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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




3 t 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume- LXVIII 



No. 1749 



January 1, 1973 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD 

AT BRUSSE1 

Messagt From President Nixon and Text of Final Communique 1 

SECRETARY ROGERS HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE AT BRUSSELS 5 

U.S. ABSTAINS ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 
ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

Statements by Ambassador Bush and Text of Resolution 25 

SECOND ASIAN POPULATION CONFERENCE MEETS AT TOKYO 
U.S.Staten 12 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



- . - 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 







lr c 




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agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1749 
January 1, 1973 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of US. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed, 



North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting 
Held at Brussels 



The North Atlantic Council held its 
regular ministerial meeting at Brussels De- 
cember 7-8. Following are texts of a mes- 
sage from President Nixon raid before the 
Council on December ? by Secretary Rogers 
and the final communique issued at the close 
of the meeting on December 8. 



MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON 

Press release 307 dated December 13 

As we approach 1973 we stand on the 
threshold of negotiations that could bring 
us closer to the lasting peace that is the goal 
of the North Atlantic Alliance : 

— explorations have begun for a Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe ; 

— explorations will begin soon regarding 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions ; 

— bilateral talks between individual Allies 
and members of the Warsaw Pact on issues 
of security and peace continue. 

These prospects for peace, however, must 
rest on a foundation of continued military 
preparedness. Competing demands vie for 
the limited budgetary resources available 
to each Ally. Our peoples are increasingly 
sensitive to the just domestic needs of demo- 
cratic and modern society, at the very time 
when the costs of modern and improved 
defense forces are increasing. 

It will test the strength and vitality of 
this Alliance to maintain and improve our 
common defenses in these times. But this 
task must be accomplished. 

For our part, the United States renews its 
pledge that given a similar approach by our 
Allies, we will maintain and improve our 
forces in Europe and will not reduce them 



unless there is reciprocal action from our 
adversaries. 

We look to you — all of you — to continue 
the remarkable effort you have made in 
assuming a greater share of the burdens of 
common defense. 

In our own way, each Ally must insure 
that its people understand the fundamental 
reasons that link a militarily strong NATO 
to successful negotiations. For without the 
understanding and the support of our 
peoples, this Alliance cannot survive. With 
this in mind, I am confident that the states- 
men and the free peoples of the North At- 
lantic Alliance will continue to support an 
undiminished defense effort by each member. 

Richard Nixon 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
Session in Brussels on 7th and 8th December, 1972. 
Foreign and Defence Ministers were present. 

2. In reviewing events since their May meeting, 
Ministers noted with satisfaction the new progress 
in East-West relations. They observed that this 
progress flowed in large measure from initiatives 
taken by Allied Governments. They took the view 
that further significant improvements could be 
achieved during the coming year and indicated 
their readiness to press on with their efforts. They 
declared their resolve to bring about closer and more 
harmonious relationships, collectively and individu- 
ally, among all peoples. They attached particular 
importance to freer movement of people, ideas and 
information. 

3. Ministers were convinced that the objectives 
so far reached would not have been realized without 
the strength and cohesion of the Alliance. They 
expressed their determination, particularly in view 
of the continued strengthening of the Warsaw Pact 
military forces, to maintain the defensive capability 
of the Alliance. A healthy and strong Alliance is 
an indispensable condition for promoting stability 



January 1, 1973 



and for achieving the aim of a just and lasting 
peace in Europe. 

4. Ministers discussed the important develop- 
ments concerning Germany which have taken place 
since their May meeting. They welcomed the ini- 
tialling of the treaty on the basis of relations 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic on 8th November, 
1972 and the statement of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany that 
it is envisaged that this Treaty will be signed on 
21st December, 1972 and thereafter will be sub- 
mitted to the legislative bodies of the Federal 
Republic of Germany for approval. They took note 
of the statement of the Federal Foreign Minister 
that after the ratification of this treaty and after 
the domestic pre-conditions have been fulfilled the 
two German states will submit their applications 
for membership of the United Nations to be con- 
sidered simultaneously by the competent organs of 
the world organization. Ministers took note of the 
declaration of the Four Powers of 9th November, 
1972. ' In this declaration the Four Powers recorded 
their agreement that they will support the applica- 
tions for membership in the United Nations when 
submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the German Democratic Republic, and affirm 
in this connection that this membership shall in no 
way affect the rights and responsibilities of the 
Four Powers and the cori'esponding, related quad- 
ripartite agreements, decisions, and practices. As 
regards the relations between France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Ministers noted that this 
declaration does not affect in any way the Con- 
vention on relations between the Three Powers 
and the Federal Republic of Germany and related 
Conventions and documents of 26th May, 1952 in 
the version of 23rd October, 1954. 

5. On the basis of these developments, individual 
member governments might wish to enter into 
negotiations with the German Democratic Republic 
with a view to establishing bilateral relations. In 
this connection Ministers reaffirmed the solidarity 
of the Alliance partners in questions concerning 
Germany, maintained since entry of the Federal 
Republic of Germany into the Alliance. The member 
states of the Atlantic Alliance expressed their con- 
tinuing support for the policy of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany to work towards a state of 
peace in Europe in which the German people regains 
its unity through free self-determination. Accord- 
ingly, they will continue to take fully into account 
the special situation in Germany, which is character- 
ized by the fact that the German people today lives 
in two states, that a freely agreed contractual peace 
settlement for Germany is still outstanding and that 



1 For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1972, p. 623. 



until such a settlement is achieved, the above- 
mentioned rights and responsibilities of the Four 
Powers relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole 
will continue. 

6. Ministers affirmed that their Governments 
would work constructively to establish necessary 
agreements in the multilateral preparatory talks, 
which have just started in Helsinki. They recalled 
that the aim of their Governments at these talks 
would be to ensure that their proposals were fully 
considered at a Conference and to establish that 
enough common ground existed among the partici- 
pants to warrant reasonable expectations that a 
Conference would produce satisfactory results. They 
considered that there should be agreement at these 
talks on the arrangements and guidelines necessary 
to enable such a Conference to produce constructive 
and specific results. They noted that such results 
could be achieved only through the process of de- 
tailed and serious negotiation, without artificial time 
limits. 

7. Ministers confirmed that it is the goal of their 
Governments to increase the security of all Europe 
through negotiations concerning such questions as 
principles guiding relations between the participants 
and through appropriate measures, including mili- 
tary ones, aimed at strengthening confidence and 
increasing stability so as to contribute to the process 
of reducing the dangers of military confrontation ; 
to improve co-operation in all fields; to bring about 
closer, more open and freer relationships between 
all people in Europe; to stimulate a wider flow of 
information and of ideas. 

8. The Ministers representing countries which par- 
ticipate in NATO's integrated defence programme 
noted with approval that the Governments of 
Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
United States, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway 
and Turkey have proposed that the Governments 
of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union join them 
in exploratory talks beginning on 31st January, 
1973 on the question of Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions in Central Europe. These Ministers re- 
called that this proposal accorded with past Allied 
initiatives and noted some indication of Eastern 
readiness to begin such talks at the time proposed. 
Ministers hoped that these talks would make it 
possible to commence negotiations on this subject 
in the Autumn of 1973. They noted that such a 
programme implied that talks on both Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions and on a Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be 
going on in the same general period of time. 

9. While considering it inappropriate to establish 
formal and specific links, these Ministers reaffirmed 
their view that progress in each set of the different 
negotiations would have a favourable effect on the 



Department of State Bulletin 



others. None of them should be isolated from the 
general nature of the relations prevailing between 
thf states concerned. 

10. These Ministers took note of a report on 
guidelines for the conduct of the exploratory talks 
on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions by the 
Allied countries involved, as well as of the work 
carried out in preparation for eventual negotiations. 
The Council in Permanent Session will continue 
consultations on all questions of objectives, policy 
and strategy pursued by Allied countries in these 
talks. 

11. Recalling the Declaration of the Council in 
Rome in May 1970,- these Ministers confirmed their 
position that Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions in Central Europe should not operate to the 
military disadvantage of any side and should en- 
hance stability and security in Europe as a whole. 
Their position is based on the conviction that the 
security of the Alliance is indivisible and that re- 
ductions in Central Europe should not diminish 
security in other areas. 

12. Ministers expressed the hope that the SALT 
TWO negotiations between the United States and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would 
achieve success. They considered that there should 
be renewed efforts in all fields of disarmament and 
arms control. 

13. Ministers agreed that on all these questions 
the close and regular consultations which they have 
held so far and which have proved their value would 
continue. 

14. Ministers took note of a new report on the 
situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their 
instructions by the Council in Permanent Session. 
Continuing instability in this region, which could 
endanger the security of the member countries, 
remains a cause for concern. Ministers instructed the 
Council in Permanent Session to continue keeping a 
close watch on developments and to report to them 
at their next meeting. 

15. Ministers noted the progress achieved by the 
CCMS [Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society] especially in such areas as combatting oil 
pollution of the seas, disaster assistance, safety of 
motor vehicles, health care, waste water treatment, 
urban transportation, and also the recent signing 
of a memorandum of understanding by six member 
nations on low-pollution automobile engine develop- 
ment. 

lfi. Ministers took note of the Report by the Con- 
ference of National Armaments Directors and of the 
views expressed on this paper by the Defence Minis- 
ters. Like the Defence Ministers, they welcomed 
the efforts being made to reduce duplication and 
waste of resources in the development and pro- 
duction of armaments. Thev instructed the Council 



3 For text, see Bvlletin of June 22, 1970, p. 772. 



in Permanent Session to make the necessary ar- 
rangements regarding the action to be taken on it 
and invited Armaments Directors to make sugges- 
tions for more effective co-operation. 

17. Ministers of the countries participating in 
NATO's integrated defence programme met as the 
Defence Planning Committee and reviewed the mili- 
tary situation in the NATO area. They noted with 
concern that despite the political developments 
described above, the Soviet Union and her Allies 
seem determined to maintain and indeed increase 
their military capability which in both scale and 
nature appears to be greatly in excess of that re- 
quired for purely defensive purposes; and that they 
continue to devote immense resources to the improve- 
ment and modernization of their land, air and 
naval forces confronting NATO. These Ministers 
stressed that NATO's requirements for defence are 
related directly to the reality of the military capa- 
bilities possessed by the Warsaw Pact. 

18. These Ministers again gave attention to the 
growing Soviet maritime capability and in partic- 
ular to the increase of Soviet naval activities in 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean which has taken 
place in recent years. They also considered the 
political and military implications of these activities 
and the measures being taken to counter them. 

19. These Ministers emphasized the close rela- 
tionship between the collective defence policy of 
NATO on the one hand and actual or potential 
developments in the international field on the other. 
They agreed that any unilateral reduction of effort 
on the part of the Alliance would reduce the 
credibility of realistic deterrence and erode the 
stable balance of forces without which no satis- 
factory security arrangements can be negotiated. It 
was agreed that negotiations, in order to be success- 
ful, must proceed from a position of effective 
partnership and strength. 

20. Accordingly these Ministers again endorsed 
the principle that the overall military capability of 
NATO should not be reduced except as part of a 
pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in 
scope and timing. In this context, they welcomed 
the reaffirmation by the United States that, given 
a similar approach by other countries of the Al- 
liance, the United States would maintain and 
improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them 
unless there is reciprocal action by the other side. 

21. In the light of the considerations outlined 
earlier, these Ministers took note of the force com- 
mitment undertaken by each member nation for the 
year 1973, and adopted a five-year NATO Force 
Plan for the years 1973-1977. In doing so they 
emphasized the need to enhance the quality and 
effectiveness of national force contributions within 
the context of the total force concept, particularly 
through the implementation of the improvements 
recommended in the special report on Alliance 



January 1, 1973 



Defence Problems for the 1970s. They reviewed 
progress reported to date, and identified those areas 
in which such improvements are still most urgently 
required. In this connection they acknowledged the 
need to allocate more resources for the moderniza- 
tion and re-equipment of NATO forces. 

22. These Ministers received from the Chairman 
of the Eurogroup an account of the Group's con- 
tinuing work in order to reinforce the collective 
contribution of its members to Alliance defence. 
They welcomed progress made, particularly towards 
fuller co-operation in equipment procurement. 

23. These Ministers, recognizing the success of 
the NATO Common Infrastructure Programme in 
providing physical facilities fundamental to the 
Alliance's deterrent and defensive effectiveness, 
agreed to the continuation of the Infrastructure 
Programme during 1975-1979 as an essential 
element of the NATO defence effort. 

24. Finally these Ministers noted with approval 
that the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment 
project (NADGE) would be virtually completed by 
the end of this year thus providing NATO, for the 
first time, with a fully integrated semi-automatic 
air defence system stretching from North Norway 
to the Eastern boundaries of Turkey. 

25. The Defence Ministers comprising the Nu- 
clear Defence Affairs Committee (Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) also 
met to review the work of the Nuclear Planning 
Group during the past year and its plans for future 
activity. 

26. The next meeting of the Defence Planning 
Committee at Ministerial level will take place in 
Brussels on 7th June, 1973. 

27. The next Ministerial Session of the North 
Atlantic Council will be held in Copenhagen on 
14th and 15th June, 1973. 



Restrictions on Visits to China 

by U.S. Aircraft and Ships Relaxed 

Following is a Department of Commerce- 
Department of Transportation announce- 
ment issued on November 22. 

Department of Commerce press release G 72-214 dated Novem- 
ber 22 

The White House today announced the re- 
laxation of restrictions on U.S. carriers to 
call on the People's Republic of China. 

Under previous regulations (Transporta- 
tion Order T-2) U.S. air carriers and ships 
were not allowed to visit Chinese ports. 
These prohibitions were removed by the ac- 
tions announced today. 1 

The modification reflects President Nixon's 
intention to review existing restrictions on 
trade and travel relative to the People's Re- 
public of China in an effort to create broader 
opportunities for contacts between the Chi- 
nese and American peoples. 

Visits of U.S. aircraft to the People's Re- 
public of China will continue to require a 
validated license under the export control 
regulations administered by the Department 
of Commerce. 

This change does not apply to North 
Korea or to the Communist-controlled area 
of Viet-Nam, where U.S. carriers continue 
to be prohibited from calling. 



'For text of Transportation Order T-2 
(Amended), Nov. 22, 1972, see 37 Fed. Reg. 25041. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers Holds News Conference at Brussels 



Following is the transcript of a )ieirs con- 
ference held by Secretary Rogers on Decem- 
ber 8 at Brttssels aft* r the North Atlantic 
Council ministerial meeting. 

Press release 309 dated December 11 

Secretary Rogers: I'd just like to say by 
way of preface that I think the meeting was 
a very successful one. and I was particularly 
pleased at the general climate of the meet- 
ing. I think that was demonstrated most for 
all of you ladies and gentlemen by the fact 
that the meeting broke up at 12 :30, which 
is quite unusual in itself. And although you 
might, I suppose, have expected problems 
to surface which would bring into play some 
contention, that wasn't the case. I think it 
was a very successful meeting. 

As you know, this is the 50th ministerial 
meeting of NATO, and I think that we em- 
phasized the importance we attach to the 
alliance not only in terms of the past but the 
importance we attach to it as far as the 
future is concerned. President Nixon ex- 
pressed in his letter the view that the alli- 
ance is a contributing factor of major 
importance to the success in the spirit of 
detente that you're all familiar with, and we 
think it contributed measurably to the pos- 
sibility of the Conference on European Se- 
curity and to the possibility of negotiations 
on mutual and balanced force reductions 
(MBFR). All in all it was a very good meet- 
ing; there was a good deal of unanimity on 
most subjects, and slight shades of differ- 
ences were easily reconciled. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke on Denmark 
critically because they've taken steps to cut 
back a bit, and you wouldn't want any cut- 
ting back nt nil. I am not clear in ml) own 
mind as to how seriously you regard this 
approach of Denmark. I just ivondered how 



seriously you regarded this particular type 
of moral defection. 

Secretary Rogers: Those are your words, 
of course. First, as Mr. McCloskey | Robert 
J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Press Relations] said in his briefing yes- 
terday — I don't know whether you were here 
or not — I did not criticize Denmark directly 
at all in either of the sessions, the restricted 
session or the private session. I did, however, 
point out, as you know, the importance we 
attach to combined support for the alliance 
and that any reduction on the part of a 
member nation, however slight or for what- 
ever reason — when I say "for whatever 
reason," I mean "for whatever domestic 
reason" — is bound to have psychological ef- 
fects on our Congress. And therefore it's 
very important that all of the member na- 
tions fully understand that we do have some 
people in our country, particularly in our 
Congress, who feel that our contributions 
over the years have been too large. And if 
it appears that the European nations are 
reducing, it naturally builds momentum in 
our country in that direction. I wasn't crit- 
ical of Denmark as such, and I didn't direct 
my remarks to any particular nation. We 
think that it's important now, especially 
during the recent improvements in relations 
between the Soviet Union and the eastern 
European countries and the Western coun- 
tries, that we maintain our strength. In other 
words, as one of the ministers said, it's im- 
portant to have reductions occur after 
detente, not before. 

Q. Si>\ can you say whether your talks 
with Mr. | William ./.] Porter increased your 
optimism that there can be a Viet-Nam 
settlement? 

Secretary Rogers: I wouldn't want to make 
any descriptive comments of that kind. I 



January 1, 1973 



had a discussion with Ambassador Porter 
on two major subjects — major, as far as I 
am concerned. Of course the Viet-Nam mat- 
ter was discussed. Ambassador Porter gave 
me a briefing on developments of the last 
day or so, a full briefing. But I also talked 
to him about his new assignment. As you 
know, President Nixon nominated him to be 
Under Secretary of State for Political Af- 
fairs. We had a very full discussion of the 
future, and I look forward with great 
pleasure to this new assignment. He is a man 
of great capability, and I am sure that he 
will bring great strength to the Department 
of State. 

Q. Obviously you have read the telegrams 
on his assessments in Paris. What is the 
special reason for his coming here to per- 
sonally report to you, sir ? 

Secretary Rogers: The principal reason, as 
I say, was to discuss his new assignment, 
but in that process he gave me a little fuller 
briefing than sometimes you can do by 
telegram. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say, has there 
been progress in Paris in the last few days? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I can't say. I want 
to avoid discussion about that. As you know, 
these matters are being handled there. I 
think it's better that if we have any com- 
ment, it come out of Paris. 

Q. Are you going back to Washington or 
to Paris? 

Secretary Rogers: I'm going back to 
Washington. 

Q. But you expect to be going to Paris 
soon? 

Secretary Rogers: I always enjoy going 
to Paris. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the last few days 
there were some rumors on the intent of the 
Western Powers for installation and localiza- 
tion of their embassies in Eastern Germany, 
whether inside or outside — (Inaudible). 

Secretary Rogers: Mr. McCloskey, what's 
the question? 



Mr. McCloskey: The question (was) 
whether, as a result of the quadripartite 
dinner, it has been decided when you ulti- 
mately get to establishment of diplomatic 
relations where the embassies will be located. 

Secretary Rogers: No, that wasn't decided. 
There is a reference in the communique to 
the establishment of relations, but it doesn't 
refer to this subject you mentioned. That 
wasn't discussed. 

Q. Sir, were you able to give Mr. Sharp 
\ Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State 
for External Affairs'] any assurances re- 
garding the conditions which Canada has 
submitted to the negotiations for the partici- 
pation of Canada in the proposed interna- 
tional cease-fire commission? 

Secretary Rogers: I didn't give any assur- 
ances here particularly. I met with him in 
New York a few days ago and talked to him 
at some length about the whole subject. I 
think as far as the conditions are concerned, 
we can probably meet most of them. Cer- 
tainly we hope so. 

Q. (Inaudible.) 

Secretary Rogers: The conditions are 
stated in sort of general terms at the moment. 
But I think that the position Canada has 
taken is perfectly reasonable, and we will 
try to be sure that we work out something 
that's satisfactory to Canada. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your administration is 
showing an improved interest in, Europe and 
has announced some steps in the next year. 
What kind of initiatives are you planning 
to take? 

Secretary Rogers: I think that your premise 
is sound. As I look to 1973, I think that 
Europe is going to be in the spotlight as far 
as our foreign policy considerations are con- 
cerned. What particular initiatives we will 
take I'm not sure. As a matter of fact, there 
are so many things underway now that I'm 
not sure that any new initiatives are re- 
quired. I think what is going to be required 
is a thoughtful implementation of the initia- 
tives that have already been taken. For ex- 



Department of State Bulletin 



ample, at a time when the Community is 
being enlarged and at a time when the Com- 
munity itself has some problems to grapple 
with, we want to make certain that the alli- 
ance remains strong. However, we'll have 
some problems with the Community that are 
quite apparent. In a sense we'll be competing 
in commerce. So at a time when the Com- 
munity itself has problems to grapple with, 
a time when we're going to have some prob- 
lems to work out with the Community, a time 
when we are facing trade negotiations which 
will start in September, it is very important 
that all of us approach these discussions in 
a very orderly, statesmanlike way. Nothing 
should interfere with the strength of the 
alliance, and we don't want to do anything 
that will interfere with the integration of 
Europe. But you can tell, because of the na- 
ture of the problems, that they are going to 
be difficult and it's going to require real 
statesmanship to solve them. We had a very 
good discussion of these matters within the 
alliance. 

Q. With respect to the meaning, Mr. Sec- 
retary, of that close cooperation with the en- 
larged Common Market, would you like it 
institutionalized? 

Secretary Rogers: I had a discussion of 
this with the Commission and some of the 
ministers. We're not inflexible about the 
structure, and we recognize that the Com- 
munity itself is in the process of making 
some decisions on its own structures. What 
we do want to do is to clearly understand 
that we will have problems and that they will 
require a great deal of discussion. Each of 
us has to understand the other's point of 
view and the other's problems, and we have 
to make appropriate accommodations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you sketch a little 
bit the nature of these problems as you see 
them ? What are the really important, critical 
questions between the United States and 
Europe that have to be resolved in this 
atmosphere of understanding which you 
spoke of? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't want to be 
too specific, because being too specific will 



single out problems sometimes in an over- 
dramatic way. But with that caveat, some 
of the problems are going to involve agricul- 
ture, and the problems are quite obvious. 
The Community has its farmers to consider; 
it's got its policies. And we've got to con- 
sider our farmers and how the decisions the 
Community makes in the agricultural field 
affect us and our farmers. We want to do 
it in a way that's not harmful to either the 
Community or the United States. Another 
illustration — and I don't want to suggest 
that these are inclusive; I just want to sug- 
gest them by way of illustration — is the 
question of reverse preferences. To us, when 
the Community gives reverse preferences, for 
whatever reason — (and) in many instances 
the reasons are quite valid, certainly as far 
as the Community is concerned — it creates 
the impression that they are discriminatory. 
They discriminate against the United States, 
and any such impression would be very 
harmful. If the impression is created that 
we are talking about free trade and the im- 
portance of liberalization, but at the same 
time we're moving in the direction of dis- 
crimination, it's harmful. So we hope that 
we can prevent those things from happening; 
we hope that in the trade negotiation that 
we can move in the direction of liberaliza- 
tion. We recognize that there are very com- 
plex problems, not only tariffs but nontariff 
barriers. Now, those are a couple of 
examples. 

Q. (Mostly inaudible question about link- 
age between CSCE {Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe] and MBFR.) 

Secretary Rogers: It depends on how the 
declaration is phrased or what is meant ex- 
actly by the declaration. There has been a 
lot of discussion about linkage, and the view 
of the United States is that there is a rela- 
tionship, obviously, between the different 
matters under consideration and it's not nec- 
essary to formally label them "linkage." For 
example, if the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation is a very successful conference, 
it would create conditions that are conducive 
to more successful negotiations on mutual 



January 1, 1973 



and balanced force reductions. Likewise, suc- 
cessful negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions would contribute to reduc- 
tion of tensions and make it more likely that 
the conference itself would be successful. So 
an interrelationship is inevitable. Whether 
it's labeled linkage or not, it seems to me, is 
quite irrelevant. What is important is to 
have the two matters under consideration in 
the same general framework. And as you 
know, what we are now proposing is a con- 
ference which would probably occur some- 
time in the summer of 1973 on security and 
cooperation, following the talks in Helsinki. 
We're talking about preparatory talks on 
mutual and balanced force reductions some- 
time in January next year with the prospect 
of negotiations being conducted in the fall 
of next year. So all of that is in the same 
general time framework. And, as I say, there 
is an inevitable interrelationship between the 
two. As far as the United States is con- 
cerned, we don't insist on calling it "link- 
age"; but as long as the discussions take 
place in the same general time frame, we 
don't think of an agenda as excluding discus- 
sions. In other words, we don't want to be 
too structured. We think that the Soviet 
Union and other eastern European countries 
have an interest in the conference. We cer- 
tainly have an interest in the conference. 
We think there is a willingness on the part 
of the Soviet Union and others to engage in 
mutual and balanced force reductions, and 
we're willing to engage in those discussions. 
We think the timing is good for both. This is 
sort of a long answer to your question, and 
I apologize. 

Q. As far the talks in Geneva are con- 
cerned, some of the allied countries would 
have more deep exploration of principles 
and what should be discussed in the negotia- 
tions, to know already some more things on 
the substance of the troop reductions. One- 
gets the feeling that your proposals for the 
agenda are more restricted to procedural 
questions. 

Secretary Rogers: I don't think that's 
right. We were perfectly prepared to have 



an agenda worked out. What we don't want 
to do is have a lot of contention about pro- 
cedures and agenda, because if they're going 
to be successful, it depends really on the in- 
tentions of both sides, and we don't want to 
have hangups on procedural matters. We fa- 
vor agenda items for MBFR. Is that what 
you're asking? 

Q. Do you think that the principles of 
troop reductions should be discussed in the 
preparatory talks in Geneva? Or should this 
be a matter to be discussed in the negotia- 
tions session? 

Secretary Rogers: But I have trouble with 
"principles" ; the word is confusing. If you 
mean should we agree in the preparatory 
talks leading up to MBFR that what we're 
talking about is that neither side should ap- 
proach the talks with the idea of taking 
advantage of the other (and that) it is un- 
derstood that any reductions will be to the 
disadvantage of neither side, that's fine. 
That's a good principle; we'd like to have 
that. But you know it doesn't mean too 
much ; I mean, we're both going to say that. 
So really, it's what you mean by "principles." 
I think these are principles. We had success- 
ful SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks], and we had them because we had 
frank discussions with the Soviet Union in 
advance about the talks. We decided that 
they were serious about it and we were seri- 
ous about it, and we engaged in the talks. 
We had practical discussions, and they suc- 
ceeded. We didn't have a long argument 
about principles to begin with. We didn't 
have a long agenda or anything. We just 
went ahead and had the talks. But I'm not 
opposed to an agenda, and I'm not opposed 
to principles. I'm just opposed to letting the 
agenda and the principles stand in the way 
of negotiations. 

Q. If the preparatory talks on the security 
conference are successful and do result in 
moving ahead to a full conference, does the 
United States think that this conference 
should be held in Helsinki or does it prefer 
another location? 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers: That hasn't been de- 
cided yet. That's something we'll talk about 
in Helsinki and that will be done in consul- 
tation with our allies. 

(,). Mr. Secretary, if the preparatory talks 
for the MBFR negotiations are taking place 
in Geneva, don't you get the impression that 
there's a certain bilateral linkage with the 

SALT talks which arc taking place as well 

in (i< turn ' 

Secretary Rogers: I wouldn't think so; 
I don't think you necessarily draw that 
conclusion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you indicated to 
the Council that during the end part of the 
ministerial you would be initiating another 
effort to get things going on an interim Suez 
settlement. 

Secretary Rogers: The United States con- 
tinues to believe that Security Council Reso- 
lution 242 is the basic framework on which 
an agreement should be worked out. 1 I think 
because of the complexities involved that it's 
unlikely that a complete and final settlement 
can be worked out pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 242 very soon. We think 
it's very difficult to imagine negotiations 
which could be conducted which would lead 
to settlement of all those problems. And if 
nothing has happened for a while — and since 
1967 nothing has happened as a practical 
matter — then it becomes more difficult. The 
situation is one of tension. We think there 
should be an attempt made to figure out a 
way to make some progress, with a full un- 
derstanding that that progress would be 
merely interim progress, that what everyone 
is seeking is a final solution based on 242. 

Now, President Sadat [of Egypt] suggested 
the interim settlement which is his proposal, 
and the Prime Minister of Israel indicated 
that she thought it was an interesting pro- 
posal which deserved consideration. What we 
have in mind is that negotiations should 
start. We recognize the difficulty in starting 
direct negotiations. We are going to be ac- 



1 For text of Security Council Resolution 242 of 
Nov. 22, 1967, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 



tive diplomatically to see if there is some 
way to get negotiations started of an indi- 
rect nature, at first, with the idea of making 
some progress. And we think that that prog- 
ress should be related to Security Council 
Resolution 242, in its final implementation. 
Now, that doesn't suggest that the United 
States is necessarily going to take any pub- 
lic initiative. But we're going to do what we 
can to stimulate interest and discussions. As 
I've said on previous occasions, this is really 
the only area of the world where no negotia- 
tions are being conducted in areas of tension. 
The two Koreas are talking; we're talking 
about Viet-Nam ; Pakistan and India are 
having discussions; the two Germanys are 
discussing matters; and we are certainly 
discussing matters with the Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China. So the 
only area where there are no real negotia- 
tions conducted is in the Middle East. We 
think that it's not only illogical that no dis- 
cussions are being held, but we think it's 
highly desirable that a serious attempt be 
made to make some progress. We think that 
an interim agreement linked to final settle- 
ment pursuant to 242 is the best prospect. 

Q. Have you approached either side 
recen tly ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it isn't so much 
recently. We're in constant contact with all 
concerned in one way or another. 

Q. Are you looking for any. what we 
might call, "help" from the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't want to single 
out any nation. We're going to be, as I said, 
active diplomatically in every possible way 
to see if we can't get the negotiations started. 
I see some of you are looking as if you're a 
little anxious to leave. 

Q. (Inaudible) — the idea of the Italians 
for a Mediterranean conference as concerns 
the definition of the Foreign Minister of Italy 
that there trill be no lasting peace in the 
world without peace in the Mediterranean. 

Secretary Rogers: I'm sorry, I don't have 
a reaction to that at this time. 



December 25, 1972 



Q. The Foreign Minister of Italy proposed 
once an Israeli-Arab settlement is achieved 
to initiate a Mediterranean conference con- 
cerning the security and peace in the Medi- 
terranean. What's your position on this? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, if it's in that time 
framework, after the settlement between 
Israel and the Arabs, I'm going to have a 
little time to think about it. [Laughter.] 

Q. Is the United States prepared to sub- 
mit to Mr. Mintoff's [Dominic Mintoff, Prime 
Minister of Malta] demands for additional 
payments on Malta? 

Secretary Rogers: There is no more de- 
mand made on the United States. 

Q. Well, the demand tvas made on NATO, 
and after all, you are contributing. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we haven't been 
involved in those discussions. 



170th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Folloiving are remarks made by Hey ward 
Isham, deputy head of the U.S. delegation, 
at the 170th plenary session of the meetings 
on Viet-Nam at Paris on December H. 

Press release 308 dated December 14 

Ladies and gentlemen: You will recall 
that our delegation's remarks last week re- 
flected general encouragement with progress 
achieved toward a negotiated settlement of 
the Viet-Nam conflict. You will also recall 
that we pointed out the important tasks 
awaiting this forum concerning the negotia- 
tion of certain arrangements in implementa- 
tion of the accord once it is signed. 

The purpose of these observations was to 
invite you to join us in a constructive, posi- 
tive approach to the proceedings here, in 
disavowal of the years of fruitless bickering 
which preceded the current period of intense 
negotiating activity. 

It was with considerable disappointment, 
therefore, that our side listened to your pres- 



10 



entations last week. As you indulged in suc- 
cessive defamations and vilifications of our 
side, as you proceeded to heap verbal abuse 
upon our motives, our activities, and even 
the heads of our respective governments, it 
became all too evident that your charges 
here bore little relationship to the actual 
state of affairs. 

You accused the United States of utilizing 
"pretexts" to prolong negotiations, although 
you are fully aware that the subjects on 
which the negotiations have concentrated 
are issues of central importance in an equi- 
table settlement. You charged the United 
States with "sabotage" of a negotiated settle- 
ment, but you know full well that we have 
affirmed and indeed have demonstrated our 
intent to reach a just and lasting peace in 
Viet-Nam as rapidly as possible. You alleged 
that the United States made an "about-face" 
during the course of negotiations, but you 
know that this is not so. 

I shall make two further general observa- 
tions about your recent presentations in this 
forum : 

First, I wish to point out that one fails to 
detect in your words here any reflection of 
the principles you have ardently professed, 
such as mutual respect, concord, and recon- 
ciliation. It would be advisable to begin to 
manifest these qualities here if you wish 
anyone to place credence in your avowed in- 
tent to be guided by them after a settlement. 

Second, I suggest you spare yourselves the 
frustration of persistent futility. Nearly four 
years of delivering ultimatum after ulti- 
matum advanced neither your purposes nor 
the cause of peace. It should therefore be 
obvious to you that this dreary tactic should 
be discarded. In our country the high- 
pressure salesman who tries to obtain im- 
mediate signature of an incomplete contract 
only succeeds in arousing suspicion about 
the transaction. Your presentations today 
can indicate whether you intend to use these 
meetings for the constructive purpose for 
which they were established. 

You have before you an opportunity to 
undertake a reasonable dialogue. My col- 
league has presented today proposals for 



Department of State Bulletin 



various specific actions related to settlement 
made recently by the President of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. Are you prepared to 
examine these proposals objectively and to 
enpape in serious discussion of them? 

Let your remarks today be an earnest of 
your pood faith and a vindication of this 
forum. You will find that our side will listen 
to you attentively and will reply to you with 
the restraint and relevance we urge you to 
adopt. 



Bill of Rights Day and 
Human Rights Day and Week 

A PROCLAMATION 1 

The ink was barely dry on the Constitution of 
the United States of America in the autumn of 
1787 when leading patriots and statesmen of the 
young Republic took up the cry for amendments 
affording written guarantees of basic human free- 
doms under the proposed national government. "A 
bill of rights is what the people are entitled to 
against every government on earth . . ." Thomas 
Jefferson wrote, "and what no just government 
should refuse or rest on inference." 

The idea that every individual was endowed by 
his Creator with rights no sovereign or majority 
could take away was thought dangerous and radical 
over much of the globe in those days, but it ran 
deep in the American grain even then. The very 
first Congress proposed a Bill of Rights, and by 
1791 its proposals had become the first ten amend- 
ments to our Constitution. 

Since that time, exactly as James Madison pre- 
dicted to Jefferson that they would do, "the political 
truths declared in that solemn manner (have ac- 
quired) by degrees the character of fundamental 
maxims of free government." They have inspired 
our own Nation's accelerating efforts to assure 
every American full equality and dignity before the 
law, and they have shone as a beacon for the rising 
aspirations of peoples around the world. 

Finally in 1948, a little more than a century and 
a half after American freedoms were enshrined in 
the supreme law of this land, the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights was approved by the United 
Nations General Assembly to assert the inalienable 
liberties of all men and women in every land. 

Symbolic of the common principles and shared 
spirit which link these two great charters is the 
fact that the anniversaries of their adoption occur 



less than one week apart each December. As we 
observe those anniversaries once again this year, 
let us gratefully take stock of the progress made 
in realizing the full promise of freedom for America 
and the world, and let us renew our commitment to 
continuing that progress during 1973. 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Richard NlxON, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
December 15, 1972, as Bill of Rights Day, and 
December 10, 1972, as Human Rights Day, and I 
call upon the American people to observe the week 
beginning December 10, 1972, as Human Rights 
Week. I ask every American to make this observ- 
ance a time of rededication to the cherished values 
embodied in our Bill of Rights and in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this ninth day of December, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-two, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-seventh. 



Secretarial Determination Provides 
for Continued Assistance to Chile 

Office of the Secretary 

[Public Notice 373] 

CHILE — Determination To Permit Continued 
Assistance 

Pursuant to section 620 (q) of the Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1961, as amended, and by virtue of 
the authority vested in me by section 101 of Execu- 
tive Order 10973, as amended, I hereby determine 
that assistance to Chile under the Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1961, as amended, is in the national 
interest of the United States, notwithstanding 
Chile's delinquency, in excess of 6 months, in the 
repayment of loans made under the Act. 

This determination shall be continuously reviewed 
and shall in no way relieve Chile of repayment 
obligations with respect to loans made under the 
Act, or of any other obligations to the United States 
Government or to any private party. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 1 

[seal] William P. Rogers 

Secretary, Department of State. 

November 17, 1972. 



■No. 117.:; 37 Fed. Reg. 26387. 



' 37 Fed. Reg. 25859. 



January 1, 1973 



11 



Second Asian Population Conference Meets at Tokyo 



The Second Asian Population Conference, 
sponsored by the Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), was held 
at Tokyo November 1-13. Following is a 
U.S. delegation statement made at the con- 
ference November 2 by Philander P. Clax- 
ton, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary 
of State for Population Matters, and 
Marjorie A. Costa, Director of the National 
Center for Family Planning Services, De- 
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
together with the text of a declaration 
adopted by the conference November 13. 

U.S. STATEMENT 

Mr. Claxton 

At the outset the U.S. delegation wishes to 
join others in expressing our deep apprecia- 
tion to our host, the Government of Japan, 
and to the most courteous and helpful people 
of Japan. 

We are grateful also to Executive Secre- 
tary U Nyun, Dr. Frisen [Carl Frisen, Chief, 
ECAFE Population Division], and members 
of the ECAFE staff who have made the 
excellent preparations and arrangements for 
this conference. 

As requested by the Executive Secretary, 
the U.S. delegation has presented a country 
statement briefly reporting on demographic 
facts and family planning policies and pro- 
grams in the United States. The statement 
also reports on our policies and programs in 
the international field, in support of United 
Nations activities and of bilateral assistance 
in population/family planning matters. 

Since the First Asian Population Confer- 
ence, the U.S. Government has undertaken 
large and increasing programs of assistance 
to research in population matters and to 



family planning services in the United 
States. The direction of the services program 
for the U.S. Government is in the National 
Center for Family Planning Services, a part 
of the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. The head of the Center is Miss 
Marjorie Costa. She is responsible for ad- 
ministering the program, which now pro- 
vides assistance for family planning services 
to the health departments of our 50 States 
and directly to many municipalities and com- 
munity organizations. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I 
should like to present Miss Costa to outline 
the present demographic situation in the 
United States and our population/family 
planning policies and programs. I will com- 
ment later on our international policies, pro- 
grams, and goals. 

Miss Costa 

The U.S. Demographic Situation, 
Domestic Policies and Programs 

I would like to report first on the principal 
facts of the demographic situation in the 
United States. Further details may be found 
in the country statement. 

There has been a rapid and remarkable 
downward trend in most fertility indicators 
during the few years since the First Asian 
Population Conference. 

The peak of the U.S. birth rate had been 
55 per 1,000 population in 1800. It had 
dropped steadily to 18.4 per 1,000 by 1936. 
With the postwar baby boom the birth rate 
leapt to 26.5 per 1,000 in 1947 and remained 
near that level until 1957. In 1958 the long 
downward trend was resumed. By 1963 it 
had dropped to 21.9 per 1,000. In the nine 
years just passed it has dropped to 15.5 per 
1,000 for the first six months of 1972. This 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



is the lowest nite in U.S. history and among 
the dozen or so lowest in the world today. 

The general fertility rate has been slant- 
ing downward in much the same way. It had 
reached a historic low of 75.8 per 1,000 wom- 
en 15-44 years of age by 1936, turned 
upward in the baby boom, and has now 
dropped to 73.1. again the lowest in U.S. 
history. Most important, a 1972 survey of 
women 18-24 years of age disclosed an ex- 
pected family size of 2.3 children. For the 
entire female population this expected 
family size comes close to the 2.1 children 
per woman which is the magic figure re- 
quired under present mortality conditions to 
stabilize the natural growth rate of the U.S. 
population. 1 

This recent rapid drop in fertility, if con- 
tinued, will make a most significant differ- 
ence in U.S. population growth over the next 
few decades. The present population stands 
at about 208.8 million. If the three-child 
family level which existed at the time of the 
last Asian population conference existed 
today and were continued, it would generate 
a population of about 322 million by the 
year 2000. At the two-child family level, 
which now seems possible, population would 
reach only about 271 million by that time. 

The rapid reduction in fertility is no doubt 
due to several causes. Large numbers of 
women in the United States are in active 
employment. Private and public old-age 
pensions greatly reduce parental dependency 
on children. Low infant and child mortality 
gives greater assurance of survival. Many 
younger women are keenly aware of the ad- 
verse effect of population pressures on the 
environment and on the quality of individual 
life. The liberalization of abortion law's in 
several States has also had an effect on 
fertility levels. 

The widespread and growing practice of 
family planning has been the principal 
means by which reductions in fertility have 
been achieved. A 1965 survey found that 



some 84 percent of U.S. white couples and 
77 percent of U.S. black couples practiced, 
or had practiced, contraception. Most of 
these couples obtained contraceptive infor- 
mation and services from their family 
physician or pharmacist. The planned par- 
enthood movement, with its first clinic 
established in 1916, deserves great credit 
for both family planning services and educa- 
tion. Some State and Federal Government 
support to contraceptive services had begun 
as early as the 1930's, but this support re- 
mained very limited. 

During the period 1960-65, 40 percent of 
births among the poor and near-poor were 
estimated to be unplanned, compared to only 
14 percent among the economically more 
favored. This difference was thought to be 
primarily due to the lack of information or 
means for the poorer groups to obtain con- 
traceptive services. As these facts became 
recognized, President Johnson in 1966 de- 
clared in a message to the Congress on 
health and education : 

We have a growing concern to foster the integrity 
of the family, and the opportunity for each child. 
It is essential that all families have access to infor- 
mation and services that will allow freedom to 
choose the number and spacing of their children 
within the dictates of individual conscience. 

To carry out this policy, the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 
increased its emphasis on family planning 
services as part of federally subsidized State 
and local health services. 

By 1968 it was estimated that there were 
some 5 million women in the United States 
who because of ignorance or poverty did 
not have access to family planning informa- 
tion or services. President Nixon in July 
1969 declared his policy that: ". . . no Amer- 
ican woman should be denied access to 
family planning assistance because of her 
economic condition." 1 He proposed a na- 
tional goal to supply adequate family plan- 
ning services to all those who want them but 



1 In the first nine months of 1972, U.S. fertility 
rate fell below replacement level of 2.1 children 
per woman. 



3 For President Nixon's message to the Congress 
of July 18, 1969, see Billetin of Aug. 11, 1969, p. 
105. 



January 1, 1973 



13 



cannot afford them. This was to be done 
over a five-year period to 1974. 

Congress has been fully cooperative in 
this purpose. It adopted legislation in 1970 
with the primary purpose of assisting in 
making "comprehensive voluntary family 
planning services readily available to all per- 
sons desiring such services." It authorized 
funds for such services and for research. The 
legislation also established an Office of Popu- 
lation Affairs in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare as a focal point in 
the Federal Government to carry out its 
purposes. 

The premise of the Federal Government 
and of the Congress in supporting family 
planning programs is simply that spacing 
and limitation of births strengthens the 
health of the mother, increases the integrity 
of the family, and gives larger opportunities 
for the children. It is intended also as one 
means to help break the vicious circle by 
which high fertility contributes to poverty 
and poverty contributes to high fertility. 

Support of domestic family planning 
services is administered by HEW's National 
Center for Family Planning Services, de- 
voted exclusively to supporting such serv- 
ices. 

Federally subsidized family planning pro- 
grams are broadly designed to include the 
delivery of services ; manpower develop- 
ment; operational research, planning, and 
evaluation ; and information and education. 
Delivery of services is by far the major 
activity, using over 90 percent of total 
family planning funds. Services are de- 
livered by State and local health de- 
partments, hospitals, and other public or 
nonprofit private health agencies. In addition, 
family planning information, counseling, 
and referral may be made by public or 
voluntary social agencies with Federal sup- 
port. All family planning programs funded 
by the Federal Government must offer a 
comprehensive range of services, including 
a choice of contraceptives, regular physical 
examinations, basic medical tests, counsel- 
ing, and educational services. A Federal 
statute of 1967 requires States to provide 



voluntary family planning services, among 
other health services, to all qualifying 
recipients of public assistance. Acceptance 
of family planning service must be voluntary 
and may not be a prerequisite or impediment 
to eligibility for any other service. 

The total program is going well. We are 
halfway to the President's original goal of 
services to all those women who want such 
services but cannot afford them. 

President Nixon, soon after coming into 
office in 1969, directed a review of U.S. 
population policies and programs, domestic 
and abroad. His conclusions following that 
review were stated in the 1969 message to 
the Congress on population. In his message, 
the President outlined some of the problems 
which even the then-existing 1 percent rate 
of population growth were creating and 
would create for the United States if con- 
tinued. He asked the Congress to authorize 
the creation of a Commission on Population 
Growth and the American Future to chart 
the course of population growth and related 
demographic developments until 2000, to 
study the resources from the public sector 
that would be required to deal with such 
growth, and to ascertain ways in which 
population growth may affect the activities 
of Federal, State, and local governments. 
The Congress enacted the requested legisla- 
tion and directed the Commission also to 
study the effects of population growth on 
pollution and "the various means appropri- 
ate to the ethical values and principles of 
this society by which our Nation can achieve 
a population level properly suited for its 
environmental, natural resources, and other 
needs." This precept was, of course, a clear 
request to recommend a population policy. 

The Commission conducted widespread 
public hearings and assembled over 100 
special research studies. It made its report 
in March of this year. 1 The report is too 



3 "Population and the American Future, The Re- 
port of the Commission on Population Growth and 
the American Future"; for sale by the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402 (Stock Number 5258-0002; 
price $1.15\. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



large and detailed oven to summarize ade- 
quately in this statement. However, its main 
conclusions were quite clear and can be 
simply stated : 

— After careful search, it could find no 
substantial economic or social benefit that 
the I 'nited States would derive from con- 
tinued population growth beyond that made 
unavoidable by past demographic trends. 

— The time has come for the United States 
to welcome and plan a deliberate policy to 
stabilize population growth. 

— The purpose of such a policy is to help 
attain socially desirable ends, the enrich- 
ment of life, not its restriction. 

The Commission made some 47 recom- 
mendations to carry out the conclusions of 
the report. 

The Commission emphasized that to attack 
the population problem successfully means 
that we must also address problems of 
"poverty, sex discrimination, minority dis- 
crimination, careless exploitation of re- 
sources, environmental deterioration and 
decaying cities." 

The Commission report is still under con- 
sideration. The President on receiving it 
commented that: "The recommendations . . . 
will be taken into account as we formulate 
our national growth and population research 
policies . . . for the years ahead." It will take 
some time to give adequate consideration 
to the many recommendations and to deter- 
mine how and to what extent they can be 
followed. Although its analysis and recom- 
mendations are, of course, directed inter- 
nally, they may be of interest to many of 
you ; copies of the report are available. 

Mr. Claxton 

Policies and Programs Abroad 
The policies and programs of the United 
States in population/family planning mat- 
ters abroad can be quickly stated. I should 
say at once that to a considerable degree 
they have profited from our study of the 
facts and implications of rapid population 
growth presented at the First Asian Popula- 



tion Conference and the recommendations 
of the conference as well as from our own 
research on problems of population growth 
in other regions of the world. 

This analysis crystallized in January 
1965 when President Johnson declared the 
willingness of the United States "to use our 
knowledge to help deal with the explosion 
in world population and the growing scar- 
city in world resources."' The Agency for 
International Development immediately in- 
formed interested governments that it was 
prepared to provide technical, material, and 
financial assistance to countries wishing 
such help for population/family planning 
programs. A year later the U.S. Government 
established in the Office of the Secretary of 
State a Special Assistant for Population 
Matters to coordinate and expedite the de- 
velopment of policies and programs in this 
new field. At the same time a Population 
Division was created in AID to administer 
assistance. The next year the Congress en- 
acted an amendment — title X — to the aid 
legislation authorizing the broadest possible 
scope of assistance to population/family 
planning programs, ranging from demo- 
graphic studies to the delivery of contracep- 
tive services. The amendment authorized 
such help through United Nations agencies, 
international bodies, private organizations, 
and direct bilateral aid. The Congress also 
set aside funds for title X purposes and has 
increased them yearly. 

Miss Costa has mentioned the review of 
U.S. population policy and programs by the 
new administration in 1969. The President 
stated his belief that the United States 
should look to "the United Nations, its 
specialized agencies, and other international 
bodies to take the leadership in responding 
to world population growth. The United 
States," he said, "will cooperate fully with 
their programs." He also directed the Secre- 
tary of State and the Administrator of AID 
"to give population and family planning high 



' For President Johnson's address to the Congress 
on the state of the Union on Jan. 4, 1965, see Bil- 
i.ktin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 



January 1, 1973 



15 



priority for attention, personnel, research, 
and funding among our several aid pro- 
grams." 

Pursuant to these policies, we have tried 
to encourage and support effective action 
in this field by every relevant United Na- 
tions agency. We have joined with many 
nations here to support the U.N. Fund for 
Population Activities (UNFPA) as the 
major source of financial assistance to other 
U.N. bodies and individual countries. We 
look to it for increasing leadership. We have 
joined with others here to see the adoption 
of the necessary resolutions by the Chil- 
dren's Fund, WHO, UNESCO, ILO, and 
FAO TWorld Health Organization; United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization; International Labor Organi- 
zation; Food and Agriculture Organization] 
for a full range of assistance to countries 
wishing their help with population pro- 
grams. We have also joined with others to 
encourage and support expanded action by 
ECAFE and the Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) in population matters. 
We hope that the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) will soon undertake 
comparable leadership. We are especially 
pleased by the new active role of the World 
Bank. 

The United States has undertaken this 
program of action on population matters for 
the same reason which we believe motivates 
the many nations of the ECAFE region now 
carrying out population /family planning 
programs : We believe they are a valuable, 
in some instances a necessary, means to 
raise the dignity and improve the quality 
of life of the individual citizen and to create 
conditions which will be conducive to eco- 
nomic and social progress in a peaceful en- 
vironment. We do not, in any case, believe 
efforts to reduce high birth rates should be 
a substitute for economic and social develop- 
ment or that aid to such programs should be 
a substitute for general aid to development. 
Moreover, we do not consider such efforts 
to be a substitute for measures to establish 
fair terms of trade or to transfer new tech- 



nical knowledge. Internally, they should not 
be a substitute for land reform, sound em- 
ployment policies, social security measures, 
or policies and programs to bring about a 
more equitable distribution of opportunity 
and income. 

In short, we regard population programs, 
in which Asian nations are now leading the 
world, as an essential part of development 
efforts and aid to such programs as a small 
but indispensable element of aid generally. 

Asian Conference and the 
World Population Year and Conference 

Just as the First Asian Population Con- 
ference provided leadership for much that 
has been accomplished after it, we believe 
this conference can provide inspiration for 
the World Population Year and Conference 
and for effective action during the rest of 
this Second Development Decade. With such 
inspiration we should redouble our own 
efforts and seek to encourage the leaders of 
other countries to join in the same endeavor. 

There are a number of fundamental 
reasons why this is so. There are also actions 
that we should take appropriate to each of 
these reasons. 

1. Population and Economic Development. 
It is now evident in all but a few developing 
countries that high rates of population 
growth are absorbing a half or more of the 
gains in economic development. For many 
countries only a fraction of the annual in- 
crease in GNP is available to improve the 
quality of life of their peoples. For many 
countries proud of their political independ- 
ence, it will be impossible to reach and 
maintain a reasonable rate of increase in 
GNP per capita without economic depend- 
ence on external financing unless they are 
able to modernize their birth rates as they 
have modernized their death rates. 

We suggest that it might be useful for in- 
terested governments to undertake an anal- 
ysis of the specific effects which present 
rapid rates of population growth will have 
on their economic progress and their pos- 
sibilities of providing schools for their chil- 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



dren and social services for their peoples. 
A program of such studies might he under- 
taken under the auspices of ECAFE as it 
has been begun in Africa under the auspices 
of ECA with funding- provided by the 
UNFPA. 

Such studies could be useful for the Sym- 
posium on Population and Development 
planned as part of the preparations for the 
World Population Conference. 

As a matter of special but very important 
interest, countries which wish to do so might 
obtain assistance from UNESCO to project 
the effects of growth of the school-age popu- 
lation on the opportunities for education of 
their children over the next two or three 
decades. We hope that UNESCO will be able 
to arrange a world conference, or regional 
conferences, on population and education. 
These studies would be useful for it. 

2. Population and Health of Mothers and 
Children. It is widely recognized that too 
many children too fast can seriously impair 
the health and life of mothers. In the 
hundreds of millions of families where food 
is a matter of daily concern, malnutrition 
and undernutrition can, and do, contribute 
to high infant and child mortality and to 
physical and even mental retardation. For 
these reasons family planning services are in 
themselves preventive health services of the 
highest importance. 

Despite the general acceptance of these 
beliefs, there is far too little specific research 
to identify and measure the actual effects 
of high parity on the family. A set of na- 
tional studies under the auspices of ECAFE 
might provide such facts. 

3. Population and Food. In 1965 and 
1966, as the United States was beginning to 
move into the population field, there was 
much concern over the food/population 
balance. In those years some 125 million 
people were added to the world's population, 
but due primarily to adverse weather condi- 
tions there was very little increase in food 
production. Since then the Creen Revolution 
of new wheat and rice varieties has had an 
outstanding success in some countries, par- 



ticularly in Asia. A degree of euphoria has 
set in. There seems to be a feeling that the 
food problem is a thing of the past. Last 
month's FAO report on food production for 
1970-71 should remove any such com- 
placency. Once again, population growth has 
outrun food production in the developing 
world. We will do well to bear in mind that 
Dr. Norman Boiiaug, who received the 
Nobel Peace Prize as the father of the Green 
Revolution, has said quite bluntly: 

By tho Green Revolution we have only delayed the 
world food crisis for another 30 years. If the world 
population continues to increase at the same rate, 
we will destroy the species. 

Perhaps, with the help of ECAFE and 
FAO, interested countries might make a 
long-range projection of the relationship of 
population growth to food production, in- 
cluding the availability of their production 
for export or their need to import, under 
assumptions of present fertility continued 
and of reduced fertility. 

4. Population and Employment, Unem- 
ployment, and Underemployment. In the re- 
cent three or four years there has been a 
sudden realization of the urgent need to 
find means of employment for the greatly 
enlarged cohorts of young people entering 
the labor market. In most countries there is 
real concern over mounting underemploy- 
ment and open unemployment. These are the 
first of the young people born in the 1950's 
who survived in larger numbers because of 
newly introduced health and sanitation 
measures. These annual new jobseekers 
will continue to grow in numbers, at least 
for the next 15 years, because they are al- 
ready born. If large and effective measures 
to reduce birth rates are not undertaken and 
seriously carried forward, the problems of 
underemployment and unemployment ex- 
perienced now will increase markedly in the 
late 1980's and thereafter. 

The recent Asian Symposium on Labor 
and Population Policies sponsored jointly by 
ECAFE and ILO has made a valuable be- 
ginning in recognizing the importance of 
slowing population growth for the interests 



January 1, 1973 



17 



of laboring people. The proposals of that 
symposium deserve early consideration for 
action. 

5. Population and Stability. Little atten- 
tion has been given to the effects of popula- 
tion factors on political institutions and 
peaceful change. Yet there is reason to 
believe that population factors — rapid popu- 
lation growth, the burdens of migration, 
the compression of more and more people 
into the same living space amid a variety of 
cultural irritations and in the presence of 
frustrations of reasonable desires to improve 
the quality of their lives — have in many 
cases been the critical added force which has 
led to internal violence and to conflicts be- 
tween neighbors. It would be well for all of 
us to examine such instances of the past to 
consider whether one or another of various 
population factors may have made the dif- 
ference between a peaceful and a violent turn 
of events. The purpose of such an analysis 
should, of course, be to guide us to take 
measures to avoid such tragedies in the 
future. 

6. Human Rights. The Second Human 
Rights Conference at Tehran in 1968 recog- 
nized the right of parents to determine the 
number and spacing of their children as a 
basic human right, and to have education 
and information for that purpose. The 
Declaration on Social Progress and Develop- 
ment adopted by the General Assembly on 
December 11, 1969, added the right to have 
the means to exercise this basic human right. 
ECOSOC [United Nations Economic and 
Social Council] approved at its May 1972 
session a resolution of the Population Com- 
mission calling upon all countries to assure 
that such information and means are in fact 
made available to all of their peoples by the 
end of the Second Development Decade. 

Many countries present will hope to reach 
this goal well before the end of the decade. 
But for the world at large this is a worthy 
goal for consideration by this conference, 
leading toward the U.N. Symposium on 
Population and Human Rights, the World 
Population Conference, and the World 



Population Plan of Action to be proposed 
to it. This concept of human rights is no 
academic matter. The ability to control their 
own fertility is an essential for the attain- 
ment of a just status by women in our 
societies. The right of children to be planned 
for and wanted so that they may have affec- 
tion, nourishment, decent housing, and an 
opportunity for education should be high 
among their rights as humans. 

7. Development Policies and Fertility Re- 
duction. The resolution of the First Asian 
Population Conference recommended that a 
national population policy should be inte- 
grated with policies and programs in related 
economic and social spheres, such as educa- 
tion, health, nutrition, social welfare, social 
security, housing, status of women, agri- 
cultural and industrial development, and 
manpower utilization. Thus far, in most 
countries, population policies have gone little 
beyond the provision of family planning 
services. There are two great needs for the 
future: One is to assure that family planning 
services are rapidly made conveniently 
available to entire populations; the other is 
to select and direct other major sectors of 
the development process so that they will 
have a maximum effect on reducing fertil- 
ity. The interregional seminar to be held by 
the U.N. on this subject in mid-November is 
a most important step in the right direction. 
The ideas and recommendations to be devel- 
oped there should be considered with thought- 
ful attention. 

8. Population and Environment. The 
Stockholm Conference left the subject of 
population and environment to the World 
Population Conference and called upon the 
Secretary General to insure that during the 
preparations for that conference, special at- 
tention be given to population concerns as 
they relate to the environment and, more 
particularly, to the environment of human 
settlements. Certainly this fundamental and 
pervasive subject needs major attention. Al- 
though the relative effects in different coun- 
tries of population growth, of affluence, and 
of technology on the environment vary, in 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



every country growing populations do affect 
the land, the forests, the rivers, lakes, and 
marginal seas, and the towns and cities. This 
in turn affects the quality of life of the peo- 
ple. However, the degree of this effect and 
its future implications need to be more care- 
fully considered and better understood. Per- 
haps a thoughtful analysis in each country 
would make an important contribution to 
the World Population Year and Conference. 
9. Urgency. The population explosion is a 
present danger requiring urgent action. The 
many adverse effects of rapid population 
growth are causing serious and irreparable 
damage now. Moreover, the youthful popu- 
lations of nearly every developing country 
create a built-in momentum of population 
growth, which means that even with the 
most determined efforts to reduce birth rates 
to modern levels it will be impossible to 
avoid a doubling and difficult to avoid a tre- 
bling of present numbers. There is great ur- 
gency because each year of delay in reaching 
a level necessary for ultimate stabilizing of 
population growth will materially increase 
the level at which it is finally stabilized. 

We look forward with hope and confidence 
to the great success of this conference. The 
visions and skills of the governmental rep- 
resentatives and experts here should make it 
possible to agree on actions and to set goals 
which will make a major contribution to the 
welfare and happiness of the peoples of Asia. 
Even beyond that, the work of this confer- 
ence could lead this worldwide endeavor to 
bring population growth rates to levels most 
beneficial for human progress. 



TEXT OF DECLARATION' 

Declaration of Population Strategy 
for Development 

The Second Asian Population Conference, 
Having considered the necessity of formulating 
population policies and programmes as integral 
parts of the social and economic development 
process, 



'U.N. doc. E/CN. 11/L. 342. 



Recognizing the urgent necessity of succeeding in 
efforts for economic and social development fur the 
benefit of tin countries and the greater welfare and 
happiness of all the peoples of the ECAFE region, 

Recognizing the human right of every couple to 
determine freelj and responsibly the number and 
spacing of their children and the need to ensure 
their access to information, education and the means 
so to do, no matter what their financial or social 
condition, 

Recognizing further the social and economic im- 
pact of individual family size on societies, and con- 
sidering it appropriate for Governments to take 
social and economic measures, in addition to family 
planning programmes, that will make a smaller 
family more acceptable and beneficial to the in- 
dividual couple, 

Giving full recognition to national sovereignties 
and to the need for each country to consider the 
establishment of goals and programmes for an effec- 
tive control of the growth of population in the light 
of individual national conditions and policies, 

Reaffirming tlie importance of integrating popula- 
tion into the development strategy of the Second 
United Nations Development Decade, 

Taking note of the Stockholm Declaration and 
stressing the impact that rapid population growth 
has on the human environment, 

Having considered the fields of concern identified 
in the report of the present Conference, 

Desirous of ensuring that the World Population 
Conference and the World Population Year con- 
tribute their utmost towards the universal resolu- 
tion of the problems of population and development, 
bearing in mind the inherent differences in such 
problems from country to country, and 

Emphasizing that the urgency of problems of 
population growth and distribution calls for inten- 
sive and dedicated work in various government 
sectors as well as innovative changes in many fields, 

Declares that 

1. While population has a direct effect on eco- 
nomic and social development and the human 
environment, conversely policies in the fields of 
education, health, housing, social security, employ- 
ment and agriculture have an impact on population 
and, therefore, require integrated national planning 
and co-ordinating action at the highest government 
level. 

2. It is important that the widespread benefits 
of economic growth should be ensured through 
policies and programmes to bring about a more 
equitable distribution of opportunity and income, 
with particular attention being paid to health and 
nutrition programmes to reduce infant and maternal 
mortality, programmes to achieve full and produc- 
tive employment, action to reduce excessive rates 
of migration to the larger cities, measures to 



January 1, 1973 



19 



improve the status of women, and appropriate 
social security measures. 

3. The priority of population and family plan- 
ning fields should be recognized through the alloca- 
tion of broad responsibilities in planning, evalua- 
tion and analysis of programmes in these fields to 
an appropriate organization within the Govern- 
ments. 

4. Governments of the region which seek to fulfil 
the ideals of their people and their national goals 
through population policies and programmes should : 

(a) recognize the essential role of population and 
family planning programmes as a means of effec- 
tively achieving the aspirations of families and their 
societies and should provide information, education 
and services for all citizens as early as possible; 

(b) encourage small families in rural and urban 
areas through intensive efforts in information and 
education, with the help of all relevant institutions 
and resources and the enactment of appropriate 
social and economic measures; 

(c) include in population policy and programmes 
provisions to ensure that all pertinent information 
reaches the policy-makers, opinion leaders, and 
socio-economic planners; 

(d) encourage the development of new tools of 
communication and the utilization of existing ones 
so that knowledge may be shared at all levels of 
society; 

(e) consider establishing population commissions 
or other bodies having multidisciplinary and multi- 
departmental representation, to assess the current 
status and future needs in the fields of population 
and family planning; 

(f) ensure co-ordination among various agencies 
at the national, regional and local levels in order 
to expedite action and plans formulated in the light 
of integrated development policies; 

(g) provide essential training facilities with a 
view to improving planning skills, promoting com- 
prehensive and innovative population policies and 
improving management skills in order to increase 
the administrative capabilities of population and 
family planning programmes. 

5. The Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) with the co-operation of the 
United Nations Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA) and other United Nations bodies, should 
ensure that there are, within the region, facilities 
for training and research in the fields of population 
and development, to meet the countries' needs for 
people skilled in the various areas of policy formula- 
tion, planning, implementation and evaluation, and 
to promote the advancement of knowledge in these 
fields. 

6. The problems encountered in dealing with 
rapid population growth are of vital concern to the 



entire world community, and the Second Asian 
Population Conference requests that the report of 
its deliberations be taken into consideration in the 
drafting of the World Population Plan of Action; 
it likewise calls upon the World Population Con- 
ference, in 1974, to consider the means which 
might be applied on a global level for the solution 
of these problems. 

7. Leadership and assistance on the part of the 
United Nations and its associated agencies are of 
crucial importance to all countries in achieving 
population goals consistent with and fundamental 
to the purposes set forth in this Declai-ation. 



U.S. Accepts Agreed Principles 
for North Atlantic Charter Flights 



Press release 296 dated December 1 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

The Department of State announced on 
December 1 U.S. acceptance of the terms of a 
declaration of agreed principles on charter 
flights over the North Atlantic which had 
been worked out jointly with Canadian 
authorities and representatives of the 20 
member states of the European Civil Avia- 
tion Conference (ECAC). It is expected that 
the declaration, while it is not a treaty or an 
executive agreement, will provide a generally 
agreed framework which will permit all 
North Atlantic states to establish substan- 
tially similar charter rules with respect to 
the new nonaffinity class of air charters that 
will facilitate and regularize their operation 
on North Atlantic air routes. Canadian and 
European authorities, with whom U.S. rep- 
resentatives had developed the declaration at 
meetings at Ottawa in October, are making 
a similar announcement. 

The texts of the declaration and a com- 
munication from Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Transportation and Telecom- 
munications Bert W. Rein to the Chairman 
of the International Transport Policy Com- 
mittee of the Canadian Transport Commis- 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



sion and the President of the European Civil 

Aviation Conference outlining U.S. views on 
it are printed below. 

Background 

Since the middle forties, scheduled inter- 
national air transportation has been con- 
trolled by a series of bilateral agreements 
between states. The United States is party 
to over 50 such agreements at present. How- 
ever, since charter flights did not become a 
significant sector of air transport operations 
until the late fifties, this type of operation 
was not included in the bilateral air trans- 
port agreements and has been carried out for 
the most part on an ad hoc basis. The stead- 
ily mounting importance of low-cost charter 
air transportation was recognized in the 
Presidential policy statement approved by 
President Xixon June 22, 1970. in which it 
was stated : ' 

Charter services by scheduled and supplemental 
carriers have been useful in holding down fare and 
rate levels and expanding passenger and cargo mar- 
kets. They offer opportunities to exploit the inherent 
efficiency of planeload movement and the elasticity 
of demand for international air transport. They can 
provide low-cost transportation of a sort fitted to the 
needs of a significant portion of the traveling public. 
Charter services are a most valuable component of 
the international air transportation system .... 



. . . foreign landing rights for charter services 
should be regularized. . . . (and) . . . intergovern- 
mental agreements covering the operation of charter 
services should be vigorously sought .... 

As charter transportation developed 
through the fifties and sixties, the affinity 
charter in which persons making up the 
charter group were required to be members 
of groups or organizations formed for pur- 
poses other than air travel (church groups, 
civic clubs, professional associations, et 
cetera) became the primary type of opera- 
tion in this field. However, as charters be- 
came a more important sector of the overall 



1 For text, see Bulletin of July 20, 1970, p. 86. 



air transportation market (some 25 percent 
of all North Atlantic passengers moved by 
charter in 1971), it became apparent that 
the regulation of affinity charter rules be- 
came increasingly difficult and that the in- 
trinsic discriminatory aspects of the rules 
themselves clearly were undesirable. To work 
toward a resolution of these problems, a 
series of meetings was instituted among 
U.S. — represented by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB), the Department of State, and 
the Department of Transportation — Euro- 
pean, and Canadian authorities in early 1971 
to seek an understanding on rules to be ap- 
plied to charters that would regularize their 
operation in a manner similar to scheduled 
air transportation and facilitate their use by 
a wider segment of the traveling public, 
which had indicated its preference for this 
type of transportation. The final meeting of 
this series, in which the Department of State 
and the Department of Transportation par- 
ticipated, took place at Ottawa, Canada. 
October 19-21, 1972, just after the announce- 
ment in late September and early October 
of a new class of experimental nonaffinity 
charters by the United States (Travel Group 
Charters) and the United Kingdom (Ad- 
vance Booking Charters). A similar rule on 
Excursion Travel Charters was also under 
consideration by the Europeans. 

Based on the new rules and the work 
already done by the multilateral group, the 
declaration of agreed principles was de- 
veloped as a means to facilitate the intro- 
duction of the new nonaffinity charters, 
which it is expected will become the most 
important single charter type for North 
Atlantic movements in the future. Final de- 
cisions have not yet been made by the parties 
on whether or not the affinity charter rules 
should be eliminated. The United States is 
giving consideration to suspending the af- 
finity rules during the experimental period 
to December 31, 1975, for the Travel Group 
Charters. In this regard, the Civil Aero- 
nautics Board issued on November 9 an ad- 
vance notice of proposed rulemaking regard- 



January 1, 1973 



21 



ing the suspension of prior-affinity charter 
authority. Whatever the outcome of this pro- 
ceeding, the CAB has noted that it expects 
to postpone the effectiveness of any rule 
which might be developed to suspend affinity 
charters until after the completion of the 
1973 travel season. 

As the communication from Mr. Rein indi- 
cates, within the framework of the declara- 
tion the United States intends to seek bi- 
lateral discussions with other interested 
aviation authorities at an early date to 
arrive at a mutually agreeable regime for 
particular bilateral traffic flows and to insure 
fully reciprocal treatment for U.S.-originat- 
ing Travel Group Charter flights. 

Since the CAB's Travel Group Charter 
rule has been challenged in a court action, 
operation of flight programs under the non- 
affinity rules will be contingent upon the final 
resolution of court proceedings in the United 
States. In this regard, however, concrete 
developments in the legal situation are ex- 
pected before the end of 1972. 



TEXT OF DECLARATION OF AGREED PRINCIPLES 

1. A new category of planeload charter operations 
should be introduced by 1 April 1973 with a view 
toward replacing affinity concepts as the primary 
regulatory regime governing North Atlantic char- 
ters by December 31, 1973. 

2. The new charter category should reflect the 
basic economies provided to airlines by passengers 
who are willing to commit themselves to specific 
operations months in advance and to accommodate 
their travel arrangements so as to travel together 
with others. It should be premised on a commitment 
to hire an entire aircraft on behalf of one or several 
groups at least 90 days in advance of the commence- 
ment of the trip. 

3. Organizers should undertake appropriate con- 
tractual arrangements with air carriei's, should 
bring such charter opportunities to the attention of 
the traveling public by all appropriate means, and 
should ensure that charter participants receive the 
agreed transportation services. The regulation of 
organizers, including the possibility of licensing, and 
the control of their business activities and legal re- 
lations with carriers and charter participants is the 
principal concern of the state in which the organizer 
seeks to originate charters. Organizers should con- 
tract for a minimum group of 40. 



4. Travelers in such new planeload charter oper- 
ations should be identified at least 90 days in ad- 
vance of the commencement of the trip. At that date, 
the appropriate authorities should be advised of 
committed group participants and a reasonable 
number of stand-by group participants. Between the 
90th and 30th days before commencement, stand-by 
participants may be transferred to the main list pro- 
vided that the number of transfers does not exceed 
20% of the total number of passengers on the main 
list of pro-rata priced flights or 15% of the total 
number of seats contracted for on another basis. 

5. Members of a participating group should de- 
part and return together, and should secure their 
round trip tickets in advance of departure. Different 
groups departing on the same aircraft may return 
at different dates. Groups should depart and return 
on aircraft of the same carrier except in special 
cases where the feasibility of the proposed charter 
opei'ation is recognized to require the participation 
of an additional carrier. 

6. Participating groups should be required to un- 
dertake a journey of a minimum duration. In light 
of the travel needs of potential participants, a 14- 
day minimum for the summer season and a 10-day 
minimum for the winter season do not seem un- 
reasonable. 

7. Carriers should offer capacity for the new cat- 
egory of operations at prices which are neither un- 
reasonably high or low taking into account the 
aircraft cost per mile, the distance involved and 
other relevant costs. Not less than four months be- 
fore the commencement of their first operation, car- 
riers should file appropriate tariffs with concerned 
regulatory authorities. In the absence of a challenge 
to such tariffs, contracts incorporating them shall be 
regarded as valid in this respect. 

8. The impact of the new charter category on the 
ability of scheduled carriers to continue adequate 
on-demand services and economically viable opera- 
tions, as well as the success of the new category in 
meeting the desires of the traveling public, should 
be carefully observed by governments. To this end, 
there should be agreement on common statistical 
techniques and exchanges of data. 

9. In the event that operations of the new charter 
category lead states to consider that problems have 
arisen, the states concerned should undertake to dis- 
cuss the matter to determine what measures, if any, 
should be taken. 

10. Any limitations on the volume of charter 
flights in the new category should normally be an- 
nounced well in advance of the 90th day before the 
commencement of any flights potentially affected, 
for example, by incorporation in licenses or regula- 
tions of general applicability. Every effort should 
be made by all states to avoid uncertainty with re- 
spect to individual flights. 

11. Regulatory authorities should make an active 
effort to enforce the elements of new concepts and 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



may require the filing of contracts, passenger lists, 
substitute rosters and other appropriate documents. 
To minimize the administrative burdens of these 
procedures on carriers and organizers, efforts should 
be undertaken to coordinate enforcement procedures. 
In normal circumstances in order to avoid inconven- 
ience to the traveling public, charter flights should 
not he interrupted by the states of destination, but 
infractions should be brought to the attention of the 
aeronautical authorities of the originating state for 
appropriate consideration and action. 

12. Scheduled carriers, in addition to their plane- 
load charter operations, should consider offering the 
public an opportunity to benefit from the economies 
of advance commitment in the context of scheduled 
operations. It was recognized, however, that this 
question was one for the scheduled air carriers to 
determine in the first instance. The decision of 
scheduled air carriers in that respect will be con- 
sidered by states when submitted. 



COMMUNICATION FROM MR. REIN = 

GENTUEMEN: After a review by appropriate exec- 
utive and regulatory authorities, we have concluded 
that the draft Declaration prepared in Ottawa is 
acceptable to the United States. We believe that this 
Declaration establishes, as we look toward experi- 
mentation with non-affinity concepts, a generally 
agreed framework which will permit all North At- 
lantic States to establish substantially similar rules. 
We would expect the Declaration to be subject to 
such modifications as experience would make 
prudent. 

Adherence to the Declaration signifies our inten- 
tion to permit the operation to and from the United 
States of foreign-originating charters marketed un- 
der national rules consistent with the Declaration 
but differing from our own pro-rata regulations. To 
this end, we are prepared to undertake discussions 
with other interested authorities, at an appropri- 
ately early date, to arrive at a mutually agreeable 
regime for particular bilateral flows and to ensure 
fully reciprocal treatment for U.S. originating TGC 
[Travel Group Charter] flights. Actual inaugura- 
tion of flight programs will, of course, be contingent 
upon the final resolution of court proceedings in the 
United States but we expect some concrete develop- 
ments in the legal situation before the end of this 
year. 

In communicating our views, I think it might be 
useful for me to call attention to several points 
which may be of interest to Canada and ECAC 



' Addressed jointly to the Chairman of the Inter- 
national Transport Policy Committee of the Cana- 
dian Transport Commission and the President of the 
European Civil Aviation Conference. 



member states. First, I believe that the decision of 
the CAB denying a stay of the TGC rule and the 
Board's subsequent initiation of an inquiry into the 
future of affinity flights underline the views which 
we expressed on affinity regulations at the Ottawa 
meeting. We would expect a relatively quick dis- 
position of the affinity proceeding. 

Second, while we accept the fact that the 10 and 
14 day limitations mentioned in paragraph 6 of the 
draft Declaration do not seem unreasonable, we 
continue to believe that a year-round 10-day rule 
would be more reasonable. We believe that further 
evaluation and experience will demonstrate that 
shorter lengths of stay can be made available to the 
public without significant risks to the air transport 
system, and we would hope that, where and when 
appropriate, traffic will move on this basis. 

Third, the provisions for substitution in para- 
graph 4 and their relation to final lists are of con- 
cern from the point of view of enforcement. We 
would expect in discussions with other interested 
governments to deal in more detail with transfer 
notifications, listing procedures, and closing dates. 
We are interested in ensuring the best possible en- 
forcement approach consistent with the economic 
viability of operations and the convenience of the 
traveling public. 

We look forward to receiving your views on the 
Ottawa Declaration. The work we have done to- 
gether has not been easy and there are no doubt 
imperfections in our product. Nevertheless, we con- 
sider that these discussions have made important 
progress which will benefit carriers and the traveling 
public on both sides of the Atlantic. 



Wildlife Conservation Conference 
To Be Held at Washington 

Department Announcement, November 28 

Press release 292 dated November 28 

The most comprehensive international 
meeting ever held by governments on the con- 
servation of the earth's endangered wildlife 
will convene at Washington in February. 
Over 100 nations are expected to participate. 

The conference, which will be hosted by 
the U.S. Government, will seek to conclude a 
convention barring most trade across inter- 
national boundaries of animals and plants 
now threatened by extinction. A stringent 
system of controls would be set up to regulate 
the limited exceptions. 

The meeting represents the culmination of 



January 1, 1973 



23 



years of preparatory work by both govern- 
ments and private organizations. The Inter- 
national Union for Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources, a nongovernmental 
body, has proposed successive model con- 
ventions starting in 1963. The latest, which 
incorporates suggestions by the Government 
of Kenya and other governments and by 
private conservation groups, will be proposed 
by the United States as the basic working 
paper of the conference. 

The conference will take place from Feb- 
ruary 12 to March 3 in the Department of 
State's conference suite. The final document 
emerging from the meeting will require rati- 
fication by the states seeking to become 
parties. 



Bangladesh To Receive More Wheat 
Under Food for Peace Program 

In response to an urgent appeal from the 
United Nations, the U.S. Government is 
donating an additional 100,000 tons of Food 
for Peace wheat to the people of Bangladesh, 
the Agency for International Development 
announced on November 28 (press release 
86). 

This is in addition to 100,000 tons of 
wheat committed earlier in November by 
the U.S. Government in response to the 
U.N.'s appeal for 700,000 tons of grain for 
Bangladesh. Delivered value of the new com- 
mitment of 100,000 tons of wheat is about 
$10 million. 

To date the U.S. Government has com- 
mitted 850,000 tons of wheat, 150,000 tons 
of rice, and 75,000 tons of edible oil to the 
people of Bangladesh. 

Including the wheat donation announced 
November 28, the U.S. Government has con- 
tributed approximately $320 million in cash, 
food, medical, and other relief and rehabili- 
tation assistance to Bangladesh since its 
independence. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 1st Session 

The Geneva Protocol of 1925. Hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Exec- 
utive J, 91st Cong., 2d sess., the protocol for the 
prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, 
poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological 
methods of warfare. March 5-26, 1971 (printed 
October 1972). 446 pp. 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

Economic Developments in Mainland China. Hear- 
ings before the Joint Economic Committee. June 
13-15, 1972. 151 pp. 

Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Nar- 
cotic Drugs. Hearing before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on Executive J, 92d Cong., 
2d sess. June 27, 1972. 80 pp. 

The States of North Africa in the 1970's. Joint 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa and 
the Subcommittee on the Near East of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 18-August 2, 
1972. 261 pp. 

Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Weapons. Hearings before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs on joint resolutions to consider 
approval of interim agreement between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics on certain measures with respect 
to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. July 
20-August 9, 1972. 158 pp. 

Full Committee Hearings on the Military Implica- 
tions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
Agreements. House Committee on Armed Services. 
July 25-27, 1972. 87 pp. 

Communist Treatment of Prisoners of War. A his- 
torical survey. Prepared for the Subcommittee To 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. August 
8, 1972. 35 pp. 

World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate 
the Administration of the Internal Security Act 
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary. Part 1 : Southeast 
Asia. August 14, 1972. 66 pp. 

Prospects for Peace in the Middle East: The View 
From Israel. Report by Senator Frank Church 
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
a study mission to Israel, August 22-27, 1972. 
September 1972. 30 pp. 

Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group. Re- 
port of the Senate delegation on the 12th meeting, 
held at New Orleans, by Senator Mike Mansfield, 
chairman. September 11, 1972. 18 pp. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Abstains on General Assembly Resolution on the Middle East 



Folloioing are statements made in the U.N. 

eral Assembly on December 5 and 8 by 

U.S. Represi ntative George Bush, together 

with the text of a resolution adopted by the 

Assembly on December 8. 

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 5 

USUN press release 152 dated December 5 

Since the tragic war of 1967, a torrent of 
words on the Middle East has engulfed this 
and other U.N. chambers. Bitterness and in- 
vective have characterized many statements, 
and these have contributed little to finding 
the road to a durable peace. 

For this reason the United States believed 
that unless there was a specific practical ob- 
jective which clearly could have moved the 
area nearer to peace, it would have been wise 
to forgo yet another debate and resolution on 
the Middle East at this General Assembly. 
Others did not agree, and the debate is on. 
It is now for us — all of us — to do our best 
to see that what emerges from this debate 
contributes directly to an improvement in 
the atmosphere in the Middle East and to the 
prospects for peacemaking or, if this is not 
possible, to insure that opportunities for 
diplomacy in the months ahead are not seri- 
ously set back. 

Secretary Rogers outlined the views of my 
government during the general debate. 1 He 
cautioned that : 

. . . the momentum toward a peace settlement 
must be regained. . . . 

. . . neither side has permanently closed the door 
to future diplomatic efforts. We believe that forces 



favoring a peaceful settlement still have the upper 
hand. Our task is to do everything possible to see 
that they ate supported. 

The basic framework for the long-sought 
peace has been in existence since 1967. So 
many pro forma and perfunctory references 
have been made to Security Council Resolu- 
tion 242 in recent years that we tend to for- 
get the landmark quality of that guideline 
to peace. 1 ' It is a carefully balanced docu- 
ment, evolved with extraordinary care to 
address the concerns of the parties involved 
as well as to serve as a basis for reconciling 
interests and laying the foundation for a 
peaceful settlement which will endure. We 
would do well to bear always in mind that 
it is the essential agreed basis for United 
Nations peace efforts and that this body and 
all its members should be mindful of the 
need to preserve the negotiating asset that 
it represents. 

The heart of this resolution is that a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East should 
include the application of two — not one, but 
two — principles : withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the 1967 
conflict; and "termination of all claims or 
states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, terri- 
torial integrity and political independence 
of every State in the area and their right to 
live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force." 

Clearly, the inability of the countries in 
the area to move forward toward a settle- 
ment, despite determined efforts by a dis- 
tinguished statesman, Ambassador Gunnar 



1 For Secretary Rogers' statement before the 
General Assembly on Sept. 25, see Bulletin of Oct. 
16, 1972, p. 425. 



- For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Dec. 
18, 1967, p. 843. 



January 1, 1973 



25 



Jarring as the Secretary General's Special 
Representative, has resulted from varying 
interpretations of the principles contained 
in Resolution 242. The issues are complex 
and have deep historical and emotional 
roots. While my government regrets that 
more progress has not been made, we are 
also convinced that these difficulties are not 
insurmountable and that further efforts must 
be made to bring the benefits of a peaceful 
settlement to all the peoples of the Middle 
East. We know that each side is convinced of 
the justice of its cause, and we know that 
each side is concerned about its future secu- 
rity. We believe that a political settlement, 
based on mutual accommodation, could as- 
sure both. 

Mr. President, the U.S. Government and 
the American people have an important, 
substantial interest in maintaining peace in 
the Middle East, in preserving the cultural 
heritage and political independence of all its 
peoples, and in helping to create stable con- 
ditions in which they may freely pursue 
their own material and social development. 
We attach great importance to our relations 
with all the states and peoples of the area, 
relations which have deep and abiding roots. 
We are particularly pleased that in the last 
year cordial and fruitful relations have been 
reestablished between the United States and 
some Arab states. We, on our part, are de- 
termined to conduct ourselves in a manner 
which will contribute to this trend of im- 
proving relations with old friends. 

For this reason we supported, and continue 
to support, Security Council Resolution 242 
and the mission of Ambassador Jarring. For 
this reason we welcomed, and continue to 
welcome, the establishment of a cease-fire 
in much of the area, which has reduced the 
loss of lives and resources and has given 
time for constructive reflection on the future 
of the area. 

And what of that future? How is it to be 
assured in peace and harmony for the coun- 
tries of the Middle East? We are still faced 
with the problem of the "how" : how to get 
a reasonable process of discussion and ac- 
commodation underway so that the peoples 



of that area may enjoy the benefits of a more 
tranquil environment. 

All of us are aware that progress on the 
great political issues of our time has come 
slowly and, in most cases, in small steps or 
stages. My government has long been con- 
vinced that the most hopeful and practical 
means of initiating a reasonable process of 
discussion and accommodation on the Middle 
East was through practical interim steps, 
such as those involved in the so-called in- 
terim Suez Canal agreement. The United 
States has publicly and privately indicated 
its willingness to play a role in helping the 
parties negotiate such an agreement if they 
so desire, and we remain available for this 
purpose. 

Mr. President, the problems in the Middle 
East area are indeed complex and deeply 
rooted. But other problems around the world 
are also complex or the product of deep his- 
torical, cultural, or political divisions. 

For our part, we are negotiating with the 
Soviet Union on the complex matter of nu- 
clear arms and other matters. We have taken 
the first steps toward reducing two decades 
of accumulated tensions between us and the 
People's Republic of China. We are talking 
to North Viet-Nam about peace in South- 
east Asia. 

In central Europe, the Federal Republic 
of Germany initiated a process that has led 
to the initialing of a basic treaty with the 
German Democratic Republic and to im- 
proved relations with the other neighbors 
to the east. The countries of North America 
and Europe are now engaged in a process 
of discussion of the issues that have divided 
Europe for almost three decades. 

Others have not been inactive in trying to 
bridge old animosities. Parties to the Cyprus 
dispute are participating in intercommunal 
talks. In south Asia, discussions are continu- 
ing among countries who only one year ago 
were engaged in active hostilities. In Korea, 
representatives from both sides of the armi- 
stice line are engaged in exploring the pros- 
pects for greater peace and stability on their 
peninsula. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



It seems to us that all members of this 
organization have a strong interest in get- 
ting such processes started also on the prob- 
lem of the Middle East. President Nixon 
recently indicated that a peaceful settlement 
in the Middle East will have a high priority 
for the United States. 

The guidelines for negotiations between 
the parties have already been established in 
Security Council Resolution 242. This As- 
sembly must preserve the measure of agree- 
ment that already underlies this resolution. 
It cannot seek to redefine the essentials for 
peace in the Middle East. It cannot seek to 
impose courses of action on the countries 
directly concerned, either by making new 
demands or by favoring the proposals or 
positions of one side or the other. These 
approaches simply will not work and may 
in fact endanger the relative calm that has 
existed since 1970. 

This Assembly must instead insure that 
its conclusions will reinforce the willingness 
of all parties in the months ahead to enter 
into a diplomatic process which alone can 
lead to the just and lasting settlement which 
is our common objective. 



STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 8 

USUN press release 157 dated December 8 

We regret very much that the resolution 
which has just been voted constitutes pre- 
cisely the kind of resolution we had so much 
hoped could be avoided at this Assembly. 
This resolution cannot render constructive 
assistance to the processes of diplomacy. It 
cannot offer encouragement to the parties to 
reach a peaceful accommodation of their 
differences. 

As we and others have noted many times 
before, Security Council Resolution 242 is a 
carefully balanced text whose provisions re- 
garding the basic aspects of a settlement are 
integrally interrelated. Security Council Res- 
olution 242 is designed to serve as the guide- 
line for a peaceful settlement which meets 
the political, security, and economic interest 
of all the peoples in the area. It is the only 



agreed basis for such a settlement, and as I 
said four days ago, it is essential that we, 
and particularly the principal parties con- 
cerned, preserve the negotiating framework 
which Resolution 242 provides. 

Several paragraphs of this resolution ap- 
pear calculated to upset the careful balance 
of Security Council Resolution 242 between 
withdrawal from occupied territories and 
agreement between the parties on the terms 
of a just and lasting peace. 

The United States was particularly con- 
cerned, as indicated in my intervention on a 
point of order earlier, over the language of 
operative paragraph 8 notwithstanding the 
efforts of a number of delegations to tone 
down the more objectionable features of the 
original language. I wish to record here and 
now that had we been permitted to vote on 
that paragraph separately, we would have 
voted "No." This paragraph is directly con- 
trary to U.S. policy on the matter of assist- 
ance and cannot affect our attitude. 

The Assembly cannot expect that by 
adopting such a resolution it can establish 
a new, agreed basis for peace in the Middle 
East. 

Four days ago my government urged the 
members of this Assembly to insure that our 
debate contribute directly to an improve- 
ment in the atmosphere in the Middle East 
and to the prospects for peacemaking or, at 
a minimum, to insure that opportunities for 
diplomacy in the months ahead are not set 
back. As President Nixon said recently, the 
Middle East will have high priority. Only 
this week Secretary Rogers reaffirmed in 
Brussels the U.S. intention to be active dip- 
lomatically to encourage meaningful nego- 
tiations between the parties. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 3 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the item entitled "The situa- 
tion in the Middle East", 

Having received the report of the Secretary - 



'U.N. doc. A/RES/2949 (XXVII); adopted by 
the Assembly on Dec. 8 by a rollcall vote of 86 to 
7, with :il abstentions (U.S.). 



January 1, 1973 



27 



General of 15 September 1972 on the activities of 
his Special Representative to the Middle East, 

Reaffirming that Secretary Council resolution 
242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 must be imple- 
mented in all its parts, 

Deeply perturbed that Security Council resolu- 
tion 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 
2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971 have not been 
implemented and, consequently, the envisaged just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East has not been 
achieved, 

Reiterating its grave concern at the continuation 
of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 
5 June 1967, 

Reaffirming that the territory of a State shall 
not be the object of occupation or acquisition by 
another State resulting from the threat or use of 
force, 

Affirming that changes in the physical character 
or demographic composition of occupied territories 
are contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, as well as to the 
provisions of the relevant applicable international 
conventions, 

Convinced that the grave situation prevailing in 
the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to 
international peace and security, 

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Na- 
tions to restore peace and security in the Middle 
East in the immediate future, 

1. Reaffirms its resolution 2799 (XXVI) ; 

2. Deplores the non-compliance by Israel with 
General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), which in 
particular called upon Israel to respond favourably 
to the peace initiative of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General to the Middle East; 

3. Expresses its full support for the efforts of 
the Secretary-General and his Special Representa- 
tive; 

4. Declares once more that the acquisition of 
territories by force is inadmissible and that, con- 
sequently, territories thus occupied must be re- 
stored; 

5. Reaffirms that the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East should include the 
application of both the following principles: 



(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict; 

(b) Termination of all claims or states of bel- 
ligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and its 
right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 

6. Invites Israel to declare publicly its adherence 
to the principle of non-annexation of territories 
through the use of force; 

7. Declares that changes carried out by Israel 
in the occupied Arab territories in contravention 
of the Geneva Convention of 1949 are null and void, 
and calls upon Israel to rescind forthwith all such 
measures and to desist from all policies and 
practices affecting the physical character or demo- 
graphic composition of the occupied Arab ter- 
ritories ; 

8. Calls -upon all States not to recognize any such 
changes and measures carried out by Israel in the 
occupied Arab territories and invites them to avoid 
actions, including actions in the field of aid, that 
could constitute recognition of that occupation; 

9. Recognizes that respect for the rights of the 
Palestinians is an indispensable element in the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the 

Middle East; 

10. Requests the Security Council, in consulta- 
tion with the Secretary-General and his Special 
Representative, to take all appropriate steps with 
a view to the full and speedy implementation of 
Security Council resolution 242 (1967), taking into 
account all the relevant resolutions and documents 
of the United Nations in this connexion ; 

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Council and the General Assembly on 
the progress made by him and his Special Repre- 
sentative in the implementation of Security Council 
resolution 242 (1967) and of the present resolution; 

12. Decides to transmit the present resolution to 
the Security Council for its appropriate action and 
requests the Council to keep the General Assembly 
informed. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



Calendar of International Conferences 



Scheduled January Through March 

U.N. ECOSOC Organizational Meeting for the 54th Session. . 
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Standardization of Technical 

Requirements for Vessels and of Ship's Papers. 
[MCO Subcommittee on Life-Saving Appliances: 6th Session. . 
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Hard Fibers: 5th Session. . 
IOC/UNESCO Ad Hoc Working Group on Rationalizing the 

Structure of the Commission. 
UNCITRAL Working Group on Negotiable Instruments . . 
ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee . . . 

ICAO Legal Committee: Special Session 

5th ICAO Africa Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation Meeting, 
IX. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination . . 
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights Ad Hoc Committee 

on Periodic Reports. 

GATT Working Group on Subsidies 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Braking Problems 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 14th Session. 
ICRC Meeting of Government Experts on Humanitarian Law 

Applicable in Armed Conflicts. 

OECD Trade Committee 

GATT/UNCTAD Joint Advisory Group on the International 

Trade Center. 
UNESCO International Bureau of Education Council: 8th Session 

WHO Executive Board 

OECD Exports Mooting on Direct Investments 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products 

GATT Working Group on the Tariff Study 

ECE Group of Exports on International Standardization Policies. 

IMCO Legal Committee: 17th Session 

UXCTAD Reinsurance Exports Meeting 

ECAFE Committee on Trade 

ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel: 4th Session 

UNCITRAL Working Group on Sales 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 25th Session . . 

UNDP Governing Council: 15th Session 

ECE Inland Transport Committee: 32d Session 

IMCO Subcommittee on Containers and Cargoes: 14th Session . 
U.N. Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites 



New York 
Geneva 

London 
Merida, Mexico 
Paris . . 

Geneva 
Bangkok . 
Montreal . 
Rome . . 
New York 
New York 



Geneva 
Geneva 
London 
Geneva 

Paris 
Geneva 

Geneva 

Geneva 

Paris 

Geneva 

Geneva 

Geneva 

London 

Geneva 

Bangkok 

Montreal 

New York 

Geneva 

New York 

Geneva 

London 

New York 



Jan. 


8-10 




Jan. 


8-12 




Jan. 


8-12 




Jan. 


8-13 




Jan. 


8-13 




Jan. 


8-19 




Jan. 


9-16 




Jan. 


9-30 




Jan. 


10-Feb. 


2 


Jan. 


11-12 




Jan. 


11-19 




Jan. 


15-17 




Jan. 


15-19 




Jan. 


15-19 




Jan. 


15-20 




Jan. 


16-17 




Jan. 


16-19 




Jan. 


16-20 




Jan. 


16-27 




Jan. 


17 




Jan. 


18-19 




Jan. 


22 




Jan. 


22-24 




Jan. 


22-26 




Jan. 


22-27 




Jan. 


22-30 




Jan. 


22-Feb. 


2 


Jan. 


22-Feb. 


2 


Jan. 


22-Feb. 


9 


Jan. 


22-Feb. 


9 


Jan. 


29-Feb. 


2 


Jan. 


29-Feb. 


2 


Jan. 


29-Feb. 


9 



''This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 15, 1972, 
rnational conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period 
January March L973. .Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CENTO, Central Treaty 
mization; EC, European Community; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Com- 
mission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social 
cil; FAO, Food and Angriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Coun- 
cil; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross; 
II' 1 . International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; NATO, Xorth Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; RID, European Convention on Transport of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail; UNCITRAL, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; 
I NCTAD, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development; U/NDP, United Nations Development Program; 
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organi- 
zation; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization. 



January 1, 1973 



29 



UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group on the Transfer of Technology Geneva^ . 
IA-ECOSOC: 8th Annual Meeting Colombia 

CCC Chemists Committee: 19th Session ■ • • ■ • ' * ' ' Paris . 
Council of Europe Consultations on UNCITBAI , ^. • • 
GATT Preparatory Committee for the International iraae 

Negotiations. „„„+ . . Geneva 

GATWorking P«ty on EC Enlwment . • . . ■ ■ ^ 

ssss assjrsfl&n- «**. »« ■ 

Special Mid-Term Meeting. _ 

OECD Agricultural Ministerial Meeting . . . ^ • • 
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working rarty 

Inflation. a+,,i-» . . . 

SNE D SCO X MSg C orG m ornme N nrE^ To Finalize Draft on 
U ?nte ln atiS Rfcommendations on Status of Scientific Research 

Workers. , , r „, ir ,.si . . Bangkok 

ECAFE Asian Industrial Development Councd^ .^ ^ 



London 
London 
Madrid 

Paris 
Paris 

Paris 
Paris 



New York 

London 

Geneva 



Goods. . . . . . . 

UNCITRAL Working Party on Shipping . . . • ■ ■ 
ICAO Conference on the Economics of Route Air iNavig^ 

EC^FE^oZ^efcf Industry and Natural Resources . . . 

S?0 G SuTommiS P o°n rt ShS DesSnTndEquipxnen^: 10th Session 

nMPrnW Committee on Natural Resources: 3d Session . . 
UNCTaS Wooing Group on the Charter of the Economic Rights 

and Duties of States. . 

ILO Governing Body: 189th Session 
FAO Technical Conference on Fis 

EcTptEn Institute for Economic Development and Planning 

ECA Conference of Ministers . . • • • ■ • • ■ ' Geneva 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Contamer Transport ■ Geneva 

U.N. ECOSOC Group of Experts on Explosives ... _ ^^ 



OH , 

Fisheries Management ana 



New York 
Montreal . 

Bangkok . 
Geneva 
London 
New Delhi 
Geneva 

Geneva 
Vancouver 

Bangkok . 
Accra . • 



Pollution 



Jute, Kenaf, and Allied Fibers: 



29th Session 



Vienna 
Rome . 

