the
United States may be able to make a modest
contribution to Yemen's economic develop-
ment. We will also want to discuss with
your government our impressions of the sig-
nificance of President Nixon's visits to Pe-
king and Moscow. Finally, before going on
to Bahrain and Kuwait, I want to discuss
with your government the prospects for
neighborly cooperation among countries of
the peninsula and to seek its views on this
important subject.

In conclusion, I want to salute the wise

August 7, 1972

165

President of Yemen, the able Prime Minis-
ter, and distinguished President of the Con-
sultative Assembly. I bring to them, and to
the people of Yemen, President Nixon's per-
sonal regards and best wishes and his hope
that resumption of U.S.-Yemeni relations
will help promote cooperation in the region
and serve the cause of peace.

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to say how
pleased we are to have had such a wonder-
ful dinner. We know how quickly it had to
be planned. As some of you may know, we
have been flying all day and were just able
to land five minutes before it was too dark.
But I want you, Mr. Prime Minister, to know
how pleased we were to be able to come be-
cause of the warm reception of the Yemeni
people and the agreeable atmosphere of this
dinner. We hope mankind will be able to live
in peace ; there should be a way for all people
to live in peace, and the United States is
working toward that goal. It is my fervent
hope that the resumption of relations will
contribute to the cause of peace.

Remarks by Prime Minister al-Ayni

On behalf of the Government of the Ye-
men Arab Republic, I extend a very warm
welcome to His Excellency Mr. William Rog-
ers, Secretary of State of the United States
of America, and his honorable colleagues,
who are visiting San'a after contact and
talks were conducted between our two coun-
tries.

Although relations between our two coun-
tries were severed five years ago, the Yemen
Arab Republic never forgot that the United
States was one of the first few countries
which recognized our Republic after the rev-
olution. In fact, due to this recognition on
the 19th of December, 1962, we were able to
occupy our seat in the United Nations, in
spite of the fact that the General Assembly
session was nearing its end.

The Yemeni people also remembered the
useful projects that were initiated by the
United States in certain parts of our coun-
try.

Your Excellency, your visit to Yemen
comes at a time of special importance in our

history. If our country has played a major
role in the past before Islam as one of the
oldest countries of the world with great civ-
ilization and heritage, it also played a sim-
ilar role after the coming of our great Islamic
faith; however, a period of isolation and
darkness was later imposed upon Yemen
where its participation in the fastly chang-
ing world were completely cut off. This iso-
lation has led Yemen to be one of the least
developed countries in the world.

As the winds of changes were sweeping
our contemporary world following the Sec-
ond World War, the people of Yemen at-
tempted several times ever since to break
the walls of isolation aspiring to share with
the world in modern methods of develop-
ment and progress. The last of these at-
tempts occurred on the 26th of September,
1962.

In the revolution of 1962 the people of
Yemen declared the noble aims and objec-
tives which may be summarized as follows:
to build and create a modern Yemen based
on liberty, law, and order; to maintain our
independence and adhere to the principle of
neutrality and nonalignment; to cooperate
with all the nations of the world on the basis
of mutual respect and common interest; to
respect the principle of noninterference in
the internal affairs of other nations.

After eight years of war, internal con-
flict, and instability, Yemen was able to
overcome its difficulties and accomplish com-
plete national unity under peace and tran-
quillity. Now our country enjoys normal and
friendly relations with all Arab and foreign
countries.

Today we are building Yemen under con-
stitutional authority and law. As we march
toward creating a modern Yemen, events
proof and success of our democratic experi-
ment. Our Consultative Council, which rep-
resents the people, carries out its normal
functions; the Presidential Council, which is
elected by the representatives of the people
in the consultative body, also presides over
the supreme functions of the state, while the
executive branch of the government, which
is appointed by the Chairman of the Presi-
dential Council and receives the vote of con-

166

Department of State Bulletin

fidence from the legislative branch of the
government, carries out the executive func-
tions of the state.

Consequently, Yemen, within the frame-
work of law and the Constitution and the
participation of the people, is embarking on
a unique development process. Our country
is witnessing a vast and far-reaching prog-
ress in education, health services, communi-
cation, agriculture, and national economy.
All these developments are taking place
within our limited resources and the help of
our friends and the cooperation of some in-
ternational organizations.

Your Excellency, the Yemeni people, be-
ing part of the Arab nation, cannot on this
occasion but draw the attention to the impor-
tant problem that affects all our Arab people
and is threatening international peace and
security; that is, the problem of Palestine.

All we ask in this regard is the implemen-
tation of the U.N. resolutions and complete
withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied
Arab land and the people of Palestine be
given their legitimate rights. It is also our
duty to ask the U.S.A. as a great nation and
a permanent member of the Security Council
to fulfill its responsibility by exerting greater
efforts in this direction. Such efforts will re-
ceive appreciation from the Arab nation.

Yemen Arab Republic views and position
with regard to the other international ques-
tions is well known. All we hope in this re-
spect is that summit meetings in both Pe-
king and Moscow have been successful and
that such meetings will in the end serve to
lessen world tension and solve international
problems.

Your Excellency, as we declare today the
resumption of diplomatic relations between
the Yemen Arab Republic and the United
States of America, we are opening a new
page of cooperation between our two friendly
nations based on sovereignty, national inde-
pendence, equality, and mutual respect. These
were in fact the basis of our relations in the
past which both parties have always adhered
to and respected.

Your Excellency, in the name of His Ex-
cellency Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, the Chair-

man of the Presidential Council, I hope that
you will convey to His Excellency Richard
Nixon, the President of the United States of
America, our greetings, respect, and the de-
sire of establishing strong relations and
fruitful cooperation that will serve our mu-
tual interests. I also hope, Your Excellency,
that you and your colleagues will accept the
sincere thanks for your generous visit. Fi-
nally, I wish for the relations between our
two peoples and governments continuous
flourishing and progress.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, ATHENS, JULY 4

Press release 163 dated July 6

I am pleased to see your great capital city
for the first time and particularly to arrive
on the day when Americans celebrate our in-
dependence. I recall that in classical times
the free city-state of Athens was known as
the School of Greece. In the history of West-
ern civilization it was the school of individual
liberty and democracy. And its example had
a profound influence on the men who signed
our own Declaration of Independence 196
years ago today.

It can be said, then, that the bond between
Greeks and Americans has a heritage of
2,000 years. That bond has been enriched by
the close links between our peoples, extend-
ing back to your own struggle for independ-
ence 150 years ago. It was further strength-
ened by our joint efforts, in the period of
World War II and the Truman doctrine, to
keep Greece free of foreign domination. And
it exists in our ties in NATO, of which
Greece has been a member for 21 years.

Today, Greece is playing an important se-
curity role on NATO's southern flank. We
encourage and support that role, and we at-
tach great importance to Greece's coopera-
tive security relationship with the United
States and with NATO.

We also welcome Greece's efforts to
strengthen peaceful relations with Turkey
and with its Balkan neighbors.

There are of course some differences of
view between ourselves and the Government
of Greece. On these, the attitude of the

August 7, 1972

167

United States is well known. We have, at
the same time, many areas in which we
agree. I am looking forward to what I am
sure will be useful and forthright talks with
the Greek leaders. As befits allies of long
standing, we must do everything we can to
strengthen the ties between our countries.
That is the purpose of my visit.

SECRETARY'S TOAST AT LUNCHEON HOSTED
BY PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU, BUCHAREST, JULY 6

Press release 167 dated July 7

Mr. President, Madame Ceausescu, ladies
and gentlemen: We have just completed a
morning of very successful talks. They con-
firm that the relations between our two
countries are good and that they will con-
tinue to grow.

Three years ago these relations were lim-
ited. But the visit of President Nixon to Ro-
mania in August 1969 and your visit to the
United States in October 1970 have begun a
new and significant era.

In our talks yesterday and today we have
demonstrated that this new era of coopera-
tion will bring benefits to our peoples and
closer relationships between our govern-
ments :

— We have signed the first consular con-
vention between Romania and the United
States since 1881. This convention will con-
tribute to the growth of normal travel and
commercial contacts between our two coun-
tries.

— The United States has taken steps which
will cut by more than half the time required
for entry of Romanian ships and crews into
United States ports, the first such measure
we have taken with respect to countries in
this part of Europe. We hope that this ad-
vance will lead to increased commerce and
that American ships will soon be visiting Ro-
manian ports as well.

— We have decided to make Export-Im-
port Bank facilities available to Romania
for the purchase of American equipment, ma-
terials, and technology.

— We have removed travel restraints on
Romanian diplomats in the United States

which were remnants of a previous period
of mutual restrictions.

These advances build upon other progress
in the relationship between our countries:

— Our cultural exchange and relations are
extensive and rapidly growing. The opening
of a Romanian library in New York last De-
cember and of an American library in Bucha-
rest in January will help to increase under-
standing between our peoples.

— Our cooperation in science and technol-
ogy is equally advanced. In the last three
years, .more than 40 Romanian scientists
have visited the United States. And just
last week seven new areas of cooperation
were approved, including work on control-
ling exhaust pollution from automobile en-
gines, a matter of major concern in the
United States. We look forward to a sub-
stantial increase both in areas of scientific
cooperation and in numbers of projects.

Mr. President, these specific advances in
our bilateral relations are impressive. But
they are not the whole story.

Our bilateral trade has more than tripled
in the past three years. To increase it still
further, we have urged and will continue to
urge our Congress to approve legislation
which will make it possible for Romanian ex-
ports to enter the United States on a most-
favored-nation basis.

Our political relations have also prospered.
Most importantly, Romania and the United
States share a community of interest in
Europe and in the world at large.

Last night Foreign Minister Manescu
spoke of transforming Europe into "A zone
of peace, cooperation, and good neighbor-
hood between sovereign countries enjoying
equal rights." We, too, support this objec-
tive. Indeed, we would like to see the day
when Europe is no longer divided. This will
not be easy to achieve, but the Berlin agree-
ment proves that marked progress is pos-
sible.

The conference next year on security and
cooperation in Europe — if it takes concrete
steps to increase contacts among Euro-
peans— can also aid the process toward Eu-
ropean reconciliation.

168

Department of State Bulletin

The United States and the Socialist Re-
public of Romania pursue world policies di-
rected to similar objectives: to the peaceful
resolution of disputes, to support for the
United Nations, to the promotion of good
relations with all countries. We also share a
basic conviction that all countries, whatever
their size or their location and whether they
are in the same or in different social systems,
are equally sovereign and equally independ-
ent and have an equal right to run their own
affairs free of outside interference. My visit
here underlines the devotion of the United
States to that basic principle of relations
among states.

Mr. President, President Nixon has asked
me to bring this message to you and to the
Romanian people: that the United States
places a high value on its relations with your
country and that it will do all it can to make
those relations prosper in years to come.

I ask you now to join me in a toast: to
President Ceausescu; to the growth in ties
between the United States and the Socialist
Republic of Romania; to the friendship be-
tween the American and the Romanian peo-
ple.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY ROGERS ON SIGNING
OF AGREEMENTS, BUDAPEST, JULY 7

Press release 168 dated July 7

In the quest for peace the United States
believes that understanding among peoples
is fundamental. Thus we favor a more open
world, open to trade, to greater contacts
among people, and to a greater flow of ideas.
Both the agreements signed today, in modest
but important ways, contribute to this goal.

The consular convention that Foreign
Minister Peter and I have signed is a re-
sponse, and an encouragement, to greater
contact between Hungary and the United
States. As American tourism to Hungary
rises and as more Hungarians visit the
United States, consular requirements are
about to increase. We therefore have a mu-
tual interest in developing a better basis
for dealing with them.

I am happy to be present at the signing of
the agreement on scientific and technical ex-
changes between the Institute of Cultural
Relations and the National Science Founda-
tion. This framework agreement will enable
scientists in each country to share their
knowledge and experience and to make the
personal contacts which are so important to
scientific progress.

Speaking for the United States Govern-
ment, I welcome both these agreements not
only for their own sake but because they in-
dicate the mutual desire and ability of our
two countries to seek improvement in our
bilateral relations in a serious and realistic
way.

JOINT U.S.-YUGOSLAV PRESS RELEASE, JULY 9

Press release 170 dated July 10

At the invitation of the Federal Secretary for
Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Mirko Tepavac, the Secretary of
State of the United States of America, William P.
Rogers, accompanied by Mrs. Rogers, paid an official
visit to Yugoslavia from July 7-9, 1972.

The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, received the Secretary
of State at Brioni on July 9, 1972. Mr. Rogers was
also received by the President of the Federal
Executive Council, Dzemal Bijedic.

In the course of the visit talks were conducted on
the international situation and on bilateral coopera-
tion between the two countries.

The two Secretaries noted with satisfaction that
relations between Yugoslavia and the United States
have been traditionally good and mutually beneficial
and are developing exceptionally well at the present
time. They underlined the importance of the meet-
ings of President Tito and President Nixon and of
their joint statement of October 30, 1971, which pro-
vides a long-term basis for cooperation between the
two countries.' They expressed satisfaction that on
the basis of this document a further development of
the close mutual relations between Yugoslavia and
the United States has been registered in all fields.

The talks covered current international issues and
developments, including recent visits made by the
leaders of both countries, European cooperation and
security, and the situations in the Middle East and

' For text of a joint statement issued at Washing-
ton on Oct. 30, 1971, see Bulletin of Nov. 22, 1971,
p. 594.

August 7, 1972

169

Southeast Asia. The activities of non-aliped and de-
veloping countries were also discussed.

In the course of the exchange of views on inter-
national issues the two sides stated their respective
positions in a candid and friendly manner. They
agreed that solutions should be found for the prob-
lems which are burdening the present-day world on
the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty,
equality, and non-interference among all States,
whether they are in the same or in different social,
economic or political systems.

Emphasizing that the development of bilateral re-
lations has been favorable in all fields, the Secre-
taries agreed further to develop and promote mu-
tually beneficial cooperation between Yugoslavia and
the United States. Special attention will be devoted
to economic relations, which have recently received
new incentives. Both countries also expressed their
intention to continue to develop and enrich scientific,
technical and cultural forms of cooperation. They
considered that an important contribution to the
development of bilateral relations is provided by
United States citizens of Yugoslav descent.

The two Secretaries affirmed the importance of
regular contacts and exchanges of views between
representatives of the two countries in various
fields, noting that they have been mutually useful
and that they should be continued in the future, in
the interest of the further development of relations
and cooperation between the SFRY and USA, as
well as of peace in the world.

NEWS CONFERENCE, ROME, JULY 11

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. At
the conclusion of my round-the-world trip, I
thought to take this opportunity to meet you
and answer a few questions, particularly
about the visit that I had here in Rome.

I had, I think, very satisfactory discussions
with leaders of the Italian Government,
President Leone and Prime Minister An-
dreotti and Foreign Minister Medici, and
this morning I had the privilege of an audi-
ence with His Holiness. I think that the talks
have gone very well, and I think it is particu-
larly appropriate that I should end this visit
in Rome, because the relations between Italy
and the United States are very, very good.
We have worked well together over the years,
and I think particularly now the relations are
especially good. We are both members of the
alliance. We have the same policy toward the
alliance; namely, its wide importance to the

security of the world and particularly to the
security here in Europe. The discussions I
had were wide-ranging discussions dealing
with the discussions I had throughout the
world, and I convey the best wishes of the
President to the new government and par-
ticularly the appreciation that we feel for the
expressions of support that the Italian Gov-
ernment continues to have toward the alli-
ance.

I will answer the questions now. Yes.

Q. Can you elaborate on the evaluation of
the whole trip on which — that you have
accomplished in the last two weeks?

A. Well, I would rather not have a detailed
discussion of the whole trip, because when I
go back to the United States I want to report
to President Nixon about the visit and at that
time I may have a press conference dealing
with the whole trip. I can really say that it
is consistent with the policy that President
Nixon has been following: on one hand to
have discussions to attempt to improve our
relations with the Soviet Union and with the
People's Republic of China and at the same
time make it clear that we are going to main-
tain our treaty commitments, that we are
going to continue the alliance that has served
the cause of peace so well.

We recognize the importance of smaller
nations, nations who were not involved in
those discussions, so we are trying to re-
assure all the nations in the world, particu-
larly allies and friends of the United States,
that nothing that has happened in these visits
is to their detriment and that we fully con-
sidered their point of view and their interests
in these discussions and that we also recog-
nize that if we are going to have peace and
stability in the world it can't be done just by
the major powers but that all nations are
involved. That's quite clear when you look
around the world, because many of the areas
of great tension involve smaller nations; so
it is consistent with the policy that the Presi-
dent has been following.

I think this visit has been successful. I
have been very gratified at the responses

170

Department of State Bulletin

that we have had in the countries I visited.
The media response has been excellent in all
of the countries; I call to your attention par-
ticularly the response that we received in
Hungary and Romania and Yugoslavia, and
I think if you ladies and gentlemen check on
the coverage, the attention that was given to
these visits, you will see that it has had a
very beneficial effect.

Q. We understand that with the Pope you
were discussing Viet-Nam. We would like to
have details of that discussion, if possible.

A. Yes, I did discuss with His Holiness
questions dealing with Viet-Nam and Indo-
china generally. I again pointed out the posi-
tion of the United States, which briefly can
be stated as follows : that we are prepared
to have a cease-fire in Viet-Nam with an
exchange of prisoners, a cease-fire interna-
tionally supervised, withdrawal of all forces
of the United States in four months, and
thereafter leave the political future of the
area to the Vietnamese people themselves. Al-
though I have been urged from time to time
on this visit that the United States should
take a more active role in finding political so-
lutions to the problems in Indochina, I have
suggested that what we have been asked to
do previously was to leave those problems
for the people in the area to solve and that we
are doing that. Now, I don't want to quote
His Holiness, but obviously he expressed to
me, as he has in public statements, his great
interest in peace, urging all concerned to do
their utmost to bring about a peaceful
settlement by negotiations. I expressed the
view of my government to His Holiness that
we supported his plea. We thought it was a
very useful and constructive step to be taken,
to make this very strong plea, and expressed
the hope on the part of my government that
the negotiations will result in a settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen you say you have
been urged during your visits that the United
States play an important role in seeking the
political settlement in Viet-Nam, do you
mean you could urge the imposing of a
settlement on Saigon?

A. Yes, I don't want to get into personal-
ities, but there are always some pleas made
to the effect that the proposal of a military
solution — which I just referred to as a cease-
fire and exchange of prisoners, a cease-fire,
and an internationally supervised withdraw-
al of forces from Indochina — will leave the
political future obscure and that the United
States should do something to prevent that
from happening. Well, we have said that we
prefer to have the solutions worked out by
the people in Viet-Nam itself. What I did em-
phasize was that the policy that President
Nixon has been following we think is a
very fair one and a very reasonable one;
that is, the United States, under the condi-
tions I just outlined, to leave Viet-Nam and
let the future be determined by the people
there. But in the specific case I didn't have
this kind of discussion with His Holiness. I
was talking about others, not the discussion
I had this morning.

Q. Would you like to clear up the matter on
ivhether you were or were not going to Is-
tanbul for the funeral [of Athenagoras I,
Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox
Church] this noon?

A. No, I have never made any plans to go
to the funeral. There was some discussion
about whether it was possible for me to do
that, but that was just a general discussion.
It turned out it wasn't possible because I
had this appointment with His Holiness here
this morning, so it wouldn't have been pos-
sible. So, on the idea that I canceled plans,
that report is incorrect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I assume you discussed
the Middle East situation with the Italian
leaders. Do you feel that Italy can play any
role in persuading both sides in stop bomb-
ing ?

A. It is very difficult to know who can play
useful roles. I would not exclude any nation's
usefulness in this regard. I think that in the
case of Italy that they do have a role to play.
They certainly have great interest in it, and
they have very good contacts in the area, so
I certainly will take it that they might play a

August 7, 1972

171

useful role. We discussed the matter in con-
siderable depth because it is of some impor-
tance to Italy.

Q. Could you talk about your meeting with
the Pope on what other subjects you dis-
cussed ?

A. Well, we have put out, what do you say,
a statement — ah, I have been corrected by
my very perceptive press spokesman, a state-
ment is being put out by the Vatican which
covers the subjects we discussed, and I don't
want to add to that. I think you'll find it is
a very good statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Kissinger has been
quoted saying that there may be some hope
that there will be some movement in the
negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Do
you share this hope, or could you tell us your
latest thinking on that?

A. I share that hope, and for many reasons
that I don't want to give in great length, I
think that there are a lot of reasons to have
some hope. Whether they will materialize or
not remains to be seen, but I think there is
reason for hope.

Q. Can you give any of those reasons ?

A. Well, I think we have been over them.
The difficulty is that I don't want to appear
too optimistic, and I don't want to appear
pessimistic. I want to continue to express
hope, and I think there is hope, obviously,
with the developments in the region: the fact
that the North Vietnamese have been un-
successful in their attempt to overrun South
Viet-Nam, the fact that mining the harbors
has been effective and the bombings of the
military targets in the North unusually ef-
fective, the fact that we have had discussions
in the Soviet Union about the matter, and
the discussions in Peking about Indochina.
I think because of the growing realization
that the continuation of the war serves no
one's interest that the United States is going
to pursue the policy the President has an-
nounced. We are going to continue it, because
we think it is a fair policy and because we
have had a great deal of diplomatic activity

and a great deal of discussion about the mat-
ter in numerous countries. It has gotten to
the point now that it would seem to us that
everyone would realize that the interests of
all concerned can best be served by working
out the settlement by the negotiating process,
and therefore I do have hopes. When these
hopes might materialize and if they will ma-
terialize, of course, remain to be seen.

Q. Do you also foresee private discussions
running parallel to the formal ones as before?

A. Well, we try not to discuss secret talks
for the obvious reason that when we do they
are not secret, but — well, we ought to expect
that we will not have private talks that are
public. Obviously we are going to have the
discussions in Paris. Other channels are not
excluded, obviously, but I don't want to say
anything here that will lead you to the con-
clusion that so-called private talks are being
held.

Q. Did the Prime Minister or Foreign
Minister have any useful ideas for new ini-
tiatives in the Middle East?

A. No, not particularly new initiatives. We
did talk about some courses that could be
followed. I think we agreed that the best
course is one that has not been tried yet: to
discuss the problems of the area on a face-to-
face basis or, if that's impossible for political
reasons, indirectly, with some other methods.
The reason for that is that the only way prob-
lems can be solved in human aff'airs is to have
discussions about them, and this can happen
all over the world except in the Middle East.
I mean, all the major areas in the world
where there have been major controversies
— India and Pakistan had summit meetings,
North and South Korea hadn't discussed
these problems since the end of the Korean
war, Viet-Nam, talks in Cyprus, the East and
West Germans are talking, we are talking to
the People's Republic of China and Soviet
Union.

So, the only area in the world where there
is a major conflict and no active discussions
are underway is the Middle East. It is high
time that everyone concerned realize the im-

172

Department of State Bulletin

portance of getting down to it. When you look
at what has happened since 1967, it has been
essentially argumentation. The United States
did play a role in bringing about a cease-fire,
but that was very indirect — a difficult, labo-
rious process. They were finally able to work
out a cease-fire, which has lasted almost two
years, but what we are trying to do is en-
courage the parties to be sensible and talk
over the problems even if they can't solve
them. We believe very firmly that even if
they cannot find a complete solution, if they
can't implement the Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, that they can start toward imple-
mentation of it. They can make some prog-
ress that has not occurred since 1967. As you
know, we have offered a formula that could
provide a foundation for this progress, but
nothing can happen unless the parties are
willing to talk about it. We are not in a po-
sition to impose a settlement. We may be able
to have some influence; we may be able to
express our views when discussion starts,
but we cannot impose a solution on the
parties. I had this kind of discussion with
the Prime Minister, and I think he fully
agrees that it will be a good course to follow
if at all possible.

Q. Who is right, and who is wrong?

A. I don't know. This is the kind of thing
that I don't want to get involved in. I mean,
this is not a litigation; we're not deciding
who's right and who's wrong. We're looking
for the way to find a peaceful solution in the
future of the Middle East. One of the prob-
lems in the discussion is that this is the ap-
proach that is so often taken. They say, well,
he is wrong and I am right, or you forgot
that we made this argument in 1971. Those
are all arguments; it is like litigating in
court. This is not what we see in the Four
Power agreement about Berlin; that is not
what we did in the SALT talks [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks]. We came to agree-
ments because we sat down and said: Let's
see if we can be sensible and find solutions
to these problems ; let's talk it over ; let's not
argue about who's right and who's wrong;
let's see if we can work out a way to live

together in peace. And this is what's been
lacking.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you and the Pope dis-
cuss the prisoners of war?

A. Yes, we did discuss it, and I thanked
His Holiness very much for the part the Vati-
can has played. They've made every kind
of an effort they reasonably could make, to
no avail; and I expressed the very warm
thanks of President Nixon and the American
people for the efforts that His Holiness has
made.

Q. Did you discuss the possibility of open-
ing the Suez Canal pending a final agree-
ment?

A. Yes, I did, because I think this is one
of the proposals that are possibly viable, and
I expressed the point of view that we've had
for some time, that it would be better to
start down the road and have a step taken
even if you recognize that it is merely a step
toward the full implementation of Security
Council Resolution 242. But we do feel that
it's important to make some progress, and we
think this is one way it could be. done. Al-
though there are still considerable differences
between Egypt and Israel on this subject,
there is a considerable number of areas of
agreement. We think this is a very good
prospect if the parties were willing to sit
down and discuss it. And we've offered to
play a role in that process. We've said we'll
act as a mediator ; if you don't want to dis-
cuss this directly, face-to-face, we'll consider
acting in that role to keep the discussions ac-
tive; we'll get together and have a very frank
and aggressive exchange of views to see if we
can make some accommodations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we understand that Sec-
retary General Waldheim yesterday an-
nounced that the Jarring mission [U.N.
Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] has
been reactivated. Do you see any prospects
for any progress under the Jarring aegis?

A. Well, I think that Jarring's role is an
important role and that Security Council
Resolution 242 that I referred to several

August 7, 1972

173

times contemplates action on his part. We
welcome any efforts that he can make to
bring about the negotiations that I referred
to. That is a good possibility. I don't think
that it necessarily excludes other possibili-
ties that I'm speaking about — proximity
talks — and when we talk about proximity
talks, I attempt to make clear that we are
not doing it at the expense of the Jarring
mission, because he is going to play a very
important role in the full implementation of
Council Resolution 242. We favor reactiva-
tion of this mission, if that's possible; we
think that he will play a very useful role in
the future, and we feel that the proximity
talks that I referred to are not mutually ex-
clusive— one does not exclude the other.

Q. Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei A. Gromyko] was talking in Brussels
of postponing the negotiations for the MBFR
[mutual and balanced force reductions] until
after the European Security Conference.
What is your opinion on this ?

A. Well, we think that they should occur in
a parallel manner — we don't mean exactly
simultaneously, but you'll see in the Moscow
communique that both the Soviet Union and
the United States expressed this view.* We
would not want the talks on MBFR delayed
until after the Security Conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the officials in NATO
have expressed concern that the Soviet
Union's detente posture is merely a mask, a
camouflage, for getting the United States
out of Europe, disbanding the NATO nations,
throwing the European nations into disar-
ray, so that they eventually could come in and
dominate. Have either the Italians or any of
the other officials that you've spoken to ex-
pressed this vieiv ? And I would like to knoiv
also what your feeling is.

A. That view has not been expressed by the
Italian Government, and it has not been ex-

' For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow
on May 29 during President Nixon's visit, see
Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 899.

pressed to me by any of our NATO allies.
I think that it has not been expressed to me
by any of our NATO allies because we made
it clear that that is not going to happen. We
think that the alliance is responsible in con-
siderable measure for the success that we've
had in our discussions with the Soviet Union.
We think the alliance has been responsible
for the maintenance of peace in this part of
the world since World War II, and we have
told our allies repeatedly that we are going to
continue to maintain our strength, that we
have no intention of abandoning our allies,
and President Nixon made that very clear in
his discussion with Chairman Brezhnev
[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Soviet Communist Party]. We are going
to maintain our alliance, we are going to
maintain our strength. Any reduction of
forces in Europe should be done on a mutual
and balanced basis, and that's why we think
the discussions about MBFR are important.
Certainly we are not going to fall into the
trap of having a euphoric attitude toward the
world situation. We think the stability that
at present exists, the fact that the world has
made considerable progress in international
affairs in the last years, is because we have
been able to maintain the strength of these
alliances and that the balance does exist; and
we are not going to do anything to see that
altered, and certainly if there is any Presi-
dent or any man who is conscious of this,
who is experienced in these types of matters,
who has a firm conviction of the necessity of
maintaining this strength, it is President
Nixon.

Q. Did you discuss with the Italian states-
men the Italian plan of convoking the Medi-
terranean conference?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you discuss with the Vatican the
POW issue?

A. I don't want to go into the specifics, but
they have made several attempts to gradually
and indirectly see if there is some way to
have exchange of prisoners. They've also

174

Department of State Bulletin

made efforts to see if there could be more
mail, more accountability for those who are
missing; in other words, they've been very
active in humanitarian ways to see that the
rules of international law and the Geneva
Convention are followed. So far, as I said,
they have been to no avail.

Q. Is there any intention from the Italians
to take part in these MBFR talks? Does the
United States agree to that?

A. I did have the opportunity to explain
to the Italian Government the United States
position. We have not decided in our own
minds exactly how these talks would take
place. That's a matter now under considera-
tion by our govei'nment. We think it is a
practical matter, that when you are talking
about matters that are as complex as the
reduction of forces — and this is based to
some extent on our experience in the SALT
talks — that you can have too many people
discussing it. You've got to have some limita-
tion of the number; so that if all nations
that have direct or indirect interest are in-
volved in the discussion, it would be very
cumbersome.

On the other hand, we fully recognize that
every nation in Europe has an interest in
what happens in those talks, and therefore
we would expect that however the talks are
conducted the interest of all nations would be
taken into account, fully taken into account.
And I expressed to the Italian Government
that certainly nothing will be done in those
talks without full coordination and discussion
with our NATO allies and that some method
could be worked out so that the nations that
did not have territories or forces involved
could be represented in the talks; so that
there is no interest on the part of the United
States to exclude anybody. It is just a practi-
cal matter, and I said we would be completely
flexible about how to do it. We would con-

tinue to talk to the Italian Government and
others that have this concern to be sure that
this concern is put to rest.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle-
men.

U.S.-Romania Consular Convention
Signed at Bucharest

Press release 166 dated July 6

The Government of the United States and
the Socialist Republic of Romania con-
cluded a consular convention at Bucharest
July 5. Secretary Rogers, who was paying
an official visit to Romania, signed the con-
vention for the United States. Foreign Min-
ister Corneliu Manescu signed for Roma-
nia. The treaty, which will be submitted to
the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent,
is a significant step in the continued im-
provement and expansion of U.S.-Romanian
relations.

The consular convention will make possi-
ble improved consular services in both coun-
tries. It will insure unhindered communica-
tion between a citizen and his consul and
prompt visits by consuls to citizens who are
detained. The convention covers consular
responsibilities and functions such as the is-
suance of visas and passports and perform-
ance of notarial services, and inviolability
of consular communications, documents, and
archives.

As a result of this convention, American
citizens will have a fuller degree of con-
sular assistance and protection than ever
before. American businessmen and shipping
companies will be able to call upon U.S.
consular officials to assist in representing
their interests, and the means for dealing
with a whole range of legal matters will be
considerably enhanced.

August 7, 1972

175

A U.S. Look at the United Nations System

Statement by George Bush

U.S. Representative to the United Nations *

There is concern about and obvious mis-
understanding in the U.N. family of the
current U.S. attitude toward U.N. programs
and budgets. We have been charged with
downgrading the U.N. and reflecting dimin-
ished confidence in the U.N.'s capacities to
play a significant role in world affairs. Some
of our own citizens have warned that we
appear to be on a collision course with the
very international agencies in whose future
we have an important stake. The watch-
word of "realism and candor" toward the
U.N. has been interpreted by some as a sig-
nal of waning U.S. financial, moral, and po-
litical support for the organization.

In particular, there is doubt about U.S.
motivations and intent in moving to achieve
as rapidly as possible a reduction in the
U.S. assessment share of U.N. agency budg-
ets to 25 percent and of the call for aus-
terity in budgeting international programs,
to which the United States has traditionally
been and continues to be the biggest finan-
cial contributor. There are vibrations ex-
pressing— more in sorrow than anger —
alarm that this turn in U.S. policy may lead
to a massive disengagement from world
concerns. Some have appealed to us to bal-
ance realism with vision and magnanimity.

I want to speak with candor about what
is behind our policy. At the outset let me

' Made before a joint meeting of the U.N. Com-
mittee for Program and Coordination (CPC) and
the Administrative Committee on Coordination at
Geneva on June 29 (USUN press release 74 dated
July 5).

assure the heads of U.N. agencies gathered
here that the United States is not weary
of its world responsibilities. We are not
disengaging from international agencies.
Our dedication to and support for U.N.
functions, in their fullest scope, continue.
We recognize full well our vital interest in
healthy, functioning U.N. agencies actively
seeking to cope with mankind's common
problems.

Our "realism and candor" embrace the
realization that we must build upon the
present U.N. structure. We must improve
what we have. And the realistic and candid
picture of the future also means that, for
the foreseeable future, the United States will
continue to be the largest contributor to in-
ternational organizations and programs.

None can deny the importance of arrange-
ments between the world's power centers.
But anyone who takes the trouble to read
fully the foreign policy reports of the Pres-
ident and of the Secretary of State knows
that in our scheme of things effective inter-
national institutions will be crucial in meet-
ing the challenges of peacekeeping, of coping
with the consequences of the new technol-
ogies and with the rising, legitimate de-
mands of the impoverished for decent living
standards.

The real issue for the U.S. Government
comprises dual concerns : how the effective-
ness of U.N. agencies can be improved and
how our taxpayers can be assured that bur-
dens are shared equitably. Effectiveness de-
pends not only on the capacity to carry out

176

Department of State Bulletin

functions efficiently and to adapt activities
to changing world needs. It also depends on
the support and confidence of member states,
their parliaments and peoples. At least it
does in the democracies. The public expects
U.N. action to deal with vital world con-
cerns and will lose confidence if interna-
tional organizations fail to deliver. Obstacles
to an effective world order are formidable,
and demands are growing. But it is precisely
because of growth and change that we must
constantly reappraise priorities, try to avoid
petty jockeying for preferred positions in
pursuit of parochial concerns, and devise ef-
fective means of financial, fiscal, and admin-
istrative accountability.

This is no recent or transitory concern of
ours. Let us put our policy in perspective.
After all, for almost a decade we and others
have expressed our concern in the Fifth
Committee [of the General Assembly] and
in the ad hoc committee on finances, caution-
ing time and again that as budgets grew
governments would no longer tolerate an
undisciplined attitude toward budgets and
programs; that taxpayers in the larger con-
tributing countries would look critically at
inefficiencies and rigidities and logrolling
tendencies that have prevailed in some agen-
cies. I recall that early in 1966 President
Johnson directed the Secretary of State to
spur international organizations to achieve
the greatest possible efficiency in the plan-
ning and operation of programs. Pointing out
that the United States is the largest single
contributor to U.N. programs, the directive
said : ^

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping
to strengthen the international agencies so they can
meet essential new needs, we must apply to them
the same rigorous standards of program perform-
ance and budget review that we do to our own Fed-
eral programs.

Essentially the rule then laid down still
forms our policy : The U.N. system has now
matured to the point where governments
should expect more eflfective use of funds,

better coordination, fair sharing, and the
same budgetary discipline and accountability
that modern governments expect in domestic
affairs.

Basically we seek a process that will as-
sure optimum use of available resources,
economy and efficiency in administration,
and responsiveness to the policy objectives
and priorities laid down by principal U.N.
bodies. We propose not a narrow bookkeep-
ing approach or a downgrading of U.N.
functions. Quite the contrary, if the U.N.
is to be taken seriously and if it is to be a
dynamic and responsive institution with a
potentially expanding role in world affairs,
it must restore confidence in the U.N.'s ca-
pacity to carry out important jobs. Reliabil-
ity and accountability are keys to effective-
ness and restored confidence. The ultimate
goal and its purpose was stated by President
Nixon in a part of his annual report that has
apparently not been noticed. Let me quote
it here : •''

Ours is the age when man has first come to realize
that he can in fact destroy his own species. Ours
is the age when the problems and complexities of
technological revolution have so multiplied that
coping with them is, in many ways, clearly beyond
the capacities of individual national governments.
Ours, therefore, must be the age when the interna-
tional institutions of cooperation are perfected. The
basic question is — can man create institutions to
save him from the dark forces of his own nature
and from the overwhelming consequences of his
technological successes ?

Can anyone ignore present inequities as
between budgets, weakness in programs, and
serious deficiencies in the operation and ad-
ministration of U.N. agencies?

The United States, other major contribu-
tors, and indeed, all members of U.N. agen-
cies cannot be indifferent to the state of
affairs. Our financial stake in the operations
of the U.N. system is sizable and growing,
as are the programs themselves. Our total
cumulative contributions from calendar

' For text of President Johnson's memorandum of
Mar. 15, 1966, see Bulletin of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 577.

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress of Feb. 9 appears in
the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled
"The United Nations" begins on p. 403.

August 7, 1972

177

year 1960 through 1970 (including both
assessed and voluntary) amount to about
$2.5 billion, rising from $160 million in 1960
to over $300 million a year a decade later.
In 1971, U.S. contributions through the
U.N. (including humanitarian assistance)
reached over $460 million out of a total of
$1.23 billion. The overall U.S. contribution
in 1971 for all programs accounted for 37.78
percent. Budgets are rising at a rate which
could mean a doubling during the next five
or six years. While in terms of some of the
larger national budgets this would appear
to be modest, it is not inconsequential and
it looms large in the public mind ; at least
in the United States it does, because these
sums for the U.N. system have to be added
to those for our national concerns. Its main
impact in my country and in our Congress
is that accountability and budgetary disci-
pline are now demanded of international
organization budgets and programs just as
they are of our domestic budgets and pro-
grams. As we study this growth curve, all
of us need to take a closer look at program
content, administrative efficiency, and the ef-
fective functioning of our organizations.

Against this background we have urged
the heads of agencies to reexamine the
budgetary, administrative, and management
practices that should govern international
agencies for the next several years :

Budget levels. First, we suggest that it is
unrealistic and self-defeating to anticipate
that the present growth rate of budgets can
continue. Our belief is that, for the near
future, consolidation should be the order of
the day and more sensitivity shown to the
financial implications of new programs. We
concluded that expenditures — which have
more than doubled in the past 10 years —
will have to be kept as much as possible at
their present level for the next several years.
Of course, growth is inevitable. Increased
costs are real; and the drive for new and
worthy programs to maintain peace and to
promote economic and social development
and cooperation in a wide range of social,
technical, and scientific activities is not to
be stayed. Indeed, the United States has

been responsible for many initiatives that
obviously have budgetary consequences. We
are not opposed to growth. Rather, a con-
stant reassessment of priorities must be
made as new programs are adopted. New
and fully justified programs can and should
be added, but whenever possible this should
be at the expense of older programs of lesser
priority which should be curtailed or abol-
ished as their relative usefulness diminishes.
Budget time should be the occasion for a
hard look at program options and priorities.

Program Budgeting. As is well known,
my government has been in the forefront
of those calling for increased efficiency of op-
erations throughout the system. Our support
for the work of the Committee of Fourteen
[Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Exam-
ine the Finances of the United Nations and
the Specialized Agencies], the Joint Inspec-
tion Unit, the Administrative Management
Service, and many other instrumentalities
created to improve the efficiency of the or-
ganization bears this out. My delegation was
pleased that the CPC, during its 12th ses-
sion, was able to press forward in support
of the new form of presentation of the U.N.
budget as a basis of planning, programing,
and budgeting for the U.N. and that the
majority of its members were able to en-
dorse the principle of program budgeting.
We are convinced that the adoption of a sys-
tem of program budgeting by the United
Nations which is compatible to those in use
by the major specialized agencies can only
result in a clearer picture of program priori-
ties and activities and their relationship to
available resources.

Inftation and Mandatory Expenses. We
recognize the impact of inflation. However,
inflation is a signal, and in many ways an
opportunity, for raising the level of effi-
ciency and performance. It can provide the
impetus for introducing more rigor into
management, for rationalizing staff require-
ments, and for reappraising priorities.
So-called mandatory expenses, i.e., those nec-
essary to maintain the prior year's estab-
lishment and activities, can be reduced in
preparing new budgets. We are also con-

178

Department of State Bulletin

vinced that improved management practices
— with consequent productivity gains and
other savings — will enable organizations to
absorb some, if not all, of the increases in
mandatory expenses caused by inflation. In
our own government, to cite an example,
the Department of State has had to cut its
personnel by more than 12 percent in the
last five years. At the same time our activi-
ties, like yours, have increased. We make
up the difference by increasing our produc-
tivity. In effect, inflation is not an irresist-
ible force. We urge that all salary increases
be held up until the Special Committee for
Review of the U.N. Salary System (estab-
lished in 1970) completes its deliberations.
There is ample ground for holding the line,
since U.N. professional staff salaries in New
York, which are based on U.S. civil service
as the highest paid national service, are al-
ready 20 to 35 percent greater than U.S.
civil service salaries.

Conferences, Documentation, Building. To
counter the impact of rising costs certain
obvious economies are in order. Conferences
should either be held at Headquarters or all
extra costs defrayed from extra-budgetary
sources, usually the host government. Most
conferences could be reduced in length and
the flow of documentation drastically cur-
tailed. Meetings should be spaced at greater
intervals. Too many hastily prepared meet-
ings have taken place with late or missing
documentation. Records of meetings should
be kept as brief as possible. Moreover, is it
unreasonable to ask that all new construc-
tion and building costs be closely scrutinized
while we take stock of the future? In the
present period we do not favor any new con-
struction that does not proceed from sound
long-term planning based on need and does
not result in budgetary economies in the
long run.

Working Capital and Contingency Funds.
In some agencies working capital is viewed
as a kind of windfall supplement to current
resources rather than a device to tide agen-
cies over periods when cash is low. We be-
lieve working capital funds should be small
and severely restricted to meeting operating

expenses while current assessments are be-
ing collected ; they should not be used to re-
place contributions of members in substan-
tial arrears.

Scale of Assessments. We believe the time
has come to take a new look at the criteria
for and equity of scales of assessments.
World agencies are of two kinds : those that
meet common technical concerns and those
with broad political, economic, and social
aims. In worldwide organizations of a spe-
cific technical nature we have suggested that
the dominant criterion in determining the
scale of assessments should be the degree of
members' involvement in the relevant ac-
tivity. Thus, for example, ocean tonnage is
a legitimate basis for the scale of assess-
ments of the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization. In worldwide
general-purpose organizations based on sov-
ereign equality, a balance of political equity
and economic equity should determine as-
sessment shares. Furthermore, world eco-
nomic growth and the great increase in U.N.
membership now permit us to avert a danger
that was foreseen early in U.N. history;
namely, too great financial dependence on any
one member.

U.S. Assessment Rate. Concern about cri-
teria for burden-sharing has raised strong
doubts in my country about the level of U.S.
financial contributions. These doubts have
been aggravated by the persistent failure of
the U.N. to come to grips with its deficit and
its future fiscal needs — failure in spite of
repeated initiatives by the Secretary Gen-
eral. Let me be very frank. A majority of
our Congress believes that U.N. budgets are
rising excessively and that we are assessed
at a disproportionate rate in certain organi-
zations. One may question the reasoning ad-
duced by some, but do not underestimate the
strength of the feeling, as recent events have
made clear.

To establish more equitable burden-sharing
and the principle that world organizations
should not be overly dependent on any one
member, we are seeking a reduction of the
U.S. assessment to 25 percent in those cases
where it exceeds that percentage. In cases

August 7, 1972

179

where the United States is assessed 25 per-
cent or less in smaller technical bodies, we
will also seek reductions when justified
either by virtue of the principle of compara-
tive benefit or by application of technical
criteria. The United States will wish to ob-
tain the largest possible reduction in its own
assessment as new members are admitted.
It is our firm intention and the announced
policy of the U.S. Government to proceed
urgently but in an orderly and reasonable
way in reaching this goal. Agency heads
and other members should begin now to
take into account the implications of such
U.S. reductions.

In looking at the assessment question let
us have no doubt of U.S. interest in the
U.N. system. Our contribution to that sys-
tem is seven times our assessed contribution
to the regular U.N. budget. Can there be
any question that the United States is dedi-
cated to the guts of this system — through
UNDP [United Nations Development Pro-
gram], the World Food Program, and other
activities? We have proved and will con-
tinue to prove that we are committed to
real progress in the basic fields of develop-
ment and humanitarian assistance and other
programs. As an example, I submit that the
U.N. operation in Bangladesh would be a
rather small effort if the United States had
not furnished 124 million dollars' worth of
assistance. When you look at matters of as-
sessment, please don't forget that the
United States is making the largest single
contribution to the operating programs of
the U.N., the programs that most often get
down to the people in real terms.

Technical Assistance. Finally, we need
to take a more rigorous look at the funding
of technical assistance. In some agencies and
in the U.N. itself a substantial portion of as-
sessed budgets is being devoted to economic
and technical assistance projects for devel-
oping nations. We believe the assessed budg-
ets should relate largely to the administra-
tion of the organizations and to activities
of common benefit. As a general rule, but
allowing for exceptions of a constitutional
nature, technical assistance activities that

fall within the mandate of the U.N. Devel-
opment Program should be financed by the
UNDP and not by regular assessed budgets.
The current preoccupation with technical
assistance programs, which buys majority
votes at the expense of support from some
major donors, is a politically risky policy.
It is also in some cases a distortion of the
agencies' constitutional mandate. We expect
UNDP funding to increase substantially, but
this will not be likely insofar as the U.S. con-
tribution is concerned if the agencies attempt
to maintain, let alone increase, technical
assistance from their regular budgets.

We present the above for discussion, not in
a take-it-or-leave-it spirit.

Unlike the U.N., the directors of special-
ized agencies by and large hold the levers of
budgetary planning in their hands. I think
we'd all agree that the governing bodies for
the most part have not exercised a tight rein
over the administration and normally have
accepted the administrative logic and budget-
ary requests of their director. Agency heads
are naturally inclined to accept the justice of
demands advanced by beneficiaries of pro-
grams and are influenced by pleas from their
own staffs to expand the services offered by
their agencies. They often find it both just
and comfortable to add worthwhile programs
and to attempt to accommodate the initia-
tives and constructive new programs with-
out regard to the constraints that I men-
tioned above. I believe that the longrun
interests of the U.N. and the agencies them-
selves counsel a tougher approach to new
claims on the budget. Agency heads and
staffs, whose competence and continuity pro-
vide the necessary expertise and perspective
to take the long view, should weigh carefully
the merits of bigger and better programs in
consideration of the effects on contributors
as well as on beneficiaries.

We believe the development role, vital as
it is, should not overshadow the core func-
tion for which agencies were established;
that is, to be coordinating and directing
mechanisms to deal with areas of global con-
cern in their special fields. Advancing the

180

Department of State Bulletin

frontiers of knowledge, setting standards,
legulating, and in certain cases administer-
ing, activities of common concern will re-
main the primary tasks.

Given the nature of the U.N. system, with
autonomy vested in the loosely federated
agencies of the U.N. family, we must look to
the agency heads for leadership both to estab-
lish programs and to insure budgetary re-
sponsibility. There is great need throughout
the system to improve management, to prune
out obsolete and unproductive activities and
unproductive staff, to counter built-in bureau-
cratic resistance, and to provide central
executive leadership to compensate for dis-
array in some of the governing bodies. We
hope you will articulate the claims of your
own organizations in terms of the long-range
purposes of the agencies and with full con-
sciousness that they are integral parts of an
evolving world order.

Let me conclude with a rather personal ob-
servation.

I am a stronger believer in the U.N. for
having served the last li/o years as U.S.
Ambassador. I have seen some of its suc-
cesses, and certainly I believe deeply in its
potential. But I would not be a strong sup-
porter if I came here and misrepresented or
underrepresented the concern of the U.S.
Government about the U.N.

To shield the U.N. from constructive crit-
icism today is to permit it to wither away
tomorrow. Too many countries, not just
mine, are now insisting that the U.N. be
improved, and thus strengthened. Please do
not dismiss this as niggardly rationalization
induced by homefront financial pressures.

The Secretary General has been trying
with all the strength he can muster to stream-
line and strengthen the bureaucracy. Fer
these efforts in some quarters in the Secre-
tariat he has received opposition and criti-
cism. But the Secretary General is not only
doing what is needed and long overdue; he is
trying to solve problems that the member
states all know exist.

Let the record show that he has the strong
support of our government as he approaches
this most difficult task.

151st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by William J.
Porter, head of the U.S. delegation, at the
151st plenary session of the meetings on
Viet-Nam at Paris on July 20.

Press release 181 dated July 20

Ladies and gentlemen: We have examined
your presentation at the 150th plenary ses-
sion in order to determine whether it might
reflect a desire on your part to adopt a con-
structive and serious approach to negotia-
tions. You spoke of the need to reflect upon
the respective positions and responsibilities
of each side in the task of seeking a settle-
ment. We have done our best, keeping in
mind all of your proposals, in our search for
common ground.

We want to speak again about our pro-
posals of May 8, which were put forward at
these talks for the first time last week.^ We
asked you for your thoughts concerning them,
for it is impossible, we think, to make prog-
ress unless there is rational discussion of
the difficulties we have with each other's po-
sitions. What is wrong, for example, with
the proposal for an internationally super-
vised cease-fire throughout Indochina? Why
not tell us frankly why it is difficult for you to
entertain this proposal, which would end the
killing promptly and which would sub-
stantially contribute to a peaceful resolution
of the conflict?

We would also like to hear more from you
on the subject of the four-month period we
have proposed for the withdrawal of all our
forces from South Viet-Nam once a cease-
fire has begun and the prisoners of war are
released. It appears logical to us to create
an atmosphere which would facilitate, not
hinder, political discussions among Vietnam-
ese.

Are there not contradictions in a position
which advocates on the one hand self-deter-

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

August 7, 1972

181

mination for the South Vietnamese people
and on the other insists that they be forced
to accept this or that kind of government
without consulting them? And have we not
advocated, in order to meet that particular
problem, that a national consultation take
place under international supervision, and an
election commission in which your friends
could participate?

Let me assure you that these questions are
mentioned not with any desire to dispute but
only with a desire to get into a rational ex-
change of thought. Both of us could continue
to have recourse to complaints which would
fill more pages of the record, but complaint
is sterile as compared to a businesslike con-
sultation on each other's views, even if we do
not agree.

Last week I expressed our side's view that
the best means of making progress here is
mutual examination of our respective posi-
tions and a serious dialogue on matters of
substance. This remains our position. Let's
begin.

U.S. To Resume Economic Assistance
to Yemen Arab Republic

Statement by Secretary Rogers '

Subsequent to the discussions that took
place during my July 1-2 visit to San'a, I am
pleased to announce that the United States
and the Yemen Arab Republic have agreed
to renewal of cooperation for the economic
development of the Yemen Arab Republic.
Discussions have been initiated in order to
define those areas where United States as-
sistance can make the most beneficial impact.

Following appropriate consultations with
the Congress, we intend to resume economic
assistance programs patterned on our previ-
ous programs in Yemen. U.S. aid projects
under consideration include the rehabilita-
tion of the John F. Kennedy Water System

^ Issued on July 14 (press release 176).

in Ta'izz, assistance in developing potable
water supplies for rural villages, and engi-
neering studies for highway development and
other infrastructure investments. Scholar-
ships for Yemeni students at American edu-
cational institutions will also be made avail-
able. These will be in addition to funds for
Yemeni students at the American University
of Beirut. We look forward to early imple-
mentation of these activities. In addition,
U.S. food aid will continue to be distributed
to needy Yemenis through an American vol-
untary agency.

As an indication of our desire to be respon-
sive to Yemen's urgent needs and as an ini-
tial step, the United States has agreed to fur-
nish Yemen on a priority basis spare parts
to permit repair of the generating equipment
for the John F. Kennedy Water System in
Ta'izz.

Members of Advisory Committee
on International Organizations Named

Press release 146 (revised) dated June 21

The Department of State announced on
June 21 the appointment of 25 private citi-
zens prominent in education, business, labor,
law, and the foundations to serve on an Ad-
visory Committee on International Organi-
zations.

The Committee is one of a series of advi-
sory groups designed to bring together senior
government officials and private citizens for
informal discussions of foreign policy prob-
lems. The President's Commission for the
Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the
United Nations, chaired by Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge, recommended the
establishment of such an advisory group to
assist the Bureau of International Organi-
zation Aff'airs.

The key purpose of the Committee is to
elicit citizen advice on how best to promote
a strong and effective United Nations that
has the confidence of the American people.

The Advisory Committee will meet in
Washington with State Department officials,

182

Department of State Bulletin

probably twice a year. Samuel De Palma,
Assistant Secretary for International Orga-
nization Affairs, was to convene the first
meeting in July.

Following are the Committee members :

Nathan R. Berke, attorney, Severson, Werson,
Berke & Melchoir, San Francisco, Calif.

Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Center for Interna-
tional Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. Rosemary H. Cass, attorney, Bloomfield, N.J.

Dr. Paul West Cook, Jr., special counsel to the
president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Mass.

Justin W. Dart, president. Dart Industries, Inc.,
Los Angeles, Calif.

John G. Detwiler, president, Alcan Cable Division,
Alcan Aluminum Corp., Jersey Shore, Pa.

Dr. Helen G. Edmonds, dean, Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences, North Carolina Central Uni-
versity, Durham, N.C.

Dr. Larry L. Fabian, Foreign Policy Studies Pro-
gram, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Madge H. Fairbanks, civic leader. Salt Lake City,
Utah

Arthur A. Fletcher, executive director, United
Negro College Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Harold Friedman, partner, Abraham and Co., New
York, N.Y.

Richard A. Hernandez, attorney, Los Angeles,
Calif.

Elmore Jackson, vice president for policy studies,
United Nations Association of the USA, New
York, N.Y.

Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, president emeritus, Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace, New
York, N.Y.

David A. Kay, associate professor. Department of
Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madi-
son, Wis.

Joseph Meyerhoff, chairman of the board, Monu-
mental Properties, Inc., Baltimore, Md.

Leslie Paffrath, president, Johnson Foundation,
Racine, Wis.

Joan Hickey Polivka, executive director, Minne-
apolis People-to-People and Sister City Program,
Minneapolis, Minn.

Dr. Marshall D. Shulman, director, Russian
Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

Francis J. Sorg, Jr., president. North Shore Hos-
pital, Manhasset, N.Y.

Joseph A. Spaulding, attorney, Bingham, Dana and
Gould, Boston, Mass.

James A. Suffridge, international president emeri-
tus. Retail Clerks International Association, Wash-
ington, D. C.

Dr. Francis O. Wilcox, dean, School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, D. C.

Bernard M. Windon, director, public affairs, G. D.

Searle and Co., Chicago, 111.
Dr. Stephen J. Wright, vice president. College

Entrance Examination Board, New York, N.Y.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'

Acceptances deposited: Gabon, July 20, 1972;
Ghana, July 20, 1972; Venezuela, July 18, 1972.

Aviation

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air
navigation services in Iceland. Done at Geneva
September 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6,
1958. TIAS 4048.
Accession deposited: Greece, May 26, 1972.

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air
navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe
Islands. Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. En-
tered into force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4049.
Accession deposited: Greece, May 26, 1972.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.
Ratification deposited: Mexico, July 19, 1972.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transit of
goods. Done at Vienna June 7, 1971.'
Signatures: Austria, June 5, 1972;= Burundi,
December 16, 1971 ;= Switzerland, June 8, 1972.'

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature: Jordan, July 14, 1972.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.

Not in force.
'■ Subject to ratification.

August 7, 1972

183

Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.
Acceptance deposited: Greece (with a statement),
June 8, 1972.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: Egypt, June 14, 1972 (with

reservations).
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, May 18, 1972 (with

reservation).

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London
May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958;
for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS
4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, March 27, 1972.

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Done at London Oc-
tober 21, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Canada, June 20, 1972.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signatures: Sierra Leone, July 17, 1972; Singa-
pore, July 19, 1972.

Weather Stations

Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean stations, with
annexes. Done at Paris February 25, 1954. En-
tered into force February 1, 1955. TIAS 3186.
Accession deposited: Greece, May 26, 1972.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy, with appendix and related notes.
Signed at Washington July 17, 1972. Enters into
force on the date on which each government shall
have received from the other written notification
that it has complied with all statutory and con-
stitutional requirements for entry into force.

^ Not in force.

Denmark

Agreement relating to conservation of Atlantic
salmon. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington July 6, 1972. Entered into force July 6,
1972.

Hungary

Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7,
1972. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange
of instruments of ratification.

Israel

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of January 13, 1972
(TIAS 7268). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington July 18, 1972. Entered into force July
18, 1972.

Khmer Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of January 13, 1972
(TIAS 7269). Effected by exchange of notes at
Phnom Penh June 23, 1972. Entered into force
June 23, 1972.

Poland

Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes.
Signed at Warsaw July 19, 1972. Entered into
force provisionally, July 19, 1972; definitively,
upon the date of written notification from Poland
to the United States that the agreement has been
approved by the Polish Council of Ministers.

Romania

Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bucha-
rest July 5, 1972. Enters into force on the 30th
day following the date of the exchange of the in-
struments of ratification.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Hugh
Purvis to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ankara July 1, 1972. Entered into force July 1,
1972.

United Kingdom

Agreement to establish on the Island of Grand Ba-
hama a transportable Apollo unified S-band
facility for the U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration to be used for tracking of
and communication with space vehicles. Effected
by exchange of notes at London April 26 and
May 3, 1968. Entered into force May 3, 1968. TIAS
6485.
Terminated: June 30, 1972.

184

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX August 7, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1728

Australia. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, news
conferences, communiques) 157

Consular Affairs. U.S.-Romania Consular

Convention Signed at Bucharest .... 175

Department and Foreign Service. Members of
Advisory Committee on International Or-
ganizations Named 182

Foreign Aid. U.S. To Resume Economic As-
sistance to Yemen Arab Republic (Rogers) 182

Greece. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, news
conferences, communiques) 157

Hungary. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements, news
conferences, communiques) 157

International Organizations. Secretary Rogers
Attends SEATO and ANZUS Meetings in
Australia and Visits 10 Other Countries
(statements, news conferences, communi-
ques) 157

Italy. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and
ANZUS Meetings in Australia and Visits
10 Other Countries (statements, news con-
ferences, communiques) 157

Middle East. Secretary Rogers Attends
SEATO and ANZUS Meetings in Australia
and Visits 10 Other Countries (statements,
news conferences, communiques) .... 157

Romania

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and ANZUS
Meetings in Australia and Visits 10 Other
Countries (statements, news conferences,
communiques) 157

U.S.-Romania Consular Convention Signed at

Bucharest 175

Treaty Information

Current Actions 183

U.S.-Romania Consular Convention Signed at

Bucharest 175

United Nations

Members of Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Organizations Named 182

A U.S. Look at the United Nations System

(Bush) 176

Viet-Nam

151st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at
Paris (Porter) 181

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and
ANZUS Meetings in Australia and Visits
10 Other Countries (statements, news
conferences, communiques) 157

Yemen Arab Republic

Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO and
ANZUS Meetings in Australia and Visits
10 Other Countries (statements, news con-
ferences, communiques)

U.S. To Resume Economic Assistance to
Yemen Arab Republic (Rogers) ....

157

182

Yugoslavia. Secretary Rogers Attends SEATO
and ANZUS Meetings in Australia and
Visits 10 Other Countries (statements,
news conferences, communiques) .... 157

Name Index

al-Ayni, Muhsin 157

Bush, George 176

Porter, William J 181

Rogers, Secretary 157, 182

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 17 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
146 of June 21, 154 of June 27, 157 of June
28, 159 of June 29, 162 of July 3, 163 of July 5,
166 of July 6, 167 and 168 of July 7, 170 of
July 10, and 176 of July 14.

No. Date Subject

tl77 7/17 Joint Department of State-Inte-
rior release on agreement for
improvement of Colorado River
water delivered to Mexico.

tl78 7/18 Rogers: Commonwealth Club, San
Francisco.

tl79 7/19 U.S. and Poland sign air trans-
port agreement (rewrite).

*180 7/20 Todman sworn in as Ambassador
to Guinea (biographic data).
181 7/20 Porter: 151st plenary session on
Viet-Nam at Paris.

*182 7/20 Rogers: House Committee on For-
eign Affairs on SALT agree-
ments.

*183 7/20 Meeting of Advisory Committee
on International Organizations,
July 24-25.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 2o402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1729

August Ih, 1972

SEEKING A PEACEFUL WORLD
Address by Secretary Rogers 185

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES POLICY TOWARD NORTH AFRICA
Statement by Assistant Secretary Newsom 192

Coston Public L
Superintendent ol Document.

AUG 2 5 \B/z

DtPOSnOKr

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN |

Vol. LXVII, No. 1729
August 14, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington. D.C. 20402

PRICE:

62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $16. foreign $23
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on development* in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Seeking a Peaceful World

Address by Secretary Rogers ^

It is a great pleasure to be invited to
appear before this distinguished club. I
first addressed the Commonwealth Club
some years ago as Attorney General in Pres-
ident Eisenhower's administration. I know
how important this forum is in the formula-
tion of public views on important foreign
and domestic matters. For that reason I
am very happy to be here today to discuss
the foreign policy of the United States. I
believe it deserves the support of thought-
ful Americans.

Today let me begin with a conclusion. As
a result of the initiatives taken by Presi-
dent Nixon in international affairs, the pres-
tige of the United States throughout the
world has never been greater. Operating
on the basic principle that there is no
"greater gift that one age could make to the
ages that follow than to forge the key to
a lasting peace," the President has consist-
ently directed every step to that end.- As a
result, the world today is a much less hos-
tile place than it was 3i/o years ago, and
the foundations for a genuinely stable and
lasting peace have been laid.

The President has resisted the temptation
to assume a national mortgage — to buy tem-
porary peace at the cost of future instabil-
ity. Real peace cannot be bought ivith the
future; it must be built for the future. That
takes patience and careful planning. It takes
a willingness to break new ground in im-

proving relationships with former adver-
saries, and it takes strength and a continu-
ing fidelity to solemn obligations to friends
and allies. That is the path President Nixon
has chosen. That is why our standing is at
an alltime high, both with our friends and
with our adversaries. That is why, in the
vernacular of the day, the world is not so
"uptight" as it was 3i/o years ago.

In addition to the visit to China, Russia,
and Poland, I have recently returned from
a visit to 11 other countries on four con-
tinents.

On this most recent visit we began by
meeting our Southeast Asian allies in Can-
berra, Australia, where I confirmed the im-
portance we attach to our close relationship
with Australia and to all our security ties
in Asia.

We stopped in some of the oldest coun-
tries in the world: in Greece, the cradle of
our own democracy, and in Ceylon, which
also had a flourishing civilization three cen-
turies before Christ.

We were in Indonesia, an important coun-
try in Southeast Asia with a population as
great as all the other countries in the area
combined. And we were in two countries of
the Persian Gulf, Kuwait and Bahrain, with
a total population about that of San Fran-
cisco, but nonetheless countries with a sig-
nificant role to play in the world.

Three of the countries we visited — Italy,

' Made before the Commonwealth Club at San
Francisco, Calif., on July 18 (press release 178).

' For President Nixon's address before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 18, 1969, see Bulletik
of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297.

August 14, 1972

185

Greece, and Australia — are allies. Two,
Hungary and Romania, are members of the
Warsaw Pact, although of course they have
marked differences in foreign policy. And
a third Communist countiy, Yugoslavia, is
a leader of nonalignment.

With most of the countries we visited
our relations are friendly and close. With
Hungary, however, our relations have been
limited, and I was the first American official
ever to visit the Hungarian leader. First
Secretary Kadar. And with Yemen, a beau-
tiful republic on the Arabian Peninsula, we
had had no diplomatic relations since 1967;
my visit to Yemen's mountain capital of
San'a was the occasion for their reestablish-
ment and for underscoring the importance
we attach to maintaining good relations
with all Arab countries.

That visit to Yemen was also a useful
reminder of the importance of all the world's
nations. We flew into the capital of this
remote and poor country in gathering dark-
ness to land on a runway with no lights or
navigational aids of any kind. At that mo-
ment it may have seemed difficult, particu-
larly for our pilot, to think of Yemen as a
significant factor in world affairs. And yet
it is — with an important geographical posi-
tion on the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula and
with the largest population on the peninsula.
We value the positive step Yemen has taken
in welcoming an American Embassy back to
San'a. And we hope that other Arab coun-
tries which have been estranged from us
since the Arab-Israeli conflict will consider
similar steps.

During my world trip I talked with a
number of distinguished leaders. They
ranged in age from the 39-year-old Amir of
Bahrain to Yugoslavia's 80-year-old Presi-
dent Tito, who participated in the Russian
revolution 55 years ago. While in Rome,
I had a useful talk with Burma's Prime
Minister Ne Win, who was also visiting
there. And I had an audience with one of the
world's most tireless advocates for peace.
Pope Paul VI.

With all these leaders I explained our

hopes and our efforts for a more peaceful
world and sought their views on how such
a world could best be achieved. Today I
would like to discuss with you some of the
things I discussed with them.
What kind of world do we seek?

Dialogue and Negotiations Between Adversaries

First of all, it should be a world in which
countries, whether friends or enemies, part-
ners or competitors, talk to each other.

During the cold war period the prevail-
ing belief was that because we had impor-
tant differences with our adversaries we
could not talk. President Nixon has pro-
ceeded from the opposite belief: that be-
cause we have important differences we
must talk. Of course the President knew
that dialogue alone would not bridge the
differences ; but he also knew that without
dialogue they might never be bridged.

Our foreign policy therefore is based on
the conviction that communication between
strangers, and negotiation between adver-
saries, serves the cause of a more tranquil
world.

That is why the President's visit to China
is so important; it established an essential
dialogue between us. With the Soviet Un-
ion, the task instead was to move to concrete
negotiation. This was done. We now have
agreements to limit offensive and defensive
strategic arms. We have five other bilateral
agreements, all signed during the Moscow
summit, which expand our cooperation with
the Soviet Union to a degree unknown since
the time of our wartime alliance. Our new
relationship with China and our growing
cooperation with the Soviet Union, I be-
lieve, are of great significance in creating a
more stable international order.

During my world tour, I found a general
appreciation of this. And I made clear our
belief that what is working for us can work
for others. Nothing can be more productive
than a willingness in all areas of the world
to move away from the rigidities of the last
two decades.

186

Department of State Bulletin

It is remarkable, in fact, how much prog-
ress is being made at this very moment be-
cause antagonists of long standing are now
talking to each other. Parenthetically I
might point out that in many instances the
United States has given quiet but effective
diplomatic support to those efforts. They
include the following:

— Talks are underway between the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic on a broad range of
issues.

— Just two weeks ago in Korea an agree-
ment was announced simultaneously in Seoul
and Pyongyang on a set of principles to less-
en tension and improve communications.

— During the same week Pakistan and In-
dia, which have fought three wars in 25
years, signed an agreement which can begin
a healing of their wounds.

— The Greek and Turkish communities on
the island of Cyprus, another hotbed of ten-
sion, have just renewed talks looking toward
a peaceful solution of their bitter differ-
ences.

— In Paris the Viet-Nam peace talks re-
sumed last week. We have returned to them
in the earnest hope that they can lead to
a negotiated settlement.

— There is only one major exception to
the trend toward dialogue. That is the Mid-
dle East. During my visit in the Middle
East I emphasized the progress that nego-
tiations had brought to difficult problems in
other parts of the world. I urged a similar
approach to the Arab-Israeli problem. As a
result of the initiative by the United States,
a cease-fire has been in effect for two years
in the Middle East. But there will be no
permanent peace until all concerned decide
to live together in peace and begin to seek
solutions to the complex and emotional prob-
lems involved. I believe that eventually this
will occur and that serious negotiations will
take place.

From these examples it can be seen that
our policy of encouraging negotiation and
opening avenues of communication in all

areas of the world is paying off — that ten-
sions have been relieved and that many
local conflicts seem to be on their way to
solution.

The Free Flow of People, Ideas, and Goods

The second characteristic of the peaceful
world we seek is closely related to the first.
As that world must be marked by dialogue
and negotiation, so too must it be open to
the free flow of people, ideas, and goods.
We are convinced that the cause of peace is
advanced by contact among people and by
a free exchange of ideas on all levels. Thus,
in areas where such contact has been limited,
we are seeking to enlarge it.

Two major aspects of our growing rela-
tionship with China are the exchange of
persons and the increase in trade contacts
which we are now discussing with the Chi-
nese in Paris. Following on the very suc-
cessful visit of the Chinese table tennis
team, we hope for other sports exchanges,
for example, in basketball and gymnastics.
We also look forward to exchanges in such
diverse fields as medicine and music. The
Commerce Department has recently granted
an export license for the sale to China of
$150 million in commercial jet aircraft. If
consummated, this will be the first signifi-
cant step toward what we hope will become
in time a productive bilateral trade relation-
ship.

We believe, too, that the new generation
of Chinese leaders should not be totally de-
prived of the firsthand knowledge of Amer-
ica and Americans that the present genera-
tion has lacked, and vice versa.

The extent to which the leaders of eastern
Europe have lacked contact with the United
States is also quite remarkable. Of the 22
members of the Soviet Union's highest
policymaking body — the Communist Party
Politburo — only four, as I understand it,
have ever visited America. Among the So-
viet Union's allies, only President Ceausescu
of Romania has ever been in any part of the
United States except to attend the United

August 14, 1972

187

Nations. Until my visit to Budapest, no
United States Cabinet member had ever
visited Hungary. In today's world one of
the first priorities must be to increase the
firsthand knowledge that leaders of states
have of one another's countries.

We also look forward to significant in-
creases in our trade and other contacts with
eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has re-
cently agreed to buy from us more grain
than has ever been sold anywhere in a single
deal. And in Romania I assured our hosts
that we would continue to press the Con-
gress for the passage of legislation to allow
Romanian exports to enter the United States
on a most-favored-nation basis ; that is,
without discriminatory tariffs. Throughout
the area, we hope it will soon be possible to
move toward a more normal trading rela-
tionship. That is the reason for our trade
mission which is presently on its way to
Moscow, headed by our Secretary of Com-
merce.

We also believe that freer movement of
persons and ideas should be an active prin-
ciple in relations between the divided parts
of Europe. Next year a Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, involving
nearly all Europe's nations as well as the
United States and Canada, is expected to be
held. We believe that to be truly useful this
conference, rather than contenting itself
with exhortations or declarations, should
take concrete steps to facilitate the normal
flow of persons and ideas across the conti-
nent. In our view practical improvements
leading to greater contact between all the
peoples of Europe are the best way to speed
the day when Europe is no longer divided.

That is precisely why we place such im-
portance on the agreement which — together
with the Foreign Ministers of the United
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union —
I signed last month in Berlin. This land-
mark agreement will enhance the everyday
lives of 2 million West Berliners by making
it possible for them to travel more normally
to East Berlin and the German Democratic
Republic. We hope that the increase in con-

tacts which the agreement insures will cre-
ate positive momentum for Europe as a
whole.

Respect for Sovereignty of All Countries

The third characteristic of the peaceful
world we seek is that there must be uni-
versal respect for the right of every country
to independence, to sovereignty, and to its
own internal development free of outside
interference.

In pressing for the removal of barriers to
freer contact, we have no interest in med-
dling in anybody's internal affairs. On the
contrary, our policy springs from a differ-
ent and positive conviction: that more open
borders will release tensions and will pro-
mote the normal human communication that
encourages people and states to live, and let
live, in peace and friendship.

We in America feel strongly about the
rights of countries to develop according to
their own desires, because we fought a rev-
olution to win those rights for ourselves. We
respect them for others. Indeed, we regard
those rights as fundamental to peaceful re-
lations among states. They must apply all
the time, not just some of the time. And
they must apply in all cases, not just some
cases. A country must not be denied full
sovereignty simply because it is small or
because the accident of geography has
placed it next to a great power or because
it has the same political, economic, or social
system as other countries in its region.

In eastern Europe I emphasized that this
principle is basic to our foreign policy. We
intend to deal with all the countries in that
region — and elsewhere — as sovereign, inde-
pendent entities. We are ready for an im-
provement or expansion of relations at what-
ever pace and in whatever manner they
themselves are prepared to follow. During
the President's visit to Moscow, the Soviet
Union and the United States by written
commitment agreed to "recognize the sov-
ereign equality of all states" and to make
no claim for ourselves or recognize the

188

Department of State Bulletin

claims of anyone else to "any special rights
or advantages in world affairs." ^ That com-
mitment, seriously undertaken by both na-
tions, will be of great importance to peace
and security in the years ahead.

Our long-term aim is to move beyond the
passive relationship implied by the word
"coexistence" toward a more active and co-
operative relationship. Building on the rec-
ognition of each country's right to run its
own affairs, we are working for a world in
which former adversaries can not only co-
exist in peace but also cooperate in peace.

Willingness To Limit the Use of Force

The fourth major characteristic of the
peaceful world we seek is a willingness
among states to reduce their reliance on
force as a viable instrument of national
policy. Even today a growing willingness
to limit the use of force is evident.

I have already referred to the variety of
negotiations currently underway on some of
the most difficult problems of the whole post-
war era. Moreover, while it is important
to keep things in perspective, I believe that
the initial SALT [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks] agreements have turned a cor-
ner in international relations. For the first
time the world's strongest nuclear powers
have concluded ironclad verifiable agree-
ments on an issue of vital importance to
themselves and to the world as a whole.

We therefore hope and expect that the
principles of peaceful relations to which we
and the Soviet Union committed ourselves
in Moscow will be more than just words on
a piece of paper. For our part we will cer-
tainly do our best to translate them into
practical realities.

We look forward to the next phase of the
SALT negotiations. We also hope that nego-
tiations can soon begin toward reduction of
military forces in central Europe. Except

for the Soviet-Chinese border, this area is
the site of the largest concentration of
armed force in the world. We intend to press
for negotiations dealing with this problem
in parallel with the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. We will be pre-
pared to negotiate specific reductions as
long as they are mutual and balanced reduc-
tions not jeopardizing the security of either
side.

' For text of the basic principles of relations
signed at Moscow on May 29, see Bulletin of
June 26, 1972, p. 898.

Preserving a Matrix of Stability

As we move toward new and more con-
^<N ^^"^structive relationships with former adver-
saries, it is all the more important that we
preserve a matrix of stability. How can we
do so?

— First, by insuring that the search for
new relationships will not be at the expense
of our allies and friends.

— Second, by recognizing that these rela-
tionships will improve our security and that
of our allies only if, in pursuing them, we
remain convincingly strong.

— Third, by affirming by word and action
that a peaceful world will not be sought,
as it could not be achieved, through U.S.
abandonment of our obligations or our in-
terests.

It is the validity of those three principles
that makes the manner of our withdrawal
from Viet-Nam as important as the with-
drawal itself. With the end of our involve-
ment in the war in sight, we must never
forget that the people of South Viet-Nam
as allies and friends have fought and died
with us. A I'easonable and honorable solu-
tion to this tragic war must be worked out
with their interests as well as our interests
taken into account.

It is the validity of those principles which
requires us iii o»r otvn interest to maintain
our commitments to NATO, in the Pacific,
and in our own hemisphere. The stability
which our alliances with 42 nations have
brought is a major necessity for the peace
we seek.

