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BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1802 


January  7,  1974 


PRESIDENT  CEAUSESCU  OF  ROMANIA  VISITS  THE  UNITED  STATES 

Exchanges  of  Remarks  Between  President  Nixon  and  President  Ceausescu 

and  Texts  of  Joint  Statements  and  Commtmique     1 

U.N.  OBSERVES  25th  ANNIVERSARY  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS  DECLARATION 
Statement  by  Robert  W.  Kitchen,  Jr.,  and  Text  of  Resolution    13 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT 


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Vol.  LXX,  No.  1802 
January  7,  1974 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  and 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  and 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements,  addresses, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  the  functions 
of  tlie  Department.  Information  is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
national agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  or  may  become  a 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  of 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  and 
legislative  material  in  the  field  of 
international  relations  are  also  listed. 


President  Ceausescu  of  Romania  Visits  the  United  States 


Nicolae  Ceausescu,  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  State  of  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Ro- 
mania, met  with  President  Nixon  and  other 
government  officials  at  Washington  Decem- 
ber Jt-6  during  an  official  visit  to  the  United 
States.  Following  are  an  exchange  of  greet- 
ings between  President  Nixon  and  President 
Ceausescu  at  a  welcoming  ceremony  on  the 
South  Lawn  of  the  White  Hojise  on  Decem- 
ber i,  their  exchange  of  toasts  at  a  White 
House  dinner  that  evening,  and  their  re- 
marks upon  signing  a  joint  statement  of 
principles  on  December  5,  together  with  the 
texts  of  the  joint  statement  of  principles,  a 
joint  statement  on  economic  cooperation 
issued  on  December  5,  and  a  joint  communi- 
que issued  on  December  7. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS,   DECEMBER  4 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated 
December   10 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Ceausescu,  and  all  of 
our  distinguished  guests:  Mr.  President,  it 
was  over  three  years  ago  that  I  had  the  honor 
of  being  the  first  American  President  to  visit 
your  country  and  when  I  had  the  honor  to 
receive  you  here  in  Washington  as  the  first 
President  of  Romania  to  visit  our  nation's 
Capital. 

In  these  past  three  years,  we  have  seen  a 
very  great  improvement  in  the  relations  be- 
tween our  two  countries — improvement  that 
is  indicated  by  the  amount  of  trade  that  we 
have  between  our  countries,  the  amount  of 
exchange,  and  in  other  areas  which  we  think 
are  particularly  important  in  the  economic 
and  political  areas. 


What  is  also  very  significant,  however,  is 
that  in  those  three  years  we  have  seen  a 
great  change  in  the  world  in  which  we  live — 
a  change  that  you  and  I  first  discussed  in 
1967  when  I  visited  your  capital,  Bucharest, 
as  a  private  citizen.  It  was  then  that  we 
talked  of  the  necessity  for  a  bridge  between 
East  and  West.  And  since  these  three  years, 
we  have  seen  not  only  the  visits  I  have  re- 
ferred to,  but  a  visit  to  the  People's  Repub- 
lic of  China,  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  de- 
velopment of  new  relationships  between  the 
United  States  and  nations  in  the  Socialist 
part  of  the  world,  but  new  relationships  be- 
tween Romania  and  nations  in  the  non- 
Socialist  part  of  the  world. 

It  is  as  we  look  at  the  world  today  that  we 
recognize  how  those  relationships  came 
about,  how  two  countries  so  very  far  apart 
geographically — one  much  larger  than  the 
other  in  terms  of  population,  but  each  with 
a  proud  history — how  two  countries  with 
different  philosophies  of  government  never- 
theless in  the  field  of  foreign  policy  had  com- 
mon objectives,  and  that  was  to  seek  good 
relations  with  all  nations,  regardless  of  what 
their  philosophical  ideas  were,  a  policy  of  re- 
specting the  independence  and  sovereignty 
of  every  nation,  large  and  small,  in  the 
world,  and  a  policy  of  always  recognizing 
that  unless  each  nation  has  independence 
and  that  that  independence  is  not  infringed 
upon  and  not  threatened  by  other  nations, 
there  cannot  be  real  peace,  lasting  peace,  in 
the  world. 

This  is  the  goal  of  our  nation;  it  is  the 
goal  of  your  nation.  It  is  one  that  we  have 
discussed  on  several  occasions  before,  and  it 
is  one  that,  in  addition  to  the  bipartisan  mat- 
ters  we  will   be  discussing,   I   am  sure  we 


January  7,   1974 


shall  discuss  at  len^h  in  our  two-day  visit 
on  this  occasion. 

We  are  happy  that  you  and  your  wife  will 
be  able  to  visit  not  only  Washington  but  a 
number  of  other  cities  in  our  country,  and 
we  know  that  you  will  receive  here  the  same 
warmhearted  welcome  that  made  such  an 
enormous  impression  on  Mrs.  Nixon  and  me 
and  all  the  members  of  our  party  when  we 
had  the  honor  of  visiting  your  country,  Ro- 
mania. 

President   Ceausescu  ' 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Nixon,  ladies  and  gen- 
tlemen: It  is  an  occasion  of  particular  pleas- 
ure for  me,  for  my  wife,  and  for  my  col- 
leagues here  to  find  ourselves  again  in  the 
United  States  to  meet  you  again,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, and  to  continue  the  dialogue  we  started 
in  1967  and  which  has  proved  to  be  so  fruit- 
ful both  for  the  relations  between  our  two 
nations  and  also  for  the  development  of  co- 
operation and  peace  in  the  world. 

It  is  true  that  after  the  visit  you  officially 
paid  to  Romania  as  the  first  President  of  the 
United  States  to  be  in  my  country,  the  visit 
you  made  together  with  Mrs.  Nixon  in  1969, 
the  relations  between  our  two  countries  have 
seen  a  continual  progress.  We  have  achieved 
significant  developments  in  our  economic  co- 
operation. At  the  same  time,  our  relations 
in  the  field  of  science,  culture,  exchanges  of 
people  in  various  fields,  have  developed  also. 
Our  peoples  have  started  to  know  each  other 
better  and  to  cooperate  together  in  the  inter- 
est of  general  progress,  of  cooperation  and 
peace  in  the  world. 

Likewise,  the  visit  I  paid  to  the  United 
States  in  1970,  the  talks  I  had  at  that  time 
with  you,  with  other  political,  economic  per- 
sonalities, with  the  representatives  of  the 
business  community  in  the  United  States, 
have  given  a  new  impetus  to  the  coopera- 
tion between  our  two  countries.  It  is  true 
since  1967,  and  then  since  your  fir.st  official 
visit  to  my  country  in  1969,  a  number  of 
years  have  passed.  And  in  these  years  many 
things  have  changed  in  the  world,  and  these 


'  President  Ceausescu  spoke  in   Romanian   on  all 
occasions. 


changes  continue  to  take  place  and  to  become 
more  accentuated,  leading  in  the  direction  of 
a  better  cooperation  among  all  peoples,  in 
the  direction  of  the  assertion  of  each  nation's 
independence,  of  the  right  for  free  economic 
and  social  development  in  conditions  of  ob- 
serving each  people's  right  to  organize  its 
life  as  it  wishes  and  deems  fit  without  any 
outside  interference. 

One  can  really  say  that  the  visit  you  paid 
to  Romania  was  really  a  good  .start  and  it 
marked  favorable  developments  in  the  rela- 
tions of  your  country  with  the  Socialist 
countries,  followed  by  the  visit  to  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China  and  your  visit  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  It  opened  the  course  toward 
developing  cooperation  with  other  Socialist 
countries  as  well.  This  is  certainly  an  impor- 
tant moment  in  the  developments  of  the 
world  today  and  in  the  general  course  to  in- 
sure a  lasting  peace  in  this  world  of  ours. 

In  its  policy,  Romania  starts  from  the 
premise  that  in  the  settlement  of  the  great 
international  problems  all  states  have  a  part 
to  play  and  they  all  should  cooperate  on  an 
equal  basis.  No  doubt  the  greater  countries 
have  greater  responsibilities  and  a  greater 
role  to  play,  but  life  itself  has  demonstrated 
that  the  big  international  issues  can  only  be 
settled  with  the  participation  and  direct  con- 
tribution of  all  states  in  international  affairs. 

It  is  only  on  that  basis  that  we  can  build  a 
better  world,  a  world  with  more  justice.  We 
are  convinced  that  the  peoples  of  the  world 
will  march  ever  more  firmly  in  this  direction. 

I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  state  that  the  re- 
lations between  Romania  and  the  United 
States  are  based  precisely  on  these  principles 
and  that  this  has  been  confirmed  in  the  years 
that  have  passed.  I  am  persuaded  that  our 
visit  to  the  United  States  and  the  talks  with 
you,  Mr.  President,  will  establish  an  even 
more  lasting  basis  to  the  cooperation  be- 
tween our  two  countries  in  the  interest  of  a 
better  and  brighter  world. 

It  is  with  these  thoughts,  Mr.  President, 
that  I  address  to  you  and  to  the  people  of 
America  the  feelings  of  friendship  on  be- 
half of  the  entire  Romanian  people.  May  I 
wish  you  and  the  American  people  progress 
and  peace. 


Department  of  Stale   Bulletin 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS,   DECEMBER  4 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated 
December  10 

President   Nixon 

President  and  Mrs.  Ceausescu,  and  all  of 
our  very  distinguished  and  honored  guests : 
As  I  sit  here  at  this  head  table  in  the  State 
Dining  Room  with  the  President  of  Romania, 
I  can  imagine  that  many  here  in  this  dining 
room  wonder  what  we  talk  about.  Now  of 
course  I  cannot  disclose  all  of  the  conversa- 
tion [laughter],  but  I  thought  that  it  would 
be  of  interest  to  all  of  you,  and  those  who 
can  hear  us  through  this  recording  [laugh- 
ter], how  the  President  and  I  first  came  to 
meet  and  how  two  of  us  from,  in  some  ways, 
very  similar  backgrounds  and  in  other  ways 
very  different  backgrounds  have  each  tried 
to  make  a  contribution  to  a  cause  everybody 
in  this  room,  in  both  of  our  countries  and, 
we  believe,  in  the  whole  world,  believes  in. 

In  1967,  when  I  was  not  in  office  and  had 
no  prospects  of  being  in  office,  I  visited  Ro- 
mania, and  the  President  was  kind  enough 
to  receive  me.  And  I  was  reminded  of  the 
subjects  we  discussed  in  1967,  just  six  years 
ago:  the  war  in  Viet-Nam,  which  then 
seemed  endless;  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  which 
then  were,  at  best,  at  arm's  length,  certainly 
not  in  terms  of  the  communication  that  we 
have  today ;  the  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
which  at  that  time  were  virtually  nonex- 
istent in  terms  of  communication.  We  talked 
of  many  other  things,  of  course — of  Roma- 
nia, the  United  States,  and  what  this  country, 
our  country,  owes  to  those  of  Romanian 
background  who  have  come  here  and  con- 
tributed so  much  to  the  diversity  of  our 
whole  society. 

Since  then,  in  1969,  when  I  had  the  honor 
of  being  the  first  American  President  ever 
to  visit  a  Socialist  country  on  a  state  visit, 
and  then  again  in  1970,  when  on  two  occa- 
sions the  President  was  here — one  on  a  state 
visit — and  then  again  today,  1973,  I  think, 
as  you  must  think,  of  how  much  has  hap- 
pened in  those  six  years. 

That  war — terribly  difficult,  costly,  for  the 
American  people  and  of  course  even  more 


so  for  the  Vietnamese  people  on  both  sides 
who  were  involved — is  ended.  The  United 
States  has  begun  a  new  relationship  with 
the  People's  Republic  of  China,  one  which 
began  just  a  year  ago  and  which  continues 
to  develop.  The  United  States,  in  addition, 
has  had  two  summit  meetings  with  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Soviet  Union  and  of  course  meet- 
ings with  other  governments  in  Europe,  in 
Africa,  Latin  America,  around  the  world. 

Now,  while  these  meetings  of  course  have 
caught  a  great  deal  of  attention  from  the 
press,  particularly  those  involving  the  major 
powers,  sometimes  what  is  overlooked  is  the 
vitally  important  role  that  is  played  by  lead- 
ers from  proud  countries  but  not  the  biggest 
countries — a  leader  like  our  distinguished 
guest  tonight,  because  he,  speaking  with  his 
candor  for  which  he  is  very  famous,  spoke 
to  me  about  then  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  Europe,  and  of  course  Viet-Nam*.  We 
did  not  agree  about  many  of  those  subjects, 
but  we  both  saw  the  profound  need  for  new 
departures,  for  breakthroughs,  for  change, 
or  otherwise  the  world  would  be  frozen  into 
a  whole  structure  of  confrontation  which 
would  inevitably  lead  to  a  configuration 
which  could  destroy  the  civilization  as  we 
know  it. 

I  am  not  suggesting  that  because  the  Pres- 
ident and  I  met  in  1967  and  had  such  a  full 
and  frank  discussion,  and  met  again  on  three 
other  occasions  in  which  these  discussions 
were  renewed,  that  those  discussions  were 
the  reasons  for  the  progress  that  has  been 
made.  What  I  do  say,  however,  is  this:  that 
our  distinguished  guest  tonight,  of  the 
world's  statesmen,  has  played  one  of  the  most 
profound  roles  of  any  world  statesman  in 
seeing  the  whole  problems  that  we  confront 
in  the  world  and  not  just  those  involving  his 
own  country  and  another  country  with  whose 
leader  he  might  be  talking  at  a  certain  time. 
He  has  shown  wisdom  and  understanding 
and  has  contributed  enormously  to  the  open- 
ing of  dialogues  that  might  otherwise  have 
forever  been  closed. 

And  so  tonight,  when  we  cannot,  unfor- 
tunately, say  that  we  have  peace  that  will 
last  forever,  because  it  may  not  be  possible 


January  7,    1974 


ever  for  that  to  be  said  for  sure  by  anyone, 
while  it  cannot  be  said  that  because  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
have  met  at  two  summit  meetings  that  that 
means  that  the  differences  those  two  great 
powers  have  are  ended,  because  they  have 
not  ended  and  they  will  not,  because  our  in- 
terests are  different- — something  the  Presi- 
dent recognizes,  something  we  recognize — 
and  it  does  not  mean  that  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China,  with  800  million  people,  be- 
cause of  a  visit  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  other  diplomatic  visits 
which  followed,  has  so  changed  the  relation- 
ship that  those  two  nations  and  those  two 
peoples  will  forever  find  themselves  as 
friends,  not  just  as  individuals  but  as  na- 
tions— but  being  the  pragmatists  that  we 
are,  the  President  and  I,  we  both  agree  it 
means  this : 

Something  very  profound  and  something 
very  positive  has  happened  in  these  past  six 
years.  The  world  has  changed,  and  it  has 
changed  for  the  better.  A  war  in  which  the 
United  States  was  engaged,  a  very  costly 
one,  is  over.  A  new  relationship  has  been  de- 
veloped between  the  two  most  powerful  na- 
tions, and  also  a  new  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  the  world's  most  pop- 
ulous nation.  And  all  of  this  means  that  the 
chance  that  we  can  avoid  a  world  struggle 
is  greatly  increa.sed. 

But  the  point  I  particularly  want  to  make 
tonight  is  this :  that  as  the  eyes  of  the  world 
inevitably  turn  to  the  meetings  at  the  sum- 
mit involving  the  leaders  of  great  powers, 
that  as  far  as  this  nation  is  concerned,  never 
at  one  of  these  meetings  in  the  past,  at  least 
on  the  occasions  of  our  participation  in  them 
since  I  have  been  in  this  office,  and  never  in 
the  future  as  long  as  our  present  policies 
are  continued,  will  the  United  States,  in  de- 
veloping better  relations  with  great  powers, 
do  so  at  the  expense  of  the  independence  and 
the  sovereignties  of  proud,  fine  people  like 
our  friends  in  Romania. 

I  say  that  because  there  is  a  tendency 
sometimes  for  us  to  believe  that  all  the 
world's  problems  would  be  so  easily  soluble 
if  only  those  with  great  power  would  use 


their  power  to  impose  those  solutions  around 
the  world.  Now,  the  great  powers  have  spe- 
cial responsibilities,  but  as  far  as  the  United 
States  of  America  is  concerned,  we  have  a 
special  feeling  also  in  our  hearts  for  people 
from  a  country  like  Romania,  a  proud  people 
with  a  great  background,  who  gave  to  Mrs. 
Nixon  and  me,  I  think,  one  of  the  warmest 
and  most  heartfelt  welcomes  we  ever  re- 
ceived in  all  of  our  travels  abroad.  And  we 
believe  that  every  nation,  large  and  small, 
has  the  right  to  its  independence,  the  right 
to  choose  its  own  way,  and  the  right  not  to 
have  that  independence  to  be  imposed  upon, 
to  be  infringed  upon,  by  any  other -power. 

That  is  what  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  really 
about.  It  is  about,  of  course,  fir.st,  peace  in 
the  world.  And  that  means  negotiations  with 
great  powers  and  between  them,  those  who 
have  the  power  to  affect  the  peace;  but  it 
also  means  having  respect  always  for  the 
rights  of  those  nations,  whether  they  be 
large  or  small,  whether  they  be  powerful  or 
weak,  who,  except  for  our  recognition  of 
their  right  to  independence,  would  be  in  very 
great  jeopardy. 

The  President  of  Romania  has  been  a 
spokesman  for  what  he  calls  the  countries 
that  are  not  the  superpowers.  He  has  been 
courageous,  he  has  been  candid,  sometimes 
critical  of  our  policy,  sometimes  critical  of 
policies  of  other  countries,  but  always  stand- 
ing up  for  his  own,  and  that  is  a  quality  we 
in  America  admire. 

We  admire  him.  We  admire  his  people  be- 
cause of  their  belief  in  their  independence 
and  their  sovereignty  and  their  willingness 
to  defend  it. 

And  so  tonight,  in  proposing  the  toast  to 
the  President,  I  do  so  not  simply  because  he 
is  here  again  as  a  state  guest  but  also  be- 
cause he  has  made  a  major  contribution  to 
this  profound  change  in  the  relations  be- 
tween nations  that  has  occurred  over  these 
past  five  years  and  also  because  he  stands 
for  a  principle  that  we  Americans  believe  in 
so  deeply:  the  right  of  every  nation,  large 
or  small,  to  its  independence,  to  its  freedom. 

And  so  I  know  all  of  you  will  want  to  join 
me  in  not  only  drinking  to  the  health  of  our 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


distinguished  guest,  to  the  friendship  be- 
tween our  two  peoples,  but  particularly  to 
the  leader  of  a  great  and  friendly  nation: 
President  Ceausescu. 


President   Ceausescu 

Mr.  President,  Madam,  ladies  and  gentle- 
men :  I  should  also  like  to  refer  briefly  to 
some  of  the  problems  pertaining  to  the  rela- 
tions between  our  two  nations  and  also  to 
international  aff'airs  today. 

We  truly  live  in  an  era  of  great  transfor- 
mation, both  on  a  national  and  international 
level.  Men  who  have  obtained  important  suc- 
cess in  the  development  of  economy,  science, 
culture,  men  who  reached  out  into  the  outer 
space,  are  still  preoccupied  with  a  great 
many  problems  here  on  earth. 

There  is  still  much  inequality  in  the  world. 
There  are  people  and  there  are  peoples  who 
still  live  in  underdevelopment.  And  there  is 
a  concern  to  establish  relations  between  peo- 
ple and  peoples  on  a  better  basis,  on  more 
justice,  both  on  a  national  and  on  an  inter- 
national level. 

No  doubt  there  are  many  different  opin- 
ions as  to  the  various  ways  leading  to  this 
better  world,  to  this  world  with  more  justice 
we  are  dreaming  about.  But  today,  more  and 
more  statesmen  understand,  as  the  peoples 
understand  themselves,  that  a  better  world, 
a  world  with  more  justice,  should  necessarily 
come  about. 

You  talk,  Mr.  President,  about  our  discus- 
sions in  1967.  At  that  time  I  was  not  Presi- 
dent of  the  State  Council  myself.  I  was  just 
the  Secretary  General  of  the  party  at  that 
time.  Therefore  it  was  not  a  discussion  be- 
tween two  presidents  at  that  time;  it  was  a 
discussion  between  two  statesmen  who  could 
talk  frankly  and  openly. 

It  appears  that  sometimes  from  time  to 
time  it  may  be  necessary  and  useful,  too,  that 
people  should  talk  not  only  in  their  official 
capacities,  not  only  as  political  people,  but 
as  people,  just  as  people. 

You  have  subsequently  visited  Romania  as 
the  first  President  of  the  United  States  to 
visit  that  country,  and  you  were  welcomed 


there  as  the  Romanian  people  know  how  to 
welcome  their  friends,  those  who  wish  and 
do  respect  their  independence  and  their  right 
to  a  free  life. 

We  met  again  in  1970  in  the  United  States, 
at  the  White  House,  and  now  again  in  '73  in 
the  United  States,  here  at  the  White  House 
again. 

We  have  indeed  talked  about  many  ques- 
tions, including  some,  so  to  say,  more  philo- 
sophical. Mostly  we  talked,  however,  about 
the  problems  which  were  a  source  of  con- 
cern to  mankind  at  that  time. 

It  was  then  that  we  talked  about  the  de- 
velopment of  cooperation  between  our  two 
countries,  about  the  peace  in  Viet-Nam  and 
in  the  Middle  East,  and  about  establishing 
relations  among  states  on  a  new  basis.  We 
are  able  to  note  today  with  great  satisfac- 
tion that  quite  a  number  of  problems  have 
found  a  solution. 

In  Viet-Nam  a  peace  agreement  has  been 
arrived  at,  although  still  more  efforts  will 
have  to  be  made  in  order  to  secure  a  lasting 
peace  in  that  area. 

Direct  contacts  and  relations  have  been 
established  between  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  and  the  United  States  as  a  result  of 
the  visit  you,  Mr.  President,  paid  to  China. 

A  number  of  agreements  have  been  con- 
cluded with  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  result  of 
your  visit,  sir,  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  of  the 
visit  paid  by  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Mr. 
Brezhnev,  to  the  United  States. 

No  doubt  all  this  has  had,  and  is  still  hav- 
ing, an  important  role  on  the  entire  develop- 
ment of  international  affairs.  But  the  picture 
will  not  be  complete  if  we  fail  to  talk  about 
the  fact  that  other  changes  have  also  oc- 
curred in  the  world. 

An  ever-increasing  number  of  nations  is 
asserting  more  powerfully  their  words  in  in- 
ternational affairs  and  their  desire  to  inde- 
pendent development,  and  they  are  playing 
an  ever  more  active  role  in  international 
life.  Of  course,  the  big  countries,  as  the 
United  States  is,  and  other  big  countries  as 
well,  have  an  important  part  to  play  in  in- 
ternational affairs ;  but  I  will  have  to  say  on 


January  7,    1974 


this  occasion  again,  in  all  frankness,  that 
these  countries  alone  are  not  in  a  position  to 
totally  insure  a  new  course  toward  detente 
and  a  new  course  toward  a  better  world  and 
a  world  with  more  justice. 

The  establishment  of  a  new  policy  in  the 
world,  a  policy  based  on  equal  rights  and  mu- 
tual respect,  can  only  be  the  result  of  the 
united  action  of  all  states  and  of  all  nations. 
This  is  like  on  a  national  level  in  which  a 
real  policy  of  social  justice  can  only  be  the 
result  of  the  united  effort  of  the  entire  peo- 
ple. 

You  have  mentioned,  Mr.  President,  the 
desire  of  the  United  States  to  act  toward 
building  new  relations.  No  doubt  in  every- 
thing that  has  been  done  to  settle  a  great 
number  of  problems  we  have  mentioned  be- 
fore, the  United  States  has  made  its  contri- 
bution. There  is  no  secret  to  anyone  today 
that  it  is  precisely  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
President  of  the  United  States — you,  sir — 
has  taken  action  in  this  particular  direction 
and  made  possible  these  results. 

But  still  more  problems  await  a  settle- 
ment, and  without  doubt  more  efforts,  and 
sustained  efforts,  too,  will  have  to  be  made 
in  this  particular  direction,  having  in  mind 
the  need  to  insure  cooperation  among  na- 
tions based  on  equal  rights,  equal  rights  ir- 
respective of  size  or  of  social  system. 

During  our  talks  today,  we  have  reached 
a  whole  area  of  understanding,  and  some 
agreements  for  the  further  cooperation  be- 
tween our  two  countries  have  been  signed 
today. 

We  would  like  to  see  the  relations  be- 
tween Romania  and  the  United  States — be- 
tween two  countries  having  different  social 
systems,  two  countries  which  are  different 
in  size,  as  one  can  easily  see — we  wish  that 
these  relations  should  really  become  an  ex- 
ample of  the  way  in  which  two  countries 
can  cooperate  based  on  the  principle  of  equal 
rights  and  mutual  respect. 

We  would  like  to  be  able  to  enable  history 
to  say  that  under  difficult  conditions  two  na- 
tions, a  big  one  and  a  small  one,  were  able  to 
cooperate  in  such  a  way  as  to  contribute 
toward   establishing   international   relations 


on  a  better  basis,  on  a  basis  of  more  justice. 

I  think,  and  I  shall  not  be  to  blame  if  I 
shall  anticipate  a  little  the  declaration  we 
are  going  to  sign  tomorrow,  it  is  going  to  be 
a  document  of  historical  importance  in  its 
own  way,  by  the  were  fact  that  it  expands 
the  relations  and  the  principles  that  govern 
relations  between  countries  which  are  differ- 
ent in  many  ways  but  which  are  united  in 
their  desire  to  cooperate  in  building  friend- 
ship between  them  and  in  building  a  world 
of  cooperation  and  peace. 

Since  our  talks  in  1967,  Mr.  President,  we 
have  covered  a  long  way  to  reach  such  a  dec- 
laration which  puts  down  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  international  relations.  This  no 
doubt  speaks  for  itself,  and  it  also  shows 
and  illustrates  the  changes  that  have  taken 
place  in  the  world.  And  it  shows  how  the 
peoples  of  our  two  countries,  how  the  lead- 
ers of  our  two  countries,  have  been  able  to 
act  in  order  to  enforce  mutual  cooperation 
and  international  cooperation  for  the  sake 
of  peace  and  better  cooperation. 

Taking  as  a  starting  point  these  changes 
that  have  worked  their  way  in  the  world,  we 
are  able  now  to  look  upon  the  future  with 
confidence.  Notwithstanding  the  difficult 
problems  that  are  still  to  be  solved  in  the 
world,  they  are  to  be  solved  if  all  the  peoples 
will  act  in  unity  to  build  a  lasting  peace 
based  on  equal  rights  and  mutual  respect. 

May  I  ask  you  to  join  me  in  this  toast:  To 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  who  all 
through  these  years  has  an  important  role  to 
play  in  the  development  of  international  life 
along  this  path,  for  the  friendship  and  coop- 
eration between  the  peoples  of  the  United 
States  and  Romania,  for  lasting  peace  and 
cooperation  in  the  world.  To  your  health, 
ladies  and  gentlemen. 

REMARKS   UPON    SIGNING   JOINT   STATEMENT 
OF  PRINCIPLES,   DECEMBER  5 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated 
December  10 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  President  and  ladies  and  gentlemen : 
As  you  know,  we  have  had  statements  of 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


principles  that  we  have  signed  with  major 
nations — with  the  Soviet  Union,  with  the 
People's  Republic  of  China.  In  this  case  we 
sign  a  statement  of  principles  with  Romania 
— Romania,  which  in  the  scale  of  size  of  pop- 
ulation is  a  smaller  country.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  the  fact  that  this  statement  of  princi- 
ples is  signed  between  Romania  and  the 
United  States  has  a  very  deep  significance, 
and  that  significance  is  that  while  the  United 
States  considers  its  relations  with  major 
powers  to  be  of  enormous  importance  in 
terms  of  building  a  structure  of  peace  in  the 
world,  we  also  consider  it  a  cornerstone  of 
our  foreign  policy  that  any  agreements  that 
we  make  must  never  be  at  the  expense  of  the 
sovereignty  and  of  the  independence  of  small- 
er nations. 

Our  relations  with  Romania  have  been 
particularly  close  during  this  administration 
due  to  the  personal  relationship  that  I  have 
enjoyed  with  President  Ceausescu,  and  we 
have  seen  growth  in  our  economic  communi- 
cations as  well  as  in  a  number  of  other  areas, 
as  demonstrated  by  the  agreements  that 
were  signed  yesterday.  But  today,  as  we 
complete  the  signing  of  this  document,  we 
are  in  effect  saying  to  the  whole  world  that 
as  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned,  we 
believe  that  the  survival  of  nations,  no  mat- 
ter how  small,  no  matter  how  weak  they 
might  be  militarily,  the  survival  of  nations 
proud  of  their  sovereignty,  proud  of  their 
independence,  is  essential  to  building  a  struc- 
ture of  peace  in  the  world,  one  that  we  can 
be  proud  of.  And  so  for  that  reason,  we 
thought  that  having  the  ceremony  here  in  the 
Cabinet  Room  with  the  members  of  our  Cab- 
inet and  the  members  of  the  President's  offi- 
cial party  here  was  particularly  appropriate. 

President  Ceausescu 

Mr.  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen :  The 
signing  of  the  joint  declaration  between  the 
United  States  and  Romania  marks  a  new 
stage  in  the  relations  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  last  few  years,  and  in 
particular  after  the  visit  paid  by  President 


Nixon  to  Romania,  the  relations  between 
Romania  and  the  United  States  have  seen  a 
strong  development  in  all  fields  of  activity. 
These  very  days  we  have  signed  several  doc- 
uments and  agreements  on  our  economic  co- 
operation, and  we  adopted  a  statement  on  the 
principles  of  our  economic  cooperation.  To- 
day we  sign  this  declaration  which  places  at 
the  basis  of  the  cooperation  between  Ro- 
mania and  the  United  States  the  principles 
which  are  asserting  themselves  ever  more 
strongly  in  international  aff"airs.  As  such, 
they  are  the  only  principles  apt  to  insure  a 
lasting  and  just  peace  in  the  world,  such  as 
equal  rights,  respect  for  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  each  nation,  noninterference 
in  the  internal  afl'airs,  mutual  advantage, 
and  renunciation  of  force  and  of  any  threat 
with  force  in  the  settlement  of  international 
issues. 

The  signing  of  this  declaration  between 
our  two  countries — countries  having  differ- 
ent social  systems,  and  which  are  different 
in  size — is  an  important  event  which  at  the 
same  time  confirms  the  deep,  growing 
changes  which  now  occur  in  the  world  and 
which  are  accelerated  today. 

We  should  like  to  see  the  significance  of 
this  document  expand  in  the  world  and  dem- 
onstrate that  in  the  world  today  it  is  indeed 
possible  for  all  countries,  big,  medium  size, 
or  small,  to  work  together  in  full  equality 
and  to  have  the  right  of  each  nation  asserted 
for  its  development  according  to  its  own 
wishes  so  that  a  better  world,  a  world  with 
more  justice,  will  be  built  for  all. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  happily  existing 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Ro- 
mania have  reached  the  present  stage  also 
due  to  the  fact  that  President  Nixon  and  my- 
self have  established  good  relations  of  coop- 
eration and  friendship  and  that  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  himself  has  taken 
action  in  trying  to  apply  these  principles  in 
the  mutual  relations  with  Romania. 

We  dearly  wish  that  the  declaration  we 
have  signed  today  should  form  the  lasting 
basis  for  the  friendship  between  our  two 
nations  and  should  contribute  at  the  same 
time  to  international  peace  and  cooperation. 


January  7,    1974 


TEXT   OF  JOINT   STATEMENT  OF  PRINCIPLES, 
DECEMBER   5 

Joint  Statement  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  Richard  Nixon,  and  the 
President  of  the  Council  of  State  of  the  So- 
cialist Republic  of  Romania,  Nicolae  Ceausescu 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
Richard  Nixon,  and  the  President  of  the  Council  of 
State  of  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Romania,  Nicolae 
Ceausescu, 

— having  met  in  a  cordial,  constructive  and 
friendly  atmosphere,  which  provided  the  opportunity 
for  a  useful  and  comprehensive  exchange  of  views, 

— having  discussed  United  States-Romanian  rela- 
tions, the  principles  underlying  those  relations,  and 
the  principal  international  problems  of  current  con- 
cern in  a  spirit  of  full  and  mutual  respect  reflecting 
the  interests  of  the  American  and  Romanian  jwoples 
in  closer  contacts, 

agreed  on  the  following  statement: 

They  expressed  the  conviction  that  all  nations, 
whatever  their  size,  political,  economic  or  social  sys- 
tems or  level  of  development,  should  contribute  to  a 
durable  world  peace,  founded  on  freedom,  equality, 
justice  and  respect  for  human  rights. 

The  two  Presidents  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
favorable  development  of  relations  and  the  good 
results  achieved  following  President  Nixon's  state 
visit  to  Romania  in  1969  and  his  subsequent  meeting 
with  President  Nicolae  Ceausescu  in  Washington  in 
1970.  They  agreed  on  the  desirability  of  expanding 
and  further  developing  relations  between  their  two 
countries  on  a  solid  and  lasting  basis  for  the  mutual 
benefit  of  the  American  and  Romanian  peoples. 

I 

The  two  Presidents  solemnly  reaffirmed  that  the 
bilateral  relations  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Romania  are 
founded  on  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the  United 
Nations  Charter,  and,  consistent  with  these,  espe- 
cially on  the  following  closely  interrelated  princi- 
ples: 

the  right  of  each  state  to  existence,  independence, 
and  sovereignty; 

the  juridical  equality  of  all  states  irrespective  of 
their  size,  level  of  development,  and  political,  eco- 
nomic and  social  systems; 

the  right  of  each  state  freely  to  choose  and  de- 
velop its  political,  social,  economic,  and  cultural  sys- 
tems; 

refraining  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  in  viola- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  Charter,  respect  for  terri- 
torial integrity,  and  inviolability  of  frontiers; 

non-intervention,  direct  or  indirect,   for  any  rea- 


son whatever,  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any  other 
state; 

the  duty  of  states  to  settle  their  international  dis- 
putes by  peaceful  means; 

cooperation  in  various  fields  of  international  rela- 
tions in  order  to  promote  international  peace  and 
security  and  economic  and  social  progress. 

II 

The  two  Presidents  expressed  their  determination 
to  develop  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  in  a 
spirit  of  esteem,  respect  and  mutual  advantage.  They 
agreed  to  take  measures  as  appropriate  to  encourage 
the  expansion  of  trade  as  well  as  industrial,  scien- 
tific and  technical  cooperation,  in  particular,  such 
forms  of  collaboration  as  joint  ventures  and  joint 
research  between  enterprises  and  institutions  of  the 
two  countries.  They  also  agreed  to  take  appropriate 
measures  to  develop  friendly  relations  between  the 
two  peoples,  by  creating  conditions  for  better  mutual 
knowledge  of  their  spiritual  and  material  values,  by 
expanding  and  deepening  contacts  and  exchanges  in 
such  fields  as  science,  technology,  culture,  arts,  edu- 
cation, information,  and  tourism,  by  relations  be- 
tween institutions,  organizations,  associations,  and 
enterprises,  as  well  as  by  contacts  between  the  citi- 
zens of  the  two  countries.  They  will  contribute  to 
the  solution  of  humanitarian  problems  on  the  basis 
of  mutual  confidence  and  good  will. 

Ill 

The  two  Presidents  expressed  their  determination 
to  act  for  the  strengthening  of  the  role  of  the 
United  Nations  in  the  maintenance  and  consolida- 
tion of  international  peace,  the  development  of  coop- 
eration among  all  nations,  and  the  promotion  of  the 
norms  of  international  law  in  relations  among  states. 

They  stressed  the  importance  of  achieving  effec- 
tive measures  of  disarmament  conducive  to  the 
strengthening  of  international  peace  and  security. 

They  agreed  to  continue  their  support  for  the 
achievement  of  security  and  cooperation  in  Europe, 
noting  that  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Coop- 
eration in  Europe  and  the  negotiations  on  Mutual 
Reduction  of  Forces  and  Armaments  and  Associated 
Measures  in  Central  Europe  should  contribute  to  this 
end.  They  agreed  that  the  process  of  building  Euro- 
pean security  would  produce  closer  relations  among 
the  participants  and  make  a  positive  contribution  to 
world  peace.  They  further  agreed  that  the  develop- 
ment of  good  neighborly  relations  among  Balkan 
countries  will  contribute  to  cooperation,  security, 
and  relaxation  of  tensions  in  Europe. 

Noting  that  international  relations  are  in  a  period 
of  intense  change,  the  two  Presidents  welcomed  the 
continuing  progress  toward  relaxation  of  tensions 
and  toward  an  era  of  negotiation  rather  than  con- 
frontation. They  welcomed  the  new  opportunities 
for  increasing  participation  by  all  interested  states 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


in  the  resolution,  by  negotiation,  of  controversial 
pro^blems  for  the  further  improvement  of  interna- 
tional relations. 

They  expressed  their  satisfaction  with  the  agree- 
ment concerning  the  reestablishment  of  peace  in 
Vietnam  and  their  hope  that  it  will  be  implemented 
to  contribute  to  peace  and  stability  in  Indochina. 

They  expressed  their  concern  with  the  recent  out- 
break of  the  conflict  in  the  Middle  East  and  empha- 
sized the  importance  they  attach  to  current  efforts 
to  achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace.  They  expressed 
themselves  in  favor  of  the  settlement  of  the  con- 
flict by  peaceful  means  in  the  spirit  and  on  the  basis 
of  the  Security  Council  resolution  of  November  22, 
1967.  They  stressed  the  need  to  proceed  without 
delay  to  the  negotiations  called  for  by  the  Security 
Council  Resolution  of  October  22,  1973  and  to  the 
convocation  of  the  peace  conference. 

IV 

The  two  Presidents  expressed  their  conviction  that 
the  continued  development  of  friendly  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Romania,  based  on  equality,  mutual  re- 
spect and  due  consideration  for  their  respective  in- 
terests, serves  the  cause  of  international  peace  and 
cooperation. 

Stressing  the  value  of  personal  contacts,  they  re- 
affirmed their  commitment  to  deepen  and  expand 
relations  between  the  two  countries  by  consultations 
at  various  levels  as  well  as  through  normaj  diplo- 
matic channels. 

Washington,  December  5,  1973 

Richard  Nixon  Nicolae  Ceausescu 

President  of  the  United      President  of  the  Council 
States  of  America  of  State  of  the  Socialist 

Republic  of  Romania 


STATEMENT  ON  ECONOMIC  COOPERATION, 
DECEMBER  5 

Joint  Statement  on  Economic,  Industrial  and 
Technological  Cooperation  Between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Romania,  December  5,  1973 

On  the  occasion  of  his  official  visit  in  the  United 
States  of  America  the  President  of  the  State  Council 
of  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Romania,  Nicolae  Ceau- 
sescu held  talks  with  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  Richard  Nixon,  on  December  4 
and  5,  1973,  with  regard  to  the  development  of  eco- 
nomic relations  between  Romania  and  the  United 
States. 

Henry  Kissinger,  the  Secretary  of  State,  George 
Shultz,    the    Secretary   of   the   Treasury,   Frederick 


Dent,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  other  officials 
on  the  American  side;  and  Manea  Manescu,  Vice 
Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  Chairman 
of  the  State  Planning  Committee,  George  Macovescu, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Vasile  Pungan, 
Counsellor  to  the  President  and  other  Romanian 
officials  also  participated  in  discussions. 

The  two  Presidents  have  emphasized  the  favor- 
able development  of  economic  relations  between  their 
two  countries  and  they  expressed  their  determina- 
tion to  promote  and  expand  economic,  industrial  and 
technological  cooperation  on  the  basis  of  respect  for 
sovereignty,  independence,  non-interference  in  do- 
mestic affairs,  juridical  equality,  mutual  advantage, 
and  refraining  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force. 

President  Nixon  and  President  Ceausescu  ex- 
pressed their  satisfaction  with  the  remarkable  rate 
of  growth  in  United  States-Romanian  trade,  which 
has  increased  more  than  fourfold  since  President 
Nixon's  visit  to  Bucharest  in  1969. 

Both  Presidents  noted  particularly  the  rapid 
growth  in  Romania's  exports  to  the  United  States, 
due  to  the  major  efforts  that  Romania  has  made  to 
promote  its  exports  to  the  United  States. 

It  was  anticipated  that  the  trade  will  continue  to 
grow  at  the  same  pace  or  better  during  1974  and  the 
following  years.  The  two  Presidents  stressed  that 
the  two  countries  have  taken  several  actions  to  en- 
courage and  facilitate  this  growth  in  trade. 

The  two  Presidents  noted  the  importance  of  the 
meetings  and  talks  to  be  held  by  President  Ceausescu 
with  American  business  leaders  aimed  at  finalizing 
agreements  and  understandings  and  generating  new 
interest  in  doing  business  with  Romania. 

The  Presidents  noted  that,  in  recognition  of  Ro- 
mania's status  as  a  developing  country,  the  United 
States  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation  is 
now  prepared  to  assist  in  insuring  and  financing 
United   States   investments  in  Romania. 

The  two  Presidents  noted  that,  since  November 
1971,  when  President  Nixon  determined  that  United 
States  exports  to  Romania  should  be  eligible  for 
United  States  Export-Import  Bank  credits  and  guar- 
antees, these  credits  and  guarantees  have  effectively 
contributed  to  the  expansion  of  trade.  Private  United 
States  banks  have  also  facilitated  this  expansion. 

The  two  Presidents  have  noted  the  importance  of 
both  countries'  participation  in  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade  and  the  importance  of  the 
provisions  and  principles  of  this  Agfreement  for  their 
respective  economic  policies. 

President  Nixon  reaffirmed  his  commitment  to  seek 
authority  to  provide  most-favored-nation  tariff 
treatment  for  Romania  in  recognition  of  the  impor- 
tance of  this  reciprocal  principle  as  a  factor  in  inter- 
national relations  and  in  the  development  and  diversi- 
fication of  economic  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. 

The  two  Presidents  further  noted  that  Romania's 


January  7,    1974 


accession  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  and  to  membership  in  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund  and  to  the  International  Bank  for  Recon- 
struction and  Development  were  positive  steps  in 
broadening  its  world-wide  economic  and  financial 
relations,  and  have  created  favorable  conditions  for 
collaboration  between  representatives  of  both  coun- 
tries within  the  framework  of  these  international 
organizations,  with  a  view  to  developing  their  eco- 
nomic cooperation. 

The  two  Presidents  welcomed  the  conclusion  on  the 
occasion  of  the  visit  of  the  Agreement  between  the 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Romania  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce on  setting  up  the  Romanian-U.S.  Economic 
Council,  the  Convention  with  respect  to  Taxes  on 
Income  and  Property,  the  Agreement  relating  to 
Civil  Air  Transport  and  the  Agreement  regarding 
Fisheries  in  the  Western  Region  of  the  Middle  At- 
lantic Ocean  as  well  as  specific  conventions  and 
understandings  among  Romanian  enterprises  and  eco- 
nomic organizations  and  American  firms  with  regard 
to  economic,  industrial  and  technological  collabora- 
tion and  cooperation  in  the  fields  of  machine-building, 
electronics,  chemicals  and  petrochemicals  and  other 
fields  of  mutual  interest. 

They  also  noted  that  discussions  regarding  Ameri- 
can bondholder  claims  have  been  resumed. 

In  order  to  further  the  development  of  economic 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Romania, 
the  two  Presidents  approved  the  following  guide- 
lines: 

1.  The  two  Governments  will  facilitate,  as  appro- 
priate, cooperation  between  interested  firms,  com- 
panies and  economic  organizations  of  the  two  coun- 
tries with  a  view  to  the  realization  of  joint  projects, 
including  joint  manufacturing  and  marketing  ven- 
tures, in  the  fields  of  industry,  commerce,  agricul- 
ture and  natural  resources,  and  other  fields  of  mu- 
tual interest. 

Areas  of  particular  interest  for  such  cooperation 
include  machine-building,  electronic  and  electrical 
industries,  energy,  metallurgy,  mining  and  petroleum, 
chemicals  and  petrochemicals,  light  industry,  foods, 
telecommunications,  building  materials,  agriculture, 
and  tourism. 

2.  Commercial  and  economic  cooperation  transac- 
tions will  be  effected  on  the  basis  of  contractual  ar- 
rangements between  firms,  companies  and  economic 
organizations  of  the  two  countries,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  and  regulations  in  force  in  both 
countries.  Such  contracts  will  generally  be  concluded 
on  terms  customary  in  international  practice. 

Such  contracts  and  arrangements  may  encompass 
such  matters  as: 

— construction  of  new  industrial  facilities,  as  well 
as  the  expansion  and  modernization  of  existing 
facilities; 


— joint  manufacturing  and  marketing  by  means  of 
joint  ventures  or  otherwise; 

— licensing  or  patents  and  exchanges  of  economic 
and  technical  information  on  products,  designs 
and  technology,  subject  to  the  laws  and  regula- 
tions in  effect  in  the  two  countries,  including 
laws  relating  to  transshipment  and  reexporta- 
tion; 

— training  and  exchange  of  specialists  and  train- 
ees; 

— establishment  of  banks  and  banking  agencies  in 
the  two  countries; 

— joint  cooperative  projects  in  third  countries. 

Such  contracts  may  provide  for  sharing  and  trans- 
fer of  benefits,  rights  of  participation  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  joint  enterprises,  procedures  for  dissolu- 
tion of  the  joint  enterprise,  and  return  and  repatria- 
tion of  capital  on  mutually  agreeable  terms. 

3.  In  their  economic  relations  and  in  applying  their 
policies  within  the  framework  of  their  laws  and 
regulations,  the  two  countries  will  take  full  account 
of  the  respective  level  of  their  economic  development 
as  well  as  the  characteristics  of  the  two  economies. 
In  this  respect,  it  is  noted  that  Romania,  as  a  devel- 
oping country,  could  be  eligible  for  treatment  ac- 
corded to  developing  countries. 

4.  Currency  payments  between  firms,  companies 
and  economic  organizations  of  the  two  countries  will 
be  made  in  United  States  dollars  or  any  other  freely 
convertible  currency  mutually  agreed  upon;  other 
forms  of  payment  may  be  agreed  upon. 

5.  Except  for  a  public  purpose,  assets  belonging 
to  nationals,  companies  and  economic  organizations 
of  one  of  the  two  countries  will  not  be  expropriated 
by  the  other  country,  nor  will  they  be  expropriated 
without  the  payment  of  prompt,  adequate  and  effec- 
tive compensation. 

6.  To  the  extent  permitted  by  the  laws  and  inter- 
national obligations  of  the  two  countries,  equipment 
and  materials  imported  temporarily  into  a  country 
for  purposes  of  contracts  concluded  between  firms, 
companies  and  economic  organizations  of  the  two 
countries,  will  be  exempt  from  customs  duties,  other 
taxes  and  any  restrictions  pertaining  to  importation. 
With  a  view  to  the  development  of  economic  coop- 
eration, both  sides  will  examine  ways  and  means  for 
the  application  of  further  customs  and  fiscal  facili- 
tation for  goods  assigned  to,  and  resulting  from  co- 
operation projects  within  the  provisions  of  customs 
legislation  in  force  in  the  two  countries. 

7.  Each  country  will  provide  nationals,  firms,  com- 
panies and  economic  organizations  of  the  other 
country  protection  of  inventions,  trademarks  and 
trade  names  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
international  agreements  in  the  field  to  which  the 
two  countries  are  parties. 

8.  Each  country  will  accord  firms,  companies  and 
economic  organizations  of  the  other  nondiscrimina- 
tory treatment  as  regards  payment,  remittances  and 


10 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


transfers  of  funds  or  financial  instruments,  in  ac- 
cordance with  arrangements  to  be  worked  out  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

9.  Each  country  will  facilitate  the  entry  and  travel 
of  official  representatives,  experts,  advisors  and  tech- 
nicians of  the  other  country  employed  in  connection 
with  commercial  and  economic  cooperation  transac- 
tions between  their  firms,  companies  and  economic 
organizations,  and  of  members  of  their  immediate 
families. 

10.  Each  country  will  facilitate  participation  of 
their  nationals,  companies  and  economic  organiza- 
tions in  fairs  and  exhibitions,  organized  in  the  other 
country. 

11.  Both  countries  will  facilitate  the  exchange  of 
economic,  commercial  and  technical  information  in 
fields  of  mutual  interest,  including  information  con- 
cerning trade  in  major  agricultural  commodities, 
among  institutions,  enterprises  and  economic  orga- 
nizations. 

12.  Both  countries  reaffirm  their  desire  promptly 
and  equitably  to  settle  on  an  amicable  basis  com- 
mercial disputes  which  may  arise.  Commercial  con- 
tracts should  include  provisions  concerning  arbitra- 
tion of  disputes  resulting  from  commercial  transac- 
tions. 

Such  understandings  will  stipulate  that  the  arbi- 
tration be  effected  in  accordance  with  the  regulations 
of  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Paris 
and  will  designate  as  place  for  arbitration  a  city 
in  a  country  other  than  the  United  States  or  Ro- 
mania which  is  a  party  to  the  1958  Convention  on 
recognition  and  application  of  foreign  arbitration 
decisions,  or  any  other  modality  agreed  upon  in  the 
terms  of  the  contract. 

13.  With  the  view  of  broadening  and  supporting 
economic  relations  between  the  two  countries,  it  was 
agreed  to  establish  a  joint  Romanian-American  Eco- 
nomic Commission  which  will  meet  annually,  alterna- 
tively in  Bucharest  and  Washington. 

The  Commission  will  consider  questions  and  prob- 
lems relating  to  the  reciprocal  establishment  of  busi- 
ness facilities  to  promote  economic  cooperation,  as 
well  as  any  other  matters  arising  in  the  course  of 
their  economic,  industrial  and  technological  coopera- 
tion. 

The  Commission  will  also  facilitate  as  appropriate 
the  establishment  of  joint  consultative  groups  be- 
tween representatives  of  firms,  companies  and  eco- 
nomic organizations  of  the  two  countries  on  matters 
of  particular  interest. 

JOINT  U.S.-ROMANIAN   COMMUNIQUE, 
DECEMBER  7 

At  the  invitation  of  Presiaent  Richard  Nixon  and 
Mrs.  Nixon,  the  President  of  the  State  Council  of  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Romania  Nicolae  Ceausescu  and 
Mrs.  Ceausescu  paid  an  official  visit  to  the   United 


States  of  America,  between  December  4-7,  1973.  They 
also  visited  Wilmington,  N.C.,  Cleveland,  Hartford, 
and  New  York. 

During  his  stay  in  Washington,  President  Ceau- 
sescu conducted  talks  with  President  Nixon  on  the 
development  of  US-Romanian  relations  as  well  as 
a  number  of  international  issues.  The  talks  pro- 
ceeded in  a  cordial  atmosphere  of  mutual  esteem  and 
respect. 

Noting  with  deep  satisfaction  the  fact  that  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Romania  have  been  developing  positively 
in  many  fields  in  the  past  years,  the  two  Presidents 
concurrently  expressed  their  interest  in  further  ex- 
panding and  diversifying  US-Romanian  cooperation. 

With  the  view  to  deepening  and  further  develop- 
ing the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Romania  and  strengthening  their  contributions  to  the 
cause  of  peace  and  international  security.  President 
Nixon  and  President  Ceausescu  signed  the  Joint 
Statement  of  December  5,  1973  containing  the  princi- 
ples on  which  the  relations  between  their  two  na- 
tions are  based. 

The  two  Presidents  also  agreed  that  concrete  steps 
would  be  taken  in  order  to  give  a  new  impetus  to 
economic  cooperation.  Fo'*  this  purpose,  they  adopted 
a  Joint  Statement  on  Economic,  Industrial  and  Tech- 
nological Cooperation. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  visit,  the  following  bilateral 
agreements  were  signed:  a  Convention  with  Respect 
to  Taxes  on  Income  and  Property,  a  Civil  Air  Trans- 
port Agreement,  and  an  Agreement  Regarding  Fish- 
eries in  the  Western  Region  of  the  Middle  Atlantic 
Ocean.  The  U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  the  Ro- 
manian Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry,  at  the 
same  time,  agreed  to  establish  a  Joint  US-Romanian 
Economic  Council  to  consider  problems  of  business 
facilitation  in  an  effort  to  broaden  and  support  eco- 
nomic relations  between  the  two  countries. 

The  two  Presidents  welcomed  the  continuing  ex- 
pansion of  cultural  and  scientific  relations  between 
the  two  countries. 

Their  talks  included  useful  and  cordial  exchanges 
of  view  on  international  issues  including  those  relat- 
ing to  Europe,  the  Middle  East,  South  East  Asia  and 
cooperation  in  the  United  Nations. 

The  two  Presidents  expressed  satisfaction  with  the 
results  of  their  talks  and  agrreed  to  continue  the 
bilateral  dialogue  both  through  the  usual  diplomatic 
channels  and  by  meetings  at  all  levels. 

President  and  Mrs.  Ceausescu  expressed  their 
cordial  thanks  to  President  and  Mrs.  Nixon  for  the 
friendly  reception  and  hospitality  extended  to  them 
during  the  visit,  regarding  it  as  an  expression  of  the 
friendship  and  mutual  esteem  existing  between  the 
Romanian  and  American  peoples. 

President  Ceausescu  invited  President  and  Mrs. 
Nixon  for  an  official  visit  to  Romania.  The  invitation 
was  accepted  with  pleasure.  The  visit  will  take  place 
at  a  mutually  agreeable  future  date. 


January  7,    1974 


11 


U.S.  and   India  Initial  Agreement 
on  U.S.  Holdings  of  Indian  Rupees 

Following  is  a  statement  issued  by  the 
U.S.  Embassy  at  New  Delhi  on  December  13. 

The  Government  of  India  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  today  initialed  an 
agreement  providing  for  the  disposition  of 
U.S.  holdings  of  Indian  rupees  accumulated 
as  a  result  of  U.S.  economic  assistance  pro- 
grams to  India  over  the  last  20  years.  Mr. 
M.  G.  Kaul,  Secretary,  Department  of  Eco- 
nomic Affairs,  Ministry  of  Finance,  initialed 
for  the  Government  of  India,  and  Ambassa- 
dor Daniel  P.  Moynihan  initialed  for  the 
United  States. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement  the 
United  States  would  grant  16.6  billion  rupees 
(about  $2.2  billion  equivalent)  to  the  mu- 
tually agreed-upon  projects  and  programs 
during  the  period  of  India's  fifth  five-year 
plan.  The  United  States  would  retain  8  bil- 
lion rupees  (about  $1.1  billion  equivalent) 
to  finance  future  U.S.  Government  expendi- 
tures. 

Before  the  agreement  may  be  signed  and 
come  into  effect,  it  must  lie  for  review  before 
appropriate  committees  of  the  U.S.  Congress 
for  a  period  of  time  and  also  be  finally  ap- 
proved by  the  Government  of  India. 


Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights  Day 
and  Week 

A     PROCLAMATION' 

Among  the  principles  undergirding  our  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  in  1776  was  the  fundamental 
conviction  that  all  men  are  endowed  with  certain 
inalienable  rights  and  that  the  purpose  of  instituting 
governments  is  to  secure  these  rights.  The  first  Con- 
gress acted  quickly  to  secure  the  basic  rights  of  the 
American  people  by  proposing  ten  amendments  to 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  These  amend- 
ments, our  Bill  of  Rights,  came  into  effect  one  hun- 


•  No.  4256;  38  Fed.  Reg.  34101. 


dred  eighty-two  years  ago,  on  December  15, 1791,  and 
have  served  ever  since  as  guiding  ideals  of  our 
democracy.  Each  generation  of  Americans  has  con- 
tributed in  its  own  way  to  realizing  the  promise 
of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  ensuring  its  responsiveness  to 
the  increasingly  complex  conditions  of  American 
society. 

The  continuing  vitality  of  that  promise  depends 
upon  our  own  steadfast  dedication  to  the  principles 
upon  which  this  Republic  was  founded.  Now,  in  this 
decade  of  our  Bicentennial,  it  is  especially  appropri- 
ate for  us  to  commemorate  the  anniversary  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  and  to  recall  with 
pride  the  efforts  of  our  predecessors  to  make  its 
ideals  a  true  guarantee  of  the  rights  of  all  Amer- 
icans. 

It  is  fitting  that  we  take  note  at  the  same  time  of 
the  progress  made  by  the  world  community  in  its 
recognition  of  the  rights  of  all  members  of  the 
human  family.  This  week  marks  the  twenty-fifth 
anniversary  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights,  adopted  by  the  United  Nations  General  As- 
sembly on  December  10,  1948,  to  proclaim  standards 
of  freedom  and  equality  common  to  all  nations  and 
all  peoples.  Though  widely  separated  by  time  and 
authorship,  the  Bill  of  Rights  and  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  share  a  common  com- 
mitment to  the  ideals  of  equality,  dignity,  and  indi- 
vidual worth. 

Our  actions  as  Americans  to  strengthen  the  Bill  of 
Rights  are  inseparable  from  our  commitment  to  the 
ideals  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 
The  strength  and  success  of  our  efforts  to  advance 
these  goals  here  at  home  will  have  a  positive  impact 
on  the  cause  of  human  rights  throughout  the  world. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Richard  Nixon,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim 
December  10,  1973,  as  Human  Rights  Day  and  De- 
cember 15,  1973,  as  Bill  of  Rights  Day.  I  call  upon 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  observe  the  week 
beginning  December  10,  1973,  as  Human  Rights 
Week.  Let  us  make  this  obser\'ance  a  time  for  reaf- 
firming the  high  principles  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  and 
of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and 
for  making  them  a  living  reality  in  the  daily  lives 
of  every  American.  For  each  of  us,  through  our  own 
example,  can  do  a  great  deal  to  strengthen  the  cause 
of  liberty  and  justice  for  all. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  this  seventh  day  of  December,  in  the  year  of 
our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-three,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the 
one  hundred  ninety-eighth. 


CM^JL^-^K:^ 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND   CONFERENCES 


U.N.  Observes  25th  Anniversary  of  Human  Rights  Declaration 


Following  is  a  statement  made  in  Commit- 
tee III  (Social,  Humanitarian  and  Cultural) 
of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  October  17 
by  Robert  W.  Kitchen,  Jr.,  Deputy  Perma- 
nent Representative  on  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council,  together  with  the  text  of  a 
resolution  adopted  by  the  committee  on  Oc- 
tober 19  and  by  the  Assembly  on  November  2. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.   KITCHEN 

USUN  press  release  94  dated  October  17 

Twenty-five  years  ago  when  the  Third 
Committee  was  meeting  to  prepare  the  draft 
of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights,  the  U.S.  Government  representative 
stated  that  this  declaration  was  necessary  to 
provide  a  basis  for  measuring  performance 
of  member  states  in  carrying  out  the  charter 
pledge  to  achieve  respect  for  human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms. 

The  role  that  constitutions  and  laws  play 
in  the  reordering  of  society  changes  with  the 
passage  of  time.  Frequently  the  original  pur- 
pose or  scope  may  become  distorted  or  re- 
stricted, and  the  reality  falls  far  short  of 
the  aspirations  of  the  original  draftsmen  and 
legislators.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  it  in- 
structive on  this  occasion  to  look  back  25 
years  to  the  debates  that  were  then  taking 
place  in  the  Palais  de  Chaillot  and  to  read 
what  the  authors  of  the  universal  declaration 
said  about  the  work  on  which  they  were  then 
engaged. 

Rene  Cassin,  the  delegate  of  France, 
placed  the  work  of  the  committee  in  its  his- 
torical perspective.  Speaking  in  the  great 
tradition  of  French  liberalism,  he  said,  "the 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  is  needed  as  a 
protest,  the  protest  of  humanity  against  the 
oppression    and    atrocities    which   so   many 


millions  have  suffered  throughout  the  ages  in 
the  past  and  more  than  ever  in  the  20th  cen- 
tury during  two  major  European  wars  and 
throughout  the  intervening  period."  Looking 
to  the  future,  he  said  "the  practical  applica- 
tions of  basic  human  rights  must  be  the  sine 
qua  non  condition  of  true  and  lasting  peace." 
He  saw  the  declaration  as  a  common  meeting 
ground  for  different  ideologies,  a  concept 
expressed  here  only  yesterday  in  the  con- 
structive and  thoughtful  statement  of  Am- 
bassador Rydbeck  of  Sweden. 

The  United  Nations  25  years  ago  was  re- 
stricted in  membership,  but  the  Third  Com- 
mittee was  careful  in  its  draft  to  produce  a 
comprehensive  document,  the  first  to  define 
from  a  truly  universal  standpoint  basic 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  to  which  all 
men  everywhere  are  entitled.  His  Excellency 
Carlos  Romulo,  now  the  distinguished  For- 
eign Minister  of  the  Philippines,  knew  that 
the  declaration  had  implications  that  tran- 
scended both  time  and  circumstances.  For 
him  and  many  others  its  enduring  signifi- 
cance lay  in  the  fact  that  the  declaration 
projects  one's  vision  beyond  the  present  to 
goals  which  are  desirable  for  all  men  every- 
where, not  only  now  but  also  in  the  future. 
"The  declaration,"  he  stated,  "foreshadows 
certain  high  and  noble  ends  which  although 
not  yet  fully  realized  in  many  places  in  the 
world  repi'esent  the  desire  for  progress  and 
unending  aspiration  of  the  human  spirit." 

Eleanor  Roosevelt  of  the  United  States 
agreed  and  described  the  declaration  as  a 
common  standard  of  achievement  for  all  peo- 
ples of  all  nations.  "The  General  Assembly," 
she  said,  "stands  at  the  threshold  of  a  great 
event  both  in  the  life  of  the  United  Nations 
and  in  the  life  of  mankind.  Behind  the 
declaration  lies  man's  desire  for  peace  and 
this  final  text  must  be  taken  as  a  testimony 


January  7,   1974 


T3 


of  common  aspiration  to  lift  men  everywhere 
to  a  higiier  standard  of  life  and  greater  en- 
joyment of  freedom."  Mrs.  Roosevelt  saw 
with  clarity  the  spiritual  fact  that  the  indi- 
vidual man  must  have  freedom  in  which  to 
develop  his  full  stature  and  that  the  achieve- 
ment of  many  individuals  would  raise  the 
level  of  human  dignity.  In  her  words,  "the 
adoption  of  the  declaration  is  indeed  a  great 
step  forward  but  it  is  also  a  time  to  rededi- 
cate  one's  efforts  to  the  unfinished  tasks 
which  lie  ahead." 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  must  refer  to  one  other 
statement  made  during  this  historic  debate. 
Then,  as  now,  the  Third  Committee  was 
guided  by  a  representative  of  Lebanon,  Mr. 
Charles  Malik.  After  having  led  the  Third 
Committee  through  85  meetings  of  discussion 
in  an  effort  to  arrive  at  the  final  text,  Mr. 
Malik  was  perhaps  in  a  better  position  than 
anyone  else  to  explain  the  importance  of  the 
declaration  for  humanity  and  the  individual 
human  being.  He  explained  that  for  the  first 
time  the  principles  of  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms  were  spelled  out  authori- 
tatively and  in  precise  detail.  Finally,  it  had 
become  clear  to  him  what  his  government 
had  pledged  itself  to  promote,  achieve,  and 
observe  when  it  signed  the  Charter  of  the 
U.N.  Now  as  an  individual  he  felt  that  with 
the  declaration  as  a  constant  guide  he  could 
work  to  have  his  government  fulfill  its  pledge 
because  the  declaration  could  serve  as  a 
potent  critic  of  existing  conditions  and  a 
catalyst  to  help  transform  reality. 

In  concluding  his  remarks  Mr.  Malik  made 
a  personal  commitment  which  should  con- 
tinue to  guide  us.  He  said,  and  I  quote, 
"What  we  are,  therefore,  launching  forth 
tonight  is  a  document  of  the  first  order  of 
importance.  It  can  never  be  said,  from  now 
on,  that  the  conscience  of  organized,  respon- 
sible humanity  has  left  ambiguous  what  in- 
herently belongs  to  my  own  humanity.  If  I 
fail  to  take  full  advantage  of  this  responsible 
proclamation,  it  will  be  my  fault." 

Twenty-five  years  later  the  world  has 
changed  in  many  ways,  but  the  importance  of 
this  document  has  been  confirmed  by  inter- 
vening events  and  its  universality  is  now 
recognized  in  principle  although,  regrettably. 


its  provisions  are  not  universally  applied  in 
practice. 

Seventy-seven  countries  have  joined  the 
U.N.  in  the  last  25  years,  and  no  part  of  this 
world  has  escaped  the  shock  waves  generated 
by  the  aspirations  of  all  for  freedom  and 
equality.  With  the  withdrawal  of  the  former 
metropolitan  powers,  the  newly  independent 
governments  now  have  the  responsibility  for 
assuring  the  enjoyment  of  human  rights  by 
their  own  people.  Many  countries  have 
adopted  sections  of  the  declaration  in  their 
constitutions.  The  movement  to  greater  free- 
dom and  equality  has  indeed  been  the  most 
characteristic  social  force  of  the  last  quarter 
century. 

While  the  world  has  praised  and  sometimes 
implemented  the  ideals  contained  in  the  dec- 
laration, we  are  still  too  far  from  a  world  in 
which  human  rights  are  everywhere  observed 
by  individuals  and  protected  by  governments. 
Serious  violations  remain  all  too  prevalent, 
even  in  countries  whose  governments  pay  ful- 
some tribute  to  the  ideals  of  the  universal 
declaration.  It  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
governments  here  assembled  each  to  renew 
their  dedication  to  the  achievement  of  all  of 
the  goals  set  forth  in  the  declaration. 

The  United  States  has  historically  at- 
tached the  greatest  importance  to  the  mainte- 
nance and  expansion  of  civil  and  political 
rights,  but  at  no  time  more  than  in  the  past 
25  years.  The  declaration  played  an  impor- 
tant part  in  creating  the  environment  that 
made  possible  the  subsequent  success  of  the 
civil  rights  struggle  in  my  own  country.  I 
would  add  that  the  United  States  attaches 
equal  importance  to  the  achievement  of  the 
goals  of  economic  and  social  rights  as  con- 
tained in  the  declaration. 

In  concluding,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like 
to  refer  to  one  of  the  many  areas  in  which 
practice  falls  conspicuously  short  of  the 
ideals  of  the  universal  declaration.  Twenty- 
five  years  ago  the  members  of  this  committee 
sought  to  achieve,  among  other  goals,  the 
elimination  of  racism  and  racial  discrimina- 
tion. Unfortunately,  the  passage  of  a  quarter 
of  a  century  has  been  insufficient  to  eliminate 
this  deep-rooted  evil  from  the  world.  It  is 
therefore   appropriate   that   this   committee 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


has  decided  to  launch  the  Decade  to  Combat 
Racism  and  Racial  Discrimination  on  De- 
cember 10,  1973,  the  anniversary  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 

Twenty-five  yea'-s  have  proved  again  and 
again  the  truth  of  Rene  Cassin's  observation 
— the  world  cannot  live  in  peace  as  long  as 
human  rights  are  flagrantly  violated.  To 
achieve  peace  both  within  national  borders 
and  among  nations,  governments  must  not 
only  pay  lipservice  to  the  universal  declara- 
tion, they  must  live  by  its  provisions. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  ' 

The  Genera!  Assembly, 

Recalling  that  in  its  resolution  2860  (XXVI)  of 
20  December  1971  it  expressed  its  conviction  of  the 
historic  significance  and  enduring  value  of  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  of  Human  Rights  as  a  common 
standard  of  achievement  for  all  peoples  and  all 
nations  and  its  desire  to  mark,  in  1973,  the  twenty- 
fifth  anniversary  of  the  Declaration  in  a  manner 
which  would  fit  the  occasion  and  serve  the  cause  of 
human  rights, 

Also  recalling  that  in  its  resolution  2906  (XXVII) 
of  19  October  1972,  it  reaffirmed  its  adherence  to  the 
principles,  values  and  ideals  contained  in  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  and  approved  a 
programme  of  suitable  activities  which  could  be 
undertaken  in  observance  of  the  twenty-fifth  anni- 
versary of  the  Declaration, 

Recalling  its  resolution  2919    (XXVII)   of  15  No- 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/3060  (XXVIII);  adopted  by  the 
Assembly  without  objection  on  Nov.  2.  On  Dec.  10 
the  General  Assembly  held  a  special  meeting  to  com- 
memorate the  25th  anniversary  of  the  declaration,  in 
the  course  of  which  U.N.  Human  Rights  Prizes  were 
awarded. 


vember  1972  in  which  it  decided  to  launch  the  Decade 
for  Action  to  Combat  Racism  and  Racial  Discrimina- 
tion and  to  inaugurate  the  activities  thereof  on  10 
December  1973,  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights, 

Regretting  that  there  are  still  many  objectives  of 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  which 
have  not  yet  been  implemented  and  urging  renewed 
commitment  by  all  peoples  and  all  nations  towards 
achieving  this  end. 

Having  examined  the  progress  report  submitted  by 
the  Secretary-General  in  accordance  with  resolution 
2906   (XXVII), 

Noting  with  satisfaction  the  measures  and  activi- 
ties undertaken  or  contemplated  in  connexion  with 
the  programme  for  the  observance  of  the  twenty- 
fifth  anniversary  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights, 

1.  Urges  Governments,  the  specialized  agencies 
and  other  intergovernmental  organizations,  and  non- 
governmental organizations  in  consultative  status 
with  the  Economic  and  Social  Council,  to  rededicate 
themselves  during  and  after  the  observance  of  the 
twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights  to  adopting  further  measures 
designed  to  serve  the  cause  of  human  rights  and  the 
implementation   of   the   Declaration; 

2.  Invites  States  which  have  not  yet  done  so  to 
ratify  the  international  instruments  concluded  in  the 
field  of  human  rights,  in  particular  the  following: 

(a)  International  Convention  on  the  Elimination 
of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimination; 

(6)  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights  and  Optional  Protocol; 

(c)  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social 
and  Cultural  Rights; 

3.  Urges  the  world  community  to  celebrate  the 
twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights  in  such  a  way  as  to  contribute 
in  a  significant  manner  to  the  realization  of  the  prin- 
ciples, values  and  ideals  contained  in  the  Declaration 
for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind. 


January  7,    1974 


15 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  ^ 


Scheduled  January  Through  March 

ECAFE  Committee  on   Trade:    17th  Session 

U.N.  ECOSOC:  Organizational  Meetings  of  56th  Session 

IMCO  Panel  of  Experts  on  Maritime  Satellites 

ECAFE  Transport  and  Communications  Committee     .     .  ... 

OECD  Executive  Committee 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Committee  for  Program  and  Coordination     .... 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Commission  on  the  Status  of  Women:  25th  Session     . 

UNDP   Governing   Council:    17th    Session 

OECD  Trade  Committee  Group  on  Preferences 

ECAFE  Transport  and  Communications  Committee 

WHO  Executive  Board:  53d  Session 

WIPO  Committee  of  Experts  on  Legal  Protection  of  Computer  Pro- 
grams. 

FAO   Intergovernmental   Group  on  Citrus .  Fruits 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Ship  Design  and  Equipment:  11th  Session     . 

IMCO   Legal  Committee:    21st  Session 

UNESCO  Conference  of  Ministers  of  the  African  Member  States 
Responsible  for  the  Application  of  Science  and  Technology. 

ICAO  Panel  on  .Application  of  Space  Techniques  Relating  to  Aviation 

UNESCO/IBE  Council 

Inter-American  Council  for  Education,  Science  and  Culture     .     .     . 

NATO  Allied  Radio  Frequency  Agency:  6th  Joint  Civil-Military 
Meeting. 

OECD  Working  Group  on  Listing  of  Securities 

ECE  Inland  Transport  Committee 

OECD    Manpower  and    Social   Affairs   Committee 

Inter-American  Permanent  Executive  Committee  of  the  Council  for 
Education,  Science  and  Culture:  7th  Meeting. 

ECAFE  Committee  on  Industry  and  Natural  Resources 

ICAO  Aircraft  Accident  Data  Reporting  Panel:  2d  Meeting     .     .     . 

ITU/CCIR  Study  Groups 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee 

ICES/FAO/IOC  Coordination  Group  for  the  Cooperative  Investiga- 
tions of  the  Northern  Part  of  Eastern  Central  Atlantic:  3d  Joint 
Session. 

U.N.  Committee  on  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  Working  Group  on 
Remote  Sensing  of  the  Earth  by  Satellites. 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Commission  on  Narcotic  Drugs 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Safety  of  Fishing  Vessels:  15th  Session     .     . 

ICAO  North  Atlantic  Ocean  System  Planning  Group 

WMO/ICAO  Joint   Financing  Conference 

OECD  Trade  Committee 


Bangkok 

New  York  . 
London   . 
Bangkok 

Paris       .  . 

New  York  . 

New  York  . 

New  York  . 

Paris  .  . 
Bangkok 

Geneva   .  . 

Geneva   .  . 

Rome 

London   .  . 

London   .  . 

Dakar     .  . 

Montreal 
Geneva   .     . 
Santo  Domingo 
Brussels 

Paris  .  . 
Geneva  .  . 
Paris  .  . 
Undetermined 


Bangkok 
Montreal 
Geneva   . 
Paris 
Rome 


New  York 


Geneva 
London 
Geneva 
Geneva 
Paris 


Jan. 
Jan. 
Jan. 
Jan. 


4-14 
7-9 
7-11 
8-15 


Jan.  10-11 

Jan.  10-11 

Jan.  14-15 

Jan.  14-Feb.  1 

Jan.  15-16 

Jan.  15-22 

Jan.  15-25 

Jan.  15-25 

Jan.  17-19 

Jan.  21-25 

Jan.  21-25 

Jan.  21-30 

Jan.  21-Feb.  1 
Jan.  22-25 
Jan.  26-Feb.  1 
Jan.  28-30 

Jan.  28 

Jan.  28-Feb.  1 
Jan.  29-Feb.  1 
January 

Feb.  1-11 
Feb.  4-15 
Feb.  5-Mar.  20 
Feb.  11 
Feb.  11-15 


Feb.  11-Mar.  1 

Feb.  17-Mar.  1 
Feb.  18-22 
Feb.  18-25 
Feb.  18-Mar.  1 
Feb.  19-20 


'This  schedule,  which  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences  on  December  11,  lists  inter- 
national conferences  in  which  the  U.S.  Government  expects  to  participate  officially  in  the  period  January-March 
1974.  Nongovernmental  conferences  are  not  included. 

Following  is  a  key  to  the  abbreviations:  CCIR,  International  Radio  Consultative  Committee;  ECAFE, 
Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East;  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for  Europe;  ECOSOC,  Economic 
and  Social  Council;  FAO,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  IBE,  International  Bureau  of  Education;  ICAO, 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ICES,  International  Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea;  ICRC, 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross;  IMCO,  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consultative  Organization; 
IOC,  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  Commission;  ITU,  International  Telecommunication  Union;  NATO, 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization;  OECD,  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development; 
UNCTAD,  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development;  UNDP,  United  Nations  Development  Pro- 
gram; UNESCO,  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization;  WHO,  World  Health  Or- 
ganization; WIPO,  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ICRC  Diplomatic  Conference  on  Humanitarian  Law  Applicable  in 
Armed  Conflicts. 

IMCO  Ad  Hoc  Working  Group  on  Revision  of  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea: 
2d  Session. 

UNESCO  Meeting  on  the  Implementation  of  the  Recommendations 
of  the  Conference  of  Asian  Ministers  of  Education. 

UNESCO/IOC  International  Coordination  Group  for  the  Tsunami 
Warning  System  in  the  Pacific. 

UNCTAD/FAO   Meeting   on   Tea 

U.N.  Environment  Program  Intergovernmental  Working  Group  on 
Environmental  Programs. 

Inter-American  Economic  and  Social  Council:  9th  Annual  Meeting 

IMCO  Marine  Environment  Protection  Committee:   1st  Session 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Lifesaving  Appliances:  7th  Session     . 

U.N.   Environment  Program  Governing  Council:   2d  Session     . 

IMCO    Legal   Committee:    22d    Session 

IMCO  Maritime   Safety  Committee:   .'^Oth  Session 

ECE  Symposium  on  Application  of  Automation  and  Computer  Tech- 
niques for  Planning  and  Management  of  River  Basins. 

Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East:  Plenary  Session     . 

UNESCO/IOC  Working  Group  on  Training,  Education  and  Mutual 
Assistance:  2d  Session. 

WIPO  Joint  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  the  International  Patent  Classi- 
fication, Strasbourg  Agreement. 

OECD   Oil  Committee   High-Level   Group 

U.N.  ECOSOC  Committee  on  Science  and  Technology  for  Develop- 
ment: 2d  Session. 


Geneva Feb.  20-Mar.  29 

London Feb.  25-Mar.  1 

Manila February 

Wellington       .     .     .  February 

Rome February 

Nairobi February 

Brasilia       ....  February 

London Mar.  4-8 

London Mar.  11-15 

Nairobi Mar.  11-22 

London Mar.  18-22 

London Mar.  25-29 

Washington     .     .     .  Mar.  26-Apr.  4 


Colombo  .  .  . 
Undetermined 

.     Mar.  27-Apr 
.     March 

Undetermined 

.     March 

Paris  .... 
New  York   .     .     . 

.     March 
.     March 

United   Nations   Documents: 
A  Selected   Bibliography 

Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as 
those  listed  beloiv)  may  be  consxdted  at  depository 
libraries  in  the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publica- 
tions may  be  purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the 
United  Nations,  United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y.  10017. 

Security  Council 

Progress  Report  of  the  Secretary  General  on  the 
United  Nations  Emergency  Force.  S/11056.  Oc- 
tober 28,  1973.   3  pp. 

Report  of  the  Secretary  General  on  the  status  of  the 
cease-fire  observation  operations  in  the  Middle 
East.    S/11057.    October  29,   1973.    4  pp. 

Report  by  the  Secretary  General  on  the  United  Na- 
tions operation  in  Cyprus,  for  the  period  June  1- 
December  1,  1973.  S/11137.  December  1,  1973.  27 
pp. 

General  Assembly 

International  Law  Commission.  Most-favoured-na- 
tion clause.  Digest  of  decisions  of  national  courts 
relating  to  the  most-favoured-nation  clause,  pre- 
pared by  the  Secretariat.  A/CN.4/269.  March  29, 
1973.   93  pp. 

Report  of  the  International  i^aw  Commission  on  the 
work  of  its  25th  session.  May  7-July  13,  1973. 
A/9010.    July  23,  1973.    198  pp. 


Report  of  the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament on  its  deliberations  for  the  period  Feb- 
ruary 20-August  30,  1973.  A/9141.  September  7, 
1973.    280  pp. 

Cooperation  between  the  United  Nations  and  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity.  Report  of  the  Sec- 
retary General.   A/91fi2.    September  26,  1973. 

Respect  for  human  rights  in  armed  conflicts.  Exist- 
ing rules  of  international  law  concerning  the  pro- 
hibition or  restriction  of  use  of  specific  weapons. 
Survey  prepared  by  the  Secretariat.  A/9215.  No- 
vember 7,  1973.    VoL  I,  210  pp.    Vol.  II,  88  pp. 

Letter  from  the  Permanent  Representative  of 
Algeria  transmitting  documents  of  the  Fourth  Con- 
ference of  Heads  of  State  or  Government  of  Non- 
Aligned  Countries,  held  at  Algiers  September  5-9, 
1973.   A/9330.    November  22,  1973.    100  pp. 


Economic  and  Social  Council 

Report  of  the  Governing  Council  of  the  United  Na- 
tions Development  Program  on  its  16th  session, 
June  6-29,  1973.  E/5365.  July  3,  1973.  82  pp. 
Institutional  arrangements  for  the  implementation 
of  special  measures  in  favour  of  the  least  devel- 
oped among  the  developing  countries,  including  the 
need  for  the  creation  of  a  special  fund  for  these 
countries.  Note  by  the  Secretary  General.  E/5416. 
September  14,  1973. 
Population    Commission: 

World  Population  Conference,  1974.  Substantive 
preparations  for  the  conference.  Progress  re- 
port of  the  Secretary  General  of  the  conference. 
E/CN.9/281.    September  24,  1973.    13  pp. 


January  7,    1974 


17 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


balance  in  the  bilateral  exchange  of  benefits 
and  to  permit  both  sides  to  reevaluate  this 
exchange  after  a  period  of  operations  by  the 
airlines  of  the  two  countries. 


U.S.   and   Romania   Sign   Agreements 
on   Aviation,   Fisheries,   and   Taxes 

ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  AVIATION  AGREEMENT 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  De- 
cember 4  (press  release  436)  that  the  United 
States  and  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Romania 
on  that  day  signed  at  Washington  a  bilateral 
air  transport  agreement.  Secretary  Kissinger 
signed  for  the  U.S.  Government  and  George 
Macovescu,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
signed  for  the  Government  of  Romania.  At 
the  same  time,  formal  letters  were  exchanged 
incorporating  certain  understandings  re- 
garding implementation  of  the  agreement. 
(For  texts  of  the  agreement  and  the  ex- 
change of  letters,  see  press  release  436.) 

The  new  bilateral  agreement  will  provide 
the  formal  framework  for  the  continuation, 
and  possible  future  expansion,  of  Pan  Amer- 
ican World  Airways  operations  to  Bucharest 
and  the  inauguration  of  service  to  the  United 
States  by  the  Romanian  national  airline, 
TAROM.  Pan  American  has  been  serving 
the  Romanian  capital  since  April  1971  on  the 
basis  of  a  unilateral  permit  issued  by  the 
Government  of  Romania,  while  TAROM 
plans  to  begin  .scheduled  service  to  New  York 
during  1974  with  the  new  Boeing  707  air- 
craft it  has  recently  purchased. 

Under  the  new  agreement,  U.S.  designated 
airlines  will  be  authorized  to  serve  Bucharest 
(and  beyond  Romania  to  points  in  the  Near 
East  and  beyond)  via  various  intermediate 
points  in  Europe,  while  Romanian  desig- 
nated airlines  will  be  able  to  operate  to  New 
York  via  intermediate  stops  at  several  Euro- 
pean points  and  Montreal.  The  letters  ex- 
changed set  forth  the  actual  commercial  op- 
portunities to  be  enjoyed  by  the  airlines  of 
both  sides  under  the  agreement.  The  ar- 
rangements agreed  to  in  these  letters  are 
designed   to   maintain   a   reasonable   overall 


ANNOUNCEMENT   OF  FISHERIES  AGREEMENT 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
December  4  (press  release  437)  that  the 
United  States  and  the  Socialist  Republic  of 
Romania  on  that  day  signed  at  Washington 
a  bilateral  agreement  regarding  fisheries  in 
the  western  region  of  the  Middle  Atlantic 
Ocean.  (For  text  of  the  agreement,  see  press 
release  437.)  Secretary  Kissinger  signed  for 
the  U.S.  Government  and  George  Macovescu, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Aff'airs,  signed  for  the 
Government  of  Romania. 

The  new  agreement  emphasizes  the  need 
to  conserve  important  fishery  resources  in 
the  waters  adjacent  to  the  U.S.  Atlantic 
coast.  The  organization  and  expansion  of 
scientific  and  technical  research  pertaining 
to  species  of  interest,  the  exchange  of  rele- 
vant scientific  data,  and  the  facilitation  of 
joint  scientific  meetings  are  provided  for. 

Under  the  agreement,  terms  are  estab- 
lished for  Romanian  fishing  vessels  to  call 
at  the  ports  of  Baltimore,  New  York,  and 
Philadelphia  to  replenish  provisions,  obtain 
necessary  repairs,  and  provide  for  crew  rest. 
Romanian  fi.shing  vessels  are  permitted  to 
exchange  their  entire  crews  once  each  year 
in  the  port  of  New  York.  Within  two  areas 
of  the  nine-mile  fishery  zone  contiguous  to 
the  territorial  sea  of  the  United  States,  Ro- 
manian fishing  vessels  are  authorized  to  con- 
duct loading  operations  during  specified  pe- 
riods of  the  year.  Additionally,  the  U.S. 
Government  agreed  to  facilitate  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Romanian  fisheries  agent  in 
the  port  of  New  York. 

The  Government  of  Romania  agreed  to 
restrict  the  operations  of  its  fishing  vessels 
in  several  meaningful  ways  so  as  to  provide 
additional  protection  for  valuable  species  of 
interest  to  U.S.  fishermen.  Romanian  fishing 
vessels  will  refrain  from  conducting  special- 
ized fisheries  for  certain  species,  will  refrain 
from  fishing  in  two  areas  adjacent  to  the  At- 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lantic  coast  during  extended  periods  of  time, 
and  will  in  certain  other  areas  employ  fishing 
gear  that  is  incapable  of  catching  ground 
fish  of  particular  commercial  interest  to 
American  fishermen.  Assurances  are  given 
that  Romanian  fishing  vessels  will  refrain 
from  the  intentional  catching  of  lobster  and 
will  return  all  lobster  caught  to  the  sea. 


ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  INCOME  TAX  TREATY 

Department  of  the  Treasury  press  release  dated  December  4 

The  Treasury  Department  announced  on 
December  4  the  signing  of  an  income  tax 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Romania.  The  treaty 
was  signed  on  that  day  at  Washington  by 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  George  P.  Shultz 
and  by  Vice  President  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  and  President  of  the  State  Plan- 
ning Committee  of  Romania,  Manea  Manes- 
cu. 

The  tax  convention  seeks  to  promote  eco- 
nomic and  cultural  relations  between  the 
two  countries  by  removing  tax  barriers  to 
the  flow  of  investment  and  individuals. 

The  new  treaty  is  similar  to  recent  U.S. 
tax  conventions  with  European  countries.  It 
incorporates  the  same  basic  principles  with 
respect  to  the  taxation  of  business  income, 
personal  service  income,  and  income  from 
investments  and  similar  provisions  for  re- 
ciprocal administrative  cooperation.  It  also 
assures  nondiscriminatory  tax  treatment. 
Citizens  and  permanent  establishments  of 
residents  of  one  nation  may  not  be  subject  to 
more  burdensome  taxation  in  the  other  na- 
tion than  that  nation's  own  nationals  and 
businesses. 

Under  the  new  U.S.-Romania  tax  treaty, 
each  country  agrees  to  reduce  its  withhold- 
ing taxes  on  interest  and  cultural  royalties 
derived  by  residents  of  the  other  country  to 
not  more  than  10  percent,  except  that  inter- 
est paid  to  the  other  government  or  on  loans 
granted  by  or  guaranteed  by  a  government 
instrumentality  will  be  exempt  from  tax  at 
the  source.  The  maximum  rate  on  industrial 
royalties  will  be  15  percent. 

In  addition,  the  treaty  provides  for  a  re- 


ciprocal withholding  rate  of  not  more  than 
10  percent  on  dividends.  This  maintains  the 
present  Romanian  statutory  rate,  which  in 
combination  with  their  corporate  tax  on 
mixed  corporations  (now  30  percent)  is 
within  the  limits  of  the  U.S.  foreigiT  tax 
credit.  Equipment  rentals  will  no  longer  be 
subject  to  the  Romanian  withholding  tax  of 
20  percent  but  will  be  subject  to  tax  only  if 
connected  with  a  Romanian  office  (perma- 
nent establishment). 

The  new  tax  treaty  also  provides  that  per- 
formers covered  by  a  specific  cultural  ex- 
change arrangement  will  be  exempt  from 
tax  in  the  host  country,  while  other  per- 
formers will  be  exempt  from  tax  if  they 
remain  less  than  three  months  and  earn 
less  than  $3,000. 

The  tax  convention  is  subject  to  approval 
by  the  U.S.  Senate.  It  would  take  effect  as 
of  January  1,  1974,  and  would  remain  in 
force  for  a  minimum  of  five  years.  It  then 
would  continue  in  force  indefinitely  unless 
terminated  by  either  nation. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Biological   Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  development, 
production  and  stockpiling  of  bacteriological  (bio- 
logical) and  toxin  weapons  and  on  their  destruc- 
tion. Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow 
April  10,  1972.' 

Ratification  deposited:   Costa   Rica,  December  17, 
1973. 

Exhibitions 

Protocol  revising  the  convention  of  November  22, 
1928,  relating  to  international  expositions,  with  ap- 
pendix and  annex  (TIAS  6548).  Done  at  Paris  No- 
vember 30,  1972.' 

Ratified  by  the  President:  December  18, 1973  (with 
reservation). 

Meteorology 

Agreement  on  the  GARP  (Global  Atmospheric  Re- 
search Program)  Atlantic  Tropical  Experiment 
(GATE)  between  the  World  Meteorological  Orga- 
nization, the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Sene- 
gal, and  other  member  states  of  the  World  Mete- 
orological   Organization    participating   in   the    ex- 

'  Not  in  force. 


January  7,    1974 


19 


periment.     Done    at   Geneva   June    27,    1973.    En- 
tered into  force  June  27,  1973. 
Notification  of  acceptance :  United  States,  Novem- 
ber 30,  1973    (with  understandings). 
Entered  into  force  for  the  United  States:    Novem- 
ber 30,  1973. 

North  Atlantic  Treaty — Status  of  Forces — Germany 

Agreement  to  amend  the  agreement  of  August  3, 
1959  (TIAS  5351),  to  supplement  the  agreement 
between  the  parties  to  the  North  Atlantic  treaty 
regarding  the  status  of  their  forces  with  respect 
to  foreign  forces  stationed  in  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany.  Done  at  Bonn  October  21,  1971. 
Ratification    deposited:    Belgium,     December     19, 

1973. 
Enters  into  force:  January  18,  1974. 

Oil  Pollution 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  1954,  as 
amended  (TIAS  4900,  6109).  Adopted  at  London 
October  21,  1969.' 

Acceptance    deposited:    Australia,    Novepiber    7, 
1973. 

International  convention  relating  to  intervention  on 
the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil  pollution  casualties, 
with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  November  8,  1973. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960   (TIAS  5780).    Adopted 
at  London  November  26,  1968.' 
Acceptance    deposited:     Switzerland,     October     1, 
1973. 


BILATERAL 

Mauritius 

Agreement  regarding  the  provision  of  facilities  for 
U.S.  Air  Force  aircraft  at  Plaisance  Airfield  in 
connection  with  the  Apollo  project,  with  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  Port  Louis  September  3,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  September  3,  1968.  TIAS  6576. 
Terminated:  October  29,  1973. 

Mexico 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport  agreement  of 
August  15,  1960,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
4675,  7167).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  December  5,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  December  5,  1973. 


PUBLICATIONS 


'  Not  in  force. 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Pitblicatioyis  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Bookstore,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  B.C. 
20520.  A  25-percent  discottnt  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below  include  domestic  postage. 

The  United  States  and  Japan:  Prime  Minister  Tana- 
ka's  Washington  Visit,  July  31-August  1,  1973,  and 
the  Tokyo  Meeting  of  the  Joint  U.S.-Japan  Commit- 
tee on  Trade  and  Economic  Affairs,  July  16-17,  1973. 

Documentation  relating  to  the  above-mentioned  meet- 
ings was  reprinted  from  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  of  August  27  and  August  13,  1973,  respec- 
tively. Pub.  8740.  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 
Series  210.   23  pp.    SO^*.    (Cat.  No.  S1.38:210). 

Certificates  of  Airworthiness  for  Imported  Aircraft. 

Agreement  with  Belgium.  TIAS  7675.  9  pp.  25(?. 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:7675). 

Reciprocal  Fishing  Privileges.  Agreement  with  Can- 
ada.  TIAS  7676.    11  pp.    25t    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7676). 

Military  Assistance — Deposits  Under  Foreign  As- 
sistance Act  of  1971.  Agreement  with  Sudan.  TIAS 
7677.   3  pp.    25t    (Cat.  No.  S9.10:7677). 

Defense — Electrical  Substation.  Agreement  with  the 
Philippines.  TIAS  7680.  3  pp.  25('.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10: 
7680). 

Amendment  of  Articles  of  Agreement  of  the  Interna- 
tional Finance  Corporation.  TIAS  7683.  2  pp.  25«f. 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:7683). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Thailand 
amending  the  agreement  of  March  17,  1972.  TIAS 
7685.   9  pp.    25('-.    (Cat.  No.  S9.10:7685). 

Continuance  of  LInited  States  Military  Rights  and 
Maritime  Practices  in  the  Bahamas.  Agreement  with 
the  Bahamas.  TIAS  7688.  3  pp.  25('.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:7688). 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  Mexico  ex- 
tending the  agreement  of  August  15,  1960,  as 
amended  and  extended.  TIAS  7691.  3  pp.  25^.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:7691). 


20 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX      January  7,  197!,      Vol.  LXX,  No.  1802 


Economic  Affairs.  U.S.  and  Romania  Si^ 
Agreements  on  Aviation,  Fisheries,  and 
Taxes 18 

Human  Rights 

Bill   of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights   Day  and 

Week    (proclamation) 12 

U.N.  Observes  25th  Anniversary  of  Human 
Rights  Declaration  (Kitchen,  text  of  resolu- 
tion)                13 

India.    U.S.   and   India   Initial   Agreement  on 

U.S.  Holdings  of  Indian  Rupees 12 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences. 

Calendar  of  International  Conferences     .     .         16 

Presidential  Documents 

Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights   Day  and 

Week    (proclamation) 12 

President  Ceausescu  of  Romania  Visits  the 
United    States 1 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  ....        20 

Romania 

President  Ceausescu  of  Romania  Visits  the 
United  States  (Ceausescu,  Nixon,  joint 
statement  of  principles,  joint  statement  on 
economic  cooperation,  joint  communique)     .  1 

U.S.  and  Romania  Sign  Agreements  on  Avia- 
tion, Fisheries,  and  Taxes 18 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 19 

U.S.  and  Romania  Sign  Agreements  on  Avia- 
tion, Fisheries,  and  Taxes 18 

United  Nations 

United   Nations    Documents 17 

U.N.  Observes  25th  Anniversary  of  Human 
Rights  Declaration  (Kitchen,  text  of  resolu- 
tion)                13 


Name  Index 

Ceausescu,    Nicolae 1 

Kitchen,  Robert  W.,  Jr 13 

Nixon,   President 1,  12 


Check   List  of   Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  December  17-23 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  December  17  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos. 
436  and  437  of  December  4. 


.Subjec't 

Kissinger:     departure     remarks, 

Tel  Aviv. 
U.S.  and  Haiti  sign  cotton  textile 

agreement. 
Northwest     Atlantic      Fisheries 

Advisory  Committee,  Jan.  3. 
Advisory  Committee  on  the  Law 

of  the   Sea,  Jan.   10-12. 
Kissinger:  arrival  remarks.  Lis- 
bon, Dec.  17. 
Joint  U.S.-Portugal  communique, 

Dec.  18. 
Joint     U.S.-Spain     communique, 

Dec.  19. 
Kissinger:    message    to    Foreign 

Minister  Lopez  Rodo  of  Spain 

on  the  death  of  Prime  Minister 

Carrero  Blanco. 
"Foreign   Relations"   volume    on 

China    for    1948    (for    release 

Dec.  28). 
U.N.  Liner  Shipping  Conference 

completes  first  session. 
Multilateral     multifiber     textile 

arrangement. 
Martin   named    U.S.    coordinator 

for    World    Food    Conference 

(rewrite). 
McGuire  sworn  in   as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Mali  (biographic  data). 
Kissinger:     Middle     East    Peace 

Conference,  Geneva,  Dec.  21. 
Kissinger:      arrival      statement, 

Geneva,  Dec.  20. 


Xo. 

Date 

t456 

12/17 

■'457 

12/18 

*458 

12/19 

*459 

12/19 

t460 

12/20 

t461 

12/20 

t462 

12/20 

*463 

12/20 

1464     12/21 


t465 
+466 
t467 

*468 
t469 
t470 


12/21 
12/21 
12/21 

12/21 
12/22 
12/22 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent    of    Documents 
U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON.    D.C.    20402 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


POSTAGE   AND   PEES   PAID 
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service,  please  renew  your  subscription  promptly 
when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  re- 
quired to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3 
months  in  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  prob- 
lems involving  your  subscription  will  receive  im- 
mediate attention  if  you  write  to:  Director,  Office 
of  Media  Services  (PA/MS),  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


I 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume  LXX         •         No.  1803         •         January  14,  1974 


MIDDLE  EAST  PEACE  CONFERENCE  OPENS  IN  GENEVA 
Statements  by  Secretary  Kissingei-     21 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER  VISITS  MIDDLE  EAST  AND  EUROPE     ^5 

GENERAL  ASSEMBLY  ADOPTS  RESOLUTION  ON  FINANCING 

U.N.  EMERGENCY  FORCE  IN  THE  MIDDLE  EAST 
Statements  by  Congressman  Buchanan  and  Text  of  Resolution     29 


THE   OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1803 
January  14,  1974 


Fof  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington.  D.C.  20402 

PRICE; 

52  issues  plus  semiannual  indexes, 

domestic  $29.80.  foreign  $37.25 

Single  copy  60  cents 

Use    of    funds    for    printing    this    publication 

approved    by    the    Director    of    the    Office    of 

Management   and   Budget    (January  29,   1971). 

Note:    Contents    of   this    publication    are    not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE    BULLETIN    as    the    source    will    be 

appreciated.     The    BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


rite  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  ttte  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  tfie  government 
witft  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  and 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  and 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  tlie  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements,  addresses, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  the  functions 
of  the  Department.  Information  is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
national agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  or  may  become  a 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  of 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  and 
legislative  material  in  the  field  of 
international  relations  are  also  listed. 


Middle  East  Peace  Conference  Opens  in  Geneva 


Secretary  Kissinger  headed  the  U.S.  dele- 
yation  to  the  opening  of  the  Middle  East 
Peace  Conference  in  Geneva  December  21- 
22.  Following  are  texts  of  his  statement 
made  upon  arrival  in  Geneva  on  December 
20  and  his  statement  before  the  conference 
on  December  21. 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT 

Press  release  470  dated  December  22 

I  have  come  to  Geneva  today,  at  the  behest 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
cause  of  peace. 

The  fate  of  Arabs  and  Jews  has  been  inex- 
tricably linked  throughout  their  history,  ris- 
ing and  falling  together.  In  recent  centuries 
both  had  been  reduced  to  an  equally  cruel 
state — the  one  dispersed  and  persecuted 
throughout  the  world,  the  other  deprived  of 
autonomy  and  freedom  in  its  own  former 
empire.  But  over  the  past  quarter  century 
both  have  stood  on  the  verge  of  overcoming 
their  past,  no  longer  restrained  by  outside 
forces  but  by  their  struggle  with  one  another. 
Thus,  in  the  land  of  Arabs  and  Jews,  where 
the  reality  of  mistrust  and  hate  so  tragically 
contradicts  the  spiritual  message  which  orig- 
inates there,  it  is  essential  for  the  voice  of 
reconciliation  to  be  heard. 

The  war  that  began  last  October  6,  like  its 
three  predecessors,  proved  the  futility  of 
military  solutions.  There  is  no  acceptable 
alternative  to  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the 
issues  so  long  in  dispute  and  to  a  determina- 
tion on  the  part  of  all  the  parties  who  will 
assemble  here  tomorrow  to  make  these  nego- 
tiations succeed. 

For  its  part,  the  United  States  comes  here 
with  that  determination.  President  Nixon 
has  instructed  me  to  engage  the  influence  and 


resources  of  the  United  States  in  a  major 
effort  to  achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in 
the  Middle  East.  I  shall  carry  out  my  in- 
structions with  all  my  heart  and  all  my 
energy. 

In  my  meetings  with  Arab  and  Israeli 
leaders  over  the  course  of  the  past  10  days  I 
found  none  who  wanted  the  war  to  continue, 
none  who  would  not  recognize  that  now  is  the 
time  to  break  the  cycle  of  uneasy  truce  and 
violent  war. 

Upon  us  and  what  we  do  here  depend  the 
lives  and  hopes  of  people,  and  it  is  to  the 
people  we  shall  have  to  answer  should  we 
fail.  The  Middle  East,  whose  dramatic, 
tragic,  and  heroic  peoples  have  .  produced 
three  great  faiths,  is  challenged  today  to 
another  act  of  faith — that  hatred  can  give 
way  to  reconciliation;  that  peace  can  become 
our  purpose,  compromise  our  method,  and 
hope  our  inspiration. 


STATEMENT  BEFORE  THE  CONFERENCE 

Press  release  469  dated  December  22 

Mr.  Secretary  General,  distinguished  For- 
eign Ministers,  delegates:  As  one  of  the  co- 
chairmen  of  this  conference,  let  me  express 
my  gratitude  to  the  United  Nations  and  to 
you  personally  for  providing  such  excellent 
facilities  for  the  conference,  for  convening 
it,  and  for  doing  us  all  the  honor  of  presiding 
at  this  historic  moment. 

We  are  convened  here  at  a  moment  of  his- 
toric opportunity  for  the  cause  of  peace  in 
the  Middle  East  and  for  the  cause  of  peace 
in  the  world.  For  the  first  time  in  a  genera- 
tion the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East  are  sit- 
ting together  to  turn  their  talents  to  the 
challenge  of  a  lasting  peace. 

All  of  us  must  have  the  wisdom  to  grasp 


January    14,    1974 


21 


this  moment — to  break  the  shackles  of  the 
past  and  to  create  at  last  a  new  hope  for  the 
future. 

Two  months  ago  what  we  now  refer  to  as 
the  fourth  Arab-Israeli  war  was  coming  to 
an  end.  Today  there  is  the  respite  of  an 
imperfect  cease-fire,  but  the  shadow  of  war 
still  hangs  over  the  Middle  East.  Either  we 
begin  today  the  process  of  correcting  the  con- 
ditions which  produced  that  conflict,  or  we 
doom  untold  tens  of  thousands  to  travail, 
sorrow,  and  further  inconclusive  bloodshed. 

When  the  history  of  our  era  is  written,  it 
will  speak  not  of  a  series  of  Arab-Israeli 
wars  but  of  one  war  broken  by  periods  of 
uneasy  armistices  and  temporary  cease-fires. 
That  war  has  already  lasted  25  years. 
Whether  future  histories  will  call  this  the  era 
of  the  25-year  Arab-Israeli  war,  or  the  30- 
year  war,  or  the  50-year  war,  rests  in  large 
measure  in  our  hands.  And  above  all,  it  rests 
in  the  hands  of  the  Israeli  and  Arab  govern- 
ments, not  only  those  whose  distinguished 
representatives  are  seated  around  this  table 
but  also  those  who  are  absent  and  who  we 
all  hope  will  join  us  soon. 

We  are  challenged  by  emotions  so  deeply 
felt — by  causes  so  passionately  believed  and 
pursued — that  the  tragic  march  from  cata- 
clysm to  cataclysm,  each  more  costly  and  in- 
decisive than  the  last,  sometimes  seems  pre- 
ordained. Yet  our  presence  here  today,  in 
itself  a  momentous  accomplishment,  is  a 
symbol  of  rejection  of  this  fatalistic  view. 
Respect  for  the  forces  of  history  does  not 
mean  blind  submission  to  those  forces. 

There  is  an  Arab  saying,  Elli  Fat  Mat, 
which  means  that  the  past  is  dead.  Let  us 
resolve  here  today  that  we  will  overcome  the 
legacy  of  hatred  and  suffering.  Let  us  over- 
come old  myths  with  new  hope.  Let  us  make 
the  Middle  East  worthy  of  the  messages  of 
hope  and  reconciliation  that  have  been 
carried  forward  from  its  stark  soil  by  three 
great  religions. 

Today  there  is  hope  for  the  future,  for  the 
conflict  is  no  longer  looked  upon  entirely  in 
terms  of  irreconcilable  absolutes.  The  pas- 
sionate ideologies  of  the  past  have,  in  part  at 
least,  been  replaced  by  a  recognition  that  all 


the  peoples  concerned  have  earned,  by  their 
sacrifice,  a  long  period  of  peace. 

From  two  recent  trips  through  the  Middle 
East  I  have  the  impression  that  people  on 
both  sides  have  had  enough  of  bloodshed.  No 
further  proof  of  heroism  is  necessary;  no 
military  point  remains  to  be  made.  The  Mid- 
dle East — so  often  the  source  of  mankind's 
inspiration — is  challenged  to  another  act  of 
hope  and  reconciliation,  significant  not  only 
for  its  own  peoples  but  for  all  mankind. 

What  does  each  side  seek?  Both  answer 
with  a  single  word:  peace.  But  peace  has  of 
course  a  concrete  meaning  for  each.  One  side 
seeks  the  recovery  of  sovereignty  and  the 
redress  of  grievances  suffered  by  a  displaced 
people.  The  other  seeks  security  and  recogni- 
tion of  its  legitimacy  as  a  nation.  The  com- 
mon goal  of  peace  must  surely  be  broad 
enough  to  embrace  all  these  aspirations. 

For  the  United  States,  our  objective  is 
such  a  peace. 

I  cannot  promise  success,  but  I  can  promise 
dedication.  I  cannot  guarantee  a  smooth 
journey  toward  our  goal.  I  can  assure  you  of 
an  unswerving  quest  for  justice. 

The  United  States  will  make  a  determined 
and  unflagging  effort. 

President  Nixon  has  sent  me  here  because 
for  five  years  he  has  endeavored  to  build  a 
new  structure  of  international  peace  in 
which  ties  with  old  friends  are  strengthened 
and  new  and  constructive  relationships  re- 
place distrust  and  confrontation  with  adver- 
saries. 

But  world  peace  remains  tenuous  and  in- 
complete so  long  as  the  Middle  East  is  in 
perpetual  crisis.  Its  turmoil  is  a  threat  to  the 
hopes  of  all  of  us  in  this  room. 

It  is  time  to  end  it. 

The  question  is  not  whether  there  must  be 
peace.  The  question  is:  How  do  we  achieve 
it?  What  can  we  do  here  to  launch  new  be- 
ginnings? 

First,  this  conference  must  speak  with  a 
clear  and  unequivocal  voice:  The  cease-fire 
called  for  by  the  Security  Council  must  be 
scrupulously  adhered  to  by  all  concerned. 
Prior  to  last  October,  the  United  States  did 
all  it  could  to  prevent  a  new  outbreak  of 


22 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


fighting.  But  we  failed  because  frustration 
could  no  longer  be  contained. 

After  the  fighting  began,  we,  in  concert 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  helped  bring  an  end 
to  the  hostilities  by  sponsoring  a  number  of 
resolutions  in  the  Security  Council.  The  six- 
point  agreement  of  November  11  consoli- 
dated the  cease-fire.  It  helped  create  the 
minimal  conditions  necessary  for  carrying 
forward  our  efforts  here.  All  these  resolu- 
tions and  agreements  must  be  strictly  imple- 
mented. 

But  regardless  of  these  steps,  we  recog- 
nize that  the  cease-fire  remains  fragile  and 
tentative.  The  United  States  is  concerned 
over  the  evidence  of  increased  military  pre- 
paredness in  recent  days.  A  renewal  of  hos- 
tilities would  be  both  foolhardy  and  danger- 
ous. We  urge  all  concerned  to  refrain  from 
the  use  of  force  and  to  give  our  efforts  here 
the  chance  they  deserve. 

Second,  we  must  understand  what  can 
realistically  be  accomplished  at  any  given 
moment. 

The  separation  of  military  forces  is  cer- 
tainly the  most  immediate  problem.  Disen- 
gagement of  military  forces  would  help  to 
reduce  the  danger  of  a  new  military  out- 
break; it  would  begin  the  process  of  building 
confidence  between  the  two  sides. 

Based  on  intensive  consultations  with  the 
leaders  of  the  Middle  East,  including  many 
in  this  room  today,  I  believe  that  the  first 
work  of  this  conference  should  be  to  achieve 
early  agreement  on  the  separation  of  mili- 
tary forces  and  that  such  an  agreement  is 
possible. 

Serious  discussions  have  already  taken 
place  between  the  military  representatives  of 
Egypt  and  Israel  at  kilometer  101.  It  is 
important  to  build  promptly  on  the  progress 
achieved  there.  And  on  the  Jordanian  and 
Syrian  fronts,  a  comparable  base  for  the 
lessening  of  tensions  and  the  negotiation  of 
further  steps  toward  peace  must  be  found. 
Progress  toward  peace  should  include  all  the 
parties  concerned. 

Third,  the  disengagement  of  forces  is  an 
essential  first  step — a  consolidation  of  the 
cease-fire  and  a  bridge  to  the  "peaceful  and 


accepted  settlement"  called  for  in  Security 
Council  Resolution  242.  Our  final  objective  is 
the  implementation  in  all  its  parts  of  Reso- 
lution 242.  This  goal  has  the  full  support  of 
the  United  States. 

Peace  must  bring  a  new  relationship 
among  the  nations  of  the  Middle  East — a 
relationship  that  will  not  only  put  an  end 
to  the  state  of  war  which  has  persisted  for 
the  last  quarter  of  a  century  but  will  also 
permit  the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East  to  live 
together  in  harmony  and  safety.  It  must  re- 
place the  reality  of  mistrust  with  a  new 
reality  of  promise  and  hope.  It  must  include 
concrete  measures  that  make  war  less  likely. 

A  peace  agreement  must  include  these  ele- 
ments, among  others:  withdi'awals,  recog- 
nized frontiers,  security  arrangements,  guar- 
antees, a  settlement  of  the  legitimate  inter- 
ests of  the  Palestinians,  and  a  recognition 
that  Jerusalem  contains  places  considered 
holy  by  three  great  religions. 

Peace  will  require  that  we  relate  the  im- 
perative of  withdrawals  to  the  necessities  of 
security,  the  requirement  of  guarantees  to 
the  sovereignty  of  the  parties,  the  hopes  of 
the  displaced  to  the  realities  now  existing. 

Fourth,  we  believe  there  must  be  realistic 
negotiations  between  the  parties.  Resolution 
338  provides  just  such  a  process.  It  is  on  the 
parties  that  the  primary  responsibility  rests. 
The  United  States  intends  to  help  facilitate 
these  talks  in  every  feasible  way,  to  encourage 
moderation  and  the  spirit  of  accommodation. 
We  are  prepared  to  make  concrete  sugges- 
tions to  either  side  if  this  will  help  promote 
practical  progress.  But  we  must  always  re- 
member that  while  a  Middle  East  settlement 
is  in  the  interest  of  us  all,  it  is  the  people  of 
the  area  that  must  live  with  the  results.  It 
must,  in  the  final  analysis,  be  acceptable  to 
them. 

Peace,  in  short,  cannot  last  unless  it  rests 
on  the  consent  of  the  parties  concerned.  The 
wisest  of  realists  are  those  who  understand 
the  power  of  a  moral  consensus.  There  is  a 
measure  of  safety  in  power  to  prevent  ag- 
gression, but  there  is  greater  security  still  in 
arrangements  considered  so  just  that  no  one 
wishes  to  overthrow  them. 


January   14,    1974 


23 


As  we  open  this  conference  we  take  a  mo- 
mentous step.  We  are  challenging  a  history 
of  missed  opportunities,  of  mutual  fear  and 
bottomless  distrust.  Our  backdrop  is  a  war 
that  has  brought  anguish  and  pain,  death  and 
destruction;  a  war  that  has  been  costly  to 
both  sides;  that  has  brought  neither  victory 
nor  defeat;  that  reflected  the  failure  of  all 
our  past  efforts  at  peaceful  solutions. 

Mr.  Secretary  General,  fellow  delegates, 
President  Nixon  has  sent  me  here  with  the 
purpose  of  affirming  America's  commitment 
to  a  just  and  lasting  peace. 

We  do  not  embark  on  this  task  with  false 
expectations.  We  do  not  pretend  that  there 
are  easy  answers.  A  problem  that  has  defied 
solution  for  a  generation  does  not  yield  to 
simple  remedies. 

In  all  efforts  for  peace  the  overriding 
problem  is  to  relate  the  sense  of  individual 
justice  to  the  common  good.  The  great  trage- 
dies of  history  occur  not  when  right  con- 
fronts wrong,  but  when  two  rights  face  each 
other. 

The  problems  of  the  Middle  East  today 
have  such  a  character.  There  is  justice  on 
all  sides,  but  there  is  a  greater  justice  still  in 
finding  a  truth  which  merges  all  aspira- 
tions in  the  realization  of  a  common  human- 
ity. It  was  a  Jewish  sage  who,  speaking  for 
all  mankind,  expressed  this  problem  well: 
"If  I  am  not  for  myself  who  is  for  me,  but 
if  I  am  for  myself  alone  who  am  I?" 

Fellow  delegates,  in  the  months  ahead  we 
will  examine  many  problems.  We  will  dis- 
cuss many  expedients.  We  will  know  suc- 
cess— and  I  daresay  we  shall  experience 
deadlock  and  despair. 


But  let  us  always  keep  in  mind  our  final 
goal: 

We  can  exhaust  ourselves  in. maneuvers,  or 
we  can  remember  that  this  is  the  first  real 
chance  for  peace  the  Middle  East  has  had  in 
three  decades. 

We  can  concentrate  on  our  resentments,  or 
we  can  be  motivated  by  the  consciousness 
that  this  opportunity,  once  past,  will  not 
return. 

We  can  emphasize  the  very  real  causes  of 
distrust,  or  we  can  remember  that  if  we 
succeed  our  children  will  thank  us  for  what 
they  have  been  spared. 

We  can  make  propaganda,  or  we  can  try 
to  make  progress. 

The  American  attitude  is  clear.  We  know 
we  are  starting  on  a  journey  whose  outcome 
is  uncertain  and  whose  progress  will  be 
painful.  We  are  conscious  that  we  need  wis- 
dom and  patience  and  good  will.  But  we 
know,  too,  that  the  agony  of  three  decades 
must  be  overcome  and  that  somehow  we  have 
to  muster  the  insight  and  courage  to  put  an 
end  to  the  conflict  between  peoples  who  have 
so  often  ennobled  mankind. 

So  we  are  here  to  spare  no  effort  in  the 
quest  of  a  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  a 
task  which  is  as  worthy  as  it  may  be  agoniz- 
ing. In  the  words  of  the  poet: 

"Pain  that  cannot  forget 
falls  drop  by  drop 
upon  the  heart 
until  in  our  despair 
there  comes  wisdom 
through  the  awful 
grace  of  God." 


24 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Middle  East  and  Europe 


Prior  to  the  opening  of  the  Middle  East 
Peace  Conference  in  Geneva,  Secretary  Kis- 
singer visited  Algeria,  Egypt,  Syria,  Jordan, 
Lebanon,  Israel,  Portugal,  Spain,  and  France. 
In  Paris  he  met  with  Le  Due  Tho,  member  of 
the  Politburo  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam.  Following  are  statements  made 
by  Secretary  Kissinger  during  the  trip  and 
the  texts  of  communiques  issued  at  the  con- 
clusion of  his  visits  to  Portugal  and  Spain. 


ARRIVAL,  ALGIERS,   DECEMBER   13 

Press  release  454  dated  December  13 

I  am  very  happy  to  begin  my  voyage  to  the 
Middle  East  in  Algeria.  President  Nixon  and 
I  have  had  very  useful  talks  with  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  Abdelaziz  Bouteflika  when 
he  was  recently  in  Washington.  During  a 
difficult  period,  your  Minister  spoke  to  us 
with  much  passion,  realism,  and  conviction. 
President  Nixon  told  your  Minister  that 
after  the  war  we  will  deploy  all  our  efforts  to 
bring  peace — a  peace  founded  on  justice,  par- 
ticularly on  the  application  of  U.N.  Security 
Council  Resolution  242. 

I  am  here  in  Algiers  to  work  toward  the 
realization  of  that  promise.  I  expect  a  great 
deal  from  my  conversations  with  President 
Boumediene,  for  whom  we  have  much  ad- 
miration and  who  we  hope  will  visit  us  some- 
day in  the  United  States. 

If  my  stay  is  short,  my  conversations  will 
be  open  and  sincere. 


DEPARTURE,  TEL  AVIV,   DECEMBER   17 

Press  release  466  dated  December  17 

Our  meetings  were  as  conversation  among 
friends.  The  talks  were  very  warm,  very 
full,  very  useful,  and  very  constructive.  We 
reached  complete  agreement  about  the  pro- 
cedures, the  terms  of  reference,  of  the  open- 


ing of  the  conference.  We've  been  informed 
that  if  the  other  parties  attend,  Israel  will 
send  a  delegation  to  Geneva.  We  also  agreed 
that  the  opening  phase  of  the  conference 
should  deal  with  the  problems  of  the  sepa- 
ration of  forces.  We  had  a  very  full,  very 
useful  discussion  about  the  problems  and 
issues  and  principles  involved  in  that  topic. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  United 
States  will  maintain  the  closest  contact  with 
the  Government  of  Israel  throughout  the  ne- 
gotiations, and  I  look  forward  personally  to 
seeing  my  friend  the  Foreign  Minister  at  the 
end  of  this  week  in  Geneva.  It  remains  for 
me  only  to  thank  the  Government  of  Israel, 
especially  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Foreign 
Minister,  and  all  their  colleagues,  for  the  ex- 
traordinary courtesy  that  has  been  extended 
to  us,  for  the  very  useful  talks  that  we've 
had. 


ARRIVAL,   LISBON,   DECEMBER   17 

Press  release  460  dated  December  20 

The  Foreign  Minister,  ladies  and  gentle- 
men: It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  visit 
Portugal  for  the  first  time.  The  Foreign  Min- 
ister spoke  correctly  about  the  long  ties  of 
friendship  and  the  recent  history  of  alliance 
between  our  two  countries,  and  he  was  right 
also  when  he  said  that  Portugal  has  been  a 
good  and  reliable  friend  of  the  United  States. 
On  this  trip  through  the  Middle  East,  I  was 
reminded  of  the  fact  that  Portugal  stood  by 
its  allies  during  the  recent  difficulties,  and 
the  United  States  is  extremely  grateful  for 
that.  When  visiting  this  country,  which  is 
known  for  its  navigators  who  explored  the 
world  with  an  act  of  both  physical  and  moral 
courage,  I  would  like  to  say  that  as  far  as 
the  United  States  is  concerned,  our  journey 
together  is  not  finished. 

I  bring  greetings  from  the  President  to 
the  leaders  of  Portugal.    I  look  forward  to 


January   14,    1974 


25 


full  and  frank  and  friendly  talks,  and  I  know 
that  we  will  leave  as  even  better  friends  than 
we  are  today. 

Thank  you  very  much. 


JOINT  U.S.-PORTUGAL  COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  461  dated  December  20 

1.  The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  Dr.  Henry  Kissinger,  made  an  official  visit 
to  Lisbon  on  December  17  and  18  at  the  invitation  of 
the  Portuguese  Government. 

2.  In  the  course  of  his  visit  he  was  received  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic  and  had  talks  with  the 
Prime  Minister.  In  various  meetings  held  at  the 
Foreign  Ministry,  Dr.  Henry  Kissinger  and  the 
Foreign  Minister,  Dr.  Rui  Patricio,  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  review  the  more  important  problems  of  the 
current  international  situation.  There  was  a  full 
discussion  of  bilateral  United  States-Portuguese  re- 
lationships. 

3.  The  talks  took  place  in  a  markedly  friendly 
atmosphere  and  produced  a  frank  exchange  of  views. 
There  was  a  large  area  of  agreement  with  respect  to 
the  problems  of  concern  to  the  two  countries. 

4.  Dr.  Kissinger,  on  behalf  of  all  his  associates, 
expressed  warm  appreciation  for  the  cordiality  and 
hospitality  with  which  he  was  received. 


JOINT  U.S.-SPAIN   COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  462  dated  December  20 

1.  The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  Dr.  Henry  A.  Kissinger,  made  an  official 
visit  to  Spain  on  December  18  and  19,  at  the  invi- 
tation of  the  Spanish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Don  Laureano  Lopez  Rodo. 

2.  During  his  stay  in  Madrid,  he  was  received  by 
His  Excellency  the  Head  of  State  and  by  His  Royal 
Highness  the  Prince  of  Spain.  He  also  held  conver- 
sations with  the  President  of  the  Government,  Ad- 
miral Carrero  Blanco,  and  with  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Seiior  Lopez  Rodo.  In  the  Palace  of 
Santa  Cruz,  the  seat  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  two  working  meetings  were  held,  in  which 
the  following  subjects  were  examined  with  special 
care: 

a.  The  present  state  of  Atlantic  relations. 

b.  The  conflict  in  the  Middle  East. 

c.  The  situation  in  the  Mediterranean. 

d.  The  existing  energy  situation. 

e.  Matters  relating  to  the  Agreement  of  Friend- 
ship and  Cooperation  between  Spain  and  the  U.S.  of 
6  August  1970. 

3.  Secretary    Kissinger    was    entertained    by    his 


Spanish  colleague  at  a  dinner  in  the  Palace  of  Viana, 
and  the  Secretary  hosted  a  working  luncheon  in  the 
United  States  Embassy  on  December  19. 

4.  The  talks  took  place  in  an  atmosphere  of  the 
greatest  cordiality  and  understanding.  Agreement 
was  reached  in  principle  to  develop  a  joint  U.S.- 
Spanish declaration  of  principles.  Both  parties 
agreed  that  Spain  is  essential  for  the  security  of  the 
West  and  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  They  agreed 
as  well  that  Spain  must  participate  on  a  basis  of 
equality  with  the  other  countries  of  the  Atlantic  area 
in  the  establishment  of  a  just  and  stable  interna- 
tional order. 

5.  The  Governments  of  both  countries  declare 
their  intention  to  continue  these  close  contacts  at  a 
high  level  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  U.S.- 
Spanish friendship,  promoting  the  resolution  of 
problems  of  common  interest,  and  contributing  to 
world  peace. 

6.  The  Secretary  of  State  expressed  his  gratitude 
for  the  warm  hospitality  shown  him  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Spain. 

7.  The  Secretary  of  State  invited  Foreign  Minister 
Lopez  Rodo  to  visit  the  United  States  at  a  mutually 
convenient  time,  and  this  invitation  was  accepted 
with  pleasure. 


U.S.  Welcomes  Release  of  American 
Civilian  Prisoner  in  Viet-Nam 

Department  Statement  ^ 

We  are  delighted  to  confirm  that  Homer 
L.  Elm,  the  American  citizen  civilian  cap- 
tured on  October  6  in  Ba  Xuyen  Province, 
South  Viet-Nam,  was  released  today  near 
Vi  Thanh,  which  is  near  Can  Tho,  the  capital 
of  the  delta.  He  was  brought  to  Can  Tho  by 
an  ICCS  [International  Commission  of  Con- 
trol and  Supervision]  helicopter.  Two  Viet- 
namese employees  captured  with  Mr.  Elm 
were  released  with  him,  and  all  three  ap- 
peared to  be  in  reasonable  physical  condition. 