Tokyo . 
Geneva 

Geneva 
Geneva 

Geneva 



IMCO Subcommittee on Marine 
IAEA Board of Governors . . 
FAO Intergovernmental Group on 

6th Session. 
U^COstc SS' oTRappoSrs'on Packaging of Dangerous 

UN°°ECOSOC Human Rights Commission 

rN^Commltrefofthe" gStf' uL "of the Sea-bed and the 
U Oce a nFToor Beyond the Limits of. National Jurisdiction. ^^ 

CCC Valuation Committee: 60th Session . • • • • • Geneva 

GATT Working Group on Countervailing Duties . . . 
GATT Working Group on l-port Docum entati on . • ^ • • Gen 

GATT Working Group on Quantitative Restriction am. ^ i 

Formalities. 
ZTr^JfZ SSpmS Board: Resumed Session \ . 
UNESCO Conference on Application of Science and Technology 

UNESCo'ZTe^y^ern^enTal Copyright Committee Study Group 
U i International Regulation of Photographic Reproduction of 

Copvrighted Works. Geneva 

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 



London 
Geneva 
Lagos 



Jan. 29-Feb. 9 
Jan. 30-Feb. 9 

January 
January 
January 

January 
January 
January 
January 
January 

January 
January 

January 
January 



Feb. 1-7 
Feb. 5-9 
Feb. 5-9 
Feb. 5-9 
Feb. 5-9 

Feb. 5-23 
Feb. 6-23 

Feb. 8-14 
Feb. 12-16 
Feb. 12-16 
Feb. 12-23 
Feb. 12-23 

Feb. 12-Mar. 2 
Feb. 13-23 

Feb. 15-16 
Feb. 19-23 
Feb. 19-23 
Feb. 19-23 
Feb. 19-Mar. 2 
Feb. 20 
, Feb. 21-23 



Feb. 26-Mar. 1 
Feb. 26-Mar. 9 

Feb. 26- Apr. 6 
Feb. 27-Mar. 9 
Feb. 27-Mar. 30 

February 
February 
February 
February 

February 
February 
February 



Paris February 



February- 
April 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



ICRO Meeting of Government Experts on Humanitarian Law 

Applicable in Armed Conflicts. 
[MCO Subcommittee on Radiocommunications: 11th Session 
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government 

Procurement. 
I ' i: Senior Advisers to ECE Governments: 10th Session . 
UN. ECOSOC Commission for Social Development: 23d Session 

[CAO Third Committee on Aircraft Noise 

ICAO Facilitation Division: Sth Session 

ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles . .' .' .' 
FAO Technical Conference on Crop Genetic Resources . . . . 
[MCO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping" 

2d Session. 
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee . . 

UNCTAD Conference on Olive Oil ' 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport 

Q.N. ECOSOC Committee on Science and Technology' .... 
WIPO Joint Ad Hoc Committee on International Patent Classi- 
fication, Strasbourg Agreement. 
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning 

Containers: 15th Session. 

U.N. KCOSOC Group of Experts on Explosives 

I. MCO Maritime Safety Committee: 27th Session ...... 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal 

Subcommittee. 

CENTO Military Committee 

NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting , . 

NATO Joint Communications/Electronics Committee 

NATO Security Committee 

2d ICAO Conference Dealing with Danish and Icelandic Joint 

Financing Agreements. 
CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 81st/82d Sessions . 
GATT Preparatory Committee for the International Trade 

Negotiations. 
IOC/UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Cooperative 

Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 6th 

Session. 

IOC/UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Southern 

Ocean: 3d Session. 
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II on Economic 

Growth. 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III on Balance 
of Payments. 

UNESCO Directing Council of the Intergovernmental Confer- 
ence for the Establishment of a World Science Information 
System: 1st Session. 

2d UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of European 
Member States. 

WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty Interim Committees 
Finance Working Group. 

ICAO Aircraft Accident Data Reporting Panel .... 

ICAO All Weather Operations Panel: 5th Session . . '. 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 7th Meeting 

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping 

GATT Working Party on EC Enlargement . 



Geneva 

London 
Paris 

Geneva 

Geneva 

Montreal 

Dubrovnik 

Geneva 

Rome . 

London 

Paris . 
Geneva 
Geneva 
New York 
Geneva 

Geneva 

Geneva 
London 
New York 

Washington 
Brussels . 
Brussels . 
Brussels . 
Paris . . 

Brussels . 
Geneva 

Colombia . 



Buenos Aires 
Paris . . . 
Paris . . . 
Paris . . . 



Mar. 5-9 

Mar. 5-9 
Mar. 5-9 



Mar. 
Mar. 
Mar. 
Mar. 



5-10 
5-23 
5-23 
6-24 



and 



Paris 

Geneva 

Montreal 

Montreal 

Geneva 

Geneva 

Geneva 



Mar. 12-16 
Mar. 12-16 
Mar. 12-16 

Mar. 12-16 
Mar. 12-30 
Mar. 19-23 
Mar. 19-30 
Mar. 20-30 

Mar. 26-30 

Mar. 26-30 
Mar. 26-30 
Mar. 26-Apr. 20 

Mar. 27-28 
Mar. 27-28 
Mar. 27-28 
Mar. 27-30 
Mar. 27-Apr. 7 

March 
March 

March 



March 
March 
March 
March 

March 

March 

March-April 
March-April 
March-April 
March-April 
March-June 



Jonuary 1, 1973 



31 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Contention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal September 23, 1971. 1 
Signature: India, December 11, 1972. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bi- 
ological) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 

. .i -ia -i Q'7p 1 

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, December 
13, 1972. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, as amended. Done at Washington December 
27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. 
TIAS 1501, 6748. . 

Signature and acceptance: Romania, December 

15 1972 
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, as amended 
Done at Washington December 27 1945 Entered 
into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502^ 5929 
Signature and acceptance: Romania, December 
15, 1972. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on the establishment of an 
international fund for compensation for oil pol- 
lution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 

1971. 1 

Signature: Finland, November 28, 1972. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions 
at sea. Approved by the international conference 
on safety of life at sea held at London from May 
17 to June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 
1, 1965. TIAS 5813. 
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, November a, 

1972. 



Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 

Ratifications deposited: Iran, Korea, Philippines, 
December 12, 1972; Argentina, December 13, 
1972; Ivory Coast, December 15, 1972. 
Accession deposited: Jamaica, December 14, 1972. 
Enters into force: February 12, 1973. 
Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In- 
telsat) , with annex. Done at Washington August 

20 1971 

Signature: Jamaica International Telecommuni- 
cations Limited (Jamintel), of Jamaica, De- 
cember 14, 1972. 

Enters into force: February 12, 1973. 

Weights and Measures 

Convention establishing an International Organiza- 
tion of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris October 
12 1955, and amended January 1968. Entered into 
force May 28, 1958; for the United States October 

22 1972 

Proclaimed by the President: December 12, 1972. 



1 Not in force. 



BILATERAL 

Iceland 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities 
relating to the agreement of June 5, 1967 (llAb 
6300). Signed at Reykjavik December 4, 1972. 
Entered into force December 4, 1972. 

Korea 

/Wreement concerning cooperation in fisheries, with 
agreed minutes. Signed at Washington November 
24, 1972. 
Entered into force: December 12, 1972. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of September 21, 19/.* 
(TIAS 7466). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Islamabad November 15, 1972. Entered into force 
November 15, 1972. 

Poland 

Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges 
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972. 
Ratified by Poland: December 8, 1972. 

Romania 

Agreement on exchanges and cooperation in educa- 
tional, cultural, scientific, technical, and other 
fields in 1973-74. Signed at Washington December 
15, 1972. Enters into force January 1, 1973. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Janttary /, t973 Vol. I. Will, No. t749 



Aviation. U.S. Igreed Principles for 

North Atlantic Charter Flights I 

ment announcement, texts of principles and 

related communication) 20 

Bangladesh. Bangladi h To Receive More 
Wheal Under Food for Peace Program . . 24 

IVccepts Agreed Principles for 
th Atlantic Charter Flights (Department 
announcement, texts of principles and related 
communication) 20 

Chile. Secretarial Determination Provides for 
Continued Assistance to Chile (Secretarial 

rmination) H 

China. Restrictions on Visits to China by U.S. 

Aircraft and Ships Relaxed 4 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 

Foreign Policy 24 

Economic Affairs. Secretary Rogers Holds 
News Conference at Brussels (transcript) . 5 

Environment. Wildlife Conservation Conference 
To Be Held at Washington (Department 

announcement) 23 

urope 

ecretary Rogers Holds News Conference at 

Brussels (transcript) 5 

.S. Accepts Agreed Principles for North At- 
lantic Charter Flights (Department an- 
nouncement, texts of principles and related 

communication) 20 

oreign Aid 
ngladesh To Receive More Wheat Under 

Food for Peace Program 24 

cretarial Determination Provides for Con- 
tinued Assistance to Chile (Secretarial de- 
termination) J2 

uman Rights. Bill of Rights Day and Human 
Rights Day and Week (proclamation) ... n 
ternational Organizations and Conferences 

lender of International Conferences ... 2!> 

ond Asian Population Conference Meets at 
Tokyo (Claxton, Costa, text of declaration) 12 
ildlife Conservation Conference To Be Held 
at Washington (Department announcement) 2,3 
iddle East 

retary Rogers Holds News Conference at 

russels (transcript) 5 

S. Abstains on General Assembly Resolution 

n the Middle East ( Hush, text of resolution) 25 

rth Atlantic Treaty Organization 
rth Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting 
at Brussels (message from President 
m, text of communique) \ 

retary Rogers Holds News Conference at 

russels (transcript) 5 

Population. Second Asian Population Confer- 
ence Meets at Tokyo (Claxton, Costa, text 

f declaration) J2 

sidential Documents 

1 of Rights Day and Human Rights Day and 
lr eek (proclamation) 11 



.North Atlantic Council Ministerial M 
Held at Brussels (message from i 

Nixon, text of communique) ... j 

United Nations 
Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day and 

Week (proclamation) n 

U.S. Abstains on General Assembly Resolution 

on the Middle East < Bush, text of resolution i 
Treaty Information. Current Actions 
Viet-Nam 
170th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 

Paris (Isham) 10 

Secretary Rogers Holds News Confereiici 

Brussels (transcript) 5 

Name Index 

Bush, George 05 

Claxton, Philander P., Jr ' 12 

Costa, Marjorie A J2 

Isham, Heyward jq 

Nixon, President ..Ill 

Rogers, Secretary ! 5' 11 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 11 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos 
292 of November 28 and 296 of December 1. 

No. Dote Subject 

303 12/11 Rogers: news conference, Brus- 

sels, Dec. 8. 

304 12/11 NATO ministerial meeting com- 

munique, Brussels, Dec. 8 
(NATO document printed 
here). 

12/12 Manfull sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Liberia (biographic 
data). 

12/13 Announcement of Department 
of State science lecture. 

12/13 Nixon: message to North At- 
lantic Council, Dec. 7. 
308 12/14 Isham: 170th plenary session 

on Viet-Nam at Paris. 
"309 12/14 Advisory Committee on Private 
International Law to meet 
Dec. 16. 

12/15 U.S. and Romania conclude 
agreement on exchanges. 
t'UOV 12 CS.-Romania agree- 

ment on exchanges. 

Not printed. 

I for a later issue of the BULLETIN. 



Superintendent of Documents 

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WASHINGTON. DC. 20402 



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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



. 3 : 



b8//7S0 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXVIII 



No. 1750 



January 8, 1973 



DR. KISSINGER REVIEWS OBSTACLES IN NEGOTIATIONS 

ON VIET-NAM PEACE 

Transcript of News Conference 33 

U.N. ADOPTS U.S. PROPOSAL ON SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS 
Statements by Senator McGee and Text of Resolution 43 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 






APR 1 7 1973 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



VOL. LXVIII, No. 1750 
January 8, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29. foreign $36.25 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by **• 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments m 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Dr. Kissinger Reviews Obstacles in Negotiations 
on Viet-Nam Peace 



Following is the transcript of a neirs con- 
fen nee l>u Henry A. Kissingt r, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, 
held at the White House on December 16. 



Weekly 

b<r 1- 



Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Decem- 



Dr. Kissingt r: Ladies and gentlemen: As 
you know, I have been reporting to the Pres- 
ident and meeting with the Secretary of 
State, the Vice President, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
and other senior officials. I am meeting with 
you today because we wanted to give you an 
account of the negotiations as they stand 
today. 

I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot 
go into the details of particular issues, but 
I will give you as fair and honest a descrip- 
tion of the general trend of the negotiations 
as I can. 

First, let me do this in three parts: What 
led us to believe, at the end of October, that 
peace was imminent; second, what has hap- 
pened since; third, where do we go from 
here? 

At the end of October we had just con- 
cluded three weeks of negotiations with the 
North Vietnamese. As you all know, on 
October 8 the North Vietnamese presented to 
us a proposal which, as it later became elab- 
orated, appeared to us to reflect the main 
principles that the President has always 
enunciated as being part of the American 
position. These principles were that there 
had to be an unconditional release of Ameri- 
can prisoners throughout Indochina; sec- 
andly. that there should be a cease-fire in 
Indochina brought into being by various 
means suitable to the conditions of the coun- 



tries concerned ; third, that we were prepared 
to withdraw our forces under these condi- 
tions in a time period to be mutually agreed 
upon; fourth, that we would not prejudge 
the political outcome of the future of South 
Viet-Nam, we would not impose a particular 
solution, we would not insist on our particu- 
lar solution. 

The agreement as it was developed during 
October seemed to us to reflect these princi- 
ples precisely. Then, toward the end of Octo- 
ber, we encountered a number of difficulties. 
At the time, because we wanted to maintain 
the atmosphere leading to a rapid settlement, 
we mentioned them at our briefings, but we 
did not elaborate on them. 

Now let me sum up what the problems 
were at the end of October. 

It became apparent that there was in 
preparation a massive Communist effort to 
launch an attack throughout South Viet-Nam 
to begin several days before the cease-fire 
would have been declared and to continue 
for some weeks after the cease-fire came in- 
to being. 

Second, there was an interview by the 
North Vietnamese Prime Minister which im- 
plied that the political solution that we had 
always insisted was part of our principles — 
namely, that we would not impose a coalition 
government — was not as clear-cut as our 
record of the negotiations indicated. 

Thirdly, as no one could miss, we en- 
countered some specific objections from Sai- 
gon. 

Under these conditions, we proposed to 
Hanoi that there should be one other round 
of negotiations to clear up these difficulties. 
We were convinced that with good will on 



January 8, 1973 



33 



both sides, these difficulties could be rela- 
tively easily surmounted and that if we con- 
ducted ourselves on both sides in the spirit 
of the October negotiations, a settlement 
would be very rapid. 

It was our conviction that if we were 
going to bring to an end 10 years of war- 
fare we should not do so with an armistice, 
but with a peace that had a chance of last- 
ing. Therefore we proposed three categories 
of clarifications in the agreement. 

First, we wanted the so-called linguistic 
difficulties cleared up so that they would not 
provide the seed for unending disputes and 
another eruption of the war. I will speak 
about those in a minute. 

Secondly, the agreement always had pro- 
vided that international machinery be put in 
place immediately after the cease-fire was 
declared. We wanted to spell out the oper- 
ational meaning of the word "immediately" 
by developing the protocols that were re- 
quired to bring the international machinery 
into being simultaneously with a cease-fire 
agreement. This, to us, seemed a largely 
technical matter. 

Thirdly, we wanted some reference in the 
agreement, however vague, however allusive, 
however indirect, which would make clear 
that the two parts of Viet-Nam would live in 
peace with each other and that neither side 
would impose its solution on the other by 
force. These seemed to us modest require- 
ments, relatively easily achievable. 

Let me now tell you the sequence of events 
since that time. We all know of the disagree- 
ments that have existed between Saigon and 
Washington. These disagreements are to 
some extent understandable. It is inevitable 
that a people on whose territory the war 
has been fought and that for 25 years has 
been exposed to devastation and suffering and 
assassination would look at the prospects 
of a settlement in a more detailed way, in 
a more anguished way, than we who are 
10,000 miles away. Many of the provisions of 
the agreement inevitably were seen in a dif- 
ferent context in Viet-Nam than in Wash- 
ington. 



I think it is safe to say that we face, with 
respect to both Vietnamese parties, this prob- 
lem. The people of Viet-Nam, North and 
South, have fought for so long that the risks 
and perils of war, however difficult, seem 
sometimes more bearable to them than the 
uncertainties and the risks and perils of 
peace. 

Now, it is no secret, either, that the 
United States has not agreed with all the 
objections that were raised by Saigon. In 
particular, the U.S. position with respect to 
the cease-fire had been made clear in October 
1970; it had been reiterated in the President's 
proposal of January 25, 1972; it was re- 
peated again in the President's proposal of 
May 8, 1972. 1 None of these proposals had 
asked for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese 
forces. Therefore we could not agree with 
our allies in South Viet-Nam when they 
added conditions to the established positions 
after an agreement had been reached that 
reflected these established positions. 

As was made clear in the press conference 
here on October 26, as the President has re- 
iterated in his speeches, the United States 
will not continue the war one day longer 
than it believes is necessary to reach an 
agreement we consider just and fair. 2 

So we want to leave no doubt about the 
fact that if an agreement is reached that 
meets the stated conditions of the President, 
if an agreement is reached that we consider 
just, that no other party will have a veto 
over our actions. 

But I am also bound to tell you that today 
this question is moot because we have not yet 
reached an agreement that the President 
considers just and fair. Therefore I want to 
explain to you the process of the negotiations 
since they resumed on November 20 and 
where we are. 

The three objectives that we were seeking 
in these negotiations were stated in the press 



1 For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 26, 1970, 
p. 465; Feb. 14, 1972, p. 181; and May 29, 1972, p. 
747. 

2 For Dr. Kissinger's news conference of Oct. 26, 
see Bulletin of Nov. 13, 1972, p. 549. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



conference of October -t>, in many speeches 
by the President afterward, and in every 
communication to Hanoi since. They could 
qoI have been a surprise. 

Now let me say a word first about what 
were called linguistic difficulties, which were 
called these m order not to inflame the situ- 
ation. How did they arise? They arose be- 
cause the North Vietnamese presented us a 
document in English which we then dis- 
cussed with them, and in many places 
throughout this document the original word- 
ing was changed as the negotiations pro- 
ceeded, and the phrases were frequently 
weakened compared to the original formu- 
lation. It was not until we received the Viet- 
namese text, after those negotiations were 
concluded, that we found that while the Eng- 
lish terms had been changed, the Vietnamese 
terms had been left unchanged. 

So we suddenly found ourselves engaged 
in two negotiations, one about the English 
text, the other about the Vietnamese text. 
Having conducted many negotiations, I must 
say this was a novel procedure. It led to the 
view that perhaps these were not simply 
linguistic difficulties, but substantive diffi- 
culties. 

Now, I must say that all of these, except 
one, have now been eliminated. 

The second category of problems concerned 
bringing into being the international ma- 
chinery so that it could operate simultane- 
ously with the cease-fire and so as to avoid a 
situation where the cease-fire, rather than 
bring peace, would unleash another frenzy of 
warfare. 

So to that end we submitted on November 
20, the first day that the negotiations re- 
sumed, a list of what are called protocols, 
technical instruments to bring this machin- 
ery into being. These protocols — and I will 
not go into the details of these protocols — 
they are normally technical documents, and 
ours were certainly intended to conform to 
normal practices, despite the fact that this 
occurred four weeks after we had made clear 
that this was our intention and three weeks 
after Hanoi had pressed us to sign a cease- 



fire agreement. The North Vietnamese re- 
fused to discuss our protocols and refused to 
give us their protocols, so that the question 
of bringing the international machinery into 
being could not be addressed. 

The first time we saw the North Vietnam- 
ese protocols was on the evening of Decem- 
ber 12, the night before I was supposed to 
leave Paris, six weeks after we had stated 
what our aim was, five weeks after the 
cease-fire was supposed to be signed, a cease- 
fire which called for this machinery to be set 
up immediately. 

These protocols were not technical instru- 
ments, but reopened a whole list of issues 
that had been settled — or we thought had 
been settled — in the agreement. They con- 
tained provisions that were not in the 
original agreement, and they excluded pro- 
visions that were in the original agreement. 
They are now in the process of being dis- 
cussed by the technical experts in Paris, 
but some effort will be needed to remove the 
political provisions from them and to return 
them to a technical status. 

Secondly, I think it is safe to say that 
the North Vietnamese perception of inter- 
national machinery and our perception of 
international machinery is at drastic vari- 
ance, and that, ladies and gentlemen, is an 
understatement. 

We had thought that an effective machin- 
ery required, in effect, some freedom of 
movement, and our estimate was that several 
thousand people were needed to monitor the 
many provisions of the agreement. The 
North Vietnamese perception is that the 
total force should be no more than 250, of 
which nearly half should be located at head- 
quarters ; that it would be dependent for its 
communications, logistics, and even physical 
necessities entirely on the party in whose 
area it was located. So it would have no 
jeeps, no telephones, no radios of its own; 
that it could not move without being ac- 
companied by liaison officers of the party 
that was to be investigated, if that party 
decided to give it the jeeps to get to where 
the violation was taking place and if that 



January 8, 1973 



35 



party would then let it communicate what 
it found. 

It is our impression that the members of 
this commission will not exhaust themselves 
in frenzies of activity if this procedure were 
adopted. 

Now, thirdly, the substance of the agree- 
ment. The negotiations since November 20 
really have taken place in two phases. The 
first phase, which lasted for three days, con- 
tinued the spirit and the attitude of the 
meetings in October. We presented our pro- 
posals. Some were accepted ; others were 
rejected. 

But by the end of the third day we had 
made very substantial progress and all of us 
thought that we were within a day or two 
of completing the arrangements. We do not 
know what decisions were made in Hanoi at 
that point; but from that point on, the 
negotiations have had the character where 
a settlement was always just within our 
reach and was always pulled just beyond our 
reach when we attempted to grasp it. 

I do not think it is proper for me to go 
into the details of the specific issues, but I 
think I should give you a general atmosphere 
and a general sense of the procedures that 
were followed. 

When we returned on December 4, we of 
the American team, we thought that the 
meetings could not last more than two or 
three days because there were only two or 
three issues left to be resolved. You all know 
that the meetings lasted nine days. They 
began with Hanoi withdrawing every change 
that had been agreed to two weeks pre- 
viously. 

We then spent the rest of the week getting 
back to where we had already been two 
weeks before. By Saturday, we thought we 
had narrowed the issues sufficiently where, 
if the other side had accepted again one 
section that they had already agreed to two 
weeks previously, the agreement could have 
been completed. 

At that point, the President ordered Gen- 
eral Haig [Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 
Deputy Assistant to the President for Na- 



tional Security Affairs] to return to Wash- 
ington so that he would be available for the 
mission, that would then follow, of present- 
ing the agreement to our allies. At that point 
we thought we were sufficiently close so that 
experts could meet to conform the texts so 
that we would not again encounter the 
linguistic difficulties which we had experi- 
enced previously and so that we could make 
sure that the changes that had been negoti- 
ated in English would also be reflected in 
Vietnamese. 

When the experts met, they were pre- 
sented with 17 new changes in the guise of 
linguistic changes. When I met again with the 
Special Adviser [Le Due Tho] , the one prob- 
lem which we thought remained on Saturday 
had grown to two, and a new demand was 
presented. When we accepted that, it was 
withdrawn the next day and sharpened up. 
So we spent our time going through the 17 
linguistic changes and reduced them again 
to two. Then, on the last day of the meeting, 
we asked our experts to meet to compare 
whether the 15 changes that had been settled, 
of the 17 that had been proposed, now con- 
formed in the two texts. At that point we 
were presented with 16 new changes, in- 
cluding four substantive ones, some of which 
now still remain unsettled. 

Now, I will not go into the details or into 
the merits of these changes. The major dif- 
ficulty that we now face is that provisions 
that were settled in the agreement appear 
again in a different form in the protocols; 
that matters of technical implementation 
which were implicit in the agreement from 
the beginning have not been addressed and 
were not presented to us until the very last 
day of a series of sessions that had been 
specifically designed to discuss them ; and 
that as soon as one issue was settled, a new 
issue was raised. 

It was very tempting for us to continue 
the process which is so close to everybody's 
heart, implicit in the many meetings, of 
indicating great progress ; but the President 
decided that we could not engage in a 
charade with the American people. 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



We are now in this curious position : (Jreat 
progress has been made, even in the talks. 
The only thing that is lacking is one decision 
in Hanoi, to settle the remaining issues in 
terms that two weeks previously they had 
already agreed to. So we are not talking 
of an issue of principle that is totally un- 
acceptable. Secondly, to complete the work 
that is required to bring the international 
machinery into being in the spirit that both 
sides have an interest of not ending the war 
in such a way that it is just the beginning 
of another round of conflict. So we are in a 
position where peace can be near but peace 
requires a decision. This is why we wanted 
to restate once more what our basic attitude 
is. 

With respect to Saigon, we have sympathy 
and compassion for the anguish of their 
people and for the concerns of their govern- 
ment. But if we can get an agreement that 
the President considers just, we will proceed 
with it. 

With respect to Hanoi, our basic objective 
was stated in the press conference of October 
26. We want an end to the war that is some- 
thing more than an armistice. We want to 
move from hostility to normalization and 
from normalization to cooperation. But we 
will not make a settlement which is a dis- 
guised form of continued warfare and which 
brings about by indirection what we have 
always said we would not tolerate. 

We have always stated that a fair solution 
cannot possibly give either side everything 
that it wants. We are not continuing a war 
in order to give total victory to our allies. 
We want to give them a reasonable oppor- 
tunity to participate in a political structure, 
but we also will not make a settlement which 
is a disguised form of victory for the other 
side. 

Therefore we are at a point where we are 
again perhaps closer to an agreement than 
we were at the end of October, if the other 
side is willing to deal with us in good faith 
and with good will. But it cannot do that 
every day an issue is settled a new one is 



raised, that when an issue is settled in an 
agreement, it is raised again as an under- 
standing, and if it is settled in an under- 
standing, it is raised again as a protocol. 
We will not be blackmailed into an agree- 
ment, we will not be stampeded into an 
agreement, and if I may say so, we will not 
be charmed into an agreement, until its 
conditions are right. 

For the President and for all of us who 
have been engaged in these negotiations, 
nothing that we have done has meant more 
than attempting to bring an end to the war 
in Viet-Nam. Nothing that I have done since 
I have been in this position has made me 
feel more the trustee of so many hopes as 
the negotiations in which I have recently 
participated. It was painful at times to think 
of the hopes of millions and, indeed, of the 
hopes of many of you ladies and gentlemen 
who were standing outside these various 
meetingplaces expecting momentous events 
to be occurring, while inside one frivolous 
issue after another was surfaced in the last 
three days. 

So, what we are saying to Hanoi is: We 
are prepared to continue in the spirit of the 
negotiations that were started in October. 
We are prepared to maintain an agreement 
that provides for the unconditional release 
of all American and allied prisoners, that 
imposes no political solution on either side, 
that brings about an internationally super- 
vised cease-fire and the withdrawal of all 
American forces within 60 days. It is a 
settlement that is just to both sides and that 
requires only a decision to maintain pro- 
visions that had already been accepted and 
an end to procedures that can only mock the 
hopes of humanity. 

On that basis, we can have a peace that 
justifies the hopes of mankind and the sense 
of justice of all participants. 

Now I will be glad to answer some of 
your questions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you explain what 
in your mind you think Hanoi's motivation 
was in playing what you called a charade? 



January 8, 1973 



37 



Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to speculate 
on Hanoi's motives. I have no doubt that 
before too long we will hear a version of 
events that does not exactly coincide with 
ours. I have attempted to give you as honest 
an account as I am capable of. I believe — 
and this is pure speculation — that for a 
people that have fought for so long it is, 
paradoxically, perhaps easier to face the 
risks of war than the uncertainties of peace. 

It may be that they are waiting for a 
further accentuation of the divisions be- 
tween us and Saigon, for more public pres- 
sures on us, or perhaps they simply cannot 
make up their mind. But I really have no 
clue to what the policy decisions were. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, from your account one 
would, conclude that the talks are now ended 
in terms of the series you completed. Is tlwt 
true? Secondly, if it is not true, on what 
basis ivill they be resumed ? 

Dr. Kissinger: We do not consider the 
talks completed. We believe that it would 
be a relatively simple matter to conclude 
the agreement, because many of the issues 
that I mentioned in the press conference of 
October 26 have either been settled or sub- 
stantial progress toward settling them has 
been made. 

Therefore, if there were a determination 
to reach an agreement, it could be reached 
relatively quickly. On the other hand, the 
possibilities of raising technical objections 
are endless. 

So, as Le Due Tho said yesterday, we 
would remain in contact through messages. 
We can then decide whether or when to meet 
again. I expect that we will meet again, but 
we have to meet in an atmosphere that is 
worthy of the seriousness of the endeavor. 
On that basis, as far as we are concerned, 
the settlement will be very rapid. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have not discussed 
at all the proposals that the United States 
made on behalf of Saigon which required 
changes in the existing agreement that was 
negotiated. Can you discuss what those were 
and what effect they had on stimulating 



Hanoi, if they did, to making counterpro- 
posals of its oivn ? 

Dr. Kissinger: As I pointed out, there were 
two categories of objections on the part of 
Saigon, objections which we agreed with 
and objections which we did not agree with. 
The objections that we agreed with are es- 
sentially contained in the list that I 
presented at the beginning and those were 
the ones we maintained. All of those, we 
believe, did not represent changes in the 
agreement, but either clarifications, removal 
of ambiguities, or spelling out the implemen- 
tation of agreed positions. 

In the first sequence of meetings between 
November 20 and November 26, most of 
those were, or many of those were, taken 
care of. So that we have literally, as I have 
pointed out before, been in the position 
where every day we thought it could and 
indeed almost had to be the last day. 

The counterproposals that Hanoi has made 
were again in two categories. One set of 
changes that would have totally destroyed 
the balance of the agreement and which, in 
effect, withdrew the most significant con- 
cessions they had made. I did not mention 
those in my statement, because in the process 
of negotiation they tended to disappear. 
They tended to disappear from the agree- 
ment to reappear in understandings and 
then to disappear from understandings to 
reappear in protocols. But I suspect that 
they will, in time, after the nervous ex- 
haustion of our technical experts, disappear 
from the protocols as well. So there were 
major counterproposals which we believe 
can be handled. 

But then there were a whole series of 
technical counterproposals which were ab- 
solutely unending and which hinged on such 
profound questions as whether if you state 
an obligation in the future tense, you were 
therefore leaving open the question of when 
it would come into operation, and matters 
that reached the metaphysical at moments 
and which, as soon as one of them was 
settled, another one appeared, which made 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



one believe that one was not engaged in an 
effort to settle fundamental issues but in a 
delaying action for whatever reason. 

Now, those issues can be settled any day 
that somebody decides to be serious. Now, 
it is clear that the interplay between Saigon 
and Hanoi is one of the complicating 
features of this negotiation, but the basic 
point that we want to make here is this : 

We have had our difficulties in Saigon, 
but the obstacle to an agreement at this 
moment is not Saigon, because we do not 
have, as yet, an agreement that we can pre- 
sent to them. When that point is reached, the 
President has made clear that he will act on 
the basis of what he considers just; but he 
has also made clear that he does not want 
to end such a long war by bringing about 
a very short peace. 

Q. Can a useful agreement be made oper- 
ative without Saigon's signature? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, this is a question that 
has not yet had to be faced and which we 
hope will not have to be faced. 

Q. For the agreement to be just, according 
to the President's terms, must there be sub- 
stantial withdrawal of North Vietnamese 
troops from the South? 

Dr. Kissinger: The question of North 
Vietnamese forces in the South has three 
elements: the presence of the forces now 
there, their future, and the general claim 
that North Viet-Nam may make with respect 
to its right to intervene constantly in the 
South. 

With respect to the last question, we can- 
not accept the proposition that North Viet- 
Nam has a right of constant intervention in 
the South. 

With respect to the first question, of the 
forces now in the South, the United States 
has made three cease-fire proposals since 
October 1970, all of them based on the de 
facto situation as it existed at the time of 
the cease-fire, all of them approved by the 
Government of South Viet-Nam. Therefore, 
we did not add that condition of withdrawal 
to our present proposal, which reflected 



exactly the positions we had taken on 
January 25 and on May 8 of this year, both 
of which had been agreed to by the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

We believe, however, that if the agree- 
ment that has been negotiated is implement- 
ed in good faith, that the problem of the 
forces will tend to lose its significance, or at 
least reduce significance, partly because of de 
facto withdrawals that could occur, and 
partly because if the provisions with respect 
to Laos, Cambodia, and no infiltration are 
maintained, the consequences in attrition 
will have to be obvious. 

Q. Are we hack to square one now, Dr. 
Kissinger, would you say? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. We have an agreement 
that is 99 percent completed as far as the 
text of the agreement is concerned. We also 
have an agreement whose associated imple- 
mentations are very simple to conclude if 
one takes the basic provisions of interna- 
tional supervision that are in the text of the 
agreement, provisions that happened to be 
spelled out in greater detail in the agreement 
than any other aspect, and therefore we are 
one decision away from a settlement. 

Hanoi can settle this any day by an ex- 
change of messages, after which there would 
be required a certain amount of work on 
the agreement, which is not very much, and 
some work in bringing the implementing 
instruments into being. 

Q. Would you tell ivhat that 1 percent is? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you know, I have 
found I get into trouble when I give figures, 
so let me not insist on 1 percent. It is an 
agreement that is substantially completed, 
but I cannot go into that. But that alone 
is not the problem. The problem is as I have 
described it in my presentation. 

Q. I am a little confused, Dr. Kissinger, 
as to whether what remains you would 
describe as fundamental or one of these 
technical problems, because you have ranged 
between the two and I am a little lost as to 
what is left. 



January 8, 1973 



39 



Dr. Kissinger: The technical implementing 
instruments that they have presented are 
totally unacceptable, for the reasons which 
I gave. On the other hand, I cannot really 
believe that they are serious. What remains 
on the agreement itself is a fundamental 
point. It is, however, a point that had been 
accepted two weeks previously and later 
withdrawn. So we are not raising a new, 
fundamental point. We are raising the ac- 
ceptance of something that had once been 
accepted. 

Q. Is it a political issue? 
Dr. Kissinger: I really don't want to go 
into it. 

Q. What is the future of the Paris peace 
talks? 

Dr. Kissinger: I think that the sort of 
discussions that have been going on in the 
Paris peace talks are not affected by such 
temporary ups and downs as the private 
peace talks, so I am sure that Minister Xuan 
Thuy and Ambassador [William J.] Porter 
will find many subjects for mutual recrimi- 
nation. [Laughter.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, isn't the fundamental 
point the one you raised about the right of 
North Vietnamese forces to intervene in the 
future in South Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: I will not go into the sub- 
stance of the negotiations. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you already mentioned 
a fundamental disagreement in ivhich you 
say it is the U.S. insistence that the two 
parts of Viet-Nam should live in peace with 
each other. Is that not the fundamental dis- 
agreement here? 

Dr. Kissinger: As I said, I will not go 
into the details. I cannot consider it an ex- 
tremely onerous demand to say that the 
parties of a peace settlement should live in 
peace with one another, and we cannot make 
a settlement which brings peace to North 
Viet-Nam and maintains the war in South 
Viet-Nam. 

Q. But isn't their position basically that 
Viet-Nam is one country and that this peace 
agreement is supposed to ratify that point? 



Dr. Kissinger: As I said, I will not go into 
the substance of the discussions, and I re- 
peat : The issue that remained when we sent 
General Haig home is one that had already 
been agreed upon once, so it could not have 
been something that happened by oversight. 
Q. Dr. Kissinger, was Hanoi messaged 
ahead of time that you ivoidd talk to us? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. But I suspect you will 
get that message to them very quickly. 

Q. Was there any understanding in Paris 
before you left that each side would be free 
to express itself without damaging the pos- 
sibility of future talks? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. Le Due Tho correctly 
stated our agreement at the airport: that 
we would not go into the substance of the 
talks. Now, I recognize that what I am doing 
here goes to the edge of that understand- 
ing — [laughter] — but the President felt 
that we could not permit a situation to con- 
tinue in which there was daily speculation 
as to something that was already accom- 
plished, while the record was so clearly con- 
trary; therefore, we owed you an explanation 
not of the particular issues, but of the 
progress of negotiations, and exactly where 
they stood. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I am not quite clear on 
a technical point. You talked about agree- 
ments, understandings, and protocols. Are 
there in fact three different sets of docu- 
ments under negotiation? What are these 
understandings ? 

Dr. Kissinger: There are agreements, 
understandings, and protocols. It always 
happens in a negotiation that there is some 
discussion which is not part of the agree- 
ment which attempts to explain what specific 
provisions mean and how they are going to 
be interpreted. This is what I meant by 
understanding. The protocols are the instru- 
ments that bring into being the international 
machinery and prisoner release. Their func- 
tion is usually, in fact always, a purely 
technical implementation of provisions of an 
agreement. 

These protocols do not, as a general rule, 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



raise new issues, but rather they say. for 
example, with respect to prisoners, if the 
prisoners are to be released in 60 days, they 
would spell out the staging, the points at 

which they are released, who can receive 
them, and so forth. 

Similarly with respect to international 
machinery, they would say where are the 
teams located, what are their functions, and 
so forth. Our concern is that the protocols, 
as we now have thorn, raise both political 
issues, which are inappropriate to imple- 
menting protocols, and technical issues, 
which are inconsistent with international 
supervision. 

We have other protocols that deal with 
prisoners and withdrawals and mining that 
also present problems, hut which I don't 
mention here because those are normal 
technical discussions that you would expect 
in the course of an agreement. 

The press: Thank you. 



171st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks by Heytvard Isham, 
deputy head of the U.S. delegation, prepared 
for delivery ut the 171st plenary session of 
tin meetings on Viet-Nctm at Paris on 
Decemb< r 21.* 

Press release 314 dated December 21 

Ladies and gentlemen : Since we expect 
this to be the final meeting of 1972, it is per- 
haps useful to review the course of events of 
the past year in order to see where we stand 
in relation to a negotiated settlement of the 
Viet-Nam conflict. 

In the light of the private consultations 
which had taken place in 1971, there was 
hope, just over a year ago, that further head- 



' The North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolu- 
tionary Government del. . ho spoke first, left 
the meeting immediately after delivering their re- 
marks. 



way might be made on the basis of our re- 
sponses to the nine points which you had 
submitted. Our points corresponded in se- 
quence and subject matter to the nine points, 
while remaining consistent with the princi- 
ples of settlement which we had always set 
forth. Nevertheless, you did not take the 
opportunity, refusing further discussion of 
our proposals. Instead, you undertook mas- 
sive preparations for the offensive launched 
at the end of March 1972. 

That offensive, crossing in force the de- 
militarized zone and using a wide range of 
modern weapons, including tanks and long- 
range artillery, inflicted heavy loss of life 
and material damage on South Viet-Nam; 
but it failed to achieve its objectives. Both 
the armed forces and the citizens of South 
Viet-Nam organized in self-defense fought 
gallantly against that invasion, and with 
appropriate assistance from the United 
States and allied forces halted the assault 
on all fronts. Once again, your decision to 
seek total military victory rather than a fair 
negotiated settlement led only to further 
suffering inflicted upon the people of both 
South and North Viet-Nam. Once again, the 
predominance of fighting in your "talk-fight" 
strategy undermined efforts to develop a 
constructive negotiating dialogue. 

There were signs in the summer of this 
year, as the full extent of the failure of this 
military attack became evident, that you 
were reconsidering your position. But it 
was not until October 8 that you finally came 
to adopt an approach that was consistent 
with the principles enunciated by President 
Nixon on May 8 so that progress toward a 
settlement could be facilitated. Once this 
approach had been taken, intensive discus- 
sions resulted and substantial progress was 
rapidly achieved. Prospects for an early 
peace seemed promising. At the same time, 
certain provisions of the draft agreement 
required clarification to avoid ambiguities 
and imprecise language wdiich could obstruct 
the implementation of an agreement from 
the start and which could provide the seeds 
for unending disputes and another eruption 



January 8, 1973 



41 



of war. A further series of discussions was 
therefore required. 

In the most recent phase of these discus- 
sions, however, your position unaccountably 
became more intransigent, and areas on 
which we thought there had been agreement 
once more became unresolved. Progress made 
in November seemed to be reversed as you 
withdrew language already agreed and 
introduced new complications. 

We must therefore record that as the 
year draws to an end we have not reached 
agreement. The responsibility for this state 
of affairs rests entirely on your side. The 
record will show that our efforts to resolve 
the remaining points in dispute were serious, 
sustained, and intensive. We have spared no 
effort to search for ways to reach an equi- 
table compromise of remaining differences. 
But unless you are prepared to make the 
decision to bring peace on an honorable basis 
to South Viet-Nam, it is difficult to see how 
further progress can be made. 

I remind you now of the principles which 
we have always maintained should be at the 
heart of any settlement : 

— An unconditional release of American 
prisoners throughout Indochina ; 

— An Indochina-wide cease-fire appropri- 
ate to each of the respective countries of the 
region and under international supervision ; 

— Complete withdrawal of U.S. forces 
within a mutually agreed period ; 

— No prejudgment of the political future 
of South Viet-Nam and no imposition of any 
particular political solution in South Viet- 
Nam by either side. 

These principles, of course, are not new 
to you ; in fact, they are incorporated in the 
draft agreement which was negotiated with 
you. You are also aware of the progress that 
was made in November toward making the 
clarifications in the draft agreement we 
thought necessary to insure the viability of 
that agreement. What is required now is only 
the decision on your part to maintain the 
provisions that had been accepted. We 
remain determined to reach an agreement 
on the basis of these mutually advantageous 



42 



principles. The responsibility is now yours 
to make the decision which will permit us to 
conclude an agreement that is just and 
durable. 



President Hails Action To Bring 
Intelsat Agreements Into Force 

With the deposit of Jamaica's instmment 
of accession on December 1U, 5U member 
countries of the International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization had completed 
action necessary to bring the definitive 
agreements for Intelsat into force February 
12, 1973. Following is a statement by Presi- 
dent Nixon issued on December 15. 

White House press release dated December IB 

I note with special satisfaction today that 
the number of ratifications necessary to 
bring the Intelsat definitive agreements into 
force has been fulfilled. This marks an his- 
toric milestone in international communica- 
tions, with consequences ranging far into the 
future. All of the partner-members can take 
great satisfaction from the progress of this 
unique multinational venture for the peace- 
ful use of outer space. 

With its volume of traffic constantly in- 
creasing and with more new earth stations 
being inaugurated each year, the global com- 
munications satellite system is helping to 
bring the peoples of the world closer to- 
gether. It is our hope that the closing of 
communications gaps will greatly enhance 
understanding among nations. 

We can now look forward to the day when 
nations around the world will be linked to- 
gether for instantaneous communications. 
The implications of this development are 
enormous, presaging improved international 
relations in the political, economic, cultural, 
and scientific spheres. 

I am pleased to congratulate the partner- 
members of Intelsat and to express my con- 
fidence in the continued growth and expand- 
ing usefulness of this system. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.N. Adopts U.S. Proposal on Scale of Assessments 



Following are statements by Senator Gale 
W. McGee, U.S. Representative to the U.N. 
General Assembly, made in Committee V 
(Administrative and Budgetary) on Novem- 
ber 16 and 29 and in plenary on December 
13. together with the text of a resolution 
adopted by the committee on December 1 
and by the Assembly on December 13. 

STATEMENTS BY SENATOR McGEE 
Committee V, November 16 

USUN press release 136 dated November 16 

Some members of the committee who have 
not attended sessions in prior years may 
have the impression that the appearance of 
a U.S. Senator in this committee is rather 
unusual and suggests that the United States 
intends to present a significantly new posi- 
tion or to announce a shift in attitude with 
respect to the financing of U.N. activities. 
To those who may have some such thought, 
I wish to point out that ever since the first 
session of the United Nations in 1946 it has 
been customary practice for the United 
States to be represented in this committee on 
important administrative, management, and 
financial questions by Members of the U.S. 
Congress, either Members of the Senate or of 
the House of Representatives. The first U.S. 
Representative to the Fifth Committee in 
1946 was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
whom we consider to be one of the founding 
fathers of the U.N. In subsequent years the 
United States has been represented in this 
committee by other distinguished members 
of the Congress, including many whose 
names are well known to you today. 

Just as the presence of a U.S. Senator in 
this committee is not new, it is equally true 



that the position which I will present to the 
committee today is not new. It is the same 
position as was set forth by Senator Vanden- 
berg in this committee in 1946, when the 
organization was only a year old and the 
enthusiasm for the U.N. in this country was 
certainly at a peak. It is the same position 
that was announced at last year's General 
Assembly by Representative Derwinski on 
behalf of the U.S. delegation. 

I have made these points because I have 
found in the course of consultations with 
other delegates that there exists in some 
quarters the belief that the proposal I am 
introducing today in document A/C.5/L. 
1091 represents a shift in U.S. policy, re- 
flecting a diminution of interest in and 
support for the organization. I wish to as- 
sure you at the outset that this is not the 
case and that the position I am presenting 
today represents the consistently held view 
of the United States since the U.N. was 
founded. It is aimed not at weakening but 
rather at strengthening the United Nations 
as an institution and its varied operations 
and important programs. 

What I am proposing is that the contribu- 
tion of the maximum contributor to the as- 
sessed administrative budget of the U.N. 
should be fixed at a level no higher than 25 
percent. I wish to emphasize that my pro- 
posal relates only to assessed contributions 
to the regular budget of the organization 
and does not relate to the voluntarily 
financed operational programs of the U.N. 
This proposal is identical with that made by 
Senator Vandenberg in 1946. I have copies 
of Senator Vandenberg's statement available 
for those who would like to read what was 
said on that occasion. 

Before dealing with the details of our 



January 8, 1973 



43 



specific proposal, it might be useful to men- 
tion briefly what happened in 1946 with 
respect to Senator Vandenberg's proposal 
and what the subsequent history of the U.S. 
assessment rate has been. 

In 1946 the Committee on Contributions 
proposed to this committee that the U.S. as- 
sessment percentage be fixed arbitrarily at 
just below 50 percent; namely, at 49.89 per- 
cent. The U.S. Representative (Senator 
Vandenberg) contested this percentage on 
grounds of principle, and a special committee 
was established to consider the matter. In 
the course of that consideration, Senator 
Vandenberg took the position that, although 
in principle no member state should pay 
more than 25 percent of U.N. administrative 
expenses, the United States recognized that 
abnormal situations existed immediately 
after the war and that accordingly the U.S. 
delegation was prepared to urge the Con- 
gress to accept a temporary allocation to be 
assumed by the United States of about one- 
third of the administrative budget. The com- 
mittee eventually compromised on a U.S. 
assessment percentage of 39.89 percent. 

This decision by the Assembly in 1946 
represented an acceptance of the principle 
that significant disproportions in assessment 
rates are not appropriate to an organization 
of sovereign and equal states. Meanwhile, 
the United States accepted this rate on an 
interim basis but made it clear that the 
United Nations should steadily work its way 
toward the 25 percent ceiling level. 

Accordingly, in 1948 the General As- 
sembly recognized in its resolution on the 
scale of assessments that "in normal times" 
the maximum annual contribution of any 
one member state should not exceed one- 
third of the ordinary expenses of the U.N. 
However, this principle was not implemented 
until 1952, when the Assembly decided that 
from January 1, 1954, the contribution of 
the highest contributor should not exceed 
33.33 percent. 

In the 1955-57 period a new element en- 
tered the picture. For the first time there 
was a sizable increase in the membership 



of the organization — 22 new member states 
were admitted during that period. As a 
result, the Assembly decided in 1957 that 
"in principle, the maximum contribution of 
any one Member State to the ordinary ex- 
penses of the United Nations should not 
exceed 30 percent of the total." This action 
by the Assembly was a recognition of the 
fact that in an organization of this kind the 
size of the membership is an important 
factor to be considered in determining what 
the range of assessment rates should be. 
Thus, the United Nations, in its first decade, 
took two specific steps toward adjusting to 
the 25 percent ceiling principle, the first in 
1952 when the Assembly determined that as 
of 1954 the ceiling should be 33.33 percent, 
and the second step in 1957 when the ceiling 
was adjusted to 30 percent. 

This brings us to the present period, and 
we find several new factors to be considered. 
First of all, although the Assembly decided 
in 1957 that no one member state, in princi- 
ple, should pay more than 30 percent of the 
assessed budget, the United States is still 
assessed at 31.52 percent, a reduction of only 
1.81 percentage points in 15 years. This fact 
is well known to the American people and to 
the American Congress. Twenty-six years 
have passed since Senator Vandenberg's 
proposal, and this long wait has understand- 
ably resulted in a certain degree of impa- 
tience and a determination to get on with the 
job by persuading the Assembly to complete 
the reduction of the U.S. percentage to the 
original goal of 25 percent. 

This matter received public attention in 
the United States when it was studied by the 
President's Commission on the Twenty-fifth 
Anniversary of the United Nations, the so- 
called Lodge Commission, whose report was 
made on April 26, 1971. * That Commission, 
whose terms of reference included recom- 



x Report of the President's Commission for the 
Observance of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the 
United Nations; for sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402 (Stock Number 4000-0261; 60 
cents). For an excerpt from the report, see Bul- 
letin of Aug. 2, 1971, p. 127. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



mending measures for strengthening the 
participation of the United states in the 
U.N., concluded that a reduction in the U.S. 
assessment percentage to 25 percent <>f the 
organization's administrative expenses 
would assist in securing greater support 
from the American people for the United 
States to participate in the financing of other 
U.N. activities across the hoard. The Com- 
mission obviously believed that such a re- 
duction would help maintain or even increase 
over time the very sizable U.S. contributions 
to voluntary programs of the U.N., those 
very programs which are most important 
to the developing countries — voluntary pro- 
grams in which the U.S. percentage has far 
exceeded the ceiling percentage applicable 
to the regular budget. 

The second important element in the pic- 
ture this year is the fact that since 1957 the 
membership of the U.N. has increased from 
82 states to 132 states ; that is, there has 
been an increase of 50 member states. The 
same principle which motivated the As- 
sembly in 1957 to reduce "in principle" the 
contribution of the maximum contributor 
from 33.33 percent to 30 percent— when 22 
member states had been admitted — certainly 
suggests that a further and more substantial 
decrease should be made in the maximum 
percentage now that 50 additional member 
states have been admitted. 

Further, with respect to the element of 
membership, the organization is just about 
reaching universality. It is anticipated that 
some very important states will become 
members within the very near future. The 
entry of these states will provide the last 
good opportunity to complete the reduction 
of the U.S. assessment percentage to 25 per- 
cent without increasing the assessment of 
other member states. 

Now I would like to turn to the details of 
the U.S. proposal which is before you as a 
draft resolution (document A ('..") L.1091). 
In doing so, I should like to thank those of 
you who have contributed advice and as- 
sistance to us in drafting this resolution. 
We have consulted widely with delegations 



from all regions and with differing interests 
and have profited enormously from sugges- 
tions and language which have been in- 
corporated into the text of our draft resolu- 
tion. 

You will note, first of all, that the format 
of this resolution is very similar to that 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1957, 
when it decided that the maximum contribu- 
tion of any one member state should not 
exceed 30 percent of the total. In effect, the 
preambular paragraphs trace by reference 
the history of the ceiling principle and as- 
sociated criteria from the inception of the 
United Nations up to the present time. 

In section (a) of the operative paragraph, 
the U.S. draft resolution provides that the 
maximum contribution of any one member 
state to the ordinary expenses of the U.N. 
shall not exceed 25 percent of the total ; it 
reaffirms the principle of the ceiling as one 
of the criteria to govern the work of the 
Committee on Contributions. 

Section (b) of the operative paragraph 
provides a directive to the Committee on 
Contributions as to how the 25 percent ceil- 
ing on the contribution of any one member 
state is to be achieved. There are several im- 
portant elements in this section, and I would 
like to discuss each in detail. 

First of all, the Committee on Contribu- 
tions is directed to implement the 25 percent 
ceiling as soon as practicable — I wish to re- 
peat those words, "as soon as practicable" — 
in preparing the next scale of assessments 
and, if necessary, scales of assessment for 
future years. We believe that the circum- 
stances which are likely to materialize by 
next year will, under the terms of this 
resolution, assure realization of the 25 per- 
cent ceiling in the scale of assessments com- 
mencing in 1974. However, since that could 
conceivably not be the case, we have pro- 
vided that the 25 percent ceiling should then 
be implemented fully in subsequent scales of 
assessment as soon as practicable ; that is, as 
soon as the necessary percentage points have 
become available for distribution. 

Section (b) also spells out clearly to the 



January 8, 1973 



45 



Committee on Contributions the method by 
which the new assessment ceiling is to be 
achieved. The reduction to 25 percent is to be 
accomplished by utilizing to the extent neces- 
sary: (1) The percentage contributions of 
any newly admitted member states immedi- 
ately upon their admission, and (2) the 
normal triennial adjustment in the percent- 
age contributions of member states resulting 
from relative growth in their national in- 
comes. 

It is our belief that there will be more 
than enough percentage points available 
when the new scale is formulated next year 
to permit the U.S. percentage to be reduced 
to 25 percent. We calculate that there will be 
some 12-13 percentage points available for 
distribution, and only 6.52 of these will be 
necessary to achieve the prescribed reduction. 
The balance of the points will, of course, be 
used to reduce the assessment rates of other 
members. 

The final section (c) of the draft resolu- 
tion is extremely important. It provides that 
"the percentage contribution of Member 
States shall not, in any case, be increased as 
a consequence of the present resolution." 2 
Identical language was used in the 1957 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 
which reduced in principle the percentage 
contribution of the maximum contributor 
to 30 percent. It means exactly what it says; 
namely, that no state will be assessed at a 
greater percentage rate than at present as 
a result of adoption of the U.S. resolution. 

I wish to be quite candid about this point. 
It is true that, if the U.S. resolution is 
adopted and some of the percentage points 
which will be available for distribution in 
establishing the scale for 1974-76 are applied 
to reduce the U.S. contribution, these points 
will not be available to reduce the rates of 
assessment of other member states. However, 
as I pointed out earlier, it seems clear that 
additional percentage points will be available 



2 On Nov. 29 the United States accepted an oral 
suggestion made by Hungary to include a reference 
to the specialized agencies in operative paragraph 
(c) of the draft resolution. 



to provide reductions for other members. 

I hope it is perfectly clear that the adop- 
tion of the U.S. proposal cannot affect ad- 
versely the countries whose percentage 
assessment is 0.04 percent. Under the terms 
of section (c) of the operative paragraph, 
their percentages cannot be increased. Be- 
cause they are assessed at a percentage rate 
which is at the floor of the scale, by defini- 
tion they would not receive any reductions. 
Accordingly, they could not in any case 
benefit from the percentage points used to 
reduce the rate of assessment of the major 
contributor. 

Several delegations appear to have some 
difficulty in interpreting the three inextri- 
cably linked sections of the operative para- 
graph of our draft resolution and have asked 
whether there will be a gap in the assessment 
scale, and as a result a deficit in the regular 
budget, if the measures provided for under 
section (b) do not produce sufficient per- 
centage points to reduce the U.S. assessment 
rate. The answer is that there will be no 
gap. The U.S. assessment percentage can be 
reduced only to the extent that sufficient 
percentage points are available. If an 
adequate number of points is not available 
to permit a reduction to 25 percent, then the 
rate of assessment on the major contributor 
can be reduced under the U.S. proposal only 
according to that availability. 

I now come, Mr. Chairman, to a most 
important aspect of this matter. In the course 
of our extensive consultations with other 
delegations, we have been asked on a number 
of occasions whether our proposal is indica- 
tive of a desire on the part of the U.S. 
Government to reduce its overall financial 
commitment to the United Nations system. 
I should like to say a word about the U.S. 
record in this respect. Even when the normal 
extra financing expected of a host govern- 
ment has been taken into account, our record 
is a proud one. 

A significant measure of the importance 
which the United States attaches to the de- 
velopment of a strong, effective, and efficient 
United Nations system is our sustained 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



financial support of the organizations and 

programs within this system. Our support 
has been substantial from the inception of 
the United Nations; it has increased with 
the years. By the end of L971, the contribu- 
tions of the United States to that system 
amounted to over $4.2 billion — or more than 
twice the total of all the regular budgets 
voted by this organization from 10 1(5 through 
1971. I cite this "track record" as hard 
evidence that the United States is not seek- 
ing the realization of a 25 percent ceiling 
rate of assessment for financial or economic 
reasons. Our reasons are those of principle. 

Of our $4.2 billion contribution, about $1 
billion represents assessed contributions to 
the U.N. and its specialized agencies. Almost 
$3 billion of the total consisted of voluntary 
contributions to U.N. programs to aid 
economic and social development in the de- 
veloping countries of the world and to pro- 
vide help and assistance to peoples living 
under conditions of distress and disaster. 

For example, through 1971 the United 
States has made available over $860 million 
to the U.N. Development Program. Our sup- 
port of the U.N. Children's Fund exceeds 
$300 million, and private support by citizens 
of my country has added very substantially 
to this figure. During the same period, our 
contribution to the U.N.-FAO World Food 
Program was well over $250 million, and 
over $100 million was made available during 
1971 alone for South Asian humanitarian 
assistance. 

We do not wish to dwell on our financial 
contributions to the U.N. system. These, of 
course, do not include our extensive bilateral 
aid programs. Neither do they include our 
large contributions to the various develop- 
ment banks. We believe, however, that 
representatives of member states here today 
will agree that the United States has fully 
demonstrated its concern for the organiza- 
tions and programs of the United Nations. 

As I pointed out earlier, the proposal 
which I am introducing today does not relate 
to the overall financial commitment of the 
United States to U.N. activities. It does not 



relate to our contributions to the voluntarily 
financed U.N. activities such as those con- 
cerned with economic and social develop- 
ment. It relates only to the U.S. percentage 
contribution to the U.N. regular budget. 

I referred previously to the recommenda- 
tion of the Lodge Commission that the U.S. 
percentage contribution to the regular budget 
should be reduced to 25 percent. In making 
that recommendation, the Commission stated 
explicitly that it was "in no way proposing 
any diminution of the overall commitment 
of U.S. resources to the UN system." 
The Commission stated its belief that the 
United States should maintain, and if possible 
increase, its total contributions to the U.N. 
system. I think the Commission's belief is 
firmly grounded in the sentiment of the 
American people. 

If the General Assembly, through its 
established procedures, approves the draft 
resolution we have just introduced, the Com- 
mittee on Contributions next spring will 
recommend a scale of assessments which, if 
sufficient percentage points have become 
available, fixes the assessment rate of the 
maximum contributor at 25 percent. Next 
year's Assembly then will be asked to ap- 
prove that scale and, if it does, the U.S. 
assessment rate will be established at the 
25 percent level from January 1, 1974. The 
achievement of this objective 28 years after it 
had been announced by Senator Vandenberg 
will remove a serious concern which, partic- 
ularly in recent years, has clearly had an 
adverse effect on the attitude of the American 
public toward the United Nations. I should 
add. Mr. Chairman, that were this concern 
not expunged, it is my considered opinion 
that it would cause damage to the interests 
of this important organization. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say: 

— We do not wish to reduce the traditional 
high level of the U.S. financial commitment 
to the activities of the United Nations; 

— We believe that, given the present mem- 
bership of this organization and the im- 
minent admission of new members, no one 



January 8, 1973 



47 



member state should be assessed more than 
25 percent of the regular budget of the 
United Nations; 

— We believe that the proposal we have 
tabled is fair to all member states; 

— We believe that adoption by this General 
Assembly of the U.S. proposal will be in the 
best interest of the United Nations as an 
institution; it particularly will be in the best 
interest of those members who benefit most 
from the activities of the organization; and 

—We are grateful to members of this 
committee for the thoughtful consideration 
they have already given to our proposal and 
hope that they will support the draft resolu- 
tion introduced here today by my delegation. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. delegation 
reserves the right to intervene further 
during the debate on agenda item 77. 

Committee V, November 29 

USUN press release 149/Corr. 1 dated November 30 

I hesitated to intrude in the discussion on 
resolution A/C.5/L.1091, the U.S. proposal, 
because we still have not heard from some 
delegations. But in the process of the dis- 
cussions in this committee, one question has 
emerged that looms larger than most of the 
others that have been thoughtfully posed 
here. And in this instance, an explanation in 
regard to the position of my delegation has 
been specifically requested. 

We have discussed with a great many 
delegations in this room this morning the 
implications and the ramifications of the 
proposal to defer action on this question 
until next year or to refer the question to 
the Committee on Contributions when it 
deliberates next spring. Since this is a very 
thoughtful and a very understandable pro- 
posal, we felt that it was important to ex- 
plain our position on it. 

I think we ought to agree that the 
specialists and the experts of the Contribu- 
tions Committee are not the masters of the 
Fifth Committee. They get instructions, as 
in most parliamentary bodies, from the 
members that make up those bodies. We 



would therefore be going about our business 
in reverse if we were to try to duck this 
issue or delay action by dumping it into the 
laps of the Contributions Committee next 
spring. We believe that this committee ought 
to take its stand on what the instructions to 
the Contributions Committee should be, one 
way or the other. And for that reason we 
would reject the proposal that our resolution 
be referred for the judgment of the assess- 
ment group next year. 

In that connection, Mr. Chairman, the 
observation has recurred again and again 
that the timing of the U.S. resolution is not 
propitious, that it comes at a very awkward 
moment. Well, we recognize that. But it is 
difficult for us to see when any time is a good 
time for this kind of an adjustment. Once 
you have been on a direction of policy for 
a very long period of time, it is easier not 
to adjust than to adjust. So that what we' 
have come to grips with is : When is the least 
difficult time to face up to that question? We 
believe that now is the time, that we gain 
nothing and we risk much by seeking to de- 
fer it. 

With the accession of so many new mem- 
bers to a body that now numbers 132, with 
only a few new members on the horizon, the 
organization is approaching the maximum 
total available. This suggests to my delega- 
tion that indeed the time has arrived to 
come to grips with this matter. 

The prospect that the Contributions Com- 
mittee, ultimately and almost certainly, will 
have access to new percentage points for al- 
locating the quotas for member states sug- 
gests the importance of a decision now. 
That condition cannot go on and on, for the 
very simple reason that we are running out 
of new additions to the United Nations. 

But we have taken care in our proposal 
to recommend that once the principle of a 
25 percent ceiling is spelled out by the action 
of this committee and then by the General 
Assembly, its implementation should take 
place — I quote precisely from our resolution 
the phrase — "as soon as practicable." That 
phrase takes cognizance of the fact that many 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



events ill the future cannot be fixed to a 
precise timetable for the convenience of 
legislative bodies or international organiza- 
tions. And in our resolution we seek to be 
realists on that point as well. 

Another of the factors thai requires now 
as the time for the decision one way or the 
other has to do with some housekeeping 
matters within my own country. These have 
been mentioned here by several delegations. 

We also have been consulted privately by 
many other delegations about the activities 
of recent months on the part of the Congress 
of the United States. I hesitate to open the 
doors of our domestic closets and have a look 
at what's in there on an occasion like this. 
Nevertheless I think, in the interest of 
candor and straightforwardness, perhaps 
that is called for. 

As you know, one body of our Congress, 
the House of Representatives, in a moment 
of legislative fervor and activity, enacted a 
bill that would have imposed a 25 percent 
limit on the American contribution to the 
U.N.'s assessed budget effective last July 1. 
We believe that the House was ill advised, 
in fact, in some substantial ways, uninformed 
about procedures, about the structure and 
the requirements under the Charter of the 
United Nations. 

I am moved to note here that the inde- 
pendence of a legislative body is not a unique 
province of the Congress of the United 
States. If we look at the arrearages of a 
great many member states in this organiza- 
tion, legislative impulses that seem to run 
against the grain of the principles in the 
Charter of the United Nations have often 
arisen around the world. And thus, in a 
sense, we all have shared that kind of an 
experience. My point here, however, is what 
we did after that small step was taken by the 
House. Well, the first thing we did was to 
reverse that action in the Senate. We did 
it only by explaining very carefully the pro- 
cedures to which the Government of the 
United States is committed under the 
Charter of the United Nations and that a 
legislative body cannot determine the assess- 



ment of its own government in the United 
Nations. That is the prerogative solely cf the 
U.N. A legislative body can withhold pay- 
ment, it can go into default or into arrears, 
but it cannot set the assessment rate. 

Once the Senate had a chance to review 
this question, it rejected the House action; 
however, in that Senate process a time 
certain was placed on arriving at an assess- 
ment percentage. That time certain, as has 
been mentioned here in the debate several 
times, is January 1, 1974. 

Now, I think there has been misunder- 
standing about why such a date was fixed 
even by the Senate. That date was fixed — I 
was there when it happened — because in 
attempting to understand the procedures of 
the United Nations, the Senate understood 
the role of the Contributions Committee and 
that its assessment scales were for three 
years, that the next assessment-formulating 
time would occur in the spring of 1973 when 
that committee would fix the new quotas 
beginning on January 1, 1974, for approval 
by the General Assembly. 

The only reason that date was placed there 
was to conform with the established proce- 
dures of the United Nations. In an attempt 
to honor and respect that U.N. prerogative, 
my government proceeded through the White 
House, through the State Department, 
through the leadership in the Senate, and 
then the Congress as a whole to integrate 
its proposals and its expectations of what- 
ever future adjustments were necessary with 
the prerogative of the U.N. alone to make 
that determination. That's the why of this 
specific legislation. 

The upshot is that having complied in 
good faith with the provisions established 
under the U.N. Charter, it would pose very 
serious fallout consequences if that proce- 
dure were now to be delayed or deferred. 
This is not to say that the initiative of this 
committee to decide whether it chooses to 
defer or not is impaired. This only says 
that because of the good faith and the ex- 
pectation that we were actually strengthen- 
ing the decisionmaking prerogative of the 



January 8, 1973 



49 



U.N. on assessment questions, that were this 
to be deferred it would create serious prob- 
lems for my delegation in the understanding 
of U.N. processes in the United States. 

Once more, I apologize for examining here 
today the interior workings of our system, 
but that examination, I think, would call up 
familiar images in many delegations present 
in this room. And so that is the third of a 
series of factors which we believe to require 
that members vote now, during this session 
of the General Assembly, on the question of 
the maximum assessment rate. That is why 
my delegation would feel obliged to oppose 
any proposal to defer or to refer it for 
further consideration. 

The ceiling proposal put forth by my 
delegation has been thoroughly discussed, 
and for a very long time. We think its ram- 
ifications have been completely aired. There 
are no mysteries behind it. The consequences 
are even now measurable, and in fairly pre- 
cise terms. And this proposal, if it were to 
be endorsed by this body, would represent 
the achievement, from the point of view of 
the United States, of a principle— an insti- 
tutional principle — in relation to a ceiling 
limitation on the basic assessment for the 
regular budget of the United Nations. 

We have stressed again and again that this 
is our only goal. There is positively no 
intention of seeking further ceiling adjust- 
ments. This was our concept at the very 
beginning of the organization. It is the con- 
cept toward which we have been systemati- 
cally working through this committee, Mr. 
Chairman, and a concept which we believe 
can best be realized now rather than at some 
later date. 

To underscore my delegation's position, if 
we were to have a vote on a motion to defer 
or refer this question, a vote to defer or 
refer would be a vote against the U.S. draft 
resolution. 

I want to say, as I close, that my delega- 
tion appreciates the friendly spirit in which 
those who both agree and do not agree with 
our proposal have nonetheless consulted 
frankly with us. We also are grateful to 



those who have participated up to this stage 
of the debate, for they have assisted in many 
ways in trying to make clear the issues 
present in this question. 

Plenary, December 13 

USUN press release 165 dated December 13 

I want to take this moment in this after- 
noon's deliberations to thank all of the 
members, regardless of vote, for the open 
participation in the decision through the 
machinery of the United Nations for the 
resolution of this question. 

My government believes that this is a con- 
structive decision. We believe that it will 
strengthen the United Nations. Since its in- 
ception, the United Nations, we have felt, 
must be strong as an institution, rather than 
a chamber of commerce or a political gim- 
mick. It must survive in its own right. 

It is our conviction that by holding the 
ceiling of the largest contributor to 25 per- 
cent we strengthen the institutional charac- 
ter of this body. This is not new, for the 
United Nations has steadily through its 
history recognized the importance of taking 
action on a ceiling of the maximum contrib- 
utor—in 1952, in 1957, and now in 1972. 
And likewise, we think it is important that 
the United Nations in this action has re- 
sisted the temptation to put it off again. 
Coming to grips with this issue has been 
delayed and the temptation to delay is under- 
standable, but the credibility of this body 
has surely been reinforced by the willingness 
of the General Assembly to meet this issue 
head on now, whatever the outcome. 

Finally, Mr. President, the integrity of 
the United Nations has been underscored in 
this action. The Congress of the United 
States has had almost as many views as 
speeches on the question. Congressmen are 
of many stripes, but one thing we resolved 
successfully this year in the Congress was 
that the Congress of the United States has 
no prerogative to determine the assessments 
in the United Nations regular budget. The 
Supreme Soviet does not have that preroga- 
tive. No legislative body in any sovereign 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



nation has that prerogative. That belongs 
alone to the United Nations, and that is why 
even the Congress, with all of its many flares 
of rhetoric, made the basic decision that this 
must proceed through the machinery and the 
mechanism of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. All that Congress or a Su- 
preme Soviet or a parliament or any other 
legislative group can do is to vote on whether 
to default or not. That is the only preroga- 
tive it has. 

Therefore we believe that we have 
strengthened the character and the credibil- 
ity and the integrity of the United Nations. 
And if there are those who. indeed, as we 
have heard suggested, propose corresponding 
action, I say the time is at hand to put our 
procedures where our rhetoric is, and that is 
to proceed by submitting the case to the 
United Nations, referring it to the Fifth 
Committee, laying it out for free and open 
debate by all of the delegates, and let this 
body make the decision, rather than impose 
it unilaterally. 

I want to express on behalf of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, and I do that as 
a member of the loyal opposition, and I want 
to extend on behalf of the American delega- 
tion here at the U.N., our deep appreciation 
for what this body has done today for the 
United Nations. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 



Noting that, when it was decided by the General 
Assembly in IDS? that, in principle, the maximum 
contrihution of any one Member State to the ordi- 
nary expenses of the United Nations should not 
exceed ,'iO per cent of the total, the United Nations 
consisted of 82 Member States, 

Noting furtht r that, since the General Assembly 
decision of 1957, 50 States have been admitted to 
membership in the United Nations, 

Recalling that, since the General Assembly deci- 
sion of 1957, there has been a reduction in the per- 
centage contribution of the State paying the 
maximum contribution from 33.33 per cent to 31.52 
per cent, 

Decides that: 

(a) As a matter of principle, the maximum con- 
tribution of any one Member State to the ordinary 
expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 
25 per cent of the total ; 

(b) In preparing scales of assessment for future 
years, the Committee on Contributions shall imple- 
ment subparagraph (a) above as soon as practi- 
cable so as to reduce to 25 per cent the percentage 
contribution of the Member State paying the maxi- 
mum contribution, utilizing for this purpose to the 
extent necessary: 

(i) The percentage contributions of any newly 
admitted Member States immediately upon their 
admission; and 

(ii) The normal triennial increase in the per- 
centage contributions of Member States resulting 
from increases in their national incomes; 

(c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (b) above, 
the percentage contribution of Member States shall 
not in any case in the United Nations, the spe- 
cialized agencies or the International Atomic En- 
ergy Agency be increased as a consequence of the 
present resolution. 



The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 
1946, 238 (III) of 18 November 1948, 665 (VII) of 
5 December 1952 and 1137 (XII) of 14 October 1957, 
relating to the apportionment of the expenses of 
the United Nations among its Members and the fix- 
ing of the maximum contribution of any one Mem- 
ber State, 

Affirming that the capacity of Member States to 
contribute towards the payment of the ordinary ex- 
penses of the United Nations is a fundamental cri- 
terion on which scales of assessment are based, 



U.N. doc. A RES/2961 B; adopted by the As- 
sembly on Dec. 13 by a rollcall vote of 81 (U.S.) to 
27, with 22 abstentions. The Legal Counsel of the 
United Nations had made a statement according to 
which the draft resolutions before the Assembly re- 
paired a two-thirds majority. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Recess Appointments 



President Nixon on December 2 granted the fol- 
lowing recess appointments: 

Richard T. Davies to be Ambassador to Poland. 
Melvin L. Manfull to be Ambassador to Liberia. 
Cleo A. Noel, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Sudan. 



January 8, 1973 



51 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement 
of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 
23, 1969. » 
Accession deposited: Fiji, November 29, 1972. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 

1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 

Accessions deposited: Guyana, Malawi (with a 

reservation), December 21, 1972. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 2.3, 1971. 1 
Signature : Nicaragua, December 22, 1972. 
Accessions deposited: Guyana, Malawi (with a 

reservation), December 21, 1972. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, November 29, 1972. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, November 29, 1972. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 
1967. TIAS 6298. 

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, October 27, 
1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 

1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. 

Ratifications deposited: Algeria (with a declara- 
tion), Peru, December 19, 1972; Brazil, Guate- 
mala, Mexico, December 20, 1972. 

Notification of provisional application: Finland, 

December 15, 1972. 
Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In- 
telsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 
20, 1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. 
Notification of provisional application: Finland, 

December 15, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement suspending article 17 of the Air Force 
Mission agreement of October 3, 1956, as amended 
(TIAS 3652, 4363). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Buenos Aires November 27, 1972. Entered into 
force November 27, 1972. 

Fiji 

Agreement continuing in force between the United 
States and Fiji the consular convention of June 
6, 1951, between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva 
and Washington October 16 and December 12, 
1972. Entered into force December 12, 1972. 

Italy 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 19, 
1967 (TIAS 6280), for a cooperative program in 
science. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome 
December 11, 1972. Entered into force December 
11, 1972. 

Japan 

Agreement regarding the king and tanner crab 
fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea, with appen- 
dix, agreed minutes, and related note. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 20, 
1972. Entei-ed into force December 20, 1972. 

Agreement regarding the king and tanner crab 
fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea, with agreed 
minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo 
December 11, 1970. Entered into force December 
11, 1970. TIAS 7019. 
Terminated: December 20, 1972. 

Agreement relating to salmon fishing in waters con- 
tiguous to the U.S. territorial sea, with agreed 
minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington December 20, 1972. Entered into force 
December 20, 1972. 

Agreement relating to salmon fishing in waters con- 
tiguous to the U.S. territorial sea, with agreed 
minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo 
December 11, 1970. Entered into force December 
11, 1970. TIAS 7020. 
Terminated: December 20, 1972. 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast of the 
United States, with related note and agreed 
minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington December 20, 1972. Entered into force 
December 20, 1972; effective January 1, 1973. 



1 Not in force. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX J I. XVIII. \ 



Communic i To 

its Into Fi 
nt> ... 

Department and i. \p- 

Manful!, Noel 

Liberia. Manfull ar \mbassador ... 51 

Poland. Davies appointed Ambas 

Presidential Documents. President Hails Act 

To Bring Intelsat Agreements Into Force . 42 

Sudan 

\ Information. Current Actions ... 

I'nited Nation- Proposal 
on . ssments (McGee, text of 
resolution) 43 

Nam 
Or. Kissinger i in Negotia- 

news conference) 
171st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 
Paris (Isham) 41 

-, Richard T 51 

rd 41 

33 

51 

4.", 

psident 42 

A., Jr 51 



Check List of 


Department of State 


Press Releases: December 18-24 


nay be ol 


Office of Pr 


Washing: 




No. 


Date 


Subject 






Rogers: on noi< 
tion of John Scali as I 
Representative to the U.N. 






van passport request. 


*313 


12/19 


Davies sworn in as Ambassador 
to Poland (biographic data). 


314 


12/21 


Isham: 171st plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 


t315 


12/22 


New arrangements for monetary 
cooperation in the OECD. 




12/22 


is: statement on nomina- 
tion of John Irwin II as 
Ambassador to France. 




12/22 


Portugal agreements on 
trade in textiles between 
-Macao and the U.S. (rewrite). 


Not 


printed. 


t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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.5 



I ?// 73-/ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume I. XVIII 



No. 1751 



January 15, 1973 



U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ESTABLISHES MACHINERY 
FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 

Statement by Senator McGee and Texts of Resolutions 53 

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: PROBLEMS AND MODALITIES OF COMMUNICATION 

by Michael H. Annacost 64 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1751 
January 15, 1973 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



U.N. General Assembly Establishes Machinery 
for International Environmental Cooperation 



Following is a statement by Senator Gale 

W. McGee, U.S. Representativt to the U.N. 

■ ral Assembly, made in Committee II 

(Economic and Financial) mi October 20, 

ther with the texts of three resolutions 

adopted by the Assembly on December 15. 

STATEMENT BY SENATOR McGEE 

USUN press release 123 dated October 20 

A major task, a historic opportunity, con- 
fronts us at this General Assembly. The 
world has identified a most serious problem 
afflicting- mankind throughout the world: the 
already existing and continuously growing 
grave threat of environmental degradation. 
Now that this threat to the human environ- 
ment has been recognized, the international 
community, through concerted action in the 
United Nations, must take action to deal 
with it. 

We can take some satisfaction from our 
international cooperative efforts to date. The 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi- 
ronment was a distinct success. 1 That 
achievement was not an accident. Nor did it 
come easily. It resulted from careful, 
thorough, and sharply focused preparations, 
from effective organization of the confer- 
ence, and from the good will, serious 
purpose, and cooperative spirit of participat- 
ing governments with different views on 
many subjects. 

No small part of the success of the Stock- 



1 For background and texts of the resolution on 
institutional arrangements adopted at Stockholm 
on June 15 and the Declaration on the Human En- 
vironment adopted on June 16, see Bulletin of July 
24, 1972, p. 105. 



holm Conference was attributable to the 
outstanding performance of its Secretary 
General, Mr. Maurice Strong, both during 
the many months of diligent preparatory 
work and during the conference itself. Also, 
tribute must be paid to the steadfast devo- 
tion of the Government of Sweden to the 
noble purpose of the conference and to their 
efforts in arranging it so successfully. 

It is fitting to pay tribute to this past 
success. But we must recognize that it is 
only a small step on the way to accomplish- 
ing our goals. The commonality of interest 
forged at Stockholm allows us to proceed 
further in the articulation of a shared con- 
cern, and it obliges us to do something about 
it. We must begin, at this General Assembly, 
with the establishment of well-designed 
machinery within the structure of the U.N. 
to focus and coordinate international efforts 
to deal with the problems of the human 
environment. 

In this respect the Stockholm Conference 
has given us specific guidance. It presented 
us with an excellent plan for institutional 
and financial arrangements. This we hope 
will be endorsed unanimously by the 27th 
General Assembly. 

As a historian, I have been interested in 
my government's involvement over the years 
with this question at the United Nations. 
In December 1968, the U.S. Representative 
to the United Nations, Ambassador James 
Russell Wiggins, pledged support, along with 
49 other cosponsors, to a resolution initiated 
by Sweden calling for the convening of an 
international conference on the human en- 
vironment no later than 1972. At that time 
Ambassador Wiggins noted the large number 



January 15, 1973 



53 



of both industrialized and developing coun- 
tries which cosponsored the resolution, show- 
ing the then growing awareness throughout 
the world of environmental problems. The 
participation of 113 developing and devel- 
oped countries alike in the Stockholm 
Conference certainly gave evidence of this 
widespread interest and concern. 

In September 1969, while addressing the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, 
President Nixon reaffirmed the U.S. Govern- 
ment's total commitment to the idea of an 
international conference. He stressed that 
the protection of man's environment is of 
international concern, and he expressed the 
hope that the United States and other coun- 
tries would be able to launch both national 
and international initiatives designed to 
improve the environment so that the world 
will be a healthy and happy place for 
man. 

At the same time, the United States took 
major steps nationally to establish govern- 
mental machinery to deal with environ- 
mental questions. Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 we 
centralized within the Federal Government 
major responsibility for coping with envi- 
ronmental problems. We have also attempted 
to do so in the international field by 
establishing within the Department of State 
an Office of Environmental Affairs to co- 
ordinate U.S. efforts and activities with 
those of other countries. We have been 
paying considerable attention as a govern- 
ment to environmental problems in the 
United States, while strengthening our ma- 
chinery for dealing with them at an interna- 
tional level. 

Mr. Chairman, my government joined with 
many others in playing an active role and 
contributing toward the success at Stock- 
holm. The success indeed is a tribute 
essentially to properly functioning interna- 
tional cooperation. Through long, arduous, 
and sometimes agonizing negotiations, 113 
governments arrived at a consensus dealing 
with institutional arrangements, with a dec- 
laration covering 26 principles, and with an 



action plan containing 109 specific proposals 
for a work program. These accomplishments 
themselves testify to the success of the Stock- 
holm Conference. But most important, they 
give evidence of the good will of governments 
throughout the world to deal with this 
subject as an international problem concern- 
ing the whole of mankind. The process of 
negotiation itself both before and at Stock- 
holm contributed greatly to exposure of 
problems and understanding of different 
points of view. It augurs well for the future 
that United Nations work, and international 
cooperative efforts in this field can build 
on this successful experience of joint con- 
sideration and of common resolve so clearly 
enunciated by the international community 
at Stockholm. 

The spirit of Stockholm is already ap- 
pearing in various ways. In the case of my 
government, it orbited its first experimental 
Earth Resources Technology Satellite on July 
23, 1972. In a press release dated July 26, 
Ambassador Bush announced that 94 experi- 
ments conducted in cooperation with princi- 
pal investigators from 34 countries and two 
international organizations will make use 
of data acquired by the satellite. Results of 
the satellite's experiments will be made 
available to the international public as an 
important early step in the "Earthwatch" 
program of the action plan. As envisioned 
by the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, some 80 nations will 
meet beginning on October 31, 1972, to try 
to complete work on a convention to bar 
ocean dumping. 

Another significant development in inter- 
national cooperation is the recent agreement 
between the scientific academies of 12 coun- 
tries to set up a joint "think tank" to seek 
solutions to various problems caused by the 
increasing industrialization of the world. 
This East-West Institute, to be located in 
Austria, will have nongovernmental repre- 
sentatives from the leading scientific organi- 
zations of major industrial countries. The 
Institute expects to have about 100 scholars 
from the East and West as well as from the 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



Third World studying environmental prob- 
lems, such as pollution control and the use 
of the world's energy resources. 
The spirit of international cooperation 

in the field of environment has also shown 
itself in two bilateral environmental agree- 
ments between the United States and Canada 
and the United States and the Soviet Union. 
These agreements were in the planning 
stage long before the Stockholm Conference 
was held. However. I feel that the posi- 
tive influence of the conference in focusing 
world attention on environmental problems 
helped toward completion of these bilateral 
agreements. 

These are the first of what will be many 
positive steps that we and other countries 
must take along the difficult road in a world- 
wide concerted program of environmental 
preservation and protection. 

Having recognized with some alarm the 
physical degradation of this planet, having 
set in place a useful framework of interna- 
tional cooperation, we must now get on with 
the urgent job at hand. The international 
community must establish effective machin- 
ery within the U.N. to enable us to apply 
our best collective efforts to environmental 
problems. Even though we don't yet have 
the answers to all the problems, we believe 
it is necessary to set up the best possible 
machinery within the U.N. to try and find 
some of these answers. 

My delegation believes that the Stockholm 
resolution on institutional and financial ar- 
rangements provides us with an excellent 
plan for this purpose. We support the recom- 
mendation for a 54-member Governing 
Council, with an equitable geographical 
composition, as the intergovernmental body 
to provide general policy guidance for the 
direction and coordination of environmental 
programs in the U.N. system. We also sup- 
port the establishment of a small, highly 
professional, and very effective secretariat 
to be established within the U.N. in support 
of the Council. We attach considerable im- 
portance to the central role of coordination 
within the U.N. system to be played by the 



Executive Director in charge of the new 
secretariat, who will also serve as chairman 
o\' the interagency Environmental Coordi- 
nating Board. To lie effective, the member- 
ship of the Environmental Coordinating 
Board must be at the highest level, as pro- 
posed yesterday by the distinguished 
delegate from Iran. In this connection we 
were very much encouraged by, and we 
welcomed, the pledges of support and mutual 
interest expressed by the heads of the 
specialized agencies at the meeting of the 
joint ACC/CPC [Administrative Committee 
on Coordination; Committee for Program 
and Coordination] last June just following 
the Stockholm Conference. 

An important part of the institutional ar- 
rangements to which we attach great 
importance is the proposal to establish an 
Environment Fund. President Nixon, in his 
February 1972 message to Congress, sug- 
gested that a voluntary environmental fund 
of $100 million be set up for the first five 
years. Secretary of State Rogers in June of 
1972 announced that the United States "is 
prepared to contribute up to $40 million to 
match the $60 million which we hope others 
will donate." Several other countries have 
officially made pledges of support. Other 
countries at Stockholm mentioned their in- 
tention to make a contribution to the Fund. 
My government hopes that these countries, 
as well as others, will be prepared to indicate 
their pledges to the Environment Fund at 
this session of the General Assembly. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wish to give 
formal support of my delegation to the two 
resolutions so ably introduced by the dis- 
tinguished delegate of Sweden. The first 
resolution deals with institutional arrange- 
ments. The second resolution before this 
committee draws the attention of govern- 
ments and the Governing Council to the 
declaration, refers the action plan to the 
Governing Council for further study, and 
proposes that June 5 be designated as 
"World Environment Day." My delegation is 
pleased to cosponsor both of these resolu- 
tions. In effect they endorse the successful 



January 15, 1973 



55 



results of the Stockholm Conference. We 
hope they will be approved unanimously by 
this committee and by the plenary of this 
General Assembly. 

We are pleased that agreement has been 
reached on an issue for which there was no 
time at Stockholm to reach a consensus, and 
here I am referring to resolution A/C.2/ 
L.1227, cosponsored by the Governments of 
Argentina and Brazil and a number of other 
delegations. In that connection may I add 
that we have noted the observations of the 
distinguished Representative of Brazil, in 
referring to a resolution cited in the pre- 
amble, and we note with satisfaction that a 
number of questions under contention a year 
ago have in the meantime been resolved and 
have been superseded by the agreements 
reached at Stockholm. We fully support this 
resolution. 

In summary, my delegation fully supports 
the results of the Stockholm Conference, its 
recommendations for institutional and finan- 
cial arrangements, its declaration, and its 
action plan. We trust that this new effort 
in the United Nations, which inevitably will 
face the most difficult operational challenges, 
will be launched with little controversy and 
with enthusiastic support at this General 
Assembly. This endeavor goes far beyond 
the question of dealing with the human en- 
vironment and is a milestone in the interna- 
tional effort of peaceful cooperation among 
nations. 

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

General Assembly Resolution 2994 c 

United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment 

The General Assembly, 

Reaffirming the responsibility of the international 
community to take action to preserve and enhance 
the human environment and, in particular, the need 
for continuous international co-operation to this 
end, 

Recalling its resolutions 2398 (XXIII) of 3 De- 
cember 1968, 2581 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969. 



2657 <XXV) of : December 1970, 2849 (XXVI) 
and 2S50 (XXVI, of 2C December 1971, 

Having considered the report of the United Na- 
tions Conference on the Human Environment 3 and 
the report of the Secretary-General thereon, 4 

Expressing its satisfaction that the Conference 
and its preparatory committee succeeded in focusing 
the attention of Governments and public opinion on 
the need for prompt action in the field of the human 
environment, 

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi- 
ronment ; 

2. Draws the attention of Governments and the 
Governing Council for Environmental Programmes 
to the Declaration of the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment and refers the Action 
Plan for the Human Environment to the Governing 
Council for appropriate action; 

3. Draws the attention of Governments to the 
recommendations for action at the national level 
referred to them by the Conference for their con- 
sideration and such action as they might deem 
appropriate; 

4. Designates 5 June as World Environment Day 
and urges Governments and the organizations in 
the United Nations system to undertake on that day 
every year world-wide activities reaffirming their 
concern for the preservation and enhancement of the 
human environment, with a view to deepening envi- 
ronmental awareness and to pursuing the determina- 
tion expressed at the Conference; 

5. Takes note with appreciation of the resolution 
adopted by the Conference on the convening of a 
second United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment and refers this matter to the Govern- 
ing Council for Environmental Programmes with 
the request that the Council study this matter, 
taking intc account the status of implementation 
of the Action Plan and future developments in the 
field of the human environment and report its views 
and recommendations to the General Assembly so 
that the Assembly car. take a decision on all the 
aspects of the matter not later than at its twenty- 
ninth session. 

General Assembly Resolution 2995 B 

Co-operation between States 
in the field of the human environment 

Tin General Assembly. 

Having considered the text of principle 20 



'Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by a vote 
of 112 (U.S.) to 0. with 10 abstentions. 



'U.N. doc. A/CONF.4S 14 and Corr. 1. [Footnote 
in original.] 

'UN. doc. A/8783 and Add. 1. Add. 1/Corr. 1. 
and Add. 2. [Footnote in original.] 

5 Adopted by the Assembly on Dec 15 by a vote of 
115 (U.S.) to 0. with 10 abstentions (draft resolu- 
tion A C.2, L.1227). 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



>f the I 'eclarati n of 

in the Human E n I to it for con- 

sidi ratior n the 

Human Environmi 

ailing its X\V] i f 2i 

cember 19' 

Bearing in mind I 
eignty iver their States must 

seek, through 

co-operation or throug nery, to 

• 'it, 

1. Emphasizes that, 
tion and development natural resources, 

- must ii' ' . •. fieant harmful effects 

in zones situated outsidi n irisdiction; 

2 /'. that ,• een States in 

the tield of the environment, including co-operation 
towards the implen _'l and 22 

of the Declaration of the '•> ted Nations Conference 
in the Human Environment, will . effectively 
achieved if official and pul lie Knowledge is provided 
of the technical data v. lating to the work to he 
carried out by States eithin their national jurisdic- 
tion with a view to avoiding significant harm that 
may occur in the human environment of the adjacent 
area : 

''.. Recognizes fnrthi r "hat the technical lata 
referred to in paragrapn 2 above will he given and 
• ■d in the hest sp;i operation and good 

neighbourliness, without this being construed as 
enabling each State to delay or impede the pro- 
grammes and projects of • xploration, exploitation 
and development of the natural resources of the 
States in whose territories such programmes and 
projects are carried out. 



States ami n conformity irith the Charter of the 
United Nations and principles of international law. 
Mindful of oral . espi es of the 

nizations nited Nations systi 

1 'he significant I and sub- 

n the field of the human 

environment and if the important role of the 

rial economic commissions and ither regional 

nti rgovernmental organizations, 

Emphasizing thai the human environ- 

ment constitute a new and important area for inter- 
national co-operation and that the complexity and 
nterdopendence jf such problems require new ap- 
proaches. 

cognizing that the relevant international 
scientific and other professional communities can 
make an important contribution to international 
co-operation n the field of the human environment, 
( 'onscious of the need for processes within the 
United Nations system which would effectively assist 
■ping countries to implement environmental 
policies and programmes that are compatible with 
their development plans ami to participate meaning- 
fully in international environmental programmes, 

inced that, in order to be effective, interna- 
tional co-operation in the field of the human envi- 
ronment requires additional financial and technical 
resources, 

Aware of the urgent need for a permanent in- 
stitutional arrangement within the United Nations 
for the protection and improvement of the human 
environment, 

Taking not'' of the report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. 



General Assembly Resolution 2997' 

Institutional and financial arrangem 
for international environmental co-operation 

The General Assembly, 

Convinced of the need for prompt and effective 
implementation by Governments and the interna- 
tional community of measures designed to safeguard 
and enhance the human environment for the benefit 
of present and future generations of man, 

Recognizing that responsibility for action to pro- 
tect and enhance the human environment rests 
primarily with Governments and, in the first 
instance, can be exercised more effectively at the 
national and regional levels. 

Recognizing further that environmental problems 
of broad international significance fall within the 
competence of the United Nations system, 

Bearing in mind that international co-operative 
programmes in the environment field must be under- 
taken with due respect to the sovereign rights of 



Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by a vote 
of IK, ( U.S.) "to 0, with 10 abstentions. 



Governing Council for Environmental Programmes 

1. Decides to establish a Governing Council for 
Environmental Programmes composed of 58 mem- 
bers elected by the General Assembly for three-year 
terms on the following basis: 

(a) Sixteen seats for African States; 
(6) Thirteen seats for Asian States; 

(c) Ten seats for Latin American States; 

(d) Thirteen seats for Western European and 
other States; 

(e) Six seats for Eastern European States; 

2. Decides that the Governing Council shall have 
the following main functions and responsibilities: 

(a) To promote international co-operation in the 
environment field and to recommend, as appropriate, 
policies to this end; 

lh) To provide general policy guidance for the di- 
rection and co-ordination of environmental pro- 
grammes within the United Nations system; 

(c) To receive and review the periodic reports of 
the Executive Director, referred to in section II, 
paragraph 1, below, on the implementation of en- 



January 15, 1973 



57 



vironmental programmes within the United Nations 
system ; 

(d) To keep under review the world environmen- 
tal situation in order to ensure that emerging 
environmental problems of wide international sig- 
nificance receive appropriate and adequate consider- 
ation by Governments; 

(e) To promote the contribution of the relevant 
international scientific and other professional com- 
munities to the acquisition, assessment and exchange 
of environmental knowledge and information and, as 
appropriate, to the technical aspects of the formu- 
lation and implementation of environmental pro- 
grammes within the United Nations system; 

(/) To maintain under continuing review the 
impact of national and international environmental 
policies and measures on developing countries, as 
well as the problem of additional costs that may be 
incurred by developing countries in the implementa- 
tion of environmental programmes and projects, and 
to ensure that such programmes and projects shall 
be compatible with the development plans and 
priorities of those countries; 

(g) To review and approve annually the pro- 
gramme of utilization of resources of the Environ- 
ment Fund referred to in section III below; 

3. Decides that the Governing Council shall report 
annually to the General Assembly through the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council, which will transmit to the 
Assembly such comments on the report as it may 
deem necessary, particularly with regard to ques- 
tions of co-ordination and to the relationship of 
environment policies and programmes within the 
United Nations system to over-all economic and 
social policies and priorities. 

II 

Environment, secretariat 

1. Decides that a small secretariat shall be estab- 
lished in the United Nations to serve as a focal 
point for environmental action and co-ordination 
within the United Nations system in such a way as 
to ensure a high degree of effective management; 7 

2. Decides that the environment secretariat shall 
be headed by the Executive Director, who shall be 
elected by the General Assembly on the nomination 
of the Secretary-General for a term of four years 
and who shall be entrusted, inter alia, with the 
following responsibilities: 

(a) To provide substantive support to the Gov- 
erning Council; 

(6) To co-ordinate, under the guidance of the 
Governing Council, environment programmes within 
the United Nations system, to keep their implemen- 
tation under review and to assess their effectiveness ; 



7 By unanimous decision on Dec. 15 (A/RES/3004 
(XXVII)), the Assembly located the environment 
secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. 



(c) To advise, as appropriate and under the guid- 
ance of the Governing Council, intergovernmental 
bodies of the United Nations system on the 
formulation and implementation of environmental 
programmes ; 

(d) To secure the effective co-operation of, and 
contribution from, the relevant scientific and other 
professional communities from all parts of the 
world ; 

(e) To provide, at the request of all parties con- 
cerned, advisory services for the promotion of 
international co-operation in the field of the 
environment; 

(/) To submit to the Governing Council, on his 
own initiative or upon request, proposals embodying 
medium-range and long-range planning for United 
Nations programmes in the field of the environment; 

(g) To bring to the attention of the Governing 
Council any matter which he deems to require con- 
sideration by it; 

(h) To administer, under the authority and policy 
guidance of the Governing Council, the Environment 
Fund referred to in section III below; 

(i) To report on environment matters to the 
Governing Council; 

(.7) To perform such other functions as may be 
entrusted to him by the Governing Council; 

3. Decides that the costs of servicing the Govern- 
ing Council and providing the small secretariat re- 
ferred to in paragraph 1 above shall be borne by 
the regular budget of the United Nations and that 
operational programme costs, programme support 
and administrative costs of the Environment Fund 
established under section III below shall be borne 
by the Fund. 

Ill 

Environment Fund 

1. Decides that, in order to provide for additional 
financing for environmental programmes, a volun- 
tary fund shall be established, with effect from 1 
January 1973, in accordance with existing United 
Nations financial procedures; 

2. Decides that, in order to enable the Governing 
Council to fulfil its policy-guidance role for the di- 
rection and co-ordination of environmental activities, 
the Environment Fund shall finance wholly or partly 
the costs of the new environmental initiatives under- 
taken within the United Nations system — which 
will include the initiatives envisaged in the Action 
Plan for the Human Environment adopted by the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environ- 
ment, with particular attention to integrated proj- 
ects, and such other environmental activities as may 
be decided upon by the Governing Council — and that 
the Governing Council shall review these initiatives 
with a view to taking appropriate decisions as to 
their continued financing; 

3. Decides that the Environment Fund shall be 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



used for financing such pri . of genera] in- 

teresl as regional and global monitoring, assessment 
anil data-collecting systems, including, as a 
priate, rusts for national counterparts; the im- 
provement of environmental quality management . 
environmental research; information exchange and 
dissemination; public education and training; assist- 
ance for national, regional and global environmental 
institutions; the promotion of environmental re- 
searcl ami studios for the development of industrial 
anil other technologies best suited to a policy of 
•nic growth compatible with adequate environ- 
il safeguards; and such other programmes as 
the Governing- Council may decide upon; and that 
in the implementation of such programmes duo 
account should he taken of the special needs of the 
developing countries; 

1. Decides that, in order to ensure that the de- 
ment priorities of developing countries shall 
not he adversely affected, adequate measures shall 
he taken to provide additional financial resources on 
terms compatible with the economic situation of the 
recipient developing country, and that, to this end, 
the Executive Director, in co-operation with com- 
petent organizations, shall keep this problem under 
continuing review; 

5. Decides that the Environment Fund, in pur- 
suance of the objectives stated in paragraphs 2 
and 3 above, shall be directed to the need for 
effective co-ordination in the implementation of in- 
ternational environmental programmes of the orga- 
nizations of the United Nations system and other 
international organizations; 

6. Decides that, in the implementation of pro- 
grammes to he financed by the Environment Fund, 
organizations outside the United Nations system, 
particularly those in the countries and regions con- 
cerned, shall also be utilized as appropriate, in 
accordance with the procedures established by the 
Governing Council, and that such organizations are 
invited to support the United Nations environmental 
programmes by complementary initiatives and 
contributions; 

7. /'. cides that the Governing Council shall for- 
mulate such general procedures as are necessary to 
govern the operations of the Environment Fund. 