August 14, 1972

189

Finally, it is the validity of those princi-
ples which has caused President Nixon to
insist on an adequate national defense budg-
et. A $30 billion cut or any cut on that
order of magnitude would undermine our
alliances overnight and would very soon put
us in a secondary military position.

Continued improvement in our relation-
ships with the Soviet Union and China does
not depend on the abandonment of our al-
liances or require a dangerously weakened
defense capability. In fact, we could never
have had an improved relationship if we
had abandoned those alliances or weakened
that capability. It is the strength of the
United States and its allies that has made
it possible for us to negotiate as we have
with confidence. To forget this lesson now
would be a tragic and retrogressive step
and would hurt, not help, the cause of peace.

This, then, is the kind of peaceful world
which we would like to see and toward
which President Ni.xon's policies are di-
rected :

— A world in which dialogue and negotia-
tion have replaced confrontation and con-
flict.

— A world in which people can move
freely and easily across national borders.

— A world in which recognition of the
sovereignty and independence of all coun-
tries is the first principle of international
relations.

— A world in which force is relied on less
and less as an instrument of national policy.

A decade ago would anybody have thought
such a world possible in our lifetimes? Even
today no one would pretend that it will be
achieved soon or that the problems and diffi-
culties are not formidable. But for the first
time since the war such a world has become
a practical possibility.

We cannot help to turn that possibility
into a reality if we withdraw to our own
shores. To help build an enduring peace we
need to remain responsibly engaged in world
aflfairs. The United States must and will
remain so engaged.

152d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Am.bas-
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S.
delegation, at the 152d plenary session of the
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on July 27.

Press release 185 dated July 27

OPENING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: Your remarks at
the 151st plenary session have received our
careful attention, and we continue to review
them in the hope that at least they may be
the prelude to specific discussion between
all of the parties concerned.

What our side has urged you to consider
is a plan which would permit a rapid, com-
plete dismantling of the war. There seems
no more compelling task for us than that
of ending the killing and doing so as soon
as we can. Cease-fire is the key. It is diffi-
cult to see how that and the exchange of
prisoners could in any way damage the in-
terests of the people of North and South
Viet-Nam. We favor such a cease-fire. We
urge it, because it would allow constructive
political discussions to take place among
Vietnamese, free of the dangers of combat.

These proposals seem to us unassailable
as principle, and we should discuss them
together.

If, for example, you find our proposal for
a cease-fire unacceptable as stated, what
variation of it would you care to discuss?
Has the issue of negotiations not been re-
duced to the simple matter of whether they
are to take place in conditions of war or
nonwar? Who can doubt that the people of
Viet-Nam prefer, above all else, that there
be a cease-fire now?

Also, we see no valid reason why arrange-
ments cannot be planned now for the time
when our men will return to their country.
What harm could it cause you to discuss
with us arrangements for their eventual re-
turn or the handling of their mail or meth-

190

Department of State Bulletin

ods of checking their physical condition? It
would be a fine sign of the good will you
mention if work on such matters could be-
gin.

In all of these matters we await your
comments, your views, or your objection.
Within the context of the May 8 proposals
put forward by President Nixon, what is
your view of the four-month period for U.S.
troop withdrawal ? > If you have an alterna-
tive suggestion, may we consider it?

We are here to examine concrete matters,
and our May 8 program is a set of new
concrete proposals. They are not at all a
"step backward." They are in fact a step
forward, a simplification of the matter, in
that they would stop the fighting immedi-
ately and thereby set the stage for Viet-
namese to discuss the resolution of political
problems by themselves.

It is true that our proposals center upon
the military situation. In the face of the
retrogressive nature of your massive in-
vasion of South Viet-Nam and your per-
sistent refusal to consider our past proposals
for a comprehensive settlement, we have re-
sponded appropriately, to permit both you
and us to emerge from the situation which
now exists. But it cannot be done without
your cooperation.

lations were not emplaced near dikes or re-
lated structures.

You have two purposes, it seems to me,
in mounting this campaign. As I pointed
out during these talks last October and as
the Mayor of Hanoi has confirmed recently,
you did not repair the damage done by last
year's floodwaters. Instead, at that time,
you diverted your manpower and resources
to build roads across the demilitarized zone
into the South in preparation for the in-
vasion which you were planning then. Now
the danger of that policy is upon you, and
you are seeking to protect yourselves from
public criticism by pretending that the
Americans are responsible for a possible
disaster. The truth is that your own neglect
of the dike system will be responsible. We
hope your people will be spared such a
disaster.

A second reason for your propaganda
campaign may be a desire to obscure the
fact that you are resisting our efforts to
have a meaningful discussion here. How
much better it would be if, instead of taking
up the time of this conference with com-
plaints, you would agree to a cease-fire and
accept the invitation of the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam to seek a settle-
ment which would eliminate complaints and
problems such as those you mention.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: I have a comment
to make on the subject of dikes.

I regret that propaganda themes on this
subject have been introduced into these talks.
The matter of dikes is clear on our side:
We have not targeted the dikes. If anything
happened to some of them, it had none of
the deliberate calculation that characterized
your efforts at Quang Tri and An Loc, to
cite but two examples. I note that you make
no claim that military equipment or instal-

U.S. and Sudan Reestablish
Diplomatic Relations

Joint U.S.-Sudan Announcement ^

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Sudan have decided to
resume diplomatic relations as of this date
[July 25] . An exchange of Ambassadors will
take place in the near future.

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

^ Issued simultaneously at Khartoum and Wash-
ington on July 25 (press release 184).

August 14, 1972

191

Department Discusses Policy Toward North Africa

Statement by David D. Newsom
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

Mr. Chairmen : I welcome this opportunity
to meet with you and the members of your
subcommittees today to discuss our policy
toward North Africa. Your joining together
for this review is symbolic of the significant
way in which the problems and the currents
of the Middle East and Africa meet in this
area.

I have been associated with our relations
with the Arab world for the better part of
my career, going back to service in Iraq in
1951. My North African experience began
with my assignment as Deputy Director of
the Office of Northern African Affairs in the
Department of State in 1962 and continued
with my appointment as Ambassador to
Libya in 1965. I continue to follow events in
the area closely against the wider backdrop
of my present African responsibilities. I
have visited each of the countries we are dis-
cussing today several times. I have met all
but one of the heads of state.

As you know, responsibility for our rela-
tions with the Arab states of North Africa,
except for Egypt, falls within the Bureau of
African Affairs. While there is no perfect
way to divide the world for such purposes,
this has proved a thoroughly feasible organi-

' Made before a joint hearing of the Subcommit-
tees on Africa and the Near East of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 19. The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

zation and has recognized the special links of
these countries with the rest of the continent.
At the same time we coordinate closely with
the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs to insure that our policies take fully
into account the fact that these countries
are also Arab and inextricably linked as well
in culture and interests with the Near East.

While there are common threads that run
through these countries, they are distinct in
character, culture, and background. In our
policies, we recognize and encourage wider
area links, but basically we treat them as
individual countries. The actual relationships
we have with each vary accordingly.

Each of these states is sovereign and jeal-
ously independent. No matter how close our
relations may be, we recognize this as a fun-
damental basis for our relations. Their in-
ternal affairs are their own. While we may
have some marginal influence on the imple-
mentation of economic and developmental
policies through our aid programs, this does
not extend to internal political policies or
organizations. The latter is an area in which,
in this day and age, our involvement is
neither feasible nor consistent with our
respect for the national political institutions.

With two of the states of the area, Algeria
and the Sudan, we do not have diplomatic re-
lations, a circumstance existing since the six-
day Middle East war of 1967. We take the
position with each that we are prepared to
resume relations whenever they are. Never-

192

Department of State Bulletin

theless, as I will show, our relations with
each have steadily grown on the basis of de-
veloping mutual interests.

In the case of Mauritania, a state which
has identified itself increasingly with North
Africa because of its Arab and Islamic herit-
age, the diplomatic relations that had been
broken in June 1967 were restored in 1970
with the reopening of a small American dip-
lomatic mission in Nouakchott and of a small
Mauritanian mission in Washington. Our
relations with Mauritania are cordial but not
extensive. In September 1971, President Ould
Daddah visited Washington in his capacity
as President of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) and held useful conversations
with President Nixon regarding the status
of Namibia.

The leaders of the area have shown in the
past several years a remarkable ability to re-
solve problems existing among them. While
actual economic or political unity may still
be a distant dream, their practical relation-
ships and understanding has steadily grown
closer. What seemed like intractable prob-
lems 10 years ago are now behind them.

Morocco's recognition of Mauritania in
1969 set aside centuries-old claims. Algeria
and Tunisia found a common understanding
on their frontier and on economic coopera-
tion in 1969. The agreement concluded be-
tween Morocco and Algeria in June of this
year resolved problems which resulted in
actual conflict between the two states in
1963. Sudan, with the help of others, has
resolved its 16-year-old internal southern
problem. Each one of these, in a world of un-
resolved disputes, is a remarkable achieve-
ment that has received all too little attention
in this country.

One regional problem that remains is the
status of Spanish Sahara, which both Mauri-
tania and Morocco claim and in whose even-
tual disposition Algeria is also interested.
Discussions regarding the future of this ter-
ritory have been held from time to time by
the interested governments and in the United
Nations. Spain has promised to hold a ref-

erendum of the inhabitants of the area to
ascertain the wishes of the population re-
garding their political future, but a date
for the referendum has not yet been fixed.
One of the principal reasons for the interest
of Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria in
Spanish Sahara is the territory's economic
potential, represented chiefly by its sub-
stantial phosphate deposits. The territory
might also provide a relatively nearby exit
point for Algerian exports of iron ore from
mines in southwestern Algeria should they
be developed in the future.

Now to take up the countries on an in-
dividual basis.

Close Relations With Morocco ancJ Tunisia

Our relations have traditionally been
closest with Morocco and Tunisia. Each has
been going through a period of some political
uncertainty.

In Morocco, since the abortive coup at-
tempt on July 10 of last year, the King has
been seeking new constitutional arrange-
ments which would widen the sharing of
governmental responsibility. He has so far
been unable to reach agreement on a more
broadly based government with the leaders
of the traditional political parties. An ad-
ditional factor may be elements in the youth
of the country who find identity neither with
the traditional political parties nor the mon-
archy. The King, a shrewd political leader
in his own right and the inheritor of a very
old monarchy, is still very much in control.

Morocco remains one of the largest recip-
ients of U.S. assistance in Africa. In fiscal
year 1972, we provided $50 million in loans
and grants, the largest part of this being in
P.L. 480 commodities. At the same time, U.S.
investment in Morocco, already at the $47
million mark by December 1971, increased
still further.

In the military field, Morocco permits us
to utilize frequencies and facilities for U.S.
naval communications, although the size of
our contingent is being reduced as part of a

August 14, 1972

193

worldwide reduction of U.S. personnel at
similar installations elsewhere. The Moroccan
facilities, however, remain an important
and integral link in our worldwide communi-
cations system. We provide a limited amount
of grant aid training for the Moroccan
armed forces, as well as credit assistance for
the purchase of U.S. military equipment
that last year totaled $15 million.

Morocco is also the site of one of the two
principal Voice of America relay points in
Africa. The transmitters at Tangier are
shared with the Moroccans under arrange-
ments made in 1963.

In Tunisia, we have had a strong friend
over many years in President Bourguiba. He
recalls early American help to him as a per-
son and to his nation. His moderate views
on many issues have been close to ours. After
a period of inactivity because of illness, he
has returned to active leadership in Tunisia,
manifested by a vigorous appearance at the
Organization of African Unity meeting in
Rabat and by a recent state visit to France.
During this period, the Destourian Socialist
Party organization has been considering the
question of succession, and constitutional
changes have been proposed. Under the cur-
rent provisions of the Constitution the Prime
Minister would fill out the remainder of the
Presidential term; that is, until 1974.

We have for many years made a substan-
tial input into Tunisia's economic develop-
ment, recognizing the potential of this ener-
getic nation with relatively few natural
resoui'ces. In fiscal year 1972, our assistance
will total about $43 million, a large part of
this representing continuing help to the agri-
cultural sector.

Relations With Algeria and Libya

Three major political differences have
affected us in our relations with Algeria since
before Algerian independence: their view of
our relations with France during the Al-
gerian war of independence; different views
on Viet-Nam, Cuba, and the Middle East;
their activist role in Third World movements.

Relations reached their lowest point when
Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us
in 1967. The break was further aggravated
by the Algerian nationalization of the assets
of nine U.S. companies.

Since that time, we have worked slowly
and realistically to find a common basis for
improved relations. This has been found in
the growing U.S. need for natural gas from
external sources and the Algerian need for
capital and markets for that country's ex-
tensive hydrocarbon resources.

Within the last few years we have, as a
result, seen the settlement, with compensa-
tion, of the nine U.S. nationalization cases, a
growing involvement in Algeria of U.S.
technology and technicians, and an increas-
ing exposure of the Export-Import Bank
in Algerian projects. The largest project is
one in which the El Paso Natural Gas Com-
pany proposes to purchase a very substantial
quantity of gas for U.S. customers from
Sonatrach, the Algerian national hydrocar-
bon company. The U.S. customers have ob-
tained preliminary approval from the Fed-
eral Power Commission for the deal, but
serious problems of future pricing remain
to be worked out. Two other U.S. companies
have contracted to purchase Algerian LNG
[liquefied natural gas]. Conceivably, Algeria,
by 1985, could be selling half of its natural
gas output to the United States.

Meanwhile, diplomatic contact has been de-
veloping through the establishment and aug-
mentation of interest sections in each coun-
try. Algeria is under the flag of Guinea in this
country, and we are under the Swiss flag in
Algeria.

The Libyan revolution of September 1969
changed the character of Libyan-U.S. rela-
tions. The new regime, under the leadership
of Colonel Qadhaafi and a group of young
military officers, sees its policies in exclusive-
ly Arab terms. It seeks closer cooperation
among Arab states and sees that cooperation
focused primarily on the cause of the Pales-
tinians and the struggle with Israel. Al-
though strongly anti-Communist, the re-
gime is at the same time cool to the United

194

Department of State Bulletin

states and Britain because of the stand of
these governments on Arab issues.

The present Libyan Government has, at
the same time, sought greater control, great-
er revenue, and greater participation in the
production of its basic resource, petroleum.
U.S. companies which produce 90 percent of
Libya's petroleum are under severe pressure
as a result.

The Libyan revolution also ended the pre-
vious military relationship with the United
States and Britain. We withdrew at the re-
quest of the Libyans from Wheelus Air Base,
as the British withdrew from their base at
El Adem. In keeping with the 1954 agree-
ment, permanent construction reverted to the
Libyan Government. Movable property was
removed except for a small amount which
was sold to the Libyans after screening our
worldwide requirements. By a recent ex-
change of notes outstanding agreements were
ended and conflicting claims canceled. The
Libyans now use the former base as their
principal military base in the Tripoli area.

Slow Improvement in U.S. -Sudan Relations

President Nimeri of the Sudan has, since
he came to power in a military coup in 1969,
been charting a delicate course among the
various political tendencies of that country,
the largest geographically in Africa. Coming
to power originally with support from the
Sudanese Communists, he broke with them
after the abortive coup of July 1971. Rela-
tions with the Soviet Union became particu-
larly strained, although those with Com-
munist China did not.

Today he is seeking to build improved re-
lations with all his neighbors, to the south
and to the north. He desires to insure the
success of the recent agreement on the south-
ern Sudan, while at the same time keeping
firm ties with Egypt and the Arab world. Be-
cause of the complex political and ethnic
makeup of the Sudan, he has avoided any
commitment to join the Confederation of
Arab Republics.

The slow improvement in our own rela-

tions with the Sudan began after Nimeri
came to power, but predating his break with
the Soviets. We see our improved relation-
ship as stemming from a desire on Presi-
dent Nimeri's part to resume effective re-
lations with the United States and not only
as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Most recently we have demonstrated our
admiration for the southern settlement and
our hope for the future of the Sudan by giv-
ing emergency assistance to the Sudan Gov-
ernment for returning refugees in the south.
We are making available more than $4 mil-
lion in P.L. 480 title II food supplies and are
also contributing some $18 million for food
relief through the World Food Program.
Much of our bilateral assistance will be fun-
neled through U.S. voluntaiy agencies.

Four Dimensions of North Africa's Policies

North Africa is the hub of a wheel with
spokes to the Near East, to Africa, to Eu-
rope, and to us. Its policies need to be seen
in all these dimensions.

The countries are drawn to the Near East
by their Arab language and culture and by
their political concern over Near East is-
sues. At the same time, other interests and
priorities are present and none is as com-
pletely absorbed in these issues as are the
states directly contiguous to Israel.

Each of these states points, also, toward
Africa. Morocco and Mauritania are press-
ing the question of the Spanish Sahara. King
Hassan of Morocco has just succeeded Presi-
dent Ould Daddah of Mauritania as Presi-
dent of the Organization of African Unity.
As such he will, for the coming year, be
deeply involved in African issues.

Algeria borders on Mauritania, Mali, and
Niger. It has always taken an interest, and
continues to do so, in the liberation move-
ment in Africa. President Boumediene re-
cently visited Guinea, before his attendance
at the OAU meeting in Rabat.

Tunisia has always taken a great interest
in African issues and a significant role in the
OAU. Libya has increasingly interested it-

August 14, 1972

195

self in sub-Saharan Africa through expres-
sions in the past of support for Moslem pop-
ulations in other states and opposition to
what it regards as Israeli influence detrimen-
tal to the Arab cause in Africa. President
Nimeri is striving to unite the Sudan, as the
recent agreement with the southerners has
shown. In this endeavor he has been aided by
other African states, the good offices of the
Imperial Ethiopian Government, and the per-
sonal efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Relations with Europe have always been
of great importance, particularly to the three
states of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria,
and Tunisia. They remain so today. Europe
is the principal market and the principal
source of supplies. Relationships of these na-
tions with the European Common Market
become increasingly important to them.

Common Market relations with Mediter-
ranean countries are in a state of flux. Exist-
ing trade arrangements are to be modified as
a result of the enlargement of the Commu-
nity and the proposed changes in relations
between the Community and the European
Free Trade Area countries remaining out-
side. For the longer run, the Community has
under active consideration a coherent "Med-
iterranean policy" embracing the countries
from Spain to Israel and including the Ai-ab
states.

Algeria, particularly, is also manifesting
more and more interest in questions of Euro-
pean and Mediterranean security and is ex-
pressing a desire for Maghreb participation
in any European Security Conference.

I have already outlined how the relation-
ship of each of these states with us is also im-
portant, whether for reasons of investment,
trade, or aid. I believe they will remain so.
Though our direct relationship to the politi-
cal events of this area may continue to dimin-
ish, though these countries may become in-
creasingly allied to Europe economically,
strong bases of common interest with the
United States will remain. Our policies for
the future will be designed to develop those
common interests into strong and realistic
links across the Atlantic.

Suspension of Meat Import Restraints
Discussed With Producing Countries

Acting Secretary Irwin, Secretary of the
Treasury George P. Shultz, and other U.S.
officials met on July 12 with represe^itatives
of 12 meat-exporting countries. Following
is the opening statement made by Acting
Secretary Irwin at a neivs conference held
after the meeting.^

Press release 174 dated July 13

Ladies and gentlemen: I'm John Irwin, of
the Department. We have just come from a
useful and, I hope, productive meeting with
the representatives of those countries which
export meat to us under the Meat Import
Quantitative Restraint Program.

As you know, this restraint program was
suspended by the President on June 26.^ He
took this action after very substantial in-
creases in meat prices over the first half of
this year; and his hope, as well as ours, is
that this action will contribute to increased
supplies of meat for all American consumers
as we look ahead.

The thrust of the remarks made in this
meeting just passed by Secretary Shultz and
my other colleagues and myself was that this
suspension offers a new opportunity to these
supplying countries to increase their share in
the American market and we hope very much
that they will be able to take advantage of
this to increase their supplies the rest of this
year.

Representatives of these countries indi-
cated that they hoped to do just that and
they will make a real effort to increase sup-
plies to this country, although, as you know,
they will have a variety of problems to con-
tend with, particularly on what one could
say was reasonably short notice.

They also, some of them, emphasized their
desire in seeing, in the future, a continued

' For the transcript of Secretary Shultz' remarks
and questions and answers, see press release 174
dated July 13.

' For background, see Bulletin of July 17, 1972,
p. 89.

196

Department of State Bulletin

liberal treatment by the United States in
future years.

But I think, in sum, we could say that this
was a productive and informative meeting on
all sides. It is a particular pleasure to ask
Secretary Shultz if he will speak to you
briefly of his thoughts, both on the meeting
and of any other thoughts, both as to the
background and the future.

U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement
on Colorado River Water Quality

Following is a joint Department of State-
Department of the Interior press release is-
sued July 1 7.

Department of State press release 177 dated July 17

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT

The Governments of the United States and
Mexico have approved an agreement provid-
ing for immediate improvement in the qual-
ity of Colorado River water to be delivered
to Mexico, it was announced by Secretary of
State William P. Rogers and Secretary of
the Interior Rogers Morton on July 14.

This agreement will result in an estimated
average annual reduction of at least 100 parts
per million (ppm) of dissolved salts in the
Colorado River waters made available to
Mexico as compared to 1971. The agreement,
called Minute No. 241 of the International
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC),
was signed by the U.S. and Mexican Com-
missioners July 14, and they afterward ex-
changed letters announcing the approval of
the minute by their respective governments.
The minute thereupon became operative
through December 31, 1972.

On June 17, the Presidents of the United
States and Mexico jointly announced that
the United States would undertake certain
actions immediately to improve the quality
of the Colorado River water going to Mexi-
co.i They instructed the International Bound-
ary and Water Commission to prepare and

sign a minute to implement this announce-
ment and to incorporate the program and
commitments announced at the same time to
find a definitive, equitable, and just solution
to this salinity problem at the earliest possi-
ble time. This minute complies with these in-
structions.

Under the minute the United States will
discharge drainage waters from the Wellton-
Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District of
Arizona to the Colorado River below Morelos
Dam, Mexico's diversion point, at the annual
rate of 118,000 acre-feet. In place of these
waters, amounting to 73,000 acre-feet dur-
ing the remainder of 1972, the United States
will substitute an equal quantity of other wa-
ters, 41,000 acre-feet from above Imperial
Dam, located about 22 miles upstream from
the California-Baja California boundary, and
32,000 acre-feet from 12 wells on the Yuma
Mesa in southwestern Arizona.

The United States will thus deliver to Mex-
ico its annual allotment of 1.5 million acre-
feet without including the drainage waters
for which substitution is made. This substi-
tution will reduce the annual average salinity
of the water delivered to Mexico to an esti-
mated 1,140 ppm from the 1,242 ppm experi-
enced in 1971.

The Government of Mexico has requested
the United States also to discharge below the
Mexican diversion point the rest of the drain-
age from the Wellton-Mohawk District,
amounting to a rate of approximately 100,000
acre-feet annually, for which no substitution
is being made. This will further reduce the
salinity of the water used by Mexico.

In making these special arrangements both
governments reserve all rights under the
Water Treaty of 1944 and the general prin-
ciples of law.

Minute No. 241 supersedes Minute No. 218,
adopted on March 22, 1965, for a five-year pe-
riod and twice extended for one-year peri-
ods.2 Under it the United States constructed

' For text of a joint communique issued on June
17, see Bulletin of July 10, 1972, p. 66.

^ For text of Minute No. 218, see Bulletin of
Apr. 12, 1965, p. 556.

August 14, 1972

197

works costing about $12 million and reduced
the salinity of the water made available for
Mexico from 1,375 ppm to about 1,242 ppm.
The United States will continue to utilize
these works in the execution of the new
agreement. No new construction will be re-
quired.

TEXT OF IBWC MINUTE NO. 241

Recommendations to Improve Immediately the

Quality of Colorado River Waters

Going to Mexico

The Commission met in the offices of the United
States Section, in El Paso, Texas, at 12:00 o'clock
noon on July 14, 1972, in accordance with the in-
structions which the two Governments issued to
their respective Commissioners pursuant to the un-
derstanding between President Richard Nixon and
President Luis Echeverria A., expressed in their
Joint Communique of June 17, 1972, which, with
respect to the salinity problem, states:

"Regarding the problem of the salinity of the
Colorado River, President Echeverria told President
Nixon that Mexico reiterates its position as regards
receiving its assignment of original waters from
the Colorado River, to which the Treaty of Febru-
ary 3, 1944 refers, and therefore, with the same
quality as those derived from the Imperial Dam.

"To this, President Nixon replied that this was a
highly complex problem that needed careful exam-
ination of all aspects. He was impressed by the
presentation made by President Echeverria and
would study it closely. It was his sincere desire to
find a definitive, equitable and just solution to this
problem at the earliest possible time because of
the importance both nations attach to this matter.

"As a demonstration of this intent and of the
goodwill of the United States in this connection, he
was prepared to:

(a) undertake certain actions immediately to im-
prove the quality of water going to Mexico;

(b) designate a special representative to begin
work immediately to find a permanent, definitive
and just solution of this problem;

(d) submit this proposal, once it has the approval
of this Government to President Echeverria for his
consideration and approval.

"President Echeverria said that he recognized the
goodwill of President Nixon and his interest in
finding a definitive solution to this problem at the
earliest possible time. He added that based on two
recent trips to the Mexicali Valley and his talks

with farmers there, his Government, while reserv-
ing its legal rights, had decided to stop using
waters from the Wellton-Mohawk project for irri-
gation purposes while waiting for receipt of the
U.S. proposal for a definitive solution.

"Both Presidents agreed to instruct their Water
and Border Commissioners to prepare and sign a
Minute containing the above program and commit-
ments as soon as possible."

The Commission, on the basis of the understand-
ings expressed in the Joint Communique, adopts,
subject to the approval of the two Governments,
the following RESOLUTION:

1. That, commencing on the date of the approval
of the present Minute, the United States take the
measures described in points 2 and 3 of this resolu-
tion, to improve the quality of the waters of the
Colorado River made available to Mexico at the
Northerly Boundary, which it is estimated will re-
duce the salinity of such waters by at least 100
parts per million as an annual mean, compared with
the mean annual salinity of the waters made avail-
able to Mexico at the Northerly Boundary in calen-
dar year 1971, under Minute No. 218; such improve-
ment to be independent of the improvement in
quality which may be achieved by discharging to the
Colorado River below Morelos Dam the part of the
drainage waters from the Wellton-Mohawk District
described in point 5 of this resolution.

2. That the United States continue to operate and
maintain, at its expense, the extension of the
Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage water convey-
ance channel and its control structures, constructed
pursuant to Recommendation 1 of Minute No. 218.

3. That, commencing on the date of approval of
the present Minute, the United States discharge to
the Colorado River downstream from Morelos Dam
volumes of drainage waters from the Wellton-
Mohawk District at the annual rate of 118,000 acre-
feet (145,551,000 cubic meters) and substitute there-
for equal volumes of other waters, to be discharged
to the Colorado River above Morelos Dam, with the
understanding that during the second six months
of 1972, the United States discharge the volume of
73,000 acre-feet (90,044,000 cubic meters) of drain-
age waters from the Wellton-Mohawk District down-
stream from Morelos Dam and substitute therefor
an equal volume of other waters to be discharged
above Morelos Dam.

4. That Mexico's requests for deliveries in the
limitrophe reach of the Colorado River be not less
than 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second,
excluding the flows charged as part of Mexico's
allotment under the Water Treaty of February 3,
1944, in accordance with Minute No. 240, for
emergency deliveries to the City of Tijuana.

5. That, pursuant to the decision of President
Echeverria, expressed in the Joint Communique,
the United States discharge to the Colorado River

198

Department of State Bulletin

downstream from Morelos Dam, the remaining vol-
ume of drainage waters of the Wellton-Mohawk Dis-
trict, which do not form part of the volume of the
drainage waters referred to in point 3 of this reso-
lution, with the understanding that this remaining
volume will not be replaced by substitution waters.

6. That, subject to the reservations of point 9
of this resolution, the Commission account for the
drainage waters of the Wellton-Mohawk District
referred to in points 3 and 5 of this resolution as a
part of those described in the provisions of Article
10 of the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944.

7. That the present Minute remain in effect until
December 31, 1972.

8. That the present Minute be expressly approved
by both Governments and enter into force upon such
approval.

9. That the provisions of the present Minute not
constitute any precedent, recognition or acceptance
affecting the rights of either country with respect to
the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944, and the
general principles of law.

10. That the life of Minute No. 218 of the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission, as ex-
tended by exchange of notes dated November 15,
1971, terminate on the date that the present Minute
enters into force.

The meeting adjourned.

J. F. Friedkin
Commissioner of the
United States

Frank P. Fullerton
Acting Secretary of the
United States Section

D. Herrera J.
Commissioner of Mexico

Fernando Rivas S.
Secretary of the Mexican
Section

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

Relief Problems in Bangladesh. Hearing before the
Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected
With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. February 2, 1972. 188
pp.

The United States and Vietnam: 1944-1947. A staff
study based on the Pentagon Papers prepared for
the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations. Study No. 2. April 3, 1972. 44 pp.

Peace Corps Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal
Year 1973. Hearing before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. April 7, 1972. 32 pp.

Convention Establishing an International Organiza-
tion of Legal Metrology. Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States transmitting the con-
vention, signed at Paris on October 12, 1955, as
amended. S. Ex. I. April 11, 1972. 17 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty
of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at
Tokyo October 30, 1970, at the Sixth Consulta-
tive Meeting.^

Notification of approval: United States, July 25,
1972, with the exception of VI-10.

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return
of astronauts, and the return of objects launched
into outer space. Opened for signature at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. En-
tered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.
Notification it considers itself bound: Fiji, July
18, 1972.

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'

Acceptances deposited: Australia, July 24, 1972;
Uganda, July 27, 1972.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971.'

Ratification deposited: Brazil (with a reserva-
tion), July 24, 1972.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.

Ratification deposited: Republic of China, July
27, 1972.

Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), re-
lating to amendments to the convention. Done
at Washington October 6, 1970.'
Adherence deposited: Canada, July 27, 1972.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March
18, 1970.'
Ratified by the President: July 15, 1972.

^ Not in force.

August 14, 1972

199

North Atlantic Treaty — Technical Information

NATO agreement on the communication of technical
information for defense purposes. Done at Brus-
sels October 19, 1970. Entered into force Febru-
ary 7, 1971. TIAS 7064.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, July 24, 1972.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space, and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Oc-
tober 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Notification of succession: Fiji, July 18, 1972.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS
6839.
Notification of succession: Fiji, July 18, 1972.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971.'
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, July 27, 1972.

Space

Notification it considers itself bound: Fiji, July
18, 1972.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington Janu-
ary 21, 1972.'
Ratified by the President: July 21, 1972.

Canada

Agreement relating to the extension of the agree-
ment of December 5, 1952 (TIAS 2730), relating
to the lease of certain lands in Canadian Air
Force Station, Goose Bay, Newfoundland. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 13,
1972. Entered into force July 13, 1972.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from El Salvador of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes

at San Salvador March 15 and April 13, 1972.
Entered into force April 13, 1972. TIAS 7382.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from Guatemala of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes
at Guatemala March 7 and April 28, 1972. En-
tered into force April 28, 1972. TIAS 7354.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

Haiti

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from Haiti of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cat-
tle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calen-
dar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at
Port-au-Prince March 2 and May 30, 1972. En-
tered into force May 30, 1972. TIAS 7370.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from Mexico of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of
cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during cal-
endar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes
at Mexico and Tlatelolco April 17 and 26, 1972.
Entered into force April 26, 1972. TIAS 7373.
Suspended: July 12, 1972.

Minute No. 241 of the International Boundary and
Water Commission (United States and Mexico)
to improve immediately the quality of Colorado
River waters going to Mexico. Adopted at El
Paso, Tex., July 14, 1972. Entered into force
July 14, 1972.

Minute No. 218 of the International Boundary and
Water Commission (United States and Mexico)
concerning the salinity of the waters of the Colo-
rado River which reach Mexico, as extended.
Adopted at Ciudad Juarez March 22, 1965. En-
tered into force March 22, 1965. TIAS 6988, 7214.
Terminated: July 14, 1972.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' Not in force.

Confirmations

The Senate on July 21 confirmed the nomination of
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to be an Assistant Secretary
of State [for European Affairs]. (For biographic
data, see White House press release dated June 27.)

200

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX August li, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1729

Africa. Department Discusses Policy Toward
North Africa (Newsom) 192

Agriculture. Suspension of Meat Import Re-
straints Discussed With Producing Coun-
tries (Irwin) 196

Algeria. Department Discusses Policy Toward
North Africa (Newsom) 192

American Principles. Seeking a Peaceful
World (Rogers) 185

China. Seeking a Peaceful World (Rogers) . 185

Congress

Confirmations (Stoessel) . . . . ^ . . . 200

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 199

Department Discusses Policy Toward North

Africa (Newsom) 192

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Stoessel) 200

Economic Affairs

Suspension of Meat Import Restraints Dis-
cussed With Producing Countries (Irwin) . 196

U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement on Colo-
rado River Water Quality (State-Interior
announcement, text of IBWC minute) . . 197

Europe

Seeking a Peaceful World (Rogers) .... 185
Stoessel Confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs 200

Libya. Department Discusses Policy Toward
North Africa (Newsom) 192

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement
on Colorado River Water Quality (State-
Interior announcement, text of IBWC
minute) 197

Morocco. Department Discusses Policy Toward
North Africa (Newsom) 192

Sudan

Department Discusses Policy Toward North
Africa (Newsom) 192

U.S. and Sudan Reestablish Diplomatic Rela-
tions (joint announcement) 191

Treaty Information

Current Actions 199

U.S. and Mexico Approve Agreement on Colo-
rado River Water Quality (State-Interior
announcement, text of IBWC minute) . . 197

Tunisia. Department Discusses Policy Toward

North Africa (Newsom) 192

U.S.S.R. Seeking a Peaceful World (Rogers) . 185

Viet-Nam. 152d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris (Porter) 190

Name Index

Irwin, John N., II 196

Newsom, David D 192

Porter, William J 190

Rogers, Secretary 185

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 200

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 24—30

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 24 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
174 of July 13, 177 of July 17, and 178 of July
18.

No. Date Subject

184 7/25 Reestablishment of diplomatic re-

lations with Sudan.

185 7/27 Porter: 152d plenary session on

Viet-Nam at Paris.
*186 7/28 New York City Ballet to tour

Soviet Union and Poland.
*187 7/28 Rogers: statement on death of

Senator Allen J. Ellender.

* Not printed.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

OFFICIAI. BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Uil^V

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1730

August 21, 1972

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 27
Excerpts From Transcript 201

NORTH VIET-NAM: THE DIKE BOMBING ISSUE
Text of Report 207

For index see inside hack cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1730
August 21, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402
PRICE:
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Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
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The Department of State BULLETIN,
a meekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, aa
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in tf>e field of
international relations are ulso listed.

President Nixon's News Conference of July 27

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Nixon in the Oval
Office at the White House on July 27.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 31

The President: Now, we will go forward
with some questions if you like, please.

Q. Mr. President, you have said that it is
against U.S. policy to bomb the dikes and
dams in North Viet-Nam. Yesterday the
State Department acknowledged there had
been incidental and inadvertent damage from
the bombing nearby. My question is this : Is
it worth the risk of possible flooding or of
having world opinion turn against us to
bomb military targets near the dikes and
dams ?

The President: I think your question per-
haps could be better answered by my discuss-
ing the policy toward bombing of civilian in-
stallations in North Viet-Nam generally and
then coming down to the specifics of your
question in giving the general answer.

Some of you who were in Texas with me
will recall that that question was raised at the
Connally ranch and it was raised, actually, by
an advocate of bombing dikes, as to why we
did not bomb dikes. And I said it had not
been U.S. policy even before the bombing halt
of 1968 to bomb the dikes, that it was not our
policy now, that it would not be in the future,
because it is the policy of the United States
in all of its activities against North Viet-
Nam to direct its attacks against military
targets only.

That was the policy in the sixties, and it is
now the policy since we have had to resume

the bombing for the purposes that I men-
tioned in my speech of May 8.^

Now, with regard to the situation on the
dikes, let us understand what we are con-
fronted with here. This is approximately a
2,700-mile chain of installations, including
perhaps a half-dozen major dams which are
the heart of the system and then peripheral
areas getting down to mounds which have,
of course, the purpose of controlling the
floodwaters in that particular area.

If it were the policy of the United States
to bomb the dikes, we could take them out,
the significant part of them out, in a week.
We don't do so for the reasons that I have
mentioned: because we are trying to avoid
civilian casualties, not cause them.

Now, with regard to the reports, reports
that have come from Hanoi that there had
been some damage to some parts of the dike
system, I think it is important to note two
things : One, there has been no report of any
flooding; second, there has been no report of
any strikes on the major dike areas.

What I am referring to is the big dams
which are the heart of the system. There
have been reports of incidental damage to
some of the peripheral installations in this
2,700-mile system which covers the country
of North Viet-Nam.

Now, under these circumstances, I think
that it is well to keep in context, first, what
our policy is, and second, what its effect has
been. Our policy is not to bomb civilian in-
stallations, and second, our restraint, it seems
to me, rather than being subject to criticisms,

^ For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

August 21, 1972

201

should be subject to objective analysis and, it
seems to me, a considerable amount of sup-
port.

As far as this matter is concerned, I think,
too, it is time to strip away the double stand-
ard. I noted with interest that the Secretary
General of the U.N., just like his predecessor,
seized upon this enemy-inspired propaganda,
which has taken in many well-intentioned
and naive people, to attack what he called the
American bombing of civilian installations
and risking civilian lives, and yet not raising
one word against deliberate bombing of civil-
ian installations in South Viet-Nam.

Now, just so the record will be kept
straight — and it should be stated at this
point — all of you ladies and gentlemen of
course are aware of it, and you have printed
it, and perhaps you will see fit to again in
this context:

I just got a cable from Ambassador [Ells-
worth] Bunker. I had asked him what had
happened to civilians in the new offensive.
You recall in my speech of May 8, I said that
20,000 civilian casualties, including women
and children, had resulted because of the
deliberate shelling of the cities and the
slaughtering of refugees indiscriminately by
the North Vietnamese.

The number is now 45,000, including
women and children, of which 15,000 are
dead.

I asked him for the number of refugees.
It is higher than I had thought. There have
been 860,000 made homeless by the North
Vietnamese invasion of South Viet-Nam, this
newest invasion to date; 600,000 of them are
still in refugee camps, away from their
homes.

Looking back over the period of this very
difficult war, we find that since 1965 there
have been 600,000 civilian casualties in South
Viet-Nam as a result of deliberate policy of
the North Vietnamese Communists, not acci-
dental, but deliberate.

And in North Viet-Nam, in the period
from 1954 to 1956, in their so-called land
reform program, a minimum of 50,000 were
murdered, assassinated, and according to the

Catholic Bishop of Da Nang, whom I talked
to when I was there in 1956 in South Viet-
Nam, in addition to the 800,000 refugees who
came south, there were at least a half million
who died in slave labor camps in North Viet-
Nam.

Now, I do not relate this series of incidents
for the purpose of saying, because they did
something bad we can do something bad.

What I am simply saying is, let's not have
a hypocritical double standard. The United
States has been restrained — greater re-
straint than any great power has ever shown
— in handling this war. We will continue to
be restrained. We have to do what is neces-
sary against military targets in order to ac-
complish the objectives that I have described
in my goal — in my speech of May 8.

But on the other hand, as far as this partic-
ular matter is concerned, I can only say that
if damage did occur that we are making
every possible effort to see that it will not
occur again, which gets to your question.
Military commanders, aircraft commanders
and so forth, in terms of where military tar-
gets are, are instructed to avoid civilian
damage where they can.

That is why some targets in the heart of
Hanoi, for example, major power installa-
tions, fuel installations, in the heart of Hanoi
have not been hit: because I have not wanted
to have civilian casualties if we could possibly
avoid it.

I will simply close by sasang that this is a
major propaganda campaign; it is one that
does concern us. But let us keep the record
straight. In the event that the United States
followed the course of action recommended
by some of those who have voted for the so-
called end-the-war resolution in the Senate of
the United States, it would mean that there
would be visited upon South Viet-Nam the
same atrocities that were visited upon North
Viet-Nam, with perhaps at least a million
marked for assassination because they had
fought against the North Vietnamese attempt
to conquer South Viet-Nam.

I will add one other thing. As far as the
negotiations are concerned, we are negotiat-

202

Department of State Bulletin

ing. We have negotiated in public. We have
had one private conference a week ago, last-
ing approximately six hours. We hope to
continue to negotiate.

We have made fair offers on withdrawal,
on cease-fire, on political settlement. We have
not made them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

We made fair offers on exchange of pris-
oners of war and accounting for missing in
action everyplace in Southeast Asia.

But having done this, there is one thing
that we have not offered, and this is the one
hangup in the settlement today. That is the
demand of the enemy indirectly or directly
to do what they cannot accomplish them-
selves, impose a Communist government in
South Viet-Nam. That would be the height
of immorality, to impose on the 17 million
people of South Viet-Nam a Communist gov-
ernment with the bloodbath that would
follow.

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned a politi-
cal settlement. What do you foresee as a
possibility withotit necessarily elections — do
you see the two factions in South Viet-Nam
coming together in some kind of an agree-
ment without an election as one possible solu-
tion in the Paris talks ?

The President: That is a very perceptive
question, but it is one that I think any of you
here would agree that I should not comment
upon for the reason that negotiations are
now underway. I have read these long nego-
tiating sessions — the public ones, of course,
and even more important, the private ones —
in great detail. At a time that matters are
being discussed, it is not well for me to state
anything with regard to what has happened
in the negotiations.

I will only say that we are negotiating with
the desire of ending this war as soon as pos-
sible. The fastest way to end the war and the
best way to end it is through negotiation. We
would hope that public figures in their com-
ments will not do anything to undercut the
negotiations, that Congress, in its actions,
will not in effect give a message to the enemy,
"Don't negotiate with the present adminis-

tration; wait for us; we will give you what
you want. South Viet-Nam."

Q. Mr. President, to follow up the first
question if I may, there had been reports that
SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites have been
put on top of some of those dikes or dams.
Does your policy rule out the bombing of that
particular area ivhere there are SAM sites?

The President: I have seen those reports,
Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily
News]. As you know, the Secretary of De-
fense has made some indirect comment about
it. The situation there is one that we would
lean against the taking out of SAM sites on
targets that would result in civilian casual-
ties of a substantial amount.

However, I have not seen in recent days
any reports indicating that any such SAM
sites have been hit and in view of the present
debate, I think we are going to be very care-
ful with regard to hitting them. We would
do so only if we had to do so in order to pro-
tect American fliers who otherwise would be
hit down by the SAM's.

Q. Mr. President, are we to understand
perhaps that now that "Stop Bombing the
Dikes" has been made a political slogan this
year, that perhaps those ivho have gotten
behind it have not thoroughly checked the
background of those accusations?

The President: I did not use the word
"naive" unintentionally. The North Vietnam-
ese are very skillful at propaganda. They
have, of course, brought those who have been
invited into the country to the areas where
they have found bomb damage. They have
not gone to any great pains to fill those holes,
which they would naturally want to do
before the possibility of rain and flood again
comes to the North.

In my view, this is a deliberate attempt on
the part of the North Vietnamese to create
an extraneous issue, to divert attention from
one of the most barbaric invasions in history,
compounded by a violation of all concepts of
international law in handling the prisoners

August 21, 1972

203

of war. For them, with their policy of delib-
erate murder and assassination, and other-
wise attacks on civilians for the purpose of
killing civilians, for them to try to seize on
this and divert attention from them, first, to
me it is a patent propaganda effort, and it is
one that I think needs to be answered.

We have to, of course, be responsible for
what we do. But it is time that in this ter-
ribly difficult war some Americans, or that
most of us, should perhaps realize that when
we talk about morality that it is never an
easy question.

If I can digress for a moment, then I will
come to your followup question on the other
matter. I remember one of the first conversa-
tions I had with President Eisenhower about
war. We were riding back from Quantico.
You may remember it. Charlie Wilson [then
Secretary of Defense] used to have those
meetings in Quantico of the Defense Estab-
lishment people. He asked me to ride back
with him. It was very early in the adminis-
tration, in the first year.

He was talking a little about the decisions
he had to make in World War II. One of the
questions I raised with him was: Here, on
our part, the deliberate bombing of German
cities, the tragedy of Dresden, of Essen, of
Hamburg, not to mention Berlin. General
Eisenhower said that was a terribly difficult
decision for us, the strategic bombing of ci-
vilians in Germany. But he said, "On the
moral question, we had to answer to our-
selves this fundamental problem." He said,
"The height of immorality would be to allow
Hitler to rule Europe."

Now, in our case we have not gone that far.
We are not going to bomb civilian targets in
the North. We are not using the great power
that could finish off North Viet-Nam in an
afternoon, and we will not. But it would be
the height of immorality for the United
States at this point to leave Viet-Nam and in
leaving to turn over to the North Vietnamese
the fate of 17 million South Vietnamese who
do not want a Communist government, to
turn it over to them.

That is what this is about. That is the only

issue that is left. Those who say "End the
war" really should name their resolution
"Prolong the war." They should name it
"Prolong the war," not because they delib-
erately want to; they want to end the war,
just as I do. But we have to face this fact:
We have only one President at a time, as I
said in 1968. At that time, as you may recall,
I was pressed quite often by you ladies and
gentlemen, "What do you think we ought
to do about negotiations?" I didn't think
there was much chance for successful nego-
tiations then.

But I said, I thought quite correctly, we
have only one President, and I didn't want to
destroy any chance he might have to end this
war. At this point, the chance for a nego-
tiated settlement is better now than it has
ever been. Oh, it is not sure, and I am not
going to raise any false hopes, but the enemy
is failing in its military offensive, although
there is still some hard fighting to take place
in the Quang Tri-Hue area, but the enemy
also is, of course, suffering the consequences
of our mining action and cutting the roads
and the other systems that would bring in
supplies to North Viet-Nam.

Under these circumstances, the enemy —
because also we have made a very fair offer
— has every incentive to negotiate. But when
you put yourself in the position of the enemy
and then they hear that the Congress of the
United States says, in effect, "We will give
you what you want regardless of what the
President has offered," why not wait? This
is the problem, and I would hope that as
Senators and Congressmen consult their con-
sciences they would realize that we have just
three months left before the election. In
those three months we hope to do everything
we can to bring this war to an end, and they
should take no action which would jeopardize
those negotiations. I can only say that the
resolutions to this point cannot help. They
can only confuse the enemy, at best; and at
the worst, they will prolong the war.

Q. What impact on American policy in the

204

Department of State Bulletin

Middle East is the xvithdrawal of Soviet per-
sonnel from Egypt likely to have?

The President: This question I noticed has
been reflected on by some lower level ofiicials
in the government, but not — because Secre-
tary Rogers and I have talked about this mat-
ter and Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs] and I— not by us. For this
reason: Our goal, as you know, is a just
settlement in the Middle East. The situation
there is still one that is not clear; and any
comment upon it, first, might possibly be er-
roneous, and second, could very well be harm-
ful to our goal of a just settlement.

So I am not trying to dodge your question,
but I just do not think it would be helpful to
our goal of a just settlement in the Middle
East. It might exacerbate the problem by
trying to evaluate what happened between
[Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat and the
Soviet leaders.

Q. Mr. President, on the bombing of the
dikes and dams, ivould you say that you have
been resisting pressure from the military to
bomb such installations?

The President: No. The pressure does not
come from the military. I have talked this
over with Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H.
Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff]
and naturally General Abrams [Gen. Creigh-
ton W. Abrams, former Commander, U.S.
Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam].
As a matter of fact, let me just say one thing
about our military, because somebody ought
to speak up for it now and then.

We get the idea they are a bunch of sav-
age flyboys and they love to get down and
machinegun innocent little civilians and all
the rest.

We can be very proud of our military, not
only the men that are flying, they are brave
and courageous, but the men on the ground.
We can be very proud of the Marines, all of
them have gone now, for what they have
done — the Marines, the Army, the ground

soldiers — for the civilians and refugees
there. It is a story of generosity in a country
that has never been equaled by American
fighting men or anybody else.

As far as our military commanders are
concerned, while they do give me their judg-
ment as to what will affect the military out-
come in Viet-Nam, they have never recom-
mended, for example, bombing Hanoi. You
have seen some of those signs "Bomb Hanoi,"
in fact, they were around in '68 even, a few,
as well as '64.

Our military don't want to do that. They
believe it would be counterproductive, and
second, they believe it is not necessary. It
might shorten the war, but it would leave a
legacy of hatred throughout that part of the
world from which we might never recover.
So our military have not advocated bombing
the dikes; they have not advocated bombing
civilian centers. They are doing their best to
carry out the policy we want of hitting mili-
tary targets only.

When, as a result of what will often hap-
pen, a bomb is dropped, if it is in an area of
injury to civilians, it is not by intent, and
there is a very great difference.

153d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassa-
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele-
gation, at the 153d plenary session of the
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on August 3.

Press release 190 dated August 3

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: I have some pre-
liminary remarks.

It is a derogation of the serious purpose of
these meetings that your statements today
have resorted to invective against the Presi-
dent of the United States.

Your attempts to vilify President Nixon,

August 21, 1972

205

as well as your continual slanders against
the person of President Thieu, neither en-
hance your arguments nor strengthen the
prospect of useful negotiations.

You would be well advised to abstain from
egregious insult and to concentrate instead
on the issues.

I have concluded these preliminary re-
marks and will now take up other matters.

OPENING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: Because the sub-
ject is very important in terms of relief for
the people of Viet-Nam from the terrible
burdens which the war has imposed on them,
I shall continue to stress the advantages
which would result immediately to them —
that is, to the people — if you would accept
President Nixon's May 8 proposals for cease-
fire and prisoner release.^ Just consider for
a moment: Under international supervision,
military activities in the South and against
the North, and indeed throughout Indochina,
would come to a halt. The general benefit to
be derived is obvious. Vietnamese could then
proceed among themselves to deal with the
complex problems of a political nature in an
atmosphere far more conducive to success
than one in which military activities con-
tinue unabated. Thus, a cooling-off period
would enable all parties to approach each
other in a rational search for common
ground.

By contrast, proposals such as those you
have advocated in these meetings, which
would put cease-fire at the end of a long,
complex, and psychologically difficult process,
seem to us to hold far fewer advantages. In-
deed, they may contain the seeds of further
strife. The need to cool off, to turn off the
fighting, is made obvious even here in this
very room where, because of the passions
engendered by years of struggle, you refuse

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

to speak to and reason with the representa-
tives of the Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam.

I cannot help thinking that you have lost
great opportunities at this table.

There are, additionally, many serious ob-
stacles to progress in the process you have in
mind. For example, you demand the dis-
mantling of much of the state administration
of the Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam as one of the preconditions to negotia-
tions between your side and the government
in Saigon. The psychological and practical
obstacles to such change stagger the imagina-
tion, but I understand that is your attitude
toward the problem. If I misstate it, please
correct me.

To cite another problem, there are aspects
in your proposals which most certainly bear
adversely on both the principle of self-deter-
mination for the South Vietnamese people
and on the implementation of that principle.

Weighing heavily on the entire process
you have proposed here is the fact that you
envisage no cease-fire until everything is
agreed to your satisfaction. During the proc-
ess of achieving preconditions to negotia-
tions and then negotiations for a three-
element government, you would leave tens of
thousands of heavily armed men maneuver-
ing as they are at present, and the killing
would go on unchecked.

For these reasons, I regret to say that
with the passage of time your seven points
and the two "clarifications" seem more re-
mote than ever from political and military
reality. To us, the simpler course offered by
our proposals of May 8, with their built-in
cooling-off period resulting from cease-fire at
the outset and the immediate commencement
of full exchanges between your side and ours
on political and military matters, offers a far
better probability of leading to an acceptable
outcome of a lasting nature. Think of the
Vietnamese people rather than of unattain-
able goals. This is a time when even the great
quality of courage should give way to com-
mon sense.

206

Department of State Bulletin

North Viet-Nam: The Dike Bombing Issue

Follotving is the text of a report released
to the press by the Department on July 28.

In recent weeks Hanoi has tried to con-
vince the world that its elaborate dike sys-
tem is a direct and deliberate target of US
attacks. This is not true. Photographic evi-
dence shows conclusively that there has been
no intentional bombing of the dikes. A few
dikes have been hit by stray bombs directed
at military-associated targets nearby. The
damage is minor and no major dike has been
breached. The damage can be easily re-
paired— in a matter of a few days — and has
not been sufficient to cause any flooding. No
damage has been observed in the Hanoi area
or against the primary dike system protect-
ing that city. Hanoi no doubt is genuinely
concerned about the dike system. North
Vietnam's rainy season will soon reach its
peak and damage in the dikes caused by last
year's very extensive flooding have not yet
been fully repaired.

North Vietnam's Water Control System

1. North Vietnam's elaborate network of
dikes, dams, and locks controls the water of
the heavily populated Red River Delta. The
delta farmland depends on irrigation during
the dry months and is endangered by flooding
in the wet months. The country's major
transportation waterways — the Red River,
the Thai Binh River, and the connecting
Canal des Rapides and Canal des Bambous —
link the principal urban centers. Fertilizer,
foodstuffs, petroleum, and other commodi-
ties are moved, in part, by these waterways,
as is the coal mined in the Hon Gai and Cam
Pha areas. Southern North Vietnam also
contains rivers necessitating a dike and lock
system for water control and navigation, but

the system is less important than that of the
delta.

2. Dikes to control flooding and the course
of the waterways are most fully developed
along the Red River. The Red River system
begins near Viet Tri, only 43 feet above sea
level, although about 100 miles inland. The
great amount of silt brought down from the
mountains and deposited along the river beds
in the delta has raised the waterways above
the surrounding countryside in many places
and requires a constant elevation of the re-
straining walls. In some ai'eas — particularly
around Hanoi — the height of the dikes
reaches 40 feet. Some are as broad as 80
feet at the flood line and spread to 200 feet
at the base. A secondary system between 4
and 22 feet high running parallel to the main
dikes is designed to localize and minimize
damage if the primary dikes are breached. A
tertiary system of smaller dikes divides the
rice-growing plains into compartments, as-
sists irrigation, and controls the level of small
streams and local waterways. In addition,
small natural or man-made dikes along the
coast keep out brackish sea water.

3. Dams and locks play a lesser role. Only
a few large dams are constructed of concrete
with gates to permit passage of watercraft,
and only one major waterway in the Red
River Delta has navigation locks to control
water levels and facilitate transport.

Recurring Floods

4. The rivers rise to a seasonal peak dur-
ing July and August, when unusually heavy
rains frequently cause breaches in the levees.
Extensive floods and destruction to property
and agricultural crops result. Although there
have been only a few major breaches since

August 21, 1972

207

the mid-1940s, minor breaks occur almost
every year.

5. The floods of last August rank with the
most serious ever recorded. Four major
breaches occurred in the primary dikes along
the Red River. An estimated 1.1 million acres
of riceland — a quarter of the country's rice
acreage — were seriously flooded and the
entire crop in that area destroyed. Storms
took out a half-mile section of a levee outside
Hanoi and closed the railroad north to Dong
Dang. The area of heavy flooding continued
to expand through late September, probably
because prolonged soaking and high water
pressure had undermined the secondary dike
systems.

6. Apart from immediate rice losses, the
floods produced extensive longer term physi-
cal damage. The enormous force of water
unleashed through breaches in the primary
dikes caused widespread erosion far beyond
obvious scouring effects near the breaks.
Long stretches of irrigation canals were cut,
and the press reported many washed-out
pumping stations. Flood water everywhere
deposited silt in drainage ditches. The pro-
longed inundation during the floods may have
caused subtle undermining of the primary
dike systems that will not show until late this
summer. The possibility that the dike sys-
tem has been weakened thus adds to this
year's flooding threat.

Resiliency of the System to Bombing

7. North Vietnam's water control system
includes a large number of widely dispersed
individual components which could be sub-
stantially affected only by a large-scale, coor-
dinated air offensive. Such attacks would be
necessary against specific locks, dams, and
dike areas, and bomb damage would have
effect only during the relatively short periods
of high water. Even then, the North Viet-
namese, long accustomed to battling against
floods, could be expected to act promptly to
mend breaches in the system.

8. Damage to the locks would have little
effect on either North Vietnam's transport or
its water control systems. Inland craft could

be diverted to waterways not dependent on
locks, and some cargoes could be sent by the
many alternative land routes. Accidental
bomb damage during the 1965-68 period
made some locks inoperative, but had little
effect on water transport or flooding in the
area. Similarly, breaching of dams, even
during pei-iods of high water, would not
cause significant disruption because most are
small and easily repaired.

9. Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb
damage. Those in the primary system could
be breached only by a series of overlapping
craters across the entire top of a dike, and
the lips of the craters would have to be suffi-
ciently lower than the river surface to initi-
ate the flow and subsequent scouring action
of water rushing through the breach. The
dikes along the Red River near Hanoi are
approximately 80 feet wide at the flood line.

Hanoi's Claims Versus Actual Damage

10. North Vietnam's official press agencies
and radio services have repeatedly described
alleged US bombing attacks on the dike sys-
tem. In April and May, the North Vietnam-
ese made more than 40 specific allegations,
and on 30 June the official press quoted the
Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that
20 bombing attacks had been made on dikes
during that month. Foreign diplomats, news-
men, and, most recently, actress Jane Fonda
have been escorted to dikes to view damage —
most of it around Hai Duong, southeast of
Hanoi.

11. A detailed examination has been made
of photography of mid-July of the North
Vietnamese Red River Delta and bomb cra-
ters were detected at 12 locations. None of
the damage has been in the Hanoi area,
where destruction of the dikes would result
in the greatest damage to North Vietnam's
economy and logistics effort. Nearly all the
damage has been scattered downstream from
Hanoi, as well as downstream from the areas
of major breaks resulting from the 1971
floods.

12. There are no signs of destruction of
vital dike portions stretching to a length of

208

Department of State Bulletin

several kilometers — as reported by Hanoi-
based newsmen. In comparison to the dikes,
the craters are small, and no flooding has oc-
curred as a result of the damage. Although
water levels are not yet at their highest, the
absence of leakage through the craters indi-
cates that damage was limited.

13. All identified points of dike damage
are located within close range of specific
targets of military value. Of the 12 loca-
tions where damage has occurred, 10 are
close to identified individual targets such as
petroleum storage facilities, and the other
two are adjacent to road and river transport
lines. Because a large number of North Viet-
namese dikes serve as bases for roadways,
the maze they create throughout the delta
makes it almost inevitable that air attacks
directed against transportation targets cause
scattered damage to dikes.

14. The bomb craters verified by photog-
raphy can be repaired easily with a mini-
mum of local labor and equipment — a crew
of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and
hand tools could repair in a day the largest
crater observed. Repairs to all the dikes
could be completed within a week, as the
necessary equipment is available throughout
the delta. Local labor historically mobilizes
to strengthen and repair dikes to avoid se-
rious flooding. An occasional bomb falling on
a dike does not add significantly to the bur-
den of annual repair work normally required.
North Vietnam must, however, complete the
repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods
before next month when this year's rainy
season will reach its peak.

Mr. Williams To Coordinate U.S. Aid
for Philippines Disaster Relief

Press release 188 dated July 31

Secretary Rogers, reflecting the concern of
President Nixon for the plight of millions of
flood victims in the Philippines, announced
on July 31 that Maurice J. Williams, Deputy
Administrator of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, has been designated to

coordinate all U.S. Government relief and re-
construction assistance to that country.

The flood emergency in the Island of
Luzon, described as the worst disaster to
strike that nation since World War II, has
caused almost 300 deaths, displaced more
than 3 million people from their homes, and
damaged public property, housing, and agri-
cultural investment estimated at more than
$300 million.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Phil-
ippines has declared the entire Island of
Luzon a disaster area and has appealed for
$50 million from the world community to
help that island recover from the typhoons
and floods resulting from almost continuous
heavy rains since July 7.

The Philippines Ambassador, Eduardo
Romualdez, on July 27 visited Dr. John A.
Hannah, AID Administrator, to transmit
President Marcos' appeal for help.

Mr. Williams was selected as coordinator
for the humanitarian effort in the Philippines
because of his experience as coordinator of
relief and rehabilitation assistance for Ban-
gladesh. Mr. Williams also was head of an
interdepartmental disaster reljef working
group appointed in November 1970 to pro-
vide help to areas stricken by the great cy-
clone wave which swept up from the Bay of
Bengal at that time.

Through July 31, AID had authorized
$550,000 in disaster funds to finance the U.S.
Government relief eff'ort in the Philippines
and had diverted approximately 5,000 metric
tons of Food for Peace from other programs
for distribution in the stricken country. The
food, valued at more than $1 million, is in
addition to the more than 6,000 metric tons
already programed for distribution in the
Philippines.

President Marcos' appeal for an additional
$50 million was directed to countries and or-
ganizations which attended the meeting in
June of the Consultative Group for the Phil-
ippines. The countries and organizations are
Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Japan,
New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom,
the United States, Yugoslavia, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Asian Develop-

August 21, 1972

209

ment Bank, the United Nations Develop-
ment Program, and the World Bank.

The 700-square-mile flooded area was first
hit June 25 by a typhoon and then by severe
rainstorms, which have destroyed most of
the crops in Luzon, a major agricultural
area, including the all-important rice crop,
apparently a total loss. Serious food short-
ages have resulted.

The U.S. Government, through AID, al-
ready is financing a U.S. naval air operation
which is distributing food, clothing, and
other emergency relief supplies to the flood
victims. Under the AID-financed operation,
the U.S.S. Tripoli, a helicopter carrier oper-
ating in the Lingayen Gulf, is airlifting sup-
plies to Luzon.

Also as part of the relief program, the U.S.
Navy is producing 10,000 nutri-buns a day
at the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay for
distribution to the flood victims. Nutri-buns
are high-protein biscuits made of enriched
and fortified wheat flour, vegetable oil, and
non-fat dry milk.

President Nixon Exchanges Greetings
With Prime Minister Meir of Israel

Following is the transcript of a telephone
conversation between President Nixon and
Prime Minister Golda Meir which was
broadcast live in Israel on July 26 during a
television program marking the inaugura-
tion of a communications satellite ground
station at Emeq Ha'ela.

White House press release dated July 26

The Prime Minister: Hello.

The President: Hello, Madam Prime Min-
ister.

The Prime Minister: Mr. President, sha-
lom.

The President: Thank you very much. 1
want you to know that as I speak here
from the Oval Office, where you and I have
met so many times, that I extend the very
best wishes of all of the people of the
United States to all of the people of Israel.

I think this program, as I saw the coun-
tries you were talking to, instead of being
called "Around the World in 80 Days,"
could be called "Around the World in 60
Minutes."

The Prime Minister: That is right. Mr.
President, it is extremely kind of you to
take time off and speak to us. I can only
tell you that the best wishes of all the peo-
ple of Israel, appreciation, and all the
friendship that we can express goes out to
you and the people of the United States.

I remember the Oval Room very well,
always with a great feeling of satisfaction
and appreciation and joy and thankfulness
that you have always taken so much of your
time to listen to my long stories of troubles
and wishes and so on. But I must say I al-
ways came out with the right answers.

The President: Madam Prime Minister,
I want you to know that you, needless to
say, are always welcome here. I only regret
that while I have visited Israel on other oc-
casions I have never been able to do so as
President, but you can be sure that we will
continue to work together for what you are
interested in, what we are interested in, and
that is a just peace in the Mideast which
will protect the integrity of Israel, for
which your people have suffered so much
and sacrificed so much.

The Prime Minister: Thank you very,
very much. It is easier to face difficulties
when you speak as you do, and I know what
you have done, so thank you very much.
There is a large group here. They are all
smiling, and they are all happy to hear your
voice.

The President: I want to say just one last
thing. I think the fact that we do have this
new television communication will mean
that the programs that will be carried from
Israel to the United States, and from the
United States to Israel, will mean that more
of our people here will have an opportunity
not only to see Israel by television but per-
haps to go there as tourists and we hope
that more people from Israel can come here.
We hope that will be one of the dividends
of this new program.

210

Deparfment of State Bulletin

The Prime Minister: This is a commercial
that will work both ways.

The President: That's right. That's right.
I know that I have enjoyed my visits, and
we want you and any of your friends to
know they are always welcome here in our
country.

The Prime Minister: Thank you very,
very much.

The President: Thank you. We look for-
ward to seeing you. Goodby.

The Prime Minister: Goodby.

President Appoints John Connally
to Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The President announced on August 3
(White House press release) the appoint-
ment of former Texas Governor John B.
Connally as a member of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The
appointment was effective as of August 1.
Governor Connally previously served on the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from
December 1, 1970, until his appointment as
Secretary of the Treasury February 11,
1971. He served as Secretary of the Treas-
ury until June 12, 1972. (For further bio-
graphic data, see White House press release
dated August 3.)

The present Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board was reconstituted and reorga-
nized by President Nixon on March 20, 1969.
It was originally established by President
Eisenhower in 1956 as the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities and was continued by Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson as the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Composed of a nonpartisan group of dis-
tinguished private citizens, the Board per-
forms a continuing review of all foreign in-
telligence and related activities conducted by

the departments and agencies of the U.S.
Government. It is responsible for advising
the President on the overall national intelli-
gence effort and for recommending to him
appropriate measures to increase the effec-
tiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
is composed of 11 members, including Gov-
ernor Connally, and is chaired by Adm.
George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), for-
mer Chief of Naval Operations and U.S.
Ambassador to Portugal. The Executive
Secretary of the Board is Gerard P. Burke.

In announcing the appointment of Gov-
ernor Connally, the President noted the
highly important role of intelligence in the
overall national security of the United
States and emphasized his reliance on the
Board for nonpartisan objective appraisals
of all the foreign intelligence activities of
the government.

Secretary Rogers Hails French Seizure
of Heroin Laboratories

Folloiving is a statement by Secretary
Rogers, who is Chairman of President
Nixon's Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control, ivhich was read to news
correspondents on July 21 by Charles W.
Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations.

The seizure yesterday of a third set of
heroin-manufacturing equipment in France
in less than a week represents an extraor-
dinary achievement by French authorities
and is a very substantial contribution to the
effort to stop international narcotics traffick-
ing. We are grateful to the French and to
others who share with us an appreciation of
the need for a united international effort to
deal with what President Nixon has called
"public enemy number one."

August 21, 1972

211

International Aspects of Weather Modification

Statement by Herman Pollack

Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs

My presentation this morning will first
recount the interest and actions of the De-
partment of State in recent years regarding
policy on weather modification, a topic cen-
tral to the resolution which is the subject of
this hearing.- Against that background I
will then comment on the broader scope of
the resolution.

The State Department follows closely the
development of all new technologies which
appear to have the potential of impacting on
the international affairs of the United States.

Quite frequently when a new branch of
technology is in its early developmental
phase it is not possible to define with any pre-
cision its future impact, much less to be sure
whether its impact will be primarily benefi-
cial or primarily harmful. At early stages
of development, the facts necessary to make
such a judgment are simply not at hand.
Under the circumstances, the formulation of
general policy is premature and we estab-
lish a "watching brief." When the develop-
ment of the technology reaches an appropri-
ate stage, the Secretary's attention is drawn
to it and the analysis and formulation of
policy gets seriously underway.

The State Department approach to weather

^ Made before the Subcommittee on Oceans and
International Environment of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on July 26. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

° S. Res. 281 proposes an international treaty pro-
hibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical
modification activity as a weapon of war.

modification has followed essentially that
pattern. Parenthetically I might say that the
art — if I may call it that — of climate, earth-
quake, or ocean modification is not yet at a
point where even a watching brief, as we use
the term, is in order. These are areas of
great paucity of scientific data and under-
standing.

Returning now to weather modification, as
you know, experiments on the modification of
clouds through seeding with various agents
started shortly after the end of the Second
World War, and by the early 1960's it
seemed likely that this technology, when fur-
ther developed and when more answers were
known, might someday produce vast benefits
through enhancing rainfall and might also
pose new tasks in international relations. At
about the same time, the first efforts to
moderate the intensity of hurricanes through
seeding were initiated. It was these develop-
ments, nearly 10 years ago, that caused the
State Department to establish its watching
brief on weather modification; and responsi-
bility for maintaining this brief was assigned
to the Bureau which I head.

In the period 1968 to 1970 several develop-
ments occurred which made it clear that
weather modification was progressing be-
yond the early experimental phase and was
approaching the stage where at least a few
types of human intervention in weather proc-
esses might well be approaching operational
status. Among these developments I will
mention three in particular:

— The studies of the Department of the In-
terior showed that proper seeding of winter

212

Department of State Bulletin

clouds might enhance the snowpack in the
Colorado River Valley by perhaps 20 or 30
percent. Such an achievement would en-
hance the fresh water available in the whole
river valley during the spring and summer
months.

— The experiments of Dr. Joanne Simpson
and her associates at the NOAA [National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]
laboratory in Miami produced manifold in-
creases in the rainfall from isolated tropi-
cal cumulus clouds.

— The experiments known as Project
Stormfury, aimed at moderation of violent
hurricanes, appear to have produced their
first substantially positive results in a series
of experiments on Hurricane Debbie of 1969.

This combination of events provided us
with some of the information needed for the
development of policy to control or facilitate
the impact of this new technology. I have at
hand the memorandum which I sent to Secre-
tary Rogers on November 16, 1970, inform-
ing him that the time had come for the
watching brief on weather modification to be
replaced by a more active study of the impli-
cations for our foreign policy. It reported
that:

. . . U.S. scientists who have heretofore been very
cautious and gruarded in their assessment of prog-
ress in this field are now showing visible signs of
excitement at recent events. This is especially so
with regard to the highly successful seeding of
cumulus clouds in tropical areas for the purpose of
increasing rainfall. Equally a source of excitement
is the mounting evidence that the force of hurricanes
and typhoons can be lessened by seeding techniques.

Clouds and storms are unconscious of sovereignty.
International law on weather modification is prac-
tically non-existent. The problems that operational
weather modification technology will pose to this
Department and the foreign offices of the world are
therefore self-evident.

Steps are under way to set up intra-Department
and inter-agency committees to develop plans and
policies for the international reception of this new
technology.

Shortly thereafter, in a statement to the
House Committee on Science and Astronau-
tics, Secretary Rogers made particular men-
tion of weather modification as a potential

boon in assisting the economic problems of
the developing nations.^ He also pointed to
the need to consider international arrange-
ments to deal with the applications of this
new phenomenon. I was pleased to note, Mr.
Chairman [Senator Claiborne Pell] , that you
quoted this section of Secretary Rogers' state-
ment in your speech on the Senate floor last
March 17.

The interagency study to which I referred
in my memorandum to the Secretary got
underway in the spring of 1971. The study,
which was completed earlier this year, came
to certain conclusions regarding civilian as-
pects of weather modification.

The objective of our programs is to ad-
vance civilian weather modification research
and development eflforts and to apply this
technology for human benefit. To this end,
we will further international cooperation
and understanding in this rapidly develop-
ing field and conduct our programs with
maximum openness and within the frame-
work of clear safeguards designed to pro-
tect the interests of the United States and of
other countries. With regard to assisting
other countries, we will cdnsider each re-
quest on the basis of its own merits. We will
not, in any case, encourage activities involv-
ing a high risk of damage or where the
eflFects cannot be foreseen with reasonable
assurance.

Since the science of weather modification
is still experimental and at an early stage in
its development, the U.S. Government will
maintain continuing review of the interna-
tional aspects of weather modification gen-
erally.

The Department of State, with appropri-
ate interagency support, is instituting and
overseeing implementation of appropriate
guidelines for U.S. activities, will review any
requests from other countries for assistance
in weather modification activity, and will
report on policy issues as the need develops.

As was indicated in Mr. Abshire's [David
M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congres-

' For Secretary Rogers' statement on Jan. 26, 1971,
see Bulletin of Feb. 15, 1971, p. 198.

August 21, 1972

213

sional Relations] letter of May 15, 1972, to
Senator Fulbright, the study came to no con-
clusions with respect to international agree-
ments on military aspects of weather modi-
fication.

With respect to climate modification, we
shall continue research in this area in the
hope that there may be a potential for human
benefit. However, no climate modification
experiment will be conducted until we can
predict its total impact with great assur-
ance, and of course, no such activity would
be conducted without thorough consultations
among interested agencies and approval at
the highest levels of government. I might
observe that it goes without saying that the
administration would not use techniques for
climate modification for hostile purposes,
even should they come to be developed.

In summary, with respect to S. Res.
281 and simply stated, we believe that
there is at present too much uncertainty
about essential facts and that the factual
basis itself is insufficient to make possible
any fundamental decisions on whether a
treaty dealing with military aspects is fea-
sible and desirable. For example, how could
we verify suspected violations or monitor
compliance by other signatories of an inter-
national agreement prohibiting the use of
weather modification, much less climate,
earthquake, or ocean modification, about
which we know next to nothing? Further-
more, how could we distinguish between
weather modification research and develop-
ment which is directed toward military appli-
cation and that which is to be used for purely
civilian purposes, since the techniques in-
volved may be the same ?

Relevant questions such as these will have
to be answered through further study and re-
search before it is possible to formulate a
solid basis for decisions on issues such as are
raised by S. Res. 281.

It is therefore our conclusion that actions
such as those recommended in S. Res. 281 are
premature. Accordingly, the Department of
State recommends that this resolution not
be adopted.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific
and Technical Cooperation

Folloiving is an announcement issued by
the Office of Science and Technology (OST),
Executive Office of the President, on July 28,
together tvith the text of the record of dis-
cussions between U.S. and U.S.S.R. delega-
tions drafted at Moscow July 7 and signed
at Washington and Moscow Jidy 28.

TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

Office of Science and Technology press release dated July 28

American and Soviet officials outlined on
July 28 six scientific and technological areas
in which their nations will try to cooperate
jointly in an attempt to solve common prob-
lems.

They are energy, agriculture, chemistry,
water resources, microbiology, and computer
usage. All will be taken up by the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and
Technical Cooperation which was called for
in the Agreement on Cooperation in the
Fields of Science and Technology signed
during President Nixon's Moscow summit.
May 24. The Commission will hold its first
meeting in Washington in the latter part of
October.

The science and technology agreement
marks the first time the two nations have
developed an intergovernmental mechanism
by which they can jointly conduct a broad
range of scientific and technological efforts
directed toward common goals.

A document establishing the framework
for the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission
was signed July 28. The document was a
"Record of Discussions" held between U.S.
and Soviet delegations in Moscow July 2-8.

In addition to setting the framework for
the Joint Commission, the discussions also
opened the door to possible Soviet partici-
pation in the U.S.-sponsored deep sea drill-
ing program, a vastly successful effort to
study the makeup of the earth's crust by bor-
ing into the bottoms of the world's oceans.

214

Department of State Bulletin

Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., President Nix-
on's Science Adviser and the leader of the
eight-man delegation which worked out the
details in Moscow earlier in July, signed for
the United States. The ceremony took place
at the White House. V. A. Kirillin, Deputy
Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Minis-
ters and Dr. David's Soviet counterpart as
Chairman of the State Committee for Sci-
ence and Technology (SCST), signed a sim-
ilar document in Moscow with U.S. Ambas-
sador Jacob D. Beam in attendance.

Until now, interactions between American
and Soviet scientists and technologists were
conducted under exchange agreements dat-
ing back to 1958. Primarily, these have
been exchanges of individuals or delega-
tions.

