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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 





s 

A 3: 





THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1775 



Julv 2, 1973 



CHANGE AND CONSTANCY IN U.S. COMMITMENTS 
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 1 

RESTORING EUROPE'S SENSE OF UNITY 
Address by Counselor Richard F. Pedersen 16 

PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRESIDENT POMPIDOU OF FRANCE 
HOLD TALKS IN ICELAND 7 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 






Ph.K crA 



'/ 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1775 
July 2, 1973 



?.- 



r\ 



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copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Renders' Guide to Periodical Literature 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a loeekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to ivhich the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments 



Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush 



I have been asked to discuss U.S. commit- 
ments in a changing world. I know of no 
better place to start than President Nixon's 
words three years ago: "Peace in the world 
will continue to require us to maintain our 
commitments — and we will." - The Presi- 
dent went on to say that it is "misleading" to 
pose fundamental questions of foreign policy 
in terms of our commitments. Rather, he 
said: "Our objective ... is to support our 
interests .... We are not involved in the 
world because we have commitments; we 
have commitments because we are involved. 
Our interests must shape our commit- 
ments. . . ." 

The first question must be: What are the 
interests of the United States? It has been 
said, and I would agree, that it is possible to 
reduce those interests to three fundamental 
elements: 

— First, to preserve the physical security 
of the United States ; 

— Second, to maintain the pluralism, the 
freedom, and the democracy of the United 
States; and 

— Third, to sustain the economic well-being 
of the American people. 

No one of these elements is sufficient to 
explain U.S. interests. But each is necessary. 

Together they don't tell us much about 
what we should do in foreign policy. They do 
tell us a great deal about what we should not 



' Made before the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces at Washington on June 5 (press release 193). 

" The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, ap- 
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the intro- 
duction begins on p. 274. 



do. We cannot undertake defense policies 
which would sacrifice economic well-being to 
establish maximum physical security. We 
cannot so emphasize butter over guns that 
we become vulnerable to attack by a real or 
presumptive enemy. We cannot be indiffer- 
ent to the fate of freedom abroad without 
cheapening our regard for it at home. 

Abstraction of our interests makes it no 
less difficult to resolve the real or the appar- 
ent conflicts among them. Someone once said, 
"Every choice is an injustice." As we exam- 
ine our interests, we will have to continue 
to make choices. And as we make choices in 
foreign policy we will be dealing with the 
question of past and future commitments. 

We have viewed our commitments chiefly 
in military terms — most recently, in terms 
of the threat to our interests posed by the 
Soviet Union and by Communist China. Thus, 
beginning first in Europe and then extending 
to other areas of the world, we undertook a 
series of collective and bilateral mutual se- 
curity agreements designed to deter and to 
contain our antagonists. These commitments 
were useful, necessary, and successful in de- 
terring aggression. 

When we undertook these defense com- 
mitments, we supplied the military strength 
our allies could not provide. And our eco- 
nomic position was unique in the free world. 
Times have changed. Our nuclear umbrella 
is still the chief strategic deterrent in the 
world. But Europe and Japan now have at- 
tained renewed economic vigor. They now 
clearly have less need to rely on us. 

President Nixon came to office heir to a 
large number of international commitments 
forged earlier. As he promised, he has main- 



July 2, 1973 



tained those commitments. But the United 
States has done two other things: 

— First, we encouraged our partners to do 
more. For example, in Viet-Nam we com- 
pleted the successful Vietnamization pro- 
gram. In Europe our allies are assuming a 
larger share of the defense burden and now 
supply 90 percent of NATO's manpower. 

— Second, we have worked hard and suc- 
cessfully to alter the nature of our relations 
with Communist China and the Soviet Union. 
Today cooperation is replacing the confron- 
tation that characterized our relations when 
President Nixon took office. 

I would like to say a few words about this 
second element because our changing rela- 
tions with our former antagonists have 
caused some people to question the value of 
our continuing commitments to our allies. 

It is clear to me that the progress we have 
made with the Soviet Union and with China 
has only come about because both they and 
our allies have had faith in our honesty and 
reliability. Both friend and foe knew that we 
would live up to our commitments. Because 
they did, we have been able to negotiate with 
the Soviet Union and with China without 
undermining either our allies' confidence or 
our adversaries' respect for our determina- 
tion. 

While I was Ambassador to Germany I 
had the privilege of negotiating the Berlin 
agreement, which eliminated that city as a 
source of permanent tension in East-West 
relations. It was clear to me throughout 
those negotiations that the reality of our 
commitments to NATO was a major factor 
in the successful conclusion of the talks. 

For the past quarter century the United 
States has suiiplied the nuclear umbrella on 
which Eurojiean security has depended. It 
has been in our mutual interest that we do 
so. If that nuclear umbrella were withdrawn, 
European nations would have to choose be- 
tween either vastly increasing their own nu- 
clear caiiabilities or seeking accommodation 
with the Soviet Union. These alternatives 
are not in our interest nor in the interest of 
our allies. The Soviet Union, however, would 



welcome a reduction in our ties to western 
Europe — a development that it would see 
both as enhancing its hegemony in eastern 
Europe and as increasing its influence in 
western Europe. 

The same unacceptable choice between en- 
larged nuclear capabilities and accommoda- 
tion would be forced on European nations 
were they to lose confidence in our commit- 
ment to the principle that European security 
and U.S. security are indivisible. Our uni- 
lateral withdrawal from our commitments 
in western Europe would almost certainly 
produce such a loss in confidence. 

Instead, we are seeking to reduce tensions 
across the continent without lowering Eu- 
rope's defenses. Thus, within a few weeks 
Secretary of State Rogers will participate 
with the Foreign Ministers of 32 other Euro- 
pean nations and Canada in the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Our 
aim and that of our allies is to increase the 
freedom of movement of people, information, 
and ideas across the continent and to affirm 
the sovereign equality of each European na- 
tion regardless of its participation with 
others in the same social or political system. 
Preparatory talks are also underway for a 
mutual and balanced reduction of the mili- 
tary forces facing each other across central 
Europe. These two sets of talks are critical 
elements as we seek to move further from 
confrontation to negotiation in Europe. If 
these talks are to succeed, both our allies and 
the Soviet Union must have continuing high 
regard for our determination to live up to 
our commitments. 

Our continued strength is an important 
element in the world's perception of our re- 
liability. In nuclear terms that means essen- 
tial equivalence in nuclear forces between 
ourselves and the Soviet Union. It is precisely 
this sort of equivalence that we seek in the 
current round of SALT talks [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks]. And as we seek in 
these negotiations to bring about further 
strategic arms limitations, we must continue 
to bargain from a strong position. 

In Asia, a new relationship is developing 
among all the nations involved. We have 



Department of State Bulletin 



been and will continue to be a Pacific power. 
Today as we seek responsibly to play our 
role in the development of a more peaceful 
and more cooperative Asia, we will scrupu- 
lously observe our commitments there. It is 
worthwhile noting that we have not sacri- 
ficed our commitments to Taiw^an as we im- 
proved our relations with Peking. In fact, 
our determination to live up to those com- 
mitments has contributed to peaceful evolu- 
tion in Asia. 

The Berlin agreement, the President's 
trips to Moscow and Peking, SALT One, the 
end of the war in Viet-Nam, General Secre- 
tary Brezhnev's coming visit to the United 
States, all indicate the degree and the direc- 
tion of change in international politics. But 
they also share a common lesson: Progress is 
only possible in a world where other nations 
confidently act on the assumption the United 
States will do as it is pledged. Where such 
basic confidence is lacking, it is next to im- 
possible to build constructive relations be- 
tween nations — negotiations in the Middle 
East are stymied because parties there lack 
this sort of confidence. 

The United States reputation for stable, 
reliable commitments has been built up over 
many years and at great cost. We cannot 
and we will not allow this precious asset to 
be frittered away by those who believe that 
our commitments can be put behind us now 
that the apparent threat to our security has 
been reduced. 

Obviously, of course, our commitments 
must be related to the nature and the level 
of the threat and the cost of countering that 
threat. As the threat changes, so must our 
ways of dealing with it. Thus, our assessment 
of the strategic threat is different now from 
what it w^as before SALT One. And it will 
change again if SALT Two achieves long- 
range agreements which will limit strategic 
weapons systems. 

If the Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe and the negotiations aimed 
at mutual and balanced reductions in central 
Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces succeed, we will have enhanced Euro- 
pean stability. The situation in Asia is aLso 



evolving rapidly, requiring close examina- 
tion as to the best ways to pursue and pro- 
tect our interests. 

As we determine how changed circum- 
stances affect our commitments, we will re- 
main in closest contact with our allies. We 
and they together will reassess how best to 
shape our mutual commitments so they con- 
tinue to serve our mutual interests. 

In the past we have defined commitment 
chiefly in terms of our defense needs. We 
will, as I have said, stand by our mutual de- 
fense commitments. But we do not foresee 
making new military commitments. 

Instead, we will be adding new dimensions 
to the word "commitment." One such dimen- 
sion must cover our evolving relations with 
China and the Soviet Union. We are almost 
daily adding to the ways we are productively 
engaged with Moscow and with Peking. 
These new means of engagement are, in 
effect, a new kind of mutual commitment — 
we to them and they to us. 

The summit meetings last year in China 
and the Soviet Union produced a commitment 
by ourselves and by each Communist power 
on the general principles that would govern 
relations between the United States and each 
of them. We and they have since been guided 
by these concepts. And since those summits 
considerable muscle has been added to the 
skeleton provided by those principles. Last 
year, for example, we signed more agree- 
ments with the Soviet Union than in any 
year since 1933, when we resumed diplo- 
matic relations. And who would have been so 
bold as to imagine 15 months ago that in 
May 1973 China and the United States would 
have established Liaison Offices. 

It is clear that our strategic nuclear rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union will continue 
to demand of us close and continuous in- 
volvement in international affairs. The im- 
mediacy of the nuclear threat may have been 
reduced somewhat but it has not been elim- 
inated — and that prospect is not in sight. 

But even in the absence of a nuclear threat, 
the United States will inevitably become 
more and more involved in the world. This 



July 2, 1973 



involvement adds another facet to the con- 
cept of commitment. 

International relations are becoming in- 
creasingly comijlex and the world increas- 
ingly interdependent. It is impossible to 
preserve our national interests — as I de- 
scribed them earlier — and at the same time 
cut ourselves off from the world. This is true 
because: 

— No nation which seeks to act alone is 
going to be able to sustain a decent quality 
of life for its citizenry; 

— No nation can alone bring about the re- 
forms of world trade and monetary struc- 
tures on which an expanding and equitable 
global economy depends ; 

— No nation independently is going to be 
able to make the oceans' resources a source 
for cooperation rather than conflict among 
nations; 

— No nation alone is going to be able to 
assure that the world's limited energy re- 
sources will be both adequately and equitably 
distributed to consumers at a fair price to 
the producer; and 

— No nation acting alone is going to be 
able to save its environment from the threat 
of pollution. 

Concerted action by nations having like 
ideologies or like political systems will not 
suffice; nor will attempts to pit developed 
against developing or race against race. 
Policies based on such negative approaches 
are easier to implement than creative inter- 
national efforts at cooperation. But they will 
produce little more than sterile confronta- 
tion. The world demands instead that nations 
reach across differences to concert action in 
pursuit of common goals. 

The United States must participate in the 
efforts to devise constructive international 
api)roaches to global issues. Otherwise our 
interests will suffer serious consequences. 
And if we are to jmrticipate we must also 
be prepared to undertake new, clearly defined 
commitments, because there can be no solu- 
tions to the challenges of the 20th century 
without such commitments by ourselves and 
by others. 



All issues on the international agenda de- 
mand one commitment from the global com- 
munity — a commitment to mutual accommo- 
dation and restraint. No nation is expected to 
sacrifice basic national interests. But all na- 
tions must act on the principle that mainte- 
nance of reliable relations is more important 
than triumph on any particular issue. These 
are the qualities that must prevail whether 
the issue is pollution of the environment or 
arms reductions agreements between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. If the 
international community is governed by flex- 
ibility, restraint, and rational adjustment 
among its members, the more cooperative and 
]ieaceful world we seek will be brought 
closer. 

In conclusion, let me summarize the U.S. 
approach to commitments now and in the 
future: 

— With our allies, we will continue to re- 
examine and reassess and when necessary 
redefine our mutual commitments to make 
them relevant to present circumstances; 

— With our adversaries, w-e will continue 
to seek to involve them in mutually beneficial 
commitments, building further our produc- 
tive relationships; and 

— With the broader world community, we 
will seek to engage in and provide leadership 
for the kind of commitments which can as- 
sure a more stable, more humane, and more 
peaceful world. 

We do not expect or intend to be able to 
disengage ourselves, or to "de-commit" or 
"un-pledge" unilaterally. We will not rescind 
our promises. Isolationism — pure, neo, quasi, 
or pseudo — is simply not an option. The trend 
is necessarily and unavoidably and benefi- 
cially toward more involvement, toward 
more complex engagement, toward greater 
interdependence. As the President has said, 
"We can forge a network of relationships 
and of interdependencies that restrain ag- 
gression and that take the profit out of 
war." ' This must be our aim. 



' For an pxcerpt from President Nixon's address 
to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see Bulleti.n of Nov. 
20, 1972, p. 605. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Discusses Development 
of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations 

Folloiving are questions submitted by 
Vkidimir Vashedchenko, chief of the Wash- 
ington bureau of TASS, to Secretary Rogers 
before his departure for Tehran and Copen- 
hagen and the Secretary's replies, released 
by the Department on June lU. 

Press release 207 dated June 14 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a few days General 
Secretayn/ of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU L. I. Brezhnev ivill make an official visit 
to the United States. President of the United 
States Mr. Richard M. Nixon visited the So- 
viet Union last May. What in your opinion is 
the sigiiificance of these summit meetings 
for the development of Soviet-American re- 
lations and what is their influence on ivorld 
affairs? 

Secretary Rogers: The American people 
will welcome the visit of General Secretary 
Brezhnev as a confirmation of the historic 
change in Soviet-American relations signaled 
by President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union 
last year — a turning away from the confron- 
tation and tensions of the past quarter 
century. 

The United States has a deep and abiding 
desire for peace. Since the beginning of his 
administration President Nixon has pursued 
improved relations with the Soviet Union in 
the interest of a stable world for the benefit 
of all mankind. 

The events of the past year give substance 
to this hope. The range and importance of 
agreements arrived at during the 1972 summit 
and the subsequent actions implement- 
ing these decisions are demonstrable achieve- 
ments. For the first time two adversaries 
divided by conflicting ideologies and political 
rivalries have been able to agree to significant 
limitations of the armaments on which their 
survival depends. For the first time two such 
nations have been able to agree on written 
principles as the basis for regulating their 
competition and channeling their eff'orts to- 
ward more constructive endeavors. The scope 
and depth of cooperative projects between 



the two countries has been increased. These 
are hopeful signs and a good beginning to 
what President Nixon has called a "momen- 
tum of achievement" in which progress in 
one area can contribute to progress in others. 
In projecting onto the world scene the ef- 
fect of improved U.S.-Soviet relations one 
must recognize that we are only two nations, 
however powerful in relative terms. We can- 
not attempt to impose solutions for problems 
involving the national interests of other 
countries. We do believe, however, that prog- 
ress between the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. will support and encourage efforts of 
other nations to resolve differences and relax 
international tensions. We hope that the 
forthcoming summit will give renewed im- 
petus to the worldwide search for true and 
lasting peace. 

Q. What are, in your opinion, practical re- 
sidts achieved in the U.S.S.R.-U.S. relations 
after the summit meeting in Moscow last 
year? 

Secretar-y Rogers: The 1972 summit set in 
train a long and impressive list of cooperative 
activities. The last 12 months have been 
marked both by the implementation of the 
understandings reached at the first summit 
meeting and by continued activity in reach- 
ing further agreement. The several accords 
signed during the President's visit to Mos- 
cow — limitations on strategic weaponry, 
basic principles to govern our relations, and 
five bilateral cooperation agreements — set the 
stage for more stable relationships between 
the two countries. We have successfully 
avoided major confrontation, begun negotia- 
tions on a permanent treaty limiting offen- 
sive strategic weapons, and carried forth an 
impressive list of bilateral projects covering 
such diverse fields as medicine, environment, 
science, culture, and space. 

In addition, on the basis of decisions at the 
summit, several accords were negotiated and 
signed in the economic field, including a trade 
agreement, a maritime agreement, and a set- 
tlement of lend-lease obligations. From 
1971 to 1972 the volume of trade be- 
tween the two countries tripled. The 
United States is strengthening its commer- 



July 2, 1973 



cial representation in the Soviet Union, and 
some new firms are opening offices there. 
There has also been relatively intensive explo- 
ration of trade possibilities by both American 
business and Soviet trade representa- 
tives, and important long-range contracts 
have been concluded or are under considera- 
tion. 

Altogether, the significance of the past 
year's events is that cumulatively they rep- 
resent consolidation of the changes embodied 
in the decisions of the Moscow summit. More 
and more officials and citizens of both coun- 
tries are learning to work together and un- 
derstand each other's problems and view- 
points after years of relative isolation and 
repeated frustrations. A fabric of common 
interests and instruments of cooperation is 
being created which can help sustain better 
relations. 

Q. What in your opinion are the prospects 
for ftirther development of the Soviet-Amer- 
ican relations ? 

Secretary Rogers: We expect that the com- 
ing meeting of the Soviet and American 
leaders will give further impetus to advances 
already made. Considerable support has de- 
veloped for the idea of cooperation for mu- 
tual benefit and exercise of restraint in areas 
of possible contention. Increasingly it is ap- 
parent that the exploitation of short-term 
advantages to the detriment of long-term 
peaceful goals is not in the national interest 
of either country. 

We recognize that fundamental differences 
remain and will persist for a long time. But 
recent events have shown that with persever- 
ance along our present course these differ- 
ences need not prove an insuperable barrier 



to improved relations between our peoples 
and our governments. 

We will be engaged for some time in 
momentous and wide-ranging negotiations in 
the security field. Negotiations on a pemia- 
nent strategic and comprehensive offensive 
arms agreement are the most important bi- 
laterally. In addition, broad multilateral ne- 
gotiations, such as a conference on European 
security and cooperation and a conference 
on mutual and balanced force reductions in 
central Europe, promise to advance the secu- 
rity and well-being of the world community. 

In any look forward, trade and other forms 
of economic activity loom large as areas ca- 
pable of expanded, mutually beneficial devel- 
opment. The world's biggest economies can 
clearly sustain a higher level of commercial 
interchange. The trebling of bilateral trade 
in 1972 compared with 1971 and the several 
recent agreements involving private U.S. 
firms as well as government-to-government 
arrangements constitute significant develop- 
ments. 

Another positive trend that seems certain 
to carry forward into the future is the steady 
upswing in exchanges of people and informa- 
tion. More and more citizens of both coun- 
tries are traveling back and forth while at 
the same time advances in communications 
technology have facilitated a concomitant 
transfer of information and ideas. 

The progress in improved relations over 
the past year is concrete and demonstrable. 
I am hopeful that as this trend continues we 
will see a diminution in the areas of confron- 
tation and an expansion in the areas of co- 
operation between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Progress along these lines 
would render significant service to the cause 
of world peace. 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Nixon and President Pompidou of France 
Hold Talks in Iceland 



President Nixon held talks with President 
Georges Pompidou of France at Reykjavik, 
Iceland, May 31-June 1 and met with Ice- 
landic President Kristjan Eld jam, Prime 
Minister Olafur Johannesson, and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Einar Agustsson on May 
30. Folloiving is an exchange of toasts by 
the three Presidents at a dinner given by 
President Eldjarn on May 31, together with 
the transcript of a news conference held that 
afternoon by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant 
to the President far National Secunty 
Affairs. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 
President Eldjarn ^ 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 4 

It is a great pleasure for myself and my 
wife to bid you and your companions wel- 
come to this house. 

It is clear to the Icelandic people that your 
meeting in this country is worldwide news. 
It focuses world attention on our country in 
a special manner. This is to our liking; for 
we wish to make our country known among 
others, to broaden their knowledge of our 
nation, its struggle for survival, and its so- 
cial and cultural aims, as well as our histor- 
ical and natural rights to this country with 
all its resources. We believe that your stay 
in this country will contribute to the 
strengthening of an understanding of our 
situation and our endeavors. 

In Iceland we attach much importance to 
the fact that a democratic way of thinking 
is rooted with us and based on an ancient 
foundation, even reaching back to the age 



' President Eldjarn spoke in Icelandic. 



of the settlement when our ancestors dis- 
covered and inhabited this country which 
had remained unknown and uninhabited. We 
are agreed in wishing to strengthen equality 
and justice among the people in our society. 
You, our distinguished guests, are leaders of 
two large and powerful nations which have 
contributed in a historic manner to paving 
the way for modern conception of freedom 
and the rights of man. The Icelandic nation, 
like others, has thanks to tender for this cul- 
tural influence. I would recall this on the 
present occasion and also the fact that our 
nation has at least since last century been in 
considerable direct contact with your nations 
and derived a fertile influence from them 
in many fields, among others in the arts and 
literature. During the past decades we have 
had extensive relations in the international 
arena which leave us with memories of last- 
ing values which will be recalled in future. 
I W'Ould make an expression of my respect 
for your great nations. 

It is necessary for every nation to follow 
the development of international affairs as 
closely as possible. We in Iceland are fully 
desirous of doing so. Your meeting and dis- 
cussions here in our midst will add further 
strength to this our will. I would like to ex- 
press the sincere wish that our country may 
offer you desirable facilities for your discus- 
sions, that your stay and that of your com- 
panions will give you pleasure, and that you 
will leave us with good memories of this your 
visit to Iceland. I would echo the wish of all 
people of good will to the effect that your 
meeting in Iceland may result in blessings 
for the world which we all jointly inhabit. 

I drink your toast, Messrs. Presidents, 
wishing happiness and welfare to yourselves 
and your nations. 



July 2, 1973 



President Nixon 

White House press release ( Roykjavikf dated May 31 

Mr. President, Mrs. Eldjarn, President 
Pompidou, Mr. Prime Minister, and all of 
our distinguished guests : This is a very his- 
toric moment for me, both personally and in 
my official capacity, because I am the first 
American President ever to visit this coun- 
try. 

I want to thank you, Mr. President, and 
your wife for the gracious hospitality you 
have extended to us on this occasion and also 
for all of our visit. 

I would remind you that it was several 
years ago in 1956 as Vice President, along 
with Mr. Rogers, we visited your country. 
It was in the dead of winter at Christmas- 
time. The snow was 12 feet high. It was the 
coldest winter, I think, in history. And now 
we are here on one of the most glorious days 
at the beginning of summer. 

But whatever the differences in the 
weather, whether it be in the cold of winter 
or in the beautiful warmth of summer, there 
is one thing that does not change, and that 
is the warmth of an Icelandic welcome. We 
thank you for that. We have seen it on every 
occasion, and we have seen it tonight. 

As we come to your capital, we are aware, 
of course, of the proud tradition of this 
country and of its modern significance as 
well. We realize that this house in which 
we have dinner tonight is older than the 
White House, which for America is a very 
old house. 

We also know that you are a member of 
our Atlantic community and, in a sense, you 
are in the center of it. That is why it was a 
very appropriate place for President Pompi- 
dou and me to meet. Each of us came half- 
way, but I should point out to President 
Pompidou I came a little more than halfway 
because his trip was only four hours and 
mine was five and a half. Now, whether I 
came more than halfway in our discussions 
will remain to be seen. 

Also, I would like to say on this occasion 
that I have appreciated the opportunity to 
again have very serious and constructive 
talks with Pi-esident Pompidou. In these 



meetings and in others we have had, we have 
carried on a continuing and comprehensive 
European-American dialogue. 

Now, that dialogue is designed to 
strengthen our relationship, to reinvigorate 
it. 

France, as everybody know's, is America's 
oldest ally, and it is an ally with whom we 
have stood side by side on many occasions. 
Lafayette, in the very early days of our 
country, once told George Washington that 
Franco-American friendship would live for- 
ever. But we know that even the oldest and 
staunchest alliance, even the oldest and 
staunchest friendship, must constantly be 
renewed if it is to be of the greatest possi- 
ble effectiveness in our changing world. 

President Pompidou put it very well when 
he said that we believe we can achieve gen- 
uine European-American unity only while 
respecting the individual personality of each 
sovereign nation. That is my philosophy as 
well. 

Within our unity there can be individual- 
ity; and if there is not individuality, that 
unity will mean nothing in the world in 
which we presently live, in which so many 
proud peoples play a pai't. 

Looking at our present situation, as Pres- 
ident Pompidou and I agreed today, it is 
our interests that unite us. We have so 
many things in common : our common poli- 
tical heritage, our common cultural tradi- 
tion, our common concern for the security 
of the Atlantic community. 

And so what differences we have, which 
are inevitable even among friends, pale into 
insignificance as they are compared with 
those great interests which reunite us in this 
great community which we share. 

I am confident that the conversations we 
have had on this occasion will result in an 
even closer appreciation of our common in- 
terests and of our common objectives and also 
a greater determination to see that those 
interests and those objectives are always 
foremost and that the tactics designed to 
meet them will be only supplemental to those 
interests. 

It is in this spirit of European-American 



Department of State Bulletin 



friendship — French, Icelandic, American 
friendship — that I offer a toast this evening, 
a toast which has never been offered before 
because such a meeting as this never oc- 
curred before and may never occur again : 
A toast to the President of Iceland, a toast 
to the Prime Minister of Iceland, and a toast 
to the President of France and to this great 
community which we are proud to share 
again. 

President Pompidou - 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 4 

I am moved indeed by the kind words you 
have spoken and by the welcome we have 
received in Reykjavik. We already knew how 
much your people has always married a deep 
sense of hospitality with its virtues of char- 
acter and drive. We witness it again today. 

Together with my gratitude, I would like 
to express the pleasure and honor I feel in 
being here, the first French head of state to 
come to Iceland. One could hardly find a 
better example of sincere friendship and 
cloudless relationship as they exist between 
our two countries. They originated in a re- 
mote past, as you know well, Mr. President, 
being an archeologist and historian. Since 
the very start they have been placed under 
the aegis of cultural relations, and so they 
remain today. Is it not symbolic in this con- 
nection that Halldor Laxness, your Nobel 
Prize winner, whose works are very popular 
in France, is also the author of a remarkable 
adaptation of "Candide"? I could not claim 
to be complete, but I shall recall that in the 
19th century our relations were enriched by 
very close contacts between ports of Iceland 
and Brittany. As you know, Pierre Loti 
found there the subject of one of his best 
books. One could not fail also to recall the 
memory of Commandant Charcot and the 
part he took in the discovery of Arctic 
regions. 

Nowadays our exchanges are diversify- 
ing. In the economic, scientific, and techno- 
logical fields they develop in a way which, 
for my part, I sincerely hope will be 
continued. 



• President Pompidou spoke in French. 



Our foreign policy options also bring us 
together. In the last war, Iceland unfortu- 
nately lost hundreds of her best sailors. We 
were allies in the past, and we still are 
within the Atlantic alliance. In trade, Ice- 
land and the European Community have 
signed an agreement, and I hope that the 
conditions will soon be fulfilled for its com- 
plete implementation. Furthermore, we sit 
side by side in the Council of Europe, in 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development], the United Na- 
tions, and for several months now at the 
Helsinki preparatory multilateral discus- 
sions on the European Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation. In these several 
forums, thanks to a thousand years' practice 
of democracy on their own soil and to the 
determination of their stand, Iceland repre- 
sentatives offer a constant example of the 
part a country can play in the world, what- 
ever its size or power, a country concerned 
both with asserting its own personality and 
being opened to the largest cooperation. 

Such manifold participation of Iceland in 
international life stems from a very old 
tradition. Around the year 1000, Leif the 
Happy, son of Eric the Red, was the first 
European to reach the New World, in North 
Newfoundland. About the same period, 
Saemundur Sigfusson, one of the most fa- 
mous scholars in the sagas' era, was in Paris. 
Mr. President of the United States, we have 
both made conversely Leif's and Saemundur's 
journeys in order to meet in Reykjavik. I 
dare say it is of excellent augury for success- 
ful talks. 

The ocean wind blowing on our meetings 
at the Azores a year and a half ago and now 
in Iceland is perhaps but the breeze of 
friendship uniting our two countries for 
quite some time now. Born on the battlefields 
of the War of Independence, consecrated in 
two World Wars by the brotherhood of arms, 
felicitously strengthened in the numerous 
activities of peace, this friendship is today 
as fruitful and necessary as ever. 

Doubtless there are several and swift 
changes on the face of the world. Many of 
them, among the most decisive ones, are due 
to your initiative, Mr. President. 



July 2, 1973 



As world relations alter, Europe gradually 
and patiently discovers the road toward unity, 
a unity which is necessary but not thereby 
easier to achieve. There, again, there is 
marked progress. 

Would it mean that relations between the 
United States and Europe, and more specif- 
ically the United States and France, have lost 
some of their urgency or interest? Certainly 
not. We know the place of Europe in your 
concern. For our part, however favorable 
may developments be in the world situation, 
we believe that it is still too fraught with un- 
certainties for the need for our alliance to 
decline. 

Happily enough, my dear sirs and Presi- 
dents, wide is the pattern of all kinds of 
links to be established between free and ac- 
tive peoples. It comes as no surprise that 
the ever-changing needs in the international 
situation should often raise new problems. 
It is life itself which puts forth new chal- 
lenges. It is up to us to stand up to them by 
overcoming them; that is, by placing them 
in the perspective of our future. 

Such is, fellow Presidents, my strongest 
wish. It is therefore with confidence and 
friendship that I drink this toast in honor of 
His Excellency Mr. Kristjan Eldjarn, Presi- 
dent of the Republic of Iceland, in honor of 
His Excellency Mr. Richard Nixon, Presi- 
dent of the United States, and to the pros- 
perity of our three countries. 



DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE 

White House press release (Reykjavik) dated May 31 

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec- 
retary to President Nixon]: You know the 
meeting this afternoon lasted two hours, 
just over two hours. So the two Presidents 
have met now for close to five hours. We will 
post the precise amount of time they have 
met today following the briefing. 

Dr. Kissinger, as you know, participated 
in both the morning session and the after- 
noon session with President Nixon and 
President Pompidou, and he is here this 
afternoon to brief you on the discussions and 
to answer some of your questions. We do 



have a dinner to attend, so we want to keep 
this to about a half an hour. Dr. Kissinger 
will begin the briefing with an opening 
comment. 

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I 
will begin by reading my notes on what 
President Pompidou and President Nixon 
agreed at the end of the meeting could be 
said. It is not a formal statement, but it was 
agreed to by both sides that this statement 
would be made and here it is. I repeat, this is 
not a formal statement. These are the notes 
to which both President Pompidou and Pres- 
ident Nixon agreed as reflecting the tenor 
of their conversations. 

As Ron Ziegler already told you, this morn- 
ing the two Presidents carried out a review 
of the world situation and of relations within 
the Atlantic alliance in a useful and con- 
structive spirit. 

In the course of this review. President 
Pompidou stressed the important role by the 
U.S. forces in Europe and the danger of a 
unilateral reduction of such forces. 

President Nixon indicated that he fully 
concurred with President Pompidou's assess- 
ment. 

In connection with what we in the United 
States have called the "Year of Europe," the 
two Presidents have agreed that this concept 
should be carried out in the closest coopera- 
tion between France and the United States 
by means of bilateral talks, exchanges at a 
high level. 

Foreign Minister [Michel] Jobert and I 
will conduct some of these exchanges, and 
our first meeting on that subject will take 
place on June 7 in Paris, when I am there 
for the Vietnamese negotiations. 

Negotiations within the alliance on specific 
issues which are now underway or which 
may be started will continue in established 
forums. As progress is made in these forums, 
the two Presidents agree that a meeting at 
the Deputy Foreign Minister level, on an ad 
hoc basis, might be desirable to see how the 
results of those bilateral exchanges and the 
multilateral exchanges going on in the other 
forums fit together for i)ossible incorporation 
in a declaration of principles. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



Whether or not there should be a summit 
of the European leaders with the President 
will be decided after the results of all these 
other negotiations can be evaluated. 

In any event, President Nixon will go to 
Europe to carry on his contacts on a bilateral 
basis with the various leaders. 

On trade matters, the two sides agreed to 
proceed in a cooperative and constructive 
spirit. On monetary matters, the French 
President gave a thorough presentation of 
his views, and President Nixon agreed that 
we would study them most attentively and 
with a helpful attitude. 

The two Presidents agreed that our inter- 
ests are identical and that the only differ- 
ence between our two nations concerns how 
we can best achieve common objectives. 

Now, this was the substance of the discus- 
sions today. 

In addition to the subjects which I have 
read to you, there was a brief discussion of 
Southeast Asia and the Middle Ea.st, subjects 
that were covered at greater length in the 
meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 

Tomorrow President Nixon and President 
Pompidou will address the bilateral relations 
between the United States and France, and 
we are confident that these talks will be 
characterized by the same constructive and 
friendly spirit that was so evident today. 

Now I will be glad to answer some 
questions. 

Q. Dr. Kissmger, 7oas there a date, or a 
rough date, set for the President's trip to 
Europe ? 

Dr. Kissinger: No, but we talked in general 
terms of the time frame I gave you at our 
last meeting — the end of October or early 
November. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in expressing the state- 
ment about whether or not there woidd be a 
summit meeting depends on these results, 
could President Pom}>idou speak for Brandt, 
Heath, and others? 

Dr. Kissinger: Obviously President Pom- 
pidou speaks for France. Obviously the 
utility of the summit meeting depends on the 



willing participation of the principal leaders. 
President Pomjndou did not pretend to speak 
for Heath or Brandt, both of whom have ex- 
pressed their views on the subject before. 

But it has always been our view that the 
summit was not an end of itself. You remem- 
ber I said this at the White House before we 
left. What we feel is necessary is a discus- 
sion of the future of the Atlantic alliance and 
of the Atlantic relationship. 

The first step in this direction was to es- 
tablish procedures by which this review 
could be carried out. These procedures have 
now been substantially established, and what 
the next step should be we will leave to the 
evolution of these discussions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, this sounds like a con- 
cession on the part of France in terms of 
setting a framework of principles. Is that 
true, ivas this ivorked out today? It sounds 
like it is more conciliatory than you had be- 
fore. And also the linkage betiveen the midti- 
lateral and bilateral. 

Dr. Kissinger: No. There has never been 
any debate about the fact that bilateral 
talks could go on side by side with multi- 
lateral talks. Our position has always been 
that we did not intend what we have called 
the "Year of Europe" either to undermine 
European unity — on the contrary, we want to 
foster it — or to push it through against the 
opposition of major allies. 

And therefore we had always envisaged 
and had never found any oiiposition to the 
idea that bilateral talks and multilateral 
talks would go on side by side. 

As for these results, we have not a]> 
proached today's discussion from the atti- 
tude that one side would win and another 
side would lose. Each side had expressed cer- 
tain views prior to the meetings. I told you 
on Tuesday that I did not believe that the 
French views and ours were as antithetical 
as some of the reports had indicated.^ 

I think what we can say is that the two 



'' For the transcript of a news conference held 
by Dr. Kissinger at Washington on May 29, see 
White House press release dated May 29, 1973. 



July 2, 1973 



11 



Presidents talked in a spirit of allies and of 
men who had been meeting for a long time 
and looked at the practical methods by which 
we could determine what there was in our 
proposal and set up the jn'ocedures by which 
they could be realized. 

Q. Did you submit a draft of the frame- 
work of principles to the President ? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have not submitted a 
draft of the framework of principles to 
anybody at this point, and we will not do so 
until we have had some preliminary bilateral 
discussions with some of the countries most 
concerned. 

Q. Henry, could you spell out in some de- 
tail tvhat you talked about as differences and 
how ive can best achieve our common objec- 
tives — what are those differences? 

Dr. Kissinger: I said that the differences, 
such as they are, concern disagreement 
on how to achieve common objectives. The 
meetings today were not really conducted in 
a contentious spirit. It was not a catalogue 
of disagreement. It was rather in order to 
understand what the approach of each side 
was. 

For example, we know the difference on 
the monetary question between our two coun- 
tries. But I think also that we both aim for a 
stable system that brings into the monetary 
field the same degree of stability that we are 
hoping to bring into the international field 
by our political initiative. 

There has been some discussion or some 
disagreement — I can't really say disagree- 
ment, but there has been perhaps a difference 
in emphasis as to how rigidly one should 
commit oneself to a particular procedure to 
follow in the discussions that are foreseen 
for this year. 

It was resolved on the basis the results of 
these discussions would guide the commit- 
ments to particular forums rather than tie 
ourselves now to a fixed forum. 

But as I have tried to point out, the dif- 
ferences were not as absolute as had been 
presented previously and the attitude was 
such to show this degree of progress. 



Q. Do the French now seem more clearly 
to see the larger political realities you have 
talked about in terms of putting it all to- 
gether in the three major areas of concern? 

Dr. Kissi7iger: I think the fact of the 
matter is that some of the problems that we 
have been reading about will, without any 
question, reappear in the actual discussions 
that are now going on. 

The two Presidents spoke more in terms of 
basic objectives than in terms of solving 
every issue before the alliance and before the 
two countries. 

I think the French understand better 
now — but they of course will have to speak 
for themselves — what we had in mind, which 
was not to use one area as blackmail for the 
other area, but rather to proceed to a general 
discussion by examining each of the areas 
and then seeing how they related to each 
other. 

Q. Can you say they agree on the basic 
objectives? 

Dr. Kissinger: I am not the best man 
to speak for the French point of view. They 
have their own spokesman here. 

I would say that we have worked out 
satisfactory procedures so that we can go 
ahead with the examination of the issues 
that we have wanted to put before the allies. 
Whether the basic objective will then emerge 
identical or different, we should leave to 
these negotiations. 

We have never said that we knew now 
what the common objective was. What we 
have said is that there is a need to attempt to 
define it and to establish a method for ex- 
amining it. That I believe we have made some 
progress toward ; and we shall pursue it 
with conviction and with energy, and we will 
begin our talks with Monsieur Jobert — I will 
begin the bilateral talks — next Thursday in 
Paris. 

Q. How do you now assess the prospects 
of getting a set of principles? 

Dr. Kissinger: I will want to see how 
the discussions that are starting in the de- 
fense field, that are going on in the trade 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



field, how the bilateral talks going on between 
us and the French and other European coun- 
tries, will develop. 

Let me add it is clearly understood by the 
two Presidents that while we will conduct 
bilateral talks with France, we will also con- 
duct bilateral talks with several other Euro- 
pean countries as these negotiations proceed 
and I would rather leave the estimate of how 
well they will go for later. 

We believe it is in the common interest 
to proceed. We will proceed very seriously 
with the attitude that nothing we develop 
will have any meaning unless it has the will- 
ing support of our European allies. So we 
are not going to hand them an American 
blueprint. We are not going to proceed on 
the basis that we know best, and we ai-e 
not doing it from the basis of undermining 
European unity — but rather strengthening 
it — or detracting from those areas in which 
the Europeans believe autonomous action 
is desirable. 

Q. Henry, you made a reference at one 
point to not tying ourselves too rigidly to 
fixed procedures or fixed deadlines, some- 
thing fixed. Was this a reference — can rve 
infer from that that you tvere talking about 
any specific or fixed commitment for a re- 
turn to convertibility? Is that the reference 
there? 

Dr. Kissinger: No, that was not the 
reference. 

The question is, when I said that we are 
not wedded to fixed procedures and fixed 
deadlines, did I mean convertibility? 

Of course convertibility is one of the issues. 
Another issue is this: We don't want to 
say that there must be, for example, a sum- 
mit meeting by October 15 or November 15 
and then gear everything to an artificial 
deadline that we have established. It is pos- 
sible that this could happen. 

It is also possible the discussions this year 
will lead to a point where, at the time of the 
President's trip to Europe, some further 
bilateral talks are needed and the time is 
not yet ripe for such a meeting. 

We are not wedded to one fixed procedure 
in achieving the general objective that we 



have set or in defining its attainability. 

Mr. Apple [R. W. Apple, Jr., New York 
Times]. 

Q. You said whether there would be a sunv- 
mit ivould depend on whether the bilateral 
and multilateral talks go ivell. That is ex- 
actly irhat the French and British said after 
the Heath -Poinpidou meeting publicly, and 
then privately they said they saw no pros- 
pect whatever where the bilateral and midti- 
lateral negotiations could be brought to a 
point where a summit would be possible 
late this year. Would you comment on that 
in light of this morning's meeting? 

Dr. Kissinger: I would have no estimate 
on that on the basis of this morning's 
meeting. I think we will be in a much better 
position to judge this around July when some 
of the discussions will have actually been 
taking place and w^hen perhaps the Deputy 
Foreign Ministers meeting is in the process 
of being organized or taking place. 

Q. Do you think it toill be possible to de- 
velop a rational, reasonable possibility that 
a European summit can take place this fall? 

Dr. Kissinger: I think there is a possi- 
bility, but I wouldn't want to tie ourselves to 
it. It really is too early to tell. I think that 
is the best answer I can give you. 

Q. Is it fair to say that we are more in- 
terested in having this summit in the fall 
than the French or some of the other Euro- 
peans, and why ivould that be? 

Dr. Kissinger: We are agnostic on the 
issue of the summit. It depends on what 
progress there has been made. 

The French, I think it is correct to say, are 
somewhat more reluctant about the sum- 
mit. The other Europeans, like the British 
and Germans, are perhaps a little closer to 
our point of view. 

But I don't think it is important to fight a 
theological battle on that issue. It has never 
been put forward as a principal American 
objective. It was first stated as a possible 
means by Chancellor Brandt on the occasion 
of his visit to Washington. 

We are prepared to examine it and we are 
prepared to participate in it if it is going 



July 2, 1973 



13 



to be useful, but we do not want to invest 
now in a great deal of debate on the issue of 
a forum when we have so much substance 
that needs to be discussed. 

Q. Do we have an agreement tvith other 
allies on these procedures you have outlined? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have had preliminary 
talks with some other countries on these 
procedures and we believe they will look 
favorably on them, but I said the two 
Presidents envisaged this and it will of 
course have to be discussed in greater de- 
tail with all the other countries, including 
those with whom we did not have preliminary 
exchanges. 

Mr. Zicgler: We have time for two more 
questions. We will go to Jim and then over 
here. 

Q. Wluit ideas or concepts might be in- 
clvxled in this declaration of principles? 

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, we have to 
see whether the negotiations as they pro- 
gress lend themselves to a declaration of 
principles. 

As I said, I can only tell you what our idea 
is and this is not a subject we have had an 
opportunity to discuss fully with all the 
others. It is to state some goals and purposes 
in the major areas — political, military, and 
economic — which then can guide the negotia- 
tions in these areas and the structures of the 
alliance over the next few years. 

Again, we will be able to be more precise 
on this when the other negotiations are 
somewhat further advanced. 

Q. What could be a possible framework 
for this summit? You mentioned in Wash- 
ington the EEC [European Economic Com- 
munity] or NATO, or an ad hoc framework. 
What are you thinking of now ? 

Dr. Kissinger: I can't answer the question, 
because the two Presidents obviously did 
not discuss the framework of a summit 
when they had not decided on a summit. 
My personal guess would be it is more 
likely to be on an ad hoc basis than on 
a basis within the framework of existing 



institutions if it takes place. I want to re- 
peat, that is a decision that has deliberately 
been left for later. 

Q. Speaking of a European summit, what 
countries do you have in mind that would he 
included? 

Dr. Kissinger: I find it amazing at this 
press conference most questions concern an 
issue which I said has not been decided yet. 
The composition of a conference that has 
not been agreed to is awfully hard to deter- 
mine. 

Q. Are you going to talk to several coun- 
tries about it? 

Dr. Kissinger: I would think it is the 
NATO countries plus those members of the 
EEC that are not members of NATO. 

Q. Are all of these negotiations going to 
take place within an existing organism? 

Dr. Kissinger: The trade and defense 
negotiations will take place within existing 
organizations. The political discussions will 
take place through diplomatic channels. 

In addition, there will be intensive bilateral 
discussions and then of course there is this 
idea of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. 

Mr. Ziegler: Thank you very much. We 
have copies of the President's toast for 
tonight which will be available immediately 
after this meeting. 

Q. You have been talking of great poivers, 
but you have not mentioned any small power. 
You are in Iceland now. Fi7-st, does the Presi- 
dent of the United States know that the 
British are shooting Iceland out of NATO, 
and what is he going to do about it? I am 
from the biggest newspaper in Iceland. 

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the question, 
which was, does the United States under- 
stand there is shooting going on — 

Q. No. Does your government know that 
the British are shooting Iceland out of NATO 
because of their behavior in Iceland, and 
what are the Americans doing about it? 

Dr. Kissinger: The United States is aware 
of the tensions that exist between Brit- 
ain and Iceland at this particular moment. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



The President had an opportunity to discuss 
this subject yesterday with your President, 
Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, who 
stated the Icelandic case very ably and very 
passionately. 

I don't think it is appropriate on the oc- 
casion of a visit to Iceland for the purpose 
of discussions with France to take a formal 
U.S. position on this dispute. But I will say 
it pains us that two good friends of ours are 
in this controversy, that we hope veiy much 
that it can be amicably resolved, and that we 
will do our best to contribute to a construc- 
tive solution. 

The Press: Thank you. 



U.S. Swimmers and Divers Tour 
People's Republic of China 

The Department of State announced on 
May 18 (press release 161) that 10 top Amer- 
ican swimmers and divers, including five 
Olympic gold medalists, would tour the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China for three weeks be- 
ginning June 2. (For a list of team members, 
see press release 161.) 

The group, consisting of eight swimmers 
and two divers, is the first American athletic 
team to visit the People's Republic of China 
since the U.S. table tennis team tour in April 
1971. Earlier in May it was announced that 
U.S. men's and women's basketball teams 
would tour the P.R.C. starting in mid-June. 

The American aquatic team is visiting the 
P.R.C. at the invitation of the All-China 
Sports Federation. Arrangements for the 
tour were made with the assistance of the 
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations 
in New York City. The American team will 
not engage in oflicial competition with 
Chinese swimmers but will hold demonstra- 
tions, clinics, exhibitions, and discussions of 
swimming and diving techniques. 



World Environment Day 

A PROCLAMATION' 

As the astronauts of Skylab I orbit the earth in 
America's first manned space station, we are mind- 
ful once again of the essential unity of mankind — 
bound together by the finite resources of one small 
planet. One of the chief concerns of this and sub- 
sequent space missions will be the resources of the 
earth and the quality of its environment. As before, 
our findings will form the basis for positive contri- 
butions to our fellow man. 

But we do not have to rely upon the results of 
space research to improve the earth's environment. 
All men and women have a personal role to play in 
this vital endeavor. The United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment held last June, with the 
participation of one hundred and thirteen nations, 
was a reflection of the increased understanding of 
all mankind that environmental quality is every- 
body's business — superseding any temporary dif- 
ferences which may hamper relations between 
nations. 

In response to a resolution of the Conference on 
the Human Environment, the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly last December endorsed a recommen- 
dation reading, in part, as follows: 

"The General Assembly . . . designates 5 June as 
World Environment Day and urges Governments 
and the organizations in the United Nations System 
to undertake on that day every year world-wide 
activities reaffirming their concern for the preserva- 
tion and enhancement of the environment, with a 
view to deepening environmental awareness and to 
pursuing the determination expressed at the Con- 
ference." 

Now, THEREFORE, I, RiCHARD NiXON, President of 
the United States of America, do, in support of the 
action of the United Nations General Assembly, call 
on the people of the United States and United States 
Government agencies to observe June 5 as World 
Environment Day with appropriate ceremonies and 
activities emphasizing the concern of Americans for 
a better environment in which to live. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this fourth day of June in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the one 
hundred ninety-seventh. 



C^ZjL^-^K:/^ 



' No. 4219; 38 Fed. Reg. 14739. 



July 2, 1973 



15 



Restoring Europe's Sense of Unity 



Address by Richard F. Pedersen 
Counselor of the Department ^ 



In his foreign i^olicy report last March 
President Nixon called 1973 the year of 
Europe, not because he felt we could over- 
come the problems of the Atlantic community 
in any single year, but because changes in 
the international situation would pose both 
new problems and oi5i)ortunities in our 
European relations. Subsequently Dr. [Henry 
A.] Kissinger described our goal as one of 
making the Atlantic relationship a force less 
geared to crisis and more conscious of op- 
portunities, drawing its inspiration from 
goals rather than from feai's. And in dis- 
cussing European affairs in his own report 
to the Congress, Secretary of State Rogers 
stressed that a substantially higher level of 
worldwide cooperation is required among 
Japan, Canada, western Europe, Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United States in solv- 
ing common trade and monetary problems, 
assisting in the growth of the developing 
world, and contributing toward a politically 
sounder world. 

Central to all of these statements was our 
intention to build new relationships among 
our closest associates that will contribute to 
a durable structure of peace for the rest of 
this century. 

At the same time the so-called year of 
Europe also retains a large dimension be- 
yond that of cooperation among allies and 
close friends. It is that dimension which I 
wish to discuss with you today. 

Improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, in- 
creasingly normalized relations between 



' Made before the Commonwealth Club at San 
Francisco, Calif., on June 8 (press release 200). 



eastern and western European states, the 
agreements which are eliminating Berlin as 
a source of tension, and expanding trade and 
human relationships are creating prospects 
for a decisive lowering of barriers to Eu- 
rope's sense of unity. Consequently, 1973 will 
not only be a year of renewed cooperation 
with western Europe. It is a year in which 
we are seeking to engage the countries of 
eastern Europe in an expanding set of close 
and individual relationships — with ourselves 
and with western European nations alike. We 
are on the verge of a quite different relation- 
ship with eastern Europe than the one of the 
past quarter century. Our intention is to 
move as rapidly toward it as the countries of 
eastern Europe are prepared to do. 

We will be pursuing our effort through a 
series of negotiations — in the President's 
talks with General Secretary [Leonid I.] 
Brezhnev this month, in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe sched- 
uled to convene this summer, and in the 
negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions (MBFR) in the fall. We will be 
])ursuing the effort also through a substan- 
tial number of bilateral negotiations and 
consultations already in process with the 
countries of eastern Europe. 

There are three areas in which advances 
need to be made: in bringing about greater 
freedom of movement of people and ideas 
throughout Europe, in lowering the level of 
forces confronting each other on the con- 
tinent, and in expanding trade, investment, 
and commercial relations. 

Last December at a session of Foreign 
Ministers in Brussels we and the other mem- 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



bers of NATO concurred upon a major 
allied objective of bringing about a wider 
flow of information and ideas and a closer, 
more open, and freer relationship among all 
people in Europe. The United States was 
particularly pleased. We are convinced that 
lasting improvements in relationships with 
eastern Europe must be grounded in a re- 
newal of the human exchange and open con- 
tacts that have been curtailed over the past 
25 years. The opening session of this sum- 
mer's European conference will provide the 
opportunity for us to test the degree of prog- 
ress that is currently possible. 

To be truly useful in opening up a new 
period of European relationships, the con- 
ference must avoid simply hortatory or sym- 
bolic results. It must be directed toward 
concrete and practical accomplishments. Our 
experience in preparatory meetings this 
spring makes us cautiously optimistic that 
such progress will be made. We hope that the 
political barriers that have divided eastern 
Europe from the rest of the continent can 
be lowered in the process. 

I say this because preliminary agreement 
has already been reached not only to estab- 
lish committees on security and on economic 
and technical cooperation but also to estab- 
lish a committee to deal with increased hu- 
man contacts. Mandates to govern the 
operations of these committees — which will 
be set up by this summer's opening session — 
are currently in the final stages of prepara- 
tion. We anticipate that the committee on 
human contacts will establish working sub- 
committees to produce concrete proposals, 
and we are currently developing specific sug- 
gestions with our allies on how the flow of 
information and of people can be increased. 

It would be foolish to pretend that substan- 
tial diff'erences do not exist between Commu- 
nist and democratic societies with respect to 
this item. But in the last two yeai's we have 
concluded a substantial number of new agi'ee- 
ments with eastern European countries that 
are already enlarging cooj^eration and con- 
tacts among our peoples. We believe that ex- 
perience under those agreements will demon- 



strate that such contacts, far from being a 
threat to anyone's security, will contribute 
to the welfare of all. 

Last December Mr. Brezhnev indicated 
that the possibilities of progi-ess in this area 
were "quite broad." We hope that this atti- 
tude and the progress we have subsequently 
made in preparatory talks will lead to sub- 
stantial results this summer. Certainly that 
will be an important objective of ours. 

The conference will be develoijing a set of 
principles to govern relations between states 
in Europe, of which freer movement will be 
a part. The countries of eastern Europe also 
attach considerable importance to a provision 
concerning the inviolability of territorial 
boundaries. We understand this concern, just 
as we believe they understand our concern 
that this concept not be used as a pretext for 
ratifying a political division in Europe. What 
is needed is not something that emphasizes 
diff'erences but something that enhances co- 
operation among all states and that assures 
each state of its political and territorial in- 
tegrity vis-a-vis each other state. 

Europe is slowly evolving toward a con- 
tinent no longer divided into two blocs but 
characterized by more open contacts among 
all states. This of course is an objective we 
have long held. It is one which has now been 
endorsed — though with some differences of 
intent — by the Warsaw Pact early in 1972 
when it called for a transformation of rela- 
tions that would make it possible to over- 
come the splitting of the continent into 
military-political groupings. 

Such a process will be assisted by the 
agreement we made with the Soviet Union 
in Moscow last spring that each of us would 
contribute to the "positive trends on the 
European continent toward a genuine de- 
tente and the development of relations 
of peaceful cooperation among states in 
Europe." - And by the agreement we both 
reached to recognize equality of all states; 
to make no claim to a«y special rights or 



" For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow 
on May 29, 1972, during President Nixon's visit, see 
Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 899. 



July 2, 1973 



17 



advantages in world affairs; and to seek to 
promote conditions in which no country will 
be subject to outside interference in its in- 
ternal affairs.' 

The Moscow summit laid the foundation 
for a markedly im]iroved relationship be- 
tween our two countries. It can also have an 
important effect upon the evolution of all 
contacts among Europe's sovereign states. 
We do not deal with nations of eastern 
Europe through Moscow. Indeed, we have 
made explicitly clear our intention to deal 
with each of them separately in its own dis- 
tinct sovereign right. But it is obviously 
easier for the governments of eastern Europe 
to expand their cooperation with us and 
with states in western Europe as the Soviet 
Union moves in the same direction. 

We anticipate that the summit soon to take 
place in Washington will facilitate further 
substantial improvements. 

And we will seek to insure that this sum- 
mer's conference will reinforce the territorial 
integrity of each state of Europe against in- 
tervention from any other state, whatever 
their social systems and regardless of 
whether or not they are members of the 
same political grouping. 

Lowering the Level of Military Forces 

A balanced reduction in the level of mili- 
tary forces would also make an important 
contribution toward lowering barriers be- 
tween countries in eastern and western 
Europe by reducing the intensity and risks 
of confrontation their presence implies. 

The remarkable progress made on the Ber- 
lin problem and the recent lowering of politi- 
cal tensions make it both possible and de- 
sirable to bring about a reduction in the 
forces stationed in central Europe. Indeed, 
we see this as an important parallel step 
that should accompany progress in the Euro- 
pean conference so that ijresent favorable 
trends may be given momentum. Such a 



' For text of the Basic Principles of Relations 
Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed 
at Moscow on May 29, 1972, see ibid., p. 898. 



process would be advantageous to the states 
of eastern as well as of western Europe. 

Since January we and our allies have been 
meeting in Vienna with eastern European 
representatives to plan for formal negotia- 
tions. These talks have not always been easy, 
and differences of view persist, particularly 
on the states which should ultimately partici- 
pate in the agreements. But a basis for open- 
ing negotiations has been arrived at. It is 
now important that agreement be reached for 
formal negotiations to begin no later than 
this October. 

Parallel with the preparatory talks in Vi- 
enna we have been developing in Brussels 
with our NATO allies a common approach to 
the specific types and scopes of reduction we 
would wish to negotiate. Substantial concur- 
rence has now been reached in NATO on a 
guidelines paper covering these and other 
negotiating issues. Remaining unresolved 
questions will be discussed by the Foreign 
Ministers in the meeting Secretary Rogers 
is attending next week and subsequently by 
the NATO Council. 

I might note that while a simple mathe- 
matical approach would be to seek equal 
reductions on both sides, it could also result 
in an inequitable result because of other fac- 
tors favoring the Warsaw Pact, such as 
differences in the size, composition, and of- 
fensive orientation of Warsaw Pact forces 
and geographic advantages in reinforcement 
of the Soviet Union over the United States. 
To reduce these advantages, allied objectives 
in MBFR could include achieving comparable 
overall levels in ground forces. American and 
Soviet forces, which are not indigenous to 
central Europe, are likely to be initial can- 
didates for reduction. 

It will also be an important allied goal, and 
should be a common objective of all parti- 
cipants, to insure that the provisions of an 
MBFR agreement will not be circumvented 
or undermined. Constraints that would lower 
risks stemming from the presence of troops 
might even precede reductions. And con- 
straints and noncircumvention provisions 
should be an integral part of the reduction 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



agreement, for adequate verification of per- 
tinent military activities of each side would 
furtlier increase political confidence. 

We are aware that in the United States 
there are still some who would like to see us 
reduce our own forces in Europe unilaterally, 
while in western Europe some remain con- 
cerned that we may make a separate bi- 
lateral agreement with the Soviet Union. We 
intend to do neither, for either of these steps 
would contribute to insecurity, the opposite 
of the result we seek. 

The new deficit of payments for the main- 
tenance of our military deployment in 
Europe last year was about $iyo billion. The 
alliance has already recognized the desira- 
bility of alleviating balance of payments 
deficits arising from military expenditures 
in the common defense. In addition to our 
negotiations on MBFR we will therefore be 
seeking further allied action to provide a 
lasting solution to this problem. 

Advances in Economic and Commercial Area 

In the area of economic and commercial 
relations — which must accompany improved 
security and greater freedom of people and 
ideas as relations with eastern Europe pro- 
gress — substantial advances have already 
been made. And even more substantial 
changes are in prospect. 

In the decade of the 1960's the trade of 
eastern Europe in CEMA [Council for Eco- 
nomic Mutual Assistance (COMECON)] 
with the rest of the continent increased from 
a level of about $3 billion to a level of over 
$9 billion. Our own trade with them has 
reached a level of about $.500 million. Still it 
remains limited, totaling less than 1 percent 
of our foreign trade; and though we antici- 
pate even greater increases, it would be un- 
realistic to expect our trade with eastern 
Europe to become a significant proportion of 
our foreign trade. 

Nevertheless we enjoy a favorable balance 
in our trade with eastern European states of 
over two to one — and we could expect to re- 
tain a favorable balance under the doubling 



or tripling of trade that can be foreseen over 
the next few years. 

We also strongly desire a normalization of 
our economic relations with eastern Europe 
in the conviction that economic interdepend- 
ence and expanded East-West trade can be- 
come a pivotal element in building a structure 
of peace. 

Last fall Secretary Rogers instructed our 
Ambassadors in eastern Europe to place 
trade promotion at the very top of the list of 
our policy priorities. We are increasing the 
number of commercial oflJicers in our Em- 
bassies throughout eastern Europe. Last fall 
we opened a trade information office in Po- 
land, and in a few days we will open a new 
East- West trade center in Vienna. Our policy 
has already begun to show results. Exports 
to eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. in 1972 
were more than double those in 1971, and we 
anticipate steady future growth. 

Significant improvement in trade and com- 
mercial arrangements with eastern Europe 
now requires further action on our own part. 
Since 1951, principally for political reasons, 
no Communist state other than Yugoslavia 
and Poland has received most-favored-nation 
(MFN) treatment from the United States. 

In 1971 we infoi'med Romania of our in- 
tention to seek most-favored-nation treat- 
ment for it as part of a commercial 
agreement. In 1972, in our new trade and 
lend-lease debt agreements with the Soviet 
Union, we undertook to seek from Congress 
a similar status for it. More recently we have 
informed Hungary of the administration's 
intent to seek approval to negotiate the ex- 
tension of such treatment to them also. In 
April, in the Trade Reform Act, the Presi- 
dent requested requisite authority to extend 
MFN to them and to other states where it 
would serve our interests. The executive 
branch will make every eff'ort to obtain 
congressional approval of this bill so that we 
may proceed toward the accelerated trade 
relations with eastern Europe that we desire. 

We will, of course, expect similar treat- 
ment in return. While in most countries with 



July 2, 1973 



19 



centrally directed economies tariff provisions 
do not have gi-eat practical significance, in- 
creasing- diversification of eastern Europe 
makes generalizations inappropriate. In a 
country w^ith a relatively liberalized system 
such as Hungary, for example, the 100 per- 
cent higher tariffs our exporters face over 
those from western Europe is a real obstacle 
which reciprocal extension of MFN would 
overcome. 

As a further step toward normalization of 
economic relations we are also substantially 
reducing the U.S. export control list to bring 
it more closely into line with the common 
strategic embargo list maintained by NATO 
countries and Japan. This step will at the 
same time maintain necessary security con- 
trols while reducing barriers to eastern 
European acquisition of industrial technol- 
ogy in which we are competitive. 

We are also ready to consider a broader 
availability of Export-Import Bank credits 
and guarantees for the sale of U.S. goods — 
beyond the recent extensions to Romania and 
the Soviet Union — as relations with indivi- 
dual countries improve and as outstanding 
claims and defaulted bonds are settled. 

But trade normalization is a two-way 
street, and we also will be seeking improve- 
ments which would facilitate the functioning 
of free enterprise traders with state- 
managed economies. 

An important element will be to insure 
that normal facilities which will automati- 
cally be available to their representatives 
here also will be available to U.S. business- 
men in eastern European countries: 

— To be physically represented on a perma- 
nent basis, through their own offices as well 
as through local agents; 

— To have direct trading access to end 
users and not to be restricted to specially 
created foreign trading companies; 

— To have rights to multiple entry visas 
and unrestricted use of such normal business 
facilities as telex lines; and 

— To be given equitable exchange rate and 
tax treatment. 

We will seek provisions for arbitration of 



commercial disputes through impartial third- 
country sources. And we will need to provide 
for the right to protect ourselves against 
market disruptions along the lines which the 
President has requested in his proposed 
changes to our own foreign trade laws. 

In the past few years we have already 
made substantial progress in relations with 
states in eastern Europe. Just two days ago 
the Secretary of State exchanged ratifica- 
tions of new consular agreements with Po- 
land, Romania, and Hungary. We have 
initiated consultations on similar agreements 
with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. 

We have a new joint trade commission, a 
scientific-technological agreement, and an air 
transport agreement with Poland; scientific 
cooperation, air transport, and claims agree- 
ments with Hungary; reduced travel con- 
trols and cultural exchange agreements with 
Romania. 

Normalization is also evident in the in- 
creasing integration of eastern Europe into 
the world payments and trade system. Better 
relations are developing between banks and 
other financial institutions of East and West. 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Ro- 
mania have become members of the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. 
Hungary is expected to do so this year. Yugo- 
slavia and Romania have become members of 
the IMF and IBRD [International Monetary 
Fund; International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development]. And Hungary has floated 
a bond issue in western Europe. 

We welcome all of these steps. For it is our 
firm conviction that by bringing eastern 
Europe into more normal contact with other 
nations we will take a long step toward a 
permanent structure of peace. 

Industrial Cooperation With Eastern Europe 

The degree toward which cooperative eco- 
nomic endeavor is progressing may be most 
visibly seen, however, in an area of coopera- 
tion I have not yet touched on — that of indus- 
trial coojDeration through joint ventures and 
investments in eastern Europe. 

For some time co-production — with West- 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



ern partners providing l<now-how, machinery, 
and components on credit against subsequent 
delivery of finished products — has been in- 
creasing. We estimate that roughly a thou- 
sand industrial cooperation projects are 
already in existence — though few exist with 
American firms outside the fields of hotel 
construction and operation. 

Nevertheless joint projects are anticipated 
under recent agreements with the Soviet 
l^nion by Occidental and General Electric 
and already exist with Clark and Interna- 
tional Harvester in Poland, Food Machinery 
Corporation and Corn Production Systems in 
Hungary, and throughout eastern Europe by 
our cola companies. 

Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary have 
also announced rules for an even more far- 
reaching step — permitting management and 
equity participation up to a 49 percent share 
by Western firms in joint ventures in their 
country. Poland has a comparable law under 
consideration. At least a few joint equity 
ventures in Yugoslavia and Romania have 
already been established. In Romania an 
American firm, Control Data Corporation, 
acquired a month ago a 45 percent interest in 
a joint corporation established with the Min- 
istry of Machine Tools and Electronics under 
the name of Romcontroldata — a company 
that will produce card punchers and card 
readers both for domestic use and for export. 
Several such equity ventures were previously 
established in Yugoslavia. 

Whether full equity participation in a 
Western sense can be expected in enterprises 
located in a centrally planned economy re- 
mains to be ascertained through practice. 
But the experimentation now underway of- 
fers new prospects for economic cooperation 
across ideological barriers hardly conceivable 
only a few years ago. We would like to see 
more U.S. comimnies active in a field which 



can help to create lasting ties of mutual 
economic benefit. 

In speaking today of our desire to con- 
tribute to a new sense of unity throughout 
Europe and to improve our own relations 
with the states of eastern Europe I have 
necessarily done so in broad terms which 
encompass the region as a whole. 

I do not want to end, however, without 
emphasizing the diversity and distinctiveness 
of eastern Europe's various states. Inherit- 
ors of a long history of struggles for inde- 
pendence among themselves and with other 
powers, victims of terrible physical destruc- 
tion in two world wars (Poland and Yugo- 
slavia had the highest fatalities per capita 
of any states in World War II), and posses- 
sors of strong national identities, they are 
states of proud and courageous peoples. 

They encompass countries with active roles 
in international affairs such as those long 
played by Yugoslavia and Romania in inter- 
national oi'ganizations and currently, though 
with some impact in our own relations, by 
Poland and Hungary in Southeast Asia. They 
differ substantially in internal economic pol- 
icies (encompassing such differences as Hun- 
gary's new economic mechanism with its 
emphasis upon local enterprise responsi- 
bility, Poland's successful agricultural pro- 
gram with 80 percent of the farms in 
private hands, and a highly centralized Ro- 
manian economy). And they even diverge on 
occasion in foreign policies — as the markedly 
different perspectives of Albania and Bul- 
garia make apparent. 

Thus we are dealing and intend to deal 
with each state in eastern Europe differently, 
determining our policy in accordance with 
the specific attitudes and actions of each, and 
looking forward to a return to our once 
wider association with all the nations of the 
area. 



July 2, 1973 



21 



U.S. Economic Policies and Their Implications 
for Latin America and the Caribbean 



Statement by William J. Casey 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs 



It is a pleasure to be here for the opening 
session of the third annual CIAP review of 
U.S. economic policies and their implications 
for the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. I come to this meeting fresh 
from the very interesting and rewarding 
journey through Latin America and the Car- 
ibbean which I have just made with Secre- 
tary Rogers. During the 17 days of that visit 
I had the opportunity to meet with many 
people in government and business engaged 
in the economic and development activities 
of that region. I have listened to their ideas. 
I was greatly impressed by a great sense of 
purpose, by a generally clear perception of 
where they want to go and what they need to 
do to get there, and by a keen interest and 
extensive knowledge of economic develop- 
ments in their own countries and in the 
world. 

I know that the two previous reviews of 
my country's economic developments and 
policies have been fruitful ones. Much of the 
credit goes to you, Dr. Sanz de Santamaria 
[Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Chairman of 
CIAP], for your able leadership. We expect 
to do all that we can, together with the Com- 
mittee, to make the third annual review an 
equal success. 

We are pleased to note that this year's 
background document for the review dif- 



' Made before the Inter-American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) on May 31 (press 
release 189). Under Secretary Casey was head of 
the U.S. delegation to the third annual CIAP re- 
view of U.S. economic policies. 



fered from the earlier reports in that it put 
forward a series of proposals for modifica- 
tions in our policy. While we probably can- 
not accept all of them, we will give them 
careful consideration. We share the general 
concept behind CIAP 605 in its thrust — to 
coordinate economic policies contributing to 
development — and its concern that, given the 
uncertain future of official development as- 
sistance, more attention should be given to 
the changing composition of capital flows 
with increased private lending to increase the 
flow of resources to the region. Recognizing 
the internal and external constraints on the 
U.S. economy, many of the specific policy 
measures cannot be implemented immedi- 
ately but will be considered by us as we pur- 
sue the task of updating our policy toward 
LDC's [less developed countries] to coor- 
dinate various economic and assistance ele- 
ments. I would like to commend the staff of 
this Committee for the constructive outlook 
and the salient thought which have gone into 
their document. 

President Nixon, in his message to the 
OAS General Assembly, renewed our con- 
tinued commitments to hemisphere coopera- 
tion and reaffirmed our purpose to build and 
strengthen a mature partnership among na- 
tions of this hemisphere. He has underscored 
our dee\) interest in Latin America with Sec- 
retary Rogers and with his announcement 
that he will visit the region himself soon. 
Today I will undertaJ\e to assess for you the 
current economic posture of the United 
States and our broad objectives in improving 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



the international economic order in a manner 
which will further facilitate economic prog- 
ress for all of us. My colleagues on the dele- 
gation will discuss the U.S. domestic econ- 
omy, our balance of payments, our trade and 
commodity policies, our approach to the up- 
coming multilateral trade negotiations and 
reform of the world monetary system, and 
our policies on multilateral and bilateral de- 
velopment financing and assistance, elabo- 
rating in greater detail on subjects I will 
touch on broadly. 

A review of U.S. international economic 
policies and their objectives must take into 
account our domestic economic situation, 
which I would like to briefly outline. Nine- 
teen seventy-two was the first full year of 
the innovative set of programs implemented 
in August 1971 to expand economic activity, 
reduce unemployment, and lower the infla- 
tion rate. As the President stated in his 
annual economic report, 1972 was "a very 
good year." The real growth of GNP, 6.5 
percent, was the highest since 1966. Civilian 
employment rose sharply, with 2.3 million 
more people employed than in 1971, the 
largest yearly percentage increase since 
1955; and the unemployment rate declined, 
although it was still higher than desired. 
Both real wages and corporate profits rose. 
Labor productivity was up significantly. 
While progress was made in the fight against 
inflation, prices were higher at the end of the 
year than the level at which the administra- 
tion had aimed. 

The situation during the first months of 
1973 has been somewhat mixed. The economy 
has continued to expand at an annual rate of 
8 percent in real terms; but a series of fac- 
tors, some of them temporary, led to rising 
inflation once again. Consumer spending in- 
creased significantly during the first quarter, 
and the nation's factories were operating at 
more than 80 percent of capacity, the highest 
level since 1969. However, the GNP deflator 
rose in the first quarter at an annual rate of 
about 6 percent. Inflation is thus the most 
critical current problem. 

Our anti-inflation program of 1973 is ad- 



dressed to these three main elements of this 
problem: 

— First, as the principal defense against a 
revival of excess demand we have proposed 
a very restrained budget plus moderation of 
the pace of monetary expansion. We are now 
moving very close to a balanced budget. 

— Second, the leaders of organized labor, 
along with leaders of management, are par- 
ticipating in the development of wage poli- 
cies. These leaders have subscribed to our 
goals of a reduced rate of inflation and rec- 
ognized the need for stabilization of wage 
increases and for industrial peace to achieve 
that goal. So far, wage settlements seem 
likely to be consistent with a moderate rate 
of inflation. 

— Third, the government has taken major 
steps to increase the supply of food and 
thereby to hold down food prices. We have 
increased the acreage available for produc- 
tion of crops and livestock, we have sold 
most of the government-owned stock of food 
commodities, we have eliminated subsidies 
to exports, and we have opened our doors to 
more imports of food. Big rises in food prices 
have reflected worldwide supply shortages 
and a rapid rise of incomes in the United 
States and elsewhere. We believe that the in- 
creased supplies that will be forthcoming, 
as a result of the natural response of farm- 
ers and the measures taken by government, 
will bring this rapid food price rise to an 
end in the second part of this year. 

Thus, our Council of Economic Advisers 
now believes that the most rapid part of the 
expansion has been passed and is estimating 
a significantly declining rate of inflation for 
the rest of the year. This estimate is based 
on the fact that the most rapid part of food 
price rises is behind us, that we probably 
will not encounter a wage explosion in 1973, 
that a decline of residential construction may 
be at hand, and that the rate of growth of 
demand will be less. In addition, the Febru- 
ary devaluation of the dollar has presum- 
ably already had most of its effect on our 
price level. Somewhat more restrictive fiscal 



July 2, 1973 



23 



and monetary policies are also being imple- 
mented to fight price increases. The prognosis 
for the rest of the year is for a rise in GNP 
of about 11 percent on an annual basis, of 
which 7 percent would be an increase in real 
output. 

The U.S. balance of payments remained 
in heavy deficit in 1972. The chief element 
was the deterioration in the trade balance to 
a record annual deficit of more than $6 
billion. Exports were up about 12 percent, 
but imports rose by more than 21 percent. The 
Smithsonian agreement of late 1971 had not 
yet had the time to favorably affect our trade 
patterns. Another partial reason for the 
large deficit was the divergence between the 
high growth rate of the U.S. economy and 
the lower increases in Japan and Europe. 

Other factors were more positive. Progress 
was made in lowering some trade barriers 
and in preparing for the multilateral trade 
negotiations which should benefit our trade 
account. The capital account deficit was de- 
creased from more than $25 billion to about 
$2 billion, and the official reserve transactions 
deficit fell from about $30 billion to about 
$10 billion. 

During the first quarter of 1973 the mer- 
chandise trade deficit narrowed sharply to 
about $900 million, compared to a $1.6 bil- 
lion deficit in the last quarter of 1972. This 
first-quarter deficit was the smallest since 
the third quarter of 1971. A further substan- 
tial improvement occurred in April, and the 
trade balance has turned positive for the 
first time in more than 18 months. 

In my brief outline of the U.S. economy 
and our balance of payments, I have at- 
tempted to sketch some of the major domes- 
tic factors which control and affect our 
overseas activities and objectives. No one 
will question that the U.S. economy no longer 
has the preeminence of earlier years. While 
our economy remains the largest and most 
productive in the world, the growth of Eu- 
rope and Japan greatly reduced or eliminated 
many aspects of U.S. primacy. Many devel- 
oped countries have per capita incomes ap- 
proaching that of the United States, and 



several developing countries have broken 
their cycles of poverty and are well on the 
way to a high level of development. These 
new realities have created the need for mone- 
tary reform, which is already underway, and 
trade negotiations, which will begin later 
this year. 

Importance of Monetary Reform 

We are all familiar with the changes in 
relative international economic positions in 
the last few years which finally required two 
dollar devaluations and set the stage for the 
monetary discussions which are being car- 
ried on in the Committee of Twenty (C-20). 
The challenge of monetary reform is of para- 
mount importance to all. The disequilibrium 
of recent years can too easily lead to restric- 
tions on public and private capital flows and 
especially on trade. A better balance of re- 
serves among countries is essential to correct 
this. The first step — a more realistic ex- 
change rate — has already improved not only 
the U.S. trading position but the competitive 
position of Latin American countries as well. 

The Treasury representative will be pre- 
pared to discuss monetary questions more 
fully, but I can say briefly and in general 
terms that: The United States and Latin 
America are in substantial agreement on the 
close interrelationship between monetary re- 
form and trade, investment, and aid. Both 
the United States and Latin America desire 
monetary reform that jjrovides for adjust- 
ment by countries with surpluses as well as 
those with deficits in their balance of pay- 
ments. Both areas seek exchange rate rela- 
tionships that provide stability and thus 
encourage world trade, and there is interest 
in obtaining a larger flow of development re- 
sources to Latin America from all of the de- 
veloped countries. 

There are some differences as to how ex- 
change rate stability can best be achieved 
and how objective indicators might be ap- 
plied to achieve symmetrical surplus and 
deficit balance of jiayments adjustment, but 
these are being discussed in the C-20, in 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



which Latin America is very ably repre- 
sented. 

Development Assistance 

The United States is prepared to work with 
each nation of Latin America on a one-to-one 
basis to improve the flow of trade and tech- 
nology and capital, both private and public, 
to accelerate its development and enhance 
the contribution which its markets and its 
products make to the world's progress and 
in-osperity. 

We will pursue a comprehensive aid policy 
designed to help stimulate social and eco- 
nomic progress, particularly higher rates of 
per capita economic growth, in the develop- 
ing world — a policy not of aid alone but em- 
ploying a wide variety of economic relation- 
ships, a policy involving coordination with 
other develo])ed countries and requiring seri- 
ous efforts from the developing countries 
themselves. We will pursue it in recogni- 
tion of the fact that just as the developing 
nations need access to the capital and cooper- 
ation of the developed countries, so will we 
increasingly need their cooperation and ac- 
cess to what they can produce. The rapidly 
burgeoning needs of the industrialized world 
for energy and raw material resources offer 
new trade jiossibilities that will both aug- 
ment production and foreign exchange earn- 
ings in the developing world. 

We are reviewing our development policies 
to make them more effective by the fullest co- 
ordinated use of international investment, 
trade expansion, preferences, financing pro- 
vided by multilateral institutions, bilateral 
grant and loan assistance, technical assist- 
ance and training, debt relief, and collabora- 
tion in social and economic institution 
building. 

While on the subject of development as- 
sistance, I would like to comment on one of 
the proposals discussed in the staff docu- 
ment — the flow of resources to the interna- 
tional financial institutions. These institu- 
tions will receive continued support from the 
U.S. Government. It is regrettable that con- 
tributions to the Inter-American Develop- 



ment Bank (IDB) have lagged, but the 
administration is making a strong effort to 
persuade Congress to correct the shortfall 
and provide the appropriations to meet our 
pledge. We agree that the IDB should have 
adequate callable capital in order to facili- 
tate the transfer of resources. We have sup- 
ported the IDE's efforts to bring other 
developed countries into the IDB with sub- 
stantial contributions to the resources of the 
IDB and will continue to do so. 

As a complement to conventional aid flows, 
the CIAP document proposes more flexible 
use of debt relief. This complex subject has 
long been debated within our government. 
Debt relief is considered an extraordinary 
measure to be undertaken only in exceptional 
circumstances. It is not clear that debt re- 
lief provides additional resources for less 
developed countries over and above the nor- 
mal capital flows, and the allocation of re- 
sources provided by debt reschedulings may 
not be in accordance with the greatest need 
for development finance. We expect the com- 
mitments made when a loan is granted to be 
met. Otherwise the flow of credit will falter. 
Situations will develop where we have to con- 
sider i-escheduling. This is a complex prob- 
lem, and in some situations difficulties in 
meeting payment schedules may have to be 
resolved ultimately through some combina- 
tion of policies involving debt relief, resource 
flows, trade, and debtor self-help. 

Foreign Private Direct Investment 

Now I would like to turn to the area of 
investment. Although attitudes toward for- 
eign direct investment in Latin America are 
changing as development proceeds, foreign 
investment, including increasing amounts 
from Europe and Japan, is clearly playing a 
significant role in Latin American develop- 
ment, particularly in those countries which 
show the most rapid growth rate. I found 
general agreement in our discussions with 
Latin American oflicials that foreign private 
direct investment is important and that ef- 
forts to clear up the differences that separate 
investors and host countries and thereby in- 



July 2, 1973 



25 



crease the flow of capital are in the interests 
of both. If this is to be done, it is clear from 
the discussions during our trip that as a 
first essential, in order to create a secure 
and responsible climate for investment, host 
countries must develop ]iolicies and regula- 
tions regarding remittances, technology 
transfer, ownership, local borrowing, and 
the various other asi^ects of investment, 
make these policies clear to the investors, 
and then maintain them consistently. 

The idea of an international effort to define 
investment guidelines which is recommended 
in the CIAP document prepared for this 
meeting is one ajiproach to the question of 
providing more consistent environments for 
investors. This and other efforts at a ra- 
tional apjn-oach to investment are useful and 
in keeping with our jiolicy that foreign pri- 
vate direct investment should be encouraged 
as a primary means of furthering develop- 
ment in Latin America and other developing 
countries. I might add, however, that encour- 
agement does not extend to involving the U.S. 
Government in the terms under which in- 
vestments are made other than in a technical 
advisory caiiacity as for example by our gov- 
ernmental investment insurance agency, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
Further, the encouragement refers to those 
countries where investment is welcome and 
treated fairly when expropriation, earnings 
remittance, and similar problems arise. 

The CIAP document this year stresses an- 
other aspect of investment; namely, portfolio 
investment, particularly via the U.S. capital 
market. Latin American efforts to raise capi- 
tal, not only in the United States, but on the 
other developed country capital markets as 
well, should be of high priority. In fact, these 
markets already are being used by the Latin 
American countries to a significant degree. 
Since 1962, the less developed countries have 
succeeded in raising $1.6 billion in the bond 
markets of various developed countries, with 
Argentina and Mexico accounting for some- 
thing more than half of this amount. Fui-- 
ther, of the top 10 LDC borrowers, eight 
were from Latin America (Mexico, Argen- 



tina, Panama, Venezuela, Jamaica, Brazil, 
Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, in that or- 
der). About one-third of this borrowing was 
obtained in the U.S. capital market. As Latin 
American development moves forward, this 
source of financing should become more im- 
portant. We are prepared to work to reduce 
barriers to the access of Latin American 
issues to these markets. 

It is becoming increasingly clear that both 
the developed and the developing countries 
have a mutual stake in strengthening capital 
markets ai'ound the world and in increasing 
their interrelationships. Although Latin 
America now finances approximately 90 per- 
cent of total investment from its own domes- 
tic savings, as the region industrializes the 
need for large-scale external financing will 
not be fully met by the capabilities of domes- 
tic capital markets or the resources of the 
multinational lending agencies. 

The capital markets program of the OAS — 
funded by a special $5 million U.S. grant — 
and of the IDB is helping Latin American 
countries to make rapid and practical im- 
provements in their domestic capital markets. 
These programs are well underway, and we 
hope full advantage will be taken of them. It 
is obvious that many of the same measures 
which Latin countries can adopt to increase 
the investment in domestic portfolios by 
their own citizens — improved disclosure 
standards and accounting practices, more 
efficient regulatory laws and institutions, 
rationalization of interest rates, appropriate 
taxation and depreciation policies, and re- 
sponsible fiscal and monetary measures — 
will also increase the confidence of foreign 
investors in Latin American issues. Improve- 
ments in local capital markets might also 
encourage the return of the large Latin 
American capital holdings held abroad. 

The OAS and CIAP have raised the idea 
of establishing a new independent organiza- 
tion to promote Latin American capital mar- 
ket development. This might duplicate activ- 
ities already being handled by other entities 
such as the OIF [International Monetary 
Fund] (debt management), the IFC [Inter- 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



national Finance Corporation], and the IDB. 
Also the OAS itself already has its capital 
markets development program. A related 
suggestion concerning the creation of a new 
financial intermediary which would purchase 
Latin American official bonds and resell them 
or sell its own issues in world markets 
is an interesting one which may warrant 
further consideration, although it lacks the 
detail necessary for a full-scale analysis. 

The Issue of Trade Relations 

Let me very briefly turn to the issue of 
trade relations, which we must all work to 
resolve satisfactorily if we hope to meet the 
challenges presented by the rapidly changing 
international economic scene. The reform 
and improvement in those areas I have al- 
ready discussed will not be sufficient unless 
we are also successful in the multilateral 
trade negotiations which will occur later this 
year. 

President Nixon has proposed broad new 
legislative authority for trade negotiations. 
The legislation has as its fundamental prem- 
ise that every nation can and should bene- 
fit from expanding trade and open trade 
practices. 

It is in the elimination of nontariff bar- 
riers that the mutuality of objectives be- 
tween the United States and Latin American 
nations is perhaps greatest. A reduction in 
the barriers to agricultural imports world- 
wide can bring major benefits to all the econ- 
omies in this hemisphere. 

During my recent Latin American trip I 
found great interest in the countries in trade 
relations in general and with the United 
States in particular. Considering the rela- 
tively greater importance which trade (as a 
share of GNP) has in the Latin American 
economies and the predominant position 
which Latin American exports to and imports 
from the United States occupy, this interest 
was not surprising; and I welcomed the 
opportunities that arose to exchange openly 
and seriously our respective views. 

There is mutual recognition that U.S.- 
Latin American trade is developing quite 



well. Between 1969 and 1972 Latin American 
exports to the United States and U.S. exports 
to Latin America both increased by about 35 
percent. Last year our duty-free imports 
from Latin America accounted for 40 percent 
of total im]oorts from the region. The average 
incidence of duty on the dutiable imports was 
under 8 percent. 

The United States realizes that developing 
countries face special difficulties in entering 
world markets, particularly when first at- 
tempting to diversify into nontraditional ex- 
ports. For that reason the trade bill would 
permit the United States to join with other 
industrialized countries in providing develop- 
ing countries access to the markets of indus- 
trialized nations. A broad range of manufac- 
tured products now regulated by tariffs 
would be accorded duty-free treatment in 
instances where countries in the early stages 
of industrialization are beginning to enter 
world markets. 

Generalized preferences have long been a 
goal of the Latin American countries, and 
there was general satisfaction that a U.S. 
proposal had been submitted to Congress. 
But some concerns were expressed, especially 
with respect to the authority proposed for 
the President to designate beneficiaries and 
to the so-called competitive need limitation. 
Preferences are a unilateral, nonreciprocal 
grant by the United States of trade privileges 
to certain countries. We have requested au- 
thority to join other industrialized countries 
in extending these preferences because we 
believe that this would contribute to economic 
development. 

The preference schemes of the other major 
industrialized countries impose quantitative 
limitations on most if not all preferential im- 
ports. The United States could have pro- 
posed this kind of a system, too, but elected 
instead to devise a scheme that would be more 
consistent with the basic objectives of gen- 
eralized preferences; namely, to encourage 
the development of new export industries. 
This is to be done by permitting unrestricted 
entry into the U.S. market up to the point 
where a country's exports of a particular 



July 2, 1973 



27 



product exceed either 50 percent of U.S. 
imports or $25 million. A product that has 
reached these levels of export success would 
not continue to have the incentive provided 
through a preference unless the President 
used his discretionary authority to grant it. 
We think this is a fair and open system pre- 
serving the benefits for those countries most 
in need of them. 

In coming months we will engage each 
other in negotiations on monetary reform, 
trade, investment, development assistance, 
and energy. From these negotiations we must 
create a realistic and durable system which 
assures the equitable and orderly conduct of 
international economic affairs in an inter- 
dependent world in which no nation holds a 
dominant economic position. We have a 
unique opportunity. Failure to take advan- 
tage of it would risk the progress which we 
have achieved. 

As we undertake this task, we welcome a 
dialogue with you in the spirit of matui-e 
partnership and shared responsibility which 
now characterizes the relationship between 
us. This third annual CIAP review of U.S. 
economic policies can make an important 
contribution to what needs to be done. 



Trademark Treaty Signed 
at Vienna 

Press release 212 dated June 15 

At the conclusion of the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference on Industrial Property, the 
Trademark Registration Treaty was signed 
on June 12 for the United States by Robert 
Gottschalk, Commissioner of Patents. 

The treaty is designed to simplify the pro- 
cedures for obtaining international registra- 
tion of trademarks for U.S. companies doing 
business abroad. 

The treaty was unanimously adopted at 



the final plenary session. In addition to the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
Hungary, San Marino, and Monaco also 
signed. Some 46 countries were represented 
at the conference. In their closing statements 
most of the other delegations present indi- 
cated their intent to confer with their gov- 
ernments and expressed their hope to sign 
before the end of the year. The treaty re- 
mains open for signature through Decem- 
ber 31. 

The negotiations at Vienna represent the 
climax of the work of several committees of 
experts and working groups which have met 
at Geneva since 1970 with the assistance of 
the World Intellectual Property Organiza- 
tion (WIPO). The U.S. delegation to the 
Vienna Conference was composed of officials 
from the Department of State, the U.S. Pat- 
ent Office, and advisers from the private 
sector. 

Under the provisions of the treaty, a single 
application either in the English or French 
language with a single fee and one set of 
standard formal requirements is filed with 
the International Bureau (under WIPO) and 
results in an international registration with 
initial effect as an application in each state 
designated therein and subsequent registra- 
tion in each state later, unless registration 
is refused within 15 months. Each state may, 
within the 15-month refusal period, refuse to 
register a mark on the same grounds for re- 
fusal as are specified in its own national law. 

The treaty will require a change in U.S. 
law to permit registration of marks without 
use in commerce for a period of three years 
after the filing of an application. The pos- 
sibility of this three-year period being ex- 
tended to as much as five years was eliminated 
as a mandatory requirement. 

The treaty is subject to ratification, which 
will take place for the United States only 
after the Senate has given its advice and 
consent and the U.S. law has been amended. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
and the Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf Area 



Statement by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 



Mr. Chairman : I welcome this opportunity 
to discuss and to answer questions about the 
present situation in the Middle East. I will 
concentrate my opening remarks on two parts 
of the area which are often discussed inter- 
changeably but which, while they do in some 
degree interact with each other, nevertheless 
constitute in fact two separate sets of prob- 
lems, each of which should be viewed pri- 
marily in its own context. I refer to the 
immediate area of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and, secondly, to the region of the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. 

I do not believe there is need to give to you 
and the members of the subcommittee an ex- 
haustive review of the Arab-Israeli problem 
or our position with respect to it. The present 
military and diplomatic situations are well 
known to you. Despite periodic and dan- 
gerous flareups, the overall level of violence 
in the area remains low, with the Israel- 
Egypt cease-fire we helped to arrange near- 
ing the end of its third year and the situation 
on Israel's other cease-fire lines without 
serious incident for a number of weeks now. 
There is, of course, sporadic terror. But 
horrible and heartrending as it is, it has not 
had, nor do we believe it can have, any de- 
cisive effect on the fundamental evolution of 



' Made before the Subcommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign 
.•\ffairs on June 6 (press release 197). The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is sovereign inde- 
pendent governments, most directly involved 
with the problem, which will make the hard 
decisions whether there is to be more fight- 
ing, a continuance of the unstable status 
quo, or the beginning of real progress to- 
ward peace. None of these governments gives 
indication it will permit its fate to be dictated 
by the practitioners of terror, although the 
recent troubles in Lebanon, where the situa- 
tion is stabilized for the present, ai'e a re- 
minder that violence is never very far below 
the surface and remains always a potentially 
disruptive factor. In saying this, I want to 
distinguish between the minority which has 
turned to mindless, futile terrorism and the 
masses of Palestinian Arabs, whose legiti- 
mate concerns must be taken into account 
in any settlement and cannot be ignored by 
the governments of the area or the interna- 
tional community if such a settlement is to be 
just and durable. 

On the face of it, the present diplomatic 
deadlock offers little that is encouraging. 
Israel and the Arabs — and here we speak 
principally of Egypt — cannot agree on the 
form of a peace process and are far apart 
on substance. The two main diplomatic tracks 
toward peace, by an interim agreement as a 
step toward a final settlement or by negotia- 
tions under Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Spe- 
cial Representative Gunnar Jarring] for 
a final settlement in accordance with the 
mandate given him in Resolution 242, are ob- 
jectionable for various reasons to one or the 



July 2, 1973 



29 



other of the parties. Menacing rhetoric con- 
tinues to emanate from the area. 

I believe, however, there are good reasons 
for us not to give way to despair. The parties 
remain interested in seeking alternatives to 
war. Today is the first day of the Security 
Council's debate on the Middle East. What- 
ever our serious doubts about the likelihood 
of this debate producing some dramatic break- 
through to peace, we .should note that the 
initiative for this review by the Security 
Council came from Egypt. Israeli Foreign 
Minister Eban in a recent speech before the 
Israeli Parliament reaffirmed that Israel ac- 
cepts the principle of compromise in settling 
its differences with the Arabs and that Israel 
remains ready for negotiations without pre- 
conditions. In recent months. King Hussein 
has often reiterated his readiness for a peace- 
ful solution. 

This continued desire of the parties for 
a peaceful settlement has been essential to 
our own diplomatic efforts. Secretary Rogers 
said in January that we would be active in 
ascertaining if and how we can help the 
parties initiate a genuine negotiating process. 
We have been and we will continue to be 
active. The absence of dramatic, visible new 
initiatives on our part should not be inter- 
preted as reflecting any want of vigor or 
seriousness or active diplomatic efforts. Our 
by now lengthy experience since 1967 in try- 
ing to further the cause of peace in the Mid- 
dle East convinces us that outsiders cannot 
impose peace, that the key is for the parties 
to begin a serious negotiating process, direct 
or indirect. Once this beginning is made, we 
believe the United States can play a con- 
structive role and practical step-by-step prog- 
ress should be possible toward the just and 
lasting settlement called for in Security 
Council Resolution 242. We ourselves remain 
available to help the parties get such a 
process started if they wish, through an in- 
direct negotiating process looking toward 
agreement on some Israeli withdrawal in 
Sinai and reopening of the Suez Canal by 
Egypt. Let me emphasize again that we 
would view, and the parties would have to 
view, such an agreement as a beginning and 



not an end in itself, as a first stage in a proc- 
ess leading to a final overall settlement recon- 
ciling Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli 
security concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, on another occasion I have 
referred to the history of the Arab-Israeli 
problem as one of lost opportunities. But not 
all opportunities have been lost, squandered, 
or ignored. There is still a chance for peace 
in the Middle East, and we are, as the Presi- 
dent has promised, giving the highest prior- 
ity to that area. 



U.S. Objectives in Persian Gulf Region 

Mr. Chairman, growing concern about the 
world's energy requirements has focused in- 
creased public attention on the second area 
I want to discuss today, that of the Arabian 
Peninsula-Persian Gulf. This is an area un- 
dergoing rapid economic and social change, 
where there has been a dramatic evolution of 
the terms of financial and concessional 
arrangements between international oil com- 
panies and producer states, and where con- 
cerns for security and stability have looked 
larger since the British terminated their pro- 
tective treaty relationships. 

The increased international focus on the 
gulf has also been marked by greater Soviet 
presence in the periphery. In this area of 
U.S. -Soviet negotiations on matters vital to 
both our national interests, we do not think 
the Soviets are seeking any direct confronta- 
tion with us in the gulf area. They do. how- 
ever, seek to augment their influence there. 
They have increased their presence and sup- 
ply of military supplies to the People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), 
Somalia, and Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, I dis- 
cussed at some length before the committee 
last year U.S. interests and policy in the 
Persian Gulf. I anticipated that U.S. inter- 
ests in this area would increase and have a 
bearing on our principal policy objectives. 
Briefly stated, these objectives are: 

— Support for indigenous regional collec- 
tive security efforts to provide stability and 
to foster orderly development without outside 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



interference. We believe Iranian and Saudi 
Arabian cooperation, inter alia, is of key im- 
portance as a major element of stability in 
this area. We also welcome the fact that 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and 
North Yemen are each in their own way 
seeking to strengthen their defensive capac- 
ities. 

— Peaceful resolution of tei-ritorial and 
other disputes among the regional states and 
the opening up of better channels of commu- 
nication among them. 

— Continued access to gulf oil supplies at 
reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities 
to meet our growing needs and those of our 
European and Asian friends and allies. 

— Enhancing of our commercial and finan- 
cial interests. 

Over the past year, our requirements for 
oil from the gulf have begun to rise, and now 
account for about 10 percent of our imports. 
or 3 percent of our total consumption. This 
growing dependence has come as the interna- 
tional oil companies and the oil-producer 
governments in the gulf region have reached 
mutually acceptable formulae. These now 
give the producer countries a greater role in 
and control over the operations of their most 
important industry but at the same time 
assure a continued role for the oil companies 
in the production and marketing of a sub- 
stantial portion of the oil coming from the 
gulf. We believe these agreements, if ratified, 
will meet our requirements that investments 
by American oil companies be fairly treated. 

Mr. Chairman, given our important and 
significant political, economic, and strategic 
interests in this area, the question of oil and 
access to oil by the Western world, including 
the United States, inevitably comes up. At 
the outset, in terms of the energj' situation of 
the future, I believe it is important to bear 
in mind two fundamentals : 

— First of all, in the long range the United 
States has the potential resources to meet its 
future energy needs, be it oil, gas, fusion, 
shale, solar energy, nuclear reactors, or other 
sources. The United States has the capacity 
to develop whatever it needs in the long 
range, and it is important to keep this in 



mind. Self-suflliciency or close to it is essential 
to our security and well-being. 

— Second, it is not in the national interest 
of the United States to be overly reliant on 
any one source or any one area for our energy 
needs. It is not in our interest on security 
grounds, nor is it in our interest for balance 
of payments reasons. Therefore, in the short 
run, it is essential that Congress act 
promptly on the recommendations made in 
the President's energy message of April 18. 
If action is taken promptly, this will limit 
expected shortages of energy supplies over 
the next decade. 

How, then, does the question of oil relate 
to the whole question of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute? It is possible to take either an overly 
optimistic or overly pessimistic view of the 
situation. It can be dismissed out of hand, 
which would be foolhardy. On the other hand, 
the possible implications can be overdrawn, 
which distorts the realities of the situation. 
We believe there is a mutuality of interests 
that has been manifest for several decades 
between producers and consumers of oil, and 
we have seen adjustments in financial ar- 
rangements between both. These adjustments 
will go on, but we do not think the mutuality 
of interests between the producer and the 
consumer should be jeopardized by whatever 
differences may or may not exist over the 
question of the Arab-Israeli dispute. 

The way to avoid our energy needs being 
exploited by others for political or other pur- 
poses is to assure our own sources of supply 
in this country. That means an all-out effort 
to develop the variety of sources available to 
us in this country — a diversification of such 
sources. To the degree to which we assure 
ourselves of our own resources here in this 
country, it will also help to assure that 
sources outside the country, to the degree to 
which we desire or need them, will remain 
available to us in the foreseeable future. 



Security and Defense 

Mr. Chairman, as the states in the gulf 
and the peninsula have taken on more respon- 
sibilities for their economic destiny, they, too, 



July 2, 1973 



31 



have become increasingly aware of threats 
they see to their security and of the need to 
improve their defense. These concerns have 
intensified as a result of the conflict between 
South and North Yemen last September ; the 
continuing insurrection in Oman's Dhofar 
Province which has its base of support in 
South Yemen ; the arrest in recent months in 
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and 
Oman of a number of members of the sub- 
versive South Yemeni-supported Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arab Gulf; the increasing supply of Soviet 
arms, equipment, and technicians to South 
Yemen and to Iraq; the March 20 border 
skirmish between Iraq and Kuwait; and the 
March 22 attack by South Yemeni aircraft on 
a Saudi border outpost. 