IV 

Co-ordination 

1. Decides that, in order to provide for the most 
efficient co-ordination of United Nations environ- 
mental programmes, an Environmental Co-ordinating 
Board, under the chairmanship of the Executive 
Director, should be established under the auspices 
and within the framework of the Administrative 
Committee on Co-ordination; 

2. Decides further that the Environmental Co- 
ordinating Board shall meet periodically for the 
purpose of ensuring co-operation and co-ordination 



among all bodies concerned in the implementation 
of environmental programmes and that it shall re- 
port annually to the Governing Council; 

::. Invites the organizations of the United Nations 
system to adopt the measures that may be required 
to undertake concerted and co-ordinated programmes 
with regai'd to international environmental prob- 
lems, taking into account existing procedures for 
prior consultation, particularly on programme and 
budgetary matters; 

■I. Invites the regional economic commissions and 
the Economic and Social Office at Beirut, in co- 
operation where necessary with other appropriate 
regional bodies, to intensify further their efforts 
directed towards contributing to the implementa- 
tion of environmental programmes in view of the 
particular need for the rapid development of re- 
gional co-operation in this field; 

5. Also invites other intergovernmental and 
those non-governmental organizations that have an 
interest in the field of the environment to lend 
their full support and collaboration to the United 
Nations with a view to achieving the largest possible 
degree of co-operation and co-ordination; 

fi. Calls upon Governments to ensure that appro- 
priate national institutions shall be entrusted with 
the task of the co-ordination of environmental action, 
both national and international; 

7. Decides to review as appropriate, at its thirty- 
first session, the above institutional arrangements, 
hearing in mind, inter alia, the responsibilities of 
the Economic and Social Council under the Charter 
of the United Nations. 



Secretary Rogers Lauds Nomination 
of Mr. Scali as U.N. Representative 

Statement by Secretary Rogers* 

I am very pleased by President Nixon's 
nomination of John Scali as the U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations. His appoint- 
ment manifests the President's high interest 
in the United Nations. Mr. Scali has been a 
respected diplomatic reporter, a valued con- 
sultant to the President, and has traveled ex- 
tensively with the President throughout the 
world. I am confident that his service at the 
United Nations will be most distinguished. 



' Issued to the press on Dec. lfi (press release -311 
: Dec. 18). 



January 15, 1973 



59 



Standing Consultative Commission 
Under SALT Agreements Established 

Following are texts of a joint communique 
issued at Geneva on December 21 at the con- 
clusion of the first round of Phase Two 
of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) and a memorandum of understand- 
ing signed that day at Geneva by Gerard 
Smith, head of the U.S. delegation, and V. S. 
Semenov, head of the U.S.S.R. delegation. 

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE 

The US-USSR negotiations on limiting 
strategic arms continued from November 21, 
1972, to December 21, 1972, in Geneva. 

The US Delegation was headed by the 
Director of the US Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency, Gerard Smith. Members 
of the Delegation Philip J. Farley, Paul 
Nitze, Harold Brown, and Royal Allison 
participated in the negotiations. 

The USSR Delegation was headed by 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR, V.S. Semenov. Members of the Dele- 
gation K. A. Trusov, P. S. Pleshakov, A. N. 
Shchukin, and 0. A. Grinevsky participated 
in the negotiations. 

The Delegations were accompanied by ad- 
visors and experts. 

In accordance with the agreement reached 
in May, 1972 to continue active US-Soviet 
negotiations on the limitation of strategic 
offensive arms, the Delegations engaged in 
further consideration of the issues relating to 
achieving an agreement on more complete 
measures limiting strategic offensive arms. 

During the course of these preliminary 
discussions a wide range of questions relating 
to this subject was considered. The discus- 
sion was useful for both sides in preparing 
for further negotiations next year. An under- 
standing was reached on the general range 
of questions which will be the subject of 
further US-Soviet discussions. 

During the negotiations, a Memorandum 
of Understanding establishing a Standing 
Consultative Commission pursuant to Article 



XIII of the Treaty between the US and the 
USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems was agreed and signed. 

The two sides express their appreciation 
to the Government of Switzerland for creat- 
ing favorable conditions for holding the 
negotiations and for the hospitality which 
was extended to them. 

Agreement was reached that negotiations 
between the US Delegation and the USSR 
Delegation will be resumed on February 27, 
1973, in Geneva. 

December 21, 1972 
Geneva 

TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 

Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics Regarding the Establish- 
ment of a Standing Consultative Commission 

I. 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative 
Commission. 

II. 

The Standing- Consultative Commission shall pro- 
mote the objectives and implementation of the 
provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the 
USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement 
between the USA and the USSR on Certain Meas- 
ures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement 
on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of 
Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of 
September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its compe- 
tence in accordance with the provisions of Article 
XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim 
Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on 
Measures.' 

III. 

Each Government shall be represented on the 
Standing Consultative Commission by a Commis- 
sioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by 
such staff as it deems necessary. 

IV. 
The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold 



1 For texts, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, pp. 
918 and 920; and Oct. 18, 1971, p. 400. 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



I essiona on dates mutually agreed by the 
missioners l>ut no less tlmn two times per year. 
>.ns shall also be convened as soon as possible, 

following reasonable notice, at the request of i 

Commissioner. 

V. 

The Standing Consultative Commission shall 
establish and appro ilations governing pro- 

cedures and other relevant matters and may amend 
them as it deems appropriate. 

VI. 
The Standing Consultative Commission will meet 
in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places 
as may be agreed. 

I>"\k in Geneva, on December 21, 197J, in two 
copies, each in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic 

For the Government of the United States of 
America : 

Gkrard C. Smith 

For the Government of the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics: 

V. S. Semenov 



New Arrangements in the OECD 
for Monetary Cooperation 

Following is an announcement issued by 
tin Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development at Paris on December 22. 

Press release 315 dated December 22 

On January 1. 1973, the OECD countries 
will bring into force new arrangements for 
monetary cooperation between their govern- 
ments and central banks. 

Firstly, an agreement establishing an 
exchange guarantee on the working balances 
held by central banks in each others' national 
currencies has been concluded between the 
central banks of 18 OECD countries.' 



' The central hanks participating in this agree- 
ment are those of Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Although the 
Bank of England is a participant, the provisions of 
the agreement will not be applied as far as it is 
concerned until it is able to fix exchange rate 
margins for sterling. [Footnote in original.] 



Secondly, a new Committee for Monetary 
ami Foreign Exchange Matters has been 
created in the OECD in which all the OECD 
countries will be represented. These arrange- 
ments will replace the European Monetary 
Agreement which will terminate at the end 
of this year [1972]. 

The new Exchange Guarantee Agreement 
will provide a guarantee on the amounts held 
by a central bank on an account with another 
central bank in the latter's national cur- 
rency, which are used as working balances. 
The precise definition of these amounts and 
the detailed terms of the exchange guarantee 
have been agreed between the central banks, 
which will have responsibility for the opera- 
tion of this exchange guarantee. The multi- 
lateral decisions concerning the operation 
of the guarantee, which will require the 
unanimous agreement of all the participating 
central banks, will be taken in the new 
Committee for Monetary and Foreign 
Exchange Matters. Thus the guarantee will 
be operated in the framework of the OECD. 

The exchange guarantee will be estab- 
lished for an initial period of three years 
from January 1, 1973, to December 31, 1975. 
Its prolongation thereafter will depend on a 
further decision of the Council of the OECD 
and the participating central banks. The new 
Committee for Monetary and Foreign Ex- 
change Matters, apart from supervising the 
operation of the exchange guarantee, will 
provide a forum, open to the participation 
of all members of the OECD, in which 
problems of monetary cooperation, par- 
ticularly those relating to the operation of 
the exchange markets, can be examined. The 
Committee will also be responsible for pro- 
posing to the Council of the OECD any 
arrangements pertaining to the operation 
of the exchange markets which could be 
needed in the light of developments and. in 
particular, of the progress made towards 
reform of the international monetary system. 
It will also discuss with any member of the 
Organization any temporary financing prob- 
lems which that member may wish to raise 
and will consider ways of facilitating 
recourse by such a member to the interna- 



Jonuary 15, 1973 



61 



tional financial market or helping such a 
member in any other way. In addition to 
representatives of each OECD country, the 
Committee will include representatives of the 
Commission of the European Economic 
Community, the International Monetary 
Fund and the Bank for International Settle- 
ments. 

Termination of the European Monetary 
Agreement 

The new arrangements carry on — in a 
manner more adapted to present condi- 
tions—some of the features of the European 
Monetary Agreement (EMA). 2 

The EMA was signed by the OEEC 
[Organization for European Economic Co- 
operation] countries in 1955 and brought 
into force at the end of 1958. It was designed 
to provide a framework for monetary co- 
operation in Europe during the period of 
transition to full convertibility of currencies. 
It had three main features : 

(1) a forum for the examination of 
monetary and financial questions between 
experts of governments and central banks ; 

(2) an exchange guarantee on central 
banks' holdings of participating countries' 
currencies ; 

(3) a European Fund, out of which short- 
or medium-term credits could be granted 
to member countries to help them overcome 
temporary balance-of-payments difficulties. 
In view in particular of the extensive facil- 
ities for balance-of-payments assistance in 
the IMF [International Monetary Fund], it 
was decided that the OECD no longer needed 
a fund from which such assistance could be 
granted and that the new arrangements 
would not include any fund of this nature. 
It was decided, therefore, to liquidate the 
European Fund and terminate the EMA on 
December 31 next. 

The uncalled capital subscriptions of the 



- The contracting parties to the EMA are Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxem- 
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom. [Footnote in original.] 



EMA countries will be cancelled and the 
called-up amounts, which were paid in gold, 
totalling the equivalent of $41 million, will 
be returned to them in gold. (In addition the 
participants will receive $3.6 million in gold 
in respect of the balance of the remaining 
interest due to them.) The Fund's remaining 
gold assets, on termination, equivalent to 
$28 million, will be sold to the EMA coun- 
tries as part of the liquidation operations. 

The EMA participants have agreed that 
the part of the capital of the European Fund 
which had been transferred to it from the 
earlier European Payments Union and 
which, in fact, represented the United States' 
net contribution to the founding of the EPU, 
will be returned to the United States. In 
addition to this sum, amounting to $271.5 
million, the United States will receive $84 
million in respect of interest earned on this 
capital during the lifetime of the EMA. Thus 
it will receive a total amount of $355.5 
million, made up of the following compo- 
nents : 

—cancellation of a claim of $123.5 million 
on the U.S. Treasury ; 
— $118 million in cash; 

$114 million in the form of a 30-year 

credit to Turkey. 

The 30-year credit to Turkey, which is 
included in the assets to be returned to the 
United States, represents the consolidation 
of the credits previously granted to Turkey 
by the European Fund and still outstanding 
on December 31, 1972. These credits, which 
had maturities of up to five years, to be 
transformed from a single consolidated 
credit which is to be repaid in 50 equal semi- 
annual installments in the 25 years from 
1978 to 2002. 

The second and third main features of 
the EMA mentioned above are reflected in 
the new arrangements which will come into 
force on January 1, 1973— the agreement 
on an exchange guarantee between central 
banks on working balances in each others' 
national currencies and the new Committee 
for Monetary and Foreign Exchange Matters 
of the OECD. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers Pays Tribute 
to Deputy Secretary Irwin 

Statement by Secretary Rogers^ 

I take great pleasure in the announcement 
of President Nixon's decision to nominate 
Deputy Secretary Irwin as American 
Ambassador to Frame. He has served his 
country with great distinction in his present 
position, and I know lie will represent his 
country with equal distinction in Paris. 

Jack Irwin is no stranger to the problems 
and opportunities in U.S. -European rela- 
tions. He has throughout his service in 
Washington engaged in an active and in- 
creasingly intimate dialogue with the 
European Community, the OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], and our western European allies and 
friends at the highest level and on the most 
sensitive political and economic matters. The 
Department and I salute him for the success 
he has had in establishing close personal and 
institutional relationships with the other 
agencies of this government which play an 
important role in our foreign relations. 

Finally, I should like to pay particular 
tribute to Jack Irwin for his service as 
Chairman of the Board of the Foreign 
Service in the past several years. He and 
the Board have steered a delicate and 
thoughtful course through the problems of 
personnel reform and employee-management 
relations during a time of great change 
within the Foreign Service; to this process 



of constructive change he has made a dis- 
tinguished and thoughtful personal contribu- 
tion. 



Authorization of Funds for Defense 
Articles and Services for Spain 

Presidential Determination No. 73-7 1 
Presidential Determination — Spain 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, November 13, 1972. 

In accordance with the recommendation in your 
memorandum of August 7, I hereby: 

(a) Determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
that authorization of the use of up to $10 million 
of funds available in FY 1973 for the grant of 
defense articles and services, together with excess 
defense articles, to Spain without regard to the 
limitation of Section 620(m) of the Act is important 
to the Security of the United States; and 

(b) Authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of 
the Act, such use of up to $10 million of funds 
for the grant of defense articles and services, 
together with excess defense articles, to Spain with- 
out regard to the limitation of Section 620 (m) of 
the Act. 

You are requested on my behalf to report this 
determination to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives within thirty days. 




'Issued on Dec. 22 (press release 316). 



1 37 Fed. Reg. 24733. 



January 15, 1973 



63 



In this essay prepared to serve as an aid to discussion in 
the semiannual planning talks between the Department of 
State and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs held at 
Shimoda in June 1972, Mr. Armacost identifies some obsta- 
cles to accurate mutual perceptions between U.S. and Jap- 
anese societies and governments and makes recommenda- 
tions for improving communications. Mr. Armacost, at that 
time a member of the Planning and Coordination Staff of 
the Department, is now assigned to the Embassy at Tokyo 
as Planning and Academic Adviser to the Ambassador. The 
essay, which is printed, here with minor editorial revisions, 
was published in the January issue of the Japanese jour- 
nal Jiyu. 



U.S.-Japan Relations: Problems and Modalities of Communication 



by Michael H. Armacost 



There is perhaps no country in the world 
with which the United States has developed 
a more elaborate structure for communicat- 
ing and consulting with respect to bilateral 
relations than with Japan. More Japanese 
and Americans are being directly exposed to 
each other's societies than ever before. The 
magnitude of seaborne trade between our 
two countries is unprecedented in history. 
For two decades U.S. and Japanese security 
policies have been closely interdependent. 
We confront an increasing number of com- 
mon problems and experiences as we enter a 
postindustrial age. 

Nevertheless, recent experiences reveal 
significant gaps in the flow of information 
between our two countries. Our ability to 
comprehend each other's longer range pur- 
poses and policies has been far from perfect. 
Presidential and Prime Ministerial motives 
have been susceptible to misunderstanding 
and misconstruction. The mutual images held 
both by the leadership and by attentive pub- 
lics in our two countries have sometimes 
diverged quite sharply from reality. 

To be sure, recent strains in our relations 



go beyond simply problems of communica- 
tions. Adjusting bilateral relations to Ja- 
pan's emergence as a major global economic 
power and to the redefinition of the U.S. role 
in Asia ushered in by the Nixon doctrine was 
bound to be accompanied by frictions and 
misunderstandings. Barriers of language, 
cultural differences, and historical experience 
necessarily complicate these adjustments. 
But the situation is not unique. Comparable 
adjustments to structural changes in relative 
positions with other major allies, e.g., Brit- 
ain in the mid-1950's and France in the 
1960's, produced similar problems. 

The value of communication is not de- 
termined by the volume of information 
amassed, but rather by the extent to which 
developments in other societies are rendered 
comprehensible and the actions of other gov- 
ernments calculable. For the actions of an- 
other government to be relatively free of 
surprises, however, one must possess an 
adequate and up-to-date frame of reference. 
The fine details of governmental structure 
and process, of lines of influence and chan- 
nels of communication, of political stakes, 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



of the interplay of issues, of the "state of 
play" in another capital must be clearly and 
widely understood. 

Keeping these frames of reference up to 
date is an enormous task requiring prodi- 
gious effort at a variety of levels. No two so- 
cieties in the world are changing more 
rapidly than the United States and Japan. 
Perhaps no two governments in the world 
have more complicated internal arrangements 
I'm- sharing and exercising power. Few coun- 
tries extend more opportunities for the pub- 
lic, pressure groups, and the press to make 
their influence felt on foreign policy issues. 

The communications problem between the 
United States and Japan concerns more than 
a handful of officials. The Diet and Congress 
possess critical influence over a number of 
key issues in our bilateral relations. Then- 
actions will in turn be shaped by the atti- 
tudes of the political parties and the com- 
mentators of the press, magazines, and TV 
who set the tone of political debate. The 
"hothouse" environment in which for two 
decades American and Japanese leaders nur- 
tured the roots of cooperation has been 
shattered. Unless there is broader participa- 
tion in efforts to improve communications 
between the United States and Japan, our 
political and economic relations will continue 
to be plagued by misunderstandings which 
arise not so much from conflicting national 
interests as from flaws in our respective 
abilities to understand one another. 

This essay attempts to: (1) identify some 
of the obstacles to accurate mutual percep- 
tions between our societies and governments 
and (2) offer some proposals for improving 
communications through official and nonoffi- 
cial channels. 

Obstacles to Mutual Understanding 

Some of the obstacles to mutual under- 
standing are rooted in our limited under- 
standing of one another's societies. Some 
derive from peculiar Japanese and American 
styles of communication. Some are a func- 
tion of different types of bureaucratic and 
party politics in Tokyo and Washington. 



Public Images 

The "Attention Cap." Japanese newspa- 
pers tend to overreport news on the United 
States, amplifying — sometimes out of all 
proportion — the importance of events in 
America having even a marginal bearing on 
Japan. Japanese newspaper coverage of de- 
velopments in the United States generally 
appears to Americans excessively critical 
and negative. 

For Americans, on the other hand, Japa- 
nese developments are grossly underreported 
in the press. American reporting on Japan 
tends to be lower in volume and inferior in 
sophistication to reporting on European af- 
fairs. Reporting on Japan in the leading 
U.S. newspapers and weekly news magazines 
is frequently resourceful, balanced, and sym- 
pathetic. Other coverage tends to be spotty 
and much less analytical. Analysis in the 
press of political developments is hampered 
by the inexplicable practice of Japanese re- 
porters clubs of excluding foreign corre- 
spondents from attending official press 
conferences in many ministries. As one ca- 
pable American reporter has noted, "No- 
where outside the Communist world are 
foreign newsmen so completely denied access 
to news sources on the day when news is 
happening." 

Relatively few U.S. correspondents master 
the Japanese language and acquire a genuine 
intuitive feel for Japanese society and cul- 
ture. TV specials attempting to offer more 
in-depth coverage on Japan have been infre- 
quent in number and erratic in quality, often 
focusing on the exotic rather than the 
significant. The cumulative effect of such 
negligence encourages inattentiveness and 
perpetuates misconceptions and misleading 
stereotypes. 

The Underdeveloped State of Americanol- 
ogy and Japanese Sttidies. In Japanese 
academia, a generation of postwar American- 
ologists is barely reproducing itself. Survey 
courses in American civilization are still not 
offered to undergraduates at many impor- 
tant universities. American studies pro- 
grams, insofar as they exist, tend to be 



January 15, 1973 



65 



oriented to the writings of Walt Whitman 
rather than the works of David Riesman, 
Daniel Moynihan, John Kenneth Galbraith, 
and other students of contemporary Amer- 
ica. The split between Marxist and modern 
schools of economic thought leaves many 
university departments offering few courses 
which do justice to the complexities of the 
modern U.S. economy. American popular 
culture is transmitted throughout Japan by 
an extensive instantaneous communications 
net. But understanding of American institu- 
tions and the historical basis of American 
attitudes toward the world is often super- 
ficial in the media and the academic world. 
The situation in the United States is no 
less bleak. Japanese studies programs in the 
United States have registered some notable 
scholarly achievements. But they have been 
underfinanced and are in danger of atrophy 
due to lack of support. Their effect has been 
felt only narrowly in any event. Less than 
1 percent of American college youth receive 
even the most superficial exposure to a study 
of Japan. For every American university 
student learning Japanese, 10 are studying 
Russian and 100 are studying French. Ap- 
proximately $15 million a year is spent on 
Japanese studies in U.S. universities, 13 per- 
cent contributed by the U.S. Government. 
This figure is about 35 percent of what is 
going annually into Chinese studies pro- 
grams. Funds supplied by the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare and by 
the Ford Foundation for such studies have 
been declining. There are only about 150 
persons in the U.S. academic community to- 
day who could be considered genuine special- 
ists in Japanese affairs, and only about 20 
or so of these can lay claim to a sophisticated 
understanding of the Japanese economy. 
American political scientists specializing in 
Japanese affairs have been peculiarly fasci- 
nated with the role of the opposition parties. 
Not until recently have there been respect- 
able studies of the governing party of Japan, 
the relations between business and govern- 
ment, the role of factions in Japanese poli- 
tics, and the interconnections between 



domestic politics and Japanese foreign pol- 
icy. It is extremely rare for an American pol- 
itician to be able to speak or read Japanese ; 
nor have American businessmen, scientists, 
or artists invested much effort in mastering 
the Japanese language. 

Perspectives and Reflexes "Overtaken by 
Events" 

Many Japanese and American perceptions 
are rooted in experiences of the immediate 
postwar period. These images have not been 
adjusted swiftly enough to changes in our 
relative positions in the world. Defeat in war 
and foreign occupation has left its stamp on 
a generation of Japanese leaders. America's 
emergence on the world scene in a global role 
occurred at a time when its enemies were 
defeated and its allies were exhausted and 
heavily dependent on U.S. largess for rapid 
reconstruction. Neither U.S. nor Japanese 
leaders have consequently had to devote 
themselves persistently to the management 
of relations among equals. This has produced 
contradictory psychological reflexes that are 
difficult to shake. 

For many Japanese, an "unbalanced re- 
lationship" with the United States has pro- 
vided, as Hiroshi Kitamura has persuasively 
argued, 1 fertile ground for amae psychology; 
that is, "the tendency to depend and pre- 
sume upon another's benevolence." It has 
encouraged "awe" of the formidable U.S. 
"potential for both constructive and de- 
structive action." It has nurtured a fear and 
feeling in some quarters of having "been 
victimized." Occasionally it has promoted 
expectations of U.S. behavior which, if un- 
realized, give rise to disillusionment and 
even resentment. It has stimulated exagger- 
ated awareness of Japanese economic vul- 
nerability, fortifying a reluctance to apply 
reciprocity to our economic relations in a 
timely fashion. 2 



1 Kitamura, Psychological Dimensions of US- 
Japanese Relations (Harvard, 1971). [Author's cita- 
tion.] 

3 Rationalizations of restrictive trade and invest- 
ment regulations on the basis of Japan's low per 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



The unbalanced relationship has also left 
its imprint on Americans. In some it has 
produced a patronizing attitude toward Ja- 
pan. It has encouraged others to exped sub- 
missiveness and compliance from Japan, not 
least "ii political and security issues. At 
times it has contributed to confusion between 
the concepts of "informing" and "consult- 
ing." Consultations on political and security 
issues have taken place, moreover, within 
the framework of an alliance in which a 
substantial identity of basic interests was 
assumed. As principal architect and guar- 
antor of this alliance, the United States has 
asserted the larger voice in designing and 
articulating the strategy. With respect to 
sharing assessments of threats to. our respec- 
tive security interests. U.S. spokesmen have 
in the past occasionally talked too much and 
listened too little. 

Another facet of the shift in relative posi- 
tions has shaped the context for communi- 
cations as far as American perceptions are 
concerned. In recent years there has been a 
dramatic contrast between the extraordi- 
nary economic growth in Japan and the lag- 
ging growth rates, high unemployment, and 
spiraling inflation in the United States. This 
has led to widespread American expectations 
that Japan should willingly extend conces- 
sions to hard-pressed U.S. industries out of 
appreciation for American responsiveness to 
Japanese aspirations concerning Okinawa, 
in order to help alleviate U.S. balance of 
payments difficulties, or as compensation for 
long-maintained Japanese trade and invest- 
ment restrictions. Japan has, to be sure, 
made substantial progress in liberalizing its 
trade and investment policies. But it has done 
so piecemeal and in such a grudging man- 
ner as to vitiate any favorable impact it 
might have had on U.S. public opinion. Re- 
luctance to move in a timely way to elimi- 
nate the more informal barriers to trade 



capita income and allegedly fragile financial base 
appear incongruous to American businessmen who 
regard Japan's rapidly expanding export trad, as 
demonstrable proof of Japan's coi strength. 

[Author's footnote.] 



and investment has also contributed plausi- 
bility to the thesis widely held in some 
quarters in the United states that Japan's 
international economic position is primarily 
a result of "unfair" collusive relations be- 
tween business and government in "Japan, 
Inc." 

Contrasting Styles of Communication 

Our respective styles of communication 
have tended to compound misunderstand- 
ings. The U.S. culture places a high pre- 
mium upon candid and forceful explication 
of dissent, on hard bargaining, and on ad- 
versary procedures in law and government. 
We feel comfortable dealing with impersonal, 
contractual relationships. These cultural 
values result in a style of communication 
which may invite the suspicion that the 
United States is insensitive to Japanese 
problems, that it is oblivious to Japanese 
sensibilities, and that it is prepared to re- 
lentlessly press its own views and drive hard 
bargains on the basis of superior size and 
Japan's greater dependence on cooperative 
relations. 

Japanese values yield a higher place to 
tacit understandings, to nonverbal communi- 
cations, to haragei or "gut feelings." Words 
are less important than the intentions and 
feelings of the speaker, and the words 
spoken are inseparable from the specific cir- 
cumstances in which they were spoken. 

Japanese culture emphasizes traditionalist 
moral rather than pragmatic legal concepts. 
It encourages patterns of human relation- 
ships derived from the family or community 
rather than the courtroom, and it looks to 
vaguer harmony and consensus and coopera- 
tion based on mutual respect and trust. The 
homogeneity of the culture — a source of so- 
cial harmony at home — has posed peculiar 
obstacles to sharing thoughts and emotions 
with foreigners. In dealing with the United 
States, these traits can occasionally contrib- 
ute to imprecision in communication and to 
misunderstanding of motives. Real differ- 
ences of view may appear to be glossed over. 
The Japanese tendency to respect the senti- 



January 15, 1973 



67 



merits expressed by outsiders and the dispo- 
sition frequently to leave one's own opinion 
blurred may result in the illusory and mis- 
leading impression of acquiescence. It may 
also lead to neglect of significant opportuni- 
ties for clarifying deep misgivings. 

Asymmetries in Governmental Structure 

Significant misunderstandings among al- 
lies—as Richard Neustadt has amply 
documented in his book "Alliance Politics" — 
frequently result from failures of leaders 
in one government to pay sufficient attention 
to the perceptions, political stakes, and 
standard operating procedures of leaders in 
allied capitals. The consequence may be 
"muddled perceptions, stifled communica- 
tions, disappointed expectations, and para- 
noid reactions." When friends misread one 
another's intent, Neustadt suggests, they 
may become reticent with one another, then 
begin to surprise one another, and finally 
initiate retaliation in kind. 

Some misreading may have occurred with 
respect to the implicit link between what 
Americans felt was President Nixon's forth- 
coming attitude on Okinawan reversion in 
November 1969 and American hopes and 
expectations that Japanese leaders would 
reciprocate by alleviating import pressures 
on politically sensitive textile manufacturers 
in the United States. Whether the root of 
the difficulty was imprecise commitments, 
faulty translation, wishful thinking, or a 
misunderstanding over then-Prime Minister 
Sato's inability to deliver all that was antici- 
pated is beside the point, in a sense. It is 
sufficient to note that intentions appear to 
have been misjudged on both sides. 

Various features of our respective govern- 
mental arrangements may exacerbate this 
problem. It takes a considerable leap of imag- 
ination for political leaders in one country 
to place themselves in the shoes of foreign 
counterparts. This may be particularly true 
of Americans and Japanese, since we have 
had unique domestic experiences and have 
for much of our respective histories been 
shielded from foreign intrusion. Ministers 
and Cabinet members must define and de- 



fend their policy positions at home. Their 
understanding of their jobs and their inter- 
ests is shaped by years of learning on the 
home grounds. That is where they are booed 
and booted out or alternatively promoted or 
reelected. Intellectual conditioning as well as 
governmental gamemanship makes it ex- 
traordinarily difficult to transcend one's own 
frame of reference and to avoid assuming, 
by analogical reasoning, that the frame of 
reference of counterparts in Tokyo is com- 
parable to the political environment in 
Washington, and vice versa. It is not! 

Some notable differences in governmental 
processes may be accountable for blurring 
these frames of reference : 

Presidential Politics vs. Cabinet Politics. 
An American Cabinet is composed for the 
most part of political confidants of the Pres- 
ident. In Japanese political terms, they are 
all members of the "President's faction." 
They are selected for their administrative 
competence and loyalty and for the balanced 
representation they can bring to the White 
House circle of advisers. Some have had no 
experience in electoral politics; others have 
no aspirations for higher office. The Presi- 
dent can normally assume their fidelity to 
his purposes. 

In the parliamentary tradition, the Japa- 
nese Cabinet, consisting as it does of able and 
ambitious politicians belonging to a variety 
of factions, possesses a different character. 
It generally includes several leading major 
factional leaders positioning themselves for 
future succession to the Prime Ministership. 
Maneuvering among the factions is to a con- 
siderable extent shielded from the view of 
foreign observers. The subtleties of intra- 
Liberal Democratic Party politics must be 
kept constantly in mind by Americans if 
miscues are to be avoided. 

Fragmentation of Responsibility. The na- 
ture of bilateral communications on an issue 
varies depending upon whether it is defined 
as a technical or political question. The tech- 
nical considerations paramount in the minds 
of Japanese officials in the Ministry of In- 
ternational Trade and Industry and the Fi- 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



nance Ministry on the textile negotiations or 

the yen revaluation question were quite dif- 
ferent from those which aroused concerns 
in the United States. Similarly. U.S. officials 
Bpeaking in a technical context may on occa- 
sion express themselves on security issues 
which bear on our bilateral relations without 
sufficient attentiveness to the impact of what 
they say on the political environment. Con- 
fusion may thus reign as to which signals 
are authoritative when many different agen- 
cies or ministries have interests in particular 
matters. 

Multiple Voices and Audit tiers. The U.S. 
Government has been likened by one ob- 
server to a Tower of Babel. Certainly it is 
true that the separation of powers produces 
a dialogue on policy issues in Washington 
that may be difficult for outsiders to sort 
out. It is not always simple — sometimes not 
possible short of Presidential statements — 
to discern over the surface noise who speaks 
with authority on important matters and 
who is merely kibitzing or playing a good 
bureaucratic game with no "hole card." 
When these confusing noises are amplified — 
occasionally without a discriminating sense 
of proportion — by a Japanese press inclined 
by natural instinct to be critical of the United 
States, misleading impressions abound. Sim- 
ilar confusion is frequently created by dif- 
ferences between the tone and nuance of 
Japanese governmental responses to Diet 
interpellations on the one hand and official 
messages transmitted in diplomatic channels 
on the other. 

In both the United States and Japan, the 
political leadership recognizes that our se- 
curity and economic relationship is grounded 
on a wide range of parallel interests — an 
assumption that is not universally accepted 
by public opinion in each country. Conces- 
sions to the other country on security or 
economic issues run up against strong popu- 
lar attitudes, and most issues between us 
involve areas that pinch one domestic group 
or another. Political leaders naturally pre- 
fer to avoid domestic controversies wher- 
ever possible. In both countries, political 



benefits may be derived by shifting the onus 
for noncooperation onto the other in the 
domestic context. Once public emotions are 
aroused, however, the room for diplomatic 
maneuver may be narrowed. 

An additional element of complexity has 
been added by the dialogues we are each 
conducting with the Chinese and Russians. 
Signals conveyed in one context may be 
easily misconstrued when viewed from an- 
other angle. 

The Problem of Leaks. James Reston once 
described the U.S. Government as the "only 
vessel known to man which leaks from the 
top." It is one such vessel, but certainly not 
the only one. Leakage of communications 
and security material is a problem familiar 
to both the U.S. and Japanese Governments. 
Apprehension about premature public dis- 
closure was an overriding reason for keep- 
ing Dr. Kissinger's [Henry A. Kissinger, 
Assistant to the President for National Se- 
curity Affairs | July 1971 visit to Peking 
secret. The resulting secrecy of preparations, 
extending within the U.S. Government as 
well as to allied governments, partially ac- 
counted for the difficulties of providing 
signals regarding the timing and thrust of 
specific moves, although the general direc- 
tion of U.S. policy toward China had been 
established publicly in 1969. 

Lines of Accountability. The constitu- 
tional allocation of responsibility for U.S. 
foreign policy is marked by vagueness and 
encourages what one eminent constitutional 
historian has termed "a standing invitation 
to struggle" between the legislative and 
executive branches of government. These 
struggles have been especially intense over 
foreign policy issues which have a major 
impact on the domestic society or economy; 
e.g., trade and currency questions. 

The textile negotiations illustrate one pit- 
fall for our bilateral relations. The attempt 
of the Japanese textile industry to negotiate 
an understanding on exports to the United 
States directly with the chairman of the 
House of Representatives Ways and Means 
Committee was susceptible to serious mis- 



Jonuary 15, 1973 



69 



understanding, since any President was lia- 
ble to regard this as a challenge to his own 
constitutional prerogatives. 

On the other hand, executive flexibility 
on foreign policy should not be exaggerated. 
Many Japanese have looked with a measure 
of envy at the evident maneuverability Pres- 
ident Nixon has enjoyed during the past 
year on the China issue. Some appear mis- 
takenly to assume comparable Presidential 
freedom of action on other issues, such as 
trade, on which domestic constituencies, 
powerful lobbying groups, and congressional 
legislative prerogatives serve to seriously 
limit executive branch flexibility. The Presi- 
dent's trip to Peking required no enabling leg- 
islation nor any specific prior authorization 
or appropriation of funds. Public opinion 
was favorably disposed, and the initiative 
won bipartisan support in Congress. These 
unique conditions do not obtain with respect 
to Presidential freedom of action on bilat- 
eral U.S.-Japanese economic issues. 

The consensus nature of Japanese politics 
makes it extraordinarily difficult for the po- 
litical leadership to push through programs 
against determined political opposition. Even 
when the government enjoys a comfortable 
parliamentary majority, it may be disposed 
to compromise in order to avert a confron- 
tation, avoid charges of "ramming measures 
through the Diet," and head off obstruction- 
ist tactics by the opposition. To Americans, 
unfamiliar with the nuances of the Japa- 
nese political process, the Japanese Govern- 
ment's need to compromise under these 
circumstances may be questioned, or may 
even be considered dilatory negotiating 
tactics. 

One could elaborate additional elements of 
bureaucratic structure which encourage mis- 
understanding and pose obstacles to free and 
easy communications. The point is perhaps 
sufficiently clear. Given the dissimilarities in 
our respective styles of communication and 
patterns of government, a special and con- 
tinuing effort is required to assess the politi- 
cal and bureaucratic stakes of counterparts, 



to examine mutual perceptions critically, 
and to communicate intentions with clarity 
and precision. 

Recommendations for Improving Communications 

In my view, recent strains on U.S.- 
Japanese communication rest not so much 
with the modalities but rather with the con- 
tent of communications between us and the 
filters imposed by our differing cultures and 
political systems. We have constructed a 
generally adequate system of channels. In 
addition to the actively utilized normal dip- 
lomatic channels in Washington and Tokyo, 
these include regular Cabinet-level discus- 
sions of economic and social issues, State 
Department-Foreign Ministry planning talks, 
periodic meetings of the Security Consulta- 
tive Committee, a complex network of con- 
sultative links on scientific and technological 
issues, and biennial joint cultural confer- 
ences. Specific proposals for improving 
communications include the following: 

1. Regularized forums for government-to- 
government consultation have played a use- 
ful role in coordinating policies, identifying 
problem areas, and developing channels of 
communication between counterparts in our 
respective governments. As we adjust our 
respective policies in the period ahead, it is 
critically important that we deepen ex- 
changes on the questions of most fundamen- 
tal significance to our political relationship. 
These include long-term U.S. and Japanese 
policies in Asia, our respective approaches 
to China, bilateral economic problems, re- 
form of international monetary and trade 
arrangements, approaches to the ever- 
widening range of problems and opportuni- 
ties opened by science to be pursued by 
technology, long-range security arrange- 
ments in the Pacific, and indeed, common 
problems of peace and security on a global 
basis in an age when basic global problems 
confront both the United States and Japan. 
We must especially seek to find ways of 
heading off problems, particularly in the 
economic field, before they become domestic 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



political footballs in either or both countries. 

2. It is clearly important to stimulate 
Japanese studios in U.S. educational institu- 
tions and to encourage a more contemporary 

funis to American studies in Japan. The Ja- 
pan Foundation can provide an important 
moans of stimulating and underwriting 
broadly conceived Japanese studies programs 
in American universities; e.g., expanding 
scholarships to American students and pro- 
fessors, promoting language and area stud- 
ies, encouraging broadly based exchange 
programs in both directions (particularly 
involving young people). 

3. We need to promote a more balanced 
presentation by the Japanese press of devel- 
opments in the United States. Possible 
methods of approach might include annual 
informal sessions of the working Japanese 
and American press to discuss professional 
problems as well as current bilateral and 
multilateral issues of mutual interest. Orien- 
tation tours for newly arrived foreign corre- 
spondents might also prove helpful. 

4. We need more interpretative and com- 
prehensive media coverage of U.S. -Japanese 
relations by the U.S. press and television. 
The Japanese Government could facilitate 
more complete and balanced coverage of 
Japan if it concentrated additional attention 
on briefing and talking with U.S. correspond- 
ents in Japan who find themselves excluded 
from sources routinely available to their 
Japanese colleagues. More attention might 
also be paid to inviting major columnists to 
Japan at fairly regular intervals. The pro- 
motion of wide-circulation magazines on 
Japan in English should be given considera- 
tion, as should the development of more 
Japanese program material for broadcast on 
American TV. We need to end the lack of 
reciprocity between privileges accorded to 
Japanese reporters in Washington and Amer- 
ican reporters in Tokyo. 3 

5. The Advisory Council on Japan-U.S. 



'Prime Minister Tanaka's inclusion of foreign 
correspondents in his first formal press conference 
marks a hopeful step in this direction. [Author's 
footnote.] 



Economic Relations has made an excellent 
start in developing joint task forces to work 
on problems of mutual interest to the busi- 
ness community. Broader interpenetration 
of professional, labor, and management as- 
sociations should be encouraged. One means 
of promoting this would entail extending 
membership in trade and professional asso- 
ciations in both countries to Japanese and 
Americans. 

6. Parliamentary-congressional exchanges 
have been useful and could be expanded. A 
special effort is warranted in promoting ex- 
changes among promising young political 
leaders. Some effort might also be made to 
bring key congressional staff members to- 
gether with their Japanese counterparts, 
perhaps through frequent three- to six-day 
seminars or consultations conducted alter- 
nately in Japan and the United States, pos- 
sibly at some point like the East-West Center 
in Honolulu. 

7. As economic interdependence becomes 
even greater, it is essential that we develop 
more sophisticated mutual understanding of 
our respective economic systems. Exchange 
programs should focus particular attention 
upon those practitioners of "the dismal sci- 
ence" of economics in both countries whose 
writings reach a wide public audience. It is 
also desirable that senior U.S. and Japanese 
officials in the economic field make more fre- 
quent informal visits to Tokyo and Washing- 
ton, respectively. At present such visits take 
place so infrequently as to appear usually to 
the press, and sometimes to the Japanese 
and American bureaucracies, as evidence of 
confrontation or imminent crisis in our eco- 
nomic relations. More frequent visits would 
also permit the development of closer and 
more informal personal relationships among 
senior officials. 

The essential task before us is to deepen 
our special relationship. That relationship is 
grounded on a broad range of converging 
interests. Our ability to make essential ad- 
justments on specific issues will depend in 
turn upon maintaining and extending the 
host of informal and friendly associations 



January 15, 1973 



71 



which exist among officials in our respective 
governments, developing further mutual 
comprehension and trust among social and 
economic leadership groups in the United 
States and Japan, and improving reciprocal 
and direct access to each other's public opin- 
ion. Clearly there is much to be done. The 
problems of communication between us are 
legion. So, too, are the opportunities. 



Libya States New Requirement 
Concerning Foreign Passports 

Department Announcement 1 

The State Department has been informed 
by the Embassy of Libya that effective Jan- 
uary 1, 1973, the Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic will no longer recognize pass- 
ports of any foreign government unless, in 
addition to the official language of the specif- 
ic country, the pertinent information stated 
within the passports is written in Arabic. In- 
asmuch as American passports are issued in 
English, prospective U.S. travelers to Libya 
should be aware that they may experience 
delays in receiving Libyan visas or in travel- 
ing to Libya after January 1 and should 
check with the Department or U.S. consular 
offices abroad for the latest developments in 
this matter. 

The State Department and other govern- 
ments which have been similarly notified by 
the Libyan Government are in touch with the 
latter in the hope that a mutually satisfac- 
tory way will be found to resolve this matter. 



"Issued on Dec. 19 (press release 312). 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

Heroin: Can the Supply Be Stopped? Report by 
Senator William Spong to the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations. September 18, 1972. 33 pp. 

Section-By-Section Analysis of the Proposed Act 
Concerning Compensation for Oil Pollution Dam- 
age. H.R. 16669, to implement the international 
convention on civil liability for oil pollution dam- 
age and the international convention on the estab- 
lishment of an international fund for oil pollution 
damage. Prepared by the executive branch for the 
use of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
September 21, 1972. 12 pp. 

1974 International Exposition on Ecology and the 
Environment. Message from the President of the 
United States transmitting a proposal for partici- 
pation by the United States Government in the 
1974 International Exposition on Ecology and the 
Environment to be held at Spokane, Washington, 
pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 91-269. H. 
Doc. 92-358. September 25, 1972. 121 pp. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appro- 
priation Bill, 1973. Report to accompany H.R. 
16705. S. Rept. 92-1231. September 27, 1972. 107 
pp. 

Restraints on Travel to Hostile Areas. Report, to- 
gether with a dissenting view, to accompany H.R. 
16742. H. Rept. 92-1461. September 28, 1972. 12 
pp. 

For the Benefit of All Mankind— The Practical Re- 
turns From Space Investment. Report of the 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics. 
H. Rept. 92-1452. October 1972. 88 pp. 

Aircraft Sabotage Convention. Report to accompany 
Ex. T, 92d Cong., second sess. S. Ex. Rept. 92-34. 
October 2, 1972. 27 pp. 

Protocol to Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention. 
Report to accompany Ex. C, 92d Cong., first sess. 
S. Ex. Rept. 92-35. October 2, 1972. 6 pp. 

Amendments to the Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1960. Report to accompany Execu- 
tive O, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 92-36. October 2, 1972. 
8 pp. 

Agreement With Brazil Concerning Shrimp. Report 
to accompany Ex. P, 92d Cong., second sess. S. 
Ex. Rept. 92-37. October 2, 1972. 10 pp. 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Discusses Progress and Problems in Arms Control 



Following is a statement by U.S. Repre- 
si ntative Georgt Bush made in the First 
■ "<■ (Political and Security) of the 
T..V. General Assembly on October 23, to- 
gether loith the text of a resolution adopted 
a! As.<, nihhi on November 29. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BUSH 

USUN press release 124 dated October 23 

The First Committee is beginning today 
its consideration of disarmament problems, 
which make up one of the most important 
items on the committee's agenda. We take up 
these problems conscious of the fact that 
achievements in the area of arms control, 
particularly the two recently concluded stra- 
tegic arms limitations agreements, have had 
a beneficial effect both in terms of beginning 
to curb the competition in nuclear arma- 
ments and of contributing to improvements 
in the international political atmosphere. 

As President Nixon said in his foreign 
policy report to the Congress earlier this 
year: ' 

The limitation of armaments is an essential 
element in the larger political process of building a 
more stable international system. By contributing to 
international stability and restraint, arms control 
ments can provide a greater measure of 
security than could be achieved by relying solely on 
military power. A mutual willingness to curb arms 
competition indicates constructive intentions in 
political as well as strategic areas. Progress in con- 
trolling arms can reinforce progress in a much 
wider area of international relations. 

The United Nations, bearing the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of world 



'The complete text of the report appears in the 
Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled 
"Arms Control" begins on p 



peace and security, appropriately devotes a 
substantial part of its annual meeting to the 
general area of arms control and disarma- 
ment. This measure of concern clearly recog- 
nizes the interrelationship between arms 
control and international security. 

The entry into force of the SALT [Stra- 
tegic Arms Limitation Talks] accords on Oc- 
tober 3 marks a major achievement in arms 
control. For the first time, agreement has 
been reached to limit strategic nuclear arms. 

This is an accomplishment we have sought 
since the very beginning of the nuclear age. 
It follows a number of other important suc- 
cesses in arms control during the past dec- 
ade, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
the Outer Space Treaty, the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 
and the Biological Weapons Convention, as 
well as the earlier SALT agreements on 
measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of 
nuclear war and to modernize the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. direct communications link. 

The ABM [anti-ballistic missile] Treaty 
and the interim agreement limiting strategic 
offensive nuclear arms represent a significant 
step in lessening the burden of nuclear weap- 
ons on mankind. They testify to the good 
faith of the two largest nuclear powers in 
working to meet their pledge under article VI 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and they 
serve the cause of the very first principle of 
the United Nations Charter — "to maintain 
international peace and security." 

The SALT accords are intended to pro- 
mote stability, arrest the arms race, and 
stimulate further measures to limit nuclear 
arms. They are designed to benefit all na- 
tions by establishing conditions for a more 
peaceful world in which resources can be 



January 15, 1973 



73 



redirected from means of destruction to 
ways of improving the life and well-being- of 
all peoples. 

Under these agreements the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. have significantly limited 
themselves. Each party undertakes not to 
deploy ABM systems for a defense of the 
territory of its country and not to provide 
a base for such a defense. In the ABM 
Treaty, the parties have pledged not to de- 
ploy more than 200 ABM launchers and mis- 
siles. In the interim agreement, the parties 
have frozen the level of offensive strategic 
missile launchers at the number operational 
and under construction. A number of impor- 
tant qualitative restraints are also specified. 
For example, the parties have accepted limi- 
tations on development and testing. They 
have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy 
ABM systems or components which are sea- 
based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land- 
based ; ABM launchers for launching more 
than one interceptor missile at a time ; auto- 
matic or semiautomatic or other similar sys- 
tems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; 
and multiple independently guided warheads 
for ABM missiles. They have also decided 
not to deploy new ABM systems based on 
other physical principles, such as those 
which employ laser beams, for example, 
without discussion and agreement on their 
limitation. The parties have also sought to 
limit the size and potential destructive power 
of offensive strategic missiles by agreeing 
not to substitute heavy missiles for light 
ones and not to increase significantly the 
dimensions of land-based ICBM [interconti- 
nental ballistic missile] silo launchers. 

The SALT agreements do not, of course, 
end the threat of nuclear war, but they have 
begun a great historical process which can 
ultimately lead to that goal. When the SALT 
talks resume in Geneva on November 21, we 
are resolved to make further progress by 
seeking more complete limitations on nu- 
clear armaments. We believe that reason and 
purpose on both sides will continue to be the 
key to success, and we are confident that so- 
ber, persistent, and realistic efforts will lead 



to positive results. We will return to the 
negotiations in that spirit, endeavoring to 
reach further agreements which will merit 
the confidence of all who seek a more stable 
and a more secure world. 

The undoubted successes in the area of bi- 
lateral arms control have been accompanied 
by important work in the Geneva forum for 
negotiating multilateral arms control. 

In accordance with Resolution 2827 
(XXVI), adopted by the General Assembly 
last year, the CCD [Conference of the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament] continued and in- 
tensified its high-priority deliberations on 
seeking effective prohibitions of chemical 
weapons. The work of the Committee during 
the past year dealt with a very wide spec- 
trum of issues related to this important 
problem. A variety of approaches was thor- 
oughly examined and analyzed. Considerable 
progress has been made in identifying the 
various areas of concern. Consideration has 
been given to the troublesome problems of 
verification and compliance. All of this ac- 
tivity, I believe, has contributed to the sig- 
nificant degree of progress that has been 
made toward our goal and has provided a 
basis for the Committee's work when it 
meets again next year. 

I would like to reaffirm at this point my 
government's commitment to the undertak- 
ing contained in article IX of the Biologi- 
cal Weapons Convention to negotiate in 
good faith for agreement on effective chemi- 
cal weapons prohibitions. My government's 
approach to achieving these prohibitions 
rests on the fundamental view that in this 
intensely complex matter of chemical weap- 
ons restraints, reliance on one or more rough- 
and-ready abstract principles is not adequate. 
What is needed is thorough and objective 
study of the materials to be placed under 
control as well as analysis of the problems 
and opportunities offered by various ap- 
proaches. Existing problems need to be faced 
squarely and solved on the basis of mutual 
accommodation. We must recognize, for ex- 
ample, that any workable prohibitions would 
apply to some complex substances that are 






74 



Department of State Bulletin 






very closely related to large-scale production 

of materials for peaceful purposes. The 

chemical industry is, as we all know, one of 
the largest, most enterprising, and most in- 
novative industries. Recognition of these 
factors lias resulted in the focusing of at- 
tention and discussion mi defining what we 
are trying to prohibit or control and the re- 
lated problems of verification. 

Last spring the United States presented to 
the ("CD a comprehensive work program to 
assist in the negotiation of practical and 
workable chemical weapons prohibitions. 
We are gratified that this program helped 
provide a framework for some of the discus- 
sions, working papers, and technical meet- 
ings during the past year at CCD. 

At the start of the CCD's summer session, 
the United States submitted five working 
papers designed to fit into this framework 
and to further the general work of the Com- 
mittee as well as the more specialized consid- 
erations of the chemical experts who met in 
Geneva shortly after the session began. The 
five working papers dealt with (1) defini- 
tions of chemical agents, (2) storage of 
chemical weapons and agents, (3) destruc- 
tion of agents, (4) statistics on U.S. trade 
and the production of key chemical sub- 
stances, and (5) U.S. legislation on hazard- 
ous chemical substances. These papers in one 
way or another all concerned themselves with 
the central problems of scope and verification 
of chemical weapons prohibitions, the rela- 
tionship between these two factors, as well 
as with the associated problems of environ- 
mental safety. They discussed, for example, 
the crucial issue of which criteria might be 
considered relevant in establishing the scope 
of an agreement. They represented an ear- 
nest effort to lay the basis for establishing 
clear and broadly acceptable standards that 
could be uniformly applied by all parties to 
an agreement. It is precisely such basic 
practical considerations that in our view- 
must necessarily precede efforts to decide on 
treaty solutions. 



'For text, see Biu.ktin of June 5, 1972, p. 795. 



1 believe that the work of the CCD during 

the past year has significantly broadened and 
deepened the understanding of the important 
issues that are involved. The U.S. delegation 
has profited greatly from the valuable con- 
tributions made by delegations of other 
countries to our common and growing fund 
of essential knowledge. The technical papers 
and the more broadly conceived analyses and 
proposals submitted by a large number of 
delegations have clearly contributed to the 
common search for effective chemical weap- 
ons prohibitions. We expect to be responding 
on the issues and the proposals at the forth- 
coming session of the CCD. 

We are hopeful that the General Assembly 
will again, as last year, provide encourage- 
ment and stimulus to the Committee to con- 
tinue in the general course it has set and, of 
particular importance, to consider all the 
various approaches to this problem. 

Turning now to another vital element of 
the Committee's work, I would like to com- 
ment briefly on the issue of a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban. The CCD this year had be- 
fore it a number of interesting proposals for 
solving the variety of problems that still 
confront us. My government will continue to 
give these proposals serious consideration, 
recognizing that the General Assembly has 
attached great urgency to the achievement 
of a comprehensive test ban. 

In a statement on August 24, the U.S. Rep- 
resentative at the CCD reaffirmed the sup- 
port of the United States for an adequately 
verified comprehensive test ban and pre- 
sented our position on several of the key as- 
pects of this issue. At the same time, the 
United States presented a detailed working 
paper which reviewed some of the current 
progress and problems in seismic verifica- 
tion. As we have often stated before, an ade- 
quate degree of compliance with an agree- 
ment by all parties to it must necessarily be 
assured if an agreement is to contribute to 
the basic objectives of greater security for 
all. 

The progress that has been made in seis- 
mology has been heartening, and we are 



January 15, 1973 



75 






proud of the contribution made by the U.S. 
scientists in this regard. Very-long-period 
seismic stations as well as some new large 
arrays have made it possible to improve 
the capability for detecting and identify- 
ing seismic events. Nevertheless, as our 
working paper showed, .mportant prob- 
lems remain. There are still, for ex- 
ample, a significant number of mixed 
events, including some fairly large-sized 
ones, in which the signals from smaller 
seismic events become hidden in those of 
larger earthquakes occurring at roughly the 
same time. These events create obvious dif- 
ficulties in achieving an adequate degree of 
verification by national means alone. These 
difficulties are real and they are significant. 

More work will need to be done on solving 
these problems as well as the continuing 
problem of possible treaty evasion through 
clandestine testing. The United States con- 
tinues to devote substantial resources to ef- 
forts to solve these problems, both by utiliz- 
ing its own means and by cooperating with 
other countries. 

As Ambassador [Joseph] Martin made 
clear in speaking on this subject to the CCD 
on September 7 of this year : 

A comprehensive test ban is not an impossible 
goal, difficult though it is. However, the technical, 
military, and political questions involved must be 
faced. We, for our part, are making the utmost 
effort to understand these questions and to propose 
what we believe are the necessary solutions in order 
to achieve an adequately verified comprehensive test 
ban. 

The United States fully recognizes that 
in order to achieve a safer, saner world it is 
important not only to write new arms con- 
trol agreements but it is equally important 
to gain the broadest possible participation in 
the existing agreements. During the past 
year, we have made some noteworthy prog- 
ress in this respect. 

After the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction was com- 
mended by the General Assembly last year, 



the treaty was opened for signature in Wash- 
ington, Moscow, and London on April 10, 
1972. Almost 100 countries have already sig- 
nified their intention to become parties to 
this landmark disarmament treaty. President 
Nixon has sent the treaty to the U.S. Senate 
for its advice and consent to ratification, and 
we hope the treaty can be brought into force 
during the course of the coming year. 

The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Em- 
placement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed 
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
Thereof came into force on May 18, 1972, 
and has now been ratified by 37 countries. 
The number of countries participating in the 
Nonproliferation Treaty continued to grow 
during the past year, and we are hopeful that 
this trend will continue. I would like to take 
this opportunity to reiterate that my govern- 
ment continues to give full support to the ob- 
jectives of the Nonproliferation Treaty. We 
consider this treaty to be one of the key 
disarmament agreements which deserve the 
broadest possible international participation. 

On the related matter of safeguards, 
many states have negotiated appropriate safe- 
guards agreements with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the NPT. 
Of particular importance, the Agency has 
recently completed safeguards negotiations 
with EURATOM [European Atomic Energy 
Community]. This will, hopefully, lead to 
early ratification of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty by the governments concerned. For 
its part, the United States has initiated talks 
with the IAEA for a safeguards agreement, 
pursuant to our unilateral offer to place U.S. 
nuclear activities, other than those of direct 
national security significance, under Agency 
safeguards at an appropriate time. 

We all recognize that the complex area 
of arms control affects the national security 
of each country in the world. In no area is 
this more true than it is with the conven- 
tional weapons that each country needs to 
defend itself against possible external ag- 
gression and for the maintenance of internal 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



security. Nevertheless, we must recognize 
that the expenditure of large sums of money 
on these arms can compete with the r< - 
sources available for economic and social 
development in both developed and develop- 
ing countries. Substantia] increases in con- 
ventional arms can also disturb existing 
military balances. 

Conventional anus must therefore be con- 
sidered along with the weapons of mass 
destruction if we are to move toward a 
structure of peace and security. It is our 
belief that the CCD should begin explora- 
tions in depth of this admittedly complex 
problem. 

During the past year my government has 
given considerable thought to the questions 
raised by General Assembly Resolution 2833 
(XXVI) with respect to a World Disarma- 
ment Conference. In the response to the 
Secretary General's request we have made 
known our position in very considerable 
detail. Permit me to outline briefly the na- 
ture of our views on a YVDC. 

The United States already supports and 
participates in different forums that we be- 
lieve are making concrete progress in the 
area of arms limitations. We stand ready to 
provide assistance to and play our part in 
any discussions which appear likely to con- 
tribute to this end. For us, the sole measure 
of the value of disarmament mechanisms is 
their likelihood of contributing to the goal 
that we all share. 

We do not believe, however, that a World 
Disarmament Conference could in fact con- 
tribute at this time to the achievement of 
concrete arms control agreements The his- 
tory of arms control efforts to date shows 
that there is no substitute for careful, patient 
negotiations. A large unwieldy conference 
w>>uld not provide the sort of atmosphere 
conducive to real progress; it could, indeed, 
be harmful t" institutions that have already 
i a record of proven accomplishments and that 
onducting on-going negotiations. So far 
as tii" establishing of broad objectives is 
erned, we believe that this committee, 
the 1 mmittee of the General Assem- 



bly, where all nuclear powers are present, is 
performing this task and it need not be 
duplicated by another forum. 

As we pointed out in our letter to the 
Secretary General, the United States at- 
taches importance to the maintenance of an 
"effective, expert and experienced body of 
limited size" to negotiate concerning arms 
control and disarmament.' It is, of course, 
desirable that such a body be broadly rep- 
resentative and include the major military 
and economic powers. The United States has 
repeatedly made clear in this connection that 
we would welcome the participation of all 
nuclear-weapon states in arms control and 
disarmament efforts in a manner satisfactory 
to those states and in a manner reflecting the 
interests and concerns of non-nuclear- 
weapon states. 

For the many reasons we have indicated 
in our letter, we believe that the General As- 
sembly should not now attempt to convene 
a World Disarmament Conference, to set a 
specific date for a conference, or to set up 
machinery for preparing for a conference. 
However, we believe it would not be inap- 
propriate for the General Assembly, if a 
consensus of its members wishes to do so, 
to note in a resolution that a WDC could 
play a role in the disarmament process at 
any appropriate time. 

The First Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly has important responsi- 
bilities in the field of disarmament. It is pri- 
marily in this committee that nations have 
the opportunity to express their views on 
the entire range of disarmament issues. It is 
here in the First Committee that the world 
community can best work out priorities in 
the disarmament field, develop a consensus 
as to which measures are now ripe for nego- 
>n in other forums, and express its con- 
cern or its satisfaction with the progress 
made in an area of unsurpassed importance 
to all countries and to all mankind. 

The views expressed in the debates of the 
i • Committee are important in stimulat- 



I \". doc. A B817 annex I. p. 75. 



January 15, 1973 



77 



ing disarmament work. The committee plays 
an indispensable role in the continuing 
search for effective measures of arms con- 
trol. No forward step in the field of arms 
control can be achieved unless it accords 
with the realities of world affairs. What 
better judge of those realities, and of both 
the problems and the opportunities they pro- 
vide, can there be than the nations of the 
world assembled here in this building? 

I have earlier noted a number of agree- 
ments which have been reached in recent 
years. In each case agreement was possible 
because the international climate was favor- 
able. There was a general perception of both 
a need and an opportunity. More than that, 
each agreement was built upon the persever- 
ance, hard work, and above all, patience of 
all involved. None would have been reached 
without the help of many nations, including 
those which did not participate directly in 
the negotiating process. 

Some 25 countries from different regions 
of the world now take part in the work of 
the Geneva Disarmament Committee. Over 
the years, they have acquired considerable 
expert knowledge about a wide range of 
disarmament issues. They do not have any 
monopoly, however, on either expert knowl- 
edge or ability to put forward fruitful ideas. 
I need only recall the oustanding role played 
by Dr. [Arvid] Pardo, then the Permanent 
Representative of Malta, in initiating the 
work which led to the Seabed Arms Control 
Treaty. And this year the Government of 
Finland presented a useful, detailed working 
paper on the subject of chemical weapons to 
the CCD. I know I can speak for all CCD 
members in welcoming such contributions 
from all U.N. member states, whether these 
contributions are made here or in Geneva. 

In our view, the years ahead are full of 
promise. We are all conscious of our respon- 
sibility to insure that the improvement we 
are witnessing in the world political situa- 
tion is translated into concrete achievements 
in the disarmament field. We believe that 
it will prove possible to identify areas where 
additional progress can be made, taking ad- 



vantage of the gradual relaxing of tensions 
now observable. The First Committee, I am 
certain, will continue to act as a spur to 
progress, as a force in overcoming inertia. 
Progress will not be easy — the same per- 
severance, hard work, and patience which 
were required will continue to be needed in 
the future — but that progress must and can 
be achieved. 

My government welcomes this annual op- 
portunity to review our objectives with the 
members of the committee. The U.S. delega- 
tion benefits greatly from this unexcelled op- 
portunity to exchange views with other 
delegations, not only in the speeches and the 
debates in the committee but in the corri- 
dors as well. Not only the goal of disarma- 
ment but the process of accomplishing it 
belongs to all nations, and this committee is 
at the very center of that process. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 4 

The General Assembly, 

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 
December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 
1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2827 A 
(XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 

Expressing its determination to act with a view 
to achieving effective progress towards general and 
complete disarmament, including the prohibition 
and elimination of all types of weapons of mass 
destruction such as those using chemical or bacte- 
riological (biological) agents, 

Noting that the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on Their Destruction has been opened for signatui'e 
and has already been signed by a large number of 
States, 

Convinced that the Convention is a first possible 
step towards the achievement of early agreement 
on the effective prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and 
on the elimination of such weapons from military 
arsenals of all States, and determined to continue 
negotiations to this end, 

Recalling the provisions of article IX of that 
Convention, 

Recalling that the General Assembly has repeac- 



1 U.N. doc. A/RES/2933 (XXVII) ; adopted by the 
Assembly on Nov. 29 by a vote of 113 (U.S.) to 0, 
with 2 abstentions. 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



edly condemned all actions contrary to the principles 
and o of the Protocol for the Prohibition 

of the Use in War of 'ting, Poisonou 

Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, signed at Geneva on IT June 1925, 

iffirming the need for the strut observance 
!>y all States of the principles and objectives of that 
col. 

Having considered the report of the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament, 3 

Noting that a work programme, a draft conven- 
tion on the prohibition of the development, produc- 
tion and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on 
their destruction, and other working papers, pro- 
posals and suggestions were submitted to the Con- 
ference of the Committee on Disarmament, 

Conscious of the benefits to mankind that would 
result from the prohibition of the development, pro- 
duction and stockpiling of chemical weapons, 

D< firing to create a favourable atmosphere for a 
successful outcome of these negotiations, 

1. Reaffirms the recognized objective of effective 
prohibition of chemical weapons; 

2. R( '• rates, to this end. the request made by the 
General Assembly to the Conference of the Commit- 
tee on Disarmament, in resolution 2827 A (XXVI), 
to continue negotiations, as a matter of high pri- 
ority, with a view to reaching early agreement on 
effective measures for the prohibition of the de- 
velopment, production and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons and for their destruction; 

Stresses the importance of working towards 
the complete realization of the objective of effective 
prohibition of chemical weapons as set forth in the 
present resolution and urges Governments to work 
to that end; 

4. Reaffirms its hope for the widest possible adher- 
ence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacte- 
riological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction; 

5. Invites all States that have not yet done so to 
accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 
June 1025 and/or ratify this Protocol, and calls 
anew for the strict observance by all States of the 
principles and objectives contained therein; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to 
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 
all documents of the First Committee relating to 
questions connected with the problem of chemical 
weapons and chemical methods of warfare; 

7. Requests the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament to report on the results of its nego- 
tiations to the General Assembly at its twenty- 
eighth session. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



V doc. A/8818-DC/235. [Footnote in orig- 
inal.) 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency of October 
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, December 22, 1972. 

Aviation 

Convention for the unification of certain rules re- 
lating to international transportation by air. Done 
at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force 
February 13, 1933; for the United States October 
29, 1934. 49 Stat. :SO00. 

Accession deposited: Iraq, June 28, 1972 (with a 
declaration). 

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 

Adherence deposited: Bangladesh, December 22, 
1972. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal September 23, 1971. 
Ratifications deposited: Hungary (with a reserva- 
tion), Republic of China, December 27, 1972. 
Enters into force: January 2fi, 1973. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological 
(biological I and toxin weapons and on their 
destruction. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow April 10, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Hungary, December 27, 
1972. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Enters into force 12 months from the date of 
deposit of the 10th instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval, or accession. 
Signatures: Canada, Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Switzerland, Turkey (with reservations), 
United Kingdom, United States. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and pre- 
venting the illicit import, export and transfer of 



Not in force. 



January 15, 1973 



79 



ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris 

November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 

1972.-" 

Ratification deposited: Niger, October 16, 1972. 

Cultural Relations 

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at 
London November 16, 1945. Entered into force 
November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 

Signatures: Bangladesh, October 27, 1972; Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, November 24, 1972. 
Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, October 27, 
1972; German Democratic Republic, November 
24, 1972. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 
1972. Enters into force nine months from the 
date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratifica- 
tion, acceptance, approval, or accession. 
Signatures: Canada, Switzerland, Turkey (with 
reservations), United Kingdom, United States. 

Hydrography 

Convention on the International Hydrographic 
Organization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 
3, 1967. Entered into force September 22, 1970. 
TIAS 6933. 

Ratification deposited: Philippines, September 21, 
1972. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution 
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with 
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, 
and Washington December 29, 1972. Enters into 
force on the 30th day following the date of 
deposit of the 15th instrument of ratification or 
accession. 

Signatures: Chad, Republic of China, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, 3 Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nor- 
way, Panama, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom," 
United States, December 29, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, December 22, 
1972; Belgium, December 27, 1972. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972.= 

Ratification deposited: Hungary, December 27, 
1972. 



Trade 

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states. 
Done at New York July 8, 1965. Entered into 
force June 9, 1967; for the United States Novem- 
ber 28, 1968. TIAS 6592. 

Ratification deposited: Chile (with a reservation), 
October 25, 1972. 

Wheat 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for 
signature at Washington March 29 through May 
3, 1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with 
respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with 
respect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Ratification to the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Netherlands, December 28, 1972. 1 
Ratification to the Food Aid Convention de- 
posited: Netherlands, December 28, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to trade in cereals, with annex. 
Effected by exchange of notes at London July 1, 
1971. Entered into force July 1, 1971. TIAS 7165. 
Terminated: December 29, 1972. 



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Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
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80 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX fannary 15, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1751 



Congi> ressional Documents Relating to 
reign Policy 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 
Rog Tribute to Deput,\ Secretary 
Irwin (statement) 

Disarmament 

Standing Consultative Comm nder 
SALT Agreements Established (SALT joint 
communique, memorandum of understand- 
ing) 

U.S. Discusses Progress and Problems in Arms 

irol (Rush, text of resolution) .... 7:: 

Economic Affair-;. Now Arrangements in the 
OECI> for Monetary Cooperation .... 61 

Environment. U.N. General Assembly Estab- 
lishes Machinery for International Environ- 
mental Cooperation ( McGee. texts of resolu- 
tions) 53 

Foreign Aid. Authorization of Funds for 
Defense Articles and Services for Spain 
(Presidential determination) 63 

France. Secretary Rogers Pays Tribute to 
retary Irwin (statement) . . 



63 



International Organizations and Conferences. 

v Arrangements in the OECD for 
Monetary Cooperation 61 

Japan. I'. S. -Japan Relations: Problems and 
Modalities of Communication (Armacost) . 64 

Libya. Libya States New Requirement Concern- 
ing Foreign Passports (Department an- 
nouncement) 



\i~-ports. Libya States New Requirement Con- 
cerning Foreign Passports (Department 
announcement) 

residential Documents. Authorization of 
Funds for Defense Articles and Services 
for Spain (Presidential determination) . . 

jhlications. Recent Releases 

Spain. Authorization of Funds for Defense 
' cles and Services for Spain (Presi- 
dential determination) 



72 

72 

63 
80 

63 



reaty Information 

jrrent Actions 79 

Standing Consultative Commission Under 
SALT Agreements Established (SALT joint 
communique, memorandum of understand- 
ing) 60 



I'.S.S.U. Standing Consult 
Under SALT Agreements 
(SALT joint communique, memorandun 

understanding) 

United Nations 

tary Rogers Lauds Nomination of Mr. 
Scali as U.N. Represental 
U.N. General Assemblj Establishes Machinery 

for International Environmental ' 
tion (Mc< ilutions) .... 

U.S. Discusses Progress and Problems in Arms 
Control ( Rush, text of resolution) .... 

Name Index 

Armacost, Michael H 64 

Rush, George 73 

McGee, Gale W 53 

Nixon, President 63 

Rogers, Secretary 59, 63 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 25 which 
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
Ill of December 18, 312 of December 19, and 
and 316 of December 22. 



No. 

t318 
319 

t320 

t:«i 
t822 



Datt 

12/26 



12/27 



12/29 



12/29 
12 29 



Subject 

Rogers: death of former 
President Harry S. Tru- 
man. 

Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs to meet at 
New York Jan. 5. 

Signing of the Convention on 

Prevention of Marine 

Pollution by Dumping of 

Wastes and Other Matter. 

Draft legislation on immuni- 
ties of foreign states. 

Rogers: death of former 
Canadian Prime Minister 
Lester B. Pearson. 



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A?™*- 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXVIII • No. 1752 • January 22, 1973 



VOTES AGAINST U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 

LLLING for study of terrorism 

U.S. Statements and Text of Resolution 81 

RAN DUMPING CONVENTION SIGNED AT WASHINGTON 
D> fit and Remarks by I 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1752 
January 22, 1973 



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The Department of State BULLET 
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I 



U.S. Votes Against U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
Calling for Study of Terrorism 



Following arc statements made in Commit- 
tee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General Assembly 
on November IS and December 8 and 11 by 
U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., 
and a statement made in plenary on Decem- 
ber 18 by U.S. Representative George Bush, 
together with the text of a resolution adopted 
by the Assembly on December 18. 

AMBASSADOR BENNETT, COMMITTEE VI 
Statement of November 13 

[JSUM press release 134 dated November 13 

The problem before us is immediate. The 
problem is urgent. Life — the life of the in- 
nocent bystander — has been made cheap. 
Violence grows apace. To the shame of us all, 
violence has come in these times almost to 
assume the character of a spectator sport. 

As the Legal Committee undertakes its 
consideration of international terrorism, it 
las the opportunity before it to take effective 
action to strengthen our common heritage 
of human rights against the arrogant de- 
mands and brutal depredations of violence. 

This international violence knows no geo- 
graphic parameters. Nor is it confined to any 
one political cause. Secretary Rogers, in his 
address before the General Assembly on last 
September 25, ' had occasion to recall that 
the United Nations in the Declaration of 
Human Rights has affirmed the right of every 
human being to life, liberty, and security of 
person. He went on to cite a series of recent 
offenses against that individual security: 



1 For Secretary Rogers' statement on Sept. 25 and 
texts of the U.S. draft convention and draft resolu- 
tion on terrorism, see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1972, p. 
425. 



— In Sweden, 90 people boarding an inter- 
national flight made hostage and held for 
ransom by Croatian terrorists. 

— In New York, shots fired into an apart- 
ment of the Soviet Mission where children 
were playing. 

— In Czechoslovakia, a Czechoslovak pilot 
killed as his plane was hijacked and diverted 
to West Germany. 

— In Munich, 11 Olympic athletes kidnaped 
and murdered in a daylong spectacle of 
horror witnessed on television throughout 
the world. 

— In Cyprus, 95 persons of many nation- 
alities narrowly saved from death on a 
Venezuelan plane when a bomb was dis- 
covered just in time. 

Those traveling on a SWISSAIR plane on 
an international flight in Europe on February 
21, 1970, were not so fortunate. Following 
an act of air sabotage, the Swiss plane 
crashed and all passengers and crewmem- 
bers were killed. Am I too dramatic in sug- 
gesting that the SWISSAIR flight was one 
on which any one of us in this room, or 
members of our families, might have been 
traveling? 

During the seven weeks or more that we 
have been meeting in this committee, inci- 
dents have multiplied in number and in 
scope. Like an unchecked forest fire, the roar 
of violence is ever louder and it consumes 
its victims quite haphazardly and indiscrim- 
inately. A few examples reported in recent 
weeks — and this is far from an all-inclusive 
list: 

— An Arab diplomat murdered in Rome. 

— A postal employee in New York injured 
by a letter-bomb mailed from Malaysia. 



January 22, 1973 



81 



— A plane hijacked from Mexico to Cuba. 

— A plane hijacked from Turkey to 
Bulgaria. 

— An attempted hijacking of a plane from 
Japan to Cuba. 

— A postman, a secretary, and an office boy 
injured in Beirut by exploding parcel -bombs. 

— Three persons injured in Libya by a 
parcel-bomb mailed from Belgrade. 

— An airport security man injured in Cairo 
by a letter-bomb. 

— Recent reports of letter-bombs posted 
into international mail channels from Am- 
sterdam and New Delhi, from Belgrade and 
Singapore, from Bombay and Malaysia to 
a worldwide list of addressees in countries 
including Canada, Austria, Argentina, United 
Kingdom, Australia, Egypt, Brazil, Cam- 
bodia, Italy, West Germany, Jordan, and 
others. 

These examples serve to illustrate the 
trend toward expanding the locus of vio- 
lence and internationalizing this form of 
conflict. The threat crosses all geographic 
and ideological lines. It affects all nations 
and all peoples. Does it really matter to the 
innocent bystander, the victim, whence de- 
rived the attack or for what motivation, 
noble or ignoble? We are all of us, without 
exception, caught up in this deadly spiral of 
violence. 

As Secretary Rogers, who represented the 
United States in this committee at an earlier 
General Assembly, said in September: 

The issue is not war — war between states, civil 
war, or revolutionary war. The issue is not the 
strivings of people to achieve self-determination and 
independence. 

Rather, it is whether millions of air travelers 
can continue to fly in safety each year. It is whether 
a person who receives a letter can open it without 
the fear of being- blown up. It is whether diplomats 
can safely carry out their duties. It is whether 
international meetings — like the Olympic games, like 
this Assembly — can proceed without the ever-present 
threat of violence. 

In short, the issue is whether the vulnerable lines 
of international communication — the airways and 
the mails, diplomatic discourse and international 
meetings — can continue, without disruption, to bring 
nations and peoples together. All who have a stake 



in this have a stake in decisive action to suppress 
these demented acts of terrorism. 

This is not an issue which should divide 
us here, for we all depend increasingly on 
means of international transportation and 
communication in this interdependent world. 

To those who have expressed fears that 
action on international terrorism will ad- 
versely affect the right of self-determination, 
let me say that as a country which itself 
emerged from colonial status the United 
States knows firsthand the strivings of peo- 
ples for self-determination. Our adherence 
to this goal did not end when we achieved 
our own independence. We are proud to 
have contributed to the Declaration of Prin- 
ciples of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations Among States, which em- 
bodies for the first time in a declaration 
adopted by consensus the right of self-deter- 
mination.- We would not be a party to any 
action which would adversely affect that 
right as set forth in that Declaration of 
Friendly Relations. 

The issue before us, rather, is the need to 
make reasonable distinctions protecting 
rights while prohibiting the epidemic spread 
of violent attacks which threaten the very 
fabric of international order and the most 
fundamental of human rights. The United 
Nations system, both in the General Assem- 
bly and through the International Civil Avia- 
tion Organization (ICAO), has taken im- 
portant steps to deal with threats or attacks 
against international civil aviation. They 
have been taken by General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions and by multi- 
lateral conventions. They have recognized 
that such attacks threaten the lives of large 
numbers of innocent persons and, indeed, the 
very fabric of world society by undermining 
our common reliance on international trans- 
portation and communication. Because of 
general agreement that such acts are too 
serious to be tolerated, these steps have con- 
sequently been taken without regard for the 
motive behind the attack. These measures 



2 For text of the declaration, see Bulletin of Nov. 
16, 1970, p. 627. 



82 



Department of State Bulletin 



can be importantly strengthened by adhering 
to and implementing General Assembly Res- 
olutions 2551 (XXIV) and 2645 (XXV) 
and by implementing the Tokyo, Hague, and 
Montreal Conventions. They can be strength- 
ened by working within ICAO for the prompt 
completion of a convention enabling the in- 
ternational community to cooperate in assert- 
ing its will on certain agreed principles in 
an orderly manner against anyone who seeks 
to stand against that will. 

The United Nations has also recognized 
the unacceptability of threats or attacks 
against diplomats or other internationally 
protected persons. The work on this aspect 
of the broader problem will be completed 
when the Assembly at its 28th session carries 
the work of the International Law Commis- 
sion on the protection of diplomats and 
officials of foreign governments and interna- 
tional organizations to conclusion by produc- 
ing a convention and opening it for signature. 

It is the view of the United States that we 
must now begin to address ourselves to the 
equally urgent problems resulting from the 
growing trend of private groups to export 
their conflicts abroad to countries not party 
to a particular conflict. The United Nations 
must leave no doubt as to the disapproval 
of the international community with respect 
to the unwarranted and unnecessary loss of 
innocent lives from the acts of international 
terrorism and the determination of the com- 
munity to take preventive action. 

Action by individual states and the co- 
operation of states must be sought. Further- 
more, we believe the United Nations should 
commence work on a convention. The urgent 
convocation of a plenipotentiary conference 
to work out the provisions of a convention 
would be the most expeditious way to 
proceed. 

The United States has tabled in this com- 
mittee a draft of a Convention for the Pre- 
vention and Punishment of Certain Acts of 
International Terrorism. 

We do not suggest that the tabled draft 



* For texts of the resolutions, see BULLETIN of 
Jan. 19, 1970, p. 70, and Jan. 4, 1971, p. 32. 



represents the final or only answer to the 
problem. It is one approach to the problem, 
an approach which we believe meets the 
most serious threats of violence while at the 
same time remaining sensitive to the aspira- 
tions of peoples seeking to emerge from 
colonial status. We also believe in the utility 
of approaching the matter in terms of the 
acts involved. The draft convention conse- 
quently does not seek to define terrorism or 
to deal with all acts which might be called 
terrorism. Rather, it is a narrowly drawn 
convention which focuses on the common in- 
terest of all nations in preventing the spread 
of violence from areas involved in civil or 
international conflict or internal disturbances 
to countries not initially parties to the vio- 
lence. The containment of violence within the 
narrowest feasible territorial limits has been 
a traditional function of international law 
in cases where it has been difficult to elimi- 
nate violence completely. 

The convention is drafted so as to deal 
only with the most serious criminal threats : 
acts involving unlawful killing, serious 
bodily harm, or kidnaping. The mechanism 
employed to limit the convention's scope to 
those cases in which we believe there should 
be an international consensus for joint ac- 
tion is to require that each of four separate 
conditions must be met before its terms 
apply: 

— First, the act must be committed or take 
effect outside the territory of a state of which 
the alleged offender is a national. The prob- 
lem of maintaining civil order within a given 
country is of course primarily a domestic 
matter. Assume, for example, that a national 
of one state kidnaps in that state another 
national of the same state in an attempt to 
obtain the release of imprisoned persons. 
That act would be a crime under the state's 
criminal law and is not covered by the con- 
vention. One speaker suggested the purpose 
of this condition is to avoid restrictions on 
governments. I suggest that attention to the 
Declaration of Human Rights and existing 
Geneva Conventions as well as an examina- 
tion of the other side of the coin of this 



January 22, 1973 



83 



limitation might allay some of those concerns. 
— Second, the act must be committed or 
take effect outside the territory of the state 
against which the act is directed ; that is, the 
convention is not aimed at conflicts taking 
place within a particular state and directed 
against that state even if nonnationals are 
involved. Though the involvement of non- 
nationals in civil strife is an important prob- 
lem, it is a problem dealt with many times 
by the General Assembly, most recently in 
the unanimously adopted Declaration on 
Friendly Relations Among States. One excep- 
tion permitted under the convention to this 
second requirement is that acts committed or 
taking effect within the territory of the 
state against which the act is directed would 
be covered if the act is knowingly directed 
against a nonnational of that state — an 
armed attack in the passenger lounge of an 
international airport, for instance. Such acts 
knowingly endangering foreign nationals 
have the same potential to involve other 
states as directly expanding the violence to 
their territory. 

— Third, the act must not be committed 
either by or against a member of the armed 
forces of a state in the course of military 
hostilities. The draft convention is aimed 
at the largely unregulated activities of ir- 
regular groups or individuals. It does not 
seek to replace existing or emerging regimes 
of human rights in armed conflict such as 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the projected 
protocol for noninternational conflicts. More- 
over, this third requirement also limits cov- 
erage to attacks against innocent persons. 

— Fourth, the act must be intended to 
damage the interests of or obtain concessions 
from a state or an international organiza- 
tion. It is acts of international violence with 
which we are here concerned, and not ordi- 
nary crimes dealt with by national criminal 
codes. 

Let me emphasize that all four of these 
conditions must be met for the convention 
to apply. And to repeat, the convention 
deals only with the most serious threats : acts 
involving unlawful killing, serious bodily 



harm, or kidnaping. 

Despite its precisely limited focus, the con- 
vention would cover most of the recent acts 
of international terrorism which have been 
evidencing the dangerous trend toward ex- 
pansion of violence to states not parties to 
a particular conflict. 

The draft is consistent with the Friendly 
Relations Declaration and does not speak to 
acts taken in response to the use of force 
to deny rights articulated in the declaration. 
It should also be noted that the draft con- 
vention by its terms would yield to other 
more specialized conventions covering attacks 
against diplomats or civil aviation where 
applicable. For example, the recent hijacking 
in Sweden would be governed by the 1970 
Hague Convention on Hijacking if there were 
a conflict in any respect between the Hague 
Convention and the draft convention. We 
have sought to concentrate as an urgent first 
step on those categories of international 
terrorism which present the greatest current 
global threat and which, ironically, have re- 
ceived the least attention. 

By not seeking at this time to cover all 
types of international violence, we of course 
do not imply that all acts not covered are 
permissible. Many other kinds of terrorist 
acts, particularly the involvement of states 
in assisting terrorist groups or the use of 
force to deny the right of self-determination, 
are already prohibited under international 
law. They will remain illegal, wholly apart 
from this new convention. The draft conven- 
tion's specific affirmation of the obligation of 
all states under the charter and other relevant 
conventions merely makes express what 
would otherwise be implicit. 

Once the critical threshold of coverage is 
reached, the draft convention establishes sub- 
stantially the same regime for dealing with 
offenses as the Hague Hijacking and Mon- 
treal Sabotage Conventions; that is, states 
parties to the convention would be required 
to establish severe penalties for covered acts 
and either to prosecute or extradite offenders 
found in their territory. There would be no 
requirement to return a person to a place in 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



which there is reason to believe he may be 
subjected to unfair treatment. The choice of 
extradition or prosecution is in the hands of 
the state in whose territory the alleged of- 
fender is found. The fundamental principle 
of non-refoulment is in no way impaired. 

The preamble of the United Nations Char- 
ter expresses a determination not only to 
prevent violence but "to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obli- 
gations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be main- 
tained." It would be strange indeed if the 
drafters of the charter had not expressed 
this need. The United States recognizes the 
logic and necessity of studying the underlying 
causes which lead men and nations to resort 
to desperate acts of violence. In the final 
analysis, the best means of bringing inter- 
national terrorism to an end would be to 
resolve all international conflicts peacefully 
and equitably and to eliminate poverty and 
other social ills. Members of the United Na- 
tions must intensify their efforts to deal with 
the political and economic factors which 
create a sense of desperation — and perhaps 
with the psychological ones as well. This is 
surely a task for the entire United Nations 
system, and thus it is properly found in the 
preamble of the charter. 

Progress in the identification and elimina- 
tion of causes will, however, come slowly, 
and we cannot refuse to do anything simply 
because we cannot do everything. For that 
matter, it may well be impossible entirely to 
eliminate the threat of international terror- 
ism, but this is no excuse for inaction. To 
take the position that nothing can be done 
on measures until the study of causes has 
been completed is to say that no treatment 
can be given the cancer patient until we 
know all the causes of cancer. Is there one 
among us here who, when faced with a 
diagnosis of malignancy in a member of his 
family, would say to the attending physician : 
"No, I am not ready for you to undertake 
treatment; we can only consider treatment 
after I have determined the cause of the 
cancer"? Similarly, we do nol hesitate in our 



domestic law to prohibit murder even though 
we have not eliminated all sources of injus- 
tice or identified all the causes which lead 
men to commit violent acts. 

Let me offer a parallel which I believe 
well illustrates the philosophy of the United 
States toward dealing with the problem of 
international violence. In 1937 a committee 
of the Council of the League of Nations 
drafted a general Convention for the Pre- 
vention and Punishment of Terrorism. Un- 
like the draft convention we have tabled, it 
sought to define "acts of terrorism," and it 
sought to do so in the broadest of terms. It 
did not differentiate between civil and inter- 
national conflict or between such conflicts 
and their spread to third countries. It in- 
cluded a visionary provision on gun control. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the League con- 
vention was ratified by only two states and 
never came into force. 

In contrast, we have sought here to limit 
coverage to the most serious international 
threats and to work toward a convention 
which can and should be adopted. In this 
respect, the new draft convention parallels 
earlier efforts aimed at the protection of civil 
aviation and diplomats. In each case we have 
sought to isolate a critical threat common to 
the international community as a whole — a 
threat we can all agree on, whatever our 
ideology or alignment — and to seek agree- 
ment on a narrowly drawn convention to 
deal with the problem. 

A convention along the lines of our draft 
will not, by itself, make the world safe from 
international violence, but a failure by this 
Assembly to achieve practical moves in that 
direction could only encourage increased re- 
sort to anarchy, violence, and terror. 

At the beginning of my remarks I asserted 
that this committee has before it the oppor- 
tunity to take effective action against the 
serious and urgent problems deriving from 
the export of violence to innocent persons. 
Outraged and aroused by the increasing toll 
of innocent victims and the widening assault 
on the vital communication and transporta- 
tion links which make modern life possible, 



January 22, 1973 



85 



world opinion is today in ferment over the 
best means for combating the growing an- 
archy. International action will be taken, one 
way or the other. 

If some governments are now more ready 
to act than others, there is talk of like- 
minded states agreeing among themselves on 
controls and sanctions with respect to trans- 
port and other facilities under their juris- 
dictions. Private groups such as airline 
pilot associations and labor organizations 
speak of acting in their own self-defense. 
There have already been some moves along 
these lines. Recent news dispatches on two 
successive days carried threats by British 
and Egyptian labor groups, respectively, to 
impose sanctions on their own responsibility. 
Such actions by groups of states rather than 
by the whole international community, or by 
private organizations, would be less than 
complete in their application and far from 
fully effective in their results. They might, 
in fact, do more harm than good to the 
delicately interwoven and interdependent 
structure of modern communication and 
transportation. Such activities would at the 
least detract from the long efforts to build 
an orderly structure of international law and 
should be of first concern to members of this 
committee. 

How much more desirable for the United 
Nations to assume its proper role of leader- 
ship in matters of such multilateral — such 
worldwide — importance. The task of deal- 
ing with the effects of international violence 
on innocent persons is preeminently a role 
for the United Nations. 

Much concern is being expressed nowadays 
in these halls and elsewhere that the United 
Nations is being bypassed on great issues 
of the day, that all too often the organiza- 
tion is not called on to contribute in attempts 
to find solutions to central world problems 
and conflicts. In one of the most remarked 
and admired statements of the recent general 
debate, the distinguished Minister for For- 
eign Affairs of Singapore spoke to this pre- 
occupation. He found both large and small 
powers guilty of practices which contribute 



to the decline of the world body. He spoke 
of the "style and temper of many United Na- 
tions resolutions." "Instead," he said, "of 
addressing ourselves to finding practical so- 
lutions to difficult and complex problems we 
give ourselves over to polemics and rhetoric." 
If these trends, indulged in by both the large 
and the small, continue, he asserted, "then 
the United Nations could become a meaning- 
less and irrelevant organization — no more 
than an international social club for weari- 
some rhetoric." 

On the issue before us we have undeniably 
one of those core problems — of sufficient 
urgency to the international community that 
in the general debate the representatives of 
no less than 92 sovereign states included a 
discussion of it in their statements before 
this world body. Here is an issue on which 
the credibility of international law itself is 
at stake. 

My delegation believes the draft resolution 
we have tabled in support of the Secretary 
General's initiative provides a framework 
for responding to the urgent problem of in- 
ternational violence. We have suggested in 
our draft resolution a procedure we believe 
effective for carrying our vital work further. 
We hope the committee will give it careful 
consideration and take decisions for prompt 
and effective action, including the expeditious 
preparation of a convention. 

It will not be easy to find an agreed resolu- 
tion. The subject is an emotional one, with 
a wide range of opinions on both of the cen- 
tral aspects of the agenda item before us. 
Let us have a full and wide discussion of both 
aspects, and let us follow the wise advice 
of our chairman to avoid polemics. Let us 
at the end be able to look back on this discus- 
sion in the Legal Committee as a time when 
the United Nations reaffirmed to doubters in 
various parts of the world that it was able 
to deal effectively and fairly with a demand- 
ing problem which threatens all peoples 
everywhere. Let it not be able to be said that 
the United Nations in its love of rhetoric lost 
sight of simple humanity and the basic right 
of the individual to security of his person. 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



Statement of December 8 

I'Sl'N press release 158 dated December 8 

We have liail a lengthy and wide-ranging 
debate on the subject of international terror- 
ism—in fact, so wide-ranging that at times 
I was not sure I was in the Sixth Commit- 
tee. We wandered far afield in our discussions 
of events, policies, weaponry, items, etcetera, 
that had either already been inscribed or 
were under discussion on the agenda of other 
committees, indeed, some already disposed 
of by other committees. The Middle East de- 
bate, for instance, has been going on in the 
great hall of this house, which is certainly 
the appropriate place for a debate of that 
importance. Some rather extraordinary state- 
ments were made about my country from 
time to time, but that's nothing new. Perhaps 
each speaker reveals something of himself — 
sometimes unwittingly — reveals something of 
his government's approach to this and other 
world issues. Each, of course, is the master 
of his own rhetoric. 

For its part, the United States has not 
come here to indulge in polemics, and it will 
not do so. The United States has no intention 
of engaging in a competition of invective. 
We deplore it from whatever source it comes. 
What we in the United States are here for, 
and have steadfastly tried to do, is to take 
part in a serious consideration of a world- 
. wide problem, the problem of the spread of 
violence by individuals or groups engaged in 
missions of international terrorism, the 
spread of that violence to innocent victims 
in third countries or in areas removed from 
the scene of the conflict. It is the killing or 
the maiming of those who have no relation 
whatsoever to a specific conflict, whatever 
that conflict, whatever the issue. That is our 
purpose here. It is that simple and that 
fundamental. It is not an issue confined to 
any one area or any one conflict. 

I should like in that connection simply to 
review one aspect of international terrorism 
— the problem of aerial hijacking. A very in- 
teresting map was published in the November 
18 edition of the London Economist, called 
the "Hijack Map— 1972." The article pointed 



out that as of the 15th of November, there 
had been 32 successful hijackings out of 63 
attempts this year — 32 out of 63 as com- 
pared with 26 successful hijackings out of 
61 attempts in 1971. The 1972 figures, I re- 
peat, go only to November 15. 

The map shows where each attempt and 
each hijack occurred, and these attempts oc- 
curred around the globe: in North America, 
Central America, the Caribbean, South 
America, eastern Europe, northern Europe, 
southern Europe, western Europe, north 
Africa, west Africa, southern Africa, and in 
Asia, in the Middle East, in the great sub- 
continent, in Southeast Asia, in Australia, 
and in islands in the Pacific. Until this morn- 
ing's news, east Africa was the only major 
region of the world where there had been no 
hijack attempt made this year. This morn- 
ing's distressing news should cause us to 
ponder. Seven more people killed, seven 
wounded, and the plane with a great hole in 
its side so that it barely limped back to its 
port — that surely shows the dimensions of 
the problem. 

The serious letter-bombing campaigns 
since September have taken place, as we 
know, in every part of the world, on every 
continent, and have engaged innocent vic- 
tims of many nationalities. 

I repeat, the cancer still spreads. Yet there 
are those who would tell us : Let us not have 
any treatment, we must find out the cause 
before we wish to submit ourselves to 
treatment. 

I would like to take a moment and repeat 
once more for the committee a statement 
made by Secretary Rogers in his general 
debate statement here at the United Nations 
on this question of international terrorism. 
Secretary Rogers said : 

The issue is not war — war between states, civil 
war, or revolutionary war. The issue is not the 
strivings of people to achieve self-determination and 
independence. 

Rather, it is whether millions of air travelers can 

continue to fly in safety each year. It is whether a 

on who receives a letter can open it without 

the fear of being blown up. It is whether diplomats 

can safely carry out their duties. It is whether 



January 22, 1973 



87 



international meetings — like the Olympic games, like 
this Assembly — can proceed without the ever-present 
threat of violence. 

I submit that this is not an issue which 
should divide us. It is a human problem, not 
a political problem. We should have a com- 
mon interest in the transportation and com- 
munication facilities which are so vulnerable 
and which bind this increasingly interde- 
pendent world together. I would also repeat 
again, as I have said many times before, 
that in the resolution which the United 
States has proposed and in the actions that 
we would favor, we have not and we would 
not be a party to any action which adversely 
affected the right of self-determination. 

In the resolution which the United States 
introduced in September, we proposed spe- 
cific but restricted steps. Our draft resolution 
expresses concern at the increasing fre- 
quency of serious acts of international ter- 
rorism. We deplore the tragic, unwarranted, 
and unnecessary loss of innocent human 
lives, and we go on to other preambular 
paragraphs. In the operative portion of the 
resolution, we call on states to become parties 
to and implement several international avia- 
tion conventions; and we request the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization to pur- 
sue as a matter of urgency the drafting of a 
further convention. In another operative par- 
agraph, we call on all states to become 
parties to a convention on the prevention 
and punishment of crimes against diplomatic 
agents and other internationally protected 
persons. And then in our resolution we ask 
the Assembly to decide to convene a pleni- 
potentiary conference to consider the adop- 
tion of a convention to meet this problem of 
individual, of innocent, victims of interna- 
tional violence. 

It is a simple resolution devoted to specific 
purposes. The draft convention which my 
government has tabled was drafted so as to 
deal only with the most serious criminal 
threats: acts involving unlawful killing, se- 
rious bodily harm, or kidnaping — an effort 
to take one more step in the erection of a 
viable structure of international law for the 



protection of all of us. 

However, despite numerous pledges of sup- 
port — delegates who have come to us and 
said they preferred our draft to the other 
two before the house — others have regarded 
our position as an extreme position. It is 
apparent that our suggestion of a plenipoten- 
tiary conference early in 1973 has struck 
many members of this body as too early to 
allow adequate preparation. I accept that 
judgment. 

Having spoken a bit of my own resolution 
and acknowledging that it is considered by 
some to be extreme, I would now speak a bit 
to the resolution at the other end of the table, 
that proposed by Algeria and others. I would 
say that if my resolution is at one extreme, 
then the Algerian resolution is the other ex- 
treme. If some felt that the U.S. draft was 
deficient and gave insufficient attention to the 
causes of international terrorism, then one 
must in all candor conclude after reading it 
that the Algerian draft deals almost exclu- 
sively with causes. One searches in vain 
throughout the operative paragraphs of that 
resolution for the word "measures," for any 
hint of action to meet this threat. The reso- 
lution establishes a committee, but it adopts 
no time limit for its work. I can easily see 
that sort of committee spending an entire 
year discussing its terms of reference, be- 
cause there are no terms of reference. 

In short, it seems to me that that resolu- 
tion is far more extreme than mine. In es- 
sence, if it were adopted here, we would have 
a prescription for talk and we would have to 
say to the outside world when we are asked 
what did the Sixth Committee accomplish, 
we would say, well, we have talked all fall 
about this issue, we have now agreed to talk 
all during the next year about it, and we are 
going to consider the subject, too, and we 
will then come back to New York next fall 
for the 28th Assembly, and we will talk about 
the subject again then. 

I submit that the United Nations must do 
better than that. Now, I know that we law- 
yers are wont to beguile ourselves with ob- 
fuscations, with learned syllogisms, and now 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



and then with a bit of sophistry. Wo all enjoy 
that. Through such moans wo may deceive 
ourselves that we are taking action here. But 
I don't think we would deceive the public. 
The reason that this is such a public issue 
is that the issue of violence against innocent 
victims, victims far removed from the scene 
of the conflict of the day, is a worldwide 
issue. There are other issues before this com- 
mittee and before this Assembly which have 
extreme emotional content in them, but they 
are issues which deal primarily with one or 
another region, even though they may have 
much wider connotations than that region. 
They may lie very intractable issues which 
will take a long time — issues with which this 
body is constantly concerned and with which 
it will continue to be concerned — to try to 
work out some means to meet these regional 
problems. 

But the export of violence to individual 
victims can happen anywhere at any time. 
That is why I think it has such a hold on 
the public imagination — because it can affect 
any man, woman, or child. 