"The new agreement does not supersede
the current Exchanges Agreement," Dr.
David said. "In fact, it broadens the exist-
ing arrangements as well as making possible
new direct contacts between scientists, agen-
cies within each government, and between
American industrial firms and Soviet state
enterprises." He emphasized that the Com-
mission will approve and monitor the pres-
ent areas proposed for cooperation and con-
sider new possibilities. In all cases, he
pointed out, the cooperation "will be on the
basis of mutual benefit, equality, and reci-
procity."

The Science and Technology Agreement
and the Commission are designed to "com-
bine the efforts of . . . scientists and spe-
cialists" involved in major problems. It is
expected that solutions reached jointly will
be achieved sooner and less expensively than
if each nation attacked its problems alone.

Working groups in all six areas have al-
ready been established on both sides. Each
group will develop specific proposals for co-
operative work for consideration at the Com-
mission's first meeting.

Areas being considered in the energy
field include magnetohydrodynamics, fusion
(thermonuclear), atomic, solar, geothermal,
and other forms of power generation, as well
as power transmission and increased genera-
tion efficiency.

Agricultural research efforts will be drawn
from a list of proposals already exchanged.

Efforts in computer applications will be
directed toward the use of computers and
cybernetic techniques for management pur-
poses.

Water resources are of interest to both
governments because of common concerns in
irrigation, recycling, flood control, ground
water levels, and other areas.

In microbiology, the production of protein
through microbial techniques will be looked
at as a source of food for both human and
animal consumption, along with the possible
synthesis of other substances.

The Commission's initial ventures into
chemistry will be in the field of chemical
catalysis in both basic and applied research.

The governmental executive agencies re-
sponsible for the Commission are Dr. David's
Office of Science and Technology and Minis-
ter Kirillin's State Committee for Science
and Technology.

Another outcome of the negotiations in
Moscow will be a joint symposium on scien-
tific and technical information.

Named Joint Commission members on the
American side were: Dr. David, Chairman;
Dr. James B. Fisk, president of the Bell
Telephone Laboratories; Dean Harvey
Brooks, National Academy of Sciences and
Harvard University; Dr. H. Guyford Stever,
Director of the National Science Foundation ;
and Herman Pollack, Director of the State
Department's Bureau of International Scien-
tific and Technological Affairs.

Drs. David and Fisk were members of the
U.S. delegation which went to Moscow July
2-8, along with Dr. Eugene Fubini of the
E. G. Fubini Consultants, Ltd., of Arlington,
Va., and Dr. John V. N. Granger of the
State Department.

The Soviet side was represented during
the July negotiations by Minister Kirillin;
M. D. Millionshchikov, Vice President of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; V. A. Trapez-
nikov. First Deputy Chairman of the SCST ;
and S. M. Tikhomirov, Deputy Chairman of
the SCST.

Minister Kirillin, Drs. Trapeznikov and

August 21, 1972

215

Millionshchikov, First Deputy Minister of
Higher and Secondary Specialized Education
N. F. Krasnov, and D. N. Pronskiy, Direc-
tor of the SCST Department of Foreign Re-
lations, were named as the Soviet members
of the Joint Commission.

TEXT OF RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS

Record of Discussions

between Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser
to the President of the United States of America
and Director of the Office of Science and Tech-
nology in the Executive Office of the President,
and Academician V. A. Kirillin, Deputy Chairman
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and Chairman
of the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers for Science and Technology (July 2-
July 8, 1972).

Discussions were held between Dr. David and
Academician Kirillin concerning implementation of
the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation
in the Fields of Science and Technology, signed on
May 24, 1972, at the Moscow Summit meeting.

Also taking part in the discussions were, from
the U.S. side. Dr. James B. Fisk, President of Bell
Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Eugene G. Fubini,
President of Fubini Consultants, Ltd.; Dr. John V. N.
Granger, Deputy Director, Bureau of International
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of
State; and other staff members of the Office of
Science and Technology and of the Department of
State.

From the Soviet side participants included Acade-
mician M. D. Millionshchikov, Vice President of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; Academician V. A.
Trapeznikov, First Deputy Chairman of the State
Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for
Science and Technology; Dr. S. M. Tikhomirov,
Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Science and Tech-
nology; and other staff members of the State Com-
mittee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R.

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the
Agreement of May 24, 1972, provides a good basis
for the long-term development and expansion of
scientific and technological cooperation between the
two countries. For the purpose of implementing this
Agreement, they considered a number of questions
concerning the structure and organization of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, to be created in ac-
cordance with Article 7 of the Agreement, as well
as possible areas and forms of cooperation.

The two sides reaffirmed the objectives of their

proposed scientific and technical cooperation, as set
forth in the Agreement. These are to assist and
develop scientific and technical cooperation between
both countries on the basis of mutual benefit,
equality and reciprocity, and to provide broad op-
portunities for both sides to combine the efforts of
their scientists and specialists in working on major
problems, whose solution will promote the progress
of science and technology for the benefit of both
countries and of mankind.

Recognizing that the achievement of common
goals in the development of science and technology
depends on a close working relationship between
scientists and specialists, the two sides will encour-
age and facilitate the development of direct contacts
between qualified individuals and organizations of
the two countries.

The two sides discussed procedural questions con-
cerning the work of the Joint Commission, the first
meeting of which will be held in Washington, D.C.,
in October, 1972.

The two sides also discussed a number of specific
areas of common interest which show promise for
direct cooperation. U.S.-U.S.S.R. ad hoc working
groups will be established as soon as possible in the
following areas:

(1) Energy Research and Development, including:

(a) magnetohydrodynamics;

(b) fusion;

(d) solar energy;

(e) geothermal energy;

(f) energy transmission;

(g) utilization of waste heat; and

(h) increasing the efficiency of thermal power

stations.
(Working groups in the energy area will be
convened only for topics not covered by the
Memorandum on Cooperation Between the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the
U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Utilization
of Atomic Energy, to be renewed in July,
1972.)

(2) Application of Computers in Management;

(3) Agricultural Research;

(4) Production of substances employing micro-
biological means;

(5) Water Resources;

(6) Research in the Field of Chemical Catalysis.

These working groups will develop specific proposals
for cooperative programs. Their reports and recom-
mendations will be submitted to the Executive
Agents in each country no later than two weeks
before the date of the first meeting of the Commis-
sion for its consideration. Working groups in addi-
tional areas may be established by the Commission
at its meetings or by agreement between the Execu-
tive Agents on both sides, in the period between
meetings of the Commission.

216

Department of State Bulletin

The Commission will monitor the progress of
joint programs established under the Agreement to
assure that obstacles which may arise are promptly
and effectively dealt with.

Following an exchange of views between Dr. David
and Academician M. V. Keldysh, President of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, on cooperation ih
oceanological research, it was decided that the U.S.
National Science Foundation and the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences would designate representa-
tives to meet in the near future to discuss possible
Soviet technical and financial participation in the
program of deep ocean drilling to be carried out with
the U.S. research vessel D/V Glomar Challenger
operated by Scripps Institute of Oceanography.

Desiring to achieve cooperation in the area of
scientific and technical information, the two sides
decided as a first step to convene in the near future
a symposium on this subject between the National
Science Foundation and the All-Union Scientific
Research Institute for Scientific and Technical In-
formation.

The two sides emphasized their desire to realize
as quickly as possible tangible results under the
Agreement. In this connection, they will render
assistance in establishing closer and more regular
contacts between individual scientists and specialists,
and also research institutions and technical organi-
zations of the two countries.

The subjects discussed in the course of this meet-
ing will be reviewed by the Joint Commission in its
first meeting.

Edward E. David, Jr.

Director,

Office of Science

and Technology, Executive

Office of the President,
United States of America

Moscow, July 7, 1972.

V. A. KiRILLIN

Chairman,

State Committee of the

U.S.S.R. Council of

Ministers for Science

and Technology

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of
Engineering, and National Research Council an-
nual report covering the fiscal year ending June
30, 1969. February 15, 1972. 414 pp.

Creating an Atlantic Union Delegation. Report, to-
gether with minority, additional minority, and op-
posing views, to accompany H.J. Res. 900. H.
Rept. 92-988. April 13, 1972. 10 pp.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near

East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
April 19, 1972. 46 pp.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. Re-
port of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, together with additional views, on S. 3526,
to provide authorizations for certain agencies con-
ducting the foreign relations of the United States,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 92-754. April 20,
1972. 125 pp.

Foreign Sale of Certain Passenger Vessels. Report,
together with minority views, to accompany H.R.
11589, S. Rept. 92-758. April 25, 1972. 12 pp.

Inter- American Foundation: First Year of Opera-
tions. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. April 25, 1972. 80 pp.

Peace Corps Act Amendments of 1972. Hearing
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on H.R. 14149 authorizing continuing appropria-
tions for Peace Corps, and for other purposes;
April 27, 1972; 39 pp. Report, together with sup-
plemental views, to accompany H.R. 14149; H.
Rept. 92-1046; May 4, 1972; 12 pp.

Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects: Analysis and Back-
ground Data. Staff report prepared for the use
of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences. May 1972. 76 pp.

Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967. Report to ac-
company H.R. 7117. S. Rept. 92-769. May 1, 1972.
5 pp.

Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, 1961. Message from the President
of the United States transmitting the protocol
opened for signature at Geneva on March 25,
1972. S. Ex. J. May 4, 1972. 12 pp.

Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
and Amendments to the 1954 Prevention of Pol-
lution of the Sea by Oil Convention. Message
from the President of the United States trans-
mitting the convention done at Brussels on De-
cember 18, 1971, and certain amendments to the
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 1954, relating to
tanker size and arrangement and the protection
of the Great Barrier Reef. S. Ex. K. May 5, 1972.
41 pp.

Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January 1972. A
staff report prepared for the use of the Subcom-
mittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Com-
mitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. May 8, 1972. 39 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation
Bill, Fiscal Year 1973. Report to accompany
H.R. 14989. H. Rept. 92-1065. May 15, 1972. 47
pp.

People's Republic of China: An Economic Assess-
ment. A compendium of papers submitted to the
Joint Economic Committee. May 18, 1972. 382 pp.

Recent Soviet Emigration to Israel. Report of spe-
cial study mission to Austria and Israel by Rep-
resentatives Jonathan B. Bingham, chairman, and
Seymour Halpern, April 2-8, 1972. Submitted to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 18,
1972. 32 pp.

August 21, 1972

217

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Poland Sign
Air Transport Agreement

The Department of State announced on
July 19 (press release 179) that the United
States and the Polish People's Republic had
that day signed at Warsaw an Air Transport
Agreement between the two governments.
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., signed
for the United States and the Honorable Mie-
czyslaw Zajfryd, Minister of Transportation,
signed for the Polish People's Republic. Si-
multaneously, the two governments ex-
changed diplomatic notes incorporating
certain understandings regarding implemen-
tation of the new agreement. (For texts of
the agreement and the U.S. note, see press re-
lease 179.)

The new bilateral agreement is the result
of successful negotiations held this past May
in Washington. It will provide the frame-
work for the expansion of Pan American
World Airways operations to Warsaw and
the inauguration of service to the United
States by LOT Polish Airlines. Pan Amer-
ican has been operating between New York
and Warsaw for approximately one year on
the basis of a unilateral permit issued by the
Government of Poland, while LOT plans to
begin scheduled service from Poland to New
York during 1973.

Under the new agreement, U.S.-designated
airlines will be authorized to serve Warsaw
(and beyond Poland to Finland, the U.S.S.R.,
and beyond) via various intermediate points
in Europe, and Polish-designated airlines will
be able to operate to New York via inter-
mediate stops at several European points and
Montreal. The notes exchanged set forth the
actual commercial opportunities to be en-
joyed by the airlines of both sides under the
agreement. The arrangements agreed to in

these notes are designed to maintain a rea-
sonable overall balance in the bilateral ex-
change of benefits and to permit both sides
to reevaluate this exchange after a period of
operations by the airlines of the two coun-
tries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April
3, 1952.'
Ratified by the President: July 25, 1972.

Atomic Energy

Protocol suspending the agreement of August 20,
1969 (TIAS 6816), between the United States,
Austria, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the application of safeguards and pro-
viding for the application of safeguards pursuant
to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968
(TIAS 6839). Done at Vienna September 21,
1971.
Entered into force: July 23, 1972.

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 27,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970."
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, August 2, 1972.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.
Ratification deposited: Fiji, July 27, 1972.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972."
Signature: Nigeria, July 10, 1972.

Cultural Relations

Agreement for facilitating the international circula-
tion of visual and auditory materials of an educa-
tional, scientific, and cultural character, and proto-
col. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered
into force August 12, 1954; for the United States
January 12, 1967. TIAS 6116.
Accession deposited: Jordan, July 7, 1972.

' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.

218

Department of State Bulletin

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy
of inventions relating to defense and for which
applications for patents have been made. Done
at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force
January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.
Ratification deposited: Canada, August 2, 1972.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force
October 4, 1967; for the United States November
1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Notification that it continues to be bound: Fiji
(with reservations), June 12, 1972.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9,
1959, as amended (TIAS 4192, 5608, 6236), gov-
erning tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington July 27,
1972. Entered into force July 27, 1972.

Costa Rica

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the deposit by Guatemala of
10 percent of the value of grant military assist-
ance and excess defense articles furnished by the
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Guatemala May 16 and July 19, 1972. Enters into
force on the date Guatemala informs the United
States that the agreement has been approved and
ratified in conformity with its constitutional pro-
cedures.

Honduras

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from Honduras of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of
notes at Tegucigalpa March 2 and May 3, 1972.
Entered into force May 3, 1972. TIAS 7399.
Suspended: July 13, 1972.

Japan

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes
on income, with related notes. Signed at Tokyo
March 8, 1971. Entered into force July 9, 1972.
Proclaimed by the President: July 25, 1972.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of June 18,

1963, as amended (TIAS 5366, 5960, 7240), for
financing certain educational exchange programs.
Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 1
and July 10, 1972. Entered into force July 10,
1972.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports
from Nicaragua of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during
calendar year 1972. Effected by exchange of notes
at Managua March 14 and April 24, 1972. En-
tered into force April 24, 1972.
Suspended: July 13, 1972.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile sys-
tems. Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972."
Senate advice and consent to ratification: August
3, 1972.

Venezuela

Agreement relating to the deposit by Venezuela of
10 percent of the value of grant military assist-
ance furnished by the United States. Effected by
exchange of notes at Caracas July 19, 1972. En-
tered into force July 19, 1972; effective February
7, 1972.

PUBLICATIONS

Volume VI in "Foreign Relations"
Series for 1947 Released

On June 21 the Department of State released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^7, Vol-
ume VI, The Far East (ix, 1,159 pages). This
volume, the second of eight to be published on the
year 1947, includes documentation on U.S. policies
toward Far Eastern powers except China, which
will be covered in a separate volume.

Of particular interest are the compilations cover-
ing American interest in nationalist opposition to
the restoration of French rule in Indochina and
Netherlands rule in the East Indies.

There is also extensive documentation concerning
U.S. occupation and control of Japan, including ef-
forts to draft an acceptable peace treaty with Japan.
Similarly, American efforts to achieve the peaceful
unification of Korea are fully documented.

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Of-

' Not in force.

August 21, 1972

219

fice, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VI
may be obtained from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D. C. 20402, for $6.00 each (Department of
State publication 8606; Stock Number 4400-1407).

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 20i02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc-
uments. A 25 -percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su-
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur-
rently in stock (at least 125) — $6; 1-year subscrip-
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new
Notes— $.3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies
of those listed below are available at 10«; each.

Austria Pub. 7955

Bahrain Pub. 8013

Canada Pub. 7769

Egypt Pub. 8152

Gabon Pub. 7968

Guyana Pub. 8095

Iran Pub. 7760

Jordan Pub. 7956

Kenya Pub. 8024

Macao Pub. 8352

Paraguay Pub. 8098

Qatar Pub. 7906

Somali Pub. 7881

Spanish Sahara Pub. 7905

U.S.S.R Pub. 7842

United Arab Emirates .... Pub. 7901

The Inter-American Community in a Larger World.

This pamphlet consists of the text of a statement by
Secretary of State William P. Rogers before the
General Assembly of the Organization of American
States at Washington, D.C., on April 12, 1972. In-
ter-American Series 100. Pub. 8654. 16 pp. 20^

Youth Travel Abroad — What to Know Before You

Go. This booklet which contains information useful
to all Americans traveling overseas is directed par-
ticularly to the interests of young travelers. In-
cluded are tips on visas, charters, consular aid, and
study abroad as well as suggestions for avoiding
problems. General Foreign Policy Series 263. Pub.
8656. 19 pp. 204.

pp.

4
Wo

pp.
rid.

Stockholm and Beyond. Report of the Secretary of
State's Advisory Committee on the 1972 United Na-
tions Conference on the Human Environment. In-
ternational Organization and Conference Series 101.
Pub. 8657. 152 pp. 65('.

Universal Postal Union — Money Orders and Postal
Travelers' Checks. Agreement with other Govern- '
ments. TIAS 7236. 142 pp. 75<*.

Training of FANK [Khmer National Armed Forces]
Personnel in Viet-Nam. Australian Participation.
Memorandum of understanding with Australia, the
Khmer Republic, and Viet-Nam. TIAS 7277. 5 pp.
10«f.

Training of FANK Personnel in Viet-Nam. New

Zealand Participation. Memorandum of understand-
ing with New Zealand, the Khmer Republic, and
Viet-Nam. TIAS 7278. 2 pp. 106

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the agree-
ment of November 4, 1966, as amended. TIAS
7287. 5 pp. 10^.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pur-
suant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with
Denmark and the International Atomic Energy
Agency suspending the agreement of February 29,
1968. TIAS 7289. 2 pp. lO^*.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pur-
suant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol
with Greece and the International Atomic Energy
Agency suspending the agreement of June 15, 1964.
TIAS 7290. 3 pp. 10(*.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam amending the agreement of June 28, 1971, as
amended. TIAS 7292. 2 pp. 10^

Whaling. Amendments to the schedule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention of 1946 adopted at
the twenty-third meeting of the International Whal-
ing Commission. TIAS 7293. 5 pp. lO^*.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Switzerland Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Switzerland and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7294.
11 pp. 10(*.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Sweden Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Sweden and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7295. 11
pp. 10^

Peace Corps. Agreement with Morocco. TIAS 7297.
13 pp. lat

Special Fund for Education — Agrarian Reform Edu-
cation. Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7300.
6 pp. 10^

220

Department of State Bulletin

^ INDEX August 21, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1730

iAyiation. United States and Poland Sign Air
Transport Agreement 218

■/•Congress

jj Congressional Documents Relating to For-

(j eign Policy 217

tj International Aspects of Weather Modifica-

( tion (Pollack) 212

['Foreign Aid. Mr. Williams To Coordinate

,'; U.S. Aid for Philippines Disaster Relief . 209

J I France. Secretary Rogers Hails French Sei-

) zure of Heroin Laboratories (Rogers) . . . 211

\ ! Intelligence. President Appoints John Con

nally to
Board

Foreign Intelligence Advisory

211

Israel. President Nixon Exchanges Greetings
With Prime Minister Meir of Israel (tran-
script of telephone conversation) .... 210

Middle East. President Nixon's News Confer-
ence of July 27 (excerpts) 201

Narcotics Control. Secretary Rogers Hails
French Seizure of Heroin Laboratories
(Rogers) 211

Philippines. Mr. Williams To Coordinate U.S.
Aid for Philippines Disaster Relief . . . 209

Poland. United States and Poland Sign Air
Transport Agreement 218

Presidential Documents

President Nixon Exchanges Greetings With
Prime Minister Meir of Israel 210

President Nixon's News Conference of July
27 (excerpts) 201

Publications

Recent Releases 220

Volume VI in "Foreign Relations" Series for

1947 Released 219

Science

International Aspects of Weather Modifica-
tion (Pollack) 212

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific and
Technical Cooperation (announcement, text
of record of discussions) 214

Treaty Information

Current Actions 218

United States and Poland Sign Air Trans-
port Agreement 218

U.S.S.R. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Scien-
tific and Technical Cooperation (announce-
ment, text of record of discussions) . . . 214

Viet-Nam

North Viet-Nam: The Dike Bombing Issue

(text of report) 207

153d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at

Paris (Porter) 205

President Nixon's News Conference of July

27 (excerpts) 201

Name Index

Connally, John B 211

Meir, Golda 210

Nixon, President 201, 210

Pollack, Herman 212

Porter, William J 205

Rogers, Secretary 211

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 31— August 6

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to July 31 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 179
of July 19.

No. Date

Subject

188 7/31 AID Deputy Administrator to co-
ordinate U.S. Government relief
aid for the Philippines.
*189 7/31 Yost sworn in as Ambassador to

Burundi (biographic data).
1.90 8/3 Porter: 153d plenary session on
Viet-Nam at Paris.

* Not printed.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington, d.c. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

of o

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 11 221

)EPARTMENT URGES EARLY SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION

OF REVISED UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Ladd 234

5£yD
For index see inside back cover

"''''"t Of r^^'^ry

'^6//

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1731
August 28, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $16, foreign $23
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of tlie Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United Slates is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of August 1 1

Press release 195 dated August 11

Secretary Rogers: Good morning, ladies
and gentlemen. Thank you.

I wanted to meet with you this morning to
have a regular press conference. And I would
like to begin by expressing the appreciation
of the administration — the President, my-
self, and all of us in the administration —
for the action that was taken by the House
of Representatives yesterday on the foreign
aid bill. It was a very significant vote, as
you know. The majority was a very substan-
tial majority. And I want to express my per-
sonal appreciation and the appreciation for
the support for all of those who gave their
vote for the Boiling amendment.

I believe that as a result of this vote that
the prospects for peace by the negotiating
route remain hopeful. I think if the House of
Representatives had voted the other way that
our prospects for a negotiated settlement in
Viet-Nam would have been damaged. And I
express particularly the President's appre-
ciation to the bipartisan support we received,
from the Speaker and from the Majority
Leader and from Mr. Boiling [Representa-
tive Richard Boiling] and many others, be-
cause it was, as I say, I believe, a very sig-
nificant vote. And it shows that on important
issues when the national interest is involved,
that we do have bipartisan support and that
the Nation functions — our system functions
well.

I would also like to say that we are pleased
at the fact that the talks in Korea have been
going well. They have now fixed a date — I
think August 11 [August 30] — for renewed
discussions, and we hope that that will lead

to a reduction of tensions in the peninsula
and, eventually, elimination of the hostility
that exists there.

Ladies and gentlemen, now I will be glad
to answer any questions. Mr. Hensley [Stew-
art Hensley, United Press International].

Q. Mr. Secretary, we haven't had an op-
portunity to talk to you since the Russian
forces ivere moved out of Egypt. And I ivould
like to knoiv what you think about this.
Were you gratified by Sadat's action in forc-
ing them out? What do you think of the sit-
uation as it exists notv? And ivhat is the
United States diplomatic stance with regard
to the Middle East at this time in the light
of the recent developments?

Secretary Rogers: Well, the decision, of
course, to reduce the Soviet presence in
Egypt was an internal matter, a decision
made by the Government of Egypt, and I
would not want to comment on it.

I said after the decision was announced by
President Sadat that we would have no
comment on it because it is a matter for
the Government of Egypt to determine.

At the moment it is too soon, I think, to
make any analysis or assessment of the sit-
uation as it presently exists, and I think it
would be a bad time to do it.

We continue to hope that the Security
Council Resolution 242 can be implemented.
It provides the foundation, I think the only
foundation, for the possibility of a peace-
ful solution in the area.

We also continue to favor, and particularly
continue to favor at this time, active nego-
tiations between Egypt and Israel, because

August 28, 1972

221

unless there are active negotiations under-
taken, the prospects for settlement are very
dim.

Now, as I said on my trip, and some of you
heard this, I said that it is the only area in
the world where there have been longstand-
ing hostilities, where wars have occurred,
and where there is a continuing state of hos-
tility, where discussions are not undertaken
by the parties. As you know, discussions are
being undertaken in Korea, between the two
Germanys, in Cyprus, India-Pakistan, in
Viet-Nam — so that the only area of the world
is the Middle East.

Now, I am not necessarily at this stage
talking about direct face-to-face negotia-
tions, but negotiations, active negotiations. If
progress is made in those negotiations, then
the parties would have to negotiate even-
tually directly, because it makes sense if they
are going to get along together to negotiate
directly. But in any event, we think it is
vitally important now that active negotia-
tions be undertaken.

I want to close this answer by saying that
we are particularly gratified, pleased, that
the cease-fire which was initiated by the
United States is now entering its third year.
And it is certainly to everyone's interest that
that cease-fire continue. And we are going to
do what we can diplomatically to be sure that
the cease-fire does continue. If we can play
a useful role in negotiations, we are prepared
to play it.

On the whole, we think that the situa-
tion is relatively stable, and we hope the
cease-fire continues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nixon mid
President Sadat have recently exchanged
messages in connection ivith the 20th anni-
versa7'y of the Egyptian revolution. Presi-
dent Sadat's message seemed to he a rather
ivarm one. And I wonder if the administra-
tion attaches any significance to it, whether
it considers it a signal from President Sadat
for any sort of action from the United States
with regard to the Middle East.

Secretary Rogers: Well, we were pleased

at the tone of President Sadat's letter, and of
course President Nixon's letter was a very
friendly letter. We think it is essential in the
implementation of the policies that we have
been following in this administration to seek
to have good relations with all countries. I
would not want to give any interpretation
to the meaning of the letter beyond its words.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you, in talking about
negotiations in the Middle East, said noth-
ing about an interim settlement. Can you say
tvhether you think prospects now for an in-
terim settlement are any brighter with the
move that President Sadat has taken, and
do you think Israel can afford to make great-
er concessions in a territorial pullback tvith
the absence of the Russians?

Secretary Rogers: Well, on the latter part
of your question, I wouldn't want to make
comments. That is a matter for the Govern-
ment of Israel to decide.

On the first part of your question, address-
ing my comments to the first part of your
question, we continue to believe that the so-
called proximity talks hold out a prospect
for a successful beginning to a complete so-
lution in the Middle East. And we would
hope that somewhere along the line the par-
ties will agree to proximity talks.

As you know, Israel has indicated a will-
ingness to undertake such talks, to take part
in such talks. And we would hope that for
the reasons that I mentioned earlier, that
such talks will begin.

We do think that that provides maybe the
most bright prospect for progress in the
area.

We have some reservation about whether
a complete solution can be achieved in early
negotiations. But we think a step should be
taken, an interim step should be taken, and
this is one that the parties have both indi-
cated that they would be prepared to con-
sider. Therefore we do hope that they will be-
gin at some point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Sargent Shriver says
that President Nixon had peace handed to

222

Department of State Bulletin

him literally in his lap but that he blew it.
Did he bloiv it?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I noticed what
Mr. Shriver said with some interest. And I
think it is political fantasy.

I have undertaken since reading the state-
ment to check, and I asked myself what Mr.
Shriver would have done if there were any
truth to what he said.

Now, if it is true that he felt that there
was a historic opportunity, the greatest in
his lifetime, then certainly he would have
done something about it. You don't sit there
with a historic opportunity, the greatest in
your lifetime, and fiddle with it. You do
something about it.

Now, he had access to anybody concerned.

Now, I have checked this morning to find
out whether he made any such reference
while he was Ambassador in Paris to such a
proposal, whether he made any recommenda-
tions of any kind on the matter, whether he
spoke to anybody at any time while he was in
office or subsequent to that, to leaving office,
on this matter. And so far I have not been
able to find anything.

I have checked with Henry Cabot Lodge,
who was there, and certainly Mr. Shriver
didn't say anything to him about any such
proposal.

I have asked all the members of the ne-
gotiating team that I was able to reach, and
they all say nothing like that ever happened.

I checked the speeches that Mr. Shriver
made, his press conferences, all the tele-
gi'ams he sent in to the Department, includ-
ing the no-distribution telegrams, and he
never made any reference to anything of this
kind at all.

I talked to him on several occasions at
the time he was about to leave the govern-
ment. He never expressed any such thought.
He never suggested any solutions that we
were not pursuing.

I have talked to Mel Laird [Secretary of
Defense], and Mel Laird pointed out that
he briefed Mr. Shriver in Paris about Viet-
namization, and Mr. Shriver told him that

he supported the Vietnamization program.

So if there was such a historic opportu-
nity, let me say Mr. Shriver was miraculous-
ly quiet about it.

He talked to many people in the White
House. In his letter of resignation he ex-
pressed the thought that his objective had
been reached and the beginning of peace in
Viet-Nam had been achieved, and that was
one of the reasons he was leaving.

So as I said to begin with, this, I think, is
not really a fabrication. It is just a political
fantasy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, apart from your person-
al satisfaction about the domestic develop-
ments yesterday in Congress, do you have
any grounds for satisfaction regarding the
way the talks are going in Paris right notv,
public or private?

Secretary Rogers: We have agreed with
the other side not to make any comments
about the private talks. We are going to an-
nounce the sessions when they take place.
But beyond that, we are not going to say
anything. Obviously we continue to have
hope that successful negotiations could be
accomplished. That is why we are there.
And I don't want to say anything beyond
that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, China seems to be one
of the chief topics of conversation ivhen the
President and Prime Minister Tanaka meet
in Honolulu. Can you say if there is a di-
vergence in IJ.S.-Japan policy that will in-
terfere with the operation of U.S. base rights
in Japan as a result of this ?

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so. We
are going to — as you know, the President
is going to meet with Prime Minister Ta-
naka in Hawaii. We are going to consult with
him about many matters. And I am sure this
will be one of the items on the agenda. We do
not believe that there is any reason why the
Japanese desire to improve their relations
with the People's Republic of China should
in any way conflict with the policy that we
have been following. And I believe that the

August 28, 1972

223

discussions that the President will have
with Prime Minister Tanaka will serve to
consolidate any possible differences — to
avoid any possible differences that might
cause any trouble in our relations. And I am
very pleased that we are having this meeting
in Hawaii.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to politics
again, as you know. Secretary Laird has an-
nounced he is going to resign his job after
four years. And I wonder if you have any
plans.

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't have any
plans. And I also think that it is important
for all of us in the administration — I don't
care who he is — to keep in mind that no one
is elected in our country until the American
people have spoken.

Now, obviously things look very encour-
aging for the administration, and all the in-
dications are that the American people fully
support the President. And the margin be-
tween the President and his opponent is
very great.

But I have been around in government
long enough to know that you can't be sure.

And in any event, the American people
will have the opportunity to look at the dif-
ferences, to consider the record of this ad-
ministration, and then decide. Now, the
time to talk about the second administration
is after the American people have spoken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is our campaign
against illegal drug traffic going these days?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we think it's go-
ing about as well as it can. It's a very diffi-
cult problem. As you know, we have made
tremendous seizures of drugs, and we have
put out a good deal of information about the
success of those seizures. We think that it's
making progress, but there are a lot of
problems in connection with it. We have
given a fairly full briefing on this, both to
the Congress and to you ladies and gentle-
men.

We wish we could do more, but we are do-
ing everything we can think of to do.

Lew [Lewis Gulick, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to politics: With
the campaign opening up oioiv, to ivhat ex-
tent do you think foreign policy tvill play a
role in the campaign discussion, and how do
you see the issues?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think foreign
policy will play a very important part in the
campaign, and I say that because in the
final analysis the American people are more
interested in peace probably than anything
else.

It is an issue that is not necessarily spo-
ken about all the time, because sometimes the
more immediate problems are discussed at
greater length. But the American people are
very concerned about a peaceful world, and I
think that is going to be a major issue in this
campaign. And I am obviously prejudiced,
but I think that President Nixon has brought
about a condition in the world that makes
the prospects for peace much better. I think
the world is a more peaceful place than it
was. I think it's a more peaceful world large-
ly because of his leadership.

Now whereas we had turmoil in the United
States in our campuses and our ghettos and
other places, to a large extent because of the
concern of the American people about peace,
most of that now has disappeared. I don't
believe America's standing throughout the
world has ever been higher.

As you know, I just returned from a trip
to 11 nations of the world, including both
friends and adversaries, and in all instances
there was great respect for the President
and his foreign policy.

So I believe it will be an issue, I believe it
will be a very important issue, and I think
that the American people will conclude that
the President has been an outstanding leader
in the cause of peace and he has provided a
foundation which we hope will provide for
a generation of peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, hotv do you see the role
of the Cabinet officers in the discussion of
the issues during an election year?

224

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that in the
case of the Secretary of State and the Sec-
retary of Defense that we should avoid
partisan gatherings. We should avoid sup-
porting particular candidates. We should
avoid fundraising dinners, and we should
avoid any pei'sonal attack, vitriolic attacks
on persons engaged in the process.

The fact is that the foreign policy of the
United States that I just referred to could
only have been achieved with the support of
many leading Democrats in the Congress.
We could not have accomplished what we
have accomplished without the support of
men like John Stennis and Carl Albert and
Hale Boggs and others, many others — I
can't name them all. But traditionally we
have had bipartisan support for our foreign
policy, so I think we have to approach it in
that light.

On the other hand, because this will be an
issue and it is an issue, and because matters
such as the Shriver thing will come to light
from time to time, and I'm in the position
that — I'm one of the few that can answer —
we can't have Foreign Service officers an-
swer— so I will answer those statements. I
will make speeches at foreign affairs groups
and other groups on foreign policy gener-
ally, and I will have press conferences.

In other words, I will do exactly what my
predecessors have done.

Now, I have checked that out. I have seen
some comments to the effect that somehow I
am acting differently than my predecessors.
That is not the case. I have checked it out
and they have all had press conferences; they
all retorted to unfair attacks; they all cor-
rected the record; they all made speeches at
foreign affairs gatherings; they all made
speeches at conventions of different groups,
not political groups; they all had press con-
ferences. So I am going to follow the prec-
edents that have been established.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I folloxv up Lexv's
question and some things that you were say-
ing earlier, talking about bright prospects,
specifically, are you saying, then, that the

prospects are bright that President Nixon
will be able to fulfill his campaign promise
in 1968 that he will end the war, not only the
American involvement, but the war in South-
east Asia?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't have the
exact quote in front of me, but what the
President said at that time was said because
he did not want to get involved in partisan
discussion of the war. He did not want to do
anything that would undercut the position
of President Johnson.

He did have a plan. That plan has been
implemented. We have tried in every possi-
ble way to bring the war to an end by nego-
tiation and by making considerable conces-
sions to the adversary — concessions certainly
compared with what had been made up to
the time of this administration.

And we have — you know, yesterday we
withdrew the last ground combat man from
Viet-Nam, and we have very few left there
now. Our casualties are way down, and we
are going to have the American involvement
continue to be limited. We have taken the
American men out of ground combat.

So I think that the record is a good one.
Of course, we wish that the other side had
been willing to negotiate a settlement so the
war itself would end. But there is no way,
actually, you could force an enemy to stop all
activities unless it is willing to do it. It's pos-
sible that it will continue guerrilla activities
for some time, but we think for all practical
purposes the American involvement in
ground combat has ended.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have the lan-
guage that Sargent Shriver used in his letter
of resignation concerning the Vietnamiza-
tion program and negotiations ?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think he
said anything about negotiations, but he said
something about having achieved his objec-
tives and reaching the beginning of peace
in Viet-Nam. We will make it available
to you, yes. There's no problem on that.

Q. Sir, do you favor the Jackson amend-

August 28, 1972

225

ment for approval of the SALT offensive —

Secretary Rogers: Yes, we support the
resolution — I mean the amendment, of Sena-
tor Jackson. We, as you know, feel the in-
terim agreement is a good agreement. The
Jackson amendment expresses a view of the
Congress, and it's consistent with the view
of the administration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, former Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark is only the latest in a se-
ries of Americans who have been to North
Viet-Nam and who are criticizing American
bombing policy over there. Would you just
respond in general to Americans going to
North Viet-Nam and the kinds of comments
they have been making ?

Secretary Rogers: I think there are two
types of Americans — I suppose you can say
there are a lot of types of Americans that
go to [North] Viet-Nam, but there are two
general classifications.

One is the Jane Fonda type, and I think
people understand the Jane Fonda types.

Ramsey Clark is different. I listened to
him — I think it was him — yesterday on a
broadcast that was repeated here and that
was alleged to be a broadcast that he made
from Hanoi on Radio Hanoi.

Now, having been in the government as
Attorney General myself, I am frank to say
that I was shocked. I was surprised when he
went to [North] Viet-Nam. But to hear the
voice of a former member of President John-
son's Cabinet, a former Attorney General of
the United States, a man who was involved
in sending more than half a million Ameri-
cans to Viet-Nam, a man who was part of
the decisionmaking process that has resulted
in the loss of so many American lives — to
hear him on Radio Hanoi was, to me, con-
temptible.

Imagine going to a nation that we are at
war with, taking their version of everything
that is said, and then going on their radio
and broadcasting back to the United States
and around the world, at a time when Amer-
ican men are flying over there and losing
their lives.

Now, I am not speaking about his views.
Obviously, he has a right to have any view
he wants to, and if he wanted to come back
here and take a position, fine. But to me,
it's — it's beyond belief, frankly, and I can't
remember any time in our history when any-
thing that is comparable has happened. And
I would think that the American people
would be shocked to hear his voice on Radio
Hanoi while the war is in progress, while
American lives are being lost, particularly a
man who was involved in the very decisions
that made the whole thing come about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been talk of a
possible North Vietnamese offensive again,
coming sometime shortly before the election.
Hoiv cnncer'ned are you about that — for the
remaining Americans there, for the South
Vietnamese, arid for the prospects in the
election?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think it is pos-
sible. The Secretary of Defense and the
members of the Military Establishment feel
that there is a real prospect that this might
occur.

We are, of course, watching for it care-
fully. We are convinced that the South Viet-
namese can handle any such activity on the
part of the enemy. So we do not believe that
it presents a threat to the lives of the Amer-
icans under the present conditions.

The United States will continue to support
the South Vietnamese if that should happen,
as we have been in recent months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some people have won-
dered about the feeling in the administration
about the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam.
With the elections only a few months off,
why should North Viet-Nam be more con-
ciliatory noiv than it would be after the elec-
tion? In other tvords, ivhy doesn't it just
ivait to see ivho wins the election?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it may be that
that's what they have had in mind. I think
that President Nixon referred to that in his
last press conference. Once a political op-
ponent says to the enemy, "We'll give you

226

Department of State Bulletin

everything you want if I'm elected," then of
course I think that does impair the prospects
for successful negotiations.

On the other hand, I wouldn't want to
leave the impression that we think that the
negotiations are hopeless, because I think
that the enemy — and this is borne out by
some of the intelligence that we have re-
ceived and also some of the things that have
been said in the press, I think — the enemy
thinks, and I think many of the nations that
are allied with them think, that the Presi-
dent is going to win again. And if that is
the case, they may decide that they would be
in a better position to negotiate on favor-
able terms if they did it now than to wait
until after President Nixon wins again.

Q. A corollary of that, Mr. Secretary.
Would President Nixon be tougher in his
terms after election than before election?

Secretary Rogers: I couldn't answer that.
He certainly isn't going to be any easier.

Q. Mr. Secretary, again on Viet-Nam, I
tvould like to ask a tivo-part question. Would
you anticipate that the bombing of North
Viet-Nam will continue indefinitely if noth-
ing favorable does indeed develop in Paris?
And the second part of the question: Hoiv
tvould you assess the possibilities of a uni-
lateral cease-fire at some time this year in
Viet-Nam if the military situation develops
in a favorable way?

Secretary Rogers: Well, on the first ques-
tion, I never like to answer a question about
"indefinitely," because I don't suppose there
is anything in life that is totally indefinite,
that continues in perpetuity. Certainly we
have no intention of changing our policy
now, and I don't see it in the immediate fu-
ture unless the other side decides to nego-
tiate seriously. And I don't see any prospect
of a unilateral cease-fire.

Q. Mr. Secretary, from your reading of the
documents, is it possible that Sargent Shri-
ver ivas overly hopeful about the negotia-
tions in Paris when he left the government

and not fidly aivare of what the Vietnamiza-
tion program was all about?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think you had
better ask him.

Q. That is \vhat he said yesterday, I think.

Secretary Rogers: What did he say?

Q. I think what he said ivas that when he
left the government he left because he found
that the President did not ivant to pursue
peace through negotiations alone.

Secretary Rogers: I really don't have any
idea what he is talking about. As I said, I
have looked through all the records that we
could find so far. Maybe there is something
else. But he never suggested anything like
this at all at any time, in writing or orally.
Certainly if the President of the United
States is sitting with peace in his lap, as
Mr. Shriver says, and Mr. Shriver knows
that peace is in his lap, he could pick up the
phone and call me, or call the President, or
talk to Cabot Lodge or the other negotiators
and say, "My God, peace is in the President's
lap." He didn't mention anything of that
kind.

I really think it is, as I say, a political
fantasy. I don't want to be unfair to him
and say it's a total fabrication. Maybe in his
own mind he sort of, now that he's a candi-
date, he thinks it happened. But obviously it
didn't happen. It's really bunk.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just putting that an-
other way, you're saying that he at no point
disagreed with the Viet-Nam policy followed
by the administration while he was Ambas-
sador to France?

Secretary Rogers: I am saying more than
that. I am saying he not only didn't disagree,
which I can understand — he says, "I am
working for an administration; I don't want
to disagree with them." I am not talking
about why he shouldn't have said something
publicly. That's a different matter; I think
he has got a valid point there. But sup-
pose it is true as he says that this was — I
think he said this was the most historic op-

August 28, 1972

227

portunlty in his lifetime — whatever he is
talking about. Now, he would have told
somebody. I mean, he had access to me. He
could pick up the phone any time and say,
"Bill, this is Sarge Shriver. The President
has a historic opportunity for peace. Peace
is in his lap. Why don't you do something
about it?" And I would have said, "Sarge,
what is it? Please tell me, quick." [Laugh-
ter.]

No, he didn't say anything like that. He
didn't write anything; he didn't tell any-
body. If he did, I can't find them. We are
looking. We are asking everybody he talked
to, did he know, did he ever hear Sargent
Shriver say peace was in the President's
lap? And did he ever say to anybody, this is
my most historic opportunity? I'll tell you
this: He missed it. If this was his most his-
toric opportunity, he really missed it, be-
cause he didn't speak to a soul about it. And
he didn't speak to a soul about it when he
came back here. He talked to me and a lot of
other people in the Department. He talked
to a lot of people in the White House and
never mentioned it, to my knowledge.

Now, maybe he talked to somebody I don't
know about, but so far we haven't found out
about it. He certainly didn't bring it to the
attention of anybody who could have done
anything about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I clarify a remark
you made on the Mideast, that both sides
are prepared to consider this? In the past
you have said that Egypt hadn't given a re-
sponse to the U.S. proposal for close prox-
imity talks. Have you received now a re-
sponse from the Egyptians?

Secretary Rogers: Not really. I said that
both sides had talked to some extent about an
interim agreement and about opening the
Suez. So at one time it appeared that there
were prospects that they would be willing to
discuss this; now, whether they still are or
not I am not sure. Israel- has indicated that
they are prepared to engage in such talks.
We have not had any definite answer really
from President Sadat, and I'm not seeking
one. I know he has problems in his country.

We understand them. I'm not seeking any
response, and I'm not sure that we will get
one in the immediate future.

I would hope that at some point along the
line we can have discussions with him or his
representatives on the subject.

Q. What are we thinking of, something
during the General Assembly session in New
York, hotel talks?

Secretary Rogers: Well, as you know, we
have been thinking about the prospects for
proximity talks for a long time. We haven't
indicated where they would take place or
how they would take place. That would be up
to the parties themselves. We have indicated
we would be willing to play a role in that
process if it was desired.

Q. Mr. Secretary, several weeks ago the
State Department released a document ex-
plaining the situation with regard to bombs
falling on the dikes in North Viet-Nam. Have
you today any further elucidation of how
these bombs have come to fall on dikes in
North Viet-Nam?

Secretary Rogers: No. I think the story is
told. I don't think there is any dispute about
it now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I go back to my
original question on the Middle East just in
order to clear up something in my own mind,
possibly? You say this is an internal matter,
having the troops out. But I'm thinking of
the President's report on foreign policy early
this year, in which it was said that the pres-
ence of the Soviet forces in Egypt and the
equipment there was a matter of great con-
cern, posed a threat to the peace not only of
the area but to the peace of the entire world.
Now you are saying that the condition there
looks relatively stable. Although you don't
say so, the implication would be that the re-
moval of the troops has gone a long ways to
increasing the stability of the Middle East.
And I am just trying to find out whether I
should use the President's statement as a
touchstone or your statement as a touch-
stone, and if not, how do you reconcile them?

228

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Rogers: Well, that's an editorial
judgment, Mr. Hensley. As you know, I don't
want to make any further comment at this
time about the significance of the decision.
We do believe that the decision was made by
Egypt as a matter of internal affairs. We
think any comment by the United States
might be misconstrued, however bland it
might be. And for that reason I don't want
to comment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted as say-
ing in Kuivait and Rome that there should
be direct negotiations betiveen the Arabs and
the Israelis. You seem to back away from
that a bit here today. Has your thinking on
that changed since your trip?

Secretary Rogers: No. I didn't back away
from it. It is quite consistent. I said the
same thing in Kuwait as I said here today.
I don't know if there is anybody here that
was there or not. But I said in these other
areas of the world there are direct negotia-
tions. And I think it is the best and easiest
way to discuss differences.

On the other hand, I did say that I under-
stood it might be difficult for Egypt to en-
gage in direct negotiations to begin with,
and we would hope that, if that was the case,
that at least they would start in these prox-
imity talks or some other way. In other
words, we are very convinced that active ne-
gotiation, so that there is an active ex-
change of views on these subjects, is vital.

Now, what form is followed is up to the
parties. I think direct negotiations would be
the better way to do it, but proximity talks
would be another way to do it. Either way
would be acceptable to the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, another point of clarifi-
cation. You have indicated that there is some
hope for the peace talks in Paris. You have
also said that the bombing will continue un-
til the other side indicates its willingness to
negotiate seriously. There seems to be an in-
ternal inconsistency.

Secretary Rogers: No. If I said that, it
was just a rhetorical slip. What I am talking
about is, we plan to continue the present

policy. Now, if some agreement is reached
based — as a result of serious negotiations,
that's a different matter. At the present time
we intend to continue the present policy. If
serious negotiations should — if we should
arrive at some other conclusion by agree-
ment in the negotiations, of course, that
would be a different matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I ivant to go back to the
Middle East. Does the policy, does your pol-
icy as you advocated in 1969 on the Middle
East, does it still stand? This is regarding
the withdraivals.

Secretary Rogers: Our policy in this area
has not changed. We have been consistent.
We haven't changed.

Anything else?

Q. That means that you continue to say
that any changes in the Middle East should
involve only insubstantial alterations of ter-
ritory ?

Secretary Rogers: As I say, because of the
colloquy that has existed over the years, I
am just saying that our position is the same,
it hasn't changed any. I don't want to pick
out any particular portion of it and refer to
it alone.

154th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambas-
sador William J. Porter, head of the U.S.
delegation, at the ISJtth plenary session of
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Au-
gust 10.

Press release 194 dat«d August 10

Ladies and gentlemen: Careful analysis of
your side's statements, and comparison be-
tween these statements and the actions your
side has undertaken, throw an instructive
light on issues considered in these talks.

Let us consider your insistent demands
for what you term a comprehensive settle-
ment embracing both political and military

August 28, 1972

229

questions. You maintain that your aim is a
simultaneous resolution of these two cate-
gories of problems. In practice, however, you
give absolute priority to military operations.
You have sent as many as 12 regular North
Vietnamese divisions to invade South Viet-
Nam. You exhort those subject to your con-
trol to intensify this offensive, to make still
greater exertions toward the ever-elusive
goal of final victory. It is clear that you
subordinate all other considerations to the
military imperatives of your attempt to
conquer the South.

It would seem logical that your position
in this forum should reflect the primacy you
give in practice to the military situation.
Acknowledge that ending the combat is the
foremost problem here, and we can begin to
discuss concrete measures to restore peace.
Your presentations here reveal the further
incongruity that on the one hand you re-
peatedly complain about certain aspects of
the war and yet on the other hand you refuse
to discuss the practical means to its termi-
nation. Your statements have increasingly
contained protests and allegations about sup-
posed "war crimes" committed by the Re-
public of Viet-Nam and its allies. This is un-
convincing propaganda, especially when set
beside your record of severity and harshness
during your current massive offensive.

Moreover, regarding United States air and
naval activities against North Viet-Nam,
you are fully aware that you have called
down these measures upon yourselves by un-
leashing your invasion of the South. Although
an end of the warfare is readily attainable,
through the internationally supervised cease-
fire proposed by President Nixon on May 8,
you are continuing your military aggression
throughout Indochina. ^ How can this obses-
sive pursuit of a military solution be recon-
ciled with your claim to seek a comprehen-
sive settlement?

Moreover, your criticism that President
Nixon's peace proposals do not address po-
litical questions is rendered meaningless by

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

your refusal to begin the search for political
solutions by discussions with representatives
of the Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam. Instead, you make war upon that gov-
ernment and the many millions of South
Vietnamese who honor its legitimately con-
stituted authority. Here again, your behavior
clearly indicates that you give priority to the
field of battle and that you relegate political
discussion to an indefinite future.

On the other hand, our proposals ad-
dress the wartime situation which you have
created. We offer an end to the killing, not
through capitulation as you assert, but
through a mutually acceptable cease-fire. We
offer a complete withdrawal of all United
States forces from Viet-Nam within four
months of the internationally supervised
cessation of hostilities and the return of
American prisoners of war. With the sub-
sidence of warfare, examination of political
issues in their true perspective could take
place, unimpeded by the dictates and hazards
of military necessity. Vietnamese themselves
could conduct their discussions on the politi-
cal future of South Viet-Nam in calm and
safety. Thus, reason could prevail over the
animosities which your present military ag-
gression only aggravates. Is there any rea-
son why this approach, by Vietnamese among
themselves, could not develop a lasting and
equitable solution?

In sum. President Nixon's proposals of
May 8 would as a matter of priority remove
the wartime hardships and obstacles hinder-
ing eventual settlement of all problems in
Viet-Nam, whether military or political in
nature. These proposals meet your own pro-
fessed objectives: peace and self-determi-
nation for the South Vietnamese people.
They relate in practical terms to the new
situation your intensification of the war has
occasioned. You should, therefore, under-
take a reasonable examination of these pro-
posals in a constructive effort to explore
mutually satisfactory avenues of resolving
this conflict. Let it not be said that reliance
on arms for settlement of disputes is both
the slogan of your leadership and the sorrow
of your people.

230

Department of State Bulletin

U.S. Assistance to Bangladesh—
the First Six Months

Following is an AID announcement issued
on August 2, together with the text of a six-
moyith report on U.S. relief assistance to
Bangladesh.

AID press release 63 issued Augrust 2

AID ANNOUNCEMENT

A massive humanitarian response by the
United States has helped avert starvation
and widespread human suffering in recent
months among millions of men, women, and
children in Bangladesh. So declared Maurice
J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the
Agency for International Development, with
the issuance on August 2 of a six-month
report detailing U.S. relief assistance to
June 30, coinciding with the first half year
of Bangladesh independence.

The total U.S. contribution to help that
emerging nation cope with the staggering
social and economic problems growing out
of last year's civil strife amounted to $267.5
million. That figure, Mr. Williams noted,
represents about one-third of the combined
contributions of all donor nations.

To counter the threat of famine, the
United States has committed, since March
alone, 700,000 tons of Food for Peace (P.L.
480) foodgrains and edible oil, valued at
$88.2 million, according to the report.

"But tonnage and dollar amounts hardly
tell the whole story," Mr. Williams, who is
also Coordinator of U.S. Relief Assistance to
Bangladesh, pointed out. "What matters
most is the people. They have suffered a
tragedy of immense proportions. We are
doing all in our power to help them."

In the six months covered by the report,
U.S. relief contributions were shown to be
in the form of: food and logistical support
totaling $132 million; grants to U.S. volun-
tary agencies, $19.5 million; and economic
assistance to the Government of Bangladesh,
$115 million.

"Here, too," Mr. Williams declared, "it

is essential to translate the report figures
into human terms." He gave these illustra-
tions :

—700,000 tons of Food for Peace wheat,
rice, and vegetable oil will feed 4.4 million
persons for a whole year.

— 115,000 tons of fertilizer will increase
Bangladesh's grain production by 690,000
tons, enough to feed another 4 million per-
sons for a year.

— 100,000 bales of cotton will clothe more
than 16 million Bengalees and provide em-
ployment for additional thousands in mills
and factories now shut down.

— Repair to coastal embankments will give
employment to 160,000 laborers this winter
and provide protection from salt water dam-
age to agricultural production while also
protecting against cyclones following the
present monsoons.

— U.S. voluntary agencies have focused
on rehabilitation of individual families who
have lost their homes. Nearly 2 million Ben-
galees who were without shelter have di-
rectly benefited from such assistance.

The U.S. aid report notes that "sustained
international effort of rehabilitation assist-
ance" will be required over the 1973 fiscal
year and points out that the administration
has requested a further $100 million "to
permit the United States to do its propor-
tionate share in this large scale humani-
tarian endeavor."

TEXT OF REPORT

U.S. Assistance to Bangladesh —
THE First Six Months

Bangladesh came into existence facing stagger-
ing difficulties. Its initial success in meeting these
difficulties has been due in great measure to the
generous humanitarian response of many countries
which have provided foods, raw materials for in-
dustry, transport and other urgent assistance
amounting to about $800 million.

The U.S. has provided $267.5 million or one-third
of the total.

Our response to the humanitarian needs of Ban-
gladesh during its first six months of independence
has been three-pronged:

August 28, 1972

231

— PL 480 food and grants to move food, primarily
under UN auspices, to counter the immediate
threat of hunger ($132 million);

— Grants to U.S. voluntary agencies to assist in
resettlement of thousands of Bengalee families
($19.5 million);

— Help to the Government of Bangladesh to re-
store basic facilities and rehabilitate the economy
($115 million).

Seven hundred thousand tons of PL 480 food-
grains and edible oil, valued at $88.2 million, have
been committed since March. At the discretion of
the Government of Bangladesh, this food is dis-
tributed free to returned refugees and other desti-
tute families or sold so that the proceeds provide
employment opportunities for the people on labor-
intensive projects.

A grant to the U.N. Relief Operation — Dacca
(UNROD) of $35 million helps with the cost of
logistical support directly related to the movement
of food into the country. These funds have been
spent largely for chartering river transport needed
to supplement the extensively-damaged rail and
road transport system. In addition, our grant —
which has accounted for some 50 percent of
UNROD's total cash resources — has been used for
vacuvators and cargo handling equipment to ex-
pedite food deliveries.

More recently, A.LD. financed the services of the
Manhattan, the U.S.'s largest merchant vessel, to
serve as a floating silo and thus expedite the han-
dling of incoming shipments of food. Also we have
chartered aircraft to airdrop food in isolated vil-
lages during the monsoons. Although these serv-
ices are not included in our grant to the UN, they
directly support the UN-sponsored food relief pro-
gram and are under the control of UNROD.

Through a series of grants totalling almost $20
million, we have recognized the important role
U.S. voluntary agencies perform in responding
rapidly to urgent human needs. They have focussed
on the rehabilitation of individual families who lost
their homes, possessions and means of livelihood. A
large part of these funds— through CARE, Catholic
Relief Services, Church World Service, Medical As-
sistance Programs and the Community Development
Foundation — are to provide construction materials
and other assistance in the rebuilding of thousands
of homes. Almost two million Bengalees who were
without shelter have directly benefited from this
U.S. assistance. Voluntary agencies also are pro-
viding medical care and distributing tools, bullocks
and equipment to thousands of farmers, fishermen,
tradesmen and small businessmen so that they can
become self-sufficient. Through the International
Rescue Committee we have supported the important
work of the Cholera Research Laboratory and pro-
vided stipends to permit students to resume their
studies. A grant to the American Red Cross fur-
thered the work of the International Committee of

the Red Cross among the minority population and
other specially needy groups in Bangladesh.

The third prong of our assistance has been direct
bilateral grant aid of $115 million to the Govern-
ment of Bangladesh to finance the rehabilitation of
basic facilities and to rehabilitate the economy.
These funds are for the importation of commodi-
ties— such as cotton, tallow, fertilizer, and pesti-
cides— to revive local industry and to increase food
production. Our grant also finances repair and
construction of coastal embankments, restoration of
power supplies, rebuilding of roads and bridges,
rehabilitation of airports, reconstruction of schools
and the procurement and printing of textbooks and
library materials lost during the civil war. In these
and other priority areas, A.I.D. funds have financed
the services of U.S. contractors with the expertise
and prior experience to do a job quickly and well.
While the grant finances urgently needed project
equipment from the United States, a significant
amount of the grant funds are used for local costs,
particularly for labor and locally available materials
and services. But even the dollars used to purchase
the local currency for such local costs are in turn
utilized by the Bangladesh Government to buy ad-
ditional priority commodities from the United
States. By such arrangements our grant assistance
serves directly to stimulate the economy and gen-
erate employment, while also ensuring that many
of the dollars we spend ultimately come back to
the United States.

In fiscal year 1972, the U.S. Congress appropri-
ated $200 million for emergency relief in South
Asia — $27.7 million was committed for relief needs
prior to the emergence of Bangladesh as an inde-
pendent country and $172.2 million since that event.
Other U.S. commitments to Bangladesh include $4.6
million from the fiscal year 1972 Contingency Fund
and $90.7 million in PL 480 resources — for a total
U.S. commitment to Bangladesh since independence
of $267.5 million.

For fiscal year 1973 the Administration has re-
quested a further $100 million to permit the U.S. to
do its proportionate share in this large scale hu-
manitarian endeavor, which will require a sustained
international effort of rehabilitation assistance over
the next year.

To summarize, U.S. Government assistance for
Bangladesh during the first six months has been as
follows:

(in million f)

Food and logistical support for mov-
ing of food, mainly through the UN

700,000 tons of Food for Peace .... $88.2
High protein food for UNICEF

Child feeding 2.5

Grant to the UN 35.3

S.S. Manhattan 4.0

Airdrop Services (Southern Air) .. 2.0

132.0

232

Department of State Bulletin

(in million t)

Grants to Voluntary Agencies

CARE— housing 5.3

Catholic Relief Services — housing

and rehabilitation 8.0

Church World Service — housing .. 1.0

American Red Cross — nutritional

and medical assistance 1.0

Community Development Founda-
tion— housing .2

Medical Assistance Programs —

medical and housing .9

Foundation for Airborne Relief —

airdrop services 1.5

International Rescue Committee —

educational and health services .. 1.6

19.5

115.0

Grant to the Government of Bangla-
desh for the following purposes:

Essential commodity imports 34.4

Repair of coastal embankments .... 15.0

Rehabilitation of power stations

and lines 16.3

Rehabilitation of schools and li-
braries 13.3

Canal excavations, inland water-
ways and dredging 6.0

Rural health centers 5.0

Reconstruction of bridges, roads,
airports and other needs to be
defined 25.0

Other Relief Assistance 1.0

Total 267.5

President Signs Executive Order
Continuing Regulation of Exports

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Continuing the Regulation of Exports

By virtue of the authority vested in the President
by the Constitution and statutes of the United States,
including Section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917,
as amended (12 U.S.C. 95a), and in view of the con-
tinued existence of the national emergencies declared

by Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16, 1950, and
Proclamation No. 4074 of August 15, 1971, and the
importance of continuing (a) to exercise the neces-
sary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of
their significance to the national security of the
United States; (b) to further significantly the for-
eign policy of the United States and to aid in ful-
filling its international responsibilities; and (c) to
protect the domestic economy from the excessive
drain of scarce materials and reduce the serious in-
flationary impact of abnormal foreign demand, it is
hereby ordered:

Section 1. Notwithstanding the expiration of the
Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, the
provisions for administration of that act contained in
Executive Order 11533 of June 4, 1970 shall continue
in full force and effect and shall authorize the exer-
cise and administration of export controls, under the
authority vested in me as President of the United
States by section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917,
as amended (12 U.S.C. 95a).

Sec. 2. Except to the extent another basis is pro-
vided in the second sentence of Section 3 of this
order, all rules and regulations issued by the Secre-
tary of Commerce, published in Title 15, Chapter 3,
Subchapter B, of the Code of Federal Regulations,
Parts 368 to 399 inclusive, and all orders, licenses and
other forms, of administrative action issued or taken
pursuant thereto, shall until amended or revoked by
the Secretary of Commerce, remain in full force and
effect, the same as if issued or taken pursuant to this
order, except that the maximum fine which may be
imposed under § 387.1(a)(1) shall not exceed $10,000
and that the civil penalty provided for under § 387.1
(b)(3) will not be applicable to any violation of the
regulations under this order.

Sec. 3. The delegations of authority in this order
shall not affect the authority of any agency or official
pursuant to any other delegation of Presidential
authority, presently in effect or hereafter made,
under Section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, as
amended. Those regulations issued under the Export
Control Act of 1949, as amended, to implement for-
eign policy set forth in Executive Orders Nos. 11322
of January 5, 1967 and 11419 of July 29, 1968, shall
until amended or revoked by the Secretary of Com-
merce continue to apply as regulations issued under
such orders.

C/h^^K^/^

' No. 11677; 37 Fed. Reg. 15483.

The White House,
August 1, 1972.

August 28, 1972

233

THE CONGRESS

Department Urges Early Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification
of Revised Universal Copyright Convention

Statement by Bruce C. Ladd, Jr.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities ^

The Department of State appreciates very
much having this opportunity to present its
views on the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971.
Accompanying me are George D. Cary, Reg-
ister of Copyrights, Library of Congress, and
Harvey J. Winter, Director, Office of Busi-
ness Protection, Department of State. Mr.
Cary also has a prepared statement on the
revised Universal Copyright Convention
which discusses some of the more technical
aspects of the convention.

Before taking up the substance of the Paris
revision of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, I believe that it is desirable and useful
to set this revision in its proper historical
perspective.

Just 20 years ago, in August 1952, the In-
tergovernmental Copyright Conference to
negotiate a new worldwide copyright con-
vention was convened in Geneva, Switzer-
land, largely at the initiative of the United
States. One of the primary reasons for con-
vening this conference was to develop a new
copyright agreement which would be ac-
ceptable to those states that had not been
able to join the only existing worldwide con-

'■ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Aug. 2. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.

vention, the Berne Convention, for a variety
of reasons. The major developed country in
this category was the United States.

The Universal Copyright Convention
(UCC) was successfully negotiated, and the
United States ratified the convention in 1954.
It came into force in 1955 and has been the
keystone of our international copyright rela-
tions since that date. As of the present date,
61 states are parties to the UCC.

The next important development in the in-
ternational copyright field was the Stock-
holm Intellectual Property Conference in
1967. One of the objectives of this confer-
ence was to revise the Berne Convention and
include special provisions for the benefit of
developing countries.

Since the United States was not a party to
the Berne Convention, the United States del-
egation attended the Stockholm Conference
only in an observer capacity. The revision of
the Berne Convention brought forth the so-
called Stockholm Protocol, which contained
special provisions for developing countries in
acquiring rights to copyrighted works for
educational purposes. The protocol gave de-
veloping countries very broad and practically
uncontrolled privileges regarding works
copyrighted in Berne member states. Thus,
there was a drastic shift in the direction of
international copyright that threatened the
foundations on which all multilateral copy-
right protection had been built since the ne-

234

Department of State Bulletin

gotiation of the Berne Convention in 1886.
Many U.S. works which had been protected
under this convention by simultaneous pub-
lication in a Berne member state were di-
rectly affected by this development.

Generally, the Stockholm Protocol was
considered unacceptable by the developed
countries, and by the end of 1967 it was se-
riously questioned whether any important
developed countries would approve the pro-
tocol. As a matter of fact, to date no major
developed country has ratified or acceded to
the Stockholm Protocol.

When it became apparent during 1968 that
developed countries were not going to accept
the protocol, the developing countries, under
the leadership of India, made their position
clear. If positive steps were not taken to
meet the legitimate needs of developing
countries for copyrighted works for educa-
tion, then these countries would seriously
consider withdrawing from the Berne Con-
vention. Because of a special clause in the
UCC known as the Berne safeguard clause,
countries renouncing Berne could not rely on
the UCC for protection in countries that
were parties to both conventions. The result
of the renunciation of Berne would have been
the exodus of the developing countries from
both major copyright conventions and a vir-
tual collapse of the international copyright
system as we know it today. Undoubtedly
the unauthorized use of copyrighted works,
that is, "book piracy," would have become
an accepted practice in these developing
countries with resultant adverse effects on
American authors and publishers and on our
balance of payments position. The United
States is the leading book-exporting country
of the world and enjoys a strongly favorable
balance of trade in books. The official De-
partment of Commerce figures for 1971 show
U.S. book exports in the amount of $177 mil-
lion and U.S. book imports totaling $101 mil-
lion. However, since these official statistics
do not include shipments valued at less than
$500, the true export figure is substantially
greater. Further, these trade statistics do
not include several million dollars a year in

"invisible exports" in the form of royalties
received for permission to translate or re-
publish American works.

To forestall such a development the United
States and other developed countries includ-
ing the United Kingdom, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, and France took the initia-
tive in carrying out a series of preparatory
meetings in 1969 and 1970 which paved the
way to the Paris Conference in July 1971 to
revise simultaneously the UCC and Berne.
This preparatory work was undertaken with
the full cooperation of the developing coun-
tries.

The two basic objectives of this simultane-
ous revision were set forth in the "Washing-
ton Recommendation" of September 1969 :

1. The level of protection in the UCC would
be improved by the adoption of certain min-
imum rights; that is, the rights of repi'oduc-
tion, public performance, and broadcasting.
At the same time, special provisions for the
benefit of developing countries would be in-
cluded in the UCC. Finally, the so-called
Berne safeguard clause would be suspended
to permit developing countries to leave the
Berne Convention if they wished without
penalty under the UCC.

2. The Stockholm Protocol would be sepa-
rated from the Berne Convention, and in
turn, the developing countries would be able
to substitute the special provisions included
for their benefit in the UCC. However, as a
protective measure, it was provided that the
Stockholm Protocol would not be separated
from the 1967 text of the Berne Convention
until such time as France, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States had ratified
the revised text of the UCC. The purpose of
this was to make ratification or accession to
the revised text of the UCC, which would
contain new concessions for developing coun-
tries, the quid pro quo for separation of the
Stockholm Protocol from the Berne Conven-
tion.

Because of the interrelationship and, in
certain respects, the interdependence of the
two conventions, the diplomatic conferences

August 28, 1972

235

for the revision of the UCC and the Berne
Convention were held at the same time in
Paris at UNESCO [United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization] ,
July 5-24, 1971. In all, 45 member states of
the UCC participated in the conference, 30
other states had observer delegations, and
three intergovernmental organizations and
16 nongovernmental organizations were rep-
resented at the conference.

At the Paris Conference there was a sig-
nificant reversal in the trend represented by
the Stockholm Protocol. A number of impor-
tant demands of developing countries were
abandoned at Paris with respect to broad-
casting rights and broad uses of literary and
artistic works for "teaching, study and re-
search in all fields of education." Essen-
tially, the concessions for developing coun-
tries at the Paris Conference were limited
to the rights of translation and reproduction.

This revision of the UCC in Paris was the
first since its adoption in 1952. It is gener-
ally recognized that the UCC was improved
by the introduction of certain basic rights
of authors. This has been accomplished in
the following way. Article IV bis makes spe-
cific reference to article I. Article I, which
remains unchanged from the 1952 conven-
tion, sets forth the undertaking of each con-
tracting state to provide for "the adequate
and effective protection of the rights of au-
thors and other copyright proprietors in lit-
erary, scientific and artistic works, including
writings, musical, dramatic and cinemato-
graphic works, and paintings, engravings
and sculpture." The new article IV bis pro-
vides that "The rights referred to in Article
I shall include the basic rights ensuring the
author's economic interests, including the
exclusive right to authorize reproduction by
any means, public performance and broad-
casting." These rights apply to works pro-
tected under the convention either in their
original form or in any form recognizably
derived from the original. It is further pro-
vided that any contracting state may, by its
domestic legislation, make exceptions to such
rights that do not conflict with the spirit and

provisions of the convention, but that any
state whose legislation so provides shall nev-
ertheless accord a reasonable degree of ef-
fective protection to each of the rights to
which exception has been made.

Article V bis, V ter, and V quater are the
new articles in the revised UCC which par-
allel articles in the revised Berne Convention
providing special exceptions for developing
countries.

Article V bis sets forth the procedure
whereby a contracting state regarded as a
developing country in conformity with the
established practice of the General Assembly
of the United Nations may take advantage
of the special translation and reproduction
provisions.

In connection with the two key provisions
of the UCC revision, article V te?- on trans-
lations and article V quater on reproduction,
the following points should be stressed:

1. Compulsory licenses under article V ter
are to be granted in connection with "teach-
ing, scholarship or research" and under arti-
cle V quater for "systematic instructional
activities." The emphasis obviously is on use
of copyrighted materials for educational pur-
poses.

2. Article V ter reduces the present seven-
year period of absolute exclusive translation
rights to three years for a developing coun-
try and "in the case of a translation into a
language not in general use in one or more
developed countries" that are party to either
the 1952 or 1971 text of the UCC, the period
can be further reduced to one year.

3. The applicable periods of exclusivity,
during which no license can be issued under
article V quater, vary. In general, the period
is five years, but a three-year period is ap-
plicable to "works of the natural and physi-
cal sciences, including mathematics, and of
technology" and the term is seven years for
"works of fiction, poetry, drama and music,
and for art books."

4. Certain provisions in articles V ter and
V quater prohibit the export of copies and
prescribe that the compulsory license shall
be valid only for publication in the contract-

236

Department of State Bulletin

ing state where it has been applied for. It
follows that these provisions are considered
as prohibiting a licensee from having copies
reproduced outside the territory of the con-
tracting state granting the license. However,
as explained in the report of the General
Rapporteur, this prohibition does not apply
under certain carefully defined conditions;
e.g., "the Contracting State granting the li-
cence has within its territory, no printing or
reproduction facilities, or, such facilities ex-
ist but are incapable for economic or practi-
cal reasons of reproducing the copies."

5. Both articles V ter and V quater state
that "due provision shall be made at the na-
tional level to ensure" that compulsory li-
censes provide for "just compensation that
is consistent with standards of royalties nor-
mally operating in the case of licences freely
negotiated between persons in the two coun-
tries concerned."

The administrative and final clauses of the
UCC were also revised. Among the more im-
portant changes were the suspension of the
Berne safeguard clause for developing coun-
tries and an increase from 12 to 18 countries
in the membership of the important Inter-
governmental Copyright Committee. In ad-
dition, UNESCO was asked to continue as
the Secretariat for that Committee.

The two protocols in the revised UCC cor-
respond in effect to the two protocols of the
1952 convention. Protocol 1 relates to the
application of the convention to works of
stateless persons and refugees, and protocol
2 concerns the application of the convention
to the works of certain international organi-
zations.

At the conclusion of the UCC revision con-
ference, 26 states signed that convention, in-
cluding the United States and other devel-
oped countries such as the United Kingdom,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Sweden, and Japan. Subsequent to the
conference, four additional states signed the
convention.

During the past year some concern has
been expressed about the compulsory licens-
ing provisions of the Paris revision of the

UCC. In this connection we wish to point
out that the concept of compulsory licensing
in the revised UCC is by no means new. A
provision for compulsory licensing for trans-
lation rights has been an integral part of
that convention since its negotiation in 1952.
To the best of our knowledge, the right to a
compulsory license has never been invoked
in any UCC member state. Instead, accepta-
ble terms have been worked out between the
interested parties without recourse to a com-
pulsory license. It is impossible to draw any
firm conclusion from this past experience,
but at least it suggests the possibility that
compulsory licensing may not be resorted to
on any widespread basis.

As I have previously indicated, one of the
basic purposes of the diplomatic conference
in Paris was to effect revision of the Berne
Copyright Convention parallel to that of the
UCC. In this connection the Stockholm Act
of Berne was replaced by the new Paris Act.
Although the substantive copyright changes
adopted at the Stockholm Conference were
repeated without any changes in the Paris
Act, the special exceptions for developing
countries contained in the Stockholm Proto-
col were replaced by an appendix to the
Paris Act of the Berne Convention. Taking
into account certain differences in structure
between the Berne Convention and the UCC,
these exceptions follow very closely the ex-
ceptions in the revised text of the UCC. Once
the Paris Act of Berne comes into force, a
country may not ratify or accede to the
Stockholm Act and the protocol. Because of
the continuing concern of U.S. copyright in-
terests about the protocol, this is a plus as
far as the United States is concerned. In
this connection it should be noted that one of
the conditions for the entry into force of the
new Paris Act is that France, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States be-
come bound by the revised text of the UCC.

The parallelism between the new texts of
the UCC and Berne was carefully devised in
order to give developing countries the option
of staying in the Berne Convention. Further,
the parallelism was designed to maintain the

August 28, 1972

237

equilibrium between the two conventions.

The Department of State and other inter-
ested agencies believe that ratiiication of the
revised Universal Copyright Convention is in
the national interest. The principal and over-
riding reason for this position is one that I
have mentioned earlier in my statement: If
the legitimate needs of developing countries
for access to foreign copyrighted materials
are not satisfied, then these countries may
well exercise their sovereign right to de-
nounce their international treaty commit-
ments. Once they do this, they can, of course,
quite legally reproduce or translate any and
all copyrighted materials they desire without
authorization, regardless of the use to which
they are to be put, and without the require-
ment of making any compensation. They
can, in fact, go even further by exporting
such materials. If such an eventuality oc-
curs, it will mark the end of the interna-
tional copyright system, with resultant ad-
verse effects on the interests of all U.S. copy-
right proprietors abroad.

There is now clear evidence that such ac-
tion is seriously being studied in a develop-
ing country which is a party to both copy-
right conventions. We have been informed
by our Embassy in Islamabad that on May
8, 1972, the Pakistan Minister of Education
announced that his country was considering
withdrawing from the Universal Copyright
Convention and the Berne Convention. As a
result of consultations between U.S. Embas-
sy officials and officials of the Pakistan Min-
isti-y of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Ed-
ucation, we have ascertained that the pri-
mary reason for considering withdrawal is
dissatisfaction with the two copyright con-
ventions that are now in force. However, the
Pakistani officials consulted have indicated
their satisfaction with the revised UCC and
Berne Convention. They are concerned,
nonetheless, that many years may pass be-
fore these conventions will be ratified by a
sufficient number of states so that they can
go into effect. And, as I have noted above,
four specific countries, including the United
States, must ratify the revised UCC before

the revised Berne Convention can enter into
force. I would be very surprised if there are j
not other developing countries that share
the concern of Pakistan.

We know that there are certain articles
which do not entirely satisfy one group or :
another. But the negotiation of an impor- fl
tant convention with a large number of
states in attendance involves give-and-take.
It is the Department of State's belief that
the revised UCC constitutes a fair and just
compromise between the developed countries
that produce the bulk of copyrighted mate-
rials and the developing countries that wish
to use these materials for educational and
research purposes on the best possible terms.

During the preparatory work for the re-
vision of the UCC the Department of State
and the Copyright Office consulted with the
principal U.S. private copyright groups
through the Department's International
Copyright Advisory Panel to obtain their
views on the proposed revision. Because of
the diverse nature of these copyright groups,
there were divergent views on some of the
key points of the proposed revision. In the
development of the U.S. position for the dip-
lomatic conference all views were carefully
considered, and we believe that we were suc-
cessful in arriving at a position that was
balanced and fair.

The product of the conference, the revised
Universal Copyright Convention, has been
carefully studied by the interested private
copyright groups in this country and has
met with widespread approval. Following
are the organizations that have endorsed
United States I'atification of the revised con-
vention:

American Bar Association

American Patent Law Association

American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers

Association of American Publishers

Broadcast Music, Inc.