Needless  to  say,  we  are  glad  Mr.  Elm  and 
those  captured  with  him  have  been  released, 
and  we  reaffirm  hope  that  the  other  Amer- 
ican civilian  known  to  be  held  in  Indochina, 
Mr.  Emmet  Kay,  a  pilot  for  Continental  Air 
Services,  Inc.,  who  was  captured  in  northern 
Laos  on  May  7,  1973,  will  also  be  released 
soon. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  on  Dec.  19  by  Paul 
Hare,  Deputy  Director,  Office  of  Press  Relations. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.   Deplores  Terrorist  Attack 
and   Hijacking   at  Rome  Airport 

On  December  17  Arab  terrorists  attacked 
a  Pan  American  World  Airways  plane  at 
Leonardo  da  Vinci  International  Airport 
near  Rome,  killing  30  persons;  the  terrorists 
then  hijacked  a  Lufthansa  German  Airlines 
plane,  forcing  it  to  fly  to  Athens,  where  a 
hostage  was  slain.  On  December  18  the  plane 
flew  to  Damascus  and  then  to  Kmvait,  ivhere 
the  remaining  hostages  were  released  and 
the  hijackers  surrendered.  Following  are 
texts  of  a  statement  read  to  news  corre- 
spo7idents  on  December  17  by  Paul  Hare, 
Deputy  Director,  Office  of  Press  Relations, 
and  a  statement  by  President  Nixon  issued 
on  December  18. 


DEPARTMENT   STATEMENT 

We  deeply  regret  the  loss  of  American  and 
other  lives  at  the  hand  of  terrorists  who  as- 
saulted innocent  bystanders  at  Rome  airport 
today. 

We  are  in  touch  with  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment regarding  this  vicious  attack  and  will 
continue  to  work  closely  with  the  Italians 
following  up  on  this  incident. 

We  are  also  maintaining  contact  with 
other  governments  involved  in  the  incident, 
which  involves  hostages  of  unconfirmed  na- 
tionality. 

This  new  outrage  underlines  the  urgent 
necessity  to  strengthen  civil  aviation  security 
measures  throughout  the  world.  The  U.S. 
Government  deplores  incidents  such  as  this 
at  any  time,  and  particularly  at  a  time  when 
a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Middle  East 
question — a  factor  apparently  in  the  minds 
of  the  terrorists — is  being  sought  by  many 
peace-loving  governments  and  individuals. 


STATEMENT   BY  PRESIDENT   NIXON 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  18 

The  Government  and  people  of  the  United 
States  are  appalled  by  the  tragedy  which  be- 
gan yesterday  with  the  heavy  loss  of  inno- 


cent lives  at  the  Rome  airport,  a  tragedy 
which  is  not  yet  ended.  Our  deep  regrets  and 
condolences  go  to  the  families  of  the  victims 
of  all  nationalities. 

This  new  outrage  only  underlines  the  ur- 
gent necessity  to  accelerate  improvements  in 
international  civil  aviation  security  meas- 
ures and  to  find  international  agreement  on 
prosecution  of  offenders  such  as  those  who 
committed  this  vicious  crime.  Terrorists 
must  be  made  to  understand  that  senseless 
violence  against  innocent  bystanders,  includ- 
ing helpless  women  and  children  in  this  in- 
stance, will  not  be  tolerated  by  people  and 
governments  who  wish  to  live  in  peace  and 
within  the  law.  Governments  must  resist 
terrorists'  demands  since  appeasement  will 
not  put  an  end  to  this  international  scourge. 
The  U.S.  Government  will  continue  to  pro- 
vide leadership  and  all  possible  assistance  in 
this  humanitarian  endeavor. 

The  U.S.  Government  deplores  incidents 
such  as  this  at  any  time  and  particularly 
when  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Middle 
East  question  is  being  sought  by  many  peace- 
loving  governments  and  individuals.  The 
perpetrators  of  such  atrocities  can  only  delay 
the  day  when  peace  and  justice  may  return  to 
the  Middle  East. 


United  Nations  Environment  Program 
Participation  Act  of   1973 

Statement  by  President  Nixon  ^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  signed  into  law  a  bill 
authorizing  a  $40  million  voluntary  contribu- 
tion by  the  United  States  to  the  United  Na- 
tions Environment  Fund  over  the  next  five 
years.  As  I  first  proposed  such  a  contribu- 
tion early  last  year  and  it  has  since  been  sup- 
ported by  both  Democrats  and  Republicans, 
this  bill  reflects  broad  agreement  on  the  need 
for  international  action  to  halt  the  continu- 
ing degradation  of  the  global  environment. 

The  indiscriminate  depletion  of  natural  re- 


'  Issued  on  Dec.  17  (White  House  press  release). 
As  enacted,  the  bill  (H.R.  6768)  is  Public  Law  93- 
188,  approved  Dec.  15. 


January    14,    1974 


27 


sources,  the  pollution  of  our  environment, 
and  the  problems  of  sustaining  the  quality  of 
life  in  urbanizing  societies  throughout  the 
world  require  that  we  act  as  a  community  of 
nations.  The  United  Nations  Environment 
Fund,  established  by  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly,  will  be  used  to  coordinate 
and  to  fill  gaps  in  existing  international  ac- 
tivities concerned  with  improving  the  world 
environment.  A  good  beginning  has  already 
been  made.  Since  the  United  Nations  Con- 
ference on  the  Human  Environment  took 
place  in  1972,  the  United  States  has  been 
most  active  in  developing  this  new  environ- 
mental program  and  drafting  several  inter- 
national treaties  concerning  the  conservation 
of  the  natural  and  cultural  heritage  of  man- 
kind, protection  of  endangered  species  of 
plants  and  animals,  and  prevention  of  the 
contamination  of  the  oceans  from  shipping 
and  offshore  disposal  of  wastes. 

But  we  need  to  do  much  more.  We  need 
additional  knowledge  about  what  the  serious 
global  problems  are  and  how  to  cope  with 
them;  we  need  to  monitor  conditions  and 
trends  of  pollutants  in  the  oceans,  in  the  at- 
mosphere, and  in  terrestrial  environments; 
and  we  need  to  manage  our  natural  resources 
more  effectively.  These  are  the  kinds  of 
activities  that  will  be  supported  by  the 
United  Nations  Environment  Fund. 

We  hold  the  earth — its  environment  and 
its  resources — in  trust  for  future  genera- 
tions. We  must  not  violate  that  trust,  nor  our 
obligation  to  the  future,  by  permitting  the 
increasing  degradation  of  the  environment. 
I  call  upon  all  nations  to  support  the  United 
Nations  Environment  Program  and  to  work 
cooperatively  to  conserve  and  enhance  the 
world  environment  so  that  others  may  enjoy 
and  benefit  from  it  as  we  have. 


U.S.-Yugoslav   Board   on   Scientific 
Cooperation  Meets  at  Washington 

Jnuit  Statement  ^ 

The  U.S.-Yugoslav  Joint  Board  on  Scien- 
tific and  Technological  Cooperation  met  in 
Washington  on  December  10-14,  1973. 

The  Board  reviewed  156  projects  in  the 
fields  of  agriculture,  energy,  ecology,  tech- 
nology, health,  transportation,  and  others 
and  agreed  to  finance  a  large  number  of  them 
from  the  U.S.-Yugoslav  Joint  Fund  estab- 
lished in  accordance  with  the  agreement  of 
May  18,  1973.  The  Board  noted  that  the  U.S.- 
Yugoslav program  had  contributed  sub.stan- 
tially  to  the  advancement  of  scientific  and 
technological  research  in  such  fields  as  agri- 
culture and  the  health  sciences. 

The  United  States  was  represented  by  Dr. 
Oswald  H.  Ganley,  Director,  Soviet  and 
Eastern  European  Scientific  and  Technical 
Programs  Directorate,  Bureau  of  Interna- 
tional Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs, 
Department  of  State;  Mr.  David  B.  Bolen, 
Counselor  for  Economic  Commercial  Affairs, 
American  Embassy,  Belgrade  and  Mr.  Wil- 
liam H.  Mills,  Scientific  Attache,  American 
Embassy,  Belgrade. 

Yugoslavia  was  represented  by  Dr.  Edo 
Pirkmajer,  the  Chairman  of  the  Board  and 
President  of  the  Commission  for  Interna- 
tional Relations  of  the  Inter-Republic  Com- 
mittee for  Coordination  of  Scientific  and 
Technical  Affairs,  and  Mr.  Milos  Rajacic, 
Scientific  Counselor,  Embassy  of  Yugoslavia, 
Washington,  D.C. 

The  Board  agreed  that  its  ne.xt  meeting 
would  take  place  in  Belgrade  next  May. 


'Issued  on  Dec.  14  (press  release  455). 


28 


Department  of   State   Bulletin 


THE  UNITED   NATIONS 


General  Assembly  Adopts  Resolution  on  Financing 
U.N.   Emergency  Force  in  the  Middle  East 


Folloimig  are  statements  by  Congressman 
John  H.  Buchanan,  Jr.,  U.S.  Representative 
to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  made  in  Com- 
mittee V  (Administrative  and  Budgetary)  of 
the  Assembly  on  November  21  and  23,  to- 
gether with  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted 
by  the  committee  on  November  23  and  by  the 
Assembly  on  December  11. 


STATEMENTS   BY   CONGRESSMAN   BUCHANAN 
Statement   of   November  21 

USUN  press  release  114  dated  November  21 

The  question  which  we  are  now  consider- 
ing, agenda  item  109,  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant issues  before  this  committee  at  its 
current  session.  Late  last  month  the  Security 
Council  adopted  a  number  of  resolutions  to 
restore  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  among 
them  being  two  which  called  for  the  estab- 
lishment and  operationalization  of  the  U.N. 
Emergency  Force.'  These  resolutions  marked 
the  expeditious  response  of  the  Council  to  an 
urgent  situation.  Cosponsored  by  Guinea, 
India,  Indonesia,  Kenya,  Panama,  Peru, 
Sudan,  and  Yugoslavia,  Resolution  340 
(1973)  established  what  has  become  known 
as  UNEF;  and  it  is  operating  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  Council  itself.  That  resolution 
inter  alia  requested  the  Secretary  General 
to  "report  within  24  hours"  on  steps  taken  to 
implement  the  resolution  and  requested  "all 
Member  States  to  extend  their  full  co-opera- 


^  For  U.S.  statements  and  texts  of  the  resolutions 
and  the  report  of  the  Secretary  General  (S/11052/ 
Rev.  1),  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  \2,  1973,  p.  598. 


tion  to  the  United  Nations  in  the  implemen- 
tation of  the  present  resolution." 

In  subsequently  approving  the  report  of 
the  Secretary  General  (S/11052/Rev.  1),  the 
Security  Council,  in  Resolution  341  (1973), 
concurred  fully  in  the  Secretary  General's 
proposal  to  establish  the  Force  "for  an  initial 
period  of  six  months";  it  also  agreed  that  in 
financing  UNEF  the  "costs  of  the  Force  shall 
be  considered  as  expenses  of  the  Organiza- 
tion to  be  borne  by  the  Members  in  accord- 
ance with  Article  17,  paragraph  2,  of  the 
Charter."  Shortly  thereafter  the  Secretary 
General  submitted  his  report  on  financing 
the  Force  (A/9285),  in  which  he  provided 
detailed  cost  estimates  totaling  $30  million 
for  a  Force  of  "7,000,  all  ranks"  for  a  six- 
month  period  (October  25,  1973-April  24, 
1974).  The  Secretary  General  requested  the 
General  Assembly  to  authorize  him  to  "enter 
into  commitments  for  this  Force  at  a  rate  not 
to  exceed  $5.0  million  per  month  for  the 
period  25  April  1974  to  31  October  1974  in- 
clusive, should  it  be  necessary  to  continue  the 
Force  beyond  the  initial  period  of  six 
months." 

My  delegation  believes  that  the  task  of  this 
committee  is  to  deal  only  with  the  financial 
aspects  of  the  U.N.  Emergency  Force.  It  is 
not  the  responsibility  of  the  Fifth  Commit- 
tee— nor  is  it  within  the  competence  of  this 
committee — to  consider  other  matters  which 
have  been  introduced,  directly  or  indirectly, 
by  some  delegations,  either  during  their  par- 
ticipation in  the  committee's  debate  or  by 
certain  amendments  to  the  35-power  draft 
resolution  contained  in  A/C.5/1130/Rev.  1. 
We  must  be  guided  by  the  Security  Council, 
which  has  exercised  its  primary  responsibil- 


January   14,    1974 


29 


ity  for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  do  our 
best  to  apportion  the  costs  of  the  Emergency 
Force.  We  should  not  be  distracted  by  con- 
siderations extraneous  to  the  financial  con- 
siderations. We  must  support  the  Council's 
action  in  establishing  the  Force.  To  do  other- 
wise is  likely  to  embroil  this  committee  in  an 
extensive  debate  which  would  ill  serve  the 
organization,  the  member  states  which  we 
i-epresent,  and  most  importantly,  the  cause  of 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  to  which  we  ai'e  all 
dedicated. 

Mr.  Chairman,  my  delegation  would  like 
to  take  this  oppoi-tunity  to  commend  the 
Security  Council  for  the  swiftness  with  which 
it  acted  in  response  to  a  threat  to  "inter- 
national peace  and  security."  We  would  also 
like  to  commend  the  Secretary  General,  who 
has  moved  rapidly  to  implement  the  various 
resolutions  of  that  body.  Similarly,  we  would 
like  to  express  our  appreciation  to  the  ACA- 
BQ  [Advisory  Committee  on  Administrative 
and  Budgetary  Questions]  for  the  dispatch 
with  which  it  has  dealt  with  the  Secretary 
General's  report  on  financing  UNEF.  It  is 
important,  if  we  are  to  contribute  further  to 
the  cause  of  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  that 
this  committee  continue  the  momentum  which 
already  has  been  generated.  In  saying  this, 
my  delegation  recognizes  the  added  burden 
which  has  been  placed  on  the  Fifth  Commit- 
tee; our  primary  objective  nevertheless  is  to 
facilitate  an  early  decision  by  this  committee 
on  the  important  question  now  before  us. 

Regarding  the  Secretary  General's  cost 
estimates  contained  in  annex  I  to  A/9285,  my 
delegation  fully  concurs  in  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  ACABQ  as  contained  in  its 
report,  document  A/9314.  We  note  in  par- 
ticular the  conclusion  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee that  a  "special  account"  should  be  es- 
tablished for  UNEF,  the  desirability  of  in- 
viting voluntary  contributions,  and  the  need 
for  early  payment  of  assessments  once  the 
method  of  financing  and  the  cost  estimates 
have  been  agreed  upon.  The  estimates  sub- 
mitted by  the  Secretary  General,  based  on 
facts  now  known,  are  the  minimum  amount 
required  to  operate  the  Force;  any  efforts  to 
reduce  these  estimates  would  be  an  act  of 


parsimony  which  could  seriously  jeopardize 
the  cause  of  peace. 

My  delegation  listened  with  great  interest 
to  the  very  provocative,  balanced,  and  infor- 
mative statement  by  the  distinguished  Repre- 
sentative of  Brazil,  Ambassador  [David  Sil- 
veiro]  Da  Mota,  when  he  introduced  the 
draft  resolution  contained  in  A/C.5/L.1130/ 
Rev.  1  on  behalf  of  34  other  delegations.  My 
delegation  would  like  to  recall  for  members 
of  this  committee  a  point  made  yesterday  by 
the  Representative  of  Australia.  He  said,  and 
I  quote: 

Just  as  Security  Council  Resolutions  340  and  341 
were  achieved  only  after  a  process  of  lengthy  con- 
sultations, taking  into  account  all  the  views  ex- 
pressed, so  too  was  the  draft  resolution  introduced 
...  by  Brazil  arrived  at  only  after  long  and  arduous 
deliberation.  It  was  the  result  of  lengthy  and  often 
difficult  consultations,  during  which  all  parties  had 
the  opportunity  to  express  their  views.  And  it  was 
drafted  only  after  the  co-sponsors  were  satisfied 
that  it  was  as  close  to  a  consensus  as  could  be 
achieved. 

The  hope  of  my  delegation  is  that  we  will 
be  able  collectively  to  reach  a  consensus  on 
the  draft  resolution  now  before  us.  The  U.S. 
delegation  fully  supports  that  draft  resolu- 
tion. 

Mr.  Chairman,  my  government  would  have 
preferred  that  the  Force  be  financed  under 
the  regular  scale  of  assessments.  That  scale 
is  in  itself  a  compromise  solution  to  the  vary- 
ing points  of  view  held  by  the  total  member- 
ship of  this  organization.  However,  in  a 
spirit  of  compromise,  my  delegation  at  an 
early  date  recognized  that  this  approach  to 
financing  the  Force  would  not  be  widely  ac- 
ceptable. Furthermore,  we  understand  that 
the  permanent  members  of  the  Security 
Council,  who  have  special  responsibilities 
under  the  charter  for  the  maintenance  of 
international  peace  and  security,  are  asked 
to  accept  a  financial  burden  greater  than  that 
imposed  under  the  regular  scale  of  assess- 
ments. 

We  concluded  therefore  that  the  35-power 
draft  resolution,  while  it  did  not  take  cog- 
nizance of  all  of  my  own  government's  views, 
did  incorporate  certain  principles  which  have 
been  operative  at  one  time  or  aKother  in 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


maintaining  similar  operations  such  as 
UNEF.  Foremost  among  these  is  that  of 
collective  responsibility  of  all  members.  The 
35-power  draft  resolution  is  founded  on  this 
concept.  This  point  was  made  explicit  by 
Ambassador  Da  Mota  when  he  introduced 
the  draft  resolution.  As  I  mentioned  a  mo- 
ment ago,  my  delegation  is  prepared  to  sup- 
port this  draft  resolution  in  a  spirit  of  com- 
promise and  in  light  of  the  particular  ad  hoc 
nature  of  the  operation  it  is  designed  to  fi- 
nance. It  is,  in  a  sense,  a  "compromise  of  a 
compromise." 

The  balance  of  the  draft  resolution  is  ex- 
tremely delicate.  In  the  final  analysis,  it  is 
not  a  fully  "objective  scale"  for  apportioning 
UNEF  costs  and  based  solely  on  national  in- 
come data;  rather,  it  is  a  "peace  and  secu- 
rity" scale  designed  to  meet  a  particular  need. 
The  draft  establishes  an  approach  on  the 
basis  of  which  my  government  will  be  able  to 
continue  its  longstanding  support  of  the 
United  Nations  in  the  field  of  peacekeeping. 

Turning  to  the  various  amendments  which 
have  been  proposed,  my  delegation  would  be 
remiss  if  it  did  not  express  serious  concern 
that  these  amendments,  if  adopted,  would 
threaten  to  destroy  the  delicate  balance  found 
in  the  draft  resolution  before  us  and  thus 
call  into  question  its  acceptability  to  many 
members.  If  this  committee  cannot  find  it 
possible  to  adopt  a  resolution  which  incorpo- 
rates the  concept  of  collective  responsibility 
for  all  in  an  acceptable  manner,  the  future 
role  of  the  United  Nations  in  establishing 
and  maintaining  a  peacekeeping  force  such 
as  UNEF  could  be  undermined  and  preju- 
diced. In  the  final  analysis,  perhaps  what  all 
delegations  face  here — and  a  point  on  which 
they  should  reflect — is  whether  or  not  the 
United  Nations  as  an  organization  of  mem- 
ber states  can,  when  the  need  arises  and  its 
members  are  called  on  to  act  collectively,  rise 
above  the  injection  of  divergent  and  distract- 
ing political  arguments  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment which  will  preserve  this  organization's 
role  not  only  in  the  current  UNEF  operation 
but  in  future  peacekeeping  operations  as  well. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  heard  various  ra- 
tionales put  forward  by  a  number  of  dele- 


gations to  justify  the  nonacceptability  of 
collective  responsibility  of  all  members  in 
financing  UNEF.  Under  the  35-power  draft 
resolution,  it  appears  to  my  delegation  that 
the  various  principles  incorporated  in  pre- 
vious General  Assembly  resolutions  on 
UNEF  and  ONUC  [United  Nations  Opera- 
tion in  the  Congo],  as  well  as  those  dealing 
with  certain  principles  regarding  peacekeep- 
ing forces  in  general,  have  been  adhered  to. 
In  particular,  the  five  principles  incorporated 
in  Resolution  1874  (S-IV)  have  been  taken 
into  account  in  the  draft  resolution  before 
us.-  Alleged  inability  to  help  finance  the 
Force  cannot  be  a  justifiable  basis  for  reject- 
ing the  concept  of  collective  responsibility 
since,  in  fact,  a  great  number  of  member 
states  will  be  required  to  contribute  only  a 
few  thousand  dollars.  Special  consideration 
already  has  been  given  to  all  developing 
member  states,  including  those  which  would 
be  permitted  to  opt  out  of  the  assessment 
scale  if  the  amendment  cosponsored  by  Cuba 
and  Yemen  (A/C.5/L.1135)  was  to  be 
adopted.  That  amendment  raises  issues  which 
are  not  germane  to  the  obligation  of  this 
committee  to  determine  the  means  of  financ- 
ing decisions  taken  by  the  Security  Council. 
It  clearly  is  not  for  the  Fifth  Committee  to 
make  political  judgments  which  the  Council 
itself  did  not  make.  My  delegation  is  strongly 
opposed  to  this  amendment.  We  are  also 
opposed  to  the  amendment  submitted  by  the 
Soviet  Union  in  document  A/C.5/L.1137, 
which  would,  in  effect,  reject  the  compromise 
which  has  been  worked  out  so  carefully  by 
the  35  cosponsors  of  the  draft  resolution  con- 
tained in  A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.l.  We  also 
would  have  difficulties  with  any  other  amend- 
ments in  view  of  the  delicate  balance  of  the 
draft  resolution. 

My  delegation  would  like,  sir,  to  express  its 
deep  appreciation  to  the  cosponsors  who  have 
worked  so  diligently  to  put  before  this  com- 
mittee a  draft  resolution  which  is  balanced, 
takes  into  account  previous  decisions  of  the 
General  Assembly,  and  accommodates  the 
basic  interests  of  all  member  states.    It  is  a 


"  For  text   of   General   Assembly   Resolution    1874 
(S-IV),  see  Bulletin  of  July  29,  1963,  p.  182. 


January   14,    1974 


31 


fair  resolution,  and  one  which  should  receive 
the  support  of  a  great  majority  of  the  mem- 
ber states  represented  in  this  committee.  Any 
efforts  to  alter  this  resolution  will  ill  serve 
the  interests  of  the  United  Nations.  We  be- 
lieve that  this  committee  must  act  with  all 
dispatch  in  order  that  an  apportionment 
scale  for  the  Force  may  be  agreed  upon  by 
the  General  Assembly  and  funds  so  badly 
needed  by  the  Secretary  General  to  maintain 
the  Force  will  be  forthcoming. 

In  concluding  my  statement,  I  would  like, 
with  your  permission,  Mr.  Chairman,  to 
make  a  few  final  points.  Those  of  us  in  this 
room  must  act  for  peace.  We  must  support 
the  decisions  of  the  Security  Council.  We 
must  enable  the  Secretary  General  to  execute 
his  responsibilities.  The  expeditious  adoption 
of  the  35-power  draft  resolution  is  the  means 
to  these  ends.  Any  other  action  throws  into 
question  all  that  has  been  accomplished  and 
the  feasibility  of  international  cooperation 
for  peace  and  security.  A  brave  beginning 
has  been  made.  It  must  not  be  destroyed  here 
and  now  because  of  particularistic  desires  or 
effoi'ts  to  settle  political  disputes  instead  of 
providing  financial  support  to  the  Emer- 
gency Force. 


Statement  of  November  23 

USUN  press  release  116  dated  November  23 

We  believe  the  United  Nations  has  dis- 
tinguished itself  today  by  demonstrating 
that  international  cooperation  for  peace  can 
unite  us.  Special  commendation,  of  course, 
goes  to  the  cosponsors,  who  worked  so  hard 
and  consulted  so  broadly  in  the  development 
of  the  compromise  package  which  will  pro- 
vide the  financial  support  to  the  Secretary 
General  to  enable  him  to  execute  the  deci- 
sions of  the  Security  Council. 

As  many  of  you  know,  I  speak  not  only  as 
a  member  of  our  delegation  but  as  a  member 
of  the  U.S.  Congress  as  well.  In  this  connec- 
tion I  note  that  of  course  our  support  for  this 
resolution   will   require  action  by  the   U.S. 


Congress,  which  controls  the  purse  strings  of 
our  nation.  I  pledge  to  you  that  I  will  carry 
the  message  to  the  U.S.  Congress  that  this 
great  world  organization  has  today  re- 
sponded in  a  manner  consistent  with  its  pur- 
poses and  principles  and  the  high  hopes  of 
the  drafters  of  the  charter  in  adopting  this 
resolution.  I  am  confident  my  colleagues  in 
the  Congress  will  share  my  view  that  we 
have  today  taken  a  step  toward  peace  which 
merits  the  fullest  support  of  all  states  in  the 
world. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  the  Congress,  it  is  my 
privilege  to  serve  as  ranking  Republican  on 
the  Near  East  and  South  Asia  Subcommittee 
of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  and 
in  that  capacity,  and  on  behalf  of  my  delega- 
tion here  at  the  United  Nations,  I  would  like 
to  express  particular  appreciation  for  the 
high  statesmanship  that  has  been  shown  here 
by  the  distinguished  Representative  of  Iran, 
the  distinguished  vice  chairman  of  this  com- 
mittee, and  his  delegation ;  the  distinguished 
Ambassador  of  Yemen  and  his  delegation;  by 
the  distinguished  Ambassador  of  Egypt  and 
his  delegation;  and  by  the  distinguished  Rep- 
resentative of  Jordan  and  that  delegation  for 
the  strategic  role  they  played  in  agreeing  to 
the  withdrawal  of  an  amendment  which  was 
divisive  and  gave  problems  to  many  delega- 
tions and  in  support  for  the  compromise  35- 
power  resolution  just  passed  by  this  commit- 
tee. Mr.  Chairman,  this  is  in  the  highest  tra- 
dition of  statesmanship  and  we  appreciate  it. 

I  would  also  like  to  express  the  apprecia- 
tion of  my  delegation  to  the  distinguished 
Ambassador  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  and  the  others  who  have  with- 
drawn amendments  and  to  the  Group  of  77 
and  the  role  they  have  played  here. 

Finally,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  be  remiss 
if  I  did  not  express  for  my  delegation  our 
profound  appreciation  for  the  courage  and 
the  wisdom  with  which  the  distinguished 
chairman  of  this  committee  has  guided  us 
through  the  treacherous  shoals  toward  the 
fulfillment  of  our  assigned  responsibility  in 
this  important  matter. 


32 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION^ 

The  General  Assembly, 

Having  considered  the  report  of  the  Secretary- 
General  on  the  cost  estimates  of  the  United  Nations 
Emergency  Force  established  pursuant  to  Security 
Council  resolution  340  (1973)  of  25  October  1973  for 
the  period  from  25  October  1973  to  24  April  1974  and 
the  report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Adminis- 
trative and  Budgetary  Questions  thereon, 

Reaffirming  its  previous  decisions  regarding  the 
fact  that,  in  order  to  meet  the  expenditures  caused 
by  such  operations,  a  different  procedure  is  required 
from  that  applied  to  meet  expenditures  of  the  regu- 
lar budget  of  the  United  Nations, 

Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  the  economically 
more  developed  countries  are  in  a  position  to  make 
relatively  larger  contributions  and  that  the  economi- 
cally less  developed  countries  have  a  relatively  lim- 
ited capacity  to  contribute  towards  peace-keeping 
operations  involving  heavy  expenditures. 

Also  bearing  in  mind  the  special  responsibilities  of 
the  States  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Coun- 
cil in  the  financing  of  such  operations,  as  indicated 
in  resolution  1874  (S-IV)  of  27  June  1963  and  other 
resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly, 

1.  Decides  to  appropriate  an  amount  of  $30  million 
for  the  operation  of  the  United  Nations  Emergency 
Force  from  25  October  1973  to  24  April  1974  inclu- 
sive and  requests  the  Secretary-General  to  establish 
a  special  account  for  the  Force; 

2.  Decides,  as  an  ad  hoc  arrangement,  without 
prejudice  to  the  positions  of  principle  that  may  be 
taken  by  Member  States  in  any  consideration  by  the 
General  Assembly  of  arrangements  for  the  financing 
of  peace-keeping  operations 

(a)  To  apportion  an  amount  of  $18,945,000  for  the 
above-mentioned  six-month  period  among  the  States 
permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council  in  the 
proportions  determined  by  the  scale  of  assessments 
for  1974-1976; 


»U.N.  doc.  A/RES/3101  (XXVIII)  (A/C.5/1130/ 
Rev.  1);  adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  Dec.  11  by  a 
recorded  vote  of  108  (U.S.)  to  3,  with  1  abstention. 


(6)  To  apportion  an  amount  of  $10,434,000  for  the 
above-mentioned  six-month  period  among  the  eco- 
nomically developed  Member  States  which  are  not 
permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council  in  the 
proportions  determined  by  the  scale  of  assessments 
for  1974-1976; 

(c)  To  apportion  an  amount  of  $606,000  for  the 
above-mentioned  six-month  period  among  the  eco- 
nomically less  developed  Member  States  in  the  pro- 
portions determined  by  the  scale  of  assessments  for 
1974-1976; 

(d)  To  apportion  an  amount  of  $15,000  for  the 
above-mentioned  six-month  period  to  the  following 
countries  among  the  economically  less  developed 
Member  States  in  the  proportions  determined  by  the 
scale  of  assessments  for  1974-1976:  Afghanistan, 
Bhutan,  Botswana,  Burundi,  Chad,  Dahomey,  Demo- 
cratic Yemen,  Ethiopia,  Guinea,  Haiti,  Laos,  Leso- 
tho, Malawi,  Maldives,  Mali,  Nepal,  Niger,  Rwanda, 
Senegal,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Uganda,  LInited  Republic 
of  Tanzania,  Upper  Volta  and  Yemen; 

3.  Decides  that,  for  the  purpose  of  the  present 
resolution,  the  term  "economically  less  developed 
Member  States"  in  paragraph  2(c)  above  shall  mean 
all  Member  States  except  Australia,  Austria,  Bel- 
gium, the  Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic, 
Canada,  Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  Finland,  the  Ger- 
man Democratic  Republic,  Germany  (Federal  Re- 
public of),  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxem- 
bourg, the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Poland,  Portugal,  South  Africa,  Sweden,  the  Ukrain- 
ian Soviet  Socialist  Republic  and  the  Member  States 
referred  to  in  paragraphs  2(a)  and  (d)  above; 

4.  Authorizes  the  Secretary-General  to  enter  into 
commitments  for  the  United  Nations  Emergency 
Force  at  a  rate  not  to  exceed  $5  million  per  month 
for  the  period  from  25  April  to  31  October  1974  in- 
clusive, should  the  Security  Council  decide  to  con- 
tinue the  Force  beyond  the  initial  period  of  six 
months,  the  said  amount  to  be  apportioned  among 
Member  States  in  accordance  with  the  scheme  set 
out  in  the  present  resolution; 

5.  Invites  voluntary  contributions  to  the  United 
Nations  Emergency  Force  both  in  cash  and  in  the 
form  of  services  and  supplies  acceptable  to  the 
Secretary-General. 


January    1 4,    1 974 


33 


THE  CONGRESS 


U.N.  Peacekeeping  Operations: 
Lessons  of  the  UNEF 

Following  is  a  statement  by  William  E. 
Schaufele,  Jr.,  U.S.  Deputy  Representative 
on  the  U.N.  Security  Council,  made  on  De- 
cember 5  before  a  joint  hearing  of  the  Sub- 
committee on  International  Organizations 
and  Movements  and  the  Subcommittee  on  the 
Near  East  and  South  Asia  of  the  Hotise 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.^ 

USUN  press  release  127  dated  December  6 

It  gives  me  a  great  deal  of  pleasure  to 
appear  before  the  subcommittee  this  morn- 
ing to  discuss  United  Nations  peacekeeping. 
As  an  American  citizen,  I  am  especially  grati- 
fied that  you  are  holding  hearings  on  a  sub- 
ject which  is  the  primary  objective  of  the 
U.N.  Charter  and  of  diplomacy  itself.  One 
important  reason  which  led  me  to  welcome 
an  assignment  at  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations  was  the  inclusion  of  peace- 
keeping as  one  of  my  principal  responsibili- 
ties. 

As  you  know,  the  U.N.  Special  Committee 
on  Peacekeeping  Operations  has  been  vir- 
tually deadlocked  for  several  years,  after 
having  made  some  initial  progress  in  its 
efforts  to  reach  agreement  on  the  guidelines 
governing  future  peacekeeping  operations.  It 
is  no  secret  that  the  major  obstacle  has  been 
a  difference  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  regarding  the  respective 
authority  and  responsibilities  of  the  Secre- 
tary General  and  the  Security  Council.  The 
Soviet  Union  has  steadfastly  supported  the 
principle  that  the  Security  Council  be  re- 
sponsible for  day-to-day  peacekeeping  opera- 
tions, thus  making  any  decision  subject  to  the 


"The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


veto.  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  emphasized  the  necessity  of  leaving 
nearly  all  operational  decisions  to  the  Secre- 
tary General  and  the  Force  commander  in  the 
interests  of  efficiency  and  effective  peace- 
keeping. 

Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  signaled  a 
willingness  to  take  a  new  look  at  U.S.  policy 
in  his  September  24  speech  to  the  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly  when  he  said: 

The  time  has  come  to  agree  on  peacekeeping 
guidelines  so  that  this  organization  can  act  swiftly, 
confidently,  and  effectively  in  future  crises.  To  break 
the  deadlock,  the  United  States  is  prepared  to  con- 
sider how  the  Security  Council  can  play  a  more 
central  role  in  the  conduct  of  peacekeeping  opera- 
tions. 

We  are  now  exploring  possibilities  which 
would  help  achieve  that  end.  In  doing  so,  we 
hope  that  we  can  break  the  deadlock,  facili- 
tate the  rapid  establishment  of  peacekeep- 
ing operations  in  response  to  crisis  situa- 
tions, and  achieve  an  agreement  which  ac- 
commodates the  concerns  of  all.  However,  we 
expect  other  delegations,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  which  have  significant  peacekeeping 
interests  and  responsibilities  to  respond  to 
the  U.S.  move. 

The  peacekeeping  operation  in  the  Middle 
East  which  established  a  new  U.N.  Emer- 
gency Force  (UNEF)  encourages  us  to  be- 
lieve that  an  acceptable  compromise  may  be 
attainable.  Before  going  into  the  lessons  of 
UNEF  or  the  establishment  of  peacekeeping 
guidelines,  I  would  like  to  describe  briefly  the 
genesis  of  that  operation. 

When  it  was  demonstrated  that  the  cease- 
fire established  by  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 338  and  reiterated  in  Resolution  339  was 
at  best  a  fragile  thing,  the  Security  Council 
on  October  25  adopted  Resolution  340,  which 
set  up  the  Force  under  the  authority  of  the 
Security  Council  and  requested  the  Secretary 
General  to  report  on  the  steps  taken  to  this 
effect.    The  Secretary  General  submitted  a 


34 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


comprehensive  report  the  following  day.  On 
October  27  the  Security  Council  adopted 
Resolution  341,  which  approved  the  Secre- 
tary General's  report  and  established  the 
Force  for  a  six-month  period  at  an  estimated 
cost  of  $30  million.  In  the  resolution  provid- 
ing for  the  financing  of  the  Force,  the  prin- 
ciple of  collective  responsibility  has  been  ac- 
cepted. Although  the  United  States  would 
have  preferred  that  the  operation  be  financed 
on  the  regular  scale  of  assessments,  we  ac- 
ceded to  a  compromise  acceptable  to  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  membership. 
However,  a  special  scale  has  been  devised, 
and  the  United  States  and  the  other  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council  will 
pay  15  percent  more  than  their  scale  of  as- 
sessment for  the  regular  budget.  Developing 
countries  will  pay  80  or  90  percent  less  than 
their  normal  scale. 

The  delay  in  final  approval  of  the  Secre- 
tary General's  report  was  due  primarily  to 
extensive,  intricate,  and  time-consuming  con- 
sultations on  the  composition  of  the  Force. 
The  United  States  proposed  an  amendment 
to  the  original  eight-power  draft  which 
would  exclude  contingents  from  the  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council.  This 
amendment  was  adopted  despite  the  reserva- 
tions of  the  Soviet  Union,  France,  and  Great 
Britain.  We  believe  that  regardless  of  their 
special  responsibility  for  the  maintenance  of 
international  peace  and  security,  it  is  often 
desirable  that  the  permanent  members  be 
excluded  in  order  to  prevent  polarization  or 
confrontation  which  could  have  effects  in  or 
beyond  the  area  in  which  the  Force  would 
operate. 

The  Soviets  believe  very  strongly  that  the 
"Western"  nations  have  dominated  U.N. 
peacekeeping  activities  in  the  past.  They 
particularly  noted  that  the  first  UNEF  con- 
tingents which  were  withdrawn  from  the 
peacekeeping  operation  in  Cyprus  comprised 
Swedes,  Finns,  and  Austrians,  whom,  though 
neutral,  the  Soviets  tend  to  describe  as 
"Western."  The  United  States,  however,  was 
and  is  in  the  first  instance  concerned  with 
the  efl!"ectiveness  of  the  Force  and  the  impar- 
tiality of  the  contributing  countries  as  to  the 
issues  and  the  parties  concerned  in  the  dis- 


pute. The  terms  of  reference  of  UNEF  con- 
cerning the  geographic  distribution  of  the 
Force  represent  a  compromise  with  which  we 
are  not  entirely  satisfied  and  which  we  cer- 
tainly do  not  regard  as  a  precedent. 

What,  then,  can  we  learn  from  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  U.N.  Emergency  Force  in  the 
absence  of  agreed  guidelines?  First,  it  has 
been  demonstrated  that  the  United  Nations, 
for  the  benefit  of  all,  can  interpose  itself  in 
certain  conflict  situations.  It  can  not  only 
improve  the  situation  on  the  ground,  but  also, 
we  have  reason  to  hope,  it  can  provide  a 
means  by  which  the  parties  to  a  conflict  can 
construct  a  permanent  settlement  of  their 
differences.  Second,  we  are  encouraged  by 
the  fact  that  in  the  case  of  the  new  UNEF, 
there  was  no  argument  at  all  about  the  pri- 
macy of  the  Security  Council.  That  is  as  it 
should  be.  The  Secretary  General  proposed 
the  terms  of  reference,  and  the  Council  ap- 
proved them.  Since  this  is  a  "consent  opei'a- 
tion,"  not  an  enforcement  action  under  ar- 
ticle 42  of  the  U.N.  Charter,  the  Security 
Council  wisely  enlisted  the  full  cooperation 
of  the  parties  concerned.  The  Council  defined 
the  mandate,  established  the  maximum  size 
of  the  Force,  provided  for  equitable  financing 
of  the  operation,  and  gave  its  consent  to  other 
decisions  before  the  operation  could  be 
launched. 

Another  lesson  is  that  the  terms  of  refer- 
ence approved  by  the  Security  Council  in- 
volved, in  several  instances,  departures  from 
positions  previously  held  by  several  delega- 
tions in  discussing  peacekeeping  guidelines 
in  more  theoretical  terms.  Our  government 
made  such  concessions,  and  so  have  others. 
That  is  a  healthy  development,  proving  that 
it  may  not  be  necessary  to  formulate  guide- 
lines so  detailed  as  we  had  previously  be- 
lieved. In  particular  cases  we  may  find  that 
agreement  can — and  perhaps  should — be 
reached  on  either  broader  or  narrower  terms 
of  reference  as  the  situation  may  require. 
Thus  the  developments  of  late  October  and 
November  provide  practical  examples  of  how 
some  knotty  problems  discussed  in  the  Peace- 
keeping Committee  for  years  were  resolved 
at  a  time  of  international  crisis.  We  dis- 
covered that  a  peacekeeping  operation  could 


January   14,    1974 


35 


in  fact  be  established  without  predetermined 
guidelines. 

Therefore  we  believe  that  the  Peacekeep- 
ing Committee  in  its  future  work  should  not 
neglect  the  important  lessons  which  we  can 
draw  from  the  way  in  which  this  operation 
was  established,  especially  concerning  such 
important  matters  as  the  establishment,  fi- 
nancing, composition,  size,  and  manner  of 
termination  of  peacekeeping  operations. 
Rather  than  taking  comfort  from  our  ability 
to  establish  UNEF  in  the  absence  of  guide- 
lines, we  should  seize  the  opportunity  which 
this  operation  presents  us  in  order  to  pursue, 
perhaps  in  more  imaginative  and  general 
ways,  the  goal  which  we  have  been  seeking 
for  eight  years  in  the  Peacekeeping  Commit- 
tee. 


Emergency  Security  Assistance 
for  Israel  and  Cambodia 

Statement  by  Kenneth  Rush 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State  ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear  be- 
fore you  this  morning  to  discuss  the  ad- 
minist>-ation's  request  for  emergency  assist- 
ance for  Israel  and  Cambodia.  We  have 
already  provided  this  committee  with  clas- 
sified documents  detailing  all  aspects  of 
this  legislation  and  will  of  course  provide 
additional  documentation  as  our  assessment 
of  the  military  balance  in  the  Middle  East 
proceeds. 

We  are  more  hopeful  now  than  at  any 
time  in  the  past  that  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict, the  source  of  four  wars  in  the  last 
25  years,  may  finally  be  settled  by  peaceful 
face-to-face  negotiations.  But  in  this  deli- 
cate period,  in  which,  hopefully,  we  move 
toward  a  peaceful  solution  to  this  dispute, 
we  must  make  it  clear  to  our  friends  in 
Israel,   to   our  friends  in   the   Arab   world. 


'  Made  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  on  Dec.  13.  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402. 


and  to  those  in  the  Arab  world  and  else- 
where who  choose  to  oppose  our  policies 
in  the  Middle  East  that  Israel  will  be  given 
the  assistance  and  the  equipment  necessary 
to  enable  her  to  defend  herself. 

The  fighting  in  the  Middle  East  was  bitter 
and  costly.  The  substantial  equipment  losses 
suffered  by  Egypt  and  Syria  and  Iraq  have 
been  and  are  being  replaced  by  a  massive 
Soviet  resupply  effort.  We  do  not  know  what 
the  repayment  terms  for  this  Soviet  equip- 
ment are,  although  we  have  given  the  com- 
mittee our  tentative  estimates  on  a  classified 
basis.  We  are  certain,  however,  that  re- 
payment terms  are  not  holding  up  the  flow 
of  Soviet  arms  into  the  area. 

Israel  has  also  suffered  severe  losses.  She 
has  purchased  nearly  $1  billion  in  equip- 
ment from  us  since  October  6.  As  a  result 
of  these  purchases,  Israel  has  replaced  nearly 
all  the  equipment  lost  during  the  recent 
fighting.  Israel  will  need  substantial 
amounts  of  additional  equipment  as  well, 
minor  amounts  to  replace  losses  but  pri- 
marily to  counterbalance  the  heavy  flow 
of  new  and  sophisticated  Soviet  weapons  to 
Arab  armies.  This  is  particularly  important 
as  we  look  ahead  to  a  round  of  negotiations 
which  could  lead  to  a  permanent  peace 
in  the  area.  Without  belaboring  the  point, 
I  believe  it  is  clear  to  anyone  who  looks 
at  a  map  of  the  Middle  East  that  Israel's 
military  equipment  needs  would  of  necessity 
increase  as  the  distance  between  the  terri- 
tory she  controls  and  the  armies  of  her 
potential  enemies  decreases.  There  should 
be  no  doubt  in  anyone's  mind  that  Israel 
was  attacked  suddenly  and  without  warning 
during  the  recent  fighting.  We  cannot  ex- 
pect that  Israel  will  be  prepared  to  make 
significant  compromises  for  peace  unless  her 
people  are  assured  that  they  will  have  the 
weapons  with  which  to  defend  themselves. 
If  Arab  armies  had  been  on  Israel's  borders 
when  the  latest  fighting  took  place,  the  out- 
come might  have  been  very  different. 

As  you  are  aware,  we  have  requested  $2.2 
billion  for  Israel  with  the  option  to  provide 
all  or  part  of  it  on  either  a  gi-ant  or  a 
credit  basis.  We  do  not  at  this  time  have 
a  firm  estimate  of  what  amount  we  might 


36 


Department   of   State   Bulletin 


wish  to  provide  on  a  grant  basis  and  what 
amount  we  might  wish  to  provide  on  a  credit 
basis.  The  Israeli  economy  was  in  excellent 
shape  before  the  fighting  began.  Subsequent 
economic  demands  and  dislocations  have  been 
heavy.  We  wish  to  be  in  a  position  to  as- 
sist Israel  to  obtain  the  equipment  she  needs 
without  disrupting  her  economy.  We  will 
of  course  keep  this  committee  and  the  Con- 
gress fully  advised  as  we  proceed  in  our 
supply  effort. 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  Israel  has  already 
purchased  equipment  valued  at  nearly  $1 
billion  which  substantially  replaces  her 
losses.  Part  of  the  money  we  are  requesting 
would  be  used  to  fund  these  purchases  on 
either  a  grant  or  a  credit  basis.  Israel  has 
also  requested  additional  equipment  from  us, 
the  value  of  which  exceeds  substantially  $1.2 
billion.  We  are  studying  these  additional  re- 
quests, but  a  total  figure  of  $2.2  billion  still 
represents  our  best  estimate  of  the  amount 
of  assistance  required  to  replace  Israel's 
losses  and  to  maintain  the  military  balance 
in  the  Middle  East  in  the  immediate  period 
ahead.  We  are  not  seeking  to  upset  the  arms 
balance  in  favor  of  Israel,  but  we  do  not  wish 
to  have  it  tilted  in  the  other  direction  either. 
There  will  be  difficult  policy  choices,  for  in 
the  last  analysis  any  military  balance  sheet 
contains  imponderable  elements  concerning 
intentions,  human  resources,  and  the  like. 
The  $2.2  billion  figure  is  our  best  estimate, 
and  we  attach  great  importance  to  securing 
all  of  it.  All  parties  to  the  Middle  East  con- 
flict are  aware  of  this  figure  and  have  reacted 
to  it.  The  authorization  of  a  lesser  amount 
now  could  necessitate  our  asking  for  an  addi- 
tional authorization  in  the  future  at  a  time 
when  such  a  request  could  have  an  unsettling 
effect  on  efforts  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion to  this  dispute. 

In  short,  gentlemen,  passage  of  this  legis- 
lation will  give  us  a  firm  basis  to  play  a  use- 
ful role  in  the  negotiations  ahead. 

I  also  wish  to  point  out  that  this  sum  if 
appropriated  will  fall  within  the  President's 
fiscal  year  1974  budget  ceiling.  No  other  re- 
quests for  authorizations  and  appropriations 
which  have  been  submitted  by  the  executive 
branch  to  the  Congress  will  have  to  be  re- 


duced to  accommodate  this  authorization 
within  the  budget  ceiling.  We  estimate  that 
the  net  cost  of  this  $2.2  billion  authorization 
to  the  United  States  in  FY  1974  will  be  ap- 
proximately $600  million. 

We  also  support  the  amendment  made  by 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  which 
will  enable  us  to  use  some  of  the  money  au- 
thorized in  this  legislation  to  pay  for  our 
share  of  costs  associated  with  maintaining 
the  United  Nations  forces  on  the  cease-fire 
lines. 

Our  policy  objectives  in  the  Middle  East 
are  clear.  We  seek  a  fundamental  peace  set- 
tlement in  which  all  states  in  the  area  will 
be  secure  from  the  recurrent  threat  of  war. 
Our  military  supply  policy  provides  clear  evi- 
dence that  we  will  not  allow  military  pre- 
ponderance to  solve  the  Arab-Israeli  dispute 
on  the  battlefield.  Our  efforts  in  the  forth- 
coming negotiations  will  demonstrate  both  to 
Arab  and  to  Israeli  leaders  that  only  with 
American  assistance  can  peace  be  attained. 
Other  states  have  sought  to  use  the  Arab- 
Israeli  dispute  to  further  interests  which 
threaten  the  religious  and  national  interests 
of  Arab  and  Jew  alike.  We  seek  no  such 
dominance.  We  have  no  ideological  fish  to  fry. 
We  seek  merely  a  firm  peace,  a  peace  which 
will  endure.  This  legislation  will  help  us  to 
attain  this  objective. 

A  lasting  peace  is  also  our  objective  in 
Southeast  Asia.  The  structure  for  the  peace 
was  established  last  January  when  the  Paris 
agreements  ended  the  active  fighting  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  At  that  time  we  hoped  that 
cease-fires  and  peace  agreements  for  Laos 
and  Cambodia  would  quickly  follow.  In  Laos 
they  have,  but  in  Cambodia  the  Communist 
side  has  responded  to  the  peace  overtures  of 
the  Cambodian  Government,  which  included 
an  offer  of  a  cease-fire,  with  ever  more  vi- 
cious attacks.  To  permit  these  tactics  to  suc- 
ceed would  embolden  the  other  side  and 
jeopardize  the  fragile  structure  of  peace  we 
have  built  in  the  area. 

The  price  of  protecting  and  building  this 
structure  in  Cambodia  is  modest.  We  are 
requesting  an  additional  $200  million  over 
our  original  request  submitted  earlier  this 
year  when  our  hopes  for  peace  were  high  and 


January   14,    1974 


37 


we  were  able  to  assist  the  Cambodian  forces 
in  their  struggle  with  U.S.  air  support.  The 
price  of  denying  this  request  is  incalculable, 
for  it  could  result  in  the  fall  of  Cambodia  and 
the  eventual  undermining  of  all  our  efforts 
for  peace  in  Southeast  Asia. 

I  realize  that  the  fiscal  year  1974  foreign 
assistance  authorization  bill  gives  us  author- 
ity to  draw  upon  Defense  Department  stocks 
to  meet  Cambodia's  requirements.  This  au- 
thority and  legislative  history  surrounding  it 
clearly  indicate  that  the  Congress  recognizes 
Cambodia's   requirements.   Under  these  cir- 


cumstances the  authorization  for  appropria- 
tions for  Cambodia  contained  in  S.  2692  is  no 
longer  legally  required.  That  authorization 
is  contained  in  section  506  of  the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act.  We  still  of  course  need  the 
appropriation  which  we  have  requested  in 
order  to  reimburse  the  Defense  Department 
to  the  extent  that  the  drawdown  authority  is 
used. 

In  both  Southeast  Asia  and  the  Middle 
East  the  funds  we  are  requesting  will  enable 
us  to  continue  to  build  secure  foundations  for 
a  lasting  peace. 


Department  Discusses  Efforts  To  Account   for  Missing   in  Action  in  Laos 


Following  is  a  statement  made  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy 
and  Scientific  Developments  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on  December 
5  by  Frank  A.  Sieverts,  Special  Assistant  to 
the  Deputy  Secretary  of  State  for  Prisoner 
of  War/Missing  in  Action  Matters.^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear  be- 
fore this  subcommittee  to  report  on  our  con- 
tinuing efforts  to  account  for  our  missing-in- 
action personnel  in  Indochina  and  to  com- 
ment on  the  House  concurrent  resolutions 
expressing  the  sense  of  Congress  on  this  se- 
rious subject.  Let  me  say  at  the  outset  that 
the  Department  of  State  fully  shares  the  con- 
cern expressed  in  the  past  by  this  subcom- 
mittee, and  by  the  many  Members  of  the  Con- 
gress who  have  spoken  on  this  subject  or  sub- 
mitted resolutions,  about  the  Communist 
side's  refusal  to  provide  information  on  our 
missing  men.  It  will  soon  be  a  year  since  the 
signing  of  the  Viet-Nam  agreement  on  Janu- 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


ary  27,  1973,  and  nine  months  since  the  last 
POW's  were  released.  The  Communist  au- 
thorities have  failed  to  account  for  a  single 
one  of  our  missing  men  since  that  time. 

My  colleague  from  the  Defense  Depart- 
ment will  speak  on  the  activities  of  the  Four- 
Party  Joint  Military  Team,  which  has  re- 
sponsibility for  this  subject  under  the  Viet- 
Nam  agreement,  and  on  the  Joint  Casualty 
Resolution  Center  (JCRC),  which  has  the 
mission  of  searching  for  our  missing  men  in 
Southeast  Asia.  My  testimony  will  concen- 
trate primarily  on  the  POW/MIA  situation 
in  Laos.  I  will  also  discuss  the  subject  of 
missing  journalists  and  other  civilians  and 
will  comment  on  the  House  concurrent 
resolutions  that  have  been  referred  to  this 
subcommittee. 

Before  examining  the  situation  in  Laos,  I 
would  like  to  report  that  the  International 
Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  meeting  in  Teh- 
ran, Iran,  on  November  14  adopted  a  resolu- 
tion reaflfirming  international  concern  about 
the  accounting  for  the  missing  and  dead  in 
armed  conflicts.  The  American  Red  Cross  and 
U.S.  Government  delegations  to  this  confer- 
ence took  the  lead  in  winning  support  for 
this  resolution,  which  was  approved  unan- 


38 


Department   of   State   Bulletin 


imously.  We  have  heard  from  our  returned 
POW's  that  a  resolution  on  treatment  of  pris- 
oners of  war  adopted  by  the  International 
Red  Cross  Conference  in  1969  may  have  been 
an  important  factor  influencing  the  North 
Vietnamese  to  improve  the  treatment  of  our 
men  in  the  fall  of  1969.  We  can  only  hope 
that  this  new  resolution  will  have  a  similar 
effect  on  the  Communist  authorities  respon- 
sible for  accounting  for  our  missing  men. 

I  would  be  glad  to  provide  the  text  of  that 
resolution  for  the  record  of  this  hearing, 
with  the  text  of  the  statement  by  Dr.  Frank 
Stanton,  chairman  of  the  American  National 
Red  Cross  and  former  president  of  CBS-TV, 
introducing  the  resolution  at  the  Tehran  con- 
ference. 

Two  agreements  and  a  protocol  govern  the 
return  of  prisoners  of  war  and  accounting 
for  the  dead  and  missing  in  Laos.  Under  the 
Viet-Nam  agreement  of  January  27,  1973,  we 
have  held  North  Viet-Nam  responsible  for 
the  release  of  all  American  POW's  held 
throughout  Indochina.  Pursuant  to  that 
agreement,  the  Communist  side  provided 
lists  of  American  prisoners  in  three  categor- 
ies: North  Viet-Nam,  the  PRG  [Provi- 
sional Revolutionary  Government] ,  and  Laos. 
Lists  for  North  Viet-Nam  and  the  PRG  were 
given  to  U.S.  oflicials  in  Paris  on  January  27. 
Names  of  nine  U.S.  prisoners  listed  as  pris- 
oners of  the  Lao  Patriotic  Front  (LPF)  — 
the  Pathet  Lao — were  given  to  U.S.  officials 
by  North  Vietnamese  officials  in  Paris  five 
days  later,  on  February  1.  That  list  was 
smaller  than  we  had  been  led  to  expect  by 
previous  statements  by  Pathet  Lao  officials, 
and  American  officials  told  the  North  Viet- 
namese that  we  did  not  accept  it  as  a  com- 
plete list  of  Americans  captured  in  Laos.  The 
nine  men  on  that  list  were  released  in  Hanoi 
on  March  28,  virtually  the  last  prisoners  re- 
leased from  Communist  captivity.  Most  of 
them  had  been  held  in  North  Viet-Nam  dur- 
ing most  of  their  captivity. 

The  Agreement  on  the  Restoration  of 
Peace  and  Reconciliation  in  Laos,  signed  by 
the  two  Lao  parties  on  February  21,  1973, 
further  spelled  out  responsibility  for  the  re- 
lease of  prisoners   and  accounting   for  the 


missing.  Article  5  of  that  agreement  reads  as 
follows: 

Both  Lao  sides  will  return  to  each  other  all  per- 
sons regardless  of  nationality  that  were  captured 
during  the  war,  including  those  imprisoned  for  co- 
operating with  the  other  side.  Their  return  will  be 
carried  out  according  to  the  procedures  set  up  by 
the  two  sides,  and,  at  the  latest,  must  be  completed 
within  60  days  following  the  establishment  of  the 
Provisional  Government  of  National  Union  and  the 
Joint  National  Political  Council. 

After  all  those  who  were  captured  have  been  re- 
turned, each  side  has  the  duty  to  gather  information 
on  those  missing  during  the  war  and  report  the  in- 
formation to  the  other  side. 

From  the  day  of  the  release  of  the  Febru- 
ary 1  list,  and  before,  senior  American  Em- 
bassy officials  in  Laos  had  made  clear  to  the 
Communist  side  the  importance  we  attached 
to  the  release  of  any  remaining  American 
prisoners  and  the  fullest  possible  accounting 


Red  Cross  Conference  Resolution 
on  Accounting  for  Missing  and  Dead 

FoUoiving  is  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted 
iinanimously  by  the  International  Conference 
of  the  Red  Cross  at  Tehran  mi  November  H. 

The  XXIInd  International  Conference  of  the 
Red  Cross, 

Recognizing  that  one  of  the  tragic  conse- 
quences of  armed  conflicts  is  a  lack  of  infor- 
mation on  persons  who  are  missing  or  who 
have  died,  including  those  who  died  in  captiv- 
ity, and 

In  conformity  with  the  humanitarian  tradi- 
tions of  the  Red  Cross  and  with  the  spirit  of 
the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949; 

Calls  oji  parties  to  armed  conflicts,  during 
hostilities  and  after  cessation  of  hostilities,  to 
help  locate  and  care  for  the  graves  of  the  dead, 
to  facilitate  the  disinterment  and  return  of 
remains,  and  to  provide  information  about 
those  who  are  missing  in  action,  and 

Further  calls  o»  parties  to  armed  conflicts  to 
cooperate  with  protecting  powers,  with  the 
ICRC  and  its  Central  Tracing  Agency,  and 
with  such  other  appropriate  bodies  as  may  be 
established  for  this  purpose,  including  National 
Red  Cross  societies,  to  accomplish  the  human- 
itarian mission  of  accounting  for  the  dead  and 
missing,  including  those  belonging  to  third 
countries  not  parties  to  the  armed  conflict. 


January   14,    1974 


39 


for  the  missing.  LPF  officials  with  whom  our 
representatives  met  took  the  position  that 
prisoner-of-war  and  missing-in-action  ques- 
tions could  not  be  addressed  until  the  pvoto- 
col  implementing  the  February  21  agreement 
was  agreed  to  and  signed.  Consequently,  our 
Embassy  representatives  worked  to  speed  the 
signing  of  that  protocol  and  to  insure  that 
constructive  POW/MIA  provisions  would  be 
included  in  it. 

Article  18  of  the  protocol  signed  Septem- 
ber 14  by  the  two  Lao  parties  includes  a 
number  of  specific  provisions  on  this  sub- 
ject. It  reads  as  follows: 

A.  The  return  of  all  persons  regardless  of  nation- 
ality who  were  captured  and  imprisoned  for  cooper- 
ating with  the  other  side  during  the  war  will  be  ac- 
complished in  three  stages  and  completed  at  the 
same  time  as  the  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops  and 
military  personnel. 

B.  The  return  of  prisoners  at  each  stage  from 
each  side  will  be  reported  by  number  of  persons,  lo- 
cation, and  time  to  the  Joint  Central  Commission  to 
Implement  the  Agreement  (JCCIA)  48  hours  in  ad- 
vance. 

C.  Within  15  to  30  days,  counting  from  the  date  of 
signing  of  this  Protocol,  each  side  will  report  the 
number  of  those  captured  and  imprisoned  to  the 
JCCIA,  indicating  nationality  and  whether  military 
or  civilian,  together  with  a  list  of  names  of  those 
who  died  in  captivity. 

D.  After  the  return  of  the  prisoners  is  completed, 
each  side  must  report  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the 
JCCIA  information  it  is  able  to  obtain  about  persons 
missing  during  the  war  regardless  of  nationality. 

E.  The  return  of  those  captured  and  imprisoned 
during  the  war  and  the  gathering  of  information 
that  each  side  will  submit  about  the  persons  missing 
during  the  war  is  the  responsibility  of  the  JCCIA. 
When  both  sides  in  the  JCCIA  believe  it  necessary, 
they  may  request  assistance  from  the  International 
Control  Commission. 

The  language  of  article  18  calls  for  the  re- 
lease of  all  prisoners  "regardless  of  nation- 
ality" captured  and  held  in  Laos.  This  would 
apply  to  Lao  personnel,  to  other  Indochinese, 
and  of  course  to  any  Americans.  The  release 
of  prisoners  is  to  take  place  in  three  stages 
and  be  completed  at  the  same  time  as  the 
withdrawal  of  foreign  troops  and  military 
personnel,  which  is  specified  elsewhere  in  the 
protocol  as  60  days  from  the  date  of  forma- 
tion of  the  coalition  government.  The  compo- 
sition of  the  coalition  is  also  spelled  out  in 


the  protocol,  but  the  60-day  clock  for  pris- 
oner releases  does  not  start  until  the  coalition 
is  actually  formed,  which  has  not  yet  hap- 
pened. 

Paragraph  C  of  article  18  provided  that 
within  "15  to  30  days"  from  the  date  of  sign- 
ing of  the  protocol  (September  14)  each  side 
was  to  report  the  number  of  those  still  held, 
with  indication  of  their  nationality  and  sta- 
tus, together  with  the  list  of  names  of  any 
who  died  in  captivity.  This  was  the  shortest 
time  period  for  implementation  specified  in 
any  part  of  the  protocol,  and  the  only  one 
starting  with  the  date  of  signing.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  Pathet  Lao  simply  disregarded 
this  provision. 

Article  18  further  states  that  information 
about  persons  missing  during  the  war  should 
be  reported  as  quickly  as  possible  after  the 
return  of  the  prisoners  is  completed.  The  in- 
formation is  to  be  reported  to  the  Joint  Cen- 
tral Commission  to  Implement  the  Agree- 
ment (JCCIA),  composed  of  representatives 
of  the  sides.  The  JCCIA  held  its  first  formal 
meeting  November  23,  and  we  have  drawn 
some  encouragement  from  the  fact  that  the 
LPF  representative  at  that  meeting  reaf- 
firmed his  recognition  of  the  obligation  to  re- 
lease prisoners  and  account  for  the  missing 
and  dead.  The  JCCIA  may,  by  mutual  agree- 
ment, request  assistance  from  the  Interna- 
tional Control  Commission  (ICC)  for  Laos. 
It  has  not  so  far  done  so. 

It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  Lao 
Patriotic  Front  has  repeatedly  stated  pub- 
licly and  directly  to  senior  U.S.  officials  that 
there  are  no  more  American  prisoners  cap- 
tured or  held  in  Laos — with  the  exception  of 
a  civilian,  Emmet  Kay,  a  pilot  for  Continen- 
tal Air  Services,  Inc.,  whose  plane  w'ent  down 
in  northwest  Laos  May  7,  1973.  They  have 
continued  to  describe  the  nine  names  pro- 
vided February  1  as  the  total  list,  reaffirm- 
ing this  position  following  the  signing  of  the 
September  14  protocol. 

Mr.  Kay's  capture  was  confirmed  by  LPF 
authorities  soon  after  it  took  place,  and  let- 
ters from  him  have  been  received  by  his  wife, 
who  resides  in  Vientiane.  Our  Embassy  has 
pressed  repeatedly  for  his  release,  but  the 


40 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


LPF  has  said  this  must  await  further  imple- 
mentation of  the  protocol — which  suggests  it 
will  come  in  the  60-day  period  after  forma- 
tion of  the  coalition.  The  International  Com- 
mittee of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)  delegate  in 
Vientiane  has  also  tried  to  intervene  on  Mr. 
Kay's  behalf,  also  to  no  avail. 

Although  U.S.  officials  in  Laos  have 
pressed  the  Communist  side  to  allow  search 
teams  from  our  Joint  Casualty  Resolution 
Center  to  visit  crash  and  grave  sites  in  Laos, 
no  provision  to  this  effect  was  contained  in 
the  Laos  agreement  or  protocol.  We  have  ex- 
plained the  peaceful,  open,  and  humanitarian 
mission  of  the  JCRC  in  the  hope  that  the 
Communist  authorities  would  permit  our 
search  teams  to  visit  at  least  selected  crash 
and  grave  sites,  so  far  to  no  avail. 

Our  representatives  have  also  provided  the 
Communist  side  with  a  detailed  listing  of  our 
POW  MIA's  in  Laos,  including  those  listed 
as  dead  whose  bodies  were  not  recovered, 
with  the  request  for  information  on  these 
men.  We  have  called  particular  attention  to 
the  cases  of  men  who  were  previously  ac- 
knowledged as  captured  in  Laos  or  for  whom 
there  are  indications  that  they  survived 
shootdowns.  Two  of  the  most  obvious  cases 
are  Air  Force  Lt.  Col.  David  Hrdlicka,  whose 
capture  May  18,  1965,  was  openly  confirmed 
by  the  Pathet  Lao,  and  the  American  civilian, 
Eugene  Debruin,  of  Air  America,  also  con- 
firmed as  a  prisoner  following  his  capture 
September  5,  1963.  We  continue  to  hope  that 
the  lists  and  information  we  have  provided 
will  help  convince  the  LPF  to  provide  addi- 
tional information  on  our  missing  men. 

As  is  clear  from  the  foregoing,  our  repre- 
sentatives in  Vientiane  have  maintained  con- 
tinuing pressure  on  the  Communist  side  on 
this  subject.  For  example,  when  it  became 
clear  that  the  Communist  side  was  ignoring 
the  30-day  period  specified  in  the  protocol  for 
provision  of  numbers  of  prisoners  and  names 
of  those  who  died  in  captivity,  our  Embassy 
called  on  a  Pathet  Lao  representative  to  make 
clear  the  importance  we  attached  to  prompt 
and  full  compliance  with  this  provision.  We 
noted  that  the  government  side  was  compil- 
ing data  on  prisoners  it  held  and  on  those 


who  died  in  captivity  and  urged  the  Pathet 
Lao  to  do  likewise,  pointing  out  that  the  pro- 
tocol gave  first  priority  to  this  subject  and 
did  not  link  it  to  the  formation  of  the  coali- 
tion government.  The  Pathet  Lao  representa- 
tive, however,  rejected  this  approach  and 
said  no  information  would  be  forthcoming 
until  the  JCCIA  was  constituted  and  the  co- 
alition government  was  formed. 

On  the  question  of  JCRC  access  to  Laos, 
the  Pathet  Lao  representative  flatly  stated 
that  no  outside  element  could  concern  itself 
with  POW/MIA's  in  what  he  described  as 
the  "liberated  zone."  He  also  rejected  our 
suggestion  of  a  possible  role  for  the  ICC  or 
ICRC  in  crash-  and  grave-site  inspections. 

The  vast  majority  of  crash  and  potential 
grave  sites  in  Laos  are  located  in  areas  that 
are  under  control  of  North  Vietnamese 
forces.  Thus,  North  Viet-Nam  effectively  con- 
trols the  basic  information  on  this  subject. 
We  have  attempted  to  raise  it  with  them  in 
the  Four-Party  Joint  Military  Team  in  Sai- 
gon, but  they  have  insisted  that  POW/MIA's 
in  Laos  must  be  discussed  with  the  LPF. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  we  are  seri- 
ously dissatisfied  with  the  Communist  side's 
performance  on  this  subject  thus  far.  Dur- 
ing the  hearings  on  his  confirmation  as  Sec- 
retary of  State,  Dr.  Kissinger  made  clear 
that  we  will  not  be  able  to  proceed  with  the 
economic  assistance  provisions  of  the  Viet- 
Nam  agreement  until  there  is  more  satisfac- 
tory compliance  with  the  MIA  provisions. 

The  June  13,  1973,  joint  communique 
signed  by  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  (DRV)  and  the  United  States  reaf- 
firmed the  commitment  of  the  two  sides  to 
implement  the  January  agreement  and  re- 
stated the  key  provisions  on  accounting  for 
the  missing  and  dead. 

On  July  29,  1973,  we  sent  a  formal  note  to 
the  North  Vietnamese  Government  strongly 
protesting  their  continued  failure  to  fulfill 
their  obligations  on  this  humanitarian  sub- 
ject. That  note  states  in  part: 

The  accounting  for  the  missing  and  the  repatria- 
tion of  remains  are  purely  humanitarian  obligations 
unrelated  to  other  issues.  They  could  have  been 
largely  caiTied  out  by  now  if  a  spirit  of  goodwill 
and  cooperation  had  been  manifested  on  this  subject. 


January    14,    1974 


41 


This  would  have  brought  solace  to  the  families  and 
loved  ones  of  more  than  1,300  Americans  listed  as 
missing,  and  of  those  who  have  died  but  whose 
bodies  have  not  been  returned. 

I  would  be  glad  to  provide  the  text  of  the 
July  29  note  for  the  record  of  this  hearing. 

I  would  like  to  call  attention  to  the  contin- 
uing efforts  by  relatives  of  our  POW/MIA's 
to  stimulate  public  awareness  on  this  subject 
and  to  appeal  directly  to  the  Communist  au- 
thorities for  information  on  our  missing  men. 
During  October,  53  relatives  of  our  men  miss- 
ing in  Laos  traveled  to  Vientiane  at  private 
expense  under  the  auspices  of  the  National 
League  of  Families  of  American  Prisoners 
and  Missing  in  Southeast  Asia  in  a  dramatic 
direct  attempt  to  elicit  information  from  the 
Communist  side.  The  trip  was  timed  to  coin- 
cide with  the  October  14  date  specified  in  the 
Laos  protocol  for  provision  of  the  informa- 
tion on  the  number  of  prisoners  and  the 
names  of  those  who  died  in  captivity.  A  few 
members  of  the  group  met  personally  with 
Mr.  Soth  Petrasi,  LPF  representative  in 
Vientiane,  to  convey  their  personal  concern 
to  him  directly.  We  share  the  hope  of  the 
family  members  that  these  and  other  efforts 
will  help  convince  the  Communist  side  even  at 
this  late  date  to  fulfill  their  humanitarian  ob- 
ligations. 

While  in  Indochina,  the  family  members 
also  met  with  the  representative  of  the  ICRC 
in  Laos,  who  told  them  of  his  continuing  ef- 
forts to  press  the  Communist  side  on  this 
subject.  The  president  of  the  ICRC,  Dr.  Eric 
Martin,  with  whom  I  met  during  the  recent 
Tehran  conference,  assured  me  that  his  or- 
ganization would  continue  and  redouble  its 
efforts  on  this  subject. 

In  addition  to  the  more  than  1,300  U.S. 
military  personnel  who  remain  unaccounted 
for  in  Indochina,  there  continue  to  be  some 
20  international  journalists  missing  and  pos- 
sibly captured,  nearly  all  of  them  in  Cam- 
bodia. We  are  in  touch  with  organizations  of 
journalists  working  on  this  subject  and  have 
supported  their  efforts  to  obtain  information 
on  their  missing  colleagues. 

In  addition  to  journalists,  there  continue  to 
be  some  25  American  civilians   missing  in 


South  Viet-Nam,  Laos,  and  Cambodia.  These 
include,  for  example,  three  missionaries  of 
the  Christian  and  Missionary  Alliance,  who 
were  seen  being  led  away  by  Communist 
forces  on  May  30,  1962.  They  have  been  miss- 
ing longer  than  any  other  Americans  in  Indo- 
china. Our  efforts  to  obtain  information  ap- 
ply fully,  of  course,  to  civilians  as  well. 

One  other  American  civilian,  Mr.  Homer 
L.  Elm,  of  Arcadia,  South  Carolina,  is  a  con- 
firmed prisoner  in  South  Viet-Nam.  Mr.  Elm 
is  an  employee  of  Pacific  Architects  and  En- 
gineers and  was  working  in  support  of  the 
International  Commission  of  Control  and 
Supervision  (ICCS)  for  Viet-Nam.  He  was 
captured  at  8  p.m.  October  6,  when  the  truck 
he  was  driving  was  attacked  on  National 
Highway  4  northeast  of  Thanh  Tri  in  Ba 
Xuyen  Province.  Two  Vietnamese  employees 
were  captured  with  Mr.  Elm.  His  capture  was 
especially  disturbing  since  the  truck  was 
clearly  marked  as  operating  in  support  of  the 
ICCS.  The  ICCS  and  we  have  pressed  the 
Communist  authorities  I'epeatedly  to  return 
Mr.  Elm  and  those  captured  with  him.  We 
continue  to  hope  for  his  early  release. 

I  have  left  to  the  last  our  comments  on  the 
House  concurrent  resolutions  that  have  been 
referred  to  this  subcommittee.  As  is  clear 
from  my  testimony,  we  share  the  concern  of 
the  many  sponsors  of  these  resolutions  about 
the  Communist  side's  failure  to  comply  with 
the  missing-in-action  and  accounting-for-the- 
dead  provisions  of  the  Viet-Nam  and  Laos 
agreements  and  protocols.  The  resolutions 
would  declare  it  to  be  the  sense  of  Congress 
that  the  U.S.  Government  should  cease  all 
consideration  of  aid,  trade,  diplomatic  recog- 
nition, or  other  forms  of  accommodation  with 
the  Democratic  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  or  the 
Provisional  Revolutionary  Government  until 
such  time  as  the  POW/MIA  provisions  of  the 
agreements  and  protocols  are  fully  complied 
with. 

It  is  already  our  consistent  policy  to  use 
all  useful  means  at  our  disposal  to  try  to 
bring  the  Communist  authorities  into  com- 
pliance with  their  obligations  on  this  subject. 
For  example,  we  have  repeatedly  made  it 
clear  to  the  North  Vietnamese,  in  private  ne- 


42 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


gotiations  and  in  numerous  public  state- 
ments, that  we  could  not  proceed  with  imple- 
mentation of  the  economic  assistance  provi- 
sions until  there  is  satisfactory  compliance 
with  the  MIA  and  return-of-remains  require- 
ment and  other  important  provisions  of  the 
agreement.  Specifically,  the  DRV  has  been 
told  that  they  could  not  expect  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment— including  the  Congress — to  ap- 
prove an  economic  assistance  program  until 
we  are  satisfied  with  their  post-cease-fire 
performance.  This  is  far  from  the  case  at 
present,  in  the  accounting  for  our  missing  or 
captured  men  and  on  other  serious  questions 
such  as  the  continued  buildup  of  North  Viet- 
Nam's  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam.  The  same 
reasoning  applies  to  the  questions  of  diplo- 
matic recognition,  trade,  and  the  other  types 
of  accommodation  referred  to  in  the  resolu- 
tions. 

In  substance,  therefore,  our  policies  al- 
ready reflect  what  we  take  to  be  the  basic  in- 
tent of  the  resolutions,  which  is  to  put  the 
North  Vietnamese  on  notice  that  there  can 
be  no  trade,  aid,  recognition,  or  other  ac- 
commodation from  the  United  States  until 
they  comply  with  their  humanitarian  obli- 
gation to  account  for  our  POW/MIA's. 

At  the  same  time,  and  despite  the  bleak 
record  thus  far,  we  would  consider  it  better 
not  to  foreclose  the  possibility  that  as  a  re- 
sult of  inducements,  deterrents,  and  persua- 
sion, the  DRV  may  yet  adopt  a  more  reason- 
able policy  on  accounting  for  our  MIA's  and 
on  other  aspects  of  the  agreements.  The  reso- 
lutions express  the  view  that  even  considera- 
tion of  this  subject  must  await  full  compli- 
ance by  North  Viet-Nam.  This  appears  to  us 
to  go  too  far.  If  adopted  as  a  policy,  it  would 
close  the  door  and  limit  our  flexibility  to  an 
undesirable  extent.  We  are  and  will  remain 
seriously  concerned  about  the  Communist 
side's  violations  of  the  Viet-Nam  agreement. 
But  we  do  not  yet  think  we  should  write  oflf 
conclusively  the  chance  of  improved  perform- 
ance by  the  DRV.  We  believe  our  policies 
should  have  the  continuing  purpose  of  trying 
to  induce  the  North  Vietnamese  to  choose  the 
road  of  cooperation  and  peace — with  fulfill- 
ment of  their  humanitarian  obligations — 
rather  than  reverting  to  large-scale  warfare. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Narcotic   Drugs 

Convention    on    psychotropic    substances.     Done    at 
Vienna  February  21,  1971." 
Accession  deposited:    Cyprus,  November  26,  1973. 

Patents 

Strasbourg  agreement  concerning  the  international 
patent  classification.  Done  at  Strasbourg  March 
24,  1971.' 

Ratification  deposited:    United   States,   December 
21,  1973. 

Protection   of  Diplomats 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment  of 
crimes  against  internationally  protected  persons 
including  diplomatic  agents.  Done  at  New  York 
December  14,  1973.  Enters  into  force  on  the  30th 
day  following  date  of  deposit  of  the  22d  instru- 
ment of  ratification  or  accession. 
Signature:  United  States,  December  28,  1973. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Publications  Distributed 

by   Bureau   of   Public  Affairs 

Single  copies  of  reprints,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs 
news  releases,  and  other  publications  listed  below 
are  available  free  of  charge  as  long  as  supplies  last 
and  may  be  ordered  from  the  General  Publications 
Division-B,  Office  of  Media  Services  (PA/MS),  De- 
partment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

A  Just  Consensus,  A  Stable  Order,  A  Durable  Peace. 

Address  by  Secretary  of  State  Henry  A.  Kissinger 
before  the  28th  session  of  the  United  Nations  Gen- 
eral Assembly  on  September  24,  1973.  Pub.  8724. 
General  Foreign  Policy  Series  282.    10  pp. 

Special  Economic  Report:  Summary  of  Controls  on 
the  International  Movement  of  Capital.  This  study, 
prepared  by  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research 


'  Not  in  force. 


January   14,    1974 


43 


and  using  the  OECD  Capital  Movements  Code  as  a 
point  of  departure,  outlines  the  nature  and  variety 
of  capital  controls  and  the  difficulties  inherent  in 
their  removal.  PA/MS  news  release.  June  1973.  IG 
pp. 

Special  Report :  Pakistan  Recuperates — A  Chronol- 
ogy of  Key  Events  Since  the  1971  War.  Chronology 
of  Pakistan's  key  domestic  and  external  events  pre- 
pared by  the  Department  of  State's  Bureau  of  In- 
telligence and  Research.  PA/MS  news  release.  Sep- 
tember 1973.   15  pp. 

Special  Economic  Report:  Living  With  Floating  Ex- 
change Rates.  Discusses  the  impact  the  floating  ex- 
change rate  system  has  had  on  foreign  trade  and 
investment,  on  rate  stability  and  ease  of  adjustment, 
and  on  internal  economic  policies.  PA/MS  news  re- 
lease.   September  1973.    27  pp. 

A  Simulation  Analysis:  $12  Billion  Turnaround  in 
the    U.S.    Trade    Balance — Is    It    Feasible?     Trade 

study  with  tables  prepared  by  the  Department  of 
State's  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research.  PA/MS 
news  release.  October  1973.  42  pp. 

Special  Report:  Japan's  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment— Growth  and  Change.  This  study  on  the  chang- 
ing emphasis  of  Japan's  overseas  investment  was 
prepared  by  the  Department  of  State's  Bureau  of  In- 
telligence and  Research.  PA/MS  news  release.  Oc- 
tober 1973.    11  pp. 

Special  Report:  1972  Indicators  of  Comparative  East- 
West  Economic  Strength.  Four  tables  prepared  by 
the  Department  of  State's  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and 
Research.   PA/MS  news  release.   October  1973.   3  pp. 

Special   Report:    U.S.  Assists  Emigration  of   Soviet 

Jews.  This  pamphlet,  prepared  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment's Oflice  of  Refugee  and  Migration  Affairs,  out- 
lines the  U.S.  role  in  assisting  refugee  emigration 
from  Eastern  Europe.  PA/MS  news  release.  October 
1973.  4  pp. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  December  18  confirmed  the  follow- 
ing nominations: 

Harry  G.  Barnes,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  Ro- 
mania. 

L.  Dean  Brown  to  be  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of 
State  [for  Management]. 

William  B.  Buffum  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  [for  International  Organization  Affairs]. 

Francis  L.  Dale  to  be  the  representative  to  the 
European  office  of  the  United  Nations,  with  the  rank 
of  Ambassador. 

Robert  Stephen  Ingersoll  to  be  an  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State  [for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs]. 

Heyward  Isham  to  be  Ambassador  to  Haiti. 

Joseph  J.  Jova  to  be  Ambassador  to  Mexico. 

Anthony  D.  Marshall  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Re- 
public of  Kenya. 

Ralph  J.  McGuire  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Repub- 
lic of  Mali. 

Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  Guate- 
mala. 

David  D.  Newsom  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Repub- 
lic of  Indonesia. 

David  H.  Popper  to  be  Ambassador  to  Chile. 

Stuart  Nash  Scott  to  be  Ambassador  to  Portugal. 

Francis  T.  Underbill,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to 
Malaysia. 

Viron  P.  Vakv  to  be  Ambassador  to  Colombia. 


44 


Departmenf   of  Stale   Bulletin 


INDEX      January  H,  197i      Vol.  LXX,  No.  ISO-J 


Cambodia.  Emergency  Security  Assistance  for 

Israel    and    Cambodia    (Rush) 36 

Chile.  Popper  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .         44 

Colombia.  Vaky  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .        44 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Barnes,  Brown,  Buffum,  Dale, 
Ingersoll,  Isham,  Jova,  Marshall,  McGuire, 
Meloy,  Newsom,  Popper,  Scott,  Underbill, 
Vaky) 44 

Department  Discusses  Efforts  To  Account  for 
Missing  in  Action  in   Laos    (Sieverts)     .     .         38 

Emergency  Security  Assistance  for  Israel  and 
Cambodia  (Rush) 36 

U.N.  Peacekeeping  Operations:  Lessons  of  the 
UNEF    (Schaufele) 34 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirma- 
tions (Barnes,  Brown,  Buffum,  Dale,  Inger- 
soll, Isham,  Jova,  Marshall,  McGuire,  Meloy, 
Newsom,  Popper,  Scott,  Underbill,  Vaky)     .         44 

Environment.     United     Nations     Environment 

Program  Participation  Act  of  1973  (Nixon)         27 

Foreign  Aid.  Emergency  Security  Assistance 
for  Israel  and  Cambodia   (Rush)     ....         36 

Guatemala.    Meloy   confirmed   as   Ambassador         44 

Haiti.   Isham   confirmed   as   Ambassador     .     .         44 

Indonesia.  Newsom  confirmed  as  Ambassador         44 

International  Red  Cross.  Red  Cross  Conference 
Resolution  on  Accounting  for  Missing  and 
Dead  (Text) 39 

Israel.    Emergency    Security    Assistance    for 

Israel    and    Cambodia    (Rush) 36 

Kenya.  Marshall  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .         44 

Laos.  Department  Discusses  Efforts  To  Ac- 
count for  Missing  in  Action  in  Laos 
(Sieverts) 38 

Malaysia.  Underbill  confirmed  as  Ambassador         44 

Mali.  McGuire  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .         44 

Mexico.  Jova  confirmed   as   Ambassador     .     .         44 

Middle  East 

General  Assembly  Adopts  Resolution  on  Fi- 
nancing U.N.  Emergency  Force  in  the 
Middle  East  (Buchanan,  text  of  resolution)         29 

Middle  East  Peace  Conference  Opens  in  Ge- 
neva (Kissinger) 21 

Secretary   Kissinger   Visits   Middle   East    and 

Europe     (Kissinger,    communiques)     ...         25 

L'.N.  Peacekeeping  Operations:  Lessons  of  the 
UNEF    (Schaufele) 34 

Portugal 

Scott  confirmed  as  Ambassador 44 

Secretary    Kissinger   Visits   Middle   East   and 

Europe     (Kissinger,    communiques)     ...         25 

Presidential  Documents 

United  Nations  Environment  Program  Par- 
ticipation .4ct  of  1973 27 

U.S.  Deplores  Terrorist  Attack  and  Hijacking 

at  Rome  Airport 27 

Publications.  Publications  Distributed  by  Bu- 
reau of  Public  .\ffairs 43 

Romania.  Barnes  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .        44 

Spain.  Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Middle  East 

and  Europe  (Kissinger,  communiques)     .     .         25 

Terrorism.  U.S.  Deplores  Terrorist  Attack  and 
Hijacking  at  Rome  Airport  (Nixon,  De- 
partment statement) 27 

Treaty   Information.   Current   Actions     ...         43 


United  Nations 

General  Assembly  Adopts  Resolution  on  Fi- 
nancing    U.N.     Emergency    Force     in     the 

Middle  East  (Buchanan,  text  of  resolution)  29 

U.N.  Peacekeeping  Operations:  Lessons  of  the 

UNEF   (Schaufele) 34 

Viet-Nam 

Department  Discusses  Efforts  To  Account  for 

Missing  in  Action  in  Laos   (Sieverts)     .     .  38 

U.S.  Welcomes  Release  of  .American  Civilian 
Prisoner  in  Viet-Nam  (Department  state- 
ment)       26 

Yugoslavia.  U.S.- Yugoslav  Board  on  Scientific 
Cooperation    Meets    at    Washington     (joint 

statement) 28 

Name  Index 

Barnes,  Harry  G.,  Jr 44 

Brown,   L.  Dean 44 

Buchanan,    John    H.,    Jr 29 

Buffum,  William  B 44 

Dale,  Francis  L 44 

Ingersoll,    Robert    Stephen !  44 

Isham,  Heyward 44 

Jova,    Joseph    J 44 

Kissinger,  Secretary 21,  25 

Marshall,  Anthony   D     .     .     .     .          .  44 

McGuire,  Ralph  J .     .  44 

Meloy,  Francis  E.,  Jr '  44 

Newsom,   David    D 44 

Nixon,  President 27 

Popper,  David  H .     .     .  44 

Rush,  Kenneth ]  36 

Scott,  Stuart  Nash 44 

Schaufele,    William    E.,   Jr     .....     '     .  34 

Sieverts,   Frank   A '  33 

Underbill,  Francis  T.,  Jr .     .  44 

Vaky,  Viron  P [  44 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  December  24-30 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  December  24  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  BULLETIN  are  Nos. 
454  of  December  13,  455  of  December  14,  456 
of  December  17,  460,  461,  and  462  of  December 
20,  and  469  and  470  of  December  22. 


Date 


Subjwt 


*471  12/27  Meloy  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Guatemala  (biographic 
data). 

t472     12/27    Kissinger:  news  conference. 

*475  12/28  Study  group  CCMT,  U.S.  Na- 
tional Committee  for  CCIR, 
Jan.  15. 

*476  12/28  Kissinger:  departure  statement, 
Geneva,  Dec.  22. 

*473  12/27  Shipping  Coordinating  Commit- 
tee Subcommittee  on  Code  of 
Conduct  for  Liner  Conferences, 
Jan.  8. 

*474  12/27  U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on 
International  Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs,  Jan.  14. 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON.    D.C.    20402 
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I 


(yv 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1804 


January  21,  1974 


SECRETARY   KISSINGER'S   NEWS   CONFERENCE  OF  DECEMBER  27     45 

INFORMATION  AND  MODERN  DIPLOMACY 
by  James  Keogh,  Director,  U.S.  Information  Agency     57 

U.S.  COSPONSORS  RESOLUTION  SETTING  1974  WORK  PROGRAM 

FOR  U.N.  OUTER  SPACE  COMMITTEE 

Statement  by  Mark  Evans  and  Text  of  Resolution     6Jt 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  Bee  inside   back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1804 
January  21,  1974 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

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Single  copy  60  cents 

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Note:    Contents   of  this    publication    are   not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE    BULLETIN    as    the    source    will    be 

appreciated.     The    BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
OfKce  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tfte  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  tfie  government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  and 
on  the  woric  of  the  Department  and 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements,  addresses, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  the  functions 
of  the  Department.  Information  is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
national agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  or  may  become  a 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  of 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  and 
legislative  material  in  the  field  of 
international  relations  are  also  listed. 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  December  27 


OPENING   STATEMENT 


Press  release  472  dated  December  27 


Secretary  Kissinger:  Ladies  and  gentle- 
men, I  thought  the  way  to  give  this  confer- 
ence some  focus  is  for  me  to  make  a  brief 
summary  of  the  highlights  of  this  year's 
foreign  policy  as  we  see  it  and  some  attempt 
of  projecting  it  into  the  future. 

First,  let  me  begin  with  the  event  that 
started  the  year,  which  was  of  course  the 
peace  in  Viet-Nam,  and  then  let  me  go  from 
there  to  the  general  design  of  the  foreign  pol- 
icy and  how  the  various  pieces — how  we  at- 
tempted to  fit  the  various  pieces  together. 

The  year  began  with  ending  the  most  di- 
visive, the  most  difficult,  the  most  agonizing 
war  in  American  history — certainly  the  most 
divisive  and  agonizing  foreign  war  in  Amer- 
ican history. 

Throughout  the  four  years  of  President 
Nixon's  first  term,  the  basic  debate  had  been 
on  the  terms  by  which  the  war  should  be 
ended.  And  the  fundamental  condition  that 
the  United  States  had  set  was  that  we  would 
not  end  the  war  by  overthrowing  the  govern- 
ment with  which  we  had  been  allied  but  that 
we  were  prepared  to  withdraw  our  forces 
and  to  leave  the  evolution  of  events  in  Indo- 
china to  the  Indochinese. 

At  the  beginning  of  January,  last  year,  we 
achieved  a  settlement  which  permitted  the 
disengagement  of  American  forces,  which 
left  the  political  resolution  of  the  political 
future  of  Viet-Nam  to  be  decided  by  negotia- 
tion among  the  Vietnamese  parties,  and 
which  returned  the  American  prisoners.  It 
did  not  settle  all  the  issues  that  had  produced 
the  conflict  in  the  first  place,  a  war  that  was 
partly  a  foreign  invasion  from  the  outside 


and  partly  civil  war;  an  area  that  had  been 
rent  by  conflict  for  30  years  could  not  pos- 
sibly go  from  war  to  peace  immediately  or 
painlessly  or  perhaps  at  all. 

We  had  defined  the  American  role  as  per- 
mitting an  evolution  that  left  the  destiny  of 
the  area  in  the  hands  of  the  people  concerned. 
We  had  hoped — if  you  remember  the  speech 
of  the  President  and  my  press  conference — - 
we  had  hoped  that  the  end  of  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam  would  permit  also  the  beginning 
of  an  era  of  national  reconciliation  in  this 
country.  And  much  of  the  agony  of  the  previ- 
ous years  had  been  assumed  to  be  overcome 
by  the  fact  that  both  those  who  had  opposed 
the  manner  of  conducting  the  war  and  those 
who  had  wanted  to  bring  it  to  a  conclusion 
along  the  lines  that  were  achieved  could 
agree  now  that  there  was  a  need  to  turn  to 
more  positive  tasks. 

For  a  variety  of  reasons,  other  issues  arose 
that  did  not  make  this  entirely  possible.  But 
the  war  in  Viet-Nam  is  no  longer — and  the 
war  in  Indochina — is  no  longer  a  divisive  na- 
tional issue;  and  as  far  as  the  administration 
is  concerned,  it  will,  as  I  have  pointed  out  in 
my  last  press  conference,  heed  the  expres- 
sions of  the  Congress  and  stay  true  to  the 
principles  that  it  has  consistently  pursued. 

In  any  event,  with  the  war  in  Viet-Nam 
ended,  the  major  focus  of  our  foreign  policy 
attention  could  turn  to  the  design  of  the 
structure  of  peace  that  has  been  the  Presi- 
dent's principal  goal  since  he  came  into  office. 

In  its  first  phase,  this  meant  that  the 
United  States  had  to  reduce  many  of  its  over- 
extended commitments  and  that  the  United 
States  had  to  disengage  gradually  from  any 
foreign  involvement  and,  above  all,  that  the 
United  States  should  evoke  a  sense  of  re- 


January  21,   1974 


45 


sponsibility  for  their  own  sake  in  many  areas 
of  the  world.  This  was  the  so-called  Nixon 
doctrine  which  characterized  the  first  two  or 
three  years  of  the  President's  first  term. 

It  was  the  prelude  to  the  initiatives  toward 
China  and  the  detente  with  the  Soviet  Union 
that  were  to  lay  the  basis  for  a  fundamental 
realignment  of  the  postwar  period  which  had 
been  based  on  a  rigid  division  between  op- 
posing hostile  blocs. 

So,  by  the  time  the  second  term  of  the 
President  started,  we  faced  an  international 
situation  in  which  the  basic  assumptions  of 
the  immediate  postwar  period  had  been  sub- 
stantially altered.  The  rigid  hostility  between 
the  Communist  world  and  the  non-Commu- 
nist world  had  been  altered  first  by  the  di- 
visions within  the  Communist  world  itself 
and  by  the  amelioration  of  relations  between 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States,  as 
well  as  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and 
the  United  States. 

Europe  and  Japan  had  gained  strength  and 
political  self-confidence.  The  economic  sys- 
tem that  had  been  created  in  the  immediate 
postwar  period  had  become  fluid  and  was  in 
need  of  redesigning.  So  the  great  task  before 
this  administration,  as  it  will  be  before  its 
successors,  has  been  to  construct  an  interna- 
tional system  based  on  a  sense  of  justice  so 
that  its  participants  would  have  a  stake  in 
maintaining  it,  with  a  sufficient  balance  of 
power  so  that  no  nation  or  group  of  nations 
would  be  dependent  entirely  on  the  good  will 
of  its  neighbors,  and  based  on  a  sense  of  par- 
ticipation so  that  all  nations  could  share  in 
the  positive  aspirations. 

This  has  been  the  basic  architectural  de- 
sign that  cannot  possibly  be  completed  in  any 
one  administration,  and  the  work  which  must 
continue  in  future  administrations.  And 
when  we  speak  of  institutionalizing  foreign 
policy,  we  do  not  mean  that  designated  com- 
mittees would  carry  out  specific  tasks,  but 
that  the  basic  goals  of  the  long  term  are 
accepted  by  a  sufficient  consensus  in  America 
so  that  the  future  security  of  this  country 
does  not  depend  entirely  on  the  vagaries  of 
the  political  process. 


Detente   With   Communist   Countries 

Now  let  me  be  more  specific,  and  let  me 
talk  in  various  categories.  Let  me  begin  first 
with  East- West  relations.  Our  policy  toward 
both  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  has  been  characterized  as  a 
policy  of  detente.  And  it  is  the  characteristic 
of  policies  that  become  more  or  less  accepted 
that  the  benefits  are  taken  for  granted  and 
that  some  of  the  difficulties  that  were  over- 
looked in  the  beginning  become  more  and 
more  apparent. 

Let  me  explain  what  we  understand  by 
detente.  We  do  not  say  that  detente  is  based 
on  the  compatibility  of  domestic  systems.  We 
recognize  that  the  values  and  ideology  of  both 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  are  opposed  and  sometimes  hostile 
to  ours.  We  do  not  say  that  there  are  no 
conflicting  national  interests.  We  do  say  that 
there  is  a  fundamental  change  in  the  inter- 
national environment  compared  to  any  other 
previous  period,  a  change  which  was  ex- 
pressed by  President  Eisenhower  more  than 
20  years  ago  when  he  said,  "There  is  no 
longer  any  alternative  to  peace."  Under  con- 
ditions of  nuclear  plenty,  the  decision  to  en- 
gage in  general  war  involves  consequences  of 
such  magnitude  that  no  responsible  states- 
man can  base  his  policy  on  the  constant 
threat  of  such  a  holocaust  and  every  leader 
with  a  responsibility  for  these  weapons  must 
set  himself  the  task  of  bringing  about  condi- 
tions which  reduce  the  possibility  of  such  a 
war  to  a  minimum  and,  indeed,  over  any 
extended  period  of  time  reduce  this  possibili- 
ty to  zero. 

So  we  do  not  say  that  we  approve  of  the 
domestic  evolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  or  of 
other  Communist  countries  with  which  we 
are  attempting  to  coexist.  Nor  do  we  accept 
that  detente  can  be  used  for  military  expan- 
sion or  for  threatening  weaker  countries  or 
for  undermining  our  traditional  friendships. 
But  we  do  make  a  conscious  eff'ort  to  set  up 
rules  of  conduct  and  to  establish  a  certain 
interconnection  of  interests  and,  above  all, 
to  establish  communications  between  the  top 
leaders  and  between  officials  at  every  level 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


that  make  it  possible  in  times  of  crisis  to 
reduce  the  danger  of  accident  or  miscalcula- 
tion. 

This  has  been  our  policy  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  it  is  the  policy  we  have  pursued 
as  well  with  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 

With  respect  to  the  Soviet  Union,  it  has 
led  us  into  a  series  of  negotiations  on  the 
limitations  of  strategic  arms,  on  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions  (MBFR),  on  Euro- 
pean security,  on  such  measures  as  the  agree- 
ment for  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war — into 
extended  exchanges  between  the  President 
and  General  Secretary  Brezhnev  designed 
to  lay  the  basis  for  a  more  civil  discourse. 

This  does  not  preclude  that  this  relation- 
ship can  break  down. 

Ideology,  long-established  relations,  as  well 
as  the  internal  logic  of  certain  areas  such  as 
the  Middle  East,  can  produce  tensions  and 
indeed  can  produce  explosions  that,  whether 
or  not  they  are  fostered  by  the  two  super- 
powers, may  bring  them  into  conflict  with 
each  other. 

Nor  is  it  foreordained  that  the  behavior 
of  the  two  protagonists  necessarily  lives  up 
to  the  principles  that  they  declare.  In  those 
cases,  as  happened  at  one  phase  during  the 
Middle  East  crisis,  the  United  States  will 
maintain  its  commitments  and  will  defend  its 
international  position  and  the  position  of  its 
friends. 

But  we  will  not  be  easily  deflected  from 
the  course  of  seeking  a  relaxation  of  tension 
— a  course  which  proved  itself  even  in  ten- 
sion periods  and  a  course  which  modern  tech- 
nology will  impose  on  any  administration 
even  if  we  should  be  prevented  from  carrying 
out  all  the  measures  by  diflFerent  opinions 
about  what  should  be  the  purposes  of  detente 
— such  as  the  degree  to  which  we  should  at- 
tempt to  use  our  foreign  policy  to  affect  the 
domestic  structure  of  other  countries. 

With  respect  to  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  we  have  established  Liaison  Offices  in 
each  other's  capitals  that  are  performing 
many  of  the  functions  that  are  normally  car- 
ried out  by  embassies.  We  have  had  two  visits 
by  myself  to  Peking  and  also  a  substantial 
expansion  of  economic  and  other  exchanges. 


So  we  believe  that  with  respect  to  the  two 
great  Communist  countries,  we  are  on  a 
course  which  is  in  the  interests  of  all  of  man- 
kind and  which  is  essential  for  the  long-term 
prospects  of  peace. 

Relations   With  Atlantic   Nations  and   Japan 

In  our  relations  with  our  friends  in  Eu- 
rope, the  year  has  been  disappointing.  It  had 
been  our  intention,  in  what  we  called  perhaps 
too  rashly  "the  Year  of  Europe,"  to  afl^rm 
that  the  important  measures  in  foreign  policy 
were  not  confined  to  relations  with  adver- 
saries but  that  traditional  friends  could  also 
seize  the  opportunities  of  the  future.  We 
intended  in  our  various  initiatives  to  lay  to 
rest  concerns  about  the  possibilities  of  a 
condominium  between  the  United  States  and 
particularly  the  Soviet  Union.  We  attempted 
to  emphasize  that  the  very  successes  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance  had  created  a  new  situation 
which  required  a  new  act  of  vision,  and  we 
invited  Europe  and  Japan  to  participate  with 
us  in  this  task  of  construction. 

Now  there  have  been  many  debates  about 
whether  the  tactics  by  which  this  objective 
was  pursued  were  always  ideal,  and  there 
were  many  comments  about  this  or  that  ini- 
tiative. And  obviously,  any  senior  official  pur- 
suing the  policies  of  his  government  will 
always  be  convinced  that  the  measures  his 
administration  took  are  correct,  because 
otherwise  he  would  not  have  taken  them.  But 
I  do  not  believe  that  this  is  the  key  problem. 
There  is  one  principal  problem  in  our  rela- 
tions with,  especially,  Europe  at  this  moment 
that  only  the  Europeans  can  answer — all  the 
other  criticisms  can  be  relatively  easily  taken 
care  of — and  that  question  is:  What  is  to  be 
the  shape  of  the  emerging  unified  Europe? 
Is  this  Europe  to  be  organized  on  a  basis 
which  seeks  its  identity  in  exclusivity  to  our 
position — or  at  least  in  distance  from  the 
United  States?  Or  is  it  prepared,  while  affirm- 
ing its  identity,  to  recognize  that  the  oppor- 
tunities of  the  future  require  Atlantic  co- 
operation ? 

As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
we  have  given  our  answer.  All  of  our  pro- 


January  21,   1974 


47 


posals,  however  they  were  advanced,  from 
the  proposal  of  the  Atlantic  charter  to  the 
proposal  of  the  common  approach  to  energy, 
had  one  fundamental  goal:  to  create  a  dia- 
logue between  ourselves  and  the  Europeans 
in  terms  of  the  challenges  that  lay  ahead  of 
us  and  in  terms  of  the  common  problems 
that  needed  to  be  solved. 

That  offer  is  still  open.  We  believe  that 
some  progress  was  made  in  our  recent  talks 
in  Europe,  and  we  will  continue  both  the 
work  on  the  declarations  with  the  European 
Community  and  v/ith  our  NATO  partners,  as 
well  as  the  work  on  the  Energy  Action  Group. 

But  the  United  States  is  not  concerned 
with  developing  some  legal  formula  or  with 
a  document  that  responds  to  a  single  initia- 
tive. The  problem  before  us  is  whether  the 
nations  of  the  Atlantic  area,  as  well  as  Japan, 
faced  with  self-evident  problems  that  affect 
them  all,  can  develop  a  common  approach  or 
whether  they  will  consume  themselves  in  the 
sort  of  rivalry  that  has  destroyed  other  civi- 
lizations. I  will  have  a  word  to  say  about  that 
when  I  discuss  the  energy  problem. 

As  far  as  Japan  is  concerned,  we  believed 
that  we  were  well  underway  to  developing  a 
new  and  mature  partnership  when  the  energy 
crisis  diverted  energies,  diverted  concerns, 
and  when  it  created  many  temporary  obsta- 
cles. But  we  believe  that  Japan  should  be  an 
integral  part  of  the  relationship  we  are  also 
attempting  to  develop  with  Europe  and  that 
Japan's  importance  and  its  gi'owing  strength 
and  its  political  maturity  entitle  it  to  full 
consideration  as  an  equal  partner  of  the 
United  States. 

The  Crisis  in  the  Middle   East 

The  most  dramatic  event  of  the  year,  of 
course,  was  the  crisis  in  the  Middle  East.  It 
is — it  came  upon  us  unexpectedly.  We  were 
not  warned  by  any  foreign  government  that 
there  were  any  specific  plans  for  an  attack. 
The  only  warnings  we  received  were  general 
descriptions  that  the  Middle  East  conflict — 
or  that  the  tensions  in  the  Middle  East — 
might  not  be  contained.  And  I  have  already 
described  the  kind  of  intelligence  informa- 


tion that  was  available  and  which  illustrated 
that  facts  are  not  self-explanatory,  that  one's 
preconceptions  determine  very  importantly 
what  interpretation  is  given  to  these  facts. 

The  war  in  the  Middle  East  faced  the 
United  States  with  a  number  of  profound 
issues.  There  was  the  commitment  the 
United  States  has  had  through  all  postwar 
administrations  to  the  security  of  Israel.  It 
was  our  concern  that  another  superpower  not 
exploit  the  tensions  in  the  area  for  its  owti 
advantage.  There  was  our  interest  in  main- 
taining a  balanced  relationship  with  the  Arab 
countries.  And  there  came  to  be,  increasingly, 
the  problem  of  the  energy  crisis. 

Our  policy  had  to  go  through  several 
phases. 

The  first,  during  the  military  phase,  was  to 
bring — to  contribute  to  a  situation  in  which 
the  postwar  evolution  would  not  be  deter- 
mined by  military  success  primarily,  espe- 
cially by  military  success  growing  out  of  a 
surprise  attack  and  achieved  with  Soviet 
arms. 

And  secondly,  to  conduct  ourselves  in  such 
a  manner  that  in  the  diplomacy  that  would 
follow  the  war,  we  would  be  able  to  talk  to 
all  of  the  parties  involved — Arab  as  well  as 
Israeli. 

And  thirdly,  we  had  to  conduct  ourselves 
in  such  a  way  that  the  Middle  East  would 
not  play  the  role  of  the  Balkans  in  1914,  in 
which  local  rivalries  produced  a  catastrophe 
from  which  Europe  never  recovered  and  in 
which,  under  contemporary  conditions,  if  a 
general  war  occurred  the  world  would  never 
recover. 

The  result  of  these  efforts  was,  first,  the 
cease-fire  of  October  22;  then,  the  six-point 
agreement  that  was  signed  in  early  Novem- 
ber; and  the  Geneva  Peace  Conference  which 
started  last  week. 

We  are  at  the  very  beginning  of  what  will 
be  a  slow  and  agonizing  effort  to  reconcile 
objectives  that  in  many  respects  seem  contra- 
dictory. But  as  I  have  said  repeatedly,  and  as 
the  President  has  emphasized,  the  United 
States  is  committed  to  making  a  major  effort 
to  bring  about  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  that  recognizes  the  security  of 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


all  the  countries  in  the  Middle  East  as  well 
as  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  all  of  the 
peoples  in  the  area. 

We  believe  that  the  conference  is  well 
launched,  and  we  hope  that  some  progress 
can  be  made  in  the  disengagement  talks  that 
are  now  going  on  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
— and  that  could  go  on  between  Israel  and 
the  other  Arab  countries. 

The   Global   Energy   Problem 

The  Middle  East — the  war  in  the  Middle 
East  also  brought  to  a  head  the  energy  crisis 
on  a  global  basis.  It  brought  it  to  a  head,  but 
it  did  not  cause  it. 

The  basic  cause  of  the  energy  crisis  is  that 
demand  for  energy  has  been  growing  expo- 
nentially while  the  incentives  for  supply  have 
not  kept  pace.  And  in  these  conditions,  sooner 
or  later,  the  energy-consuming  countries 
would  have  come  up  against  the  situation 
where  their  demand  far  outstripped  the  pos- 
sibilities of  supply. 

And  therefore,  it  is  the  U.S.  view  that  the 
long-term  problem  in  the  field  of  energy 
makes  it  essential  that  a  worldwide  coopera- 
tive effort  between  consumers,  and  between 
consumers  and  producers,  be  started  so  that 
we  car  deal  with  the  challenges  on  a  long- 
term  basis  and  not  have  to  improvise  re- 
sponses with  every  year. 

In  this  respect,  the  energy  crisis  may  be 
only  a  forerunner  of  similar  difficulties  in 
other  areas — and  this  is  why  the  United 
States  supported  the  World  Food  Conference 
that  has  now  been  called  for  1974. 

Tasks  for  the   Future 

These  are  some  of  the  highlights  of  last 
year,  and  if  one  is  to  look  ahead,  one  can  see 
that  the  major  task  of  building  this  interna- 
tional system  remains  to  be  done. 

In  East-West  relations,  in  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  we  have  before  us  the 
problem  of  SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limita- 
tion Talks],  and  as  I  have  pointed  out  re- 
peatedly, no  task  is  more  urgent  than  to 
master   the    rapid   technological    change    in 


which  weapons  may  outstrip  the  capacity  of 
political  control. 

And  therefore  the  United  States  will  make 
a  determined  effort  to  fulfill  the  promise  that 
President  Nixon  and  General  Secretary 
Brezhnev  made  to  each  other  to  try  to  have 
an  agreement  on  SALT  in  1974.  It  is  a  diffi- 
cult assignment,  because  the  first  SALT 
agreement  dealt  with  quantitative  change, 
the  present  negotiations  deal  with  the  prob- 
lem of  qualitative  change,  which  is  both  tech- 
nically and  conceptually  much  more  difficult. 

And  we  will  continue  to  pursue  the  nego- 
tiations on  mutual  force  reductions  and  Euro- 
pean security. 

In  relations  with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  we  will  continue  the  policy  of  normali- 
zation that  was  started  and  seek  to  accel- 
erate it. 

Our  relations  with  Europe — the  offer  that 
we  made  in  April  and  December  still  remains 
on  the  table,  and  we  are  prepared  to  discuss 
with  our  European  allies  those  aspects  of  our 
consultative  processes  that  they  find  difficult. 
We  believe  that  the  problem  of  fears  of  con- 
dominium cannot  be  settled  by  abstract  dec- 
larations, but  only  by  a  confident  cooperation 
in  trying  to  devise  a  future  that  we  can  all 
believe  in. 

In  the  Middle  East,  we  will  strive  for  peace 
— based  on  justice  and  accepted  by  all  of  the 
parties.  And  we  hope  that  the  peace  that  has 
been  so  painfully  achieved  in  Indochina  can 
be  preserved. 

These  are  the  major  tasks  that  we  have  set 
ourselves,  together  with  an  initiative  toward 
Latin  America  which  will  culminate  in  a 
Foreign  Ministers  meeting  at  the  end  of 
February  in  Mexico  City,  in  which  the  Latin 
American  Foreign  Ministers  have  responded 
to  an  initiative  by  the  United  States  last  Oc- 
tober that  we  should  define  together  a  new 
Western  Hemisphere  relationship. 

But  I  would  like  to  stress  again  that  the 
basic  conviction  of  the  administration  is  that 
the  task  that  we  have  set  ourselves  cannot  be 
completed  in  one  administration  or  in  one 
decade,  because  the  international  system  that 
has  grown  up  over  many  decades  is  funda- 
mentally altered  and  the  new  international 


January  21,    1974 


49 


system  will  take  many  years  to  construct. 
But  its  ultimate  objective  must  be  to  con- 
tribute to  the  peace  and  to  the  well-being  of 
all  mankind. 

Now  I'll  be  glad  to  answer  your  questions. 


QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  early  on  in  your  lecture 
you  said  that  the  great  task  before  this  ad- 
ministration is  to  create  an  international 
situation  based  on  a  structure  so  that  its  par- 
ticipants will  have  a  stake  in  maintaifiing  it, 
which  is,  I  suppose,  about  the  same  as  the 
late  Secretary  Dulles  used  to  say  when  he 
said  the  Russians  will  keep  any  agreements 
that  is  to  their  benefit  to  keep. 

With  that  background  of  continuity  in 
mind,  I  woidd  like  to  ask  you  u^hether  you 
can  tell  us  at  all  what  stake  the  Soviet  Union 
has  in  maintaining  the  agreements  that  you 
have  made  so  far  in  the  Middle  East,  and  if 
so,  where  their  position  is  nou\  I  am  thinking 
of  the  various  meetings  that  you  have  had 
with  Mr.  Dobrynin  [Anatoliy  F.  Dobrynin, 
Soviet  Ambassador  to  the  United  States']  and 
others. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  are  two  schools 
of  thought  about  Soviet  objectives  in  the 
Middle  East.  One  school  of  thought  is  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has  an  interest  in  maintaining 
the  tension  because  that  will  guarantee 
permanent  Arab  hostility  to  the  United 
States  and  enhances  the  possibilities  of  Soviet 
influence.  The  other  school  of  thought  is  that 
while  this  may  have  started  out  to  be  the 
Soviet  policy  in  the  1950's,  there  have  been 
since  then  three  wars  which  have  consumed 
a  great  deal  of  Soviet  resources  and  whose 
outcome  has  been  inconclusive.  It  has  been 
demonstrated  that  the  conflict  in  the  Middle 
East  can  bring  the  superpowers  into  positions 
of  potential  confrontation.  And  it  is  there- 
fore at  least  possible  that  the  Soviet  Union 
now  has  an  interest  in  contributing  to  the 
stabilization  of  the  situation  in  an  area  which 
neither  superpower  can  really  control  by 
itself. 

As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 


we  will  deal  with  the  Soviet  Union  as  long  as 
its  actions  are  consistent  with  the  second  in- 
terpretation. That  is  to  say,  if  the  Soviet 
Union  makes  a  responsible  contribution  to 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  we  will  be  prepared 
to  cooperate — not  at  the  expense  of  our  tra- 
ditional friends  nor  by  imposing  a  settlement 
made  together  with  the  Soviet  Union.  We 
are  in  direct  contact  with  all  of  the  parties 
in  the  Middle  East.  But  we  are  prepared  to 
deal  with  the  Soviet  Union  on  an  equitable 
basis  as  long  as  its  motives — or  as  long  as  its 
actions  are  consistent  with  a  responsible 
course. 

At  Geneva,  the  Soviet  Union  contributed  to 
a  positive  atmosphere.  As  you  know.  Foreign 
Minister  [of  the  U.S.S.R.  Andrei  A.]  Gromy- 
ko  met  with  Foreign  Minister  [of  Israel 
Abba]  Eban. 

The  Soviet  Union  cooperated  also  in  focus- 
ing the  discussions  on  the  first  issue  of  dis- 
engagement, which  seemed  more  manageable 
than  some  of  the  more  difficult  ones  that  will 
come  along  further  down  the  road. 

So  as  of  now,  judging  the  Soviet  Union  by 
its  actions,  we  are  willing  to  cooperate. 
Should  Soviet  behavior  change,  we  can  al- 
ways reexamine  our  policy. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  mentioned  the  insti- 
tutionalizing of  foreign  policy  again  today. 
Perhaps  you  can  comment  on  that  in  light 
of  increasing  piiblished  stories  that  you  have 
displayed  an  increasing  penchant  for  secrecy 
and,  instead  of  institutionalizing  it,  you  have 
been  personalizing  it  and  making  it  entirely 
dependent  on  your  own  role. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course  the  final 
judgment  on  foreign  policy  is  the  substance 
and  not  the  procedure.  The  institutionaliza- 
tion of  foreign  policy  is,  in  my  view,  the 
development  of  a  set  of  principles  of  foreign 
policy  and  of  a  sufficient  support  among 
those  who  have  to  carry  it  out  so  that  con- 
tinuity within  the  limits  of  the  changes  of 
the  political  process  is  assured. 

Now,  I  have  read  many  of  these  stories. 
And  of  course  I  do  not  propose  to  engage 
in  a  public  debate  with  the  various  sources 
of  these  stories. 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I  believe  that  I  am  working  closely  with 
the  appropriate  Assistant  Secretaries  who 
are  responsible  for  the  areas  with  which 
we  are  dealing-,  and  I  believe  that  anyone 
who  has  a  real  knowledge  of  how  policy  is 
being  made  in  the  State  Department  today 
knows  that  there  is  a  close  sense  of  partici- 
pation by  all  of  those  who  have  responsibility 
for  regional  areas  or  for  those  functional 
areas  that  can  most  contribute  to  policy. 
How  this  filters  down  below  the  Assistant 
Secretary  level  is  primarily  the  responsibility 
of  the  Assistant  Secretaries.  But  I  believe 
that  after  a  period  of  six  to  nine  months  it 
will  be  quite  obvious  what  has  been  done. 

Arab  Oil   Embargo 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  noiv  that  the  Arab 
states  have  lifted  their  oil  embargo  against 
Europe  and  Japan  and  have  restored  some  of 
the  production  cutbacks,  when  do  you  expect 
them  to  start  supplying  the  United  States 
with  oil  again? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  want  to  spec- 
ulate on  when  the  Arab  countries  will  restore 
— will  lift  the  boycott  against  the  United 
States.  As  I  have  pointed  out  at  several 
previous  press  conferences,  the  United  States 
could  understand  certain  actions  by  Arab 
countries  at  a  time  when  the  United  States 
seemed  to  be — was  supplying  military  equip- 
ment to  one  of  the  sides  in  a  war.  Now  that 
the  United  States  has  publicly  declared  its 
commitment  to  bring  about  a  just  settlement, 
now  that  much  of  the  progress  that  has  been 
made  toward  a  settlement  can  be  traced  to 
American  actions,  discriminatory  measures 
against  the  United  States  become  increas- 
ingly difficult  to  understand. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  m.uch  knoivledge 
did  you  have,  either  before  you  left  Wash- 
ington or  after  you  left  Saudi  Arabia,  that 
the  Arab  nations  tvere  about  to  make  a 
change  in  their  oil-export  policy  to  take 
Europe  and  Japan  off  the  hook? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  this  before  I  left  Washington.  And  I 
had  no  precise  knowledge  of  specific  meas- 


ures when  I  left  Saudi  Arabia,  except  that 
I  knew  that  certain  measures  were  under 
consideration. 

Now,  in  analyzing  the  supply  of  oil,  one 
has  to  consider  that  there  are  two  problems 
involved.  One  is  the  problem  of  the  embargo; 
the  second  is  the  problem  of  production. 
Lifting  the  embargo  without  increasing  the 
production  does  not  help  a  great  deal,  be- 
cause it  means  that  more  nations  would 
compete  for  an  inadequate  supply.  So  both 
of  these  measures  have  to  go  hand  in  hand. 
And  on  the  whole,  we  consider  it  a  positive 
step  that  production  has  been  increased. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  yoti  seem  to  be  express- 
ing an  increasing  sense  of  irritation  with  the 
fact  that  Saudi  Arabia,  principally,  has  not 
lifted  the  oil  embargo  against  the  United 
States,  though  it  has  taken  these  other  ac- 
tions toward  Europe  and  Japan.  Was  there 
some  action  that  you  expected  to  happen  by 
now  from  the  Saudi  Arabians  that  did  not? 
Do  you  link  a  possible  action  to  the  disen- 
gagement talks  in  Geneva? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  express  an 
increasing  sense  of  irritation.  I  am  express- 
ing the  view  that  the  United  States  has  con- 
sistently taken  and  which  I  have  expressed 
at  every  previous  press  conference;  namely, 
that  discriminatory  action  against  the 
United  States  becomes  increasingly  inappro- 
priate when  the  United  States  is  the  princi- 
pal country  engaging  itself  in  the  search  for 
a  just  and  durable  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
This  is  a  position  that  has  been  taken  by  this 
administration  from  the  beginning.  It  is  not 
said  in  any  spirit  of  irritation,  but  it  is  a 
statement  of  reality. 

I  do  not  want  to  say  what  I  expected.  But 
the  view  that  I  have  expressed  here  is  not 
caused  by  any  disappointment  about  what  I 
had  been  led  to  believe. 

Q.  Is  there  a  link  as  well  with  the  disen- 
gagement talks? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  U.S.  position 
with  respect  to  the  oil  embargo  has  been 
that  we  cannot  discuss  specific  peace  terms  in 
relation  to  the  lifting  of  the  oil  embargo, 


January   21,    1974 


51 


that  we  can  express  our  commitment  to  bring 
about  a  just  and  durable  peace— or  to  help 
bring  it  about — based  on  Security  Council 
Resolution  242.  But  as  I  have  explained 
many  times  before,  we  cannot  bargain  indi- 
vidually with  oil-producing  countries  and 
then  enter  into  a  peace  conference  in  which 
the  parties  have  to  negotiate  this  process  all 
over  again. 

Strategic  Arms   Limitation   Negotiations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  we  have  the  impression 
that  one  of  the  problems  with  the  SALT 
talks  is  that  this  government  hasn't  gotten 
its  oivn  ducks  in  a  row.  For  example,  do  you 
go  along  with  the  apparent  doctrine  that  ivas 
enunciated  the  other  day  by  Dr.  Schlesinger 
[Secretary  of  Defense  James  R.  Schlesinger] 
ivhich  he  called,  for  lack  of  a  better  name, 
"total  equality"? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  how  can  you  in 
an  egalitarian  society  not  accept  total  equal- 
ity? I  will  agree  with  you  that  our  govern- 
ment has  not  thought  through  all  the  impli- 
cations of  the  problem  of  qualitative  change. 
I  agree  with  the  phrase  "total  equality."  But 
like  all  slogans,  it  does  not  supply  its  own 
answer.  And  I  am  certain  that  my  friend 
Dr.  Schlesinger  would  agree  that  once  you 
have  enunciated  that  doctrine  you  still  have 
to  give  it  content  in  terms  of  what  it  is  that 
you  want  to  have  equal.  Is  it  numbers,  is  it 
throw-weight,  is  it  warheads,  is  it  every- 
thing? How  do  you  compare  superiority  in 
bombers  to  superiority  in  missiles?  How  do 
you  compare  the  throw-weight  or  the  carry- 
ing power  of  bombers  with  the  throw-weight 
of  missiles?  These  are  the  tough  questions 
that  have  to  be  answered. 

And  I  am  frank  to  say  that  while  we  have 
developed  positions,  and  while  I  believe  our 
positions  are  better  than  those  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  we  have  not — there  is  not  the  con- 
ceptual basis  for  the  SALT  Two  that  existed 
over  a  decade  of  previous  work  with  respect 
to  SALT  One.  However,  I  am  confident  that 
as  far  as  the  U.S.  Government  is  concerned 
this  problem  will  be  substantially  overcome 
in  the  very  near  future  and  that  if  the  Soviet 


Union   is   prepared   to   proceed   we   have   a 
chance  of  meeting  our  deadline  of  1974. 

Q.  Along  those  lines.  Dr.  Kissinger,  about 
five  or  six  weeks  ago  a  senior  U.S.  official 
expressed  the  hope — /  guess  is  the  best  word 
— that  these  problems  you  are  talking  about 
as  far  as  both  the  Soviets  and  we  are  con- 
cerned would  be  settled  by  Christmas.  Would 
it  be  fair  to  say,  then,  that  these  negotiations 
or  your  private  discussions  with  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  are  behind  schedule,  and  if  so 
could  you  tell  u^  why  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  there  are  some 
senior  officials  who  get  caught  by  giving  too 
early  deadlines.  Whether  a  particular  nego- 
tiation is  on  or  behind  schedule  you  can 
really  only  determine  in  retrospect,  after  it 
is  completed. 

We  expect  to  make  progress  in  clarifying 
the  various  points  of  view  within  our  govern- 
ment in  the  very  near  future.  And  I  believe, 
based  in  part  also  on  conversations  I  have 
recently  had,  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  work- 
ing very  seriously  on  the  problem.  How  the 
various  issues  can  then  be  reconciled  re- 
mains to  be  seen.  But  I  think  everybody 
recognizes  that  the  pace  of  technology  is  such 
that  there  is  a  certain  urgency  in  pushing 
these  negotiations,  and  they  will  be  pushed. 

Q.  Is  this  what  you  have  been  discussing 
with  Mr.  Dobrynin  in  the  last  two  days? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  never  go  into  the 
discussions  with  Ambassador  Dobrynin. 

Q.  On  the  same  question,  do  you  think  it  is 
still  conceivable  that  President  Nixon  could 
go  to  the  Soviet  Union  this  srimmer,  or  would 
the  SALT  negotiations  make  it  more  feasible 
to  go  later  in  the  year? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No  date  has  been  set, 
but  the  summer  is  certainly  not  ruled  out. 