Now, there have been many efforts to 
bridge the gap between these two extreme 
positions, the U.S. extreme and the Algerian 
extreme. I have participated in some rather 
lengthy meetings myself, one of five hours 
yesterday, and I have become convinced that, 
regrettably, the issues of principle that di- 
vide us are very deep here. The issue is be- 
tween those like the United States, who think 
that while .studying the problem, while giv- 
ing further research to this disease, that we 
should also have some treatment, we should 
have some therapy to go along with the 
study, with the research. 

The difference is with those who wish to 
give their full time to the study and who do 
not wish to move toward any effective inter- 
national action. I have come to the regret- 
table conclusion that it is not possible to 
bridge that gap. For five hours we met last 
evening, and we talked about it in every way. 
I think there was a sincere effort to find an 
agreement. We asked direct questions, and 
we asked indirect questions, and we made 



statements, but we could not get the Algerian 
Representative and his colleagues to accept 
one single word of language which had to do 
with international legal measures. 

Now, this is an international legal commit- 
tee, but those words "international legal 
measures" were simply not acceptable to the 
other side. They are rather weak words to 
my extreme point of view — since I think we 
should move toward a convention — and to 
those here who think we need a convention, 
but we couldn't get even that much. 

Now, our Algerian friends are quite forth- 
right in their position. I appreciate their 
honesty and I admire them as a people, but 
we do have a difference here. And it is not 
just between the two of us. This involves 
all of us who believe that this is an issue of 
such urgency as to require some action as 
compared with those who do not. 

Now, there has been an effort for a middle 
ground. There is a middle-ground resolution 
before the house. That is the resolution in- 
troduced by Italy, with other cosponsors. A 
great deal of effort has been put into that, 
and those middle-ground cosponsors were 
present at these lengthy meetings which have 
been held. I would suggest that as we con- 
sider this further and go forward in consid- 
eration of these resolutions, that both of us 
in the extreme positions might look toward 
the center. 

I am quite ready to cede my position, cede 
my priority to the middle-ground resolution, 
and I would urge that course on the other 
extreme so that we can look at the middle 
and see where we can find agreement, so that 
at the end of this long debate the United Na- 
tions, the Sixth Committee, can take action 
which shows that it can face up to the clear 
challenge before us and to begin some mean- 
ingful action to cope with this scourge which 
affects us all. 

Statement of December 1 1 

USUN press release 163 dated December 13 

In explaining the U.S. vote, there is of 
course no necessity to discuss our draft reso- 
lution, since I have already ceded priority 



January 22, 1973 



89 



over that resolution to resolution 879, which 
is being sponsored by Italy and other powers. 

Regrettably, my delegation would find it 
necessary to vote against resolution 880 as 
sponsored by Algeria and other powers. It 
seems to us that this resolution is defective 
in that it has made a political problem out 
of what to my delegation is essentially a 
human problem, a problem involving the 
right of every individual to the security of 
his person as promised him under the Dec- 
laration of Human Rights. 

In resolution 880 regional concerns have 
been given priority over what to my dele- 
gation should be our common concern, our 
world concern, for the protection of the in- 
dividual everywhere. 

Now, regional problems — and I refer par- 
ticularly to the southern African problem — 
are very serious problems. That particular 
problem in its several aspects is a most in- 
tractable one, as we all know. It requires 
and it receives, and it deserves to receive, 
the constant attention of various commit- 
tees of the General Assembly, of the Security 
Council, and of all the constituent bodies of 
our organization. One does not need to over- 
emphasize the difficulty of achieving the 
objectives that we all share as we seek solu- 
tions for those great human problems. 

But I have no doubt that in company with 
the force of nature and the passage of time, 
we are going to find the solutions. The cur- 
rent of history is very plainly moving. And 
the current of history is like a mighty 
stream. Man can try to control its flow, can 
try to hasten and try to help it along, but 
the current is greater than man himself. And 
so I have every satisfaction in the confidence 
that the southern African problem is going 
to have a solution, and we are all going to 
keep on working until we have it. 

But if we put all of our human problems 
into one package and say that we must work 
on all of them at once, then I fear we are 
not going to get much progress on any one 
of them. With respect to the specific acts of 
international terrorism that we have dis- 
cussed in this committee, we ought to be 



able to seek measures to prevent those acts 
while we are working on other problems. 

The result, in the opinion of my delega- 
tion, of the adoption of resolution 880 would 
be to provide an indefinite delay on any 
meaningful action on this export of violence 
to innocent human beings far removed from 
the scene of the conflict. Indeed, some of the 
sponsors, not all of them, but some of the 
sponsors of resolution 880, have made it 
clear in the corridors and elsewhere that 
they do not wish to have any action on inter- 
national terrorism. The resolution, it seems 
to me, is drafted to provide that kind of 
indefinite delay, no matter how much some 
of the cosponsors may wish to have action. 

The adoption of resolution 880 would be 
a clear signal to the world that the United 
Nations as a body has chosen to take minimal 
action rather than meaningful action on this 
very urgent problem. And that will mean, 
as I said in my opening remarks in this de- 
bate, that others will take over the handling 
of this issue. The United Nations will lose 
what ought to be its preeminent role on what 
is undeniably a world problem. We ought to 
think about that. We ought to be clear as we 
vote today whether we wish to abdicate our 
position as the central organ for action on 
world problems. 

As one of those who had the privilege of 
being at San Francisco at the original writ- 
ing of the charter, I remember the high hopes 
of those days. We have not achieved all those 
hopes. We have not yet realized the high 
objectives of the charter. But, with all of 
its imperfections, the United Nations is the 
only world body we have to work on world 
problems. I would hope those who value the 
institution would think — would consider 
carefully — whether we should take a side 
step around an urgent and immediate issue 
of such general international concern. 

With respect to the amendments presented 
by the delegates of Saudi Arabia and Le- 
sotho, they are well meant and offered in an 
effort to bridge a gap which exists. They 
do not, I am sorry to say, seem to me ade- 
quate to the need. 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 



My delegation is able to support and will 
support resolution 879, which represents 
an effort at a middle ground in the situation. 
This resolution provides for a full study 
and a full analysis of the underlying causes 
of those forms of terrorism and acts of vio- 
lence which lie in misery, frustration, griev- 
ance, and despair and which cause some peo- 
ple to sacrifice human lives, including their 
own. in an attempt to effect radical changes. 

The action proposed and the study pro- 
posed under resolution 879 stresses the rights 
of every government and of all people to 
sovereign equality, to equal rights, and to 
self-determination. Concurrently with this 
full and comprehensive study and analysis, 
which we all agree is necessary, the reso- 
lution provides for some meaningful action 
on measures to prevent international terror- 
ism. Resolution 880 is conspicuously silent 
on the question of measures in its operative 
paragraphs. 

Resolution 879 requests the International 
Law Commission to prepare a convention for 
submission to the 28th session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. Such an approach would pro- 
vide an opportunity for an impartial and 
balanced review of the requisite legal meas- 
ures by 25 experts who have been elected 
by the General Assembly. 

Now, in the event that the convention to 
be produced by this representative group of 
experts should not be broadly acceptable to 
the international community, it would of 
course not win support and therefore it 
would not be adopted. If, however, the In- 
ternational Law Commission performed with 
its usual high standard of excellence, then 
the convention could subsequently be adopted. 
Of course, the convention would not be 
adopted if it were opposed by one-third of 
the states present and voting. And in the 
event a minority of states comprising not 
even one-third of the international commu- 
nity were not prepared to associate them- 
selves with the convention thus produced, 
they of course would be under no obligation 
to become parties to it. 



Now, I ask, where is the danger in such 
a process? Who is being carried along be- 
yond his own sovereign wish? How is he 
asked to take part in action with which he 
does not agree? What body of opinion in the 
organization would be deprived of any of 
its interests by this approach? 

To speak against this process is to speak 
against the very manner in which the in- 
ternational community has organized itself. 

There are those who say it takes at least 
three years to write a convention. I would 
dispute that. I think the will is more im- 
portant than the time. If there is a will, the 
way can be found. 

Some have referred to the convention writ- 
ten by the League of Nations, and I would 
recall that three years were spent on that. 
The end product received the approval of 
only two states. Time is not the real de- 
terminant. 

Since we are talking of the League of 
Nations and since others have referred to it 
earlier, I recommend we search our con- 
sciences on this and look at the parallel with 
today. This parallel is being drawn at this 
time in many places within and without this 
organization. Let us recall that the League 
of Nations grew increasingly unwilling or 
unable to come to grips with the realities of 
its day. It faded away into the mists of his- 
tory, the sunset of its passage warmed only 
by the roseate glow of some superb oratory. 

As one who believes in this organization 
and who sees it as the best hope for a world 
effort to bring fulfillment to those who now 
are lacking in rights and who deserve to 
have their rights, to provide security for all, 
to lift up the standard of living of all man- 
kind, I would hope that we would act here 
so as to avoid a parallel with the fate of the 
League of Nations. I do not wish to exag- 
gerate and say what we do here today, this 
one decision, is going to cause the United 
Nations to come tumbling down. Obviously 
not. I would not want to be involved in an 
exaggeration. But this is an important issue, 
a world issue, as we have agreed earlier. 



January 22, 1973 



91 



Ninety-two speakers in the general debate, 
representing the governments of 92 sover- 
eign countries, gave their attention to this 
urgent problem. Our decision on this issue 
is important evidence of our general intent. 
We should take meaningful action, rather 
than minimal action, on the menace of in- 
ternational terrorism. 

The United States will vote therefore 
against resolution 880 and in favor of reso- 
lution 879." 

AMBASSADOR BUSH, PLENARY, DECEMBER 18 

USUN press release 166 dated December 18 

International terrorism poses a threat to 
all mankind — to individuals and to the de- 
velopmental processes of nations. It poses a 
threat to the delicately interwoven network 
of modern transportation and communica- 
tion facilities on which every country is de- 
pendent as it seeks to sustain or improve 
the life of its citizens. It poses a threat to 
the postal worker who sorts the mail and 
to the recipient of those letters. It poses a 
threat to the passenger who travels on an 
airplane and to the innocent passerby on 
the street. 

Incidents of terrorist activity causing 
death and serious injury have taken place 
in every continent of the world and the 
islands in between. The dead and injured 
include the poor as well as the rich, men, 
women, and children of every race and re- 
ligion. No one, no one of us, is immune from 
this scourge of violence. 

It is understandable why the Secretary 
General took the exceptional step of bringing 
the item before this Assembly. It is under- 
standable why public opinion, moved by a 
sense of personal involvement as in few 
other issues, takes a special interest in the 
problem of international terrorism. 

The United Nations was given the oppor- 
tunity to prove that it was capable of rising 
to the challenge of this world issue. It is 



* Draft resolution A/C.6/L.880/Rev. 1 was adopted 
by the committee on Dec. 11 by a vote of 76 to 34 
(U.S.), with 16 abstentions. Draft resolution A/ 
C.6/L.879/Rev. 1 was not pressed to a vote. 



an issue which should have united us in 
common purpose. 

It is therefore with genuine regret that I 
announce that my delegation will vote 
against the resolution contained in the report 
of the Legal Committee. 5 We have only after 
lengthy and painful soul-searching deter- 
mined our position. We would very much 
like to have been able to vote at this 27th 
Assembly in favor of a resolution on inter- 
national terrorism, but we could not in good 
conscience vote affirmatively on the resolu- 
tion before us. 

In order for us to have voted affirmatively, 
we would have needed a resolution which 
reflected an accurate and meaningful expres- 
sion of the attitude of the international com- 
munity toward random acts of violence 
which threaten the security of the individual 
enshrined in the Declaration of Human 
Rights, which threaten the right to life it- 
self. If acts are to be condemned then surely 
acts of the type which produced the atrocity 
of Munich, the killing and wounding of air- 
line pilots and passengers on several con- 
tinents in incidents which put the lives of 
hundreds of travelers in mortal danger, let- 
ters which explode in the hands of the re- 
cipient or maim postmen involved in their 
duty of serving the public, must be among 
those condemned. We would also have needed 
a resolution which established an objective 
process that could reasonably be expected to 
lead to concrete measures. We proposed a 
plenipotentiary conference. Others suggested 
the International Law Commission as a first 
step in the process. Neither of these ap- 
proaches could have deprived states mem- 
bers of the right to determine for themselves 
precisely what concrete measures they would 
be willing to take. Yet we find neither ap- 
proach set forth in the resolution. 

The resolution before us fails to meet 
either of these basic criteria of an adequate 
expression of community views and a pro- 
gram for future action. 

The resolution, moreover, has other seri- 



r 'U.N. doc. A/8969. 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



ous defects. But now is not the time for 
recrimination or for bickering over formula- 
tions which are so drafted as to be sus- 
ceptible of being interpreted as aimed at 
raising rather than lowering the level of 
violence in our troubled world. 

It is incumbent upon all of us to ask our- 
selves whether the General Assembly has 
risen to the challenge, whether it has given 
grounds for believing that it has the ability 
to respond to the needs of mankind. Does 
the resolution before us today represent the 
best we could have achieved? Does it rep- 
resent the sum of the individual views of 
states members? Is it a true expression of 
the general will among us? Does it represent 
the views expressed by the assembled min- 
isters during the general debate? Has there 
been an opportunity to negotiate toward the 
best possible goal ? Has each state freely ex- 
pressed its will on the matter? Can we say 
that the Assembly is functioning in a way 
such as to maximize international coopera- 
tion? Have we taken full advantage of the 
rich opportunities afforded by the United 
Nations system? 

These are neither easy nor pleasant ques- 
tions to have to ask ourselves. We believe 
the answers are profoundly disturbing. 

This session has had some positive 
achievements, has taken forward steps in im- 
portant fields, such as the human environ- 
ment, the law of the sea, and earth resource 
surveying by satellite, that bring hope to us 
all. It is tragic that an adequate response to 
the deadly menace of international terrorism 
is not among the achievements of the 27th 
General Assembly. 

We must not let our failure thus far to 
find common ground on this problem deter 
us from the continued search. Those who will 
continue to be directly associated with the 
work of this potentially great world body 
must not lose heart. The time between now 
and when this Assembly next convenes should 
be used to demonstrate that this institution 
need not and must not be a captive of its 
present failures in this field. We should 
neither gloss over what has happened nor 



let our current despondency become a self- 
fulfilling prophecy of impotence. 

The deeper currents of history are not 
always visible on the surface, but I am con- 
vinced that an international community of 
wider opportunity and greater security for 
the individual is forming. These currents 
will continue to flow. 

My government will continue its positive 
efforts to find a solution to the problem 
of international terrorism through the ma- 
chinery of the United Nations if at all pos- 
sible. We call on all other members to join 
in that effort. For the alternatives to work- 
ing through the United Nations are bilateral 
efforts and efforts of groups of states and 
of individuals. There may be no alternative 
to such efforts, although we recognize that 
they can have neither the authority nor the 
overall effectiveness of measures taken 
through this great world body. They can 
only be a pale substitute born of the ne- 
cessity to take partial steps at a time when 
broader ones prove impossible. When our 
inaction here forces states to look outside 
the United Nations, we weaken the only 
worldwide mechanism for international co- 
operation that exists. We deprive mankind 
of the hopes so eloquently set forth in our 
charter. 

Let us make assets of our current failure. 
Let us use it as a spur to make the United 
Nations system function with greater effec- 
tiveness on the urgent problems of our day. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION' 

The General Assembly, 

Deeply perturbed over acts of international terror- 
ism which are occurring with increasing frequency 
and which take a toll of innocent human lives, 

Recognizing the importance of international co- 
operation in devising measures effectively to prevent 
their occurrence and of studying their underlying 
causes with a view to finding just and peaceful 
solutions as quickly as possible, 



'U.N. doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII) (draft resolu- 
tion contained in A/8969, as amended in plenary) ; 
adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 18 by a rollcall 
vote of 76 to 35 (U.S.), with 17 abstentions. 



Jonuary 22, 1973 



93 



Recalling the Declaration on Principles of Inter- 
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, 

1. Expresses deep concern over increasing acts 
of violence which endanger or take innocent human 
lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms; 

2. Urges States to devote their immediate atten- 
tion to finding just and peaceful solutions to the 
underlying causes which give rise to such acts of 
violence; 

3. Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-deter- 
mination and independence of all peoples under 
colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien 
domination and upholds the legitimacy of their 
struggle, in particular the struggle of national 
liberation movements, in accordance with the pur- 
poses and principles of the Charter and the relevant 
resolutions of the organs of the United Nations; 

4. Condemns the continuation of repressive and 
terrorist acts by colonial racist and alien regimes in 
denying peoples their legitimate right to self- 
determination and independence and other human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; 

5. Invites States to become parties to the existing 
international conventions which relate to various 
aspects of the problem of international terrorism; 

6. Invites States to take all appropriate measures 
at the national level, with a view to the speedy and 
final elimination of the problem, bearing in mind 
the provisions of paragraph 3 above; 

7. Invites States to consider the subject-matter 
urgently and submit observations to the Secretary- 
General by 10 April 1973, including concrete pro- 
posals for finding an effective solution to the prob- 
lem; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit an 
analytical study of the observations of States sub- 
mitted under parn graph 7 above to the ad hoc com- 
mittee to be established under paragraph 9; 

9. Decides to establish an ad hoc committee con- 
sisting of thirty-five members, to be appointed by 
the President of the General Assembly bearing in 
mind the principle of equitable geographical repre- 
sentation; 

10. Requests the ad hoc committee to consider the 
obs°rvations of States under paragraph 7 above 
and submit its report with recommendations for 
possible co-operation for the speedy elimination of 
the problem, bearing in mind the provisions of 
paragraph 3, to the General Assembly at its twenty- 
eighth session; 

11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the 
ad hoc committee with the necessary facilities and 
services; 

12. Decides to include the item in the provisional 
agenda of its twenty-eighth session. 



172d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Ambassa- 
dor William J. Porter, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 172d plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on January 4. 

Press release 1 dated January 4 

Ladies and gentlemen : At the new year it 
is appropriate to examine the tasks before us 
and to renew our resolve to complete them. 
It is not a time for rancor or propaganda, 
but instead for applying ourselves to the 
measures which will restore a just and last- 
ing peace in Indochina. 

There is much to distinguish this new year 
of negotiations from those which preceded 
it — those four years of largely sterile ex- 
changes which only developed last October 
into a phase which can today be described 
as a serious negotiating process. 

But my purpose today is not to review this 
record, much less to assign blame. It is rather 
to look ahead to what the year may bring 
if we continue on the wise path of negotia- 
tions. We would see this year as marking, 
at last, the concluding phase of this pro- 
tracted conflict and the beginning of an en- 
tirely new era of relationships, not only 
between the United States and North Viet- 
Nam but between North and South Viet-Nam 
and among all the nations of the Indochina 
region. These relations, of course, must be 
founded on those very principles of mutual 
respect and the search for reconciliation 
which are at the heart of the Viet-Nam 
settlement. All the participants in this con- 
flict have gone through their share of suf- 
fering and sacrifices; all have shown their 
share of determination and heroism; all 
have persevered against enormous odds in 
the cause which they considered just and 
worth dying for. What we have now to do is 
to start afresh, having learned lessons from 
this painful history, and apply those lessons 
both to the concluding phase of these negotia- 
tions for a settlement in Viet-Nam and to 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



the now state of regional relationships which 
ran now develop. 

All this will require continuing work, pa- 
tience, and a large measure of understand- 
ing for continued differences of view and 
continued suspicions which cannot overnight 
disappear. 1 am not inclined at all to under- 
estimate the problems which exist and which 
will face us still for some time. But what we 
must now do is to put all of our energies and 
abilities to the service of a new and con- 
structive set of relationships, to the rebuild- 
ing and to the healing tasks which will be 
paramount. 

In this effort, the United States will not 
be found wanting. 



Ocean Dumping Convention 
Signed at Washington 

The Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter was opened for signature at 
Washington, London, Mexico City, and Mos- 
cow December 29. ' Sixteen nations signed the 
convention at Washington that day. Follow- 
ing are a Department announcement issued 
December 29 and remarks made by Acting 
Secretary U. Alexis Johnson at the signing 
ceremony at the Department of State. 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

Press release 320 dated December 29 

Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson signed 
on December 29 for the United States the 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter. The ceremony at the Department of 
State involved representatives of other coun- 
tries who also signed the convention for their 
respective governments. Similar signing cere- 
monies were held that day at London, 
Mexico City, and Moscow, the capitals of the 
other depositaries. 



1 For text of the convention, see Bulletin of Dec. 
18, 1972, p. 711. 



Acting Secretary Johnson in his remarks 
to the group of Ambassadors and other of- 
ficials noted that this convention marked a 
unique step by nations to protect our global 
ocean resources from further pollution due to 
dumping. As the first positive action com- 
pleted pursuant to recommendation by the 
Stockholm 1972 United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment, the Ocean Dump- 
ing Convention requires parties to establish 
national systems to control substances leav- 
ing their shores for the purpose of being 
dumped at sea. Annex I of the convention 
contains a "blacklist" of prohibited sub- 
stances: mercury and cadmium and their 
compounds, organohalogen compounds such 
as DDT and PCB's, persistent plastics, oil, 
high-level radioactive wastes, and chemical 
and biological warfare agents. Annex II lists 
substances requiring special permits in each 
case: heavy metals, lead, copper, zinc, also 
cyanides and fluorides, waste containers 
which could present a serious obstacle to 
fishing or navigation, and medium- and low- 
level radioactive wastes. Substances not listed 
in Annex I or II require a general permit, 
and all dumping must be carried out with 
full consideration given to a list of technical 
considerations contained in Annex III. 

The convention provides that each party 
will take appropriate steps to insure that the 
terms of the convention apply to its flag ships 
and aircraft and to any vessel or aircraft 
loading at its ports for the purpose of dump- 
ing. Full use is to be made of the best avail- 
able technical knowledge which together with 
periodic meetings and participation by ap- 
propriate international technical bodies will 
keep the contents of the three annexes up to 
date and realistic in meeting ocean pollution 
control needs stemming from ocean dumping. 

Although ocean dumping accounts for less 
than 10 percent of the pollutants that enter 
the oceans — rivers and other drainage and 
the atmosphere being the two major routes 
for such pollutants — this convention is sig- 
nificant in that it demonstrates that govern- 
ments can agree on practical measures to 
control their necessary and common re- 
sources. Possibly the next step will be inter- 



January 22, 1973 



95 



national control of pollutants entering the 
oceans through rivers. 

The convention calls for signature by gov- 
ernments between December 29, 1972, and 
December 31, 1973, followed by ratification. 
Thereafter, governments may accede to the 
convention by depositing the appropriate in- 
struments with the depositary governments. 
Mexico, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, 
and the United States are depositaries, with 
the Government of the United Kingdom act- 
ing as the major administrative depositary. 
Within four months after the deposit of 15 
instruments of ratification, the first meeting 
of the parties will be held to adopt normal 
organizational matters and to select an exist- 
ing, competent international organization to 
be responsible for secretariat duties relevant 
to the convention. 

An early draft of this convention was in- 
troduced by the United States in June 1971 
following the proposal by President Nixon 
in February of that year requesting that in- 
ternational control procedures be established 
that would be compatible with proposed 
domestic ocean dumping legislation. U.S. 
domestic legislation was signed into law by 
the President on October 23, 1972, and will 
require only minor modification to be fully 
consistent with this international treaty. The 
executive branch plans to request Senate ad- 
vice and consent to the ratification of the 
treaty early in 1973. Anticipating such Fed- 
eral action, the Department of State issued a 
draft environmental impact statement on the 
convention on October 11, 1972, and held 
hearings on October 26, 1972. A final impact 
statement will be issued in the near future. 
The United States, in keeping with normal 
protocol in the case of a multiple depositary 
treaty, signed the convention December 29 at 
all four depositary capitals — Mexico City, 
Moscow, London, and Washington. 



REMARKS BY ACTING SECRETARY JOHNSON 

It is a pleasure to welcome each of you to 
the opening for signature of the Convention 
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. The 



96 



Government of the United States shares de- 
positary duties for this convention with the 
Governments of Mexico, the Soviet Union, 
and the United Kingdom. 

Nearly two years ago, representatives of 
over 30 countries met in London to consider 
means for controlling and preventing marine 
pollution. This was the first meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine 
Pollution, one of five such groups preparing 
separate subjects for the 1972 United Na- 
tions Conference on the Human Environ- 
ment held at Stockholm in June. An early 
draft of this convention was discussed at 
that meeting. The participants believed that 
such a convention was possible and was 
necessary, although it would be only one 
small step on the road to proper management 
of our oceans. 

After that London meeting, work at Ot- 
tawa, Reykjavik, and again at London 
showed sufficient progress for the Stock- 
holm Conference to recommend that a final 
meeting be called to complete work on the 
text and that the agreed convention be opened 
for signature before the end of this year. 

Representatives of 91 nations, many of 
which are represented here today, spent 
many long hours at London during the period 
of October 30 to November 13 (Saturdays 
and Sundays included) and produced the 
text we are opening for signature today. 
Similar ceremonies are being held today at 
the capitals of the other depositaries — Lon- 
don, Mexico City, and Moscow. 

I believe this is a historic occasion. This is 
the first international treaty devoted to en- 
vironmental protection on a global basis. 
Parties to the convention will be agreeing 
to restrict their use of the oceans as a dump- 
ing ground, for the long-term benefit of all 
of us, particularly our future generations. 

The United States is concerned about its 
environment and has initiated many activi- 
ties on a broad front to cope with these 
problems. We share our environment with 
many other nations, and we are eager to 
work with others toward common objectives. 
We look forward to working with other gov- 
ernments in making this treaty an effective 
initial effort in controlling ocean pollution 






Department of State Bulletin 



Former President Truman 
Mourned by the Nation 

Former President Harry S Truman died 
December 26. Following are statements by 
P> i sident Nixon and Secretary Rogers issued 
that day. 

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

\Vhit«' House press release dated Deeember 26 

Harry S Truman will be remembered as 
one of the most courageous Presidents in 
our history, who led the Nation and the 
world through a critical period with excep- 
tional vision and determination. 

Our hopes today for a generation of peace 
rest in large measure on the firm foundations 
that he laid. 

Recognizing the new threat to peace that 
had emerged from the ashes of war, he stood 
boldly against it with his extension of aid to 
Greece and Turkey in 1947; and the "Tru- 
man doctrine" thus established was crucial 
to the defense of liberty in Europe and the 
world. In launching the Marshall plan, he 
began the most farsighted and most generous 
act of international rebuilding ever under- 
taken. With his characteristically decisive 
action in Korea, he made possible the defense 
of peace and freedom in Asia. 

He was a fighter, who was at his best 
when the going was toughest. Like all polit- 
ical leaders, he had his friends and his op- 
ponents. But friends and opponents alike 
were unanimous in respecting him for his 
enormous courage and for the spirit that 
saw him through whatever the odds. Whether 
in a political campaign or making the great 
decisions in foreign policy, they recognized 
and admired him — in a description he him- 
self might have appreciated the most — as 
a man of "guts." 

Embroiled in controversy during his 
Presidency, his stature in the eyes of history 
has risen steadily ever since. He did what 
had to be done, when it had to be done, and 
because he did the world today is a better 
and safer place — and generations to come 
will be in his debt. 



It is with affection and respect that a 
grateful Nation now says farewell to "the 
man from Independence" — to its 33d Presi- 
dent, Harry S Truman. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Press release 318 dated December 26 

The death of Harry S Truman saddens all 
Americans. President Truman served his 
country in three great wars and in trying 
years of precarious peace. His decisions de- 
termined America's postwar course. The 
monuments to his wisdom and humanity 
survive in the restored vitality of nations 
demolished by war, in a great peacetime 
alliance of wartime allies, and in the hearts 
of once threatened but still free peoples. We 
mourn the loss of this great and courageous 
man. 

Mrs. Rogers joins me in this expression 
of our deepest sympathy and profound re- 
gard to Mrs. Truman and her family. 



Waiver of Transit Visas Suspended 
for Additional Period 

Following is the text of a notice of exten- 
sion of suspension which was published in 
the Federal Register on December 22. 1 

Nonimmigrant Documentary Waiver; Suspension 

In view of indications that the possibility of the 
commission of terrorist acts in the United States 
remains high, of the continued presence in the 
United States of aliens against whom such acts 
might be directed, and of the possibility that such 
acts might be directed against U.S. citizens or their 
property as well as against aliens, it has been 
determined that there is a continuing emergency 
situation in which the need for advance screening 
of aliens seeking admission into the United States 
requires the suspension for an additional period of 
the provision for admission of aliens in immediate 
transit without a visa. Therefore, Part 41, Chapter 
I, Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations is 
amended by suspending until July 1, 1973, the 
waiver of the nonimmigrant visa requirement in the 
case of aliens in immediate transit. 



37 Fed. Reg. 28286. 



January 22, 1973 



97 






Paragraph (e) of § 41.6 is suspended until July 
1, 1973. 

Effective date. The amendment to the regulations 
contained in this order shall become effective upon 
publication in the Federal Register (12-22-72). 

The provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (80 Stat. 383; 5 U.S.C. 553) relative to notice 
of proposed rule making are inapplicable to this 
order because the regulations contained herein 
involve foreign affairs functions of the United 
States. 

(Sec. 104, 66 Stat. 174: 8 U.S.C. 1104) 

Dated: December 15, 1972. 

[seal] William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State. 

Concurred in : December 18, 1972. 

Richard G. Kleindienst, 
Attorney General. 



Oil Import Program Modified 
by President Nixon 

A PROCLAMATION 1 

Modifying Proclamation No. 3279, Relating to 
Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products 

The Director of the Office of Emergency Prepared- 
ness, with the advice of the Oil Policy Committee, 
has under consideration a number of substantial 
proposals relating to the management of the oil 
import program under Proclamation No. 3279, 2 as 
amended. Pending final decisions and announce- 
ments on those proposals, he has recommended that 
the Secretary of the Interior be delegated authority 
to provide interim allocations for the allocation 
period commencing January 1, 1973, and for suc- 
ceeding allocation periods. 

The Director, with the advice of the Oil Policy 
Committee, has also recommended that occasional 
shortages of certain finished petroleum products 
important to the national security should be relieved 
by delegating authority to the Secretary of the 
Interior to permit additional imports from the 
United States Virgin Islands. Such delegated author- 
ity then could be used with the Director's existing 
authorities relating to Puerto Rico and the use of 
Western Hemisphere crude oil in the development 
of programs to assist in meeting these shortages. 

The Director, with the advice of the Oil Policy 



1 No. 4175; 37 Fed. Reg. 28043. 

■24 Fed. Reg. 1781; 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 



11. 



Committee, has found that such changes would not 
adversely affect the national security. 

I agree with the findings and recommendations of 
the Director and deem it necessary and consistent 
with the security objectives of Proclamation No. 
3279, as amended, to adjust the imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products, and to improve the ad- 
ministration of the program, as hereinafter pro- 
vided. 

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitu- 
tion and laws of the United States, including section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do hereby 
proclaim that, effective as of the date of this Procla- 
mation, Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, is 
further amended as follows: 

1. Subparagraph (4) of paragraph (b) of section 
3 is amended by adding the following sentence at 
the end thereof: 

"Whenever the Secretary, upon recommendation 
of the Director of the Office of Emergency Prepared- 
ness, finds that there may be shortages in the supply 
of any finished product or products in Districts 
I-IV, which products are deemed by the Director 
of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to be 
important to the national security, the Secretary 
may allocate imports of any such product or prod- 
ucts manufactured in the Virgin Islands in excess 
of the limitation in the preceding sentence for such 
product or products, for such time and under such 
conditions as he may deem consistent with the 
purposes of this proclamation." 

2. Section 3A is amended to read as follows: 

"Commencing with the allocation period January 
1, 1973, through December 31, 1973, the Secretary, 
with the concurrence of the Director of the Office 
of Emergency Preparedness, is authorized to make 
an interim allocation for any allocation period or 
portion thereof to any person who held an allocation 
of imports of crude oil and unfinished oils or of No. 
2 fuel oil during the preceding allocation period. No 
such interim allocation shall exceed the like alloca- 
tion held in such preceding allocation period by such 
person. However, the Secretary may adjust the 
allocation to any person limited by the previous 
sentence if such person would have been eligible 
for a larger allocation in 1973 under the regulations 
applicable during the allocation period commencing 
January 1, 1972. Any license issued under such in- 
terim allocation may be utilized for imports hereaf- 
ter entering the United States prior to December 31, 
1972, if authorized by the Secretary. Any allocation 
subsequently made to any person who receives an 
interim allocation pursuant to this section, shall be 
reduced by an amount equal to the interim allocation 
made pursuant to this section." 



98 



Department of State Bulletin 



I\ witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 16th day of December, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-two and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-seventh. 



tfLjU-^K^ 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Portugal Sign Agreements 
on Macao Textile Exports to the U.S. 

The Department of State announced on 
December 22 (press release 317) that notes 
had been exchanged at Lisbon that day con- 
stituting new bilateral agreements govern- 
ing exports of textiles from Macao to the 
United States. Ridgway B. Knight, U.S. Am- 
bassador to Portugal, and Portuguese For- 
eign Minister Rui Patricio signed on behalf 
of their respective governments. (For texts 
of the U.S. notes, see press release 317.) 

Major features of the new agreements are: 

a. A five-year term from January 1, 1973, 
through December 31, 1977. 

b. Overall ceilings in square yards equiva- 
lent for the first agreement year (i.e., Jan- 
uary 1-December 31, 1973) as follows: 
Cotton textiles, 2.5 million; wool textiles, 2 
million; man-made fiber textiles, 24 million. 

c. Specific ceilings on two categories of cot- 
ton textiles and seven categories of man- 
made fiber textiles. 

Provisions for flexibility, growth, consulta- 
tion, spacing, exchange of statistics, cate- 
gory designations and conversion factors, 
definition of textile articles, equity, and 
carryover are similar to those of other U.S. 
bilateral textile agreements. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their 
destruction. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow April 10, 1972. 1 
Signature: Guyana, January 3, 1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 1 
Signature : Niger, November 28, 1972. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution 
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with 
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, 
and Washington December 29, 1972. 1 
Signature: Jordan, January 4, 1973. 

Patents 

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971. 1 

Ratification deposited: France (with a declara- 
tion), November 16, 1972. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New 
York December 21, 1965. Entered into force 
January 4, 1969. 2 
Accession deposited: Barbados (with reservation 

and statement), November 8, 1972. 
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, November 

22, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for 
a global commercial communications satellite sys- 
tem. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. 
Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 
Terminates: February 12, 1973. 

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 
5646. 
Terminates: February 12, 1973. 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. 
Ratifications deposited: Egypt, Viet-Nam, January 
3, 1973. 



1 Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



January 22, 1973 



99 



Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the 
United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Ratifications deposited: Guatemala, October 12, 
1972 ; 3 Philippines, November 1, 1972. 4 
Accession deposited: China, People's Republic, 
November 16, 1972. 6 

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as 
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space 
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Ge- 
neva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 
1, 1973. TIAS 7435. 

Notification of approval: United Kingdom, Octo- 
ber 17, 1972." 



BILATERAL 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of February 14, 1972 
(TIAS 7273). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul November 17, 1972. Entered into force 
November 17, 1972. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of February 14, 1972 
(TIAS 7273). Effected by exchange of notes at 
vember 24, 1972. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of February 14, 1972 
(TIAS 7273). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul December 7, 1972. Entered into force De- 
cember 7, 1972. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Memorandum of understanding regarding the estab- 
lishment of a Standing Consultative Commission.' 
Signed at Geneva December 21, 1972. Entered into 
force December 21, 1972. 




3 With declarations contained in final protocol. 

4 With reservations and statements contained in 
final protocol. 

5 With reservation. 

Extended to Channel Islands and Isle of Man. 

7 This Commission shall promote the objectives 
and implementation of the provisions of the stra- 
tegic arms limitation agreements. 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20U02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent 
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on 
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication 
7n,ailed to the same address. Remittances, payable 
to the Superintendent of Documents, must accom- 
pany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock (at least 125) — $6; 1-year subscrip- 
tion service for approximately 75 updated or new 
Notes — $3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies 
of those listed below are available at 10# each. 

British Honduras Pub. 8332 4 pp. 

Costa Rica Pub. 7768 4 pp. 

French Territory of Afars and 

Issas (TFAI) Pub. 8429 4 pp. 

Guatemala Pub. 7798 6 pp. 

Laos Pub. 8301 8 pp. 

Lebanon Pub. 7816 4 pp. 

Portugal Pub. 8074 4 pp. 

Sweden Pub. 8033 4 pp. 

World Military Expenditures 1971. Sixth annual 
report by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. Pub. 65. 59 pp. $1.25. 

The International Implications of the Energy Situa- 
tion. Statement by Under Secretary John N. Irwin 
II made before the House Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs on April 10, 1972. (Reprinted 
from the Department of State Bulletin of May 1, 
1972.) Pub. 8662. General Foreign Policy Series 
265. 5 pp. 10<J. 

Saint Lawrence Seaway— Tariff of Tolls. Agreement 
with Canada amending the agreement of March 9, 
1959, as amended. TIAS 7408. 4 pp. lOtf. 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Ghana. TIAS 
7410. 2 pp. lO^. 



100 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January Vol. I. XVIII, No. 1752 



Economic Affairs. U.S. and Portugal Sign 
cements on Macao Textih to 
Um U.S 99 

Knwronment. Ocean Dumping Convention 
ud at Washington (Department an- 
nouncement, Johnson) 95 

Law of the Sea. Ocean Dumping Convention 
Signed at Washington (Department an- 
nouncement, Johnson ) 95 

Macao. U.S. and Portugal Sign Agreements on 
Macao Textile Exports to the U.S. ... 99 

Petroleum. Oil Import Program Modified by 
President Nixon (proclamation) .... 98 

Portugal. U.S. and Portugal Sign Agreements 
on Macao Textile Exports to the U.S. . . 99 

Presidential Documents 

Former President Truman Mourned by the 

ion 97 

Oil Import Program Modified by President 
Nixon (proclamation) 98 

Publications. Recent Releases 100 

Terrorism. U.S. Votes Against U.N. General As- 
sembly Resolution Calling for Study of Ter- 
rorism (Bennett, Bush, text of resolution) . 81 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 99 

Ocean Dumping Convention Signed at Wash- 
ington (Department announcement, John- 
son) 95 

and Portugal Sign Agreements on Macao 
Textile Exports to the U.S 99 

United Nations. U.S. Votes Against U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly Resolution Calling for Study 



of Terrorism (Bennett, Rush, text of resolu- 
tion) 81 

Viet -Nam. ITlM Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris (Pi 

Visas. Waiver of Transit Visas Suspended for 

litional Period (Federal Register notice) 97 

ic Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 81 

Bush, George 81 

Johnson, U. Alexis 95 

Nixon, President 97, 98 

Porter, William J 94 

Rogers, Secretary 97 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 1—7 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 1 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
317 of December 22, 318 of December 26, and 
320 of December 29. 

No. Date Subject 

1 1/4 Porter: 172d plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris. 
*2 1/4 International Book Advisory Com- 
mittee to meet Jan. 11-12. 



Not printed. 



Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. CQVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



f&VL 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXYIII 



No. 1753 



January 29, 1973 



THE AVAILABILITY OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECORDS 

by William M. Franklin 
Director of the Historical Office 101 

U.S. REAFFIRMS SUPPORT OF EFFORTS OF U.N. IN DRUG ABUSE CONTROL 

Statement by Jewel Lafontant 
and Texts of Resolutions 110 



I III OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside b<n 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1753 
January 29, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 65 cents 
I'se of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
iaterf. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State. United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



In this article based on an address he made at the Univer- 
sity of Virginia at Charlottesville in November, Dr. Frank- 
lin describes in historical context the three principal 
methods of making Department of State documents avail- 
able to the public: by publication, by granting access to 
files, and by providing copies on request. 



The Availability of Department of State Records 



by William M. Franklin 
Director of the Historical Office 



Ever since the sensational publication of 
the "Pentagon Papers" a year and a half 
ago, the public prints, the halls of Congress, 
and the conventions of learned societies have 
buzzed with talk of "declassification" of offi- 
cial documents. On March 8, 1972, President 
Nixon signed a new Executive order on 
the subject. The National Archives and Rec- 
ords Service has built up a declassification 
staff which is energetically tackling the prob- 
lem. The Department of State has set up a 
Council on Classification Policy, chaired by 
William B. Macomber, Jr., the Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for Management. A high- 
level Interagency Classification Review Com- 
mittee has been established, with former 
Ambassador John Eisenhower as chairman. 
All of this suggests that this might be an 
appropriate time to take a look at the whole 
problem of the availability to the public of 
State Department documents. 

First of all, we have to sort out our terms. 

'Classification" as used in this context refers 
to the system of marking documents as Con- 
fidential, Secret, or Top Secret, depending 
on their importance to the national security. 

'Declassification" is, of course, the reversal 
of the process. In general it can be said 
that the authority to classify or declassify 
a given piece of paper rests with the offices 
having responsibility for the policy toward 
the particular country, organization, or type 
of problem to which it relates. Historians 



and archivists may have a voice with respect 
to classification and declassification, but they 
do not make the decisions — at least not in 
State Department practice. 

Not infrequently one hears the accusation 
that classification is nothing but a "coverup 
for errors by the bureaucrats." I cannot 
speak for other agencies, but in the State 
Department system this would be most un- 
likely. Almost all our policy officers are 
either political appointees or Foreign Service 
officers, most of whom stay in a given assign- 
ment only a few years (eight is about the 
maximum), after which the control over the 
documents that they have classified passes to 
other officials — perhaps of an opposing polit- 
ical party — who can declassify any of those 
documents without any reference back to the 
original classifiers. Documents may be kept 
classified far longer than scholars and re- 
porters may consider necessary, but this is 
done for reasons of policy — not for the pro- 
tection of persons, most of whom never 
thought they had made any errors anyway. 

Another relationship that needs attention 
is that between classification and secrecy. 
The present classification system came into 
the United States Government only with 
World War II. Prior to that time documents 
of special sensitivity were sometimes marked 
as "confidential" but generally they bore no 
such indication at all. Does this mean that 
prior to World War II government docu- 



January 29, 1973 



101 



ments were in principle more open to the 
public? On the contrary, the principle was 
firmly embedded that every paper prepared 
on official business was to be shown only to 
other officers on a need-to-know basis. The 
only papers that were properly releasable to 
the public were those specifically so desig- 
nated by higher authority. So, ironically, it 
can be said that the present classification 
system marked in principle a step toward 
greater liberality in that it made thousands 
of unclassified documents immediately re- 
leasable to the public. 

But being "unclassified" or "declassified" 
does not in itself make a document available 
to the public. Papers unclassified or declassi- 
fied are still in government file rooms closed 
to the public. 

So declassification is not enough. In order 
to become available to the public, official 
records which are unclassified or which have 
been declassified must be (1) published in 
some manner, (2) opened up for public ac- 
cess, or (3) released in response to requests 
from the public for particular documents. 
Each of these procedures has a history of its 
own in the practice of the Department of 
State, and from this historical perspective 
some useful insights may be derived. 

Publication of Official Papers 

The traditional and original method of re- 
leasing official papers was publication on 
particular topics. The practice arose in 18th- 
century England, where Parliament, begin- 
ning to reach for the reins of power, 
demanded on occasion that the government 
publish papers on particular subjects, par- 
ticularly crises in foreign affairs which were 
becoming matters of increasing popular con- 
cern. When the government acceded — or 
when it decided on its own to release some 
papers — it had first to select from the files 
those that were to be released and then to 
send them to the public printer, often with 
portions still sensitive marked for omission. 
The printer would run the documents in 
the requisite number of copies (enough at 
least for parliamentary distribution) and 



would bind them together with "printer's 
wrapper" ; i.e., covers of white paper. If 
the size of the text warranted it, he might 
be forced to use heavier covers, which were 
customarily of blue cardboard. Thus origi- 
nated the eminent series of British White 
Papers and Blue Books which in the 19th 
century blazed a trail toward greater free- 
dom of information in matters, such as for- 
eign affairs, which had hitherto been 
regarded as prerogatives of the Crown, too 
sensitive or too complex to be shared even 
with Parliament, let alone the people. The 
time for sharing had begun. 1 

The young United States inherited this 
tradition and extended it in its own way. 
From the earliest days documents on foreign 
affairs were made available to Congress on 
particular subjects of interest, but the novel 
characteristic which developed in American 
practice was the annual review. To the Pres- 
ident's annual message to Congress on the 
state of the Union (traditionally delivered 
in December) there were attached detailed 
reports from the various Cabinet officers — 
except from the Secretary of State, who cus- 
tomarily rendered his report not in narrative 
but in the form of papers illustrating Amer- 
ican foreign policy and diplomatic relations 
during the year. These papers, along with 
the Presidential address, were printed up as 
a congressional document and were circu- 
lated in the Capitol. In 1861 the Department 
of State, for the first time, had these foreign 
policy documents bound in hard covers and 
published under the title Papers Relating to 
Foreign Affairs. Thus there began that con- 
tinuing series of annual volumes which, un- 
der the newer title, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, has now reached the docu- 
ments for the year 1948. 

It is interesting to note that the Foreign 
Relations series was started as a medium for 
releasing current documents of major im- 
portance. Indeed, the volume issued in 1861 
contained documents of that very year, many 



1 See Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, 
A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 18H-19U 
(New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966). 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



of them on the hot and vital question of 
keeping the Great Powers from aiding and 
recognizing the Confederate States of Amer- 
ica. Under the modern system of classifica- 
tion such documents could easily justify a 
Top Secret stamp, for they literally con- 
cerned the very existence of the United 
States of America and dealt with the immi- 
nent possibility of war with several Euro- 
pean states. In those days the documents 
bore no stamp of classification, but it was 
understood that nothing of this sort was to 
be released without higher approval. Today 
this would be called "declassification" ; at that 
time it was "clearance" — a term still used in 
the Historical Office of the Department. It 
would be my guess that the documents of 
1861 were "cleared" by Secretary Seward 
personally, and probably also with President 
Lincoln, before they were published. The 
process has not essentially changed through 
all the years, although we do not generally 
have to go so high for clearance. 2 The docu- 
ments for each year have to be located, 
selected, copied, and annotated by the His- 
torical Office. Then galley proofs are run at 
the Government Printing Office and copies 
thereof — appropriately divided up by sub- 
jects — are circulated for declassification to 
all the concerned policy offices in the Depart- 
ment of State and to all other departments, 
agencies, and sometimes foreign govern- 
ments whose documents we are proposing to 
publish. Since each volume now runs well 
over 1,000 pages, with seven to twelve vol- 
umes per year, it is no exaggeration to say 
that the staff of historians working on the 
Foreign Relations series is now the Depart- 
ment's principal declassification team. 

The release of documents through the me- 
dium of a continuing series has certain great 
advantages. In contrast to a haphazard re- 
leasing of individual documents, the series 
presents all the important documents on each 



' For an example of a question of clearance (de- 
classification) that went to Roosevelt and Churchill 
for decision, see Foreign Relations of the United 
States, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 
1943 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
19701. pp. 1 .134-35, 1338. 



subject in context. The series provides a con- 
venient and lasting reference source for stu- 
dents and scholars throughout the world. 
The release of documents through official 
publication is obviously equitable; there are 
no favorites and no "scoops." Placed in their 
historical setting, the documents are often 
easier for the Department to declassify and 
release because in such context their release 
is less likely to be misunderstood as having 
some current political significance. 

Some of these desirable characteristics, 
however, worked to the disadvantage of the 
series in other respects, notably in speed of 
publication. To the end of the 19th century 
the volumes were being brought out when 
the documents were only a year or two old. 
In the present century the series began to 
lag, and by World War I the documents pub- 
lished were about eight years old. The huge 
increase in the volume of documentation oc- 
casioned by both World Wars, plus the in- 
creasingly important role played by the 
United States on the world stage, worked to 
make the series slip back year by year, until 
by 1970 the documents being released were 
over 25 years old. This situation came to the 
attention of President Nixon early in 1972, 
and on March 8 of that year he issued in- 
structions that the series be brought up to a 
20-year line. Three additional positions have 
been added to the Foreign Relations staff, 
and more money has been provided for in- 
dexing and printing, but the attainment of 
the President's goal will depend in large 
measure on the speed with which busy policy 
officers (not historians) can be persuaded 
to review the documents proposed for de- 
classification and publication. 

From all this it is clear that the Foreign 
Relations series in the 20th century has no 
longer fulfilled its original purpose as a me- 
dium for the release of current documents. 
As the series slid backward in time, its place 
was taken on the contemporary scene by 
press releases and by special publications on 
particular subjects on which the Department 
felt it necessary or desirable to give out doc- 
uments. The press releases were reprinted 



January 29, 1973 



103 



in a weekly publication entitled Press Re- 
leases beginning in 1929. In 1939 the title 
of this publication was changed to the De- 
partment of State Bulletin, and the scope 
was broadened to include not only docu- 
ments, strictly speaking, but also statements, 
announcements, and articles which may con- 
tain information previously classified. The 
special documentary publications issued by 
the Department in the period since World 
War II (such as the so-called China White 
Paper) number several dozen, not counting 
the voluminous serial publications of treaties 
and other international acts, the digests of 
international law, and the multilateral pub- 
lication of German documents. This is not 
the place to discuss any of these in detail, 
but it is worth noting that thousands of 
documents previously classified or closely 
held have been released in this fashion, far 
ahead of the Foreign Relations volumes. 

Opening of Files to Access 

The ultimate in openness is to let members 
of the public into the files, where they can 
see all the documents and copy any that in- 
terest them. If this "see for yourself" method 
has the advantage of high credibility, it also 
has the disadvantage of being a type of 
operation which generally can be used effec- 
tively only by graduate-level scholars and 
professional researchers. Documents pub- 
lished by the Department of State are avail- 
able in all the major public and university 
libraries throughout the world; documents 
that are merely opened to access in Washing- 
ton will actually reach the public only to 
the extent that nonofficial historians choose 
to reproduce or describe them in their books 
and articles. 

One might think that opening the files (or 
"granting access" as we call it) would be 
the easiest and cheapest method of making 
documents available to the public, but this, 
too, requires some qualification. Before files 
can be opened, they must be declassified by 
decision of policy officers, and this can only 
be effected on the basis of some sort of ex- 
amination of the documentation either paper 



by paper or by spot checking, or by bulk 
categories where these can be defined. The 
records thus declassified must be defined by 
chronology or subject; they must be brought 
together as much as possible and physically 
separated from files still classified. Finding 
aids (indexes) to the open records must be 
prepared or made accessible, and adequate 
accommodations for researchers must be 
provided, including trained personnel to 
service their requests. 

While the publishing of documents on for- 
eign affairs goes back to the 18th century, 
the opening of files to access by the public 
or even to eminent scholars is a compara- 
tively recent method of making documents 
available. Many foreign offices still do not 
open their files to the public in any system- 
atic manner, contenting themselves with let- 
ting in an occasional privileged scholar 
whom they regard as "reliable." This was 
in fact the practice followed in the 19th 
century by even the most democratic foreign 
offices, including the Department of State. 
And historians did not fail to complain about 
it. In the annual report of the American 
Historical Association for 1893 it was sourly 
noted that "historical papers in the State 
Department are not accessible to the histori- 
cal student except as a special favor . . . ." ! 
By today's standards it would appear that 
Clio's disciples had something to complain 
about. It was not until 1901 that Congress 
passed a law providing that "facilities for 
study and research in the Government De- 
partments . . . shall be afforded to scientific 
investigators and duly qualified individuals, 
students, and graduates of institutions of 
learning . . . under such rules as the heads 
of the Departments . . . may prescribe." 4 
Apparently the Department of State began 
thereafter to admit scholars to the files in 



3 American Historical Association, 1893 (Wash- 
ington, Government Printing Office, 1894), p. 4. 
Background data for this portion of the article 
were supplied by Dr. Milton Gustafson, Chief of 
the Diplomatic Branch, National Archives, and Dr. 
Arthur G. Kogan of the Historical Office, Depart- 
ment of State. 

4 31 Stat. 1039. 



104 



Department of State Bulletin 



greater numbers, but only to documents of 
the pre-Civil War period, and even then un- 
der the proviso that the Department would 
review every researcher's notes or manu- 
script. In 1916 some notes were withheld on 
papers as much as 66 years old, and as late as 
1920 the Department refused a researcher's 
request to see files of the war years — that 
is, the war of 1861-65. 

Not until 1921 did the Department have 
a regulation providing for systematic ac- 
cess to records, and that access was still 
under careful control, cases being judged on 
an ad hoc basis. In 1927 the Department's 
eminent Historical Adviser, Tyler Dennett, 
stated that the files were open only up to 
1898 although some subjects "might be pur- 
sued down to 1906."' Here was the beginning 
of a pattern which the Department followed 
for many years thereafter: (1) Records 
were "declassified" in bulk when they were 
about 30 years old, and those files were then 
opened to researchers. (2) There was a "re- 
stricted" period (five to ten years ahead of 
the "open" period) to which "bona fide" 
or "trustworthy" American scholars might 
be admitted subject to certain controls. 
(3) There was a "closed" period covering 
the most recent records. The establishment 
of the National Archives in 1936 did not 
alter this basic pattern, although it produced 
a sharper definition of the open period and 
provided much better facilities for taking 
care of both records and researchers. 

It is no secret that in recent decades the 
administration of the restricted period 
caused increasing friction between the De- 
partment and the academic world. The de- 
termination as to which "scholars" were to 
be admitted provoked invidious distinctions. 
Those who were admitted frequently re- 
sented the censorship of their notes. After 
I War II a security investigation be- 
came a requirement for admission to the 
still-classified records of the restricted pe- 
riod, a requirement costly to the government 
and resented by most applicants for access. 



Accordingly, at the beginning of 1972 the 
Department decided to open, i.e., declassify, 
its records for the entire period of World 
War II, an action which in effect abolished 
the old restricted period, which at that point 
had included the years 1942-45. Later in 
1972 the Department extended the open pe- 
riod to include 1946, after the last of the 
Foreign Relations volumes for 1946 had been 
published ; and the regulations were changed 
to provide for just two periods, "open" and 
"restricted." Records of the new restricted 
period (1947 on) are closed to access by 
nonofficial researchers," but copies of indi- 
vidual documents may be obtained by re- 
quest, as will be explained later in this paper. 
Until recent years there was never any 
apparent relationship between the publica- 
tion of the Foreign Relations series and the 
opening of files to access. This was because 
the series, beginning in 1861 and for all the 
rest of the 19th century, was publishing 
documents at least 50 years ahead of the 
period to which access was granted. In the 
20th century this gap began to narrow as 
the publication was allowed to lag while ac- 
cess was rapidly advanced. Even so, the 
published volumes have always been far 
ahead of the open period of the files, and 
indeed they were well ahead of even the 
restricted period until the end of World War 
II. Then for a brief period some private 
scholars were permitted into some of the 
wartime records before the publication of 
Foreign Relations. This aberration was made 
possible by the flood of documents on the 
war and its origins, released through mem- 
oirs, the Pearl Harbor hearings, etc., but the 
usefulness of this special access was limited 
by the fact that these historians were not 
permitted to cite many of the most important 
classified files that they were permitted to 
see. In the files of the postwar period a 



Department of State files, June 1927, 116.2/4440. 



• The Department's regulations provide for an 
exception : "Persons who previously occupied policy- 
making positions to which they were appointed by 
the President . . . may be authorized access to 
classified information or material which they 
originated, reviewed, signed, or received while in 
public office." (6 FA.M 946). 



January 29, 1973 



105 



higher proportion of important records are 
classified, so that no access is really possible 
until after the subjects have been considered 
and the principal papers declassified for 
publication in Foreign Relations. To say that 
the series is holding back access is like say- 
ing that the tugboat up front is holding back 
the barge. 

Release of Specific Documents by Request 

With the Freedom of Information Act 
(effective July 4, 1967) there was provided 
a third mechanism whereby documents 
might be made available to the public; 
namely, by special request through a desig- 
nated channel. Each department and agency 
was required to designate an official with 
whom members of the public might register 
their requests for copies of specific docu- 
ments. 7 The act required that the documents 
be "identifiable" and provided that the de- 
partment or agency might deny the request 
if the documents fell into any of nine ex- 
empted categories and that otherwise the 
requester must be provided with copies of 
what he wanted (subject to payment of a 
fee for research and copying). Among the 
nine possible exemptions the most important 
with respect to Department records was the 
one that made exemptible those "specifically 
required by Executive Order to be kept 
secret in the interest of the national defense 
or foreign policy." The Department, how- 
ever, has not taken any general refuge in 
this provision. Whenever the documents 
requested under the act have been identifi- 
able and have turned out to be classified, the 
Department has seen to it that they have 
been reviewed by officers authorized to de- 
classify them and that any negative answers 
to requesters would be reviewed by the Office 
of the Legal Adviser in the Department, as 
well as, more recently, by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs. The requester may also file 
an appeal with the Department's Council on 
Classification Policy and/or with the Inter- 



agency Classification Review Committee, 
established by Executive Order 11652, signed 
by the President on March 8, 1972, which 
became effective on June 1, 1972. 

This Executive order contains several 
other provisions designed to facilitate the 
operation of the Freedom of Information 
Act. It greatly reduced the number of of- 
ficers authorized to classify documents, and 
it set up a general declassification schedule 
under which many Top Secret documents will 
be automatically declassified after ten years, 
Secret papers in eight years, Confidential 
ones in six years. The full effect of these 
measures will not be felt for some years, 
but obviously they will tend to reduce the 
number of classified documents and thus to 
improve the likelihood of larger returns to 
members of the public who ask for copies of 
documents. 

The amount of documentation so far made 
available to the public by the State Depart- 
ment under Freedom of Information Act 
procedures is impressive — about 13,000 
pages. Actually, an additional 10,000 pages 
were approved for release by the Department 
in response to requests, but the requesters, 
for one reason or another, failed to order 
their copies. 

On the other hand some scholars and re- 
porters have been bitterly disappointed with 
their meager returns under the act, and it ap- 
pears from some of these cases that there 
has been a fundamental misunderstanding. 
The Freedom of Information Act was not 
designed primarily to meet the broad needs 
of scholars, and not even its most enthusias- 
tic sponsors ever claimed that it would take 
the place of publication and access to files as 
mechanisms for the wholesale release of 
documents. The report on the bill to the 
House of Representatives by the Committee 
on Government Operations s makes it quite 
clear that the sponsors of the measure were 
thinking along more limited and practical 
lines, principally of how to help the citizen 









7 The officer in the Department of State is Donald 
J. Simon, Chief of the Records Services Division. 



8 House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2d 
session, Report No. 1497, May 9, 1966. 



106 



Department of State Bulletin 



who had been adversely affected by some 
government ruling or decision and was un- 
able to find out where or how to proceed with 

his complaint or inquiry. Nothing in the re- 
port suggests that the sponsors of the bill 
were aiming to release to scholars large quan- 
tities of highly classified documents on 
recent foreign policy and international rela- 
tions. The fact of the matter is that the Free- 
dom of Information Act procedure, in the 
experience of this Department, works rather 
well for what it was intended to do. It will 
also assist the occasional scholar who wants 
only documents that are individually identi- 
fiable on subjects relatively nonsensitive. 
Judging from the experience of recent years, 
I should say in all honesty that "grab bag" 
requests for documents by subjects or cate- 
gories will generally not receive favorable 
action, and neither will requests for the 
highest level documents on the most sensi- 
tive international crises of recent years. 

Some scholars have asked to see indexes 
or lists of documents in order that they might 
be better able to identify what they want. 
It is not feasible at present to produce such 
a listing, but this may become possible as the 
files of the Department are computerized. 
Looking ahead one can see the day when the 
Department will be able to issue periodic 
lists of documents unclassified and declassi- 
fied from which anyone can pick his desired 
items and obtain copies with great speed. 
Thus the providing of copies by request may 
become in time a far more important method 
of releasing documents than it can be at 
present. 

In the foregoing pages I have described 
the three ways of making government docu- 
ments available to the public: by publica- 
tion, by granting access to files, and by 
providing copies on request. Each of these 
methods has characteristics of its own, and 
all of them are necessary to meet the vary- 
ing needs of different types of persons and 
problems. In recent years the Department 
has moved to improve and expedite every 
one of these mechanisms, all of which ad- 
mittedly need from time to time a shot of 



"openness." We are continuing to work to 
improve still further. Only in this way can 
there be maintained a proper balance be- 
tween the immediate need of the government 
— in the interest of the public as a whole — 
for confidentiality in some matters of na- 
tional security and foreign affairs and the 
sometimes temporarily conflicting right of 
the individual citizen in a democracy to 
know what is going on. 



173d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Hey ward 
I sham, acting head of the U.S. delegation, 
at the 173d plenary session of the meetings 
on Viet-Nam at Paris on January 11. 

Press release 3 dated January 11 

Ladies and gentlemen: My remarks today 
will be particularly brief because, as you 
know, a further round of substantive dis- 
cussions is in progress and I believe we 
should say nothing here today which could 
in any way complicate the efforts being made 
to reach a just settlement. 

It has long been our preference to take 
the path of negotiations as the most effective 
means to end the war and restore peace. 
Serious negotiations offer the best prospect 
of settling the complex issues in this pro- 
tracted conflict with justice to all parties. 

In keeping with the implementing respon- 
sibilities which will be undertaken here once 
an agreement is concluded, I believe that we 
should exercise restraint and moderation in 
our presentations. Exaggerated rhetoric and 
unfounded accusations of bad faith are of 
course inconsistent with the constructive at- 
mosphere which should accompany a process 
of serious negotiations. 

On the other hand, a sober deescalation of 
the rhetoric would be a useful step so that 
our deliberations here might enlighten, not 
obscure, the search for peace. I hope that 
you will be guided by this precept. 



January 29, 1973 



107 



U.S. Joins Canada in Mourning Death 
of Former Prime Minister Pearson 

Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister 
of Canada, died December 27. Following are 
statements by President Nixon and Secretary 
Rogers issued December 28. 



STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

White House press release dated December 28 

Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister 
of Canada, will be remembered as one of the 
20th century's most untiring and effective 
workers in the cause of world peace. For 
four decades, as diplomat, statesman, and 
Nobel Peace Prize laureate, he gave unstint- 
ingly of himself in the service of Canada and 
the world community. The record of his ac- 
complishments as an outstanding postwar 
leader has few equals. 

Canada has lost a great leader. We in the 
United States have lost a firm friend. The 
world has lost a great statesman and a wise 
counselor. His life illustrates in a profound 
way how much one man, by virtue of hard 
work, high principle, and a sympathetic 
understanding of his fellow man, can accom- 
plish in the cause of peace and freedom. 

As one who has had the privilege of know- 
ing Lester Pearson for two decades, and 
who has counted him a friend, I shall miss 
him greatly. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Press release 322 dated December 29 

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death 
of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson. 
He leaves behind a truly distinguished record 
of service to Canada and to mankind, not 
only in his years as Prime Minister but in 
his years as Secretary of State for External 
Affairs. As we continue our efforts to create 
a stable peace in the world, the example of 
his achievements in working toward that goal 



will be a source of inspiration to us all. I 
extend to the Pearson family my deepest 
sympathy in their loss. 



Import Quotas for Nonfat Dry Milk 
Temporarily Increased 

A PROCLAMATION 1 

Amending Part 3 op the Appendix to the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States with Respect 
to the Importation of Agricultural Commod- 
ities 

Whereas, pursuant to section 22 of the Agri- 
cultui-al Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 
624), by Presidential Proclamation limitations have 
been imposed on the quantities of certain dairy prod- 
ucts which may be imported into the United 
States in any quota year; and 

Whereas, in accordance with section 102(3) of 
the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, the President 
by Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963 (28 
F.R. 9279), proclaimed the additional import re- 
strictions set forth in part 3 of the Appendix to the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States; and 

Whereas the import restrictions on certain 
dairy products set forth in part 3 of the Appendix 
to the Tariff Schedules of the United States as 
proclaimed by Proclamation No. 3548 have been 
amended by Proclamation No. 3558 of October 5, 
1963; Proclamation No. 3562 of November 26, 1963; 
Proclamation No. 3597 of July 7, 1964; section 88 of 
the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act 
of 1965 (79 Stat. 950) ; Proclamation No. 3709 of 
March 31, 1966; Proclamation No. 3790 of June 
30, 1967; Proclamation No. 3822 of December 16, 
1967; Proclamation No. 3856 of June 10, 1968; 
Proclamation No. 3870 of September 24, 1968; 
Proclamation No. 3884 of January 6, 1969; Proc- 
lamation No. 4026 of December 31, 1970; and 
Proclamation No. 4138 of June 3, 1972; and 

Whereas the Secretary of Agriculture has re- 
ported to me that he believes that additional 
quantities of dried milk provided for in item 950.02 
of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (here- 
inafter referred to as "nonfat dry milk") may be 
imported for a temporary period without rendering 
or tending to render ineffective, or materially in- 
terfering with, the price support program now 
conducted by the Department of Agriculture for 
milk or reducing substantially the amount of prod- 



1 No. 4177; 38 Fed. Reg. 7. 



108 



Department of State Bulletin 



ucts processed in the United States from domestic 
milk ; and 

WHEREAS, under the authority of section 22, I 
have requested the United States Tariff Commission 
to make an investigation with respect to this mat- 
ter : and 

WHEREAS the Secretary of Agriculture has de- 
termined and reported to me that a condition exists 
with respect to nonfat dry milk which requires 
emergency treatment and that the quantitative lim- 
itation imposed on nonfat dry milk should be in- 
creased during the period ending February' 15, 1973, 
without awaiting the recommendations of the United 
States Tariff Commission with respect to such ac- 
tion; and 

Whereas I find and declare that the importation 
during the period ending February 15, 1973, of the 
additional quantity of nonfat dry milk specified 
below will not render or tend to render ineffective, 
or materially interfere with, the price support pro- 
gram which is being undertaken by the Department 
of Agriculture for milk and will not reduce sub- 
stantially the amount of products processed in the 
United States from domestic milk; and that a con- 
dition exists which requires emergency treatment 
and that the quantitative limitation imposed on 
nonfat dry milk should be increased during such 
period without awaiting the recommendations of 
the United States Tariff Commission with re 
to such action ; 

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me as President, 
and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 
and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby 
proclaim that headnote 3(a) of Part 3 of the 
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United 
States is temporarily amended by adding a new sub- 
division as follows: 

(vi) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
part, 25,000,000 pounds of dried milk described in 
item 115.50 may be entered during the period be- 
ginning December 30, 1972, and ending February 
15, 1973, in addition to the annual quota quantity 
specified for such article under item 950.02, and 
import licenses shall not be required for entering 
such additional quantity. No individual, partner- 
ship, firm, corporation, association, or other legal 
entity (including its affiliates or subsidiaries) may 
during such period enter pursuant to this provision 
quantities of such additional dried milk totaling in 
excess of 2,500,000 pounds. 



The additional quota quantity provided for herein 
shall continue in effect pending Presidential action 
upon receipt of the report and recommendations of 
the Tariff Commission with respect thereto. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this thirtieth day of December in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-two, and 
of the Independence of the United States of Amer- 
ica the one hundred and ninety seventh. 



(J2jjW7L^ 



Authorization of Funds for Defense 
Articles and Services for Portugal 

Presidential Determination No. 73-9 a 
Presidential Determination — Portugal 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, December 5, 1972. 
In accordance with the recommendation in your 
memorandum of November 6, and pursuant to 
Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, I hereby: 

(a) Determine that the use of not to exceed 
$905,000 in FY 1973 for the grant of defense 
articles and defense services to Portugal, without 
regard to Section 620 (m) of the Act, is important 
to the security of the United States; and 

(b) Authorize such use of up to $905,000 for the 
grant of defense articles and defense services to 
Portugal without regard to the limitations of 
Section 620 (m) of the Act. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 



1 37 Fed. Reg. 27613. 



January 29, 1973 



109 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Reaffirms Support of Efforts 
of U.N. in Drug Abuse Control 

Following is a statement made in Com- 
mittee HI (Social, Humanitarian and Cul- 
tural) of the U.N. General Assembly on 
November 28 by U.S. Representative Jewel 
Lafontant, together with the texts of resolu- 
tions adopted by the committee on November 
29 and by the Assembly on December 18. 

STATEMENT BY MRS. LAFONTANT 

USUN press release 147 dated November 28 

The response of the international com- 
munity to the growing menace of drug abuse 
is encouraging. National and international 
programs have been formulated which seek 
to eradicate this menace in all forms and in 
all places throughout the world. My govern- 
ment welcomes this development which sup- 
ports our view that no society is free of the 
present or potential threat of drug abuse. 

Control of drug abuse requires interna- 
tional cooperation as well as determined na- 
tional programs. In his message to Congress 
on June 17, 1971, President Nixon stated: 1 

No serious attack on our national drug problem 
can ignore the international implications of such 
an effort, nor can the domestic effort succeed with- 
out attacking the problem on an international plane. 

My government believes that the United Na- 
tions has a key role to play in the worldwide 
fight against drug abuse. A good start has 
been made. As the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) report indicates, 2 there 
have been significant developments during 
the past year in the efforts of the United 
Nations to deal with the problem of drug 
abuse and illicit traffic. 



1 For text, see Bulletin of July 12, 1971, p. 58. 

2 U.N. doc. A/8703. 



The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control, which was established less than two 
years ago, has made progress in developing 
administrative structure and in project prep- 
aration. We anticipate that the Fund will 
become more fully operational in the year 
ahead and provide meaningful assistance to 
countries in their efforts to combat drug 
abuse. 

Nineteen countries have contributed to 
the Fund, and several have indicated they 
will maintain their contributions on an an- 
nual basis. Continuing and increasing finan- 
cial support and strong management and 
viable projects are all necessary for an effec- 
tive program of United Nations assistance 
to cooperating countries. 

My delegation is pleased that many excel- 
lent projects have been developed by the 
Fund with the support of the Division of 
Narcotic Drugs and the assistance of the 
specialized agencies, particularly WHO and 
FAO [World Health Organization; Food and 
Agriculture Organization]. It is noteworthy 
that the number of projects approved by the 
Fund exceeds available resources. The pro- 
gram in Thailand is now underway, and we 
hope that similar programs will be launched 
shortly in other countries. We trust that 
project implementation will proceed rapidly 
and effectively and that the best quali- 
fied personnel will be secured for specific 
programs. 

At present all funds necessary to complete 
long-term projects of the Fund are being 
committed for the full life of those projects 
and thus cannot be used for current expend- 
itures. This practice has placed a financial 
strain on the Fund. We would recommend 
that, subject only to the maintenance of a 
small operational reserve, all financial re- 
sources of the Fund be available for current 
programing purposes. Only in this way can 



110 



Department of State Bulletin 



the organization obtain maximum value for 
funds contributed. 

The capabilities of the United Nations in 
the field of drug abuse control have been 
strengthened by the appointment of Dr. Sten 
Martens to the important post of Director 
of tlu> Division of Narcotic Drugs. We wish 
him well in his important undertaking. We 
anticipate further appointments in the 
United Nations narcotics organization, such 
as regional narcotics advisers, which will 
enhance the capabilities of the organization 
to deal effectively with this international 
problem. 

The important Protocol Amending the 
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
was adopted by an international conference 
last March. This protocol is now before gov- 
ernments and will come into force when 40 
ratifications are deposited. The United States 
has completed its ratification process, and 
we would urge other governments to expe- 
dite their procedures for ratification or ac- 
cession so that the protocol may become 
effective at the earliest possible date. The 
amending protocol and the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, adopted in 1971, 
are two important pieces of international 
legislation which are before governments for 
approval. When brought into force, they will 
strengthen the regulation of the interna- 
tional traffic in narcotics and other drugs 
subject to abuse and enhance the operations 
of the International Narcotics Control Board. 

In this connection I have the honor to 
int induce the draft resolution contained in 
A C.3 L.1977, which calls on all countries 
to adhere to the 1961 Single Convention, the 
amending protocol to the Single Convention, 
and the Convention on Psychotropic Sub- 
stances. This resolution is cosponsored by 
the delegations of Australia, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Nicaragua, 
Korway, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkey, and Uruguay, in addi- 
tion to my delegation. We commend this res- 
olution to the committee and recommend its 
unanimous adoption. 



The International Narcotics Control Board, 
which has made a vital contribution to com- 
bating illicit production and trafficking, will 
have an even more important function when 
the amending protocol comes into force. My 
government attaches great importance, there- 
fore, to the elections to the International 
Narcotics Control Board next year, and we 
would urge governments to insure that 
highly qualified individuals are nominated. 

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs has 
been expanded and strengthened as a result 
of a decision taken by ECOSOC Resolution 
1663 (LII). A 30-member Commission will 
permit wider representation of member 
states, thereby providing tangible recogni- 
tion to the increased importance which the 
international community accords to the prob- 
lem of drug control. 

We would hope that interested countries 
which are not members of the Commission 
will accept the invitation of the Secretary 
General to participate in its work as ob- 
servers. We would urge interested govern- 
ments in particular to be represented at the 
next session of the Commission in January 
1973. 

An important initiative taken by the Com- 
mission at its session in 1971 was the estab- 
lishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit 
Traffic in the Near and Middle East. This 
committee has now concluded a study tour 
of the countries in the area and will soon 
be issuing a report on its findings. We hope 
that the results of this study tour will lead 
to more effective cooperation among the 
countries in the area and that it will en- 
courage countries in other areas to establish 
similar forms of cooperation. My delegation 
would hope that the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs at its next session in January 1973 
would recommend to the Economic and So- 
cial Council that it convert the ad hoc com- 
mittee to a regional subcommission for that 
area and authorize the establishment of re- 
gional subcommissions in other areas. 

My delegation welcomes the resolution in- 
troduced by the delegation from Afghanistan 
and contained in A/C.3/L.1976, which we 



January 29, 1973 



111 



are pleased to cosponsor. We believe that 
this resolution is consistent with article 14 
bis in the protocol amending the Single Con- 
vention, which provides : 

. . . the Board . . . may recommend . . . that 
technical or financial assistance, or both, be pro- 
vided to the Government in support of its efforts to 
carry out its obligation under this Convention. . . . 

We are also pleased to cosponsor draft 
resolution A/C.3/L.1978, presented at the 
initiative of the distinguished Representa- 
tive of Greece. We support the need for more 
effective and extensive efforts by the United 
Nations system in dealing with drug abuse 
and sustained contributions to the United 
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. 

In conclusion, we wish to express our ap- 
preciation to the Secretary General, to his 
special representative Ambassador [Carl] 
Schurmann, to Dr. Martens, Director of the 
Division of Narcotic Drugs, and all their col- 
leagues in the Secretariat who have been 
responsible for the progress which the 
United Nations has made in the field of drug 
abuse control during the past year. 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

General Assembly Resolution 3012 

Assistance in narcotics control 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling that assistance to developing countries 
is a concrete manifestation of the will of the inter- 
national community to honour the commitment con- 
tained in the Charter of the United Nations to 
promote the social and economic progress of all 
peoples, 

Recalling the special arrangements made by the 
General Assembly under its resolution 1395 (XIV) 
of 20 November 1959 with a view to the provision 
of technical assistance for drug control, 

Reaffirming its resolution 2719 (XXV) of 15 De- 
cember 1970, in which it welcomed the establishment 
of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control, 

Further recalling Economic and Social Council 
resolution 1664 (LII) of 1 June 1972, in which the 
Council urged States, institutions and individuals 



to contribute to the Fund in any form and accord- 
ing to their capacity, 

1. Welcomes the fact that the Economic and 
Social Council expressed satisfaction with the suc- 
cessful result of the United Nations Conference to 
Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, particularly that a new arti- 
cle 14 bis was adopted concerning technical and 
financial assistance to promote more effective execu- 
tion of the provisions of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs; 

2. Declares that, to be more effective, the measures 
to fight drug abuse must be co-ordinated and 
universal ; 

3. Declares further that the fulfilment by the 
developing countries of their obligations under the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs calls for 
adequate technical and financial assistance from 
the international community. 

General Assembly Resolution 3013' 
Narcotic drugs 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolu- 
tions 1658 (LII) and 1665 (LII) of 1 June 1972, 

Deeply concerned over the threat to human dig- 
nity and society posed by the flow of illicit drugs, 

Gratified by the adoption by international con- 
ferences of the Convention on Psychotropic Sub- 
stances and the Protocol amending the Single Con- 
vention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 

Convinced that the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances would result in the necessary inter- 
national regulation of these substances, 

Further convinced of the importance of the Pro- 
tocol in strengthening enforcement provisions of 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 

Calls upon all countries, provided they have not al- 
ready done so, to adhere to : 

(a) The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961; 

(b) The Protocol amending the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 ; 

(c) The Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 

General Assembly Resolution 3014"' 

United Nations Programme for Drug Abuse Control 

The General Assembly, 

Noting that drug abuse is a continuing problem 
in many parts of the world, 

Encouraged by the growing interest of Govern- 
ments in dealing with drug abuse, 



3 Adopted on Dec. 18 by a recorded vote of 113 
(U.S.) to 0, with 9 abstentions. 



* Adopted on Dec. 18 by a recorded vote of 111 
(U.S.) to 0, with 9 abstentions. 

G Adopted on Dec. 18 by a recorded vote of 114 
(U.S.) to 0, with 8 abstentions. 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



1. Weloomu the expanded operations of the 
United Nations Programme for Drug Abuse Con- 
trol and especially the efforts made by the Division 
of Narcotic Drugs of the Secretariat in the field of 
drug abuse control; 

2. Recognizes the importance of the United Na- 
tions programme of action based on short-term 
and long-term policy, as approved by the General 
Assembly in resolution 2719 (XXV) of 15 December 
1970, and affirms the need for more effective and 
extensive efforts by the United Nations system; 

3. Appeals consequently to Governments for sus- 
tained support and voluntary contributions to the 
Tinted Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, in 
any form and according to their capacity; 

4. Invites the Division of Narcotic Drugs, the 
specialized agencies and other interested inter- 
governmental organizations to co-operate fully in 
the United Nations programme of action; 

5. Further invites the specialized agencies and 
other interested intergovernmental organizations to 
pay special attention in the formulation of their own 
programmes relating to the socio-economic conse- 
quences of drug abuse and to appropriate means 
to combat it. 



General Assembly Sets Schedule 
for Conference on Law of the Sea 

Following are statements by John R. 
Stevenson. Legal Adviser of the Department 
of State and U.S. Representative to the U.N. 
Seabed Committee, made in Committee I 
(Political and Security) of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly on November 28 and Decem- 
ber 7. together with the text of a resolution 
adopted by Committee I on December 7 and 
by the Assembly on December 18. 



STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 28 

USUN press release 148 dated November 28 

It is a pleasure for me to speak to this 
committee in connection with our considera- 
tion of the law-of-the-sea item. The focus of 
our deliberations is the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference, and I would like to outline today my 
delegation's views on what a General As- 
sembly resolution on this subject should 
contain. 

This General Assembly has the opportu- 
nity to confirm and build upon the terms of 



Resolution 2750 C passed at the 25th session 
and calling for the convening of a Law of 
the Sea Conference in 1973.' The most 
important thing we could do in this regard 
would be to determine a precise and suitable 
schedule and site or sites for the conference. 
The judgment of the 25th General Assembly 
in choosing 1973 as the year for beginning 
a conference should be respected. However, 
we agree with those who believe that ad- 
ditional intensive preparatory work by the 
committee in 1973 would improve the 
chances for a successful conference on the 
substance of the law of the sea. Thus, we 
can agree with those delegations that have 
suggested an organizational meeting of the 
conference in the fall of 1973, with intensive 
preparatory work by the committee in the 
spring and summer of 1973 and the schedul- 
ing of adequate substantive conference work 
to begin in the spring of 1974, preferably, in 
our view, in March. We are pleased to see 
the details of this schedule, including specific 
dates and places, reflected in the thinking 
of a large number of delegations. 

In the view of my delegation, a timely 
conclusion to substantive work, with the at- 
tendant opening of a treaty for signature, 
is as important as an early beginning. If 
the preparatory work next year sees the 
full emergence of the constructive and work- 
manlike atmosphere which began to develop 
in the Seabed Committee this past summer 
and if nations face up to some of the hard 
political decisions necessary for an overall 
accommodation of interests in the law of 
the sea, then there is no reason why the 
conference could not complete its work 
during 1974. We could help insure a suc- 
cessful completion of the treaty in 1974 if 
we schedule at this General Assembly suf- 
ficient time for substantive work in that 
year. If the General Assembly were at this 
time to schedule two sessions of the confer- 
ence in 1974, one in March-April and the 
other in July-August, this would afford the 
opportunity for consultations within and 
among governments in the interval between 



1 For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Feb. 
1, 1971, p. 158. 



January 29, 1973 



113 



the sessions, yet maintain the momentum of 
the negotiations looking toward a generally 
acceptable law-of-the-sea treaty. 

Mr. Chairman, the kind of conference 
resolution being discussed is premised on the 
need for more preparatory work. Accord- 
ingly, it is extremely important for the Sea- 
bed Committee to accelerate the pace of its 
work in the months ahead if we are to meet 
the schedule that I have just outlined. In par- 
ticular, it would be a mistake to consider 
providing for any less than the 13 weeks for 
preparatory work by the Seabed Committee 
which was suggested earlier by the commit- 
tee itself. (See paragraph 26 of the commit- 
tee's report — A/8721.) Of course, the 
committee can determine how to use that 
time most productively. For example, it 
might well be that the first one or two weeks 
of the eight-week summer session could be 
more productively devoted to working-group 
rather than full committee or subcommittee 
sessions. 

Since 1970, the Seabed Committee has held 
four meetings in discharging its duty of 
preparing for the conference. Its progress, or 
the lack of it, has been criticized by some. 
However, as I have suggested, my govern- 
ment noted a greater dedication to work 
within the committee at last summer's meet- 
ing. This more positive attitude significantly 
contributed, we believe, to two concrete 
achievements : first, the adoption of the com- 
prehensive list of subjects and issues and, 
second, the preparation of draft texts (with 
alternative formulations where agreement 
could not be reached) on the principles of a 
regime for the deep seabed. The former 
accomplishment fulfills one of the specific 
directives of Resolution 2750 C, while the 
latter demonstrates what can be done when 
members engage in intensive negotiations 
and detailed drafting with a minimum of 
rhetoric. We continue to believe that working 
groups similar to those formed by subcom- 
mittees I and HI of the Seabed Committee 
to deal with the international seabed regime 
and marine pollution are one of the best 
means to assure progress in treaty drafting, 
and we would support the establishment 



during 1973 of working groups in subcom- 
mittee II. 

Resolution 2750 C contains a provision 
permitting the General Assembly to postpone 
the conference if, upon the review of the 
Seabed Committee's work, it finds the prep- 
arations to be insufficient. As a strictly legal 
matter, such express authority is not neces- 
sary to enable a succeeding General As- 
sembly to alter a decision taken by an earlier 
one. However, we see no difficulty in includ- 
ing an express provision on this point in a 
new resolution. In fact, we support its 
inclusion as the best way of achieving wide- 
spread support for a resolution which fixes 
a definite and confidence-inspiring time 
schedule. By balancing a fixed and exacting 
time schedule which could lead to completion 
of the treaty in 1974 with provision for 
altering this schedule if progress is insuf- 
ficient, we maximize the opportunity to 
finish at the earliest possible date, yet 
reassure those who do not wish to move to 
the conference stage without reasonable 
assurance that the conference has been 
adequately prepared. 



STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 7 

As my delegation has already made clear 
its views on the scheduling and preparations 
for the Law of the Sea Conference, we will 
limit our remarks to two points in con- 
nection with our affirmative vote on the 
conference resolution (document A/C.l/L. 
634). 

First, we are pleased that the details of 
the resolution have been resolved in a 
manner that permitted such widespread 
support from all regions. This augurs well 
for the future of our deliberations and rep- 
resents a clear determination on the part of 
all concerned to resolve our substantive 
problems together at a timely and successful 
Law of the Sea Conference. 

Second, we continue to believe that the 
precise work schedule for 1974 contained 
in the resolution is not adequate. However, 
we have been reassured by statements from 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



the cosponsors to the effect that the decision 
regarding eight weeks of work is not neces- 
sarily a complete schedule for 1974 and that 
this could be expanded in an appropriate 
way by the 28th General Assembly. A 
number of cosponsors have referred to 
specific ways of expanding the schedule. It 
is our view that such an expansion will be 
necessary. In the light of these assurances, 
the United States is able to support the 
resolution as revised by the cosponsors in 
accordance with the statement of the dis- 
tinguished Representative of Thailand. 

Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by the 
wide extent of agreement in this committee 
on an expanded and accelerated work pro- 
gram for the Seabed Committee in 1973. We 
believe that the final phase of our prepara- 
tory work should begin not in March of 
1973 but much sooner than that as govern- 
ments, alone and in consultation with each 
other, endeavor to find ways to harmonize 
the interests of their own countries with 
those of other countries and the international 
community in general. Let us arrive in 
March, having identified our interests more 
clearly and determined to shape a new and 
comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea 
that protects and accommodates all of the 
major interests involved. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 246V (XXIII) of 21 
December 1968, 2750 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 
and 2881 (XXVI) of 21 December 1971, 

Having considered the report of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Juris- 
diction on the work of its sessions in 1972, 

ng with satisfaction the further progress 
made towards the preparations for a comprehensive 
international conference of plenipotentiaries on the 
law of the sea, including in particular acceptance 
of a list of subjects and issues relating to the law 
of the sea. 

Reaffirming that the problems of ocean space 
are closely interrelated and need to be considered 
as a whole, 



•TJ.N. doc. A/3029 A (XXVII); adopted by the 
Assembly unanimously on Dec. 18. 



Recalling its decision, in resolution 2750 C (XXV) 
of 17 December 1970, to convene a conference on 
law of the sea in 197.:, 

Expressing the expectation that the conference 
may be concluded in 1974 and, if necessary as may 
be decided by the conference with the approval of 
the General Assembly, at a subsequent session or 
subsequent sessions no later than 1975, 

1. Reaffirms the mandate of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction 
sit forth in General Assembly resolutions 2467 
(XXIII) and 2750 (XXV), as supplemented by 
the present resolution; 

2. Requests the Committee, in the discharge of 
its mandate in accordance with resolution 2750 C 
(XXV), to hold two further sessions in 1973, one of 
five weeks at New York, beginning in early March, 
and the other of eight weeks at Geneva, beginning 
in early July, with a view to completing its pre- 
paratory work, and to submit a report with rec- 
ommendations to the General Assembly at its 
twenty-eighth session and, in the light of the 
decision taken under paragraph 5 of this resolution, 
to the conference; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to convene the 
first session of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea at New York for a period 
of approximately two weeks in November/ December 

1973, for the purpose of dealing with organization- 
al matters, including the election of officers, the 
adoption of the agenda and the rules of procedure 
of the Conference, the establishment of subsidiary 
organs and the allocation of work to these sub- 
sidiary organs; 

4. Decides to convene the second session of the 
Conference, for the purpose of dealing with sub- 
stantive work, at Santiago, Chile, in April/May 

1974, for a period of eight weeks, and such sub- 
sequent sessions, if necessary, as may be decided 
by the Conference and approved by the General 
Assembly, bearing in mind that the Government 
of Austria has offered Vienna as a site for the 
Conference for the succeeding year; 

5. Further decides to review at its twenty-eighth 
session the progress of the preparatory work of the 
Committee and, if necessary, to take measures to 
facilitate completion of the substantive work for 
the Conference and any other action it may deem 
appropriate; 

6. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consul- 
tation with the Chairman of the Committee, to make 
such arrangements as may be necessary for the 
efficient organization and administration of the 
Conference and the Committee, utilizing to the 
fullest extent possible the resources of staff at his 
disposal, to render to the Conference and the Com- 
mittee all the assistance they may require in legal, 
economic, technical and scientific matters and to 
provide them with all relevant documentation of 



January 29, 1973 



115 



the United Nations, the specialized agencies and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency; 

7. Decides to consider as a matter of priority at 
its twenty-eighth session any further matters re- 
quiring decision in connexion with the Conference, 
including the participation of States in the Con- 
ference, and to inscribe on the provisional agenda 
of that session an item entitled "Reservation ex- 
clusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and 
the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying 
the high seas beyond the limits of present national 
jurisdiction and use of their resources in the in- 
terests of mankind, and convening of a conference 
on the law of the sea"; 

8. Invites the specialized agencies, the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency and other inter- 
governmental organizations to co-operate fully with 
the Secretary-General in the preparations for the 
Conference and to send observers to the Conference; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General, subject to 
approval by the Conference, to invite interested non- 
governmental organizations having consultative 
status with the Economic and Social Council to 
send observers to the Conference; 

10. Decides that the Conference and its main 
committees shall have summary records of their 
proceedings. 



U.S. Opposes Establishing Committee 
To Review U.N. Charter 

Following is a statement made in Com- 
mittee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General As- 
sembly by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on 
December k, together with the text of a 
resolution adopted by the committee on 
December 7 and by the Assembly on Decem- 
ber 1U. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT 

USUN press release 153 dated December 5 

The United States considers the item 
before us one of profound importance. Con- 
sequently we are pleased at how much of 
what has been said so far we can whole- 
heartedly agree with. 

I would like first to commend our dis- 
tinguished colleague and old friend the 
distinguished Foreign Minister of the Philip- 
pines for his constructive and eloquent 
introduction of the item. We regard as an 



appropriate theme for the discussion of this 
item the following words of General [Carlos 
P.] Romulo: "the United Nations must keep 
pace, indeed it must set the pace of change 
in our changing world." 

But we must ask ourselves whether this 
imperative leads to the conclusion that we 
must embark on a general review of the 
charter. 

It seems to my delegation unarguably true 
that the charter has not been interpreted or 
applied in a rigid and unbending manner. It 
has, in fact, been interpreted and applied 
as a document of a constitutional character. 
The practices of the organization, including 
General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions and the advisory opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, have con- 
tributed to a very substantial evolution of 
the basic law of the United Nations. Refer- 
ence has already been made by other 
speakers to the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
and the Declaration of Principles of Inter- 
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among States as examples 
of the process of evolution. 1 

This is not to say that the system is per- 
fect, much less that it has operated in a 
perfect manner. As we stated in our written 
comments to the Secretary General on the 
question of charter review : " 

The performance of the United Nations has ad- 
mittedly been disappointing on many occasions and 
in various areas of concern. It has clearly not 
realized its potential. The United States believes 
that in so far as this is a reflection of structural 
or organizational weaknesses in the Organization, 
every effort should be made to remedy them, and 
sees much that could be done. 

I will not repeat all of the specific sug- 
gestions we set forth in our reply to the 
Secretary General nor reiterate the specific 
suggestions made by Secretary of State 
Rogers in his general debate statement. 3 

Further efforts to rationalize the function- 



1 For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Nov. 
20, 1950, p. 823; for text of the declaration, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 627. 

2 U.N. doc. A/8746/Add. 1. 

3 For Secretary Rogers' statement before the 
General Assembly on Sept. 25, see Bulletin of Oct. 
16, 1972, p. 425. 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing of the organization are urgently required 

if the Assembly is to function with accept- 
able efficiency and effectiveness. 

We also continue to believe that the United 
Nations should establish an associate status 
short of full membership for states that 
because of their limited population and re- 
sources are unable to fulfill charter obliga- 
tions and participate fully in the work of 
the organization. 

Nor should these efforts within the exist- 
ing framework be limited to the General 
Assembly. 

The Security Council must also strive to 
enhance its effectiveness. The Council should, 
inter alia, make greater use of its existing 
powers of investigation and recommenda- 
tion. At the least, greater heed should be paid 
to the provisions of article 23, which enjoins 
the Assembly to pay special regard "in the 
first instance to the contribution of Members 
of the United Nations to the maintenance 
of international peace and security and to 
the other purposes of the Organization" in 
electing nonpermanent members of the 
Security Council. 

The International Court of Justice has 
taken what appear to be significant steps 
to streamline and modernize its procedures. 
Further study of ways and means of making 
greater use of the Court seems to us advis- 
able, but more on that when we come to our 
next item. 

Far more important, however, than any of 
these specific suggestions is the need for 
states to exhibit the requisite will to make 
the existing system work. Other speakers 
have mentioned this need, but it cannot be 
overstressed. 

None of the specific suggestions we have 
just mentioned, it will be noted, require an 
amendment of the charter. 

This is not to say we oppose charter 
amendment per se. We supported an amend- 
ment which increased the size of the 
Security Council and two amendments in- 
creasing the size of the Economic and Social 
Council. We, however, prefer the case-by- 
case approach. The case-by-case approach 
holds greater prospects of bringing about 



desirable changes for which there is the 
required majority support while avoiding 
acrimonious debate about changes on which 
there is not broad agreement and which 
consequently would divide rather than 
strengthen the institution. If there are 
changes which command broad support we 
are prepared to consider them as we did the 
amendments recommended by the 18th 
General Assembly and even take the lead in 
espousing them as we did at the 26th session. 
Past history indicates that we do not need 
to launch a new committee on the review 
of the charter in order to adopt amendments. 

We do not hesitate to launch an exercise 
on the review of the charter merely because 
we think the resources and energies of 
governments would be better directed to 
improving the functioning of the existing 
machinery. Nor do we doubt the wisdom of 
such an exercise simply because history has 
shown that it is not a necessary step on the 
road to agreeing to amend the charter. Nor 
would we suggest that the existing strain on 
the fiscal and personnel resources of the 
organization is alone sufficient reason to 
decide not to embark on establishing a new 
ad hoc committee to review the charter — 
though we would venture to suggest that the 
sum of these reasons ought to give one pause 
before embarking on the creation of a new 
committee. Nor do we share the sim- 
plistic notion of the world as divided by dif- 
fering economic policies — capitalism versus 
socialism. 

The greatest problem with charter review 
is not its effect on the status quo, but the 
danger it poses to evolution or even ad hoc 
amendment as a means by which the institu- 
tion can continue to meet the changing 
needs. If states are forced to enunciate 
positions on a wide range of charter provi- 
sions in the context of an overall review 
process, there is considerable danger that 
they will be less able to adopt flexible at- 
titudes when the need arises. Moreover, an 
unsuccessful review exercise which resulted 
in unnecessary confrontations between states 
or groups of states could increase rather 
than diminish existing differences and have 



January 29, 1973 



117 



the effect of decreasing confidence in the 
charter and thus render a profound dis- 
service to the United Nations and the cause 
of peace. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while we 
are not opposed to the concept of charter 
review, my delegation shares the doubt of 
others that this is the time to create a new 
committee to pursue the matter. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 4 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 2552 (XXIV) of 12 
December 1969 and 2697 (XXV) of 11 December 
1970 entitled "Need to consider suggestions regard- 
ing the review of the Charter of the United 
Nations", 

Taking note of the observations which were sub- 
mitted by Governments in response to the inquiry 
made pursuant to resolution 2697 (XXV) and 
which are set out in the report of the Secretary- 
General, 

Observing that less than a quarter of the Govern- 
ments of Member States have replied to the Secre- 
tary-General's inquiry and that no general trend 
of opinion in the United Nations can be deduced 
from these replies, 

Recognizing that a review of the Charter which 
was not generally supported would militate against 
the desired result, that is to say, the strengthening 
of the effectiveness of the United Nations, 

Considering that the effectiveness of the United 
Nations depends in the first place on the conduct 
of Member States, 

1. Requests the Secretary-General to invite Mem- 
ber States that have not already done so to submit 
to him, before 1 July 1974, their views on the 
desirability of a review of the Charter of the United 
Nations and their actual suggestions in this respect; 



'U.N. doc. A/RES/2968 (XXVII); adopted by 
the Assembly on Dec. 14 by a vote of 90 (U.S.) to 
10, with 25 abstentions. 



2. Further requests the Secretary-General to 
present to the General Assembly at its twenty- 
ninth session a report setting out the views and 
suggestions of Member States which have been 
submitted to him in accordance with paragraph 1 
above ; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to bring up to 
date as quickly as possible the "Repertory of Prac- 
tice of United Nations Organs"; 

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda 
of its twenty-ninth session the item entitled "Need 
to consider suggestions regarding the review of 
the Charter of the United Nations". 



United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section 
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 
10017. 



General Assembly 

Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its 24th session, May 2-July 7, 1972. 
A/8710. July 22, 1972. 268 pp. plus addendum. 

World Disarmament Conference. Report of the Sec- 
retary General. A/8817. September 25, 1972. 85 
pp. 

The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of 
South Africa — Report of the Special Committee 
on Apartheid on maltreatment and torture of 
prisoners in South Africa. By Barakat Ahmad, 
Rapporteur. A/8770. September 26, 1972. 136 pp. 

General and Complete Disarmament — Chemical and 
Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons — Urgent 
Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo- 
nuclear Tests. Report of the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament. A/8818. September 
26, 1972. 362 pp. 

Implementation of the Declaration on Strengthening 
of International Security. Report of the Secre- 
tary General. A/8775. October 5, 1972. 57 pp. 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Romania Sign Exchanges Agreement for 1973-1974 



Following are a Department announce- 
ment issued December 15 and the text of the 
U.S.-Romania Agreement on Exchanges and 
Cooperation in Educational, Cultural, Scien- 
tific, and Other Fields in 1973-197U signed 
at Washington that day. 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

Press release 310 dated December 15 

The United States and Romania on De- 
cember 15 concluded an Agreement on 
Exchanges and Cooperation in Educational, 
Cultural, Scientific, Technical, and Other 
Fields in 1973-1974. 

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Assistant Secre- 
tary for European Affairs, and Corneliu 
Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the 
United States, signed the agreement at 
Washington. 