Music Publishers Association of the United States,
Inc.

National Association of Broadcasters

National Music Publishers' Association

Recording Industry Association of America

238

Department of State Bulletin

Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Organizations
and Institutions on Copyright Law Revision (Na-
tional Education Association)

Of these organizations, I would like to
mention specifically the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the fact that the ABA's House
of Delegates believed the question of early
U.S. ratification of the revised Universal
Copyright Convention was important enough
to be considered at an extraordinary session
in February of this year.

We believe that it is a matter of conse-
quence for the United States to be among
the first to ratify the revised Universal
Copyright Convention. One major developed
country, the United Kingdom, whose pub-
lishers and authors have as much at stake
as their American counterparts, has already
ratified the UCC. It is well known that the
United States played a very active part not
only in the negotiation of the revised Uni-
versal Copyright Convention but also in the
initiation of this project. For this and other
reasons that I have mentioned previously,
early ratification of the UCC by the United
States would be consistent with our leading
role in behalf of international copyright pro-
tection and would advance our basic foreign
policy objective of more effective protection
abroad for the intellectual property rights
of American nationals.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

United States-Mexican Trade Relations. Hearing be-
fore the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Feb-
ruary 24, 1972. 65 pp.

Northern Ireland. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. February 28-March 1, 1972. 639 pp.

Law of the Sea and Peaceful Uses of the Seabeds.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. April 10-11, 1972.
115 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, August 4, 1972.

Agreement amending the agreement of March 10,
1967 (TIAS 6583), for the application of safe-
guards by the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy to the bilateral agreement between the United
States and Brazil of July 8, 1965 (TIAS 6126),
for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Vienna July 27, 1972. Enters
into force on the date the agreement for coopera-
tion of July 17, 1972, between the United States
and Brazil enters into force.

Signatitres : Brazil, International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States.

Biological Weapons

Ratification deposited: Mauritius, August 7, 1972.
Signature: Argentina, August 7, 1972.

Hydrographic Organization

Convention on the International Hydrographic Or-
ganization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3,
1967. Entered into force September 22, 1970. TIAS
6933.
Accession deposited: Singapore, July 5, 1972.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial
matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.
Entered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638.
Ratification deposited: France (with declara-
tions) , July 3, 1972.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties,
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.'
Accession deposited: Norway, July 12, 1972.

' Not in force.

August 28, 1972

239

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu-
lations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo No-
vember 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971,
except for article V of the additional protocol,
which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS
7150.

Ratifications deposited: Greece, May 31, 1972; Ku-
wait, May 26, 1972.

Property — Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international classi-
fication of goods and services to which trademarks
are applied. Done at Nice June 15, 1957. Entered
into force April 8, 1961; for the United States
May 25, 1972.
Proclaimed by the President: August 2, 1972.

Nice agreement concerning the international classi-
fication of goods and services for the purposes of
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as re-
vised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into
force March 18, 1970; for the United States May
25, 1972.
Proclaimed by the President : August 2, 1972.

Locarno agreement establishing an international
classification for industrial designs, with annex.
Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into
force April 27, 1971; for the United States May
25, 1972.
Proclaimed by the President : August 2, 1972.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nu-
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion on the seabed and ocean floor and in the sub-
soil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, August 10, 1972;
Ghana, August 9, 1972.

Space — Liability

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signature: Pakistan, August 10, 1972.

' Not in force.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement
of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London
June 23, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, July 14, 1972.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig-
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3,
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re-
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with re-
spect to other provisions; for the United States
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Application of the wheat trade convention by the
United Kingdom to: Grenada, August 3, 1972.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of April 29, 1971 (TIAS
7231). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz
June 5 and 7, 1972. Entered into force June 7,
1972.

Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS
2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxem-
bourg June 15 and July 25, 1972. Entered into
force July 25, 1972.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of March 9, 1972 (TIAS
7301). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad
July 21, 1972. Entered into force July 21, 1972.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of November 17, 1971
(TIAS 7215). Effected by exchange of notes at
Tunis April 19, 1972. Entered into force April 19,
1972.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the termination of the loan of
the U.S.S. Guitarro and the U.S.S. Hammerhead
pursuant to the agreement of February 16 and
July 1, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3042, 4309, 5989,
6746), relating to the loan of two submarines to
Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara
January 26, 1972. Entered into force January 26,
1972; effective January 30, 1972.

Agreement relating to the loan of the submarines
U.S.S. Entemedor and the U.S.S. Threadfin to
Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara
July 28, 1972. Entered into force July 28, 1972.

240

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX August 28, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1731

Bangladesh. U.S. Assistance to Bangladesh —
the First Six Months (AID announcement,
text of report) 231

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 239

Department Urges Early Senate Advice and
Consent to Ratification of Revised Universal
Copyright Convention (Ladd) 234

Economic Afifairs. Department Urges Early
Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification
of Revised Universal Copyright Convention
(Ladd) 234

Foreign Aid

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of Au-
gust 11 221

U.S. Assistance to Bangladesh — the First Six

Months (AID announcement, text of report) 231

Japan. Secretary Rogers' News Conference of

August 11 221

Korea. Secretary Rogers' News Conference of

August 11 221

Middle East. Secretary Rogers' News Confer-
ence of August 11 221

Narcotics Control. Secretary Rogers' News

Conference of August 11 221

Presidential Documents. President Signs Ex-
ecutive Order Continuing Regulation of Ex-
ports (Executive order) 233

Trade. President Signs Executive Order Con-
tinuing Regulation of Exports (Executive
order) 233

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 239

Viet-Nam

154th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at

Paris (Porter) 229

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of Au-
gust 11 221

Name Index

Ladd, Bruce C, Jr 234

Nixon, President 233

Porter, William J 229

Rogers, Secretary 221

Check List

of Department of State

Press Releases: August 7-13

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-

fice of Press Relations, Department of State,

Washington

D.C. 20520.

No. Date

Subject

tl91 8/7

Department releases volume II of

"Foreign Relations" series for

1947.

*192 8/9

Stoessel sworn in as Assistant

Secretary for European Affairs

(biographic data).

tl93 8/10

Declassification of Department's

records for 1946.

194 8/10

Porter: 154th plenary session on

Viet-Nam at Paris.

195 8/11

Rogers: news conference.

*196 8/8

Johnson: House Subcommittee on

National Security Policy and

Scientific Developments,
ted.

* Not prin

t Held for

a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
j.s. government printing office

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

j THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol LXVII, No. 1732

September U, 1972

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF REGION
Statement by Assistant Secretary Sisco 2^1

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY— KEY TO WORLD UNDERSTANDING
by Deputy Assistant Secretary Reich 248

CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

TRANSMITTED TO THE SENATE 253 % ..

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1732
September 4, 1972

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of tlie Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the worfc of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of tlie Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

United States Policy Toward the Persian Gulf Region

Statement by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^

Mr. Chairman: I want to thank you and
the members of the committee for providing
the opportunity to come here to discuss the
situation in the gulf and its adjacent region
and to explain our policy toward this area.
I have recently returned from Yemen, Bah-
rain, and Kuwait impressed anew with the
importance of the gulf region. I welcome the
fact that this committee shares our interest
in this matter.

Mr. Chairman, in our lifetimes we have
seen many spectacular changes but few so
striking as the transition of the gulf: from
poverty to a number of areas of affluence,
from traditional to more modern ways, from
a position of international significance pri-
marily as part of the British "lifeline" to
India to a position of significant strategic
and economic importance to many indus-
trial countries. This change has been fueled,
as the world increasingly is fueled, by oil.
Growing concern about world energy re-
quirements focuses international attention
on the gulf. Given recent political changes in
the oil-rich gulf region, this has prompted
some rather far-reaching speculation about
the area's future and the impact of its future
on our interests and energy needs. It is there-
fore timely for us to take a reasoned and
realistic look at this region.

Mr. Chairman, the Persian Gulf contains

' Made before the Subcommittee on the Near East
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Aug.
8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

areas of varying age and history. There are,
on the one hand, monarchies like Iran and
Saudi Arabia with long histories as inde-
pendent nations with established influence
and interests in the area. On the other, there
are states which have achieved full inde-
pendence only recently. While greater atten-
tion of the outside world has been on the
gulf in recent times, we must not forget
that the nations of that region themselves
have for long had interests in the gulf,
which will continue. The present process of
transition in the area was dramatized when
the British made the decision to terminate
their protective treaty relationships with the
lower gulf states, an action completed by De-
cember 1971.

Iran and the Arabs who border the gulf
have strong economic ties with, and unique
importance to, the outside world. Conse-
quently, the way in which outside nations
view the gulf is significant. The relation-
ships among the major world states will be
reflected in their policies toward the gulf.
As a strategic part of the world, the gulf is
affected by the global strategic situation.

In addition to the tradition of Anglo-
American cooperation throughout the world
and the parallel nature of American and
British interests in the Persian Gulf, the
United States has had a long and fruitful
tradition of cooperation with the two major
regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia. We
share with these two countries a strong mu-
tual interest in the stability and orderly
progress of the region, as do western Euro-
pean states and Japan. Along with the major

September 4, 1972

241

regional powers and other interested states,
we loolc forward to constructive relations
with the newly independent smaller gulf
states, and we are not unmindful of the com-
mercial opportunities which exist there. We
all share an interest in an orderly, expand-
ing marketplace insulated insofar as possi-
ble from ideologically motivated disruptions.

Principles Guiding U.S. Policy

As we have formulated our own policy
toward the gulf, we have been guided by
certain basic principles which derive from
our policies round the world :

— Noninterference in the internal affairs
of other nations.

— Encouragement of regional cooperation
for peace and progress.

— Supporting friendly countries in their
efforts to provide for their own security and
development.

— The principles enunciated at the Mos-
cow summit of avoiding confrontations in
such areas of the world.

— Encouraging the international exchange
of goods, services, and technology.

We have also recognized that the tensions
arising from regional conflicts can spread to
neighboring states and disrupt their stabil-
ity and orderly development. The gulf area
is not immune to the virus of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, whose peaceful and just reso-
lution remains an overriding goal of our
Middle East policy?

Holding to these principles, we have over
the last few years carefully examined our
posture toward the strategic gulf region —
an area undergoing spectacular economic
growth and social change, an area which has
experienced a decade of historic political ev-
olution, an area where American interests
are of great significance.

The American intei'est in the gulf tends
to be characterized in terms of oil. Undoubt-
edly, the United States has major strategic
and economic interests in the oil of the gulf
states. Its continued flow has been of vital

importance to the economies of our NATO
allies and of our friends east of Suez; as-
sured sources of gulf petroleum are of grow-
ing importance to our own energy-hungry
economy. American companies are heavily
invested in the development of the oil re-
sources of the region, and the returns on
their investment have made substantial con-
tributions to our international balance of
payments.

But our interests in the region extend
well beyond crude oil. From crude oil pro-
duction the gulf states have derived spec-
tacular and rapidly increasing wealth —
wealth providing for growing economies, of-
fering significant markets for American
goods and services; wealth providing better
lives for the peoples of the gulf through
schemes of social and economic development,
offering opportunities for American assist-
ance in sharing technology and expert ad-
vice; wealth providing surplus capital for in-
vestment abroad and economic development
throughout the world.

From these interests and our longstand-
ing good relations with the peoples of the
gulf derives an American interest in orderly
political development there and regional co-
operation to assure the tranquillity and
progress of the area. Most governments of
the gulf are friendly to the United States
and welcome commercial and cultural con-
tacts. Our policy toward the area is designed
to support these governments in maintaining
their independence and assuring peace, prog-
ress, and regional cooperation, without our
interfering in the domestic affairs of these
friendly countries.

Emphasis on Technical Assistance

Ml-. Chairman, United States policy toward
the gulf recognizes that the states of the re-
gion want to provide for their own security
and can. Our policy seeks to encourage Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the smaller states
to cooperate wholeheartedly with one an-
other to assure that the region remains se-
cure. At the same time, we seek, in concert

242

Department of State Bulletin

with other friendly non-gulf countries inter-
ested in the area, to assist these states where
our help is needed and desired. The empha-
sis of our assistance will be in the provision
of technology to those less advantaged. To
those more advanced, credit through the Ex-
port-Import Bank and cooperation in the se-
curity field will be the main emphasis.

The states of the region, as a general rule,
neither need nor desire American conces-
sionary economic assistance and can pay
their own way for the advice and technology
which we provide. In the security field, we
have for a number of years assisted in the
modernization of the armed forces of Iran
and Saudi Arabia to enable them to provide
effectively for their own security and to fos-
ter the security of the region as a whole. The
outsiders' role in this modernization process
has not been exclusively American. The
United Kingdom, France, and other coun-
tries have also participated. In the smaller
states of the gulf, providing military advice
and equipment has traditionally been a Brit-
ish undertaking. We stand ready to comple-
ment this British role in the areas where
modest amounts of American equipment or
training are desired and would make a real
contribution to the self-defense and internal
security of the states concerned. We would
prefer, however, that the focus of American
technical help in the smaller gulf states be
on the improvement of the infrastructure of
the civilian side of the governments and
economies to strengthen the fabric of these
rapidly developing societies.

U.S. Friendship and Interest

As the smaller states of the gulf have be-
come fully independent, we have extended
our diplomatic presence into the area. Spe-
cifically, in the past 12 months we 'have
opened small missions in Bahrain, the United
Arab Emirates, and Oman and have accred-
ited our Ambassador in Kuwait to these
states and to Qatar. We believe that the re-
sultant closer governmental contacts will
contribute substantially to furthering our in-

terests in commercial and technological ex-
change with these new states and in encour-
aging the trend toward cooperation among
them.

United States friendship and interest has
been further demonstrated over the last year
by visits of top administration figures to the
area — the President's visit to Iran; the Vice
President's visit to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait; and the Secretary of State's visits
to Saudi Arabia, and most recently, Kuwait,
Bahrain, and the neighboring Yemen Arab
Republic, which during his visit became the
first Arab League member to resume broken
diplomatic relations with the United States.

As another manifestation of continuing
American interest in the gulf and wider In-
dian Ocean region, we have maintained a
small American naval contingent at Bahrain
which has for a quarter century carried out
the mission of visiting friendly ports in the
region to symbolize American interest. It is
not our intention to expand this presence or
to alter its role nor indeed to undertake an
operational American military role in any
state in the area. There is no need for the
United States to assume responsibilities for
security that the British exercised in the
gulf in a different era. We do not seek to. We
are making no new military commitments in
the region but will support as we can the en-
deavors of the new states to consolidate their
independence through economic and social
progress and improvement of their means of
self-defense and internal security.

There has been much said recently about
the role of the Soviet Union in the Persian
Gulf, a region in which there is historic Rus-
sian interest. The Soviet Union has devel-
oped close relations with Iraq at the head of
the gulf, as well as in certain other Arab
countries not bordering on this waterway.
Soviet naval vessels have visited the area
from time to time. The Soviet diplomatic and
commercial presence is well established in
Iran and in Kuwait. The Soviet Union has
recognized the newly independent states in
the lower gulf. The governments of these
states are proud of their independence. They

September 4, 1972

243

will make their own choices, perhaps in con-
sultation with their neighbors, about the
kind of contact which they desire with out-
side powers. In the gulf and beyond, in the
Indian Ocean, we seek no confrontation nor
military competition with the Soviet Union.
The only competition that we seek is a
friendly and free one in the cultural, com-
mercial, and technological fields.

Petroleum Policies

Mr. Chairman, I have noted the important
United States strategic and commercial in-
terest in the oil of the region and the expec-
tation that this interest will increase. The
inaintenance of friendly relations with the
governments of the area, of course, is impor-
tant to assuring an environment in which
economic cooperation in petroleum and other
economic activities can flourish.

Today we are witnessing rather dramatic
changes in the terms of the financial and
concession arrangements between interna-
tional oil companies and the producer states.
These changes reflect a strong and under-
standable impulse of economic nationalism.
They are not restricted to the gulf region,
and the oil policies of the gulf states will un-
doubtedly be influenced by trends in the in-
ternational oil markets and concession rela-
tionships outside the area. States such as
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, however,
have consistently indicated by their approach
to petroleum questions their recognition of a
strong mutual economic interest with the ma-
jor industrial nations. They have also rec-
ognized the useful role which international
oil companies play in assuring the continu-
ing and efficient flow from producer to con-
sumer countries on financial terms acceptable
to both. Difficult negotiations are currently
underway on the question of "participation"
as well as the recent moves by Libya and
Iraq toward nationalization of certain West-
ern oil operations in their countries. I do not
wish to minimize either the economic sig-
nificance or the complexity of these negotia-
tions. It is my hope, however, that they can
be conducted in a businesslike atmosphere

toward conclusions which recognize the in-
terdependence of the various national inter-
ests involved in the world petroleum picture.

Period of Political Transition

Mr. Chairman, the lower gulf has emerged
into a new era of full independence after a
decade of historic political transition. This
began when Kuwait became fully independ-
ent in 1961. The process was completed last
year as the British protective relationships
with the nine lower gulf sheikhdoms ter-
minated and Bahrain and Qatar, along with
the United Arab Emirates, took their places
as fully independent members of the world
community. At the same time, the Sultanate
of Oman, which the United States has recog-
nized since the 19th century as an independ-
ent state, emerged under new leadership
from a period of isolation and began the
process of modernization at home and nor-
malization of contacts with other states in
the Arab world and beyond.

This transition has required the resolu-
tion of longstanding conflicting territorial
claims. The United States Government has
never taken a position on the merits of these
territorial claims but has consistently urged
their resolution in a spirit of friendship and
cooperation. The most notable achievement
in solution of these problems was Iran's
statesmanlike relinquishment of its claim to
Bahrain.

Iran, by virtue of its population, its eco-
nomic and military strength, and its geo-
graphic position along the northern shore of
the Persian Gulf, is destined to play a major
role in providing for stability in the gulf
and the continued flow of oil to consumer
countries. Fortunately, Iran has both the
will and the capability to do so. At a press
conference in July of this year in London,
the Shah reiterated Iran's desire to live in
peace and harmony with its neighbors on
the other side of the Persian Gulf; he stated
that Iran was prepared to off"er assistance to
the smaller gulf states should they wish it.
Iran has given concrete evidence of its de-
sire for cooperation by reaching median-line

244

Department of State Bulletin

agreements with a number of its Arab neigh-
bors, most notably Saudi Arabia.

Some territorial problems in the region
remain, but on balance the solutions that
have been found provide an excellent oppor-
tunity for the newly independent states to
live in peace and cooperation with one an-
other and their larger neighbors. The end of
the British treaty relationship also involved
an effort to achieve federation of the small
gulf sheikhdoms. The United States and
other friendly outside countries, as well as
the larger gulf neighbors, supported this
concept. At this stage, seven of the states,
the so-called Trucial States, have formed a
union, the United Arab Emirates. The re-
maining states, Bahrain and Qatar, have at-
tained independence as separate entities but
have expressed their continued dedication to
the concept of federation.

Mr. Chairman, the political transition in
the Persian Gulf inevitably has created un-
certainties about the future there. Having
just returned from the area, my conviction
is reinforced that as they face the future,
the governments of the region are deter-
mined to maintain their independence, as-
sure the growing prosperity and welfare of
their people, and give substance to their de-
clared intention to cooperate with one
another in the interest of security and stabil-
ity in this important part of the world.

Members of U.S. Delegation
to IAEA Conference Confirmed

The Senate on August 15 confirmed the
nomination of James R. Schlesinger to be the
Representative of the United States to the
16th session of the General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

The nominations of William O. Doub, T.
Keith Glennan, Robert H. McBride, Herman
Pollack, Dwight J. Porter, and James T.
Ramey to be Alternate Representatives were
also confirmed that day.

155th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Folloiving are remarks made by Ambassa-
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele-
gation, at the 155th plenary session of the
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on August 17.

Press release 197 dated August 17

Ladies and gentlemen: Throughout these
talks our side has consistently maintained
that serious discussion of concrete matters
must be the basis of proceedings here. To
serve that purpose, in our view, the Paris
meetings must both reflect and address the
evolving situation in Indochina. We must
then assess the implications of that situation
in terms of prospects for peaceful settlement.

This is why we have repeatedly called your
attention to the extremely retrogressive
effect which your invasion of South Viet-
Nam since March 30 has had. Your escala-
tion of the war has, of course, enormously
complicated our search for peace. Not once,
however, have you acknowledged — or even
mentioned — the 12 divisions of the regular
North Vietnamese armed forces you sent
south in hopes of imposing a military solu-
tion there. This disregard for fundamental
realities does not enhance your arguments
for "comprehensive settlement" of all out-
standing issues; on the contrary, it only lends
weight to our view that military problems
should receive primary emphasis in these
negotiations.

Another example of the complications you
place in the path of negotiations concerns
your protests against United States air and
naval actions against military targets in
North Viet-Nam. By making such protests,
while passing over in silence your invasion of
South Viet-Nam, you attempt to reject the
consequences of what you yourselves have
caused. This is unconvincing. How can one
sympathize with the arsonist for his scorched
fingers ?

Moreover, changed circumstances of
another kind merit attention in these talks.
As you try to mount fresh offensives against

September 4, 1972

245

Hue, in areas adjacent to Saigon, and in the
delta, North Vietnamese invaders do not en-
counter American ground forces. During the
past week the last American ground combat
unit was withdrawn from Viet-Nam.

By September 1 the number of American
military personnel in Viet-Nam will be only
7 percent of what it was in early 1969. There
are no longer any American land combat
forces anywhere in Indochina. The major
land forces now operating in Indochina out-
side their national border are those of North
Viet-Nam invading Laos, Cambodia, and
South Viet-Nam.

Do not speak, therefore, about the respon-
sibilities incumbent upon our side unless you
are prepared to recognize and assume the
responsibilities which by any standards of
realism are properly yours. Because you have
resorted to intensification of the war, your
principal responsibilities in the task of re-
storing peace to Indochina should relate,
above all, to your military activities.

First, you have the responsibility of taking
immediate steps to stop the devastation and
victimization which have characterized your
conduct of the war. If your prospects for
military victory are as bright as you claim,
why could you not stop the shelling of cities
and refugee camps, the destruction of
of schools, hospitals, and other civilian in-
stitutions, and the forced conscription of the
population?

Second, if you really wish to give evidence
of humanitarian concern for prisoners of
war, why could you not, for example, provide
full information about them, allow unham-
pered correspondence between them and their
families, allow impartial inspection of deten-
tion facilities, and allow neutral internment
or repatriation of those wounded and seri-
ously ill?

Third, if you desire to bring the war to an
end, why will you not negotiate with us an
Indochina-wide cease-fire under international
supervision? This, together with return of
American prisoners of war, would not only
bring about the cessation of all acts of force
by the United States but the complete with-

drawal of all American forces from Viet-
Nam within four months thereafter. With
the killing stopped, you could devote your
attention and resources to needs you have
neglected during wartime, such as the dikes.
Vietnamese could hold discussions on South
Viet-Nam's future political institutions with-
out the fear and anger which combat situa-
tions generate. The slow processes of heal-
ing and reconciliation could begin.

We urge that a settlement of military
problems take precedence here, not only be-
cause ending the war is so earnestly sought
by all the peoples and forces concerned but
also because the military situation you have
brought about makes your version of a com-
prehensive settlement increasingly removed
from reality. The families of the 45,000
civilian casualties your oflFensive had caused
in South Viet-Nam by the end of July will
not forget your invasion. The 860,000 South
Vietnamese who by then had taken refuge
from your forces will not forget your inva-
sion. Each act of war and terrorism which
you carry out, each successive day of combat
which you mount, only discredits further
both your political and military aims and for-
tifies resistance to them.

Since making war is apparently still the
paramount element of your policy, restoring
peace must be the foremost question before
us. In his proposals of May 8, President
Nixon, with President Thieu's concurrence,
offers not just a military settlement, but the
way toward a comprehensive settlement in-
corporating military and political issues
alike.i A most important component of the
proposals is for an Indochina-wide interna-
tionally supervised cease-fire. The outcome
of that cease-fire would be a situation which
for a generation the peoples of Indochina
have wanted more than any other: peace
without further delay and the opportunity to
assure not only life and liberty but the exer-
cise of true self-determination in political
aflfairs as well.

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

246

Department of State Bulletin

You have described our proposals as both
unreasonable and unrealistic, but I believe
that if you will examine them on their merits,
leaving aside your ideological rigidities, you
will find them sufficiently reasonable and
realistic to constitute a valid basis for a ne-
gotiated solution to this conflict.

since January 1969 for refugees, widows,
war orphans and other disadvantaged chil-
dren, the aged, and the physically disabled.

Letters of Credence

President Orders Additional Aid
for Viet-Nam Invasion Refugees

Follotving is an announcement issued on
August 15 by the Agency for International
Development.

AID preos release 71 dated August 15

The Agency for International Develop-
ment, at President Nixon's direction, has
released $15 million to Viet-Nam to provide
additional assistance and care to those most
recent victims of the war made homeless as
a result of the North Vietnamese invasion
which began last March.

More than 900,000 South Vietnamese have
been forced to flee their homes, seeking
safety. Most of these are women, children,
and elderly people. The Government of Viet-
Nam has responded exceptionally well in
meeting their need for emergency shelter,
food, and care, but given the heavy financial
burden imposed by the military situation,
needs additional assistance.

The $15 million in U.S. assistance will
provide roughly 6 billion piasters to help
meet refugee relief needs until December
of this year. The United States is also pro-
viding food under Public Law 480, tents, and
water trailers, as well as medical assistance.
The total cost for refugee needs is estimated
to be more than $70 million in this fiscal
year.

Future contributions will be made avail-
able to rebuild and equip hospitals and dis-
pensaries destroyed by the invasion in addi-
tion to direct support for the refugees.

The United States has provided a total of
$260 million in various forms of assistance

Botswana

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Botswana, Amos Manyangwa
Dambe, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Nixon on July 21. For texts of the Am-
bassador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
July 21.

Burma

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Union of Burma, U Lwin, presented his cre-
dentials to President Nixon on July 21. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State
press release dated July 21.

Ghana

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Ghana, Harry Reginald Amonoo,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on July 21. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated July 21.

Qatar

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
State of Qatar, Abdullah Saleh al-Mania, pre-
sented his credentials to Pi-esident Nixon on
July 21. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated July 21.

Viet-Nam

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Viet-Nam, Tran Kim Phuong,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on July 21. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated July 21.

September 4, 1972

247

In this article based on an address he made on June 15 he-
fore a meeting of the Rotary Club of New York which
included Rotarians from six continents, Mr. Reich discusses
the Department's interest in furthering people-to-people
interchange and the importance of service clubs in increas-
ing international tinder standing. Mr. Reich is Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Educational and Culttiral Affairs.

People-to-People Diplomacy— Key to World Understanding

by Alan A. Reich

Technological advances have made nuclear
war a threat to mankind's very existence.
Fortunately, however, new initiatives and
agreements in the disarmament field oflfer
hope that the deadly cycle of weapons build-
up may be broken. Prospects for increased
government-to-government cooperation look
better now than at any time since World
War II. The great powers are focusing on
areas of common concern rather than on
their differences. The results appear prom-
ising.

But while technology has made nuclear
annihilation possible, it also has sparked a
revolution in communication and transpor-
tation which brings increasing numbers of
people in all walks of life into direct, open,
and immediate contact. International diplo-
macy, traditionally the task of men behind
closed doors, has become a public matter.
Many foreign offices no longer confine them-
selves to speaking with other foreign offices
for peoples ; they help and encourage peoples
to speak for themselves across national
boundaries. People-to-people communica-
tion has become a dominant force in inter-
national relations throughout the world.

Societies and their problems have become
more complex. More and more people are
educated and have become concerned citi-
zens. The media reach and stimulate in-

creasing numbers of people. The number
of individuals and institutions that influence
major decisions in every country is grow-
ing. This is true in international affairs as
well as in domestic matters.

We share the concern of people through-
out the world with the serious problems of
disease, hunger, pollution, and overpopula-
tion. We also share the frustration and
sense of injustice such problems bring and
the commitment to find solutions. Our fu-
tures are intertwined in the work to im-
prove the quality of life on our planet. If
we do not succeed in bringing about peace-
ful cooperation in the world over the next
few decades, neither we nor our children
will be able to give the necessary emphasis
to solving our domestic problems. Working
with our international counterparts and de-
veloping better communication and under-
standing are mutually reinforcing processes.
Citizens are involved in and contributing to
both.

The geometric increase in citizen involve-
ment in world affairs has special signifi-
cance for the diplomat. It is a fundamental,
irreversible, and irresistible influence for
peace. Nations are less likely to deal with
their differences in absolute terms when
their citizens communicate and cooperate
with each other freely and frequently.

248

Department of State Bulletin

When people-to-people bonds and com-
munications networks are more fully de-
veloped, there will be a greater readiness to
communicate, to seek accommodation, and
to negotiate. The likelihood of international
confrontation will diminish, and prospects
for peaceful solutions will be enhanced. This
rationale governs the interest of the State
Department in the furtherance of meaning-
ful people-to-people exchange.

In the past few years, social scientists
have increasingly studied the relevance of
informal nongovernmental communications
activities to matters of war and peace. Emi-
nent social scientists such as Dr. Herbert
Kelman at Harvard University are attempt-
ing to develop a scientific base for these
cross-cultural communications activities.
Their research suggests that the existence
of informal communications tends to reduce
the level of tension when conflicts of inter-
est occur; they contribute to a climate of
opinion in which conflicts may be negoti-
ated more eff"ectively. Second, their research
indicates that informal relationships create
a greater openness in individual attitudes
toward other nations, peoples, and cultures;
these predispositions also lead to greater
readiness to communicate and to resolve dif-
ferences peaceably. Third, social scientists
tell us that international cooperation and ex-
change contribute to world-mindedness and
to an internationalist or global perspective
on what otherwise might be viewed either as
purely national or essentially alien problems.
Finally, international people-to-people rela-
tionships help develop enduring networks of
communication which cut across boundaries
and reduce the likelihood of polarization
along political or nationalist lines.

Department-Sponsored Exchanges

When you think of the State Department's
conduct of our international affairs, the ex-
change-of-persons program does not come
immediately to mind. It is, nonetheless, a
significant and important activity. The Bu-
reau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

works constantly and quietly to improve the
climate for diplomacy and international co-
operation. The exciting, challenging job of
the Bureau is to utilize its modest funds and
manpower to reinforce the work of Ameri-
can individuals and organizations who want
to help construct, a little at a time, the foun-
dation of better relationships with the rest
of the world. It also coordinates, as neces-
sary, the activities of other government
agencies with international exchange pro-
grams in substantive fields such as health,
education, social welfare, transportation,
agriculture, military training, and urban
planning.

Having come not too long ago from the
business world, I have a great appreciation
for what is being done for an investment
of $40 million annually. There are several
major elements of the exchange program:

-^The Fulbright-Hays exchange program
over 25 years has engaged more than
100,000 people in academic exchanges. An-
nually, some 5,000 professors, lecturers, and
scholars are exchanged to and from the
United States.

— The international visitor program brings
to the United States about 1,500 foreign
leaders and potential leaders annually for
one- or two-month orientation programs.
This includes nonacademic leaders and pro-
fessionals, from Cabinet officers to journal-
ists. One out of every 10 heads of state in
the world today has been a State Depart-
ment exchange visitor, as have some 250
Cabinet ministers of other nations.

— The Department of State sends abroad
annually several leading performing arts
groups and athletic stars; for example, in
the past year Duke Ellington toured the So-
viet Union, several jazz groups performed
in eastern Europe, the Utah Symphony
toured South America, and Kareem Jabbar
(Lew Alcindor) and Oscar Robertson of the
Milwaukee Bucks visited Africa.

— Some 150 prominent U.S. lecturers
went abroad for six-week lecture tours in
1971.

September 4, 1972

249

— Nearly 500 United Nations specialists,
selected by their home countries and funded
by the U.N., are programed annually by the
State Department through 30 other govern-
ment agencies for six- to nine-month train-
ing programs in the United States.

The State Department's small but cata-
lytic exchange-of-persons program stimu-
lates constructive communication among
leaders and future leaders in many fields
here and abroad. It creates durable reser-
voirs of information, understanding, and
empathy. It develops rewarding and last-
ing contacts of key people of other countries
with their counterparts here.

Private Sector Participation

These programs depend heavily on the
willing cooperation of countless private in-
dividuals and organizations throughout the
United States. Their response has been out-
standing. The Department also contracts
with a number of organizations to assist in
carrying out these activities. For instance,
COSERV— the National Council for Com-
munity Services to International Visitors —
is a network of 80 voluntary organizations
throughout the United States which enlists
some 100,000 Americans to provide hospi-
tality and orientation for international vis-
itors. They serve voluntarily because they
believe in the importance of their work to
strengthen international understanding. This
makes an indelible impression on the foreign
visitors they serve.

Another organization, the National Asso-
ciation for Foreign Student Affairs, coun-
sels many of the 150,000 foreign students
now studying in American colleges and uni-
versities. The Institute of International Ed-
ucation and several private programing
agencies help carry out the Fulbright and
international visitor programs.

We in the Department of State are aware
that our programs represent only a portion
of the total private-public participation in
exchanges aimed at furthering international

mutual understanding. In addition to serv-
ice organizations, professional associations
of doctors, lawyers, journalists, municipal
administrators, and others link their mem-
bers with counterparts throughout the world.
More than 30 American sports organizations
carry on international programs involving
their athletes in competition, demonstra-
tions, and coaching clinics here and abroad;
several youth organizations conduct inter-
national exchanges involving nearly 5,000
American and foreign teenagers annually.
Numerous foundations, businesses, and in-
stitutions throughout America facilitate the
private studies of some of the nearly 150,000
foreign students who come to study in the
United States annually and approximately
half that number of Americans who study
abroad each year. Private American per-
forming arts groups tour other countries;
reciprocal opportunities are offered to coun-
terpart groups from abroad. The People-to-
People Federation and its various com-
mittees actively promote and carry out
meaningful exchanges; the sister city pro-
gram of the Town Affiliation Association
links some 400 American cities with com-
munities in 60 countries of the world.

Before we undertook new exchange ac-
tivities in the private sector last year, we
asked the cultural affairs officers in our Em-
bassies around the world whether they
wanted an increase in exchanges by private
groups. They were also asked whether
these activities further our long-term pur-
pose of increasing mutual understanding
with their respective countries. Almost with-
out exception the posts replied that they want
increased exchanges. They want them to
occur both to and from the United States.
They confirmed that these activities con-
tribute to removing barriers to understand-
ing and to forming durable coopei'ative I'e-
lationships.

Last year the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs set up a special oflSce to
respond to the needs of private organiza-
tions seeking to participate in international
person-to-person programs. This Office of

250

Department of State Bulletin

Private Cooperation, on request, helps pri-
vate organizations to become active inter-
nationally.

The Contribution of Service Organizations

In government and in the private sector,
there is much to be done. Service organiza-
tions, such as Rotary International through
its people-to-people programs, are doing a
great job. Rotary 's international youth ex-
change, involving 700 youths throughout the
world annually, is a model program with con-
siderable impact.

The Rotary Club matching program, which
links Rotary Clubs in 150 countries with
counterpart clubs for direct Rotarian-to-
Rotarian relationships and shared service
projects, is equally impressive. Rotary's
world community service program has
helped people throughout the world. Through
Rotary International's small business clinic
program, many individuals in less developed
countries have been helped to self-sufficiency
and community contribution.

Two other elements of the overall Rotary
International outreach are especially mean-
ingful. First, the mere existence of some
150,000 Rotary Clubs in 150 countries is a
potent force for mutual understanding.
Rotary, like other worldwide service organi-
zations, is made up of leaders from all
segments of society; this fraternal relation-
ship— professional to professional, business-
man to businessman, and so on — generates
good will among millions throughout the
world.

Another service which Rotary Clubs per-
form is the furtherance of international
person-to-person relationships by others in
their communities. In visits throughout the
United States I have been impressed with
the extent to which Rotary and other serv-
ice clubs have initiated and developed sister
city affiliations, people-to-people exchanges,
international hospitality programs, and in-
ternational activities of local performing
arts and sports groups. These activities
contribute to strengthened bonds between

participating local groups and the nations in-
volved.

I have been asked by leaders of service
organizations what they might do to in-
crease international understanding. Frankly,
I cannot imagine a more significant organi-
zational outreach, either in concept or in
program, than that of Rotary International.

I can only urge Rotary and other organi-
zations to do more of the same — demon-
strating so well the capacity for commit-
ment of the American people in solving
that most important of all human problems,
the achievement of a sustained world peace,
by sponsoring exchanges, providing commu-
nity leadership in international programing,
helping peoples of other nations to become
less dependent, and strengthening interna-
tional ties among key individuals and
groups.

All this adds up to building a better world
through people-to-people diplomacy. To ac-
complish this will require the patience, the
persistence, and the participation of us all,
public and private sector alike. But the re-
sult is well worth the effort. And I am con-
fident that Rotary and the other service or-
ganizations will be found in the forefront
of those who get the job done.

Philip Hoffman To Represent U.S.
on U.N. Human Rights Commission

The President announced on August 3
(White House press release) the appoint-
ment of Philip E. Hoffman to be the Rep-
resentative of the United States of America
on the Human Rights Commission of the
Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. He succeeds Rita E. Hauser, who
has resigned. Mr. Hoffman is currently
chairman of the executive committee of the
United States Realty and Investment Com-
pany in Newark, N.J. (For further bio-
graphic data, see White House press release
dated August 3.)

September 4, 1972

251

President Marks 25th Anniversary
of Board of Foreign Scholarships

FoUoiving is the text of a letter dated
August 1 from President Nixon to James H.
Billington, Chairman of the Board of For-
eign Scholarships and professor of history,
Woodroiv Wilson School of Public and In-
ternational Affairs, Princeton University,
Priyiceton, N.J.

White House press release dated August 2

August 1, 1972.

Dear Professor Billington: As the
Board of Foreign Scholarships marks the
close of its 25th year, I congratulate you and
your fellow Board members, past and pres-
ent, for your diligence and resourcefulness in
promoting scholarly exchanges between the
United States and other countries of the
world.

The educational exchange program has a
proud record of achievement in its first
quarter century. In all, more than 100,000
students, teachers and scholars from 110
countries have participated in this program,
including over 36,000 Americans. Its contri-
bution to mutual understanding, and ulti-
mately to world peace, is incalculable.

Looking ahead, I would like to commend
the Board for the forward-looking initia-
tives in its program for the Seventies and
especially for the Lincoln Lectureships,
which are being inaugurated today. Please
convey my deep appreciation to the four dis-
tinguished scholars who will launch this sig-
nificant new lecture series — Professors
Franklin, Samuelson and Townes [John
Hope Franklin, professor of history, Uni-
versity of Chicago; Paul A. Samuelson, pro-
fessor of economics, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology; and Charles H. Townes, pro-
fessor of physics, University of California
at Berkeley], and Mr. Updike [John A.
Updike, author, Ipswich, Mass.]. The Lincoln
Lectureships typify this country's willing-
ness to share with the rest of the world the

finest in American scholarship and intellec-
tual achievement. And I am pleased to know
that eminent foreign lecturers, in turn, will
give Americans the benefit of their talents
and thought.

I also take this opportunity to commend
the wisdom and foresight of the exchange
program's many Congressional founders and
supporters. Their backing, over the years,
has enabled this program to play an increas-
ingly significant role in our relations with
other countries and cultures.

The Board and the program it supervises
have my very best wishes for every success
in meeting the new challenges of the next
quarter century.
Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.

Foreign Policy Records for 1946
Declassified by Department

Press release 193 dated August 10

Effective August 10, the Department of
State has declassified almost all of its foreign
policy records for the year 1946. This action
has been taken by special administrative de-
cision and does not void the Department's
standing regulation which provides for the
opening of records 30 years old.

This action is a part of the President's pro-
gram for declassifying government papers
as soon as possible. Many of the most impor-
tant papers in the Department's files for 1946
have already been declassified and published
in the Department's continuing series For-
eign Relations of the United States, which
runs to 11 volumes for 1946.

The bulk of the Department's records for
1946 are in the custody of the National Ar-
chives and Records Service, and most of
them are physically in the National Archives
building in Washington. They may now be
consulted by all researchers in accordance
with the standard procedures of the Nation-
al Archives.

252

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons
Transmitted to the Senate

PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE i

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice
and consent of the Senate to ratification, the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel-
opment, Production, and StockpiUng of Bac-
teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons,
and on their Destruction, opened for signa-
ture at Washington, London and Moscow on
April 10, 1972.

The text of this Convention is the result of
some three years of intensive debate and ne-
gotiation at the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament at Geneva and at the United
Nations. It pi'ovides that the Parties under-
take not to develop, produce, stockpile, ac-
quire or retain biological agents or toxins, of
types and in quantities that have no justifi-
cation for peaceful purposes, as well as
weapons, equipment and means of delivery
designed to use such agents or toxins for hos-
tile purposes or in armed conflict. The provi-
sions of the Convention are described in
detail in the accompanying report of the
Seci'etary of State.

It was about two years ago that this Gov-
ernment renounced, unilaterally and uncondi-
tionally, the use of all biological and toxin
weapons and affirmed that we would destroy
our existing stocks and confine our programs

' Transmitted on Aug. 10 (White House press re-
lease); also printed as S. Ex. Q, 92d Cong., 2d sess.
For text of the convention, see Bulletin of Nov. 1,
1971, p. 508.

to strictly defined defensive purposes. These
initiatives reflected a deep national convic-
tion and contributed in a very substantial
way to the ultimate success of the negotia-
tions leading to this Convention.

At that same time, we looked to the day
when the community of nations would act
together to prohibit biological warfare and
weaponry. We accompanied our renuncia-
tion of these weapons with support for the
principles and objectives of the United King-
dom's 1968 draft convention in this field. On
December 16, 1971, the Convention trans-
mitted herewith, which would provide a
binding international prohibition on the
weapons we have renounced, was overwhelm-
ingly commended by the General Assembly
of the United Nations.

This Convention is the first international
agreement since World War II to provide for
the actual elimination of an entire class of
weapons from the arsenals of nations. The
safe destruction of biological and toxin stocks
in this country is expected to be completed by
the end of this year. All the stocks at Pine
Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas have already been
destroyed, and the former biological warfare
facility there is now a new national center
for research on the adverse eflfects of chemi-
cal substances in man's environment. The
former military biological research facility
at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is becoming a
center for cancer research. Other nations are
being invited to share in the humanitarian
work at these centers.

I believe this Convention will enhance the

September 4, 1972

253

security of the United States and the world
community. It will help ensure that scientific
achievements in the field of biology will be
devoted not to destruction but to the service
of mankind. It represents a significant ad-
vance in the field of arms control and dis-
armament and I recommend that the Senate
give it prompt and favorable attention.

Richard Nixon.

The White House,
August 10, 1972.

SECRETARY ROGERS' REPORT 2

Department of State,
Washington, B.C., June 21, 1972.

The President,
The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to
you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratifica-
tion, a certified copy of the Convention on the Pro-
hibition of the Development, Production and Stoclc-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons, and on their Destruction.

The Convention was opened for signature at Wash-
ington, London and Moscow on April 10, 1972.
Seventy-four States, including the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, signed the Convention in Washington on
that date. A number of other States have also signed
the Convention in one or more of the three capitals.

In January 1969, immediately after this Admin-
istration took office, the Secretary of Defense ini-
tiated a review of all chemical and biological pro-
grams within his Department. In April you directed
that the National Security Council conduct a com-
prehensive study of United States policies and pro-
grams relating to chemical and biological warfare.
This was the first such review ever undertaken on
this subject at the Presidential level. On November
25, 1969, you announced that the study had been
completed and that you had made several decisions
on the basis of that review. At that time you an-
nounced that the United States was unilaterally
renouncing biological methods of warfare and would
destroy its existing stocks of these weapons.

On February 14, 1970, a further, closely related
step was taken. As a result of a study of our policy
and programs concerning toxins subsequent to your
November announcement, the United States also

'■ S. Ex. Q, 92d Cong., 2d sess.

renounced the use of toxins as a method of warfare.
In May 1971, the Department of Defense announced
that plans to destroy the United States inventory of
bacteriological and toxin weapons at Pine Bluif,
Arkansas had been cleared by interested agencies
and would proceed forthwith. Similar announcements
with respect to other facilities were made in July
1971. All anti-personnel agents have now been de-
stroyed. Destruction of anti-crop material is con-
tinuing and will be completed before the end of 1972.
With respect to Fort Detrick, Maryland, it was an-
nounced on October 18, 1971, that this facility would
be converted into a cancer research center.

Included in your November 25 announcement was
the positive association of the United States with the
principles and objectives of the draft Convention on
Biological Weapons that had been submitted by the
United Kingdom at the Geneva Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament, now the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), in July 1969.
Important provisions of the present Convention
are derived from that United Kingdom draft, which
was revised in 1970 after extensive discussion at the
CCD. At our suggestion, the coverage of the United
Kingdom draft was expanded to include toxins.
Other provisions of the Convention are based on a
draft convention presented at the Geneva confer-
ence in March 1971 by the Soviet Union and a num-
ber of its allies.

Following the tabling by the United States and by
the Soviet Union and its allies of identical drafts of a
convention prohibiting biological and toxin weapons
at Geneva on August 5, 1970 [1971], the representa-
tives of Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yu-
goslavia presented a paper containing specific sugges-
tions which are reflected in the present text. Other
recommendations reflected in the language of this
Convention and in statements regarding its inter-
pretation were put forward at Geneva by representa-
tives of Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Italy,
Morocco, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
On September 28, 1971, a final revised draft text was
cosponsored in Geneva by the United States, the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, together with
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy,
Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania.
This text was forwarded to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly for its consideration. On December
16, 1971, by a vote of 110-0, with one abstention, the
General Assembly commended this draft text and
requested that the Convention be opened for signa-
ture and ratification at an early date.

The Convention consists of a Preamble and 15
Articles. The Preamble contains ten paragraphs
expressing the consensus of the Parties. The first
expresses the belief that an agreement eliminating
biological weapons will facilitate the achievement of
general and complete disarmament; the second rec-
ognizes the significance of the Geneva Protocol of

254

Department of Stale Bulletin

1925; the third reaffirms the adherence of the Parties
to the principles and objectives of the Protocol; the
fourth recalls condemnations by the United Nations
of all actions contrary to those principles and objec-
tives; the fifth and sixth express the desire to con-
tribute to the improvement of the international
atmosphere and to the realization of the purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter; the
seventh notes the importance of eliminating chemi-
cal and biological weapons; the eighth expresses the
determination to continue negotiations on effective
measures for prohibiting chemical weapons; the
ninth expresses the determination to exclude com-
pletely the possibility of biological agents and toxins
being used as weapons; and the final preambular
paragraph expresses the conviction that the use of
such weapons would be repugnant to the conscience
of mankind.

In Article I, the Parties undertake never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire
or retain microbial or other biological agents, or
toxins whatever their origin or method of produc-
tion, of types and in quantities that have no justifi-
cation for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes, as well as weapons, equipment and means
of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Many Parties to the Geneva Protocol have, in their
ratification of that Agreement, entered reservations
regarding the right to use weapons covered by the
Protocol (including biological and toxin weapons)
in retaliation against States Parties which them-
selves use such weapons in violation of the Protocol.
The phrase "never in any circumstances" in Article I
of this Convention makes it clear that, as a practical
matter, these reservations would not result in any
exception to the total prohibition of biological and
toxin weapons achieved by the Convention. More-
over, since war would obviously be one of the "cir-
cumstances" referred to, the phrase "never in any
circumstances" emphasizes the intention of the Par-
ties that this Convention remain in full force and
effect in time of war. The inclusion of this phrase
does not, of course, prejudice the rights of Parties
under the withdrawal clause in Article XIII.

While this Convention does not explicitly ban the
use of biological weapons, no Party to the Conven-
tion would be permitted to possess such weapons
even in wartime. There is no possibility that a Party
could use biological or toxin weapons without being
in violation of Articles I and II of this Convention.

The phrase "whatever their origin or method of
production" after the word "toxins" in Article I is
intended to ensure that the concept of toxins will be
interpreted broadly and that toxins produced syn-
thetically, as well as those produced naturally by
bacteriological or other biological organisms, would
be covered by the prohibition. Toxins are poisonous
chemical substances which are naturally produced
by living organisms and which, if present in the

body, produce effects comparable to those of infec-
tion by hostile organisms.

The provisions of Article I would not permit any
quantities of the agents or toxins covered to be
developed, produced, stockpiled, acquired or retained
for hostile purposes or for use in armed conflict.
Nor would they permit the stockpiling or retention
for non-peaceful purposes of agents or toxins that,
when acquired, had a justification for a peaceful pur-
pose, such as meeting hospital requirements.

Article I provides that biological agents or toxins
justified for purposes covered by the terms "pro-
phylactic" and "protective" are not prohibited by this
Convention. The word "prophylactic" refers to ac-
tivities related to the protection of the human body
from the effects of organisms or substances to which
an individual might be directly exposed. It encom-
passes medical activities such as diagnosis, therapy
and immunization, and related research. The term
"protective" applies to the development of such
equipment as decontamination systems, protective
masks and clothing, air and water filtration systems,
and detection and warning devices. Laboratory quan-
tities of certain agents and toxins might well be
required for research and testing in these areas. In
order to avoid any possible ambiguity, it was made
clear during the negotiation of this Convention
that the terms "prophylactic" and "protective" are
not intended to convey any broader meaning which
would in any way permit possession of biological
agents or toxins for weapons purposes on the theory
that such weapons were for "defensive" warfare,
retaliation or deterrence.

Article II sets forth a requirement for destruction
of the agents, toxins, weapons and equipment pro-
hibited by Article I within nine months after the
entry into force of this Convention. It is expected
that the United States program of destruction will
be completed before the expiration of this period.
Article II specifies that, in carrying out such de-
struction, all necessary safety precautions should be
observed to protect the populations of all States and
the environment. We believe, as we and a number of
other participants in the negotiation of this Conven-
tion have already made clear, that it would be appro-
priate and desirable for each Party to inform other
Parties, through notices to the Depositary Govern-
ments, of actions taken in the implementation of the
provisions of this Article. The United States intends
to do so when its program has been completed.

Article III provides that no Party shall transfer to
any recipient, directly or indirectly, or assist any
other State or States to manufacture or otherwise
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equip-
ment or means of delivery specified in Article I.
This Article is designed to prevent indirect partici-
pation by States Parties in the development, produc-
tion or stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.

Article IV provides that each Party shall, in ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes, take any

September 4, 1972

255

necessary measures to prohibit and prevent those
activities prohibited by Article I, within its terri-
tory, under its jurisdiction or under its control any-
where. The question of what measures are neces-
sary at a given time must, of course, be assessed
in the light of the factual circumstances facing a
State Party at that time. The governmental policies
with respect to biological and toxin weapons an-
nounced on November 25, 1969 and February 14,
1970 assure compliance with the Convention by the
United States Government. Article IV also con-
templates the adoption by legislative or administra-
tive action of any measures which may be necessary
to prohibit and prevent private activity which would
defeat the central objectives of the Convention.
Existing United States statutes relevant to this ob-
ligation include the Munitions Control provisions of
the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. § 1934
(1970)) and the Export Administration Act of 1969
(50 U.S.C. App. §2401 et. seq. (1970)). However,
additional legislation for more effective implemen-
tation of Article IV is being prepared for early sub-
mission to the Congress.

Articles V, VI, and VII strengthen this Convention
by establishing a framework for consideration of any
problems arising under the Convention and for possi-
ble assistance to any Party endangered as a result of
a violation.

Article V provides for consultations and coopera-
tion in solving any problems which may arise in
relation to the objective of the Convention or the
application of its provisions. Such consultations and
cooperation need not be limited to narrow questions
of a possible technical violation of any particular
article but may encompass as well any problems con-
cerning the achievement of the overall objective of
this Convention. Consultation and cooperation pur-
suant to this Article may be undertaken directly
among Parties or through appropriate international
procedures within the framework of the United
Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI provides that any Party to the Conven-
tion which finds that any other Party is acting in
breach of its obligations under this Convention may
lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the
United Nations. In the second pargraph of Article
VI each Party undertakes to cooperate with any in-
vestigation that the Security Council may initiate on
the basis of such a complaint.

Article VII concerns providing or supporting as-
sistance, "in accordance with the United Nations
Charter", to any Party to the Convention which so
requests, if the Security Council decides that such
Party has been exposed to danger as a result of a
violation of this Convention. This Article does not,
of course, alter the obligations or the rights of Par-
ties under the United Nations Charter but reaffirms
those rights and obligations in the specific context
of a possible violation of this Convention. While
this Article does not create any new international

commitment, it stresses the importance of strict
observance of the Convention by placing the ques-
tion of a possible violation, resulting in danger to
any State which has agreed to abide by its prohi-
bition, on the highest plane of international con-
cern. It was made clear during the negotiations that
under this provision assistance would be provided
only following a request by the endangered Party
and each Party would decide for itself whether it
was in a position to provide or support the form of
assistance requested. In the course of the negotia-
tions, the United States, the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union expressed their view that medical
or other humanitarian relief assistance would be
suitable. While this Article, by its terms, would not
apply until a decision by the Security Council had
been made that a Party had been exposed to danger
as a result of a violation, Parties would remain free
to provide assistance that they deemed appropriate
in. the interim.

Article VIII provides that nothing in this Conven-
tion shall in any way limit or detract from obliga-
tions assumed by any State under the Geneva
Protocol.

Article IX reaffirms the objective of effective pro-
hibition of chemical weapons, and contains an under-
taking to continue negotiations with a view to
reaching early agreement on effective measures to
eliminate such weapons.

Article X is designed to encourage international
cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of biologi-
cal agents and toxins. It contains a general under-
taking by the Parties to cooperate in efforts to
facilitate the widest possible application of dis-
coveries in the field of biology for the prevention of
disease or for other peaceful purposes. In addition,
it provides for implementation of this Convention in
a manner which avoids hampering the economic and
technological development of Parties in this area.
The Article is based on similar provisions in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.

Article XI sets forth the procedure for amend-
ment. Any Party may propose amendments. An
amendment would enter into force for each Party
accepting it upon acceptance by a majority of the
Parties, and for any other Party on the date it
accepts the amendment. This Article is similar to a
provision found in the Outer Space Treaty.

Article XII provides for a review conference to be
held five years after entry into force of the Conven-
tion, or earlier if requested by a majority of the
Parties. The provision for a review conference was
included to assure that the purposes of the Pre-
amble and the provisions of the Convention, including
the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical
weapons, were being realized, taking into account
any relevant technological developments. This Ar-
ticle is similar to a provision of the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty.

Article XIII provides in its first paragraph that the

256

Department of State Bulletin

Convention shall be of unlimited duration and con-
tains in its second paragraph the withdrawal clause
that has been standard in post-war arms control
treaties. This clause provides that a Party may
withdraw from the Convention upon notice if it finds
that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the Convention have jeopardized its su-
preme interests. The notice period required is three
months.

Article XIV designates the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as Depositary
Governments, and provides that the Convention shall
enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of
ratification by twenty-two signatory States includ-
ing the Depositary Governments. It specifies how
other States may become Parties and contains pro-
visions of a formal nature relating to ratification,
accession and registration with the United Nations.

The final Article provides for official languages
and other formal matters.

The provisions for signature and accession have
been designed to permit the widest possible applica-
tion of the Convention. At the same time adher-
ence to the Convention will in no way imply recogni-
tion or change in status of regimes the United States
does not now recognize. Nor will it in any way result
in according recognition or change in status to any
regime not now recognized by any other Party.

I believe that this Convention represents a major
advance in arms control. Its broad acceptance will
enhance the security of all countries. It will help to
eliminate biological and toxin weapons from the
arsenals of States, and help to ensure that advances
in the field of biology, now being made at an im-
pressive pace, will be devoted to the benefit and not
to the destruction of mankind. I hope that the
United States, whose ratification is required to bring
the Convention into force, will become a Party in the
near future.

Respectfully submitted.

William P. Rogers.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

U.N. Conference on Human Environment: Prepara-
tions and Prospects. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. May 3-5, 1972.
163 pp.

Problems of War Victims in Indochina. Part I:
Vietnam. Hearing before the Subcommittee To
Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees
and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary. May 8, 1972. 161 pp.

Toward a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Con-
trol, International Law and Organization of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. May
15, 1972. 152 pp.

Termination of Hostilities in Indochina. Hearings
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
May 16-June 1, 1972. 145 pp.

Councils and Committees: A Selection of Readings.
Compiled by the Subcommittee on National Secu-
rity and International Operations of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations. May 22,
1972. 46 pp.

Report on Essentiality of Specialty Steels Industry
to National Security. Subcommittee on General
Legislation of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services. S. Rept. 92-804. May 25, 1972. 7 pp.

The 26th Annual Meeting of the United Nations
General Assembly. Report by Representative Ed-
ward J. Derwinski, member of the U.S. delegation
to the 26th U.N. General Assembly. May 31, 1972.
70 pp.

North Pacific Fisheries Act. Report to accompany
H.R. 9501. H. Rept. 92-1102. May 31, 1972. 32 pp.

International Plant Protection Convention. Report
to accompany Ex. D, 84-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-22.
June 5, 1972. 12 pp.

Convention To Prevent and Punish the Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against
Persons and Related Extortion That Are of Inter-
national Significance. Report to accompany Ex. D,
92-1. S. Ex. Rept. 92-23. June 5, 1972. 5 pp.

Treaty with Honduras on the Swan Islands. Report
to accompany Ex. H, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-24.
June 5, 1972. 5 pp.

Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters. Report to accompany Ex.
A, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-25. June 6, 1972. 5 pp.

Extradition Treaty with Argentina. Report to ac-
company Ex. F, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-26. June 6,
1972. 4 pp.

Partial Revision of Radio Regulations (1959) Relat-
ing to Space Telecommunications. Report to ac-
company Ex. E, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-27. June 6,
1972. 3 pp.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Report to ac-
company S. 3645. S. Rept. 92-851. June 12, 1972.
7 pp.

Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects. Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States transmitting the con-
vention, signed at Washington, London, and Mos-
cow March 29, 1972. S. Ex. M. June 15, 1972. 11
pp.

Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969.
Message from the President of the United States
transmitting the convention, signed for the United
States at London June 23, 1969. S. Ex. N. June 15,
1972. 48 pp.

Equal Export Opportunity Act and the International
Economic Policy Act of 1972. Report of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs to accompany S. 3726, together with
additional views; S. Rept. 92-890; June 19, 1972;
17 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations to accompany S. 3726; S. Rept. 92-
981; July 24, 1972; 4 pp.

September 4, 1972

257

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Statement by Frederick H. Sacksteder, Jr.

U.S. Representative on the U.N. Trusteeship Council ^

The United States delegation is pleased to
report once more on our administration of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
during the past year. We believe that this
has been a particularly significant period in
our administration of the territory, a time
in which meaningful progress has been
achieved on several fronts toward the even-
tual termination of the trusteeship and in
which the United States has continued major
efforts in meeting its trusteeship and charter
obligations to bring about the political, eco-
nomic, and social advancement of the terri-
tory.

When Ambassador Phillips appeared
before the Council last year to present our
report, he noted that President Nixon had
shown his deep interest in the question of the
future status of the trust territory by nam-
ing Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams
to act as his personal representative in carry-
ing on discussions with members of the Joint
Committee on Future Status of the Congress
of Micronesia in accordance with the stated
desire of the Congress to negotiate entry into
free association with the United States.^
Ambassador Williams has now had the op-
portunity to lead U.S. delegations to two for-
mal sessions of negotiations with the Joint

'Made before the 39th session of the United Na-
tions Trusteeship Council on May 24 (USUN press
release 55).

' For a statement by Christopher H. Phillips, U.S.
Representative on the Trusteeship Council, see
USUN press release 69 dated May 26, 1971.

Status Committee, one at Hana on the Island
of Maui in Hawaii in October 1971 and
another at Koror in the Palau District of the
trust territory in April of this year.

At the Hana talks, broad agreement was
reached between the U.S. and Micronesian
representatives on several issues of principle
that had previously divided the two sides'. In
the words of the final joint communique
ending the session, "both sides expi'essed
appreciation for the spirit and atmosphere
surrounding the Third Round of Talks on
Micronesian Future Political Status," and
both the Micronesian and the American sides
"found the open exchange and the explora-
tion of each other's point of view highly
useful," and both agreed that "substantive
progress was made in narrowing differences
and in reaching preliminary understandings
in some important areas."

In keeping with Ambassador Williams' in-
struction from the President, the U.S. dele-
gation at Hana introduced a number of new
proposals that reflected concern at the high-
est levels of the U.S. Government that agree-
ment on a new status for Micronesia should
serve the long-term welfare and needs of the
Micronesian people. These proposals cen-
tered on those issues which the Micronesians
had said were of the greatest importance to
them and their future.

The U.S. delegation accordingly suggested
at Hana that a compact of association would
be freely entered into by the people of Micro-
nesia through a sovereign act of self-deter-

258

Department of State Bulletin

mination at the time of termination of the
trusteeship. This compact would define the
terms of the future association between
the United States and Micronesia, inckiding
the rights and responsibihties of both parties.

In accordance with sucli a compact, the
rights of the people of Micronesia to govern
their own internal affairs would be fully rec-
ognized and protected. This would include
the right to adopt their own constitution and
their own laws. U.S. laws and programs
would apply to Micronesia only as agreed to
by the Micronesians and as detailed in the
compact or as subsequently agreed upon by
mutual consent.

As for the conduct of foreign affairs and
defense matters after the termination of the
present trusteeship, the U.S. position at Hana
was similar to a proposal made in July 1970
by the political status delegation of the Con-
gress of Micronesia. This proposal was that
"the responsibility for external affairs and
defense would be handled by the United
States and it would be therefoi'e necessary
for the United States to retain sufficient
power in those areas to enable it to fulfill
its responsibilities."

Perhaps one of the most important factors
leading to the positive atmosphere at Hana
was the full recognition in the U.S. proposal
of the vital significance of land to the Micro-
nesians.

Under the terms of the proposed compact
of association put forward by the U.S. side,
all Micronesian land would be under the con-
trol of Micronesians and the United States
would commit itself not to exercise the
powers of eminent domain. The United
States further proposed that private owner-
ship of land by non-Micronesians should be
determined by the Micronesians and that any
future acquisition of land would only be in
accordance with Micronesian law.

Despite the heartening progress noted by
the Micronesian and U.S. delegations at
Hana, both sides felt that there were certain
remaining divergencies to be resolved prior
to the conclusion of an agreement that could
form the basis for the termination of the
present trusteeship. A principal issue that

remained unresolved after the Hana talks
was the question of the method by which the
future relationship between Micronesia and
the United States might be modified or ter-
minated.

Further U.S. flexibility on this issue at the
next round of talks at Palau in April of this
year undoubtedly contributed to the success-
ful completion of this most recent session of
the negotiations. The Micronesian delega-
tion stated after the talks:

We believe that we have laid the foundations of
an agreement which may enable us to end the
Trusteeship and create a new Micronesian state in
free association with the United States. With the
end of this round of talks, we find ourselves closer
than we have ever been to self-government in Micro-
nesia.

In particular. Senator [Lazarus] Salii of
the Joint Committee on Future Status stated
that:

The Micronesian Delegation believes that United
States acceptance of Micronesia's right of unilateral
termination, combined with previous acceptance of
Micronesia's control over laws and lands, constitute
the basis of an eventual agreement with the United
States. Micronesia's four basic principles and legal
rights have been recognized.

The final joint communique at Palau cited
specific basic agreement on several impoi'tant
issues. In particular, both sides noted in the
communique that:

. . . the future relationship between Micronesia
and the United States will be determined by a Com-
pact. That Compact will be based on the sovereign
right of the people of Micronesia to choose their own
future. The Compact will have to be approved by the
Congress of Micronesia, the United States Congress,
and by the people of Micronesia.

The Compact will establish a mutually beneficial
relationship of Free Association between Micronesia
and the United States and constitute the basis of the
respective rights of the parties. Under it the people
of Micronesia will vest in the Government of Micro-
nesia authority over their internal affairs while au-
thority over and responsibility for foreign affairs and
defense will be vested in the Government of the
United States.

As Ambassador Williams noted in a state-
ment issued April 19 after the talks at Palau:

The agreements reached at Hana and the new
agreements arrived at in Koror have provided a

September 4, 1972

259

foundation on which the U.S. and Micronesia Delega-
tions can direct their future efforts. The agreements
and understandings reached thus far are inter-de-
pendent and provisional; and the ultimate task of
drafting a compact will be a long and complex one.

Nevertheless, we agree with the Micro-
nesian representatives that our negotiators
have indeed built the framework of a new
relationship.

Representatives of both delegations will
probably meet later this summer to begin the
difficult task of translating agreement in
principle into a formal compact of free asso-
ciation.

These have not been easy negotiations for
either side. The United States has unusual
requirements and responsibilities in the Mi-
cronesian area that were recognized by the
Security Council when the strategic trust
was established and that are not easily recon-
ciled with a new status for the territory. The
Micronesian side has had problems of a
different sort stemming from the dissimilar
views of peoples living on scores of islands
scattered over thousands of miles of ocean.
Their efforts to achieve a consensus in the
status talks constitute ample evidence of the
growing political maturity of the people of
Micronesia and their freely elected leaders.

I should point out, however, that although
five of the six districts of the territory have
reached some agreement on a common posi-
tion in the negotiations, the sixth, the Mar-
iana Islands, has chosen a different path.
The Marianas representatives at the Palau
talks, and subsequently at Saipan, ap-
proached the U.S. delegation and requested
separate negotiations leading toward a close
and permanent union with the United States.
In their approach, they had both a mandate
from the Marianas District legislature and
the permission of the other members of the
Micronesian Joint Status Committee. The
U.S. delegation informed the Micronesian
and Marianas representatives that it would
respond affirmatively.

While it has been U.S. policy to develop all
of Micronesia toward a common future
status, events in the Marianas over the past

10 years have plainly demonstrated that the
full implementation of that policy is not fea-
sible. As the Council is well aware, the people
and leaders of the Marianas have shown
through referenda, petitions to this Council
and to my government, and repeated resolu-
tions of their district legislature that they
preferred much closer bonds to the United
States than did the other districts.

The Council will, we understand, once
again be hearing from representatives of the
Marianas District during the current ses-
sion. I am sure that they can explain more
clearly than I the reasons why they desire a
separate solution to the question of what
future relationship with the United States
best suits the people of the Marianas. How-
ever, I believe that the Council may find it
useful if I describe the present U.S. position
in regard to the opening of separate talks
with the Status Committee that has recently
been established by the Marianas District
legislature.

As Ambassador Phillips pointed out to the
Council last year in his opening statement,
we have encouraged the leadership in the
Marianas to work within the system and
urged them to participate in territory-wide
activities such as the Congress of Micronesia
and its Joint Status Committee and to seek
accommodation of their views within these
forums. They have now done so for another
year and two additional sessions of status
talks, at Hana and Palau.

They have had ample opportunity to ob-
serve the kind of solution to the status ques-
tion desired by the other five districts of the
territory. Their hopes for a different solu-
tion have been confirmed and noted by the
representatives of the other districts who
have agreed to the approach made by the
Marianas at the last session of the negotia-
tions.

Thus, not only do we believe that we have
ample grounds to consider that the decision
transmitted to us by the Marianas leaders
represented the freely expressed wishes of
the people concerned, but also we believe that
they have done so with the full understanding

260

Department of State Bulletin

of the people of the other districts. For the
United States to have responded other than
positively to the Marianas initiative could
have led ultimately to an imposition of a po-
litical status upon the people of that district
that they had made abundantly clear that
they did not want. Although we have made
the decision to enter into talks with the new
Marianas Status Committee, we have re-
affirmed our policy that the trusteeship is to
be terminated simultaneously in all of the
disti-icts of the territory.

I have discussed the outcome of the talks
at Hana and at Palau and our recent re-
sponse to the initiative taken by the Marianas
leaders at some length, feeling that these are
events of the last year of the greatest interest
to the Council and of the most importance
ultimately to the people of the territory. In
addition, the U.S. Special Representative,
High Commissioner [Edward J.] Johnston,
will, of course, be in a far better position to
describe other developments in our adminis-
tration of the territory during the past year
and will discuss in some detail some of the
plans for the future in key areas of our re-
sponsibility. He will describe our efforts
since the last session of the Council to pro-
mote the economic welfare of the territory
and to advance the people of Micronesia
toward self-government. As he will point
out, we have achieved progress in several
areas of longstanding interest to the Coun-
cil: new efforts to improve the economic in-
frastructure following on continued high
levels of grant funds appropriated by the
U.S. Congress, authorization by the U.S.
Congress of $5 million to be matched by a
similar amount to be provided in kind by
the Government of Japan for the settlement
of war claims, $5 million in appropriations
for the Micronesian Economic Development
Loan Fund, and new developments in the
fields of health and education.

In addition, we believe that significant
gains have been made within the territory
toward increased self-government. During
a long and productive legislative session at
Palau, the Congress of Micronesia passed

several important acts including one grant-
ing the Congress the right of "advice and
consent" on key appointments within the ad-
ministration. The administration, for its
part, has named an increasing number of
Micronesians to important positions within
the executive branch.

[Mr. Sacksteder concluded his statement
by introducing the members of the U.S. dele-
gation to the 39th session of the Trusteeship
Council.]

Security Council Approves Proposal
for U.N. Representative on Namibia

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council on August 1 hy U.S. Repre-
sentative George Bush, together with the text
of a resolution adopted by the Council that
day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BUSH

USUN press release 78 dated August 1

My delegation has followed with great in-
terest the efforts of the Secretary General in
his consultations with the Government of
South Africa and other parties to meet the
objectives set by the Council at our historic
meeting in Addis Ababa. We are encouraged
that progress has been made, as indicated by
the Secretary General's report which we are
now meeting to consider. The task which we
have set for the Secretary General has not
indeed been an easy one, and I think we
should all applaud the adroit manner in
which the Secretary General and his very
able staff along with the wise counsel of the
Group of Three have handled a most diffi-
cult situation.

The representative of the Secretary Gen-
eral will have a very delicate responsibility
in the months ahead in pursuing the role
established by the current resolution and
outlined in the Secretary General's report.

September 4, 1972

261

We are indeed hopeful that the next phase
of his efforts will move forward from what
has been a good beginning, but we should
recognize that it will take time to make sig-
nificant progress on this difficult issue. The
Secretary General deserves, in our view, the
fullest measure of our understanding and
support, and the members of this Council
should make him clearly aware that they
stand behind him. My government pledges to
him and to the Group of Three the fullest
measure of our support as the Secretary
General attempts to carry out the difficult
task with which we have entrusted him and
with which we will further entrust him upon
what will be, I am sure, the adoption of this
resolution.

We hope that he will be able to report ap-
preciable progress to this Council by Novem-
ber 15 for the ultimate achievement of the
goals of our Security Council Resolution 309.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION!

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February
1972, and without prejudice to other resolutions
adopted on the question of Namibia,

Having considered the report submitted by the
Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 309
(1972) (S/10738),

1. Notes with appreciation the efforts made by the
Secretary-General in the implementation of resolu-
tion 309 (1972) ;

2. Reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible
right of the people of Namibia to self-determination
and independence ;

3. Reaffirms also the national unity and the terri-
torial integrity of Namibia;

4. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation
and close co-operation with the Group of the Secu-
rity Council established in accordance with resolution
309 (1972), to continue his contacts with all parties
concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary
conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia,
freely and with strict regard to the principles of
human equality, to exercise their right to self-
determination and independence, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Approves the proposal of the Secretary-General

'U.N. doc. S/RES/319 (1972); adopted by the
Council on Aug. 1 by a vote of 14 in favor (China
did not participate).

to proceed, after necessary consultations, with the
appointment of a representative to assist him in the
discharge of his mandate as set out in paragraph 4
above ;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the
Security Council informed as appropriate and in any
case to report to it on the implementation of resolu-
tion 309 (1972) and of this resolution by 15 Novem-
ber 1972.

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed belo7v) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
10017.

Economic and Social Council

Statistical Commission:

A System of Demographic and Social Statistics
and Its Links With the System of National Eco-
nomic Accounts. E/CN.3/432. April 3, 1972. 161
pp.
Report of the Expert Group on Statistics of the
Distribution of Income, Consumption and Ac-
cumulation. E/CN.3/426. June 12, 1972. 17 pp.
Statistical Activities of the Regional Economic
Commissions and of the Inter-American Statis-
tical Institute. Progress report by the Secretary
General. E/CN.3/438. June 21, 1972. 14 pp.
Economic Survey of Europe in 1971. Summary. E/

5124. April 20, 1972. 6 pp.
Uses of the Sea. Study prepared by the Secretary

General. E/5120. April 28, 1972. 51 pp.
Annual Report of the Administrative Committee on
Coordination for 1971-1972. E/5133. May 2, 1972.
52 pp.
Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1971.

Summary. E/5132. May 3, 1972. 9 pp.
Economic Conditions in Africa, 1971. Summary. E/

5145. May 4, 1972. 18 pp.
Activities of the United Nations Economic and So-
cial Office in Beirut. Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral covering the period from April 15, 1971, to
April 14, 1972. E/5137. May 17, 1972. 18 pp.
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971. Summary.

E/5161. May 19, 1972. 13 pp.
Population Commission. Report of the Ad Hoc Con-
sultative Group of Experts on Population Policy
(New York, December 15-17, 1971). E/CN.9/267.
May 23, 1972. 17 pp.
Tourism. Review of the work of the United Nations
system of organizations and of its planning and
coordination. Report of the Secretary General.
E/5148. May 25, 1972. 55 pp.

262

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on ofTenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem-
ber 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969.
TIAS 6768.

Accessio7is deposited: Libya, June 12, 1972; Zam-
bia, September 14, 1971.

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification
of certain rules relating to international carriage
by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49
Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Guate-
mala City March 8, 1971.'
Accession deposited: Chad, July 10, 1972.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS
1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at New York
March 12, 1971.'

Ratifications deposited: Egypt, July 17, 1972;
Hungary, July 6, 1972; Japan, June 14, 1972;
Lebanon, May 4, 1972; Luxembourg, July 11,
1972; Trinidad and Tobago, July 10, 1972.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven-
tion on international civil aviation, as amended
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170). Adopted by the Assembly
of ICAO at Rome at its 14th session September
15, 1962.'
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 14, 1972.

Biological Weapons

Signatures : The Gambia, June 2, 1972; Somalia,
July 3, 1972.

Universal copyright convention, as revised, with pro-
tocols 1 and 2. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification : August
14, 1972.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and prevent-

ing the illicit import, export, and transfer of own-
ership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris
November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24,
1972."

Senate advice and consent to ratification with res-
ervation and understanding: August 11, 1972.

Customs

Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the tem-
porary admission of goods, with annex. Done at
Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into force
July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 1969.
TIAS 6631.
Accession deposited: Canada, July 10, 1972.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund, as amended. Done at Washington De-
cember 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27,
1945. TIAS 1501, 6748.

Signature and acceptance: Bangladesh, August
17, 1972.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, as amended.
Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered
into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502, 5929.
Signature and acceptance : Bangladesh, Augfust 17,
1972.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.'
Signatures: Colombia, March 25, 1972; Finland,

May 16, 1972; Gabon, Lebanon, March 25, 1972;

Panama, May 18, 1972 (with reservation); Peru,

March 25, 1972.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain
cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague
April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937.
50 Stat. 1317.

Notification of succession deposited: Fiji, June 12,
1972.