Q.  What  do  you  think,  though?  Do  you 
think  you  could  have  a  SALT  agreement  by 
this  Slimmer? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Not  with  O'Leary 
[Jeremiah  O'Leary,  Washington  Star-News] 
sitting  next  to  you.    I  am  not  going  to  give 


52 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


you  another  date  on  anything.    [Laughter.] 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  are  you  satisfied  by  the 
degree  of  cooperation  that  you  are  getting 
from  the  Governments  of  Israel  and  Egypt 
and  Jordan  to  get  a  peace  in  the  Middle  East? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  that  one  of 
the  results  of  the  two  trips  that  I  have  made 
into  the  Middle  East  is  that  the  governments 
that  you  have  mentioned  now  have  a  much 
clearer  common  understanding  of  what  needs 
to  be  done.  They  are  now  talking  from  a 
common  base.  And  I  have  no  complaint 
about  the  cooperation  that  I  have  received 
from  any  of  these  governments,  and  I  believe 
that  there  is  a  good  possibility  of  progress. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  if  you  have  found  a  way 
to  coexist  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  China, 
what  is  there  to  prevent  a  detente  or  coexist- 
ence with  Cuba?  Do  you  have  any  plans  for 
attempting  to  achieve  a  rapprochement  ivith 
Cuba  or  on  your  trip  will  you  go  to  Havana  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  certainly  have  no 
plan  to  go  to  Havana  on  any  trip  that  I  am 
now  planning.  And  the  major  obstacle  to 
rapprochement  with  Cuba  has  been  the  hos- 
tility of  the  Cuban  Government  and  its  com- 
mitment to  a  revolutionary  policy  through- 
out the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  Middle   East  and   U.S.-Soviet  Detente 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  you  have  talked  and 
given  us  a  more  specific  definition  of  "de- 
tente" and  some  of  the  limitations  on  de- 
tente. And  you  also  referred  to  the  inter- 
connection between  issues.  I  know  you  will 
not  go  into  the  discussions  you've  had  with 
the  Soviet  Ambassador,  but  can  you  tell  us 
in  any  more  generalized  way  what  the  pres- 
ent interrelationship  is  of  a  solution  of  the 
Middle  East  crisis  to  the  pattern  of  relation- 
ships with  the  Soviet  Union — SALT,  MBFR, 
these  other  issues? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it  is  obvious 
that  it  is  not  possible  for  a  country  to  exac- 
erbate tensions  in  one  area  and  to  seek  re- 
laxation in  another.  This  administration  has 
consistently  opposed  the  notion  of  selective 


detente,  in  which  one  area  would  be  pacified 
while  there  would  be  very  active  conflict  in 
another.  Therefore,  obviously  we  would  have 
to  judge  the  Soviet  sincerity  in  seeking 
across-the-board  relaxation  of  tensions  by 
its  behavior  in  all  the  negotiations  in  which 
we  are  engaged  with  it,  including  that  of  the 
Middle  East. 

Now,  I  want  to  repeat:  I'm  not  saying 
this  in  any  particularly  challenging  manner, 
because  the  Soviet  behavior  in  the  prelude  to 
the  Geneva  Conference  and  during  the  first 
phase  of  the  Geneva  Conference  has  been 
constructive  and  has  been  recognized  to  be 
constructive  by  all  of  the  parties  there. 

U.S.   Relations  With   India 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  one  gets  the  impression 
that  lately,  since  you  took  over,  there  has 
been  a  vast  improvement  in  India-America 
relations.  Is  it  possible  for  you  to  put  your 
relations  with  India  in  perspective  against 
the  background  of  the  global  peace  that  you 
seek? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  always  con- 
sidered, even  during  periods  of  diflicult  rela- 
tionship— vve've  always  considered  India  as 
one  of  the  major  countries  in  the  world.  It 
is  a  great  democracy,  and  a  great  democracy 
in  an  underdeveloped  country,  that  can  be  a 
symbol  for  many  other  countries.  There  is  a 
long  history  of  friendship  between  India  and 
the  United  States.  And  we  have  no  conflict- 
ing national  interests.  And  therefore,  as  far 
as  the  administration  is  concerned,  we  have 
made — you  are  quite  correct — a  serious 
effort  to  improve  our  relationship  with  India. 

I  believe  this  effort  has  been  reciprocated. 
One  of  its  tangible  expressions  has  been  the 
recent  rupee  settlement,  which  we  consider 
the  beginning  of  a  continually  improving 
relationship. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  if  you  get  the  kind  of 
progress  that  you're  talking  about  in  disen- 
gagement, would  it  entail  a  quick  opening  of 
the  Suez  Canal?  And  do  you  consider  that  to 
be  one  of  the  principal  Soviet  objectives  at 
this  stage  of  the  negotiation  ? 


January  21,    1974 


53 


Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  that — first, 
I  don't  want  to  speculate  about  what  the 
specific  terms  of  a  disengagement  scheme 
would  be;  but  I  do  not  believe  that  opening  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  however  advantageous  it 
might  be  to  any  of  the  parties,  is  the  prin- 
cipal objective  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

I  want  to  stress  also  that  much  of  the  di- 
plomacy that  has  preceded  the  opening  of  the 
Geneva  talks  was  not  one  that  was  organized 
between  us  and  the  Soviet  Union  but  was 
developed  on  several  trips  through  the  Mid- 
dle East  by  myself,  on  behalf  of  the  adminis- 
tration, and  in  direct  relationship  with  the 
parties  in  the  Middle  East.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  supported  these  effoi'ts.  But  it 
was  not  a  solution  that  was  achieved  between 
Moscow  and  Washington  and  then  handed  to 
the  parties  in  the  conflict.  Much  of  it  has 
emerged  out  of  the  discussions  that  took 
place  at  kilometer  101  between  the  Egyptians 
and  the  Israelis  without  either  U.S.  or  Soviet 
participation.  So  I  do  not  believe  that  the 
principal  Soviet  interest  would  be  the  open- 
ing of  the  Suez  Canal,  even  if  that  should 
turn  out  to  be  one  of  the  results. 

Worldwide   Problem   of  Terrorism 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  a  two-part  question,  if 
I  may.  In  view  of  Kuwait's  refusal  to  extra^ 
dite  to  Italy  the  Palestinians  who  were  the 
self-admitted  murderers  of  16  American  citi- 
zens, in  view  of  Kuwait's  continuation  of  the 
oil  embargo,  how  is  it  that  rve  have  reports 
that  we  have  planned,  as  a  nation,  to  supply 
this  nation  ivith  continued  military  aid  as 
well  as  agricultural  products?  That's  the 
first  part  of  the  question,  sir. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  My  understanding  is 
that  there  is  a  plan  to  extradite  these  terror- 
ists to  the  so-called  Palestinian  Liberation 
Organization,  which  has  promised  to  punish 
them  severely. 

Now,  our  interest  is  that  this  terrorism  be 
ended,  and  the  United  States  has  made  strong 
representations  to  that  effect.  With  respect  to 
other  measures,  they  will  have  to  await  the 
actions  of  the  Kuwaiti  Government  on  other 


fronts,  but  we  have  not  yet  seen  any  reason 
to  terminate  them. 

Q.  Well,  in  connection  with  his  promise  to 
punish  them  severely,  I  seem  to  recall  your 
predecessor  Secretary  Rogers  asked  for  the 
death  penalty  of  those  Palestinians  that  mur- 
dered Ambassador  Noel  last  March.  I 
checked  with  your  Sudan  desk  this  week  and 
find  that  these  terrorists  have  not  even  been 
brought  to  trial.  Now,  in  consideration  of 
that  and  reports  that  a  group  similar  to  this 
— or  possibly  the  same  group — planned  to 
assassinate  you,  what  is  the  administration 
prepared  to  do  about  this,  other  than  regret 
it  or  plead  for  aviation  security,  usually  in 
vain  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  adminis- 
tration has  taken  a  very  strong  stand  against 
any  attacks  on  me.    [Laughter.] 

But  our  position  on  terrorism  is  clear.  We 
believe  that  it  is  a  worldwide  problem  that 
must  be  stamped  out.  We  will  renew  our 
eflforts  to  achieve  a  multilateral  agreement 
which  puts  teeth  into  the  enforcement  of 
antiterrorist  activity.  But  I  do  not  want  to 
comment  on  every  individual  action  of  every 
government  concerned. 


New  Element  in   Strategic  Arms  Equation 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  answer  may  be  in 
your  responses  here;  but  the  thing  that  I  am 
still  uncertain  about  is  that,  you  will  recall, 
in  that  saloon  in  the  basement  of  the  Na- 
tional Hotel  in  Moscow,  when  you  briefed  us 
on  the  SALT  agreement,  there  was  a  certain 
amount  of  optimism  about  the  future  with 
respect  to  offensive  nuclear  weapons.  I  ac- 
knowledge it  was  qualified  optimism.  Now, 
who  is  responsible  for  the  fact  that  things 
have  not  gone  quite  as  well  as  you  thought 
at  the  time?  Now,  if  the  premise  of  my  ques- 
tion is  ivrong,  why,  the  answer  is  inoperative 
— /  don't  knoiv.    [Laughter.'] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  think  one 
would  have  to  look  again  at  the  transcript  of 
that  press  conference  in  order  to  be  able  to 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


determine  what  is  meant  by  the  phrase  "It 
has  not  gone  as  well  as  one  hoped." 

The  agreement  that  was  made  in  Moscow 
in  1972  was  supposed  to  last  for  only  five 
years.  And  it  was  to  permit  the  negotiation 
of  a  more  permanent  agreement. 

It  was  recognized  at  the  time  that  the 
pi'oblem  of  the  multiple  warheads  would  soon 
come  to  the  fore.  If  the  strategic  problem 
had  remained  what  it  was  in  1972 — that  is 
to  say,  individual  weapons  with  individual 
warheads — the  situation  would  have  been 
essentially  stabilized  by  that  agreement. 

The  new  element  in  the  equation  is  the 
rapid  evolution  of  technology,  coupled  with 
improvements  in  accuracy  that  have — even 
within  the  limits  of  that  agreement — pro- 
duced vulnerabilities,  perhaps  a  year  or  two 
more  rapidly  than  one  expected  at  the  time. 

When  I  was  a  professor,  I  used  to  study 
the  issue  of  arms  control.  All  of  the  theoret- 
ical thinking  was  concentrated  on  the  prob- 
lem of  quantity,  how  to  get  control  of  quanti- 
tative change.  How  to  master  technology 
really  has  no  good  theoretical  base.  When  we 
started  the  first  SALT  negotiations,  there 
was  a  vast  literature  on  which  one  could 
draw  for  an  understanding  of  the  problem  of 
numbers. 

So  if  things  have  not  gone  as  well — which 
I  wouldn't  quite  concede — if  we  are  now  fac- 
ing new  problems,  it  is  not  because  anyone 
has  done  anything  wrong.  It  is  simply  be- 
cause technology  has  been  accelerating  at  a 
rate  that  threatens  to  outstrip  the  capacity 
to  control  it. 

Q.  Technology  has  been  accelerating  from 
the  Rtissian  side,  not  from  our  side? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it's  been  accel- 
erating on  both  sides,  but  especially  on  the 
Russian  side. 

Q.  To  folloiv  up,  Mr.  Secretary — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  This  young  lady  here 
has  been  very  patient,  and  then  we'll  get  the 
next  question. 

Q.  Thank  you,  Dr.  Kissinger.   Also  a  two- 


part  question.    I  hope  I  can  get  a  two-part 
answer. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You'll  probably  get  a 
five-part!    [Laughter.] 

Process  of  Middle   East   Negotiations 

Q.  First  of  all,  what  can  you  tell  us  of  the 
fate  of  the  Israeli  POW's  in  Syria?  And,  sec- 
ondly, what  concessions  do  you  expect  Israel 
to  make  in  the  Geneva  talks? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  the 
Israeli  prisoners  in  Syria,  the  United  States 
has  of  course  strongly  supported  their  release 
and  the  provision  at  least  of  lists  to  the 
Israelis. 

It  is  not  correct — as  has  been  pointed  out 
— that  we  promised  this  as  a  condition  of  the 
cease-fire,  though  we  did  indicate  that  we 
had  been  given  to  understand  that  a  major 
eff'ort  would  be  made  after  Israel  had  already 
accepted  the  cease-fire. 

Nevertheless,  the  United  States  supports 
the  fact  that  the  lists  should  be  produced  and 
that  the  prisoners  should  be  released  as 
rapidly  as  possible. 

Q.  Are  they  still  alive? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  no  inde- 
pendent information.  We  have  no  informa- 
tion that  would  indicate  that  they  are  not 
alive,  but  we  have  really  no  information  of 
any  kind — that  is,  of  an  independent  source. 

What  was  the  second  one? 

Q.  What  do  you  expect  the  Israelis  to  do  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  are  not  approach- 
ing the  problem  of  negotiations  by  drawing 
up  a  list  of  concessions  that  either  side  should 
make.  What  we  have  attempted  to  do  is  dis- 
cover, as  honestly  as  we  could,  on  these  trips 
through  the  Middle  East,  what  the  minimum 
requirements  of  each  side  were  and  then 
attempt  to  bring  these  into  some  relation  to 
each  other. 

To  the  extent  that  the  parties  have  talked 
to  each  other,  as  the  Egyptians  and  Israelis 
have  on  kilometer  101,  some  rapprochement 


January   21,    1974 


55 


has  developed  out  of  the  process  of  negotia- 
tion; but  we  are  not  starting  with  an  abstract 
list  of  concessions  which  we  are  then  asking 
any  country  to  make. 

There  was  a  followup  question. 

Q.  Yes.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  spoke  just 
earlier  of  the  lack  of  a  conceptual  basis  for 
SALT  Two  to  be  one  of  the  problems  and 
then  expressed  confidence  that  this  problem 
would  be  overcome  in  the  very  near  future. 
Do  you  mean  within  our  onm  government 
only,  or  do  you  expect  that  perhaps  in  the 
near  future  there  ivill  be  some  agreement  on 
a  conceptual  basis  for  SALT  Two  between 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States,  as 
there  rvas  on  a  conceptual  basis  for  SALT 
One  in,  I  think,  the  spring  of  1971  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  hope  for  both.  But 
of  course  there  have  to  be  two  stages.  First, 
we  have  to  clear  up  our  own  thinking.  But 
don't  let  me  leave  you  with  a  misconception. 
The  United  States  made  a  proposal  last  year 
which  was  perfectly  adequate  from  our  point 
of  view  and  which  reconciled  many  different 
points  of  view  within  our  government. 

As  you  progress  in  a  negotiation,  you  al- 
ways face  the  problem  then  of  getting  down 
to  the  essentials.  And  as  we  are  getting 
down  to  the  essentials,  the  need  for  a  new 
conceptual  base,  or  a  more  refined  concep- 
tual base,  has  become  apparent. 


Presidential   Determination 
on   Fishing   Boat  Seizures 

Presidential  Determination  No.  74-8 ' 

Transfer  of  Foreign  Assistance  Funds 
Programmed  for  Ecuador  and  Peru 

Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  State 

The  White  House, 
Washington,  December  11,  1973. 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  Section 
5(b)  of  the  Fishermen's  Protective  Act  of  1967,  as 
amended,  I  hereby  certify  that  it  is  in  the  national 
interest  not  to  transfer  to  the  Fishermen's  Protec- 
tive Fund  established  pursuant  to  Section  9  of  the 
Fishermen's  Protective  Act  of  1967,  as  amended, 
funds  from  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961  pro- 
grammed for  Ecuador  and  Peru  in  the  amount  of 
$2,305,416,  which  amount  is  equal  to  the  amounts 
reimbursed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in 
accordance  with  Section  3  of  the  Fishermen's  Pro- 
tective Act  of  1967,  as  amended,  for  the  twenty-two 
fishing  boat  seizures  each  by  Ecuador  and  Peru 
occurring  during  the  period  November  12,  1972 
through  February  10,  1973. 

You  are  requested  on  my  behalf  to  convey  this 
determination  and  certification  to  the  Congress,  as 
required  by  law. 

This  determination  shall  be  published  in  the 
Federal  Register. 


'  38  Fed.  Reg.  34799. 


[ 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


In  this  article  adapted  from  an  address  he  made  before  the 
Neiv  York  Chapter  of  the  Public  Relations  Society  of 
America  on  November  H  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  Mr.  Keogh 
discusses  the  programs  of  the  United  States  Information 
Agency  in  fulfilling  its  work  "of  explaining  our  country  and 
our  people,  of  correcting  or  minimizing  misunderstandings 
that  clog  or  contaminate  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  other  countries." 


Information  and  Modern  Diplomacy 


by  James  Keogh 

Director,  United  States  Information  Agency 


What  in  the  world  is  the  United  States  In- 
formation Agency? 

In  the  world,  it  is  a  multifaceted  tool  of 
modern  diplomacy  with  a  well-defined  role 
in  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

In  the  United  States,  it  is  so  little  known 
and  understood  among  the  general  public 
that  even  well-informed  people  are  uncertain 
about  what  it  is  and  what  it  does. 

When  I  was  nominated  to  be  Director  of 
USIA  a  little  less  than  a  year  ago  and  my 
friends  came  around  to  congratulate  me,  I 
soon  discovered  that  many  of  them  were  not 
quite  sure  just  what  it  was  that  I  was  going 
to  do.  Some  thought  I  was  going  to  run  the 
CIA,  while  others  thought  surely  U.S.  Infor- 
mation must  have  something  to  do  with  the 
Library  of  Congress.  Some  were  as  confused 
as  the  distraught  woman  who  called  our 
Paris  office  in  an  effort  to  determine  the 
whereabouts  of  her  husband,  who  had  failed 
to  return  to  their  hotel  after  a  night  on  the 
town.  She  thought  that  surely  the  U.S.  In- 
formation Agency  ought  to  know  what  he 
was  up  to. 

This  lack  of  information  about  the  Infor- 
mation Agency  is  largely  the  result  of  legis- 
lation which  specifically  forbids  the  USIA  to 
disseminate  within  the  United  States  the  in- 
formation and  media  products  it  distributes 
abroad.    There  is  a  sound  rationale  for  this 


legislation.  Its  aim  is  to  prevent  USIA  from 
becoming  an  internal  propaganda  force  in 
the  service  of  a  sitting  administration.  Yet 
its  effect  has  been  to  keep  the  American  pub- 
lic too  much  in  the  dark  about  what  USIA 
does.  We  are  now  trying — by  strictly  legal 
means — to  throw  some  light  on  the  subject. 

My  interest  in  attempting  to  inform  the 
rest  of  the  world  about  the  United  States 
goes  back  a  good  many  years.  This  interest 
was  cultivated  in  the  trips  abroad  that  I  took 
during  my  incarnation  as  an  editor  of  Time. 
I  recall  flying  from  Honolulu  to  Sydney, 
Australia,  a  decade  ago  and  stopping  on  the 
way  at  Nandi  in  the  Fiji  Islands.  I  walked 
into  the  lobby  of  the  quite  modern  airport 
and  saw  a  booth  with  a  sign  that  read  Fiji 
Chamber  of  Commerce.  An  attractive  Fiji 
girl  was  in  charge  of  the  booth.  Using  up 
some  of  that  airport  waiting  time,  I  struck 
up  a  conversation  with  her. 

"Are  you  going  to  stay  here  long?"  she 
asked,  in  a  polished  British  accent.  "No,"  I 
said,  "we  will  leave  just  as  soon  as  the  crew 
gets  the  plane  serviced.  This  is  just  a  stop- 
over." "Where  are  you  from?"  she  asked.  At 
that  point,  I  drew  myself  up  with  some  pride 
and  I  said,  "I'm  from  the  United  States — 
from  New  York  City."  She  seemed  thought- 
ful, even  puzzled,  for  a  moment  and  then  she 
said,  "Ah,  yes,  New  York  City.  I  think  that's 


January  21,    1974 


57 


where  one  makes  a  stopover  on  the  way  to 
London." 

It  was  on  this  same  trip,  I  recall,  that  I 
hired  a  car  and  driver  so  that  my  wife  i.nd  I 
could  travel  through  the  outback  surround- 
ing Brisbane.  It  was  a  warm  afternoon  in 
January,  and  as  we  came  to  a  small  town  I 
suggested  to  the  Australian  driver  that  we 
stop  for  something  to  drink.  Searching  for  a 
place  along  the  street,  I  saw  a  familiar  sign 
and  said,  "Well,  there's  a  Coca  Cola  sign. 
Let's  stop  there.  It  looks  just  like  home." 
The  driver  turned  to  me  with  what  seemed 
genuine  surprise  and  said,  "Oh,  do  you  have 
Coke  in  the  States,  too?" 

Experiences  such  as  these — and  others 
with  more  depth  but  less  anecdotal  value — 
tended  to  punctuate  my  feeling  that  a  strong 
information  program  is  of  great  importance 
to  the  United  States.  This  is  not  a  new  idea. 
From  the  time  of  the  American  Revolution 
the  United  States  has  employed  information 
activities  in  one  way  or  another  to  produce 
an  impact  in  other  countries.  The  merits  of 
the  American  cause  were  argued  abroad  in 
the  18th  century  by  a  talented  team  of  com- 
municators, headed  by  a  wily  old  PR  man 
named  Benjamin  Franklin.  During  the  Civil 
War  the  Union  actively  sought  support  from 
antislavery  elements  in  Europe.  At  one  point, 
Abraham  Lincoln  even  addressed  an  open 
letter  directly  to  the  people  of  England. 

If  the  history  of  American  efforts  to  influ- 
ence foreign  opinion  is  a  long  one,  doubts 
about  the  importance  or  even  the  existence 
of  public  opinion  are  equally  venerable.  The 
Declaration  of  Independence,  we  recall,  en- 
joins us  to  show  a  decent  respect  for  the 
opinions  of  mankind.  Dean  Acheson  wrote 
in  1965:  "World  opinion  simply  does  not 
exist  on  matters  that  concern  us."  In  his 
column  a  short  time  later,  Walter  Lippmann 
replied: 

It  is  fashionable  in  certain  circles  to  dismiss  scorn- 
fully a  serious  concern  about  what  foreign  nations 
think  of  us.  This  is  a  reaction  to  the  naive  and  often 
silly  American  wish  to  be  loved  by  everybody.  But 
the  reaction  has  gone  much  too  far.  For  it  is  not  true 
that  in  the  real  world  of  affairs  a  great  power,  even 
the  strongest,  can  afford  to  ignore  the  opinions  of 
others.   It  must  have  friends  who  trust  it  and  believe 


in  it  and  have  confidence  that  its  power  will  be  used 
wisely. 

It  was  pi'ecisely  to  nurture  such  friend- 
ships that  USIA  was  established  in  1953  as 
the  first  separate  U.S.  Government  informa- 
tion service  with  a  mission  of  presenting  the 
American  case  abroad  during  times  of  rela- 
tive peace.  Through  the  two  decades  of 
USIA's  existence,  the  nature  of  its  mission 
has  evolved  with  the  times.  It  is  evolving 
now — perhaps  more  than  ever. 


Communications  Channels  and  Activities 

What  is  the  mission  of  the  U.S.  Informa- 
tion Agency?  As  I  see  it,  the  mission  is  to 
support  U.S.  national  interests  by: 

— Conveying  an  understanding  of  what 
the  United  States  stands  for  as  a  nation  and 
as  a  people  and  presenting  a  true  picture  of 
the  society,  institutions,  and  culture  in  which 
our  policies  evolve; 

— Explaining  U.S.  policies  and  the  reasons 
for  them;  and 

— Advising  the  U.S.  Government  on  the 
implication  of  foreign  opinion  for  the  formu- 
lation and  execution  of  our  foreign  policy. 

To  do  this  we  use  all  available  means  of 
communication. 

The  lai'gest  element  in  USIA  is  the  Voice 
of  America,  the  radio  arm  of  the  Agency. 
It  broadcasts  in  36  languages  around  the 
world  to  an  adult  audience  of  many  millions. 

USIA  produces  or  acquires  some  150  film 
and  television  documentaries  annually  for 
showing  overseas.  The  vast  majority  of 
these  productions  are  acquired  from  com- 
mercial sources.  In  addition,  a  variety  of 
special-targeted  programs  and  many  news- 
clips  are  produced  for  foreign  television.  We 
also  help  television  and  film  producers  from 
other  countries  who  want  to  do  pieces  about 
the  United  States. 

We  radioteletype  texts  of  official  policy 
statements  and  interpretive  material  to  127 
overseas  posts  five  days  a  week.  Receiving  ! 
the  texts  of  such  papers  on  an  almost  immedi- 
ate basis  is  often  of  crucial  importance  to 
U.S.  representatives  in  dealing  with  both  the 


58 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


governments    and    the    media    in    the    host 
countries. 

Special  articles  written  by  our  staff  and 
reprints  from  U.S.  publications  are  regularly 
mailed  to  posts  for  placement  in  local  media 
and  for  background  information  and  use  by 
Embassy  officers. 

We  publish  magazines  in  27  languages  and 
distribute  them  in  100  countries. 

Every  year  we  build  and  circulate  abroad 
some  50  exhibits  about  life  in  the  United 
States. 

We  maintain  or  support  almost  300  librar- 
ies in  information  centers,  reading  rooms, 
and  binational  centers  in  98  countries.  These 
libraries  are  used  by  about  121,2  million  peo- 
ple each  year. 

The  educational  and  cultural  exchange  pro- 
grams which  USIA  administers  abroad  for 
the  State  Department  form  another  vital  ele- 
ment in  the  eff'ort  to  communicate  with  peo- 
ple around  the  world. 

Of  course,  the  most  important  and  effec- 
tive means  of  communication  we  have  is  the 
personal  contact  between  our  officers  in  109 
countries  and  local  opinion  leaders.  I  recall 
Edward  R.  Murrow's  remark,  when  he  held 
the  position  that  I  now  occupy,  that  USIA 
could  easily  and  immediately  transmit  infor- 
mation 25,000  miles  around  the  world.  The 
difficulty,  he  noted,  is  in  conveying  it  the  last 
three  feet.  That  is  the  all-important  job  of 
our  overseas  officers. 

These  various  communications  channels 
and  activities  are  brought  together  in  a  uni- 
fied coordinated  program  by  means  of  Coun- 
try Plans  drawn  up  by  our  posts  overseas, 
cleared  by  the  Ambassador,  and  finally  ap- 
proved by  our  headquarters  in  Washington 
and  the  Cultural  Affairs  Bureau  of  the  State 
Department. 

The  need  for  this  kind  of  public  diplomacy 
is  widely  recognized  by  the  nations  of  the 
world.  Back  in  1954  a  British  study  commis- 
sion reported: 

A  modern  government  has  to  concern  itself  with 
public  opinion  abroad  and  be  properly  equipped  to 
deal  with  it.  .  .  .  The  information  services  must 
today  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  normal  apparatus 
of  diplomacy  of  a  great  power. 


Picking  up  that  cue,  other  major  countries, 
including  the  Communist  governments,  have 
steadily  expanded  their  cultural  and  infor- 
mation programs  during  the  last  decade. 
For  example,  appropriations  for  the  French 
external  cultural  and  information  program 
reached  $430  million  in  1971 — more  than 
double  the  1961  level  and  more  than  twice 
the  size  of  USIA's  present  budget.  West 
Germany  has  increased  its  spending  for  this 
purpose  substantially  in  recent  years,  and 
last  year  it  reached  $300  million,  which  is 
50  percent  more  than  our  budget.  While  no 
solid  figures  are  ascertainable,  it  is  estimated 
that  the  Soviet  Union  has  expanded  its  cul- 
tural and  information  programs  to  the  point 
at  which  it  is  spending  almost  $1  billion  an- 
nually, an  effort  that  dwarfs  the  U.S.  com- 
mitment for  this  purpose.  While  all  this  has 
been  going  on,  USIA  resources  have  been 
shrinking.  In  real  dollar  terms,  the  USIA 
budget  for  this  year  is  approximately  the 
same  as  it  was  in  1953. 

This  imbalance,  to  put  it  mildly,  keeps  us 
on  our  mettle. 


New  Tasks  and  New  Techniques 

In  recent  years,  the  environment  in  which 
we  operate  has  changed  tremendously — in 
both  technological  and  political  terms.  This 
inevitably  conditions  our  tasks  as  well  as  our 
methods  of  functioning. 

One  change  has  been  the  extraordinary  ex- 
pansion of  new  techniques  and  channels  of 
communication.  Technical  developments  such 
as  transistor  radios,  satellite  telecasting, 
video  cassettes,  videotape  recordings,  com- 
puter data  banks,  and  so  on,  have  been 
matched  by  the  expansion  around  the  world 
of  television  and  radio  networks,  news  agen- 
cies, and  non-media  channels  of  communica- 
tion involving  business,  tourism,  and  profes- 
sional and  scholarly  contacts. 

In  this  general  area,  I  would  like  to  men- 
tion just  one  of  the  new  devices  USIA  is 
using.  We  call  it  the  electronic  dialogue.  The 
first  step  in  this  process  is  the  taping  or 
filming  of  a  speech  or  statement  by  a  high 
government  official  or  a  distinguished  leader 


January  21,    1974 


59 


from  the  pi'ivate  sector  or  academe  discus- 
sing the  discipline  in  which  he  or  she  is 
expert.  A  USIA  post  overseas  will  then 
gather  that  country's  leaders  in  the  field 
under  discussion — men  from  government, 
the  private  sector,  and  academic  life.  They 
will  watch  the  tape  or  film  and  then  through 
a  special  international  telephone  connection 
will  question  and  discuss  the  subject  with  the 
speaker  for  as  much  as  an  hour  or  more.  On 
important  matters  of  U.S.  policy  in  which  the 
other  country  has  a  mutual  interest,  we  have 
found  this  to  be  a  highly  effective  means  of 
communication. 

Some  critics  of  USIA  take  the  position  that 
in  this  day  of  rapid  and  saturated  communi- 
cation there  is  no  longer  any  need  for  a  U.S. 
information  effort.  Why,  they  ask,  is  it  not 
possible  to  just  let  the  regular  news  media 
take  care  of  all  that? 

There  are  very  fundamental  reasons  why 
the  news  media — here  or  abroad — cannot  be 
expected  to  perform  the  information  func- 
tion for  the  U.S.  Government.  By  its  very 
definition,  news  is  the  unusual.  The  media, 
which  are  essentially  and  properly  commer- 
cial enterprises,  tend  to  highlight  the  special, 
the  spectacular,  and  the  bizarre,  with  a  heavy 
tilt  toward  the  negative.  The  broad  sweep 
of  the  normal  ongoing  endeavors,  develop- 
ments, and  achievements  of  a  society  do  not 
make  very  exciting  headlines  or  bulletins. 
The  news  media  have  no  desire  to  be  the  plat- 
form for  official  statements  or  explanations 
of  U.S.  policy.  Replying  to  foreign  critics  is 
not  their  job.  Nor  have  they  any  financial 
incentive  to  attempt  to  communicate  with 
people  in  closed  societies  or  underdeveloped 
nations.  As  a  result,  it  is  often  a  confused 
and  distorted  image  of  the  United  States 
that  reaches  foreign  eyes  and  ears  and  be- 
comes an  element  in  the  balance  sheet  of  our 
foreign  relations.  A  continuing  effort  to 
explain  the  facts  and  underlying  principles 
of  our  actions  and  policies  and  to  correct  the 
willful  or  unintentional  distortions  about  our 
country  abroad  is  the  daily  and  vital  task  of 
USIA. 

The  task  has  become  more  complicated  as 
the  political  atmosphere  in  which  we  func- 


tion has  changed.  Some  quite  rapid  changes 
have  brought  new  opportunities  as  well  as 
new  problems.  While  a  new  climate  for  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  and  China  has 
been  developing,  there  has  been  an  undeni- 
able erosion  of  old  relations  with  some  of  our 
major  allies.  New  problems  have  arisen;  per- 
ceptions of  national  interest  are  changing. 
In  Western  Europe  there  is  a  generation  of 
adults  with  no  memory  of  World  War  II  and 
the  contribution  of  the  United  States  to  the 
defense  and  subsequent  reconstruction  of 
their  countries. 

This  changed  American  relationship  with 
Europe  was  aptly  explained  by  Congress- 
man Benjamin  Rosenthal  of  New  York  as  he 
was  speaking  to  a  group  of  parliamentarians 
from  the  Common  Market  countries.  He  said 
that  too  many  Americans  still  seemed  to  be- 
lieve in  "grandmotherly  diplomacy — the  idea 
that  we  have  a  delightful,  charming,  depend- 
able and  unique  relationship  with  Europe 
because  all  of  our  grandmothers  and  great- 
grandmothers  came  from  Europe.  We  can't 
rely  on  our  grandmothers  anymore.  We  must 
rely  on  ourselves." 

Fostering  Dialogue  With  Eastern  Europe 

As  our  government  seeks  to  resolve  differ- 
ences through  negotiations  and  engage 
former  adversaries  and  old  friends  in  con- 
structive dialogue,  USIA  must  attempt  to 
foster  a  better  and  more  extensive  under- 
standing of  our  purpose  and  policies.  We 
must  simultaneously  listen  attentively  to  the 
views  and  opinions  of  others,  for  an  impor- 
tant part  of  our  job  is  to  make  U.S.  policy- 
makers aware  of  the  attitudes,  aspirations, 
and  fears  of  other  nations  on  issues  of  mu- 
tual concern. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  policy  of  negotiation 
rather  than  confrontation,  and  the  reality  of 
detente,  have  presented  the  United  States 
and  the  world  with  new  opportunities  for 
constructive  dialogue  which  the  USIA  is  in  a 
unique  position  to  foster. 

In  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe, 
the  officials  and  the  people  are  much  more 
receptive    to    our    traveling    exhibits    than 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


before.  During  1973  we  have  shown  eight 
major  exhibits  in  six  countries  in  that  part 
of  the  world,  dealing  with  American  ap- 
proaches to  research  and  development,  out- 
door recreation,  progress  and  the  environ- 
ment, educational  technology,  and  auto  life — 
an  exposition  of  the  way  the  automobile  has 
affected  the  social,  industrial,  and  environ- 
mental aspects  of  American  life. 

More  than  214  million  people  visited  these 
exhibits.  The  Soviet  Union  not  only  coop- 
erated with  us  in  staging  these  exhibits  but, 
for  the  first  time,  even  accorded  them  a 
guarded  measure  of  favorable  publicity.  In 
addition,  we  also  displayed  nine  exhibits  of 
American  fine  arts  in  five  Eastern  European 
countries. 

In  September  I  went  to  the  Soviet  Union 
to  open  our  exhibit  on  outdoor  recreation  in 
the  city  of  Irkutsk.  The  reception  we  were 
accorded  in  Moscow,  Leningrad,  and  Irkutsk 
could  not  have  been  more  cordial.  The  Soviet 
officials  and  people  that  I  met  gave  the  gen- 
uine impression  that  they  were  deeply  inter- 
ested in  wider  informational  and  cultural 
exchanges  with  the  U.S.  Government.  Some 
of  the  officials  may  not  have  been  entirely 
comfortable  with  the  idea,  but  there  seemed 
to  be  no  question  of  their  interest. 

In  I'-kutsk,  a  city  in  the  heart  of  Siberia,  a 
city  with  a  tradition  of  300  years  and  a  pres- 
ent that  is  filled  with  dramatic  growth,  our 
exhibit  was  the  center  of  intense  interest.  It 
was  welcomed  with  the  greatest  warmth  by 
the  Mayor  of  Irkutsk,  a  50-year-old  local 
patriot  deeply  concerned  about  the  growth 
and  development  of  the  city  where  he  was 
born.  He  had  visited  the  United  States,  es- 
pecially the  Pacific  Northwest.  As  he  showed 
us  the  illuminated  chart  of  the  plan  for  his 
city's  development,  he  expressed  one  great 
goal:  to  make  Irkutsk  just  like  Seattle.  I 
firmly  believe  that  the  importance  of  this 
kind  of  communication  to  the  future  of  inter- 
national relationships — indeed,  to  the  future 
of  civilization- — cannot  be  overestimated. 

Perhaps  of  the  greatest  significance  in  our 
new  communications  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  is  the  fact  that  the  U.S.S.R.  no 
longer  jams  the  Voice  of  America.    After 


five  consecutive  years  of  steady  jamming,  the 
electronic  blockade  ceased  last  September  10. 
This  presented  us  with  a  new  and  vastly 
larger  audience  within  the  Soviet  Union  than 
we  had  before.  When  I  was  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  Voice  of  America  was  coming 
through  loud  and  clear  in  Moscow,  in  Lenin- 
grad, and  in  the  heart  of  Siberia.  An  Ameri- 
can correspondent  living  in  Moscow  told  one 
of  our  officers  that  Russians  he  knows  now 
consider  it  an  "in"  thing  to  listen  to  the 
Voice  and  do  so  openly  at  home  and  even  on 
the  street.  Our  spacemen  in  Moscow  on  the 
Apollo-Soyuz  project  have  been  told  by  their 
Russian  counterparts  that  they  and  others 
in  the  scientific  community  now  regularly 
listen  to  the  Voice.  The  Russian-speaking 
guides  with  our  traveling  exhibits  report  a 
vast  increase  in  VOA  listenership. 

While  detente  has  thus  given  us  new  and 
welcome  opportunities  for  communication 
with  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  it  would  be  naive — indeed,  fool- 
hardy— for  us  to  assume  that  all  differences 
between  our  countries  are  about  to  be  wiped 
out.  Clearly  there  is  no  end  to  competition 
either  in  the  political  sphere  or  in  the  realm 
of  ideas.  General  Secretary  Brezhnev  [Leonid 
I.  Brezhnev,  General  Secretary  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  of  the  Soviet  Union]  himself 
said  of  the  new  relationships:  "The  successes 
of  this  important  matter  do  not  signify  in 
any  way  the  possibility  of  relaxing  the  ideo- 
logical struggle."  In  this  struggle,  while  we 
eschew  polemics  and  the  rhetoric  of  the  cold 
war,  we  must  meet  international  competition 
by  insuring  that  a  clear  and  balanced  picture 
of  the  United  States  and  its  policies  gets 
through  abroad,  both  to  those  who  make  deci- 
sions and  the  public  at  large. 

In  larger  focus,  the  opportunities  and 
challenges  presented  by  this  set  of  circum- 
stances were  placed  in  historical  context  by 
Secretary  of  State  Henry  Kissinger  when  he 
said:' 

We  are  at  one  of  those  rare  moments  where 
through  a   combination  of   fortuitous   circumstances 


'  For  Secretary  Kissinger's  address  before  the 
Third  Pacem  in  Terris  Conference  at  Washington  on 
Oct.  8,  1973,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  29,  1973,  p.  525. 


January   21,    1974 


61 


and  design  man  seems  in  a  position  to  shape  his 
future.  What  we  need  is  the  confidence  to  discuss 
issues  without  bitter  strife,  the  wisdom  to  define 
together  the  nature  of  our  world,  as  well  as  the 
vision  to  chart  together  a  more  just  future. 

Information  Support  for  Economic  Programs 

In  another  way,  changing  world  circum- 
stances have  placed  new  demands  on  the  for- 
eign affairs  structure  of  government.  As 
national  priorities  shift,  USIA  is  shifting  the 
emphasis  of  its  own  programs  to  lend  infor- 
mation support  to  new  foreign  affairs  objec- 
tives. Toward  this  end,  and  while  still  carry- 
ing on  our  larger  and  traditional  role,  we 
have  launched  a  program  to  help  improve  the 
U.S.  balance  of  payments  in  trade  and  tour- 
ism. I  have  called  on  Agency  personnel  in 
more  than  100  countries  to  support  the  trade 
and  promotion  programs  of  the  Department 
of  State  and  Commerce.  We  seek  to  portray 
the  United  States  as  an  attractive  place  to 
visit,  and  we  report  on  scientific  and  techni- 
cal achievements,  including  the  research  and 
development  of  new  techniques  and  products. 
USIA  officers  abroad  will  inform  local  busi- 
nessmen about  U.S.  products  and  services 
available.  Our  organization  will  carry  on  an 
intensive  effort  to  keep  the  U.S.  position 
strong  in  the  world  trade.  We  look  forward 
to  closer  cooperation  with  the  private  sector 
in  this  effort. 

We  see  this  part  of  our  mission  as  going 
beyond  the  issue  of  the  balance  of  payments 
— as  important  as  that  issue  is.  President 
Nixon  recently  expressed  the  wider  view 
when  he  said:^ 

.  .  .  trade  leads  to  communication  between  peoples, 
not  just  governments  but  peoples.  ...  I  believe  that 
as  we  increase  communication  between  peoples  at  all 
levels,  the  opportunity  of  discussing  differences 
rather  than  fighting  about  differences  is  greatly 
increased. 

Recently  an  old  friend  of  mine — a  jour- 
nalist— looked  at  me  with  an  expression  that 
can  only  be  described  as  pity.   "You  must  be 


'  For  President  Nixon's  remarks  before  the  Presi- 
dent's Conference  on  Export  Expansion  at  Washing- 
ton on  Oct.  11,  1973,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  5,  1973, 
p.  553. 


having  a  terrible  time,"  he  said.  "How  can 
you  possibly  find  anything  good  to  say  about 
the  United  States  these  days?" 

That  point  of  view  touches  on  a  phenome- 
non that  I  believe  is  of  the  greatest  signifi- 
cance for  the  picture  of  the  United  States 
which  we  deliver  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  We 
must  be  careful  not  to  be  so  obsessed  with 
the  short-term  negatives  in  our  society  that 
we  are  blinded  to  the  long-lasting  positives. 
In  telling  America's  story  to  the  world,  USIA 
does  not  try  to  say  that  this  is  a  society  with- 
out troubles.  It  would  be  ridiculous  for  us  to 
do  so.  Hardline  propaganda  is  a  relic  of  the 
past.  We  try  to  explain  what  is  happening 
in  the  United  States  in  a  way  that  is  factual 
and  with  a  perspective  that  places  events  in 
the  context  of  the  general  thrust  of  the 
American  society. 

What  was  on  my  friend's  mind,  of  course, 
was  that  subject  that  seems  so  all-encompas- 
sing: Watergate  and  related  matters.  On 
our  news  programs  on  the  Voice  of  America, 
we  report  the  story  of  the  Watergaie  affair 
fairly  and  factually.  We  do  not,  however, 
deal  in  rumor,  hearsay,  speculation,  or  anony- 
mous accusations.  When  I  set  that  policy 
some  of  my  old  friends  in  the  news  media 
complained  that  I  had  turned  censor  and  was 
somehow  suppressing  the  truth  because  I 
would  not  allow  rumor,  hearsay,  speculation, 
and  anonymous  accusations  to  run  at  full 
stream  on  the  Voice  of  America.  It  seemed 
to  me  the  only  responsible  policy  for  the 
Voice  to  follow  in  reporting  this  story  to  the 
rest  of  the  world. 

In  explaining  what  is  happening  in  this 
country  as  a  result  of  the  Watergate  affair, 
we  try  to  make  the  point  to  our  overseas  au- 
diences that  what  they  are  seeing  and  hear- 
ing is  this  free  and  open  society  working  out 
a  problem.  Charges  against  people  in  high 
places  have  been  brought  forward  and  ex- 
tended largely  by  the  free  press.  These 
charges  are  being  investigated  by  the  legisla- 
tive branch,  through  the  Senate  select  com- 
mittee, and  by  the  judicial  branch,  through 
the  grand  jury  system.  The  interplay  of  all 
these  forces  in  our  society — the  free  press, 
the  executive  branch,  the  legislative  branch. 


62 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


the  judicial  branch — is  being  carried  out 
very  much  in  public.  Ultimately  the  problem 
will  be  resolved.  Whatever  remedial  steps 
may  be  necessary  will  be  taken,  and  the  so- 
ciety will  move  on.  While  some  of  our  friends 
abroad  ai-e  appalled  at  what  they  see  as  a 
nation  publicly  destroying  its  own  image,  our 
unhysterical  explanation  of  the  free  and  open 
working  of  this  society  strikes  a  remarkably 
positive  and  calming  reaction  among  the 
sophisticated  in  some  lands  where  such  open- 
ness is  unknown. 

While  it  seems  at  times  difficult  to  avoid 
being  obsessed  with  the  negatives  that  batter 
our  eyes  and  ears  here  at  home,  we  at  USIA 
cannot  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  prob- 
lems faced  on  many  issues  in  many  other 
countries  make  our  own  seem  relatively 
minor.  Take,  for  example,  the  omnipresent 
matter  of  the  cost  of  living  and  inflation.  It 
is  a  fact  of  life  that  a  typical  factory  hand  in 
Britain,  France,  or  West  Germany — to  cite 
some  of  the  most  prominent — must  work  ap- 
proximately twice  as  long  as  one  in  the 
United  States  to  buy  a  home,  a  car,  a  wash- 
ing machine,  a  television  set,  or  a  dozen 
eggs.  As  for  inflation,  the  increase  in  the 
consumer  price  index  from  July  1972  to  July 
1973  was  less  in  the  United  States  than  in 
any  major  developed  country.  Shortages? 
Our  complaints  about  shortages  would  be 
incomprehensible  to  many  relatively  ad- 
vanced societies  of  the  world  which  have 
never  known  the  plenty  we  have  come  to 
consider  a  right. 

In  these  volatile  days,  we  even  hear  now 
and  then  that  our  country  is  adrift  on  the 
international  seas.  But  what  country  was  it 
that  served  as  the  catalyst  in  the  effort  to 
bring  peace  to  the  Middle  East — however 
difficult  and  unending  that  effort  might  be? 
Which  country  is  it  that,  amidst  new  ten- 
sions, was  able  to  maintain  and  move  toward 
greater  development  of  its  new  relationships 
with  old  adversaries  with  approaches  for 
lasting  peace? 

Keeping  as  clear  a  perspective  as  we  can, 
we  at  USIA  see  our  foreign  communications 
activities  as  part  of  a  permanent  long-range 
process  whose  effects  are  cumulative. 


Whether  our  officers  are  broadcasting  on  the 
Voice  of  America,  or  editing  a  magazine  in 
Arabic,  or  scheduling  a  performance  by  Duke 
Ellington  in  Moscow,  or  setting  up  an  ex- 
hibit in  Bulgaria,  or  arranging  a  lecture  by 
a  Fulbright  professor  in  New  Delhi,  or  assist- 
ing a  French  TV  producer  to  plan  a  series 
on  American  environmental  programs,  or 
giving  the  facts  about  U.S.  trade  policies  to  a 
Japanese  editor,  it  is  all  part  of  the  same 
effort:  the  extremely  important  work  of  ex- 
plaining our  country  and  our  people,  of  cor- 
recting or  minimizing  misunderstandings 
that  clog  or  contaminate  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  other  countries. 

These  day-to-day  contacts  give  substance 
to  the  continuing  dialogue  with  foreign 
audiences.  By  providing  facts  and  points  of 
view  and  the  human  dimension  of  personal 
relations,  we  broaden  and  strengthen  this 
discourse.  Collectively  and  cumulatively 
these  efforts  affect  attitudes  and  shape  per- 
ceptions of  the  United  States. 

On  the  occasion  of  his  75th  birthday,  U.S. 
Supreme  Court  Justice  William  0.  Douglas 
expressed  a  view  with  which  I  am  in  whole- 
hearted agreement,  although  I  am  sure  that 
if  I  were  privileged  to  sit  in  deliberations 
with  the  Justice  he  and  I  might  find  our- 
selves on  different  sides  of  many  more 
limited  issues.  Justice  Douglas  said:  "I  think 
the  heart  of  America  is  sound,  the  conscience 
of  America  is  bright  and  the  future  of 
America  is  great." 

This  is  the  vision  of  the  United  States  that 
we  want  to  share  and  make  comprehensible 
to  the  people  abroad  so  that  in  our  relations 
with  other  nations  distortion  and  doubt  will 
be  replaced  by  confidence,  respect,  and  under- 
standing. 

Senate  Confirms   Dr.   Ehrlich 
for  WHO  Executive  Board 

The  Senate  on  December  18  confirmed  the 
nomination  of  Dr.  S.  Paul  Ehrlich,  Jr.,  to  be 
the  representative  of  the  United  States  on 
the  Executive  Board  of  the  World  Health 
Organization. 


January   21,    1974 


63 


THE   UNITED   NATIONS 


U.S.  Cosponsors  Resolution  Setting  1974  Work  Program 
for  U.N.  Outer  Space  Committee 


Folloiving  is  a  statement  made  in  Com- 
mittee I  (Political  and  Security)  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  December  7  by  U.S. 
Representative  Mark  Evans,  together  with 
the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  com- 
mittee on  December  10  and  by  the  Assembly 
on  December  18. 


STATEMENT   BY  MR.   EVANS 

LISUN  press  release  129  dated  December  7 

The  First  Committee  is  now  considering 
the  report  of  the  most  outward  looking — and 
perhaps  forward  looking — organization  in 
the  United  Nations  family,  the  Committee  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space.^  And  all 
of  us  must  have  been  impressed  by  how  this 
expanding  peaceful  activity  in  space  contin- 
ues to  enlarge  man's  intellectual  horizons. 

Just  this  week  Pioneer  10  has  fired  our 
imaginations  as  it  sped  past  Jupiter  at  more 
than  96,000  miles  an  hour,  giving  mankind 
its  first  closeup  view  of  that  giant  planet. 
We  eagerly  await  the  analysis  of  the  images 
and  other  data  that  Pioneer  10  has  sent  back 
and  has  still  to  transmit  as  it  continues  its 
voyage  past  the  farthest  reaches  of  the  solar 
system  and  beyond. 

Pioneer  10  demonstrates  mankind's  in- 
genuity in  devising  technology  to  do  his 
work  in  the  vast  distances  of  space  still  far 
beyond  his  reach.  This  month  man  himself 
will  make  his  unique  contribution  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  universe  when  the  Skylab 
astronauts  take  advantage  of  an  unparalleled 
opportunity  to  observe  the  comet  Kohoutek. 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/9020. 


With  the  instruments  on  Skylab,  they  will  be 
able  to  observe  the  comet  when  it  is  closest 
to  the  sun  and  at  its  brightest.  At  that  time, 
ground-based  observations  will  have  very 
limited  scope  because  of  scattered  sunlight 
in  the  atmosphere.  The  astronauts  will  also 
be  able  to  react  to  such  transient  events  as 
the  sudden  flaring  and  changes  in  shape  that 
are  characteristic  of  comets. 

But  space  research  does  far  more  than  help 
man  see  himself  and  the  universe  truly  and  in 
perspective,  important  as  that  may  be.  Space 
research  promises  to  improve  the  quality  of 
life  on  earth  as  well. 

We  are  reminded  daily  of  how  space  mete- 
orology and  communication  help  us  in  our 
life  and  work  here  on  the  earth's  surface. 
Participating  in  the  World  Weather  Watch, 
over  70  countries  now  make  direct  use  of 
data  from  U.S.  weather  satellites.  Communi- 
cations satellites  such  as  Intelsat  link  peoples 
and  continents  instantaneously. 

More  and  more,  we  are  learning  of  the 
promise  of  a  new  form  of  earth-oriented 
space  technology:  remote  sensing  by  satel- 
lites. To  see  if  this  promise  can  become  a 
reality,  scientists  from  37  countries  and  two 
international  organizations  (the  U.N.  Food 
and  Agriculture  Organization  and  the  U.N. 
Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far 
East)  have,  along  with  scientists  in  the 
United  States,  initiated  investigations  on  the 
basis  of  data  from  the  Earth  Resources 
Technology  Satellite  ERTS-1  and  the  Earth 
Resources  Experiment  Package  on  Skylab. 
Brazil  has  joined  Canada  in  establishing  its 
own  earth  resources  data  acquisition  and 
processing  facilities,  and  other  countries 
have  expressed  interest  in  doing  the  same. 


64 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


One  result  of  the  investigations  to  date  bears 
significantly  on  studies  of  the  long  drought 
in  Sahelian  Africa:  the  location  of  subsur- 
face water  in  close  proximity  to  usable  soils. 

We  take  particular  note  also  of  India's  up- 
coming experiment  in  instructional  television 
by  satellite.  Using  the  ATS-F  satellite 
[Applications  Technology  Satellite],  which 
the  United  States  will  make  available  for 
four  to  six  hours  a  day  during  the  experi- 
ment, India  in  1975  will  transmit  its  own 
programs,  primarily  on  family  planning  and 
agricultural  production,  from  its  ground 
station  at  Ahmadabad  via  the  spacecraft 
directly  to  some  2,000  specially  equipped 
village  ground  receivers. 

The  United  States  takes  great  pride  in  the 
degree  to  which  our  national  space  program 
is  based  on  cooperation  with  other  countries. 
That  pride  is  based  not  only  on  our  commit- 
ment to  the  principle  of  cooperation  but  es- 
pecially on  our  conviction  that  we  have  a 
better  program  because  of  it.  The  participa- 
tion of  other  nations  in  remote  sensing  in- 
vestigations, in  the  development  of  satellite 
meteorology  and  communications,  and  in 
scores  of  other  flights  and  ground-based 
projects  in  space  science  and  applications 
underlines  the  point. 

Expanding   U.S.   Cooperative   Space  Research 

We  are  pleased  that  during  the  past  year 
the  scope  and  depth  of  cooperation  in  space 
research  was  extended  significantly. 

A  prime  example  is  the  Apollo-Soyuz  Test 
Project,  the  joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  flight  in  1975 
to  test  compatible  rendezvous  and  docking 
systems.  Flight  crews  have  been  named,  and 
joint  training  has  begun.  U.S.  and  Soviet 
docking  system  development  units  are  under- 
going joint  testing;  and  a  host  of  operational 
details  have  been  worked  out,  such  as  trajec- 
tories, control  center  operations,  and  crew 
activities.  At  a  joint  midterm  project  review 
in  October,  senior  representatives  of  NASA 
and  the  Soviet  Academy  of  Sciences  con- 
firmed that  all  joint  working  group  activities 
were  on  schedule  and  that  the  mission  could 
be  expected  to  proceed  on  as  planned.  Our 


astronauts  have  just  returned  from  the 
U.S.S.R. 

Also  particularly  worthy  of  note  is  the 
recent  agreement  between  NASA  and  the 
European  Space  Research  Organization 
which  provides  for  development  by  Europe 
of  a  manned  orbital  laboratory,  called  Space- 
lab,  for  use  in  manned  missions  with  the 
NASA  Space  Shuttle.  ESRO  will  design,  de- 
velop, manufacture,  and  deliver  to  NASA  a 
Spacelab  flight  unit  on  behalf  of  the  nine 
European  countries  which  are  funding  the 
$400  million  eff"ort.  Spacelab  will  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  realizing  the  full  potential  of 
the  shuttle.  Its  development  will  employ 
European  skills  on  the  frontiers  of  space 
technology.  It  will  be  available  to  many 
countries.  Its  availability  will  provide  the 
first  opportunity  for  experimenter  astronauts 
from  other  countries  to  follow  their  Amer- 
ican counterparts  into  space  and  take  advan- 
tage of  that  environment  in  their  work. 

In  addition  to  the  joint  manned  mission 
and  Spacelab  projects,  we  are  moving  ahead 
on  bilateral  satellite  and  sounding  rocket 
projects,  as  well  as  arrangements  for  launch 
services,  with  a  number  of  countries.  In  all 
these  activities  the  United  States  is  guided  by 
an  underlying  policy  favoring  the  broadest 
possible  international  cooperation  in  the 
peaceful  uses  of  outer  space.  This  policy  was 
first  proclaimed  by  President  Eisenhower, 
and  it  has  been  consistently  upheld  through 
all  succeeding  administrations.  John  F.  Ken- 
nedy enunciated  it  with  characteristic  elo- 
quence a  decade  ago  when,  in  praising  the 
accomplishments  of  pioneer  astronauts  Yuri 
Gagarin  and  Alan  Shepard,  he  said : 

We  have  a  long  way  to  go  in  the  field  of  space. 
.  .  .  But  we  are  working  hard  and  we  are  going  to 
increase  our  effort.  In  addition,  we  are  making 
available  the  scientific  information  which  we  have 
gathered  to  other  scientists  in  the  world  community 
and  people  who  share  our  view  that  the  probe  into 
space  should  be  peaceful,  and  should  be  for  the  com- 
mon good,  and  that  will  continue  to  motivate  us. 

Motivate  us  it  has  and  does.  Just  next  week 
in  Washington  a  symposium  will  convene  to 
evaluate  further  the  results  of  the  ERTS-1 
experiments,  which,  as  I  have  noted,  reflect 
international  participation.    The  symposium 


January  21,    1974 


65 


is  thus  the  latest  fulfillment  of  President 
Nixon's  pledge  to  this  Assembly  that  the 
United  States  will  share  the  benefits  of  our 
earth  resources  survey  program  as  it  "pro- 
ceeds and  fulfills  its  promise." 

Before  leaving  this  survey  of  our  coopera- 
tive activities  in  space,  Mr.  Chairman,  I 
would  like  to  extend  my  delegation's  thanks 
for  the  many  kind  words  addressed  to  us  by 
previous  speakers  concerning  those  activities 
and  U.S.  space  accomplishments  generally. 
Once  again,  we  consider  that  in  a  very  real 
sense  they  all  belong  to  mankind. 

U.N.  Scientific  and  Technical   Programs 

Turning  now  to  the  work  of  the  United 
Nations  in  outer  space  affairs  during  the 
past  year,  let  me  say  at  the  outset  that  my 
delegation  thinks  the  results  have  been  on 
the  whole  positive.  The  work,  as  we  know, 
is  concentrated  in  the  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  and  its  sub- 
sidiary bodies,  which  have  had  a  busy  year. 

The  Working  Group  on  Remote  Sensing  of 
the  Earth  by  Satellites  held  its  fi/st  substan- 
tive session.  The  Working  Group  on  Direct 
Broadcast  Satellites  met  for  the  first  time 
since  1970.  The  Scientific  and  Technical  and 
Legal  Subcommittees  held  their  regular  ses- 
sions. All  made  progress. 

The  Working  Group  on  Remote  Sensing,  in 
our  view,  achieved  a  proper  perspective  for 
the  next  phase  of  its  work  when  it  recom- 
mended the  creation  from  its  ranks  of  a  spe- 
cialized task  force  to  identify,  study,  and  an- 
alyze possible  alternatives  for  international 
dissemination  and  optimum  utilization  of  en- 
vironmental and  resources  data,  keeping  in 
mind  the  requirements  for  such  data  of 
developing  countries.  The  overall  purpose 
will  be  to  promote  the  best  possible  use  of 
remote  sensing  technology  for  the  benefit  of 
individual  countries  as  well  as  the  interna- 
tional community. 

My  delegation  is  gratified  that  this  sug- 
gested approach  was  approved  both  by  the 
Scientific  and  Technical  Subcommittee  and 
the  parent  committee  and  that,  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  General  Assembly,  the  task 
force  is  to  convene  early  next  year.  We  think 


this  practical,  pragmatic  approach  is  the  best 
one  to  take  at  the  present  stage  of  remote 
sensing  technology.  The  United  States  hopes 
to  make  a  worthwhile  contribution  to  the 
task  force  study. 

Besides  reviewing  the  work  of  the  Work- 
ing Group  on  Remote  Sensing,  the  Scientific 
and  Technical  Subcommittee  focused  on  the 
U.N.  program  on  space  applications,  taking 
particular  note  of  the  report  of  the  Expert  on 
Space  Applications,  Dr.  [H.  G.  S.]  Murthy, 
of  India.  The  subcommittee  approved  con- 
tinuation of  the  Expert's  work  on  what  we 
regard  as  a  satisfactory,  if  not  ideal,  basis, 
keeping  in  mind  the  financial  straits  in  which 
the  United  Nations  finds  itself.  I  want  to  take 
this  occasion,  however,  to  reiterate  my  gov- 
ernment's continuing  support  for  Dr.  Murthy 
and  his  program,  which  is  well  calculated  to 
bring  wider  awareness  of  the  prospective 
benefits  of  space  applications  to  countries  in 
varying  stages  of  development. 

The  Working  Group  on  Direct  Broadcast 
Satellites  was  asked  to  consider  new  devel- 
opments in  the  field  since  it  last  met  in  1970. 
It  had  considerable  ground  to  cover,  and  at 
the  same  time  many  delegations  wanted  to 
record  their  views  in  general  debate.  While 
relatively  few  conclusions  were  reached,  the 
broad  exchange  of  views  clarified  positions 
and  resulted  in  generally  acceptable  guide- 
lines for  the  working  group's  next  session  in 
spring  1974. 

Delegations  are  of  course  aware  that  views 
differ  on  the  question  of  possible  principles 
on  direct  satellite  broadcasting.  The  United 
States  continues  to  believe  that  any  meaning- 
ful consideration  of  such  principles  must  also 
take  relevant  technical  and  economic  factors 
into  account.  We  are  confident  that  the  work- 
ing group  will  do  this  in  light  of  paragraphs 
77-79  of  its  report,-  as  endorsed  by  the  Outer 
Space  Committee. 

Treaties  on  Registration  and  the  Moon 

Let  me  now  turn,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  a  look 
at  the  work  of  the  Legal  Subcommittee, 
about  which  some  delegations  have  expressed 


'U.N.  doc.  A/AC.105/117. 


66 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


a  degree  of  disappointment.  We  share  their 
regret  that  it  proved  impossible  for  the  sub- 
committee to  complete  the  text  either  of 
the  convention  on  registration  of  objects 
launched  into  outer  space  or  of  the  treaty 
concerning  exploration  and  use  of  the  moon, 
planets,  and  other  bodies  of  the  solar  system. 

I  refer  to  the  latter  treaty  in  this  fashion 
deliberately,  since  it  is  our  understanding 
that  such  an  expansion  of  the  scope  of  the 
original  draft  treaty  on  the  moon  has  been 
agreed  to  in  principle.  In  this  connection  I 
would  like  to  reiterate  my  delegation's  appre- 
ciation to  the  distinguished  Representative 
of  Sweden  for  having  originally  brought  be- 
fore us  the  cogent  argument  in  favor  of  this 
limited  extension  of  the  reach  of  the  treaty. 
Especially  in  view  of  the  planetary  explora- 
tion going  on  right  now  and  projected  for 
the  near  future,  we  cannot  see  any  reason 
why  rules  applicable  to  the  moon  should  not 
apply  also  to  other  bodies  of  the  solar  system. 

Regarding  the  issues  which  still  remain 
unresolved  in  this  treaty,  my  delegation  con- 
tinues to  hope  that  the  most  difficult  of  these 
— concerning  possible  future  exploitation  of 
natural  resources — can  be  resolved.  I  would 
note  that  the  persisting  differences  relate 
only  to  that  period  before  an  appropriate  and 
mutually  acceptable  international  regime  for 
resource  exploitation  comes  into  effect.  There 
seems  to  be  no  disagreement  that  such  a  re- 
gime should  be  established. 

Besides  the  resources  question,  it  appears 
that  only  two  other  issues  in  the  treaty  are 
outstanding.  These  concern  the  timing  of 
international  notification  of  planned  missions 
to  the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies  and 
the  way  in  which  the  scope  of  the  treaty  is  to 
be  formulated.  We  continue  to  believe  that 
once  the  resources  issue  is  solved,  the  others 
should  be  within  our  ability  to  settle. 

The  Legal  Subcommittee  came  even  closer 
to  final  agreement  on  the  treaty  on  registra- 
tion of  objects  launched  into  outer  space.  The 
United  States,  responding  to  the  stated  inter- 
ests of  other  delegations,  took  a  very  active 
part  in  the  subcommittee's  negotiations  on 
the  registration  treaty,  even  though  we  had 
not  been  previously  convinced  of  the  need  to 
change  the  present  system  of  voluntary  regis- 


tration submissions  to  the  Secretary  General 
of  the  United  Nations. 

Showing  the  will  toward  mutual  accommo- 
dation that  has  long  characterized  the  work 
of  the  Legal  Subcommittee,  the  negotiators 
made  great  progress.  At  the  end  of  the  sub- 
committee's session,  only  one  issue  remained : 
the  question  of  external  marking  of  objects 
launched  into  earth  orbit  or  beyond.  My  dele- 
gation's views  as  to  the  lack  of  utility  of  such 
a  provision  are  familiar;  I  would  only  repeat 
that  we  do  not  consider  that  a  marking  re- 
quirement could  help  in  identifying  a  space 
object  that  might  return  to  earth  and  cause 
damage,  which  we  view  as  the  basic  purpose 
of  a  registration  treaty.  We  hope  that  this 
point  of  view  will  in  the  end  be  persuasive  to 
those  members  which  up  to  now  have  re- 
garded a   marking   provision   as   necessary. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  view  of  such  substantial 
areas  of  agreement  in  the  draft  treaties  on 
registration  and  on  the  moon  and  other  ce- 
lestial bodies,  it  is  only  logical  to  assign  the 
highest  priority  to  efforts  to  complete  them 
at  the  Legal  Subcommittee's  next  session. 
We  therefore  support  the  approach  set  out 
in  operative  paragraph  5  of  the  draft  resolu- 
tion contained  in  document  A/C.1/L.669,  of 
which  my  delegation  is  a  cosponsor.  And  we 
agree  with  the  scale  of  priorities  for  other 
items  on  the  subcommittee's  agenda  as  set 
out  in  operative  paragraphs  6-8.  I  should  like 
to  record  my  delegation's  genuine  apprecia- 
tion to  the  drafter  of  the  resolution  for  ac- 
curately reflecting  the  delicate  balance  of 
different  views  and  interests  in  relation  to 
these  items. 

In  fact,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  our  view  that 
the  draft  resolution  as  a  whole  sets  out  the 
work  program  for  the  Outer  Space  Commit- 
tee and  its  subsidiary  organs  for  1974  and 
appropriate  guidelines  for  the  relationship 
between  the  committee  and  other  U.N.  bodies 
in  a  fair,  balanced,  and  comprehensive  way. 
We  believe  this  committee  should  unani- 
mously recommend  adoption  of  the  resolution 
by  the  General  Assembly. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  conclude  with  a  personal 
remark.  I  recognize  that  what  I  am  about  to 
say  has  something  in  it  of  gazing  into  the 
crystal  ball.     But  since   space  activity  has 


January  21,   1974 


67 


been  born  and  developed  so  far  so  rapidly, 
perhaps  you  and  our  colleagues  will  forgive 
me  for  relating  an  experience  that  was  mine 
and  gives  me  great  hope  for  tomorrow. 

Some  years  ago  I  spent  two  days  in  South- 
ern California  at  one  of  the  aerospace  com- 
panies which  has  done  the  most  in  pushing 
the  space  technology  frontier  outward.  There 
I  was  shown  a  large  enclosed  area  covered 
with  strange-looking  tripod  devices.  We  were 
required  to  wear  surgical  masks,  hats,  and 
aprons — a  precaution  against  any  foreign 
matter,  regardless  how  minuscule,  jeopardiz- 
ing the  many  celestial  missions  whose  jour- 
neys began  on  that  assembly  floor.  At  the  end 
of  our  tour  we  sat  mesmerized,  enthralled  as 
a  modern-day  prophet  graphically  depicted 
the  possibility  that  one  day  satellites,  equi- 
distant in  the  skies,  could  contain  in  com- 
puterized form  all  of  mankind's  knowledge 
to  be  drawn  upon  by  all  on  earth — an  almost 
incomprehensible  library  in  the  heavens. 

Visionary?  Certainly.  But  that  is  the  di- 
rection in  which  international  space  coopera- 
tion can  lead  us  all.  How  appropriate  that 
this  item  should  be  toward  the  end  of  our 
work,  leaving  a  sense  of  realistic  hope  for 
our  children  and  children's  children.  Let  us 
here  at  the  United  Nations  continue  in  that 
direction  in  the  years  to  come  as  we  share 
the  inspiring  adventure  that  is  the  peaceful 
uses  of  outer  space.  Like  Neil  Armstrong, 
we  here  take  one  small  step  for  men — one 
giant  step  for  mankind. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  3 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recalling  its  resolutions  2914  (XXVII),  2915 
(XXVII),  2916  (XXVII)  and  2917  (XXVII)  of  9 
November   1972, 

Having  considered  the  report  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space, 

Noting  with  appreciation  the  way  in  which  the 
500th  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  Nicolaus  Coperni- 
cus, the  great  Polish  astronomer,  had  found  its  re- 
flection in  space  activities. 


''U.N.  doc.  A/RES/3182  (XXVIII)  (A/C.1/L.669/ 
Rev.l);  adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  Dec.  18  by  a 
recorded  vote  of  77 (U.S.)  to  0,  with  10  abstentions. 


Reaffirming  the  common  interest  of  mankind  in 
furthering  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space 
for  peaceful  purposes, 

Recalling  its  resolution  1721  B  (XVI)  of  20  De- 
cember 1961,  in  which  it  expressed  the  belief  that 
the  United  Nations  should  provide  a  focal  point  for 
international  co-operation  in  the  peaceful  exploration 
and  use  of  outer  space, 

Reaffirming  further  its  belief  that  the  benefits  de- 
riving from  space  exploration  can  be  extended  to 
States  at  all  stages  of  economic  and  scientific  de- 
velopment on  an  expanding  basis,  if  Member  States 
conduct  their  space  programmes  increasingly  with  a 
view  to  promoting  maximum  international  co-opera- 
tion, including  the  widest  possible  exchange  of  in- 
formation in  this  field, 

Convinced  of  the  need  for  increased  international 
efforts,  particularly  through  the  United  Nations,  to 
promote  and  expand  practical  applications  of  space 
technology  and  believing  that  wider  participation  by 
Member  States  in  the  activities  of  the  United  Nations 
relating  to  space  matters  may  contribute  to  the 
objective  of  such  increased  international  efforts. 

Bearing  in  mind  that,  since  the  establishment  of 
the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 
in  1961,  the  membership  of  the  United  Nations  has 
been  considerably  increased  and  a  corresponding  en- 
largement of  the   Committee  is  therefore  desirable. 

Reaffirming  the  importance  of  international  co- 
operation in  developing  the  rule  of  law  in  the  peace- 
ful exploration  and  use  of  outer  space, 

1.  Endorses  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Usf^s  of  Outer  Space; 

2.  Invites  States  which  have  not  yet  become  par- 
ties to  the  Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activi- 
ties of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer 
Space,  including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial 
Bodies,  the  Agreement  on  the  Rescue  of  Astronauts, 
the  Return  of  Astronauts  and  the  Return  of  Objects 
Launched  into  Outer  Space,  and  the  Convention  on 
International  Liability  for  Damage  Caused  by  Space 
Objects,  to  give  early  consideration  to  ratifying  or 
acceding  to  those  international  agreements,  so  that 
they  may  have  the  broadest  possible  effect; 

3.  Notes  that  the  Working  Group  on  Direct  Broad- 
cast Satellites  has  discussed  the  question  of  elabo- 
rating principles  governing  the  use  by  States  of  ar- 
tificial earth  satellites  for  direct  television  broadcast- 
ing referred  to  in  General  Assembly  resolution  2916 
(XXVII)  and  endorses  the  decision  of  the  Commit- 
tee on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space,  as  set  out  in 
paragraph  66  of  its  report,  to  reconvene  the  Work- 
ing Group  in  1974; 

4.  Notes  that,  in  responding  to  the  request  of  the 
General  Assembly,  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  Outer  Space  and  its  Legal  Sub-Committee 
have  achieved  further  significant  progress  towards 
the   completion  of  the   draft  treaty  relating  to  the 


68 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Moon   and   the   draft   convention   on   registration   of 
objects  launclied  into  outer  space; 

5.  Recommends  that  the  Legal  Sub-Committee 
should,  as  a  matter  of  highest  priority,  make  its  best 
efforts  to  complete  the  draft  treaty  relating  to  the 
Moon  and  the  draft  convention  on  registration  at  its 
next  session; 

6.  Recommends  further  that  the  Legal  Sub-Com- 
mittee should  consider  at  its  next  session,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  high  priority,  the  question  of  elaborating 
principles  governing  the  use  by  States  of  artificial 
earth  satellites  for  direct  television  broadcasting 
with  a  view  to  concluding  an  international  agree- 
ment or  agreements  in  accordance  with  General 
Assembly  resolution  2916  (XXVII),  taking  due  ac- 
count of  the  interdisciplinary  character  of  the  subject 
and  of  the  work  of  the  Working  Group  on  Direct 
Broadcast  Satellites; 

7.  Recommends  also  that  the  Legal  Sub-Commit- 
tee, at  its  next  session,  should  respond  to  the  request 
for  its  views,  by  the  Working  Group  on  Remote 
Sensing  of  the  Earth  by  Satellites,  on  the  legal 
implications  of  the  earth  resources  survey  by  remote 
sensing  satellites,  devoting  part  of  that  session  to 
this  purpose; 

8.  Agrees  that  the  Legal  Sub-Committee  at  its 
next  session,  as  time  permits,  should  consider  mat- 
ters relating  to  the  definition  and/or  delimitation  of 
outer  space  and  outer  space  activities; 

9.  Welcomes  the  comments  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space,  contained  in 
paragraph  57  of  its  report,  regarding  the  role  and 
functions  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Sub-Com- 
mittee and  agrees  that,  with  regard  to  its  future 
work,  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Sub-Committee 
should  proceed  on  the  lines  indicated  in  section  V 
of  its  report'; 

10.  Notes  with  satisfaction  that,  in  promoting 
international  co-operation  in  the  application  of  space 
technology,  considerable  attention  has  been  given  to 
the  potential  of  remote  sensing  of  the  earth  by  satel- 
lites to  development  programmes  of  all  countries, 
especially  of  developing  countries; 

11.  Welcotncs  the  various  efforts  envisaged  by  the 
Scientific  and  Technical  Sub-Committee  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  and  the 
Working  Group  on  Remote  Sensing  of  the  Earth  by 
Satellites  with  a  view  to  bringing  the  benefit  of  this 
new  technology  to  all  countries,  especially  developing 
countries,  including  the  preparation  of  a  second  sur- 
vey of  potential  users  of  remote  sensing,  in  regard 
to  which  a  questionnaire  on  remote  sensing  of  the 
environment  and  natural  resources  from  satellites, 
covering  technical,  legal  and  organizational  aspects, 
has  been  sent  to  Member  States; 

12.  Commends  this  questionnaire  to  the  attention 
of  Member  States  and  requests  them  to  respond  to  it 


*  U.N.  doc.  A/AC.105/115. 


as  soon  as  possible  with  a  view  to  making  progress 
in  identifying,  studying  and  analysing  the  best 
means  of  disseminating  remote  sensing  data; 

13.  Requests  the  Committee  to  include  in  its 
report  to  the  General  Assembly,  at  its  twenty-ninth 
session,  its  views  on  further  measures  to  promote 
international  co-operation  in  the  field  of  remote 
sensing  of  the  earth  by  satellites; 

14.  Considers  that  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  Outer  Space  and  its  appropriate  subsidiary 
organs  will  have  to  give  further  in-depth  considera- 
tion to  the  legal,  organizational  and  other  related 
aspects  of  remote  sensing  of  the  earth  by  satellites; 

15.  Welcomes  the  continuing  progress  achieved  in 
developing  the  United  Nations  programme  on  space 
applications  into  a  significant  means  of  promoting 
international  co-operation  in  this  field,  commends 
this  programme  to  the  attention  of  Member  States, 
the  specialized  agencies  and  interested  United  Na- 
tions bodies,  and  draws  attention  in  this  respect  to 
the  request  contained  in  paragraph  43  of  the  Com- 
mittee's report; 

16.  Endorses  the  United  Nations  programme  on 
space  applications  as  contained  in  paragraph  36  of 
the  report  of  the  Committee  and  recommends  the 
continuing  development  of  the  programme,  taking 
especially  into  account  the  needs  of  the  developing 
countries; 

17.  Notes  with  appreciation  that  several  Member 
States  have  offered  educational  and  training  facili- 
ties, under  United  Nations  sponsorship,  in  the  prac- 
tical application  of  space  technology  and  draws  the 
attention  of  Member  States,  particularly  the  devel- 
oping countries,  to  those  opportunities  as  outlined  in 
paragraphs  45  to  50  and  52  of  the  report  of  the 
Committee; 

18.  Further  notes  the  value  of  United  Nations 
panels  and  training  seminars  in  various  fields  of 
space  application  and  hopes  that  Member  States  will 
continue  to  offer  to  serve  as  host  to  these  panels  and 
training  seminars,  with  a  view  to  the  widest  possible 
spread  of  information  and  sharing  of  cost  in  this 
new  area  of  development,  especially  that  of  the 
developing  countries; 

19.  Welcomes  the  efforts  of  a  number  of  Member 
States  to  share  with  other  interested  Member  States 
the  practical  benefits  that  may  be  derived  from 
programmes   in   space  technology; 

20.  Welcomes  further  efforts  of  Member  States  to 
keep  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer 
Space  fully  informed  of  their  space  activities  and 
invites  all  Member  States  to  do  so; 

21.  Approves  continuing  sponsorship  by  the 
United  Nations  of  the  Thumba  Equatorial  Rocket 
Launching  Station  in  India  and  the  CELPA  Mar  del 
Plata  Station  in  Argentina,  expresses  its  satisfac- 
tion at  the  work  being  carried  out  at  those  ranges  in 
relation  to  the  use  of  sounding  rocket  facilities  for 


January  21,    1974 


69 


international  co-operation  and  training  in  the  peace- 
ful and  scientific  exploration  of  outer  space  and 
recommends  that  Member  States  continue  to  give 
consideration  to  the  use  of  those  facilities  for  space 
research  activities; 

22.  Notes  that,  in  accordance  with  General  As- 
sembly resolution  1721  B  (XVI),  the  Secretary- 
General  continues  to  maintain  a  public  registry  of 
objects  launched  into  orbit  or  beyond  on  the  basis 
of  information  furnished  by  Member  States  and 
welcomes  the  co-operation  of  Member  States  in  pro- 
viding relevant  information  to  the  Secretary-Gen- 
eral; 

23.  Notes  with  appreciation  that  a  number  of  the 
specialized  agencies,  in  particular,  the  World  Mete- 
orological Organization,  the  International  Telecom- 
munication Union,  the  United  Nations  Educational, 
Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization  and  the  Food 
and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations, 
have  continued  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  United 
Nations  programme  for  the  promotion  of  interna- 
tional co-operation  in  the  practical  application  of 
space  technology,  including  the  organization  of  tech- 
nical panels; 

24.  Agrees  with  the  Committee  that  proper  co- 
ordination is  necessary  for  activities  within  the 
United  Nations  system  relating  to  the  peaceful  uses 
of  outer  space; 

25.  Requests,  therefore,  the  specialized  agencies 
and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  con- 
tinue, as  appropriate,  to  provide  the  Committee  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  with  progress 
reports  on  their  work  relating  to  the  peaceful  uses 
of  outer  space  and  to  examine  and  report  to  the 
Committee  on  the  particular  problems  that  may 
arise  from  the  use  of  outer  space  in  the  fields  within 
their  competence  and  that  should,  in  their  opinion, 
be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Committee; 

26.  Reiterates  its  request  to  the  World  Meteoro- 
logical Organization  to  pursue  actively  the  imple- 
mentation of  its  tropical  cyclone  project,  continuing 
and  intensifying  its  other  related  action  programmes, 
including  the  World  Weather  Watch  and,  especially, 
the  efforts  being  undertaken  towards  obtaining  basic 
meteorological  data  and  discovering  ways  and  means 
to  mitigate  the  harmful  effects  of  tropical  storms  and 
to  remove  or  minimize  their  destructive  potential, 
and  looks  forward  to  its  report  thereon  in  accord- 
ance with  General  Assembly  resolution  2914 
(XXVII); 

27.  Notes  that  the  Inter-Governmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization  has  been  involved  in  dis- 
cussions on  the  use  of  maritime  satellites  and  ex- 
presses its  interest  in  receiving  information  con- 
cerning activities  in  this  field  and  other  related 
work; 

28.  Decides  to  enlarge  the  membership  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  and  re- 
quests the  President  of  the  General  Assembly,  in 
consultation  with  the  regional  groups  and  with  the 


Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Outer  Space,  to  designate,  at  an  early  date  and  not 
later  than  15  May  1974,  not  more  than  nine  additional 
members,  taking  into  account  the  principle  of  equi- 
table geographical  distribution; 

29.  Endorses  the  view  expressed  by  the  Committee 
in  paragraph  68  of  its  report  regarding  measures  for 
enhancing  the  effectiveness  of  the  Outer  Space 
Affairs  Division  in  order  to  enable  it  to  meet  its  ex- 
panding responsibilities  in  carrying  out  the  United 
Nations  programme  on  space  applications  and  in 
assisting  the  Committee  to  discharge  its  co-ordinat- 
ing functions  as  the  "focal  point"  in  promoting 
international  co-operation  in  this  field,  as  envisaged 
by  the  General  Assembly; 

30.  Requests  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses 
of  Outer  Space  to  continue  its  work,  as  set  out  in 
the  present  resolution  and  in  previous  resolutions  of 
the  General  Assembly,  and  to  report  to  the  Assem- 
bly at  its  twenty-ninth  session. 


U.S.  Gives  Views  on  Strengthening 
the  Role  of  the  United  Nations 

Following  is  a  statement  made  in  plenary 
session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on 
November  29  by  U.S.  Representative  W. 
Tapley  Bennett,  Jr.,  together  ivith  the  text 
of  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Assembly  on 
November  30. 


STATEMENT   BY  AMBASSADOR   BENNETT 

USUN  press  release  121  dated  November  29 

My  government  has  carefully  studied  the 
views  of  member  countries  contained  in  doc- 
ument A/9128  on  "strengthening  the  role  of 
the  United  Nations  with  regard  to  the  main- 
tenance and  consolidation  of  international 
peace  and  security,"  and  we  find  much  with 
which  we  can  agree.  The  United  States  is 
gratified  that  several  states  noted  the  urgent 
need  to  achieve  agreement  on  guidelines  for 
U.N.  peacekeeping  operations.  We,  as  other 
members  have  done,  urge  that  greater  use  be 
made  of  the  existing  means  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes,  including  the  good 
offices  of  the  Secretary  General,  a  revitalized 
International  Court  of  Justice,  and  the  virtu- 
ally limitless  possibilities  of  quiet  diplomacy 


70 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


practiced  in  a  spirit  of  good  will  and  mutual 
compromise.  Finally,  we  are  in  full  agree- 
ment with  all  those  who  noted  that  the  suc- 
cess of  the  United  Nations  depends  primarily 
on  the  political  will  of  its  members  to  apply 
the  principles  laid  out  in  its  charter. 

Today's  consideration  of  ways  to 
strengthen  the  United  Nations  seems  an  ap- 
propriate occasion  to  call  attention  to  a  trend 
which  is  having  just  the  reverse  effect  and 
which,  if  it  continues,  could  seriously  weaken 
the  U.N.'s  potential  as  an  instrument  for 
international  cooperation.  What  I  am  refer- 
ring to  is  a  growing  tendency  on  the  part  of 
this  organization  to  adopt  unenforceable  or 
impractical  resolutions  and  to  reject  con- 
structive if  limited  action  in  an  effort  to 
attain  unrealistic  "total"  solutions. 

The  United  States  supports  constructive 
international  cooperation  along  regional, 
political,  economic,  or  ideological  lines,  in- 
side or  outside  the  United  Nations.  We  real- 
ize that  international  cooperation  must  be 
based  on  the  perception  of  mutual  interest 
among  like-minded  states.  We  are  also  suffi- 
ciently familiar  with  parliamentary  practices 
to  know  that  an  Assembly  of  this  size  can 
only  function  on  the  basis  of  such  groupings, 
the  composition  of  which  will  normally  vary 
from  issue  to  issue.  We  believe  that  group 
action  can  play  a  constructive  role,  as  my 
government  was  quick  to  acknowledge  in  the 
case  of  the  contribution  by  the  nonaligned 
members  of  the  Security  Council  toward  the 
setting  up  of  a  U.N.  Emergency  Force  for  the 
Middle  East. 

However,  recent  voting  patterns  within  the 
United  Nations  lead  us  to  consider  whether 
or  not  bloc  voting  is  now  too  often  being  used 
in  a  manner  which  raises  serious  questions 
for  the  future  effectiveness  of  this  organiza- 
tion. 

One  concern  is  with  the  inclination  of 
many  U.N.  members  to  support  one-sided  or 
simplistic  resolutions  on  complicated  or  con- 
tentious issues,  resolutions  which  do  not 
necessarily  represent  the  weight  of  world 
opinion  and  which,  worse  still,  have  not  the 
slightest  chance  of  being  effectively  imple- 
mented. The  United  Nations  is  not  an  instru- 
ment for  wish  fulfillment.   Rather,  it  should 


be  a  catalyst  for  effective  action  on  world 
problems.  Marshaling  majorities  behind  un- 
enforceable resolutions  is  a  meaningless 
activity.  It  discredits  the  organization  and 
brings  ultimate  frustration  to  those  on  both 
sides  of  the  question  who  wish  to  see  real 
progress  on  these  difficult  issues. 

The  case  for  a  responsible  approach  to  the 
issues  facing  this  Assembly  was  most  elo- 
quently made  by  former  Secretary  General 
U  Thant  two  years  ago  in  his  1971  annual 
report,  when  he  said: 

It  is  futile  to  adopt  recommendations  which  every- 
one knows  from  the  start  will  have  no  effect.  To 
adopt  recommendations  which  are  realistic,  which  are 
fair  to  all  the  interests  involved,  is  bound  to  influ- 
ence world  opinion  and  to  affect  the  course  of  events. 
The  Assembly  thus  offers  the  smaller  and  the  med- 
ium Powers  not  only  a  voice,  but  also  a  way  of  in- 
fluencing the  course  of  events  far  in  excess  of  what 
was  previously  available  to  them.  To  really  exer- 
cise this  influence,  however,  the  majority  must  make 
it  plain  that  they  will  listen  to  both  sides  of  a  case 
and  not  only  to  the  larger  faction.  The  majority 
must  prove  that  they  will  seek  a  realistic  way  out  of 
difficulties  rather  than  resort  to  condemnations  or 
threats. 

It  would  be  a  grave  pity  if  the  smaller  and  medi- 
um Powers  throw  away  their  opportunity  and  fail  to 
establish  some  collective  credibility  through  a  more 
realistic  approach  to  what  they  can  or  cannot  do. 

Another  concern  is  with  the  willingness  of 
some  to  stall  or  block  U.N.  action  in  areas 
where  general  if  limited  agreement  may  be 
attainable,  on  grounds  of  frustration  with 
this  organization's  inability  to  provide  im- 
mediate solutions  for  more  deep-rooted, 
sometimes  more  fundamental  problems 
which  perforce  require  time  for  full  and 
final  solution.  Progress  on  many  of  the  great 
issues  before  us  can  only  come  about  through 
the  most  patient,  painstaking,  and  thorough 
processes  of  diplomacy.  Solutions  of  the 
smaller  difficulties  and  problems  we  face  are 
often  the  paving  stones  on  the  road  to  solu- 
tions of  the  larger  ones.  We  can  only  com- 
plete the  journey  if  we  take  the  necessary 
first  steps.  Each  of  us  has  a  responsibility  to 
help  all  of  us  move  forward,  to  assist  the 
world  community  in  reaching  a  general  con- 
sensus where  it  can,  and  to  avoid  destructive 
or  dangerous  contention  where  general 
agreement  cannot  be  found. 


January   21,    1974 


71 


The  great  power  of  the  General  Assembly 
lies  in  its  ability  to  give  expression  to  world 
opinion,  to  focus  attention  on  problems,  to 
point  toward  or  suggest  solutions,  and  to 
help  create  a  climate  in  which  problems  can 
be  solved.  When  we  adopt  patently  unrealis- 
tic positions,  we  discredit  this  organization, 
and  ultimately  we  further  weaken  its  capac- 
ity to  face  realistically  the  very  problems  we 
want  it  to  solve.  Each  state  member,  and 
particularly  states  whose  security  and  influ- 
ence are  most  served  by  the  existence  of  a 
strong  United  Nations,  must  be  alert  lest 
through  careless  or  thoughtless  action  we 
end  by  contributing  to  the  whittling  away  of 
the  prestige  of  the  United  Nations.  I  do  not 
omit  my  own  delegation  from  this  injunc- 
tion. 

Each  nation  i-emains  responsible  for  its 
own  actions  and  thus  for  its  own  votes  here 
in  the  United  Nations.  We  have  too  often 
heard  representatives  privately  admit  that 
their  delegation  was  voting  against  its  own 
preferences  and  convictions  on  a  given  issue 
in  the  interests  of  one  or  another  form  of 
"solidarity."  Sovereign  states  cannot  so 
easily  abdicate  responsibility.  Each  of  us 
must  realize  that  others  will  judge  us — and 
the  organization  as  a  whole — by  what  we  do 
in  public,  not  by  what  we  say  in  private. 
History  will  judge  the  United  Nations  by 
what  it  accomplishes,  not  by  what  it  says  it 
would  like  to  accomplish. 

The  way  the  United  Nations  responded  to 
last  month's  hostilities  in  the  Middle  East 
gives  cause  for  optimism  about  this  organi- 
zation's ability  to  function  effectively  even 
in  the  most  difficult  situations.  I  think  we 
have  all  experienced  a  revival  of  spirit  in 
recent  weeks.  If  members  of  this  organiza- 
tion can  agree  on  action,  tentative  and  pre- 
liminai'y  though  it  may  be,  on  such  long- 
standing problems  as  the  Middle  East  and 
Korea — as  difficult  and  contentious  as  any 
issues  before  us — then  there  is  indeed  hope 
that  the  United  Nations  may  yet  come  to  ful- 
fill the  dreams  and  expectations  of  its  found- 
ers. It  is  particularly  notable  that  in  the 
instances  cited  all  groups  within  the  United 
Nations  had  their  parts  in  proposing  and  in 
supporting  constructive  U.N.  action. 


Our  present  discussion  on  strengthening 
the  role  of  the  United  Nations  is  another  ex- 
ample of  how  reasonable  discourse  and  con- 
structive leadership  can  help  to  move  this 
organization  forward.  My  government 
wishes  to  express  its  appreciation  for  the 
sincere  effort  the  Romanian  delegation  has 
made  to  focus  attention  on  the  central  prob- 
lem before  us  all — how  to  make  the  United 
Nations  more  effective  in  the  real  world,  how 
to  move  it  from  rhetoric  to  relevancy. 

We  believe  the  Romanian  delegation  has 
made  a  genuine  contribution  to  the  evolution 
of  thinking  within  the  United  Nations  on 
these  issues.  My  delegation  intends  to  vote, 
despite  a  certain  vagueness  of  language  on 
some  points,  for  the  draft  resolution  con- 
tained in  document  A/L.713.  We  hope  that 
each  delegation  will  have  time  to  study  with 
care  the  many  thoughtful  statements  which 
have  been  made  here.  Let  us  all  profit  from 
this  useful  exercise. 


TEXT   OF   RESOLUTION  ' 

The  General  Assembly, 

Having  further  considered  the  item  entitled 
"Strengthening  of  the  role  of  the  United  Nations 
with  regard  to  the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of 
international  peace  and  security,  the  development  of 
co-operation  among  all  nations  and  the  promotion  of 
the  rules  of  international  law  in  relations  between 
States", 

Recalling  its  resolution  2925  (XXVII)  of  27  No- 
vember 1972, 

Taking  note  of  the  report  of  the  Secretary-General 
prepared  on  the  basis  of  that  resolution,  as  well  as 
of  the  views  and  suggestions  expressed  in  the  debate 
on  the  present  item, 

Considering  that  the  new  steps  taken  towards 
achieving  the  universality  of  the  United  Nations  are 
likely  to  contribute  to  an  increase  in  the  capacity  of 
the  Organization  to  take  effective  action  for  the 
strengthening  of  international  peace  and  security 
and  for  the  development  of  international  co-opera- 
tion, 

Aware  that  the  affirmation  of  a  new  course  in 
international  life,  aimed  at  the  establishment  of  an 
atmosphere  of  confidence  and  understanding  between 
States  and  at  the  settlement  of  international  prob- 
lems of  general  interest  with  the  broadest  possible 


'U.N.    doc.    A/RES/3073    (XXVIII)     (A/L.    713); 
adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  Nov.  30. 


72 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


participation  of  States,  requires  an  adequate 
strengthening  of  the  role  of  the  United  Nations  as  a 
centre  for  harmonizing  the  actions  of  nations. 

Concerned  about  the  insufficient  use  of  the  frame- 
work provided  by  the  United  Nations  for  the  settle- 
ment of  problems  affecting  the  interests  of  all  Mem- 
ber States, 

1.  Reaffirms  that  it  is  imperative  that  the  United 
Nations  should  become  a  more  effective  instrument 
in  safeguarding  and  strengthening  the  independence 
and  sovereign  equality  of  all  States,  as  well  as  the 
inalienable  right  of  every  people  to  decide  its  own 
fate  without  any  outside  interference,  and  that  it 
should  take  firm  action,  in  accordance  with  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  to  oppose  foreign 
domination  and  to  prevent  and  suppress  acts  of  ag- 
gression or  any  other  acts  which,  in  violating  the 
Charter,  may  jeopardize  international  peace  and 
security; 

2.  Reiterates  its  appeal  to  all  Member  States  to 
take  full  advantage  of  the  framework  and  means 
provided  by  the  United  Nations  in  order  to  prevent 
the  perpetuation  of  situations  of  tension,  crisis  and 
conflict,  avert  the  creation  of  such  new  situations 
which  endanger  international  peace  and  security,  and 
settle  international  problems  exclusively  by  peaceful 
means; 

3.  Believes  that  the  United  Nations  can  bring  an 
increased  contribution  to  the  strengthening  of  gen- 
eral peace  and  security  by  taking  actions  aimed  at 
establishing  the  relations  between  all  States  on  the 
basis  of  the  principles  of  the  Charter,  and  at  using 
more  actively  the  machinery  and  possibilities  pro- 
vided by  the  Charter  with  a  view  to  preventing  con- 
flicts and  encouraging  the  peaceful  settlement  of  dis- 
putes between  States; 

4.  Considers  that  the  strengthening  of  the  role  of 
the  United  Nations  requires  continuous  improve- 
ment of  the  functioning  and  effectiveness  of  its 
principal  organs  in  the  exercise  of  their  responsibili- 
ties under  the  Charter; 

5.  Considers  further  that,  in  the  context  of  en- 
deavours to  strergthen  the  role  of  the  United 
Nations,  it  is  important  to  study  and  agree  upon 
ways  and  means  of  enhancing,  in  accordance  with 
the  Charter,  the  effectiveness  of  the  resolutions  of 
the  General  Assembly  and  other  organs  of  the 
United  Nations,  inter  alia,  by  actively  promoting  the 
method  of  consultation  among  all  Member  States 
interested  in  their  elaboration  and  adoption,  as  well 
as  by  evaluating,  as  appropriate,  their  practical 
effects; 

6.  Emphasizes  that  the  active  participation  of  all 
Member  States  in  the  efforts  aimed  at  strengthening 
the  United  Nations  and  enhancing  its  role  in  con- 
temporary international  relations  is  essential  for  the 
success  of  these  efforts; 

7.  Urges  all  Member  States,  in  furtherance  of 
these  efforts,  to  fulfil  their  obligations  under  the 
Charter  and,  in  accordance  with  its  provisions,  to 


implement  the  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly 
and  the  Security  Council; 

8.  Invites  all  Member  States  to  communicate  and 
further  elaborate  on  their  views,  suggestions  and 
proposals  concerning  the  strengthening  of  the  role 
of  the  United  Nations  not  later  than  30  April  1974; 

9.  Believes  that  the  efforts  aimed  at  strengthening 
the  role  of  the  United  Nations  will  be  greatly  assisted 
by  grouping  the  views,  suggestions  and  proposals 
made  on  this  subject  by  Member  States,  so  as  to 
facilitate  their  consideration  by  the  appropriate  ex- 
isting organs  of  the  United  Nations; 

10.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  prepare  a 
report  presenting,  in  a  systematized  manner,  those 
views,  suggestions  and  proposals  formulated  at  the 
twenty-seventh  and  twenty-eighth  sessions  of  the 
General  Assembly,  as  well  as  in  the  relevant  commu- 
nications received  from  Member  States,  and  to  sub- 
mit that  report  to  the  Assembly  at  its  twenty-ninth 
session; 

11.  Decides  to  include  in  the  provisional  agenda 
of  its  twenty-ninth  session  the  item  entitled 
"Strengthening  of  the  role  of  the  United  Nations 
with  regard  to  the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of 
international  peace  and  security,  the  development  of 
co-operation  among  all  nations  and  the  promotion  of 
the  rules  of  international  law  in  relations  between 
States". 


U.S.  Calls  for  Declaration 
on  Religious  Intolerance 

Following  is  a  statement  by  Congressman 
John  H.  Buchanan,  Jr.,  U.S.  Representative 
to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  made  in  Com- 
mittee III  (Social,  Humanitarian  and  Cul- 
tural) of  the  Assembly  on  October  30. 

USUN  press  release  106  dated  October  30 

The  U.S.  delegation  believes  that  this  com- 
mittee can  and  should  reach  agreement  in 
this  session  on  a  Declaration  on  the  Elimina- 
tion of  All  Forms  of  Religious  Intolerance. 

Positive  action  by  this  committee  this  year 
toward  agreeing  to  a  declaration  of  princi- 
ples on  the  basic  human  right  of  freedom  of 
religion  and  conscience  would  not  only  be 
welcomed  by  citizens  of  the  vast  majority  of 
nations  but  also  would  be  a  positive  step 
toward  achieving  tolerance  and  understand- 
ing among  nations. 

If  the  world's  people  are  to  know  freedom 
of  thought  and  conscience,  we  must  individu- 


January  21,   1974 


73 


ally  and  collectively  do  all  within  our  power 
to  help  eliminate  religious  intolerance  and  to 
foster  freedom  of  conscience. 

The  U.S.  delegation  understands  that  in 
view  of  the  complexity  of  the  documentation 
some  delegations  have  taken  the  position  that 
it  would  be  better  to  remand  the  draft  dec- 
laration to  the  Human  Rights  Commission 
for  further  work.  This  would  mean  that  no 
action  will  be  taken  on  this  vital  issue  during 
this  year  which  marks  the  25th  anniversary 
of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights,  and  we  do  not  agree  with  that  posi- 
tion, although  we  do  understand  it. 

It  is  of  course  unfortunate  that  we  do  not 
have  before  this  committee  a  complete  draft 
that  has  been  endorsed  by  the  Human  Rights 
Commission,  but  we  believe  we  can  and 
should  take  constructive  action  now.  We  be- 
lieve so  for  two  reasons : 

First,  the  fundamental  principles  embod- 
ied in  a  Declaration  on  the  Elimination  of 
All  Forms  of  Religious  Intolerance  should 
not  be  controversial. 

Those  principles  have  been  in  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  in 
the  covenant  [on  civil  and  political  rights]. 
They  are  also  set  forth  in  the  fundamental 
law  of  most  countries  of  the  world. 

Second,  my  delegation  believes  that  once  a 
declaration  has  been  approved  establishing 
the  broad  principles,  details  can  be  left  to 
the  drafting  of  a  convention  on  the  subject 
in  future  years. 

What  we  hope  to  do  here  and  now  is  simply 
to  reaffirm  basic  general  ideals. 

Those  ideals  have  been  an  essential  part  of 
the  American  way  of  life. 

Our  nation  was  founded  in  large  part  by 
individuals  seeking  to  escape  religious  intol- 
erance. Pilgrims  crossed  perilous  seas  and 
settled  in  an  uncharted  wilderness  in  order 
to  live,  work,  and  worship  as  their  con- 
sciences dictated. 

Unfortunately  some  of  them  then  at- 
tempted to  establish  state  churches  in  the 
American  colonies  and  to  cut  off  the  voice  of 
dissent  and  to  punish  dissenters.  It  was  pre- 
cisely because  of  this  right  to  dissent  so  often 


violated  and  free  expression  so  often  denied 
that  our  Founding  Fathers  sought  to  provide 
legal  safeguards  for  freedom  of  religion  in 
the  new  Republic.  These  safeguards  are  set 
down  in  the  first  amendment  to  our  Constitu- 
tion, which  states :  "Congress  shall  make  no 
law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion, 
or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof." 

Within  our  nation's  Capital  there  are 
houses  of  worship  of  virtually  every  faith, 
Protestant,  Catholic,  Jewish,  Islam,  Bud- 
dhist, Hindu,  Baha'i,  and  many  others.  Our 
laws  protect  the  right  to  hold  a  religious 
faith,  but  they  also  protect  the  right  of  the 
individual  to  hold  nontheistic  or  atheistic 
beliefs  as  well. 

While  freedom  of  religion  and  belief  has 
been  attained  in  many  countries,  there  are 
unfortunate  millions  of  people  throughout  the 
world  who  suffer  from  religious  intolerance 
and  outright  persecution. 

At  this  advanced  point  in  human  history, 
it  seems  strange  and,  indeed,  quite  irrational 
for  any  government  to  pit  itself  against  the 
basic  rights  of  its  people  and  seek  to  thwart 
their  noblest  aspirations;  yet  in  the  area  of 
religious  repression  and  intolerance  this  re- 
mains a  fact  of  life  in  the  present  world.  In 
some  instances  such  repression  is  directed 
against  Protestant  or  Catholic  Christians,  in 
others  against  Moslems,  and  often  against 
Jews.  The  adherents  of  virtually  every  great 
world  faith  have  been  the  victims  of  such 
intolerance,  somewhere  on  earth. 

If  we  could  enact  a  declaration  acknowl- 
edging our  unified  belief  in  the  right  of  the 
individual  to  freedom  of  thought,  conscience 
and  religion,  it  would  establish  a  standard  of 
tolerance  which  would  help  to  curb  such 
practices. 

We  can  and  should  act  now,  consistent 
with  Resolution  3027  (XXVII)  of  December 
18,  1972,  which  decided  to  give  priority  to 
the  adoption,  if  possible,  of  such  a  declara- 
tion. No  one  can  say  that  this  is  not  possible; 
we  ought  therefore  to  proceed  to  consider 
this  matter  article  by  article. 

The  Netherlands  draft,  derived  as  it  is 
from  the  work  which  has  gone  before,  is  a 


74 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


document  worthy  of  this  subject  and  of  our 
detailed  consideration.  It  reflects  a  sensitivity 
to  the  diversity  of  nations,  cultures,  govern- 
mental systems,  and  philosophies  represented 
in  this  chamber. 

In  producing  the  amendments  to  the  work- 
ing group  text  distributed  today  as  A/C.3/ 
L.2027,  the  Netherlands  delegation  has 
performed  a  useful  service  to  the  committee 
by  showing  the  close  relationship  between 
the  two  drafts.  The  broad  principles  of  toler- 
ance proclaimed  in  both  documents  should  be 
acceptable  to  men  and  women  of  good  will 
the  world  over. 

In  response  to  your  very  apt  request  that 
we  move  from  generalities  to  specifics,  Mr. 
Chairman,  my  delegation  is  prepared  to  use 
the  working  group  draft  in  document  A/8330 
as  the  basis  for  the  discussion  and  to  consider 
it  in  the  light  of  the  Netherlands  amend- 
ments and  such  other  amendments  as  delega- 
tions may  wish  to  offer.  The  views  of  my 
government  on  the  six  articles  of  the  working 
group  draft  are  on  record  in  document 
A/9134/Add.l. 

My  government  also  has  some  views  as  to 
four  additional  articles  which  we  would  like 
to  see  included.  These  are  set  forth  in  annex 
II  of  A/8330,  and  we  will  be  glad  to  discuss 
them  at  the  appropriate  time. 

It  would  of  course  be  possible  to  prevent 
the  adoption  of  this  declaration  during  this 
anniversary  year  by  too  fine  a  regard  for  the 
details  of  drafting  or  by  procedural  obstruc- 
tion. But  we  believe  that  the  failure  of  this 
committee  to  take  action  may  be  misinter- 
preted as  lack  of  interest  in  this  important 
subject.  We  can  achieve  an  acceptable  reso- 
lution if  we  will,  and  my  delegation  earnestly 
hopes  that  we  will  do  so.* 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


'  In  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  committee  by  con- 
sensus on  Oct.  31  and  by  the  Assembly  without  ob- 
jection on  Nov.  30  (A/RES/3069  (XXVIII)),  the 
Assembly  invited  the  Economic  and  Social  Council 
"to  request  the  Commission  on  Human  Rights  .  .  . 
to  consider  as  a  matter  of  priority,  the  elaboration  of 
a  draft  Declaration  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms 
of  Religious  Intolerance  .  .  .  and  to  submit,  if 
possible,  a  single  draft  Declaration  to  the  Assembly 
at  its  twenty-ninth  session.  .  .  ." 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of 
aircraft.    Done  at  The  Hague  December  16,  1970. 
Entered  into  force  October  14,  1971.   TIAS  7192. 
Accession  deposited:    Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  Jan- 
uary 3,  1974. 

Load   Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  1966.  Done  at 
London  April  5,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  21, 
1968.    TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720. 

Accessions  deposited:  People's  Republic  of  China, 
October  5,  1973  (with  declaration  and  reserva- 
tion) ;  Hungary,  September  25,  1973;  Iran,  Oc- 
tober 5,  1973. 

Narcotic   Drugs 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on  narcotic 
drugs,  1961  (TIAS  6298).    Done  at  Geneva  March 
25,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Cyprus,  November  30,  1973. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960  (TIAS  5780).  Adopted 
at  London  October  25,  1967.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Switzerland,  October  1, 
1973. 


BILATERAL 

Japan 

Protocol  amending  the  agreement  of  February  28, 
1968,  as  amended    (TIAS  6517,  7306),  concerning 
civil    uses    of    atomic    energy,    with    exchange    of 
notes.    Signed  at  Washington  March  28,  1973. 
Entered  into  force:  December  21,  1973. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  on  the  establishment  of  a  U.S.  informa- 
tion center  in  Sarajevo  in  accordance  with  the 
memorandum  of  understanding  of  June  14,  1961. 
Signed  at  Belgrade  July  18,  1973.  Entered  into 
force  provisionally  July  18,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  definitively:  December  14,  1973. 


'  Not  in  force. 


January  21,   1974 


75 


Second   "Foreign   Relations"  Volume 
on   China   for   1948   Released 

I'li-ss  ii-li-aw  ■ll'.l  chili'cl  DiTiTiil.iT  i;i    (fell-  leli'iisf  I)i-i'fml>tT  2H) 

The  Dciiiirtim'iil  of  StaU-  released  on  Decemher  28 
volunie  VIII  in  the  series  "ForeiRn  Relations  of  the 
United  States"  for  the  year  1948.  This  volume  is 
entitled  "The  Far  East:  China." 

This  986-page  volume  contains  previously  unpub- 
lished documentation  relatins:  principally  to  U.S. 
military  and  (>cononiic  assistance  to  (^hina,  as  well  as 
material  on  the  withdrawal  of  11. S.  marines  and  the 
evacuation  of  .American  citizens  from  China. 

This  is  the  fourth  of  nine  "Foreign  Relations" 
volumes  to  be  published  on  U.S.  diplomacy  in  1948. 
A  companion  volume  on  China  (volume  VII),  cover- 
ing: principally  the  military  and  political  situation, 
was  released  in  AuRust  197M. 

The  volumes  are  prejjared  by  the  Historical  Office, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs.  ('(>))ies  of  volume  VlII 
(Department  of  State  publication  8(>8;i;  (iPO  cat. 
no.  Sl.l:948/v.  VllI)  may  be  obtained  for  $9.30. 
Checks  or  money  orders  should  be  made  out  to 
"Superintendent  of  Documents"  and  should  be  sent  to 
the  U.S.  Government  Bookstore,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


GPO  Sales   Publications 

Pnhlications  may  be  ordered  hy  catalog  or  stock  num- 
ber from  the  U.S.  Govenimciit  Printing  Office  Book- 
store, Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 
A  SH-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or 
more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superin- 
tendent  of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shoien  belou'  include  domestic  postage. 

Latin  American  Military  Expenditures  1967-1971. 
Survey  of  defense  spending  in  1(!  Latin  American 
countries:  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  the  Dominican  Re- 
public, Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Guyana, 
Haiti,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Pana- 
ma, Paraguay,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and  Uruguay. 
Tables  included.  Pub.  8720.  Inter-American  Series 
103.  29  pp.   55<*.    (Cat.  No.  81.26:103). 


.Antarctica — Measures  in  Furtherance  of  Principles 
and  Objectives  of  (he  Antarctic  Treaty.  TIAS  7692. 
10  pp.  2.'j(.   (Cat.  No.  S9.10:7692). 

Consular  Ki-lations — Continued  Application  to  Bar- 
bados of  the  United  States-United  Kingdom  Conven- 
tion of  .June  6,  19.'>1.  Agreement  with  Barbados.  TIAS 
76!W.    2  pp.    2,'j('.    (Cat.  No.  S9.10:769;i). 

Cooperation  in  Combating  Illicit  International  Traffic 
in  Narcotics  and  Other  Dangerous  Drugs — Grant  of 
Reference  Books.  Agreement  with  Mexico.  TIAS 
7694.   :i  pp.   2r,e    (Cat.  No.  S9.10:7694). 

Colorado  River  Salinity.  Agreement  with  Mexico  ex- 
tending minute  no.  241  of  the  International  Boundary 
and  Water  Commission,  United  States  and  Mexico, 
of  July  14,  1972,  as  extended.  TIAS  7696.  4  pp.  25<'. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:7696). 

Radio  Broadcasting  in  the  Standard  Broadcast  Band 
— Frequency  Modulation  Broadcasting  in  the  88  to 
108  MHz  Band.  Agreement,  with  annexes,  with  Mexi- 
co.   TIAS  7697.    92  pp.    80('.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7697). 

p:xtension  of  Loan  of  Vessels— U.S.S.  Holt,  U.S.S. 
Erbcn,    U.S.S.    Hiekox,    and    U.S.S.    Hahey    Powell. 

Agreement  with  the  Republic  of  Korea.  TIAS  7704. 
3  pp.    2.'".«'.    (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:7704). 

Colorado  River  Salinity.  Agreement  with  Mexico  con- 
firming minute  no.  242  of  the  International  Boundary 
and  Water  Commission,  United  States  and  Mexico. 
TIAS  7708.    10  pp.     25-'.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7708). 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  December  19  confirmed  the  follow- 
ing nominations: 

Arthur  A.  Hartman  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State   [for  European  Affairs]. 

Robert  C.  Hill  to  be  .Ambassador  to  Argentina. 

Robert    J.    McCloskey    to    be    an    Ambassador    at 
Large. 

Lloyd  1.  Miller  to  be  Ambassador  to  Trinidad  and 
Tobago. 

Helmut  Sonnenfeldt  to  be  Counselor  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

^Walter  J.  Stoessel,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics. 


76 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX     January  21,  197 U 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  ISOJt 


Argentina.  Hill  confirmed  as  Ambassador   .     .        76 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Hartman,  Hill,  McCloskey,  Mil- 
ler, Sonnenfeldt,  Stoessel) 76 

Senate  Confirms  Dr.  Ehrlich  for  WHO  Execu- 
tive Board 63 

Cuba.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference 
of  December  27 .-' .        45 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirma- 
tions (Hartman,  Hill,  McCloskey,  Miller, 
Sonnenfeldt,  Stoessel) 76 

Disarmament.    Secretary     Kissinger's     News 

Conference  of  December  27 45 

Ecuador.  Presidential  Determination  on  Fish- 
ing Boat  Seizures  (text) 56 

Energy.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence of  December  27 45 

Europe 

Hartman  confirmed  as  Assistant  Secretary     .        76 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  De- 
cember 27 45 

Human  Rights.  U.S.  Calls  for  Declaration  on 
Religious  Intolerance  (Buchanan)    ....        73 

India.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference 
of  December  27 45 

Information  Policy.  Information  and  Modern 
Diplomacy  (Keogh) 57 

International  Organizations.  Senate  Confirms 

Dr.  Ehrlich  for  WHO  Executive  Board     .     .        63 

Japan.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference 

of  December  27 45 

Middle  East.  Secretary  Kissinger's  New  Con- 
ference of  December  27 45 

Peru.  Presidential  Determination  on  Fishing 
Boat  Seizures  (text) 56 

Presidential  Documents.  Presidential  Deter- 
mination on  Fishing  Boat  Seizures  ....        56 

Publications 

GPO  Sales  Publications 76 

Second  "Foreign  Relations"  Volume  on  China 
for  1948  Released 76 

Space.  U.S.  Cosponsors  Resolution  Setting 
1974  Work  Program  for  U.N.  Outer  Space 
Committee   (Evans,  text  of  resolution)   .     .        64 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....        75 

Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Miller  confirmed  as  Am- 
bassador             76 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  De- 
cember 27 45 

Stoessel  confirmed  as  Ambassador 76 

United  Nations 

U.S.  Calls  for  Declaration  on  Religious  Intol- 
erance (Buchanan) 73 

U.S.    Cosponsors    Resolution    Setting    1974 
Work  Program  for  U.N.  Outer  Space  Com- 
mittee (Evans,  text  of  resolution)    ....        64 


U.S.  Gives  Views  on  Strengthening  the  Role 
of  the  United  Nations  (Bennett,  text  of  res- 
olution)               70 

Viet-Nam.  Secretary  Kissinger's  New  Confer- 
ence of  December  27 45 


Name  Index 

Bennett,  W.  Tapley,  Jr 70 

Buchanan,  John  H.,  Jr 73 

Ehrlich,  S.  Paul,  Jr 63 

Evans,  Mark 64 

Hartman,  Arthur  A 76 

Hill,  Robert  C 76 

Keogh,  James 57 

Kissinger,  Secretary 45 

McCloskey,  Robert  J 76 

Miller,  Lloyd  I 76 

Nixon,  President 56 

Sonnenfeldt,  Helmut 76 

Stoessel,  Walter  J.,  Jr 76 


No.     Dnte 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  Dec.  31 -Jan.  6 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  December  31  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos. 
464  of  December  21  and  472  of  December  27. 

Subjmt 

Kissinger:  letter  of  sympathy  to 
widow  of  Charles  E.  Bohlen. 

Popper  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Chile   (biographic  data). 

Mrs.  Hutar  sworn  in  as  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative on  U.N.  Commission  on 
the  Status  of  Women  (rewrite). 

Scott  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Portugal  (biographic  data). 

Kissinger:  news  conference,  San 
Clemente,  Calif.  Jan.  3. 

Marshall  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Kenya  (biographic  data). 

Hill  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Argentina  (biographic  data). 

Barnes  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Romania  (biographic  data). 

Study  group  8,  U.S.  National  Com- 
mittee for  CCIR.  Jan.  18. 

Study  group  1,  U.S.  National  Com- 
mittee for  CCITT,  Jan.  31. 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


*1 

1/2  ] 

*2 

1/3 

t3 

1/3 

*4 

1/3 

t5 

1/4  1 

♦6 

1/4  I 

*7 

1/4  ] 

*8 

1/4  1 

*9 

1/4  . 

*10 

1/4  i 

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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1805 


January  28,  1974 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE 
OF  JANUARY  3     77 

U.N.  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY  ADOPTS  CONVENTION 

ON  PROTECTION  OF  DIPLOMATS 

Statement  by  Ambassador  Bennett  and  Text  of  Resolution     89 


THE   OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1805 
January  28,  1974 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
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♦ 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  January  3 


Folloiving  is  the  trmisoipt  of  a  news  con- 
ference held  by  Secretary  Kissinger  at  San 
Clemente,  Calif.,  on  January  3.  Gerald  L. 
Warren,  Deputy  Press  Secretary  to  President 
Nixon,  introduced  the  Secretary. 


Pi-ess  release  5  dated  January  4 


Mr.  Warren:  The  Secretary,  as  you  know, 
has  been  in  San  Clemente  for  a  few  days  in 
discussion  with  the  President  on  foreign  poli- 
cy, on  the  Geneva  talks  and  the  Middle  East 
situation.  He  discussed  various  matters  with 
the  President  this  morning  by  telephone  and 
will  begin  by  taking  your  questions. 

Mr.  Secretary. 

Secretary  Kissi)ige)':  Actually,  we  have 
been  reviewing  the  Middle  East  situation  as 
well  as  the  whole  gamut  of  foreign  policy. 
It  hasn't  been  confined  to  the  Middle  East. 
But  I  will  be  glad  to  answer  your  questions. 

Q.  What  are  the  prospects  for  an  early 
peace  and  disengagement  along  the  Suez? 

Secretai'y  Kissinger:  Well,  as  you  know, 
we  have  encouraged  negotiations  on  the  sep- 
aration of  forces  first  on  the  Egyptian  front 
but,  in  principle,  also  on  the  other  fronts  to 
reduce  the  danger  of  war,  to  begin  some 
movement  toward  a  peace  settlement. 

These  talks  took  place  first  at  kilometer 
101,  and  while  they  didn't  lead  to  a  settle- 
ment, they  led  to  a  clarification  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  two  sides  in  a  direction  that  of- 
fered some  promise  of  further  progress. 

As  you  all  know,  I  expect  to  see  Defense 
Minister  Dayan,  as  was  agreed  when  I  last 
was  in  Israel,  tomorrow;  and  unless  there 
has  been  a  basic  change  of  view,  which  I  do 
not  believe,  I  expect  that  good  progress  can 
be  made  in  the  separation  of  forces  along  the 
Suez  Canal. 


Q.  What  effect  will  the  elections  in  Israel 
have  0)1  their  staiiding  in  the  talks? 

Sec)eta)y  Kissinger:  I  don't  believe  that 
the  elections  will  have  any  effect  on  the  talks 
that  are  now  going  on  with  respect  to  dis- 
engagement, because  there  has  been,  as  I 
understand  it,  a  broad  consensus  in  Israel 
that  those  talks  can  proceed  even  before  a 
new  government  is  formed. 

What  the  effect  will  be  of  the  election  on 
the  ultimate  settlement  talks  will  depend  in 
part  on  the  composition  of  the  Cabinet  and 
on  the  negotiations  that  are  now  going  on 
between  the  parties,  and  I  think  it  would  be 
premature  for  me  to  offer  an  opinion. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  Jiave  a  timetable 
for  when  you  think  that  disengagement 
might  actually  get  started? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  I  don't  have  a 
timetable,  because  a  great  deal,  of  course, 
depends  on  the  parties;  but  it  has  always 
been  understood  that  after  the  Israeli  elec- 
tions the  talks  might  accelerate,  and  we 
would  expect  that  after  my  talks  with  Dayan 
tomorrow,  then  when  the  talks  resume  next 
week  we  will  then  see  during  the  month  of 
January  how  much  progress  is  possible. 

I  am  not  predicting  that  there  will  be  a 
solution  during  the  month  of  January.  I  am 
just  saying  we  will  then  see  what  can  be 
done. 

Q.  On  a  related  subject,  ivhat  are  the 
chances  of  the  oil  embargo  being  lifted  in  the 
ne.rt  few  weeks  or  the  near  future? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  know  I  keep 
repeating  myself  about  the  oil  embargo.  The 
principles  that  the  President  has  adopted 
with  respect  to  the  oil  embargo  and  that  we 
are  attempting  to  implement  are  as  follows. 


January  28,    1974 


77 


We  have  understanding  for  the  initial  Arab 
position.  Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  it  be- 
comes increasingly  less  appropriate  for  Arab 
governments  to  pursue  discriminatory  meas- 
ures against  the  United  States  when  the 
United  States  has  publicly  declared  its  sup- 
port for  Resolution  242  and  has  been  the 
principal  country  promoting  a  settlement  in 
the  area. 

We  cannot  engage  in  negotiations  with  the 
Arab  governments  about  the  specific  terms 
that  we  will  support  in  negotiations  in  order 
to  get  the  embargo  lifted,  because  it  would 
make  our  foreign  policy  then  entirely  subject 
to  the  producing  nations'  decisions  and  would 
set  up  an  endless  cycle. 

However,  we  will  continue  to  make  a  seri- 
ous effort.  We  have  told  the  Arab  govern- 
ments the  direction  in  which  we  are  moving, 
and  we  have  talked  to  the  Israeli  Govern- 
ment. 

We  therefore  cannot  tie  it  to  any  particular 
time  frame,  but  we  hope  that  there  will  be 
progress  on  the  oil  embargo  issue,  together 
with  a  general  easing  of  the  situation  in  the 
Middle  East. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  there  any  thought  of 
a  counterembargo  of  some  American  raw  tna- 
terials  ivhich  are  used  in  the  A?-a&  countries? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  are  not  planning 
any  specific  measures  of  this  kind  at  this 
moment.  First,  let  me  make  a  few  general 
observations  about  the  energy  problem. 

First,  it  is  important  to  separate  the  Mid- 
dle East  war  aspect  of  it  from  the  endemic 
long-range  problem.  There  would  have  been 
an  energy  problem  even  without  the  Middle 
East  war,  and  there  will  be  an  energy  prob- 
lem after  the  embargo  is  lifted. 

The  energy  problem  is  produced  in  part. by 
the  fact  that  the  demand  has  outrun  the  in- 
centive for  supply,  and  therefore  there  is  a 
common  problem  on  the  part  of  all  energy- 
consuming  countries  to  develop  new  sources 
of  energy,  to  adopt  conservation  measures 
for  existing  sources  of  energy,  and  to  deal 
with  this  whole  new  complex  of  issues  pro- 
duced by  this  rapid  rise  in  energy  prices. 

This  is  why  the  President  asked  me  to 
propose  the  Energy  Action  Group  between 


consumers  and  between  consumers  and  pro- 
ducers, and  we  will  take  additional  initiatives 
with  respect  to  that  within  the  next  week, 
and  we  believe  that  that  is  the  long-term 
solution  to  the  energy  problem. 

Recent  Talks  With  Le  Due  Tho 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  on  another  subject,  did 
you  in  your  talks  with  Le  Due  Tho  leave  him 
with  any  kind  of  a  ivarning  that  a  North 
Vietnamese  offensive  woidd  be  met  ivith  an 
American  response? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First  of  all,  we  have 
an  agreement  that  we  do  not  discuss  the 
substance  of  these  talks. 

Secondly,  we  had  a  general  review  of  the 
situation  in  Indochina  with  particular  em- 
phasis on  the  situation  in  Viet-Nam  and 
measures  that  might  be  taken  to  ease  the 
situation. 

We  are  now  both  studying  these  positions. 
We  will  be  in  touch  with  each  other  in  the 
next  few  weeks,  and  therefore  the  thrust  of 
our  talks  concerns  the  ways  to  alleviate  the 
situation  and  not  particular  responses  we 
might  make  to  this  or  that  move. 

Q.  If  I  could  folloiv  up,  do  you  anticipate 
a  North  Vietnamese  offensive  now? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  My  old  associate  Le 
Due  Tho  is  not  one  of  the  most  confiding  of 
men,  and  he  has  not  in  the  past  been  in  the 
habit  of  sharing  all  his  plans  with  me.  I 
would  think  that  on  the  whole,  on  narrow 
balance,  I  would  expect  that  the  North  Viet- 
namese would  recognize  that  nobody's  inter- 
est would  be  served  by  an  offensive  in  Viet- 
Nam. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  will  the  energy  problem 
affect  the  President's  plans  for  foreign 
travel? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  the  energy  prob- 
lem will  not  affect  the  President's  plans  for 
foreign  travel.  It  of  course  is  likely  to  be  a 
subject  in  conversations,  especially  with  Eu- 
ropean and  Japanese  leaders,  if  he  should 
meet  them  later  this  year. 

The  President's  plans  with  respect  to  Eu- 
ropean travel  have  been  geared  to  progress 


78 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


that  is  being  made  on  the  various  declara- 
tions that  we  are  discussing  now  with  our 
European  allies — a  declaration  within  the 
NATQ  framework  and  a  declaration  between 
the  Common  Market  countries  and  the  United 
States. 

In  both  of  these  cases,  substantial  progress 
has  been  made,  and  there  is  another  meeting 
of  the  Political  Directors  of  the  Common 
Market  with  our  equivalent  of  political  direc- 
toi-s,  which  is  Assistant  Secretary  [for  Euro- 
pean Affairs  Walter  J.]  Stoessel  and  the  new" 
Counselor  of  the  State  Department,  Mr. 
[Helmut]  Sonnenfeldt.  And  we  believe  that 
after  the  period  in  which  there  was  a  con- 
junction of  the  formation  of  European  unity 
with  our  attempt  to  redefine  Atlantic  rela- 
tionships— and  these  two  efforts  tended  to 
compete  with  each  other  for  the  attention 
of  the  leaders — that  now  there  is  a  relation 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  that  these  ef- 
forts are  not  competitive  but  complementary, 
and  that  relatively  rapid  progress  will  be 
made. 