One of the principal U.S. policies in the 
gulf since the British announced in 1968 their 
intention to end their protective treaty rela- 
tionship there has been to encourage 
friendly states in the area to assume increas- 
ing responsibility for collective security in 
the region. In the gulf, this has been shared 
primarily by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Else- 
where in the peninsula, Saudi Arabia now 
bears the primary responsibility. These coun- 
tries have turned to the United States for 
military equipment and supplies, and it is in 
this context that we have responded posi- 
tively in helping them build up their own de- 
fensive capabilities. We have sought to assist 
them through sales of military equipment 
and services appropriate to their defense 
needs. This has been the policy for some time ; 
the arms assistance arrangements being dis- 
cussed or being implemented with Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are not knee-jerk reactions of 
the last few weeks to a so-called energy crisis 
as some contend. We have had a military 
modernization and supply relationship with 
Iran and Saudi Arabia for two decades and 
have been discussing the needs of Kuwait, 
in response to its request, also for over a year. 

To give some current examples, we are 
going forward with the Saudis with plans 
to hel]) them develop a modest naval force of 
small ships suitable for the protection of 
their extensive coastlines; we are selling 
F-5 Freedom Fighters to replace older Amer- 



ican aircraft; we are now initiating a sales 
program to reorganize and equip elements of 
the National Guard (a paramilitary internal 
security force) ; and American companies are 
continuing to assist in improving Saudi 
Arabia's air defense capabilities. Recently 
we have agreed in principle to consider the 
sale of a limited number of F-4 aircraft. 

In Iran, where our relationship has shifted 
from aid to sales, we have underway a sub- 
stantial program for the sale of defense 
materiel, particularly aii'craft. Equipment 
deliveries under these sales will take place 
over the next few years. We are sending 
Technical Assistance Field Teams to Iran in 
phase with equipment deliveries to provide 
instruction in the operation and maintenance 
of the new equipment. 

With the Kuwaitis, we have been discuss- 
ing at their request for over a year ways in 
which we could help them improve their own 
defensive capabilities. These negotiations 
have intensified since the border skirmish 
with Iraq, but no contractual commitments 
have yet been undertaken. Some aspects of 
the discussions are well advanced ; for exam- 
ple, the possible sale of F-8 Navy Crusaders 
as well as equipment for Kuwait's ground 
forces and air defense system. With respect 
to the F-4, we have had inquiries from the 
Kuwaitis regarding our willingness to sell, 
and this matter is now under active consider- 
ation. 

As for the other friendly countries in the 
Arabian Peninsula, we have made them eligi- 
ble for foreign military sales. However, as 
I pointed out last year, we expect that these 
smaller states will meet their more limited 
requirements mainly from other friendly 
sources. 

Political and Economic Changes 

Mr. Chairman, the political transition in 
the gulf still leaves many uncertainties. Un- 
resolved boundary issues remain for all the 
countries of the area, and an uneasy truce 
exists between the two Yemens as they dis- 
cuss a possible unity agreement. There has 
nevertheless been an encouraging trend to- 
ward regional cooperation. Saudi assistance 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



in North Yemen, one of the poorest countries 
in the world, has increased markedly in the 
past year ; and the Saudis are now beginning 
to help Oman, whose economic development 
has been hindered by the costs of the Dhofar 
insurrection. The seven-member United Arab 
Emirates is slowly building federal institu- 
tions, and it, too, has pledged to use some of 
its oil wealth to help Yemen and Oman. 
There are a growing number of visits by 
high-level dignitaries among the gulf and 
peninsula states. Other neighboring coun- 
tries, such as Iran and Jordan, are providing 
technical personnel or teachers to help im- 
prove the security or the economic develop- 
ment of several lower gulf states. The British 
have continued to take an important interest 
in the stability of the region despite their 
relinquishment of their former defense 
treaties. France, Japan, and other indus- 
trialized countries are increasingly active 
commercially. While this increases commer- 
cial competition for us, these countries share 
our interest in the stability of this area and 
in continued free and unhindered access to 
its markets as well as its energy resources. 

With rising income, the Persian Gulf rep- 
resents a rapidly growing market for Amer- 
ican goods and services. Such sales already 
are well in excess of $1 billion. In spite of 
our growing imports of crude from the gulf, 
we still have a favorable balance of trade 
with countries of the region. In order to 
maintain this balance, we have increased our 
commercial activities. There have been sev- 
eral very successful U.S. Government-spon- 
sored trade missions to Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the lower gulf states; we are 
opening a Regional Trade Development Cen- 
ter in Tehran ; and we now have a diplomatic 
presence in all of the newly independent gulf 



states. These are very small posts, however, 
and we must find ways to increase their 
ability to support our commercial activities. 

Mr. Chairman, the rapid growth in oil 
production, while it is a guarantor of great 
prosperity for the region, has also brought 
with it new economic as well as political prob- 
lems. The Saudis and other oil-rich penin- 
sular states have begun to accumulate large 
foreign exchange reserves well beyond their 
needs. They have now indicated that if pro- 
duction is to rise beyond their income re- 
quirements, they must find productive outlets 
at home or aboard to invest their surplus 
revenues. This is a challenge to the consumer 
countries generally and to our American 
businessmen specifically. We are giving con- 
siderable thought to how we can find ways to 
encourage these pai'ticular countries to con- 
tinue to produce oil in sufficient quantities 
to meet free world needs and to use their 
large foreign exchange reserves to help meet 
the world's growing capital requirements. 

At the same time, these countries are not 
immune from the nationalist and political 
crosscurrents in other parts of the Arab 
world, including those arising out of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. For this reason, the 
United States will continue to make every 
feasible effort to encourage the parties to 
start a serious negotiating process to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the meantime, 
we will do all we can to maintain and 
strengthen our cooperative relations with the 
countries in the important Arabian Penin- 
sula-gulf area, seeking to demonstrate 
through our actions the mutual benefits de- 
riving from those relations and from insulat- 
ing them to the extent possible from tensions 
and destabilizing forces elsewhere in the 



region. 



July 2, 1973 



33 



Secretary Rogers Discusses Objectives of Foreign Assistance Program 

Statement by Secretary Rogers^ 



It is a pleasure to appeal' before you this 
morning to support the foreign assistance 
program. Last week this committee proposed 
a series of amendments to the Foreign As- 
sistance Act designed to redirect and rein- 
vigorate our economic assistance program. 

We welcome the committee's thoughtful 
and positive approach. In the next few days 
we will comment more fully on various de- 
tails of your constructive proposals. We be- 
lieve the committee intended to allow suffi- 
cient flexibility to respond to particular bi- 
lateral issues within its overall approach, and 
we shall examine together with you how best 
to assui'e this. 

Our overall agreement with the commit- 
tee's proposals to focus bilateral develop- 
ment assistance on critical human problems 
and encourage the poorest people to partici- 
pate more effectively in development is re- 
flected in Dr. Hannah's [John A. Hannah, 
Administrator, Agency for International 
Development] statement last week. We agree 
that the problem areas on which the bill con- 
centrates are among the most critical for 
helping people of the developing countries. 

We commend the committee for supporting 
the President's budget request for foreign 
assistance. 

We agree with the committee's goal of 
promoting new flows of development capital 
and U.S. exports to the developing countries. 



' Made before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on .Tune 5 (press release 192). The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



We believe we must give your proposal for 
an Export Development Credit Fund careful 
study to insure that it is consistent with 
other U.S. Government policies and pro- 
grams. We will have detailed reactions on 
this proposal shortly. 

We recognize the need for better coordi- 
nation of development assistance, trade, and 
financial policies. I am especially pleased at 
the committee's reaffirmation of the central 
role of the Department of State in overall 
guidance of U.S. development policies. With 
respect to the specific nature and member- 
ship of the coordinating committee proposed, 
we shall comment soon in more detail. In 
general, I believe in a flexible approach to 
the necessary interdepartmental coordina- 
tion. '- 

Within a few days we will be ready to 
give you the results of our review of all of 
the committee's amendments. I hope you will 
understand that I am not in a position this 
morning to discuss these amendments in any 
detail. 

Let me turn now to the relation of devel- 
opment assistance to the national interests 
of this country. 

In the first four years of this administra- 
tion, we believe we made important progress 
toward our fundamental goals of a durable 
structure of peace. 

A settlement in the Viet-Nam conflict, al- 
though still imijerfect, has been negotiated. 
Relations have turned from confrontation 
to negotiation, as our contacts with the 
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China 
have entered a new, less sterile phase. Steps 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



are underway to reduce the threat of nuclear 
war. Association with traditional allies and 
trading partners is being reinvigorated. 

Encourag-ing as these developments with 
the industrialized nations are, they do not 
obscure the condition or importance of the 
poor nations. The developing countries oc- 
cupy two-thirds of the earth's land and con- 
trol vast amounts of its natural resources. 
They contain 74 percent of the world's total 
population. 

Some of the developing countries have 
made significant economic progress in recent 
years. These gains have been unevenly real- 
ized and too often overwhelmed by un- 
checked population growth. The gap between 
small groups of citizens who have benefited 
from modernization and the much larger 
groups who remain trapped in conditions of 
severe deprivation continues to grow. 

This situation appeals to American sympa- 
thies. But it is more than a moral dilemma. 
The long-term structure of peace is inevi- 
tably threatened by the persistence of mass 
poverty. Peace cannot be sustained in condi- 
tions of social upheaval or a growing con- 
frontation between rich and poor. 

Equally important from the perspective of 
our own interests, the United States and the 
other industrial countries are linked to the 
developing countries by consideration of 
trade, investment, and critical resource 
needs. We share with them a common inter- 
est in an open international economic system 
in which all nations benefit from an increased 
flow of goods and services. 

With 6 percent of the world's population, 
the United States consumes nearly 40 percent 
of the world's annual output of raw materials 
and energy. Increasingly, we depend on the 
developing countries for these supplies. 

On the other side of the trade ledger, the 
developing countries are becoming increas- 
ingly important as markets for U.S. goods. 
In 1970 they accounted for 30 percent of all 
U.S. exports. The investments of U.S. cor- 
porations in the developing countries pres- 
ently total some $30 billion and are growing 
at about 10 percent a year. Fifty percent of 



our foreign investment income comes from 
the developing countries. 

The solution of such world problems as 
environmental pollution, narcotics control, 
and security of travel requires broad inter- 
national cooperation with the developing 
countries. And the development of a satis- 
factory international monetary system re- 
quires the participation of the developing 
countries. 

The development assistance program con- 
tains direct benefits for the United States. 
Eighty percent of the funds are spent in this 
country, creating additional jobs and income 
for Americans. Undoubtedly in each one of 
your districts there are farms, factories, or 
universities that directly benefit from this 
program. 

For all of these economic, political, and 
moral reasons, a sustained U.S. response to 
the challenge of underdevelopment is as 
much in our interest as it is in that of the 
developing nations. 

I should like now to comment on the Pres- 
ident's proposed security assistance program 
for fiscal year 1974. I am convinced that 
American support for these defense efforts 
of other nations is essential if we are to build 
a stable international system in the years 
immediately ahead. 

I can well understand how, after a long 
and frequently frustrating military struggle, 
a desire to withdraw from the burdens of an 
active role in world affairs can exist. When 
this administration took office, the President 
determined that a reordering of our relation- 
ships with other nations was needed. But we 
were not prepared to sacrifice U.S. interests 
to the growing desire among some Ameri- 
cans for withdrawal — a desire that might 
well lead to isolationism. As the President 
has observed: - 

Heedless American abdication of its responsibil- 
ities to the world would destroy the global balance 
and the fabric of peace we had worked so hard and 



- The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on May 3 appears in 
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled 
"Asia and the Pacific" begins on p. 770. 



July 2, 1973 



35 



so long to develop. Those who relied on us to help 
assure their security would be gravely concerned. 
Adversaries who had shown a willingness to recon- 
cile long-standing differences would promptly revise 
their calculations and alter their actions. 

The administration decided instead to 
chart a course between overcommitment and 
withdrawal. At the same time, the President 
launched a number of initiatives to bring 
the cold war to an end. As I noted earlier, 
the consistent pattern of confrontation that 
has lasted for a quarter of a century is now 
being altered. Based on progress to date, we 
are most hopeful about the future. However, 
we will continue to need firmness, a deter- 
mination to protect our own security, and a 
fidelity to our friends and allies as they move 
to assume more of the burden for their own 
defense. 

Within this framework, security assistance 
continues to be a vital instrument of the U.S. 
foreign policy. 

The program that the President has pre- 
sented to the Congress for fiscal year 1974 
is well organized and balanced. We are pro- 
posing several basic changes in the struc- 
ture and direction of security assistance for 
FY 1974. I believe that Under Secretary Tarr 
has discussed these with you during his ap- 
pearance on May 24, 1973.^ However, I 
should like to cover several aspects of the 
proposed in-ogram that warrant close atten- 
tion. 

The first I'elates to the IVIiddle East. This is 
a key region in our efforts to develop a global 
structure of peace. It has been three years 
now since the initiative by the United States 
resulted in a cease-fire between Egypt and 
Israel. Our major immediate objective is to 
get negotiations started, whether direct or 
indirect. At the same time, however, we feel 
it is essential to provide nations in the area 
with the equipment and help needed for their 
self-defense and internal security. The pro- 
grams which the administration is proposing 
are intended to maintain the stabilitv and 



^ For a statement made before the committee on 
May 24 by Under Secretary for Security Assistance 
Curtis W. Tarr, see BULLETIN of June 18, 1973, 
p. 892. 



military balance essential to our ongoing ef- 
forts to encourage a meaningful Arab-Israeli 
negotiating process, as well as to promote 
regional security in the area of the Arabian 
Peninsula and Persian Gulf, where we have 
important interests. 

The second area of concern is Cambodia. 
We are requesting $180.6 million in grant 
military assistance for Cambodia in FY 1974. 
As I have pointed out in previous appear- 
ances before various committees of Congress, 
the last area in Indochina to achieve a cease- 
fire is Cambodia. This has necessarily been 
addressed during last month's talks and will 
be again this week in Paris. We very much 
want a settlement here, too, both for the sake 
of Cambodia and because of its importance 
to the success of the Viet-Nam cease- 
fire and peace throughout Indochina. How- 
ever, until the talks are concluded and we 
have been able to as.sess the results, it is es- 
sential that we maintain our present policies. 
Precipitate action by the Congress at this 
point can only hinder and not hasten the 
chances for a lasting peace. 

Once a reasonable peace is achieved 
throughout the states in Indochina, I believe 
that there will be a major role for U.S. eco- 
nomic assistance in the transition from the 
devastation of war to the tasks of recon- 
struction and reconciliation. This does not 
mean that we should bear the entire burden 
by ourselves. We expect that aid from other 
donors will meet from one-third to one-half 
of Indochina's economic assistance needs 
within two to three years. But it is highly 
probable that in the interim our assistance 
will be vital to these countries. 

Finally, I urge the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs to support the President's program 
for Latin America. The United States should 
no longer attempt to determine for the Latin 
Americans what their reasonable military 
needs should be. We have put such paternal- 
ism behind us. President Nixon has recently 
exercised the waiver authority granted him 
by Congress to find five Latin American 
countries eligible to jiurchase the F-5E 
fighter aircraft. These countries are Argen- 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



tina, Brazil, Chrle, Colombia, and Venezuela. 
But we must also raise the ceiling which 
current legislation imposes upon military 
sales and grants. This ceiling is offensive to 
the Latin Americans, who consider it an at- 
tempt to control their sovereign right to de- 
termine their own defense requirements. The 
only result of the ceiling has been to encour- 
age the Latin Americans to make their pur- 
chases outside the United States. I hope the 
committee will support the legislation that is 
needed. We must avoid the kind of political 
alienation that could occur if Latin Ameri- 



can governments were to feel that the United 
States is not prepared to operate on a mature 
partnership basis with them. 

In conclusion let me just say that we look 
forward to working closely with this com- 
mittee in support of our shared objectives: 
to assist the developing countries to assume 
a larger share of the responsibility for their 
own defense, to help the poorer countries 
meet the basic human needs of their citizens, 
and to further this country's growing and 
mutually beneficial trade and investment re- 
lations with the developing countries. 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences 



Scheduled July Through September 

OECD Environment Committee Expert Group on Oxidants in the 
Atmosphere. 

U.N. ECOSOC Joint Meeting of the Committee for Program and 
Coordination and the Administrative Committee on Coordina- 
tion. 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Tea Subgroup of Exporters: 
6th Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission Working Group on Inter- 
national Statistical Programs and Coordination. 

FAO Executive Committee of the Codex Alimentarius Com- 
mission: 19th Session. 

Joint IMCO/ILO Committee on Training 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning 
Containers. 



Paris . . . 


. . July 2-4 


Geneva . . 


. . July 2-4 


Rome . . . 


. . July 2-4 


Geneva . . 


. . July 2-4 


Geneva . . 


. . July 2-6 


London . . 
Geneva . . 


. . July 2-6 
. . July 2-6 



' This schedule, vifhich was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, 1973, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July- 
September 1973. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; ECE, Economic Commis- 
sion for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; 
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAE.4, International Atomic Energy Agency; 
lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; 
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European 
.Migration; ICES, International Council for the Exploration of the Sea; IHO, International Hydrographic 
Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; I.MCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Ox-ganization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ISVS, International Secretariat for 
Volunteer Service; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North .Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway 
Congresses; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; 
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; WHO, 
World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorolog- 
ical Organization. 



July 2, 1973 



37 



UNESCO/WIPO 3(1 Committee of Government Experts on Prob- 
lems Raised by Transmission Via Space Satellites. 

GATT Preparatory Committee for the International Trade 
Negotiations. 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products 

UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to 
Trade. 

ICAO Technical Panel on Supersonic Transport Operations: 
4th Meeting. 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 55th Session 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Tea 

ECE Meeting on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs 

UNCTAD Advisory Committee to the Trade and Development 
Board. 

Inter- .-American Telecommunications Conference: 3d Meeting of 
the Permanent Executive Committee and 1st Meeting of Perma- 
nent Technical Committees III and IV. 

IMCO Conference on Space Requirements for Special Passenger 
Ships. 

IOC/UNESCO Working Group on International Oceanographic 
Data Exchange: 7th Session. 

Permanent International Association of Navigation Conferences: 
23d Congress. 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Bananas, 5th Session, and Sub- 
Group on Statistics, 6th Session. 

UNCTAD Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States. 

WIPO/U.N. Negotiation on Relationship Agreement Between 
U.N. ECOSOC and WIPO. 

IOC/UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Cooperative 
Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 6th Ses- 
sion. 

NATO Joint Communication-Electronics Committee 

ECE Meeting on Ship-Borne Barge Transport 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Provisions of Motor 
Coaches and Buses. 

PAHC Technical Committee on Planning: 6th Meeting 

PAHO Executive Committee: 70th Meeting 

UNIDO Ad Hoc Committee of 27 

UNCTAD Cocoa Council 

ICAO Automated Data Interchange Systems Panel : 5th Meeting. 

ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in 
Europe, Regional Planning Group: 9th Meeting. 

UNCTAD Advisory Committee to the Board and to the Com- 
mittee on Commodities. 

UNCT.\D Preparatory Committee on a Convention on Intermodal 
Transport. 

OECD Consumer Policy Committee Working Party 

Inter- American Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 8th 
Meeting. 

14th Pan American Child Congress 

lA-ECOSOC Ad Hoc Working Group to Study the Possibility of 
Establishing a Technical Advisory Council of Campesino Orga- 
nizations. 

U.N. ECOSOC Group of Experts on Explosives 

WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: 
6th Session. 

U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination . . 

UNCTAD Committee on :\Ianufactures 

Inter-American Children's Institute Directing Council: 53d 
Meeting. 

IOC/UNESCO Joint lOC/WMO Planning Group for Integrated 
Global Ocean Station System : 2d Session. 



Nairobi . . . 


. July 


2-11 


Geneva . . . 


. July 


2-25 


Geneva . . . 


. July 


2-Aug. 24 


Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 


. July 3-4 
. July 3-13 


Montreal . . . 


. July 3-20 


Geneva . . . 
Rome .... 
Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 


. July 4-Aug. 3 
. July 5-6 
. July 9-13 
. July 9-13 


Rio de Janeiro . 


. July 


9-13 


London . . . 


. July 9-13 


New York . . 


. July 9-13 


Ottawa . . . 


. July 


9-18 


Bremen . . . 


• July 


10-20 


Geneva . . . 


• July 


13-27 


Geneva . . . 


. July 


16-18 


Cartagena . . 


• July 


16-21 


Brussels . . . 
Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 


• July 

• July 

• July 


17-18 
23-27 
23-27 


Rio de Janeiro . 
Washington . . 
Vienna . . . 
Geneva . . . 
Montreal . . . 
Paris .... 


. July 
. July 
. July 
. July 
. July 
. July 


23-27 
23-Aug. 3 
25-Aug. 1 
30-Aug. 10 


Geneva . . . 


. July 




Geneva . . . 


• July 




Paris .... 
Asuncion . . . 


. July 

• July-August 




• Aug. 
■ Aug. 


5 11 


Caracas . . . 


6-10 


Geneva . . . 
Helsinki . . . 


. Aug. 
. Aug. 


6-10 
6-18 


New York . . 
Geneva . . . 
Santiago . . . 


• Aug. 

• Aug. 
. Aug. 


6-24 
7-17 
13-15 


Geneva . . . 


• Aug. 


13-17 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECOSOC Group of Rapporteurs on the Packaging of Dangerous 
Goods. 

WMO Regional Association I (Africa) : 6th Session 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 13th Session .... 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Belts 

I.MCO Working Group on Revision of Safety of Life at Sea Con- 
vention. 
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 24th Session. 
ICAO Diplomatic Conference on Air Law and 20th Session (Ex- 
traordinary) of the Assembly. 
I FAO/LAE.^ Symposium on Isotopes and Radiation Techniques 
in Studies of Soil Physics, Irrigation and Drainage in Relation 
to Crop Production. 

IMCO Legal Committee: 20th Session 

WMO Executive Committee: 25th Session 

1 OECD Financial Marketing Committee Working Party on Ad- 
I mission of Securities. 

1 ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting 

I ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution 

IMCO Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites: 3d Session . . 
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels: 14th Session. 

'< ECE Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning 

South Pacific Commission: 13th South Pacific Conference and 

36th Session of the Commission. 
WIPO Diplomatic Conference on the European Patent Convention 

UNCTAD Sugar Conference: 2d Session 

GATT Ministerial Meeting To Initiate International Trade Nego- 
tiations. 

IAEA Board of Governors 

ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 27th Session . . . 

CCC Working Party of the Permanent Technical Committee . . . 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Hard Fibers: 6th Session . . 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 28th Session 

ILO Textile Committee: 9th Session 

UNESCO Executive Board: 93d Session 

UNESCO/IBE Council: 9th Session 

U.N. General Assembly 

UNESCO International Conference on Education: 34th Session 

NATO Heads of Defense Ministry Information Sections .... 

International Coffee Council 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Jute, Kenaf and Allied Fibers 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Mechanized Trademark Search . 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 15th Session . 

CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 81st and 82d Sessions . . 

UNESCO/IOC Joint ICES/FAO/IOC Coordination Group for the 
Planning and Execution of Cooperative Investigations of the 
Northern Part of the Eastern Central Atlantic: 3d Session. 

SEATO Council: 18th Meeting 

International Atomic Energy Agency: 17th General Conference. 

lA-ECOSOC: 13th Special Meeting 

ICAO Legal Committee: 21st Session 

WIPO Headquarters Building Subcommittee 

WHO E.xecutive Board : Special Session 

ISVS Council: 15th Session 



Geneva 

Geneva 
Geneva 
Geneva 
London 

Wellington 
Rome . . 



Nicosia 



Aug. 13-17 

Aug. 21-Sept. 1 

Aug. 21-Sept. 14 
Aug. 27-31 

Aug. 28-Sept. 1 

Aug. 28-Sept. 5 
Aug. 28-Sept. 21 

Sept. 3-4 



London . . . . 


Sept. 3-7 


Geneva . . . . 


Sept. 4-7 


Paris 


Sept. 4-7 


Honolulu . . . . 


Sept. 5-28 


Geneva . . . . 


Sept. 10-14 


Paris 


Sept. 10-14 


London . . . . 


Sept. 10-14 


Geneva . . . . 


Sept. 10-14 


Guam .... 


Sept. 10-28 


Brussels or 




Munich . . 


Sept. 10-Oct. 6 


Geneva 


Sept. 10-Oct. 10 


Tokyo .... 


Sept. 12-14 


Geneva 


Sept. 12-14 


Torremolinos 


Sept 14-Oct. 26 


Geneva 


Sept. 15-30 


Brussels . . . 


Sept. 17-21 


Rome .... 


Sept. 17-21 


London 


Sept. 17-21 


Geneva 


Sept. 17-28 


Paris .... 


Sept. 17-Oct. 12 


Geneva . . . 


Sept. 18-28 


New York . . 


Sept. 18-December 


Geneva . . . 


Sept. 19-27 


London . . . 


Sept. 20-21 


London . . . 


Sept. 24 


Rome .... 


Sept. 24-26 


Geneva . . . 


Sept. 24-28 


Geneva . . . 


Sept. 24-28 


London . . . 


Sept. 24-28 


Brussels . . . 


Sept. 24-Oct. 5 


Lisbon .... 


Sept. 26-28 


New York . . 


Sept. 28 


Undetermined . 


September 


Undetermined . 


September 


Montreal . . . 


September 


Geneva 


September 


Geneva 


September 


Geneva 


September or 




October. 



July 2, 1973 



39 



U.S. Calls for Stronger Enforcement of U.N. Sanctions 
Against Southern Rhodesia 



Following are statements made in the 
U.N. Security Council on May 16 and 22 by 
U.S. Representative John Scali, together 
ivith the texts of a resolution adopted by the 
Council on May 22 and a draft resolution 
which was vetoed by the United States and 
the United Kingdom that day. 

STATEMENT OF MAY 16 

USUN press release 46 dated May 16 

The special rejiort of the Sanctions Com- 
mittee ' gives me my first opportunity to 
speak to an issue to which the U.S. delega- 
tion attaches great importance. 

At the outset I wish to reaffirm my gov- 
ernment's full support for majority rule in 
Southern Rhodesia and the sooner the better. 
This is the objective fixed by this Council 
and is the reason that it voted for sanctions 
in the first place. 

That objective has not yet been achieved. 
At the same time there is no doubt that sanc- 
tions have inflicted hardships on the illegal 
regime in Southern Rhodesia. The original 
framework of sanctions as set out in Resolu- 
tion 25.3 is a valid one.- What is required is 
to act now to make the present sanctions 
more eff'ective rather than to expand or 
widen their scope. For the first time the 
Sanctions Committee has come to grips with 
some of the fundamental stumbling blocks to 
full implementation. The agreed recommen- 
dations and suggestions in the report offer 
a serious prospect of making sanctions more 



' U.N. doc. S/10920. 

- For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of June 
24, 1968, p. 847. 



effective. Therefore they have our full 
support. 

What has the committee accomplished? 
If we accept its recommendations and sug- 
gestions, the Council would request states to 
take effective measures to examine cargoes 
which, because of their nature or because 
they were shipped from Angola, Mozam- 
bique, or South Africa, can reasonably be 
suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin. 
States would also be asked to report on meas- 
ures taken to jirevent sanctions evasions. 
With the cooperation of governments, ex- 
perts would be made available to an im- 
porting country, if so desired, to inspect 
suspicious cargoes to determine their true 
origin. If it is established that such cargoes 
originated in Southern Rhodesia, they would 
be seized or disposed of in accordance with 
domestic laws and regulations. These recom- 
mendations are fundamental and can be ef- 
fective if we, the members of the U.N., 
respond quickly and positively without ex- 
ception. 

The committee has also recommended that 
it urgently produce a manual containing in- 
formation on the necessary documentation 
and clearing procedures to help determine 
the true origin of suspected cargoes. My dele- 
gation will cooperate fully in the preparation 
of such a manual. We will, for example, pass 
on to the committee the lessons that we have 
learned in testing products that might be of 
Southern Rhodesian origin. I would point 
out, however, that while such tests can be 
very effective for such i^roducts as chrome 
ore, ferrochrome, and asbestos, we have not 
yet develojied technical tests to determine 
the oiigin of some other products. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



Members of the Council may recall Am- 
bassador Phillips' statement of September 29 
in which he noted that close study of trade 
statistics contained in the committee's own 
report would be illuminating.^ He under- 
scored the fact that impoi-t statistics of cer- 
tain materials — produced both in Rhodesia 
and neighboring countries — provided by im- 
porting states show considerably higher fig- 
ures than export statistics provided by 
Rhodesia's neighbors. The natural inference 
is that transshipment of Rhodesian commodi- 
ties through those areas accounts in large 
part for the discrepancies. 

My delegation welcomes the fact that this 
point was stressed in paragraph 21 of the 
committee's report. That paragraph noted 
the discrepancies in trade statistics in the 
committee's fifth annual report and recom- 
mended that the Secretary General bring 
them to the attention of countries trading 
with Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. 
It also recommended that the comments of 
countries concerned be solicited along with 
information on those countries' procedures 
to insure that products from Southern Rho- 
desia are not being imported disguised as 
products of Angola, Mozambique, and South 
Africa. These replies are to be published. 
However, it would have been more appropri- 
ate to ask states to take the necessary action 
to insure that such discrepancies do not mask 
the importation of disguised Rhodesian 
goods. This would have gone to the heart of 
the problem and been consistent with other 
recommendations of the committee. We hope 
the committee will give fuller attention to 
this matter with jjarticular reference to the 
relevant sections of the fourth and fifth an- 
nual reports. In this connection the compen- 
dium on South Africa's external trade for the 
years 1965 and 1971 prepared for the com- 
mittee as working paper 65 of April 9, 1973, 
is also a useful document. 

The Sanctions Committee has worked long 
and hard to prepare its report and, I am glad 



" For statements made in the Council on Sept. 29, 
1972, by U.S. Representative Christopher H. Phillips, 
see Bulletin of Nov. 6, 1972, p. 543. 



to say, my delegation actively participated in 
its i)rei)aration. I wish to express our appre- 
ciation to the delegations of Guinea, Kenya, 
and the Sudan for making a wide variety of 
]n-oposals for the committee's consideration. 
All these proposals were genuinely intended 
to obtain wider compliance with sanctions. 
If we could not accept all of them it was be- 
cause they raised certain practical and legal 
difficulties. For the most part, however, the 
l)roposals were accepted, and we hope they 
will contribute to tightening sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia. 

The United States, Mr. President, has con- 
stantly reiterated its belief that sanctions 
could have more effect on the policies of the 
Smith regime if they were thoroughly imple- 
mented in the spirit which lies behind Reso- 
lution 253 — the achievement of self-deter- 
mination and majority rule in Southern 
Rhodesia. We commend the committee for 
its efforts, which are a concrete and realistic 
step toward that end. 



STATEMENT OF MAY 22 

USUN press release 47 dated May 22 

When I spoke in the Council May 16, I 
underlined the importance that my govern- 
ment places on the sanctions against South- 
ern Rhodesia. Looking at the resolution con- 
tained in document S/10927 as a whole, I 
wish to emphasize that my delegation is in 
sympathy with its general aims. We strongly 
hope that the recommendations it contains 
will contribute significantly to making sanc- 
tions more effective. 

We would therefore have liked very much 
to have voted in favor of the resolution, but 
were unable to do so because of our domestic 
legislation and practical problems with some 
of the recommendations which were dis- 
cussed but not agreed to in the Sanctions 
Committee. 

The importation of certain strategic mate- 
rials from Southern Rhodesia into the United 
States has again been raised in the Council. 
I wish it noted that these materials in 1972 
amounted to less than 5 ]?ercent of the 



July 2, 1973 



41 



projected total of Rhodesian export earnings 
for that year. My government has cooper- 
ated with the Sanctions Committee in fully 
reporting these imports. We wish other im- 
porters of Rhodesian commodities would do 
the same. We would then know a great deal 
more than we do now about how Southern 
Rhodesia is surviving sanctions. This does 
not detract, however, from our complete sup- 
port for the recommendations for improving 
sanctions made in paragraphs 10 through 22 
of the Sanctions Committee's second special 
report. We are also fully in favor of opera- 
tive paragraphs 2 and 8 of the resolution. 
In particular, we believe the information 
called for in operative paragraph 8 will prove 
useful in evaluating the sanctions program, 
and we hope all states will cooperate. 

Our difficulties with paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 
were made clear by my delegation during the 
Sanctions Committee's long deliberations, 
and there is no need to elaborate further. 
However, I wish to assure this Council we 
will adhere strictly to the basic purposes and 
intents of these paragraphs. 

The subject of the sale of three Boeing 
aircraft to Southern Rhodesia has been 
raised by several speakers during this session 
of the Security Council. The U.S. Represent- 
ative noted before the Sanctions Committee 
on April 16 that three Boeing aircraft, actu- 
ally 720's, had appeared in Southern Rhode- 
sia. It was explained that the United States 
had authorized neither the sale of any Boeing 
aircraft to Southern Rhodesia nor the reex- 
port of such aircraft to Rhodesia. I can add 
that the United States will not authorize the 
servicing of these aircraft or the sale of spare 
parts. It was also explained that the United 
States would look into the details of when 
and how the sale took place. This investiga- 
tion continues, and we assume that govern- 
ments whose nationals may be involved are 
also looking into the matter. 

There is less to say about the second reso- 
lution. We regret that it was introduced for 
Council consideration. It includes several pro- 
posals that were debated fully in the Sanc- 
tions Committee on which my delegation and 



others expressed their strong reservations. 
While we can well understand the sentiment | 
behind the draft resolution, we consider it I 
unrealistic to call for broader sanctions until I 
the full membership of the United Nations 
has demonstrated its willingness to take more 
seriously the sanctions already in force. In 
the circumstances we do not believe this | 
resolution would enhance the ability of the 
United Nations to act effectively. In our view, 
to pass a resolution which is clearly unen- 
forceable would seriously damage the repu- 
tation and credibility of the United Nations 
and further erode public confidence in the 
U.N.'s ability to act in a meaningful way. 
This consideration, and this consideration 
alone, underlies my government's decision to 
vote against this resolution. Those who im- 
pute other motives stray far, far, far from 
the facts, and I reject these accusations. They 
have no foundation and deserve no further 
reply. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION^ 

The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions 320 (1972) and 328 
(1973), 

Noting that measures so far instituted by the 
Security Council and the General Assembly have not 
brought an end to the illegal regime in Southern 
Rhodesia, 

Reiterating its grave concern that some States, 
contrary to Security Council resolutions 232 (1966), 
253 (1968) and 277 (1970) and to their obligations 
under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal 
regime of Southern Rhodesia, 

Condenining the persistent refusal of South 
Africa and Portugal to co-operate with the United 
Nations in the effective observance and implemen- 
tation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) in clear violation of the United Nations 
Charter, 

Ha%nng considered the second special report of 
the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 
253 (1968) (S/10920), 

Taking note of the letter dated 27 April from the 
Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation 



' U.N. doc. S/RES/333 (draft resolution S/10927) ; 
adopted by the Council on May 22 by a vote of 12 to 
0, with 3 abstentions (U.S., France, U.K.). 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



with regard to the Implementation of the Declara- 
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (S/10923), 

1. Approves the recommendations and suggestions 
contained in paragraphs 10 to 22 (S/10920) of the 
second special report of the Committee established 
in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968); 

2. Requests the Committee, as well as all Govern- 
ments, and the Secretary-General as appropriate, 
to take urgent action to implement the recommen- 
dations and suggestions referred to above; 

3. Requests States with legislation permitting 
importation of minerals and other products from 
Southern Rhodesia to repeal it immediately; 

4. Calls upon States to enact and enforce immedi- 
ately legislation providing for imposition of severe 
penalties on persons natural or juridical that evade 
or commit breach of sanctions by: 

(a) Importing any goods from Southern Rho- 
desia; 

(b) Exporting any goods to Southern Rhodesia; 

(c) Providing any facilities for transport of goods 
to and from Southern Rhodesia; 

(d) Conducting or facilitating any transaction or 
trade that may enable Southern Rhodesia to obtain 
from or send to any country any goods or services; 

(e) Continuing to deal with clients in South 
Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and 
Namibia after it has become known that the clients 
are re-exporting the goods or components thereof 
to Southern Rhodesia, or that goods received from 
such clients are of Southern Rhodesian origin; 

5. Requests States, in the event of their trading 
with South Africa and Portugal, to provide that 
purchase contracts with those countries should 
clearly stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable, 
prohibition of dealing in goods of Southern Rho- 
desian origin; likewise, sales contracts with those 
countries should include a prohibition of resale or 
re-export of goods to Southern Rhodesia; 

6. Calls upon States to pass legislation forbidding 
insurance companies under their jurisdiction from 
covering air flights into and out of Southern Rhode- 
sia and individuals or air cargo carried on them; 

7. Calls upon States to undertake appropriate 
legislative measures to ensure that all valid marine 
insurance contracts contain specific provisions that 
no goods of Southern Rhodesian origin or destined 
to Southern Rhodesia shall be covered by such 
contracts ; 

8. Calls upon States to inform the Committee of 
the Security Council on their present sources of 
supply and quantities of chrome, asbestos, nickel, 
pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together with 
the quantities of these goods they obtained from 
Southern Rhodesia before the application of sanc- 
tions. 



TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ■ 

The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions on the situation in South- 
ern Rhodesia, in particular, resolutions 320 (1972) 
and 328 (1973), 

Noting the measures called for in resolution. . .,' 

Considering the urgent and simultaneous need for 
more stringent measures in order to meet the re- 
quirements of paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972), 

Deeply disturbed at the deteriorating situation 
in Southern Rhodesia, which constitutes a serious 
threat to international peace and security, 

Reiterating its deep concern that measures 
adopted by the Council have failed to bring to an 
end the illegal regime and its conviction that sanc- 
tions cannot terminate the illegal regime unless 
they are comprehensive, mandatory and effectively 
supervised and unless measures are taken against 
States which violate them, 

Reaffirming that effective action must be taken 
to end open and persistent refusal of South Africa 
and Portugal to implement sanctions against the 
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia which has 
undermined the effectiveness of the measures 
adopted by the Security Council and which con- 
stitutes a violation of the obligations of South 
Africa and Portugal under Article 25 of the 
Charter, 

1. Decides that all States should limit, with im- 
mediate effect, any purchase of chromium ores, 
asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize 
and any products from South Africa, Mozambique 
and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing 
in 1965; 

2. Requests States to take the necessary measures, 
including enacting legislation denying or revoking 
landing rights to national carriers of countries 
that continue to grant such rights to aircraft from 
Southern Rhodesia or operate air services to South- 
ern Rhodesia; 

3. Decides to extend the Beira blockade to cover 
all commodities and products from or destined to 
Southern Rhodesia to the port of Laurengo Marques; 

4. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom, 
as the administering Power, to take all effective 
measures to implement fully paragraph 3 above 
and to seek such co-operation of other States in 
this task as they may require; 

5. Condemns all those Governments, in particular 
South Africa and Portugal, that encourage, assist 
or connive at any violation of sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia. 



'U.N. doc. S/10928; the draft resolution was not 
adopted owing to the negative votes of two perma- 
nent members of the Council, the vote being 11 in 
favor, 2 against (U.S., U.K.), with 2 abstentions 
(Austria, France). 

" Draft resolution S/10927. [Footnote in original.] 



July 2, 1973 



43 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty 
of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at 
Wellington November 10, 1972 at the Seventh 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.' 
Notification of approval: Belgium, May 30, 1973, 

recommendations VII-I through VII-IV, VII- 

VI through VII-IX. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of ai-ticle VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. 
Proclaimed by the President: June 14, 1973. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.' 
Signature : Colombia, June 4, 1973. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Philippines (with a decla- 
ration). May 16, 1973. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971.' 
Accepta7ice deposited: Philippines, May 16, 1973. 

Peace in Viet-Nam 

Joint communique implementing the agreement, with 
protocols, of January 27, 1973 (TIAS 7542), on 
ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam. 
Signed at Paris June 13, 1973. 

Signatures : United States, Republic of Viet-Nam, 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
South Viet-Nam. 
Entered into force: June 13, 1973. 

Property — Industrial 

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. 
Done at Vienna June 12, 1973. Enters into force 



six months after five states have deposited their 
instruments of ratification or accession. 
Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany, Hun- 
gary, Italy, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino, 
United Kingdom, United States, June 12, 1973. 

War 

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of the condi- 
tion of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members 
of armed forces at sea; 
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of 

prisoners of war; 

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 

persons in time of war. 

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 

force October 21, 1950; for the United States 

February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 

3365, respectively. 

Accession deposited: Singapore, April 27, 1973. 

War, Renunciation of 

Treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an 
instrument of national policy. Signed at Paris 
August 27, 1928. Entered into force July 24, 1929. 
46 Stat. 2343. 
Notification of succession: Fiji, May 21, 1973. 



BILATERAL 

Colombia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 24, 1973 (TIAS 
7623). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota 
May 11, 1973. Entered into force May 11, 1973. 

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam 

Joint communique implementing the agreement, with 
protocols, of January 27, 1973 (TIAS 7542), on 
ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam. 
Signed at Paris June 13, 1973. Entered into force 
June 13, 1973. 

Ireland 

Agreement relating to recognition of charterworthi- 
ness of charter traffic during June 1973. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington June 7 and 
8, 1973. Entered into force June 8, 1973. 

Agreement amending the agreement of February 3, 
1945, as amended (59 Stat. 1402, 61 Stat. 2872, 
TIAS 4007), relating to air transport services. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin June 11, 
1973. Entered into force June 11, 1973. 

Japan 

Agreement concerning an international observer 
scheme for whaling operations from land stations 
in the North Pacific Ocean. Signed at Tokyo May 
29, 1973. Entered into force May 29, 1973. 



' Not in force. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX JhUi ^. I97.J Vol. LXIX. Nn. 1775 



Asia. Change anil ronstimcv in U.S. Commit- 
ments (Rush) ... 1 

China 

Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments 

(Rush) 1 

S. Swimmers and Divers Tour People's Re- 
public of China 15 

I ingress 
1 icpartment Discusses the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
and the Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf Area 

(Sisco) ; T.- • ^^ 

Secretary Rogers Discusses Objectives of For- 
eign Assistance Program (Rogers) .... 34 

Kconomic Affairs 

Kestoring Europe's Sense of Unity (Pedersen) . 16 
■Pia(lemarl< Treaty Signed at Vienna .... 28 
i.S. Economic Policies and Their Implica- 
tions for Latin America and the Caribbean 

(Casey) 22 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Swim- 
mers and Divers Tour People's Republic of 

China 15 

Environment. World Environment Day (procla- 
mation) '^ 

Europe 

Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments 

(Rush) V, •, • \ ■ ,1 

Restoring Europe's Sense of Unity (Pedersen) . lb 

loreign Aid. Secretary Rogers Discusses Ob- 
jectives of Foreign Assistance Program 
(Rogers) 34 

Trance. President Nixon and President Pompi- 
dou of France Hold Talks in Iceland 
(Eldjarn, Nixon, Pompidou, Kissinger) . . 7 

Iceland. President Nixon and President Pompi- 
dou of France Hold Talks in Iceland (Eld- 
jarn, Nixon, Pompidou, Kissinger) .... 7 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
Calendar of International Conferences ... 37 

Latin America. U.S. Economic Policies and 
Their Implications for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Casey) 22 

Middle East. Department Discusses the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict and the Arabian Peninsula- 
Persian Gulf Area (Sisco) 29 

Military Affairs. Restoring Europe's Sense of 
Unity (Pedersen) 16 

Presidential Documents 

President Nixon and President Pompidou of 
France Hold Talks in Iceland 7 

World Environment Day (proclamation) ... 15 

.-Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Calls for Stronger En- 
forcement of U.N. Sanctions .Against South- 
ern Rhodesia (Scali, texts of resolution and 
draft resolution) 40 

Treaty Information 

' urrent Actions 44 

1 rademark Treaty Signed at Vienna .... 28 



U.S.S.R. 

Change and Constancy in U.S. Commitments 
(Rush) • 1 

Secretary Discusses Development of U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Relations (written interview for 
TASS) 5 

United Nations. U.S. Calls for Stronger En- 
forcement of U.N. Sanctions Against South- 
ern Rhodesia (Scali, texts of resolution and 
draft resolution) 40 

Name Index 

Casey, William J 22 

Eldjarn, Kristjan 7 

Kissinger, Henry A " 

Nixon, President '^' Jc 

Pedersen, Richard F 16 

Pompidou, Georges r q3 

Rogers, Secretary 5, 34 

Rush, Kenneth 1 

Scali, John 40 

Sisco, Joseph J ^^ 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to June 11 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
161 of May 18, 189 of May 31, 192 and 193 
of June 5, 197 of June 6, and 200 of June 8. 

Subject 

U.S. and Ireland reach agreement 
on landing rights (rewrite). 

Rogers: arrival statement, Teh- 
ran, June 9. 

Rogers: CENTO ministerial con- 
ference, Tehran, June 10. 

Rush : Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations. 

Rogers: news conference, Tehran, 
June 11. 

Rush : World Affairs Council, Los 
Angeles. 

Rogers: TASS interview. 

CENTO communique, June 11. 

Newsom: Senate Subcommittee 
on Africa. 

Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan 
Educational and Cultural Co- 
operation, Hilo, Hawaii, June 
16-18. 

Rogers : interview for Danish tel- 
evision. 

Trademark treaty signed at 
Vienna. 



No. 


Date 


t201 


6/11 


t202 


6/11 


t203 


6/11 


t204 


6/12 


t205 


6/12 


1-206 


6/14 


207 
t208 
t209 


6/14 
6/14 
6/15 



t210 6/15 



1211 
212 



6/15 
6/15 



tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent or Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



PO«T*CC AND nt» PAID 
U.a. eOVCPNMCNT PHIMTINO OfPICC 



Spaclal Fourth Clais Rat* Book 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Oflfice 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXIX • No. 1776 • July 9. 1973 



COMMUNIQUE SIGNED AT PARIS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
OF VIET-NAM AGREEMENT U5 

THE UNITED STATES WITH EUROPE 
Address by Deputy Secretary Rtish 54 

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ENERGY 
Address by Under Secretary Casey 59 

FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROGRESSIVE LATIN AMERICA 
Address by Assistant Secretary Kubisch 68 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1776 
July 9, 1973 



Kor sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 66 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

lyote: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Communique Signed at Paris on Implementation 
of Viet-Nam Agreement 



Follotving is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held at Paris on June 13 by Hem-y A. 
Kissinger, Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs, together with the 
texts of joint communiques signed at Paris 
that day by the four parties to the January 
27 Viet-Nam agreement and by the United 
States and the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam.'^ 



DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE 

White House press release dated June 13 

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, first 
of all, I want to thank those of you who have 
been following me around in these many ses- 
sions in November, December, January, Feb- 
ruary, and now, for your patience, sometimes 
for risking your necks. I regret I haven't 
been able to be more communicative at the 
end of each session, but these negotiations 
are somewhat complex and involve many 
parties. 

I understand that there has already been 
a previous briefing which went to the details, 
but let me say very briefly what we consider 
to be the significance of this communique, 
what is in the communique, and then I will 
take your questions. 

As you know, during the course of March 
and April the United States became quite 
concerned about the manner in which the 
cease-fire agreement was being implemented. 



' For texts of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and protocols 
signed at Paris on Jan. 27, see Bulletin of Feb. 
12, 1973, p. 169. 



We were specifically concerned about the fol- 
lowing points: • 

— One, the inadequate implementation of 
the cease-fire. 

— Secondly, the continued infiltration into 
South Viet-Nam and the continued utiliza- 
tion of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for 
that infiltration. 

— Three, we were concerned about the in- 
adequate accounting for the missing in 
action. 

— Fourth, we were concerned about the 
violations of the demilitarized zone. 

— Fifth, we were concerned about the in- 
adequate cooperation with the International 
Control Commission and the slow staffing of 
the Two-Party Military Commission. 

— Sixth, we were concerned about the vio- 
lations of article 20 requiring the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia. 

Needless to say, the other side had its list 
of complaints, and in these circumstances we 
proposed that Mr. Le Due Tho and I meet 
again to review the implementation of the 
agreements that had been so painfully nego- 
tiated last fall. 

There was a preliminary meeting between 
Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs] and Vice Minister 
[for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co] Thach, and 
then on May 17 Le Due Tho and I met again 
and reached some preliminary conclusions. 
We were in daily contact with the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam through its delega- 
tion here and through our Embassy in Sai- 
gon. We then sent Ambassador Sullivan to 



July 9, 1973 



45 



Saigon for further consultations. I returned 
here. The negotiations continued. There was 
a slight interruption last Saturday, and we 
reached a final conclusion today. 

As far as the content of the joint communi- 
que is concerned, we believe that we have 
achieved a satisfactory conclusion of the 
points that were of principal concern to the 
United States. 

There is, as you know, to be issued a new 
order on the cease-fire, which is to go into 
effect roughly 36 hours from now, which we 
hope and expect will be implemented fully. 

Second, there is a clear repetition of the 
prohibitions against the infiltration of per- 
sonnel and materiel into South Viet-Nam, 
except as replacements under article 7 of the 
original agreement and according to pro- 
cedures agreed to by the two parties with 
reference to respect for the demilitarized 
zone and to the prohibition of transiting the 
demilitarized zone except in accordance with 
the replacement provisions of the agreement. 

Under the provisions for missing in action, 
all sides have pledged that they would make 
major efforts to help each other to account 
for the missing in action throughout Indo- 
china, and this is a matter which is of great 
concern to the United States. 

The Two-Party Military Commission is to 
be fully staffed, and special assurances have 
been given in paragraph 12 about coopera- 
tion with the International Control Commis- 
sion by all the parties to grant them reason- 
able freedom of movement. 

With respect to Laos and Cambodia, the 
communique says that the provisions of 
article 20 are to be scrupulously observed, 
and there have been long discussions about 
the whole complex of issues raised by Laos 
and Cambodia. However, since the final re- 
sults depend on the sovereign decision of 
other parties, we will not discuss this sub- 
ject here, and we will leave it to the results 
and to events to testify to progress. 

The other subject which has been dis- 
cussed and which I have left separately is 
that of political evolution in South Viet- 



Nam. As you know, the United States has 
always taken the view that the political evo- 
lution of South Viet-Nam is to be decided 
by the South Vietnamese. 

Therefore the United States has always 
believed — and that is reflected in the com- 
munique — that the political future of South 
Viet-Nam should be determined by a process 
of free and democratic general elections. The 
other provisions regarding political evolu- 
tion reafl^rm what is said in chapter IV of 
the cease-fire agreement. 

Now, we have today signed the communi- 
que, ladies and gentlemen; and the history of 
Indochina is replete with agreements and 
joint declarations. I am not naive enough to 
pretend to you that the mere fact of having 
again agreed to certain words in itself guar- 
antees peace; but I will also say that since 
all parties have worked so seriously for the 
last three weeks, we have every hope that 
they will match this effort with performance 
and therefore there is fresh hope, and we 
hope a new spirit, in the implementation of 
the agreement, which in itself is maintained. 

What was signed today is an amplification 
and a consolidation of the original agree- 
ment. It is not a new agreement. Now, the 
people of Indochina, and especially the peo- 
ples of Viet-Nam, have suffered conflicts for 
a generation, and our greatest ambition has 
been to end their suffering and to restore 
peace, and it is our hope that by what has 
been done today a significant step has been 
taken in the consolidation of peace in Viet- 
Nam and in Indochina. 

Now I will be glad to answer your ques- 
tions. For my own education, will you iden- 
tify yourselves. 

Q. What were the changes in the communi- 
que in the last jew days that made it accept- 
able to the South Vietnamese Government? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it is useful to 
go through all the details of the negotiation 
and to provide a scorecard. In any negotia- 
tion there are sometimes impasses reached 
that afterward are rather complex to explain. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



I will be glad to explain one difficulty that 
existed which was perhaps not of monu- 
mental substantive significance but which 
was extremely time consuming and which 
concerned the formal signing of the com- 
munique. 

The United States began by proposing 
that it should be a two-party communique 
between Hanoi and the United States as a 
recommendation to the South Vietnamese 
parties. The North Vietnamese proposed that 
it should be a two-party communique signed 
with the concurrence of the South Vietnam- 
ese parties. The South Vietnamese proposed 
that it should be a four-party communique. 

We accepted a four-party communique, at 
which point Saigon proposed that it should 
be a two-party communique with recommen- 
dations to the two South Vietnamese parties, 
which in turn induced Hanoi to accept the 
four-party communique. We then, as a com- 
promise, accepted Hanoi's proposal of a two- 
party communique with the concurrence of 
the South Vietnamese parties. 

So there was one fleeting moment where 
Saigon had our position, we had Hanoi's 
position, and Hanoi had Saigon's position. So 
you must not believe that every time that a 
great deal of time is spent, it always con- 
cerns final issues of war and peace. This was 
one of the issues that took some time, but I 
will not discuss every issue that arose. 

Q. Lou Cioffi, ABC Neivs. Besides the fact 
that the other parties did negotiate seriously, 
ivhat else makes you think that they are now 
willing to work together seriously for a 
political solution in Indochina and not a mili- 
tary one? 

Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. Cioffi, that the 
whole evolution of the Indochina tragedy and 
of the Vietnamese war has been a slow reali- 
zation by all the parties that they could not 
impose a military solution on each other. 

This has been a very painful process for all 
concerned, because I think it is safe to say 
that the art of compromise is not the most 
highly developed quality in Viet-Nam. 



I believe that the realities of the situation, 
both before the cease-fire agreement and, I 
think it is fair to say, since the cease-fire 
agreement, may have brought home to the 
parties concerned the necessity of, first, 
peaceful coexistence and eventually some po- 
litical solution. 

I repeat, I did not say that this was guar- 
anteed. It is undoubtedly a process which 
will have its ups and downs. But we are 
entering this new phase with the intention 
of contributing what we can to easing the 
situation and promoting the peace. 

Q. The communique today deals witfi the 
tivo sides' military leaders getting together 
to agree on what areas are controlled. If 
since the January agreement of the 27th they 
have not been able to agree even on an 
agenda in the political discussions, why is 
there reason to believe they will be able to 
agree on what areas the military control? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, events will 
show very quickly whether they will be able 
to agree. One of the reasons why the Two- 
Party Military Commission has not worked 
as efficiently as was originally hoped was be- 
cause of the difficulty of agreeing on location 
and immunity; and that problem has been 
substantially resolved by this agreement, or 
should have been substantially resolved by 
this agreement. 

With respect to areas controlled and mo- 
dalities of stationing, it is our view that this 
is determined by the military presence, and 
on that basis both sides, after a clear cease- 
fire is achieved, should be able empirically to 
determine where the forces are located and 
on that basis delimit the zones of military 
control. 

One reason it has not worked previously 
is because the cease-fire was not fully ob- 
served. To the extent that this new cease- 
fire order — which will go into efi^ect at 4 
o'clock Greenwich mean time on the 15th — to 
the extent that that is observed, the delimita- 
tion of areas of control should be substan- 
tially eased. 



July 9, 1973 



47 



Q. Do you feel now that with the signing 
of the document you have mere or less ended 
your work in the Indochina area or that you 
will still have a lot of difficulties, especially 
concerning Cambodia? 

Dr. Kissinger: The remaining issues in In- 
dochina will still require significant diplo- 
matic efforts, and we expect to continue 
them. Of course, we remain committed to the 
strict implementation of the agreement, and 
we will maintain our interest in it. I hope to 
be able to reduce my own participation in 
this process in order to preserve my emo- 
tional stability. [Laughter.] 

Q. If the question that was just asked had 
to do rvith American aerial military opera- 
tions in Cambodia, that is ivhat I was going 
to ask also. If it was not, what I tvould like 
to ask is, is there anything in this agreement, 
this communique, which substantially com- 
mits the United States to cease such opera- 
tions ? 

Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in this 
communique that commits the United States 
to cease such operations. It is our hope, and 
we will make major efforts in that direction, 
to continue the diplomacy that will produce 
a cease-fire in Cambodia. 

Q. Jim Browning, Westinghouse Broad- 
casting. Can I ask you what there is in the 
communique that was released today, besides 
the good will and seriousness of the people 
tvho negotiated it, that will make it work 
better than the agreement that rvas negoti- 
ated on January 27 ? 

Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in any 
communique that makes a communique work. 
A communique works because the parties 
concerned intend to implement it, and there- 
fore all a communique can do, or an agree- 
ment can do, is to prescribe what the obliga- 
tions of the various parties are. 

To the extent that this communique pre- 
scribes the specific obligations and reaffirms 



them, it can contribute to the consolidation 
of peace. But it is never words alone that 
produce peace; it is the combination of words, 
the intention, and the consequences of per- 
formance. 

Q. I am with Economic Review, Dr. Kis- 
singer. I find in the com-munique one new 
point, and that is that your government has 
agreed to conclude the first phase of the 
talks on the Joint Economic Commission with 
the North Vietnamese within 15 days after 
the signing of the accord. If I understand the 
American negotiation process correctly, I 
was under the impression that in fact the 
negotiations on the joint economic aid ivere 
to some extent meant to be a guarantee that 
North Viet-Nam does apply the accords. 

Have you managed to obtain some under- 
standing or some guarantees from the North 
Vietnamese, apart from tvhat ive have found 
in the communique, that they will apply the 
accords — because I am rather siwprised by 
this concession, if we can call it that? 

Dr. Kissinger: The Joint Economic Com- 
mission had substantially completed its work 
at the point when we suspended negotiations. 
So that the schedule which is indicated in the 
communique is inherent in the resumption of 
negotiations. 

The United States has always made clear 
that the final implementation of the economic 
clauses of the agreement has to be seen as 
part and parcel of the total implementation 
of the agreement. 

Of course, many of you know that even 
after the Joint Economic Commission com- 
pletes its work, its results will first have to 
be submitted to the Congress and, secondly, 
will have to be approved by the Congress, 
which is not an automatic process. 

So, there will be sufficient time in which 
to assess the implementation of the agree- 
ment. This administration has left no doubt 
that its support for the in'ogram in the vari- 
ous forums is related to the overall imple- 
mentation of the agreement. 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. May I ask you a question off the subject 
of the immediate subject of the Viet-Nam, 
communique? 

Dr. Kissinger: Preferably not. 

Q. Preferably not, but I may? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you can ask it, and 
then I will determine whether I will answer 
it. 

Q. I wondered if you would be prepared to 
say why you went to see Mr. Chi P'eng-fei 
today, and at whose initiative, and what you 
talked about. 

Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister of 
China is an old friend whom I have seen re- 
peatedly in Peking, and since we found our- 
selves in the same town, a courtesy visit was 
arranged. It lasted 50 minutes, but you have 
to allow time for translation. [Laughter.] 

Q. I am with the Los Angeles Times. I 
ivoidd like to ask, Dr. Kissinger, what kind 
of an estimate you have over the last few 
months in connection with the cease-fire vio- 
lations, the extent to tvhich they are inten- 
tional or accidental; that is to say, coyitroUed 
or uncontrolled, on the other side, naturally. 

Dr. Kissinger: In a situation, as in Viet- 
Nam, where many of the forces are mingled 
together in very close contact, an implemen- 
tation of the cease-fire is of course extremely 
difficult. The first thing to remember is that 
the level of violence since January 27 has 
dropped very markedly and is at the lowest 
level that it has been in a decade. 

I would say that there are daily reports of 
major and minor violations. I think it is safe 
to say that, of the minor violations, a signi- 
ficant percentage is produced by the proxim- 
ity of the forces and not necessarily by a 
deliberate design. 

In the case of the major violations, which 
have averaged around 15 a day, I think it is 
safe to say that a significant majority are 
produced by the deliberate decision, often of 
local commanders, but in any case by de- 
liberate decisions. 



Q. Scott Sullivan, Newsweek. Both the 
Saigon government and I believe the Ameri- 
can Government have said they ivere very 
eager to tie dotvn a date for free and demo- 
cratic elections in South Viet-Nam. On the 
surface of the communique, there doesn't 
seem to be any such tying doivn or linking. 
Are you satisfied that significant progress 
has been made in that particular direction? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have two separate prob- 
lems. One is the desirability of the dates for 
general elections and the suitability of a four- 
party document to tie such a date down. Last 
fall, when we negotiated this agreement, the 
Saigon government very properly took the 
view that it would be inappropriate for the 
United States or for an international docu- 
ment to prescribe the specific date for elec- 
tions, and we spent many days on that issue 
because it was at that time that the North 
Vietnamese wanted to tie down the date and 
it was we who, following the recommenda- 
tions of the Saigon government, did not do so. 

In these circumstances, it is impossible 
for the United States to insist now on what 
it refused in December. Nevertheless, we 
have always taken the view that the political 
future of South Viet-Nam should be left to 
the South Vietnamese and that free and dem- 
ocratic general elections should be a central 
element in determining that future. 

Individually, we support the South Viet- 
namese proposal that a time should be fixed 
for that election. We think it is a reasonable 
proposal. But in the light of the negotiating 
history, it was not appropriate to introduce 
into a communique which is supposed to 
bring about the implementation of the agree- 
ment a clause which was not part of the orig- 
inal agreement and which was not part of 
the original agreement at the request of the 
South Vietnamese Government. 

But nevertheless, as far as the internal 
negotiations are concerned, we think the 
South Vietnamese demand is reasonable, and 
we hope it will be accepted. 



July 9, 1973 



49 



Q. John Harris, Hearst Papers. If this 
agreement doesn't work out, do you envisage 
negotiating a third agreement? 

Dr. Kissinger: It is a prospect I cannot 
face today. [Laughter.] When we sign an 
agreement, we hope that it will be imple- 
mented, and whatever difficulties, arise should 
be principally discussed between the Viet- 
namese parties, and I don't want to address 
now the question of what happens if there 
should be violations before we have even 
concluded the two-party signature. 

We have negotiated this in good faith, 
after a long war and a great deal of suffer- 
ing, with the hope that at last the parties 
concerned will draw the conclusion from the 
overwhelming reality in Viet-Nam that no- 
body can have his way by force. 

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle- 
men. 



TEXTS OF JOINT COMMUNIQUES 

Four-Porty Joint Communique 

Joint Communique 

The Parties signatory to the Paris Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
Nam, signed on January 27, 1973, 

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous 
implementation of all provisions of the Agreement 
and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them 
are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and 
contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and 
Southeast Asia, 

Have agreed on the following points (in the 
sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement) : 

1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, 
the United States shall cease immediately, com- 
pletely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over 
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam. 

2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement 
and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance: 

(a) The United States shall resume mine clear- 
ance operations within five days from the date of 
signature of this Joint Communique and shall suc- 
cessfully complete those operations within thirty 
days thereafter. 

(b) The United States shall supply to the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed 
to be adequate and suflficient for sweeping mines in 
rivers. 

(c) The United States shall announce when the 



mine clearance in each main channel is completed 
and issue a final announcement when all the opera- 
tions are completed. 

3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agree- 
ment, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the 
High Commands of the two South Vietnamese 
parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and 
irregular armed forces and the armed police under 
their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire 
throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400 
hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously 
implement the Agreement and its Protocols. 

4. The tsvo South Vietnamese parties shall strictly 
implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the 
Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam which read as 
follows: 

"Article 2 

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force 
and until regulations are issued by the Joint 
Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and 
air combat forces of the parties in South Viet- 
Nam shall remain in place; that is, in order to 
ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no 
major redeployments or movements that would 
extend each party's area of control or would 
result in contact between opposing armed forces 
and clashes which might take place. 

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces 
and the armed police of the parties in South 
Viet-Nam shall observe the prohibition of the 
following acts: 

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by 
opposing armed forces and flights by bomber 
and fighter aircraft of all types, except for 
unarmed flights for proficiency training and 
maintenance; 

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either 
military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, 
including the use of small arms, mortars, 
artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes 
and any other type of weapon or explosive 
device; 

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on 
rivers, on the sea and in the air; 

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; 
and 

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or 
private property. 

Article 3 
(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall 
not hamper or restrict: 

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, 
freedom to work, and freedom of the people to 
engage in trade, and civilian communication and 
transportation between and among all areas 
in South Viet-Nam; 

(2) The use by each party in areas under its 
control of military support elements, such as 
engineer and transportation units, in repair 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



and construction of public facilities and the 
transportation and supplying of the population ; 

(3) Normal military proficiency training con- 
ducted by the parties in the areas under their 
respective control with due regard for public 
safety. 

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall 
immediately agree on corridors, routes, and 
other regulations governing the movement of 
military transport aircraft, military transport 
vehicles, and military transport vessels of all 
types of one party going through areas under 
the control of other parties." 

5. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall 
immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 
3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas con- 
trolled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties 
and the modalities of stationing. This task shall be 
completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall 
also immediately discuss the movements necessary 
to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the 
two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they 
occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into force 
on January 28, 1973. 

6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred 
to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders 
of the opposing armed forces at those places of 
direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions 
of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in 
South Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agree- 
ment on temporary measures to avert conflict and to 
ensure supply and medical care for these armed 
forces. 

7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement: 

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not 
accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, 
and military personnel, including technical military 
personnel, into South Viet-Nam. 

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not 
accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and 
war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the 
two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make 
periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and 
war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the 
Agreement, through designated points of entry and 
subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Mili- 
tary Commission and the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision. 

In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agree- 
ment regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone, 
military equipment may transit the Demilitarized 
Zone only if introduced into South Viet-Nam as re- 
placements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement 
and through a designated point of entry. 

(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force 
of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two- 
Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the 
modalities for the supervision of the replacements 
of armaments, munitions, and war material per- 
mitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three 



points of entry already agreed upon for each party. 
Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the 
cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South 
Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement 
three additional points of entry for each party in the 
area controlled by that party. 

8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement: 

(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 
8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been re- 
turned shall be returned without delay, and in any 
event within no more than thirty days from the date 
of signature of this Joint Communique. 

(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the 
Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall 
be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian 
personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement 
and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Cap- 
tured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possi- 
ble. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their 
utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days 
from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. 

(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol 
on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured 
and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shall 
be treated humanely at all times. The two South 
Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement 
Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days 
from the date of signature of this Joint Communi- 
que, allow National Red Cross Societies they have 
agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel 
are held. 

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall co- 
operate in obtaining information about missing per- 
sons and in determining the location of and in taking 
care of the graves of the dead. 

(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agree- 
ment, the parties shall help each other to get infor- 
mation about those military personnel and foreign 
civilians of the parties missing in action, to deter- 
mine the location and take care of the graves of the 
dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatria- 
tion of the remains, and to take any such other meas- 
ures as may be required to get information about 
those still considered missing in action. For this pur- 
pose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be 
made between Saigon and Hanoi. 

9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall imple- 
ment Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as 
follows : 

"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two 
South Vietnamese parties will: 

— achieve national reconciliation and concord, 
end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of re- 
prisal and discrimination against individuals or 
organizations that have collaborated with one 
side or the other; 

— ensure the democratic liberties of the peo- 
ple: personal freedom, freedom of speech, free- 
dom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom 



July 9, 1 973 



51 



of organization, freedom of political activities, 
freedom of belief, freedom of movement, free- 
dom of residence, freedom of work, right to 
property ownership and right to free enterprise." 

10. Consistent with the principles for the exer- 
cise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self- 
determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agree- 
ment: 

(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide 
themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam 
through genuinely free and democratic general elec- 
tions under international supervision. 

(b) The National Council of National Reconcilia- 
tion and Concord consisting of three equal seg^ments 
shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity 
with Article 12 of the Agreement. 

The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an 
agreement on the internal matters of South Viet- 
Nam as soon as possible, and shall do their utmost to 
accomplish this within forty-five days from the date 
of signature of this Joint Communique. 

(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree 
through consultations on the institutions for which 
the free and democratic general elections provided 
for in Article 9(b) of the Agreement will be held. 

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall im- 
plement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads 
as follows: 

"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in 
South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two 
South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national 
reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual 
respect, without foreign interference, in accord- 
ance with the postwar situation. Among the 
questions to be discussed by the two South 
Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their 
military effectives and to demobilize the troops 
being reduced. The two South Vietnamese par- 
ties will accomplish this as soon as possible." 

11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agree- 
ment: 

(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of 
the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam 
shall immediately be implemented with respect to 
the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. That 
Commission shall also immediately be accorded the 
eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed 
upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. 
Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made 
between Saigon and the headquarters of the Regional 
Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other 
places in South Viet-Nam as required for the op- 
erations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commis- 
sion. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also 
be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh. 

(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon 



proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South 
Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one 
of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The 
locations of the headquarters of the Regional Two- 
Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams 
of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall 
be determined by that Commission within fifteen 
days after the entry into force of the cease-fire re- 
ferred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be 
changed at any time as determined by the Com- 
mission. The locations, except for teams at the points 
of entry, shall be selected from among those towns 
specified in Article 11(b) and (c) of the Protocol 
on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam and those 
places where an area controlled by one South Viet- 
namese party adjoins an area controlled by the 
other, or at any other place agreed upon by the 
Commission. 

(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned 
in paragraph 11(a) are accorded by both South 
Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission shall be fully staflFed and its regional 
commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen 
days after their locations have been determined. 

(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission 
and the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist 
each other in carrying out their respective functions. 

12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agree- 
ment and Article 10 of the Protocol on the Interna- 
tional Commission of Control and Supervision, the 
International Commission, including its teams, is al- 
lowed such movement for observation as is reason- 
ably required for the proper exercise of its functions 
as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these 
functions, the International Commission, including 
its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and 
cooperation from the parties concerned. The two 
South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary 
instructions to their personnel and take all other 
necessary measures to ensure the safety of such 
movement. 

13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cam- 
bodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented. 

14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agree- 
ment, the United States-Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam Joint Economic Commission shall resume 
its meetings four days from the date of signature of 
this Joint Communique and shall complete the first 
phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter. 

AflSrming that the parties concerned shall strictly 
respect and scrupulously implement all the pro- 
visions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and 
this Joint Communique, the undersigned representa- 
tives of the parties signatory to the Paris Agreement 
have decided to issue this Joint Communique to re- 
cord and publish the points on which they have 
agreed. 

Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



[Separate Numbered Page] 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Republic of Viet- 
America : Nam : 



Henry A. Kissinger 
Assistant to the Presi- 
dent of the United States 
of America 



Nguyen Luu Vien 
Representative of the 

Government of the 
Reptiblic of Viet-Nam 



[Separate Numbered Pagel 

For the Government of For the Provisional Rev- 
the Democratic Republic olutionary Government 
of Viet-Nam: of the Republic of South 

Viet-Nam : 



Le Due Tho 

Representative of the 

Government of the 

Democratic Republic of 

Viet-Nam 



Nguyen Van Hieu 
Minister of State of the 
Provisional Revolution- 
ary Government of the 
Republic of South 
Viet-Nam 



Two-Party Joint Communique 

Joint Communique 

From May 17 to May 23, from June 6 to June 9, 
and on June 12 and June 13, 1973, Dr. Henry A. 
Kissinger, on behalf of the Government of the United 
States of America, and Mr. Le Due Tho, on behalf 
of the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam, reviewed the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace 
in Viet-Nam and its Protocols and discussed urgent 
measures to ensure the correct and strict imple- 
mentation of the Agreement and its Protocols. 

The Government of the United States of America, 
with the concurrence of the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, 



The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Viet-Nam, 

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous im- 
plementation of all provisions of the Paris Agree- 
ment and its Protocols by all the parties signatory 
to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet- 
Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indo- 
china and Southeast Asia, 

Have agreed on the following points (in the 
sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement) : 

[Texts of paragraphs 1-14 as above] 

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly 
respect and scrupulously implement all the provi- 
sions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, this 
Joint Communique, and a Joint Communique in the 
same terms signed by representatives of the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America, the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of South Viet-Nam, the representative of 
the United States of America, Dr. Henry A. 
Kissinger, and the representative of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Le Due Tho, have de- 
cided to issue this Joint Communique to record and 
publish the points on which they have agreed. 

Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973. 



For the Government of 
the United States of 
America: 

Henry A. Kissinger 
Assistant to the Presi- 
dent of the United States 
of America 



For the Government of 
the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam: 

Le Due Tho 

Representative of the 

Government of the 

Democratic Republic of 

Viet-Nam, 



July 9, 1973 



53 



The United States With Europe 



Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Ritsh 



The United States is embarked upon one of 
the most exciting- periods of foreign relations 
in its history. Today, we are building- the 
relationships that will determine the course 
of American foreign relations and, to no 
small degree, of world politics and economics 
for the remainder of the century. Some be- 
lieve that the United States is entering a 
new period of isolationism. This is not true. 
Nor should it be true. 

What is taking place is a search for new 
forms of involvement, new forms of engage- 
ment, new forms of cooperation with the 
rest of the international community. Pres- 
ident Nixon is trying, as he has said, to 
"forge a network of relationships and of 
interdependencies that restrain aggression 
and that take the profit out of war."= This 
interdependence can provide the framework 
for the "generation of peace" the President 
seeks. 

Our changed relationships with the Soviet 
Union and with China were among the most 
dramatic accomplishments of President 
Nixon's first term. Cooperation has increas- 
ingly come to replace confrontation. General 
Secretary Brezhnev's impending visit to this 
country highlights the kind of change that 
has come about. With Moscow and with 
Peking we are demonstrating that adver- 
saries need not be antagonists. At the same 
time, we are determined not to involve our- 
selves in any way in the quarrel between 
Moscow and Peking. 



' Made before the Los Angeles, Calif., World Af- 
fairs Council on June 14 (press release 206). 

■ For an excerpt from President Nixon's address 
to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see Bulletin of Nov. 
20, 1972, p. 605. 



The new relationships with our foi'mer 
antagonists, and the end of the war in Viet- 
Nam, have enabled us to turn our energy 
and our imagination toward reshaping and 
reinforcing our ties to our closest allies else- 
where in the world. Today, I would like to 
focus on our relations with western Eu- 
rope — an area with which we are intimately 
tied by history, by intei'est, and by friendship. 

Twenty-five years ago fear, crisis, and eco- 
nomic ruin marked the European Continent. 
The United States alone among major indus- 
trial countries escaped the devastation of the 
war — and it held undisputed primacy in nu- 
clear weapons. 

Today Europe has recovered economically 
and i)olitically. The gross national product of 
the nine members of the European Com- 
munity is 78 percent of that of the United 
States. Europe as a whole is now the 
United States principal trading partner ; the 
European Community alone absorbs about 
one-fourth of our exports. It is also a major 
commercial rival. The European Community 
provides 22.1 percent of the world's exports 
and consumes 17.7 percent of its imports. 
The United States, by comparison, supplies 
12.4 percent of the world's exports and 12.5 
percent of its imports. 

Economic recovery has been paralleled by 
political revival. The Europeans have a nat- 
ural desire to play an equal role in the de- 
cisions that aff'ect them. U.S. leadership is 
necessarily being replaced by U.S. participa- 
tion with our allies in common decisions. 

The tensions across Europe have been 
greatly reduced. The continent no longer lives 
in constant fear. At the same time the United 
States is no longer the sole possessor of a 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



credible nuclear deterrent; instead there is 
approximate parity between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

There has been a tendency in some quar- 
ters to view this period of transition in terms 
of contradictions: a contradiction between 
defense and detente; between European 
unity and Atlantic cooperation; between bi- 
lateral consultation and multilateral coopera- 
tion; between Europe's economic vitality and 
the economic interests of the United States. 

To pose the issues of our Atlantic partner- 
ship in these terms is misleading-. It is also 
dangerous, because to do so encourages the 
latent tendencies against cooperation that 
exist on both sides of the Atlantic. 

The ease and candor with which we and 
Europe discuss our differences make it all the 
more important to set forth concrete objec- 
tives as we seek to strengthen our Atlantic 
partnership. I would like to list for you our 
six objectives: 

First, we seek to reinforce and reaffirm 
our close ties with each European nation. 
This year's series of bilateral consultations 
between President Nixon and European lead- 
ers is a critical part of that process. The 
President intends to travel to Europe in the 
fall to carry forward his bilateral contacts. 
Our strong bilateral ties are essential build- 
ing blocks in NATO, in our cooperative ef- 
forts in the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development, and, for ex- 
ample, in our mutual endeavor to restructure 
the world's trade and monetary systems. We 
intend to keep each of our European allies 
fully informed of the result of our bilateral 
consultations to assure that these talks con- 
tinue to supplement the strength of our 
broader association. 

Second, we seek a common effort to rede- 
fine the principles that can guide Atkintic 
relations in the future. Equality among the 
Atlantic partners calls for a new consensus 
on our common objectives and how to attain 
them. Such principles must be the result of a 
mutual effort among all the allies. Security, 
economic, and political issues must continue 
to be discussed in appropriate organizations 



and through high-level consultations, both 
bilateral and multilateral. But agreement on 
general jirinciples will enable all of us to re- 
inforce our mutual interests as we address 
specific issues. As each nation in the alliance 
reviews the many ways and many places we 
are involved with each other, the United 
States is hopeful that all will contribute to 
the formulation of common principles, com- 
mon interests, and an agreed approach to our 
relations. However, we do not intend to force 
the pace of discussions. 

Third, we will continue to welcome western 
Europe's march totvard economic and politi- 
cal unity. A belief that a united Europe would 
be in the interest of the United States, as 
well as of the Europeans, has been a consis- 
tent thread in American foreign policy for 
the past 27 years. We acted on that belief to 
support western European efforts at greater 
unity. Experience has shown the wisdom of 
our policy. Today a more united Europe is a 
better trading partner, is a more secure home 
for democracy, and is more able to assume a 
greater responsibility for the common de- 
fense. We hope, as the Secretary of State has 
said, to build a relationship with the Euro- 
pean Community that "will in time become 
a solid pillar of U.S.-European association 
such as we already have in NATO." " Thus, 
we have welcomed the decision last fall by 
the members of the European Community to 
make their objective European union by the 
end of the decade. We look forward to the 
day, to borrow a phrase, when somebody will 
be able to answer the phone for Europe when 
we call. 

Fourth, we want to develop with Japan, 
Europe, Canada, and An-stralia a more com- 
plete relationship among all of us. We all 
share democracy and market economy. To- 
gether we produce about 70 percent of the 
world's goods and services. Together we have 
many common political and economic inter- 
ests; our common energy requirement is one. 
The need to further concert our policies to- 



' For text of the introduction to United States 
Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of the Secretary of 
State, transmitted to the Congress on Apr. 19, see 
Bulletin of May 7, 1973, p. 545. 



July 9, 1973 



55 



ward the developinjr world is another. Our 
many common economic, political, and secu- 
rity interests suggest the necessity for devel- 
oping fuller consultation among us all. 

Fifth, in close cooperation ivith our NATO 
allies ive will be building neiv relations with 
the Soviet Union and East Europe. The 
United States and its allies are presently en- 
gaged with the Soviet Union and its allies in 
two separate sets of talks which center on 
the reduction of the chronic tensions in 
Europe. The first of these is the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
where a total of 34 nations are participating 
in Helsinki. Secretary Rogers, who is today 
attending a meeting of NATO Foreign Min- 
isters in Copenhagen, will be attending a 
ministerial-level meeting of this conference 
within a few weeks. We and our allies are 
seeking to have this conference take concrete 
measures to increase the freedom of move- 
ment of people, information, and ideas across 
the continent and to affirm the right of each 
European nation to self-determination. 

Meanwhile, in Vienna, preparatory talks 
are underway for a conference on mutual and 
balanced reduction of NATO and Warsaw 
Pact forces facing each other in central 
Europe. We and our allies have worked inti- 
mately and successfully to develop common 
positions in both sets of talks. The candor, 
the self-confidence, and the mutual trust dis- 
played in our talks is evidence of the vigor of 
our alliance. 

The United States is also negotiating bi- 
laterally with the Soviet Union in SALT 
Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], with 
the aim of enhancing strategic stability and 
further reducing the risk of nuclear war. As 
you know, SALT One achieved an anti- 
ballistic-missile treaty placing strict low 
limits on strategic defense systems and an 
interim agreement limiting strategic offen- 
sive weapons. In SALT Two we are seeking 
a permanent accord based on essential stra- 
tegic equivalence between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union. Such an agreement would re- 
move the incentive for an arms race while 



maintaining our security. The European 
allies have a vital interest in the progress of 
these talks. And for that reason we have 
consulted closely with them. 

Sixth, we will seek to work with the na- 
tions of western Europe in defining and coor- 
dinating our actions on broad global con- 
cerns. We both are generating the capital, 
the technology, the exports, the imports, and 
the ideas that assure our continued involve- 
ment with the broader world community. We 
all look to global monetary and trade talks 
as the proper places to assure that we will 
continue to enjoy an expanding and equitable 
international economy. We all are anxious to 
protect the world's threatened environment. 
There are many other global issues in which 
we are involved. Moreover, Europe's cul- 
tural force, its economic strength, and its 
other strengths mean it must play a major 
role in bringing about a more secure and 
more cooperative world. We will need to co- 
operate closely as Europe continues to as- 
sume broad global responsibilities. 

As we seek these six goals we will expect 
differences in perception and approach. No 
nation has a monopoly on wisdom, just as no 
nation today enjoys either military or eco- 
nomic predominance. But differences on cer- 
tain specific issues do not mean that we will 
lose sight of the fact that our interests and 
those of Europe are essentially congruent. 
Two wars have taught us that our security 
and Europe's security are indivisible; our 
economies are all but inextricably tied; and 
we are all heirs to a belief that free societies 
are each others' best friends. 

We note with interest that the Greek Gov- 
ernment has pledged a return to parliamen- 
tary rule, and free and fair general elections 
before the end of 1974. We have consistently 
held that the form of government that pre- 
vails in Greece is a matter for the Greek 
people to decide. However, I am sure that 
friends and allies of Greece share a common 
interest in the referendum on constitutional 
revisions scheduled for the coming month 
and the elections which should provide the 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



Greek people an opportunity to exercise free 
ciioice in determining their future. 

In the United States some have been 
temi)ted to use the lessening of tensions be- 
tween ourselves and our adversaries to jus- 
tify a reduction of our defense expenditures, 
including a unilateral cutback of our forces 
in Europe. In fact, our strong defense pos- 
ture has been essential to our successes in 
bringing about a more normal relationship 
with the Soviet Union and with China. 

While I was serving as President Nixon's 
Ambassador to Bonn from 1969 to 1972, I 
repeatedly witnessed the importance of our 
determination to live up to our commitments. 
That determination gains the confidence of 
our allies. And that determination commands 
the resiject of our adversaries. That con- 
fidence and that respect were essential in- 
gredients in the negotiations of the 1971 
Berlin agreement, negotiations in which I 
was privileged to participate. As we seek in 
Helsinki and in Vienna to further lower 
Euroijean tensions without lessening western 
European security, we must continue to en- 
joy the confidence of our allies and the re- 
spect of our adversaries — and that means no 
unilateral reduction in our forces stationed in 
Europe. 

Those who advocate unilateral reductions 
forget that the major reason our troops are 
in Europe is for our own defense. Of course 
we seek greater allied participation in Euro- 
pean defense. We also want to work out 
measures which offset the balance of pay- 
ments effects on the United States — some 
$1.5 billion this year — of our troops sta- 
tioned in Europe. As essential as these steps 
are, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that our European allies maintain 3 million 
men under arms, 25 percent more than the 
United States, that for every American 
soldier in Europe there are nine allied sol- 
diers, and that they have approximately the 
same percentage of their population in the 
militai-y as we do. Therefore the emphasis 
must be upon qualitative improvements and 
better reserve forces. All of us will be facing 



greatly increased costs for new and more 
sophisticated equipment and higher person- 
nel costs. 

Defense expenditures are but one area in 
which the United States and Europe will be 
doing some very hard bargaining. Others are 
trade relations, monetary arrangements, bal- 
ance of ])ayment adjustment mechanisms. We 
will be searching for cooperative solutions to 
these issues. Such a positive outcome will not 
be easy. Each of the issues affects income, 
employment, and general well-being in each 
nation. Even clearer than the difficulty of the 
issues is the cost to each of us if we fail to 
develop cooperative solutions. In that case 
all will be worse off. 

We must also remember that continued co- 
operation can yield great benefits for us all. 
In trade, for example, the growing compe- 
tition between ourselves and our allies can 
yield greater prosperity for each. As Presi- 
dent Nixon has said, there is a great advan- 
tage to economic competition "because in 
economic competition every participant can 
win — there need be no losers." ' That is why 
we should not be afraid of the growing eco- 
nomic competition between ourselves and our 
allies. And that is why we and the Euro- 
peans and the Japanese reached understand- 
ings in 1972 to negotiate trade and monetary 
questions "on the basis of mutual advantage 
and mutual commitment with overall reci- 
procity." '■ These principles should allow us to 
minimize conflicts while seeking greater 
prosperity. The trade bill President Nixon 
submitted to Congress is essential to our 
country's successful participation in this 
hopeful process. 

I believe there is another lesson we all 
must keep before us — that each of our econ- 
omies is dependent on the others; all are in- 
terdependent. On the one hand, this suggests 
that the option of protectionism can be pur- 



' For an excerpt from President Nixon's economic 
report transmitted to the Congress on Jan. 31, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1973, p. 225. 

^ For backg-round, see Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1972, 
p. 512 and p. 515. 



July 9, 1973 



57 



sued only at very high cost. The United 
States now exports 14 percent of its indus- 
trial production and 31 percent of its crop. 
These exports would be cut in a protectionist 
world. On the other hand, it compels us all to 
remember that the economic decisions we 
each make have effects not only on our own 
citizens but also on those of our closest allies. 
Interest rates set in Washington cause money 
movements in Bonn and Paris. Trade bar- 
riers in Europe have a direct impact on Cali- 
fornia. Energy decisions in New York cause 
price variations in London. Recession here 
causes slowdown there. We and Europe will 
necessarily have to coordinate our own do- 
mestic economic policies if they are going to 
achieve our mutual ends. 

The challenges and opportunities before 
both the United States and Europe are un- 
precedented. I hope what I have said today 
suggests how the United States will proceed 
as it seeks to enhance cooperation between 
ourselves and our developed partners — Eu- 
rope, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Our 
common democratic institutions and our 
many common interests suggest that we can 
bring such improved cooperation within our 
grasp. But there is nothing in our relation- 
ship that makes such a hopeful prospect in- 
evitable. Only through the support of out- 
ward-looking men and women like yourselves 
will we achieve greater intimacy, trust, and 
cooperation between the United States and 
Europe and the other industrial countries. 
With that support, and with the contribution 
of Europe, we can achieve what President 
Nixon described as "a structure of peace to 
which all nations contribute and in which all 
nations have a stake." " 



° The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap- 
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; "Part I — 
1971 — The Watershed Year — An Overview" begins 
on p. 314. 



Meeting of Committee on U.S.-Japan 
Educational and Cultural Cooperation 

The Department of State announced on 
June 15 (press release 210) that the Joint 
Committee on U.S.-Japan Educational and 
Cultural Cooperation would meet at Hilo, 
Hawaii, June 16-18. 

Distinguished Japanese and American 
panelists including government officials, jour- 
nalists, broadcasters, and representatives 
from business and academia discussed recent 
developments in the U.S. and Japanese sec- 
ondary educational systems, foreign student 
counseling, Japanese and American studies 
programs and library and museum ex- 
changes. They also discussed advances in 
interpretation and translation and the role 
of the mass media in communicating cultural 
differences. 

Professor John W. Hall of Yale University 
led the U.S. panelists and Mr. Yoshinori 
Maeda, president of the NHK network, 
headed Japan's panel. They issued a sum- 
mary report of the deliberations at the con- 
cluding session of the meeting on June 18. 

The Joint Committee, which assists in co- 
ordinating ongoing U.S. and Japanese ex- 
change programs, is responsible for planning 
the U.S.-Japan Conferences on Cultural and 
Educational Interchange whigh are held ev- 
ery two years. During the last conference, 
held in Washington and New York in June 
1972, the Japanese announced their decision 
to establish a foundation to administer a 
multi-million-dollar international exchange 
program. These conferences and the meet- 
ings of the Joint Committee are part of a 
series of meetings inaugurated after the 1961 
conference between the late President John 
F. Kennedy and former Prime Minister 
Hayato Ikeda to study and expand cultural 
and educational cooperation between the 
United States and Japan. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



International Cooperation on Energy 



Address by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 



The international oil situation has changed 
significantly over the ]iast year. These 
changes have heightened the concern con- 
suming countries have about the security of 
their oil supply. They have also put into 
sharper focus the need for intensified inter- 
national cooperation to deal not only with 
shortrun concerns but with the longer run 
energy requirements of the world. The de- 
velopments of the past year may be summa- 
rized as follows: 

— The worldwide supply situation has be- 
come even tighter than it was last fall and 
is becoming increasingly focused on the Per- 
sian Gulf area. Competition between buyers 
has contributed toward continuing rising 
prices. 

— The structure of international markets 
is changing. For example, the Iranian- 
consortium agreement as well as the partici- 
pation agreements that will ultimately result 
in 51 percent control for Saudi Arabia and 
other gulf producers has shifted control away 
from the international oil companies and to- 
ward the producer country governments. 

— Price schedules have been further re- 
vised as a result of changes in currency pari- 
ties, and there has been a substantial increase 
in prices paid for oil by buyers to whom 
availability of crude is more important than 
its price. 

President Nixon in his energy message of 
April 18 spelled out the policy of the United 
States in dealing with the energy crisis. This 



' Made at Fordham University, New York, N.Y., 
under the auspices of the Center for the Study of 
the Presidency, on June 21 (press release 222). 



message concentrated on assessment of our 
domestic requirements and resources and 
proposed a series of domestic measufes to 
meet our needs for clean and reliable energy 
sources in the decades ahead. This concentra- 
tion on domestic policies was based on the 
realization that our primary response to the 
energy challenge must lie in the pursuit of 
national policies and measures to more fully 
and more rapidly develop existing energy re- 
sources within the United States and its 
off'shore areas as well as new energy technol- 
ogies while utilizing energy resources in the 
most frugal manner. 

At the same time, the President directed a 
comprehensive effort to develop cooperation 
with other nations in sharing the impact of 
energy shortages in the short run and in 
working to develop new sources of energy. 
He has also reiterated the policy of the 
United States to maintain cooperative rela- 
tions with oil-exporting countries. 

We are interested in the development of 
an effective continuing mechanism among the 
oil-consuming nations for sharing the loss of 
oil in an emergency curtailment of supply. 
In the past we have done this on an ad hoc 
basis to deal with shortages arising from the 
Suez crisis of the late fifties and from the 
Israeli-Arab war in 1967. The subject of oil 
sharing in times of critical shortage, along 
with collateral questions of storage and ra- 
tioning, has been and continues to be under 
intensive study in Washington. 

We favor participation by all parties in 
some sort of emergency sharing scheme 
based on oil imports carried over interna- 
tional waters. 



July 9, 1973 



59 



The issues involved in the matter of sup- 
ply sharing are complex and difficult. The 
essence of a sharing arrangement is that it 
be equitable. Among the criteria which will 
need to be considered in this connection are 
the measures countries are taking to help 
themselves through stockpiling or production 
and the burdens that these measui-es involve. 
Then there is the question of the extent to 
which rationing or demand curtailment 
should be a part of the schemes. Countries 
participating in an import-sharing arrange- 
ment should probably also have petroleum 
stocks and standby rationing arrangements 
available to support their participation. Each 
of these are mutually supportive means of 
reducing the nation's vulnerability to supply 
interruption. Studies are investigating ways 
in which these three schemes could be inte- 
grated. It will take close study to determine 
how stockpiling and rationing steps can best 
be reflected in the commitment to absorb the 
burden of curtailed supplies so as to provide 
incentives to stockpile and so as to induce or 
compensate for rationing. 

Collaboration in Research and Development 

A second area for international collabora- 
tion is in research and development [R. & 
D.]. We must increasingly direct our com- 
bined efforts toward longer term measures to 
develop energy-conserving technologies and 
to increase energy supplies and to diversify 
their resources. 

International cooperation in research and 
development projects can best be handled 
through specific arrangements between two 
or more countries which are directly sponsor- 
ing specific research programs and have spe- 
cific technological assets to contribute to 
those programs. There is today a reasonable 
amount of international cooperation in en- 
ergy technologies on which we can build a 
more comprehensive program. For example, 
the United States has had longstanding co- 
operative programs with a number of coun- 
tries in the nuclear reactor field. We have 
bilateral research projects with other coun- 
tries in coal technology, in geothermal en- 



ergy, in magnetohydrodynamics, thermal and 
hydro power stations, power transmission 
technology, and solar and geothermal energy. 

Our common task now is to enlarge and 
expand the scope and scale of international 
R. & D. cooperation. International coopera- 
tion in the development of new energy 
technologies holds great promise. There is 
significant competence in many of these tech- 
nologies in other countries. 

Research and development will be the basis 
for the long-term solutions to our mutual 
energy problems. Cooperative bilateral and 
multilateral R. & D. projects between nations 
can avoid duplication, reduce costs, and help 
hasten the day when solutions will be 
attained. 

We should pay particular attention to in- 
ternational cooperation at an industrial level. 
Experience has shown that as technologies 
approach a commercial stage, cooperation at 
a government-to-government level becomes 
more difficult. Cooperation at the industrial 
level is therefore especially pertinent to those 
technologies that might provide nearer term 
solutions to energy needs. 

Cooperative efforts, whether between in- 
dustry and government or between com- 
panies or between governments, will for the 
most part be developed ad hoc depending on 
the priorities, the technologies, the budgets, 
the scientific assessments, and the objectives 
of the particular parties. The OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development], however, can contribute sig- 
nificantly to stimulating and guiding this 
process. 

We know that many countries are per- 
forming significant research and develop- 
ment work on their own in the energy field. 
The OECD, representing 24 of the more ad- 
vanced nations, can play a valuable role in 
collecting, cataloging, and disseminating in- 
formation on what research work is being 
done. This could be a useful first step toward 
meaningful cooperation in the R. & D. field. 
A major gap exists in our own knowledge of 
each country's efforts in energy research. An 
up-to-date inventory and exchange of infor- 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



mation on ongoing projects would go far in 
assisting us all to set priorities and reduce 
expensive duplications of effort and could 
lead to mutually beneficial coordination of 
our research efforts. 



Financial Implications of Energy Problem 

The need for international cooperation in 
energy goes far beyond collaboration on re- 
search and development. 

In the more complex and delicate area of 
price and supply, measures for international 
cooperation must be designed to include pro- 
ducing as well as consuming nations. Coop- 
eration among consuming nations will also 
be necessary, but it cannot seem to be or be- 
come confrontation with producer nations. 

Let me specify some further areas of co- 
operation. One of them relates to the growing 
financial resources of oil-producing countries. 
This general subject of the financial implica- 
tions of the energy problem is one which is 
frequently attended by more rhetoric than 
clarity of thought. Governments need to un- 
derstand better the financial implications of 
the energy problem so as to offer constructive 
responses. As Secretary [of the Treasury 
George P.] Shultz suggested to the interna- 
tional monetary conference of the American 
Bankers Association meeting in Paris re- 
cently, the international banking community 
has an unprecedented opportunity to develop 
the techniques which will facilitate the in- 
vestments of oil-producing states so as to 
transform their national oil assets to other 
types of earning assets. 

There can be important commercial oppor- 
tunities in cooperation with the oil-producing 
countries in the use of their financial re- 
sources, their raw materials, and their cheap 
energy to develop industry, markets, and jobs 
for their people. We must work with the oil- 
producing states to meet these needs in ways 
that bring about and sustain the willingness 
of these countries to produce the oil the con- 
sumers of the world will require through the 
next two decades. 

The companies that comprise the inter- 



national oil industry no longer have complete 
control over production to meet the demand 
requirements of their customers as they see 
them. They now must have the agreement of 
their new partners in management — the pro- 
ducer governments. Already some producing 
governments have set a limit on production, 
and others may be finding mounting financial 
reserves less and less attractive in assuring 
their long-term future. 

The more industrialized nations should be 
ready to assist producing nations in their 
desire to marry their vital oil with the 
equally valuable technology, engineering, 
management, and markets of other countries 
in order to reap lasting benefits for their 
peoples during this one brief generation 
when they are in a highly favorable market 
position. We know their desires for the loca- 
tion of high-energy-using export industries 
in their countries. We can all help here, not 
only in providing the plants but also in mar- 
keting the product of those plants. It is criti- 
cal, however, that in our efforts we not let 
our requirements to sell plant, equipment, 
and services cloud the judgments and advice 
we offer these developing nations. 

All of us should want this process to de- 
velop into cooperative endeavors that result 
in mutually beneficial multilateral flows of 
oil and money adequate to meet the great 
needs of a peaceful, prosperous, less waste- 
ful, and more conserving world and guaran- 
tee the long-term viability of the producer 
countries' economies — even after today's 
tight oil market has eased. 

It seems to us that producer as well as con- 
sumer nations also have a clear and vital 
stake in cooperating to find additional 
sources of hydrocarbons, bring them to mar- 
ket in a prudent and orderly manner, mini- 
mize waste in their use, and bring on 
supplementary sources of energy at a rate 
and in a way which will maintain the pi'os- 
perity of the oil-rich nations as their wasting 
hydrocarbon assets diminish. If together 
with the producing nations we focus our at- 
tention on these common objectives we will 
improve the prospects for constructive coop- 



July 9, 1973 



61 



ei'ation and minimize the risk of confronta- 
tion. 

Our immediate and urgent need is for more 
oil. We should first of all recognize the re- 
markable role played by commercial firms 
and enterprises of all nationalities in find- 
ing, developing, transporting, and marketing 
petroleum around the world. We believe it to 
be in the interest of both producer and con- 
sumer nations to encourage the oil industry 
to invest its talents, experience, and capital 
in the quest for more oil. 

Importance of Maintaining an Open System 

We believe that the long-term interests of 
both consumer and producer nations will be 
served best by an open system in which all 
those capable of finding, developing, and mar- 
keting oil resources can have an opportunity 
to do so. Nationalization without prompt, 
adequate, effective compensation by pro- 
ducing nations, bilateral deals between pro- 
ducing and consuming governments, and 
anything else that dries up capital and 
freezes out experienced oil organizations will 
be counterproductive to all. 

We are under no illusions about the ability 
of consuming countries to reverse the trend 
toward greater government participation in 
oil-producing operations. At the same time, 
we can avoid policies which would serve only 
to accelerate this trend. For example, we be- 
lieve that assumption of a negotiating role 
by governments would weaken the role of the 
companies. By destroying the very useful 
bufi'er role played by the companies, govern- 
ments would also increase the risk of gov- 
ernment-to-government confrontation with 
oil producers. We believe as well that gov- 
ernments should discourage the purchase of 
oil from nationalized properties which have 
not been adequately compensated. 

How do we deal with the problem of de- 
structive competition? Competition per se is 
not bad, and we obviously do not wish to pur- 
sue a policy of eliminating competition. How- 
ever, we all need to exercise great care to 
avoid steps which merely bid up prices with- 
out expanding supply, as would result from 



a scramble for exclusive supply or investment 
arrangements. 