Slave Trade

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery,
as amended. Done at Geneva September 25, 1926.
Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United
States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183, TIAS 3532.
Notification of succession deposited: Fiji, June 12,
1972.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signature: The Gambia, June 2, 1972.
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 17, 1972.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

September 4, 1972

263

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Ge-
neva July 17, 1971.'

Notification of approval: United States, includ-
ing territories of the United States, July 28,
1972.

Weights and Measures

Convention establishing an International Organiza-
tion of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris October
12, 1955, and amended January 1968. Entered into
force May 28, 1958.'

Senate advice and consent to accession: August
11. 1972.

BILATERAL

10 and August 14, 1972. Entered into force
August 14, 1972.

Nonvay

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to
taxes on income and property, with related notes.
Signed at Oslo December 3, 1971.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: August
11, 1972.

PUBLICATIONS

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of March 7, 1969 (TIAS
6653). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz
March 24 and April 20, 1972. Entered into force
April 20, 1972.

Ecuador

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re-
lating to the agreement of June 30, 1969 (TIAS
6867). Signed at Quito July 31, 1972. Entered into
force July 31, 1972.

Fiji

Agreement continuing in force between the United
States and Fiji the agreement of November 26,
1965 (TIAS 5941), between the United States and
the United Kingdom relating to the reciprocal
granting of authorizations to permit licensed ama-
teur radio operators of either country to operate
their stations in the other country. Effected by
exchange of notes at Suva and Washington July

' Not in force.

- Not in force for the United States.

1947 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on Latin America Released

On July 20 the Department of State released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol-
ume VIII, The American Republics (xii, 1,082
pages). This volume, the third of eight to be pub-
lished on the year 1947, includes documentation on
U.S. policies toward Latin America and relations
with individual countries. It begins with documents
on the Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro
in August 1947, which produced the fundamental
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
It also includes sections on military assistance pro-
grams, the political situation in Argentina during
the Presidency of Juan Peron, economic coopera-
tion, and U.S. policies with regard to political un-
rest in the Caribbean and elsewhere.

The volumes are prepared by the Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VIII
may be obtained from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D. C. 20402, for $5.75 each (Department of
State publication 8587; Stock Number 4400-1408).

264

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX September h, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1732

Atomic Energy. Members of U.S. Delegation

to IAEA Conference Confirmed 245

Botswana. Letters of Credence (Dambe) . . 247

Burma. Letters of Credence (Lwin) .... 247

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 257

Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons

Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon, Rogers) . 253

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Confer-
ence Confirmed 245

United States Policy Toward the Persian Gulf
Region (Sisco) 241

Department and Foreign Service. Foreign
Policy Records for 1946 Declassified by De-
partment 252

Disarmament. Convention on Biological and
Toxin Weapons Transmitted to the Senate
(Nixon, Rogers) 253

Economic Affairs. United States Policy To-
ward the Persian Gulf Region (Sisco) . . 241

Educational and Cultural Affairs

People-to-People Diplomacy — Key to World
Understanding (Reich) 248

President Marks 25th Anniversary of Board of
Foreign Scholarships ( letter to Chairman of
the Board) 252

Foreign Aid. President Orders Additional Aid
for Viet-Nam Invasion Refugees .... 247

Ghana. Letters of Credence (Amonoo) . . . 247

International Organizations and Conferences.

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Con-
ference Confirmed 245

Middle East. United States Policy Toward the
Persian Gulf Region (Sisco) 241

Namibia. Security Council Approves Proposal
for U.N. Representative on Namibia (Bush,
text of resolution) 261

Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands (Sack-
steder) 258

Petroleum. United States Policy Toward the
Persian Gulf Region (Sisco) 241

Presidential Documents

Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons
Transmitted to the Senate 253

President Marks 25th Anniversary of Board of

Foreign Scholarships 252

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Records for

1946 Declassified by Department .... 252

Publications. 1947 "Foreign Relations" Vol-
ume on Latin America Released .... 264

Qatar. Letters of Credence (al-Mania) . . . 247

Treaty Information

Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons

Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon, Rogers) . 253

Current Actions 263

U.S.S.R. United States Policy Toward the Per-
sian Gulf Region (Sisco) 241

United Nations

Philip Hoffman To Represent U.S. on U.N.

Human Rights Commission 251

Security Council Approves Proposal for U.N.

Representative on Namibia (Bush, text of

resolution) 261

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(Sacksteder) 258

United Nations Documents 262

Viet-Nam

Letters of Credence (Phuong) 247

155th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at

Paris (Porter) 245

President Orders Additional Aid for Viet-Nam

Invasion Refugees 247

Name Index

al-Mania, Abdullah Saleh 247

Amonoo, Harry Reginald 247

Bush, George 261

Dambe, Amos Manyangwa 247

Hoffman, Philip E 251

Lwin, U 247

Nixon, President 252, 253

Phuong, Tran Kim 247

Porter, William J 245

Reich, Alan A 248

Rogers, Secretary 253

Sacksteder, Frederick H., Jr 258

Schlesinger, James R 245

Sisco, Joseph J 241

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 14—20

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to August 14 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No.
193 of August 10.

No. Date Subject

197 8/17 Porter: 155th plenary session on

Viet-Nam at Paris.
tl98 8/18 U.S. delegation to specialized

OAS conference on education of

women.
tl99 8/18 U.S. aid for Burundi refugees.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

73i

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1733

September 11, 1972

SECRETARY ROGERS INTERVIEWED FOR THE KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS 265

;ECRETARY OF commerce PETERSON HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW
ON FIRST MEETING OF JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMERCIAL COMMISSION 285

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE CHANGING WORLD POWER ALIGNMENT
Statement by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Johnson 275

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1733
September 11, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $16, foreign (23
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on development* in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, as
well as special articles on various
phases of international affairs and the
functions of tlie Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

♦

Secretary Rogers Interviewed for the Knight Newspapers

Following is the transcript of an inter-
vietv ivith Secretary Rogers by James Mc-
Cartney, Knight Newspapers, which was
conducted August 16 and first published
August 20.

Press release 202 dated August 22

Mr. McCartney: In the '68 campaign Pres-
ident Nixon suggested that he ivoidd end the
war in Viet-Nam. Three-and-a-half years
have passed, and the war is still going on.
Do you believe that the President has met
his campaign commitment or promise?

Secretary Rogers: He has carried out his
campaign promise in the sense that Ameri-
cans are now out of ground combat and the
only remaining Americans are there as a
limited or residual force related to obtaining
the release of the prisoners of war. We are,
as you know, engaged in the air war. But
even that is being gradually turned over in
the South to the Vietnamese, so that they
are now carrying a larger share of the air
war there than they have done previously.

We have done everything we could to
bring about a negotiated settlement which
would completely end the war insofar as all
combatants are concerned, including the
Vietnamese. But that can only be accom-
plished if the other side is prepared to ne-
gotiate seriously. And that has not occurred.

Mr. McCartney: Well, I know that the
President in the '68 campaign did talk about
his hopes for a negotiated settlement.

Secretary Rogers: That is right.

Mr. McCartney: And it tvas implicit in
what he was discussing. I think it is a very
complex situation, hard for people to follow.

What is standing in the ivay of a negotiated
settlement right now?

Secretary Rogers: The refusal of the other
side to discuss with us a solution which
would take into account what we believe
are reasonable considerations of both sides.
If you analyze the position of the other side,
it is simply this — a military takeover of
South Viet-Nam — they want us to leave and
stop giving any economic or military assist-
ance to the South Vietnamese, and impose
a government of their choosing on the people
of South Viet-Nam. Now, that is unaccept-
able. The United States since 1965 has been
engaged in this very difficult war. We en-
couraged the South Vietnamese to defend
their country. We fought alongside them.
They have suffei'ed tremendous casualties,
as we have. And if we now reversed our po-
sition completely — and by that I mean just
quit, gave them no economic support and
support by way of military supplies, and for
at least a period of time continuing air sup-
port— we would be reneging on everything
we have represented and anything we have
stood for.

The President has offered a cease-fire and
exchange of prisoners, international super-
vision of some kind, and we have agreed to
leave the political solution to the people in
the area.

Mr. McCartney: What do you think would
happen if Senator McGovern's program for
Viet-Nam were adopted?

Secretary Rogers: Well, first, based on the
experience in North Viet-Nam in 1955, I
think there would be a slaughter of many
people in South Viet-Nam. Secondly, I think

September 11, 1972

265

that our military alliances, the security ar-
rangements we have with 42 countries in the
world, which have been developed as a result
of bipartisan foreign policy of the United
States, would be seriously undermined. We
have these alliances which we have developed
since World War II based on the premise
that they are for mutual security purposes.
We think they have contributed to the sta-
bility of the world. We think that NATO,
for example, has been a very important fac-
tor in providing peace in Europe.

Now, no ally would believe us from that
point on if we quit and totally abandoned
South Viet-Nam and the interests of the
people of South Viet-Nam. The alliances
which are so vital to world security would
be badly shaken. Our foreign policy would
be seriously undermined.

M): McCartney: Senator McGovern seems
to believe that if he ivithdrew all U.S. forces
from Southeast Asia in 90 days, he woidd
automatically get American prisoners of war
hack. Do you think that woidd happen?

Secretary Rogers: I think his proposal
goes further than that, if I understand it.
However, there is certainly no reason to
think so. The North Vietnamese consistently
have used those prisoners as political hos-
tages. And if they succeeded in the purposes
that they have had in mind, why wouldn't
they hold the prisoners and then demand
other action on our part? They might de-
mand that we get out of Thailand or move
the 7th Fleet or that we impose a govern-
ment in South Viet-Nam acceptable to the
Communists. In other words, there is no
reason to think that they are not going to
continue the blackmail they have been en-
gaged in involving the prisoners of war to
achieve political objectives.

Mr. McCartney: So you believe Senator
McGovern is naive in this belief? Do I un-
derstand you to say that?

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say that.
I just said it won't work. And I said any
such policy would undermine our entire for-

eign policy — in Asia, in Europe, and in the
Middle East.

Mr. McCartney: Just won't ivork.

Secretary Rogers: No. There is no reason
to think it will work.

Mr. McCartney: On Henry Kissinger's
[Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs] trip to
Saigon, can you give us any indication of
what is going on here?

Secretary Rogers: No, I am not in a posi-
tion to comment.

Mr. McCartney : Talking about it in a gen-
eral sense, the 2var is about the control of
South Viet-Nam, ivho is going to control it.
And is the —

Secretary Rogers: I would rather say it
is on the question of the political future of
South Viet-Nam: Will it be a Communist
takeover by force, or will it reflect the views
of the South Vietnamese people?

Mr. McCartney: There have been some
reports or speculation that President Thieu
is sort of dragging his heels as he appeared
to be doing in 1968. And there have been re-
ports that some South Vietnamese generals
are thinking in terms of an indefinite war,
that this coidd happen. Do we have any evi-
dence that President Thieu really doesn't
ivant peace?

Secretary Rogers: No. On the contrary,
we think he is, just as we are, anxious to
work out a peaceful solution. And I think
his willingness to resign within the context
of a negotiated solution leaving the fate of
the government to the electorate is a clear
indication that he wants to bring about a
peaceful settlement. And he is also prepared
of course to accept international supervision.

Mr. McCartney: Have the South Viet-
namese been participating in any way in the
secret negotiations in Paris in which Henry
Kissinger has been involved?

Secretary Rogers: No. But they are ad-

266

Department of State Bulletin

vised of course about those negotiations.

Mr. McCartney: I think to many people
the war is so confusing that ivhat they won-
der really is when is this ivar going to end,
in those kind of simple terms.

Secretary Rogers: I am not so sure. I think
that the people realize that the President has
gotten the Americans out of the combat role,
draft calls are way down, and draftees are
not being sent to the area unless they volun-
teer. We keep talking about the war as we
did in 1968. It is quite a different situation
now. And I think the polls reflect that. The
polls reflect the American people have confi-
dence in the President's decisions and think
that he is doing a good job in dealing with a
very difficult situation which he inherited
and has gotten American ground combat
forces out of Viet-Nam.

Mr. McCartney: But with the record of
51/2 years here of inability, for ivhatever
reasons, to achieve a negotiated settlement
— if a negotiated settlement cannot be
achieved, if people just ivon't talk, what is
the prospect?

Secretary Rogers: Well, if one side refuses
to bring about an end to the fighting by ne-
gotiation and avows to continue military or
guerrilla activity for a long time, there is
no way to predict with certainty how long it
might last. But in those terms we are now
talking about a war involving those in the
area, not American forces. In any event I do
not believe that question is going to be a live
question. I think that either we will have a
negotiated settlement before the election,
which I think is a possibility, or we will
have one very soon after President Nixon's
reelection, because I think that the North
Vietnamese are having serious military, eco-
nomic, and psychological difficulties. The role
of several of their allies indicated that in the
international field most nations feel that the
war should be ended by negotiation. And so
I think that will be the inevitable result of
these pressures.

Mr. McCartney: Former Attorney General

Ramsey Clark has been stirring up some-
thing of a storm with his statement that if
George McGovern was elected some Ameri-
can prisoners would be released on January
20 and all of them by next April 20. Do you
think that would happen?

Secretary Rogers: No.

Mr. McCartney : You said some strong
tvords about Mr. Clark in your news confer-
ence the other day.^ Since then other people
have commented about it. Does it appear to
you that Mr. Clark is likely to be a major
factor in the campaign?

Secretary Rogers: Oh, I have no idea. I
expressed my own views ; they are strongly
held views, and I still hold them.

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements

Mr. McCartney: Let's talk a little bit
about non-Viet-Nam subjects. Let's talk
about the Soviet Union and American-Soviet
relations. Since the strategic arms agree-
ment was reached in Moscow, the adminis-
tration has been proposing new programs of
various kinds for defense expenditures not
covered by the treaty. When is the American
taxpayer going to get any benefit from the
strategic arms agreement ?

Secretary Rogers: Well, he already gets
benefit from it, because in the absence of the
treaty and the interim agreement the de-
fense expenditures would have inevitably
been higher than they are now. So to that
extent, there has been a saving. For exam-
ple, if neither side had agreed to stop ABM
[antiballistic missile] deployment, each side
would have had to proceed with it; it would
have been a tremendous cost. So they are
getting benefits already. And of course if
we are able to achieve further agreement on
off'ensive missiles, there will be further
saving.

Now, because we don't have a permanent
agreement on offensive missiles, both the

' For Secretary Rogers' news conference of Aug.
11, see Bulletin of Aug. 28, 1972, p. 221.

September 11, 1972

267

Russians and we agreed that we were per-
fectly free to continue to develop offensive
capabilities within the prescribed limitations.
And of course if we fail to do that, we would
be at a disadvantage in the negotiations,
militarily and in foreign policy terms.

So it has been a tremendous achievement.
And I think for people to say that we haven't
achieved savings is really quite a superficial
comment.

I believe that the treaty on arms limita-
tion is the most important treaty ever signed
dealing with arms limitation. And I think
the world is a much safer place today than
it was before.

Mr. McCartney: What is the next step
for us? What would we like to achieve in the
next round?

Secretary Rogers: Of course we would
like to achieve as much as we can. We are
not sure how much we can achieve. But the
more comprehensive the agreement as far
as offensive weapons are concerned, the
better.

Mr. McCartney : Can you give me any idea
of what kind of hard proposals we may go
into ?

Secretary Rogers: No, we are not in a
position to disclose what our initial negotiat-
ing position is going to be. But we will make
every effort to achieve a fair and balanced
agreement just as we did in the defensive
missile field.

Achievements in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Mr. McCartney: In the broad area of
American relations with the Soviet Union,
do you believe a beginning has been made in
a better relationship? There seems to be
some trouble in the trade field. What is the
next step overall or some of the other steps
that we woidd like to achieve in going beyond
what has already been done?

Secretary Rogers: I do not think that the
achievements are minimal today, as your
question might suggest. I think that the
President's visit was a most successful one.

not only in present terms but in future
terms.

First, we have established a very good re-
lationship with the U.S.S.R., an understand-
ing based on the principles that we an-
nounced there.- We had six agreements, in
the field of environment, health, science,
space, medicine, incidents at sea, and so
forth, all of which are very significant be-
cause they have continuing aspects. We are
going to work together in scientific projects
and so forth. Now, those have continuing
benefits.

Of course, in addition, as I have men-
tioned, we have the arms limitation agree-
ment, which is a very significant agreement.

We also agreed that we would take part
in the European Conference on Security and
Cooperation looking to ways to reduce ten-
sions in Europe. We agreed on parallel ne-
gotiations on mutual and balanced force re-
ductions in Europe. We talked about in-
creased trade. And we are having discussions
about that now. The Russians have agreed
to buy almost a billion dollars' worth of
grain from us during this year, which is the
largest grain purchase, I think, in the his-
tory of the world.

So these are very substantial achievements
— not only in themselves but looking to the
future.

We would hope that as we work together
in these fields, as we have more contacts
with each other, as we have more trade with
each other, as we proceed in the second phase
of the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks], that instead of having merely
peaceful coexistence, that gradually, over a
period of time, we will look to ways that we
can deal with each other more cooperatively,
not just live-and-let-live, but getting along
better realizing it is to our mutual benefit.

As you know, the President wouldn't go
to the summit with the Russians until he
felt there were going to be concrete results.
And because of that policy we worked for a
couple of years in advance, so that when the

' For text of the basic principles of relations
signed at Moscow on May 29 during President
Nixon's visit, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 898.

268

Department of State Bulletin

trip took place we would have the opportu-
nity to complete them at the summit.

So I think that anyone that is thoughtful
about this initiative on the part of President
Nixon has to come to the conclusion that it
is very significant, not only presently but for
the future of the world.

Mr. McCartney : On the question that you
mentioned here involving mutual and bal-
anced force reductions in Europe, Senator
McGovern, as you knoiv, has proposed ivhat
I think is fairly described as a unilateral
slash in U.S. troops to the level of 130,000,
compared to something like 300,000 now.
What do you think would happen in Europe
if that ivere done?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we wouldn't have
to bother thinking about mutual and bal-
anced force reductions, because we would
have unilaterally reduced. I think it would
be very unwise. If we are going to reduce
our forces we should require the Russians to
reciprocate, and reduce our forces in a mu-
tual and balanced manner.

But more than that, I think it would have
the effect of undermining our NATO alli-
ance, which is, I think, of great importance
to our security. As you know, it is an alliance
consisting of 15 nations which has worked
together very effectively since World War II
for common defense. And if we gave the
Europeans the idea that somehow we were
losing interest in it now and we were not
prepared to continue to maintain the
strength of the alliance, it would have a very
debilitating effect on the alliance and on the
European situation generally.

Middle East Situation

Mr. McCartney: May we switch to the
Middle East. Does the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Egypt, in your judgment, sub-
stantially improve the prospects for peace
in the Middle East?

Secretary Rogers: We have hesitated to
make any comments about the effect of that
decision on the part of Egypt. Certainly it is
a new factor in the equation. And we hope

that it will have that effect. But we are not
sure. No one can be sure.

The policy we have pursued in the Middle
East is a sound one. We wish that it had
resulted in a negotiated settlement carrying
out the provisions of Security Council Reso-
lution 242. But looking at the situation today
compared to 3V'o years ago, there has been
great improvement. We have had a cease-
fire now that is going into its third year that
was brought about by the initiative that was
taken by the Nixon administration. Jordan
is in a much more stable position than it was.
We have very good relations with many
Arab countries. And we just renewed diplo-
matic relations with both Yemen and Sudan,
which are important countries in that area.
And our relations with Israel are excellent.
And notwithstanding some of the statements
that have been made by some officials in
Egypt, I think there is a feeling that the
United States can play a useful role in ne-
gotiations in the future. In fact, my next
caller is the Egyptian representative that is
in charge of the Interest Section for the
Egyptian Government, who has asked to see
me.

Mr. McCartney: What differences do you
see betiveen this admiyiistration' s policies in
the Middle East and those of Senator
McGovern?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I am not sure
what his policies are. I know what our poli-
cies are. We have been very active in bring-
ing about or trying to bring about negotia-
tions. And as you know, in that process we
were able to bring about a cease-fire, so that
there has been no fighting between Egypt
and Israel for more than two years. We have
given very effective and convincing support
to Israel in order to maintain the military
balance in the area. So that Israel, I think,
believes that the Government of the United
States has done what it should to assist them
in maintaining their sovereignty, independ-
ence, and security. And at the same time we
have made it clear to the Arabs that we
want peace in the area and that we are very
anxious to play a responsible role in bringing

September 11, 1972

269

about that peace. And although the Arabs
are disappointed that we have not accom-
pUshed more, the relations that exist now
between the Arab world and the United
States are better than they have been for
some time.

So I don't think anybody could seriously
challenge the success of our foreign policy in
the Middle East.

In other words, I think any fair observer
would have to give President Nixon tremen-
dous credit for the policies that we have fol-
lowed in the Middle East.

Developments in U.S.-China Relations

Mr. McCartney : The trip to China, as you
know, has fascinated the ivorld. Discussion
about it has died down now some months
later. What is developing , what has devel-
oped since the trip to further improve, if
anything, the relationship with China, and
what are we headed for there?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that the
developments since the visit have been the
developments that we expected — somewhat
gradual, because it takes some effort to move
quickly when you haven't had any contact
with a nation for 22 years.

We have had meetings with the Chinese
on a periodic basis. The things that we
agreed to in terms of conversations, about
admission of Americans to China and so
forth, have gone on schedule. As you know,
Senators Mansfield and Scott visited in
China, and the majority leader and minority
leader in the House visited China. We have
had Americans who went to the Chinese
Trade Fair and received orders there. They
were treated courteously and with respect by
the Chinese. And we would expect that our
relations would continue to improve and
gradually we will develop more trade, we will
have more exchanges.

As you know, Dr. Kissinger had a return
trip after the Moscow visit.

So that the relations are developing just
about as we expected they would.

The Chinese have been very friendly. They
have been restrained in their comments

about the United States, and we on our part
have, I think, been restrained in our com-
ments. As far as we can tell, we are going
to continue to improve our relations with
the People's Republic of China. And we are
particularly pleased that our allies in that
part of the world have understood the Presi-
dent's purposes and have reported the suc-
cess of his mission.

U.S. Commitment to Viet-Nam

Mr. McCartney: I want to return to Viet-
Nam, on the question of a political settle-
ment— the whole debate over the possibility
of ivhat has become a kind of a scare term
or a political term, I believe — a coalition
government of some sort. What is the pros-
pect for some kind of a political settlement
there? What kind of deal cayi be made there?
Is there atiy framework that has shaped up
here ?

Secretary Rogers: Well, you see, when we
had more than half a million men in Viet-
Nam, as we did in the beginning of 1969,
that was one thing. Now we are just about
out of there. We now have 39,000 or 40,000,
something like that, and they are not in
combat and are not combat troops.

The political future of that area should be
left to the people of the area. That is what
everyone urged us to do when this admin-
istration came in office. Our position is let
the people there work out the political solu-
tion; just stop the fighting and have inter-
national supervision to see that the cease-
fire is honored, exchange prisoners of war,
and let the people in the area decide their
political future. Why should the United
States be asked to decide the political fu-
ture? Let them work it out.

What we have said is that we prefer the
elective process. Whatever the people want
as expressed by their votes would be ac-
ceptable.

But now we are out of there. Why should
we be called upon to make the political de-
termination? Why should the North Viet-
namese ask us to work out a political solu-
tion? Let the people there work it out.

270

Department of State Bulletin

Mr. McCartney: Well, when they ivon't
talk, a)id we do have a commitment there —
irhat I am trying to get at is ivhat kind of
tiling might be possible. It seems to be an
impasse.

Secretary Rogers: There is no doubt that
it is an impasse, but it is an impasse because
the North Vietnamese won't talk to the
South Vietnamese. That is why we say, Stop
the fighting, have everyone stop the fighting
now, exchange prisoners of war, have an in-
ternational community get into the act and
help supervise a cease-fire, and then let talks
start about the political future of the area.

The one thing that we cannot permit now
is a military takeover of South Viet-Nam by
the Communists after the tremendous bur-
den we have borne both in men and re-
sources. If we did that the United States
would live in shame for generations. If we
did that, if we just pulled out and let the
Communists take over as a result of military
force and didn't continue to give limited
help to the South Vietnamese, we would be
reneging on all representations that we as a
nation have made.

We have said, "We are prepared to assist
you. We are going to get our combat forces
out. You have got to take over the role now
of defending yourself." And as I have said,
we have done that to a large extent. "But we
are going to continue to give you some eco-
nomic aid and some military supplies as
long as the North Vietnamese continue the
invasion of your country. In other words,
we expect you to defend your own country
now that we are out, but we are going to
help you for a period of time with airpower
and economically. We cannot stop at this
point and let the North Vietnamese take
over as a result of military force."

I asked some of our allies at an alliance
meeting one time privately how many of
them would have any confidence in our treaty
commitments if under these circumstances
we had a complete reversal of policy and
refused to give any aid of any kind to the
South Vietnamese, after fighting alongside
them since 1965. The universal answer was
our treaty commitments would be next to

meaningless, that it would be difficult for
other nations to rely on a national policy of
the United States.

The question of whether we should have
entered the war in 1965 is one the historians
will have to determine. But there is no doubt
in my mind that the policy that President
Nixon is following in Viet-Nam is the right
policy, and also I think it has the support
of the American people. They realize it was
a very difliicult situation that he inherited,
and I think that they believe he has done a
good job.

Furthermore, I think they realize that all
the other efi'orts he has made in the foreign
affairs field, the initiatives he has taken
toward the Soviet Union, toward China, the
success of our policy in the Middle East, all
of these show that he is a world leader for
peace. And I think most of the nations in
the world, not only allies but adversaries
alike, have great respect for him.

Mr. McCartney: In the absence of a ne-
gotiated settlement, what is the prospect for
stopping of the bombing, which the Demo-
crats seem to be making something of an
issue of, and withdrawal of forces outside'*of
Viet-Nam, Southeast Asia and offshore
forces ?

Secretary Rogers: We plan to continue the
present policy. The other side is having
serious difficulties. First, their offensive, the
invasion they launched in South Viet-Nam,
has not been successful. That is quite clear.
They committed almost all of their divisions,
combat divisions, to that invasion, and it has
not succeeded. Second, our bombing of mili-
tary targets in the North and mining the
harbors have been successful. Third, I think
the word is beginning to get back to the
North Vietnamese people that this is a hope-
less endeavor for them to be engaged in, that
they realize that the South Vietnamese are
fighting very well. You know, there was this
myth that the South Vietnamese couldn't
fight. They are doing all the fighting on the
ground and doing it well. Fourth, you find
that the international community is largely
supporting President Nixon in the proposals

September 11, 1972

271

that he has made to bring about a peaceful
settlement. I want to recall that Senator
Mansfield said when the President made his
last proposal that it was as far as any
reasonable man could go under the circum-
stances.

So I think all those things will combine to
make the North Vietnamese want to work
out a settlement.

Now, whether that happens before the
election or shortly thereafter, I don't know.
But I am convinced it will happen.

Mr. McCartney: Is the bombmg policy in
part designed to keep pressure on them at
the negotiating table?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it is designed
principally to prevent the invasion of South
Viet-Nam from working, to be sure that our
troops in South Viet-Nam are not in jeop-
ardy, and to prevent the Communists from a
military takeover of South Viet-Nam. In-
directly, I think it puts pressure on them at
the negotiating table, yes.

156th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassa-
dor Hey ward Isham, acting head of the U.S.
delegation, at the 156th plenary session of
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Au-
gust 2U-

Press release 203 dated August 24

OPENING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: In the five preced-
ing sessions of these talks, we sought to en-
gage your side in a dialogue about the reali-
ties of the situation in Indochina. We have
demonstrated that the most urgent task be-
fore us is to begin negotiations to end the
killing and restore peace throughout the re-
gion. We have also demonstrated that the
absolute primacy your side gives to the mili-
tary effort only confirms our position that

the search for a cease-fire should take prior-
ity in this forum, not, as you demand, com-
prehensive agreement on all outstanding is-
sues.

Having contrasted your professions in this
forum with your military behavior, I now
draw your attention to the contrasts be-
tween your side's statements in Paris and
your statements elsewhere.

Last week your side stated, as it has on
previous occasions, that "we reaffirm that
we came here with good will and the desire
to settle the South Vietnamese problem
peacefully." Recently you distributed to the
press in Paris excerpts from an article signed
by "Chien Binh" (The Combatant) origi-
nally printed August 4 in the two major
Hanoi daily newspapers, an article extolling
the "failures of Vietnamization" and the mil-
itary prowess of your invading divisions. It
is interesting, however, that the version you
distributed did not include certain striking
passages from the original text. Thus, for
example, you deleted mention of your side's
claim to be "struggling to gain time in order
to gradually weaken or annihilate the enemy
forces, smash his pacification plan, develop
our forces, and organize firm battlegrounds
so as to change the war situation and win
increasingly greater victories." You deleted
mention of the injunctions to "destroy enemy
posts, subsectors, and district towns," to
"launch continuous attacks," and to have all
people "channel their force to the battle-
fields."

Is this what you call a "desire to settle the
South Vietnamese problem peacefully"? Is
this not a call in the most categorical terms
for escalation of the fighting, regardless of
cost, in pursuit of military victory? There
could be no more resounding endorsement of
our position that, in view of your actions,
these talks must address the military prob-
lems in this conflict as a matter of highest
priority.

A second instance of the contradictions
which beset you is found in your side's pious
assertion, repeated at last week's session,
that "The PRO [Provisional Revolutionary
Government] does not reserve for itself a

272

Department of State Bulletin

monopoly of control of the political life in
South Viet-Nam." Once again a deleted por-
tion of the "Chien Binh" article refutes your
contention, for it openly boasts of having
"smashed the puppet administrative appa-
ratus at the hamlet and village levels and re-
gained mastery in most of the rural areas in
the South." How can you reconcile your
words here about "equality and mutual re-
spect among the forces in South Viet-Nam,"
about the supposedly nonmonolithic nature
of the political arrangements you propose,
with the "Chien Binh" call for "wresting
back the mastership right" and "strengthen-
ing the revolutionary fortresses"?

Again, you have expressed the view here
that negotiations are the best way to stop the
war and restore peace to Viet-Nam. How-
ever, a Nhan Dan editorial of August 17 con-
demned the very notions of compromise and
reconciliation — both indispensable for nego-
tiations— contending that reconciliation could
only be justified "in order to impel the of-
fensive of the revolutionary forces" and that
compromise was tantamount to "opportun-
ism." "We Communists," the editorial
stated, "must persist in revolution and should
not compromise." Similarly, a Nhan Dan edi-
torial of August 19 equated compromise with
"capitulation," declared that "our posture is
very firm and can be reversed by nobody,"
and concluded, "We will only advance, never
retreat."

These statements come as no surprise, for
they reflect a policy you have followed for
many years, and the only reason for citing
them now is that they raise questions about
the consistency of what you are saying in
Paris and what you are saying elsewhere.

How can you expect people to believe your
claim that our side is responsible for the
deadlock in negotiations when you seem to
dismiss the very possibility of undertaking
a serious negotiating process, of making the
effort to find common ground that this en-
tails?

How can you expect people to accept your
charges that our side is escalating the war
when you urge your followers to intensify
their offensive operations heedless of cost

and regardless of negotiating alternatives?

This is a curious way to be "flexible"; this
is an unconvincing argument for what you
call a "correct" and "reasonable" solution.

There is, however, a remedy for your in-
ternal contradictions. You can give primacy
here to military problems in this conflict, as
you do in practice. You can negotiate an In-
dochina-wide cease-fire, with the added safe-
guard of international supervision, to end
the fratricide your people lament. You can
return American prisoners of war, which,
together with the internationally supervised
cease-fire, will occasion the complete with-
drawal of United States forces from Viet-
Nam, and within four months. You can dis-
cuss political questions with representatives
of the Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam to deal with the substance of determin-
ing the political future of South Viet-Nam,
free from external interference, by the Viet-
namese people themselves.

We agree with you that negotiations are
the best way to stop the war and to restore
peace to Viet-Nam. The question is. Are you
prepared to end the dichotomy between your
words and your actions, your words in Paris
and your words elsewhere? Let this dichot-
omy end and a dialogue between our two
sides begin.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen : I have a few brief
remarks to make. The proposal of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam to re-
patriate 600 sick and wounded prisoners of
war is a constructive effort toward deesca-
lating the conflict through specific humani-
tarian measures. This proposal is fully in
keeping with the Geneva Convention on the
treatment of prisoners of war, by which
both sides are bound. We hope that this hu-
mane initiative will meet with a positive re-
sponse and will occasion additional measures
of this kind.

I take note of your inability to explain the
contradictions I have pointed out, citing your
own sources, between your words about good

September 11, 1972

273

will in Paris and your belligerent exhorta-
tions to your followers in Viet-Nam to in-
tensify their military efforts.

Therefore, you still bear the burden of
proof that you really wish to negotiate, to
seek a basis for compromise of conflicting
interests, for a basis that will take into ac-
count the reasonable interests of both sides.

Compromise, may I add, need not be
equated with capitulation in negotiations. On
the contrary, "principled compromise," to
use your own term, is a necessary element
of a wise policy. It has been increasingly
recognized as such by states with widely di-
versified political interests and facing prob-
lems of great complexity. I hope that you
will come to realize this. Please reflect on
these thoughts.

President Authorizes Further Relief
for Flood Victims in the Philippines

Initial shipments of the 150,000 tons of
U.S. rice and other food authorized by Presi-
dent Nixon for Philippines relief were sched-
uled to arrive in Manila in August, the Agen-
cy for International Development said on
August 9 (AID press release 72-66). The
food is part of a new relief program an-
nounced by the White House on August 8 to
help millions of flood-stricken Filipinos in
the Island of Luzon.

In a message to President Marcos on July
31 extending his sympathy and that of the
American people. President Nixon pledged
"the continuing support and cooperation of
the United States as the Philippines goes
about the difficult task of relief and recov-
ery."

The new program, totaling $30 million,
will help people in the flood area whose food
supplies have been swept away and whose
crops have been destroyed. In addition to the
relief food, valued at $24 million, the Presi-
dent also instructed the State Department to

make a contribution of $6 million from the
Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund to
help pay for other emergency relief and re-
habilitation needs. This brings the total of
U.S. disaster relief assistance to the Philip-
pines to more than $32.4 million.

The largest portion of the food to be pro-
vided under the new aid program, 100,000
tons of unpolished rice, was destined for
Korea under the Food for Peace program
and is being diverted to the Philippines with
the cooperation of Korean President Park.
Later shipments will replace the rice for
Korea. The rice is valued at $15 million and
is a sale on 30-year concessional credit
terms.

The remaining food, approximately 25,000
tons of rice and 25,000 tons of other foods,
will be a grant valued at $9 million, includ-
ing shipping costs.

The $30 million in new disaster assistance
is in addition to immediate U.S. relief meas-
ures in the form of rescue operations by
U.S. Army Disaster Area Relief Teams
( dart's) and distribution of food, water,
medical, and other emergency supplies by
U.S. Navy, Marine, and Air Force helicop-
ters. The dart's, permanently stationed in
Okinawa, are made up of 104 specialists in
medicine, communications, and civic action.
They have inoculated thousands of Filipinos
with a combined cholera-typhoid vaccine, as
well as effecting rescue opei'ations and food
distribution. U.S. Navy doctors are also
training local teams in modern mass inocula-
tion methods.

Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and
Church World Service, all of which have es-
tablished programs in the Philippines, have
been helping to distribute Food for Peace,
clothing, medicines, and other supplies as
well as providing cash grants. In addition,
Lutheran World Relief is distributing cloth-
ing, while the American Red Cross is pro-
viding cash relief grants and the Foster
Parents Plan is making small loans to unem-
ployed workers.

274

Department of State Bulletin

National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment

Statement by U. Alexis Johnson
Undo- Seci'etary for Political Affairs ^

These hearings have been of particular
interest to me. Many of my former profes-
sional colleagues, including one of my former
chiefs, Dean Rusk, have testified before you.
I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your invitation
to join them in discussing these matters with
you and your distinguished colleagues. In
doing so, I am not so much representing the
formal views of the Department of State or
the administration as I am sharing with you
some personal thoughts derived from my
own background and experience.

I am now in my 38th year in the Foreign
Service of the United States. When I entered
the Service in 1935, I took an oath that I
would "support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, for-
eign and domestic" and that I would bear
"true faith and allegiance to the same." I
take that oath to mean that I am sworn to
do everything I am able to do to promote
the security and well-being of the United
States. Like most Foreign Service officers,
I consider that not only a professional obli-
gation but a personal one. I have also had
very much in mind that my oath was not
as an officer of the Department of State, but
rather as a Foreign Service officer of the
United States responsible to all the depart-

^ Made on August 8 before a hearing-symposium
on "National Security Policy and the Changing
World Power Alignment," Session VII, "View From
the State Department," held by the Subcommittee
on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-
ments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(press release 196). The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.

ments and agencies of the government with
interests abroad.

Mr. Chairman, I realize this committee is
trying to look into the future. But I hope you
will permit me a brief detour into the past.
I believe much of our nation is now in con-
siderable disarray and confusion as to what
our position is in the world and what it
should be. Before turning to those questions,
I think it right to let you know where I, at
least, think we have been.

In my early service, it was clear to me and
to a growing number of my fellow citizens
that the security and well-being of the
United States were deeply threatened by the
developments in Europe and the Far East.
The need for a more adequate national de-
fense was obvious. The need to provide diplo-
matic and material support to those nations
immediately threatened by the Axis Powers
was clear. We ultimately made a supreme
national effort to that end. Its justification
was beyond question, on either moral or
practical grounds.

After the Second World War, we quickly
came as a nation to recognize a somewhat
parallel situation. Large portions of the
world lay inert, victims of physical and psy-
chological destruction on an unprecedented
scale. Desperate men and shattered states
saw a bleak future. They were tempted to
embrace, or submit to, a new tyranny which
openly professed hostility not only to the
United States but also to any international
structure in which we could survive. We
alone had the strength and the confidence to
provide an alternative center of leadership
and help.

It seemed to me then — and it seems to me

September 11, 1972

275

now — unthinkable that we should have ig-
nored the need and the opportunity. Strong
as we were, we were not then — and we are
not now — strong enough to be indifferent to
the world we live in. It would have been
worse than foolish — it would have been feck-
less— for the United States to have declined
to lead the non-Communist world in the
aftermath of World War II.

It is now fashionable to question our mo-
tives and accomplishments in the postwar
era. I find such questions extraordinary.

As to our motives, I will simply note that
Winston Churchill, an observer with some
experience in these matters, characterized
our effort in the early postwar years as the
"most unsordid act in history."

To my mind, our accomplishments speak
for themselves :

— Our bitterest enemies of three decades
ago are now among our closest friends. And
surely it is better to have strong friends
than strong enemies.

— The dreadful prospect of another world
war, this time between the Communist and
non-Communist powers, seems now more re-
mote than at any time since the mid-1940's.

— The American people have prospered to
an unprecedented degree during this period.

— More than 60 free nations came into
being in the remarkable and largely peaceful
liquidation of some 400 years of colonial his-
tory. (Not a single one of these nations has
chosen the Communist system.)

— A new sense of the interdependence of
nations has grown in only a few decades
from being a bitterly disputed premise to a
commonplace statement of the obvious.

— We have kept the atomic genie in his
bottle and have made significant progress in
establishing international limits which lessen
the atomic threat to mankind, and enhance
the potential of the atom's beneficial use.

— We have made a singular contribution
to the economic recovery of the world from
World War II and have witnessed record
levels of prosperity in large parts of the
world.

— We have helped create an international

economic system which has resulted in an
explosion in trade between nations on a scale
unprecedented in history, with immeasurable
benefits to the people of the world, notably
including our own.

These are not negligible accomplishments.
They are, in fact, historic accomplishments.
I do not think that we need be apologetic
or defensive about them. Rather, I think this
country should be proud of them. I think the
Congress, which has contributed so greatly
to them, should be proud of them. The fact
that we have had some failures — and that
we still face serious problems — gives no basis
for the denial of the accomplishments of the
past three decades.

Diplomacy and Military Strength

Mr. Chairman, I expressed the opinion
earlier that much of the Nation is now con-
fused about our foreign policy goals. In times
of confusion, it is useful to go back to funda-
mentals. The Constitution is a domestic com-
pact describing how to organize and run the
United States. It does not say how we will
deal with the rest of the world. But from the
Constitution, and particularly the preamble,
which speaks of establishing justice, insur-
ing domestic tranquillity, providing for the
common defense, and promoting the general
welfare, certain obvious foreign policy guid-
ance can be derived.

It is, for example, clear that the first re-
sponsibility of government is the physical
safety of our people. This responsibility rests
no less on Foreign Service officers than it
does on military officers, and our objective is
identical : to maintain an international en-
vironment in which the incentives and op-
portunities for conflict are kept to a mini-
mum, and if conflict occurs, to contain and
defeat it quickly.

And while I am on this subject, Mr. Chair-
man, I want to say a word about my military
colleagues. For a good part of my life, in
fact going back to my association with the
marines in North China in 1939, I have
worked closely with professional American

276

Department of State Bulletin

military men. I think I know them as well
as any civilian can. We have, on occasion,
had disagreements, sometimes vigorous ones.
However, on broad policy issues, it has been
my experience that differing views are rai^ely
drawn solely along military and nonmilitary
lines. The American military professionals
I have known have served with devotion and
skill the well-being mid the peace of this
land. To picture them otherwise is to draw
a caricature. I find extremely painful and
dangerous the growing tendency in this
country to belittle the United States armed
services and the contribution they have made
to our country and to the world. Neither as
individuals nor as national institutions do
they deserve it; and although they have
better champions than me, I wanted to take
this opportunity to say a word on their
behalf.

I cannot understand the argument that we
should reduce our military strength as a
contribution to the national search for peace.
In my experience, military strength is not
an alternative to a national search for peace.
It is an essential element of it. In the world
as it is, and is likely to be for the indefinite
future, military strength and diplomacy are
fingers of the same hand. A national com-
mitment to the search for peace not backed
up by military strength would not be a poli-
cy at all. It would be a pious expression of
hope, devoid either of credibility or efi'ect.

To my mind, the Berlin crisis of 1961 and
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 were excel-
lent demonstrations of how diplomacy and
military capabilities were orchestrated by a
skillful President to achieve an important
national security purpose without resort to
violence. Without deft diplomacy, Mr. Chair-
man, our strength would not have been
enough to save our people from tragedy.
But without our strength, the most brilliant
diplomacy could not have met these blunt
challenges to our security.

On a somewhat different plane, I believe
that the recent SALT [Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Talks] agreements, which are now
before the Congress, give clear evidence of
the fact that diplomacy and military strength

are not contradictory but very much comple-
ment each other. They are self-reinforcing,
and both are necessary instruments of a
national policy that aims at a peaceful world.
The efforts and the sacrifices that we have
made over the years have established the
environment in which the President has been
able to take great and constructive initiatives
in recent months in both Moscow and Peking.
One can recognize the consummate skill in-
volved in realizing those profits without los-
ing sight of the wisdom of the investments
which made the profits possible.

A Period of Transition and Uncertainties

The subject of these hearings could hardly
be more timely. We are in a transition pe-
riod, and some of the central assumptions
upon which our policies were based during
the last 2'/2 decades are no longer valid.
The ultimate shape of our policies is not yet
clear. Nor, for that matter, is the ultimate
shape of the international environment. All
that is clear is that both the world situation
and our own policies are changing. With this
change come uncertainties, and it is with that
we must concern ourselves.

One of the uncertainties is the question
of what the American people and their con-
gressional representatives will be willing to
support in the way of national security and
foreign policies in the future. What invest-
ment will this country be willing to make in
the years to come in order to influence the
international political environment we live
in? That uncertainty has led to serious
doubts abroad about the future course of
U.S. foreign policy. This is a matter of the
greatest importance for our national se-
curity and well-being. For unless our foreign
friends understand our policies clearly and
have confidence in the continuity — the de-
pendability— of our policies, then they can-
not concert their policies with ours. Let me
put it bluntly: If they cannot count on us,
they will not for long be willing to be counted
with us.

Both our friends and our antagonists now
see divisions in this country on many funda-

September 11, 1972

277

mental aspects of policy. They see us di-
vided :

— On the wisdom of our current levels of
defense expenditures.

— About the maintenance of U.S. forces
in Europe.

— Over the assistance we should provide
to poorer nations.

— About the future U.S. military presence
in East Asia and the western Pacific.

— About continuing military assistance to
friendly developing nations.

— They also see us divided about whether
to continue to support more liberal world
trade or return to building protectionist
walls to isolate national economies from each
other.

In each of these matters, our domestic
disagreements make our future policies ap-
pear uncertain. And taken together, these
uncertainties lie at the heart of our relations
with most of the countries of the world.

I do not know how our society will resolve
its disagreements on these issues. But I do
know that the national interest requires that
they be resolved without much delay. For
it is a truism that a great power cannot
exercise its influence abroad unless its poli-
cies have assured continuity. Ours cannot be
given assured continuity by anyone but the
American people and their representatives
in the Congress.

New Relationships With Communist Powers

Mr. Chairman, as the American domestic
scene has changed, so has the international
situation. There are few who would now
dispute the fact that a monolithic Communist
world has ceased to exist. We should keep in
mind that the only combat employment of
the Soviet Army since World War II has
been against its own allies — East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the People's
Republic of China.

But the fact that the Communist world is
internally in conflict does not mean that it
is benignly disposed toward us or that an
"era of negotiation" must automatically suc-

ceed. We still have real and serious differ-
ences with the Soviet Union, China, and
other Communist powers ; and some of them
could conceivably lead to conflict. Certainly,
the earlier conceptions of bloc confrontation
and monolithic communism must now give
way to recognition of a complex set of new
and changing relationships. But the salient
fact is that almost nothing is certain about
those new relationships.

We may now have opening before us a
prospect we have not seen for a very long
time. There are concrete reasons to believe
that the tensions between great powers may
in the next few years be reduced to a level
unknown since before the First World War.
A pattern of accommodation is beginning to
emerge, by which the great powers exercise
restraint in asserting and pursuing their own
interests and treat with respect each other's
legitimate interests even when they are in
conflict. Such restraint opens the prospect of
broad cooperation in areas where interests
are complementary.

But it is an uncertain prospect — fragile
and tentative. It would be folly to read into
this possibility the attributes of certainty,
or even of probability. For this is a delicate
process upon which we have embarked, vul-
nerable to a host of difficulties, any of which
could prove fatal to the emerging structure
of cooperation. Indeed, it is only the recogni-
tion of the vast benefits which all would
share from cooperation that gives me gen-
uine hope that the difficulties may be over-
come.

Moreover, we must not close our eyes to
the fact that the decline in tensions between
ourselves and the major Communist powers
also tends to threaten the stability of the
Western alliance. It is a fact that the primary
cement of that alliance was fear of Com-
munist aggression. As tensions decline, that
fear declines; and that is very much to be
desired. But it also weakens the cement upon
which our security and well-being have
rested for over 20 years.

And it does more. It opens temptations for
the Western allies to engage in competition
with each other in making favorable ar-

278

Department of State Bulletin

rangements with the Communist powers.
Such pursuit of narrow national advantage
can only undermine the association of sov-
ereign allies which has itself created the
environment in which an adjustment of rela-
tions between the traditional antagonists is
possible. We will need to be very careful to
avoid the unraveling of our unity — and very
scrupulous in making sure we do not encour-
age it by our own actions.

The point I am trying to make is simply
this. We should, and we certainly will, pur-
sue with full vigor the openings to a new
relationship with the Soviet Union and
China. But we would be imprudent indeed,
while engaged in that pursuit, to dismantle
our own defenses or to permit our alliances
to fall into disrepair and disrepute. If we
try to purchase a better relationship with
the Communists at the price of our strength
and our friends, we shall — without a doubt
— end up losing all three.

Let me illustrate. The U.S.-Chinese rela-
tionship, so long as it does not threaten war,
is not likely to determine a U.S. presidential
election. The same issue in Japan can bring
down a government. Because the United
States and Japan are allies, how each of us
handles our bilateral affairs with China is a
crucial U.S. -Japanese issue as well.

Mr. Chairman, while studying the changes
that are taking place in the international en-
vironment, we need to keep clearly in mind
that there are certain things that have not
changed. The security equation continues
to be bipolar. The United States and U.S.S.R.
may not be the only ones that count, but they
clearly count the most.

The state of mutual nuclear deterrence
that exists today has little to do with the
fact that there are five nuclear powers, but
a great deal to do with the fact that there
are two very large ones. That is why SALT
is a bilateral exercise and, in fact, why
earlier arms control initiatives like the lim-
ited nuclear test ban of the early 1960's were
bilateral.

Neither Europe nor Asia has developed as
a wholly independent source of military
power. Therefore, if you accept that deter-

rence is a sensible strategic concept, then
our alliance systems and the forces devoted
to them are also sensible, since it is through
those alliances that U.S. military power can
be brought to bear in concert with our allies
in a deterrent role. Without them, we either
force the creation of new military power
centers, with their attendant instabilities, or
force the creation of new and probably hos-
tile political and economic alignments of our
former allies and the Communist powers.

Finally, the concept of forcing the negotia-
tion of differences by foreclosing the al-
ternatives of military coercion and political
blackmail also seems likely to survive as a
workable policy. I do not foresee instant
detente or guaranteed peace coming out of
the various diplomatic initiatives that we —
and our allies — are engaged in with the Com-
munist powers. It is a promising beginning.
But only if we maintain a stable security
environment can we deny exploitable open-
ings to potential enemies. And only under
those circumstances do I see a realistic pos-
sibility, over time, for the accommodation
of the national interests of the Communist
and non-Communist worlds.

Problems of Technology and Development

Let me turn now to the question of the
economic side of diplomacy. Here, I believe,
we face the most intractable problems for
the future. I expect that economic considera-
tions may dominate foreign policy over the
next two decades as security concerns have
dominated the last two. Technology is hurry-
ing us into the future at a rate that neither
our understanding nor our institutions, in-
cluding our diplomatic ones, seem able to
comprehend or cope with.

Many of you are familiar with the small
recently published book called "The Limits
to Growth." It presents a very dismal fu-
ture for the world, arguing that the planet's
finite resources cannot possibly support the
exponential growth rates of people and pro-
duction that have marked the last century. It
concludes that catastrophe faces us within

September 11, 1972

279

the next generation or so if drastic action is
not taken now.

To whatever degree this bleak picture has
validity, to it must be added the problems
created by the maldistribution of economic
development. The gap between rich and poor,
or if you will. North and South, is growing
at a very disturbing rate. In a few nations,
the rate of per capita economic growth is
nearly zero or actually negative. This funda-
mentally unacceptable situation becomes ex-
plosive in a political sense when the devel-
oped world, by contrast, is able to maintain
a steady growth rate of already very large
and healthy economies.

These two phenomena, rates of growth and
their distribution, present the world with
two serious dilemmas:

— First, how can the many nation-states
of the world concert their separate decisions
on resource use which, taken together, will
in the end determine whether the human
race will prosper or perish, either from star-
vation or from suffocation in its own gar-
bage?

— Second, how can the job be done without
denying to either the developed or under-
developed nations the resources and rates of
growth on which their prosperity and, in
some cases, their survival depend?

We need to redefine the whole concept of
development. We have tended to equate de-
velopment with the achievement of traffic
jams and urban sprawl. It seems to me that
it should be possible for us to devise con-
cepts of development which would eliminate
the worst effects of industrialization as
experienced in the advanced countries.

Furthermore, I do not believe that indus-
trialization or development can be imposed
from outside. The poorer countries must de-
termine the direction, and control the proc-
esses, of their own development. Their
progress must reflect their own personalities,
even though they obviously need both capital
and technical assistance from outside. Above
all, it will take time, given both luck and
everyone's best efforts.

I think it is right, politically and morally.

that we should assist the process with ma-
terial resources. But I think it is at least
equally important that the advanced coun-
tries devote a greater measure of energy
and time, at high political levels, to remedy-
ing the belief among the less developed
countries that they are increasingly forgot-
ten or ignored. If the less developed nations
have no stake in the international structure,
then they will inevitably become its enemies.
I have no answers to these questions; I
doubt, in fact, that such answers now exist,
although I am optimist enough to believe
they can be found. The difficulties, however,
are immense. If an apparent international
consensus on whaling, as expressed at the
recent Stockholm Conference, cannot be
made effective in practice, one may legiti-
mately wonder how we are to deal with the
much more important issues of environ-
mental pollution and the conservation of
energy and mineral resources.

Practical Foundations of Interdependence

One reason I do not give way to despair
is that although we can only see through the
glass darkly, I sense the beginning of an out-
line of a more rational world order. I sense
this not because of any grand designs that
have been put forward by political scientists,
but because of the practical foundations
of interdependence that I see being laid
throughout the world.

These foundation bricks of interdepend-
ence are being laid not only by governments
but, at least of equal importance, by business
and by private citizens.

At the business level, there is the phe-
nomenal growth of the multinational corpo-
rations which operate on a supranational
basis with an international staff. To such a
corporation and its personnel, the world and
its problems look very different than when
viewed from behind a single national bound-
ary. We need new political concepts and
organization for dealing with both the prob-
lems and opportunities of these corporations.

Beyond the growing interdependence of
business and national economies, there has

280

Department of State Bulletin

been a fantastic growth in what might be
termed person-to-person relations. I was
especially struck by this when I was last
serving in Japan. Just as one small example,
I once went over to Niigata, a medium-sized
and relatively remote city on the Japan Sea
coast, and found the mayor, the president of
the Chamber of Commerce, and more than
a score of others from Galveston, Texas,
with sister city, sister bank, sister radio
station, and sister department store relations
long and soundly established. Meetings of
Japanese and American doctors, scientists,
engineers, musicians, TV producers, base-
ball teams — and on and on — took place so
frequently and steadily that we in the Em-
bassy had great difficulty in even keeping
up with what was going on. In many other
countries, the situation is similar.

On the government level, we take part
each year in some 600 international meet-
ings, conferences, commissions, and working
groups. These cover a staggering array of
subjects — tunafish, air navigation, meteor-
ology, marine pollution, forestry, fur seals,
seabeds. Virtually every important field of
human endeavor is now the subject of a co-
operative, and by and large constructive,
examination on an international scale.

The number of our critical national needs
which can only be met through international
action and cooperation is continuing to grow.
Narcotics cannot be controlled any other
way. Air traffic cannot be made safe any
other way. Endangered species cannot be
protected any other way. The flow of goods
vital to our economy and health cannot be
guaranteed any other way. The benefits of
satellite communications cannot be enjoyed
any other way. Let me stress that I am not
saying these problems are made easier by
cooperation between nations. I am saying
that there is — literally — no other way to
solve them.

This is what the President has called the
New Dimension of Diplomacy. More than
anything else, it has to do with what is now
called the quality of life. It will become, in
some ways it hias already become, a major
preoccupation of American diplomacy. In the

years to come, our government's perform-
ance on these problems will be a very large
factor in the way our people view their
government. And we are not well organized
for it.

By definition, these activities cut across
the responsibilities of many agencies of gov-
ernment and of our civil life. We have done
remarkably well in dealing with many of
the problems, considering the jerry-built ma-
chinery we are using. But we cannot, in the
future, leave the solution of these important
problems to a process of muddling through.
I would very much like to see the Congress
devote more attention to this issue.

U.S. Weil-Being and Foreign Affairs

Finally, I would like to comment on the
tendency, very marked in the United States
but visible abroad as well, to look inward
and to concentrate attention on domestic
problems. The tendency itself is neither sur-
prising nor necessarily bad. But it appears
to be encouraging some people to make some
very surprising and very bad assumptions:

— First, the assumption that we can be
active at home or active abroad, but not
both, because we lack the resources, the ener-
gy, and the talent.

— Second, the assumption that we have
broad freedom to choose between domestic
and foreign affairs and that our internal
problems can be solved in isolation from the
rest of the world.

Both of these assumptions are wrong. I
find absurd the concept that a nation of 200
million people and a trillion-dollar economy
is too poor and exhausted to provide for and
manage both its foreign and domestic prob-
lems. I find even more absurd the concept
that we have the freedom to choose. I know
that I do not need to spell out to this com-
mittee the degree to which our domestic
prosperity and security depend on good
management of both our domestic and our
foreign affairs. The first question is not what
we can afford. It is what does our well-being
require. We are not a subsistence economy.

September 11, 1972

281

If, however, our people believe they are
too poor, too inept, or too distracted with
domestic problems to deal with the world
abroad, then this, too, is a reality our foreign
policy will reflect.

I would suggest that our problem is not
in fact caused by a shortage of either ma-
terial or psychological resources in our so-
ciety. We face instead a problem of will and
of public confidence.

I am absolutely convinced that American
society will invest in those things which are
important to it. Peace is important to it.

One of the characteristics of our times is
the widespread efl'ort to instill a lack of con-
fidence among our people in the operations
of our government. This has tended to under-
cut the national consensus of support for our
foreign policy. The relationship between our
people and our government therefore is not
only a problem for our domestic affairs; it is
a serious problem in our foreign affairs.

It is, I believe, the urgent responsibility
of all of us concerned with these matters
both in the executive and legislative branches
to so conduct ourselves that our people
understand both the need for and the benefits
that flow from the investments we make in a
peaceful and secure international environ-
ment. I think that we can do a better job
than we have been doing. I think it is essen-
tial that we do so in the years that lie ahead.

U.S. Provides Relief Assistance
for Refugees From Burundi

Department Announcement ^

The State Department, through its Office
of Refugee and Migration Affairs, is making
an additional $100,000 available to the Cath-
olic Relief Services (CRS) for emergency
assistance to refugees from Burundi now in
Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda.

This latest grant, when combined with an

' Issued on Aug. 18 (press release 199).

earlier grant of $50,000 made in mid-July
to Catholic Relief Services, raises the total
U.S. cash assistance for these refugees to
$150,000. (The $50,000 grant in July enabled
CRS to mount an emergency relief program
for Burundi refugees in Zaire. The grant
was used to purchase and transport food and
medicines to refugee sites along the shore
of Lake Tanganyika in Zaire.)

Latest estimates by private relief agencies
indicate that there are between 78,000 and
82,000 refugees from Burundi, with the ma-
jority located in Zaire. Total outside cash
assistance for these refugees, not including
the substantial contributions being made by
Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda — the host
countries — is almost $1 million. The major
donors are the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, the Lutheran World
Federation, the World Council of Churches,
the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
(Oxfam), Catholic Relief Services, Caritas
International, and the U.S. Government.

The United States was the first govern-
ment to extend relief to the victims of the
Burundi tragedy, by allocating $100,000 to
the American Embassy in Bujumbura to
purchase ambulances, food, blankets, medi-
cines, and cooking utensils.

The Ambassador of Burundi, Terence
Nsanze, called at the Department on August
17 and discussed the situation in his country
with Acting Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs Robert S. Smith.

Mr. Smith expressed our deep concern
over this tragedy, as had been done on previ-
ous occasions, and our hope that stability
soon will be restored in Burundi.

The United States, through various means,
has clearly stated its willingness to support
an international effort that will provide re-
lief assistance to all those who have suffered
during the tragic events in Burundi.

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim
recently dispatched a technical mission to
Burundi to appraise the requirements for
assistance that will benefit the entire popu-
lation and the country as a whole. We await
the results of this initiative.

282

Department of State Bulletin

Senate Resolutions on Burundi
Discussed by Department

Following is the text of a letter dated
August 18 from David M. Abshire, Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations, to
Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.

August 18, 1972.

Honorable J. W. Fulbright

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Secretary has
asked me to respond to your letter of June
15 requesting comments on Senate Resolu-
tions 315, 316, and 317 on civil strife in
Burundi.

The Administration has been closely fol-
lowing the recent events in Burundi. As we
understand the situation, a rebellion by ele-
ments of the Hutu people during the week
of May 1 triggered a reaction by the ruling
Tutsi who feared losing their dominant posi-
tion and their lives as the Tutsi had in
Rwanda in the early sixties. The subsequent
arrests and executions, which the Burundi
Government claimed only involved those
guilty of revolution against the state, are
alleged to have included large numbers of
Hutu government leaders, intellectuals, sec-
ondary school children, common workers and
peasants.

The United States was the first govern-
ment to extend relief to the victims of this
crisis by allocating $100,000 to our Embassy
for the purchase of ambulances, food, blan-
kets, medicines and cooking utensils. In ad-
dition, our Embassy associated with the Em-
bassies of Belgium, Great Britain, Rwanda,
Switzerland, West Germany, and Zaire in
supporting the demarche presented to the
Government of Burundi by the dean of the
diplomatic corps, the Papal Nuncio, calling
for a return to peace and an end to reprisals.

Anticipating that the Burundi question
would be considered at the June summit of

the OAU, prior to that meeting, we discussed
the crisis with the governments of Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Zaire and with the President
and Secretary-General of the OAU. The
members of the OAU, however, chose not to
intervene in what they considered to be the
internal affairs of another African state.

We theh consulted with UN officials to
ascertain \vhat that organization could use-
fully do. On June 22, a three-man mission
sent by Secretary-General Waldheim reached
Burundi to investigate the requirements of
humanitarian assistance and also, privately
to assess the general situation and convey a
message of concern to President Micombero.
The mission included a representative of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees
[UNHCR].

We have not seen the report submitted to
the Secretary-General, but we know that the
Government of Burundi reported 80,000
dead and estimated that $8 million would be
needed for immediate relief requirements.
The Secretary-General subsequently issued
a statement which noted that "the propor-
tions of the human tragedy which the people
of Burundi are experiencing are stagger-
ing." With respect to Burundi's request for
relief assistance, Waldheim announced that
"the United Nations system must be in a
position to assure the international com-
munity, and donors in particular, that as-
sistance will reach the entire population and
benefit the country as a whole."

Partly to satisfy this requirement, the UN
sent a second mission in late July. We hope
that the mission made it clear to the Govern-
ment of Burundi that relief aid will have to
be equitably distributed. International or-
ganizations have previously had difficulty in
securing appropriate cooperation with hu-
manitarian efforts in Burundi. Early in the
current crisis, UNICEF and UNDP [United
Nations Children's Fund; United Nations
Development Program] vehicles were com-
mandeered by the Government for internal
security use. The International Red Cross
found itself unable to gain freedom of access
to all parts of the country and all elements

September 11, 1972

283

of the population and has withdrawn its
staff and supplies. Catholic Relief Services
(CRS) is continuing its operations within
Burundi.

The United States is prepared to contrib-
ute further to emergency relief in Burundi
but there must be adequate guarantees that
the relief will benefit directly those requir-
ing it.

In the states neighboring Burundi, the
refugee problem has become more acute. The
United States has expressed its concern
about the refugee problem and about the
situation within Burundi to the Govern-
ments of Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. The
Presidents of Zaire and Tanzania subse-
quently met with President Micombero and
the President of Rwanda received Foreign
Minister Simbananiye. We hope that these
contacts will produce initiatives which will
involve Burundi's neighbors and other Afri-
can states in cooperative efforts to provide
assistance and assure peace.

In the meantime, public and private or-
ganizations are caring for the refugees along
Burundi's borders. The United States has
given an emergency allocation of $50,000 to
the Catholic Relief Services to help the
Burundi refugees in East Zaire and will
further supplement the efforts of the asylum
countries, UNHCR and other relief agencies
as additional needs are identified.

It is clear from the above that the objec-
tives of Senate Resolutions 315 and 317 have
been realized. With regard to Senate Resolu-
tion 316, as already noted above, the OAU
decided not to intervene in what they con-
sidered to be an internal Burundi problem.
Furthermore, the United States is not a
member of the Organization of African
Unity and, therefore, would be in a difficult
position to request an investigation by or a
report from that body. Since the beginning

of the crisis, we have discussed our concerns
about Burundi with key leaders of the OAU.
These discussions have revealed a concern
on their part, but we are not aware of any
specific steps being taken by the OAU.

The Office of Management and Budget
advises that from the standpoint of the Ad-
ministration, there is no objection to the sub-
mission of this report.
Sincerely yours,

David M. Abshire

Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Geneva To Be Permanent Site
of Phase II of SALT Talks

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 72-15
dated August 14

The Government of Switzerland has ap-
proved a request by the Governments of the
United States and the Soviet Union to hold
the second phase of the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks at Geneva, the State Depart-
ment announced on August 14.

The Governments of the United States and
the U.S.S.R. sincerely appreciate the whole-
hearted support and cooperation received
from the Governments of Finland and Aus-
tria throughout Phase I of SALT. However,
the United States and the U.S.S.R. came to
the conclusion that because of administrative
problems involved in the rotation between
Helsinki and Vienna, it would be more ad-
vantageous to settle upon a single location.

No date has as yet been established for the
opening of SALT Phase II, but should it be
agreed to start negotiations before the move
to Geneva has been completed, the opening
session may take place at Vienna.

284

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary of Commerce Peterson Holds News Conference at Moscow
on First Meeting of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission

The first meeting of the Joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission was held
at Moscow July 20-August 1. Following
is the transcript of a news conference held
at the U.S. Embassy at Moscoiv on August
1 by Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peter-
son, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Commission.

Department of Commerce press release dated August 1

Let me start out first by telling you about
my meeting with Mr. Brezhnev.^

I will give you first some reactions to Mr.
Brezhnev, the man. He is a very vigorous
man of body and spirit. He strikes me as an
outgoing — I would say even a gregarious —
man; I, as one person at least, did not find
that the pictures I had seen really portray
him accurately. He is a very easy and eff'ec-
tive storyteller, for example. He is obviously
a strong man and he is a strong advocate of
his system, as we are strong advocates of
our system. He is an informed man. We
spent nearly three hours together; we cov-
ered a wide range of commercial and eco-
nomic topics. He did not refer to any notes
during the entire discussion, and he covered
a good deal of substance. He strikes me as a
practical man, and at the same time he can
take the longer view. For example, some of
the projects that he was discussing with us
will not come to full fruition until the latter
part of the decade. He seemed very much
iYiterested in them nonetheless.

On the matter of the substance of the
meeting, I would not characterize the meet-
ing as a negotiating session, at least in any
specific sense. Mr. Brezhnev reaffirmed his
commitment to the summit, obviously shared

by our President. I told Mr. Brezhnev that
the President had instructed me to do what
I could to carry out the seventh principle of
the basic principles that were signed by our
President and Mr. Brezhnev, the principle
that deals with broad commercial relations.-
I found out very quickly that I did not need
to remind Mr. Brezhnev of either the princi-
ples in general or this principle in particular.
He is obviously very familiar with each of
them and took them seriously.

Mr. Brezhnev indicated to us that he felt
that trade and commercial matters should
now move to the front tier, not only for com-
mercial reasons but for political reasons as
well. He made repeated references to im-
proving the standard of living of our peo-
ples.

It is clear from my discussions that Mr.
Brezhnev is very aware of his country's vast
treasures, as he refers to them — quantities
of oil, gas, timber, platinum, chromium, and
nickel, and so forth. I believe the General
Secretary believes the time has come to ex-
plore major joint projects in some of these
fields.

He obviously was also interested in joint
manufacturing projects, which in some cases
would flow naturally out of these raw ma-
terials resources.

I think it is also accurate to say that Mr.
Brezhnev feels that as the world's two larg-
est economies, we should think not just in
conventional terms but in larger and per-
haps unconventional terms.

All in all, my own impression is that Mr.
Brezhnev is an impressive man who values

' Secretary Peterson and Leonid I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party,
met at Oreanda in the Crimea on July 30.

■ For text of the Basic Principles of Relations
Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed
at Moscow on May 29, see Bulletin of June 26,
1972, p. 898.

September 11, 1972

285

both the principles and the summit highly.
In talking to me before I left, it was clear to
me that our President respects Mr. Brezhnev
and I got the distinct impression from my
visit to the Crimea that Mr. Brezhnev re-
ciprocates that feeling. He wants to move on
with concrete steps — I believe that is the
word he used frequently — and large steps.

Now, as for our Commission meetings, a
number of you have asked me, Have these
meetings met our expectations? A question
like that should be preceded by. a prior
question: What did we expect?

First, we expected to get some basic or-
ganizational work done. This morning we
will sign the terms of reference and the pro-
cedures of the Commission, which lay out
both what our work is that we hope to
achieve and how we expect to go about get-
ting the work done.

For the last 10 or 11 days, special work
groups were assigned on both sides to do
just that, which is to start getting specific
work done. We had a working group on the
trade agreement chaired on our side by As-
sistant Secretary Gibson [Andrew E. Gib-
son, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Domestic and International Business]. In
that case we have had sub-work groups, one
on most-favored-nation (MFN), another on
business facilities; and there has been work
done on arbitration as well as other specific
provisions of the trade agreement.

We had a work group on the credit prob-
lem— reciprocal credit, that is — that group
was headed by Mr. Jack Bennett, Deputy
Under Secretary of the Treasury.

We have had a group working on lend-
lease, headed by Willis Armstrong, Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Afi'airs.

We have had a group working on licenses,
patents, copyright, and taxes, headed by Mr.
Charles Brower of the State Department.

A number of us have worked in a variety
of ways on the important subject of joint
projects between the two countries.

And finally, we had a group working on
the maritime agreement, where I would say
there has been some substantial progress
made.

Now, we have agreed yesterday, Mr. Pa-
tolichev [Nikolay S. Patolichev, Soviet Min-
ister of Foreign Trade] and I, that over the
next few weeks each of these work groups
will resume sessions and try to work closer
and closer toward final agreement in each of
these areas.

Now, the second expectation which I think
I mentioned at the airport on arrival was
that both sides would propose specific solu-
tions. Now, a little background on this to
give both myself and you a sense of perspec-
tive : The SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Talks], as I recall, took some two
years of negotiations. While these talks are
not comparable in complexity or in the tech-
nical sense with the SALT talks, they are
talks that are aimed at the result of what we
would call reaching a comprehensive agree-
ment. By that we mean the agreement will
include many factors. Many of these factors
in turn are highly interrelated.

The first time we had any specific com-
mercial negotiations with the Soviet Union
was in May of this year, less than three
months ago. Our talks were preceded by
Secretary Stans' [Maurice H. Stans, then
Secretary of Commerce] original and ex-
ploratory trip to the Soviet Union in Novem-
ber of last year. They, the specific negotia-
tions, started for the first time in May. At
our May meeting, I would say that we spent
most of our time defining and ventilating
the problems and the issues and trying to get
agreement on agenda and, more importantly,
trying to define the role of the Joint Com-
mercial Commission.

The President obviously decided that such
a Commission was in the best interest of our
country — as did the leaders of the Soviet
Union. You may recall this Commission was
set up at the summit. Thus, this is the first
meeting of this Commission, and it is the
first time that specific solutions had been pro-
posed to the problems that had been identified
earlier. As always happens to solutions — and
this is no earth-shattering surprise — we like
some of our proposals better than we like
theirs, and I am sure they feel the same
way about their proposals vis-a-vis ours. I

286

Department of State Bulletin

think there is an inevitable process that has
begun which will further refine and clarify
issues on which we hope to find acceptable
middle ground, and I expect to see us make
continuing progress over the continuing
weeks.

I think our third expectation was that we
expected intensive bargaining. We must re-
member that we are dealing with the two
largest economies in the world, each power-
ful in its own way. We are dealing with two
countries whose relationships during the
past one-quarter century had not been easy
going. We are dealing with two countries
that have very different economies and
philosophies. So I think both sides expected
intensive bargaining — you might say tough
bargaining — and I think it is fair to say that
our expectations in this have been met. Mr.
Patolichev has perhaps used a word in de-
scribing the negotiations as realistic and
reminding us that no negotiation is ulti-
mately a good negotiation unless it meets
the real interests of both sides.

I think there are certain principles which
I am heartened to say seemed to be accepted
on both sides.

Let us take the issue of credit. The Soviet
Union seems to me is a very attractive cus-
tomer for many reasons. It is a very attrac-
tive customer since it buys in very large
amounts because it is the second largest
economy in the world and its purchases are
concentrated. This obviously gives a buyer
that much more leverage in a negotiating
situation. His negotiating position, in other
words, is hardly weakened by the fact that
the Soviet Union is a single buyer.

It is also clear from this visit that interest
rates are viewed differently in our society
and here. I was very interested to see, for
example, after spending a couple of hours in
some stores, that the consumer in this coun-
try pays only 2 percent on credit. More than
once during our discussions we have heard
reference to the idea of "godly" interest
rates. I take this as a euphemism for low
interest rates. Well, we know that there are
many bankers who lend money who think
that God is high in the heavens. And it

might be argued, therefore, that there are
somewhat different perceptions of what "god-
ly" interest rates mean.

It is no secret that in the course of the
grain agreement the Soviet Union had hoped
for long-term arrangements up to 10 years
and very low interest rates at 2 percent. I
think what has emerged from these sessions
is growing acceptance of the basic principle
that if the President decided to make any
determination, it cannot be one that involves
concessionary rates or concessionary proce-
dures. He means that interest rates and
terms must be the same as those offered
other countries and that the procedures by
which we approve credit must be the same
as for other countries.

I was also heartened to see that there
were discussions on reciprocal credit to the
United States on its purchases from the
Soviet Union. I think there was agreement
that the general principle of reciprocity and
nondiscriminatory terms could also apply
with regard to their credit to us.

Next, I think it was the expectation when
I came here that we would have another
meeting. When we landed, I indicated that
we did not see this series of meetings as a
counterpart of the summit. It was not going
to be one big meeting with big results. It is
roughly analogous to what went on in the
SALT talks, but I hope we do not have as
nearly as many meetings nor as long. We see
it as a series of meetings.

Now, obviously the summit and the gen-
eral agreement of principles that were
agreed to there by our leaders give this Com-
mission a thrust and a momentum that is
extremely important to achieve a set of objec-
tives and a time schedule that would simply
have been impossible had the summit meet-
ing not been generated. From our extensive
talks with General Secretary Brezhnev, and
it is certainly clear to me from our talks
with our President, the top leaders of both
countries have a commitment to move ahead
and have a deep interest in the specific com-
mercial arrangements that we are talking
about here. The Minister and I have agreed
that we will have another meeting later this

September 11, 1972

287

year. We will mutually set it when we see
how these individual work groups are going.

I should say that these are complex agree-
ments we are talking about. I think that it
could be roughly analogized as a system of
agreements that are critically interrelated.
If I can use the word, there is a concept,
as you know, in complex systems called the
"critical path" — where certain problems
cannot be solved until other problems are
solved. I think in this case, for example, it
is very unlikely that our President will ex-
tend Exim credit until the lend-lease problem
is satisfactorily resolved. In turn, the Soviet
Union does not wish to pay its lend-lease
amounts until the MFN question is satis-
factorily resolved. So, while we can make
substantial progress on some of these indi-
vidual items over the forthcoming period
of time, this system is not a "go" system, as
it were, until one or two of these critical
items are resolved — and it would not be at all
surprising if on one or two of these critical
items, we will find ourselves in a situation
in which decisions at the highest level of the
two governments will be involved.

Certainly I expect our President to be
very much involved in a couple of the criti-
cal decisions that need to be made.

When I came here, I said we would have
an expectation that we would have a trade
agreement by the end of the year. I still
think there is a pretty good chance of doing
it. We are going to achieve that. We have
got a lot of work to do, and that is exactly
what the work groups are going to be doing
over the next weeks and months. We have
some very key decisions to make, but I still
think there is a pretty good chance of an
overall deal. We have already made real
progress.