Q.  What  can  you  tell  us,  Mr.  Secretary, 
about  the  possibility  of  a  European  trip  by 
the  President  this  spring? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  if  we  make  the 
progress  in  Atlantic  relations  that  I  have 
indicated  as  possible,  then  it  has  always  been 
foreseen  that  the  President  at  that  point 
might  take  a  trip,  and  while  no  final  decision 
has  been  made,  this  could  very  well  happen 
this  spring. 

Presidential  Initiative  on  Energy  Problem 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  I  take  you  back  to 
ike  Middle  East  for  a  moment.  You  discussed 
the  proposal  for  a7i  energy  group.  Energy 
Action  Group,  and  you  said  that  the  adminis- 
tration intended  to  take  additional  initiatives 
within  the  next  iveeks.  Can  you  discuss  at  all 
what  those  might  be  or  ivhat  the  general 
character  of  those  initiatives  might  be? 

Secretary  Kissinger:^  No,  of  course,  this 
will  become  more  apparent  when  these  initia- 
tives are  developed,  but  basically  they  will 
spell  out  in  somewhat  greater  detail  than  I 


did  in  London  our  concept  of  cooperation 
between  consumers  and  between  consumers 
and  producers.  Incidentally,  it  is  interesting 
to  point  out  that  some  of  the  most  positive 
reactions  to  this  idea  have  come  from  the 
producing  countries  that  also  seem  to  feel 
the  need  for  stabilizing  what  could  otherwise 
turn  into  an  extremely  competitive  and  dis- 
ruptive situation,  and  since  they  are  part  of 
the  same  world  economy  everyone  else  is,  the 
producing  countries  cannot  have  an  interest 
in  a  massive  depression. 

So  what  you  will  see  is  a  spelling-out  of 
the  ideas  that  the  President  asked  me  to  put 
forward  in  London,  and  the  initiative  will 
probably  be  undertaken  at  the  Presidential 
level. 

Q.  In  a  speech  or  a  statement  of  some 
kind? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Probably  in  an  ap- 
proach to  the  various  leaders  concerned. 

Q.  Going  back  to  Indochina  for  a  moment, 
if  I  may,  if  there  should  be  a  North  Viet- 
namese offensive,  is  it  at  all  possible  the 
United  States  might  respond  militarily? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  want  to  specu- 
late on  what  the  United  States  would  do  in 
every  circumstance.  I  have  pointed  out  in 
Washington  that  we  are  conscious  of  the 
legal  obligations  under  which  this  govern- 
ment operates  and  that  we  of  course  intend 
to  observe  them. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  there  have  been  reports 
that  General  Dayan  is  coming  here  so  that 
the  United  States  can  coordinate  a  policy 
with  Israel.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  situa- 
tion with  the  Arabs  is  so  tenuous  and  you  are 
trying  to  make  progress  in  lifting  the  oil 
embargo,  do  you  think  it  is  proper  fgr  the 
U.S.  policy  to  be  so  tied  to  the  Israeli  policy 
that  there  seeyns  to  be  no  separation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  conducted 
our  policy  in  the  Middle  East  by  talking  at 
great  length  with  all  of  the  parties  concerned. 
We  have  discussed  our  ideas  on  a  settlement 
in  exactly  the  same  terms  with  every  one 
of  the  parties  involved.  Every  Arab  country 
that  is  concerned  is  aware  of  Mr.  Dayan's 


January  28,    1974 


79 


visit  to  Washington,  and  I  have  every  reason 
to  believe  that  they  welcome  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  is  actively  pursuing-  the 
objective  of  the  separation  of  forces  and  that 
they  don't  vievi^  it  at  all  in  the  light  you  have 
indicated. 

Q.  Going  back  to  this  Preside)itial  ap- 
■proach  to  the  producer  nations,  how  high — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  And  consumer  na- 
tions. 

Q.  And  consumer  nations.  How  high  is  the 
United  States  iviUing  to  let  the  price  of  oil 
go;  how  serious  is  this  situation  as  you  see 
it  now?  Are  you  prepared  to  just  let  the 
price  go  on  up,  or  are  you  going  to  try  for 
some  rollbacks  or  what? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You  have  to  under- 
stand that  the  very  way  you  formulate  the 
question  demonstrates  the  nature  of  the  prob- 
lem. It  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  United 
States  to  control  the  rise  of  these  prices. 
These  prices  are  being  set  by  the  producing 
countries  and  under  conditions  of  totally  un- 
restrained competition  among  all  the  con- 
sumer countries.  There  is  no  way  any  one 
consumer  can  affect  the  prices. 

The  United  States  has  made  it  clear  that  it 
is  not  in  the  long-term  interest  of  even  the 
producer  countries  to  pursue  a  policy  of  un- 
restrained price  increases  because,  as  I 
pointed  out  earlier,  the  producers,  too,  are 
living  in  the  same  world  economy  that  the 
consumers  are.  And  a  worldwide  depression 
produced  by  an  imbalance  in  balance  of  pay- 
ments and  a  complete  overemphasis  on  the 
energy  side  would  have  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence of  depressing  also  the  situation  of  the 
producer  countries.  And  many  of  them  have 
come  to  realize  this. 

The  situation  has  developed  in  this  way 
because  the  long-term  demand  for  energy  has 
grown  so  rapidly  and  the  uses  to  which 
money  can  be  put  are  relatively  so  limited 
that  there  has  been  little  incentive  to  increase 
production  and  an  almost  unlimited  seller's 
market. 

One  reason  why  the  United  States  has 
supported  cooperative  approaches  among  the 
consumers  and  between  the  consumers  and 


producers  is  because — even  with  good  will  on 
both  sides — unless  there  is  a  systematic  ef- 
fort to  address  the  problem,  there  is  no  way 
any  one  nation  can  solve  it  by  itself,  not 
even  a  nation  as  powerful  as  the  United 
States.  It  is  the  example  par  excellence  of 
how  interdependent  the  world  has  become, 
how  impossible  purely  selfish  policies  are,  and 
how  suicidal  for  everybody  it  is  to  pursue 
totally  independent  courses. 

We  will  make  a  major  effort  to  bring  the 
prices  into  some  relationship  to  the  needs  of 
the  growth  of  the  world  economy  in  which 
everybody  has  a  share.  And  we  are  also  pro- 
foundly convinced  that  as  far  as  the  consum- 
ing countries  are  concerned,  unrestrained 
competition  between  them  would  be  a  disas- 
ter for  everybody,  and  I  say  that  even  though 
in  the  short  term  we  are  better  placed  than 
anyone  else  to  withstand  such  competition. 

Q.  Are  these  going  to  be  personal  appeals 
by  the  President  to  King  Faisal  and — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  want  to  go 
into  it.  They  will  be  announced  at  the  ap- 
propriate moment.  But  they  will  be  an  at- 
tempt to  embody  the  principles  that  I  have 
outlined  here,  and  they  are  of  a  very  major 
concern  of  the  President  right  now,  to  which 
he  is  giving  a  great  deal  of  his  personal 
attention. 

Q.  Will  we  get  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  know  how 
much  of  it  will  be  made  public  all  at  once, 
but  you  will  see  the  development  of  this 
approach  over  the  next  weeks. 

Common  Interest  in  Energy  Problem 

Q.  Will  one  of  the  principles  be  an  attempt 
to  get  the  producer  countries  to  forswear 
future  oil  boycotts  of  this  kind?  I  mean,  you 
spoke  about  our  relative  independence  com- 
pared to  Europe  and  Japan.  But  it  seems  to 
me  those  other  countries  would  have  a  stake 
in  wanting  a  promise  along  this  line. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  are  two  prob- 
lems, as  I  pointed  out.  One  is  the  problem 
of  the  boycott — there  are  three  problems :  the 
boycott,  the  production,  and  the  prices. 


80 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


Leaving  aside  the  question  of  the  boycott, 
in  the  long  term,  if  the  Arab  countries  or  if 
the  producing  countries — it  isn't  just  a  ques- 
tion of  the  Arab  countries — if  the  producing 
countries  do  not  increase  their  production,  it 
will  have  the  same  objective  consequences  as 
a  boycott  did,  because  it  will  mean  that  there 
will  be  a  constant  shortfall  of  supplies. 

Secondly,  if  the  prices  keep  rising,  then  it 
is  already  estimated  that  anywhere  from  30 
to  50  percent  of  the  foreign  reserves  of  some 
countries  will  have  to  be  devoted  simply  to 
the  acquisition  of  energy,  and  this  will  affect 
their  import  policy  toward  other  countries, 
and  it  will  therefore  have  a  very  profound 
effect  on  the  whole  world  economic  situation. 

Now,  in  the  short  term,  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  any  number  of  bilateral  deals  that 
can  be  made  between  major  consuming 
countries  and  major  producing  areas.  In  the 
short  term,  it  is  possible  to  see  how  particular 
producing  countries  can  enrich  themselves 
by  an  unrestrained  use  of  their  temporarily 
strong  bargaining  position. 

But  in  the  long  term,  it  is  bound  to  lead 
to  disaster  for  everybody.  And  therefore  we 
are  not  trying  to  approach  this  on  a  piece- 
meal basis,  but  on  a  comprehensive  approach 
to  the  energy  problem  now  and  in  the  fore- 
seeable future  to  see  whether  some  thought- 
ful long-range  policy  can  be  developed.  And 
it  is  peculiarly  a  case  where  the  common 
interest  is  also  everybody's  selfish  interest. 

Q.  In  view  of  all  this,  what  do  you  see  as 
the  most  hopeful  sign  in  the  Mideast  right 
now,  Mr.  Secretary? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  think  in  the 
Mideast  there  is  a  good  possibility  of  prog- 
ress in  the  separation-of-forces  talks.  This, 
in  turn,  will  create  very  positive  conditions 
for  similar  progress  on  other  fronts,  and  it 
will  be  a  good  bridge  into  the  general  peace 
talks  that  will  of  course  continue. 

The  President  has  said,  and  it  has  been  our 
policy  and  our  conviction,  that  the  chances 
for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  are  better  than 
they  have  been  in  25  years.  That  doesn't 
mean  that  the  negotiations  won't  be  extreme- 
ly painful  and  extremely  difficult. 

With  respect  to  the  energy  situation,  on 


the  one  hand,  of  course  we  are  going  through 
a  rather  painful  period;  on  the  other,  there 
is  a  certain  advantage  in  having  the  nature 
of  a  problem  that  was  endemic  precipitated 
in  a  way  that  one  could  deal  with  it  compre- 
hensively and  at  an  early  enough  stage  so 
that  we  could  get  a  look  at  all  of  its  implica- 
tions on  a  worldwide  basis.  So  even  the  dis- 
locations of  this  year  can  spur  us  to  develop 
alternative  sources  of  energy,  to  conserve 
energy  in  a  systematic  way,  and  to  enable 
the  consuming  countries  to  work  together 
and  to  work  together  with  the  producing 
countries  to  get  a  long-range  policy.  So  this 
could  be  seen,  this  year — if  we  all  act  wisely 
and  decisively — could  be  seen  as  a  good  tran- 
sitional period. 

Q.  Wliat  about  a  country  like  Japan?  It  is 
more  than  a  pinch  there.  They  are  threatened 
with  economic  destruction.  How  long  can  you 
keep  a  country  like  that  in  check? 

Secirtary  Kissinge)-:  It  is  not  a  question  of 
keeping  a  country  like  that  in  check,  because 
that  is  not  our  attempt.  Our  attempt — if 
what  we  are  attempting  to  do  works,  then 
obviously  it  must  take  into  account  the  basic 
needs  of  Japan.  And  again,  at  the  risk  of 
repeating  myself,  I  can  only  say  that  an 
attempt  by  Japan  to  deal  with  its  problem  on 
a  purely  national  basis  will  bring  it  up 
against  almost  insoluble  problems,  either  of 
price  rises  or  of  competition  with  other  coun- 
tries, and  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that 
this  is  recognized  by  the  Japanese,  too. 

We  have  been  talking  about  a  structure  of 
peace.  We  have  been  talking  about  the  inter- 
connection of  events  in  the  world.  And  when 
we  were  talking  about  political  matters,  it 
sounded  abstract  and  theoretical,  but  here  we 
have  a  very  concrete  case  in  which  isolated 
solutions  will  turn  out  to  be  impossible.  We 
are  not  trying  to  contain  Japan.  We  are  try- 
ing to  enable  Japan  to  meet  its  requirements 
within  the  only  framework  in  which  it  is 
possible  to  meet  them,  and  I  am  confident 
that  the  Japanese  see  it  in  the  same  way. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  will  you  give  tis  a  per- 
sonal note  regarding  the  energy  crisis?  Com- 
ing out  here  you   traveled  commercially.  I 


January   28,    1974 


81 


just  wondered  what  your  reaction  was  to 
that  flight  and  the  attention  you  got  on  it. 
Did  yon  feel  like  an  average  traveler? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  they  don't  have 
stewardesses  on  Air  Force  One.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  that  same  perso)ial 
note,  there  are  a  lot  of  people  who  are  inter- 
ested— particularly  women — interested  in 
your  future.  Could  you  tell  tis  your  mar- 
riage pla)is? 

Secretanj  Kissinger:  I  don't  plan  them. 
[Laughter.] 

Q.  What  can  yon  tell  us  about  your  plans 
to  get  married? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  said  three  weeks 
ago  when  a  particular  plan  was  mentioned, 
that  that  particular  plan — I  commented  on 
that  particular  plan  and  I  said  that  I  would 
not  make  any  future  comments  on  my  per- 
sonal situation.  I  would  be  spending  too  much 
of  my  time.  I  don't  want  to  upset  too  many 
people.  [Laughter.]  Humility  has  always 
been  my  outstanding  trait.  [Laughter.]  Jerry 
is  going  to  issue  a  statement  putting  that 
part  off  the  record.   [Laughter.] 

Declarations  With  Western  Europe 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  on  the  President's  trip 
to  Europe  which  you  say  could  take  place  as 
early  as  the  spring,  tvould  there  he  two  sep- 
arate declarations  made?  Do  you  foresee 
that,  one  loith  the  Common  Market  and  one 
tvith  NATO? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Yes,  the  present  plan 
is  to  have  two  declarations,  one  with  the 
Common  Market  and  one  with  NATO.  The 
reason  is  that  not  every  member  of  the  Com- 
mon Market  is  also  a  member  of  NATO  and 
therefore  it  would  have  been  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  construct  a  document  that  took 
care  of  both  of  these  groupings. 

Secondly,  in  the  Common  Market,  the  nine 
members  speak  as  a  unit,  while  in  NATO 
they  are  still  represented  in  their  capacities 
as  individual  nations.  And  therefore  there 
will  be  two  declarations:  one  dealing  with 
the  issues  of  mutual  security  and  the  political 


issues  related  to  that,  and  the  second  one 
related  to  the  emerging  European  identity, 
the  American  position  vis-a-vis  that  and  the 
united  Europe's  position  vis-a-vis  the  United 
States,  the  economic  issues,  and  that  part  of 
the  political  relationship  that  is  relevant  to 
the  relations  of  a  united  Europe  with  the 
United  States. 

As  I  said,  we  have  made  very  good  progress 
on  the  NATO  declaration  and  we  are  also 
making  progress  on  the  declaration  with  the 
European  Community.  We  have  to  stress 
again  that  to  us  this  is  not  just  a  paper 
exercise,  nor  is  it  an  attempt  on  our  part 
to  define  legal  obligations  which  can  then  be 
enforced  by  one  party  against  the  other, 
which  is  obviously  not  the  case.  It  is  an  at- 
tempt on  our  part  to  give  the  democracies 
an  opportunity  to  prove  that  not  all  achieve- 
ments in  foreign  policy  are  to  be  sought 
in  relations  with  adversaries,  but  that  those 
countries  whose  unity  and  strength  and 
dynamism  brought  them  to  the  point  where 
relations  with  adversaries  can  be  improved 
can  also  define  a  future  for  themselves  in  a 
world  which  is  different  from  that  of  the 
early  1950's. 

It  is  an  opportunity  for  creativity,  not  a 
legal  haggle  in  which  we  are  trying  to  get 
this  or  that  clause,  and  in  this  process  I  think 
the  effort  has  already  generated  a  great  deal 
of  reexamination  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlan- 
tic and  will  in  i-etrospect,  I  think,  be  seen  as 
having  made  a  useful  contribution. 

Q.  If  you  get  these  tivo  declarations  for 
the  sake  of  clarity,  then  ivhen  will  the  Presi- 
dent he  makiyig  the  trip  to  Europe? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Whenever  those  dec- 
larations are  ready  for  signature  and  for  the 
final  stages  of  the  negotiations,  the  President 
would  like — 

Q.  No  time  frame? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  indicated  that 
I  thought  when  somebody  mentioned  this 
spring  that  that  was  a  possibility.  But  the 
final  decision  has  not  been  made,  and  we  do 
not  want  to  set  a  date  and  then  give  our- 
selves a  deadline  that  puts  us  under  pressure. 

We  will  follow  the  same  procedure  that  we 


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followed  in  other  negotiations;  that  is,  we  set 
the  date  when  there  is  a  reasonable  progress 
in  sight. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  is  impeachment 
floi)/f/  to  affect  the  President's  foreign  policy 
i)i-itiatives  in  the  comi)ig  year — /  mea)i,  the 
whole  fight  over  it  and  the  threat  in  Con- 
gress? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  no  reason  to 
assume  that  there  will  be  an  impeachment, 
and  therefore  I  don't  want  to  speculate  on 
that.  We  can  only  conduct  foreign  policy  on 
the  assumption  that  the  principles  that  we 
have  attempted  to  implement  of  a  new  rela- 
tionship with  our  friends,  of  accelerating 
the  progress  in  easing  tensions  with  our  ad- 
versaries, are  basic  principles  of  American 
policy  which  the  President  will  continue  to 
pursue  because  they  are  right  and  independ- 
ent of  the  situation  to  which  you  have  re- 
ferred. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  there  have  been  some 
reports  that  since  the  President  lias  been  be- 
leaguered by  the  challenge  and  the  complexi- 
ties of  Watergate  that  you,  as  a  Secretary  of 
State,  have  been  carrying  out  policy  perhaps 
in  a  more  independent  way  than  in  the  first 
four  ycai's,  when  you  served  as  an  adviser. 
I  wonder,  sir,  if  you  could  address  yourself  to 
that  question. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  read 
those  reports,  and  they  are  totally  incorrect. 
I  think  the  idea  developed  because  now  that  I 
am  Secretary  of  State  the  press  is  traveling 
with  me  and  sees  me  more  regularly  than 
they  did  on  previous  trips  and  also  there  is  a 
more  detailed  reporting  of  my  day-to-day 
activities  because  of  the  necessity  of  daily 
press  briefings  emerging  out  of  one  of  the 
great  departments. 

I  see  the  President  when  we  are  in  town 
together  every  morning  for  a  minimum  of 
half  an  hour,  but  usually  for  a  much  moi'e 
extended  period  than  that.  When  we  are  not 
in  the  same  town,  I  cannot  recall  a  day  when 
we  do  not  talk  on  the  telephone.  When  I 
travel,  I  send  the  President  a  repoi't  at  the 
end  of  every  day.  I  am  in  close  touch  with 
General  Haig  [Gen.  Alexander  M.  Haig,  Jr., 


Assistant  to  the  President]  and  General 
Scowcroft  [Maj.  Gen.  Brent  Scowcroft,  Dep- 
uty Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs],  who  are  manning  the 
White  House,  with  whom  I  usually  talk  on 
the  telephone  even  when  I  am  on  trips  and 
from  whom  I  always  get  a  report.  Before  I 
go  on  a  trip,  the  President  and  I  sit  down, 
as  we  always  have,  and  he  tells  me  what  his 
general  strategy  is  and  what  he  wants  me  to 
accomplish. 

Having  worked  as  closely  together  as  we 
have  for  five  years,  there  is  no  necessity  for 
him — and  it  isn't  his  style  anyway — to  go 
into  every  last  tactical  detail.  But  this  is  not 
new;  this  is  the  way  it  has  always  been. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  great  departments 
of  the  government  can  be  personal  fiefdoms 
of  individual  men.  The  constitutional  respon- 
sibility for  conducting  foreign  policy  resides 
in  the  President.  The  Secretary  of  State  has 
to  be  the  agent  of  the  President,  or  he  repre- 
sents nothing.  And  in  this  present  situation 
in  America,  I  believe  that  government  has  to 
be  regular  and  it  has  to  be  conducted  on  the 
basis  of  existing  constitutional  practice.  And 
I  therefore  totally  reject  the  idea  that  I  am 
attempting  to  conduct  an  independent  policy. 

Europe's  Reaction  to  U.S.  Initiatives 

Q.  Mr.  Seci'etary,  going  back  to  the  two 
European  declarations,  did  you  really  give  us 
all  the  reasons  why  there  are  going  to  be  two 
declarations?  You  had  said  in  your  New 
York  speech  that  you  tvanted  a  new  Atlantic 
charter,  and  you  had  spoken  of  defense,  po- 
litical, and  economic  matters  as  realistically 
being  connected. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  is  right. 

Q.  The  Europeans  came  back  and  said,  no, 
no,  we  don't  want  them  connected;  we  want 
two  declarations.  Isn't  this  really  jvhat  hap- 
pened or  lias  been  evolving? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No.  What  happened 
was  when  we  made  the  proposal,  I  think  it  is 
fair  to  say  that  we  did  not  expect  that  we 
were  raising  a  controversial  issue.  We  had 
reason  to  believe,  on  the  basis  of  conversa- 


January  28,    1974 


83 


tions  which  the  President  had  had  with  the 
British  Prime  Minister  and  exchanges  which 
the  President  had  had  with  other  European 
leaders,  that  this  would  be  an  issue  that 
would  be  relatively  noncontroversial,  would 
be  greeted  with  some  enthusiasm,  and  would 
lead  fairly  rapidly  to  a  general  declaration. 

In  this  respect,  as  I  pointed  out  last  week, 
the  European  reaction  surprised  us  and,  I  am 
frank  to  say,  disappointed  us.  Now,  what 
was  the  reason  for  this? 

There  were  many  causes,  one  of  them 
being  that  this  was  also  the  year  in  which 
the  Europeans  attempted  to  form  their  po- 
litical union  and  that  some  of  the  European 
countries  thought  that  there  was  an  inconsist- 
ency between  at  one  and  the  same  time  fos- 
tering European  union  and  greater  Atlantic 
cooperation. 

Given  the  way  the  constitution  of  the  Eu- 
ropean Community  is  written,  one  or  two 
countries  can  block  the  views  of  the  major- 
ity, because  it  requires  the  approval  of  all  of 
them. 

Secondly,  many  European  countries  had 
domestic  problems  of  their  own,  and  there- 
fore the  process  by  which  they  responded  to 
the  initiative  was  somewhat  slow  and  some- 
what uncertain.  It  was  reflected,  for  exam- 
ple, in  the  fact  that  the  Europeans  could  not 
decide  among  themselves  how  to  respond. 
That  is  to  say,  there  was  one  proposal  which 
still  existed  at  the  time  of  the  meeting  be- 
tween the  President  and  President  Pompidou 
at  Reykjavik,  that  the  declaration  should  be 
developed  at  the  level  of  the  Deputy  Foreign 
Ministers  of  the  individual  countries.  We 
agreed  to  that. 

Then  there  was  a  proposal  that  there  be  a 
series  of  bilateral  meetings  between  the 
United  States  and  key  European  countries. 
We  had  15  bilateral  meetings  between  the 
United  States  and  key  European  countries, 
including  five  by  the  President  himself,  with 
Foreign  Ministers  of  other  countries,  in  one 
case  the  British  Cabinet  Secretary.  And  at 
that  time  we  were  still  talking  about  a  com- 
prehensive declaration  because  we  were  deal- 
ing with  the  European  countries  as  individ- 
ual countries. 


At  the  end  of  July,  without,  incidentally, 
discussing  the  matter  with  us,  the  Europeans 
decided  that  for  the  part  that  concerned 
economics  they  were  going  to  attempt  to  use 
our  initiative  as  a  device  to  form  European 
unity  and  to  go  for  the  first  time  in  their 
experience  through  the  exercise  of  develop- 
ing a  common  political  position. 

So  at  that  point,  when  the  Europeans  de- 
cided that  some  issues  were  going  to  be 
handled  by  the  Nine  and  others  were  going 
to  be  handled  by  NATO,  we  agreed  that  the 
two  could  be  split  but  would  be  signed  essen- 
tially simultaneously  so  that  their  total  effect 
would  be  in  any  event  one  common  approach. 

Then,  having  decided  that  we  were  going 
to  do  it  on  a  common  basis,  it  took  the  Euro- 
peans three  months  to  develop  a  common 
declaration.  And  while  it  was  a  major 
achievement  for  them  to  get  anything  agreed 
to  among  nine  countries,  its  content,  in  our 
view,  did  not  reflect  the  difficulty  of  achiev- 
ing a  consensus,  and  therefore  it  led  to 
another  set  of  negotiations. 

This  is  the  history  as  I  see  it.  Now,  I  know 
there  were  many  criticisms  made  that  we 
were  trying  to  link  together  political,  econom- 
ic, and  military  things  and  that  that  was  not 
appropriate.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that 
in  practice  they  are  linked,  whether  they  are 
in  two  declarations  or  in  one  declaration. 
And  the  fact  of  the  matter,  however,  even 
more  importantly,  is  we  do  not  conceive 
these  declarations  as  a  means  of  blackmail 
on  the  Europeans.  We  do  not  conceive  them 
as  something  that  we  can  use  in  defining  a 
legal  obligation  from  which  we  can  develop 
certain  demands. 

What  we  are  trying  to  do  is  to  see  whether 
the  free  countries  in  totally  changed  condi- 
tions from  those  of  the  1950's  can  define  a 
future  for  themselves  and  can  work  coop- 
eratively along  these  ranges  of  issues. 

If  we  want  a  confrontation  with  the  Eu- 
ropeans on  economic  matters,  those  of  you 
who  know  Washington  will  be  aware  of  the 
fact  that  we  don't  need  a  declaration.  Our 
economic  agencies  are  delighted  to  have  a 
confrontation. 

With  a  declaration,  what  we  are  trying  to 


84 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


do  is  to  have  a  long-term  political  objective 
which  would  put  at  rest  all  of  these  argu- 
ments :  Is  the  United  States  planning  a  con- 
dominium with  the  Soviet  Union — an  argu- 
ment that  cannot  be  answered  in  the  ab- 
stract. 

We  have  told  the  Europeans,  "For  God's 
sake,  let's  sit  down  together.  What  is  the 
world  we  are  trying  to  bring  about?  We  are 
willing  to  discuss  with  you  what  policies 
should  be  done  unilaterally,  what  policies 
should  be  done  jointly,  and  we  are  willing 
to  put  our  detente  thinking  before  you  and 
you  put  yours  before  us,  and  let's  talk  about 
it  on  that  basis." 

All  we  want  from  these  declarations  is  that 
they  create  the  framework  for  it,  not  a  legal 
dicker  in  which  one  side  then  produces  a 
document  as  if  we  were  going  to  court. 

Q.  If  the  short  answer,  then,  is  that  there 
aren't  going  to  be  any  trade  concessions — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  are  no  short 
answers  in  my  press  conferences.  [Laugh- 
ter.] These  guys  have  gotten  totally  out  of 
control  since  I  stopped  briefing  them. 
[Laughter.] 

Q.  If  the  short  answer  is  that  there  aren't 
going  to  he  any  trade  concessions,  how 
rapidly  and  at  xvhat  pace  ivill  the  administra- 
tion begin  reevaluating  our  military  contri- 
bution to  Europe? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  not  saying  the 
short  answer  is  that  there  won't  be  any  trade 
concessions,  because  there  are  negotiations 
going  on  within  the  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariff's  and  Trade]  framework  in 
which,  of  course,  our  trade  bill  will  be  an 
essential  component  and  we  expect  that  there 
will  be  an  agreement  also  on  trade  matters. 

However,  the  new  reality  that  has  been 
created  by  the  energy  crisis,  in  terms  of  re- 
serves and  so  forth,  will  force  all  countries 
to  take  a  new  look  at  their  economic  rela- 
tionships. And  I  think  it  will  make  some  of 
what  you  previously  considered  to  be  irri- 
tating competitive  aspects  seem  somewhat 
less  important  and  will  make  their  solution 
somewhat  easier. 


Q.  Just  a  piece  of  detail.  How  many  coun- 
tries would  you  like  to  see  involved  as  con- 
sumers and  producers  in  any  kind  of  group? 
To  put  it  another  way,  how  many  tvill 
appeals  be  made  to? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  will  announce 
that  next  week.  We  are  in  the  process  of  dis- 
cussing it,  and  it  is  one  of  the  issues  which 
the  President  has  yet  to  decide.  But  we  have 
a  pretty  clear  idea  already. 

Q.  On  the  order  of  20? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  In  that  general  area. 

Detente  and  Soviet  Domestic  Policies 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  believe  that  the 
publication  of  Mr.  Solzhenitsyn's  book  will 
have  any  effect  on  our  detente  with  Russia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Our  view  about  de- 
tente has  never  been  geared  to  our  approval 
of  the  Soviet  domestic  system.  We  have 
always  maintained  that  we  recognize  that 
there  is  an  important  difference  and,  in  many 
significant  respects,  incompatibility  between 
the  Soviet  domestic  system  and  our  system. 

It  did  not  indicate  moral  approval  in  any 
respect  of  the  Soviet  system — even  less,  of 
course,  of  the  conditions  described  in  that 
book. 

Our  view  about  detente  is  produced  by  the 
horrors  that  a  nuclear  war  would  inflict  on 
mankind  and  therefore  the  obligation  that  is 
imposed  on  the  leaders  of  all  countries  to  do 
their  utmost  to  prevent  such  a  catastrophe 
from  arising. 

This  is  why  we  are  seeking  to  moderate 
Soviet  foreign  policy  conduct.  This  is  why 
we  believe  it  is  essential  for  high-level  con- 
tact to  be  maintained,  and  easy  communica- 
tion between  the  President  and  the  rulers  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  And  therefore,  while  we 
have  our  own  views  of  the  conditions  which 
are  described  in  this  book,  they  do  not  ob- 
viate the  necessities  that  I  have  described. 

Q.  Incidental  to  an  earlier  question  about 
travel,  is  there  a  possibility,  and  if  so  how 
strong,  of  another  visit  by  the  President  to 


January  28,   1974 


85 


the  Soviet  Union  this  coming  year  and  also 
one  to  Japan  ? 

Secretary  Kissingo':  There  has  been  al- 
ready an  agreement  in  principle  that  the 
President  would  visit  Japan  this  year,  and 
we  believe  that  this  is  an  agreement  that  can 
be  carried  out. 

There  has  also  been  an  agi'eement  which 
was  reached  at  the  last  summit  that  the 
President  would  visit  the  Soviet  Union  this 
year,  and  this,  too,  in  fact  we  are  planning 
for. 

Now,  the  exact  date  of  the  visit  to  the 
Soviet  Union  will  depend  on  progress  in 
negotiations  which  would  justify  Presiden- 
tial participation  in  meetings  with  the  Gen- 
eral Secretary,  principally  SALT  [Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks]. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  I  follow  irp  on  the 
impeachment  question,  which  I  don't  think 
yon  answered  the  first  time  I  asked  it.  Do 
you  think  the  President  can  be  the  leader  of 
the  free  world  in  pretty  ambitions  schemes 
to  maintain  economic  stability  and  world 
peace  while  he  is  under  unprecedented  attack 
at  home  and  fighting  for  the  very  Presidency 
here  in  the  coming  months? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  that  the 
President  can  do  it,  and  I  believe  that  his 
foreign  policy  will  be  recognized  as  valid  in 
the  years  ahead. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  if  I  could  follow  on  Pat's 
[Patrick  J.  Sloyan,  Hearst  Neivspapers] 
question,  do  you  think  it  is  possible  that  new 
foreign  policy  initiatives  would  be  part  of 
the  President's  defense  on  impeachment? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  foreign  policy 
of  the  United  States,  I  think,  will  be  seen  to 
have  been  carried  out  in  a  consistent,  respon- 
sible manner  over  the  years,  according  to 
principles  that  have  been  laid  down  in  annual 
foreign  policy  reports,  and  I  believe  that  it 
will  be  recognized  that  the  measures  are  con- 
ducted on  their  own  merit  and  not  for  do- 
mestic reasons. 

The  Press:  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr. 
Secretary. 


United  States  Protests  Attack 
on  Search  Mission  in  Viet-Nam 

Following  is  a  U.S.  note  delivered  to  the 
Embassy  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  at  Pajis  by  the  U.S.  Embassy  on  De- 
cember 17. 

Press  release  45fiA  dated  Decemlier  17 

The  Department  of  State  of  the  United 
States  of  America  presents  its  compliments 
to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Democratic  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  and  has 
the  honor  to  refer  to  the  Agreement  on  End- 
ing the  War  and  Restoring  Peace  in  Viet- 
Nam  of  January  27,  1973. 

On  December  15,  1973,  communist  forces 
attacked  three  unarmed  helicopters  of  the 
Four-Party  Joint  Military  Team  (FPJMT) 
in  Binh  Chanh  District,  Gia  Dinh  Province 
of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam.  This  attack 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  one  helicopter, 
the  death  of  one  American  and  one  Viet- 
namese and  the  wounding  of  several  Amer- 
icans and  Vietnamese  in  the  party.  These 
helicopters  and  personnel  were  engaged  in 
the  search  for  missing  personnel,  a  humani- 
tarian mission  specifically  authorized  by  the 
Agreement.  The  helicopters  were  clearly 
marked  in  orange,  the  color  designating  them 
as  FPJMT  vehicles.  As  is  customary,  the 
communist  side  had  been  notified  in  advance 
of  the  details  of  this  search  mission  and  had 
been  invited  to  participate. 

The  United  States  condemns  in  strongest 
terms  this  unprovoked  act  by  the  communist 
side  and  deplores  the  unnecessary  loss  of  life 
which  has  resulted.  The  United  States  is 
gravely  concerned  over  this  latest  contempti- 
ble violation  of  the  Agreement  by  the  com- 
munist side.  The  United  States  notes  that  the 
communist  side  has  consistently  adopted  a 
callous  attitude  toward  the  provisions  of  the 
Agreement  that  call  for  a  full  accounting  of 
the  missing-in-action.  Now,  not  content  with 
obstructing  the  implementation  of  those  pro- 
visions through  its  indifference  and  total  lack 
of  cooperation,  the  communist  side  has  again 
resorted  to  criminal  acts  to  prevent  their 
implementation. 


86 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  United  States  urges  the  Democratic 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  to  promptly  identify 
and  punish  those  on  its  side  who  were  re- 
sponsible for  the  deplorable  attack  in  Gia 
Dinh.  Beyond  that,  the  United  States  once 
again  calls  on  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  to  fulfill  its  undertakings  as  speci- 
fied in  the  Agreement  and  to  demonstrate  in 
real  terms  its  cooperation  in  accounting  for 
the  missing-in-action.  The  Democratic  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  will  recognize  clearly  the 
grave  responsibilities  it  has  in  this  matter. 


President  Names  Export  Council 
and  Interagency  Committee 

Folloiciiifj  is  a  Wliite  House  cnnioiiucement 
issued  on  December  20,  together  with  the  text 
of  a  mcmo)(uidnm  signed  by  President  Nixon 
that  day  establishing  the  President's  Inter- 
agency Committee  on  Export  Expansion. 


WHITE   HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 

White  House  press  release  clate<l  December  20 

President  Nixon  announced  on  December 
20  the  appointment  of  22  persons  as  members 
of  the  President's  Export  Council.  They  are : 

Fletcher  L.  Byrom,  of  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  chairman  of 
the  board,  Koppers  Company,  Inc.,  Pittsburgh.  Mr. 
Byrom  will  serve  as  Chairman  of  the  Council. 

F.  Perry  Wilson,  of  New  York,  N.Y.,  chairman  of 
the  board  and  chief  executive  officer,  Union  Car- 
bide Corporation,  New  York.  Mr.  Wilson  will  serve 
as  Vice  Chairman  of  the  Council. 

James  H.  Binns,  of  Lancaster,  Pa.,  president  and 
director,  Armstrong  Cork  Company,  and  director, 
Campbell  Soup  Company. 

Werner  C.  Brown,  of  Wilmington,  Del.,  president 
and  chief  executive  officer,  Hercules,  Inc.,  Wil- 
mington. 

Hugh  G.  Chatham,  of  Elkin,  N.C.,  chairman  of  the 
board,  Chatham  Manufacturing,  Elkin ;  director. 
Business  Foundation  of  North  Carolina,  North 
Carolina  Textile  Foundation,  American  Textile 
Manufacturers  Association,  and  Hanes  Dye  and 
Finishing  Company. 

Edward  W.  Cook,  of  Germantown,  Tenn.,  president 
of  Cook  and  Company,  Memphis,  Tenn. 


R.  Hal  Dean,  of  Glendale,  Mo.,  chief  executive  officer 
and  director,  Ralston  Purina  Company,  St.  Louis, 
Mo. 

E.  Mandell  de  Windt,  of  Lyndhurst.  Ohio,  chair- 
man and  president  of  the  board,  Eaton  Corpora- 
tion, Cleveland,  Ohio. 

J.  Robert  Fluor,  of  Pasadena,  Calif.,  chairman  of 
the  board  and  chief  executive  officer,  Fluor  Corpo- 
ration, Los  Angeles,  Calif. 

John  L.  Hanigan,  of  Glencoe,  111.,  president  and 
chief  executive  officer,  Brunswick  Corporation, 
Chicago,  111. 

John  W.  Hanley,  of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  president  and 
chief  executive  officer,  Monsanto  Corporation,  St. 
Louis. 

John  D.  Harper,  of  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  chairman  of  the 
board.  Aluminum  Company  of  America,  Pitts- 
burgh. 

Robert  Hatfield,  of  Greenwich,  Conn.,  chairman  of 
the  board,  president,  and  chief  financial  and  ex- 
ecutive officer.  Continental  Can  Company,  New 
York,  N.Y. 

Melvin  C.  Holm,  of  Fayetteville,  N.Y.,  president, 
chief  executive  officer,  and  chairman  of  the  board, 
Carrier  Corporation,  Syracuse,  N.Y. 

John  V.  James,  of  Dallas,  Tex.,  president,  chief 
executive  officer,  and  director.  Dresser  Industries, 
Inc.,  Dallas. 

Reginald  H.  Jones,  of  Greenwich,  Conn.,  chairman 
of  the  board,  chief  executive  officer,  and  president, 
General  Electric  Company,  New  York,  N.Y. 

J.  Paul  Lyet,  of  Bronxville,  N.Y.,  director,  Sperry 
Rand  Corporation,  New  York,  N.Y. 

David  C.  Scott,  of  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  chairman  of  the 
board,   Allis  Chalmers   Corporation,   Milwaukee. 

Mark  Shepard,  Jr.,  of  Dallas,  Tex.,  president,  Texas 
Instruments,  Dallas. 

Lynn  A.  Townsend,  of  Bloomfield  Hills,  Mich., 
chairman  of  the  board  and  chief  executive  officer, 
Chrysler  Corporation,  Detroit,  Mich. 

Calvin  W.  Verity,  Jr.,  of  Middletown,  Ohio,  chair- 
man of  the  board,  Ai-mco  Steel  Corporation,  Mid- 
dletown. 

T.  A.  Wilson,  of  Seattle,  Wash.,  chief  executive 
officer,  Boeing  Corporation,  Seattle. 

The  President's  Export  Council  was  estab- 
lished on  December  20  by  Executive  order.^ 
On  October  11,  1973,  the  President  an- 
nounced that  he  would  establish  the  Council, 
and  a  new  President's  Interagency  Commit- 
tee on  Export  Expansion,  also  established  on 
December  20.  On  October  11,  the  President 
also  announced  that  he  would  appoint  Mr. 
Byrom  as  Chairman  and  Mr.  Wilson  as  Vice 
Chairman  of  the  President's  Export  Council. 


'  No.  11753 ;  for  text,  see  38  Fed.  Reg.  34983. 


January  28,    1974 


87 


The  President's  Export  Council  and  tiie 
President's  Interagency  Committee  on  Ex- 
port Expansion,  working  through  the  Coun- 
cil on  International  Economic  Policy,  will 
recommend  short-term  action  to  achieve  ma- 
terial improvement  in  the  U.S.  trade  account, 
long-term  programs  to  achieve  equilibrium 
in  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments,  and  action 
to  remove  domestic  impediments  to  U.S.  ex- 
ports and  improve  or  supplement  existing 
incentives. 


The  Committee  will  submit  within  90  days  its  first 
report  on  recommendations  concerning  impediments 
to  U.S.  exports. 

Richard  Nixon. 


Interest  Equalization  Tax 
Reduced 

Tveasurii  Department  Announcement 


MEMORANDUM   FROM   PRESIDENT   NIXON 

White  House  press  release  dated  December  20 

December  20,  1973. 
Memorandum  for: 

The  Secretary  of  Agriculture 

The  Secretary  op  Commerce 

The  Secretary  of  Labor 

The  Secretary  of  Transportation 

Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  Affairs 

Deputy  Secretary  op  the  Treasury 

Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense 

Assistant  Attorney  General,  Antitrust  Divi- 
sion 

President,  Export-Import  Bank  of  the  United 
States 

Chairman,  Federal  Maritime  Commission 

Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations 

Director,  Office  of  Management  and  Budget 

Executive  Director,  Council  on  International 
Economic  Policy 

This  memorandum  establishes  the  President's  In- 
teragency Committee  on  Export  Expansion,  which 
will  report  to  the  President  through  the  Council  on 
International  Economic  Policy.  The  Secretary  of 
Commerce  will  serve  as  Chairman  with  the  other  ad- 
dressees as  members.  The  President's  Interagency 
Committee  on  Export  Expansion  will  ensure  that 
programs  and  policies  that  affect  the  United  States 
export  performance  are  coordinated  and  operate  ef- 
fectively to  achieve  common  objectives. 

The  Committee  will  identify,  evaluate  and  make 
recommendations  concerning  impediments  to  U.S. 
exports,  especially  those  which  are  under  Federal 
control.  It  will  also  consider  analysis  of  other  aspects 
of  the  U.S.  export  performance  such  as  the  ongoing 
interagency  evaluation  of  U.S.  export  promotion  pro- 
grams chaired  by  0MB. 


The  Treasury  Department  today  [Decem- 
ber 26]  announced  that,  pursuant  to  an 
Executive  order  signed  by  the  President,-  the 
interest  equalization  tax  (lET)  applicable  to 
acquisitions  of  foreign  stock  and  foreign 
debt  obligations  will  be  reduced  from  the 
present  rate  of  approximately  three-quarters 
of  1  percent  to  a  new  rate  of  approximately 
one-quarter  of  1  percent.  The  new  lower  lET 
rate  schedule  will  be  applicable  to  trades  and 
acquisitions  of  foreign  stock  or  obligations 
made  after  December  31,  1973. 

The  lET  has  been  in  effect  since  July  1963 
as  a  means  of  helping  to  restrain  flows  of 
capital  from  the  United  States  into  portfolio 
investments  in  other  developed  countries. 
Under  the  lET  law,  the  President  has  au- 
thority to  vary  the  effective  rate  of  tax 
between  zero  and  the  equivalent  of  IV-j  per- 
cent per  annum  on  purchases  of  foreign 
securities  subject  to  the  tax.  The  last  change 
in  the  rate  of  the  tax  was  on  April  5,  1969, 
when  it  was  reduced  from  li/j.  percent  to 
three-quarters  of  1  percent  per  annum. 


'  Issued  on  Dec.  26  (Department  of  the  Treasury 
press  release).  On  the  same  day  the  Department  of 
Commerce  announced  changes  in  the  foreign  direct 
investment  program  and  the  Board  of  Governors  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System  issued  amendments  to 
the  voluntary  foreign  credit  restraint  guidelines. 
The  Treasury  Department  also  noted  that  it  will  be 
conferring  with  the  Congress  during  1974  on  the 
question  of  eliminating  the  withholding  and  estate 
taxes  applicable  to  foreign  investors  in  the  United 
States. 

'  No.  11754;  for  text,  see  38  Fed.  Reg.  35423. 


88 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


THE    UNITED    NATIONS 


U.N.  General  Assembly  Adopts  Convention 
on   Protection  of  Diplomats 


Following  is  a  statement  made  in  plenav]) 
session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on 
December  H  by  U.S.  Representative  W. 
Tapley  Bennett,  Jr.,  together  with  the  text 
of  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Assembly  that 
day. 


STATEMENT   BY  AMBASSADOR  BENNETT 

USUN  press  release  134  <lated  December  14 

This  Assembly  can  justly  be  proud  of  hav- 
ing successfully  completed  its  work  on  this 
important  convention. 

A  debt  of  gratitude  is  owed  to  the  Interna- 
tional Law  Commission.  The  Commission 
produced  the  excellent  draft  which  was  the 
basis  of  the  Assembly's  work  and  which  by 
its  excellence  greatly  facilitated  our  task. 
Since  work  of  the  highest  caliber  is  what  we 
can  routinely  expect  from  the  Commission 
by  now,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  Com- 
mission produced  this  draft  at  a  single  ses- 
sion in  response  to  the  request  of  the  Assem- 
bly. 

This  effort  which  the  Assembly  has 
brought  to  fruition  was  in  response  to  an 
urgent  need.  The  long-established  principle 
of  the  inviolability  of  diplomatic  agents  was 
being  threatened  by  random  acts  of  violence 
in  various  parts  of  the  world.  The  continued 
effectiveness  of  diplomatic  channels,  the 
means  by  which  states  communicate  with  one 
another,  has  been  jeopardized.  Although  the 
legal  obligation  to  protect  these  persons  was 
never  questioned,  the  mechanism  for  inter- 
national cooperation  to  insure  that  perpe- 
trators of  serious  attacks  against  such  per- 
sons are  brought  to  justice,  no  matter  to 
where  they  may  flee,  was  lacking. 


The  Assembly  here  and  now  declares  to  the 
world  that  under  no  circumstances  may  a 
diplomat  be  attacked  with  impunity.  In  addi- 
tion, the  convention  sets  up  a  valuable  legal 
mechanism  which  requires  submission  for 
prosecution  or  extradition  of  persons  alleged 
to  have  committed  serious  crimes  against 
diplomats.  This  mechanism  is  similar  to  that 
employed  in  the  field  of  interference  with 
civil  aviation — specifically  in  the  Hague  (Hi- 
jacking) and  Montreal  (Sabotage)  Conven- 
tions.' Indeed,  many  of  the  provisions  of  the 
new  convention  have  been  modeled  on  pro- 
visions of  the  Hague  and  Montreal  Conven- 
tions. While  the  new  convention  in  several 
cases  makes  drafting  improvements  or  re- 
finements, these  are  intended  simply  to 
clarify  the  intention  of  the  previous  conven- 
tions. 

Paragraph  2  of  article  1  defines  the  term 
"alleged  offender."  The  definition,  while 
couched  in  apparently  technical  language, 
must  of  course  be  read  more  broadly  so  it  can 
be  applied  by  the  various  legal  systems.  We 
shall  regard  it  as  incorporating  the  standard 
applied  in  determining  whether  there  are 
sufficient  grounds  for  extradition  in  accord- 
ance with  normal  extradition  practice. 

Article  2  of  the  convention  defines  the 
crimes  covered.  The  Legal  Committee  de- 
cided to  cover  serious  crimes,  as  was  the 
initial  intention  of  the  International  Law 
Commission.  Subparagraph  1(a)  has  been 
clarified  so  that  instead  of  referring  to  "vio- 
lent attack"  it  refers  to  "murder,  kidnap- 
ping or  other  attack."  Obviously,  the  words 
"other  attack"   mean   attacks   of  a   similar 


'  For  texts  of  the  conventions,   see  Bulletin   of 
Jan.  11,  1971,  p.  53,  and  Oct.  12,  1971,  p.  465. 


January  28,    1974 


89 


United  Stales  Signs  Convention 
on  Protection  of  Diplomats 

Statement  by  William  E.  Schaufele,  Jr} 

I  am  gratified  to  sign  today  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States  the  Convention  on  the  Preven- 
tion and  Punishment  of  Crimes  Against  Inter- 
nationally Protected  Persons,  Including  Diplo- 
matic Agents. 

As  Ambassador  Bennett  assured  the  plenary 
in  his  statement  on  this  subject,  in  the  two 
weeks  since  the  adoption  of  the  convention  by 
the  Assembly  my  government  has  undertaken 
an  urgent  review  of  the  final  text  of  the  con- 
vention. We  have  concluded  that  the  text  on 
the  whole  is  excellent.  In  signing  the  conven- 
tion, the  United  States  signifies  its  intention 
to  begin  the  necessary  process  of  submitting 
the  convention  to  the  Congress  and  of  seeking 
appropriate  legislation  in  order  to  put  us  in  a 
position  to  be  able  to  ratify  the  convention. 

Since  the  United  States  thinks  this  conven- 
tion should  go  into  force  as  promptly  as  possi- 
ble, we  have  acted  with  a  sense  of  urgency. 
Both  the  International  Law  Commission  and 
the  General  Assembly  considered  the  adoption 
of  this  convention  a  most  urgent  matter.  In- 
deed, the  preamble  of  the  convention  itself 
points  to  the  concern  generated  in  the  interna- 
tional community  by  attacks  on  diplomats. 
The  United  States  hopes  that  all  other  govern- 
ments will  consider  the  matter  with  a  similar 
sense  of  urgency  and  take  prompt  action  so 
that  this  convention  can  be  brought  into  force 
as  promptly  as  possible  on  a  wide  geographical 
basis. 


'  Made  at  U.N.  Headquarters  on  Dec.  28 
(USUN  press  release  140).  Ambassador 
Schaufele  is  U.S.  Deputy  Representative  in  the 
U.N.  Security  Council. 


serious  nature  to  those  expressly  mentioned 
— murder  and  kidnapping.  Covering  threats, 
attempts,  and  accessoryship  is  appropriate 
because  of  the  initial  seriousness  of  the  acts 
covered  under  subparagraphs  (a)  and  (b)  of 
paragraph  1. 

The  crimes  covered  in  paragraph  1  of 
article  2  are  those  to  which  reference  is  made 
throughout  the  convention  by  the  phrase  "the 
crimes  set  forth  in  Article  2."  Paragraph  3 
of  article  2  does  not  add  to  the  crimes  cov- 


ered by  the  convention  but  merely  states  a 
basic  fact  that  would  be  true  whether  or  not 
this  paragraph  were  included  in  the  conven- 
tion. 

Together  with  articles  1,  2,  and  3,  articles 
6,  7,  and  8  join  to  form  the  basic  mechanism 
of  the  convention.  This  mechanism  is  ob- 
viously central  to  the  object  and  purpose  of 
the  convention,  and  without  it  the  convention 
could  not  operate  effectively. 

Article  6  establishes  the  obligation  upon 
states  parties  to  insure  the  continued  pres- 
ence for  the  purpose  of  prosecution  or  extra- 
dition of  an  alleged  offender  when  he  is  on 
the  territory  of  that  state  party.  The  phrase 
"upon  being  satisfied  that  the  circumstances 
so  warrant"  merely  reflects  the  fact  that 
before  a  state  may  take  action  it  must  know 
of  the  presence  of  the  alleged  offender  in  its 
territory. 

The  obligation  in  article  7  is  clearly  stated 
to  be  "without  exception  whatsoever."  It 
forms  a  central  part  of  the  mechanism  of  the 
convention. 

Several  articles  in  the  convention  deal  with 
cooperation  among  states  in  the  prevention 
and  punishment  of  the  covered  crimes.  These 
are  articles  4,  5,  6,  10,  and  11.  Article  4  deals 
with  taking  all  practicable  measures  to  pre- 
vent preparation  for  the  commission  of  the 
covered  crimes.  The  United  States  under- 
stands this  obligation  to  refer  to  doing  the 
utmost  to  prevent  attempts  to  commit  such 
crimes  or  conspiracy  to  commit  such  crimes. 
Article  10  is  notable  in  that  it  substantially 
improves  the  prospects  for  proper  presenta- 
tion of  cases  when  prosecutions  are  con- 
ducted outside  the  territory  of  the  state 
party  in  whose  territory  the  crime  was  com- 
mitted. In  such  cases  assistance  in  connec- 
tion with  the  criminal  proceedings,  as  well 
as  the  supply  of  all  evidence  at  the  disposal 
of  other  states  parties,  including  witnesses 
who  are  willing  or  can  be  convinced  to  attend 
proceedings  in  another  state,  will  be  neces- 
sary for  the  mechanism  of  the  convention  to 
operate  successfully. 

Article  12  is  a  compromise  article  which 
was  the  result  of  a  difficult  negotiation.  While 
the  United  States  does  not  see  the  need  for 
such  an  article  in  this  convention,  we  recog- 


90 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


nize  that  there  are  some  other  countries  that 
believe  it  essential  that  such  an  article  be 
included.  This  having  been  said,  we  worked 
cooperatively  with  those  countries  to  draft 
an  article  that  is  limited  in  its  scope  and 
clear  in  its  language.  The  article  states  that 
this  convention  shall  not  affect  the  applica- 
tion of  treaties  on  asylum  in  force  as  be- 
tween parties  to  those  treaties  inter  se.  That 
is  to  say,  even  if  the  alleged  offender  is  pres- 
ent on  the  territory  of  one  party  to  such  a 
treaty  and  the  state  on  the  territory  of  which 
the  crime  has  taken  place  is  also  a  party  to 
such  a  treaty,  if  the  internationally  protected 
person  attacked  exercised  his  functions  on 
behalf  of  a  state  not  party  to  such  a  treaty 
or  the  alleged  offender  was  a  national  of  a 
state  not  party  to  such  a  treaty,  the  state 
where  the  alleged  offender  is  present  may 
not  invoke  that  treaty  with  respect  to  the 
non-party  state.  Thus,  the  non-party  state 
can  hold  the  state  where  the  alleged  offender 
is  present  to  its  obligations  under  article  7 
and  may,  if  it  wishes,  request  extradition 
under  article  8. 

The  United  States  would  have  preferred  a 
stronger  dispute-settlement  provision  than 
the  one  contained  in  article  13.  The  U.S. 
delegation  made  proposals  to  this  end  dur- 
ing the  negotiations.  However,  many  coun- 
tries preferred  to  follow  the  model  of  the 
Hague  and  Montreal  Conventions.  Nonethe- 
less, we  are  gratified  that  minor  technical 
improvements  have  been  made  in  paragraph 
1  of  article  13,  which  we  consider  reflect 
more  precisely  the  intention  of  the  drafters 
of  the  provisions  in  the  Hague  and  Montreal 
Conventions. 

We  are  also  pleased  that  an  acceptable 
compromise  has  been  arrived  at  with  regard 
to  the  final  clauses  which  permits  the  widest 
possible  adherence  to  the  convention  without 
placing  the  Secretary  General  in  an  impossi- 
ble position. 

Since  the  Assembly  did  such  excellent  work 
in  completing  the  convention,  we  were 
pleased  to  vote  in  favor  of  the  resolution 
which  constitutes  the  formal  act  of  adoption 
of  the  convention.  Such  a  resolution  consti- 
tutes the  procedural  step  by  which  the  inter- 
national community,  whether  operating  in 


the  context  of  the  General  Assembly  or  a 
diplomatic  conference  specially  convened  for 
the  purpose,  concludes  its  legislative  actions. 
While  this  resolution  contains  some  para- 
graphs which  we  would  not  have  considered 
necessary,  we  nevertheless  see  no  particular 
harm  in  their  inclusion  since  they  do  not  pur- 
port to  impinge — and  of  course  cannot  im- 
pinge— upon  the  convention.  One  such  para- 
graph restated  propositions  we  were  all 
pleased  to  accept  in  the  authoritative 
Friendly  Relations  Declaration  at  the  25th 
session.  It  is  perhaps  always  useful  to  recog- 
nize fundamental  human  rights,  including 
the  legitimate  exercise  of  the  right  of  self- 
determination  in  accordance  with  the  char- 
ter. 

Regarding  the  injunction  in  paragraph  6 
of  the  resolution  to  the  United  Nations  to 
publish  the  resolution  in  conjunction  with  the 
convention,  we  consider  that  this  requires 
the  convention  to  be  published  as  part  of  the 
United  Nations  volumes  of  resolutions  of  the 
General  Assembly;  in  addition,  the  idea  of 
including  the  resolution  in  the  treaty  series 
for  information  purposes  could  be  regarded 
as  useful  in  that  those  referring  to  the  treaty 
series  can  conveniently  have  ready  access  to 
the  resolution. 

The  convention  will  be  opened  for  signa- 
ture today,  and  my  government  has  begun 
the  necessary  review  of  the  final  text  in  order 
to  enable  us  to  sign  it  before  the  end  of  the 
year.  We  hope  a  number  of  others  will  do 
likewise. 

The  convention  would  not  have  been  possi- 
ble without  the  positive  cooperation  of  all 
regional  groups.  Such  cooperation  was 
forthcoming,  and  as  a  result  this  Assembly 
has  a  major  positive  achievement. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  -' 

The  General  Assembly, 

Considering  that  the  codification  and  progressive 
development  of  international  law  contributes  to  the 
implementation  of  the  purposes  and  principles  set 
forth  in  Articles  1  and  2  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations, 


-U.N.   doc.  A/RES/3166    (XXVIII);   adopted  by 
the  Assembly  without  objection  on  Dec.  14. 


January  28,   1974 


91 


Recalling  that  in  response  to  the  request  made  in 
General  Assembly  resolution  2780  (XXVI)  of  3 
December  1971,  the  International  Law  Commission, 
at  its  twenty-fourth  session,  studied  the  question  of 
the  protection  and  inviolability  of  diplomatic  agents 
and  other  persons  entitled  to  special  protection  under 
international  law  and  prepared  draft  articles  on  the 
prevention  and  punishment  of  crimes  against  such 
persons, 

Having  considered  the  draft  articles  and  also  the 
comments  and  observations  thereon  submitted  by 
States  and  by  specialized  agencies  and  intergovern- 
mental organizations  in  response  to  the  invitation 
made  in  General  Assembly  resolution  2926  (XXVII) 
of  28   November  1972, 

Convinced  of  the  importance  of  securing  interna- 
tional agreement  on  appropriate  and  effective  meas- 
ures for  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  crimes 
against  diplomatic  agents  and  other  internationally 
protected  persons  in  view  of  the  serious  threat  to 
the  maintenance  and  promotion  of  friendly  relations 
and  co-operation  among  States  created  by  the  com- 
mission of  such  crimes, 

Having  elaborated  for  that  purpose  the  provisions 
contained  in  the  Convention  annexed  hereto, 

1.  Adopts  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and 
Punishment  of  Crimes  against  Internationally  Pro- 
tected Persons,  including  Diplomatic  Agents,  an- 
nexed to  the  present  resolution ; 

2.  Re-cmi)hasizcs  the  great  importance  of  the  rules 
of  international  law  concerning  the  inviolability  of 
and  special  protection  to  be  afforded  to  internation- 
ally protected  persons  and  the  obligations  of  States 
in  relation  thereto; 

3.  Considers  that  the  annexed  Convention  will  en- 
able States  to  carry  out  their  obligations  more  effec- 
tively ; 

4.  Recognizes  also  that  the  provisions  of  the  an- 
nexed Convention  could  not  in  any  way  prejudice 
the  exercise  of  the  legitimate  right  to  self-deter- 
mination and  independence  in  accordance  with  the 
purposes  and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations  and  the  Declaration  on  Principles  of  Inter- 
national Law  concerning  Friendly  Relations  and  Co- 
operation among  States  in  accordance  with  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  by  peoples  strug- 
gling against  colonialism,  alien  domination,  foreign 
occupation,  racial  discrimination  and  apartheid; 

5.  Invites  States  to  become  parties  to  the  an- 
nexed Convention ; 

6.  Decides  that  the  present  resolution,  whose  pro- 
visions are  related  to  the  annexed  Convention,  shall 
always  be  published  together  with  it. 

ANNEX 

Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment 
OF  Crimes  against  Internationally  Protected 
Persons,  including  Diplomatic  Agents 

The  States  Parties   to  this  Convention, 

Having  in  mind  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the 


Charter  of  the  United  Nations  concerning  the  main- 
tenance of  international  peace  and  the  promotion  of 
friendly  relations  and  co-operation  among  States, 

Considering  that  crimes  against  diplomatic  agents 
and  other  internationally  protected  persons  jeopard- 
izing the  safety  of  these  persons  create  a  serious 
threat  to  the  maintenance  of  normal  international 
relations  which  are  necessary  for  co-operation  among 
States, 

Believing  that  the  commission  of  such  crimes  is  a 
matter  of  grave  concern  to  the  international  com- 
munity. 

Convinced  that  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  adopt 
appropriate  and  effective  measures  for  the  preven- 
tion and  punishment  of  such  crimes, 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  1 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Convention: 

1.  "internationally  protected  person"  means: 

(a)  a  Head  of  State,  including  any  member  of  a 
collegial  body  performing  the  functions  of  a  Head 
of  State  under  the  constitution  of  the  State  con- 
cerned, a  Head  of  Government  or  a  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  whenever  any  such  person  is  in  a 
foreign  State,  as  well  as  members  of  his  family  who 
accompany  him ; 

(b)  any  representative  or  official  of  a  State  or 
any  official  or  other  agent  of  an  international  orga- 
nization of  an  intergovernmental  character  who,  at 
the  time  when  and  in  the  place  where  a  crime 
against  him,  his  official  premises,  his  private  accom- 
modation or  his  means  of  transport  is  committed,  is 
entitled  pursuant  to  international  law  to  special 
protection  from  any  attack  on  his  person,  freedom 
or  dignity,  as  well  as  members  of  his  family  forming 
part  of  his  household; 

2.  "alleged  offender"  means  a  person  as  to  whom 
there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  determine  prima  facie 
that  he  has  committed  or  participated  in  one  or  more 
of  the  crimes  set  forth  in  article  2. 

Article  2 
1.  The  intentional  commission  of: 

(a)  a  murder,  kidnapping  or  other  attack  upon 
the  person  or  liberty  of  an  internationally  protected 
person ; 

(b)  a  violent  attack  upon  the  official  premises,  the 
private  accommodation  or  the  means  of  transport 
of  an  internationally  protected  person  likely  to  en- 
danger his  person  or  liberty; 

(c)  a  threat  to  commit  any  such  attack; 

(d)  an  attempt  to  commit  any  such  attack;  and 

(e)  an  act  constituting  participation  as  an  ac- 
complice in  any  such  attack 

shall  be  made  by  each  State  Party  a  crime  under  its 
internal  law. 


92 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


2.  Each  State  Party  shall  make  these  crimes  pun- 
ishable by  appropriate  penalties  which  take  into 
account  their  grave   nature. 

3.  Parag:raphs  1  and  2  of  this  article  in  no  way 
derogate  from  the  obligations  of  States  Parties 
under  international  law  to  take  all  appropriate 
measures  to  prevent  other  attacks  on  the  person, 
freedom  or  dignity  of  an  internationally  protected 
person. 

Article  3 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  take  such  measures  as 
may  be  necessary  to  establish  its  jurisdiction  over 
the  crimes  set  forth  in  article  2  in  the  following 
cases: 

(a)  when  the  crime  is  committed  in  the  territory 
of  that  State  or  on  board  a  ship  or  aircraft  regis- 
tered in  that  State; 

(b)  when  the  alleged  offender  is  a  national  of  that 
State; 

(c)  when  the  crime  is  committed  against  an  inter- 
nationally protected  person  as  defined  in  article  1 
who  enjoys  his  status  as  such  by  virtue  of  functions 
which  he  exercises  on  behalf  of  that  State. 

2.  Each  State  Party  shall  likewise  take  such 
measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  establish  its  juris- 
diction over  these  crimes  in  cases  where  the  alleged 
offender  is  present  in  its  territory  and  it  does  not 
e.xtradite  him  pursuant  to  article  8  to  any  of  the 
States  mentioned  in  paragraph  1  of  this  article. 

3.  This  Convention  does  not  exclude  any  criminal 
jurisdiction  exercised  in  accordance  with  internal 
law. 

Article  4 

States  Parties  shall  co-operate  in  the  prevention 
of  the  crimes  set  forth  in  article  2,  particularly  by: 

(a)  taking  all  practicable  measures  to  prevent 
preparations  in  their  respective  territories  for  the 
commission  of  those  crimes  within  or  outside  their 
territories ; 

(b)  exchanging  information  and  co-ordinating  the 
taking  of  administrative  and  other  measures  as  ap- 
propriate to  prevent  the  commission  of  those  crimes. 

Article  5 

1.  The  State  Party  in  which  any  of  the  crimes 
set  forth  in  article  2  has  been  committed  shall,  if  it 
has  reason  to  believe  that  an  alleged  offender  has 
fled  from  its  territory,  communicate  to  all  other 
States  concerned,  directly  or  through  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  United  Nations,  all  the  pertinent 
facts  regarding  the  crime  committed  and  all  available 
information  regarding  the  identity  of  the  alleged 
offender. 

2.  Whenever  any  of  the  crimes  set  forth  in 
article  2  has  been  committed  against  an  interna- 
tionally protected  person,  any  State  Party  which  has 
information  concerning  the  victim  and  the  circum- 


stances of  the  crime  shall  endeavour  to  transmit  it, 
under  the  conditions  pi'ovided  for  in  its  internal  law, 
fully  and  promptly  to  the  State  Party  on  whose 
behalf  he  was  exercising  his  functions. 

Article  6 

1.  Upon  being  satisfied  that  the  circumstances  so 
warrant,  the  State  Party  in  whose  territory  the 
alleged  offender  is  present  shall  take  the  appropriate 
measures  under  its  internal  law  so  as  to  ensure  his 
presence  for  the  purpose  of  prosecution  or  extradi- 
tion. Such  measures  shall  be  notified  without  delay 
directly  or  through  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
United  Nations  to; 

(a)  the  State  where  the  crime  was  committed; 

(b)  the  State  or  States  of  which  the  alleged 
offender  is  a  national  or,  if  he  is  a  stateless  person, 
in  whose  territory  he  permanently  resides; 

(c)  the  State  or  States  of  which  the  internation- 
ally protected  person  concerned  is  a  national  or  on 
whose  behalf  he  was  exercising  his  functions; 

(d)  all  other  States  concerned;  and 

(e)  the  international  organization  of  which  the 
internationally  protected  person  concerned  is  an 
official  or  an  agent. 

2.  Any  person  regarding  whom  the  measures 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this  article  are  being 
taken  shall  be  entitled: 

(a)  to  communicate  without  delay  with  the  nearest 
appropriate  representative  of  the  State  of  which  he 
is  a  national  or  which  is  otherwise  entitled  to  protect 
his  rights  or,  if  he  is  a  stateless  person,  which  he 
requests  and  which  is  willing  to  protect  his  rights; 
and 

(b)  to  be  visited  by  a  representative  of  that  State. 

Article  7 

The  State  Party  in  whose  territory  the  alleged 
offender  is  present  shall,  if  it  does  not  extradite  him, 
submit,  without  exception  whatsoever  and  without 
undue  delay,  the  case  to  its  competent  authorities 
for  the  purpose  of  prosecution,  through  proceedings 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  that  State. 

Article  8 

1.  To  the  extent  that  the  crimes  set  forth  in  article 
2  are  not  listed  as  extraditable  offences  in  any  extra- 
dition treaty  existing  between  States  Parties,  they 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  included  as  such  therein. 
States  Parties  undertake  to  include  those  crimes  as 
extraditable  offenses  in  every  future  extradition 
treaty  to  be  concluded  between  them. 

2.  If  a  State  Party  which  makes  extradition  con- 
ditional on  the  existence  of  a  treaty  receives  a  re- 
quest for  extradition  from  another  State  Party  with 
which  it  has  no  extradition  treaty,  it  may,  if  it 
decides  to  extradite,  consider  this  Convention  as  the 
legal  basis  for  extradition  in  respect  of  those  crimes. 


January  28,    1974 


93 


Extradition  shall  be  subject  to  the  procedural  provi- 
sions and  the  other  conditions  of  the  law  of  the 
requested  State. 

3.  States  Parties  which  do  not  make  extradition 
conditional  on  the  existence  of  a  treaty  shall  recog- 
nize those  crimes  as  extraditable  offences  between 
themselves  subject  to  the  procedural  provisions  and 
the  other  conditions  of  the  law  of  the  requested  State. 

4.  Each  of  the  crimes  shall  be  treated,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  extradition  between  States  Parties,  as  if  it 
had  been  committed  not  only  in  the  place  in  which  it 
occurred  but  also  in  the  territories  of  the  States  re- 
quired to  establish  their  jurisdiction  in  accordance 
with  paragraph  1  of  article  3. 

Article  9 

Any  person  regarding  whom  proceedings  are  being 
carried  out  in  connexion  with  any  of  the  crimes  set 
forth  in  article  2  shall  be  guaranteed  fair  treatment 
at  all  stages  of  the  proceedings. 

Article  10 

1.  States  Parties  shall  afford  one  another  the 
greatest  measure  of  assistance  in  connexion  with 
criminal  proceedings  brought  in  respect  of  the  crimes 
set  forth  in  article  2,  including  the  supply  of  all  evi- 
dence at  their  disposal  necessary  for  the  proceed- 
ings. 

2.  The  provisions  of  paragraph  1  of  this  article 
shall  not  affect  obligations  concerning  mutual  judi- 
cial assistance  embodied  in  any  other  treaty. 

Article  11 

The  State  Party  where  an  alleged  offender  is  pros- 
ecuted shall  communicate  the  final  outcome  of  the 
proceedings  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
Nations,  who  shall  transmit  the  information  to  the 
other  States  Parties. 

Article  12 

The  provisions  of  this  Convention  shall  not  affect 
the  application  of  the  Treaties  on  Asylum,  in  force 
at  the  date  of  the  adoption  of  this  Convention,  as 
between  the  States  which  are  parties  to  those  Trea- 
ties; but  a  State  Party  to  this  Convention  may  not 
invoke  those  Treaties  with  respect  to  another  State 
Party  to  this  Convention  which  is  not  a  party  to  those 
Treaties. 

Article  13 

1.  Any  dispute  between  two  or  more  States  Par- 
ties concerning  the  interpretation  or  application  of 
this  Convention  which  is  not  settled  by  negotiation 
shall,  at  the  request  of  one  of  them,  be  submitted 
to  arbitration.  If  within  six  months  from  the  date  of 
the  request  for  arbitration  the  parties  are  unable  to 
agree  on  the  organization  of  the  arbitration,  any  one 
of  those  parties  may  refer  the  dispute  to  the  Inter- 


national Court  of  Justice  by  request  in  conformity 
with  the  Statute  of  the  Court. 

2.  Each  State  Party  may  at  the  time  of  signature 
or  ratification  of  this  Convention  or  accession  there- 
to declare  that  it  does  not  consider  itself  bound  by 
paragraph  1  of  this  article.  The  other  States  Parties 
shall  not  be  bound  by  paragraph  1  of  this  article 
with  respect  to  any  State  Party  which  has  made  such 
a  reservation. 

3.  Any  State  Party  which  has  made  a  reservation 
in  accordance  with  paragraph  2  of  this  article  may  at 
any  time  withdraw  that  reservation  by  notification 
to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations. 

Article  14 

This  Convention  shall  be  open  for  signature  by  all 
States,  until  31  December  1974  at  United  Nations 
Headquarters  in  New  York. 

Article  15 

This  Convention  is  subject  to  ratification.  The 
instruments  of  ratification  shall  be  deposited  with 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations. 

Article  16 

This  Convention  shall  remain  open  for  accession 
by  any  State.  The  instruments  of  accession  shall  be 
deposited  with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
Nations. 

Article  17 

1.  This  Convention  shall  enter  into  force  on  the 
thirtieth  day  following  the  date  of  deposit  of  the 
twenty-second  instrument  of  ratification  or  acces- 
sion with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

2.  For  each  State  ratifying  or  acceding  to  the  Con- 
vention after  the  deposit  of  the  twenty-second  instru- 
ment of  ratification  or  accession,  the  Convention 
shall  enter  into  force  on  the  thirtieth  day  after 
deposit  by  such  State  of  its  instrument  of  ratifica- 
tion or  accession. 

Article  18 

1.  Any  State  Party  may  denounce  this  Convention 
by  written  notification  to  the  Secretary-General  of 
the  United  Nations. 

2.  Denunciation  shall  take  effect  six  months  fol- 
lowing the  date  on  which  notification  is  received  by 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations. 

Article  19 

The  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  shall 
inform  all  States,  inter  alia: 

(a)  of  signatures  to  this  Convention,  of  the  de- 
posit of  instruments  of  ratification  or  accession  in 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


accordance  with  articles  14,  15  and  16  and  of  notifi- 
cations made  under  article  18. 

(b)  of  the  date  on  which  this  Convention  will  enter 
into  force  in  accordance  with  article  17. 

Article  20 

The  original  of  this  Convention,  of  which  the  Chi- 
nese, English,  French,  Russian  and  Spanish  texts  are 
equally  authentic,  shall  be  deposited  with  the  Secre- 
tary-General of  the  United  Nations,  who  shall  send 
certified   copies   thereof   to   all    States. 

In  Witness  Whereof  the  undersigned,  being  duly 
authorized  thereto  by  their  respective  Governments, 
have  signed  this  Convention,  opened  for  signature  at 
New  York  on  14  December  1973. 


U.S.  Approves   UNHCR   Efforts 
To   Secure   Rights  for   Refugees 

Following  is  a  statement  made  in  Commit- 
tee III  (Social,  Hnmanitarian  and  Cultural) 
of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  November 
26  by  U.S.  Representative  Clarence  Clyde 
Ferguson,  Jr.,  together  ivitli  the  text  of  a 
)-esoliition  adopted  by  the  committee  on 
November  27  and  by  the  Assembly  o)i  De- 
cember ]!(. 

STATEMENT   BY  AMBASSADOR  FERGUSON 

USUN  press  release  118  ilatetl  November  26 

My  government  wishes  to  commend  the 
High  Commissioner  for  his  excellent  report.' 
It  is  a  particular  pleasure  for  me  to  note  the 
fine  humanitarian  work  that  he  is  doing 
throughout  the  world.  I  personally  count  it  a 
privilege  to  have  been  able  to  work  with  the 
High  Commissioner  on  other  occasions  on 
many  matters  of  great  import. 

Perhaps  no  other  group  has  suffered  the 
almost  complete  deprivation  of  human  rights 
as  have  had  refugees.  No  other  group  has 
been  so  shorn  of  hope.  It  is  the  task  of  the 
U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR)  to  rebuild  that  hope.  This  re- 
quires above  all  the  restoration  to  refugees 


'  U.N.  doc.  .\/9012. 


of  a  great  many  of  those  very  rights  which 
are  so  clearly  enunciated  in  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 

We  consider  that  Prince  Sadruddin  Aga 
Khan  has  brought  the  influence  of  his  office 
to  bear,  in  the  most  salutary  fashion,  upon 
the  lives  of  refugees  the  world  over.  His 
humanitarian  work  has  also  contributed  sig- 
nificantly to  the  stability  of  the  countries  of 
asylum  for  refugees. 

My  government  has  consistently  stressed 
the  overriding  importance  of  the  function  of 
international  protection  of  refugees  among 
the  activities  of  the  UNHCR.  In  the  first  in- 
stance it  is  essential  that  effective  safe  haven 
or  asylum  be  secured  for  refugees.  The  pro- 
vision of  asylum  is  the  function  and  the  duty 
of  the  counti-y  into  which  the  refugee  has 
fled.  But  it  is  likewise  the  duty  of  the  High 
Commissioner  to  maintain  close  coordination 
with  governments  of  asylum  countries,  with 
the  view  to  insuring  that  the  forcible  return 
of  refugees  to  their  country  of  origin — re- 
foulement — shall  not  take  place.  Indeed,  the 
High  Commissioner  is  given  a  supervisory 
function  in  that  respect  by  two  international 
treaties — the  1951  U.N.  Convention  and  the 
1967  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Status  of 
Refugees. 

These  treaties  are  surely  two  of  the  most 
important  instruments  yet  formulated  to 
implement  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Hu- 
man Rights.  Both  treaties  recognize  the 
priority  need  for  protecting  the  actual  safety 
of  the  refugee.  Some  67  nations  have  thus 
far  acceded  to  one  or  both  of  these  interna- 
tional treaties.  Yet  it  remains  true  that 
roughly  one-half  of  the  nations  of  the  world 
have  not  yet  accepted  either  treaty.  My  gov- 
ernment applauds  the  High  Commissioner  for 
his  unrelenting  efforts  to  secure  further  rati- 
fications of  the  refugee  convention  and  proto- 
col. 

My  government  finds  it  particularly  dis- 
turbing to  learn  that  cases  of  refoulement 
continue  to  occur.  We  deplore  the  fact  that 
any  country  would  knowingly  depart  from 
the  time-honored  U.N.  principle  that  any 
repatriation  of  refugees  must  be  voluntary. 


January   28,    1974 


95 


and  we  lend  our  complete  support  to  the 
persistent  efforts  of  the  High  Commissioner 
toward  terminating  this  practice. 

As  the  committee  knows,  the  two  refugee 
treaties  also  contain  provisions  which  would 
guarantee  a  number  of  specified  rights  to 
refugees  which  are  fully  consistent  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights.  These  rights  in  toto  form  the 
basis  enabling  the  refugee  to  cease  being  a 
refugee  and  through  his  own  eff"orts  to  take 
his  place  in  the  life  of  his  new  community, 
living  in  dignity,  self-support,  and  self- 
respect.  The  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees has  carried  out  thoroughgoing  measures 
vis-a-vis  contracting  parties  to  these  treaties 
in  the  eft'ort  to  secure  their  full  and  rightful 
implementation  in  the  territories  concerned. 

My  government  was  interested  and  grati- 
fied that  the  World  Peace  Through  Law 
Center,  at  its  sixth  biennial  world  conference 
held  at  Abidjan  in  August  1973,  devoted 
major  attention  to  the  subject  of  interna- 
tional protection  for  refugees.  I  was  pleased 
to  have  been  able  to  participate  in  the  con- 
ference. The  conference  stressed  the  direct 
link  between  the  achievement  of  world  peace 
and  the  attainment  of  human  rights  for  refu- 
gees. We  applaud  this  concentration  of  atten- 
tion on  this  subject  on  the  part  of  a  broad 
cross  section  of  the  most  eminent  of  the 
world's  lawyers  and  judges,  and  we  will 
watch  with  great  interest  the  progress  of 
followup  action  planned  by  the  World  Peace 
Through  Law  Center. 

The  UNHCR  has  extended  life-sustaining 
assistance  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of  refu- 
gees through  his  material  assistance  pro- 
gram. The  High  Commissioner  has  done  this 
through  projects  which  from  their  inception 
are  designed  to  lead  ultimately  to  the  com- 
plete rehabilitation  of  the  refugee. 

As  the  High  Commissioner  notes,  the  pur- 
pose of  UNHCR  assistance  is  to  enable  the 
refugee  to  cease  being  a  refugee.  Thus,  we 
applaud  the  High  Commissioner's  constant 
efforts  with  asylum  countries  to  facilitate 
naturalization  of  refugees.  Here  the  High 
Commissioner  has  used  his  material  assist- 
ance program  as  an  essential  complement  to 


his  international  protection  function.  The 
end  objective  is  to  remove  the  refugee  from 
dependence  on  international  resources  and  to 
assimilate  him  in  new  national  communities 
with  all  the  rights  and  protections  enjoyed  by 
nationals. 

I  cannot  conclude  these  remarks  without 
particular  recognition  of  the  splendid  per- 
formance of  the  UNHCR  in  carrying  out  the 
special  duties  assigned  him  by  the  Secretary 
General.  First,  we  wish  to  commend  the  High 
Commissioner  for  his  successful  efforts  in 
providing  care  and  maintenance  and  finding 
resettlement  opportunities  for  the  stateless 
Asians  of  Uganda.  In  this  connection  I  may 
note  that  the  United  States  provided  1,500 
resettlement  opportunities  in  the  United 
States  for  stateless  Asians  from  LTganda. 

At  the  request  of  the  Secretary  General, 
as  the  Assembly  is  aware,  the  High  Commis- 
sioner continued  his  emergency  relief  pro- 
gram within  the  Sudan  through  October  of 
this  year.  My  government  wishes  to  congrat- 
ulate the  UNHCR  on  the  completion  with 
great  efficiency  of  an  important  and  diflicult 
operation.  The  United  States  in  1972,  and 
subsequently,  contributed  a  very  substantial 
portion  of  the  total  contribution  to  the 
UNHCR  budgets  for  the  Uganda  Asian  and 
Sudanese  programs. 

Finally,  my  government  wishes  to  express 
its  full  confidence  that  the  UNHCR  will  be 
successful  in  carrying  out  his  special  assign- 
ment as  Executive  Agent  in  coordinating  the 
exchange  of  persons  in  South  Asia.  The  High 
Commissioner  has  already  displayed  great 
imagination  and  an  exemplary  sense  of  ur- 
gency in  pursuit  of  this  historic  task.  My 
government  is  making  initial  contributions 
totaling  $2,150,000  to  this  special  program. 

We  should  all  be  grateful  that  the  High 
Commissioner  has  achieved  such  a  large 
measure  of  success,  in  both  his  regular  and 
his  special  assignments,  and  that  he  is  press- 
ing so  insistently  toward  necessary  ends 
which  have  not  yet  been  achieved.  Of  equal 
import  is  the  fact  that  the  High  Commis- 
sioner has  maintained  all  of  his  activities  on 
a  completely  nonpolitical  basis.  This  has  been 
one  of  the  key  reasons  for  his  great  success  in 


96 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


giving  meaning  to  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights  as  it  touches  upon  the  lives 
of  refugees. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION - 

The  General  Assembly, 

Having  considered  the  report  of  the  United  Na- 
tions High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  concerning 
the  activities  of  his  Office  and  having  heard  his  state- 
ment, 

Noting  with  appreciation  the  manner  in  which  the 
High  Commissioner  has,  in  accordance  with  the  rele- 
vant resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly  and  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council  and  the  directives  of  the 
Executive  Committee  of  the  High  Commissioner's 
Programme,  carried  out  essential  humanitarian 
actions, 

Bearing  in  mind  the  importance  of  the  increas- 
ingly useful  co-operation  between  the  High  Commis- 
sioner and  other  members  of  the  United  Nations 
system,  resulting  in  better  co-ordination  of  action 
and  greater  efficiency  in  fields  of  common  interest, 

Recognizing  the  importance  of  voluntary  repatria- 
tion as  a  permanent  solution  to  the  problem  of  refu- 
gees and  the  useful  role  played  by  the  High  Com- 
missioner in  co-operation  with  other  members  of  the 
United  Nations  system  and  non-governmental 
agencies  in  assisting  them. 

Noting  with  satisfaction  the  increasing  number  of 
Governments  contributing  to  the  High  Commission- 
er's programme  and  the  generous  attitude  adopted  by 
Governments  in  supporting  various  activities  of  the 
High  Commissioner, 

Commending  accessions  to  the  Convention  relating 
to  the  Status  of  Refugees  of  1951,  the  protocol  relat- 
ing to  the  Status  of  Refugees  of  1967  and  other 
relevant  instruments, 

1.  Expresses  its  deep  satisfaction  at  the  efficient 
manner  in  which  the  United  Nations  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees  and  his  staff  continue  to  accom- 
plish their  humanitarian  task,  and  appeals  to  him  to 
consider  favourably  his  re-election  on  account  of  the 
unflagging  dedication  which  he  has  manifested  since 
he  assumed  the  responsibilities  of  his  present  post; 

2.  Requests  the  High  Commissioner  to  continue 
his  assistance  and  protection  activities  in  favour  of 
refugees  within  his  mandate  as  well  as  for  those  to 
whom  he  extends  his  good  offices  or  is  called  upon  to 
assist  in  accordance  with  relevant  resolutions  of  the 
General  Assembly; 

3.  Requests  the  High  Commissioner  to  continue  his 


=  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/3143  (XXVIII);  adopted  by  the 
Assembly  without  objection  on  Dec.  14. 


efl'orts,  in  co-operation  with  Governments,  United 
Nations  bodies  and  voluntary  agencies,  to  promote 
permanent  and  speedy  solutions  through  voluntary 
repatriation,  assistance  in  rehabilitation  where  neces- 
sary, integration  in  countries  of  asylum  or  resettle- 
ment in  other  countries; 

4.  Urges  Governments  to  continue  to  lend  their 
support  to  the  High  Commissioner's  humanitarian 
action  by: 

(a)  Facilitating  the  accomplishment  of  his  task 
in  the  field  of  international  protection; 

(b)  Co-operating  in  the  promotion  of  permanent 
solutions  to  refugee  problems; 

(c)  Providing  the  necessary  means  to  attain  the 
financial  targets  established  with  the  approval  of  the 
Executive  Committee  of  the  High  Commissioner's 
Programme. 


U.S.  Votes  for  November   1974 
World  Food  Conference 

Folloiving  is  a  statement  ryiade  in  plenary 
session  of  the  U.N.  General  AssemhUj  on 
December  17  by  U.S.  Representative  W.  Tap- 
ley  Bennett,  Jr.,  together  with  the  text  of  a 
resolution  adopted  by  the  Assembly  that  day. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  BENNETT 

USUN  pi-ess  release  136  dated  December  17 

I  wish  to  express  the  appreciation  of  my 
government  for  the  cooperation  of  all  mem- 
bers who  have  contributed  their  time  and 
their  ideas  to  the  consideration  of  plans  for 
the  World  Food  Conference.  It  is  a  credit  to 
the  United  Nations  system  that  in  the  short 
time  since  this  matter  was  proposed  to  the 
General  Assembly  in  late  September,  it  has 
been  reviewed  and  approved  by  the  17th  Gen- 
eral Conference  of  the  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organization,  the  Economic  and  Social  Coun- 
cil, the  Second  Committee,  and  now  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

My  government  takes  satisfaction  in 
events  leading  to  passage  by  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  resolution  calling  for  the 
convening  of  a  World  Food  Conference.  Sec- 
retary   Kissinger    called    attention    to    the 


January  28,   1974 


97 


pressing  nature  of  the  problem  in  his  speech 
to  the  General  Assembly  on  September  24 
when  he  said : 

The  growing  threat  to  the  world's  food  supply 
deserves  the  urgent  attention  of  this  Assembly.  Since 
1969,  global  consumption  of  cereals  has  risen  more 
rapidly  than  production;  stocks  are  at  the  lowest 
levels  in  years.  We  now  face  the  prospect  that — even 
with  bumper  crops — the  world  may  not  rebuild  its 
seriously  depleted  reserves  in  this  decade. 

My  government  believes  that  a  World  Food 
Conference  can  significantly  assist  the  world 
community  in  meeting  this  challenge  of 
global  proportions.  The  purpose  of  the  con- 
ference, as  we  and  many  other  delegates  here 
have  noted,  would  be  to  explore  means  to 
maintain  adequate  food  supplies  in  the  face 
of  rising  world  demand  and  to  prevent 
hunger  and  malnutrition  resulting  from  na- 
tional disasters.  The  conference  will  offer 
an  opportunity  to  agree  on  principles  appli- 
cable to  all  governments  in  this  effort. 

The  U.S.  proposal  for  a  World  Food 
Conference  is  fully  consistent  with  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  just  now 
beginning.  We  believe  that  they  are  com- 
plementary. Questions  of  trade  and  of  the 
supply  and  demand  for  food  are  highly  inter- 
related. On  the  one  hand  we  hope  to  see  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  reaching 
agreement  on  specific  commitments  by  coun- 
tries to  deal  with  all  the  factors  that  under- 
lie trade  distortions  and  trade  in  agricultural 
products  specifically.  We  see  the  World  Food 
Conference,  on  the  other  hand,  not  as  a  ne- 
gotiating forum  for  agricultural  trade  issues 
but  as  an  opportunity  for  arriving  at  gen- 
erally accepted  principles  and  objectives  in 
the  agricultural  field  which  can  facilitate 
negotiations  in  other  international  fora. 

Turning  to  preparations  for  the  food  con- 
ference, we  are  pleased  to  note  that  there  is 
general  agreement  that  the  conference  should 
be  preceded  by  a  careful  analysis  of  factors 
directly  relevant  to  the  food  situation.  In  our 
view  this  review  should  include  assessment  of 
the  demand  and  supply  outlook,  the  projected 
pace  of  technological  change,  and  the  pros- 
pects of  the  developing  countries  improving 
their   food   production,   both  for  their   own 


domestic  consumption  and  for  export.  We 
believe  that  this  type  of  information  will 
provide  an  essential  basis  for  eflfective  plan- 
ning by  the  international  community. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  generally  recognized 
that  increasing  food  production  in  develop- 
ing countries  is  a  fundamental  requirement 
if  we  are  to  assure  long-term  world  food 
security.  Increasing  this  food  production,  as 
many  delegates  have  pointed  out,  involves  a 
vast  range  of  agricultural,  trade,  and  devel- 
opmental issues — issues  that  often  transcend 
the  strictly  agricultural  field.  A  single  con- 
ference cannot  reach  useful  decisions  on  all 
these  questions.  Accordingly,  we  believe  that 
the  World  Food  Conference  must  concentrate 
on  a  few  key  issues  where  improved  inter- 
national cooperation  can  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  produce  substantial  results  quickly. 

For  example,  one  means  of  increasing  food 
availabilities  within  a  relatively  short  time 
in  the  developing  countries  lies  in  devising 
more  effective  measures  to  prevent  the  large 
crop  losses  which  regularly  occur  as  a  result 
of  pests,  plant  diseases,  and  inadequate  stor- 
age facilities. 

Another  measure,  on  which  work  is  al- 
ready being  done,  is  the  maintenance  of  ade- 
quate stocks  of  food  to  enable  the  world 
to  cope  effectively  with  shortfalls  in  produc- 
tion and  surges  in  demand.  The  World  Food 
Conference  may  wish  to  build  on  the  work  of 
the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  in 
this  field  by  developing  a  set  of  principles 
that  would  define  the  responsibilities  of  all 
countries  for  the  maintenance  of  adequate 
stocks.  In  this  connection,  attention  should 
also  be  paid  to  the  role  of  independently  held 
commercial  stocks  as  an  important  part  of 
world  food  reserves. 

In  addition  to  food  reserves,  the  United 
States  believes  that  food  aid  and  disaster 
relief  are  areas  that  would  benefit  from  im- 
proved international  coordination.  Guidelines 
for  both  donor  and  recipient  nations  should 
be  worked  out  that  will  insure  that  food  aid 
is  used  as  effectively  as  possible,  both  to  meet 
disaster  relief  needs  and  also  to  encourage 
agricultural  productivity. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  United  States  believes 


98 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


that  the  nations  of  the  world  have  in  the 
World  Food  Conference  a  unique  opportunity 
to  rededicate  themselves  to  the  goal  of  pro- 
viding sufficient  food  for  all  the  world's 
people,  a  goal  which,  as  Secretary  Kissinger 
said  on  September  24,  is  an  essential  element 
and  a  prerequisite  for  the  sort  of  world  com- 
munity we  all  seek. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  ^ 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recognizing  that  the  principal  task  of  a  world 
food  conference,  on  which  the  greatest  effort  should 
be  concentrated,  consists  in  developing  ways  and 
means  whereby  the  international  community  as  a 
whole  could  take  specific  action  to  resolve  the  woi'ld 
food  problem  within  the  broader  context  of  devel- 
opment and  international  economic  co-operation. 

Believing  that  a  world  food  conference  would 
provide  members  with  a  forum  in  which  to  bring: 
about  the  improvement  of  world  food  security  and 
emergency  assistance, 

Recognizing  that  the  conference  should,  in  the  first 
instance,  place  emphasis  on  additional  measures  for 
increasing  the  food  production,  consumption  and 
trade  of  developing  countries. 

Recalling  that  the  Fourth  Conference  of  Heads  of 
State  or  Government  of  Non-Aligned  Countries,  held 
at  Algiers  from  5  to  9  September  1973,  called  for 
the  convening,  as  a  matter  of  urgency,  of  a  confer- 
ence on  food  problems  at  the  ministerial  level,  spon- 
sored jointly  by  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organiza- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  and  the  United  Nations 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development,  and  further 
recalling  the  proposal  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica for  the  convocation  of  a  world  food  conference 
under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations, 

1.  Decides  to  convene  a  World  Food  Conference 
under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations  for  about 
two  weeks,  in  November  1974,  in  Rome; 

2.  Recommends  that  the  Conference  be  an  inter- 
governmental   conference    at   the    ministerial    level ; 

3.  Entrusts  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  with 
over-all  responsibility  for  the  Conference; 


'U.N.    doc.   A/RES/3180    (XXVIII);   adopted   by 
the  Assembly  without  vote  on  Dec.  17. 


4.  Requests  the  Secretary-General,  after  consulta- 
tion with  the  Director-General  of  the  Food  and 
Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations  and 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development,  to  appoint  as 
soon  as  possible  a  Secretary-General  of  the  Confer- 
ence, and  to  set  up  a  small  Conference  secretariat 
drawing  pai'ticularly  upon  the  expertise  and  com- 
petence of  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
of  the  United  Nations,  the  United  Nations  Confer- 
ence on  Trade  and  Development  and  other  relevant 
bodies  of  the  United  Nations  system; 

5.  Recommends  that  in  preparing  for  the  World 
Food  Conference,  proper  account  be  taken  of  the 
recommendations  of  the  seventeenth  Conference  of 
the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United 
Nations  and  of  the  recommendations  made  by  legisla- 
tive bodies  of  other  organizations  in  the  United  Na- 
tions system  concerning  the  goals  and  objectives  of 
the  Conference,  as  requested  by  the  Economic  and 
Social   Council  in   its   decision  of  18   October   1973; 

6.  Invites  all  the  competent  organizations  of  the 
United  Nations  system  to  collaborate  closely  in  the 
organization  of  the  Conference; 

7.  Accepts  with  appreciation  the  invitation  of  the 
Government  of  Italy  to  act  as  host  to  the  Conference 
in  Rome. 


Ambassador  Martin  To  Coordinate 
U.S.  Participation  in  Food  Conference 

Secretary  Kissinger  announced  on  De- 
cember 21  (press  release  467)  the  appoint- 
ment of  Ambassador  Edwin  M.  Martin  as 
Coordinator  of  U.S.  participation  in  the 
World  Food  Conference.  The  U.N.  General 
Assembly  adopted  unanimously  on  December 
17  a  resolution  providing  that  the  conference 
should  be  held  in  November  1974.  The  hold- 
ing of  the  conference  was  proposed  by  Secre- 
tary Kissinger  in  his  inaugural  speech  to  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly  in  September.  Am- 
bassador Martin,  who  will  report  directly  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  will  take  up  his  new 
duties  early  in  1974.  (For  biographic  data, 
see  press  release  467.) 


January   28,    1974 


99 


United   States  Opposes  Move  To  Change  Representation 
of  Cambodia   in   the   United   Nations 


Statement  by  W.  Tapley  Bennett,  Jr. 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  ' 


Last  week  this  Assembly  discussed  means 
of  strengthening  the  United  Nations.  During 
that  debate  the  United  States  called  attention 
to  the  growing  tendency  of  some  of  our  mem- 
bers to  propose  simplistic  one-sided  resolu- 
tions on  the  most  complex  and  difficult  of 
issues,  resolutions  often  totally  unacceptable 
to  the  parties  concerned.  My  delegation 
pointed  out  then  that  in  divorcing  itself  from 
reality  in  this  manner,  the  General  Assembly 
was  weakening  its  ability  to  have  impact  on 
the  real  problems  we  face  in  many  parts  of 
the  world. 

Regrettably,  the  resolution  we  are  consid- 
ering today  is  particularly  notable  both  for 
its  one-sidedness  and  for  its  failure  to  take 
account  of  the  real  situation  as  it  presently 
exists  in  Cambodia  and  in  East  Asia.  One 
can  only  wonder  at  the  curious  twists  of 
logic  which  have  produced  a  resolution 
through  which  some  members  of  the  non- 
aligned  movement  appear  to  support  great- 
power  hegemony  in  Asia,  through  which 
self-proclaimed  revolutionary  governments 
appear  to  support  the  divine  right  of  a  royal 
pretender,  and  through  which  some  of  those 
among  us  who  are  the  most  vociferous  in 
denouncing  outside  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  sovereign  states  now  propose  that  this  As- 
sembly instruct  the  Khmer  people  on  who  is 
to  represent  them. 

Certainly   the   complexities    of   the    issue 


'  Made    in    plenary    session    of   the    U.N.    General 
Assembly  on  Dec.  5  (USUN  press  release  126,  corr. 


before  us  are  worthy  of  a  more  balanced, 
considered  approach  than  that  taken  by  this 
resolution.  One  must  wonder  whether  its 
sponsors  have  thought  through  seriously  the 
consequences  of  what  they  propose.  Have 
they  asked  themselves,  for  example,  why  it  is 
that  only  one  East  Asian  member  govern- 
ment supports  seating  Prince  Sihanouk's 
"government"? 

Many  delegations  here  have  been  quick  to 
voice  their  concern  over  any  appearance  of 
great-power  domination  and  their  resent- 
ment whenever  they  believe  they  sense  the 
possibility  of  a  great-power  dictate.  Have 
they,  I  wonder,  thought  about  the  implica- 
tions of  this  resolution  for  Asia  ?  Have  they 
asked  the  views  of  their  many  East  Asian 
colleagues?  Have  they  considered  that  they 
would  be  siding  with  the  great  power  of  the 
area  against  the  smaller  ones? 

Yesterday  the  distinguished  Representa- 
tive of  Thailand  referred  to  the  views  of 
seven  Asian  and  Pacific  states — Indonesia, 
Japan,  Malaysia,  New  Zealand,  the  Philip- 
pines, Singapore,  and  Thailand.  These  states 
have  formulated  their  position  on  the  issue 
before  us  and  have  circulated  it  among  the 
U.N.  membership  in  document  A/9254.  I 
believe  that  all  of  us  have  an  obligation  to 
examine  these  views  carefully.  Many  mem- 
bers here  have,  in  other  circumstances,  in- 
sisted on  the  importance  of  giving  primacy 
to  states  of  a  region  or  their  regional  group- 
ing in  seeking  solutions  to  problems  of  their 
respective  area.   In  this  case,  it  seems  to  me. 


TOO 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


we  are  fortunate  to  have  a  regional  con- 
sensus before  us,  and  we  should  certainly 
give  it  the  greatest  weight  in  our  considera- 
tions. 

The  argumentation  made  in  support  of  the 
"Royal  Government  of  National  Union  of 
Cambodia"  seems  to  rest  largely  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  since  Prince  Sihanouk  is  at  its 
head,  it  must  be  the  true  government  of  Cam- 
bodia. But  with  all  due  respect  to  Prince 
Sihanouk's  once  intimate,  often  constructive 
role  in  earlier  Cambodian  developments,  I 
submit  that  we  can  find  some  more  objective 
and  reliable  criteria  for  deciding  who  gov- 
erns Cambodia.  Better  yet,  can  we  not  allow 
the  Cambodian  people  the  privilege  of  mak- 
ing this  determination  themselves?  The 
Cambodian  people  have  not,  so  far  as  I  know, 
granted  Prince  Sihanouk  any  irrevocable 
right  to  rule  over  them.  Neither,  I  submit, 
should  we. 

Among  the  sponsors  of  the  resolution 
before  us  are  some  of  the  most  vocal  sup- 
porters of  the  principle  of  noninterference  in 
the  internal  afi^airs  of  sovereign  states.  Have 
they  fully  considered  the  basic  conflict  be- 
tween this  principle  and  support  for  a  resolu- 
tion by  which  foreigners  would  tell  the 
Khmer  people  who  is  to  represent  them  in 
this  world  organization? 

It  is  hard  to  conceive  of  a  more  gross  or 
more  blatant  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  a  member  state.  If  this  were  to 
become  a  precedent,  who  is  to  say  what 
member  state  in  this  Assembly  might  not  be 
the  next  victim  of  such  a  procedure? 

All  of  us  who  have  been  reading  the  inter- 
national press — reputable  journals  such  as 
Le  Monde  of  Paris  and  the  Guardian  of  Brit- 
ain, which  enjoy  a  large  audience  here  in 
the  United  Nations — are  aware  that  Prince 
Sihanouk  himself  admits  that  he  is  not  in 
control  of  his  "government"  and  that  his 
"government"  is  not  in  control  of  Cambodia. 
Prince  Sihanouk  does  not  head  a  govern- 
ment-in-exile; he  is  a  non-government-in- 
exile.  Have  the  supporters  of  the  resolution 
before  us  given  thought  to  the  precedent  they 
are  setting  in  seeking  to  have  the  United 
Nations  decide  the  issue  of  Cambodian  rep- 


resentation not  on  the  basis  of  who  actually 
governs  Cambodia,  but  rather  who  they 
would  like  to  have  govern  Cambodia? 

But  let  us  leave  the  never-never  land  of  the 
"Royal  Government  of  National  Union  of 
Cambodia"  and  resolution  A/L.714.  Let  us 
turn  our  attention  to  the  real  world,  to  what 
has  happened  in  Cambodia,  what  is  happen- 
ing, and  what  my  delegation  believes  most  of 
us  hope  will  happen. 

In  March  of  1970,  Prince  Norodom  Siha- 
nouk was  removed  as  the  Chief  of  State  of 
Cambodia  by  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  Cam- 
bodian Parliament  under  the  terms  of  the 
constitution  then  in  effect,  the  constitution 
that  Prince  Sihanouk  himself  had  pro- 
claimed. The  complaint  against  the  Prince 
which  led  to  his  removal  was  his  open  and 
since  publicly  admitted  complicity  with 
North  Vietnamese  forces  in  the  prosecution 
of  their  war  against  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam.  His  activity  included  his  giving  per- 
mission for  large-scale  use  of  Cambodian  ter- 
ritory by  South  Vietnamese  Communists  and 
the  North  Vietnamese  Army  over  a  period  of 
years.  This  occupation  began  to  supplant  the 
indigenous  Cambodian  inhabitants  and,  in  a 
de  facto  manner,  to  annex  the  areas  occu- 
pied. Here  is  the  real  intervention  by  a  for- 
eign force.  This  is  the  intervention  that 
began  the  tragedy  of  Cambodia. 

The  removal  of  Prince  Sihanouk  was  not 
a  palace  coup.  It  resulted  from  popular  dis- 
affection and  general  discontent  with  the 
then  existing  situation.  The  initial  demon- 
strations began  in  the  provinces,  protesting 
North  Vietnamese  occupation  of  their  terri- 
tory, and  quickly  spread  to  the  capital,  cul- 
minating in  the  Parliament's  unanimous  de- 
cision to  remove  Prince  Sihanouk  from  the 
office. 

I  might  note  that  Prince  Sihanouk's  re- 
moval from  office  was  not  accompanied  by 
any  change  of  government.  The  government 
in  existence  at  the  time  had  been  chosen  by 
the  Prince  in  August  of  the  preceding  year, 
and  the  Parliament  had  been  elected  in  1966 
from  his  own  political  organization.  This 
government  remained  in  office,  reiterated  its 
adherence  to  all  treaties  and  agreements,  and 


January   28,    1974 


101 


made  no  substantive  changes  in  its  own  com- 
position. 

No  sooner  had  the  Cambodian  Govern- 
ment made  the  single  change  of  removing 
Sihanouk  and  begun  negotiations  with  Viet- 
namese Communist  representatives  for  the 
withdrawal  of  their  troops  from  Cambodia, 
.than  those  troops  began  to  attack  police  and 
army  posts  in  and  near  their  areas  of  occu- 
pation, to  widen  their  zones  of  control,  and 
to  protect  their  base  areas.  How  many  here 
protested  that  interference  by  foreign  forces 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  member  state? 

Following  his  removal  from  office,  Siha- 
nouk turned  to  an  insurgent  group  which  he 
had  previously  tried,  with  considerable  suc- 
cess, to  suppress,  the  Khmer  Rouge,  and  to 
the  Vietnamese  occupation  forces  in  an  effort 
to  regain  his  personal  power.  He  himself 
has  chosen  to  live  in  Peking.  The  principal 
bases  of  his  mandate  to  rule  Cambodia — 
North  Vietnamese  troops,  Chinese  diplo- 
macy, and  an  externally  supported  insur- 
gency— do  not  enhance  the  legitimacy  of  his 
claim. 

The  situation  at  present  is  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Cambodia  is  fighting  alone,  with- 
out the  assistance  of  foreign  ti'oops  or  for- 
eign advisers,  against  a  local  insurgency  led, 
equipped,  and  substantially  assisted  by  the 
forces  of  a  foreign  country.  North  Viet-Nam. 

The  Government  of  the  Khmer  Republic 
has  never  ceased  to  maintain  its  clear  con- 
trol of  the  machinery  of  government,  the 
support  of  a  great  majority  of  the  population, 
and  administration  of  the  crucial  urban  areas 
and  territories  in  which  the  greatest  portion 
of  the  economic,  social,  and  political  life  of 
the  Khmer  people  takes  place.  It  thus  com- 
mands the  resources  and  enjoys  the  support 
of  the  people  of  the  state  and  consequently 
is  in  a  position  to  carry  out  the  obligations  of 
Cambodia  under  the  U.S.  Charter. 

My  delegation  flatly  rejects  as  untrue  the 
assertions  by  the  delegation  of  Algeria  and 
the  delegation  of  China  that  the  insurgents 
in  Cambodia  control  a  majority  of  the  Khmer 
people.  We  have  all,  of  course,  unfortunately 


grown  accustomed  to  the  shrill  insistence  of 
the  Algerian  delegation  that  they  must  be 
the  one-sided  arbiter  of  almost  every  issue 
that  comes  before  this  body,  and  few  will 
be  surprised  to  know  that  the  Algerian  dele- 
gation has  resorted  to  gross  invention  and 
exaggeration. 

The  General  Assembly  should  be  more 
concerned  that  the  delegation  of  China  has, 
regrettably,  chosen  to  repeat  the  false 
charges  and  misstatements  of  fact  which  we 
heard  from  its  representative  in  the  Gen- 
eral Committee.  And  I  am  sorry  to  see  that 
it  has  once  again  employed  harsh  invective 
against  my  country.  Repetition  does  not 
make  false  allegations  and  misstatements  of 
fact  true.  China  is,  after  all,  a  permanent 
member  of  the  Security  Council.  We  believe 
China's  privileged  position  in  this  organiza- 
tion entails  certain  responsibilities,  including 
the  responsibility  of  the  Chinese  delegation 
to  present  its  views  in  a  reasonable  tone,  free 
from  propaganda  excesses  and  intentional 
inaccuracies. 

It  is  true  that  North  Vietnamese  and  in- 
surgent forces  have  disrupted  government 
control,  in  the  military  sense,  of  some  parts 
of  the  territory  of  Cambodia.  Claims  by  the 
insurgents  and  their  foreign  supporters  that 
they  control  90  percent  of  the  territory  and 
80  percent  of  the  population  are  patently 
false.  The  deep  water  port  of  Kompong  Som 
and  16  of  the  20  Provincial  capitals  are 
controlled  by  the  Government  of  the  Khmer 
Republic.  The  four  Provincial  capitals  ex- 
cepted, all  in  the  northeast  of  the  country, 
were  abandoned  to  the  North  Vietnamese 
Army  in  June  of  1970.  The  bulk  of  the 
Khmer  population  lives  along  the  lines  of 
communications  and  rivers.  These  are  gen- 
erally controlled  by  forces  loyal  to  the  gov- 
ernment in  Phnom  Penh.  We  estimate  that 
more  than  70  percent  of  the  population  is 
administered  by  the  Government  of  the 
Khmer  Republic. 

The  territory  in  which  the  North  Vietnam- 
ese and  the  Khmer  Rouge  hold  sway  is  pri- 
marily rural  in  character.   The  areas  of  cen- 


102 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tral  importance  to  the  main  functions  of 
government  and  the  social  patterns  of  Cam- 
bodian hfe,  as  well  as  the  major  markets  and 
other  ports,  are  clearly  under  full  govern- 
ment control.  Neutral  foreign  observers  are 
free  to  visit  the  areas  under  Phnom  Penh 
control  and  do  so  as  a  matter  of  course.  It 
should  also  be  noted  that  even  in  those  areas 
under  the  military  control  of  North  Vietnam- 
ese and  insurgent  forces,  a  large  part  of 
the  population  retains  its  allegiance  to  the 
Government  of  the  Khmer  Republic.  The 
thousands  of  refugees  who  flee  the  fighting 
in  contested  zones  go  only  to  territories  in 
wliich  the  government  has  clear  control. 

In  any  case,  the  fact  that  government  con- 
trol of  certain  parts  of  the  territory  of  Cam- 
bodia has  been  interrupted  by  North  Viet- 
namese and  insurgent  forces  has  no  neces- 
sary relationship  to  the  question  of  the  de- 
gree of  effective  authority  exercised  by  the 
self-styled  Sihanouk  "government."  That 
entity,  which  has  long  had  its  base  in  a  for- 
eign capital  far  distant  from  the  territory  of 
Cambodia,  has  not  even  demonstrated  its 
control  over  the  insurgent  forces  operating 
in  Cambodia.  Nor  is  there  any  indication 
that  that  entity  controls  any  sort  of  adminis- 
trative machinery  which  might  exercise  gov- 
ernmental authority  in  territory  under  the 
military  control  of  insurgent  and  North  Viet- 
namese forces. 

The  fighting  in  Cambodia  goes  on,  and  as 
long  as  the  North  Vietnamese  are  willing  to 
continue,  there  is  no  end  in  sight.  Should 
we,  in  view  of  this  long,  costly,  and  still-un- 
resolved conflict,  conclude  that  the  Khmer 
people  were  wrong  to  resent  and  resist  for- 
eign aggression  ?  Should  we  declare  that  they 
were  naive  to  believe  their  country  could 
avoid  the  domination  of  its  powerful  neigh- 
bors to  the  north?  Should  we  now  explain  to 
them  that  they  must  accept  a  regime  based  in 
Peking,  that  they  must  allow  North  Viet- 
Nam  to  occupy  and  control  much  of  their  ter- 
ritory, and  that  they  must  never  again  seek 
to  change  their  policies,  nor  their  Chief  of 
State,  without  first  securing  the  approval  of 


China,  North  Viet-Nam,  and  this  Assembly? 
We  cannot  believe  that  states  valuing  their 
own  sovereignty  and  represented  in  this 
Assembly  would  display  such  arrogance  in 
trying  to  dictate  to  the  people  of  a  member 
state  of  the  United  Nations. 

As  for  the  Khmer  people,  they  chose  not 
to  accept  the  dictates  of  a  cynical  realpolitik 
which  took  no  account  of  their  national 
pride,  their  dignity,  and  their  freedom.  In 
removing  Prince  Sihanouk  from  office,  the 
Government  of  Cambodia  sought  to  preserve 
its  neutrality,  its  independence,  and  its  sov- 
ereignty, national  rights  which  it  felt  Prince 
Sihanouk  had  ceased  to  defend.  Are  we  to 
tell  the  Khmer  people  that  these  principles 
are  only  words,  that  they  do  not  apply  to 
small,  weak  states  with  strong  aggressive 
neighbors?  Has  this  organization  so  for- 
gotten the  ideals  of  its  founders?  Have  we  so 
departed  from  the  principles  of  our  charter? 

Clearly  there  is  much  disagreement  among 
us  as  to  how  the  present  situation  in  Cam- 
bodia came  about  or  as  to  how  it  should  be 
resolved.  But  the  United  States  would  hope 
that  we  could  all  agree  that  a  negotiated  set- 
tlement is  preferable  to  a  military  solution. 
Let  us  all  read  the  public  statements  and 
study  the  private  actions  of  the  Government 
of  the  Khmer  Republic,  and  on  the  other 
hand  those  of  Prince  Sihanouk,  to  determine 
which  of  the  two  is  truly  seeking  peace, 
which  of  the  two  has  off"ered  to  negotiate, 
and  which  of  the  two  has  accepted  the  need 
for  conciliation.  It  is  the  Government  of  the 
Khmer  Republic  that  has  repeatedly  stated 
its  willingness  to  negotiate  a  political  settle- 
ment. It  is  Prince  Sihanouk  and  the  Khmer 
Rouge  who  seek  to  prolong  the  violence  and 
the  bloodshed.  Let  us  not  therefore  seek  to 
discredit  those  who  are  seeking  a  peaceful 
settlement.  Let  us  not  take  any  action  which 
can  only  complicate  the  situation  and  further 
block  the  path  to  peace.- 


-  On  Dec.  5  the  Assembly  adopted,  by  a  rollcall  vote 
of  53  (U.S.)  to  50,  with  21  abstentions,  a  motion  that 
consideration  of  the  item  be  adjourned  until  the  29th 
General  Assembly. 


January  28,   1974 


103 


U.S.   Discusses  Situation 
in   Namibia 

Statement  bij  W.  Tapley  Bennett,  J/J 

Given  recent  events,  it  is  entirely  fitting 
and  in  fact  necessary  that  the  Council  again 
review  the  unique  role  of  the  United  Nations 
with  regard  to  Namibia  and  that  we  examine 
the  situation  in  the  territory.  We  would  like 
to  take  this  opportunity  to  thank  the  Secre- 
tary General  for  his  conscientious  efforts  in 
carrying  out  his  mandate  under  the  terms  of 
Security  Council  Resolutions  309,  319,  and 
323  and  to  express  our  appreciation  for  the 
detailed  report  of  April  30  on  his  contacts 
with  representatives  of  the  Government  of 
South  Africa.-  With  hindsight,  perhaps  it 
would  have  been  more  useful  had  the  Council 
met  sooner  to  consider  the  conclusions 
reached  by  the  Secretary  General  in  his  re- 
port. 

It  has  been  nearly  two  years  since  the 
Council  first  invited  the  Secretary  General  to 
initiate  contacts  to  enable  the  people  of 
Namibia  to  exercise  their  right  to  self-deter- 
mination. The  situation  in  Namibia  today 
appears  on  the  surface  much  as  it  was  when 
Resolution  309  was  passed.  It  has  been  said, 
accordingly,  that  the  contacts  between  the 
Secretary  General  and  the  South  African 
Government  have  not  been  successful  in 
meeting  the  objectives  set  by  the  Council. 

Rather  than  simply  accepting  this  asser- 
tion, however,  let  us  examine  what  has  taken 
place.  Through  the  Secretary  General's  con- 
sultations, U.N.  officials  visited  Namibia, 
examined  conditions  firsthand,  and  met  with 
Namibians.  These  visits  were  a  concrete 
illustration  to  the  people  of  the  territory,  and 
to  the  world,  of  the  U.N.'s  concern  and  re- 
sponsibility for  Namibia. 

We  should  not  undervalue  the  Secretary 
General's  achievement  in  obtaining  South 
Africa's   assurances    on    Namibia.     Foreign 


'Made  in  the  U.N.  Security  Council  on  Dec.  11 
(USUN  press  release  131).  Ambassador  Rennett  is 
U.S.  Deputy  Representative  to  the  United  Nations. 

=  U.N.  doc.  S/10921. 


Minister  Muller  stated  that  South  Africa 
would  respect  the  wishes  of  the  whole  popula- 
tion in  Namibia  and  would  allow  all  political 
parties  "full  and  free  participation  in  the 
process  leading  to  self-determination  and 
independence."  He  added  that  South  Africa 
had  no  intention  of  delaying  self-determina- 
tion and  would  cooperate  with  the  Secretary 
General  to  determine  measures  to  achieve 
this  goal.  The  South  African  Government 
also  asserted  that  it  did  not  foresee  the  sud- 
den independence  of  individual  population 
groups.  On  balance — and  I  believe  that  his- 
tory will  support  this  view — we  believe  that 
the  Secretary  General's  efforts  have  been 
beneficial  to  U.N.  involvement  in  the  Nami- 
bian  question. 

We  have  followed  recent  events  in  Na- 
mibia, however,  with  deepening  concern.  We 
believe  that  the  South  African  Government 
could  have  avoided,  and  still  can  avoid,  such 
developments  which  call  into  question  its 
good  faith.  We  have  in  mind  in  particular 
that  government's  persistence  in  implement- 
ing its  so-called  homelands  policy  in  evident 
contradiction  to  previous  assurances  given 
the  Secretary  General.  The  numerous  arrests, 
the  arbitrary  suppression  of  political  activity, 
and  the  public  floggings  of  dissidents  conflict 
sharply  with  the  tenor  of  South  Africa's 
statements  to  the  Secretary  General. 

The  reaction  of  my  own  government  to 
South  Africa's  illegal  presence  in  Namibia  in 
fact  predates  these  moves.  Since  May  1970 
we  have  followed  a  policy  of  discouraging 
further  American  investment  there  and  have 
advised  potential  investors  that  we  will  not 
intercede  to  protect  their  investments  against 
claims  of  a  future  legitimate  government  in 
that  territory. 

As  Council  members  will  recall,  it  was  on 
July  29,  1970,  that  the  Security  Council  re- 
quested the  International  Court  of  Justice  to 
give  an  advisory  opinion  on  the  following 
question :  What  are  the  legal  consequences 
for  states  of  the  continued  presence  of  South 
Africa  in  Namibia,  notwithstanding  Security 
Council  Resolution  276   (1970)? 

The  United  States  participated  in  both  the 
written  and  oral  phases  of  the  argument  of 
the   case.    The  U.S.   position  was   that   the 


104 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


United  Nations  had  succeeded  to  the  super- 
visory powers  of  the  League  of  Nations  over 
the  mandate  granted  South  Africa  to  admin- 
ister Namibia  and  that  therefore  the  General 
Assembly  had  validly  terminated  that  man- 
date by  its  Resolution  2145  of  October  27, 
1966.  The  United  Nations  had  assumed  di- 
rect responsibility  for  the  territory,  and 
South  Africa  was  under  an  obligation  to 
withdraw  its  administration.  Until  it  did  so, 
however,  its  responsibilities  to  the  people  of 
Namibia  continued.  On  June  21,  1971,  the 
Court  handed  down  its  advisory  opinion,  the 
conclusions  of  which  were  consonant  with  the 
U.S.  position. 

The  United  States  regrets,  Mr.  President, 
that  South  Africa  has  not  abided  by  the 
spirit  of  its  discussions  with  the  Secretary 
General.  Yet  we  are  reluctant  to  eliminate 
the  possibility  of  future  talks.  As  we  are  all 
aware,  a  number  of  seemingly  intractable 
international  conflicts  and  problems  have 
been  solved  during  the  past  several  years  by 
patient,  dogged  negotiations.  Are  the  people 
of  Namibia  not  deserving  of  similar  efforts? 
The  United  States  continues  to  believe  that 
such  discussions  are  also  the  most  realistic 
way  of  gaining  self-determination  for  the 
people  of  Namibia.  A  number  of  questions 
concerning  South  Africa's  plans  for  Namibia 
require  more  specific  replies.  What  timetable 
does  South  Africa  propose  for  Namibia's 
self-government?  What  steps  is  South  Africa 
willing  to  take  now  to  improve  political  and 
social  conditions  in  the  territory?  The  Secre- 
tary General  should  be  free  to  seek  answers 
and  to  look  into  the  welfare  of  Namibians 
reportedly  arrested  for  speaking  with  visit- 
ing U.N.  officials. 

We  should  not  delude  ourselves  that  prog- 
ress toward  Namibian  self-determination 
will  be  quick.  As  the  Secretary  General  has 
cautioned,  time  and  protracted  discussion 
will  be  required.  Nonetheless,  we  believe  con- 
tacts between  the  Secretary  General  and 
South  Africa  are  valuable  in  illuminating 
South  Africa's  policies  and  actions.  It  is  ne- 
gotiation on  Namibia,  as  on  other  differences, 
which  holds  the  promise  of  ultimate  success. 

No  matter  what  one  might  think  of  the 
sincerity  of  the  Soutii  African  Government, 


responses  already  given  to  the  Secretary 
General  by  Foreign  Minister  Muller  repre- 
sented important  departures  from  previous 
policy.  They  signal  openings  which  are  ad- 
mittedly narrow  but  which  we  believe  to  be 
worth  further  exploration.^ 


U.N.  Defers  Action  on  Proposal 
for  Human  Rights  Commissioner 

Following  is  a  statement  made  in  Commit- 
tee III  (Social,  Humanitarian  and  Cidtural) 
of  the  U.N.  General  Asscmblij  on  December  5 
by  U.S.  Representative  William  F.  Buckley, 
Jr.,  together  with  the  text  of  a  resolution 
adopted  by  the  committee  on  December  4  and 
by  the  Assembly  on  December  H. 


STATEMENT   BY   MR.   BUCKLEY 

USUN  jiress  release  1:^5  <laled  Decemher  o 

My  government  desires  to  explain  its  ab- 
stention yesterday  on  the  two  votes  in  this 
committee  that  followed  the  truncated  debate 
on  the  motion  of  creating  a  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Human  Rights.' 

It  is  our  understanding  that  the  purpose  of 
this  committee  is  to  devise  means  of  promot- 
ing human  rights  around  the  world.  The 
arguments  of  tiiose  opposed  to  the  creation 
of  a  High  Commissioner  appeared  to  center 
on  the  concern  that  said  High  Commissioner 
would  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
their  countries.  Our  understanding  was  that 
suitable  precautions  against  such  interfer- 
ences, in  violation  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter,   were  built  into   the  pending  pro- 


"In  a  resolution  (S/RES/342  (1973))  adopted 
unanimously  on  Dec.  11,  the  Security  Council  decided 
"to  discontinue  further  efforts  on  the  basis  of  resolu- 
tion 309  (1972)"  and  requested  the  Secretary  General 
"to  keep  the  Security  Council  fully  informed  about 
any  new  important  developments  concerning  the 
question  of  Namibia." 

'  On  Dec.  4  the  United  States  abstained  on  a  sep- 
arate vote  on  the  words  "thirtieth  session"  in  opera- 
tive paragraph  3  of  the  draft  resolution,  as  well  as 
on  the  draft  resolution  as  a  whole. 


January  28,    1974 


105 


posal.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  deny 
that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  mere  es- 
pousal of  human  rights  in  an  international 
organization  is  to  interfere  philosophically 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  some  countries. 
Human  rights  is  an  ideal  to  which  we  all  pay 
lipservice.  Even  the  best  intentioned  among 
us  serve  that  ideal  asymptotically;  in  some 
societies,  with  such  studied  unsuccess  as  to 
call  into  question  whether  we  can  really  call 
human  rights  a  shared  ideal.  Among  those 
who  spoke  yesterday  in  opposition  to  a  High 
Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  were  states 
who  would  have  you  believe  that  such  is  the 
congestion  of  human  rights  within  their  fron- 
tiers that  it  is  necessary  to  surround  them- 
selves with  great  walls  and  oceans  to  prevent 
these  human  rights  from  emigrating. 

My  government  registers  its  sorrow  that 
all  the  work  that  in  the  last  eight  years  has 
gone  into  the  concept  of  a  High  Commis- 
sioner, who  might  have  proved  technically 
useful  in  promoting  human  rights,  has  ap- 
parently been  of  no  avail.  We  regret  that  the 
noble  resolution  proposed  by  the  distin- 
guished delegates  of  Sweden  and  Costa  Rica, 
for  which  we  intended  enthusiastically  to 
vote,  was  not  submitted  for  action  in  this 
chamber. 