The United States has refrained from en- 
tering into special bilateral agreements for 
special supply or market access arrange- 
ments with oil-producing .states. We have felt 
that to do this could have stimulated other 
nations to seek similar arrangements and 
destabilized the contractual business struc- 
tures between producer governments, inter- 
national oil companies, and all the elements 
which make up the distribution channels 
through which crude oil is brought out of the 
ground to bunkers and gas stations. We be- 
lieve it is not in the individual and collective 
interest of consuming governments to seek 
exclusive bilateral oil supply arrangements 
with oil producer governments. The policies 
of each government in this regard will de- 
pend in large measure on the postures of 
other consuming governments. 

This leads to my conclusion on the broad 
issue of cooperation among consumer coun- 
tries on oil supplies, purchases, and prices on 
which there has been so much talk lately. 
Everything I have said requires that con- 
sumer countries intensify consultation among 
themselves and with producer nations on 
their policies and avoid misunderstandings of 
each other's positions which could lead to a 
competitive scramble for exclusive arrange- 
ments. At the same time we all have a 
common concern lest this kind of increased 
consultation activity be seen to be leading to 
a consumer country confrontation with 
producer countries. We should therefore pro- 
ceed pragmatically, without fanfare, building 
on our present institutions. 

The program I am suggesting is not dra- 
matic, but I do not believe drama is called 
for in this delicate stage in international oil 
relations. Instead we need to proceed with 
care and deliberation to build a foundation 
for international cooperation designed to 
meet the world's requirements for energy in 
the months as well as decades ahead. We need 
to work constructively to build a structure 
of international cooperation with producers 
and consumers alike. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Tolbert of Liberia 
Visits Washington 

President William R. Tolbert, Jr., of the 
Republic of Liberia -met tvith President Nixon 
and other officials at Washington June i-8 
during a pnvate visit to the United States. 
Folloiving is an exchange of toasts betiveen 
President Nixon and President Tolbert at a 
dinner at the White House on June 5. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 11 

PRESIDENT NIXON 

Mr. President, Mrs. Tolbert, and all of our 
distinguished guests: Secretary Rogers and 
I were just remarking about the fact that two 
weeks from tonight in this room and at this 
place, we will be welcoming Mr. Brezhnev, the 
leader of a great and powerful nation. And 
tonight, just two weeks before that visit, we 
welcome another very distinguished guest, 
President Tolbert. 

When we met today, he said that he rep- 
resented a very small country, but I think 
what this visit signifies to all of us is that 
at a time when the United States, we think 
quite properly, in the interest of peace for our 
children and all the generations to come, is 
developing a new relationship with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and a new relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union, that we not forget 
our old friends. 

Our first visitor in this room in the year 
1973 was Prime Minister Heath, and as all of 
us know, it has been said for many, many 
years that we have a special relationship 
with Britain. I should point out tonight that 
we have, and that I particularly have, a very 
special relationship with Liberia and with 
our distinguished guest. 

This is true not only because for 150 years 
we have enjoyed the closest relations, but it 
is true also for very personal reasons. Presi- 
dent Tolbert and I served together as Vice 
Presidents, and when people serve as Vice 
Presidents, they learn a great deal. 

Little did we dream that one day we would 
serve together as Presidents. Of course, all 



Vice Presidents dream of being President, 
but few make it. And I suppose this is one 
of those rare cases in history when two men 
who have served as Vice President meet to- 
gether as President. And so that makes our 
relationship very special. 

It is very special for another reason. We 
share the same view of the world, not only 
of the necessity to develop a new and peaceful 
relation between the great powers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the United 
States and Europe, the United States and 
Peking and Japan, but also the necessity to 
think of the world as it will be 25 years £rom 
now, 50 years from now. We think of the 
new nations of Africa, and we think of the 
older nations. And we think of our friend. 
President Tolbert, and the leadership that 
he is giving to all of those new nations trying 
to develop a way to bring progress to their 
people, bring it with freedom and at the same 
time maintaining their independence. 

I could simply say in presenting him to you 
tonight that it would be enough to mention 
him alone, but I must not forget his wife. 
When I was in Liberia — and my wife, who 
has been there since, last year on a good-will 
trip — but when we were there together in 
1957, I remember going, Mr. President, out 
into the countryside. You were Vice Presi- 
dent at that time, and we met a paramount 
chief and he was a very old man, and he 
was veiy kind to me and proceeded to desig- 
nate me as a paramount chief. And he told 
me that one of the rights of a paramount 
chief was to have as many wives as he liked. 
I have only one wife, President Tolbert has 
only one, and she is a lovely lady, and we are 
glad to have her here. 

So as we drink our toast tonight, let us 
think of the relations between Liberia and 
America that go back so many years. Let us 
think of the broader concept of the relations 
between the United States and all the new 
states of Africa that have had their inde- 
pendence over the past 10 to 15 years, and 
let us think finally of our very good friend. 
President Tolbert, one who has been a friend 
of this country from the time he has been in 
public life, and one who is now a leader of 



July 9, 1973 



63 



Africa, and being a leader of Africa, one who 
speaks for the best that is in Africa and 
also the best for us, too. To President Tol- 
bert: Mr. President. 



PRESIDENT TOLBERT 

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon, distin- 
guished ladies and gentlemen: In a world 
of demanding challenges, there is responsi- 
bility enough for everyone, and all must wel- 
come the opportunity to change for the better 
the tenor of human life. In line with this 
vision, therefore, men in open relief are 
moving away from years of protracted con- 
frontation into an era of reconciliation and 
responsibility. 

We seem now, after so long, actually to 
be building that better world, and there is no 
greater builder than you, Mr. President. That 
is why it is so fulfilling to come here to the 
White House to break bread and sip wine to- 
gether, even though I sip water, with men 
and women who in fact must share a deep 
sense of dedication to the welfare of this 
planet. 

It is also fulfilling to be here because we 
know that we are in the company of good, 
old friends. Our trip has been a long one, 
starting on the west coast of Africa, speed- 
ing on that chartered aircraft, really speed- 
ing. We first attended in Ethiopia the 10th 
anniversary celebration of the Organization 
of African Unity. Then a few days ago we 
arrived on the west coast of America, having 
been invited to speak to the graduating class 
of California State University at San 
Francisco. 

Our government has had a 10-year con- 
tract with that institution under which we 
have been building together a consolidated 
school system for our capital city, Monrovia. 
From the west coast of the United States, 
another jet craft symbolizing the Spirit 
of '76 brought us to this place and this time. 
And tonight we are gathered here in this 
most significant, historic setting to savor a 
few moments of quiet intimacy with friends 
we have known and highly esteemed for a 
long time. 



Richard Nixon and I first met when he 
served President Eisenhower as a faithful 
Vice President, and in that capacity he 
visited Liberia. Again, it was my pleasure 
to enjoy his company when he paid a private 
visit to our country. Even as a private citi- 
zen, his interest and affection for Africa con- 
tinued to be positively demonstrated. 

Over the interim years our contacts have 
remained most cordial and fruitful, and no 
moment in this long relationship was more 
pleasant than when we had the singular 
honor of receiving Mrs. Nixon, the charming 
wife of our dear friend, at my inauguration 
in Monrovia in January of 1972, on which 
occasion she indeed represented you, Mr. 
President, with warmth and distinction. Her 
visit to Liberia and to the Republics of the 
Ivory Coast and Ghana, so widely heralded 
in various news reports, will long be cher- 
ished in the hearts of African people. 

So Mrs. Tolbert and I are extremely de- 
lighted to be here, and we highly appreciate 
and are grateful to our friends, President 
and Mrs. Nixon, for this splendid oppor- 
tunity. 

At one single setting we can recognize that 
the record of long private friendship with 
historic Americans is inclusive of a longer 
national relationship between our two coun- 
tries, and we can declare with sincerity that 
our exhilaration in the company of old 
friends is matched in intensity only by our 
steadfast quest for new aspirations and new 
destinies. 

At the celebration of its bicentennial in 
1976, the United States of America will be 
only 71 years older than the Republic of 
Liberia, her traditional ally in Africa. 
Throughout the years, the relationship be- 
tween our two countries has been repeatedly 
described as unique, as special. We befittingly 
acknowledge the special quality of that re- 
lationship. 

After all, the whole concept of the found- 
ing of Liberia as an asylum for black men 
was born in the minds of Americans, and 
where else do you have a capital city of one 
country named after a President of another? 

But what I ask now : What will be the na- 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



ture of our special relationship in the future, 
and very special relationship at that? Will it 
mean more than strategic expediency? Will 
it mean more than unwavering support at 
every international forum, or will the friend- 
ship between the United States and Liberia 
come to rest, in fact, upon a solid fulcrum of 
purpose, of progress, and of continuity as 
we face the future? 

President Nixon has stated, and we are 
heartened by his statement, that in the years 
ahead the United States will not only main- 
tain old friendships, but will also reach out 
for new relationships. We are particularly 
heartened by that, because as old and trusted 
friends, we hope the United States and 
Liberia will indeed continue in very special 
ways to reach out for each other. 

In Liberia, however, we are determined 
today to take the first steps in a new direc- 
tion : to help ourselves, to lift ourselves. And 
speed is truly the symbol of the new Liberia. 
For while in other developing countries, men 
would speak of the revolution, in the Republic 
of Liberia our people are seeking a speedy 
evolution. 

Today, Liberians are impatient to proceed 
with the work of development and progress. 
They are impatient with illiteracy, with pov- 
erty, with hunger, with disease, with the ir- 
ritating old problems of social imbalance. 

Liberians can no longer tolerate the living 
conditions of people, young and old, who 
must sleep on mats laid on floors of clay. They 
find it intolerable that their children must 
walk for miles in the rain to inadequate rural 
schools. They find it even agonizing that a 
majority of the children cannot go into school 
at all. They are truly frustrated by the eflfects 
of economic strangulation. 

But there is a compelling question which 
arises here. That question is. How? How do 
we fulfill the urgent aspirations of our peo- 
ple? How will we order our national priori- 
ties? Just how will we obtain the necessary 
facilities for accelerated development so 
urgently needed? 

There is a twofold answer, Mr. President. 
Realistically, we must, with appropriate ap- 
preciation, encourage and effectively utilize 
any development cooperation and assistance 



that is available to us. Then, with greater 
faith in the supreme source, we must self- 
reliantly come to depend more and more upon 
ourselves. 

We believe the time has truly come to 
create new structures and to activate the 
latent resources of our institutions and peo- 
ples so that we may eventually transform 
their lives. 

Recently in Liberia, we launched a new 
effort, the National Fund-Raising Rally. We 
called upon our people to consider together 
the urgent goals of their own development. 
We called upon them to rekindle the pioneer- 
ing spirit of self-reliance. We called upon 
our people to reawaken within themselves a 
new national consciousness. And they have 
responded, Mr. President. 

On a sunny day a few weeks ago, after 
nine months of voluntary contributions, yield- 
ing about $4.5 million, the people of Liberia 
undertook simultaneous groundbreaking cere- 
monies across the country for the construc- 
tion of farm-to-market roads, for schools, 
for hospitals, and for clinics. 

It was much more than a symbolic ven- 
ture. These people have truly inspired them- 
selves with this unprecedented effort to create 
a more decent and respectable way of life, 
thus enhancing their human dignity. 

But in the largest sense, we understand, 
too, that our praise and our resolve are the 
heart of this whole matter. We have seized 
the faith to uphold the free heritage of a 
small but proud nation. We have assumed 
the responsibility to preserve that heritage 
not only for Liberia but also for citizens of 
the world, for the fate of mankind is our 
challenge. 

When Richard and Pat Nixon visit Liberia 
again — and we hope they soon do — they will 
find an energized Republic on the move. They 
will meet a nation not looking only beyond 
the horizon for ideas and resources, but work- 
ing primarily herself with imagination, with 
zest, and with zeal, with creativity and pro- 
ductivity, to uplift the standard of human 
life. 

Richard and Pat Nixon will meet a Repub- 
lic caught up in the spirit of pride, of real 



July 9, 1973 



65 



independence, and of self-reliance, a mani- 
festation of the unique American spirit, 
somehow securely embedded in the African 
dream. 

Men of all times have dreamed dreams, 
some simple, some fantastic, some utterly un- 
imaginable. 

As I propose a toast to the President of 
these great United States, I wonder if my 
grandfather, D. Frank Tolbert — freed over 
a century ago by the signature of a man who 
occupied the seat that Richard Nixon, the 
noble architect of peace, now occupies — I 
wonder if D. Frank Tolbert could have 
dreamed that his grandson would ever have 
had the honor of being toasted in this place 
by so great a personality, as you, Mr. 
President? 

Thank God it happened to me, the repre- 
sentative of a grateful people committed to 
work together with all men of good will in 
structuring a better world for all men to live 
together in peace, with justice, happiness, 
and with human dignity. Ladies and gentle- 
men : The President of the United States. 



U.S. Responds to U.N. Appeal 
for African Drought Relief 

Following is the text of a letter dated 
June 20 from President Nixon to United 
Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. 

Press release 223 dated June 21 

Dear Mr. Secretary General: I fully 
share the concerns which you have expressed 
to Ambassador [John A.] Scali for the mil- 
lions of persons who are suffering from the 
terrible drought in the Sahelian nations of 
West and Central Africa. For many months 
reports from United States and United Na- 
tions representatives and from the govern- 
ments themselves have related graphically 
the growing effects of the worst drought 
of this century in the African Sahel. Those 
of us who have been spared this scourge 
have been responding to the crisis, but more 
must be done, as you have said. The United 



States stands prepared to commit further 
resources as needs are identified. 

As you know, the United States response 
has been carried out on several fronts. We 
have increased the amounts of foodgrains 
destined for these nations through both 
American programs and the World Food 
Programs. By mid-summer, 156,000 tons of 
grain valued at nearly $19 million will have 
arrived in West African ports or in the in- 
terior states of Mali, Upper Volta, Niger 
and Chad. Two million dollars in disaster 
relief funds have also been made available. 
United States Air Force aircraft, and those 
of other donors, are airlifting grain to 
stricken nomads and farmers in remote 
districts of Mali and Chad. Animal feed and 
vaccines are being distril)uted to save as 
much livestock as possible. Medicines are 
being provided to combat malnutrition and 
potential epidemics. In response to a request 
from Director General [of the FAO Addeke 
H.] Boerma, the Agency for International 
Development has provided a logistical plan- 
ning expert to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and our 
staffs in West Africa are being augmented 
to improve our ability to deliver what is 
needed to the right place at the right time. 
We share your concern that the problems 
of dealing with the immediate emergency 
will become even more difficult as the rains 
begin and road transport problems increase. 
We therefore stand ready to provide further 
support for internal transport, as specified 
needs are identified. 

As you have recognized, this region is 
faced not only with the immediate needs of 
feeding the hungry but also of rehabilitating 
water and forage resources, livestock herds 
and grain producing facilities to permit a 
long range recovery from the devastating 
effects of the drought. This effort will require 
close collaboration among African leaders 
and the donor community. As specific re- 
habilitation needs are more clearly identified, 
and as it becomes clearer what others are 
ready to do, the United States will be pre- 
pared to provide additional assistance for 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Sahel to help overcome the profound 
effects of this tragedy. 

In order to coordinate more effectively 
our emergency relief efforts and to plan our 
part in a rehabilitation program, I intend 
to designate Mr. Maurice J. Williams as a 
Special United States Coordinator. He will 
cooperate closely in his work with Director 
General Boerma and with other governments 
— so that the work of relief and rehabili- 
tation can go forward as expeditiously as 
possible. 



Letters of Credence 

India 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of India, Triloki Nath Kaul, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon 
on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated 
June 14. 

Jordan 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Abdullah 
Salah, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on June 14. For texts of the Ambas- 
sador's remai'ks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
June 14. 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia) 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Khmer Republic, Um Sim, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Nixon on June 14. For 



texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State 
press release dated June 14. 

Malawi 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Malawi, Robert Bernard Mbaya, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated 
June 14. 

Nepal 

The newly appointed Ambassador of*the 
Kingdom of Nepal, Yadu Nath Khanal, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated June 14. 

Oman 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Sultanate of Oman, Faisal Bin Ali al-Bu- 
Sa'id, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on June 14. For texts of the Ambas- 
sador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
June 14. 

Yemen Arab Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Yemen Arab Republic, Yahya H. Geghman, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on June 14. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated June 
14. 



July 9, 1973 



67 



For a Peaceful and Progressive Latin America 



Address by Jack B. Kubisch 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ' 



Last week I returned from participating 
in tiie most extensive trip to Latin America 
by a Secretary of State in almost 40 years. 
Also last week, I took my oath of office as 
Assistant Secretary after my own absence 
from the hemisphere of nearly two years. 

Today I would like to make some observa- 
tions about our just-completed trip and then 
to discuss our relations with Latin America, 
including the main elements if our overall 
policy for the period just ahead. 

As for the trip, I can tell you that every- 
where we went we were well received. Be- 
fore departing Washington we had been 
hopeful that we would be able to hold quiet 
and serious discussions in each capital. Our 
hopes turned out to be fully reciprocated by 
our hosts. 

All in all, we visited eight countries in the 
area, meeting with Presidents, Foreign Min- 
isters, and other high government officials. 
In addition, the Secretary and I also had the 
opportunity to meet during the inaugural 
period in Buenos Aires with top officials of 
many of the countries we were unable to in- 
clude on our itinerary. I can tell you that all 
these meetings were characterized by realism 
and frankness, were uniformly constructive, 
and that no subject was excluded from dis- 
cussion. 

We found the vigorous nationalism in Latin 
America also to be for the most part construc- 
tive and a force with which we can work. 
Each of the nations we visited is proud of its 
own distinctiveness. And each nation is de- 
termined to control its own destiny. It neither 



' Made before the Council of the Americas at Wash- 
ington on June 6 (press release 196). 



can nor should be any other way. But that 
pride and that determination also seem to be 
accompanied by an awareness that solutions 
to many of the challenges confronting the 
Americas must be found in international co- 
operation. 

We also found that the pursuit of economic 
and social development continues to be of 
highest priority and the task of bringing a 
better life to all the peoples of this hemi- 
sphere remains immense, but progress is 
evident almost everywhere. Success in devel- 
opment of course must come principally from 
the efforts of each nation, a fact well under- 
stood by them. It is also clear that the United 
States must continue to assist generously and 
understandingly in Latin American develop- 
ment efforts. 

Almost everywhere we found a willingness 
to seek mutual accommodation and negotiated 
solutions to those issues that exist between 
some of the Latin American nations and the 
United States. There is no doubt that the trip 
increased mutual understanding between us. 
We were able to put to rest many differences 
based on mere misunderstandings or miscon- 
ceptions. More deeply rooted issues became 
the subject of important discussions. We 
went with an attitude of good will and a 
desire to make real progress on points of 
difference. We found that our Latin Amer- 
ican counterparts felt the same way. 

Now let me turn briefly to the state of our 
overall relations with the hemisphere, the re- 
cent past, and the main lines of our policy 
for the period ahead. 

This requires some generalizing, with all 
the dangers of generalization, particularly 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



with respect to a region as diverse as Latin 
America — notwithstanding the deeply en- 
trenched and regrettable myth in the United 
States that Latin America is one homo- 
geneous mass. I intend on future occasions to 
speak in greater detail on specific issues and, 
if time allows, will be glad today to try and 
answer any questions you may have. 

My absence from the area for the past 
two years has given me the opportunity to 
look at Latin America, an area of the world 
with which I have been associated for more 
than 25 years, with fresh eyes and to see 
U.S.-Latin American relations in their broad 
sweep over recent decades, rather than in 
their most recent details. 

One of the strong impressions that I have 
is that there have been and are still certain 
enduring themes underlying U.S. policy to- 
ward Latin America. These constants are 
often lost sight of in the day-to-day ebb and 
flow of our relationships. 

First of all, there remains a general recog- 
nition that the forces of geography, economy, 
and heritage have combined to produce de 
facto a special relationship between the 
United States and the countries of Latin 
America. Second, the United States continues 
to feel — quite correctly, in my view — that its 
own national interests are deeply involved 
in the political independence and the eco- 
nomic and social progress of the other coun- 
tries of the hemisphere. 

The United States has acted upon its sense 
of a special interest in Latin America and 
the Caribbean with a variety of styles and 
methods ranging from the high degree of 
U.S. leadership and direction typical of much 
of the 1960's to the so-called lower profile 
and more unobtrusive posture that has been 
attempted thus far in the 1970's. 

I would like to emphasize, however, that 
it would be a gross error to conclude that the 
United States does not have a clear and firmly 
based Latin American policy simply because 
there is no special title or slogan which can 
be applied to all of our relations and pro- 
grams with Latin America. In fact, in the 
light of the recent past and the more sophis- 
ticated, critical, and varied environment in 



which we now find ourselves in Latin Amer- 
ica, I question the desirability of such a 
single title or slogan. 

Early in 1969 President Nixon determined 
that our policies toward Latin America had 
not responded sufficiently to the rapid 
changes taking place in that area. The very 
processes of economic development were ex- 
erting destabilizing effects on political and 
social institutions. There was general dis- 
satisfaction in Latin America with the rate 
of economic and social progi'ess. Nationalism 
intensified and was often directed at the 
United States as the dominant power in the 
hemisphere. Regardless of how well moti- 
vated the United States might have been, 
many in Latin America perceived the need 
for more self-assertion and less dependency 
on the United States. 

In response, the President made a basic 
decision to work toward a more realistic and 
mature relationship with the countries of 
Latin America. We consciously sought to 
lower our voices and reduce our prominence, 
while maintaining support for their develop- 
ment. We tried to curb our didactic and tu- 
torial tendencies. Official U.S. presence, in- 
cluding military presence, was reduced. We 
encouraged interested Latin Americans to 
come forward with their own proposals for 
self-help and reform which we could support. 
We urged Latin America as a whole to 
broaden its relations with the rest of the 
world, especially Europe and Japan. We 
sought a larger role for the inter- American 
system, particularly in the economic area. 
We worked with the Latin American gov- 
ernments to formulate a generalized prefer- 
ences proposal. We shifted the greater part 
of our development assistance to multilateral 
agencies, and we sought to strengthen those 
institutions. 

These were sound plans based on good in- 
tentions. While we were not able to imple- 
ment all of these plans as fully as we had 
hoped, neither was the Latin American re- 
sponse to our policy shift always as full or as 
positive as we expected. The reduction in 
U.S. presence was sometimes interpreted as 
proof of indifference. Nevertheless, to a con- 



July 9, 1973 



69 



siderable extent our effoi-ts have borne fruit. 
Our role has indeed become much less pa- 
tronizing and paternalistic. U.S. imports 
from Latin America have increased in the 
aggregate. Latin America's relations with 
friendly extra-hemispheric powers have ex- 
panded rapidly. 

U.S. economic assistance has also con- 
tinued to play an important role in the eco- 
nomic and social development of the area. 
Although our bilateral-type assistance has 
been declining, this has been more than com- 
pensated for by increased lendiilg through 
the international financial institutions. 

Now where do we go from here ? 

The Secretary of State's recent trip to 
Latin America has set the stage, I believe, 
for a vigorous new effort to overcome our 
shortfalls. The effort wi'l have to come from 
both sides. For the United States, the policy 
we intend to follow for the period just ahead 
was set forth in Secretary Rogers' May 18 
speech at the Casa Bolivar, in Bogota.^ I 
commend the text to your careful attention. 

The Secretary pointed out that with the 
world more secure than it was four years ago 
we intend to increase our attention to our 
closest associates: Latin America, western 
Europe, and Japan. As Deputy Secretary of 
State Rush said last week, if 1973 is the year 
of Europe, it is also the beginning of the four 
years of Latin America. 

Citing President Nixon's definition of U.S. 
policy toward the Americas as "a modem 
policy of mature partnership," the Secretary 
set forth in his speech in Bogota the follow- 
ing basic seven elements of that policy : 

— First, he said, our policy is based on 
respect for the sovereignty and independence 
of each nation in Latin America. In our bi- 
lateral relations the reality is that there are 
23 nations, each with its own policies, each 
different from the other, and each expecting 
the United States to deal with it separately. 
We respect that diversity. At the same time 
we also recognize the need and mutual ad- 
vantage in dealing with many matters of 



' For text, see Bulletin of June 25, 1973, p. 912. 



70 



regional interest on a fully multilateral basis 
in the hemisphere. 

— Second, it is our policy to make our re- 
lations with each Latin American state as 
equal as friends can make them. 

— Third, our policy is to encourage re- 
gional cooperation. We favor such coopera- 
tion both in those instances in which we are 
involved, such as the OAS, and in those in 
which we are not, such as the subregional 
groupings. 

—Fourth, our policy is to resolve differ- 
ences among us with mutual good will. The 
United States intends, of course, to uphold 
its interests, and we expect the other nations 
of the area to do likewise. But we do not 
seek to impose our views on others. We know 
of no dispute in the hemisphere which can- 
not be resolved through negotiation and good 
will. 

— Fifth, the United States intends to con- 
tinue to give substantial support to Latin 
American efforts to assure a decent life for 
all the people of this hemisphere. 

— Sixth, it is our policy to strengthen the 
inter-American system and the Organization 
of American States. We are prepared to ex- 
amine with our Latin American friends how 
the OAS can be restructured and improved,, 
and we are likewise prepared to excludei 
nothing from these deliberations. 

— Seventh, our policy is to encourage in- 
creased hemispheric leadership in building' 
a more peaceful and cooperative world. As 
examples, the Secretary suggested that an 
outward-looking American community can 
make decisive contributions to the world in 
monetary matters, the upcoming trade nego- 
tiations, the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, 
the fight against international terrorism, the 
common endeavor to destroy the interna- 
tional drug traffic, to name but a few. 

These, then, are the main lines of our 
overall jjolicy toward Latin America. They 
flow from our global policy and the way 
we see the world, and they are reinforcedjj 
by our bilateral policies and relationships' 
with each of the countries of the hemisphere. 

This is not a razzle-dazzle policy, and it 



Department of State Bulletir 



is not intended to be. The realities of this 
hemisphere call for a realistic, realizable, and 
down-to-earth policy, and that is what we 
are pursuing. 

It is also a living policy for a very much 
alive and rapidly changing area. For while 
we have had — and no doubt will continue to 
have — short-term differences and disagree- 
ments, I am absolutely convinced that the 
true and long-term interests of the countries 
of Latin America and the United States 
either coincide or run closely in parallel. 

Having in mind the topics of other 
speakers, I have not discussed today the role 
of U.S. business in Latin America. In any 
case, I think my views on that subject are 
well known, and Secretary Rogers spoke out 
on this specific point many times during 
the course of our recent trip. 

However, in closing, I would like to say 
just a woi-d about how I think the U.S. 
Government can best help American busi- 
nessmen and their operations in Latin 
America. 

That is, in my view, for us to do all we 
can to promote a peaceful, stable, friendly, 
dependable, progressive, and prosperous 
framework in Latin America within which 
U.S. business can operate and make its own 
unique and vitally important contribution 
to the further development of the region. 

I recognize that we have special problems 
in some industries and in some countries, 
and we will do our part in dealing with these 
problems. My door will always be open to 



any suggestions or views any of you may 
wish to express on these problems or, for 
that matter, on any other subject. 



Sales, Credits or Guaranties to Peru 
Under Foreign Military Sales Act 

Presidential Determination No. 73-13 ' 

Sales, Credits or Guaranties to the Government 
OF Peru Under the Foreign Military Sales Act 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State* 

The White House, 
Washington, May H, 1973. 

In accordance with the recommendation contained 
in your memorandum of April 25, I hereby deter- 
mine that the waiver of the provisions of Section 
3(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, 
with respect to the Government of Peru is impor- 
tant to the security of the United States and, there- 
fore, the provisions of that Section are hereby waived 
insofar as they relate to sales, credits or guaranties 
to the Government of Peru. 

You are requested on my behalf to report this 
determination and waiver to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and to the Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as required 
by law. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 



"■ 38 Fed. Reg. 16019. 



July 9, 1973 



71 



THE CONGRESS 



Deparfment Urges Continued Government Support 
of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Riish ' 



It is an honor for me to appear before you 
in support of S. 1914, the Board for Inter- 
national Broadcasting bill. The purpose of 
this bill is to authorize continued govern- 
ment grants in fiscal years 1974 and 1975 in 
support of the broadcasts of Radio Free 
Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) and 
to establish a sound mechanism for adminis- 
tering those grants. It is, in our view, the 
best way to make sure that these essential 
nonofficial radios maintain their professional 
independence while continuing to broadcast 
in a manner not inconsistent with broad U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. 

Just a little more than a year ago, there 
was a sharp debate over the current role of 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in 
the present period. A number of views were 
expressed at that time, in the Congress and 
elsewhere, as to the present role of this type 
of broadcasting, the appropriate mechanism 
for providing support to the radios, and the 
possibility of broadening the base of finan- 
cial support. Over a period of several months, 
nearly 600 editorials favorable to con- 
tinuation of the stations appeared in the 
American press while some 30 to 40 were un- 
favorable. Scores of distinguished private 
specialists in Communist affairs and interna- 
tional communications testified to the unique 



and valuable purpose served by the stations. 
In March 1972, a substantial number of mem- 
bers of the Senate, 67 to be exact, cospon- 
sored a resolution expressing the sense of the 
Senate on this matter. In the resolution, they 
expressed their "intention to provide ade- 
quate support to these two radios while the 
methods for future support to these two 
radios are carefully examined within the 
framework of the United States foreign pol- 
icy objectives." By the end of March 1972, 
both Houses of the Congress had voted to 
continue government grants to the stations 
for FY 1972. 

The President understood that support as 
a firm decision not to terminate these valu- 
able broadcasting services without a careful 
examination of their function and relation- 
ship to the U.S. Government. In August 1972, 
he therefore appointed a Study Commission 
on International Radio Broadcasting con- 
sisting of five distinguished Americans to 
study this matter and report their findings to 
him. Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Chairman of 
the Commission, and his distinguished col- 
leagues, Edward W. Barrett, John A. Gro- 
nouski, Edmund A. Gullion, and John P. 
Roche, submitted their report "The Right to 
Know" earlier this year, and the President 
released it May 7 with a strong endorse- 
ment.- They are here today to answer any 



' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on June 12 (press release 204). The com- 
plete transcript of the liearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



- For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
May 7, see Bulletin of June 18, 1973, p. 875; copies 
of the Commission's report are available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (stock no. 
4000-00289; 70 cents postpaid). 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



questions on their findings. I would like to 
take this occasion to thank them for the very 
conscientious job they did, including? the care 
with which they studied the workings of the 
radios in Munich. 

The principal findings of the report are 
embodied in the bill before this committee in 
paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 2. These 
state: 

(4) That the continuation of Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Liberty as independent broadcast media, 
operating in a manner not inconsistent with the 
broad foreign policy objectives of the United States 
and in accordance with high professional standards, 
is in the national interests; and 

(5) That in order to provide an effective instru- 
mentality for the continuation of assistance of Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty and to encourage 
a constructive dialogue with the peoples of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe, 
it is desirable to establish a Board for International 
Broadcasting. 

Anyone who believes that these radios are 
irrelevant or detrimental to the improved 
climate of East-West relations in the past 
few years or the prospects for further im- 
provement should carefully study this report. 

The reasons for the Commission's finding 
that the continuation of Radio Liberty and 
Radio Free Europe broadcasting is in the na- 
tional interest are cogently argued in its re- 
port, especially on pp. 26-29, which I would 
like to summarize briefly here and introduce 
in full into the record at this point, if I may. 
Addressing itself to the viewpoint that re- 
cent improvements in relations between the 
Soviet Union and the United States dictated 
termination of the two radios, the Commis- 
sion stated: 

The Commission is satisfied that the two radio 
operations have adjusted progressively to meet the 
requirements of changing times, that they do not 
operate to keep alive Cold War animosities, and 
that they contribute to detente by adding to knowl- 
edge and understanding. 

The report pointed out that Soviet and 
East European leaders and media have made 
it clear, even after the thaw in East- 
West relations began, that the principles of 
coexistence do not "off"er possibilities of i-e- 
laxing the ideological struggle." The Presi- 
dent, in his June 1972 report to Congress on 



his visit to the Soviet Union, called attention 
to the fact that "Soviet ideology still pro- 
claims hostility to some of America's most 
basic values" and that Soviet leaders "will 
continue to be totally dedicated competitors 
of the United States." 

The recent improvement in East-West re- 
lations has taken place while the stations 
have been operating, the report pointed out, 
and the Soviet Union apparently does not 
think its own major effort of "ideological 
struggle against imperialism" is damaging to 
such relations. 

The Commission pointed to the efforts of 
the two radios to keep their audiences fully 
informed on events both in the world outside 
and within their own countries, and it consid- 
ered that East European leaders have been 
obliged increasingly to take popular "pres- 
sures" into consideration. The Commission 
said it was confident that the radios, by pro- 
viding information and interpretation, "will 
continue to be of help in future negotiations 
and coo])eration between the Soviet Union 
and the United States in such areas as stra- 
tegic arms limitation, trade, European secu- 
rity and environmental protection." 

The Commission concluded that it is in the 
interests of the United States that the sta- 
tions continue until the Soviet Union and 
East European countries permit a free flow 
of truthful information. 

Mr. Chairman, the welcome readiness of 
the Soviet leadership to enter into agree- 
ments relating to arms control and to seek 
a reduction of tension in Europe is not the 
result of a change of heart or of ideology. 
It is related very directly to the increasing 
need recognized by them and by leaders in 
eastern Europe to meet the rising demands 
of their peoples for a fuller, more satisfying 
daily existence, more nearly comparable to 
that enjoyed by Europeans in the West. This 
is, I strongly believe, a highly positive devel- 
opment. We will shortly welcome the Soviet 
leader Mr. [Leonid L] Brezhnev to Washing- 
ton to pursue the fruitful dialogue the Pres- 
ident started with him last year on issues of 
arms control, broader exchanges, and trade. 
We have good reasons of U.S. national inter- 



July 9, 1973 



73 



est to encourage this trend and to maintain 
and broaden the dialogue with the leaders of 
eastern Europe as well. 

We have, in view of their important role 
in this process, equally good reasons for 
maintaining a dialogue with the peoples of 
the Soviet Union and eastern Europe by 
means of radio broadcasting. Until there is a 
considerably freer movement of persons from 
East to West, a considerably greater range 
of human contacts, and a considerably 
broader internal dissemination of informa- 
tion and opinion to the peoples of these 
countries, international radio broadcasting 
will remain the principal source of informa- 
tion and analyses about the current negotia- 
tions in Europe. While they can receive 
international news and analyses from official 
Western radios (like the Voice of America), 
the real meaning of detente to them is its 
effect, and this gets into areas difficult to 
handle in official broadcasting. These people 
want to know the relationship between de- 
tente and the improvement of their own con- 
ditions of life. They want to know how their 
own government's priorities are affected. 
They want to know how the opportunities 
provided by an era of negotiation are being 
used by their leaders. They want to know if 
they are to receive only some material bene- 
fits from detente and be deprived of most of 
the non-material benefits such as freer move- 
ment and more varied and complete informa- 
tion. These are some of the significant issues 
relevant to the aspirations of these peoples 
for a meaningful and lasting detente, not one 
which can be turned on and oflF for temporary 
political advantage. These are the issues to 
which Radio Free Europe's experienced 
newsmen and analysts have been giving their 
greatest attention, the issues on which Radio 
Liberty has broadcast, during the past year, 
a significant body of analytical material em- 
anating from independent thinkers in the 
Soviet Union whose product otherwise re- 
ceives very little circulation. This is the type 
of information which is not and should not 
be analyzed in detail by the Voice of Amer- 
ica, the official international broadcaster of 
the U.S. Government. 



Does the broadcasting of information 
about and analyses of events inside the Com- 
munist world disrupt detente? Certainly the 
Soviet leaders and some of the leaders of 
eastern Europe would prefer to have a mo- 
nopoly of the channels of information to their 
people. In all cases except Hungary and 
Romania, they continue to jam these broad- 
casts. But there is absolutely no evidence 
that their continuation has slowed the evolu- 
tion of detente. On the contrary, we believe 
these important channels of communication 
to the peoples of the area have contributed 
to this process and that their continuation 
will help keep that process from being a 
short-term phenomenon. The degree to which 
our allies and other non-Communist states in 
Europe share our view of the importance of 
a freer exchange of ideas and information 
and closer human contacts to a meaningful 
in-ocess of detente has been amply demon- 
strated in the ]>reparatory talks in Helsinki 
for the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe. At general Western insist- 
ence, provision has been made at Helsinki 
for these matters to be highlighted in a major 
agenda item at the conference and in ways 
which should provide an opportunity to ne- 
gotiate specific practical improvements. 

Mr. Chairman, I anticipate that some 
might quite logically ask at this point: Why, 
then, do not the Europeans participate in the 
financial support of Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty, and why is it that the United 
States must now establish a Board for Inter- 
national Broadcasting to supervise their 
financing? 

These are legitimate questions. On the 
matter of the Board, I believe the Commis- 
sion's report speaks persuasively in favor of 
it. The Commissioners can, I believe, further 
elaborate their rationale. It is convincing to 
us precisely because we believe that the Com- 
mission correctly identified the objectives 
governing the U.S. Government's relation- 
ship with the radios, and I would like here to 
cite those listed on pp. 37-38 of their report 
and enter them in the record: 

— The professional independence and hence the 



74 



Department of State Bulletin 



credibility and effectiveness of the stations must be 
preserved. 

— Organizational arrangements and procedures 
must be such as to insure that publicly funded facil- 
ities are not used in a manner inconsistent with 
United States foreign policy objectives. 

— The organizational structure should permit the 
use of funds from American and non-American 
sources, both public and private, and must provide 
for appropriate accountability. All funds should be 
openly provided and publicly reported. 

— The organizational structure should be shaped 
to stimulate maximum efficiency and economy in the 
operations of the stations. 

— Since the condition of free movement of infor- 
mation into and within the Soviet sphere, which 
could make the stations unnecessary, is not likely 
to be achieved soon, the organizational structure 
should be sufficiently strong and flexible to serve for 
at least a decade, if necessary. 

The report makes clear why a small Board 
for International Broadcasting is the best 
way to meet these objectives. 

There was substantial sentiment expressed 
in this committee a year ago in favor of 
European financial support for RFE and RL. 
The Department concluded at that time, how- 
ever, that formal approaches to European 
governments by the United States should 
await thorough consideration of the matter 
by the Presidential Study Commission. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to inform you 
that, with the President's endorsement of 
the Commission's recommendations, we have 
moved to encourage strongly the participa- 
tion of European governments in the financ- 
ing of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe 
research. Furthermore, the annual corporate 
fundraising drive of the Radio Free Europe 
Fund is underway, and we expect this will be 
supplemented this year by efforts of Radio 
Liberty. 

With respect to European support from 
private sources, a group of leading private 
citizens established last year the West Euro- 
pean Advisory Committee on the Free Flow 
of Infoi-mation and is now in the process of 
exploring the possibilities and methods of 
seeking private contributions in Europe. 

We do not know at this point whether gov- 
ernments which decide to support the ra- 
dios' research will wish to do so directly 
in exchange for research produced, through 



the European nongovernmental fundraising 
body, through the Board for International 
Broadcasting, or through other bilateral or 
multilateral instrumentalities of their own 
choosing. But the Board, as proposed in sec- 
tion 7 of the bill before you, will have among 
its competences the right to receive contri- 
butions and to use them for the purposes of 
the bill. I believe that a small Board of dis- 
tinguished citizens with few administrative 
expenses and functions limited to those out- 
lined in section 4 of the bill would be, in the 
eyes of many nongovernmental or foreign 
contributors, a preferable recipient of^contri- 
butions to a large U.S. Government depart- 
ment which has a wide range of functions 
and responsibilities. 

Mr. Chairman, I cannot at this point pre- 
dict what success we will have in raising 
funds from the above-described sources for 
the two radios, especially since the action 
taken by Congress will have a significant 
bearing on these efforts. Given the best of 
circumstances, I do not expect that we can, 
in the coming year, reach a high level of Eu- 
ropean participation. The Commission, for 
reasons outlined in its report, recommended 
that the effort with foreign governments fo- 
cus on the radios' excellent research product, 
which many of them have used for years at 
little or no cost. Should we succeed during 
the coming year in raising sufficient funds 
in this way to finance research fully, we 
would be able to reduce cost to the U.S. Gov- 
ernment of the radios in FY 1975. We would 
hope to raise additional funds from non- 
governmental sources here and abroad which 
could be used to reduce demands for U.S. 
Government expenditure on the radios. We 
are prepared, if it appears appropriate, to 
consider the use of contributed nongovern- 
mental funds for operating costs or for trans- 
mitter improvement as well as for research, 
depending on the wishes of the donor and the 
needs. We hope to lessen in every way we 
can, including the proposed Board's function 
of searching for economies, the burden on 
the U.S. taxpayer. But we share the basic 
judgment in the report that we must realis- 
tically see these radios as an activity which 
will continue to be largely U.S. financed. In 



July 9, 1973 



75 



looking to the principle of burden sharing 
for a reduction of U.S. costs, we must ob- 
viously place our emphasis in our approaches 
to Europe on the much more significant area 
of defense costs. 

I do not wish to avoid the fact that, as in 
the case of European defense costs, devalua- 
tion has made these radio operations more 
expensive for us. This is clear already in 
this fiscal year, during which the February 
realignment of currencies has obliged us to 
seek the authorization request now before 
you for a $1.8 million supplemental appro- 
priation for RFE and RL for the present 
year. The $50.3 million funding request for 
FY 74 contains $31.6 million for RFE, $18.3 
million for RL, and $275,000 for the Board 
for International Broadcasting proposed in 
the legislation. The radio figures do not pro- 
vide for any increase in present goods, per- 
sonnel, or new equipment (other than 
replacement equipment) but will maintain 
the same level of programing as FY 73. The 
increase over the radios' FY 73 costs — $9.6 
million — is needed for the following reasons : 

1. We need to meet increased costs esti- 
mated at $3.5 million caused by the dollar 
devaluation. The radios spend over 80 per- 
cent of their budgets in foreign currencies. 

2. We must reinstate or partially restore 
payments to pension plans of $2.4 million 
which went unfunded in the prior two years 
due to insufllicient funds. 

3. We need to cover normal wage and 
price increases which will total $3.2 million 
given the rising salary scales both here and 
in Germany attributable to the impact of 
inflation. 

4. Expenditures to maintain equipment 
and facilities will require an added $500,000. 

The radios, a significant factor adding to 
the pressures which moved the U.S.S.R. to- 
ward a policy of reduced tensions in Europe, 
can be maintained for less than the price 
of four F-14's. 

I think that there is no question that this 
is a price worth paying. While we should 
definitely seek a European participation in 
the manner outlined by the Presidential 
Commission, we should be clear in our own 



minds that we are supporting an activity 
definitely in our own interest. We are sup- 
porting an activity whose cost, in the burden- 
sharing context, is not comparable to the 
much more significant defense cost sharing 
we are seeking. We are supporting an activ- 
ity which, not just in our view but also in 
the view of authoritative spokesmen for the 
Communist side, is not in conflict with an 
era of negotiation. Tamas Palos, Deputy 
Head of the Agitation and Propaganda De- 
partment of the Central Committee of the 
Hungarian Communist Party, quite explicitly 
stated the Communist case in a Budapest 
radio symposium last November 21 : 

If we want the support of the masses, if we want 
them to be convinced of our truth, then we must tell 
them this truth. Thus, mobilization — within the 
country but also on an international scale — requires 
an intensified ideologrical struggle. . . . The intensi- 
fication of the ideological struggle is a normal de- 
velopment under conditions of peaceful coexistence. 
Because, what is peaceful coexistence? Countless 
relations, and these countless relations have an ideo- 
logical basis. . . . Thus, the ideological struggle goes 
hand in hand with peaceful coexistence. Therefore, 
it is in our interest that this ideological struggle be 
expanded. 

I do not quote Mr. Palos to argue for the 
expansion of Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty broadcasting. I quote him to demon- 
strate that we are talking about a type of 
activity which our Communist negotiating 
partners could hardly disclaim as incompati- 
ble with the present period. The unrestricted 
sale of Soviet newspapers and magazines in 
the West continues. The distribution of So- 
viet assessments in the Daily Worker in the 
United States goes on. The support rendered 
by the Soviet Union to Communist parties 
abroad in the name of "proletarian interna- 
tionalism" has not stopped. Moscow Radio's 
substantial broadcasting continues to be sup- 
plemented by the so-called "unofficial" Soviet 
station "Peace and Progress." The weekly 
250 hours continues to be beamed to North 
America by eastern European and Soviet 
radios in English and in languages familiar 
to ethnic groups here. Moscow domestic me- 
dia continue to give a picture of America, 
according to the New York Times corre- 
spondent in Moscow on June 1, which por- 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



trays it as — and I quote — "A land of racism, 
social injustice, unemployment, crime, vio- 
lence, and youth unrest." 

The myriad channels of communication in 
the United States and in the West open to 
the Soviets and their allies are full of evi- 
dence that they do not consider the flow of 
information from East to West to be in con- 
tradiction with their concept of peaceful co- 
existence or of detente. Therefore we need 
not be self-conscious or anxious about the 
continuation of radio broadcasting by Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty to the peo- 
ples of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
We need only consider whether it continues 
to be in our interest. Our own most experi- 
enced academicians, diplomats, and journal- 
ists reach the conclusion that it is not the 
time to reduce the free flow of information 
from West to East. A report by the Atlantic 
Council's Advisory Committee on CSCE and 
MBFR [Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe; mutual and balanced force 
reductions] issued last November stated, in 
the section on Freedom of Communication, 
that: 

A weighty argument for retaining the stations, 
in our opinion, would be that East-West relations 
have improved significantly over the past ten years 
while these stations were operating and caused a 
demonstrable measure of political liberalization in 
the Soviet Bloc countries in which their broadcasts 
have a wide audience. It should be kept in mind that 
the East European party rulers formulate their 
policies under popular pressures, even while they 
seek to maintain their control by means of coercion. 
To abolish these radio stations now in the interest 
of improving the political environment would be to 
deprive the peoples of Eastern Europe of the truth 
and of their communication with the West, but more 
importantly, it would return to the communist re- 
gimes the monopoly of communication In their coun- 
tries. It is very likely that this would result in a 
regression of communist domestic policies toward 
"totalitarianism." In this context, any improvement 
which the abandonment of these Western broadcast- 
ing stations might bring to East-West relations 
would probably prove shallow in the long run. Euro- 
pean security cannot be served by the re-isolation 
of Eastern Europe. 

The Washington Post summed it up 
soundly and succinctly when it said: "De- 
tente, if it means anything, means widening 
the West's contacts with the East, not help- 



ing the East seal off its people from the 
West. It means the exchange of people, goods, 
words and ideas. This is the essential busi- 
ness of RFE and RL." 



Drought Relief and Rehabilitation 
for West and Central Africa 

Statement by David D. Newsom 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ' 

I am most grateful for the opportunity to 
discuss the disastrous effects of the worst 
drought in this centuiy in several west and 
central African states, a geographic zone 
called the Sahel. The disaster has not had 
the dramatically sudden impact of an earth- 
quake, a tidal wave, or a flood but it is none- 
theless a true disaster; famine and misery 
face millions of persons. Because the effects 
of the drought have been creeping, world 
attention has not focused on it until recently. 

The countries thus far most seriously 
affected are Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, 
Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad. Neighboring 
states have been hurt as well but to a lesser 
extent. We enjoy excellent relations with all 
of these governments. Over a period of years, 
we have worked with them on the problems 
of their economic development. Trust and 
confidence mark these efforts. 

Several years of unusual dryness capped 
by a severe drought this past year have 
brought large expanses in this region to the 
edge of disaster. 

On November 2, 1972, we drew the atten- 
tion of high-level authorities of our own gov- 
ernment to the seriousness of the problem 
which was developing, and later that month 
interagency efforts began to deal with the 
problem. Our response, which my colleague 



' Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
June 15 (press release 209). The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



July 9, 1973 



77 



Don Brown [Donald S. Brown, Deputy As- 
sistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, 
Agency for International Development] will 
present in detail, springs from fundamental 
humanitarian considerations as well as our 
friendly relations with these admirable peo- 
ple. What many Americans do not realize is 
that from the earliest Middle Ages until the 
coming of the European colonizers this area 
of Africa was the home of great kingdoms 
which flourished on world trade. In the 
fourth century A.D. the Kingdom of Ghana, 
which spread into the Sahel zone, was al- 
ready a rich and powerful state. In the Mid- 
dle Ages, the University of Timbuktu in the 
Kingdom of Mali was renowned as one of the 
world's great centers of learning. Tides of 
history shift and modern history left these 
kingdoms behind, so that poverty and illiter- 
acy predominate today and the countries 
stricken by this drought are, under the best 
of circumstances, among the economically 
poorest in the world by all the usual stand- 
ards of judgment such as gross national 
product and per capita annual income. The 
latter would scarcely average $100. They re- 
main, however, proud and self-reliant people. 

Approximately 25 million people inhabit 
the six countries which I have mentioned 
above. Most of the population is rural and 
has been affected by the drought. Farmers, 
herders, and nomads have seen their crops 
fail, forage disappear, wells dry up, and their 
livestock suffer and, in serious proportion, 
die. The way of life for millions has been 
severely dislocated. It is clear from all re- 
ports that hunger and malnutrition are wide- 
spread and will grow. The drought has thus 
struck heavily at the resource base of these 
nations. Moreover, commercial crops such as 
peanuts in Senegal and cotton in Mali have 
been greatly reduced. Thus, the local food 
base has been greatly diminished, exports 
have fallen, foreign exchange reserves re- 
duced, and the entire productive framework 
weakened. 

Preoccupying as well to the area's leaders 
is a grave fiscal threat: Tax collections based 



on agriculture have dropped drastically. In 
some instances it has been necessary simply 
to waive tax obligations of the hard-hit farm- 
ers and herders. This will have serious re- 
percussions on the total economy of each of 
these countries. 

There has been an energetic response from 
the donor community. U.S. efforts to provide 
food and other forms of assistance have thus 
far surpassed $20 million. The European 
Community has had a more important role, 
a leadership role, which is appropriate in 
view' of the many ties which it has with the 
region. Also participating are the U.S.S.R., 
the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, 
Japan, several neighboring African nations, 
and others. U.N. Secretary General Wald- 
heim, deeply concerned by the situation, des- 
ignated Director General Boerma of the FAO 
[Food and Agriculture Organization] to co- 
ordinate donor activities and has appealed to 
the United States and other donors for more 
help. 

Recipient governments have been deeply 
grateful for U.S. assistance thus far ren- 
dered. For example, the Senegalese Govern- 
ment has publicly acknowledged its thanks. 
Ambassadors from the area, who are here 
today, have told me personally of their grati- 
tude. And President Diori of Niger has 
written President Nixon stating in part: 

... I wish to express to you, on behalf of my gov- 
ernment, that of the people of Niger and of myself 
personally, our profound gratitude for the extent, 
effectiveness and speed of the various forms of 
assistance which the United States has willingly 
given Niger for the relief of its suffering people. 

Since the nutritional equilibrium in Niger can 
hardly be re-established before October, we must 
continue to rely on international cooperation, nota- 
bly that of the friendly government of the United 
States. 

While the foregoing may appear to be an 
impressive response to a human tragedy, it is 
not enough. The next few weeks are critical, 
as the rainy season begins in this area and 
the need to plant crops recurs. The farmers 
must be strong enough to plant, tend, and 
eventually harvest their crops. In many areas 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



the able-bodied must be returned to their 
normal settlements to carry out the planting. 
Feeding assistance must continue through 
the rainy season until harvests begin in Sep- 
tember and October, and thereafter a major 
rehabilitation effort must be undertaken. 
Herds must be reconstituted, grazing areas 
restored, water sources reestablished, and a 
dispirited population encouraged to go on. 

To review rehabilitation needs of the 
months and years ahead, the United Nations 
has called for a conference in Geneva at the 
end of June. From this meeting and from the 
needs which we will identify through the 
efforts of our missions in the Sahel we will 
define our proper role in a multidonor pro- 
gram. And at the same time we participate 
in rehabilitation we will encourage other 
donors to join with us in a long-range attack 
on the basic problem of the desertification of 
the Sahelian zone. From the present tragedy 
we hope to seize an initiative which will dem- 
onstrate our interest in coping with the nat- 
ural problems of man living in the arid 
lands of the Sahel. 

Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I think 
this crisis and the need for a comprehensive 
response — short-term emergency feeding, 
medium-term rehabilitation, and long-range 
preventative measures to help overcome hu- 
man and natural deficiencies — point up the 
merits of a functional approach on a regional 
basis to a major human problem. This ap- 
proach is, as I understand it, one of the key 
objectives of the amendments to the Foreign 
Assistance Act which have been tabled by a 
majority of the membership of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. I heartily en- 
dorse this objective. 

Before concluding, I would like to stress 
that the drought crisis and our response is 
not just an effort to help friends who have 
turned to us in their misfortunes but it is also 
a demonstration that we, the richest people 
of the earth, can extend a helping hand to 
the poorest. We need your committee's sym- 
pathetic support in meeting the responsi- 
bilities which this crisis places on us today 
and in the future. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return 
of astronauts, and the return of objects launched 
into outer space. Opened for sifrnature at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. En- 
tered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Ratification deposited: Republic of China, June 15, 
1973. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation 
Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 
15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; 
for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 
7063. 
Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, May 8, 1973. 

Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En- 
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United 
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: Democratic People's Repub- 
lic of Korea, May 19, 1973. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution 
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Washington December 29, 1972.^ 
Signatures: Japan, Morocco, June 22, 1973. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.^ 

Signature: Brazil, May 23, 1973 (subject to rati- 
fication). 

BILATERAL 

Canada 

Arrangement supplementary to the agreement of 
December 20, 1971, and February 23, 1972 (TIAS 
7281), concerning the establishment and operation 
of a temporary space tracking facility in connec- 
tion with Project Skylab. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Ottawa March 14, April 11, and June 
5, 1973. Entered into force June 5, 1973. 



' Not in force. 



July 9, 1973 



79 



Agreement on reciprocal fishing privileges in cer- 
tain areas off the coasts of the United States and 
Canada. Signed at Ottawa June 15, 1973. Entered 
into force June 16, 1973. 

France 

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation, 
and maintenance of an Omega navigational sta- 
tion on the island of La Reunion, with annex. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Paris June 7, 
1973. Enters into force on the date of the notifi- 
cation by France that it has complied with all of 
its constitutional procedures for entry into force. 

Hungary 

Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7, 
1972. Entered into force July 6, 1973. 
Proclaimed by the President: June 18, 1973. 

Philippines 

Agreement relating to the relinquishment of certain 
land at the United States Naval Communications 
Station, San Miguel. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Manila June 4 and 7, 1973. Entered into force 
June 7, 1973. 

Poland 

Agreement regarding fisheries in the western region 
of the middle Atlantic Ocean, with annexes and 
agreed minutes. Signed at Warsaw June 2, 1973. 
Entered into force July 1, 1973. 

Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges 
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972. Entered 
into force July 6, 1973. 
Proclaimed by the President: June 18, 1973. 

Romania 

Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bu- 
charest July 5, 1972. Entered into force July 6, 
1973. 
Proclaimed by the President: June 18, 1973. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement on cooperation in the field of transpor- 
tation. Signed at Washington June 19, 1973. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1973. 

Agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture. 
Signed at Washington June 19, 1973. Entered into 
force June 19, 1973. 

General agreement on contacts, exchanges, and co- 
operation, with annex, and related notes. Signed 
at Washington June 19, 1973. Entered into force 
June 19, 1973. 

Agreement on cooperation in studies of the world 
ocean. Signed at Washington June 19, 1973. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1973. 

Convention on matters of taxation, with related let- 
ters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973. Enters 
into force 30 days after the exchange of instru- 
ments of ratification. 



Basic principles of negotiations on the further lim- 
itation of strategic offensive arms. Signed at 
Washington June 21, 1973. Entered into force 
June 21, 1973. 

AgT-eement on scientific and technical cooperation 
in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Washington June 21, 1973. Entered into 
force June 21, 1973. 

Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Signed 
at Washington June 22, 1973. Entered into force 
June 22, 1973. 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to June 18 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
196 of June 6, 204 of June 12, 206 of June 14, 
and 209 and 210 of June 15. 

No. Date Subject 

t213 6/18 NATO ministerial meeting com- 
munique, June 15. 

t214 6/19 Rogers: news conference, Copen- 
hagen, June 15. 

*215 6/19 Paul Taylor Dance Company to 
perform at Istanbul festival 
June 22-25. 

*216 6/19 Study groups 10 and 11 of U.S. 
National Committee for CCIR, 
Washington, July 12. 

*217 6/19 Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Washington, 
July 13. 

*218 6/19 Study group 6 of U.S. National 
Committee for CCIR, Boulder, 
Colo., July 13. 

*219 6/19 National Review Board for East- 
West Center, Honolulu, July 
30-31. 

*220 6/20 John Hope Franklin to tour East 
Asia and the Pacific as Lincoln 
lecturer. 

t221 6/21 Rush : Country Day School Head- 
masters Association, Carlisle, 
Pa. 

222 6/21 Casey: Fordham University, New 

York. 

223 6/21 Nixon: letter to U.N. Secretary 

General on West African 
drought relief. 

*Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



80 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Jubj 9, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1776 



Africa 

r light Relief and Rehabilitation for West 

nd Central Africa (Newsom) 77 

-. Responds to U.N. Appeal for African 
irought Relief (Nixon) 66 

nbodia 
imunique Signed at Paris on Implementa 

mn of Viet-Nam Agrreement (Kissinpi 
lur-party and two-party communique) . 
ters of Credence (Sim) iiT 

leress 

•artment Urges Continued Government Sup- 

irt of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 

Rush) 72 

ught Relief and Rehabilitation for West and 
entral Africa (Newsom) 77 

'iiomic Affairs. International Cooperation on 
iiergy (Casey) 59 

Kilucational and Cultural Affairs. Meeting of 
'ommittee on U.S.-Japan Educational and 
ultural Cooperation 58 

Energy. International Cooperation on Energy 
(Casoyl 59 

artinent Urges Continued Government Sup- 
port of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 

Rush) 72 

United States With Europe (Rush) ... 54 

Foreign Aid. Sales, Credits or Guaranties to 
Peru Under Foreign Military Sales Act 
Presidential determination) 71 

India. Letters of Credence (Kaul) 67 

Japan. Meeting of Committee on U.S.-Japan 
Educational and Cultural Cooperation ... 58 

Jordan. Letters of Credence (Salah) .... 67 

loos. Communique Signed at Paris on Imple- 
entation of Viet-Nam Agreement (Kiss- 
iger, four-party and two-party communique) 45 

[in America. For a Peaceful and Progressive 
Latin America (Kubisch) 68 

Liberia. President Tolbert of Liberia Visits 
Washington (exchange of toasts with Presi- 
dent Nixon) 63 



Malawi. Letters of Credence (Mbaya) .... 67 

Middle East. International Cooperation on 
Energy (Casey) 59 

Military Affairs. Sales, Credits or Guaranties 
to Peru Under Foreign Military Rales Act 
(Presidential determination) 71 

Nepal. Letters of Credence (Khanal) .... 67 

Oman. Letters of Credence (al-Bu-Sa'id) ... 67 

Peru. Sales, Credits or Guaranties to Peru 
Under Foreign Military Sales Act (Presi- 
dential determination) 71 

Presidential Documents 

President Tolbert of Liberia Visits Washington 63 

Sales, Credits or Guaranties to Peru Under 
Foreign Military Sales Act (Presidential de- 
termination) 71 

U.S. Responds to U.N. Appeal for African 
Drought Relief 66 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 79 

United Nations. U.S. Responds to U.N. Appeal 
for African Drought Relief (Nixon) ... 66 

Viet-Nam. Communique Signed at Paris on 
Implementation of Viet-Nam Agreement 
(Kissinger, four-party and two-party com- 
munique) 45 

Yemen Arab Republic. Letters of Credence 
(Geghman) 67 

Name Index 

al-Bu-Sa'id, Faisal Bin AH 67 

Casey, William J 59 

Geghman, Yahya H 67 

Kaul, Triloki Nath 67 

Khanal, Yadu Nath 67 

Kissinger, Henry A 45 

Kubisch, Jack B 68 

Mbaya, Robert Bernard 67 

Newsom, David 'D 77 

Nixon, President 63, 66, 71 

Rush, Kenneth 54, 72 

Salah, Abdullah 67 

Sim, Urn 67 

Tolbert, William R., Jr 63 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1777 



July 16, 1973 



SECRETARY ROGERS ATTENDS CENTO AND NATO MEETINGS 81 

U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION 
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 91 

THE UNITED NATIONS: A MIRROR OF THE REAL WORLD 
Address by Ambassador Scali 96 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX. No. 1777 
July 16, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyriKhtcd and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI. 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau o\ 
Public Affairs, provides ttte public an 
interested agencies of ifie governmeni 
witfi information on developments i 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on tlie work of tfie Department and 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tfie Wfiite House and ttie Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of tlie President 
and tfie Secretary of State and otfier 
officers of tfie Department, as well as 
special articles on various pfiases of 
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of tlie Department. Information is in- 
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United States is or may become a 
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Publications of tlie Department of 
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legislative material in tfie field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Rogers Attends CENTO and NATO Meetings 



Sccretarii Rogers headed the U.S. observer 
delegation to the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers of the Central Treaty Organiza- 
tion (CENTO) at Tehran June 10-11, made 
an official visit to Denmark June 12-13, and 
headed the U.S. delegation to the regular 
North Atlantic Council rninisterial meeting 
at Copenhagen June U-15. Following are 
statements and news conferences by Secre- 
tary Rogers and the texts of the communi- 
ques issued at the conclusion of the meetings. 

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, TEHRAN, JUNE 9 > 

Press release 202 dated June 11 

I am pleased to be once again in Iran, a 
beautiful and dynamic country making rapid 
progress under its farseeing leadership. Re- 
lations between the United States and Iran 
are excellent. Both of our countries have 
benefited from our years of close cooperation 
based on our mutual respect and shared 
interests. 

We have noted with pleasure the growing 
spirit of cooperation among Iran and its 
neighbors across the Persian Gulf. We wel- 
come this responsible and constructive ap- 
proach to the security and development of 
this vital region. We also welcome the agree- 
ment recently concluded between Iran and 
the oil consortium, which should assure a 
stable and mutually beneficial relationship. 

I am here to attend the annual meeting of 
the CENTO Council of Ministers. I look for- 
ward to exchanging views with Foreign Min- 
ister Khalatbary and the representatives of 
other CENTO member countries. We will be 
discussing a variety of subjects concerning 
this area, including our shared view that 



' Issued to the press. 



outside powers should not interfere in the 
affairs of CENTO member countries, and 
the useful role CENTO plays in regional 
economic cooperation and development. 

I also look forward to an audience with 
His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah. We 
have learned to value his counsel and will be 
most interested in having the benefit of his 
wisdom before the summit meetings between 
President Nixon and Soviet General Secre- 
tary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev later this month. 

Thank you. 

CENTO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING 
Statement by Secretary Rogers, June 10 

Press release 203 dated June 11 

First I would like to join with my col- 
leagues in expressing appreciation to His 
Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah for his 
inspiring message, to the Prime Minister for 
his gracious words, and to the Secretary 
General for the very excellent report that he 
has given us. 

It is with pleasure that I return to Tehran 
and to another meeting with my colleagues 
of the CENTO Council of Ministers. Each 
visit to this country creates a lasting impres- 
sion of the graciousness of Iranian hospital- 
ity, the vitality of the country, and the 
friendliness of its people. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States finds 
much of value in its association with the 
Central Treaty Organization, both as a re- 
gional organization and as a means of rein- 
forcing the close and cordial bilateral ties 
we have with each of the member states. 

It is true that the world in which CENTO 
was born differs substantially from the world 
of today. The phrase which dominated our 



July 16, 1973 



81 



thoughts in the 1950's was "cold war." The 
poHcy which guides us today is to substitute 
negotiation for confrontation and to achieve 
a generation of peace. The changes in the 
world scene, however, make CENTO no less 
relevant than before. 

The attainment of that goal, the goal of 
peace, demands our unwavering attention 
and sustained effort. The search for peace 
must be universal. All countries, large and 
small, can contribute to the emerging global 
structure of peace. The United States is 
striving to maintain the momentum that has 
built up in recent years. In that connection, 
this meeting is particularly opportune for 
it provides an opportunity for an exchange 
of views on the eve of President Nixon's 
talk with General Secretary Brezhnev in 
Washington. We believe, as I know you do, 
that improved relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States should contrib- 
ute to the security and stability of the 
CENTO region. 

I want to join particularly with my col- 
leagues and especially with what Sir Alec 
[Douglas-Home] said about the necessity for 
maintaining our strength. At a time when 
the prospects for peace seem bright, at a 
time when the world is a much safer place 
than it was foui- years ago, a much more 
peaceful world than it was four years ago, 
it is vital to maintain our strength and our 
resolve. Certainly, if there is any lesson we 
have learned in history, it is that military 
weakness, lack of resolve, is an invitation to 
aggression. And really, that is what this 
meeting is about, it seems to me. 

I look forward to my discussions with you 
on the Arab-Israel conflict, too, because the 
situation in the Middle East remains tenuous 
and fragile — although we are approaching 
three years of cease-fire between Eg>-pt and 
Israel. During the first months of this year 
we have vigorously pursued a series of diplo- 
matic contacts with the parties concerned. 
We are convinced that what is required is 
the beginning of a serious and genuine nego- 
tiating process between the parties. It is 
within a negotiating framework that the 
United States believes it can be most helpful 
to the parties in achieving the agreement 



called for by the November 1967 resolution 
of the United Nations, a resolution which 
neither endorsed nor precluded the pre-June 
1967 lines as the final lines. The main ques- 
tion facing the parties is how to reconcile 
the principle of sovereignty on the one hand 
and the needs of security on the other. These 
are both legitimate and understandable con- 
cerns of the parties in the area. It is not un- 
important that both sides remain committed 
to the Security Council Resolution 242, re- 
gardless of their differing interpretations. 
For this reason, the United States will do 
everything it can to help assure that the deli- 
cate balance of this resolution will be main- 
tained throughout the current proceedings 
of the United Nations Security Council. 

We continue to give full support to the 
resolution. We will continue to assist the 
parties in making progress toward peace — a 
peace that meets the legitimate concerns of 
all of the states and peoples of the area, in- 
cluding the Palestinians. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, it is interesting 
that the Middle East seems to be the one area 
in the world where there is a major conflict 
where the parties have not been able to di- 
rectly or indirectly discuss their differences. 
It is the only area in the world now remain- 
ing where no negotiations have been con- 
ducted, where the parties have not actually 
actively exchanged views. And we think 
there is no substitute for that process. We 
do not believe that there is anything the 
United Nations can do as a body to make the 
parties come to an agreement, reach a settle- 
ment. We think it is vitally important that 
the parties start a serious negotiating proc- 
ess of some kind. 

In the Persian Gulf we see an area of vast 
dimension, great vitality, and substantial 
resources. We look primarily to the states 
in the area to produce new patterns of re- 
gional cooperation and stability in the area 
of increasing importance to the free world. 
We are greatly encouraged to see so many 
indications of regional cooperation. These 
new relationships can help build a solid foun- 
dation for the future prosperity and stability 
of all .states and peoples in the gulf. 

We pay particular tribute to Iran and His 



82 



Deparfment of Stale Bulletin 



Imperial Majesty for the leadership he has 
taken in this area of the world, which is so 
important to peace and stability. 

We believe that significant progress has 
been made toward reconciliation in South 
Asia in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan 
war. Pakistani, India, Bangladesh made con- 
siderable progress at Simla. Such a negotiat- 
ing process, we hope, will also lead to a 
solution of the delicate questions which have 
been raised here this morning of prisoners 
of war and detainees to the satisfaction of 
all concerned. It is from reconciliation among 
South Asians themselves and their respective 
efforts to economic development that a strong 
bulwark of security can be built. 

We realize, too, that the transition from 
confrontation to negotiation and cooperation 
both in the CENTO area and other parts of 
the world will not be without new problems. 
Thus prudence dictates that we must remain 
vigilant and strong in legitimate defense of 
our respective interests. 

Mr. Chairman, peace has many components. 
One of them assuredly is cooperation among 
countries. In few parts of the world has this 
been more apparent than in the CENTO re- 
gion, where cooperation has become a habit. 
The substance of cooperation may have 
changed from time to time — as indeed it 
should if it is properly to reflect new develop- 
ments and new interests — but the spirit un- 
derlying it has not. We in the United States 
enter these discussions with that spirit in 
mind and in the belief that CENTO today, 
facing changed circumstances, is more im- 
portant than ever as an instrument of co- 
operation and as an instrument of peace. 

Text of Final Communique, June 1 1 

Press release 208 dated June 14 

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO), which was inaugurated by 
the message of His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah 
Aryamehr, read by His Excellency Mr. Amir Abbas 
Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, held their 20th 
Session in Tehran on June 10 and 11, 1973. 

The Delegations were led by: 

His Excellency Mr. Abbas All Khalatbary 

Minister for Foreign .\ffairs 

Iran 



His Excellency Mr. Aziz Ahmed, H.PK., HQA., 

S PK 
Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs 

Pakistan 

His Excellency Mr. Umit Haluk Bayulken 

Minister for Foreign Affairs 

Turkey 

The Right Honorable Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 

K.T., M.P. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common- 
wealth .Affairs 
The United Kingdom 
The Honorable William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 
The United States 

Following an address by the Prime Minister of 
Iran, opening statements were made by the leaders 
of the Delegations and the Secretary General of 
CENTO, expressing their appreciation of the Shah- 
anshah's gracious message and the warm hospitality 
of the host country. 

His Excellency Mr. A. A. Khalatbary, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Iran, presided at the session. 

The Council of Ministers conducted a comprehen- 
sive review of the international situation, paying 
particular attention to the matters of interest to the 
CENTO area. The Ministers recognized the strength 
and vitality of political and economic development 
achieved by the member countries, the importance of 
peaceful and just settlement of disputes, and the 
need to maintain vigilance in the region. 

The Ministers affirmed the vital importance they 
attach to the preservation of the independence and 
territorial integrity of each of the member states in 
this region. . 

The Ministers noted the success with which Paki- 
stan was meeting the problems which faced her, fol- 
lowing the conflict with India. They expressed the 
hope that lasting peace on the Subcontinent could 
be secured through a just settlement of differences 
between Pakistan and India and they reaffirmed 
their support for Security Council Resolution No. 
307 of 21 December 1971. In particular the Ministers 
urged the early release of prisoners of war. 

The Ministers viewed with concern the continuing 
critical situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed 
their support of Security Council Resolution No. 242 
of 22 November 1967, and welcomed efforts being 
made to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute along the 
lines of the Resolution. 

Considering the continuing subversive threats in 
the region, the Ministers expressed the determination 
of their Governments to meet such efforts with all 
the means at their disposal. 

The Ministers viewed with favor current negotia- 
tions for the purpose of reducing armaments and 
fostering conditions for peace and stability in Eu- 
rope. They expressed the hope that these negotiations 
would not fail to take into consideration the interests 
of the CENTO region. 



July 16, 1973 



83 



In approving the report of the Military Committee, 
the Ministers noted the continuing improvement 
in cooperation among the armed forces of their 
countries. 

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the rapid 
economic development of the regional countries. In 
reviewing the report of the Economic Committeo, 
they directed the Committee to consider ways of 
expanding its work with a view to strengthening and 
promoting economic cooperation in CENTO. 

In concluding their review of the activities over 
the past year, the Ministers noted with satisfaction 
the annual report of the Secretary General. They 
reiterated their determination to continue to cooper- 
ate for peace, security and stability to promote fur- 
ther social and economic development in the CENTO 
region. 

The Ministers accepted the invitation of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States to hold the next session 
of the Council in May 1974 in Washington. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, TEHRAN, JUNE 11 

Press i-elease 205 dated June 12 

I wanted to take this opportunity just be- 
fore I left to meet with you briefly. When I 
arrived, I said that I would try to have a 
short meeting with you, and I am happy to 
do it. 

I think it has been a very useful short stay 
which I had in Iran. As you know, I was able 
to meet with His Imperial Majesty and had 
a very satisfactory discussion for almost 
two hours. I had meetings with the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Minister, and I 
merely want to say that as far as relations 
between the United States and Iran are con- 
cerned, they have never been better. They 
are excellent. 

President Nixon is looking forward to the 
visit of the Shahanshah to Washington. They 
have been good friends for a long time, and 
President Nixon holds His Imperial Majesty 
in the highest esteem. So I consider on the 
bilateral basis that this has been a very 
successful visit. I am very privileged myself 
to have had the opportunity to be here again, 
and I want to express my thanks to all of 
the members of the Iranian Government for 
their hospitality. 

As far as the CENTO meeting was con- 
cerned, it gave me an opportunity first to 
meet with all of the Foreign Ministers repre- 



sented in CENTO on a bilateral basis. We 
had, I think, very useful discussions. The 
meeting itself, on the basis of a consensus 
that was expressed at the conclusion of the 
meeting, was the best one I have attended. 
This is my fifth CENTO meeting. The dis- 
cussions were very direct and frank, and we 
had an exchange of views which in some re- 
spects was quite unusual for an international 
conference. I think that the communique will 
reflect the satisfactory nature of the meeting, 
and particularly it will stress, as the conver- 
sations themselves stressed, the importance 
that is attached to the sovereignty of all the 
member states. We believe in the United 
States, and I think it was generally con- 
cluded, that this is a very valuable alliance. 
It is an alliance that is valuable not only for 
itself but because it is one of a number of 
alliances that we have throughout the world 
which we believe has laid the foundation for 
improvement of the relations that have oc- 
curred between the East and the West. It 
provides a continuation of the stability that 
we think is necessary for improved relations. 
So I am veiy pleased indeed that the meet- 
ing went so well. I think that CENTO is go- 
ing to continue to be a very important 
alliance, and it will deal especially with the 
problems that exist today in the world. 

I also would like to say that I have been 
very much impressed with the developments 
in the Persian Gulf area. I think the cooper- 
ation that exists, the growing cooperation 
among the nations in the area, is of greatest 
importance. Certainly the Persian Gulf is 
going to assume greater and greater impor- 
tance as the years go by. And Iran is playing 
a major role in that area. It is essential, we 
believe in the United States, that the nations 
in the area cooperate together, provide re- 
gional cooperation, that they put aside their 
difl'erences — and there are a lot of diff"erences 
that have existed for a long time, but in the 
overall they are fairly minor. The overriding 
considerations are for peace and stability in 
the area and the ability of the nations in the 
area to get along with each other, to be sure 
that there is no outside interference, that 
there is no subversion that upsets the sta- 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



bility of the area. I am very pleased to see 
the developments in the area since I was 

last here. 

I want to again thank all the members of 
the government who are here. I appreciate 
their coming to the airport, and I will be 
glad to answer some questions, if you have 
some. 

i Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the exchange 
of views was, in some respects, quite unusiml 
for an international conference. Could you 
\ tell us what you mean by that? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes. Usually at interna- 
tional conferences every Minister has a set 
speech that has been written for him by 
somebody, and he reads it. And it is pretty 
dull. This time there were no set speeches. 
Everyone spoke the things that were on his 
mind. After each Minister had the opportu- 
nity to say what was on his mind and to 
speak quite frankly, there was an exchange 
of views. Questions were asked, and we had 
a lively exchange of opinion. The result was, 
I thiniv, that there was quite a different cli- 
mate. In fact the Foreign Minister of Iran, 
who said that he had attended meetings in 
CENTO for 10 years, said this was by far 
the most interesting, the most satisfactory, 
meeting that he had ever been to. I think 
that was reflected by the comments of the 
Secretary General. Certainly it is true as far 
as I am concerned. This was the fifth year 
that I have attended. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, to what will you ascribe the 
sicccess of this meeting of an alliance lohich 
some years ago the regional countries were 
tending to tvrite off as a paper alliance? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that there 
is a tendency, when the world is moving in 
the direction to detente, to feel that somehow 
alliances are not important and to say, "Well, 
now things are going very well in the world ; 
let's just put aside these organizations that 
have served us well in the past." This meet- 
ing provided a realistic assessment, it seemed 
to me, of the necessity of continuing the alli- 
ances that have made it possible for the East 
and West to improve relations. We also rec- 
ognize that as the world moves away from 



active conflict and nuclear confrontation, 
and hopefully away from any major conflicts 
among the nations, there are other dangers 
that occur, dangers of subversion, things of 
that kind. And also, you realize the necessity 
of equilibrium— stability, if you will— in an 
area. That can only be brought about by re- 
gional cooperation. This Organization con- 
sists of nations in the region that work well 
together. I am speaking about Iran, Turkey, 
and Pakistan. It also includes the United 
Kingdom and the United States. You put 
those nations together ; it serves a very use- 
ful purpose. The discussions focused on what 
I think is a realistic appraisal of the value 
of this kind of alliance— not an old-fashioned 
appraisal, not an appraisal that might have 
been relevant 20 years ago or 15 years ago 
or 10 years ago, but an appraisal that is 
relevant today. Therefore I believe we left 
the meeting with a sort of renewed inspira- 
tion, a renewed spirit about the necessity of 
CENTO. 

Q. You mentioned or you stressed the im- 
portance of stability in the Persian Gulf. 
Does the United States consider the arms 
buildup in all these states or the richer states 
along the gulf to be part of this stability? 

Secretary Rogers: That really depends 
upon what is meant by arms buildup. If arms 
buildup means an arms race, so that every- 
one is madly attempting to get a tremendous 
amount of arms, that is an undesirable situa- 
tion. On the other hand, history certainly 
teaches us that if there are nations which are 
strong in an area — or the nations that 
have ulterior purposes in an area are strong 
and there are weak nations nearby — that 
is an invitation to trouble. So a reason- 
able development of military strength vis- 
a-vis the military strength of possible 
adversaries is not a bad situation; it is a 
stabilizing situation. In a sense that is what 
has happened between the United States and 
the Soviet Union or, to put it differently, 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. So we 
do not think that the strengthening of the 
armed forces in Iran, the desire on the part 
of Saudi Arabia to be stronger militarily, 



July 16, 1973 



85 



causes any danger. We think it is stabilizing 
to that extent. 

Q. Were the Soviet Union to supply arms, 
say, at the same level to the Iraqis, would this 
not cause the arms race ivhich you say would 
be a bad thing? 

Secretary Rogers: It depends upon the ex- 
tent. But what about the converse? Suppose 
you have a situation where the Soviet Union 
is supplying tremendous amounts of arms 
to one country and the neighbor counti-y does 
not have any. That is a dangerous situation. 
In other words, if you have a strong nation, 
strong militarily, that has aggressive designs 
and a very weak nation next to it, that is an 
invitation to trouble. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a document distributed 
by the public relations division of CENTO 
defines the purpose of CENTO in the begin- 
ning as to guarantee protection against the 
Soviet Union if it should threaten the terri- 
torial integrity of the region after World 
War II. Does that continue to be the purpose 
of CENTO? 

Secreta^-y Rogers: Well, I am sure you 
would have to read the whole pamphlet to 
get its thrust. Certainly that was one of the 
purposes that was behind CENTO at its in- 
ception. But, as I say, I do not think it is 
necessary every time we have a meeting to 
restate the purposes. We think this alliance, 
our alliance with the NATO countries, and 
our alliance with SEATO are important as- 
pects of the policy we developed after World 
War II of mutual security. We think the de- 
velopment of strength in these areas, the 
ability to work together closely as we are 
doing, provides an equilibrium, if you will, 
which makes for stability in the world. That 
is why we think the alliances are important. 
That is why we wanted, at a time when we 
are entering into much better relations with 
the Soviet Union, much better relations with 
the People's Republic of China, that we not 
forget that the alliances have contributed to 
the very success that we are now seeing in the 
world. And we want to continue to maintain 
those alliances. 



Q. Are we correct to assume that Pakistan 
has agreed to continue the alliance? There 
was some thought that the Pakistanis are 
not too happy with the alliance. 

Secretary Rogers: I would not want to 
speak for Pakistan. I will merely say that 
we're very pleased about the level of repre- 
sentation at this meeting. 

Q. Let me put it another tvay. Have all the 
members of the alliance agreed to continue 
it? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, as I say, there is 
no change in the alliance as a result of this 
meeting. It was a very successful meeting, 
and we are very happy at the level of repre- 
sentation of Pakistan. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the regional 
members, in fact, all of the regional mem- 
bers, seemed quite concerned if not alarmed 
about the threat of subversion. Now, you 
have not mentioned this yourself. Are you — 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, yes. I mentioned it. 
I mentioned subversion. 

Q. Is it serious? 

Secretary Rogers: Certainly subversion is 
a matter of concern to the nations in the re- 
gion. Certainly subversion occurs in many 
Ijarts of the world. It is one of the things 
that has to be guarded against, as I said a 
little earlier. As the threat of nuclear war 
diminishes — and I believe it has — and the 
threat of war between the major powers is 
lessened, subversion is a natural way to 
spread ideology-. It is not unexpected, and I 
think it is important for nations in the re- 
gion to consider it, to guard against it, and 
to be sure it does not cause instability. The 
answer to your question is yes. 

Q. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, it is par- 
ticularly important to watch out for subver- 
sion at this time when the Soviet Union ap- 
pears to be moving toward detente, or at least 
following the policies of detente? 

Secretary Rogers: Here again I want to 
be sure we understand definitions. We are 
convinced in the United States that the 
Soviet Union seriously desires to improve its 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



relations with us. And we are inclined to 
think that the Soviet Union is serious about 
improving its relations with the western 
European countries. People refer to that as 
detente, if you will, and we are very pleased 
about that." We are going to do everything 
we can to move in that direction. But that 
does not suggest that they have changed their 
ideology. It does not suggest that they are 
not going to attempt to extend their influ- 
ence in other parts of the world. And it does 
not suggest that military strength is no 
longer necessary. 

As a matter of fact, it suggests just the 
opposite to us. The fact that we have been 
able to improve our relations with them is 
because we have been strong as a nation and 
because we have alliances that are strong. 
So we think that it is necessary to maintain 
our military strength. It is necessary to 
maintain our military alliances, if you will, 
and to guard against subversion. 

If we see as time goes on that the improved 
relations that we are witnessing throughout 
the world mean that subversion is not going 
to be an instrument of extending influence 
throughout the world, if the world all of a 
sudden is going to be a place of high ideals 
and governments are not going to have con- 
flict and there is going to be no attempt to 
extend ideologies by one means or another, 
fine. But until that time comes, we want to 
be sure that we move sensibly in the direc- 
tion of improved relations, not being euphoric 
about it but being realistic about it and doing 
the things I have suggested. I will take one 
or two more questions. 

Q. The Secretary General, in a press con- 
ference just before ijours, speaking aboxd the 
dangers of subversion and ranging from 
Oman, the Persian Gulf— how far does this 
area go, the Arabian Peninsula — / mean, 
how far does this overlap 7cith the CENTO, 
how far does this come tvithin CENTO's 
orbit or — 

Secretary Rogers: I do not know if we 
have ever attempted to make such specific 
delineations. Obviously if the Persian Gulf 
became an area of serious conflict, it would 
have serious repercussions in the CENTO 



July 16, 1973 



region. So yes, we are concerned about it ; I 
guess you can say we are more immediately 
concerned about action in the member states. 
But certainly the conditions that occur, the 
situations that develop in the region, affect 
the member states. So we are concerned. 
I will take one or two more questions. 

Q. \^Inaudible.'\ 

Secretary Rogers: Well, did I understand 
your question? Do I think that CENTO 
should concern itself with development in 
the region? Yes, and I think that we are. I 
think that we are pleased to see the develop- 
ment in the region. Since I was here last, I 
think there has been tremendous develop- 
ment and it is very favorable. 

Thank you very much. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, COPENHAGEN, JUNE 15 

Press release 214 dated June 19 

I would just like to make a few prelimi- 
nary comments, and then I'll answer some 
questions. First, I think this Council meeting 
has been a very successful one. As you know, 
I'm getting to be an oldtimer, and I think this 
is probably the best meeting that we've had. 
By that, I mean the spirit was particularly 
good ; there was really no acrimony ; the res- 
olution of the final communique was easily 
achieved; and I think all of us recognize 
certain important facts. 

First, I think there was a complete and 
acknowledged recognition of the fact that 
the alliance has contributed very substan- 
tially to peace and stability in the world; 
that because it has been so successful we 
have a special duty — now as we enter nego- 
tiations this fall, both in July and October, 
on the Conference on European Security 
and Cooperation and on mutual and balanced 
force reductions — to maintain the unity and 
solidarity of the alliance, to recognize its 
importance, never losing sight of it for a 
moment, and by common resolve to maintain 
its strength. I think that was accomplished. 
Secondly, I think that there was general 
agreement that, although these negotiations 
are going to be difficult in view of the fact 
that there are so many nations involved and 



87 



there are so many complex questions involved 
in the negotiations, we have been very suc- 
cessful in our common effort to appi'oach 
these negotiations in a united way. Prepara- 
tory talks that have led up to the conference 
on European security have been, I think, con- 
ducted very satisfactorily. There was a rec- 
ognition to that effect by the Ministers. 

Third, I think there was a very positive 
response to the initiative that President 
Nixon has taken about the year of Eui'ope. 
There were a great many statements to the 
effect that this was a good time to examine 
our objectives, to underscore the principles 
on which we agree, and to restate them in 
the light of current realities. I particularly 
appreciate the attitude of the French For- 
eign Minister. I thought his interventions 
were very constructive, and I was pleased to 
notice that he felt just as I do— that the 
meeting was a very successful one. 

With that preliminary statement, I'll take 
a few questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, all we've done then, if 
I understand right, is restate the principles 
on which we already agree. Is that really 
progress ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say restate 
them. I said examine the principles that are 
ones that we have to have in the light of 
current realities. We want to undertake an 
examination of them and, if we can, to have 
a declaration of principles which will serve 
to emphasize our common interests, the goals 
that we hold in common, and the importance 
of the relationships that exist among us and 
in the alliance itself. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivill this no7v go forward 
in the context of NATO or in a broader con- 
text involving other European countnes as 
well? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, in my statement I 
pointed out that we are not going to be hung 
up on procedures. The important thing is 
substance. Now we will go ahead with an 
examination of these matters in the alliance, 
among the permanent representatives, but 
not nece.ssarily in an exclusive manner. We'll 
have, obviously, a lot of bilateral discussions, 



and we'll have discussions in other areas. The 
important thing is not how we proceed; the 
important thing is to proceed, to continue 
the momentum that has started, and to be 
sure that when we arrive at the declaration 
of principles we will have had the opportu- 
nity to consider them fully and they will rep- 
resent our common views on the principles 
that should guide us in the years ahead. 

Q. [Inaudible] Watergate question — Wash- 
ington. Can you say anything about the 
Beirut incident, sir, when you learned about 
it and where it stands notv ? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't even get the 
question. Has it intruded in the State 
Department? 

Q. The story of the FBI representative in 
the American Embassy in Beirut exerting 
influence on Ambassador [William R] Buf- 
fum to intervene on Mr. [Robert L.] Vesco's 
behalf? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, you don't state it 
correctly. Quite the opposite. The story was 
just the opposite. The story was that there 
was no influence. The story as I read it was 
that there was a call made to the FBI rep- 
resentative and the State Department rep- 
resentative had nothing to do with it. So you 
can't say that the State Department is in- 
volved. This is a situation where the State 
Department said absolutely no. 

Q. During the meeting, did you change 
your mind about Greece? 

Secretary Rogers: No, my mind hasn't 
been changed on Greece. 

Q. One question about Iceland. You said 
on Danish Television two days ago that there 
might be a possibility to find a form for the 
Keflavik Base that woidd be more palatable 
to the Icelandic Government. What form did 
yo7i think of when you said that ? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't know. We're go- 
ing to talk to the government about it. Really 
there isn't much dissatisfaction with the base 
itself. I was there recently, but I think that, 
as you know, the present government prom- 
ised some time back — I guess in the cam- 
paign — that they would consider the base 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



question. What we are going to do is consider 
it with them. I don't believe we'll have a 
major problem with them. 

Thank you very much. I am soriy I have 
to leave. 



TEXT OF NATO COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 15 

Press release 213 dated June IS 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
session in Copenhagen on 14th and 15th June. 

2. Ministers underlined the essential contribution 
which the Alliance has rendered over the years to 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The progress being made toward better East/West 
relations and the reduction of tensions in Europe 
could not have been achieved without the unshake- 
able resolve of the West to defend itself and a sound 
military capability to do so. Ministers asserted that 
an effective defense system remained a fundamental 
prerequisite for further progress. Consequently, the 
Allies must continue to make the efforts necessary to 
ensure their defense and security. 

3. Ministers reaffirmed the principles and objec- 
tives of the Alliance established a quarter of a cen- 
tury ago. They noted, however, the profound changes 
which were taking place in every field of interna- 
tional activity. With this in mind, Ministers decided 
that the time had come, without prejudice to con- 
tinuing negotiations in other fora, for their Govern- 
ments to examine in a spirit of solidarity and by a 
common effort their relationships in the light of 
these changes. They entrusted the Council in perma- 
nent session with this task. Ministers expressed full 
confidence that the Alliance would continue to be a 
vital force for maintaining peace, improving East 
West relations, and promoting greater security and 
well-being. 

4. Ministers considered the outcome of the Multi- 
lateral Talks in Helsinki in preparation for the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
[CSCE]. Recalling the purpose of their Govern- 
ments in entering into these talks. Ministers were 

'. satisfied that it had been possible at Helsinki to 
I agree on arrangements for this Conference which 
' would ensure that their proposals were examined 
I fully and in depth. 

5. Ministers stressed the need for the Conference 
to be conducted with all due deliberation befitting 
the range, complexity and importance of the sub- 

■ jects to be discussed, including security; economic, 
I scientific, technological and environmental coopera- 
' tion; cooperation in humanitarian and other fields 
and, in particular, in the field of human contacts. 
Tliey reaffirmed that constructive and specific results 
could be achieved only through a process of detailed 
and serious negotiations without artificial time limits. 



They felt that given these circumstances there were 
reasonable hopes that the Conference could produce 
satisfactory results. Consequently, they expressed 
their willingness to begin the first phase of the Con- 
ference in Helsinki on July 3rd. They noted that a 
decision on the opening date for the second phase of 
the Conference remains to be taken and agreed to 
consult further on this matter. 

6. Ministers representing countries which partici- 
pate in NATO's integrated Defense Program noted 
with satisfaction that the initiative for mutual and 
balanced force reductions in Central Europe which 
they took at Reykjavik in 1968 has led to Multi- 
lateral Exploratory Talks in Vienna. The agreements 
reached there thus far are useful steps forward. 
These Ministers expect negotiations on specific force 
reduction and associated measures in Central Europe 
to begin in October 1973 as previously agreed. They 
reaffirmed the importance they attach to the prompt 
fulfilment of this commitment. 

7. In such negotiations, it will be the aim of the 
Allied Governments concerned, bearing in mind the 
indivisibility of the security of the Alliance, to se- 
cure step by step practical arrangements which en- 
sure undiminished security for all parties at a lower 
level of forces in Central Europe. The readiness of 
the Warsaw Pact countries to contribute to balanced 
results would, together with a successful outcome of 
the parallel negotiations in CSCE, open the way to 
a more fruitful and stable relationship in Europe. 
These Ministers reaffirmed the conviction of their 
Governments that unilateral action on the part of 
countries of the Alliance to reduce or withdraw 
forces would undermine the negotiation of satis- 
factory agreements aimed at enhancing military 
stability. 

8. These Ministers noted with approval the ex- 
tent of agreement already reached within the Alli- 
ance in preparation for negotiations on mutual and 
balanced force reductions. They requested the Coun- 
cil in permanent session to continue this work and 
to develop further an Alliance program for the 
forthcoming negotiations. 

9. Ministers expressed satisfaction that the nego- 
tiations between the United States and the USSR 
seeking permanent limitations on strategic offensive 
arms (SALT TWO) were being pursued. They rec- 
ognized the importance of this subject for the Al- 
liance and reaffirmed the continuing need for close 
Allied consultation. 

10. Ministers considered the latest developments 
in questions concerning Germany. They noted the 
conclusion of the legislative process in the Federal 
Republic of Germany approving the Treaty on the 
basis of relations between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic of 
21st December, 1972, whose signature Ministers 
welcomed at their last meeting. They also noted the 
conclusion of the legislative process to empower the 



July 16, 1973 



89 



Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
apply for entry to the United Nations. They ex- 
pressed the hope that relations between the two 
German States would develop steadily in a satisfac- 
tory manner, taking into account the special situa- 
tion in Germany. 

11. As regards Berlin, Ministers share the view 
that the strict observance and full application of the 
Quadripartite Ag-reement of 3rd September, 1971 
constitute a condition for lasting detente and stability 
in Europe. They noted the practical improvements 
in the Berlin situation which the Agreement has 
produced and were in agreement that the opportuni- 
ties which it affords for the continuing well-being 
of the city should be fully utilized. 

12. Ministers took note of the report on the situ- 
ation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instruc- 
tions by the Council in permanent session. They 
reiterated their concern at the developments in this 
area which could have dangerous consequences for 
the countries of the Alliance. They accordingly in- 
structed the Council in permanent session to con- 
tinue its consultations on this question and to 
report to them at their next meeting. 

13. Ministers received with interest a report by 
the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
on steps to improve armaments cooperation. Noting 
that the need to collaborate in the areas of stand- 
ardization, development and procurement has be- 
come more pressing, they instructed the Council in 
permanent session to take the necessary action. 

14. Ministers representing countries which partic- 
ipate in NATO's Integrated Defense Program wel- 
comed the reaffirmation by the United States that, 
given a similar approach by their Allies, they would 
maintain and improve their forces in Europe and 
not reduce them except in the context of an East/ 
West Agreement. These Ministers also recalled 
their previous Agreement that member nations were 
entitled to bring to the attention of the Alliance any 
special problems arising from balance of payment 
problems resulting from military expenditures for 
collective defense, and that Alliance solidarity can 
be strengthened by cooperation between members to 



alleviate these problems. They noted that permanent 
representatives have been directed to study these 
issues and to offer whatever recommendations seemed 
appropriate. 

15. The next Ministerial session of the North 
Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels, on 10th 
and 11th December, 1973. 



Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales 
to Five Latin American Nations 

Presidential Determination No. 73-14 ' 

Presidential Determination — Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, May 21, 1973. 

In accordance with the recommendation in your 
memorandum of April 3, 1973, I hereby determine, 
pursuant to Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales 
Act, as amended, that the extension of credit to the 
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
and Venezuela, in connection with the sale of F-5 
military aircraft, is important to the national secu- 
rity of the United States. 

You are hereby requested on my behalf to report 
this determination to the Congress as required by 
law. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 



'38 Fed Reg. 16021. 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Foreign Relations in a Period of Transition 



Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Riish ' 



I am sure that many of you will recall an 
English play some years ago, "Look Back in 
Anger." One of the many things that made 
characters in the play angry was their belief 
that the older generation of English leaders 
handed on to them an England diminished in 
its greatness, with its great tasks already be- 
hind it. I would like to talk to you today of my 
belief that the young Americans you are 
educating will inherit an undiminished 
America — an America with great tasks be- 
fore it. 

As with the postwar England in which 
"Look Back in Anger" was set, the United 
States is today in a period of transformation. 
And today America's foreign relations are 
in a period of transition. Change comes 
quickly these days. But before describing 
changes that are taking place let me pause 
a moment and look back on the period we 
are leaving behind, if only to reflect on its 
accomplishments. In an era when doubt has 
become fashionable, recent experience can be 
reassuring about the ability of our nation to 
deal effectively and realistically with both 
problems and opportunities. 

Twenty-five years ago we also lived in a 
time of doubt. The cold war was entering a 
very cold phase indeed, and there were those 
who wondered whether the world would man- 
age to avoid a nuclear war. Certainly, two 
global wars in less than 30 years were not an 
encouraging precedent. And even if war were 
averted, our closest associates in Europe 
still lay in economic ruin. There was reason 
to doubt the survival of free institutions on 



' Made before the Country Day School Head- 
masters Association at Carlisle, Pa., on .Tune 21 
(press release 221). 



the continent. Some thoughtful men pondered 
whether the United States could survive as 
an isolated democracy. 

The threats, the dangers, and the grim pos- 
sibilities were apparent. There were some 
who were ready to succumb to them. A little 
over a decade ago a President of the United 
States thought it necessary to explain that 
there were other alternatives to the equations 
"better red than dead" and "better dead than 
red." 

It has been shown that there were other 
alternatives. And the grim prospects of 25 
years ago have been avoided. Europe has re- 
gained its economic and political vitality. In 
fact, the nine members of the European Eco- 
nomic Community have set for themselves the 
goal of economic and political union by the 
end of the decade. In Asia, Japan has 
emerged from the destruction of the war 
with an economy that has impressed the 
world and with equally impressive democratic 
institutions. 

Bipartisan American foreign policy had a 
great deal to do with these accomplishments. 
It enabled us to support European recovery 
through the Marshall plan and to assist re- 
building and reform in Japan. And it made 
it possible to maintain our own strength and 
to engage in alliances which deterred and at 
times turned back aggression. 

The United States enjoyed a unique posi- 
tion for much of the past quarter century. 
We had sole possession of a credible nuclear 
deterrent. We were the world's economic ar- 
biter — you will recall the many popular 
articles about the gold reserves in Fort Knox, 
which at one time approached nearly 70 per- 
cent of the free world's monetary gold re- 



July 16, 1973 



91 



serves. Washington was clearly the center of 
decisionmaking for the Western world. And 
fear had helped weld alliances between our- 
selves and our allies in Europe and Asia. 

That world is now clearly receding. Europe 
and Japan now have a combined GNP equal 
to that of the United States and share with us 
economic leadership. Political self-confidence 
and natural assertiveness have accompanied 
that growth. With our allies, U.S. leadership 
has given way to a condition of equality. And 
U.S. nuclear dominance has been supplanted 
by approximate parity between ourselves and 
the Soviet Union. 

In the past four years President Nixon has 
brought about dramatic changes that make 
the fears of a quarter century ago appear re- 
mote. The current visit of General Secretary 
[Leonid I.] Brezhnev to the United States 
emphasizes the direction of those changes. 
The President's trips to Moscow and to 
Peking started a process in which productive 
relations are rapidly replacing confrontation 
in our relations with each of these countries. 
We are showing that adversaries need not 
be antagonists. 

Strengthening Our Relations With Allies 

Change marks our relations in both Europe 
and Asia. That said, it must be emphasized 
that defense remains the handmaiden of 
detente. As you may know, I had the priv- 
ilege of serving as President Nixon's Ambas- 
sador to Germany from 1969 to 1971. In that 
capacity I participated in the negotiations 
which produced the 1971 Berlin agreement— 
an agreement which removed that city as a 
permanent source of tension between East 
and West. It was clear that our allies in that 
negotiation gained strength from their con- 
fidence in our continuing commitment to their 
defense. And the Soviet Union's respect for 
that commitment was no less important to 
the success of that negotiation. In Asia a 
similar situation prevails. For example, both 
we and Japan believe that our continuing 
security ties have been assets rather than 
liabilities as we have gone about establishing 
more normal relations with Communist coun- 
tries. 