The new agreement reflects the mutual 
interest of the United States and Romania 
in a continued expansion and improvement 
of exchanges. The most comprehensive in a 
series of biennial accords which began in 
1960, the agreement signed December 15 
contains several new features. It is in the 
form of an intergovernmental agreement 
rather than of a program effected by ex- 
change of diplomatic notes as in the past. 
It provides for an increase in the number of 
scholars exchanged between the two coun- 
tries each year. Delegations of university 
officials will be exchanged for visits of three 
or four weeks' duration, and a bilateral 
seminar on an aspect of education to be 
agreed upon will be organized in each coun- 
try. An expansion of scientific-medical ex- 
changes is also called for, as well as the 
conclusion of a memorandum of understand- 



ing between the U.S. National Science 
Foundation and the Romanian National 
Council for Science and Technology ; and an 
entirely new section covering government, 
social, professional, and civic exchanges has 
been included. Other sections of the agree- 
ment provide for exchanges and other activi- 
ties in the performing and creative arts, 
books and publications, radio and television, 
exhibits, motion pictures, sports, and 
tourism. 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT 

Press release 310A dated December 15 

Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government 
of the Socialist Republic of Romania on Ex- 
changes and Cooperation in Educational, 
Cultural, Scientific, Technical, and Other 
Fields in 1973-1974 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania, 

Considering the historic ties of friendship be- 
tween the American and the Romanian peoples; 

Believing that exchanges and cooperation in edu- 
cational, cultural, scientific, technical, and other 
fields will contribute to the further broadening of 
mutual understanding between the American and 
the Romanian peoples and to the continued develop- 
ment of mutually beneficial relations between the 
two countries; 

Recognizing that exchanges and cooperation be- 
tween the educational, cultural, scientific and tech- 
nical institutions of the two countries will contribute 
to the cultural and material development of their 
peoples; 

Agree as follows: 

Article I 

Education 
1. a. The United States will make every effort 
to receive annually from the Socialist Republic of 
Romania 17 graduate students or young instructors 



January 29, 1973 



119 



and 18 research scholars for a period of one aca- 
demic year each, with the understanding that four 
of the graduate students will be considered for up 
to three years of study on a program leading to a 
doctoral degree. 

b. The Socialist Republic of Romania will make 
every effort to receive annually from the United 
States 15 graduate students or young instructors 
and 10 research scholars for a period of one aca- 
demic year each, with the understanding that four 
of the graduate students will be considered for up 
to three years of study on a program leading to a 
doctoral degree. 

c. In selecting the fields of study under subpara- 
graphs a and b above, the Parties will make every 
effort to achieve a suitable balance between the 
pure and applied sciences and the social sciences 
and humanities. 

d. The Parties will make every effort to receive 
annually three graduate students or specialists in 
the fine or performing arts for visits which, for the 
three together, total 12 months. 

2. The Parties will receive during the period of 
this Agreement 15 faculty members of educational 
institutions for 21 to 60 day visits totaling 18 
months for the purpose of observation and research 
in mutually acceptable fields. 

3. The Parties will make every effort to promote 
the study of the language, literature and civiliza- 
tion of the two countries in the following manner: 

a. The United States will make every effort to 
receive each academic year four university pro- 
fessors or instructors, at least two of whom will 
be specialists in the teaching of the Romanian 
language and literature. The United States will 
explore the possibility of receiving up to four ad- 
ditional professors or instructors annually. 

b. The Socialist Republic of Romania will make 
every effort to receive each academic year four uni- 
versity professors or instructors in the English 
language and American studies. The Socialist 
Republic of Romania will explore the possibility 
of receiving up to four additional professors or 
instructors annually. 

c. The Parties also agree to encourage the ac- 
ceptance at universities or other academic institu- 
tions of visiting lecturers of the other country in 
mutually acceptable fields of specialization. 

4. The Parties will make every effort further to 
promote the study of the language and literature 
of the other country in the following manner: 

a. The Socialist Republic of Romania will re- 
ceive annually up to 15 American scholars at the 
summer courses on the language, literature, history 
and art of the Romanian people, of whom up to 
eight will receive scholarships from the Romanian 
side; and 

b. The Socialist Republic of Romania will receive 



annually three American lecturers at the summer 
course for Romanian teachers of English. 

5. The Parties will encourage the conclusion of 
arrangements for direct collaboration between their 
universities and institutions of higher learning. 
Such collaboration may include, but need not be 
limited to, cooperative research projects, the grant- 
ing of scholarships and fellowships at the under- 
graduate and graduate levels, and the exchange of 
teachers for lectures and research. 

6. The United States will provide annually the 
opportunity for four Romanians to participate in 
the program of the Council of International Pro- 
grams for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, Inc. 

7. The United States will provide annually the 
opportunity for up to three Romanian teachers of 
science to participate in the summer institutes 
sponsored by the National Science Foundation. 

8. The Parties will encourage their academic in- 
stitutions to send young instructors, graduate stu- 
dents or research scholars to pursue doctoral or 
other specialized studies in the other country. The 
expenses of these scholars will be borne by the 
sending side. 

9. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
materials in the field of education (study plans, 
analytical programs, text books, etc.) between 
institutions of scientific research and education of 
the two countries. 

10. The Parties will exchange delegations of 
three or four university officials for three to four 
week visits, one delegation in each direction, during 
the period of the agreement. The delegations will 
visit universities and other institutions of higher 
learning in order to familiarize themselves with 
the university system in the host country. 

11. Each Party will organize in its own country 
one conference during the period of the agreement 
on an aspect of education to be agreed on through 
diplomatic channels. Each conference will be at- 
tended by three to six participants from each coun- 
try and will include visits to pertinent educational 
institutions. The two Parties will agree on dates 
and agendas 60 days prior to each conference. 

12. The United States will provide annually the 
opportunity for two Romanian writers to participate 
in the University of Iowa International Writing 
Program. Arrangements for this participation will 
be made through diplomatic channels. 

Article II 
Science and Technology 

1. The Parties will promote and assist, as ap- 
propriate, scientific and technical cooperation and 
exchanges between the two countries and will en- 
courage and facilitate direct contacts and coopera- 
tion between agencies, scientific institutions, and 
institutions of higher learning and enterprises of 
the two countries. 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



2. Scientific anil technical cooperation under this 
Agreement may include, but need not l>e limited to, 

tli>' following: 

a. Exchange of scientists and specialists for both 

Bhort and long term visits; 

b. Exchange of scientific and technical informa- 
tion and documentation; 

c. Joint research, exchange of research results and 
experience, and joint development and implementa- 
tion of programs and projects in the basic and 
applied sciences; 

d. Organization of joint courses, conferences, and 
symposia, including the exchange of leading scien- 
tists to give lectures and conduct classes and 
seminars for selected groups of scientists and re- 
searchers; and 

e. Other forms of scientific and technical coopera- 
tion as may be mutually agreed upon. 

3. Each Party will encourage invitations to 
scientists, scholars, and specialists of the other 
country to attend international congresses or con- 
ferences or other scientific and scholarly meetings 
with international participation in the Party's own 
country. 

4. The Parties will encourage and support the 
conduct of cooperative research, joint seminars, and 
scientific visits between scientists and institutions 
of their respective countries in fields of concurrent 
interest to the National Science Foundation of the 
I'nited States of America and the National Council 
for Science and Technology of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania. Specific activities to be con- 
ducted shall be those proposed by scientists and 
scientific institutions of each country. These pro- 

i posals shall be exchanged between the National 
Science Foundation of the United States and the 
National Council for Science and Technology of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania and shall require 
their joint approval. Wherever appropriate, the 
Parties will undertake to promote participation by 
scientists of other countries in these activities. 
The Parties will also support the conclusion of 

i a memorandum of understanding between the Na- 
tional Science Foundation and the National Council 
for Science and Technology- on scientific and tech- 
nological cooperation. 

5. The Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare of the United States of America and the 
Ministry of Health of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania will provide for the exchange annually 
from each country of: 

a. up to seven specialists in medicine and public 
health, for three to four weeks each, to visit 
specialized institutions and exchange information; 
and 

b. up to four medical specialists, for up to six 
months each, to carry out specific research projects 
in fields of common interest. 



The Parties will also facilitate the exchange of 
medical publications, appropriate films, and biolog- 
ical materials between the Department and the 
Ministry. Details of the specific exchanges provided 
for under this paragraph, including necessary ad- 
ministrative arrangements, as well as any new ex- 
changes in the field of health, shall be agreed upon 
directly between the Department and the Ministry. 

6. The Parties will take all appropriate measures 
to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of the 
following agreements: 

a. The Memorandum of Understanding on Ex- 
changes between the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America and the Academy 
of the Socialist Republic of Romania; 

b. The Agreement for an Exchange between the 
International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX) of the United States of America and the 
National Council for Science and Technology of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania; 

c. The Memorandum of Understanding on Trans- 
portation Research Cooperation between the Depart- 
ment of Transportation of the United States of 
America and the Ministry of Transportation and 
Telecommunications of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania; and 

d. The exchange of letters between the Ambas- 
sador of the United States of America to the 
Socialist Republic of Romania and the Chairman of 
the National Council for Science and Technology 
of the Socialist Republic of Romania representing 
a joint understanding on cooperative scientific re- 
search programs between the National Science 
Foundation of the United States of America and the 
National Council for Science and Technology of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. 

7. The Parties will support the renewal of the 
Memorandum of Cooperation between the Atomic 
Energy Commission of the United States of America 
and the State Committee for Nuclear Energy of 
the Socialist Republic of Romania, including any 
mutually agreed upon amendments. 

8. The Parties will support cooperation between 
the International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX) of the United States of America and the 
Academy of Social and Political Sciences of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. 

Article IN 

Performing and Creative Arts 
1. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
leading professional and academic musical, dance, 
and theatrical groups, conductors, and individual 
artists. The United States will encourage the ac- 
ceptance by American impresarios of Romanian 
performing arts groups and individual artists in 
the United States. The Romanian side will en- 
courage the acceptance by the Agency for Artistic 



January 29, 1973 



121 



Management (ARIA) of American performing arts 
groups and individual artists in the Socialist 
Republic of Romania. 

2. The Parties will make every effort to receive, 
on a basis of reciprocity, four specialists annually 
for observation and exchange of information in 
the fields of drama, music, literature or other cul- 
tural and artistic fields, for 30 days each. 

Each Party will explore the possibility of re- 
ceiving one or two cultural leaders for visits of 
shorter duration. 

3. The Parties will encourage the performance 
of theatrical and musical plays of the other coun- 
try, subject to the consent of the authors or com- 
pliance with other legal requirements. 

4. The Parties will encourage the invitation of 
distinguished artists, cultural representatives and 
young performing artists from the other country 
to take part in cultural-artistic events with inter- 
national participation which are organized in their 
own countries. 

Article IV 

Books and Publications 

1. The United States will encourage the Library 
of Congress and other libraries in the United States, 
and the Socialist Republic of Romania will en- 
courage the State Central Library and other 
libraries in Romania, to expand existing exchanges 
of printed and duplicated materials. 

2. The Parties will encourage, subject to the con- 
sent of the authors or compliance with other legal 
requirements, the translation and publication in 
their respective countries of scientific and literary 
works, including anthologies, dictionaries, and other 
compilations, as well as scientific studies, reports, 
and articles published in the other country. 

3. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
scholarly publications and microfilms of manuscripts 
and documents found in their archives, museums, 
and libraries, relating to the history of the two 
countries. 

4. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
specialized publications and microfilms between the 
National Archives of the United States of America 
and the General Department of State Archives of 
the Socialist Republic of Romania. 

Article V 
Radio and Television 
The Parties will encourage and facilitate ex- 
changes in the fields of radio and television by 
exchanging radio materials, such as radio com- 
mentary and musical programs, and by exchanging 
television films on documentary, artistic and musical 
subjects. 

Article VI 
Exhibits 
1. The Parties agree to exchange one exhibit an- 



nually to be shown in three cities for a period of 
four weeks in each city. The themes for the exhibits 
and details as to itinerary and other conditions will 
be determined through diplomatic channels. 

2. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
other exhibits, and the necessary arrangements will 
be made directly between appropriate organizations 
of the two countries. These medium-sized or smaller 
exhibits may incorporate appropriate activities re- 
lated to the themes of the exhibits. Each exhibit 
may be accompanied by such personnel as the send- 
ing side deems necessary. 

3. The Parties will exchange information concern- 
ing the cultural-scientific life of each country, and 
will facilitate the participation of the other country 
in national cultural-artistic exhibits and events with 
international participation which are organized in 
their own country. 

4. The Parties will encourage the museums of 
the two countries to establish and develop direct 
contacts with the aim of exchanging exhibits, inform- 
ative materials, albums, art monographs, and other 
publications of mutual interest. 

5. The Parties will make every effort to exchange 
annually a small exhibit of photographs devoted to 
current topics in the life and cultures of the two 
countries. 

Article VII 

Motion Pictures 

1. The Parties will encourage the conclusion of 
contracts between American film companies and 
Romanian film organizations for the purchase and 
sale of mutually acceptable feature films. 

2. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
mutually acceptable documentary and scientific films 
between corresponding organizations of the two 
countries. 

3. The Parties will encourage the joint production 
of feature and documentary films and will cooperate 
in the field of motion pictures through other means 
that may be agreed upon. 

4. The Parties will encourage the establishment 
of contacts and exchanges of information between 
film publications and associations of film specialists 
of the two countries. 

5. Each Party will encourage the reception of 
film specialists and films at international film 
festivals or meetings of cinematographers to be held 
in its own country. 

6. Each Party will encourage the sponsoring by 
appropriate organizations, including film libraries, 
of a film week devoted to the films of the other 
country. Film specialists from the other country 
may be invited to these functions. Organizational 
and financial details will be established through 
diplomatic channels or between the corresponding 
organizations. 

7. The Parties will encourage the exchange of 
films and informational materials between the Na- 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



tional Film Archives of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania and appropriate institutions in the United 
States. 

Article VIII 

Government, Social, Professional and 
Civic Kxelianges 

1. The Parties agree to render assistance to 
members of the Congress of the United States of 
America and deputies of the Grand National As- 
sembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania, as well 
as to other officials of the national governments of 
both countries, making visits to Romania and the 
United States respectively, concerning which the 
Parties will agree in advance through diplomatic 
channels. 

2. The Parties agree to encourage exchanges of 
representatives of municipal, local and state gov- 
ernments of the United States and Romania to 
study various functions of government at these 
levels. 

3. The Parties agree to encourage joint under- 
takings and exchanges between appropriate organi- 
zations active in civic, social, and professional life, 
including youth and women's organizations, recog- 
nizing that the decision to implement such joint 
undertakings and exchanges remains a concern of 
the organizations themselves. 

Article IX 

Sports 

1. The Parties will facilitate the development of 
exchanges in the field of sports and will support 
the exchange of experience and information between 
the organizations, federations, and institutions of 
physical education and sport in the two countries. 

2. These exchanges and visits will be agreed upon 
between the appropriate United States and Roma- 
nian organizations. 

Article X 
Tourism 
The Parties agree to encourage arrangements 
for tourist travel between the two countries and 
measures to satisfy the requests of tourists, as 
individuals or in groups, to acquaint themselves with 
the life, work and culture of the people of each 
country. 

Article XI 

General 

1. The exchanges and visits provided for herein 
shall be subject to the constitutional requirements 
and applicable laws and regulations of the two 
countries. Within this framework, both Parties will 
use their best efforts to promote favorable condi- 
tions for the fulfillment of these exchanges and 
visits in accordance with the provisions and ob- 
jectives of this Agreement. 



2. This Agreement shall not preclude other ex- 
changes and visits which may be arranged by 
interested organizations or individuals, it being 
understood that arrangements for additional ex- 
changes and visits will be facilitated by prior agree- 
ment through diplomatic channels or between 
appropriate organizations. 

3. The Parties agree to hold, within one year 
after the entry into force of this Agreement, a 
meeting of their representatives to discuss the 
implementation of exchanges in 1973 and the devel- 
opment of the program for 1974. 

Article XII 
Entry into Force 
This Agreement shall enter into force on January 
1, 1973. 

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly 
authorized, have signed this Agreement. 

Done at Washington, in two originals, in the 
English and Romanian languages, both equally 
authentic, this fifteenth day of December, 1972. 

For the Government of the United States of 
America: 

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

For the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania: 

Corn eli u Bogdan 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. > 

Acceptances deposited: Cyprus, January 12, 
1973; Jamaica, January 10, 1973. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, January 9, 
1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. 

Signaturt Egypt, November 24, 1972. 
Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, January 9, 
1973. 



1 Not in force. 



January 29, 1973 



123 



Continental Shelf 

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva 
April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. 
TIAS 5578. 

Accession deposited: Greece (with a reservation), 
November 6, 1972. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution 
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Washington December 29, 1972. 1 
Signatures: Bolivia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, 
Honduras, December 29, 1972; Lesotho, January 
8, 1973; Nepal, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- 
public, Uruguay, December 29, 1972. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 12, 1971. i 
Acceptance deposited: Jordan, December 8, 1972. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971. i 
Acceptance deposited: Jordan, December 8, 1972. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Univer- 
sal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which 
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: Gabon, November 23, 
1972; India, November 17, 1972. 

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Ratification deposited: Gabon, November 23, 1972. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London November 26, 1968. » 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, December 13, 1972. 



Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. 
Ratification deposited: Tanzania, January 9, 1973. 

Wheat 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with 
respect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Dominican Republic, December 29, 
1972. 



BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of April 29, 1971 (TIAS 
7231). Signed at La Paz December 20, 1972. En- 
tered into force December 20, 1972. 

Korea 

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Larson 
to Korea. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul 
October 30 and December 21, 1972. Entered into 
force December 21, 1972. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement for the reciprocal recognition of certif- 
icates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
September 11 and 17, 1934. Entered into force 
October 17, 1934. 49 Stat. 3652. 
Terminated: December 28, 1972. 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of 
airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange 
of notes at London December 28, 1972. Entered 
into force December 28, 1972. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement relating to the transfer of scrap to 
Viet-Nam as supplementary military assistance. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon Novem- 
ber 8 and December 14, 1972. Entered into force 
December 14, 1972. 



1 Not in force. 



124 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX 









I Will 



nnada in Mourning Death 

■Dii, 
Rogers) 

Department and Foreign Sen li- 

ability 

anklin) . . . 

Economic Affairs 

Pry Milk Temporarily Ino: 'reclama- 
tion) 108 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and 
Romania Sign Exchanges nent for 
i (Department announcement, text 
of agreement) .... 119 

Foreign Aid. Authorization of Funds for De- 
nticles anil .Services for Portugal 
■ sidential determination) 109 

n of the Sea. General Assembly Sets Sched- 
ule for Conferci Law of the Sea 
(Stevenson, text of resolution) 113 

Narcotics Control. U.S. Reaffirms Support of 
its of I'.N. in Drug Abuse Control (La- 
fontant, texts of resolutions) 110 

Portugal. Authorization of Funds for Defense 
cles and for Portugal (Presi- 
dential determination) 109 

Presidential Documents 

Authorization of Funds for Defense Articles 
an<l s for Portugal (Presidential 
determination) 109 

Iiport Quotas for Nonfat Pry Milk Tempo- 
rarily Inr reclamation) 108 
S. Joins Canada in Mourning Death of 
Former Primp Minister Pearson 108 
iblic Affairs. The Availability of Department 
of State Records (Franklin) 101 
•mania. U.S. and Romania Sign Exchanges 
• ■ement for 19 (Department an- 
nouncement, text of agreement) 119 

Science. I >. and Romania Sign Exchanges 
Agreement for 1 l Department an- 
nouncement, text of agreement) 119 

Treaty Information 

■nt Actions 123 



1 Mania Sigl 

nt) 

United Nations 

on Paw of tin 

of resolution) 

1 Nations Documents 

uses Establishing Committee To Re- 
view I'.N. Charter (Bennett, t^xt of resolu- 
tion) . . in; 

Reaffirms Support of Efforts of U.N. in 
Drug Abuse Control (Lafontant, texts of 
resolutions) 110 

Viet-Nam. 173d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris (Isham) 107 

e Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr llfi 

Franklin, William M 101 

Isham, Heyward 107 

Lafontant, Jewel 110 

Nixon, President 108, 109 

Rogers, Secretary 108 

Stevenson, John R 113 



Check List of Deportment of State 
Press Releases: January 8-14 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 8 which 
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
"1" ami S10A of December 15 and 322 of 
December 29. 

No, Date Subject 

1 11 Isham: 173d plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

*4 1/12 Biography of Secretary Rogers. 

*5 1/12 National Review Board of the East- 
West Center to meet at Honolulu, 
Jan. 21) 



* Not printed. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



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of Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 







THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXVm • No. 1754 • February 5, 1973 



THE SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT NIXON 125 

THE NEED FOR A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Address by Secretary Rogers 129 

ITED STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: WHERE ARE WE? 
Address by Deputy Assistant Secretary Weintmub 133 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1754 
February 5, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
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Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public an ' 
interested agencies of the governmen 
with information on developments i 
the field of I/.S. foreign relations ar, 
on the work of the Department 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses 
and news conferences of the Presidet 
and the Secretary of State and oth 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information is i 
eluded concerning treaties and inte 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inte 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, < 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



The Second Inaugural Address of President Nixon 



Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Chief 
Justice, Senator Cook, Mrs. Eisenhower, 
and my fellow citizens of this great and good 
country we share together: 

When we met here four years ago, Amer- 
ica was bleak in spirit, depressed by the 
prospect of seemingly endless war abroad 
and of destructive conflict at home. 

As we meet here today, we stand on the 
threshold of a new era of peace in the world. 

The central question before us is : How 
shall we use that peace? 

Let us resolve that this era we are about 
to enter will not be what other postwar 
periods have so often been : a time of retreat 
and isolation that leads to stagnation at home 
and invites new danger abroad. 

Let us resolve that this will be what it can 
become: a time of great responsibilities 
greatly borne, in which we renew the spirit 
and the promise of America as we enter our 
third century as a nation. 

This past year saw far-reaching results 
from our new policies for peace. By continu- 
ing to revitalize our traditional friendships, 
and by our missions to Peking and to Mos- 
cow, we were able to establish the base for 
a new and more durable pattern of relation- 
ships among the nations of the world. Be- 
cause of America's bold initiatives, 1972 will 
be long remembered as the year of the great- 
est progress since the end of World War II 
toward a lasting peace in the world. 

The peace we seek in the world is not the 
flimsy peace which is merely an interlude 
between wars, but a peace which can endure 
for generations to come. 



1 Delivered on Jan. 20 (Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Jan. 22) 



It is important that we understand both 
the necessity and the limitations of America's 
role in maintaining that peace. 

Unless we in America work to preserve the 
peace, there will be no peace. Unless we in 
America work to preserve freedom, there will 
be no freedom. 

But let us clearly understand the new na- 
ture of America's role as a result of the new 
policies we have adopted over these past 
four years. 

We shall respect our treaty commitments. 

We shall support vigorously the principle 
that no country has the right to impose its 
will or rule on another by force. 

We shall continue, in this era of negotia- 
tion, to work for the limitation of nuclear 
arms and to reduce the danger of confronta- 
tion between the great powers. 

We shall do our share in defending peace 
and freedom in the world. But we shall ex- 
pect others to do their share. 

The time has passed when America will 
make every other nation's conflict our own 
or make every other nation's future our re- 
sponsibility or presume to tell the people of 
other nations how to manage their own 
affairs. 

Just as we respect the right of each nation 
to determine its own future, we also recog- 
nize the responsibility of each nation to 
secure its own future. 

Just as America's role is indispensable in 
preserving the world's peace, so is each na- 
tion's role indispensable in preserving its 
own peace. 

Together with the rest of the world, let us 
resolve to move forward from the beginnings 
we have made. Let us continue to bring down 
the walls of hostility which have divided the 



February 5, 1973 



125 



world for too long and to build in their place 
bridges of understanding — so that despite 
profound differences between systems of gov- 
ernment, the people of the world can be 
friends. 

Let us build a structure of peace in the 
world in which the weak are as safe as the 
strong, in which each respects the right of 
the other to live by a different system, in 
which those who would influence others will 
do so by the strength of their ideas and not 
by the force of their arms. 

Let us accept that high responsibility not 
as a burden, but gladly — gladly because the 
chance to build such a peace is the noblest 
endeavor in which a nation can engage, 
gladly also because only if we act greatly 
in meeting our responsibilities abroad will 
we remain a great nation and only if we re- 
main a great nation will we act greatly in 
meeting our challenges at home. 

We have the chance today to do more than 
ever before in our history to make life better 
in America — to insure better education, bet- 
ter health, better housing, better transporta- 
tion, a cleaner environment; to restore 
respect for law, to make our communities 
more livable; and to insure the God-given 
right of every American to full and equal 
opportunity. 

Because the range of our needs is so great, 
because the reach of our opportunities is so 
great, let us be bold in our determination to 
meet those needs in new ways. 

Just as building a structure of peace 
abroad has required turning away from old 
policies that have failed, so building a new 
era of progress at home requires turning 
away from old policies that have failed. 

Abroad, the shift from old policies to new 
has not been a retreat from our responsi- 
bilities, but a better way to peace. And at 
home, the shift from old policies to new will 
not be a retreat from our responsibilities, 
but a better way to progress. 

Abroad and at home, the key to those new 
responsibilities lies in the placing and the 
division of responsibility. We have lived too 
long with the consequences of attempting to 
gather all power and responsibility in 
Washington. 



Abroad and at home, the time has come to 
turn away from the condescending policies 
of paternalism — of "Washington knows 
best." 

A person can be expected to act responsi- 
bly only if he has responsibility. This is hu- 
man nature. So let us encourage individuals 
at home and nations abroad to do more for 
themselves, to decide more for themselves. 
Let us locate responsibility in more places. 
And let us measure what we will do for 
others by what they will do for themselves. 

That is why today I offer no promise of a 
purely governmental solution for every prob- 
lem. We have lived too long with that false 
promise. In trusting too much in government, 
we have asked of it more than it can deliver. 
This leads only to inflated expectations, to re- 
duced individual effort, and to a disappoint- 
ment and frustration that erode confidence 
both in what government can do and in what 
people can do. 

Government must learn to take less from 
people so that people can do more for 
themselves. 

Let us remember that America was built 
not by government, but by people; not by 
welfare, but by work; not by shirking re- 
sponsibility, but by seeking responsibility. 

In our own lives, let each of us ask not 
just what will government do for me, but 
what can I do for myself? In the challenges 
we face together, let each of us ask not just 
how can government help, but how can I 
help? 

Your national government has a great and 
vital role to play. And I pledge to you that 
where this government should act, we will 
act boldly and we will lead boldly. But just 
as important is the role that each and every 
one of us must play, as an individual and 
as a member of his own community. 

From this day forward, let each of us 
make a solemn commitment in his own heart 
to bear his responsibility, to do his part, to 
live his ideals — so that together we can see 
the dawn of a new age of progress for Amer- 
ica and together, as we celebrate our 200th 
anniversary as a nation, we can do so proud 
in the fulfillment of our promise to our- 
selves and to the world. 



126 



Department of State Bulletin 



As America's longest and most difficult 
war comes to an end, let us again learn to 
debate our differences with civility and de- 
cency. And let each of us reach out for that 
one precious quality government cannot pro- 
vide: a new level of respect for the rights 
and feelings of one another, a new level of 
respect for the individual human dignity 
which is the cherished birthright of every 
American. 

Above all else, the time has come for us to 
renew our faith in ourselves and in America. 
In recent years, that faith has been chal- 
lenged. Our children have been taught to be 
ashamed of their country, ashamed of their 
parents, ashamed of America's record at 
home and its role in the world. 

At every turn we have been beset by those 
who find everything wrong with America 
and little that is right. But I am confident 
that this will not be the judgment of history 
on these remarkable times in which we are 
privileged to live. 

America's record in this century has been 
unparalleled in the world's history for its 
responsibility, for its generosity, for its 
creativity, and for its progress. 

Let us be proud that our system has pro- 
duced and provided more freedom and more 
abundance, more widely shared, than any 
system in the history of the world. 

Let us be proud that in each of the four 
wars in which we have been engaged in this 
century, including the one we are now bring- 
ing to an end, we have fought not for our 
selfish advantage, but to help others resist 
aggression. 

And let us be proud that by our bold new 
initiatives, by our steadfastness for peace 
with honor, we have made a breakthrough 
toward creating in the world what the world 
has not known before : a structure of peace 
that can last, not merely for our time but 
for generations to come. 

We are embarking here today on an era 
that presents challenges as great as those 
any nation or any generation has ever faced. 

We shall answer to Clod, to history, and to 
our conscience for the way in which we use 
these years. 



As I stand in this place so hallowed by his- 
tory, I think of others who have stood here 
before me. I think of the dreams they had for 
America, and I think of how each recog- 
nized that he needed help far beyond himself 
in order to make those dreams come true. 

Today I ask your prayers that in the years 
ahead I may have God's help in making de- 
cisions that are right for America, and I 
pray for your help so that together we may 
be worthy of our challenge. 

Let us pledge together to make these next 
four years the best four years in America's 
history so that on its 200th birthday America 
will be as young and as vital as when it 
began and as bright a beacon of hope for all 
the world. 

Let us go forward from here confident 
in hope, strong in our faith in one another, 
sustained by our faith in God who ci'eated 
us, and striving always to serve His purpose. 



174th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are remarks made by Hey ward 
Isham, deputy head of the U.S. delegation, at 
the 17Uth plenary session of the meetings on 
Viet-Nam at Paris on January 18. 

Press release 13 dated January 18 

Ladies and gentlemen: Recent develop- 
ments in the search for a solution of the 
Viet-Nam conflict give grounds for encour- 
agement. Negotiations have made progress, 
in the judgment of both sides. In recognition 
of that progress, President Nixon made the 
decision to suspend bombing, shelling, and 
further mining throughout North Viet-Nam 
on January 15. Negotiations — seriously un- 
dertaken by both sides — continue. 

It is clear that continued determination 
and seriousness are required for further 
progress in the negotiating tasks still before 

us. 

It is also clear that we must concentrate 
our efforts in this forum on the processes of 
transition from war to a negotiated peace 
which is just and advantageous for all. 

To evolve from adversary relationships 



February 5, 1973 



127 



will require much restraint and an unremit- 
ting effort toward mutual understanding. 
Outworn verbiage and outmoded conceptions 
should be modified in the light of realities, in 
order to undertake the constructive effort 
necessary for restoring peace. 

Some of the benefits of serious negotia- 
tions have already become apparent. Achiev- 
ing the full promise of negotiations depends 
upon the effort, attitude, and will of both 
sides. 

We will not be sparing of our negotiating 
effort. Our attitude will continue to be cor- 
rect and serious. As for our will, let me 
reiterate that there can be no question what- 
ever of President Nixon's determination to 
achieve a settlement of the conflict which 
establishes a peace of justice and concilia- 
tion. I have concluded. 



Letters of Credence 

Bulgaria 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Christo Del- 
chev Zdravchev, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on December 19. For texts 
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated December 19. 

Ecuador 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ecua- 
dor, Alberto Quevedo Toro, presented his 
credentials to President Nixon on December 



19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated December 19. 

Greece 

The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Greece, John A. Sorokos, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Nixon on December 19. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated December 19. 

Laos 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Laos, Pheng Norindr, presented 
his credentials to President Nixon on Decem- 
ber 19. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated De- 
cember 19. 

Panama 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Panama, Nicolas Gonzalez 
Revilla, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Nixon on December 19. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated December 19. 

Sudan 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Abdel 
Aziz Al Nasri Hamza, presented his creden- 
tials to President Nixon on December 19. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated December 19. 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Need for a Negotiating Process in the Middle East 



Address by Secretary Rogers 1 



Ambassador | Yitzhak] Rabin, whom we 
honor tonight, is a distinguished representa- 
tive of the Washington diplomatic corps, a 
diplomatic corps that I believe is unexcelled 
in any world capital. So in paying tribute to 
a man who epitomizes the excellence of the 
diplomats assigned to Washington I want 
to take this opportunity to acknowledge the 
abilities not only of Ambassador Rabin but 
of his colleagues as well and to express ap- 
preciation to the governments which they 
represent for sending us such qualified men. 

So in one sense it could be said that in 
honoring Ambassador Rabin we honor his 
profession. However, in the spirit that brings 
to this room such an impressive gathering of 
distinguished Americans, we are here espe- 
cially to honor Ambassador Rabin, a gentle- 
man and friend. 

Mr. Ambassador, in almost five years in 
Washington you have earned the respect of 
all who have worked with you. You have 
understood the nature of relations between 
the United States and Israel, and you have 
built upon them. Your advocacy of your 
country's interests has been vigorous, imag- 
inative, and openminded. Though the United 
States and Israel often look at things from 
the same perspective, you have been excep- 
tionally skillful in clarifying and putting 
forth your country's views when they have 
sharply differed from our own. You have 
understood the United States and interpreted 
Israel faithfully to us. You have steadfastly 
pursued the search for peace in the Middle 



East, a peace which will be real and not 
illusory. 

There is, of course, no higher purpose that 
can motivate a country's policies than the 
search for a just and lasting peace. It is 
the goal to which American foreign policy 
is dedicated: to build a world in which, as 
Ambassador Rabin has done, the soldier steps 
back in favor of the diplomat. As President 
Nixon himself put it in his first inaugural 
address : "Where peace is unknown, make 
it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it 
strong; where peace is temporary, make it 
permanent." 

In the last four years we have made dra- 
matic, though at times uneven, progress to- 
ward that goal. We will persist in the 
pursuit, wherever the effort is required, over 
the next four. 

Certainly our success in drastically reducing 
great-power tensions — between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and between the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China — is a major advance toward a future 
at peace. Longstanding contentious relation- 
ships are changing into relations of "mu- 
tually beneficial cooperation." - Fundamental 
differences, of course, will remain. But we 
are intent upon building a pattern of mutual 
commitments that will reinforce the natural 
desires of our peoples for a world free of 
war. 

Patient, creative, persistent negotiation 
has been essential to the progress we have 
made. Further progress is necessary to 



1 Made at a dinner sponsored by the Conference 
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organiza- 
tions at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 17 (press release 
8). 



* For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow 
on May 29, 1972, during President Nixon's visit, see 
BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 899. 



February 5, 1973 



129 



achieve our realistic hope for a generation of 
peace. 

We will seize every opportunity in the 
coming months to continue toward that goal : 

— We will seek to achieve with the U.S.S.R. 
not just a limitation but a reduction of of- 
fensive strategic weapons. We have already 
limited anti-ballistic missile systems and 
agreed not to deploy them for a defense of 
our national territories. Now we must seek to 
actually lower the level of the offensive stra- 
tegic forces that pose the threat to the 
security of us both. 

— We will seek to bring about greater free- 
dom of movement and ideas throughout 
Europe. In a period of interdependence and 
of detente greater understanding and ex- 
panded exchanges of ideas and peoples will 
be essential to a stable peace. In this connec- 
tion Chairman Brezhnev's [Leonid I. Brezh- 
nev, General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party] recent statement that 
"the possibilities here are quite broad" en- 
courages us to expect progress toward this 
end at the forthcoming Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe. 

— We will seek a mutual and balanced re- 
duction of military forces in central Europe. 
Under an improving political atmosphere in 
Europe a mutual reduction of military forces 
can further help to lower tensions while pre- 
serving the security of both sides. In the ex- 
ploratory talks shortly to start we will lay 
the basis for serious negotiations for this 
purpose next fall. 

— We will seek to expand our exchanges 
and visits and at least to double our current 
level of trade with the People's Republic of 
China during 1973. Already we have in- 
creased our trade with China from less than 
$5 million to about $100 million and have 
initiated the first significant exchanges of 
visits between us in 25 years. We are pleased 
with that progress and expect to see it pro- 
gressively continued. 

It is not through rhetoric but out of accom- 
plishments such as these that the basis of 
a peaceful world will be built. 

Thus it is that we have persistently sought 
to bring a lasting and honorable peace to 



Viet-Nam. As you know, President Nixon's 
decision to suspend the bombing, shelling, 
and further mining of North Viet-Nam was 
the result of progress in the latest round of 
negotiations. 

Peace in Viet-Nam naturally is of major 
concern, but there can be no assurance of a 
generation of peace without a lasting settle- 
ment in the Middle East. 

The United States has in the last four 
years devoted serious and painstaking efforts 
toward this objective, one that has eluded the 
world for a quarter century. The 1970 cease- 
fire along the Suez Canal — the result of a 
U.S. initiative and in whose achievement 
Ambassador Rabin played an important role 
— was a signal advance. Fighting along the 
canal has been stopped for almost 21/2 years, 
an accomplishment that continues to benefit 
all the parties. 

But negotiations are not yet underway. We 
believe progress toward a solution can only 
be made through a genuine, meaningful 
negotiating process, direct or indirect. A 
decision to enter negotiations does not re- 
quire changes in objectives or policies. Nego- 
tiations only require a willingness to look for 
solutions and to seriously and thoughtfully 
consider possibilities of mutual accommoda- 
tion. Negotiations can bring about the mutual 
clarifications of concepts and the determina- 
tions of ultimate national interests from 
which a permanent peace can emerge. 

When President Nixon expressed the hope 
four years ago that the world was moving 
from an era of confrontation to one of nego- 
tiation he was not speaking exclusively of 
relations among superpowers. He was speak- 
ing about the process and about the hope 
such a process provides for settling disputes 
among all nations. Thus, not only have there 
been serious and wide-ranging negotiations 
between ourselves, the Soviet Union, and the 
People's Republic of China, but antagonists 
elsewhere across the globe are also involved 
in negotiation: East Germans with West 
Germans, Pakistanis with Indians, North 
Koreans with South Koreans. I think it is 
clear that the policies of the President have 
contributed to these gratifying developments 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



and to the improvement of the climate for 
peace in all parts of the world. 

The Middle East remains an exception to 
the effort to reconcile differences through an 
active dialogue. However, relaxation of ten- 
sions between the major powers, improved 
conditions in other countries of the area, 
and the maintenance of the military balance 
combine to make 1973 a favorable time for 
negotiations. We are convinced that both 
sides, Arabs and Israelis, want a settlement 
based on the U.N. Security Council resolution 
of November 1967. 2 Thus, in our judgment 
the doors of diplomacy remain open. 

The most realistic approach, we continue 
to believe, would be to begin with negotia- 
tions on an interim Suez Canal agreement. 
Such a development would : 

— Separate the military forces of the two 
sides; 

— Reinforce the cease-fire ; 

— Result in partial Israeli withdrawal ; and 

— Open the Suez Canal to international 
commerce. 

Its conclusion and observance would build 
confidence and provide momentum toward a 
permanent settlement. Its achievement would 
be not an end of the process, but a first de- 
cisive step facilitating negotiations to carry 
out Security Council resolution 242 in its 
entirety. ■ 

President Nixon has publicly stated that 
we will be giving a very high priority to the 
Middle East. We will be active in ascertain- 
ing if and how we can help the parties ini- 
tiate a genuine negotiating process. 

The bonds between the United States and 
Israel are excellent. Our relationship with 
many of the Arab states is also excellent, 
and we have interests in and ties to the 
entire region. We earnestly hope that those 
ties will improve and expand. 

No area of the world could benefit more 
from peace and from the healing that would 
follow than could the Middle East. In an 
area that is heir to a bitter history, it is 
understandable that leaders feel an obliga- 
tion to previous generations, an obligation 



3 For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 



February 5, 1973 



to seek to correct inequities of the past as 
they see them. But surely the obligation to 
future generations is even greater. What is 
of central importance is to keep the future 
in mind and to create conditions under which 
the peoples of the entire region can live at 
peace with each other. Certainly resumption 
of warfare would not advance this purpose. 
Generations to come in the Middle East will 
judge our era by what it hands on. It must 
hand on the achievement of peace, a peace 
that will take into account the interests of 
Israel, of the Arab states, and of the Pales- 
tinians as well. 

Ambassador Rabin, as one of the few men 
in Israel — or elsewhere, for that matter — 
who have attained the pinnacle in both war 
and diplomacy, your views carry great 
weight in both. As one who understands this 
country and knows American policies and 
aspirations at first hand, I know that you 
carry with you the same sense of purpose 
we feel : that every opportunity to overcome 
the diplomatic impasse must be seized upon 
in 1973 in a spirit of equity and with for- 
ward-looking determination to make con- 
crete progress toward permanent peace in 
the Middle East. 



President Nixon Welcomes 
Chinese Acrobatic Troupe 

Following is an exchange of remarks be- 
tween President Nixon and Chang Ying-wu, 
director of the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe 
from the People's Republic of China, in the 
State Dining Room of the White House on 
January 12. 

White House press release dated January 12 

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

Ladies and gentlemen : We are very happy 
to welcome you officially here in the White 
House and to thank you for the splendid 
achievement that you have made in your trip 
in the United States. This is the first group 
of performing artists to come from the Peo- 



131 



pie's Republic of China to the United States 
of America in a quarter of a century. And I 
am sure that all of those who have had the 
privilege of seeing you will say the first was 

the best. 

I can say that based on the reports that I 
have had from Mrs. Nixon, who was there 
for the first night, and also from my 
daughter who was there on the third night. 
You have, by coming such a great distance 
from your country to our country, brought 
us a very great gift. You have brought us the 
talent of great artists. But even more im- 
portant, you have brought us a greater gift. 
My daughter reported how impressed she 
was by your talent in your performance at 
the Kennedy Center. She reported how the 
audience stood and applauded after most of 
the acts. But she reported that the greatest 
applause was at the conclusion, when you 
held up a sign saying, "Chinese-American 
Friendship." 

And friendship is the most important gift 
that one group can bring to another. It is a 
tragedy of this century that for 20 years a 
great wall of hostility has separated the 800 
million people of the People's Republic of 
China and the 200 million people of the 
United States of America. 

As a result of the meetings that I was 
privileged to have with Chairman Mao and 
Premier Chou En-lai in Peking early in 1972, 
that wall of hostility is now coming down. 
And we only hope in the future that young 
Americans will have the opportunity to go 
to your country and that they will be as 
fine ambassadors of friendship as you have 
been ambassadors of friendship from the 
People's Republic of China to the United 
States of America. 

Now, since you have brought us these 
great gifts, your talent and your friendship, 
we have a small token of appreciation for 
you to take with you as you return home. 
This is the seal of the President of the United 
States which each of you can have and which 



will remind you of your visit to our country. 
Now, Mrs. Nixon and I would like the 
privilege of greeting each of you personally 
to express our appreciation for your long 
journey, for your magnificent talent, but 
most of all for the friendship that you have 
brought to the American people. 



REMARKS BY MR. CHANG » 

Your Excellencies, Mr. President and Mrs. 
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen: On the eve of 
the conclusion of our tour in the United 
States, we have the opportunity to meet Mr. 
President and Mrs. Nixon here in the White 

House. 

On behalf of the entire troupe, I would 
like to express my thanks to you all. 

I thank you, Mr. President, for your warm 
speech, for your souvenir, and also for the 
letter autographed by you which was sent 
to us two days ago. 

In coming to the United States on the per- 
formance tour, we have brought with us the 
friendship of the Chinese people for the 
American people, and during our stay here 
we have been given the warm hospitality and 
praises about our performances, and I be- 
lieve through our current performance tour 
the understanding and friendship between 
the Chinese and the American peoples will 
be furthered and your kind hospitality and 
warm response from the audience have left 
deep impressions on us. 

When we go back we shall carry with us 
the friendly sentiments of the American peo- 
ple toward the Chinese people at home, and 
I hope the friendship between the Chinese 
and American people will go further still on 
the basis of mutual understanding. 

Once again, I would like to give my sincere 
thanks to Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon for 
your audience here. 
Thank you. 



1 Mr. Chang spoke in Chinese. 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States Foreign Economic Policy: Where Are We? 



Address by Sidney Weintraub 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development 1 



There are some cliches relevant to my sub- 
ject which are making the rounds these days : 

The United States is no longer the over- 
whelmingly predominant economic power in 
the world ; we now are only the first among 
equals. There are those who look at the world 
trading pattern and question whether we are 
first. 

When we were predominant, we took 
actions in the interests of all, such as institut- 
ing the Marshall plan, encouraging the for- 
mation and strengthening of the European 
Common Market, accepting trade arrange- 
ments with countries such as Japan and 
Canada which were lopsided in their favor, 
and fostering development in less developed 
countries. Now that equality is the watch- 
word, we have to be like other countries and 
give priority to our own interests. 

International affairs increasingly are dom- 
inated by economics, and U.S. foreign policy 
must be guided by this essential fact. 

Because of the changed structure of 
world affairs — namely, the greater economic 
strength of others, our need to look primar- 
ily to self-interest in the same way others do, 
the primacy of economics in world affairs — 
the institutions designed immediately after 
World War II, in another era, are outmoded. 

There is some truth in all the foregoing. 
Other countries are economically stronger 
than they were ; some countries have not al- 
ways behaved in the most cooperative man- 
ner in world economic affairs; our economy 



1 Made before the World Affairs Forum at Wash- 
ington on Jan. 4. 



underpins our political and security strength ; 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), to name two key institutions, do 
need modification. 

There is also oversimplification in the 
cliches cited. Much of the cause for our bal- 
ance of payments difficulties is not that 
others behaved iniquitously, but rather that 
we were careless in handling our domestic 
economy. Economics always mattered in 
world affairs, and one need only examine 
U.S. history to see this. The IMF and the 
GATT do need changing, but they also were 
changed in the past, for example, by the in- 
stitution of special drawing rights (SDR's) ; 
the coming changes will have to be substan- 
tial, but not because everything that went 
before was bad. Countries must always look 
to their self-interest; if they do not, others 
are unlikely to do so. We think we did so in 
an enlightened way in the past; I trust we 
will try to do so again in the future. 

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in an article in 
the 50th-anniversary issue of Foreign Af- 
fairs last October, referred to the need for 
"a resolute attempt at complication" since 
policymaking based on a simplified version 
of perceived facts will be inadequate. Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan had earlier referred to the 
need to "complexify." I, too, want to get 
away from the simplistic version of the 
United States as a country full of people 
wearing white hats facing all those nefarious 
black-hatted foreigners. The real world is an 
intermixture of pursuing self-interest in a 
context of hard bargaining, of confrontation 



February 5, 1973 



133 



among countries at times, of the establish- 
ment of rules of behavior and on occasion 
stretching them by all parties, and of the 
need to find modes of cooperation lest we are 
all impoverished by "beggar thy neighbor" 
practices. This is a far closer approximation 
of reality than simplistic cliches. 

Let me see if I can approach reality in 
about 20 minutes by dealing with the present 
state of U.S. policy in the trade field, inter- 
national monetary affairs, foreign direct in- 
vestment issues, and relations with less 
developed countries. I will not try to deal 
with such critical areas as energy, transpor- 
tation, communications, and others. I sepa- 
rate the four issues I will cover for the sake 
of convenience and manageability, just as 
most complicated matters must be broken 
into treatable parts. In the real world, they 
are of course interrelated. 

Major Issues in Trade Policy 

There are several important factual points 
in the trade field that might first be made. 

Our trade account has deteriorated over 
the past decade, to such an extent that in 
1971 we ran a deficit for the first time in 
this century, and the deficit grew to substan- 
tial proportions of more than $6 billion in 
1972. The high-water mark of the U.S. trade 
surplus was in 1964. Since then our exports 
have grown by 7Y? percent a year, but our 
imports on a c.i.f. [cost, insurance, and 
freight] basis have grown by 13 percent a 
year. For all industrial countries, just to give 
you a comparison, exports f.o.b. [free on 
board] grew from 1964 to 1971 by liy 2 
percent a year and imports c.i.f. also by 
llVa percent. For Japan, to pick a country 
with an extraordinary record, the import 
growth figure was 8%, percent a year and 
the export growth figure 20 percent. 

By August 1971, when convertibility of 
the dollar into gold and other reserve as- 
sets was suspended, the dollar clearly was 
overvalued. 

Tariffs on industrial goods are no longer 
high on the average in most developed coun- 
tries, but neither are they necessarily neg- 
ligible in many cases. As a consequence 



of lower tariffs, the trade-restrictive effect 
of nontariff barriers has become more 
self-evident. 

In certain areas, such as in agriculture, 
trade restrictions impinge greatly on sectors 
in which the comparative advantage of the 
United States is substantial. 

Because of various preferential arrange- 
ments, particularly within Europe and be- 
tween Europe and an increasing number of 
less developed countries, the proportion of 
world trade moving under conditions of most- 
favored-nation treatment has diminished. 

Finally, in the explosive expansion of 
world trade which has occurred since the end 
of World War II, the less developed countries 
as a group have fared less well than the de- 
veloped countries. 

I have tried just now to stick to facts, 
selective ones of course, but I think not an 
unfair selection. But policy must deal not 
only with facts but also with interpretation 
of facts. Let me now give some interpreta- 
tions which relate to the facts just cited. 

The dollar was overvalued in part because 
others in deficit found it easier — not easy, 
but easier — to devalue their currencies than 
surplus countries generally found it to re- 
value upward. Many countries were content 
to build up their reserves, many were con- 
tent with export-led economic growth and 
with the employment-creating effects of ex- 
ports, and this contentment created a dispo- 
sition for many developed countries to prefer 
currency undervaluation to overvaluation. 
The dollar was overvalued, and our trade 
account moved from surplus to deficit, also 
because of our own failure to control infla- 
tion, for example, by our unwillingness to 
finance the Viet-Nam war buildup in the 
latter part of the 1960's through increased 
taxation. Our trade deficit, consequently, was 
not necessarily only the result of unfair ac- 
tions by others, but also in part of profligacy 
on our part. 

Nontariff barriers are often the result not 
of a desire by countries to restrict trade, 
although this may be their effect, but rather 
of their wish to deal with difficult domestic 
problems. Our price support programs in 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



agriculture restrict trade, but at their core 
are domestic social and political goals. The 
European price support programs in agri- 
culture restrict trade even more, but at their 
core are domestic social and political goals. 

We have a "buy American" preference for 
government procurement, with a general 
preference of 6 percent and a higher prefer- 
ence for procurement in domestic areas of 
substantial unemployment and even greater 
preferences at times for defense procure- 
ment, for a variety of reasons — to promote 
domestic industry, domestic employment, 
and domestic defense industries. The Euro- 
peans and Japanese and Canadians direct 
government procurement to domestic indus- 
tries for much the same reasons. 

The less developed countries have not done 
as well as developed countries in the growth 
of trade, due in part to their own policies, 
such as by having overvalued exchange rates 
and fostering inefficiency by excessive im- 
port protection. In addition, prices have risen 
more for the goods they must import, usu- 
ally manufactured goods, than for those they 
frequently export, such as basic commodities. 
Finally, developed country tariffs and non- 
tariff barriers impinge greatly on the labor- 
intensive goods less developed countries have 
to export. 

I moved from fact to interpretation; I 
would now like to touch briefly on policy 
prescription, which I hope flows logically 
from what I have just stated and which is 
the subject of my talk. 

We are trying domestically to deal with in- 
flation by responsible fiscal policy, by mone- 
tary policy consistent with our growth po- 
tential, by a program of wage and price 
controls, and in general by destroying the 
inflationary mentality. 

In the field of foreign affairs, we have 
tried to deal with dollar overvaluation by the 
exchange rate realignment reached in De- 
cember 1971 at the Smithsonian Institution 
and to deal with this on a more systematic 
basis in the monetary reform negotiations 
now in progress in the IMF. 

Tariff and nontariff barriers to trade will 
not be reduced much by exhortation, but they 



might be by reciprocally beneficial negotia- 
tion. We hope to begin such negotiation in 
September 1973. For U.S. participation in 
this negotiation to be credible, Congress 
must authorize the President to implement 
the tariff changes that may be agreed to. 
Hence the administration is considering sub- 
mitting the legislation it will need to accom- 
plish this. 

Since restrictions in agricultural trade 
stem from domestic social and political pro- 
grams, we must look at these domestic pro- 
grams in order to get at the root problem. 

Since preferential trade is growing, one 
way to attack this is by dealing with the key 
instrument for the preference, namely, the 
tariff, since as tariffs are lowered among in- 
dustrial countries, so will the tariff prefer- 
ences be lowered. 

Imports sometimes cause hardship to 
domestic workers, and as one moves to 
freer trade, there also is a need to devise 
safeguards to minimize hardships. 

Currently in the trade policy field, there- 
fore, we are examining the bases for legisla- 
tive action and otherwise getting ourselves 
ready to negotiate tariff reductions and re- 
ductions of nontariff barriers, to free up 
trade in agriculture, to assure that the less 
developed countries get a reasonable oppor- 
tunity to benefit fully from these negotia- 
tions, and to do all this in a way that 
provides reasonable benefits and safeguards 
for the American worker. It has taken less 
than a minute to state this most complicated 
policy prescription, but one should expect a 
busy year ahead in the trade field and many 
busy and arduous years after that in the 
negotiating process. 

One cliche may not be bad in the trade 
policy field. We are on the threshold of deal- 
ing seriously with major issues which will 
affect, beneficially we think, American con- 
sumers, workers, farmers, employers, and 
American foreign policy and worldwide in- 
terests as a whole. 

Policy Agenda in Monetary Affairs 

August 15, 1971, was a watershed date. 
We formally recognized then that the United 



February 5, 1973 



135 



States and the dollar would not thereafter 
play the same role in the functioning of the 
international monetary system that they had 
previously. A process of negotiation for 
monetary reform was set in motion, and this 
now is underway in a body known as the 
Committee of 20, under the auspices of the 
IMF. 

The working of the international mone- 
tary system is not a topic of everyday fa- 
miliarity for most people. It is a subject that 
sounds complex and in point of fact is, in 
various respects. Let me try, however, to 
distill a few of the key points involved. 1 
will again start with a few facts. 

The United States on August 15, 1971, 
formally suspended convertibility into gold 
and other reserve assets of dollars held by 
foreign central banks. This was our signal 
that changes were needed. In point of fact, 
we lacked the reserve assets to meet all 
comers if they had wanted to convert their 
dollars. Right now, for example, foreign 
central banks hold 50.7 billion of dollars in 
their reserves, and our total reserves are 
$13.2 billion. 

The IMF system worked from 1946 to 
1971 in part because our deficits provided the 
bulk of reserve increases of others. World 
reserves increased from 1946 to 1971 from 
$41.5 billion to $132.1 billion, and 48 per- 
cent of the increase was in dollars. 

Another way of looking at this is that in 
1946 the United States held 48 percent of 
world reserves (and 61 percent of official 
gold holdings) . By the end of 1971 this figure 
had dropped to less than 10 percent. 

For various reasons of national pride and 
domestic politics, countries have been reluc- 
tant to alter exchange rates even when nec- 
essary, and when they finally have been 
forced to do so, the changes have tended to 
be large and hence disruptive. 

Because of the role of the dollar as a cur- 
rency held by others in their reserves and to 
buy and sell to maintain the value of their 
own currencies in exchange markets, and 
also because of the importance of the United 
States in the world economy, it was harder 



to devalue the dollar than to devalue other 
currencies. 

The significance of the foregoing points 
can be stated briefly. Rather than a system 
which adjusted smoothly when currencies 
were in disequilibrium, we had a system 
which adjusted by fits and starts. By resist- 
ing necessary exchange rate changes, coun- 
tries encouraged speculative money flows out 
of weak currencies into strong ones. When 
changes were made, they were large. 

Even worse, adjustments frequently were 
not made, since surplus countries felt no 
great pain in accumulating more reserves. 
The world's distribution of reserves became 
skewed. Reserve creation itself became 
largely a function of continued U.S. deficits, 
and indeed the system tended to rely on our 
deficits until the SDR system was created 
a few years ago. 

It is worth keeping in mind that money 
is a means to buy goods and services and that 
a key purpose of the world's monetary sys- 
tem is to facilitate the flow of goods and 
services among countries. Reserves are in- 
tended to tide countries over difficult periods, 
and they cannot do this effectively if they 
are not distributed according to need. 

Based on the few facts and interpretations 
I have given, what then is the policy which 
flows from these? 

Most important, we are looking for tech- 
niques to make adjustment of disequilibria 
smoother and prompter. When an exchange 
rate needs changing, it should be done more 
quickly and in smaller steps. As one econo- 
mist phrased it, when exchange rate changes, 
because they are small and not uncommon, 
become routine stories on the financial pages 
of the New York Times rather than head- 
lines on page one, we will have made some 
progress. 

We are seeking techniques to facilitate 
prompt adjustment by surplus countries, 
who normally are under less pressure to ad- 
just than deficit countries. 

We have suggested using a changing level 
of reserves to signal a need for adjustment 
by both deficit and surplus countries. By ad- 
justment I refer to some combination of 



136 



Department of State Bulletin 



measures, which could involve the exchange 
rate, domestic monetary or fiscal policy, and 
trade liberalization, to correct a disequilib- 
rium. Using reserves to signal a need for 
adjustment also requires giving some at- 
tention to the appropriate distribution of 
reserves among countries. 

We have suggested making collective world 
decisions on reserve creation, essentially us- 
ing SDR's rather than leaving this mainly 
to the vagaries of gold production or U.S. 
balance of payments deficits. If disequilibria 
are corrected more rapidly, excessive deficits 
and surpluses might be shorter lived. 

We have suggested that the United States 
needs the ability to control the exchange rate 
for the dollar in a manner comparable to 
other countries' control of the exchange rate 
for their currencies. 

We have stated our willingness to return 
to convertibility when circumstances war- 
rant; that is, when we have the reserve 
assets to do so and when the system pro- 
motes more rapid and smoother adjustment. 

The negotiating issues involved in this pol- 
icy agenda are difficult ones. They affect 
trade positions, employment, income. They 
bring into play national differences in per- 
ceived self-interest and hence will require 
substantial discussion, education, and com- 
promise. Changing exchange rates more rap- 
idly than in the past involves a behavioral 
change, and this is not easy to effect. Many 
countries still tend to be mercantilistic in the 
way they look at trade deficits and surpluses, 
and this attitude may need to be modified to 
some extent. Various nontariff barriers in- 
sulate trade from exchange rate changes — 
for example, if a government directs that 
procurement be made from a domestic firm, 
the pattern of exchange rates and interna- 
tional competition both lose relevance — and 
this needs airing in both the trade and mone- 
tary negotiations. 

I noted a valid cliche in the trade field: 
that we are on the threshold of dealing seri- 
ously with various major issues which will 
affect most Americans. The same is true in 
the interrelated monetary field. 



Direct Private Investment Abroad 

The most dynamic aspect of economic in- 
terchange in the modern world is capital 
movements. Almost all of us are familiar 
with the massive shifts of short-term capital 
resulting from interest rate differentials 
among countries and the desire to flee from 
weak and to strong currencies. Billions of 
dollars can shift among countries in hours if 
conditions are propitious. These movements 
are a sign of interdependence and a result of 
general convertibility ; they can also be trou- 
blesome to monetary authorities. 

They also are a sign of the multinational 
nature of business, particularly of our larg- 
est companies and of banking. 

U.S. direct private investment abroad has 
been growing rapidly. Its book value at the 
end of 1971 was $86 billion, and its recent 
growth has been between 7 and 8 percent a 
year. 

Investment abroad by U.S. multinational 
corporations is a theme replete with contro- 
versy. Receipts from investment income are 
a strong plus in our balance of payments. 
There is considerable evidence that U.S. in- 
vestment abroad generally stimulates U.S. 
exports. On the other hand, labor is con- 
cerned that investment abroad often is mo- 
tivated by a search for lower wage costs and 
that such investment, as a consequence, re- 
sults in a loss of jobs in the United States. 
Labor also has argued that our tax laws ac- 
tually encourage investment to move abroad. 

Abroad, various industrial countries, such 
as Canada and Australia, are concerned 
about excessive foreign domination of key 
sectors of their economies. They are partic- 
ularly uptight about takeovers of existing 
firms. The sovereignty issue is even more 
sharp in less developed countries, and there 
have been a number of recent cases of ex- 
propriation of foreign firms, particularly in 
mining and public utilities. 

I have touched on a few themes, which 
time will not permit me now to elaborate. 
However, to revert to the subject of my 
speech, where we are on policy formation is 
a mixed bag. 



February 5, 1973 



137 



Thus, we do continue to encourage invest- 
ment in less developed countries that want 
it, but we argue that neutrality is the best 
policy as it relates to private direct invest- 
ment in industrial countries. We maintain 
controls on the export of capital, but we 
would like to get rid of these controls as 
conditions permit. We recognize the right of 
expropriation, even if we do not normally 
find it wise, but insist on just compensation. 
We are sensitive to the sovereignty issue of- 
ten cited by others, but we are not sure this 
can be dealt with efficiently other than by 
sensitivity on the part of investing compa- 
nies. We have examined the possibility of in- 
ternational codes for mitigating investment 
problems but are not sure these can usefully 
be negotiated now. We know many facts 
about U.S. investment abroad but far less 
about the worldwide investment of others. 

In sum, we have some idea of the prob- 
lems but not as much as we would like about 
the answers. Policy, to use another cliche, is 
under examination, by us, by labor, by busi- 
ness, by other countries. 

The Less Developed Countries 

Another area where the issues are in 
search of a coherent policy is the less devel- 
oped countries. 

We have recognized that there is a vari- 
ety of difficult problems that less developed 
countries must overcome in their own de- 
velopment effort. These relate to their do- 
mestic savings ratios and capital-mobilization 
efforts, income distribution, employment, 
urban-rural matters, population, agricultural 
production, education, attaining a modicum 
of political tranquillity, and the like. 

Similarly, I think we have recognized that 
the balance of payments problems faced by 
many less developed countries can be ap- 
proached via aid, either loans or grants, via 
opening export opportunities, providing 
credit, obtaining foreign private investment, 
and various permutations of these. In a 
sense, it is this aspect of the issue that is the 
rub, in that we have not really reached any 
consensus about the desirable mix of these 
policies, at least for the United States. 

I believe we accept our responsibility as a 



nation to do our share, together with other 
industrial countries, to assist the less devel- 
oped countries. I can use figures in this field 
to prove many things. For example, the total 
flow of resources from the United States to 
the less developed countries in 1971 was 0.69 
percent of our gross national product, rank- 
ing us 14th out of the 16 members of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Looking only at official devel- 
opment assistance, this was 0.32 percent of 
our GNP in 1971, which put us 12th out of 
16. However, to look at this from another 
vantage point, 43 percent of all official de- 
velopment assistance in 1971 came from the 
United States. We tend to take more im- 
ports, including of manufactured goods, 
from less developed countries than do other 
industrial countries. 

I am not trying to prove that our record 
vis-a-vis the less developed countries is either 
good or bad compared with the performance 
of other industrial countries. Rather, I would 
like to emphasize the following interrelated 
points : 

We have learned much about development 
in the last several decades — what is involved 
for the less developed countries and what is 
involved for the industrial countries. 

We have to "complexify" in this field. We 
have to look at all our policies and what their 
impact will be on us and on the less devel- 
oped countries; we have to look at the mix 
among these policies. And to date, we have 
not done so adequately. 

I have tried both to clarify issues and to 
avoid oversimplification. In the process, I 
can only have been too simple by trying to 
deal with four major themes in too short a 
period of time. 

However, I chose these themes, despite the 
inherent inconsistency of complicating and 
simplifying at the same time, because they 
are an important part of the international 
economic agenda at this moment of history. 
How we and the world resolve the policy is- 
sues involved will have an important effect 
on the developments of the coming decade. 
How we resolve them will also affect most 
of you. 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



European Community Eliminates 
Retaliatory Tariffs Against U.S. 

Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 
press release 174 dated January 3 

Ambassador William D. Eberle, the Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations, 
announced on January 3 that the European 
Community had eliminated the remainder of 
its retaliatory tariffs against the United 
States for the U.S. actions in 1962 raising 
tariffs on sheet glass and Wilton and velvet 
carpets. The EC action lowers the duty on 
U.S. exports to the EC of : polyethylene from 
32 percent to 16 percent, woven fabrics of 
continuous synthetic fibers from 35 percent 
to 13 percent, and woven fabrics of artificial 
fibers from 30 percent to 15 percent. 

The EC action, effective January 1, grants 
the United States the same treatment now 
accorded other countries entitled to most- 
favored-nation tariff rates on those products. 

The removal of the retaliation against the 
U.S. products named above coincides with 
the expiration of the U.S. escape-clause ac- 
tion on Wilton and velvet carpets on Decem- 
ber 31, 1972, when the U.S. import duty was 
reduced from 40 to 21 percent. In 1971 the 
President had proclaimed a three-stage 
phaseout of the remainder of the escape- 
clause rates on sheet glass. The first stage 
became effective on May 1, 1972. The second 
is to take place on January 31, 1973, and the 
third is scheduled for January 31, 1974, 
after which the trade agreement rates will 
apply. 

The EC retaliation, which originally ap- 
plied to five product classes, began in June 
1962 after the United States had raised tar- 
iffs on Wilton and velvet rugs and carpets 
and 24 tariff rates on sheet glass in escape- 
clause actions. About $30-$33 million in trade 
in each direction was affected. In January 
1967 the United States eliminated escape- 
clause rates on 18 sheet glass items and re- 
duced the escape-clause rates on six others. 
The European Community subsequently elim- 
inated its retaliation on varnishes and poly- 
styrene and reduced the retaliation rate on 
fabrics of synthetic fibers from 40 to 35 
percent. In January 1970 the United States 



removed carpets of oriental design from 
escape-clause protection and the European 
Community reduced the retaliation against 
polyethylene from 40 to 32 percent and 
against fabrics of artificial fibers from 40 
to 30 percent. 



U.S. Reserves Right To Renegotiate 
Trade Concessions Under GATT 

Following is an announcement issued by 
the Office of the Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations on December 29. 

Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 
press release 173 dated December 29 

The United States has notified the Con- 
tracting Parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that, in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of paragraph 
5 of article XXVIII of that agreement, it 
reserves the right for the duration of the 
three-year period commencing on January 
1, 1973, to modify its schedule (schedule 
XX) of concessions in accordance with the 
procedures of paragraphs 1 to 3 of article 
XXVIII. Those paragraphs set forth the 
procedures to be followed in modifying or 
withdrawing tariff concessions as well as the 
rights of countries having a negotiating or 
trade interest in the items being modified or 
withdrawn. 

A number of other contracting parties, 
including the European Community, have 
already reserved this right for that three- 
year period. 

The U.S. notification is a technical step 
which will enable the United States, should it 
decide to do so at any time during the next 
three years, to renegotiate particular items 
in its present schedule of GATT concessions. 
No decision has been made to exercise this 
right; reservation of the option to do so is 
intended to give the United States more 
flexibility to negotiate in the framework of 
GATT such changes in U.S. commitments as 
may seem desirable in the light of develop- 
ments in the next three years. 

A background paper on GATT article 
XXVIII follows. 



February 5, 1973 



139 



Background on GATT Article XXVIII 

Article XXVIII is a general provision of 
GATT intended to permit member countries 
every three years to alter the composition of 
tariff concessions granted by them in previ- 
ous negotiations. In these "renegotiations" a 
country raising tariffs on items subject to 
concessions is expected to lower tariffs on 
other items to preserve the overall balance 
of concessions in its GATT schedule. 

While it is possible to "renegotiate" in- 
dividual concessions during a three-year 
"firm life" period, this normally requires 
specific authorization by formal GATT 
decision. 

Sometimes a country has reason to believe 
that it may want to renegotiate some conces- 
sions during a forthcoming three-year firm- 
life period but is not sure that it will in fact 
elect to do so or what the scope of any such 
future action might be. In such a case the 
country may, pursuant to paragraph 5 of 
article XXVIII, reserve its right to renego- 
tiate any concessions in its schedule at any 
time during the forthcoming three-year pe- 
riod. Notification to this effect must be sub- 
mitted before the firm-life period begins. If 
a country invokes paragraph 5 of article 
XXVIII, all other GATT countries automat- 
ically have the right to renegotiate any con- 
cessions in their schedules which were 
initially negotiated with the invoking country. 

A new three-year firm-life period begins 
on January 1, 1973. As this date approached, 
notifications of intention to invoke para- 
graph 5 of article XXVIII had been sub- 
mitted by Australia, Austria, Denmark, the 
European Community, Finland, India, Israel, 
New Zealand, South Africa, and the United 
States. These notifications do not necessarily 



mean that extensive renegotiations — or in- 
deed any renegotiations at all — will actually 
take place. The notifying countries have 
simply reserved the right to undertake such 
renegotiation with affected countries if they 
should wish to do so during the next three 
years. 



Offshore Procurement Authorized 
of Rice for Laos and Cambodia 

Presidential Determination No. 73-8 1 

Determination and Authorization for Offshore 
Procurement of Rice for Laos and Cambodia 

Memorandum for the Honorable John A. Hannah, 
Administrator, Agency for International De- 
velopment 

The White House, 
Washington, December 5, 1972. 
In accordance with the recommendations in your 
memorandum of October 30, 1972, I hereby: 

A. Determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 
U.S.C. 2364), that the use of up to $21 million of 
funds available in FY 1973 for the procurement of 
rice from outside the United States, for Laos and 
Cambodia, without regard to the requirement of 
Section 604(e) of the Act, is important to the se- 
curity of the United States ; and 

B. Authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the 
Act, such use of up to $21 million of funds for the 
procurement of rice, from outside of the United 
States, for Laos and Cambodia, without regard to 
the requirements of Section 604(e) of the Act. 

This determination shall be published in the Fed- 
eral Register pursuant to Section 654 of the Act. 



1 37 Fed. Reg. 26573. 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Williams Reports to President on Managua Earthquake Relief 



Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administra- 
tor of the Agency for International Develop- 
ment, who visited Managua, Nicaragua, 
December 30-January 6 as the President's 
Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief 
to Nicaragua, reported to President Nixon 
on January 9. Following is the text of a 
memorandum dated January 8 from Mr. 
Williams to the President, together with its 
attached table showing total relief assistance 
as of January 8. 



text of memorandum 

January 8, 1973. 
Memorandum for the President 

Subject: Special Report on Emergency Relief for 
the Managua Disaster 

Just after midnight on December 23 an 
earthquake registering 6.5 on the Richter 
scale struck the city of Managua, Nicaragua. 
In less than 30 seconds, some 36 blocks in the 
heart of the nation's capital — or half of the 
total city — were practically leveled. Except 
for a few damaged buildings still standing, 
what the initial and after shocks left were 
1,200 square acres of rubble in the geomet- 
rically exact center of the capital. 

We will never know how many died or 
even how many were injured in the earth- 
quake ; estimates of the number killed range 
between 4,000 and 12,000 and some 20,000 
more injured. We do know, however, that 
the other losses were staggering. Not only 
was the basic infrastructure of a modern 
city — electricity, communications, water sup- 
ply and transport — immediately knocked out, 
but 50,000 homes were totally destroyed and 
thousands more made uninhabitable, forcing 
the survivors into the streets to fend for 
themselves. 

The gigantic dimensions of what was lost 



soon began to emerge. Gone was all of the 
physical plant of the national government; 
half the public schools in the city; all of its 
hospitals and practically all of the commer- 
cial services, markets and commodity stocks 
upon which an urban society depends. A pre- 
liminary estimate places the immediate 
losses at over $600 million. Additionally, al- 
most half of the nation's GNP has been 
disrupted, more than half of the govern- 
ment's sources of revenue has been lost, and 
25 percent of the population is now without 
the means to sustain even the minimum 
necessities of life. The Government of Nic- 
aragua is faced with these overwhelming 
needs of its people at a time when basic in- 
stitutions and services are badly disrupted 
and when the budgetary resources at its dis- 
posal are greatly diminished. 

At your direction, I conferred with gov- 
ernment leaders in Nicaragua to determine 
what more could be done to help cope with 
immediate problems and to assure the ade- 
quacy and effectiveness of our help for a 
sister American republic in its time of 
tragic need. Nicaragua's leaders are respond- 
ing to the emergency, with courage and a 
sense of national purpose. A National Com- 
mittee for the Emergency, bringing together 
all groups, has been constituted under the 
able leadership of General Anastasio So- 
moza. Similar local committees are cooperat- 
ing throughout the country and services 
gradually are being established in an orderly 
way to help the quarter of the population 
in dire need. It is an immense undertaking 
for a country the size of Nicaragua and it 
has just begun. 

The immediate problems have been to 
reestablish medical services, to assure the 
distribution of water and food, and to 
provide at least temporary shelter for the 
hundreds of thousands of victims who fled 



February 5, 1973 



141 



from Managua. Our help in each of these 
areas has provided the critical margin which 
made it possible to prevent even greater suf- 
fering, and probably disorder. American re- 
lief made it possible for Nicaragua's people 
to meet their most urgent needs and to face 
the awesome tasks ahead with renewed hope. 
Action to meet the immediate problems is 
well underway. 

At your direction, I supervised the orga- 
nization of a mass feeding program to as- 
sure food for the hungry throughout the 
country. An estimated 350,000 people fled 
the city after the quake to find food and 
shelter with friends and relatives in the out- 
lying areas of Managua and in other towns 
and cities across the country. The problem 
is complicated by a severe drought during 
this past crop season which adversely affects 
the availability of food both for the earth- 
quake victims and many other people as well. 
The distribution of water to the survivors 
in Managua was also immediately essential. 
The distribution system we devised with the 
full cooperation of the Government is work- 
ing throughout the Republic. There were 
early problems, but I am satisfied that the 
distribution of both food and water is now 
adequate and that the distribution system 
will continue to function well until it is no 
longer needed. 

Nicaragua will need food assistance for 
the next ten months until the harvest in Sep- 
tember 1973. We have provided some 20 mil- 
lion pounds of food, both delivered and 
underway, valued at $3 million. More will be 
needed — both from U.S. and from others 
as well. 

With respect to the shelter problem, we 
have sent to Nicaragua 4,000 tents; enough 
to shelter 25,000 people. But there is need 
for more and better temporary shelters. 
Working jointly with the Nicaraguan Gov- 
ernment, we devised an emergency shelter 
program for immediate construction of 
15,000 individual wood and metal structures 
to house an additional 75,000 refugees and 
to permit essential workers to return to 
Managua. We authorized $3 million in A.I.D. 



funds for this purpose. Our prompt action 
to launch this emergency construction, which 
should be completed in the next 30 days, was 
a source of great encouragement to the gov- 
ernment and people. 

In the field of emergency health measures, 
we have taken steps which have brought the 
situation under control, including the dona- 
tion of two U.S. army field hospitals which 
were brought in the day after the tragedy; 
the two facilities, which total 124 beds plus 
all related equipment to operate a modern 
hospital, are now fully staffed by Nicaraguan 
doctors and nurses — and are providing basic 
medical services for the city of Managua. 

These measures taken jointly with Gen- 
eral Somoza and his emergency committee 
mean that they have turned the corner on 
the most critical needs of medical assistance, 
food and water, and, finally, in the coming 
weeks, shelter. 

We have committed $10.6 million to date 
for emergency relief. It constitutes a critical 
contribution to people who have long been 
friendly and who found themselves in the 
most urgent need of their history. There 
will be additional emergency help needed 
from us over the next 10 months, but it will 
be insignificant compared with the efforts 
that will be required of the Nicaraguan 
nation. 

In particular, emergency measures are 
needed to help replace at least part of the 
$50 million equivalent lost to the Govern- 
ment in tax revenues because of the disrup- 
tion of the economy and commercial activity 
in Managua. General Somoza is most anxious 
to launch public works programs to begin 
rebuilding and provide jobs for the over 
52,000 who lost their means of livelihood. 
We have agreed to help the Government de- 
sign works projects to provide for emer- 
gency employment for displaced workers. 
A.I.D. is fielding a senior, experienced team 
to assist in this effort. 

Reconstruction itself poses a number of 
difficult problems, since it is being considered 
whether or not the city should be rebuilt 
along different lines and with some relocation 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



to lessen danger from the possibility of fur- 
ther earthquakes. A team of U.S. geologists 

and other experts are in Nicaragua working 
on studies which will provide the technical 
basis for this decision. Further, there is need 
to coordinate with other aid donors to re- 
direct assistance projects underway to meet 
the current needs and to assess plans for re- 
construction. Resolution of these problems 
will take time — but the situation in Nicara- 
gua today is urgent and does not permit the 
luxury of the normal procedures of interna- 
tional consultation and attendant delays. 

We are pressing for early action on assess- 
ments, both technical and economic, which 
will permit the Government of Nicaragua 
to plan its programs of reconstruction and 
provide the basis for assistance in this task 
from the U.S. and other aid donors. We an- 
ticipate that the Organization of American 
States, the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the IBRD [ International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development] will play 
important parts in the overall effort. 

While issues of reconstruction are for fu- 
ture decision, you may be interested in my 
judgment as to the overall quality of the 
American aid effort of the past two weeks. 
It is a pleasure to report that the perform- 
ance of Ambassador Turner B. Shelton 
and his staff during the recovery was out- 
standing, even heroic. Tumbled from their 
beds in the first shocks, lacking light and 
with only very rudimentary communication, 
they were able to respond to the welfare and 
evacuation of Americans and non-essential 
personnel, and, at the same time, to begin 
to help meet the emergency needs of the 
Nicaraguans. 

While many other nations and groups re- 
sponded swiftly with mercy flights and per- 
sonnel, the American contribution was criti- 
cal in averting a compounding of the crisis. 
It was largely U.S. Army personnel who or- 
ganized the first emergency help and set up 
the first medical facilities. U.S. Army sani- 
tation experts brought in water purification 
equipment when no pure water was available 
over a period of days, and after arranging 



emergency distribution they saw to the re- 
pair of (lie municipal supply system and the 
partial restoration of service. Power and 
communications are being restored quickly 
both within the city and with the outside 
world in large part because American ex- 
perts who knew how to do it were rushed in. 
It was largely the officers at our Mission, 
operating out of tents and the Ambassador's 
residence because the Embassy itself was 
destroyed, who helped to organize the first 
crude feeding programs and the provision 
of emergency shelter. 

In particular, Ambassador Shelton is de- 
serving of special commendation. Through- 
out the emergency he performed with 
exceptional skill and courage a task that 
would test great generals. Nicaragua and 
we are fortunate that he was there when the 
challenge came. 

Maurice J. Williams 

President's Special Coordinator for 

Emergency Relief to Nicaragua, 

Attachment: Total relief assistance to date. 

TEXT OF ATTACHMENT TO MEMORANDUM 

Managua Earthquake 
Disaster Relief Assistance (Preliminary Data) 

I. U.S. Government Commitments 

Military Supplies & 

Equipment $2,137,355 

Military Airlift 722,773 

AID Emergency Housing 3,000,000 
AID Procured Supplies 937,301 

Commercial Transport 325,000 

U.S. Contributions to OAS 25,000 
Ongoing Cost Not Yet 

Reported 500,000 

Food for Peace 2,994,000 



Total U.S. Government 



$10,641,429 



II. U.S. Voluntary Agencies Contributions 



Catholic Relief Services 
Church World Services 
American Red Cross 
Salvation Army 
Seventh Day Adventists 
Wisconsin Partners 

of the Americas 
CARE 

Total U.S. Voluntary 
Agencies 



$346,000 

19,500 

251,440 

20,000 

29,750 

90,000 
20,000 



$ 776,690 



February 5, 1973 



143 



III. International Agencies & Other Nations 



Thirty one nations contrib- 






uting through National 






Red Cross Societies $1,715,840 




United Nations 


120,000 




Japan 


400,000 




Australia 


29,000 




France 


250,000 




Republic of China 






(Taiwan) 


256,000 




United Kingdom 


46,000 




OAS 


225,000 




Total International 






Agencies & Other 






Nations 




$ 3,041,840 


GRAND TOTAL ALL 






CONTRIBUTIONS 




$14,459,959 



US -Columbia Treaty on Quita Sueno 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon 1 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting for the Senate's advice 
and consent to ratification the Treaty be- 
tween the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Colombia, concerning the Status 
of Quita Sueno, Roncador and Serrana, 
signed at Bogota on September 8, 1972. 

Under the Treaty the United States re- 
nounces all claims to sovereignty over three 
uninhabited outcroppings of coral reefs in 
the Caribbean — Quita Sueno, Roncador and 
Serrana. 

The Treaty assures that the fishing rights 
of each Government's nationals and vessels 
in the waters adjacent to Quita Sueno will 
be free from interference by the other 
Government or by its nationals or vessels. 
Colombia also agrees to guarantee to United 
States nationals and vessels a continuation 
of fishing in the waters adjacent to Roncador 
and Serrana, subject to reasonable conserva- 
tion measures applied on a nondiscrimina- 
tory basis. 



1 Transmitted on Jan. 9 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. A, 93d Cong., 1st 
sess., which includes the report of the Department 
of State and the text of the treaty. 



The express purpose of the Treaty is to 
settle long-standing questions concerning the 
status of the three reefs, which are located 
between 380 and 460 miles from the Colom- 
bian mainland. In the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, the United States claimed them under 
the terms of the Guano Islands Act of 1856, 
following their discovery by an American 
citizen in 1869. In 1890 Colombia protested 
the extraction by United States nationals of 
guano from these reefs, claiming that Colom- 
bia had inherited sovereign title to them 
from Spain. In 1928 the United States and 
Colombia recognized the existence of their 
dual claims and agreed to maintain a status 
quo situation which has existed to the pres- 
ent day. 

Negotiation of the Treaty signed last Sep- 
tember was a response to Colombia's desire 
to enhance its claim to sovereignty. The pri- 
mary interest of the United States in the 
area is to protect the right of American na- 
tionals and vessels to continue fishing there. 
Another United States interest is the con- 
tinued maintenance of navigational aids on 
the three reefs. 

The Treaty meets the practical interests 
of both countries. It will satisfy the long- 
standing desire of the Colombian people that 
their claim to sovereignty not be encumbered 
by a conflicting claim by the United States. 
It will protect United States interests in 
maintaining fishing rights in the area and, 
through a related arrangement, will provide 
for maintenance by Colombia of the naviga- 
tional aids there in accordance with inter- 
national regulations. The enclosed report of 
the Department of State more fully describes 
the provisions of the Treaty and its related 
arrangements. 

This Treaty demonstrates once again the 
desire and willingness of the United States 
to settle, in a spirit of understanding and 
good will, differences which may exist in 
our relations with other countries particu- 
larly with our Latin American neighbors. 
I urge that the Senate act favorably on the 
Treaty in the near future. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, January 9, 1973. 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. and Canada Clarify Agreement 
on Telecommunications Satellites 

Following are texts of letters exchanged 
by Bertram W. Rein, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for Transportation and Communica- 
tions, with K. B. Williamson. Minister of the 
Embassy of Canada at Washington, and F. 
G. Nixon. Administrator, Telecommunica*- 
tions Management Bureau, Canadian De- 
partment of Covnnunications, setting forth 
steps to be followed in the event Telesat 
Canada institutes international service. 



CANADIAN LETTER OF NOVEMBER 6 

November 6, 1972. 

Dear Mr. Rein, This will confirm our informal 
advice to the State Department last May, to the 
effect that Telesat Canada is taking steps to have 
its objects amended. The draft amendment, as ap- 
proved by Telesat Canada, is set forth in the at- 
tached annex. 

The Corporation has instituted this action since 

I it has perceived the possible application of satellite 
communications technology to national resource de- 
velopments such as the proposed Mackenzie Valley 
gas pipeline which, when realized, would undoubt- 
edly have communications requirements largely 
within Canada, but also to certain nearby points in 
the United States. More recently, as you are aware, 
several U.S.A. domestic satellite communications 
system applicants have expressed an interest in the 
short term use of Telesat facilities for service be- 
tween points in the United States. 

It is Telesat Canada's intention, if and when their 
objects are so amended, that the services provided 
to and between points outside Canada would be 
incidental and peripheral to the main Canadian 
domestic service of the Corporation. It is, of course, 
recognized that any service involving points within 
the United States would require the approval of 
your Government. Insofar as service between U.S.A. 
points is concerned, it is also recognized that it 
would normally be agreed to only when there existed 
an insufficiency of U.S.A. domestic facilities. These 
principles are endorsed by the Minister of Communi- 
cations and the Secretary of Stat* for External 
Affairs who assume that you would agree to the 
application of the same principles in a reciprocal 
situation when your domestic satellite systems are 
in operation. 

We should also say that Telesat Canada's opera- 
tion, and this is particularly significant if it involves 
international public telecommunication services, will 
be consistent with Canada's obligations under the 



Intelsat Agreement, expected to come into force 
shortly. 

As you know the Telesat Canada Act requires 
that the amending letters patent, issued for the 
purpose of extending the objects of the Corporation, 
be laid before Parliament. They become effective if 
after thirty sitting days they have not been annulled 
by a resolution of either House. The amending 
letters patent have not yet been laid before Parlia- 
ment which means that the proposed extension of 
Telesat's objects cannot become effective before late 
December at the earliest. 1 

Inasmuch as our 1969 understanding on the pro- 
vision of the forthcoming series of launch services 
for the Telesat satellites is based on the system 
being used for Canadian domestic telecommunica- 
tions services and although these will still be the only 
services Telesat Canada will be empowered to pro- 
vide at the time of the first launch on November 
9, we would appreciate receiving your comments on 
the foregoing intention. 
Yours sincerely, 

K. B. Williamson, Minister. 
F. G. Nixon, Administrator, 
Telecommunications Management Bureau, 
Department of Communications. 

Mr. Bertram W. Rein, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation & 
Telecommunications, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 

Proposed Amendments to Telesat Canada Act 
(i) Delete from subsection (1) of section 5 which 
reads : 

"The objects of the company are to establish 
satellite telecommunication systems providing, on a 
commercial basis, telecommunication services be- 
tween locations in Canada." 

and substitute therefor the following: 

"The objects of the company are to establish sat- 
ellite telecommunication systems providing on a 
commercial basis, telecommunication services 

(a) between locations in Canada; and 

(b) subject to the appropriate intergovernmental 
arrangements to and between other locations." 

(ii) Delete from paragraph (c) of subsection (1) 
of section 6 thereof the words "between locations in 
Canada" so that the said paragraph (c) is to read: 

"the power to enter into contracts on such terms 
and conditions as it considers reasonable for the pro- 
vision of telecommunication services by satellite." 

(iii) Delete from paragraph (d) of subsection 
(1) of section 6 which reads: 

"the power to conduct research and developmental 



1 The letters patent were laid before Parliament 
on Jan. 5. 



February 5, 1973 



145 



work in all matters relating to telecommunication 
by satellite;" 

and substitute therefor the following: 

"the power to conduct research and developmental 
work and to provide managerial, engineering and 
other services in all matters relating to telecommu- 
nication by satellite and satellite systems;" 



U.S. LETTER OF NOVEMBER 7 

November 7, 1972. 
Honorable Kenneth B. Williamson, 
Minister, Embassy of Canada, 
17Jt6 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Minister: This is in response to your 
letter of November 6, 1972, jointly signed by Mr. 
F. G. Nixon, confirming your earlier informal advice 
to the Department of State that TELESAT Canada 
is taking steps to have its objects amended and ask- 
ing for our comments on this intention. 

As you have noted, the United States commitment 
to provide launch services was for a domestic Ca- 
nadian satellite system, and, indeed, we understand 
the TELESAT Act does not now authorize 
TELESAT to provide other than Canadian domes- 
tic telecommunication service. You advise it is now 
intended that the objects of the Corporation under 
the TELESAT Act be amended to include authority 
to handle international traffic as well as the domes- 
tic traffic of other countries. Although the proposed 
statutory language is quite broad, you have indi- 
cated it is intended that the satellites to be launched 
by the United States would be used only to provide 
telecommunication service to and between locations 
outside Canada which was incidental and peripheral 
to the main Canadian domestic service of the Cor- 
poration and would be consistent with Canada's 
obligations under the INTELSAT Agreement. In 
any event, any provision of other than Canadian 
domestic telecommunication service would, as re- 
quired by Subsection (1) (b) of Section 5 of the 
TELESAT Canada Act as proposed in the draft 
amendment, be provided "subject to the appropriate 
intergovernmental arrangements". 

Under these circumstances, we believe that the 
launch service to be furnished by the United States 
must be premised on your adherence to the follow- 
ing condition. Prior to the institution of any inter- 
national public telecommunications service utilizing 
satellites launched pursuant to the 1969 understand- 
ing, the Canadian authorities will submit the pro- 
posal to the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties in 
accordance with paragraph (d) of Article XIV of 
the INTELSAT definitive agreements. Such service 
shall not be inaugurated unless: 

(a) The proposal receives a favorable recom- 



mendation in the INTELSAT Assembly (for these 
purposes a favorable recommendation requires a 
two-thirds favorable vote) ; or 

(b) The proposal is supported by the USG [U.S. 
Government], and the Canadian authorities, in the 
absence of a favorable recommendation by the 
INTELSAT Assembly, consider in good faith that 
they have met their obligations under Article XIV; 
or 

(c) The Canadian authorities, in the absence of 
a favorable recommendation by the INTELSAT 
Assembly, when the USG does not support the pro- 
posal, consider they have met their obligations under 
Article XIV, and the USG, after taking into account 
the degree to which the proposal has been modified 
in the light of the factors which were the basis 
for the lack of support within INTELSAT, there- 
after communicates its support of the proposal. 

Since we would assume that any proposal for 
international telecommunication service to points 
within the United States would not be made in the 
absence of prior United States concurrence and, 
would therefore have United States support in 
INTELSAT, such services would be consistent with 
the above conditions. 

As was pointed out to Canadian authorities in 
correspondence dated June 23, 1972, there are, we 
believe, certain special circumstances where it would 
be in the interest of both our countries not to pre- 
clude our domestic satellite telecommunications sys- 
tems from providing assistance to one another. One 
such case would be the provision of support and 
assistance, subject to the availability of facilities 
and to the extent it is technically feasible, in the 
case of catastrophic failure of either system. An- 
other would be for each system to be in a position 
to assist the other country in meeting its domestic 
telecommunication needs via satellite either when 
the other country does not yet have a system in 
operation or when it may have a temporary short- 
age of adequate facilities. A third case would be the 
extension of service to a point or points in the other 
country where such service was incidental and pe- 
ripheral to the provision of what was clearly and 
essentially a domestic service. The implementation 
of any proposal for services of the type discussed 
in this paragraph will be subject to approval by 
appropriate representatives of both Governments. 

We would appreciate receiving confirmation that 
you share the views expressed herein, and that this 
exchange of letters constitutes an "intergovernmen- 
tal arrangement" within the meaning of the pro- 
posed amendment to the TELESAT Act. 



Sincerely yours, 



Bert W. Rein, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



CANADIAN LETTER OF NOVEMBER 8 

November 8, 1972. 

Dear Mr. Rein, We refer to your letter of No- 
vember 7. 1972. We are able to confirm Canadian 
acceptance of the views and understandings which 
you have expressed in the paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
your letter and, more particularly, for the purposes 
of the satellites launched pursuant to the 1969 un- 
derstanding, the conditions which you have specified 
in the third paragraph. 

We hereby confirm that our letter of November 
6, 1972, your letter of November 7, 1972, and this 
reply constitute an "intergovernmental arrange- 
ment" within the meaning of the proposed amend- 
ment to the objects and powers under the Telesat 
Canada Act. 

With the completion of this exchange of letters, 
we believe it would now be appropriate to encour- 
age the relevant agencies and parties to further 
explore and define the agreed areas of mutual in- 
terest for co-operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
K. B. Williamson, Mmiatt r. 
F. G. Nixon, Administrator, 
Telecommunications Management Bureau, 
Department of Communications. 
Mr. Bertram W. Rein, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation & 
Telecommunications, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 



President Nixon Orders Increase 
in Certain Oil Import Levels 

A PROCLAMATION 1 

Modifying Proclamation No. 3279, Relating to 
Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products 

The Director of the Office of Emergency Pre- 
paredness, with the advice of the Oil Policy Commit- 
tee, has found that increases in domestic production 
in 1973 will not be sufficient to supply the expanded 
demand for petroleum and petroleum products dur- 
ing the year. He has therefore recommended an in- 
crease of 915,000 barrels per day in licensed imports 
into Districts I-IV, including the Canadian compo- 
nent of those imports. 

The Director, with the advice of the Oil Policy 
Committee, has also found that there may be a 
threat of temporary shortage of No. 2 fuel oil in the 
current season and has recommended that the re- 
quirement for allocations of such fuel oil be sus- 
pended for the period January 1, 197.3, through 
April 30, 197.3. He has also recommended certain 
technical amendments to Proclamation No. 3279, 1 as 



amended, relating to foreign trade zones, gilsonite, 
oil shale and liquefied gases. 

In each instance above, the Director has found 
that his recommended changes would not adversely 
ail.it the national security. 

The Director, with the advice of the Oil Policy 
Committee, has taken into account the estimates of 
the Secretary of the Interior of the quantity of 
crude oil and natural gas liquids that will be pro- 
duced in Districts I-IV, adjusted to reflect other 
national security determinations, and has recom- 
mended that Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, be 
further amended to adjust imports in conformity 
with these findings. 

I agree with the findings and recommendations of 
the Director and deem it necessary and consistent 
with the security objectives of Proclamation No. 
3279, as amended, to adjust the imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products, and to improve the admin- 
istration of the program, as hereinafter provided. 

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti- 
tution and laws of the United States, including sec- 
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do 
hereby proclaim that, effective as of this date, Proc- 
lamation No. 3279, as amended, is further amended 
as follows: 

1. Paragraph (a) of Section 1 is revised to read 
as follows: 

"Sec. 1(a) In Districts I-IV, in District V, and in 
Puerto Rico, no crude oil, unfinished oils, or finished 
products may be entered for consumption or with- 
drawn from warehouse for consumption, except 
(1) by or for the account of a person to whom a 
license has been issued by the Secretary of the In- 
terior pursuant to an allocation made to such person 
by the Secretary in accordance with regulations is- 
sued by the Secretary, and such entries or with- 
drawals may be made only in accordance with the 
terms of such license, or (2) as authorized by the 
Secretary pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, 
or (3) as to finished products, by or for the account 
of a department, establishment, or agency of the 
United States, which shall not be required to have 
such a license but which shall be subject to the pro- 
visions of paragraph (c) of this section, or 
(4) crude oil, unfinished oils, or finished products 
which are transported into the United States by 
pipeline, rail, or other means of overland transpor- 
tation from the country where they were produced, 
which country, in the case of unfinished oils or fin- 
ished products, is also the country of production of 
the crude oil from which they were processed or 
manufactured or (5) as provided in paragraph (d) 
of this section, or (6) as otherwise provided in this 
Proclamation." 



1 No. 4178; 38 Fed. Reg. 1719. 



'24 Fed. Reg. 1781; 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., 
p. 11. 



February 5, 1973 



147 



2. Paragraph (a) of Section 1A is amended as 
follows : 

(a) In subparagraph (1) substitute "1973" for 

"1972." 

(b) Subparagraph (2) is revised to read as 

follows: 

"(2) During the period January 1, 1973, through 
December 31, 1973, Canadian imports under alloca- 
tions made pursuant to this subparagraph (2) into 
Districts I-IV shall not exceed an average of 675,000 
barrels per day. Entries for consumption of crude 
oil or unfinished oils transported by pipeline may be 
made until midnight January 15, 1974 under any 
license authorizing such imports from Canada for 
that period and until midnight January 15, 1973, 
under any license authorizing such imports from 
Canada for the preceding allocation period. The 
Secretary shall by regulation provide for allocations 
of such imports. The regulations shall provide that 
licenses issued under such allocations shall permit 
the entry, or withdrawal from warehouses, for con- 
sumption of Canadian imports only." 

3. Subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) of Sec- 
tion 2 is amended as follows: 

(a) Substitute "2,025,000" for "1,165,000." 

(b) Substitute the following for the third and 
fourth sentences: 

"In addition to the imports permitted under the 
first sentence of this paragraph, for the period May 
1, 1973, through December 31, 1973, and for each 
allocation period thereafter, there may be imported 
into District I, an average of 50,000 barrels per day 
of No. 2 fuel oil, manufactured in the Western 
Hemisphere from crude oil produced in the Western 
Hemisphere, for allocation, under regulations of the 
Secretary, to persons in the business in District I 
of selling No. 2 fuel oil who do not have crude oil 
import allocations into Districts I-IV and who oper- 
ate deep water terminals in District I or have 
throughput agreements with deep water terminal 
operators in District I who do not have crude oil 
import allocations into District I-IV, on a fair and 
equitable basis, to the extent possible, in relation 
to such persons* inputs of No. 2 fuel oil to such ter- 
minals, having regard to any product import alloca- 
tion into Districts I-IV made to such persons." 

4. Add subparagraph (4) to paragraph (a) of 
Section 2 as follows: 

"(4) For the period January 1, 1973, through 
April 30, 1973, any person who is in the business of 
selling No. 2 fuel oil in Districts I-IV to be used as 
fuel may import such No. 2 fuel oil into Districts 
I-IV without reducing the quantities of crude oil, 
unfinished oils, and finished products that have 
been or may be imported under the provisions of 
Section 1, Section 1A, and Section 2 of this procla- 
mation. Such imports shall require no allocation and 



148 



licenses shall be available for such imports in ac- 
cordance with regulations issued by the Secretary." 
5. Paragraph (f ) of Section 9 is amended to read 
as follows: 

"(f) 'Crude Oil' means a mixture of hydrocar- 
bons that existed in the liquid phase in natural 
underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmos- 
pheric pressure after passing through surface sepa- 
rating processes (and are not natural gas products) 
and the initial liquid hydrocarbons (at atmospheric 
conditions) produced from tar sands, gilsonite, and 
oil shale;." 

6. Subparagraph (1) of paragraph (g) of Sec- 
tion 9 is amended to read as follows : 

" ( 1 ) The following liquefied gases, namely ethane, 
propane, butanes, ethylene, propylene and butylenes 
which are derived by refining or other processing of 
natural gas, crude oil, or unfinished oils;." 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this seventeenth day of January, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three and of 
the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred ninety-seventh. 



^L/^^i 



New Bill Proposed on Immunities 
of Foreign States in U.S. Courts 

Following are a Department announce- 
ment issued on December 29 and the text of 
a letter dated January 16 from Secretary 
Rogers and Attorney General Richard G. 
Kleindienst to Speaker of the House Carl 
Albert. 1 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

Press release 321 dated December 29 

The Department of State announced on 
December 29 that the Departments of State 
and Justice have completed work on a draft 
bill to regulate the jurisdictional immunities 
of foreign states in U.S. courts. The draft 
bill would create a comprehensive statutory 
regime for determining sovereign immunity 
issues and would transfer to the courts the 

1 An identical submission was made to President 
of the Senate Spiro T. Agnew. 






Department of State Bulletin 



task of determining when a foreign state is 
entitled to immunity. 