Mr.  Chairman,  why  did  the  United  States 
then  abstain  on  the  proffered  resolution,  as 
amended? 

For  one  thing  there  was  the  lack  of  clarity. 

It  was  not  clear  yesterday,  and  it  is  no 
clearer  this  morning — indeed,  my  distin- 
guished colleagues  appear  to  be  divided  on 
the  interpretation — what  exactly  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  phrase  "alternative  approaches" 
as  used  in  the  third  paragraph  of  the  adopted 
resolution,  recording  that  we  have  decided  to 
include  in  the  provisional  agenda  of  the  30th 
session  of  the  General  Assembly  an  item 
entitled  "Alternative  approaches  and  ways 
and  means  within  the  United  Nations  system 
for  improving  the  effective  enjoyment  of  hu- 
man rights  and  fundamental  freedoms." 

"Alternative"  suggests  a  choice.  As  used  in 
the  adopted  resolution,  it  could  be  held  to 
mean  "other  than."  Other  than  what?  Other 
than  a  High  Commissioner?  But  this  com- 


mittee has  not  rejected  the  idea  of  a  High 
Commissioner.  It  can  only  be  understood,  by 
all  members  here  present,  as  having  agreed 
to  postpone  action.  The  ambiguity,  however, 
remains.  Since  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  in  favor  of  a  High  Commissioner  for 
Human  Rights,  it  is  obvious  that  we  could 
not  vote  for  a  resolution  which  might  be 
interpreted  as  suggesting  that  we  reject  a 
Human  Rights  Commissioner  as  a  means  of 
promoting  the  cause  of  human  rights.  It  is 
more  likely,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  the  majority 
of  my  distinguished  colleagues  intended  that 
the  phrase  "alternative  approaches"  meant 
something  more  accurately  given  as  "sup- 
plementary approaches" ;  that  is  to  say, 
approaches — not  excluding  a  High  Com- 
missioner— for  improving  the  effective  en- 
joyment of  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms  that  go  beyond  those  approaches 
already  institutionalized  in  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

However,  Mr.  Chairman,  even  if  that  am- 
biguity had  been  clarified,  my  government 
could  not  in  good  conscience  have  voted  to 
put  off  stimulating  the  pursuit  of  human 
freedoms  until  the  30th  session  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly.  To  suggest,  as  one  of  my 
distinguished  colleagues  did,  that  we  need 
more  time  in  order  to  permit  our  ideas  to 
"mature"  is  a  melancholy  reflection  on  the 
priorities  given  to  human  liberty,  reminding 
us  that  in  the  recorded  history  of  our  planet, 
human  rights  are  as  a  grain  of  sand  in  a  huge 
beach.  It  is,  as  several  of  my  colleagues  sug- 
gested yesterday,  infinitely  disappointing  to 
the  people  of  the  world  that  the  United 
Nations  does  not  do  more  of  a  concrete  na- 
ture to  serve  the  cause  of  human  rights.  It  is 
grotesque  that  the  United  Nations  should  de- 
cline formally  to  meditate  the  problem  until 
1975.  If,  as  the  Secretary  General  said  on  a 
recent  occasion,  to  satisfy  the  human  hunger 
for  rights  is  as  necessary  in  its  way  as  to 
satisfy  the  human  hunger  for  bread,  then  we 
can  be  held  to  have  acted  as  callously  as  the 
keeper  of  the  granary  who  will  wait  two 
years  before  listening  to  the  supplications  of 
the  hungry. 

Even  so,  Mr.   Chairman,  my  government 


106 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


could  not  vote  against  any  resolution  that 
commits  us  to  the  search  for  means  of  im- 
proving the  effective  enjoyment  of  human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  at  any 
time,  not  even  if  the  resolution  had  called  for 
turning  our  attention  to  the  subject  in  1985 
rather  than  1975. 

This,  then,  the  explanation  of  my  govern- 
ment, most  respectfully  registered. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  - 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recalling  its  resolution  2841  (XXVI)  of  18  De- 
cember 1971  and  Economic  and  Social  Council  reso- 
lution 1237  (XLII)  of  6  June  1967, 

Taking  note  of  the  deliberations  of  the  General 
Assembly,  since  its  twentieth  session,  on  the  item 
entitled  "Creation  of  the  post  of  United  Nations 
High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights", 

Taking  note  also  of  the  note  by  the  Secretary- 
General  on  the  question,' 

Bearing  in  mind  the  Proclamation  of  Teheran  of 
13  May  1968," 

Having  regard  to  the  existing  machinery  and  pro- 
cedures within  the  United  Nations  system  for  the 
implementation  of  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms,  to  the  proceedings  of  the  various  organs 
and  bodies  of  the  United  Nations  and  to  the  various 
modalities  suggested  in  the  course  of  the  delibera- 
tions of  those  bodies  for  the  more  effective  imple- 
mentation of  human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms. 

Expressing  its  hope  that  the  International  Cove- 
nants on  Human  Rights  will  enter  into  force  in  the 
near  future, 

1.  Reaffirms  its  conviction  that  further  measures 
should  be  considered  to  ensure  universal  realization 
of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  for  all 
without  distinction  of  any  kind; 

2.  Decides  to  keep  under  review  the  consideration 
of  alternative  approaches  and  ways  and  means 
within  the  United  Nations  system  for  improving 
the  effective  enjoyment  of  human  rights  and  funda- 
mental freedoms; 


=  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/3136  (XXVIII);  adopted  by 
the  Assembly  on  Dec.  14  by  a  recorded  vote  of  105 
to  0,  with  23  abstentions,  the  United  States  voting 
in  favor  of  the  resolution. 

'  U.N.  doc.  A/9139. 

'  For  text  of  the  proclamation  adopted  by  the  U.N. 
International  Conference  on  Human  Rights  at  Teh- 
ran on  May  13,  1968,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  2,  1968, 
p.  258. 


3.  Decides  accordingly  to  include  in  the  provisional 
agenda  of  its  thirtieth  session  an  item  entitled  "Al- 
ternative approaches  and  ways  and  means  within  the 
United  Nations  system  for  improving  the  effective 
enjoyment  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms". 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers  of  phono- 
grams  against  unauthorized   duplication   of  their 
phonograms.    Done    at   Geneva    October   29,    1971. 
Entered  into  force  April  18,  1973. 
Notification     from     World    Intellectual    Property 

Organization  that  ratification  deposited:  United 

States,  December  10,  1973. 
Enters  into  force:  United  States,  March  10,  1974. 

Postal   Matters 

Additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union  with  final  protocol  signed  at 
Vienna  July  10,  1964  (TIAS  5881),  general  regu- 
lations with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the  uni- 
versal postal  convention  with  final  protocol  and 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Tokyo  November 
14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1971,  except 
for  article  V  of  the  additional  protocol,  which  en- 
tered into  force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 
Ratification  deposited:   Guinea,  July  26,  1973. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travellers'  cheques  agree- 
ment, with  detailed  regulations  and  forms.  Signed 
at  Tokyo  November  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
July  1,  1971;  for  the  United  States  December  31, 
1971.  TIAS  7236. 
Ratification  deposited:    Guinea,  July  26,  1973. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  industrial 
property  of  March  20,  1883,  as  revised.  Done  at 
Stockholm  July  14,  1967.  Articles  1  through  12 
entered  into  force  May  19,  1970;  for  the  United 
States  August  25,  1973.  Articles  13  through  30 
entered  into  force  April  26,  1970;  for  the  United 
States  September  5,  1970.  TIAS  6923. 
Notification  of  intention  to  apply  transitional  pro- 
visions:   Uruguay,  November  19,  1973. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty  Organization.     Done   at   Stockholm    July   14, 


January  28,    1974 


107 


1967.    Entered  into  force  April  26,  1970;  for  tiie 
United  States  August  25,  1970.    TIAS  6932. 
Accession   deposited:    Sudan,   November  15,   1973. 
Notification  of  intention  to  appli/  transitional  pro- 
visions:   India,  November  19,  1973. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  damage 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  March  29,  1972.  Entered  into 
force  September  1,  1972;  for  the  United  States 
October  9,  1973. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:    November  21,  1973. 

Whaling 

International    whaling    convention    and    schedule   of 
whaling  regulations.    Done  at  Washington  Decem- 
ber   2,    1946.     Entered    into    force    November    10, 
1948.    TIAS  1849. 
Adherence  deposited:    Brazil,  January  4,  1974. 

Protocol  to  the  international  whaling  convention  of 
December  2,   1946   (TIAS  1849).    Done  at  Wash- 
ington   November    19,    1956.     Entered    into    force 
May  4,  1959.    TIAS  4228. 
Adherence  deposited:    Brazil,  January  4,  1974. 


Paraguay 

Treaty  on  extradition.    Signed  at  Asuncion  May  24, 
1973.' 
Ratified  l)ij  the  President :    November  21,  1973. 

Uruguay 

Treaty  on  extradition  and  cooperation  in  penal  mat- 
ters. Signed  at  Washington  April  6,  1973.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:    November  21,  1973. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  November  9,  1973. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Saigon  December 
18,  1973.    Entered  into  force  December  18,  1973. 


PUBLICATIONS 


BILATERAL 

Brazil 

Agreement  establishing  a  cooperative  program  for 
the  operation  and  maintenance  of  a  network 
of  rawinsonde  observation  stations  in  Brazil. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
March  12,"  1968.  Entered  into  force  March  12, 
1968.  TIAS  6500. 
Terminated:    November  19,  1973. 

Iran 

Air   transport   agreement,   with   exchange   of   notes. 
Signed  at  Tehran  February  1,  1973. 
Entered  into  force:    January  9,  1974. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  October  6, 
1947,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS  1666,  1924, 
2068,  2947,  3112,  3520,  6594,  6886,  7070,  7207, 
7576),  relating  to  a  military  mission.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Tehran  August  8  and  Decem- 
ber 12,  1973.  Entered  into  force  December  12, 
1973. 

Italy 

Treaty  on  extradition.    Signed  at  Rome  January  18, 
1973.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:    November  21,  1973. 

Khmer  Republic 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  July  25,  1973  (TIAS 
7703).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Phnom 
Penh  December  14,  1973.  Entered  into  force  De- 
cember 14,  1973. 


Not  in  force. 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock  num- 
ber from  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office  Book- 
store, Department  of  State,  Washington,  B.C.  20520. 
A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or 
more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.  Agreement  with  Belgium 
amending  annex  B  to  the  agreement  of  January  27, 
1950.  TIAS  7695.  3  pp.  25<''.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:7695). 

International  Field  Year  for  the  Great  Lakes.  Agree- 
ment with  Canada.  TIAS  7698.  7  pp.  25(*.  (Cat.  No. 
S9.10:7698). 

Supporting  Assistance  Loan.  Agreement,  with  annex, 
with  Malta.  TIAS  7699.  10  pp.  25<'.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10: 
7699). 

Education — Financing  of  Exchange  Programs.  Agree- 
ment with  the  Netherlands.  TIAS  7700.  7  pp.  25('. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:7700). 

Prevention  of  Foot-and-Mouth  Disease  and  Rinder- 
pest. Agreement  with  El  Salvador.  TIAS  7701.  10 
pp.   25(<.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7701). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the 
Khmer  Republic.  TIAS  7703.  10  pp.  25('.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:7703). 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.  Agreement  with  Luxem- 
bourg amending  annex  B  to  the  agreement  of  Janu- 
ary 27,  1950.  TIAS  7705.  3  pp.  25('.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:7705). 


108 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     Jarmanj  28,  197i     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1805 


Agriculture.  U.S.  Votes  for  November  1974 
World  Food  Conference  (Bennett,  text  of 
resolution) 97 

Cambodia.  United  States  Opposes  Move  To 
Change  Representation  of  Cambodia  in  the 
United  Nations  (Bennett) 'T  .       100 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Ambassador 
Martin  To  Coordinate  U.S.  Participation  in 
Food  Conference 99 

Economic  Affairs 

Interest  Equalization  Tax  Reduced  (Treasury 

announcement) 88 

President  Names  Export  Council  and  Inter- 
agency Committee  (White  House  announce- 
ment, memorandum  from  President  Nixon)         87 

U.S.   Votes   for   November   1974  World   Food 

Conference  (Bennett,  text  of  resolution)  .     .         97 

Energy.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence of  January  3 77 

Europe.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence of  January  3 77 

Human  Rights.  U.N.  Defers  Action  on  Pro- 
posal for  Human  Rights  Commissioner 
(Buckley,  text  of  resolution) 105 

Middle  East.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Con- 
ference of  January  3 77 

Namibia.  U.S.  Discusses  Situation  in  Namibia 

(Bennett) 104 

Presidential  Documents.  President  Names  Ex- 
port Council  and  Interagency  Committee  .     .         87 

Publications.   GPO    Sales  Publications     ...       108 

Refugees.  U.S.  Approves  UNHCR  Efforts  To 
Secure  Rights  for  Refugees  (Ferguson,  text 
of  resolution) 95 

South    Africa.    U.S.    Discusses    Situation    in 

Namibia  (Bennett) 104 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 107 

U.N.  General  Assembly  Adopts  Convention  on 
Protection  of  Diplomats   (Bennett,  text  of 

resolution) 89 

United  States  Signs  Convention  on  Protection 

of  Diplomats  (Schaufele) 90 

U.S.S.R.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence of  January  3 77 

United  Nations 

Ambassador  Martin  To  Coordinate  U.S.  Par- 
ticipation in  Food  Conference 99 

U.N.  Defers  Action  on  Proposal  for  Human 
Rights  Commissioner  (Buckley,  text  of  res- 
olution)        105 

U.N.  General  Assembly  Adopts  Convention  on 
Protection  of  Diplomats  (Bennett,  text  of 
resolution) 89 


U.S.  Approves  UNHCR  Efforts  To  Secure 
Rights  for  Refugees  (Ferguson,  text  of  res- 
olution)                95 

U.S.  Discusses  Situation  in  Namibia  (Bennett)       104 

United  States  Opposes  Move  To  Change  Rep- 
resentation of  Cambodia  in  the  United  Na- 
tions (Bennett) 100 

U.S.   Votes   for   November   1974   World   Food 

Conference  (Bennett,  text  of  resolution)  .     .         97 

Viet-Nam 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
January  3 77 

United  States  Protests  Attack  on  Search  Mis- 
sion in  Viet-Nam  (U.S.  note) 86 

Name  Index 

Bennett,   W.  Taplev,  Jr 89,  97,  100,  104 

Buckley,  William  F.,  Jr 105 

Ferguson,  Clarence  Clyde,  Jr 95 

Kissinger,  Secretary 77 

Martin,  Edwin  M 99 

Nixon,  President 87 

Schaufele,  William  E.,  Jr 90 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  January  7—13 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  January  7  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos. 
456A  of  December  17,  467  of  December  21,  and 
5  of  January  4. 

No.        Date  Subject 

"^ll  1/7  Sonnenfeldt  swom  in  as  Coun- 
selor of  the  Department  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*12  1/7  Isham  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Haiti  (biographic  data). 

*13  1/8  IngersoU  sworn  in  as  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs  (biographic 
data). 

tl4  1/10  Kissinger,  Simon:  joint  news 
conference. 

*15  1/11  Dale  sworn  in  as  U.S.  Represen- 
tative to  the  European  Office  of 
the  United  Nations  (biographic 
data). 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume  LXX        •        No.  1806        •        February  4,  1974 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER  AND  FEDERAL  ENERGY  ADMINISTRATOR  SIMON 
HOLD  JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE     109 

PRESIDENT  NIXON  EXTENDS  INVITATIONS 
TO  CONFERENCE  ON  ENERGY 

Texts  of  Letters  to  Heads  of  Government 
of  Oil-Consuming  and  Oil-Producing  Countries    123 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1806 
February  4,  1974 


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Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  Energy  Administrator  Simon 
Hold  Joint   News  Conference 


Following  is  the  transcript  of  a  news  con- 
ference held  on  Janitary  10  by  Secretary  Kis- 
singer and  William  Simon,  Administrator, 
Federal  Energy  Office. 

Press  release  14  <latetl  January  10 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  wanted  to 
welcome  His  Majesty  the  energy  czar  to  the 
State  Department.  We  will  do  this  press  con- 
ference in  two  parts.  I  will  talk  about  the 
foreign  policy  aspects  of  the  President's  let- 
ter to  the  consumer  nations  and  also  to  the 
OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum  Export- 
ing Countries]  members;'  and  Mr.  Simon 
will  discuss  the  relationship  of  this  initiative 
to  the  domestic  energy  concerns,  and  we  will 
both  take  questions  on  that  subject.  Then,  at 
an  appropriate  point,  we  will  switch  to  other 
foreign  policy  subjects,  which  I  alone  will 
answer,  Mr.  Simon.  [Laughter.] 

Mr.  Simo)i:  I  can  understand  that,  because 
at  the  appropriate  time,  Mr.  Secretary,  you 
will  press  a  button  and  I  will  disappear  into 
the  ground.  [Laughter.] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  So  let  me  discuss  the 
philosophy  and  intention  behind  the  letters 
which  the  President  has  sent  yesterday  to  the 
consuming  nations,  as  well  as  to  the  members 
of  OPEC. 

It  is  the  President's  conviction  that  the 
energy  crisis  reflects  a  basic  problem  for  the 
entire  international  community  for  the  fore- 
seeable future  that  today  concerns  energy 
but  that  in  the  future  may  concern  other  raw 
materials  or  foodstuffs  where  incentives  for 
supply  are  out  of  proportion  to  the  demand. 

We  face  two  major  problems  in  connection 
with  energy.  One  is  that  demand  has  far  out- 
stripped incentives  for  supply.   The  second  is 


'  See  p.  123. 


that  the  rise  in  prices  that  has  been  decided 
upon  by  the  OPEC  countries  recently,  and  the 
pattern  that  may  be  established  as  a  result 
of  this,  may  have  a  revolutionary  impact  on 
the  world  economy,  affecting  balance  of  pay- 
ments of  all  of  the  advanced  as  well  as  the 
less  developed  consuming  nations  and  creat- 
ing a  situation  in  which  the  producing  na- 
tions, as  well,  can  become  victims  of  their 
own  actions  and  in  which  there  exists  as  of 
this  moment  no  framework  in  which  compre- 
hensive long-range  decisions  can  be  taken. 

If  anything  was  needed  to  illustrate  the 
interdependence  of  nations  in  this  world,  it  is 
what  has  happened  in  the  field  of  energy. 

No  single  country  is  capable  of  solving  the 
problem  by  itself.  Indeed,  no  group  of  coun- 
tries, as  between  consumers  and  producers, 
can  solve  the  problem  by  themselves.  And 
therefore  we  feel  very  strongly  that  what  the 
President  has  proposed  should  not  be  seen  as 
a  confrontation  between  consumers  and  pro- 
ducers ;  rather,  it  should  be  seen  as  creating 
a  framework  within  which  decisions  can  be 
taken  by  both  consumers  and  producers  that 
take  into  account  the  long-term  necessities 
of  both  sides  and  that  can  assure  a  construc- 
tive evolution  of  the  world  economy  and  of 
international  relations  and  can  prevent  cer- 
tain very  dangerous  and  potentially  cata- 
strophic consequences. 

We  are  proposing  to  proceed  in  two  or 
three  stages. 

The  invitation  to  the  Foreign  Ministers 
conference  on  February  11  was  addressed  to 
the  nations  comprising  the  High  Level  Oil 
Committee  of  the  OECD  [Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development]. 
They  are  the  nations  that  import  75  to  80 
percent  of  the  world's  energy  imports.   They 


February  4,    1974 


109 


are  the  nations  that  have  worked  together  on 
that  committee  to  take  certain  emergency 
measures. 

The  President  has  proposed  that  the  meet- 
ing be  moved  to  the  Foreign  Ministers  level 
because  the  issues  that  have  been  raised, 
both  on  the  supply  side  as  well  as  by  the 
increase  in  prices,  now  far  transcend  the 
technical  issues  that  are  normally  involved 
in  simply  allocating  available  energy  sources. 

However,  we  view  this  meeting  as  a  pre- 
lude to  a  discussion  with  other  consuming 
nations,  especially  consuming  nations  from 
the  less  developed  parts  of  the  w^orld,  who 
have  been  even  more  profoundly  affected  in 
terms  of  their  capacities  by  the  recent  price 
rises  than  the  developed  nations.  Our  esti- 
mate is  that  their  bill  may  approach  $30  bil- 
lion, which  of  course  far  exceeds  any  of  the 
aid  flows  that  anyone  has  ever  projected  and 
indeed  makes  the  whole  international  aid  pro- 
gram a  problematical  and  different  exercise 
compared  to  the  additional  exactions  that 
have  been  imposed  on  these  countries. 

And  we  will  move  from  there,  with  the 
agreement,  of  course,  of  the  countries  con- 
cerned, to  a  meeting  between  consumer  na- 
tions, both  developed  and  less  developed  na- 
tions, and  the  producing  nations,  in  order  to 
assess  and  to  develop  a  pattern  of  supply 
that  is  just  to  the  concerns  of  all  of  the  coun- 
tries concerned,  that  will  produce  prices  that 
are  sustainable  over  an  indefinite  future,  and 
that  will  discuss  the  impact  on  the  world 
economy,  in  which  all  of  these  nations  will 
live,  of  the  energy  needs  on  a  global  scale. 


Tasks   for   Energy-Consuming   Countries 

At  the  meeting  of  the  consumers,  the  first 
task  will  have  to  be  to  see  whether  we  can 
come  to  an  agreement  about  the  nature  of  the 
problem  that  is  facing  us — whether  the  con- 
suming nations  can  agree  between  them- 
selves about  the  impact  of  the  supply  situa- 
tion on  their  economies  and  the  necessities 
that  are  produced  for  all  of  their  economies 
by  the  prices  that  now  exist. 

We  believe  it  is  important  that  we  will 
discuss     together     alternative     sources     of 


energy,  efforts  to  pool  the  research  and  de- 
velopment efforts  of  the  major  consuming 
countries,  and  attempts  to  share  between  the 
major  consuming  countries  the  energy 
sources  that  become  available  as  a  result  of 
these  efforts.  Therefore  we  believe  that  it 
may  be  appropriate  that  working  groups  be 
formed  to  study  these  problems,  as  well  as 
the  international  economic  problems  that  are 
raised  by  the  present  patterns.  And  Secretary 
[of  the  Treasury  George  P.]  Shultz  will  raise 
some  of  these  issues  at  the  C-20  [Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  Committee  of  Twenty] 
meetings  that  he  is  attending  in  Rome  next 
week. 

Now,  we  are  aware  of  the  fact  that  there 
are  temptations  toward  bilateral  arrange- 
ments. And  we,  of  course,  are  in  the  best 
position  of  any  consuming  country  to  engage 
in  bilateral  efforts  on  our  own.  We  have  sub- 
stantial sources  of  energy  in  our  own  coun- 
try. We  have  large  capabilities  for  research 
and  development.  And  we  are  in  possession 
of  much  of  the  advanced  technology  that  is 
necessary  in  exploring  the  seabeds,  for  ex- 
ample. 

Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  unrestricted 
bilateral  competition  will  be  ruinous  for  all 
of  the  countries  concerned  and  that  the  seem- 
ing victories  that  can  be  achieved  will  be  at 
the  cost  of  world  stability  and  of  the  world 
economy.  And  therefore,  even  though  we  are 
well  placed  in  this  competition  and  even 
though  we  have  the  capability  to  withstand 
it  better  than  any  potential  competitor,  we 
believe  that  it  is  essential  for  all  of  the  de- 
veloped countries  to  understand  that  we  are 
now  truly  interdependent  and  that  it  is  a 
problem  that  must  be  solved  on  a  common 
basis  if  we  are  not  going  to  suffer  very 
severe  consequences  for  international  sta- 
bility and  for  the  international  economy. 

We  also,  in  the  developed  nations,  have  a 
special  obligation  toward  the  consuming  de- 
veloping nations,  so  that  as  a  result  of  the 
situation  that  has  developed  so  suddenly,  the 
hard-won  gains  of  20  years  of  effort  are  not 
dissipated  and  the  international  efforts  to 
bring  about  a  greater  equality  between  the 
developed  and  less  developed  nations  are  not 


110 


Department  of  State   Bulletin ' 


destroyed  as  a  result  of  decisions  that  cer- 
tainly did  not  take  all  the  consequences  into 
account. 

So,  as  far  as  the  consuming  nations  are 
concerned,  the  energy  situation,  and  what  it 
portends  for  the  future,  will  be  a  test  of  the 
whole  approach  toward  the  international 
system  that  we  and  other  developing  nations 
have  pursued — and  other  developed  nations 
have  pursued  toward  each  other  and  toward 
developing  nations  for  the  last  25  years. 

It  is  a  test  of  the  proposition  that  the  world 
has  become  truly  interdependent  and  that 
isolation  and  selfish  approaches  must  be 
destructive  for  all  concerned. 

Problem  of  Global  Significance 

As  for  the  relations  between  the  consum- 
ing and  the  producing  nations,  the  same  is 
essentially  true.  In  the  framework  that  now 
exists,  the  producing  nations  have  no  alter- 
native except  to  maximize  their  short-term 
benefits.  There  does  not  exist  a  framework 
in  which  they  can  assess  the  impact  on  them 
of  the  changes  in  the  economies  of  the  de- 
veloped nations  that  are  produced  by  the 
producing  nations.  And  therefore  the  evolu- 
tion that  the  President  is  proposing,  which 
seeks  a  greater  understanding  by  the  con- 
suming nations  of  the  whole  range  of  their 
energy  concerns  as  well  as  of  the  impact  on 
energy  needs  on  their  economies,  provides 
also  a  framework  within  which  the  producing 
nations  can  guarantee  to  themselves  the  in- 
ternational stability  within  which  alone  the 
seeming  benefits  that  they  are  gaining  can  be 
maintained. 

The  basic  conviction  of  the  President  and 
of  his  associates  is  that  it  is  a  problem  of 
truly  global  significance  in  which  selfish 
advantages  cannot  be  attained,  or  if  attained, 
cannot  be  sustained,  either  among  consuming 
nations  or  between  consuming  and  produc- 
ing nations.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the 
United  States  will  make  its  proposals,  first  at 
the  meeting  on  February  11,  and  at  the  sub- 
sequent meetings  that  will,  we  hope,  flow 
from  that.  And  it  will  be  in  a  spirit  that  we 
are  constructing  a  solution  for  all  of  man- 


kind, and  not  of  particular  benefit  to  any  one 
segment  of  it,  that  the  President  has  ad- 
dressed both  the  consuming  and  the  produc- 
ing nations  to  start  a  process  which  we  hope 
will  provide  long-term  answers  to  the  prob- 
lem of  supply  as  well  as  to  the  problems  of 
the  economy. 

Now,  Bill,  would  you  like  to  talk  about 
the  domestic  side? 

Domestic   and   International   Approaches 

Mr.  Simon:  Basically  the  energy  policy  of 
the  United  States,  domestic  as  well  as  inter- 
national, can  be  broken  down  into  five  parts. 

From  the  domestic  side,  number  one,  we 
must  establish  a  new  energy  ethic.  We  must 
reduce  demand  in  this  country,  as  you  have 
all  often  heard  me  say.  With  a  nation  that 
has  6  percent  of  the  world's  population  and 
consumes  35  percent  of  the  world's  energy, 
we  have  been  a  nation  of  great  energy 
wastrels.  There  is  great  waste  in  our  con- 
sumption. This  must  be  reduced.  We  must 
have  this  change  in  lifestyles  that  I  have 
spoken  about  so  often. 

A  new  government  relationship  must  be 
forged  with  the  domestic  as  well  as  interna- 
tional energy  problem  and  energy  industries. 
We  must  create  this  agency  in  government 
that  brings  together  for  the  first  time  all 
components  of  energy  under  one  roof  so 
that  we  can  more  effectively  deal  with  this 
problem. 

Fourth,  and  most  important,  is  what  we 
like  to  call  Project  Independence.  The  energy 
problem,  as  far  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, is  the  most  infinitely  soluble  prob- 
lem in  our  country  today.  We  have  been 
blessed  with  a  superabundance  of  natural  re- 
sources and  technology.  We  have  the  ability 
to  become  self-suflficient.  We  are  today  do- 
mestically 85  percent  self-sufficient  in  energy 
— that  other  15  percent  is  going  to  be 
achieved  over  the  next  decade  to  decade  and 
a  half. 

And  finally,  this  dovetails  with  what  Secre- 
tary Kissinger  has  been  explaining:  inter- 
national cooperation. 

Our  domestic  goals  are  completely  compat- 


February  4,    1974 


111 


ible  with  our  international  role  of  reducing 
demand,  of  the  apportionment  of  critically 
short  supplies,  not  only  during  short-term 
emergencies  such  as  this  but  to  deal  with  the 
long-term  energy  problem.  And  this  prob- 
lem is  not  going  to  go  away,  domestically  or 
internationally,  even  after  the  embargo  is 
lifted.  This  has  been  a  problem  that  you 
have  been  warned  about  for  years  in  the 
United  States.  The  embargo  is  what  brought 
it  home.  Demand  continues  to  rise  at  4  to  5 
percent  domestically.  Our  production  peaked 
in  1970.  Our  exploration  peaked  in  1956. 
We  have  to  get  about  the  regeneration  of  our 
coal  industry  domestically,  the  utilization  of 
oil  shale — a  Manhattan-type  project,  or  com- 
parable to  the  synthetic  rubber  experience 
during  World  War  II,  to  utilize  the  imagina- 
tion, technology,  and  just  great  thrust  of  this 
free  enterprise  system. 

Our  technology — we  must  work  with  other 
nations  of  the  world  in  sharing  our  technol- 
ogy, the  development  with  them  of  alternate 
sources  of  energy. 

And,  finally,  world  oil  prices.  Obviously, 
we  must  deal  with  these  world  oil  prices,  be- 
cause the  long-term  interests  of  the  world  are 
best  served  by  a  world  economy  that  is 
healthy. 

I  look  forward  to  working  with  my  col- 
leagues in  the  State  Department  in  moving 
forward  with  the  rest  of  the  world  in  solving 
this  very  difficult  problem. 

Thank  you. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  If  I  can  just  add  one 
point  to  what  Mr.  Simon  said:  As  the  United 
States  achieves  self-sufficiency  in  energy  and, 
in  time,  surplus,  we  are  prepared,  as  part  of 
these  discussions  with  the  other  consuming 
nations,  as  well  as  with  any  other  interested 
nation,  to  discuss  sharing  our  energy  sources 
as  they  develop  over  the  long-term  future 
and,  above  all,  to  share  the  research  and 
development  efforts. 

Q.  Mr.  Simon  and  Mr.  Secretary,  to  deal 
tvith  the  present  hard  situation,  the  oil  price 
squeeze,  to  what  extent  do  you  think  the  oil 
companies  themselves  have  created  a  fanci- 
ful situation?  Should  they  be  implicated  in 


our  minds  with  the  problems  we  are  under-    ' 
going?  I  have  heard  no  mention  from  either    i 
of  you  about  the  role  of  the  oil  companies  in 
the  futtire.   How  about  the  present,  though? 
Is  this  oil  squeeze  some  of  their  doing? 

Mr.  Simon:  Actually,  you  did  hear  me 
allude  in  one  of  my  five  parts,  as  far  as  our 
energy  policy  is  concerned — and  that  was  the 
second  part,  the  new  government  relation- 
ship that  is  going  to  be  forged — that  we 
are  going  to  have  to  take  a  brandnew  look  at 
what  the  government  role  is  to  be,  interna- 
tionally as  well  as  domestically,  in  our  energy 
industry. 

Q.  Are  you  including  pricing,  sir? 

Mr.  Simon:  I  would  include  pricing.  I 
would  include  government  negotiation  versus 
the  way  it  is  done  now,  in  a  company-to- 
government  manner.  I  would  not  preclude 
looking  at  absolutely  everything  but  would 
not  give  you  any  final  solution  today  until 
we  forge  this  new  role  that  government  is 
going  to  hold.  Industry  and  government  co- 
operation to  bring  on  the  alternate  sources 
of  energy — there  are  many  things  that  must 
be  done. 

Immediate  and   Long-Term   Problems 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 


Secretary  Kissinger: 
Chicago  Daily  News] . 


Peter  [Peter  Lisagor, 


Q.  How  do  both  of  you  reconcile  the  state- 
ments of  the  President  with  tvhat  you  have 
ju^t  said?  The  President  said  that  we  mv^t 
become  self-sufficient — and  I  think  you,  Mr. 
Simon,  have  said  it  often,  you  have  just  said 
it — so  that  we  would  not  be  subject  to  black- 
mail from  foreign  sources  or  dependent  upon 
foreign  sources.  Secretary  Kissinger  says 
we  are  a  world  that  is  truly  interdependent 
and  we  can't  solve  this  problem  alone.  Now, 
how  do  you  reconcile  those  two  views? 

Mr.  Simon:  Well,  that  basically — Mr.  Sec- 
retary, would  you  like  to  start?  [Laughter.] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  can  solve  prob- 
ably the  immediate  problem  of  energy  by  a 


112 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


unilateral  effort,  although  it  would  still  leave 
a  gap  of  about  five  to  ten  years  in  which  this 
15  percent  shortage  of  which  Mr.  Simon 
spoke  would  exist.  So  when  the  President 
speaks  of  achieving  independence,  he  is  talk- 
ing about  the  late  seventies,  early  eighties. 
He  is  not  talking  of  any  short-term  future. 

Secondly,  as  I  indicated  in  my  presenta- 
tion, we  could  probably  achieve,  even  in  the 
period  between  1970  and  1980,  a  preferential 
position  for  ourselves  by  an  exercise  of  bi- 
lateral diplomacy,  using  the  strength  of  our 
economy  and  our  political  strength  to  achieve 
a  preferred  position  with  respect  to  energy. 
And  it  could  be  that  we  will  be  driven  to  this. 
But  the  intent  to  do  so  would  heighten  the 
difficulties  of  all  other  consuming  nations  in 
this  interim  period.  And  therefore  we  believe 
that  as  we  achieve  greater  independence  with 
respect  to  energy,  we  must  let  the  other  na- 
tions participate  in  this  effort. 

The  problem  of  bringing  in  new  sources 
of  energy,  expanding  our  research  and  de- 
velopment, is  not  an  effort  which  we  should 
conduct,  if  we  have  a  choice,  entirely  by  our- 
selves. 

And  therefore,  while  we  can  in  time  be- 
come independent,  our  preferred  course 
would  be  to  use  our  technological  capability 
to  help  solve  the  problems  on  a  common  basis, 
because  if  the  economies  of  other  nations — if 
one  looks  at  the  statistics,  for  example,  of  the 
impact  on  the  balance  of  payments  of  other 
developed  countries  of  the  price  rises,  they 
have  a  really  revolutionary  impact  for  the 
other  countries;  they  have  a  relatively  less 
decisive  impact  on  us. 

Nevertheless,  if  the  economies  of  other 
countries  are  weakened,  in  time  the  world 
economy  will  suffer.  And  therefore  we  may 
bring  about  a  situation  in  which  it  will  be 
demonstrated  that  no  nation  can  prosper  in 
isolation. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  yon  have  any  hope 
that  by  the  time  the  conference  begins  on 
February  11  there  will  be  any  resumption  of 
Arab  oil  deliveries,  and  tvhat  effect,  if  that 
were  to  take  place,  would  that  have  on  the 
conference? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  You  ladies  and  gen- 
tlemen know  that  we  have  a  firm  policy,  in 
this  building  at  least,  not  to  put  any  deadlines 
on  our  expectation  with  respect  to  the  em- 
bargo. Nevertheless,  the  problem  that  I  have 
described  here  is  essentially  independent  of 
the  embargo.  Even  if  there  had  been  no 
embargo,  the  problem  would  have  existed  on 
both  levels  that  I  have  indicated.  It  would 
have  existed  on  the  level  of  supply,  because 
unless  the  producing  nations  increased  their 
production  there  would  have  been  a  shortfall 
in  any  event;  and  it  would  of  course  have 
existed  on  the  level  of  price,  independent  of 
the  embargo. 

So  what  we  are  proposing  here  is  not  a 
device  to  get  the  embargo  ended.  But  of 
course  it  remains  our  strong  conviction  that 
the  embargo  is  becoming  increasingly  inap- 
propriate and  it  is  a  matter  that  should  be 
considered  seriously  by  those  countries  im- 
posing it.  But  this  is  not  the  purpose  of  these 
conferences. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  there  has  been  a  situa- 
tion described  here  today  in  which  we  are, 
in  the  United  States,  83  percent  self-suffi- 
cient and  we  have  other  countries,  our  allies, 
that  are  80  percent  dependent  on  foreign 
sotirces  of  oil.  Is  the  United  States  pre- 
pared to  start  sharing  noiv,  before  this  con- 
ference begins,  in  order  to  discourage  efforts 
at  bilateral  deals? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  conference  is 
proposed  for  February  11  or  any  other  con- 
venient day  in  that  week.  We  will  put  before 
those  nations — the  nations  that  have  been 
invited^ — and  before  all  other  interested  na- 
tions our  ideas  as  to  the  long-term  evolution 
of  the  energy  situation.  The  purpose  of  this 
conference  is  not  to  prevent  nations  between 
now  and  February  11  from  making  bilateral 
deals.  The  argument  with  respect  to  bilat- 
eral deals  is  a  more  fundamental  one  than 
the  immediate  situation.  It  has  to  do  with 
the  impact  on  everybody  of  unrestricted  com- 
petition once  it  is  unleashed. 

Do  you  want  to  say  something? 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  elaborate,  sir. 


February  4,    1974 


113 


on  your  statement  at  the  outset  of  your 
presentation  that  there  may  be  shortages  in 
other  commodities?  Was  this  a  reference  to 
food? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  One  looks  ahead  over 
the  next  10  to  15  years.  It  is  conceivable, 
though  not  in  such  an  acute  form,  that  other 
raw  materials  may  become  scarce  in  relation 
to  demand,  and  we  saw  temporarily  some 
pressure  on  the  food  situation  last  year.  I 
think  it  behooves  all  nations  to  take  a  look  at 
their  long-term  problems  so  that  we  can  deal 
thoughtfully  with  them  before  they  become 
acute. 

Now,  as  you  know,  we  have  proposed  a 
World  Food  Conference  which  will  address 
itself  to  these  issues.  And  we  have  started, 
within  our  government,  a  study  of  what 
may  happen  with  respect  to  other  commodi- 
ties over  the  next  10  years.  And  if  our  con- 
clusions should  lead  us  to  the  view  that  a 
repetition  of  some  of  these  difficulties  could 
arise,  we  hope  to  make  proposals  at  an 
early  time. 

Participation    in    Energy   Conference 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  since  the  Eastern  Euro- 
peans have  not  been  invited — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  to  understand 
the  system  by  which  this  works,  where  one 
points  to  one  person  and — 

Q.  Oh,  ivere  you  looking  at  somebody  else  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it's  my  glasses. 
[Laughter.] 

Q.  Since  the  Eastern  European  countries 
have  not  been  invited,  how  will  this  confer- 
ence have  an  impact — u'hat  ivill  be  the  im- 
pact of  this  conference  on  detente  with  the 
Soviet  Union?  Tioo,  aren't  we  getting  into 
the  position  of  19U7-Jt8  when  the  Marshall 
plan  was  launched  that  precipitated  in  some 
form  the  cold  war?  And  three,  perhaps  you 
can  say  ivhat  tvill  be  the  impact  of  the  con- 
ference on  countries  tvhich  are  not  invited  at 
present  bid  have  hopes  for  entry?  I  mean 
how  will  they  get  in? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  the  ' 
East  European  countries,  it  is  our  under- 
standing that  the  Socialist  countries  of  East- 
ern Europe  are  substantially  self-sufficient 
as  of  this  moment  through  their  cooperative 
arrangements.  We  see  no  reason  why  this 
should  produce  in  any  sense  the  cold  war,  or 
a  resumption  of  the  cold  war,  because  there  is 
no  stretch  of  the  imagination  by  which  this 
could  be  construed  as  directed  against  the 
Soviet  Union  or  against  any  other  group  of 
nations.  It  is  an  attempt  to  produce  a  com- 
mon solution. 

Secondly,  with  respect  to  the  participation 
of  other  countries — we  are  prepared,  for  ex- 
ample, if  the  European  Community  should 
feel  that  all  its  members  should  participate  in 
this  conference  and  that  there  should  not  be 
preferential  membership — we  would  be  pre- 
pared to  carry  out  what  I  said  in  my  Pil- 
grims speech,  that  it  is  up  to  the  European 
Community  to  decide  the  form  and  nature  of 
its  participation. 

Thirdly,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  meet- 
ing of  the  consumers,  we  would  be  prepared 
to  extend  an  essentially  open-ended  invita- 
tion to  other  interested  parties  to  participate 
in  those  fields  of  the  work  of  the  consumers, 
and  consumers  and  producers,  that  is  appro- 
priate to  them. 

We  have  no  intention  here  of  producing  a 
closed  club.  But  it  is  important  to  point  out 
that  the  nations  that  are  invited  between 
themselves  represent  75  to  80  percent  of  all 
the  energy  imports  in  the  world,  which  is 
going  to  be  one  of  the  chief  topics. 

Let  me  turn  over  here. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I'm  so  terrified  of  Mr. 
O'Leary  [Jeremiah  O'Leary,  Washington 
Star-News]  that  I  am  ready  to  recognize 
him.   Go  ahead. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  spoke  earlier  of,  if 
need  be,  using  the  strength  of  our  economy 
and  our  political  strength.  What  forms  of 
political  strength  do  you  have  in  mind? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First,  when  you  talk 


114 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


about  the  strength  of  the  economy,  it  is  clear 
that  if  the  balance  of  payments  situation  is 
as  we  described  it,  we  could  withstand  com- 
petitive bidding  better  than  some  other  na- 
tions. Secondly,  since  we  have  long-estab- 
lished political  relationships  with  many  of 
the  producing  countries,  we  are  not  badly 
placed  to  deal  with  those  countries  in  a  bilat- 
eral context. 

I  repeat,  however,  that  this  is  not  our  pre- 
ferred solution,  that  the  temporary  benefits 
that  one  would  gain  by  this  approach  would 
in  the  long  term  damage  even  the  United 
States. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretarij,  Secretary  of  Defense 
[James  R.']  Schlesinger  the  other  day  sug- 
gested that  the  energy  crisis  might  produce 
pressures  to  use  force  to  get  oil.  How  serious 
do  you  consider  the  dangers  of  countries 
going  to  war  over  oil? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  as  I  under- 
stood Secretary  Schlesinger,  he  was  explain- 
ing theoretical  situations  that  might  arise  if 
the  squeeze  became  excessive.  If  I  undei*- 
stand  him  correctly,  he  also  pointed  out  that 
this  point  had  not  yet  been  reached.  So  it  is 
hard  to  answer  your  question. 

But  why  don't  we  save  the  purely  foreign 
policy  questions  for  a  little  later? 

Study  of  Impact  of  Rising  Oil  Prices 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  are  you  convinced  that  it 
will  he  necessary  to  roll  back  oil  prices  which 
have  already  been  announced  in  order  to  pre- 
vent a  worldwide  depression? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  all  of  the  eco- 
nomic experts  that  have  studied  the  problem 
believe  that  the  bill,  as  it  stands  now,  cannot 
be  paid  by  most  of  the  countries  concerned. 
Now,  what  the  remedy  to  this  is — whether  it 
is  a  reduction  of  prices  or  some  other  method 
— I  think  I  would  like  to  defer  the  answer  on 
that  until  our  own  studies  have  been  further 
advanced. 

We  hope  to  put  forward  some  suggestions 
at  the  meeting  in  February.  But  we  have  not 
been  able  to  come  up  with  any  conclusive 


answers  ourselves — unless  Mr.  Simon  is  hid- 
ing them  from  us. 

Q.  Well,  I  would  like  to  hear  what  Mr. 
Simon  thinks  about  this. 

Mr.  Simon :  I  think  that,  as  I  said,  the  long- 
term  interests  of  the  world  are  best  served  in 
a  world  economy  that  is  healthy.  And  one 
must  gauge  the  impact  of  these  prices  on  the 
world  economy,  and  it  must  be  done  on  a 
country-by-country  basis.  As  the  Secretary 
says,  these  studies  cannot  be  done  overnight. 
Before  we  gauge  the  impact  to  see  whether 
or  not  we  must  roll  back  these  prices,  we 
have  to  complete  this  work.  And  it  will  be 
completed  before  the  conference. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Marvin  [Marvin 
Kalb,  CBS  News]. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  teas  going  to  ask  you 
— at  the  last  news  conference  you  said  that 
you  were  not  increasingly  irritated  by  the 
continuing  embargo,  and  yet  some  people 
might  draw  that  conclusion  from  your  com- 
ment today,  from  perhaps  the  indirect  com- 
ment of  the  Defense  Secretary  a  few  days 
ago,  the  Vice  President  a  fetv  days  ago.  And 
I  ivas  7vondering  whether  there  is  here  an 
attempt  to  orchestrate  what  might  he  inter- 
preted as  a  national  threat,  and  if  that  is  the 
case,  what  kind  of  threat? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  all  of  you  who 
know  the  essential  equanimity  of  my  nature 
would  find  it  difficult  to  believe  that  I  would 
be  irritated. 

Of  course  our  government  is  convinced,  as 
I  have  pointed  out  at  every  press  conference 
that  I  have  held  on  this  subject  since  Novem- 
ber, that  we  understand  the  reasons  that  led 
some  producing  nations  to  impose  an  em- 
bargo at  a  time  when  they  perceived  us  to  be 
taking  sides  in  a  military  conflict  in  which 
they  were  engaged. 

At  the  same  time,  since  we  were  the  coun- 
try that  played  a  principal  role  in  ending  that 
conflict,  since  we  are  the  country  that,  after 
the  end  of  that  conflict,  has  made  the  major 
eff'ort  to  promote  a  just  and  lasting'  settle- 
ment and  to  produce  whatever  progress  has 


February  4,   1974 


115 


been  achieved  in  the  negotiations,  or  contrib- 
ute to  producing  it,  we  believe  it  is  inappro- 
priate to  maintain  the  postures  of  confron- 
tation that  existed  before.  This  reflects  no 
irritation.  It  reflects  a  statement  of  our  con- 
viction. And  since  the  various  parts  of  our 
government  are  obviously  in  communication 
vv^ith  each  other,  it  should  not  surprise  you 
that  the  various  members  say  essentially  the 
same  thing. 
Mr.  O'Leary. 

Pitfalls   of  Bilateral  Arrangements 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  spoken  about 
the  pitfalls  of  bilateral  arrangements.  Some 
nations  have  already  taken  care  of  their  bi- 
lateral requirements,  notably  France.  What 
makes  you  think  France  has  any  interest  at 
all  in  ivhatever  you  might  have  to  say  to  them 
on  February  11  or  beyond,  and  ivhat  kind  of 
cards  do  the  industrial  nations  of  the  world 
really  have  to  play  in  the  decade  ahead 
against  the  countries  that  have  the  oil  that 
we  are  not  at  this  moment  prepared  to  share 
with  them  as  we  will  later? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  Mr.  O'Leary, 
I  don't  believe  that  it  is  correct  to  say  that 
France  has  taken  care  of  its  needs.  France 
has  made  an  arrangement  for  a  small  part 
of  its  needs  on  a  bilateral  basis.  And  other 
nations  no  doubt  may  make  bilateral  arrange- 
ments. 

Our  point  is  that  an  unrestricted  bilateral- 
ism is  going  to  be  counterproductive  for  all 
the  countries  concerned,  including  those  vi^ho 
may  steal  a  march  on  some  others  on  a  tem- 
porary basis  by  making  this  or  that  deal. 
The  conditions  w^hich  I  described  of  unre- 
stricted competition  cannot  be  avoided  by 
unilateral  efforts.  And  therefore  the  challenge 
to  the  statesmanship  of  all  of  the  consuming 
nations  is  whether  they  are  able  to  recognize 
this  fact — because  if  not,  reality  will  impose 
it  on  them. 

It  is  not  an  American  proposal  for  our  own 
selfish  benefit.  Indeed,  any  country  can  prob- 
ably gain  in  any  six-month  period  some  tem- 
porary benefits  for  itself.    But  over  a  five- 


year  period,  the  result  of  such  a  course,  if 
adopted  by  everybody  else,  would  be  ex- 
tremely unfortunate,  including  for  the  coun- 
tries that  seem  to  be  gaining  a  temporary 
advantage. 

Now,  as  for  the  relationship  between  the 
consumers  and  the  producers — I  believe  that 
a  considerable  number  of  the  producers 
realize  today  that  it  cannot  be  in  their  inter- 
ests to  bring  about  a  worldvdde  economic 
depression,  that  if  they  are  to  benefit  from 
the  resources  which  they  control,  it  must  be 
within  the  framework  of  a  healthy  world 
economy.  And  one  interesting  result  of  our 
initiative  has  been  that  no  producing  nation 
has  yet  expressed  the  slightest  opposition  to 
it.  And  several  producing  nations  indicated 
that  they  support  the  concept  of  consumer- 
producer  meetings  in  order  to  lay  out  the 
long-term  goals  of  energy  policy  for  both 
sides. 

Under  the  present  framework,  the  produc- 
ing nations  are  forced  to  look  only  primarily 
at  their  short-term  problems  and  they  have 
to  assess  them  in  terms  of  the  immediate 
supply-and-demand  situation. 

If  there  was  some  assured  demand  over  a 
medium-term  future  and  if  the  producing 
nations  had  some  assurance  and  understand- 
ing of  what  is  ahead  for  them,  they  could 
make  their  price  decisions  on  a  much  more 
long-range  basis.  And  therefore  what  we 
are  proposing  is  not  intended  as  a  confron- 
tation, but  it  is  intended  to  permit  a  rational 
consideration  of  issues  in  which  the  long- 
term  interests  of  the  consumers  and  produc- 
ers are  not  necessarily  divergent. 

Sequence   of  Energy  Conferences 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  originally  started 
with  the  premise  of  beginning  this  process 
with  a  meeting  of  producing  and  consuming 
nations.  Could  you  tell  us,  sir,  what  hap- 
pened to  that  original  concept?  Are  the  Arab 
nations  nmv  holding  off  from  this  process 
until  there  is  further  advancement  in  re- 
solving the  Arab-Israeli  conflict?  And  third- 
ly, can  you  be  any  more  precise  about  the 
sequence  of  conferences  that  will  take  place 


116 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


after  the  initial  meeting  of  the  consuming 
nations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First,  Murrey  [Mur- 
rey Marder,  Washington  Post],  the  original 
proposal  did  not  go  into  any  detail  as  to  the 
sequence  of  moves.  But  I  can  assure  you  that 
it  was  always  the  President's  intention  to  fol- 
low the  sequence  that  we  are  now  proposing. 
So  there  has  been  no  change  in  the  concept 
between  the  Pilgrims  speech  and  the  formal 
letter  that  the  President  sent  yesterday  to 
the  consuming  and  producing  nations. 

Secondly,  no  producing  nation  has  linked 
its  response  to  a  further  evolution  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  negotiations.  And  we  believe 
that  this  linkage  would  be  irrelevant  to  the 
basic  problem.  But  there  is  no  sense  com- 
menting on  it,  since  no  nation  has  made  this 
linkage. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  what  will  you  do  if  the 
Arabs  refuse  to  come? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  was  the  last 
part  of  the  question  ? 

Q.  The  remaining  part  was  hoio  do  you 
envision  the  process  going — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Oh — how  do  we  en- 
vision the  process.  We  envision  that  the 
consumer-producer  conference  will  meet 
within  three  months  of  the  original  consum- 
er conference  and  that  the  other  consulta- 
tions with  developing  consuming  nations  and 
other  interested  parties  will  take  place  be- 
tween February  11  and  the  time  that  the 
consumer-producer  conference  takes  place, 
which  we  will  propose  should  be  no  later  than 
three  months  after  the  original  proposal. 

What  do  we  do  if  the  producers  don't 
come? 

Q.  Yes. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  then  we  can't 
have  a  consumer-producer  conference. 
[Laughter.] 

Clark  [Clark  R.  Mollenhoff,  Des  Moines 
Register  and  Tribune]. 

Q.  In  the  light  of  the  admitted  disasters  of 
the  wheat  deal  and  also  in  the  light  of  the 


talk  of  one-dollar  bread  and  the  Agriculture 
Department  posturing  itself  to  become  an 
importer  of  wheat,  what  confidence  can  the 
American  people  have  of  the  representatives 
of  the  United  States  not  being  caught  in 
another  ripoff  for  the  consumers  and  tax- 
payers ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  Mr.  Mollen- 
hoff, in  order  to  answer  that  question,  we 
would  have  to  have  a  long  discussion  of  the 
structure  of  the  wheat  deal  and  what  pro- 
duced it.  But  the  short  answer  to  your  ques- 
tion would  be  this.  The  wheat  deal  was  the 
result  of  certain  assumptions  about  the  na- 
ture of  our  surpluses — certain  lack  of  infor- 
mation about  the  nature  of  the  purchases 
that  were  being  made.  And  it  is  precisely  to 
avoid  having  to  make  decisions  on  the  basis 
of  inadequate  information  and  inadequate 
understanding  of  the  future  that  we  are 
proposing  an  approach  which  takes  a  com- 
prehensive look  at  all  the  factors  involved 
and  which  would  reflect  the  basic  necessities 
of  the  American  people  as  well  as  of  the 
rest  of  mankind. 

Q.  In  the  initial  wheat  deals  you  were 
relying  to  a  large  degree  upon  the  wheat  and 
the  international  grain  trade,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  plus  the  Agriculture  Department. 
Do  you  have  any  reason  to  believe  that  you 
will  get  straight  figures  from  the  oil  indus- 
try, which  provides  most  of  the  figures  we 
have  in  this  country  at  this  stage? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Mr.  Mollenhoff,  it  is 
difficult  to  compare  a  one-time  negotiation, 
which  was  on  a  scale  that  was  unprecedented 
and  therefore  which  the  existing  framework 
could  not  handle,  with  a  long-term  generic 
problem  that  will  be  with  us  for  decades.  We 
have  every  confidence  that  for  the  sort  of 
enterprise  that  we  are  now  proposing  with 
respect  to  energy,  it  will  not  fail  for  lack  of 
correct  information.  It  may  fail  for  lack  of 
wisdom  and  for  the  inability  to  develop  a 
long-range  view  on  the  part  of  all  the  com- 
ponents that  are  involved  internationally. 

But  with  all  respect,  I  would  say  there  is 
no   comparison   between   the   long-term   en- 


February  4,  1974 


117 


ergy  problem   and  a  one-time  wheat  deal. 

Q.  Are   you   concerned   about    the    wheat 
importation  situation — 


Factors   in   Energy   Crisis 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  I  ask  you  to  clar- 
ify something  that  n-as  asked,  I  think,  in  the 
first  question.  Let  me  be  more  specific.  To 
what  extent  are  the  major  oil  companies  to 
bla77ie  for  our  current  'pricing  problems? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  to  let  Mr. 
Simon  answer  this. 

Mr.  Simon:  Basically  their  arrangement 
has  been  changed,  and  changed  quite  often, 
over  the  past  few  years.  It  is  a  feeling  on  the 
part  of  the  nations  of  the  Mideast  that  they 
have  sold  their  oil  too  cheaply,  and  indeed  as 
we  move  into  different  arrangements — we 
use  the  term  "negotiations"  in  Vienna;  I 
suggest  that  is  a  dignified  term  for  the  de- 
mands, if  you  will,  for  higher  prices.  They 
are  just  announcing  higher  prices,  what  they 
are  going  to  demand.  It  is  not  the  25  percent 
equity  any  longer.  But  obviously  they  are 
going  to  demand  a  majority  interest  in  the 
oil  in  the  ground.  They  are  also,  because  they 
own  67  percent  of  the  world's  proven  re- 
serves— they  believe  that  they  can  now  make 
up  for  oil,  looking  back.  And  anyone  who 
looks  back  on  a  market  can  understand  that 
maybe  he  would  have  done  things  differently. 
That  they  will  indeed  charge  a  price  for  it. 
And  that  is  what  is  going  on. 

As  far  as  the  specifics  of  blaming  the  oil 
companies,  that  is  a  very  popular  game 
everyone  is  playing  today.  We  are  in  the 
blame  syndrome  now — let's  find  out  who  is  to 
blame  and  let's  hang  him.  And  I  will  suggest 
that  over  the  years — and  you  can  go  back  to 
the  Paley  Commission  in  the  Truman  admin- 
istration, who  warned  of  this  impending 
crisis — you  can  go  back  for  the  past  five 
years,  or  just  the  14  months  I  have  been  in 
government,  as  Chairman  of  the  President's 
Oil  Policy  Committee,  warning  of  this  im.- 
pending  crisis — forgetting  the  embargo. 
That  we  are  looking  back  on  a  period  where 


we  had  a  low-cost  abundant  energy  base.  We 
are  now  in  a  high-cost  scarce  energy  base. 
And  our  alternatives  right  now  to  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  blackmail — importing 
today  6'/)  to  7  million  barrels  a  day,  if  in- 
deed the  embargo  were  over,  to  upward  of 
10  or  12  million  barrels  per  day  by  the  end  of 
this  decade,  and  being  subject  to  whatever 
price  perhaps  they  wish  to  put  on  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Sim,on — 

Mr.  Simon:  We  have  the  alternative  to 
bring  on  at  a  reasonable  level  alternate 
sources  of  energy  in  this  country  to  give  us 
the  ability  for  self-sufficiency,  thereby  re- 
moving a  demand  from  the  rest  of  the  world 
for  this  oil  and  removing  a  pressure  from 
the  marketplace. 

Q.  Mr.  Simon,  you  described  a  "game" 
that  everybody  is  playing.  Could  you  be  more 
specific  about  this  game,  whether  we're  try- 
ing to  find  who's  at  fault  and  trying  to  hang 
him? 

Mr.  Simon:   Well,  I  can — 

Q.  Are  there  any  other  examples  in  this 
game  that  you  can  give  us? 

Mr.  Simon:  No.  As  I  say,  we're  all  look- 
ing for  the  scapegoat  right  now.  And  I  can 
go  back,  sure;  and  I'll  go  back  and  point  to 
various  government  actions  and  inactions 
over  the  past  20  years  that  have  created  the 
economic  disincentives,  if  you  will,  for  the 
oil  industry  to  do  exactly  what's  happened 
internationally,  as  far  as  drilling  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  is  concerned.  You  can  go  back  to 
the  Phillips  decision  of  1954  on  the  regula- 
tion of  natural  gas,  and  how  this  discouraged 
necessary  exploration  and  production  in  this 
country.  On  the  environmental  impacts,  on 
the  mandatory  oil  import  policy  that  acted  as 
a  disincentive  to  building  needed  refinery 
capacity,  the  Clean  Air  Act  and  need  for 
implementation  of  the  primary  and  second- 
ary standards — it  is  for  many  reasons. 

I'm  not  saying  that  the  oil  industry  should 
have  had  a  little  bit  more  responsibility.  Fine, 
they  should  have.  And  we're  going  to  look  at 
the  specifics  of  that.    But  let's  not  say  that 


118 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


it's  been  just  one  thing  to  blame;  there  are 
a  whole  series  of  events. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretanj,  at  this  stage,  is  it  still 
possible  to  enlarge  the  February  11  confer- 
ence beyond  the  eight  invited  countries,  or 
would  you  rather  tell  other  interested  con- 
sumer nations  to  join  later  on  in  the  working 
group  level? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  as  I  pointed 
out,  we  are  prepared,  if  the  European  Com- 
munity would  prefer  this,  to  have  the  nine 
members  of  the  Community  participate,  so 
that  it  would  not  appear  as  though  we  wanted 
to  make  a  distinction  between  the  members 
of  the  European  Community. 

Beyond  that,  we  believe  that  it  would  be 
most  efficient  if  the  future  participation  were 
at  the  working  group  level  and  at  other  con- 
ferences that  will  develop  out  of  this,  such 
as  between  the  developed  consumer  nations 
and  the  developing  consumer  nations — and 
of  course  the  consumer-producer  conference 
that  will  take  place  later  on. 

Variables   AfFecfing    Energy   Shorffall 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  mentioned  some  fig- 
ures in  your  answer  a  moment  ago  of  restor- 
ing our  delivery  of  oil  to  6y2  to  7  million 
barrels  a  day. 

Mr.  Simon:  That's  what  our  estimates 
are  as  to  what  the  demand  would  be  now. 

Q.  In  the  future  it's  10  million  as  com- 
pared to  2,  2^2,  that  we're  bringing  in  now. 
Could  you  appraise  for  us  quantitatively  or 
qualitatively  how  much  of  a  difference  it 
would  make  for  us  to  have  the  Arab  oil  em- 
bargo lifted  on  this  nation's  economy? 

Mr.  Simon:  Well,  right  now,  as  I've  said 
many  times  right  from  the  first  press  con- 
ference— which  was  shortly  after  our  figures 
were  published,  as  far  as  the  extent  of  the 
shortfall — and  let's  get  a  real  handle  on  that 
right  at  the  outset,  because  there's  a  great 
deal  of  problems  with  that  favorite  word  of 
"credibility"  today  on  the  extent  of  the  short- 
fall— in  the  job  which  we  have  of  managing 


a  shortage,  rather  than  just  forecasting 
what  the  shortage  may  be,  we  can  gauge,  and 
we  can  gauge  with  hard  numbers,  the  exact 
amount  of  oil,  assuming  an  effective  em- 
bargo, that  we  are  not  going  to  bring  into 
this  country.  And  this  is  the  number  that 
we  use  if  we  are  going  to  responsibly  manage 
this  shortage — manage  it  to  the  extent  that 
industry  and  jobs  and  employment  in  this 
country  aren't  going  to  suffer  unduly. 

Fine,  it's  going  to  have  economic  impact. 
Then  we  take  a  look  at  the  variables,  and  the 
variables  are  obviously  weather.  And  we've 
had  a  great  break  in  the  fourth  quarter  of 
1973  on  the  weather,  and  that  took  care  of 
reducing  demand.  Then  our  conservation 
measures  reduced,  and  that  helped.  There 
was  leakage  in  the  embargo,  which  many 
people  predicted — although  the  extent  of  the 
leakage  is  extremely  difficult  to  predict. 

So  all  of  these  variables  move  into  play 
to  reduce  the  shoi'tfall;  and  this  is  where 
other  people,  utilizing  some  of  these  assump- 
tions— they  say,  "The  shortfall  won't  be  that 
bad;  the  government's  wrong."  Well,  we're 
not  wrong.  We  believe  it  won't  be  that  bad 
if  the  American  people  do  their  job.  But  I 
can't  bet  on  jobs  in  this  country — and  the 
comfort  and  health  of  the  American  people 
— by  betting  these  variables  are  going  to 
work  to  this,  that,  or  another  extent. 

As  I've  said  from  the  very  first  day,  with 
a  nation — 6  percent  of  the  world's  popula- 
tion, utilizing  35  percent — we  waste  almost 
as  much  as  we  use.  Some  estimates  show  we 
waste  between  30  and  40  percent  of  our 
energy  utilization.  We  can  make  up  this 
shortfall  with  simple  changes  in  our  life- 
styles. 

Now,  these  aren't  going  to  be  done  over- 
night; we  understand  that.  Industry  can  do 
a  great  deal,  and  they  are  doing  a  great  deal 
overnight.  We  obviously  can't  stop  driving 
some  of  the  the  gas-burners  we  all  drive 
around  today;  but  we  can  drive  them  less,  we 
can  drive  them  slower.  There  are  many 
things  we  can  do.  And  I  think  the  figures  we 
put  out  every  week  show  that  we  are  reduc- 
ing our  demand  and  we're  moving  toward 


February  4,   1974 


119 


the  elimination  of  this  shortfall.  Whether  we 
make  it  or  not  is  uncertain,  and  for  that  rea- 
son we  recommended  to  the  President  that  he 
put  the  rationing  program  into  effect  [on  a 
contingency  basis]. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Since  Mr.  Simon  is 
obviously  gaining  on  me  and  since  this  can- 
not be  permitted  in  this  building  [Laughter] , 
we'll  have — sit  down  for  a  minute,  Marvin; 
I'm  in  the  middle  of  a  very  important  an- 
nouncement [Laughter] . 

Mr.  Simon:  Can  I  hold  a  separate  confer- 
ence outside?  Did  they  shut  my  microphone 
off?    [Laughter.] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Since,  in  fact,  we're 
going  to  open  the  trapdoor  under  Mr.  Simon ! 
[Laughter.] 

Just  a  minute — w^e'll  take  one  more  ques- 
tion on  energy,  and  then  we'll  take  a  few 
questions  on  other  aspects  of  foreign  policy. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretai^j,  I  think  you've  already 
implied  the  answer  to  this  question;  but  I 
wonder  if  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 
set  kind  of  a  moral  lead  by  forswearing  any 
kind  of  bilateral  advantage  in  the  immediate 
future. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
will  make  proposals  at  the  conference  that 
will  start  on  February  11  which  will  reflect 
the  philosophy  that  I  have  described  here, 
and  I'm  not  aware  of  any  bilateral  U.S.  deals 
that  are  in  process  between  now  and  Febru- 
ary 11. 

And  now  should  we  switch  to  questions 
on — 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  yoti  recently  have  just 
had  discussions  with  the  Japanese  Deputy 
Prime  Minister. 

Secretary  Kissinger:    Yes. 

Q.  Now,  there's  a  little  doubt  in  the  minds 
of  some  of  tis  who  talked  with  some  officials 
later  as  to  whether  or  not  they  were  going 
to  go  along  wholeheartedly  with  the  U.S. 
initiative.  Now,  I'm  wondering  what  role 
you  feel  countries  like  Japan,  xcho  are  so 
vulnerable  to  the  need  for  oil  in  Arab  de- 


mands, can  play  in  the  type  of  initiative  that 
ijou  have  in  mind. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it  is  my  under- 
standing that  the  Japanese  Government  is 
meeting  today  to  decide  its  answer  to  the 
President's  letter.  And  I  don't  think  that  I 
should  prejudge  what  the  answer  of  the 
Japanese  Government  will  be. 

Our  proposal  is  designed  to  enable  the 
Japanese  Government,  as  well  as  all  other 
invitees,  to  meet  their  energy  needs  over  the 
indefinite  future.  Each  government  con- 
cerned will  have  to  decide  for  itself  whether 
by  participating  in  an  examination  of  its 
long-term  problems  it  is  jeopardizing  its 
short-term  situation.  We  do  not  believe  that 
this  is  the  case.  We  are  making  this  proposal 
precisely  to  reduce,  and  in  time  to  eliminate, 
the  insecurity  under  which  particularly  those 
countries  suffer  that  import  a  much  larger 
percentage  of  their  energy  than  we  do.  But 
I  cannot  predict  what  the  Japanese  reaction 
will  be. 

Q.  If  the  nonmembers  of  the  Community 
ivant  to  attend?  Yoti  didn't  mean  to  single 
out  certain  ones?  And  in  your  Pilgrims 
speech  you  said  the  Community  might  decide 
to  participate  with  one  voice.  Would  that 
still  be  welcome  in  the  February  11  confer- 
ence? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  will  leave  it  to 
the  Community  to  decide  the  form  of  its 
participation;  yes. 

Middle   East   Negotiations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 

Q.  — you  are  going  to  leave  for  Egypt  at 
midnight — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  So  are  you.  [Laugh- 
ter.] 

Q.  — and  then  go  to  Israel  and  go  back  to 

Egypt.  And  that  schedule  suggests  that  you 
expect  to  come  home  rvith  an  agreement.  Is 
that  the  case? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No.  What  we  expect 


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Department  of   State   Bulletin 


to  do  on  this  trip  is  to  see  whether  we  can 
transform  the  general  ideas  that  have  up  to 
now  been  advanced  into  a  concrete  proposal. 
And  we  hope  that  when  such  a  concrete  pro- 
posal exists,  it  will  lead  to  a  serious  negotia- 
tion between  Egypt  and  Israel  on  the  issue 
of  the  separation  of  forces.  Therefore,  if  the 
Israeli  Cabinet  decides  after  my  first  visit 
there  to  make  a  proposal,  we  will  be  prepared 
to  take  it  to  Egypt.  But  the  more  likely  out- 
come of  this  would  be  not  that  there  would 
be  an  agreement  but  that  there  would  be  a 
negotiation  which  would  be  conducted  at 
Geneva. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  isn't  there  a  danger  of 
an  overplaying  of  your  oivn  role  in  this?  If 
the  effort,  as  you've  described  it  from  the 
very  beginning,  is  to  induce  the  parties  to 
come  up  ivith  their  own  settlement,  is  there 
not  the  danger,  by  your  going  back  time  and 
again,  that  you  become  too  fixed  an  element 
in  the  negotiation  and  deprive  the  parties  of 
the  chance  to  negotiate  themselves? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  this  particular 
trip  was  made  at  the  request  of  the  parties 
and  not  at  our  initiative.  And  therefore, 
while  the  basic  consideration  is  valid,  in  the 
crucial  initial  phase — where  confidence  has 
to  be  built  and  where  a  process  has  to  be 
started — we  would  think  that  it  is  most  im- 
portant to  get  the  progress  made. 

Once  the  initial  phase  is  behind  us,  then 
we  believe  that  the  negotiation  should  be  con- 
ducted at  Geneva  and  that  higher  level  par- 
ticipation should  occur  only  when  there  is  an 
overwhelming  deadlock. 

Q.  Sir,  it's  become  more  or  less  enshrined 
in  the  press  in  recent  weeks  that  the  Israelis 
have  proposed  a  ivithdrawal  to  a  line  about 
20  miles  east  of  the  Suez  Canal  in  return  for 
a  thinning-out  of  Egyptian  troops.  Is  this  the 
kind  of  proposal  you'd  be  bringing  to  Asivan? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I'm  not  bring- 
ing, on  my  first  trip,  any  particular  proposal 
to  Aswan.  What  I  intend  to  do  is  to  discuss 
with  President  Sadat  his  ideas,  to  give  him 


my  impression  of  some  of  the  general  Israeli 
ideas;  and  any  specific  proposals  would  have 
to  await  a  decision  by  the  Israeli  Govern- 
ment, as  the  Israeli  Ambassador  pointed  out 
yesterday. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Let  me  get  questions 
over  here  [pointing] . 

Q.  Sir,  if  I  could  return  for  a  moment  to 
your  energy  proposal,  you  said  that  the 
object  of  the  series  of  meetings  would  be  to 
establish — a  "framework"  ivas  the  word  you 
used — for  solving  these  problems  between 
the  developed  industrial  nations  which  need 
the  fuel  and  the  nations  ivhich  have  the  fuel 
that  are  not  developed.  Essentially,  that's  it. 

Now,  perhaps  "framework"  is  a  term  of 
the  art;  and  I  don't  cover  the  diplomatic  cir- 
cuit. But  ivhat  kind  of  a  frameivork  are  you 
talking  about — some  sort  of  series  of  actvxd 
agreements  among  nations  on  the  world 
economy?  And  if  so,  is  there  any  precedent 
in  past  diplomacy  for  such  a  broad,  all- 
encompassing  approach  to  the  entire  world 
economy  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  is  no  prece- 
dent in  past  diplomacy  for  this  particular 
approach,  but  there  is  also  no  precedent  in 
past  diplomacy  for  this  particular  problem. 
What  we  are  talking  about  is  a  series  of 
agreements  or  understandings  in  a  series  of 
related  areas — areas  of  sharing  of  technol- 
ogy, of  determining  the  nature  of  the  de- 
mand, of  the  concept  of  measures  that  can 
be  taken  with  respect  to  the  conservation  of 
energy  resources. 

Other  problems — there  are  other  problems 
to  which  we,  frankly,  haven't  even  the  begin- 
ning of  an  answer — such  as,  what  happens 
to  the  consuming  developing  nations  that  we 
used  to  think  were  in  need  of  substantial  aid 
flows,  where  all  of  the  aid  flows  have  been 
outstripped  in  one  afternoon's  decision  by 
the  price  increase  that  has  been  imposed  on 
these  countries  by  the  producing  nations.  The 
balance  of  payments  issues  that  I  raised  with 


February  4,    1974 


121 


you  have  now  been  understood  in  terms  of 
numbers,  but  in  terms  of  solutions  we  have, 
frankly,  not  come  up  with  any  answers  that 
we  are  as  yet  prepared  to  put  before  other 
nations. 

Moreover,  we  do  not  believe  that  we  alone 
have  the  obligation  to  come  up  with  all  of  the 
answers.  We  are  inviting  the  other  countries 
concerned  to  share  with  us  their  thinking  on 
a  problem  that,  after  all,  concerns  them  at 
least  as  much  as  us. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  Egyptians  expressed 
concern  that  a  disengagement  agreement 
would  simply  result  in  a  freezing  of  another 
cease-fire  line  in  the  Middle  East.  Do  you 
share  that  concern  ?  And  if  so,  are  you  seek- 
ing assurances  from  Israel  that  political  talks 
will  take  place  and  will  lead  to  further 
Israeli  tvithdraivals  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  has  always  been 
understood  that  disengagement  would  be  the 
first  phase  in  a  process  toward  a  final 
settlement  and  that  negotiations  toward  that 
final  settlement  would  continue.  And  that  is 
the  American  position;  and  we  believe  that 
it  is  the  position  of  the  parties  concerned. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  tell  us  what 
has  been  accomplished  in  talks  between  Pan- 
ama and  the  United  States  in  the  last  cou- 
ple of  days  that  didn't  exist  before  and 
whether  this  involved  the  Panamanians  ac- 
cepting— agreeing  to  some  principles  that 
we  proposed,  or  vice  versa,  or  both? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  in  all  negotia- 
tions, the  progress  reflected  a  modification 
by  both  sides  of  some  of  the  positions  they 
previously  held.  I  think  substantial  progress 
has  been  made  toward  a  statement  of  prin- 
ciples, which  now  have  to  be  filled  in  by  con- 
crete negotiations.  But  since  those  principles 
are  still  ad  referendum,  which  means  that 


they  still  require  the  approval  of  the  govern- 
ments concerned,  I  don't  want  to  go  into 
greater  detail. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  made  very  clear  at 
the  beginning  of  the  press  conference  the 
principles  of  tvorld  interdependence.  You 
also  made  very  clear  the  basic  necessity  of 
fuel,  like  food  and  water,  which  all  nations 
need.  Now,  aside  from  any  theoretical  propo- 
sitions to  xvhich  you  referred  earlier,  inas- 
much OS  these  are  very  basic  needs,  would 
yotc  foresee  that  failure  to  recognize  the  prin- 
ciples that  you  outline  here  today  could  even- 
tually lead  to  hostilities  for  the  very  basic 
things  of  life  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  don't  want  to 
predict  exactly  what  will  happen  if  the  short- 
sightedness of  man  should  triumph  over  his 
clear  necessities,  but  obviously  it  will  be  a 
much  more  tense  and  extremely  competitive 
world  that  would  then  emerge,  in  which  col- 
laborative relationships  in  many  fields  would 
severely  suffer. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  yesterday  the  Cuban 
Ambassador  in  Mexico  said  that  talks  with 
the  United  States  would  be  possible  if  the 
United  States  agrees  to  lift  the  economic  em- 
bargo. Now,  some  have  interpreted  his  re- 
marks as  one  of  the  mildest  yet  coming  out 
of  Cuba  or  from  a  Cuban  official.  Ho^v  do 
yoti  see  his  statement? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  not  had 
an  opportunity  to  analyze  all  the  subtleties 
of  the  statement.  Our  position  is  that  our 
objection  to  Cuban  policy  has  concerned  its 
attempt  to  export  its  revolution  to  subvert 
existing  governments  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. Our  attitude  would  be  subject  to 
change  if  Cuba  pursued  a  more  restrained 
international  course. 


122 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


President  Nixon  Extends  Invitations  to  Conference  on  Energy 


Following  are  the  texts  of  letters  sent  by 
President  Nixon  on  January  9  to  the  heads 
of  governmeyit  of  major  iyidustrial  oil-con- 
suming countries  and  member  states  of  the 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries (OPEC). 


TEXT  OF  LETTER  TO   HEADS  OF  GOVERNMENT 
OF  OIL-CONSUMING  COUNTRIES  > 

White  House  press  release  dated  January  10 

January  9,  1974. 

Developments  in  the  international  energy 
situation  have  brought  consumer  and  pro- 
ducer nations  to  an  historic  crossroad.  The 
world's  nations  face  a  fundamental  choice 
that  can  profoundly  affect  the  structure  of 
international  political  and  economic  relations 
for  the  remainder  of  this  century. 

Today  the  energy  situation  threatens  to 
unleash  political  and  economic  forces  that 
could  cause  severe  and  irreparable  damage 
to  the  prosperity  and  stability  of  the  world. 
Two  roads  lie  before  us.  We  can  go  our  own 
separate  ways,  with  the  prospect  of  progres- 
sive division,  the  erosion  of  vital  interdepend- 
ence, and  increasing  political  and  economic 
conflict;  or  we  can  work  in  concert,  develop- 
ing enlightened  unity  and  cooperation,  for 
the  benefit  of  all  mankind — producer  and 
consumer  countries  alike. 

It  was  with  these  thoughts  in  mind  that  I 
asked  Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  in  his 
December  speech  to  the  Society  of  Pilgrims 
in  London  to  propose  establishment  of  an 
Energy  Action  Group  and  to  urge  a  concerted 
action  program  among  consumers  and  pro- 


ducers to  meet  the  world's  energy  needs  in  a 
manner  which  would  satisfy  the  legitimate 
interests  of  both  the  consuming  and  produc- 
ing countries. 

As  a  first  step  to  carry  out  this  concept,  I 
invite  (name  of  country)  to  a  meeting  of 
major  industrial  consumer  nations  to  be  held 
at  the  Foreign  Minister  level  on  February  11, 
1974,  or  any  other  convenient  date  that 
week.  I  would  like  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
invite  you  to  send  your  representative  to 
such  a  meeting  here  in  Washington.  After  I 
know  your  views,  I  plan  to  send  a  Special 
Representative  to  discuss  with  your  Govern- 
ment the  specifics  of  this  meeting,  including 
suggestions  on  agenda  and  substance.- 

Our  concept  is  that  the  Foreign  Ministers 
meeting  would  agree  on  an  analysis  of  the 
situation  and  the  work  to  be  done.  It  would 
establish  a  task  force  drawn  from  the  con- 
suming countries  which  would  formulate  a 
consumer  action  program..  Part  of  this  pro- 
gram would  be  concerned  with  new  coopera- 
tive measures  designed  to  deal  with  the  ex- 
plosive growth  of  global  energy  demand  and 
to  accelerate  the  coordinated  development  of 
new  energy  sources.  Another  task  would  be 
to  develop  a  concerted  consumer  position  for 
a  new  era  of  petroleum  consumer-producer 
relations  which  would  meet  the  legitimate 
interests  of  oil  producing  countries  while  as- 
suring the  consumer  countries  adequate 
supplies  at  fair  and  reasonable  prices. 


'  Canada,  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  and 
the  United  Kingdom;  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Devel- 
opment was  also  invited  to  attend. 


"  The  following  paragraph  was  added  between 
paragraphs  4  and  5  of  President  Nixon's  letter  to 
Chancellor  Willy  Brandt  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany: 

"As  was  pointed  out  in  the  original  proposal  we 
would  wish  to  leave  it  to  the  European  Community 
to  decide  whether  and  how  it  may  wish  to  partici- 
pate in  the  meeting  in  Washington.  I  am  bringing 
this  point  to  your  attention  in  your  capacity  as  head 
of  the  government  now  in  the  presidency  of  the 
Community  and  will  be  very  pleased  to  extend  an 
invitation  to  a  representative  of  the  Community.  I 
shall  appreciate  it  if  you  would  inform  me  of  the 
Community's  decision." 


February  4,   1974 


123 


In  calling  for  a  meeting  of  the  major  in- 
dustrial consumer  countries,  we  are  fully 
conscious  that  the  energy  problem  is  one  of 
vital  importance  to  all  consuming  countries, 
particularly  those  of  the  developing  world 
whose  hope  for  a  better  life  critically  depends 
on  access  to  energy  on  reasonable  terms. 
Whereas  our  immediate  concern  is  to  get 
preparations  underway  as  promptly  and  ef- 
fectively as  possible,  clearly  the  interests  of 
all  consumers,  including  the  developing  coun- 
tries, will  have  to  be  represented  in  an  appro- 
priate manner. 

A  concerted  effort  of  this  kind  is  but  a  first 
and  essential  step  toward  the  establishment 
of  new  arrangements  for  international  ener- 
gy and  related  economic  matters.  To  this  end, 
a  meeting  of  consumer  and  producer  repre- 
sentatives would  be  held  within  90  days.  I  am 
sending  personal  messages  to  the  heads  of 
government  of  the  OPEC  states  to  assure 
that  they  understand  the  purpose  of  the  pro- 
posed meeting  of  consumer  states. 

We  face  a  profound  challenge  to  turn  this 
period  of  crisis  into  one  of  opportunity  for 
constructive  and  creative  cooperation  which 
will  be  of  benefit  to  all  the  peoples  of  the 
world.  I  look  forward  to  hearing  your  reply 
and  comments. 


critical  importance  of  energy  to  the  pros- 
perity and  stability  of  the  international 
economy.  Severe  disruptions  of  economic 
activity  and  of  the  world  monetary  system, 
whether  caused  by  insufficiency  of  energy 
supplies  or  abrupt  price  movements  could 
prove  disastrous  for  consumers  and  produc- 
ers alike. 

Oil  importing  nations  are  vitally  concerned 
with  mechanisms  which  will  assure  adequate 
supplies  at  reasonable  prices.  Oil  producing 
states,  in  turn,  are  concerned  with  arrange- 
ments that  will  assure  fair  payment  for 
and  rational  use  of  their  non-renewable  re- 
sources. 

Accordingly,  as  suggested  by  Secretary  of 
State  Kissinger  in  his  speech  in  London  in 
December,  the  United  States  believes  it  is 
necessary  to  deal  with  these  matters  urgently. 

The  United  States  is  undertaking  this 
initiative  as  a  constructive  and  positive  step, 
consistent  with  the  publicly  stated  views  of  a 
number  of  oil  producing  nations  which  have 
called  for  a  consultative  relationship  between 
producers  and  consumers.  It  is  my  hope  that 
the  results  of  the  forthcoming  meeting  will 
lead  to  an  early  joint  conference  of  consumer 
and  producer  nations. 


TEXT  OF  LETTER  TO   HEADS  OF  GOVERNMENT 
OF  OPEC  MEMBER  STATES' 


Congressional   Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


White  House  press  release  dated  January  10 

January  9,  1974. 

Today  I  have  invited  governments  of  the 
major  oil  consuming  countries  to  send  repre- 
sentatives to  a  meeting  in  Washington  on 
February  eleventh.  The  purpose  of  this  meet- 
ing will  be  to  seek  a  consensus  among  the 
participants,  looking  toward  a  meeting  of 
consumers  and  producers,  which  would  es- 
tablish new  mutually  beneficial  arrangements 
for  international  energy  and  related  eco- 
nomic matters. 

Recent  developments  have  emphasized  the 


'  Abu  Dhabi,  Algeria,  Ecuador,  Gabon,  Indonesia, 
Iran,  Iraq,  Kuwait,  Libya,  Nigeria,  Qatar,  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  Venezuela. 


93d   Congress,    1st  Session 

The  Great  Lakes.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Inter-American  Affairs  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  Foreign  Affairs.  Part  I:  The  1973  Floods 
and  Activities  of  the  International  Joint  Commis- 
sion, United  States  and  Canada.  March  23-May  1, 
1973.  715  pp. 

Oil  Negotiations,  OPEC,  and  the  Stability  of  Supply. 
Hearings  before  the  Subcommittees  on  Foreign 
Economic  Policy  and  on  the  Near  East  and  South 
Asia  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs. 
April  10-September  18,  1973.    300  pp. 

Energy  and  Foreign  Policy.  Hearings  before  the  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  May  30^31, 
1973.    239  pp. 

U.S.  Forces  in  Europe.  Hearings  before  the  Sub- 
committee on  Arms  Control,  International  Law  and 
Organization  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations.    July  25-27,  1973.    386  pp. 

Travel  Agents  Registration.  Report  to  accompany 
S.  2300.  S.  Rept.  93-458.   October  10,  1973.    19  pp. 


124 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


THE  UNITED   NATIONS 


U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Programs  Against  Drug  Abuse 


Following  is  a  statement  by  Congressman 
John  H.  Buchanan,  Jr.,  U.S.  Representative 
to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  made  in-  Com- 
mittee III  (Social,  Humanitarian  and  Cul- 
tural) of  the  Assembly  on  November  28,  to- 
gether with  the  texts  of  three  resolutions 
adopted  by  the  committee  on  November  29 
and  by  the  Assembly  on  December  lU. 


STATEMENT  BY  CONGRESSMAN  BUCHANAN 

USUN  press  release  120  dated  November  28 

As  we  meet  for  the  annual  discussion  of 
narcotics  control  in  this  committee,  we  can 
observe  two  major  and  conflicting  trends  on 
the  international  drug  control  scene. 

On  the  one  hand,  we  can  perceive  a  steady 
increase,  noted  in  the  report  of  the  Interna- 
tional Narcotics  Control  Board  for  1972,  in 
the  volume,  geographic  extent,  and  number 
of  persons  affected  by  drug  abuse. 

On  the  other  hand,  and  running  contrary 
to  the  spread  of  drug  abuse,  we  can  observe 
a  steady  progression  of  events  which  cannot 
but  provide  solid  basis  for  hope  in  the  fu- 
ture. I  refer  to  the  increased  national  and 
international  efforts  directed  at  stopping  the 
illicit  traffic,  eradicating  the  illicit  produc- 
tion, and  reducing  the  demand  for  drugs  of 
abuse. 

These  latter  efforts  have  been  undertaken 
within  national  borders,  within  the  context 
of  bilateral  agreements,  and  multilaterally 
through  the  many  international  organiza- 
tions cooperating  in  drug  abuse  control  in 
accordance  with  their  capabilities  and  re- 
sponsibilities. 

The  strenuous  efforts  of  my  own  country 
are  already  known  to  you.  Suffice  it  to  repeat, 
as  President  Nixon  pointed  out  at  a  White 


House  conference  on  drug  matters  two 
months  ago,  that  we  have  attacked  drug 
abuse  on  all  fronts — supply,  trafficking,  and 
demand.  The  Federal  Government,  for  ex- 
ample, now  spends  10  times  as  much  on  the 
treatment  of  drug  addiction  as  it  did  four 
and  a  half  years  ago.  These  efforts  have 
attained  some  success,  for  as  the  President 
stated,  "We  have  turned  the  corner  on  drug 
addiction  in  the  United  States.  .  .  ."  We  in 
this  country  know  we  must  maintain  our 
efforts,  however,  because  as  the  President 
also  pointed  out,  "There  is  a  long  road  after 
turning  that  corner  before  we  get  to  our 
goal  of  getting  (drug  abuse)  really  under 
control.  .  .  ."  But  we  approach  the  future 
confident  that  increased  efforts  will  bear 
fruit. 

Our  own  efforts  will  be  increased  both  na- 
tionally and  internationally.  Both  the  U.S. 
House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate 
have  approved  legislation  providing  $42.5 
million  for  each  of  two  years  in  bilateral  and 
multilateral  programs.  This  measure  is 
awaiting  final  action  and  represents  an  even 
stronger  commitment  on  the  part  of  my 
country  to  combating  international  drug 
traffic. 

Other  nations  also  have  undertaken  pro- 
grams designed  to  eliminate  the  sources  and 
to  moderate  the  effects  of  the  illicit  traffic  in 
drugs  of  abuse.  These  national  programs  de- 
rive increased  scope  and  effectiveness  from 
mutual  cooperation  and  assistance — some- 
times through  bilateral  arrangements,  some- 
times on  a  regional  basis,  and  sometimes  on  a 
global  basis.  Time  does  not  permit  citation  of 
all  the  activities  of  nations  directed  toward 
eliminating  drug  abuse.  I  would  be  remiss, 
however,  if  I  did  not  express  my  govern- 
ment's deep  gratification  on  observing  these 


February  4,   1974 


125 


efforts  and  our  sincere  hope  for  their  con- 
tinuing success. 

These  successes,  however,  have  not  been 
without  cost — in  some  cases  heavy  costs  to 
the  nations  involved.  There  has  been  not 
only  a  burden  on  resources,  but  there  has 
also  been  the  far  greater  cost  of  human  life. 
My  country  respects  and  appreciates  the 
dedication  of  those  countries  in  their  com- 
mitment to  curbing  the  deadly  traffic  in  nar- 
cotics. The  United  States  is  proud  to  partici- 
pate in  this  expanding  international  effort. 

The  organs  created  by  the  world  commu- 
nity for  dealing  with  drug  problems  present 
grounds  for  hope  in  the  world  struggle 
against  drug  abuse.  Those  organizations, 
which  are  the  mind  and  hands  of  the  world 
community  in  drug  matters,  are  alert  and 
dadicated  to  our  common  goal. 

The  Commission  on  Narcotic  Drugs 
(CND),  with  an  expanded  membership  aug- 
mented by  numerous  .states  representatives 
who  have  made  signal  contributions  as  ob- 
servers, has  addressed  the  international 
emergency  energetically  and  effectively.  In 
the  25th  session  it  focused  upon  actions  re- 
quired and  recommended  resolutions  for 
adoption  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(ECOSOC)  which  the  Council  approved  at 
its  54th  session.  Among  the  more  important, 
in  our  view,  were  the  establishment  of  a  Sub- 
commission  on  Illicit  Traffic  in  the  Middle 
East  and  the  authorization  of  an  Ad  Hoc 
Committee  on  Illicit  Traffic  in  the  Far  East. 
We  expect  that  the  special  session  of  the 
CND  scheduled  for  early  1974  will  be  equally 
helpful  to  the  international  community  in 
clarifying  problems  and  in  recommending 
solutions. 

It  should  be  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  us 
all,  parties  to  the  drug  control  conventions 
and  beneficiaries  of  the  international  conti'ol 
system,  that  the  International  Narcotics  Con- 
trol Board  (INCB)  is  actively  pursuing  its 
responsibilities  and  defending  our  common 
interests  under  the  treaties.  The  Board  Sec- 
retariat, under  the  able  leadership  of  its 
Secretary,  Joseph  Dittert,  maintains  a  high 
standard  of  service  to  the  treaty  parties. 

We  support  the  efforts  by  the  Secretary 
General  to  achieve  better  coordination  among 


the  various  international  drug  control  bodies 
in  accordance  with  the  draft  resolution  rec- 
ommended by  the  25th  session  of  the  Com- 
mission and  approved  by  ECOSOC. 

We  cannot  afford  duplication  or  waste  or 
inefficiency  in  our  international  effort.  But 
we  are  equally  impressed  with  the  impor- 
tance of  continuing  the  present  special  admin- 
istrative arrangements  between  the  Board 
and  the  Secretariat,  which  seek  to  assure  the 
technical  independence  of  the  INCB  in  carry- 
ing out  its  treaty  functions.  Those  arrange- 
ments, which  were  approved  by  the  Economic 
and  Social  Council  as  recently  as  May  of  this 
year,  have  well  served  the  interests  of  the 
international  community.  It  would  not  be 
desirable,  in  our  view,  to  have  the  INCB's 
activities  or  personnel  merged  with  those  of 
any  other  body. 

The  United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse 
Control  is  now  promoting  and  supporting  an 
expanded  program  of  assistance,  as  was  its 
objective.  The  report  of  the  Acting  Execu- 
tive Director  gives  us  cause  to  be  pleased  by 
the  variety  of  the  work  accomplished,  the 
quality  of  projects  still  underway,  and  by  the 
scope  of  the  programs  under  consideration. 
Although  we  all  recognize  the  difficulty  of 
acliieving  a  balance  among  programs  affect- 
ing the  three  aspects  of  the  drug  problem — 
supply,  trafficking,  and  demand — the  Fund 
has  pursued  this  objective  with  a  consider- 
able measure  of  success.  Thus  the  Fund  has 
ongoing  programs  of  assistance  not  only  in 
training  of  law  enforcement  officers  and  re- 
placement of  illicit  narcotics  production  with 
other  crops  but  al.so  in  prevention,  treatment, 
and  rehabilitation  and  research. 

My  country  has  been  impressed  by  the  ini- 
tial successes  of  this  program,  despite  its 
embryonic  stage.  But  additional  resources 
will  be  needed  if  the  Fund  is  to  increase  its 
efforts.  The  United  States  is  willing,  where 
appropriate  and  desirable,  to  reinforce  the 
efforts  of  the  Fund  by  complementary  pro- 
grams designed  to  achieve  shared  goals. 

It  is  obvious  from  the  Fund's  recent  activi- 
ties that  increasing  emphasis  is  being  given 
to  coordination  with  other  U.N.  agencies 
working  on  drug  matters  under  Fund  leader- 
ship.  I  believe  all  governments  will  view  this 


126 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


development  with  satisfaction.  The  report  of 
the  Administrative  Committee  on  Coordina- 
tion (ACC),  Issued  In  September  of  this 
year,  is  a  significant  prelude  to  even  better 
coordination  In  the  future. 

We  are  also  pleased  to  note  the  beginnings 
of  program  evaluation  included  in  the  most 
recent  ACC  report.  This  will  be  responsive 
to  the  views  and  expectations  of  the  CND  as 
expressed  by  many  representatives  at  the 
25th  session.  We  also  look  forward  to  the 
realization  of  the  Fund's  plans  for  assigning 
regional  advisers  to  the  principal  geograph- 
ical areas,  to  enable  the  United  Nations  to  be 
more  responsive  more  promptly  to  countries' 
requests  for  advice  and  assistance  in  meet- 
ing their  international  obligations. 

The  appointment  of  a  regional  adviser  for 
the  Middle  East  recently  announced  by  the 
distinguished  Acting  Executive  Director  of 
the  Fund,  whom  we  are  honored  to  have  here 
with  us  today,  provides  evidence  of  the 
Fund's  determination  to  acquire  the  capacity 
to  respond  to  the  needs  of  the  world  com- 
munity. 

The  U.N.  Fund  has  been  in  existence  for 
only  a  short  period.  Established  to  provide 
extraordinary  resources  for  emergency 
needs,  the  Fund  can  give  to  the  United  Na- 
tions the  capacity  to  respond  to  requests  for 
assistance  from  countries  with  significant 
drug  abuse  control  problems.  The  mainte- 
nance of  this  capacity  is  the  responsibility  of 
every  nation  represented  here,  because  the 
Fund  can  act  only  with  the  resources  pro- 
vided to  it  by  the  international  community. 
We  hope  that  all  nations  will  contribute  on  a 
sustained  basis  to  the  resources  of  the  Fund 
as  generously  as  they  are  able. 

This  discussion  would  be  incomplete  with- 
out mention  of  the  basic  agreements  which 
underlie  our  cooperation  in  this  field;  that  is, 
the  series  of  international  conventions  de- 
signed to  control  drugs  of  abuse. 

The  Single  Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs 
has  now  been  accepted  by  102  nations,  its 
amending  protocol  by  14  nations,  and  the 
Convention  on  Psychotropic  Substances  by 
13  nations.  Most  countries  which  have  not 
yet  ratified  the  protocol  and  Psychotropic 
Convention  are  making  preparations  to  do  so. 


As  a  result  of  international  confei'ences 
there  is  a  moral  commitment,  which  the 
the  United  States  respects,  to  perfect  and  up- 
date this  international  control  system  in  the 
interest  of  all  nations  and  peoples. 

The  world  drug  scene  is  dominated  today 
by  the  spread  of  drug  abuse  and  by  the  ener- 
gization of  nations  and  international  orga- 
nizations to  combat  this  pollution  of  human 
resources. 

My  government  believes  that  energetic  and 
sustained  action  by  the  world  community 
through  programs  directed  at  the  supply, 
traflicking,  and  demand  for  illicit  drugs  will 
in  time  permit  the  peoples  of  the  world  to 
"turn  the  corner"  on  the  problem  of  drug 
abuse. 

Extraordinary  eff'orts  are  required,  but  the 
hope  of  success  is  real  if  we  maintain  our 
national  commitments  and  continue  our  co- 
operation with  other  nations  and  with  inter- 
national organizations.  I  pledge  that  my 
government  will  carry  on  with  its  eff"orts 
both  within  the  United  States  and  in  coopera- 
tion with  other  nations  to  reduce  drug  abuse 
and  bring  it  under  eff"ective  control. 


TEXTS  OF  RESOLUTIONS 


General  Assembly  Resolution  3145  ' 

Assistance  to  the  developing  countries  in  the  field 
of  narcotics  control 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recalling  its  resolutions  2859  (XXVI)  of  20  De- 
cember 1971  and  3012  (XXVII)  of  18  December 
1972, 

Considering  that  some  developing  countries,  owing 
to  the  lack  of  technical  and  financial  means,  are  un- 
able to  contribute  to  the  control  of  narcotic  drugs 
as  effectively  as  they  earnestly  desire, 

Recognizing  that  in  order  to  do  so  they  would  be 
required  to  make  an  extensive  effort  to  improve 
especially  the  economic  and  social  conditions  of 
some  of  their  often  isolated  and  impoverished  regions 
where  traditionally  the  revenue  derived  from  the 
cultivation  of  opium  poppy  or  other  narcotic  drugs  is 
in  some  cases  the  principal  means  of  livelihood  for 
the  populations  concerned, 

Recognizing  further  that  in  those  regions  of  the 


'  Adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  Dec.  14  by  a  vote  of 
118  (U.S.)  to  0,  with  10  abstentions. 


February  4,    1974 


127 


above-mentioned  developing  countries  the  replace- 
ment of  a  traditionally  drug-oriented  economy  by 
other  agricultural  and  economic  activities  should  be 
undertaken  in  such  a  way  as  to  minimize  hardship 
for  the  populations  concerned  and  to  assist  in  estab- 
lishing new  adequate  sources  of  revenue  and  means 
of  livelihood  for  them, 

Being  fully  aware  that  to  embark  on  such  compre- 
hensive programmes  these  countries  need  substantial 
technical  and  financial  assistance  from  the  interna- 
tional community, 

Conscious  that  the  United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug 
Abuse  Control,  in  order  to  be  able  to  participate 
financially  in  these  programmes  and  to  continue  to 
support  training,  research  and  other  scientific  activi- 
ties and  rehabilitation  efforts  in  the  interest  of  all 
States,  whatever  their  individual  stage  of  develop- 
ment, requires  funding  on  a  continuous  basis, 

1.  Considers  that  the  United  Nations  system, 
through  the  United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse 
Control,  can  make  a  major  contribution  in  this 
respect ; 

2.  Welcomes  the  fact  that  some  of  the  developing 
countries  in  Asia  and  Latin  America,  in  co-operation 
with  the  Fund  have  initiated  or  are  about  to  initiate 
programmes  aimed  at  the  effective  elimination  of 
illicit  traffic,  illicit  production  and  abuse  of  narcotic 
drugs; 

3.  Commends  the  Governments  which  have  already 
contributed  to  the  Fund  and  urges  them  to  continue, 
and  if  possible,  to  increase  their  contribution ; 

4.  Urges  all  States,  according  to  their  capacities, 
to  make  substantial  and  sustained  contributions  to 
the  Fund  and  also  to  provide  technical  and  financial 
assistance  to  the  developing  countries  directly  con- 
cerned which  request  such  assistance  for  bringing 
narcotic  drugs  under  effective  control ; 

5.  Appeals  to  international  financial  institutions 
to  assist  these  developing  countries  in  carrying  out 
their  respective  narcotics  control  programmes. 

General  Assembly  Resolution  3146- 

Support  for  and  voluntary  contributioyis  to  the 
United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 

The  General  Assembly, 

Noting  with  concern  the  report  of  the  Interna- 
tional Narcotics  Control  Board  for  1972  that  drug 
abuse  is  still  increasing  in  volume,  geographical 
extent  and  number  of  people  affected. 

Encouraged  by  the  Board's  assessment  that  there 
has  at  the  same  time  been  a  deepening  realization  at 
all  levels  of  society  that  this  grave  and  complex 
phenomenon  can  only  be  met  successfully  by  a  sus- 


tained, united  effort  on  the  part  of  the  world  com- 
munity by  Governments  acting  in  concert  with  one 
another, 

1.  Commends  the  action  already  taken  by  Govern- 
ments to  reduce  illicit  production,  traffic  and  con- 
sumption ; 

2.  Expresses  the  hope  that  tfiese  actions  will  con- 
tinue and  that  even  greater  concerted  efforts  will  be 
made; 

3.  Recognizes  that  a  number  of  countries  will  need 
assistance  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  their  drug 
abuse  control  programmes; 

4.  Reaffirms  its  declaration  in  resolution  3012 
(XXVII)    of  18  December  1972  that  the  fulfilment 

by  the  developing  countries  of  their  obligations  under 
the  Single  Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs,  1961,  calls 
for  technical  and  financial  assistance  from  the  inter- 
national community; 

5.  Urgently  appeals  to  Governments  for  sustained 
support  and  increased  voluntary  contributions  to  the 
United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control,  in 
any  form  and  according  to  their  capacities. 


General  Assembly   Resolution   3147- 

Accession  to  drug  control  treaties 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recalling  its  resolution  3013  (XXVII)  of  18  De- 
cember 1972  calling  for  adherence  to  the  Single 
Convention  on  Narcotic  Drugs,  1961,  the  Convention 
on  Psychotropic  Substances,  1971,  and  the  1972  Pro- 
tocol Amending  the  Single  Convention, 

Gratified  that  since  this  resolution  was  adopted  a 
number  of  States  have  acceded  to  one  or  more  of 
these  instruments, 

1.  Stresses  the  importance  to  international  drug 
control  of  universal  accession  to  all  three  treaties  and 
to  the  earliest  possible  entry  into  force  of  the  1971 
Convention  on  Psychotropic  Substances  and  the  1972 
Protocol  Amending  the  Single  Convention ; 

2.  Urges  Governments  of  countries  directly  related 
to  the  manufacturing  and  production  of  psycho- 
tropic substances  to  ratify  or  accede  to  the  said  Con- 
vention as  soon  as  possible; 

3.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  draw  the 
present  resolution  to  the  attention  of  all  Govern- 
ments; 

4.  Also  requests  the  Secretary-General  to  report 
to  the  General  Assembly  at  its  twenty-ninth  session 
on  the  progress  made  towards  universal  acceptance 
of  all  three  treaties. 


'  Adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  Dec.  14  by  a  vote  of 
119  (U.S.)  to  0,  with  10  abstentions. 


128 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


U.S.  Reviews  Progress  on  Disarmament  Issues  in  1973 
Before  U.N.  General  Assembly 


Following  are  statements  by  Joseph  Mar- 
tin, Jr.,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  Confer- 
ence of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament 
(CCD)  and  Adviser  to  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  made  in  Com- 
mittee I  (Political  and  Security)  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  on  October  23  and  November 
23,  together  with  the  texts  of  two  resolutions 
adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  December  18. 


STATEMENT   BY  AMBASSADOR  MARTIN, 
OCTOBER  23 

USUN  press  release  97  dated  October  23 

Writing  about  the  atomic  bomb  in  1945, 
Albert  Einstein  reluctantly  saw  a  certain 
merit  in  the  specter  of  danger  it  had  intro- 
duced. "It  may  intimidate  the  human  race," 
he  said,  "into  bringing  order  into  its  inter- 
national affairs,  which,  without  the  pressure 
of  fear,  it  would  not  do." 

Certainly  no  one  would  question  that  nu- 
clear weapons  and  other  forms  of  advanced 
technology  have  had  the  most  pervasive 
effects  on  human  society.  But  has  this  tech- 
nology had  an  influence  over  international 
affairs  as  Einstein  anticipated?  The  answer 
is,  obviously,  yes — but  perhaps  not  as  much 
as  he  expected.  One  reason  is  that  the  human 
race  becomes  partially  inured  to  almost  any- 
thing, including  danger.  Another  reason  is 
that  it  changes  its  thought  habits  only  very 
slowly;  many  people  today  still  think  in  terms 
of  an  earlier  era  of  conventional  weaponry. 

All  the  more  credit  therefore  seems  due  to 
those  who  have  read  the  implication  of  tech- 
nology   correctly    and    who    have    labored 


against  considerable  odds  to  bring  it  under 
control.  Those  who  work  in  the  arms  control 
field  should  draw  courage,  I  think,  from  yet 
another  consideration  :  Difficult  and  frustrat- 
ing as  these  efforts  may  be  over  the  long  run, 
they  are  bound  to  have  an  effect  on  the 
thoughts  and  trends  of  governments,  even 
before  specific  results  are  achieved. 

As  the  First  Committee  begins  once  again 
today  to  explore  the  problems  of  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament,  there  are  certainly 
many  factors  on  the  world  scene  which  are  a 
source  of  apprehension.  It  is  easy  under  these 
circumstances  to  be  discouraged  about  the 
prospects  for  arms  control;  however,  if  we 
take  stock  of  the  events  of  the  past  decade, 
we  can,  I  believe,  be  encouraged  by  how  far 
we  have  come. 

Only  a  decade  ago,  arms  control  and  dis- 
armament often  seemed  just  another  issue 
which,  despite  its  importance,  had  become 
enmeshed  in  the  cold  war.  Proposals  were 
often  made  with  no  thought  of  their  ultimate 
acceptance;  speakers  seemed  intent  upon 
scoring  propaganda  victories  rather  than 
achieving  progress  toward  meaningful  arms 
control  measures. 

This  fall  we  can  cite  more  than  a  body  of 
agreements  already  concluded.  We  can  point 
to  promising  negotiations  now  underway  or 
about  to  begin  on  strategic  arms  limitations, 
on  mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
(MBFR)  in  Central  Europe,  and  on  Euro- 
pean security  and  cooperation.  The  Confer- 
ence of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament  con- 
tinues its  efforts  to  come  to  grips  realistically 
with  important  subjects:  a  comprehensive 
test  ban  and  limitations  on  chemical  weapons. 

The  past  year  has  seen  encouraging  signs 
of  further  movement  toward  stability.  The 


February  4,    1974 


129 


Viet-Nam  and  Laos  agreements  have  already 
reduced  the  scope  of  the  conflict  that  has  torn 
Southeast  Asia  for  so  long.  Although  fighting 
has  occurred  in  the  Middle  East,  it  has  been 
possible  to  arrange  a  cease-fire.  My  country 
will  of  course  continue  its  eff'orts  to  help 
arrange  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Middle 
East  conflict.  Elsewhere  in  the  world,  prog- 
ress has  been  made  toward  relaxing  tensions. 

Here  at  the  United  Nations  we  have  the 
clear  duty  to  move  ahead  in  our  work  on 
arms  control,  whatever  the  difficulties  facing 
us.  It  is  up  to  us  to  build  on  the  base  of  agree- 
ments already  achieved  in  order  to  take  those 
further  steps  which  may  now  be  feasible. 

Nuclear  arms  control  naturally  enjoys  pri- 
ority in  our  efl^'orts.  In  this  area  as  in  others, 
the  coming  years  hold  the  promise  of  further 
progress,  building  upon  that  of  the  past  five 
years. 

In  1969,  President  Nixon  pledged  to  the 
United  Nations  that  the  United  States  was 
embarked  on  a  "determined  eflfort  not  only  to 
limit  the  buildup  of  strategic  arms  but  to 
reverse  it."  In  1972,  we  concluded  with  the 
Soviet  Union  agreements  limiting  each  side 
to  two  ABM  [antiballistic  missile]  sites  and 
freezing  ICBM  [intercontinental  ballistic 
missile]  and  SLBM  [submarine-launched 
ballistic  missile]  launcher  levels  for  five 
years.  In  the  U.S.-Soviet  agreement  con- 
cluded on  June  21,  1973,  President  Nixon 
and  General  Secretary  Brezhnev  stated  their 
intention  of  reaching  a  permanent  agree- 
ment on  more  complete  measures  on  the  limi- 
tation of  arms,  as  well  as  their  subsequent 
reduction.  They  also  announced  that  the  two 
sides  would  make  serious  eff"orts  to  work  out 
the  provisions  of  the  permanent  agreement 
with  the  objective  of  signing  it  in  1974.  U.S. 
and  Soviet  negotiators  are  now  meeting  in 
Geneva  in  order  to  try  to  carry  out  that 
objective. 

The  SALT  talks  [Strategic  Arms  Limita- 
tion Talks]  represent  a  fundamental  change 
in  international  relationships.  Each  side  has 
set  a  goal  of  breaking  the  momentum  and 
moderating  the  process  of  strategic  arms 
competition. 

On  October  30,  historic  talks  will  begin  in 


Vienna  aiming  at  reductions  in  the  level  of 
military  forces  now  stationed  in  Central 
Europe.  How  important  these  negotiations 
are  is  evident  from  the  area  involved.  Central 
Europe  has  been  since  World  War  II  a  region 
of  major  East-West  confrontation.  It  has 
long  been  a  battleground  of  many  peoples 
and  nations.  Preserving  security  undimin- 
ished in  that  region  at  lower  levels  of  forces 
would  represent  a  major  breakthrough  to- 
ward a  more  rational  world  order.  We  and 
our  allies  plan  to  negotiate  in  Vienna  with 
dedication,  bearing  in  mind  that  not  just  the 
interests  of  the  actual  participants  will  be 
served  by  our  success  but  international  peace 
and  security  will  generally  be  strengthened. 

Nonproliferation  Treaty 

Neither  negotiations  on  strategic  arms  nor 
the  forthcoming  talks  on  mutual  and  bal- 
anced force  reductions  in  Europe  are  directly 
concerned  With  the  question  of  the  interna- 
tional proliferation  of  nuclear  arms.  In  the 
end,  however,  their  purpose  is  similar  to  that 
of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.  For  the 
many  nations  which  negotiated  the  Nonpro- 
liferation Treaty  shared  the  same  goals  as 
the  SALT  and  MBFR  negotiators  :  to  achieve 
greater  stability  in  a  world  living  under  the 
nuclear  threat,  to  reduce  the  chances  of  nu- 
clear war  breaking  out  whether  by  design 
or  by  accident,  and  to  lessen  the  burden  of 
armaments  on  the  world.  The  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty  reflects  the  desire  of  its  more 
than  100  signatories  to  call  a  halt  to  the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  before  an 
increasing  number  of  countries  felt  com- 
pelled to  invest  substantial  resources  into 
building  their  own  deteri-ent  forces.  The 
benefits  of  the  treaty  have  flowed  to  nuclear- 
weapon  and  non-nuclear-weapon  states  alike. 
The  world  as  a  whole  has  profited  from  the 
fact  that  no  country  has  joined  the  "nuclear 
club"  since  1964.  One  can  well  ask  where  we 
would  be  today  if,  in  addition  to  the  other 
conflicts  in  the  world,  the  last  few  years  had 
seen  a  desperate  action-reaction  cycle  as  ad- 
ditional countries  acquired  nuclear-weapon 
capabilities. 


130 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


It  will  not  be  on  the  basis  of  the  short  five 
years  of  its  existence,  but  over  the  decades 
to  come,  that  future  generations  will  judge 
the  usefulness  of  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty.  Strengthening  that  treaty  and  its 
underlying  principles  is  one  of  our  heaviest 
responsibilities.  During  the  past  year,  the 
treaty  did  indeed  receive  increasing  support 
with  the  adherence  of  six  additional  states. 
Another  important  development  was  the 
signing  last  April  of  the  verification  agree- 
ment between  the  IAEA  [International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency]  and  the  European 
Community,  removing  one  obstacle  to  wider 
adherence  to  the  treaty.  We  earnestly  hope 
that  additional  countries,  particularly  those 
with  an  advanced  nuclear  technology,  will 
adhere  to  the  treaty. 

Article  VIII  of  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  calls  for  a  review  conference  five 
years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  treaty. 
We  look  forward  to  that  conference.  We  re- 
gard it  as  an  important  opportunity  to  pro- 
vide additional  impetus  to  the  treaty  and  its 
principles.  We  intend  to  cooperate  fully  with 
other  treaty  parties  in  insuring  that  the  con- 
ference will  be  carefully  organized.  To  that 
end,  we  are  now  beginning  to  consult  with 
the  other  depositaries  and  parties  on  how 
best  to  proceed  with  the  arrangements  for 
the  conference  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to 
all  the  parties. 

Comprehensive   Ban   on   Nuclear  Testing 

An  important  objective  involved  in  the 
control  of  nuclear  arms  remains  a  compre- 
hensive ban  on  nuclear  testing.  Resolutions  of 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  have 
often  drawn  attention  to  the  priority  that  a 
comprehensive  ban  should  receive  in  disar- 
mament negotiations. 

We  share  the  general  assessment  that  the 
Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  has  made  a  sub- 
stantial contribution  to  international  arms 
control  efforts.  Our  common  objective  of  lim- 
iting the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons 
would  have  been  more  difficult  to  achieve 
except  for  the  willingness  of  states  to  accept 
the  constraints  placed  on  them  by  the  Lim- 


ited Test  Ban  Treaty  in  the  knowledge  that 
other  states  were  accepting  the  same  con- 
straints. The  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty,  as 
the  initial  breakthrough  after  years  of  stalled 
arms  control  negotiations,  improved  the  in- 
ternational climate  and  hence  helped  to  make 
possible  the  later  arms  control  agreements. 
For  all  its  value,  however,  the  Limited 
Test  Ban  Treaty  has  been  regarded  as  a  step, 
albeit  a  most  important  one,  to  a  ban  on  all 
nuclear  testing.  The  United  States  has  al- 
ways supported  the  objective  of  an  adequate- 
ly verified  comprehensive  test  ban.  President 
Nixon  stated  in  his  May  3,  1973,  foreign 
policy  report  to  Congress : 

The  United  States  has  continued  to  support  the 
objective  of  an  adequately  verified  agreement  to  ban 
all  nuclear  weapons  testing. 

Some  countries  maintain  that  national  means  of 
verification  would  be  sufficient  to  monitor  such  a  ban 
with  confidence.  We  disagree.  Despite  substantial 
progress  in  detecting  and  identifying  seismic  events, 
including  underground  nuclear  tests,  we  believe  that 
national  means  of  verification  still  should  be  supple- 
mented by  some  on-site  inspection. 

The  United  States  shares  the  view  of  many  other 
nations  that  an  adequately  verified  comprehensive 
test  ban  would  be  a  positive  contribution  to  moderat- 
ing the  arms  race.  For  this  reason  we  are  giving 
high  priority  to  the  problem  of  verification.  We  will 
continue  to  cooperate  with  other  nations  in  working 
toward  eventual  agreement  on  this  important  issue. 

Regarding  our  common  goal  of  achieving 
a  halt  to  all  nuclear  testing,  we  have  made 
progress  toward  establishing  the  basis  for  a 
ban.  Our  understanding  of  seismic  detection 
and  identification  capabilities  has  improved 
significantly  over  the  past  decade.  My  coun- 
try, in  particular,  has  devoted  very  substan- 
tial resources  to  research  and  development 
in  the  field  of  seismology.  At  this  summer's 
CCD  session,  we  submitted  a  working  paper 
analyzing  in  detail  our  recent  progress  in 
seismic  verification  research.  That  paper  de- 
scribed our  current  plans  to  construct  15  or 
20  new  seismic  research  stations  in  coopera- 
tion with  other  interested  nations  at  key 
places  in  the  world.  It  also  outlined  our  plans 
to  install  a  data  management  system  to  col- 
lect, store,  and  distribute  to  interested  gov- 
ernments  and   other   institutions   and   indi- 


February  4,    1974 


131 


viduals  the  enormous  quantities  of  data 
wliich  will  flow  from  this  expanded  seismic 
network.  These  plans  call  for  seismic  data 
to  be  available  on  a  routine  basis  by  late  next 
year  or  early  in  1975. 

My  country,  along  with  others  interested 
in  a  comprehensive  test  ban,  benefited  from 
an  intensive  four-day  exchange  of  views  on 
this  subject  at  informal  meetings  of  the  CCD 
last  July.  Those  meetings,  attended  by  ex- 
perts from  nine  countries,  were,  in  our  opin- 
ion, among  the  most  useful  ever  held  at  the 
CCD.  I  would  like  here  to  express  our  ap- 
preciation to  Japan  for  its  efforts  in  pro- 
posing and  helping  to  arrange  the  meetings. 

The  past  year  has  also  seen  progress  in  a 
less  universal,  but  nevertheless  very  impor- 
tant, arms  control  measure.  As  a  party  to 
Additional  Protocol  II  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco,  the  United  States  was  most  grati- 
fied to  note  the  adherence  during  the  year 
to  that  protocol  of  two  additional  nuclear- 
weapon  states :  France  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China.  We  are  pleased  to  see  the 
Latin  American  nuclear-free  zone  gain  this 
new  support.  Full  credit  must  be  given  to  the 
Mexican  Government  and  its  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations,  Am- 
bassador [Alfonso]  Garcia  Robles,  for  their 
dedication  and  unflagging  support  of  this 
endeavor. 


Limiting   Chemical  Weapons 

During  the  past  year,  the  CCD  devoted  a 
large  part  of  its  eff'orts  to  discussing  limita- 
tions on  chemical  weapons  (CW).  At  the  end 
of  the  spring  session,  a  group  of  eight  non- 
aligned  members  presented  their  views  on  a 
possible  treaty  to  the  Committee.  On  August 
21,  the  Japanese  delegation  tabled  the  outline 
of  a  draft  treaty  for  the  consideration  of  the 
Committee.  During  the  year,  the  CCD  looked 
carefully  at  many  aspects  of  chemical  weap- 
ons, including  those  related  to  possible  agree- 
ments. Such  careful  consideration  of  all  rele- 
vant issues  is  the  way  to  make  progress 
toward  the  achievement  of  treaty  restraints. 

The  memorandum  of  the  nonaligned  coun- 
tries performed  a  useful  service  to  the  CCD 
in   providing   detailed   views   on   the   many 


interconnected  elements  in  any  possible  CW 
agreement.  The  delegation  of  the  United 
States  commented  in  a  systematic  fashion  on 
the  key  points  in  the  nonaligned  memo- 
randum. We  agreed  with  the  point  in  the 
memorandum  that  prohibition  on  chemical 
weapons  must  be  coupled  with  adequate  veri- 
fication and  that  verification  in  turn  has  both 
technical  and  political  aspects  which  interact 
with  the  question  of  the  scope  of  prohibitions. 
We  presented  our  views  about  how  best  to 
achieve  our  mutual  objective  of  a  balanced 
agreement.  Thus,  the  nonaligned  memoran- 
dum served  not  only  to  put  on  record  the 
views  of  eight  CCD  members  but  gave  rise  to 
an  examination  in  depth  at  the  CCD  of  many 
of  the  key  elements  involved  in  any  agree- 
ment to  limit  chemical  weapons. 

The  Japanese  working  paper  tabled  shortly 
before  the  end  of  the  CCD  session  has  al- 
ready begun  to  receive  wide  consideration. 
We  are  giving  the  Japanese  proposal  the 
serious  and  careful  study  it  deserves.  In 
doing  so,  we  are  conscious  that  the  Japanese 
delegation  had  itself  taken  into  consideration 
the  views  of  other  CCD  members,  including 
those  contained  in  the  nonaligned  memoran- 
dum, in  preparing  the  proposal.  One  of  our 
own  views — that  there  must  be  an  essential 
relationship  between  the  scope  of  activities 
to  be  prohibited  and  the  possibilities  of  veri- 
fication— is  reflected  in  the  Japanese  working 
paper.  We  have  also  considered  that  the  al- 
ternative of  a  gradual  approach  to  the  prob- 
lem of  chemical  weapons  should  be  held  open, 
as  indeed  it  is  in  the  Japanese  proposal. 

During  the  past  year,  the  CCD  carried  out 
important  work  in  deepening  our  mutual 
understanding  of  the  elements  involved  in 
limiting  chemical  weapons.  Its  value  as  a 
forum  was  rarely  more  evident  than  in  the 
detailed  discussions  held  about  chemical 
weapons.  These  discussions,  in  which  virtu- 
ally every  CCD  member  joined,  covered  the 
widest  possible  range  of  issues. 

The  United  States  remains  committed  to 
seeking  effective  limitations  on  chemical 
weapons.  We  will  continue  our  search  for 
workable  means  of  restricting  these  weapons 
during  the  coming  year,  while  exercising 
restraint  in  our  own  program. 


132 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


As  I  told  the  CCD  on  August  30,  we  have 
not  produced  any  lethal  chemical  weapons 
since  1968  and  in  fact  have  been  phasing  out 
parts  of  our  CW  stockpiles. 

Question   of  Disarmament  Forums 

I  should  like  now  to  turn  to  the  question  of 
disarmament  forums.  As  you  all  know,  a 
number  of  suggestions  have  been  advanced. 
We  would  like  to  make  our  views  known  on 
these  suggestions. 

The  CCD  remains,  in  our  view,  a  valuable 
forum  which  has  proven  itself  over  more 
than  a  decade.  Its  limited  size  and  its  free- 
dom from  external  pressures  have  permitted 
the  CCD  delegations  to  establish  close  work- 
ing relations  with  each  other.  They  have  ac- 
quired a  detailed  understanding  of  the  tech- 
nical issues  involved  in  arms  control  issues 
and  have  evolved  procedures  which  have  per- 
mitted the  work  of  the  Committee  to  proceed 
smoothly.  These  factors  have  enabled  the 
CCD  to  achieve  truly  constructive  results. 
We  believe  that  the  United  Nations  should 
continue  to  provide  full  support  to  this  Com- 
mittee which  has  been  responsible  for  so 
much  of  the  progress  that  we  have  made  in 
arms  control. 

Some  countries  have  called  for  the  conven- 
ing of  a  world  disarmament  conference  with 
preparations  for  such  a  meeting  to  begin  as 
soon  as  possible.  Other  countries  have  stated 
their  view  that  such  a  conference  would 
prove  useful  only  if  all  the  nuclear  powers 
agreed  to  participate  in  it.  The  views  of  the 
United  States,  which  are  well  known,  remain 
unchanged.  While  we  agree  that  a  world  dis- 
armament conference  could  serve  a  useful 
function  at  a  later  stage  in  the  disarmament 
process,  we  do  not  believe  that  such  a  con- 
ference at  this  time  would  produce  useful 
results.  For  such  a  conference  not  to  dis- 
appoint the  hopes  of  all  those  wishing  to  see 
rapid  progress  in  disarmament,  the  confer- 
ence would  have  to  be  able  to  offer  real 
prospects  of  agreement  on  significant  arms 
control  measures.  However,  it  is  not  the  lack 
of  a  suitable  forum  but  the  lack  of  political 
agreement  which  prevents  us  from  taking 
more    far-reaching    steps    toward    a    more 


peaceful  order  with  reduced  levels  of  arma- 
ments. A  world  disarmament  conference 
would  be  less  likely  to  overcome  this  lack  of 
agreement  than  to  fall  victim  to  it.  The  end 
result  could  well  be  a  slowdown  in  our  work 
combined  with  the  dashing  of  expectations 
everywhere.  Therefore,  we  oppose  convening 
a  world  disarmament  conference  or  setting  a 
date  or  starting  preparations  for  one  at  this 
time. 