92 



Because we and our NATO allies enjoy 
mutual confidence, we are able to proceed to- 
gether with negotiations with the East that 
should lower tensions across Europe without 
lessening European security. Thus in early 
July Secretary Rogers will join the Foreign 
Ministers of 34 other nations in Helsinki. 
Our objective and that of our allies is to in- 
crease the movement of people, ideas, and in- 
formation across the frontiers of Europe and 
at the same time further establish the right 
of each nation to self-determination. And in 
the fall we and others will join members of 
the Warsaw Pact in Vienna, where we will 
pursue mutual and balanced reduction in the 
forces facing each other in central Europe. 
It is possible that the initial stage of these 
talks could focus on U.S. and Soviet forces 
stationed in the area. 

The meeting of the NATO Foreign Minis- 
ters attended by Secretary Rogers last week 
concluded, and I quote: - 

The progress being made toward better East/West 
relations . . . could not have been achieved without 
the unshakeable resolve of the West to defend itself 
and a sound military capability to do so. . . . an ef- 
fective defense system remained a fundamental pre- 
requisite for further progress. 

U.S. troops stationed in Europe are a vital 
part of the defense system and a tender of 
our resolve. We cannot unilaterally withdraw 
them as some in the Congress are advocating 
without weakening the chances for further 
progress — and we should not forget that we 
have them there for our own defense. At last 
week's NATO meeting our allies agreed to 
examine ways of relieving the balance of pay- 
ments burden on us of maintaining those 
stationed troops. 

In Asia a healthy relationship between our- 
selves and Japan is essential to both Asian 
stability and to our role in the area. Economic 
issues have produced some friction in these 
relations. However, both sides are aware of 
the importance of controlling these issues, 
and the Japanese have taken several steps to 
get at their cause. 

In the future we expect to see Japan's role 
in Asia continue to grow. Its economic assist- 



-'See p. 89. 



Department of State Bulletin 



ance to and its trade with other Asian nations 
have expanded greatly. Japan will be par- 
ticipating in postwar reconstruction efforts 
in Viet-Nam. Political relations with Peking 
now more truly reflect the longstanding rela- 
tions between China and Japan. And the 
Japanese are contemplating long-term in- 
vestment arrangements in Siberia. 

In Asia we are determined to resist hegem- 
ony by any one power. Japan and China are 
similarly committed. If all powers who are 
involved in the area are guided by the prin- 
ciple that we each have a legitimate role to 
play, Asia will at last enjoy the first period 
of peace it has known in 40 years. 

Advantages of an Open Trading System 

The new economic balance between our- 
selves and our partners demands attention to 
our trade and financial relations. Our mutual 
aim must be to enhance cooperation and rein- 
force a relationship which has yielded so 
much to us both. The economic strength of 
Europe and Japan has made them our best 
customers and also our most formidable com- 
petitors. We and they both believe that world 
trade is an area in which all parties gain. 
Trade has in fact expanded at 8 percent a 
year, twice as fast as the global economy. As 
President Nixon has said, there is a great ad- 
vantage to economic competition "because in 
economic competition every participant can 
win — there need be no losers." ' That is why 
we will be working with the Europeans and 
the Japanese and other nations to restructure 
the world's trade and monetary system so 
that they will support an expanding and 
more equitable global economy. That is why, 
too, it is essential that Congress approve the 
trade bill President Nixon submitted to it 
earlier this year. That trade bill will enable 
the United States to participate effectively 
in the multilateral trade negotiations that can 
bring about the more open trading system 
that we all seek. 

There has been some concern about the 
U.S. ability to compete in such an open sys- 



' For an excerpt from President Nixon's economic 
report transmitted to tlie Congress on Jan. .31, 1973, 
see BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1973, p. 225. 



tem. Those concerns are not well founded. 
Even before the exchange realignments the 
United States was well able to compete in 
such items as computer technology, aircraft, 
heavy machineiy, petroleum, exploratory 
equipment, nuclear technology, farm and 
forest products. With the new currency align- 
ments there are undoubtedly other areas in 
which we will be competitive. 

The emphasis in the United States is all 
too often on the competition from abroad. 
People seldom stop to think that we export 
14 percent of our industrial product and 31 
percent of our agricultural crop. How often 
do we reflect on the fact that Canada is our 
best single trading partner? Or as we con- 
template Japanese goods in our stores do 
we consider that: (1) Japan is our best for- 
eign market after Canada; (2) Japan is our 
fastest growing foreign market ; and (3) our 
exports to Japan of machinery and equipment 
totaled $1.2 billion, almost as much as our ex- 
ports of agricultural goods? 

As we seek to perfect our economic rela- 
tions with our friends, each nation will be 
faced with difficult decisions — decisions that 
affect income, employment, and production at 
home. But we will have to make those de- 
cisions if we are to continue to enjoy the 
benefits of an interdependent global economy. 
Otherwise we will all be the poorer. 

Changed Relationship With U.S.S.R. and China 

While strengthening our relations with 
allies, we are also seeking to elaborate and 
reinforce the trend toward productive rela- 
tions with our adversaries. The most impor- 
tant single achievement of President Nixon's 
visits to Moscow and Peking was the agree- 
ment between ourselves and each of them on 
a formal set of principles which would guide 
our relations with each. In the intervening 
period we have proceeded to elaborate that 
bare structure. 

Few would have imagined the speed with 
which this progress has taken place in our 
relations with Peking. The formal establish- 
ment of Liaison Offices in each of our capitals 
was a singular achievement for us both. And 
this year we hope to continue to build our 



July 16, 1973 



93 



developing economic relationship. Thus trade, 
which totaled $5 million in 1971 and reached 
nearly $100 million in 1972, may climb to well 
over $500 million this year. The Chinese are 
particularly interested in our farm products 
and certain high-technology items — comput- 
ers, synthetic fiber plants, and communica- 
tions systems among them. This rapid in- 
crease in our trade should not suggest the 
existence of great untapped Chinese markets, 
because the Chinese are not a major trading 
nation. Nevertheless expanding trade will 
contribute importantly to the more normal 
relationship we both seek. 

The changed relationship with the Soviet 
Union is most dramatic. Americans who have 
failed to catch this drama will have it driven 
home this weekend when they will perhaps 
view General Secretary Brezhnev addressing 
them on national television. This indeed is a 
development that would have seemed implau- 
sible even five years ago. You of course are 
daily witnessing on television and in the 
press the new dimensions that are being 
added to our relations with Moscow. 

Accelerating the Development Process 

Thus I would like to turn briefly to our 
relations with the developing world, where 
the United States must be a participant and 
not a mere bystander. 

Three-fourths of mankind lives in the de- 
veloping world. Much of the world's natural 
resources are in the developing world. The 
diversity of the developing world is difficult 
to comprehend. Levels of economic develop- 
ment range from the most primitive to nearly 
developed. Cultures, religions, economic, 
social, and political structures are incredibly 
varied. 

Yet all these nations share at least two 
common qualities — unacceptably high levels 
of poverty and very well developed deter- 
mination to be masters of their own destinies. 
I think we in this country are familiar 
enough with our own well-developed sense 
of nationalism and with the manifestation 
of that nationalism in other countries that 
this asiiect of the developing world needs no 
further elaboration from me. But consider 



for a moment some of the facts of the devel- 
oping world's poverty : 

— Half the world's population is living on 
$100 or less per year. 

— Half of all deaths in the developing 
world occur in children under six years old. 

— The gap between rich and poor is widen- 
ing. Per capita income in the developing 
world grew by less than $50 in the 10 years 
from 1960 to 1970. During the same decade 
per capita income in the United States grew 
by $1,000. 

In the past, the United States and other 
developed countries have helped several na- 
tions successfully set out toward develop- 
ment. The recent experience of nations as 
diverse as Taiwan, Israel, and Brazil show 
both that development is possible and that 
developed nations can contribute usefully to 
the process. 

But over the next few years we, our devel- 
oped partners, and the developing world are 
going to have to examine the ways and the 
means by which we all can contribute to ac- 
celerating the development process. 

Questions that are almost certain to come 
up are: 

— First, how can developed countries as- 
sure trade opportunities in their economies 
for the developing world? Expanded trade 
can make the most important single contri- 
bution to development. We need to make 
trade opportunities available to poorer na- 
tions. That is why President Nixon included 
a request for authority to grant special tariff 
preferences to goods from developing coun- 
tries in his trade bill. 

— Second, under what terms and with what 
assurance are developing countries going to 
seek foreign private investment? Foreign in- 
vestment brings badly needed capital, tech- 
nology, and managerial skills to the develop- 
ing world. But it will only move into areas 
where it does not fear confiscatory nation- 
alization. 

— Third, what should the response be of aid 
donors to countries which make no reason- 
able effort to limit the rate of expansion of 
their population? And what are developing 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



countries' responsibilities in tiiis vital mat- 
ter? 

— Fourth, what is a reasonable balance be- 
tween arms expenditures and expenditures 
on development, health, and education in each 
developing country? 

These are some of the issues that will cer- 
tainly be the subject of a dialogue between 
ourselves, our allies, and the developing 
world. Throughout this necessary exchange 
it is essential that we in this country keep one 
fact before us : that we cannot hope for the 
support of the developing world on issues of 
importance to us— from terrorism and drugs 
to energy and new global monetary and trade 
structures — if we do not convincingly demon- 
strate to developing nations that we share, 
support, and understand their desire to bring 
a better life to their citizens. 

Congress has a very important role to play 
in this effort. The House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, for example, has proposed some 
thoughtful and constructive amendments to 
the foreign aid bill. One amendment would 
focus our aid on the particularly acute human 
needs in developing countries such as food 
and nutrition, population and health, and 
education, while retaining the flexibility we 
need to keep these programs effective on a 
country-to-country basis. Another amend- 
ment — and this one is quite imaginative — 
would establish an Export Development 
Credit Fund for the relatively poorest coun- 
tries of the world. 

Gentlemen, many of us in this room have 
spent most of our adult lives in a world in 
which aggression, actual or feared, was the 
dominant quality of international life. Today 
we face the hopeful prospect that a sense of 
fear can be replaced by a sensitivity to op- 
portunity — the opportunity to build a more 
peaceful, a more cooperative, and more secure 
world. 

This is President Nixon's purpose in work- 
ing with our adversaries — a process that is 
being advanced during General Secretary 
Brezhnev's visit. As fear recedes we are seek- 



ing with our allies to continue to build a re- 
lationship that gives us all so much. And we 
must increasingly turn our attention to the 
developing world where there is so much 
potential for beneficial collaboration. 

As we seek the generation of peace Presi- 
dent Nixon has made his goal, we are search- 
ing out new and ever broader means of en- 
gagement with the world. The same broad 
support that made it possible for this nation 
to rise to the challenges of a quarter century 
ago will enable us to seize the opportunities 
before us. 

In maturity, the generation you are now 
educating will undoubtedly face new and dif- 
ferent problems and opportunities. But if we 
are equal to the tasks before us, they will do 
so from an undiminished America. 



U.S. and Ireland Reach Agreement 
on Landing Rights 

The Department of State announced on 
June 11 (press release 201) that by an ex- 
change of diplomatic notes at Dublin that 
day, the Government of Ireland granted to 
the United States landing rights at Dublin 
for an airline to be designated by the U.S. 
Government. The United States in its turn 
restored to the Government of Ireland cer- 
tain rights at New York which had been 
withdrawn on August 18, 1972. The notes 
were signed by U.S. Ambassador John D. J. 
Moore and Irish Foreign Minister Dr. Garret 
FitzGerald. (For texts of the notes, see press 
release 201.) 

This agreement marks the culmination of 
efforts extending over many years to secure 
U.S. landing rights at Dublin. U.S. airlines 
have heretofore been restricted to landing at 
Shannon, while the Irish airline had landing 
rights at New York, Boston, and Chicago. 
The addition of Dublin will improve the serv- 
ices U.S. airlines can offer to travelers be- 
tween the United States and Ireland. 



July 16, 1973 



95 



The United Nations: A Mirror of the Real World 



Address by John Scali 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 



It is a very special satisfaction for me to 
address so large an audience of distinguished 
representatives of American business and 
labor. You are men and women whose con- 
crete achievements in the real world of the 
American economy have helped make it the 
most productive economy on earth. In a real 
sense you are people whose achievements 
move America. At the same time I am aware 
that your being here tonight demonstrates 
that you are also profoundly attached to 
ideals — to those cherished fundamental 
American goals and dreams enshrined in our 
own Constitution, which in turn have helped 
inspire the Charter of the United Nations. 

It is this blend of realism and idealism that 
makes us proud of our national heritage as 
we approach our 200th birthday. President 
Nixon, in naming me U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations, has charged 
me with the responsibility of promoting con- 
crete results within the family of the United 
Nations — 132 member countries, each proud 
of its identity, its cultural background, and 
its right to share the riches, both spiritual 
and material, of our planet. 

Those of us who were young when the 
United Nations was born back in 1945 in 
the aftermath of a terrible war hoped that 
man would be wise, creative, and inspired 
enough to create a magnificent structure of 
international peace. We dreamed of one that 
would guard the safety of all nations, large 



' Made at New York, N.Y., on June 7 before the 
annual dinner of the United Nations Association of 
the United States of America, Inc., inaug^urating the 
national United Nations Day program (USUN press 
release 52). 



and small, and create a new world order. The 
lofty goal was proudly proclaimed in the 
charter in these words : "to practice tolerance 
and live together in peace with one another 
as good neighbors and to unite our strength 
to maintain international peace and secu- 
rity." This was and is a noble goal. 

But as we look back now, 28 years later, 
we recognize that perhaps our dream of uni- 
versal justice exceeded the strength of the 
structure we created to fulfill our yearnings. 
We can see now clearly that we did not create 
an instant world government. Instead what 
we put in place was an international forum 
where the separate, often conflicting foreign 
policies of member governments collided, at 
a time when the tidal wave of nationalism 
became a dominant force in relations between 
governments. And collide they did, with re- 
sulting arguments, tension, and deadlock — 
but occasional visible agreement and prog- 
ress. In other words, the United Nations has 
turned out to be a mirror of the real world. 

As a newsman back in 1945, I watched as 
the United Nations structure was put to- 
gether word by word. But perhaps I and 
others failed at that time to recognize that 
the final structui'e laboriously pieced together 
after millions of words of discussion and de- 
bate and reconciling of diverging views was 
a compromise, albeit the best a war-weary 
mankind could devise at that time. 

In those days, as a newly returned young 
war correspondent, I firmly believed in the 
need for a United Nations. Almost 28 tur- 
bulent years later, as a man who prides him- 
self in being a pragmatist, one who seeks to 
specialize in what works, I can still tell you 



96 



Department of State Bulletin 



I believe profoundly in the United Nations. 
I am honored that our President has offered 
me the opportunity to support his effort to 
make faith in the United Nations a realistic 
faith. 

I am committed, and I can assure you the 
President is committed, to bringing- this 
about. In his most recent report to the Con- 
gress, President Nixon puts it like this : " 

Unable to retreat into isolation in a world made 
small by technology and shared aspirations, man 
has no choice but to reach out to his fellowman. 
Together we must build a world order in which we 
can work together to resolve our common problems. 

I have observed before that this is what 
the United Nations is all about. It is a truism 
to say that the world community, and particu- 
larly the American people, have been disap- 
pointed in the achievements of the United 
Nations thus far. If at times we appear to be 
criticizing rather than praising the United 
Nations, it is because we need it and because 
we want to make it a more dynamic instru- 
ment for promoting a lasting peace in a 
world where nuclear weapons can incinerate 
a hemisphere. Yes, nearly 28 years have gone 
by. But 28 years, ladies and gentlemen, rep- 
resent a speck in the march of civilization. 

The Search for a Middle East Solution 

At the very moment that you have con- 
vened in New York, the Security Council of 
the United Nations is once again grappling 
with an issue that has resisted ultimate solu- 
tion for 25 years — the Middle East question. 
In the days ahead we will be solemnly review- 
ing the agonizing history of this conflict and 
searching for a solution that has defied the 
wisdom and the best efforts of many distin- 
guished statesmen. 

Critics can rightfully claim that during 
this quarter of a century the United Nations 
has achieved only limited success in moderat- 
ing the fear and suffering of the people of 
the Middle East. Yet, even as we sit around 
the United Nations conference table and ex- 



- The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on May 3 appears in 
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled 
"The United Nations" begins on p. 822. 



amine this problem anew, we do so with the 
assurance that the guns are silent while the 
statesmen talk of a new beginning. A cease- 
fire, promoted by the Government of the 
United States, has stopped most of the kill- 
ing for 33 months and eased the grave danger 
that this conflict can engulf other nations 
in a larger and bloodier war. 

The fact that eight Foreign Ministers have 
come to New York to join the members of 
the Security Council in this new search for 
peace within the Security Council Chamber 
is testimony to mankind's continuing hope 
that this great international organization can 
move toward its most important goal as the 
guarantor of peace. I cannot predict for you 
tonight that this newest review of the melan- 
choly history of this war will succeed. But I 
can assure you that I and the members of my 
delegation and, I am sure, others of good 
will will do their best to bring about the kind 
of negotiations between the parties that one 
day will bring real peace to this region which 
has known more than its share of sorrow. 

I mentioned earlier that an American ini- 
tiative in the United Nations framework, a 
cease-fire proposed and accepted by all par- 
ties, has at least provided an atmosphere 
where statesmen can seek to convert this 
fragile cease-fire into a permanent peace. 

So I reject the judgment that the Middle 
East represents a record of United Nations 
failure and futility. The present Security 
Council review is moving ahead under the 
leadership of Ambassador Yakov Malik of 
the Soviet Union, whose turn it is to preside 
as President over this 15-nation organ of the 
United Nations. 

To many of us who are only too familiar 
with the harsh, often ugly vituperation of 
the cold war, it was a source of deep satisfac- 
tion to hear Ambassador Malik open the de- 
bate yesterday morning with words which 
are new evidence of the winds of peace that 
are stirring around the world. Ambassador 
Malik said : 

The necessity for the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East without delay is 
particularly obvious to all in the conditions of the 
auspicious changes which have been achieved in the 



July 16, 1973 



97 



international situation, the perceptible improvement 
in the political climate on our planet and the con- 
tinuing further easing of international tension. The 
world is going through an important turnabout in 
international relations, a turning away from the 
dangerous tension of the cold war towards detente 
and peace. 

I welcome these words by Ambassador 
Malik. If there is to be a lasting peace in the 
Middle East, it will be partly because of co- 
operation between the United States and the 
Soviet Government in encouraging both sides 
to negotiate their differences before it be- 
comes an explosive threat to international 
peace and security. 

Cooperation Among the Major Powers 

The words of Ambassador Malik are a re- 
flection of the search for a step-by-step im- 
provement in Soviet-American cooperation 
for peace, to which President Nixon and Gen- 
eral Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev are now 
committed. 

As one who has stood at the President's 
side for the past several years as he launched 
and followed through with his historic initia- 
tives to open the door to China and to Moscow 
while he ended American involvement in an 
agonizing war in Southeast Asia, I perhaps 
can be forgiven if I give full credit to our 
President for the initiatives that have led 
to the improving international climates. 
Within a few weeks. General Secretary 
Brezhnev will be meeting face-to-face with 
the President in talks that will, I am con- 
fident, move us further on the road toward 
a better understanding with the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. This newest move, as you are 
aware, comes only a few weeks after the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China after years of isolation from one an- 
other have set in motion a series of impor- 
tant moves to normalize relations, the newest 
of which is the establishment of Liaison 
Oflices in each other's capitals. 

I mention these bilatei-al achievements be- 
cause it is inevitable that these daring, imag- 
inative initiatives by our President inevitably 
will be I'eflected some day in greater cooper- 
ation among the major powers within the 
framework of the United Nations. I am not 



naive enough to believe that some reasonable, 
encouraging words by Ambassador Malik in 
themselves guarantee a new spirit of cooper- 
ation in achieving a settlement of the Middle 
East crisis. But it at least is an augury of 
hope for those who believe that the success 
of the United Nations depends on less rivalry 
and more working together by larger nations 
to help the smaller ones whose security some- 
times depends on membership in the United 
Nations and the conscience of mankind. 

It is my belief, as a man whom it is some- 
times difficult to persuade, that we could be 
on the threshold of the generation of peace 
to which the President has dedicated most of 
his life and leadership. 

I am conscious, as you are, that I am 
speaking in the presence of the distinguished 
Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Dr. Kurt Waldheim. He knows that I hold 
him and his statesmanship in great respect. I 
hope he will forgive me if I turn for a mo- 
ment to matters that are of special concern 
to you and to me as Americans. 

At a time when everyone is preoccupied 
with the question of morality in public af- 
fairs, let us examine briefly the role of 
morality, the role of principle, in American 
foreign policy. I submit that when historians 
look back on these troubled years they will 
discover a record of which Americans can be 
proud. 

As President Nixon moves with careful 
planning from one foreign policy initiative to 
another, to the applause of Democrats and 
Republicans alike, I submit it is because this 
policy is firmly grounded in morality — in the 
search for an enduring peace. 

In the words of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the President's policy seeks "to reaf- 
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, 
and in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations, large and small, to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be 
maintained. ..." This is a search for a way 
to live with one another as good neighbors. 

I mention this before a gathering of those 



98 



Department of State Bulletin 



who believe in the United Nations because 
the waves emanating from the success of the 
President's individual initiatives will one 
day make this United Nations house a 
stronger, more enduring structure. 

Economic Sanctions Against Rhoclesic 

It is on this foundation of principle that 
I hope to shape our conduct in the United 
Nations. Our goal will not be a selfish short- 
term one which relies on superior economic- 
military might or geographic position. At the 
United Nations we will seek to build on 
principle liecause our tradition and our herit- 
age demand it and mankind expects it. 

This same concern for principle has moti- 
vated our conduct in the United Nations. We 
are prepared to forgo shortrun advantages to 
do the momentarily unpopular thing if in so 
doing we can contribute in the longer run 
to a world at peace, if we can make of the 
United Nations a more realistic and effective 
instrument of peace. 

As an example of this approach, I would 
cite my recent veto of a resolution calling for 
an extension of economic sanctions, now in 
force against trade with Rhodesia, to cover 
South Africa and Portuguese territories. I 
vetoed because we were convinced the pro- 
posed new sanctions would be ignored by 
many countries, large and small, inevitably 
weakening the credibility of the United Na- 
tions. 

There were those in the United Nations 
who disagreed with us. I am morally certain 
that time will demonstrate that our vote was 
a constructive step toward liberty and jus- 
tice in a troubled part of the world. 



In this connection, I have respectfully in- 
vited the Congress of the United States to 
reconsider the amendment to the Defense 
Appropriation Act which two years ago 
placed the United States in open violation of 
international law. At that time the Congress 
voted legislation making it impossible for 
the executive branch to prevent imports of 
chrome and other strategic commodities from 
Rhodesia as required by the Security Council, 
a decision for which the United Statas voted 
and which is legally binding on the United 
States. 

The evidence is mounting that this amend- 
ment not only damages America's image and 
reputation as a law-abiding nation but that 
it has net economic disadvantages as well. 
The United Nations Association has itself 
made public studies suggesting that the 
amendment's repeal would be advantageous 
from the point of view of our economic 
health, of increasing employment, and of the 
national security. I would urge you, leaders 
in American business and labor, to acquaint 
yourselves with this issue and to address it. 

This is only one modest issue. It is only one 
example of the kind of concern for our posi- 
tion in the international community to which 
I would bespeak your attention. It is the na- 
ture of the American political system that the 
effectiveness of your representatives depends 
ultimately on the wisdom and energy of the 
public and its leaders. I urge you most ear- 
nestly to bring that wisdom and energy to 
bear on the issues before us. There is no 
magic in the United Nations, but working 
together we can make it increasingly effec- 
tive as an instrument of peace and well-being 
and, pray God, worthy of our noblest dreams. 



July 16, 1973 



99 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Gives Views on Bill Proposing Establishment 
of International Commerce Service in Commerce Department 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush ' 



I appreciate the opportunity to appear be- 
fore you today to present the further views 
of the Department of State on the proposed 
bill to establish an International Commerce 
Service within the Department of Commerce. 
We are also prepared to answer questions on 
the other bills you are considering. This is 
my first appeai-ance before your committee. I 
look forward to working: with you toward the 
common goal of improvement in U.S. foreign 
trade. 

The Department of State fully agrees with 
the underlying objective of S. 1485 — export 
expansion. The expansion of exports and 
improvement of our balance of payments 
position is a fundamental objective of U.S. 
foreign policy. The administration, however, 
does not agree that these ends would be bet- 
ter served by the establishment of a separate 
International Commerce Service. 

In January of last year, Nathaniel Sam- 
uels, then Deputy Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs, testified before your com- 
mittee on the proposed Export Expansion 
Act of 1971. This act included as title I a 
provision to create an International Com- 
merce Service along the lines of the Foreign 
Service and to operate commercial and eco- 
nomic offices abroad and in the United States. 
Subsequent to the testimony of Mr. Samuels, 



' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Com- 
merce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Com- 
merce on June 7. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. 



Secretary Rogers, in a letter to Senator 
Inouye dated March 6, 1972, explicitly op- 
posed the adoption of title I. He also sug- 
gested that the committee defer consideration 
of the bill pending completion of a study of 
the subject by the Office of Management and 
Budget (0MB). 

The 0MB repoil entitled "Commercial 
and Economic Representation Abroad" was 
released this spring. In our view, it is a 
thorough, deliberate, and impartial study. In 
addition to the sound recommendations it 
makes, many of which we have already begun 
to implement, the re])ort presents various 
organizational options. Based on this study, 
the President has determined that the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign Service 
should retain their present responsibilities 
for commercial and economic rejiresentation 
abroad. 

We strongly support the President's deter- 
mination, for the reasons cited in the 0MB 
report, which I would like to summarize: 

1. A change in organization is not needed 
to effect improvement in trade promotion and 
business assistance activities. A major reor- 
ganization would delay these improvements 
and disrupt current reform effoits. 

2. Present organizational arrangements 
best permit the flexible application of our 
overseas economic-commercial personnel to 
accomplish high-priority tasks. 

3. The Department of State and the For- 
eign Service of the United States would re- 
main fully involved in the whole range of 
international economic and commercial af- 



100 



Department of State Bulletin 



fairs and better understand them as a vital 
element in our foreign relations and domestic 
policy. 

4. The addition of a large staff of another 
agency would make the Ambassador's man- 
agement and diplomatic responsibilities more 
difficult. Although all aspects of the U.S. mis- 
sion are under the Ambassador's formal au- 
thority, in practice this authority has been 
more easily and directly exercised over For- 
eign Service personnel than over the over- 
seas representatives of domestic departments 
and agencies. 

Overseas export promotion and business 
assistance abroad relates directly to U.S. 
foreign policy, especially as we face the 
task of restructuring the international 
economic and monetary system. For ex- 
ample, trade with eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union depends on our government's 
negotiating outstanding political as well as 
economic issues with those countries. Addi- 
tionally, our Foreign Service officers have 
on many occasions stepped in and quietly 
but effectively persuaded other governments 
to take actions beneficial to U.S. business 
interests or not to adopt policies harmful 
to such interests. 

The 0MB cited two disadvantages of re- 
taining overseas commercial and economic 
activities in State: 

1. The feeling that Foreign Service atti- 
tudes toward the importance of trade pro- 
motion and business assistance programs are 
firmly established, making improvement 
without organizational change more difficult. 

2. The fact that the many overseas respon- 
sibilities and duties of the Foreign Service 
may prevent appropriate priority and em- 
phasis being given to business assistance and 
trade promotion. 

Both State and Commerce have taken steps 
to improve the services to American business 
overseas, taking into account many of the 
points noted in the 0MB .study, in GAO | Gen- 
eral Accounting Office] comment, and in our 
own evaluation of current needs. Your com- 
mittee has played a constructive role in this 



regard, stressing the importance of the com- 
mercial function and stimulating both agen- 
cies to improve their performance. 

Improving Economic-Commercial Activities 

I would like to report to you the improve- 
ments that have been and are being made in 
economic and commercial activities. All 
areas, including organization, personnel man- 
agement, programing, and analysis have been 
aflfected. 

We have filled top management positions 
in State with individuals who have strong 
economic and commercial backgrounds: 

— Our highest ranking economic position 
was upgraded from Deputy Under Secretary 
to Under Secretary. William Casey was se- 
lected for the position. Mr. Casey has exten- 
sive experience in financial and business 
matters, making him particularly suited to 
lead our efforts to promote trade and to ne- 
gotiate a more balanced relationslii]) with our 
principal trading partners. 

— In February 1972, the Assistant Secre- 
tary for Economic and Business Affairs posi- 
tion was filled by Willis Armstrong, who 
combines a very strong background in both 
business and the Foreign Service. 

— The Director General of the Foreign 
Service, William Hall, who is responsible 
for administering the Foreign Service per- 
sonnel system, has economic-commercial cre- 
dentials from both academic training and his 
experience as Ambassador and as a senior 
officer in our foreign assistance programs. 

— Two Deputy Directors of Personnel, 
with responsibilities for personnel policy 
and recruitment, and the Chief of the Per- 
sonnel Evaluation Staff, are themselves ex- 
l)erienced senior economic-commercial of- 
ficers. 

— The Director General has also estab- 
lished a special group in his office to develop 
and monitoi- imj^rovements in the economic- 
commercial function as these affect per- 
sonnel. 

— Our new Dejuity Assistant Secretary for 
Commercial and Business Activities, Daniel 



July 16, 1973 



101 



Searby, has extensive international business 
experience. 

We have taken actions to strengthen and 
enhance the organization of commercial ac- 
tivities and business assistance: 

— Secretary Rogers has urged each mis- 
sion to study carefully the possibility of re- 
organizing its economic and commercial 
work into a more fully integrated function, 
as recommended in the 0MB study. Some 
posts already manage themselves in this 
manner. We believe the payoff is more effec- 
tive implementation of trade and commercial 
policies and export promotion activities. 

— During meetings with our Ambassadors, 
the Secretary and I, and other senior officers 
of the Department, have stressed the im- 
portance we attach to our economic-commer- 
cial activity overseas. We have urged each of 
our Ambassadors actively to participate in 
trade promotion work. I believe this message 
is getting through. 

— Commercial coordinators have been des- 
ignated in the five regional bureaus in the 
Department of State. These senior Foreign 
Service officers are responsible for commer- 
cial programs and policies in their bureaus. 
They also serve as liaison between their 
bureaus and the Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs. 

— The Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Commercial and Business Activities has been 
designated the senioi- officer responsible in 
the Department of State for developing com- 
mercial programs, managing commercial ac- 
tivities, and coordinating our commercial de- 
velopment efforts with other agencies, par- 
ticularly the Department of Commerce. His 
office serves as a home base for commercial 
officers serving abroad. Mr. Searby's staff 
regularly briefs and debriefs commercial of- 
ficers between assignments. 

— Last year, in consultation with Com- 
merce, we in'epared a functional commercial 
budget for presentation to the 0MB. This 
budget reviewed and justified commercial re- 
sources on a global rather than on a regional 
basis. We plan to present a similar budget 
for fiscal year 1975. 



Personnel Programs 

We have enhanced the attractiveness 
of the economic-commercial career path 
through a number of actions designed to at- 
tract and hold the best talent available for 
this function: 

— Twenty-eight overseas posts have been 
designated "commercial interest posts" and 
will normally be headed by officers with an 
economic-commercial specialization or by 
others having significant economic-commer- 
cial experience. 

— It is our objective to have one-fourth of 
the Deputy Chief of Mission positions filled 
by oflncers with such backgrounds. Since this 
objective was announced, 27 Deputy Chief of 
Mission assignments have been made. Five 
were economic-commercial officers, and nine 
were officers from another function but with 
significant economic-commercial experience. 

— Assignment officers have been instructed 
to assure that economic-commercial oflncers 
receive full consideration for executive and 
program direction positions in geographic 
bureaus. These positions were formerly 
reserved almost exclusively for political 
oflncers. 

— Overseas positions are being repro- 
gramed. By June 30, 1973, we will have re- 
programed 20 American positions and 16 
local employee positions from other areas to 
commercial activities. For example, five com- 
mercial oflicer positions were recently repro- 
gramed to the high-priority areas of the 
U.S.S.R. and eastern Europe, which as of last 
September did not have a single full-time 
commercial officer. 

— Senior officers posted to economic- 
commercial minister positions in London, 
Paris, Bonn, Rome, Saigon, and Tokyo are 
now eligible to qualify for the rank of Career 
Minister by virtue of this assignment. 

— Recruitment efl'orts aimed at attracting 
the best candidates with economic-commer- 
cial credentials have been strengthened. Pub- 
licity has been specially targeted at people 
with business backgrounds. The written ex- 
amination is being i-evised to reveal eco- 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



nomic-commercial expertise and potential 
more fully. 

We believe that State has further demon- 
strated its increased emjihasis on trade pro- 
motion and business assistance in personnel 
evaluation: 

— One of the factors now in the promotion 
rating of all Foreign Service officers, what- 
ever their specialty, is the demonstrated con- 
cern for American business interests. Thus, 
the careers of our officers are linked to their 
performance in assisting U.S. business. This 
is in addition to the "end-user reports" pre- 
pared by the Dejiartment of Commerce on 
economic-commercial officers which become 
part of the officer's performance file. 

— Senior officials from the Department of 
Commerce serve as full members of Foreign 
Service promotion panels. 

— Commerce officials also participate on in- 
spection teams that evaluate our overseas 
missions. Our Foreign Service inspectors 
have been instructed to pay i:;articular atten- 
tion to the commercial performance of over- 
seas missions. 

Commerce Department officials continue to 
participate actively in various other essential 
Foreign Service personnel operations. They 
work with our recruiters and examiners. One 
Commerce official is physically located in 
the State Department and works on a full- 
time basis with our career counseling and 
assignments officers. The Department of 
Commerce also has a jiermanent representa- 
tive on the Board of the Foreign Service, 
which establishes personnel policies. We wel- 
come the contributions that Commei'ce makes 
through this day-to-day involvement in our 
personnel system. 

We recognize training as vital to the effec- 
tive performance of our economic-commer- 
cial officers and as a valuable rung on their 
career ladders: 

— A 26-week course in economics and com- 
mercial affairs is offered at the Foreign Serv- 
ice Institute twice each year. The course 
includes major treatment of corjiorate fi- 
nance, multinational operations, and the tax 



framework which affects exporting and over- 
seas investment. Classes average 25 officers. 

— A new series of one-week seminars has 
been instituted to provide senior political and 
other officers with a better understanding of 
economic-commercial considerations in U.S. 
policy formulation. 

— The senior training programs of both 
the Foreign Service Institute and the Na- 
tional War College are now devoting in- 
creased time to the study of economic and 
energy matters. 

— A new six-week workshop on interna- 
tional business is being developed, in consul- 
tation with Commerce, for officers assigned 
to commei'cial jobs. The workshop will in- 
clude discussions led by businessmen, presen- 
tations by qualified academics, and visits to 
manufacturing plants and Commerce field 
offices. 

— Commerce and State now jointly plan 
and fund economic-commercial conferences. 
The most recent conferences were held in 
Singapore and Tokyo, with an upcoming 
conference in Vienna next week. We are 
planning three to four regional conferences 
in fiscal year 1974. We attach great im- 
portance to these conferences as an effective 
means of training and advising our officers 
on matters being considered in Washing- 
ton and oijenly hearing their views and 
suggestions. 

— There are plans to send 10 officers to 
universities in fiscal year 1974 to study eco- 
nomics and business subjects at the graduate 
level. This 25 percent increase over the pres- 
ent fiscal year was achieved by transferring 
resources from other training functions. 

— The Director General's office is actively 
reviewing the State-Commerce personnel 
exchange program to determine possibilities 
for improving administration and for in- 
creasing the number of officers exchanged 
between the two agencies. The current pro- 
gram, in effect since 1956, provides for an 
exchange of 20 officers from each agency. 

Progress in Increasing Services 

For the past year we have been working 



July 16, 1973 



103 



closely with the Department of Commerce to 
improve the mechanics of commercial pro- 
grams and trade promotion. In May 1972, 
State and Commerce established 11 working 
groups: personnel; World Traders Data Re- 
port; Agent Distributor Service; trade op- 
portunities program; major projects; country 
commercial programs; communications; com- 
puters; publications; commercial libraries; 
trade inquiries. 

The following are some of the specific ac- 
complishments to date: 

— "Early Warning" reporting by overseas 
posts on prospective large foreign projects 
has increased substantially. 

— Trade opportunities are now in the 
hands of U.S. businessmen in seven days, 
compared to the previous time of 26 days. In 
April 1973 an automated system of distribu- 
tion by Commerce for six high-potential tar- 
get industries went into operation. This 
automated system will serve as a pilot model 
for a fully automated subscription system for 
all trade opportunities to be introduced by 
Commerce in September 1973. 

— The World Traders Data Report, pro- 
viding U.S. businesses with credit and other 
commercial information on foreign firms, has 
been streamlined and made more timely by 
two-way telegraphic transmission. 

— The Agent Distributor Service, designed 
to assist American manufacturers and ex- 
porters in locating agents and distributors 
in foreign markets, has been expanded world- 
wide from the 35 countries available pre- 
viously. 

— Equipment and technical guidance has 
been provided to establish a new secure com- 
munications facility for direct electrical com- 
munications between Commerce and State. 
For several years Commerce has had direct 
electrical communications with our posts 
abroad for unclassified operational traffic. 

— The delivery of nontelegraphic commer- 
cial materials, both incoming and outgoing, 
between Commerce and overseas posts has 
been expedited. 

Another important aspect of our commer- 



cial program is to inform U.S. business of 
foreign relations developments which bear on 
their commercial activities abroad. 

— As an example, on April 19 we hosted a 
conference for 365 key business executives. 
Secretary Rogers, Under Secretaries Casey 
and Porter, Assistant Secretary Armstrong, 
and other senior officials of the Department 
participated in panel presentations which 
focused on trade, investment, monetary poli- 
cies, and export promotion. 

— We are working with numerous other 
business groups including the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Secre- 
tary's Business Advisory Committee, the 
United States Council of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council, the Business Council for 
International Understanding, and others, as 
well as the trade promotion offices of indi- 
vidual states and cities. 

— Officers of all levels, when in the United 
States, participate in business consultations 
arranged cooperatively by State and Com- 
merce. These bring the officers into direct 
contact with senior businessmen and bankers 
all over the country as well as with Depart- 
ment of Commerce field offices. 

This is a sketch of a large number of spe- 
cific actions that have been initiated or given 
new impetus largely since our January 1972 
meeting with this committee. We are con- 
fident that we have made real progress and 
that economic-commercial activities have a 
very high priority in the Department as well 
as overseas. We have been told by many 
members of the business community and by 
other U.S. Government organizations that 
the improvements are substantial. 

New Management Tools and Programs 

The immediate question is: Where do we 
go from here ? Each country is a separate and 
identifiable market. Specific programs must 
be tailored to these markets. We believe that 
each of our overseas missions should have 
major responsibility for the allocation of its 



104 



Department of State Bulletin 



resources to achieve commercial objectives in 
a given country. Our officers abroad are in 
daily contact and are familiar with the pe- 
culiarities and commercial operations of local 
markets. We intend to pay close attention to 
the commercial policies and practices of for- 
eign governments so that we may continue 
to expand opportunities for American firms 
to export and to bid successfully on overseas 
projects. We are surveying the total range of 
commercial resources available to the govern- 
ment so as to maximize their effective use. 

State and Commerce are developing jointly 
a new management tool, the country com- 
mercial program (CCP) . The CCP will estab- 
lish commercial objectives in a given country, 
set priorities and quantifiable goals, and 
jirovide the framework to enable the post to 
program its commercial resources accord- 
ingly. The CCP will also measure the post's 
commercial effectiveness. The two agencies 
are well along in the development of five 
pilot country commercial programs, for 
Zaire, Colombia, Netherlands, Australia, and 
Iran. These programs will identify key com- 
mercial objectives for each country so that 
all U.S. Government efforts can be coordi- 
nated to meet these objectives. We expect 
other agencies to become involved in this 
process so that the final programs will permit 
all elements of the U.S. Government overseas 
to work together toward agreed goals. What 
we learn by this experience will be quickly 
expanded to other countries where there is a 
significant U.S. commercial interest. 

Simultaneously, State and Com.merce will 
be concentrating on a few key commercial 
countries, such as Japan, Germany, and 
Brazil, to develop targeted export programs 
for these major markets. These programs 
will proceed in concert with basic U.S. eco- 
nomic policies toward these important 
trading partners. 

Much of what I have said thus far con- 
cerns what we and the Department of Com- 
merce have done since January 1972. Dur- 
ing this period our Embassies and consulates 
around the world have been working for 
economic policies that are fair to American 



business. They have been searching out and 
reporting on export and investment oppor- 
tunities. They have provided prompt and 
effective assistance to American firms seek- 
ing major export contracts. They have been 
sending back trade leads, company reports, 
and assessments of agents and distributors. 
They have been encouraging foreign firms to 
make capital investments in the United 
States which can simultaneously reduce im- 
ports and provide jobs here. Our Embassies 
and consulates also prepare reports on busi- 
ness conditions that are often the major 
source for publications distributed to the 
business community by the Commerce De- 
partment. 

As you can see, our joint efforts with the 
Department of Commerce cover an excep- 
tionally wide range of services to the Ameri- 
can business community. It is in the interest 
of our government to insure that knowledge 
of these services is as extensive as possible 
so that their utility may be maximized. 

A few weeks ago, several members of this 
committee saw firsthand the comprehensive 
balance of payments program implemented 
by our Embassy in the Netherlands. It is a 
fully integrated program that capitalizes on 
the expertise of all mission members. It rec- 
ognizes that assessing economic policy, 
spotting commercial opportunities, and re- 
porting on political developments are fre- 
quently different aspects of the same thing. 
Under the Ambassador's active leadership, 
all elements of the mission are engaged in 
promoting industrial exports, agricultural 
exports, contract and other service income, 
tourism to America, and portfolio invest- 
ment. 

We are pleased that committee members 
were able to see our activities not only in 
the Netherlands but in other countries as 
well. You were able to talk with the officers 
who develop information for the Export- 
Import Bank and other government agencies, 
who line up appropriate contacts for trade 
exhibits and trade missions, and who per- 
form a myriad of services for businessmen, 
frequently on very short notice. We believe 



July 16, 1973 



105 



you will agree that these officers are compe- 
tent, capable, and professional and that they 
view commercial objectives as a priority 
task. 

Obviously, however, the Foreign Service 
must be backed by effective Washington 
support from the Departments of State and 
Commerce and other agencies. Most im- 
portant of all, government efforts are with- 
out avail if American business does not rise 
to the challenge and vigorously engage in 
export trade. The role of government in our 
international economic affairs is an im- 
portant one. We are determined to make it 
effective. Government can set a congenial 
framework for economic activity by a well- 
functioning international monetary system, 
export access to foreign markets, reduction 
of trade barriers, and export promotion ef- 
forts. But it is not the government that in- 
creases exports; the primary impetus must 
come from the business community. 

We now have a particularly favorable 
policy framework. Our government has been 
pressing the governments of other countries 
to open their doors more widely to U.S. ex- 
ports. The trade bill now before Congress 
constitutes a major initiative to expand trade 
generally on a most-favored-nation multi- 
lateral basis. The realignment of the value 
of the dollar in relation to other major cur- 
rencies means our exports are more com- 
Iietitive. We have opened new markets for 
our exporters in the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China. Other countries 
have rising incomes and a high level of busi- 
ness activity which should increase their ca- 
pacity to absorb even larger quantities of 
American products and services. It is en- 
couraging to note that in April, for the first 
time in 18 months, the United States enjoyed 
a balance of trade surplus. 

Over the longer term, the improvement of 
the U.S. foreign trade ])osition will require 
that we continually reassess our economy and 
those of our trading partners to take advan- 
tage of changing comparative advantage. Be- 
cause of the changes in our economy, which 
has become more service-oriented and short 
on energy and raw materials, we will have 



to redirect somewhat our economic and com- 
mercial efforts. To encourage new investment 
and capitalize on the sale of services and 
high-technology exports, we must be open to 
new ways of doing business, more imagina- 
tive in reformulating our policies, and more 
vigorous in implementing them. 

We believe that the fonnulation of trade 
policies, trade negotiations, monetary re- 
alignments, and trade promotion should be 
harnessed in tandem to provide an effective 
government response to the trade imbalance 
and to create a healthy international econ- 
omy. Segregation of these related functions 
could result in the isolation of the individual 
components. Those engaged in the commer- 
cial function might neglect policies and eco- 
nomic analysis which have a critical bearing 
on trade promotion efforts. Likewise, those 
engaged in economic analysis could lose sight 
of trade expansion. Our object is the inte- 
gration of overseas activity to improve polit- 
ical as well as economic officers in behalf 
of American business. By making all the 
officers in an Embassy commercially sensi- 
tive, we can make them more effective in 
influencing, assessing, and reporting on 
economic policy. 

Each aspect of foreign economic relations 
is important, and each can make its maxi- 
mum contribution when the whole is coor- 
dinated effectively. The administration be- 
lieves that the interests of the United States 
are better served when our economic policies 
and trade programs ai-e coordinated and 
directed overseas by the Foreign Service and 
the Department of State. 

In conclusion, let me say that we in State 
believe that we have benefited from the in- 
terest that your committee has taken in our 
work and that we have gained added under- 
.standing of your concerns as a result. 
Frankly, we have not thought, nor do we now 
think, that the fragmentation of responsibil- 
ity in foreign affairs that the bill would cre- 
ate is wise or likely to improve the export 
performance of the United States. But we 
are convinced that your criticism and your 
wisdom have been good for us and have con- 
tributed to our doing the job that we all want 
done. 



106 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Outlines Views on Future Inter-American System 



Statement by Jack B. Kubisch 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs^ 



I very much appreciate this opportunity to 
make a general statement to this Special 
Committee prior to my departure tomorrow. 
If you will permit me a personal word, this 
past week in Lima has been extraordinarily 
interesting to me. Although I have been as- 
sociated with Latin American affairs for 
more than 2.5 years, I have been absent from 
the hemisphere for the past two years; and 
these meetings have given me a rapid rein- 
troduction to the hemisphere and the state 
of the inter- American system. 

I do not want to make a long speech, and 
in line with the consensus reached at our 
first day's meeting last Wednesday, I will 
not attempt to restate well-known positions 
of my government on a wide range of 
matters. 

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, my government 
wants this committee's work to be construc- 
tive and fruitful. We intend to participate 
actively in the proceeding. We are prepared 
to consider any proposal and examine any 
issue. 

We firmly believe in the need for a living 
and relevant inter-American system which 
is solidly based on today's realiti&s and fully 
responsive to the needs and aspirations of 
all the people of the Americas. We do not 
believe, however, that the system should be 
merely a forum for debate — although even 
that has substantial merit in international 



' Made at Lima on June 25 before the OAS Special 
Committee To Study the Inter-American System and 
To Propose Measures for Restructuring It (press re- 
lease 225). 



affairs. Even less do we think our meetings 
should be exijloited for narrow political 
purpose. 

During these past few days I have been 
surprised at times to observe how certain 
views or policies are incorrectly attributed 
to the U.S. Government. I hope I may be 
allowed a brief comment on several of these. 

One is that the U.S. Government desires 
hegemony in this hemisphere. Gentlemen, 
nothing could be farther from the truth. 
Time and time again the President of the 
United States, the Secretary of State, and 
many other high U.S. officials have made this 
quite clear. From the standpoint of the 
United States it is neither practical, neces- 
sary, attainable, nor in our interest to have 
or to seek hegemony in this hemisphere, and 
we are not seeking it. Nor do we seek depend- 
ency from anyone. 

I have also heard criticized our concept of 
mature partnership. Let me be quite clear on 
this aLso : I do not think we have successfully 
arrived at such a partnership in our inter- 
American relations. 

But such is the goal of overall U.S. policy 
in this hemisphere. We earnestly seek a con- 
structive, close, rational, and cooperative re- 
lationship with the other countries of the 
Americas. This goal is the absolute opposite 
of a policy of hegemony that has incorrectly 
been attributed to us. 

If we do not have such a relationship with 
ail the countries of this hemisphere — al- 
though I believe we do have with most of 
them — nor within the inter-American system 



July 16, 1973 



107 



as a whole, it is precisely this committee's 
work and proposals that can help to i-emedy 
the situation, to bring about a greater ma- 
turity and reasonableness on all sides. That 
is one of the challenges and one of the op- 
portunities we have. 

A surprising — to me, at least — amount of 
misunderstanding has also arisen concerning 
U.S. views of bilateralism versus multilater- 
alism. Mr. Chairman, delegates, let me try to 
clarify our position on this point. 

My government sees both necessity and 
value in interacting with other nations in a 
variety of ways, depending on the nature of 
the matter to be considered. Some matters 
concern only two countries and are therefore 
bilateral ; others concern many countries and 
are multilateral in scope. 

It is not at all a question of which is better, 
but rather which level of relationship and 
which forum is best suited to consideration 
of the matter at hand. One of the principal 
reasons for several recent U.S. references to 
the importance of bilateral relations was to 
take account of a charge often made against 
the United States; namely, that we tend to 
lump all the Latin American countries to- 
gether in our policy formulations and do not 
distinguish sufficiently among them. 

Nevertheless, the broad nature of some of 
our most urgent pi'oblems and objectives 
clearly requires that they be addressed by 
multilateral communities as a whole. Our 
presence and active participation in various 
bodies of the inter-American system, as in a 
variety of multilateral forums all over the 
world, is a reflection of the high importance 
we attach to multilateralism. 

The Hemispheric Community 

Let me turn now to express some views as 
to how my delegation envisages the inter- 
American system of the future. These are 
preliminary thoughts of ours and are offered 
for consideration now as a contribution to 
this first phase of the committee's work. 

We believe that historical, geographical, 
and sociopolitical forces have combined over 
several centuries to shape a community of 
nations in this hemisphere, one with unique 



108 



characteristics which distinguish it clearly 
from other groupings of nations. Like a com- 
munity of neighbors in a city or town, our 
hemispheric community consists of individ- 
uals with distinct personalities, widely vary- 
ing tastes and interests, different standards 
of living, diverse occupations, and different 
philosophies of life. Yet there is a permanent 
bond which requires that we live and work 
together as a community, as well as individ- 
ually, in order to advance our general well- 
being. 

The inter-American system, in our view, 
represents the overall pattern of our relations 
as a community of nations. Just as any 
neighborhood must organize itself to define 
certain elemental standards of behavior, to 
provide community services, and to foster 
harmonious relations among its members, so 
too our hemispheric community has adopted 
a pattern of activities which define our inter- 
dependent relationship : 

Its charters and treaties codify commonly 
accepted standards of behavior governing our 
intercourse with each other. 

Its forums afford us the means of exchang- 
ing ideas and viewpoints on matters of 
common concern and for improving our un- 
derstanding of each other. 

Its organs and agencies provide us with 
instruments for joining forces to deal with 
specific problems or to achieve specific goals 
of common interest to members of the 
community. 

And, ideally at least, its dispute-settlement 
mechanisms should enable us to resolve the 
differences and conflicts which inevitably 
arise in a community of sovereign individuals 
in a peaceful manner which preserves the 
dignity of each individual member. 

The U.S. Role Within the System 

The United States considers itself to be a 
member of this hemispheric community and 
a participant in the pattern of relationships 
which we know as the inter-American system. 

Because it wishes to take part in the ac- 
tivities of the community, it values the order 
and definition which the instruments of the 
system give to our relationship. Indeed, it 



Department of State Bulletin 



accords these particular value because of its 
distinctive character and individuality, as an 
essential means of accommodating the great 
disparities in size, levels of economic devel- 
opment, and interests between itself and 
other members of the community. 

It subscribes to the standards of behavior 
embodied in the charter, including particu- 
larly the principles of nonintervention and 
self-determination of peoples. 

It values the forums and agencies of the 
system as a means whereby it can join mul- 
tilaterally in the activities of the community 
and thereby enhance both its own interests 
and those of other members. 

It takes great satisfaction from the 
uniquely peaceful character which our system 
of mutual security, embodied in the Rio 
Treaty, has given our hemispheric commu- 
nity for over a generation. 

It aspires to see the community's system 
of relations further refined and improved, 
particularly those mechanisms aimed at re- 
solving disputes and differences among indi- 
vidual members, at improving coordination 
and understanding through the consultative 
process, and at implementing the develop- 
mental efforts we have agreed to undertake 
together. 

We believe that the system and its various 
instruments have been and continue to be of 
great value to the community as a whole as 
well. We strongly reject the view that the 
system itself has somehow been rigged to in- 
sure the predominance of the United States 
and to im]5ose conditions of inferiority upon 
other members of the community. To the 
contrary, we believe that the system has 
generally served to guard against excesses on 
the part of any individual member and has 
helped to keep our disparities and differing 
interests within a manageable framework. 

Strengthening the System 

No system of relations among men or 
among nations is perfect and immutable. As 
circumstances change and the interests of 
individual members evolve, the system itself 
must adapt — and adapt promptly. We share 
the desire of the members that the system 



which structures our relationship reflect the 
needs and realities of our association. 

We would like to see the purposes and func- 
tions of the various instruments of the sys- 
tem more clearly defined in present-day 
terms, taking into account the vast changes 
in the world at large, the global character 
of many of our problems, and the realistic 
limits upon our ability to solve those prob- 
lems by ourselves. 

We would like to see new imagination and 
creativity applied to the problem of resolving 
disputes among members of our community, 
including those involving private foreign 
investment, so that these will not impinge 
upon other aspects of our cooperation. 

We would like to see the outward reach 
of our community extended so as to encour- 
age greater interchange and cooperation 
with other friendly nations, taking into ac- 
count the increasingly active role now being 
played in the world by other members of the 
community. 

We would like to see a reexamination of 
our basic premises regarding the system's 
role and function in developmental cooper- 
ation and a search for new ways of insuring 
that our cooperative programs accord with 
each nation's needs and priorities. 

And we would like to see the management 
and operations of the various organs of the 
system modernized so as to prevent waste 
of our limited resources, improve internal co- 
ordination, increase eflnciency, guard against 
duplication of effort, and enhance their 
image and stature in the eyes of the peoples 
of the Americas. 

In our coming weeks of work, we expect 
to refer more specifically to each of these 
areas, and we look forward to hearing spe- 
cific proposals which other delegations will 
no doubt wish to advance along similar lines. 

Mr. Chaii-man, delegates, we have great 
faith in the future of this hemisphere and 
in our joint abilities to devise a means of 
living together peacefully and with mutual 
benefit. 

The U.S. delegation to this Special Com- 
mittee has come to Lima with the intention 
of giving the most serious consideration to 



July 16, 1973 



109 



the views and proposals of every other dele- 
gation, and we trust that our own views and 
proposals will be received in a similar spirit. 

We agree that mistakes have been made 
in the past — who among us has not made 
them? — and we believe the task ahead is to 
learn from those mistakes and to correct 
them. We are prepared to play an active part 
not only in this committee's work but, con- 
sistent with the desires of other member na- 
tions, in the new inter-American system 
that we are trying to create. 

It is our firm intention that our point of 
view throughout these meetings be positive, 
constructive, and openminded. 



U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR 
Supported by United States 

FoUov'ing is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council on June 22 by William E. 
Schaufele, Jr., Senior Adviser to the U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, to- 
gether with the text of an announcement 
issued by the U.S. Mission to the United Na- 
tions on June 18. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCHAUFELE 

USUN press release 61 dated June 22 

My delegation wishes to associate itself 
with the statements made this morning by 
the Permanent Representatives of France 
and the United Kingdom. We, too, are 
pleased that the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many and the German Democratic Republic 
have submitted applications for membership 
in the United Nations. My government will 
continue to support those applications. 

The United States views the spirit of co- 
operation displayed by the consensus in the 
Security Council today as a further indica- 
tion that patience and good will can help 
develop new relationships in areas long char- 
acterized by frictions. These new relation- 



ships can serve not only the cause of peace 
but also the day-to-day well-being of millions 
of people. This has a positive impact on the 
United Nations, the two German states, and 
the cause of international peace. 

The United States has sought to bring 
about improvements in international rela- 
tions through careful negotiations, to replace 
hostility with mutual understanding. Today's 
action by the Security Council is evidence 
that we are making significant progress to- 
ward accomplishing these goals. ^ Obviously 
this is not and cannot be the work of one 
country or one group of countries. In the 
present case we have sought to cooperate 
with the Soviet Union as well as with the 
Federal Republic of Germany and our other 
Western allies who share with us, and with 
the international community in general, a 
common interest in eliminating the causes 
of tension in central Europe. 

The Federal Republic of Germany has 
earned in this process our particular admi- 
ration. Its leadership has sought — we believe 
successfully — to deal constructively with na- 
tional problems while taking into account the 
responsibilities which it and others bear for 
the maintenance of peace, stability, and 
security in Europe. We can, I believe, count 
on this same constructive attitude on the 
part of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
the work of the United Nations. 

We also welcome the declared intention of 
the German Democratic Republic to work un- 
reservedly in fulfilling the United Nations 
mission of peace and in promoting the eco- 
nomic and social advancement of all peoples. 
Each German state has great resources in 
scientific capacity, a skilled population, and a 
strong economy. Both states have indicated 
a desire to be of assistance in bringing about 
economic and social progress around the 



' The Security Council on June 22 adopted with- 
out objection a resolution (S/RES/335 (1973)) rec- 
ommending to the General Assembly that the German 
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of 
Germany be admitted to membership in the United 
Nations. 



110 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



world. We are convinced that they will be 
able to do so. We are particularly gratified 
that as members of the United Nations they 
will be able to work with each other in con- 
tributing to the successful achievement of 
United Nations programs and objectives. 
The admission of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Re- 
public to full United Nations membership 
this fall, when they will receive the approval 
of the 28th General Assembly, will add im- 
portant new strength to the United Na- 
tions — a development of historic importance 
to this world body and to the goals it pursues 
in the interests of us all. 



U.S. MISSION ANNOUNCEMENT 

USUN press release 60 dated June 18 

The Permanent Representatives of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet 
Union sent to the United Nations Secretary General 
on June 16 the text of a quadripartite declaration 
on Germany negotiated by Ambassadors of the four 
governments last fall in Berlin and issued as an 
agreed text on November 9 in the respective capitals." 
The four governments agreed at that time to request 
that this declaration be circulated as an official doc- 
ument to the members of the United Nations in con- 
nection with the submission of applications for 
United Nations membership by the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 

The quadripartite declaration records the agree- 
ment of the four governments to support simulta- 
neous admission to the United Nations of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic and affirms that their membership shall 
not affect the rights and responsibilities and related 
quadripartite agreements, decisions, and practices of 
the Four Powers regarding Berlin and Germany as 
a whole. The declaration is an important element in 
the recent series of events in Germany and has 
helped open the way for the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic to 
apply for membership in the United Nations. The 
declaration will be of immediate relevance as the 
members of the United Nations consider the two 
German applications. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



' For text of the declaration, see Bulletin of Nov. 
27, 1972, p. 623; the four Representatives' letters 
transmitting the declaration to the Secretary General 
were circulated as U.N. docs. S/10952-5 dated June 
18. 



United States and El Salvador 
Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
May 30 (press release 184) that notes had 
been exchanged at Washington to amend and 
extend the U.S.-El Salvador bilateral cotton 
textile agreement. As a result of this ex- 
change of notes, up to 6.2 million square 
yards equivalent of cotton textile imports 
from El Salvador will be permitted entry for 
the 12-month period beginning April 1, 1973. 
This is a 1.1-million-square-yard increase 
over the preceding year's level. The term of 
the agreement is extended by two years 
through March 31, 1979. (For texts of the 
U.S. note dated April 10 and the El Salvador 
note dated May 16, see press release 184.) 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. 
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 27, 1973. 

Aviation 

Convention on the international recognition of rights 
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered 
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847. 
Accession deposited: Libya, March 5, 1973. 

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the con- 
vention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered 
into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756. 
Ratifications deposited: Fiji, April 4, 1973; Iran. 
February 19, 1973. 

Protocol relating to amendment of the convention on 
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at 



July 16, 1973 



in 



Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 

17, 1962. TIAS 5170. 

Ratification deposited: Fiji, April 4, 1973. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 
1591, 3756, 5170). Done at New York March 12, 
1971. Entered into force January 16, 1973. TIAS 
7616. 
Ratification deposited: Syria, March 26, 1973. 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 
Accession deposited: Jordan, May 3, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hajrue December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Iceland, June 29, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unla\vful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Iceland, June 29, 1973. 

Economic Cooperation 

Convention on the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development and supplementary 
protocols Nos. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December 
14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961. 
TIAS 4891. 
Accession deposited: New Zealand, May 29, 1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva March 
25, 1972.^ 

Ratification deposited: Brazil, May 16, 1973 (with 
declaration and reservation). 

Wheat 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with 
respect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 

Accessio7is to the Food Aid Convention deposited: 
Denmark, June 28, 1973; Ireland, June 29, 1973. 
Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Federal Republic of Germany, June 27, 
1973.-" 
Ratification of the Food Aid Convention deposited: 
Federal Republic of Germany, June 27, 1973.= 



' Not in force. 

"Applicable to Berlin (West). 



BILATERAL 

Belgium 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of 
airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Brussels February 12 and May 14, 
1973. Entered into force May 14, 1973. 

Arrangement for the acceptance of certificates of 
airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Brussels July 19 and Decem- 
ber 3, 1957. Entered into force December 3, 1957. 
TIAS 3954. 
Terminated: May 14, 1973. 

Iran 

Agreement relating to the privileges and immunities 
granted American military and non-military tech- 
nicians assisting in the modernization program of 
the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Tehran May 24 and 30, 1973. 
Entered into force May 30, 1973. 

Japan 

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial con- 
tribution for United States administrative and 
related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1973 
pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agree- 
ment of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). EflFected by 
exchange of notes at Tokyo June 19, 1973. Entered 
into force June 19, 1973. 

Malta 

Supporting assistance loan agreement, with annex. 
Signed at Valletta June 15, 1973. Entered into 
force June 15, 1973. 

Tunisia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of March 17, 1967 (TIAS 
6323). Signed at Tunis June 13, 1973. Entered into 
force June 13, 1973. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Protocol relating to the possibility of establishing a 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce. Signed at 
Washington June 22, 1973. Entered into force 
June 22, 1973. 

Protocol relating to expansion and improvement of 
commercial facilities in Washington and Moscow. 
Signed at Washington June 22, 1973. Entered into 
force June 22, 1973. 

Protocol on questions relating to the expansion of air 
services under the civil air transport agreement of 
November 4, 1966, as amended and extended (TIAS 
6135, 6489, 6560, 7287, 7609), with annex and 
agreed services. Signed at Washington June 23, 
1973. Entered into force June 23, 1973. 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX ./"/)/ Id, 197J Vol. LXIX. A'o. 1777 



Argentina. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to 
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential 
determination) 90 

Asia. U.S. Foreign Relations in a Period of 
Transition (Rush) 91 

Aviation. U.S. and Ireland Reach Agreement 
on Landing Rights 95 

Brazil. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to Five 
Latin American Nations (Presidential de- 
termination) 90 

Chile. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to Five 
Latin American Nations (Presidential de- 
termination) 90 

(Dlombia. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to 
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential 
determination) 90 

( ongress. Department Gives Views on Bill Pro- 
posing Establishment of International Com- 
merce Service in Commerce Department 
(Rush) 100 

Department and Foreign Service. Department 
Gives Views on Bill Proposing Establishment 
of International Commerce Service in Com- 
merce Department (Rush) 100 

Developing Countries. U.S. Foreign Relations 
in a Period of Transition (Rush) .... 91 

Fconomic Affairs 

partment Gives Views on Bill Proposing 
[establishment of International Commerce 
Service in Commerce Department (Rush) . . 100 
•lited States and El Salvador Sign Cotton 
Textile Agreement Ill 

^l Salvador. United States and El Salvador 
Sign Cotton Textile Agrreement Ill 

hurope. U.S. Foreign Relations in a Period 
of Transition (Rush) 91 

I'oreign Aid. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to 
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential 
determination) 90 

Cermany. U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR 
Supported by United States (Schaufele, U.S. 
.Mission announcement) 110 

I ri'land. U.S. and Ireland Reach Agfreement on 
Landing Rights 95 

Latin .\merica. U.S. Outlines Views on Future 
Inter-.A.merican System (Kubisch) .... 107 

Middle East 

Secretary Rogers Attends CENTO and NATO 

Meetings (Rogers, texts of communiques) . 81 
The United Nations: A Mirror of the Real 

World (Scali) 96 

Military Affairs. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales 
to Five Latin American Nations (Presiden- 
tial determination) 90 

North .Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary 
Rogers Attends CENTO and NATO Meetings 
(Rogers, texts of communiques) 81 

Organization of American States. U.S. Outlines 
Views on Future Inter-.\merican System 
(Kubisch) 107 

Presidential Documents. Credit for F-5 Air- 
craft Sales to Five Latin American Nations 
(Presidential determination) 90 



Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations: A 
Mirror of the Real World (Scali) .... 96 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions Ill 

United States and El Salvador Sign Cotton 

Textile Agreement Ill 

U.S. and Ireland Reach Agreement on Landing 

Rights 95 

United Nations 

The United Nations: A Mirror of the Real 
World (Scali) 96 

U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR Supported 
by United States (Schaufele, U.S. Mission 
announcement) 110 

Venezuela. Credit for F-5 Aircraft Sales to 
Five Latin American Nations (Presidential 
determination) 90 



Name Index 

Kubisch, Jack B 107 

Nixon, President 90 

Rogers, Secretary 81 

Rush, Kenneth 91, 100 

Scali, John 96 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 110 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 25— July 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to June 25 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 184 
of May 30, 201, 202, and 203 of June 11, 205 
of June 12, 208 of June 14, 213 of June 18, 214 
of June 19, and 221 of June 21. 

No. Date Subject 

t224 6/25 U.S.-Soviet fisheries agreement 
signed at Copenhagen June 21. 
225 6/25 Kubisch: OAS Special Committee, 
Lima. 

t226 6/27 $50 million to assist Soviet mi- 
grants to Israel. 

*227 6/27 Ghana selects chancery site in 
International Center. 

*228 6/29 Department of State Advisory 
Committee on Science and For- 
eign Affairs, July 13-14. 

*229 6/29 Study group 4 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for CCIR, 
July 18. 

*230 6/29 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural AiTairs, July 20. 

*231 6/29 Assistant Secretary Newsoni to 
visit Africa. 

t232 7/1 Rogers: news confej-ence on de- 
parture for CSCE. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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\ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1778 



July 23, 1973 



GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES 

Renmrks by President Nixon and Genetxil Secretary Brezhnev 113 

Text of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqxie 130 

Neivs Conferences of Presidential Assist""* Kissinger 134 

Texts of Agreements Signed During the Visit 158 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside hack cover 






i^/^i 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLET! 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1778 
July 23, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
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Single copy 65 cents 
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note: Contents of this publication arc not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication isatied by th 
OtHee of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public and 
interested agencies of tfie government 
uitfi information on developments i/i£ 
tfie field of UJS. foreign relations ant^ 
on tfie work of tfie Department ani^ 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selectei 
press releases on foreign policy, issuea 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of tfie President 
and tfie Secretary of State and otfier 
officers of tfie Department, as well as 
special articles on various ptiases of 
international affairs and tfie functions 
of tfie Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and intet'^ i 
national agreements to wfiicli tfijf\ 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter-^ 
national interest. 

Publications of tfie Department of| 
State. United Nations documents, ani 
legislative material in tfie field of 
international relations are also listed. 



I 



General Secretary Brezhnev Visits the United States 



Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arrived in 
the United States on June 16 for an official visit June 18-25. 
Folloiving are remarks by President Nixon and General Secre- 
tary Brezhnev at a welcoyning ceremony on the South Lawn of 
the White House on June 18; their exchanges of toasts at a din- 
ner at the White House on June 18 and at a dinner at the Soviet 
Embassy on June 21: their remarks at a poolside reception at 
the Western White House at San Clemente, Calif., on June 23 and 
at a departure ceremony there on June 2h; an address by General 
Secretary Brezhnev broadcast on television and radio on June 
2i; and the text of a joint communique released on June 25 upon 
General Secretary Brezhnev's departure from the United States. 



REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY 
AT THE WHITE HOUSE, JUNE 18 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25 

President Nixon 

Mr. General Secretary and all of our dis- 
tinguished guests : Mr. Brezhnev, it is a very 
great honor for me to welcome you on your 
first visit to the United States. It was just a 
year ago that we met in Moscow, and on that 
occasion we entered into a number of agree- 
ments that changed the relationship between 
our two great countries in a very profound 
way. 

What has happened since those agreements 
have been entered into, and the preparations 
that have been made over many, many 
months, the correspondence that we have 
had, and other meetings, lead me to conclude 
that this year at the summit in Washington 
we will not only build on the foundation that 
we laid last year but that we have the op- 
portunity to make even greater progress than 
we made last year toward the goals that we 
share in common — the goals of better rela- 



tions between our two governments, a better 
life for our people, the Russian people, the 
American people, and above all, the goal that 
goes beyond our two countries, but to the 
whole world— the goal of lifting the burden 
of armaments from the world and building 
a structure of peace. 

As you know, Mr. General Secretary, these 
television cameras mean that right now mil- 
lions in America and millions in the Soviet 
Union are seeing us as we appear together 
and as we speak. 

I could also add that not only are the Rus- 
sian people, the Soviet people, and the Amer- 
ican people watching, but all the world is 
watching as we meet on this occasion, be- 
cause the people of the world know that if 
the leaders of the two most powerful nations 
of the world can work together and their 
governments can work together, the chance 
for a world of peace is infinitely increased. 

The hopes of the world rest with us at this 
time in the meetings that we will have. I am 
confident, Mr. General Secretary, that in our 
meetings this week we shall not disappoint 
those hopes. 



July 23, 1973 



113 



We wish you a good stay in our country, 
but above all, on this, which is a trip of such 
great significance to our two peoples and to 
the world, we trust that at the end not only 
the Soviet people and the American people 
but the people of the world will look on this 
event as a great step forward in the goal we 
all want — not only peace between our two 
countries but peace and progress for all the 
people of the world. 

General Secretary Brezhnev' 

Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. 
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen : I am happy to 
have a new meeting with you, Mr. President, 
and I thank you for the warm words ad- 
dressed to us, representatives of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

This is my first visit to your country, my 
first direct acquaintance with America and 
the American people. We have made a long 
journey from Moscow to Washington. Our 
two capitals are separated by over 6,000 
miles. 

But international politics has its own con- 
cepts of relativity, not covered by Einstein's 
theory. The distances between our countries 
are shrinking, not only because we travel 
aboard modern aircraft following a well- 
charted route but also because we share one 
great goal, which is to insure a lasting peace 
for the peoples of our countries and to 
strengthen security on our planet. 

One year ago in Moscow we jointly took a 
major step in that direction. The results of 
our first meeting laid a good and reliable 
foundation for peaceful relations between 
our two countries. 

But even then we both took the view that, 
building on that foundation, we should move 
further ahead. During the past year a good 
beginning has been made in that sense. And 
now we regard our visit to the United States 
and the forthcoming meetings with you as an 
expression of our common determination to 
make a new contribution to what was jointly 
initiated. 

I and my comrades who have come with me 



' General Secretary Brezhnev spoke in Russian 
on all occasions. 



are prepared to work hard to insure that the 
talks we will have with you, Mr. President, 
and with other American statesmen justify 
the hopes of our peoples and serve the inter- 
ests of a peaceful future for all mankind. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER 
AT THE WHITE HOUSE, JUNE 18 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25 

President Nixon 

Mr. General Secretary, members of the 
Soviet delegation, and all of our distinguished 
guests and friends : As all of these lights 
were turned on, the General Secretary, with 
his delightful sense of humor, said, "At the 
end of the dinner, Mr. President, you de- 
cided to fry our guests." 

As all of you came through the receiving 
line tonight, the General Secretary noted that 
you came from all parts of the country, from 
both political parties, from business, from 
labor, from all segments of our society. And 
the question that he asked on several occa- 
sions was whether the individuals concerned 
supported the new initiatives with regard to 
Soviet-American friendship and cooperation 
which we have undertaken. And I would like 
to say to our very distinguished guest tonight 
that not only in this room but across this 
country, regardless of political party, regard- 
less of whatever the organization may be, the 
overwhelming number of Americans support 
the objective of Soviet-American friendship. 

Now, I am told that in the Ukraine, where 
we were so very well received on our visit to 
Kiev last year and where our guest of honor 
this evening lived as a young man, there is 
a proverb which says, "Praise the day in the 
evening." 

I take this bit of advice as my text this 
evening for a few reflections on the first day 
of the very important week of meetings and 
also on the first year of an historic new de- 
parture in the relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

The results of our discussions today allow 
us to praise, indeed, our day today. We have 
resumed the talks that ended just over a year 
ago. We have resumed those talks on a new 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



foundation of significant accomplishments in 
reshaping relations between our two peoples 
and between our two countries. Our common 
starting point was the document that you, 
Mr. Brezhnev, and I signed on May 29, 1972, 
in which we agreed on basic principles of our 
relations and the agreements to limit strate- 
gic weapons.- On this basis, a year ago we 
set a course toward a move constructive and 
mutually beneficial relationship. 

We have been able to embark on this course 
because we have recognized certain funda- 
mental factors. We have recognized that 
despite the differences in our ideology and 
our social systems, we can develop normal 
relations. We have agreed that in the nuclear 
age there is no alternative to a policy of peace 
for any nation. We have recognized that we 
have special responsibilities to work for the 
removal of the danger of war, and of nuclear 
war in particular. We have accepted the 
great task of limiting strategic arms. We 
have recognized that our responsibilities in- 
clude the scrupulous respect for the rights 
of all countries, large or small. 

Today, in the discussions we have had, we 
have reconfirmed these principles. We have 
laid the groundwork for a significant im- 
provement in our relations that will result 
from the discussions and agreements under- 
taken this week. 

We receive you and your colleagues to- 
night, and for this week, with the firm inten- 
tion of building on our past successes. A 
year ago, when I reported to the Congress 
upon my return from the Soviet Union, I 
described the principles we had agreed to as 
a roadmap — a map which would be useful 
only if both our two countries followed it 
faithfully. Tonight, looking back over the 
first 12 months of our journey along the 
route which that map marks out, I believe 
there is good reason to be encouraged. Now 
we have another profound opportunity to 
advance along this course that we set for 
ourselves in Moscow a year ago. 

It is America's hope that the coming days 
of our meetings will carry forward the prom- 



- For text of the basic principles, see Bulletin 
of June 26, 1972, p. 898. 



ising start that we have made on this first 

day. 

Our two peoples want peace. We have a 
special responsibility to insure that our re- 
lations—relations between the two strongest 
countries in the world— are directed firmly 
toward world peace. 

Our success will come to be measured not 
only in years but in decades and in genera- 
tions and probably centuries. 

Mr. General Secretary, many American 
Presidents and many very distinguished for- 
eign leaders over a period of 180 years have 
dined together in this room, and they have 
worked together for peace within these walls. 
But none of them, 1 believe, have borne a 
heavier responsibility or faced a more mag- 
nificent opportunity than we do today and 
this week. 

The question is: Shall the world's two 
strongest nations constantly confront one 
another in areas which might lead to war, 
or shall we work together for peace? The 
world watches and listens this week to see 
what our answer is to that question. Mr. 
General Secretary, I know that your answer, 
based on our acquaintanceship and our dis- 
cussions today and a year ago, is the same as 
mine to that question. We shall be worthy of 
the hopes of people everywhere that the 
world's two strongest nations will work to- 
gether for the cause of peace and friendship 
among all peoples regardless of differences 
in political philosophy. 

So to all of our distinguished guests, will 
you join me in a toast to the General Secre- 
tary, his colleagues, to the friendship of the 
Soviet and American peoples, and peace be- 
tween our countries and among all nations. 

General Secretary Brezhnev 

Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. 
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen : Permit me first 
of all to thank you, Mr. President, for the in- 
vitation to visit your country, for the kind 
words you have just said here, and for the 
hospitality you are according us on the soil 
of the United States. 

Taking this opportunity, I should like to 
say that it gives me great satisfaction to be 
able to continue my talks with you aimed at 



July 23, 1973 



115 



the further improvement of Soviet- American 
relations initiated in Moscow in May of last 
year. 

The time that has elapsed since our Mos- 
cow meeting has, I feel, convincingly con- 
firmed the correctness of the jointly taken 
line of invigorating the relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and of reshaping 
them in accordance with the principles of 
peaceful coexistence which were set out in 
the document you and I signed a year ago. I 
trust you will agree, Mr. President, that we 
are on the right track, as it is one that meets 
the fundamental interests of the peoples of 
our countries and of all mankind. 

And what has already been done and is 
being done to give effect to the basic prin- 
ciples of mutual relations between our coun- 
tries laid down in Moscow is of no small 
significance. Life is the best counselor. The 
results of the past year suggest the direction 
for further advance. They inspire us to take, 
in the course of this meeting, new major 
steps and give Soviet-American relations 
greater stability and thereby increase the 
contribution of our countries to the cause 
of peace and international detente. 

Of course, the reshaping of Soviet-Amer- 
ican relations is not an easy task. And the 
crux of the matter lies not only in the fact 
that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. have differ- 
ent social systems. What is also required is 
to overcome the inertia of the cold war and 
its aftereffects in international affairs and 
in the minds of men. 

However, mankind's development requires 
positive and constructive ideas. I am con- 
vinced, therefore, that the more persistently 
and speedily we move toward the mutually 
advantageous development of Soviet-Amer- 
ican relations, the more tangible will be the 
great benefits of this for the peoples of our 
countries and the greater will be the number 
of those in favor of such a development, and 
they are known to be in the majority even 
today. That is why we are in favor of build- 
ing relations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States on a properly large scale 
and a long-term basis. 

We have come here to Washington with a 
firm desire to give, together with the leaders 



of the United States, a new and powerful 
impetus to the development of Soviet- 
American relations along precisely those 
lines, and this fully accords with the peace 
program adopted by the 24th congress of 
our party. In its resolution, the congress 
stressed in the most definite terms the Soviet 
Union's readiness to develop relations with 
the United States of America proceeding 
from the assumption that this meets both 
the interests of the Soviet and American 
peoples and the interests of universal peace. 

I would like our American partners and all . 
Americans to be fully aware that this de- I 
cision by the supreme forum of our party, the 
ruling i)arty of the Soviet Union, reflects the 
fundamental position of principle of the So- 
viet Government and of our entire people 
in matters bearing on relations with the 
United States of America. And that deter- 
mines the policy we are pursuing. 

In today's discussion with the President, 
I spoke of the favorable feelings of our 
people in all parts of the country as regards 
the decisions taken last year during our sum- 
mit meeting in Moscow, and I spoke of the 
friendly feelings, the desire of the Soviet 
people for friendship with the United States. 

Now, Mr. President, the peoples are indeed 
expecting a great deal from our new meet- 
ing. And I believe it is our duty to live up to 
these expectations. The first discussions we 
have had with you here at the White House 
do, I feel, confirm that this is the mutual de- 
sire of both sides. 

And I would venture in this connection to 
express the hope, and even the confidence, 
that our present meeting will play an impoi'- 
tant role in further strengthening mutually 
advantageous cooperation between our coun- 
tries and in improving the international cli- 
mate as a whole. 

And let me make one more point. It is well 
known that the initiated process of bettering 
Soviet-American relations is evoking a broad 
response throughout the world. Most com- 
ments indicate that the peoples and the 
governments of other countries are welcom- 
ing this improvement. And this is quite 
natural. They see in it an encouraging factor 
for the invigoration of the international sit- 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



uation as a whole and a major contribution 
by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to a stronger 
universal peace. 

It is absolutely clear to anyone who is at 
least slightly familiar with the real course 
of events and with the real nature of the 
development of Soviet-American relations 
that their improvement in no way prejudices 
the interests of any third country. 

Naturally, the development of good rela- 
tions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States will have, and already has, no 
small a bearing on world affairs. But this in- 
fluence is one that promotes the strengthen- 
ing of peace, security, and international co- 
operation. In building through joint effort a 
new structure of peaceful relations, we have 
no intention of turning it into a secluded 
mansion completely fenced off from the out- 
side world. We want to keep this spacious 
edifice open to all those who cherish the peace 
and well-being of mankind. 

Mr. President, present-day political reali- 
ties show in practice how arduous and toilful 
can at times be the tasks involved in carry- 
ing out the foreign policy of nations. But 
when our thoughts and practical deeds are 
directed toward achieving the noble goals of 
peace, the burden is not oppressive, but 
rather gives strength and confidence. 

The start of our negotiations — and I have 
in mind both their content and the atmos- 
phere in which they are proceeding — gives 
reason to hope that their results will be fruit- 
ful and will become a new landmark in 
Soviet-American relations. 

Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to offer 
a toast to the health of the President of the 
United States of America and Mrs. Nixon, 
to the health of all the members of the Amer- 
ican Government present here, to all Ameri- 
cans who support the great and noble cause 
of peace among nations. 

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER 
AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY, JUNE 21 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25 

General Secretary Brezhnev 

Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. 
Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades : To- 



night it is my very pleasant duty to welcome 
you, Mr. President, and your wife and mem- 
bers of the U.S. Government and other dis- 
tinguished American guests here at the So- 
viet Embassy in Washington. 

On behalf of my comrades and myself, I 
would like first of all to cordially thank you 
personally, Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon, 
and other members of your family, for the 
warmth and consideration with which you 
have been surrounding us from the very start 
of our visit to your country. 

At the same time I would like to say that 
we are grateful to all Americans who have 
shown their friendly feelings toward us and 
taken a lively interest in our visit and our 
negotiations. In all this we see a confirmation 
of the respect harbored by the people of the 
United States toward Soviet people and evi- 
dence of the mutual desire of our two peoples 
to live together in peace and friendship. 

An awareness of our high duty and respon- 
sibility is permeating the entire course of our 
meetings. Our talks bear the hallmark of a 
vigorous pace, a broad scope, and a business- 
like and constructive spirit. Each day, all 
this is yielding tangible results, bringing us 
closer to the jointly set objectives of securing 
a further major advance in the development 
of Soviet-American relations, of lessening 
the threat of war, and of strengthening peace 
and security on our planet. 

The contribution made by our two nations 
to the attainment of this paramount goal 
will undoubtedly raise Soviet-American re- 
lations to a new level. In May of last year 
we agreed that in the nuclear age there is 
no alternative to conducting relations be- 
tween our countries on the basis of peaceful 
coexistence. We can now confidently say that 
this fundamental principle is being increas- 
ingly imbued with concrete substance. 

We are convinced that the results of our 
talks will strengthen still more the relations 
of peace and mutual trust between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. At the same 
time, new vistas will be opened for the con- 
structive development of those relations. 

The new step forward which it has proved 
possible to take through joint efforts in so 
vitally important and at once so complex a 



July 23, 1973 



117 



problem as the limitation of Soviet and 
American strategic arms is also something 
that cannot fail to cause satisfaction. 

The agreement achieved on the basic prin- 
ciples for further negotiations on this prob- 
lem contains everything to give a new 
impetus and a clear direction to joint work 
on important agreements designed not only 
to curb but also to reverse the race of the 
most formidable and costly types of rocket 
nuclear arms and thus to permit our coun- 
tries to switch more resources to constructive 
purposes and use them to better man's life. 

Atomic energy, too, must ever increasingly 
serve the aims of peace. The readiness of our 
two nations to promote that objective through 
joint efforts has been reflected in the agree- 
ment on cooperation in the field of the peace- 
ful uses of atomic energy which President 
Nixon and I also signed today. 

In pursuance of the line jointly initiated 
during last year's meeting in Moscow, a new 
series of agreements on cooperation between 
the U.S.S.R. and the United States in several 
other fields of science, technology, and cul- 
ture was signed in the course of this visit. 
This we also value highly. It will give Soviet- 
American relations still greater diversity and 
stability. At the same time, we are sure the 
development of such cooperation will benefit 
other peoples, too, since it is aimed at solving 
problems that are important for all mankind. 

Of course, in the relations between our two 
countries there are still quite a few out- 
standing problems and, I would say, some 
unfinished business. In particular this relates 
to the sphere of strategic arms limitation 
and also to commercial and economic matters. 

We are optimists, and we believe that the 
very course of events and an awareness of 
concrete interests will prompt the conclusion 
that the future of our relations rests on their 
comprehensive and mutually advantageous 
development for the benefit of the present 
and coming generations. 

But I wish especially to emphasize that we 
are convinced that on the basis of growing 
mutual confidence we can steadily move 
ahead. We want the further development of 
our relations to become a maximally stable 



process, and what is more, an irreversible 
one. 

Mr. President, in our discussions — and we 
value their businesslike and constructive 
character — I have already had an opportunity 
to tell you, and I want to repeat this for the 
benefit of all the American guests present 
here tonight, that the Soviet Union's line at 
improving relations with the United States 
is not some temporary phenomenon. It is a 
firm and consistent line reflecting the per- 
manent principles of Soviet foreign policy 
formulated by the great founder of the So- 
viet state, V. I. Lenin. It is a line that rasts 
on the full support of our people. I 

Soviet people believe that most Americans, • 
too, approve of the jointly initiated line 
aimed at strengthening peace and coopera- 
tion between the peoples of the Soviet Union . 
and of the United States. | 

Unfortunately the tight schedule of our 
talks has not left me much of a chance to 
learn more about your great country and to 
get a closer look at the life of Americans. But 
the little I have managed to see seemed to 
me to be very interesting indeed. To some ex- 
tent I hope to be able to fill in that gap when, 
at your invitation, Mr. President, we go to 
the west coast of the United States, to Cali- 
fornia, long famous for the beauty of its na- 
ture and more recently for its surging 
indu.strial development. 

I would like to use this very pleasant op- 
portunity when we are all together here at 
the Soviet Embassy to confirm the invitation 
conveyed to you, Mr. President, on behalf of 
the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme 
Soviet and the Soviet Government to make an 
ofl^cial visit to the Soviet Union in 1974. I 
am confident that your new trip to the Soviet 
Union will also mark another important stage 
in the successful development of relations 
between our two countries. We will be happy 
to repay the hospitality shown to us by the 
President, the government, and the people of 
the United States. 

And permit me to express the hope that 
this time, Mr. President, you will familiarize 
yourself moi-e closely with our country and 
with its nature and with the life of Soviet 
people. 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



The cause of developing Soviet-American 
relations is indeed moving forward. In two 
years Soviet and American astronauts will 
fly into outer space to carry out the first 
major joint experiment in man's history. 
Now they know that from up there in space 
our planet looks even more beautiful, though 
small. It is big enough for us to live in peace, 
but too small to be subjected to the threat of 
nuclear war. 

I shall be making no mistake if I say that 
the spirit of our talks and the main direction 
of our joint efforts were determined by an 
awareness of one major factor: Everything 
must be done for the peoples of the world to 
live free from war, to live in security, co- 
operation, and communication with one an- 
other. That is the imperative command of 
the times, and to that aim we must dedicate 
our joint efforts. 

Allow me to propose this toast to the health 
of the President of the United States of 
America and Mrs. Nixon, to the further suc- 
cess of the great cause which we have suc- 
ceeded in advancing during our present 
meeting, to the docking on earth as well as in 
outer space of man's efforts and talents for 
the good of the peoples, to peace, friendship, 
and cooperation between the Soviet and 
American peoples, to peace throughout the 
world. 

President Nixon 

Mr. General Secretary, our hosts from the 
Soviet Union, and all of our friends from the 
United States : We want to express our ap- 
preciation to you, Mr. General Secretary, and 
to our hosts for this splendid dinner. There 
is a saying in our country on occasion when 
one is a guest, "Make yourself at home." To- 
night we had that somewhat reversed, be- 
cause Mrs. Dobrynin told me that all the 
things that were served tonight, including 
the wines in this magnificent banquet, were 
brought from the Soviet Union. So we had a 
chance this evening to be, in a sense, in the 
Soviet Union, and we thank her for her 
thoughtfulness in giving us that opportunity. 

On this occasion I am reminded of the fact 
that it marks several events. This is the last 
day that Secretary Rogers will be 59 years 



of age. He will be 60 tomorrow ; so we wish 
him a happy birthday in advance. Also, Mr. 
General Secretary, this happens to be the 
33d wedding anniversary for Mrs. Nixon 
and me, and we appreciate your arranging 
this dinner on this occasion. 

And of course, as you know, all over the 
world June 21 is the longest day in the year. 
I remember just a little over a year ago a 
very long day, almost as long as the longest 
day in the year. Just before midnight, Mr. 
General Secretaiy, you and I signed the first 
agreement on limiting nuclear arms in the 
Kremlin. To show how our relations have 
moved forward since that time, we signed 
the second agreement with regard to limiting 
nuclear arms at 12 :30, in the middle of the 
day, today. 

And in addition to that, as you pointed out 
in your remarks, we signed a parallel agree- 
ment with regard to cooperation in the field 
of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 

You have spoken eloquently about these 
two agreements. There is little I can add ex- 
cept to say that all of us know that this 
enormous source of nuclear power can either 
destroy the world or it can build a new world 
with the peaceful energy which can be un- 
leashed for the benefit of all mankind. 

Today we have taken a very important step 
in limiting the power of destruction and in 
unleashing the power of creation. 

As idealistic men — and I know, Mr. Gen- 
eral Secretary, from our long talks in Mos- 
cow and the talks we have had at Camp 
David and here in Washington, we both share 
the ideal of building a world of peace — we are 
pleased with the progress we have made so 
far in the agreements that we have signed in 
limitation of nuclear arms. But as practical 
men, as we are both practical men, we realize 
that we have taken two steps but there is 
still a long way to go. We recognize that we 
must dedicate ourselves toward going further 
in not only limiting this great power of de- 
struction but also of eventually, we trust, 
reducing the burden of arms which bears 
down so heavily on the world and on our two 
peoples. 

This will not come easily. It will come 
only after extensive negotiation. But with 



July 23, 1973 



119 



continued contact, with continued discussion 
such as the kind of discussions that we have 
had on this occasion and in Moscow a year 
ago, we can move forward in that direction 
between our two countries and thereby set 
an example for other countries in the world. 
And for that reason, it is with a great deal 
of pleasure that I accept the very generous 
invitation you have extended for me to re- 
turn to Moscow next year for a third meeting. 

In that third meeting I will of course look 
forward to what will be my fifth visit to the 
Soviet Union, to see more of your country 
and to meet more of your people, but also I 
shall look forward again to the kind of dis- 
cussions we have had on this occasion and 
concrete results toward the goal that we have 
dedicated ourselves to jointly on this occa- 
sion — the goal of not only better relations 
behveen our two countries, not only peace be- 
tween our two countries, but recognizing the 
rights of all countries, large and small, to 
live in a world of peace without threat from 
any of their neighbors. 

It is this goal to which we are dedicated. 
And if our two great countries can set an 
example in this direction and have concrete 
results following it in the various meetings 
that we will have, perhaps annually, it means 
that a great step will be taken toward the 
objective that we all share. 

I would not for one moment suggest to 
this audience, or to those who may be listen- 
ing on television or radio, that one meeting 
or two meetings at the summit brings instant 
peace, instant relaxation of tensions, and 
instant reduction or limitation of arms. 

But I do know this : that these two summit 
meetings have brought us closer together, 
have brought greater understanding of our 
differences and greater determination to re- 
duce those differences, and certainly, at the 
very least, to solve those differences without 
confrontation. And this indeed is an historic 
change in the relations between our two 
countries which the General Secretary and I 
are dedicated to continue. 

And now, ladies and gentlemen, here in the 
Soviet Embassy, it is my privilege to return 
the toast that the General Secretary has 
given. 



On this occasion, I, in addition to asking 
you to drink to his health — he obviously be- 
ing our host, being the ranking guest — I 
think it is appropriate also to drink to the 
health of those who have been in this city 
so many years as the Ambassador, Ambassa- 
dor Dobrynin and Mrs. Dobrynin, to Foreign 
Minister Gromyko, who has also been in our 
city and knows our country so well, and so 
many others of our Soviet guests. You have 
made us feel, tonight, most welcome. And we 
can only say that, as we drink to your health, 
we drink to it not simply in the casual way 
that one raises a glass of champagne, be it 
California or New York or French or, in this 
case, Russian champagne, but we drink to 
your health, having in mind what you have 
said and what I have tried to reaffirm: the 
desire of the two strongest nations in the 
world, through their top leaders, to work 
together for peace rather than for continued 
confrontation which could lead to destruction. 

This is a goal worthy of great nations, and 
it is a goal that we are proud, Mr. General 
Secretary, to work with you so that we can 
achieve it for the benefit of the Soviet people, 
of the American people, and all of the people 
of this world. 

Now, ladies and gentlemen, since we can't 
repeat all those words in raising our glasses, 
may I suggest, to Mr. Brezhnev and to Mrs. 
Brezhnev, who could not be here but who 
talked on the telephone with him today, to 
their children, and all of our children : Mr. 
Brezhnev. 

General Secretary Brezhnev 

Mr. President, and ladies and gentlemen, 
and dear guests : Believe me, I am not trying 
to make a new, long toast. [Laughter.] But 
let me just add to the kind words said here 
by the President and to what I said a little 
earlier that great ideas bear fruit in the form 
of a great will and great energy and vigor, 
and I therefore want to assure you, Mr. Pres- 
ident, and the American Government and the 
American people — and I trust that the Pres- 
ident will reciprocate my feelings — that we 
for our part will go on working toward this 
great goal that we have set ourselves with 
great vigor and energy, a great goal that we 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



both mentioned in our remarks a little while 
ago. And therefore permit me yet again, with 
great sincerity, to ask you to join me in a 
toast to the very good health of the Presi- 
dent and to the great vigor of both our 
countries in our efforts to reach our goal of 
peace and cooperation. 

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS AT A RECEPTION 
AT SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., JUNE 23 

White House press release (San Clementel dated June 23 

President Nixon 

Mr. General Secretary and all of our dis- 
tinguished guests : We have met in Washing- 
ton and also at Camp David, and as this 
historic week is concluded we think it is most 
appropriate that we meet here in California. 
Mr. General Secretary, I told you a lot 
about California, our most populous State, 
our most diverse State. There are 20 million 
people who would like to be here tonight to 
welcome you, but these are representative of 
California, and they receive you, as you note, 
very warmly. 

As you have pointed out, the name of this 
house is La Casa Pacifica, which means "The 
House of Peace," and in Russian, I just heard 
him translate it, that is Dom Mira. 

The General Secretary thought this was a 
particularly appropriate place— this house 
and this State on the Pacific— to have our 
concluding talks. We believe that the agree- 
ments that we have reached this week will 
contribute to the peaceful world that every- 
body here wants and that the General Secre- 
tary and I have been working for in our 
respective positions. 

As we look back to this day, we hope that 
this name, "The House of Peace," will be a 
reality— a reality in terms of the agreements 
that have been reached and in terms of the 
promise those agreements mean for not just 
the Soviet people and the American people 
but for all the people of the world. 

Mr. General Secretary, we are going to 
meet all the guests, but I should point out to 
our guests that we will have in our receiving 
line, in addition to Mrs. Nixon and the General 
Secretary, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Am- 



bassador and Mrs. Dobrynin, both of whom 
have come from Washington, and Secretary 
of State and Mrs. Rogers. 

Incidentally, the Secretary of State is cel- 
ebrating his birthday, and nobody has cele- 
brated his 60th birthday more often and in 
more auspicious places than the Secretary of 
State. We celebrated it Wednesday when the 
General Secretary toasted him two days in 
advance at Camp David. The next day we 
celebrated it in the Soviet Embassy at the 
brilliant dinner party given there when both 
the General Secretary and I toasted him, 
thinking that was either the day or the day 
before. We finally learned from Mrs. Rogers 
that today is the day, so we say, "Happy 
birthday to the Secretary of State." 

Then, finally, in this distinguished com- 
pany, our leaders from political and business 
life, as well as some of the people that both 
of us have seen and admired on the screen. 
I find in my personal chats with the General 
Secretary that he likes western movies as well 
as some others, but he likes westerns in par- 
ticular, and so do I. We have several western 
movie stars that you will recognize. But be- 
cause this is a house of peace, everyone of 
them has checked his holster belt with the 
pistols at the door before he came in. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

General Secretary Brezhnev 

Ladies and gentlemen, I have spent already 
several days in the United States of America. 
Every day President Nixon arranges for me 
and for the comrades who are accompanying 
me on this trip new surprises. I would also 
say that we are conducting very necessary 
and important negotiations and we have al- 
ready managed to sign quite important 
agreements which are confirming and con- 
solidating the good, friendly relations which 
are existing between our peoples and between 
our states, and I might stress that especially 
significant in this respect is the agreement 
we have concluded yesterday on the preven- 
tion of nuclear war. 

Every day I meet old acquaintances in 
America and I make new friendships, and 
this is a fact which is a fact of great pleasure. 



July 23, 1973 



121 



I would like to stress that it is important 
that today I am here in the home of the Pres- 
ident and Mrs. Nixon, and I feel happy. We 
are continuing with our serious and beneficial 
work here, and we have spent many hours in 
businesslike negotiations. 

Today, here on the territory of California 
near to the home of the President, I have 
addressed the American people through 
American television. I am not sure when 
they will have this program, today or to- 
morrow, but when you see it you will hear 
my thoughts and the thoughts of the Soviet 
people. 

I would very much like that the name of 
this house. La Casa Pacifica, would be sym- 
bolic. I would very much like that our rela- 
tions go down in history as relations of peace, 
of friendship, of mutual respect between our 
peoples so that there is no more war. 

And in conclusion, I would like to exprass 
my gratitude to the President and Mrs. Nix- 
on for this wonderful party which he ar- 
ranged for us today. I believe that this 
gathering will permit me to acquaint myself 
with the representatives of various walks of 
life, of various professions, and I feel very 
happy and grateful. 

And to all of you, I would like to wish good 
health, personal happiness, and success in all 
your endeavors. 

Mr. President, I would also like to con- 
gratulate you and all the American people on 
the successful completion of the heroic space 
flight, on the occasion of the successful re- 
turn of your astronauts; and I would like 
to wish them new successes in this very im- 
portant area of human discovery and knowl- 
edge, and please convey my best greetings 
to them. 

I would like to wish that our space men 
continue their cooperation. I would like to 
wish them new, brilliant successes in their 
wonderful profession which combines cour- 
age with science. 

Of course, I cannot but mention what has 
happened here — by the way, I was the first 
who congratulated Secretary of State Rogers 
on his birthday, and now I am all confused. 
What is really the day when Secretary of 



State Rogers was born? [Laughter.] But 
anyway, I would like to say that I also con- 
gratulate Mr. Rogers and wish him all the 
best. 

President Nixon 

You will be interested to know that the 
General Secretary's speech on television, 
which was filmed right here at the Western 
White House this afternoon, will be carried 
Sunday night. When I was in the Soviet 
Union, my remarks were carried to the So- 
viet audience, and his remarks will be carried 
to the American people. 