Now, what are the problems? What are
the issues? First we had better stand back
and ask. What are we trying to achieve? It
seems to me we are in many ways trying
to achieve the building of a foundation, not
too visible or glamorous — in many ways it is
below the surface. But the more and the
deeper we do our work now, the fewer prob-
lems we are going to have later on. And if we

want to make broad commercial relation-
ships between our two countries which you
might call the permanent edifice that I think
our two top leaders both do, we are going
to need some permanent institutions, we are
going to need some ground rules. This means
we must resolve some subjects that I am
sure do not at this point sound cosmic in
nature but which are necessarily funda-
mental in building that foundation. Arbi-
tration, taxes, patents, royalties, business
facilities, are some of the institutional
mechanisms that we need.

Now, it is pai-ticularly important for us to
remember what the role of the U.S. Govern-
ment is. The role of our government is
obviously a very difl:erent role than the
role of the Soviet Government. The Soviet
Government not only sets the policies but
also makes the deals, and it also executes the
deals. In the case of the U.S. Government we
do not make deals. Our main role is to fa-
cilitate and to protect — to make it possible
for hundreds and thousands of individual
businesses to make deals that they have de-
cided are in their own interests. Although
we are concerned with ground rules, we are
also concerned with having good umpires.
Except to the extent that we are extending
credit on specific deals, it is the businessmen
of America, not the government, who are
going to play this game.

Many of the issues we have, it seems to
me, arise from the fact that we are dealing
with a non-market economy on the one hand
and a market economy on the other.

One of the fundamental questions that I
think we will resolve over the next several
months is to what extent the two largest
economies in the world can adjust their way
of doing business. Now, the mere fact that
we are having a discussion of a trade agree-
ment is an illustration of that. The United
States has simply not had such a trade agree-
ment. This is a departure.

Now, we might turn to the most-favored-
nation problem. If we were to grant each
other most-favored-nation treatment, the
symmetry is obviously something less than
perfect. Here, the state trade monopoly buys

288

Department of State Bulletin

everything and sells everything for what are
clearly reasons of its own. For that reason,
what it buys, what it sells, who it buys from,
who it sells to, and what it pays can obvi-
ously be subjective decisions, not market
decisions. And therefore there is potential
for discrimination, whether that is the in-
tent or not. By itself, most-favored-nation
treatment that we would grant is not an
adequate quid pro quo, and our most-favored-
nation treatment has substantially broader
implications.

There are some additional complexities.
In a market economy like ours, we allocate
our resources using the price mechanism. It
means that costs get allocated and the costs
get reflected in products. Somebody has to
pay for these costs. However, in a non-mar-
ket economy, it means that such issues as
dumping become a real possibility, whether
intentional or not. Also, we belong to inter-
national organizations where such problems
as dumping and market disruption problems
are anticipated, and there are mechanisms
provided for taking care of problems of that
sort.

It is important, therefore, in building a
permanent commercial relationship that we
anticipate these possibilities and decide how
they are to be handled.

On the question of business facilities,
again you see an interesting difference be-
tween a non-market economy and a market
economy. In other places in the world, the
American businessman makes his own de-
cisions about business facilities. He looks at
the size of the market, he assesses his
chances of getting a share of that market, he
looks at the costs of facilities and decides
whether he wants facilities. Here in the
Soviet Union, of course, we have quite a
different situation. There is a real shortage
of facilities. We have talked to the Soviet
Union about the possibilities for expanding
these facilities. Also, the specific decisions
here are made by the government, obviously.
It is important to the United States that we
discuss how many offices American busi-
nesses might get and by what procedures
and criteria they are allocated and how we

avoid discrimination. In short, in somewhat
the same way that most-favored-nation ap-
plies to markets, it is our view that the
most-favored-nation principle should also
apply to business facilities.

On the subject of joint projects, I men-
tioned earlier that in the case of the Soviet
Union the government owns the resources,
it pi'oduces them, it negotiates the deals, and
it implements them. We have spent a good
deal of time this week discussing these joint
projects. We have to think through the right
governmental mechanisms for next steps on
such projects. It may be that we will need
special mechanisms. I say that for two rea-
sons. In the first place, there are very large
amounts of money involved; second, there
are interesting interfaces with other policies.
In the field of energy, we have questions of
price, we have questions of national security,
we have questions of maritime policy — which
are affected by U.S. Government policies. So,
it is possible that we will set up mechanisms
to determine what the optimum role and the
position of the U.S. Government should be
in the case of some of these large joint
projects.

All this may tell you more than you
wanted to hear, or less than you wanted to
hear, but let me now take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much progress has
been made on the matter of lend-lease?

A. I am surprised to hear you ask that
question. Well, I guess one thing is clear
on the face of it — if we had a lend-lease
agreement to announce, I would have been
telling you about it. So I think you can safely
conclude that we do not have a lend-lease
agreement.

I think the two governments have come
somewhat closer together on the lend-lease
issue. I think both governments understand
that it is an important and difficult issue. I
think it is entirely possible that this is one
of those issues that in the final analysis will
have to be resolved at the highest level of
both governments. We are somewhat closer,
I would say, on the issue. Obviously, we have
some intensive bargaining ahead. I simply

September 11, 1972

289

will not and cannot comment on the critical
elements of what is involved in the lend-
lease settlement, which obviously includes
the matter of principle — both principal and
principle. The question of the term of pay-
ment, the question of interest rates that are
involved — I think it is counterproductive to
get involved in that discussion.

Q. You don't have the feeling that other
questions for the long-term future are deter-
nmied by this cause and effect?

A. Well, it's hard to know what is cause
and effect in a complex system like this.
It is a bit circular. I think one thing is quite
clear: Some of the areas, at least from our
side, will not move until this matter is set-
tled. Credit, for example. It is hard for me
to visualize circumstances under which we
will move on credit without a satisfactory
resolution of this lend-lease problem. Also,
it might be likely to go the other way, as
the way you have suggested. For example,
we have talked about most-favored-nation
and we talked about business facilities and
projects. As both sides assess the potential
and promise of these future relationships
I think it is entirely possible that this as-
sessment will also affect what will be con-
sidered to be a reasonable lend-lease settle-
ment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you find the groiving
foreign trade deficit to have weakened your
negotiating position?

A. Even if it were so, I would not ac-
knowledge it. But no, it hasn't. I think we
have to put these things in perspective.

First, we have to look to the U.S. economy.
We are having what has been referred to as
prodigious growth in the United States. Now
it looks like we are having growth in the
United States at a figure which could equal
or exceed $100 billion. That is the growth
in one year. All you have to do is look at the
rest of the world and try to think of how
many economies would like to have that large
a total GNP, and that is just growth in one
year. We have an inflation situation in the

last report that combines very high growth
rate with a very low inflation, about 2 per-
cent. The success and health of our economy
is predominately affected by domestic fac-
tors. Of our GNP only about 4 percent is
involved in exports.

Next, we have had recently a major reeval-
uation of currency. It is our expectation that
this is going to improve our trade situation.

Finally, I think it is important to put these
matters in perspective. Even in the field of
trade, where we are talking about roughly
$90 billion of exports and imports — let us
put a few things in perspective here. While
I think it is important for us to look for
expanded trade with the Soviet Union, we
must remember that their total exports, I
believe, to Western industrialized countries,
total in the range of $2i/2 billion to $234
billion per year. Suppose we look at what
might be a legitimate U.S. share of that
level of imports, which we expect to grow.
If we make a commercial deal with the
Soviet Union, you can see, for some time to
come at least, in relation to our total trade
this will not be a dominant factor. So, I think
the clear answer to your question is that the
trade situation has had very little to do with
these negotiations.

Q. What is the United States prepared to
disctiss ivith the Soviet Union, especially in
connection ivith joint ventures?

A. Well, it depends on the field. In some
fields I think we would have only a very
limited role. The negotiations would be car-
ried on entirely by private companies with-
out any government involvement at all. For
example, there has been a discussion of some
joint projects which would take the follow-
ing forms. The American company would
make a contribution, let's say, of technology
and know-how. The plant would be built in
the Soviet Union, and the American com-
pany might take its share of the return in
the product that comes out of these joint
ventures. In such a situation, there would be
no government involvement at all in a project
of that sort.

On the other end of the spectrum, there is

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Department of State Bulletin

obvious interest, of course, in projects in the
field of energy and in the field of gas. These
projects are very diff"erent projects in a
number of respects. In the first place, the
level of investment is substantially higher
than any that have been traditionally con-
sidered in Eximbank financing. It is true
that some of these projects run in the range
of billions of dollars. The presumption is
therefore that the U.S. Government would
play a role in the financing. It might be of a
substantial enough nature that obviously we
would want to be satisfied that the venture
is a viable one, economically and techno-
logically.

If we are dealing in the field of energy,
this is obviously a field in which there is
government coordination required. Within
our country, for example, as you know, the
rates for energy are set by government
agencies — in our case, the Federal Power
Commission. Therefore, before the U.S.
Government might be willing to get involved
in some of these projects, it is important
that internal energy policies and rate struc-
tures be clarified and articulated ; that, again,
it seems to be a viable venture. There are
national security issues involved here having
to do with what the country wants to do
about future imports of energy, what
amounts, what countries, et cetera.

Finally, it is clear that in the case of gas,
for example, there are a series of related
issues that will include the U.S. Government.
We are talking here, for example, about
very large ships — so-called LNG [liquefied
natural gas] ships. This necessarily gets us
involved in the question of financing of
those ships and the extent to which there
are subsidies for building different kinds of
ships — issues of that kind, maritime issues.
Transportation costs are very important
costs in the cost of energy — and the so-called
cryogenic supertankers, that would be in-
volved in projects of that sort. It can be dem-
onstrated that it would be economically more
efficient to have deepwater docks in the
United States that could facilitate that
transfer. It is probably true that if a de-
cision were made on these big deals, the

government would also be involved in the
question of appropriate docks.

So, I think the degree of government in-
volvement will depend very largely on the
nature of the project. For most projects I
would expect to see the U.S. Government
have a very minimal role, except for the
decision on credit, if that is involved.

Q. Would the first step be government-to-
government agreement, before the involve-
ment of commercial firniis?

A. I would not expect a government-to-
government agreement, because the U.S.
Government, given its market system, would
want the private sector itself to play a major
role. We would be interested in what can be
done to maximize its financial contribution
in such a venture. Therefore, in the final
analysis, it would be a deal between perhaps
the Soviet Government and a U.S. company.
The U.S. Government might facilitate it by
making certain other policy decisions at a
U.S. Government-Soviet Government negoti-
ation.

Q. Would an American company be ex-
pected to enter into these deals itself, or
would this be done through a trading com-
pany ?

A. No. There are a variety of companies
which are already set up in the United States
to physically distribute and market that
product (i.e., gas). The U.S. Government
I would not think would get involved in that
kind of private mechanism. From what I
have heard, there are a substantial number
of companies that feel they are fully pre-
pared to handle the marketing and distribu-
tion. Unless there is some new mechanism
which can demonstrate that it would do the
job better, I would fully expect the private
companies that already exist to do that kind
of marketing and distribution.

Q. hi discussing reciprocal credits, are
you referring to the need for Soviet com-
payiies to extend credit at the same I'ate,
roughly at the same terms that Exim credit
was being made to the Soviet Union?

September 11, 1972

291

A. Yes, as I understand it. Mr. Bennett
has chaired that group. There have been
extensive discussions about the reciprocal
concept, reciprocity as a principle that under-
lines all these discussions. They are quite
willing to discuss this, and they have indi-
cated that they are quite willing to extend
credit to American companies.

Q. What I meant to say was, will our
level of credit to them he somewhat tied to
their level of credit to us?

A. Once again, we want to avoid an over-
structured situation here. In the final analy-
sis, our system depends on whether a buyer
or seller in America wants to buy or if he
has something he thinks he wants to sell in
the Soviet Union. The level of trade will
depend, in the final analysis, on whether we
can find products in the Soviet Union for
which there is a sufficient market in the
United States that some private companies
decide make sense. What we are saying is
that when that happens, the Soviet Union
has indicated generally their willingness to
offer credit to American companies.

Q. You mentioned that Mr. Brezhnev
raised the possibility of joint manufacturiyig
ventures. Could you he specific and tell us
what you think he had in mind?

A. Well, it is difficult to get into specific
areas because it might look as if one area
is more important than another. And what
the General Secretary may have meant to do
is illustrate what he had in mind. As a
general notion, visualize the following situ-
ation. Visualize a raw material of some sort,
a natural resource out of which manufactur-
ing is possible. One might visualize an ar-
rangement where in addition to exploring
and getting the raw material, one can imag-
ine a manufacturing project that related to
that in some way. The American company in
turn could be compensated by taking a share
of the output — the output being a manufac-
tured product that flows from that raw
material.

Q. After the summit conference, Russian
officials indicated to us they felt the Amer-

ican position on trade questions was colored
by general political coyisiderations and hy
foreign policy considerations beyond simply
the economical positioyis involved. Is that
still the position? Are we still trying to fuse
trade into the political arena?

A. Well, I think it has been said that war
is too important to be left to the generals.
I think it might be said that trade is getting
too important to be left to commercial min-
isters. For me to suggest that the progress
of trade will not be affected by the larger
political environment would be, I think, not
to understand that there is relationship be-
tween economics and politics. The more
favorable the political environment, the more
political tensions are reduced, given the kind
of system we have in the United States, the
more likely, I think, that the American pub-
lic, the Congress, and others will support
the concept of expanded trade, support the
concept of expanded credit.

Q. Did the subject of Viet-Nam come up
during the course of your discussions?

A. No, it did not.

President Reports on Plans for 1974
International Environment Exposition

Message From President Nixon ^

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Public Law 91-269, I
wish to inform the Congress today of cur-
rent plans for the six-month International
Exposition on the Environment to be held
in Spokane, Washington in 1974.

This exposition will be a particularly wel-
comed event in America. The Spokane ex-
position and the 1976 Winter Olympics are
now the only internationally recognized
events scheduled for this country during our
Bicentennial Era. In addition to stimulating

' Transmitted on Aug. IB (White House press
release).

292

Department of State Bulletin

trade and cultural exchanges, the exposition
through its theme — "How Man Can Live,
Work and Play in Harmony with His En-
vironment"— will also focus fresh attention
on one of the most pressing concerns of our
time.

In November 1970, Expo '74, the nonprofit
corporation which is sponsoring the exposi-
tion and is responsible for its planning and
operation, applied for Federal recognition
of the exposition under the provisions of
Public Law 91-269. After reviewing the
plans of the sponsor, the Secretary of Com-
merce submitted to me the detailed I'eport
required under Section 2(a) (1) of Public
Law 91-269 and recommended Federal i-ec-
ognition. A copy of the Secretary's report is
transmitted herewith. In this report the
Secretary indicated that the sponsor had ful-
filled all of the requirements of that law and
the regulations issued thereunder (15 CFR
§667).

The Secretary concluded that the environ-
mental theme of the exposition was relevant
to current national concerns and was appro-
priate to the exposition site. He also deter-
mined that the sponsors had obtained from
the State of Washington, the local govern-
ments involved, business and civic leaders
of the region and others the financial and
other support necessary to assure the suc-
cessful development of the exposition.

The Secretary of Stat.e also reported under
Section 2(a) (2) of Public Law 91-269 that
the event qualified for registration by the
Bureau of International Expositions as a
Special Category event.

Based on these favorable reports, I ad-
vised the Secretaries of State and Commerce
on October 15, 1971, that the exposition war-
ranted Federal recognition as provided by
statute. I also indicated that it was my in-
tention to extend this Administration's full-
est possible support to foster a successful
event.

On November 24, 1971, upon request of
the United States, the Bureau of Inter-
national Expositions in Paris officially recog-
nized the event as a Special Category exposi-
tion and approved its General Rules and

Regulations by unanimous vote. At its meet-
ing on May 16, 1972 the Bureau also estab-
lished procedures for sanctioning the special
rules and regulations for the exposition.

On January 31, 1972, I issued a proclama-
tion directing the Secretary of State to in-
vite such foreign countries as he may con-
sider appropriate to participate in this
event.- The Secretary issued those invita-
tions through diplomatic channels on Febru-
ary 15, 1972. Thus far, Canada, the USSR,
and Iran have accepted — and many other
countries are now expected to accept. In that
proclamation, I also indicated that I planned
to appoint a United States Commissioner
General to exercise the responsibility of the
United States Government for fulfillment of
the Convention Relating to International Ex-
positions of November 22, 1928, as modified.
Pending this appointment, I am designating
the Secretary of Commerce to serve in that
capacity on an acting basis. In addition, the
Secretary is currently preparing a plan for
Federal participation under Section 3 of
Public Law 91-269, which I will transmit to
the Congress at some later date.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, August 15, 1972.

President Establishes Commission
on International Radio Broadcasting

White House press release dated August 10

President Nixon announced on August 10
the establishment of the Commission on
International Radio Broadcasting. The Com-
mission wall review the alternative arrange-
ments for providing future government sup-
port to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
and will make recommendations to the Presi-
dent. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
have been broadcasting news and commen-
tary to eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
since the early 1950's.

- For text of Proclamation No. 4103, see Bulletin
of May 8, 1972, p. 667.

September 11, 1972

293

The President also announced that Dr.
Milton Eisenhower, president emeritus of
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.,
will chair the Commission. Other Commis-
sion members will be: Dr. John P. Roche,
professor of politics at Brandeis University,
Waltham, Mass.; Dr. Edmund A. Gullion,
dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass.;
Edward Ware Barrett, director of the Com-
munications Institute, Academy for Educa-
tional Development, New York, N.Y.; and
Dr. John A. Gronouski, dean of the Lyndon
B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, Univer-
sity of Texas, Austin, Tex.

On May 10, 1972, the President announced
that he planned to appoint a Presidential
Study Commission to review the govern-
ment's methods and mechanisms for provid-
ing support to Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty.! At that time, he noted that the
operations of the radios had come under close
and careful scrutiny in and out of the gov-
ernment, producing a number of divergent
views as to how the radios might be best or-
ganized and funded in the future.

The Commission will submit its report to
the President by February 28, 1973, so that
the administration and the Congress can take
the Commission's findings and recommenda-
tions into consideration in formulating any
necessary legislation early in the 93d Con-
gress.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Copying
Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 12991. H.
Kept. 92-1144. June 15, 1972. 2 pp.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. Con-
ference Report to accompany H.R. 14734. H. Rept.
92-1145. June 15, 1972. 18 pp.

U.S. Economic Assistance for the Khmer Republic
(Cambodia). Report by the House Committee on

Government Operations. H. Rept. 92-1146. June
16, 1972. 61 pp.

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements: hearings
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions; June 19-July 20, 1972; 435 pp. Treaty on
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems: re-
port to accompany Ex. L., 92-2; S. Ex. Rept.
92-28; July 21, 1972; 10 pp. Agreement on Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Weapons: report to ac-
company S. J. Res. 241; S. Rept. 92-979; July 21,
1972; 10 pp.

Foreign Service Grievance Procedures. Report to
accompany S. 3722. S. Rept. 92-888. June 19,
1972. 9 pp.

Authorizing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1973, for
Military Procurement, Research and Development,
Certain Construction for the Safeguard Anti-
ballistic Missile System, Active Duty and Reserve
Strength, and for Other Purposes. Report, to-
gether vi'ith additional views, to accompany H.R.
15495. H. Rept. 92-1149. June 19, 1972. 115 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

' For President Nixon's statement of May 10, see
Bulletin of June 12, 1972, p. 816.

U.S. and Uruguay Reach Agreement
on New Extradition Treaty

Press release 201 dated August 22

Delegations representing the United States
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
reached substantial agreement on August 17
on the text of a new extradition treaty be-
tween the two countries. The present treaty
dates from 1905.

The agreement will substantially modern-
ize extradition relations between the two
countries, both in terms of extraditable of-
fenses and procedure. The treaty contains,
among others, provisions directed against
aircraft hijacking and narcotics offenses. It
also excludes from the category of political
offenses crimes committed on board commer-
cial aircraft and kidnaping and other crimes
against the life and physical security of dip-
lomats and other persons to whom states
have a special duty of protection in accord-
ance with international law.

The treaty will now be submitted to the
Uruguayan Parliament for its ratification

294

Department of State Bulletin

and to the U.S. Senate for advice and con-
sent. Approval by these bodies would permit
it to enter into effect following signature by
the two governments.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971.'
Accession deposited: Mali, August 24, 1972.

Fisheries

International convention for the Northwest Atlan-
tic fisheries. Done at Washington February 8,
1949. Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089;

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done
at Washington June 25, 1956. Entered into force
January 10, 1959. TIAS 4170;

Declaration of understanding regarding the inter-
national convention for the Northwest Atlantic
fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington April
24, 1961. Entered into force June 5, 1963. TIAS
5380;

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-
ing to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington
July 15, 1963. Entered into force April 29, 1966.
TIAS 6011;

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), re-
lating to entry into force of proposals adopted by
the Commission. Done at Washington November
29, 1965. Entered into force December 19, 1969.
TIAS 6840;

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-
ing to measures of control. Done at Washington
November 29, 1965. Entered into force December
19, 1969. TIAS 6841;

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-
ing to panel membership and to regulatory meas-
ures. Done at Washington October 1, 1969. Entered
into force December 15, 1971. TIAS 7432;

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-
ing to amendments to the convention. Done at
Washington October 6, 1970."
Adherences deposited: Bulgaria, August 21, 1972.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March
18, 1970.

'■ Not in force.

Ratifications deposited: Norway, August 3, 1972;

United States, August 8, 1972.
Enters into force: October 7, 1972.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: Chile, August 18, 1972.
Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, August 24,
1972.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In-
telsat), with annex. Done at Washington August
20, 1971.'
Signature: Saudi Arabia, August 24, 1972.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.'
Signattire: Philippines, August 22, 1972.

Trade, Transit

Convention on transit trade of landlocked states.

Done at New York July 8, 1965. Entered into force

June 9, 1967; for the United States November 28,

1968. TIAS 6592.

Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Social-
ist Republic, July 11, 1972 (with a reservation
and declaration) .

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave
traffic, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949
(TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. En-
tered into force July 18, 1905; for the United
States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Fiji,
June 12, 1972.

BILATERAL

Finland

Agreement relating to the deposit by Finland of 10
percent of the value of training services furnished
by the United States. Effected by exchange of
notes at Helsinki August 17, 1972. Entered into
force August 17, 1972; effective February 7, 1972.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement extending the agreement of November 9,
1963, and January 4, 1964, as amended and ex-
tended (TIAS 5659, 6071, 6413, 6555, 6998, 7265),
relating to the establishment of a television sys-
tem in Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of
notes at Jidda April 24 and July 30, 1972. Entered
into force July 30, 1972.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement with respect to purchases of grain by
the Soviet Union in the United States and credit
to be made available by the United States, with
exchange of notes. Signed at Washington July 8,
1972. Entered into force July 8, 1972.

September 11, 1972

295

PUBLICATIONS

U.N, Environment Conference Report
Published for Public Sale

umes. The remaining four volumes of 1947 are
scheduled for publication within the next half year.
The volumes are prepared by the Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume II may
be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402, for $6.00 each (Department of State publica-
tion 8530).

Press release 200 dated August 18

The Department of State has arranged for publi-
cation of the report of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment held at Stockholm,
Sweden, June 5-16. The document, totaling 135
pages, will be reproduced by the National Technical
Information Service (NTIS) of the Department of
Commerce. Orders for the report should cite acces-
sion number PB-211-133 and the title, "Report of
the UN Conference on the Human Environment,
held at Stockholm June 5-16, 1972." Orders should
be addressed to the NTIS, Department of Commerce,
Springfield, Va., 22151, accompanied by check or
money order payable to NTIS for $3.

Fourth "Foreign Relations" Volume
for 1947 Released

Press release 191 dated August 7 (for release August 14)

The Department of State released on August 14
another volume in the "Foreign Relations" series
for the year 1947; namely. Foreign Relations of the
United States, 19i7, Volume II: Council of Foreign
Ministers; Germany and Austria.

The volume provides detailed documentation on
the efforts of the United States to bring about peace
settlements for Germany and Austria. The bulk of
the volume is devoted to the records of and reports
on the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers
at Moscow in March and April and at London in
November and December 1947, as well as the related
meetings of the Deputies for Germany, the Deputies
for Austria, and the Austrian Treaty Commission.
Comprehensive documentation on the problem of
occupation and control in Germany and Austria is
also presented.

This is the sixth "Foreign Relations" volume to
be published since President Nixon's memorandum
of March 8, 1972, which asked the State Department
to accelerate publication of these volumes, then
being issued 26 years after the event, so that the
series would be publishing documents for 1955 by
the year 1975. Four volumes have now been pub-
lished for 1947, which will be covered in eight vol-

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
201t02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is inade on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication
mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to
the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany
orders.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur-
rently in stock (at least 125) — $6; 1-year subscrip-
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new
Notes — $3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies
of those listed below are available at 10^ each.

Barbados Pub. 8242 4 pp.

China, People's Republic of . . Pub. 7751 12 pp.

China, Republic of Pub. 7791 7 pp.

Dominican Republic Pub. 7759 7 pp.

Jamaica Pub. 8080 4 pp.

Poland Pub. 8020 7 pp.

Uruguay Pub. 7857 4 pp.

Viet-Nam, Republic of ... . Pub. 7933 12 pp.

Yemen Arab Republic .... Pub. 8170 4 pp.
Yemen, People's Democratic

Republic of Pub. 8368 4 pp.

Fostering the U.S. Role in an Open World Economy.

This pamphlet consists of the text of an address
by Secretary of State William P. Rogers before
the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. at Wash-
ington, D.C, on May 1, 1972. General Foreign Pol-
icy Series 264. Pub. 8659. 12 pp. 20(*.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Arrangement with Thai-
land. TIAS 7299. 12 pp. lO^*.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan
amending the agreements of November 25, 1970,
and August 6, 1971. TIAS 7301. 3 pp. 10<?.

Protection of Migratory Birds. Agreement with
Mexico supplementing the agreement of February 7,
1936. TIAS 7302. 4 pp. lO!*.

Economic Assistance. Agreement with Portugal.
TIAS 7303. 4 pp. 10^.

296

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX September 11, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1733

Burundi

Senate Resolutions on Burundi Discussed by

Department (letter to Senator Fulbright) 283

U.S. Provides Relief Assistance for Refugees

From Burundi (Department announcement) 282

China. Secretary Rogers Interviewed for the

Knight Newspapers (transcript) .... 265

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 294

National Security Policy and the Changing
World Power Alignment (Johnson) . . . 275

President Reports on Plans for 1974 Interna-
tional Environment Exposition (message to
the Congress) 292

Senate Resolutions on Burundi Discussed by

Department (letter to Senator Fulbright) 283

Developing Countries. National Security Poli-
cy and the Changing World Power Align-
ment (Johnson) 275

Disarmament

Geneva To Be Permanent Site of Phase II of

SALT Talks 284

Secretary Rogers Interviewed for the Knight

Newspapers (transcript) 265

Economic Affairs. Secretary of Commerce
Peterson Holds News Conference at Moscow
on First Meeting of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Commercial Commission (transcript) . . 285

Environment

President Reports on Plans for 1974 Interna-
tional Environment Exposition (message to
the Congress) 292

Europe

National Security Policy and the Changing
World Power Alignment (Johnson) . . . 275

President Establishes Commission on Interna-
tional Radio Broadcasting 293

Secretary Rogers Inters'iewed for the Knight
Newspapers (transcript) 265

Extradition. U.S. and Uruguay Reach Agree-
ment on New Extradition Treaty .... 294

Foreign Aid. President Authorizes Further

Relief for Flood Victims in the Philippines 274

Middle East. Secretary Rogers Inter^'iewed for
the Knight Newspapers (transcript) . . 265

Philippines. President Authorizes Further Re-
lief for Flood Victims in the Philippines 274

Presidential Documents. President Reports on
Plans for 1974 International Environment
Exposition 292

Publications

Fourth "Foreign Relations" Volume for 1947

Released 296

Recent Releases 296

U.N. Environment Conference Report Pub-
lished for Public Sale 296

Refugees

Senate Resolutions on Burundi Discussed by

Department (letter to Senator Fulbright) 283

U.S. Provides Relief Assistance for Refugees

From Burundi (Department announcement) 282

Trade. Secretary of Commerce Peterson Holds
News Conference at Moscow on First Meet-
ing of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Com-
mission (transcript) 285

Treaty Information

Current Actions 295

U.S. and Uruguay Reach Agreement on New

Extradition Treaty 294

U.S.S.R.

Secretary of Commerce Peterson Holds News
Conference at Moscow on First Meeting of
Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission
(transcript) 285

Secretary Rogers Interviewed for the Knight
Newspapers (transcript) 265

Uruguay. U.S. and Uruguay Reach Agreement
on New Extradition Treaty 294

Viet-Nam

156th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at

Paris (Isham) 272

Secretary Rogers Interviewed for the Knight
Newspapers (transcript) 265

Name Index

Abshire, David M 283

Isham, Heyward 272

Johnson, tf. Alexis 275

Nixon, President 292

Peterson, Peter G 285

Rogers, Secretary 265

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to August 21 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
191 of August 7. 196 of August 8, and 199 of
August 18.

Xo. Date Snbject

200 8/21 Stockholm Environment Confer-

ence report published for pub-
lic sale.

201 8/22 Agreement reached on new extra-

dition treaty with Uruguay.

202 8/22 Rogers: interview for Knight

Newspapers, Aug. 16.

203 8/24 Isham: 156th plenary session on

v^ict"^^ 3.111 3.t Pflris
t204 8/24 Rogers: Order of Ahepa, Atlanta.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington, d.c. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

i3i

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 17 3A

September 18, 1972

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 29
Excerpts From Transcript 297

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Message From President Nixon to the Congress and Excerpt
From the Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 308

THE NEED FOR STEADFASTNESS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Address by Secretary Rogers 301

Superj:

For index see inside back cover

1^17?

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I

Vol. LXVII, No. 1734
September 18, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Oflfice
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $16, foreign $23
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note; Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides tfte public and
interested agencies of tfie Government
witfi information on developments in
tfie field of foreign relations and on
tlie work of tlte Department of State
and tfie Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by tfie Wliite House and tfte Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of tfie Presi-
dent and tfie Secretary of State and
otfier officers of tfie Department, as
well as special articles on various
piloses of international affairs and tfie
functions of tfie Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to wfiicfi
tlie United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of tfie Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in tfie field of
international relations are also listed.

President Nixon's News Conference of August 29

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Nixon at the Western
White House at San Clemente, Calif., on
August 29.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated September 4

The President: We will go right ahead
with your questions because I know you want
to cover perhaps some international as well
as domestic matters, including, I understand,
for the first time, political matters.

Q. Mr. President, in your last news con-
ference, on July 27, you said the chances for
a settlement have never been better. Mr.
Rogers in late August forecast early settle-
ment,^ and you tvere quoted by Stewart
Alsop, you were quoted saying the ivar won't
be hanging over us the second term. I ivant
to knoiv whether this is politics or is there
any substance, any movement in negotiations
or any other track toward peace?

The President: Mr. Potter [Philip Potter,
Baltimore Sun], as I also told Mr. Alsop, as
you noted, in that interview, I did not indi-
cate to him that any breakthrough had oc-
curred in the negotiations that have been
taking place between Dr. Kissinger [Henry
A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs] and Mr. Le Due
Tho at this point. Now, let me divide the an-
swer into its component parts, if I may.

First, with regard to negotiations, I will
not comment on past negotiations. I will not

' For an interview with Secretary Rogers for the
Knight Newspapers on Aug. 16, see Bulletin of
Sept. 11, 1972, p. 265.

comment upon any negotiations that may
take place in the future. By agreement of
both sides, we are not going to comment,
either the other side or we on our part, on
the substance of negotiations or whether or
when or what will happen in the future. All
that we will do is to announce, after negotia-
tions do take place, if they do — and I do not
suggest that more will occur — we will an-
nounce the fact that they have taken place.

Second, with regard to what the prospects
are, I think what we are all referring to is
that this long and difficult war — long and
difficult and costly for both sides — has
reached a point where it should be brought to
an end. We have made every reasonable ne-
gotiating proposal that we can. We are being
very reasonable in the proposals that we
have made in our various discussions with
the other side. Also, with regard to the bat-
tlefront, it is significant to note that the
South Vietnamese, by heroic efforts, have
stopped the invasion from the North on the
ground and they have done that without our
assistance on the ground.

It is also significant to note that the enemy
at this point, while it is able to launch a spurt
here and there, does not have the capability
or has not demonstrated the capability to
overrun South Viet-Nam.

Now, under these circumstances we be-
lieve that this is the time for a negotiated
settlement. If the enemy does not feel that
way, then we are prepared to go on as we
have indicated, to continue the training of
the South Vietnamese — we have completed
virtually the ground training, because they
are undertaking the ground fighting entirely
by themselves — but to continue the training
in the air and on the sea so that they, by

September 18, 1972

297

themselves, can defend their country against
the Communist invaders from the North.

Q. Mr. President, you announced today
another reduction in the force levels in Viet-
Nam, and it ivas unclear from the announce-
ment ivhether this is your last announcement.
Do you see this as the residual force in Viet-
Nam necessary as bargaining leverage?

The President: I can't imagine that Mr.
Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary
to President Nixon] didn't make everything
perfectly clear. [Laughter.] But I shall try
to, under those circumstances. The announce-
ment of 27,500 (27,000) does not indicate
that 27,500 (27,000) is the force that is going
to remain in South Viet-Nam indefinitely.
We are going to look at the situation again
before the 1st of December, after the elec-
tion, incidentally, because we are not going
to play election politics with this next with-
drawal, or this next announcement, I should
say, because I am not suggesting that there
will be another withdrawal.

We will look at the situation, and the three
principles that I have always applied with
regard to withdrawals will in this case con-
trol it: the status of our POW and MIA
situation, the status with regard to negotia-
tiofHs, and the status of enemy activity. At
that time we will determine what the Ameri-
can force level should be. It should be noted
that the present force level of 39,000 and the
level that we will reach of 27,500 (27,000)
involves no ground combat personnel. It in-
volves only advisory and training personnel
and, of course, air support personnel. It is
entirely a volunteer force.

I will add something that perhaps every-
one here is quite aware of: that as far as any
so-called residual force is concerned, our
offer is for a total withdrawal. We want to
withdraw all American forces, but that offer
is conditioned on what I laid down on May 8,
and one of those conditions is the situation
with regard to our POW's and MIA's.^ As
long as there is one POW in North Viet-Nam

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

or one missing in action not accounted for,
there will be an American volunteer force in
South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. President, how do you reconcile
your 1968 campaign promise to end the war
with the massive bombing of North Viet-
Nam that is no2V going on?

The President: Well, in tei-ms of what I
said in 1968, all you who were following me
will remember that I said that we would seek
an honorable end to the war. We have come
a long way in reaching that. We have reduced
our casualties by 98 percent; we have with-
drawn over half a million men from the
forces that we found that were there; we
have completely finished the American
ground combat role.

Only volunteers will be serving in Viet-
Nam in the future. What is left now simply
is to complete the long-term involvement of
the United States in a way that does not
destroy respect, trust, and, if I may use the
term, honor for the United States around the
world. I think that we have come — it seems
to me — made very significant progress in this
respect, and we expect to make more. |

On the negotiating front, we have gone
very far, as far as any reasonable person, I
think, would suggest, and under the circum-
stances I believe the record is good.

As far as what can happen in the future,
I know that there are those who believe — I
noted some report out of the Air Force to
the effect that we probably would be bombing
in North Viet-Nam two or three years from
now. That, of course, is quite ridiculous. As
far as the future is concerned, we believe
that our training program for the South
Vietnamese, not only on the ground but in the
air, has gone forward so successfully that if
the enemy still refuses to negotiate, as we
have asked them to negotiate, then the South
Vietnamese will be able to undertake the
total defense of their country.

At the present time, let the record show
that while we hear a lot about what the
Americans are doing in terms of undertaking
bombing activities, that now approximately
50 percent of all ground support air sorties

298

Department of State Bulletin

are being made by the South Vietnamese Air
Force, which is a good air force and which
is growing in strength.

I Q. Is there a possibility that you would
call off the bombing or slacken it even if there
is no all-inclusive agreement on Indochina?

The President: Absolutely not. I have
noted some press speculation to the effect
that since 1968 — the bombing halt seemed to
have a rather dramatic effect on the election
chances of Senator Humphrey — Vice Presi-
dent Humphrey, now a Senator — that people
have suggested that as a gimmick or more or
less as an election-eve tactic, that we would
call a bombing halt even though our prison-
ers of war are not accounted for. No progress
has been made there, and even though the
enemy continued its activities and was still
stonewalling us in the negotiations, unless
there is progress on the negotiating front
which is substantial, there will be no reduc-
tion of the bombing of North Viet-Nam and
there will be no lifting of the mining.

Q. Mr. President, if it is, as yo7i say, "quite
ridictilous" that 7ve will be bombing two or
three years from now — by the way, I don't
know if you mean North Viet-Nam or all of
Viet-Nam — then hotv about a year from
now? Is it likely that bombing would no
longer be necessary in your present plan or
thinking?

The President: No, I would not comment
on what the situation will be a year from now
because, with the fact that we have had ne-
gotiation proposals made — I am not indicat-
ing progress; I am simply indicating they
have been made — and with also the progress
that is being made by the South Vietnamese,
the very outstanding progress in their ability
to defend themselves and also to undertake
the air effort as well as the ground effort, I
am not going to put any limitation on when
the U.S. activities in the air would stop.

Also I am not going to indicate they are
going to continue for any length of time. We
are going to continue to watch the situation
month by month. We will do what is neces-

sary to protect our interests. We will do what
is necessary to assure the return of our
POW's and accounting for our missing in
action. We will do what is necessary to pre-
vent the imposition, against their will, of a
Communist government on the people of
South Viet-Nam.

All this we will do, but on the other hand,
we are not there for the purpose of staying
any moment that is longer than is necessary.

Q. Mr. President, may I ask a question
concerning your meeting with Mr. Tanaka?

The President: Sure.

Q. Mr. Tanaka has made his intention
clear that he would like to discuss further
with you China and discuss less economic
problems. But I am also told that the United
States wants to discuss the economic prob-
lems as tvidely and deeply as the other issues,
and it can be said that it is an open secret
that the United States is asking Japan for
another revaluation of the yen in the near
future. Could you tell me to what extent are
you going to discuss ivith Tanaka the eco-
nomic issues?

The President: Our meeting with Mr.
Tanaka is, first, very important because it is
the first chance I will have to meet him as
Prime Minister, although I did meet him
here, you will recall, when he came with
Premier Sato, and I have known him for
many years and have great respect for him
as one of the new leaders of Japan. So it will
first provide an opportunity for establishing
a dialogue between these two countries, both
of whom are economic superpowers.

Second, we will naturally cover the whole
range of problems of the Pacific. Both Japan
and the United States are tremendously in-
terested in peace in the Pacific. On the eco-
nomic side, I think both sides will be pre-
pared to discuss the fact that there is now an
unfavorable balance of trade between Japan
and the United States of $3.4 billion a year.
Naturally, that is not healthy for the United
States, but responsible Japanese leaders do
not believe it is healthy for Japan, because

September 18, 1972

299

what will happen if that kind of an imbal-
ance continues? It will inevitably feed the
fire of those in this country who would want
to set up quotas and other restrictions, and
the interest of Japan and the United States
will better be served by freer trade rather
than more restrictive trade.

I believe that out of this meeting will come
some progress in trying to reduce that un-
favorable balance between Japan and the
United States.

Now, with regard to the devaluation of the
yen and that sort of thing, I won't comment
on that. I have no expectation that that kind
of technical international monetary matter
will be one that we will discuss. I say that for
the reason that saying anything else is likely
to have the stock markets in Tokyo and New
York go up and down, so I will categorically
say that revaluation of the yen is not on the
agenda, but the other matters of how we can
adjust this trade balance so that it is less
favorable to the United States is, of course,
in order.

One final thing that I would say from a
symbolic standpoint: Since World War II,
Presidents of the United States have wel-
comed Prime Ministers of Japan to Wash-
ington on several occasions. I welcomed, as
you know, the Emperor in the United States,
in Anchorage, and we have met here with
Prime Minister Sato.

It seems to me that we could have no better
proof of the fact that the war is over, not
only the shooting but also the enmity, than
the fact that we are having this meeting be-
tween the leader of Japan and the leader of
the United States in Hawaii, where the war
began, and I am very glad that the Prime
Minister and I mutually agreed that we

should have it in Hawaii because we talk
about the initiatives toward the People's Re-
public of China and toward the Soviet Union
and the rest. As I have often said, and I re-
peat again, Japan, being an economic giant
with great potentials for political and other
leadership in the Pacific, plays an indis-
pensable role if we are going to have peace
in the Pacific.

As I have said, Japanese- American friend-
ship and cooperation is the linchpin of peace
in the Pacific, and we are going to try to
strengthen that linchpin in these meetings.

U.S. Force Ceiling in Viet-Nam

To Be Cut to 27,000 by December 1

White House Announcement ^

The President asked me to announce this
morning that after consultation with the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam,
and after a thorough review of the Indochina
situation. President Nixon has decided to
continue our withdrawal program to an au-
thorized level of 27,000 by December 1, 1972.

This new level of 27,000 which will be
achieved by December 1, 1972, will bring the
total number of troops withdrawn by Presi-
dent Nixon to 522,000, or 95 percent of the
authorized level when President Nixon took
office.

^ Made to news correspondents on Aug. 29 at San
Clemente, Calif., by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secre-
tary to President Nixon (Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Sept. 4).

300

Department of State Bulletin

The Need for Steadfastness in U.S. Foreign Policy

Address by Secretary Rogers ^

I am very pleased to join you in celebrat-
ing the golden anniversary of "The Order of
Ahepa." In those 50 years AHEPA has
established a remarkable record of achieve-
ment in philanthropy, in education, in civic
action, and — perhaps most important — in
giving new and fresh life to those vibrant
elements of your ancestors' culture which so
enrich the lives of all Americans.

Your association has included, and in-
cludes, many prominent Americans. I know
that Vice President Agnew cherishes his
membership in your great organization for
he shares its ideals and is dedicated to its
work. I have worked very closely with the
Vice President for the last 3i/> years. He has
undertaken important diplomatic missions in
28 countries, and he has handled these assign-
ments with great delicacy, tact, and effective-
ness. He is an outstanding American — and
is a great credit to this organization and to
the United States, which he serves so faith-
fully.

In the past few months we have seen some
remarkable initiatives taken to reduce ten-
sions in the world.

— The United States has opened a wholly
new relationship with the People's Republic
of China, a nation of more than 800 million
people with which we had had no contact
since the birth of the Peking government
more than 22 years ago.

— We have consolidated with the Soviet

' Made before the American Hellenic Educational
Progressive Association (AHEPA) at Atlanta, Ga.,
on Aug. 24 (press release 204).

Union a relationship marked by a greater
variety of negotiation and contact than has
existed between our two countries since the
Bolshevik Revolution.

— We have reached unprecedented agree-
ments with Moscow to limit our strategic
power.

— As a result of the initiative of the
United States there has been a cease-fire in
the Middle East which is now in its third
year.

Of course we are still too close to those
events to judge with precision what the fu-
ture holds. But it is already clear that the
consistent pattern of confrontation which
has lasted for a quarter of a century has
been altered. The United States Govern-
ment today is engaged in a great endeavor.
Building on the initiatives President Nixon
has taken, we are trying to create lasting
relationships with our former adversaries
which can help the world's peoples realize
their dream of peace. We do not underesti-
mate the obstacles in the path toward a more
tranquil world. But based on progress to
date, we are most hopeful about the future.

In the process we will continue to need a
creative and forward-looking approach to
foreign policy. But we must also guard
against superficiality or euphoria. We will
continue to need firmness, a determination to
protect our own security, and a fidelity to
our friends and our commitments. Without
the proper balance our policy might be too
rigid on the one hand or too reckless on the
other.

It has been — and it remains — President

September 18, 1972

301

Nixon's purpose to give our foreign policy
that necessary balance. The generation of
peace that we seek depends upon it.

We must never forget that the progress
we have made would not have been possible
without a firm foundation of American
strength and American steadfastness. And
continued progress cannot be made unless we
preserve that foundation.

That is why, for example, we must insist
on an adequate national defense budget. We
must resist attempts to cut that budget to a
point at which we would endanger or impair
our own security or which might cause our
allies to doubt our resolve to meet our treaty
commitments if the occasion arose.

We must maintain and be steadfast to our
commitments to the 42 nations with which
we have alliances, alliances which underline
that their security is important to us. That
is the lesson we learned in World War II;
that is the lesson we must never forget.

And that is why, in Viet-Nam, the way we
end our involvement is of such fundamental
importance. The President has gotten all
American ground troops out of combat and
has brought half a million American troops
home. He has done this in a way which has
prevented a Communist takeover of South
Viet-Nam by force and in a way which
should give the South Vietnamese the right
to determine their own future. We are being
urged by some now to quit — to refuse to give
any further support, economic or otherwise
— to throw up our hands — to abandon the
people of South Viet-Nam — to forget all that
we have said as a nation, and to forget all
they have done as a nation. This the Presi-
dent will not do.

We must remember that they have trusted
us and have fought together with us and
thousands have died with us. We must, of
course, consider what is best for the United
States. But I believe that what is best for
the United States is a solution which takes
into account not only our interests but the
interests of the people of Viet-Nam as well.
A total abandonment of an ally now after
fighting alongside each other since 1965 —
a complete about-face — would be unconscion-

able. We must continue to be steadfast in
our determination to achieve an honorable
solution to that tragic conflict based on Pres-
ident Nixon's proposals — proposals which
have been recognized as fair and reasonable
by most of the world community.

We must be steadfast, too, in our search
for reciprocal arms limitation. The unprece-
dented SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] agreements we signed three months
ago in Moscow are probably the most impor-
tant arms limitation agreements ever ne-
gotiated. I am convinced that they will sig-
nificantly reduce the danger of nuclear war.
And yet we could not have achieved them
unless we had kept our strategic position
strong — unless we had resisted the effort
by many well-intentioned persons to disarm
unilaterally.

This fall we will enter the second round
of SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Their principal aim will be to reach agree-
ment on more comprehensive limitations on
offensive strategic weapons. In the process
we may also want to test the possibilities for
qualitative constraints on weapons. More-
over, we may want to explore the possibili-
ties for moving toward actual reductions of
strategic arms. As the President has said,
our objective is "not only to limit the buildup
of strategic arms but to reverse it." ^

NATO's Contribution to Detente

Our own military capabilities are one side
of the security coin. The other side is, as I
have noted, the network of alliances and se-
curity relationships that we have entered
into with other countries since World War
II. Even in an era of negotiation — indeed,
especially in an era of negotiation — we must
remain steadfast in our support for the con-
cept of mutual security.

One of the main pillars of our collective
security system is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. For a generation, the dura-

' For President Nixon's address before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 18, 1969, see Bulletin of
Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297.

302

Department of State Bulletin

bility, solidarity, and determination of
NATO have been the foundation of peace in
Europe. NATO is the umbrella under which
our friends in Europe have built prosperous
societies while protecting and preserving the
right of their citizens to live free of foreign
domination.

NATO has also provided a base from
which we have been able to move from con-
frontation to negotiation. And today the
countries of Europe, with our participation,
are currently engaged in unprecedented ne-
gotiating activity.

— Together with the United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union, we have
achieved an agreement giving the 2 million
brave people of West Berlin increased access
to East Berlin and the German Democratic
Republic.

— West and East Germany have just
begun formal negotiations on a treaty to
improve relations between them.

— We expect preliminary talks to begin
this year looking toward a conference in
1973 on security and cooperation in Europe
which will involve European nations as well
as the United States and Canada.

— We also look forward to early multilat-
eral East-West talks on the mutual and bal-
anced reduction of military forces in central
Europe, which, except for the Soviet-Chinese
border, is the site of the largest concentra-
tion of ground forces in the world.

— Finally, in addition to the agreements
we have completed with the Soviet Union, in-
volving arms limitation, science, the environ-
ment, health, cultural exchanges, space coop-
eration, and the prevention of incidents at
sea between our navies, we are seeking to
reach a comprehensive trade agreement.
Even without one, our grain sales during the
next year should make the Soviet Union our
second largest agricultural market in the
world, second only to Japan.

Nearly all Americans recognize the impor-
tant role that NATO has played in contribut-
ing to these developments and to peace in
Europe since World War II. But in the cur-
rent climate of detente, the argument can be

heard that because the alliance was built
decades ago it is no longer relevant. Nothing
could be further from the truth. As Presi-
dent Nixon said in his foreign policy report
to the Congress earlier this year:^

Today, the military balance underpins the overall
stability on the Continent which makes detente fea-
sible in the 1970's. East-West diplomacy in Europe is
more active today than at any time since the Second
World War; new hopes and new complexities are
emerging. This is hardly the time for the West to
abandon the very cohesion and stability that have
brought these new opportunities about.

U.S. Relationship With Greece

One of our relationships within the alli-
ance has been a special target of critics. I
refer of course to our partnership with
Greece in NATO and our policy toward
Greece.

What about that policy? As all of you
know so well, there are strong bonds of
friendship and confidence between the people
of the United States and the people of
Greece. They go back to the earliest days of
our own Republic and the earliest days of the
Greek struggle for independence. President
James Monroe in his message to the Con-
gress of December 22, 1822, observed that :

Greece fills the mind with the most exalted senti-
ments. . . . Superior skill and refinement in the arts,
gallantry in action, disinterested patriotism and
devotion in favor of public liberty. . . .

Relations between Greece and the United
States remain of great importance and
should be a subject for reflection and under-
standing by all Americans.

Greece and the United States were allies in
World War II. Subsequently we joined to-
gether in defeating the Communist attempt
to wrest Greece from the community of free
nations. We fought together under the flag
of the United Nations in Korea. For more
than 20 years we have been partners in the
North Atlantic alliance. That alliance has
given Greece a guarantee of its sovereignty

" The complete text of the report appears in the
Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled "Eu-
rope and the Atlantic Alliance" begins on p. 332.

September 18, 1972

303

and integrity not subject to the whim of
others. And, of course, Greece's role has
provided the alliance with a vital link in the
security of Europe and the West.

The United States has ideological links,
too, with the people of Greece. The heritage
of classical Greece teaches us that authoritar-
ian governments can be inflicted upon nations
all too easily but a democracy cannot be im-
posed. By its very nature a democracy grows
out of the will of a people. Our Founding
Fathers, too, built our own country with
that knowledge.

We believe that a democratic system offers
the best hope for achieving the spiritual and
material aspirations of people everywhere.
But the choice, except as it applies to our
own country, is not ours to make. It would
be the ultimate arrogance of power to think
that we can, or should, impose our will on
others — to threaten or coerce others even
in the name of conscience. The kind of gov-
ernment other countries have must, in the
final analysis, be what their people want or
will permit.

Because of our long and close relationship
with the people of Greece we would of course
like to see their Constitution speedily imple-
mented and their parliamentary system rein-
stituted. Some critics of our policy toward
Greece have urged us to denounce the gov-
ernment of an allied country because it has
failed to implement its Constitution in a
manner and at a pace they think desirable.
Others would use the alliance as a means of
pressure. As good friends and allies we can
urge other governments to take certain
steps. I do not believe that we should
threaten retaliation or use coercive methods
to insist that another government conduct
its internal affairs in a manner to coincide
with our views. Such a policy violates the
concept of sovereignty and independence
and, in my opinion, would not be effective
or in our best interests.

Alliances are made by governments, but
in a more fundamental sense the most im-
portant aspect of alliances is people. Gov-
ernments are transitory, but the people are

not. Many American governments and Greek
governments have passed from the scene, and
our people and the Greek people remain
allies. Whatever the government of the
United States and whatever the government
of Greece, I hope Americans will continue to
be bound to the people of Greece in friend-
ship and common purpose.

Pressures on Southern Flank of NATO

Over the past 20 years the pressures on
NATO have increased in the south, and today
the weight of challenge falls heavily on the
allies of the southern flank, particularly on
Greece and Turkey. Soviet activity, military
and political, in the Mediterranean has
sharply increased in recent years. We and
our allies must continue to give serious at-
tention to maintaining and strengthening
our defense in this area which is so im-
portant to the peace of the world.

Within that framework we have obtained
the agreement of our Greek allies to provide
a home port in Greece to one element of the
6th Fleet. Early in September a squadron
of six destroyers will take up anchorages in
Greece and some 770 dependents of the crews
will move into Athens. Homeporting in
Greece will have advantages for the United
States, for Greece, and for NATO. It will
help improve the morale of our Navy per-
sonnel by eliminating long periods of sep-
aration from their families. It will also make
it easier for the 6th Fleet to maintain the
high state of readiness essential to its role as
one of the key NATO defense forces on the
southern flank of the alliance.

We have also undertaken over the past two
decades to help Greece play an effective and
necessary role in the deterrence which the
alliance represents. We intend to continue
providing that assistance because we believe
it to be in the best interest of the Greek
people, of the NATO alliance, and of the
United States.

Let me leave you with this thought. In the
search for an exit from the dangerous con-
frontations of the past decades, the desire for

304

Department of State Bulletin

detente must not lead to a retreat from our
responsibilities abroad. In a retreat to isola-
tionism there are no safe havens to be found
along the way. The threat to peace and se-
curity in the world has been reduced, but it
would be foolhardy to think that it has
quickly and completely evaporated. Our alli-
ances must therefore remain strong.

In seeking improved relations with our
former adversaries we must maintain warm
and reassuring relations with our old and
close friends in the world. That is the heart
of our policy toward Europe and the heart
of our policy toward Greece. It is my earnest
hope that you support that policy.

157th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Folloiving are remarks made by Ambassa-
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele-
gation, at the 157th plenary session of the
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on August 31.

Press release 205 dated August 31

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: As you know, on
August 29 the White House announced a fur-
ther reduction in the level of American forces
in Viet-Nam. Twelve thousand more men will
be withdrawn within the next three months,
leaving a total of only 27,000 American mili-
tary personnel in Viet-Nam as of December
1. This is an additional measure of the suc-
cess of Vietnamization, the program we have
followed for more than three years to reduce
and eventually eliminate American involve-
ment in this conflict as the capability of the
armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam
has increased. We have withdrawn more than
half a million men.

You are aware that Vietnamization is the
alternative we have pursued in the face of
your persistent refusal to seek a negotiated

solution to this war. But peace could come
more rapidly through serious discussion here,
and it continues to be our hope that you will
recognize the compelling logic of negotiation
and join us in the search for a settlement
fair and honorable for all parties. President
Nixon's proposals of May 8 offer the basis
for such a settlement.^

Finally, I should emphasize again that our
withdrawal will not be total as long as Amer-
ican prisoners of war are held by your side.
Nor will our aerial and naval activity against
military targets in North Viet-Nam be ended
in the absence of a cease-fire and the return
of those prisoners. I suggest therefore that
you consider anew our proposals of May 8,
recognize the generous and constructive na-
ture of those proposals, and respond posi-
tively to them.

OPENING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: Four weeks ago I
observed in this forum that your side had
"lost great opportunities at this table." My
thought was of the prospects of peace avail-
able to you and to all Indochina through ac-
ceptance of United States and Republic of
Viet-Nam proposals from 1969 through 1972.
They provide for an end to the killing and a
beginning of the resolution of political prob-
lems by Vietnamese themselves.

Instead, you have continued the senseless
fratricidal struggle and you have maintained
a defiant attitude toward the world's hopes
for a negotiated settlement of this conflict.
Hanoi Radio's English-language broadcast
of August 26 once again gloated over "mas-
sive annihilation and disintegration" that
you are inflicting in South Viet-Nam, threat-
ening to "persist in and step up" military
activities. Nevertheless you attempt to mis-
lead world opinion by reaffirmations of your
so-called "good will," readiness for negotia-
tions, and tender solicitude toward the peo-

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on
May 8, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.

September 18, 1972

305

pie, forgetting that the free press has access
to the record of your treatment of civiUan
populations falling into your hands.

You have maintained an absolutely rigid
position in your accusations and demands, as
a reading of your statements at the first ple-
nary session, on January 25, 1969, will re-
veal. Despite this, your propaganda vehicle
known as Quan Doi Nlian Dan, whose mis-
sion is to deceive your people, had the audac-
ity to complain on August 27 that "in the last
four years of negotiations, Nixon has not
made even half a step forward" — ignoring,
of course, the series of conciliatory proposals
put forward by our side since the first ple-
nary session.

Your line here is lamentable because of its
total variance with the realities of the situa-
tion in Indochina today.

First, your descriptions of American ac-
tion in Viet-Nam are contradicted by the
withdrawal of more than half a million
American combat personnel from Viet-Nam
since 1969 and by our declared willingness to
withdraw all of our forces within four
months, if you will but agree to cease the
killing in Indochina and return our men to
us, along the lines of our May 8 proposals.
Our actions are in sharp contrast to your
continued attempts to augment your invad-
ing forces.

Second, the falseness of your appeals for
peaceful settlement are made even clearer by
the fact that your armies are making war in
the South — and in Laos — and in Cambodia —
while you maintain your ridiculous pretense
that they are not even in those places.

Third, your plaintive indignation about
United States air and naval action against
your war machine in the North is contra-
dicted by your exhortations to intensify "de-
stroying the towns" of South Viet-Nam, as
your commentator "Chien Binh" put it on
August 4. I am referring, of course, to the
real "Chien Binh" text in my possession, not
to the doctored version of it you handed out
to the press here. Don't you owe the press
another apology for this additional decep-
tion?

Fourth, your pretension that you bear

humane concern toward prisoners of war in
your charge is belied by your failure to mani-
fest any policy of compassion or clemency
toward them in recent years. Your response
to the Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam's offer to return 600 of your own serv-
icemen will be a significant indicator of your
true attitudes.

Fifth, by continually contradicting your-
selves you have deluded yourselves — there is
no other term for it — so that you have be-
come divorced from the reality of your own
situation. Have you lost the ability to dis-
tinguish the truth from the deceptions you
have sown? In 1969 you told us arrogantly
that you had "liberated four-fifths of the
territory and 11 million people"; this year
your propaganda claims to have "liberated"
an additional 2 million South Vietnamese.
With such successes, whom, then, are you
fighting — yourselves ?

Yes, your real foes are indeed yourselves
and those who urge you to continue to ignore
our peace overtures and to go on with your
fratricidal campaigns. We do not want to
war against you, but to persuade you to ac-
cept a cease-fire. We are not trying to use
prisoners of war from your forces as bar-
gaining pawns, but to repatriate them. The
United States is not seeking to perpetuate its
military presence in Viet-Nam, but to effect
complete withdrawal quickly once peace is
restored. The Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam is willing to discuss political issues
with you although you are utilizing all your
military resources to bend your compatriots
and neighbors to your political will.

These Paris meetings can become real and
meaningful negotiations, but only if you will
take the first steps in this forum to cast off
your obsession with war and dictatorship.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Press release 205A dated September 1

Ladies and gentlemen: I judge by your
lack of response to the offer of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam to repatri-
ate 600 of your sick and wounded soldiers

306

Department of State Bulletin

that you do not intend to respond to their
offer. That is quite in keeping with the high
quality of your "humanitarianism."

Now let me read you parts of a letter to
wounded and sick combatants and their fam-
ilies written last month by your President,
Mr. Ton Due Thang, to commemorate
Wounded Combatants and Fallen Heroes
Day, as reported by Hanoi Radio on July 17.

"Dear comrade wounded and sick com-
batants and families of war dead and soldiers
(Mr. Thang wrote), I convey to the comrade
wounded and sick combatants my best re-
gards.

"Our party, our Government highly values
the noble contribution of the comrade
wounded and sick combatants. The wounded
and sick combatants and the families of the
war dead and soldiers have achieved merits
in serving the fatherland and the people.
Therefore (your President continued), our
duty is to show gratitude to them and love
and help them."

I will repeat that sentence: "Therefore,
our duty is to show gratitude to them and
love and help them."

I am making the point here that once again
your words and promises mean nothing, not
even when they involve your own sick and
wounded soldiers. I invite you, the North
Vietnamese delegate, to state here and in-
form the press outside how President
Thang's words are compatible with your dis-
regard for the 600 sick and wounded North

Vietnamese soldiers whom the Government
of the Republic of Viet-Nam has offered to
repatriate. We await your comments.

Herbert Brownell Named To Study
Colorado River Salinity Problem

President Nixon announced on August 16
(White House press release) the designation
of former Attorney General Herbert Brown-
ell as his Special Representative to study the
problem of high salinity in the Colorado
River waters which flow into Mexico and to
recommend a solution to the problem. (For
biographic data, see White House press re-
lease dated August 16.) Mr. Brownell will
begin work immediately and report to the
President by the end of the year.

As the President's Special Representative,
Mr. Brownell will head an interagency task
force of technical experts and specialists,
who will assist him in proposing a solution
to the high salinity in the Colorado River,
which has been a problem for the two gov-
ernments since 1961. The problem was dis-
cussed by President Nixon and Mexican
President Luis Echeverria during President
Echeverria's visit to Washington June 15-
16, 1972, and was one of the subjects of
their joint communique of June 17, 1972.^

' For text of the communique, see Bulletin of
July 10, 1972, p. 66.

September 18, 1972

307

THE CONGRESS

International Aspects of Environmental Quality

Following is the text of President Nixon's
message to the Congress on August 7 trans-
mitting the third annual report of the Coun-
cil on Enviro7imental Quality, together with
the text of chapter 3 of the report, eyititled
" hiternational Aspects of Environmental
Quality." i

PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 14

To the Congress of the United States :

At the dawn of the twentieth century, al-
most as a voice in the wilderness he loved,
President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed an
environmental ethic for America. He said:

I recogrnize the right and duty of this generation
to develop and use our natural resources; but I do
not recognize the right to waste them, or to rob by
wasteful use, the generations that come after us.

At the dawn of the 1970's there was still
no more significant challenge facing Amer-
icans than the task of wisely conserving our
natural resources and leaving the Nation a
cleaner and healthier place for our children
and grandchildren.

In my 1970 State of the Union Message I
asked our people:

Shall we surrender to our surroundings or shall
we make our peace with nature and begin to make
reparations for the damage we have done to our air,
to our land, and to our water?

' The 450-page report entitled "Environmental
Quality: The Third Annual Report of the Council
on Environmental Quality — August 1972" is for
sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
(Stock Number 4111-0011; $2.).

This year's report of the Council on En-
vironmental Quality examines the environ-
mental conditions of a dynamic and mature
society. The report addresses some very
complex issues — the need for indices of en-
vironmental quality and forecasting, the
costs and impact on the economy of pollution
control requirements, and the effects of en-
vironmental standards on international trade
— and puts these issues in sharper perspec-
tive. The increasing sophistication which we
are bringing to our perception of environ-
mental problems is itself an encouraging
indication of progress.

This Annual Report on Environmental
Quality also offers an assessment of how we
are faring. I am pleased that the data pre-
sented in the Council's report indicate that
the quality of the air in many of our cities is
improving. Across the nation, emissions
from automobiles — a significant portion of
total emissions — are declining. We can ex-
pect these welcome trends to accelerate as the
new standards and compliance schedules
called for by the Clean Air Act of 1970 be-
come fully effective.

Although the Report shows that we still
have a major battle ahead to restore the
quality of our waters, and urgently need
effective new legislation which I submitted
to the Congress over a year and a half ago,
impressive strides have been made under
present authorities. These include a four-
fold increase in enforcement actions under
the Refuse Act of 1899 since 1968.

The private sector is performing far
more effectively in environmental protection.
Throughout the country, industry is develop-
ing and using new technology to reduce pol-

308

Department of State Bulletin

lution. Surveys indicate that business has
increased its spending on pollution controls
by about 50 percent in each of the last two
years.

The future will bring new challenges to
both the private and the public sectors in
arresting environmental decay. The Coun-
cil's report estimates that in order to meet
current environmental protection require-
ments, both the public and private sectors
together will need to spend an annual amount
of $33 billion in 1980. Cumulative expendi-
tures of more than $287 billion are estimated
over the 10 years from 1971 to 1980.

So — we have only just begun to face up
to the environmental question, even though
we may have awakened just in time for us
to stave off catastrophe.

The encouraging news in this report by
the Council — as well as the hope we have for
mastering the many difficult problems that
still persist — is the rapid step-by-step prog-
ress in institutionalizing and reorganizing
the Federal environmental structure, the
dramatic funding, the wide range of admin-
istrative actions that have been taken, the
strict enforcement of pollution control laws,
the new international agreements which
have been forged, and the broad array of
major new legislation which has been sub-
mitted to the Congress for action.

Years of Progress

With the creation of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality and the Environmental
Protection Agency, we have brought about
a major institutional reform within the
Federal Government and a far more effective
organization for environmental policy-mak-
ing and enforcement. This reform has pro-
duced major progress — evidenced, for exam-
ple, by the broad legislative proposals for
environmental improvement which I have
submitted to the Congress and by the vigor-
ous enforcement of our pollution laws. The
establishment of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration gives us a focus
on the marine environment. I have proposed
a Department of Natural Resources, for

coordinated resource management, and a De-
partment of Community Development, for a
systematic approach to both urban and rural
growth. The Congress has yet to act on these
two crucial reorganization proposals.

Under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), we have undertaken a funda-
mental reform in the requirement that Fed-
eral agencies give careful analysis to the
potential environmental impacts of proposed
Federal actions. Already this changed em-
phasis has led to reconsideration of some
projects, improvements of many others, and,
overall, a far more thoughtful and compre-
hensive planning process. Our requirement
that this whole process of environmental
analysis must be open to the public for
examination and comments — well before pro-
posed actions are taken — is providing a new
and more open dimension to Government.
We can be proud of this record of improved
citizen participation in the vital process of
public decision-making.

The level of Federal funding for environ-
mental protection has never been higher. In
the four years since fiscal year 1969, Federal
outlays for environmental protection have
increased fivefold. Funding for cleanup of
pollution at Federal facilities has increased
from a $52 million annual level at the outset
of my Administration to my 1973 budget of
$315 million.

Regulatory and enforcement actions have
accelerated dramatically over the past four
years. The number of criminal actions taken
by the Justice Department against water
polluters was increased four fold — from 46
to 191— between 1968 and 1971. EPA has
taken action to halt harmful discharges into
Lake Superior and shut down major indus-
tries during an air pollution crisis in Bir-
mingham, Alabama.

In our long-term determination to provide
tangible benefits for our children and grand-
children, we have created the Legacy of
Parks program. Over 140 Federal properties
have already been made available for park
and recreation use, covering more than
20,000 acres in thirty-nine states and Puerto
Rico. Most of these natural retreats are lo-

September 18, 1972

309

cated in and near cities where the need for
open space is greatest. The estimated fair
market value of these properties is almost
$100 million. In addition, we proposed major
urban parks at gateways to both of our
coasts — New York City and San Francisco.
These two parks would comprise almost
50,000 acres, including valuable cultural,
historic, and recreation assets accessible to
millions of people.

My Administration has tackled a host of
controversial issues of environmental pro-
tection. We have limited oil drilling in the
Santa Barbara Channel off the California
coast. We helped protect the Everglades in
Florida by stopping a proposed jetport. In
addition, I proposed legislation to acquire
interests in the Big Cypress Swamp to pro-
tect the Everglades' water supply. We halted
the Cross-Florida Barge Canal and are con-
sidering the inclusion of the Oklawaha River
in the system of scenic and wild rivers. And
we have restricted use of DDT almost solely
to public health purposes. We stopped the
use of poisons on public lands. And we
stopped all commercial whaling by the United
States as well as all imports of whale prod-
ucts into this country. These are examples
of the rigorous executive action taken by my
Administration to protect the environment.

New Laws We Need

New legislation is still badly needed in a
number of areas, and in a series of environ-
mental messages to Congress I have set forth
a comprehensive legislative program de-
signed to clean up the inherited problems of
the past and to deal with emerging problems
before they become critical. Many of these
problem areas are defined in this Annual
Report. To date, much of the proposed legis-
lation has been the subject of congressional
hearings, where it has attracted heartening
interest and support. However, the record of
final congressional action is entirely inade-
quate, with more than 20 major environ-
mental proposals still pending.

Last month, I signed an important Port
and Waterways Safety Act into law. This

new law, which I proposed in May 1970,
will help protect our inland waters from oil
and other hazardous pollutant spills. This is
a welcome beginning, but passage of my
other major proposals to give us effective
tools to deal with the environmental chal-
lenge— together with creation of a new De-
partment of Natural Resources — will be
essential, in my judgment, if we are to have
an adequate base for improving environ-
mental quality. I urge the Congress to com-
plete final action on responsible legislation
to give us authority to upgrade water quali-
ty and to control the dumping of wastes at
sea. We urgently need the new controls I
have proposed over the use of toxic sub-
stances such as mercury, over the increasing
problem of excessive noise, and over the
misuse of chemical pesticides.

I have proposed a Toxic Wastes Disposal
Control Act under which the Environmental
Protection Agency would establish Federal
Guidelines and requirements for State pro-
grams to regulate disposal on or under the
land of those toxic wastes which pose a haz-
ard to health. The Act would provide for
Federal enforcement action if a State should
fail to establish its own program.

Legislation which I have proposed is
urgently needed to protect the land from the
potential ravages of mining, by imposing
adequate standards of reclamation. Strip
mining alone now disturbs almost 4,650 acres
a week. My proposed Power Plant Siting
Act, for which the need is more evident with
each passing month, would allow us effective-
ly to reconcile environmental protection and
energy needs.

I have proposed new legislation calling
upon the States to assume control over land-
use planning and regulation in areas of
critical environmental concern and to regu-
late land use around major growth-industry
facilities such as highways and airports. I
have asked the Congress for authority to
initiate at the State level regulatory pro-
grams to control sediment affecting water
quality from earth-moving activities such as
building and road construction. Federal en-
forcement would be imposed in situations in

310

Department of State Bulletin

which a State failed to implement such a
program.

I proposed a new type of law for pollution
control purposes — a charge on harmful sul-
fur oxides emissions. This proposal embodies
the principle that the price of goods should
be made to include the costs of producing
and disposing of them without harm to the
environment. I also proposed a law that
would employ our tax structure to discourage
potentially harmful development in our pre-
cious coastal wetlands.

I have asked for a new and more effective
Federal law to protect endangered species
of wildlife — by covering species likely to be-
come endangered as well as those more im-
mediately threatened, and by imposing
Federal penalties for taking of such species.

These proposals, and others I have put
forward, are vital to all Americans in the
years to come. But the critical final steps
have yet to be taken. The Nation needs these
laws, and they should be enacted this year.
The Congress has a splendid opportunity to
leave an historic record of environmental
achievement, an opportunity which it must
seize. The time for deliberation has passed.
It is now time for action.

Nations Acting Together

While our most immediate concern must
be for the quality of our national environ-
ment, it is clear that we are part of a global
environment whose long-range protection
must be achieved by a mix of national and
international efforts. This past year wit-
nessed three historic milestones in the field
of international environmental activity.

On April 15, in Ottawa, Prime Minister
Trudeau and I signed the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement providing a common com-
mitment to work together to clean up these
important, shared resources.-

On May 23, in Moscow, President Pod-
gorny and I signed a Co-operative Agree-
ment on Environmental Protection which
opens a new area of U.S.-Soviet cooperation

and permits our two peoples to work together
on the solution of environmental problems in
11 broad areas.-'

Between June 5-16, in Stockholm, the
United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment brought together the represen-
tatives of 113 nations representing nine-
tenth's of the world's people to explore
together the opportunities for national and
international action on common environ-
mental problems.^ The Conference achieved
nearly all of the goals which the United
States had urged in advance. Specifically, the
nations :

— Reached agreement on the establish-
ment of a permanent new organization with-
in the United Nations to coordinate interna-
tional environmental activities.

— Agreed to the establishment of a United
Nations environmental fund to be financed
by voluntary contributions from U.N. mem-
ber governments. I shall ask Congress to au-
thorize and appropriate $40 million as our
Nation's share of a five-year, $100 million
fund.

— Endorsed completion of a convention
proposed by the United States to control
ocean dumping of shore-generated waste.
The favorable prospect for international
action heightens the urgency of passing the
domestic legislation. I have proposed to cur-
tail ocean dumping from our shores.

— Approved an "earth watch" program for
worldwide environmental monitoring.

— Endorsed in principle a convention on
endangered species, designed to protect spe-
cies of plants and animals threatened with
extinction by imposing control in interna-
tional shipment, import and export.

— Endorsed our recommendation for a
ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling.
(Despite vigorous U.S. efforts, this mora-
torium was not agreed to by the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission at its recent
meeting, although we were successful in

- For background, see Bulletin of May 8, 1972,
p. 647.

' For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of June
26, 1972, p. 921.

' For background, see Bulletin of July 24, 1972,
p. 105.

September 18, 1972

311

achieving substantially reduced quotas and
other protective measures.)

In addition, a proposal which I made in
1971 for a World Heritage Trust — to give
uniquely important historic, cultural and
natural areas of the world special interna-
tional recognition and protection — was
strongly supported at Stockholm. When es-
tablished, the Trust will provide vital new
international dimension to the national park
concept.

Environmental problems do not distin-
guish between national boundaries or differ-
ing social and economic systems. Environ-
mental cooperation offers nations an oppor-
tunity for dealing constructively with each
other and for responding to the growing as-
pirations of ordinary people around the
globe to live decently and well in healthful
surroundings.

I am hopeful about the prospects of inter-
national cooperation in the environmental
field. The U.S. will continue to provide lead-
ership in developing such cooperation. I am
encouraged — even more profoundly — that
the common search for a better environment
can be one of those activities which serves to
unify nations.

The Environment and Our People

In October, 1971, I initiated the Environ-
mental Merit Awards Program. Adminis-
tered by the Environmental Protection
Agency in cooperation with the Office of
Education, this program gives national rec-
ognition to successful student projects
leading to environmental understanding or
improvement. Qualifications for the awards
are determined by local boards. Each board
consists of secondary school students, facul-
ty, and representatives of the local com-
munity. Already thousands of high schools
and summer camps from all fifty states are
registered in the program. This Fall the
program will be expanded to include junior
high schools as well.

As I said in my 1972 Environmental Mes-
sage to Congress:

The starting point of environmental quality is in
the hearts and minds of the people. Unless the peo-
ple have a deep commitment to new values and a
clear understanding of the new problems, all our laws
and programs and spending will avail little. The
young, quick to commit and used to learning, are
gaining the changed outlook fastest of all. Their
enthusiasm about the environment spreads with a
healthy contagion. Their energy in its behalf can be
an impressive force for good.

As we reflect upon the characteristics and
problems of the dynamic and mature society
that this Annual Report of the Council on
Environmental Quality describes, there
should be a sober realization that we have
not done as well as we must, that changes
in laws and values come slowly, and that
reordering our priorities is difficult and com-
plicated. But there is ample room for en-
couragement in the growing capacity of a
people able to assess their problems, take
stock of their situation and get on with the
unfinished business of shaping the United
States as a model of a satisfying and health-
ful environment.

I welcome and salute the lead that our
young people are taking in this great en-
deavor.

Long before America was powerful or
wealthy, we were already looked to for
leadership in demonstrating the possibilities
of a vigorous, free society. By the time of the
Constitutional Convention this country had
captured the world's imagination and stood
high in international esteem, not for its ma-
terial wealth, but for its ideals.

Today as nations around the globe strive to
enhance the lives of their citizens, the effort
directed toward a cleaner and healthier en-
vii'onment is a vital measure of a country's
stature.

This is a hopeful sign that the productive
pursuits of peace are coming gradually to
command increasing attention in the dis-
course and competition among nations. In
the 197th year of American Independence,
the quality of life enjoyed by our citizens
has become a new sign to the world of our
progress as a people.