Secretary Rogers hailed the draft bill as 
"an important milestone in the foreign rela- 
tions law of the United States." He said that 
the draft would l>e jointly transmitted by him 
and the Attorney General to the 93d Congress 
as soon as it convenes and that in view of the 
importance of the legislation he hopes that 
it can receive careful attention early in the 
session. 

At present the determination whether a 
foreign state which is sued in a court of 
the United States is entitled to immunity is 
largely governed by suggestions of the De- 
partment of State communicated to the 
courts through the Department of Justice. 
In making suggestions of immunity, the De- 
partment has been guided by the "restric- 
tive theory of sovereign immunity" as set 
forth in the "Tate letter" of May 19, 1952, 
from the Acting Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State, Jack B. Tate, to the 
Acting Attorney General. According to the 
restrictive theory of immunity, the immunity 
of the sovereign is recognized with regard 
to public acts, but not with regard to private 
or commercial acts. 

The Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, John R. Stevenson, said that "the draft 
bill was carefully prepared over a period of 
four years and reflects the most modern 
thinking on the law governing when foreign 
states should be subject to the jurisdiction 
of U.S. courts." He also indicated that for 
many years the foreign relations bar has been 
virtually unanimous in feeling that develop- 
ment of the law of sovereign immunity would 
be enhanced by judicial determination on the 
basis of comprehensive legislation. He ex- 
plained that in recent years a number of gaps 
in the existing law have become more trou- 
blesome, particularly the lack of a clear 
method of service of process on foreign gov- 
ernments. One consequence has been a prac- 
tice of attaching the assets of foreign 
governments simply as a method of obtaining 
jurisdiction over them. This practice has in 
turn sometimes resulted in serious hardships 
as foreign governments have had their assets 
tied up. Mr. Stevenson further pointed out 



that as our trade and other commercial ar- 
rangements with foreign governments in- 
crease, it will be even more important to 
have a modern regime for dealing with these 
issues. 

The proposed bill largely follows the re- 
strictive theory of sovereign immunity. It 
also spells out the respective jurisdictions of 
State and Federal courts and the venue and 
removal requirements in actions brought 
against foreign states and creates a method 
of service of process on foreign states. At- 
tachment of the assets of a foreign state for 
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction would 
thus no longer be appropriate. 

The Legal Adviser said that until the draft 
legislation is enacted, the Department will 
continue to be guided by its traditional policy 
as embodied in the "Tate letter." He pointed 
out also that "the Department contemplates 
that when draft legislation on this subject is 
enacted, it would propose, subject to Senate 
approval, that the United States file a dec- 
laration accepting the compulsory jurisdic- 
tion of the International Court of Justice, on 
condition of reciprocity, with respect to dis- 
putes concerning the immunity of foreign 
states. Such a declaration would recognize 
the common interest of all nations in recip- 
rocally applicable rules concerning the im- 
munity of foreign states." 



TEXT OF LETTER 

January 16, 1973. 
The Speaker 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: There is attached for your 
consideration and appropriate reference a draft bill, 
"To define the circumstances in which foreign states 
are immune from the jurisdiction of United States 
courts and in which execution may not be levied on 
their assets, and for other purposes," which is being 
submitted jointly by the Department of State and 
the Department of Justice. 

At present the determination whether a foreign 
state which is sued in a court of the United States 
is entitled to sovereign immunity is made by the 
court in which the action is brought. However, the 
courts normally defer to the suggestion of the 
Department of State that immunity should be ac- 
(i and make their own determination of entitle- 



February 5, 1973 



149 



ment to immunity only when the Department of 
State makes no submission to the court. 

The law which is applied both by the courts and 
by the Department of State is thus the result of 
the joint articulation of the law by the judiciary 
and the Department. The views expressed by the 
courts influence the Department of State, and the 
views expressed by the Department of State influ- 
ence the courts. In the process of ascertaining and 
applying the law, both the Department and the 
courts rely on precedents and trends of decision in 
foreign as well as United States courts. 

The policy of the Department of State, which 
has been given effect by the courts as well, was set 
forth in a letter of May 19, 1952 from the Acting 
Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the 
Acting Attorney General. The Department of State 
asserted that its policy would be thereafter "to follow 
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the 
consideration of requests of foreign governments 
for a grant of sovereign immunity." The letter 
stated, 

According to the newer or restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the 
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign 
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but 
not with respect to private acts (jure ges- 
tionis) . There is agreement by proponents of 
both theories [i.e. of absolute and of restrictive 
immunity], supported by practice, that sover- 
eign immunity should not be claimed or granted 
in actions with respect to real property (diplo- 
matic and perhaps consular property excepted) 
or with respect to the disposition of the 
property of a deceased person even though a 
foreign sovereign is the beneficiary. 

The effect of the draft bill would be to accomplish 
four things: 

1. The task of determining whether a foreign 
state is entitled to immunity would be transferred 
wholly to the courts, and the Department of State 
would no longer express itself on requests for im- 
munity directed to it by the courts or by foreign 
states. 

2. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
would be further particularized in statutory form. 

3. Foreign states would no longer be accorded 
absolute immunity from execution on judgments 
rendered against them, as is now the case, and 
their immunity from execution would conform more 
closely to the restrictive theory of immunity from 
jurisdiction. 

4. The means whereby process may be served on 
foreign states would be specified. 

The central principle of the draft bill is to make 
the question of a foreign state's entitlement to 
immunity an issue justiciable by the courts, without 
participation by the Department of State. As the 
situation now stands, the courts normally defer to 



the views of the Department of State, which puts 
the Department in the difficult position of effectively 
determining whether the plaintiff will have his day 
in court. If the Department suggests immunity, the 
court will normally honor the suggestion, and the 
case will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If 
the Department does not suggest immunity, the 
court may either take the silence of the Department 
as an indication that immunity is not appropriate 
or will determine the question itself, with due regard 
for the policy of the Department and the views 
expressed in the past by the courts. While the De- 
partment has attempted to provide internal proce- 
dures which will give both the plaintiff and the 
defendant foreign state a hearing, it is not satis- 
factory that a department, acting through ad- 
ministrative procedures, should in the generality 
of cases determine whether the plaintiff will or 
will not be permitted to pursue his cause of action. 
Questions of such moment appear particularly 
appropriate for resolution by the courts, rather than 
by an executive department. 

The transfer of this function to the courts will 
also free the Department from pressures by foreign 
states to suggest immunity and from any adverse 
consequences resulting from the unwillingness of 
the Department to suggest immunity. The Depart- 
ment would be in a position to assert that the 
question of immunity is entirely one for the courts. 

Plaintiffs, the Department of State, and foreign 
states would thus benefit from the removal of the 
issue of immunity from the realm of discretion and 
making it a justiciable question. 

The draft bill would give appropriate guidance, 
grounded in the restrictive theory of immunity, on 
the standards to be employed. These are consistent 
with those applied in other developed legal systems. 
In brief, foreign states would not be immune from 
the jurisdiction of United States courts when the 
foreign state has waived its immunity, when the 
action is based on a commercial activity or concerns 
property present in the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity, when the action relates 
to immovables or to rights in property acquired 
by succession or gift, or when an action is brought 
against a foreign state for personal injury or death 
or damage to or loss of property occasioned by the 
tortious act in the United States of a foreign state. 
Special provisions would be made for counterclaims 
and for actions relating to the public debt of a 
foreign state. 

Under the present law, a plaintiff who is able 
to bring his action against a foreign state because it 
relates to a commercial act (jure gestionis) of that 
state may be denied the fruits of his judgment 
against the foreign state. The immunity of a foreign 
state from execution has remained absolute. The 
draft bill would permit execution on the assets of a 
foreign state if the foreign state had waived its 
immunity from execution or if the assets were held 
for commercial purposes in the United States. The 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



plaintiff could thus recover against commercial 
accounts, but not against those maintained for 
governmental purposes. The successful plaintiff 
would also be precluded from levying on funds 
deposited in the United States in connection with 
central banking activities and on military property. 

Finally the draft bill would, in addition to 
specifying the respective jurisdictions of State and 
Federal courts in actions against foreign states and 
venue requirements, clear up the question of how 
foreign states are to be served. Service would be 
made either on the ambassador or other person 
entitled to receive service, and a copy of the 
complaint, furnished to the Department of State, 
would in turn be transmitted to the department of 
the foreign state responsible for the conduct of 
foreign relations. The initiation of actions through 
attachment would thus no longer be appropriate. 

The ideal arrangement concerning the sovereign 
immunity of foreign states would be the regulation 
of the question through a general international 
agreement. The draft bill is looked upon as an 
arrangement to be applied until such time as a 
satisfactory convention is drawn up and the United 
States becomes a party to it. 

The Department of State contemplates that if 
the draft bill should be enacted, it would propose 
that the United States file a declaration accepting 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice, on condition of reciprocity, with 
respect to disputes concerning the immunity of 
foreign states. The resolution of disputed questions 
of sovereign immunity by the World Court would 
have the beneficial effect of assuring- that the law 
and practice of this and other countries conform 
with international law and of imparting further 
precision to the law in areas where some measure 
of uncertainty now exists. 

The Office of Management and Budget has advised 
that there is no objection to the enactment of this 
legislation from the standpoint of the Administra- 
tion's program. 
Sincerely, 

Richard G. Kleindienst William P. Rogers 

A tfnrney General Secretary of State 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



92d Congress, 2d Session 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1972. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 16029. S. Rept. 92-1182. September 
19, 1972. 38 pp. 

Journey to the New China, April-May 1972. Reports 
of Senator Mike Mansfield and Senator Hugh 
Scott. S. Doc. 92-89. September 26, 1972. 34 pp. 



U.S. Participation in the Spokane Expo 1974. Re- 
port, together with minority views, to accompany 
S. 4022; S. Rept. 92-1251 j October 2, 1H72; 24 
pp. Report to accompany S. 4022; H. Rept. 92- 
1584; October 12, 1972: f. pp. 

Creating an Atlantic Union Delegation. Report to 
accompany S.J. Res. 217. S. Kept. 92-1255. 
October 2, 1972. 42 pp. 

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on 
Certain Dyeing and Tanning Products and In- 
clusion of Logwood Among Such Products. Report 
to accompany H.R. 15795. H. Rept. 92-1481. 
October 2, 1972. 3 pp. 

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on 
Certain Istle. Report to accompany H.R. 15442. 
H. Rept. 92-1482. October 2, 1972. 3 pp. 

Protection of Foreign Officials. Conference report 
to accompany H.R. 15883. H. Rept. 92-1485. 
October 2, 1972. 3 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

International air services transit agreement. Done 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Hungary, January 15, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, January 17, 

1973. 
Accession deposited: Republic of Korea, January 
18, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 26, 197o. 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, January 17, 
1973. 1 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972. 2 

Signatures: India, January 15, 1973; 3 Thailand, 
January 17, 1973. 



1 Does not apply to Faroe Islands and Greenland, 
in force. 
With a statement. 



February 5, 1973 



151 



Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 
Notification of provisional application: Iceland, 

January 16, 1973. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 17, 1973. 
Accession deposited: Barbados, January 19, 1973. 

Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In- 
telsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 
20, 1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. 
TIAS 7532. 

Signature: Cable and Wireless (West Indies) 
Ltd. for Barbados, January 19, 1973. 

Trade 

Agreement on implementation of article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva June 30, 1967. Entered into force July 
1, 1968. TIAS 6431. 

Acceptance deposited: Spain, December 19, 1972. 
Protocol for the accession of the People's Republic, 
of Bangladesh to the General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade, with annex. Done at Geneva No- 
vember 7, 1972. Entered into force December 16, 
1972. 

Acceptances deposited: Japan, December 13, 1972; 
Norway, December 1, 1972; United States, No- 
vember 24, 1972. 



BILATERAL 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 
7358). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta 
December 11, 1972. Entered into force December 

11, 1972. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 
7358). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta 
December 12, 1972. Entei'ed into force December 

12, 1972. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 
7358). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta 



December 13, 1972. Entered into force December 
13, 1972. 

Oman 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Oman. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Muscat November 15 and 28, 1972. 
Entered into force November 28, 1972. 

Poland 

Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Warsaw July 19, 1972. Entered into 
force provisionally July 19, 1972. 
Entered into force definitively : December 8, 1972. 

Portugal 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles be- 
tween Macau and the United States, with annex. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon December 
22, 1972. Entered into force December 22, 1972. 

Agreement relating to exports of wool and man- 
made fiber textile products from Macau; with 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon 
December 22, 1972. Entered into force December 
22, 1972. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending (1) agreement on certain fish- 
ery problems on the high seas in the western 
areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean of December 
11, 1970 (TIAS 7009) ; (2) protocol to the agree- 
ment on certain fishery problems on the high seas 
in the western areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean 
of February 2, 1971 (TIAS 7043) ; (3) agreement 
on certain fisheries problems in the northeastern 
part of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of the 
United States of America of February 12, 1971 
(TIAS 7046) ; (4) agreement relating to fishing 
operations in the northeastern Pacific Ocean of 
February 12, 1971 (TIAS 7045); and (5) agree- 
ment relating to fishing for king and tanner 
crab of February 12, 1971 (TIAS 7044). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 
31, 1972. Entered into force December 31, 1972. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement confirming a memorandum of under- 
standing concerning the furnishing of launching 
and associated services by NASA for United 
Kingdom satellites, with annexes. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington January 17, 
1973. Entered into force January 17, 1973. 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 5, 1973 Vol. LXVIII. No. 1754 



» Bulgaria. Letters of Credence (Zdrachev) . . 128 
Cambodia. Offshore Procurement Authorized 
of Rice for Laos and Cambodia (Presiden- 
tial determination) 140 
Canada. U.S. and Canada Clarify Agreement 
on Telecommunications Satellites (texts of 
letters) 145 

China. President Nixon Welcomes Chinese Ac- 
robatic Troupe (Nixon, Chang) 131 

Colombia. U.S.-Colombia Treaty on Quita 
Sueno Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Nixon) 144 

ngress 
bngressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 151 

ew Bill Proposed on Immunities of Foreign 
States in U.S. Courts (Department an- 
nouncement, text of joint Justice-State 

letter to Speaker of the House) 148 

.S.-Colombia Treaty on Quita Sueno Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 144 

nomic Affairs 
uropean Community Eliminates Retaliatory 

Tariffs Against U.S 139 

nited States Foreign Economic Policy: 

Where Are We? (Weintraub) 133 

.S. Reserves Right To Renegotiate Trade 

Concessions Under GATT 139 

uador. Letters of Credence (Quevedo Toro) 128 

reece. Letters of Credence (Sorokos) . . . 128 

el. The Need for a Negotiating Process in 
the Middle East (Rogers) 129 

ios. Letters of Credence (Pheng Norindr) . . 128 

iddle East. The Need for a Negotiating 
Process in the Middle East (Rogers) . . . 129 

icaragua. Mr. Williams Reports to President 
on Managua Earthquake Relief (memoran- 
dum to President Nixon) 141 

ama. Letters of Credence (Gonzalez Revi- 
11a) 128 

etroleum. President Nixon Orders Increase 
in Certain Oil Import Levels (proclama- 
tion) 147 

esidential Documents 

'shore Procurement Authorized of Rice for 
Laos and Cambodia (Presidential determina- 
tion) 110 

sident Nixon Orders Increase in Certain 
Oil Import Levels (proclamation) .... 117 

sident Nixon Welcomes Chinese Acrobatic 
Troupe 131 



The Second Inaugural Adi President 
Nixon 

Sudan. Letters of < (Hamza) .... 128 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 

U.S.-Colombia Treaty on Quita Sueno Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 144 

\ it I Nam. 174th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris (Isham) 127 

Name Index 

Chang Ying-wu 131 

Gonzalez Revilla, Nicolas 128 

Hamza, Abdel Aziz Al Nasri 128 

Isham, Heyward 127 

Nixon, President .... 125, 131, 140, 144, 147 

Pheng Norindr 128 

Quevedo Toro, Alberto 128 

Rogers, Secretary 129 

Sorokos, John A 128 

Weintraub, Sidney 183 

Williams, Maurice J 141 

Zdrachev, Christo Delchev 128 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 15—21 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to January 15 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
321 of December 29. 

Subject 

Volume IX of "Foreign Relations" 
series for 1948 released. 

Rejrional foreign policy confer- 
ence, New Orleans, Feb. 15. 

Ropers: Conference of Presidents 
of Major American Jewish Or- 
ganizations, New York. 

U.S. launch services for British 
satellites. 

John Updike to Visit Africa as 
Lincoln lecturer (rewrite). 

Meeting of U.S. Advisory Com- 
mission on International Educa- 
tional and Cultural Affairs, Feb. 
2. 

Regional foreign policy confer- 
ashville, Feb. 15. 

Isham: 174th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

* Not printed. 

t H'ld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



No. 


Date 


te 


1/16 


*7 


1/16 


8 


117 


+9 


1 17 


tio 




♦11 


I 17 


*12 









Superintendent ok Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, o.c. 2o402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



' 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXVIII 



No. 1755 



February 12, 1973 



AGREEMENT CONCLUDED ON ENDING THE WAR 
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIET-NAM 

Address by President Nixon 153 
News Conference of Dr. Kissinger 155 
Texts of Agreement and Protocols 169 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1755 
February 12, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE : 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 66 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of I/.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and ot 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases o 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 






Agreement Concluded on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam 



Following are texts of an address to the 
Nation made by President Nixon on tele- 
vision and radio on January 23, a news con- 
ference held at the White House on January 
2-i by Henry A. A Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs, and 
the Agreement on Ending the War and Re- 
storing Peace in Vietnam and related proto- 
cols released by the White House January 24. 



ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON, JANUARY 23 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 29 

Good evening. I have asked for this radio 
and television time tonight for the purpose 
of announcing that we today have concluded 
an agreement to end the war and bring 
peace with honor in Viet-Nam and in South- 
east Asia. 

The following statement is being issued at 
this moment in Washington and Hanoi : 

"At 12:30 Paris time today, January 23, 
1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by 
Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United 
States, and Special Advisor Le Due Tho on 
behalf of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. 

"The agreement will be formally signed by 
the parties participating in the Paris Con- 
ference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at 
the International Conference Center in Paris. 

"The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 
Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. 
The United States and the Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam express the hope that this 
agreement will insure stable peace in Viet- 
nam and contribute to tho preservation of 



lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast 
Asia." 

That concludes the formal statement. 

Throughout the years of negotiations, we 
have insisted on peace with honor. In my ad- 
dresses to the Nation from this room of Jan- 
uary 25 and May 8, I set forth the goals that 
we considered essential for peace with honor. 1 

In the settlement that has now been agreed 
to, all the conditions that I laid down then 
have been met. A cease-fire, internationally 
supervised, will begin at 7 p.m. this Satur- 
day, January 27, Washington time. Within 
60 days from this Saturday, all Americans 
held prisoners of war throughout Indochina 
will be released. There will be the fullest 
possible accounting for all of those who are 
missing in action. 

During the same 60-day period, all Amer- 
ican forces will be withdrawn from South 
Viet-Nam. 

The people of South Viet-Nam have been 
guaranteed the right to determine their own 
future without outside interference. 

By joint agreement, the full text of the 
agreement and the protocols to carry it out 
will be issued tomorrow. 

Throughout these negotiations we have 
been in the closest consultation with Presi- 
dent Thieu and other representatives of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam. This settlement meets 
the goals and has the full support of Presi- 
dent Thieu and the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, as well as that of our 
other allies who are affected. 

The United States will continue to recog- 
nize the Government of the Republic of Viet- 



1 For texts, see Bulletin i i, L972, p. 181, 

and May 29, L972, p. 717. 



February 12, 1973 



153 



Nam as the sole legitimate government of 
South Viet-Nam. 

We shall continue to aid South Viet-Nam 
within the terms of the agreement, and we 
shall support efforts by the people of South 
Viet-Nam to settle their problems peacefully 
among themselves. 

We must recognize that ending the war 
is only the first step toward building the 
peace. All parties must now see to it that this 
is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that 
heals, and a peace that not only ends the war 
in Southeast Asia but contributes to the 
prospects of peace in the whole world. 

This will mean that the terms of the agree- 
ment must be scrupulously adhered to. We 
shall do everything the agreement requires 
of us, and we shall expect the other parties 
to do everything it requires of them. We shall 
also expect other interested nations to help 
insure that the agreement is carried out and 
peace is maintained. 

As this long and very difficult war ends, I 
would like to address a few special words to 
each of those who have been parties in the 
conflict. 

First, to the people and Government of 
South Viet-Nam : By your courage, by your 
sacrifice, you have won the precious right to 
determine your own future, and you have 
developed the strength to defend that right. 
We look forward to working with you in the 
future, friends in peace as we have been 
allies in war. 

To the leaders of North Viet-Nam: As 
we have ended the war through negotiations, 
let us now build a peace of reconciliation. 
For our part, we are prepared to make a 
major effort to help achieve that goal ; but 
just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, 
so, too, will it be needed to build and 
strengthen the peace. 

To the other major powers that have been 
involved, even indirectly: Now is the time 
for mutual restraint so that the peace we 
have achieved can last. 

And finally, to all of you who are listen- 
ing, the American people: Your steadfast- 
ness in supporting our insistence on peace 
with honor has made peace with honor pos- 



sible. I know that you would not have wanted 
that peace jeopardized. With our secret nego- 
tiations at the sensitive stage they were in 
during this recent period, for me to have 
discussed publicly our efforts to secure peace 
would not only have violated our under- 
standing with North Viet-Nam; it would 
have seriously harmed and possibly de- 
stroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I 
know that you now can understand why dur- 
ing these past several weeks I have not 
made any public statements about those 
efforts. 

The important thing was not to talk about 
peace, but to get peace and to get the right 
kind of peace. This we have done. 

Now that we have achieved an honorable 
agreement, let us be proud that America did 
not settle for a peace that would have be- 
trayed our allies, that would have abandoned 
our prisoners of war, or that would have 
ended the war for us but would have con- 
tinued the war for the 50 million people of 
Indochina. Let us be proud of the 214 mil- 
lion young Americans who served in Viet- 
Nam, who served with honor and distinction 
in one of the most selfless enterprises in the 
history of nations. And let us be proud of 
those who sacrificed, who gave their lives 
so that the people of South Viet-Nam might 
live in freedom and so that the world might 
live in peace. 

In particular, I would like to say a woi*d to 
some of the bravest people I have ever met — 
the wives, the children, the families, of our 
prisoners of war and the missing in action. 
When others called on us to settle on any 
terms, you had the courage to stand for the 
right kind of peace so that those who died 
and those who suffered would not have died 
and suffered in vain and so that where this 
generation knew war the next genera- 
tion would know peace. Nothing means more 
to me at this moment than the fact that your 
long vigil is coming to an end. 

Just yesterday, a great American who 
once occupied this office died. In his life Presi- 
dent Johnson endured the vilification of 
those who sought to portray him as a man 
of war. But there was nothing he cared 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



about more deeply than achieving a lasting 
peace in the world. 

I remember the last time I talked with him. 
It was just the day after New Year's. He 
spoke then of his concern with bringing 
peace, with making it the right kind of peace, 
and I was grateful that he once again ex- 
pressed his support for my efforts to pain 
such a peace. No one would have welcomed 
this peace more than he. 

And I know he would join me in asking 
for those who died and for those who live: 
Let us consecrate this moment by resolving 
together to make the peace we have achieved 
a peace that will last. 

Thank you and good evening. 



DR. KISSINGERS NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JANUARY 24 



Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 29 

Ladies and gentlemen : The President last 
evening presented the outlines of the agree- 
ment, and by common agreement between us 
and the North Vietnamese we have today re- 
leased the texts. And I am here to explain, 
to go over briefly, what these texts contain 
and how we got there, what we have tried 
to achieve in recent months, and where we 
expect to go from here. 

Let me begin by going through the agree- 
ment, which you have read. 

The agreement, as you know, is in nine 
chapters. The first affirms the independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. 
as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements 
on Viet-Nam, agreements which established 
two zones divided by a military demarcation 
line. 

Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The 
cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock, 
Washington time, on Saturday night. The 
principal provisions of chapter II deal with 
permitted acts during the cease-fire and with 
what the obligations of the various parties 
are with respect to the cease-fire. 

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal 
of American and all other foreign forces 
from Viet-Nam within a period of 60 days 



And it specifies the forces that have to be 
withdrawn. These are, in effect, all military 

personnel and all civilian personnel dealing 
with combat operations. We are permitted 
to retain economic advisers, and civilian 
technicians serving in certain of the military 
branches. 

Chapter II further deals with the pro- 
visions for resupply and for the introduction 
of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition 
against the introduction of any military 
force into South Viet-Nam from outside of 
South Viet-Nam, which is to say that what- 
ever forces may be in South Viet-Nam from 
outside South Viet-Nam, specifically North 
Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforce- 
ments, replacements, or any other form of 
augmentation by any means whatsoever. 
With respect to military equipment, both 
sides are permitted to replace all existing 
military equipment on a one-to-one basis 
under international supervision and control. 

There will be established, as I will explain 
when I discuss the protocols, for each side 
three legitimate points of entry through 
which all replacement equipment has to move. 
These legitimate points of entry will be 
under international supervision. 

Release of Prisoners 

Chapter III deals with the return of cap- 
tured military personnel and foreign civil- 
ians, as well as with the question of civilian 
detainees within South Viet-Nam. 

This, as you know, throughout the nego- 
tiations presented enormous difficulties for 
us. We insisted throughout that the question 
of American prisoners of war and of Amer- 
ican civilians captured throughout Indochina 
should be separated from the issue of Viet- 
namese civilian personnel detained, partly 
because of the enormous difficulty of classify- 
ing the Vietnamese civilian personnel by 
categories of who was detained for reasons 
of the civil war and who was detained for 
criminal activities, and secondly, because it 
was foreseeable that negotiations about the 
release of civilian detainees would be com- 
plex and difficult and because we did not 
want to have the issue of American per- 



February 12, 1973 



155 



sonnel mixed up with the issues of civilian 
personnel in South Viet-Nam. 

This turned out to be one of the thorniest 
issues, that was settled at some point and 
kept reappearing throughout the negotia- 
tions. It was one of the difficulties we had 
during the December negotiations. 

As you can see from the agreement, the 
return of American military personnel and 
captured civilians is separated in terms of 
obligation, and in terms of the time frame, 
from the return of Vietnamese civilian 
personnel. 

The return of American personnel and the 
accounting of missing in action is uncondi- 
tional and will take place within the same 
time frame as the American withdrawal. 

The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel 
will be negotiated between the two Viet- 
namese parties over a period of three months, 
and as the agreement says, they will do their 
utmost to resolve this question within the 
three-month period. 

So I repeat, the issue is separated, both 
in terms of obligation and in terms of the 
relevant time frame, from the return of 
American prisoners, which is unconditional. 

We expect that American prisoners will 
be released at intervals of two weeks or 15 
days in roughly equal installments. We have 
been told that no American prisoners are 
held in Cambodia. American prisoners held 
in Laos and North Viet-Nam will be re- 
turned to us in Hanoi. They will be received 
by American medical evacuation teams and 
flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to 
places of our own choice, probably Vientiane. 

There will be international supervision of 
both this provision and of the provision for 
the missing in action. And all American 
prisoners will, of course, be released, within 
60 days of the signing of the agreement. 
The signing will take place on January 27 in 
two installments, the significance of which I 
will explain to you when I have run through 
the provisions of the agreement and the asso- 
ciated protocols. 

Self-Determination for South Viet-Nam 

Chapter IV of the agreement deals with 
the right of the South Vietnamese people to 



self-determination. Its first provision con- 
tains a joint statement by the United States 
and North Viet-Nam in which those two 
countries jointly recognize the South Viet- 
namese people's right to self-determination, 
in which those two countries jointly affirm 
that the South Vietnamese people shall de- 
cide for themselves the political system that 
they shall choose and jointly affirm that no 
foreign country shall impose any political 
tendency on the South Vietnamese people. 

The other principal provisions of the 
agreement are that in implementing the 
South Vietnamese people's right to self- 
determination, the two South Vietnamese 
parties will decide, will agree among each 
other, on free elections, for offices to be de- 
cided by the two parties, at a time to be 
decided by the two parties. These elections 
will be supervised and organized first by an 
institution which has the title of National 
Council for National Reconciliation and Con- 
cord, whose members will be equally ap- 
pointed by the two sides, which will operate 
on the principle of unanimity, and which will 
come into being after negotiation between 
the two parties, who are obligated by this 
agreement to do their utmost to bring this 
institution into being within 90 days. 

Leaving aside the technical jargon, the 
significance of this part of the agreement 
is that the United States has consistently 
maintained that we would not impose any 
political solution on the people of South 
Viet-Nam. The United States has consist- 
ently maintained that we would not impose 
a coalition government or a disguised coali- 
tion government on the people of South 
Viet-Nam. 

If you examine the provisions of this chap- 
ter, you will see, first, that the existing gov- 
ernment in Saigon can remain in office; 
secondly, that the political future of South 
Viet-Nam depends on agreement between the 
South Vietnamese parties, and not on an 
agreement that the United States has im- 
posed on these parties ; thirdly, that the na- 
ture of this political evolution, the timing of 
this political evolution, is left to the South 
Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that 
is created to see to it that the elections that 



156 



Department of State Bulletin 



are organized will be conducted properly is 
one in which each of the South Vietnamese 
parties has a veto. 

The other significant provision of this 
agreement is the requirement that the South 
Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduc- 
tion of their armed forces and that the forces 
being reduced will be demobilized. 

The Issue of the Demilitarized Zone 

The next chapter deals with the reunifica- 
tion of Viet-Nam and the relationship be- 
tween North and South Viet-Nam. In the 
many negotiations that I have conducted over 
recent weeks, not the least arduous was the 
negotiation conducted with the ladies and 
gentlemen of the press, who constantly 
raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the 
existence of South Viet-Nam as a political 
entity, and other matters of this kind. 

I will return to this issue at the end when 
I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious 
that there is no dispute in the agreement 
between the parties that there is an entity 
called South Viet-Nam and that the future 
unity of Viet-Nam, as it comes about, will be 
decided by negotiation between North and 
South Viet-Nam : that it will not be achieved 
by military force; indeed, that the use of 
military force with respect to bringing about 
unification, or any other form of coercion, is 
impermissible according to the terms of this 
agreement. 

Secondly, there are specific provisions in 
this chapter with respect to the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ). There is a repetition of the 
agreement of 1954 which makes the demarca- 
tion line along the 17th parallel provisional, 
which means pending reunification. There 
is a specific provision that both North ami 
South Viet-Nam shall respect the demili- 
tarized zone on either side of the provisional 
military demarcation line, and there is an- 
other provision that indicates that among 
the subjects that can be negotiated will be 
modalities of civilian movement across the 
demarcation line, which makes it clear that 
military movement across the demilitarized 
zone is in all circumstances prohibited. 

Now, this may be an appropriate point to 
explain what our position has been with 



respect to the DMZ. There has been a great 
deal of discussion about the issue of sover- 
eignty and about the issue of legitimacy — 
which is to say, which government is in con- 
trol of South Viet-Nam — and finally, about 
why we laid such great stress on the issue 
of the demilitarized zone. 

We had to place stress on the issue of the 
demilitarized zone because the provisions of 
the agreement with respect to infiltration, 
with respect to replacement, with respect to 
any of the military provisions, would have 
made no sense whatsoever if there was not 
some demarcation line that defined where 
South Viet-Nam began. If we had accepted 
the proposition that would have in effect 
eroded the demilitarized zone, then the pro- 
visions of the agreement with respect to re- 
strictions about the introduction of men and 
materiel into South Viet-Nam would have 
been unilateral restrictions applying only to 
the United States and only to our allies. There- 
fore, if there was to be any meaning to the 
separation of military and political issues, 
if there was to be any permanence to the 
military provisions that had been negotiated, 
then it was essential that there was a defini- 
tion of where the obligations of this agree- 
ment began. As you can see from the text 
of the agreement, the principles that we de- 
fended were essentially achieved. 

Chapter VI deals with the international 
machinery, and we will discuss that when I 
talk about the associated protocols of the 
agreement. 



Laos and Cambodia 

Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cam- 
bodia. Now, the problem of Laos and Cam- 
bodia has two parts. One part concerns those 
obligations which can be undertaken by the 
parties signing the agreement — that is to 
say, the three Vietnamese parties and the 
United States — those measures that they can 
take which affect the situation in Laos and 
Cambodia. A second part of the situation 
in Laos has to concern the nature of the civil 
conflict that is taking place within Laos and 
and the solution of which, of 
course, must involve as well the two Laotian 



February 12, 1973 



157 



parties and the innumerable Cambodian 

factions. 

Let me talk about the provisions of the 
agreement with respect to Laos and Cam- 
bodia and our firm expectations as to the 
future in Laos and Cambodia. 

The provisions of the agreement with re- 
spect to Laos and Cambodia reaffirm, as an 
obligation to all the parties, the provisions of 
the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 
1962 agreement on Laos, which affirm the 
neutrality and right to self-determination of 
those two countries. They are therefore con- 
sistent with our basic position with respect 
also to South Viet-Nam. 

In terms of the immediate conflict, the 
provisions of the agreement specifically pro- 
hibit the use of Laos and Cambodia for mili- 
tary and any other operations against any of 
the signatories of the Paris agreement or 
against any other country. In other words, 
there is a flat prohibition against the use of 
base areas in Laos and Cambodia. 

There is a fiat prohibition against the use 
of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration into 
Viet-Nam or, for that matter, into any other 
country. 

Finally, there is a requirement that all 
foreign troops be withdrawn from Laos and 
Cambodia, and it is clearly understood that 
North Vietnamese troops are considered 
foreign with respect to Laos and Cambodia. 
Now, as to the conflict within these coun- 
tries which could not be formally settled in 
an agreement which is not signed by the 
parties of that conflict, let me make this 
statement, without elaborating it: It is our 
firm expectation that within a short period 
of time there will be a formal cease-fire in 
Laos which in turn will lead to a withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from Laos and, of course, 
to the end of the use of Laos as a corridor 
of infiltration. 

Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as 
those of you who have studied it will know, 
is somewhat more complex because there are 
several parties headquartered in different 
countries. Therefore, we can say about 
Cambodia that it is our expectation that a 
de facto cease-fire will come into being over 



158 



a period of time relevant to the execution of 
this agreement. 

Our side will take the appropriate meas- 
ures to indicate that it will not attempt to 
change the situation by force. We have rea- 
son to believe that our position is clearly 
understood by all concerned parties, and I 
will not go beyond this in my statement. 

Relationship of the U.S. to North Viet-Nam 

Chapter VIII deals with the relationship 
between the United States and the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 

As I have said in my briefings on Octo- 
ber 26 and on December 16 and as the Presi- 
dent affirmed on many occasions, the last 
time in his speech last evening, the United 
States is seeking a peace that heals. 2 We 
have had many armistices in Indochina. We 
want a peace that will last. 

And therefore it is our firm intention in 
our relationship to the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam to move from hostility to nor- 
malization, and from normalization to con- 
ciliation and cooperation. And we believe 
that under conditions of peace we can con- 
tribute throughout Indochina to a realization 
of the humane aspirations of all the people 
of Indochina. And we will, in that spirit, 
perform our traditional role of helping peo- 
ple realize these aspirations in peace. 

Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual 
implementing provision. 
So much for the agreement. 

Provisions of Protocols to the Agreement 

Now let me say a word about the protocols. 
There are four protocols or implementing 
instruments to the agreement : on the return 
of American prisoners, on the implementa- 
tion and institution of an International Con- 
trol Commission, on the regulations with 
respect to the cease-fire and the implementa- 
tion and institution of a Joint Military Com- 
mission among the concerned parties, and a 



2 For Dr. Kissinger's news conferences of Oct. 26 
and Dec. 16, 1972, see Bulletin of Nov. 13, 1972, 
p. 549, and Jan. 8, 1973, p. 33. 



Department of State Bulletin 






protocol about the deactivation and removal 
of mines. 

I have given you the relevant provisions 
of the protocol concerning the return of 
prisoners. They will be returned at periodic 
intervals in Hanoi to American authorities 
and not to American private groups. They 
will lie picked up by American airplanes, 
except for prisoners held in the southern 
part of South Viet-Nam. which will be re- 
leased at designated points in the South, 
again to American authorities. 

We will receive on Saturday, the day of 
the signing of the agreement, a list of all 
American prisoners held throughout Indo- 
china. And both parties — that is to say, all 
parties — have an obligation to assist each 
other in obtaining information about the 
prisoners, missing in action, and about the 
location of graves of American personnel 
throughout Indochina. 

The International Commission has the 
right to visit the last place of detention of 
the prisoners, as well as the place from which 
they are released. 

Now to the International Control Com- 
mission. You will remember that one of the 
reasons for the impasse in December was 
the difficulty of agreeing with the North 
Vietnamese about the size of the Interna- 
tional Commission, its function, or the loca- 
tion of its teams. 

On this occasion, there is no point in re- 
hashing all the differences. It is, however, 
useful to point out that at that time the pro- 
posal of the North Vietnamese was that the 
International Control Commission have a 
membership of 250, no organic logistics or 
communication, dependent entirely for its 
authority to move on the party it was sup- 
posed to be investigating; and over half of 
its personnel were supposed to be located in 
Saigon, which is not the place where most 
of the infiltration that we were concerned 
with was likely to take place. 

We have distributed to you an outline of 
the basic structure of this Commission. 1 
Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160, 



' Not printed here. 



drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, 
and Poland. It has a headquarters in Saigon. 
It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based 
in localities throughout Viet-Nam which were 
chosen either because forces were in con- 
tact there or because we estimated that these 
were the areas where the violations of the 
cease-fire were most probable. 

There are 12 teams at border-crossing 
points. There are seven teams that are set 
aside for points of entry, which have yet 
to be chosen, for the replacement of military 
equipment. That is for article 7 of the agree- 
ment. There will be three on each side, and 
there will be no legitimate point of entry 
into South Viet-Nam other than those three 
points. The other border and coastal teams 
arc there simply to make certain that no 
other entry occurs, and any other entry is 
by definition illegal. There has to be no other 
demonstration except the fact that it 
occurred. 

This leaves one team free for use, in par- 
ticular, at the discretion of the Commission. 
And of course the seven teams that are being 
used for the return of the prisoners can be 
used at the discretion of the Commission 
after the prisoners are returned. 

There is one reinforced team located at 
the demilitarized zone, and its responsibility 
extends along the entire demilitarized zone. 
It is in fact a team and a half. It is 50 per- 
cent larger than a normal border team and 
it represents one of the many compromises 
that were made, between our insistence on 
two teams and their insistence on one team. 
By a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team 
and a half. [Laughter.] 

With respect to the operation of the In- 
ternational Commission, it is supposed to 
operate on the principle of unanimity, which 
is to say that its reports, if they are Com- 
mission reports, have to have the approval 
of all four members. However, each mem- 
ber is permitted to submit his own opinion, 
so that as a practical matter any member 
of the Commission can make a finding of a 
violation and submit a report, in the first 
instance to the parties. 



February 12, 1973 



159 



The International Commission will report 
for the time being to the four parties to the 
agreement. An international conference will 
take place, we expect, at the foreign minis- 
ters level within a month of signing the 
agreement. 

That international conference will estab- 
lish a relationship between the International 
Commission and itself, or any other interna- 
tional body that is mutually agreed upon, so 
that the International Commission is not 
only reporting to the parties that it is in- 
vestigating. But for the time being, until the 
international conference has met, there was 
no other practical group to which the Inter- 
national Commission could report. 

In addition to this international group, 
there are two other institutions that are sup- 
posed to supervise the cease-fire. There is, 
first of all, an institution called the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission, which is 
composed of ourselves and the three Viet- 
namese parties, which is located in the same 
place as the International Commission, 
charged with roughly the same functions, 
but as a practical matter, it is supposed to 
conduct the preliminary investigations, its 
disagreements are automatically referred to 
the Intel-national Commission, and moreover, 
any party can request the International Com- 
mission to conduct an investigation regard- 
less of what the Four- Party Commission does 
and regardless of whether the Four-Party 
Commission has completed its investigation 
or not. 

After the United States has completed its 
withdrawal, the Four-Party Military Com- 
mission will be transformed into a Two- 
Party Commission composed of the two South 
Vietnamese parties. The total number of 
supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in 
the neighborhood of 4,500 during the period 
that the Four-Party Commission is in exist- 
ence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 
after the Four-Party Commission ceases 
operating and the Two-Party Commission 
comes into being. 

Finally, there is a protocol concerning the 
removal and deactivation of mines, which 
is self-explanatory and simply explains — 



discusses the relationship between our ef- 
forts and the efforts of the DRV concerning 
the removal and deactivation of mines, which 
is one of the obligations we have undertaken 
in the agreement. 



Procedure for Signing Documents 

Now let me point out one other problem. 
On Saturday, January 27, the Secretary of 
State, on behalf of the United States, will 
sign the agreement bringing the cease-fire 
and all the other provisions of the agreement 
and the protocols into force. He will sign in 
the morning a document involving four par- 
ties, and in the afternoon a document be- 
tween us and the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam. These documents are identical, 
except that the preamble differs in both 
cases. 

The reason for this somewhat convoluted 
procedure is that while the agreement pro- 
vides that the two South Vietnamese parties 
should settle their disputes in an atmos- 
phere of national reconciliation and concord, 
I think it is safe to say that they have not 
yet quite reached that point, indeed, that 
they have not yet been prepared to recognize 
each other's existence. 

This being the case, it was necessary to 
devise one document in which neither of 
the South Vietnamese parties was mentioned 
by name, and therefore no other party could 
be mentioned by name, on the principle of 
equality. So the four-party document, the 
document that will have four signatures, can 
be read with great care and you will not 
know until you get to the signature page 
whom exactly it applies to. It refers only 
to the parties participating in the Paris 
Conference, which are, of course, well known 
to the parties participating in the Paris 
Conference. [Laughter.] 

It will be signed on two separate pages. 
The United States and the GVN are signing 
on one page, and the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam and its ally are signing on a 
separate page. And this procedure has aged 
us all by several years. [Laughter.] 

Then there is another document, which will 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



be signed by the Secretary of State and the 
Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam in the afternoon. That docu- 
ment, in its operative provisions, is word for 
word the same as the document which will be 
signed in the morning and which contains 
the obligations to which the two South 
Vietnamese parties are obligated. 

It differs from that document only in the 
preamble and in its concluding paragraph. In 
the preamble it says the United States, with 
the concurrence of the Government of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam, and the DRV, with 
the concurrence of the Provisional Revolu- 
tionary I ;<>\ernment. and the rest is the same, 
and then the concluding paragraph has the 
same adaptation. That document, of course, 
is not signed by either Saigon or its oppo- 
nent, and therefore their obligations are de- 
rived from the four-party document. 

I do not want to take any time in going 
into the abstruse legalisms. I simply wanted 
to explain to you why there were two dif- 
ferent signature ceremonies and why, when 
we handed out the text of the agreement, 
we appended to the document which con- 
tains the legal obligations which apply to 
everybody — namely, the four parties — why 
we appended another section that contained 
a different preamble and a different imple- 
menting paragraph which is going to be 
signed by the Secretary of State and the 
Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam. 

This will be true with respect to the agree- 
ment and three of the protocols. The fourth 
protocol, regarding the removal of mines, 
applies only to the United States and the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and there- 
fore we are in the happy position of having 
t" sign only one document. 

Negotiating Process and Achievements 

Now then, let me summarize for you how 
we got to this point and some of the aspects 
of the agreement that we consider signif- 
icant, and then I will answer your questions. 

As you know, when I met with this group 
on December 16, we had to report that the 



negotiations in Paris seemed to have reached 
a stalemate. We had not agreed at that time, 
although we didn't say so, on the — we could 
not find a formula to take into account the 
conflicting views with respect to signing. 
There were disagreements with respect to 
the DMZ and with the associated aspects 
of what identity South Viet-Nam was to have 
in the agreement. 

There was a total deadlock with respect 
to the protocols, which I summed up in the 
December 16 press conference. The North 
Vietnamese approach to international con- 
trol and ours were so totally at variance that 
it seemed impossible at that point to come 
to any satisfactory conclusion. And there be- 
gan to be even some concern that the separa- 
tion which we thought we had achieved in 
October between the release of our prisoners 
and the question of civilian prisoners in 
South Viet-Nam was breaking down. 

When we reassembled on January 8, we 
did not do so in the most cordial atmosphere 
that I remember. However, by the morning 
of January 9 it became apparent that both 
sides were determined to make a serious ef- 
fort to break the deadlock in negotiations. 
And we adopted a mode of procedure by 
which issues in the agreement and issues of 
principle with respect to the protocols were 
discussed at meetings between Special Ad- 
visor Le Due Tho and myself while con- 
currently an American team headed by 
Ambassador Sullivan | William H. Sullivan, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs] and a Vietnamese 
team headed by Vice Minister Thach 
[Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for For- 
eign Affairs] would work on the implemen- 
tation of the principles as they applied to 
the protocols. 

For example, the Special Advisor and I 
might agree on the principle of border con- 
trol posts and their number, but then the 
problem of how to locate them, according to 
what criteria, and with what mode of opera- 
tion presented enormous difficulties. 

Let me on this occasion also point out that 
these negotiations required the closest co- 
operation throughout our government, be- 



February 12, 1973 



161 



tween the White House and the State 
Department, between all the elements of our 
team, and that therefore the usual specula- 
tion of who did what to whom is really ex- 
traordinarily misplaced. 

Without a cooperative effort by everybody, 
we could not have achieved what we have 
presented last night and this morning. 

The Special Advisor and I then spent the 
week first on working out the unresolved 
issues in the agreement and then the unre- 
solved issues with respect to the protocols 
and, finally, the surrounding circumstances 
of schedules and procedures. 

Ambassador Sullivan remained behind to 
draft the implementing provisions of the 
agreements that had been achieved during 
the week. The Special Advisor and I re- 
mained in close contact. 

So by the time we met again yesterday, 
the issues that remained were very few, in- 
deed, were settled relatively rapidly. And I 
may on this occasion also point out that 
while the North Vietnamese are the most 
difficult people to negotiate with that I have 
ever encountered when they do not want to 
settle, they are also the most effective that I 
have dealt with when they finally decide to 
settle — so that we have gone through peaks 
and valleys in these negotiations of ex- 
traordinary intensity. 

Now then, let me sum up where this agree- 
ment has left us — first with respect to what 
we said we would tiy to achieve, then with 
respect to some of its significance, and finally, 
with respect to the future. 

First, when I met this group on October 
26 and delivered myself of some epigram- 
matic phrases, we obviously did not want to 
give a complete checklist and we did not want 
to release the agreement as it then stood, 
because it did not seem to us desirable to 
provide a checklist against which both sides 
would then have to measure success and 
failure in terms of their prestige. 

At that time, too, we did not say that it 
had always been foreseen that there would be 
another three or four days of negotiation 
after this tentative agreement had been 
reached. The reason why we asked for an- 



other negotiation was because it seemed to 
us at that point that for a variety of reasons, 
which I explained then and again on Decem- 
ber 16, those issues could not be settled 
within the time frame that the North Viet- 
namese expected. 

It is now a matter of history, and it is 
therefore not essential to go into a debate of 
on what we based this judgment. But that 
was the reason why the agreement was not 
signed on October 31, and not any of the 
speculations that have been so much in print 
and on television. 

Now, what did we say on October 26 we 
wanted to achieve? We said, first of all, that 
we wanted to make sure that the control 
machinery would be in place at the time of 
the cease-fire. We did this because we had 
information that there were plans by the 
other side to mount a major offensive to 
coincide with the signing of the cease-fire 
agreement. 

This objective has been achieved by the 
fact that the protocols will be signed on the 
same day as the agreement, by the fact that 
the International Control Commission and 
the Four-Party Military Commission will 
meet within 24 hours of the agreement going 
into effect, or no later than Monday morning, 
Saigon time, that the regional teams of the 
International Control Commission will be in 
place 48 hours thereafter, and that all other 
teams will be in place within 15 and a maxi- 
mum of 30 days after that. 

Second, we said that we wanted to com- 
press the time interval between the cease- 
fires we expected in Laos and Cambodia and 
the cease-fire in Viet-Nam. 

For reasons which I have explained to you, 
we cannot be as specific about the cease- 
fires in Laos and Cambodia as we can about 
the agreements that are being signed on 
Saturday, but we can say with confidence 
that the formal cease-fire in Laos will go 
into effect in a considerably shorter period 
of time than was envisaged in October, and 
since the cease-fire in Cambodia depends to 
some extent on developments in Laos, we 
expect the same to be true there. 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



We said that certain linguistic ambiguities 
should be removed. The linguistic ambiguit'es 
were produced by the somewhat extraordi- 
nary negotiating procedure whereby a change 
in the English text did not always produce 
a correlative change in the Vietnamese text. 
All the linguistic ambiguities to which we 
referred in October have in fact been re- 
moved. At that time I mentioned only one. 
and therefore I am free to recall it. 

I pointed out that the U.S. position had 
consistently been a rejection of the imposi- 
tion of a coalition government on the people 
of South Viet-Nam. I said then that the Na- 
tional Council of Reconciliation was not a 
coalition government, nor was it conceived 
as a coalition government. 

The Vietnamese language text, however, 
permitted an interpretation of the words 
"administrative structure" as applied to the 
National Council of Reconciliation which 
would have lent itself to the interpretation 
that it came close or was identical with a 
coalition government. 

You will find that in the text of this agree- 
ment the words "administrative structure" 
no longer exist and therefore this particular 
— shall we say — ambiguity has been removed. 
I pointed out in October that we had to 
find a procedure for signing which would 
be acceptable to all the parties for whom 
obligations were involved. This has been 
achieved. 

I pointed out on October 26 that we would 
seek greater precision with respect to cer- 
tain obligations particularly, without spell- 
ing them out, as they applied to the 
demilitarized zone and to the obligations 
with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That, 
too, has been achieved. 

And I pointed out in December that we 
were looking for some means, some expres- 
sion, which would make clear that the two 
parts of Viet-Nam would live in peace with 
each other and that neither side would im- 
pose its solution on the other by force. 

This is now explicitly provided, and we 
have achieved formulations in which in a 
number of the paragraphs, such as article 
14, 18(e), and 20, there are specific refer- 



ences to the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam. 
There are specific references, moreover, 
to the same thing in article 6 and article 11 
of the ICCS [International Commission of 
Control and Supervision] protocol. There are 
specific references to the right of the South 
Vietnamese people to self-determination. 

And therefore we believe that we have 
achieved the substantial adaptations that 
we asked for on October 26. We did not 
increase our demands after October 26, and 
we substantially achieved the clarifications 
which we sought. 

Now then, it is obvious that a war that has 
lasted for 10 years will have many elements 
that cannot be completely satisfactory to all 
the parties concerned. And in the two periods 
where the North Vietnamese were working 
with dedication and seriousness on a conclu- 
sion, the period in October and the period 
after we resumed talks on January 8, it was 
always clear that a lasting peace could come 
about only if neither side sought to achieve 
everything that it had wanted ; indeed, that 
stability depended on the relative satisfac- 
tion and therefore on the relative dissatis- 
faction of all of the parties concerned. And 
therefore it is also clear that whether this 
agreement brings a lasting peace or not de- 
pends not only on its provisions but also on 
the spirit in which it is implemented. 

It will be our challenge in the future to 
move the controversies that could not be 
stilled by any one document from the level 
of military conflict to the level of positive 
human aspirations, and to absorb the enor- 
mous talents and dedication of the people of 
Indochina in tasks of construction, rather 
than in tasks of destruction. 

We will make a major effort to move to 
create a framework where we hope in a 
short time the animosities and the hatred 
and the suffering of this period will be seen 
as aspects of the past and where the debates 
concern differences of opinion as to how to 
achieve positive goals. 

Of course the hatreds will not rapidly 
disappear, and of course people who have 
fought for 25 years will not easily give up 
their objectives, but also people who have 



February 12, 1973 



163 



suffered fox* 25 years may at last come to 
know that they can achieve their real satis- 
faction by other and less brutal means. 

The President said yesterday that we have 
to remain vigilant, and so we shall, but we 
shall also dedicate ourselves to positive ef- 
forts. And as for us at home, it should be 
clear by now that no one in this war has had 
a monopoly of anguish and that no one in 
these debates has had a monopoly of moral 
insight. And now that at last we have 
achieved an agreement in which the United 
States did not prescribe the political future 
to its allies, an agreement which should pre- 
serve the dignity and the self-respect of all 
of the parties, together with healing the 
wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal 
the wounds in America. 

I will be glad to answer any questions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what, if any, supervision 
do you envisage over the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
by an international agency? 

Dr. Kissinger: We expect that the Inter- 
national Control Commission that exists in 
Laos will be reinstituted. We have also pro- 
vided for the establishment of border teams, 
as you can see from the maps, at all the 
terminal points of the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
into South Viet-Nam. And therefore, we be- 
lieve that there will be international su- 
pervision of the provisions, both within 
Laos and within South Viet-Nam. 

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News]. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, one of the major prob- 
lems has been the continued presence of 
North Vietnamese troops in the South. Could 
you tell lis, first, so far as you know, hoiv 
many of these troops are there in the South 
now, and do you have any understanding or 
assurance that these troops will be with- 
drawn ? 

Dr. Kissinger: Our estimate of the number 
of North Vietnamese troops in the South is 
approximately 145,000. Now, I want to say 
a number of things with respect to this. 

First, nothing in the agreement establishes 
the right of North Vietnamese troops to be 
in the South. 

Secondly, the North Vietnamese have 



never claimed that they have a right to have 
troops in the South, and while opinions may 
differ about the exact accuracy of that state- 
ment, from a legal point of view it is im- 
portant because it maintains the distinction 
that we, too, maintain. 

Thirdly, if this agreement is implemented, 
the North Vietnamese troops in the South 
should, over a period of time, be subject to 
considerable reduction. First, there is a 
flat prohibition against the introduction of 
any outside forces for any reason whatso- 
ever, so that the normal attrition of person- 
nel cannot be made up by the reinfiltration 
of outside forces. I am talking now about the 
provisions of the agreement. Secondly, there 
is a flat prohibition against the presence of 
foreign forces in Laos and Cambodia and 
therefore a flat prohibition against the use 
of the normal infiltration corridors. Thirdly, 
as the agreement makes clear, military move- 
ment of any kind across the demilitarized 
zone is prohibited, both in the clause re- 
quiring respect for the demilitarized zone, 
which by definition excludes military per- 
sonnel, and second, in the clause that says 
only modalities of civilian movement can be 
discussed, not of any other movement be- 
tween North and South Viet-Nam. Fourth, 
there is a provision requiring the reduction 
and demobilization of forces on both sides, 
the major part of which on the South Viet- 
namese (Communist) side is believed, by 
all knowledgeable observers, to have arrived 
from outside of South Viet-Nam. 

Therefore it is our judgment that there 
is no way that North Viet-Nam can live up 
to that agreement without there being a re- 
duction of the North Vietnamese forces in 
South Viet-Nam, without this being ex- 
plicitly stated. 

Of course, it is not inconceivable that the 
agreement will not in all respects be lived up 
to. In that case, adding another clause that 
will not be lived up to, specifically requiring 
it, would not change the situation. 

It is our judgment and our expectation — 
it is our expectation that the agreement 
will be lived up to, and therefore we believe 
that the problem of these forces will be 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



taken care of by the evolution of events in 
South Viet-Nam. 

Peter [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily 

News ] . 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can I try to get a clari- 
fication of just that point* Several times, I 

think, you hare said it is understood that 
North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cam- 
bodia are considered foreign troops. 

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. 

Q. Are they so considered? 

Dr. Kissinger: I said it once, Peter. 

Q. You said it in answer to Marvin's ques- 
tion, but is it so considered in South Viet- 
Nam? Is North Viet-Nam a foreign entity 
in South Viet-Nam according to this 
agreement? 

Dr. Kissinger: This is one of the points 
on which the bitterest feeling rages and with 
which it is best not to deal in a formal and 
legalistic manner. 

As I have pointed out, in this agreement 
there are repeated references to the identity 
of South Viet-Nam, to the fact that the South 
Vietnamese people's right of self-determina- 
tion is recognized both by the DRV and by 
the United States, to the fact that North 
and South Viet-Nam shall settle their dis- 
putes peacefully and through negotiation, 
and other provisions of a similar kind. 

Therefore it is clear there is no legal way 
by which North Viet-Nam can use military 
force against South Viet-Nam. 

Now. whether that is due to the fact that 
there are two zones temporarily divided by 
a provisional demarcation line or because 
North Viet-Nam is a foreign country with 
relation to South Viet-Nam — that is an issue 
which we have avoided making explicit in the 
agreement and in which ambiguity has its 
merits. From the point of view of the inter- 
national position and from the point of view 
of the obligations of the agreement, there is 
no legal way by which North Viet-Nam can 
use military force vis-a-vis South Viet-Nam 
to achieve its objectives. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on that subject, by what 
means was the United States able to con- 



vince President Thieu to accept tin presence 
of Ninth Vietnamese troops in South Viet- 

Na m ? 

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, it is not easy 
to achieve through negotiations what has 
not been achieved on the battlefield, and if 
you look at the settlements that have been 
made in the postwar period, the lines of 
demarcation have almost always followed 
the lines of actual control. 

Secondly, we have taken the position 
throughout that the agreement cannot be 
analyzed in terms of any one of its pro- 
visions, but it has to be seen in its totality 
and in terms of the evolution that it starts. 

Thirdly, we have not asked President 
Thieu, nor has he accepted, the presence of 
North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam 
as a legal right, nor do we accept that as 
a legal right. 

We have, since October 1970, proposed a 
cease-fire-in-place. A cease-fire-in-place al- 
ways has to be between the forces that exist. 
The alternative of continued war also would 
have maintained the forces in the country. 

Under these conditions, they are cut off 
from the possibility of renewed infiltration. 
They are prevented from undertaking mili- 
tary action. Their resupply is severely 
restricted. 

And President Thieu, after examining the 
totality of the agreement, came to the con- 
clusion that it achieved the essential objec- 
tives of South Viet-Nam, of permitting his 
people to bring about self-determination and 
of not posing a security risk that he could not 
handle with the forces that we have equipped 
and trained. 

Mr. Horner ["Carnett D. Horner, Wash- 
ington Star-News]. 

Q. Because of a news n port from Paris 
this morning that actually their wen some 
15 or 20 protocols, of which only four are be- 
ing made public, were th n any secret proto- 
cols a greed to? 

Dr. Kissinger: The only protocols that exist 
are the protocols that have been made public. 

Q. What about understandings? 



February 12, 1973 



165 



Dr. Kissinger: There are, with respect to 
certain phrases, read into the record certain 
statements as to what they mean, but these 
have been explained in these briefings and 
made clear. 

There are no secret understandings. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, it has been widely specu- 
lated that the 12-day saturation bombing of 
the North was the key to achieving the agree- 
ment that you found acceptable. Was it, and 
if not, what rvas? 

Dr. Kissinger: I was asked in October 
whether the bombing or mining of May 8 
brought about the breakthrough in October, 
and I said then that I did not want to specu- 
late on North Vietnamese motives. I have too 
much trouble analyzing our own. 

I will give the same answer to your ques- 
tion, but I will say that there was a deadlock 
which was described in the middle of Decem- 
ber, and there was a rapid movement when 
negotiations resumed on the technical level 
on January 3 (January 2) and on the sub- 
stantive level on January 8. These facts have 
to be analyzed by each person for himself. 

I want to make one point with respect to 
the question about understandings. It is ob- 
vious that when I speak with some confidence 
about certain developments that happen with 
respect to Laos and other places, that this 
must be based on exchanges that have taken 
place, but for obvious reasons I cannot go 
further into them. 

The formal obligations of the parties have 
all been revealed, and there are no secret 
formal obligations. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the dollar amount put on 
the amount to which the United States is 
committed in rebuilding — this construction 
you referred to in North Viet-Nam or repa- 
rations or whatever it is to be — is there any 
dollar amount suggested? 

Dr. Kissinger: We will discuss the issue of 
economic reconstruction of all of Indochina, 
including North Viet-Nam, only after the 
signature of the agreements and after the 
implementation is well advanced. And the 
definition of any particular sum will have to 
await the discussions which will take place 
after the agreements are in force. 



Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any understand- 
ing with the Soviet Union or with Communist 
China that they will take part in an inter- 
national conference or will help toward the 
preservation of this framework of the agree- 
ment? 

Dr. Kissinger: Formal invitations to the 
international conference have not yet been 
extended. But we expect both the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China to 
participate in the international conference 
which will take place within 30 days of the 
signature of the agreement. 

We have reason to believe that both of 
these countries will participate in this con- 
ference. 

Now, with respect to their willingness to 
help this agreement become viable, it is, of 
course, clear that peace in Indochina requires 
the self-restraint of all of the major countries 
and especially of those countries which on all 
sides have supplied the wherewithal for this 
conflict. 

We, on our part, are prepared to exercise 
such restraint; we believe that the other 
countries, the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China, can make a very major 
contribution to peace in Indochina by exer- 
cising similar restraint. 

Q. If a peace treaty is violated and if the 
ICC proves ineffective, will the United States 
ever again send troops into Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to speculate on 
hypothetical situations that we don't expect 
to arise. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what agreement or un- 
derstanding is there on the role that will be 
played by the so-called neutralist or third- 
force groups in Viet-Nam in the National 
Council of Reconciliation? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have taken the position 
throughout that the future political evolu- 
tion of South Viet-Nam should be left, to the 
greatest extent possible, to the South Viet- 
namese themselves and should not be pre- 
determined by the United States. 

Therefore, there is no understanding in 
any detail on the role of any particular force 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



in South Viet-Nam. The United States has 
always taken the view that it favored free 
elections, but on the whole, the essence of this 
agreement is to leave the political evolution 
of South Viet-Nam to negotiation among the 
various South Vietnamese parties or factions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, about a year ago. Pres- 
ident Nixon outlined a peace proposal which 
included a provision for President Thieu to 
resign prior to elections. Is there any similar 
provision in this agreement ? 

Dr. Kissingi r: That proposal was in a 
somewhat different context. In any event, 
there is no such provision in this agreement 
and this, again, is a matter that will have to 
be decided by the Vietnamese parties within 
the context of whatever negotiation they 
have, but there is no requirement of any kind 
like this in the agreement. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when do you expect the 
first American planes to arrive in Hanoi to 
pick up the prisoners? 

Dr. Kissinger: Our expectation is that the 
withdrawals, as well as the release of pris- 
oners, will take place in roughly equal incre- 
ments of 15 days over the 60-day period, so 
within 15 days of January 27. That is the 
outside time. It could be faster. 

Q. I wanted to know the earliest time. 

Dr. Kissinger: I can't give any earlier time 
than within 15 days. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have addressed your- 
self to this n< neral area In tore, but the ques- 
tion keeps coming up. Would you just review 
for us briefly how you fed that the agreement 
that you have reached differs from one that 
could have been reached, say, four years ago? 

Dr. Kissinger: Four years ago the North 
Vietnamese totally refused to separate polit- 
ical and military issues. Four years ago the 
North Vietnamese insisted that as a condi- 
tion to negotiations the existing governmental 
structure in South Viet-Nam would have to 
be disbanded, and only after this governmen- 
tal structure had been disbanded and a dif- 
ferent one had been installed would they even 
discuss, much less implement, any of the 
other provisions of the agreement. 



Therefore, until October 8 of this year, all 
of the various schemes thai were constantly 
being discussed foundered on the one root 
factor of the situation — that the North Viet- 
namese, until October 8 of this year, de- 
manded that a political victory be handed to 
them as a precondition for a discussion of all 
military questions. But in that case, all mili- 
tary questions would have become totally ir- 
relevant because there was no longer the 
political structure to which they could apply. 

It was not until October 8 this year that the 
North Vietnamese ever agreed to separate 
these two aspects of the problem, and as soon 
as this was done, we moved rapidly. 

Then, there was the second phase, which I 
have described, which included the changes 
that were made between October and Jan- 
uary, which produced this agreement. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, earlier you said that as 
of December 16 there were various disagree- 
ments which you then listed, and the first one 
was the question of the demilitarized zone 
and associated aspects over what identity 
South Viet-Nam should have under the agree- 
ment. Can you elaborate on this, and most 
particularly, can you elaborate on it from the 
standpoint of whether you are referring here 
to President Thieu' s objections? 

Dr. Kissinger: I have made clear what 
exactly was involved. We have here several 
separate issues. One, is there such a thing as 
a South Viet-Nam, even temporarily, until 
unification? Secondly, who is the legitimate 
ruler of South Viet-Nam? This is what the 
civil war has been all about. Thirdly, what is 
the demarcation line that separates North 
Viet-Nam from South Viet-Nam? 

Now, we believe that the agreement defines 
adequately the demarcation line. It defines 
adequately what the identity is to which we 
refer. It leaves open to negotiation among the 
parties the political evolution of South Viet- 
Nam and therefore the definition of what 
ultimately will be considered by all South 
Vietnamese the legitimate ruler. 

The President made clear yesterday that 
as far as the United States is concerned, we 
recognize President Thieu. This is a situation 



February 12, 1973 



167 



that has existed in other countries. And 
these were the three principal issues in- 
volved, of which two have international 
significance and were settled within the agree- 
ment, and the third has significance in terms 
of the political evolution of South Viet-Nam, 
and that has been left to the self-determina- 
tion of the South Vietnamese people. 

As to the question of President Thieu's 
objections, comments, and so forth, we said 
on October 26 that obviously in a war fought 
in South Viet-Nam, in a war that has had 
hundreds of thousands of casualties of South 
Vietnamese, enormous devastation within 
South Viet-Nam, it stands to reason that the 
views of our allies will have to be considered. 
There is nothing wrong or immoral for them 
to have such views. 

Secondly, their perception of the risks has 
to be different from our perception of the 
risks. We are 12,000 miles away. If we make 
a mistake in our assessment of the situation, 
it will be painful. If they make a mistake in 
the assessment of the situation, it can be 
fatal. And therefore, they have had a some- 
what less flexible attitude. Where we in some 
respects have at some points been content 
with more ambiguous formulations, they 
were not. 

Nevertheless, it is also obvious to any 
reader of the Saigon press and of their offi- 
cial communications that we did not accept 
all of their comments and that we carried out 
precisely what the President had said and 
what was said at the various press confer- 
ences in which I presented the U.S. Govern- 
ment view; namely, that we would make the 
final determination as to when the American 
participation in the war should end. 

Those parts of their comments that we 
thought were reasonable we made our own; 
those that we did not, we did not. And once 
we had achieved an agreement with the 
North Vietnamese that we considered fair 
and just and honorable, we presented it with 
great energy and conviction in Saigon. 

Q. This is what I am asking you, doctor. 
You say you made some of his points your 
points. What did he get in January that he 
didn't have in October? 



Dr. Kissinger: I do not want to discuss 
what he got. I pointed out the list of objec- 
tives we set ourselves in October and what 
was achieved. I pointed out the changes that 
were achieved between October and January. 
We believe them to be substantial, and I do 
not want to make a checklist of saying which 
originated in Saigon or which originated in 
Washington. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you personally feel 
strengthened in the negotiations as a result 
of the saturation bombing? 

Dr. Kissinger: The term "saturation bomb- 
ing" has certain connotations. We carried 
out what was considered to be necessary at 
the time in order to make clear that the 
United States could not stand for an indefi- 
nite delay in the negotiations. 

My role in the negotiations was to present 
the American point of view. I can only say 
that we resumed the negotiations on Jan- 
uary 8 and the breakthrough occurred on 
January 9, and I will let those facts speak 
for themselves. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is now the extent 
and the nature of the American commitment 
to South Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: The United States, as the 
President said, will continue economic aid 
to South Viet-Nam. It will continue that mili- 
tary aid which is permitted by the agree- 
ment. The United States is prepared to gear 
that military aid to the actions of other 
countries and not to treat it as an end in 
itself. 

And the United States expects all countries 
to live up to the provisions of the agreement. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you say, "The two South 
Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to 
make periodic replacements of armaments, 
munitions and war materials which have 
been destroyed." Why do we have to put any 
more materials in there? Why should they be 
in there, and will these materials come from 
the United States or what countries? 

Dr. Kissinger: Let's separate two things: 
what is permitted by the agreement and 
what we shall do. What is permitted by the 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



agreement is that military equipment that, 
as you read, is destroyed, worn out, used up, 
or damaged can be replaced. 

The reason for thai provision is that if for 
any reason the war should start at any level, 
it would be an unfair restriction on our South 
Vietnamese allies to prohibit them from re- 
placing their weapons if their enemies are 
able to do so. 

The degree, therefore, to which these 
weapons have to be replaced will depend on 
the degree to which there is military activity. 
If there is no military activity in South Viet- 
Nam, then the number of weapons that are 
destroyed, damaged, or worn out will of 
course be substantially less than in other 
circumstances. 

Secondly, what will be the U.S. position? 
This depends on the overall situation. If there 
is no military activity, if other countries do 
not introduce massive military equipment 
into Viet-Xam. we do not consider it an end 
in itself to give military aid. But we believe 
that it would be unfair and wrong for one 
country to be armed by its allies while the 
other one has no right to do so. This is what 
will govern our actions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the plan for the 
rather sizable U.S. military force offshore in 
warships off South Viet-Nam and ateo B-52 
bases in Thailand? Will these forces be re- 
'/, and is there an understanding with 
the North Vietnamese that you have not men- 
tioned to us here that would nduce those 
forces ? 

Dr. Kissinger: There is no restriction on 
American military forces that is not men- 
tioned in the agreement. One would expect, 
as time goes on, that the deployment of our 
naval forces will take account of the new 
situation. 

As you know, we have kept many of our 
forces on station for longer than the normal 
period of time, and we have had more car- 
riers in the area than before, but this is not 
required by the agreement and this is simply 
a projection of what might happen. 

The same is true with respect to Thailand. 
There are no restrictions on our forces in 



Thailand. It has always been part of the 
Nixon doctrine that the deployment of our 
forces would be related to the degree of the 
danger and has not an abstract quality of its 
own. 

So that as a general rule one can say that 
in the initial phases of the agreement, before 
one knows how it will be implemented, the 
deployment will be more geared to the war 
situation, and as the agreement is being im- 
plemented, the conditions of peace will have 
a major impact on it. But this is simply a 
projection of our normal policy and is not 
an outgrowth required by the agreement. 

The press: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. 



TEXTS OF AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOLS 
Text of Agreement 

White House press release dated January 24 

AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR 

AND 

RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM 

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference 
on Vietnam, 

With a view to ending the war and restoring 
peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the 
Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and 
the South Vietnamese people's right to self-deter- 
mination, and to contributing to the consolidation of 
peace in Asia and the world, 

Have agreed on the following provisions and 
undertake to respect and to implement them: 

Chapter I 

The Vietnamese People's 
Fundamental National Rights 

cle 1 
The United States and all other countries respect 
the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial 
integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 
Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. 

Chapter II 

Cessation of Hostilities — Withdrawal of Troops 

■le 2 
A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South 
Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 

At the same hour, the United States will stop all 
its military activities against the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and 
naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end 



February 12, 1973 



169 



the mining- of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, 
and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam. The United States will remove, permanently 
deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial 
waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North 
Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect. 
The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned 
in this Article shall be durable and without limit 
of time. 

Article 3 
The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire 
and to ensure a lasting and stable peace. 
As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect: 

(a) The United States forces and those of the 
other foreign countries allied with the United States 
and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place 
pending the implementation of the plan of troop 
withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commis- 
sion described in Article 16 shall determine the 
modalities. 

(b) The armed forces of the two South Viet- 
namese parties shall remain in-place. The Two- 
Party Joint Military Commission described in 
Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by 
each party and the modalities of stationing. 

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms 
and the irregular forces of the parties in South 
Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against 
each other and shall strictly abide by the following 
stipulations: 

— All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and 
on the sea shall be prohibited; 

— All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both 
sides will be banned. 

Article A 
The United States will not continue its military 
involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of 
South Vietnam. 

Article 5 
Within sixty days of the signing of this Agree- 
ment, there will be a total withdrawal from South 
Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military 
personnel, including technical military personnel 
and military personnel associated with the pacifica- 
tion program, armaments, munitions, and war 
material of the United States and those of the 
other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). 
Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all 
paramilitary organizations and the police force will 
also be withdrawn within the same period of time. 

Article 6 
The dismantlement of all military bases in South 
Vietnam of the United States and of the other 
foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall 
be completed within sixty days of the signing of 
this Agreement. 

Article 7 
From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the 



formation of the government provided for in Articles 
9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South 
Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction 
of troops, military advisers, and military personnel 
including technical military personnel, armaments, 
munitions, and war material into South Vietnam. 

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be per- 
mitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, 
munitions and war material which have been 
destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the 
cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same 
characteristics and properties, under the supervision 
of the Joint Military Commission of the two South 
Vietnamese parties and of the International Com- 
mission of Control and Supervision. 

Chapter III 

The Return of Captured Military Personnel 

and Foreign Civilians, and Captured 
and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel 

Article 8 

(a) The return of captured military personnel 
and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried 
out simultaneously with and completed not later 
than the same day as the troop withdrawal men- 
tioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange 
complete lists of the above-mentioned captured 
military personnel and foreign civilians on the day 
of the signing of this Agreement. 

(b) The parties shall help each other to get 
information about those military personnel and 
foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to 
determine the location and take care of the graves 
of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and 
repatriation of the remains, and to take any such 
other measures as may be required to get informa- 
tion about those still considered missing in action. 

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese 
civilian personnel captured and detained in South 
Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Viet- 
namese parties on the basis of the principles of 
Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation 
of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two 
South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of 
national reconciliation and concord, with a view to 
ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering 
and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese 
parties will do their utmost to resolve this question 
within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into 
effect. 

Chapter IV 

The Exercise of the South Vietnamese People's 
Right to Self-Determination 

Article 9 
The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam undertake to respect the following 
principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese 
people's right to self-determination : 

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self- 



170 



Department of State Bulletin 



determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall he 
lected by all countries. 

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide 
themselves the political future of South Vietnam 
through genuinely free and democratic general elec- 
tions under international supervision. 

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any 
political tendency or personality on the South Viet- 
namese people. 

I rticle 10 

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to 
respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South 
Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through 
negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict. 

Article 11 
Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South 
Vietnamese parties will: 

— achieve national reconciliation and concord, end 
hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and 
discrimination against individuals or organizations 
that have collaborated with one side or the other; 

— ensure the democratic liberties of the people: 
personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the 
i, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, 
freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, 
freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom 
of work, right to property ownership, and right to 
free enterprise. 

Article 12 
(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two 
South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in 
a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, 
mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set 
up a National Council of National Reconciliation 
and Concord of three equal segments. The Council 
shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After 
the National Council of National Reconciliation and 
Concord has assumed its functions, the two South 
Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation 
of councils at lower levels. The two South Viet- 
namese parties shall sign an agreement on the 
internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as 
possible and do their utmost to accomplish this 
within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into 
effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese 
people's aspirations for peace, independence and 
democracy. 

The National Council of National Reconcilia- 
tion and Concord shall have the task of promoting 
the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation 
of this Agreement, achievement of national recon- 
ciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic 
liberties. The National Council of National Recon- 
ciliation and Concord will organize the free and 
democratic general elections provided for in Article 
9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of 
these general elections. The institutions for which 
the preneral elections are to be held will be agreed 
upon through consultations between the two South 



Vietnamese parties. The National Council of Na- 
tional Reconciliation and Concord will also decide 
the procedures and modalities of such local elections 
as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon. 

Article IS 
The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South 
Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnam- 
ese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and 
concord, equality and mutual respect, without 
foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar 
situation. Among the questions to be discussed by 
the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to 
reduce their military effectives and to demobilize 
the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese 
parties will accomplish this as soon as possible. 

Article H 
South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of 
peace and independence. It will be prepared to 
establish relations with all countries irrespective of 
their political and social systems on the basis of 
mutual respect for independence and sovereignty 
and accept economic and technical aid from any 
country with no political conditions attached. The 
acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the 
future shall come under the authority of the govern- 
ment set up after the general elections in South 
Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (b). 

Chapter V 

The Reunification of Vietnam and the 

Relationship Between North and South 

Vietnam 

Article 15 

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out 
step by step through peaceful means on the basis 
of discussions and agreements between North and 
South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by 
either party, and without foreign interference. The 
time for reunification will be agreed upon by North 
and South Vietnam. 

Pending reunification: 

(a) The military demarcation line between the 
two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional 
and not a political or territorial boundary, as 
provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declara- 
tion of the 1954 Geneva Conference. 

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the 
Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional 
Military Demarcation Line. 

North and South Vietnam shall promptly 
start negotiations with a view to reestablishing 
normal relations in various fields. Among the ques- 
tions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian 
movement across the Provisional Military Demarca- 
tion Tine. 

<(\) North and South Vietnam shall not join any 
military alliance or military bloc and shall not 
allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, 
troops, military advisers, and military personnel on 



February 12, 1973 



171 



their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 

Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. 

Chapter VI 

The Joint Military Commissions, the 

International Commission of Control and 

Supervision, the International Conference 

Article 16 

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Con- 
ference on Vietnam shall immediately designate 
representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission with the task of ensuring joint action 
by the parties in implementing the following pro- 
visions of this Agreement: 

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South 
Vietnam ; 

—Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. 
forces and those of the other foreign countries re- 
ferred to in that Article ; 

—Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between 
all parties in South Vietnam; 

Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South 

Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other 
foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) ; 

Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of 

military bases in South Vietnam of the United 
States and those of the other foreign countries 
mentioned in Article 3 (a) ; 

—Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured 
military personnel and foreign civilians of the 
parties; 

Article 8 (b), regarding the mutual assistance 

of the parties in getting information about those 
military personnel and foreign civilians of the 
parties missing in action. 

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
shall operate in accordance with the principle of 
consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be 
referred to the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision. 

(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
shall begin operating immediately after the signing 
of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty 
days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops and those of the other foreign countries 
mentioned in Article 3 (a) and the completion of the 
return of captured military personnel and foreign 
civilians of the parties. 

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on 
the organization, the working procedure, means of 
activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint 
Military Commission. 

Article 17 
(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall im- 
mediately designate representatives to form a Two- 
Party Joint Military Commission with the task of 
ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese 



parties in implementing the following provisions of 
this Agreement: 

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South 
Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Com- 
mission has ended its activities; 

—Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between 
the two South Vietnamese parties; 

Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between 

all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission has ended its activities; 

Article 7, regal-ding the prohibition of the in- 
troduction of troops into South Vietnam and all 
other provisions of this article; 

Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the 

return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured 
and detained in South Vietnam; 

Article 13, regarding the reduction of the mili- 
tary effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties 
and the demobilization of the troops being reduced. 

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the Inter- 
national Commission of Control and Supervision. 

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the 
Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree 
immediately on the measures and organization 
aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving 
peace in South Vietnam. 

Article 18 

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an In- 
ternational Commission of Control and Supervision 
shall be established immediately. 

(b) Until the International Conference provided 
for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the 
International Commission of Control and Supervi- 
sion will report to the four parties on matters con- 
ceiving the control and supervision of the imple- 
mentation of the following provisions of this 
Agreement: 

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South 
Vietnam; 

Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. 

forces and those of the other foreign countries re- 
ferred to in that Article; 

Article 3 (c) , regarding the cease-fire between 

all the parties in South Vietnam ; 

—Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from Viet- 
nam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign 
countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) ; 

— Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of mili- 
tary bases in South Vietnam of the United States 
and those of the other foreign countries mentioned 
in Article 3 (a) ; 

—Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured 
military personnel and foreign civilians of the 
parties. 

The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall form control teams for carrying 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immedi- 
ately on the location and operation of these teams. 
The parties will facilitate their operation. 

(c) I'ntil the International Conference makes 
definitive arrangements, the International Conimis- 

of Control and Supervision will report to the 
two South Vietnamese parties on matters concern- 
ing- the control and supervision of the implementa- 
tion of the following provisions of this Agreement: 

— The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South 
Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Com- 
mission has ended its activities; 

— Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between 
the two South Vietnamese parties; 

— Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between 
all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission has ended its activities; 

— Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the in- 
troduction of troops into South Vietnam and all 
other provisions of this Article; 

— Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the re- 
turn of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and 
detained in South Vietnam; 

— Article 9 (b), regarding the free and demo- 
cratic general elections in South Vietnam; 

— Article 13, regarding the reduction of the mili- 
tary effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties 
and the demobilization of the troops being reduced. 

The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall form control teams for carrying 
out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties 
shall agree immediately on the location and oper- 
ation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese 
parties will facilitate their operation. 

(d) The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall be composed of representatives of 
four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and 
Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will 
rotate among the members for specific periods to 
be determined by the Commission. 

(e) The International Commission of Control 
and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accord- 
ance with the principle of respect for the sover- 
eignty of South Vietnam. 

(f) The International Commission of Control 
and Supervision shall operate in accordance with 
the principle of consultations and unanimity. 

(g) The International Commission of Control 
and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease- 
fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the 
provisions in Article 18 (b) concerning the four 
parties, the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision shall end its activities when the 
Commission's tasks of control and supervision re- 
garding these provisions have been fulfilled. As re- 
gards the provisions in Article 18 (c) concerning 
the two South Vietnamese parties, the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision shall end 



its activities on the request of the government 
formed after the general elections in South Vietnam 
provided for in Article 1» (b). 

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on 
the organization, means of activity, and expendi- 
tures of the International Commission of Control 
ami Supervision. The relationship between the In- 
ternational Commission and the International Con- 
ference will be agreed upon by the International 
Commission and the International Conference. 

Article 19 

The parties agree on the convening of an Inter- 
national Conference within thirty days of the sign- 
ing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed 
agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, 
the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect 
of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national 
rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to 
self-determination; and to contribute to and guaran- 
tee peace in Indochina. 

The United States and the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating 
in the Paris Conference on Vietnam, will propose 
to the following parties that they participate in this 
International Conference: the People's Republic of 
China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four 
countries of the International Commission of Con- 
trol and Supervision, and the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, together with the parties partic- 
ipating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. 

Chapter VII 

Regarding Cambodia and Laos 
Article 20 

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Con- 
ference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 
Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 
Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the 
Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental na- 
tional rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, 
unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. 
The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cam- 
bodia and Laos. 

The parties participating in the Paris Conference 
on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the 
territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to 
encroach on the sovereignty and security of one 
another and of other countries. 

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all 
military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally 
withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into 

two countries troops, military advisers and 
military" personnel, armaments, munitions and war 
material. 

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos 
shall lie settled by the people of each of these 
countries without foreign interference. 

i.li The problems existing between the Indo- 



February 12, 1973 



173 



Chinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese 
parties on the basis of respect for each other's in- 
dependence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 

Chapter VIII 

The Relationship Between the United States 
and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

Article 21 

The United States anticipates that this Agree- 
ment will usher in an era of reconciliation with 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the 
peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional 
policy, the United States will contribute to healing 
the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout 
Indochina. 

Article 22 
The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in 
Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this 
Agreement will create conditions for establishing 
a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship 
between the United States and the Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each 
other's independence and sovereignty, and non- 
interference in each other's internal affairs. At the 
same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam 
and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace 
in Indochina and Southeast Asia. 

Chapter IX 

Other Provisions 

Article 23 
This Agreement shall enter into force upon sig- 
nature by plenipotentiary representatives of the 
parties participating in the Paris Conference on 
Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly 
implement this Agreement and its Protocols. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 

[Separate Numbered Page] 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Republic of Vietnam 
America 



William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



Tran Van Lam 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



[Separate Numbered Page] 

For the Government of For the Provisional Rev- 
the Democratic Republic olutionary Government 
of Vietnam of the Republic of South 

Vietnam 



AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR 
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM 

The Government of the United States of America, 
with the concurrence of the Government of the Re- 
public of Vietnam, 

The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, 

With a view to ending the war and restoring 
peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the 
Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights 
and the South Vietnamese people's right to self- 
determination, and to contributing to the consolida- 
tion of peace in Asia and the world, 

Have agreed on the following provisions and 
undertake to respect and to implement them: 

[Text of Agreement Chapters I-VIII Same As Above] 

Chapter IX 

Other Provisions 
Article 23 
The Paris Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force 
upon signature of this document by the Secretary of 
State of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
and upon signature of a document in the same terms 
by the Secretary of State of the Government of the 
United States of America, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Viet- 
nam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam. The Agreement and the protocols to it 
shall be strictly implemented by all the parties 
concerned. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 



For the Government of 
the United States of 
America 

William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



For the Government of 
the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam 

Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Nguyen Thi Binh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Protocol on Prisoners and Detainees 

White House press release dated January 24 

Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning 
the Return of Captured Military Personnel 
and Foreign Civilians and Captured and De- 
tained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel. 

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference 
on Vietnam, 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam 
signed on this date providing for the return of cap- 
tured military personnel and foreign civilians, and 
captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Tiik Return of Captured Military Personnel 
and Foreign Civilians 

Article 1 
The parties signatory to the Agreement shall re- 
turn the captured military personnel of the parties 
mentioned in Article 8 (a) of the Agreement as 
follows: 

— all captured military personnel of the United 
States and those of the other foreign countries 
mentioned in Article " (a) of the Agreement shall 
be returned to United States authorities; 

— all captured Vietnamese military personnel, 
whether belonging to regular or irregular armed 
forces, shall be returned to the two South Viet- 
namese parties; they shall be returned to that 
South Vietnamese party under whose command 
they served. 

A rticle 2 

All captured civilians who are nationals of the 
United States or of any other foreign countries 
mentioned in Article 3 (a) of the Agreement shall 
be returned to United States authorities. All other 
captured foreign civilians shall be returned to the 
authorities of their country of nationality by any 
one of the parties willing and able to do so. 

Article s 

The parties shall today exchange complete lists 
of captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 
of this Protocol. 

Article h 

(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned 
in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be com- 
pleted within sixty days of the signing of the Agree- 
ment at a rate no slower than the rate of with- 
drawal from South Vietnam of United States forces 
and those of the other foreign countries mentioned 
in Article 5 of the Agreement. 

(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or 
maimed, old persons and women shall be returned 
first. The remainder shall be returned either by re- 
turning all from one detention place after another 
or in order of their dates of capture, beginning with 
those who have been held the longest. 

A rticle 5 
The return and reception of the persons men- 
tioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be 
carried out at places convenient to the concerned 
parties. Places of return shall he agreed upon by 
the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. The 
parties shall ensure the safety of personnel engaged 
in the return and reception of those persons. 



Article B 

Each party shall return all captured persons 
ioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol with- 
out delay and shall facilitate their return and 
reception. The detaining parties shall not deny or de- 
lay their return for any reason, including the fact 
that captured persons may, on any grounds, have 
been prosecuted or sentenced. 

The Return of Captured and 
Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel 

A rticle 7 

(a) The question of the return of Vietnamese 
civilian personnel captured and detained in South 
Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Viet- 
namese parties on the basis of the principles of 
Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation 
of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954, which 
reads as follows: 

"The term 'civilian internees' is understood to 
mean all persons who, having in any way con- 
tributed to the political and armed struggle be- 
tween the two parties, have been arrested for 
that reason and have been kept in detention by 
either party during the period of hostilities." 

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties will do 
so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord 
with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order 
to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two 
South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to 
resolve this question within ninety days after the 
cease-fire comes into effect. 

(c) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes 
into effect, the two South Vietnamese parties shall 
exchange lists of the Vietnamese civilian personnel 
captured and detained by each party and lists of 
the places at which they are held. 

Treatment of Captured Persons During Detention 

Article 8 

(a) All captured military personnel of the parties 
and captured foreign civilians of the parties shall 
be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance 
with international practice. 

They shall be protected against all violence to 
life and person, in particular against murder in 
any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, 
and outrages upon personal dignity. These persons 
shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the 
detaining party. 

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, 
shelter, and the medical attention required for their 
state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange 
post cards and letters with their families and re- 
ceive parcels. 

(b) All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured 
and detained in South Vietnam shall be treated 
humanely at all times, and in accordance with in- 
ternational practice. 

They shall be protected against all violence to 
life and person, in particular against murder in any 



February 12, 1973 



175 



form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and 
outrages against personal dignity. The detaining 
parties shall not deny or delay their return for 
any reason, including the fact that captured persons 
may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sen- 
tenced. These persons shall not be forced to join the 
armed forces of the detaining party. 

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shel- 
ter, and the medical attention required for their 
state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange 
post cards and letters with their families and re- 
ceive parcels. 

Article 9 

(a) To contribute to improving the living condi- 
tions of the captured military personnel of the 
parties and foreign civilians of the parties, the 
parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire 
comes into effect, agree upon the designation of 
two or more national Red Cross societies to visit 
all places where captured military personnel and 
foreign civilians are held. 

(b) To contribute to improving the living con- 
ditions of the captured and detained Vietnamese 
civilian personnel, the two South Vietnamese parties 
shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes 
into effect, agree upon the designation of two or 
more national Red Cross societies to visit all places 
where the captured and detained Vietnamese civil- 
ian personnel are held. 

With Regard to Dead and Missing Persons 
Article 10 

(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
shall ensure joint action by the parties in imple- 
menting Article 8 (b) of the Agreement. When the 
Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended 
its activities, a Four-Party Joint Military team 
shall be maintained to carry on this task. 

(b) With regard to Vietnamese civilian personnel 
dead or missing in South Vietnam, the two South 
Vietnamese parties shall help each other to obtain 
information about missing persons, determine the 
location and take care of the graves of the dead, in 
a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, in 
keeping with the people's aspirations. 

Other Provisions 

Article 11 

(a) The Four-Party and Two-Party Joint Mili- 
tary Commissions will have the responsibility of 
determining immediately the modalities of imple- 
menting the provisions of this Protocol consistent 
with their respective responsibilities under Articles 
16 (a) and 17 (a) of the Agreement. In case the 
Joint Military Commissions, when carrying out their 
tasks, cannot reach agreement on a matter pertain- 
ing to the return of captured personnel they shall 
refer to the International Commission for its 
assistance. 

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission 



shall form, in addition to the teams established by 
the Protocol concerning the cease-fire in South 
Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions, a sub- 
commission on captured persons and, as required, 
joint military teams on captured persons to assist 
the Commission in its tasks. 

(c) From the time the cease-fire comes into force 
to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission becomes operational, the two South 
Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional 
sub-commission and provisional joint military teams 
to carry out its tasks concerning captured and de- 
tained Vietnamese civilian personnel. 

(d) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
shall send joint military teams to observe the re- 
turn of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 
of this Protocol at each place in Vietnam where 
such persons are being returned, and at the last de- 
tention places from which these persons will be 
taken to the places of return. The Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission shall send joint military teams 
to observe the return of Vietnamese civilian per- 
sonnel captured and detained at each place in South 
Vietnam where such persons are being returned, 
and at the last detention places from which these 
persons will be taken to the places of return. 

Article 12 

In implementation of Articles 18 (b) and 18 (c) 
of the Agreement, the International Commission of 
Control and Supervision shall have the responsibility 
to control and supervise the observance of Articles 
1 through 7 of this Protocol through observation of 
the return of captured military personnel, foreign 
civilians and captured and detained Vietnamese 
civilian personnel at each place in Vietnam where 
these persons are being returned, and at the last 
detention places from which these persons will be 
taken to the places of return, the examination of 
lists, and the investigation of violations of the pro- 
visions of the above-mentioned Articles. 

Article IS 

Within five days after signature of this Protocol, 
each party shall publish the text of the Protocol 
and communicate it to all the captured persons 
covered by the Protocol and being detained by that 
party. 

Article 1A 

This Protocol shall come into force upon signa- 
ture by plenipotentiary representatives of all the 
parties participating in the Paris Conference on 
Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the 
parties concerned. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



[Separate Numbered Page) 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Republic of Vietnam 
America 

William P. Rogers Tran Van I. am 

Secretary of State Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 

[Separate Numbered Page] 

For the Government of For the Provisional Rev- 
the Democratic Republic olutionary Government 
of Vietnam of the Republic of South 

Vietnam 



Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 



Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 



Nguyen Tin Binh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning 
the Return of Captured Military Personnel 
and Foreign Civilians and Captured and De- 
tained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel 

The Government of the United States of America, 
with the concurrence of the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam, 

The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, 

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam 
signed on this date providing for the return of 
captured military personnel and foreign civilians, 
and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian 
personnel. 

Have agreed as follows: 

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-13 same as above] 

Article 14 
The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending 
the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concern- 
ing the Return of Captured Military Personnel and 
Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Viet- 
namese Civilian Personnel shall enter into force 
upon signature of this document by the Secretary 
of State of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam, and upon signature of a document in the same 
terms by the Secretary of State of the Government 
of the United States of America, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic 
of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provi- 
sional Revolutionary Government of the Republic 
of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly 
implemented by all the parties concerned. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 



For the Government of 
the United States of 
America 

William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



For the Government of 
the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam 

Nguyen Duy Trinh 

M mister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Protocol on the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision 

White House press release dated January 24 

Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning 
the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision 

The parties participating in the Paris Conference 
on Vietnam, 

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam 
signed on this date providing for the formation of 
the International Commission of Control and Super- 
vision, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

The implementation of the Agreement is the 
responsibility of the parties signatory to the Agree- 
ment. 

The functions of the International Commission 
are to control and supervise the implementation of 
the provisions mentioned in Article 18 of the Agree- 
ment. In carrying out these functions, the Interna- 
tional Commission shall: 

(a) Follow the implementation of the above- 
mentioned provisions of the Agreement through 
communication with the parties and on-the-spot 
observation at the places where this is required ; 

(b) Investigate violations of the provisions which 
fall under the control and supervision of the Com- 
mission; 

(c) When necessary, cooperate with the Joint 
Military Commissions in deterring and detecting 
violations of the above-mentioned provisions. 

A rticle 2 
The International Commission shall investigate 
violations of the provisions described in Article 18 
of the Agreement on the request of the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission, or of the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission, or of any party, or, 
with respect to Article 9 (b) of the Agreement on 
general elections, of the National Council of Na- 
tional Reconciliation and Concord, or in any case 
where the International Commission has other 
adequate grounds for considering that there has 
been a violation of those provisions. It is understood 



February 12, 1973 



177 



that, in carrying out this task, the International 
Commission shall function with the concerned 
parties' assistance and cooperation as required. 

Article 3 

(a) When the International Commission finds 
that there is a serious violation in the implementa- 
tion of the Agreement or a threat to peace against 
which the Commission can find no appropriate 
measure, the Commission shall report this to the 
four parties to the Agreement so that they can 
hold consultations to find a solution. 

(b) In accordance with Article 18 (f) of the 
Agreement, the International Commission's reports 
shall be made with the unanimous agreement of the 
representatives of all the four members. In case no 
unanimity is reached, the Commission shall forward 
the different views to the four parties in accordance 
with Article 18 (b) of the Agreement, or to the two 
South Vietnamese parties in accordance with Article 
18 (c) of the Agreement, but these shall not be 
considered as reports of the Commission. 

Article i 

(a) The headquarters of the International Com- 
mission shall be at Saigon. 

(b) There shall be seven regional teams located 
in the regions shown on the annexed map and based 
at the following places: 



Regions 
I 

II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 



Places 
Hue 
Danang 
Pleiku 
Phan Thiet 
Bien Hoa 
My Tho 
Can Tho 



The International Commission shall designate 
three teams for the region of Saigon-Gia Dinh. 

(c) There shall be twenty-six teams operating 
in the areas shown on the annexed map and based 
at the following places in South Vietnam: 

Region I 
Quang Tri 
Phu Bai 

Region II 
Hoi An 
Tarn Ky 
Chu Lai 

Region HI 
Kontum 
Hau Bon 
Phu Cat 
Tuy An 
Ninh Hoa 
Ban Me Thuot 

Region IV 
Da Lat 



Bao Loc 
Phan Rang 

Region V 
An Loc 
Xuan Loc 
Ben Cat 
Cu Chi 
Tan An 

Region VI 
Moc Hoa 
Giong Trom 

Region VII 
Tri Ton 
Vinh Long 
Vi Thanh 
Khanh Hung 
Quan Long 

(d) There shall be twelve teams located as shown 
on the annexed map and based at the following 
places: 

Gio Linh (to cover the area south of the Pro- 
visional Military Demarcation Line) 
Lao Bao 
Ben Het 
Due Co 
Chu Lai 
Qui Nhon 
Nha Trang 
Vung Tau 
Xa Mat 

Bien Hoa Airfield 
Hong Ngu 
Can Tho 

(e) There shall be seven teams, six of which shall 
be available for assignment to the points of entry 
which are not listed in paragraph (d) above and 
which the two South Vietnamese parties choose as 
points for legitimate entry to South Vietnam for 
replacement of armaments, munitions, and war 
material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement. 
Any team or teams not needed for the above- 
mentioned assignment shall be available for other 
tasks, in keeping with the Commission's respon- 
sibility for control and supervision. 

(f) There shall be seven teams to control and 
supervise the return of captured and detained 
personnel of the parties. 