REMARKS AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY, 
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., JUNE 24 

White House press release (San Clemente) dated June 24 

President Nixon 

Mr. General Secretary, all of our distin- 
guished guests from the Soviet Union, and 
ladies and gentlemen : Just last Monday when 
you, Mr. General Secretary, arrived in Wash- 
ington, I made the remark that in addition 
to the millions of people in the Soviet Union 
and in the United States who were seeing us 
on television, that millions more throughout 
the world were watching what we might do 
this week. 

As we have just completed our visit by 
signing this joint communique, I think we 
can say with great satisfaction that in our 
actions this week we have not disappointed 
the hopes of the people of the world. 

First, we have built on the strong founda- 
tion that we laid a year ago in the relations 
between our two countries in adopting a 
number of significant agreements for coop- 
eration. We have also built on the begin- 
ning that we made a year ago with regard 
to the limitation of nuclear arms. But the 
most significant agreement was the one we 
signed Friday, which was truly a landmark 
agreement, not only between the relations of 
our countries but also a landmark agreement 
for the whole world. 

When the two strongest nations of the 
world agree not to use force or threats of 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



force in their relations with each other and 
also not to use force or threats of force in 
their relations with other nations, this action 
indeed gives profound hope to those through- 
out the world who want peace, because there 
can only be true peace in a world in which 
the weak are as safe as the strong and by our 
agreements we have dedicated ourselves to 
building that kind of world. 

In speaking of this I think, too, that the 
agreement that we have signed, all of the 
agreements, take on added meaning because 
of the personal relationship that we developed 
a year ago and that we have built on this 
year. 

All who have studied history know that an 
agreement means nothing unless there is the 
will of the parties to keep it, and Mr. General 
Secretary, as you know from our long talks 
at Cam]) David, in Washington, and here at 
San Clemente, we have the will to keep all 
the agreements we have made and particu- 
larly the one that we signed Friday. 

And having that will, it means that we 
are dedicating ourselves to build a new era 
not only of peace between our two great 
countries but of building an era in which 
there can be peace for all the people of the 
world. 

When you return to the Soviet Union, I 
would appreciate it very much if you would 
extend to the millions of people in your coun- 
try the good wishes, the friendship, of the 
millions of people in the United States, 
because I am sure that there are many Amer- 
icans who would like personally to give that 
message to your people. And you can tell 
them that the American people — not just the 
American leaders, but the American people — 
welcome the opportunity to work with the 
people of the Soviet Union to build peace be- 
tween each other and peace for the world. 

General Secretary Brezhnev 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen : To- 
day when our visit draws to an end and the 
day of our departure grows closer, I am very 
hapiiy indeed to have this opportunity once 
again to express my gratitude to the Presi- 
dent of the United States for the hospitality 



that was accorded to me and all my colleagues 
present here in California. It has been very 
pleasant indeed for me to be able to visit 
this wonderful part of the United States, and 
I want also to express my gratitude to all 
Californians and to all the people of the 
United States. I had an opportunity to do so 
in the television address which, however, you 
will only be seeing tonight, so I do want to 
do that again, to express my gratitude again 
on this wonderful morning. 

As we said at the start of our meeting, we 
must work hard in the interests of our peo- 
ples, in the interest of the great and noble 
aims of defending peace and developing 
friendly relations between our peoples, and 
we can now say quite safely that we certainly 
did that. 

We have done some very serious work to- 
gether, and we have achieved complete agree- 
ment on several important issues which are 
of prime concern to our peoples, and I can 
certainly say that all the people in the Soviet 
Union will welcome what has been achieved. 

All of the agreements that we and our col- 
leagues signed in the course of this week are 
important, but those that you and I signed, 
Mr. President, last Friday were particularly 
important, and they were indeed happy 
events not only for the peoples of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. I am 
certain that all the people of the world will 
salute and welcome the agreements we 
signed. 

In these very pleasant days spent in the 
United States, I had a very good opportunity 
to meet with some of your Senators, with 
representatives of the business community, 
and yesterday I had the very great pleasure 
of meeting quite a few Californians belong- 
ing to various walks of life and various pro- 
fessions. 

But apart from all the talks we had and 
all the formal meetings, I was very happy to 
note, and I was also told this by my col- 
leagues, who, too, have been meeting with 
many Americans during this visit — and I 
am particularly happy that I was able a 
couple of days ago to chat briefly with a group 
of American correspondents — and everyone 



July 23, 1973 



123 



I talked to have said that they are happy over 
the results achieved during this visit. 

And so, that is a source of very special 
joy. I am therefore leaving the United States 
with very good feelings and with the convic- 
tion that the agreements and documents we 
signed will be unanimously approved in the 
United States as they undoubtedly will in the 
Soviet Union and that, moreover, they will 
be approved and welcomed by the nations of 
the entire world. And that is something that 
gives us added strength and new vigor and 
a desire to go on working hard so that may- 
be in six or eight months' time, as the Presi- 
dent wishes, we will be able to meet again 
when the President comes to Moscow and 
when we do that we will move still further 
ahead the very important achievements 
started last year in May. And he will come 
to the Soviet Union confident that we will 
prepare and sign new and more important 
agreements which will develop all that was 
started so well last year in Moscow. 

In conclusion, permit me once again to ex- 
press my very sincere gratitude to you, Mr. 
President, to Mrs. Nixon, to all your col- 
leagues, and to all those who have come here 
to be with us this morning. For that, I am 
indeed grateful, and so as I leave you I wish 
to say not farewell, but goodby until we meet 
again. 

Mr. President, you will agree with me if 
I say in all of our work during this visit, you 
and your colleagues, American statesmen, 
just as I and all of my colleagues here did not 
strictly observe the rules of protocol and 
we devoted the greater part of our time to 
hard work. In fact, suffice it to say that last 
night we went on working until the early 
hours of this morning, and we did some very 
good work together. 

But perhaps for that reason I simply omit- 
ted to say one thing in my remarks and that 
is the following: The United States is a very 
great, a very big country, a country with a 
population of over 220 million people, and 
I and all my colleagues in Moscow and those 
who are with me on this visit would like to 
express our deep appreciation and gratitude 
to all Americans who support what we have 



done and are doing and who take a correct 
view and correctly appreciate our policy and 
our line of conduct and who, in thus doing so, 
are helping us in our work, and I therefore 
trust that the peaceful policies pursued by 
the President and by the U.S. Government 
under him will be supported by the people. 

It is a policy aimed at insuring and 
streno-thening peace, cooperation, and secu- 
rity in the interests of our two countries but 
also in the interests of all other nations, big 
and small, throughout the world, and for this 
I wish to express my appreciation also. 

I ask all of your colleagues, Mr. President, 
and mine, to draw up closer to us so that we 
could all be in this historic picture together. 



ADDRESS BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV 
ON TELEVISION AND RADIO, JUNE 24^ 

Dear Americans: I highly appreciate this 
opportunity of directly addressing the people 
of the United States on my visit to your 
country. 

I would like first of all to convey to all of 
you the greetings and friendly feelings of 
millions of Soviet people who are following 
with great interest my visit to your country 
and our talks with President Nixon and who 
are looking forward to this new Soviet- 
American summit meeting making a fruitful 
contribution to better relations between our 
countries and stronger universal peace. 

Our discussions with President Nixon and 
other U.S. Government oflicials have been go- 
ing on for several days, and they have been 
very intensive indeed. We came to this coun- 
try anticipating that these would be respon- 
sible negotiations devoted to major questions 
bearing on the development of Soviet-Amer- 
ican relations and to a search for ways in 
which our two nations could promote the 
further invigoration of the entire interna- 
tional atmosphere. Today I have every reason 
to say that those hopes were justified. We 
are satisfied with the way the talks went 
and with the results alreadv achieved. New 



' Recorded at San Clemente, Calif., on June 23 
and broadcast June 24 (text made available by the 
White House Press Office). 



124 



Department of State Bulletin 



agreements have been signed in Washing- 
ton, and in many respects they broaden the 
sphere of peaceful and mutually advanta- 
geous cooperation between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Another big step has been taken 
along the path that we jointly mapped out 
a year ago during our meeting in Moscow. 

Let me say frankly that personally I am al- 
so pleased that this visit has given me an op- 
portunity to gain some firsthand impressions 
of America, to see some aspects of the Ameri- 
can way of life, to meet with prominent gov- 
ernment and public leaders of your country, 
and to have some contact with the life of 
Americans. 

You are well aware that, in the past, re- 
lations between our countries developed very 
unevenly. There were periods of stagnation ; 
there were ups and downs. But I guess I 
would not be making a mistake if I said that 
the significance of good relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States has 
always been quite clear to the more far- 
sighted statesmen. In this connection we have 
good reason to recall that this is the year 
of the 40th anniversary of the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between our countries 
on the initiative of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. 

In World War II the Soviet Union and the 
United States became allies and fought side 
by side against nazism, which threatened the 
freedom of nations and civilization itself. The 
jubilant meeting of Soviet and American 
soldiers on the Elbe River at the hour of 
victory over Hitlerism is well remembered 
in our country. 

The wartime alliance could have been ex- 
pected to usher in a new era of broad peace- 
ful cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. I can tell you with confi- 
dence that that is what our country wanted. 
We wanted to cement and develop the good 
relations whose foundations had been laid 
during the war. 

Things went differently, however. What 
came was not peace, but the cold war, a poor 
substitute for genuine peace. For a long time 
it poisoned relations between our countries 



and international relations as a whole. Some 
of its dismal influence can unfortunately be 
felt in certain things to this day. 

Under the circumstances, it was no easy 
task indeed to make a turn from mutual dis- 
trust to detente, normalization, and mutually 
advantageous cooperation. It took courage 
and political foresight ; it took a lot of pains- 
taking work. We appreciate the fact that 
President Nixon and his administration 
joined their efforts with ours to really put 
Soviet-American relations on a new track. 

I have heard that the American political 
vocabulary includes the expression "to win 
the peace." The present moment in history 
is, I believe, perhaps the most suitable oc- 
casion to use that expression. We jointly won 
the war. Today our joint efforts must help 
mankind win a durable peace. The possibility 
of a new war must be eliminated. 

The outcome of the two meetings between 
the leaders of the Soviet Union and the 
United States and the practical steps taken 
in the intervening year convincingly show 
that important results have already been at- 
tained. It transpired that a reasonable and 
mutually acceptable approach to many prob- 
lems, which previously seemed insoluble, can 
in fact be found. Not so long ago I suppose 
it would have been hard even to imagine the 
possibility of such progress. 

Last year's agreements are, on the whole, 
being successfully implemented. Tangible 
progress is being made in almost all spheres 

and it is a progress secured through joint 

efforts. The inauguration of a regular pas- 
senger shipping line between Leningrad and 
New York, the establishment of consulates 
general in Leningrad and San Francisco, the 
initiation of friendly ties between Soviet 
and American cities, and livelier athletic ex- 
changes are all becoming part of the daily 
lives of the peoples of our two countries to- 
day. 

The best possible evidence that Soviet- 
American relations are moving ahead, and 
not marking time, is provided by the impor- 
tant document signed the other day by Pres- 
ident Nixon and myself, the agreement be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the United States 



July 23, 1973 



125 



on the prevention of nuclear war. I trust I 
will not be accused of making an overstate- 
ment if I say that this document is one of 
historic significance. The Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America have concluded an agreement to 
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war between 
themselves and to do their utmost to prevent 
the outbreak of nuclear war generally. It is 
surely clear how important this is for the 
peace and tranquillity of the peoples of our 
two countries and for the improvement of the 
prospects for a peaceful life for all mankind. 

Even if our second meeting with the Pres- 
ident of the United States yielded no other 
results, it could still be said with full grounds 
that it will take a fitting place in the annals 
of Soviet-American relations and in inter- 
national affairs as a whole. The entire world 
can now see that, having signed last year the 
fundamental document entitled "Basic Prin- 
ciples of Relations Between the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
States of America," our two nations regard 
it not as a mere declaration of good intent 
but as a program of vigorous and consistent 
action, a program they have already begun 
to implement, and one which they are deter- 
mined to go on implementing. 

It is also of no little significance that our 
countries have agreed on the main principles 
of further work to prepare a new agreement 
on strategic arms limitation, a broader one 
this time and of far longer duration. This 
means that the exceptionally important job 
begun in May 1972 in Moscow is continuing. 
It means that political detente is being 
backed up by military detente. And this is 
something from which all the peoples and the 
very cause of peace stand to gain. 

The other day representatives of our two 
governments also signed new agreements on 
Soviet-American cooperation in several spe- 
cific fields. Together with the earlier agree- 
ments concluded during the past year, they 
make up an impressive file of documents on 
cooperation between our two nations and our 
two great peoples in some widely ranging 
fields : from the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy to agriculture and from outer space 
to the ocean depths. 



Of course, the Soviet Union and the United 
States are countries which are, so to speak, 
self-sufficient. Until recently that was, in 
fact, how things were in our relations. How- 
ever, we, as well as many Americans, realize 
only too well that renunciation of coopera- . 
tion in the economic, scientific, technological, I 
and cultural fields is tantamount to both 
sides turning down substantial extra bene- , 
fits and advantages. And most important, | 
such a renunciation would be so pointless as 
to defy any reasonable argument. This is , 
particularly true of economic ties. Today, I 
believe, both you and we would agree that in 
this area it is not enough simply to over- 
come such an anomaly generated by the cold 
war as the complete freezing of Soviet- Amer- 
ican trade. Life poses questions of far 
greater importance. I have in mind, above 
all, such forms of economic relations as 
stable large-scale ties in several branches of 
the economy and long-term scientific and 
technological cooperation, and in our age 
this is very important. The contacts we have 
had with American officials and businessmen 
confirm that it is along these lines that the 
main prospects for further economic coop- 
eration between our countries can be traced. 

It is alleged at times that the development 
of such cooperation is one-sided and only 
benefits the Soviet Union. But those who say 
so are either completely ignorant to the real 
state of affairs or deliberately turn a blind 
eye to the truth. 

And the truth is that broader and deeper 
economic cooperation in general and the 
long-term and large-scale deals which are 
now either being negotiated or have already 
been successfully concluded by Soviet or- 
ganizations and American firms are bound to 
yield real and tangible benefits to both sides. 
This is something that has been confirmed 
quite definitely by American businessmen 
whom I have had an opportunity to talk with 
both in this country and earlier in Moscow. 
It was in that context that we discussed the 
matter with President Nixon, too. 

To this I would like to add that both the 
Soviet leadership and, as I see it, the U.S. 
Government attach particular importance to 
the fact that the development of long-term 



126 



Department of Stote Bulletin 



economic cooperation will also have very 
beneficial political consequences. It will con- 
solidate the present trend toward better So- 
viet-American relations generally. 

Prospects for the broad development of 
Soviet-American exchanges in culture and 
the arts are, as we see it, also good. Both our 
countries have much to share in this field. To 
live at peace we must trust each other, and 
to trust each other we must know each other 
better. We, for our part, want Americans to 
visualize our way of life and our way of 
thinking as completely and correctly as 
possible. 

By and large, we can say that quite a lot 
has already been done to develop Soviet- 
American relations. Yet we are still only at 
the beginning of a long road. Constant care 
is needed to preserve and develop the new 
shoots of good relationships. Tireless efforts 
are needed to define the most essential and 
most suitable forms of cooperation in various 
fields. Patience is needed to understand the 
various specific features of the other side 
and to learn to do business with each other. 
I believe those who support a radical im- 
provement in relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States can look to the 
future with optimism, for this objective 
meets the vital interests of both our nations 
and the interests of peace-loving people all 
over the world. 

The general atmosphere in the world de- 
pends to no small extent on the climate pre- 
vailing in relations between our two coun- 
tries. Neither economic or military might 
nor international prestige give our countries 
any special privileges, but they do invest 
them with special responsibility for the des- 
tinies of universal peace and for preventing 
war. In its approach to ties and contacts 
with the United States, the Soviet Union is 
fully aware of that responsibility. 

We regard the improvement of Soviet- 
American relations not as an isolated phe- 
nomenon, but as an integral and very 
important part of the wider process of radi- 
cally improving the international atmosphere. 
Mankind has outgrown the rigid cold war 
armor which it was once forced to wear. It 
wants to breathe freely and peacefully. And 



we will be happy if our efforts to better 
Soviet-American relations help draw more 
and more nations into the process of de- 
tente—be it in Europe or Asia, in Africa or 
Latin America, in the Middle or the Far 

East. 

We regard it as a very positive fact that 
the normalization of Soviet-American rela- 
tions is contributing to the solution of the 
great and important problem of consolidat- 
ing peace and security in Europe and of 
convening the all-European conference. 

The improvement of Soviet-American re- 
lations undoubtedly played its useful role in 
promoting the termination of the long-drawn- 
out war in Viet-Nam. Now that the agree- 
ment ending the Viet-Nam war has come into 
effect and both our countries, together with 
other nations, are signatories to the docu- 
ment of the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam, 
it seems to us to be particularly important 
that the achieved success be consolidated and 
that all the peoples of Indochina be given 
the chance to live in peace. 

There still exist hotbeds of dangerous ten- 
sion in the world. In our discussions with 
President Nixon we touched upon the situa- 
tion in the Middle East, which is still very 
acute. We believe that in that area justice 
should be assured as soon as possible and a 
stable peace settlement reached that would 
restore the legitimate rights of those who 
suffered from the war and insure the security 
of all peoples of that region. That is im- 
portant for all the peoples of the Middle East, 
with no exception. It is also important for 
the maintenance of universal peace. 

In short, the ending of conflicts and the pre- 
vention of new crisis-fraught situations is an 
essential condition for creating truly reliable 
guarantees of peace. And our two countries 
are called upon to make a worthy contribu- 
tion to that cause. In our discussions Presi- 
dent Nixon and I have devoted a great deal 
of attention to these matters. 

I would like to emphasize at this point 
that in discussing questions of our bilateral 
relations and international problems of a 
general nature we invariably took into ac- 
count the fact that both the Soviet Union and 
the United States have their own allies and 



July 23, 1973 



127 



their own obligations toward various other 
states. It should be stated quite definitely 
that our talks, both in their spirit and in the 
letter of the signed agreements, fully take 
that fact into consideration. 

But the main purport of all that we dis- 
cussed and agreed upon with President Nix- 
on in the field of international afi'airs is the 
firm determination of both sides to make 
good relations between the U.S..S.R. and 
the U.S.A. a permanent factor of interna- 
tional peace. 

In our time — and I am sure you know 
this — there are still too many people who 
would rather make noise about military prep- 
arations and the arms race than discuss prob- 
lems of detente and peaceful cooperation in 
a constructive spirit. 

What can be said on that account? 

The Soviet people are perhaps second to 
none when it comes to knowing what war 
means. In World War II we won a victory 
of world-historic significance. But in that 
war over 20 million Soviet citizens died. 
Seventy thousand of our towns and villages 
were devastated, and one-third of our na- 
tional wealth was destroyed. 

The war wounds have now been healed. 
Today the Soviet Union is a mightier and 
more prosperous country than ever before. 
But we remember the lessons of the war only 
too well, and that is why the peoples of the 
Soviet Union value peace so highly, that is 
why they strongly approve the peace policy 
of our party and government. 

For us peace is the highest achievement to 
which all men should strive if they want to 
make their life a worthy one. We believe in 
reason, and we feel that this belief is shared 
also by the peoples of the United States and 
of other nations. If that belief were lost, or 
if it were obscured by a blind faith in 
strength alone, in the power of nuclear arms 
or some other kind of weapon, the fate of 
civilization — of humanity itself — would be 
miserable indeed. 

Our path has not been an easy one. Our 
people are proud that in a historically short 
period of time, after the victory of the So- 
cialist Revolution, backward Russia trans- 



formed itself into a major industrial power 
and achieved outstanding successes in sci- 
ence and culture. We take pride in having 
built a new society — a most stable and con- 
fidently developing society — which has as- 
sured all our citizens of social justice and has 
made the values of modern civilization the 
property of all the people. We are proud that 
dozens of previously oppressed nations and 
nationalities in our country have become 
genuinely equal and that in our close-knit 
family of nations they are developing their 
economy and culture. 

We have great plans for the future. We 
want to raise considerably the living stand- 
ards of the Soviet people. We want to make 
new advances in education and medicine. 
We want to make our villages and towns 
more comfortable to live in and more beauti- 
ful. We have drafted programs to develop 
the remote areas of Siberia, the North and 
the Far East, with their immense natural 
resources. And every Soviet individual is 
deeply conscious of the fact that the realiza- 
tion of those plans requires peace and peace- 
ful cooperation with other nations. 

Of course, like any other countiy, we have 
quite a few problems and quite a few short- 
comings. But the solution to all the problems 
we face requires, as in the case of other na- 
tions, not war or an artificial fanning of 
tensions, but peace and creative labor, which, 
we are convinced, are the only things that 
can guarantee well-being and abundance of 
material and spiritual benefits for all mem- 
bers of society. 

I have attempted to give a brief account of 
the thoughts and plans of the Soviet people 
and to explain the nature of the Soviet 
Union's foreign policy. Its peaceful essence 
stems from the very core of our society. And 
it is by no mere chance that the very 
concept of peaceful coexistence, which today 
is turning more and more into a universally 
recognized basis for the development of re-, 
lations between states with different social 
systems, was evolved by Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state. 

You probably know that two years ago 
the 24th congress of our ruling party, the 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ap- 
proved the Soviet peace program, which is 
a concrete embodiment of the policy of peace- 
ful coexistence in modern conditions. It is a 
program of active contribution to interna- 
tional detente and to securing a truly lasting 
peace on earth for many generations to come. 
It expresses not only the convictions and 
intentions of our people but also, we are 
sure, the aspirations of millions and millions 
of peace-loving people all over the world. We 
are implementing this program, working 
hand in hand with our friends and allies, the 
Socialist countries. On the basis of this pro- 
gram we seek to build relations of good will 
and mutually beneficial cooperation with all 
countries that have a similar desire. And 
the improvement of Soviet-American rela- 
tions occupies its rightful place in that pro- 
gram. 

Dear viewers: The importance and com- 
plexity of the problems on the agenda of 
our talks with President Nixon, of our meet- 
ing and discussions with members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed 
by Senator Fulbright, and with prominent 
representatives of the American business 
community, called for a tight work schedule 
on this visit. 

As I have already pointed out, these were 
fruitful discussions held in a good atnios- 
phere. This gives us a feeling of satisfaction. 
At the same time, I do personally regret 
that the extreme pressure of business has 
not given me and my colleagues who accom- 
panied me and took part in our woi-k a chance 
to see more of your country. While still in 
Moscow, and then here, in the United States, 
I received many warm letters from various 
American cities, organizations, companies, 
and private citizens kindly inviting me to 
visit this or that town, to see plants, farms, 
and universities, or to be a guest in the 
homes of Americans. I am taking this op- 
portunity to express my sincere gratitude to 
all those who wrote such letters. I regret 
that, for the reasons I have just mentioned, 
I was unable to take up those invitations. 

Of course, it would have been interesting 
to visit New York and Chicago and Detroit 
and Los Angeles, to see some of your indus- 



trial projects and farms, to talk to American 
working people, whose achievements are ad- 
mired by Soviet people. Perhaps the future 
will offer such an opportunity, especially 
since President Nixon and I have definitely 
agreed that in the future our contacts will 
be placed on a regular footing. We are look- 
ing forward to President Nixon's visit to 
the Soviet Union next year. 

But even though this brief visit did not 
give me a chance to see as much as I would 
like to in America, I nevertheless have every 
reason, when I return home, to tell my col- 
leagues and all Soviet people both about the 
important political results of the visit and 
about the atmosphere of good will and the 
trend in favor of peace, of detente, and of 
improving relations between our two coun- 
tries. It is a trend which we felt during our 
stay in the United States and during our 
contacts with government and public lead- 
ers of your country and with many American 
citizens. I can assure you that these feelings 
are fully shared by Soviet people. 

I do not believe I will be divulging a major 
secret if I tell you that in my talks with 
President Nixon over the last few days we 
not only addressed ourselves to current po- 
litical problems but also tried to look ahead 
and to take into account the future interests 
of the peoples of both our countries. In so 
doing we proceeded from the assumption 
that in politics those who do not look ahead 
will inevitably find themselves in the rear, 
among the stragglers. A year ago in Moscow 
we laid the foundation for improving Soviet- 
American relations. Now this great and im- 
portant objective has been successfully 
brought closer. It is our hope that this trend 
will continue, for it meets the interests of 
our two great peoples and of all mankind. 

In conclusion, I want to express my sincere 
gratitude to the American people, to the 
President and the Government of the United 
States for their hospitality, for their kind- 
ness and numerous expressions of warm feel- 
ings toward the Soviet people and us, their 
representatives. 

Dear Americans, please accept my wishes 
for well-being and happiness to all of you. 
Thank you. 



July 23, 1973 



129 



TEXT OF JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMUNIQUE' 

Joint US-USSR Communique 

At the invitation of the President of the United 
States, Richard Nixon, extended during his official 
visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance 
with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an 
official visit to the United States from June 18 to 
June 25. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by A. A. 
Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 
Member of the Politbureau of the Central Commit- 
tee, CPSU; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign 
Trade; B. P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; 
G. E. Tsukanov and A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistants to 
the General Secretary of the Central Committee, 
CPSU; L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS; 
E. I. Chazov, Deputy Minister of Public Health of 
the USSR; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Col- 
legium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR; G. A. Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute 
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev 
held thorough and constructive discussions on the 
progress achieved in the development of US-Soviet 
i-elations and on a number of major international 
problems of mutual interest. 

Also taking part in the conversations held in 
Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente, were: 

On the American side William P. Rogers, Secre- 
tary of State; George P. Shultz, Secretary of the 
Treasury; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. 

On the Soviet side A. A. Gromyko, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Polit- 
bureau of the Central Committee, CPSU; A. F. 
Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; N. S. 
Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. P. 
Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; A. M. Alek- 
sandrov and G. E. Tsukanov, Assistants to the Gen- 
eral Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; 
G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. 

I. The General State of US-Soviet Relations 

Both Sides expressed their mutual satisfaction 
with the fact that the American-Soviet summit 
meeting in Moscow in May 1972 and the joint de- 
cisions taken there have resulted in a substantial 
advance in the strengthening of peaceful relations 
between the USA and the USSR and have created 
the basis for the further development of broad and 
mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of 
mutual interest to the peoples of both countries and 
in the interests of all mankind. They noted their 



'Signed at San Clemente, Calif., on June 24; re- 
leased at Moscow, Washington, and San Clemente 
on June 25. 



satisfaction with the mutual effort to implement 
strictly and fully the treaties and agreements con- 
cluded between the USA and the USSR, and to 
expand areas of cooperation. 

They agreed that the process of reshaping rela- 
tions between the USA and the USSR on the basis 
of peaceful coexistence and equal security as set 
forth in the Basic Principles of Relations Between 
the USA and the USSR signed in Moscow on May 
29, 1972 is progressing in an encouraging manner. 
They emphasized the great importance that each 
Side attaches to these Basic Principles. They re- 
affirmed their commitment to the continued scrupu- 
lous implementation and to the enhancement of the 
effectiveness of each of the provisions of that docu- 
ment. 

Both Sides noted with satisfaction that the out- 
come of the US-Soviet meeting in Moscow in May 
1972 was welcomed by other States and by world 
opinion as an important contribution to strengthen- 
ing peace and international security, to curbing the 
arms race and to developing businesslike cooperation 
among States with different social systems. 

Both Sides viewed the return visit to the USA 
of the General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, and the talks held 
during the visit as an expression of their mutual 
determination to continue the course toward a major 
improvement in US-Soviet relations. 

Both Sides are convinced that the discussions' they 
have just held represent a further milestone in the 
constructive development of their relations. 

Convinced that such a development of American- 
Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their 
peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take 
further major steps to give these relations maximum 
stability and to turn the development of friendship 
and cooperation between their peoples into a perma- 
nent factor for worldwide peace. 

II. The Prevention of Nuclear War and the 
Limitation of Strategic Armaments 

Issues related to the maintenance and strengthen- 
ing of international peace were a central point of 
the talks between President Nixon and General 
Secretary Brezhnev. 

Conscious of the exceptional importance for all 
mankind of taking effective measures to that end, 
they discussed ways in which both Sides could work 
toward removing the danger of war, and especially 
nuclear war, between the USA and the USSR and 
between either party and other countries. Conse- 
quently, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Basic Principles of Rela- 
tions of May 29, 1972, it was decided to conclude 
an Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on 
the Prevention of Nuclear War. That Agreement 
was signed by the President and the General Secre- 
tary on June 22, 1973. The text has been published 
separately. 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



The President and tlie General Secretary, in ap- 
praising this Agreement, believe that it constitutes 
a historical landmark in Soviet-American relations 
and substantially strengthens the foundations of 
international security as a whole. The United States 
and the Soviet Union state their readiness to con- 
sider additional ways of strengthening peace and 
removing forever the danger of war, and particu- 
larly nuclear war. 

In the course of the meetings, intensive discussions 
were held on questions of strategic arms limitation. 
In this connection both Sides emphasized the funda- 
mental importance of the Treaty on the Limitation 
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed 
between the USA and the USSR in May 1972 which, 
for the first time in history, place actual limits on 
the most modern and most formidable types of 
armaments. 

Having exchanged views on the progress in the 
implementation of these agreements, both Sides re- 
affirmed their intention to carry them out and their 
readiness to move ahead jointly toward an agree- 
ment on the further limitation of strategic arms. 

Both Sides noted that progress has been made in 
the negotiations that resumed in November 1972, 
and that the prospects for reaching a permanent 
agreement on more complete measures limiting 
strategic offensive armaments are favorable. 

Both Sides agreed that the progress made in the 
limitation of strategic armaments is an exceedingly 
important contribution to the strengthening of US- 
Soviet relations and to world peace. 

On the basis of their discussions, the President 
and the General Secretary signed on June 21, 1973, 
Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The text has 
been published separately. 

The USA and the USSR attach great importance 
to joining with all States in the cause of strengthen- 
ing peace, reducing the burden of armaments, and 
reaching agreements on arms limitation and dis- 
armament measures. 

Considering the important role which an effective 
international agreement with respect to chemical 
weapons would play, the two Sides agreed to con- 
tinue their efforts to conclude such an agreement in 
cooperation with other countries. 

The two Sides agree to make every effort to fa- 
cilitate the work of the Committee on Disarmament 
which has been meeting in Geneva. They will ac- 
tively participate in negotiations aimed at working 
out new measures to curb and end the arms race. 
They reaffirm that the ultimate objective is general 
and complete disarmament, including nuclear dis- 
armament, under strict international control. A 
world disarmament conference could play a role in 
this process at an appropriate time. 



III. International Questions: The Reduction of 
Tensions and Strengthening of Interna- 
tional Security 

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev 
reviewed major questions of the current interna- 
tional situation. They gave special attention to the 
developments which have occurred since the time 
of the US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow. It was 
noted with satisfaction that positive trends are de- 
veloping in international relations toward the fur- 
ther relaxation of tensions and the strengthening of 
cooperative relations in the interests of peace. In 
the opinion of both Sides, the current process of 
improvement in the international situation creates 
new and favorable opportunities for reducing ten- 
sions, settling outstanding international issues, and 
creating a permanent structure of peace. 

Indochbm 

The two Sides expressed their deep satisfaction 
at the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the 
War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and also at 
the results of the International Conference on Viet- 
nam which approved and supported that Agreement. 

The two Sides are convinced that the conclusion 
of the Agi-eement on Ending the War and Restoring 
Peace in Vietnam, and the subsequent signing of the 
Agreement en Restoring Peace and Achieving Na- 
tional Concord in Laos, meet the fundamental inter- 
ests and aspirations of the people of Vietnam and 
Laos and open up a possibility for establishing a last- 
ing peace in Indochina, based on respect for the inde- 
pendence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity 
of the countries of that area. Both Sides emphasized 
that these agreements must be strictly implemented. 

They further stressed the need to bring an early 
end to the military conflict in Cambodia in order 
to bring peace to the entire area of Indochina. They 
also reaffirmed their stand that the political futures 
of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be left to 
the respective peoples to determine, free from out- 
side interference. 

Europe 

In the course of the talks both Sides noted with 
satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing 
tensions and developing cooperation is actively con- 
tinuing and thereby contributing to international 
stability. 

The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the 
further normalization of relations among European 
countries resulting from treaties and agreements 
signed in recent years, particularly between the 
USSR and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. 
They also welcome the coming into force of the 
Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971. 
They share the conviction that strict observance of 
the treaties and agreements that have been con- 
cluded will contribute to the security and well-being 
of all parties concerned. 

They also welcome the prospect of United Na- 



July 23, 1973 



131 



tions membership this year for the FRG and the 
GDR [German Democratic Republic] and recall, in 
this connection, that the USA, USSR, UK and 
France have signed the Quadripartite Declaration of 
November 9, 1972, on this subject. 

The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire, 
guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint 
US-USSR Communique adopted in Moscow in May 
1972, to continue their separate and joint contri- 
butions to strengthening peaceful relations in 
Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting 
peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their 
policies. 

In this connection satisfaction was expressed with 
the fact that as a result of common efforts by many 
States, including the USA and the USSR, the pre- 
paratory work has been successfully completed for 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. The 
USA and the USSR hold the view that the Con- 
ference will enhance the possibilities for strengthen- 
ing European security and developing cooperation 
among the participating States. The USA and the 
USSR will conduct their policies so as to realize 
the goals of the Conference and bring about a new 
era of good relations in this part of the world. 

Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward 
the Conference, both Sides will make efl'orts to bring 
the Conference to a successful conclusion at the 
earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the 
assumption that progress in the work of the Con- 
ference will produce possibilities for completing it 
at the highest level. 

The USA and the USSR believe that the goal of 
strengthening stability and security in Europe 
would be further advanced if the relaxation of 
political tensions were accompanied by a reduction 
of military tensions in Central Europe. In this re- 
spect they attach great importance to the negotia- 
tions on the mutual reduction of forces and arma- 
ments and associated measures in Central Europe 
which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both Sides 
state their readiness to make, along with other 
States, their contribution to the achievement of mu- 
tually acceptable decisions on the substance of this 
problem, based on the strict observance of the prin- 
ciple of the undiminished security of any of the 
parties. 

Middle East 

The parties expressed their deep concern with the 
situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions 
regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settle- 
ment. 

Each of the parties set forth its position on this 
problem. 

Both parties agreed to continue to exert their ef- 
forts to promote the quickest possible settlement in 
the Middle East. This settlement should be in ac- 
cordance with the interests of all states in the area, 
be consistent with their independence and sover- 



eignty and should take into due account the legiti- 
mate interests of the Palestinian people. 

IV. Commercial and Economic Relations 

The President and the General Secretary thor- 
oughly reviewed the status of and prospects for 
commercial and economic ties between the USA 
and the USSR. Both Sides noted with satisfaction 
the progress achieved in the past year in the nor- 
malization and development of commercial and ec- 
onomic relations between them. 

They agrreed that mutually advantageous cooper- 
ation and peaceful relations would be strengrthened 
by the creation of a permanent foundation of eco- 
nomic relationships. 

They recall with satisfaction the various agree- 
ments on trade and commercial relations signed in 
the past year. Both Sides note that American-Soviet 
trade has shown a substantial increase, and that 
there are favorable prospects for a continued rise 
in the exchange of goods over the coming years. 

They believe that the two countries should aim at 
a total of 2-3 billion dollars of trade over the next 
three years. The Joint US-USSR Commercial Com- 
mission continues to provide a valuable mechanism 
to promote the broad-scale growth of economic rela- 
tions. The two Sides noted with satisfaction that 
contacts between American firms and their Soviet 
counterparts are continuing to expand. 

Both Sides confirmed their firm intention to 
proceed from their earlier understanding on meas- 
ures directed at creating more favorable conditions 
for expanding commercial and other economic ties 
between the USA and the USSR. 

It was noted that as a result of the Agreement 
Regarding Certain Maritime Matters signed in Octo- 
ber 1972, Soviet and American commercial ships 
have been calling more frequently at ports of the 
United States and the USSR, respectively, and since 
late May of this year a new regular passenger line 
has started operating between New York and 
Leningrad. 

In the course of the current meeting, the two 
Sides signed a Protocol augmenting existing civil 
air relations between the USA and the USSR pro- 
viding for direct air services between Washington 
and Moscow and New York and Leningrad, in- 
creasing the frequency of flights and resolving other 
questions in the field of civil aviation. 

In the context of reviewing prospects for further 
and more permanent economic cooperation, both 
Sides expressed themselves in favor of mutually 
advantageous long term projects. They discussed a 
number of specific projects involving the participa- 
tion of American companies, including the delivery 
of Siberian natural gas to the United States. The 
President indicated that the USA encourages Amer- 
ican firms to work out concrete proposals on these 
projects and will give serious and sympathetic con- 
sideration to proposals that are in the interest of 
both Sides. 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



To contribute to expanded commercial, cultural 
and technical relations between the USA and the 
USSR, the two Sides signed a tax convention to 
avoid double taxation on income and eliminate, as 
much as possible, the need for citizens of one coun- 
try to become involved in the tax system of the 
other. 

A Protocol was also signed on the opening by the 
end of October 1973 of a Trade Representation of 
the USSR in Washington and a Commercial Of- 
fice of the United States in Moscow. In addition a 
Protocol was signed on questions related to es- 
tablishing a US-Soviet Chamber of Commerce. These 
agreements will facilitate the further development 
of commercial and economic ties between the USA 
and the USSR. 

V. Further Progress in Other Fields of Bilat- 
eral Cooperation 

The two Sides reviewed the areas of bilateral co- 
operation in such fields as environmental protection, 
public health and medicine, exploration of outer 
space, and science and technology, established by 
the agreements signed in May 1972 and subse- 
quently. They noted that those agreements are 
being satisfactorily carried out in practice in accord- 
ance with the programs as adopted. 

In particular, a joint effort is under way to de- 
velop effective means to combat those diseases which 
are most widespread and dangerous for mankind: 
cancer, cardiovascular or infectious diseases and 
arthritis. The medical aspects of the environmental 
problems are also subjects of cooperative research. 

Preparations for the joint space flight of the 
Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft are proceeding accord- 
ing to an agreed timetable. The joint flight of these 
spaceships for a rendezvous and docking mission, 
and mutual visits of American and Soviet astronauts 
in each other's spacecraft, are scheduled for July 
1975. 

Building on the foundation created in previous 
agreements, and recognizing the potential of both 
the USA and the USSR to undertake cooperative 
measures in current scientific and technological ar- 
eas, new projects for fruitful joint efforts were iden- 
tified and appropriate agreements were concluded. 

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
Bearing in mind the great importance of satisfy- 
ing the growing energy demands in both countries 
and throughout the world, and recognizing that the 
development of highly efficient energy sources could 
contribute to the solution of this problem, the 
President and General Secretary signed an agree- 
ment to expand and strengthen cooperation in the 
fields of controlled nuclear fusion, fast breeder re- 
actors, and research on the fundamental properties 
of matter. A Joint Committee on Cooperation in 
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will be estab- 
lished to implement this agreement, which has a 
duration of ten years. 



Agriculture 
Recognizing the importance of agriculture in 
meeting mankind's requirement for food products 
and the role of science in modern agricultural pro- 
duction, the two Sides concluded an agreement pro- 
viding for a broad exchange of scientific experience 
in agricultural research and development, and of 
information on agricultural economics. A US-USSR 
Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation will 
be established to oversee joint programs to be car- 
ried out under the Agreement. 

World Ocean Studies 
Considering the unique capabilities and the major 
interest of both nations in the field of world ocean 
studies, and noting the extensive experience of US- 
USSR oceanographic cooperation, the two Sides have 
agreed to broaden their cooperation and have signed 
an agreement to this effect. In so doing, they are 
convinced that the benefits from further develop- 
ment of cooperation in the field of oceanography 
will accrue not only bilaterally but also to all peo- 
ples of the world. A US-USSR Joint Committee on 
Cooperation in World Ocean Studies will be estab- 
lished to coordinate the implementation of coopera- 
tive programs. 

Transportation 

The two Sides agreed that there are opportu- 
nities for cooperation between the USA and the 
USSR in the solution of problems in the field of 
transportation. To permit expanded, mutually bene- 
ficial cooperation in this field, the two Sides con- 
cluded an agreement on this subject. The USA and 
the USSR further agreed that a Joint Committee 
on Cooperation in Transportation would be es- 
tablished. 

Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation 

Recognizing the general expansion of US-USSR 
bilateral relations and, in particular, the growing 
number of exchanges in the fields of science, tech- 
nology, education and culture, and in other fields of 
mutual interest, the two Sides agreed to broaden 
the scope of these activities under a new General 
Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Coopera- 
tion, with a duration of six years. The two Sides 
agreed to this in the mutual belief that it will fur- 
ther promote better understanding between the peo- 
ples of the United States and the Soviet Union and 
will help to improve the general state of relations 
between the two countries. 

Both Sides believe that the talks at the highest 
level, which were held in a frank and constructive 
spirit, were very valuable and made an important 
contribution to developing mutually advantageous 
relations between the USA and the USSR. In the 
view of both Sides, these talks will have a favorable 
impact on international relations. 

They noted that the success of the discussions in 



July 23, 1973 



133 



the United States was facilitated by the continuing 
consultation and contacts as agreed in May 1972. 
They reaffirmed that the practice of consultation 
should continue. They agreed that further meetings 
at the highest level should be held regularly. 

Having expressed his appreciation to President 
Nixon for the hospitality extended during the visit 
to the United States, General Secretary Brezhnev 



invited the President to visit the USSR in 1974. 
The invitation was accepted. 

June 24, 1973 

Leonid I. Brezhnev 



Richard Nixon 

President of the United 
States of America 



General Secretary of the 

Central Committee, 

CPSU 



Presidential Assistant Kissinger Discusses Agreements Signed 
During General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit 



Folloiving are traiiscripts of news confer- 
ences held on June 21, June 22, and June 
25 bij Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. 

DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, 
WASHINGTON, JUNE 21 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25 

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec- 
retary to President Nixon]: As we mentioned 
to you this morning, President Nixon and 
General Secretary Brezhnev have reached 
agreement on the basic principles of negotia- 
tion of further limitation for strategic of- 
fensive arms. The final agreement of those 
principles was reached in the meeting yester- 
day evening. 

Also, an agreement will be signed today be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union on scientific and technical coopera- 
tion in the field of peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. The signing of both of these matters 
will take place at 3:30 in the East Room, 
which we have already announced. 

Before Dr. Kissinger briefs you on the 
matters I have just referred to, together with 
Ambassador Johnson [U. Alexis Johnson, 
U.S. Representative and chief of the U.S. 
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT)l, I should tell you that the 
morning meeting between the President and 



General Secretary lasted for slightly over an 
hour. It began at 11 :30 and ended at 12:30. 
Dr. Kissinger participated in most of that 
meeting. The President and General Secre- 
tary then took a brief break and resumed 
their meetings at 1:20 and are still meeting 
at this time and plan to return to Washing- 
ton for the signing ceremony at 3:30. With 
that, I will present to you Dr. Kissinger. 

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I will 
go over the agreement on SALT principles 
with you. Due to some misunderstanding 
between Camp David and my oflfice here, 
the actual text hasn't been distributed to you, 
but it vdll be at the end of the meeting. I 
thought that in order to explain it adequately 
I would read to you each of the principles 
and then explain what they mean. 

There is no need for you to take down the 
text itself, because we are going to distribute 
it right after the meeting, together with a 
factsheet, and my apologies for not having 
gotten it to you before this briefing. 

Let me first give you some background on 
the principles that have been agreed upon 
and what they are intended to achieve. 

As you know, the second round of SALT 
started last November, and as you know also, 
our representative is Ambassador Johnson, 
who is here to help with the briefing. 

The objective of these talks has been to 
consider a permanent agreement limiting of- 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



fensive weapons to replace the interim agree- 
ment that was signed in Moscow last May 
and which came into effect last October to 
run for five years. 

Now, in negotiating a permanent agree- 
ment, one faces problems that are more com- 
plex than those in an interim agreement. The 
essence of the interim agreement was that 
both sides froze their offensive weapons at 
the levels they had achieved last May and, 
frankly, at the levels that were foreseeable 
over the terms of the interim agreement, for 
a period of five years. 

And as you know, we have always rejected 
the argument that we had agreed to a numer- 
ical inferiority in the interim agreement pre- 
cisely because there was no possibility of 
overcoming that numerical inferiority in the 
five years for which the interim agreement 
was designed. 

On the other hand, when you are dealing 
with a permanent agreement you are affect- 
ing the long-term strategic interests of both 
countries, and therefore numbers that are ac- 
ceptable in an interim agreement will have a 
different connotation in a permanent agree- 
ment and safeguards will have to be looked 
at in a different context. 

Secondly, with respect to a permanent 
agreement, we now face the situation that the 
numerical arms race, quantitative arms race, 
has been, in some respects, eclipsed in sig- 
nificance by the qualitative arms race. 

Throughout the 1960's, it was considered 
that the buildup was the greatest threat to 
the stability of the arms race and hence to 
international peace. In this period we have 
to consider as well that the improvement — 
refinement — of arms in terms of accuracy, in 
terms of throw-weight, in terms of multiple 
warheads, can be profoundly unsettling to 
this strategic equation even when the num- 
bers on both sides are kept fairly constant. 

And thirdly, when one is talking about a 
permanent agreement, one has to consider the 
question not only of limiting arms but the 
objective of reducing arms. It was in this 
context that the negotiations started last No- 
vember and have been conducted for the last 
six months. 



The negotiations went through the usual 
phase of some exploratory discussions, fol- 
lowed by some more concrete proposals by 
both sides. However, we faced the situation 
in April where it became clear that a com- 
prehensive agreement of a permanent nature 
would require more time than the interval 
before the summit allowed; and therefore the 
President, General Secretary Brezhnev, in 
their communications with each other de- 
cided that perhaps the approach of agreeing 
on some principles that could guide the nego- 
tiators, coupled with some full discussions 
while they were meeting in the United States, 
could give a new impetus to the talks on stra- 
tegic arms limitation. This is what was done. 

In the closest consultation with Ambassa- 
dor Johnson and with the allies most con- 
cerned, we developed a set of principles on 
a preliminary basis, which we have further 
discussed since the General Secretary has 
arrived in the United States and which led to 
the agreement which we are releasing today. 

Now, since you don't have the text, I think 
the best thing I can do is read it, and then 
attempt to explain its significance — what we 
understand by it. It isn't very long. I see 
somebody is looking at his watch. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

The preamble says: The President of the 
United States and the General Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the CPSU, having 
thoroughly considered the question of the 
further limitation of strategic arms and the 
progress already achieved at the current ne- 
gotiations, reaffirming their conviction that 
the earliest adoption of further limitation of 
strategic arms would be a major contribution 
in reducing the danger of an outbreak of 
nuclear war and in strengthening interna- 
tional peace and security, have agreed as 
follows. 

The primary significance of the preamble 
is the emphasis that both leaders give to their 
conviction of the importance of the earliest 
adoption of further limitation of strategic 
arms, not only with respect to reducing the 
danger of the outbreak of nuclear war but 
with respect to the strengthening of inter- 
national peace in general, and therefore the 



July 23, 1973 



135 



personal backing that they are giving to a 
sense of urgency in the conduct of these 
negotiations. 

The first principle is as follows: The two 
sides will continue active negotiations in or- 
der to work out a permanent agreement on 
more complete measures on the limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, as well as their sub- 
sequent reduction, proceeding from the Basic 
Principles of Relations between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics signed in Moscow, May 
29, 1972, and from the interim agreement 
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
of May 26, 1972. Over the course of the next 
year, the two sides will make serious effort 
to work out the provisions of the permanent 
agreement on more complete measures on the 
limitation of strategic offensive arms with 
the objective of signing in 1974. 

The first principle substantially speaks for 
itself. It commits both sides to accelerate 
their efforts, and it commits both sides to 
make a major effort to achieve an agreement 
in 1974, or during the course of 1974. The 
two leaders would not have made this formal 
statement if they did not believe that this 
goal was within reach and was attainable. 

Therefore it represents a commitment by 
both sides to bring about — to do their utmost 
to bring about a permanent agreement on the 
limitation of strategic arms during the course 
of next year. This agreement is to be based 
on the basic principles of international rela- 
tions that were established last year in Mos- 
cow and on the interim agreement. However, 
the U.S. position has been clear that the 
agreement has to be more comprehensive and 
that the numbers that last governed the in- 
terim agreement would not be the numbers 
of a permanent agreement. 

The second ])rinciple is: New agreements 
on the limitation of strategic offensive arma- 
ments will be based on the principles of the 
American-Soviet documents adopted in Mos- 
cow in May 1972 and the agreements reached 
in Washington in June 1973; and in particu- 
lar, both sides will be guided by the recogni- 
tion of each other's equal security interests 
and by the recognition that efforts to obtain 
unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, 

136 



would be inconsistent with the strengthening 
of peaceful relations between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 

This article attempts to set out the basic 
guidelines in which the two sides will ap- 1 
proach the negotiations. It makes it clear 
that neither side can attempt to achieve 
through these negotiations a unilateral ad- 
vantage and, secondly, that we have always 
maintained the position that we did not 
separate our security interests from those of 
our allies. 

I must mention one other point with re- 
spect to the first principle, which is to say 
that both sides have agreed that the negotia- 
tions should include not only limitations on 
strategic arms but measures for the reduc- 
tion of strategic arms. 

The third principle states: The limitations 
placed on strategic offensive weapons can 
apply both to their quantitative aspects as 
well as to their qualitative improvement. 

This is one of the essential differences be- 
tween SALT One and SALT Two. SALT One 
concerned primarily exclusively the question 
of numerical limitation. SALT Two will in- 
clude, as well, qualitative restraint. That will 
involve discussions on MIRV's [multiple in- 
dejiendently targetable reentry vehicles], on 
throw-weight, and issues introduced by the 
other side with respect to specific types of 
armaments; for example, on airplanes. 

The fourth principle states: Limitations on 
strategic offensive arms must be subject to 
adequate verification by national technical 
means — which is a familiar principle from 
the previous SALT discussions and which 
the negotiating record makes it clear that we 
include also the imperative that both sides 
will maintain practices which facilitate mon- 
itoring the agreement. 

The fifth principle applies to the moderni- 
zation of arms and states: The modernization 
and replacement of strategic offensive arms 
would be permitted under conditions which 
will be formulated in the agreements to be 
concluded. 

The essence here is that on the one hand 
there will be some provision for moderniza- 

Department of State Bulletin 



tion and replacement. On the other hand, it 
also makes clear that the modernization and 
replacement cannot take place except under 
agreed conditions that do not threaten the 
purposes of the agreement. 

The. sixth principle is: Pending the com- 
pletion of a permanent agreement on more 
complete measures of strategic offensive 
arms limitation, both sides are prepared to 
reach agreements on separate measures to 
supplement the existing interim agreement 
of May 26, 1972. 

The significance of this principle is that 
with respect to some issues that are time- 
urgent, in which the interval between now 
and the time in 1974 when we expect the per- 
manent agreement to be concluded, that this 
interval might have a major impact on the 
existing strategic situations, both sides have 
agreed that they would be prepared to nego- 
tiate supplementary or separate measures to 
the interim agreement which would probably 
be of shorter duration and which would of 
course be absorbed by the permanent agree- 
ment. 

The seventh principle is a reaffirmation of 
the accidental war agreement, which is to say 
that each side will continue to take necessary 
organizational and technical measures for 
preventing accidental or unauthorized use of 
nuclear weapons under its control in accord- 
ance with the agreement of September 30, 
1971, between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
To sum up, the statement of principles 
which will be signed today, first, formally 
commits the two principal leaders to the 
urgency of completing a permanent agree- 
ment and the relationship between interna- 
tional peace and security and the completion 
of such an agreement. Secondly, it states a 
deadline for the completion of the agreement, 
in 1974. Thirdly, it includes reductions as one 
of the objectives of the agreement and not 
simply limitation. Fourth, it defines a per- 
manent agreement as one that will limit the 
number of weapons systems as well as to 
limit their qualitative improvement and 
therefore opens a dimension to the negotia- 
tions that was not covered by SALT One. 
And it defines some general principles as 

July 23, 1973 



yardsticks against which the negotiators 
can measure progress. 

Now, these principles have to be seen also 
in terms of the negotiating record at Geneva, 
where both sides are now discussing concrete 
proposals and where it is therefore perfectly 
clear what both sides mean by such phrases 
as "qualitative changes" and other phrases. 
It must also be seen in the light of the 
extensive discussions that took place yester- 
day between the President and the General 
Secretary which dealt with how to give effect 
to these principles and how to move forward 
to these negotiations so that the timetable 
that has been set out in these principles can 
be realistically met. 

These, then, are the principles which will 
guide our actions over the next year. We 
expect that they will be seen as a major 
step in developing a permanent agreement 
on the limitation of offensive weapons — the 
ultimate reduction — as a move toward bring- 
ing under control not only the pace of the 
arms race but its nature and therefore will 
contribute to long-term prospects of peace. 

Now I will be glad to answer any ques- 
tions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, why do you find the 
need to provide for further interim agree- 
ments if you think you are going to have 
a permanent agreement within 18 months? 

Dr. Kissinger: This issue will of course be 
left in detail to the negotiators. The need 
could arise, for example, in the case of 
certain technological developments, where 
restraints on the pace of testing could affect 
the situation in the space over the next 12 
to 18 months. It would be applied to those 
issues which are sensitive to the time 
interval that has been outlined in this agree- 
ment. It would not, obviously, apply to such 
issues as the numbers of weapons to be 
deployed because that would not arise in the 
12- to 18-month period. 

Q. Does the United States seek parity in 
numbers in the permanent agreement? 

Dr. Kissinger: The issue of how you define 
equal security and no unilateral advantage 
is one of the most complex. As you know, 

137 



with respect to the interim agreement, we 
believe that the larger number of our war- 
heads compensated for the somewhat larger 
number of their missiles, and also the larger 
number of our airplanes. And we also con- 
cluded that in the five-year period of this 
agreement we were not going to increase 
the number of these weapons anyway. 

With respect to a permanent ban, the 
limitations must be equitable; that is, they 
must take into account the numbers of 
weapons and the numbers of warheads. And 
we will certainly seek, and we will obtain, 
what we consider strategic parity. 

Q. So you don't have to have exactly the 
same numbers in terms — 

Dr. Kissinger: It depends what other limi- 
tations exist, and therefore it is very difficult 
to answer it in the abstract. In general, our 
objectives will be equality, but how you 
calculate this equality, we have to leave open 
to the negotiators. In effect though, the total 
compositions of the forces should be sub- 
stantially equal. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said in reading this 
over, I don't know if you meant it, that in 
principle 3 — 

Dr. Kissinger: If I said it, there is a 
chance I meant it. [Laughter.] 

Q. You said this is qualitative as well as 
quantitative, and later on you said the agree- 
ment will deal with qualitative. In relation 
to that, if you mean that it will deal with 
qualitative matters, can you relate principle 
4 on the use of national technical means of 
inspection to the control of MIRV's? Are 
you announcing that the United States is 
prepared to use national technical means 
of inspection to verify any kind of MIRV 
agreement that might be forthcoming? 

Q. Can we have the question, please? 

Dr. Kissinger: I will repeat the question, 
but not the introduction to the question. The 
question is that the third principle says that 
the agreement can apply both to qualitative 
and to quantitative aspects and then the 
fourth principle says that the limitation 
must be subject to adequate verification by 
national technical means. 

Miss Berger's question was how these 



two principles could be reconciled and 
specifically whether we were saying that we 
were prepared to accept national verification 
for any kind of MIRV agreement. 

I think I would put it another way. I 
would say any kind of MIRV agreement that 
may be reached will have to be one that can 
be verified by national technical means, and 
therefore that those MIRV agreements that 
are not verifiable by national technical means 
would be difficult to reconcile with these 
provisions and therefore the question de- 
pends on the nature of MIRV limitations 
that we are talking about. But as I have 
made clear, we consider the development of 
multiple independent warheads one of the 
major factors of concern in the arms race. 
And that is clearly understood by the other 
side. 

Q. You are aware that there are stories 
circulating that the President and Mr. 
Brezhnev are working on a so-called surprise 
agreement also in the nuclear field. Can you 
tell us whether in fact this is the only agree- 
ment going to be reached at the summit that 
has anything to do with nuclear weapons or, 
in a more general way, whether they are 
working on some more major surprise agree- 
ment — to be announced here, I mean ? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to comment 
on everything that they may be working on. 
I would not characterize anything as a 
surprise agreement, and I would say that 
there is nothing that they are working on 
that is directly relevant to the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any understand- 
ing about whether forward-based systems 
will be considered in these negotiations? 

Dr. Kissinger: The basic position of the 
two sides has been elaborated in previous 
negotiations. We have left no doubt that we 
consider our security interests and those of 
our allies inseparable and that we believe 
that the central strategic systems should be 
the principal concern of this phase of the 
negotiations ; that is to say, the ICBM's [in- 
tercontinental ballistic missiles], bombers, 
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 

The Soviet Union has taken a different 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



view in the past. It is a view that we 
managed to avoid having to address in the 
first phase of SALT, and it is something 
which we believe can be negotiated in the 
second phase of SALT. 

But we can state now that with respect 
to forward-based systems, we will make no 
agreement that separates our security 
interests from those of our allies and that 
we believe that in this phase the central 
strategic systems should be the principal 
focus of negotiation. 

Q. What can you tell us of the changes the 
Soviets have made in the last year in their 
missile programs and whether they have 
been completely in accordance with the 
agreements reached in Moscow? 

Dr. Kissiriffer: The Soviet Union, to the 
best of my information, has pursued an 
active program within the terms of the 
agreement. If we should receive any infor- 
mation that is contrary to that, we will 
actively pursue it in the standing committee 
and in other channels. Up to now, they have 
pursued an active program, which is, how- 
ever, to the best of our current information, 
within the terms of the agreement. 

Q. Could you give just a general outline 
of what that active program constitutes? 

Dr. Kissinger: I reveal Soviet strategic 
deployments only in bars in the Soviet 
Union. [Laughter.] 

Q. Henry, I am having a little trouble 
here with the qualitative principle. What is 
new about the qualitative principle? I 
thought it was understood right along that 
SALT Two would be qualitative as well as 
numerical. Are you saying here there is 
something in this that now permits the 
Soviet Union to place a freeze on MIRV's? 
Is that what is new here? If not, what is the 
change ? 

Dr. Kissinger: I am saying this is the first 
time that there is a formal statement to this 
effect by both sides. Our position on it has 
been made clear, and I have enunciated it to 
this group. This is the first time that an 
agreed guideline signed by the two leaders, 
or an agreed guideline by the two sides, to 
this effect has been enunciated. 



Q. So it is that the Soviet Union has 
agreed to negotiate on MIRV? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to speak to 
the Soviet position because qualitative can 
include many things in addition to MIRV. 

Q. Dr. Ki.ssinger, is the final agreement on 
SALT contingent on any agreement or 
understanding of any kind, and if not, what 
is all this talk about SALT not being reach- 
able if the Soviet Union does not get most- 
favored-nation treatment? 

Dr. Kissinger: The SALT agreement is 
independent of other agreements, but it is 
of course dependent on the general climate 
of U.S.-Soviet relations. We have always 
held the view that the relationship between 
the general political climate and progress in 
SALT was close. It is not, however, linked 
as a condition to progress in any other 
negotiation ; it has not been stated as such 
by us. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, may I follow that up? 
In the event the Jackson amendment is 
adopted, will SALT go down the drain? 

Dr. Kissinger: I would not speculate on 
any particular agreement. We have said that 
in the event that the Jackson amendment is 
adopted in its present form that it would 
have a serious impact on Soviet-American 
relations. What the particular impact will be 
on any specific negotiation, I would not want 
to go into. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what can we say to our 
readers in the area of the prospects for re- 
ductions? Aren't you kind of dangling out 
the proposition here that the world can look 
forward to a reduction in the spending for 
nuclear armaments? What can we tell them 
the real prospects might be? When would it 
come, the lower number of missiles? Would 
it involve large amounts of savings on either 
side? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to go into 
specific proposals that are being negotiated. 
I will only say that our proposals will be 
consistent with these principles and they will 
include proposals for initial limitations to be 
followed by ultimate reductions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the linkage was not 
stated by us, with any other agreements. 



July 23, 1973 



139 



Have the Soviets raised the question of a 
linkage? 

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union also has 
not raised any particular linkage. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said the numbers in 
the temporary agreement would not be the 
numbers in the permanent agreement — 

Dr. Kissinger: Not necessarily. 

Q. — is it our side's position that the 
Soviet Union's numbers will have to be 
decreased more than our numbers have to, to 
reduce or eliminate the apparent disparity 
between the numbers agreed upon in the 
temporary agreement, and if so, do they 
accept that as a general proposition? 

Dr. Kissinger: How you set these limits, 
and what weapons you include in these limits 
is of course one of the key issues in the 
negotiations. For example, if you include 
bombers in the limits, the inequality in total 
numbers is different than if you are only 
talking about missiles. 

Therefore, at what figure you set the limit, 
whether you set it at one below both sides' 
current strength, at the strength of one side, 
or somewhere in between, that remains to be 
determined through the negotiations, and I 
don't want to speculate on that. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us, sir, if an 
attempt was made to reach an agreement in 
principle here on a MIRV freeze but that 
was found to perhaps be too complex to 
achieve at this stage of the negotiations? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to go into the 
details of any particular negotiation. I don't 
think that would be appropriate for me to 
do. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any news about 
a ban on underground testing? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have stated this is a 
subject under very active review in our 
government now and one on which we will 
make a decision as soon as the studies are 
completed, but not during the summit. 

Q. I have a double question. The first is: 
The implication of your earlier comment 
about national means and MIRV's — does that 
mean you will have to have a limitation on 
flight tests, a test ban on MIRV's, and you 
cannot get into a production ban; and the 



second question is, if the two leaders are 
confident enough to set a deadline for the 
negotiations, why couldn't the other princi- 
ples be more specific on such questions as 
MIRV and the numbers than you have been 
able to be today? 

Dr. Kissinger: Because, first, with respect 
to the question of what sort of limitations 
are verifiable by national means, it is obvious 
that flight testing is more easily verifiable 
than production, and this has been an issue 
we have covered in previous discussions on 
MIRV. 

With respect to the principles, our objec- 
tive is to have the permanent agreement, and 
not have a spectacular announcement. Many 
issues that can be agreed to in principle 
nevertheless leave a margin — a narrow 
margin, but nevertheless a margin — for sub- 
sequent discussion, such as numbers, such 
as the type of qualitative limitations, and 
such as the procedures to be followed in 
eliminating the remaining margins. And for 
that reason, it was thought to be best if we 
went no further, then, now. But there have 
been discussions on how to proceed from 
here to meet this objective with some con- 
fidence. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you talk of quality, 
are you including limitations on technical 
improvements of accuracy of warheads ? 

Dr. Kissinger: When I speak of quality, 
these are all permissible issues to be raised. 
They have to be seen, however, in the context 
of verifiability. And the more esoteric the 
problem the more complex the problem of 
verification becomes. And it is not in the 
interests of either side to have agreements, 
particularly of a permanent nature, in which 
both sides feel they are at the mercy of 
developments that they cannot control. 

So I would say, in principle, this is some- 
thing that can be included in these dis- 
cussions probably by means of restrictions 
on testing. In practice, however, it is getting 
into the more esoteric areas. 

Q. Can you express confidence that we 
will have some kind of limitation, particu- 
larly on land-based MIRV's, within the next 
18 months? 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



Dr. Kissinger: I have confidence that we 
will achieve an agreement consistent with 
the principles enunciated. 

DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, 
WASHINGTON, JUNE 22 ' 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 25 

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, let 
me put this agreement [on the prevention 
of nuclear war] first in its context, describe 
what it is seeking to achieve, and then go 
through its specific provisions, a little bit 
of its history, and then I will take your 
questions. 

The principal goal of the foreign policy of 
this administration ever since 1969 has been 
to set up what the President has called a 
structure of peace, by which we mean an 
international system less geared to the man- 
agement of crises, less conscious of constant 
eruptions of conflict, in which the principal 
participants operate with a consciousness of 
stability and permanence. 

This requires that all of the nations 
operate with a sense of responsibility, and 
it puts a particular obligation on the two 
great nuclear powers that have the capacity 
to destroy mankind and whose conflicts have 
produced so many of the crises of the post- 
war period. 

In achieving this objective, the United 
States has operated on many levels. We have 
always believed that it required adequate 
strength to deter aggression. But we also 
have believed that we have to move from the 
period of military confrontation to a period 
which is characterized more by restraints 
and, eventually, cooperation. In our dealings 
with the other great nuclear superpower, the 
President, from the day of his first inaugura- 
tion, has emphasized that we wanted to move 
from confrontation to negotiation. 

In those negotiations we have operated on 
many levels. We have attempted to remove 
specific causes of tension. We have attempted 
to forge specific instruments of cooperation. 



" Introductory remarks by Press Secretary Ziegler 
are not printed here. 



And finally, we have attempted to develop 
certain principles of conduct by which the 
two great nuclear countries could guide their 
expectations and by which both in relations 
to each other and in their relations to third 
countries, they could calm the atmosphere 
and replace purely military measures by a 
new attitude of a cooperative international 
system. 

It is in this spirit that last year in Moscow 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
signed certain principles of conduct which 
were described then as a roadmap on a road 
that no one was forced to travel but that if 
we wanted to travel it, it was there for the 
two major countries. 

I believe we have traveled on this road in 
the last year and therefore it was decided 
to formalize some of these principles in an 
agreement, to extend them in some respects, 
particularly concerning consultation. The 
origin of the negotiation, as it turned out, 
was at the last session of the Moscow summit 
meeting when there were some general ex- 
changes with respect to how to control 
nuclear weapons in a political and diplomatic 
sense, beyond the negotiations going on in 
strategic arms limitations. 

These discussions were continued between 
the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko 
on the occasion of Gromyko's visit to the 
United States last October. They were con- 
tinued in exchanges between the two leaders. 
There was some discussion when I visited 
the Soviet Union in September of last year, 
and the discussions continued this spring 
and were extensively pursued in Zavidovo 
and finally concluded here. 

Throughout, the United States has held 
the view that any obligations with respect 
to international conduct that applied to the 
great nuclear powers also had to apply to 
their relations to other countries, and we 
have held the view, which was shared by 
the Soviet leaders, that the principal problem 
was how to prevent a war and not how to 
conduct a war. 

Therefore this is an agreement which is 
designed to regulate the relations of the two 
nuclear powers to each other and to other 



July 23, 1973 



141 



countries in time of peace. It is an attempt 
to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. And 
to the extent that it contributes to this task, 
it can be a significant landmark in the rela- 
tionships of the United States to the Soviet 
Union and in the relationships of the two 
great nuclear countries toward all other 
countries of the world. 

Now let me run through the articles, 
which are largely self-explanatory. 

Article I states that it is an objective of 
both the policy of the United States and the 
policy of the Soviet Union to remove the 
danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear 
weapons. This has been a consistent goal of 
American foreign policy and is a goal shared 
by all of mankind. 

Article II applies this objective to the 
general conduct of both sides ; that is to say, 
the prevention of nuclear war presupposes 
the avoidance of situations capable of an 
exacerbation of relations, avoidance of mili- 
tary confrontation, and it is in that context 
that the outbreak of nuclear war can be 
excluded. The second article states this more 
concretely by elaborating that the prevention 
of nuclear war presupposes the avoidance of 
force or the use or threat of force by the 
two nuclear countries toward each other and 
toward other countries. 

Article III is a general article that simply 
states that the two nuclear countries have 
to develop their relations with each other 
and with third countries in a way consistent 
with the pur])oses of this agreement, and it 
makes it clear that while it is a bilateral 
agreement the obligations are multilateral. 

Article IV states that in any situation in 
which the two great nuclear countries might 
find themselves in a nuclear confrontation, 
or in which either as a result of their policies 
toward each other or as the result of de- 
velopments elsewhere in the world there is 
a danger of a nuclear confrontation between 
them or between them or any other country, 
they are obligated to consult with each other 
in order to avoid this risk. 

Article V permits tlie consultation — that 
these consultations he communicated to the 
United Nations and to other countries, a 



clause which we would of course apply to 
our allies. 

Article VI makes clear that this agreement 
deals with the prevention of war and that 
if it fails, the existing obligations in existing 
documents, treaties, and alliances will be 
maintained. 

So, we see the basic significance of this 
agreement as a step, a significant step 
toward the prevention of nuclear war and 
the prevention of military conflict. It is a 
formal obligation that the two nuclear super- 
powers have taken toward each other and, 
equally importantly, toward all other coun- 
tries to practice restraint in their diplomacy, 
to build a peace that is permanent, to pursue 
a policy whose dedication to stability and 
peace will become, as General Secretary 
Brezhnev said last night at the banquet, 
irreversible. 

Of course anyone who has studied the 
history of the last 30 years must recognize 
that agreements are not always maintained 
and that there is nothing self-enforcing 
about this document. However, if the two 
great nuclear countries continue to be ani- 
mated by the spirit in which they have con- 
ducted their policy of the last two years, 
then this document could mark a landmark 
on the road toward the structure of peace 
of which the President has been speaking 
and can be seen as a step toward a new era 
of cooperation in the relations of all nations 
and of lifting from them increasingly the 
fear of nuclear war and of war in general. 

Now I will be glad to answer your 
questions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, please, does article II 
have any relation to our bombing of Cam- 
bodia, and does article II have any relation 
to the supply of the belligerents by both the 
Soviet Union, the United States, and other 
countries, of military support? 

Dr. Kissinc/er: What is the question? 

Q. Does article II have any bearing or any 
relation to our bombing in Cambodia or to 
the military supply of the Indochina bel- 
ligerents l)y both the United States and the 
Soviet Union? 

Dr. Kissinger: Obviously, in interpreting 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



this agreement we could go around the world 
and see how it specifically applies to each 
individual country and to each conceivable 
situation. 

Let me answer first as to Cambodia. The 
military operations now going on in Cam- 
bodia were in progress when this agreement 
was being negotiated, and it was not raised 
as applying to that particular situation. 
Now, I don't want to go into the relation- 
ship of particular articles to particular 
events. I don't think it would be appropriate 
at this point to do it. 

Let me say as a general proposition this : 
It is not possible under this agreement for 
either side — and I was specifically exempting 
Cambodia for the reason that this is an 
operation that was in progress at the time — 
but it is not possible for either side to use 
force in circumstances that can threaten 
international peace and stability, as is said 
in article II, without breaching the letter 
and the spirit of this agreement. 

Now, one then has to decide to what extent 
the clauses of article VI apply and to what 
extent particular operations threaten inter- 
national peace and stability, and I don't 
think this is the appropriate time to discuss 
it. 

The purpose of this agreement is to 
legalize, to symbolize, and to bring about 
restraint on the part of the two nuclear 
superpowers in their international relation- 
ship so as to produce — at least contribute to 
the preservation of peace, and it cannot be 
approached from the point of view of a 
sharp lawyer pushing against the limits of 
every clause because if that is going to be 
the attitude, the agreement will not have 
any significance. 

Q. I would like to ask a naive question, 
if I could. It seems to me that we agreed on 
the desirability of motherhood here. I don't 
see why it took so long to reach this agree- 
ment and what the disputes were. I wonder 
if you could outline some of the negotiations 
that went on, and what were the issues in 
this discussion? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I don't agree, first of 
all, with your premise, because this agree- 



ment was made by two countries whose con- 
flicts and confrontations have characterized 
the entire postwar period. For them to 
formalize these series of restraints, the will- 
ingness to consult, was a very major step. 

Secondly, I don't think it is useful at the 
conclusion of the negotiation to go through 
all of the debates and provide a scorecard. I 
have indicated the general approach that we 
took, which was to extend the applications 
to the international system in general and 
not just have them apply to the United 
States and to the Soviet Union and to put 
the emphasis on the prevention of war 
rather than on how wars might be con- 
ducted. But I don't think any useful purpose 
is served by going through all of the com- 
plexities. 

Q. I have a two-part question. According 
to article II, would China be regarded as an 
ally of the Soviet Union? And secondly, to 
what degree would this document be con- 
ceived as an effort to forestall any kind of 
military action against China? 

Dr. Ki.ssinger: What article II says is that 
force and the threat of force cannot be used 
against the ally of another country; it 
doesn't say anything about one's own allies. 
But it also says force and the threat of force 
cannot be used against any other country, 
so clearly under this agreement the use of 
force against any country under circum- 
stances that would have wide international 
repercussions would be precluded. 

It was not conceived as a protection for 
any particular country, but I think its 
practical consequence is that if it were 
observed — as we of course expect it will be — 
it will have the practical consequence of ap- 
plying both to the situation you described 
as well as to many other conceivable situa- 
tions. 

Q. May I follow that up. Dr. Kissinger, 
please? Did you have prior consultations 
when you met with the Chinese representa- 
tives several days ago about any form of this 
document? And would you at some point 
this year or next like to broaden the docu- 
ment to include China as a signatory? 

Dr. Kissinger: The United States con- 



July 23, 1973 



143 



suited several countries prior to the com- 
pletion of this document, but I don't want 
to go into an enumeration of which countries 
were consulted. I do not discuss my conversa- 
tions with the head of the Chinese Liaison 
Office, but I have no particular reason to 
suppose that they will necessarily approve a 
bilateral agreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, whatever its 
consequences. I will let them speak for them- 
selves. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is one qualifier in 
article II, where it says that both parties will 
refrain from the use or threat of force in 
circumstances which may endanger interna- 
tional security. When the Soviets went into 
Czechoslovakia, they obviously thought it 
didn't endanger international peace, and 
when the United States went into North 
Viet-Nam, they felt it didn't endanger inter- 
national peace. Isn't that a large hole for 
a truck to go through? 

Dr. Kissinger: If either of the two signa- 
tories wants to find an excuse to go to war, 
it will find an excuse to go to war. This has 
been the history of the postwar period. We 
are talking here of restraint on significant 
military actions ; and what endangers inter- 
national peace and security is not determined 
by the unilateral declaration of the country 
going to war but also by the reactions of 
other members of the international system, 
because this is what pi'oduces the threat to 
international peace and security. 

Therefore, again, I can only repeat, if any 
of the signatories deal with this like sharp 
lawyers pushing against the edges of the 
agreement, they will of course then find ways 
of doing so. 

On the other hand the movement into 
sovereign countries of large forces would 
not be in our view consistent with the spirit 
of this agreement, but I really do not want 
to go into a detailed analysis of every con- 
ceivable situation that could arise. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, while realizing you can- 
not go into specific circumstances, could you 
discuss in a general way what your expecta- 
tions are for applying this principle, for 
example, to the Middle East area or Asia to 



reduce the dangers of nuclear war in either 
of those areas? 

Dr. Kissinger: I really do not want to go 
into specific areas. Obviously, if we did not 
believe that this agreement could make a 
contribution to bringing about international 
restraint in areas which have been demon- 
strable sources of international tension, if 
we did not believe it could make a major 
contribution to this, we would not have 
agreed to proceed with it. 

So, as a general answer to your question, 
I would say that it is our intention to proceed 
on the basis that the restraint foreseen by 
this agreement will become an increasingly 
vital factor in international aff"airs. But I 
think that you can understand why one can- 
not at this moment give a precise descrip- 
tion of every situation which might arise. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have two questions. 
You have said it would be impossible to 
indicate in every situation what this might 
tend to prohibit or inhibit. Could you give 
us an example looking back over the past 20 
or 25 years of any situation in which force 
has been applied which you think it would 
be inhibited in the future? That is the first 
question. 

The second question is: This is the kind 
of agreement which the Russians have been 
inclined to sign with a number of countries, 
and I wonder whether or not it was they 
who were the ones who originally raised the 
idea back in Moscow last May? 

Dr. Kissinger: As to the agreement as it 
has now emerged, it would be difficult to say 
who raised the particular nature of this 
agreement. When the discussions were first 
raised in Moscow last year, it was indeed 
by the Soviet Union, but in a different con- 
text. 

The original discussion that gave the im- 
petus to this has been transformed into an 
agreement in which, I think, the contril)ution 
of both sides can be said to be equal — 

Q. You are particularly talking about the 
broadening aspect to other countries? 

Dr. Kissinger: — and the emphasis on the 
prevention of war in general. But again, on 
the approach, I think at this point it can 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



be said that both parties made a substan- 
tially equal contribution to this agreement. 

Now, secondly, with respect to situations 
that might be prevented, I can think of 
several crises in this administration, and I 
would have thought in previous periods — 
the Cuban missile crisis would be one 
example. Several Berlin ci'ises that we have 
had would be othei- examples that would 
have been avoided. I can think of some in 
this administration, but again, when we are 
talking about restraint we are talking about 
things that do not happen. 

It is never very easy to demonstrate why 
something has not happened. I think it 
reflects the changes that have occurred in 
the international environment that such an 
agreement which would have been incon- 
ceivable, say on the visit 15 years ago of 
Khrushchev, can now be described in one 
question as simply affirming motherhood — it 
is not the virtues of motherhood or desir- 
ability of motherhood. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, this agreement obvi- 
ously will have a long-term effect within 
the United States and other countries. I 
wonder why this was not written in a treaty 
form so that the Senate could get a chance 
to discuss it in its entirety and question you 
about it. And two, has there really been 
discussion with the NATO allies? I know 
you didn't want to discuss that, but obviously 
in Europe there will be concern about the 
American credibility in case of large-scale 
conventional attacks in central Europe. 

D)\ Kissinger: There can be no concern, 
because article VI fully covers existing 
NATO obligations and because if war is not 
prevented there is no particular restraint 
then about how it is conducted. Secondly, 
several NATO allies were closely consulted 
over an extended period of time, but I don't 
want to go into details. 

Q. As to the first part of the question, on 
the treaty? 

Dr. Kissinger: Excuse me. With respect to 
why it was not made in treaty form, it does 
not involve any particular positive actions 
that the United States has to take and it is a 
general statement of policy. The President, 



however, is meeting with the congressional 
leaders at 11 :30, and he will discuss with 
them ways in which the Congress can regis- 
ter its support if it wishes to do so. 

Q. You have now signed a new document 
of detente, and yesterday you pledged to go 
for new strategic arms agreements by 1974. 
Can you explain how the administration will 
then be able to ask Congress for more arms 
in the strategic arms field, and will you dis- 
cuss some insight into how you will argue 
your case? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have believed that the 
limitation of strategic arms should be 
achieved by agreement, and of course we will 
scrupulously observe the limitations that the 
agreement we hope to sign in 1974 will be 
carried out. 

However, it would be destructive of the 
negotiations if we now unilaterally imposed 
on ourselves the limitations that we are at- 
tempting to negotiate. We believe that one 
of the elements that has brought about the 
present situation is the military balance that 
exists between us and the Soviet Union. 

However, we believe that this document 
can contribute to an atmosphere that will ac- 
celerate the discussions on strategic arms 
limitations, and as I said yesterday, we con- 
sider the reduction of arms an important 
element of the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks. And it has been so expressed in the 
principles that were signed yesterday. 

But we cannot anticipate what may be 
negotiated by unilateral actions on our part. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger — 

Dr. Kissinger: Haven't you asked a ques- 
tion already? 

Q. I reminded you of part of Bernie's 
question. 

Dr. Kissinger: You are only entitled to a 
short question then. 

Q. My question. Your explanation of not 
putting it in treaty form is based in part on 
it not involving any positive obligations on 
the United States part. How is it different 
from a limited nuclear test ban treaty in that 
respect? Could you expand on why it didn't 
need to be a treaty or shouldn't be one? 

Dr. Kissinger: The limited nuclear test 



July 23, 1973 



145 



ban reflected a significant change in our arms 
policy that had been carried out until that 
time. This is really a statement of policies 
that we intend to pursue and have to be 
applied in individual cases. 

It is therefore more in the nature of a for- 
malization of a declaration of principles 
rather than of a specific set of obligations 
that can be applied automatically to concrete 
specific circumstances. 

Q. In your expose today, you used the 
word "superpower." Ambassador Zamyatin 
[L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS], 
when I spoke to him about this "super- 
power," he said the Soviet Union is not a 
superpower, neither a great power, only a 
big power. Then he said this word is in- 
vented by the Chinese. [Laughter.] 

My other question is about Israel. We in 
the Arab world welcome this agreement; we 
are concerned that Israel has so far not 
signed a partial nuclear treaty. There was an 
article by Flora Lewis, which referred to 
you, saying that you had taken a study by 
the Rand Corporation on how Israel can at- 
tack Egypt with an atomic bomb. Within 
articles IV and VI, do you think America, 
as an ally of Israel, will try to bring her to 
sign this partial treaty? 

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, with respect to 
the comments of Ambassador Zamyatin, I 
welcome the humility that he has expressed, 
and it was not adequately reflected due to 
certain personality problems in my own 
comment. 

With respect to the Rand study, I have 
never seen such a study, and I know it has 
been written about, although this is a big 
government and there are many studies 
floating around in it. They don't necessarily 
mean, however, that they have any connec- 
tion with American foreign policy. 

Thirdly, the implications of the agreement 
on the actions of other countries with respect 
to existing multilateral agreements, I do not 
want to speculate about. We could not as- 
sume that this agreement imposes on the 
United States a particular additional obliga- 
tion with respect to treaties whose obliga- 
tions are already clear. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you interpret this 



document as one that supercedes the so- 
called Brezhnev doctrine? 

Dr. Kissinger: This document makes no 
distinction in its application between the 
domestic structure of various forms of 
countries. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, is this document a re- 
nunciation of atomic war, and if not, why 
not? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I will take you along 
on future negotiations to fill in gaps that we 
leave. But this document is designed to pre- 
vent the outbreak of nuclear war by impos- 
ing restraints on the major countries with 
respect to nuclear war and with respect to 
the use of force in general. 

Therefore it does not address the question 
of what happens if war cannot be prevented, 
because that is not its purpose. Its purpose is 
to prevent wars. It is not a renunciation of a 
particular form of war if war cannot be 
prevented, but we hope that it will make a 
major contribution to the prevention of war 
and therefore your question will not have to 
be addressed. 

Q. Did you discuss the concept of not us- 
ing nuclear force first against each other, 
and why wasn't that included? 

Dr. Kissinger: We can now discuss many 
things that individual members of the press 
corps would like to have as part of other 
agreements. 

Q. That is a recognized international con- 
cept of how to prevent nuclear war, isn't it, 
Dr. Kissinger? 

Dr. Kissinger: There are two ways you 
can look at how to prevent nuclear war. One 
is by preventing war, and the second is by 
imposing on yourselves specific restraints 
with respect to particular categories of 
weapons if war cannot be avoided. 

We choose to go the road of attempting to 
prevent war, and thereby nuclear war, be- 
cause many other countries depend upon 
what actions will be taken in case an ag- 
gression occurs. Therefore, we did not be- 
lieve it would contribute to peace if we made 
particular distinctions as to categories of 
weapons in case of war. 

The overriding problem is to preserve the 
peace and to prevent war. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Dr. Kissing-er, does article IV oblige 
the United States to act as sort of an arbiter 
or mediator of the Sino-Soviet conflict if it 
should get worse? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. What article IV pro- 
vides is that if either of the countries con- 
templates nuclear war with any other 
country, or of course with the other nuclear 
country, it has an obligation to consult the 
other signatory with the purpose of avoiding 
the situation that would produce such a war. 

We have no intention of being an arbiter 
between the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China, and we look at this con- 
sultation as a mutual restraint rather than 
as one that creates a right of intervention 
all over the world. 



DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, 
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., JUNE 25 

White House press release (San Clemente) dated June 25 

Mr. Ziegler: You have the communique, 
which is embargoed until 1 o'clock eastern 
time and 10 o'clock Pacific time. Dr. Kis- 
singer is here to discuss that with you and 
take your questions on the communique and 
also on the summit between the President 
and General Secretary. 

For the statistics buffs in the press corps, 
the President and General Secretary spent 
a total of 47 hours together. They met in 
formal sessions with advisers or alone for 
I814. hours. In addition, the President and 
General Secretary were together 28% hours 
at informal gatherings, social functions and 
signing ceremonies, and events of that sort. 

Q. How much alone, face to face? 

Mr. Ziegler: Almost 10 hours — 91/0 hours. 

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I 
will not go through the communique, be- 
cause I understand you have already had a 
chance to read it. Let me make a few gen- 
eral observations about the summit and how 
it fits into the general development of our 
foreign policy, and then I will take questions 
about the communique or any other part of 
the summit which you may wish to raise. 

One good way of assessing the results of 
the summit is to compare last year's com- 



munique with this year's communique. Last 
year's communique spoke about the desira- 
bility of peaceful coexistence. I said : - 

Having considered various areas of bilateral 
US-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an 
improvement in relations is possible and desirable. 

This year we say that: 

Both Sides are convinced that the discussions 
they have just held represent a further milestone 
in the constructive development of their relations. 

Convinced that such a development of American- 
Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their 
peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take 
further major steps to give these relations maxi- 
mum stability and to turn the development of 
friendship and cooperation between their peoples 
into a permanent factor for worldwide peace. 

In other words, what marks the turning 
point last year, in which the fact of peaceful 
coexistence required special affirmation and 
the possibility of improving relations be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union was thought deserving of special 
note, and this year we are speaking of a 
continuing relationship. 

As a result, as relations between the So- 
viet Union and the United States proceed 
along the course that was charted last May 
and accelerated this June, we cannot expect 
that these meetings, which we have affirmed 
should become a regular part of U.S. -Soviet 
relationships, will produce a dramatic new 
departure. It is the strength of this relation- 
ship as it develops that the road is charted 
and that what we expect to see is a further 
evolution along a path which will be increas- 
ingly free of confrontations and which will 
become increasingly a part of a .stable inter- 
national system. This is the context in which 
we see the U.S. -Soviet relationship. 

If you look back over previous summit 
meetings between Soviet and American 
leaders, they almost invariably occurred in 
the shadow of some crisis, and they were in- 
evitably directed to removing some source 
of tension and some cause of confrontation. 

In May 1972 we still met in this shadow 
of the Vietnamese war and the recent deci- 
sions that had led to an expansion of military 



July 23, 1973 



■ For text, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 899. 

147 



operations in Indochina but even then, be- 
fore the first talk, enunciated some common 
principles of conduct and affirmed the de- 
sirability of a long-term evolution toward a 
peaceful and ultimately cooperative relation- 
ship between the two states and the two 
peoples. These expectations were fulfilled 
over the course of the year, and therefore 
what this summit intended to do was to 
strengthen the cooperative bonds that had 
developed in particular areas, to give a new 
impetus to the key areas of negotiations, 
especially strategic arms limitations and 
mutual force reductions, and thirdly, to take 
the joint principles one step further by em- 
bodying them in a formal agreement de- 
signed to prevent war, and especially nuclear 
war. 

There is nothing I can add to the partic- 
ular agreements that are enumerated in the 
communique that deal with the cooperative 
relationships in various fields and that rep- 
resent a continuation of a process that 
started last year. 

I can only say from my personal experi- 
ence in participating in many of these ne- 
gotiations that what I told you ladies and 
gentlemen before the summit has been re- 
inforced by the experience of the summit. 
Many of these agreements do not themselves 
take the attention and time of the top lead- 
ers, and it would be absurd to pretend to 
you that the General Secretary and the Pres- 
ident sit down and discu.ss the details of the 
civil aviation agreements ; but it is also true 
that the imminence of their meetings, and 
the fact that they have determined to give a 
symbolic expression to this relationship, 
gives an impetus to negotiations that other- 
wise would drag on for months and permits 
the quick resolution of particular issues 
which, if left to the expert level, could pro- 
duce extended stalemate and there is some 
significance in having the relationship de- 
velop on such a broad front, developing on 
both sides a commitment that is becoming 
increasingly difficult to reverse. 

With respect to the other areas, I have 
talked to you at some length about the de- 
cisions with respect to Strategic Arms Lim- 



itation Talks. I think you can assume that 
in addition to what has been stated formally 
in the agreement on principles that the two 
leaders had extensive discussions as to how 
the process can be accelerated so that a 
meaningful agreement can be achieved con- 
sistent with the deadline that they have set 
themselves. Therefore we believe, with con- 
siderable hope, that a permanent agreement 
limiting strategic offensive arms, which 
would be one of historic achievements in the 
field of arms control, can and will be nego- 
tiated during the course of 1974. 

With respect to the mutual balanced force 
reductions (MBFR), we told you before this 
summit conference that this was not the 
forum in which to negotiate the specifics. 
This is a matter of the profoundest concern 
to our allies, and it had never been intended 
to discuss the specifics, the specific schemes, 
at this meeting. 

However, as those who have followed the 
discussions realize, there had been some un- 
certainty about when these discussions would 
begin. Prior to the meeting, in the prepara- 
tory conference in Vienna, the Soviet posi- 
tion had tied the opening of the MBFR con- 
ference to the ending of the European 
Security Conference. At this meeting, it was 
decided that the MBFR conference would 
begin unconditionally on October 30th, and 
of course both leaders agreed that they would 
make a serious effort to deal with the ques- 
tion of armaments in central "Europe. 

The Indochina problem, which last year 
was a source of contention, has received a 
common expression in this document. 

And finally, there has been the agreement 
on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I 
have seen several comments to the effect that 
it is nonbinding, that it is not self-enforcing, 
and no doubt I have contributed to this by 
comments that reflect my former profes- 
sorial profession, so let me state our posi- 
tion : that no agreement in history has ever 
enforced itself; every agreement in history 
that has been observed has depended either 
on the willingness of the parties to observe 
it or on the willingness of one or the other 
parties to enforce it or on the rewards for 



148 



Department of State Bulletin 



compliance and the risks of noncompliance. 

This agreement is no different from any 
other agreement in that respect. When great 
powers make an agreement with each other, 
they of course have the capability of not 
observing it unless the other side is prepared 
to draw extreme consequences. But the vio- 
lation of this agreement would have serious 
consequences for the whole context of U.S.- 
Soviet relations, and conversely the observ- 
ance of this agreement can mark, as I said 
on Friday, a milestone in the achievement 
of self-restraint by the major countries, a 
self-restraint which is by definition the es- 
sence of peace and which we intend to ob- 
serve, which we expect the Soviet Union to 
observe, and which can therefore provide 
the foundation for a new international rela- 
tionship. 

Of course history is replete with changes 
of course and we must be vigilant and pre- 
pared for such an occurrence; but it is the 
belief of the President that this period has a 
unique opportunity to create a new and more 
peaceful system. It is an opportunity that 
has come about partly as a result of the 
enormity of the weapons that would be used 
in case of a conflict, partly by the depth of 
human aspiration toward peace, partly as a 
result of the complexities of a world in which 
the ideological expectations of any side have 
not been fully met. 

But whatever the reasons, we consider the 
summit as a further advance along that 
road, that as these meetings become a regu- 
lar feature of international life and as we 
come to take them more and more for 
granted, the results will follow paths that 
will come to seem more and more natural, 
and we would consider that one of the best 
signs that a peaceful world is coming into 
being. 

So this is our assessment of the summit, 
and I will be glad to answer any questions 
on this or on what I have said or on the com- 
munique or anything else related to the sum- 
mit. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the communique says 
positive trends are developing in interna- 
tional relations toward the relaxation of 



tension and the strengthening of cooperative 
relations in the interest of peace. I wonder if 
you would apply that sentence specifically to 
the Middle East situation and what tran- 
spired on it in the summit? 

Dr. Kissinger: As you can see from the 
communique, the Middle East is one of the 
most complex areas and it is one in which one 
has to separate two problems, one, the local 
tensions — that is, the tensions between the 
Arab states and Israel — from the so-called 
great-power rivalry in that area. When this 
administration came into oflfice, they were 
inextricably linked. In 1970 the world came 
close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps 
was realized generally at the time, over the 
invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at 
that time every conflict in the Middle East 
became immediately and inextricably a part 
of the great rivalry. Even the selection of 
words by White House briefers was picked 
up by local newspapers and became a matter 
of attention in the context of East-West re- 
lationships. 

Now, I think it is safe to say not that the 
Soviet Union and we agree on the evolution 
of the Middle East and how it should be 
resolved, as the communique makes clear, 
but I think both sides will make an effort 
not to become inextricably involved in its 
conflict with respect to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 

The communique states that both sides 
recognize the importance of the solution and 
that both sides will make efforts to help 
pi'omote it, and therefore we hope that some 
progress will be made over the course of the 
year. 

Q. Is there any significance in the drop- 
ping of the word "balanced" from mutual 
balanced force reduction in the communique, 
and I notice that you used it once and didn't 
use it another time? 

Dr. Kissinger: That is because I usually 
speak extemporaneously. No, there is no sig- 
nificance in the dropping of the word "bal- 
anced." 

In the preparatory discussions in Vienna, 
there was some di.scussion about it, but since 
it concerned entirely procedural matters it 



July 23, 1973 



149 



has no substantive significance. The U.S. 
position with respect to the mutual l)alanced 
force reduction negotiations has been sub- 
mitted to our allies. We think that it has re- 
ceived substantial support from our allies. 
We will enter the negotiations, we are con- 
vinced, with a reasonable and united position. 

What particular adjective one gives to de- 
scribe it is really less important, but the sub- 
stance of it will be that it must be balanced 
and that it must reflect the principles of this 
communique and of May 29 last year — that 
no negotiation can succeed that attempts to 
give a unilateral advantage to one side or 
another. 

Q. Is there any significance in the brief 
material on the Middle East to the omission 
of the word "security" in the phrase "be 
consistent with their independence and sov- 
ereignty"? 

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is safe to say 
that both sides recognize that no solution is 
possible that does not assure the security of 
the countries concerned. And there is no 
dispute about this. 

Q. Why didn't the communique then say 
so? 

Dr. Kissinger: The truth is that I don't 
remember any discussion about the word 
"security." If somebody there thought of it, 
it almost certainly would have said so. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you plan soon to go 
to China or do you plan to invite a Chinese 
leader to visit the United States in order to 
assure them that what they witnessed this 
past week was not the beginning of some kind 
of superpower condominium? 

Dr. Kissinger: We are of course ahvays in 
touch with all interested countries, and it 
is a fixed element of our policy not to partic- 
ipate in any condominium directed either at 
our allies or at other interested parties. 

We believe that we have a common in- 
terest with the Soviet Union in promoting a 
peaceful order. We believe also that to the 
extent that a more peaceful conduct emerges 
by all parties — emerges from our discus- 
sions — that all nations benefit. 

We have not agreed, and we shall not agree 
nor were we asked to agree, to anything that 



smacks of superpower condominium, and 
our views on this are well known to all 
interested countries. 

We have no specific plans at this moment 
for any of the visits that you have described, 
and if any should develop, we will of course 
announce them immediately. But we don't 
have to have such a visit to make that par- 
ticular point clear. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there has been a con- 
siderable amount of confusion in connection 
with the SALT agreement about MIRV's. In 
the agreement it states that national means 
of inspection will be the only possible means. 
Is it possible to control MIRV through only 
national means of inspection, or should we 
read into the wording there that in effect, 
you have abandoned the notion of being able 
to control MIRV's? 

Dr. Kissinger: First, the agreement does 
not say national means are the only possible 
means. It says that both sides agree that 
they must be verifiable by national means. 
If both sides should decide to have other 
than national means, that wouldn't be pre- 
cluded ; but I think that is extremely unlikely. 

So, the realistic assumption has to be that 
any agreement that will be made is one that 
will be monitored by national means. Now 
then, the question is: Does that principle 
really exclude any control of MIRV's? 

First, let me say that we believe that 
MIRV's are an important part of this nego- 
tiation and therefore we believe that it is 
possible to have some restraints on MIRV's 
that can be monitored by national means and 
therefore a great deal depends on what re- 
straints we are talking about. 

If you are talking about bans on produc- 
tion, those would be next to impossible to 
monitor by national means. If you are talk- 
ing about deployment, then they are possible 
to monitor within a margin of error which is 
larger than is the case in mere quantities — 
than if you are monitoring quantities, but 
that is finite. If you are talking about a com- 
bination of deployment and improvements in 
accuracy and so forth, so that you could add 
certain testing restraints, then you have ever 
greater possibilities of inspection. 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



I am not saying that these are our specific 
proposals. I am saying that you cannot just 
look at this in terms of one category of re- 
straints and assess the relationship of na- 
tional means to that one category. You have 
to do it in the whole complex of MIRV tech- 
nology and of the kinds of restraints you 
want to employ, and we think it is possible 
to put together a package by combining sev- 
eral restraints verifiable by national means. 
Q. Dr. Kissinger, on page 12 of the com- 
munique, it says they set the goal for trade 
over the next three years $2-$3 billion. This 
is the figure for the entire three-year period, 
as I understand it. Is that right? 
Dr. Kissinger: That is right. 
Q. Since the current trade is running at, 
I think $1.3 billion annually now, '73, would 
not this be — 

Dr. Kissinger: The $1.3 billion includes 
agricultural. This is excluding agricultural 
commodities. 

Q. Do you have any figure including agri- 
cultural commodities ? 

Dr. Kissinger: I do not have it including 
agricultural. I think, excluding agricultural, 
it runs at about $600 million now, and I 
think this envisages an increase of about 
50 percent. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, does the communique 
hint, or more than hint, at an East-West 
summit at the end of the European Security 
Conference? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it obviously mentions 
it. 

The position of the communique with re- 
spect to the East- West summit is one that 
we have taken before; that is to say, that 
the level of the concluding phase of the Euro- 
pean Security Conference will be determined 
by progress that is made in the first two 
phases, the first of which begins on July 3 
at the Foreign Minister level. Then there will 
be commission meetings, and upon the con- 
clusion of the commission meetings, one can 
determine, first, the final phase of the con- 
ference and, secondly, the appropriate level 
of participation. We are, in principle, pre- 
pared to consider a summit if the results of 
the first two phases warrant it. 

Q. May I ask you to enumerate as briefly 



as possible the total package of benefits that 
will accrue to the United States as a result 
of the past few days' activities? 

Dr. Kissinger: I can see this is not some- 
body who has attended previous briefings or 
he wouldn't have made a demand for brevity. 
[Laughter.] 

The benefits that accrue to the United 
States are the benefits that accrue to all par- 
ticipants in the international system from an 
improvement in the prospects of peace. To 
the extent that we live in an atmosphere of 
confrontation, the United States, as the 
strongest country in the non-Communist 
world and as the one on which the security of 
most others depends, is immediately drawn 
closer to the brink of war than almost any 
other participant. 

Secondly, we expect that as a result of 
many of these cooperative efforts, both peo- 
ples will benefit in a concrete way. 