I am reminded of Benjamin Franklin's
remark at the Constitutional Convention in

312

Department of State Bulletin

Philadelphia, when he pointed to the golden
half -sun engraved on the back of General
Washington's chair: "Now at length I have
the happiness to know that it is a rising
and not a setting sun."

Richard Nixon.

The White House, August 7, 1972.

EXCERPT FROM REPORT

Chapter 3: International Aspects
OF Environmental Quality

According to a Swedish report presented to the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment in June, most of the sulfur emissions from
Swedish industries are carried abroad, while Swe-
den's rivers, forests, and property are being damaged
by "acid rains" from the sulfur emissions of British,
German and other nations' industries. Two months
before, the United States and Canada agreed on a
wide range of actions to control pollution of the
Great Lakes, which span their common border.
Earlier, in February, 12 European nations signed
the Oslo Convention, aimed at curbing ocean dump-
ing in the Northeast Atlantic and the North Sea.
These recent events well illustrate that many en-
vironmental problems override international borders,
that pollution from one country may affect another,
and that the collective pollution from many nations
may jeopardize important common resources such
as the oceans and the atmosphere. Extended dis-
cussions at the U.N. conference vividly pointed out
that a nation's domestic pollution cleanup program
may affect international commerce and that pollu-
tion control measures may alter the demand for
natural resources domestically and internationally.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The
first reviews significant international activities of
the past year. The second discusses pollution of the
oceans — a major pollution issue of international
scope. The third section analyzes environmental
standards and their effects on national economies and
international trade. The last section addresses a
number of wildlife issues of international interest.

Major Developments of the Past Year

The past year was a landmark year for interna-
tional cooperation in attacking environmental prob-
lems. The Stockholm conference was the first meet-
ing of almost all of the world's nations — both de-
veloped and developing- — to agree on common prin-
ciples and to establish international mechanisms for
global environmental improvement. In addition to

its major role in the conference, the United States
pushed ahead with two major bilateral environmental
agreements — with Canada and with the Soviet
Union. This section highlights these and several
other key international accomplishments of the past
year.

The U.N. Conference on the Human Environment

At the June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Conference in Stock-
holm, representatives of 113 nations — encompassing
most of the world's people — joined in meetings that
mirrored the complexities of winning worldwide
consensus on all aspects of environmental protection.
More important, the conference produced some con-
crete first steps in institutionalizing international
concerns and in coming to grips with several major
substantive issues of worldwide concern. It achieved
nearly every goal established for it in the prepara-
tory papers and meetings, including almost all the
U.S. proposals. The U.S. delegation, led by Russell E.
Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality, included delegates from the executive
branch, the Congress, the States, and the private
sector. The conference agreed on the following
major points:

• A new permanent organization will he estab-
lished within the United Nations to coordinate
international environmental activities. The new
Environmental Secretariat will be headed by an
Executive Director with a small staff of about 30
to 50 persons. It will be supported by a Governing
Council, composed of representatives of 54 nations,
which will report to the General Assembly through
the Economic and Social Council.

• A U.N. environmental fund, financed by volun-
tary contributions from member governments, will
be established. This fund was initially proposed by
President Nixon in his Environmental Message to
the Congress on February 8, 1972.'^ It will be used
to finance the major projects of the new U.N. En-
vironmental Secretariat, such as the worldwide
monitoring network approved by the conference.
The initial goal for the fund is $100 million over
the first 5 years. The United States is prepared to
commit $40 million over this period on a matching
basis, subject to Congressional appropriation. Other
countries have already indicated that they will also
contribute to the fund.

• The conference endorsed completion of a con-
vention to control ocean dumping of shore-generated
wastes. Such a convention was called for by Presi-
dent Nixon in his 1971 Environmental Message ° and
when he submitted domestic ocean dumping legisla-
tion to the Congress. The conference agreed to re-

" For excerpts from the message, see Bulletin
of Mar. 6, 1972, p. 301.
" For excerpts, see Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1971, p. 253.

September 18, 1972

313

fer the draft prepared in April and May of this year
to the U.N. Seabed Committee July-August session
for information and comment. It also called upon
interested governments to convene a conference be-
fore November 1972 to negotiate a convention for
signature before the end of the year. This confer-
ence would be convened by the United Kingdom in
consultation with the Secretary General of the
United Nations.

• The conference urged that the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) adopt a 10-year mora-
torium on commercial whaling. The conference also
recommended that the IWC be strengthened and
that international research efforts be increased. This
moratorium was rejected by a 6-to-4 vote (with four
abstentions) by the IWC at its meeting in London
on June 26-30. The United States, which had pro-
posed the moratorium, cast one of the four favorable
votes. Although the moratorium was rejected, the
Stockholm recommendation and the firm U.S. posi-
tion made it possible to secure significant reductions
in quotas and improvements in the IWC and its pro-
cedures.

• The conference approved the Earthivatch Pro-
gram— a coordinated plan to use and expand existing
monitoring systems to measure pollution levels
around the world and their effects on climate. As
part of this program, a network of 110 monitoring
stations will be set up throughout the world under
the auspices of the U.N. World Meteorological Or-
ganization (WMO). The network will monitor
changes in the earth's climate and will chart levels of
air pollution. It will include 10 "baseline" stations in
remote areas to contrast the air quality there and
in developed areas. The Earthwatch Program also
includes plans to monitor the oceans, radioactive
wastes, food contamination, and changes in the
numbers of plants and animals which might indi-
cate hazardous conditions in the environment.

• The conference etidorsed proposals for conser-
vation conventions:

• The World Heritage Trust Convention was
proposed by President Nixon in his Environmental
Message of February 8, 1971. It is based on the
concept that some areas of the world are of such
unique natural, historical, or cultural value that
they are part of the heritage of all mankind and
should be given special recognition and protection.
The Stockholm conference endorsed the draft con-
vention developed under UNESCO [United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation] auspices and invited governments to com-
plete work on it "with a view to adoption" at the
next general session of UNESCO to be held in
Paris this fall.

• The Endangered Species Convention is de-
signed to protect species of plants and animals
threatened with extinction. It would impose strict
controls on the export, import, and transnational
shipment of endangered species. It was endorsed

in principle by the conference, with the recommen-
dation that an international conference be held
as soon as possible to adopt a convention.

• The conference adopted a 26-point declaration
of environmental principles calling for commitments
by countries to deal with environmental problems of
international significance. An example is Principle
21, which declares that states have "the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other states or areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."

• The conference adopted a recommendation call-
ing for coinpensatioyi by the developed countries to
the less-developed countries for trade damages stem-
ming from environmental factors. The United States
voted against this proposal, pointing out that many
forces affect export earnings and that to single out
any of these, such as environmental actions, for
compensatory treatment is wrong in principle and
would create a disincentive for environmental im-
provement.

Although most of the Stockholm recommendations
require further action by the U.N. General Assem-
bly, the proposed U.N. Environmental Secretariat,
or other international bodies, the conference for the
first time provided a forum for almost all the na-
tions of the world to deal with a broad range of en-
vironmental problems. Considering the diversity of
goals, political systems, and stages of development
of the nations at the conference, the success in reach-
ing consensus on so many issues was significant.

OECD Guidelines

Recognizing that environmental measures can
have important economic implications, the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) — composed of Japan, Australia, and the in-
dustrialized nations of Western Europe and North
America — asked the Environment Committee that
it formed in 1970 to suggest ways to minimize the
impacts of environmental protection measures on
international trade. Based on committee recommen-
dations, the OECD Council at its ministerial meeting
in May 1972 adopted a set of guiding principles on
the international economic aspects of environmental
policies.' These principles, reprinted as Appendix
1 to this chapter, follow the general recommenda-
tions made in July 1971 by the President's Com-
mission on International Trade and Investment
Policy.

The OECD guidelines espouse the "polluter pays"
principle, which states that the cost of pollution
controls should be reflected in the costs of making
products the use or production of which causes
pollution. Under this principle some portion of the
environmental protection cost is ultimately borne

' For text, see Bulletin of June 19, 1972, p. 837.

314

Department of State Bulletin

by the consumer of the product. The guidelines also
include another important principle — that govern-
ments should frame their environmental protection
measures in a way that avoids creating nontariff bar-
riers to trade. The guidelines further urge harmoni-
zation of national environmental standards when
reasons for differences do not exist — an issue that is
explored later in this chapter.

IMCO's Efforts To Control Pollution From Ships

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO), a U.N. specialized agency, is
the primary institution through which the maritime
nations reach agreement on controlling pollution
from ships. It has continued its efforts to prevent
and reduce oil pollution from tanker collisions,
groundings, and intentional discharges of oily ballast
and bilge water. In October 1971, IMCO adopted
standards to reduce oil outflow from tanks ruptured
in vessel casualties. In May 1972, the President sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and consent con-
vention provisions to implement these standards.

In December 1971, the United States and a num-
ber of other nations agreed to compensate victims
damaged by oil spills by establishing a compensation
fund supported by contributions from oil cargo re-
ceivers. This convention was also developed by
IMCO.

In October 1971, IMCO resolved to make the com-
plete elimination of intentional pollution from oil
and noxious substances and the minimization of ac-
cidental spills the main objectives of its 1973 Con-
ference on Marine Pollution. Through IMCO's Sub-
committee on Marine Pollution, the United States
is helping to develop a new international convention
to replace the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil. The new convention's
goal will be to eliminate intentional discharges of
oil and hazardous substances from ships by 1975, if
possible, or at the latest, by the end of the decade.
This goal was first proposed by the United States
at a meeting of NATO's Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society in late 1970.

Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
(CCMS)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's CCMS,
established in 1969 at the President's recommenda-
tion, has extended its multilateral "pilot project"
approach to a number of environmental programs.
In the field of air quality, for example, with the
United States as the pilot country, CCMS adopted
a resolution for NATO nations to use a systems ap-
proach to develop air quality management programs.
In addition, it has published air quality criteria doc-
uments for sulfur oxides and particulates and plans
to publish additional documents on carbon monoxide,
nitrogen oxides, and photochemical oxidants. This
is the first time an international body has been able
to agree on publication of such criteria. The com-

mittee is planning a second international conference
on advanced low-pollution engines for motor vehicles.

In the field of water quality, a Canadian-led proj-
ect is developing a model approach to dealing with
water quality in an interjurisdictional setting. Using
the St. John's River Basin on the U.S. -Canadian
border between Maine and New Brunswick, the proj-
ect will establish a cooperative program involving
Provincial, State, and local governments. A confer-
ence on the problems of cooperation in an interna-
tional river basin will be held this fall in Maine. A
British-led project on advanced sewage treatment
has been built around a demonstration plant using
the advanced physical-chemical treatment process.
Germany and France are undertaking a similar pro-
gram employing the pure oxygen process. In ad-
dition, a program is underway to model pollution in
the North Sea in connection with the CCMS ocean
pollution project. Led by Belgium, the project is al-
so overseeing implementation of its goal of ending
deliberate oil discharges by the end of the decade.
This was the goal adopted as the basis for a con-
vention being prepared by IMCO.

CCMS is expanding its environmental efforts be-
yond pollution control. For example, a French-led
project is examining various approaches to land use
planning as it relates to environmental quality, with
recommendations expected at the end of this,
year. And the Committee is considering the possible
establishment of an International Cities Institute to
deal with common urban problems on a systems
basis.

U .S. Bilateral Actions

The United States entered into two unprecedented
bilateral agreements in 1972: An agreement with
Canada to restore and protect the Great Lakes and
an agreement with the Soviet Union on a broad
range of environmental concerns. In addition, the
United States recently agreed with Mexico to take
new steps to protect the quality of the water in the
Colorado River as it flows from the United States
into Mexico.

United States-Canadian Great Lakes Water Quali-
ty Agreement — The United States-Canadian Great
Lakes Water Quality Aerreement signed by Presi-
dent Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau on April
15, 1972, in Ottawa was a major bilateral action to
address a common environmental problem.

Pollution of the Great Lakes, especially Lake Erie,
has been a matter of intense United States and Ca-
nadian concern. The lakes are not just a critical
natural resource but are also a center of commercial
and industrial activity for both nations. Because the
international boundary passes through four of the
five lakes and through the three connecting channels,
pollution of these waters cannot be abated success-
fully except by cooperative action.

The basic U.S. -Canadian agreement on the Great
Lakes is articulated in the Boundary Waters Treaty

September 18, 1972

315

approved by the U.S. Senate in 1909. In 1964, the
two governments asked the International Joint
Commission (IJC), a joint U.S.-Canadian organiza-
tion established under the 1909 Treaty, to investigate
and report on the condition of the waters in Lake
Erie, Lake Ontario, and the international section of
the St. Lawrence River and to recommend actions to
improve water quality. The IJC submitted its final
report to the governments in 1970, urging specific
joint action. The report and its recommendations
were reviewed by a U.S.-Canadian joint working
group composed of Federal, State, and Provincial
agency representatives. It reported its conclusions
to a ministerial level meeting in Washington on June
10, 1971. The United States and Canada then ne-
gotiated and concluded the agreement.

The agreement calls on the United States and
Canada to adopt both general and specific water
quality objectives. The general objectives are de-
scribed in terms of five freedoms: freedom from
toxic substances; freedom from nutrients in quan-
tities which stimulate growth of unsightly weeds and
algae (accelerated eutrophication); freedom from
oil, floating debris, scum and other floating materials;
freedom from material producing odor, color, or
other nuisance conditions; and freedom from ob-
jectionable sludge deposits.

The agreement prescribes as specific objectives
maximum ambient concentrations for specific pollut-
ants and maximum loadings for phosphorous. U.S.
and Canadian water quality standards and regula-
tory requirements must conform to these objectives,
which in some cases are stricter than existing Fed-
eral-State water quality standards. The IJC is
charged with monitoring both U.S. and Canadian
progress in fulfilling the goals of the agreement.

The two governments agreed that by December 31,
1975, certain programs and measures either will
have been completed or will be in process. However,
control of pollution in the Great Lakes will be a con-
tinuing demand on both nations long after that.
New programs will be implemented and old ones re-
vised as necessary.

The cost of preventing and cleaning up pollution
in the Great Lakes is influenced by increasing popu-
lation, industrial growth, intensified agriculture, and
many other factors. Accordingly, no one sum may be
given as the cost to clean up the lakes. The United
States will furnish funds to construct municipal
waste treatment plants and to help finance State
water pollution control programs on the Great Lakes.
This year approximately $400 million of Federal,
State, and local funding will be provided for the
Great Lakes treatment program. New water pollu-
tion legislation, now being considered by the Con-
gress, would permit expanded construction and a
more intensified enforcement program.

The Enviroyimental Protection Agreement Be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union — On
May 23, 1972, President Nixon and President Pod-

gorny signed an agreement on environmental mat-
ters that is significant both environmentally and
politically. The agreement not only is a potential
model of how two nations can work together to un-
derstand and protect the environment, but it also
strengthens cooperative eff'orts between two of the
world's great powers.

The two countries have agreed to work together in
11 problem areas ranging from air and water
pollution and the urban environment to the influence
of environmental change on climate, earthquake
prediction, and arctic and subarctic ecological sys-
tems. The scope of the agreement reflects the fact
that the United States and the Soviet Union, both
industrial nations with large and diverse land areas,
experience almost every type of environmental prob-
lem. It goes far beyond past arrangements between
the United States and Russia for exchanging visits
and research information. It calls explicitly for joint
action programs and active cooperation on specific
projects.

Although early eff'orts will focus on the 11 speci-
fic areas, the agreement envisions great flexibility in
extending programs to other areas. The long-term
nature of environmental problems is reflected in the
5-year term of the agreement, which will continue
to be extended for successive 5-year periods unless
one party wishes to stop. The full text of^the agree-
ment is reproduced as Appendix 2 of this chapter.
United States-Mexican Communique on Salinity —
In a further move toward environmental accord with
an immediate neighbor, the United States has ini-
tiated new steps to deal with Colorado River salinity
that Mexico has determined damages agriculture in
its Mexicali Valley. In a joint communique issued on
June 17, 1972, with visiting Mexican President
Echeverria, President Nixon announced that the
United States will take several immediate measures
to reduce salinity and that he will appoint a special
representative to investigate the entire problem in
order to propose by the end of 1972 a definitive solu-
tion for the approval of the U.S. Government.'

In the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty, the United
States agreed to deliver annually 1.5 million acre-
feet of Colorado River water, which might come
"from any and all sources," without mention of qual-
ity. However, after the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation
and Drainage District began a pumped drainage
operation in 1961 in southwestern Arizona, Mexican
farmers complained of an increase in the concen-
tration of salts, the Mexican Government contending
that the water was too saline to be acceptable under
the Treaty and was contaminated contrary to inter-
national law. The United States took measures at
once to reduce the salinity. In a 1965 agreement with
Mexico, the United States agreed to take further
measures to upgrade the river's quality, which was

° For text of the communique, see Bulletin of
July 10, 1972, p. 66.

316

Department of Stale Bulletin

done at a cost of $12 million. However, the Mexican
Government complained that despite the remedial
measures taken, the salinity of the Colorado River
in Mexico is still too high for proper agricultural
use and that the disparity is too great between the
quality of its water and that used by major water
users in the United States near the border.

The June 1972 communique, in addition to deal-
ing with the issue of Colorado River salinity, con-
tained an agreement by the two Presidents to have
policy-level officials from the United States and
Mexico meet regularly to discuss other environ-
mental problems of mutual concern and methods
for dealing with them more systematically.

Pollution of the Oceans

Many pollutants eventually end up in the world's
oceans. They are carried there by the winds and
wash in with rain or snow, and they flow from the
rivers or outfalls which drain the land. The dump-
ing of dredge spoils and other wastes in the oceans
and discharges of oil and other hazardous substances
from ships are further pathways that pollutants fol-
low into the marine environment.

Sometimes no immediately visible problems arise
from man's use of the oceans as a common dumping
ground. Often the oceans seem capable of forever
diluting and rendering harmless the wastes pouring
into it. There is disturbing evidence, however, that
the waters of the open ocean — and especially the bio-
logically rich coastal waters and estuaries — are be-
coming more and more polluted.

At times marine pollution appears principally as
a national problem, as when the coast of a particular
country becomes polluted. At other times the prob-
lem is regional, as with the pollution of the Baltic,
Black, Mediterranean, and North Seas. But in the
final analysis, marine pollution is fundamentally an
international concern. The seas play a vital role in
maintaining the world's environment, making a home
for a rich variety of life, contributing to the oxygen-
carbon dioxide balance in the atmosphere, altering
global climate, and providing the base for the world's
hydrologic system. Marine resources are economi-
cally vital to man. And because they are used by
mankind as a whole, national and international ac-
tion to protect them becomes mandatory.

We do not know as much as we should about the
dimensions and severity of marine pollution. We do
not fully understand the pathways of pollutants in
the marine environment and the rate at which they
are removed or assimilated. Further, we have only
limited data on the harm caused by pollution, espe-
cially that resulting from long-term exposure to
potentially harmful substances in small concentra-
tions. For this reason, it is extremely important that
much more research and monitoring be undertaken
for accurately measuring the degree of marine pol-
lution that we now have, to discover its routes, and

to chart the long-term hazards inherent in current
and even greater levels of pollution. At the same
time, protective actions can and should be taken
now. One of the principles outlined in the Declara-
tion on the Human Environment, adopted at the
U.N. Conference in Stockholm, deals with national
responsibilities to prevent pollution of the oceans. It
provides that:

States shall take all possible steps to prevent
pollution of the seas by substances that are liable
to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or
to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

Marine Pollution From the Atmosphere

Many pollutants enter the seas by way of the
atmosphere. It is estimated, for example, that more
than 90 percent of the petroleum polluting the
oceans each year comes not from tanker breakups
or other disasters but from the vaporization of gas-
oline and other petroleum products ashore." The
washout of heavy metals and synthetic organic chem-
icals from the atmosphere is also important. Lead
and DDT inputs into the marine environment from
the atmosphere may be as large as or larger than
inputs from rivers.'"

Pollutants can persist in the atmosphere for vary-
ing lengths of time, and some drift over great dis-
tances. Sulfur dioxide, for example, has an average
lifetime of 2 or 3 days in the atmosphere before
dropping out in precipitation. There is evidence that
during this period it can travel hundreds of miles
from its original source. Nitrogen oxides, water
vapor, and particulate matter discharged into the
stratosphere by high-flying aircraft can stay aloft
for at least a year and can be dispersed over great
distances."

Although marine pollution is an international prob-
lem, the first line of defense is national. There are no
international mechanisms for controlling air pollu-
tion from individual countries, and it seems unlikely
that such mechanisms are forthcoming in the near
future. Existing international organizations have
no enforcement powers. They can merely encourage
member nations to develop their own air quality

"Ocean Science Committee of the NAS-NRC
Ocean Affairs Board, Marine Environmental Quali-
ty, pp. 7-8 (1971). [Footnote in original.]

"/fefrf.,- Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
Royal Ministry of Agriculture, Air Pollution Across
National Boundaries: The Impact on the Environ-
ment of Sulfur in Air and Precipitation, Sweden's
Case Study for the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment (1971). [Footnote in origi-
nal.]

" The Study of Critical Environmental Problems
(MIT), Man's Impact on the Global Environment,
pp. 58-59, 68 (1970). [Footnote in original.]

September 18, 1972

317

standards to curb the pollutants that they discharge
into the air. This situation argues for strong na-
tional legislation, standard setting, and enforce-
ment— with international effects taken into consider-
ation. Otherwise, marine pollution from all sources,
including the atmosphere, will continue to worsen
in the years ahead.

Pollution From Rivers

Pollution from rivers — from municipalities, in-
dustries, and land runoff — is the principal route by
which most pollutants reach the oceans. River banks
are the site of heavy industrial and municipal con-
centrations whose effluents often are insufficiently
treated before they are discharged. Land runoff
pours nutrients, pesticides, and organic wastes into
the rivers, which eventually flow into the oceans.
There the pollutants that they carry are joined by
pollutants from other rivers and ocean outfalls.

As in the case of pollution from atmospheric
sources, pollution from land runoff is essentially a
problem to be solved at the national level. Some
countries already have taken important actions to
clean up their rivers. These actions benefit estuaries,
coastal regions, and the open sea. The United States,
for example, has Federal-State water quality stand-
ards, which are enforced by regulating industrial and
municipal effluents. Funds are made available to
localities to build sewage treatment facilities. Com-
prehensive new water quality legislation remains to
be hammered out in a Congressional conference com-
mittee."^

A dramatic example of a new national effort can
be seen in Britain, where a massive campaign to
fight water pollution was announced early this
year. Britain will spend some $3.8 billion over
the next 5 years — nearly 50 percent more than it
spent during the last 5 years — to clean up over
2,000 miles of seriously polluted rivers.

CCMS has launched river basin studies," and other
international organizations, such as the U.N. Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (ECE), are seeking
ways to reduce water pollution within Eastern and
Western Europe. OECD has agreed to undertake
a pilot study of coastal degradation and pollution in
the Mediterranean. On the national level, many
governments have plans to clean up their rivers with
better sewage treatment.

"=8. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). [Footnote
in original.]

" Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society,
Inland Water Pollution Project, NATO Document
AC/274-D/11, Apr. 13, 1971; Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society, "Summary Record
of a Meeting held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
Sept. 8-10, 1971," NATO Document AC/274-D/8,
Feb. 11, 1972. [Footnote in original.]

But marine pollution from rivers also lends it-
self to regional solutions. Certain areas — the Baltic,
Black, and North Seas, for example — are seriously
polluted and demand cooperation between nations
whose rivers drain into them. The recently concluded
agreement between the United States and Canada to
clean up the waters of the Great Lakes furnishes a
model for this kind of cooperation.

Ocean Dumping

The dumping of wastes at sea — dredge spoils, in-
dustrial wastes, sewage sludge, and solid wastes — is
only a part of a broad problem of marine pollution.
But it is one which requires national and interna-
tional action before the practice gets out of hand.
The United States has moved to curb marine pollu-
tion through domestic legislation to regulate ocean
dumping of shore-generated wastes. The legislation
has passed both the Senate and the House and has
been reported out by a conference committee."

The United States has also been working with
other nations on an international convention to con-
trol ocean dumping. The convention would only allow
dumping in accordance with a permit system ad-
ministered by national authorities.

The U.N. Conference at Stockholm urged a special
meeting before November 1972 to ready the conven-
tion for signature by the end of the year. In the
meantime, the Oslo Convention, an important re-
gional convention signed in February 1972 by 12
European countries, will help to end dumping of
hazardous wastes by ships and planes in the North-
east Atlantic and the North Sea.

Ongoing efforts to achieve a worldwide ocean
dumping convention illustrate the technical and
political difficulties that may beset efforts to shape
international environmental agreements. It has been
difficult to reach agreement on which toxic sub-
stances should be banned altogether from dumping.
There has also been disagreement on how to handle
contaminants such as mercury, which may be pres-
ent in trace amounts in dredge spoils and municipal
wastes. At the present time, there is no international
body with sufficient technical expertise to set toler-
ance levels for such trace pollutants or to oversee
a system of dumping permits for materials that
exceed agreed-upon tolerances. The United States
has therefore proposed that a U.N. body, the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
develop this kind of technical and administrative
capability. Preliminary work in this area has been
initiated by the Joint Group of Experts on the
Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, a special or-
ganization affiliated with the United Nations.

"H.R. 9727, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). [Footnote
in original.]

318

Department of State Bulletin

Pollution From Ships

Shipboard discharges of oil, garbage, and other
wastes into the seas is a growing problem. Oil is
particularly vexing because a small amount spread
over wide reaches of ocean may well cause serious
environmental damage. Discharges from ships can
also severely contaminate waters in ports, bays,
and ship channels and along coasts. Thus, pollution
from shipping is another problem with both inter-
national and national overtones and one for which
international action is particularly crucial.

The recent work of the United States and other
nations through IMCO to control pollution from
ships was described in the first section of this Chap-
ter. Another approach to marine pollution, adopted
by Canada, is the unilateral establishment of a pollu-
tion control zone at sea. Canada has claimed a 100-
mile zone of this kind in the area above 60° N.
latitude, arguing that the Arctic region is in need
of special protection from oil and other spills be-
cause the intense cold causes pollutants to persist
for a long time. The United States has taken the
position that such zones go well beyond the tra-
ditional breadth of the territorial sea, have no sanc-
tion in international law, and are not the best way
to control ocean pollution effectively because they
involve fragmented unilateral actions rather than
internationally agreed upon arrangements. The issue
of pollution control zones will be a major item of
interest for participants in the U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference planned for 1973.

International Uniformity of Pollution
Control Standards

The new water pollution control legislation recent-
ly passed by the House of Representatives and the
Senate " directs the President to pursue internation-
al agreements for uniform effluent standards for new
facilities and for toxic and ocean discharges. This
directive raises a broader question of potentially
critical environmental, economic, and political con-
sequences: To what extent should nations through-
out the world make various pollution control stand-
ards uniform ? The question already has been de-
bated vigorously within the Committee on the En-
vironment of the OECD and in other international
forums.

The first consideration is the extent to which uni-
form standards can be justified on an environmental
protection basis. Air quality standards, for example,
can be considered at two diflFerent levels — protection
of health and protection of property, vegetation and

'=See note 12, supra, § 5; see § 7 of S. 2770 as
passed by the House, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
[Footnote in original.]

aesthetic values, as is the case under the Clean Air
Act in the United States.

Except to the extent that people in various geo-
graphical areas may respond substantially different-
ly to a particular ambient concentration of common
pollutants because of variations in altitude, climate,
and the like, uniform minimum air quality standards
to protect public health may have merit. In setting
standards to protect property, vegetation and aes-
thetics, however, each country will tend to weigh
its social, political, and economic values much more
heavily in deciding the level of air quality com-
pared to other national goals.

Water quality standards are based upon the desig-
nation of beneficial uses for specific bodies of water
and portions thereof. The desired uses are likely to
vary to some extent among nations. Water quality
criteria — based on use designations — specify the
concentrations that must be achieved (as in the
case of dissolved oxygen) or must not be exceeded
(as in the case of biochemical oxygen demand). Even
within a nation, such as the United States, where
there are many types of waterways and aquatic pop-
ulations, the criteria to protect a particular use
designation (e.g., fishing, domestic water supply, and
swimming) vary with the peculiarities of the water
body. These factors apparently were recognized in
the pending Senate and House water quality bills,
which do not call for uniform international water
quality standards.

The strongest argument for common air or water
quality standards is made when pollution from one
country crosses into another. Such standards need
be uniform only in the sense that common objectives
are agreed upon in order to protect one nation from
pollution originating in another.

In both existing air quality legislation and pend-
ing water quality legislation at the Federal level in
the United States, there are requirements for new
facilities to meet minimum emission or effluent limits
based on the performance of demonstrated technol-
ogy. These controls are independent of limits based
on ambient air and water quality standards for var-
ious pollutants — frequently mandating higher levels
of abatement than such standards would require. The
rationale in both cases is that advanced pollution
control technology can be most economically em-
ployed in new facilities in order to prevent future
growth from degrading environmental quality.
There may well be merit in such a technologically
based control strategy for new facilities on an in-
ternational basis. The actual level of technology
might vary among nations according to such relevant
factors as the rate, nature, and concentration of
growth.

It does not make sense from an environmental
standpoint, however, to demand the same degree of
emission control internationally on all new automo-

September 18, 1972

319

biles. For example, some nations do not need stand-
ards as stiff as the United States with its large and
concentrated automobile and urban populations.

Toxic pollutants in both air and water are suffi-
ciently dangerous to health and environment in al-
most any quantities to warrant controls that prevent
or at least minimize their release into the environ-
ment rather than setting a tolerable ambient con-
centration in air or water. Thus, like new facilities,
toxic emissions and effluents appear amenable to uni-
form international standards. Similarly, all dis-
charges into the oceans — shared resources for all
mankind — ought logically to be governed by uni-
formly accepted principles and criteria. This ap-
proach has been adopted by the United States in
seeking an international convention on ocean dump-
ing."

In the case of pesticides, the desirability of uni-
form standards hinges largely on the type of
pesticide under consideration. Persistent pesticides
such as DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons
can have effects throughout the world. Because of
their long life and nondegradability, these pesticides
tend to accumulate in the oceans and in animal and
plant life, where their concentrations are magnified.
In view of their widespread impact, it appears that
persistent pesticide use should be confined to health
protection or other essential uses for which no fea-
sible alternative is available. With nonpersistent
pesticides, different ecological systems, food chains,
application practices, and other factors probably
warrant substantial latitude for controls among dif-
ferent nations. The use of such pesticides particu-
larly involves a weighing of benefits and risks, such
as the prevalence or absence of a pest-carried dis-
ease problem (malaria, for instance) and the need
to assure an adequate food supply.

As shown, many factors must be considered in
assessing the desirability- — scientifically and environ-
mentally— of international as compared to national
controls over pollution. Even when uniform inter-
national environmental protection standards can be
justified on purely scientific grounds, there are sub-
stantial social and political constraints. Individual
countries differ tremendously in their priorities,
stage of economic and technological development,
and cultural values. Although it would be short-
sighted for any nation to pursue industrial develop-
ment and ignore the inevitable side effects of pollu-
tion, the exact degree of environmental controls will
vary from one nation to another. The factors that
will decide this include the nation's stage of eco-
nomic development, its need for industrial expansion,
and its difficulty in attracting industries.

A nation with an extremely low standard of living
and the need to build a strong industrial and com-

" "Report of the Intergovernmental Meeting on
Ocean Dumping," adopted at London, England, May
31, 1972. [Footnote in original.]

mercial base may be more tolerant of environmental
abuses than a more highly developed nation. More-
over, nations with relatively limited resources may
decide that basic health care services or education,
and not the environment, has the highest priority.

To some extent, a less-developed country might
seek to justify becoming a pollution haven because
it desperately needs the jobs that foreign invest-
ment would bring. It might set low environmental
standards designed to attract industrial investment.
It might further argue that setting weak standards
is fully within its prerogatives as a sovereign nation
and that so long as its pollution does not cross
national frontiers or unduly contaminate global air
and water resources, its actions are beyond reproach.
But in the long term, it is doubtful that such a
country's overall economic development would be
helped. While the immediate economic benefits of
unregulated industrialization could temporarily
speed its development, the heavy social cost in in-
creased diseases, mortality, and degradation of re-
sources could slow down development over the long
run. If development continued unchecked, it would
be only a matter of time before a less-developed
nation became so polluted that it would be forced
to adopt, however belatedly, environmental meas-
ures similar to those of developed nations. But by
then, irreparable physical, social, and economic harm
might already have been done. Firms in such coun-
tries that developed markets based on production
without pollution control might have trouble adapt-
ing to new standards. Such transitional problems
could hamper development further.

The environmental and economic hazards of a
nation's adopting lax pollution control standards
are real, but they do not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that uniform standards are needed. In-
ternational uniformity of pollution control standards
has the most validity in certain areas — toxic pol-
lutants, persistent pesticides, controls on new facili-
ties. Uniform air quality standards to protect health
may also have merit.

But it may be much more useful and feasible to
concentrate primarily on the development of uni-
form— and more important, comprehensive — inter-
national criteria for environmental protection stand-
ards. Such criteria would assimilate the best avail-
able scientific data on the environmental and health
dangers of various pollutants at different levels of
concentration in the environment. The World Health
Organization and CCMS have already done work to
develop and publish such criteria.

International criteria, along with informational
guidelines on available control technologies and
their performances, could serve as the basic under-
pinning for appropriate standards in individual na-
tions. And if some form of international standards
were deemed desirable at a future time, the criteria
would provide a scientific basis for their develop-
ment.

320

Department of State Bulletin

International Economic Effects of
Environmental Controls

Practically all measures to maintain and improve
the environment have an economic impact. There
are a number of specific issues that bear directly
on international trade and investment and that,
unless resolved satisfactorily, could damage inter-
national economic relations and set back efforts to
improve the environment. The issues include how to
prevent pollution controls and their costs from dis-
torting international trade, what policy to adopt
toward the movement of capital investment to pol-
lution havens, how to reconcile real and imagined
conflicts between environmental imperatives and eco-
nomic development, and how to avoid damaging the
export markets of less-developed countries (LDC's)
with environmental programs of developed countries.

Effects on Trade

Some industrialists worry that firms subject to
strict environmental standards will be put at a com-
petitive disadvantage with foreign competitors that
are not. There is a corresponding concern that non-
tariflf barriers, such as frontier charges and export
subsidies, may be established by nations with high
environmental standards to equalize environmental
costs with trade competitors. Such action could
trigger a series of retaliatory trade actions. Further
consideration of this problem may be found in the
1971 report to the President by the Commission on
International Trade and Investment Policy.

The United States is hopeful that the guiding
principles agreed to in the OECD, which seek to
harmonize to the extent practical the environmental
policies and practices of member countries, will help
avoid or minimize such trade problems.

A significant element of the guidelines is the
"polluter pays" principle, which provides that the
cost of pollution controls should be reflected in the
costs of goods the use or production of which causes
pollution and should not be financed by subsidies.
The guidelines permit certain exceptions to the "pol-
luter pays" principle, particularly for transitional
periods, provided that they do not lead to significant
distortions in international trade and investment.
Adherence to this principle will both contribute to a
more efficient allocation of productive resources and,
by promoting uniform practices for the financing of
pollution control costs, help avoid trade distortions.

The OECD guidelines also address international
differences in environmental standards, discussed
earlier in this chapter. They recognize that even if
all nations follow the "polluter pays" principle, in-
ternational trade distortions may be caused by
widely disparate standards, especially if some coun-
tries become pollution havens — setting inadequate
environmental standards in order to attract indus-
trial investment or to gain a competitive advantage
for their export industries. While recognizing that
in many cases valid reasons exist for differences

among national environmental standards, the OECD
guidelines recommend that whenever appropriate,
governments should harmonize national environ-
mental policies. They also urge worldwide movement
toward effective standards. The guidelines suggest
that harmonization among nations of the timing
and general scope of regulations for specific indus-
tries is particularly appropriate from the standpoint
of preventing trade distortions.

The Environment Committee of the OECD is now
working on a notification and consultation procedure
for member governments to use in consulting with
each other on their observance of the guiding prin-
ciples. Information that American firms can supply
the U.S. Government regarding foreign environ-
mental standards and policies will be useful in such
considerations involving our Government.

It is too early to evaluate how successful these
OECD measures will be in minimizing distortions
of international trade. Although member nations of
the OECD have agreed in principle to follow the
"polluter pays" philosophy and to consult with other
governments in standard setting, putting these con-
cepts into practice will not be easy. The logistics of
international consultation will often be complicated
by domestic demands and legislative requirements.
Some firms may seek exceptions to the "polluter
pays" rule and pressure their governments to relax
the rule for them. Although a certain flexibility in
administering the "polluter pays" principle is nec-
essary, leniency in interpretation and numerous
exceptions will defeat its purposes.

Effects on Development

The economic implications of environmental con-
trols are of particular interest and concern to the
less-developed countries. The LDC's are mainly wor-
ried that their economies will be adversely affected
in two respects: higher development costs caused
by environmental safeguards imposed by donor na-
tions for specific aid projects and programs and
reduced exports of materials for which world de-
mand may be reduced by domestic environmental
controls adopted by developed nations. There were
sharp discussions of these issues in preparatory
meetings for the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment, and the subject was in the
forefront of LDC thinking at the conference.

Over the opposition of almost all aid-donor coun-
tries, the LDC's won approval at Stockholm of a
recommendation calling for an increase in assistance
"adequate to meet the additional environmental re-
quirements" of developed countries. The main basis
for the U.S. vote against this recommendation was
that there is no rationale for singling out environ-
mental protection costs from among others for spe-
cial accounting in giving aid. At U.S. initiative, the
Development Advisory Committee of the OECD has
begun discussions aimed at coordinating donor na-
tion policies on the environmental ramifications of
development aid to the LDC's.

September 18, 1972

321

Developing nations that depend mainly on exports
of primary resources are concerned that the demand
for such resources will be reduced as a result of
actions by developed countries to safeguard the
environment. Thus, LDC's that produce lead and
sulfur, for example, fear that as lead is phased out
of gasolines and paints and as sulfur is recovered
from coal and oil desulfurization processes and from
the stack gas removal of sulfur oxides, the world-
vi'ide demand for these materials will decline.

If recovery and recycling of waste materials be-
come more widespread in industrialized countries,
developing countries are afraid that the rate of
growth in the use of many natural resources, in-
cluding iron ore, timber, and bauxite, will slow
down. To meet this problem, developing countries
believe that the developed countries should be pre-
pared to pay "compensation" to cover any decline
in export earnings that is caused by actions taken
in the developed countries to protect the environ-
ment. A recommendation to this effect was also
adopted at the U.N. conference.

The United States voted against this proposal
because as a matter of principle it opposes com-
pensating countries for declines in their export
earnings for whatever cause and believes that a
commitment to pay such compensation would serve
as a disincentive to environmental controls. How-
ever, the United States made it very clear that it
will take all practical steps in carrying out environ-
mental programs to prevent reduced access to our
markets and will not use environmental concerns as
a pretext for discriminatory trade policies. The
United States also said that it was fully prepared to
deal with any claim that U.S. environmental actions
violated its General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) obligations in accordance with established
GATT procedures.

Conservation of Natural Resources

Although the international aspects of marine pol-
lution are very clear, conservation is often thought
of primarily in a limited national sense — such as
preserving animals and their habitats in a particular
country. However, conservation has a broader mean-
ing. For example, some ocean resources, such as
whales, are international in nature. Certain animal
species such as spotted cats or natural areas such
as the Serengeti Plains of East Africa, found in in-
dividual nations, are resources of interest to all
mankind.

Conservation is not merely a concern of the upper
and middle classes in developed countries — it can
either foster or hinder both the long-term plans of
the LDC's for overall development and a favorable
balance of payments. Tourism from abroad is a
major earner of foreign exchange and occupies an
important position in the economies of some LDC's.

Wild animals in their natural settings are often a
focal point of tourism.

Animals of Special Concern

Whales — Marine mammals, including whales,
dolphins, seals, and polar bears, are increasingly en-
dangered by man's onslaughts. Of these mammals,
some species of whales are probably in the greatest
jeopardy.

Technological developments over the years — such
as ships powered by engines instead of the wind, the
invention of the explosive harpoon gun, and the later
development of fast killer ships, huge factory ships,
radar and sonar, and helicopters — all combined to
increase the efficiency of whale killing greatly.

The effect on whale stocks of this accelerated
killing was predictable. In the peak year of 1930,
almost 30,000 blue whales were killed, out of a total
population estimated at 100,000." By 1964, when the
International Whaling Commission (IWC) prohib-
ited further taking of blue whales by member na-
tions, less than 5 percent of their original estimated
population of 200,000 was left. Along with the blue
whale, four other species — right, bowhead, hump-
back, and gray — have also been overharvested, and
their harvest has also been banned. Some stocks of
four other species of large whales — fin, sei, sperm,
and Bryde's — are significantly depleted but are still
harvested. The population of the fin whale is se-
verely reduced from its estimated original size.
Commercial harvesting of whales is actually no
longer necessary in view of the fact that there are
now substitute raw materials for virtually all prod-
ucts fabricated from whales. Soap, margarine, cos-
metics, machine oil, transmission fluid, fertilizer,
food, and pet food — for which whale products are
used — can easily be made from other substances.
However, some countries still rely rather heavily
on whale meat for human food.

Because of the increased national concern for the
protection of whales, in 1971 the Senate and House
of Representatives both passed resolutions calling
for a 10-year moratorium on the killing of all
whales." On December 2, 1970, the Secretary of the
Interior put eight species of commercially hunted
whales on the Endangered Species List." This action
banned the import of whale products as of December
1971, thus removing about 20 percent of the world's

" Committee for Whaling Statistics, Bureau of
International Whaling Statistics, "International
Whaling Statistics," p. 14 (1964). [Footnote in
original.]

"S.J. Res. 115, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.Con.
Res. 387, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). [Footnote in
original.]

"35 Fed. Reg. 18319 (1970). [Footnote in origi-
nal.]

322

Department of State Bulletin

demand for such products. The last remaining U.S.
whaling operation was terminated as of December
1971, when the Secretary of Commerce announced
that no further licenses for commercial whaling by
U.S. citizens would be granted.

Similar efforts to save whales have not been un-
dertaken by either Japan or the Soviet Union, which
in the 1969-70 season together accounted for 85
percent of the 42,000 whales killed."" The main inter-
national organization concerned with whaling — the
IWC — has not taken effective action in the past to
halt the precipitous decline in whale populations.

Today some species stand on the edge of extinc-
tion. The IWC's approach to protecting endangered
whales has been to try to manage them, on a sus-
tained-yield basis, by setting quotas on takings low
enough to permit depleted populations to recover.
However, the limits set at the June 1971 IWC meet-
ing were unsatisfactorily high. And although it was
agreed that international observers would accom-
pany whaling fleets beginning with 1971-72 Ant-
arctic season, the Russian and Japanese fleets sailed
without any observers.

The United States has advocated a 10-year mora-
torium on all whaling, both to let presently de-
pleted stocks recover and to generate needed scien-
tific data on whales. The U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment endorsed this proposal, calling
upon the IWC to implement it. While pressing for
the moratorium, the United States also strength-
ened its participation in the IWC. In April 1972, the
President appointed the Chairman of the Council
on Environmental Quality as his special representa-
tive to the IWC and urged other governments to
take steps to buttress the work of the Commission.

At the IWC meeting in June 1972, the Commission
rejected the proposed moratorium by a 6-to-4 vote,
with four abstentions. However, it agreed to signifi-
cant reductions, from 8 to 38 percent, in the 1973
quotas for catches of fin, sei, and sperm whales in
the North Pacific and Antarctic Oceans. It also
extended the current ban on hunting humpback and
blue whales. Other seriously threatened whales —
the bowhead, right, and gray whales — continue to
receive protection as well. For the first time, the
IWC agreed to set quotas by individual species,
stocks, and in some cases, by sex, to permit man-
agement tailored to specific problems. Further, the
Commission agreed in principle to expand its $16,000
annual budget to about $100,000 and to initiate ac-
tion for an International Decade of Whale Research.
The Soviet Union and Japan agreed to allow inter-
national observers on their ships to check for com-
pliance with quotas and other IWC regulations.

Other Marine Mammals — Tuna fishermen have

long known that dolphins and certain species of
tuna often travel together, apparently in some kind
of feeding association. When tuna were only taken
by long lines or by poling, there was little danger
that dolphins would be caught inadvertently. But in
the last decade, tuna fishermen have turned to using
huge purse seine nets. Although these nets do catch
more tuna, in tuna fishing by U.S. fishermen in the
Pacific, it is estimated that from 100,000 to 900,000
porpoises are accidentally drowned each year when
trapped in tuna nets. In addition, some countries,
notably Japan, hunt dolphins and porpoises com-
mercially, principally for human consumption. The
result has been a marked reduction in the number
of porpoise schools, and some types of porpoise may
soon face severe depletion unless they are protected.
Although no solution to this problem has been devel-
oped to date, efforts are now underway to perfect
new fishing methods, including new types of tuna
nets which will kill fewer dolphins.

An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 polar bears now
live in the Arctic region.'' The extent of recent
hunting — estimated at about 1,300 animals in 1969 '^
— has caused concern that annual kills may be too
high. Because these bears live part of the time on
pack ice which is on the high seas, their conserva-
tion requires international agreement among the
five governments on whose land or waters polar
bears are found: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the
United States, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union has banned sport hunting of polar bears for
some years, both on its soil and on the high seas,
and some limited regulations to protect polar bears
domestically are already in effect in the other four
countries. But international agreement is necessary
to fully protect bears on the high seas.

In the fall of 1971, the United States sounded out
the four other governments on the possibility of
negotiating a convention to conserve polar bears. It
was hoped that this could be done in time for signa-
ture at the June 1972 U.N. conference. But the effort
was delayed because of the claim by some of these
countries that more scientific data on polar bears
must first be collected. New information has been
developed and made available to governments by
the International Union for Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources. Based on this information,
a polar bear convention may be developed by these
five nations in the coming year.

Existing international law does not protect or
regulate wildlife on the Antarctic high seas or on

-" International Commission on Whaling, "21st
Report of the Commission," London (June 1970).
[Footnote in original.]

-'■ Survival Service Commission, "Notes of the 3d
Meeting of the Polar Bear Specialist Group of the
Survival Service Commission of the I. U.C.N."
Morges, Switzerland, Feb. 7-10, 1972. [Footnote in
original.]

'^ Ibid. [Footnote in original.]

September 18, 1972

323

the pack ice. Consequently, this area is open to
sealing by any nation. The Norwegians took about
1,000 seals there in 1964,-' and they and several
other nations are reportedly considering commercial
operations in 1973. The United States has taken
the lead in developing a convention to protect Ant-
arctic seals at a conference in London in February
1972, and it was signed by the United States and
other nations in June.

The convention completely protects three species
of seals, sets low limits on three others, and estab-
lishes closed seasons and bans harvesting in certain
areas. While the convention allows harvest of some
seals in the Antarctic, it establishes conservation
measures where none now exists.

Spotted Cats — The United States has also moved
to protect another threatened group of animals —
spotted cats. The continued killing of these cats for
their fur led the Secretary of the Interior in March
1972 to place several additional species of spotted
cats that are threatened with worldwide extinction
on the Endangered Species List.=' These cats, their
parts, or products made from them are allowed into
the United States only for scientific, zoological, and
related purposes. The animals involved are the
cheetah, ocelot, margay, tiger cat, leopard, tiger,
snow leopard, and jaguar.

By effectively removing sales of furs made from
these creatures from the American market, the eco-
nomic incentive to hunt them is greatly reduced.

Endangered Species Convention

The United States and many other nations are
working to set up a meeting to draft an Endangered
Species Convention to protect plant and animal
species threatened with extinction. The Convention,
endorsed at the Stockholm conference, will impose
strict control on the export, import, and trans-
national shipment of these species. It will both cor-
rect the present overexploitation of endangered
species and prevent other plants and animals from
being decimated to the point at which they are offi-
cially considered to be endangered.

World Heritage Trust

In his 1971 Environmental Message, President
Nixon indicated that it would be fitting for all na-
tions to agree to the principle that some areas of
the world are of such unique natural, historical, or
cultural value that they are part of the heritage of
all mankind and should be accorded special recogni-
tion and protection as part of a World Heritage
Trust. Such an arrangement would not impose lim-

^ Communication from Dr. Niles A. Orisland, Uni-
versity of Oslo, Norway, May 25, 1972. [Footnote in
original.]

"37 Fed. Reg. 6476 (1972). [Footnote in original.]

its on national sovereignty but would extend inter-
national recognition to areas that qualify. Technical
assistance would be made available to protect and
manage such areas.

A final draft of a convention for a World Herit-
age Trust, embodying the President's proposals,
was completed by a group of experts at a UNESCO
meeting in April 1972 and was endorsed at the U.N.
conference. It will be ready for signature at UNES-
CO's General Conference in Paris in late 1972.

The Convention will lend much needed protection
and management assistance for many of the out-
standing areas of the world, which may be lost or
irrevocably destroyed unless the world's nations
take effective action. The Trust could include such
natural areas as the Grand Canyon, the Serengeti
Plains of East Africa, and the Galapagos Islands.
Historic and cultural sites such as the pyramids, the
Acropolis, Angkor Wat, and Stonehenge might also
be included.

Conservation of Genetic Resources

The widest possible diversity of and within spe-
cies should be maintained for ecological stability of
the biosphere and for use as natural resources. The
survival of all species, including man, depends upon
the diversity of existing gene pools. But man's ex-
ploitation of new areas is destroying or displacing
many important genetic resources. For example,
wild species and primitive domesticated plants are
being lost, especially in areas of the developing
world that traditionally have had large numbers of
wild varieties. Because of the enormous range of
species involved and the dimensions of monocultural
agriculture, international action is called for to pre-
serve the world's genetic resources. The Stockholm
conference recommended that international pro-
grams be launched to preserve these resources, in-
cluding establishment of a system of natural re-
serves to protect unique ecosystems.

Conclusion

The first international conference on the global
environment and major bilateral agreements involv-
ing the United States highlight the past year of un-
precedented international activity to protect the en-
vironment. These and other accomplishments have
built institutional foundations for future action. The
new U.N. Environmental Secretariat and the mech-
anisms established in the U.S. -Canadian agreement
on the Great Lakes, for example, should furnish the
essential framework for the actions agreed to at
Stockholm in June and in Ottawa last April. Simi-
larly, the U.S. agreement with the Soviet Union
outlines types of actions and a number of specific
substantive areas for pooling the resources of

324

Department of State Bulletin

these two world powers. And the Oslo convention
on ocean dumping provides an important regional
step toward the international convention that is
needed.

There has been considerable discussion and action
regarding the international economics of environ-
mental protection measures. OECD has adopted
guidelines for its industrialized member nations.
They call for a "polluter pays" approach to financ-
ing environmental controls and for strengthening
and maximizing appropriate harmonization of na-
tional standards, all to minimize distortions of trade
relationships. The U.N. conference mirrored the de-
sire of the LDC's that environmental requirements
imposed on them or affecting their exports not im-
pair their economic development or their interna-
tional markets. The international economics of the
environment is still a very live issue.

Despite the many still-unresolved environmental
problems of international scope — such as ocean pol-
lution and preservation of endangered species — the
overall assessment of the past year is distinctly
positive. The year's activities have brought the
world much closer to the conventions and other in-
ternational measures needed to deal with these
problems. In the thorny areas of economics, there
are obviously strong opposing viewpoints on how
the overall costs and economic impacts of environ-
mental protection should be borne, but there is little
basic disagreement on the need to protect and re-
store the environment. The road toward global con-
cern and concerted actions to make our environment
more livable is a long one. The actions taken in the
past year represent major strides. But with a host
of conflicting economic pressures and the complexity
and pervasiveness of the task of restoring the
world's environment, success will require the dili-
gence, patience, and tenacity of all nations.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

Vietnam: May 1972. A staff report prepared for the
use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. June 29, 1972. 32 pp.

Amending Title 18, United States Code, To Provide
for Expanded Protection of Foreign Officials, and
for Other Purposes. Report to accompany H.R.
10502. H. Rept. 92-1202. June 29, 1972. 24 pp.

Amendments to the Fishermen's Protective Act of
1967. Report to accompany S. 3545. S. Rept. 92-
950. June 30, 1972. 5 pp.

Full U.S. Participation in International Trade. Re-
port to accompany S. 1798, a bill to foster full
U.S. participation in international trade by the
promotion and support of representation of U.S.
interests in international voluntary standards ac-
tivities, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 92-963.
July 14, 1972. 34 pp.

Amending National Security Act. Report to ac-
company S. 2224, a bill to amend the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the
Congress better informed on matters relating to
foreign policy and national security by providing
it with intelligence information obtained by the
Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of
such information by such agency. S. Rept. 92-964.
July 17, 1972. 10 pp.

Further Amending the U.S. Information and Edu-
cational Exchange Act of 1948. Report to ac-
company S. 3645, a bill for the authorization of
U.S. Government grants to Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty for fiscal year 1973. H. Rept.
92-1225. July 19, 1972. 8 pp.

Amendments to the Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1960. Message from the President of
the United States transmitting 11 amendments
adopted in 1968 and 1969. S. Ex. 0. July 24, 1972.
12 pp.

Dues for Membership in International Criminal Po-
lice Organization. Conference Report to accom-
pany H.R. 11350. H. Rept. 92-1233. July 24, 1972.
2 pp.

Agreement with Brazil Concerning Shrimp. Message
from the President of the United States trans-
mitting the agreement, together with an agreed
minute and related exchanges of notes, signed at
Brasilia May 9, 1972. S. Ex. P. July 28, 1972. 10 pp.

To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Provide
for Expanded Protection of Foreign Officials, and
for Other Purposes. Report to accompany H.R.
15883. H. Rept. 92-1268. July 31, 1972. 22 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1972. Report, together
with minority, supplemental, additional and dis-
senting views, on H. R. 16029. H. Rept. 92-1273.
August 1, 1972. 37 pp.

Impressions of the New China. Joint Report to the
House of Representatives by Majority Leader Hale
Boggs and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford on
their mission to the People's Republic of China
June 23-July 7, 1972. H. Doc. 92-337. August 3,
1972. 27 pp.

Termination of Hostilities in Indochina. Report, to-
gether with minority, dissenting, supplemental and
additional views, to accompany H. J. Res. 1225. H.
Rept. 92-1293. August 3, 1972. 13 pp.

Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress.
Report to accompany S. 596. H. Rept. 92-1301.
August 3, 1972. 4 pp.
Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the
President. Report to accompany S. 2956. H. Rept.
92-1302. August 3, 1972. 7 pp.
International Bridge Act of 1972. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 15577. H. Rept. 92-1303. August 3,
1972. 19 pp.

September 18, 1972

325

TREATY INFORMATION

Swan Islands Treaty With Honduras
Enters Into Force

Press release 206 dated September 1

Acting Secretary of State John N. Irwin
II and Roberto Alonzo Cleaves, Charge
d'AfFaires a.i. of the Embassy of Honduras,
exchanged their respective governments' in-
struments of ratification of the treaty which
provides for recognition by the United States
of the sovereignty of Honduras over the
Swan Islands. The ceremony took place in
the Department of State on September 1.

Simultaneously, a ceremony marking the
transfer of sovereignty took place on Great
Swan Island. Participants there included
President Ramon E. Cruz of Honduras and
U.S. Ambassador Hewson A. Ryan.

The Swan Islands are rock keys about 98
miles off the coast of Honduras. The larger
of the two islands is two miles long and one-
half mile in width. The United States took
possession of the Swans in 1863 under the
terms of the Guano Islands Act. For many
years the United States has maintained a
weather and telecommunications facility on
the islands, as well as an air navigational
beacon. Honduras has always claimed that
the islands were discovered by Spain and
that Honduras, upon becoming independent
in 1821, had succeeded to Spanish sover-
eignty over the islands.

Under the terms of the treaty, both gov-
ernments have agreed to establish a coopera-
tive meteorological program to maintain the
weather station and telecommunications fa-
cility, with Honduras assuming responsibil-
ity for the operation of the radio air naviga-
tional beacon. The treaty entered into force
upon the exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion September 1 and marks the successful

conclusion of several years of negotiation
between the two governments.

In 1969 President Nixon authorized the
Secretary of State to seek a settlement on the
longstanding issue of sovereignty over the
Swan Islands. Two years later, on November
22, 1971, at San Pedro Sula, Honduras, the
treaty was signed by Ambassador Ryan and
President Nixon's Counsellor Robert Finch
for the United States and by President Cruz
and Foreign Minister Andres Alvarado
Puerto on behalf of Honduras.

On June 12, 1972, the U.S. Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification of the
Swan Islands Treaty, and President Nixon
signed the United States instrument of rati-
fication on July 1.

United States and Lebanon Sign
Air Transport Agreement

The Department of State announced on
September 1 (press release 207) that the
United States and Lebanon had that day
signed at Beirut a new Air Transport Agree-
ment between the two governments. Am-
bassador William B. Buffum signed for the
United States, and His Excellency Ambassa-
dor Mahmoud Hafez, Director for Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed
for Lebanon. Simultaneously, the two gov-
ernments exchanged diplomatic notes in-
corporating certain understandings regard-
ing the implementation of the new agree-
ment. (For texts of the agreement and the
U.S. note, see press release 207.)

The new Air Transport Agreement is the
fruit of a series of negotiations over the past
months. It replaces the 1946 agreement,
which had become obsolete in several re-
spects and which had left the Lebanese routes
to be defined at a later date. The new agree-
ment confirms U.S. route rights, grants route
rights to Lebanon, and incorporates up-to-
date governing provisions. For the United
States, the agreement permits the continua-

326

Department of State Bulletin

tion of Pan American's varied services to
and through Beirut. Lebanese airlines are
accorded rights to operate to New York via
several points in Europe, and provision is
also made for certain additional operational
rights for air cargo purposes.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: Niger, September 1, 1972.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March
19, 1967 ; for the United States December 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Lesotho, July 26, 1972 (with
declaration).

Universal copyright convention, as revised, with
protocols 1 and 2. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 19,
1972.

Cultural Relations

Agreement for facilitating the international circula-
tion of visual and auditory materials of an edu-
cational, scientific, and cultural character, and
protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949.
Entered into force August 12, 1954; for the United
States January 12, 1967. TIAS 6116.
Accession deposited: Cyprus, August 10, 1972.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva March
25, 1972.'
Signature: Senegal, August 16, 1972.

Property — Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international classi-
fication of goods and services for the purposes of
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as re-
vised at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into
force March 18, 1970; for the United States May
25, 1972. TIAS 7419.
Application to: Faroe Islands, June 28, 1972.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the
United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Notification of succession deposited: Barbados,
August 9, 1972.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washing^ton,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972."
Ratification deposited: Niger, September 1, 1972.
Entered into force: September 1, 1972.

Trade, Transit

Convention on transit trade of landlocked states.
Done at New York July 8, 1965. Entered into
force June 9, 1967; for the United States Novem-
ber 28, 1968. TIAS 6592.

Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
July 21, 1972 (each with reservation and decla-
ration) .

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of June 26, 1972. Effected
by exchange of notes at Bogota June 26 and 28,
1972. Entered into force June 28, 1972.

Egypt

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched-
uling of past-due debts owed to U.S. Government
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Cairo December
6, 1971.
Entered into force: August 28, 1972.

Honduras

Treaty on the Swan Islands, with related notes.
Signed at San Pedro Sula November 22, 1971.
Ratifications exchanged: September 1, 1972.
Entered into force: September 1, 1972.

Agreement establishing a cooperative program for
the operation and maintenance of the meteorologi-
cal observation and telecommunications facility
on the Swan Islands, with annexes. Effected by
exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa November 22,
1971.
Entered into force: September 1, 1972.

Agreement relating to the making available of elec-
tric power to the radio air navigational facility
and dock and landing strip lighting systems on
the Swan Islands. Effected by exchange of notes
at Tegucigalpa November 22, 1971.
Entered into force: September 1, 1972.

' Not in force.

" Not in force for the United States.

September 18, 1972

327

Inter-American Development Bank

Protocol to the social progress trust fund agreement
of June 19, 1961 (TIAS 4763). Signed at Wash-
ington April 28, 1972. Entered into force April
28, 1972.

Italy

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Pickerel
and the U.S.S. Volador to Italy. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Rome July 24 and August 12,
1972. Entered into force August 12, 1972.

Japan

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of an Omega navigational aid
station in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo August 15, 1972. Entered into force August
15, 1972.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of May 4, 1972 (TIAS
7324). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
August 16, 1972. Entered into force August 16,
1972.

Zaire

Agreement relating to the deposit by Zaire of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance
and excess defense articles furnished by the
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Kinshasa April 18 and May 16, 1972. Entered into
force May 16, 1972; effective February 7, 1972.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc-
uments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super-
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Sample Questions from the Written Examination for
Foreign Service Officer. This pamphlet describes the
written examination and presents samples of the
kinds of questions that are asked in the written ex-
amination for selection of Foreign Service officers.
Pub. 7640. Department and Foreign Service Series
123. Available free of charge from the Board of
Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States. This
publication contains a complete and official listing of
the foreign consular offices in the United States,
together with their jurisdictions and recog^nized per-
sonnel. Department and Foreign Service Series 128.
Pub. 7846. 96 pp. 45('.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Twenty-fourth
annual report, covering fiscal year 1971, by the
United States to the United Nations on the admin-
istration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands. International Organization and Conference
Series 91. Pub. 8520. 335 pp. $1.50.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco.
TIAS 7288. 4 pp. 10<».

Trade — Strawberries. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS
7291. 5 pp. lOf*.

Peace Corps. Agreement with Democratic Republic
of the Congo. TIAS 7304. 4 pp. lOt^.

Termination of Loan of Vessels — U.S.S. Guitarro and
U.S.S. Hammerhead. Agreement with Turkey. TIAS
7305. 3 pp. lOf*.

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Japan amending the agreement of Febru-
ary 26, 1968. TIAS 7306. 9 pp. 10^

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Ireland.
TIAS 7307. 6 pp. lOt*.

Disaster Assistance. Agreement with Mexico amend-
ing the agreement of May 3, 1968. TIAS 7308. 4
pp. 10^.

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Malaysia.
TIAS 7309. 3 pp. lO^

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea correcting the agreement of De-
cember 30, 1971. TIAS 7310. 2 pp. 10«;.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of China amending the agreement of January
14, 1971. TIAS 7311. 2 pp. 10(J.

Great Lakes Water Quality. Agreement, with an-
nexes and texts and terms of reference, with Canada.
TIAS 7312. 69 pp. 30«J.

Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands.

Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7314. 130 pp. 10(.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Czecho-
slovak Socialist Republic extending the agreement
of February 28, 1969. TIAS 7316. 3 pp. 10(i'.

Archives of the Arbitral Commission on Property
Rights and Interests — Transfer te the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Agreement with the Federal Re-
public of Germany. TIAS 7317. 3 pp. 10^.

Peace Corps. Agreement with the British Solomon
Islands Protectorate. TIAS 7318. 4 pp. lOi.

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with New Zea-
land. TIAS 7319. 6 pp. lO^*.

328

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX September 18, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 173 Jt

Aviation. United States and Lebanon Sign Air
Transport Agreement 326

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to For-
eign Policy 325

International Aspects of Environmental Quali-
ty (President Nixon's message to the Con-
gress; excerpt from report of the Council
on Environmental Quality) 308

Environment

Herbert Brownell Named To Study Colorado

River Salinity Problem 307

International Aspects of Environmental Qual-
ity (President Nixon's message to the Con-
gress; excerpt from report of the Council
on Environmental Quality) 308

Greece. The Need for Steadfastness in U.S.
Foreign Policy (Rogers) 301

Honduras. Swan Islands Treaty With Hon-
duras Enters Into Force 326

Japan. President Nixon's News Conference of
August 29 (excerpts) 297

Lebanon. United States and Lebanon Sign
Air Transport Agreement 326

Mexico. Herbert Brownell Named To Study

Colorado Kiver Salinity Problem .... 307

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The

Need for Steadfastness in U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy (Rogers) 301

Presidential Documents

International Aspects of Environmental Qual-
ity 308

President Nixon's News Conference of August

29 (excerpts) 297

Publications. Recent Releases 328

Treaty Information

Current Actions 327

Swan Islands Treaty With Honduras Enters
Into Force 326

United States and Lebanon Sign Air Trans-
port Agreement 326

Viet-Nam

The Need for Steadfastness in U.S. Foreign

Policy (Rogers) 301

157th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at
Paris (Porter) 305

President Nixon's News Conference of August

29 (excerpts) 297

U.S. Force Ceiling in Viet-Nam To Be Cut to
27,000 by December 1 (White House an-
nouncement) 300

Name Index

Brownell, Herbert 307

Nixon, President 297, 308

Porter, William J 305

Rogers, Secretary 301

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Aug. 28-Sept. 3

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to August 28 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletiisj is No.
204 of August 24.

No.

Date

Subject

205 8/31 Porter: 157th plenary session

on Viet-Nam at Paris.
205A 9/1 Porter: additional remarks.

206 9/1 Swan Islands treaty with Hon-

duras enters into force.

207 9/1 U.S. -Lebanon air transport

agreement signed (rewrite).
t208 9/2 Rogers: statement on extradi-
tion of Auguste Ricord.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

5 :' THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

I '

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1735

September 25, 1372

PRESIDENT NIXON AND JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TANAKA MEET IN HAWAII 329

UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON AND AMBASSADOR INGERSOLL
HOLD NEWS CONFERENCE IN HAWAII 333

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE IN OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE
Excerpt From Address by President Nixon 3UU

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXVII, No. 1735
September 25, 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing: Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues plus semiannual indexes,
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Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
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ment and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note! Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
witli information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
and news conferences of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State and
other officers of the Department, at
well as special articles on various
piloses of international affairs and the
functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United Slates is or may become a
party and treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Meet in Hawaii

President Nixon and Prime Minister Kak-
uei Tanaka of Japan held talks at the Kui-
lima Hotel, Kahuku, Oahu, Hawaii, August
31-September 1. Following are texts of Pres-
ident Nixon's remarks upon arrival at Hick-
am Air Force Base on August 30, an ex-
change of remarks between the President
and Prime Minister Tanaka upon the Prime
Minister's arrival later that day, a joint
statement issued on September 1 following
their meetings, and an announcement issued
on September 1 on talks which had been
held between U.S. Ambassador to Japan
Robert Ingersoll and Japanese Deputy Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiyohiko Tsu-
rumi.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ARRIVAL REMARKS

White House press release (Honolulu) dated AuKUst 80

Over the past 25 years, my wife and I
have received welcomes in 80 countries and
50 States, but every time we come to Hawaii
we say there is nothing like a welcome in
Hawaii, and we are most grateful for the
warm reception we have received.

I appreciate your signs. I see "Nixon No
Ka Oi." I know what it means.

Governor Burns has very eloquently de-
scribed the purpose of our visit. Because the
rain is coming down a bit, I will not take
much of your time. I would like very simply
to tell you what this State means to Amer-
ica and what this visit can mean to America
and to the world.

We go back to the year 1969, which was
the first year that I had the privilege of com-
ing to Hawaii after being elected to the
Presidency. That was the time that we went
on to Midway and began the reduction of

forces in Viet-Nam which has brought 500,-
000 Americans home and which has moved
toward the peace with honor that all Amer-
icans want, there and throughout the world.

Then we were here again at the time of
the Apollo 13 flight, when we welcomed back
brave men who hadn't succeeded but who
came back, and it was one of those epics in
American bravery which all of us wanted to
pay tribute to.

Then, as Governor Burns has indicated, it
was February of this year that we stopped
in Hawaii. We were here two days planning
the trip to the People's Republic of China,
which opened a dialogue between the most
populous nation in the world and the United
States of America, a dialogue that is essen-
tial if all of these wonderful young people we
see here — the real young ones — are going to
grow up in a world of peace. We cannot have
a world of peace and have a fourth of the
world's people outside of any communication
with the United States and other nations.

And now we come for another purpose.
We come not to meet with those who have
been our adversaries in recent times. We
come to meet with those who have been very
close friends of the United States going back
over the past 20 years, and I refer to the
Prime Minister of Japan and his official
party.

This is a working visit. We shall discuss
many problems, particularly problems of
trade and problems of cooperation, but what
this visit signifies more than anything else,
coming as it does in Hawaii, is how much
the world has changed and changed for the
better, not only over the last four years to
which I referred but over the last 25 years.
It was here just 26 (31) years ago that

September 25, 1972

329

war in the Pacific began, and now here in
Hawaii the Prime Minister of Japan, the
President of the United States meet for the
purpose of building a structure of peace in
the Pacific, because without peace and coop-
eration and friendship between the people of
Japan and the people of the United States,
there cannot be peace in the Pacific and there
cannot be peace in the world.

We value that friendship, and we know
that these meetings will contribute to it.

Let me say that you here in Hawaii have
set a magnificent example of what that
friendship can mean. Governor Burns has
referred to the fact that so many people of
Japanese background live here, and other
backgrounds as well. Let me say in that con-
nection what you have demonstrated here as
to how people of different backgrounds can
work together, can create together, can live
together, that is what we need to demon-
strate in the world so that we can have that
world of peace that we want, not only for
ourselves but for all the children of the
world.

We are delighted to be here and meeting
here in Hawaii. I think with this nice rain
falling this means a good omen for this trip.
It will produce certainly good news for the
United States, good news, we trust, also for
Japan, but more important, good news for
all the people of the world interested in peace.

Thank you.

ARRIVAL OF PRIME MINISTER TANAKA
Remarks by President Nixon

White House press release (Honolulu) dated August 30

Mr. Prime Minister and all of our distin-
guished guests from Japan: In the word of
welcome which is so famous not only here in
Hawaii but throughout the world, I say
Aloha.

And, Mr. Prime Minister, I am very hon-
ored to welcome you not only in your oflScial
capacity for the first time as Prime Minister
but also to welcome you again as a personal
friend. This is as it should be, because the

alliance between our two countries is one
not only of necessity but it is one that is
strengthened also by the bonds of friend-
ship; and the fact that the relationships be-
tween Presidents of the United States and
Prime Ministers of Japan over the years
have been not only official but personal has
meant that that alliance has been thereby
strengthened.

It is particularly appropriate that your
first official visit as Prime Minister to the
United States should be in this State of Ha-
waii, because here 30 percent of the popu-
lation of this State is proud of its Japanese
background. And we are reminded as we
meet in Hawaii of how much Americans who
have Japanese background have contributed
to the strength, the diversity of our country.

As we see what has happened in Hawaii
and as we see what has happened in ether
parts of our country where people of Jap-
anese background and the other diverse back-
grounds in America have worked together,
we realize how much the Japanese people of
your country and the American people can
do together in the cause of building a struc-
ture of peace in the world.

I know that this meeting that we will have
will contribute to the desire of both of our
peoples to strengthen the structure of peace
so that we can continue on the road to prog-
ress which we fortunately both are moving
on together today.

Mr. Prime Minister, I can say only that I
extend this welcome not only personally but
from all the American people to you and to
the people of Japan. May we always meet
as we meet today, working for the great goals
of peace in the Pacific and peace in the
world.

Remarks by Prime Minister Tanaka ^

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated September
11

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, Mr. Secretary
of State, ladies and gentlemen: I wish to
thank you most sincerely, Mr. President, for

' Prime Minister Tanaka spoke in Japanese.

330

Department of State Bulletin

your very kind words and for this extremely
cordial and warm reception accorded to us
today.

Since I assumed the post of Prime Minis-
ter, it has been my strong wish to meet and
have discussions with President Nixon and
other leaders of the United States Govern-
ment at the earliest possible opportunity. It
is indeed a great pleasure for me that the op-
portunity is now realized.

I feel that it is most appropriate and sig-
nificant that the meeting is taking place here
in Hawaii, where peoples of diverse races
with diverse traditions and cultures in the
Pacific area have come and toiled together
under the American flag to build a paradise
in the Pacific.

All of you are aware that Japan and the
United States, as partners situated across
the Pacific, have maintained close coopera-
tive relations in a variety of fields for many
years. Today we are living in an increasingly
multipolarized world where Japan has come
to assume greater responsibilities in the in-
ternational community commensurate with
her increased national strength. With this in
mind, we wish to strengthen further the al-
ready solid foundation of friendship and mu-
tual trust between Japan and the United
States and to promote even more wide-rang-
ing cooperative relations in the coming years.
I earnestly hope that my meeting with Pres-
ident Nixon will mark the beginning of a
new era of constant dialogue between our
two countries.

Let me lastly convey, on behalf of the peo-
ple of Japan, their very sincere greetings to
the people of the United States.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

1. Prime Minister Tanaka and President Nixon
met in Hawaii August 31-September 1 for wide
ranging discussions on a number of topics of mutual
interest. The talks were held in an atmosphere of
warmth and mutual trust reflecting the long history
of friendship between Japan and the United States.
Both leaders expressed the hope that their meeting
would mark the beginning of a new chapter in the
course of developing ever closer bonds between the
two countries.

2. The Prime Minister and the President reviewed
the current international situation and the pros-
pects for the relaxation of tension and peaceful so-
lutions to current problems in the world, with par-
ticular reference to Asia. It was stressed that the
maintenance and strengthening of the close ties of
friendship and cooperation between the two coun-
tries would continue to be an important factor for
peace and stability in the evolving world situation.
Both leaders reaffirmed the intention of the two
governments to maintain the Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security between the two countries,
and agreed that the two governments would con-
tinue to cooperate through close consultations with
a view to ensuring smooth and effective implemen-
tation of the Treaty.

3. In discussing the increasing indications for
peace and stability in Asia, the Prime Minister and
the President welcomed the recent opening of dia-
logue in the Korean Peninsula, and the increasingly
active efforts of Asian countries for self-reliance
and regional cooperation, and shared the hope for
an early realization of peace in Indochina. The
Prime Minister and the President recognized that
the President's recent visits to the People's Repub-
lic of China and the USSR were a significant step
forward. In this context, they shared the hope that
the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister to the
People's Republic of China would also serve to fur-
ther the trend for the relaxation of tension in Asia.

4. The Prime Minister and the President discussed
the recent agreements reached by the United States
and the USSR on the limitation of ballistic missile
defenses and the interim arrangement on the limi-
tation of strategic offensive missiles, and they agreed
that such measures represented an important step
forward in limiting strategic arms and contributing
to world peace. They agreed to consult on the need
for further steps to control strategic arms.

5. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged
views in a broad perspective on issues related to
economic, trade and financial matters. The Prime
Minister and the President emphasized the great
importance of economic relations between Japan
and the United States. Both leaders expressed their
conviction that their talks would contribute to closer
cooperation between the two countries in dealing
with economic issues of a bilateral and global na-
ture.

6. The Prime Minister and the President shared
the view that fundamental reform of the interna-
tional monetary system is essential. They com-
mitted their governments to work rapidly to achieve
such reform. In trade, they reaffirmed the Febru-
ary 1972 commitments of both countries to initiate
and actively support multilateral trade negotiations
covering both industry and agriculture in 1973. In
this connection they noted the need in the forthcom-
ing trade negotiations to lay the basis for further
trade expansion through reduction of tariff and non-

September 25, 1972

331

tariff barriers as well as formulations of a multi-
lateral non-discriminatory safeguard mechanism.

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed
that both countries would endeavor to move towards
a better equilibrium in their balance of payments
and trade positions. In this regard, the President
explained the measures undertaken by the United
States to improve its trade and payments position
and stated that the Government of the United States
was urging U.S. firms to expand the volume of ex-
ports through increased productivity and improved
market research, particularly to Japan. The Prime
Minister indicated that the Government of Japan
would also try to promote imports from the United
States and that it was the intention of the Govern-
ment of Japan to reduce the imbalance to a more
manageable size within a reasonable period of time.
The Prime Minister and the President agreed that
it would be most valuable to hold future meetings
at a high level to review evolving economic relation-
ships, and that they intend to hold a meeting of the
Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs as early in 1973 as feasible.