Some  speakers  at  this  session  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  have  already  alluded  to  the 
possibility  of  reconvening  the  United  Nations 
Disarmament  Commission  (UNDC).  You 
will  recall  that  the  Commission  last  met  in 
1965,  when  there  had  been  no  [complete] 
General  Assembly  session  and  hence  no  dis- 
armament debate. 

We  find  it  difficult  to  see  how  the  UNDC 
could  usefully  tackle  the  problems  facing  us 
today.  We  doubt  seriously  that  such  a  large 
conference  could,  despite  the  best  of  inten- 
tions, tackle  the  working  out  of  concrete 
treaty  agreements.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
conference  were  only  to  continue  the  ex- 
change of  views  which  we  will  be  having 
here,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  could  add 
to  the  debate  in  this  committee.  Moreover, 
a  prolonged  debate  might  give  rise  to  heated 
exchanges  not  relevant  to  the  solution  of 
arms  control  and  disarmament  problems. 
Such  exchanges  would  only  set  back  the  cause 
of  disarmament. 

I  have  tried  to  sum  up  where  we  stand  in 
our  work.  Obviously  we  have  not  moved 
ahead  as  rapidly  as  we  would  have  liked  to 
on  all  fronts.  In  this  respect,  we  must  recog- 
nize frankly  that  there  are  elements  of  divi- 
sion and  mistrust  which  have  existed  in  the 
world  for  a  long  time.  A  process  of  compro- 
mise, of  overcoming  longstanding  political 
diff'erences,  and  of  relegating  ideological  dif- 
ferences to  their  proper  place  will  be  needed 
before  we  can  attain  a  more  rapid  rate  of 
progress  in  all  sectors  of  arms  control  and 
disarmament. 

But  we  must  equally  recognize  that  this 
is  by  no  means  a  time  for  despair — rather  the 
contrary.  In  the  realm  of  strategic  arms  con- 
trol there  has  been  very  substantial  progress 
indeed,  with  good  prospects  for  future  prog- 


February  4,   1974 


133 


ress  in  the  not  too  distant  future.  In  the 
realm  of  conventional  forces,  we  will  soon  be 
witness  to  an  undertaking  of  transcendental 
importance,  with  the  start  of  actual  negotia- 
tions on  the  mutual  and  balanced  reduction 
of  forces  and  armaments  in  Central  Europe. 
Of  all  the  areas  of  dangerous  confrontation, 
perhaps  none  over  time  has  occupied  our 
thoughts  more  starkly  or  more  relentlessly 
than  this  one,  for  a  conflagration  in  this  area 
would  scarcely  leave  any  part  of  the  world 
untouched. 

Finally,  and  perhaps  above  all,  we  can 
draw  encouragement  from  the  growth, 
worldwide,  of  an  idea— an  idea  which  is  the 
cardinal  principle  of  all  work  in  arms  control 
and  disarmament:  that  limitations  can  as- 
sure security  and  stability  better  than  even 
the  highest  levels  of  armaments. 


later  time  will  be  free  to  join  the  committee. 
We  also  think  that  the  committee  should  be 
ready  to  receive  suggestions  by  interested 
countries  concerning  its  work. 

Early  in  its  deliberations  the  committee 
will,  no  doubt,  wish  to  consider  inviting  the 
IAEA  to  provide  assistance  for  the  substan- 
tive preparation  of  the  conference,  as  well  as 
to  send  experts  to  participate  in  the  confer- 
ence. 

We  think  that  the  draft  resolution  in  docu- 
ment A/C.1/L.665  merits  the  support  of  all 
delegations  that  approve  the  objectives  of  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty.  For  our  part,  we 
look  forward  to  cooperating  actively  in  insur- 
ing that  the  conference  in  1975  will  result 
in  a  serious  and  constructive  review  of  the 
operation  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  MARTIN, 
NOVEMBER  23 

The  U.S.  delegation  is  happy  to  cosponsor 
the  draft  resolution  in  document  A/C.1/L.665 
on  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  review  con- 
ference. We  attach  importance  to  the  confer- 
ence, and  we  consider  it  to  be  in  the  general 
interest  to  insure  that  the  conference  is  care- 
fully prepared  and  that  appropriate  facilities 
and  services  are  provided.  These  purposes 
are  served  by  the  draft  resolution  in  docu- 
ment A/C.1/L.665. 

Operative  paragraph  2  requests  the  Secre- 
tary General  to  render  assistance  and  provide 
services. 

Operative  paragraph  1  takes  note  that  a 
preparatory  committee  has  been  formed, 
comprised  of  parties  to  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  serving  on  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  Board  or  [represented]  at 
the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament. 

We  believe  that  those  criteria  represent 
the  best  practical  solution  to  the  problem  of 
constituting  a  committee  that  is  fully  repre- 
sentative of  the  interests  of  all  parties  to  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty. 

We  favor  a  wide  interpretation  of  those 
criteria  so  that  any  party  meeting  them  at  a 


TEXTS  OF  RESOLUTIONS 


General  Assembly  Resolution   31848^ 

The   General  Assembly, 

Recalling  its  resolution  2373  (XXII)  of  12  June 
1968,  in  which  it  commended  the  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and  expressed 
the  hope  for  the  widest  possible  adherence  to  that 
Treaty, 

Noting  that  article  VIII,  paragraph  3,  of  the 
Treaty  provides  that: 

"Five  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  this 
Treaty,  a  conference  of  Parties  to  the  Treaty  shall 
be  held  in  Geneva,  Switzerland,  in  order  to  review 
the  operation  of  this  Treaty  with  a  view  to  assuring 
that  the  purposes  of  the  Preamble  and  the  provisions 
of  the  Treaty  are  being  realized", 

Bearing  in  mind  that  the  Treaty  will  have  been 
in  force  for  five  years  on  5  March  1975  and  expecting 
that  the  review  conference  called  for  in  the  Treaty 
will  take  place  soon  after  that  date, 

1.  Notes  that,  following  appropriate  consultation, 
a  preparatory  committee  has  been  formed  of  parties 
serving  on  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  or  represented  at  the 
Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament; 

2.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  render  the 
necessary  assistance  and   to  provide   such   services, 


'  A/C.1/L.665;  adopted  by  Committee  I  on  Nov.  23 
by  a  vote  of  66  (U.S.)  to  2,  with  10  abstentions,  and 
by  the  Assembly  on  Dec.  18  by  a  recorded  vote  of 
100  (U.S.)  to  2,  with  11  abstentions. 


134 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


including  summary  records,  as  may  be  required  for 
the  review  conference  and  its  preparation. 


General   Assembly   Resolution   3183- 

The  General  Assembly, 

Conscious  of  the  responsibility  of  the  United  Na- 
tions under  the  Charter  for  the  maintenance  of  in- 
ternational peace  and  for  disarmament, 

Convinced  that  all  peoples  of  the  world  have  a 
vital  interest  in  the  success  of  disarmament  negotia- 
tions, 

Deeply  convinced  that  substantial  progress  in  the 
field  of  disarmament  can  be  achieved  only  by  ensur- 
ing adequate  conditions  of  security  for  all  States, 

Convinced  also  that  all  States  should  contribute 
to  the  adoption  of  measures  for  the  achievement  of 
this  goal. 

Believing  that  it  is  imperative  that  all  States  exert 
further  efforts  for  the  adoption  of  effective  measures 
of  disarmament  and,  more  particularly,  nuclear  dis- 
armament. 

Believing  also  that  a  world  disarmament  confer- 
ence, adequately  prepared  and  convened  at  an  appro- 
priate time,  could  promote  the  realization  of  such 
aims  and  that  the  co-operation  of  all  nuclear  Powers 
would  considerably  facilitate  their  attainment. 

Recalling  resolution  2833  (XXVI)  of  16  December 
1971, 

Recalling  also  resolution  2930  (XXVII)  of  29  No- 
vember 1972,  by  which  it  decided  to  establish  a 
Special  Committee  on  the  Woi-ld  Disarmament  Con- 
ference, 

Bearing  in  mind  the  note  of  the  Secretary-General, 
of  17  October  1973,  and  the  statements  made  during 
the  consideration  by  the  First  Committee  of  agenda 
item  32, 

Noting  that,  before  any  conclusion  may  be  reached 
with  regard  to  preparation  for  the  convening  of  a 
world  disarmament  conference,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  carry  out  considerable  study  of  the  relevant 
existing  conditions, 

1.  Decides  to  establish  an  Ad  Hoc  Committee  to 
examine  all  the  views  and  suggestions  expressed  by 
Governments  on  the  convening  of  a  world  disarma- 
ment conference  and  related  problems,  including 
conditions  for  the  realization  of  such  a  conference, 
and  to  submit,  on  the  basis  of  consensus,  a  report  to 
the   General   Assembly  at   its   twenty-ninth   session; 

2.  Decides  further  that  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee 
shall  consist  of  the  following  40  non-nuclear-weapon 
Member  States  appointed  by  the  President  of  the 
General  Assembly  after  consultation  with  all  re- 
gional groups :  Algeria,  Argentina,  Austria,  Belgium, 
Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Burundi,  Canada,  Chile,  Colombia, 


^  A/C.1/L.673;  adopted  by  Committee  I  unani- 
mously on  Dec.  13  and  by  the  Assembly  unanimously 
on  Dec.  18. 


Czechoslovakia,  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  Hungary,  India, 
Indonesia,  Iran,  Italy,  Japan,  Lebanon,  Liberia, 
Mexico,  Mongolia,  Morocco,  Netherlands,  Nigeria, 
Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Romania,  Spain, 
Sri  Lanka,  Sweden,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia,  Zaire  and  Zambia; 

3.  Invites  the  States  possessing  nuclear  weapons 
to  co-operate  or  maintain  contact  with  the  Ad  Hoc 
Committee,  it  being  understood  that  they  will  enjoy 
the  same  rights  as  the  designated  members  of  the 
Committee; 

4.  Invites  all  States  to  communicate  as  soon  as 
possible  to  the  Secretary-General,  for  transmission 
to  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee,  any  views  and  sugges- 
tions they  deem  pertinent  to  present  for  the  purpose 
defined  in  paragraph  1  above; 

5.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  render  all 
necessary  assistance  to  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  in  its 
work,  including  the  preparation  of  summary  records; 

6.  Decides  to  include  in  the  provisional  agenda  of 
its  twenty-ninth  session  the  item  entitled  "World 
Disarmament  Conference". 


United  Nations  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 

Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as 
those  listed  below)  may  be  consulted  at  depository 
libraries  in  the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publi- 
cations may  be  purchased  from,  the  Sales  Section  of 
the  United  Nations,  United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 
10017. 

Economic  and   Social   Council 

Population    Commission: 

Population  program  of  the  United  Nations.  Report 
of  the  Secretary  General.  E/CN.9/289.  October 
1,  1973.    35  pp. 

Work  programs  in  population  of  organizations  in 
the   United   Nations   system.    E/CN.9/284.    Oc- 
tober 4,  1973.    91  pp. 
Permanent  sovereignty  over  natural  resources.    Re- 
port of  the   Secretary  General.    E/5425.    October 

3,  1973.   37  pp. 
Commission  on  the  Status  of  Women: 

Study  on  UNESCO  activities  of  special  interest  to 
women.   E/CN.6/580.   October  9,  1973.   58  pp. 

Consideration  of  proposals  concerning  a  new  in- 
strument or  instruments  of  international  law 
to  eliminate  discrimination  against  women. 
Working  paper  by  the  Secretary  General.  E/ 
CN.6/573.    November  6,  1973.   44  pp. 

Study  on  the  interrelationship  of  the  status  of 
women  and  family  planning.  Report  of  the  Spe- 
cial Rapporteur.  E/CN.6/575.  November  27, 
1973.    22  pp. 

International  Women's  Year.  Report  of  the  Secre- 
tary General.    E/CN.6/576.    December  4,   1973. 


February  4,    1974 


135 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


New  Multilateral   Multifiber  Textile 
Arrangement   Negotiated 


Press  release  466  dated  December  21 


On  December  20,  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  Textile 
Negotiating  Group,  meeting  in  Geneva, 
agreed  to  a  comprehensive  multilateral  ar- 
rangement to  regulate  world  trade  in  man- 
made  fiber,  wool,  and  cotton  textiles.  The 
new  arrangement  has  been  under  negotiation 
since  July  1973  and  is  effective  from  January 
1,  1974,  for  a  four-year  term. 

The  arrangement,  which  is  considered  a 
major  accomplishment  within  the  GATT,  in- 
volves over  50  countries  with  divergent  in- 
terests in  textile  trade.  No  countries  made 
reservations  regarding  the  arrangement. 
Each  country  will  officially  accede  to  the 
arrangement  by  notifying  the  GATT. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  seizure 
of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  December  16, 
1970.  Entered  into  force  October  14,  1971.  TIAS 
7192. 

Ratification    deposited:      Greece,     September     20, 
1973. 

Convention    for    the    suppression    of    unlawful    acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.    Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.    Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 26,  1973.   TIAS  7570. 
Ratification  deposited:    Greece,  January  15,  1974. 

Conservation 

Convention    on    international    trade    in    endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora,  with  appendices. 
Done  at  Washington  March  3,  1973.' 
Ratification  deposited:   United  States,  January  14, 
1974. 


Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers  (CSC), 
with  anne.xes.    Done  at  Geneva  December  2,  1972. 
Signature :  France    (with  reservation),  December 
13, 1973. 

Health 

Amendments  to  articles  34  and  55  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  World  Health  Organization  of  July  22, 
1946,  as  amended  (TIAS  1808,  4643).  Adopted  at 
Geneva  May  22,  1973.  Enters  into  force  when  two- 
thirds  of  the  members  of  the  World  Health  Orga- 
nization have  deposited  an  acceptance. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Fiji,  November  15,  1973; 
Egypt,  January  14,  1974. 

Additional  regulations  amending  articles  1,  21,  63, 
71,  and  92  of  the  international  health  regulations 
of  July  25,  1969  (TIAS  7026).  Adopted  at  Ge- 
neva May  23,  1973.  Entered  into  force  January  1, 
1974.= 

Seals — Antarctic 

Convention  for  the  conservation  of  Antarctic  seals, 
with  anne.x  and  final  act.  Done  at  London  June 
1,  1972.' 

Ratification    deposited:     Norway,    December     10, 
1973. 

BILATERAL 

Colombia 

Agreement  confirming  the  agreement  between  the 
Colombian  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  the  United 
States  Department  of  Agriculture  for  the  control 
and  eradication  of  foot  and  mouth  disease  in  Co- 
lomljia.  EflFected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bogota 
November  27,  December  3,  14,  and  17,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  December  17,  1973. 

Italy 

Agreement  regarding  exports  of  cotton  velveteen 
fabrics  from  Italy,  with  related  note.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  January  9,  1974. 
Entered  into  force  January  9,  1974;  effective  Oc- 
tober 1,  1973. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  December  3, 
1973,  concerning  the  provision  of  four  helicopters 
and  related  assistance  by  the  United  States  to 
help  Mexico  in  curbing  traflic  in  illegal  narcotics. 
Efl'ected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico  Decem- 
ber 21,  1973.  Entered  into  force  December  21, 
1973. 


'  Not  in  force. 

'  In  force  for  all  members  of  the  World  Health 
Organization  except  as  follows:  Not  bound — Aus- 
tralia, the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  India, 
Singapore,  and  South  Africa.  Position  not  defined — 
Bahamas,  Botswana,  China,  The  Gambia,  Holy  See, 
and  Nauru.  Position  not  defined  pending  acceptance 
of  reservations — Egypt,  Greece,  Iran,  Iraq,  Italy, 
Libya,  Luxembourg,  Madagascar,  Malta,  Thailand, 
and  Yugoslavia. 


136 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX  February  U,  197h     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1806 


Congress.   Congressional   Documents   Relating 

to  Foreign  Policy 124 

Cuba.  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  En- 
ergy Administrator  Simon  Hold  Joint  News 
Conference 109 

Disarmament.  U.S.  Reviews  Progress  on  Dis- 
armament Issues  in  1973  Before  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly  (Martin,  texts  of  resolutions)       129 

Economic  Affairs 

New  Multilateral  Multifiber  Textile  Arrange- 
ment Negotiated 136 

Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  Energy  Ad- 
ministrator Simon  Hold  Joint  News  Confer- 
ence    109 

Energy 

President  Nixon  Extends  Invitations  to  Con- 
ference on  Energy  (texts  of  letters)     .     .     .       123 

Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  Energy  Ad- 
ministrator Simon  Hold  Joint  News  Confer- 
ence     109 

Europe.  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  En- 
ergy Administrator  Simon  Hold  Joint  News 
Conference 109 

Japan.  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  En- 
ergy Administrator  Simon  Hold  Joint  News 
Conference 109 

Middle  East.  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal 
Energy  Administrator  Simon  Hold  Joint 
News  Conference 109 

Narcotics  Control.  U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Pro- 
grams Against  Drug  Abuse  (Buchanan, 
texts  of  resolutions) 125 

Panama.  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  En- 
ergy Administrator  Simon  Hold  Joint  News 
Conference 109 

Petroleum.  President  Nixon  Extends  Invita- 
tions to  Conference  on  Energy  (texts  of  let- 
ters)        123 

Presidential  Documents.  President  Nixon  Ex- 
tends Invitations  to  Conference  on  Energy 
(texts  of  letters) 123 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 136 

New  Multilateral  Multifiber  Textile  Arrange- 
ment Negotiated 136 

U.S.S.R.  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  En- 
ergy Administrator  Simon  Hold  Joint  News 
Conference 109 


United  Nations 

United  Nations  Documents 135 

U.S.  Reviews  Progress  on  Disarmament  Is- 
sues in  1973  Before  U.N.  General  Assembly 
(Martin,  texts  of  resolutions) 129 

U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Programs  Against  Drug 

Abuse  (Buchanan,  texts  of  resolutions)     .     .       125 


Name  Index 

Buchanan,  John  H.,  Jr 125 

Kissinger,  Secretary 109 

Martin,  Joseph,  Jr 129 

Nixon,  President 123 

Simon,  William 109 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  January   14—20 

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appear  in  this  issue  of  the  BULLETIN  are  Nos. 
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No.     Date  Subject 

*16  1/14  Jova  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Mexico   (biographic  data). 

*17  1/14  Hartman  sworn  in  as  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  Affairs 
(biographic  data). 

*18  1/14  Newsom  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Indonesia  (biographic  data). 

*19  1/16  Study  group  5,  U.S.  National  Com- 
mittee for  CCIR.  Feb.  1. 

*20  1/16  Underbill  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Malaysia   (biographic  data). 

*21  1/17  Dr.  Chen  Ning  Yang.  Nobel  Prize- 
winning  physicist,  to  visit  South 
America  as  Lincoln  lecturer. 

*22  1/17  U.S.  and  Italy  sign  cotton  textile 
agreement,  Jan.  9. 

*23  1/18  Miller  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  (biograph- 
ic data). 

*24  1/18  U.S.  and  Bermuda  sign  agreement 
on  preclearance  of  U.S.-bound 
air  travelers. 

*  Not  printed. 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1807 


February  11,  1974 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE 
OF  JANUARY  22     137 

U.S.  ANNOUNCES  EGYPT-ISRAEL  AGREEMENT 

ON  FORCE  SEPARATION 

Remarks  by  President  Nixon    US 

IMF  COMMITTEE  OF  TWENTY  MEETS  AT  ROME 

Statement  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Shultz 

and  Text  of  Communique    147 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1807 
February  11,  1974 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
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The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
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Publications  of  tlie  Department  ol 
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international  relations  are  also  listed, 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  January  22 


Press  release  28  daterl  January  22 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  will  go  right  to  the 
questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ive  had  a  number  of 
second-  and  third-hand  reports  from  senior 
American  officials  and  Congressmen,  and  so 
forth,  about  the  question  of  whether  you  on 
your  trip  in  concluding  this  [Egyptian-Is- 
raeli] agreement,  or  getting  it  concluded, 
made  any  commitments  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States — or  beyond  that,  whether  there 
are  any  tmpublished  understandings  which 
put  the  United  States  in  the  position  of  being 
a  diplomatic  guarantor.  And  I  thought  it 
would  be  helpful  if  you  would  tell  us  your- 
self about  this. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Let  me  sum  up  the 
documents  that  exist  and  then  explain  our 
understanding  of  their  significance. 

First,  there  is  an  agreement  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  signed  by  the  Chiefs  of 
Staff  of  Egypt  and  Israel  at  kilometer  101 — 
and  which  has  been  published  in  the  news- 
papers. 

Secondly,  there  exists  an  undertaking 
about  the  limitation  of  forces  in  the  zones 
of  limited  armament,  and  elsewhere,  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  that  came  about  as  the  re- 
sult, technically,  of  a  U.S.  proposal  made  by 
the  United  States  to  both  sides.  The  reason 
was  that  both  sides  found  it  easier  to  accept 
a  U.S.  proposal  as  to  the  limitation  of  their 
forces  than  to  accept  limitations  which 
seemed  to  be  demanded  by  the  other  side 
about  their  deployment. 

This  proposal  was  transmitted  in  a  letter 
by  the  President  to  the  heads  of  government 
of  Egypt  and  Israel  in  which  it  was  pointed 
out  that  acceptance  of  this  identical  docu- 


ment— that  signature  of  this  document  would 
constitute  acceptance  and  that  it  would  there- 
by become  part  of  the  basic  agreement.  It 
therefore  does  not  constitute  a  U.S.  guaran- 
tee, but  it  was  a  device  by  which  the  United 
States  made  it  possible  to  convey  to  the 
other  their  acceptance  of  certain  limitations 
on  the  armaments.  This,  at  the  request  of 
both  sides,  has  not  been  published;  and  since 
it  is  not  a  U.S.  obligation,  we  felt  we  had  to 
acquiesce  in  the  views  of  the  parties. 

Thirdly,  in  the  process  of  negotiating  the 
agreement,  both  of  the  parties  asked  us  ques- 
tions about  the  intentions  of  the  other  that 
were  not  part  of  the  formal  agreement  but 
that  nevertheless  made  it  easier  for  them  to 
plan  their  own  course. 

And  we  therefore,  sometimes  in  writing, 
sometimes  orally,  would  do  one  of  two  things. 
We  would  either  ask  one  of  the  parties  what 
its  intention  was  with  respect  to  the  problem 
at  issue,  and  we  would  then  communicate 
that  statement  of  intentions  to  the  other  side, 
in  effect  saying:  "We  have  been  informed 
that  the  Egyptian  Government" — or  that  the 
Israeli  Government — "plans  to  do  the  fol- 
lowing." Sometimes  we  were  asked  what  our 
interpretation  was  of  certain  clauses,  and  in 
that  case  we  did  that — sometimes  in  writing, 
sometimes  orally.  In  the  cases  that  now  come 
to  my  mind,  it  turned  out  that  our  interpre- 
tations were  identical  with  the  interpreta- 
tions of  both  of  the  parties,  and  therefore  it 
was  essentially  irrelevant. 

Now,  are  we  guarantors  of  the  agreement? 

In  the  sense  of  having  a  formal  obligation 
to  take  specific  action  in  case  of  violation  of 
the  agreement,  we  are  not  guarantors. 

In  the  sense  that  we  will  be  in  some  way 
involved  if  the  agreement  breaks  down,  all 


February   11,    1974 


137 


of  recent  history  in  the  Middle  East  indi- 
cates that  if  there  is  an  outbreak  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  the  United  States  is  involved 
whether  or  not  it  has  engaged  in  prior  diplo- 
matic activity.  It  is  certain  that  if  there  is 
another  conflict,  one  or  both  of  the  parties 
are  going  to  ask  us  for  diplomatic  support — 
and  in  that  sense  it  is  of  course  true  that  our 
judgment  as  to  who  violated  the  agreement 
will  affect  the  course  that  we  will  pursue. 
But  in  the  legal  sense,  there  is  no  obligation 
that  the  United  States  has  taken  to  enforce 
the  agreement. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  if  you  will  follow  up 
this  question — having  read  the  four  or  five 
whatever  you  call  them,  assurances,  it  struck 
me  that  all  of  them  tvere  given  to  Israel. 
Didn't  Egypt  need  any?  Was  Mr.  Sadat  so 
self-assured  that  he  didn't  ask  for  any — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  there  were  some 
assurances  given  to  Egypt  as  well. 

Q.  Would  you  tell  us  some  more?  We  have 
read  in  the  papers  those  you  gave  to  Israel, 
but  nothing  about  Egypt. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  ones  you 
read  in  the  papers  that  were  given  to  Israel 
had  previously  been  leaked  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Israel.  The  ones  that  were  given  to 
Egypt  have  not  been  released — but  they  are 
of  the  same  nature. 


Prospects  for  End  of  Arab  Oil  Embargo 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  at  your  previ- 
ous, or  last,  neivs  conference,  that  it  tvas  in- 
creasingly inappropriate  for  the  Arab  oil 
embargo  to  continue  while  the  United  States 
was  engaged  in  a  mediating  effort.  Now  that 
that  effort  has  been  successful,  in  its  first 
stage  at  least,  what  is  your  feeling  about  the 
continuation  of  the  oil  embargo?  And  can 
you  report  any  progress  in  that  area? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  we  have  had 
every  reason  to  believe  that  success  in  the 
negotiations  would  mark  a  major  step  toward 
ending  the  oil  embargo.  We  would  therefore 
think  that  failure  to  end  the  embargo  in  a 


reasonable  time  would  be  highly  inappropri- 
ate and  would  raise  serious  questions  of  con- 
fidence in  our  minds  with  respect  to  the  Arab 
nations  with  whom  we  have  dealt  on  this  is- 
sue. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  back  on  the  question  of  \ 
the  documents — doesn't  this  leave  the  public 
record  of  the  administration,  and  the  United 
States,  in  a  rather  strange  position  with 
these  unpublished  documents?  And  does  this 
not  raise  a  question  of  where  the  administra- 
tion is  heading  in  its  relations  with  Con- 
gress, where  there  have  been  very  strong  de- 
mands in  recent  years  for  full  documentation 
of  international  accords? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  congressional 
leaders  were  given  a  detailed  account  of  all 
of  these  assurances  as  well  as  of  the  content 
of  any  unpublished  document. 

Secondly,  it  makes  a  great  deal  of  differ- 
ence whether  we  publish  a  document  to  which  ' 
the  United  States  is  a  party  and  which  there- 
fore spells  out  an  American  obligation — or  i 
whether  we  publish  a  document  which,  in  ef- 
fect, spells  out  the  obligations  of  other  par- 
ties and  in  which  we  played  a  mediating  role 
because  of  the  confidence  these  other  parties 
had  in  us.  I  would  suggest  that  there  is  an 
enormous  difference  in  these  two  situations. 
Nevertheless  the  congressional  leaders  have 
been  informed  about  these  matters. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  going  back  to  your  an- 
swer on  oil,  you  mentioned  that — you  u^ed 
the  phrase  something  about  a  "reasonable" 
period  of  time  that  this  could  be  lifted.  Is  it  a 
proper  assumption  that  when  the  disengage- 
ment has  been  completed,  when  this  iO-day 
cycle  is  over,  that  it  is  at  that  time  you  would 
think  the  oil  embargo  ought  to  be  lifted? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  in  more  am- 
bitious terms. 

Q.  Do  you  mean  even  before  that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Yes. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  is  word  from — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Wait  a  minute — 

Q.  Have  you  got  some  assurances  from 


138 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Mr.  Sadat  that  lie  would  use  his  influence  in 
the  oil-pyoducing  countries  in  this  embargo? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  think  it  would 
be  appropriate  to  go  into  all  the  details  of  the 
conversation  between  President  Sadat  and 
myself,  but  I  have  made  clear  the  U.S.  posi- 
tion on  the  oil  embargo  and  I  believe  that  it 
is  clearly  understood  by  all  of  the  leaders 
with  whom  I  have  spoken. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  while  you  were  away,  it 
was  disclosed  here  through  the  White  House 
and  the  Pentagon  that  the  U.S.  military  had 
been  receiving  certain  unauthorized  National 
Security  Council  (NSC)  documents  by  such 
devices  as  going  through  your  briefcase,  be- 
cause they  tcere  worried  about  your  policy  on 
China  and  the  Soviet  Union,  and  further, 
that  when  you  heard  about  it,  that  you  ivere 
furious  and  demanded  the  transfer  of  the 
guilty  parties. 

This  becomes  a  matter  of  curiosity  to  me 
because  I  found  myself  wondering  and  want- 
ing to  ask  you  hoiv  you  knew  that  these 
things  ivere  happening,  when  I  recall  your 
stvorn  testimony  before  the  Senate  was  that 
you  didn't  know  about  the  existence  of  the 
"plumbers,"  had  no  contact  with  David 
Young,  and  thought  he  ivas  doing  sotnething 
else. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  missed  you  on  the 
trip,  Mr.  O'Leary  [Jeremiah  O'Leary,  Wash- 
ington Star-News].  [Laughter.]  Let  me  an- 
swer the  question  in  terms  of  my  knowledge 
of  this  particular  episode. 

This  incident  arose  out  of  the  leakage  of 
highly  classified  documents  containing  min- 
utes of  meetings  of  the  Washington  Special 
Action  Group  on  the  India-Pakistan  crisis 
to  a  columnist.  As  a  result  of  this  leak,  Mr. 
[John  D.]  Ehrlichman,  who  was  in  charge 
of  all  internal  security  investigations  in  the 
White  House,  started  an  investigation  of  this 
particular  leak. 

Sometime  after  this.  Admiral  Welander 
[Rear  Adm.  Robert  O.  Welander],  who  was 
in  charge  of  the  JCS  [Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff] 
liaison  oflice  at  the  NSC,  came  to  General 
[Alexander  M.]  Haig  and  told  him  that  the 
internal  evidence  of  at  least  one  of  the  docu- 


ments suggested  to  him  that  the  leak  to  the 
columnist  had  occurred  from  his  office.  I  was 
out  of  town  at  the  time.  When  General  Haig 
informed  me  of  this,  I  told  him  to  turn  that 
matter  over  to  Mr.  Ehrlichman. 

Sometime  later — I  don't  have  the  exact 
dates,  several  weeks  later — Mr.  Ehrlichman 
let  me  see,  or  rather  listen  to,  the  interroga- 
tion of  Admiral  Welander  with  respect  to 
this  particular  incident.  And  in  the  course 
of  this  interrogation,  there  was  developed  an 
allegation  not  only  with  respect  to  the  source 
of  the  leak  but  also  about  the  unauthorized 
transfer  of  documents  from  my  office  to  the 
office  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff.  Beyond  this  one  interrogation,  I  was 
told  nothing  about  the  investigation,  either 
preceding  or  following  this  interrogation. 

I  was  amazed  by  this  allegation,  since  the 
office  of  the  Chairman  and  my  office  had 
worked  closely  together.  I  agree  with  what 
Admiral  Moorer  [Adm.  Thomas  H.  Moorer, 
Chairman,  JCS]  said  on  television  last  week, 
that  there  was  a  full  flow  of  information 
between  my  office  and  his  office;  and  I  had 
no  reason  to  suppose,  on  the  basis  of  my 
experience,  that  there  was  any  conflict  be- 
tween the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  my  office. 
And  therefore  I  have  no  reason  to  question 
the  argument  that  has  been  made  by  Admiral 
Moorer  that  this  incident  of  the  unauthorized 
transfer  of  papers  from  my  office  to  his  office 
reflected  overzealousness  on  the  part  of  sub- 
ordinates and,  in  any  case,  gave  him  no  infor- 
mation that  he  did  not  already  possess. 

I  mu.st  add  that  I  was  not  aware  of  the 
fact  that  a  report  was  being  prepared  by 
Mr.  Ehrlichman,  and  I  have  never  seen  that 
report.  Nor  have  I  seen  the  report  of  the 
investigation  that  was  conducted  by  Secre- 
tary Laird's  [Melvin  R.  Laird,  then  Secre- 
tary of  Defense]  office.  And  therefore  what 
I  am  saying  is  based  on  my  personal  knowl- 
edge of  the  incident,  which  is  confined  to  this 
one  interrogation  of  one  individual  who  vol- 
unteered his  information  first  to  my  office. 
These  reports  must  have  come  to  conclusions 
similar  to  the  ones  I  have  outlined  here, 
because  no  disciplinary  action  was  taken  by 
the  addressees  of  this  report. 


February   11,    1974 


139 


After  these  allegations  became  known  to 
me,  it  was  decided  in  consultation  between 
Admiral  Moorer  and  myself  to  close  the  liai- 
son office  attached  to  my  staff. 

With  respect  to  my  statements  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  made 
under  oath,  I  reaffirm  here  every  word  that  I 
have  said  to  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee,  and  I  assert  that  they  were  fully 
consistent  with  the  allegations  of  the  un- 
named sources  that  have  been  made  while  I 
was  on  my  trip  last  week.  To  be  specific,  I 
did  not  know  that  David  Young  was  conduct- 
ing an  investigation  into  the  matter  of  the 
[Jack]  Anderson  leaks.  He  never  talked  to 
me  about  this,  or  any  other  subject,  while  he 
was  conducting  what  I  now  know  was  his 
investigation.  I  did  not  instruct  him,  nor  did 
I  request  it.  I  never  saw  the  report,  nor  did  I 
know  that  the  report  existed  until  I  read  it 
in  a  newspaper  early  last  week.' 

I  have  called  both  Senator  Fulbright  and 
Senator  Stennis  and  told  them  that  I  would 
be  prepared  to  meet  with  their  committees  to 
answer  any  questions  that  they  might  have 
on  this  subject. 

Q.  One  quick  folloivup.  Who  interrogated 
Admiral  Welander? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  he  was  in- 
terrogated by  David  Young,  but  from  this 
one  could  not  suppose  that  David  Young  was 
conducting  an  investigation. 

Q.  Did  you  know  David  Young  had  per- 
formed the  interrogation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  knew  that  David 
Young  had  performed  the  interrogation,  but 
I  had  assumed  that  since  we  had  sent  Ad- 
miral Welander  to  Mr.  Ehrlichman's  office, 
Mr.  Ehrlichman  had  designated  one  of  his 
staff  members  to  take  whatever  report  Ad- 
miral Welander  had  to  give. 

I  repeat  again,  we  were  not  told  about 
either  the  investigation  preceding  it  or  the 
investigation  following  it,  and  I  had  no  con- 


'  General  Haig  has  himself  assured  me  that  he  had 
no  contact  with  David  Young  on  the  report  or  related 
matters.  [.Added  to  the  record  subsequent  to  the 
press  conference.] 


tact  whatever  with  David  Young  during  that 
period. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  clarify,  you  said  you 
participated  in  the  interrogation. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  did  not  participate 
in  the  interrogation. 

Q.  Could  yon  clarify  that  you  read  or 
listeru'd  to  a  tape  of  the  interrogation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  listened  to  a  portion 
of  the  tape  of  the  interrogation. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  why  did)i't  you  find,  out 
the  total  results  of  the  investigation  and  the 
interrogation  of  Admiral  Welander? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Because  I  was  told 
that  I  was  not  to  be  informed  of  it. 

Q.  By  whom  were  you  told? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  said  all  that  I 
will  say  on  this  subject.  All  internal  security 
matters  in  the  White  House  after  May  1970 
were  handled  by  Mr.  Ehrlichman's  office,  and 
therefore  it  was  not  unusual  for  this  to  be 
conducted  in  the  established  framework. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  perhaps  your  lack  of 
precision  on  the  oil  question  is  deliberate,  but 
I  wonder  if  I  could  try  to  pin  you  down  once 
more.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you  would  define 
to  be  a  reasonable  period  of  time?  And  you 
said  if  nothing  did  happen,  that  it  would 
raise  a  question  of  confidence.  What  is  the 
implication  of  that  question  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  would  not  be  useful 
for  me  to  go  beyond  this.  But  we  have  carried 
out  in  good  faith  what  we  have  told  both 
sides  we  would  do. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  United  States  has 
stated  its  opposition  to  any  one  country  domi- 
nating affairs  in  Asia  or  in  other  parts  of  the 
world.  Hoiv  do  you  look  upon  (a)  the  Paracel 
Islands  question  and  (b)  the  island  question 
that  is  dividing  North  and  South  Korea? 
There  seem  to  be  disputes  over  both  sets  of 
islands. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  think  either  of 
those  issues  raises  the  question  of  dominating 


140 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  area  or  dominating  the  world. 

With  respect  to  the  Paracel  Islands,  there 
has  been  a  dispute  between  various  countries 
as  to  the  ownership  of  these  islands.  The 
United  States  regrets  the  use  of  military 
force  in  settling  this  dispute,  but  it  does  not 
raise  an  issue  of  world  domination. 

With  respect  to  the  Korean  islands,  those 
were  assigned  to  South  Korea  as  the  result 
of  the  armistice  agreement,  and  the  United 
States  supports  that  position. 

Further  Middle  East  Negotiations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  are  the  prospects 
now  for  aqreements  between  Israel  and  Syria 
and  Israel  and  Jordan?  And  in  that  connec- 
tion, has  your  own  personal  diplomacy  super- 
seded the  Geneva  Conference? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  Syria 
and  Israel,  on  the  occasion  of  my  visit  to 
Syria  the  Syrian  Government  put  forward 
some  ideas  with  respect  to  the  disengagement 
of  forces  on  the  Syrian  front.  It's  the  first 
time  that  the  Syrian  Government  put  for- 
ward concrete  suggestions  on  any  phase  of 
the  negotiations.  We  have  transmitted  those 
ideas  to  the  Government  of  Israel,  which  is 
now  studying  them  and  which  has  promised 
us  an  answer  sometime  after  their  Cabinet 
meets  next  Sunday. 

We  hope  that  a  process  can  be  generated 
by  which  the  disengagement  of  forces  on  the 
Syrian  side  can  be  negotiated  with  the  same 
seriousness  as  on  the  Egyptian  side,  and  we 
have  indicated  that  we  would  be  prepared,  if 
the  two  parties  request  it,  to  offer  our  good 
offices. 

I  might  say  also  that  the  visit  to  Syria  led 
to  an  improvement  in  the  bilateral  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Syria,  one 
example  of  which  is  the  fact  that  an  Amer- 
ican citizen  who  has  been  held  in  Syria  on 
the  charge  of  espionage  since  July  of  1972  is 
being  released  tomorrow.  His  name  is  John 
Bates,  and  Mr.  Vest  [George  S.  Vest,  Special 
Assistant  to  the  Secretary  for  Press  Rela- 
tions] can  give  any  of  you  who  want  to  pur- 
sue it  further  particulars. 

With  respect  to  Jordan,  the  United  States 


believes  that  all  parties  that  have  frontiers 
with  Israel  should  participate  in  the  process 
of  negotiation,  and  we  favor  negotiations,  as 
well,  between  Israel  and  Jordan. 

The  framework  for  the  negotiations  that 
have  taken  place  was  established  by  the  Ge- 
neva Conference.  The  cochairmanship  be- 
tween us  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  taken  very 
seriously  by  us;  and  we  are  keeping,  and  have 
kept,  the  Soviet  Union  informed  of  all  of  the 
actions  which  we  have  taken,  which  we  be- 
lieve are  consistent  with  the  consensus  reso- 
lution M'hich  ended  the  last  meeting  of  the 
Geneva  Conference  and  which  carried  out  the 
spirit  of  this. 

My  personal  role  has  been  produced  by  the 
fact  that  both  parties  found  it  easier  to  con- 
vey certain  ideas  through  an  intermediary 
and  because,  given  the  hostility  in  the  area, 
it  was  useful  to  have  a  more  impartial  third 
party  convey  certain  considerations  and  par- 
ticular assurances.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  as 
these  negotiations  develop,  and  as  the  par- 
ties gain  confidence  in  each  other,  the  role  of 
a  mediator  will  become  less  crucial.  But  given 
the  importance  to  the  peace  of  the  whole 
world  of  making  progress  toward  a  settle- 
ment in  the  Middle  East,  I  don't  want  to  take 
a  dogmatic  position  on  that  issue. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Marilyn  [Marilyn 
Berger,  Washington  Post]. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  mentioning  the  docu- 
ments that  do  exist  you  said  the  second  docu- 
ment is  an  undertaking  of  limited  forces  in 
zones  of  limited  armaments  and  elsewhere. 
Can  you  spell  that  out  a  little  bit,  and  does 
this  involve  limitation  on  tveapons  that  could 
reach  the  other  side  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  concerns  primarily 
the  limitation  of  weapons  within  the  zones 
of  limited  armaments  and  some  understand- 
ings with  respect  to  offensive  capabilities. 

Q.  Does  each  side  then  take  on  the  respon- 
sibility not  to  acquire  offensive  capability? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  it  is  strictly  a  de- 
ployment question. 


February   11,    1974 


141 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  President  Sadat  is 
qrioted  today  in  Algeria  as  saying  that  there 
has  been  a  significant  change  since  three 
months  ago  in  U.S.  policy  ton-ard  the  Middle 
East.  I  tvonder  if  you  could  tell  us  ivhat  it 
was  that  you  either  said  or  did  while  yon 
toere  in  Egypt  that  would  cause  President 
Sadat  to  reach  that  conclusion. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think — of  course  I 
am  not  a  spokesman  for  President  Sadat — 
but  it  is  obvious  that  the  United  States  has 
played  a  much  more  active  role  in  the  Middle 
East  in  pursuing  a  settlement  than  has  been 
the  case  previously  and  the  United  States  has 
attempted  to  take  into  account  the  legiti- 
mate concerns  of  both  sides  in  urging  a  set- 
tlement. So  I  would  think  that  the  change  to 
which  President  Sadat  referred  concerns  the 
degree  of  our  activity  and  our  general  partic- 
ipation in  producing  a  settlement. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  expect  now  that 
there  will  be  a  swift  resumption  of  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Egypt  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  the  conditions 
for  that  have  been  improved. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  some  of  the  Arab  states, 
or  oil-producing  states,  are  said  to  be  mi7iing 
their  oil  fields  in  a  direct  response  to  Secre- 
tary [of  Defense  James  R.]  Schlesinger's 
speech  of  January  6  in  which  he  said  that 
ptiblic  opinion  might  force  a  shon-  of  force 
by  the  West.  What  is  your  opinion  about  the 
likelihood  of  such  a  shoiv  of  force  by  the 
West  if  the  embargo  goes  too  far? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  don't  think 
the  embargo  will  go  too  far,  so  that  this  is  es- 
sentially an  academic  question. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  following  your  last 
round  of  conversations  with  the  Chinese 
leadership,  you  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
process  of  normalization  could  be  accelerated. 
Cotdd  you  tell  us  as  to  7vhat  precisely  yoti 
mean  by  normalization?  Is  it  establishment 
of  full  diplomatic  relations?  And  if  so,  hotv 
tvould  you  go  about  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  in  our  relations 


with  the  Chinese  we  have  always  stressed 
that  the  practical  improvement  of  our  rela- 
tions is  more  important  than  the  legal  form 
in  which  it  is  expressed.  Therefore  we  have 
always  stressed  particular  concrete  steps.  We 
are  at  the  moment  negotiating  a  number  of 
issues  with  the  Chinese  Government  on 
blocked  assets  and  claims  of  both  sides,  which 
are  progressing,  and  we  are  proceeding  along 
the  lines  which  we  have  previously  outlined. 
But  by  normalization  of  relations  we  mean 
at  this  stage  closer  contact,  improved  com- 
munications, and  a  greater  interconnection 
of  various  activities. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  Mr.  Ehrlichman  is  gone, 
but  have  yon  been  assured  since  then  that 
you  never  again  will  be  denied  information 
which  properly  falls  within  your  sphere  of 
operations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  had  no  reason  to 
complain  about  the  matter,  because  I  thought 
it  was  a  reasonable  division  of  labor  that  I 
would  not  participate  in  internal  security 
matters. 

Preparations  for  Energy  Conference 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you've  talked — 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what's  the  status  of  the 
preparations  for  the  energy  conference?  And 
have  you  yet  dispatched  the  special  emissary 
to  the  European  countries  for  the  prepara- 
tions? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  question  is  what 
is  the  status  of  preparations  for  the  energy 
conference  and  have  we  dispatched  the  emis- 
sary. 

Very  active  work  went  on  in  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  energy  conference  as  a  result  of 
a  task  force  composed  of  Mr.  Donaldson,  Mr. 
Sonnenfeldt,  Mr.  Lord  [Under  Secretary  for 
Security  Assistance  William  H.  Donaldson, 
Counselor  of  the  Department  Helmut  Son- 
nenfeldt, Director  of  Planning  and  Coordina- 
tion Winston  Lord],  and  Mr.  Cooper  from 
the  National  Security  Council  [Deputy  As- 
sistant to  the  President  for  NSC  Interna- 
tional Economic  Affairs  Charles  A.  Cooper], 


142 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


together  with  representatives  from  other  de- 
partments, Mr.  Bennett  from  the  Treasury 
[Deputy  Under  Secretary  for  Monetary  Af- 
fairs Jack  F.  Bennett],  a  representative  of 
the  Energy  Office. 

Now,  we  are  having  daily  meetings  on  the 
subject  this  week,  and  when  our  preparations 
have  progressed  to  a  certain  point,  no  later 
than  the  end  of  this  week,  we  will  be  pre- 
pared to  talk  to  our  allies  and  to  other  in- 
vitees. I  will  have  to  talk  to  Mr.  Donaldson  on 
what  the  best  use  of  his  time  is,  whether  the 
best  use  of  his  time  between  now  and  the  be- 
ginning of  the  conference  is  by  taking  a  trip 
or  whether  we  can  brief  the  other  partici- 
pants here.  And  that  decision  will  be  made 
in  the  next  few  days. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  has  been  a  debate 
irithin  the  government  over  many  years  as 
to  ichether  it  is  good  or  bad  for  the  United 
States  that  the  Sxiez  Canal  be  open.  What  is 
your  view  noic,  since  one  byproduct  of  this 
negotiation  may  be  the  opening  of  the  canaU 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  say  that  ob- 
viously the  United  States  has  no  overwhelm- 
ing reason  of  its  own  to  get  the  Suez  Canal 
opened.  So  the  arguments  pro  and  con  have 
to  be  seen  within  the  context  of  the  general 
contribution  that  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal 
would  make  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  In 
that  context,  the  United  States  would  feel 
that  it  would  be  a  positive  step  toward  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  and  the  greater  ease  by 
which  the  Soviet  Union  can  transfer  its  fleet 
from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Indian  Ocean 
can  be  compensated  both  by  the  greater  ease 
with  which  we  can  transfer  some  of  our  ships 
into  the  Indian  Ocean  and  other  measures 
that  can  be  taken  of  a  different  nature. 

Progress  on  U.S. -Europe  Declarations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  last  fall  when  Foreign 
Minister  Jobert  was  here  yoii  spoke  of  the 
constructive  role  that  France  was  playing  in 
the  dialogue  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe.  I  was  wonder-ing  if  you  would  still 
use  that  description  for  French  policy  in 
view   of  the  initial  steps  that  France   has 


taken  with  regard  to  the  franc  and  the  nega- 
tive attitude  the  French  have  taken  U7itil  now 
toward  your  projected  energy  conference. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  of  course  the 
steps  that  France  has  taken  with  respect  to 
the  franc  are  similar  to  the  steps  that  we 
have  taken  with  respect  to  the  dollar.  And 
we  can't  blame  France  for  pursuing  a  fiscal 
policy  similar  to  our  own. 

With  respect  to  the  negotiations  on  the 
various  declarations,  they  are  now  in  proc- 
ess. I  am  quite  optimistic  that  the  NATO 
declaration  can  be  settled  fairly  quickly.  The 
declaration  with  the  European  Community  is 
in  the  process  of  being  redrafted.  And  there 
will  be  another  meeting  of  our  representa- 
tives with  those  of  the  Nine  early  in  Febru- 
ary, and  it  will  be  easier  to  form  a  judgment 
then. 

With  respect  to  energy,  our  views  and 
those  of  France  are  quite  opposed.  And  to 
the  extent  that  we,  of  course,  believe  that  we 
are  correct,  I  could  not  characterize  the 
French  attitude  as  constructive. 

Q.  To  follow  up,  at  your  San  Clemente 
press  conference,  the  last  time  you  talked 
about  Europe,  you  mentioned  only  two  dec- 
larations. What  happened  to  the  third  one, 
was  it  dropped — the  idea? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  Eu- 
rope, we  are  working  on  two  declarations:  a 
declaration  defining  the  relationship  between 
the  European  Community  and  the  United 
States  and  a  declaration  defining  the  basic 
principles  on  which  NATO  should  proceed. 

There  is  a  project  that  we  strongly  sup- 
port for  a  third  declaration,  including  Eu- 
rope, the  United  States,  and  Japan,  and  en- 
compassing the  basic  principles  of  both  of 
the  declarations  we  are  drafting  with  Eu- 
rope, plus  certain  objectives  we  share  to- 
gether with  Japan.  The  U.S.  position  is  that 
we  strongly  favor  such  a  trilateral  declara- 
tion, and  we  have  not  changed  our  policy. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  if  France  does  not  come 
to  the  oil  conference,  then  would  you  go 
ahead  with  it  anyivay? 


February   11,1 974 


143 


Secretary  Kissinger:  We  would  proceed  in 
any  event.  Yes. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  would  you  say  that  the 
removal  of  the  oil  embargo  is  not  really 
enough,  is  not  the  real  problem,  but  that  the 
production  cutbacks  must  be  restored  as  tvell 
— otherwise,  everybody  tvould  be  competing 
for  the  same  amount  of  scarce  oil?  Do  you 
have  reason  to  believe  that  that  xvill  happen, 
as  well  as  the  lifting  of  the  embargo? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  maintain  the  posi- 
tion that  I  advanced  at  previous  press  con- 
ferences. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  one  of  the  Senators  who 
n^as  at  a  meeting  tvith  you  yesterday  said 
that  the  Russian  cooperation  ivas  mainly  not 
objecting  to  what  you  were  achieving  in  the 
Middle  East.  Could  you  give  us  an  example 
of  the  more  positive  Soviet  cooperation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  Soviet  Union 
played  a  very  useful  role  and  a  very  crucial 
role  in  helping  to  get  the  Geneva  Conference 
organized.  It  played  a  very  constructive  role 
at  the  Geneva  Conference  itself.  Neither  of 
those  events  could  have  occurred  without  ac- 
tive and  constructive  Soviet  participation. 

With  respect  to  disengagement,  it  was  al- 
ways understood  by  the  Soviet  Union  and 
ourselves  that  we  were  in  a  tactically  better 
position  to  promote  progress  on  that  issue. 

And  therefore,  at  the  military  committee 
that  was  meeting  in  Geneva,  it  was  agreed 
from  the  beginning  that  the  Israeli  and 
Egyptian  discussions  should  take  place  under 
the  auspices  of  a  U.N.  representative  rather 
than  under  the  auspices  of  the  cochairmen. 

Now,  in  the  last  phase  of  the  negotiations, 
the  tactical  details  were  handled  primarily 
by  the  United  States,  but  the  Soviet  Union 
was  informed  and  indicated  its  strong  sup- 
port for  the  effort — and  we  consider  this  a 
constructive  step. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  mentioned  opening 
a  new  dialogue — your  desire  to  open  a  new 
dialogue  with  the  countries  in  South  Amer- 
ica, and  there  has  been  some  talk  about  a 


trip,  perhaps  to  Panama,  and  your  trip  to 
Mexico  City  at  the  end  of  the  month  and  pos- 
sibly a  larger  trip  to  the  continent  in  April. 
I  would  like  to  ask  you  if  you  could  be  more 
specific  at  this  time  about  your  plans  and 
whether  you  would  rule  out  a  meeting  in 
Mexico  ivith  an  emissary  of  the  Cuban  Gov- 
ernment. 


New  Dialogue  With  Latin  America 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  indicated  at  a 
previous  press  conference  that  there  has  been 
an  agreement  ad  referendum,  which  means 
for  current  examination,  by  the  U.S.  and 
Panamanian  Governments  about  the  basic 
principles  on  which  a  negotiation  leading  to 
a  new  treaty  for  the  Panama  Canal  should  be 
based.  These  principles  are  now  being  stud- 
ied in  our  government,  and  when  they  are 
approved,  it  is  possible  that  I  may  take  a 
trip  to  Panama  to  mark  the  agreement  on 
these  principles. 

The  meeting  in  Mexico  City  grew  out  of  a 
speech  I  made  to  the  Latin  American  Foreign 
Ministers  during  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly, in  which  I  pointed  out  that  the  United 
States  was  eager  to  start  a  new  dialogue  with 
Latin  America  on  the  basis  of  equality  and 
geared  to  the  realities  of  the  current  situa- 
tion. 

At  this  lunch,  the  Foreign  Minister  of 
Colombia  responded  to  my  speech  and  in- 
vited the  Foreign  Ministers  of  all  Latin 
American  countries  to  a  meeting  in  Bogota 
to  formulate  a  preliminary  response  to  this 
American  initiative.  That  meeting  took  place 
in  November  and  came  up  with  what  we  con- 
sider a  very  constructive  document  that  out- 
lines an  agenda  for  a  proposed  meeting  be- 
tween the  other  nations  of  the  Western  Hem- 
isphere and  the  United  States. 

This  meeting  is  now  scheduled  for  the  pe- 
riod of  February  21st  to  the  23d  in  Mexico 
City.  The  Latin  American  Foreign  Ministers 
will  meet  several  days  before  then  to  formu- 
late their  ideas  even  more  precisely  than  was 
possible  in  Bogota.  I  have  been  in  close  touch 


144 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


with  various  Foreign  Ministers  who  are  ac- 
tive in  Latin  America  and  who  are  actively 
engaged  in  this,  and  I  am  quite  optimistic 
that  we  can  take  a  significant  step  in  Mexico 
City,  and  we  are  hard  at  work  in  preparing 
an  American  position  in  response  to  this 
Latin  American  initiative. 

With  respect  to  a  possible  meeting  with  a 
Cuban  representative,  there  is  no  such  plan. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  don't  know  if  you  had 
a  chance  to  be  fully  briefed  on  certain 
changes  in  strategic  nuclear  weapons  poli- 
cies that  Secretary  Schlesinger  has  publicly 
talked  about,  involving  retargeting  of  nu- 
clear warheads  and  also  the  improvements  in 
the  accuracy  of  our  nuclear  warheads — and 
if  so,  rvhat  effect  do  you  think  these  deci- 
sions might  have  on  our  relations  with  the 
Soviets,  and  what  effect,  if  any,  on  the  SALT 
Two  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks']  dis- 
cussions ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  All  decisions  of  this 
nature  are  taken  within  the  framework  of 
the  National  Security  Council  system  and 
therefore,  in  my  capacity  as  Assistant  to  the 
President  as  well  as  in  my  capacity  as  Sec- 
retary of  State,  I'm  of  course  familiar  with 
these  various  matters. 

I  would  say  that  they  underline  the  inex- 
orable nature  of  the  arms  race  and  the  essen- 
tial necessity  of  making  progress  on  the  lim- 
itation of  arms. 

If  the  strategic  arms  race  continues  un- 
checked, it  is  inevitable  that  both  sides  will 
refine  the  number  of  their  weapons,  multiply 
their  warheads,  increase  their  accuracies, 
and  develop  strategies  which  will  sooner  or 
later  create  the  threat  of  a  gap  between  the 
first-strike  and  the  second-strike  capability — 
which  was  considered  to  be  a  principal  ele- 
ment of  insecurity  in  the  1950's  and  early 
1960's — which  would  put  a  premium  on  strik- 
ing first  and  therefore  contribute  to  the  dan- 
ger of  the  outbreak  of  nuclear  war. 

Q.  Thank  you  very  much — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  This  is  why  we  be- 


lieve that  this  is  a  year  in  which  major  prog- 
ress should  be  made  on  strategic  arms  limi- 
tation. 


The  press 
retary. 


:  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Sec- 


U.S.  Announces  Egypt-Israel 
Agreement  on  Force  Separation 

Remarks  by  President  Nixon  ' 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  I  have  an  announce- 
ment that  I  am  sure  will  be  welcome  news, 
not  only  to  all  Americans  but  to  people  all 
over  the  world.  The  announcement  has  to  do 
with  the  Mideast,  and  it  is  being  made  simul- 
taneously at  3  o'clock  Washington  time  in 
Cairo  and  in  Jerusalem,  as  well  as  in  Wash- 
ington. 

The  announcement  is  as  follows : 

In  accordance  with  the  decision  of  the  Geneva 
Conference,  the  Governments  of  Egypt  and  Israel, 
with  the  assistance  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  have  reached  agreement  on  the  disengage- 
ment and  separation  of  their  military  forces.  The 
agreement  is  scheduled  to  be  signed  by  the  Chiefs  of 
Staff  of  Egypt  and  Israel  at  noon  Egypt-Israel  time, 
Friday,  January  18,  at  Kilometer  101  on  the  Cairo- 
Suez  Road.  The  Commander  of  the  United  Nations 
Emergency  Force,  General  Siilasvuo,  has  been  asked 
by  the  parties  to  witness  the  signing. 

A  brief  statement  with  regard  to  this  an- 
nouncement, I  think,  is  in  order. 

First,  congratulations  should  go  to  Presi- 
dent Sadat,  to  Prime  Minister  Meir,  and 
their  colleagues,  for  the  very  constructive 
spirit  they  have  shown  in  reaching  an  agree- 
ment on  the  very  difficult  issues  involved 
which  made  this  announcement  possible. 

Also,  we  in  the  United  States  can  be  proud 
of  the  role  that  our  government  has  played 
and  particularly  the  role  that  has  been  played 
by  Secretary  Kissinger  and  his  colleagues  in 


'  Made  in  the  press  briefing  room  at  the  White 
House  on  Jan.  17  and  broadcast  on  television  and 
radio  (White  House  press  release). 


February   11,   1974 


145 


working  to  bring  the  parties  together  so  that 
an  agreement  could  be  reached,  which  we 
have  just  read. 

The  other  point  that  I  would  make  is  with 
regard  to  the  significance  of  the  agreement. 
In  the  past  generation  there  have  been,  as 
we  know,  four  wars  in  the  Mideast,  followed 
by  uneasy  truces.  This,  I  would  say,  is  the 
first  significant  step  toward  a  permanent 
peace  in  the  Mideast.  I  do  not  understate,  by 
making  the  statement  that  I  have  just  made, 
the  difl!iculties  that  lie  ahead  in  settling  the 
differences  that  must  be  settled  before  a 
permanent  peace  is  reached,  not  only  here  but 
between  the  other  countries  involved.  But 
this  is  a  very  significant  step  reached  directly 
as  a  result  of  negotiations  between  the  two 
parties  and  therefore  has,  it  seems  to  me,  a 
great  deal  of  meaning  to  all  of  us  here  in  this 
country  and  around  the  world  who  recognize 
the  importance  of  having  peace  in  this  part 
of  the  world. 

The  other  point  that  I  would  make  is  with 
regard  to  the  role  of  the  United  States.  Our 
role  has  been  one  of  being  of  assistance  to 
both  parties  to  bring  them  together,  to  help 
to  narrow  differences,  working  toward  a  fair 
and  just  settlement  for  all  parties  concerned 
where  every  nation  in  that  area  will  be  able 
to  live  in  peace  and  also  to  be  secure  insofar 
as  its  defense  is  concerned. 

Looking  to  the  situation  in  the  world  gen- 
erally, I  think  we  could  probably  say  that  the 
area  of  the  world  that  potentially  is  the  one 
in  which  the  great  powers  can  be  brought 
into  confrontation  is  the  Mideast,  that  that 
area  more  than  any  other  is  in  that  category, 
as  recent  events  have  indicated. 

Now,  the  announcement  we  have  made 
today  is  only  a  first  step,  but  it  is  a  very 
significant  step.  It  paves  the  way  for  more 
steps  which  can  lead  to  a  permanent  peace. 


And  I  personally  shall  see  that  all  negotia- 
tions, any  efforts  which  could  lead  to  that 
permanent  peace,  not  only  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  but  between  the  other  countries 
involved,  have  the  full  and  complete  support 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
Thank  you. 


Administration   Regrets   House  Action 
on   IDA  Replenishment  Bill 

Follotving  is  a  joint  statement  by  Secre- 
tanj  Kissinger  and  Seo'etary  of  the  Treasury 
George  P.  Shultz  issued  on  January  23. 

Tress   release  31    dated   Januai'y    23 

The  administration  deeply  regrets  the  ac- 
tion of  the  House  of  Representatives  today 
in  voting  down  the  administration  bill  for 
a  four-year  replenishment  of  the  Interna- 
tional Development  Association  totaling  $1.5 
billion.  This  money  formed  part  of  an  equi- 
tably shared  effort  among  all  industrialized 
nations  to  provide  the  capital  and  know-how 
to  help  the  poorest  and  developing  countries. 
In  this  most  critical  of  times  for  interna- 
tional amity  and  harmony,  this  action  repre- 
sents a  major  setback  to  all  efforts  of  coop- 
eration and  to  the  ability  of  the  United  States 
to  provide  leadership  in  the  world  where 
there  is  an  increasingly  serious  tendency  for 
nations  to  believe  their  best  interest  lies  in 
going  it  alone. 

We  intend  to  confer  immediately  with 
members  of  both  parties  of  the  Congress  in 
an  effort  to  find  a  way  in  which  the  United 
States  can  continue  to  play  a  role  of  leader- 
ship fully  consistent  with  our  own  economic 
situation. 


146 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


IMF  Committee  of  Twenty  Meets  at  Rome 


The  Committee  of  the  Board  of  Governors 
o)  the  Internatioval  Monetary  Fund  on  Re- 
form of  the  International.  Monetary  System 
and  Related  Issues  met  at  Rome  January  17- 
18.  FolloH'ing  is  a  statement  made  in  the  com- 
mittee on  January  17  by  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  George  P.  Shultz,  together  with  the 
text  of  a  communique  issued  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  meeting  on  January  18. 


STATEMENT   BY  TREASURY   SECRETARY   SHULTZ 

Department  of  the  Treasury  press  i-elease  Hated  January  17 

We  scheduled  this  meeting  because  we  had 
a  common  belief  that,  working  together, 
there  was  much  we  could  accomplish  through 
improving  our  international  monetary  ar- 
rangements. We  felt  we  could  reach  agree- 
ments which,  together  with  those  achieved 
elsewhere,  would  promote  international  co- 
operation and  allow  each  of  our  nations  to 
derive  greater  benefit  from  international 
trade  and  investment. 

Since  the  meeting  was  scheduled,  most  of 
the  nations  represented  here — both  more  de- 
veloped and  less  developed — have  found  the 
prospects  for  their  economic  activity,  prices, 
and  balance  of  payments  sharply  worsened. 
Any  economic  betterment  we  can  contribute 
through  international  cooperation  is,  there- 
fore, now  even  more  urgently  needed  than 
before.  And  that  international  cooperation  is 
all  the  more  essential  since  we  do  not  know 
with  any  certainty  which  nations  among  us 
are  likely  to  be  most  seriously  afflicted  by  the 
new  developments. 

In  these  circumstances,  the  logic  seems  to 
me  compelling  to  act  as  do  the  members  of  a 


mutual  insurance  society  who  recognize  a 
common  interest  in  pledging  to  spread  the 
impact  of  a  calamity  which  could  otherwise 
fall  with  concentrated  foi'ce  on  any  one  of  the 
members.  At  the  same  time,  of  course,  we 
must  not  only  insure  against  the  risk.  Our 
more  basic  task  is  to  do  all  we  can  to  reduce 
it. 

It  is  imperative,  therefore,  that  we  make 
the  most  of  our  meeting.  But  after  a  change 
in  economic  circumstances  without  precedent 
in  magnitude  and  suddenness  in  peacetime, 
we  obviously  must  rethink  our  priorities  in 
the  area  of  monetary  reform.  And  we  must 
act  in  the  financial  area  with  a  full  realiza- 
tion that  our  response  to  the  current  threat 
of  economic  instability  will  be  viewed  as  a 
fundamental  test  of  our  willingness  to  coop- 
erate internationally. 

A  number  of  governments,  the  oil  export- 
ers, have  demonstrated  that  they  can  act  in 
pursuit  of  immediate  political  and  economic 
objectives.  In  doing  so,  the  clear  danger  is 
that  they  will  create  severe  economic  disrup- 
tion for  other  nations  and  ultimately  for 
themselves  as  well. 

Now  we  must  demonstrate  that  we  can 
achieve  joint  action  among  a  much  larger 
number  of  countries  and  in  a  more  broadly 
beneficial  manner.  We  must  develop  a  broad- 
er cooperation  which  meets  the  legitimate  as- 
pirations of  the  oil  producers  for  an  appro- 
priate level  of  compensation  for  their  cur- 
rent production  and  for  secure  and  profitable 
opportunities  for  investing  their  financial  re- 
sources while  assuring  that  they  in  turn  meet 
their  responsibilities  for  producing  in  rea- 
sonable amounts  without  capricious  manipu- 
lation of  supplies  or  prices.  We  must  develop 


February   11,    1 974 


147 


u  broader  cooperation  that  does  not  under- 
mine economic  development  in  any  areas  of 
our  world. 

This  meeting  of  Ministers  of  Finance  is 
not  the  proper  forum  for  discussions  of  all 
the  implications  of  the  new  developments  in 
the  field  of  energy.  Primary  work  must  be 
undertaken  elsewhere  on  agreements  for  the 
maintenance  of  appropriate  levels  of  supplies 
and  prices,  on  research  and  development,  on 
conservation,  on  alternative  energy  sources, 
and  on  emergency  sharing  of  supplies. 

President  Nixon,  to  insure  that  all  this 
work  is  undertaken  promptly,  has  issued  an 
invitation  for  a  meeting  in  Washington  to 
ministers  of  a  number  of  oil-consuming  coun- 
tries, together  with  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development],  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Commission  of  the  EC  [European 
Communities].  It  is  the  President's  belief,  I 
know,  that  this  small  group  can  launch  most 
expeditiously  the  preparatory  work  which 
will  permit  substantive  and  productive  meet- 
ings to  take  place  in  the  near  future  on  a 
broader  basis  among  representatives  of  the 
oil  producers  and  the  oil  consumers  from  all 
parts  of  the  world.  The  ultimate  objective  is 
a  set  of  international  arrangements  which 
will  permit  economic  development  to  continue 
on  a  secure  basis  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

Economic  Impact  of  New  Oil  Developments 

The  recent  price  increases  and  supply  dis- 
turbances of  oil  have  created  uncertainty, 
which — even  apart  from  the  direct  costs  in- 
volved— is  detrimental  to  economic  develop- 
ment. And  when  the  newly  announced  prices 
are  applied  to  estimates  of  oil  consumption 
which  are  in  the  neighborhood  of  previous 
forecasts  for  1974  and  later  years,  the  arith- 
metic results  are  staggering.  We  have  seen 
estimates,  for  example,  of  an  increase  in  the 
costs  of  imported  oil  in  1974  of  more  than 
$75  billion  just  from  the  price  increases  of 
the  last  few  months.  Similar  calculations  for 
later  years  yield  even  larger  numbers. 

In  appraising  these  estimates,  however,  I 


believe  we  must  be  driven  to  the  conclusion 
they  are  simply  not  realistic.  At  the  prices 
used  in  these  calculations  the  consuming 
countries  will  not — and  in  some  cases  prob- 
ably cannot — import  such  large  volumes.  In 
the  more  developed  countries  the  combina- 
tion of  consumer  choice  and  government  con- 
trols is  bound  to  restrict  consumption  of  im- 
ported oil  substantially,  even  in  the  short  run. 
Increasingly  over  time,  imports  will  fall  even 
further  behind  earlier  forecasts,  not  only 
from  reductions  in  consumption  but  also  from 
increases  in  production  from  alternative  en- 
ergy sources  which  have  become  economic  by 
comparison.  With  the  economic  incentives 
which  now  exist,  I  suspect  we  shall  all  be  sur- 
prised by  the  new  ways  of  producing  and  of 
saving  energy  which  "come  out  of  the  wood- 
work." 

The  impossibility  of  the  initial  projections 
of  mammoth  increases  in  import  bills  for  oil 
is  particularly  obvious  for  the  less  developed 
countries  which  are  not  oil  producers.  I  have 
seen  estimates  that  their  import  bill  alone 
would  increase  by  more  than  $10  billion  in 
1974,  an  amount  in  excess  of  the  total  of  offi- 
cial assistance  which  they  have  been  receiv- 
ing in  recent  years.  Clearly  it  would  not  be 
possible  for  these  countries  to  absorb  such 
increases.  Conceivably  these  countries  could 
turn  to  the  oil  producers  to  borrow  some  por- 
tion of  the  increased  cost.  But  many  of  these 
governments  are  already  near  the  limits  of 
prudent  indebtedness.  Moreover,  it  is  one 
thing  to  borrow  for  a  promising  investment 
project  which  will  generate  increasing  reve- 
nues in  the  future,  but  it  is  a  far  different 
and  dangerous  course  to  borrow  large 
amounts  to  cover  current  consumption.  Of 
course  the  more  developed  nations  must 
maintain  their  assistance  programs;  but  in 
addition,  to  meet  the  new  needs  some  of  the 
oil  producers  must  provide  a  substantial 
amount  of  grant  assistance  if  current  welfare 
and  future  development  are  not  to  be  dras- 
tically reduced  in  many  areas  whose  levels  of 
economic  welfare  are  already  abysmally  low. 

Even  after  the  inevitable  reduction  in  fu- 
ture levels  of  imports,  the  increasing  cost  of 


148 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


imported  energy  in  the  near  future  will  still 
be  huge.  The  secondary  effects  in  terms  of 
the  availability  of  such  derived  products  as 
fertilizer  must  also  be  recognized.  The  extra 
funds  paid  by  the  importers  will  inevitably 
mean  a  decline  in  their  terms  of  trade,  a  bur- 
den upon  their  economies,  and  a  heavy  bur- 
den on  efforts  to  manage  common  affairs  co- 
operatively. Of  course  the  funds  paid  by 
importers  will  not  disappear  from  the  face 
of  the  earth.  They  will  be  used  by  the  recipi- 
ents in  part  for  increased  purchases  of  goods 
and  services  and  in  substantial  part  for  in- 
vestment in  other  countries.  These  reflows 
will  collectively  redress  the  payments  posi- 
tions of  those  countries.  But  in  the  new  cir- 
cumstances there  inevitably  is  great  uncer- 
tainty as  to  which  countries  will  receive  these 
reflows. 

Naturally  we  in  the  U.S.  Government  are 
hopeful  that  our  businessmen  will  be  com- 
petitive with  their  exports,  and  we  know 
that  we  have  a  large  and  smoothly  function- 
ing market  for  investments.  Yet,  for  us  as 
for  others,  there  is  great  uncertainty  as  to 
what  will  be  the  net  impact  of  the  new  oil  de- 
velopments on  our  payments  position.  We 
had,  after  all,  been  scheduled  to  be  the 
world's  single  largest  importer  of  oil  during 
the  next  few  years.  The  oil  price  increases 
are  likely  in  the  short  run  to  cause  for  us  an 
even  larger  percentage  increase  in  the  total 
cost  of  imports  than  will  be  the  case  for  most 
major  countries  in  Europe,  since  oil  looms 
larger  among  our  imports. 


Implications  for  Monetary  Reform 

For  me  these  new  developments  have  three 
basic  implications  for  our  work  on  monetary 
reform  in  the  Committee  of  Twenty: 

— First,  we  must  demonstrate  that  we  can 
achieve  international  economic  cooperative 
agreements  in  a  timely  fashion.  It  is  impera- 
tive that  we  reach  a  substantive  agreement 
by  the  date  which  we  have  already  set  for 
ourselves,  July  31  of  this  year. 

— Second,  in  doing  so,  we  must  reorder  our 


thinking  to  take  fully  into  account  the  new 
conditions  and  the  new  uncertainties  which 
have  been  thrust  upon  our  international  af- 
fairs. Our  monetary  reform  agreements  must 
not  attempt  to  impose  upon  the  system  a  ri- 
gidity which  hampers  response  to  future  de- 
velopments, including,  for  instance,  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  surfeit  of  energy  supplies  around 
the  world  in  a  few  years'  time.  Rather,  we 
must  agree  on  rules  and  procedures  to  insure 
there  will  be  prompt  adjustment  in  response 
to  developing  international  monetary  imbal- 
ances. We  must  try  to  avoid  the  mistake  of 
giving  too  much  weight  to  present  conditions 
by  simply  extrapolating  them  far  into  the  fu- 
ture, while  setting  the  flexibility  necessary  to 
adapt  and  evolve  the  system  to  meet  future 
developments. 

— Third,  we  must  design  financial  mecha- 
nisms and  arrangements  to  deal  with  the 
present  problem.  But  we  must  be  realistic 
and  recognize  that  the  present  problem  is  lit- 
erally unmanageable  for  many  countries.  The 
oil-producing  countries  have  to  recognize  this 
simple  fact  and  cooperate  with  the  rest  of  the 
world  in  scaling  down  the  magnitude  of  the 
financial  problem  to  manageable  proportions. 
Once  that  is  accomplished,  we  must  still  bring 
together  the  countries  that  have  investment 
opportunities  with  oil-producing  countries 
which  have  investable  funds  so  that  major 
destabilizing  forces  in  the  world  economy  are 
avoided. 

If  we  manage  our  affairs  pi'operly,  it  will 
plainly  make  economic  sense  all  around  for 
producers  to  pump  oil  in  excess  of  their  cur- 
rent revenue  needs  so  that  oil  wealth  can  be 
put  to  uses  which  generate  a  greater  return 
than  would  result  from  letting  that  oil  in- 
crease— or  possibly  decrease — in  value  while 
lying  in  the  ground.  In  fact,  however,  that  oil 
is  not  likely  to  be  produced  unless  the  pro- 
ducers of  the  oil  and  the  custodians  of  the  in- 
vestment projects  can  be  brought  together  in 
a  manner  in  which  each  participant  feels  he 
can  rely  on  the  contractual  relationships  with 
the  other.  There  may  be  possibilities  for  col- 
lective action  which  should  be  given  consid- 
eration in  this  area. 


February  11,   1974 


149 


All  these  tasks  I  have  just  mentioned  are 
ones  for  which  we  as  Finance  Ministers  must 
take  primary  responsibility.  But  our  respon- 
sibilities for  constructive  response  to  the  new 
circumstances  will  not  end  there.  We  also 
have  a  vital  role  to  play  in  facilitating  future 
trade  negotiations. 

The  recent  experience  of  abrupt  major 
shifts  in  world  supply-demand  relationships 
in  certain  commodities  has  caused  us  all  to 
lethink  our  policies  and  our  methods  of  eco- 
nomic management,  domestically  and  inter- 
nationally. In  this  rethinking,  some  have  con- 
cluded that  recent  proposals  for  trade  nego- 
tiations should  be  put  aside  in  view  of  more 
pressing  problems  like  the  energy  supply 
constrictions  and  price  rises  or  alleged  world 
food  shortages.  That  is  the  wrong  conclusion. 

The  effort  to  embark  on  trade  negotiations 
has  much  in  common  with  our  efforts  in  the 
monetary  field:  on  the  one  hand,  to  solve  spe- 
cific problems,  and  on  the  other  hand,  to 
bring  about  a  negotiating  process  and  im- 
proved framework  for  trade  relations  which 
would  help  deal  more  effectively  with  new 
problems  as  they  arise.  The  recent  diflficulties, 
to  me,  argue  more  strongly  than  ever  for 
getting  moving  on  the  process  of  trade  nego- 
tiations. 

The  exact  way  in  which  we  go  about  this 
and  the  new  priorities  that  may  be  emerg- 
ing— including  the  avoidance  of  export  re- 
strictions— will  need  close  examination.  But 
it  is  imperative  that  the  process  itself  be  set 
in  motion  now. 

While  this  broader  process  is  getting  un- 
derway we  have  to  insure  that  nothing  is 
done  to  make  the  situation  worse  now.  No 
country  can  take  unilateral  restrictive  trade 
or  monetary  measures  to  benefit  some  se- 
lected section  of  its  economy  or  its  current 
balance  of  payments  at  the  cost  of  others 
without  generating  still  greater  turmoil  in 
world  economic  relations.  There  would  inev- 
itably be  countermeasures.  Unilateral  trade 
or  monetary  actions  which  are  generated  by 
energy  problems  or  similar  difficulties  would 
be  counterproductive.  Any  new  trade  or  mon- 
etary actions  should  be  considered  in  the 
most  careful  way  in  this  delicate  time  and 


should  be  kept  consistent  with  mutual  inter- 
ests and  obligations.  Bilateral  agreements  be- 
tween oil-producing  and  oil-consuming  coun- 
tries should  themselves  be  fitted  into  an  in- 
ternationally agreed  framework. 

As  Finance  Ministers,  with  our  particular 
knowledge  of  the  dangers  of  economic  insta- 
bility and  autarkic  policies,  we  must  impress 
upon  our  national  colleagues  the  dangers  of 
attempting  to  "go  it  alone"  in  international 
economic  affairs  in  today's  circumstances. 
We  must  recognize  that  monetary  coopera- 
tion plays  a  large  part,  but  still  only  a  part, 
in  the  broad  effort  needed  to  respond  to  the 
new  economic  challenges.  With  cooperation, 
we  can  find  a  balance  in  the  essential  needs 
of  oil  producers  and  consumers.  With  intelli- 
gence and  understanding,  we  can  avoid  un- 
employment through  excesses  of  financial 
restraint  at  home.  If  we  approach  our  prob- 
lems in  common,  we  can  maintain  a  fabric  of 
reasonable  stability  and  freedom  in  interna- 
tional commodity  and  exchange  markets  to 
the  benefit  of  all  our  citizens. 

The  new  challenges  have  come  upon  us 
with  a  brutal  suddenness.  But  the  collision 
between  growing  energy  demands  and  the 
slower  gi-owth  in  apparent  supply  was  in- 
evitable in  any  event.  Let  us  now  attempt  to 
insure  that  we  derive  one  important  benefit 
from  our  recent  jolting  experience.  Let  us 
resolve  to  delay  no  longer  and  to  proceed  at 
once  with  the  reordering  of  our  research  ef- 
forts, our  production  plans,  and  our  con- 
sumption patterns  to  fit  our  new  conception 
of  the  world's  energy  balance.  In  doing  so, 
let  us  achieve  that  broad  consistency  among 
our  individual  actions  that  is  essential  to  the 
success  of  the  total  effort. 


TEXT  OF  COMMUNIQUE 

1.  The  Committee  of  the  Board  of  Governors  of 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  on  Reform  of  the 
International  Monetary  System  and  Related  Issues 
(the  Committee  of  Twenty)  held  their  fifth  meeting 
in  Rome  on  January  17  and  18,  1974,  under  the 
chairmanship  of  Mr.  Ali  Wardhana,  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance for  Indonesia.  Mr.  Johannes  Witteveen,  Man- 
aging Director  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund, 


150 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


took  part  in  the  meeting  which  was  also  attended  hy 
Mr.  Wilhelm  Haferkamp,  Vice-President  of  the 
E.E.C.,  Mr.  Rene  Larre,  General  Manatjer  of  the 
B.I.S,  [T'.ank  for  International  Settlements],  Mr. 
Emile  van  Lennep,  Secretary-General  of  the  O.E.C.D., 
Mr.  Olivier  Long,  Director-General  of  the  G.A.T.T. 
[General  .Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade],  Mr. 
Manuel  Perez-Guerrero,  Secretary-General  of  the 
U.N.C.T..A.D.  [United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development],  and  Sir  Denis  Rickett,  Vice- 
President  of  the  I.B.R.D.  [International  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development]. 

2.  Members  of  the  Committee  began  by  reviewing 
important  recent  developments  including  the  large 
rise  in  oil  prices  and  the  implications  for  the  world 
economy.  They  expressed  serious  concern  at  the 
abrupt  and  significant  changes  in  prospect  for  the 
world  lialance  of  payments  structure.  They  recog- 
nised that  the  current  account  surpluses  of  oil-pro- 
ducing countries  would  be  very  greatly  increased,  and 
that  many  other  countries — both  developed  and  de- 
veloping— would  have  to  face  large  current  account 
deficits.  In  these  difficult  circumstances  the  Commit- 
tee agreed  that  in  managing  their  international  pay- 
ments countries  must  not  adopt  policies  which  would 
merely  aggravate  the  problems  of  other  countries. 
.Accordingly,  they  stressed  the  importance  of  avoid- 
ing competitive  depreciation  and  the  escalation  of 
restrictions  on  trade  and  payments.  They  further 
resolved  to  pursue  policies  that  would  sustain  appro- 
priate levels  of  economic  activity  and  employment, 
while  minimising  inflation.  They  recognised  that  seri- 
ous difficulties  would  be  created  for  many  developing 
countries  and  that  their  needs  for  financial  resources 
will  be  greatly  increased;  and  they  urged  all  coun- 
tries with  available  resources  to  make  every  effort  to 
supply  these  needs  on  appropriate  terms.  The  Com- 
mittee agreed  that  there  should  be  the  closest  inter- 
national cooperation  and  consultation  in  pursuit  of 
these  objectives.  They  noted  that  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  the  World  Bank  and  other  interna- 
tional organisations  are  concerned  to  find  orderly 
means  by  which  the  changes  in  current  account  posi- 
tions may  be  financed,  and  they  urged  that  these 
organisations  should  cooperate  in  finding  an  early 
solution  to  these  questions,  particularly  in  relation 
to  the  difficult  problems  facing  non-oil-producing 
developing  countries.  In  particular,  while  recognising 
the  uncertainties  with  regard  to  future  developments 
in  the  field  of  energy,  the  Committee  agreed  that  the 
proposal  of  the  Managing  Director  of  the  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  for  a  temporary  supplemen- 
tary facility  should  be  urgently  explored.  It  is 
recognised  that  such  a  facility  poses  operational 
problems  which  must  be  resolved  and  would,  particu- 
larly for  non-oil-producing  developing  countries,  be 
only  a  partial  measure,  in  view  of  the  nature  and 
magnitude  of  the  balance  of  payments  problems 
created. 

3.  The  Committee  expressed  its  determination  to 


complete  its  work  on  the  main  features  of  a  reformed 
international  monetary  system  in  the  coming  months. 
They  recognised  that,  in  the  light  of  the  recent  de- 
velopments in  the  world  economy  noted  above,  pri- 
ority should  be  given  to  certain  important  aspects  of 
reform  affecting  the  interests  both  of  developed  and 
developing  countries,  with  a  view  to  their  early 
implementation.  Other  aspects  of  reform  could  be 
agreed  with  the  understanding  that  their  operational 
provisions  would  be  developed  and  implemented  at 
a  later  date.  The  Committee  agreed  that  the  Deputies 
should  arrange  to  study  the  broad  question  of  the 
transfer  of  real  resources,  including  all  aspects  of 
capital  transfers,  and  that  there  should  be  a  report 
to  the  next  meeting  of  the  Committee. 

4.  The  Committee  discussed  the  valuation  and 
yield  of  the  SDR  [special  drawing  right].  They 
agreed  that  further  attention  should  be  given  to  the 
question  of  protecting  the  SDR's  capital  value 
against  depreciation.  In  the  present  circumstances 
the  Committee  agreed  that,  for  an  interim  period 
and  without  prejudice  to  the  method  of  valuation 
to  be  adopted  in  the  reformed  system,  it  would  be 
appropriate  to  base  the  valuation  of  the  SDR  on  a 
"basket"  of  currencies.  They  invited  the  Executive 
Board  to  work  urgently  on  the  composition  of  a 
basket  of  currencies,  the  effective  interest  rate,  and 
other  outstanding  questions,  with  a  view  to  early 
adoption  by  the  Fund   of  this  method  of  valuation. 

5.  The  Committee  discussed  certain  aspects  of  the 
future  structure  of  the  International  .Monetary  Fund. 
They  agreed  that  in  the  reformed  system  it  would  be 
desirable  to  establish,  between  the  full  Board  of 
Governors  and  the  Executive  Directors,  a  permanent 
and  representative  Council  of  Governors  with  twenty 
members.  They  agreed  that  the  Council  should  meet 
regularly,  three  or  four  times  a  year  as  required, 
and  should  have  the  necessary  decision-making  pow- 
ers to  manage  and  adapt  the  monetary  system,  to 
oversee  the  continuing  operation  of  the  adjustment 
process  and  to  deal  with  sudden  disturbances  which 
might  threaten  the  system,  while  maintaining  the 
role  of  the  Executive  Board.  As  an  interim  step, 
pending  the  establishment  of  the  Council,  it  was 
agreed  that  a  Committee  of  the  Board  of  Governors 
should  be  created,  with  an  advisory  role  in  the  same 
areas  as  the  Council  and  with  the  same  composition 
and  procedures.  This  Committee  would  come  into 
being  when  the  Committee  of  Twenty  has  completed 
its  work.  The  Executive  Board  was  invited  to  prepare 
for  the  Board  of  Governors  a  draft  Resolution  to 
create  such  a  Committee,  giving  due  consideration  to 
the  need  for  adequate  consultative  machinery  and 
the  protection  of  the  interests  of  all  Fund  members. 

6.  The  Committee  received  reports  from  the  Chair- 
man of  the  Deputies  on  the  progress  of  the  Technical 
Groups  set  up  after  the  Nairobi  meeting  and  urged 
them  to  complete  their  work  if  possible  before  the 
next  meeting  of  the  Deputies.  They  also  received  a 
report  on  the  Deputies'  preliminary  discussion  of  con- 
ditions and  rules  for  floating  in  the  reformed  system. 


February   11,    1974 


151 


They  instructed  the  Deputies,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Executive  Board,  to  continue  to  work  on  these  ques- 
tions and  to  report  to  the  next  meeting  of  the 
Committee. 

7.  The  Committee  discussed  their  future  pro- 
gramme. They  agreed  that,  following  meetings  of 
the  Deputies  in  March  and  May,  the  Committee 
would  aim  to  complete  its  work  on  the  reform  at  a 
meeting  to  be  held  in  Washington  on  June  12-13, 
1974. 


U.N.   Liner  Shipping  Conference 
Completes  First  Session 

Following  is  a  report  on  the  first  session 
of  the  United  Nations  Conference  of  Pleni- 
potentiaries on  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  Liner 
Conferences  prepared  by  the  Office  of  Man- 
time  Affairs,  Bureav  of  Economic  and  Busi- 
ness Affairs. 

The  84-country  United  Nations  Conference 
of  Plenipotentiaries  on  a  Code  of  Conduct 
for  Liner  Conferences  completed  its  first  ses- 
sion December  15  after  five  weeks  of  meet- 
ings at  Geneva.  Its  purpose,  in  accordance 
with  a  December  1972  United  Nations  Gen- 
eral Assembly  resolution,  was  "to  consider 
and  adopt  a  convention  or  any  other  multi- 
lateral legally  binding  instrument  on  a  code 
of  conduct  for  liner  conferences."  ' 

The  conference  was  held,  following  two 
sessions  of  a  preparatory  committee  which 
met  in  January  and  June  1973,  under  the 
auspices  of  the  United  Nations  Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development  and  was  the  fruit 
of  developing  countries'  pressure  to  bring 
shipping  liner  conferences  under  interna- 
tional regulation.  Although  originally  sched- 


'  Liner  conferences  are  two  or  more  shipping  lines 
grouped  together  to  fix  uniform  freight  rates  and 
sometimes  to  concert  their  business  activities  in 
other  ways.  Conferences  transport  the  large  major- 
ity of  the  world's  oceanborne  general  cargo  (as  dis- 
tinguished from  bulk  cargo).  Conferences  serving 
U.S.  trade  have  been  subject  to  U.S.  regulation 
through  the  Federal  Maritime  Commission  or  its 
predecessor  since  1916.  Most  U.S.  shipping  lines  are 
conference  members. 


uled  to  conclude  its  work  in  one  session,  the 
conference  will  have  a  three-week  resumed 
session  beginning  March  11,  at  which  time  it 
hopes  to  complete  its  work. 

The  U.S.  delegation  to  the  U.N.  conference 
was  headed  by  Raymond  J.  Waldmann, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Transportation  and  Telecommunications, 
and  included  representatives  from  U.S.  mari- 
time agencies,  interested  congressional  com- 
mittees, and  private  industry. 

Despite  failure  to  complete  its  task  at  the 
first  session,  the  conference  made  consider- 
able progress  in  the  work  on  the  Code  of 
Conduct.  The  basis  of  its  work  was  a  text 
with  many  alternative  provisions  for  the  code 
which  had  emerged  from  the  June  prepara- 
tory committee  meeting.  The  conference  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  agreement  on  the  texts  of 
a  majority  of  the  substantive  provisions  of 
the  code  as  well  as  on  the  most  appropriate 
approach  for  the  implementation  of  the  code. 

This  progress  resulted  from  a  fairly  thor- 
ough exploration  of  some  of  the  technical 
aspects  of  the  code's  provisions  as  well  as 
from  a  number  of  major  concessions  from 
both  the  traditional  maritime  states  and  the 
developing  countries.  The  maritime  states 
were  willing  to  concede  a  considerable  role  of 
government  in  the  operation  of  the  code, 
more  stringent  controls  over  the  setting  of 
freight  rates,  and  some  provisions  for  cargo 
sharing  in  the  code.  For  their  part,  the  de- 
veloping countries  abandoned  their  former 
insistence  on  a  mandatory  and  binding  inter- 
national arbitration  system  for  enforcing  the 
code,  relinquished  their  .strict  40-40-20 
cargo-sharing  formula  for  a  somewhat  more 
flexible  formula,  lessened  their  demand  for 
preferential  treatment  in  the  code  for  the 
economic  interests  of  developing  countries, 
and  agreed  to  a  slightly  diminished  role  of 
government. 

Although  differences  over  a  large  number 
of  minor  provisions  were  resolved  and  there 
was  considerable  rapprochement  on  major 
issues,  several  of  the  latter  still  loom  as  ma- 
jor  problem   areas  for  the   March   session. 


152 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


These  include  the  definitive  provisions  on 
cargo  sharing  and  especially  the  degree  of 
flexibility  in  any  formula,  the  degree  of  con- 
trols to  be  set  over  freight  rate  increases,  and 
especially  whether  the  mandatory  (but  not 
binding)  conciliation  procedure  for  solving 
disputes  arising  under  the  code  will  apply  to 
freight  rate  matters. 

A  key  role  was  played  in  the  U.N.  confer- 
ence by  its  President,  C.  P.  Srivastava  of 
India,  who  had  also  presided  at  the  two  pre- 
paratory committee  sessions  and  who  became 
Secretary  General  of  the  Intergovernmental 
Maritime  Consultative  Organization  on  Jan- 
uary 1.  During  the  latter  part  of  the  session 
Mr.  Srivastava  prepared,  on  the  basis  of  dis- 
cussions within  a  high-level  select  negotiat- 
ing committee,  a  statement  of  principles  on 
major  issues.  The  statement  was  accepted  by 
all  of  the  developing  countries,  Eastern  Eu- 
ropean Socialist  countries,  and  some  mari- 
time countries.  Other  maritime  countries 
explicitly  stated  they  could  not  accept  it.  The 
United  States  was  unable  to  accept  all  of  the 
statement  but  was  prepared  to  use  it  as  a 
basis  for  continuing  negotiations,  which  in 
fact  is  what  happened. 

The  conference  concluded  its  session  De- 
cember 15  with  the  adoption  of  a  resolution 
which  stated  the  progress  achieved,  the  ad- 
herence of  a  majority  of  countries  to  the 
above-mentioned  statement  of  principles,  and 
the  scheduled  resumption  of  the  conference 
on  March  11,  at  which  time  already  agreed 
texts  are  not  to  be  reopened  for  substantive 
discussion. 

The  United  States  will  participate  in  the 
March  session  also,  and  in  preparation 
therefor  the  Department  of  State  plans  to 
conduct  intensive  discussions  with  appropri- 
ate government  agencies,  congressional  com- 
mittees, and  the  maritime  industry.  In  gen- 
eral, the  United  States  seeks  a  code  which 
will  be  consistent  with  U.S.  trade  and  trans- 
port objectives  and  which  will  be  favorable 
to  the  development  of  fair  and  efficient  rela- 
tionships in  international  shipping  on  a 
worldwide  basis. 


President   Establishes  Commission 
for  World   Population   Year 

AN    EXECUTIVE    ORDER' 

Establishing  a  National  Commission 
FOR  THE  Observance  of  World  Population  Year 

In  a  message  to  the  Congress  on  July  18,  1969,  I 
stated  that  "One  of  the  most  serious  challenges  to 
human  destiny  in  the  last  third  of  this  century  will 
be  the  growth  of  the  population.  Whether  man's  re- 
sponse to  that  challenge  will  be  a  cause  for  pride  or 
for  despair  in  the  year  2000  will  depend  very  much 
on  what  we  do  today.  If  we  now  begin  our  work  in 
an  appropriate  manner,  and  if  we  continue  to  devote 
a  considerable  amount  of  attention  and  energy  to  this 
problem,  then  mankind  will  be  able  to  surmount  this 
challenge  as  it  has  surmounted  so  many  during  the 
long  march  of  civilization". 

The  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations,  by 
a  resolution  approved  at  its  twenty-fifth  session,  has 
designated  the  year  1974  as  World  Population  Year. 
This  action  was  designed  to  focus  international  at- 
tention on  various  aspects  of  the  population  problem 
and  to  encourage  appropriate  and  relevant  coopera- 
tive activity  in  this  field.  In  the  same  resolution, 
the  General  Assembly  called  upon  member  states 
and  international  organizations  to  participate  fully 
in  the  World  Population  Year  and  to  devote  the  year 
1974  to  appropriate  efforts  and  undertakings  con- 
cerning the  population  ((uestion.  The  .Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  United  Nations  has  called  upon  member 
states  to  begin  preparatory  work  immediately. 

Now,  Therefore,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested 
in  me  as  President  of  the  United  States,  it  is  ordered 
as  follows: 

Section  1.  Establishment  of  Commission,  (a) 
There  is  hereby  established  a  National  Commission 
for  the  Observance  of  World  Population  Year,  1974. 

(b)  The  Commission  shall  consist  of  not  more  than 
twenty  members  to  be  appointed  by  the  President 
from  among  citizens  in  private  life.  The  President 
shall  designate  the  Chairman  and  two  Vice  Chairmen 
of  the  Commission  from  among  its  members. 

(c)  The  members  shall  serve  without  compensa- 
tion, but  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  travel  expenses, 
including  per  diem  in  lieu  of  subsistence,  as  author- 
ized by  law  (5  U.S.C.  5703). 

Sec  2.  Functions  of  the  Commission,  (a)  The 
Commission  shall  promote  the  appropriate  observ- 
ance in  the  United  States  of  1974  as  World  Popula- 
tion Year.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  shall  seek 
to  create  within  the  United   States  a  better  under- 


'  No.  11763;  39  Fed.  Reg.  2349. 


February    11,    1974 


153 


standing  of  the  causes,  nature,  scope,  and  conse- 
quences of  the  problem  of  population  growth,  both 
national  and  international,  and  the  relationship  of 
this  problem  to  the  quality  of  human  life. 

(b)  The  Commission  shall  keep  itself  informed  of 
activities  undertaken  or  planned  by  various  organiza- 
tions and  groups  in  the  United  States  in  observance 
of  the  Year  and  shall  seek  to  consult  with  such 
groups  and  to  stimulate  such  activities. 

(c)  The  Commission  shall  hold  meetings,  public  or 
private,  at  such  times  and  places  as  the  Chairman 
shall  determine.  It  may  assemble  and  disseminate 
information,  issue  reports  and  other  publications,  and 
conduct  such  other  activities  as  it  may  deem  appro- 
priate to  provide  for  the  effective  participation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  observance  of  World  Population 
Year. 

(d)  The  Commission  may  establish  such  subcom- 
mittees or  working  groups,  the  membership  of  which 
may  include  persons  not  members  of  the  Commission, 
as  it  may  deem  necessary  for  the  fulfillment  of  its 
tasks. 

(e)  The  Commission  shall  conclude  its  work  by  the 
end  of  the  year  1974  and  shall  make  a  report  to  the 
President  on  its  work  within  thirty  days  thereafter, 
at  which  time  the  Commission  shall  be  deemed  to  be 
terminated. 

Sec.  3.  Assistance  and  Cooperation,  (a)  The  Com- 
mission is  authorized  to  request  any  agency  of  the 
executive  branch  of  the  Government  to  furnish  the 
Commission  with  such  information  and  advice  and 
services  as  may  be  useful  to  it  for  the  fulfillment  of 
its  functions  under  this  Order.  Each  such  agency  is 
authorized,  to  the  e.xtent  permitted  by  law  and  with- 
in the  limits  of  available  funds,  to  furnish  such 
information,  advice,  and  services  to  the  Commission 
upon  request  of  the  Chairman  or  Executive  Secretary 
of  the  Commission. 

(b)  Subject  to  the  availability  of  funds,  the  Com- 
mission may  procure  the  temporary  services  of  ex- 
perts to  assist  in  its  work,  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  section  .3109  of  title  5  of  the  United 
States  Code. 

(c)  The  Departments  of  State  and  of  Health,  Edu- 
cation, and  Welfare  shall,  to  the  extent  permitted 
by  law,  provide  the  Commission  with  administrative 
services,  facilities,  and  funds  necessary  for  its  activi- 
ties. The  Department  of  State  shall  provide  an  Exec- 
utive Secretary  for  the  Commission. 

(d)  The  Secretaries  of  State  and  Health,  Educa- 
tion, and  Welfare  shall  participate  with  the  Com- 
mission in  order  that  activities  which  may  be  under- 
taken by  the  executive  branch  of  the  United  States 
Government  in  obsen^ance  of  World  Population  Year 
and  those  undertaken  by  the  Commission  may  be 
properly  coordinated. 

(e)  The  President  of  the  Senate  and  the  Speaker 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  invited  to 
designate  two  Members  of  each  House  to  participate 
with  the  Commission  in  order  that  activities  which 


may  be  undertaken  by  the  Congress  in  observance 
of  World  Population  Year  and  those  undertaken  by 
the  Commission  may  be  properly  coordinated. 


(^2jJ^<k:^^ 


The  White  House,  Januayy  17,  1974. 

Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

93d   Congress,    1st   Session 

Emergency  Powers  Statutes:  Provisions  of  Federal 
Law  Now  in  Effect  Delegating  to  the  Executive 
Extraordinary  Authority  in  Time  of  National 
Emergency.  Report  of  the  Senate  Special  Com- 
mittee on  the  Termination  of  the  National  Emer- 
gency.   September  1973.   607  pp. 

The  Impact  of  the  October  Middle  East  War.  Hear- 
ings before  the  Subcommittee  on  the  Near  East 
and  South  Asia  of  the  House  Committee  on  For- 
eign Affairs.  October  3-November  29,  1973.  159 
pp. 

Ocean  Dumping  Convention  Implementation.  Report 
to  accompany  H.R.  5450.  H.  Rept.  93-568.  October 
10,  1973.    17  pp. 

Trade  Reform  Act  of  1973.  Report,  together  with 
dissenting  views,  to  accompany  H.R.  10710.  H. 
Rept.  93-571.    October  10,  1973.    204  pp. 

Arctic  Winter  Games  Authorization.  Report  to  ac- 
company S.  907.  H.  Rept.  93-583.  October  12,  1973. 
8  pp. 

Patent  Cooperation  Treaty  and  Annexed  Regula- 
tions. Report  to  accompany  Ex.  S,  92-2.  S.  Ex. 
Rept.  93-20.    October  18,  1973.    10  pp. 

Strasbourg  Patent  Classification  Agreement.  Report 
to  accompany  Ex.  E,  93-1.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  93-21.  Oc- 
tober 18,  1973.   5  pp. 

World  Tourism  Organization.  Report  to  accompany 
Ex.  R,  93-1.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  93-22.  October  18,  1973. 
7  pp. 

Convention  Concerning  the  Protection  of  the  World 
Cultural  and  Natural  Heritage.  Report  to  accom- 
pany Ex.  F,  93-1.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  93-23.  October  18, 
1973.    9  pp. 

Metric  Conversion  Act  of  1973.  Report,  together 
with  additional  views,  to  accompany  H.R.  11035. 
H.  Rept.  93-604.    October  23,  1973.    22  pp. 

Authorize  Appropriations  for  the  United  States  In- 
formation Agency.  Veto  message  from  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  returning  without  ap- 
proval the  bill  (S.  1317)  entitled  "The  United 
States  Information  Agency  Appropriations  Au- 
thorization Act  of  1973."  S.  Doc.  93-41.  October 
26,  1973.   4  pp. 

Review  of  Southeast  Asia  Collective  Defense  Treaty. 
Report  to  accompany  S.  Res.  174.  S.  Rept.  93-481. 
October  30,  1973.  3  pp. 


154 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  convention 
on  international  civil  aviation,  as  amended  (TIAS 
1591,  3756,   5170,  7616).   Done  at  Vienna  July   7, 
1971.' 
Ratified  by  the  President :  January  14,  1973. 

Convention    for    the    suppression    of   unlawful    acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Janu- 
ary 26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accessio7i  deposited:  Pakistan,  January  24,  1974. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  revised.  Done  at 
Paris  July  24,  1971.' 

Protocol  1  annexed  to  the  universal  copyright  con- 
vention, as  revised,  concerning  the  application  of 
that  convention  to  works  of  stateless  persons  and 
refugees.  Done  at  Paris  July  24,  1971.' 

Protocol  2  annexed  to  the  universal  copyright  con- 
vention, as  revised,  concerning  the  application  of 
that  convention  to  the  works  of  certain  interna- 
tional organizations.  Done  at  Paris  July  24,  1971.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, October  18,  1973.' 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international  transit  of 
goods  (ITI  convention).  Done  at  Vienna  June  7, 
1971.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  January 
21,  1974. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at 
New  York  March  30,  1961.  Entered  into  force 
December  13,  1964;  for  the  United  States  June  24, 
1967.  TIAS  6298. 

Ratification  deposited:   Federal   Republic  of  Ger- 
many, December  3,  1973.' 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol  signed  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964  (TIAS 
5881),  as  amended  by  additional  protocol,  general 
regulations  with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and 
the  universal  postal  convention  with  final  protocol 
and  detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Tokyo  Novem- 
ber 14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1971, 
except   for  article   V    of   the   additional   protocol, 


'  Not  in  force. 

-  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 


which  entered  into  force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS 
7150. 

Accession  deposited:  Bahrain,  April  4,  1973. 
Additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union  with  final  protocol  signed  at 
Vienna  July  10,  1964  (TIAS  5881),  general  regula- 
tions with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the  uni- 
versal postal  convention  with  final  protocol  and 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Tokyo  November 
14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1971,  except 
for  article  V  of  the  additional  protocol,  which 
entered  into  force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 
Ratification  deposited:  Ethiopia,  November  26, 
1973. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for  pre- 
venting collisions  at  sea,  1972.  Done  at  London 
October  20,  1972.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Ghana,  December  7,  1973. 
Accession  deposited:  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics   (with   statements),   November   9,   1973. 

Space 

Convention    on    international    liability  for    damage 

caused    by    space    objects.    Done    at  Washington, 

London,  and  Moscow  March  29,  1972.  Entered  into 
force  September  1,  1972;  for  the  United  States 
October  9, 1973. 

Ratification   deposited:   Switzerland,  January   22, 
1974. 

Trade 

Arrangement  regarding  international  trade  in  tex- 
tiles, with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  20, 
1973.  Entered  into  force  January  1,  1974,  except 
for  article  2,  paragraphs  2,  3,  and  4;  enters  into 
force  April  1,  1974,  for  article  2,  paragraphs  2, 
3,  and  4. 
Acceptance :  United  States,  December  28,  1973. 


BILATERAL 


Afghanistan 

Agreement  extending  the  technical  cooperation  pro- 
gram agreement  of  June  30,  1953  (TIAS  2856). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kabul  November 
27,  1973,  and  January  14,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
January  14,  1974;  effective  June  30,  1973. 

Belgium 

Consular  convention.  Signed  at  Washington  Septem- 
ber 2,  1969. 
Proclaimed  by   the  President:  January  22,   1974. 

Bermuda 

Agreement  on  preclearance  of  U.S. -bound  air  travel- 
ers before  departure  from  Bermuda,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Hamilton  January  15,  1974.  Entered  into 
force  January  15,  1974. 

Colombia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  April  24,  1973  (TIAS 


February   11,   1974 


155 


7623).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bogota  De- 
cember 11,  1973.  Entered  into  force  December  11, 
1973. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  November 
20,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS  5518,  7386,  7507,  7607, 
7735),  for  conducting  certain  educational  exchange 
programs.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bonn 
January  11,  1974.  Entered  into  force  January  11, 
1974. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  February  14,  1973 
(TIAS  7589).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Jakarta  December  31,  1973.  Entered  into  force  De- 
cember 31,  1973. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  relating  to  travel   group  charter  flights 
and  advance  booking  charter  flights,  with  memo- 
randum of  understanding.   Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  The  Hague  July  11,  1973. 
Entoed  into  force  definitively :  January  21,  1974. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  acceptance  of 
ail-worthiness  certifications.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  The  Hague  January  16,  1974.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  of  receipt  by  the  United 
States  of  a  notification  from  the  Netherlands  that 
the  approval  constitutionally  required  in  the  Neth- 
erlands has  been  obtained. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  September  5, 
1972  (TIAS  7433),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  tex- 
tiles. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
January  9  and  18,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Janu- 
ary 18,  1974. 

Poland 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  agreement 
of  March  15,  1967,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
6228,  6835),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
January  22,  1974.  Entered  into  force  January  22, 
1974. 


PUBLICATIONS 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Bookstore,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  B.C. 
20520.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Energy:  Cooperative  World  Action  To  Solve  Short- 
ages. This  pamphlet  in  the  Current  Foreign  Policy 
series  is  based  on  an  address  by  William  J.  Casey, 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  Affairs,  Sep- 
tember 18,  1973,  before  the  Johns  Hopkins  Confer- 
ence for  Corporation  Executives.  Pub.  8741.  General 
Foreign  Policy  Series  281.  6  pp.  25t*.  (Cat.  No. 
S1.71:281). 

Defense — Use  of  Facilities  at  Goose  Bay  Airport, 
Newfoundland.  Agreement  with  Canada.  TIAS  7702. 
6  pp.  25^.    (Cat.  No.  S9.10:7702). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  amending  the  agreement  of 
October  2,  1972,  as  amended.  TIAS  7706.  2  pp.  2B«f 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:7706). 

Extradition — Continued  Application  to  Fiji  of  the 
United  States-United  Kingdom  Treaty  of  December 
22,  1931.  Agreement  with  Fiji.  TIAS  7707.  3  pp.  25«'. 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:7707). 

Cooperation  in  Combating  Illicit  International  Traf- 
fic in  Narcotics  and  Other  Dangerous  Drugs — Com- 
munications Equipment.  Agreement  with  Mexico. 
TIAS  7709.   4  pp.   25^.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7709). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Bangla- 
desh. TIAS  7711.  10  pp.  25^.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:7711). 


156 


Deportment  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     February  11, 197 i     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1807 


Asia.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference 
of  January  22 137 

Congress 

Administration  Regrets  House  Action  on  IDA 
Replenishment  Bill   (Kissinger,  Shultz)   .     .       146 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 

Policy 154 

Economic  Affairs 

IMF   Committee   of   Twenty   Meets    at   Rome 

(Shultz,  text  of  communique) 147 

U.N.  Liner  Shipping  Conference  Completes 
First   Session 152 

Egypt.  U.S.  Announces  Egypt-Israel  Agree- 
ment on   Force   Separation    (Nixon)    .     .     .       145 

Energy 

IMF  Committee   of  Twenty  Meets   at  Rome 

(Shultz,  text   of   communique) 147 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
January    22 137 

Europe.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence  of  January   22 137 

Foreign  Aid.  Administration  Regrets  House 
Action  on  IDA  Replenishment  Bill  (Kissin- 
ger, Shultz) 146 

International   Organizations  and  Conferences. 

IMF  Committee  of  Twenty  Meets  at  Rome 
(Shultz,   text   of  communique) 147 

Israel.  U.S.  Announces  Egypt-Israel  Agree- 
ment on  Force  Separation  (Nixon)  ....       145 

Japan.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence  of  January   22 137 

Latin  America.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News 
Conference  of  January  22 137 

Maritime  Affairs.  U.N.  Liner  Shipping  Con- 
ference Completes  First  Session 152 

Middle  East 

Secretary    Kissinger's    News    Conference    of 

January    22 137 

U.S.   Announces   Egypt-Israel   Agreement  on 

Force  Separation  (Nixon) 145 

Population.  President  Establishes  Commission 
for  World  Population  Year  (Executive 
order) 153 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Establishes  Commission  for  World 
Population   Year    (Executive   order)    .     .     .       153 

U.S.  Announces  Egypt-Israel  Agreement  on 
Force   Separation 145 


Publications.    GPO  Sales  Publications     ...       156 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....       155 

U.S.S.R.    Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence of  January  22 137 

United  Nations 

President  Establishes  Commission  for  World 

Population    Year    (Executive   order)    ...       153 
U.N.    Liner    Shipping    Conference    Completes 

First  Session 152 


Name  Index 


Kissinger,  Secretary 137, 146 

Nixon,   President 145^  153 

Shultz,  George  P 146, 147 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  January  21-27 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

.Vo.      Date  Subject 

t25  1/21  Rush:  Cleveland  Council  on  For- 
eign Relations. 

*26  1/21  Caribbean  scholars  to  visit  the 
United  States. 

*27     1/22     Stoessel   sworn  in  as  Ambassador 

to  U.S.S.R.  (biographic  data). 
28     1/22     Kissinger:  news  conference. 

*29  1/23  Shipping  Coordinating  Committee, 
Feb.  26. 

*30     1/23     Subcommittee  on  Code  of  Conduct 
for    Liner   Conferences,    Feb.    5. 
31     1/23     Kissinger,    Shultz:    statement    on 
House    vote    on    ID.A.    replenish- 
ment. 

*32  1/24  Hyland  sworn  in  as  Director,  Bu- 
reau of  Intelligence  and  Research 
(biographic  data). 

*33  1/25  U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  In- 
ternational Educational  and  Cul- 
tural Affairs,  Feb.  26. 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent   of    Documents 

u.s.  government  printing  office 

washington,  d.c.  20402 


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/f^'^ 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1808 


February  18,  1974 


THE  STATE  OF  THE  UNION 

Excerpts  From  President  Nixon's  Address 

and  Message  to  the  Congress     157 

FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  AND  FREE  CAPITAL  MARKETS 
Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Casey    170 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1808 
February  18,  1974 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

52  issues  plus  semiannual  indexes. 

domestic  $29.80.  foreign  $S7.2B 

Single  copy  60  cents 

Use    of    funds    for    printing    this    publication 

approved    by    the    Director    of    the    Office    of 

Management  and   Budget    (January  29,    1971). 

Note:    Contents    of   this    publication    are    not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE    BULLETIN    as    the    source    will    be 

appreciated.     The   BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  and 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  and 
the  Foreign  Service. 
Tlie  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  tite  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements,  addresses, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  the  functions 
of  the  Department.  Information  is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
national agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  or  may  become  a 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  of 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  and 
legislative  material  in  the  field  of 
international  relations  are  also  listed. 


The  State  of  the  Union 


Following  are  excerpts  from  President 
Nixon's  address  made  before  a  joint  session 
of  the  Congress  on  January  30,  together  with 
excerpts  from  his  message  presented  to  the 
Congress  that  day.^ 

EXCERPTS  FROM  ADDRESS 

Mr.  Speaker,  Mr.  President,  my  colleagues 
in  the  Congress,  our  distinguished  guests,  my 
fellow  Americans:  We  meet  here  tonight  at 
a  time  of  great  challenge  and  great  oppor- 
tunities for  America.  We  meet  at  a  time 
when  we  face  great  problems  at  home  and 
abroad  that  will  test  the  strength  of  our  fiber 
as  a  nation.  But  we  also  meet  at  a  time  when 
that  fiber  has  been  tested  and  it  has  proved 
strong. 

America  is  a  great  and  good  land,  and  we 
are  a  great  and  good  land  because  we  are  a 
strong,  free,  creative  people  and  because 
America  is  the  single  greatest  force  for 
peace  anywhere  in  the  world.  Today,  as  al- 
ways in  our  history,  we  can  base  our  confi- 
dence in  what  the  American  people  will 
achieve  in  the  future  on  the  record  of  what 
the  American  people  have  achieved  in  the 
past. 

Tonight,  for  the  first  time  in  12  years  a 
President  of  the  United  States  can  report  to 
the  Congress  on  the  state  of  a  Union  at  peace 
with  every  nation  of  the  world.  Because  of 
this,  in  the  22,000-word  message  on  the  state 
of  the  Union  that  I  have  just  handed  to  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  and  the  President  of 
the  Senate  I  have  been  able  to  deal  primarily 
with  the  problems  of  peace — with  what  we 
can  do  here  at  home  in  America  for  the 
American  people — rather  than  with  the  prob- 
lems of  war. 


'  For  the  complete  texts,  see  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  dated  Feb.  4. 


The  measures  I  have  outlined  in  this  mes- 
sage set  an  agenda  for  truly  significant  prog- 
ress for  this  Nation  and  the  world  in  1974. 

Before  we  chart  where  we  are  going,  let 
us  see  how  far  we  have  come. 

It  was  five  years  ago  on  the  steps  of  this 
Capitol  that  I  took  the  oath  of  office  as  your 
President.  In  those  five  years,  because  of  the 
initiatives  undertaken  by  this  administra- 
tion, the  world  has  changed;  America  has 
changed.  As  a  result  of  those  changes  Amer- 
ica is  safer  today,  more  prosperous  today, 
with  greater  opportunity  for  more  of  its 
people  than  ever  before  in  our  history. 

Five  years  ago  America  was  at  war  in 
Southeast  Asia.  We  were  locked  in  confron- 
tation with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  were  in 
hostile  isolation  from  a  quarter  of  the  world's 
people  who  lived  in  Mainland  China. 


Five  years  ago  the  spiraling  rise  in  drug 
addiction  was  threatening  human  and  social 
tragedy  of  massive  proportion,  and  there  was 
no  program  to  deal  with  it. 

Five  years  ago — as  young  Americans  had 
done  for  a  generation  before  that — America's 
youth  still  lived  under  the  shadow  of  the  mili- 
tary draft. 


We  met  the  challenges  we  faced  five  years 
ago,  and  we  will  be  equally  confident  of  meet- 
ing those  that  we  face  today. 

Let  us  see  for  a  moment  how  we  have  met 
them.  After  more  than  10  years  of  military 
involvement,  all  of  our  troops  have  returned 
from  Southeast  Asia,  and  they  have  returned 
with  honor.  And  we  can  be  proud  of  the  fact 
that  our  courageous  prisoners  of  war,  for 
whom  a  dinner  was  held  in  Washington  to- 
night, that  they  came  home  with  their  heads 
high — on  their  feet  and  not  on  their  knees. 


February   18,   1974 


157 


In  our  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union,  we 
have  turned  away  from  a  policy  of  confron- 
tation to  one  of  negotiation.  For  the  first 
time  since  World  War  II,  the  world's  two 
strongest  powers  are  working  together  to- 
ward peace  in  the  world.  With  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  after  a  generation  of  hos- 
tile isolation  we  have  begun  a  period  of 
peaceful  exchange  and  expanding  trade. 

A  massive  campaign  against  drug  abuse 
has  been  organized.  And  the  rate  of  new 
heroin  addiction,  the  most  vicious  threat  of 
all,  is  decreasing  rather  than  increasing. 

For  the  first  time  in  a  generation  no  young 
Americans  are  being  drafted  into  the  Armed 
Services  of  the  United  States. 

As  we  look  back  over  our  history,  the  years 
that  stand  out  as  the  ones  of  signal  achieve- 
ment are  those  in  which  the  administration 
and  the  Congress,  whether  one  party  or  the 
other,  working  together,  had  the  wisdom  and 
the  foresight  to  select  those  particular  ini- 
tiatives for  which  the  Nation  was  ready  and 
the  moment  was  right — and  in  which  they 
seized  the  moment  and  acted. 

Looking  at  the  year  1974  which  lies  before 
us,  there  are  10  key  areas  in  which  landmark 
accomplishments  are  possible  this  year  in 
America.  If  we  make  these  our  national 
agenda,  this  is  what  we  will  achieve  in  1974: 

— We  will  break  the  back  of  the  energy 
crisis;  we  will  lay  the  foundation  for  our 
future  capacity  to  meet  America's  energy 
needs  from  America's  own  resources. 

— And  we  will  take  another  giant  stride 
toward  lasting  peace  in  the  world,  not  only 
by  continuing  our  policy  of  negotiation 
rather  than  confrontation  where  the  great 
powers  are  concerned  but  also  by  helping 
toward  the  achievement  of  a  just  and  lasting 
settlement  in  the  Middle  East. 

— We  will  check  the  rise  in  prices  without 
administering  the  harsh  medicine  of  reces- 
sion, and  we  will  move  the  economy  into  a 
steady  period  of  growth  at  a  sustainable 
level. 


— We  will  establish  a  new  system  that 
makes  high-quality  health  care  available  to 
every  American  in  a  dignified  manner  and  at 
a  price  he  can  afford. 

—We  will  make  our  States  and  localities 
more  responsive  to  the  needs  of  their  own 
citizens. 

— We  will  make  a  crucial  breakthrough 
toward  better  transportation  in  our  towns 
and  in  our  cities  across  America. 

— We  will  reform  our  system  of  Federal 
aid  to  education  to  provide  it  when  it  is 
needed,  where  it  is  needed,  so  that  it  will  do 
the  most  for  those  who  need  it  the  most. 

— We  will  make  an  historic  beginning  on 
the  task  of  defining  and  protecting  the  right 
of  personal  privacy  for  every  American. 

— And  we  will  start  on  a  new  road  toward 
reform  of  a  welfare  system  that  bleeds  the 
taxpayer,  corrodes  the  community,  and  de- 
means those  it  is  intended  to  assist. 

— And  together  with  the  other  nations  of 
the  world,  we  will  establish  the  economic 
framework  within  which  Americans  will 
share  more  fully  in  an  expanding  worldwide 
trade  and  pi'osperity  in  the  years  ahead,  with 
more  open  access  to  both  markets  and  sup- 
plies. 

In  all  of  the  186  state  of  the  Union  mes- 
sages delivered  from  this  place  in  our  his- 
tory, this  is  the  first  in  which  the  one  prior- 
ity, the  first  priority,  is  energy. 

Let  me  begin  by  reporting  a  new  develop- 
ment which  I  know  will  be  welcome  news  to 
every  American.  As  you  know,  we  have 
committed  ourselves  to  an  active  role  in 
helping  to  achieve  a  just  and  durable  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  on  the  basis  of  full 
implementation  of  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338.  The  first  step  in  the  proc- 
ess is  the  disengagement  of  Egyptian  and 
Israeli  forces  which  is  now  taking  place. 

Because  of  this  hopeful  development  I  can  i 
announce  tonight  that  I  have  been  assured 
through  my  personal  contacts  with  friendly  ' 
leaders  in  the  Middle  Eastern  area  that  an ! 
urgent  meeting  will  be  called  in  the  immedi- 
ate future  to  discuss  the  lifting  of  the  oil 
embargo. 


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Department  of   State   Bulletin 


This  is  an  encouraging  sign.  However,  it 
should  be  clearly  understood  by  our  friends 
in  the  Middle  East  that  the  United  States  will 
not  be  coerced  on  this  issue. 

Regardless  of  the  outcome  of  this  meeting, 
the  cooperation  of  the  American  people  in 
our  enei'gy  conservation  program  has  al- 
ready gone  a  long  way  toward  achieving  a 
goal  to  which  I  am  deeply  dedicated.  Let  us 
do  everything  we  can  to  avoid  gasoline  ra- 
tioning in  the  United  States  of  America. 

Last  week  I  sent  to  the  Congress  a  compre- 
hensive special  message  setting  forth  our 
energy  situation,  recommending  the  legis- 
lative measures  which  are  necessary  to 
a  program  for  meeting  our  needs.  If  the 
embargo  is  lifted,  this  will  ease  the  crisis, 
but  it  will  not  mean  an  end  to  the  energy 
shortage  in  America.  Voluntary  conserva- 
tion will  continue  to  be  necessary.  And  let 
me  take  this  occasion  to  pay  tribute  once 
again  to  the  splendid  spirit  of  cooperation 
the  American  people  have  shown,  which  has 
made  possible  our  success  in  meeting  this 
emergency  up  to  this  time. 

The  new  legislation  I  have  requested  will 
also  remain  necessary.  Therefore  I  urge 
again  that  the  energy  measures  that  I  have 
proposed  be  made  the  first  priority  of  this 
session  of  the  Congress.  These  measures  will 
require  the  oil  companies  and  other  energy 
producers  to  provide  the  public  with  the  nec- 
essary information  on  their  supplies.  They 
will  prevent  the  injustice  of  windfall  profits 
for  a  few  as  a  result  of  the  sacrifices  of  the 
millions  of  Americans.  And  they  will  give 
us  the  organization,  the  incentives,  the 
authorities,  needed  to  deal  with  the  short- 
term  emergency  and  to  move  toward  meeting 
our  long-term  needs. 

Just  as  1970  was  the  year  in  which  we 
began  a  full-scale  effort  to  protect  the  en- 
vironment, 1974  must  be  the  year  in  which 
we  organize  a  full-scale  eff'ort  to  provide  for 
our  energy  needs  not  only  in  this  decade  but 
through  the  21st  century. 

As  we  move  toward  the  celebration  two 
years  from  now  of  the  200th  anniversary  of 
this  Nation's  independence,  let  us  press  vigor- 


ously on  toward  the  goal  I  announced  last 
November  for  Project  Independence.  Let  this 
be  our  national  goal.  At  the  end  of  this 
decade,  in  the  year  1980,  the  United  States 
will  not  be  dependent  on  any  other  country 
for  the  energy  we  need  to  provide  our  jobs, 
to  heat  our  homes,  and  to  keep  our  transpor- 
tation moving. 

To  indicate  the  size  of  the  government 
commitment  to  spur  energy  research  and 
development,  we  plan  to  spend  $10  billion  in 
Federal  funds  over  the  next  five  years.  That 
is  an  enormous  amount.  But  during  the  same 
five  years  private  enterprise  will  be  invest- 
ing as  much  as  $200  billion — and  in  10  years, 
$500  billion — to  develop  the  new  resources, 
the  new  technology,  the  new  capacity  Amer- 
ica will  require  for  its  energy  needs  in  the 
1980's.  That  is  just  a  measure  of  the  magni- 
tude of  the  project  we  are  undertaking. 

But  America  performs  best  when  called 
to  its  biggest  tasks.  It  can  truly  be  said  that 
only  in  America  could  a  task  so  tremendous 
be  achieved  so  quickly,  and  achieved  not  by 
regimentation  but  through  the  effort  and  in- 
genuity of  a  free  people  working  in  a  free 
system. 

America's  own  prosperity  in  the  years 
ahead  depends  on  our  sharing  fully  and 
equitably  in  an  expanding  world  prosperity. 
Historic  negotiations  will  take  place  this 
year  that  will  enable  us  to  insure  fair  treat- 
ment in  international  markets  for  American 
workers,  American  farmers,  American  in- 
vestors, and  American  consumers. 