With respect to the economic relationships, 
about which this question is often asked, they 
have to be seen in the whole context of the 
web of relations that is developing between 
the two countries. Most of the large deals 
that are being talked about will have to be 
made by private American industry, and 
they would presumably not be made unless 
they were thought to be of mutual benefit. 
We have taken the view from the begin- 
ning of this administration, first, that nego- 
tiations with the Soviet Union should not 
be conducted on the basis of atmospherics, 
but on the basis of very concrete negotia- 
tion and, secondly, that the economic and 
political matters should be linked together 
so that the progress would take place on a 
broad front. And I must say it is a little 
ironic that early in the administration we 
were all accused of delaying the progress of 
negotiations and now many of the same peo- 
ple who accused us then of being too slow 
are discovering that the benefits may be too 
one-sided. But the benefits of peace in this 
period cannot be one-sided. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the reason for 
including a proposal for a world disarma- 
ment conference to be held at an appro- 
priate time? What is your definition of an 
appropriate time? Does it mean after the 



July 23, 1973 



151 



treaties on the strategic arms, or what? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you know that the 
proposal for a world disarmament confer- 
ence is one that the Soviet Union has re- 
peatedly made. It was included in last year's 
communique, and it was repeated in this 
year's communique, and I think it is safe to 
say that if our Soviet colleagues and we were 
pressed to the wall, our definition of the ap- 
propriate time might differ. [Laughter.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what we have been lis- 
tening to is an anthology of the positive 
results of the summit. Were not there some 
things that you had hoped to achieve at this 
particular summit that you have not? 

Dr. Kissinger: Either due to lack of imag- 
ination or megalomania, I can't really tell 
you anything that we were hoping to achieve 
that we didn't. These summits are prepared 
over a long period of time. This particular 
summit is the result of many exchanges with 
the Soviet Union : Secretary Peterson's 
[Peter G. Peterson, then Secretary of Com- 
merce] trip in July, my trip in September, 
Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to the 
United States in October, Secretary [of the 
Treasury George P.] Shultz's trip in March, 
my trip in May, many exchanges between 
the two leaders. 

So it really is organically almost impos- 
sible for those summits to occur with a long 
agenda in which you will say we will try this 
and see what happens. It is impossible, and 
also undesirable, because when you have the 
two leaders of the most powerful nations in 
the world confronting each other you do not 
want to have a situation in which a totally 
unpredictable clash can occur. 

So in this meeting the range of what was 
attainable was clearly understood by April 
or May, and the results were within the 
I'ange that had been previously agreed to. 

Now, at the end of each summit there is 
always a very extensive meeting between 
the two leaders in which they decide the sort 
of problems they can be working on over the 
next year. We had such a meeting in the 
Kremlin on the day of the President's de- 
parture in 1972, and that was the third time 
that this agreement on the prevention of 



nuclear war in a slightly different context 
was raised. 

As j-ou all know, the President and the 
General Secretary met for three hours on 
Saturday night, and there was a discussion 
of the sort of problems that could be worked 
on in preparation for next year's summit, 
and of course there is an unfinished agenda. 
Obviously the Middle East is part of the un- 
finished agenda, but we didn't expect to 
settle it at this meeting. SALT is part of it. 
MBFR is part of it. This is where we stand 
now in relation to next year's summit. 

Q. General Secretary Brezhnev said, as he 
was departing, that he believed that Presi- 
dent Nixon could be returning to the Soviet 
Union as early as six to eight months. He 
also said that he expects that there will be 
more important agreements, or equally im- 
portant agreements, signed there, indicating 
to some that he was possibly projecting per- 
haps an interim agreement on SALT. On 
those two points, could you give us the U.S. 
view on the timing of a visit and also on 
possibilities of an interim agi'eement on 
SALT, which was referred to in an earlier 
statement by the principals? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, as you saw, the Gen- 
eral Secretary was speaking without notes 
and in the exuberance of the moment. 
[Laughter.] 

We don't foreclose a meeting earlier than 
12 months that has been customary between 
the two recent summits, but if we had been 
asked on that occasion to give our estimate, 
we would have been somewhat more cautious. 
So if it is more rapid, then this would indi- 
cate a more rapid pace of negotiation than 
we have foreseen, which we do not exclude 
but which we think is unlikely. 

Now, it is not at all excluded, as the prin- 
cipals made clear, that there would be an 
interim agreement on SALT in a period less 
than the 12 to 14 months that I would have 
given you as an estimate, and this is one of 
the matters to which we will now turn. 

Q. A followup on Mr. Kalb's question. 
Was chemical weapons control one of the 
things that had been dropped by April or 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



May, or was that actively under considera- 
tion at this summit? 

Dr. Kissinger: No. 

Q. You suggested that most things had 
been decided on the agenda by April or May. 
I wondered if this matter had been excluded 
at that point for possible agreement or was 
under active consideration for agi'eement 
here? 

Dr. Kissinger: When I say "had been de- 
cided by April or May," let me make clear 
what I mean. By the end of my visit to Za- 
vidovo, it was not that everything had been 
decided, but that the range within which the 
negotiations between the two leaders would 
take place had been essentially determined 
and therefore the shape of probable agree- 
ments had become fairly clear. By that time 
it was clear that there would be no agree- 
ment on chemical warfare. 

Q. It used to be a theory that it would be 
a good idea for the top Soviet leaders to 
come to this country to get an idea of our 
strength; that is, the size of the country, 
what the people are like, the size and scope 
of our production, that kind of thing. This 
summit conference could have been held on 
a rock in the Atlantic Ocean for as much or 
as little that Mr. Brezhnev saw of America 
and Americans. Did he have at any time any 
desire to see anything of us and our country 
outside of the Presidential compound? 

Dr. Kissinger: The nature of the travel of 
the General Secretary was left to him. We 
made it clear that he could go anywhere he 
chose and for as long as he wished, so the 
General Secretary's itinerary was not deter- 
mined by us. However, it seemed logical to 
us as well that the General Secretary wanted 
to follow the summit in Moscow that had 
been devoted entirely to work with just two 
very brief side trips with another summit 
in the United States of a more or less similar 
nature, in which the two leaders would spend 
most of their time in accelerating the mo- 
mentum of their previous conversations. 

I think, however, it is safe to say that now 
that the basic course has been established 
and many of the major agreements have 
been achieved, that the purpose to which 



you referred will be realized in future sum- 
mits. For example, the General Secretary 
has pointed out to the President that when 
he returns to the Soviet Union in 1974, the 
Soviet Union would like it very much if we 
would agree to a greater exposure to various 
aspects of Soviet life and also to see more of 
the Soviet Union than proved to be the case 
last year. We have agreed to this. 

If these summits become annual events 
and the General Secretary returns here in 
1975, it can be taken for granted that much 
more extensive travel would be included in 
his program. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, concerning Indochina, 
on page 8, the last sentence on page 8 says 
that the leaders may also reaffirm their stand 
that the political futures of Viet-Nam, Laos, 
and Cambodia should be left to the respective 
peoples to determine, free of outside inter- 
ference. Have you detected any change, per- 
haps, in the Soviet attitude concerning the 
current fighting in Cambodia, and particu- 
larly, do the Soviets disapprove at all of any 
activities that Hanoi may be undertaking in 
Cambodia, either supply or military? 

Dr. Kissinger: First, let us get the Cam- 
bodian problem into perspective. We are talk- 
ing here of the very last phase of a very 
prolonged war. We are not talking here of 
the beginning of another Indochina conflict. 
I don't want to characterize the Soviet atti- 
tude toward Cambodia. I think the Soviet 
Union should speak for itself. 

I think that this sentence here states our 
view exactly : that w^e agreed that the future 
of Cambodia should be left to the Cambodian 
people and that peace should come consistent 
with the sovereignty and the rights of self- 
determination of the Cambodians. We are 
actively engaged in attempting to bring this 
about at this moment, and we believe, as I 
said previously, that as the relationships 
among the great powers fall into clearer 
focus, as one looks at these areas less from 
their symbolic aspect of either being the 
spearhead of wars of national liberation or 
of being a conspiracy directed, it was thought 
once, from Peking, I think that all countries 
can adopt a more responsible attitude to- 



July 23, 1973 



153 



ward the conflict in Indochina and a more 
disassociated attitude than was the case in 
the 1960's. 

Q. My impression is that the granting of 
most-favored-nation status to the Soviet 
Union, whether or not it is granted, is no 
longer a serious obstacle to the development 
of long-term trade. Is that the case ? 

Dr. Kissinger: No, we believe that the 
granting of most-favored-nation status to the 
Soviet Union is important for the develop- 
ment of large-scale trade, and it is extremely 
important to the development of Soviet- 
American relations. This was part of the 
series of understandings in a whole complex 
of relationships between us and the Soviet 
Union last year, and it would cast serious 
doubt on our ability to perform our side of 
understandings and agreements if in each 
case that part of an agreement that is car- 
ried out later by one side or the other is then 
made the subject of additional conditions that 
were not part of the original negotiation. 
And therefore I would say that for both sym- 
bolic and substantive reasons, and substan- 
tively both economic and political, it would 
be very unfortunate if the request to grant 
most-favored-nation status to the Soviet 
Union, which means nondiscriminatoiy 
status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were not 
granted. 

Q. Can you address yourself to two im- 
pressions? 

Dr. Kissinger: Impressions or questions? 

Q. However you like, impressions and a 
question. First, is there here a signal to the 
Russians that they have a free hand where 
China is concerned, as a followup to an ear- 
lier question? And the second impression. 
Dr. Kissinger, in the 89 words devoted to the 
Middle East, one gets the impression that the 
Soviet Union and the United States are as 
far apart as before. 

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the first 
question, as I said on Friday, I do not want 
to go into hypothetical cases addressed to 
particular countries. However, since you 
raised the question, lot me say this: I don't 
know what a free hand vis-a-vis China 
means. The Soviet Union has declared offi- 



cially that it has no military intentions vis- 
a-vis the People's Republic of China. 

On the other hand it is difficult to conceive 
a military attack by anybody on the People's 
Republic of China that would not endanger 
international peace and security, and there- 
fore it would be thought to be, from what- 
ever direction it came, not consistent with 
our view of this treaty, but I repeat: This 
does not imply that we have any reason to 
believe that any such attack is contemplated 
or that any of this subject was discussed at 
all between them. 

With respect to the Middle East, the com- 
munique makes clear that there is no una- 
nimity of views. Whether that is as wide as 
before or narrower, I think we should let 
the future decide, but obviously the subject 
was discussed at some length. 

Q. The glowing manner in which the two 
leaders have described their past weeks — 

Dr. Kissinger: What manner? 

Q. Glowing manner, the euphoric manner. 

Dr. Kissinger: Don't top yourself. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

Q. — carries with it the impression that 
we can now expect an acceleration of de- 
mands or requests or proposals, at least 
within our own country, for the reduction 
of armaments. A moment ago you talked 
about the necessity of maintaining vigilance. 
Would you discuss that in context with the 
summit meeting? 

Dr. Kissinger: This period requires great 
sophistication on the part of the American 
people. We have reached this point because 
we have proceeded from the basis of ade- 
quate strength and because we have consist- 
ently taken the position that we would 
reduce our strength only by agreement with 
the other side in some agreed relation to the 
reductions by the other side. 

This must remain an essential part of our 
policy, and we cannot do, as a result of this 
agreement, unilaterally those things that the 
Soviet Union will not do. We have made it 
clear in the communique and we have made 
it clear in the conduct of our policy that the 
principal goal of this administration in the 
field of foreign policy is to leave behind it a 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



world that can be said to be safer, more 
peaceful, and more permanently free of crisis 
than the one we found. 

But we, in our view, cannot achieve this 
by unilateral reductions of American 
strength, and we believe that the course on 
which we are — which has made, in our judg- 
ment, significant progress — can be main- 
tained only if we were to continue to pursue 
it on the basis of strict reciprocity. 

Q. If I may, I would like to come back to 
this not so important adjective "balanced." 
Isn't it true that the Soviets have quite a 
different interpretation of balance than you 
have, and is this one of the reasons why not 
even the formal title of MBFR talks was 
spelled out in the communique? 

Dr. Kissinger: What was spelled out in 
the communique is, I believe, consistent with 
what was agreed to in Vienna. The future of 
force reductions in Europe will not be deter- 
mined by adjectives. It will be determined 
by concrete programs. It will not be deter- 
mined by constant insinuations of some dark 
American design. 

The United States has taken the view and 
has stated publicly that our security is inte- 
grally linked to the security of our European 
allies. Therefore we are prepared to work 
with our European allies on working out a 
concrete program that reflects the common 
conception of security. We have invited our 
European allies to participate with us in 
developing this program, and we think the 
time has come to discuss the program, rather 
than the adjectives of a title of a conference. 
Q. Dr. Kissinger, did they give us to un- 
derstand that they would play a useful role 
in seeking a cease-fire in Cambodia, and did 
we give them to understand that we will be 
winding down our bombing there in the 
meantime ? 

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think any useful 
purpose is served if I go into the details of 
these discussions with respect to Cambodia. 
The primary problem with respect to Cam- 
bodia now is whether it is possible in a finite 
period of time to bring about a negotiation 
that leads toward a political settlement and 
produces a rapid cease-fire. The particular 



tactics of particular operations are subsid- 
iary to that overriding issue which was the 
subject of discussions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, does the agreement to 
])revent nuclear war mean that we would 
have to enter into consultations with the 
Russians before we would come to the de- 
fense of an ally under attack? 

Dr. Kissinger: The agreement for the pre- 
vention of nuclear war, in article VI, makes 
clear that allied obligations are unaffected. 
Secondly, the significance of article IV is that 
in case of situations that might produce the 
danger of nuclear war in general, consulta- 
tions have to be undertaken. It .should there- 
fore be seen as a restraint on the diplomacy 
of both sides and, as I pointed out on Friday, 
not a guide to action in case those restraints 
break down and war occurs. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the economic front, 
here you talk about that serious and sympa- 
thetic consideration should be given by the 
U.S. Government. Earlier you stressed in 
your discussion — 

Dr. Kissinger: Consideration to what? 
Q. To proposals that are in the interests 
of both sides. These are business proposals, 
presumably. Earlier you stressed the impor- 
tance of the private corporations in the ne- 
gotiations. What happens when they conflict 
and a corporation says this is in our mutual 
best interest, but perhaps you do not? A case 
in point right now is the natural gas deals. 
There are two of them that were discussed 
before. One corporation went out and made 
a deal. How do you resolve this question? 

Dr. Kissinger: To the extent that corpora- 
tions can implement their deals without the 
aid of the government, we can do no more 
than express our views to their directors. To 
the extent that the corporations require the 
assistance of the government or the guaran- 
tee of the government of their investment, 
we have the possibility of gearing the deci- 
sions to our national policy. 

Now, with respect to the natural gas deal, 
we are not under the impression that these 
companies have the resources to do them 
entirely on their own, and therefore we can 
relate them to national policy; but as the 



July 23, 1973 



155 



communique says, we are looking on them 
favorably. But it is hard to discuss in the 
abstract. 

Q. There is a reference in the communi- 
que to a meeting at the highest level to com- 
plete the European Security Conference. 
What sort of time frame do you have in 
mind? 

Dr. Kissinger: As you notice, the com- 
munique makes no particular reference to a 
specific time frame, and therefore this ques- 
tion will be easier to answer after the For- 
eign Ministers have met and particularly 
after the commissions have started their 
work. It will depend to some extent on 
whether the European participants will de- 
cide to take a summer vacation and the 
commissions will decide to take a summer 
vacation in August or not. The time frame is, 
as the communique says, the quickest possi- 
ble time, but there is no particular time limit. 

Q. We are talking about some period with- 
in less than a year, aren't we? 

Dr. Kissinger: That would be a reasonable 
assumption, but it depends on the progress 
of the conference. But that is a good working 
hypothesis. 

Q. On the Watergate, the inevitable ques- 
tion as to whether Watergate in any way 
was discussed between the President and the 
General Secretary, and would you, Dr. Kis- 
singer, be prepared to comment on published 
speculation that the pressures of Watergate 
applied a more modest negotiating technique 
on the part of the President in his expecta- 
tions on the summit? 

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the first 
question, Watergate was not discussed. And 
I don't think the point has yet been reached 
where our domestic travails are discussed 
with foreign leaders. Second, the negotiating 
frame for the summit was established last 
year and was in no way affected by Water- 
gate. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet side, com- 
ing back to the natural gas deals, ask for a 
more specific, more categorical American 
endorsement of these, particularly the latest 
Occidental Petroleum deal, and a promise of 



guarantees on the credits than is in the 
communique? 

Dr. Kissinger: No, the specific status of 
the gas deals is now that they have to be 
moved from these abstract declarations of 
intent to some concrete propositions. These 
concrete propositions have to be developed, 
in the first instance, by the companies con- 
cerned that have to make a judgment of the 
degree of investment that is required and 
also on whether it is an economic proposition. 

At that point, one will have to determine 
whether this can be done entirely by private 
capital or if it requires, at least in some of its 
aspects, some U.S. governmental guarantees. 
That point has not yet been reached, because 
the projects have not yet been formulated 
into precise economic propositions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in what way are the doc- 
uments and agreements signed by the Gen- 
eral Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party binding in any respect on the Soviet 
Government, and another rather petty ques- 
tion, is there any connection between the 
timing of this week's events or at least the 
communique, this press conference this 
morning and your press conference Wednes- 
day, if you have one — is there any connec- 
tion between that timing and the Watergate 
events going on in Washington? 

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the first 
question, whenever the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party signs a document, we 
are given — it is actually legally a very good 
question — we are given a document by the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry pointing out that he 
has full powers to sign that document, be- 
cause, as you know, Mr. Brezhnev has no 
ofl^cial governmental position. So that legally 
the documents which he signed this year and 
the documents which he signed last year are 
fully within Soviet constitutional processes, 
and we have also an ofl^cial Soviet statement 
that he has full governmental powers to sign 
the document. 

Secondly, with respect to my briefings, our 
view here has always been that the necessi- 
ties that produce foreign policies are of a 
permanent nature and that our objective is 
what I described at the beginning, to bring 



156 



Department of State Bulletin 



about a more peaceful world. They are not 
geared in any respect to any of the domestic 
situations. 

This schedule was determined at a time 
when it was believed that [John W.] Dean 
would testify last week, and it was agreed 
then that in view of the fact that the Gen- 
eral Secretary's speech was on television 
yesterday, that his departure statement 
would be on television yesterday, and in view 
of the fact that it is more appropriate to re- 
lease communiques at a time he is leaving 
the country, that the release of the commu- 
nique would be on Monday and therefore 
the briefing of the communique would be on 
Monday. That is a schedule that was deter- 
mined, I repeat, at a time when we did not 
know that the hearings would be postponed. 

If I have another briefing on Wednesday, 
it is in response to the repeated request of 
many of you ladies and gentlemen that we 
have a more informal session, less geared to 
the words of the communique, to set this in 
better perspective. 

But, since you have raised the issue, I will 
say now, I will move you to Thursday, to 
remove any question about it. The thought 
had never crossed our mind, and we will now, 
if there is one, have it on Thursday. 



Q. Could I suggest that the day is less 
important than it be sometime later in the 
afternoon, California time. 

Dr. Kissinger: Work it out with Ron. If 
there is another briefing, the purpose is to 
permit a somewhat more philosophical dis- 
cussion of where we are going. The timing 
should be left to what produces the best 
philosophical discussion. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the proposal for a world 
disarmament conference has been mentioned 
many times over the years and ha.s not been 
a subject necessarily of agreement between 
the Soviet Union and the United States as to 
its usefulness. I wonder whether the mention 
of it here in the communique, whether you 
would characterize it as one of the accom- 
plishments of the summit? 

Dr. Kissinyer: The world disarmament 
conference was mentioned in last year's 
communique, and therefore to have it men- 
tioned again cannot be considered a radical 
departure and one of the principal accom- 
plishments of the conference. 

We have said that we would be prepared 
to discuss it at an appropriate time, and I 
suspect that this will lead to several ex- 
changes on that subject. 



July 23, 1973 



157 



Agreements Signed During General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit 
to the United States 



FoUotving are texts of agreements signed 
during the tveek of June 18 by President 
Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, by 
Secretary of Agricnltxire Earl L. Butz and 
Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, by Secre- 
tary of the Treasury George P. Shultz and 
Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev, 
and by Secretary of Transportation Claude 
S. Brinegar and Minister of Civil Aviation 
B. P. Buyagev. 

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS 
ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION 

Basic Principles of Nkgotiations on the Firtiier 

LliMITATION OK STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 

The President of the United States of America, 
Richard Nixon, and the General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, 

Having thoroughly considered the question of the 
further limitation of strategic arms, and the prog- 
ress already achieved in the current negotiations, 

Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adop- 
tion of further limitations of strategic arms would 
be a major contribution in reducing the danger of 
an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening 
international peace and security, 

Have agreed as follows: 

First. The two Sides will continue active negotia- 
tions in order to work out a permanent agreement 
on more complete measures on the limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent 
reduction, proceeding from the Basic Principles of 
Relations between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in 
Moscow on May 29, 1972, and from the Interim 
Agreement between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 
May 26, 1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 

Over the course of the ne.xt year the two Sides 
will make serious efforts to work out the provisions 
of the permanent agreement on more complete meas- 



ures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms 
with the objective of signing it in 1974. 

Second. New agreements on the limitation of stra- 
tegic offensive armaments will be based on the prin- 
ciples of the American-Soviet documents adopted in 
Moscow in May 1972 and the agreements reached 
in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both 
Sides will be guided by the recognition of each 
other's equal security interests and by the recogni- 
tion that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, di- 
rectly or indirectly, would be inconsi.'itent with the 
strengthening of peaceful relations between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 

Third. The limitations placed on strategic offen- 
sive weapons can apply both to their quantitative 
aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement. 
Fourth. Limitations on strategic offensive arms 
must be subject to adequate verification by national 
technical means. 

Fifth. The modernization and replacement of stra- 
tegic offensive arms would be permitted under con- 
ditions which will be formulated in the agreements 
to be concluded. 

Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent 
agreement on more complete measures of strategic 
offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to 
reach agreements on separate measures to supple- 
ment the existing Interim Agreement of Mav 26 
1972. 

Seventh. Each Side will continue to take neces- 
sary organizational and technical measures for pre- 
venting accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear 
weapons under its control in accordance with the 
Agreement of September 30, 1971 between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 



Washington, June 21, 1973 



For the United 
of America: 



Richard Nixon 

President of the United 
States of A^nerica 



States For the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics: 

L. I. Brezhnev 

General Secretary of the 

Central Committee, 

CPSU 



158 



Department of State Bulletin 



AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION 
IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 

REPUBLICS ON Scientific and Technical Co- 
operation IN THE Field of Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy 

The United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics; 

Attaching great importance to the problem of 
satisfying the rapidly growing energy demands in 
both countries as well as in other countries of the 

world ; 

Desiring to combine the efforts of both countries 
toward the solution of this problem through the de- 
velopment of highly efficient energy sources ; 

Recognizing that solutions to this problem may be 
found in more rapid development of certain nuclear 
technologies already under study, such as controlled 
thermonuclear fusion and fast breeder reactors, as 
well as in additional basic research on the funda- 
mental properties of matter; 

Noting with satisfaction the successful results of 
previous cooperation between the Parties in the field 
of peaceful uses of atomic energy; 

Wishing to establish a more stable and long-term 
basis for cooperation in this field for the benefit of 
both their peoples and of all mankind; 

In accordance with and in further development of 
the Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Coopera- 
tion in the Fields of Science and Technology of 
May 24, 1972; the Memorandum on Cooperation in 
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of Septem- 
ber 28, 1972 between the U.S. Atomic Energy Com- 
mission and the USSR State Committee for the 
Utilization of Atomic Energy; and the General 
Agreement between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Con- 
tacts, Exchanges and Cooperation of June 19, 1973; 
Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 
The Parties will expand and strengthen their co- 
operation in research, development and utilization 
of nuclear energy, having as a primary objective the 
development of new energj' sources. This coopera- 
tion will be carried out on the basis of mutual bene- 
fit, equality and reciprocity. 

Article 2 
1. Cooperation will be concentrated in the follow- 
ing three areas: 

a. Controlled thermonuclear fusion. 
The aim of cooperation in this area is the even- 
tual development of prototype and demonstration- 
scale thermonuclear reactors. Cooperation may in- 
clude theoretical, calculational, experimental and 



design-construction studies at all stages up to in- 
dustrial-scale operations. 

b. Fast breeder reactors. 

Cooperation in this area will be directed toward 
finding solutions to mutually agi-eed basic and ap- 
plied problems connected with the design, develop- 
ment, construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants utilizing fast breeder reactors. 

c. Research on the fundamental properties of 

matter. 
Cooperation in this area will include joint theo- 
retical and experimental studies on mutually agreed 
subjects, and particularly in high, medium and low 
energy physics, through utilization of accelerators, 
data processing equipment and other facilities of the 
two countries. Cooperation may also be undertaken 
on the design, planning and construction of joint 
facilities to be used in this area of research. 

2. Further details of cooperation in each of these 
three areas will be arranged through individual im- 
plementing protocols. 

3. Other areas of cooperation may be added by 
mutual agreement. 

4. Cooperation under this Agreement shall be m 
accordance with the laws of the respective countries. 

Article 3 
1. Cooperation provided for in the preceding Ar- 
ticles may take the following forms: 

a. Establishment of working groups of scientists 
and engineers for design and execution of joint 
projects; 

b. Joint development and construction of experi- 
ments, pilot installations and equipment; 

c. Joint work by theoretical and experimental sci- 
entists in appropriate research centers of the two 
countries ; 

d. Organization of joint consultations, seminars 

and panels; 

e. Exchanges of appropriate instrumentation, 
equipment and construction materials; 

f. Exchanges of scientists and specialists; and 

g. Exchanges of scientific and technical informa- 
tion, documentation and results of research. 

2. Other forms of cooperation may be added by 
mutual agreement. 

Article 4 

In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, the 
Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate 
and monitor the development of cooperation and 
direct contacts between organizations and institutions 
of the two countries, including the conclusion, as ap- 
propriate, of implementing protocols and contracts 
for carrying out cooperative activities under this 
Agreement. 

Article 5 

1. For the implementation of this Agreement, 



July 23, 1973 



159 



there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Commit- 
tee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energi.-. Meetings will be convened once a year in the 
United States and the Soviet Union alternately, 
unless otherwise mutually agrreed. 

2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as 
is necessary for effective implementation of this 
Agreement including, but not limited to, approval of 
specific projects and programs of cooperation; desig. 
nation of appropriate participating organizations 
and institutions responsible for carrying out cooper- 
ative activities; and making recommendations, as 
appropriate, to the two Governments. 

3. The Executive Agents of this Agreement shall 
be, for the United States of America, the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission, and for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the USSR State Committee for 
the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The Executive 
Agents, on their respective sides, shall be responsi- 
ble for the operation of the Joint Committee and 
shall coordinate and supervise the development and 
implementation of cooperative activities conducted 
under this Agreement. 

Article 6 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to 
prejudice other agreements concluded between the 
Parties. 

Article 7 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon 
signature and shall remain in force for ten years. 
It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement 
of the Parties. 

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not 
affect the validity of implementing protocols and 
contracts concluded under this Agreement between 
interested organizations and institutions of the two 
countries. 

Done at Washington, this 21st day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the United States For the Union of Soviet 

of America: Socialist Republics: 

Richard Nixon l. I. Brezhnev 

President of the United General Secretary of 
States of America the Central Committee, 

CPSU 

AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR 
WAR 

Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War 

The United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as 
the Parties, 



Guided by the objectives of strengthening world 
peace and international security. 

Conscious that nuclear war would have devas- 
tating consequences for mankind. 

Proceeding from the desire to bring about condi- 
tions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear 
war anj^vhere in the world would be reduced and 
ultimately eliminated. 

Proceeding from their obligations under the Char- 
ter of the United Nations regarding the mainte- 
nance of peace, refraining from the threat or use 
of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity 
with the agreements to which either Party has 
subscribed, 

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations 
between the United States of .\merica and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on 
May 29, 1972, 

Reaffirming that the development of relations be- 
tween the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics is not directed against 
other countries and their interests, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

The United States and the Soviet Union agree 
that an objective of their policies is to remove the 
danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear 
weapons. 

-Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in 
such a manner as to prevent the development of situ- 
ations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation 
of their relations, as to avoid military confronta- 
tions, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear 
war between them and between either of the Parties 
and other countries. 

Article II 
The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I 
and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to 
proceed from the premise that each Party will re- 
frain from the threat or use of force against the 
other Party, against the allies of the other Party 
and against other countries, in circumstances which 
may endanger international peace and security. The 
Parties agree that they will be guided by these con- 
siderations in the formulation of their foreign 
policies and in their actions in the field of interna- 
tional relations. 

Article III 
The Parties undertake to develop their relations 
with each other and with other countries in a way 
consistent with the purposes of this Agreement. 

Article IV 
If at any time relations between the Parties or 
between either Party and other countries appear to 
involve the ri.sk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations 
between countries not parties to this Agreement ap- 
pear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



Socialist Republics or between either Party and other 
countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
acting in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent con- 
sultations with each other and make every effort to 
avert this risk. 

Article V 

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security 
Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations and the Governments of allied 
or other countries of the progress and outcome of 
consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV 
of this Agreement. 

Article VI 

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair: 

(a) the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Char- 
ter of the United Nations, 

(b) the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, including those relating to the maintenance 
or restoration of international peace and security, 
and 

(c) the obligations undertaken by either Party 
towards its allies or other countries in treaties, 
agreements, and other appropriate documents. 

Article VII 
This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. 

Article VIII 
This Agi-eement shall enter into force upon sig- 
nature. 

Done at Washington on June 22, 197.3, in two 
copies, each in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the United States For the Union of Soviet 
of America: Socialist Republics: 



Richard Nixon 



L. I. Brezhnev 



President of the United General Secretary of the 
States of America Central Committee, 

CPSU 

AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN 
AGRICULTURE 

Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Go\-ernment 
OF the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; 

Taking into account the importance which the pro- 
duction of food has for the peoples of both countries 
and for all of mankind; 

Desiring to expand existing cooperation between 



the two countries in the field of agricultural research 
and development; 

Wishing to apply new knowledge and technology in 
agricultural production and processing; 

Recognizing the desirability of expanding relation- 
ships in agricultural trade and the exchange of in- 
formation necessary for such trade; 

Convinced that cooperation in the field of agricul- 
ture will contribute to overall improvement of rela- 
tions between the two countries; 

In pursuance and further development of the 
Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972, 
and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges 
and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educa- 
tional, Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972, 
and in accordance with the Agreement on Coopera- 
tion in the Field of Environmental Protection of 
May 23, 1972; 

Have agi-eed as follows: 

Article I 
The Parties will develop and carry out coopera- 
tion in the field of agriculture on the basis of mutual 
benefit, equality and reciprocity. 

Article II 

The Parties will promote the development of mu- 
tually beneficial cooperation in the following main 
areas : 

1. Regular exchange of relevant information, in- 
cluding forward estimates, on production, consump- 
tion, demand and trade of major agricultural com- 
modities. 

2. Methods of forecasting the production, demand 
and consumption of major agricultural products, in- 
cluding econometric methods. 

3. Plant science, including genetics, breeding, 
plant protection and crop production, including pro- 
duction under semi-arid conditions. 

4. Livestock and poultry science, including gen- 
etics, breeding, physiology, nutrition, disease pro- 
tection and large-scale operations. 

5. Soil science, including the theory of movement 
of water, gases, salts, and heat in soils. 

6. Mechanization of agriculture, including devel- 
opment and testing of new machinery, equipment and 
technology, as well as repair and technical service. 

7. Application, storage and transportation of min- 
eral fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals. 

8. Processing, storage and preservation of agri- 
cultural commodities, including formula feed tech- 
nology. 

9. Land reclamation and reclamation engineering, 
including development of new equipment, designs 
and materials. 

10. Use of mathematical methods and electronic 



July 23, 1973 



161 



computers in agriculture, including mathematical 
modeling of large-scale agricultural enterprises. 

Other areas of cooperation may be added by mu- 
tual agreement. 

Article III 
Cooperation between the Parties may take the fol- 
lowing forms: 

1. Exchange of scientists, specialists and trainees. 

2. Organization of bilateral symposia and con- 
ferences. 

3. Exchange of scientific, technical and relevant 
economic information, and methods of research. 

4. Planning, development and implementation of 
joint projects and programs. 

5. Exchange of plant germ plasm, seeds and living 
material. 

6. Exchange of animals, biological materials, agri- 
cultural chemicals, and models of new machines, 
equipment and scientific instruments. 

7. Direct contacts and exchanges between botani- 
cal gardens. 

8. Exchange of agricultural exhibitions. 

Other forms of cooperation may be added by mu- 
tual agreement. 

Article IV 

1. In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, 
the Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, promote 
and monitor the development of cooperation and 
direct contacts between governmental and non- 
governmental institutions, research and other or- 
ganizations, trade associations, and firms of the two 
countries, including the conclusion, as appropriate, 
of implementing agreements for carrying out spe- 
cific projects and programs under this .Agreement. 

2. To assure fruitful development of cooperation, 
the Parties will render every assistance for the 
travel of scientists and specialists to areas of the 
two countries appropriate for the conduct of activi- 
ties under this Agreement. 

3. Projects and exchanges under this Agreement 
will be carried out in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the two countries. 

Article V 

1. For implementation of this Agreement, there 
shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on 
Agricultural Cooperation which shall meet, as a rule, 
once a year, alternately in the United States and the 
Soviet Union, unless otherwise mutually agreed. 

2. The Joint Committee will review and approve 
specific projects and programs of cooperation; estab- 
lish the procedures for their implementation; desig- 
nate, as appropriate, institutions and organizations 
responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; 
and make recommendations, as appropriate, to the 
Parties. 

3. Within the framework of the Joint Committee 
there shall be established a Joint Working Group on 
Agricultural Economic Research and Information 
and a Joint Working Group on Agricultural Re- 



search and Technological Development. Unless other- 
wise mutually agreed, each Joint Working Group 
will meet alternately in the United States and the 
Soviet Union at least two times a year. The Joint 
Committee may establish other working groups as 
it deems necessary. 

4. The Executive Agents for coordinating and 
carrying out this Agreement shall be, for the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America, the United 
States Department of Agriculture, and for the Gov- 
ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR. The Exec- 
utive Agents will, as appropriate, assure the cooper- 
ation in their respective countries of other institu- 
tions and organizations as required for carrying out 
joint activities under this .Agreement. During the 
period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the 
Executive Agents will maintain contact with each 
other and coordinate and supervise the development 
and implementation of cooperative activities con- 
ducted under this Agreement. 

Article VI 
Unless an implementing agreement contains other 
provisions, each Party or participating institution, 
organization or firm, shall bear the costs of its par- 
ticipation and that of its personnel in cooperative 
activities engaged in under this Agreement. 

Article VII 

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted 
to prejudice or modify any existing Agreements be- 
tween the Parties. 

2. Projects developed by the US-USSR Joint 
Working Group on Agricultural Research which 
were approved at the first session of the US-USSR 
Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Coop- 
eration on March 21, 1973, will continue without 
interruption and will become the responsibility of 
the US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Co- 
operation upon its formal establishment. 

Article VIII 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon 
signature and remain in force for five years. It will 
be automatically extended for successive five-year 
periods unless either Party notifies the other of 
its intent to terminate this Agreement not later than 
six months prior to the expiration of this Agreement. 

2. This Agreement may be modified at any time by 
mutual agreement of the Parties. 

3. The termination of this Agreement will not 
affect the validity of implementing agreements con- 
cluded under this Agreement between institutions, 
organizations and firms of the two countries. 

Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 
For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Union of Soviet So- 
America: cialist Republics: 

Earl L. Butz A. Gromyko 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN STUDIES 
OF THE WORLD OCEAN 

Agrrement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government 
OK the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean 

I'he Government of the United States of America 
an.l the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; 

Recognizing the importance of comprehensive 
studies of the World Ocean for peaceful purposes and 
for the well-being of mankind; 

Striving for more complete knowledge and ra- 
tional utilization of the World Ocean by all nations 
through broad international cooperation in oceano- 
gvaphic investigation and research; 

Aware of the capabilities and resources of both 
countries for studies of the World Ocean and the 
extensive history and successful results of previous 
cooperation between them; 

Desiring to combine their efforts in the further 
investigation of the World Ocean and to use the re- 
sults for the benefit of the peoples of both countries 
and of all mankind; and 

In pursuance and further development of the 
Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972, 
and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges 
and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, 
Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972, and in 
accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in 
the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23, 
1972; 

Have agreed as follow-s: 

Article 1 
The Parties will develop and carry out coopera- 
tion in studies of the World Ocean on the basis of 
equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit. 

Article 2 

In their studies of the World Ocean, the Parties 
will direct cooperative efforts to the investigation 
and solution of important basic and applied research 
problems. Initially, cooperation will be implemented 
in the following areas: 

a. Large-scale ocean-atmosphere interaction, in- 
cluding laboratory studies, oceanic experiments, and 
mathematical modeling of the ocean-atmosphere 
system. 

b. Ocean currents of planetary scale and other 
questions of ocean dynamics. 

c. Geochemistry and marine chemistry of the 
World Ocean. 

d. Geological and geophysical investigations of the 
World Ocean, including deep sea drilling for scien- 
tific purposes. 

July 23, 1973 



e. Biological productivity of the World Ocean and 
the biochemistry of the functioning of individual or- 
ganisms and whole biological communities in the 
World Ocean. 

f. Intercalibration and standardization of oceano- 
graphic instrumentation and methods. 

Other areas of cooperation may be added by mu- 
tual agreement. 

Article 3 

Cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles 
may take the following forms: 

a. Joint planning, development, and implementa- 
tion of research projects and programs; 

b. Exchange of scientists, specialists, and ad- 
vanced students; 

c. Exchange of scientific and technical informa- 
tion, documentation, and experience, including the 
results of national oceanographic studies; 

d. Convening of joint conferences, meetings, and 
seminars of specialists; 

e. Appropriate participation by both countries in 
multilateral cooperative activities sponsored by in- 
ternational scientific organizations; 

f. Facilitation by both Parties, in accordance with 
laws, rules and regulations of each country and rele- 
vant bilateral agi-eements, of use of appropriate port 
facilities of the two countries for ships' services and 
supplies, including provision for rest and changes of 
ships' personnel, in connection with carrying out co- 
operative activities. 

Other forms of cooperation may be added by mu- 
tual agreement. 

.Article 4 
In furtherance of the aims of this .\greement, the 
Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate 
and monitor the development of cooperation and di- 
rect contacts between agencies, organizations and 
firms of the two countries, including the conclusion, 
as appropriate, of implementing agreements for 
carrying out specific projects and programs under 
this Agreement. 

Article 5 

1. For implementation of this Agreement, there 
shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on 
Cooperation in World Ocean Studies. This Joint 
Committee shall meet, as a rule, once a year, alter- 
nately in the United States and the Soviet Union, 
unless otherwise mutually agreed. 

2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is 
necessary for effective implementation of this Agree- 
ment including, but not limited to, approval of spe- 
cific projects and programs of cooperation; designa- 
tion of appropriate agencies and organizations to be 
responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; 
and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the 
Parties. 

3. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent 



163 



which will be responsible for carrying out this 
Agreement. During the period between meetings of 
the Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall 
maintain contact with each other and coordinate 
and supervise the development and implementation 
of cooperative activities conducted under this 
Agreement. 

Article 6 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to 
prejudice other agreements between the Parties or 
commitments of either Party to other international 
oceanographic programs. 

Article 7 
Each Party, with the consent of the other Party, 
may invite third countries to participate in coopera- 
tive activities engaged in under this Agreement. 

Article 8 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon sig- 
nature and remain in force for five years. It may be 
modified or extended by mutual agreement of the 
Parties. 

2. The termination of the Agreement shall not 
affect the validity of implementing agreements con- 
cluded under this Agreement between interested 
agencies, organizations and firms of the two coun- 
tries. 

Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Union of Soviet So- 
America: cialist Republics: 

WiLUAM P. Rogers A. Gromyko 



AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN 
TRANSPORTATION 

Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government 
OF THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Cooperation in the Field of Transportation 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; 

Recognizing the important role played by safe and 
efficient transportation systems in the development 
of all countries; 

Considering that the improvement of existing 
transportation systems and techniques can benefit 
both of their peoples; 

Believing that the combined efforts of the two 
countries in this field can contribute to more rapid 
and efficient solutions of transportation problems 



than would be possible through separate, parallel 
national efforts; 

Desiring to promote the establishment of long. 
term and productive relationships between transpor- 
tation specialists and institutions of both countries; 

In pursuance and further development of the 
Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972, 
and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges 
and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational. 
Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972, and in 
accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in 
the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23, 
1972; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article l 

The Parties will develop and carry out coopera- 
tion in the field of transportation on the basis of 
mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity. 

Article 2 
This cooperation will be directed to the investiga- 
tion and solution of specific problems of mutual in- 
terest in the field of transportation. Initially, cooper- 
ation will be implemented in the following areas: 

a. Construction of bridges and tunnels, including 
problems of control of structure stress and fracture, 
and special construction procedures under cold cli- 
matic conditions. 

b. Railway transport, including problems of roll- 
ing stock, track and roadbed, high speed traffic, 
automation, and cold weather operation. 

c. Civil aviation, including problems of increasing 
efficiency and safety. 

d. Marine transport, including technology of mari- 
time shipping and cargo handling in seaports. 

e. Automobile transport, including problems of 
traffic safety. 

Other areas of cooperation may be added by mu- 
tual agreement. 

Article 3 
Cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles 
may take the following forms: 

a. Exchange of scientists and specialists; 

b. Exchange of scientific and technical information 
and documentation; 

c. Convening of joint conferences, meetings and 
seminars; and 

d. Joint planning, development and implementa- 
tion of research programs and projects. 

Other forms of cooperation may be added by mu- 
tual agreement. 

Article 4 
In furtherance of the aims of this .Agreement, the 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate 
and monitor the development of cooperation and 
direct contacts between agencies, organizations and 
firms of the two countries, including the conclusion, 
as appropriate, of implementing agreements for car- 
rying out specific projects and programs under this 
Agreement. 

Article 5 

1 For the implementation of this Agreement, 
there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Commit- 
tee on Cooperation in Transportation. This Com- 
mittee shall meet, as a rule, once a year, alternately 
in the United States and the Soviet Union, unless 
otherwise mutually agreed. 

2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is 
necessary for efTective implementation of this Agree- 
ment including, but not limited to, approval of spe- 
cific projects and programs of cooperation; designa- 
tion of appropriate agencies and organizations to be 
responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; 
and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the 
Parties. 

H. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent 
which will be responsible for carrying out this Agree- 
ment. During the period between meetings of the 
Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall main- 
tain contact with each other, keep each other in- 
formed of activities and progress in implementing 
this Agreement, and coordinate and supervise the 
development and implementation of cooperative ac- 
tivities conducted under this Agi-eement. 

Article 6 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to 
prejudice other agreements between the Parties or 
their respective rights and obligations under such 
other agreements. 

Article 7 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon 
signature and shall remain in force for five years. It 
may be modified or extended by mutual agreement 
of the Parties. 

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not 
affect the validity of implementing agreements con- 
cluded under this Agreement between interested 
agencies, organizations and firms of the two coun- 
tries. 

Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Union of Soviet So- 
America: cialist Republics: 



William P. Rogers 



A. Gromyko 



GENERAL AGREEMENT ON CONTACTS, 
EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION 

General Agreement Between the United States 
OF America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Coop- 
eration 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; 

Consistent with the Basic Principles of Relations 
Between the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on 
May 29, 1972; 

Desiring to promote better understanding between 
the peoples of the United States and the Soviet 
Union and to help improve the general state of rela- 
tions between the two countries; 

Believing that the further expansion of mutually 
beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will 
facilitate the achievement of these aims; 

Taking into account the positive experience 
achieved through previous agreements on exchanges 
in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and 
other fields; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

1. The Parties will encourage and develop con- 
tacts, exchanges and cooperation in the fields of sci- 
ence, technology, education and culture, and in other 
fields of mutual interest on the basis of equality, 
mutual benefit and reciprocity. 

2. Such contacts, exchanges and cooperation shall 
be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws 
and regulations of the respective countries. Within 
this framework, the Parties will make every effort to 
promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of 
these contacts, exchanges and cooperation. 

Article II 

1. The Parties take note of the following special- 
ized agreements on cooperation in various fields and 
reaffirm their commitments to achieve the fulfillment 
of them: 

a. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
Environmental Protection Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972; 

b. The Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Coopera- 
tion in the Field of Medical Science and Public 
Health, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972; 

c. The Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use 



July 23, 1973 



165 



of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, signed at 
Moscow on May 24, 1972; 

d. The Agrreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation 
in the Fields of Science and Technology, signed at 
Moscow on May 24, 1972; 

e. The Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Coopera- 
tion in the Field of Agriculture, signed at Washing- 
ton on June 19, 1973; 

f. The Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation 
in Studies of the World Ocean, signed at Washing- 
ton on June 19, 1973; and 

g. The Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation 
in the Field of Transportation, signed at Washing- 
ton on June 19, 1973. 

2. The Parties will support the renewal of spe- 
cialized agreements, including mutually agreed upon 
amendments, between : 

a. The National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America and the Academy of Sci- 
ences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and 

b. The American Council of Learned Societies and 
the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 

3. The Parties will encourage the conclusion, when 
it is considered mutually beneficial, of additional 
agreements in other specific fields within the frame- 
work of this Agreement. 

Article III 

The Parties will encourage and facilitate, as ap- 
propriate, contacts, exchanges and cooperation be- 
tween organizations of the two countries in the field 
of .science and technology and in other related fields 
of mutual interest which are not being carried out 
under specialized agreements concluded between the 
Parties. These activities may include: 

a. the exchange of specialists, delegations, and 
scientific and technical information; and the organi- 
zation of lectures, seminars and symposia for such 
specialists; 

b. the participation of scientists and other spe- 
cialists in scientific congresses, conferences and sim- 
ilar meetings being held in the two countries, and the 
conducting of specialized exhibits and of joint re- 
search work; and 

c. other forms of contacts, exchanges and coop- 
eration which may be mutually agreed upon. 

Article IV 

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate the 
expansion of contacts, exchanges and cooperation in 



various fields of education. To this end, the Parties 
will: 

a. provide for the exchange of students, research- 
ers and faculty members for study and research; 
professors and teachers to lecture, offer instruction, 
and conduct research ; as well as specialists and dele- 
gations in various fields of education; and 

b. facilitate the exchange, by appropriate organi- 
zations, of educational and teaching materials, in- 
cluding textbooks, syllabi and curricula, materials on 
methodologj-, samples of teaching instruments and 
visual aids. 

2. The Parties will also encourage the study of 
each other's language through the development of 
the exchanges and cooperation listed above and 
through other mutually agreed measures. 

Article V 
In order to promote better mutual acquaintance 
with the cultural achievements of each country, the 
Parties will encourage the development of contacts 
and exchanges in the field of the performing arts. 
To this end, the Parties will facilitate exchanges of 
theatrical, musical and choreographic ensembles, or- 
chestras, other artistic and entertainment groups, 
and individual performers. 

Article VI 

1. The Parties will encourage the organizations of 
the film industries of both countries, as appropriate, 
to consider means of further expanding the purchase 
and distribution on a commercial basis of films pro- 
duced in each country. 

2. The Parties will also encourage, as appropri- 
ate, the exchange and exhibition of documentary 
films in the fields of science, technology, culture, 
education and other fields, as well as facilitate the 
exchange of delegations of creative and technical 
specialists. 

3. The Parties further agree, when requested by 
organizations and individuals of their respective 
countries, to consider other proposals directed toward 
the expansion of exchanges in this field, including the 
holding of film premieres and film weeks in each 
country and the joint production of feature films 
and short and full-length educational and scientific 
films. 

Article VII 

1. The Parties will facilitate contacts and encour- 
age exchanges between organizations of the two 
countries in the fields of radio and television, in- 
cluding the exchange of radio programs and tele- 
vision films and exchanges of delegations and spe- 
cialists in these fields. 

2. The Parties further agree, when requested by 
organizations and individuals of their respective 
countries, to consider other proposals in the fields of 
radio and television, including joint production of 
television films and the providing of assistance in the 
production of radio and television programs. 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



Article VIII 
The Parties will encourage: 

a. the exchange of books, magazines, newspapers 
and other publications devoted to scientific, technical, 
cultural, and general educational subjects between 
libraries, universities and other organizations of 
each country, as well as the reciprocal distribution 
of the magazines Amerika and Soviet Life; and 

b. exchaJiges and visits of journalists, editors, pub- 
lishers, and translators of literary works, as well as 
their participation in appropriate professional meet- 
ings and conferences. 

Article IX 
The Parties will encourage and facilitate the ex- 
change of exhibitions on various topics of mutual 
interest, as well as appropriate participation by one 
Party in exhibitions which may take place in the 
other's country. The Parties will also render assist- 
ance for the exchange of exhibitions between the 
museums of the two countries. 

Article X 
The Parties will provide for reciprocal exchanges 
and visits of architects, art historians, artists, com- 
posers, musicologists, museum specialists, play- 
wrights, theater directors, writers, specialists in var- 
ious fields of law and those in other cultural and 
professional fields, to familiarize themselves with 
matters of interost to them in their respective fields 
and to participate in meetings, conferences and 
symposia. 

Article XI 

1. The Parties will render assistance to members 
of the Congress of the United States of America and 
deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to officials of 
the national governments of both countries, making 
visits to the Soviet Union and the United States re- 
spectively. .Arrangements for such assistance will be 
agreed upon in advance through diplomatic channels. 

2. The Parties will encourage exchanges of repre- 
sentatives of municipal, local and state governments 
of the United States and the Soviet Union to study 
various functions of government at these levels. 

Article XII 
The Parties will encourage joint undertakings and 
exchanges between appropriate organizations active 
in civic and social life, including youth and women's 
organizations, recognizing that the decision to im- 
plement such joint undertakings and exchanges re- 
mains a concern of the organizations themselves. 

Article XIII 
The Parties will encourage exchanges of athletes 
and athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in 
the fields of physical education and sports under ar- 
rangements made between the appropriate sports or- 
ganizations of the two countries. 



Article XIV 
The Parties will encourage the expansion of tour- 
ist travel between the two countries and the adoption 
of measures to satisfy the requests of tourists to 
acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture 
of the people of each country. 

Article XV 
The Parties note that commemorative activities 
may take place in their countries in connection with 
the celebration of anniversaries recognized by major 
international bodies. 

Article XVI 
The Parties agree to hold a meeting each year of 
their representatives for a general review of the 
implementation of contacts, exchanges and coopera- 
tion in various fields and to consider exchanges which 
are not being carried out under specialized agree- 
ments concluded between the Parties. 

Article XVII 

1. In implementation of various provisions of this 
Agreement, the Parties have established a Program 
of Exchanges for 1974-1976, which is annexed to and 
constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. The 
terms of this Program shall be in force from Janu- 
ary 1, 1974 to December 31, 1976, and thereafter, 
unless and until amended by agreement of the Par- 
ties, will provide the basic guidelines for the Pro- 
gram of Exchanges in 1977-1979. 

2. The Parties agree that their representatives 
will meet prior to the end of 1976 and will develop 
the Program of Exchanges for the succeeding three 



years. 



Article XVIII 



The Parties agree that: 

a. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay, 
dates of arrival, size of delegations, financial and 
transportation arrangements and other details of 
exchanges and visits, except as otherwise determined, 
shall be agreed upon, as a rule, not less than thirty 
days in advance, through diplomatic channels or be- 
tween appropriate organizations requested by the 
Parties to carry out these exchanges; 

b. Applications for visas for visitors participating 
in exchanges and cooperative activities shall be sub- 
mitted, as a rule, at least fourteen days before the 
estimated time of departure; 

c. Unless otherwise provided for in specialized 
agreements between the Parties, and except where 
other specific arrangements have been agreed upon, 
participants in exchanges and cooperative activities 
will pay their own expenses, including international 
travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in 
the receiving country. 

Article XIX 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on signa- 
ture and shall remain in force until December 31, 



July 23, 1973 



167 



1979. It may be modified or extended by mutual 
agreement of the Parties. 

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prejudice other agreements concluded between the 
two Parties. 

Done at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Union of Soviet So- 
America: cialist Republics: 

William P. Rogers a. Gromyko 

ANNEX 

Program of Exchanges for 1974-197(! 

In implementation of various provisions of the 
General Agi-eement between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation signed at 
Washington on June 19, 1973, the Parties have 
agreed on the following Program of Exchanges for 
the period January 1, 1974 to December 31, 1976: 

Section I 
Education 
1. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange 
annually from each side of: 

a. At least 40 graduate students, young research- 
ers and instructors for study and postgraduate re- 
search in the natural sciences, technical sciences, hu- 
manities and social sciences, for periods of stay from 
one semester up to one academic year, including 
five-week courses before the beginning of the aca- 
demic year to improve the participant's competence 
in the Russian or English language; 

b. At least 30 language teachers to participate in 
summer courses of ten weeks to improve their com- 
petence in the Russian or English language ; 

c. At least 10 professors and instructors of uni- 
versities and other institutions of higher learning to 
conduct scholarly research for periods of stay be- 
tween three and six months, the total volume of these 
exchanges not to exceed 50 man-months for each 
side ; and 

d. At least two graduate-level students or young 
specialists in the fields of dance, music, theater, film 
and the graphic and plastic arts for the purpose of 
study, research and training for periods of from four 
to ten months in specialized schools, institutes, con- 
servatories, theaters, museums, studios, or other 
institutions. 

2. The Parties agree to provide for exchanges of 
professors and specialists from universities and 
other institutions of higher learning, in accordance 
with the desires of the receiving side, for periods of 
from one semester up to one academic year, to offer 
instruction and to lecture at universities and other 
institutions of higher learning in the fields of: 



a. The natural sciences, technical sciences, human- 
ities and social sciences; and 

b. Language, literature and linguistics. 

3. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange 
of at least two specialists in vocational rehabilita- 
tion or education of the handicapped from each side 
during the period of this Program for a period of 
from three to six months. The specialists will con- 
duct research on topics to be agreed upon between 
the appropriate organizations of both countries. 

4. The Parties agi-ee to facilitate the conducting 
of bilateral seminars of United States and Soviet 
specialists in education: twelve participants from 
each side for a period of two to four weeks on sub- 
jects to be agreed upon subsequently. During the pe- 
riod of this Program, four seminars will be con- 
ducted in each country, two in subjects bearing on 
higher education, and two in subjects bearing on 
primary and secondary education. 

5. The Parties agree to exchange during the period 
of this Program four delegations from each side com- 
posed of three to five specialists for a period of up 
to three weeks on topics to be agreed upon subse- 
quently; two of these delegations shall be in the 
field of higher education, and two in primary and/or 
secondary education. 

6. The Parties agree to explore the possibility of 
an exchange of primary or secondary school teachers 
between appropriate organizations of the two coun- 
tries. 

7. The United States will take measures to encour- 
age the study of the Russian language in the United 
States in accordance with the Joint United States- 
Soviet Communique of May 29, 1972. 

8. The Parties agree to explore the possibility of 
an exchange of information and appropriate con- 
sultation concerning equivalency of degrees. 

9. The exchanges specified in this Section will be 
implemented in accordance with the terms of a sup- 
plemental agreement to be effected through an ex- 
change of notes. 

Sex^tion II 
Performing Arts 

1. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of at 
least ten major performing arts groups from each 
side during the period of this Program. The detailed 
arrangements for tours of these groups will be pro- 
vided for in contracts to be concluded between the 
following entities: for tours of American groups, 
between the Embassy of the United States of Amer- 
ica in Moscow or authorized representatives of the 
groups themselves and the appropriate concert or- 
ganizations of the Soviet Union ; for tours of Soviet 
groups, between appropriate organizations or im- 
presarios of the United States and concert organiza- 
tions of the Soviet Union. The receiving Party will 
seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending Party con- 
cerning the timing and duration of the tours as well 
as the number of cities to be visited. 

2. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of at 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



least 35 individual performers from each side during 
the period of this Program. Arrangements for tours 
of individual performers will be made directly be- 
tween appropriate organizations or impresarios of 
the United States and concert organizations of the 
Soviet Union. 

Section III 
Publications 
1. The Parties agree to render practical assistance 
for the successful distribution of the magazines 
Amcrika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the 
United States on the basis of reciprocity and to con- 
sult as necessary in order to find ways to increase the 
distribution of these magazines. Upon reaching full 
distribution of the 62,000 copies of each magazme as 
currently provided for, the Parties will examine the 
possibility of expanding the reciprocal distribution 
of the magazines to 82,000 copies per month by De- 
cember 1976. The Parties will distribute free of 
charge unsold copies of the magazine among visitors 
to mutually-arranged exhibitions. 

2. The Parties agree to encourage the exchange of 
specialized publications and microfilms between the 
National Archives of the United States of America 
and the Main Archival Administration of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 

Section IV 
Exhibitions 
1. The Parties agree to exchange exhibitions dur- 
ing the period of this Program, as follows: 

a. From the Soviet side, either a major industrial/ 
trade exhibition or one or two circulating exhibitions. 
The decision of the Soviet side on this matter will 
be conveyed through diplomatic channels; and 

b. From the US side, one or two circulating 
exhibitions. 

The subjects of the exhibitions will be agreed upon 
through diplomatic channels. 

The circulating exhibitions will be shown in nine 
cities in each country for a period of up to 28 actual 
showing days in each city. The Parties will discuss in 
a preliminary fashion the nature and general content 
of each exhibition and will acquaint each other with 
the exhibitions before their official opening, in par- 
ticular through the exchange of catalogues, pro- 
spectuses and other information pertinent to the 
exhibitions. Other conditions for conducting the ex- 
hibitions (dates, size and character of premises, 
number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be 
subject to agreement by the Parties. Arrangements 
for conducting the exhibitions will be concluded no 
later than five months before their opening. 

2. The Parties agree to render assistance for the 
exchange of exhibitions, including art exhibitions, 
between the museums of the two countries, and to 
encourage these museums to establish and develop di- 
rect contacts with the aim of exchanging informa- 



tive materials, albums, art monographs and other 
publications of mutual interest. In the case of art 
exhibitions, their content and the conditions for con- 
ducting them would be the subject of discussion and 
special agreement in each case between the relevant 
American museums and the Ministry of Culture of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

3 The Parties will agree through diplomatic chan- 
nels on the arrangements for other exhibitions and 
on participation in national exhibitions which may 
take place in either country. 

Section V 
General 
Each of the Parties shall have the right to include 
in delegations interpreters or members of its Em- 
bassy, who shall be considered as within the agreed 
total membership of such delegations. 

CONVENTION ON MATTERS OF TAXATION 

Convention Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Matters of Taxation 

The President of the United States of America 
and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to 
avoid double taxation and to promote the develop- 
ment of economic, scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation between both States, have appointed for 
this purpose as their respective plenipotentiaries: 

The President of the United States of America: 

George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury of 
the USA; and 

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 

Nikolai Semenovich Patolichev, Minister of For- 
eign Trade of the USSR; 

Who have agreed as follows : 
Article I 

1. The taxes which are the subject of this Con- 
vention are: 

(a) In the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, taxes and dues provided for by the All- 
Union legislation; 

(b) In the case of the United States of America, 
taxes and dues provided for by the Internal Rev- 
enue Code. 

2. This Convention shall also apply to taxes and 
dues substantially similar to those covered by para- 
graph 1. which are imposed in addition to, or in 
place of, existing taxes and dues after the signature 
of this Convention. 

Article II 
In this Convention, the terms listed below shall 
have the following meaning: 



July 23, 1973 



169 



1. "Soviet Union" or "USSR" means the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and, when used in a 
geographical sense, means the territories of all the 
Union Republics. Such term also includes: 

(a) The territorial sea thereof, and 

(b) The seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the 
territorial sea, over which the Soviet Union ex- 
ercises sovereign rights, in accordance with inter- 
national law, for the purpose of exploration for 
and exploitation of the natural resources of such 
areas. However, it is understood that such term in- 
cludes such areas only to the extent that the per- 
son, property or activity with respect to which 
questions of taxation arise is connected with such 
exploration or exploitation. 

2. "United States" or "USA" means the United 
States of America and, when used in a geographical 
sense, means the territories of all the states and 
of the District of Columbia. Such term also includes: 

(a) The territorial sea thereof, and 

(b) The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the terri- 
torial sea, over which the United States exercises 
sovereign rights, in accordance with international 
law, for the purpose of exploration for and exploi- 
tation of the natural resources of such areas. How- 
ever, it is understood that such term includes such 
areas only to the extent that the person, property 
or activity with respect to which questions of taxa- 
tion arise is connected with such exploration or 
exploitation. 

3. "Resident of the Soviet Union" means: 

(a) a legal entity or any other organization 
treated in the USSR as a legal entity for tax pur- 
poses which is created under the laws of the Soviet 
Union or any Union Republic and 

(b) an individual resident in the Soviet Union for 
purposes of its tax. 

4. "Resident of the United States" means: 

(a) a corporation or any other organization 
treated in the United States as a corporation for 
tax purposes which is created or organized under 
the laws of the United States or any state thereof 
or of the District of Columbia and 

(b) an individual resident in the United States 
for purposes of its tax. 

5. "Contracting State" means the United States 
or the Soviet Union, as the context requires. 

6. The term "competent authorities" means; 

(a) in the case of the Soviet Union, the Ministry 
of Finance 

(b) in the case of the United States, the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury or his delegate. 

Article III 
1. The following categories of income derived 
from sources within one Contracting State by a 

170 



resident of the other Contracting State shall be sub- 
ject to tax only in that other Contracting State: 

(a) rentals, royalties, or other amounts paid as 
consideration for the use of or right to use literary, 
artistic, and scientific works, or for the use of copy- 
rights of such works, as well as the rights to in- 
ventions (patents, author's certificates), industrial 
designs, processes or formulae, computer programs, 
trademarks, service marks, and other similar prop- 
erty or rights, or for industrial, commercial, or 
scientific equipment, or for knowledge, experience, 
or skill (know-how) ; 

(b) gains derived from the sale or exchange of 
any such rights or property, whether or not the 
amounts realized on sale or exchange are contingent 
in whole or in part, on the extent and nature of use 
or disposition of such rights or property; 

(c) gains from the sale or other disposition of 
property received as a result of inheritance or gift; 

(d) income from the furnishing of engineering, 
architectural, designing, and other technical serv- 
ices in connection with an installation contract with 
a resident of the first Contracting State which are 
carried out in a period not exceeding 36 months at 
one location; 

(e) income from the sale of goods or the supply- 
ing of services through a broker, general commis- 
sion agent or other agent of independent status, 
where such broker, general commission agent or 
other agent is acting in the ordinary course of his 
business; 

(f) reinsurance premiums; and 

(g) interest on credits, loans and other forms 
of indebtedness connected with the financing of 
trade between the USA and the USSR except where 
received by a resident of the other Contracting 
State from the conduct of a general banking busi- 
ness in the first Contracting State. 

2. A Contracting State shall not attribute taxable 
income to the following activities conducted within 
that Contracting State by a resident of the other 
Contracting State: 

(a) the purchase of goods or merchandise; 

(b) the use of facilities for the purpose of stor- 
age or delivery of goods or merchandise belonging 
to the resident of the other Contracting State; 

(c) the display of goods or merchandise belonging 
to the resident of the other Contracting State, and 
also the sale of such items on termination of their 
display; 

(d) advertising by a resident of the other Con- 
tracting State, the collection or dissemination of in- 
formation, or the conducting of scientific research, 
or similar activities, which have a preparatory or 
auxiliary character for the resident. 

Article IV 

1. Income from commercial activity derived in one 
Contracting State by a resident of the other Con- 
tracting State, shall be taxable in the first Contract- 
Department of State Bulletin 



ing State only if it is derived by a representation. 
j 2. The term "representation" means: 

(a) with regard to income derived within the 
USSR, an office or representative bureau estab- 
lished in the USSR by a resident of the United 
States in accordance with the laws and regulations 
in force in the Soviet Union; 

(b) with regard to income derived within the 
USA, an office or other place of business established 
in the USA by a resident of the Soviet Union in ac- 
cordance with the laws and regulations in force in 
the United States. 

3. In the determination of the profits of a repre- 
sentation, there shall be allowed as deductions from 
total income the expenses that are connected with 
the performance of its activity, including executive 
and general administrative expenses. 

4. This article applies to income, other than in- 
come of an individual dealt with in Article VI, from 
the furnishing of tour performances and other pub- 
lic appearances. 

5. The provisions of this article shall not affect 
the exemptions from taxes provided for by Articles 
III and V. 

Article V 

1. Income which a resident of the Soviet Union 
derives from the operation in international traffic 
of ships or aircraft registered in the USSR and 
gains which a resident of the USSR derives from 
the sale, exchange, or other disposition of ships or 
aircraft operated in international traffic by such 
resident and registered in the USSR shall be exempt 
from tax in the United States. 

2. Income which a resident of the United States 
derives from operation in international traffic of 
ships or aircraft registered in the USA and gains 
which a resident of the USA derives from the sale, 
exchange, or other disposition of ships or aircraft 
operated in international traffic by such resident and 
registered in the USA shall be exempt from tax in 
the Soviet Union. 

3. Remuneration derived by an individual from 
the performance of labor or personal services as an 
employee aboard ships or aircraft operated by one 
of the Contracting States or a resident thereof in 
international traffic shall be exempt from tax in the 
other Contracting State if such individual is a mem- 
ber of the regular complement of the ship or air 
craft. 

Article VI 

1. Special exemptions. 

Income derived by an individual who is a resident 
of one of the Contracting States shall be exempt 
from tax in the other Contracting State as provided 
in subparagraphs (a) through (f). 

(a) Governmental employees. 

(1) An individual receiving remuneration from 
government funds of the Contracting State of which 
the individual is a citizen for labor or personal 

July 23, 1973 



services performed as an employee of governmental 
agencies or institutions of that Contracting State 
in the discharge of governmental functions shall not 
be subject to tax on such remuneration in that other 
Contracting State. 

(2) Labor or personal services performed by a 
citizen of one of the Contracting States shall be 
treated by the other Contracting State as performed 
in the discharge of governmental functions if such 
labor or personal services would be treated under 
the internal laws of the first Contracting State as 
so performed. However, it is understood that persons 
engaged in commercial activity, such as employees 
or representatives of commercial organizations of 
the USA and employees or representatives of the 
foreign trade organizations of the USSR, shall not 
be considered in the USSR and USA respectively 
as engaged in the discharge of governmental func- 
tions. . , 1, 4. 

(3) The provisions of this Convention shall not 
affect the fiscal privileges of diplomatic and consular 
officials under the general rules of international law 
or under special agreements. 

(b) Participants in programs of intergovernmen- 
tal cooperation. 
An individual who is a resident of one of the 
Contracting States and who is temporarily present 
in the other Contracting State under an exchange 
program provided for by agreements between the 
governments of the Contracting States on coopera- 
tion in various fields of science and technology shall 
not be subject to tax in that other Contracting State 
on remuneration received from sources within either 
Contracting State. 

(c) Teachers and researchers. 

(1) An individual who is a resident of one of the 
Contracting States and who is temporarily present 
in the other Contracting State at the invitation of 
a governmental agency or institution or an educa- 
tional or scientific research institution in that other 
Contracting State for the primary purpose of teach- 
ing, engaging in research, or participating in scien- 
tific, technical or professional conferences shall not 
be subject to tax in that other Contracting State on 
his income from teaching or research or participat- 
ing in such conferences. 

(2) Subparagraph (1) shall not apply to in- 
come from research if such research is undertaken 
primarily for the benefit of a private person or 
commercial enterprise of the USA or a foreign 
trade organization of the USSR. However, sub- 
paragraph (1) shall apply in all cases where re- 
search is conducted on the basis of intergovern- 
mental agreements on cooperation. 

(d) Students. 

An individual who is a resident of one of the 
Contracting States and who is temporarily present 
in the other Contracting State for the primary pur- 
pose of studying at an educational or scientific re- 
search institution or for the purpose of acquiring a 
profession or a specialty shall be exempt from taxes 
in the other Contracting State on a stipend, schol- 
arship, or other substitute type of allowance, nec- 
essary to provide for ordinary living expenses. 



171 



(e) Trainees and specialists. 

An individual who is a resident of one of the 
Contracting States, who is temporarily present in 
the other Contracting State for the primary pur- 
pose of acquiring technical, professional, or com- 
mercial experience or performing technical serv- 
ices, and who is an employee of, or under contract 
with, a resident of the first mentioned Contracting 
State, shall not be subject to tax in that other 
Contracting State on remuneration received from 
abroad. Also, such individual shall not be subject 
to tax in that other Contracting State on amounts 
received from sources within that other Contracting 
State which are necessary to provide for ordinary 
living expenses. 

(f) Duration of exemptions. 

The exemptions provided for under subpara- 
graphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this article shall 
extend only for such period of time as is required 
to effectuate the purpose of the visit, but in no 
case shall such period of time exceed: 

(1) One year in the case of subparagraphs (b) 
(Participants in programs of intergovernmental 
cooperation) and (e) (Trainees and specialists); 

(2) Two years in the case of subparagraph (c) 
(Teachers and researchers) ; and 

(3) Five years in the case of subparagraph (d) 
(Students). 

If an individual qualifies for exemption under more 
than one of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e), 
the provisions of that subparagraph which is most 
favorable to him shall apply. However, in no case 
shall an individual have the cumulative benefits of 
subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) for more 
than five taxable years from the date of his arrival 
in the other Contracting State. 

2. General exemptions. 

Income derived by an individual who is a resident 
of one of the Contracting States from the perform- 
ance of personal services in the other Contracting 
State, which is not exempt from tax in accordance 
with paragraph 1. of this article, may be taxed in 
that other Contracting State, but only if the indi- 
vidual is present in that other Contracting State 
for a period aggregating more than 183 days in the 
taxable year. 

Article VII 
This Convention shall not restrict the right of a 
Contracting State to tax a citizen of that Contract- 
ing State. 

Article VIII 
This Convention shall apply only to the taxation 
of income from activity conducted in a Contracting 
State in accordance with the laws and regulations 
in force in such Contracting State. 

Article IX 
If the income of a resident of one of the Con- 
tracting States is exempt from tax in the other 

172 



Contracting State, in accordance with this Conven-I 
tion, such resident shall also be exempt from any 
tax which is at present imposed or which may be 
imposed subsequently in that Contracting State on 
the transaction giving rise to such income. 

Article X 

1. A citizen of one of the Contracting States who 
is a resident of the other Contracting State shall 
not be subjected in that other Contracting State to 
more burdensome taxes than a citizen of that other 
Contracting State who is a resident thereof carry- 
ing on the same activities. 

2. A citizen of one of the Contracting States who 
is a resident of the other Contracting State or a 
representation established by a resident of the first 
Contracting State in the other Contracting State 
shall not be subjected in that other Contracting 
State to more burdensome taxes than are generally 
imposed in that State on citizens or representations 
of residents of third States carrying on the same 
activities. However, this provision shall not require 
a Contracting State to grant to citizens or represen- 
tations of residents of the other Contracting State 
tax benefits granted by special agreements to citi- 
zens or representations of a third State. 

3. The provisions of paragraphs 1. and 2. of this: 
article shall apply to taxes of any kind imposed on 
the Federal or All-Union level, the state or Republic 
level, and on the local level. 

Article XI 

1. If a resident of one of the Contracting States 
considers that the action of one or both of the 
Contracting States results or will result for him in 
taxation not in accordance with this Convention, he 
may, notwithstanding the remedies provided by the 
laws of the Contracting States, present his case to 
the competent authorities of the Contracting State 
of which he is a resident or citizen. Should the 
claim be considered to have merit by the competent 
authorities of the Contracting State to which the 
claim is made, they shall endeavor to come to an 
agreement with the competent authorities of the 
other Contracting State with a view to the avoid- 
ance of taxation not in accordance with the pro- 
visions of this Convention. 

2. In the event that such an agreement is reached 
the competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall, as necessary, refund the excess amounts paid, 
allow tax exemptions, or levy taxes. 

Article XII 

The competent authorities of the Contracting 
States shall notify each other annually of amend- 
ments of the tax legislation referred to in para- 
graph 1. of Article I and of the adoption of taxes 
referred to in paragraph 2. of Article I by trans- 
mitting the texts of amendments or new statutes 
and notify each other of any material concerning 
the application of this Convention. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Article XIII 

This Convention shall be subject to ratification 
and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. The 
instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at 
Moscow as soon as possible. 

The provisions of this Convention shall, however, 
have effect for income derived on or after January 1 
of the year following the year in which the instru- 
ments of ratification are exchanged. 

Article XIV 

1. This Convention shall remain in force for a 
period of three years after it takes effect and shall 
remain in force thereafter for an indefinite period. 
Either of the Contracting States may terminate this 
Convention at any time after three years from the 
date on which the Convention enters into force by 
giving notice of termination through diplomatic 
channels at least six months before the end of any 
calendar year. In such event, the Convention shall 
cease to have effect beginning on January 1 of the 
year following the year in which notice is given. 

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1. 
of this article, upon prior notice to be given through 
diplomatic channels, the provisions of subparagraphs 
(e), (f). or (g) of paragraph 1. of Article III and 
the provisions of Article IX may be terminated sep- 
arately by either Contracting State at any time 
after three years from the date on which this Con- 
vention enters into force. In such event such pro- 
visions shall cease to have effect beginning on 
January 1 of the year following the year in which 
notice is given. 

In Witness Whereof, the plenipotentiaries of the 
two Contracting States have signed the present Con- 
vention and have affixed their seals thereto. 

Done at Washington, this 20th day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 



For the President of 
the United States of 
America 

George P. Shultz 



For the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics 

N. S. Patolichev 



PROTOCOL ON U.S.-U.S.S.R. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE 

Pkotocol 

Considering the interest expressed by United 
States companies and Soviet foreign trade organiza- 
tions in the development of organizational arrange- 
ments for increased cooperation, and 

Recognizing that such increased cooperation 
would contribute to the promotion of contacts be- 
tween businessmen of the USA and the USSR, 
which in turn would assist in the development of 

July 23, 1973 



mutually beneficial trade between the two countries, 
The Secretary of Commerce of the USA will meet 
at an early date with members of the United States 
business and financial community to discuss the 
desirability of establishing in the United States 
private sector a US-USSR Chamber of Commerce. 
The Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR will 
continue similar consultations with Soviet foreign 
trade and other organizations. 

The results of these consultations shall be re- 
ported promptly to the Joint US-USSR Commer- 
cial Commission. 

Done at Washington, this 22nd day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the Government For the Government of the 

of the United States Union of Soviet Socialist 

of America: Republics: 
George P. Shultz N. S. Patolichev 

Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Trade 
Treasury 



PROTOCOL ON COMMERCIAL FACILITIES 

Protocol 

In the interests of strengthening their commercial 
and economic ties, the Government of the USA and 
the Government of the USSR undertook in the 
Agreement between the Government of the USA and 
the Government of the USSR Regarding Trade 
signed in October 1972, to cooperate in the expan- 
sion and improvement of their commercial facilities 
in Moscow and Washington. 

In accordance with that undertaking representa- 
tives of the Soviet Government and the US Embassy 
in Moscow have this week contracted for new facili- 
ties at a convenient location which will enable the 
Office of the Commercial Counselor of the USA to 
provide more effective services to US businessmen 
seeking assistance in their commercial pursuits with 
appropriate USSR organizations. 

The US Government facilitated the acquisition by 
the USSR earlier this year of a building at a con- 
venient location in Washington for use as the Office 
of the Commercial Counselor of the USSR. 

The Government of the USSR has also informed 
the Government of the USA that, in connection with 
the Agreement Regarding Trade, it has issued ac- 
creditation to establish representations in Moscow 
to the following US business and financial organiza- 
tions: 

Pullman Incorporated 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. 
General Electric Company 
International Harvester Company 
Caterpillar Tractor Company 

173 



Hewlett-Packard Company 

Engelhard Minerals & Chemicals Corporation 

Bank of America 

First National City Bank 

Requests by additional US firms for accreditation 
in Moscow are now under consideration by Soviet 
authorities. 

Consistent with Article 5 of the Agreement Re- 
garding Trade, the Government of the USA and 
the Government of the USSR have also agreed to- 
day to undertake immediate preparations for mu- 
tually satisfactory arrangements to enlarge their 
commercial staffs in each other's country. A Trade 
Representation of the USSR in Washington and a 
Commercial Office of the USA in Moscow will simul- 
taneously be opened as soon as possible and in any 
event not later than October 31st of this year. 

Done at Washington, this 22nd day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the Government For the Government of the 

of the United States Union of Soviet Socialist 

of America: Republics: 

George P. Shultz 

Secretary of the 
Treasury 



N. S. Patolichev 
Minister of Foreign Trade 



PROTOCOL ON EXPANSION OF AIR SERVICES 

Protocol Between the United States of America 
AND the Union of Soviet .Socialist Republics 
on Questions Relating to the Expansion of 
Air Services 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 

In keeping with paragraph 7 of the Basic Prin- 
ciples of Relations Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972, 

Desiring to foster expanded communications be- 
tween the two countries on a mutual basis. 

Recognizing the role which air transportation can 
play in this connection, and 

Pursuant to Article 16 of the Civil Air Transport 
Agreement between the two Governments of No- 
vember 4, 1966, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 
The existing agreed services under the Civil Air 
Transport Agreement between New York and Mos- 
cow are to be expanded to include services for the 
designated airline of the United States from New 
York to Leningrad and for the designated airline of 
the USSR from Moscow to Washington. 

Article 2 
In view of the increasing traffic between the two 



countries, the existing arrangements under the Civil 
Air Transport Agreement relating to flight frequen- 
cies are to be amended to allow increases in fre- 
quency of service. 

Article 3 

The foregoing and other related amendments of 
the Civil Air Transport Agreement are incorporated 
in the attached Annex which supersedes the existing 
Annex to that Agreement. 

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature. 

Done at Washington, this 23rd day of June, 1973, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the Government For the Government of the 

of the United States Union of Soviet Socialist 

of America: Republics: 

Claude S. Brinegar b. P. Bugayev 

ANNEX 

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics entrusts the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation of the USSR with responsibility for the 
operation of the agreed services on the routes speci- 
fied in Table I of this Annex, which in turn desig- 
nates for this purpose the General Department of 
International Air Services f Aeroflot Soviet Airlines). 

2. The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica designates Pan American World Airways, Inc., 
to operate the agreed services on the routes specified 
in Tabic II of this Annex. 

3. Each designated airline shall have the follow- 
ing rights in the operation of the agreed services on 
the respective routes specified in Tables I and II of 
this Annex: 

(1) The right to land for technical and commer- 
cial purposes at the terminal point of the agreed 
route in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, as well as to use alternative airports and 
flight facilities in that territory for these purposes; 

(2) The right to discharge passengers, baggage, 
cargo and mail in the territory of the other Con- 
tracting Party, but without the right to discharge 
passengers, baggage, cargo and mail coming from 
any intermediate point in a third country on the 
given route, except for passengers and their ac- 
companied baggage which have been disembarked at 
that intermediate point by the designated airline and 
subsequently reembarked during the validity of the 
ticket (but in no event later than one year from the 
date of disembarkation) and which are moving un- 
der a passenger ticket and baggage check providing 
for transportation on scheduled flights on each seg- 
ment of the route between the two Contracting 
Parties; and 

(3) The right to pick up passengers, baggage, 
cargo and mail in the territory of the other Con- 
tracting Party, but without the right to pick up 
passengers, baggage, cargo and mail destined for 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



any intermediate point in a third country on the 
given route, except for passengers and their ac- 
companied baggage which are to be disembarked at 
that intermediate point and subsequently re- 
embarked by the designated airline during the 
validity of the ticket (but in no event later than one 
year from the date of disembarkation) and which 
are moving under a passenger ticket and baggage 
check providing for transportation on scheduled 
flights on each segment of the route between the 
two Contracting Parties. 

4. In addition to the rights specified in paragraph 
3 above, each designated airline shall have the right, 
subject to paragraph 5 below, to pick up and dis- 
charge passengers, baggage, cargo and mail in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party which are 
to be discharged or have been picked up at any 
intermediate point in a third country on the given 
route. 

5. Each designated airline may operate up to two 
roundtrip flights per week through March 31, 1974, 
up to three roundtrip flights per week during the 
1974 summer traffic season (April 1, 1974-October 
31, 1974), up to two roundtrip flights per week dur- 
ing the 1974/75 winter trafl^c season (November 1, 
1974-March 31, 1975), and thereafter such number 
of flights as is subsequently agreed between the 
Contracting Parties. The designated airline of the 
United States may exercise the right specified in 
paragraph 4 above on all its flights. The designated 
airline of the Soviet Union may exercise the right 
specified in paragraph 4 above on one of its flights. 

6. The intermediate points referred to in Table I 
of this Annex shall be any two of the following: 
Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Paris, London, Frankfurt, 
and Brussels; and the intermediate points referre-1 
to in Table II shall be any two of the following: 
London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Copenhagen, Brus- 
sels and Paris. At the beginning of each summer 
and winter traffic season, each designated airline 
may change from one combination of two interme- 
diate points to another combination of two inter- 
mediate points for that season. No more than one 
intermediate point may be served on each flight. The 
intermediate point or points may, at the option of 
each designated airline, be omitted on any or all 
flights. 

7. Each designated airline may make a change of 
gauge at any intermediate point in Europe listed in 
paragraph 6 above provided that: 

(1) carriage beyond the point of change of gauge 
will be performed by a single aircraft of capacity 
equal to or less (in the case of services outbound from 
the homeland) or equal to or more (in the case of 
services inbound to the homeland) than that of the 
arriving aircraft, and 

(2) aircraft for such beyond carriage will be 
scheduled only in coincidence with the incoming 
aircraft (with the same flight number) to insure 
true and genuine continuing service. 



AGREED SERVICES 
Table I 
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 

Moscow to New York or Washington (Dulles) 
and return, via the intermediate points listed in 
paragraph 6 of the Annex. New York and Washing- 
ton will be served on separate flights. Technical 
stops will be limited to those listed in Article II of 
the Supplementary Agreement, as amended. 

Table II 

For the United States of America: 

New York to Leningrad or Moscow, and return, 
via the intermediate points listed in paragraph 6 
of the Annex. Leningrad and Moscow will be served 
on separate flights. Technical stops will be limited 
to those listed in Article II of the Supplementary 
Agreement, as amended. 



Current Treaty Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Protocol suspending the agreement of March 4, 1969 
(TIAS 6741), between the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Iran, and the United States for 
the application of safeguards and providing for 
the application of safeguards pursuant to the 
nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 
6839). Done at Vienna June 19, 1973. Enters into 
force on the date on which the Agency receives 
from Iran written notification that it has com- 
pleted its constitutional requirements for entry 
into force of the treaty safeguards agreement and 
of this protocol. 

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Iran, United States. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 
Accession deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1973. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, July 3, 1973. 



Not in force. 



July 23, 1973 



175 



Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973 TIAS 
7532. 

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, including West Berlin, July 2, 1973. 



BILATERAL 



Ireland 

Agreement relating to travel group charter flights 
and advance booking charter flights, with memo- 
randum of understanding. Efl'ected by exchange of 
notes at Washington June 28 and 29, 1973. En- 
tered into force June 29, 1973. 

Morocco 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 19, 1973. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Rabat May 11, 
1973. Entered into force May 11, 1973. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Protocol to the agreement of February 21, 1973 
(TIAS 7575), relating to the consideration of 
claims resulting from damage to fishing vessels 
or gear and measures to prevent fishing conflicts, 
with annex. Signed at Copenhagen June 21, 1973. 
Entered into force June 21, 1973. 

Agreement on certain fishery problems on the high 
seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic 
Ocean. Signed at Copenhagen June 21, 1973 En- 
tered into force July 1, 1973. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent dis- 
count is made on orders for 100 or more cojnes of 
any one publication mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, must accompany orders. 

Discussion Guide— Issues : No. 4— People's Republic 
of Chma. A teaching tool to facilitate classroom 
and adult discussion groups use of the recently pub- 
lished "Issues" pamphlet on the People's Republic 
of China. Pub. 8503. East Asian and Pacific Se- 
ries 185. 4 pp. 20^ postpaid. 

Social Security. Agreement with Liechtenstein. 
TIAS 7476. 3 pp. 15^ 



Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Uruguay 
TIAS 7477. 11 pp. 15<. 

Passenger Charter Air Services. Memorandum of 
Understanding with Belgium. TIAS 7479. 3 pp 
15(!. 

Naval Communications Facility on Diego Garcia. 

Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland supplementing the 
agreement of December 30, 1966. TIAS 7481. 21 
pp. 25^ 

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Kinder, 
pest. Agreement with Panama. TIAS 7482. 7 nn 
IS*-. ^^' 

Education— Educational Foundation and Financing 
of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Pakistan 
TIAS 7483. 6 pp. 15f. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Spain ex- 
tending the provisional agreement of June 28 and 
30, 1972. TIAS 7484. 3 pp. 15^ 

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan 
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as ex- 
tended. TIAS 7485. 3 pp. 15^. 

Surplus Property— Off-Shore Sales Facility. Agree- 
ment with Singapore amending the agreement of 
May 5, 1972. TIAS 7486. 1 p. 15c. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the 
Khmer Republic amending the agreement of Janu- 
ary 13, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7487. 5 pp. 15o. 

Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Spain. TIAS 7488 
5 pp. 15('. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Korea amending the agreement of Febru- 
ary 14, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7489. 4 pp. 15('. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of September 21, 1972 
TIAS 7490. 2 pp. ISf". 

Improvement of Airfield Facilities. Memorandum of 
understanding with the Khmer Republic. TIAS 

7491. 5 pp. 15('. 

Military Assistance— Deposits Under Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 

7492. 5 pp. 15(<. 

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. 

Agreement with the Republic of China, the Republic 
of Korea, and Hong Kong. TIAS 7493. 4 pp. 
15('. 

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. 

Agreement with Hong Kong. TIAS 7494. 8 pp. 
15^ 



Fiber Textiles. Ar- 

7495. 23 pp. 30('. 



Trade in Wool and .Man-Made 

rangement with Japan. TIAS 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Korea amending the agreement of Decem- 
ber 30, 1971. TIAS 7496. 2 pp. ISt*. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia 
amending the agreement of March 7, 1969. TIAS 
7497. 5 pp. 15(*. 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 23, 197 J Vol. LXIX, No. 1778 



liculture. Agreements Signed During Gen- 
ial Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the United 
tates (basic principles for strategic arms 
i.gotiations, agreements on peaceful uses of 
itoniic energy, prevention of nuclear war, 
agriculture, studies of the world ocean, trans- 
portation, and exchanges, convention on 
taxation, protocols on Chamber of Commerce, 
immercial facilities, and air services) . . . 158 

omic Energy. Agreements Signed During 

leneral Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the 

nited States (basic principles for strategic 

arms negotiations, agreements on peaceful 

uses of atomic energ>-, prevention of nuclear 

var, agriculture, studies of the world ocean, 

1 ansportation, and exchanges, convention on 

taxation, protocols on Chamber of Commerce, 

commercial facilities, and air services) . . 158 

Disarmament 

Agreements Signed During General Secretary 
Brezhnev's Visit to the United States (basic 
irinciples for strategic arms negotiations, 
agreements on peaceful uses of atomic 
energy, prevention of nuclear war, agricul- 
ture, studies of the world ocean, transporta- 
tion, and exchanges, convention on taxation, 
protocols on Chamber of Commerce, com- 
mercial facilities, and air services) .... 158 

Tresidential Assistant Kissinger Discusses 
Agreements Signed During General Secre- 
tary Brezhnev's Visit (news conferences) . . 134 

Economic Affairs. .Agreements Signed During 
General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the 
United States (basic principles for strategic 
arms negotiations, agreements on peaceful 
uses of atomic energy, prevention of nuclear 
war, agriculture, studies of the world ocean, 
transportation, and exchanges, convention on 
taxation, protocols on Chamber of Commerce, 
commercial facilities, and air services) . . . 158 

Educational and Cultural .\8fairs. Agreements 
Signed During General Secretary Brezhnev's 
\'isit to the United States (basic principles 
for strategic arms negotiations, agreements 
on peaceful uses of atomic energy, prevention 
of nuclear war, agriculture, studies of the 
world ocean, transpoi-tation, and exchanges, 
convention on taxation, protocols on Chamber 
of Commerce, commercial facilities, and air 
services) ^58 

I'lesidentia! Documents. General Secretary 
Brezhnev Visits the United States (Nixon, 
Brezhnev, joint communique) 113 

Publications. Recent Releases 1''6 

Treaty Information 

^irreements Signed During General Secretary 
Brezhnev's Visit to the United States (basic 



principles for strategic arms negotiations, 
agreements on peaceful uses of atomic 
energy, prevention of nuclear war, agricul- 
ture, studies of the world ocean, transporta- 
tion, and exchanges, convention on taxation, 
protocols on Chamber of Commerce, com- 
mercial facilities, and air services) .... 1-58 
Current Treaty Actions 1"5 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreements Signed During General Secretary 
Brezhnev's Visit to the United States (basic 
principles for strategic anns negotiations, 
agreements on peaceful uses of atomic 
energy, prevention of nuclear war, agricul- 
ture, studies of the world ocean, transporta- 
tion, and exchanges, convention on taxation, 
protocols on Chamber of Commerce, com- 
mercial facilities, and air services) .... 158 

General Secretary Brezhnev Visits the United 
States (Nixon,'Brezhnev, joint communique) 113 

Presidential Assistant Kissinger Discusses 
Agreements Signed During General Secre- 
tary Brezhnev's Visit (news conferences) . . 134 

Name Index 

Bi'ezhnev, Leonid I 113 

Kissinger, Henry A 134 

Nixon, President 113 



Check List of Department of Stafe 
Press Releases: July 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. Date 



Subject 



t233 7/2 U.S. and Ireland reach under- 
standing on operation of ad- 
vance air charters, June 29 
(rewrite). 

*234 7/3 Study group 8 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for CCIR, 
July 31. 

t235 7/5 U.S.-Japan Committee on Scien- 
tific Cooperation, July 10-12. 

t236 7/6 U.S. opens consulate general in 
Leningrad. 

t237 7/6 Rogers: Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, 
July 5. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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washington. o.c. 2040z 

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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
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Washington, D.C. 20520. 



I 

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(3: 



\l//77f 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1779 



July 30, 1973 



CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 
MEETS AT HELSINKI AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL 

Statement by Secretary Rogers, Conference Communique, 
and Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations 177 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES RECENT NEGOTIATIONS 

IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY 

Statement by Under Secretary Casey 190 

U.S. CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ON PRIORITY PROPOSALS 

FOR U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM 

Statement by Christian A. Herter, Jr. 201 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1779 
July 30, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.26 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI, 
a weekly publication issued by t, 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public at 
interested agencies of the governmei 
with information on developments i, 
the field of V.S. foreign relations 
on the work of the Department 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes aelecta 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and othei 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases ol 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information is iiu 
eluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which /Aas 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, ant 
legislative material in the field oi 
international relations are also listed 



Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Meets at Helsinki at Foreign Minister Level 



The first stage of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe met at Hel- 
sinki Jnly 3-7, at the Foreign Ministers level. 
Following is a statement by Secretary Rogers 
made before the conference on July 5, to- 
gether ivith the texts of a covimtinique is- 
sued at the conclusion of the meeting on 
July 7 and of the Final Recommendations of 
the Helsinki Considtxitions, agreed to on June 
8 by participants in the preparatory talks 
and adopted by the conference on July 3. 

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS, JULY 5 

Press release 237 dated July 6 

I would like to join my colleagues in ex- 
pressing the gratitude of the U.S. Govern- 
ment to the Government of Finland for its 
many and substantial contributions to bring- 
ing this conference into being. This confer- 
ence provides the nations represented here 
a historic opportunity. But whether the con- 
ference itself achieves historic importance 
depends on how we — the Foreign Ministers 
here present and the 35 governments we rep- 
resent — avail ourselves of the opportunity. 

I think it can be said that so far the meet- 
ing has met our expectations. We have gath- 
ered together in a friendly and constructive 
manner and have engaged in what we refer 
to as a general debate — but a debate with 
very few differences. I am the 21st speaker, 
and unless I missed something, each speaker 
who preceded me spoke thoughtfully, respect- 
fully of the viewpoints of others, and with- 
out using contentious rhetoric. Maybe we 
should not list this as an accomplishment, 
but we can say it's a i-elief. 

But beyond the friendly climate which has 
prevailed throughout, we made a decision of 



major dimensions at the outset — almost 
routinely. After careful consideration by our 
governments, we unanimously adopted the 
Final Recommendations of the Helsinski 
Consultations. This, in fact, is a remarkable 
document. It is not merely a conference 
agenda. It contains a long list of agreed prin- 
ciples and includes a detailed and carefully 
drafted work program designed to promote 
peaceful evolution in Europe for the years 
ahead. This document is a commitment to 
find new and more civilized ways of dealing 
with one another. I wish to underline the 
point that the commitments we have made 
here are solemn obligations to develop com- 
prehensive and specific measures to advance 
our relationships in that spirit. 

I think President Kekkonen captured the 
essence of our decision when he said, "Secu- 
rity is not gained by erecting fences; security 
is gained by opening gates." 

For a quarter century, division has been 
the dominant feature of Europe. We all 
recognize that this conference must not con- 
firm the barriers that still divide Europe. 
Rather, by our support of the final recom- 
mendations we have expressly undertaken to 
lower these barriers. We have said coexist- 
ence is not enough. Indeed, the document to 
which we have agreed requires constructive 
change on a broad front in order that with 
the passage of time we can engage in many 
truly cooperative and mutually beneficial and 
peaceful relationships. 

The decisive challenge of the conference, 
then, is: Can we follow through? 

We have had some discussion here about 
the time frame for meeting the challenge. It 
seems to me that that decision can be reached 
later on. If we are successful — and I believe 



July 30, 1973 



177 



we can succeed — then scheduling will come 
easily. If we fail, the schedule will be of little 
importance. 

Cynics have suggested that the objective 
of an international conference is to complete 
it. I am sure that does not represent the views 
of any nation here. This conference, I be- 
lieve, should proceed as expeditiously as pos- 
sible, but without undue haste. What we seek 
is progress. Progress results from practical 
steps. Practical steps are not easy to take, 
but they are essential because we do not want 
to complete our work merely restating fa- 
miliar principles. 

As previous speakers have noted, the con- 
ference comes at a propitious time. Many na- 
tions represented here have dramatically con- 
tributed to creating the conditions which 
have made this conference possible. Four and 
one-half years ago President Nixon pledged 
that the policy of the United States would be 
to move from confrontation to negotiation in 
all areas of the world. He acted promptly to 
carry out his policy, and as a result it is gen- 
erally acknowledged that today we live in a 
much more peaceful world. This new climate 
for peace benefits all of mankind. But much 
more remains to be done. 

The universal hope for a durable peace 
can be significantly strengthened by the na- 
tions participating in this conference; that 
is the hope that permeates this hall. We rep- 
resent most of the world's developed nations. 
Our economies produce about 75 percent of 
the world's wealth, and together we account 
for approximately 85 percent of the world's 
military expenditures. Our long-range goal 
must be an act of common will to bring our 
enormous resources to bear on the common 
problems we face and on assisting others less 
fortunate. Moreover, it is now within our 
grasp to contribute to an improved world 
climate so that a reduction in the world's 
armaments is a definite possibility. 

We are all conscious, as so many have said, 
that the two World Wars began in Europe. 
We have all learned lessons from those con- 
flicts. The United States has learned from 
our experience that Europe's security is in- 
divisible from our own. The presence of my 
delegation today symbolizes that fundamen- 



tal fact — ^the fact, if you will, of our engage- 
ment in Europe. 

Americans believe that during the last 
generation we have made a constructive and 
successful commitment to peace and stability 
in Europe. And today, on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States, I want to un- 
derscore the firmness of our resolve both to 
continue that commitment and to strengthen 
our relationship with all of the states repre- 
sented here. 

Let me turn briefly to some of the specific 
issues with which the conference has agreed 
to deal. 

Nothing is more important than the prin- 
ciple that states refrain from the use or 
threat of force. It is the keystone in the arch 
of a durable peace, and we have accepted it 
as a fundamental principle in relations be- 
tween states. 

This means, of course, that frontiers 
should not be violated by force or threats of 
force. At the same time, this does not rule 
out — and I emphasize, does not rule out — 
peaceful changes in frontiers if such changes 
are based on popular will and mutual agree- 
ment between states. Certainly no one could 
validly contend otherwise, for such conten- 
tion would violate the twin principles of sov- 
ereignty and the right of self-determination. 

Another principle which this conference 
has already endorsed is the principle of uni- 
versal respect for the right of every country 
to independence and to its own internal de- 
velopment free of outside interference, ir- 
respective of its political, economic, or social 
system. We have said in effect that a country 
must not be denied these rights for any 
reason. That is why we Foreign Ministers 
have mandated the committee that it must 
"express the determination of the participat- 
ing States to respect and apply the principles 
equally and unreservedly in all aspects to 
their mutual relations and co-operation, in 
order to ensure to all participating States 
the benefits resulting from the application of 
these principles by all." There is nothing 
equivocal about that decision which we have 
made. And in international aff'airs strict ob- 
servance of that mandate is of utmost im- 
portance. 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



Another important mandate in the docu- 
ment states that we should study ways in 
which problems arising between states can 
be resolved on a peaceful basis early on to 
avoid later conflict. The committee could 
achieve meaningful results in this area by 
carefully developing plans for early consulta- 
tion and possibly mediation to avoid confron- 
tation. 

The committee is also enjoined to give 
specific meaning to the concept of reduction 
of tensions in the military sphere as set forth 
in paragraph 23 of the final recommenda- 
tions. Thus we support : 

1. Advance notification of major military 
maneuvers ; 

2. Exchanges of observers by invitation at 
military maneuvers under mutually accept- 
able conditions ; and 

3. The study of prior notification of major 
military movements. 

We have given support to these measures 
because we believe greater confidence can re- 
sult from sharing such military information 
so that the margin for surprise can be sub- 
stantially reduced. 

A fundamental aspect of our commitment 
is outlined in section III. I refer of course to 
the lowering of barriers to the freer flow of 
people, information, and ideas among the 
participating states. This aspect of our work 
stems from the importance we attach to 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
There are few words which are so filled with 
meaning, so venerated by people everywhere. 
But section III could turn out to be a sad foot- 
note in future history books unless the com- 
mittee finds concrete ways to embody the 
concepts contained therein so that the every- 
day lives of people are favorably aflfected. I 
have in mind here, for example, proposals for 
arrangements that will permit the reunifica- 
tion of families, more regular visits between 
the members of divided families, new ways of 
sharing experiences in various fields of pro- 
fessional and intellectual endeavor, and pro- 
moting closer links between our young 
people. Our youth should learn more about 
one another and about other states and sys- 
tems. The future development of our rela- 



lations can only profit from their mutual 
understanding. 

We have agreed here also to facilitate 
travel for personal or professional reasons. 
In several countries, as in our country, citi- 
zens are free to travel anywhere in the world 
without any restriction or interference. I 
recognize of course that each state has its 
own regulations. But the thrust of the man- 
date is to encourage — indeed, to exhort — 
states to lower barriers to travel and en- 
courage human contacts that are so essential 
to understanding and mutual respect in to- 
day's world. 