Article 5 
(a) To carry out its tasks concerning the return 
of the captured military personnel and foreign 
civilians of the parties as stipulated by Article 8 
(a) of the Agreement, the International Commis- 
sion shall, during the time of such return, send one 
control and supervision team to each place in Viet- 
nam where the captured persons are being returned, 
and to the last detention places from which these 
persons will be taken to the places of return. 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



South China 
Sea 




Phan Rang 
Phan Pang 



South China 
Sea 



THIET 

PHAN THlCT 



Map lo be attached to the 

Protocol Concerning the International 

Commission of Control end Supervision 

Bin rfd kern Irieo Nghj dinh Ihi/ *» 
Oy ban qu6c It kmfm soar vi gitm ait 

R*gk>n Boundary ■■■■* Ranh gtdt Kht/ vuc 
T.ami-Artlcle 4(6) ^ CtC Tt-Oltu 4(b) 
T.ema-»rtlde 4 (c) • ^— CaC T6-0iiu 4(c) 
Taeme-Arllcle 4 <d> X.Uti Cic T6-Ottu 4 (d) 



jA 



(b) To carry out its tasks concerning the return 
of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and 
detained in South Vietnam mentioned in Article 8 
(c) of the Agreement, the International Commis- 
sion shall, during the time of such return, send 
one control and supervision team to each place in 
South Vietnam where the above-mentioned captured 
and detained persons are being returned, and to 
the last detention places from which these persons 
shall be taken to the places of return. 
Article fi 

To carry out its tasks regarding Article 9 (b) 
of the Agreement on the free and democratic general 
elections in South Vietnam, the International Com- 
mission shall organize additional teams, when 
necessary. The International Commission shall 
discuss this question in advance with the National 
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. If 
additional teams are necessary for this purpose, 
they shall be formed thirty days before the general 
elections. 

Article 7 
The International Commission shall continually 
keep under review its size, and shall reduce the 
number of its teams, its representatives or other 
personnel, or both, when those teams, representatives 
or personnel have accomplished the tasks assigned 
to them and are not required for other tasks. At 
the same time, the expenditures of the International 
Commission shall be reduced correspondingly. 

Article 8 
Each member of the International Commission 
shall make available at all times the following 
numbers of qualified personnel : 

(a) One senior representative and twenty-six 
others for the headquarters staff. 

(b) Five for each of the seven regional teams. 

(c) Two for each of the other international 
control teams, except for the teams at Gio Linh 
and Vung Tau, each of which shall have three. 

(d) One hundred sixteen for the purpose of 
providing support to the Commission Headquarters 
and its teams. 

Article 9 

(a) The International Commission, and each of 
its teams, shall act as a single body comprising 
representatives of all four members. 

(b) Each member has the responsibility to ensure 
the presence of its representatives at all levels of 
the International Commission. In case a representa- 
tive is absent, the member concerned shall im- 
mediately designate a replacement. 

Article 10 

(a) The parties shall afford full cooperation, 
assistance, and protection to the International 
Commission. 

(b) The parties shall at all times maintain reg- 



ular and continuous liaison with the International 
Commission. During the existence of the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the 
parties to that Commission shall also perform liai- 
son functions with the International Commission. 
After the Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
has ended its activities, such liaison shall be main- 
tained through the Two-Party Joint Military Com- 
mission, liaison missions, or other adequate means, 
(e) The International Commission and the Joint 
Military Commissions shall closely cooperate with 
and assist each other in carrying out their respec- 
tive functions. 

(d) Wherever a team is stationed or operating, 
the concerned party shall designate a liaison officer 
to the team to cooperate with and assist it in carry- 
ing out without hindrance its task of control and 
supervision. When a team is carrying out an in- 
vestigation, a liaison officer from each concerned 
party shall have the opportunity to accompany it, 
provided the investigation is not thereby delayed. 

(e) Each party shall give the International Com- 
mission reasonable advance notice of all proposed 
actions concerning those provisions of the Agree- 
ment that are to be controlled and supervised by the 
International Commission. 

(f) The International Commission, including its 
teams, is allowed such movement for observation 
as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of 
its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In 
carrying out these functions, the International Com- 
mission, including its teams, shall enjoy all neces- 
sary assistance and cooperation from the parties 
concerned. 

Article 11 

In supervising the holding of the free and demo- 
cratic general elections described in Articles 9 (b) 
and 12 (b) of the Agreement in accordance with 
modalities to be agreed upon between the National 
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord 
and the International Commission, the latter shall 
receive full cooperation and assistance from the 
National Council. 

Article 12 

The International Commission and its personnel 
who have the nationality of a member state shall, 
while carrying out their tasks, enjoy privileges and 
immunities equivalent + o those accorded diplomatic 
missions and diplomatic agents. 

Article IS 
The International Commission may use the means 
of communication and transport necessary to per- 
form its functions. Each South Vietnamese party 
shall make available for rent to the International 
Commission appropriate office and accommodation 
facilities and shall assist it in obtaining such fa- 
cilities. The International Commission may receive 
from the parties, on mutually agreeable terms, the 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



necessary means of communication and transport 
and may purchase from any source necessary 
equipment and services not obtained from the par- 
ties. The International Commission shall possess 
these means. 

Article U 

The expenses for the activities of the Interna- 
tional Commission shall be borne by the parties and 
the members of the International Commission in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article: 

(a) Each member country of the International 
Commission shall pay the salaries and allowances 
of its personnel. 

(b) All other expenses incurred by the Inter- 
national Commission shall be met from a fund to 
which each of the four parties shall contribute 
twenty-three percent (239r) and to which each 
member of the International Commission shall 
contribute two percent (29! I. 

(c) Within thirty days of the date of entry into 
force of this Protocol, each of the four parties shall 
provide the International Commission with an ini- 
tial sum equivalent to four million, five hundred 
thousand (1.500,000) French francs in convertible 
currency, which sum shall be credited against the 
amounts due from that party under the first budget. 

(d) The International Commission shall prepare 
its own budgets. After the International Commission 
approves a budget, it shall transmit it to all parties 
signatory to the Agreement for their approval. 
Only after the budgets have been approved by the 
four parties to the Agreement shall they be obliged 
to make their contributions. However, in case the 
parties to the Agreement do not agree on a new 
budget, the International Commission shall tempo- 
rarily base its expenditures on the previous budget, 
except for the extraordinary, one-time expenditures 
for installation or for the acquisition of equipment, 
and the parties shall continue to make their con- 
tributions on that basis until a new budget is 
approved. 

Article 15 

(a) The headquarters shall be operational and in 
place within twenty-four hours after the cease-fire. 

(b) The regional teams shall be operational and 
in place, and three teams for supervision and con- 
trol of the return of the captured and detained 
personnel shall be operational and ready for dis- 
patch within forty-eight hours after the cease-fire. 

(c) Other teams shall be operational and in place 
within fifteen to thirty days after the cease-fire. 

Article in 
Meetings shall be convened at the call of the 
Chairman. The International Commission shall 
adopt other working procedures appropriate for the 
effective discharge of its functions and consistent 
with respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam. 



Article 17 

Phe Members of the International Commission 
may accept the obligations of this Protoco 

sending notes of acceptance to the four parties sig- 
natory to the Agreement. Should a member of the 
International Commission decide to withdraw from 
the International Commission, it may do so by giv- 
ing three months notice by means of notes to the 
four parties to the Agreement, in which case those 
four parties shall consult among themselves for 
the purpose of agreeing upon a replacement member. 

Article 18 

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signa- 
ture by plenipotentiary representatives of all the 
parties participating in the Paris Conference on 
Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the 
parties concerned. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 

[ Separate Numbered Page] 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Republic of Vietnam 
America 



William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



Tran Van Lam 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



[Separate Numbered Page] 

For the Government of For the Provisional Rev- 
the Democratic Republic olutionary Government 
of Vietnam of the Republic of South 

Vietnam 



Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 



Nguyen Thi Binh 

Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 



Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning 
the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision 

The Government of the United States of America, 
with the concurrence of the Government of the Re- 
public of Vietnam, 

The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, 

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam 
signed on this date providing for the formation of 
the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision, 

Have agreed as follows: 

IText of Protocol Article* 1-17 same as above.) 



February 12, 1973 



181 



Article 18 
The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending 
the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concern- 
ing the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall enter into force upon signature 
of this document by the Secretary of State of the 
Government of the United States of America and 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon 
signature of a document in the same terms by the 
Secretary of State of the Government of the United 
States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revo- 
lutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented 
by all the parties concerned. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Democratic Republic 
America of Vietnam 



William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam 
and the Joint Military Commissions 

White House press release dated January 24 

Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning 
the Cease-Fire in South Vietnam and the 
Joint Military Commissions 

The parties participating in the Paris Confer- 
ence on Vietnam, 

In implementation of the first paragraph of Arti- 
cle 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and 
Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date 
which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam 
and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Mili- 
tary Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission, 

Have agreed as follows : 

Cease-Fire in South Vietnam 

Article 1 
The High Commands of the parties in South Viet- 
nam shall issue prompt and timely orders to all 
regular and irregular armed forces and the armed 
police under their command to completely end hostil- 
ities throughout South Vietnam, at the exact time 
stipulated in Article 2 of the Agreement and ensure 



that these armed forces and armed police comply 
with these orders and respect the cease-fire. 

Article 2 

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force 
and until regulations are issued by the Joint Mili- 
tary Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air com- 
bat forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall 
remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable 
cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or 
movements that would extend each party's area of 
control or would result in contact between opposing 
armed forces and clashes which might take place. 

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and 
the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam 
shall observe the prohibition of the following acts: 

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by op- 
posing armed forces and flights by bomber and 
fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed 
flights for proficiency training and maintenance; 

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either 
military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, 
including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, 
bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other 
type of weapon or explosive device; 

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on 
rivers, on the sea and in the air; 

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and 

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private 
property. 

Article 3 

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not 
hamper or restrict: 

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, free- 
dom to work, and freedom of the people to engage 
in trade, and civilian communication and transpor- 
tation between and among all areas in South 
Vietnam ; 

(2) The use by each party in areas under its 
control of military support elements, such as engi- 
neer and transportation units, in repair and con- 
struction of public facilities and the transportation 
and supplying of the population; 

(3) Normal military proficiency training con- 
ducted by the parties in the areas under their re- 
spective control with due regard for public safety. 

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall im- 
mediately agree on corridors, routes, and other 
regulations governing the movement of military 
transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and 
military transport vessels of all types of one party 
going through areas under the control of other 
parties. 

Article U 
In order to avert conflict and ensure normal con- 
ditions for those armed forces which are in direct 
contact, and pending regulation by the Joint Mili- 
tary Commissions, the commanders of the opposing 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



armed forces at those places of direct contact shall 
meet as soon as the cease-fire comes into force with 
a view to reaching an agreement on temporary 
measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and 
medical care for these armed forces. 

Article 5 

(a) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes 
into effect, each party shall do its utmost to com- 
plete the removal or deactivation of all demolition 
objects, mine-fields, traps, obstacles or other danger- 
ous objects placed previously, so as not to hamper 
the population's movement and work, in the first 
place on waterways, roads and railroads in South 
Vietnam. Those mines which cannot be removed 
or deactivated within that time shall be clearly 
marked and must be removed or deactivated as soon 
as possible. 

(b) Emplacement of mines is prohibited, except 
as a defensive measure around the edges of military 
installations in places where they do not hamper 
the population's movement and work, and movement 
on waterways, roads and railroads. Mines and other 
obstacles already in place at the edges of military 
installations may remain in place if they are in 
places where they do not hamper the population's 
movement and work, and movement on waterways, 
roads and railroads. 

Article 6 
Civilian police and civilian security personnel of 
the parties in South Vietnam, who are responsible 
for the maintenance of law and order, shall strictly 
respect the prohibitions set forth in Article 2 of 
this Protocol. As required by their responsibilities, 
normally they shall be authorized to carry pistols, 
but when required by unusual circumstances, they 
shall be allowed to carry other small individual 
arms. 

Article 7 
(a) The entry into South Vietnam of replacement 
armaments, munitions, and war material permitted 
under Article 7 of the Agreement shall take place 
under the supervision and control of the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission and of the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision and through 
such points of entry only as are designated by the 
two South Vietnamese parties. The two South Viet- 
namese parties shall agree on these points of entry 
within fifteen days after the entry into force of 
the cease-fire. The two South Vietnamese parties 
may select as many as six points of entry which 
are not included in the list of places where teams 
of the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision are to be based contained in Article 
4 (d) of the Protocol concerning the International 
Commission. At the same time, the two South Viet- 
namese parties may also select points of entry from 
the list of places set forth in Article 4 (d) of that 
Protocol. 



(b) Each of the designated points of entry shall 
be available only for that South Vietnamese party 

which is in control of that point. The two South 
Vietnamese parties shall have an equal number of 
points of entry. 

.1 rticle 8 

(a) In implementation of Article 5 of the Agree- 
ment, the United States and the other foreign coun- 
tries referred to in Article 5 of the Agreement shall 
take with them all their armaments, munitions, 
and war material. Transfers of such items which 
would leave them in South Vietnam shall not be 
made subsequent to the entry into force of the 
Agreement except for transfers of communications, 
transport, and other non-combat material to the 
Four-Party Joint Military Commission or the Inter- 
national Commission of Control and Supervision. 

(b) Within five days after the entry into force 
of the cease-fire, the United States shall inform 
the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the 
International Commission of Control and Supervi- 
sion of the general plans for timing of complete 
troop withdrawals which shall take place in four 
phases of fifteen days each. It is anticipated that 
the numbers of troops withdrawn in each phase 
are not likely to be widely different, although it is 
not feasible to ensure equal numbers. The approxi- 
mate numbers to be withdrawn in each phase shall 
be given to the Four-Party Joint Military Commis- 
sion and the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision sufficiently in advance of actual 
withdrawals so that they can properly carry out 
their tasks in relation thereto. 

Article 9 

(a) In implementation of Article 6 of the Agree- 
ment, the United States and the other foreign coun- 
tries referred to in that Article shall dismantle and 
remove from South Vietnam or destroy all military 
bases in South Vietnam of the United States and 
of the other foreign countries referred to in that 
Article, including weapons, mines, and other mili- 
tary equipment at these bases, for the purpose of 
making them unusable for military purposes. 

(b) The United States shall supply the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission and the Interna- 
tional Commission of Control and Supervision with 
necessary information on plans for base dismantle- 
ment so that those Commissions can properly carry- 
out their tasks in relation thereto. 

The Joint Military Commissions 
Article 10 

(a) The implementation of the Agreement is the 
responsibility of the parties signatory to the 
Agreement. 

The Four-Party Joint Military Commission has 
the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in 
implementing the Agreement by serving as a chan- 



February 12, 1973 



183 



nel of communication among the parties, by drawing 
up plans and fixing the modalities to carry out, 
coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation 
of the provisions mentioned in Article 16 of the 
Agreement, and by negotiating and settling all 
matters concerning the implementation of those 
provisions. 

(b) The concrete tasks of the Four-Party Joint 
Military Commission are: 

(1) To coordinate, follow and inspect the imple- 
mentation of the above-mentioned provisions of the 
Agreement by the four parties; 

(2) To deter and detect violations, to deal with 
cases of violation, and to settle conflicts and matters 
of contention between the parties relating to the 
above-mentioned provisions; 

(3) To dispatch without delay one or more joint 
teams, as required by specific cases, to any part of 
South Vietnam, to investigate alleged violations of 
the Agreement and to assist the parties in finding 
measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases; 

(4) To engage in observation at the places where 
this is necessary in the exercise of its functions; 

(5) To perform such additional tasks as it may, 
by unanimous decision, determine. 

Article 11 

(a) There shall be a Central Joint Military Com- 
mission located in Saigon. Each party shall designate 
immediately a military delegation of fifty-nine per- 
sons to represent it on the Central Commission. The 
senior officer designated by each party shall be a 
general officer, or equivalent. 

(b) There shall be seven Regional Joint Military 
Commissions located in the regions shown on the 
annexed map and based at the following places: 



?gions 


Places 


I 


Hue 


II 


Danang 


III 


Pleiku 


IV 


Phan Thiet 


V 


Bien Hoa 


VI 


My Tho 


VII 


Can Tho 



Each party shall designate a military delegation 
of sixteen persons to represent it on each Regional 
Commission. The senior officer designated by each 
party shall be an officer from the rank of Lieuten- 
ant Colonel to Colonel, or equivalent. 

(c) There shall be a joint military team operat- 
ing in each of the areas shown on the annexed 
map and based at each of the following places in 
South Vietnam: 

Region I 
Quang Tri 
Phu Bai 

Region II 
Hoi An 
Tarn Ky 
Chu Lai 



Region III 
Kontum 
Hau Bon 
Phu Cat 
Tuy An 
Ninh Hoa 
Ban Me Thuot 

Region IV 
Da Lat 
Bao Loc 
Phan Rang 

Region V 
An Loc 
Xuan Loc 
Ben Cat 
Cu Chi 
Tan An 

Region VI 
Moc Hoa 
Giong Trom 

Region VII 
Tri Ton 
Vinh Long 
Vi Thanh 
Khanh Hung 
Quan Long 



Each party shall provide four qualified persons 
for each joint military team. The senior person des- 
ignated by each party shall be an officer from the 
rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent. 

(d) The Regional Joint Military Commissions 
shall assist the Central Joint Military Commission 
in performing its tasks and shall supervise the 
operations of the joint military teams. The region 
of Saigon-Gia Dinh is placed under the responsibil- 
ity of the Central Commission which shall designate 
joint military teams to operate in this region. 

(e) Each party shall be authorized to provide 
support and guard personnel for its delegations to 
the Central Joint Military Commission and Regional 
Joint Military Commissions, and for its members of 
the joint military teams. The total number of sup- 
port and guard personnel for each party shall not 
exceed five hundred and fifty. 

(f) The Central Joint Military Commission may 
establish such joint sub-commissions, joint staffs and 
joint military teams as circumstances may require. 
The Central Commission shall determine the num- 
bers of personnel required for any additional sub- 
commissions, staffs or teams it establishes, provided 
that each party shall designate one-fourth of the num- 
ber of personnel required and that the total number 
of personnel for the Four-Party Joint Military Com- 
mission, to include its staffs, teams, and support 
personnel, shall not exceed three thousand three 
hundred. 

(g) The delegations of the two South Vietnamese 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 




Rang 
haft Rang 



PHAN THICT 
PHAN THliT 



Map to be attached to lha 

Protocol Concarnlng tha Ceeae-fke In 

South Vietnam and tha 

Joint Military Commi»ilon« 

Bin db kern thw> Ngh; dinh thu 

vi noting bin & Mitn Nam VtQI-Nam 

va cac Ban Itan hyp quan aJ 

a*fkm Boundary aaajaaai Ranh gtdi Khu vdc 

!»»I-M<I.11IW ^ rtcTb-Oitull(b) 
T«am«-»rUda 11 (c) • — Cic T6-0ibu 11 (c) 



South China 
Sea 



parties may, by agreement, establish provisional 
sub-commissions and joint military teams to carry 
out the tasks specifically assigned to them by Article 
17 of the Agreement. With respect to Article 7 of the 
Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties' dele- 
gations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commis- 
sion shall establish joint military teams at the 
points of entry into South Vietnam used for re- 
placement of armaments, munitions and war ma- 
terial which are designated in accordance with 
Article 7 of this Protocol. From the time the 
cease-fire comes into force to the time when the 
Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes 
operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' dele- 
gations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
shall form a provisional sub-commission and pro- 
visional joint military teams to carry out its tasks 
concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civil- 
ian personnel. Where necessary for the above pur- 
poses, the two South Vietnamese parties may agree 
to assign personnel additional to those assigned to 
the two South Vietnamese delegations to the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission. 
Article 12 
(a) In accordance with Article 17 of the Agree- 
ment which stipulates that the two South Viet- 
namese parties shall immediately designate their 
respective representatives to form the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission, twenty-four hours after 
the cease-fire comes into force, the two designated 
South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Two- 
Party Joint Military Commission shall meet in 
Saigon so as to reach an agreement as soon as 
possible on organization and operation of the Two- 
Party Joint Military Commission, as well as the 
measures and organization aimed at enforcing the 
cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam. 

(b) From the time the cease-fire comes into force 
to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Com- 
mission becomes operational, the two South Viet- 
namese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint 
Military Commission at all levels shall simultaneously 
assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission at all levels, in addition to their func- 
tions as delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission. 

(c) If, at the time the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission ceases its operation in accordance with 
Article 16 of the Agreement, agreement has not been 
reached on organization of the Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission, the delegations of the two 
South Vietnamese parties serving with the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall 
continue temporarily to work together as a pro- 
visional two-party joint military commission and to 
assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission at all levels until the Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission becomes operational. 

Article 13 
In application of the principle of unanimity, the 



186 



Joint Military Commissions shall have no chairmen, 
and meetings shall be convened at the request of , 
any representative. The Joint Military Commissions 
shall adopt working procedures appropriate for 
the effective discharge of their functions and 
responsibilities. 

Article H 
The Joint Military Commissions and the Inter- 
national Commission of Control and Supervision 
shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in 
carrying out their respective functions. Each Joint 
Military Commission shall inform the International 
Commission about the implementation of those pro- 
visions of the Agreement for which that Joint Mili- 
tary Commission has responsibility and which are 
within the competence of the International Commis- 
sion. Each Joint Military Commission may request 
the International Commission to carry out specific 
observation activities. 

Article 15 
The Central Four-Party Joint Military Commis- 
sion shall begin operating twenty-four hours after 
the cease-fire comes into force. The Regional Four- 
Party Joint Military Commissions shall begin 
operating forty-eight hours after the cease-fire 
comes into force. The joint military teams based 
at the places listed in Article 11 (c) of this Proto- 
col shall begin operating no later than fifteen days 
after the cease-fire comes into force. The delegations 
of the two South Vietnamese parties shall simulta- 
neously begin to assume the tasks of the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission as provided in Article 
12 of this Protocol. 

Article 16 

(a) The parties shall provide full protection and 
all necessary assistance and cooperation to the Joint 
Military Commissions at all levels, in the discharge 
of their tasks. . 

(b) The Joint Military Commissions and their 
personnel, while carrying out their tasks, shall en- 
joy privileges and immunities equivalent to those 
accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents. 

(c) The personnel of the Joint Military Com- 
missions mav carry pistols and wear special insignia 
decided upon by each Central Joint Military Com- 
mission. The personnel of each party while guard- 
ing Commission installations or equipment may be 
authorized to carry other individual small arms, 
as determined by each Central Joint Military 
Commission. 

Article 17 

(a) The delegation of each party to the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission shall have its own 
offices, communication, logistics and transportation 
means, including aircraft when necessary. 

(b) Each party, in its areas of control shall 
provide appropriate office and accommodation facil- 
ities to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission 

Department of State Bulletin 






and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at 
all levels. 

(c) The parties shall endeavor to provide to the 
Four-Pnrty Joint Military Commission and the 
Two-Party Joint Military Commission, by means 
of loan, lease, or vr i t" t . the common means of opera- 
tion, including equipment for communication, sup- 
ply, and transport, including- aircraft when 
necessary. The Joint Military Commissions may 
purchase from any source necessary facilities, equip- 
ment, and services which are not supplied by the 
parties. The Joint Military Commissions shall pos- 
sess and use these facilities and this equipment. 

(d) The facilities and the equipment for common 
use mentioned above shall be returned to the parties 
when the Joint Military Commissions have ended 
their activities. 

Article 18 
The common expenses of the Four-Party Joint 
Military Commission shall be borne equally by the 
four parties, and the common expenses of the Two- 
Party Joint Military Commission in South Vietnam 
shall be borne equally by these two parties. 

Article 19 
This Protocol shall enter into force upon signa- 
ture by plenipotentiary representatives of all the 
parties participating in the Paris Conference on 
Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the 
parties concerned. 

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 

[Separate Numbered Page) 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Republic of Vietnam 
America 



William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



Tran Van Lam 

Minister for Foreign 

Affair 8 



[Separate Numbered Page) 

For the Government of For the Provisional Rev- 
the Democratic Republic olutionary Government 
of Vietnam of the Republic of South 

Vietnam 

Nguyen Duy Thnh Nguyen Tm Binii 

Minister for Foreign Minister for Foreign 

Affairs Affairs 

Protocol to the Agreement on ENDING the War 
and Restorinc Peace in Vietnam CONCERNrNG 
the Cease-Fire in South Vietnam and the 
Joint Military Commissions 

The Government of the United States of America, 
with the concurrence of the Government of the Re- 
public of Vietnam, 

The Government of the Democratic Republic of 



Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, 

In implementation of the first paragraph of Arti- 
cle 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and 
Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date 
which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam 
and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Mili- 
tary Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission, 

Have agreed as follows: 

[Ti>xt of Protocol Articles 1-18 same as above] 

Article 19 
The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending 
the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concern- 
ing the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint 
Military Commissions shall enter into force upon 
signature of this document by the Secretary of 
State of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam, and upon signature of a document in the same 
terms by the Secretary of State of the Government 
of the United States of America, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic 
of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Re- 
public of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be 
strictly implemented by all the parties concerned. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Democratic Republic 
America of Vietnam 



William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



Protocol on Mine Clearing in North Viet-Nam 

White House press release dated January 24 

Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning 
the Removal, Permanent Deactivation, or De- 
struction of Mines in the Territorial Waters, 
Ports, Harbors, and Waterways of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam 

The Government of the United States of America, 

The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, 

In implementation of the second paragraph of 
Article 2 of the Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date, 

Have agreed as follows: 



February 12, 1973 



187 



Article 1 

The United States shall clear all the mines it 
has placed in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, 
and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam. This mine clearing operation shall be accom- 
plished by rendering the mines harmless through 
removal, permanent deactivation, or destruction. 

Article 2 
With a view to ensuring lasting safety for the 
movement of people and watercraft and the pro- 
tection of important installations, mines shall, on 
the request of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
be removed or destroyed in the indicated areas; and 
whenever their removal or destruction is impossible, 
mines shall be permanently deactivated and their 
emplacement clearly marked. 

Article 3 
The mine clearing operation shall begin at twenty- 
four hundred (2400) hours GMT on January 27, 
1973. The representatives of the two parties shall 
consult immediately on relevant factors and agree 
upon the earliest possible target date for the com- 
pletion of the work. 

Article J> 
The mine clearing operation shall be conducted 
in accordance with priorities and timing agreed 
upon by the two parties. For this purpose, repre- 
sentatives of the two parties shall meet at an early 
date to reach agreement on a program and a plan 
of implementation. To this end: 

(a) The United States shall provide its plan for 
mine clearing operations, including maps of the 
minefields and information concerning the types, 
numbers and properties of the mines; 

(b) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall 
provide all available maps and hydrographic charts 
and indicate the mined places and all other potential 
hazards to the mine clearing operations that the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam is aware of; 

(c) The two parties shall agree on the timing of 
implementation of each segment of the plan and 
provide timely notice to the public at least forty- 
eight hours in advance of the beginning of mine 
clearing operations for that segment. 

Article 5 
The United States shall be responsible for the 
mine clearance on inland waterways of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam. The Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam shall, to the full extent of its 



capabilities, actively participate in the mine clear- 
ance with the means of surveying, removal and 
destruction and technical advice supplied by the 
United States. 

Article 6 
With a view to ensuring the safe movement of 
people and watercraft on waterways and at sea, 
the United States shall in the mine clearing process 
supply timely information about the progress of 
mine clearing in each area, and about the remain- 
ing mines to be destroyed. The United States shall 
issue a communique when the operations have been 
concluded. 

Article 7 

In conducting mine clearing operations, the U.S. 
personnel engaged in these operations shall respect 
the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam and shall engage in no activities inconsistent 
with the Agreement on Ending the War and Re- 
storing Peace in Vietnam and this Protocol. The 
U.S. personnel engaged in the mine clearing opera- 
tions shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the duration 
of the mine clearing operations. 

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall ensure 
the safety of the U.S. personnel for the duration of 
their mine clearing activities on the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and shall provide 
this personnel with all possible assistance and the 
means needed in the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam that have been agreed upon by the two parties. 

Article 8 

This Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending 
the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall en- 
ter into force upon signature by the Secretary of 
State of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by the 
two parties. 

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of Janu- 
ary, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy- 
Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese 
and English texts are official and equally authentic. 



For the Government of 
the United States of 
America 

William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 



For the Government of 
the Demowatic Republic 
of Vietnam 

Nguyen Duy Trinh 

Minister for Foreign 

Affairs 



188 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Urges World Efforts 
To Maintain Peace in Viet-Nam 

Following arc statements made by Secre- 
tary Rogers upon arrival at Paris on Jan- 
Mary 26 and upon departure on January 27. 

Press release 18 dated January 30 

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, JANUARY 26 

Tomorrow, with the signing of the agree- 
ments and the protocols, peace will come to 
Viet-Nam. The restoration of peace will be 
a source of great satisfaction to the Ameri- 
can people. 

President Nixon, his administration — and 
I am sure the Congress of the United States — 
are fully prepared to turn all of our efforts 
toward making peace work. There is before 
the parties — before the world — an unparal- 
leled opportunity to put an end to the vio- 
lence and the misery that have become a way 
of life for millions of people in Indochina. 
Finally now the energies and talents of those 
who have suffered so much can be turned to 
the process of building, educating, and grow- 
ing. This can be done if the parties abide 
faithfully by the agreements in a spirit of 
reconciliation and cooperation. The interna- 
tional community stands ready to join in this 
effort. In the spirit of conciliation which has 
brought us to the signing ceremony tomor- 
row — a point which many said could never 
be reached — let us, the parties and the in- 
ternational community, strive together in full 
cooperation to achieve a generation of peace. 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, JANUARY 27 

I would like to say goodby to you and to 
express to the French Government and the 
French people, and of course to President 
Pompidou, the thanks of the U.S. Govern- 
ment for hosting the negotiations that have 
led to such a successful conclusion. 

I am particularly pleased by how smooth- 
ly the signing ceremony went today. I was 
recalling, just before I stepped out here, the 



tart that when I arrive in Washington, bach 

in the United States, the cease-fire will be in 
effect. Very soon thereafter we have every 
reason to hope, and we do expect, that the 
cease-fire will extend to all of Indochina. 
I think people all over the world will be 
gratified and very pleased that for the first 
time in a long time there will be no major 
fighting in the world. It's important for all 
of us who are interested in peace, for those 
who signed the agreements this morning, for 
those who will take part in the international 
conference which will convene toward the 
end of February, and for the international 
community to devote our attention to the 
maintenance of this peace. 

President Nixon has dedicated himself to 
building a structure of peace; he hopes that 
we can achieve a generation of peace; and 
the events here in Paris today are a mile- 
stone in achieving that purpose. I appreciate 
very much the courtesy of the press, of the 
French people, and all who took part in the 
ceremony today. Thank you very much. 



National Moment of Prayer 
and Thanksgiving 

A PROCLAMATION 1 

A long and trying ordeal for America has ended. 
Our Nation has achieved its goal of peace with 
honor in Vietnam. 

As a people with a deep and abiding faith, we 
know that no great work can be accomplished with- 
out the aid and inspiration of Almighty God. No time 
could be more fitting for gTateful prayer and medi- 
tation than the opening moment of the peace we 
have achieved with His help. 

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, as requested by the 
Congress, do hereby designate 7:00 p.m., e.s.t., 
January 27, 1973 as a National Moment of Prayer 
and Thanksgiving, and the 24-hour period beginning 
then as a National Day of Prayer and Thanksgiving. 

I urge all men and women of goodwill to join the 
prayerful hope that this moment marks not only the 
end of the war in Vietnam, but the beginning of a 
new era of world peace and understanding for all 
mankind. I authorize the flying of the American flag 
at the appointed hour, and I call on all the people of 



No. 4181; 38 Fed. Reg. 2737. 



February 12, 1973 



189 



the United States to observe this moment with ap- 
propriate ceremonies and activities. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-sixth day of January, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of 
the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred ninety-seventh. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



(ftjjLJ^K^ 



Death of Former President Johnson 

Folloiving is a statement by Secretary 
Rogers issued on January 22. 

Press release 14 dated January 22 

I am profoundly saddened by the death 
this evening of former President Lyndon B. 
Johnson. 

The country, indeed the world, has lost 
one of the great leaders of contemporary 
history — a man of the people, a man of ex- 
traordinary vision, a man of action, and a 
man who reflected and gave substance to 
the pulse of our generation. He devoted a 
lifetime of service to the ideals of a greater 
society. 

We who knew him will treasure separate 
memories of the man. Mine will be his 
success in achieving passage of the landmark 
civil rights bill of 1957, the first such legisla- 
tion in almost a century and the harbinger 
of what was still to come during his 
Presidency. 

We must all be particularly saddened in 
light of our current negotiations that he did 
not live to see peace restored to Indochina. 

On frequent occasions during the last four 
years I had the privilege and enjoyed the 
satisfaction of discussing many matters of 
current international interest with him. He 
unfailingly gave his patriotic support to the 
goals of this Nation. The world will be the 
less without him. 

Mrs. Rogers, those who served him in 
the Department of Stato and I extend our 
heartfelt condolences to Mrs. Johnson and 
her family. 



U.S. To Provide Launch Services 
for British Satellites 

Press release 9 dated January 17 

The United States and the United King- 
dom on January 17 concluded an agreement 
that provides for U.K. access to U.S. space 
launch capabilities on a reimbursable basis. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the U.K. 
Department of Trade and Industry will pur- 
chase appropriate boosters and launching 
services from the U.S. National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration for satellite proj- 
ects undertaken by DTI. The launchings will 
be conducted at NASA launch sites in the 
United States. 

The first U.K. satellite planned to be 
launched under the agreement is the X-4 
technology research satellite. A Scout launch 
vehicle will be used to place the payload into 
orbit. The launch is scheduled to take place 
at the U.S. Western Test Range in 1974. 

The agreement represents another link in 
continued U.S.-U.K. cooperation in space ac- 
tivities that since 1960 has included U.K. 
support of several NASA tracking stations, 
joint testing of experimental communications 
satellites, numerous sounding rocket proj- 
ects, lunar sample experiments by British 
scientists, and cooperative scientific satellite 
projects involving four launchings to date, 
with one additional payload to be launched 
in 1973. 

In a ceremony marking the exchange of 
diplomatic notes concluding the agreement, 
Under Secretary of State for Political Af- 
fairs U. Alexis Johnson noted that "it is fit- 
ting that the first agreement for foreign 
access to U.S. space launch capabilities pur- 
suant to the President's announcement on 
October 9, 1972, is with the United Kingdom, 
with whom we have traditionally had close 
ties in scientific and technological co- 
operation." 

The British Ambassador to the United 



190 



Department of State Bulletin 



States, the Earl of Cromer, said: "This 
agreemenl between our two governments 
provides a firm and welcome assurance of 
tlie future continuation of cooperation, which 
admirably reflects the spirit of the announce- 
ment by the President of the United States 
on 9 October li'Tl' about the provisions by 
the United States of launch assistance to 
foreign states." 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. 

Signatures: Mexico, January 25, 1973; Paraguay, 
January 23, 1973. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Poland, January 25, 1973. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 

Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 

24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. 

TIAS 7502. 

Accession deposited: Bhutan, December 7, 1972. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 

6839. 

Ratification deposited: Australia, January 23, 
1973. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Washington December 29, 1972. 1 

>>at>ircs: Federal Republic of Germany (with 
a statement), January 26, 1973; Iceland, De- 
cember 29, 1972; Khmer Republic, January 2, 
1973; Luxembourg, Philippines, December 29, 
1972. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on the establishment of an 
international fund for compensation for oil pollu- 
tion damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971. ' 



matures: Ireland, December 21, 1972; Japan, 

December 28, 1972; Netherlands, Decern!- 
1972; Norway, December 21, 1972. 

Peace in Viet-Nam 

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in 
Viet-Nam and protocols: 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war and 
restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning the re- 
turn of captured military personnel and foreign 
civilians and captured and detained Vietnamese 
civilian personnel. 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war and 
restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning the 
cease-fire in South Viet-Nam and the Joint 
Military Commissions. 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war and 
restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning the 
International Commission of Control and 
Supervision. 

Done at Paris January 27, 1973. 

Signatures to agreement and protocols: United 
States, Republic of Viet-Nam, Democratic Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam. 

Entered into force January 27, 1973. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 
4, 1969. a 
Ratification deposited: Haiti, December 19, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Enters into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, January 22, 

1973. 
Notifications of provisional application: Federal 

Republic of Germany,' Turkey, January 24, 

1973. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and 
in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into 
force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, January 23, 
1973. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972. a 
Accession deposited: Iraq (with a statement), 
October 4, 1972. 



1 Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

"Applicable to Land Berlin. 



February 12, 1973 



191 



Ratifications deposited: Kuwait (with an under- 
standing), November 15, 1972; Poland, Janu- 
ary 25, 1973. 

Weather Stations 

Protocol to amend the agreement on North Atlantic 
Ocean stations signed at Paris February 25, 1954, 
as amended (TIAS 3186, 5283, 6812, 7163). Open 
for signature at Montreal from December 1, 
1972. Enters into force on June 1, 1973, provided 
it has been signed by a majority of the contract- 
ing governments, including those responsible in 
the aggregate for the operation or financing as at 
July 1, 1972, of at least 17 vessels under the 
agreement. 
Signature: United States, January 23, 1973. 

BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreements extending the loan of certain vessels to 
Argentina pursuant to the agreement of March 
4 and April 1, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4455, 
4662, 6614), for the loan of vessels. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington October 7, 
1971, and January 22, 1973. Entered into force 
January 22, 1973. 

Brazil 

Agreement extending the agreement of January 18 
and September 10, 1968, as extended, relating to 
a program of cooperative research in remote 
sensing for earth resources surveys (TIAS 6569, 
7060). Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force De- 
cember 29, 1972. 

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam 

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace 
in Viet-Nam and protocols: 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war and 
restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning the 
removal, permanent deactivation, or destruction 
of mines in the territorial waters, ports, har- 
bors, and waterways of the Democratic Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war and 
restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning the 
return of captured military personnel and for- 
eign civilians and captured and detained Viet- 
namese civilian personnel. 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war and 
restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning the 
cease-fire in South Viet-Nam and the Joint 
Military Commissions. 

Protocol to the agreement on ending the war 
and restoring peace in Viet-Nam concerning 
the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision. 

Done at Paris January 27, 1973. Entered into 
force January 27, 197*3. 



PUBLICATIONS 






Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

People's Republic of China. No. 4 in the Issues in 
United States Foreign Policy series (replaces 
"Issues" pamphlet Communist China published De- 
cember 1969). Pub. 8666. East Asian and Pacific 
Series 206. 44 pp. $1.25. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series 
is based on the testimony of Martin Hillenbrand, 
then Assistant Secretary of State for European Af- 
fairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Subcommittee on Europe, on April 25, 1972. Pub. 
8677. European and British Commonwealth Series 
77. 4 pp. 10<>. 

U.S. Leads Global War on Drug Abuse. This pam- 
phlet in the Current Foreign Policy series contains 
the text of a statement submitted to the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee in September 1972 
by Nelson Gross, Senior Adviser and Coordinator 
for International Narcotics Matters at the Depart- 
ment of State. Pub. 8679. General Foreign Policy 
Series 269. 12 pp. 25(t. 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Venezuela. TIAS 
7411. 3 pp. lOtf. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators — Continued Applica- 
tion to Fiji of the United States-United Kingdom 
Agreement of November 26, 1965. Agreement with 
Fiji. TIAS 7417. 2 pp. 10e\ 

Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classi- 
fication of Goods and Services for the Purposes of 
the Registration of Marks. TIAS 7419. 36 pp. 
20tf. 

Locarno Agreement Establishing an International 
Classification for Industrial Designs. TIAS 7420. 
50 pp. 25tf. 

Deposits Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. 
Agreement with Finland. TIAS 7421. 3 pp. 10<i. 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Zaire. TIAS 
7422. 5 pp. 10<*. 






192 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 12,1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 



American Principles. I President 

Johnson 

ential Documents 

aent Concluded on Ending: the War and 

Restoring Peace r im 

National Moment of Prayer and Thanksgiving 
(proclamation) 189 

jhlications. Recent Releases 192 

see. U.S. To Provide Launch Services for 
British Satellites 190 

i <-.it > Information 

Agreement Concluded on Ending the War and 
Restoring- Peace in Viet-Nam (Nixon, Kissin- 
ger, texts of agreement and protocols) . . 153 

urrent Actions 191 

.S. To Provide Launch Services for British 
Satellites 190 

Jnited Kingdom. U.S. To Provide Launch Serv- 
ices for British Satellites 190 

fat-Nam 

Agreement Concluded on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam (Nixon, Kiss- 
inger, texts of agi md protocols) . . 153 

National Moment of Prayer and Thanksgiving 

(proclamation) 189 

cretary Urges World Efforts To Maintain 
Peace in Viet-Nam (statements at Paris) . 189 



Ilger, Henry A 

Nixon, President 

Roger tary 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to January 22 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
6 of January 16. 

No. Date 

14 1/22 

♦15 1/24 



Subject 



of 



tl6 1/26 
*17 1/27 



Rogers: statement on death 
former President Johnson. 

American Foreign Service Asso- 
ciation certified as exclusive rep- 
resentative of Foreign Service 
employees. 

Montreal Aviation Sabotage Con- 
vention enters into force. 

Information on U.S. and foreign 
civilians captured in South Viet- 
Nam on lists presented to U.S. 
representatives in Paris Jan. 27. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN. 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXYIII 



No. 1756 



February 19, 1973 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 31 
Excerpts From Transcript 193 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SULLIVAN DISCUSSES 
VIET-NAM PEACE AGREEMENT ON "MEET THE PRESS" 198 

THE RUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT- 
FISCAL YEAR 1974 (EXCERPTS) 206 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back t 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1756 
February 19, 1973 



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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
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ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
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special articles on various phases of 
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United States is or may become a 
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Publications of the Department of 9 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



President Nixon's News Conference of January 31 



Following are excerpts relating to foreign 

policy from the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by President Nixon in the press 
briefing room at the White House on Jan- 
uary SI. 

The President: Won't you be seated. 

In view of the announcement that has 
already been made this morning, I know 
that you will have questions on that and 
other matters, so we will go right to the 
questions. 1 

I think Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, 
United Press International] has the first 
question. 

Q. Can you tell us whether you are going 
to meet with President Thieu sometime this 
spring and also give us a better feeling on 
Dr. Kissinger's | Henry A. Kissinger, As- 
sistant to the President for National Secu- 
rity Affairs] trip, the purpose and so forth? 

The President: At some time this spring 
I do plan to meet with President Thieu. I 
have discussed the matter with him in corre- 
spondence, and I also discussed it yesterday 
in my meeting with the Foreign Minister 
[Trail Van Lam]. It will be at a time 
mutually convenient. The UPI story, inci- 
dentally, was on the mark except for the lo- 
cation. The location we have agreed on will 
be the Western White House this spring. 

As far as Dr. Kissinger's trip is concerned, 



1 The following announcement was made to the 
press earlier that day by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press 
Secretary- to President Nixon : 

"The United States and the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam have agreed that Dr. Kissinger, As- 
sistant to the President of the United States, will 
visit Hanoi from February 10-13, 1973, to discuss 
with the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam the postwar relationship between the 
two countries and other matters of mutual 
concern." 



this is a matter that we feel is very im- 
portant in terms of developing the postwar 
relationship with North Viet-Nam. When we 
look at this very intricate agreement, which 
Dr. Kissinger so brilliantly briefed for the 
members of the press — and if you have read 
it, you will see why I use the word intri- 
cate — we can see that insofar as its terms 
are concerned, if the agreement is kept, there 
is no question about the fact that we will 
have peace in not only Viet-Nam but in Indo- 
china for a very long period of time. But 
the question is whether both parties, in fact, 
all parties involved, have a will to peace, 
if they have incentives to peace, if they have 
desire to peace. 

Now, on this particular point it is neces- 
sary, of course, for us to talk to the South 
Vietnamese, as we are. It is also vitally 
important that we have a direct communi- 
cation with the North Vietnamese. And Dr. 
Kissinger will be going to Hanoi to meet 
with the top leaders of the Government of 
the DRV. There he will discuss the postwar 
relationship. He will, of course, discuss the 
current status of compliance with the peace 
agreements which we have made, and he will 
also discuss, in terms of postwar relation- 
ships, the matter of the reconstruction pro- 
gram for all of Indochina. 

As the leaders probably reported after 
my meeting with them, the day after I an- 
nounced the cease-fire agreement, I raised 
with the leaders the point that the United 
States would consider for both North Viet- 
Nam and South Viet-Nam and the other 
countries in the area a reconstruction pro- 
gram. I, of course, recognized in raising 
this with the leaders that there would have 
to he congressional consultation and con- 
gressional support. In terms of this particu- 
lar matter at this time, Dr. Kissinger will 



February 19, 1973 



193 



be having- an initial conversation with the 
North Vietnamese with regard to this whole 
reconstruction program. 

I should also say that I have noted that 
many Congressmen and Senators and many 
of the American people are not keen on 
helping any of the countries in that area, 
just as they are not keen on foreign aid 
generally. But as far as I am concerned, 
whether it is with the North or the South 
or the other countries in the area, I look 
upon this as a potential investment in peace. 
To the extent that the North Vietnamese, for 
example, participate with us and with other 
interested countries in reconstruction of 
North Viet-Nam, they will have a tendency to 
turn inward to the works of peace rather 
than turning outward to the works of war. 

This, at least, is our motive, and we will 
know more about it after Dr. Kissinger com- 
pletes his talks with them, which we think 
will be quite extensive and very frank since 
he has already, obviously, paved the way 
for it. 

Q. Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger is going 
to Viet-Nam and is due there in Hanoi on 
February 10. Is this related in any way tvith 
the first prisoners of war to come out of 
Hanoi ? 

The President: Not at all. 

Q. I mean, is the date a coincidence ? 

The President: The date is a pure coinci- 
dence, and Dr. Kissinger will not be meet- 
ing with the prisoners of war. Incidentally, 
speaking of the POW question, I have noted 
some speculation in the press, and it isn't — 
I should say — it's speculation that is justi- 
fied, because I understand there was a De- 
fense Department report to this effect, that 
I was going to go out to Travis Air Force 
Base to meet the first POW's when they 
came in. 

I do not intend to do so. I have the greatest 
admiration for the prisoners of war, for 
their stamina and their courage and the 
rest, and also for their wives and their par- 
ents and their children, who have been so 
strong during this long period of their vigil. 

This is a time that we should not grand- 
stand it; we should not exploit it. We should 



remember that it is not like astronauts com- 
ing back from the moon after what is, of 
course, a very, shall we say, spectacular and 
dangerous journey, but these are men who 
have been away, sometimes for years. They 
have a right to have privacy, they have a 
right to be home with their families just as 
quickly as they possibly can, and I am going 
to respect that right, of course, to the extent 
that any of them or their families desiring 
to visit the White House can be sure that 
they will be very high on the list. 

Q. Do you have any floor or ceiling dollar 
figure in mind for the rehabilitation of 
North Viet-Nam or the rest of Indochina? 

The President: Mr. Theis [J. William 
Theis, Hearst Newspapers], that is a matter 
that the Members of the Congress raised 
with me, as you might imagine, and they 
raised it not only with regard to North 
Viet-Nam but with regard to South Viet- 
Nam and Cambodia and Laos in this period 
as we move into the cease-fire and, we hope, 
peacetime reconstruction. 

I cannot give you that figure now, be- 
cause it is a matter that has to be nego- 
tiated and it must be all part of one pattern. 
The figure, of course, will come out. The 
figures will come out, but they must first 
be discussed with the bipartisan leadership, 
because with all of this talk about the powers 
of the Presidency, let me say I am keenly 
aware of the fact that even though I might 
believe that a program of reconstruction for 
North Viet-Nam, as well as South Viet-Nam, 
is an investment in peace, the Congress has 
to believe it. The Congress has to support 
it. And this is going to be one of the more 
difficult assignments I have had as Presi- 
dent, but I think we can make it if the Con- 
gress sees what the stakes are. 

Q. Mr. President, sir, Senator Hollings 
says on a recent trip to Sozitheast Asia he 
discovered that tve are letting some coun- 
tries, including Japan, have 2 percent money, 
yet we have denied our own farmers in 
rural cooperatives 2 percent money. We are 
telling them they have to have their loans 
at 5 percent. Would you comment on this 



194 



Department of State Bulletin 



and how this might relati to your upcoming 
program of aid to Southeast Asia? 

The President: Well, as far as the pro- 
gram of aid is concerned and the percentage 
of interest that is paid, we will, of course, 
have in mind the interest of the American 
people. We want to be fair, of course, to 
those who have been our allies and, in the 
great tradition of America when it fights 
wars, to those who have been our enemies, 
like Germany and Japan, who with Amer- 
ica's help now have become our two greatest 
competitors in the free world. 

Now, when you get down to whether the 
percentage will be 2 percent or 5 percent 
or 3 percent, that is a matter to be nego- 
tiated, but we will be fair, and we will see 
that our farmers also are treated fairly. 

Q. Mr. President, you and people in your 

administration hare hern i/unted as calling 
! fin year of Europe. Could you tell us 
exactly what that means to you, and spe- 
cifically, will you he making a trip to Europe 
in tin vi .-■/ month or so? 

The President: I will not be making any 
trips to Europe, certainly in the first half 
of this year. Whether I can make any trips 
later on remains to be seen. As a matter of 
fact, so that all of you can plan not to take 
shots, I plan no trips whatever in the first 
half of this year outside the United States. 
The meeting with President Thieu, if it does 
work out at a time mutually convenient, 
will take place sometime in the spring. 

Now, the fact that I don't take a trip to 
Europe does not mean that this will not be 
a period when there will be great attention 
paid to Europe, because it just happens as 
we complete the long and difficult war in 
Viet-Nam, we now must turn to the prob- 
lems of Europe. We have been to the Peo- 
Republic of China. We have been to 
the Soviet Union. We have been paying 
attention to the problems of Europe, but 
now those problems will be put on the front 
burner. 

There is the problem of trade, for ex- 
ample. There is the problem of the Euro- 
pean Security Conference, which we must 



discuss. There is the problem of mutual bal- 
anced force reduction (MBFR). All of this 
will require consultation with our European 
allies, and in that connection, that is one of 
the reasons that the Heath visit is so enor- 
mously important. I am spending more time 
with Mr. Heath than I have with some 
other visitors. I mean by that not that time 
proves everything, but not only will we have 
the usual dinners and luncheons and so 
forth, but I am spending a full day with 
him at Camp David because I want to get 
his thoughts about what the position of the 
United States and our European friends 
should be with regard to the European 
Security Conference, with regard to the 
MBFR, and of course, what the position of 
the United States should be and the new, 
broader European Community should be in 
this period when we can either become com- 
petitors in a constructive way or where we 
can engage in economic confrontation that 
could lead to bitterness and which would 
hurt us both. 

We want to avoid that, even though it 
has been predicted by some in this country 
who really fear the new Europe. I do not 
fear it if we talk to them and consult at 
this time. 

Q. Mr. President, there are two American 
fliers still being held prisoner in China, a)id 
they are sort of in limbo — well, three Amer- 
icans, but ttvo fliers. I wonder if you could 
give us their status, and do you expect them 
to be returned with the other prisoners? 

The President: This matter we discussed 
when we were in the People's Republic of 
China, and we have every reason to believe 
that these fliers will be released on the 
initiative of the People's Republic of China 
as the POW situation is worked out in Viet- 
Nam. 

I won't go beyond that, because this is 
a matter that should be left to the People's 
Republic of China; but we have, we believe, 
every assurance that will happen. 

Q. [John T. | Dun, i t ,/, also? 

Tin /' • <], nt: Downey is a different case, 
as you know. Downey involves a CIA agent. 



February 19, 1973 



195 



His sentence of 30 years has been, I think, 
commuted to five years, and we have also 
discussed that with Premier Chou En-lai. I 
would have to be quite candid. We have no 
assurance that any change of action other 
than the commutation of the sentence will 
take place, but we have, of course, informed 
the People's Republic through our private 
channels that we feel that would be a very 
salutary action on his part. 

But that is a matter where they must act 
on their own initiative, and it is not one 
where any public pressures or bellicose state- 
ments from here will be helpful in getting 
his release. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. President. 



Peace in Perspective 

Following is an excerpt from remarks 
made by President Nixon at the 21st annual 
National Prayer Breakfast at Washington on 
February 1. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 5 

I think back to the four years that I have 
had the privilege to be here as a guest and 
also of the years before even 1953 when I 
met with first the House prayer breakfast 
group and then the Senate prayer breakfast 
group. 

I think, too, of what has happened over 
these four years, and I think all of us perhaps 
will remember what a year we have just 
completed. Since we last met here, just one 
year ago, we have made the trip to the 
People's Republic of China, which opened 
communication with one-fourth of the people 
who live on this globe, where there had 
previously been virtually no communication 
whatever as far as we were concerned. 

We made the trip to the Soviet Union, to 
Moscow, and with the Ambassador from the 
Soviet Union here and the Mayor from Mos- 
cow here, we all realize that that trip had 
enormous significance in terms of the future 
of the world in which we live because it was 



really the first time that two very great 
powers sat down together, recognized their 
differences and also those areas where they 
could work together, and made agreements, 
agreements to work together in certain peace- 
ful enterprises and to limit armaments in 
other enterprises; and so a beginning was 
made, a very important beginning that 
needed to be made. That happened this year. 

And then finally — and reference has 
already been made to this — for the first time 
in 10 years at one of these prayer breakfasts, 
the President of the United States is able to 
say the United States is at peace in Viet- 
Nam. 

Could I put that peace in perspective? I 
refer to these journeys abroad and also the 
agreement that has just been reached. We 
could read too much into the peace that we 
have talked about, much as we would hope 
that it could mean everything that we could 
possibly imagine. 

But as we look over the history of agree- 
ments between nations and as we look at 
those periods of peace that follow war, the 
record is not too encouraging. Because what 
we often find is that after war and after 
a period in which a nation has peace, the 
conflict that we were engaged in in war tends 
to turn itself inward and we continue to 
engage in that conflict in peace. And rather 
than a period of peace being one that is 
creative and positive, it is one that is 
negative, one of withdrawal, one of isolation, 
and that plants the seeds for more conflict 
not only at home but abroad. 

This is the record too often in the past. We 
must not let it happen now. 

I recall, for example, in 1969 right after 
I had been elected for the first time, a trip 
to Europe. We had some problems on our 
campuses at that time, as you may remember. 
And when I visited one of the European 
heads of state which had had no war for 25 
years — and we had had two; one in Korea, 
and we were then involved in one in Viet- 
Nam — we talked long into the night about 
the problems of our young people, his and 
ours. And he made a very profound comment. 
He said, "The problem with your young 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 



people is war." He said. "The problem with 
our young people is peace." 

We must not let that happen. For our 
young people and for this Nation, we must 
recognize that peace is not something that 
is simply the absence of war; it is an op- 
portunity to do great things — great things 
for our people at home, great things for 
people abroad. 

I think, for example, of treaties that are 
made. I have made reference to the fact that 
the recent agreements that we have signed 
will mean peace in Viet-Nam, and eventually 
throughout Indochina, we trust; but it will 
mean peace only to the extent that both sides 
and the leaders of both sides have the will to 
keep the agreement. 

All the paper in the world, all the more 
fancy phrases that could have added to the 
very intricate phrases that are already in 
the agreement would mean nothing if the 
individuals who have the responsibility for 
keeping the agreement do not keep it. 

We will keep the agreement. We expect 
others to keep the agreement. That is the 
way peace can be kept abroad — only, in 
other words, by the will of the individuals 
involved, and you must change the man or 
you must change the woman if the agreement 
is to be kept. 

And so it is at home. We are concerned 
about conflict at home. We are concerned, 
for example, about the problems that divide 
us. They talk about the divisions between 
the generations, the divisions between the 
races, the divisions between the religions in 
this country, and we have them. 

So we can legislate about some of those 
divisions. For example, we pass laws, laws 
providing and guaranteeing rights to equal 
opportunity, but there is no law that can 
legislate compassion; there is no law that can 
legislate understanding; there is no law that 
can legislate an end to prejudice. That only 



comes by changing the man and changing 
the woman. 

That is what all religion is about, however 
we may worship. That is what our religion 
is about, those of us who may be of the 
Christian religion. So today I would simply 
close with one thought. There is a lyric from 
a song I recall, that runs something like 
this: "Let there be peace on earth and let 
it begin with me." 

And so, abroad and at home, let that be 
our prayer. Let there be peace on earth, and 
let it begin with each and every one of us in 
his own heart. 

Thank you. 



Diplomatic Privileges Extended 

to Mission of European Communities 

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER 1 

Extending Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 
to the Mission to the United States of Amer- 
ica of the Commission of the European Com- 
munittes and to certain members thereof 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Act of October 18, 1972 (Public Law 92-499), and 
as President of the United States, I hereby extend 
to the Mission to the United States of America of 
the Commission of the European Communities, and 
to the officers of that Mission assigned to Washing- 
ton to represent the Commission to the Government 
of the United States and duly notified to and ac- 
cepted by the Secretary of State, and to their 
families, the same privileges and immunities, sub- 
ject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as 
are enjoyed by diplomatic missions accredited to 
the United States and by members of the diplomatic 
staffs thereof. 




The White House, December 5, 1972. 



1 No. 11689; 87 Fed. Reg. 25987. 



February 19, 1973 



197 



Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan Discusses 
Viet-Nam Peace Agreement on "Meet the Press" 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Deputy Assistant Secretary William H. 
Sullivan broadcast on the National Broad- 
casting Company's television and radio pro- 
gram "Meet the Press" on January 28. 

Mr. Spivak [Lawrence E. Spivak, per- 
manent member of the "Meet the Press" 
panel, moderator]: Our guest today on 
"Meet the Press," answering questions from 
Paris, is the State Department's top special- 
ist on Southeast Asia, William H. Sullivan. 
He has been a key member of the U.S. team 
which negotiated the Viet-Nam peace agree- 
ment. Mr. Sullivan, a former Ambassador 
to Laos, is Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

From our Washington studio now we will 
have the first questions for Ambassador Sul- 
livan from Alvin Rosenfeld of NBC News. 

Mr. Rosenfeld: Mr. Ambassador, reports 
from Saigon say fighting is continuing to- 
day, the day after the cease-fire. How long 
will it be before you can fairly judge whether 
serious violations are occurring? 

Mr. Stdlivan: Well, Mr. Rosenfeld, I have 
heard some reports from Saigon to indicate 
that there have been a number of violations 
of the cease-fire. In fact the figure that I 
think I heard was 138 violations recorded. 
These, as I understand it, are small, sporadic 
attacks. As you know, the forces on both 
sides are spread in great dispersion through- 
out the country. We have seen the cease-fire 
orders that have been broadcast by the Com- 
munist command. We expect them to be 
executed. I think that in the next day or two 
we will certainly know how seriously these 
problems are going to affect the cease-fire. 

Mr. Rosenfeld: There's also reports from 
Saigo7i today, Mr. Ambassador, that the 



United States has given official but private 
assurances to Saigon that we would inter- 
vene militarily again if Hanoi commits 
serious violations. Just what is our commit- 
ment? What would we do if a cease-fire 
breaks down? 

Mr. Sullivan: I am not going to speculate 
on that, Mr. Rosenfeld. I think you have seen 
Dr. Kissinger's statement concerning the 
method in which the agreement has stip- 
ulated the requirements for carrying out this 
accord. 1 There are no inhibitions upon us, 
but we are not going to discuss any hypo- 
thetical questions at this time about what the 
future prospects may bring. 

Mr. Gwertzman [Bernard Gwertzman, 
New York Times]: Mr. Ambassador, we 
know one of the problems was getting the 
Saigon government to agree to a settlement. 
What type of pledges have we made as a 
government to the Saigon government for 
the future — economic, military, or political? 

Mr. Sullivan: There have been no pledges 
in the sense that you imply by your question, 
Mr. Gwertzman. We intend, as the President 
has said, to attempt to continue to provide 
economic assistance to Viet-Nam, to South 
Viet-Nam, and to assist in the rehabilitation 
of the other states of Indochina. The eco- 
nomic assistance that we intend to supply 
will be to enable the South Vietnamese to 
repair their economy and to move toward a 
much greater degree of economic independ- 
ence. We also, of course, are prepared, within 



1 For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
Jan. 23, a news conference held on Jan. 24 by Henry 
A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs, and texts of the Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
Nam and the protocols to the agreement, see Bul- 
lktin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 153. 



198 



Department of State Bulletin 



the provisions of article 7 of the agreement, 
to provide replacement military equipment 
for that which is used up, worn out, de- 
Btroyed, or damaged. But the pledges of the 
typo you imply just don't exist. 

Mr. Gwertzman: Haven't we also promised 
them that in rase of a flagrant violation by 
North Viet-Nam that the U.S. Air For, 
Thailand might take retaliatory steps? 

Mr. Sullivan: Mr. Gwertzman, we are not 
at this stage speculating on what the future, 
in terms of breakdown of this agreement, 
would bring about. The fact is that we ex- 
pect this agreement to be carried out scru- 
pulously. We will retain U.S. Air Force forces 
in Thailand. We will retain the U.S. 7th 
Fleet in the Pacific, but we don't intend to 
indicate at this time any uses that we would 
have for those military elements. 

.1//-. Gwertzman: Hare ire discussed the 
ust of this militant power with Hanoi? 

Mr. Sullivan: I don't think we are going 
into discussions of that type either. Hanoi 
certainly is aware of the existence of those 
elements, where they will be deployed, and 
can draw some conclusions. 

Situation in Laos and Cambodia 

Mr. Noyes [Crosby S. Noyes, Washington 
Star-News']: Mr. Ambassador, can you talk 
a little bit about the situation in Laos and 
Cambodia? We have been getting some 
rather conflicting reports. Henry Kissinger 
told us the other day that he expected a 
cease-fire in Laos within 15 days. Since tin n 
th< re have been news reports that the Lao- 
tians expect a major Communist offensive 
in the near future. What can you tell us 
about the situation that is going on there 

Mr. Sullivan: Well, Mr. Noyes, I don't 
know in great detail, because I am somewhat 
removed from it here in Paris; but from the 
reports I have seen, those two statements 
are not necessarily contradictory. There does 
appear to be a fairly significant Communist 
offensive going on in various quarters of 
Laos at this moment. They are apparently 
attempting to take some ground which would 



be of significance to them in anticipation of 
the cease-fire. 

We have reason to believe there will be 
a cease-fire in the not too distant future, 
as Dr. Kissinger indicated. 

Mr. Noyes: Wc hart also been told I hut 
if the Communists in Laos make » grab for 
the major population centt rs there that they 
are counting on American air support — / 
Utr Royal Laotian Army is counting 
on major American air support in this pe- 
riod. What can you say about that-! 

Mr. Sullivan: Well, first, let me say that 
I have been associated on and off for 12 or 
13 years now with Laos, and there has never 
yet been a Communist effort to take the 
major population centers. It is something 
which is not only probably beyond their 
capabilities to sustain, but something which 
for political reasons they would have no 
great desire to do, so I think again you are 
posing a hypothetical prospect that we really 
don't feel we are going to have to face. 

In the interim period between now and 
whenever there is a cease-fire in Laos, we 
are continuing to provide air support to the 
Royal Laotian forces in resisting whatever 
Communist movements that are taking place. 

Mr. Noyes: Well, the agreement that we 
just signed yesterday states specifically 
that n-e will remove our military presence 
from Laos and Cambodia and will not re- 
introduce any weapons or even any military 
materiel. Hon- de they combine? Is there a 
time clement? 

Mr. Sullivan: You will discover that the 
agreement says we shall respect the agree- 
ments of 1954 with respect to Cambodia and 
1962 with respect to Laos. Now, those agree- 
ments do have provisions in them for the 
supply of military equipment to the Cam- 
bodian and to the Lao forces with certain 
limitations similar to the limitations that 
are spelled out in this agreement on Viet- 
nam. 

The question that you were asking I 
thought had to do with the immediate period 
prior to the cease-fire. Once the cease-fire 
goes into effect in Laos, then we would expect 



February 19, 1973 



199 



that there would be a cessation of hostilities 
there; there would be no need for further 
American intervention. There will be the 
withdrawal, we expect, of all foreign forces. 

I might point out that none of our air 
which has been used in Laos has ever been 
based or stationed in Laos. 

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily 
News]: Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Kissinger re- 
ferred to Viet-Nam as a civil war in his 
briefing last Wednesday. I would like to ask 
you how that squares with the U.S. Govern- 
ment, the State Department, calling it all 
these years an invasion and an aggression 
from the outside? 

Mr. Sullivan: Well, Mr. Lisagor, I think 
if there were an invasion by, let's say, East 
Germany into West Germany, we would still 
consider it an invasion although it would 
probably be also considered a civil war 
between the two elements of Germany. 

Viet-Nam, as is recognized by the 1954 
agreements and as is endorsed by this agree- 
ment, is essentially a single country, but it 
has been divided since 1954 by this pro- 
visional demarcation line and if during this 
period these countries — separate and apart — 
attack each other in pursuit of their civil 
scraps with each other, it is certainly an 
invasion. If the West Germans were to attack 
the East Germans, I think there would be no 
doubt what the reaction would be from the 
Soviets and the others associated with them. 

Settlement Through Political Means 

Mr. Lisagor: Some say, Ambassador Sid- 
livan, that all we got out of this agreement 
really was a military stalemate, a truce and 
not a peace, and it was a thin cover really for 
the United States getting out of Viet-Nam. 
Now, people don't quarrel with that, but they 
say that is in essence what we got. Do you 
agree with that? 

Mr. Sullivan: No, I would say there is more 
to it than that. First of all, it has to be seen 
in the configuration, a larger configuration, 
of Southeast Asia and of East Asia. Remem- 
ber that we have never really been negotiat- 
ing here with a government. We have been 



negotiating with the Communist party of 
Indochina, the so-called Lao Dong Party. 

This party has had its ambitions for the 
past 30 years to take over the area that was 
previously controlled in a colonial way by the 
French. Now it has had its tentacles in Laos, 
in Cambodia, and in South Viet-Nam. What 
has happened, we believe, as a result of this 
agreement is that there have been certain 
limits set upon the capability of that party 
to utilize the military manpower of North 
Viet-Nam that it has controlled for efforts 
toward a military victory. There is still going 
to be a political struggle going on in Indo- 
china, and it is going to be carried on, we 
believe, with advantages which now accrue 
to the states that are opposing the Lao Dong 
Party. And I might say that among the 
opposition to the Lao Dong Party's domina- 
tion over Indochina, there is not only the 
United States but certain other powers which 
don't really wish to see Indochina brought 
under that hegemony and control. 

Mr. Lisagor: But don't we leave the central 
issue still up for grabs — and that is the 
political future of the South Vietnamese 
Government? 

Mr. Sullivan: Absolutely. That is what we, 
for years, have been saying that we wish 
to do: to let this problem be settled in a 
political way and not in a military way and 
not with outside interference, but to be 
settled by the people of South Viet-Nam in 
accordance with the political valence each 
one could bring to bear. 

We believe that if an election were held 
in the very near future the South Vietnamese 
voters would turn in a result which would 
give very short shrift to the Lao Dong, very 
short shrift to the Communists — perhaps 
less than 20 percent of the electorate. 

Keeping the Agreement 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, almost 
everybody is trying to prove that the Viet- 
Nam peace agreement won't work. Yet any 
agreement will work if those who signed it 
find it ivise to keep the agreement. Why do 



200 



Department of State Bulletin 



think it is wise for North Vi( t-Nam to 
the agreerru 

Mr. Siillinni: Well, the North Vietnam- 
ese — again, as 1 say. North Viet-Nam is 
merely an area and a population that is 
currently under the control of the Lao Dong 
Party. The Lao Dong Party will find it 
satisfactory, I think, to keep the agreements 
because there are external pressures which 
would lead it in that direction. It has dis- 
covered that the Chinese and the Soviets are 
not willing to go to the lengths that it would 
like them to go to commit themselves for its 
ambitions. It has discovered that there are 
certain limitations that it has already reached 
as far as its military capabilities are con- 
cerned. Its manpower it has been drawing 
from North Yiet-Xam is really close to ex- 
haustion. They have killed about 800,000 of 
their young men that they have sent out of 
that country in expeditionary forces on 
behalf of these old men in the Politburo. The 
generation that they had, this romantic 
generation, is going to pass; and the time has 
come when they are going to have to settle 
down and think in terms of living in this 
real world rather than in the jungle guerrilla 
world they have created for themselves. 

Mr. Spivak: Why do you think it is wise 
for South Viet-Nam to keep the agreements? 

Mr. Sullivan: South Viet-Nam, I think, 
needs a period of great respite and peace. It 
needs to be able to build up and consolidate 
a social fabric and a government that can 
direct the energies of its people. Its people 
are intelligent, enormously ingenious, but 
they have had the disruption that has been 
going on now ever since the end of the 
colonial period. South Viet-Nam needs peace; 
it needs the opportunity to rebuild its struc- 
ture and to sort out its own lines for the 
future. 

Mr. Spivak: And lastly, why do you think 
the Vu t Cong to keep t) 
m ent? 

Mr. Sullivan: The Viet Cong are goin 
have to keep the agreement because their 
external support is going to be more limited 
than it has been in the past. They will 



doubtless be the least happy with this settle- 
ment, and there are already indications that 
they are the people that Found the least profit 
in it from their point of view. They are going 
to have to find themselves faced either with 
the prospect of reconciling themselves to the 
position of a minority in the society and 
working politically within that society or 
else going back into the bush and leading the 
rest of their lives as guerrillas without the 
type of support that they previously could 
call upon. 

Mr. Rosenfeld: And yet, Mr. Ambassador, 
in the South you do have this leopard-spot 
situation, this unresolved situation. From the 
practical point of view, what is there to 
prevent one or both sides from continuing 
the ivar, the struggle, by other means: 
political assassinations, mass roundups, and 
so forth ? 

Mr. Sullivan: As far as the provisions of 
the agreement are concerned, political assas- 
sinations and other acts of violence are 
forbidden. Now, if you are asking me why 
would they carry out the terms of the agree- 
ment, I think the answer would probably 
be that not to carry them out, they have 
learned, produces a situation that is worse 
than what they are currently tolerating. 

We think that they have reached a stage 
where they realize that neither side is going 
to be able to win a military victory. If the 
South Vietnamese had been able to push out 
all the North Vietnamese troops, that would 
have been one thing. If the North Vietnamese 
troops and their Viet Cong cadre had been 
able to take over major cities and other major 
centers of population, that would have been 
another. But neither one of those has oc- 
curred, and so they are going to have to 
start from the situation they are in, work 
from there, and find some way in which they 
can reach some accommodations with each 
other. 

What they will be, we don't really know. 
We don't really want to get in the business 
of trying to predict, because I frankly think 
that Americans very, very little understand 
[ndochinese society. 



February 19, 1973 



201 



Mr. Gwertzman: There have been some 
reports that a high-ranking American mis- 
sion might go out to Hanoi soon for a general 
talk. Is there any likelihood of this soon? 

Mr. Sullivan: I have no comment on that, 
Mr. Gwertzman. I think you best put that 
question to whoever the high-ranking mis- 
sionary is who gave you the tip on it. 

Background on Reaching Agreement 

Mr. Gwertzman: Can I ask you another 
question? How much did the Russians and 
Chinese help in bringing about this agree- 
ment? There has been a lot of speculation 
along that line, but of course officially 
Moscow and Peking have supported Hanoi 
down the line. 

Mr. Sullivan: Well, we will never know 
how much once actually went on behind the 
scenes in the interplay among Moscow, 
Peking, and Hanoi, but it is very clear that 
the attitude of China has had a great deal 
to do with the way in which this situation 
has worked out. 

When President Nixon decided to put the 
mines into the harbors of North Viet-Nam 
May 8, he produced a situation in which 
North Viet-Nam became 100 percent de- 
pendent upon China for the provision of its 
equipment. Everything coming from the 
Soviet Union had to transit Chinese territory. 
Nothing could go through the waters and 
come into Haiphong over the seas. This means 
that China's preoccupation with Soviet en- 
circlement came into play. This means that 
China's feeling that it would rather have 
four balkanized states in Indochina, rather 
than an Indochina that was dominated by 
Hanoi and possibly susceptible to Moscow, 
came into play. 

All this sort of background certainly has 
had an effect upon the situation that we have 
been able to bring to a peaceful conclusion, 
but exactly how these forces were played out 
among the particular Communist person- 
alities, we don't know. 

Mr. Noyes: The North Vietnamese, Le Due 
Tho and so on, are claiming that this agree- 



ment is a notable victory for their side — and 
apparently they are getting a certain amount 
of support — that what we have signed in 
Paris is a victory for the Socialist states. Do 
you agree tvith that, or what is your com- 
ment on that? 

Mr. Sullivan: If it makes them happy and 
gives them any solace to consider it such, I 
think it probably is about as small a peace 
as they can carry away from the negotiating 
table. 

Mr. Noyes: Well now, we have been told 
that until October 8, or early in October, that 
their negotiating demands were totally inac- 
ceptable to us. What do you think it was that 
made them change their demands at that 
time ? 

Mr. Sullivan: I think they probably had 
prepared to change their demands sometime 
earlier in the summer when the full effect 
of the mining had set in and the degree of 
supplies which they discovered they could 
get through China had become calculated and 
their offensives in the South had been turned 
back with very heavy losses to themselves. 
They probably came to the conclusion that 
they had to drop all these demands that they 
had sought continuously since 1968: the 
overthrow of President Thieu, the establish- 
ment of a coalition government, the cutoff 
of all American economic support, and no 
future replacement of military equipment. 
All this went by the board very suddenly in 
October, October 8, but it clearly was an 
accumulation of events and of decisions that 
brought that upon them. 

We had made this general proposition to 
them that they accepted as early as May 31, 
1971, in private talks. We made it publicly 
on May 8, 1972. 2 

They knew that they could settle on those 
terms. When they came in on October 8, they 
knew they were coming in for a settlement, 
and they knew that settlement represented 
an enormous step back from their ambitions 
and from the ambitions of what you have 



■ For President Nixon's address to the Nation 
on May 8, 1972, see Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747. 



202 



Department of State Bulletin 



previously called the victory of the Socialist 
world. 

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Sullivan, Mrs. [Nguyen 
Thi\ Binh, the Viet Cong represent 
said President Nixon was violating the spirit 
of tti> agreement when he said the United 
States recognizes tin Saigon government as 
the std< legitimate governmt nt of South Viet- 
Nam. Does her complaint have merit under 
this agreement? 

Mr. Sullivan: No, not at all. We have 
certainly the privilege and the right to choose 
to recognize a government. We recognize the 
Government of Viet-Nam and always have. 
Mrs. Binh's government, so-called, does not 
have a capital, does not have any outward 
manifestations that make it feasible to be 
called a government. 

Mr. Lisagor: Is there an implicit aid com- 
mitment to North Viet-Xam? Has there been 
a secret understanding or )>rivate tender- 
standing that we will supply reconstruction 
aid to North Viet-Nam? 

Mr. Sullivan: There is nothing secret about 
the statement. It is in the — I can't remember 
which article it finally ended up in — article 
21, I believe, of the agreement, saying that 
we, in the spirit and the practice of our 
normal traditions of binding up the wounds 
of war, will assist in the reconstruction of 
Indochina, including North Viet-Nam. We 
are going to give that sort of assistance. We 
have not yet had any detailed discussions 
with the Xorth Vietnamese concerning that 
sort of assistance, but there is nothing secret 
about the fact that we are going to be doing 
that. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassathn , sina only 
North Viet-Nam knows nil the Ann 
prisoners tin ■> hold, ; be sun that 

nil will I,, rt turned and SOWN WOn'i frl held 

for ransom ? 

Mr. Sullivan: Well, Mr. — I assume that 

Mr. Spivak. T have no video here, and 

as I told Mr. Lisagor, it looks much better 

this way, but, Mr. Spivak, article 8 of the 

agreement, which concerns prisoners, has 



three paragraphs in it. as you may note. 
Article 8(a) concerns the U.S. military 
prisoners and foreign civilians. Article 8(b) 
concerns the problem that you are just talking 
about. We want an accounting for all those 
missing in action. We want the right to 
have our graves registration teams and others 
go in and exhume bodies or otherwise give 
us satisfaction that what has been turned 
over is the full total of prisoners being held. 
Now, there would be no reason to hold 
prisoners for ransom, because if prisoners 
were held there would be nothing they could 
ransom them against. We have a settlement. 
But the fact is we will demand, and of course 
this will be reciprocal, this will be among 
all the parties, the prospect — 

Mr. Spivak: I am sorry to interrupt, but 
our time is tip. Thank you, Ambassador Sul- 
livan, for being with us today on "Meet the 
Press." 



National Energy Requirements 
and Oil Import Policy 

Following is a statement made before 
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs on January 22 by Willis C. Arm- 
strong, Assistant Secretary for Economic 
and Business Affairs.* 

We appreciate your invitation to testify on 
this important question. Secretary Rogers 
has asked me to express his regret that he 
was unable to testify today. He looks for- 
ward to meeting with your committee at a 
later date. 

The Department of State believes that a 
sound oil import policy is an essential ele- 
ment of a national energy policy. We have 
attempted, in written testimony which I am 
submitting separately, to answer the per- 
tinent questions which you have asked us. 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



February 19, 1973 



203 



We believe that our oil import program 
has been necessary and useful. In the past it 
has shielded us from the supply disruptions 
caused by crises such as those in the Middle 
East in 1956 and 1967 and has enabled us 
on those occasions to help fill the needs of 
our European allies. It has not been able, 
however, to give us lasting protection against 
limited domestic production and growing 
demand. 

Today our reliance on imported fuels is 
already greater than that foreseen by the 
President's task force of 1969, and our ability 
to help our allies has been absent for some 
time. We believe that a continuation of some 
limitation on imports is and will remain es- 
sential, but we recognize that an import 
policy alone cannot restore the more com- 
fortable level of self-sufficiency and security 
we enjoyed previously. A searching look at 
our national energy requirements and options 
is called for and is now underway in the ad- 
ministration as well as in this committee. 
We expect that as a result of the policy ini- 
tiatives and legislation that will emerge from 
this review, our government will be able to 
act decisively and in a concerted manner to 
meet the problems which face us. 

No matter what policies we adopt, how- 
ever, our dependence on imports is certain 
to continue to grow for a number of years. 
We are already the world's largest importer 
of oil, and our impact on the world's petro- 
leum market is considerable and growing. 
As we look at that market, we see that it 
is in a state of profound transformation 
and considerable instability. A large number 
of oil-importing nations, faced with rapidly 
increasing domestic consumption and few or 
no short- or even medium-term alternatives, 
must turn to a small number of exporting 
countries for ever-increasing amounts of oil. 
Those producers have declared their inten- 
tion to maximize their profits from the sale 
of what is, in most cases, their only impor- 
tant national resource. They have succeeded 
over the past three years in driving up oil 
prices to a very significant degree and are 
now embarked on a major, and so far suc- 
cessful, effort to change the very nature of 



the international petroleum market through 
negotiating eventual control of the produc- 
ing companies and a greater share of oil 
marketing. The rate of change has been 
very rapid over the past few years, and the 
oil-importing nations feel increasingly unsure 
about the effect of future changes on their 
ability to find and pay for their necessary 
oil supplies. 

We must recognize in this context that 
what we do, as an importer of increasingly 
large quantities of oil, will have a profound 
impact on this world oil market. To our 
European and Japanese allies, we are com- 
petitors for available supplies. They are con- 
cerned that efforts on our part to obtain 
secure supplies for ourselves may be made 
at the expense of the security of their own 
supplies, and they are watching our actions 
closely. They will welcome the actions our 
government takes to stop the deterioration 
of our self-sufficiency in energy. 

As you know, the State Department has 
testified previously that we believe that first 
priority should go to actions to cut the rate 
of growth in our energy imports, both by 
improving our self-sufficiency and by reduc- 
ing the rate of growth of our consumption. 
Since, however, our import needs will none- 
theless continue to grow, we believe that 
priority should also be given to developing 
increased supplies from our neighbors in the 
Western Hemisphere, both because those sup- 
plies are inherently more secure and because 
this would increase the total availability of 
supplies. Unfortunately, under present eco- 
nomic conditions and the state of uncertainty 
concerning the national energy policies of 
the United States, Venezuela, and Canada, it 
does not appear likely that large increases in 
supply will be developed quickly enough from 
Western Hemisphere countries. Nonetheless, 
we have maintained consultations with both 
the Canadian and Venezuelan Governments 
with the purpose of reaching agreement on 
ways to stimulate increased supplies from 
these two sources. We hope that our efforts 
will be successful. 

We recognize, however, that increased 
imports of conventional oil from the West- 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



ern Hemisphere cannot in the near future, 
or perhaps even in the long run, meet our 
import needs. Early in the next decade, 
large additional supplies may become avail- 
able from sources such as the Canadian tar 
sands or the Venezuelan heavy-oil belt; but 
for the 8-10 years more immediately upon 
us, our increased imports will have to come 
largely from the Eastern Hemisphere. 
Therein lies not only more potential inse- 
curity regarding supply sources and trans- 
port routes for us but also the basis for 
increased competition between ourselves and 
the other importers for available supplies. 
We believe such competition would be harm- 
ful to all oil importers and would only serve 
to drive up prices and to strengthen the 
bargaining power of the exporting nations. 
We believe that this should be avoided and 
are pleased that other members of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development are prepared to join us in 
discussing ways in which cooperation among 
oil-importing nations can be strengthened. 
We believe that there is a good chance that 
the major oil-importing nations will be will- 
ing to act jointly in developing a common 
energy strategy rather than to act piecemeal 
as has been the case to date. Necessary to 
the conditions for greater cooperation among 
oil-consuming nations, we believe, will be a 
readiness on our pail to act with restraint 
in seeking to assure our own supplies from 
Eastern Hemisphere exporters. We must at 
the same time, however, continue to 
strengthen and improve our relations with 
the oil-exporting nations. 

In summary, we believe that we must now 
consider new steps in our national resource 
and import policies which will strengthen 
our own security by reducing our require- 
ments for imported energy, enable us to de- 



velop new sources of more secure imports, 
and strengthen our cooperation with other 
oil-importing nations as well as with oil 
producers. 



John Updike Visits Africa 
Under Lincoln Lectureships 

The Department of State announced on 
January 17 (press release 10) that John H. 
Updike was to visit Ghana, Nigeria, Tan- 
zania, Kenya, and Ethiopia from January 21 
through February 14 as a Lincoln Lecturer. 

The Lincoln Lectureships were announced 
by President Nixon last August in a letter to 
Dr. James H. Billington, Chairman of the 
Board of Foreign Scholarships, which 
marked the completion of 25 years of educa- 
tional exchanges under the Fulbright-Hays 
and earlier acts. 1 

Mr. Updike, who received the Rosenthal 
Award from the National Institute of Arts 
and Letters in 1960 and the O'Henry Prize 
Story Award in 1968, is one of four Amer- 
icans from the academic and cultural com- 
munity chosen by the Board for the lecture- 
ships during the 1972-73 academic year. 
(For further biographic data, see press re- 
lease 10.) The others are: Charles H. 
Townes, Nobel Prize winner for physics and 
professor at the University of California, 
Berkeley; John Hope Franklin, professor of 
history, University of Chicago; and Paul 
A. Samuelson, Nobel Prize-winning professor 
of economics, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 



1 For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Sept. 4, 
1972, p. 252. 



February 19, 1973 



205 



THE CONGRESS 



The Budget of the United States Government — Fiscal Year 1974 (Excerpts) ' 



PART 1— THE BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE 
PRESIDENT 

To the Congress of the United States: 

The 1974 budget fulfills my pledge to hold 
down Federal spending so that there will be 
no need for a tax increase. 

This is a budget that will continue to 
move the Nation's economy toward a goal 
it has not achieved in nearly two decades: 
a high employment prosperity for America's 
citizens without inflation and without war. 

Rarely is a budget message perceived as 
a dramatic document. In a real sense, how- 
ever, the 1974 budget is the clear evidence 
of the kind of change in direction demanded 
by the great majority of the American peo- 
ple. No longer will power flow inexorably 
to Washington. Instead, the power to make 
many major decisions and to help meet local 
needs will be returned to where it belongs — 
to State and local officials, men and women 
accountable to an alert citizenry and respon- 
sive to local conditions and opinions. 

The 1974 budget proposes a leaner Federal 
bureaucracy, increased reliance on State and 
local governments to carry out what are 
primarily State and local responsibilities, 
and greater freedom for the American peo- 
ple to make for themselves fundamental 
choices about what is best for them. 

This budget concerns itself not only with 



'H. Doc. 93-15, 93d Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted 
on Jan. 29. Reprinted here are excerpts from part 
1 and excerpts from the section on national 
defense and the full text of the section on interna- 
tional affairs and finance from part 4 of the 392- 
page volume entitled The Budget of the United 
States Government — Fiscal Year 1974, for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20420 
($2.60). 



the needs of all the people, but with an idea 
that is central to the preservation of democ- 
racy : the "consent of the governed." 

The American people as a whole — the 
"governed" — will give their consent to the 
spending of their dollars if they can be pro- 
vided a greater say in how the money is 
spent and a greater assurance that their 
money is used wisely and efficiently by gov- 
ernment. They will consent to the expendi- 
ture of their tax dollars as long as individual 
incentive is not sapped by an ever-increasing 
percentage of earnings taken for taxes. 

Since the mid-1950's, the share of the Na- 
tion's output taken by all governments in 
the United States — Federal, State, and 
local — has increased from a quarter to a 
third. It need not and should not go higher. 

The increase in government claims on tax- 
payers was not for defense programs. In 
fact, the defense share of the gross national 
product declined by one-quarter while the 
share for civilian activities of all govern- 
ments grew by three-fourths, rising from 
14% of the gross national product in 1955 
to about 25% in 1972. 

In no sense have Federal civilian pro- 
grams been starved ; their share of the gross 
national product will increase from 6V&% 
in 1955 to 14% in 1972. Nor will they be 
starved by the budget that I am proposing. 
A generous increase in outlays is provided 
each year by the normal growth in revenues. 
Higher Federal tax rates are not needed 
now or in the years ahead to assure adequate 
resources for properly responsive govern- 
ment — if the business of government is man- 
aged well. And revenue sharing will help 
State and local governments avoid higher 
taxes. 

During the past 2 years, with the econ- 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



omy operating below capacity and the threat 
of inflation receding, the Federal bu< 
provided fiscal stimulus that moved the econ- 
omy toward full employment. The 1974 budg- 
et recognizes the Federal Government's 
continuing obligation to help create and 
maintain — through sound monetary and fis- 
cal policies — the conditions in which the na- 
tional economy will prosper and new job 
opportunities will be developed. However, 
instead of operating primarily as a stimu- 
lus, the budget must now guard against 
inflation. 

The surest way to avoid inflation or 
higher taxes or hath is for the Congress to 
join me in a conn rted i ffort to control Fed- 
eral sp, riding. I therefore propose that 
before the Congress approves any spending 
bill, it establish a rigid ceiling on spending, 
limiting total 1974 outlays to the $268.7 
billion recommended in this budget. 

I do not believe the American people want 
higher taxes any more than they want in- 
flation. I am proposing to avoid both higher 
taxes and inflation by holding spending in 
1974 and 1975 to no more than revenues 
would be at full employment. 



Building a Lasting Structure of Peace 

Building a lasting peace requires much 
more than wishful thinking. It can be 
achieved and preserved only through pa- 
tient diplomacy and negotiation supported 
by military strength. To be durable, peace 
must also rest upon a foundation of mutual 
interest and respect among nations. It must 
be so constructed that those who might 
otherwise be tempted to destroy it have an 
incentive to preserve it. 

The 197 1 budget supports America's effi 
to establish such a peace in two important 
ways. First, it maintains the military 
strength we will need to support our 
tiations and diplomacy. Second, it pro- 
poses a sound fiscal policy that, supported 
by a complementary monetary policy, will 
contribute to prosperity and economic sta- 
bility here and abroad. 

Our strength, together with our willing- 



ness to negotiate, already has enabled us to 

begin building a structure for lasting world 
peace and to contribute to a general re- 
laxation of world tensions. 

— We have made substantial progress to- 
ward ending our involvement in the diffi- 
cult war in Southeast Asia. 

— In the past 4 years, we have concluded 
more significant agreements with the Soviet 
Union than in all previous years since World 
War II, including the historic agreement 
for limiting strategic nuclear arms. 

— We have ended nearly a quarter century 
of mutual isolation between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China 
and can look forward to the development 
of peaceful cooperation in areas of mutual 
interest. 

In this atmosphere, other nations have 
also begun to move toward peaceful settle- 
ment of their differences. 

One of the results of our negotiations, 
taken together with the success of the Nixon 
Doctrine, our substantial disengagement 
from Vietnam, and the increased effective- 
ness of newer weapons systems, has been a 
significant but prudent reduction in our 
military forces. Total manpower has been 
reduced by about one-third since 1968, and 
will be further reduced as we end the draft 
and achieve an All-Volunteer Force. At the 
same time, our allies are assuming an in- 
creasing share of the burden of providing 
for their defense. 

As a result, defense outlays have been 
kept in line. In 1974, they will be substan- 
tially the same as in 1968. During the same 
period, the total budget has grown by 5n 
and nondefense outlays have grown by 91%, 
or $90 billion. When adjusted for pay and 
price increases, defense spending in 1974 
will be about the same as in 1973 and about 
one-third below 1968. 

But, while this Administration has suc- 
ceeded in eliminating unnecessary defense 
spending, it is equally determined to spend 
whatever is necessary for national security. 
Our 1974 budget achieves this goal. It as- 
sures us of sufficient strength to preserve 
our security and to continue as a major 



February 19, 1973 



207 



force for peace. Moreover, this strength will 
be supported, beginning this year, without 
reliance on a peacetime draft. 

A framework for international economic 
progress is an important part of our efforts 
for peace. A solid beginning has been made 
on international monetary reform through 
our participation in the ongoing discussions 
of the Committee of Twenty. We will con- 
tinue to press these efforts during the year 
ahead. 

Our foreign assistance programs also re- 
flect our intention to build a lasting struc- 
ture of peace through a mutual sharing of 
burdens and benefits. America will remain 
firm in its support of friendly nations that 
seek economic advancement and a secure 
defense. But we also expect other nations 
to do their part, and the 1974 budget for 
foreign assistance is based upon this ex- 
pectation. 

Our goal is a durable peace that is sus- 
tained by the self-interest of all nations 
in preserving it. Our continuing military 
strength and our programs for interna- 
tional economic progress, as provided for 
in this budget, will bring us closer to that 
goal for ourselves and for posterity. 



vides more income for more people than any 
other system by suffocating the productive 
members of the society with excessive tax 
rates. 

Common sense tells us that it is more 
important to save tax dollars than to save 
bureaucratic reputations. By abandoning 
programs that have failed, we do not close 
our eyes to problems that exist; we shift 
resources to more productive use. 

It is hard to argue with these common 
sense judgments; surprisingly, it is just as 
hard to put them into action. Lethargy, 
habit, pride, and politics combine to resist 
the necessary process of change, but I am 
confident that the expressed will of the peo- 
ple will not be denied. 

Two years ago, I spoke of the need for 
a new American Revolution to return power 
to people and put the individual self back 
in the idea of seZ/-government. The 1974 
budget moves us firmly toward that goal. 

Richard Nixon. 

January 29, 1973. 



PART 4— THE FEDERAL PROGRAM BY 
FUNCTION 



Conclusion 

The respect given to the common sense 
of the common man is what has made Amer- 
ica the most uncommon of nations. 

Common sense tells us that government 
cannot make a habit of living beyond its 
means. If we are not willing to make some 
sacrifices in holding down spending, we will 
be forced to make a much greater sacrifice in 
higher taxes or renewed inflation. 

Common sense tells us that a family budg- 
et cannot succeed if every member of the 
family plans his own spending individ- 
ually — which is how the Congress operates 
today. We must set an overall ceiling and 
affix the responsibility for staying within 
that ceiling. 

Common sense tells us that we must not 
abuse an economic system that already pro- 



National Defense 

Our national security strategy is designed to move 
us toward the goal of a generation of peace through 
strength, partnership and negotiation. In the past 
4 years we have demonstrated that there can be 
meaningful negotiation only if we maintain ade- 
quate military strength and effective partnership 
with our allies. Forces and programs proposed in 
1974, together with those of our allies, continue to 
be designed to deter military conflict at any level. 

In implementing our strategy for peace, we have 
significantly improved our relations with the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China. At the 
same time, in accord with the Nixon doctrine, our 
allies have assumed a greater share of the burden 
for their own defense. These developments, and the 
increased effectiveness of modern weapon systems, 
have enabled us to reduce our military forces with- 
out jeopardizing our strength or abandoning our 
commitments. Military personnel planned for 1974 
are 37% lower than in 1968. Active Army and 
Marine Corps divisions have been reduced from 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



NATIONAL DEFENSE 
Program Highlights 

• Provided a sufficient nuclear deter- 
rent while seeking permanent mutual limi- 
tations in strategic offensive forces. 

• Initiated modernization of the general 
purpose forces for their role in deterring 
conventional attacks while pursuing efforts 
to achieve mutual and balanced force 
reductions. 

• Conducted a vigorous research and 
development program to maintain force 
effectiveness and technological superiority. 

Budget Proposals 

• Maintain military strength as a foun- 
dation for further negotiations to achieve 
lasting peace. 

• Increase total national defense out- 
lays from $76.4 billion in 1973 to $81.1 
billion in 1974 and $85.5 billion in 1975 
primarily due to pay and price increases. 

• Offset selected increases necessary to 
maintain the strength and readiness of 
our combat forces by savings and re- 
ductions. 

• Achieve an All-Volunteer Force. 



The cost of maintaining our strength continues to 
be substantial but far less than the cost of allowing 
our defenses to deteriorate. Outlays for the national 
defense function will increase from $76.4 billion in 
1978 to $81.1 billion in 1974. The cost of moderniz- 
ing our forces will be largely offset by savings and 
reductions. Total outlays increase primarily as the 
result of an additional $4.1 billion required to main- 
tain military and civilian pay levels comparable to 
those in the private sector, to raise pay and benefit 
levels sufficient to achieve an All-Volunteer Force, 
to meet normal price increases, and to pay for higher 
military retirement annuities. 

National defense outlays are expected to increase 
in 1975 to $85.5 billion also primarily due to pay 
and price increases. The cost of essential improve- 
ments in readiness and equipment will be offset 
through savings and efficiencies. 

Department of Defense — The Department of De- 
fense budget continues to provide the strong defense 
posture essential for the security of the United States 
and for the support of negotiations which are mov- 
ing us toward peace. The 1974 budget checks the 
past trend of rising manpower costs and devotes 
major emphasis to equipment modernization and re- 
search and development. The proportion of the de- 
fense budget devoted to manpower costs in 1974 
will be held to the 1973 level, about 56%, after in- 
creasing from 42% in 1968 — the peak of the Viet- 
nam war. 



23 3 /3 to 16. Older ships have been retired from 
the fleet and selected reductions have been made in 
both strategic and tactical aircraft. The potential for 
further force adjustments, however, depends upon 
achieving effective arms limitation agreements. 

NATIONAL DEFENSE 

[In millions of dollars) 











Recom- 






Outlays 




mended 


Program or agency 








budget 










1972 


1973 


1974 


authority 




actual 


estimate 


estimate 


for 1974' 


Department of Defense — 










Militarv ' 


76.161 


74,200 


78,200 


83,481 


Military assistance-" 


806 


600 


800 


1.684 


Subtotal. Military 










and Military 










Assistance 13 


76.967 


74.800 


79.000 


86,166 


Atomic Energy • 1 


2.392 


2.194 


2.374 


2.429 


Defense-related activities 


96 


192 


83 




Deductions for offsetting 










receipts : 










Proprietary receipts 










from the public* 


-108 


-761 


-382 


-382 


Total 


78.336 


76,435 


81,074 


87.303 







1 Compares with budget authority of $80,314 million in 1972 
and $81,719 million in 1973. 

1 Entries net of offsetting receipts. 

' Includes both Federal funds and trust funds. 

4 Excludes offsetting receipts which have been deducted by 
subfunctions above: 1972. -$1,280 million. 1973, -12.547 
million: 1<<74. -$2,717 million. 



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OUTLAYS' 

Actual Estimated 

1968 1972 1973 1974 

Outlays (in billions) : 

Manpower 32.6 40.2 41.8 43.9 

Operating costs (other than 

payroll) 12.3 11.4 11.2 11.5 

Investment 2 - 33.1 24.3 21.8 23.6 

Total 78.0 76.0 74.8 79.0 

Percent of total: 

Manpower 42 58 66 66 

Operating costs (other than 

payroll) 16 16 16 16 

Investment 1 --- 42 32 29 29 

Total 100 100 100 100 

1 Includes military assistance program and foreign military 
sales programs. 

- Includes procurement; research, development, test, and 
evaluation: and construction. 

The surge in manpower costs is being curbed by 
holding pay and benefit increases to much lower 
levels than those of recent years, by further reduc- 
tions in personnel, and by other means. Intensive 
efforts have been made to increase the efficiency of 
available personnel. Reductions in headquarters, 
training and support activities will reduce the num- 
ber of support personnel and overhead costs. Re- 
placement of 31,000 military personnel by civilians 
in positions not requiring military skills will result 
in further support cost reductions. Through these 



February 19, 1973 



209 



actions defense military and civilian manpower 
strengths will be budgeted at the lowest level since 
1950. 

Another way of looking at the defense budget is 
in terms of military program or mission to be accom- 
plished. The accompanying table displays the major 
Department of Defense programs in terms of total 
obligational authority. This is a measure of the 
total activity approved in each year. 

SUMMARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE BUDGET PROGRAM 1 

[In billions of dollars] 

Total obligational authority 

Major military programs Actual Estimate 

1968 1972 1973 1974 

Strategic forces 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.4 

General purpose forces 30.4 25.2 25.7 26.4 

Intelligence and communica- 
tions 5.5 5.4 5.7 6.0 

Ail-lift and sealift 1.8 1.1 .9 .8 

Guard and Reserve 2.2 3.3 4.0 4.4 

Research and development 2 4.3 6.1 6.5 7.4 

Central supply and maintenance 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.4 
Training, medical, and other 

general personnel activities 12.2 15.5 16.4 18.2 

Administration and associated 

activities 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.7 

Support of other nations 1.8 2.6 2.9 2.9 

Total obligational 

authority 75.0 76.8 80.0 83.7 

Less prior year funds and 
other financial adjustments __ 1.4 —1.7 —2.2 —0.2 

Total budget authority ___ 76.4 75.1 77.8 83.5 

1 Excludes military assistance program and foreign military 
sales programs. 

3 Excludes R. & D. in other program areas on systems ap- 
proved for production. 

Strategic forces. — Our nuclear forces must be suf- 
ficient to deter nuclear attack against the United 
States and our allies. For this purpose we maintain 
an effective combination of strategic offensive forces, 
including intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] , 
manned strategic bombers, submarine-launched bal- 
listic missiles and the systems necessary to their 
command and control in a nuclear attack environ- 
ment. 

This year's program completes the one Safeguard 
ABM [antiballistic missile] site located at Grand 
Forks, N. Dak., but stops work on the second site 
located at Malmstrom, Mont., in accordance with 
the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
treaty. Funds are not included this year to support 
the deployment of an ABM defense of Washington, 
D.C. However, we will continue to plan for deploy- 
ment of a defense of our Capital using components 
developed for Safeguard or the more advanced ABM 
system being developed in the Site Defense pro- 
gram. This latter program has as its primary aim 
the development of an effective ABM defense for 
ICBM fields or other point targets as a hedge 
against abrogation of the ABM treaty. 

The SALT talks also resulted in an interim 



agreement to limit offensive nuclear forces and have 
led to further negotiations aimed at achieving an 
equitable and effective treaty on offensive force 
limitations. However, until such a treaty is nego- 
tiated, we will maintain our current strength to 
insure the viability of our deterrent and to pro- 
vide the Soviet Union an incentive for meaningful 
negotiations. Total obligational authority of $7.4 
billion is proposed in 1974 for strategic forces. These 
funds will permit us to : 

« Continue development of the Trident sea-based 
ballistic missile system; 

• Further develop the B-l advanced manned stra- 
tegic bomber; 

» Continue the conversion of ballistic missile 
forces to the Minuteman III and Poseidon systems 
which are equipped with multiple warheads; 

o Begin development of a strategic submarine- 
launched cruise missile; 

• Pursue research and development on Site De- 
fense. 

• Further improve our early warning capability 
against ballistic missiles; and 

o Upgrade our strategic command and control 
through development of the advanced airborne com- 
mand post and of satellite communications. 

General purpose forces. — The improvement in our 
relations with the Warsaw Pact countries and the 
People's Republic of China is encouraging evidence 
that further progress toward a relaxation of inter- 
national tension may be possible. The Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China, however, con- 
tinue to maintain large and capable forces. While 
the strategic nuclear power of the United States 
and the Soviet Union is in approximate balance, it 
is unrealistic to expect that the risk of escalation 
to strategic nuclear war will deter either aggression 
with conventional forces or against smaller coun- 
tries. Therefore, we will continue to maintain the 
strong and ready general purpose forces needed to 
provide, in conjunction with the forces of our allies, 
a realistic and credible deterrent to aggression at 
any level. 

Our land forces will be modernized and main- 
tained at a high state of readiness. Armored ca- 
pability will be enhanced with the procurement of 
additional M60 tanks and wire-guided antitank 
missiles. Additional purchases of the improved 
Hawk missile system will upgrade Army and Marine 
Corps field defenses against low- and medium- 
altitude supersonic aircraft. A reduction in the 
number of Army wheeled vehicles and the pro- 
curement of commercial vehicles in place of spe- 
cialized vehicles should result in significant savings. 

The United States relies on naval forces to pre- 
serve our right to use the seas. We plan to support 
a more ready and capable, though smaller, fleet 
through the retirement or modernization of existing 



210 



Department of State Bulletin 



ships and a vigorous shipbuilding program. To en- 
hance the capabilities of our sea-control forces, this 
budget includes procurement of five nuclear-powered 
submarines, construction of a nuclear-powered air- 
carrier, and the modernisation of three guided 
missilc fr ilso included are initial funds for 

the first Sea Control Ship. Improvements are plan- 
ned in surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, sonars, and 
radars. 

Aircraft development and procurement provided 
for in this budget will assure continued air superior- 
ity for the tactical air forces. For the Air Force, 
additional F-15 fighters — with combat performance 
and maneuverability designed to exceed any other 
known aircraft — are being purchased. For ground 
attack, development will continue on the A-X close 
air-support system which will combine the ability 
to deliver large ordnance payloads on enemy ground 
positions with increased assurances of survival in 
the battle area. 

The Navy will deploy its new fleet fighter, the 
F-14. This aircraft, with its load of up to six 
Phoenix air-to-air missiles, is designed to intercept 
and destroy enemy aircraft before they can threaten 
the fleet. In addition, the Navy is enhancing its anti- 
submarine warfare capabilities with the introduc- 
tion of the S-M Viking aircraft system. 

Modernization of the Marine air wings will be 
accomplished by purchasing the latest F-4 Phan- 
tom for air superiority, A I attack aircraft for 
heavier bombing strikes, and the vertical takeoff 
and landing AV-8 Harrier for close air support of 
ground forces. 

The inventory of air-launched munitions will be 
upgraded with procurement of the latest guided 
bombs and missiles. 

vrd and Reserve. — Under the Total Force 
Concept. Guard and Reserve forces have been 
modernized and are now designated as the primary 
source for augmenting the active forces in an 
emergency. High priority is being given to im- 
proving mobilization readiness through equipment 
modernizaton, intensified training, and conversion 
of units to higher priority missions or elimination 
of elements no longer required. 

Without the draft, manning the reserve forces 
will be more difficult than attracting active force 
volunteers. A large percentage of reserve members, 
for example, were motivated to volunteer for duty 
to avoid eat of being drafted. Once the 

draft is terminated this source of volunteers will 
disappear. To fill this gap, reserve units have in 
tensified retention and recruiting efforts. Some suc- 
cess has been achieved with individuals having 
prior military service: but, additional incentives 
are proposed to achieve manpower levels needed 
to fulfill the National Guard and Reserve mission. 

/.'■ march and >!■ \— A vigorous research 

and development program is essential to maintain 



force effectiveness and technological superiority. At 
a time when high manpower costs and the transi- 
tion t.i an \ll-Volunteer Force place great I 
phasis on effective manpower usage, investment in 
military technology is necessary to assure in. 
ing individual effectiveness. 

In addition to maintaining force effectiveness and 
technological superiority, efforts are being directed 
toward reducing investment and operating costs. 
The design-to-cost approach will be expanded in 
the development of systems such as the lightweight 
fighter prototypes for the Air Force, a new main 
battle tank for the Army, and the Agile air-to-air 
missile for the Navy. Lower operating costs, in- 
cluding the maintenance and support of systems, 
will be emphasized as a specific design goal for 
these new systems. 

Improvements in the efficiency of the R. & I) 
and procurement processes will be sought by em- 
phasizing prototypes, improving test and evaluation, 
minimizing simultaneous development and produc- 
tion, and by cooperating with our allies to make 
more efficient use of joint technical resources. 

Support of oilier nations. — This program includes 
direct support by DOD for designated forces in 
Southeast Asia, the military personnel costs of 
military assistance missions and advisory groups 
around the world, the U.S. share of the cost of in- 
ternational military headquarters, and NATO com- 
mon logistics. For 1974, $2.9 billion in total obliga- 
tional authority is recommended for this program. 
This completes the major portion of investment 
for South Vietnamese forces. 

Military assistance. — Military assistance and 
credit sales programs provide the support neces- 
sary to strengthen the efforts of other countries 
to provide for their own defense — a fundamental re- 
quirement for the success of the Nixon doctrine, 
i Additional discussion of these programs is con- 
tained in the International Affairs and Finance 
section.) 



International Affairs and Finance 

With the Presidential trips to Moscow and Peking, 
the strategic arms limitation agreements, the Ber- 
lin accords, and the lessening of American military 
involvement in Vietnam, the United States is mov- 
ing decisively to end the postwar era of confronta- 
tion and build a durable structure of peace. Our 
goal is a network of relationships and interdepend- 
encies which will give each nation a stake in 
the peace. Our tools are those of diplomacy and 
negotiation, foreign assistance, international mone- 
tary reform and trade expansion, and the exchange 
of persons and ideas. 



February 19, 1973 



211 



The 1974 budget for international programs pro- 
vides means to seek the goal of peace commensurate 
with our opportunities and at the minimum level of 
resources required. Outlays for international affairs 
and finance are estimated to be $3.8 billion in 1974. 
In 1975, outlays are also expected to be $3.8 billion. 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE 

[In millions of dollars] 

Recom- 
Outlays mended 

Program or agency budget 

1972 1973 1974 authority 

actual estimate 1 estimate for 1974 2 

Economic and financial 
assistance : 

International security 
assistance : 
(Military 

assistance) 3 * (719) (759) (791) (1,085) 

Security supporting 

assistance 717 563 708 729 

International develop- 
ment assistance : 

Multilateral 472 567 682 1,374 

Bilateral 5 911 976 871 909 

President's foreign 
assistance contin- 
gency fund 43 23 19 30 

Export-Import Bank" 39 

Peace Corps (Action) 11 77 83 77 78 

Other 28 61 50 40 

Food for Peace 993 847 766 654 

Foreign information and 
exchange activities : 
United States Informa- 
tion Agency 6 198 207 213 224 

Department of State 

and other 44 48 54 60 

Radio Free Europe/ 

Radio Liberty 32 39 45 45 

Conduct of foreign 

Department of State 5 ' 437 486 522 521 

Other 15 17 16 15 

Deduction for offsetting 
receipts : 

Intrabudgetary 

transactions 8 * * * * 

Proprietary receipts 

from the public -280 -574 -213 -213 

Total 3,726 3,341 3,811 4,465 

1 Amounts for programs included in the Foreign Assistance 
Appropriation Act, 1973, are based on the annual rates specified 
in the temporary continuing resolution for the period October 
15, 1972, through February 28, 1973 (Public Law 92-571). 

2 Compares with budget authority of $5,010 million for 1972 
and $3,705 million for 1973. 

3 Outlays and budget authority for military assistance are 
classified in the national defense function. They are not included 
in the totals shown for international affairs and finance. 

1 Excludes trust funds. Net of offsetting receipts. 

6 Includes both Federal funds and trust funds. 

c Transactions of the Export-Import Bank were removed from 
the budget totals by Act of Congress (Public Law 92-126), as 
of Aug. 17, 1971. 

7 Entries net of offsetting receipts. 

s Excludes offsetting receipts which have been deducted by 
subfunction above: 1972, $9 million; 1973, $14 million; 1974. 
$15 million. 

* Less than $0.5 million. 

Economic and financial assistance. — Foreign as- 
sistance programs reflect our intention to build a 
lasting structure of peace on a mutual sharing of 
burdens and benefits. The United States will remain 
steadfast in its support of friendly countries that 
seek economic advancement and a secure defense; 
but we also expect other nations to do their part. 
Thus, the 1974 budget estimates are derived not 
only from a careful assessment of the assistance 
necessary to achieve our foreign policy objectives, 



but also in the expectation that fulfilling our obli- 
gations will call forth comparable efforts by other 
nations. 

At the time this budget was prepared, the Con- 
gress had enacted neither the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1972 nor the Foreign Assistance Appropria- 
tion Act for 1973. Accordingly, the 1973 estimates 
for foreign assistance used throughout the budget 
are based, where applicable, on the annual rates 
specified in the temporary continuing resolution 
for the period beginning October 15, 1972, and 
ending February 28, 1973. These rates are not the 
same as the budget request that the President 
presented to Congress in January 1972. 

Foreign assistance programs serve international 
security, developmental, and humanitarian pur- 
poses. They are under the direction of the Secretary 
of State. 



iNTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE 
PROGRAM TRENDS 

Program Highlights 

• Concluded initial strategic arms lim- 
itation agreements with the Soviet 
Union and began the second phase of 
negotiations. 

• Began progress toward reform of 
the international monetary system. 

• Streamlined administration of for- 
eign economic assistance and reduced 
personnel in Washington and abroad. 

• Expanded programs to control il- 
legal production and distribution of 
narcotics and dangerous drugs, a major 
foreign policy objective. 

• Provided large scale assistance to 
Bangladesh and the Philippines for relief 
and rehabilitation. 

Budget proposals 

• Continue to help friendly nations 
assume more of their own defense 
burden. 

o Sharpen the focus of our bilateral 
economic assistance programs through 
reductions of low priority activities and 
concentration on critical development 
problems. 

• Meet our commitments to share in 
contributions to international develop- 
ment institutions. 

• Contribute to a new United Nations 
Environment Fund created at United 
States initiative. 

• Expand contacts between American 
and foreign individuals and institutions. 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



International security assistance.- -Ky providing 

aid to countries whose economies cannot yet ade- 
quately support their Becurity needs, these pro- 
prams help friendly nations develop and maintain 
the capability t.> defend themselves. Total Federal 
fund outlays for 1974 are estimated at $1.5 billion. 

[INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

[In millions of dollars] 





Budget authority 




Outlays 




Assistance program 










1972 


1'.I73 


1974 


1972 


1973 


1974 




actual 


esti- 


esti- 


actual 


esti- 


esti- 






mate 


mate 




mate 


mate 


Military 














assistance: - 














Grant military 














assistance 


501 


563 


685 


663 


550 


678 


Foreign military 














credit sales 


400 


400 


526 


147 


230 


313 


Credit sales to 














Israel 








eg 


90 


38 


Offsetting receipts. 














and other 














accounts 


-70 


-101 


-125 


-60 


-111 


-138 


Security supporting 














assistance 


548 


697 


729 


717 


563 


708 


Total 


1.379 


1.449 


l.MI 


1.436 


1.321 


1.499 



• Military assistance is classified in the national defense 
function. 

* Excludes trust funds. 



Military assistance, administered by the Depart- 
ment of Defense and classified in the national 
defense function, includes gTants of equipment and 
training as well as credit sales of military equip- 
ment. (Military aid to Laos and South Vietnam is 
included in Department of Defense appropriations 
and not shown in the table above.) As the 
economies of recipient nations and the world 
political situation improve, military assistance can 
gradually be shifted from grants to credit and cash 
sales. Consequently, increased reliance on credit 
sales is projected for 1974. Total Federal fund 
outlays for military assistance, including credit 
sales to Israel, will be $791 million in 1974. 

Security supporting assistance, administered by 
the Agency for International Development, pro- 
motes political and economic stability in countries 
of foreign policy importance to the United States. 
Outlays are estimated to be $708 million for 1974. 

/• '-motional development assistance. — These 
programs promote the long-term economic growth 
of developing countries through both multilateral 
and bilateral channels. Outlays are estimated at 
$1.5 billion in 1974. 

By providing financial support through multi- 
lateral assistance channels, the United States joins 
with other industrialized countries in sharing 
equitably the responsibility for assisting developing 
nations. American contributions to international 
financial institutions — the World Bank Group and 
the Inter-American and Asian Development 



Banks — are administered by the Treasury Depart- 
in. -nl. To provide the U.S. share of internationally 
agreed upon capital replenishments in 1974, budget 
authority is requested as follows: 

• $.'!^0 million for the International Development 
Association; 

• $193 million for the ordinary capital of the 
Inter-American Development Bank, plus a $500 
million payment to its fund for special operations; 
and 

• $100 million for the special fund of the Asian 
Development Bank, with an additional $109 million 
to be provided for the Bank's ordinary capital upon 
the enactment of authorizing legislation. 

The largest voluntary contribution to interna- 
tional organizations will be to the United Nations 
Development Program, which finances programs 
of technical assistance and pre-investment surveys. 
A contribution of $90 million is proposed for 1974. 
A contribution of $10 million to the new United 
Nations Environment Fund is also proposed. 

Bilateral assistance is administered principally 
by the Agency for International Development. Out- 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE 

[In millions of dollars] 

Budget authority Outlays 

Assistance program 

1972 1973 1974 1972 1973 1974 
actual esti- esti- actual esti- esti- 
mate mate mate mate 

Multilateral: 
International 

financial insti- 
tutions : 

Special pay- 
ment 1 1,059 

Internationa] 
Bank for Re- 
construction 
and Develop- 
ment 123 1 12 

International 
Development 
Association __ 320 320 78 160 220 

Inter-American 
Development 
Bank 212 418 693 181 238 286 

Asian Develop- 
ment Bank .. _-_ 209 17 21 31 

International 

Organizations _ U9 133 Jj>2 _196 147 134 

Subtotal. 

multilateral 1,543 871 1.374 472 567 682 
Bilateral: 
Development 

loans 340 328 351 620 467 338 

Grants and other 

programs 646 676 481 406 496 532 

Ml Private 
Investment 

Corporation .,_ 12 12 72-21 7-10 

Inter-American 

Foundation 2 6 v 

Other 4 _4 4 6 3 4 

Subtotal, 

bilateral „ 1.003 921 909 911 976 871 

Proprietary 
receipts from 
the public -^64 -313 -71^ -64 -313 -71 

Total 2.482 1,479 2.212 1.319 1.230 1.482 

transfer to international financial institutions as 
• I to maintain the gold value of U.S. dollar contributions. 



February 19, 1973 



213 



lays are estimated at $871 million in 1974. AID's 
employment will be further decreased in 1974, 
making a total reduction of 44% since 1968. 

Development loans finance essential imports to 
developing countries of special interest to the 
United States. These loans assist both general 
development programs and specific projects in such 
fields as agriculture and industry. Bilateral as- 
sistance also includes technical assistance activities, 
designed to transfer technology and expertise in 
key areas such as education and agriculture. These 
activities, plus programs to assist developing coun- 
tries in population planning and to control the 
international production and traffic in narcotic and 
dangerous drugs, are funded under grants and 
other programs. 

The principal function of the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation is to guarantee and insure 
U.S. private investments in developing countries 
against losses incurred through inconvertibility, 
war, or expropriation. Budget authority of $72 
million is requested in 1974 to increase insurance 
reserves to adequate levels. 

The Inter-American Foundation, with estimated 
outlays of $8 million in 1974, provides grants 
primarily to private nonprofit organizations for 
innovative developmental activities in Latin 
America. 

International humanitarian assistance, adminis- 
tered by the Department of State and AID, 
provides help for refugees and victims of natural 
disasters. It is financed largely from the Food for 
Peace program, the President's foreign assistance 
contingency fund, and special relief appropriations. 
The United States has recently contributed to 
critical relief needs in South Asia, the Philippines, 
Central Africa, and Nicaragua. 

The President's foreign assistance contingency 
fund. — This fund permits the United States to 
respond to unforeseen circumstances requiring 
security, development, or humanitarian assistance. 
Budget authority of $30 million is recommended 
for 1974. 

Peace Corps (Action). — The $78 million budget 
authority estimate for Peace Corps activities in 
1974, supplemented by increased host country 
contributions, will maintain current volunteer 
levels. 

Food for Peace. — Through the sale and donation 
of agricultural commodities to foreign countries, 
Food for Peace combats hunger and malnutrition, 
promotes economic growth in developing nations, 
and expands export markets for American agricul- 
tural products. Outlays will be $766 million in 
1974, of which net sales will be $500 million and 
donations $266 million. 

Foreign information and exchange activities. — 

The educational and cultural exchange programs 
of the Department of State are being expanded 



in recognition of their importance in improving 
communication between key elements of American 
and other societies. Programs of the United States 
Information Agency, designed to interpret the 
United States and its policies to foreign audiences, 
will continue at about current levels. However, 
employment will decrease in 1974, making a total 
reduction of 22% since 1967. An appropriation of 
$16 million is requested for the relocation of the 
Voice of America's Okinawa radio relay station. 

Conduct of foreign affairs. — Increased operating 
costs abroad and assessments by international 
organizations require additional outlays for the 
Department of State in 1974. Although small 
employment increases in 1973 and 1974 will be 
necessary to meet the increasing workload, overall 
personnel will have been reduced by 13% since 
1967. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



92d Congress, 2d Session 

Fishermen's Protective Act. Report to accompany 
H.R. 14385. H. Rept. 92-1487. October 2, 1972. 
7 pp. 

Preservation and Protection of Polar Bears. Report 
to accompany H.J. Res. 1268. S. Rept. 92-1259. 
October 3, 1972. 7 pp. 

Canadian Fishing Vessels. Report to accompany 
H.R. 16793. H. Rept. 92-1506. October 3, 1972. 
10 pp. 

Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects. Report to accompany 
Ex. M, 92d Cong., second sess. S. Ex. Rept. 
92-38. October 4, 1972. 14 pp. 

Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities to the Mission 
of the European Communities. Report to ac- 
company S. 2700. H. Rept. 92-1521. October 4, 
1972. 4 pp. 

Fishermen's Protective Act Amendments. Confer- 
ence report to accompany H.R. 7117. H. Rept. 
92-1523. October 4, 1972. 3 pp. 

American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of 1972. 
Report to accompany H.R. 15461. S. Rept. 92- 
1285. October 10, 1972. 5 pp. 

Inter-American Relations. A collection of documents, 
legislation, descriptions of inter-American organi- 
zations, and other material pertaining to inter- 
American affairs. Printed for the use of the i 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. October 
10, 1972. 656 pp. 

Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam : Effectiveness. 
A staff study based on the Pentagon Papers. 
Prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. October 12, 1972. 35 pp. 

International Center Complex. Report to accompany 
S. 4039. S. Rept. 92-1293. October 12, 1972. 8 pp. 

Importation of Pre-Columbian Sculpture and 
Murals. Conference report to accompany H.R. 
9436. S. Rept. 92-1298. October 13, 1972. 4 pp. 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 




Convention on Aviation Sabotage 
Enters Into Force 

Press release lfi dated Jnnun; 

Today [January 26], 30 days after the 
deposit by Hungary of the LOth instrument of 
ratification, the Convention for the Suppres- 
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
vil Aviation came into force. 1 The other 
governments whose ratifications brought the 
convention into force are Brazil, Canada, 
Chad. Israel, South Africa, Spain. Trinidad 
and Tobago, the United States, and Yugo- 
slavia. A total of 63 nations have signed 
the Montreal Convention, and 20 nations 
have now ratified or acceded to it. 

This convention was opened for signature 
at Montreal on September 23, L971, at the 
headquarters of the International Civil Avia- 
tion Organization. It requires contracting 
governments to prosecute or extradite of- 
fenders — those involved in the destruction of 
aircraft or navigational facilities. The Mon- 
treal Convention, which covers acts against 
aircraft in domestic as well as international 
service, is the third in a series of conventions 
dealing with unlawful interference with civil 
aviation. The other two conventions are the 
Tokyo Convention of 1963 and the Hague 
Convention of 1970. 

The Tokyo Convention obligates contract- 
ing governments to restore control of a hi- 
jacked aircraft to its commander. This 
convention also requires a state in which a 
hijacked aircraft lands to permit its passen- 
gers and crew to continue their journey as 
soon as practicable. Sixty-two governments 
are now parties to the Tokyo Convention, 
and eight others have signed it. 

The Hague Convention requires that a 
state either extradite a hijacker or submit 



the case, without exception whatsoever, to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. The convention provides that hi- 
jackers shall lie subject to severe penalties 
in all contracting states and calls for 
universal jurisdiction over hijackers, v 
ever found. Eighty-one states have si: 
and 51 states have become parties to the 
Hague Convention. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

International air services transit agreement. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1914. Entered into force 
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Oman, January 24, 1973; 

effective February 23, 1973. 
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
April I, 1917. TIAS 1591. 

Adherence deposited: Oman, January 24, 1973. 
Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven- 
tion on international civil aviation, as amended 
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. I ten. a < 
New York .March 12, 1971. 
Ratifications deposited: Guyana, December 20, 

1972; Malagasy Republic, January 1(">, 1973; 

Togo, January 12, 1973. 
Entered into force: January 16, 1973. 

Privileges and Immunities 

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the 
United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for 
the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 
Accessioi ed: Guyana, December 28, 1972. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Signed at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February- 12, 1 
TIAS 7532. 

Ratification deposited: Tunisia, January 30, 1973. 
Notification of provisional application: Colombia, 
January 30, 1973. 

Seals — Antarctic 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, 

with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 

1971'. 

Signatures: France, December 19, 1972; Chile, 3 
Japan, December 28, 197:!. 



' For text of the convention, see Rii.i.ktin of 
Oct. 25, 1971, p. 465. 



Not in force. 
With a statement. 



February 19, 1973 



215 



Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with an- 
nex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 1 
Ratification deposited: Argentina (with reserva- 
tions and declaration), December 5, 1972. 

BILATERAL 

Bahamas 

Agreement relating to the establishment of an agri- 
cultural research development and training center 
primarily devoted to livestock production. Signed 
at Nassau January 18, 1973. Entered into force 
January 18, 1973. 

Ecuador 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of July 31, 1972 (TIAS 
7436). Effected by exchange of notes at Quito 
January 19, 1973. Entered into force January 
19, 1973. 

Iran 

Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Tehran February 1, 1973. Enters into 
force on the date of an exchange of diplomatic 
notes indicating approval of each contracting 
party, in accordance with its constitutional 
requirements. 

Italy 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 
18, 1973. Enters into force upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 



(TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon January 17, 1973. Entered into force 
January 17, 1973. 

Yemen Arab Republic 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at San'a October 
22 and December 4, 1972. Entered into force 
December 4, 1972. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



1 Not in force. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on February 1 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

William J. Casey to be Under Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs. 

John N. Irwin II to be Ambassador to France. 

U. Alexis Johnson to be Ambassador at Large 
[to serve as chief of the U.S. delegation to the 
United States-Soviet negotiations on the Limitation 
of Strategic Arms]. 

William J. Porter to be Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs. 

Donald Rumsfeld to be the U.S. Permanent Rep- 
resentative on the Council of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 

Kenneth Rush to be Deputy Secretary of State. 

John A. Scali to be U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations and U.S. Representative in the 
Security Council of the United Nations. 

John A. Volpe to be Ambassador to Italy. 



216 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February t9, 1973 Vol. LXYIIl, \ 



(una. President Nixon's News Conference of 
January 31 (excerpts) 193 



\ \iat ion. Convention on Aviation Sabotage En- 

Into Force 215 

Chii 

The 
F 



.onftr. 

The Budget of the United States Government — 
al Year 197-1 ( Excerpts) 

Confirmations 1 1 vin, Johnson, Porter, 

Rumsfeld, Rush, Scali. Volpe) 216 

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 214 

National Energy Requirements and Oil Import 
Policy (Armstrong) 203 

department and Foreijrn Service. Confirmations 
(Casev, Irwin, Johnson, Porter, RumstV 
Rush, Scali, Volpe) 216 

Economic Affairs. The Budget of the United 
;es Government — Fiscal Year 1974 (Ex- 
cerpts) 206 

durational and Cultural Affairs. John Updike 
Visits Africa Under Lincoln Lectureships . 205 

Snergy. National Energy Requirements and 
Oil Import Policy (Armstrong) 203 

Europe. President Nixon's News Conference 
of January 31 (excerpts) 193 



•"ranee. Irwin confirmed as Ambassador . . . 

International Orfranizations and Conferences. 
Diplomatic Privileges Extended to Mission of 
European Communities (Executive order) . 



216 



197 
216 



Volpe confirmed as Ambassador . . 

s'orth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Rumsfeld 
confirmed as U.S. Representative on the 
NATO Council . 216 

Petroleum. National Energy Requirements and 
Oil Import Policy (Armstrong) .... 203 

residential Documents 

Budget of the United States Government — 

Fiscal Year 1974 (Excerpts) 206 

)iplomatic Privileges Extended to Mission of 
European Communities (Executive order) . 197 

Peace in Perspective 196 

esident Nixon's News Conference of Janu- 

i excerpts) 193 

reaty Information 

onvention on Aviation Sabotage Enters Into 

Force 215 

nt Actions 215 

Jnited Nations. Scali confirmed as U.S. Rep- 
resentative 216 

t-Nam 

Assistant Secretary Sullivan Discusses 
-Nam Peace Agreement on "Meet the 

. . 198 



Peace in Perspective (Nixon) . . 
President Nixon's News G 
uar . . 



i Index 

Armstrong, Willis C 

Casev, William J 

Irwin, John N., II 

Johnson, U. Alexis 

Porter. William J 

Nixon, President I, 197, 206 

Rumsfeld, Donald 216 

Rush, Kenneth 216 

Scali, John A 216 

Sullivan. William H 198 

Volpe, John A 216 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Jan. 29-Feb. 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 29 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
10 of January 17 and 16 of January 26. 

No. D»tf Subject 

18 1/30 Rogers: arrival and departure 
statements at Paris, Jan. 2G 
and 27 (printed in Bulletin 
of Feb. 12). 

*19 1/30 Program for official visit of Prime 
Minister Edward Heath of the 
United Kingdom. 

+20 2/1 U.S. and Iran sign Air Transport 
Agreement (rewrite). 

*21 2/1 Information on U.S. and foreign 
civilians captured in Laos on 
lists presented to U.S. repre- 
sentatives at Paris Feb. 1. 

*22 2/2 Meeting of the Advisory Com- 
mittee of the Foreign Service 
Institute, Feb. 26-27. 

•23 2/1 San Francisco Symphony to tour 
S.R. in June under Depart- 
ment auspices. 

*24 2/2 "Fifth Dimension" to tour Turkey 
and eastern Europe in April 
under Department auspices. 

printed. 
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 2o402 



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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (P/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 






/£/€ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXVIII 



No. 1757 



February 26, 1973 









ilETARY ROGERS REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON PROGRESS 
DER VIET-NAM PEACE AGREEMENT 
Statement Before House (' s 220 

THE STATE OF THE UNION 

the Congress 217 

THE INTERNATIONAL IN TRANSITION 

rt 

and t) ~5 



TUB OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back c 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $3C.2B 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1757 
February 26, 1973 



The Department of State BULLETI, 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
interested agencies of the governm 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations 
on the work of the Department 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selecte 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a. 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department ot 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed^ 






The State of the Union 



Folloioing is the text of the first of a series 
of messages from President Nixon to the 
Congress on the state of the Union, trans- 
mitted on February 2. 

White House press release dated February 2 

Ti> the Congress of the United States: 

The traditional form of the President's an- 
nual report giving "to the Congress Informa- 
tion of the State of the Union" is a single 
message or address. As the affairs and con- 
cerns of our Union have multiplied over the 
years, however, so too have the subjects that 

luire discussion in State of the Union 
[Messages. 

This year in particular, with so many 
changes in Government programs under con- 
sideration — and with our very philosophy 
about the relationship between the individual 
ind the State at an historic crossroads — a 
single, all-embracing State of the Union Mes- 
sage would not appear to be adequate. 

I have therefore decided to present my 
1973 State of the Union report in the form 
)f a series of messages during these early 
iveeks of the 93rd Congress. The purpose of 
:his first message in the series is to give a 
:oncise overview of where we stand as a 
"»eople today, and to outline some of the gen- 
eral goals that I believe we should pursue 
iver the next year and beyond. In coming 
reeks, I will send to the Congress further 
State of the Union reports on specific areas 
)f policy including economic affairs, natural 
resources, human resources, community de- 
velopment and foreign and defense policy. 

The new course these messages will outline 
presents a fresh approach to Government: 

approach that addresses the realties of the 
970s, not those of the 1930s or of the 1960s. 

e role of the Federal Government as we 



approach our third century of independence 
should not be to dominate any facet of Amer- 
ican life, but rather to aid and encourage 
people, communities and institutions to deal 
with as many of the difficulties and 
challenges facing them as possible, and 
to help see to it that every American has a 
full and equal opportunity to realize his or 
her potential. 

If we were to continue to expand the Fed- 
eral Government at the rate of the past sev- 
eral decades, it soon would consume us 
entirely. The time has come when we must 
make clear choices — choices between old pro- 
grams that set worthy goals but failed to 
reach them and new programs that provide a 
better way to realize those goals; and choices, 
too, between competing programs — all of 
which may be desirable in themselves but 
only some of which we can afford with the 
finite resources at our command. 

Because our resources are not infinite, we 
also face a critical choice in 1973 between 
holding the line in Government spending and 
adopting expensive programs which will 
surely force up taxes and refuel inflation. 

Finally, it is vital at this time that we re- 
store a greater sense of responsibility at the 
State and local level, and among individual 
Americans. 

Where We Stand 

The basic state of our Union today is 
sound, and full of promise. 

We enter 1973 economically strong, mili- 
tarily secure and, most important of all. at 
peace after a long and trying war. 

America continues to provide a better and 
more abundant life for more of its people 



^bruary 26, 1973 



217 



than any other nation in the world. 

We have passed through one of the most 
difficult periods in our history without sur- 
rendering to despair and without dishonor- 
ing our ideals as a people. 

Looking back, there is a lesson in all this 
for all of us. The lesson is one that we some- 
times had to learn the hard way over the 
past few years. But we did learn it. That les- 
son is that even potentially destructive forces 
can be converted into positive forces when 
we know how to channel them, and when we 
use common sense and common decency to 
create a climate of mutual respect and good- 
will. . 

By working together and harnessing the 

forces of nature, Americans have unlocked 

some of the great mysteries of the universe. 

Men have walked the surface of the moon 

and soared to new heights of discovery. 

This same spirit of discovery is helping us 
to conquer disease and suffering that have 
plagued our own planet since the dawn of 

time. 

By working together with the leaders ot 
other nations, we have been able to build a 
new hope for lasting peace— for a structure 
of world order in which common interest 
outweighs old animosities, and in which a 
new generation of the human family can 
grow up at peace in a changing world. 
' At home, we have learned that by work- 
ing together we can create prosperity with- 
out fanning inflation; we can restore order 
without weakening freedom. 



The Challenges We Face 

These first years of the 1970s have been 
good years for America. 

Our job— all of us together— is to make 
1973 and the years to come even better ones. 
I believe that' we can. I believe that we can 
make the years leading to our Bicentennial 
the best four years in American history. 

But we must never forget that nothing 
worthwhile can be achieved without the will 
to succeed and the strength to sacrifice. 

Hard decisions must be made, and we must 
stick by them. 

In the field of foreign policy, we must 

218 



- 



remember that a strong America— an Amer- ,| 
ica whose word is believed and whose 
strength is respected— is essential to con- 
tinued peace and understanding in the world. 
The peace with honor we have achieved in 
Vietnam has strengthened this basic Amer- 
ican credibility. We must act in such a way 
in coming years that this credibility will re- 
main intact, and with it, the world stability 
of which it is so indispensable a part. 

At home, we must reject the mistaken 
notion— a notion that has dominated too 
much of the public dialogue for too long- 
that ever bigger Government is the answer 
to every problem. 

We have learned only too well that heavy 
taxation and excessive Government spend- 
ing are not a cure-all. In too many cases, in- 
stead of solving the problems they were 
aimed at, they have merely placed an ever 
heavier burden on the shoulders of the 
American taxpayer, in the form of higher 
taxes and a higher cost of living. At the 
same time they have deceived our people 
because many of the intended beneficiaries 
received far less than was promised, thus 
undermining public faith in the effectiveness, 
of Government as a whole. 

The time has come for us to draw the line. 
The time has come for the responsible lead- 
ers of both political parties to take a stand 
against overgrown Government and for the 
American taxpayer. We are not spending 
the Federal Government's money, we are 
spending the taxpayer's money, and it must 
be spent in a way which guarantees his 
money's worth and yields the fullest possible 
benefit to the people being helped. 

The answer to many of the domestic prob- 
lems we face is not higher taxes and more 
spending. It is less waste, more results and : 
greater freedom for the individual American 
to earn a rightful place in his own com- 
munity—and for States and localities to ad- 
dress their own needs in their own ways, 
in the light of their own priorities. 

By giving the people and their locally 
elected leaders a greater voice through 
changes such as revenue sharing, and by say- 
ino- "no" to excessive Federal spending and 
higher taxes, we can help achieve this goal. 



! 



Department of State Bulletin 






loming Messages 

The policies which I will outline to the 
^ongress in the weeks ahead represent a re- 
iflirmation, not an abdication, of Federal 
•esponsibility. They represent a pragmatic 
■ededication to social compassion and national 
•xcellence, in place of the combination of 
rood intentions and fuzzy follow-through 
vhich too often in the past was thought 
ufficient. 

In the field of economic affairs, our 
•bjeetives will be to hold down taxes, to con- 
inue controlling inflation, to promote eco- 
tomic growth, to increase productivity, to 
ncourage foreign trade, to keep farm in- 
come high, to bolster small business, and to 
•romote better labor-management relations. 

In the area of natural resources, my 
ecommendations will include programs to 
•reserve and enhance the environment, to ad- 
ance science and technology, and to assure 
alanced use of our irreplaceable natural 
esources. 

In developing human resources, I will have 
ecommendations to advance the Nation's 
ealth and education, to improve conditions 
f people in need, to carry forward our in- 
reasingly successful attacks on crime, drug 
buse and injustice, and to deal with such 
nportant areas of special concern as con- 
jmer affairs. We will continue and improve 
ur Nation's efforts to assist those who have 
?rved in the Armed Services in Viet-Nam 
irough better job and training oppor- 
jnities. 

We must do a better job in community 
evelopment — in creating more livable com- 



munities, in which all of our children can 
grow up with fuller access to opportunity 
and greater immunity to the social evils and 
blights which now plague so many of our 
towns and cities. I shall have proposals to 
help us achieve this. 

I shall also deal with our defense and for- 
eign policies, and with our new approaches 
to the role and structure of Government 
itself. 

Considered as a whole, this series of mes- 
sages will be a blueprint for modernizing the 
concept and the functions of American Gov- 
ernment to meet the needs of our people. 

Converting it into reality will require a 
spirit of cooperation and shared commit- 
ment on the part of all branches of the Gov- 
ernment, for the goals we seek are not those 
of any single party or faction, they are goals 
for the betterment of all Americans. As 
President, I recognize that I cannot do this 
job alone. The Congress must help, and I 
pledge to do my part to achieve a construc- 
tive working relationship with the Congress. 
My sincere hope is that the executive and 
legislative branches can work together in 
this great undertaking in a positive spirit 
of mutual respect and cooperation. 

Working together — the Congress, the 
President and the people — I am confident 
that we can translate these proposals into 
an action program that can reform and re- 
vitalize American Government and, even 
more important, build a better life for all 
Americans. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, February J, 1073. 



sbruary 26, 1973 



219 



Secretary Rogers Reports to Congress on Progress 
Under Viet-Nam Peace Agreement 

Statement by Secretary Rogers 1 



I appreciate the opportunity to appear be- 
fore your committee today to discuss the 
situation in Indochina and the implementa- 
tion of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring the Peace in Viet-Nam signed 
in Paris on January 27. 2 This agreement and 
its protocols, as you know, contain provi- 
sions regarding cease-fire, the withdrawal of 
troops, the return of prisoners, and the 
security of South Viet-Nam. It also estab- 
lishes machinery to insure implementation 
of the agreement. My specific purpose in 
coming before you is to report on the prog- 
ress that is being made in carrying out the 
agreement. In the course of my statement, 
I should also like to address some of the 
questions that I know are on your minds 
about the road still to be traveled to insure 
a durable peace in Indochina. 

The Viet-Nam cease-fire formally went 
into effect at midnight, Greenwich time, on 
Saturday, January 27. The fighting did not 
immediately stop all over South Viet-Nam, 
but the expected surge of military activity 
just before the cease-fire and the reactions it 
provoked gradually subsided as the tradi- 
tional Tet holiday approached on February 
3 and has been at a low level since then. 
We anticipate that movement of the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission and Inter- 



1 Made before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on Feb. 8 (press release 27). The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 For text of the agreement and protocols, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169. 



220 



national Commission of Control and Super- 
vision (referred to as the ICCS) teams into 
place should have a further dampening effect 
on the level of military activity. Of course, 
all U.S. military operations in Viet-Nam, 
North and South, were halted on schedule. 

The South Vietnamese people have wel- 
comed the January 27 agreement with sober 
and cautious relief. Although the agreement 
is viewed with reservations and some appre- 
hension, there is growing realization that, 
with continued American support as per- 
mitted in the agreement, the South Viet- 
namese people can face the future with 
confidence. 

A number of organizations and mecha- 
nisms are provided for in the Paris agree- 
ments. I would like to give a brief report 
on the progress that is being made in each 
one. Overall, in these various activities, one 
conspicuous theme stands out: that pre- 
viously irreconcilable parties are in fact 
meeting, are holding useful and productive 
discussions, and are learning how to make 
their new relationships work. 

The Joint Military Commissions 

The Four-Party Joint Military Commis- 
sion consists of the United States, South 
Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam, and the Viet 
Cong, or PRG [Provisional Revolutionary 
Government]. It is the only supervisory 
mechanism on which the United States is 
represented. The Commission is charged 
with coordinating and inspecting the various 
phases of implementation of the agreement 
and also serving as a channel of communica- 






Department of State Bulletin 



tion among the parties. It will deter and de- 
tret violations and help to settle matters of 
contention that may arise. The overall ceil- 
ing for the Commission is 3,300 men, with 
each of the four parties contributing one- 
Fourth o( the total. Four-Party teams will 
be dispersed widely around the country, 
many of them in juxtaposition with ICCS 
groups. The Four-Party Commission also has 
begun to function effectively in resolving 
many of its initial organizational and logistic 
problems and is now sending personnel to 
various prescribed localities around the 
country. 

One bilateral issue between the United 
States and North Viet-Nam in which the 
Four-Party Commission has been helpful 
concerns the sweeping of the mines from 
North Vietnamese harbors and inland water- 
ways. A U.S. military team is now in North 
Viet-Nam discussing practical arrangements 
for beginning that work. U.S. naval units 
are standing by, ready to begin operations 
as soon as arrangements are agreed upon. 

A Two-Tarty Joint Military Commission 
with specific functions set forth in the agree- 
ment is also required, and it will replace 
the Four-Party Commission after 60 days 
from the signing of the basic agreement. 
Although the Two-Party Commission has 
not yet begun to function formally, the GVN 
[Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam] 
and PRO delegations on the Four-Party Com- 
mission are in fact conferring in a two-party 
context. 

The ICCS 

The International Commission consists of 
representatives of Canada, Hungary, Indo- 
nesia, and Poland. It is responsible for con- 
trolling and supervising the implementation 
of the agreement, notably those provisions 
relating to maintenance of the cease-fire, 
the release of prisoners, and prohibition of 
illegal entry into South Viet-Nam of troops 
and armaments. 

The Commission is considerably larger 
than any of its predecessors in Southeast 
Asia. It has a ceiling of 1.160 personnel from 
the four member countries, with the excep- 



tion that this ceiling may be exceeded for 
supervision of the general elections in Viet- 
Nam. In addition to the headquarters in 
Saigon and seven regional teams, there are 
41 teams to be based at localities throughout 
South Viet-Nam where violations of the 
cease-fire were considered most likely to 
occur. This dispersion is also important in 
that the mere presence of a Commission 
team in a locality should tend to discourage 
violations of the agreement in the vicinity of 
that team. There are also additional teams 
provided for supervision and control of the 
return of prisoners, for the legitimate re- 
supply of military equipment, and for such 
other purposes as the Commission may 
determine. 

It is inescapable that no matter how ade- 
quate the equipment or terms of reference, 
the effectiveness of the International Com- 
mission in Viet-Nam will depend ultimately 
upon the willingness of the four member 
countries to cooperate among themselves and 
with the parties to the agreement to help 
insure that violations of the agreement are 
reduced to a minimum. To date we under- 
stand that questions which have arisen 
within the Commission have been dealt with 
in a businesslike and objective manner. 

Given the complexities of the situation in 
Viet-Nam, no one would expect that the 
agreement could be implemented instantly, 
without any violations occurring. However, 
the International Commission constitutes an 
important assurance that violations that oc- 
cur do not, through tolerance, become larger 
violations and that the fabric of the agree- 
ment will prove a resilient framework within 
which the processes of disengagement, with- 
drawal, and national reconciliation can occur. 

National Council of Reconciliation 

The agreement also calls for the forma- 
tion of a National Council of National Rec- 
onciliation and Concord, about which there 
has been so much speculation. Let me assure 
you this is not a coalition government in 
disguise, nor do we think it will be a fruit- 
less or futile exercise. It will be what the 
parties mainly concerned — the GVN and the 



February 26, 1973 



221 



PRG — jointly want it to be, and it could be- 
come an important forum of communication 
and consultation and an instrumentality to 
implement the principles set forth in the 
agreement. President Thieu had his repre- 
sentative in Paris initiate bilateral contact 
with the PRG, and the two parties have now 
held two sessions at the Majestic Hotel. 

The International Conference 

No amount of supervision can assure peace 
unless the Vietnamese adversaries are them- 
selves determined to make it work. How- 
ever, other nations, and particularly the 
major powers, have a responsibility to do 
their part, too. 

That is why we have made provision in 
the basic peace agreement for the holding 
of an international conference later this 
month at the foreign ministers level. It is 
scheduled to open on February 26. We and 
the North Vietnamese have proposed Paris 
as the site of the conference. In addition to 
the United States, the conference will include 
the other Vietnamese parties to the agree- 
ment, the four nations in the international 
supervisory commission, the other permanent 
members of the United Nations Security 
Council, and the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. This broad composition is 
significant, for it brings together the bellig- 
erents with other nations and parties — in- 
cluding those who have been Hanoi's princi- 
pal allies and suppliers — who have been less 
directly involved in the conflict but who have 
the capability of making meaningful contri- 
butions to assuring future peace and stability 
in Southeast Asia. Their agreement to par- 
ticipate in the conference will constitute a 
significant first step toward a collective in- 
ternational underwriting of the cease-fire 
to help make it endure and to promote the 
transition to lasting peace. 

Article 19 of the agreement stipulates an 
international conference will be convened "to 
acknowledge the signed agreements ; to 
guarantee the ending of the war, the main- 
tenance of peace in Viet-Nam, the respect of 
the Vietnamese people's fundamental na- 
tional rights, and the South Vietnamese peo- 



ple's right to self-determination ; and to 
contribute to and guarantee peace in Indo- 
china." 

It is our intention to utilize the conference 
to give concrete meaning to these objectives. 
We believe other nations should pledge to 
observe and give their support to the provi- 
sions of the peace agreement, not only in 
Viet-Nam, but as it relates to Laos and Cam- 
bodia as well. We would also hope that spe- 
cific steps can be taken by the conference to 
create some form of continuing relationship 
between the conference members and the in- 
ternational supervisory organization in Viet- 
Nam, thereby lending in a concrete way the 
collective international weight of the confer- 
ence members to the peacekeeping process. 
And we would hope that the conference will 
be able to contribute, at least in an initial 
way, to the development of momentum to- 
ward an international cooperative effort in 
postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction in 
that part of the world. 

That, then, is the array of peacekeeping 
and consultative mechanisms concerning 
Viet-Nam called for in the agreement and 
where they stand at the moment. From this 
brief description of developments over the 
past two weeks we can already see that the 
Vietnamese parties as well as others involved 
are working together to carry out the agree- 
ment. To summarize: The widespread killing 
has been stopped; the level of military ac- 
tivity has declined substantially from the first 
clays of the cease-fire; the ICCS has placed 
teams at seven key locations; after under- 
standable initial difficulties, the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission is now function- 
ing and is meeting with the ICCS ; and direct 
talks between the South Vietnamese parties 
are now underway in Paris. Of course there 
are many remaining problems to be worked 
out, but so far developments certainly sup- 
port our expectations that the agreement 
will work, that the South Vietnamese peo- 
ple have a reasonable chance to sort out their 
own political destiny, and that peace with 
honor is being achieved. The United States, 
for its part, will do all it can to insure that 
this process will continue to build mo- 
mentum. 



222 



Department of State Bulletin 



Laos and Cambodia 

Let me shift now to the other two coun- 
tries of Indochina. 

In article 20 of the agreement, regarding' 
Laos and Cambodia, the signatories agree 
to respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agree- 
ments, which recognized the fundamental 
national rights of the Lao and Cambodians 
and to refrain from using Laos and Cam- 
bodia as a base of operations against each 
other or against other countries. Provisions 
of this article also call on foreign countries 
to stop military activity in and withdraw 
troops from Laos and Cambodia, stipulate 
that the two countries should be left to 
resolve their own internal problems, and 
call for settlement of problems among the 
Indochinese countries on the basis of mutual 
respect and noninterference. 

With regard to Laos, it is our firm expec- 
tation that within a short period of time 
there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos and 
withdrawal of all foreign forces. At the 
moment the two Laotian sides are negotiat- 
ing in Vientiane in an effort to work out the 
terms of the cease-fire. Meanwhile the fight- 
ing goes on as a result of major Communist 
attempts to gain control over as much terri- 
tory as possible. Until a cease-fire is reached 
we for our part will continue to give support 
to the Royal Lao Government in response 
to its requests. We believe that failure to do 
so would compromise the efforts to reach 
a cease-fire agreement. 

In Cambodia, President Lon Nol declared 
a unilateral cessation of hostilities on Jan- 
uary 28, reserving only the right of self- 
defense, and there has been a considerable 
lessening of military activity. Also there are 
signs that certain elements of the Khmer in- 
surgents are reconsidering their heretofore 
intransigent attitude toward the Cambodian 
Government, as well as signs that the North 
Vietnamese are less involved in combat oper- 
ations. In response to its requests we con- 
tinue to support the Cambodian Government 
with both military and economic assistance. 
The supply of military equipment remains 
at a modest scale. U.S. air support is in line 
with President Lon Nol's declared policy to 



cease offensive operations while reserving 
the right of self-defense. 



Prisoners of War 

One of the major goals of our Viet-Nam 
policy has been the return of our prisoners of 
war and the fullest possible accounting for 
those who are missing. I am profoundly re- 
lieved, as all America must be, that the way 
to achieve these goals has been set forth in 
the January 27 agreement and that within 
the next few days the first of our prisoners 
will be coming home. 

In Paris, the other side has turned over 
to us lists of 562 U.S. military and 24 U.S. 
civilian personnel who are currently being 
held captive and who will be released within 
the 60-day period following the signing of 
the Paris agreement. The specific details of 
how and when these prisoners will be released 
are currently being worked out by the Joint 
Military Commission of the four parties in 
Saigon. These arrangements will include the 
visit of prisoner of war camps by designated 
national Red Cross societies. For our part, 
we have prepared a carefully detailed pro- 
gram — this is called Operation Homecoming 
— to receive our prisoners initially at Clark 
Air Force Base in the Philippines and help 
them prepare to return to their families. 
These men will be given every conceivable 
assistance that we can offer to ease their 
readjustment after their long absence from 
home. 

Our happiness over the prospective return 
of almost 600 of our prisoners, however, is 
tempered by our sad realization that many 
will not come back. The lists received in Paris 
record 76 American soldiers and civilians as 
having died in captivity. As you know, we 
do not regard the Lao list as complete. There 
are also some questions requiring clarifica- 
tion on the other lists. In addition, some 1,300 
names of missing Americans do not appear 
on these lists, and we share the sorrow of 
those families of missing men of whom no 
news has been received. We will continue 
to press ahead with all efforts to obtain the 
fullest possible information on these cases. 



February 26, 1973 



223 



Progress has been the keynote of my re- 
marks to you today. While noting this prog- 
ress, however, we would be remiss not to 
keep in mind that the agreement of January 
27 and the two weeks of development since 
then constitute only the first steps toward 
building peace in Indochina. Leaving as it 
did basic political questions in Viet-Nam still 
to be resolved, the agreement provides the 
Vietnamese with viable prospects for peace 
and guarantees their right freely to deter- 
mine their own future. But the challenge 
of finding lasting solutions to the problems 
of Viet-Nam still lies ahead. In addition to 
the massive and complex economic and 
political problems in Viet-Nam which must 
be resolved, we must also realize that the 
conflicts in Laos and Cambodia must be 
ended. We believe that this will be accom- 
plished. 

It is less than a year since President Nixon 
went to Peking and Moscow. Looking back, 
we can see how important those initiatives 
were in giving substance to the concept of 
dialogue in international affairs. It serves 
no purpose to attempt to define just what 
bearing the President's initiatives had on 
the process which culminated in the Viet- 
Nam agreement. There is little doubt, how- 
ever, that they did have a bearing. It is our 
hope that the cooperative efforts of world 
powers, especially those countries which have 
been Hanoi's principal allies and suppliers, 
will provide the supplementary inducements 
necessary for lasting peace in Indochina. This 
agreement has received worldwide approval, 
and we hope this will be translated into co- 
operative international action to further con- 



ditions of peace and progress in Southeast 
Asia. 

We believe we are on the road to a lasting 
settlement in Indochina. Peace there can pro- 
vide a steppingstone to security and stability 
in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. 
But we must see the job through. I therefore 
urge this Congress to give the President the 
support he will need in the months ahead 
in building the structure for peace which 
he has pursued with such dedication and 
success. 



Visit to People's Republic of China 
by Dr. Kissinger 

Joint Announcement 1 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 5 

In accordance with the United States and 
People's Republic of China Joint Communi- 
que of February 1972, Dr. Henry A. Kissin- 
ger, Assistant to the United States President 
for National Security Affairs, will visit the 
People's Republic of China from February 
15 to 19, 1973, for concrete consultations 
with Chinese leaders to further the normali- 
zation of relations between the People's Re- 
public of China and the United States and 
continue to exchange views on issues of 
common interest. 



1 Issued simultaneously at Washington and Pe- 
king on Feb. 3; read to news correspondents that 
day by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to Presi- 
dent Nixon. 



224 



Department of State Bulletin 



The International Economic System in Transition 



ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (EXCERPTS) 



Following is an excerpt from the Economic 
Report of the President, together with the 
full te.rt of chapter 5, "The International 
omic System in Transition," of the 
Annual Report of the Council of Economic 
Advisers. 1 



ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Nowhere is the need to make 1973 a year 
of economic reform more apparent than in 
our international relations. Our actions of 
August 15. 1971, put the world on the path 
of negotiation for improvement of the inter- 
national economy.- Last year we made 
proposals for the reform of the international 
financial system, and these proposals are now 
the subject of discussion by high-level 
officials of the member countries of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. This year we expect 
to enter negotiations on the subject of trade. 

We want the American people to be able 
to buy those foreign goods and services that 
are better, cheaper, or more interesting than 
our own. That raises the American standard 
of living. We want our people to be able to 



1 Economic Report of the President, Tranam 
' Congress j muary 1973, Together With the 
<d Report of tlie Council of Economic Adr 
risers (H. Doc. 93-28, 93d Cong., 2d sess., trans- 
mitted on Jan. 31); for sale by the Superintendent 
of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402 (301 pp.; $2, 

'For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 6, 1971, 
p. 253. 



invest abroad when that is the most profit- 
able thing to do. But we also want the 
American people to be able to pay for these 
purchases and investments in the way that 
is best for us. That means, first, that we must 
be able to pay by selling abroad the things 
that we produce best, and selling them on the 
best terms that we can freely obtain. Second, 
it means that we must be able to pay in a 
way that is sustainable so that we are not 
confronted with the need for sudden and 
possibly painful adjustments. 

Existing arrangements are not favorable 
to us in either respect. We have been buying 
from abroad in rapidly increasing amounts, 
and that has helped the American people. 
But our exports, with which we seek to pay 
for these imports, have been subject to high 
barriers, particularly in the case of our 
agricultural products. We have not been able 
to sell enough to pay for our overseas ex- 
penditures, and so we have had to pay by 
incurring more and more short-term debts 
abroad. This is not a situation that can go 
on indefinitely; its sudden ending could be 
disruptive. Therefore we want to bring about 
those reforms that will permit us to earn 
our way. 

Our proposals have been, and will be, put 
forth in the U.S. national interest. But this 
is not contrary to the interest of other 
countries. International competition is shift- 
ing from the military and political arenas 
to the economic. This is a great advantage, 
because in economic competition every 
participant can win — -there need be no losers. 



February 26, 1973 



225 



The effort of each nation to produce and sell 
what it can do most efficiently will benefit 
others. This is the fundamental belief under- 
lying our proposals for reform and the 
fundamental reason for thinking that a 
satisfactory agreement will be reached. 

% % % ^ ^ 

The general prediction is that 1973 will be 
another very good year for the American 
economy. I believe that it can be a great 
year. It can be a year in which we reduce 
unemployment and inflation further and 
enter into a sustained period of strong 
growth, full employment, and price stability. 
But 1973 will be a great year only if we 
manage our fiscal affairs prudently and do 
not exceed the increases in Federal expendi- 
tures that I have proposed. This is the 
practical lesson of the experience from 1965 
to 1968, when loose fiscal policy turned a 
healthy expansion into a feverish boom fol- 
lowed by a recession. I am determined to 
live by this lesson. And I urgently appeal to 
the Congress to join me in doing so. 

Richard Nixon. 
Januarxj 31, 1973. 



the major currencies to relieve the existing dis- 
equilibrium in international payments. For the long 
term, they agreed to enter into multilateral negotia- 
tions on reform of the international economic 
system. 

The overall balance-of-payments position of the 
United States, while still far from equilibrium, 
began to improve in 1972. The improvement, which 
was all in the capital account was largely the 
result of a sharp reduction over 1971 in speculative 
outflows of capital. Domestic economic policies 
which curtailed the rate of inflation, the realign- 
ment of exchange rates, and renewed confidence in 
international monetary relationships all contributed 
to this improvement. The trade and current account 
deficits of the United States, however, were consid- 
erably larger in 1972 than in 1971, although they 
levelled off during the year. The year-over-year 
deterioration in these accounts stemmed primarily 
from the rapid growth of the U.S. economy and a 
lag in the economic recovery of some of the other 
major countries. 

Progress was also made during 1972 on the 
longer-term reform objective. Agreement was 
reached on a format for international monetary 
negotiations. Discussions on the characteristics of a 
revised international monetary system are now 
underway, and the United States has set forth a 
number of proposals. The major industrialized coun- 
tries have also agreed to initiate multilateral trade 
negotiations in the fall of 1973. Finally, these same 
countries have agreed to explore new forms of co- 
operation on internal policies which affect trade 
and investment among nations. 



REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
ADVISERS 

Chapter 5 — The International Economic System 
in Transition 

The international economic policy of the United 
States had two major objectives in 1972. One was 
to improve the U.S. balance of payments, which had 
reached a record deficit of nearly $30 billion in 1971. 
The other was to make progress on reform of the 
international economic system, affecting monetary, 
trade, and investment relationships. The existing 
system has been unable to cope with shifting pat- 
terns of trade and imbalances in international pay- 
ments which have resulted in repeated international 
economic and political tensions. 

The groundwork for progress on both fronts had 
been laid in December of 1971 when the world's ma- 
jor industrialized countries met at the Smithsonian 
Institution;' For the short term, the participants 
agreed on a realignment of exchange rates among 



1 For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1972, 
p. 32. 



The U.S. Balance of Payments in 1972 

As this Report goes to press, official data for the 
U.S. balance of payments are available only for the 
first 3 quarters of 1972. These figures, shown in 
Table 29, indicate that, at annual rates, Americans 
imported $76.2 billion in goods and services during 
the first 9 months of 1972, while foreigners pur- 
chased $71.2 billion in U.S. goods and services. On 
balance, therefore, Americans obtained $4.9 billion 
more goods and services abroad than they provided 
to the rest of the world. In addition, U.S. Govern- 
ment grants and other types of unilateral transfers 
to foreigners exceeded similar transfers to the 
United States by $3.7 billion, and U.S. investments 
in long-term assets abroad exceeded foreign invest- 
ments in U.S. long-term assets by $1.6 billion. 
Moreover, recorded short-term capital movements, 
nonrecorded transactions, and allocations of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR's) together resulted in a net 
outflow of $1.4 billion. Overall, therefore, American 
balance-of-payments expenditures exceeded receipts 
by $11.6 billion. Virtually the whole deficit in the 
U.S. balance of payments on the official reserve 
transactions basis was financed by increased dollar 
holdings of foreign central banks. 



226 



Department of State Bulletin 



Table 29. — I'.s. balance-of-payments transactions, 1971-72 

[Billions of dollars] 



Type of transaction 


1971 


1972 first 3 quarte 


rs 1 


Receipts 


Payments 


Balance 


Receipts 


Payments 


Balance 


Goods' . . 


42.8 

23.4 
1.9 

12.9 
8.5 


45.5 

19.9 

4.8 

4.9 

10.2 


-2.7 

3.4 
-2.9 

8.0 
-1.7 


47.4 

23.8 
1.2 

13.1 
9.6 


54.4 

21.8 
4.7 
5.7 

11.3 


7.0 


Services . 


2.1 


Military transactions 

Investment income 3 .. 
Other --. . -. ... 


-3.6 

7.4 

-1.8 


GOODS AND SERVICES 


66.1 


65.4 


.7 


71.2 


76.2 


-4.9 


Unilateral transfers, net ' 




3.6 
69.0 


-3.6 
-2.8 




3.7 
79.9 


-3.7 


CURRENT ACCOUNT 


66.1 


71.2 


-8.7 


Long-term capital 

U.S. Government 5 

Direct investment 

Other private . 


1.8 
-.5 
-.1 

2.3 


8.2 
1.9 
4.8 
1.6 


-6.5 

-2.4 

-4.8 

.8 


5.1 
.3 
.3 

4.4 


6.7 
1.3 
3.3 
2.1 


-1.6 

-1.0 

-3.0 

2.4 


CURRENT ACCOUNT AND LONG- 
TERM CAPITAL ... . 


67.9 


77.2 


-9.3 


76.3 


86.6 


-10.2 


Short-term nonliquid capital . 


C) 


2.4 


-2.4 


.1 


.7 


-.6 


Short-term liquid capital 


-6.7 


1.1 


-7.8 


2.9 


1.4 


1.5 


Errors and unrecorded trans- 
actions, net __ 




11.0 


-11.0 

.7 

'-29.8 




3.0 


-3.0 


Allocations of SDR's 


.7 
61.9 


.7 
80.0 


.7 


TOTAL 


91.7 


91.7 


'-11.6 



1 Seasonally adjusted annual rates. 

3 Excludes transfers under military grants. 

3 Includes direct investment fees and royalties. 

1 Excludes military grants of goods and services. 

'" Excludes official reserve transactions and in- 
cludes transactions in some short-term U.S. Govern- 
ment assets. 



" Less than $0.05 billion. 

7 Equals official reserve transactions balance. 

Note. — Detail may not add to totals because of 
rounding. 

Source: Department of Commerce. 



THE GOODS-AND-SERVICES ACCOUNT IN 1972 

For the goods-and-services account, preliminary 
estimates are available for the full year 1972. These 
figures differ slightly from those in Table 29, which 
are annual rates based on data for the first 3 
quarters. These preliminary estimates indicate that 
the United States imported abou- 11 ion more 

goods and services than it exported. U.S. imports 
of goods exceeded exports by about $7 billion in 
1972, while exports of services exceeded imports by 
about %ZVz billion. These figures represent a sub- 
stantial deterioration in the goods-and-services ac- 
count from the full year 1971. 

On a quarterly basis, net imports increased from 
$1.2 billion in the first quarter of 1972 to $1.6 billion 
in the second quarter and then declined to $900 
million in the third quarter and remained at about 
the same level in the fourth. When exports and im- 
ports are calculated in volume terms by adjusting 



for price changes, the quarterly decline in net im- 
ports begins somewhat sooner (in the first quarter 
rather than the second) and is more marked over 
the course of the year. 

The figures just cited give early indications that 
the dollar devaluation, reinforced by a lower rate 
of inflation in the United States than in other major 
industrialized countries in 1972, is beginning to 
affect U.S. exports and imports. The fact remains, 
however, that the U.S. trade deficit was much larger 
in 1972 than had been expected after the realign- 
ment of exchange rates. Cyclical developments in the 
United States and abroad were a major reason for 
this disappointment. Nominal gross national product 
(GNP) in the United States grew by nearly 10 
percent in 1972, compared to 7% percent in 1971 
and '■> percent in 1970. Thus while changes in rela- 
tive prices reduced the attractiveness of foreign 
goods compared to domestic goods, the level of im- 
ports continued to increase with the rapid rise in 



February 26, 1973 



227 



Chart 11 



Movement of European Community 
Exchange Rate? 



PERCENT DEVIATION 
FROM SMITHSONIAN RATES 
4 00 



STRONGEST EC CURRENCY 
_ / 




I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I A I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC 
1972 



* Sterling crisis. 

Note : Data relate to Friday rates in the exchange 
markets of countries belonging to the European Eco- 
nomic Community (EC). 



Source : Treasury Department. 



the overall demand for goods in the U.S. economy. 
At the same time, a number of major industrial 
countries experienced lower than normal rates of 
growth in 1972, which tended to hold down the in- 
crease in their demand for U.S. goods. 

Apart from the effects of these cyclical develop- 
ments, the response to any devaluation is generally 
delayed. First, it takes some time before a devalua- 
tion is reflected in the relative prices obtained by 
exporters and paid by importers. In the short run, 
to protect their market shares, foreign exporters 
frequently do not increase their list price in the 
U.S. market by the full amount of devaluation. Con- 
versely, foreign importers frequently do not reduce 
their list price of U.S. goods in the foreign market 
by the full amount of the devaluation. 

Second, when the change in relative prices does 
occur, its initial impact is likely to be perverse 
because a devaluation raises the dollar prices of 
imported goods and services before the volume of 
exports and imports responds to the changes in rela- 
tive prices. In time, the effect of devaluation on 
real trade flows is expected to outweigh the change 
in prices. It is because of this sequence of events 
that one expects the trade balance of a devaluing 
country to improve in real or volume terms before 
it improves in value terms, which is what happened 
in 1972. 

In the case of the United States, the trade deficit 
in 1972 was also affected by long-run changes in 



the demand for basic materials. In particular, do- 
mestic production of fuels has not kept pace with 
the growth of the U.S. economy, and consequently 
net imports of fuels increased from $1.7 billion in 
the first 10 months of 1971 to $2.6 billion in the 
first 10 months of 1972. Although U.S. exports of 
agricultural products have also expanded rapidly, 
they have not fully offset this increased demand for 
fuels. On balance, long-term changes in trade pat- 
terns have tended to make the elimination of the 
U.S. balance-of-payments deficit more difficult. 

THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT IN 1972 

Returning to the balance-of-payments figures in 
Table 29, the net outflow of capital from the United 
States fell from $27.7 billion in 1971 to an annual 
rate of $3.7 billion in the first 3 quarters of 1972. 
This sharp reduction was due to several factors. 

First, the realignment of exchange rates, and the 
preservation of international monetary cooperation 
among the major countries, reestablished confidence 
in international monetary relationships. Investors 
had less incentive to hedge against the risk of a 
change in exchange rates or the imposition of new 
restraints on capital transfers, and some investors 
were induced to bring back funds transferred 
abroad in 1971 for hedging purposes. 

Second, a tightening of credit conditions in the 
United States relative to some major European 
countries led to a reversal in the flow of interest- 
sensitive funds. In line with this trend, foreign 
banks placed liquid funds in the U.S. money market. 

Third, the rapid expansion of the U.S. economy 
created improved investment opportunities in the 
United States, and sluggish rates of growth in a 
number of major foreign countries reduced incen- 
tives for U.S. investment in these countries. In par- 
ticular, the improved economic prospects in the 
United States made purchases of U.S. stocks more 
attractive to foreigners. 

These factors affected both short-term capital 
movements, which recorded a net inflow of $0.9 
billion at an annual rate in the first 3 quarters of 
1972 compared to a net outflow of $10.2 billion in 
1971, and long-term capital flows, which recorded 
net outflows of $1.6 billion at an annual rate in the 
first 3 quarters of 1972 compared to $6.5 billion in 
1971. 

FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN 1972 

When the supply of a currency exceeds the de- 
mand its value tends to drop in foreign exchange 
markets, and when the demand exceeds the supply 
its value rises. In order to hold currency values in 
the foreign exchange market within certain limits, 
governments other than the United States have fol- 
lowed the practice of entering the market as buyers 
or sellers of their own currency whenever its value 
in terms of U.S. dollars falls or rises beyond a 



228 



Department of State Bulletin 



TABLE 30. — Percent deviations of major foreign currencies from central rates, 
December 1971-Deeember 1972 

(Currency units per U.S. dollar 1 ] 





Central 
rate 


Deviation of currency at end of period from central rate 


Currency 


December 
1971 


1972 




Feb- 
ruary 


April 


June 


August 


October 


De- 
cember 


British pound 


2.60571 

44.8159 

3.84 

3.2225 

5.1157 

581.5 

3.2447 

308.0 


-2.1 
.4 
-2.0 
-1.5 
-2.1 
-2.1 
-.3 

(•) 

-2.2 


0.0 

2.2 
-.8 

1.1 

.9 

-.9 

2.1 
-.2 

1.2 


0.2 

1.5 

-.6 

1.3 

1.6 

-.4 

.8 

.9 

1.0 


-6.2 
2.2 
2.5 
2.0 
2.2 
.2 
2.2 
1.7 
2.2 


-6.0 
2.0 
1.6 
1.0 
2.2 
.1 
.5 
1.8 
2.2 


-10.5 

1.6 

1.1 

.6 

1.6 

-.6 

.5 

1.8 

2.2 


-10.0 
1 7 


Belgian franc . . . 


Swiss franc 


1.9 
.7 
I 


West German mark 

French franc ._ 


Italian lira 


2 


Netherlands guilder 

Canadian dollar 3 

Japanese ven _ 


.6 

.5 

2 2 







1 British pound and Canadian dollar are expressed 
in U.S. dollars per unit of currency. Percent devia- 
tions are based on mid-day selling rates in London. 

2 Measured by deviation from 1-to-l relationship 



between U.S. dollar and Canadian dollar. 
3 Less than 0.05. 

Source: Treasury Department. 



certain range. On the basis of the Smithsonian 
Agreement that range was established as a maxi- 
mum deviation of plus or minus 2Y* percent from 
the announced parity or central rate of that cur- 
rency vis-a-vis the dollar; a total of 4% percent. 

Movements in the exchange rate between the 
dollar and the major foreign currencies can be seen 
in Table 30. Chart 11 shows the movements of the 
currencies of the European Community (EC). The 
EC countries have agreed to keep their currencies 
within a maximum range of 2V* percent of each 
other, which is half the maximum spread allowed 
between any two currencies other than the dollar by 
the Smithsonian Agreement. This narrowed intra- 
European band of fluctuation is generally known as 
the "EC snake in the Smithsonian tunnel." 

Changes in reserves of the major countries, as 
well as changes in U.S. liabilities to all foreign 
central banks, are shown in Table 31. Changes in 
reserve holdings of foreign central banks reflect 
primarily their intervention in the foreign exchange 
market to keep the value of their currencies within 
the agreed margins. Changes in U.S. liabilities to for- 
eign central banks show the extent to which foreign 
central banks have acquired claims against the 
United States as a result of intervention in the for- 
eign exchange market. 

The dollar was under downward pressure and, 
conversely, most other currencies were under up- 
ward pressure, at the beginning of the year, before 
Smithsonian rates had become fully established, 
and during the summer, when a loss of confidence 



in the established value of the pound sterling raised 
questions about the whole Smithsonian structure 
of exchange rates. During the spring and the latter 
part of the year, the dollar strengthened relative to 
most other currencies. These movements in the value 
of the dollar reflected primarily changes in the de- 
gree of confidence in existing exchange rates. 
Changes in credit market conditions in the United 
States relative to those abroad also played a role. 

Two major currencies did not follow the general 
pattern described above, the British pound and the 
Japanese yen. The pound sterling came under con- 
siderable downward pressure toward the end of 
June, when a number of factors created considerable 
doubt regarding the long-term viability of the Brit- 
ish exchange rate established at the Smithsonian. 
After losing a considerable amount of foreign ex- 
change in preventing the pound from dropping below 
the Smithsonian floor, the British authorities al- 
lowed the pound to float downward in response to 
market pressures. Over the next 6 months the pound 
dropped 10 percent below the rate set at the 
Smithsonian. 

The Japanese yen has been under upward pressure 
since the end of June, reflecting the sizable sur- 
plus in the Japanese balance of payments. Through- 
out the second half of the year, the Japanese 
authorities were required to purchase large amounts 
of dollars in the foreign exchange market to keep 
the value of the yen from rising above the Smith- 
sonian ceiling. During this period, forward yen 
rates remained substantially above the Smithsonian 



February 26, 1973 



229 



Table 31. — Changes in official reserves for selected 

countries and changes in U.S. liabilities to foreign. 

official reserve holders, 1972 





1972 changes (billions of dollars) 1 


Country 












First 


Second 


Third 




Total 2 


quarter 3 


quarter* 


quarter 


Total official re- 










serve for coun- 










tries below 


8.5 


4.1 


0.4 


3.9 


Belgium 


.6 


.2 


.2 


.2 


Canada 


.5 


.2 


.3 


( 6 ) 


France 


1.8 


.2 


.9 


.6 


Italy ___ 


-.4 


-.1 


-.2 


n 


Japan 


1.1 


1.3 


-.8 


.6 


Nether- 










lands 


1.1 


.6 


( 5 ) 


.5 


Sweden 


.3 


2 


.1 


( 6 ) 


Switzerland _ 


.4 


-.2 


.3 


.4 


United 










Kingdom _ 


-2.7 


.4 


3.2 


( 6 ) 


West 










Germany _ 


5.8 


1.4 


2.9 


1.5 


U.S. liabilities to 










foreign official 










reserve holders 


9.4 


3.2 


.8 


5.4 



1 Quarterly changes are based on data for end of 
quarters. 

2 Total change for first 3 quarters. 

3 Total official reserves in the first quarter include 
1972 SDR allocations of $1.2 billion. 

4 Second quarter data have been adjusted to reflect 
sterling outflows which were not recorded until the 
third quarter. 

"' Less than $0.05 billion. 

Note. — Detail may not add to totals because of 
rounding. 

Source: International Monetary Fund. 



ceiling, reflecting market uncertainty over the exist- 
ing yen parity. 

The renewed confidence in existing exchange rates 
in the latter part of 1972, with the two exceptions 
just described, had several causes. One was that 
the determination of governments to support the 
Smithsonian rates was reaffirmed in July by a 
number of major governments. U.S. intervention 
in the exchange markets on a limited basis, and the 
stated willingness of the United States to take such 
action when it was desirable as a means of dealing 
with speculative pressures, were important symbols 
of cooperative support for the Smithsonian Agree- 
ment. The fact that the U.S. price performance in 



1972 was better than that of any of its major part- 
ner countries, despite our rapid expansion, also con- 
tributed to the improvement in confidence during the 
second half of the year. 



Reforming the International Economic System 

Changes are required in monetary arrangements, 
in trading arrangements and in procedures for deal- 
ing with policies usually considered to be "domestic" 
but having a significant impact on international 
transactions. The United States has strongly empha- 
sized not only that reform is needed in all three 
of these areas but also that the reforms in all three 
must be considered as part of a single package, since 
policies adopted in one field may complement or con- 
flict with policies in the others. However, thinking 
is now farthest advanced with respect to monetary 
reform and we devote most of this chapter to it. 

The President has also taken steps to improve 
the handling of international economic issues within 
the U.S. Government, to take better account of the 
close interconnections of all aspects of international 
economic policy with each other and with domestic 
policy. The recently created Council on Economic 
Policy will provide a framework for the unified con- 
sideration of domestic and international economic 
issues. The Council on International Economic Policy 
(CIEP) continues to have responsibilities for for- 
eign economic policy within the framework of the 
Council on Economic Policy, and the director of 
CIEP is a member of the latter group. Other steps 
to improve the handling of the economic aspects of 
foreign relations include the appointment of a 
higher ranking official to be responsible for economic 
policy in the State Department and the develop- 
ment of more effective procedures for the National 
Advisory Council on International Monetary and 
Financial Policies, the body which coordinates the 
foreign lending policies and activities of the U.S. 
Government. 

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 

The suspension of the convertibility of the dollar 
into gold on August 15, 1971, gave public recogni- 
tion to the fact that the postwar international 
monetary arrangements, known as the Bretton 
Woods system, had become untenable. Interim ar- 
rangements, including the negotiation of a multi- 
lateral realignment of exchange rates at the 
Smithsonian Institution in December 1971, have been 
developed, but they do not provide a long-term solu- 
tion to the problems which made changes in the rules 
of the Bretton Woods system inevitable. The ar- 
rangements have greatly facilitated the maintenance 
of normal international commercial and invest- 
ment relationships, but they do not constitute an 
adequate system of rules for the international 
monetary system in the long run. 



230 



Department of State Bulletin 



A stable international monetary system must 
I meet several major requirements if it is to serve 
as the basis for the continued expansion of world 
trade and investment. First, it should be market- 
oriented. For the sake of both efficiency and equity, 
the mechanism for balancing each country's total 
foreign exchange receipts and payments over the 
long run should function in such a way as to mini- 
mize interference with individual market trans- 
actions. Second, the settlement of payments balances 
among countries should be multilateral, so that every 
country can offset its deficits with some countries 
by means of surpluses with others. To fulfill this 
condition, the system must provide for the ultimate 
settlement of claims in terms of commonly accepted 
reserve assets. Such a generalized payments system 
makes possible a far higher level of international 
trade and investment transactions than . would be 
feasible if each country had to balance its payments 
bilaterally with every other country in a network 
of barter relationships. Third, the system should 
be stable. International commerce frequently entails 
long-run commitments and hence requires stable 
expectations about conditions affecting the future 
profitability of international transactions. 

In order to meet these requirements the inter- 
national monetary system must fulfill certain spe- 
cific functions. It must provide an effective and 
equitable mechanism for adjustment of payments 
imbalances among countries, so that external pay- 
ments imbalances are not allowed to persist and 
accumulate. It must also provide international mone- 
tary reserves in adequate amounts and in forms 
acceptable to the participants in the system, i.e., 
international liquidity has to be adequate. If the 
system permits the creation of too much inter- 
national money, international inflationary pressures 
will be created; if too little international money 
is created, deflationary pressure or pressures for 
restrictions on international transactions will re- 
sult. Finally, the system must operate in such a 
way as to create and maintain confidence in its 
continued viability and in the value of the inter- 
national reserve assets associated with it. 

Characteristics of the Bretton Woods System 

The Articles of Agreement which established the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the imme- 
diate postwar period reflected a heavy emphasis 
on the need for stability and confidence in the in- 
ternational monetary system. The rules embodied in 
the Articles dealt primarily with such questions as 
the conditions under which governments could 
change their exchange rates, or borrow from the 
Fund to cover deficits, or impose exchange restric- 
tions. The primary objective was to prevent arbi- 
trary actions by governments in these areas, and 
in meeting this objective the Articles were highly 
successful. 



Under the Articles of Agreement, governments 
were obligated to support their exchange rates at 
agreed parity levels in either of two ways — by buy- 
ing or selling their own currency in the foreign 
exchange market whenever the rate rose 1 percent 
above or fell 1 percent below parity, or by making 
their currency convertible into gold or other reserve 
assets at the request of a foreign official institu- 
tion. In practice, all countries but the United States 
have suported their currencies by buying or selling 
them for dollars, while the United States has main- 
tained the convertibility of dollars into gold or 
other reserve assets tied to gold. 

The rules permitted changes in a country's parity 
when its balance of payments was in fundamental 
disequilibrium. In practice the parities were changed 
only infrequently, generally after a prolonged period 
of disequilibrium in external payments. There was 
also a widespread belief that, because of the impor- 
tance of the United States in world trade and the 
central role of the dollar in the international mone- 
tary system, the United States could not change its 
exchange rate. In any case, since most other coun- 
tries were pegging their rates to the dollar in the 
foreign exchange market, the United States could 
not be certain that a change in the price of gold 
would actually result in a change in the value of the 
dollar in terms of foreign currencies. 

The Articles of Agreement did not address them- 
selves explicitly to the question of liquidity. The ex- 
pectation was that, as in the past, newly mined gold 
would provide the major source of new official re- 
serves. It was also implicitly assumed that coun- 
tries would hold certain currencies as additional 
reserves. There were no arrangements, however, for 
reviewing or influencing the growth of liquidity. 
The growth of reserves was thus dependent on the 
vagaries of gold markets and on deficits in the bal- 
ance of payments of reserve currency countries. In 
practice, the U.S. deficits provided the bulk of new 
reserves for the rest of the world. 

The inadequacies of the system with respect to 
the process of liquidity creation led to an important 
step forward with the recent creation of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR's), an internationally cre- 
ated obligation of the International Monetary Fund. 
With the establishment of SDR's, the system no 
r had to rely on a persistent deficit in the U.S. 
balance of payments for the creation of new re- 
3. The creation of SDR's could not in itself 
equilibrium to international payments, how- 
ever, since provisions for the adjustment of pay- 
ments imbalances remained inadequate. 

The Articles of Agreement were not very ex- 
plicit about the circumstances under which countries 
should take action to remove balance-of-payments 
ta or surpluses. The assumption was that deficit 
countries would sooner or later run out of reserves 
or borrowing facilities and therefore would have 



February 26, 1973 



231 



to adjust. However, surplus countries could post- 
pone adjustment as long as they were willing to 
accumulate reserves. Since the major deficit country, 
the United States, could not adjust its exchange 
rate without endangering the operation of the sys- 
tem, and since most of the surplus countries were 
persistently reluctant to change their own rates, the 
disequilibrium in world payments increased through 
the latter half of the 1960's until it reached a 
breaking point in mid-1971. At that time, the dis- 
equilibrium became so large that speculative pres- 
sures caused billions of dollars to be exchanged 
for foreign currencies within a few days. These 
currency movements greatly increased U.S. liabili- 
ties to foreign official institutions and further re- 
duced the stock of U.S. reserve assets. This brought 
to a head a problem which had been developing for 
some time: how to maintain convertibility as the 
stock of dollars held by foreign official institutions 
grew and the United States' own stock of reserve 
assets, mainly gold, shrank. 

On August 15, the President announced a sus- 
pension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold 
or SDR's. This action withdrew U.S. support from 
the old exchange rates between the dollar and other 
foreign currencies, and in effect put the dollar on a 
floating basis. Subsequently, a new set of exchange 
rates was agreed upon at the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion, and as part of that realignment the United 
States agreed to increase the U.S. official price 
of gold from $35 to $38 an ounce. This 8.5-percent 
increase in the price of gold was signed into law 
on March 31, 1972. The United States has not re- 
sumed the convertibility of the dollar, but has said 
that it will undertake appropriate convertibility ob- 
ligations in the context of a suitably reformed 
international monetary system, provided that the 
U.S. balance-of-payments and reserve positions im- 
prove sufficiently to make such an undertaking 
viable. 

Preparations for International Monetary Reform- 
Some of the major problems to be dealt with in a 
reform of the international monetary system, as 
well as a number of approaches to their solution, 
were examined in a report submitted by the Execu- 
tive Directors of the International Monetary Fund 
to the Board of Governors in August 1972. At about 
the same time, the member countries of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund agreed to create a committee 
to conduct negotiations on reform. This commit- 
tee, the Committee of Twenty, is patterned after 
the representational system used in the Executive 
Board of the International Monetary Fund, where 
the membership is broken down into twenty con- 
stituencies, each with a single spokesman to act on 
behalf of all the countries in the constituency. Al- 
though some of the constituencies are formed by 
single large countries, as is true with the United 
States, most comprise several smaller countries. 



The first meeting of this new group was held at the 
annual session of the International Monetary Fund 
in September 1972; this was followed by several 
meetings of deputies, who expect to prepare a draft 
outline of the main reform proposals in time for 
the 1973 annual meeting of the International Mone- 
tary Fund. 

U.S. Ideas on International Monetary Reform 

In order to help get the negotiation process under- 
way, the United States has advanced some general 
proposals on reform. The U.S. approach is evolu- 
tionary, seeking to build on existing principles and 
practices where they have proved useful and have 
met with international approval. At the same time, 
it proposes certain important changes to ensure the 
viability of the new system. The primary emphasis 
is on the creation of an effective and evenhanded 
mechanism for the adjustment of payments im- 
balances that would place all countries, surplus 
and deficit alike, under agreed and broadly sym- 
metrical rules and responsibilities for taking action 
to restore equilibrium. In the U.S. view, the most 
promising approach is a system in which dispropor- 
tionate changes in a nation's reserves in either di- 
rection indicate the need for measures to eliminate 
the payments imbalance. Within such a system 
of symmetrical adjustment discipline, the U.S. ap- 
proach would allow considerable diversity in the 
choice of instruments for bringing about adjust- 
ment. One way to widen the choice of adjustment 
tools would be to allow increased flexibility of ex- 
change rates. 

With respect to international liquidity, the U.S. 
proposal envisages an increase in the importance 
of the SDR and the elimination of various encum- 
brances which reduce its usefulness as a reserve 
asset. At the same time, the U.S. proposal contem- 
plates a gradual diminution of the role played by 
gold in the international monetary system. Hold- 
ings of foreign currency reserves would be neither 
banned nor encouraged, but it is expected that they 
would become a smaller proportion of total inter- 
national reserve assets than they are today. 

The Adjustment Process 

In developing its proposals the United States 
has taken into account a number of realities about 
the international adjustment process. First, every 
government seeks to retain a large degree of dis- 
cretion in managing its economy, in order to meet 
the specific social and economic concerns of its citi- 
zens. Second, the policies of every government are 
necessarily affected and constrained by the inter- 
action of its economy with the outside world, since 
international trade and investment are increasingly 
important factors in the economic prosperity of all 
countries. The U.S. proposal seeks to achieve a- 
proper balance between these two conditions by re- 
taining considerable national discretion with respect 



232 



Department of State Bulletin 



to the method and timing of adjustment, but by im- 
posing a strongi'i- international discipline to ensure 
the achievement of adjustment object 
Reserves as objective indioatora for adjust' 

The U.S. proposal, that disproportionate changes in 
reserves in either direction be used as the primary 
indicator of the need for balanoe-of-payments ad- 
justment, is described in detail in Appendix A. 1 In 
summary, the proposal is that certain points should 
be established above and below each country's 
"base," or "normal" level of reserves, and that move- 
ments in reserves beyond these points would signal 
the need for balance-of-payments adjustment. 

The U.S. proposal is based on the recognition that 
countries experiencing a persistent deterioration in 
their reserve positions have always had to devalue 
their currencies or to take other adjustment meas- 
ures. The U.S. proposal would make this discipline 
symmetrical for both deficit and surplus countries 
by providing that a disproportionate gain in re- 
serves would indicate the need for adjustment ac- 
tions by surplus countries to the same extent that 
disproportionate reserve losses now impose pressure 
on deficit countries to adjust. 

Symmetry in the adjustment process, as provided 
for in the U.S. proposal, is desirable for several 
reasons. Active implementation of adjustment poli- 
cies, as opposed to passive acceptance of the domes- 
tic consequences of adjustment by others, frequently 
entails political costs (as in the case of an exchange 
rate change, which governments have commonly 
considered to be a confession of weakness). And it 
may sometimes involve economic costs of adjust- 
ment as well (when, for example, a deficit country- 
tolerates an increase in unemployment in order to 
improve the payments balance through demand re- 
straint). Thus, a balanced distribution of the re- 
sponsibility for initiating adjustment is in part a 
question of equity. 

Such symmetry also makes the process of inter- 
national adjustment more efficient. If countries on 
both the deficit and the surplus sides of a payments 
imbalance follow active policies for the restoration 
of equilibrium the process is likely to be easier than 
if the deficit countries try to bring about adjustment 
by themselves. Deficit countries would in any case 
be unable to restore equilibrium unless surplus 
countries at least followed policies consistent with 
a reduction of the net surplus in their payments 
positions. Such problems can best be avoided by 
clarifying the responsibilities of both groups of 
countries in bringing about payments adjustment. 

The use of reserve criteria also focuses on the 
close relationship between the speed of adjustment 
and the need for liquidity. The less efficient and 
prompt the adjustment process, the larger is the 
global need for reserves; the smaller and less elastic 



' Not printed here. 



the total stock of reserves, the more stringent the 
demands will be on the adjustment process. In a 
system where the adjustment process is tied to re- 
serves, the total volume of reserves created can be 
related to the sum of countries' individual reserve 
targets as reflected in the internationally agreed in- 
dicators. If the two are not made consistent, sus- 
tained balance-of-payments equilibrium cannot be 
obtained. Failure to provide the system with ade- 
quate reserves puts deflationary pressure on deficit 
countries and induces a disruptive competition for 
scarce reserves. In contrast, the creation of too 
large a volume of reserves places the major share 
of adjustment pressures on surplus countries and ex- 
acerbates tendencies toward world inflation. 

A link between adjustment measures and reserve 
changes is essential if a generalized system of con- 
vertibility of national currencies into international 
reserve assets is to be sustainable. In the long run, 
convertibility can be maintained only if the adjust- 
ment mechanism prevents the development of large 
and persistent imbalances which would inevitably 
prevent a deficit country from providing conversion 
of its own currency into primary reserve assets. 

Reserve indicators have several other advantages 
as compared to other conceivable adjustment guides. 
They are comprehensive, quickly available, and rela- 
tively unambiguous. Furthermore, they do not 
discriminate between one set of transactions and an- 
other. They leave the relation between specific types 
of transactions to market forces, focusing only on 
the overall level of the balance of payments. In a 
system based on the market principle, it would be 
inappropriate to base judgments about the need for 
adjustment solely on trade, or the current account, 
or the capital account. 

Adoption of reserve criteria as a primary indi- 
cator of the need for adjustment does not imply 
automaticity. The system would operate in the con- 
text of a multilateral review procedure. While ex- 
cessive reserve changes may create an increasingly- 
strong presumption that effective adjustment meas- 
ures are called for, a country could still convince 
the international community that the signals were 
wrong and adjustment was not appropriate. In such 
a case the reserve indicator could be overriden. 
Moreover, the use of reserve indicators would not 
preclude such supplementary guides as might be 
available. 

Short-term capital movements may present a 
problem in managing any system of adjustment, 
including one based on reserve indicators. Large 
movements of such funds in response to differences 
in interest rates, or the expectation of future 
changes in exchange rates, could bring about large 
changes in reserves. This could signal the need for 
adjustment actions even though they might not 
otherwise be thought appropriate. It should be 
possible, however, to identify such cases in the 
multilateral review and to override the signal by in- 



February 26, 197? 



233 



ternational agreement. Moreover, the wider margins 
within which exchange rates can fluctuate have al- 
ready provided a useful cushion against short-term 
capital movements initiated by interest rate differ- 
entials, and these margins should become more 
effective in a system where the maintenance of in- 
appropriate parities is avoided. 

Greater flexibility in the exchange rate. An im- 
portant feature of the U.S. proposals is that they 
would make exchange rate changes a more useful 
internationally acceptable instrument of adjust- 
ment. The U.S. suggestions regarding the exchange 
rate mechanism assume that most countries will gen- 
erally choose to continue their practice of maintain- 
ing established values for their currencies. At the 
same time, the United States recognizes that the 
difficulties caused by prolonged maintenance of in- 
appropriate exchange rates can be avoided only if 
countries adjust their parities more promptly than 
was usual in the past. 

The U.S. proposal recognizes the current evolu- 
tion of more flexible techniques of exchange rate 
management. For example, despite the fact that 
floating a currency — suspending the maintenance of 
its value by exchange market intervention — is tech- 
nically a violation of the Bretton Woods Agree- 
ment, a number of important countries have done 
so. Such floats may be either transitional, as a way 
of utilizing market signals in determining a new 
rate, or indefinite in their duration. The Canadians 
have floated during long intervals for more than 
two decades, the Germans have floated twice in re- 
cent years, and the British have been floating since 
mid-1972. The U.S. proposal would permit either 
transitional or indefinite periods of floating, but it 
would impose standards on countries adopting float- 
ing regimes to guard against their use as instru- 
ments for competitive devaluation. 

The United States also proposes that countries 
which maintain parity exchange rates adopt wider 
margins within which the market exchange rate 
is allowed to fluctuate. The Smithsonian Agreement 
temporarily increased the permissible margins from 
1 percent on either side of dollar parity to 2% 
percent above or below dollar parity, implying a 
maximum spread of 4% percent between any two 
nondollar currencies. A number of countries have 
adopted these wider margins. The United States 
favors the permanent adoption of margins for all 
currencies, including the dollar, that are in the 
same range as those permitted for nondollar cur- 
rencies under the Smithsonian Agreement. Since 
the dollar currently serves as the chief intervention 
currency it can never deviate from its parity with 
any other currency by more than the width of the 
margin, or 2Vi percent. For any two nondollar cur- 
rencies, however, the maximum spread is twice the 
margin, because one currency could be at the floor 
while the other currency was at the ceiling. To do 
away with this particular asymmetry will require 



innovations in the techniques of exchange market 
intervention, a question which will have to be ad- 
dressed in the context of the general reform effort. 

A larger zone within which fluctuation can take 
place without government intervention implies more 
opportunity for the operation of market forces and 
can facilitate small changes in parities. Wider mar- 
gins can also lessen the incentives for short-term 
capital flows in response to interest rate differentials 
by increasing the scope for forward premiums or 
discounts in the exchange markets, thus neutraliz- 
ing such differentials. 

The desire for symmetry between the margins 
for the dollar and for other currencies reflects the 
view that, whereas the dollar had unique functions 
and responsibilities in the old system, its role in 
the new system should be closer to that of other 
important currencies. Under the Bretton Woods 
system, other countries maintained or changed the 
values of their currencies in relation to the dollar, 
and the United States was passive. The proposed 
change would give the United States more freedom 
to exercise control over its own exchange rate, not 
only in influencing the rate within the margins 
around parity, but also in changing the parity itself. 
Of course, under any system this freedom will be 
limited by the fact that the United States is so im- 
portant in world trade that any change in the 
value of the dollar would strongly affect other coun- 
tries. In addition, the dollar will undoubtedly con- 
tinue to be an international medium of exchange, 
even when no Americans are involved, and substan- 
tial amounts of dollars will still be held abroad in 
private and official hands. Therefore, reasonable 
stability in the value of the dollar will be desirable. 
Nonetheless, in a reformed system the dollar should 
have considerably more flexibility than it did before. 

Other techniques of adjustment. Under the U.S. 
proposal a variety of mechanisms for restoring pay- 
ments balance would be available, among them 
changes in monetary and fiscal policy. Furthermore, 
in keeping with the goal of the international mone- 
tary system to encourage a freer flow of resources, 
surplus countries would be encouraged to remove 
barriers to imports and capital outflows, while defi- 
cit countries would be encouraged to remove bar- 
riers to exports and capital inflows. 

Such a choice among adjustment measures is 
essential, not only to preserve national sovereignty, 
but also because the nature of the imbalance may 
itself suggest a particular form of policy response. 
Furthermore, the existence of uncertainty about 
whether or not adjustment will take the form of a 
change in the exchange rate can itself be a sta- 
bilizing influence by holding down speculation in re- 
sponse to reserve changes. 

The U.S. proposal would in extreme circumstances 
permit the imposition of direct restraints for bal- 
ance-of-payments purposes. Their use, however, 
would be appropriately circumscribed to ensure that 



234 



Department of State Bulletin 



controls remained temporary and caused the least pos- 
sil>lf distortion in the pattern of trade and invest- 
ment. Controls or surcharges on some transactions 
and not on others distort economic relation- 
ships, arid for that reason broad adjustment meas- 
ures are generally preferable. And where selective 
measures are used, price-based barriers such as taxes 
or surcharges are generally preferable to quantita- 
tive barriers such as quotas. Taxes on some trans- 
actions and not on others change relative prices, 
but they do not insulate such transactions from mar- 
ket pressures, as quotas do. This view contrasts 
with the present rules of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which specifically au- 
thorize quantitative restrictions but not surcharges 
for balance-of-payments purposes. 

The U.S. proposal furthermore reflects the view 
that controls on capital transactions for balance-of- 
payments purposes should not be encouraged and 
certainly should not be required in lieu of other 
measures of adjustment, nor should they become the 
means of maintaining an undervalued or overvalued 
exchange rate. This position is based on a belief 
that restrictions have a distorting influence whether 
they are focused on trade in commodities, in serv- 
ices, or in assets (the capital account), and that this 
parallelism should be recognized in the rules govern- 
ing the reformed international monetary system. 
In contrast, the provisions of the earlier system 
made a sharp distinction between controls on trade 
and other current transactions and controls on 
capital transactions. 

The U.S. proposal assumes that countries would 
take their responsibilities seriously and would usual- 
ly take steps toward adjustment before such steps 
became necessary on the basis of the indicators. In 
the few cases where countries might persist in 
avoiding adjustment, however, certain international 
sanctions would become operative. On the deficit 
side, for example, failure to adjust might lead to 
refusal to provide credit, as under the old system, 
or to loss of scheduled SDR allocations. On the sur- 
plus side, the international inducements for adjust- 
ment might include the risk of losing scheduled 
SDR allocations or a tax on the country's excess 
reserve holdings. In some situations, other countries 
might be authorized to impose a surcharge on im- 
ports from the chronic surplus country until effec- 
tive measures were taken to correct the situation. 
The Bretton Woods Agreement incorporated a pro- 
vision similar to this last one, the so-called scarce 
currency clause. However, because this provision 
was never invoked, there was no effective form of 
international pressure on surplus countries to 
adjust. 

■ational Liquidity 

The magnitude, composition, and distribution of 
world liquidity have undergone substantial changes 
in recent years. From the end of 1969 to the end of 



October 1972, gross international official reserves 
increased from $78 billion to $152 billion, or almost 
100 percent in '■', years. Part of this increase was in 
newly created Special Drawing Rights, but most of 
it was in dollars. Gold and reserve positions in the 
International Monetary Fund remained at approxi- 
mately the same level as in 1969. As a result, a 
significant change occurred in the proportional com- 
position of international reserves. Gold dropped from 
50 percent to 26 percent, reserve positions in the 
IMF dropped from 9 percent to 4 percent, foreign 
exchange rose from 41 percent to 64 percent, and 
SDR'