It  is  vital  that  the  authorities  contained  in 
the  trade  bill  I  submitted  to  the  Congress  be 
enacted  so  that  the  United  States  can  nego- 
tiate flexibly  and  vigorously  on  behalf  of 
American  interests.  These  negotiations  can 
usher  in  a  new  era  of  international  trade  that 
not  only  increases  the  prosperity  of  all  na- 
tions but  also  strengthens  the  peace  among 
all  nations. 

In  the  past  five  years  we  have  made  more 
progress  toward  a  lasting  structure  of  peace 
in  the  world  than  in  any  comparable  time  in 
the  Nation's  history.  We  could  not  have  made 


February   18,    1974 


159 


that  progress  if  we  had  not  maintained  the 
military  strength  of  America.  Thomas  Jef- 
ferson once  observed  that  the  price  of  liberty 
is  eternal  vigilance.  By  the  same  token  and 
for  the  same  reason,  in  today's  world  the 
price  of  peace  is  a  strong  defense  as  far  as 
the  United  States  is  concerned. 

In  the  past  five  years,  we  have  steadily 
reduced  the  burden  of  national  defense  as  a 
share  of  the  budget,  bringing  it  down  from 
44  percent  in  1969  to  29  percent  in  the  cur- 
rent year.  We  have  cut  our  military  man- 
power over  the  past  five  years  by  more  than 
a  third,  from  3'/-j  million  to  2.2  million. 

In  the  coming  year,  however,  increased  ex- 
penditures will  be  needed.  They  will  be  need- 
ed to  assure  the  continued  readiness  of  our 
military  forces,  to  preserve  present  force 
levels  in  the  face  of  rising  costs,  and  to  give 
us  the  military  strength  we  must  have  if  our 
security  is  to  be  maintained  and  if  our  ini- 
tiatives for  peace  are  to  succeed. 

The  question  is  not  whether  we  can  afford 
to  maintain  the  necessary  strength  of  our 
defense;  the  question  is  whether  we  can  af- 
ford not  to  maintain  it — and  the  answer  to 
that  question  is  no.  We  must  never  allow 
America  to  become  the  second  strongest 
nation  in  the  world. 

I  do  not  say  this  with  any  sense  of  bellig- 
erence, because  I  recognize  that  fact  that  is 
recognized  around  the  world:  America's 
military  strength  has  always  been  main- 
tained to  keep  the  peace,  never  to  break  it;  it 
has  always  been  used  to  defend  freedom, 
never  to  destroy  it.  The  world's  peace  as 
well  as  our  own  depends  on  our  remaining  as 
strong  as  we  need  to  be  as  long  as  we  need 
to  be. 

In  this  year  1974  we  will  be  negotiating 
with  the  Soviet  Union  to  place  further  limits 
on  strategic  nuclear  arms.  Together  with 
our  allies,  we  will  be  negotiating  with  the 
nations  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  on  mutual  and 
balanced  reduction  of  forces  in  Europe.  And 
we  will  continue  our  efforts  to  promote 
peaceful  economic  development  in  Latin 
America,  in  Africa,  in  Asia.  We  will  press 
for  full  compliance  with  the  peace  accords 
that  brought  an  end  to  American  fighting  in 


Indochina,  including  particularly  a  provision 
that  promised  the  fullest  possible  accounting 
for  those  Americans  who  are  missing  in 
action. 

And  having  in  mind  the  energy  crisis  to 
which  I  have  referred  to  earlier,  we  will  be 
working  with  the  other  nations  of  the  world 
toward  agreement  on  means  by  which  oil 
supplies  can  be  assured  at  reasonable  prices 
on  a  stable  basis  in  a  fair  way  to  the  consum- 
ing and  producing  nations  alike. 

All  of  these  are  steps  toward  a  future  in 
which  the  world's  peace  and  prosperity — and 
ours  as  well — as  a  result  are  made  more 
secure. 

Throughout  the  five  years  that  I  have 
served  as  your  President,  I  have  had  one 
overriding  aim,  and  that  was  to  establish  a 
new  structure  of  peace  in  the  world  that  can 
free  future  generations  of  the  scourge  of 
war.  I  can  understand  that  others  may  have 
different  priorities.  This  has  been  and  this 
will  remain  my  first  priority  and  the  chief 
legacy  I  hope  to  leave  from  the  eight  years  of 
my  Presidency. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  shall  not  have 
other  priorities,  because  as  we  strengthen  the 
peace  we  must  also  continue  each  year  a 
steady  strengthening  of  our  society  here  at 
home.  Our  conscience  requires  it,  our  inter- 
ests require  it,  and  we  must  insist  upon  it. 

As  we  create  more  jobs,  as  we  build  a 
better  health  care  system,  as  we  improve  our 
education,  as  we  develop  new  sources  of 
energy,  as  we  provide  more  abundantly  for 
the  elderly  and  the  poor,  as  we  strengthen  the 
system  of  private  enterprise  that  produces 
our  prosperity,  as  we  do  all  of  this  and  even 
more,  we  solidify  those  essential  bonds  that 
hold  us  together  as  a  nation. 

Even  more  importantly,  we  advance  what 
in  the  final  analysis  government  in  America 
is  all  about.  What  it  is  all  about  is  more 
freedom,  more  security,  a  better  life,  for  each 
one  of  the  211  million  people  that  live  in  this 
land. 

We  cannot  afford  to  neglect  progress  at 
home  while  pursuing  peace  abroad.  But 
neither  can  we  afford  to  neglect  peace  abroad 
while  pursuing  progress  at  home.    With  a 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


stable  peace  all  is  possible,  but  without  peace 
nothing  is  possible. 

In  the  written  message  that  I  have  just 
delivered  to  the  Speaker  and  to  the  President 
of  the  Senate,  I  commented  that  one  of  the 
continuing  challenges  facing  us  in  the  legis- 
lative process  is  that  of  the  timing  and  pac- 
ing of  our  initiatives,  selecting  each  year 
among  many  worthy  projects  those  that  are 
ripe  for  action  at  that  time. 

What  is  true  in  terms  of  our  domestic  ini- 
tiatives is  true  also  in  the  world.  This  period 
we  now  are  in  in  the  world — and  I  say  this  as 
one  who  has  seen  so  much  of  the  world,  not 
only  in  these  past  five  years  but  going  back 
over  many  years — we  are  in  a  period  which 
presents  a  juncture  of  historic  forces  unique 
in  this  century.  They  provide  an  opportunity 
we  may  never  have  again  to  create  a  struc- 
ture of  peace  solid  enough  to  last  a  lifetime 
and  more — not  just  peace  in  our  time  but 
peace  in  our  children's  time  as  well.  It  is  on 
the  way  we  respond  to  this  opportunity  more 
than  anything  else  that  history  will  judge 
whether  we  in  America  have  met  our  respon- 
sibility, and  I  am  confident  we  will  meet  that 
great  historic  responsibility  which  is  ours 
today. 

It  was  27  years  ago  that  John  F.  Kennedy 
and  I  sat  in  this  Chamber  as  freshmen  Con- 
gressmen, hearing  our  first  state  of  the 
Union  address  delivered  by  Harry  Truman. 
I  know  from  my  talks  with  him  as  members 
of  the  Labor  Committee,  on  which  we  both 
served,  that  neither  of  us  then  even  dreamed 
that  either  one  or  both  might  eventually  be 
standing  in  this  place  that  I  now  stand  in 
now  and  that  he  once  stood  in  before  me. 

It  may  well  be  that  one  of  the  freshmen 
Members  of  the  93d  Congress,  one  of  you  out 
there,  will  deliver  his  own  state  of  the  Union 
message  27  years  from  now,  in  the  year 
2001. 

Well,  whichever  one  it  is,  I  want  you  to  be 
able  to  look  back  with  pride  and  to  say  that 
your  first  years  here  were  great  years  and 
recall  that  you  were  here  in  this  93d  Con- 
gress when  America  ended  its  longest  war 
and  began  its  longest  peace. 


EXCERPTS  FROM  MESSAGE 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

We  enter  1974  not  at  the  beginning  of  an 
historical  cycle,  but  in  the  middle  of  one. 
Beginnings  have  been  made  in  many  vital 
areas,  beginnings  which  we  now  must  build 
upon.  New  needs  have  arisen  w^hich  we  are 
in  the  process  of  addressing.  Opportunities 
are  coalescing  which  give  us  a  chance  to 
make  historic  progress  toward  a  stable  peace 
and  e.xpanding  prosperity. 

In  looking  at  the  agenda  for  1974,  we  can- 
not consider  the  work  of  this  or  of  any  one 
year  in  isolation.  What  we  select  as  our  tasks 
in  1974  must  build  on  the  work  of  the  years 
before,  and  anticipate  needs  of  those  ahead. 
Indeed,  one  of  the  continuing  challenges  fac- 
ing us  in  the  legislative  process  is  that  of  the 
timing  and  pacing  of  our  initiatives. 

It  would  be  as  false  to  pretend  that  we 
could  do — or  afford  to  do — everything  at 
once,  as  it  would  be  to  maintain  that  we  can 
do  nothing.  Therefore,  we  must  strive  to 
maintain  steady  progress,  selecting  each  year 
among  many  worthy  projects  those  that  are 
ripe  for  action  at  that  time,  and  that  can  be 
accommodated  within  the  constraints  of  our 
budget — but  pressing  to  ensure  that  the  most 
that  can  be  done  is  done. 

In  discussing  my  legislative  recommenda- 
tions for  this  Congressional  session,  there- 
fore, I  shall  do  so  in  the  context  of  the  ad- 
vances that  have  already  been  made,  the 
problems  that  remain,  and  the  special  oppor- 
tunities we  have  in  1974  to  make  further 
progress. 


Meeting  Our  Energy  Needs 

At  the  start  of  this  Congressional  session, 
the  number  one  legislative  concern  must  be 
the  energy  crisis. 

The  cooperative  efforts  of  the  American 
people,  together  with  measures  already  taken 
by  the  Administration,  have  significantly  re- 
duced the  immediate  impact  of  the  energy 
crisis.  There  has  been  some  economic  dislo- 
cation and  some  individual  hardships,  but 
these  have  been  minimized  by  our  policy  of 


February   18,    1974 


161 


encourag'ing  broad  conservation  measures 
and  allocating  scarce  energy  resources  so  as 
to  do  the  least  possible  harm  to  jobs  and  the 
economy.  The  object  has  been  to  keep  our 
farms  and  factories  producing,  to  keep  our 
workers  on  the  job,  and  to  keep  our  goods 
and  services  flowing,  even  if  this  means  that 
we  must  live  and  work  in  somewhat  less 
comfortable  surroundings  and  drive  fewer 
miles  at  slower  speeds. 

Even  with  the  full  cooperation  of  most 
Americans,  however,  we  will  still  face  real 
challenges — and  genuine  shortages — in  the 
months  and  years  immediately  ahead.  To 
meet  these  challenges,  we  must  change  our 
patterns  of  energy  consumption  and  produc- 
tion, we  must  press  forward  with  the  devel- 
opment of  reliable  new  energy  sources,  and 
we  must  adjust  to  the  fact  that  the  age  of 
unlimited  supplies  of  cheap  energy  is  ended. 

The  immediate  energy  crisis  began  with 
the  oil  embargo  imposed  in  the  Middle  East 
last  fall.  But  the  embargo  only  hastened  a 
shortage  that  was  already  anticipated.  For  a 
number  of  years  our  fuel  consumption  had 
been  climbing  while  our  production  of  domes- 
tic energy  supplies  declined.  We  became  more 
and  more  heavily  dependent  on  oil  imports 
and,  consequently,  more  vulnerable  to  any  in- 
terruption or  reduction  in  those  imports,  as 
well  as  to  sudden  increases  in  foreign  prices. 
Today,  we  have  an  interruption  in  supplies 
and  we  face  sharply  increased  prices  for 
those  supplies  when  they  are  restored. 

Irrespective  of  the  possibility  of  restoring 
the  flow  of  Middle  East  oil,  we  must  act  now 
to  ensure  that  we  are  never  again  dependent 
on  foreign  sources  of  supply  for  our  energy 
needs.  We  must  continue  to  slow  the  rise  in 
our  rate  of  consumption,  and  we  must 
sharply  increase  our  domestic  production. 

The  effects  of  energy  conservation  can  be 
felt  at  once.  Already  the  responsiveness  of 
the  American  people  to  the  recent  crisis  has 
proved  to  be  the  major  factor  in  helping  to 
avoid  the  serious  consequences  that  the 
winter  might  have  brought.  That  conserva- 
tion must  continue. 

The  required  increase  in  domestic  sup- 
plies cannot  be  achieved  so  rapidly.  It  will 
involve    the    development    of    entirely    new 


sources  of  energy  as  well  as  the  expanded 
development  of  oil  and  coal  resources;  it  will 
require  a  significant  expansion  of  our  re- 
search and  development  eff"orts;  it  will  re- 
quire a  shift  from  the  use  of  scarce  fuels  to 
those  which  are  more  plentiful  but  also  more 
expensive  than  the  cheap  energy  to  which 
we  have  been  accustomed;  it  will  require  that 
we  encourage  both  exploration  and  produc- 
tion; it  will  mean  that  as  we  act  to  prevent 
the  energy  industry  from  making  uncon- 
scionable windfall  profits,  we  must  also  avoid 
crippling  that  industry  with  punitive  legisla- 
tion; and  finally,  it  will  require  that  we  make 
some  diflicult  decisions  as  we  sort  out  our 
economic  and  environmental  priorities. 

As  we  seek  to  act  domestically  to  increase 
fuel  supplies,  we  will  act  internationally  in 
an  effort  to  obtain  oil  at  reasonable  prices. 
Unreasonable  increases  in  the  cost  of  so  vital 
a  commodity  as  oil  poses  a  threat  to  the 
entire  structure  of  international  economic 
relations.  Not  only  U.S.  jobs,  prices  and  in- 
comes are  at  stake,  but  the  general  pattern 
of  international  cooperation  is  at  stake  as 
well.  It  is  our  hope  that  we  can  work  out  co- 
operative efforts  with  our  friends  abroad  so 
that  we  can  all  meet  our  energy  needs  with- 
out disrupting  our  economies  and  without 
disrupting  our  economic  relationships. 

Last  week  I  sent  to  the  Congress  a  compre- 
hensive special  message  setting  forth  our 
energy  situation,  our  energy  prospects,  our 
energy  needs,  and  the  legislative  measures  I 
consider  necessary  for  meeting  those  needs. 
I  shall  not  repeat  that  analysis  nor  the  full 
list  of  those  recommendations  today. 

I  do  want  to  urge,  however,  that  the  criti- 
cal energy  measures  which  I  have  proposed 
be  made  the  first  order  of  legislative  business 
in  this  session  of  the  Congress,  and  that  work 
go  forward  expeditiously  on  the  others. 
Those  measures  which  I  request  be  given  the 
highest  priority  are  the  following: 

— A  special  energy  act  which  would  per- 
mit additional  restrictions  on  energy  con- 
sumption and  would  postpone  temporarily 
certain  Clean  Air  Act  requirements  for 
power  plants  and  automotive  emissions; 

— A  windfall  profits  tax  which  would  pre- 


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Department  of  State   Bulletin 


vent  private  profiteei-inpf  at  the  expense  of 
public  sacrifice; 

— Unemployment  insurance  for  people  in 
areas  impacted  by  serious  economic  disloca- 
tion; and 

— Mandatory  reporting  by  major  energy 
companies  on  their  inventories,  their  produc- 
tion and  their  reserves. 

I  am  also  asking  that  the  Congress  quickly 
establish  the  Federal  Energy  Administration 
and  the  Energy  Research  and  Development 
Administration  to  provide  the  appropriate 
organizational  structure  for  administering 
the  national  energy  policy,  as  we  work  to- 
ward the  establishment  of  a  Department  of 
Energy  and  Natural  Resources. 

The  13  other  energy  measures  I  requested 
last  week  deal  with  longer-term  needs,  ex- 
tending beyond  the  present  emergency.  But 
these  also  require  expeditious  action  if  we  are 
to  achieve  the  goal  of  Project  Independence 
— a  capacity  for  energy  self-sufficiency  by 
1980.  The  success  of  Project  Independence 
is  essential  to  the  continued  strength  of  our 
position  in  world  trade,  and  also  to  our  inde- 
pendence of  action  as  a  great  power. 

I  hope  that  our  joint  efforts  now  to  resolve 
the  energy  crisis  and  to  move  toward  a  ca- 
pacity for  self-sufficiency  in  energy  will  en- 
able the  President  who  addresses  the  98th 
Congress  a  decade  from  now  to  look  back  and 
say  we  made  it  possible  for  America  to  enjoy 
continued  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  1980s. 

The  Nation's  Economy 
The  World  Economy 

During  the  past  three  years  the  United 
States  has  reached  an  unprecedented  level  of 
material  prosperity.  Industrial  output  has 
set  new  records.  Trade  has  flourished.  Con- 
sumption has  risen  to  the  highest  levels  in 
history.  Even  our  inflation  rate — the  most 
serious  economic  problem  we  now  face — has 
been  one  of  the  lowest  in  the  industrialized 
free  world. 

The  major  policy  decisions  we  took  in 
1971  contributed  significantly  to  this  pros- 
perity— both  here  and  in  other  countries.  It 
was  clear,  for  example,  as  we  moved  into  the 


197()s  that  the  international  monetary  sys- 
tem adopted  after  World  War  II  needed 
major  adjustments.  Unsustainable  imbal- 
ances had  developed,  threatening  a  resur- 
gence of  protectionism  and  a  disi'uption  of 
woi-ld  trade.  This  is  why  I  decided  to  take 
some  very  strong  measures  in  August  of 
1971,  measures  that  have  resulted  in  a  major 
realignment  of  world  currency  values,  prog- 
ress toward  new  and  more  flexible  interna- 
tional monetary  management,  and  negotia- 
tions toward  a  more  open  and  equitable  trad- 
ing system. 

These  adjustments,  while  essential,  were 
not  easy.  But  now  we  have  finally  entered 
into  a  more  flexible  and  realistic  interna- 
tional financial  system.  Much  remains  to  be 
done  to  complete  the  transition,  but  its  bene- 
ficial results  are  already  clear. 

The  realignment  of  currency  values  helped 
produce  an  increase  of  80  percent — or  more 
than  $50  billion— in  the  rate  of  U.S.  exports 
during  the  past  two  years,  along  with  a 
major  improvement  in  our  trade  balance. 
This  improvement  was  good  not  only  for  us, 
but  also  for  the  re.st  of  the  world.  In  addition, 
the  shocks  to  the  world  economy  arising  from 
reduced  food  supplies  in  1972  and  1973,  and 
in  recent  months  from  the  oil  embargo  and 
the  arbitrary  increases  in  the  price  of  oil, 
all  were  managed  without  panic  under  the 
new  arrangements.  Indeed,  world  trade  has 
continued  to  expand,  despite  these  temporary 
difficulties. 

International  Trade  Barriers 

A  vigorous  international  trade  is  vital  to 
the  American  economy.  Jobs  for  American 
workers  depend  on  our  ability  to  develop 
foreign  markets.  Moreover,  American  con- 
sumers deserve  access  to  foreign-made  prod- 
ucts that  might  be  less  expensive,  or  more 
interesting,  or  unavailable  in  the  United 
States.  But  if  trade  is  to  be  advantageous 
over  the  long  run,  it  must  be  conducted  on  a 
basis  which  is  fair  to  all  participants. 

There  are  still  many  unnecessary  barriers 
to  trade  which  need  to  be  lowered  or  re- 
moved. While  improvements  have  been  made 
in  this  situation  during  the  last  10  years,  we 


February   18,    1974 


163 


need  now  to  build  on  this  progress  and  to 
negotiate  for  more  open  access  both  to  mar- 
kets and  supplies.  This  is  why  I  call  upon  the 
Congress  with  special  urgency  to  complete 
action  on  my  proposed  Trade  Reform  Act,  in 
order  to  provide  the  authority  we  will  need 
to  negotiate  effectively  for  reductions  in  bar- 
riers to  trade,  to  improve  the  trading  system, 
and  to  manage  trade  problems  at  home  more 
effectively. 

As  the  Senate  considers  this  legislation,  I 
would  draw  its  attention  particularly  to  pro- 
visions added  in  the  House  which  would 
seriously  impede  our  efforts  to  achieve 
more  harmonious  international  relationships. 
These  provisions  would  effectively  prevent 
both  the  extension  of  nondiscriminatory  tar- 
iff treatment  and  of  credits  to  certain  Com- 
munist counti'ies  unless  they  followed  a 
policy  which  allowed  unrestricted  emigra- 
tion. I  am  convinced  that  such  a  prohibition 
would  only  make  more  difficult  the  kind  of 
cooperative  effort  between  the  United  States 
and  other  governments  which  is  necessary 
if  we  are  to  work  together  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  and  throughout  the  world.  I  am 
confident  that  by  working  with  the  Congress 
we  can  find  a  solution  to  this  problem  that 
will  avoid  a  major  setback  in  our  peacemak- 
ing efforts. 

At  the  same  time,  we  must  move  forward 
with  current  negotiations  to  reform  the  in- 
ternational payments  system  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  International  Monetary  Fund. 
These  negotiations  are  designed  to  increase 
the  opportunities  for  all  nations  to  trade  and 
invest  profitably.  The  U.S.  has  already  pre- 
sented proposals  for  deterring  the  growth  of 
significant  imbalances  in  international  mone- 
tary affairs  while  preserving  for  each  nation 
a  wide  freedom  in  choosing  how  necessary 
adjustments  can  best  be  accomplished.  In 
addition,  the  system  will  also  have  to  accom- 
modate the  increased  payments  flow  and 
prospective  reserve  accumulations  occasioned 
by  higher  oil  prices.  If,  however,  other  na- 
tions share  with  us  the  will  to  preserve  a 
healthy  and  growing  world  economy,  I  am 
confident  that  a  mutually  acceptable  solution 
to  this  problem  will  be  achieved. 


In  practice,  this  means  that  our  markets 
must  increasingly  be  open  to  imports  from 
developing  countries — a  condition  that  would 
be  significantly  facilitated  by  enactment  of 
the  Trade  Reform  Act.  It  also  means  that 
the  Congress  must  continue  to  authorize  and 
appropriate  our  fair  share  of  both  bilateral 
and  multilateral  economic  assistance,  includ- 
ing a  substantial  contribution  to  the  Interna- 
tional Development  Association  which  helps 
the  poorest  countries.  In  1973  we  success- 
fully negotiated  a  reduction  of  the  United 
States  share  from  40  percent  to  one-third  of 
IDA  funds.  We  cannot  let  the  action  of  the 
House  in  voting  against  IDA  stand  as  our 
final  answer.  We  will  work  hard  with  the 
Congress  to  ensure  that  this  country  con- 
tinues to  play  a  leadership  role,  consistent 
with  our  own  economic  situation,  so  that 
long-term  economic  development  can  con- 
tinue to  be  planned  in  an  orderly  manner. 

Along  with  trade  and  monetary  problems, 
new  international  agreements  on  investment 
policies  and  new  mechanisms  for  dispute 
settlement  are  high  on  our  negotiating 
agenda  for  the  coming  year.  We  must  con- 
tinue to  work  for  economic  arrangements 
which  permit  the  beneficial  flow  of  interna- 
tional investment  so  that  all  may  derive  the 
maximum  benefit  from  their  own  resources. 
To  that  end,  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  note  that 
this  week  the  United  States  completed  the 
phaseout  of  controls  on  flows  of  capital  from 
this  country. 

The  recent  oil  embargo  and  especially  ar- 
bitrary increases  in  the  price  of  oil  have 
created  major  economic  problems  for  many 
countries,  including  the  United  States.  If 
continued,  these  policies  would  require  enor- 
mous transfers  of  goods  and  assets  from  oil 
importing  nations,  transfers  which  would 
represent  a  serious  burden  for  even  the 
wealthiest  countries  and  which  would  be 
virtually  unbearable  for  the  less  developed 
countries. 

Our  objectives  are  clear — we  must  get 
world  oil  prices  down  from  levels  that  are 
arbitrary  and  exploitative.  We  must  also 
cooperate  to  ensure  that  the  international 
and  domestic  economic  policies  of  the  ad- 


164 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


vanced  countries  do  not  compound  the  eco- 
nomic disturbances  created  by  the  current 
emergency  but  rather  that  we  do  all  that  can 
be  done  to  contain  and  limit  those  disturb- 
ances. 


A  Healthy  Agricultural  Economy 

Abundance  is  the  primary  goal  of  our  farm 
policy — abundance  that  can  guarantee  lower 
food  prices  for  every  American  and  higher 
incomes  for  all  American  farmers. 

Five  years  ago,  agriculture  was  a  troubled 
industry: 

— Government  controls  were  reducing  in- 
centives for  production  and  costing  the  tax- 
payers over  $3  billion  a  year  in  farm  subsi- 
dies designed  to  hold  down  production. 

— Farm  income  was  low  ($14.7  billion) 
and  the  long  hours  worked  by  farmers  earned 
them  an  average  income  that  was  26  percent 
below  the  nonfarm  average.  Farm  families 
had  been  leaving  the  farm  at  an  average  rate 
of  over  100,000  a  year. 

Today,  that  picture  has  been  dramatically 
altered: 

— Farm  markets  have  expanded  dramatic- 
ally. Farm  exports  have  set  new  records  in 
each  of  the  last  four  years,  becoming  the 
largest  single  factor  in  the  Nation's  balance 
of  payments  and  strengthening  the  dollar  in 
international  money  markets. 

— Farm  production  has  reached  new  record 
levels  in  each  of  the  last  three  years,  and  a 
new  record  harvest  should  be  forthcoming 
in  1974. 

— The  billions  of  tax  dollars  which  used  to 
go  for  farm  price  support  payments  for  basic 
commodities  every  year  will  be  reduced  to 
nearly  zero. 

— Farm  income  has  reached  record  levels. 
By  1973,  the  gap  between  farm  income  and 
nonfarm  income  had  closed  from  26  to  7  per- 
cent. Net  farm  income  was  up  from  $14.7 
billion  to  $26.1  billion. 

We  are  making  this  progress  not  through 
more  Government  regulation  but  less.  One 
of  the  proudest  achievements  of  this  Admin- 


istration was  the  enactment  of  the  Agricul- 
ture and  Consumer  Protection  Act  of  1973, 
which  places  production  decisions  where  they 
belong — with  farmers,  not  with  the  Govern- 
ment. 

A  primary  challenge  for  Federal  agricul- 
ture policies  now  is  to  encourage  greater  pro- 
duction of  agricultural  goods — which  will 
mean  more  income  for  the  farmer,  greater 
international  trading  benefits  for  the  Nation, 
and  reasonable  food  prices  for  the  consumer. 
I  am  therefore  asking  the  Congress  to  re- 
vamp the  programs  which  still  require  re- 
strictive Federal  control  over  the  production 
of  some  remaining  farm  commodities — espe- 
cially rice,  peanuts,  tobacco,  sugar,  and  extra 
long  staple  cotton. 

To  further  enhance  agricultural  activity, 
the  Administration  will  also: 

— Promote  longer-run  soil  and  water  con- 
servation practices. 

— Consolidate  the  locations  of  local  offices 
of  Federal  agricultural  agencies — specific- 
ally, the  Agricultural  Stabilization  and  Con- 
servation Service,  the  Soil  Conservation 
Service,  the  Farmers  Home  Administration, 
and  the  Federal  Crop  Insurance  Corporation 
— creating  one-stop  agricultural  service  cen- 
ters on  the  local  level  to  make  things  easier 
for  the  farmer  and  less  costly  for  the  Govern- 
ment. 

— Place  high  priority  on  directing  agricul- 
tural research  into  those  areas  which  will  as- 
sure plentiful  agricultural  goods  at  reason- 
able prices,  maintain  our  competitive  advan- 
tage in  world  agricultural  production,  and 
protect  the  land. 

At  my  direction.  Secretary  Kissinger  re- 
cently proposed  to  the  United  Nations  that 
it  convene  a  World  Food  Conference,  a  con- 
cern made  urgent  by  acute  food  shortages  in 
many  parts  of  the  world.  This  conference, 
to  be  held  in  November  of  1974,  should  prove 
of  particular  importance  to  the  American 
farmer,  whose  extraordinary  productivity 
has  made  this  Nation  the  world's  leading 
food  exporter  and  whose  own  prosperity  will 
continue  to  increase  as  we  help  to  meet  the 
needs  of  a  hungry  world. 


February   18,    1974 


165 


Our  farm  policy  must  of  course  address 
not  only  the  needs  of  the  farmer  but  also 
those  of  the  consumer.  During  1973,  we  ex- 
perienced a  period  of  rapidly  increasing-  food 
prices.  Those  prices  leveled  off  in  late  1973, 
but  now  we  appear  to  be  heading  into  a 
period  of  increasing  food  prices  for  at  least 
the  next  few  months.  It  is  our  intention  to 
hold  these  increases  to  the  smallest  possible 
rate  through  executive  actions  such  as  lifting 
the  quota  on  wheat  imports,  an  action  that  I 
took  last  week.  But  the  most  significant  force 
in  the  battle  against  higher  food  prices  is 
higher  production.  This  summer  and  fall, 
the  large  1974  harvest  should  be  coming  on 
the  market,  serving  as  the  best  possible 
damper  on  higher  prices. 


Ending  Drug  Abuse 

During  the  decade  of  the  '60s,  increasing 
numbers  of  Americans — including  a  high 
percentage  of  young  people — each  year 
turned  to  heroin  and  other  drugs  in  search 
of  "new  highs"  and  "synthetic  solutions"  to 
the  problems  of  life.  In  this  retreat  from 
reality,  the  Nation's  drug  problem  grew 
dramatically.  Residents  of  our  proudest 
cities  were  gripped  by  fear  as  addicts  turned 
to  crime  to  support  their  habits,  and  thou- 
sands of  families  suffered  devastating  per- 
sonal tragedies. 

I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  report  that  since 
then.  Federal  spending  on  drug  treatment 
and  enforcement  have  increased  tenfold,  and 
progress  has  been  made.  We  have  indeed 
turned  the  corner  on  hard  drugs: 

— Better  drug  law  enforcement,  at  home 
and  abroad,  has  caused  an  acute  heroin 
shortage  throughout  much  of  the  country. 

— Enough  treatment  capacity  has  now 
been  created  so  that  virtually  all  addicts  who 
want  medical  help  and  counselling  can  get  it. 

— Our  drug  abuse  indicators  ail  suggest 
that  we  have  at  last  succeeded  in  reducing 
both  the  total  number  of  heroin  addicts  and 
the  number  of  new  addicts. 

Nevertheless,  the  drug  battle  is  far  from 
over. 

For  the  sake  of  the  next  generation,  I  am 


determined  to  keep  the  pressure  on — -to  en- 
sure that  the  heartening  progress  made  to 
date  is  translated  into  a  lasting  victory  over 
heroin  and  other  drugs. 

As  enforcement  efforts  meet  with  success 
in  one  area  of  the  world,  pressure  increases 
on  other  trafficking  routes.  To  meet  these 
new  threats,  we  will  step  up  our  support  of 
joint  drug  enforcement  programs.  I  have 
also  directed  that  plans  for  increased  vigi- 
lance at  our  own  borders  be  put  into  effect. 

In  the  treatment  area,  we  are  intensifying 
our  efforts  to  encourage  hard-core  addicts  to 
undergo  treatment. 

To  provide  added  incentive  for  those  not 
motivated  to  seek  help  on  their  own,  I  have 
directed  Federal  agencies  to  expand  their 
support  for  local  programs  which  direct 
addicts  charged  with  crimes  into  treatment 
pending  trial  and  sentencing. 

Continued  progress  will  also  require  help 
from  the  Congress: 

— I  will  shortly  recommend  severe  new 
penalties  for  both  heroin  traffickers  and 
those  engaged  in  illegal  distribution  of  other 
illicit  drugs.  This  legislation  will  supplement 
my  proposals  currently  pending  before  the 
Congress. 

— The  Psychotropic  Convention,  a  key  in- 
ternational treaty  regulating  manufactured 
drugs  worldwide,  has — after  2io  years — still 
to  be  ratified.  Affirmative  action  in  this  ses- 
sion is  of  the  utmost  importance. 

I  will  continue  to  pursue  a  balanced  ap- 
proach to  the  drug  problem  in  the  next  year 
by  emphasizing  both  vigorous  law  enforce- 
ment, and  treatment  and  rehabilitation  pro- 
grams to  help  speed  the  return  of  ex-addicts 
to  productive  lives  in  society. 

Enhancing  the  Environment 

Both  our  Nation  and  the  world  have  made 
imposing  strides  during  recent  years  in  cop- 
ing with  the  problems  of  our  natural  envi- 
ronment. Building  upon  well-justified  con- 
cerns, we  have  created  institutions,  developed 
policies  and  strategies,  and  deepened  public 
understanding  of  the  problems  that  face  us. 


166 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Improving  the  World  Environment 

On  our  small  planet,  pollution  knows  no 
boundaries.  World  concern  for  the  environ- 
ment is  as  necessary  as  it  is  encouraging. 
Many  significant  international  actions  have 
been  taken  in  recent  years,  and  the  United 
States  can  be  proud  of  its  leadership. 

These  actions  have  included  the  signing  of 
international  conventions  to  protect  endan- 
gered species  of  wildlife,  to  regulate  ocean 
dumping,  to  extend  the  national  park  concept 
to  the  world,  and  to  control  marine  pollution. 

A  United  Nations  Environment  Program 
was  established  last  year.  With  it,  the  UN 
Environment  Program  Fund  came  into 
being,  fulfilling  a  proposal  I  had  made  in 
1972. 

Under  the  US-USSR  Environment  Agree- 
ment, which  I  signed  in  Moscow  in  May, 
1972,  Soviet  and  American  scientists  and  en- 
vironmentalists have  been  actively  working 
together  on  serious  environmental  problems. 


America  and  the  World 

When  this  Administration  took  oflfice,  it 
was  apparent  that  the  world  had  changed  in 
fundamental  ways,  and  that  America's  for- 
eign policy  had  to  change  in  equally  funda- 
mental ways. 

We  needed  to  end  our  military  involve- 
ment in  the  Vietnam  war  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent with  our  responsibilities  and  commit- 
ments as  a  major  world  power. 

We  needed  to  adjust  to  the  changes  in  the 
strategic  situation  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States  which  presented  a 
unique  opportunity  to  build  a  solid  founda- 
tion for  peace  but  which  also  threatened  our 
own  security  if  that  foundation  could  not  be 
built. 

We  needed  to  end  a  quarter  century  of 
hostile  isolation  which  had  kept  one-fourth 
of  the  world's  population  outside  the  frame- 
work of  international  cooperation.  The  world 
could  not  aflford  another  generation  of  hos- 
tility between  the  United  States  and  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China. 

We  needed  to  adjust  our  partnerships  with 


Western  Europe  and  Japan,  recognizing 
their  increasing  political  and  economic 
strength  and  self-reliance,  and  emphasizing 
our  important  common  goals. 

We  needed  to  alter  the  world  monetary  sys- 
tem to  reflect  the  new  realities  of  the  inter- 
national economic  system  and  America's 
place  in  it. 

During  the  past  five  years  we  have  made 
striking  progress  in  meeting  each  of  these 
needs. 

Continuing  Responsibility  in  Vietnam 

The  United  States  is  at  peace  for  the  first 
time  in  more  than  a  decade.  But  peace  must 
be  something  more  than  the  absence  of  the 
active  engagement  of  American  forces  in  con- 
flict. 

We  must  guard  against  the  tendency  to 
express  relief  at  our  military  extrication 
from  Southeast  Asia  by  "washing  our  hands" 
of  the  whole  affair.  Men  and  women  are  still 
dying  there.  We  still  have  a  responsibility 
there.  We  must  provide  those  ravaged  lands 
with  the  economic  assistance  needed  to  sta- 
bilize the  structures  of  their  societies  and 
make  future  peace  more  likely.  We  must  pro- 
vide, as  well,  the  continued  military  aid 
grants  required  to  maintain  strong,  self- 
reliant  defense  forces.  And  we  will  continue 
to  insist  on  full  compliance  with  the  terms  of 
the  agreements  reached  in  Paris,  including  a 
full  accounting  of  all  of  our  men  missing  in 
Southeast  Asia. 

Building  New  Relationships 

As  we  work  through  detente  to  reduce 
conflict  in  areas  of  the  world  where  both  we 
and  the  Soviet  Union  have  important  inter- 
ests, we  must  also  continue  to  work  to  reduce 
the  potential  causes  of  conflict  between  us. 

We  must  persevere  in  our  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  to  place  further  limits 
on  strategic  arms  competition  and  in  our 
talks  with  the  Warsaw  Pact  nations  to  reduce 
forces  in  Europe  in  a  way  that  will  increase 
security  and  stability  for  all. 

We  will  pursue  our  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  climate  of  detente  estab- 
lished two  years  ago  in  Moscow  and  reaf- 


February   18,    1974 


167 


firmed  by  General  Secretary  Brezhnev's  visit 
to  Washington  last  year.  During  the  fateful 
weeks  of  the  Middle  East  war  last  October, 
the  strength  of  our  detente  was  severely 
tested.  Since  then,  American  diplomatic 
leadership  and  initiative  have  played  a  cen- 
tral role  in  the  search  for  a  final  settlement 
in  the  long-troubled  Middle  East.  This  began 
with  the  ceasefire  of  October  22,  worked  out 
with  the  Soviet  Union's  assistance,  and  was 
later  strengthened  by  the  Six-Point  Agree- 
ment in  November  to  consolidate  the  cease- 
fire, then  by  the  Geneva  Peace  Conference — 
under  the  co-sponsorship  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union — and  most  re- 
cently by  the  agreement  on  the  disengage- 
ment of  Egyptian  and  Israeli  military  forces, 
which  is  being  implemented  in  cooperation 
with  the  United  Nations  Emergency  Force. 
These  steps  are  but  the  beginning  of  broad- 
ened efforts  to  find  a  lasting  settlement  of 
the  area's  problems. 

The  process  of  building  a  .normal  relation- 
ship with  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
continues.  Liaison  offices  have  been  estab- 
lished in  our  respective  capitals  and  there 
continues  to  be  fruitful  contact  between  our 
governments  at  very  high  levels. 

Strengthening  Our  Free  Wo7id  Partnerships 

As  our  relationships  with  old  adversaries 
are  changing,  so  are  our  relationships  with 
old  friends.  Western  Europe  and  Japan  have 
put  behind  them  the  post-war  struggle  to 
rebuild  their  economies,  re-order  their  so- 
cieties and  re-establish  their  political  force. 
Their  success  in  these  endeavors  is  some- 
thing we  helped  to  foster  and  in  which  we 
can  take  pride.  But  now  times  have  changed 
and  our  past  role  in  their  success  cannot  be 
the  sole  basis  for  a  continuing  relationship. 
We  must  instead  adjust  our  relationships  to 
recognize  their  new  economic  capacities  and 
their  international  political  objectives.  We 
must  accommodate  all  of  these  within  the 
framework  of  the  friendship  and  goodwill  of 
our  allies  and  our  whole  past  history  of  co- 
operation in  the  pursuit  of  our  common 
goals.  This  is  a  cornerstone  of  the  structure 
of  peace  we  are  seeking  to  build. 


With  our  closest  neighbors,  here  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  we  shall  continue  to 
seek  additional  ways  of  working  coopera- 
tively to  solve  the  problems  which  face  the 
Americas.  Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  will 
be  meeting  in  a  few  weeks  with  the  foreign 
ministers  of  Latin  America  to  begin  a  new 
and  constructive  dialogue  in  the  family  of 
American  states. 

International  Trade  and  Commerce 

As  we  turn  from  an  era  of  confrontation 
to  one  of  cooperation,  trade  and  commerce 
become  more  important.  We  have  moved 
from  a  position  of  virtual  economic  hegem- 
ony in  the  world  to  a  new  role  in  a  more 
interdependent  world  economy.  We  must 
create  an  equitable  and  efficient  system  of 
integrating  our  own  economy  with  that  of 
the  rest  of  the  world. 

Much  has  already  been  accomplished  on 
this  front.  The  markets  of  the  USSR  and 
China  are  now  accessible,  thereby  providing 
jobs  for  American  workers.  Our  major  trad- 
ing partners  in  Western  Europe  and  Japan 
share  our  interest  in  further  reducing  inter- 
national trade  barriers  and  increasing  world 
trade.  The  rigid  and  outmoded  international 
monetary  system  which  over-valued  the  dol- 
lar and  impeded  our  foreign  trade  has  been 
decisively  altered.  After  two  years  of  trade 
deficits,  America  achieved  a  trade  surplus 
in  1973. 

But  we  must  persevere  in  our  international 
monetary,  investment  and  trade  negotiations. 
The  greatest  tasks  still  lie  ahead  and  the 
stakes  are  high.  Avoiding  the  economic  and 
political  disruptions  associated  with  interna- 
tional monetary  turmoil  and  restrictive  trade 
and  investment  practices  increases  in  impor- 
tance as  international  interdependence  grows. 

As  I  noted  earlier  in  this  message,  prompt 
passage  of  the  pending  Trade  Reform  Act 
is  essential  to  achieving  the  goal  of  a  less 
restrictive  and  more  equitable  international 
economic  system.  In  addition,  we  must  move 
forward  with  the  current  negotiations  to  re- 
form the  international  payments  system  un- 
der the  auspices  of  the  International  Mone- 
tary   Fund,    reforms    which    will    markedly 


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increase    the    opportunities    for    nations    to 
trade  and  invest  profitably. 

We  must  also  strengthen  our  resolve  as 
the  world's  most  prosperous  nation  to  help 
less  fortunate  countries.  In  the  world  of 
today,  no  nation  will  be  fully  secure  or  pros- 
perous until  all  nations  are.  As  in  the  past, 
we  will  take  pride  in  our  efforts  to  work  with 
developing  nations  which  aspire  to  greater 
economic  and  social  well-being.  The  United 
States  has  called  for  the  World  Food  Con- 
ference which  will  be  held  in  November  un- 
der the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations.  We 
will  also  actively  observe  1974  as  World 
Population  Year,  as  proclaimed  by  the 
United  Nations. 

Maintaining  a  Strong  Defense  Force 

But  as  we  work  for  peace,  we  must  be 
conscious  that  the  opportunity  to  build  a 
structure  of  peace  came  because  our  arms 
have  served  as  a  deterrent  to  war.  We  must 
maintain  that  deterrent. 

In  the  last  five  years,  outlays  for  the  De- 
partment of  Defense  have  been  reduced  by 
about  1/;^— measured  in  constant  dollars — 
and  military  personnel  have  been  cut  from 
3.5  million  to  2.2  million. 

This  year,  I  will  recommend  a  substantial 
increase  in  the  1975  budget  for  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense.  These  increases  are  neces- 
sary to  improve  the  readiness  of  our  armed 
forces,  to  build  up  levels  of  e.ssential  equip- 
ment and  supplies  and  to  preserve  present 
force  levels  in  the  face  of  rising  costs. 

Conclusion 

Throughout  these  five  years,  I  have  had 
one  overriding  aim :  to  establish  a  structure 
of  peace  in  the  world  that  can  free  future 
generations  from  the  scourge  of  war.  Others 
may  have  different  priorities;  this  has  been 
and  will  remain  my  first  priority,  the  chief 
legacy  that  I  hope  to  leave  from  the  eight 
years  of  my  Presidency. 

As  we  strengthen  the  peace,  we  must  also 
continue  each  year  a  steady  strengthening 


of  our  society  here  at  home.  Our  conscience 
requires  it.  Our  interests  require  it.  We 
must  insist  on  it. 

As  w'e  create  more  jobs,  as  we  build  a 
better  health  care  system,  and  improve  edu- 
cation ;  as  we  develop  new  sources  of  energy, 
as  we  provide  more  abundantly  for  the  el- 
derly and  the  poor,  as  we  strengthen  the 
system  of  private  enterprise  that  produces 
our  prosperity — as  we  do  all  this  and  more, 
we  solidify  those  essential  bonds  that  hold 
us  together  as  a  Nation.  Even  more  im- 
portantly, we  advance  what  in  the  final  anal- 
ysis government  in  America  is  all  about: 
more  freedom,  more  security,  a  better  life, 
for  each  one  of  the  211  million  individual 
persons  who  are  America. 

We  cannot  afford  to  neglect  progress  at 
home  while  pursuing  peace  abroad.  But 
neither  can  we  aff"ord  to  neglect  peace  abroad 
while  pursuing  progress  at  home. 

With  a  stable  peace,  all  is  possible;  with- 
out peace,  nothing  is  possible. 

Earlier  in  this  message,  I  comment  that 
"one  of  the  continuing  challenges  facing  us 
in  the  legislative  process  is  that  of  the  tim- 
ing and  pacing  of  our  initiatives  .  .  .  select- 
ing each  year  among  many  worthy  projects 
those  that  are  ripe  for  action  at  that 
time  .  .  ." 

What  is  true  in  terms  of  our  domestic  ini- 
tiatives is  true  also  in  the  world.  This  period 
we  now  are  in — these  few  years — presents 
a  juncture  of  historic  forces  unique  in  this 
century,  which  provide  an  opportunity  we 
may  never  have  again  to  create  a  structure 
of  peace  solid  enough  to  last  a  lifetime  and 
more — not  just  peace  in  our  time  but  peace 
in  our  children's  time  as  well.  It  is  on  the 
way  we  respond  to  this  opportunity,  more 
than  anything  else,  that  history  will  judge 
whether  we  in  America  have  met  our  respon- 
sibility. 

I  have  full  confidence  that  we  will  meet 
that  responsibility. 

Richard  Nixon. 
The  White  House,  January  30,  1974. 


February    18,    1974 


169 


Foreign  Investment  and   Free  Capital   Markets 


Statement  by  William  J.  Casey 

Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ' 


From  the  earliest  days  of  the  Republic  we 
have  maintained  a  policy  of  welcoming  for- 
eign investment.  As  part  of  our  efforts  since 
the  1930's  to  forge  an  open  world  economy, 
we  have  urged  others  to  do  the  same.  We 
have  been  a  moving  force  behind  the  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development]  Code  of  Liberalization  of  Cap- 
ital Movements;  we  have  entered  into  a  net- 
work of  bilateral  treaties  of  friendship,  com- 
merce, and  navigation  or  of  amity  and 
economic  relations  to  secure  and  to  grant  na- 
tional treatment  to  foreign  investment; 
through  our  tax  laws  and  bilateral  tax  trea- 
ties we  have  sought  to  achieve  neutrality 
with  regard  to  whether  income  is  earned  in 
this  country  or  abroad.  We  have  encouraged 
foreign  investment  because  of  its  contribu- 
tion to  economic  development  and  questioned 
the  wisdom  of  policies  such  as  expropriation, 
which  if  adequately  compensated  sends  capi- 
tal out  of  a  country,  and  if  not,  has  an  ad- 
verse effect  on  private  investment  flows. 

To  abandon  our  traditional  hospitality  to- 
ward foreign  investment  would  make  it  diffi- 
cult to  resist  restrictions  against  our  own 
economically  much  more  significant  foreign 
investment.  Even  more  important,  it  would 
bring  into  question  the  U.S.  commitment  to 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Finance  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking,  Hous- 
ing and  Urban  Affairs  on  Jan.  23.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the 
committee  and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


the  type  of  open  world  economy  which  we  are 
trying  to  achieve  through  the  current  inter- 
national monetary  and  trade  negotiations. 

However,  it  is  clear  that  concern  has  de- 
veloped, particularly  in  recent  months,  about 
the  prospect  that  foreign  investors  may  wish 
and  be  able  to  sharply  increase  their  owner- 
ship in  American  industry.  This  concern 
seemed  to  come  from  the  ability  of  foreign 
interests  to  acquire  devalued  dollars  cheap 
and  buy  into  U.S.  companies  at  bargain  base- 
ment prices  in  a  depressed  stock  market.  We 
have  seen  the  devalued  dollar  turn  around 
sharply  in  recent  weeks.  This  concern  also 
comes  from  the  possibility  that  the  huge 
money  flows  which  escalated  oil  prices  will 
bring  to  oil-producing  countries  may  be  ap- 
plied to  acquire  control  over  significant  seg- 
ments of  the  American  economy.  The  inquiry 
which  this  committee  is  initiating  today  pro- 
vides a  timely  forum  for  a  careful  reevalua- 
tion  of  our  traditional  open  door  policy  of 
encouraging  and  welcoming  foreign  invest- 
ment in  the  United  States. 

While  recognizing  the  validity  of  these  new 
concerns,  it  continues  to  be  the  view  of  the 
Department  of  State  that  it  would  be  dam- 
aging to  the  United  States  and  to  the  world 
economy  and  our  interests,  both  political  and 
economic,  to  create  barriers  to  the  inflow  of 
foreign  capital  and  the  technology  and  skills 
which  frequently  accompany  it.  There  are 
many  reasons  for  this  conclusion.  We  believe 
that  our  traditional  policy  of  welcoming  for- 
eign investment  and  fostering  the  free  flow 
of  investment  as   it  finds   opportunity  and 


170 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


need  around  the  world  has  worked  well  for 
us  and  for  others. 

We  will  not  be  able  to  establish  significant 
barriers  to  foreign  investment  in  the  United 
States  without  risking  the  imposition  of  re- 
strictions on  our  investment  abroad.  We  are 
much  more  exposed  and  have  more  to  lose 
from  this  than  anyone  else. 

The  U.S.  investment  abroad  now  runs  close 
to  $100  million — $94  million  at  the  end  of 
1972  as  reported  by  the  Commerce  Depart- 
ment. The  direct  foreign  investment  in  the 
United  States  at  that  time  was  set  at  $14.4 
million,  less  than  15  percent  of  our  direct  in- 
vestment abroad.  On  top  of  that  we  had  port- 
folio investments  of  about  $34  billion,  while 
foreign  holdings  of  American  stocks  and 
bonds  ran  to  about  $45  billion.  Thus,  U.S.  to- 
tal investments  abroad,  at  $128  billion,  run 
more  than  twice  foreign  investment  in  the 
United  States,  which  amounts  to  about  $60 
billion.  Of  U.S.  investments  abroad  about  75 
percent  represent  direct  ownership  of  busi- 
ness abroad,  while  in  the  case  of  foreign  in- 
vestment here  the  ratio  is  just  the  opposite — 
about  25  percent  direct  ownership  and  with 
75  percent  representing  investment  in  stocks 
and  bonds  and  other  portfolio  assets. 

Our  $6  billion-plus  trade  deficit  in  1972 
was  oflfset  by  a  $10  billion  net  inflow  in  divi- 
dends, interest,  royalties,  et  cetera,  from  our 
private  investments  abroad  (or  $8  billion  if 
interest  income  paid  to  foreign  central  banks 
is  included).  This  inflow  is  expected  to  in- 
crease by  a  further  25  to  30  percent  for  1973. 

We  have  become  a  service  economy,  where 
two  out  of  three  workers  produce  services, 
while  only  the  third  produces  the  goods  that 
are  the  stuff  of  trade.  This  kind  of  an  econ- 
omy must  rely  increasingly  on  receipts  from 
dividends  and  royalties  from  investments 
abroad  and  from  services,  especially  financial 
and  management  services  exported  largely  in 
the  form  of  multinational  enterprises'  invest- 
ments. To  balance  off  these  investments,  we 
must  export  securities  and  bring  in  foreign 
investments  to  the  United  States.  As  a  coun- 
try  which   faces    increasing   needs    for    re- 


sources of  energy  and  raw  materials  from 
abroad,  we  will  have  to  invest  abroad  and  in- 
crease the  inflow  of  investment  earnings  to 
justify  that  investment. 

To  balance  off  that  investment  we  will 
have  to  attract  investments  from  abroad.  We 
will  have  to  maintain  and  strengthen  our 
ability  to  raise  capital  throughout  the  world 
as  well  as  at  home. 

We  have  restricted  the  export  of  capital 
from  the  United  States  for  some  10  years — 
through  the  interest  equalization  tax  on  the 
purchase  of  foreign  securities  and  restric- 
tions on  the  degree  to  which  American  com- 
panies and  banks  could  make  direct  invest- 
ments and  extend  credit  abroad.  This  has  had 
the  effect  of  shifting  the  center  of  the  inter- 
national capital  market  from  New  York  to 
Europe.  We  have  scaled  down  these  capital 
export  restrictions  substantially  and  plan  to 
eliminate  them  sometime  this  year.  This 
seems  likely  to  result  in  some  increase  in 
equity  and  loan  capital  going  abroad,  and  it 
should  be  offset  by  an  increase  in  the  repatri- 
ation of  earnings  and  in  investments  from 
abroad. 

To  avoid  excessive  drains  on  our  balance 
of  payments  from  this  freeing  of  our  capital 
market,  we  should  encourage  investment  in 
the  United  States  and  facilitate  the  joining 
of  American  savings  with  funds  generated 
abroad  to  generate  the  worldwide  financing 
which  the  needs  of  our  rapidly  changing 
world  require.  The  time  has  come  for  great- 
er American  participation  in  international 
capital  markets. 

Interdependence  in  a  Time  of  Scarcities 

There  is  a  growing  economic  interdepend- 
ence which  links  all  parts  of  the  world.  I  be- 
lieve this  to  be  of  great  value  and  importance 
in  building  political  and  security  as  well  as 
economic  welfare.  We  have  experienced  the 
serious  consequences  which  follow  when  any 
one  of  those  links,  whether  it  be  oil  or  soy- 
beans or  money,  is  broken  or  interrupted. 
This  interdependence  is  made  even  more  crit- 


February    18,    1974 


171 


ical  by  the  scarcities  around  us,  the  rate  at 
which  resources  are  being  depleted,  and  the 
degree  to  which  commodities  essential  to 
modern  life  are  concentrated  in  a  few  coun- 
tries. 

The  need  for  energy  and  raw  materials 
and  for  the  ability  to  absorb  waste  and  pol- 
lution will  in  the  next  few  years  require  a  re- 
organization and  relocation  of  industry,  an 
expansion  of  transportation  facilities,  a  rate 
of  new  plant  construction,  and  a  mobilization 
of  capital  which  will  dwarf  anything  we  have 
seen  before. 

We  believe  particularly  that  now,  when  the 
world  faces  shortages  and  escalating  prices 
in  oil,  in  food,  in  metals,  in  fibers,  is  no  time 
to  cut  off  and  isolate  the  natural  tendency  of 
capital,  technology,  and  management  skills  to 
go  where  resources,  opportunity,  and  need 
are  to  be  found. 

With  sharply  escalated  oil  prices  shifting 
large  flows  of  money  to  oil-producing  states 
and  placing  the  financial'  reserves  and  the 
economies  of  both  developed  and  under- 
developed nations  under  great  pressure,  the 
stability  of  the  world's  monetary  and  trading 
system  may  depend  on  our  ability  and  the 
ability  of  other  nations  to  keep  these  funds 
in  circulation  in  part  by  attracting  invest- 
ments from  oil-producing  states  directly  and 
indirectly  through  financial  intermediaries 
and  capital  markets  and  through  ventures 
with  or  investments  in  the  corporate  organi- 
zations in  Europe,  the  United  States,  Japan, 
and  elsewhere  which  have  experience  and 
capability  in  mobilizing  and  applying  the 
ingredients  of  production  and  economic  de- 
velopment. It  would,  in  our  view,  be  a  par- 
ticularly inappropriate  time  to  establish  a 
maginot  line  against  foreign  investment. 

The  United  States  has  a  very  great  oppor- 
tunity and  obligation  to  respond  to  the 
world's  need  for  energy.  We  are  less  depend- 
ent on  foreign  energy  sources  than  Europe 
and  Japan.  The  quantum  leap  in  prices  will 
attract  investment  to  create  and  find  new  en- 
ergy resources.  We  have  the  assets  most 
likely  to  attract  these  investment  flows — the 


oil-  and  gas-finding  experience,  the  offshore 
drilling  and  technology,  the  evaluated  sites, 
the  nuclear  technology,  the  coal  and  shale, 
the  advanced  technologies  to  create  new  en- 
ergy sources  from  the  atom,  hydrogen,  and 
the  sun  as  well  as  to  make  available  resources 
go  further  through  more  efficient  transmis- 
sion, storage,  and  use  of  energy. 

To  develop  new  technologies,  to  extract  oil 
and  gas  from  coal  and  shale  and  build  nuclear 
power  plants  at  home,  and  to  carry  out  ex- 
ploration throughout  the  world,  offshore  and 
onshore,  we  will  have  to  raise  hundreds  of 
billions  of  dollars  in  this  next  decade. 

We  will  need  to  get  some  of  this  capital 
from  foreign  sources.  We  will  need  to  send 
capital  abroad.  We  will  need  to  harness  our 
own  capital  and  capital  from  oil-producing 
states  to  apply  technology  and  skill  to  the  de- 
velopment needs  of  less  developed  countries 
if  they  are  to  be  able  to  continue  their  devel- 
opment while  paying  higher  fuel  bills. 

In  short,  if  we  are  to  overcome  the  re- 
source shortages,  manage  the  payment  defi- 
cits, and  meet  the  development  needs  that 
loom  ahead,  we  must  rely  heavily  on  the  two- 
way  flow  of  capital  and  technology  and  man- 
agement skills  around  the  world.  For  us  to 
establish  barriers  to  investment  in  the  United 
States  would  represent  a  very  serious  back- 
ward step. 

We  hear  the  fear  expressed  that  foreigners 
are  buying  up  the  United  States.  I've  already 
indicated  that  we're  ahead  6  to  1  against  the 
world  in  foreign  investment.  There  has  been 
a  significant  acceleration  in  foreign  direct  in- 
vestment. Foreign  interests  building  plants 
here  and  buying  interests  in  companies  ex- 
ceeding 25  percent  has  taken  an  increase 
three  times  from  $700  million  to  $2  billion 
from  1972  to  1973.  But  that  $2  billion  is  less 
than  one-fifth  of  1  percent  of  the  value  of  all 
stock  outstanding  and  about  27  percent  of 
the  new  capital  we  raised  in  the  United 
States  last  year.  It  will  take  a  very  long  time 
for  anyone  to  buy  up  the  American  economy. 
That  doesn't  mean  that  we  should  not  watch 
carefully  the  impact  of  foreign  investment 


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Department  of  State   Bulletin 


on  particular  sectors  of  the  economy  where 
it  might  acquire  a  significant  position  if  con- 
centrated. 


Bilateral  and  Multilateral  Arrangements 

Let  me  now  turn  to  how  we  have  articu- 
lated policies  and  understandings  on  foreign 
investment  and  what  we  are  now  doing  to 
develop  these  policies  further. 

We  have  130  treaties  of  the  type  known  as 
FCN — friendship,  commerce,  and  naviga- 
tion—beginning with  France  in  1778.  The 
basic  concept  in  all  these  treaties  is  either 
national  treatment  or  most-favored-nation 
treatment.  National  treatment  means  the 
same  treatment  a  country  gives  its  own  citi- 
zens. Most-favored-nation  treatment  means 
the  treatment  that  a  country  extends  to  na- 
tionals of  the  foreign  country  which  is  enti- 
tled to  the  most  favorable  treatment,  which 
may  be  less  favorable  than  national  treat- 
ment. 

In  recent  years,  national  treatment  has 
been  the  norm,  supplemented  by  specific  pro- 
visions to  assure  that,  irrespective  of  the 
treatment  actually  accorded  to  nationals,  the 
nationals  and  companies  of  the  other  party 
receive  treatment  no  less  favorable  than  that 
required  by  international  law.  These  are  re- 
ciprocal; the  rights  which  we  seek  for  Amer- 
ican investors  abroad  must  be  those  we  seek 
to  accord  to  foreign  investors  in  the  United 
States.  However,  national  treatment  is  al- 
ways subject  to  reasonable  exceptions,  and 
how  it  is  applied  varies  with  circumstances 
in  each  country.  Treaties  are  the  products  of 
negotiation.  They  reflect  the  concerns  not 
only  of  the  United  States  but  also  of  the 
country  with  which  the  treaty  was  con- 
cluded. 

Although  FCN  treaties  still  provide  for 
most  international  obligations  in  the  area  of 
foreign  investment,  we  may  expect  that  in 
this,  as  in  other  areas  of  international  eco- 
nomic activity,  bilateralism  will  eventually 
give  way  to  more  pervasive  multilateral 
agreements. 


To  date,  the  principal  multilateral  agree- 
ment is  the  Code  of  Liberalization  of  Capital 
Movements,  or  Capital  Movements  Code, 
adopted  by  the  OECD  in  1961.  All  OECD 
members  except  Canada  adhere  to  the  code. 
Its  purpose  is  to  extend  the  liberalization  of 
capital  movement  worldwide.  It  makes  little 
attempt  to  establish  sanctions  for  noncom- 
pliance and  in  fact  expressly  prohibits  retali- 
ation against  states  which  lodge  reservations 
or  invoke  derogations — in  short,  do  not  want 
to  comply  in  one  respect  or  another. 

The  basic  obligations  set  forth  in  the  code 
are:  first,  to  abolish  progressively  restric- 
tions on  movements  of  capital  "to  the  extent 
necessary  for  effective  economic  coopera- 
tion"; second,  to  accord  the  same  treatment 
to  all  nonresident-owned  assets;  and  third,  to 
permit  liquidation  of  nonresident-owned  as- 
sets and  the  transfer  of  the  proceeds  there- 
from. By  liberalization  is  meant  the  granting, 
upon  request,  of  any  authorization  required 
for  a  specific  type  of  transaction  as  well  as 
the  transfer  of  funds  to  accomplish  the  trans- 
actions. Countries  may  enter  reservations  at 
any  time  with  regard  to  certain  specified 
transactions.  With  regard  to  others,  also 
listed,  the  country  must  enter  its  reservation 
when  it  adheres  or  when  that  type  of  trans- 
action is  added  to  the  list. 

These  obligations  are  far  less  restrictive 
than  the  obligations  contained  in  our  bilat- 
eral treaties.  At  the  most,  a  country  is  re- 
quired to  extend  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment to  other  member  states  with  respect  to 
the  transactions  listed  in  the  two  lists.  Al- 
though the  Code  contains  a  normative  stand- 
ard, "liberalization,"  there  is  no  obligation 
to  accord  fully  liberalized  treatment  with  re- 
spect to  any  transaction,  but  only  to  move  to- 
ward liberalization  at  a  rate  to  be  determined 
by  the  country  itself. 

At  our  request,  the  OECD  Council  has  de- 
cided that  the  provisions  of  the  code  do  not 
apply  to  an  action  by  one  of  our  States  which 
comes  within  the  jurisdiction  of  that  State. 
As  far  as  our  Federal  Government  is  con- 
cerned, we  have  lodged  a  reservation  with 


February   18,    1974 


173 


respect  to  the  liberalization  of  direct  invest- 
ment transactions  by  aliens  in  sectors  from 
which  they  are  excluded  by  statute. 

Our  consistently  liberal  attitude  toward 
foreign  investment  in  the  United  States  has 
undoubtedly  been  a  positive  factor  in  con- 
vincing other  nations  to  adopt  similar  poli- 
cies with  respect  to  our  investment. 

Steps  Toward  International  Consensus 

All  this  highlights  the  need  for  some  inter- 
national consensus  on  foreign  investment  is- 
sues— a  consensus  recognizing  the  important 
positive  role  that  foreign  investment  plays 
in  the  world  economy  and  permitting  agree- 
ment on  some  ground  rules  to  be  observed  by 
both  governments  and  corporations. 

Given  the  wide  national  and  regional  dif- 
ferences in  economic  development,  legal  sys- 
tems, and  other  factors,  we  consider  it  pre- 
mature to  try  to  develop  a  single  new  inter- 
national forum  for  handling  the  whole  range 
of  foreign  investment  issues — better,  we 
think,  to  tackle  investment  issues  individu- 
ally and  in  the  forum  judged  most  appropri- 
ate to  the  purpose.  On  a  number  of  invest- 
ment issues,  it  will  be  easier  to  obtain  a 
consensus  among  the  developed  countries, 
certainly  for  the  time  being. 

The  OECD  Capital  Movements  Code  has 
been  useful,  but  it  is  only  a  beginning.  It  does 
not  cover  the  question  of  national  treatment 
for  foreign-owned  enterprises  once  an  invest- 
ment has  been  made.  Nor  does  it  cover  gov- 
ernment incentives  to  attract  investment  on 
the  one  hand  and  taxes  to  restrict  it  on  the 
other.  Nor  do  our  FCN  treaties  go  far 
enough.  Their  highly  qualified  statement  of 
national  treatment  may  be  an  adequate  solu- 
tion to  the  treatment  of  our  foreign  invest- 
ment once  it  is  in  place.  The  permitted  ex- 
ceptions to  national  treatment  vary,  however, 
from  treaty  to  treaty.  There  are  many  coun- 
tries with  whom  we  have  no  FCN  treaty  at 
all.  Canada,  our  most  important  investment 
partner,  is  the  outstanding  example. 

Given  the  rapid  growth  of  foreign  invest- 
ment, the  important  lacunae  in  existing  in- 


ternational agreements,  and  the  domestic 
pressures  in  a  number  of  countries  to  adopt 
more  restrictive  policies,  the  administration 
has  placed  a  high  priority  on  sitting  down 
with  the  other  developed  countries  to  deter- 
mine where  we  go  from  here. 

We  have  taken  a  leading  role  in  the  review 
of  investment  issues  now  underway  in  the 
OECD  under  the  general  coordination  of  the 
Executive  Committee  meeting  in  Special  Ses- 
sion, called  the  XCSS.  In  the  five  meetings 
which  we  in  the  XCSS  have  held  since  De- 
cember 1972  and  in  two  ancillary  meetings 
of  government  investment  experts,  we  have 
pressed  for  the  establishment  of  consultation 
machinery  which  would  give  any  member 
country  a  forum  to  air  its  concerns  about  the 
investment  policies,  either  restrictive  or 
encouraging,  of  another  member  country. 
We  hope  that  the  consultation  machinery 
will  include  a  review  procedure.  Considerable 
progress  has  been  made  in  this  direction. 
Much  hard  work  remains  to  be  done  over  the 
coming  months. 

Of  great  importance,  too,  is  the  work  going 
forward  in  the  OECD  on  multinational  cor- 
porations. This  involves  highly  technical 
problems  for  the  most  part.  Because  the  com- 
plexity of  these  issues  is  not  widely  realized, 
more  heat  than  light  is  often  shed  in  public 
discussions.  I  am  pleased  that  the  various 
specialized  committees  of  the  OECD  are  in- 
tensifying their  analyses  of  these  problems, 
with  the  results  to  serve  as  a  well-documented 
and  well-studied  basis  for  considering  the 
extent  to  which  we  can  in  fact  develop  bal- 
anced guidelines  for  the  relationships  of  gov- 
ernments and  companies,  and  the  avoidance 
of  problems  which  can  spill  over  into  our 
foreign  relations. 

We  recognize  of  course  that  some  foreign 
investment  matters  will  have  to  be  treated 
in  broader  fora  which  include  the  developing 
countries  and  the  Socialist  states.  Accord- 
ingly, we  are  cooperating  in  the  studies  of 
foreign  investment  and  multinational  corpo- 
ration activities  currently  going  forward  in 
the  various  member  organizations  of  the 
U.N.  family— ECOSOC,  ILO,  UNCTAD,  and 


174 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


UNCITRAL  [Economic  and  Social  Council; 
International  Labor  Organization;  United 
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Develop- 
ment; United  Nations  Commission  on  Inter- 
national Trade  Law]. 

These  studies  can  make  valuable  contribu- 
tions to  the  state  of  our  knowledge  on  foreign 
investment  matters.  Several  of  our  major 
companies  are  cooperating  with  the  United 
Nations,  because  they  realize,  as  we  do,  that 
international  benchmarks  will  contribute 
greatly  to  a  stable  atmosphere  in  which  to 
do  business.  This  government  will  likewise 
cooperate  with  these  U.N.  initiatives  and 
through  our  participation  try  to  make  cer- 
tain that  the  studies  are  objective  and  sup- 
portive of  the  development  of  an  interna- 
tional consensus  on  foreign  investment. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


93d   Congress,    1st   Session 

Extending  the  Temporary  Suspension  of  Duty  on 
Certain  Bicycle  Parts  and  Accessories.  Report  to 
accompany  H.R.  6642.  H.  Kept.  93-611.  October 
30,  1973.   3  pp. 

Energy  Facts.  Prepared  for  the  Subcommittee  on 
Energy  of  the  House  Committee  on  Science  and 
Astronautics  by  the  Science  Policy  Research  Di- 
vision, Congressional  Research  Service,  Library  of 
Congress.    November  1973.    539  pp. 

Inter-American  Relations.  A  Collection  of  Docu- 
ments, Legislation,  Descriptions  of  Inter-American 
Organizations,  and  Other  Material  Pertaining  to 
Inter-American  Affairs.  Printed  for  the  use  of 
the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  Novem- 
ber 1973.    780  pp. 

Intervention  on  the  High  Seas  Act.  Report  to  accom- 
pany S.  1070.  S.  Rept.  93-482.  November  2,  1973. 
6  pp. 

United  States  Contributions  to  International  Organi- 
zations. Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  State 
transmitting  the  21st  report  on  the  extent  and 
disposition  of  U.S.  contributions  to  international 
organizations,  for  fiscal  year  1972.  H.  Doc.  93-195. 
November  5,  1973.  86  pp. 

China  Report.  Report  of  a  special  congressional  dele- 
gation. July  1973.  S.  Doc.  93-43.  November  7,  1973. 
13  pp. 

A  Letter  From  the  Chairman,  National  Advisory 
Council  on  International  Monetary  and  Financial 
Policies,  Transmitting  a  Special  Report  to  the 
President  and   to   the   Congress   on   the   Proposed 


Replenishment  of  the  Resources  of  the  Interna- 
tional Development  Association.  H.  Doc.  93-181. 
November  7,  1973.    84  pp. 

A  Letter  From  the  Chairman,  National  Advisory 
Council  on  International  Monetary  and  Financial 
Policies,  Transmitting  a  Special  Report  to  the 
President  and  to  the  Congress  on  a  Proposed  Con- 
tribution and  Subscription  of  Resources  to  the 
Asian  Development  Bank.  H.  Doc.  93-182.  No- 
vember 7,  1973.    106  pp. 

Protocol  to  the  Convention  for  the  International 
Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea.  Message 
from  the  President  of  the  United  States  transmit- 
ting the  protocol  done  at  Copenhagen  on  August 
13,  1970.  S.  Ex.  V.  November  9,  1973.  5  pp. 


National  MIA  Awareness  Day 

A    PROCLAMATION' 

Over  1,200  Americans  are  still  missing  and  unac- 
counted for  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  bodies  of  more 
than  1,100  men  who  were  killed  in  the  same  area 
have  never  been  recovered. 

.Although  the  Vietnam  Agreement  of  January  27, 
1973,  obligates  North  Vietnam  and  its  allies  to  ac- 
count for  the  missing  and  to  return  the  remains  of 
those  who  died,  communist  authorities  have  failed  to 
account  for  our  missing,  or  to  return  the  remains  of 
our  dead  in  the  year  that  has  elapsed  since  the 
Vietnam  .Agreement  was  signed.  As  a  result,  the 
families  of  our  missing  men  continue  to  live  with  the 
anguish  of  uncertainty  about  the  fate  of  their  loved 
ones. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Richard  Nixon,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America  do  hereby  designate 
Sunday,  January  27,  1974,  as  National  MIA  Aware- 
ness Day,  a  day  dedicated  to  the  many  .Americans 
who  remain  missing  and  unaccounted  for  in  Indo- 
china, and  to  their  families.  I  call  upon  all  Americans 
to  join  on  this  occasion  in  expressing  the  clear, 
continuing  commitment  of  the  American  people  and 
their  Government  to  seek  the  fullest  possible  account- 
ing for  Americans  missing  in  Southeast  .-^sia  and  the 
return  of  the  remains  of  those  who  died.  I  also  call 
upon  State  and  local  officials  and  private  organiza- 
tions to  obser\-e  this  day  with  appropriate  ceremonies 
and  activities. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  January,  in  the  year  of 
our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-four,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the 
one  hundred  ninety-eighth. 


(;^^JL^<%;^ 


'  No.  4261 ;  39  Fed.  Reg.  3535. 


February   18,    1974 


175 


Assistant  Secretary  Sisco  Discusses  Progress 
in  Middle  East  Negotiations 


Following  are  remarks  by  Joseph  J.  Sisco, 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asiayi  Affairs,  made  on  January  25 
before  representatives  of  the  American  So- 
ciety of  Association  Executives  at  a  White 
House  conference  on  energy. 

Mr.  Sisco:  I  am  just  going  to  try  to  give 
you  two  or  three  minutes  on  the  recent  trip 
which,  as  all  of  you  know,  resulted  in  a 
disengagement-of-forces  agreement  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  and  open  it  up  for  questions 
and  give  you  the  maximum  time  to  develop 
areas  of  interest. 

Let  me  say  first  of  all  that  I  do  feel  that 
this  disengagement-of-forces  agreement  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel  could  mark  a  turn- 
ing point  in  the  Middle  East.  We  were  able 
to  achieve  this  result  because,  I  think,  we 
find  in  the  Middle  East  today  a  different 
perception  of  the  situation  than  that  which 
existed  before  the  October  war  of  last  year. 
By  that  I  mean  that  each  side,  it  seems,  has 
had  enough  of  war  and  there  is  a  realization 
that  neither  side  can  achieve  a  decisive  vic- 
tory in  a  military  sense  and  therefore  there 
is  no  better  alternative  to  negotiations. 

The  Geneva  Conference  that  was  convened 
in  December  was  a  major  achievement; 
for  the  first  time  the  parties  sat  across 
the  conference  table,  meeting  in  the  presence 
of  the  two  major  powers  and  the  United 
Nations.  The  fact  that  Egypt,  Israel,  and 
Jordan  were  willing  to  take  that  unprece- 
dented step  reflects  the  view  that  any  next 
war  is  very  likely  to  be  an  attritional  war  be- 
tween the  two  sides,  a  war  that  is  likely  to 
be  very  costly  to  each  side,  and  therefore 
each  side  for  his  own  reasons  has  decided  to 
try  the  path  of  negotiations. 

Now,  in  achieving  a  disengagement  of 
forces  between  Egypt  and  Israel  it  is  im- 


portant to  underscore  that  it  is  only  a  first 
step  toward  the  overall  settlement.  In  addi- 
tion, we  believe  it  reduces  the  likelihood  of 
war. 

Hopefully,  the  agreement  also  will  help 
set  the  climate  for  further  negotiations  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel.  We  hope,  too,  that 
from  the  disengagement-of-forces  agreement 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  it  will  be  possible 
in  time  to  achieve  a  similar  agreement  be- 
tween Syria  and  Israel. 

The  U.S.  role,  and  it  has  been  a  very  active 
ona,  has  been  to  help  achieve  a  cease-fire  and 
a  consolidation  of  that  cease-fire. 

The  interesting  thing  about  our  role  is 
that  the  United  States  has  become  acceptable 
to  both  sides  as  an  intermediary.  This  is 
of  major  significance.  It  places  a  special 
responsibility  on  the  United  States,  and  I 
think  it  off'ers  us  a  great  opportunity  to  try 
to  help  achieve  the  kind  of  results  which 
could  lead  to  a  durable  and  just  peace.  We 
are  under  no  illusions  that  25  years  of  sus- 
picion and  mistrust  can  be  dispelled  very 
easily.  The  principal  way  to  succeed,  it 
seems  to  me,  is  on  the  basis  of  a  step-by-step 
approach,  one  piece  of  the  problem  at  a 
time,  until  a  meaningful  and  real  peace  is 
achieved. 

Without  sounding  pollyannaish,  I  believe 
the  changed  circumstances  in  the  area,  the 
relative  equilibrium  in  the  area  between  the 
principal  combatants,  the  realization  that  a 
military  victory  of  a  decisive  character  can- 
not be  achieved  by  one  side  or  the  other, 
the  realization  that  both  sides  would  like  to 
begin  to  put  more  of  their  resources  to 
peaceful  pursuits  rather  than  the  very  heavy 
budgets  involved  in  maintaining  the  kind  of 
war  establishment  that  each  side  has  had 
to  maintain — I  believe  these  realistic  appre- 
ciations, appreciations  that  we  have  not  too 


176 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


often  lieretofore  seen  in  the  area,  are  hopeful 
signs.  The  attitude  of  both  sides  has  been 
constructive.  In  these  circumstances,  active 
American  diplomacy  can  be  helpful  to  the 
parties. 

I  will  stop  right  there  and  take  your  ques- 
tions. 

Q.  Mr.  Sisco,  xvhen  do  you  see  the  Suez 
Canal  reopening,  and  ivhat  effect  will  that 
Iiave  on  the  energy  situation? 

Mr.  Sisco:  First,  let  me  say  that  there 
are  no  specific  undertakings  as  it  relates  to 
the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  in  the  agree- 
ment itself.  However,  we  do  expect  that  one 
of  the  results  of  this  disengagement  agree- 
ment will  be  the  beginning  of  work  on  the 
opening  of  the  canal  at  a  reasonably  early 
date. 

We  also  feel  that  the  disengagement  agree- 
ment itself  should  lead  within  a  reasonable 
time  frame  to  the  lifting  of  the  embargo 
and  production  restrictions.  This  is  our  hope, 
if  not  our  expectation,  and  I  think  we  will 
have  to  wait  and  see. 

The  decision  on  the  embargo  was  a  col- 
lective decision  between  certain  of  the  pro- 
ducers. I  am  sure  that  consultations  on  this 
matter  will  ensue.  My  hope  is  that  there 
will  be  easing  at  an  early  date. 

Q.  Mr.  Sisco,  is  the  United  States  in  any 
sense  a  guarantor  of  this  agreement  so  that 
it  might  have  to  intervene  in  case  one  side 
or  the  other  does  not  keep  it? 

Mr.  Sisco:  We  are  not  a  guarantor  of  this 
agreement  in  the  sense  that  we  have  under- 
taken any  specific  legal  obligations  to  inter- 
vene. We  have  in  certain  instances  had  to 
interpret  one  side  to  the  other.  We  have  had 
to  convey,  for  example,  assurances  from  one 
side  to  the  other.  If  something  goes  wrong 
with  the  agreement,  we  are  going  to  hear 
about  it.  In  my  judgment,  we  are  involved 
because  of  our  overall  political,  economic,  and 
strategic  interests  in  the  area.  We  are  in- 
volved in  the  sense  that  I  have  described  by 
way  of  having  been  the  principal  interme- 
diary in  bringing  about  the  agreement.  I 
have  no  doubt  that  if  there  should  be  any 
difficulties  that  arise  about   interpretations 


or  whether  one  side  or  another  is  carrying 
out  the  agreement,  the  United  States  would 
have  to  become  active  diplomatically. 

Q.  On  the  Suez  Canal  prohleyn  I  under- 
stand after  ive  get  a  political  decision  it  will 
take  three  to  five  years  to  clean  it  up. 

Mr.  Sisco:  The  estimate  we  have  been 
given  on  the  cleaning  up  and  preparing  the 
Suez  Canal  for  operation  is  somewhere  be- 
tween six  and  eight  months. 

Q.  Mr.  Sisco,  the  United  States  responded 
forcefully  to  the  Russian  threat  to  introduce 
troops  into  the  Middle  East  and  subsequent 
to  that  played  a  major  role  in  the  negotia- 
tions. Where  do  these  events  noiv  leave  the 
Soviet  Unioyi  in  the  Middle  East? 

Mr.  Sisco:  The  Soviet  Union  has  a  con- 
tinuing interest  in  the  area,  and  it  will  con- 
tinue to  manifest  that  interest.  We  and  the 
Soviet  Union  are  cochairmen  of  the  Geneva 
Conference.  It  played  a  constructive  role  at 
Geneva.  Throughout  this  whole  exercise  of 
the  last  month  we  kept  them  informed;  we 
remained  in  touch  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
It  was  the  desire  of  both  parties  that  we 
play  the  intermediary  role.  The  Soviet 
Union,  of  course,  does  not  have  diplomatic 
relations  with  Israel,  nor  efli'ective  contact 
with  it.  We  have  good  contacts  with  both 
sides. 

Q.  Secretary  [of  the  Treasury  George  P.] 
Shidtz  talked  last  iveek  to  the  Foreign  Min- 
isters in  Rome  and  urged  them,  urged  the 
Arab  countries  to  take  a  new  look  at  their 
price  hikes  and  so  forth,  he  felt  the  price 
was  too  high.  Do  you  think  there  is  any 
chance  that  they  ivill  take  that  kind  of  urg- 
ing seriously? 

Mr.  Sisco:  I  really  ought  not  to  speculate 
on  that,  simply  because  neither  Secretary 
Kissinger  nor  I  raised  that  particular  ques- 
tion in  any  direct  sense.  We  had  our  hands 
full  with  what  we  were  negotiating.  There- 
fore I  think  Secretary  Shultz  is  in  a  much 
better  position  to  make  a  judgment  on  that 
than  I  am. 

Q.  As  you  move  frotn  the  very  encourag- 


February   18,    1974 


177 


ing  steps  of  disengagement  to  Geneva  have 
you  any  idea  at  what  pomt  there  might  be 
some  real  joint  control  over  terrorist  groups 
that  seem  to  have  a  potential  to  upset  the 
agreement? 

Mr.  Sisco:  First,  with  respect  to  the  ter- 
rorists let  me  say  that  such  acts  are  acts 
of  desperation.  I  believe  that  to  the  degree 
to  which  the  more  militant  guerrilla  elements 
have  had  to  resort  to  these  individual  grand- 
stand acts  of  terrorism,  this  is  in  a  sense 
a  reflection  of  the  failure  of  the  guerrilla 
movement  as  an  effective  military  force  in 
the  area.  Whatever  the  Arabs  achieved 
militarily  on  the  ground  against  the  Israelis 
in  the  October  war  was  achieved  by  the 
Arab  states  themselves,  not  the  guerrillas. 
The  established  Arab  states  carried  the 
brunt,  and  the  guerrillas  were  not  actively 
involved  militarily. 

Now  to  broaden  the  question — are  we  ever 
going  to  achieve  a  political  solution  and  some- 
thing which  is  durable  and  meaningful  un- 
less we  resolve  the  so-called  Palestinian  is- 
sue? There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
unless  an  overall  settlement  meets  the  legiti- 
mate interests  of  the  Palestinians,  we  are 
not  going  to  get  a  durable  settlement.  If 
you  look  at  the  history  of  the  Middle  East 
over  the  last  25  years,  you  must  assume  that 
there  will  always  be  a  small  group  that  will 
remain  unreconstructed  insofar  as  the  settle- 
ment is  concerned.  There  will  always  be  a 
small  group  that  will  oppose  it  by  any  and 
all  means. 

But  I  happen  to  believe  that  the  majority 
of  the  people  both  on  the  Israeli  side  and 
on  the  Arab  side,  Palestinian  and  non- 
Palestinian,  are  fed  up  with  war  and  they 
are  ready  for  a  settlement  which  meets 
fairly  and  impartially  the  concerns  of  both 
sides.  If  we  are  able  to  achieve  this — and 
it  is  a  big  "if,"  of  course — if  we  are  able 
to  achieve  this,  I  believe  that  not  only  most 
of  the  Arab  states  will  be  in  support  of 
such  an  agreement  but  also  most  of  the 
Palestinians. 

What  the  eventual  settlement  will  be  as 
far  as  Palestinians  specifically  are  concerned 
is  very  hard  to  say ;  the  Palestinians  are  di- 


vided. When  one  talks  about  Palestinian 
representation,  you  have  to  ask  who  speaks 
for  the  Palestinians.  Certainly  King  Hus- 
sein's answer  to  that  is  difi'erent  from  that 
of  [Yasir]  Arafat.  So  it  is  an  Lssue  which 
at  the  moment  does  not  arise  in  a  very  con- 
crete sense,  but  as  we  get  closer  to  the 
basic  elements  of  peace,  as  we  make  more 
progress  toward  peace,  I  believe  there  may 
well  be  continuing  individual  acts  of  violence 
by  terrorists  since  a  peace  settlement  is  not 
viewed  with  sympathy  by  this  small  group  of 
extremists. 

Q.  Mr.  Sisco,  what  is  your  diagnosis  on 
the  Western  relations  in  the  wake  of  the 
petroleum  price  increase? 

Mr.  Sisco:  You  mean  with  our  Western 
allies? 

Q.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sisco:  Our  approach  has  been  and 
will  be  one  of  trying  to  find  ways  to  cooperate 
with  our  allies.  This  is  not  going  to  be  a 
very  easy  task,  as  is  evident  from  what  we 
have  seen  in  the  last  few  weeks.  We  have 
the  energy  action  conference  coming  up, 
which  I  am  sure  a  number  of  others  have 
spoken  about  here  today,  opening  on  the 
11th  of  February.  On  the  other  hand,  one 
sees  members  of  the  European  Community 
itself  very  busily  engaged  in  trying  to  make 
certain  arrangements  of  their  own.  One 
would  hope  that  we  can  find  common  ground 
in  order  to  attack  the  longer  range  problem 
in  a  cooperative  way. 

The  Arab-Israeli  dispute  is  not  the  cause 
of  the  energy  problem.  The  resolution  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  problem  is  not  going  to 
eliminate  our  energy  problem  or  the  energy 
problem  for  Europe  and  the  principal  con- 
sumers around  the  world.  The  Arab-Israeli 
dispute  has  been  a  complicating  factor. 
Whether  we  will  be  able  to  develop  the  kind 
of  cooperative  relationships  which  I  think 
will  be  in  our  mutual  interest,  only  time  will 
tell.  I  hope  so,  because  I  think  the  alterna- 
tive is  an  unleashing  of  the  kind  of  competi- 
tion which  in  the  long  run  could  be  injurious 
to  all,  even  though  our  situation  is  more 
manageable  than  that  of  the  Europeans  since 


178 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


they  are  much  more  reliant  on  Middle  East- 
ern oil  than  we  are.  If  one  looks  at  the 
long-range  situation,  we  do  have  the  overall 
capacity  to  become  self-sufficient  in  time.  It 
is  essential  that  we  develop  the  capacity  to 
become  self-sufficient  so  that  no  undue  in- 
fluence in  the  long  run  can  be  exercised  on  us. 

Q.  Mr.  Sisco,  to  what  extent  do  you  think 
some  of  the  other  materials  that  are  con- 
trolled bij  small  groups  of  countries  are  likely 
to  be  used  as  paw)is  for  exerting  other  in- 
fluence on  us,  and  also  increase  the  price? 

Mr.  Sisco:  I  am  not  really  the  man  to 
respond  to  that  in  any  technical  sense.  The 
studies  that  I  have  looked  at  tend  to  cast 
some  doubts  as  to  how  useful  that  particular 
approach  is,  but  I  am  not  sufficiently  knowl- 
edgeable from  a  technical  point  of  view  to 
express  any  conclusive  judgment. 


Interest  Equalization   Tax  Rate 
Reduced  to  Zero 

Treasury  Department  Announcement  ^ 

The  Treasury  Department  announces  that 
the  effective  rate  of  interest  equalization  tax 
(lET)  has  been  reduced  to  zero,  in  accord- 
ance with  an  Executive  order  signed  by  the 
President.-  The  new  zero  rate  will  be  appli- 
cable to  trades  and  acquisitions  of  any  for- 
eign stock  or  debt  obligations  made  after 
January  29. 

Under  the  interest  equalization  tax  legisla- 
tion, the  President  has  the  authority  to  re- 
duce the  rate  of  the  lET  to  zero  when  that 
action  is  consistent  with  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments objectives  of  the  United  States.  The 
lET  has  been  applied  since  July  1963  in  order 
to  help  restrain  the  outflow  of  capital  from 
the  United  States  into  portfolio  investments 


'Issued  on  Jan.  29  (Department  of  the  Treasury 
press  release).  On  the  same  day  the  Department  of 
Commerce  announced  the  termination  of  foreign 
direct  investment  controls,  and  the  Board  of  Gover- 
nors of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  announced  the 
termination  of  the  voluntary  foreign  credit  restraint 
guidelines. 

"  No.  11736;  for  text,  see  39  Fed.  Reg.  3807. 


in  other  developed  countries.  The  rate  of  tax 
has  been  changed  from  time  to  time.  The  last 
such  change  became  effective  January  1, 
1974,  when  the  rate  was  reduced  from  11.25 
percent  to  3.75  percent  with  respect  to  for- 
eign stocks  and  from  a  rate  equivalent  to  a 
charge  of  approximately  0.75  percent  per 
annum  to  a  rate  of  approximately  0.25  per- 
cent per  annum  on  foreign  debt  obligations. 
The  Internal  Revenue  Service  will  provide 
guidelines  on  the  effect  of  this  order  on  re- 
porting and  compliance  procedures  in  forth- 
coming information  releases. 


President  Suspends  Import  Quotas 
for  Wheat  and  Milled  Wheat  Products 

A     PROCLAMATION! 

Amending  Part  3  of  the  Appendix  to  the  Tariff 
Schedules  of  the  United  States  with  Respect 
TO  the  Importation  of  Agricultural  Commodi- 
ties 

Whereas,  pursuant  to  section  22  of  the  Agricul- 
tural Adjustment  .^ct,  as  amended  (7  U.S.C.  624), 
limitations  have  been  imposed  by  Presidential  proc- 
lamations on  the  quantities  of  wheat  and  milled 
wheat  products  which  may  be  imported  into  the 
United  States  in  any  quota  year;  and 

Whereas  the  import  restrictions  proclaimed  pur- 
suant to  said  section  22  are  set  forth  in  part  3  of  the 
Appendix  to  the  Tariff  Schedules  of  the  United 
States;  and 

Whereas,  at  my  request,  the  United  States  Tariff 
Commission  has  made  an  investigation  under  the 
authority  of  subsection  (b)  of  section  22  of  the  Agri- 
cultural Adjustment  Act  to  determine  whether  the 
import  quotas  on  wheat  and  milled  wheat  products 
provided  for  in  item  950.60  of  part  3  of  the  Appendix 
to  the  Tariff  Schedules  of  the  United  States  (TSUS) 
may  be  suspended  without  rendering  or  tending  to 
render  ineffective,  or  materially  interfering  with,  the 
loan  and  payment  programs  now  conducted  by  the 
Department  of  Agriculture  for  wheat  or  reducing 
substantially  the  amount  of  products  processed  in  the 
United  States  from  domestic  wheat;  and 

Whereas  the  United  States  Tariff  Commission  has 
submitted  to  me  a  report  with  respect  to  this  matter; 
and 

Whereas,  on  the  basis  of  such  investigation  and 


'No.  4260;  39  Fed.  Reg.  3533. 


February   18,    1974 


179 


report,  I  find  and  declare  that  the  entry  of  additional 
quantities  of  wheat  and  milled  wheat  products  result- 
ing from  the  suspension  during  the  period  ending 
June  30,  1974,  of  the  quantitative  limitations  pro- 
vided for  in  item  950.60  of  the  TSUS  will  not  render 
or  tend  to  render  ineffective,  or  materially  interfere 
with,  the  loan  and  payment  programs  now  being 
conducted  by  the  Department  of  Agriculture  for 
wheat  and  will  not  reduce  substantially  the  amount 
of  products  processed  in  the  United  States  from 
domestic  wheat,  that  the  circumstances  which  re- 
quired the  imposition  of  such  quantitative  limita- 
tions on  wheat  and  milled  wheat  products  no  longer 
exist,  and  that  such  quantitative  limitations  should 
be  suspended  during  the  period  ending  June  30,  1974; 
Now,  Therefore,  I,  Richard  Nixon,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  acting  under  and  by 
virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President, 
and  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  section  22 
of  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act,  as  amended,  and 
the  Tariff  Classification  Act  of  1962,  do  hereby  pro- 
claim that  headnote  3(a)  of  part  3  of  the  Appendix 
to  the  Tariff  Schedules  of  the  United  States  is 
amended  by  adding  a  new  subdivision  as  follows: 

(ix)  Notwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  this 
part  the  quantitative  limitations  for  the  articles  pro- 
vided for  in  item  950.60  shall  be  suspended  during 
the  period  beginning  January  26,  1974,  and  ending 
June  30,  1974.  Quantities  of  such  articles  entered 
during  the  period  of  May  29,  1974,  through  June  30, 
1974,  shall  not  be  deducted  from  the  quantities  which 
may  be  entered  during  the  twelve  month  period  be- 
ginning May  29,  1974,  under  the  quantitative  limita- 
tions provided  for  in  item  950.60. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  January,  in  the  year 
of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-four,  and  of 
the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America 
the  one  hundred  ninety-eighth. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


^^S-JL/^^^^ 


MULTILATERAL 


Labor 

Instrument  for  the  amendment  of  the  constitution  of 
the  International  Labor  Organization.  Done  at 
Montreal  October  9,  1946.  Entered  into  force  April 
20,  1948.  TIAS  1868. 

Admission    to    membership:    German    Democratic 
Republic,  January  1,  1974. 

Whaling 

Amendments  to  paragraphs  4(1)  (a),  (b);  6(l)-(5); 
7(a);  8(a),  (e)-(h);  9(a),  (b);  10(b),  (c);  15;  17 
(c)(1),  (2)  of  the  schedule  to  the  international 
whaling  convention  of  December  2,  1946  (TIAS 
1849).  Adopted  at  London  June  29,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  October  4,  1973,  with  the  exceptions  of 
paragraphs  8(a)  and  8(h),  which  entered  into  force 
January  2,  1974,  except  for  Japan  and  the  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics. 


BILATERAL 


Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  May  9,  1972, 
concerning  shrimp  (TIAS  7603).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Brasilia  December  31,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  December  31,  1973. 

Switzerland 

Amendment  to  the  agreement  of  December  30,  1965 
(TIAS  6059),  for  cooperation  concerning  civil  uses 
of  atomic  energy.  Signed  at  Washington  Novem- 
ber 2,  1973.  Entered  into  force  January  29,  1974. 


180 


Deportment  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     Februarij  18,197',     Vol.  LXX,  No.  ISOS 


Agriculture 

President  Suspends  Import  Quotas  for  Wheat 
and  Milled  Wheat  Products  (proclamation)  .       179 

The  State  of  the  Union  (excerpts  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon's  address  and  message  to  the 
Congress) 157 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 

Policy 175 

Foreign  Investment  and  Free  Capital  Markets 

(Casey) - .'     170 

The  State  of  the  Union  (excerpts  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon's  address  and  message  to  the 
Congress) 157 

Economic  Affairs 

Foreign  Investment  and  Free  Capital  Markets 

(Casey) 170 

Interest  Equalization  Tax  Rate  Reduced  to 
Zei'o  (Treasury  Department  announcement)       179 

President  Suspends  Import  Quotas  for  Wheat 

and  Milled  Wheat  Products  (proclamation)  .       179 

The  State  of  the  Union  (excerpts  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon's  address  and  message  to  the 
Congress)        157 

Energy.  The  State  of  the  Union  (excerpts 
from  President  Nixon's  address  and  mes- 
sage  to  the  Congress) 157 

Environment.  The  State  of  the  Union  (ex- 
cerpts from  President  Nixon's  address  and 
message  to  the  Congress) 157 

Middle  East.  Assistant  Secretary  Sisco  Dis- 
cusses Progress  in  Middle  East  Negotiations 
(remarks  at  White  House  conference  on 
energy) 176 

Narcotics  Control.  The  State  of  the  Union 
(excerpts  from  President  Nixon's  address 
and  message  to  the  Congress) 157 

Presidential  Documents 

National  MIA  .•Awareness  Day  (proclamation)       175 


President  Suspends  Import  Quotas  for  Wheat 

and  Milled  Wheat  Products  (proclamation)  .       179 

The  State  of  the  Union  (excerpts  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon's  address  and  message  to  the 
Congress) 157 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....       180 

Viet-Nam.     National     MIA     Awareness     Day 

(proclamation) ".       175 

Name  Inde.v 

Casey,  William  J 170 

Nixon,   President 157,  175, 179 

Sisco,  Joseph  J 176 


Check  list  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:   Jan.  28-Feb.   3 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

So.       Diitr  Subject 

*34  1/28  Study  group  1  of  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  for  the  CCITT,  Feb. 
14. 

*35  1/28  Study  group  7  of  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  for  the  CCIR,  Feb. 
26. 

*36  1/29  Springsteen  designated  Special  As- 
sistant to  the  Secretary  and  Ex- 
ecutive Secretary  of  the  Depart- 
ment  (biographic  data). 

*37  2/1  U.S.  delegation  to  Intelsat  Assem- 
bly of  Parties,  Feb.  4-8. 

*  Not  printed. 


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1 


(3: 


^^//SOf 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1809 


February  25,  1974 


U.S.  AND  PANAMA  AGREE  ON  PRINCIPLES  FOR  NEGOTIATION 
OF  NEW  PANAMA  CANAL  TREATY 

Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  Text  of  Joint  Statement  of  Principles     181 

AMERICA  AND  ASIA:   THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW 
Address  by  Deputy  Secretary  Rush    186 

INTERNATIONAL  AVIATION:  THE  FUEL  CRISIS  AND  OTHER  PROBLEMS 

by  Raymond  J.   Waldmann     192 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  intide  back  cover 


Su, 


[UkR 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1809 
February  25,  1974 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documenta 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

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Note:    Contents   of  this   publication    are    not 

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ST.\TE    BULLETIN    as    the    source    will    be 

appreciated.     The    BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  ofl 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  n 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  select 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  l$su 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depa 
ment,  and  statements,  addreuet 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  othm 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well 
special  articles  on  various  phases  « 
international  affairs  and  the  functlom 
of  the  Department.  Information  i 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inttr 
national  agreements  to  which  ih 
United  States  is  or  may  become  i 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  intv 
national  interest. 

Publications    of    the    Department    • 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  oM 
legislative    material    in    the    field 
international  relations  are  also  listd 


U.S.  and  Panama  Agree  on  Principles  for  Negotiation 
of  New  Panama  Canal  Treaty 


Ow  Fehruarxj  7  at  Panaind,  Secretary  Kis- 
singer and  Juan  Antonio  Tack,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  Panama,  initialed  a  joint 
statetnent  of  principles  for  negotiation  of  a 
neiv  Panama  Canal  treaty.  Following  is  an 
address  made  by  Secretary  Kissinger  at  the 
ceremony,  together  with  the  text  of  the  joint 
statement. 


ADDRESS   BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 

Press  release  42  dated  February  7 

We  meet  here  today  to  embark  upon  a  new 
adventure  together.  Our  purpose  is  to  begin 
replacing  an  old  treaty  and  to  move  toward 
a  new  relationship.  What  we  sign  today, 
hopefully,  marks  as  well  the  advent  of  a  new 
era  in  the  history  of  our  hemisphere  and 
thus  makes  a  major  contribution  to  the  struc- 
ture of  world  peace. 

Meeting  as  we  do  on  this  isthmus  which 
links  North  with  South  and  Atlantic  with 
Pacific,  we  cannot  but  be  conscious  of  history 
— a  history  which  has  profoundly  changed 
the  course  of  human  affairs.  Four  centuries 
ago  the  conquistadors  landed  here  bringing 
faith  and  taking  booty.  They  were  represen- 
tatives of  the  traditional  style  and  use  of 
power.  Seventy  years  ago,  when  the  Panama 
Canal  was  begun,  strength  and  influence  re- 
mained the  foundations  of  world  order. 

Today  we  live  in  a  profoundly  transformed 
environment.  Among  the  many  revolutions 
of  our  time  none  is  more  significant  than  the 
change  in  the  nature  of  world  order.  Power 
has  grown  so  monstrous  that  it  defies  calcu- 
lation; the  quest  for  justice  has  become  uni- 
versal. A  stable  world  cannot  be  imposed  by 


force;  it  must  derive  from  consensus.  Man- 
kind can  achieve  community  only  on  the  basis 
of  shared  aspirations. 

This  is  why  the  meeting  today  between 
representatives  of  the  most  powerful  nation 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  one  of  the 
smallest  holds  great  significance.  In  the  past 
our  negotiation  would  have  been  determined 
by  relative  strength.  Today  we  have  come 
together  in  an  act  of  conciliation.  We  recog- 
nize that  no  agreement  can  endure  unless  the 
parties  to  it  want  to  maintain  it.  Participa- 
tion in  partnership  is  far  preferable  to  reluc- 
tant acquiescence. 

What  we  do  here  today  contains  a  message, 
as  well,  for  our  colleagues  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  who,  in  their  recent  meeting  in 
Bogota,  gave  impetus  to  this  negotiation.  The 
method  of  solution  and  the  spirit  of  partner- 
ship between  Panama  and  the  United  States 
as  embodied  in  this  agreement  are  an  example 
of  what  we  mean  by  the  spirit  of  community 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere;  it  can  be  the 
first  step  toward  a  new  era  which  we  believe 
will  be  given  fresh  hope  and  purpose  when 
we  meet  again  with  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
all  the  hemisphere  in  two  weeks'  time. 

The  United  States  and  Panama 

The  relationship  between  Panama  and  the 
United  States  is  rooted  in  extraordinary  hu- 
man accomplishment — the  Panama  Canal,  a 
monument  to  man's  energy  and  creative 
genius.  But  as  is  so  often  the  case,  man's 
technological  triumph  outstripped  his  politi- 
cal imagination: 

— For  60  years  the  safe,  efficient,  and  equi- 
table  operation   of  the  canal  has   given  to 


February  25,   1974 


181 


Panama,  to  the  United  States,  and  to  all 
nations  benefits  beyond  calculation. 

— Yet  the  canal  still  operates  under  the 
terms  of  a  treaty  signed  in  1903,  when  the 
realities  of  international  affairs  were  still 
shaped  by  traditional  precepts  of  power. 

— The  tensions  generated  by  these  contra- 
dictions, the  endless  debates  over  the  costs 
and  benefits  of  the  convention  of  1903,  have 
jeopardized  the  ability  of  our  two  countries 
not  only  to  work  together  to  meet  future  de- 
mands upon  the  canal  but  also  to  develop  a 
constructive  relationship  as  friends. 

We  must  assess  the  document  we  have  just 
signed  against  this  background.  Above  all,  we 
must  judge  it  in  the  context  of  what  it  means 
for  the  peoples  of  the  United  States  and 
Panama  and  what  it  can  mean  for  the  people 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  eight  principles  in  this  agreement 
constitute,  as  General  Torrijos  [Brig.  Gen. 
Omar  Torrijos,  Head  of  Government  of  Pan- 
ama] has  said,  a  "philosophy  of  understand- 
ing." Sacrificing  neither  interest  nor  self- 
respect,  Panama  and  the  United  States  have 
made  a  choice  for  partnership.  Meeting  in 
dignity  and  negotiating  with  fairness,  we 
have  acknowledged  that  cooperation  is  im- 
posed on  us  by  our  mutual  need  and  by  our 
mutual  recognition  of  the  necessity  for  a 
cooperative  world  order.  Foreign  Minister 
Tack  and  Ambassador  Bunker  [Ambassador 
at  Large  Ellsworth  Bunker,  U.S.  chief  nego- 
tiator for  the  Panama  Canal  treaty]  have 
shown  that  Panama's  sovereignty  and  the 
vital  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Panama  Canal  can  be  made  compatible.  They 
have  engaged  in  an  act  of  statesmanship  im- 
pelled by  the  conviction  that  we  are  part  of  a 
larger  community  in  the  Americas  and  in 
the  world. 

In  that  spirit  of  partnership  the  United 
States  and  Panama  have  met  as  equals  and 
have  determined  that  a  just  solution  must 
recognize : 

— First,  that  Panama  and  the  United 
States  have  a  mutual  stake  in  the  isthmus : 
Panama  in  its  greatest  natural  resource,  and 
the  United  States  in  the  use  and  defense  of 
the  canal. 


— Second,  that  the  arrangement  which  may 
have  been  suitable  70  years  ago  to  both  the 
United  States  and  Panama  must  be  adjusted 
to  meet  the  realities  of  the  contemporary 
world. 

—Third,  that  a  new  treaty  is  required 
which  will  strengthen  the  relationship  be- 
tween us  while  protecting  what  is  essential  to 
each.  A  new  agreement  must  restore  Pan- 
ama's territorial  sovereignty  while  preserv- 
ing the  interests  of  the  United  States  and  its 
participation  in  what  is  for  us  an  indispensa- 
ble international  waterway. 

While  we  have  taken  a  great  stride  for- 
ward, we  must  still  travel  a  difficult  distance 
to  our  goal.  There  is  opposition  in  both  our 
countries  to  a  reasonable  resolution  of  our 
differences.  Old  slogans  are  often  more  com- 
forting than  changes  that  reflect  new  reali- 
ties. It  is  the  essence  of  revolutions  that  to 
their  contemporaries  they  appear  as  irritat- 
ing interruptions  in  the  course  of  a  comforta- 
ble normalcy.  But  it  is  equally  true  that  those 
who  fail  to  understand  new  currents  are 
inevitably  engulfed  by  them. 

We  are  determined  to  shape  our  own 
destiny.  Our  negotiators  will  require  wisdom, 
purposefulness,  tenacity.  They  will  meet  ob- 
stacles and  disagreements.  Yet  they  will  suc- 
ceed— for  our  relations  and  our  commitments 
to  a  new  community  among  us  and  in  this 
hemisphere  demand  it. 

In  the  President's  name,  I  hereby  commit 
the  United  States  to  complete  this  negotiation 
successfully  and  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  Western  Hemisphere  Community 

We  are  here  today  not  just  as  two  sov- 
ereign nations,  but  as  representatives  of  our 
hemisphere.  We  meet  at  the  place  where 
Simon  Bolivar  enunciated  the  concept  of  an 
inter-American  system.  We  meet  at  a  point 
of  time  between  meetings  of  Foreign  Min- 
isters in  Bogota  and  Mexico  City  which  can 
mark  a  historic  turning  point  in  making 
Bolivar's  vision  come  true. 

I  know  that  many  of  my  country's  south- 
ern neighbors  believe  they  have  been  the  sub- 
ject of  too  many  surveys  and  too  few  policies. 


182 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  United  States  is  accused  of  being  better 
at  finding  slogans  for  its  Latin  American 
policy  than  at  finding  answers  to  the  prob- 
lems that  face  us  all. 

Some  of  these  criticisms  are  justified.  At 
times  rhetoric  has  exceeded  performance. 
But  the  United  States  has  been  torn  by  many 
problems ;  only  from  afar  does  it  appear  as 
if  all  choices  are  equally  open  to  us.  We  have 
not  been  willfully  neglectful.  And  in  any  case, 
we  have  recognized  that  the  time  for  a  new 
approach  is  overdue. 

I  have  come  here  today  to  tell  you  on  behalf 
of  our  President  that  we  are  fully  committed 
to  a  major  effort  to  build  a  vital  Western 
Hemisphere  community.  We  understand  our 
own  needs : 

— To  live  in  a  hemisphere  lifted  by  prog- 
ress, not  torn  by  hatreds ; 

- — To  insure  that  the  millions  of  people 
south  of  us  will  lead  lives  of  fulfillment  not 
embittered  by  frustration  and  despair;  and 

— Above  all,  to  recognize  that  in  the  great 
dialogue  between  the  developed  and  the  less 
developed  nations,  we  cannot  find  answers 
anywhere  if  we  do  not  find  them  here  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  I  shall  meet  my  col- 
leagues in  Mexico  City  later  this  month  to 
deal  with  the  issues  posed  by  them  in  their 
Bogota  meeting.  We  attach  particular  sig- 
nificance to  the  fact  that  the  meeting  in  Mexi- 
co City — its  substance  and  its  impetus — is 
the  product  of  Latin  American  initiative.  It 
is  a  response  to  the  necessities  of  the  times 
such  as  the  United  States  had  hoped  to 
achieve  with  partners  elsewhere  in  the  world. 

The  United  States  will  not  come  to  Mexico 
City  with  a  program  that  presumes  to  have 
all  the  answers.  Nor  will  we  pretend  that  our 
lost  opportunities  can  be  remedied  by  yet 
another  freshly  packaged  program  labeled 
"Made  in  the  U.S.A."  But  we  shall  come  with 
an  open  mind  and,  perhaps  more  importantly, 
with  an  open  heart.  We  are  at  a  moment  of 
truth,  and  we  shall  speak  the  truth. 

We  know  that  our  neighbors  are  worried 
about  the  blackmail  of  the  strong.  We  want 
them  to  know  that  we  are  sympathetic  to  this 
concern.  At  the  same  time,  blackmail  is  no 


more  acceptable  from  any  other  source.  We 
need  each  other.  So  let  us  all  seek  solutions 
free  of  pressure  and  confrontation,  based  on 
reciprocity  and  mutual  respect.  In  Mexico 
City  we  can  but  lay  the  foundations  for  the 
future.  But  building  upon  what  we  achieve  in 
Mexico  City  we  can,  over  the  months  and 
years  ahead,  erect  an  edifice  of  true  partner- 
ship, real  trust,  and  fruitful  collaboration. 

Thus  we  approach  the  meeting  in  Mexico 
with  but  one  prejudice:  a  profound  belief 
that  the  Americas,  too,  have  arrived  at  a 
moment  of  basic  choice,  a  time  of  decision 
between  fulfillment  together  and  frustration 
apart.  Our  choice  will  be  found  in  the  an- 
swers we  give  to  these  critical  questions : 

— Can  we  make  our  diversity  a  source  of 
strength,  drawing  on  the  richness  of  our 
material  and  moral  heritage? 

— In  short,  can  the  countries  of  Latin 
America,  the  Caribbean,  and  the  United 
States,  each  conscious  of  its  own  identity, 
fashion  a  common  vision  of  the  world  and  of 
this  hemisphere — not  just  as  they  are,  but  as 
they  are  becoming  and  as  we  feel  they  should 
be — so  that  we  can  move  together  toward  the 
achievement  of  common  goals? 

We  will  conduct  the  broader  dialogue  we 
have  all  set  for  ourselves  in  Mexico  City  with 
the  same  commitment  to  reciprocity,  the 
same  consideration  of  each  other's  interests, 
that  marked  the  negotiations  between  the 
United  States  and  Panama. 

For  centuries  men  everywhere  have  seen 
this  hemisphere  as  offering  mankind  the 
chance  to  break  with  their  eternal  tragedies 
and  to  achieve  their  eternal  hopes.  That  was 
what  was  new  about  the  New  World.  It  was 
the  drama  of  men  choosing  their  own  desti- 
nies. 

An  American  poet  has  written : 

We  shall  not  cease  from  exploration 
And  the  end  of  all  our  exploring 
Will  be  to  arrive  where  we  started 
And  know  the  place  for  the  first  time. 

Panama  and  the  United  States  have  now 
begun  this  exploration.  Our  sister  republics 
can  make  the  same  choice.  Our  creativity, 
our  energy,  and  our  sense  of  community  will 
be  on  trial.  But  if  we  are  equal  to  the  oppor- 


Februory  25,    1974 


183 


tunity,  we  will  indeed  arrive  where  we 
started — a  hemisphere  which  apain  inspires 
the  world  with  hope  by  its  example.  Then  we 
shall  indeed  know  the  place  for  the  first  time, 
because  for  the  first  time  we  shall  truly  have 
fulfilled  its  promise. 


TEXT  OF  JOINT  STATEMENT 

Joint  Statement  by  the  Honorable  Henry 
A.  Kissinger,  Secretary  of  State  of 
THE  United  States  of  America,  and 
His  Excellency  Juan  Antonio  Tack, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  on  February  7, 
1974  AT  Panama 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama  have  been  engaged  in 
negotiations  to  conclude  an  entirely  new 
treaty  respecting  the  Panama  Canal,  negotia- 
tions which  were  made  possible  by  the  Joint 
Declaration  between  the  two  countries  of 
April  3,  1964,  agreed  to  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Permanent  Council  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States  acting  provisionally 
as  the  Organ  of  Consultation.'  The  new 
treaty  would  abrogate  the  treaty  existing 
since  1903  and  its  subsequent  amendments, 
establishing  the  necessary  conditions  for  a 
modern  relationship  between  the  two  coun- 
tries based  on  the  most  profound  mutual 
respect. 

Since  the  end  of  last  November,  the  au- 
thorized representatives  of  the  two  govern- 
ments have  been  holding  important  conver- 
sations which  have  permitted  agreement  to 
be  reached  on  a  set  of  fundamental  principles 
which  will  serve  to  guide  the  negotiators  in 
the  effort  to  conclude  a  just  and  equitable 
treaty  eliminating,  once  and  for  all,  the 
causes  of  conflict  between  the  two  countries. 

The  principles  to  which  we  have  agreed,  on 
behalf  of  our  respective  governments,  are  as 
follows : 

1.  The  treaty  of  1903  and  its  amendments 
will  be  abrogated  by  the  conclusion  of  an 
entirely  new  interoceanic  canal  treaty. 


'  For  text  of  the  joint  declaration,  see  Bulletin 
of  Apr.  27,  1964,  p.  656. 


2.  The  concept  of  perpetuity  will  be  elimi- 
nated. The  new  treaty  concerning  the  lock 
canal  shall  have  a  fixed  termination  date. 

3.  Termination  of  United  States  jurisdic- 
tion over  Panamanian  territory  shall  take 
place  promptly  in  accordance  with  terms 
specified  in  the  treaty. 

4.  The  Panamanian  territory  in  which  the 
canal  is  situated  shall  be  returned  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  The 
Republic  of  Panama,  in  its  capacity  as  terri- 
torial sovereign,  shall  grant  to  the  United 
States  of  America,  for  the  duration  of  the 
new  interoceanic  canal  treaty  and  in  accord- 
ance with  what  that  treaty  states,  the  right 
to  use  the  lands,  waters  and  airspace  which 
may  be  necessary  for  the  operation,  mainte- 
nance, protection  and  defense  of  the  canal 
and  the  transit  of  ships. 

5.  The  Republic  of  Panama  shall  have  a 
just  and  equitable  share  of  the  benefits  de- 
rived from  the  operation  of  the  canal  in  its 
territory.  It  is  recognized  that  the  geographic 
position  of  its  territory  constitutes  the  prin- 
cipal resource  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

6.  The  Republic  of  Panama  shall  partici- 
pate in  the  administration  of  the  canal,  in 
accordance  with  a  procedure  to  be  agreed 
upon  in  the  treaty.  The  treaty  shall  also 
provide  that  Panama  will  assume  total  re- 
sponsibility for  the  operation  of  the  canal 
upon  the  termination  of  the  treaty.  The  Re- 
public of  Panama  shall  grant  to  the  United 
States  of  America  the  rights  necessary  to 
regulate  the  transit  of  ships  through  the 
canal  and  operate,  maintain,  protect  and  de- 
fend the  canal,  and  to  undertake  any  other 
specific  activity  related  to  those  ends,  as  may 
be  agreed  upon  in  the  treaty. 

7.  The  Republic  of  Panama  shall  partici- 
pate with  the  United  States  of  America  in 
the  protection  and  defense  of  the  canal  in 
accordance  with  what  is  agreed  upon  in  the 
new  treaty. 

8.  The  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  recognizing  the  impor- 
tant services  rendered  by  the  interoceanic 
Panama  Canal  to  international  maritime 
traflic,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  possibility 
that  the  present  canal  could  become  inade- 
quate for  said  traflic,  shall  agree  bilaterally 


184 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


on  provisions  for  new  projects  which  will 
enlarge  canal  capacity.  Such  provisions  will 
be  incorporated  in  the  new  treaty  in  accord 
with  the  concepts  established  in  principle  2. 


Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
Visits  Washington 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  communique 
issued  on  February  5  at  the  conclusion  of  a 
visit  to  Washington  by  A7idrei  A.  Gromyko. 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  U.S.S.R. 

White  House  press  release  dated  February  o 

At  the  invitation  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment, Andrei  A.  Gromyko,  member  of  the 
Politburo  of  the  CPSU  [Communist  Party 
of  the  Soviet  Union]  Central  Committee  ^nd 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  USSR, 
visited  Washington,  D.C.,  from  February  3 
to  February  5,  1974.  During  his  visit  he  held 
talks  with  President  Nixon  and  Secretary  of 
State  Henry  Kissinger. 

Also  taking  part  in  the  talks  were : 

On  the  American  side: 

Under  Secretary-designate  for  Political 
Affairs  Joseph  Sisco;  Counselor  of  the  De- 
partment of  State  Helmut  Sonnenfeldt; 
Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Affairs 
Arthur  Hartman;  Ambassador-designate  to 
the  USSR  Walter  Stoessel. 

On  the  Soviet  side: 

Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  A.  F. 
Dobrynin;  Member  of  the  Collegium  of  the 
Foreign  Ministry  of  the  USSR  G.  M.  Korni- 
yenko;  Assistant  to  the  Foreign  Minister  of 
the  USSR  V.  G.  Makarov ;  and  Y.  M.  Voront- 
sov,  Minister-Counsellor  of  the  Soviet  Em- 
bassy. 

In    accordance    with    the    understandings 


reached  in  May  1972  and  June  1973  that  the 
practice  of  consultations  between  the  two 
countries  should  continue,  an  exchange  of 
views  took  place  on  a  number  of  subjects  of 
mutual  interest. 

Both  sides  reaffirmed  their  determination 
to  continue  developing  their  relations  along 
the  lines  established  during  President  Nix- 
on's visit  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  1972  and 
General  Secretary  Brezhnev's  visit  to  the 
United  States  in  1973  and  reflected  in  the 
agreements  concluded  on  those  occasions. 

In  reviewing  their  bilateral  relations,  the 
two  Sides  discussed  questions  relating  to  the 
further  limitation  of  strategic  arms  and 
prospects  for  the  development  of  trade  and 
economic  relations  between  the  two  countries, 
as  well  as  other  pertinent  matters.  They  ex- 
pressed their  agreement  on  the  desirability  of 
achieving  progress  in  these  and  other  areas. 

The  two  Sides  also  held  discussions  on  a 
number  of  current  international  topics. 

Special  attention  was  devoted  to  the  Mid- 
dle Ea.st.  Both  Sides  attached  particular  im- 
portance to  their  special  role  at  the  Geneva 
conference,  the  need  for  a  peaceful  Middle 
East  settlement  and  for  progress  toward  that 
end  within  the  framework  of  the  Geneva 
Peace  Conference. 

In  exchanging  views  on  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  both 
Sides  agreed  that  the  Conference  should 
reach  a  successful  conclusion  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. The  question  of  mutual  force  reduction 
in  Central  Europe  was  touched  on. 

The  exchange  of  views  was  conducted  in  a 
businesslike  and  constructive  manner  and 
was  considered  useful  by  both  Sides. 

It  was  agreed  that  Secretary  Kissinger 
will  visit  Moscow  in  the  second  half  of  March 
1974  in  connection  with  preparations  for  the 
visit  to  the  Soviet  Union  of  President  Nixon, 
which  will  take  place  this  year  in  accordance 
with  the  agreement  reached  in  June  1973. 


February  25,    1974 


185 


America  and  Asia:  The  Old  and  the  New 


Address  by  Deputy  Secretary  Kenneth  Rush 


In  coming  to  Cleveland  this  evening,  I 
have  kept  in  mind  the  fact  that  there  has 
been  in  the  last  few  months  much  discussion 
about  our  relations  in  Europe  and  about  the 
energy  crisis  and  that  we  have  just  witnessed 
a  major  diplomatic  feat  accomplished  by  Sec- 
retary Kissinger  in  the  Middle  East.  You  are 
all  very  much  aware  of  these  recent  develop- 
ments. I  decided,  therefore,  to  raise  an  issue 
which  has  not  been  discussed  as  frequently 
in  the  last  year  or  so  as  it  had  been  during 
the  past  decade. 

I  will  be  departing  next  month  on  a  major 
tour  of  Asian  nations;  and  I  would  like  to 
speak  to  you  tonight  about  Asia  and  America, 
about  the  old  and  the  new  in  our  relation- 
ship, about  our  views  of  one  another  and  of 
ourselves. 

An  Englishman  once  wrote  condescend- 
ingly of  Americans :  Youth  is  their  oldest  tra- 
dition— it  has  been  going  on  now  for  200 
years.  We  are  a  young  nation — young  in 
spirit,  in  ideas,  and  in  our  aspirations.  But 
we  are  also  in  a  sense  one  of  the  world's  old- 
est nations,  for  we  built  some  time  ago  many 
of  the  institutions  which  the  vast  majority 
of  mankind  is  still  striving  to  construct;  we 
are  the  world's  oldest  constitutional  democ- 
racy and  the  most  developed  industrial  so- 
ciety. Thus  our  political  and  economic  sys- 
tems aj"e  simultaneously  among  the  longest 
lived  and  the  most  likely  to  live  long. 

If  America  is  a  young  nation  with  old  in- 
stitutions, Asia  is  composed  of  old  nations 
with  young  institutions.    For  while  Ameri- 


^  Made   before  the   Cleveland   Council   on   Foreign 
Relations  on  Jan.  21  (press  release  25). 


186 


cans  are  gaining  a  new  appreciation  for 
Asia's  ageless  cultural  and  intellectual  values, 
most  of  Asia's  political  structures  have 
emerged  since  the  Second  World  War  and 
many  Asians  are  only  now  entering  the  In- 
dustrial Revolution.  Rapid  and  unsettling 
change  is  natural  as  Asians  seek  political 
strength,  economic  progress,  and  national 
security. 

The  perceptions  that  emerge  from  this 
complex  blend  of  the  old  and  the  new  guide 
the  restructuring  of  America's  policies 
toward  Asia. 

First,  we  must  expect  and  accept  change 
in  Asia. 

But  second,  as  a  mature  nation  the  United 
States  can  and  must  provide  an  essential  ele- 
ment of  stability  in  this  area  of  turbulent 
change. 

And  third,  as  President  Nixon  stated  in  his 
1971  foreign  policy  report,  the  United  States 
"must  strike  a  balance  between  doing  too 
much  and  thus  preventing  self-reliance,  and 
doing  too  little  and  thus  undermining  self- 
confidence." 

The  flood  of  events  in  recent  years  may 
have  overwhelmed  us,  obscuring  the  pro- 
found transformation  which  these  policies 
have  helped  achieve.  Consider  our  situation 
just  a  few  shoi't  years  ago: 

— Two  decades  of  hostility  and  estrange- 
ment from  Asia's  largest  and  the  world's 
most  populous  nation,  the  People's  Republic 
of  China,  had  yet  to  end; 

— American  forces  were  still  fully  engaged 
in  this  nation's  longest  and  most  frustrating 
war,  Viet-Nam;  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


tini 


— Relations  with  our  closest  Asian  ally, 
Japan,  were  severely  strained  by  an  inevi- 
table but  painful  adjustment  of  our  relation- 
ship; for  example,  the  necessity  to  correct  an 
unprecedented  $4  billion  trade  deficit. 

But  two  years  ago  next  month  President 
Nixon  visited  Peking;  a  year  ago  this  month 
we  signed  the  Paris  accords  ending  American 
combat  involvement  in  Viet-Nam;  and  in  re- 
cent months  we  have  made  steady  progress 
toward  a  more  equal  and  balanced  relation- 
ship with  Japan. 

Thus  as  I  depart  next  month  to  visit  sev- 
eral Asian  nations,  I  do  so  confident  that  we 
have  removed  some  major  impediments  to 
construction  of  a  new  American  relationship 
with  Asia.  We  have  freed  ourselves  from 
preoccupation  with  containing  the  threats 
of  the  past.  Now  we  can  concentrate  on  real- 
izing the  opportunities  of  the  future. 