It will also be important to give specific 
content to our agreement to improve the 
circulation of and access to information 
transmitted by the various media and to im- 
prove the conditions under which journalists 
may exercise their profession in our coun- 
tries. The right of people to know fully what 
is happening in the world is a basic human 
right and a basic requirement for under- 
standing and knowledge. 

We have also agreed to reduce the obsta- 
cles in the development of trade by examin- 
ing specific measures, among other things, 
to facilitate business contacts and the ex- 
change of information on commercial op- 
portunities. 

In addition to our work in this conference, 
we have recognized that the process of rec- 
onciliation must move forward on a broader 
front. In this connection it should be noted 
that the increasingly united European Com- 
munity has a special contribution to make as 
it forges an economic and political union 
among member states whose past disputes 
were a frequent cause of war in Europe. And 
by building closer ties with individual East 
European nations, members of the Commu- 
nity and other West European nations are 
lowering the barriers that have too long 
divided Europe. 

The United States will continue to work 
closely with its allies in the Atlantic alliance, 
which contributes not only to the security 
and independence of its members but is also 
seeking new ways to improve relations in 
Europe. 

With the nations of eastern Europe the 



July 30, 1973 



179 



United States has opened a new era of im- 
proved relations. We are dealing with each 
country in eastern Europe separately — de- 
termining our policy in accordance with the 
specific policies and actions of each and look- 
ing forward to a wider and more construc- 
tive association with all the nations of the 
area. 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
have a major contribution to make to a 
secure and cooperative Europe. Just as the 
confrontation between our two nations con- 
tributed to the division of postwar Europe, so 
the recent improvement in our relations is 
helping to bring Europe together again. 

At the conclusion of their meeting in 
Washington last month President Nixon and 
General Secretary Brezhnev affirmed that 
"ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a 
paramount goal of their policies." ' The 
agreement they signed on prevention of nu- 
clear war is a landmark in Soviet-American 
relations and should have a favorable impact 
upon European security as well. And by set- 
ting forth basic principles for further limita- 
tion of strategic arms and by entering into 
several other agreements involving mutual 
endeavors, the Soviet Union and the United 
States further contributed to the goal, held 
by all of us at this conference, of strengthen- 
ing stability and security in Europe. 

The United States is also gratified by the 
progress being made in discussions in various 
forums on the limitation of arms and arma- 
ments. We are particularly pleased that 
many of us here have reached agreement that 
negotiations on the mutual reduction of 
armed forces and armaments and associated 
measures in central Europe will begin on 
October 30. These talks will be proceeding in 
Vienna at the same time as the second stage 
of this conference is going forward in Ge- 
neva. The Vienna talks should complement 
our efforts in this conference to strengthen 
stability and security in Europe. 

As the first phase of the conference draws 
to a close, it might be well briefly to outline 



' For text of a communique issued June 25 upon 
General Secretary Brezhnev's departure from the 
United States, see Bulletin of July 23, 1973, p. 
130. 



what we hope can be achieved during the 
second phase. The conference should : 

1. Elaborate, with precision, upon the 
agreed general principles in ways that re- 
late directly and specifically to the problems 
of states participating in the conference; 

2. Reach agreements on specific military 
matters including exchange of certain signi- 
ficant military information and appropriate 
exchange of observers in order to increase 
confidence and dispel suspicion ; 

3. Develop methods for early and peaceful 
settlement of disputes which might have the 
potential for confrontation between any of 
the participating states ; 

4. Advance proposals for reducing bar- 
riers to the growth of trade, increasing com- 
mercial exchanges, industrial cooperation, 
cooperation in the field of science and tech- 
nology; and 

5. Of paramount importance, work out 
specific and meaningful ways to facilitate 
human contacts, the freer dissemination of 
information, and the broadening of cultural 
and educational cooperation. 

In the second phase we have to translate 
the results of our work into dynamic pro- 
grams which would give specific meaning to 
the relationships that we seek, and the United 
States will submit concrete proposals for this 
purpose. Finally, during the process we must 
adhere in all of our dealings to the spirit of 
reconciliation. For it is this spirit which has 
raised all of our hopes for a new era of peace 
in Europe and throughout the world. 

Our goal should be a continent in which no 
nation feels threatened, a continent open to 
the free flow of people and ideas, and a con- 
tinent enriched rather than divided by po- 
litical and cultural diversity. Such a Europe 
will not come about merely by wishing for 
it or by making declarations about it. Only 
time will tell whether we have accomplished 
anything or not, but one thing is certain: 
We must proceed with great industry and 
diligence in the days ahead and must pursue 
our goal with patience, understanding, and 
determination through the years to come. If 
there is a consensus among us in that spirit, 
then we may be proud of the few days we 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



spent together in this friendly city of Hel- 
sinki. 

TEXT OF CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE, JULY 7 

Press release 238 dated July 9 

The first stage of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe took place in Helsinki from 3 
to 7 July 1973. In accordance with the agreement 
reached earlier, this stage of the Conference was held 
at Foreign Minister level. 

The following states are participating in the con- 
ference: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cy- 
prus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ire- 
land, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mon- 
aco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Ro- 
mania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia. 

At the Inaugural Session of the Conference Dr. 
Urho Kekkonen, President of the Republic of Fin- 
land, made a speech of welcome. Dr. Kurt Waldheim, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, also ad- 
dressed the Conference. 

The Ministers adopted the Final Recommendations 
of the Helsinki Consultations which comprise the 
agenda and instructions of the working bodies of the 
Conference together with the rules of procedure and 
the other arrangements relating to the conduct of 
the Conference. The text of these final recommenda- 
tions is available to the public. 

The Ministers stated the views of their govem- 
ments on essential problems relating to security and 
cooperation in Europe, and on the further work of 
the Conference. 

The Foreign Ministers of several states submitted 
proposals on various questions relating to the 
agenda. Others announced the intention to submit 
proposals during the second stage of the Conference. 
The Ministers examined the manner in which the 
Conference would acquaint itself with points of view 
expressed by non-participating states on the subject 
of various agenda items. This matter was in particu- 
lar considered in connection with the request of 
Malta and Spain in favor of Algeria and Tunisia. 
This matter was also considered in relation to other 
non-participating states bordering the Mediterra- 
nean. No consensus was reached for the time being. 
The Ministers decided that the second stage of the 
Conference will meet in Geneva on September 18, 
1973, in order to pursue the study of the questions on 
the agenda and in order to prepare drafts of decla- 
rations, recommendations, resolutions or any other 
final documents on the basis of the proposals sub- 
mitted during the first stage as well as those to be 
submitted. 

The coordinating committee made up of represen- 



tatives of participating states will assemble for its 
first meeting in Geneva on August 29, 1973, in order 
to prepare the organization of the second stage. 

The Ministers expressed the determination of their 
governments to contribute to the success of the 
further work of the Conference. 

The participants in the Conference expressed their 
profound gratitude to the Government of Finland for 
its hospitality and for the important contribution 
made by Finland to the preparation of the Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to 
the conduct of the first stage. 

TEXT OF FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE HELSINKI CONSULTATIONS 

(1) The participants in the Helsinki Consultations 
on the question of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, representing the Govern- 
ments of States listed in the annex, recommend to 
their Governments that this Conference should be 
convened under the conditions specified below, con- 
cerning its organization, agenda and the related in- 
structions, participation, date, place, rules of 
procedure and financial arrangements. 

(2) The participants expressed their collective 
agreement to these Recommendations on 8 June, 1973. 

(3) Each State entitled to participate in the Con- 
ference will infoi-m the Government of Finland, 
within the time limits laid down in Chapter 3, of its 
decision to take part in this Conference, thereby 
indicating its intention to do so on the basis of the 
Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consulta- 
tions. The Government of Finland will inform all 
States entitled to participate of the communications 
received in this respect. 

(4) The Government of Finland will take the nec- 
essary measures, in accordance with the arrange- 
ments provided for in the Final Recommendations, 
to organize the first stage of the Conference. 

(5) Index of Recommendations 

1. Organization of the Conference 

2. Agenda and the Related Instructions 

3. Participation, Contributions, Guests 

4. Date 

5. Place 

6. Rules of Procedure 

7. Financial Arrangements 

Annex : Li-st of Participating Countries ' 

1 . Organization of the Conference on Security 
ancJ Cooperation in Europe 

(6) The Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe will take place in three stages: 

(a) Stage I 

(7) The first stage will consist of a meeting of the 



= Not printed here. 



July 30, 1973 



181 



Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the participating 
States. In accordance with the recommendations of 
the Helsinki Consultations, the Ministers will adopt 
the rules of procedure, the agenda and the instruc- 
tions of the working bodies of the Conference, to- 
gether with the other arrangements relating to the 
conduct of the Conference. The Ministers will state 
the views of their Governments on the problems re- 
lating to security and co-operation in Europe. Should 
they so wish they will put forward, for consideration 
in the course of the second stage, proposals relating 
to the various topics on the agenda. 

(b) Stage II 

(8) The second stage will comprise the work of the 
specialized committees and sub-committees whose in- 
structions are defined in Chapter 2 of these recom- 
mendations (points I, II and III of the agenda). 
Within this framework and on the basis of the pro- 
posals submitted either by the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, or subsequently by the delegations of the 
participating States, the committees and sub-com- 
mittees will prepare drafts of declarations, recom- 
mendations, resolutions or any other final documents. 
The participating States will be represented in these 
bodies by such delegates and experts as they shall 
designate for the purpose. 

(9) A co-ordinating committee, composed of rep- 
resentatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, will meet periodically during the second 
stage of the Conference. It will co-ordinate the activ- 
ities of the committees and assemble the results of 
their work with a view to the final stage of the 
Conference. The Co-ordinating Committee shall also 
be entrusted with the execution of the tasks defined 
in point IV of the agenda, as stated in Chapter 2 of 
the present recommendations. It will, furthermore, 
submit to the participating Governments such rec- 
ommendations as it may consider useful regarding 
the conduct of the Conference, especially the organi- 
zation of its third stage. 

(c) Stage III 

(10) In the light of the recommendations drawn 
up by the Co-ordinating Committee, the Conference 
will meet for its third stage. 

(11) The level of representation at the third stage 
will be decided by the participating States during 
the Conference, before the end of the second stage. 

(12) The Conference will adopt its final docu- 
ments, in formal session, at the close of this third 
stage. 



2. Agenda and the Related Instructions 

I. Questions Relating to Security in Europe 

(13) In carrying out the instructions set out be- 
low, the Committee will bear in mind the wider 
objective of promoting better relations among par- 
ticipating States and ensuring conditions in which 



their people can live in peace free from any threat 
to or attempt against their security. 

(14) In its work the Committee will proceed from 
the premise that the strengthening of security in 
Europe is not directed against any State or continent 
and should constitute an important contribution to 
world peace and security. 

(15) In considering questions relating to security 
in Europe, the Committee will bear in mind the 
broader context of world security and in particular 
the relationship which exists between security in 
Europe and in the Mediterranean area. 

(16) The Committee will be assisted in its tasks 
by the appropriate Sub-Committees. 

1. 

(17) (a) The Committee/Sub-Committee is charg- 
ed with the task of considering and stating in 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations those basic principles which each 
participating State is to respect and apply in its re- 
lations with all other participating States, irrespec- 
tive of their political, economic or social systems, 
in order to ensure the peace and security of all par- 
ticipating States. 

(18) The principles to be stated shall be included 
in a document of appropriate form to be submitted 
by the Committee for adoption by the Conference. 
It shall express the determination of the participat- 
ing States to respect and apply the principles equally 
and unreservedly in all aspects to their mutual rela- 
tions and co-operation, in order to ensure to all par- 
ticipating States the benefits resulting from the 
application of these principles by all. 

(19) The reaffirmation, with such clarifications 
and additions as may be deemed desirable, and the 
precise statement, in conformity with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations, of the follow- 
ing principles of primary significance guiding the 
mutual relations of the participating States, are 
deemed to be of particular importance: 

— sovereign equality, respect for the rights inher- 
ent in sovereignty; 

— refraining from the threat or use of force; 

— inviolability of frontiers; 

— territorial integrity of States; 

— peaceful settlement of disputes; 

— non-intervention in internal affairs; 

— respect for human rights and fundamental free- 
doms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief; 

— equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 

— co-operation among States; 

— fulfilment in good faith of obligations under in- 
ternational law. 

(20) In discharging itself of these tasks, the Com- 
mittee/Sub-Committee shall take into account in par- 
ticular the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations. 

(21) (b) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall 
give expression to the idea that respect for the above- 
listed principles will encourage the development of 
normal and friendly relations among the participat- 
ing States as well as of their political contacts which 
in turn would contribute to the furthering of their 
co-operation. It shall also consider proposals de- 
signed to give effect to refraining from the threat or 
use of force. In this context, it shall study proposals 
for and undertake the elaboration of a method for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes among partici- 
pating States. 

2. 

(22) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall have 
regard to the fact that the participating States are 
desirous of eliminating any causes of tension that 
may exist among them and of contributing to the 
strengthening of peace and security in the world, 
bearing in mind the fact that efforts aimed at dis- 
armament complement political detente and are 
essential elements in a process in which all partici- 
pating States have a vital interest. 

(23) In order to strengthen confidence and to 
increase stability and security, the Committee/Sub- 
Committee shall submit to the Conference appropri- 
ate proposals on confidence-building measures such 
as the prior notification of major military manoeu- 
vres on a basis to be specified by the Conference, and 
the exchange of observers by invitation at military 
manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. 
The Committee/Sub-Committee will also study the 
question of prior notification of major military move- 
ments and submit its conclusions. 

(24) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pay due 
attention to the view-s expressed by participating 
States on the various subjects mentioned in the pre- 
ceding paragraphs, on the particular interest they 
attach thereto, especially from the point of view of 
their own security and of their desire to be informed 
about the relevant developments. 

II. Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, of 
Science and Technology and of the Environ- 
ment 

(25) The Committee shall be responsible for 
drawing up a draft final document/documents con- 
taining guidelines and concrete recommendations 
which could stimulate common efforts for increased 
co-operation in the fields of economics, science and 
technology and environment, which might guide the 
participating States in their mutual relations in 
these areas and which they might utilize in the 
conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements, 
as well as recommendations on specific measures for 
the development of co-operation which could be 
agreed by participating States. 

(26) The Committee will bear in mind the 



contribution which such co-operation could make to 
the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe. 
It will also bear in mind the interests of developing 
countries and regions and the positive effects which 
the broadening of co-operation among participating 
States could have on world economic relations. 

(27) The Committee, having in mind the fore- 
going, shall study ways and means that would make 
it possible, by mutual agreement among participat- 
ing States, to facilitate, with due regard for the 
diversity of economic and social systems and under 
conditions of reciprocity of advantages and obliga- 
tions, the development of trade and co-operation in 
the various fields of economic activity, science, tech- 
nology and in the field of the environment. In this 
regard, it will in particular take account of the 
work of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe. 

(28) In considering questions relating to co- 
operation in Europe covered by this mandate, the 
Committee will bear in mind the relationship which 
exists between such co-operation in Europe and in 
the Mediterranean area. 

(29) The Committee in its final draft/drafts will 
formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect 
for the principles guiding relations among the par- 
ticipating States enumerated in the terms of refer- 
ence for the Committee on item I of the agenda. 

(30) The Committee, assisted by the appropriate 
Sub-Committees, will examine the following ques- 
tions: 

1. Commercial Exchanges 

(31) The Committee/Sub-Committee will examine 
general provisions designed to promote trade and 
the exchange of services between participating 
States. It could discuss general problems relating 
to most favoured nation treatment. It could also 
examine measures aiming at the reduction or pro- 
gressive elimination of all kinds of obstacles to the 
development of trade. 

(32) The Committee/Sub-Committee will examine 
specific measures designed to facilitate commercial 
transactions and the exchange of services, such as 
measures aiming at the improvement of 

— business contacts and facilities 

— the exchange of information on commercial op- 
portunities and specific trading conditions 

— provisions for the settlement of commercial dis- 
putes including various forms of arbitration. 

2. Industrial Co-operation 
and Projects of Common Interest 

(33) The Committee/Sub-Committee will study 
the forms and modalities of industrial co-operation 
and will examine the various measures by which 
participating States could encourage the develop- 
ment of this co-operation using, as appropriate, the 
framework of bilateral or multilateral intergovern- 
mental agreements. 

(34) The Committee/Sub-Committee will ex- 



July 30, 1973 



183 



amine, in particular, the measures which govern- 
ments could take to create conditions favourable to 
this co-operation between competent organizations, 
firms and enterprises of participating States. It will 
bear in mind that the specific forms of such 
co-operation should be settled bilaterally unless 
otherwise agreed upon by the participants. This 
examination could bear on the various forms of 
co-operation, such as co-operation in production and 
sales, on the exchange of information concerning 
the possibilities of industrial co-operation, on the 
improvement of conditions for setting up projects, 
and on other measures which could develop and 
facilitate various forms of industrial co-operation. 

(35) The Committee/Sub-Committee will also ex- 
amine the possibilities of encouraging projects of 
common interest and of working out, where rele- 
vant, recommendations in this respect. 

(36) This examination could bear on the possi- 
bilities of implementing projects of common interest 
in the fields of energy resources, exploitation of 
raw materials and, when appropriate, of transport 
and communications. 

3. Science and Technology 

(37) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall con- 
sider proposals for the development of co-operation 
in the field of science and technology, taking into 
account already existing or planned co-operation in 
this field, with a view to facilitating, through such 
means as the improvement of contacts and infor- 
mation, access to new developments in science and 
technology, and to contributing to the most effec- 
tive solution of problems of common interest and 
to the betterment of the conditions of human life. 

(38) These proposals, in particular, shall be 
concerned with the areas where there are the most 
favourable prerequisites for such co-operation, the 
forms and methods for its implementation, as well 
as with the obstacles that hinder such co-operation 
and measures for their removal. In the consideration 
of these questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee 
will seek to build on existing practices and take into 
account the possibilities and capabilities of relevant 
existing international organizations. 

4. Environment 

(39) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall be re- 
sponsible for discussing questions of environmental 
protection and improvement and in particular for 
determining the fields that are important for the 
participating States and can best lend themselves 
to the development of co-operation between them, 
such as: protection of the seas surrounding Europe, 
of the waters and of the atmosphere; improvement 
of environmental and living conditions, especially 
in towns; protection of nature and of its resources. 

(40) The Committee/ Sub-Committee shall ex- 
amine and put forward the most appropriate bi- 
lateral and multilateral forms and methods of 
co-operation, including co-operation on a regional 



and subregional basis, for the various fields that 
have been determined. In the consideration of these 
questions, the Committee/Sub-Committee will seek 
to build on existing practices and take into account 
the possibilities and capabilities of the relevant 
existing international organizations. 

5. Co-operation in Other Areas 

(41) The Committee/Sub-Committee could ex- 
amine the following questions: 

— problems relating to the development of trans- 
port and communications between participating 
States; 

— promotion of tourism by the exchange of infor- 
mation, techniques and the results of practical ex- 
perience and by the study of appropriate measures; 

— economic and social aspects of migrant labour; 

— training of personnel in various fields of eco- 
nomic activity; 

— such other questions as may be decided by 
common agreement. 

III. Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other 
Fields 

(42) With the aim of contributing to the 
strengthening of peace and understanding among 
the peoples of the participating States and to the 
spiritual enrichment of the human personality, with- 
out distinction as to race, sex, language or religion 
and irrespective of their political, economic and social 
systems, the Committee, assisted by the appropriate 
Sub-Committees, shall be charged with examining 
all possibilities of co-operation conducive to creating 
better conditions for increased cultural and educa- 
tional exchanges, for broader dissemination of in- 
formation, for contacts between people, and for the 
solution of humanitarian problems. In this connec- 
tion, it shall not only draw upon existing forms of 
co-operation, but shall also work out new ways and 
means appropriate to these aims. 

(43) The Committee in its final document will 
formulate relevant proposals, based on full respect 
for the principles guiding relations among the par- 
ticipating States enumerated in the terms of refer- 
ence for the Committee on item I of the agenda. 

(44) The Committee shall also consider to what 
extent existing institutions could be used to achieve 
these aims. 

1. Human Contacts 

(45) The Committee/ Sub-Committee shall pre- 
pare proposals to facilitate freer movement and 
contacts, individually or collectively, privately or 
officially, among persons, institutions and organi- 
sations of the participating States. 

(46) With a view to contributing to the favour- 
able examination and settlement of relevant matters 
by the States concerned under mutually acceptable 
conditions, it shall pay particular attention to: 

(a) contacts and regular meetings on a basis of 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 



family ties; reunification of families; marriage be- 
[ tween nationals of different States; 

(b) travel for personal or professional reasons; 
improvement of conditions for tourism, on an in- 
dividual or collective basis; 

(c) meetings among young people; expansion of 
contacts and competitions, particularly in the field 
of sport. 

2. Information 

(47) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pre- 
pare proposals to facilitate the freer and wider 
dissemination of information of all kinds. In doing 
so it shall pay particular attention to: 

(a) improving the circulation of, and access to, 
oral, printed, filmed and broadcast information and 
extending the exchange of information; 

(b) encouraging co-operation in these fields of 
information on a basis of short or long term agree- 
ments ; 

(c) improving conditions under which journalists 
from one participating State exercise their profes- 
sion in another participating State. 

3. Co-operation and exchanges in the field of culture 

(48) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pre- 
pare proposals aimed at extending and improving 
co-operation and exchanges in the various fields of 
culture and shall indicate the components and ob- 
jectives of a consistent long-term development of 
such exchanges. In its work, it shall bear in mind 
the results of the Intergovernmental Conference 
on Cultural Policies in Europe, Helsinki, June 1972 
including the broader concept of culture outlined by 
that Conference. 

(49) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall con- 
sider in particular: 

(a) Extension of relations among competent gov- 
ernment agencies and non-governmental bodies deal- 
ing with matters of culture; 

(b) Promotion of fuller mutual knowledge of 
and access to achievements in literature, art and 
other fields of cultural activity; 

(c) Improvement of facilities for contacts and 
exchanges in the above-mentioned spheres; 

(d) Extension of contacts and co-operation among 
creative artists and people engaged in cultural 
activities; 

(e) Common search for new fields and forms of 
co-operation; co-operation in the investigation of 
the social aspects of culture; 

(f) Encouragement of such forms of cultural 
co-operation as: international events in the fields 
of art, film, theatre, music, folklore, etc.; book 
fairs and exhibitions; joint projects in the field of 
protection of monuments and sites; co-production 
and exchange of films and of radio and television 
programmes. 

(50) The Committee/Sub-Committee while con- 
sidering the role of States in co-operation in the 



field of culture will bear in mind the contribution 
that national minorities or regional cultures could 
make to it within the framework of respect for 
principles referred to above. 

4. Co-operation and exchanges 
in the field of education 
(51) The Committee/Sub-Committee shall prepare 
proposals aimed at broadening co-operation and ex- 
changes in the fields of education and science on a 
short or long-term basis. These proposals shall be 
carried out bilaterally and multilaterally as appro- 
priate, between participating States and non-govern- 
mental bodies. The Committee/Sub-Committee shall 
consider in particular: 

(a) Expansion of links between State institutions 
and non-governmental bodies whose activities are 
concerned with questions of education and science. 

(b) Improved access, under mutually acceptable 
conditions, for students, teachers and scholars from 
the participating States to each other's educational, 
cultural and scientific institutions, and a more exact 
assessment of the problems of comparison and equiv- 
alence between academic degrees and diplomas. 

(c) Encouragement of the study of the languages 
and civilizations of other peoples for the purpose of 
creating favourable conditions for promoting wider 
acquaintance with the culture of each country. 

(d) Exchange of experience in teaching methods 
in various fields including those used in adult educa- 
tion and exchanges in the field of teaching materials. 

(52) The Committee/Sub-Committee while consid- 
ering the role of States in co-operation in the field 
of education will bear in mind the contribution that 
national minorities or regional cultures could make 
to it within the framework of respect for principles 
referred to above. 

IV. Follow-up to the Conference 

(5.3) The Co-ordinating Committee shall consider, 
on the basis of the progress made at the Conference 
such measures as may be required to give effect to 
the decisions of the Conference and to further the 
process of improving security and developing co- 
operation in Europe. Having considered proposals 
to this effect, including proposals of an organiza- 
tional nature, it shall make any recommendations 
which it deems necessary. In examining the follow-up 
of the Conference, the Committee shall also consider 
the contributions which it believes could be asked 
from existing international organizations. 



3. Participation, Contributions, Guests 

(a) Participation 

(54) All European States, the United States and 
Canada shall be entitled to take part in the Confer- 
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe. If any 
of these States wishes to attend as an observer it 



July 30, 1973 



185 



may do so. In that case, its representatives may at- 
tend all stages of the Conference and of its working 
bodies, hut shall not participate in the taking of 
decisions. Such a State may decide later to accept 
these decisions or some of them under the conditions 
defined by the Conference. 

(55) States referred to in the first sentence of the 
paragraph above wishing to participate in the Con- 
ference or to attend as observers must so inform the 
Finnish Government at the latest on 25 June 1973. 

(b) Contributions 

(56) The Conference and its working bodies will 
acquaint themselves, in such manner as they may 
determine, with the points of view held by non- 
participating States on the subject of the various 
agenda items. 

(57) States situated in regions adjacent to Europe 
and to whom reference is made in the provisions of 
Chapter 2, and in particular those of the Mediter- 
ranean States which have already expressed their 
interest in stating their views to the Conference, are 
especially envisaged by this Chapter. 

(58) The Co-ordinating Committee may decide, by 
consensus, the means by which the working bodies of 
the Conference may consult appropriate interna- 
tional organizations, on the subject of the various 
agenda items. 

(c) Guests 

(59) The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
will be invited as guest of honour to the inaugural 
session of the Conference. 

4. Date 

(60) 1. The Conference on Security and Co-oper- 
ation in Europe shall be opened on 3 July 1973 at 
11:30 a.m. 

(61) 2. The date of the opening of the second 
stage shall be determined by the Ministers during the 
first stage. 

(62) 3. The date of the opening of the third 
stage shall be decided during the second stage by 
agreement among the participating States on the 
basis of the recommendations of the Co-ordinating 
Committee. 



5. Place of the Conference 

(63) Taking into account with appreciation the 
invitation by the Government of Finland, having in 
view practical considerations and rotation, the first 
stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe will be held in Helsinki; the second stage 
will be held in Geneva; the third stage will be held in 
Helsinki. 



6. Rules of ProcecJure 

(64) The States participating in the Conference 



on Security and Co-operation in Europe shall con- 
duct their work as follows: 

(65) 1. All States participating in the Confer- 
ence shall do so as sovereign and independent States 
and in conditions of full equality. The Conference 
shall take place outside military alliances. 

(66) 2. The representation of the participating 
States at each stage of the Conference shall be de- 
termined in accordance with the provisions laid down 
in Chapter 1 of these Final Recommendations. 

(67) 3. The working bodies of the Conference 
shall be the Co-ordinating Committee, the Commit- 
tees and the Sub-Committees. These working bodies 
will function during the second stage of the Confer- 
ence. However, the Co-ordinating Committee will 
meet at the site of the second stage before the open- 
ing of the second stage in order to settle questions 
relating to the organization of that stage. 

(68) The working bodies of the Conference may, 
if they so wish, set up such working groups as they 
may consider useful. The working bodies and work- 
ing groups of the Conference shall be open to all 
participating States. 

(69) 4. Decisions of the Conference shall be 
taken by consensus. Consensus shall be understood 
to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a 
Representative and submitted by him as constituting 
an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question. 

5. Chairmanship 

(70) A. The Chair at the inaugural and closing 
meetings of the first stage of the Conference shall 
be taken by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
host country. The Chair at other meetings shall be 
taken on a basis of rotation, as follows: 

(a) The Chair at each meeting shall be taken 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a different 
participating State, in an order established in ac- 
cordance with a list selected by lot country by 
country before the end of the Helsinki Consulta- 
tions; 

(b) If the Conference should meet both in the 
morning and in the afternoon of the same day, the 
two meetings shall be regarded as constituting two 
distinct meetings; 

(c) In the interval between meetings of the Con- 
ference, the functions of the Chair shall be exercised 
by that Minister for Foreign Affairs who presided 
over the immediately preceding meeting of the 
Conference; 

(d) Should a Minister for Foreign Affairs be 
prevented from taking the Chair, it shall be taken 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country 
next in the order established. 

(71) B. The Chair at the inaugural meeting of 
the working bodies of the Conference shall be taken 
by the Representative of the host country. There- 
after, the office of Chairman shall be filled as 
follows: 



186 



Department of State Bulletin 



(a) The Chairman of the Co-ordinating Commit- 
tee and the Chairmen of the Committees shall be 
designated on a basis of daily rotation, in French 
alphabetical order, starting from a letter drawn by 
lot; 

(b) The Chairmen of Sub-Committees and of 
other subsidiary bodies of the Conference shall be 
designated on a basis of rotation in accordance with 
practical arrangements to be established at the 

^appropriate time by the bodies in question. 

(72) Where necessary, a rapporteur shall be 
designated by consensus. 

(73) C. The provisions laid down for the meet- 
ings of the first stage shall be applicable inutatis 
mutandis to the meetings of the third stage of the 
Conference. They may be further defined by the 
Co-ordinating Committee. 

(74) 6. The Executive Secretary for technical 
matters at each stage of the Conference shall be 
a national of the corresponding host country. He is 
designated by the host country subject to agreement 
by the participating States. 

(75) In organizing the services, the Executive 
Secretary of each stage will be responsible for the 
recruitment of his staff and assured of the collabo- 
ration of the Secretariats of the other stages. 

(76) The Executive Secretaries will work under 
the authority of the Conference and report on their 
activities to the appropriate body of each stage of 

: the Conference, especially on financial matters. 

(77) 7. Official verbatim records shall be taken 
at the meetings of the first and third stages of the 
Conference. 

(78) Proposals on matters of substance and 
amendments thereto shall be submitted in writing 
to the Chairman and circulated to all participants. 
The proposals adopted shall be registered by the 
Executive Secretary and circulated among the par- 
ticipants. 

(79) Representatives of States participating in 
the Conference may ask for their formal reserva- 
tions or interpretative statements concerning given 
decisions to be duly registered by the Executive 
Secretary and circulated to the participating States. 
Such statements must be submitted in writing to the 
Executive Secretary. 

(80) 8. The inaugural and closing sessions of 
the first stage of the Conference will be open. Other 
sessions of the first stage may be open if the Min- 
isters so decide. The Co-ordinating Committee, the 
Committee and the Sub-Committee shall not, as a 
rule, meet in open sessions, unless the participants 
decide otherwise. Arrangements for the third stage 
will be similar to those for the first stage and may 
be further defined by the Co-ordinating Committee. 

(81) 9. The working languages of the Confer- 
ence and of its working bodies shall be: English, 
French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. 

(82) Speeches made in any of the working Ian- 



July 30, 1973 



guages shall be interpreted into the other working 
languages. 

(83) 10. Any Representative may make a state- 
ment in a language other than the working lan- 
guages. In this case, he shall himself provide for 
interpretation into one of the working languages. 

(84) 11. Records and decisions of the Conference 
shall be issued and circulated to participants in the 
working languages. 

(85) The participants shall decide by consensus 
whether it is desirable to make public, through the 
appropriate services of the Conference, certain 
documents or communiques on the work of the Con- 
ference and, if they decide in the affirmative shall 
specify the contents. 

(86) 12. During the discussion of any matter, a 
Representative may raise a point of order and the 
Chairman shall give him the floor immediately. A 
Representative raising a point of order may not 
speak on the substance of the matter under 
discussion. 

(87) 13. During the meeting the Chairman shall 
keep a list of speakers and may declare it closed 
with the consent of the meeting. He shall, however, 
accord the right of reply to any Representative if 
a speech after he has declared the list closed makes 
this desirable. 

(88) 14. These procedural arrangements shall 
be adopted by consensus. Once adopted, they can 
only be altered by consensus. 

7. Financial Arrangements 

A. Distribution of Expenses 

(89) The following scale of distribution has been 
agreed for the expenses of the Conference, subject 
to the reservation that the distribution in question 
concerns the Conference only and shall not be 
considered as a precedent which could be relied 
on in other circumstances: 

(90) 

France 8.80 per cent 

Federal Republic 

of Germany 8.80 

Italy 8.80 
Union of 

Soviet Socialist 

Republics 8.80 

United Kingdom 8.80 
United States of 

America 8.80 52.80 per cent 

Canada 5.52 5.52 

Belgium 3.48 

German Democratic 

Republic 3.48 

Netherlands 3.48 

Poland 3.48 

Spain 3.48 

Sweden 3.48 20.88 



187 



Austria 2.00 

Czechoslovakia 2.00 

Denmark 2.00 

Finland 2.00 

Hungary 2.00 

Norway 2.00 

Switzerland 2.00 

Greece 0.80 

Romania 0.80 

Turkey 0.80 

Yugoslavia 0.80 

Bulgaria 0.60 

Ireland 0.60 

Luxembourg 0.60 

Portugal 0.60 

Cyprus 0.20 

Holy See 0.20 

Iceland 0.20 

Liechtenstein 0.20 

Malta 0.20 

San Marino 0.20 



14.00 



3.20 



2.40 



1.20 



100 per cent 100 per cent 

(91) Necessary alterations of the cost sharing 
scale due to any possible modification in the list of 
participating States above will be decided upon by 
consensus. 

B. System, of Financing 

(92) 1. The monies needed to finance the Con- 
ference will be advanced by the host country of 
each stage subject to reimbursement out of the con- 
tributions of the participating States according to 
the agreed cost sharing scale. 

(93) 2, Payment of contributions by participat- 
ing States shall be made to a special account of the 
Conference. 

(94) 3. Payment shall be made in the currency 
of the host country. 

(95) 4. Accounts will be rendered in respect of 
each stage or at intervals of three (3) months, as 
appropriate. 

(96) 5. Accounts shall be expressed in the cur- 
rency of the host country and shall be rendered as 
soon as technically possible after the termination of 
a billing period. They shall be payable [within] 
sixty (60) days of presentation. 



Senate Confirms Gerald F, Tape 
OS U.S. Representative to IAEA 

The Senate on June 6 confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Gerald F. Tape to be the Repre- 
sentative of the United States to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, with 
the rank of Ambassador. 



Secretary Signs Consular Convention 
With Czechoslovakia 

Secretary Rogers visited Czechoslovakia 
July 8-9. Following is a statement made by 
Secretary Rogers upon his arrival in Pmgue. 

Press release 240 dated July 9 

It is a pleasure to be in Prague for this 
official visit to Czechoslovakia. It is, I be- 
lieve, the first such visit by an American 
Secretary of State since the founding of this 
nation. The United States is proud of the 
part it played in the foundation of Czecho- 
slovakia in 1918 and proud, too, of our par- 
ticipation in your liberation in 1945. 

As you are well aware, the United States 
has made a major efl'ort under President 
Nixon's leadership to improve its relation- 
ships with all countries, including those of 
eastern Europe, on the basis of reciprocity 
and mutual respect. I am prepared tonight 
to say that we wish to improve our relation- 
ship with Czechoslovakia in that spirit. Thus 
I hope that this visit, and the Consular Con- 
vention we will be signing tomorrow, will 
help to open a new chapter in our relations. 

Mr. Minister [Bohuslav Chnoupek, Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs], you and I have just 
returned from a conference in Helsinki in 
which we and 33 other states committed 
ourselves to an important set of principles 
governing future relations. That conference 
made a fundamental and unanimous decision 
to lower the barriers that have too long 
divided our peoples. The meetings we will 
have tomorrow therefore are particularly 
timely. 

First, the Consular Convention should open 
the way to a considerably greater flow of 
people between our two countries. 

Second, our discussions of outstanding 
economic and commercial problems could 
pave the way to better relations in the field 
of trade and commerce. 

Third, our discussions could lead to better 
understanding on both sides of our respec- 
tive views and could result in negotiations 
leading to an exchange agreement. 

Finally, while of course we will continue to 



188 



Department of State Bulletin 



have fundamental diflferences of ideology and 
viewpoints, it is my hope that we can make 
progress on a number of problems and thus 
begin to improve relations between Czecho- 
slovakia and the United States. 



U.S. Opens Consulate General 
in Leningrad 

Press release 236 dated July 6 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

At a ceremony in Leningrad July 6, 
Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., presided over 
the raising of the American flag at the office 
building which will house the U.S. consulate 
general in that city. In addition to repre- 
sentatives of the city of Leningrad and the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adolph 
Dubs, U.S. Charge d' Affaires ad interim in 
the U.S.S.R., and Culver Gleysteen, U.S. 
consul general in Leningrad, were present. 

The building, which is the second U.S. 
Foreign Service post in the Soviet Union, 
will house the consulate general's offices and 
the American Print, Film, and Music Li- 
brary in addition to providing apartments 
for a large part of the American staff. 

REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL 

Mr. Mayor, Mr. Popov [Georgiy I. Popov, 
Diplomatic Representative, Leningrad Dip- 
lomatic Agency, Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs] , distinguished guests: We are gathered 
here today to open the American consulate 
general in Leningrad. The Soviet consulate 
general in San Francisco was opened two 
weeks ago. These two events are symbolic 
of a long and often difficult effort to improve 
U.S.-Soviet relations. The first effort to open 
a consulate was almost 40 years ago. Another 
effort was made in 1948. It is perhaps inter- 
esting to note that at that time I was to be 
assigned to Leningrad as a vice consul, but 



the office never opened. This makes it even 
more of a personal pleasure for me to be 

here today. 

The current project for a consular office 
here was initiated by Mr. Nixon when he 
was Vice President. When Mr. Nixon became 
President, he was determined to improve 
relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, and I am sure it is a source 
of great satisfaction to him that after so 
many years we are now opening the Ameri- 
can consulate general in Leningrad. 

As you know, the Conference on European 
Security and Cooperation is now taking 
place in Helsinki. I can say from my personal 
experience there that it is working very 
well and the atmosphere is good. We are 
drawing away from confrontation and have 
moved toward negotiation. It is pai-ticularly 
fitting that the opening of this office in Len- 
ingrad is taking place at this time. Cxeneral 
Secretary Brezhnev has just completed his 
visit to the United States, one year after 
President Nixon's visit to the U.S.S.R. These 
two visits have made an enormous contri- 
bution toward improving bilateral relations 
between our two countries and to prospects 
for peace everywhere. We believe that in 
their day-to-day operations the new con- 
sulates general in Leningrad and San Fran- 
cisco will play a significant role in under- 
standing and contacts between our two 

countries. 

I wish on this occasion to say a special 
word about Leningrad. This is a city with 
a great history which is world famous for 
its culture, its beauty, and its industrial 
achievements. It is a hero city which has a 
deep meaning for all who remember the 
past and who are dedicated to preserving 
peace now and in the future. You who repre- 
sent Leningrad have reason to be proud of 
your city, and the United States is proud 
to be present here. 

Mr. Mayor, Mr. Popov, and other distin- 
guished guests, let me raise a toast to your 
health, to the city of Leningrad, to the suc- 
cess of our consul general and his colleagues 
in their important tasks, and to the constant 
improvement of relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 



July 30, 1973 



189 



Department Discusses Recent Negotiations 
in the International Oil Industry 



Statement by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs^ 



I thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today and to discuss recent negotiations con- 
cerning the international oil industry. I know 
this committee is already familiar with the 
basic nature of our oil relationships with the 
producers and with other consuming nations. 
Nonetheless, before specifically addressing 
the negotiations of the past year, I would 
like to make a few general comments about 
the international oil market with which we 
find ourselves so intimately involved as a re- 
sult of our own growing oil imports. This 
will explain a great deal about the OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] and other negotiating situations. 

The first feature of the international oil 
market is its size: The quantities involved 
are huge, and the rate at which they are 
increasing is dramatic. The world at present 
consumes approximately 50 million barrels 
of oil per day and, at present rates of growth, 
will double that figure early in the 1980's. 
Unless this rate of growth can be moderated 
through conservation or development of 
large-scale alternatives, new oil production 
in quantities equivalent to the production of 
Kuwait, or the North Sea, must be developed 
each year simply to keep up with demand. 
This is not an impossible task, but it is one 
which will require huge amounts of capital. 



' Made before the Subcommittees on Foreign Eco- 
nomic Policy and on the Near East and South .Asia 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 
11 (press release 244). The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. 



effort, and good will if it is to be achieved 
in a stable and secure manner. We unfor- 
tunately cannot assume that conditions will 
be uniformly favorable, and it seems entirely 
possible that serious problems may develop 
in bringing forth the desired quantities of 
production. 

The second major feature of the interna- 
tional oil picture is the increasing concentra- 
tion of key supplies under the effective con- 
trol of a small number of governments, 
which as a result have a tremendous poten- 
tial to influence the terms of trade in their 
favor jointly or individually. Over the past 
few years they have, moreover, shown a con- 
siderable degree of solidarity in pursuing 
their joint goals of achieving ever-increasing 
revenues from their oil production as well as 
control over the production of the oil itself. 
The growth in their revenues has been sub- 
stantial in the past few years and will con- 
tinue to increase with expected increases in 
oil production and price. Their increasing 
affluence will give these governments new 
strength and new responsibilities as well in 
terms of the management of their fiscal re- 
serves and investment funds. For a small 
number of them — principally the Arab states 
of the gulf — increased affluence may bring 
serious problems in addition to its benefits. 
They are concerned that they may not find 
sufficiently attractive investment outlets for 
their growing revenues and that their grow- 
ing wealth could become a source of instabil- 
ity. They will want to structure expenditure 
and investment programs which will make 
possible the most balanced and mutually bene- 



190 



Department of State Bulletin 



ficial development of oil production and 
capital utilization. We and other consuming 
governments should help them in this to the 
extent we can. 

The third feature of the international oil 
picture is the reverse of the second. Con- 
trasted to relative cohesion of the OPEC 
governments, the oil companies and govern- 
ments of the consuming nations tend to act 
independently and sometimes even at cross- 
purposes. Faced v/ith an increasing possibil- 
ity that oil will continue to be in short supply 
in the future, individual companies as well 
as governments have understandably acted 
to protect their own interests by seeking 
special access to sources of supply. The end 
result of this policy can add to the general 
insecurity, bid up prices further, and 
strengthen the negotiating hand of the OPEC 
governments. As a result, it seems desirable 
to us that consumer governments consult to 
develop more coordinated energy policies 
which do not. We have taken a number of 
specific steps toward this goal, which I will 
return to later. 

Major Transition in the Oil Industry 

Against this background, it is not unex- 
pected that the negotiators from OPEC gov- 
ernments have been able over the past several 
years to gain many of the major objectives 
for which they have reached. They have 
achieved not only a major improvement in the 
terms on w^hich they export their oil but also 
the acceleration of a major transition in the 
oil industry itself. The producer governments 
have been assuming a greater role in the 
international oil industry for some time 
through joint ventures, service contracts, or 
other new forms of association with oil com- 
panies. Up until the recent negotiations, how- 
ever, these have largely been on the fringes ; 
the major oil concessions were still tradi- 
tional in form and under the effective con- 
trol of the concessionary companies. That 
has now changed, and entirely new relation- 
ships between producer governments, oil com- 
panies, and consumer nations are developing. 
The central fact of the new arrangements 
is the increasing degree of control which will 



be exercised by the OPEC governments over 
oil production. By the early 1980's they will 
control directly over half of the oil sold in 
world trade. This transition need not neces- 
sarily be harmful to our interest, however, if 
the loss of influence over production and in- 
vestment decisions formerly enjoyed by our 
oil companies can be compensated for by 
development of common interests in filling 
the needs of the oil consumers. 

The companies have not embarked on 
their course toward new arrangements wath 
the producer governments entirely voluntar- 
ily. The negotiations of the past months have 
been difficult and at times strained, and there 
has inevitably been occasional bad feeling 
on both sides. The companies, who have 
formed a common front for the purpose of 
these negotiations, have been able as a result 
to coordinate their negotiating strategies, 
and this has had some effect in reducing the 
danger that OPEC negotiators could play 
them off one against the other. In the final 
analysis, however, they have found it diffi- 
cult to negotiate with sovereign governments 
which have the ability to invoke legislation 
if their negotiating goals are not reached. 

We have kept closely in touch with these 
negotiations, both through our diplomatic 
contacts with the OPEC governments and 
through our companies; other oil company 
parent governments have done likewise and 
have kept closely in touch with us. We have 
also made every eflfort to share information 
with other consumer governments, some of 
which are concerned at the fact that decisions 
affecting their vital oil supplies are being 
made in negotiations at which the only par- 
ties are OPEC governments and largely 
American-British oil companies. 

Implications of Recent Settlements 

Without going into the specific terms of the 
agreements reached, most of which have been 
published in the newspapers, I w^ould like to 
make general comments on the implications 
which we see in the settlements recently 
reached. 

First is the participation settlement with 
Saudi Arabia, which is important not only 



July 30, 1973 



191 



because of the tremendous importance of 
Saudi oil reserves and production potential, 
but also because it has set a pattern for other 
countries and because it appears to present 
an opportunity for a gradual, stable, and mu- 
tually beneficial transition period to new ar- 
rangements in the international oil industry. 
By providing for a phased increase in the 
government's control over oil production and 
marketing, it will allow the companies to 
continue to plan an important and stabilizing 
role as major suppliers of market require- 
ments, while at the same time allowing the 
OPEC governments to build up their own 
market outlets at a pace which will maintain 
their interest in permitting production in- 
creases. Through the government's share of 
participation oil, previously oil-short govern- 
mental or private companies (including many 
American ones) should also be able to se- 
cure access to needed supplies. This should 
in the long run have a reassuring effect on 
the market, although in the recent past these 
new customers have only driven up the price 
of oil in their anxiety to secure supplies. 
Another benefit from participation is the fact 
that the producer government will have to 
put up its equity share for capital expansion 
programs ; this will both ease the capital re- 
quirements in the consuming countries and 
put to constructive use some of the large 
revenues of the producer governments. It is 
also probable that, under participation, the 
producer governments will find it advanta- 
geous to develop their own markets through 
investment in downstream facilities. We 
should welcome such a development, which 
would give the producers a real interest in 
maintaining stable oil supplies as well as 
])rovide another productive outlet for pro- 
ducer government revenues. 

The participation agreements negotiated 
with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi 
are in the process of being implemented, 
while that with Kuwait remains to be ratified 
and may involve some modifications of the 
previous agreements. A variant form of par- 
ticipation, giving the government a higher 
initial equity in the company but a compara- 
ble financial settlement, has been negotiated 
with Nigeria We believe that the basic pat- 



tern these agreements have established for] 
transition to a period of much greater oil 
producer government control links the in- 
terest of the producing state with the in- 
terest of the companies and the oil consum- 
ers, who wish to see a steady expansion of 
the necessaiy oil flow. At the same time it 
provides a real role for producer govern- 
ments in the management of their major 
resource and offers new opportunities for 
constructive use of their gi-owing revenues. 
Settlements remain to be negotiated in Libya 
and the Basra concession in Iraq. While these 
negotiations may be long and diflficult, we 
hope that they will result in settlements 
which will not undercut the basic principles 
of the gulf participation agreements. 

Settlement of the long dispute between the 
Government of Iraq and the oil companies 
was reached last spring at the end of another 
major negotiation. Because the 11-year-old 
dispute between the companies and the Iraqis 
had resulted in a low rate of development of 
Iraq's very considerable oil-producing po- 
tential, the settlement will finally make pos- 
sible increased Iraqi oil production during 
the coming decades. The final agreement set- 
tled both last June's nationalization of the 
Iraq Petroleum Company's Kirkuk fields and 
the original 1961 dispute as well. The com- 
panies are presently receiving compensation 
which, although not as great as they had 
hoped for, is many times the depreciated 
book value figure which the Iraqis had origi- 
nally oflfered. The principle set in the partici- 
pation settlements that compensation must 
bear some relationship to the actual value of 
the property was thus also upheld in the Iraq 
negotiations. 

In Iran, negotiations are underway to work 
out final arrangements for a new working 
relationship between the oil consortium and 
the government. The Iranians, who national- 
ized their oil industry in 1951, have as a 
result not found the concept of participation 
to be attractive, as it would consist essen- 
tially of buying an enterprise which was al- 
ready theirs. They have therefore asked the 
consortium to transform its relationship to 
that of long-term contract purchaser, which 



192 



Department of State Bulletin 



is in fact the legal form of the arrangements 
which have existed since 1954. The companies 
have agreed to assume the role of purchase 
contractors. As contractors, the consortium 
companies will continue to enjoy exclusive 
access to the bulk of Iran's oil production 
with the exception of certain quantities (ap- 
proximately 20 percent of production in 
1980) reserved for the government to market 
on its own. The companies will retain some 
management role and initiative as service 
contractors to run the oil fields and facilities. 
This arrangement will, like participation, 
provide common incentives to both company 
and government to make available a stable 
and expanding supply of oil to help meet 
world needs. As in the participation agree- 
ments this will be done at some loss to the 
companies' present degree of control over 
production and investment decisions. 

As we look to the future, a major ques- 
tion is the degree to which this assumption 
of control over production by the producer 
governments will affect the stability and nec- 
essary expansion of supplies. We believe that 
the participation agreements and the agree- 
ment with Iran provide some degree of as- 
surance that the necessary stability can be 
maintained. They link the interest of the 
producer government with the enterprise, 
and with the supply of its markets, while at 
the same time giving additional incentive 
to those governments to supply other mar- 
kets. They retain a significant role for the 
oil companies in providing the production, 
development, transport, and marketing ca- 
pabilities necessary to bring to market the 
huge quantities of oil which the world will 
need in the future. They provide, most im- 
portantly, a framework within which a stable 
and gradual transition can be accomplished 
and avoid the sterility of confrontation and 
nationalization which would seriously dam- 
age the steady development of new produc- 
tion capacity. The agreements cannot m 
themselves, of course, guarantee the stability 
of the new arrangements or the flow of oil. 
These will depend on the good faith of the 
parties as well as other developments in the 
world, including perhaps political ones. 
The evolution of new relationships between 



producer governments and oil companies is 
only one part of the rapidly changing world 
petroleum situation. Major oil-consuming. 
governments have also felt the need to review 
their policies in an effort to find answers to 
their growing energy problems. On April 18 
President Nixon sent to the Congress the 
administration's assessment of our domestic 
requirements and resources and proposed a 
series of domestic measures to meet our 
needs for clean and reliable energy sources 
in the decades ahead. This concentration on 
domestic policies was based on the realiza- 
tion that our primary response to the energy 
challenge must lie in the pursuit of national 
policies and measures to develop more fully 
and most rapidly the existing energy re- 
sources within the United States and its off- 
shore areas, as well as new energy technol- 
ogies, while utilizing energy resources in a 
more frugal and efficient manner. 

Cooperation To Manage Energy Problem 

At the same time, the President directed a 
comprehensive effort to develop cooperation 
with other nations in sharing the impact ot 
energy shortages in the short run and m 
working to develop new sources of energy. 
He also directed us to develop cooperative 
relations with the oil-exporting countries. In 
early June, I met in Paris with representa- 
tives of other governments which belong to 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development-OECD. At that meeting 
we began a new phase in the continuing dia- 
logue with other members of the OECD on 
how to effectively cooperate to manage the 
now well-publicized world energy problem. 

Among other things, the United States 
proposed, and the OECD Oil Committee ac- 
cepted, a suggestion that an informal work- 
ing group be established to develop and 
evaluate various issues and options of an 
OECD-wide agreement to share oil in times 
of emergency. We also proposed expanded 
international cooperation in research and de- 
velopment to increase energy supplies and 
to diversify resources. We believe particular 
attention should be paid to international co- 
operation at the industrial level, especially in 
the development of those technologies that 



July 30, 1973 



193 



might provide nearer term solutions to 
energy needs. We are hopeful that these ini- 
tiatives will result in improved communica- 
tion and actions of mutual benefit to all con- 
sumers of energy. 

The more difficult and pressing question of 
worldwide competition for shrinking supplies 
of oil does not lend itself to the same confi- 
dence that cooperative action by consumers 
can result in successful solution to the prob- 
lem. Within recent months there has been a 
substantial increase in prices paid for oil in 
world markets by buyers to whom avail- 
ability of crude oil is today more important 
than its price. It is clear that we must design 
measures of international cooperation to in- 
clude producing as well as consuming na- 
tions which will bring about and sustain the 
willingness of the oil-producing countries to 
produce the oil the consumers will require 
over the next several decades. 

This will not be easy to achieve. It is the 
administration's view, and one we have 
urged, that the industrialized nations stand 
ready to assist the producing nations in their 
desire to marry their vital oil with the equally 
valuable technology, engineering, manage- 
ment, and markets of consuming countries in 
order to reap lasting benefits for their peo- 
ples during this one brief generation when 
they will be in a highly favored market po- 
sition. We know their common desires for 
the location of high-energy-using export in- 
dustries in their countries. We must help 
here, not only in providing the plants, but 
also in marketing the product of those plants. 
It is critical, however, that in our eflTorts we 
not let our requirements to sell plant, equip- 
ment, and services cloud the judgments and 
advice we offer these developing nations. It is 
also important that we do not undermine the 
role of the international oil companies, which 
have found so much oil and still have the best 
capability to find more oil and bring it effi- 
ciently from the ground to consumption 
points throughout the world. 

It seems to us that producer, as well as 
consumer nations, have a clear and vital 
stake in cooperating to find additional sources 
of hydrocarbons, bring them to market in a 
prudent and orderly manner, minimize waste 



I 



m their use, and bring on supplementary 
sources of energy at a rate and in a way 
which will maintain the prosperity of the 
oil-rich nations as their petroleum assets 
diminish. The administration is fully com- 
mitted to this task. We do not believe that 
drama is called for in this delicate stage of 
international oil relations. Instead we all 
need to proceed with care and deliberation 
to build a foundation for international coop- 
eration designed to meet the world's require- 
ments for energy in the months as well as 
the decades ahead. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Agreement 
Signed at Copenhagen 

Press release 224 dated June 25 

Representatives of the United States and 
the Soviet Union signed at Copenhagen on 
June 21 a bilateral fisheries agreement 
broadening and extending through Decem- 
ber 31, 1974, an agreement concluded Decem- 
ber 11, 1970, concerning fishing and fishing 
operations in ocean areas off the Atlantic 
coast of the United States. Ambassador 
Donald L. McKernan, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wild- 
life and Coordinator for Ocean AflTairs in the 
Department of State, signed for the United 
States." Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Deputy Min- 
ister of Fisheries, signed for the Soviet 
Union. The presence of fisheries experts of 
both countries in Copenhagen for the 23d an- 
nual meeting of the International Commis- 
sion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
June 5-15 facilitated final arrangements con- 
cerning the agreement. 

The new agreement contains provisions to 
further conserve stocks of fish of mutual con- 
cern, to enhance the exchange of scientific 
information with respect to these stocks, to 
minimize fishing-gear conflicts between ves- 
sels of the two countries and to facilitate the 
settlement of claims arising from such con- 
flicts, and to provide opportunities for pe- 
riodic discussions of problems of mutual 



194 



Department of State Bulletin 



concern between representatives of the ap- 
propriate fisheries authorities of the two gov- 
ernments and fishermen's organizations. 
Ambassador McKernan said the new agree- 
ment has been expanded to afford new pro- 
tection for biuefish, lobster, and yellowtail 
flounder. Protective measures are broadened 
for menhaden and continued for scup, 
• flounder, hake, and river herring. The agree- 
ment also continues the seasonal closure 
January 1 to April 15 to fishing bv all Soviet 
vessels in waters roughly between 50 and 
100 fathoms from Rhode Island to Virginia 
where bottom-dwelling species concentrate 
I early in the year. 

New assurances are added to the agree- 
ment indicating that Soviet vessels shall not 
intentionally catch lobster north of Cape 
Hatteras. shall take appropriate measures to 
minimize incidental catches of lobster in spe- 
cialized fisheries for other species, and shall 
return to the sea in a viable condition all 
lobster taken incidentally, insofar as possible. 
To facilitate conservation of bottom- 
dwelling inshore stocks of yellowtail floun- 
der, Soviet vessels of more than 145 feet in 
length will limit fishing operations to mid- 
water trawling during the period from July 
1 through December 31 in the area adjacent 
to the U.S. southern New England coast 
north of 40° 20' N and south of 43° 17' N 
and west of a line drawn between the points 
68° 15' W, 40° 20' N, and 70° 00' W, and 
43 17' N. 

In return, the United States agreed to cer- 
tain relaxation of port privileges for Soviet 
fisheries vessels in Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
New York, and Boston. In addition, Soviet 
fishing vessels will continue to be allowed to 
transfer fish and supplies in two areas within 
the contiguous fishing zone and to fish within 
a small area of the contiguous fishing zone 
off the United States middle Atlantic coast. 
The agreement also establishes a volun- 
tary scheme of joint inspection between the 
United States and the Soviet Union to help 
insure the enforcement of its provisions. 

Both countries agreed to seek to minimize 
the possibility of conflicts between Soviet 
fisheries using mobile fishing gear and U.S. 



fisheries using fixed fishing gear. To facilitate 
settlement of claims that might arise from 
any such conflicts, a protocol to the agree- 
ment makes available fisheries claims boards 
to consider claims voluntarily submitted by 
either side and to attempt to conciliate the 
parties on the basis of factfinding. 

Ambassador McKernan said, "The new 
agreement represents important progress in 
facilitating conservation of stocks of fish of 
importance to the United States and in pro- 
viding further protection for our coastal 
fisheries." 



U.S.-ltaly Extradition Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith the Treaty on Extradition be- 
tween the United States of America and 
Italy, signed at Rome on January 18, 1973. 
I transmit also, for the information of the 
Senate, the report of the Department of 
State with respect to the Treaty. 

The Treaty significantly updates the extra- 
dition relations between the United States 
and Italy and adds to the list of extraditable 
offenses both narcotic offenses, including 
those involving psychotropic drugs, and air- 
craft hijacking. 

The Treaty will make a significant contri- 
bution to the international effort to control 
narcotics traflflc and to cope with other of- 
fenses. I recommend that the Senate give 
early and favorable consideration to the 
Treaty and give its advice and consent to 
ratification. 

Richard Nixon. 
The White House, June 26, 1973. 



• Transmitted on June 26 (White House press re- 
lease, San Clemente, Calif.) ; also printed as S. Ex. 
M, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of 
the treaty and the report of the Department of State. 



July 30, 1973 



195 



Fund Committed for Assistance 
to Migrants to Israel 

Press release 226 dated June 27 

The Department of State on June 27 com- 
pleted commitment of $50 million appropri- 
ated by the Congress to assist migrants from 
the Soviet Union, particularly Jews moving 
to Israel. 

Initial expenditures from the appropria- 
tion, amounting to $33.5 million, were an- 
nounced by the Department on April 6.^ The 
new commitments, totaling $16.5 million, 
are: 

— A $13 million contract signed June 27 
with United Israel Appeal, Inc. (UIA), an 
accredited American voluntary agency. Sig- 
natories were, for the Department, Frank L. 
Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
for Refugee and Migration Affairs, and for 
UIA, Executive Vice Chairman Gottlieb 
Hammer of New York. The new contract 
brings to $44 million the funds UIA will ex- 
pend for en route care of migrants to Israel, 
construction of absorption centers and hous- 
ing, a hospital facility, and training or re- 
training of artisans, professionals, and 
scientists. 

— An additional $3 million to the Inter- 
governmental Committee for European Mi- 
gration for air travel of migrants from 






' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 30, 1973, 
p. 532. 



Austria to Israel, bringing the total to $S 
million. 

— An additional $500,000 to other volun- 
tary agencies for assistance to migrants from 
the Soviet Union to countries other than 
Israel, bringing the total to $1 million. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 1st Session 

Section-By-Section Analysis of the Proposed For- 
eign Military Sales and Assistance Act. S. 1443, 
To Authorize the Furnishing of Defense Articles 
and Services to Foreign Countries and Interna- 
tional Organizations. April 24, 1973. 19 pp. 

Executive Branch GATT Study No. 1. Tax Adjust- 
ments in International Trade: GATT Provisions 
and EEC Practices. Senate Committee on Fi- 
nance. Study prepared by the executive branch 
at the request of Senator Abraham Ribicoff, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Trade. 
April 26, 1973. 15 pp. 

Text of International Labor Organization Conven- 
tion No. 132, Concerning Annual Holidays With 
Pay. Communication from Acting Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Congressional Relations trans- 
mitting the convention. H. Doc. 93-97. May 7, 
1973. 12 pp. 

Report of the Subcommittee To Investigate the Ad- 
ministration of the Internal Security Act and 
Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary for the fiscal year ending 
February- 28, 1973. S. Rept. 93-137. May 8, 
1973. 42 pp. 

Six Amendments to the Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1960. Message from the President 
of the United States transmitting the amendments 
adopted at London October 12, 1971. S. Ex. I. 
May 9, 1973. 11 pp. 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Cautions Against Premature International Regulation 
of Developing Direct Broadcast Satellite Technology 



The Woi'king Group on Direct Broad<;ast 
Satellites of the U.N. Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met at U.N. 
Headquarters June 11-22. Following are ex- 
cerpts from a statement made in the working 
group on June 15 by U.S. Representative 
Sttoart H. Mclntyre, ivho is Deputy Director 
for Oceans, Outer Space, and Disarmament 
of the DepaHment's Office of United Nations 
Political Affairs.' 

The use of satellites in communication, 
particularly broadcasting, is a fascinating: 
subject which is engaging the attention of 
more and more of the world. At the same 
time it is very difficult at this early stage 
to estimate what the benefits and liabilities 
of this new means of communication may 
be. But all of us have a common interest 
in maximizing the potential benefits and 
minimizing the potential problems. 

The working group has been assigned an 
important responsibility by the General 
Assembly and its parent committee in rela- 
tion to this new and as yet untried tech- 
nology. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
2453 B (XXIII) requires the working group 
"to study and report on the technical feasi- 
bility of communication by direct broadcast 
from satellites and the current and foresee- 
able developments in this field, including 
comparative user costs and other economic 
considerations, as well as the implications 
of such developments in the social, cultural, 
legal and other areas." Specifically, this 
session of the working group is to consider 
new developments in the satellite broad- 



' For the complete text, see USUN press release 
59 dated June 15. 



casting field since the group's last meeting 
in 1970. 

To assist the working group in carrying 
out this mandate, we considered that it would 
be important that the group have a clear 
perspective of the current state and 
prospects of the technology. The June 12 
presentation by Mr. Leonard Jaffe, Deputy 
Associate Administrator for Applications of 
NASA [National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration], represented an effort to 
provide such a perspective covering both 
technical and economic aspects. 

In this connection let me express the U.S. 
delegation's appreciation for the thorough 
and well-prepared background and status 
report on broadcast satellite technology con- 
tained in the working paper submitted 
jointly by Canada and Sweden. While we 
will suggest a few minor modifications, we 
believe this report provides a balanced, 
accurate, and informative resume of devel- 
opments to date which should be useful to 
the entire U.N. community. 

The Canadian-Swedish working paper 
points out that all current activity in the 
satellite broadcast field relates to broadcasts 
to community receivers. This also accords 
with Mr. Jaffe's appraisal that we know of 
no work in progress or planned on other 
than community systems. Broadcasts to com- 
munity systems, of course, should arouse 
none of the concerns apparently perceived 
by some countries in relation to systems 
utilizing a signal transmitted from a satel- 
lite directly to unaugmented individual home 
receivers without utilizing a ground station 
or other intermediary for retransmission. 
So far as we are aware, virtually all current 
work with community systems is associated 



July 30, 1973 



197 



with U.S. experimental programs. These are 
open to arrangements for international co- 
operation, in keeping with the approach 
we have taken previously in contributing to 
improved space communication capabilities 
in the world community. 

As Mr. Jaffe noted, two community 
broadcast projects now being developed in- 
volve such cooperative arrangements. Can- 
ada and the United States are collaborating 
on the Communications Technology Satellite 
(CTS) system for community broadcasts 
to Canadian viewers, and we look forward 
to the Indian Satellite Instructional Tele- 
vision Experiment (SITE) making use of 
the U.S. applications technology satellite 
ATS-F, scheduled for launch in 1974. 



Broadcast Satellites and Development 

Mr. Chairman, we are at the very begin- 
ning of learning how to use broadcast satel- 
lites for particular economic and social 
development purposes. Indeed, we do not 
yet fully understand what they can do and 
what they cannot do. Satellites are only 
delivery mechanisms; their effectiveness will 
depend on what is delivered and how it is 
used. We can only be certain that they pro- 
vide us some important new possibilities 
for improving the quality of life: through 
making education available where there are 
no schools or teachers; through providing 
isolated rural populations with access to 
information on agricultural practices, nutri- 
tion, and health; through making worldwide 
expertise and information rapidly available 
to every nation. 

The major task of this decade must be to 
learn how to achieve these potentials. We 
have made a start. We do have a growing 
knowledge of how to use communications 
technology for particular development prob- 
lems. This has been notably true in educa- 
tion, thanks to the creative and bold efforts 
of developing nations which are using tele- 
vision and radio for broad national develop- 
ment and expansion of forma] education, 
nations like Brazil, El Salvador, the Ivory 
Coast, Mexico, and many othens. Satellite 



technology now provides the opportunity to 
build on these efforts, to attack other kinds 
of problems, and to reach larger populations. 
Our most direct opportunitj' to learn about 
these new kinds of problems will be through 
the planned experimental projects with com- 
munity broadcast satellites, including those 
in India, Canada, and the United States. We 
believe that contact among the professionals 
involved in these programs and with those 
from other nations is essential. We would 
be happy to facilitate such professional con- 
tacts with the U.S. experimental projects. 
We also specifically would like to invite ex- 
pressions of interest in participation of ex- 
perts from other nations to work in the 
ATS-F projects within the United States 
in the Rocky Mountain area, Alaska, and 
Appalachia. We are working out mechanisms 
to fund the work of a number of experts 
from developing countries in these programs. 
For the participants it should be a valuable 
and unique experience. For the projects it 
would provide the United States with valu- 
able technical assistance. We invite others 
to share our problems, possible failures, and 
— we hope — successes. 

Finally, we would point to the need for 
many other kinds of cooperative activities 
in making such systems useful instruments 
of social development: 

— Research on more effective ways to 
program for diverse populations. 

— Studies of sy.stem cost, building on the 
fine work of UNESCO [United Nations Edu- 
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion] and related work sponsored by the 
United States. 

— Studies of alternative and complemen- 
tary transmission systems. 

— Studies of ways to use satellites to 
extend existing networks of professional 
knowledge, e.g., in medicine and engineering, 
across country boundaries. 

— Development of an effective information 
network on the social development uses of 
satellites. 

— Additional work in training, project de- 
sign, and evaluation. 

Mr. Chairman, we stand ready to coop- 



198 



Department of State Bulletin 



erate actively in learning how to use this 
technology as an instrument for social de- 
velopment. We believe that a serious and 
substantial effort of this sort w\\\ have two 
yields: First, it will solve many important 
educational and technical problems; second, 
it will teach us about means of cooperation 
at the substantive and professional level 
that may eliminate many of the problems 
that can arise at the political level. 

Problems in Setting Global Principles 

However, let me turn now to a matter 
with immediate consequences for the work- 
ing group: the proposition, supported by 
a number of delegations in their general 
debate statements, that the working group 
should embark at this session on the actual 
elaboration of principles to govern direct 
television broadcasting by satellites. We hold 
the view that some other delegations have 
already expressed — that such action is 
wholly inadvisable. Our position is based 
on both substantive and procedural grounds. 

As to the substantive issues involved, we 
think it would be wrong to attempt to es- 
tablish globally applicable principles con- 
cerning a technology which is still far in 
the future and may be regionally organized 
if it does come into being. 

I might note that as far as the United 
States is concerned, our broadcasters have 
shown no interest in developing a domestic 
direct broadcast satellite television system. 
The existing infrastructure of the present 
U.S. television system is simply too broad, 
and represents too great an investment, to 
be replaced economically by telecasting in a 
different mode, even if this were technically 
feasible. As far as we know, the idea of 
reaching unaugmented home receivers — un- 
altered TV sets of the type which people 
have in their homes today — is simply un- 
realistic within the foreseeable future. 

On the other hand, certain American firms 
engaged in the manufacture of communi- 
cations satellite equipment have studied 
systems for transmitting to augmented indi- 
vidual receivers. Augmented receivers would 



utilize a larger antenna than is required to 
receive conventional broadcasts as well as 
a relatively sophisticated adapter unit. Gov- 
ernments could of course control the manu- 
facture or import of such equipment. 
However, to our knowledge no satellite ex- 
periments utilizing augmented home re- 
ceivers are presently scheduled. 

We would be interested in learning 
whether assessments and plans of other 
countries in this area differ from our own. 
If such differences exist, it obviously would 
be useful if the working group were in- 
formed of them. 

But even if more rapid progress than we 
now estimate toward satellite direct broad- 
casting to augmented individual receivers 
should subsequently develop, how unwise 
it would seem to run the risk of inhibiting 
that progress by freezing international be- 
havior in connection with satellite broad- 
casts at an unduly early stage. We believe 
that we must have a clearer picture of what 
it is we are dealing with — and, indeed, what 
concrete and specific problems are foreseen 
in the use of the technology — before we es- 
tablish principles designed to govern it. 

Basic Human Right To Exchange Ideas 

The United States, however — and I want 
to stress this — is keenly interested in hearing 
and discussing in depth, in this forum and 
later in others, the concerns and problems 
which others may perceive in connection 
with satellite direct broadcasting. Even 
though we may not agree that all such con- 
cerns are warranted, we understand the 
basis for many of them. And as we explore 
various views regarding the possible social, 
cultural, legal, and other implications of 
direct broadcast satellites, we ask that our 
colleagues take our concerns into account 
as well. 

Foremost among these concerns is our 
constitutional commitment to the principle 
of freedom of speech. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, one of the most distinguished legal 
philosophers to sit on the American Su- 
preme Court, expressed this fundamental 
value in these memorable words: 



July 30, 1973 



199 



. . . the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market. . . . 

We believe that in the competition of the 
market of thought and ideas, the freedom 
to receive information is just as impoi-tant 
as the freedom to impart it. We would ask- 
that all members of the working group weigh 
most carefully the possible consequences to 
this basic human right, as set out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 
considering possible constraints on the use 
of satellite broadcasting. 

We share another concern, articulated 
yesterday by the distinguished Representa- 
tive of Japan, that a technology whose prac- 
tical applications offer high prospective 
benefit to all should not be stunted and 
thwarted by an unduly restrictive abstract 
approach. It is important to think through 
the practical consequences of various prin- 
ciples which may be discussed — in particular, 
could they inhibit the use of satellite broad- 
casting in ways which might not be suspected 
by their proponents? 

We see, for example, in the blanket prin- 
ciple of prior consent an inherent danger 
of sanctioning not only total censorship but 
such arbitrary and diverse application of 
the principle as to nullify the basic human 
right to exchange ideas and information. 

Let me address one concern of others 
which a number of countries already have 
aired quite explicitly: the fear that the 
free flow of information and ideas, at least 
as conveyed by a future direct broadcast 
satellite, might be a one-way flow controlled 
by the few powers technically capable of 
launching, and financially able to operate, 
a satellite service. The United States is pre- 
pared to study possible arrangements for 
sharing broadcast time and channels on 
any future direct broadcast system among 
countries within a given region. We think 



that discussion of these possible arrange-! 
ments could be one of the most fruitful 
exchanges of views that the working group 
could take up. Access to the use of direct 
broadcast satellites seems to us to represent 
a central problem, and solving this problem 
could well eliminate a large number of other 
potential difl^culties. | 

Also in this regard, I would like to re- 
iterate that my government is willing to 
provide other countries launch assistance 
on a nondiscriminatory, reimbursable basis, 
for any space program designed for peaceful 
purposes. This offer is applicable to com- 
munications satellite programs; and as is 
known, we already have made available 
launch capability and space segments for 
both domestic and international experimental 
and operational programs in this field. 

In general my delegation believes that 
further study is indicated regarding possible 
regional approaches to arrangements facili- 
tating the use of direct broadcast satellites. 
These arrangements might be among broad- 
casting and receiving states, or perhaps 
among broadcasting agencies or broadcasters 
unions. Another possibility warranting fur- 
ther exploration is the adoption of voluntary 
codes of conduct by those entities. Whether 
on an ofliicial or nonoflficial basis, a regionally 
oriented approach sensitive to the needs, 
tastes, attitudes, and practices of a particular 
region may be preferable to attempting to 
impose universal standards or principles. 

I would only add this final thought for 
the group's consideration : The basic question 
underlying our work is how to encourage 
responsible conduct in international direct 
broadcasting by satellites, when and if such 
broadcasting may become an actuality. 
Success in this effort is most likely to emerge 
from the encouragement of international 
cooperation based on the fullest understand- 
ing of both benefits and concerns. 



200 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Calls for Immediate Action on Priority Proposals 
for U.N. Environment Program 

Statement by Christian A. Herter, Jr. * 



Over the next two weeks we shall be en- 
gaged in the important and precedent-setting 
task of getting the new U.N. Environment 
Program underway. We have already made 
remarkable progress, not only in receiving 
the endorsement of the General Assembly 
as to the action plan, the declaration, and the 
institutional arrangements propounded by 
Stockholm but in positioning ourselves to 
move ahead. It is important also to note that 
with the impetus of Stockholm the in- 
ternational community has in the last year 
negotiated three new environmental con- 
ventions — one on ocean dumping, one on a 
world heritage trust, and a third on inter- 
national trade in endangered species. 

We believe that there is a fundamental 
reason for this progress. Whatever other 
matters may divide us, we do share a com- 
mon concern for the future of human life 
on this planet. This principle, which underlay 
all our actions at Stockholm, is one we must 
not forget — one that we hope will carry over 
in all our actions in this Governing Council. 
Whatever particular steps we take should 
be in the context of man's relationship to 
an incredibly complex and fragile series of 
ecosystems and a finite resource base. 

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the 
United States plans to approach its responsi- 
bilities in this body in the spirit of Stockholm 



' Made in the Governing Council of the United Na- 
tions Environment Program (UNEP) at Geneva on 
June 13. Mr. Herter, who was U.S. Representative 
to the Governing Council, is Director of the Office 
of Environmental Affairs and Special Assistant to 
the Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs. 



and we shall strive to work cooperatively 
with all the members of this Council to help 
assure that the new program gets off to a 
sound start. 

Having made these preliminary remarks, 
it would be appropriate to comment on some 
of the more specific aspects of the matters 
before us. 

Mr. Chairman, my government wishes to 
express its satisfaction with the progress 
made since the Stockholm Conference in the 
development of the U.N. Environment Pro- 
gram. With a very large number of tasks to 
be performed, the Executive Director and his 
small but competent staff have devoted a 
good deal of attention to policy and admin- 
istrative matters and to the preparation of 
essential documents — activities vital to get- 
ting the UNEP machinery in place. Now our 
energies must be directed toward the devel- 
opment of substantive programs for action — 
the heart of the UNEP effort. 

In this connection we have given a good 
deal of study in the United States to the doc- 
ument UNEP/GC/5, the Report of the Exec- 
utive Director on an Action Plan for the 
Human Environment. In general we believe 
it constitutes a constructive basis for initiat- 
ing action. There are a few general comments 
with respect to this document that we would 
like to make at the outset: 

First, we do not think it a productive ex- 
ercise for the Governing Council to try to 
establish priorities among the objectives sug- 
gested in chapter I. All of these objectives set 
out in this chapter are ones toward which we 
should strive and which we believe should 



July 30, 1973 



201 



provide guidelines, to the greatest possible 
extent, for the program of UNEP. We would 
be hard put to list them in some order of 
priority. Far more useful, in our judgment, 
would be an indication of what programs 
should be developed for Council approval and 
which should be given priority. Here we feel 
the criteria for selection of programs should 
reflect the urgency of the environmental 
problem, the capacity of the institutional 
structure inside and outside the U.N. to ini- 
tiate action, and the cost of implementation 
relative to available funds. 

Second, and based at least in part on the 
criteria I have just outlined, we think it ex- 
tremely important that the Governing Coun- 
cil authorize the Executive Director at this 
meeting to proceed with the implementation 
of two or three key programs. In our judg- 
ment it is vital that the momentum of Stock- 
holm not be lost— that the world understand 
we mean business and that we are in fact 
underway. We have in mind, for example, 
that portion of "Earthwatch" which deals 
with the monitoring of pollutants of inter- 
national significance; the Information Re- 
ferral Service, which we understand is close 
to being ready for implementation ; and per- 
haps a program concerned with desertifica- 
tion, taking into account national and 
international efforts in this area that have 
already begun. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, UNEP must begin 
immediately to establish its credibility as an 
effective environmental force. 

Major Areas of Concern 

If I may, I would like now to mention in 
somewhat more specific terms two broad cat- 
egories of concern which should receive pri- 
ority attention : problems of natural resource 
management and problems of pollution where 
there is urgency because damage to the en- 
vironment may be irreversible. With respect 
to both categories, the involvement of the 
developing countries is essential. 

First, with regard to resources, emphasis 
should be placed on programs leading to 
improved management of ecosystems, par- 



ticularly arid lands and tropical forests. 
Desertification and shifting cultivations are 
examples of the harmful side effects of man's 
activities, and action must be taken to im- 
prove management of irreplaceable re- 
sources. While we are on this topic I note 
that research on ecosystems does not figure 
importantly in the subject document. We 
would like to see additional emphasis placed 
on this matter in accordance with the con- 
sensus at Stockholm. 

Emphasis should also be placed on: 

— Initiation of a genetic resources conser- 
vation program. 

— Regional programs in water resources 
management. 

— Guidelines for use by countries and the 
U.N. family for assessing the potential en- 
vironmental impacts of development projects. 

Second, efforts concerned with pollution 
should, in the U.S. view, be focused on : 

— Identification of pollutants which are of 
international significance and selection of 
actions which should have highest priority 
for their control. 

—Global monitoring of pollutants consid- 
ered to have international significance. A bal- 
anced program should be developed concerned 
with monitoring the oceans, atmosphere, 
food, terrestrial ecosystems, and human 
health. 

— Consideration of exposure-eflPect rela- 
tionships. This should include criteria for 
pollutant exposures and risks and identifica- 
tion of pathways and sources. 

—Development of primary protection 
standards. First priority should be given to 
human health and well-being. 

— Derivation of working limits (ambient 
standards) for pollutants in air, water, and 
food to provide a basis for international co- 
operation in the development of effective and 
economically feasible methods for the pre- 
vention and control of pollutants from spe- 
cific sources. 

— International agreement on the control 
of pollutants in specific environments. 

Recognizing that actions also should begin 
in other areas of environmental concern, the 



202 



Department of State Bulletin 



following topics, which will increase environ- 
mental competence and understanding in all 
countries, merit attention : 

— Training in the environmental aspects of 
development project planning and analysis. 

— Regional training programs in human 
settlements planning and management, re- 
source management, and pollution control. 

— Technical assistance on practical pro- 
grams to deal with serious and specific en- 
vironmental problems. 

— Review of means to help countries bring 
their exports within the tolerances estab- 
lished by other countries for the protection 
of the environment. 

— Consultation to identify priority items 
for action in the human settlements area and 
cooperative national research programs. 

I mentioned in the course of describing 
U.S. priorities that one area of emphasis 
should be international agreements on the 
control of pollutants in specific environments. 
We have made major progress in the devel- 
opment of an ocean dumping convention 
which will help curtail the degradation of a 
vital international resource. We note that 
IMCO [Intergovernmental Maritime Consul- 
tative Organization] is preparing to negoti- 
ate a convention this fall to regulate pollution 
of the oceans from vessels. We believe it is 
time to take yet another step to regenerate 
the productivity of the oceans. Accordingly, 
we propose that the Governing Council au- 
thorize the Executive Director to devote 
substantial effort during the coming year to 
arranging for consultations among inter- 
ested states on possible means of achieving 
an internationally accepted system of con- 
trols over toxic land-based discharges into 
rivers and estuarial areas, based perhaps on 
similar initiatives at the regional level. 

We also propose that the Governing Coun- 
cil request the Executive Director to urge 
the International Whaling Commission, be- 
fore its annual meeting in London starting 
June 25, to give renewed consideration to a 
10-year moratorium on commercial whaling 
in accordance with recommendation 86 that 
was approved at Stockholm. 



Coordination of U.N. Environmenf Programs 

Turning now to the role of coordination 
of environmental programs within the U.N. 
system given to the Environmental Secre- 
tariat by the relevant provisions of General 
Assembly Resolution 2997, we note that the 
Executive Director has met with the Envi- 
ronment Coordination Board. = The report 
of that meeting, which is part of the docu- 
mentation for this Council meeting, indicates 
that excellent progress was made in estab- 
lishing a basis for cooperation. As this is 
a major element in the entire program, it 
is essential that relationships between UNEP 
and the specialized agencies are clearly estab- 
lished. If UNEP is to provide direction and 
coordination of environmental programs 
within the U.N. system, it must draw upon 
all existing competencies to do so. It must 
develop means to identify and fill gaps in 
current programs and propose reorienta- 
tions and expansions of existing efforts when 
that appears desirable. It must try to prevent 
overlapping and duplications. This implies 
an organizational responsibility going beyond 
simple responses to requests for financial 
support from the specialized agencies. 

In a somewhat similar vein, we believe it 
is essential that the Council be kept informed 
of all work in the United Nations family 
which bears upon the human environment. 
It is obvious that there are already extensive 
programs within the U.N. system which have 
important environmental implications but 
are oriented principally toward other objec- 
tives. Examples include efforts to increase 
forest or crop productivity or to provide 
medical assistance. Although these programs 
are not the direct concern of UNEP, we will 
be looking to the Executive Director in his 
coordinating role for regular information on 
the status and need for improvements in 
collateral programs relating to the environ- 
ment. 

To return to document UNEP/GC/5, it is 
the U.S. view that chapter III, dealing with 
the relationship of future activities to the 



' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan. 
15, 1973, p. 57. 



July 30, 1973 



203 



functional components of the action plan, 
contains a useful exposition of plans for 
UNEP in the years ahead. We will look for- 
ward to seeing these plans develop and reach 
fruition at future meetings of the Council. 
In the course of this activity, it is critical 
that the broadest range of talent be brought 
to bear and not be restricted to that avail- 
able through governments and intergovern- 
mental organizations. There is an immense 
reserve of capability and expertise available 
in the nongovernmental scientific community, 
in industry, and in conservation and other 
organizations which must be utilized if a 
global environmental effort is to be success- 
ful. We look forward to working with the 
Executive Director, as I am sure all countries 
do, to develop means for drawing upon this 
valuable resource. 

As a final point concerning the action plan, 
I would like to provide U.S. views on the 
recommendations contained in chapter IV of 
UNEP/GC/5. With regard to recommenda- 
tion (a), we have already expressed our 
approval of the objectives in toto, while 
recognizing that they do not provide, in our 
view, a useful basis for establishing priori- 
ties. We have separately indicated priorities 
for programs which we believe should be 
pursued. 

As to recommendation (b), it is the U.S. 
view that the Executive Director should be 
given the authority to draw upon resources 
available to him so that he can develop com- 
prehensive programs for submission to the 
Council. 

So far as recommendation (c) is con- 
cerned, we hope that the Council will agree 
that the Executive Director should assume 
the Secretariat responsibilities which are 
set forth within the terms of the convention 
on international trade in endangered species 
of wildlife. We view this as an extremely 
important area of concern and would propose 
that the assignment be carried out by the 
Executive Director through contractual ar- 
rangements with appropriate organizations. 
As other similar conventions ai-e concluded 
relevant to the Stockholm Conference, we 
believe that the responsibilities and capa- 



bilities of UNEP should be kept in mind, 
and its possible role considered on a case-by- 
case basis. 

Recommendation (d) deals with the In- 
formation Referral Service. We support the 
establishment of the IRS, although we have 
no indications about the staffing and funding 
of such an eflfort, as no limits have been de- 
termined as to the number and type of users 
and the size and content of the referral data 
base. 

We believe that the Executive Director 
should continue to receive advice on an ad 
hoc basis during the design and initial im- 
plementation stages of the IRS. Further, it 
is essential that a survey be made of exist- 
ing and planned information and data serv- 
ices within the U.N., and particularly within 
the context of Earthwatch, so that IRS, dur- 
ing its organizational phase, can benefit from 
and interrelate with these efforts. 

With regard to recommendation (e), we 
have already indicated our strong support 
of the concept of Earthwatch and specifically 
the early initiation of a monitoring effort. 
We believe that the convening of a meeting 
as early as possible at the intergovernmental 
level is an essential first step to filling the 
gaps in an important program of global 
significance. 

Administration of the Environment Fund 

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have spent most 
of my time discussing some of our thoughts 
on substantive matters. I would like to turn 
now to a different but related aspect of our 
work and reflect for a few minutes on the 
proposed rules and procedures which should 
govern the administration of the Environ- 
ment Fund. 

When it adopted Resolution 2997 last fall, 
the General Assembly created a new U.N. 
program which in many respects is unique. 
The principal task of the new program is 
one of coordination : the development of a 
cooperative, coordinated U.N. program for 
the preservation and enhancement of the hu- 
man environment. The overriding nature of 
this assignment is apparent in the resolution 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



itself, where the word "coordination" is all 
pervasive. 

What this implies, we believe, is that the 
UNEP must have a considerable degree of 
autonomy and operating flexibility. 

On the other hand, the UNEP was estab- 
lished with one foot firmly in the U.N. itself 
and derives part of its lifeblood from the 
U.N. The costs of the core staff and the costs 
of servicing this Council are borne by the 
U.N. regular budget. Furthermore, the Fund 
was to be established, and I quote from the 
resolution, "in accordance with existing 
United Nations financial procedures," al- 
though the resolution also charges the Gov- 
erning Council with the task of formulating 
"such general procedures as are necessary 
to govern the operations of the Environment 
Fund." 

We will address ourselves to the particu- 
lars of the arrangements and procedures 
which are now proposed to govern the Fund — 
and I refer not only to GC/4 but also to the 
Secretary General's report to the General 
Assembly on the financial and personnel ar- 
rangements—at the appropriate point in our 
deliberations. In this connection we believe 
that a sessional group on this subject should 
be established at the earliest possible time. 
For the moment, we would simply like to 
record some general comments. 

First, we support the basic concept that 
the Governing Council must provide policy 
and program guidance to the Secretariat. 
This places a particular obligation, in our 
view, on the Executive Director to present 
his program recommendations to the Gov- 
erning Council in sufficient detail that the 
Council may make considered and realistic 
program decisions. On the other hand, we 
believe the Executive Director should have 
authority for the initiation and implemen- 
tation of projects which fall within the 
Council's guidance. 

Second, we strongly urge that contribu- 
tions to the Environment Fund be un- 
restricted as to use. Otherwise, we shall 
severely handicap the ability of the Executive 
Director to develop and implement programs 



July 30, 1973 



to which we as a total Governing Council 
have assigned priority attention. 

Third, we reiterate our conviction that the 
Fund not be used for development assistance. 
Fourth, we would like to reemphasize our 
view that UNEP will not be an operating 
agency but will rely on other agencies and 
organizations to carry out environment 
programs. 

Fifth, we suspect that one part or another 
of the arrangements now recommended to 
the Council, resulting as they do from many 
days of sensitive negotiations between U.N. 
headquarters and the UNEP Secretariat, are 
not entirely satisfactory to either party. 
Frankly, we are not entirely happy either. 
We do think, however, that the procedures 
and arrangements recommended, subject to 
some clarifications and perhaps some modifi- 
cations which we will suggest in due course, 
appear to be generally satisfactory. 

Finally, I should like to express my gov- 
ernment's great pleasure at the excellent ar- 
rangements which are being made by the 
Government of Kenya for locating the United 
Nations Environment Program at Nairobi. 
The support which is being accorded to this 
undertaking is evidence of the deep concern 
nations everywhere feel for improving the 
condition of the global environment. We look 
forward to continued and rewarding cooper- 
ation with the Government of Kenya and 
other governments within the United Nations 
system in this effort to improve the quality 
of human life throughout the world. 



United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 
10017. 

Economic and Social Council 

Commission for Social Development: 

Report of the Board of the United Nations Re- 
search Institute for Social Development on its 



205 



activities during 1971 and 1972. E/CN.5/489. 
December 19, 1972. 13 pp. 
Report on Youth. Report of the Secretary Gen- 
eral. Summary and Proposals for Action. E/ 
CN.5/486/Summary. December 22, 1972. 13 pp. 
Commission on Human Rights: 

Study of Equality in the Administration of Jus- 
tice. Report of the Secretaiy General. E/CN.4/ 
1112. January 12, 1973. 31 "pp. 
Report of the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control on its first session. Note by the Secre- 
tary General. E/CN.4/111.3. January 30, 1973. 
5 pp. 

The Widening Gap. A study of the realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, by Man- 
ouchehr Ganji, special rapporteur of the Com- 
mission on Human Rights. E/CN.4/1108, Feb- 
ruary 5, 1973, and Add. 1-9. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement 
on "Advance Charter" Flights 

The Department of State announced on 
July 2 (press release 233) that the United 
States and Ireland had concluded on June 29 
a memorandum of understanding on travel 
group charters (TGC's) and advance booking 
charters (ABC's) under which each party 
will accept as charterworthy transatlantic 
traffic originated in the territory of the 
other party and organized and operated 
pursuant to the "advance charter" (TGC or 
ABC) rules of that party. Other provisions 
deal with enforcement and arrangements 
to minimize administrative burdens on car- 
riers and organizers of "advance charters." 
The understanding was brought into force 
by an exchange of notes at Washington. 
While the understanding is not an exchange 
of economic rights, it is expected to facilitate 
the operation of "advance charter" flights 
between the United States and Ireland by 
carriers of both countries. The understand- 
ing with Ireland is the fourth of a series of 
such agreements the United States hopes 
to conclude soon with other countries to 



facilitate the operation of "advance char- 
ters." (For text of the memorandum of 
understanding, see press release 233.) 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Ag- 
ricultural Sciences. Done at Washington January 
15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944 
58 Stat. 1169. 
Adherence deposited: Guyana, June 6, 1973. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force I 
June 1, 1973. | 

Acceptances deposited: Byelorussian Soviet So- 
cialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, July 12, 1973. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971 TIAS 
7192. 

Ratification deposited: Colombia, July 3, 1973. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acta 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, July 11, 1973; 

Finland, July 13, 1973; Iran, Sweden, July 10. 

1973. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, July 12, 1973. 

Bills of Lading 

Protocol to amend the international convention for 
the unification of certain rules of law relating 
to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 
1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 
23, 1968.' 
Signature: Egypt, June 4, 1973. 

Load Unes 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at 
London October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, May 30, 1973. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 
Signatures: Greece, May 17, 1973; India, Ireland, 



Not in force. 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



May 30, 1973; New Zealand, June 1, 1973 (all 
subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval). 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 12, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Norway, May 29, 1973. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the 
United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Ratification deposited: Liberia, April 27, 1973. 



BILATERAL 

Barbados 

Agreement continuing in force between the United 
States and Barbados the consular convention of 
June 6, 1951, between the United States and the 
United Kingdom (TIAS 2494). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Bridgetown September 14, 
1972, and May 10, 1973. Entered into force May 
10, 1973. 

Belgium 

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 
2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels 
June 25 and 28, 1973. Entered into force June 28, 
1973. 

Brazil 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Brazil. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Rio de Janeiro November 11, 1961. En- 
tered into force November 11, 1961. TIAS 4909. 
Terminated: March 7, 1973. 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Brazil. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Brasilia June 18, 1973. Entered into 
force June 18, 1973. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the air transport agreement 
of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 29, 1973. 
Entered into force June 29, 1973. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of September 21, 1972 
(TIAS 7466). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Islamabad June 20, 1973. Entered into force June 
20, 1973. 

Sudan 

Agreement relating to the deposit by Sudan of 10 
percent of the value of grant military assistance 
furnished by the United States. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Khartoum April 27 and May 
24, 1973. Entered into force May 24, 1973. 



PUBLICATIONS 



' Not in force. 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent dis- 
count is made on orders for 100 or more copies of 
any one publication, mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu- 
m.ents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock— at least 140— $16.35; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
nev Notes— $14.50; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 20<' each. 

Bangladesh Cat. No. S1.123:B22 

Pub. 8698 8 pp. 

Equatorial Guinea Cat. No. S1.123:EQ2 

Pub. 8025 4 pp. 

Pakistan Cat. No. S1.123:P17 

Pub. 7748 8 pp. 

Panama Cat. No. S1.123:P19 

Pub. 7903 4 pp. 

Swaziland Cat. No. S1.123:SW2 

Pub. 8174 5 pp. 

Thailand Cat. No. S1.123:T32 

Pub. 7961 8 pp. 

United Kingdom Cat. No. S1.123:UN34K 

Pub. 8099 8 pp. 

Vatican City Cat. No. S1.123:V45 

Pub. 8258 3 pp. 

International Exchange: People's Diplomacy in Ac- 
tion. This illustrated report describes major aspects 
of the Department's exchange program and some of 
the support from private citizens, organizations, and 
institutions which enriches and multiplies govern- 
ment efforts in this age of people's diplomacy. Pub. 
8682. International Information and Cultural Series 
103. 19 pp. 45((. 

Trade in Wool and Man.Made Fiber Textile Products. 

Agreement with the Republic of China. TIAS 7498. 
13 pp. ISf*. 

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. 

Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7499. 
11 pp. 15('. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia 
amending the agreement of April 29, 1971, as 
amended. TIAS 7500. 4 pp. IS**. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia 
amending the agreement of May 26, 1972, as 
amended. TIAS 7501. 2 pp. IS?*. 



July 30, 1973 



207 



Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Op- 
tional Protocol on Disputes. TIAS 7502. 208 pp. 
$2. 

Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Treaty 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 
7503. 27 pp. 30<'. 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Interim 
ajerreement and protocol with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. TIAS 7504. 21 pp. 25<'. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement w-ith Sri 
Lanka amending the agi-eement of December 20 
1971. TIAS 7505. 4 pp. 15('. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Phil- 
ippines amending the agreement of May 4 1972 as 
amended. TIAS 7506. 2 pp. 15(^. 

Education— Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany supple- 
menting the agreement of November 20, 1962 as 
supplemented. TIAS 7507. 3 pp. ISt". 

Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on 
Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with Jordan. 
TIAS 7508. 3 pp. 15«'. 

Taxation— Withholding of Contributions for Educa- 
tional Insurance. Agreement with Panama. TIAS 
7509. 5 pp. ISC'. 

Extradition. Treaty with Argentina. TIAS 7510 
39 pp. 

Loan of Vessel— U.S.S. Camp. Agreement with Viet- 
Nam. TIAS 7511. 4 pp. IS^*. 

Embassy Sites— Conditions of Construction. Agree- 
ment with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
TIAS 7512. 29 pp. 20('. 

Use by Bahamian Organizations of Certain Lands at 
the United States Navy Base, Great Exuma Island, 
Bahamas. Agreement with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7514 5 
pp. 20('. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement vrith the 
Khmer Republic amending the agreement of Jan- 
uary 13, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7515. 3 pp. 

Shellfish Sanitation. Agreement with the Republic of 
Korea. TIAS 7516. 6 pp. 20(». 

Fisheries. Agreement with the Republic of Korea 
TIAS 7517. 14 pp. 20('. 

Television System and Radio Facility. Agreement 
with Saudi Arabia extending the agreement of De- 
cember 9, 1963, and January 6, 1964, as amended 
and extended. TIAS 7518. 5 pp. 20^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet- 
Nam amending the agreement of October 2, 1972. 
TIAS 7519. 3 pp. 20^ 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Indo- 
nesia amending the agreement of May 26, 1972 as 
amended. TL4S 7520. 6 pp. 20^ 



Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of September 21, 1972 as 
amended. TIAS 7521. 3 pp. 20i*. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland 
TIAS 7522. 3 pp. 20('. 

Status, Privileges and Immunities of Strategic Arms 
Limitation (SALT) Delegations. Agreement with 
Switzerland. TIAS 7523. 5 pp. 20('. 

Cultural Relations. Agreement with the Socialist 
Republic of Romania. TIAS 7524. 29 pp. 

Consular Officers— Continued Application to Fiji of 
the United States-United Kingdom Convention of 
June 6, 1951. Agreement with Fiji. TIAS 7525 

2 pp. 20<*. 

Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with Italy extend- 
ing the agreement of June 19, 1967. TIAS 7526 

3 pp. 20('. 

Fisheries— King and Tanner Crab. Agreement with 
Japan. TIAS 7527. 6 pp. 20('. 

Fisheries— Certain Fisheries Off the United States 
Coast Salmon Fisheries. Agreements with Japan 
TIAS 7528. 13 pp. 20C. 

Defense— Acquisition and Production of Additional 
F-4EJ Aircraft and Acquisition of RF-4E Aircraft. 

Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7529. 8 pp. 20('. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with St Vincent. 
TIAS 7530. 4 pp. 20('. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with the Re- 
public of Korea amending the agreement of Feb- 
ruary 14, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7531. 7 pp. 
20«(. 

Transfer of Military Scrap. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. TIAS 7534. 5 pp. 20^. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on June 6 confirmed the nomination 
of David H. Popper to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State [for International Organization Affairs]. 

The Senate on June 14 confirmed the nomination 
of Graham A. Martin to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. 

The Senate on June 15 confirmed the nomination 
of Kenneth B. Keating to be Ambassador to Israel. 

The Senate on June 30 confirmed the nomination 
of John Hugh Crimmins to be Ambassador to 
Brazil. 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 30, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1779 



Atomic Energy. Senate Confirms Gerald F. 
& Tape as U.S. Representative to IAEA . . 188 
^viation. U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement on 

"Advance Charter" Flights 206 

Hrazil. Crimmins confirmed as Ambassador . 208 
( ommunications. U.S. Cautions Against Pre- 
mature International Regulation of Develop- 
ing Direct Broadcast Satellite Technology 
(Mclntyre) l^** 

.iigress ,, ^. 

mfirmations (Crimmins, Keating, Martin, 

Popper) _,••.• 2"^ 

ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy • • . • 19^ 

partment Discusses Recent Negotiations m 
the International Oil Industry (Casey) . . 190 
. nate Confirms Gerald F. Tape as U.S. Repre- 
sentative to IAEA 188 

Czechoslovakia. Secretary Signs Consular Con- 
vention With Czechoslovakia (Rogers) . . 188 

Department and Foreign Service 
Confirmations (Crimmins, Keating, Martin, 

Popper) . . . . . . ....... • ■ 208 

U.S. Opens Consulate General in Leningrad 

(Department announcement, Stoessel) . . 189 

Economic AfTairs. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries 
Agreement Signed at Copenhagen .... 194 

Energy. Department Discusses Recent Negotia- 
tions in the Industrial Oil Industry (Casey) 190 

Environment. U.S. Calls for Immediate Action 

ton Priority Proposals for U.N. Environment 
, Program (Herter) 201 

Europe. Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe Meets at Helsinki at Foreign 
Minister Level ( Rogers, texts of communique 
and Final Recommendations of Helsinki 

Consultations) 1'^'' 

Extradition. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon) ... 195 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe Meets at Helsinki at Foreign Min- 
ister Level (Rogers, texts of communique 
and Final Recommendations of Helsinki 
Consultations) • • 1'^'' 

Popper confirmed as Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs . . . 208 

Senate Confirms Gerald F. Tape as U.S. Repre- 
sentative to IAEA 188 

Ireland. U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement on 
".Advance Charter" Flights 206 

Israel 

Fund Committed for Assistance to Migrants 

to Israel 19° 

Keating confirmed as Ambassador .... 208 

Italy. U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon) 195 

Middle East. Department Discusses Recent Ne- 
gotiations in the International Oil Indus- 
try (Casey) 190 

Presidential Documents. U.S.-Italy Extradition 
Treaty Transmitted to the Senate .... 19.) 