8. The Prime Minister and the President noted
the endeavors of the two countries, in cooperation
with other developed countries, to help bring stabil-
ity and prosperity to the developing countries in
Asia and other regions of the world. They acknowl-
edged the need for adequate levels of official devel-
opment assistance on appropriate terms. They also
reaffirmed that the two governments intend to con-
tinue to help strengthen the international financial
institutions for the purpose of economic develop-
ment of the developing countries.

9. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed
the need to promote efforts to improve the mutual
understanding of the cultural, social and other back-
grounds between the peoples of the two countries.
They agreed further that new and improved pro-
grams of cultural and educational exchange are an
important means to this end. In this connection the
President underlined his high hopes for the suc-
cessful activities of the Japan Foundation to be
inaugurated in October this year.

10. The Prime Minister and the President noted
with satisfaction the growing momentum of coop-
eration between the two countries in increasingly
diverse fields under the common aims of maintain-
ing and promoting peace and prosperity of the
world and the well-being of their countrymen. They
agreed to strengthen and expand the already close
cooperation between the two countries in controlling
the illegal traffic in narcotics and other dangerous
drugs, and they also agreed on the need for further
bilateral and multilateral cooperation concerning the
development and better utilization of energy and
mineral resources and on the pressing problems of
environmental protection and pollution control. They
pledged to continue appropriate assistance through

the UN and its specialized agencies for the solution
of problems caused by too rapid population growth.

11. The Prime Minister and the President dis-
cussed cooperation in space exploration including
Japan's goal of launching geo-stationary communi-
cations and other applications satellites. The Presi-
dent welcomed Japan's active interest in and study
on the launching of a meteorological satellite in sup-
port of the global atmospheric research program.

12. The Prime Minister and the President ex-
pressed satisfaction with their talks and agreed to
continue to maintain close personal contact.

ANNOUNCEMENT ON U.S.-JAPAN
ECONOMIC TALKS

White House press release (Honolulu) dated September 1

1. On the occasion of their meeting in Hakone the
United States and Japan exchanged views on their
respective balance of payments objectives. In this
context both governments discussed various meas-
ures, both short-term and long-term, that could as-
sist the improvement of their mutual trade imbal-
ance.

2. Since their meeting in Hakone, the two govern-
ments have closely cooperated and worked together
in an attempt to quantify some of the specific short-
term measures that have been discussed at the time
of Hakone. President Nixon, taking the opportunity
of his meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka, wel-
comed the following results thus worked out in a
series of meetings between Deputy Vice Minister
Tsurumi and Ambassador Ingersoll, including pur-
chase of U.S. goods and services of over $1 billion:

A. The estimated increase in Japan's purchases of
agricultural, forestry and fishery products from the
United States during Japanese Fiscal Year 1972,
ending March 31, 1973, is expected to be about $390
million. In addition, it is expected that there will be
about $50 million in special grains purchases on the
basis of reasonable prices. These purchases total
$440 million more than the purchases in the previous
year. These would bring total Japanese purchases
of agricultural, forestry, and fishery products from
the U.S. to $2,218,000/)00 in JFY 1972, the highest
such exports by the U.S. to any country.

B. Japanese commercial airlines are plarming to
purchase civil aircraft, including wide-bodied air-
craft, valued at approximately $320 million from the
United States. Such orders would be placed in JFY
1972 and JFY 1973. The Government of Japan will
facilitate the purchase of these aircraft upon finali-
zation of purchase contracts. The Government of
Japan also intends to purchase, subject to budgetary
appropriation, helicopters and aviation related fa-
cilities amounting to $20 million from the U.S.

332

Department of State Bulletin

C. The Japanese power companies will purchase
$320 million in uranium enrichment services from
the United States with payment to be facilitated by
the Government of Japan.

D. Finally, it was also agreed by both the U.S.
and Japanese governments that they would use their
best efforts to facilitate the establishment at an
early date of a joint Japan-U.S. working group to
begin study of the feasibility of a joint venture for
construction in the United States of a gaseous dif-

fusion enrichment facility for peaceful uses, which
would involve a total investment of approximately
$1 billion.

3. The President also noted with appreciation the
recent decisions by the Government of Japan to lib-
eralize access to its distribution system by allowing
improved investment opportunities in retailing, proc-
essing and packaging as well as the decision to al-
low greater sales of American computer products in
Japan.

Under Secretary Johnson and Ambassador Ingersoll
Hold News Conference in Hawaii

Following is the transcript of a news con-
ference held by Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and U.S.
Ambassador to Japan Robert Ingersoll at the
Kuilima Hotel, Kahuku, Oahu, Hawaii, on
September 1. Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec-
retary to President Nixon, introduced Under
Secretary Johnson and Ambassador Inger-
soll.

White House press release (Kahuku. Hawaii) dated September 1

Mr. Ziegler: We gave you earlier a copy
of the joint statement which has resulted
from a meeting between President Nixon
and Prime Minister Tanaka and also mate-
rial referring to economic arrangements that
have been worked out with Japan.

Under Secretary of State U. Alexis John-
son, who has participated in the meetings
here, is available to take your questions and
also make some comments to you on the
meetings, together with Ambassador Robert
Ingersoll, United States Ambassador to Ja-
pan.

Ambassador Ingersoll has been involved,
as you know, in many of the discussions re-
lating to our relations with Japan; specifi-
cally, in the economic and trade areas. He
will be able to take your questions on that
subject.

We told you earlier this morning that the

meeting between the President and the
Prime Minister got underway shortly after
9 o'clock in the same setting in which they
took place yesterday. We will have additional
information on that for you later.

Mr. Johnson: Thanks, Ron.

As Ron mentioned, you have befen given
the text of the two statements: one, the joint
statement beween the Prime Minister and
the President; and then, what you might call
a supplementary statement on the announce-
ment of the results of the talks on trade mat-
ters between Ambassador Ingersoll and Dep-
uty Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
Tsurumi. Ambassador Ingersoll will be avail-
able to answer questions with regard to those
discussions.

I might point out that those discussions re-
ferred to the meetings at Hakone which Am-
bassador Eberle, the Special Trade Repre-
sentative of the President, had last month,
in which Ambassador Ingersoll participated
and has been following up on those discus-
sions since that time.

I might make a couple of points before
taking your questions.

First, I think that the importance that the
President thoroughly attaches to our rela-
tions with Japan is well demonstrated by the
fact that the President has come out here to
Honolulu at this time for this kind of a

September 25, 1972

333

meeting, and I believe this speaks for itself.

Next, I know that it is traditional, conven-
tional, in communiques to talk about warmth
of the meetings, frankness of discussions,
and those terms; and I want to say those
terms in this communique have more sub-
stance than any meeting I have attended, in
recent years at least. What I am saying is
that I feel that the President and the Prime
Minister have established especially close,
warm, personal relationships.

They, of course, have met previously, but
this is the first time they have had an oppor-
tunity for this type of discussion, and of
course this is the first time they have had a
discussion with Tanaka as Prime Minister.
This meeting was not brought about by any
crisis in our relations, but rather it was
brought about by the President's desire to
get acquainted and establish a relationship
with this new government in Japan that can
continue on and will provide the basis for our
relationship over the years to come.

As you know, the President is well ac-
quainted with Japanese political figures. He
has visited there many times, and he partic-
ularly wanted to take advantage of the ear-
liest possible opportunity to become better
acqtiainted with Prime Minister Tanaka.

It has not been, as I said, a meeting
brought about by any crisis or negotiation
crisis. In one sense it has not been a nego-
tiating meeting, although it has been very
much a substantive meeting. What I am say-
ing by this is that there has been, both be-
tween the Prime Minister and the Presi-
dent and between the Foreign Minister and
Secretary Rogers, a real, full exchange of
views, and again I am using that term not in
its conventional sense but in a very real
sense; that is, with each party really ex-
plaining their own attitudes, explaining their
own policies, and talking about those things
that are of most importance to them.

The communique, or joint press statement
as we are calling it, that has been presented
to you has of course been under discussion
for some time, but it was only last night, fi-
nally, at the dinner, that the unresolved mat-
ters in the communique were resolved and

that we were able to make it available to
you this morning.

The spirit of the meetings and the rela-
tionship that has been established, I think,
is well exemplified, and I agree with the
Prime Minister's characterization of the din-
ner last night as being a family dinner. I
have never attended an official function
which was less formal, the spirit was
warmer, and I know that the President is
pleased. I think that the Prime Minister has
also been pleased.

I think that is about all I will say in the
way of preliminary remarks. I will take your
questions at this time.

Q. Would you clarify the timespan in which
the $1 billion of purchases will be made?
Are all of them to be made before the end of
the Japanese fiscal year, or do they go over a
longer timespan?

Mr. Johnson: I will let Ambassador Inger-
soU talk to that. He has been carrying out
the discussion on that.

Ambassador Ingersoll: The expectation
for the transfer of goods and funds of the
billion-plus dollars does not necessarily cover
any exact time frame. We do not know ex-
actly how much funds will be transferred
before the end of the Japanese fiscal year,
which ends March 31 of '73, but it will be in
the range of, I would say, $400 million to
$500 million of transferred funds. Some of
the deliveries of products will come over a
continuing period of time.

I am speaking now of the emergency pur-
chases. Included in this billion dollars are
some increased purchases of agricultural
products, all of which will come, are expected
to come, before March 31, and you could add
another $390 million to the $400 million to
$500 million that I referred to.

Q. When you talk about transferred funds,
is this the advance-payments proposition that
we have talked about ?

Ambassador Ingersoll: Yes.

Q. They will pay in advance for some of
the goods that will be delivered to them
later?

334

Department of State Bulletin

Ambassador Ingersoll: Yes. You might say
the enriched uranium is this type. They
don't need it now, but they are going to make
advance payments for it, and we have it
available, so it could be transferred at any
time. It is just a convenience to them when
they want to have it transferred, but they
will make the payments before March 31.

Q. Could I follotv that up ? For those of us
who don't follotv this as closely as you do,
could you state what the trade deficit would
have been in terms of, let's say, the Japanese
fiscal year and tvhat it now tvill be for the
current fiscal year ending March 31 and
what it will be for the following fiscal year?

Ambassador Ingersoll: If I were able to
give you exact figures on that, I think I
could probably play the stock market and a
lot of other things more successfully than I
have in the past, but we are projecting —
there is a Japanese Government projection
and a U.S. Government projection on these
imbalances — at Hakone, we reached a close
agreement between $3.5 billion and $3.8 bil-
lion of imbalance by the end of this calendar
year; that is, if nothing was done to correct
the present trend.

At that time — this was the latter part of
July — it was expected that some of these
emergency purchases will reduce that trade
imbalance as it actually comes up on March
31. These are all projections, so you can't
pin us down to exact figures, because there
are many factors which could change it.
But of these emergency purchases, such as
the enriched uranium, they will not show up
in the trade balance. They will not reduce the
trade balance. They will reduce the balance
of payments because there will be a transfer
of funds prior to that time.

So it is very difficult to say what the actual
imbalance will be, because there are, as you
will recall, in the latter part of the special
announcement on economic discussions, cer-
tain longer range decisions that were made
in Hakone and subsequently firmed up which
will reduce the imbalance, but we are un-
able to estimate how much they will reduce
it by the end of this fiscal year.

Now, you asked about the imbalance for
the following year. That is getting further
out than I would be willing to make predic-
tions, but for the last two months the trend
of imbalance between our two countries has
been reduced. In other words, for both June
and July the trend has gone down. The
monthly imbalance is lower than it was in
previous months. So it is going in the right
direction now, and we hope that it will con-
tinue in that reducing direction.

Mr. Johnson: I might say just a supple-
mentary word on this economic side, Mr.
Ambassador.

First, that this whole question of our trade
deficit, trade imbalance, is not something, of
course, that can be settled simply bilater-
ally between the United States and Japan. I
think the communique points out that these
are multilateral problems, in large part,
that have to be settled in a multilateral con-
text.

Japan is a very important element in it.
Europe is also an important element. The
United States is an important element in it.
As the President said yesterday to the Prime
Minister, we recognize that these problems
have to be dealt with in the broad context.
We recognize that Japan is now a world
power, looking outwardly as a world power,
and that we and Europe and Japan have to
deal with these problems on the basis of
equality. We are satisfied that Japan is se-
rious in trying to resolve these problems.
They cannot be solved only by Japan; they
can't be solved only by us; they can't be
solved only by our other trading partners.

But we are satisfied that Japan is regard-
ing these matters seriously, is taking a seri-
ous approach; and as far as the announce-
ment on the talks between Ambassador
Ingersoll and Ambassador Tsurumi, the im-
portance there is of course in the figures, but
I think in many ways even more importantly
it shows the effort that is being made by the
Japanese to help correct these problems.

As Ambassador Ingersoll has said, this an-
nouncement is not going to resolve all of our
bilateral trade problems by any means, but it
is a step in that direction, and it is a demon-

September 25, 1972

335

stration of the Japanese Government's ear-
nest efforts to try to move toward the resolu-
tion of these problems.

Q. Mr. Johnson, to what extent 7vas there
agreement with the Japanese on how to ap-
proach the Common Market to reduce their
restrictions to both countries?

Mr. Johnson: We had not negotiated on
that in the sense that there has not been any
ganging up by the United States and Japan
against the Common Market, but we both
recognize it is a problem for Japan and it is a
problem for the United States, and it is a
matter that will have to be dealt with on the
trilateral context — that is, Japan-Common
Market-U.S. context — and not something
that can be dealt with bilaterally by the
United States and Japan.

Q. What is the gaseous diffusion plant you
are talking about?

Mr. Johnson: The gaseous diffusion plant
is a plant for producing enriched uranium.
As you know, we have two plants in the
United States producing enriched uranium
at the present time, and as you also know,
Japan is building a large number of nuclear
powerplants and the requirements for fuel
for those plants are increasing.

As you have seen in here, we are selling to
Japan an additional $320 million in enrich-
ment services. I want to point out that is not
selling uranium. It is selling the service of
enriching uranium. Japan can buy the ura-
nium in the United States or Canada or
elsewhere, and we charge them for the en-
richment of it.

Now, in talking about a gaseous diffusion
plant, it is recognized that there is going to
be a shortage by about the 1980's of facilities
for producing nuclear fuel for powerplants
throughout the world, and Japan is inter-
ested in developing an additional source for
this. What is being discussed here is the
building in the United States of a gaseous
diffusion enrichment plant for producing en-
riched uranium in which Japanese power
companies would contribute part of the capi-
tal and private American companies would

contribute the other part of the capital.

This is a project on the general order of
magnitude of $1 billion. If Japan were to
invest half of that, this would mean an in-
vestment of about $500 million in the United
States, which has its obvious advantages in
terms of our balance of payments and, as far
as Japan is concerned, has its advantages in
assuring Japan of supplies of nuclear fuel in
the future.

Q. There is a published report that the
United States wanted the joint statement to
reflect the applicability of the mutual secu-
rity treaty to the defense of Taiwan and
Korea and the Japanese refused. Is that the
case ?

Mr. Johnson: No, there is nothing like
that in the communique at any point. The
communique in that regard reads as it is
now, nor was there any discussion of that.

Q. Did the question of the use of Japanese
bases in the defense of Taiwan come up at
all?

Mr. Johnson: Let me say that as far as
our discussion on mutual security problems
and Japan working toward improving its
i-elations with Peking and this whole scale
of problems, that we are entirely satisfied
that Japan has no intention of acting in any
way contrary to our mutual security interest.

That is an all-embracing statement, and it
will be up to Japan — the Japanese Govern-
ment, of course — to speak for itself. But on
the basis of our conversations with them, we
have no concern in that regard.

Q. There was no intent on their part to
disavoiv the phrase in the Sato communique
of 1969 regarding the defense of Taiwan and
Korea as essential or vital to Japan?

Mr. Johnson: There is nothing, as you can
see, in the communique on that at all.

Q. Can you give assurance they are not
going to disavow that?

Mr. Johnson: The subject just wasn't dis-
cussed nor was it discussed in those terms.

336

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Isn't that odd that it wouldn't be dis-
cussed?

Mr. Johnson: No, why?

Q. Because it is very important to the
problems in the Pacific.

Mr. Johnson: In this regard, let me say
Japan set forth their thoughts with regard
to what they planned to do with respect to
their relations to the mainland, and it is up
to them to speak to how they plan to carry
this out, but I can say to you, we are satis-
fied that they are not going to act contrary
to our mutual security interest, including
our mutual security interest with Taiwan.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what were the unre-
solved matters that were settled at the din-
ner last night?

Mr. Johnson: Well, there was a question
of the wording of this portion of the com-
munique on reducing the trade imbalance.
There wasn't any real dispute about this. It
was simply a question of how it would be
said and how it would be expressed.

There was some thought that there might
be some advantage in trying to set target
figures for reductions in imbalance, but the
more we discussed it the more it became
clear that trying to establish figures on this,
as Ambassador Ingersoll has said, the more
difficulty you get into.

So it was agreed that we would not try to
use any figures on this, but rather the Jap-
anese Government would express in the
terms of the communique here its intention
of doing everything possible to correct this
trade imbalance.

As I said, I am satisfied that they are mov-
ing in that direction and moving very ear-
nestly in that direction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, couldn't you have used
something stronger than the formulation
that the Prime Minister indicated Japan
would try to promote imports from the
United States? Isn't that a bit vaguer than
you would have liked?

Mr. Johnson: No, there was no dispute

about that language. We say we are going
to try to promote exports to Japan, and they
are going to try to promote imports. The
word "try" in there was never under dis-
cussion.

I think that they would probably have been
willing to say they will promote imports,
but of course, they can only try. We have to
do the exporting, and they can only try to
establish those conditions which will en-
courage the import of American products.

The Japanese Government itself cannot
do the importing, except in those few areas
which the Japanese Government is the buyer.

Q. But is it not entirely up to them to re-
duce the quotas and tariffs on our goods?

Mr. Johnson: That is correct, and they
have been doing this, as you know. The num-
ber of quota restrictions, the quota items,
have gradually been reduced over a period
of time.

Q. What are the main ones remaining?

Ambassador Ingersoll: Computer-related
products are the primary industrial items,
and in the agricultural field there are sev-
eral, such as oranges and certain feed grains
and wheat and that sort of thing, which we
sell a very large number of, but there are
quota restrictions, and they do not permit
the free market to act. But I think every
country in the world has its agriculture
problem, and certainly Japan is not unique.
Therefore, they feel it incumbent at this
point not to completely open up their agri-
cultural market, although they have made
considerable progress in the past few years
and, I think, expect to make further prog-
ress. But I think that is up to the Japanese
to state that.

Mr. Johnson: May I say in this connection,
Ron pointed out that he feels there might be
some misunderstanding about this advance-
payment portion of this statement. May I
say I do not want to overstress or overem-
phasize the importance of that. To the de-
gree advance payments are borrowing from
the future, let's say, they are helpful to us,
but they don't correct the fundamental im-

September 25, 1972

337

balance. This doesn't mean that we don't
appreciate Japan doing this. It doesn't mean
that this isn't an indication of good intent
on their part. But the fundamental trade
problems still remain in spite of the advance
payments, but the advance payments are
helpful to us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the context of what
you said earlier about the attempt to set
some target figures for the reduction of the
trade imbalance, at Hakone there was men-
tion of such target figures; namely, that the
Japanese should try to reduce the trade im-
balance in this fiscal year, Japanese fiscal
year, to $3 billion or less and next year to
$2 billion or less. Were those the target
figures which were tried on the Japanese and
which eventually were not pushed through?

Mr. Johnson: There was a discussion of a
number of figures. They were among the
figures that were discussed. In this regard,
the Prime Minister's view was — and I re-
spect him for it — that he did not want to be
in the position of making statements that he
possibly couldn't carry out, and the reduc-
tion of these figures, as I was pointing out,
is not something that is unilaterally under
the control of Japan. It is a question of, one,
our ability to sell additional goods to Japan
and, secondly, how much in the way of Jap-
anese goods Americans buy. So these are
not things that can just be turned on and off
and are under the full control of the Japa-
nese Government.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, would we like to see
the Japanese do more than they are doing
in the way of reducing trade barriers, re-
strictions, and so forth?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, there is no secret that
we would like to have them do more than
they are doing in this regard, and they are
moving in that direction.

Ambassador Ingersoll: I might just say,
you will notice in the joint statement that
we expect continuing discussions on this
subject, and this is in full agreement with
the Japanese. We think it is desirable that
any two countries that are as industrially

competitive as both the United States and
Japan are, that we constantly keep in touch
on this subject and resolve the problems
before they get to be of large magnitude.

Mr. Johnson: Japan is a large customer
for us, too. You will notice in the statement
on the talks between Ambassador Ingersoll
and Mr. Tsurumi, it is pointed out that
Japan will be importing this year from the
United States $2.2 billion in agricultural,
forestry, and fishery products. This is over-
whelmingly the largest export of these prod-
ucts of any country in the world. Japan is
overwhelmingly our biggest customer for
agricultural products, and it is going up
every year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the discussions, did it
come up at all that if the imbalance of trade
was not settled that the United States would
set quotas for Japanese goods?

Mr. Johnson: No, that was not discussed.
It was pointed out that a settlement of this
problem is not just a matter of concessions
for the United States. A settlement of this
problem is important to Japan being able to
maintain its markets in the United States,
because I think we all recognize that if the
imbalance is too large, the pressures for pro-
tectionist actions in the United States would
continue to grow, and thus Japan has an in-
terest in keeping its markets open in the
United States.

On the other side of it, Japan also has an
interest in getting goods in return for the
goods it is sending to the United States. We
talk about this often in simply financial
terms, but in goods terms what is happening
is, as far as the Japanese producer and con-
sumer is concerned, they are exporting goods
to the United States. They are not getting
goods in return. They are piling up dollars.
Now, it would obviously be of interest to
the Japanese consumer if those dollars could
be turned into goods which could be sold to
the Japanese and to the Japanese consumer.
Thus, it is a matter of mutual interest and a
mutual problem. It is not just a one-way
problem.

338

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Mr. Secretary, the joint communique
talks about Prime Minister Tanaka agreeing
"to reduce the imbalance to a more manage-
able size tvithin a reasonable period of time."

Mr. Johnson: That is correct.

Q. How do you interpret "a reasonable
period of time"? What is "a reasonable pe-
riod of time"?

Mr. Johnson: We are talking here in terms
of — we haven't tried to define that statement
exactly with them, but we are talking in
terms of years. We are talking in terms of
two, three, four, five years. That is what we
are talking in terms of.

As Ambassador Ingersoll pointed out, the
effects of the revaluation, of the Smithso-
nian agreement, are only now beginning to
take effect. In a revaluation-devaluation sit-
uation of this type, its effects take certain
years to come into play. Initially there is a
perverse effect; that is, initially, when Japan
ships products to the United States under
previous existing contracts, it gets more dol-
lars for the same goods; that is, if there was
a contract for 10,000 TV sets, say, and that
contract was entered into prior to revalua-
tion, when those sets are shipped to the
United States after revaluation, the dollar
price, of course, is higher because of revalu-
ation, and that means that the Japanese
company initially gets more in the way of
dollars for those same 10,000 sets.

Now, it takes some time for the fact that
the prices have increased — prices of Japa-
nese products have increased — it takes some
time for that to become effective in terms of
future contracts, what the economists call
the J effect.

That is, after revaluation or devaluation —
this has been a historical experience — you
have a period in which things get worse in-
stead of better because of this situation, and
then they start to get better and adjust
themselves, and this will be a matter of
some several years, at least.

Q. If I understand what you have said so
far, you don't expect any substantial reduc-
tion this year in the projected $3.8 billion

deficit and you have failed to achieve any
specific goals — $2 billion, $3 billion, or what-
ever— for future years. If that is the case,
what substantial progress on the fundamen-
tal trade problem do we have here?

Mr. Johnson: You have the specifics, which
are contained in the statement here, in the
way of additional sales — additional sales of
agricultural products, additional sales of
uranium enrichment services, the additional
sales of aircraft, the additional sales of the
helicopters. Those are additional sales, some
of which will be reflected in this year's trade
figures, but the larger part of which will
probably be reflected in future years' trade
figures.

So as far as any major correction of this
year's trade figures, we would not expect
that to take place, as Ambassador Ingersoll
has pointed out. What we are working on
here is the immediate situation, but not so
much on the immediate situation as we are
working on the whole question of long-term
trends and long-term economic relations be-
tween the two countries and trying to turn
things around a little bit.

Remember, up to 1965 Japan had a very
adverse balance of payments with the United
States. We had a great surplus in our sales
from the United States. This change has
taken place since 1965, and in 1972 it has
now turned to an adverse balance of pay-
ments situation and adverse trade balance,
as far as we are concerned. What we are
trying to do is steer the thing off in another
direction, and both governments are work-
ing to do that.

I think that is the thing that has been
accomplished at this point, not just at this
meeting, but I think it has been affirmed at
this meeting and I think there is a better
understanding at the top level of both gov-
ernments of the problems and the actions
that we will be taking to correct it.

In that regard, I think that the Prime
Minister's and the President's talks have
been very, very useful. As Ambassador
Ingersoll points out, this is a continuing
process. It is not going to be solved in any

September 25, 1972

339

single meeting. It is a continuing process at
all levels of the government.

We announce in the communique here that
we look forward to a meeting early next
year of the Joint Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs. There will also be other
meetings at the various levels of the govern-
ment.

Ambassador IngersoU will be continuing
his negotiations in Tokyo. What we are talk-
ing about is not solving this in one dramatic
movement. What we are talking about is a
process here that has now been put into
motion.

Ambassador IngersoU: I would like to just
comment on this. As I mentioned earlier, we
do not know the exact amount of the reduc-
tion of the imbalance for this fiscal year
which will take place, but there are several
elements in here, such as special purchases
of agricultural products, which will not be,
you might say, the normal increases. There
are special purchases of helicopters and other
things, and we can't tell just when delivery
is going to be made of those. But all of those
that are made before March 31 will add to
the reduction of that imbalance.

Now, I pointed out in the last paragraph
of that statement on economic issues that
there have been some agreements made
which we think will have significant change
in the imbalance, not only this year but in
subsequent years, and as we go further
down the road they will have greater effect.
They are there in only about a four-line par-
agraph, but they are, I think, of the longer
term significance which we are all looking
for.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the
mutual security treaty, ivas there any talk
of the 50-odd tanks and 100 armored per-
sonnel carriers that cannot now be moved
from Japan to Viet-Nam?

Mr. Johnson: This was not discussed spe-
cifically. Ambassador IngersoU is carrying
on the discussions of that in Tokyo, but there
was general discussion of this whole prob-
lem of implementing this security treaty,

and obviously in a relationship of this kind,
there are problems on both sides.

Our security relationship is a complicated
one. We have our bases and facilities in
Japan, and the Japanese Government his-
torically, and continuing up to the present
time, has made earnest efforts to implement
the treaty conscientiously in accordance with
its tei-ms.

It has its problems at times with its own
people and its own political elements, and
we have discussed these problems in general
terms. You will see in the communique, both
governments have reaffirmed their adherence
to the mutual security treaty, to its impor-
tance to both countries, and expressed their
intention of continuing to have close con-
sultation with each other in carrying out its
terms.

The press: Thank you, gentlemen.

158th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassa-
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S.
delegation, at the 158th plena7'y session of
the meetirigs on Viet-Nam at Paris on Sep-
tember 7.

Press release 214 dated September 7

Ladies and gentlemen: Why do you con-
tinue to glorify war and militarism? Why
do you advocate violence for the settlement
of political problems? On September 2 the
Prime Minister of North Viet-Nam, Mr.
Pham Van Dong, extolled your policy as "a
determination to fight until total victory."
Your newspaper Nhan Dan observed that
day that "the more we fight, the more com-
plete will our victory be," while Mr. Dong
used a similar phrase: "the more we fight,
the more powerful we become." Evidence of-
fered by the Prime Minister in support of
his thesis included so-called "resounding
victories" in Thua Thien and Quang Tri

340

Department of State Bulletin

Provinces of South Viet-Nam by "our armed
forces and people."

Please note that Mr. Dong's use of the
term "our armed forces" within South Viet-
Nam means that you are no longer required
to maintain the transparent fiction that
North Vietnamese forces have remained
within your country's boundaries. You may
now feel free to acknowledge the well-known
fact that virtually the entirety of the North
Vietnamese army is deployed within South
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

It came as no surprise when on September
2 your Prime Minister scoffed at the search
for negotiated settlement of the conflict. Mr.
Dong denounced these meetings as "a trick"
and a "smokescreen" by our side, allegedly
to "conceal the war and deceive public opin-
ion." No more eloquent description of your
own practices could possibly be formulated.

Your true aim of imposing a Communist
regime upon the South Vietnamese people
has become so self-evident that only those
exceptionally eager to be duped fail to grasp
it. Since when has North Viet-Nam favored
the installation of non-Communist govern-
ments anywhere? Once again I am in the
debt of Prime Minister Dong for a lucid
formulation of your position. The North, he
said, is "the revolutionary base of the entire
country," for it is "armed with the great
thoughts of all-conquering, Marxist-Leninist
doctrine." His speech made it clear that the
Viet Cong, to use its correct name, is the
chosen instrument of North Viet-Nam and
that a so-called "tripartite government of
national concord" is the preferred vehicle for
installing the Viet Cong in power within
South Viet-Nam. I do not wish to embarrass
the representatives of the Viet Cong in this
forum when I suggest the pretentiousness of
the titles they are currently singing. What-
ever else the Viet Cong may be, they and
their few colleagues are not "provisional"
— for they are only the latest embodiment of
a conspiracy beginning with the Indochinese
Communist Party 40 years ago. Nor are they
"revolutionary," for nothing could be more
reactionary than to persist in Asia's old

miseries of war and oppression. The prob-
lem of the Viet Cong is its lack of repre-
sentativity. No one ever elected it into the
offices it doesn't fulfill; it administers noth-
ing ; and the only programs it carries out are
mobilization and combat under external
orders. It would simplify matters here were
you to abandon ridiculous pretenses and
accept the fact that the world perceives the
Viet Cong as the southern branch of Hanoi's
war machine — for it is nothing more than
that.

The import of my remarks is that we must
deal with factual situations in this forum.
Objective analysis and undogmatic dialogue
will enable us to make progress here, if you
will but adopt these approaches. I invite you
to draw the conclusions which the situation
dictates :

First, your military effort has failed. You
have not succeeded in your invasion of the
South. You have incurred terrible losses,
but you have not broken South Viet-Nam's
will or capacity to resist you. That Viet-
namization has succeeded is borne out "by the
setbacks you have experienced at the hands
of Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam
forces unaided by United States ground com-
bat units. Another striking fact is that the
United States has withdrawn, during your
offensive, 62 percent of American military
personnel in Viet-Nam when your offensive
began. After your Prime Minister declared
in his September 2 speech that Vietnamiza-
tion had failed, he felt it necessary to men-
tion and denounce that progress no less than
15 times in the same speech. Why is he so
concerned about a program which has failed ?
He knows the real answer, you know it, and
we know it: It has not failed.

Second, your political effort has failed.
Nearly a million South Vietnamese fled your
invading forces, which was a clear enough
response to the Viet Cong call for an anti-
government uprising. Neither the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam nor the
United States has succumbed to your politi-
cal demands. In particular, the United States
refuses to ease your failures on the battle-

September 25, 1972

341

field and your fears of the ballot box through
the treachery and interventionism you seek
of us.

Third, since your military and political of-
fensives have brought you nothing but ruin,
you should adopt serious diplomacy. We offer
to discuss with you an internationally super-
vised cease-fire throughout Indochina —
which all peoples would receive with grati-
tude. The return of American prisoners
would take place — which our Nation and
world public opinion so earnestly have
sought. Within four months thereafter the
complete withdrawal of United States forces
will occur — and your demand will have been
met. Then discussions among Vietnamese
concerning the future political institutions of
South Viet-Nam will complete the restora-
tion of a just, lasting peace — and the honor
of all who have upheld self-determination
for South Viet-Nam will have been vindi-
cated.

Please give our proposals serious consider-
ation. You will find that they envision a
peaceful future for Indochina which can end
years of conflict without harm to your legiti-
mate interests, including your hope that
Viet-Nam will eventually be unified. By
adopting the principle of nonviolence in the
settlement of political disputes you would be
in step with world trends. Is there any rea-
son to deny your people the benefits of
negotiation to resolve disputes?

Romanian Officials Tour United States
Under Cultural Program

The Department of State announced on
September 8 (press release 220) that a six-
member delegation of Romanian officials was
to arrive September 10 for a 10-day tour of
the United States under the U.S.-Romanian
cultural program. The visit was in return
for one made to Romania by a group of
American Governors last fall.

The delegation was to meet with State De-

partment oflficials and be guests at a lunch-
eon offered in their honor by Assistant Sec-
retary for European Affairs Walter J. Stoes-
sel, Jr. During their stay in the United
States, the delegation was to call on Gov-
ernor Marvin Mandel of Maryland and Gov-
ernor John A. Love of Colorado. Their tour,
in addition to Washington, Annapolis, and
Denver, was to include visits to San Fran-
cisco, the Central Valley of California, and
New York City.

The Romanian group was headed by
Gheorghe Cioara, President of the Executive
Committee of the Bucharest Municipal Peo-
ples Council (Mayor) and member of the
Executive Committee of the Central Commit-
tee of the Romania Communist Party. Mem-
bers of the delegation included:

AuREL DucA, President of the Executive Committee
of the Cluj District Council

Gheorghe Rosu, President of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Bacau District Council

Gheorghe Palos, President of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Gorj District Council

CoNSTANTiN Badescu, Counselor of State Commit-
tee for Local Administration

Stefan Nastasescu, Foreign Ministry official

U.S. Delegation to OAS Conference
on Education of Women

The Department of State announced on
August 18 (press release 198) that Miss
Barbara M. White, Career Minister of the
U.S. Information Agency and the second
woman now serving with the rank of Career
Minister in the U.S. Foreign Service, would
head the U.S. delegation to the Inter-Ameri-
can Specialized Conference on the Integral
Education of Women in Buenos Aires, Ar-
gentina, August 21-25.

The meeting, sponsored jointly by the Gov-
ernment of Argentina and by the Council of
Education, Science and Culture of the Orga-
nization of American States, focused upon
ways to integrate the American woman into
all levels of academic life.

342

Department of State Bulletin

Distinguished women educators and gov-
ernment officials from Latin America, the
Caribbean countries, and the United States
participated in the conference as it assessed
and sought to advance equal educational op-
portunity and a greater role in society for
women of the Western Hemisphere. The
meeting was the first of its kind to be held
under the auspices of the Organization of
American States and was planned with the
cooperation of the Inter-American Commis-
sion of Women, an OAS specialized agency,
which is scheduled to hold its 16th biennial
assembly in Washington during September.

The U.S. delegation to the Buenos Aires
conference consisted of the following women
who are prominent in public and private life:

Miss Barbara M. White, chairman of delegation;
Career Minister of the U.S. Information Agency.

Mrs. Flora Atherton, vice chairman of delegation;
U.S. Representative to the Inter-American Com-
mission of Women.

Dr. Barbara Newell, vice chairman of delegation;
president of Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.

Mrs. Joyce L. Robinson, adviser to delegation; di-
rector of Latin American Programs, Overseas
Education Fund of the League of Women Voters.

Dr. Bette C. White, adviser to delegation; associate
dean of students at Eastern Michigan University,
Ypsilanti, Mich.

Dr. Elizabeth Tolman, adviser to delegation; Eco-
nomic Adviser to U.S. Permanent Mission to the
OAS, and career Foreign Service officer.

Letters of Credence

Austria

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Austria, Arno Halusa, presented
his credentials to President Nixon on Sep-

tember 7. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated Sep-
tember 7.

Finland

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Finland, Leo Olavi Tuominen,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on September 7. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated
September 7.

Guinea

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Guinea, Sadan Moussa Toure,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on September 7. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated Sep-
tember 7.

Nigeria

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, John M. Garba,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on September 7. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated
September 7.

Upper Volta

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Upper Volta, Telesphore Yagui-
bou, presented his credentials to President
Nixon on September 7. For texts of the Am-
bassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated September 7.

September 25, 1972

343

The Role of National Defense in Our Efforts for Peace

Address by President Nixon (Excerpt)^

Now, I have selected for my subject to
address this great convention of the Ameri-
can Legion here in Chicago, national defense.

Now, when I use the subject of national
defense before a Legion convention, I am
sure many would say that is like the preacher
talking to the choir, because after all, you are
already converted. I hope all members of the
choir are converted, but in any event you are
people who believe in national defense.

You pass resolutions for strong national
defense year after year. And whenever is-
sues come up, whoever is President of the
United States, he can be sure that the com-
mander of the American Legion, as he comes
to the White House, as your commander here
now and as others through the years have
been there, will be there, always supporting
strong national defense.

I tell you why I talk about it today. I talk
about it because it is an issue. It happens to
be an issue in an election campaign, but even
if there were not an election it would be an
issue, because the American people naturally
would like to spend more of their money on
domestic needs, they would like to spend
enough to defend the country, but they don't
want to spend more than they need to.

And so naturally there is honest difference
of opinion as to how much we ought to spend
in order to have an adequate national defense.

^ Made before the national convention of the Amer-
ican Legion at Chicago, 111., on Aug. 24 (White
House press release, Chicago, 111.).

I want to talk to you about it now with those
thoughts in mind.

How much is enough? What do we really
need?

Let me begin by saying something that is
quite obvious, and that is that when we speak
before a group like the American Legion,
you know from personal experience the im-
portance of keeping America strong.

I think perhaps the most eloquent state-
ment in recent times in that respect was by
General MacArthur in his very famous
speech on the plain of West Point, "Duty,
Honor, Country." If you haven't read it,
read it again. It is one of the greatest
speeches perhaps ever made on national de-
fense and also on what is great about Amer-
ica. About the soldier, he told them, those
young men on the plain, "above all other
people," he said, the soldier "prays for peace,
for he must suffer and bear the deepest
wounds and scars of war."

That is something we forget sometimes.
We think that a veterans organization is pri-
marily interested in problems of war. I have
found that veterans organizations have the
strongest commitments to peace, because you
know what war is, and you are for strength
because you want to avoid more war.

Others may talk of the dream of peace and
the horrors of war, but no one understands
them better than you, you who have to pay
the toll. It is the military man, as much as
the poet or the politician, who is the guard-
ian of peace when it comes and is the restorer
of peace when it is challenged.

344

Department of State Bulletin

History is strewn with the ruins of coun-
tries which, sometimes for the most idealistic
of reasons, lost the will to defend themselves
and ultimately lost the will to survive at all.

George Washington stated it also very well
— perhaps it has not been surpassed — when
he said, "To be prepared for war is one of the
most effectual means of preserving peace."
Let us not forget that warning of his, because
the stakes now for us and for the rest of the
world are infinitely greater than it was in
that early period when the United States
was a very strong country in terms of its
own spirit but very weak militarily and not a
great factor in the world.

Washington was not alone in his conviction
that it takes a strong America to keep a
free America. Lincoln, Wilson, Theodore
Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Tru-
man, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy,
Lyndon Johnson — each time we have found
that they have spoken on this subject always
reflected in eloquent terms the need for a
strong national defense.

I am convinced those are the views of a
majority of Americans, whatever their party
affiliations. I feel, of course, that there are
naturally some small antimilitary activists
who totally disagree. They have rights to
their opinions.

As I will point out, I believe that when we
consider what the goal is — and the goal is
peace — that it is certainly irrefutable that
we need the strong national defense if we
are going to reach the goal.

That is why my principle, like yours, is
that the United States must never have a
defense which is second to that of any other
nation in the world.

I say that for a number of reasons which,
I suppose, might be open to question, but one
of them is not that it is a matter of jingoistic
pride, although we should be proud of our
country; it is not a matter of national ego,
although we should not be ashamed of our
country. But, you see, I have sat across the
bargaining table with representatives of
other great powers. I know what they stand

for. I know that the only way that we can
get a reduction of arms, the only way that
we can get agreements that will limit the
danger of war, is to be sure that the Presi-
dent of the United States, whoever he is, is
never negotiating from weakness. That is
what we have to have.

Now the question is, "What is enough?"
because I realize that others have spoken to
this convention and others will speak to
Legion conventions in the future and say,
"We have enough; we can cut." You should
consider that, but I ask you now to consider,
very calmly and very quietly, what I have
to say about what is enough. I have studied
this a great deal. I have had the opportunity
not only to negotiate, where I found out what
the other side had, and I knew what we had,
but I also have had an opportunity, as we
have wound down the war in Viet-Nam, to do
something that we all want to do — to cut on
defense where it is not needed.

We have economized. We will continue to
economize on military spending whenever it
is safe to do so. But I have never gambled,
and I never will gamble, with the safety of
the American people under the false banner
of economy. Lasting peace is built on
strength — economy always, but weakness
never.

Now, look at the record. Let's see what we
have done.

We have been able to reduce defense spend-
ing to a safe minimum without betraying our
security or dishonoring our treaty commit-
ments.

We have successfully reduced our overall
military manpower by nearly one-third. This
is all over the past 31/2 years.

We have closed overseas bases which were
no longer needed for our national security,
and we have done that without undermining
the confidence of our allies.

We have successfully persuaded our allies
to take up a greater share of the free-world
defense burden than they have in the past,
under the Nixon doctrine.

Separate the facts from the campaign

September 25, 1972

345

rhetoric and you will find that the 1973 de-
fense budget, which has been subjected to so
much criticism, accounts for only 6.4 percent
of our GNP and that imposes the smallest
economic burden on our country of any de-
fense budget in more than 20 years. Now,
that is real progress.

Now we come to the key point.

We have cut our defense budget in terms
of its burden on our American economy.
Can we go further ? In my belief, it would be
a mistake to go further, and I am supported
in that belief by a bipartisan majority in the
House and in the Senate. And to their great
credit, let me say, speaking as one who is a
member of the minority party as reflected in
those two bodies. Democrats and Republicans
who put their country above their party
voted down big defense cuts because they
knew it would cut into the muscle of Ameri-
can defense, and that we must never do.

Now that, of course, is a conclusion. Let
me give you the facts to back it up. Let me
give you the reasons why I think that Demo-
crats join with Republicans in voting over-
whelmingly in both the House and the Senate
against these big cuts in defense that were
supported by other people who believed that
we could cut and still be strong enough, still
be, as some have said, the strongest nation
or at least with a defense second to none.

When we talk about who is going to be
first, who is going to be second, let's put
it in terms of what is sufficient for both coun-
tries. In that connection, what we find as we
look at the Soviet Union and the United
States, taking the two strongest powers in
the world, we find that today they are rela-
tively equal when we balance it all out in
terms of their defenses. We are ahead in
some areas; they are ahead in others. We are
ahead in the areas we believe are necessary
for our defense; they are ahead in the areas
that they believe are necessary for their de-
fense.

At the present time, for example, the Soviet
Union has a much greater army than we have
because they are a land power. They need
more. On the other hand, in other areas we

are ahead. But now let's look at these var-
ious cuts.

If we want to keep the United States from
having the second-best defense, we must rec-
ognize that if we should take the Minuteman
III program, the Poseidon missile program,
and if we should halt the development of
those programs, it would mean that the
United States would be the second strongest
country in the world in missiles. We would
be number two, not number one.

So now we start. We are second in man-
power already. Now we are second in mis-
siles. If we were to cut 60 percent of our
strategic bomber force, which is the second
recommendation made by some of the others,
and if we cancel development of the B-1
bomber, it would mean that the United
States would become the second strongest
nation in the world in airpower. There are
no other conclusions you can reach.

If we cut back on our naval strength, as
some have recommended, and they have rec-
ommended that we can cut carrier forces
from 16 to six, if we do that at a time when
the Soviet Union is actively engaged in the
greatest naval buildup in history, the United
States would become the second strongest
nation in the world in naval power.

What this adds up to, my friends, very
simply is this: We would be second on the
ground; we would be second in airpower;
we would be second in terms of missiles;
and we would be second as far as the Navy
is concerned.

That means that we would be hopelessly
behind. We cannot let that happen to Amer-
ica. We have to see that America always has
enough. So the issue of whether we cut or
don't cut is very simply this: The cuts that I
have mentioned make the United States the
second strongest nation in the world. That is
why I have had to oppose them. That is why
a majority of the Members of the House and
Senate oppose them, and that is why I ask
the American Legion to oppose them in the
interest of strong national defense for this
country.

Let's turn to a couple of other areas.

346

Department of State Bulletin

Many of the Legionnaires here have served
in Europe, either in World War II or, after
that, in our peacetime forces in NATO. If
we would have a major, unilateral reduction
of our forces in NATO, what it would do
would be to undercut the confidence of our
friends; but more so, it would destroy an ini-
tiative that we are now undertaking with the
Soviet Union and with the Warsaw Pact
foi'ces mutually to reduce our forces.

Let's look at another point, looking to the
future. If we were to cut back the money
going into research and development for a
more modern national defense, we risk the
safety of the next generation of Americans,
because this I know: The Soviet Union is not
cutting back on its research and development.

Let us remember: We have made a signifi-
cant step forward in our talks with the So-
viets, but it was hardheaded bargaining. We
expected them to bargain hard. We bar-
gained hard. We have had the first step taken
to limit nuclear arms. We have had a treaty
to limit, of course, nuclear arms as far as
defensive arms are concerned; we have an
offensive limitation as an understanding. We
are going to go on with further negotiations,
we trust, later in this year.

But, my friends, the only way, in any kind
of a negotiation, you can get something in
dealing with a major power like the Soviet
Union, or any other major power — the only
way you can get something is if you have
something to give. If the United States uni-
laterally cuts back on what we have, you have
destroyed their incentive to come to the con-
ference table, because they will already have
what they want.

That is another reason why we have to
keep these defenses up. That is the responsi-
ble position. We are going to continue to be
responsible. If we do, putting it on the posi-
tive side, we stand today on the brink of a
more peaceful, more secure era for all man-
kind because from a positive standpoint we
can negotiate in these areas, negotiating not
from weakness.

Now, none of this could have been achieved
without the strong moral support of groups

like the American Legion, of individual
Americans of both political parties, as I have
indicated. If there is one thing that can sus-
tain a President in trying times, it is the sup-
port and faith of the people themselves. More
than any other American, the President has
the opportunity to witness this faith in a
thousand big and little ways.

People write letters. They say they are
praying for you. A commander of the Amer-
ican Legion or VFW or another veterans or-
ganization comes in or he calls on the phone.
These things mean a great deal, particularly
when we have difficult times. I am grateful
for the support that you have given, not to
me as an individual, not to my party, but to
the President of the United States, who is
Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.
You have stood behind your government dur-
ing the difficult but successful policy of wind-
ing down the war in Viet-Nam and settling it
in an honorable way.

That is why we have been able to bring
home half a million American fighting men
from Viet-Nam. But what is more impor-
tant, we have done it without selling out our
allies, without surrendering to our enemies,
and without abandoning our prisoners of
war and our missing in action. That we will
never do.

Now, I would like to say something, if I
could, about the men who have served and
are serving our country in Viet-Nam and
other parts of the world. I know that it has
become rather fashionable in recent times,
perhaps in the last four or five years as we
have gone through the terribly difficult war
in Viet-Nam, to find everything that is wrong
about the men who serve in our Armed
Forces: They are drug addicts; they are dan-
gerous people; they are savage; they are peo-
ple who are really the inferior people, the
ones who, from a moral standpoint, agreed
to serve rather than not to serve and so on
and so forth.

Let me tell you that I have been to Viet-
Nam a number of times. Since our involve-
ment there began, I have been there in '64,
'65 — six times, as a matter of fact, before I

September 25, 1972

347

became President, and once since. I have
gone out in the field. I have been to Da Nang
with the marines. I have been up in the high-
lands with the Army. I have been down in
the delta, also with Army forces. I have seen
some of the naval forces, too.

Let me tell you, yes, there are, as there al-
ways are in every war, as there always are in
any American community of young men,
there are men who don't live up to the stand-
ards that we would like. But I can tell you
that as I have seen the young men who have
served in Viet-Nam, I am proud of them.
They are fine young men, and we should
stand up for them.

I am very proud, for example, of Marine
and Army groups who, in the year 1967 —
and it has happened every year since then;
that was the last time I was there and had
a chance to look at it in this particular mat-
ter— contributed $1 million out of their very
small pay for the purpose of helping to build
schools and community centers and roads for
the people of South Viet-Nam.

I have seen marines, I have seen young
men, enlisted men, not officers necessarily —
oh, they were there, too — but I have seen
them out there teaching language, working,
taking their time, helping these people in a
peaceful way. Let me say, instead of making
moral heroes of a few hundred who have
deserted their country, let's honor the real
heroes who have served their country in
Viet-Nam.

They are gallant men. They are not
ashamed of their country. They are brave
men who did not desert their Nation. They
are heroes who will stand just as tall as those
who fought at Normandy and Iwo Jima.
America is not going to turn her back on
them. We are not going to make a mockery
of their sacrifice and devotion by talking of
amnesty for deserters while some of their
comrades are held captive in brutal North
Vietnamese prisons.

What they fought for and what we seek
today is a true generation of peace, not a

short, humiliating truce that will encourage
aggression and have the effect of rewarding
the foes of freedom. I know that many say
that the journey to such a peace is long, and
of course it is. But it is a journey that we
have begun. We have begun it in opening a
new relationship with the world's most pop-
ulous country, the People's Republic of
China. We have begun it in our negotiations
with the Soviet Union. I have gone to the
four corners of the earth, including even
other countries that a President never visited
before.

I do not mean that the trips alone will do
it, but I do mean that because the United
States is strong, because the United States is
respected, the United States can be and
should be the leader in the world for peace.

That is why we must keep our strength,
because if we were not strong we would not
be respected. Let's never have a President in
that position as he goes abroad. I found a
desire for peace in Peking and Moscow.
Many of you will find that hard to believe,
but it is not desired for the same reason or
the same terms in each of these world cen-
ters. But it is desired, so that if America
does not falter or weaken we have a basis to
build on.

We can have a hope that the next genera-
tion of Americans will not have to face the
same specter of war in their time that we
have had in ours. This is a noble hope, a hope
we all should work to build into reality. It
will not become a reality if we heed the hon-
est but misguided voices of those who say
we should weaken America today and naively
hope for peace tomorrow.

But it can become a reality if we continue
to follow a responsible, rational foreign pol-
icy, if we keep America strong enough to
make that policy credible.

Therefore, I say, let us join together to
keep America strong. If we do this, a strong
America can continue to lead the world to-
ward a just and lasting peace.

348

Department of State Bulletin

U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Nixon '

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith the Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Japan for the Pro-
tection of Migratory Birds and Birds in
Danger of Extinction, and their Environ-
ment, signed at Tokyo on March 4, 1972. I
transmit also, for the information of the
Senate, the report from the Department of
State regarding the Convention.

This Convention, which marks the cul-
mination of several years of intensive study
and consultations between experts of both
countries, is designed to provide for the pro-
tection of species of birds which are common
to both countries or which migrate between
them. Recognizing the importance of the
preservation of the environment of birds
and recognizing that island environments
are particularly susceptible to disturbance,
the Convention provides that each country
will develop programs to preserve and en-

^ Transmitted on Aug. 18 (White House press
release) ; also printed as S. Ex. R, 92d Cong., 2d
sess., which includes the report from the Depart-
ment of State and the text of the convention.

hance the environment of the birds which
are protected under the Convention.

I believe that the Convention establishes
an effective basis for cooperation in taking
measures for the management and protec-
tion of the birds included under the Conven-
tion. I recommend that the Senate give early
and favorable consideration to the Conven-
tion and give its advice and consent to ratifi-
cation.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, August is, 1972.

Paraguayan Cooperation in Fight
Against Illegal Drugs Welcomed

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^

The extradition of Auguste Ricord to the
United States to face trial is a major step
forward in the administration's fight against
illicit drug trafficking. We appreciate the
cooperation of the Paraguayan Government
and look forward to further collaboration
with them and all other concerned nations as
we work to eliminate this menace to human
society. Ambassador Ylitalo and his staff at
our Embassy in Asuncion are to be congratu-
lated for their part in effecting this extra-
dition.

'Issued on Sept. 2 (press release 208).

September 25, 1972

349

The Step-by-Step Approach to Peace in the Middle East

Address by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^

Mr. Plofsky [Ralph Plofsky, a past na-
tional commander, Jewish War Veterans]
distinguished guests, and friends: First let
me say thank you for your very generous
introduction. I cannot help but recall the
story of the man who fell off the 20th story
of a building. After he passed the 10th floor,
a friend stuck his head out of the window
and shouted, "Joe, so far you are all right."
There are times that in this job, which has
been very challenging, I have felt a little bit
like the fellow who fell off the 20th floor. But
nevertheless it has been a labor of love, a
labor of deep commitment to a political
settlement which would result in a durable
peace in the area.

There are three aspects of the Middle East-
ern problem that help explain the continuing
danger in the area.

There is the Arab-Israeli dispute, where
the fundamental chasm is still deep, where
mistrust between the parties remains.

There are the differences within the Arab
world itself, the intra-Arab disputes that, in
addition to the differences over the Arab-
Israeli dispute, contribute to the present in-
stability in the area. The objective of Arab
unity still remains elusive.

And as if this were not enough, the fact
that the Middle East is an area of potential
conflict between the major powers helps to
explain why it is high on the agenda of world
trouble spots.

' Made before the national convention of the Jew-
ish War Veterans of the U.S.A. at Houston, Tex., on
Aug. 19.

In my judgment, there is no satisfactory
answer to the situation other than a stable
and durable peace between the two sides — a
peace agreement that will replace the 20
years of de facto cease-fire, a peace agree-
ment in which each side undertakes obliga-
tions to the other, not a scotch-tape armistice
arrangement, not undefined lines, but a peace
agreement based on the fundamental phi-
losophy of live-and-let-live.

As we look at the situation today, there are
several positive elements.

The first is the cease-fire that has existed
in the area well over two years. There are
many things that can be said about the cease-
fire, but I would single out one in particular :
The people on both sides have experienced a
period of over two years of reduced violence.
This period, I hope, in time will help create a
new atmosphere in the Middle East, a new
atmosphere which has begun to emerge — not
only an atmosphere of live-and-let-live but
an atmosphere where there can be deep and
meaningful coexistence; where people can
move freely; and where each side can have
confidence that agreements entered into will
be kept because they will be agreements
serving the interests of both.

The second positive element is that the
balance in the area has been and will be
maintained. I am convinced that for Ameri-
can diplomacy in the area to be effective it
has to be based on the maintenance of the
balance within the region, as it has been
these past years, and the maintenance of the
global balance. It must also continue to be
bulwarked by a strong American presence in

350

Department of State Bulletin

the Mediterranean. Diplomacy must have
teeth to be credible in the area.

A third element in the present situation
has been the development of greater realism
in the Arab world. I say this with some cau-
tion. Certainly the elements of violence in
the Middle East are there. Certainly the peo-
ple and the forces who see the military option
as the answer still remain. But the forces
of moderation are slowly getting the upper
hand. The people in the area have an oppor-
tunity over the next three or four or five
years to strengthen those voices of modera-
tion; to move toward a peace shaped princi-
pally by the people and the countries of the
area.

I am mindful of the fact that my words
here tonight will be heard and scrutinized
both in Cairo and in Tel Aviv. I hope you will
bear this in mind. I have probably spoken to
President Sadat for a longer period of time
than any other official American since he has
assumed the Presidency of his country. I
want to say to this Jewish audience: I be-
lieve he wants a peaceful solution. I believe
he has unleashed certain expectations in his
countiy which the people of his country want
satisfied. I believe he wants to satisfy those
expectations, both in terms of peace and the
welfare of his people. I believe that a part of
the greater realism in the Arab world, re-
gardless of the strident rhetoric we hear
daily, is the appreciation that going to war
would not solve anything. It would not solve
anything for the people or the countries in
the area, nor would it get at the key issues
of a binding contractual peace agreement or
resolving the territorial issues that divide the
two sides.

What's our objective? It is a stable peace
in the area. We have in the Security Council
resolution of November 1967 the framework
of a binding peace agreement.^ But this
Security Council resolution, important as it
is, is no more than a bareboned framework.
A basic assumption of that resolution was
that there would be negotiations between the

two sides in order to arrive at an agreement.
Such negotiations would seek to resolve the
key questions of withdrawal, of territory, of
borders, of the opening of the Suez Canal,
the question of the right of each state in the
area to exist, and the problem of refugees.
It is, as I say, a bareboned outline. It can
have no lasting meaning in terms of imple-
mentation unless the details are filled out and
agreed to by both sides and unless the resolu-
tion, in fact, in detail, and in reality, leads
to a binding peace agreement arrived at by
the two sides, not imposed from the outside.
We have influence that we can bring to bear
on the situation, but no major power has the
capacity to impose a solution.

Where do matters stand ? At the May sum-
mit in Moscow, the Middle East was not a
primary item, though it was discussed thor-
oughly and in detail. The communique en-
dorsed a political solution based on the No-
vember 1967 resolution.^ We all know the
1967 resolution is interpreted differently in
Israel and in the Arab world. The Egyptians
have always insisted the resolution means
total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that
existed before the June war of 1967. Israel
has never agreed with this interpretation.
The resolution does call for withdrawal of
Israeli forces from territories occupied dur-
ing the June war. But it also calls for secure
and recognized boundaries. The Security
Council resolution neither endorses nor pre-
cludes the 1967 lines as the final lines. The
assumption was that the final lines would
have to be agreed between the two sides. I
helped negotiate that resolution; and I am
therefore fully familiar with its legislative
history. The phrase "secure and recognized
boundaries" is in the resolution, and it was
adopted by a unanimous vote of the U.N.
Security Council with each side applying its
own interpretation in the explanations of
vote. The Security Council did not endorse
any specific lines as the final lines. This was
and is a matter for the parties themselves to

' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Dec.
18, 1967, p. 843.

' For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow
May 29 during President Nixon's visit, see Bulletin
of June 26, 1972, p. 899.

September 2S, 1972

351

decide in the context of real negotiations,
whether under the aegis of Ambassador
Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gun-
nar Jarring] or under other auspices.

In addition to the endorsement of a polit-
ical solution in the summit communique, an
important set of principles was adopted:*
that each side should avoid confrontations
over various trouble spots, that each ought
to resort to peaceful means, that each should
try to resist the temptation to derive unilat-
eral benefit from one given trouble spot or
another. There were no new departures. The
communique tells the story: Neither major
power wanted or wants to see the present
situation break out again into hostilities
between the two sides. Both sides remain
committed to a political settlement based on
the November 1967 Security Council resolu-
tion.

Since then there have been significant de-
velopments in Egypt. I am not in a position
to say much about these developments. The
events speak for themselves. This is an
internal matter for the Egyptian people to
decide. Moreover, not all of the facts are in;
and before any firm judgments and conclu-
sions can be drawn, we will want to be clear
on what the situation is. That there has been
a substantial reduction of the Soviet pres-
ence in Egypt has been confirmed. What it
will mean in the future, what it will mean in
terms of the "no war, no peace" situation in
the area, what it will mean in terms of the
possibilities of future negotiations, is diffi-
cult to predict at this point. At present the
position on the substance of a settlement
between the two sides remains unchanged.

There are diplomatic opportunities avail-
able. Ambassador Jarring has just con-
cluded two weeks in New York. The United
States has supported both the November
1967 resolution and Ambassador Jarring's
mission. If Ambassador Jarring can break
the impasse, it would be fine with us. But we
have doubts on this score for one simple rea-
son: Egypt says there must be total Israeli

' For text of the basic principles of relations
signed at Moscow May 29, see ibid., p. 898.

withdrawal to the lines v/hich existed before
the June war; Israel is equally insistent that
there must be substantial change in the lines.
Because this difference is fundamental at
this stage and not bridgeable in the near
future, we continue to feel the more practical
approach is the step-by-step approach.

You will recall that a year ago both
President Sadat and Prime Minister Meir in-
dicated a willingness to explore the possibili-
ties of a so-called interim Suez Canal agree-
ment. We, the United States, over the past
year have tried to get these talks started, and
we have not been successful. In October
1971 Egypt was favorable, Israel was not.
Last February Israel took an affirmative
decision to enter into so-called proximity
talks under the aegis of the United States.
The present Israeli position, in simple terms,
is that it is willing to enter into these talks
without conditions. The present Egyptian
position is that before Egypt is willing to
enter into such proximity talks it wants a
prior commitment on the part of Israel to
the memorandum submitted by Ambassador
Jarring in February of 1971, which would
amount to a prior commitment to withdraw
to the line with Egypt that existed before the
June war of 1967.

In the last few weeks the Prime Minister
of Israel has stressed once again and re-
affirmed the desire of Israel to enter into
these talks. We noted in particular that in
her most recent speech she placed a certain
amount of stress on the fact that Israel con-
ceives of any interim Suez Canal agreement
as temporary. A few days later Defense
Minister Dayan placed similar emphasis on
the desirability of such an interim agree-
ment, indicating also some willingness to
consider, in his words, "a line in the Sinai,
temporary or permanent." The Israeli em-
phasis on the temporary nature of any in-
terim Suez Canal agreement seems, in my
judgment, to reflect a recognition on the part
of Israel that one of the difficulties which
Egypt has with the notion of an interim
agreement is that it not become a new indefi-
nite de facto status quo. Egypt is understand-
ably concerned that any interim agreement

352

Department of State Bulletin

not become a final agreement with Israel re-
maining in occupation of territoi-y.

I can recall, since this has already been in
the public domain, having visited Israel a
year ago in May and having had long discus-
sions with the Prime Minister. We discussed
this particular point of Arab concern — that
an interim agreement not be the final agree-
ment. I was authorized at that time by the
Government of Israel to communicate the
following to Pi-esident Sadat: First, that
Israel would be willing to withdraw in the
context of any interim agreement to what-
ever line is agreed to and that that line
would not be the final line. And secondly, I
was also authorized to communicate to Presi-
dent Sadat that Israel would be willing to
withdraw in the context of an overall peace
agreement to such other line that might be
agreed to in the context of those negotiations.
This is not news, because the Foreign Minis-
ter of Israel indicated what I just said in
these terms in his speech before the General
Assembly a year ago. But these two points,
in addition to the emphasis on the temporary
nature of any interim Suez Canal agreement,
are intended, I believe, to try to reassure
Egypt that an interim agreement, in fact,
would be considered by Israel as a partial
step — a partial step which would open the
resources of the Suez Canal to Egypt, since
Israel has never questioned the sovereignty
of Egypt over the Suez Canal; a step that
would mean an extended cease-fire, would
mean that the combatants in the area would
be separated, would offer new opportunities
for further efforts to achieve overall settle-
ment. In short, it would be an agreement in
the mutual interest of both sides because it
would be a practical and realistic test of
peace on the ground. It would give a prac-
tical meaning to signed pieces of paper.

Let me leave you with one concluding
thought. The "no war, no peace" situation
in the area gives continuing opportunity to
our adversary for penetration in the area,
regardless of the recent developments that
have occurred in Egypt. There is no satis-
factory alternative to the unstable "no war,
no peace" situation other than a stable peace

agreement. The key is negotiations. Unfor-
tunately, the concept of negotiations does not
have the same meaning in the Arab world as
it does in the Western world. Negotiations
are the key because the day is long gone when
the Middle East can claim to be unique in
this regard. There have been three wars in
the last two decades in the Middle East. If
North Korea can talk to South Korea and the
East Germans can talk to the West Germans,
if the Indians can talk to the Pakistanis in
the aftermath of a war, just a few months
after a war, if we can talk to Peking when
there has been no dialogue for 20 years, if we
can talk to the Viet Cong every day in Paris
— then the force of the argument that the
Middle East must remain a unique exception
in this regard is weak and unrealistic. I do
not mean that such negotiations need start
face-to-face at the outset. But there is need
for a negotiating process to begin; proximity
talks on an interim Suez Canal agreement
are still the most feasible approach. So I
hope as we look ahead that opportunities in
time will develop. I believe the minimal con-
ditions exist in the area for such' opportuni-
ties to evolve in time. We remain available
to play a role in promoting an interim Suez
Canal agreement. I hope I can get together
again with this audience, a year, two, three
years from now, and find in existence not
only a cease-fire but a peace meeting the
legitimate concerns of both sides. I am con-
vinced this is a do-able proposition.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

Annual Report on Agricultural Export Activities
Carried Out Under Public Law 480 During Calen-
dar Year 1971. Message from the President of
the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc.
92-318. June 29, 1972. 140 pp.

The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nu-
clear Age. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security Policy and Scientific Developments
by Leneice N. Wu, Foreign Affairs Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
August 1972. 67 pp.

September 25, 1972

353

THE UNITED NATIONS

Security Council Unable To Agree
on U.N. Membership for Bangladesh

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council on August 25 by U.S. Rep-
resentative Christopher H. Phillips.

USUN press release 82 dated August 25

My delegation regrets that this Council
has been unable to agree on a recommenda-
tion for the admission of Bangladesh to the
United Nations.^ We also regret that it was
not possible to agree on a further but limited
postponement which might have made pos-
sible a resolution of the underlying problems
which have contributed to the impasse we
face.

As the record makes clear, we would
have been gratified to see the entry into the
United Nations of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh. The United States recognized
Bangladesh on April 4, 1972, and established
formal diplomatic relations on May 18.
Previously the United States had maintained
an official mission in Dacca since 1949, and
over the years many Americans, both in
official and private capacities, have derived
much satisfaction from their association

' On Aug. 25 the Council voted on a draft resolu-
tion (S/10771) sponsored by India, the U.S.S.R., the
United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia, whereby the Se-
curity Council would recommend to the General As-
sembly the admission of Bangladesh to membership
in the U.N. The draft resolution was not adopted
owing to the negative vote of a permanent member
of the Council, the vote being 11 (U.S.) in favor, 1
(China) against, with 3 abstentions.

A draft resolution sponsored by China (S/10768
and Corr. 1), whereby the Council would postpone
consideration of the application of Bangladesh for
membership in the U.N. pending full implementation
of General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) and
Security Council Resolution 307 (1971), had been re-
jected by a vote of 3 to 3, with 9 abstentions (U.S.).

with the development efforts of the people
of Bangladesh. We are pleased with the
friendly relations existing between our coun-
try and Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has emerged from the tragic
events of last year with its economy and
infrastructure disrupted and damaged. A
massive international relief effort under
United Nations auspices was mounted to
assist the people and Government of Ban-
gladesh in their task of economic and social
reconstruction, and I take pleasure in the
fact that to date the United States has com-
mitted $286.4 million to this effort.

Mr. President, we sincerely hope that
progress will continue toward the normali-
zation of relations between the nations of the
subcontinent. Such progress we believe can
best be advanced by full and speedy imple-
mentation of all the provisions of Resolution
307 adopted by the Security Council last
December.^ In particular we strongly believe
that the provisions of the Geneva Convention
regarding prisoners of war should be imple-
mented as soon as possible.

Mr. President, if I may comment briefly
on the vote of the United States on the
amendment proposed by the delegation of
Somalia.^ In this connection, we realize, Mr.
President, that in voting for this amendment
which was not carried, the effect of this
language would have been debatable, given
the ruling of the International Court of Jus-
tice and the provisions of the charter. But
we regarded the resolution as a recommen-
dation of the Council for admission of Ban-
gladesh nonetheless. We voted for the lan-
guage contained in the proposed amendment
because of the great importance the United

' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan.
17, 1972, p. 70.

'An amendment introduced by Somalia (S/10775)
to the four-power draft resolution, which would have
made the recommendation contained in that resolu-
tion subject to the immediate implementation of the
provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 relating
to prisoners of war, was rejected by the Council on
Aug. 25 by a vote of 4 (U.S.) to 4, with 7 absten-
tions.

354

Department of State Bulletin

states attaches to the release of prisoners
of war.

The peoples of the Indian subcontinent
have rich and ancient cultures which have
contributed much to the knowledge and en-
richment of mankind everywhere. Unfor-
tunately, these same peoples have in recent
times been the victims of great suffering and
sorrow. It is our earnest hope that progress
toward amelioration of these conditions can
be advanced. For our part we are prepared
to cooperate fully with the United Nations
and with all the peoples of the region to this
end.

15-16 (1 million square yards equivalent),
22-23 (1 million square yards equivalent),
and 26-27 (2 million square yards equiva-
lent).

Provisions for flexibility, growth, consul-
tation, spacing, exchange of statistics, cate-
gory designations and conversion factors,
definition of cotton textile articles, equity,
and carryover are similar to those in other
U.S. bilateral cotton textile agreements.

Current Actions

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Nicaragua Sign
Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on
September 7 (press release 216) that notes
had been exchanged at Washington on Sep-
tember 5 constituting a new bilateral agree-
ment governing exports of cotton textiles
from Nicaragua to the United States. Dr.
Alvaro Rizo-Castellon, Charge d'Affaires of
the Embassy of Nicaragua, and Willis C.
Armstrong, Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, signed the respective
notes. (For texts of the notes, see press
release 216.)

Major features of the new agreement are
as follows:

a. A five-year term from August 1, 1972,
through July 31, 1977;

b. An overall ceiling of 5 million square
yards equivalent for the first agreement year
(i.e., August 1, 1972-July 31, 1973; and

c. Specific ceilings on combined categories
9-10 (1 million square yards equivalent),

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971."
Signature: Burundi, March 6, 1972.
Ratification deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic, June 9, 1972 (with a reservation).

Universal copyright convention, as revised, with pro-
tocols 1 and 2. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.^
Ratified by the President: August 28, 1972.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation
Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December
15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952;
for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS
7063.
Adherence deposited: Zaire, July 26, 1972.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, as amended. Done at Washington Decem-
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27,
1945. TIAS 1501, 6748.

Signatures and acceptances: Bahrain, September
7, 1972; Qatar, September 8, 1972.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March
18, 1970. Enters into force October 7, 1972.
Signature: France, August 24, 1972.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union viath final protocol signed at

' Not in force.

September 25, 1972

355

Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu-
lations with final protocol and annex, and the uni-
versal postal convention with final protocol and
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except
for article V of the additional protocol, which
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratifications deposited: Bolivia, July 20, 1972;
Finland, July 21, 1972.
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree-
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31,
1971. TIAS 7236.
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 21, 1972.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva
July 17, 1971. Enters into force January 1, 1973.
Proclaimed by the President: September 4, 1972.

Weights and Measures

Convention establishing an International Organiza-
tion of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris October
12, 1955, and amended January 1968. Entered into
force May 28, 1958."

Accession approved by the President: August 28,
1972.

BILATERAL

Denmark

Agreement amending the agreement of May 28,
1962, as amended (TIAS 5060, 5775), for financing
certain educational exchange programs. Effected
by exchange of notes at Copenhagen November
22, 1971, and April 27, 1972. Entered into force
April 27, 1972.

Lebanon

Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes.
Signed at Beirut September 1, 1972. Entered into
force provisionally September 1, 1972; definitively,
on the date of exchange of notes indicating ap-
proval of each contracting party in accordance
with its constitutional procedures.

Mexico

Agreement confirming an agreement to eradicate
screwworms. Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico August 28, 1972. Entered into force Au-
gust 28, 1972.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with

annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington September 5, 1972. Entered into force
September 5, 1972; effective August 1, 1972.

Norway

'■ Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 4—10

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 4 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
198 of August 18 and 208 of September 2.

No. Date Subject

t209 9/5 Rogers: statement on attack on
Israeli Olympic team.

t210 9/5 Brower: Special Subcommittee of
the International Civil Aviation
Organization, Sept. 4.

1211 9/5 Rogers: statement on death of
Israeli Olympic team members.

t212 9/6 Rogers: Special Subcommittee of
the ICAO.

*213 9/6 Dr. David C. Driskell, authority
on black American art, to visit
four African nations under De-
partment of State grant.
214 9/7 Porter: 158th plenary session on
Viet-Nam at Paris.

*215 9/7 Brownell sworn in as President
Nixon's special representative
for resolution of salinity prob-
lem with Mexico (biographic
data).
216 9/7 U.S. and Nicaragua sign cotton
textile agreement (rewrite).

*217 9/7 Silverberg appointed Executive
Secretary of the Board of the
Foreign Service (biographic
data).

t219 9/8 Dr. Charles H. Townes, Nobel
Prize physicist, to open Lincoln
lectureships marking 25th anni-
versary of Fulbright-Hays ex-
changes (rewrite).
220 9/8 Romanian officials visit U.S. under
cultural program, Sept. 10-20
(rewrite).

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

356

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX September 25, 1972 Vol. LXVII, No. 1735

Austria. Letters of Credence (Halusa) . . . 343

Bangladesh. Security Council Unable To Agree
on U.N. Membership for Bangladesh (Phil-
lips) 354

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 353

U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Nixon) 349

Economic Affairs

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka Meet in Hawaii (Nixon, Tanaka,
joint statement, announcement on economic
talks) 329

Under Secretary Johnson and Ambassador In-

gersoU Hold News Conference in Hawaii . 333

United States and Nicaragua Sign Cotton
Textile Agreement 355

Education. U.S. Delegation to OAS Confer-
ence on Education of Women 342

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Romanian
Officials Tour United States Under Cultural
Program 342

Environment. U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Con-
vention Transmitted to the Senate (mes-
sage from President Nixon) 349

Finland. Letters of Credence (Tuominen) . . 343

Guinea. Letters of Credence (Toure) .... 343

Japan

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka Meet in Hawaii (Nixon, Tanaka,
joint statement, announcement on economic
talks) 329

Under Secretary Johnson and Ambassador In-

gersoll Hold News Conference in Hawaii . 333

U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Nixon) 349

Middle East. The Step-by-Step Approach to

Peace in the Middle East (Sisco) .... 350

Military Affairs. The Role of National De-
fense in Our Efforts for Peace (Nixon) . . 344

Narcotics Control. Paraguayan Cooperation in
Fight Against Illegal Drugs Welcomed
(Rogers) 349

Nicaragua. United States and Nicaragua Sign

Cotton Textile Agreement 355

Nigeria. Letters of Credence (Garba) . . . 343

Organization of American States. U.S. Dele-
gation to OAS Conference on Education of
Women 342

Paraguay. Paraguayan Cooperation in Fight

Against Illegal Drugs Welcomed (Rogers) 349

Presidential Documents

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka Meet in Hawaii 329

The Role of National Defense in Our Efforts
for Peace 344

Romania. Romanian Officials Tour United

States Under Cultural Program .... 342

Treaty Information

Current Actions 355

United States and Nicaragua Sign Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 355

U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Nixon) 349

U.S.S.R. The Role of National Defense in Our

Efforts for Peace (Nixon) 344

United Nations. Security Council Unable To
Agree on U.N. Membership for Bangladesh
(Phillips) 354

Upper Volta. Letters of Credence (Yaguibou) 343

Viet-Nam

158th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at
Paris (Porter) 340

The Role of National Defense in Our Efforts
for Peace (Nixon) 344

Name Index

Garba, John M 343

Halusa, Arno 343

Ingersoll, Robert 333

Johnson, U. Alexis 333

Nixon, President 329,344,349

Phillips, Christopher H 354

Porter, William J 340

Rogers, Secretary 349

Sisco, Joseph J 350

Tanaka, Kakuei 329

Toure, Sadan Moussa 343

Tuominen, Leo Olavi 343

Yaguibou, Telesphore 343

Ziegler, Ronald L 333

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