Publications. Recent Releases 207 

Space. U.S. Cautions Against Premature Inter- 
national Regulation of Developing Direct 
Broadcast Satellite Technology (Mclntyre) . 19/ 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions ^'^^ 



Secretary Signs Consular Convention With 

Czechoslovakia (Rogers) ....... 188 

U.S. and Ireland Sign Agreement on "Advance 

Charter" Flights 206 

U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty Transmitted to 

the Senate (Nixon) . 195 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Agreement Signed at 

Copenhagen 1^* 

U.S.S.R. . . , . 

U.S. Opens Consulate General in Leningrad 

(Department anouncement, Stoessel) . . 189 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Agreement Signed at 

Copenhagen 1^4 

United Nations 

United Nations Documents ■'05 

U.S. Calls for Immediate Action on Priority 
Proposals for U.N. Environment Program 
(Herter) • ; ^01 

U.S. Cautions Against Premature International 
Regulation of Developing Direct Broadcast 
Satellite Technology (Mclntyre) 197 

Viet-Nam. Martin confirmed as Ambassador . 208 

Name Index 

Casey, William J 190 

Crimmins, John Hugh ^0° 

Herter, Christian A., Jr 201 

Keating, Kenneth B 208 

Martin, Graham A ^08 

Mclntyre, Stuart 11 19; 

Nixon, President 19^ 

Popper, David H 1^7 TrI 

Rogers, Secretary ^ ' ' , on 

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 189 

Tape, Gerald F 1b» 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 9-1 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to July 9 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
233 of July 3 and 236 and 237 of July 6. 

No. Date Subject 

238 7/9 Communique on first stage of 
CSCE, July 8. 
*239 7/9 Rogers: departure statement, 
Helsinki, July 8. 
240 7/9 Rogers: arrival statement, 

Prague, July 8. 
*241 7/10 Subcommittee on Code of Con- 
duct for Liner Conferences, 
Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee, July 19. 
t242 7/10 Rush: House Committee on For- 
eign Affairs. 
*243 7/10 U.S. announces pledge of funds 
for drug control at U.N. 
ECOSOC meeting July 9. 
244 7/11 Casey: House Subcommittee on 

Near East. 
t245 7/12 Casey: House Committee on For- 
eign Affairs. 
t246 7/12 Rumsfeld: House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. 

*Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issued of the Bulletin. 



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s 

/. 3 ; 
9//7go 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1780 



August 6, 1973 



DEPARTMENT OPPOSES PROPOSALS FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTION 

OF U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE 

Statements by Deputy Secretary Rush, 

Under Secretary Casey, and Ambassador Rumsfeld 209 

U.S. REVIEWS YEAR'S ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

IN THE FIELD OF OUTER SPACE 

Statement by Herbert Reis 231 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



.•>iiO(V^- 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1780 
August 6, 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29. foreign $36.2.'i 
Single copy 66 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers" Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI. 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public an 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments /i 
the field of U.S. foreign relations am 
on the work of the Department am 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selectei 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President^ 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions^ 
of the Department. Information is in4 
eluded concerning treaties and inters 
national agreements to which the. 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Department Opposes Proposals for Unilateral Reduction 
of U.S. Troop Levels in Europe 



Following are texts of a statement made 
before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe on 
Juhj 10 by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush, 
a statement submitted on July 12 by Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs William. J. 
Casey, and a statement made that day by 
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the North Atlantic Council.'' 



STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH, JULY 10 

Press release 242 dated July 10 

I welcome this opportunity to testify be- 
fore the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
and its European Subcommittee on proposals 
made by Members of the Congress and dis- 
tinguished Members of this committee for a 
reduction in the level of American forces in 
western Europe. I very much appreciate 
Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan's readiness 
to hear us before your full committee and 
Congressman [Benjamin S.] Rosenthal's co- 
operation in making that possible. 

In order to remove any possible doubt that 
may exist, I want to assure you that we are 
unequivocally opposed to any unilateral re- 
duction of American forces in western Eu- 
rope and therefore to those proposals that 
now lie before your committee that would 
commit the Congress or bind the adminis- 
tration to such an act. 

Our policy is most authoritatively stated 
by the President himself. It was most re- 
cently reaffirmed in his annual foreign pol- 



icy report to the Congress; there he re- 
peated the pledge made to the NATO Coun- 
cil last December : - 

In the light of the present strategic balance and of 
similar efforts by our allies, we will not only main- 
tain but improve our forces in Europe and will not 
reduce them unless there is reciprocal action by our 
adversaries. 

My colleagues and I of the executive 
branch appear before your committee this 
week to explain why we believe that this pol- 
icy should remain that of the United States 
and to ask your continued support for it. 

Let me begin by assuring you that we are 
keenly aware of the changed circumstances 
that affect NATO, our defenses, and our re- 
lationship to Europe. 

First, we are embarked on a period 

of active negotiations— SALT, CSCE, and 
MBFR [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe; mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions] — each of which has a direct bearing 
on the security of our allies and ourselves. 
Together with the summit meetings, they 
form part of our general effort to create a 
more normal relationship between East and 
West. While we feel there has been progress, 
this process is only beginning and in the next 
phase we will be dealing with the more diffi- 
cult issues of reducing military tensions. 

— Second, this process is occurring at a 
time when in each allied country, not just in 
the United States, there are growing pres- 
sures to divert resources to domestic needs. 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



-"The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on May .3 appears in 
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled 
"Europe and the Atlantic Alliance" begins on p. 754. 



August 6, 1973 



209 



— Third, our allies are now stronger than 
ever economically and are making significant 
strides toward greater political and economic 
unity. At the same time a considerable num- 
ber of common trade and monetary problems 
characterize our economic relationships. 

— Finally, we face a strategic nuclear situ- 
ation in which the predominance of the 
United States vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. has 
given way to rough balance, placing a 
greater premium on conventional deterrence. 

I think it essential that the Congress be 
fully aware of what is being done to adapt 
NATO and our presence in Europe to these 
realities. We are dealing with them in a 
threefold manner: 

1. We are seeking in this year of Europe 
to reinvigorate our relationship with our 
allies and to establish a framework within 
which we can deal productively with the 
issues of trade, finance, and security. 

2. As a result of the recent meetings of 
NATO's Foreign and Defense Ministers, we 
are working on programs aimed at: 

— Improving NATO's defense posture. 

— Developing a multilateral mechanism 
for more equitable burden sharing and for 
helping with our military balance of pay- 
ments problems. 

— Revising some basic defense concepts 
affecting specialization and more efllicient 
use of scarce defense resources. 

3. We have reached agreement that full- 
scale negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions will begin in slightly more 
than 90 days, on October 30. We are cur- 
rently developing an allied position that 
could lead to U.S. and Soviet reductions. 

In sum, we are involved with our allies to 
improve the postwar trade and monetary sys- 
tem ; we are at work in NATO to build a 
more equitable and effective security pos- 
ture; and we are engaged with the Soviet 
Union in finding ways to ease the burdens 
of defense on our peoples at no loss in our 
fundamental security. This is an undertak- 
ing of unprecedented scope and importance 
for America's future welfare. It should be 
obvious that we risk failure in all these en- 
deavors if: 



— First, we tell our allies that irrespective 
of their desires to accommodate our mutui 
needs, we will unilaterally cut back our con' 
tribution to the common defense. 

— And second, we tell our adversaries that 
we will unilaterally cut our forces even 
though we want mutual reductions. 

In effect, we would be telling our allies 
that we want them to do more for America 
in trade, finance, and security and in return 
we will do less. And we would be telling the 
eastern nations that they can expect some- 
thing for nothing. 

These are the important and compelling 
considerations that convince us that unilat- 
eral reductions in our NATO defense effort 
would be unwise. In addition, there are three 
specific reasons that I believe are of funda- 
mental and determining importance. They 
are that: 

— The independence and security of wesi 
ern Europe is vital to every American be- 
cause of its decisive influence upon his 
security, his economic well-being, and the 
survival of his democratic way of life. 

— The independence of western Europe isi 
dependent upon the maintenance of a credi- 
ble deterrent and defense against an attack, 
and in such a defense posture U.S. forces 
play a vital role. 

— The process of maintaining a reliable 
defense posture while negotiating an orderly 
and balanced reduction in the size of the 
forces facing each other in Europe would 
be disastrously undercut by a unilateral re- 
duction of our forces. 

America's Vital Stake in Western Europe 

Your committee has many times told us 
and has repeatedly sustained the view that 
the survival of a prosperous and independ- 
ent western Europe is essential to the well- 
being of the United States and of its citizens. 
That primacy has in no respect diminished 
during the last quarter of a century since the 
conclusion of the Second World War. West- 
ern Europe is, and has been, the foremost 
concern in the defense of the United States 
against the only other superpower. It is 
there, more than anywhere else in the world, 



210 



Department of State Bulletin 



that the future of the United States could 
be threatened. It is that conviction that has 
led the Congress and the President to take 
tlie United States into two World Wars and 
to sustain a major effort for the rebuilding of 
western Europe after the Second World War 
to prevent Europe's falling into hostile 
hands. 

Those sacrifices were made in the interests 
of the United States and of its people. They 
were a reflection of policies championed by 
both parties and by a succession of Con- 
gresses and of Presidents. They have proved 
themselves to have been among the wisest 
and the most sensible policies adopted by our 
government in this century. 

Nor is our vital interest in western Europe 
by any means only a matter of history or 
habit. Our very prosperity is buttressed upon 
it. It has, in fact, become an ever more pow- 
erful center of the world economy. It is our 
most important market and our most im- 
portant supplier. American firms have more 
than $28 billion invested in western Europe, 
which earns American investors almost $3 
billion a year. Make no mistake: Our pros- 
perity and the prosperity of the entire world 
is deeply affected by western Europe. That 
means American jobs, American dividends, 
and the American standard of living. 

It is because we and our western European 
allies are so totally aware of our inter- 
dependence that we are now engaged in com- 
mon efl'orts to strengthen our common 
economy through global trade negotiations 
and through a reform of the world monetary 
system. Neither expanded world trade nor 
monetary reform can succeed without a full 
measure of western European cooperation. 

It is in the light of that reality that we 
urge the Congress and the American people 
not to discard or to turn away from the most 
successful of our postwar policies or to for- 
get the reasons for the sacrifice that we and 
our allies have made in two great wars. This 
is the moment in history when our postwar 
policies are about to bear the long-desired 
fruits of relaxed tension, greater stability, 
reduced costs, and a more secure world peace. 
It would be folly to abandon the very policies 



that have brought us to the threshold of our 
long-term objective. 

The Need for Conventional Forces 

The defense of western Europe depends 
upon three conditions. First, it depends upon 
the will of the Europeans to be independent 
and to defend themselves. Second, it depends 
upon the commitment of the United States to 
its European allies that, in the face of the 
imposing military resources of their neigh- 
bors to the east, it will stand with them to 
deter aggression and to defend our common 
interests should deterrence fail. Third, it de- 
pends upon the existence of a defense system 
the capability of which is convincing not only 
to the eastern European states but to our 
NATO allies and to ourselves as well. 

Fulfilling these conditions requires a con- 
tinuing effort on the part of the United 
States and its allies. 

Our European allies do have the will to 
maintain their independence and their free- 
dom. They have been steadfast during the 
postwar period in resisting threats to their 
independence both from within and from 
without. They continue to give solid, tangible 
proof that they are ready, able, and deter- 
mined to stand with us in our common de- 
fense. They are today spending almost $35 
billion a year for their own defense. They 
have over 3 million men in active service in 
western Europe today. 

While the U.S. contribution is highly sig- 
nificant, particularly because of the quality 
of our forces, our allies do contribute to 
NATO nearly 90 percent of the ground 
forces, 80 percent of the seapower, and 75 
percent of the airpower. In central Europe, 
the allies, including France, supply 25 of the 
291/:? combat-ready divisions. 

Moreover, the allies, in the form of the 
European Defense Improvement Program, 
have undertaken to procure major new items 
of military equipment and construction 
which we have jointly agreed are most sig- 
nificant in improving NATO's nonnuclear 
defense capabilities. In December 1970 they 
undertook a $1 billion five-year program. In 
December 1971 they announced increases in 



August 6, 1973 



211 



their planned defense budgets for the next 
year of well over $1 billion. In December 
1972 they announced a similar increase for 
the next year of about $1.5 billion. Overall, 
the defense expenditure of the European 
NATO countries increased from $19.5 billion 
in 1965 to $35 billion in 1973. 

At the same time, the United States has 
repeatedly stated its commitment to the de- 
fense of its interests in Europe. Our record 
of support for European reconstruction, for 
the integration of western Europe, for the 
creation and strengthening of NATO, and 
the presence of more than 300,000 American 
troops in western Europe are reciprocal 
proof that we are fully and unequivocally 
committed to help defend western Europe 
as our own first line of defense. 

This fabric of political commitment, eco- 
nomic cooperation, and common defense is 
convincing both to our allies and to the 
Warsaw Pact nations. 

It is that certainty that has guaranteed 
peace with the Warsaw Pact for a quarter 
century. It has allowed the economy of the 
Atlantic world to prosper beyond our great- 
est expectations. And today that fabric is 
being strengthened by a broad range of pro- 
grams for improved forces, for more equita- 
ble burden sharing, for balance of payments 
relief, and for development of a more ra- 
tional, efficient, and cost-conscious defense 
posture. 

Historically, NATO's first function, and 
still its most important, has been to safe- 
guard its members from external attack and 
pressure. I know that Soviet relations with 
its neighbors in Europe, as well as with us, 
have improved significantly in recent years. 
We welcome that improvement. But I also 
know that the Soviet Union is still far more 
powerful than any other state or group of 
states in Europe. I know that there is no 
certainty, nor can there ever be any, that its 
power will never be used to threaten the in- 
terests of the members of NATO. Such 
power would be a constant political pressure 
on the western European states to accommo- 
date to Soviet policies unless it continues to 
be counterbalanced by NATO. 

The Warsaw Pact nations see no inconsis- 



tency between negotiations to reduce tension 
in Europe and maintaining and strengthen- 
ing their military power. Nor is there any 
necessary inconsistency. Soviet negotiating 
from strength has not impeded our search 
for better relations with the East. In fact, 
it has probably provided the only basis for 
Soviet policy to evolve as it has. The eastern 
countries no doubt will continue to negotiate j 
on this basis. It is important that they never 
have reason to expect that we would do 
otherwise. 

Even in a period of relative detente in 
Europe, occasions may arise when the 
U.S.S.R. would want to exert military pres- 
sure on a neutral neighbor or one of the 
adjacent NATO members or to back up some 
diplomatic position with a show of force. No 
one can exclude the possibility that in these 
or other kinds of situations the Soviet Union 
might wish to probe allied positions, either 
as a means of diplomatic pressure or as a 
possible prelude to some form of aggression. 
Nor can anyone exclude the possibility of 
frontier violence arising from accident 
rather than design, but with unforeseeable 
consequences. 

The power of the Warsaw Pact has grown 
appreciably in recent years. Its manpower 
in eastern Europe has remained roughly con- 
stant, but these forces are increasingly 
armed with the most modern equipment 
available. They are trained and deployed, 
should war come, for a short decisive thrust 
through western Europe. In keeping with 
the emphasis of Soviet military doctrine on 
offensive operations against NATO forces in 
the event of war, the Warsaw Pact forces 
have developed a superiority over the NATO 
forces in tanks and artillery. 

In the face of this Warsaw Pact capability, 
and the diversity of the options it gives to 
the Soviet Union, prudence and common 
sense dictate that we be prepared for a wide 
range of eventualities. Makeshift responses 
imposed by inadequate advance preparation 
are likely to prove not only insufficient but 
downright dangerous. This is the more true 
in that the purpose of the United States, as 
of its allies, is to deter war. And war can be 
deterred at every level only if it is cer- 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



tain that attack will be met at every level. 
At this point I want to deal with what we 
believe to be a specious argument advanced 
to justify unilateral U.S. withdrawals. It is 
that NATO has only a tripwire defense and 
that in case of attack it would have to resort 
to nuclear weapons in a few short days, if 
not hours. Therefore it is argued that the 
United States does not need to keep 300.000 
men in Europe to serve as a tripwire. 

The premise of a tripwire defense is false, 
and so is the conclusion. However, major 
U.S. reductions and their effect on the morale 
and preparedness of our allies could well 
bring about a tripwire situation in which 
violence in Europe could automatically bring 
the threat of nuclear war to every American. 
The doctrine of "massive retaliation" be- 
came inadequate when the Soviet Union be- 
came a real nuclear power able to retaliate 
in kind. That is why it is astonishing to hear 
proposals to defend western Europe by de- 
pendence upon nuclear weapons alone. This 
backdoor revival of the doctrine of massive 
retaliation coincides with the emergence of 
something like parity in strategic weapons 
systems between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. But nuclear parity makes mas- 
sive retaliation less believable as a means of 
deterring all forms of aggression in Europe. 
The proposed return to this concept, whether 
it is called "massive retaliation" or "trip- 
wire," as a substitute for NATO's agreed 
flexible response capability reflects one of 
two things : either a misunderstanding of the 
implications of strategic parity or a cavalier 
dismissal of the possibility of less than all- 
out war in Europe. 

There can never be absolute security. But 
I am struck by this simple judgment: War 
can probably continue to be deterred in Eu- 
rope at all levels by the same means by 
which it has been deterred for more than a 
decade. NATO planned ahead in the 1960's 
to deal with eventual strategic parity be- 
tween East and West. It decided to acquire 
the conventional arms needed to counter a 
Warsaw Pact conventional capability to use 
force in many ways short of strategic war. 
Now, in the 1970's we are facing precisely 
the circumstances for which these plans were 



made. It seems absurd to abandon the prep- 
arations so successfully made to deal with 
the predicted threat that now exists. 

I will not review the NATO force struc- 
ture and the U.S. role in it. Other witnesses 
will do so in detail. But I want to emphasize 
very strongly that with continued appropri- 
ate support by all its members NATO will 
continue to have a solid conventional option 
against Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack. 

The allies have much to do to place them- 
selves in the best posture to meet conven- 
tional threats. 

But NATO's military deficiencies are not 
of a sort to require a wholesale turning away 
from a rational strategy for lack of means 
to put it into effect. On the contrary, it is the 
expert judgment of U.S. and NATO military 
planners that the flexible response strategy is 
the right one for the world of the seventies 
and that with vigorous political and military 
leadership in the alliance, the resources 
needed for this strategy can be equitably 
provided. 

In short, the need for a convincing con- 
ventional capability to defend western Eu- 
rope and to deter war is greater than ever, 
and today our allies and ourselves have un- 
derway the programs and actions which we 
believe can continue to provide that capabil- 
ity into the future. 

I will leave to Ambassador Rumsfeld and 
to General Goodpaster [Gen. A. J. Good- 
paster, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe] a detailed explanation of the rea- 
sons why our men in western Europe cannot 
be replaced by our Eui-opean allies. But the 
fact is that the presence of militarily signifi- 
cant numbers of our troops is essential to 
convince the public and the parliaments of 
both our allies and the Warsaw Pact that 
western Europe can and will be defended. 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 

The third reason that unilateral reductions 
would be unwise is that such an act would 
cripple our careful effort to negotiate recip- 
rocal force reductions. In May 1972 at the 
Moscow summit, we and the Soviet Union 
agreed in principle to seek reciprocal reduc- 



August 6, 1973 



213 



tions. In November of that year, the NATO 
allies invited the Warsaw Pact states to ex- 
ploratory talks that opened shortly there- 
after in January 1973. These resulted in an 
important agreement on a negotiating forum 
and upon the negotiating procedures. Finally, 
the President and General Secretary Brezh- 
nev agreed during their Washington meet- 
ings that the substantive phase of the nego- 
tiations will begin on October 30 of this year. 

We are now poised to begin a series of 
negotiations that could be among the most 
portentous of the postwar era. It would be 
unthinkable to jeopardize these negotiations 
by unilateral action. Such a step would make 
almost inconceivable the conduct of recip- 
rocal negotiations. The very likelihood of 
such a decision would remove the incentive 
of the Warsaw Pact states to negotiate at all. 

Moreover, a unilateral American troop re- 
duction would seriously divide the NATO 
alliance. Since the United States would have 
reduced without regard to the military con- 
sequences, our allies would be under political 
pressure from their parliaments to make 
comparable unilateral reductions. The entire 
fabric of our common decisionmaking could 
be torn apart. And while the governments 
would probably oppose any further reduc- 
tions — reciprocal or not — the process of un- 
raveling the peacetime defense of the West 
would be underway and would have been be- 
gun by the United States itself. 

Under such circumstances, our every effort 
would be needed to hold NATO together and 
to restore some degree of its effectiveness. 

Our unilateral reductions would unsettle 
the entire military situation in Europe to 
our detriment. Who among us can be confi- 
dent that the discovery of a weakened and 
divided West would not reawaken the appe- 
tite of those in the East whose hope for the 
control of all Europe must still sui-vive? 
Who would feel America's interests would be 
safeguarded once accommodation rather than 
independence became the guiding rule of 
Europe's foreign policy? 

We do not yet know precisely where the 
effort to achieve mutual reductions will even- 
tually lead. Like SALT, it promises to be a 
process that will yield not only substantial 



military results but a continuing political 
discourse that could well be valuable to us. 
In SALT, our candid discussions with the 
Soviet Union did much to dispel common 
misconceptions. That same possibility lies 
before us in MBFR. I urge that none of us 
underestimate the contribution that it could 
make to our security and to reduced inter- 
national tensions. 

But the promising prospects of these mo- 
mentous negotiations would be destroyed by 
a unilateral decision of the United States to 
reduce its NATO forces. Such a pullout 
would disrupt NATO, unsettle the existing 
East- West equilibrium, and abruptly halt the 
process of reciprocal force reduction. 

Economic Aspects 

I have stated the three decisive reasons 
against a unilateral troop withdrawal. Let 
me conclude by explaining why, in our judg- 
ment, we need not feel forced by economics 
to do that which political and military reason 
tells us would be profoundly wrong. 

There is much confusion about the costs 
of our military deployments in the European 
theater. Let's begin with the facts about cost. 

First, the budgetary costs. Our budgetary 
outlays for keeping our 300,000 men in the 
European theater, and that includes the 
Mediterranean Sea, is $4 billion for fiscal 
year 1974. That is the cost of pay and main- 
tenance of these men and their dependents 
in Europe. 

However, if we consider the cost of the 
support facilities in the United States for 
these forces and the cost of their arms and 
equipment, the cost rises to $7.7 billion for 
fiscal year 1974. That includes the $4 billion 
figure. 

Within these costs there is an incremental 
cost to the stationing of our forces in Europe 
additional to the costs of similar forces in the 
United States. It runs to about $400 million 
per year and is composed largely of such ex- 
penses as transportation. 

Now, that is the budgetary cost of keep- 
ing 300,000 men and their dependents in 
Europe. If you bring these men home and 
maintain our NATO commitment, you will 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 



have to keep them in uniform and provide 
the added transport and duplicate heavy 
ai-ms in Europe so that they can be rapidly 
returned to fight there. In that case, the an- 
nual budget cost will be more than at 
present. 

The main point is that while there is a 
modest incremental cost to stationing our 
forces in Europe, these costs cannot be saved 
by bringing the troops home if at the same 
time we are serious about providing the 
wherewithal to continue meeting our com- 
mitments. 

Second, there is the balance of payments 
effect. In this calculation we are trying to 
measure the net outflow (or inflow) of all 
goods, services, and capital between the 
United States and the rest of the world. 

The result of our having 300,000 men and 
their dependents in Europe was a deficit in 
our military balance of payments of $1.5 bil- 
lion in fiscal year 1972. That is, after sub- 
tracting the value of our military exports 
and services to western Europe from the 
value of our military expenditures in west- 
ern Europe, there was a difference of $1.5 
billion. In this particular part of our overall 
balance of payments, we had spent more 
than we had earned. 

This excess of military purchases over mil- 
itary sales has to be looked at in the context 
of our overall balance of payments. It is 
comparable, for example, to the excess of 
expenditures by American tourists visiting 
western Europe over the expenditures of 
western European tourists visiting the 
United States. There our deficit for 1972 was 
$1.2 billion. 

But our $1.5 billion deficit on military ac- 
count is a relatively small part of our balance 
of payments deficit. In 1972 our total basic 
payments deficit was $9.2 billion. And of 
this, only a sixth (that is, $1.5 billion) was 
attributable to our military spending in Eu- 
rope, of which the deployment of our troops 
is a major part. However, such comparisons 
are overly simplistic in that they fail to take 
into account the interdependency of different 
accounts that make up the balance of pay- 
ments. Thus, even total withdrawal of all 
troops could not be expected to "improve" 



our balance of payments by $1.5 billion, be- 
cause of indirect or secondary effects that 
withdrawal would have on other activities 
affecting the payments situation — such as 
European imports of nonmilitary goods and 
services from the United States. 

Obviously, the United States cannot man- 
age a $9 billion basic deficit indefinitely. But 
neither can we eliminate it simply by attack- 
ing individual items such as the military 
account. The causes of the deficit are funda- 
mental, and fundamental changes are re- 
quired to respond to them. That is why we 
have moved so energetically to correct the 
problem by the devaluation of the dollar and 
by insisting upon constructive reform of the 
international monetary system. 

It is because these fundamental economic 
changes are being made that we need not feel 
that our national defense must be hobbled 
by balance of payments problems. The re- 
alignment of currencies will strengthen our 
competitive position over the whole range of 
our exports and imports of goods and serv- 
ices, which are running in excess of $80 bil- 
lion each way. It will also influence the out- 
flow and inflow of long-term investments. 

As Secretary Casey will tell you, the 
results of our monetary actions are be- 
ginning to take effect. Our overall balance 
of payments has begun to improve as the 
turnaround has started to take hold. The 
Department of Commerce data for the first 
quarter of this calendar year shows a drop 
in the deficit in our basic balance of pay- 
ments from $3.8 billion for the first quarter 
of 1972 to $1.2 billion this year. That is a 
very impressive improvement. Our econo- 
mists believe that, despite some initial spotti- 
ness, the trend back to equilibrium will 
continue and that it will do so at an increas- 
ing pace. 

This turnaround in our balance of pay- 
ments does mean that the very real concern 
that we have had about the balance of pay- 
ments costs of stationing troops in western 
Europe is much relieved. We can see the 
restoration of equilibrium in the reasonable 
future. We must, however, continue to exact 
every possible economy in the maintenance 
of our forces there. And we must continue to 



August 6, 1973 



215 



press our allies to shoulder a larger and 
more equitable portion of the costs of the de- 
fense of Europe. Relief is now being felt, 
not only because of these moves but because 
of the effects of the Smithsonian agreement 
and the other currency adjustments that 
have been made. 

In calling on our allies to share a larger 
part of the defense burden, I would not want 
you to assume that they are not already do- 
ing a great deal to reduce our military bal- 
ance of payments deficit. A significant share 
of their defense outlays goes to capital im- 
provements, and much of this is spent on 
purchases of U.S. military equipment. 

The German Government, in addition to 
substantial arms purchases in the United 
States, has also purchased $621 million in 
U.S. Government medium-term securities on 
which it pays the interest and has put $186 
million into the rehabilitation of U.S. bar- 
racks in Germany, benefiting both our bal- 
ance of payments and our budget costs. The 
total value of this oflfset agreement to the 
United States has been approximately $2,065 
billion over a two-year period. We are now 
negotiating another ofi'set agreement with 
the Federal Republic. In addition, and im- 
portant for the long run, NATO's Defense 
Ministers last month agreed to examine the 
problem of finding additional multilateral 
means to reduce the adverse economic conse- 
quences borne by the United States as a re- 
sult of its stationing forces in Europe. We 
consider this a major step that can reduce 
the incremental budgetary burden and bal- 
ance of payments impact of stationing forces 
abroad rather than at home. 

It is the turnaround in our balance of pay- 
ments outlook, the stringent balance of pay- 
ments economies being practiced by the De- 
partment of Defense, and the continued sup- 
port of our allies in reducing the balance of 
payments effects of our troops in Europe 
that leads to the conclusion that I have al- 
ready stated; that is, that our balance of 
payments situation does not oblige us to 
make decisions about the deployment of 
troops in Europe that are politically and 
militarily wrong. 

It is for these reasons, Mr. Chairman, 



that we believe that a decision to make uni- 
lateral reductions in the number of American 
troops in western Europe would be gravely 
contrary to the vital interests of the United 
States and its citizens. 

The friendship and cooperation of western 
Europe is essential to the security, economic 
well-being, and peace of mind of every 
American. Our defense is its defense, and its 
security is essential to our own. 

That security today depends upon a con- 
vincing conventional and nuclear capability 
to resist pressure, to deter aggression, and 
to defend western Europe if deterrence fails. 
Today that dual capability exists, but it 
hinges upon the presence of substantial U.S. 
forces in Europe. 

Our goal is to maintain our present secu- 
rity, but to do so at lower levels of tension 
and armament. The process of making the 
transition from security at the present level 
to security at a lower level will be diflicult. 
But the negotiations to do so are already 
agreed between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
The substantive phase of the mutual and bal- 
anced force reduction negotiations opens on 
October 30. 

These extraordinarily important negotia- 
tions cannot succeed, nor can they proceed, 
if the United States undercuts them with 
unilateral troop reductions. 

Equally important, our efforts with our 
allies for more equitable burden sharing, 
trade, and monetary arrangements are also 
underway. Programs to improve NATO's de- 
fense and to provide a more cost-conscious 
and eflicient posture are also in train. 

Nor need we feel compelled by our budget 
or balance of payments to withdraw our 
troops from the area where they are most 
valuable to a distant base in the United 
States. The improvement in our overall bal- 
ance of payments that is already beginning 
to show can be expected greatly to diminish 
this pressure in the months ahead. 

It is for these essential reasons that my 
colleagues and I believe that unilateral troop 
reductions in western Europe would be con- 
trary to the interests of the American peo- 
ple and that we ask your continued support 
for our Atlantic defense policy. 



216 



Department of State Bulletin 



STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY CASEY, JULY 12 

Press release 245 dated July 12 

Mr. Chairman : I am pleased to have this 
opportunity to discuss with you and the dis- 
tinguished Members of this committee ques- 
tions concerning the maintenance of U.S. 
military forces in Europe, with particular 
emphasis on the balance of payments aspect 
of our European troop commitment. For the 
reasons given in my testimony today, I trust 
the committee and the Congress will reject 
proposals for unilateral reductions in our 
force levels. 

We maintain these forces in Europe be- 
cause security interests of the highest im- 
portance to the United States demand it. 
What happens in western Europe is a matter 
of utmost gravity to the United States. West- 
ern Europe is the second greatest economic 
power in the world, linked to the United 
States by innumerable strategic, political, 
cultural, and economic ties. It is American 
security which dictates the necessity to deter 
not only a full-scale Soviet attack on western 
Europe but also the application of Soviet 
political pressure on that area that could give 
it a veto power over western European co- 
operation with the United States. U.S. forces 
in Europe together with those of our NATO 
allies provide an effective shield for our com- 
mon interests there. This shield has made 
possible not only the recovery of Europe but 
the development of detente with the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. It is the pres- 
ence of these forces which has been in large 
measure responsible for the agreement by 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to 
agree to talks on the mutual reduction of 
forces, through which we hope forces on both 
sides may be reduced in this region, thereby 
contributing to increased stability at less 
cost to us all. It is against these fundamental 
national security considerations that I wish 
to cast my remarks on the balance of pay- 
ments costs of our troops in Europe. 

At the outset, Mr. Chairman, let me under- 
score the distinction between the budget 
cost of our forces deployed in the European 
area and our military balance of payments 
with NATO Europe. 



The budget cost of our maintaining some 
300,000 troops and their dependents in the 
European area is about $4 billion for their 
pay and maintenance. If we add to that the 
cost of the support facilities in the United 
States for these forces, the cost of their 
arms and equipment, and a proportionate 
share of the U.S.-based training and logistics 
support, the cost rises to $7.7 billion for fiscal 
year 1974. These are the total dollars spent 
to pay for our forces in the European area. 

You will also have heard the figure of $17 
billion. That is the cost of all the U.S. armed 
forces, wherever located in the world, that 
are committed to NATO and would be de- 
ployed in the event of hostilities. It is not the 
cost of our troops now in Europe, nor would 
this amount be saved even if we withdrew all 
of our forces from Europe. 

In FY 1972, foreign currency expenditures 
for these troops was about $2.1 billion in 
NATO European countries. This supported 
our troop deployments and the 6th Fleet. 
European countries spent about $600 million 
in the United States (mainly for military 
goods and services) , leaving a net deficit of 
about $1.5 billion in the U.S. military pay- 
ments balance with NATO countries. This 
deficit with NATO Europe comprised about 
one-sixth of the overall worldwide basic bal- 
ance of payments deficit of about $9.2 billion. 
While the continued decline in value of the 
dollar increases our foreign costs, it increases 
the competitiveness of our services and mer- 
chandise exports. It therefore contributes 
to the improvement of our balance of pay- 
ments and speeds the return to equilibrium. 
At the same time, of course, it does increase 
the cost of our troop deployments in western 
Europe to the extent that these expenditures 
apply to local costs. This increase is small, 
however, compared to the favorable impact 
which the new exchange rates are having on 
our $80 billion annual exports of goods and 
services. 

It is obvious, therefore, that the deteriora- 
tion in the military balance of payments has 
not been the primary cause of our deterio- 
rating balance of payments situation with 
NATO Europe. The major problem has been 
an increasingly adverse balance in nonmili- 



August 6, 1973 



217 



tary goods and services. The balance of this 
account deterioi-ated from a surplus of $1 
billion in 1970 to a deficit of about $2.7 bil- 
lion in 1972. The very significant fact that I 
want to underline to you is that this adverse 
trend has apparently begun to turn around. 

Since April 1971, the value of the dollar 
has declined sharply with respect to many of 
our trading partners; for example, by 26 
percent with Japan, 34 percent with Ger- 
many, 33 percent with Switzerland, and 26 
percent with France. This factor, coupled 
with the continuing effects of the 1971 de- 
valuation and the still-evolving impact of 
the February dollar devaluation, has im- 
proved our competitive position in interna- 
tional trade. A turnaround has, in fact, 
already started to take effect. The statistics 
indicate a steady export growth between 
January and May, up 35 percent over the 
same five-month period in 1972. Imports, on 
the other hand, have shown only a 23 percent 
rise during the past five months over the 
same 1972 period. Thus, the January to May 
1972 trade deficit of $2,414,300,000 has re- 
duced during the same 1973 period to $454.5 
million. Since March, with the European 
countries and Japan functioning under a 
"managed floating" exchange rate system, 
there has been a net reduction in official dol- 
lar holdings of about $1.6 billion — mainly by 
Japan. This compares with increases in hold- 
ings, from January 1 to mid-March, of $11.5 
billion. 

Predictions of future performance aie 
hazardous because of rising demand and the 
fact that the U.S. economy is running close 
to capacity, coupled with export controls on 
various commodities. These factors are likely 
to reduce the extent of the improvement in 
the trade account in 1973 and may mask the 
real improvement in longrun competitiveness 
of U.S. exports. 

The current decline of the dollar is not 
justified by fundamental trade and balance 
of payments factors but seems to arise from 
confidence and related psychological factors. 

We continue to believe that the general 
structure of exchange rates established by 
the February realignment is broadly correct 
in the sense that it provides a valid basis for 



elimination of the longstanding U.S. deficit 
and restoration of international payments 
equilibrium. Indeed, developments in recent 
months with respect to our trade position 
reinforce the view that our competitive posi- 
tion has benefited in a major way from the 
two realignments of December 1971 and Feb- 
ruary 1973, and further important gains in 
our balance of payments can be expected. 
Plainly, the speed and extent of our success 
will, as always, be dependent upon our ability 
to restrain inflation at home and to maintain 
a sound domestic economy. 

As Deputy Secretary Rush testified on 
Tuesday, the approach to eliminating our 
balance of payments deficit should not be to 
forgo programs which are essential to our 
security. We want to be satisfied that they 
are necessary and carried out in an efficient 
and economical manner. But then, we should 
recognize that the causes of our balance of 
payments deficit are fundamental, and fun- 
damental changes are required to respond to 
them. That is why we have moved so ener- 
getically to correct the problem by the de- 
valuation of the dollar and by insisting upon 
constructive reform of the international 
monetary system. 

It is because these fundamental economic 
changes are being made that we need not 
feel that our national defense must be hob- 
bled by balance of payments problems. The 
realignment of currencies will strengthen 
our competitive position over the whole 
range of our exports and imports of goods 
and services and also influence the outflow 
and inflow of long-term investments. 

At the same time, we are firmly committed 
to the maximum possible alleviation of the 
balance of payments costs attributed to our 
troop presence. Let me spell out how we are 
pursuing this. There are now two strands 
to this effort. 

The first strand is to continue our bilateral 
offset arrangements with the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. These have a history of 
successive improvements in quality. These 
oflfset arrangements will continue to be nec- 
essary as long as the overall balance of pay- 
ments adjustment is not accomplished. 

The second element will be the eflfort, com- 



218 



Department of State Bulletin 



bined with the bilateral offset program with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, to develop 
offset arrangements with all of NATO Eu- 
rope in a multilateral framework. We expect 
that a formal report will be made to the De- 
fense Planning Committee ministerial meet- 
ing in December and that we shall have even 
before then clear indications of the direction 
in which our allies wish to move. 

When we discuss troop costs, there are 
three aspects which tend to become confused. 
First, there is offset, which refers to meas- 
ures w'hich give goods or securities to an ally 
but give us dollars to erase the balance of 
liayments costs of stationing our troops in 
Europe. Secondly, there is burden sharing 
or cost absorption, which avoids balance of 
payments costs of stationing our troops in 
of the extra budgetary cost involved in sta- 
tioning our troops in Europe. Some meas- 
ures, for example, for the Germans or other 
Europeans to pay up the cost of local labor 
or of providing or making improvements in 
necessary facilities, would accomplish both 
burden sharing and offset. Finally, there is 
force improvement, which involves improve- 
ment in the quality and quantity of forces 
of the allies as a whole, such as the European 
Defense Improvement Program in Europe. 
What w-e hope to avoid is that, to the extent 
the Europeans share some part of our budge- 
tary burden, they not simultaneously reduce 
the effectiveness of their own troops. 

Multilateral Offset Measures 

The alliance itself has long recognized, as 
stated in the communique of the North At- 
lantic Council in November 1968, that the 
solidarity of the alliance can be strengthened 
by cooperation between members to alleviate 
balance of payments deficits resulting spe- 
cifically from military expenditures for the 
common defense. 

In his May 3, 1973, report. President 
Nixon stated: 

Our position is unique in that our deployments in 
Europe add significantly to our general balance of 
payments deficit. 

... the Alliance as a whole should examine this 
problem. As a general principle, we should move 



toward a lasting solution under which balance of 
payments consequences from stationing U.S. forces 
in Europe will not be substantially different from 
those of maintaining the same forces in the United 
States. It is reasonable to expect the Alliance to ex- 
amine this problem this year. 

On June 7 at the meeting of the Defense 
Planning Committee in ministerial session, 
Defense Secretary [James R.] Schlesinger 
asked the Ministers to work on the develop- 
ment of a multilateral program to compen- 
sate the United States for the additional 
burden it assumes by stationing its troops in 
Europe. In the communique following this 
meeting, the Ministers directed the Perma- 
nent Representatives to develop appropriate 
recommendations. 

At this time it is too early to say just what 
kind of program and of what amount will be 
developed. Suffice it to say that our goal is 
that this, combined with the bilateral offset 
program with the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, will move significantly toward elimi- 
nating our military balance of payments 
deficit with NATO Europe. We expect that 
a formal report will be made to the Defense 
Planning Committee ministerial meeting in 
December and that we shall have even before 
then clear indications of the direction in 
which we can move on multilateral burden 
sharing. 

We believe that this program should be 
developed and implemented by our allies. In 
this connection the allies could undertake 
actions which would cover both budgetary 
and balance of payments costs of U.S. troops 
stationed in Europe. These could, for exam- 
ple, include such things as assuming recur- 
ring costs for the operation and maintenance 
of bases and other real property or such non- 
recurring costs connected with construction 
or rehabilitation of facilities used by our 
troops. They might also undertake certain 
actions which would reduce the U.S. military 
balance of payments deficit such as increased 
purchases of military goods and services in 
the United States or by the funding of cer- 
tain research and development projects in 
this country. 

We shall, of course, be working closely 
with our allies on this problem and shall 



August 6, 1973 



219 



keep this committee and the Congress in- 
formed on the progress we have made. 

Bilateral Offset Measures 

Of our forces in Europe the bulk — 
210,000 — is stationed in the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany. 

A key member of the NATO alliance, 
Germany has been consistently one of 
NATO's strongest supporters. Its total force 
contribution of 485,000 men is the largest 
of the European forces committed to NATO, 
and its financial support of NATO is the 
highest of the European members. Germany 
has provided effective leadership in NATO to- 
ward securing a greater West European con- 
tribution to Western defense. It promoted the 
European Defense Improvement Program, 
under which the European NATO states in 
1970 agreed to contribute $1 billion over a 
five-year period for force improvements 
above and beyond their normal military bud- 
gets, and it has assumed about half of the 
total costs of that program. In line with 
NATO force goals recommendations, Ger- 
many also has placed a high priority on im- 
proving its military capabilities with special 
emphasis on improvements in armor, anti- 
tank weapons, maritime forces, and air and 
air defense weapons. So the presence of a 
substantial number of U.S. troops in Ger- 
many, together with the over 140,000 British, 
French, Belgian, Canadian, and Dutch sol- 
diers stationed on German soil, is an impor- 
tant but not dominant element in defense of 
the central front in Europe. The FRG is the 
dominant element. 

Under a series of offset agreements dating 
back to the early 1960's, the German Govern- 
ment has substantially increased the trans- 
fers of funds to the United States to finance 
military purchases in the United States and 
to invest in certain special securities and 
other assets in order to offset the costs of 
stationing of U.S. troops in Germany. Our 
current offset agreement expired June 30, 
and we now are in the process of negotiating 
a new bilateral offset agreement. For this 
purpose I have met with the German chief 
negotiator, Assistant Secretary [Peter] 



Hermes of the German Foreign Oflice, to 
discuss aspects of a new agreement. The 
German negotiator has undertaken to assess 
German procurement possibilities, and we 
have provided a number of proposals for 
study. These negotiations are continuing in 
an orderly fashion, and it is expected that, 
as in the past, the new offset agreement will 
be retroactive; that is, to July 1, 1973. 

Through fiscal year 1967, German military 
procurement in the United States repre- 
sented the major component in a mix of pur- 
chases and transactions designed to balance 
as much as possible U.S. military spending 
in Germany. The first three offset agreements 
provided for German military procurement 
from the United States close to $4 billion for 
fiscal years 1962-67. 

By the midsixties, however, basic equip- 
ping of German military forces was accom- 
plished, and the level of German military 
procurement dropped off sharply. As a re- 
sult, new forms of offset were developed. 
The Germans agreed to purchase medium- 
term U.S. Treasury notes in the amount of 
$500 million and $625 million respectively, 
at market rates of interest. 

While the transactions during the fiscal 
years 1968 and 1969 had an immediate fa- 
vorable impact on the U.S. balance of pay- 
ments, they were not entirely satisfactory 
as a sole means of offset, and an improved 
agreement was negotiated for fiscal year 
1970-71. Military procurement again became 
a major offset component. The agreement 
provided also for additional civilian offset 
procurement, a long-term loan at below- 
market rates of interest subsidized by the 
Bonn government, and various other finan- 
cial transactions. A detailing of the elements 
of this agreement is being submitted sepa- 
rately for the record. The components of the 
1970-71 offset came to $1.52 billion, at the 
then prevailing exchange rate. 

The latest agreement, covering fiscal years 
1972 and 1973, reflected further improve- 
ments in ofi'setting our troop costs, with total 
benefits amounting to over $2 billion. At 
$1,207 billion, military procurement in the 
United States again represented the largest 



220 



Department of State Bulletin 



single component. Secondly, the German 
Bundesbank (central bank) agreed to lend 
the United States the amount of $621 million 
(repayable after 4i/o years at 2.5 percent 
interest) . Other elements include a cash pay- 
ment of $100 million equivalent to interest 
and, for the first time in the history of our 
offset agreements, a commitment by the Ger- 
man Government to provide $186 million for 
the rehal)ilitation of U.S. troop barracks and 
other facilities. This component represents 
the fir.SL time that German funds have been 
made available for the direct support of U.S. 
activities in the Federal Republic. The bar- 
racks rehabilitation program has proceeded 
exi^editiously. The program involves the re- 
habilitation and renovation of eight airbases, 
56 barracks, and 35 remote sites. The Ger- 
man Government to date has committed 97 
percent of the promised funds under this 
provision of the offset agreement. Just 
this week, in Ludwigsburg, Germany, the 
first completely renovated barracks vi^ere 
dedicated by our top diplomatic and military 
representatives in Germany in the presence 
of German Defense Minister [Georg] Leber. 

Since the inception of the offset agree- 
ments, the German Government has com- 
mitted itself to military procurement in the 
United States exceeding $5.5 billion. Here 
again the German record of fulfilling its off- 
set commitments has been exemplary. While 
the data on military procurement for the 
last four quarters of the current agreement 
is not yet complete, the record of the Ger- 
man Government from the inception of the 
offset agreements has been one of faithful 
fulfillment of their obligations under the 
agreement. 

I am making available for the record more 
detailed breakdowns concerning U.S. securi- 
ties purchased by the Federal Republic of 
Germany under terms of the various offset 
agreements and on German military pro- 
curement. 

Troop Reductions, Trade, and Monetary Reform 

While I have concentrated my attention 
upon the balance of payments aspects of the 
troop level problem, I cannot leave the sub- 



ject at that. As Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, I am working daily with 
our European allies on the whole range of 
our economic relations. 

These are enormously important to our 
prosperity as well as to our security. The 
future of the world monetary system, of 
world trade, of our private investments 
abroad, and of our income from services, 
patents, and royalties dei)ends squarely upon 
our ability to work closely and constructively 
with the West Europeans. 

We need western Europe and its good will 
for our well-being just as western Europe 
needs us and our good will for its well-being. 
We are deeply interdependent, not only in 
the abstract but in the practical day-to-day 
lives of our workers, our farmers, our in- 
vestors, and our managers. 

We and our NATO allies have been able 
to forge a prosperous and dynamic world 
economy from the ruin of war because we 
worked together, not only to rebuild the 
world economy, but also because we worked 
together to provide for our common security. 
There can be no prosperity without security, 
just as there can be no security without a 
sound economy. 

We cannot abandon that cooperation in 
one sector without gravely damaging the 
other. It is that knowledge that has always 
provided the commonsense bounds to our 
differences on any matter. 

That is a reality that I urge the committee 
not to forget as it considers proposals to act 
unilaterally to reduce our contribution to 
our common defense. It would not be prudent 
to assume that the good will and constructive 
effort that our allies have brought to the 
solution of our common trade and monetary 
problems could be quite the same if our co- 
operation in our common defense had been 
eroded by substantial unilateral troop re- 
ductions. 

I do not wish to say that our economic 
cooperation would be ended. But I do believe 
that it would be permeated by a new and 
corrosive atmosphere that would make the 
resolution of our common basic economic 
problems much more difficult. That is a cost 



August 6, 1973 



221 



which every prudent man should give due 
weight as he considers the wider implica- 
tions of the troop level proposals lying be- 
fore your committee. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rosenthal, my state- 
ment has been a short one, but I hope that I 
have conveyed several basic points : 

— First, that our balance of payments is 
not a factor obliging the United States to 
reduce its deployment of troops in western 
Europe; 

— Second, that the deficit in our balance 
of payments caused by military costs in 
Europe is a small component of the total ; 

— Third, that the fundamental change in 
our worldwide competitive position as a re- 
sult of the devaluation of the dollar promises 
to wipe out our military deficit within the 
foreseeable future; 

— Fourth, that the turnaround in our basic 
balance of payments is already evident and 
may be expected to continue; 

— Fifth, that we are at the same time 
woi'king energetically with our NATO allies 
to improve the valuable balance of payments 
and budgetary help that they are already 
providing for our European costs; and 

— Finally, that there will be an inevitable 
and disadvantageous spillover into our eco- 
nomic relations with our major trading part- 
ners if we ignore their deep security concerns 
and make major unilateral troop reductions. 

It is with these very weighty considera- 
tions in mind that I urge the committee and 
the Congress to reject proposals for uni- 
lateral reduction of our European troop 
deployment. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, JULY 12 

Piesa release 24G dated July 12 

I welcome the opportunity to appear be- 
fore this committee to discuss the question 
of American forces in Europe. This issue 
has been a central topic of foreign policy 
debate for many years; and it is a subject 
on which I have had countless discussions, 
not only at NATO but in many allied capi- 
tals, with European leaders. It is especially 



appropriate that in this year of examination 
of Atlantic relations — a reexamination which 
has certainly stirred Europe — you have fo- 
cused on the question of this alliance, which 
is the keystone of our foreign policj'. 

Because of the several negotiations with 
the East and because of the President's call 
for a fresh look at our Atlantic relations, 
the shape of the future U.S. presence in 
Europe is a most important topic. 

I would particularly like to discuss with 
you today what I believe are the fundamental 
questions of what policy purposes are served 
by our troops in Europe. We sometimes get 
so preoccupied with some of the detailed 
questions related to the management and 
maintenance of these armed forces that we 
fail to reflect upon the basic reasons why 
they are there at all. 

Let us review briefly, then, the principal 
reasons why five successive American Pres- 
idents have determined that it is in the na- 
tional interest to station American forces on 
the continent of Europe. I would summarize 
these as follows: 

1. To assist in preventing the domination 
of western Europe by the Soviet Union. 

2. To provide a contribution to the defen- 
sive strength of the alliance, which is the 
essential underpinning of allied efforts to 
lessen tensions in Europe. 

3. To contribute to the achievement of 
stable conditions for the development of 
mutual prosperity in our relationships with 
western Europe. 

4. Finally, to help enable a reinvigorated 
western Europe to assume a greater share 
of the common defense. 

What I would like to do today is evaluate 
the success we have had to date in achieving 
those aims and to give my views on what 
further needs to be done. 

1. It is worth recalling the familiar point 
that the NATO alliance has succeeded for 
nearly 25 years in preserving the independ- 
ence, integrity, and stability of the West. I 
have not received the least indication from 
any ally that responsible Europeans are in- 
difi"erent to this achievement or think that 
NATO's usefulness is now over. 



222 



Department of State Bulletin 



This may seem an impolitic point to make, 
in view of the improving relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States ; but 
we must continue to bear in mind the power- 
ful Soviet position across the Eurasian land- 
mass. Soviet political and economic long-term 
interests would be served by a stronger role 
in western Europe, and there is no reason to 
believe that, given the opportunity, the So- 
viet Union would fail to take advantage of 
opportunities to satisfy those interests. As 
others have discussed in greater detail, we 
are still faced with an impressive array of 
Soviet military power. 

In the absence of an effective alliance 
defense posture credibly linked to the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent, I fail to see how we could 
prevent the Soviets from enjoying a 
strengthened position. I also see little likeli- 
hood at present of a unified European de- 
fense grouping which could substitute in 
great part for the U.S. commitment to Euro- 
pean defense. 

2. In terms of the second interest, assur- 
ing the stability necessary to lessen tensions 
in Europe, we can take satisfaction from the 
impressive progress in recent years. The 
achievements of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in reconciling some of the deep 
conflicts with its eastern neighbors have 
contributed to the reduction of tension in 
Europe. The Four-Power agreement on Ber- 
lin and the recent treaty between East and 
West Germany are part of this encouraging 
picture. 

Other important negotiations are contin- 
uing or are just getting underway: SALT 
Two, the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, and the conference on 
mutual and balanced force reductions. Our 
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union 
have improved markedly in recent years, 
culminating in the President's two meetings 
with the Soviet leadership, resulting in nu- 
merous new agreements. We might also draw 
some hope from at least some indications 
that the leadership of the Soviet Union is 
underlining the importance of technological 
improvement and the level of consumer 
goods, as reported in the recent study by the 
Joint Economic Committee. 



What we must also bear in mind, however, 
is that this process is by no means complete. 
Nor do we know what the future will hold. 
The Soviet Union continues to enjoy a dom- 
inant position in eastern Europe and remains 
dedicated to a system irreconcilable with our 
own in many ways. Massive armies still con- 
front each other across the center of Europe. 
There remain points of potential conflict — 
the Middle East, the Balkans — and Europe 
is still a divided continent. 

3. With respect to the third interest, the 
creation of conditions of stability and well- 
being, the achievements of the Atlantic com- 
munity have been impressive. The countries 
of western Europe have been free of signifi- 
cant conflict among themselves, and I do 
not think that even today we should under- 
estimate the influence of a visible U.S. pres- 
ence on this unprecedented harmony. In the 
postwar years, the United States has en- 
joyed the fruits of a highly productive and 
mutually beneficial relationship with Eu- 
rope in the economic and commercial spheres. 
It would be a grave error, however, to 
take the indefinite continuation of these rela- 
tions for granted. A growing conviction in 
Europe that the United States was deter- 
mined to unilaterally withdraw out of pique 
over some specific commercial issues w^ould 
be widely seen as a lessening of the U.S. com- 
mitment to preserve its interest in Europe. 
This could start a regressive trend in our 
mutual relations which could result in a de- 
structive upswing of protectionism on both 
sides of the Atlantic. I believe that a sharp 
unilateral reduction of our forces would only 
worsen the difficult problems in the commer- 
cial field which we are experiencing today. 
4. Let me turn to the final item on my list 
of U.S. interests, the assumption by western 
Europe of its share of the common defense. 
I know the committee is familiar with the 
figures on the division of burden within the 
NATO defense structure. 

We are all aware that the Europeans do 
make a substantial contribution to their own 
defense. We are also all aware that they 
could do more, particularly to improve 
NATO's conventional defense posture, and 
could be more helpful in assisting us in a 



August 6, 1973 



223 



portion of our balance of payments problem. 
Active efforts are continuing in NATO to 
insure that the United States does not have 
to face a disproportionate share of the com- 
mon defense. In May we proposed to the 
allies a new multilateral approach to burden 
sharing to supplement our bilateral arrange- 
ments. 

However, a unilateral reduction of U.S. 
forces could make it much more difficult to 
convince the allies that they should contrib- 
ute more resources to the alliance. Such a 
move could convince them of the unreliability 
of the U.S. commitment and thus of the 
NATO defense system concept. The principal 
effect would be to create a dangerous situa- 
tion of American retreat and European con- 
fusion at a time of critical negotiations with 
the Soviet Union on fundamental security 
questions. 

Prevention of War in Europe 

But there is one more reason why it has 
been thought wise and in the national inter- 
est to station American forces in western 
Europe — the prevention of war in Europe. 

If someone who was trying to forecast 
the future in 1953, or even 1963, had told us 
that not only would there be no war in Eu- 
rope by 1973 but that the perception of the 
danger of war in 1973 would be less and that 
people generally would be relaxed and not 
fearful, we probably would have thought him 
excessively optimistic, somewhat unrealistic, 
and not very prudent. 

I offer this comment to emphasize the re- 
markable fact that there has been no war 
in Europe for 28 years. We don't have to 
dwell on historical examples of Europe 100 
years ago, or before World War I, or before 
World War II, to remind ourselves that long 
periods without war have not been the ordi- 
nary state of affairs in European history. 
This different and improved situation has 
resulted from decades of wise leadership and 
steadiness of purpose, expressed through the 
North Atlantic partnership in its political 
and economic and military aspects. 

Among our chief policy objectives must 



be the continuation of peace in Europe. We 
cannot take peace for granted; it will not 
just happen; if we achieve it, it will be be- 
cause of wise and strenuous efforts. What- 
ever the other problems — diplomatic, politi- 
cal, economic, monetaiy — they are subordi- 
nate in importance to the task of preventing 
another war. 

The trouble with what I am saying is that, 
once said, it is too obvious. But if it is not 
said, there is a danger that we will take peace 
for granted as if it were the normal state of 
things in international affairs, as it is in do- 
mestic politics ; and taking peace for granted 
can lead to grave errors with severe conse- 
quences. I take the risk of saying the obvious 
and telling you what you know well, to make 
sure that we consider these questions in 
the right context; namely, preventing war. 
How can the United States in cooperation 
with our European allies pursue these aims? 

Europe is not yet one. It is still a collection 
of very distinct nations ; this sometimes 
makes Europe a difficult negotiating partner, 
as we have seen. But Europe is fully united 
on one question — and I know of no signifi- 
cant departure from this consensus — the con- 
viction that it is of the highest importance 
for the period ahead that the United States 
and NATO maintain their military force 
levels in Europe until the time when compa- 
rable reductions can be obtained, through 
negotiations, with the other side. 

In past decades the United States had an 
overwhelming strategic nuclear capability, 
which deterred both conventional and nu- 
clear attacks against us or our European 
allies. 

Now a situation of rough strategic nuclear 
parity exists. Both sides are thought to be 
capable of sustaining a first nuclear attack 
and striking back with their own nuclear 
weapons. Now both sides theoretically deter 
nuclear attack. 

When in 1967 we decided, with our NATO 
allies, to abandon the policy of massive re- 
taliation, we knew that the alternative would 
be a burden. But we accepted the demands 
on our money and our manpower, and we 
welcomed the new situation. We were right 



224 



Department of State Bulletin 



to welcome it, because we had reached the 
stage in which resort to nuclear weapons 
seemed less likely than it had a decade 
before. 

A marked imbalance of conventional 
forces, tempting one side to strike at the 
other because the "pickin's" looked easy, pre- 
sents a situation which might be provocative 
because the weakness was enticing. If the 
victim of aggression is weak in conventional 
forces but has a substantial nuclear capabil- 
ity, the possibility of nuclear war seems 
greater. 

The alternative to a dangerously low nu- 
clear threshold is the maintenance of an ade- 
quate conventional force in Europe and, 
perhaps more important, the maintenance of 
the belief by all parties that we can be 
counted upon to maintain that collective de- 
fense force until negotiations have permitted 
a reduction on both sides. Such a negotiated 
reduction is the only kind of reduction that 
does not lower the threshold and increase 
the risks of nuclear war. 

Preventing war, preserving the independ- 
ence of western Europe, reducing tensions, 
creating stability, and helping Europe in- 
creasingly to provide its own defense — those 
are the common goals. They are what the 
French political commentator Raymond Aron 
meant when he applauded the President's 
initiative for a reexamination of Atlantic 
relations and said, "At this time when eco- 
nomics appears to divide us, let us remember 
that politics unites us." 

Contributions of the Allies 

Mr. Chairman, I am often asked: Why 
does so much of the burden for the defense 
of Europe fall on the United States? Why 
can't the Europeans do more for their own 
defense? Are the allies doing their fair 
share? 

The answer is that they do make a sub- 
stantial effort and carry a large share of the 
burden. You know that by rough aggregate 
calculations they provide something approxi- 
mating 90 percent of the men, 80 percent of 
the ships, and 75 percent of the aircraft in 



western Europe. As for defense spending, 
NATO Europe, including France, devoted 
something in the range of $35 bilhon to de- 
fense in 1972. Their defense expenditure 
collectively has increased by an average of 
10 percent per year in current terms since 
1970. In constant terms, the increase has 
been on the order of 3 or 4 percent per year. 
During the 10 years of significant American 
manpower reductions in Europe, five NATO 
nations have increased their manpower con- 
tribution. For example, since 1960 German 
forces have increased by more than 70 per- 
cent, from 270,000 to 467,000. 

Of the 61 divisions or division equivalents 
available to SACEUR [Supreme Allied Com- 
mander, Europe] in Europe, the United 
States furnishes five division equivalents. 
These units are not all equal in size, the 
U.S. units being among the largest in NATO ; 
nevertheless, the proportion is not mislead- 
ing. In the central region, however, the U.S. 
divisions constitute about one-quarter of the 
available NATO forces and are key to the 
effective defense of that area. 

Even so, it has been the position of this 
government that the allies should do more 
and that we should not be asked to carry 
what we feel is a disproportionate share of 
the burden. We have told them, and we con- 
tinue to tell them ; and they have responded 
with positive action. Our repeated pledge 
that we will not reduce our effort unilaterally 
has always been coupled with the condition 
that they must make a similar effort. 

Further, as you know, we are urging them 
to examine with us the principles and ob- 
jectives of our alliance, as Dr. Kissinger's 
speech proposed, and to find, in the light of 
the new circumstances, shared goals for our 
allied effort in the coming period. ' These 
new grounds for a continuing alliance should 
take into account the greatly increased eco- 
nomic prosperity of western Europe and the 
budget and balance of payments problems 
that the United States faces. 



" For an address made on .A.pr. 23 by Henry A. 
Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Se- 
curity Affairs, see Bulletin of May 14, 1973, p. 593. 



August 6, 1973 



225 



As to the economic side, in my view we 
shouldn't make a major decision on a secu- 
rity matter, such as reducing troops in Eu- 
rope, affecting a successful alliance and 
partnership involving 15 nations, because 
the troops contribute to a balance of pay- 
ments deficit. The corrections must be made, 
and they are being made, and as with the 
other deficits, we should make them up by 
increasing our sales of products to other 
countries and other offset arrangements. 

From the political viewpoint, there are 
some who say, in my judginent wrongly, that 
there seems to be no compelling need for 
U.S. troops in Europe and thus conclude that 
if they are not necessary, we should bring 
them home for military reasons. But if one 
concludes, as do I, that they are necessary 
to our security arrangements and to the 
stability which has fostered detente, let's not 
reduce them unilaterally because of confu- 
sion over the balance of payments issue. 

An unstable Europe or a Europe unfa- 
vorably disposed to the United States — or a 
so-called "neutral" Europe — could lead to 
monetary, balance of payments, and trade 
consequences that would cost us far more 
than the military deficit we now sustain in 
Europe. This should be clear when one con- 
siders the tens of bilHons of dollars of U.S. 
investments in Europe. 

For all of these reasons, it seems unwise 
and even dangerous to advance the balance 
of payments deficit in the military account 
in Europe as the reason for reducing the 
number of U.S. troops in western Europe. 

But let us remember that it is the position 
of the U.S. Government, and one that I ad- 
vance in the North Atlantic Council, that we 
believe greater assistance should be provided 
with respect to the balance of payments for 
contributing to our collective security. We 
think that no nation should suffer a balance 
of payments disadvantage, and we continue 
to urge that a remedy be designed. I believe 
we will continue to make progress on it. 

We have pledged, firmly and repeatedly, 
that we would not reduce our troops uni- 



laterally and would maintain and improve 
our force capabilities if the allies made a 
similar effort. What would the allied reaction 
be to a substantial unilateral cut in our 
forces now? 

One possibility is that the allies would act 
quickly and effectively to fill the void left by 
our troops. But in my judgment that would 
be playing Russian roulette. The nations of 
western Europe are making some progress 
toward greater cooperation, but they do not 
now have the political base for a unified 
military buildup. The troop increases, if 
they occurred in any instances, would be in 
separate national armies. One immediate re- 
sult might be an emergence of rivalry and 
mistrust among the allies and a spirit of 
going it alone or seeking bilateral ties with 
the East. Or worse, it could mean a return to 
the national conflicts which marred past 
European history and even escalated into 
broader conflicts. 

Another possibility, if we reduce our 
troops unilaterally, is that our allies would 
begin to think that they could not or should 
not rely on the United States for nuclear de- 
fense. They might — and all of this is, of 
course, speculation, for no one knows pre- 
cisely what the cumulative allied reaction 
would be — they might decide to try to build 
up their own nuclear capabilities. Some think 
we should be pleased to be relieved of such a 
grave responsibility; but others ask if we 
really want nuclear weaponry to begin to 
spread again, just when the prospects of 
limitation of nuclear strategic arms are 
more hopeful. 

The most likely reaction, in my opinion, to 
a U.S. unilateral troop reduction would be a 
loss of confidence among the allies — loss of 
confidence in the United States and our 
pledges, loss of confidence in the alliance and 
its ability to provide the integrated security 
they need, and loss of confidence in their 
ability to defend themselves. 

One possible result of a serious instability 
could be a tilt toward the East in ways that 
could be harmful for the people of all of 



226 



Deportment of State Bulletin 



Europe, harmful to international stability, 
and harmful to American interests and 
security. 

I said before that I cannot be sure just 
what would happen if we unilaterally cut 
our troop presence — and that in itself is an 
important point. Such an action would un- 
doubtedly lead to a period of uncertainty, 
during which all sorts of new political forces 
might be released among our European al- 
lies, with unpredictable results. Is this the 
time when we want to introduce new and 
potentially unsettling elements in what has 
become a rather stable and certainly more 
reliable situation? It seems to me that the 
answer should be no. 

Effect on Negotiations 

But arguments against substantial uni- 
lateral troop reductions should not be under- 
stood as insistence that our present troop 
levels must be maintained in Europe forever. 
MBFR is one answer to that contention. 

In my opinion, alliance strength and the 
U.S. presence in Europe were among the pri- 
mary moving forces in the change in the ad- 
versary relationship with the Soviet Union. 
The alliance's weakness and our absence as 
a counterpoise would have been (and could 
still be) a great enticement. Instead of en- 
ticement to aggressive adventure, we have 
offered to the East only the path of serious 
negotiations to accomplish a mutual force 
reduction. The result of these negotiations, 
scheduled to begin October 30, can be a lower 
level of political and military confrontation. 
We seek undiminished security for both sides 
at a lower level of forces. Our assumption is 
that balanced reductions would enhance sta- 
bility and security while unilateral changes 
in the balance would damage stability and 
security. 

Beginning in 1972, NATO began to grap- 
ple with the concrete issues involved — for 
example, what kinds of forces should be re- 
duced, whose forces, in what part of Europe ; 
what sort of measures should be sought to 
insure against (or detect) violations of any 



agreement ; and what timetable should be en- 
visaged. The fact that NATO members were 
moving into questions involving their basic 
military security, both collective and individ- 
ual, required careful discussion of the issues. 
With our allies we are now fully engaged 
in the process. They have become increas- 
ingly sensitive to the painful choices facing 
the U.S. Government and Congress in the 
allocation of budgetary and manpower re- 
sources. Obviously, a multilateral negotiation 
of this kind takes more time than a bilateral 
negotiation, but in the end will minimize the 
damage to American credibility and to the 
strength of the alliance, which is as impor- 
tant for us as it is for the Europeans. 

The Vienna talks illustrate the point. Some 
six months of intense effort by allied negoti- 
ators were required, but we succeeded in 
settling on a specific date and geographic 
focus for the negotiations and a satisfactory 
description of what the negotiations would 
be about. 

Unilateral American military reductions 
would spell the end of meaningful negotia- 
tions on conventional forces and would seri- 
ously undercut the U.S. bargaining position 
with the Soviet Union in the SALT negotia- 
tions. SALT is an opportunity to partially 
limit the danger to world peace posed by the 
nuclear arms race. MBFR is the one reason- 
able and safe way to reduce the military con- 
frontation in central Europe. 

Some people seem to think or hope that if 
we reduced unilaterally, the other side would 
match the reductions. Past withdrawals have 
not drawn this reaction. In 1968 we dual- 
based two-thirds of a division and four tac- 
tical fighter squadrons, withdrawing these 
from permanent stationing in Europe. 

There was no parallel response from the 
Soviets. The military capability of the Soviet 
Union increased during this period. Indeed, 
1968 saw a movement of Soviet troops into 
Czechoslovakia. You are fully aware of the 
expanded Soviet naval might in the Mediter- 
ranean and in the northern waters, of the 
modernization projects which have been car- 
ried through to improve the capability of 



August 6, 1973 



227 



their ground forces in Europe. When such a 
unilateral American or Western reduction is 
suggested, we must recall this history and 
take note of the fact that never once in all our 
recent talks with the Soviet Union have they 
suggested the possibility of their reducing 
unilaterally. Our search for a mutual reduc- 
tion is genuine and reasonable, but there is 
no basis for hope that a unilateral step would 
work a revolution in the behavior of the 
East. 

U.S. forces in Europe have served well 
the American interests and basic foreign pol- 
icy objectives for which they were intended. 
We may be on the threshold of a new era 
between East and West Europe, marked for 
the first time in history by : 

— A reasonably reliable security structure 
consciously agreed to by both sides to serve 
us for a time. 

— A period of reduction in the level of 
confrontation matched by a period of an in- 
crease in levels of confidence and trust. 

— A deceleration of the arms race for a 
period and increasing allocation of resources 
for nonmilitary purposes. 

— The development of better and more co- 
operative relations in the political, economic, 
and cultural fields. 

The emergence of such an era would hold 
the promise of a brighter future for our citi- 
zens than many would have considered possi- 
ble only a few years ago. U.S. representa- 
tives are working intently on East-West 
negotiations to help make such an era possi- 
ble. 

On the other hand, events may lead in an 
entirely different direction : 

— Efforts in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation to bridge differences and build 
understanding with the Communist world 
could fail. 

—We may find in MBFR talks that the 
Soviets are not seriously interested in reduc- 
ing their forces, and as yet w-e do not know 
what the answer will be. 

— Soviet leaders could decide to rapidly 
reverse their present policy and give higher 
priority to ideological and political-military 
conflict than to practical cooperation. 



— Present Soviet interest in detente could 
eventually prove to have been merely a tactic 
for a period of years, to exploit differences 
within the alliance and weaken Western de- 
fenses, while they continue to increase their 
military capabilities. J 

Developments of this kind would forecast 
a very different future for coming genera- 
tions. 

At this moment, all we can say with cer- 
tainty is that we are in a period of probing, 
of exploration, to see what the dimensions 
of the future may be. 

At this juncture, I find it difficult to imag- 
ine anything more unwise than a unilateral 
decision by the United States to discontinue 
the approach that has been working so well 
in favor of a unilateral and undoubtedly de- 
stabilizing withdrawal. Our allies could in- 
terpret this as meaning that the United 
States was no longer willing to protect its 
security interests. The Soviets could see this 
as an irresistible invitation to explore the new 
limits of the possible with a provocatively 
weakened and exposed western Europe. 

The process of negotiations on curbing the 
arms race and developing cooperation with 
the Soviet Union and the other countries of 
eastern Europe is in swing. Great Britain 
has become a member of the European Com- 
munity, and the dialogue on strengthening 
European integration, including in the mili- 
tary field, is again underway. My hope is 
that the negotiations now in process between 
East and West, among the West Europeans 
themselves, and between the United States 
and its allies will enable the United States to 
reduce its forces in Europe safely in the 
years ahead. 

But until the results of these efforts be- 
come clearer, I believe we should strongly 
oppose unilateral reductions and that we 
must keep the country's commitment not to 
reduce our forces in Europe except in the 
framework of mutual force reductions. To do 
otherwise might be appealing for a time, but 
it would endanger those very interests for 
which the American people have made so 
many sacrifices in this century. 



228 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Urges Support in Search 
for Cambodian Settlement 

Following are texts of President Nixon's 
message to the House of Representatives on 
June 27 upon his veto of H.R. 7Uh.7 and a 
statement by President Nixon issued at San 
Clemente, Calif., on July 1 upon his signing 
H.R. 9055 (Public Law 93-50) and H.J. Res. 
636 (Public Latv 93-52). 



MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
JUNE 27 

White House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated June 27 

To the House of Representatives: 

I am returning today without my approval 
H.R. 7447, the Second Supplemental Ap- 
propriation Act of 1973. 

I am doing so because of my grave con- 
cern that the enactment into law of the 
"Cambodia rider" to this bill would cripple 
or destroy the chances for an effective ne- 
gotiated settlement in Cambodia and the 
withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops, 
as required by Article 20 of the January 27 
Vietnam agreement. 

After more than ten arduous years of 
suffering and sacrifice in Indochina, an equi- 
table framework for peace was finally agreed 
to in Paris last January. We are now in- 
volved in concluding the last element of that 
settlement, a Cambodian settlement. It 
would be nothing short of tragic if this great 
accomplishment, bought with the blood of so 
many Asians and Americans, were to be un- 
done now by Congressional action. 

The decision to veto is never easy, but in 
this case there is no other responsible course 
open to me. To understand this decision, we 
should all recognize what the full impact 
would be if we call a total halt to U.S. air 
operations in Cambodia, as now sought by 
the Congress: 

A total halt would virtually remove 

Communist incentive to negotiate and would 
thus seriously undercut ongoing diplomatic 
efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Cambodia. 
It would effectively reverse the momentum 



towards lasting peace in Indochina set in 
motion last January and renewed in the 
four-party communique signed in Paris on 
June 13. 

— The proposed halt would also gravely 
jeopardize the ability of the Cambodian 
armed forces to prevent a Communist mili- 
tary victory achieved with the assistance of 
outside forces and the installation of a 
Hanoi-controlled government in Phnom 
Penh. 

— A Communist victory in Cambodia, in 
turn, would threaten the fragile balance of 
negotiated agreements, political alignments 
and military capabilities upon which the 
overall peace in Southeast Asia depends and 
on which my assessment of the acceptability 
of the Vietnam agreements was based. 

— Finally, and with even more serious 
global implications, the legislatively imposed 
acceptance of the United States to Commu- 
nist violations of the Paris agreements and 
the conquest of Cambodia by Communist 
forces would call into question our national 
commitment not only to the Vietnam settle- 
ment but to many other settlements or agree- 
ments we have reached or seek to reach with 
other nations. A serious blow to America's 
international credibility would have been 
struck — a blow that would be felt far beyond 
Indochina. 

I cannot permit the initiation of a process 
which could demolish so substantially the 
progress which has been made, and the fu- 
ture relationships of the United States with 
other nations. 

However, I must emphasize that the pro- 
visions of H.R. 7447, other than the "Cam- 
bodia rider," contain a number of appropria- 
tions that are essential to the continuity of 
governmental operations. It is critical that 
these appropriations be enacted immediately. 

By June 28, nine Government agencies 
will have exhausted their authority to pay 
the salaries and expenses of their employees. 
The disruptions that would be caused by a 
break in the continuity of government are 
serious and must be prevented. For example, 
it will be impossible to meet the payroll of 
the employees at the Social Security Admin- 



August 6, 1973 



229 



istration, which will threaten to disrupt the 
flow of benefits to 25 million persons. 

But an even greater disservice to the 
American people — and to all other peace lov- 
ing people — would be the enactment of a 
measui-e which would seriously undermine 
the chances for a lasting peace in Indochina 
and jeopardize our efforts to create a stable, 
enduring structure of peace around the 
world. It is to prevent such a destructive 
development that I am returning H.R. 7447 
without my approval. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, June 27, 1973. 



STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON, JULY 1 

white House press release (San Clemente. Calif. t dated July 1 

I have today signed H.R. 9055, the second 
supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 
1973, and H..J. Res. 636, the continuing joint 
resolution. 

Last week I was compelled to veto the 
original supplemental bill because of my 
grave concern that enactment of the rider 
then attached to it, calling for an immediate 
halt to all air activity over Cambodia, would 
have led to a destructive series of events. As 
I indicated then, such a precipitous step 
would have crippled or destroyed the chances 
for achieving a negotiated settlement in 
Cambodia. The stability of Southeast Asia 
would have been threatened, and we would 
have suffered a tragic setback in our efforts 
to create a lasting structure of peace. 

The conclusion of a responsible settlement 



in Indochina has been and remains a matter 
of the greatest urgency. All but one of the 
major elements of that peace are now in 
place, forged against the will of a determined 
enemy by the sacrifice and courage of count- 
less men and women, by our perseverance 
in protracted negotiations, and by the effec- 
tiveness and the deterrent of American mili- 
tary power. The last remaining element of 
the peace in Southeast Asia is a stable Cam- 
bodian settlement. I believe that settlement 
can be secured so long as we maintain rea- 
sonable flexibility in our policies and essen- 
tial air support is not withdrawn unilaterally 
while delicate negotiations are still under- 
way. 

A sudden bombing halt, however, would 
not have brought us the lasting peace that 
we all desire. As President, charged by our 
Constitution with responsibility for conduct- 
ing our foreign policy and negotiating an end 
to our conflicts, I will continue to take the 
responsible actions necessary to win that 
peace. Should further actions be required to 
that end later this year, I shall request the 
Congress to help us achieve our objectives. 



Senate Confirms William B. Dale 
as U.S. Executive Director, IMF 

The Senate on June 6 confirmed the nomi- 
nation of William B. Dale to be U.S. Execu- 
tive Director of the International Monetary 
Fund for a term of two years. 



230 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Reviews Year's Activities of the United Nations 
in the Field of Outer Space 



The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space met at U.N. Headquarters 
June 25-July 6. Follovnng is a statement 
made in the committee ov July 2 by U.S. 
Represeiitative Herbert Reis. 

USUN press release 62 dated July 2 

Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying 
how much my delegation appreciates the 
very kind and generous remarks of other 
delegations on the successful completion of 
the first visit by our astronauts to Skylab. 
We were of course concerned over the me- 
chanical difficulties which were initially en- 
countered in the Skylab mission but were 
impressed by the ingenuity and resourceful- 
ness of those, both on the ground and in 
space, who analyzed the problems, developed 
remedies, and put them into effect. Skylab is 
another demonstration, if one were needed, 
that man will play an essential role in the 
space systems of the future. And in this 
sense the Skylab crew acted not only on be- 
half of the United States but of mankind. 

Skylab marks a continuation of inter- 
national cooperation in the U.S. space pro- 
gram. The Earth Resources Experiment 
Package (EREP) aboard the orbiting lab- 
oratory will provide data for scientists in 
more than 20 countries who are investigat- 
ing possible research applications in agri- 
culture, forestry, ecology, geography, me- 
teorology, hydrology, hydrography, and 
oceanography. 

Mr. Chairman, we are proud to have been 
a pioneer in the international cooperation in 
space of which Skylab is an important cur- 
rent embodiment and are delighted at the 
expansion of cooperative relationships, not 
just those in which we play a part but also 



those among other nations throughout the 
world. Many of these have already been men- 
tioned during general debate in this com- 
mittee. 

We are also proud that cooperation has 
become so integral a part of the U.S. space 
program that in 1972 each and every NASA 
[National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- 
tration] launching had a distinct interna- 
tional aspect. 

Ten of these missions involved interna- 
tional cooperation on a basis in which both 
sides assumed full financial responsibility 
for their contributions to joint projects. An 
example is the AEROS satellite, proposed, 
designed, built, instrumented, and funded by 
the Federal Republic of Germany; NASA 
contributed the launch vehicle in considera- 
tion of our program interest in the satellite's 
scientific objectives. Another example is the 
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 3, which 
carried an experiment proposed and funded 
by the United Kingdom. This satellite, named 
Copernicus, has already honored the .500th 
anniversary of the great Polish astronomer 
by making some 2,000 observations of 92 
ultraviolet and X-ray sources in the sky. 

Still another example is the significant 
international involvement in the last two 
Apollo missions. Apollo 16 carried a Swiss 
experiment for measuring solar winds, and 
both Apollo 16 and 17 carried biological 
experiments contributed by Germany and 
France. Both missions returned quantities 
of lunar surface material for analysis in 
340 experiments from 20 other countries. 

In addition, NASA launched six satellites 
for international organizations and other 
governments on a nonprofit cost basis. In a 
seventh international launching, an Italian 



August 6, 1973 



231 



team used Italy's unique San Marco sea plat- 
form off the coast of Kenya to launch a U.S. 
satellite on our behalf. 

Nineteen seventy-two will also be remem- 
bered for the Earth Resources Technology 
Satellite. Some 150 experiments propo.sed by 
scientists in nearly 40 countries (13 of them 
members of this committee) are now being 
pursued on the basis of ERTS data. These 
programs of analysis are enlarging man's 
understanding of the potential applications 
of earth sensing from space. As I have noted, 
this work is being carried forward with the 
Earth Resources Experiment Package on 
Skylab. 

Meanwhile, we have been building for the 
future. During the past year, work has con- 
tinued on additional joint satellite projects — 
with Canada, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. We have signed new agree- 
ments for joint sounding rocket projects 
with France, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, India, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. 
There has been major progress on the joint 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. experimental flight which will 
test compatible rendezvous and docking pro- 
cedures in 1975. And in the area of space 
science and applications, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
working groups can point to the exchange of 
lunar samples and of detailed physiological 
data derived from manned space flight, to a 
joint program of measurements of surface 
phenomena in the Bering Sea, and to con- 
tinuing consideration of common problems 
encountered in exploring the planets. 

Of major significance for the future has 
been the action early this year by the Coun- 
cil of the European Space Research Organi- 
zation to establish an ESRO special project 
for the development of a Sortie Laboratory 
(called Space Lab in Europe) to operate in 
conjunction with the NASA Space Shuttle. 
Seven European countries have so far 
listed themselves for participation. Agency- 
to-agency and intergovernmental agreements 
are currently being negotiated. When this 
project comes to fruition, it is certain to 
constitute a very major cooperative ven- 
ture in the development of advanced space 
technology. 

232 



Mr. Chairman, this brief review of U.S. 
cooperative activities leads me to the report! 
of the Scientific and Technical Subcommit- 
tee.' The U.S. delegation would like to draw 
attention as meriting particular study to 
the sections of the report which deal with the 
status of the United Nations program on 
space applications and with the progress and 
future eff^orts of the Working Group on 
Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites. 

The presence of Dr. [H. G. S.] Murthy, 
the new United Nations Expert on Space 
Applications, afforded the subcommittee an 
opportunity to take a fresh look at the pro- 
gram for which he is responsible. After con- 
sidering his report and proposals, the sub- 
committee recommended the experimental 
appointment of two part-time regional con- 
sultants and the preparation of audiovisual 
presentations, for the purpose both of facil- 
itating the work of the expert in disseminat- 
ing information on space applications and 
creating an awareness of their economic and 
social potential. Looking ahead to 1974, the j 
subcommittee approved a program devoted 
primarily to panel meetings and training 
workshops. These recommendations seem a 
reasonable approach to the utilization of 
limited resources. We believe they should be 
commended to the General Assembly. May 
I take this occasion also to renew my gov- 
ernment's overall support for Dr. Murthy 
and his program. 

Probably the most important section of 
the report of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee is that which addresses the 
activities of the Working Group on Remote 
Sensing of the Earth by Satellites. At the 
heart of this section is its recommendation 
that the Outer Space Committee approve the 
establishment of a task force to undertake 
the specialized work of identifying and 
reporting on alternatives for the dissem- 
ination and optimum utilization of en- 
vironmental and resources data, keeping 
in mind the data requirements of the devel- 
oping countries. The principal objective of 
the task force would be to identify, study, 
and analyze for the benefit of the working 



^U.N. doc. A/AC.105/116. 

Department of State Bulletin 



group the best means of disseminating re- 
mote sensing data acquired from space in 
the interest of promoting the optimum 
utilization of this space application for 
the benefit of states and the international 
community. 

In this connection, we recall that durmg 
the deliberations of the working group early 
this year the U.S. Representative stated that 
if, after examining the cost and other factors 
involved, the need for an international dis- 
tribution center or centers of some kind 
should become apparent, its character de- 
fined, and at a later date, its establishment 
agreed, the United States would undertake 
to make available on a timely basis a master 
copy of the data we receive from our experi- 
mental satellite program. 

With this in mind, my delegation believes 
that the Outer Space Committee should ap- 
prove the Scientific and Technical Subcom- 
mittee's recommendation that a task force 
be established for the purposes mentioned. 
The task force study seems to us the most 
sensible way to proceed at this stage in as- 
certaining how benefits from remote sensing 
technology can be given the widest possible 
international availability. 

We appreciate the significant progress 
made by the Working Group on Remote 
Sensing under the leadership of its able 
chairman and suggest that this committee's 
report to the General Assembly should in- 
clude reference to the advances that have 
been recorded in this important space 
application. 

Mr. Chairman, we consider that the report 
of the other working group of this commit- 
tee, the Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
Satellites, on its 1973 session contains some 
useful results.- Although consideration of 
new developments in the satellite broadcast- 
ing field was somewhat curtailed owing to 
extensive general debate, viewpoints were 
clarified through a broad exchange of views, 
aided, we hope, by the technical briefing on 
the state of the art of satellite communica- 
tions presented by the United States. A 
precis of that briefing is contained in work- 



ing paper A/AC.105/L.71, which was pre- 
pared for circulation to this committee in 
the hope that it will provide members with 
a perspective on the status of this promising 
new technology. 

We think that, whenever consideration 
may be given to the question of principles 
concerning satellite broadcasting, it will be 
essential to take account of relevant tech- 
nical and economic factors. We were able to 
accept the recommendation to reconvene the 
working group on that basis, as reflected in 
the statement of the group's terms of refer- 
ence in paragraphs 77-79 of its report. 

Mr. Chairman, turning now to the report 
of the Legal Subcommittee,' we have noted 
that many delegations expressed disappoint- 
ment that the subcommittee was unable to 
complete its work either on the Treaty on the 
Moon or the Convention on the Registration 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space. We 
have shared their disappointment. Indeed, 
we came to the current session of this com- 
mittee prepared to participate in making 
further progress toward agreement on both 
treaties. The new readiness of the United 
States to accept a suitable review provision 
in the Registration Convention bears witness 
to the reality of our commitment. 

It seems apparent, Mr. Chairman, that our 
informal consultations during the week just 
passed have brought us closer to agreement. 
On the other hand, it has become more evi- 
dent than before that in both treaties dif- 
ferences still persist on issues of importance. 
Agreement has so far escaped us concerning 
how the Moon Treaty will deal with the ques- 
tion of possible future exploitation of natural 
resources of the moon and other celestial 
bodies in the period before an appropriate 
international regime is established. The U.S. 
delegation would like to subscribe to what 
the distinguished Representative of France. 
M. [Jean-Felix] Charvet, suggested the othei- 
day: that it would be unwise to let differ- 
ences over a very hypothetical future pos- 
sibility block conclusion of a treaty contain- 
ing many provisions affording new benefits 
to all countries. Once agreement is reached 



'U.N. doc. A/AC.105/117. 



U.N. doc. A/AC.105/115. 



August 6, 1973 



233 



on the natural resources question, my dele- 
gation would not anticipate undue difficulty 
in resolving the other outstanding issues. 

With respect to registration, we find the 
short-term outlook for agreement a bit more 
promising. In fact, we seem close to success 
in our efforts to bridge the one real gap 
which remains, diflferences as to the need for 
a provision on the marking of space objects. 
My delegation has repeatedly stated its views 
as to the lack of utility such a provision 
would have in identification assistance, and 
I shall not repeat those views now. 

If agreement does not prove possible in 
the remaining informal consultations, we 
should leave both treaties as priority items 
for consideration in the agenda of the 1974 
session of the Legal Subcommittee, expect- 
ing that governments will use the time be- 
tween now and that next session of the Legal 
Subcommittee to deliberate further on the 
remaining issues. We sincerely hope that 
agreement would then be within reach. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and the Netherlands Agree 
on "Advance Charter" Flights 

The Department of State announced on 
July 18 (press release 255) that the United 
States and the Netherlands had concluded 
on July 11a memorandum of understanding 
on travel group charters (TGC's) and 
advance booking charters (ABC's) under 
which each party will accept as charter- 
worthy transatlantic traffic originated in the 
territory of the other party and organized 
and operated pursuant to the "advance 
charter" (TGC or ABC) rules of that party. 
Other provisions deal with enforcement and 
ari'angements to minimize administrative 
burdens on carriers and organizers of "ad- 
vance charters." The understanding was 
brought into force by an exchange of notes 



in The Hague. While the understanding is 
not an exchange of economic rights, it is 
expected to facilitate the operation of "ad- 
vance charter" flights between the United 
States and the Netherlands by carriers of 
both countries. The understanding with the 
Netherlands is the fifth of a series of such 
agreements the United States has concluded 
with other countries to facilitate the opera- 
tion of "advance charters." (For text of the 
memorandum of understanding, see press 
release 255.) 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London 
May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for 
the United States December 8, 1961. TIA.S 4900 
6109. 

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, June 11, 1973 (with 
a reservation). 

International convention on civil liability for oil pol- 
lution damage. Done at Brussels November 29 
1969.' 

Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, June 21, 197,3. 
Patents 

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, May 17, 1973. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TI.\S 
5881), as amended by additional protocol, general 
regulations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which en- 
tered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratification deposited: Philippines, April 27, 1973. 

.Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 



' Not in force. 



234 



Department of State Bulletin 



for article V of the additional protocol, wnich 
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: Iran, April 2, 1973; Sri 
Lanka, April 24, 1973. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970. Articles 13 
through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for 
the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Enters into force: United States, August 25, 1973, 

for articles 1 through 12. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 11, 1973. 

Nice agreement concerning the international classifi- 
cation of goods and services for the purposes of the 
registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised 
at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 
1972. TIAS 7419. 

Accessions deposited: Austria, May 11, 1973; Fin- 
land, May 16, 1973. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
196"7. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 11, 1973. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nu- 
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the 
subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force 
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 

Accession deposited: India, July 20, 1973 (with a 
statement) . 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement extending the agreement of November 16 
and December 18, 1970 (TIAS 7024), concerning 
activities of the United States at the Churchill 
Research Range. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ottawa June 29, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 
1973. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of March 31, 1970 (TIAS 
6863) , with memorandum of understanding. Signed 
at Santo Domingo June 12, 1973. Entered into 
force June 12, 1973. 

Lebanon 

Grant agreement for a cooperative program to cur- 
tail illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs. 
Signed at Beirut June 29, 1973. Entered into force 
June 29, 1973. 

Mexico 

Agreement concerning a grant to Mexico of refer- 



ence books in the field of narcotics abuse. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Mexico June 26 and 27, 
1973. Entered into force June 27, 1973. 

Netherlands 

Agreement relating to travel group charter flights 
and advance booking charter flights, with memo- 
randum of understanding. Effected by exchange of 
notes at The Hague July 11, 1973. Entered into 
force provisionally July 11, 1973; definitively, on 
the date of receipt by the United States of a noti- 
fication from the Netherlands that the approval 
constitutionally required has been obtained. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of July 19, 1962 (TIAS 
5106). Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo 
March 30 and June 22, 1973. Entered into force 
June 22, 1973. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Bookstore, De- 
partment of State, Washington, B.C. 20520. A 25- 
percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
copies of any one publication mailed to the same 
address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent 
of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock— at least 140— $16.35; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $14.50; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 20<* each. 



Argentina 
Australia . 
Brazil . . 
Ecuador . 
El Salvador 
Fiji . 
Finland 



Cat. No. S1.123:AR3 
Pub. 7836 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:AU7/2 
Pub. 8149 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:B73 
Pub. 7756 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.12-3:EC9 
Pub. 7771 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:EL7 
Pub. 7794 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:F47 
Pub. 8486 4 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:F49 
Pub. 8262 8 pp. 



August 6, 1973 



235 



The Battle Act Report 1972. Twenty-fifth report to the 
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act). Pub. 
8702. General Foreign Policy Series 275. 93 pp. "0( 
(domestic postpaid). (Cat. No. 81.71:275). 

U.S. Foreifrn Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable 
Peace. President Nixon's report to the Congress of 
May 3, 1973. 234 pp. $1.85 (domestic postpaid). 
(Stock No. 4000-00292) 

Loan of Vessel— U.S.S. Larson. Agreement with the 
Republic of Korea. TIAS 7536. 4 pp. 20('. 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. 

Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7537. 8 pp. 20«f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agieements with Indo- 
nesia amending the agreement of May 26, 1972, as 
amended. TIAS 7538. 6 pp. 20('. 

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products 
With Macao. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 7539. 
8 pp. 20('. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles With Macao. Agreement 

with Portugal. TIAS 7540. 6 pp. 20('. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on July 12 confirmed the following 
nominations: 

William D. Brewer to be Ambassador to the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan. 

William I. Cargo to be Ambassador to the King- 
dom of Nepal. 

Philip K. Crowe to be Ambassador to Denmark. 

William H. Sullivan to be Ambassador to the 
Philippines. 

The Senate on July 14 confirmed the nomination 
of Ernest V. Siracusa to be Ambassador to 
Uruguay. 



No. 

*247 



*249 


7/16 


t250 


7/16 


t251 


7/17 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to July 16 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 242 
of July 10 and 245 and 246 of July 12. 

Date Subject 

7/16 Secretary's Award (posthumous) 
to Ambassador Noel and Mr. 
Moore. 
'248 7/16 IJC, U.S. and Canada, submits 
interim report on the regulation 
of Lake Superior outflows. 
Rogers: arrival statement, Tokvo, 

July 15. 
Rogers: U.S. -Japan Committee, 

Tokyo. 
Rogers : remarks prior to plenary 
session of U.S. -Japan Commit- 
tee, July 16. 
t252 7/17 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Economic Affairs: commu- 
nique. 
t253 7/18 Rogers, Foreign Minister Ohira: 

news conference. 
t254 7/18 Final volume in "Foreign Rela- 
tions" series for 1947 (for re- 
lease July 25). 
255 7/18 U.S. and Netherlands reach un- 
derstanding on operation of 
advance air charters, July 11 
(rewrite). 
*256 7/18 Rogers: American Chamber of 
Commerce in Japan and Amer- 
ica-Japan Society, July 17. 
Rogers: arrival statement, Seoul. 
Crimmins sworn in as Ambassador 

to Brazil (biographic data). 
Crowe sworn in as Ambassador to 

Denmark (biographic data). 
Kubisch: Inter-American Festi- 
val luncheon, Miami. 
Rogers: international cooperation 

on energy, Tokyo, July 16. 
Rogers: statement on developing 

countries, Tokyo, July 17. 
Program for state visit to 
Washington of the Shah of 
Iran. 
*264 7/20 Study group 1 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for CCITT, 
Aug. 2. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



1257 
*258 


7/18 
7/19 


*259 


7/19 


t260 


7/19 


1261 


7/20 


t262 


7/20 


*263 


7/20 



236 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Augtist 6, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1780 



\\iation. U.S. and the Netherlands Agree on 
•Advance Charter" Flights 234 

I ambodia. President Urges Support in Search 
for Cambodian Settlement (Nixon) .... 229 

' ingress 

iifirmations (Brewer, Cargo, Crowe, Sira- 
cusa, Sullivan) 236 

department Opposes Proposals for Unilateral 
Reduction of U.S. Troop Levels in Europe 

(Casey, Rush, Rumsfeld) 209 

esident Urges Support in Search for Cam- 

I' bodian Settlement (Nixon) 229 

enate Confirms William B. Dale as U.S. 
Executive Director, IMF 230 

Jenmark. Crowe confirmed as Ambassador . . 230 

Jepartment and Foreign Service. Confirmations 
(Brewer, Cargo, Crowe, Siracusa, Sullivan) 236 

Economic Affairs. Senate Confirms William B. 
Dale as U.S. Executive Director, IMF ... 230 

Europe. Department Opposes Proposals for 
Unilateral Reduction of U.S. Troop Levels 
in Europe (Casey, Rush, Rumsfeld) . . . 209 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Senate Confirms William B. Dale as U.S. 
Executive Director, IMF 230 

Nopal. Cargo confirmed as Ambassador . . . 236 

Netherlands. U.S. and the Netherlands Agree 
on "Advance Charter" Flights 234 

irth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Depart- 
:iient Opposes Proposals for Unilateral Re- 
duction of U.S. Troop Levels in Europe 
(Casey, Rush, Rumsfeld) 209 



Philippines. Sullivan confirmed as Ambassador 236 

Presidential Documents. President Urges Sup- 
port in Search for Cambodian Settlpment . . 229 

Publications. Recent Releases 235 

Space. U.S. Reviews Year's Activities of the 
United Nations in the Field of Outer Space 
(Reis) 231 

Sudan. Brewer confirmed as Ambassador . . . 236 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 234 

U.S. and the Netherlands Agree on "Advance 
Charter" Flights 234 

United Nations. U.S. Reviews Year's Activities 
of the United Nations in the Field of Outer 
Space (Reis) 231 

Uruguay. Siracusa confirmed as Ambassador . 236 



Name Index 

Brewer, William D 236 

Cargo, William I 236 

Casey, William J 209 

Crowe, Philip K 236 

Dale, William B 230 

Nixon, President 229 

Reis, Herbert 231 

Rumsfeld, Donald 209 

Rush, Kenneth 209 

Siracusa, Ernest V 236 

Sullivan, William H 236 






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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1781 



August 13, 1973 



JOINT U.S.-JAPAN COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
HOLDS NINTH MEETING AT TOKYO 237 

SECRETARY ROGERS VISITS KOREA 
Arrival Statement and News Conference 253 

PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 

FOR THE U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 

Statement by Ambassador Scali 260 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



6ULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1781 
August 13, 1973 



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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
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The Department of State BULLBTI. 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public am 
interested agencies of the governme, 
with information on developments ii 
the field of US. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department an4. 
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Publications of the Department o4 
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Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs 
Holds Ninth Meeting at Tokyo 



Secretary Rogers headed the U.S. delega- 
tion to the ninth meeting of the Joint U.S.- 
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic 
Affairs, which ivas held at Tokyo July 16-17. 
Following are statements made by Secretary 
Rogers in the committee, the text of a final 
communique issued at the close of the meet- 
ing, arid the transcript of a joint news 
conference held by Secretary Rogers and 
Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira 
on Jidy 17. 



STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Introductory Remarks, July 16 ' 

The other members of the U.S. delegation 
and I are pleased and honored to have this 
opportunity to meet with our distinguished 
counterparts. We wish to thank you for the 
fine arrangements the Japanese Government 
has made for this conference and the cour- 
tesy with which we have been received. 

At the eighth meeting of our joint Cabinet 
session in 1971, the United States and Japan 
recognized the seriousness of our trade and 
payments imbalance and resolved to work 
together to restore a balanced economic rela- 
tionship. The most extensive series of con- 
sultations in the history of our relationship 
followed that meeting, including two summit 
meetings between President Nixon and Jap- 
anese Prime Ministers. This intensive dia- 
logue produced heightened awareness of our 
mutual interdependence and genuine prog- 
ress toward a more stable and balanced eco- 



' Made prior to the beginning of the plenary ses- 
sion f press release 251 dated July 17). 



nomic relationship between our countries. 
Though further efforts by both nations will 
be necessary if we a