Some  Americans  still  view  Asia  as  an  area 
of  less  vital  concern  to  the  United  States  than 
Europe.  But  the  fact  that  Asia  has  been  less 
frequently  on  the  front  pages  of  our  news- 
papers in  recent  months  can  be  ascribed  more 
to  the  wisdom  of  that  phrase  "no  news  is 
good  news"  than  to  the  intrinsic  importance 
of  Asia  to  our  interests. 

Let  me  briefly  mention  a  few  obvious  but 
sometimes  forgotten  factors : 

— Half  the  world's  people  live  in  Asia,  and 
that  proportion  is  increasing; 

— Our  trade  with  Asia  now  equals  85  per- 
cent of  our  trade  with  Western  Europe  and 
is  growing  more  rapidly; 

— Twice  in  a  single  generation  we  have 
been  drawn  into  war  in  Asia,  while  Europe 
has  remained  relatively  more  stable;  every 
American  war  since  World  War  I  has  started 
in  Asia;  and 

— Four  of  the  world's  major  powers — the 
United  States,  Japan,  China,  and  the  Soviet 
Union — come  together  only  in  the  Pacific. 

Thus  our  policies  toward  Asia  are  central 
to  our  policies  toward  the  entire  world. 

In  his  address  to  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly last  September,  Secretary  Kissinger  sug- 
gested that  the  world  has  come  to  what  may 


be  described  as  an  open  moment  in  history, 
a  time  when  nations  will  l)e  making  funda- 
mental choices,  choices  which  will  profoundly 
affect  the  future  shape  of  the  international 
environment. 

All  over  the  world,  familiar  landmarks — 
political,  economic,  social,  psychological — are 
disappearing,  changing,  being  challenged, 
and  being  forged  into  new  shapes.  We  are  at 
one  of  those  rare  moments  in  human  history 
v/hen  a  concerted  effort  can  determine  the 
framework  of  international  relations  for 
decades  to  come.  But  should  the  United 
States  and  like-minded  nations  fail  to  gen- 
erate the  momentum  to  propel  international 
events  in  the  direction  they  prefer,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  others  will  make  them  move  in  the 
direction  they  want — or  events  will  just  drift 
aimlessly  and  chaotically. 

In  this  formative  period  our  policies  in 
Asia  have  two  basic  and  mutually  reinforc- 
ing purposes: 

— First,  to  build  a  network  of  mutual  un- 
der.'^tanding  and  mutual  restraint  among  the 
major  powers  in  Asia:  Japan,  China,  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  the  United  States;  and 

— Second,  with  the  smaller  nations  in  Asia, 
to  pursue  the  Nixon  doctrine's  goal  of  shared 
responsibilities  and  shared  burdens  for  de- 
velopment and  defense. 

We  must  pursue  both  these  purposes  if  we 
are  to  hope  for  success  in  either  one.  Only 
by  continuing  to  demonstrate  our  determina- 
tion to  assist  smaller  nations  can  we  con- 
vince major  powers  that  they  must  work 
with  us  to  reduce  tensions.  Conversely,  only 
by  pursuing  increased  cooperation  among  the 
major  powers  can  we  reduce  the  tensions 
which  have  stimulated  confrontation  and 
conflict  among  the  smaller  nations. 

New  Relationship  Among  Major  Powers 

Let  me  deal  with  each  of  these  two  policies 
in  turn. 

The  world  has  been  brought  to  this  forma- 
tive moment  in  part  because,  for  the  first 
time  in  approximately  2.5  years,  international 
politics  are  no  longer  dominated  by  rigid, 


February  25,    1974 


187 


sterile  confrontation  between  the  Communist 
and  non-Communist  powers.  The  changed 
climate  of  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  and  between  the 
United  States  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  have  contributed  importantly  to  this 
hopeful  evolution. 

U.S.  policy  with  both  of  our  adversaries 
aims  to  build  with  each  a  fabric  of  mutually 
beneficial  relationships,  relationships  which 
provide  the  substance  of  what  President 
Nixon  has  called  a  structure  of  peace. 

With  the  Soviet  Union  we  are  engaged  in 
a  web  of  concrete  negotiations;  with  China 
we  are  opening  a  new  relationship.  With  the 
Soviet  Union  we  are  endeavoring  to  insure 
peace  and  stability  through  agreement  to 
exercise  mutual  restraint  in  international 
relations  and  through  reaching  specific 
agreements  on  normalizing  trade  and  other 
forms  of  cooperation  in  bilateral  relations. 
With  China  we  are  seeking  to  bridge  two 
decades  of  isolation  and  hostility,  an  atmos- 
phere in  which  misunderstanding  was  as- 
sured and  miscalculation  was  a  constant 
danger. 

We  cannot  take  for  granted  the  present 
reduction  of  international  tensions.  Both 
Moscow  and  Peking  continue  to  view  their 
relationships  with  us  and  our  allies  as  funda- 
mentally competitive — politically,  strategi- 
cally, economically,  and  ideologically.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  read  the  minds  of  men  in  the 
Soviet  Union  and  in  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  to  realize  this.  But  the  agreements  we 
are  seeking  with  both  countries  are  designed 
to  promote  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
and  of  its  allies,  regardless  of  what  may  be 
the  motivations  of  our  opponents  in  reaching 
those  agreements.  Ultimately,  of  course,  we 
believe  that  all  parties  benefit  from  these 
agreements;  for  a  sound  peace  can  only  rest 
on  mutually  beneficial  arrangements. 

Our  ability  to  build  elements  of  coopera- 
tion into  our  relationship  with  the  two  Com- 
munist powers  has  been  possible  only  because 
the  leaders  in  the  two  capitals  have  been  re- 
ceptive. Looking  ahead,  while  we  cannot  say 
with  certainty  that  Soviet  and  Chinese  poli- 


188 


cies  will  continue  along  present  lines,  we  can 
encourage  that  outcome  by  institutionalizing 
our  relationship  as  much  as  possible  through 
the  concrete  and  mutually  beneficial  arrange- 
ments which  I  have  discussed. 

Japan  is  our  major  partner  in  this  en- 
deavor. We  view  Japan  not  only  as  an  essen- 
tial factor  in  Asia  but  as  one  of  the  principal 
factors  in  the  global  situation.  We  have  con- 
sistently stressed  the  need  for  Japan  to  par- 
ticipate fully  in  the  relationship  we  are  cre- 
ating with  Western  Europe.  Japan's  global 
economic  power  and  its  emerging  political 
power  make  highly  important  its  participa- 
tion in  the  formulation  of  new  basic  objec- 
tives by  the  advanced  industrialized  democ- 
racies. 

A  major  aspect  of  the  new  relationship  we 
and  Japan  are  building  with  China  and  the 
Soviet  Union  is  agreement  to  oppose  at- 
tempts by  anyone  to  impose  hegemony  in  the 
Asia-Pacific  region.  In  fact,  agreement 
among  the  major  powers  to  exercise  re- 
straint has  led  to  a  marked  slowing  down  of 
the  action-reaction  cycle  so  prevalent  in 
recent  years.  A  more  considered  approach 
results  from  the  need  to  take  into  account 
the  interests  of  more  countries. 

Shared  Responsibilities  and  Shared  Burdens 

Smaller  nations  benefit  equally  from  this 
positive  momentum.  In  fact  probably  the 
two  most  important  results  of  this  adminis- 
tration's policies  in  Asia  have  been: 

— First,  that  there  has  been  a  substantial 
relaxation  of  tensions  throughout  Asia  and 
a  reduction  of  the  threat  of  conflict  and  con- 
frontation; and 

— Second,  that  our  allies  and  friends  are 
achieving  the  essence  of  the  Nixon  doctrine 
by  shouldering  a  greater  part  of  the  burden 
for  their  own  security  and  economic  develop- 
ment. 

These  two  basic  changes  in  the  Asian  scene 
have  made  it  possible  and  appropriate  for  the 
United  States  to  adjust  its  role  toward  a  less 
direct  involvement  in  the  affairs  of  Asia. 
Since  President  Nixon  took  office  in  1969, 


Deportment  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  forces  in  Asia  have  been  reduced  to 
about  one-fourth  of  their  previous  size,  leav- 
ing about  200,000  U.S.  troops  in  the  area, 
and  U.S.  military  assistance  to  Asia  has  been 
cut  by  about  40  percent  to  approximately  $1.4 
billion. 

We  are  particularly  pleased  by  growing 
regional  cooperation  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
by  the  efforts  of  the  Association  of  South- 
East  Asian  Nations  to  involve  Indochina  in 
this  process.  And  we  support  the  growing 
role  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  in  Asia's 
future,  a  role  I  will  be  discussing  with  their 
Foreign  Ministers  at  our  regular  ANZUS 
meeting  next  month. 

Of  all  areas  in  the  world,  Indochina  has 
been  one  of  the  last  to  benefit  from  the  heal- 
ing winds  of  detente: 

— In  Laos  the  cease-fire  has  held  extremely 
well,  and  there  is  progress  toward  a  single 
government. 

— In  Cambodia  fighting  unfortunately 
continues,  but  the  Cambodian  Government 
has  reiterated  its  proposal  that  all  parties 
join  in  reaching  a  political  settlement.  There 
is  hope  that  if  the  Khmer  Rouge  realize  they 
cannot  obtain  a  military  solution  they  will 
agree  to  engage  in  negotiations. 

— And  in  Viet-Nam  the  level  of  hostilities 
was  substantially  lower  in  1973  than  in  ear- 
lier years.  This  was  an  encouraging  decline. 
South  Viet-Nam  has  demonstrated  increasing 
ability  to  defend  itself.  But  we  remain  con- 
cerned about  failure  to  implement  the  peace 
agreement.  While  the  possibility  of  a  North 
Vietnamese  offensive  in  1974  cannot  be  ruled 
out,  we  hope  that  last  year's  decline  will  con- 
tinue this  year.  We  also  continue  to  hope 
that  North  Viet-Nam  will  concentrate  on 
peaceful  reconstruction  of  its  shattered  econ- 
omy and  society  instead  of  vainly  pursuing 
war  in  the  South.  The  United  States  remains 
ready  to  contribute  to  this  effort  when  North 
Viet-Nam  fulfills  its  obligations  under  the 
Paris  accords,  including  its  obligation  to 
make  a  full  accounting  of  our  missing  in 
action. 

In  realigning  our  role  in  Asia  the  United 
States  must  not  fall  prey  to  the  dangerous 


temptation  of  total  withdrawal.  The  essence 
of  the  Nixon  doctrine  is  shared  burdens  and 
shared  responsibilities,  not  unilateral  abroga- 
tion of  responsibility  by  the  United  States. 
Given  the  continuing  critical  importance  of 
the  balancing  role  we  now  play  in  Asia, 
American  withdrawal  would  only  lead  to  a 
reappearance  of  severe  instability.  Thus  we 
should  not  contemplate  further  substantial 
reductions  in  U.S.  forces  in  Asia  until  the 
continuing  tensions  in  the  area  have  substan- 
tially diminished.  Equally  important,  we 
must  continue  to  extend  adequate  security 
and  economic  assistance.  Only  by  making  this 
effort  can  we  assure  that  the  nations  of  Asia 
will  achieve  the  secure  peace  that  their  sac- 
rifices, and  ours,  were  designed  to  create. 

Shortages  Threatening  World  Economy 

As  the  saying  goes,  we  often  find  that  "the 
best  of  times  is  the  worst  of  times."  Just  as 
we  are  making  major  progress  in  the  area 
of  our  greatest  concern  over  the  past  quarter 
century  by  reducing  the  threat  to  man's  phys- 
ical security,  energy  and  other  resource 
shortages  have  arisen  to  threaten  the  world's 
economic  security. 

In  another  era  the  United  States  could  have 
remained  relatively  unconcerned  about  this 
development.  But  this  is  no  longer  the  case, 
as  you  in  Cleveland  know  with  one  of  the  na- 
tion's major  ports,  as  all  in  Ohio  know  with 
the  nation's  fourth  largest  exports  of  indus- 
trial goods,  and  as  all  in  America  know  with 
the  current  problems  facing  us  both  as  con- 
sumers and  producers.  America's  ability  to 
grow  is  tied  to  our  imports,  and  our  ability  to 
pay  for  these  imports  is  tied  to  our  exports. 
It  is  increasingly  clear  that  to  control  our  in- 
flation, to  save  our  environment,  to  preserve 
our  very  way  of  life,  we  must  seek  new  forms 
of  international  cooperation. 

The  United  States  would  survive  better 
than  most  in  a  world  torn  asunder  by  unre- 
strained competition  caused  by  man's  de- 
mands upon  this  small  planet's  finite  re- 
sources. But  the  developed  and  developing 
nations  of  Asia  have  a  much  smaller  margin 
of  survival.  Many  Asian  nations  have  bene- 


February  25,  1974 


189 


fited  from  the  world's  fastest  economic 
growth  rates  to  maintain  domestic  political 
stability.  Should,  for  example,  sharply  re- 
duced energy  supplies  and  sharply  rising  en- 
ergy prices  bring  their  economic  growth  to  a 
standstill,  this  could  cause  unpredictable  po- 
litical and  social  instability. 

Thus  it  is  in  the  interest  of  both  Asia  and 
America  to  insure  that  we  achieve  an  unprec- 
edented level  of  international  cooperation  to 
meet  an  unprecedented  international  chal- 
lenge. Nations  are  only  just  beginning  to  un- 
derstand the  magnitude  of  this  challenge.  It 
is  not  just  a  problem  of  oil  supplies  but  of 
prices,  not  just  a  matter  of  energy  but  of  all 
natural  resources,  not  just  a  question  of  econ- 
omics but  of  politics  and  security,  not  just  an 
issue  for  1974  but  for  the  rest  of  this  cen- 
tury. 

The  oceans  present  another  excellent  ex- 
ample of  the  uncharted  but  pressing  chal- 
lenge of  our  growing  interdependence.  The 
United  Nations,  through  its  third  Conference 
on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  is  this  year  writing 
what  will  in  essence  be  a  constitution  for  an 
area  covering  two-thirds  of  the  earth's  sur- 
face. Whether  it  is  the  protein,  the  minerals, 
or  the  oil  which  the  oceans  contain  or  their 
increasing  importance  for  international 
transportation  and  national  security,  this 
conference  will  confront  problems  of  unprec- 
edented complexity  and  challenge. 

Nations  are  only  beginning  to  understand 
the  magnitude  of  the  problem  presented  by 
growing  interdependence.  No  one  nation  can 
provide  the  answers.  We  must  all  work  to- 
gether. Our  initial  objective  is  to  develop  a 
framework  to  provide  incentives  for  coopera- 
tion and  discourage  attempts  to  satisfy  one's 
own  demands  at  the  expense  of  others. 

Three-Point  Program  on  Energy 

To  address  the  specific  problem  of  energy, 
President  Nixon  and  Secretary  Kissinger 
have  developed  a  three-point  program: 

— First,  to  expand  sources  of  supplies 
within  the  United  States  and  dampen  de- 
mand and  thus  to  reduce  the  pressure  on  the 


international  petroleum  market  and  decrease 
our  dependence  on  foreign  sources  of  supply; 

— Second,  to  invite  Foreign  Ministers  of 
the  major  consuming  nations  to  meet  in 
Washington  early  next  month  to  develop  co- 
operative action  among  industrial  consuming 
nations  looking  toward  a  dialogue  with  the 
petroleum-exporting  countries;  and 

— Third,  to  propose  the  establishment  of 
an  international  Energy  Action  Group  that 
would  bring  consumer  and  supplier  nations 
together  to  develop  new  international  cooper- 
ation benefiting  consumer  and  producer  alike. 
The  stake  of  the  oil  producers  in  an  expand- 
ing global  economy  is  growing.  Together 
with  consumer  nations,  they  have  a  vital  in- 
terest in  maintaining  the  monetary  and  trad- 
ing system  which  promises  them  so  much. 

We  want  Japan  to  be  one  of  our  principal 
partners  in  this  endeavor,  for  we  are  keenly 
aware  of  her  nearly  total  dependence  on  for- 
eign oil.  The  Japanese  have  told  us  that  to 
continue  to  play  an  active  economic  role  in 
the  world  they  recognize  the  need  to  play  a 
political  role  as  well.  We  welcome  this  ap- 
proach, for  we  believe  that  we  share  broad 
common  concerns  and  interests. 

Energy  price  rises  are  causing  hardships 
on  the  developing  nations  of  Asia.  These 
hardships  threaten  to  destroy  the  accomplish- 
ments of  decades.  The  interests  of  these  na- 
tions must  be  fully  represented  and  pro- 
tected. We  would  hope  that  the  consumer  na- 
tions in  the  developing  world  could  concert 
to  encourage  a  more  reasonable  approach  on 
the  part  of  producer  nations — who  are  them- 
selves still  developing  or  are  recently  devel- 
oped. Development  prospects  over  the  next 
decade  may  well  depend  on  progress  in  low- 
ering prices  and  transferring  capital  re- 
sources from  the  oil  producers  to  the  less 
well-endowed  nations. 

Let  me  conclude. 

Americans  have  understandably  grown 
tired  of  the  burdens  of  world  leadership.  And 
as  I  have  attempted  to  outline,  this  adminis- 
tration has  sought  to  lighten  this  burden  and 
to  transform  its  nature. 

But    the    two    most    recent    international 


190 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


crises — in  the  Middle  East  and  in  energy^ — 
have  once  again  demonstrated  the  role  which 
only  the  United  States  can  play.  Who  else 
could  have  brought  the  Arabs  and  the  Is- 
raelis to  the  negotiating  table  after  two  dec- 
ades of  conflict,  conflict  which  threatened  to 
engulf  the  major  powers  as  well?  And  who 
else  could  provide  the  vision  and  the  will  to 
bring  together  oil  consumers  and  producers 
so  that  together  we  can  halt  the  otherwise 
inevitable  collapse  of  the  world's  economy? 

Americans  can  be  proud  of  these  contribu- 
tions, and  we  can  I'egain  from  them  the  con- 
fidence required  to  pursue  an  active  and 
imaginative  foreign  policy  not  only  in  Asia 
but  throughout  the  world. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Argentina 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Argentine  Republic,  Alejandro  Jose  Luis  Or- 
fila,  presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Nixon  on  February  1.  For  texts  of  the  Am- 
bassador's remarks  and  the  President's  re- 
ply, see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  February  1. 

Cyprus 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Cyprus,  Nicos  G.  Dimitriou,  pre- 
sented his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on 
February  1.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's 
remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see  De- 
partment of  State  press  release  dated  Feb- 
ruary 1. 

El  Salvador 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  El  Salvador,  Francisco  Bertrand 
Galindo,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Nixon  on  February  1.  For  texts  of  the 
Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's 


reply,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  February  1. 

Korea 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea,  Dr.  Pyong-choon  Hahm, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Nixon 
on  February  1.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassa- 
dor's remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  dated  Feb- 
ruary 1. 

Oman 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Sultanate  of  Oman,  Ahmed  Macki,  presented 
his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on  Febru- 
ary 1.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  re- 
marks and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  dated  February  1. 

Pakistan 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Islamic  Republic  of  Pakistan,  Sahabzada 
Yaqub  Khan,  presented  his  credentials  to 
President  Nixon  on  February  1.  For  texts  of 
the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  Presi- 
dent's reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  February  1. 

Tunisia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Tunisia,  Ali  Hedda,  presented  his 
credentials  to  President  Nixon  on  February 
1.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks 
and  the  President's  reply,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  dated  February  1. 

Zaire 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Zaire,  Mbeka  Makosso,  presented 
his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on  Febru- 
ary 1.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks 
and  the  President's  reply,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  dated  February  1. 


February  25,   1974 


191 


In  this  article  based  on  an  address  he  made  before  the  Inter- 
national Aviation  Club  at  Washington  on  January  22,  Mr. 
Waldmann,  who  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Trans- 
portation and  Telecoryimunications,  discusses  current  prob- 
lems and  policy  developments  in  the  field  of  international 
aviation. 


International  Aviation:     The  Fuel  Crisis  and  Other  Problems 


by  Raymond  J.  Waldmann 


If  something  seems  to  be  working  well,  as 
the  international  aviation  system  is,  I  believe 
it  should  be  left  alone.  When  changes  are 
necessary,  however,  we  should  not  hesitate 
to  make  them.  We  do  have  a  number  of  prob- 
lems these  days  which  require  attention.  I 
won't  produce  any  magic  formulas  or  pana- 
ceas for  solving  them,  but  will  explain  some 
actions  and  policies  to  deal  with  them. 

In  the  last  three  months  many  of  us  in  gov- 
ernment have  learned  far  more  about  petro- 
leum than  we  ever  wanted  to  know.  Middle 
distillate,  kerosene,  naphtha  based,  JP-4, 
bonded  fuel — all  these  terms  have  found 
their  way  into  our  vocabularies.  At  the  De- 
partment, we  first  learned  of  the  jet  fuel 
shortage  in  a  very  direct  way  around  Novem- 
ber 1  when  our  phones  began  to  light  up.  In 
the  first  10  days  of  November  we  set  about 
combating  problems  arising  from  forthcom- 
ing fuel  shortfalls  and  resultant  cutbacks  in 
service.  We  also  found  that  there  was  at 
least  some  disagreement  about  our  goals. 

We  at  the  Department  assumed,  for  exam- 
ple, that  we  live  in  an  interdependent  world. 
Each  nation  has  to  modify  its  own  activities 
to  the  extent  that  they  impinge  upon  other 
nations.  No  nation  in  1973,  we  believed,  was 
either  so  omnipotent  or  isolated  that  it  could 
chart  its  course  without  regard  to  the  effects 
on  other  nations. 

Further,  we  believed  that  international 
travel  and  commerce  are  important.  We  be- 
lieved that  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  United 


States  to  maintain  a  system  of  international 
aviation  services  with  other  countries.  We 
believed  that  this  system  has  in  law  and  in 
fact  no  greater  or  lesser  priority  than  our 
domestic  system — that  our  international  and 
domestic  economic  policies  are  intertwined. 
We  soon  learned  that  these  views  were  not 
universally  shared. 

Shortfalls  of  Bonded  Jet  Fuels 

Our  most  immediate  problem  in  mid-No- 
vember was  with  bonded  jet  fuels,  fuels  pro- 
duced outside  the  United  States,  held  in  bond 
at  U.S.  airports,  and  used  for  international 
flights.  Bonded  jet  fuels  were  projected  to 
have  far  greater  shortfalls  than  domestic 
fuels.  And  to  make  a  bad  situation  worse, 
the  projected  shortfalls  varied  widely.  Two 
of  the  four  major  suppliers  stated  that  they 
would  be  unable  to  meet  commitments  while 
two  others,  whose  supplies  came  from  Africa 
and  Venezuela,  said  they  had  few  problems. 
So  we  faced  the  real  possibility  that  between 
two  carriers  serving  the  same  international 
market,  one  carrier  would  continue  its  full 
schedule  while  the  other  carrier  might  be 
wiped  out. 

When  this  situation  became  widely  under- 
stood, foreign  ministries  around  the  world 
began  dialing  the  State  Department's  num- 
ber and  our  appointment  calendars  began  to 
bulge  with  Ambassadors  bearing  diplomatic 
protests.     We   had   many   specific   requests, 


192 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


hardship  cases,  and  just  plain  complaints  to 
handle.  Their  points  were  well  made.  In 
most  foreign  countries  there  was  no  distinc- 
tion between  domestic  and  bonded  fuels  and 
nondiscriminatory  treatment  was  being  ac- 
corded U.S.  airlines. 

Nations  requested  similar  treatment  from 
the  United  States.  Any  fine  lines  we  drew 
between  bonded  and  domestic  fuels  were 
viewed  as  thinly  veiled  attempts  to  discrim- 
inate against  foreign  carriers.  It  was  clear  to 
us  that  any  inequitable  treatment  of  foreign 
airlines  would  quickly  lead,  through  retali- 
ation, to  some  severing  of  international  avia- 
tion connections  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Quite  simply  put,  if  we  did  not  provide  for- 
eign-flag carriers  fuel  in  the  United  States 
they  would  cut  off  our  carriers  in  their  coun- 
tries. 

We  first  favored  the  allocation  or  sharing 
of  bonded  fuels  for  international  operations. 
Because  of  legal  and  other  difficulties  with 
this  solution  we  then  turned  to  other  methods 
of  assuring  carriers  fuel.  The  shortfalls  in 
bonded  fuel  will  be  made  up  through  the  use 
of  domestic  fuel,  and  bonded  fuel  itself  will 
not  be  allocated.  Shortfalls  expected  in 
bonded  fuel  can  be  made  up  by  relatively 
small  diversions  from  domestic  fuel  stocks. 

We  now  have  a  situation  we  can  live  with ; 
we  have  finally  given  birth  to  a  nondiscrim- 
inatory jet  fuel  program.  This  will  aid  us 
immensely  in  protecting  our  carriers  over- 
seas from  arbitrary  restrictions  and  discrim- 
inatory policy  in  other  countries.  That  the 
public  can  still  fly  overseas  today  with  rela- 
tive ease  has  been  no  small  accomplishment 
and  one  that  brings  us  a  certain  satisfaction. 

But  we're  not  completely  out  of  the  woods 
yet.  The  most  crucial  problem  now  is  the 
price  of  fuel.  Bonded  fuel  will  have  to  find 
its  international  level  if  it  is  to  continue  to 
flow  to  the  United  States.  The  question  of 
finding  an  equitable  pricing  system  for  both 
domestic  and  international  airlines  remains 
unanswered.  Regardless  of  the  price  of 
domestic  fuel  for  international  carriers,  the 
net  effect  of  all  this  will  be  a  dramatic  in- 
crease in  the  airlines'  fuel  bill  and  higher 
prices  for  foreign  travel.  The  impact  on 
international    traffic    could    be    substantial. 


coming  as  it  does  at  a  time  of  generally  soft- 
ening travel  markets. 


Problem   of   Excess  Airline   Capacity 

The  fuel  crisis  came  at  us  when  many  felt 
that  there  was  already  excess  airline  capacity 
— that  is,  too  many  flights — in  some  interna- 
tional markets.  With  the  blessings  of  the 
Civil  Aeronautics  Board  (CAB),  U.S.  and 
foreign  airlines  have  already  reached  agree- 
ment to  reduce  capacity  in  some  markets  and 
have  eliminated  flights  unilaterally  in  others. 
Airlines  are  also  restructuring  part  of  the 
U.S.  international  air  transport  system.  Ex- 
amples include  the  proposed  PanAm-TWA 
route  swap  involving  Ireland  and  East  Africa 
and  the  proposed  exchange  of  South  Pacific 
and  Caribbean  routes  between  PanAm  and 
American.  The  underlying  causes  for  these 
swaps  predate  the  fuel  crisis,  but  they  may 
have  been  accelerated  by  it. 

Under  the  Bermuda  system,'  which  this 
country  has  espoused  for  over  25  years,  gov- 
ernments agree  to  allow  competition  in  avia- 
tion rather  than  enforcing  rigid  bilateral  reg- 
ulation. Do  capacity  agreements  and  route 
swaps  mark  the  demise  of  the  Bermuda  sys- 
tem? There  may  be  some  who  think  it  is  high 
time  we  scrapped  it.  The  fact  is  that,  how- 
ever, while  the  basic  principles  of  Bermuda 
have  not  changed,  our  application  of  those 
principles  throughout  the  years  has  not  been 
immutable.  For  example,  we  have  been  able 
to  conclude  Bermuda-type  air  transport 
agreements  with  a  number  of  countries — 
such  as  Italy,  Spain,  and  Iran,  to  mention  a 
few — whose  aviation  philosophy  is  quite  dif- 
ferent from  ours.  We  have  satisfied  these 
countries  as  to  U.S.-airline  capacity  plans. 
And  of  course  we  now  have  part  213  of  the 
CAB  regulations,  which  permits  the  United 
States  to  retaliate  against  foreign  airlines 
whose  governments  are  restricting  our  op- 
erating rights. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  basic  elements  of 
the  Bermuda  system  are  dead  or  even  dying. 
These  principles  derive  from  our  common 


'  For  text  of  the  final  act  of  the  U.S.-U.K.  confer- 
ence on  civil  aviation  held  in  Bermuda  Jan.  15-Feb. 
11,  1946,  see  BulIuETIN  of  Apr.  7,  1946,  p.  584. 


February  25,    1974 


193 


conception  that  governments  should  not  be  in 
the  business  of  making  commercial  decisions. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  should  not  forget  that 
Bermuda  is  a  system  of  regulation.  Conse- 
quently, just  as  it  seems  that  the  nature  and 
extent  of  domestic  regulation  may  be  chang- 
ing, so  it  may  be  internationally. 

The  Department  and  other  concerned 
agencies  are  initiating  a  study,  utilizing  the 
services  of  outside  research  groups,  to  deter- 
mine what  changes  in  U.S.  policies,  if  any, 
are  necessary  to  meet  the  new  challenges. 
Moreover,  we  are  also  examining  means  to 
put  teeth  into  the  standard  provisions  of  bi- 
lateral agreements  which  deal  with  excess 
capacity.  We  are  particularly  concerned 
about  excess  capacity  dedicated  to  carrying 
fifth-  or  sixth-freedom  traffic,  traffic  outside 
the  primary  market  between  the  bilateral 
partners.  When  this  government  gets  itself 
equipped  with  the  appropriate  tools,  we  may 
be  able  to  talk  to  our  bilateral  partners  about 
this  kind  of  problem  with  something  more 
than  moral  indignation. 


Negotiation   of   Route  Agreements 

Anyone  who  has  kept  a  tabulation  of  U.S. 
air  transport  negotiations  over  the  last  few 
years  will  have  noted  that  almost  all  of  them 
have  ended  without  agreement.  This  does  not 
reflect  some  basic  difficulty  in  the  process  of 
negotiating;  it  does  reflect  the  fact  that  we 
are  insisting  on  getting  as  much  as  we  give. 
The  reason  is  quite  simple:  In  recent  times 
quite  a  few  countries,  including  some  in 
larger  markets,  have  been  getting  more  out 
of  bilateral  agreements  than  we  think  they 
are  due,  both  in  terms  of  revenues  and  in 
terms  of  balance  of  payments. 

Not  only  are  we  turning  these  countries 
away  when  they  ask  for  more ;  we  are  trying 
to  do  something  to  correct  those  agreements 
which  are  grossly  inequitable.  Since  in  most 
cases  there  is  nothing  additional  we  want,  the 
only  means  of  correcting  the  imbalance 
would  be  to  take  away  rights  foreign  coun- 
tries already  have,  a  difficult  solution  at 
best — although  we  do  have  the  option  to  de- 
nounce and  renegotiate  an  agreement.  We 
are  acutely  conscious  of  the  problem,  and  we 


do  not  attempt  to  push  it  under  the  rug  sim- 
ply because  it  is  hard  to  solve. 

The  Department  is  also  determined  to  pro- 
tect our  airline  services  abroad  and  to  ex- 
pand them  where  it  is  in  the  U.S.  interest. 
However,  in  a  world  where  few  things  are 
free  we  have  to  pay  for  what  we  want.  With- 
in this  government  there  is  not  always  a 
unanimous  view  whether  the  price  paid  is 
worth  the  benefit  achieved.  I  have  found  that 
these  differences  tend  to  be  more  over  a  prin- 
ciple than  over  a  pragmatic  calculation  of  the 
dollars-and-cents  value.  One  may  question 
whether  the  price  we  are  asked  to  pay  is  jus- 
tified in  order  that  U.S.  airlines  may  serve 
the  far  corners  of  the  globe.  Is  it  really  nec- 
essary for  either  commercial  or  national  in- 
terest reasons  for  U.S.  airlines  to  sei've  just 
about  every  country  there  is? 


Foreign   Restrictive   Practices 

Capacity  and  routes  are  the  basic  questions 
of  our  international  services,  but  we  are  be- 
coming increasingly  concerned  by  foreign  re- 
strictive practices  which  impair  the  ability  of 
our  carriers  to  get  a  fair  crack  at  the  foreign 
market.  The  use  of  restrictions  to  achieve 
what  cannot  be  achieved  openly  is  not  con- 
fined to  international  aviation.  The  nontariff 
barrier,  after  all,  was  widespread  in  Europe 
during  the  1930's,  when  international  avia- 
tion was  in  its  infancy. 

The  subject  has,  however,  been  given  re- 
cent prominence  by  virtue  of  a  report  pi-e- 
pared  by  the  CAB  from  reports  supplied 
from  our  Embassies  abroad.  In  our  view, 
foreign  restrictive  practices  fall  into  two  cat- 
egories. 

First,  there  are  those  practices  which  are 
so  embedded  in  the  cultural,  social,  or  politi- 
cal way  of  life  of  a  country  that  there  is  little 
or  nothing  we  can  reasonably  do  to  change 
them,  no  matter  how  foreign  they  may  be  to 
our  thinking.  Socialist  countries  refuse  to  al- 
low foreign  enterprises  to  sell  tickets  for  lo- 
cal currency.  Foreign  governments  may  en- 
courage preferential  treatment  for  their  air- 
lines or  monopolize  domestic-origin  traffic. 
Since  the  practice  cannot  be  changed  by  any 


194 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


action  on  our  part,  the  only  remedy  is  to  ad- 
just the  benefits  under  the  agreement  ac- 
cordingly and  decrease  the  ability  of  the  for- 
eign airline  to  penetrate  the  U.S.  market.  We 
have  followed  this  course  in  our  air  transport 
agreements  with  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries, for  example. 

The  second  category  contains  practices 
adopted  by  regulation  or  order  of  a  foreign 
government  which  could  be  rescinded  if  the 
United  States  had  effective  means  to  retali- 
ate. This  may  include  practices  such  as  re- 
quiring that  ground  handling  be  performed 
by  the  national  airline  or  a  government- 
controlled  monopoly.  And  of  course  in  our 
free  enterprise  economy  the  U.S.  Government 
cannot  force  compensating  actions  such  as 
having  foreign  airlines  contract  with  partic- 
ular companies  for  ground  handling  in  the 
United  States.  Foreign  governments  may  re- 
fuse to  allow  reasonable  remittance  of  reve- 
nues or  may  grant  tax  or  foreign  exchange 
advantages  to  travelers  using  foreign  airlines 
while  denying  the  same  advantages  to  travel- 
ers on  U.S.  airlines.  The  efi'ective  means  of 
retaliation  are  not  easy  to  find,  however,  be- 
cause finance  authorities  around  the  world 
seem  to  be  impervious  to  aviation  considera- 
tions. 

We  must  look  elsewhere  for  effective  lever- 
age; this  probably  means  doing  something  to 
the  schedules  of  the  foreign  airlines.  In  new 
agreements,  we  are  insisting  on  "doing  busi- 
ness" provisions  which  guarantee  the  remit- 
tance of  revenues,  the  right  to  sell  tickets  and 
post  employees  abroad,  and  so  on.  The  United 
States  itself  cannot  adopt  discriminatory 
practices  if  it  expects  others  to  forgo  this 
form  of  protectionism.  Other  countries  have 
been  quick  to  point  out,  for  example,  that  the 
Domestic  International  Sales  Corporation 
law,  which  gives  a  minimal  but  clearly  pref- 
erential tax  break  to  U.S.  export  companies 
which  ship  on  U.S.-flag  aircraft,  is  discrim- 
inatory, in  their  view.  We  must  keep  our  own 
house  in  order. 

Charter  Services 

In  the  Department  we  have  taken  very  se- 
riously the  statement  approved  by  the  Presi- 


dent that  "Charter  services  are  a  most  val- 
uable component  of  the  international  air 
tiansportation  system,  and  they  should  be  en- 
couraged." - 

We  have  sought  to  achieve  the  regular iza- 
tion  of  charter  services  through  intergovern- 
mental agreements  called  for  by  the  policy 
statement.  I  suspect  at  times  that  some  may 
have  wished  we  displayed  somewhat  less  zeal 
in  this  pursuit.  We  are  convinced  of  the  im- 
portance of  charters  as  a  way  of  making  in- 
ternational travel  available  at  reasonable 
prices  to  a  great  part  of  the  public.  Our 
scheduled  carriers,  as  well,  have  found  char- 
ter operations  to  be  an  important  part  of 
their  business.  It  was  through  the  energetic 
charter  activities  of  both  scheduled  and  non- 
scheduled  carriers  that  the  U.S.-flag  share  of 
North  Atlantic  travel  overall  has  improved 
at  a  time  when  our  share  of  the  scheduled 
market  remained  constant. 

Within  the  last  year  we  were  able  to  ne- 
gotiate successfully  the  first  comprehensive 
bilateral  agreement  on  charters  with  Yugo- 
slavia and  agreements  with  Canada  and  Jor- 
dan. These  agreements,  while  significant  as 
precedents,  do  not  cover  the  major  travel 
markets  for  the  United  States.  A  recent  de- 
velopment of  perhaps  greater  importance  is 
the  decision  of  the  European  Civil  Aviation 
Conference.  ECAC  has  expressed  willingness 
to  reconsider  its  recommendation  against  its 
members'  negotiating  bilateral  charter  agree- 
ments with  us.  Further  work  with  ECAC  is 
required,  but  we  intend  to  pursue  energetic- 
ally our  goal  to  negotiate  agreements  on 
charters  with  our  important  aviation  part- 
ners. 

This  past  year,  too,  has  seen  an  important 
experiment  in  the  charter  field  with  the  ad- 
vent of  the  "advance  booking  charter,"  which 
allows  individuals  to  participate,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  in  nonscheduled  flights.  The 
Department  has  played  a  leading  role  first  in 
establishing  the  international  principles  in 
the  so-called  Ottawa  Declaration  and  subse- 
quently in  negotiating  specific  bilateral  ar- 


'  For  a  statement  by  President  Nixon  issued  on 
June  22,  1970,  and  a  statement  of  international  air 
transportation  policy,  see  Bulletin  of  July  20,  1970, 
p.  86. 


February  25,   1974 


195 


rangements  with  European  countries.^ 

We  are  very  much  aware  that  the  returns 
are  not  yet  in  on  this  experiment.  Charters  of 
affinity  groups  such  as  clubs,  churches,  and 
so  on,  have  until  recently  been  the  major  ve- 
hicle for  promoting  low-cost  travel,  but  they 
are  nonetheless  discriminatory  and  are  a 
headache  because  they  invite  abuses. 

It  is  our  hope  that  the  experiment  will  be 
successful  and  that  the  advance  booking  con- 
cept will  become  the  basic  international  form 
of  charter.  Until  that  happens,  however,  we 
must  maintain  the  affinity  charter  because  so 
many  of  our  citizens  now  depend  on  it.  We 
are  pleased  that  the  Europeans  have  decided 
to  permit  U.S.-origin  affinity  charters  to  con- 
tinue despite  their  decision  to  discontinue 
European-origin  affinities. 

Need  for  Simplified  Tare  Structure 

For  a  while  last  year  it  looked  as  if  we  had 
discovered  an  airfare  equivalent  of  the  sun- 
spot  theory  of  the  business  cycle.  It  looked  as 
if  we  would  have  an  open-rate  confrontation 
over  the  North  Atlantic  about  every  10  years; 
that  is,  operations  without  international 
agreement  about  rates.  The  aviation  commu- 
nity found  it  necessary  last  spring  to  con- 
tinue a  fare  pattern  not  really  supported  by 
anyone,  because  neither  the  International  Air 
Transport  Association  (lATA)  nor  govern- 
ments could  agree  on  new,  imaginative  solu- 
tions. 

On  the  substance  of  the  issue  we  have  sup- 
ported and  will  continue  to  support  the  CAB 
in  seeking  a  simplified  structure  that  the  pub- 
lic can  understand.  We  believe  that  the  struc- 
ture should  realistically  reflect  costs  and 
more  fairly  weigh  the  comparative  values  of 
products  offered.  One  class  of  passengers 
should  not  subsidize  the  travel  of  another. 

Nevertheless  we  must  remind  ourselves 
that  international  aviation  is  in  fact  interna- 
tional. In  a  complicated  world  of  nations, 
jealous  over  their  sovereignties,  few  if  any 
are  quite  ready  to  accept  the  principle  that 
all  wisdom  is  located  at  a  particular  set  of 


"  For  background  and  text  of  the  declaration,  see 
Bulletin  of  Jan.  1,  1973  p.  20. 


latitude  and  longitude  coordinates.  In  other 
words,  no  one  government  can  impose  its 
views  upon  the  rest.  We  must  insist,  how- 
ever, that  other  governments  deal  with  us 
fairly  and  objectively  in  finding  a  construc- 
tive middle  ground.  Given  the  range  of  social 
and  economic  views  in  this  field,  the  task  is 
not  simple.  It  will  require  the  patient  and 
dedicated  and  creative  cooperation  of  all  con- 
cerned to  maintain  a  healthy  international 
air  transport  system. 

Following  these  precepts,  the  latest  North 
Atlantic  fare  package  is  an  improvement. 
More  importantly  from  our  point  of  view,  it 
was  achieved  without  confrontation  and 
without  the  open-rate  situation  which  some 
feared  was  looming  over  us.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  what  ideas  lATA  can  produce,  not  only 
to  deal  with  the  annual  fare  problem  but  also 
the  restructuring  of  routes,  costs,  and  serv- 
ices that  might  flow  in  the  wake  of  the  energy 
crisis. 


Dealing   With   Hijacking 

We  had  a  good  year  in  1973  in  one  respect: 
Hijacking  in  the  United  States  dropped  to 
zero.  However,  periodic  incidents  arising 
abroad  dramatically  and  painfully  highlight 
the  need  for  improved  aviation  security 
throughout  the  world. 

Just  before  Christmas,  30  travelers  quietly 
waiting  at  the  Rome  airport  were  suddenly 
and  senselessly  killed  in  a  savage  terrorist  at- 
tack on  a  Pan  American  plane.  These  passen- 
gers had  little  in  common,  certainly  not  na- 
tionality, race,  religion,  or  politics.  In  fact, 
the  only  thing  they  did  have  in  common  was 
that  they  were  all  travelers.  It  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  the  Rome  attack  was  universally 
condemned;  for  example,  the  Saudi  Arabian 
Foreign  Ministry  characterized  the  act  as 
criminal  and  one  which  "none  but  the  worst 
enemies  of  the  Arab  and  Islamic  nations 
could  commit." 

Combating  hijacking  is  not  a  simple  prob- 
lem. There  are  political  forces  which  inhibit 
the  governments  from  taking  the  forthright 
action  necessary  to  make  air  travel  secure. 
The  fruitless  and  frustrating  attempt  at  the 


196 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


International  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO)  Conference  in  Rome  last  year  to  de- 
velop an  enforcement  convention  confirmed 
the  strength  of  these  forces.  We  were  ex- 
tremely disappointed  by  this  setback,  but  we 
are  not  discouraged.  We  intend  to  continue 
vigorous  efforts  to  combat  hijacking,  to 
tighten  physical  security  measures,  to  en- 
courage ICAO  to  be  more  active,  and  to  pur- 
sue efforts  with  other  nations  to  find  a  more 
effective  legal  structure  for  dealing  with 
criminals  who  threaten  international  aviation 
security. 


Maintaining   and   Expanding   Aerospace   Exports 

There  used  to  be  a  fable  passed  around  to 
the  effect  that  the  State  Department  was 
only  interested  in  air  transport;  the  aircraft 
manufacturers  were  said  to  be  left  in  a  state 
of  benign  neglect.  This  myth  was  already 
outdated  when  I  came  to  the  Department 
some  10  months  ago,  but  I  would  like  to  make 
it  clear  that  aerospace  exports  are  of  major 
concern  to  the  Department  and  to  our  Em- 
bassies abroad. 

As  those  who  work  in  the  aerospace  indus- 
try or  follow  it  know,  the  risks  in  aerospace 
are  not  all  concentrated  on  the  astronauts. 
Since  1968,  employment  in  this  key  U.S.  in- 
dustry has  dropped  a  staggering  42  percent. 
Even  in  1973,  which  was  on  the  whole  a  good 
year  for  the  industry,  employment  dropped 
3  percent  below  1972.  The  one  bright  spot  in 
this  picture  has  been  the  growth  of  exports, 
which  expanded  38  percent  in  1973  to  reach 
an  alltime  peak.  The  net  result  of  this  slow- 
ing down  of  overall  production  and  increase 
in  exports  has  been  an  industry  increasingly 
dependent  on  foreign  sales.  Last  year  they 
constituted  almost  40  percent  of  total  mili- 
tary and  civilian  aircraft  shipments,  up  from 
20  percent  in  1968.  It  has  been  estimated  that 
161,000  full-time  jobs  in  the  aerospace  indus- 
try depend  on  exports.  It  is  our  objective  to 
maintain  and  expand  what  has  become  the 
largest  positive  industrial  element  in  the  U.S. 
balance  of  trade. 

The  maintenance  of  a  high  level  of  U.S. 
aerospace  exports  is  important  to  the  United 


States,  but  it  is  also  an  asset  to  the  air  trans- 
port industry  and  to  the  traveling  public 
everywhere.  Aerospace  development  costs 
and  fuel  costs  are  skyrocketing  here  and 
abroad.  Our  commercial  advantages  from  de- 
valuation may  be  transitory.  The  benefits  of 
the  U.S.  industry's  efficiency  and  long  pro- 
duction runs  are  important  to  all  nations  de- 
siring inexpensive  and  safe  air  transporta- 
tion. New  possibilities  are  opening  up  in 
Eastern  Europe  and  in  the  People's  Republic 
of  China.  These  markets  pose  special  prob- 
lems for  the  industry  and  the  government  on 
which  we  have  to  work  together  closely. 

In  this  review  of  the  international  aviation 
scene,  I  have  touched  on  a  number  of  issues. 
In  my  view,  the  system,  international  avia- 
tion, and  the  policies  are  in  pretty  good 
shape.  We  have  problems,  of  course;  we  have 
new  issues  to  deal  with;  and  we  will  have  to 
adjust  to  future  events.  I  think  we  can  take 
these  problems  in  stride. 


Authorization  of  Funds  for  Defense 
Articles  and  Services  for  Portugal 

Presidential  Determination  No.  74-7 ' 
Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  State 
Presidential  Determination — Portugal 

November  2,  1973. 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  Section 
614(a)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as 
amended,  I  hereby: 

(a)  Determine  the  use  of  not  to  exceed  $1,000,000 
in  FY  1974  for  the  grant  of  defense  articles,  defense 
services  and  training  to  Portugal,  without  regard  to 
Section  620 (m)  of  the  Act,  is  important  to  the  secu- 
rity of  the  United  States;  and 

(b)  Authorize  such  use  up  to  $1,000,000  for  the 
grant  of  defense  articles,  defense  services  and  train- 
ing to  Portugal,  without  regard  to  the  limitations  of 
Section  620(m)  of  the  Act. 

This  determination  shall  be  published  in  the  Fed- 
eral Register. 


(J2jl^^"K:/^ 


'  39  Fed.  Reg.  1423. 


February  25,   1974 


197 


U.S.   Announces   1975-76  Pledge 
to  U.N.-FAO  World  Food   Program 

Following  is  a  statement  made  before  the 
pledging  conference  of  the  World  Food  Pro- 
gram (WFP)  at  the  United  Nations  on  Feb- 
ruary Jf  by  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Agriculture  Richard  E.  Bell,  who  was  head 
of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  pledging  confer- 
ence. 

USUN  press  release  6  dated  February  4 

As  a  primary  sponsor  and  major  supporter 
of  the  World  Food  Program,  the  United 
States  attaches  special  significance  to  this 
sixth  opportunity  to  participate  in  a  pledg- 
ing conference.  We  join  the  community  of 
nations  in  marking  the  beginning  of  the 
World  Food  Program's  second  decade  of  pro- 
viding help  and  hope  for  millions  of  people 
throughout  the  world. 

It  is  a  tribute  to  the  Program's  initiative 
and  vitality  that  during  a  period  of  world 
commodity  supply  problems  the  World  Food 
Program  has  apparently  exceeded  its  1973- 
74  pledging  target  by  some  $15  million. 

Prospects  for  record  production  of  world 
grain  and  oilseed  crops  this  year  give  rise  to 
optimism.  However,  the  combination  of  in- 
creasing populations,  sharply  reduced  global 
stocks,  the  push  toward  impi-oved  diets,  and 
the  need  for  replenishing  and  building  stocks 
is  expected  to  result  in  tight  supplies  for  the 
immediate  future.  In  this  connection,  Secre- 
tary of  Agriculture  [Earl  L.]  Butz  empha- 
sized, in  addressing  the  Food  and  Agricul- 
ture Organization's  biennial  conference  last 
November,  that  the  food  supply  involves 
more  than  just  the  visible  amount  of  a  com- 
modity. It  involves  the  capacity  of  soil  to 
produce,  the  often  capricious  influences  of 
weather,  the  ability  of  people  to  take  the 
product,  process  it,  transport  it,  and  make  it 
available  to  people  at  prices  they  can  afford 
to  pay.  It  requires  the  total  cooperative  effort 
of  not  only  food  producers,  consumers,  and 
traders  but  of  those  who  also  provide  the  ba- 
sic inputs  for  food  production. 


I  believe  we  can  agree  that  as  our  mutual 
problems  have  become  more  clearly  identified, 
our  concern  over  them  has  sharpened  and  ac- 
tions toward  reaching  acceptable  resolutions 
are  showing  more  promise.  FAO's  leadership 
in  dealing  with  the  possibilities  for  minimum 
world  food  security  and  the  joint  efforts  of 
the  United  Nations,  FAO,  and  other  world 
bodies  in  preparing  for  the  World  Food  Con- 
ference in  November  1974  give  hope  and 
promise  to  the  objective  of  more  adequate 
food  supplies. 

Too,  we  have  seen  in  the  World  Food  Pro- 
gram an  excellent  example  of  how  a  multi- 
lateral organization  can  take  effective  action 
in  meeting  the  needs  and  alleviating  the  suf- 
fering of  people.  As  noted  in  Dr.  Aquino's 
[Francisco  Aquino,  Executive  Director  of  the 
World  Food  Program]  report  to  the  24th  ses- 
sion of  the  Intergovernmental  Committee,  the 
World  Food  Program  has  committed  over 
$1.5  billion  to  development  projects  and 
emergency  operations  involving  over  25  mil- 
lion people  and  including  nearly  100  coun- 
tries. 

While  WFP's  pledging  target  has  increased 
from  its  original  target  of  $100  million  (for 
a  three-year  period)  to  the  current  target  of 
$440  million  for  the  1975-76  biennium,  the 
Program  has  not  been  able  to  avoid  hardships 
during  the  year  just  ended.  For  the  first  time 
since  its  inception,  the  Program's  Executive 
Director  could  not  present  new  projects  for 
approval  of  the  Intergovernmental  Commit- 
tee because  of  a  reduction  in  resources  avail- 
able to  the  Program.  Although  representing 
a  significant  increase,  the  $440  million  target 
may  not  call  forward  the  volume  of  commodi- 
ties represented  by  the  previous  $340  million 
target  because  of  expected  higher  prices.  The 
minimum  nature  of  the  $440  million  target 
was  stressed  in  Dr.  Aquino's  recent  letter  to 
states  members  of  the  United  Nations  and  of 
FAO.  In  short,  the  need  is  greater  and  the 
obligation  broader  than  can  be  accommodated 
through  traditional  sources. 

Against  this  background,  I  turn  to  our 
pledge  to  the  World  Food  Program  for  the 
1975-76  biennium.  The  United  States  pledges 


198 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


commodities,  shipping  services,  and  cash  up 
to  a  total  of  $140  million  toward  the  $440 
million  pledge  target  for  the  1975-76  period. 
This  pledge  includes  up  to  $97  million  in  com- 
modities, subject  to  the  condition  that  the 
U.S.  contribution  does  not  exceed  32  percent 
of  the  total  contributions  from  all  govern- 
ments in  commodities  and  in  cash  used  for 
the  purchase  of  commodities. 

The  United  States  will  also  furnish  ship- 
ping services  to  transport  all  of  the  commodi- 
ties provided  by  the  United  States  to  the 
World  Food  Program.  The  value  of  such  serv- 
ices is  presently  estimated  at  $40  million  for 
the  $97  million  worth  of  commodities.  The 
United  States  will  also  contribute  $3  million 
in  cash,  which  may  be  utilized  together  with 
cash  pledges  of  other  nations,  to  provide  ad- 
ministrative direction  of  the  Program  for  the 
1975-76  biennium. 

Our  pledge  makes  real  our  traditionally 
stated  desire  to  give  WFP  a  truly  multilat- 
eral character  and  to  encourage  both  present 
and  new  donors  to  respond  more  fully  to 
WFP  requirements.  It  mirrors  our  continued 
strong  support  of  multilateral  aid  through 
WFP  and  our  sensitivity  to  those  in  need. 
It  is  made  possible  by  our  free,  incentive- 
oriented  farm  economy. 

This  pledge,  it  must  be  recognized,  is  sub- 
ject to  the  availability  of  funds  and  com- 
modities. The  kinds  and  quantities  of  com- 
modities to  be  supplied  are  to  be  worked  out 
with  the  Executive  Director  of  the  WFP  on 
the  basis  of  requirements  and  availabilities  at 
the  time  the  commodities  are  needed  and  in 
accordance  with  the  applicable  U.S.  laws  and 
regulations.  For  planning  purposes,  WFP 
may  assume  that  the  kinds  of  commodities 
that  will  be  provided  by  the  United  States 
will  likely  be  the  same  as  those  provided  in 
the  past. 

Although  one  cannot  be  certain  about  the 
future,  let  me  say  that  we  look  forward  to 
continuing  cooperation  with  other  nations 
participating  in  the  World  Food  Program 
and  that  we  regard  the  level  of  interest 
shown  here  today  as  a  favorable  omen  for 
the  Program's  future. 


U.S.  and  Mexico  Agree  on  Proposed 
1974  Tuna  Conservation  Program 

Joint  U.S.-Mexico  Statement  ' 

Delegations  representing  the  United  States 
and  Mexico  met  in  Mexico  City  from  January 
29  to  February  1,  1974,  to  study  the  system 
for  the  control  of  yellowfin  tuna  fishing  in  the 
eastern  tropical  Pacific  during  1974.  The 
talks  between  the  delegations  were  the  result 
of  an  agreement  reached  at  the  15th  Inter- 
governmental Meeting  on  the  Conservation 
of  Yellowfin  Tuna,  the  last  phase  of  which 
took  place  in  Washington,  D.C.,  in  December 
1973. 

A  draft  resolution  agreed  upon  by  the  two 
delegations  will  be  forwarded  for  approval  to 
the  Governments  of  Canada,  Costa  Rica, 
France,  Japan,  Nicaragua  and  Panama, 
which  participated  in  the  Intergovernmental 
Meeting  and  are  members  of  the  Inter-Amer- 
ican Tropical  Tuna  Commission  [lATTC]. 
If  these  Governments  approve  the  resolution, 
it  will  be  implemented  by  the  Commission. 

Under  the  agreement,  the  fishing  season 
will  be  divided  into  two  periods,  the  first  of 
which  will  be  a  free  fishing  season  in  which 
the  fleets  of  all  member  countries  will  be  able 
to  fish  for  yellowfin  tuna  without  restriction. 
In  the  second,  closed  season,  vessels  of  these 
fleets  of  less  than  400  tons  capacity  will  be 
permitted  to  fish  up  to  a  limit  of  6,000  tons 
per  country.  Lastly,  the  agreement  provides 
that  vessels  with  special  problems  will  be 
permitted  to  fish  during  the  closed  season  up 
to  a  limit  of  8,000  tons  of  yellowfin  tuna. 
The  participating  delegations  at  all  times 
sought  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the  tuna 
resource. 

The  Mexican  delegation  was  headed  by 
Ambassador  Fernando  Castro  y  Castro,  Di- 
rector General  of  the  Secretariat  of  External 
Relations,  and  included  also  Minister  Joaquin 
Mercado,  of  that  Secretariat,  as  well  as  Mexi- 
can lATTC  Commissioners  Arturo  Diaz 
Rojo,  Pedro  Mercado,  Amin  Zarur  and  Luis 


'  Issued  at  Mexico  City  and  Washington  on  Feb.  5 
(press  release  40). 


February  25,   1974 


199 


Garcia  Cacho,  all  of  the  Secretariat  of  Indus- 
try and  Commerce. 

The  delegation  of  the  United  States  was 
headed  by  Wilvan  G.  Van  Campen,  of  the 
Office  of  the  Special  Assistant  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Fisheries  and  Wildlife,  and 
included  also  U.S.  lATTC  Commissioners 
John  G.  Driscoll,  Jr.,  Steven  Schanes,  Donald 
P.  Loker  and  Robert  C.  Macdonald,  as  well  as 
John  L.  Martin  and  Mary  Beth  West  of  the 
Department  of  State,  George  B.  Rees  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Mexico,  Gerald  V.  Howard, 
Brian  S.  Hallman  and  William  W.  Fox  of  the 
Department  of  Commerce,  and  Doyle  E. 
Gates  of  the  State  of  California. 

First  Secretary  Yoichi  Watanabe  of  the 
Japanese  Embassy  in  Mexico  attended  as  ob- 
server and  Dr.  James  Joseph,  lATTC  Direc- 
tor of  Research,  acted  as  adviser  to  the 
meeting. 

Representatives  of  various  elements  of  the 
tuna  industries  of  both  countries,  including 
officers  of  vessel  owners'  associations,  proc- 
essing companies,  cooperatives  and  fisher- 
men's unions,  attended  the  sessions  as 
advisers  to  their  respective  government  dele- 
gations. 


Mrs.  Hutar  Named  U.S.  Representative 
on  U.N.  Status  of  Women  Commission 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
January  3  (press  release  3)  that  Mrs.  Pa- 
tricia Hutar  had  been  sworn  in  that  day  as 
U.S.  Representative  on  the  Commission  of 
the  Status  of  Women  of  the  United  Nations 
Economic  and  Social  Council.  (For  bio- 
graphic data,  see  press  release  3.)  Mrs.  Hu- 
tar's  initial  assignment  was  to  represent  the 
United  States  at  the  25th  session  of  the  Com- 
mission on  the  Status  of  Women  January 
14-31  at  the  United  Nations  in  New  York. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Meteorology 

Convention   of  the   World  Meteorological   Organiza- 
tion. Done  at  Washington   October  11,  1947.   En- 
tered into  force  March  23,  1950.  TIAS  2052. 
Accession  deposited:  Liberia,  February  7,  1974. 

BILATERAL 


Chile 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  resched- 
uling of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaranteed,  or  in- 
sured by  the  United  States  Government  and  its 
agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington  Feb- 
ruary 6,  1974.  Entered  into  force  February  6,  1974. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  resched- 
uling of  payments  under  P.L.  480  title  I  agricul- 
tural commodity  agreements,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Washington  February  6,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
February  6,  1974. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  resched- 
uling of  certain  debts  owed  to  the  Agency  for  In- 
ternational Development  (AID)  pursuant  to  cer- 
tain loan  agreements,  with  schedules.  Signed  at 
Washington  February  6,  1974.  Enters  into  force, 
except  as  AID  may  otherwise  agree  in  writing, 
when  Chile,  within  30  days  from  date  of  signature 
of  agreement,  furnishes  to  AID,  in  form  and  sub- 
stance satisfactory  to  ATD,  a  legal  opinion  of 
counsel  satisfactory  to  AID  that  this  agreement 
has  been  duly  authorized  or  ratified  by,  and  exe- 
cuted and  delivered  on  behalf  of,  Chile  and  consti- 
tutes a  valid  and  legally  binding  obligation  of  Chile 
in  accordance  with  its  terms. 

Spain 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  the  contin- 
ued operation  and  expansion  of  the  space  vehicle 
tracking  and  communications  station  on  the  Island 
of  Gran  Canaria  of  April  14,  1966  (TIAS  6003). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Madrid  January 
15,  1974.  Entered  into  force  January  15,  1974. 


200 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     February  25,  197 Jt     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1809 


Agriculture.  U.S.  Announces  1975-76  Pledge  to 

U.N.-FAO  World  Food  Program  (Bell)     .     .       198 

Argentina.  Letters  of  Credence   (Orfila)      .     .       191 

Asia.  America  and  Asia:  The  Old  and  the  New 

(Rush)        186 

Aviation.    International    Aviation:    The    Fuel 

Crisis  and  Other  Problems  (Waldmann)    .     .       192 

Cyprus.  Letters  of  Credence  (Dimitriou)     .     .       191 

Economic  Affairs 

America    and    Asia:    The    Old    and    the    New 

(Rush)        186 

International   Aviation:    The   Fuel   Crisis   and 

Other  Problems   (Waldmann) 192 

U.S.  and  Mexico  Agree  on  Proposed  1974  Tuna 

Conservation  Program  (joint  statement)     .       199 

El  Salvador.  Letters  of  Credence  (Bertrand 
Galindo) 191 

Energy.     International     Aviation:     The     Fuel 

Crisis  and  Other  Problems  (Waldmann)    .     .       192 

Foreign  Aid 

Authorization  of  Funds  for  Defense  Articles 
and  Services  for  Portugal  (Presidential  de- 
termination)     197 

U.S.  Announces  1975-76  Pledge  to  U.N.-FAO 

World  Food  Program  (Bell) 198 

Japan.  America  and   Asia:   The   Old   and   the 

New  (Rush) 186 

Korea.  Letters  of  Credence  (Hahm)     ....       191 

Latin  America.  U.S.  and  Panama  Agree  on 
Principles  for  Negotiation  of  New  Panama 
Canal  Treaty  (Kissinger,  joint  statement)    .       181 

Mexico.  U.S.  and  Mexico  Agree  on  Proposed 
1974  Tuna  Conservation  Program  (joint 
statement) 199 

Oman.  Letters  of  Credence  (Macki)     ....       191 

Pakistan.  Letters  of  Credence  (Yaqub  Khan)   .       191 

Panama.  U.S.  and  Panama  Agree  on  Princi- 
ples for  Negotiation  of  New  Panama  Canal 
Treaty  (Kissinger,  joint  statement)     .     .     .       181 

Portugal.  Authorization  of  Funds  for  Defense 
Articles  and  Services  for  Portugal  (Presi- 
dential determination) 197 

Presidential  Documents.  Authorization  of 
Funds  for  Defense  Articles  and  Services  for 
Portugal  (Presidential  determination)      .     .       197 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions   ....       200 

Tunisia.  Letters  of  Credence  (Hedda)     .     .     .       191 

U.S.S.R.  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
Visits  Washington  (communique)     ....       185 

United  Nations 

Mrs.    Hutar   Named   U.S.   Representative   on 

U.N.  Status  of  Women  Commission     .     .     .       200 


U.S.  Announces  1975-76  Pledge  to  U.N.-FAO 

World  Food  Program  (Bell) 198 

Zaire.  Letters  of  Credence  (Mbeka)     ....       191 


Name  Index 

Bell,  Raymond  E 198 

Bertrand  Galindo,  Francisco 191 

Dimitriou,   Nicos   G 191 

Hahm,  Pyong-choon 191 

Hedda,  AH 191 

Hutar,  Mrs.  Barbara 200 

Kissinger,  Secretary 181 

Macki,  Ahmed 191 

Mbeka   Makosso 191 

Nixon,  President 197 

Orfila,  Alejandro  Jose  Luis 191 

Rush,  Kenneth 186 

Waldmann,  Raymond  J 192 

Yaqub  Khan,  Sahabzada 191 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  February  4—10 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  February  4  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos. 
3  of  January  3  and  25  of  January  21. 

Xo.     Date  Subject 

"38  2/4  Study  group  1  of  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  for  the  CCITT,  Feb. 
13. 

*39     2/4     Buffum  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Sec- 
retary  for   International    Organi- 
zation Affairs  (biographic  data). 
40    2/5     U.S. -Mexico  tuna  conservation  pro- 
gram. 

*41     2/6    Kissinger:     Harvard-Princeton-Yale 
Club,  Washington. 
42     2/7     Kissinger:  address  at  Panama  City. 

*43  2/7  Secretary  Kissinger  to  speak  in 
Missoula  and  San  Francisco. 

*44  2/8  National  Review  Board  for  Center 
for  Cultural  and  Technical  In- 
terchange between  East  and 
West,   Honolulu,  Mar.  4. 

*45  2/8  Advisory  Committee  on  Private  In- 
ternational Law  Study  Group, 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  Mar.  1. 


*  Not  printed. 


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70, 


/8/0 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1810 


March  4,  1974 


MAJOR  OIL-CONSUMING  COUNTRIES  MEET  AT  WASHINGTON 

TO  DISCUSS  THE  ENERGY  PROBLEM 

TJ.S.  Statements  and  Text  of  Conference  Communique    201 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE 
OF  FEBRUARY  13     223 

PRESIDENT  NIXON  HONORS  ENERGY  CONFERENCE  REPRESENTATIVES 

AT  WHITE  HOUSE  DINNER    230 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


Sv.">V''' 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1810 
March  4,  1974 


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appreciated.     The    BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


in 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  government 
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the  Foreign  Service. 
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included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
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Publications  of  the  Department  of 
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Major  Oil-Consuming  Countries  Meet  at  Washington 
To  Discuss  the  Energy  Problem 


FoUotving  are  statements  made  before  the 
Washington  Energy  Conference  on  February 
11  by  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Federal  En- 
ergy Administrator  William  Simon  and  an 
outline  of  a  statement  made  that  day  by  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  George  P.  Shultz, 
together  with  the  text  of  a  communique 
issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the  conference  on 
February  13. 


STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 

Press  release  46  dated  February  11 

On  behalf  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  I  welcome  you  to  this  conference. 

My  great  predecessor  Dean  Acheson  once 
observed  that  sometimes  there  is  nothing 
man  can  do  to  avert  disaster  but  more  often 
our  failure  lies  "in  meeting  big,  bold,  de- 
manding problems  with  half  measures,  tim- 
orous and  cramped."  The  nations  gathered 
in  this  room  are  confronted  with  an  unprece- 
dented challenge  to  our  prosperity  and  to  the 
entire  structure  of  international  cooperation 
so  laboriously  constructed  over  the  last  gen- 
eration. The  impact  of  the  energy  crisis 
reaches  around  the  world,  raising  funda- 
mental questions  about  the  future  of  the 
developing  countries,  the  prospects  for  eco- 
nomic growth  of  all  nations,  and  the  hopes 
for  global  stability. 

The  dimensions  of  the  problems  were 
recognizable  at  least  a  year  ago;  indeed,  we 
addressed  them  as  part  of  our  original  pro- 
posal for  a  new  relationship  with  Europe  and 
Japan.  The  challenge  will  be  with  us  for  at 
least  the  rest  of  this  decade  and  perhaps 
beyond.  The  seriousness  of  the  problem,  its 


pervasiveness,  and  the  impossibility  of  na- 
tional solutions  all  compel  international  co- 
operation— among  major  consumer  nations, 
among  developed  and  developing  nations,  and 
among  producer  and  consumer  nations. 

The  United  States  has  called  this  confer- 
ence for  one  central  purpose:  to  move  urgent- 
ly to  resolve  the  energy  problem  on  the  basis 
of  cooperation  among  all  nations.  Failure  to 
do  so  would  threaten  the  world  with  a  vicious 
cycle  of  competition,  autarky,  rivalry,  and  de- 
pression such  as  led  to  the  collapse  of  world 
order  in  the  thirties.  Fortunately,  the  prob- 
lem is  still  manageable  multilaterally:  Na- 
tional policies  are  still  evolving,  practical  so- 
lutions to  the  energy  problem  are  technically 
achievable,  and  cooperation  with  the  produc- 
ing countries  is  still  politically  open  to  us. 

Let  me  summarize  the  U.S.  views  on  the 
maior  issues  confronting  us: 

First,  the  energy  situation  poses  severe 
economic  and  political  problems  for  all  na- 
tions. Isolated  solutions  are  impossible.  Even 
those  countries,  like  Canada  and  the  United 
States,  capable  of  solving  the  energy  problem 
by  largely  national  means  would  still  suffer 
because  of  the  impact  on  them  of  a  world 
economic  crisis.  Consumer  or  producer, 
affluent  or  poor,  mighty  or  weak — all  have  a 
stake  in  the  prosperity  and  stability  of  the 
international  economic  system. 

Second,  this  challenge  can  be  met  success- 
fully only  through  concerted  international 
action.  Its  impact  is  controllable  if  we  work 
together;  it  is  unmanageable  if  we  do  not. 

Third,  the  developing  countries  must 
quickly  be  drawn  into  consultation  and  col- 
laboration. Their  futures  are  the  most  pro- 
foundly affected  of  all.   Unable  to  meet  pres- 


March  4,   1974 


201 


ent  prices  for  oil  and  fertilizer,  they  face  the 
threat  of  starvation  and  the  tragedy  of 
abandoned  hopes  for  further  economic  devel- 
opment. In  the  name  both  of  humanity  and 
common  sense  we  cannot  permit  this. 

Fourth,  cooperation  not  confrontation 
must  mark  our  relationships  with  the  pro- 
ducers. We  each  have  legitimate  interests. 
We  each  face  looming  dangers.  We  need 
each  other.  If  we  move  rapidly  and  coopera- 
tively toward  collective  action,  all  will  bene- 
fit. 

Fifth,  the  United  States  recognizes  its  own 
national  responsibility  to  contribute  signifi- 
cantly to  a  collective  solution.  While  we  are 
less  immediately  affected  than  others,  we  see 
it  as  a  matter  of  enlightened  self-interest — 
and  moral  responsibility — to  collaborate  in 
the  survival  and  restoration  of  the  world 
economic  system.  Project  Independence, 
which  will  reduce  the  American  demand  for 
world  supplies,  can  be  a  way  station  on  the 
road  to  a  new  Project  Interdependence.  We 
are  willing  to  share  American  advances  in 
energy  technology,  to  develop  jointly  new 
sources  of  supply,  and  to  establish  a  system 
of  emergency  sharing.  We  are  prepared  to 
make  specific  proposals  in  these  areas  in  the 
follow-on  work  of  this  conference. 

The  Energy  Problem 

The  energy  crisis  has  three  dimensions; 
first,  the  oil  embargo;  second,  the  shortage  of 
supply;  and  finally,  the  quantum  increase  in 
prices. 

The  embargo  now  is  directed  largely  at  the 
United  States.  We  will  deal  with  this  issue 
and  ask  for  no  assistance.  But  while  the  em- 
bargo's immediate  economic  impact  may  be 
selective,  its  political  dimension  should  be  of 
more  general  concern.  For  it  carries  pro- 
found implications  for  the  world  community 
— the  manipulation  of  raw  material  supplies 
in  order  to  prescribe  the  foreign  policies  of 
importing  countries. 

The  basic  economic  problem  goes  deeper, 
however.  The  explosion  of  demand  has  out- 
stripped the  incentives  of  producers  to  in- 
crease production.   Inflationary  pressures  in 


the  consumer  countries  have  tended  to  create 
incentives  to  withhold  production.  This  is  es- 
pecially true  in  a  sellers'  market,  where  the 
producing  countries  can  increase  their  in- 
come by  raising  prices  rather  than  output. 

But  there  are  hopeful  signs.  World  demand 
has  been  reduced  in  recent  weeks — partly  be- 
cause of  rising  prices — and  may  well  remain 
below  last  September's  level.  Thus  we  may 
be  at  the  beginning  of  a  dramatic  change  in 
the  long-term  outlook  for  the  world  petro- 
leum market.  Determined  conservation  ef- 
forts in  the  consuming  countries  and  vigor- 
ous pursuit  of  alternative  energy  sources  can 
further  reduce  the  rate  of  growth  in  demand 
for  oil. 

The  most  immediate  and  critical  problem 
concerns  price.  Current  price  levels  are  sim- 
ply not  sustainable.  At  these  levels,  the  in- 
dustrial countries  alone  will  incur  a  current 
account  deficit  of  $36-$40  billion  in  1974. 
Such  large  increases  in  costs  would  seriously 
magnify  both  unemployment  and  inflation  in 
the  importing  countries,  while  the  effect  on 
domestic  production  would  be  deflationary. 
Pressures  for  import  quotas  will  become  ir- 
resistible; a  general  decline  in  world  trade 
will  follow  inevitably. 

The  threat  to  the  world's  poorer  nations  is 
even  more  profound.  At  present  prices  the 
less  developed  nations  will  face  a  current 
account  deficit  of  $25-$30  billion  in  1974,  of 
which  more  than  $10  billion  is  caused  by  the 
increase  in  oil  prices.  This  deficit  is  three 
times  the  total  aid  flow  of  the  entire  world  in 
recent  years.  Neither  the  developing  nations 
nor  traditional  aid  donors  can  finance  such 
a  sum.  Even  the  attempt  would  destroy  two 
decades  of  hard-won  progress,  leaving  in  its 
wake  a  legacy  of  political  tension,  social  tur- 
moil, and  human  despair. 

Moreover,  as  a  direct  result  of  the  oil  price 
hikes  the  poorer  nations'  supply  of  crucial 
fertilizer  has  been  severely  reduced  in  recent 
months.  Fertilizer  prices  have  at  least 
doubled,  raising  the  specter  of  famine.  We 
cannot  permit  this  to  happen. 

The  producing  countries  themselves  will 
not  be  spared  these  consequences.  Their  un- 
precedented opportunity  for  dramatic  and 


202 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


rapid  economic  progress  cannot  escape  the 
effect  of  global  inflation,  mounting  restric- 
tions in  the  world's  trading  and  monetary 
system,  and  the  political  tensions  of  un- 
bridled competition.  A  major  task  before 
this  confei'ence  is  to  begin  creating  a  frame- 
work of  cooperation  that  will  fulfill  both  the 
hopes  of  the  producing  and  the  needs  of  the 
consuming  nations. 

These  global  dilemmas  cannot  be  avoided 
through  exclusive  bilateral  arrangements. 
We  do  not  dispute  the  right  of  sovereign  na- 
tions to  make  individual  arrangements.  But 
we  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  these  ar- 
rangements follow  agreed  rules  of  conduct. 
In  their  absence,  unrestrained  bilateralism  is 
certain  to  produce  disastrous  political  and 
economic  consequences. 

No  conceivable  increase  in  bilateral  trade 
with  the  producing  nations  can  cover  the 
massive  payments  deficits  that  each  nation 
faces.  The  only  result  of  unmanaged  bilater- 
alism will  be  to  bid  up  prices,  perhaps  even 
beyond  present  levels,  and  to  stabilize  them 
at  levels  that  will  ruin  the  countries  making 
the  bilateral  arrangements  before  they  ruin 
everyone  else. 

Thus  the  ultimate  challenge  is  to  the  frag- 
ile fabric  of  international  principles  and 
institutions.  If  we  fail  to  achieve  a  coopera- 
tive solution,  each  of  us  will  be  tempted  to 
transfer  the  problem  onto  others.  This  was 
the  approach  the  industrial  world  followed 
during  the  "beggar-thy-neighbor"  policies  of 
the  1930's.   We  all  know  the  consequences. 

A  Seven-Point  Approach  to  Cooperation 

The  great  goal  of  American  policy  for  the 
past  quarter  century  has  been  to  try  to 
achieve  a  more  cooperative  world,  to  put 
permanently  behind  us  the  narrowly  compet- 
itive approach  which  has  traditionally  ended 
in  conflict — economic  or  military  or  both. 
We  maintain  our  faith  in  the  validity  of  this 
goal.  In  pursuit  of  the  common  interest,  the 
United  States  is  willing  to  make  a  major  con- 
tribution, in  effort,  in  science,  in  technology, 
and  in  resources,  to  a  common  solution  to  the 
energy  problem. 


President  Nixon  Expresses  Satisfaction 
With  Outcome  of  Energy  Conference 

Statement  by  President  Nixon  ' 

I  would  like  to  express  my  satisfaction  with 
the  outCome  of  the  international  energy  con- 
ference which  has  just  been  meeting  in  Wash- 
ington. The  United  States  has  approached  the 
energy  problem  in  a  spirit  of  cooperativeness 
— among  consumers  and  between  consumers 
and  producers — and  I  am  pleased  that  this  atti- 
tude struck  a  responsive  chord  with  the  partici- 
pants of  the  Washington  Conference. 

I  believe  that  we  are  now  well  launched  on  an 
international  effort  to  deal  with  all  aspects  of 
the  problem.  At  the  same  time,  this  is  only  a 
beginning,  and  all  the  nations  concerned  must 
now  pool  their  efforts  and  their  ingenuity  in  the 
following  up  of  the  work  of  the  conference. 
The  United  States  is  ready  to  do  so  and  looks 
forward  to  working  with  all  the  other  countries 
involved. 


'  Issued  on  Feb.  13    (White  House  press  re- 
lease. Key  Biscayne,  Fla.). 


The  United  States  is  prepared  to  join  with 
the  nations  assembled  here,  and  later  with 
the  producers  and  other  consumers,  to  make 
a  truly  massive  effort  toward  this  major 
goal:  the  assurance  of  abundant  energy  at 
reasonable  costs  to  meet  the  entire  world's 
requirements  for  economic  growth  and  hu- 
man needs. 

To  this  end,  we  suggest  that  this  confer- 
ence consider  seven  areas  for  cooperative  ex- 
ploration: conservation,  alternative  energy 
sources,  research  and  development,  emer- 
gency sharing,  international  financial  coop- 
eration, the  less  developed  countries,  con- 
sumer-producer relations. 

1.  Consei'vation:  The  development  of  a 
new  energy  ethic  designed  to  promote  the 
conservation  and  most  efficient  use  of  exist- 
ing energy  supplies  is  crucial.  We  need  a 
basic  commitment  to  share  the  sacrifices  and 
costs  of  conservation  and  thus  reduce  pres- 
sures on  world  supply.  The  United  States 
recognizes  that  it  is  the  world's  most  profli- 


March  4,    1974 


203 


gate  energy  consumer.  Yet  our  own  national 
program  has,  within  the  past  four  months, 
reduced  government  energy  use  by  20  per- 
cent, industrial  consumption  by  more  than  10 
percent,  gasoline  consumption  by  9  percent, 
and  natural  gas  and  electricity  consumed  in 
residential  and  commercial  buildings  by  6 
and  10  percent  respectively.  We  shall  con- 
tinue to  expand  this  program.  We  are  pre- 
pared as  well  to  join  other  consumers  in 
pledging  a  sustained  conservation  effort.  The 
United  States  is  willing  to  collaborate  in  a 
review  of  the  national  programs  of  each  con- 
sumer country,  in  an  appraisal  of  their  effec- 
tiveness, and  in  recommendations  to  govern- 
ments for  additional  measures. 

2.  Alternative  Energy  Sources:  The  de- 
mands of  this  decade  cannot  be  met  unless 
we  expand  available  supplies  through  vigor- 
ous development  of  alternative  energy 
sources. 

To  produce  quick  results,  we  must  concen- 
trate on  known  fuel  resources.  Coal  is  in 
abundant  supply,  but  w^e  need  to  develop  the 
technology  neglected  during  the  period  of 
low-cost  oil.  Continental  shelves  and  non- 
conventional  deposits — coal,  shale,  and  simi- 
lar resources — need  to  be  developed  rapidly. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to  explore 
the  following  possibilities  for  consumer  coop- 
eration: 

— A  collective  commitment  to  develop  the 
fossil  fuel  resources  that  are  available  within 
our  respective  borders. 

— Coordinated  policies  to  encourage  the 
flow  of  private  capital  into  the  new  higher 
cost  energy  industries,  such  as  synthetic  oils 
and  gas  from  coal  and  shale. 

— Governmental  arrangements  to  accele- 
rate the  global  search  for  new  energy  sources 
such  as  offshore  oil. 

— International  programs  to  reduce  the 
vulnerability  of  the  major  industrial  coun- 
tries to  the  interruption  and  manipulation  of 
supply,  such  as  the  orderly  conversion  of  key 
sectors  away  from  petroleum. 

3.  Research  and  Development:  New  tech- 
nologies, and  not  only  new  explorations,  can 
provide  us  with  additional  sources  of  energy. 


Many  of  our  countries  are  launching  large 
new  programs.  Our  own  national  program 
contemplates  the  expenditure  of  more  than 
$11  billion  in  government  funds  over  the  next 
five  years  and  an  expected  investment  of 
$12.5  billion  in  private  funds  in  the  same 
period.  But  we  have  no  monopoly  on  the  most 
advanced  and  promising  approaches.  It  is  to 
our  mutual  benefit  to  coordinate  and  combine 
our  efforts.  Thus  the  United  States  is  pre- 
pared to  make  a  major  contribution  of  its 
most  advanced  energy  research  and  develop- 
ment to  a  broad  program  of  international 
cooperation  in  energy. 

Without  a  doubt,  a  significant  portion  of 
new  energy  will  be  supplied  from  nuclear 
reactors,  for  which  increased  quantities  of 
enriched  uranium  will  be  needed.  Within  a 
framework  of  broad  cooperation  in  energy, 
the  United  States  is  prepared  to  examine  the 
sharing  of  enrichment  technology — diffusion 
and  centrifuge.  Such  a  multilateral  enrich- 
ment effort  could  be  undertaken  in  a  frame- 
work of  assured  supply,  geographic  disper- 
sion, and  controls  against  further  prolifera- 
tion. We  shall  submit  principles  to  guide  such 
a  cooperative  enterprise  for  the  follow-on 
work  which  we  are  proposing. 

4.  Emergency  Sharing:  The  allocation  of 
available  supplies  in  time  of  emergencies  and 
prolonged  shortages  is  essential. 

None  of  us  can  be  certain  how  the  world 
balance  of  supply  and  demand  for  petroleum 
will  develop  or  what  political  contingencies 
may  arise.  But  we  cannot  leave  our  security 
or  our  national  economies  to  forces  outside 
our  control. 

The  United  States  declares  its  willingness 
to  share  available  energy  in  times  of  emer- 
gency or  prolonged  shortages.  We  would  be 
prepared  to  allocate  an  agreed  portion  of  our 
total  petroleum  supply  provided  other  con- 
suming countries  with  indigenous  production 
do  likewise.  As  we  move  toward  self-sufficien- 
cy, our  ability  for  sharing  would  of  course 
increase. 

Building  on  the  earlier  work  done  in  the 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development],  definite  recommenda- 
tions should  be  submitted  to  governments 
including: 


204 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


— A  sharing  formula ; 

— Criteria  to  determine  when  a  supply 
shortage  exists ; 

■ — -A  mechanism  which  would  implement 
and  terminate  the  sharing  arrangement;  and 

— Complementary  programs  such  as  stock- 
piling and  standby  rationing  schemes. 

5.  International  Financial  Cooperation: 
The  structure  and  strength  of  the  world's 
trading  and  monetary  system  must  be  re- 
stored and  strengthened.  If  there  is  no  way 
for  the  industrial  countries  collectively  to 
eliminate  the  trade  deficits  created  by  their 
higher  oil  import  bills,  they  can  attempt  to  do 
so  individually  only  at  the  cost  of  enlarging 
someone  else's  problems.  In  addition,  the 
producing  nations  are  accumulating  financial 
claims  against  the  consuming  nations  at  a 
rate  unprecedented  in  history. 

In  the  past,  the  various  national  and  inter- 
national money  markets  have  efficiently  re- 
cycled oil  revenue  funds  back  into  the  econo- 
mies of  the  consuming  countries.  At  least  for 
industrial  countries,  these  markets  can  in 
large  part  continue  to  perform  that  function. 
The  removal  of  our  capital  controls  and  the 
easing  of  controls  in  other  countries  should 
help.  But  the  magnitude  of  the  new  flows 
could  put  serious  strains  on  the  operations 
of  these  markets.  The  funds  flowing  to  par- 
ticular consumer  countries  may  not  reflect 
their  needs  for  balance  of  payments  financ- 
ing; severe  instability  could  result  if  these 
funds  were  repeatedly  shifted  across  curren- 
cy boundaries  without  adequate  financial 
cooperation  among  the  industrialized  coun- 
tries. Here  again  there  is  a  crucial  congruent 
interest  between  the  producers  and  consum- 
ers and  an  urgent  need  for  cooperative  solu- 
tions. 

Measures  to  deal  with  the  economic  eff'ects 
of  high  oil  prices  must  be  adopted  on  a  broad 
front.  Recommendations  should  include: 

— New  mechanisms  to  facilitate  the  distri- 
bution of  international  capital  flows  from  oil 
revenue  surpluses. 

— Means  for  producers  and  consumers  to 
cooperate  in  building  confidence  in  invest- 
ment policies  and  the  integrity  of  invest- 
ments. 


— Steps  to  facilitate  the  fuller  participa- 
tion of  producing  nations  in  existing  inter- 
national institutions  and  to  contribute  to  the 
urgent  needs  of  the  developing  consumer 
countries. 

6.  The  Less  Developed  Countries:  The 
needs  of  the  developing  countries  are  a  par- 
ticularly urgent  dimension  of  the  energy 
crisis.  Massive  increases  in  oil  import  costs 
are  occurring  at  a  time  when  the  export  pros- 
pects of  many  less  developed  countries  have 
sharply  diminished  as  a  result  of  the  slow- 
down in  world  economic  activity.  Even  at 
lower  oil  prices,  the  balance  of  payments 
problems  of  the  less  developed  countries 
would  require  sustained  attention. 

Our  approach  to  this  human  and  economic 
challenge  should  be  based  on  several  princi- 
ples: 

— The  developing  consumer  countries 
should  be  invited  to  join  the  next  stage  of  our 
deliberations. 

— Developed  countries  should  avoid  cutting 
their  concessional  aid  programs  in  response 
to  balance  of  payments  problems.  In  this 
regard,  the  United  States  will  urge  the  Con- 
gress to  restore  our  contribution  to  the  Inter- 
national Development  Association   (IDA). 

— The  wealth  of  the  producer  nations 
opens  up  a  potential  new  source  of  large- 
scale  capital  assistance  for  development.  The 
producer  nations  should  have  a  special  under- 
standing for  the  problems  facing  the  poorer 
nations.  We  should  encourage  and  facilitate 
their  participation  in  international  and  re- 
gional institutions. 

— Urgent  measures  must  be  taken  to  as- 
sure sufficient  fertilizer  supplies  for  the 
coming  year.  The  immediate  problem  is  to 
provide  oil  at  a  price  that  will  allow  existing 
fertilizer  production  capacity  to  be  fully  uti- 
lized. The  longer  term  problem  is  to  create 
sufficient  capacity  to  meet  the  world's  rapidly 
growing  needs.  The  United  States  would  be 
prepared  to  contribute  its  technological  skills 
to  such  a  joint  enterprise. 

7.  Co7isumer-Producer  Relations:  Our  ulti- 
mate goal  must  be  to  create  a  cooperative 
framework  within  which  producers  and  con- 


March  4,   1974 


205 


sumers  will  be  able  to  accommodate  their 
differences  and  reconcile  their  needs  and  as- 
pirations. Only  in  this  way  can  we  assure  the 
evolution  and  growth  of  the  world  economy 
and  the  stability  of  international  relations. 
We  must  work  toward  the  objective  of  pre- 
venting coercion  of  the  weak  by  the  strong 
as  of  the  strong  by  the  weak ;  the  producing 
nations  must  be  given  a  secure  stake  in  an 
expanding  world  economy  and  the  consuming 
nations  a  secure  source  of  supply. 

It  seems  clear  that  enlightened  self-interest 
of  consumers  and  producers  need  not  and 
should  not  be  in  conflict.  Future  generations 
may  not  enjoy  a  permanent  source  of  petrole- 
um. Excessively  high  prices  are  already  call- 
ing forth  massive  investments  in  alternative 
energy  sources,  which  raises  the  prospect  of 
lower  prices  and  shrunken  export  markets 
for  the  producers  in  the  future.  But  stable  oil 
earnings,  at  just  prices,  wisely  invested  and 
increasing  by  the  principle  of  compound 
interest,  will  be  available  as  a  long-term 
source  of  income. 

Thus  the  producers  must  have  an  interest 
in  a  "just"  price  and  in  stable  long-term 
political  and  economic  relations.  Therefore, 
at  the  consumer-producer  conference  for 
which  we  are  heading,  let  us  discuss  what 
constitutes  a  just  price  and  how  to  assure 
long-term  investments.  A  well-conceived  pro- 
ducer-consumer meeting,  in  which  the  con- 
sumers do  not  seek  selfish  advantages  either 
as  a  group  or  individually,  far  from  leading 
to  confrontation,  could  instead  lay  the  basis 
of  a  new  cooperative  relationship.  But  it  will 
do  so  only  if  it  is  well  prepared — and  if  the 
consumers  have  first  constructed  a  solid  basis 
of  cooperation  among  themselves. 

The  Next  Steps 

The  United  States  is  not  interested  in  es- 
tablishing new  institutions  for  their  own 
sake.  We  are  solely  concerned  with  practical 
results.  Some  of  the  tasks  I  have  suggested 
can  be  carried  out  by  existing  international 
mechanisms;  others  will  break  new  ground. 
The  essential  requirement  is  to  see  that 
concrete  recommendations  are  submitted  to 


the  next  conference.  In  order  to  carry  our 
work  forward,  we  believe  a  coordinating 
group  should  be  established  with  the  follow- 
ing responsibilities: 

— To  relate  the  tasks  that  are  assigned  to 
existing  bodies  to  our  future  work. 

— To  undertake  those  tasks  for  which 
there  are  presently  no  suitable  bodies. 

— To  prepare  for  the  next  meeting. 

Another  conference  of  consumers  should 
then  be  called  at  the  foreign  minister  level  to 
assess  the  work  in  all  seven  areas.  This  con- 
ference could  include  representatives  of  the 
less  developed  countries. 

This  meeting  would  lead  to  a  third  confer- 
ence of  consumers  and  producers. 

We  are  open  to  suggestions  about  the  locale 
of  these  next  conferences.  We  should  aim  to 
complete  the  entire  process  by  May  1. 

The  approach  to  global  cooperation  out- 
lined here  has  prompted  the  President's  invi- 
tations to  you  to  join  us  here  today.  This 
conception  is  ambitious,  but  the  need  is  great. 
Therefore  let  us  resolve : 

— To  meet  the  special  challenges  and  op- 
portunities facing  the  major  consuming  na- 
tions with  a  program  of  cooperation. 

— To  bring  the  developing  nations  into 
immediate  consultation  and  collaboration 
with  us. 

— To  prepare  for  a  positive  and  productive 
dialogue  with  the  producing  nations. 

As  we  look  toward  the  end  of  this  century, 
we  know  that  the  energy  crisis  indicates  the 
birth  pains  of  global  interdependence.  Our 
response  could  well  determine  our  capacity 
to  deal  with  the  international  agenda  of  the 
future. 

We  confront  a  fundamental  decision.  Will 
we  consume  ourselves  in  nationalistic  rivalry 
which  the  realities  of  interdependence  make 
suicidal?  Or  will  we  acknowledge  our  inter- 
dependence and  shape  cooperative  solutions? 

Our  choice  is  clear,  our  responsibility  com- 
pelling :  We  must  demonstrate  to  future  gen- 
erations that  our  vision  was  equal  to  our 
challenge. 


206 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


STATEMENT   BY  MR.   SIMON 


WashinKton  Energy  Conference  doc.  10 


The  world  economy  is  undergoing  a  period 
of  rapid  change  and  growth.  Decisions  made 
in  one  country  affect  the  patterns  of  life  for 
the  rest  of  the  world.  Such  decisions  demand 
not  only  the  collective  wisdom  of  world  lead- 
ership but  also  a  continuing  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion among  the  countries  of  the  world.  By 
building  an  international  framework  of  co- 
operation among  nations,  I  am  convinced  that 
we  can  overcome  the  problems  that  face  all 
of  us  in  the  energy  area  today  and  can  es- 
tablish a  permanent  structure  for  worldwide 
economic  development. 

The  explanation  of  our  current  problems 
lies  in  ourselves — in  our  own  failure  to  ac- 
knowledge our  interdependence  and  plan  for 
it. 

There  are  several  areas  in  which  we  have 
failed.  On  an  individual  basis,  we  in  the 
United  States  and  other  individual  industri- 
alized nations  have  misused  our  energy  re- 
sources and  failed  to  gain  control  over  the 
rate  of  growth  of  energy  demand,  largely  be- 
cause our  shortsightedness  has  lulled  us  into 
believing  that  abundant  and  cheap  energy 
supplies  could  continue  indefinitely.  Further, 
we  have  failed  to  develop  available  domestic 
energy  resources  adequately.  As  a  group,  all 
of  the  major  consuming  countries  have  failed 
to  develop  and  agree  upon  allocation  pro- 
grams to  meet  emergency  shortage  situa- 
tions. Further,  we  have  failed  to  coordinate 
our  national  energy  policies  or  even  to  ade- 
quately discuss  their  interrelations  at  a  high 
political  level.  In  fact,  we  do  not  have  an  ade- 
quate supply  of  information  and  data  on 
world  demand  and  supply,  oil  supply  arrange- 
ments between  consumer  and  producer  na- 
tions, and  future  prospective  resources  in 
order  to  adopt  realistic  energy  policies. 

Because  of  these  failures,  we  now  find  our- 
selves at  a  crossroads  faced  with  a  choice 
which  will  influence  the  history  of  future 
generations  of  the  modern  world.  We  can  ig- 
nore the  lessons  of  the  past  and  be  doomed  to 
relive  them,  or  we  can  learn  from  them  and 


forge  together  a  new  atmosphere  for  orderly 
world  economic  growth. 

As  such,  we  must  commit  ourselves  to  work 
against  unconstrained  bilateral  deals  which 
will  be  counterproductive  to  all  of  our  goals. 
In  fact,  we  must  seek  to  redefine  bilateralism 
so  that  bilateral  arrangements  only  occur 
within  the  umbrella  of  international  coopera- 
tion. 

Today  I  would  like  to  present  to  you  our 
views  on  how  we  can  do  this.  At  a  time  when 
the  energy  shortage  has  caused  a  sense  of 
paralysis  that  grips  many  people  of  the 
world,  we  must  calmly  place  the  issues  in  the 
l)roper  perspective.  We  must  wring  the  emo- 
tions out  of  our  considerations  of  these  is- 
sues and  carefully  assess  where  we  are  and 
where  we  must  go  from  here. 

The  World   Energy   Situation 

In  order  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
problem  we  now  face  and  how  we  can  over- 
come it,  I  think  it  is  important  to  review  the 
world  energy  situation,  in  particular  with  re- 
spect to  production,  consumption,  and  energy 
prices,  as  well  as  the  impact  which  these  fac- 
tors have  on  balance  of  payments,  on  employ- 
ment, and  on  the  world  economy. 

Production  and  Consumption 

First  of  all,  let  us  review  the  world  pro- 
duction-consumption picture.  During  Sep- 
tember 1973  free-world  petroleum  produc- 
tion averaged  47.8  million  barrels  per  day. 

In  the  subsequent  months,  after  the  out- 
break of  war  in  the  Middle  East,  production 
declined  as  a  result  of  intentional  cutbacks  by 
a  few  of  the  oil-producing  countries  border- 
ing on  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  low  point  in 
production  was  reached  in  November,  when 
free-world  production  was  estimated  to  be 
only  43.2  million  barrels  per  day.  By  January 
1974  production  had  increased  to  an  esti- 
mated 46.2  million  barrels  per  day,  a  level 
about  8  percent  below  prewar  estimates  of 
the  level  of  January  production. 

Consumption  in  January  was  probably 
about  equal  to  January  production.  There 
had  been  some  drawdown  in  stocks  of  crude 


March  4,   1974 


207 


and  petroleum  products,  but  the  cumulative 
reduction  by  the  end  of  January  is  estimated 
to  have  been  only  on  the  order  of  magnitude 
of  100  million  barrels. 

For  the  calendar  year  1974  as  a  whole,  it 
is  estimated  that  through  responsible  and  ef- 
ficient use  of  existing  and  planned  facilities 
the  free  world  could  produce  about  51.4  mil- 
lion barrels  per  day.  Whether  conditions  in 
1974  will  be  such  that  producers  will  choose 
to  produce  that  much  and  consumers  will  con- 
sume and  add  to  inventories  that  much  oil  is 
very  difficult  to  predict. 

Prices 

In  September  1973  the  arm's-length  open- 
market  f.o.b.  price  for  a  new  short-duration 
sale  of  a  cargo  of  Arabian  light  crude  was  on 
the  order  of  $2.12  per  barrel.  In  November 
some  crude  sales  apparently  were  at  prices 
in  excess  of  the  equivalent  of  $15  per  barrel 
for  Arabian  light.  By  the  end  of  January  the 
comparable  spot  market  price  had  appar- 
ently fallen  to  the  $10-to-$ll-per-barrel 
range. 

In  light  of  continuing  efforts  to  reduce  con- 
sumption around  the  world,  the  potential 
clearly  exists  for  spot  market  prices  to  con- 
tinue to  decline.  There  can  be  no  certainty 
how  greatly  consumers — and  their  govern- 
ments— will  be  inclined  to  reduce  their  con- 
sumption below  the  prewar  forecast  of  about 
51.4  million  barrels  per  day  in  consumption 
plus  normal  inventory  buildup  in  1974. 

A  rough  estimate  now  would  be  for  free- 
world  1974  consumption  of  about  46.4  million 
barrels  per  day  if  oil  prices  around  the  world 
average  in  1974  a  level  consistent  with  an 
Arabian-light  f.o.b.  price  of  $8.50  per  barrel. 
On  a  comparable  basis,  estimated  consump- 
tion would  be  on  the  order  of  50.3  million 
barrels  per  day  with  an  Arabian-light  price 
of  $4.50  per  barrel. 

To  these  consumption  estimates  must  be 
added  estimates  for  the  buildup  of  invento- 
ries. Companies  and  governments  will  un- 
doubtedly wish  over  coming  months  to  add  to 
their  inventories,  not  only  to  return  to  levels 
considered  normal  in  the  past  but  also  to  pro- 
vide greater   security   against   the    demon- 


strated insecurity  of  imported  supplies.  Ulti-  j 
mate  objectives  for  inventories  will  probably 
be  considerably  in  excess  of  targets  to  be 
reached  by  the  end  of  1974.  A  reasonable  es- 
timate of  targets  for  yearend  1974  might  be 
levels  5  percent  above  what  would  have  been 
considered  normal  in  prewar  days.  On  that 
basis  it  can  be  roughly  estimated  that  200 
million  barrels  will  need  to  be  added  to  in- 
ventories in  1974  to  build  up  from  present 
levels  to  the  yearend  target.  That  addition  to 
inventory  would  increase  1974  total  demand 
to  48.8  million  barrels  per  day  at  the  $8.50 
price  and  50.8  million  barrels  per  day  at  the 
$4.50  price. 

Spare  Capacity 

At  either  of  these  illustrative  combinations 
of  price  and  oil  use  in  1974,  the  world's  fore- 
cast "normal"  oil  production  capacity  would 
not  be  fully  employed  during  the  year. 
Whether  some  oil-producing  nations  will 
choose  to  allow  sonie  of  their  "normal"  pro- 
duction capacity  to  lie  idle,  with  accompany- 
ing loss  of  revenue,  is  of  course  problemati- 
cal. 

Assuming  as  at  present,  most  producers 
wish  to  maintain  production,  relatively  sharp 
cutbacks  would  be  necessary  by  the  remain- 
ing producers  at  the  $8.50  price.  For  in- 
stance, if  only  Saudi  Arabia  restrained  its 
production,  then  for  the  year  Saudi  produc- 
tion would  average  only  3.6  million  barrels 
per  day,  only  about  44  percent  of  its  poten- 
tial output.  If  1974  production  restraint  were 
borne  on  an  equal  percentage  basis  by  Saudi 
Arabia,  Kuwait,  the  United  Arab  Emirates, 
and  Qatar,  then  the  production  for  each 
would  be  about  67  percent  of  capacity.  At  the 
$4.50  price,  on  these  assumptions  there  would 
still  be  a  margin  of  excess  capacity  in  these 
countries. 

Certainly  at  the  higher  of  the  two  illustra- 
tive price  levels,  and  quite  possibly  at  the 
lower  level  as  well,  production  in  other  oil  \ 
countries  would  grow  faster  than  world  de- 
mand over  the  years  after  1974,  so  that  the 
relative  production  restraint  would  need  to 
be  increased  over  time  to  maintain  those 
prices. 


208 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Balance  of  Payments  Impacts 

The  impact  of  such  higher  costs  of  im- 
ported oil  will  be  severe  upon  the  economies 
of  many  oil-consuming  nations.  The  increased 
costs  in  1974  for  the  less  developed  nations 
alone  would  be  on  the  order  of  $9  billion  at 
the  $8.50  price  and  approaching  $5  billion  at 
the  $4.50  price.  As  a  consequence  of  these 
changes  in  oil  payments,  the  projected  1974 
current  account  deficit  for  the  LDC's  [less 
developed  countries]  would  be  estimated  at 
about  $22  billion  at  the  $8.50  price  and  on 
the  order  of  $18  billion  at  the  $4.50  price. 

The  incidence  of  the  higher  oil  prices 
among  individual  LDC's  will  vary  widely. 
Some  of  the  hardest  hit  countries,  such  as 
India,  Bangladesh,  and  the  drought-ridden 
regions  of  western  Africa,  not  only  face  a 
significant  increase  in  their  import  bill,  but 
their  low  per  capita  incomes  and  slow  rates 
of  growth  of  output  and  of  exports  will  make 
it  difficult  to  finance  anything  approaching 
the  same  volume  of  imports  as  in  1973.  Other 
countries,  such  as  Brazil,  Korea,  Taiwan,  and 
Turkey,  while  facing  a  significant  increase  in 
their  import  bill,  will  have  a  greater  capacity 
to  finance  increased  oil  payments  in  the  short 
run  with  their  relatively  high  level  of  re- 
serves. 

Employment  and  Inflation 

These  large  increases  in  payments  will 
worsen  both  the  employment  and  inflation 
situation  in  oil-importing  countries.  Even  af- 
ter adjustment  in  monetary  and  fiscal  poli- 
cies, these  increased  import  bills  will  have  a 
deflationary  impact  on  demand  for  domestic 
production  as  purchasing  power  is  diverted 
from  domestically  produced  goods  and  serv- 
ices in  order  to  meet  increased  oil  import 
payments. 

At  the  same  time  that  demand  for  domes- 
tic production  is  being  decreased,  cost-push 
inflationary  pressures  will  be  increased  as  a 
result  of  the  direct  impact  of  oil  price  rises 
on  price  indexes  and  possibly  also  as  a  result 
of  intensified  labor  pressures  attempting  to 
secure  a  wage  increase  sufficient  to  offset  the 
decrease  in  the  standard  of  living  implied  by 


the  increased  price  of  oil.  There  is  also  likely 
to  be  a  temporary  increase  in  unemployment 
and  decline  in  output  as  patterns  of  consump- 
tion and  production  are  readjusted  to  the 
levels  of  energy  costs.  Particularly  hard  hit 
will  be  such  products  as  automobiles,  plastics, 
fertilizers,  and  boating  and  camping  equip- 
ment. 

It  is  estimated  that  for  a  number  of  the 
large  industrial  countries  these  factors,  even 
after  appropriate  adjustments  in  fiscal  and 
monetary  policies,  could  combine  to  reduce 
rates  of  real  economic  growth  by  1  to  li/i 
percent  during  1974  if  an  $8.50  level  of  prices 
prevailed.  There  could  be  2  to  3  percent  addi- 
tional upward  pressure  on  prices  in  many 
countries.  At  a  $4.50  level  of  prices  these  im- 
pacts would  be  considerably  less. 

The  Economic  Impact  of  Higher  Oil  Prices 

In  general,  then,  projections  of  the  eco- 
nomic impact  for  1974  of  higher  price  levels 
for  oil  indicate  that  oil-consuming  nations 
will  experience  lower  rates  of  growth,  higher 
rates  of  inflation,  higher  levels  of  unemploy- 
ment, lower  levels  of  real  income,  and  no- 
tably less  favorable  trade  balances  than  pre- 
viously anticipated.  The  economic  impact  of 
higher  oil  prices  will  vary  widely  among 
countries,  reflecting  not  only  differing  de- 
grees of  dependence  on  imported  oil  but  also 
differing  degrees  of  financial  strength  and 
economic  adaptability.  All  industrial  nations, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  Canada,  could 
experience  serious  economic  difliculties,  as 
will  many  LDC's.  For  LDC's  with  inadequate 
reserves,  low  per  capita  incomes,  and  slow 
rates  of  output  and  export  growth,  the  eco- 
nomic impact  of  higher  oil  prices  could  be  ex- 
tremely severe. 

For  the  developed  countries — which  in  re- 
cent years  have  typically  run  current  ac- 
count surpluses  in  the  order  of  $10  billion 
per  year — the  increased  oil  costs  at  the  $8.50- 
per-barrel  price  would  mean  a  current  ac- 
count deficit  of  more  than  $30  billion.  At  the 
$4.50  price,  the  deficit  for  the  developed 
countries  would  still  be  in  the  range  of  $5- 
$10  billion.  For  the  OPEC  [Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries]  producers, 


March  4,   1974 


209 


even  after  taking  into  account  an  assumed  in- 
crease in  tiieir  imports,  an  $8.50  price  would 
yield  a  current  account  surplus  in  the  order 
of  $55  billion.  The  $4.50  price  would  still 
yield  a  surplus  in  excess  of  the  $20  billion 
range.  The  corresponding  increases  during 
1974  in  the  foreign  asset  holdings  of  the  pro- 
ducing countries,  while  large,  will  still  be 
equal  to  only  a  small  fraction  of  the  assets 
traded  in  the  financial  markets  of  the  OECD 
countries. 

The  incidence  among  the  developed  coun- 
tries is  relatively  evenly  spread,  with  projec- 
tions of  increased  oil  payments  as  a  percent 
of  total  imports  falling  in  the  range  of  10  to 
20  percent  for  most  countries.  Japan  will  be 
particularly  hard  hit,  with  a  projected  in- 
crease in  oil  payments  approaching  one-third 
of  total  1973  imports.  Canada,  on  the  other 
hand,  with  oil  exports  of  roughly  the  same 
magnitude  as  imports,  should  feel  virtually 
no  net  balance  of  payments  impact  from  the 
changes. 

Project   Independence 

At  this  point  I  think  it  is  important  to 
carefully  assess  these  projections  of  energy 
production,  consumption,  and  prices  and  rec- 
ognize that  they  are  flashing  warning  signals 
to  which  we  must  respond.  We  must  realize 
that  these  projections  depend  upon  the  basic 
assumption  that  recent  trends  in  world  de- 
mand for  energy,  in  the  sources  of  energy, 
and  in  the  form  in  which  energy  is  supplied, 
will  continue  largely  unchanged.  Together, 
we  can  prevent  this  from  happening. 

The  projections  do  show — clearly  and  viv- 
idly— that  we  face  far-reaching  changes  in 
our  energy  balances.  We  must  accept  that  the 
rising  demand  for  energy  will  lead  to  a  sub- 
stantial increase  in  real  costs.  We  cannot  be 
blind  to  the  concentrated  location  of  the  ex- 
isting resources  which  can  be  made  available 
for  the  years  immediately  ahead. 

But  there  is  another  side.  These  projec- 
tions show  us  what  needs  to  be  done.  If  we 
approach  it  bilaterally,  a  potential  crisis  will 
become  a  reality.  However,  if  we  make  the 
commitment  to  join  together,  a  potential 
crisis  may  be  translated  into  a  real  opportu- 


nity. In  essence,  the  energy  problem  is  the 
most  infinitely  solvable  one  we  have — but  we 
must  approach  it  together.  Action  by  con- 
suming countries,  with  a  long  view  of  their 
best  interest,  is  required  now. 

We  in  the  United  States — in  our  actions 
and  in  our  planning — are  participating  in 
this  process  with  the  greatest  sense  of  ur- 
gency. 

In  November  1973  the  President  of  the 
United  States  inaugurated  Project  Independ- 
ence, designed  to  insure  an  expansion  in  do- 
mestic energy  production  so  that  our  nation 
would  no  longer  be  subject  to  economic  dis- 
ruption, or  the  threat  of  such  disruption, 
from  a  sudden  curtailment  of  vital  energy 
supplies.  Project  Independence  is  designed: 

1.  To  conserve  energy — to  establish  a  new 
energy  ethic  that  will  greatly  reduce  our 
growing  demand  for  energy; 

2.  To  increase  production  of  all  forms  of 
energy  in  the  United  States;  and 

3.  To  meet  our  energy  needs  at  the  lowest 
cost  consistent  with  the  protection  of  both 
national  security  and  environment. 

As  we  begin  this  conference,  we  must  not 
view  Project  Independence  as  a  move  toward 
autarky,  but  rather  we  must  see  it  as  part  of 
a  worldwide  effort  to  bring  greater  balance  to 
world  energy  supply  and  demand.  Our  cur- 
rent energy  problems  magnify  the  fact  that 
we  live  in  an  interdependent  world.  We  in 
the  United  States  view  Project  Independence 
as  a  means  for  us  to  reduce  our  call  on  oil 
available  to  the  international  market.  More- 
over, it  is  our  way  to  become  exporters  of  en- 
ergy by  1985.  Seen  in  this  way,  this  eflfort 
will  be  our  contribution  to  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Let  us  now  look  carefully  at  Project 
Independence  and  relate  this  initiative  to 
what  we  all  can  and  must  do  together. 

The  first  major  thrust  of  U.S.  energy  pol- 
icy is  to  eliminate  waste  and  conserve  energy 
resources.  The  United  States  is  the  largest 
energy  consumer,  using  one-third  of  the 
world's  energy.  Our  pattern  of  energy  con- 
sumption has  in  part  resulted  from  the  rela- 
tively low  cost  of  energy  in  the  past.  As 
prices  rise,  normal  market  forces  will  result 


210 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


in  a  reduction  in  demand.  The  problem,  how- 
ever, is  that  we  cannot  wait  for  these  forces 
to  operate.  We  must  force  adoption  of  energy 
conservation  and  demand  curtailment  as  an 
individual  and  collective  ethic  now.  In  turn, 
efficient  energy  utilization  will  become  a  na- 
tional "way  of  life"  and  not  simply  a  tempo- 
rary expedient  to  be  followed  during  this  pe- 
riod of  acute  shortage. 

Our  objectives  are  to  eliminate  waste,  hus- 
band our  scarce  resources,  and  extend  the 
available  supplies  to  insure  that  essential 
needs  are  fully  met.  In  this  way  a  "less  is 
better"  ethic  can  cushion  the  impact  of  en- 
ergy shortfalls  on  the  economy  and  yield  an 
improved  quality  of  life.  This  means  less 
weight  and  horsepower  in  our  automobiles, 
less  speed  on  our  highways,  less  heat  and  heat 
loss  in  our  homes,  less  empty  seats  on  our 
planes,  trains,  and  buses,  less  waste  in  our  in- 
dustrial processes  and  powerplants,  less 
throwaway  containers.  All  of  these  will  en- 
hance rather  than  detract  from  our  eco- 
nomic well-being  and  living  standard. 

With  such  a  program,  our  goal  is  to  cut 
our  annual  growth  rate  in  energy  consump- 
tion from  the  present  4  to  5  percent  down  to 
2  or  3  percent  by  1980.  If  we  can  do  this,  our 
estimates  show  that  we  could  save  as  much 
as  7  million  barrels  of  oil  per  day.  Although 
much  of  the  expected  7-million-barrels-per- 
day  saving  can  result  from  adherence  with 
current  conservation  policies,  there  is  consid- 
erable research  we  plan  to  do  which  is  aimed 
at  permanently  reducing  consumption  of  en- 
ergy. For  example,  better  insulation  of 
houses,  more  efficient  automobile  engines,  and 
more  efficient  power  cycles  can  save  energy 
without  causing  economic  or  social  disloca- 
tion. Thus  our  research  program  will  con- 
centrate on  these  areas. 

The  second  major  thrust  of  Project  Inde- 
pendence is  to  stimulate  the  development  and 
production  of  domestic  energy  resources  and 
to  develop  alternative  new  energy  sources. 
Specifically,  our  program  will  include  the 
following: 

— Developing  our  coal  reserves  more  ef- 
fectively. We  have  1.5  trillion  tons  of  identifi- 
able coal  reserves,  or  half  of  the  non-Com- 


munist world's  reserves,  425  billion  tons  of 
which  are  economically  recoverable  now.  We 
must  develop  ways  to  utilize  this  abundant 
resource.  We  must  mount  major  i-esearch  and 
development  efforts  in  gasification  and  lique- 
faction of  coal.  Further,  we  must  develop 
techniques  for  mining  surface  coal  that  do 
not  desti'oy  the  landscape  permanently.  We 
must  also  develop  ways  to  deep-mine  coal 
that  protect  the  health  and  safety  of  miners. 

— We  have  talked  for  years  about  the  pro- 
duction of  oil  from  our  oil  shale.  There  are 
an  estimated  1.8  trillion  barrels  of  oil  in  the 
shale  resources  in  the  United  States,  and  just 
those  reserves  that  we  presently  know  are 
exploitable  could  satisfy  our  needs  for  oil  for 
over  100  years.  We  need  an  increased  effort 
by  both  the  Federal  Government  and  private 
industry  to  develop  this  potentially  produc- 
tive resource.  I  am  especially  encouraged 
by  recent  progress  in  the  m?  situ  processes  for 
extracting  shale  oil.  This  process  suggests 
that  it  may  be  possible  to  produce  shale  oil 
at  much  less  than  the  current  cost  of  Persian 
Gulf  crude.  In  situ  extraction  should  also 
have  minimal  impact  on  the  environment,  and 
its  development  must  be  expedited. 

— We  also  have  to  push  forward  in  the 
development  and  utilization  of  nuclear  power. 
Currently,  nuclear  power  provides  only  1 
percent  of  our  energy  needs  after  30  years  of 
development.  It  could  easily  provide  10  per- 
cent by  1985.  We  will  take  every  step  to 
expedite  the  licensing  and  construction  of 
nuclear  power  plants,  which  are  an  essential 
part  of  our  program  for  achieving  energy 
self-sufficiency.  We  will  also  develop  a  broad 
nuclear  program  which  looks  toward  liquid 
metal  and  other  breeder  reactors.  In  addition, 
top  priority  will  continue  to  be  given  to 
assuring  that  nuclear  power  plants  are  built 
and  operated  safely  with  acceptable  environ- 
mental impact. 

— We  have  also  talked  for  years  about 
development  of  such  relatively  distant  al- 
ternatives to  fossil  fuels  as  fusion,  geother- 
mal,  and  solar  energy.  For  the  next  decade 
these  alternatives  are  still  very  much  in  the 
research  and  development  stage  of  growth, 
and  they  could  not  come  into  widespread  use 
until  after  1990.  Nevertheless,  although  we 


March  4,    1974 


211 


will  invest  in  the  development  of  these  alter- 
natives, at  the  same  time  we  must  focus  now 
on  nearer  term  measures  for  expanding  ener- 
gy supplies. 

With  this  overall  approach  in  mind,  let  us 
examine  in  more  detail  novv'  the  specifics  of 
Project  Independence. 

We  have  tried  to  visualize  our  policy  in 
terms  of  what  must  be  done  in  the  relatively 
short  range,  up  to  the  mid-1980's;  and  what 
must  be  done  in  the  long  term,  beyond  the 
1980's.  The  strategies  appropriate  for  deal- 
ing with  the  short  range  are  in  general  not 
the  same  as  those  appropriate  for  the  long 
range,  and  so  I  will  discuss  them  separately. 

Short  Range 

In  the  short  range  our  efforts  must  be 
toward  development  of  the  existing  state  of 
the  art,  and  in  addition  to  our  conservation 
efforts  our  underlying  strategy  will  be: 

1.  To  increase  our  domestic  supply  of  gas 
and  oil,  including  development  of  the  Outer 
Continental  Shelf,  our  resources  in  Alaska, 
as  well  as  our  large  gas  reserves. 

2.  To  supplement  this  development  of  oil 
and  gas  with  expanded  use  of  alternative 
energy,  mainly  coal  and  nuclear  power  and 
oil  shale. 

Research  can  make  some  contribution  to- 
ward implementing  these  short-range  strate- 
gies, but  the  real  rewards  from  research  will 
come  in  the  next  decade.  Our  progress  be- 
tween now  and  1980  will  depend,  for  the  most 
part,  on  our  ability  to  implement  existing 
technology  rather  than  on  the  results  of  new 
research. 

1.  Increase  domestic  supply  of  gas  and  oil. 

To  increase  our  domestic  supply  of  gas  and 
oil  involves  both  the  application  of  existing 
technology  and  the  creation  of  new  tech- 
nology. Application  of  existing  technology 
would  include  such  techniques  as  secondary 
and  tertiary  recovery  from  existing  oilfields 
and  greatly  expanded  exploration  for  new  oil 
and  gas  reservoirs,  particularly  on  the  Outer 
Continental  Shelf. 

The  undiscovered  oil  and  gas  on  Federal 


lands  and  beneath  our  Outer  Continental 
Shelf  can  provide  a  significant  portion  of  the 
energy  necessary  to  make  us  self-sufficient. 
The  total  U.S.  offshore  lands,  including  the 
Outer  Continental  Shelf,  are  estimated  to 
contain  42  percent  (160  billion  barrels  of  oil 
equivalent)  of  the  remaining  discoverable  oil 
and  gas  reserves  in  the  United  States.  We 
are  now  increasing  the  acreage  leased  on  the 
Outer  Continental  Shelf  to  10  million  acres 
beginning  in  1975,  more  than  tenfold  what 
had  been  planned  two  years  ago.  In  later 
years,  the  amount  of  acreage  to  be  leased  will 
be  based  on  market  needs  and  on  industry's 
record  of  performance  in  exploring  and  de- 
veloping leases. 

In  addition  to  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf 
program,  we  will  move  rapidly  to  exploit  our 
resources  in  Alaska.  The  Alaskan  pipeline, 
when  completed,  will  result  in  more  than  2 
million  barrels  of  oil  a  day  by  1980.  This  is 
equal  to  one-third  of  current  U.S.  oil  imports. 
As  important,  approval  of  the  Alaskan  pipe- 
line will  encourage  additional  development  of 
Alaskan  fields.  Projections  indicate  that  the 
North  Slope  has  potential  reserves  of  as  much 
as  80  billion  barrels.  Thus,  eventually  we 
could  achieve  an  Alaskan  production  of  be- 
tween 5  and  6  million  barrels  a  day. 

Further,  it  has  long  been  clear  that  while 
an  Alaskan  oil  pipeline  was  needed,  it  alone 
will  not  be  enough.  In  addition  to  the  huge 
oil  reserves  in  the  North  Slope  of  Alaska, 
there  are  also  gas  reserves  there  of  at  least 
26  trillion  cubic  feet — enough  to  heat  10  mil- 
lion homes  for  20  years.  We  are  now  working 
to  determine  the  need  for  future  Alaskan  oil 
and  gas  pipeline  capacity,  including  the  best 
routes. 

2.  Supplement  oil  and  gas  through  devel- 
opment of  coal  and  nuclear  energy. 

In  addition  to  these  increased  efforts  in  the 
oil  and  gas  areas,  we  will  move  to  develop 
coal  and  nuclear  energy  as  alternatives.  We 
can  identify  two  separate  approaches :  direct 
substitution  and  coal  conversion. 

a.  Direct  use  of  coal  for  oil  and.  gas  in 
industrial  and  utility  applications.  Substitu- 
tion requires  research,  since  the  main  prob- 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lem  in  burning  coal  is  tlie  environmental 
impact.  We  have  a  large  program  devoted  to 
stack-gas  cleanup,  and  there  is  every  reason 
to  expect  this  program  will  be  successful, 
thus  allowing  us  to  substitute  coal  for  a  sub- 
stantial amount  of  the  oil  and  gas  we  now 
burn.  Some  have  estimated  that  by  1985  we 
might  save  as  much  as  6  million  barrels  per 
day  through  direct  substitution:  2  million 
barrels  per  day  through  direct  replacement 
of  oil  under  utility  boilers,  1  million  barrels 
per  day  in  residential  and  commercial  space 
heating  (primarily  through  heat  pumps), 
and  3  million  barrels  per  day  in  industrial 
processes. 

b.  Conversion  of  coal  into  liqicids  and 
gases.  Techniques  for  liquefying  and  gasify- 
ing coal  are  fairly  well  known.  However,  in 
general  these  methods  are  expensive  and  will 
require  further  development  before  they  be- 
come commercially  feasible.  We  are  under- 
taking a  crash  program  now,  and  we  estimate 
that  we  might  be  able  to  replace  as  much  as 
3  million  barrels  per  day  of  oil  with  synthetic 
fuels  made  from  coal. 

We  thus  visualize  coal  emerging  as  a  very 
central  element  in  our  energy  picture  by 
1985.  There  are  some  estimates  that  suggest 
that  by  then  we  shall  have  to  mine  as  much 
as  1,500  or  even  1,800  million  tons  of  coal 
per  year.  This  represents  a  tripling  of  our 
coal  production. 

c.  Expanding  the  use  of  nuclear  energy 
requires  research  on  nuclear  safety,  waste 
disposal,  siting  of  nuclear  reactors,  and  tho- 
rium systems,  as  well  as  providing  additional 
separative  work  capacity.  Siting  is  also  an 
important  element  of  our  nuclear  strategy 
since,  in  the  absence  of  a  rational  siting  policy 
for  nuclear  reactors,  the  nuclear  option  may 
be  jeopardized. 

Long  Range 

All  of  these  developments  can  take  place 
in  a  relatively  short-range  time  frame.  Long 
range,  our  goal  is  to  gradually  transform  the 
base  of  our  energy  system  from  the  non- 
renewable fossil  fuels  to  nonfossil  fuels, 
mainly  nuclear,  geothermal,  and  solar. 

To  accomplish  this,  we  have  provided  sub- 
stantial funds  for  energy  research  and  de- 


velopment. Last  June  the  President  an- 
nounced a  $10  billion  Federal  program  over 
the  next  five  years,  but  he  stressed  that  we 
would  spend  whatever  additional  sums  that 
could  reasonably  be  spent  to  accomplish  our 
task.  Last  month  the  President  announced 
that  in  fiscal  year  1975 — the  first  year  of  the 
five-year  energy  R.  &  D.  program — the  total 
Federal  commitment  for  direct  energy  re- 
search and  development  will  be  increased  to 
$1.8  billion,  almost  double  the  level  of  a  year 
ago. 

Our  research  will  retain  as  much  flexibility 
as  possible.  In  the  coal  area,  the  challenge  is 
to  learn  how  to  transform  our  different  types 
of  coal  through  a  variety  of  processes  into 
acceptable  gaseous  and  liquid  fuels  suitable 
as  substitutes  and  replacements  for  dwin- 
dling supplies  of  petroleum  and  gas.  Thus, 
low-BTU  gas,  which  is  probably  marginal  in 
the  short  range,  looms  with  high  priority  in 
the  long  range.  And  perfection  of  processes 
for  coal  hydrogenation  leading  to  production 
of  syncrude  and  syngas  will  be  supported  to 
the  limit  of  scientific  creativity. 

Finally,  nuclear  energy  holds  the  most  im- 
portance for  the  long  range,  primarily  be- 
cause it  gives  mankind  an  essentially  inex- 
haustible energy  source,  one  that  is  relatively 
independent  of  mineral  resource  costs.  At  the 
present  time  the  breeder  reactor  is  the  only 
nuclear  technology  that  can  be  counted  upon 
today  to  achieve  the  nuclear  promise.  Thus, 
research  and  development  on  other  breeder 
reactor  concepts  (light  water  breeder,  gas- 
cooled  fast  breeder,  and  molten  salt  breeder) 
will  be  supported  and  expanded  to  retain 
them  as  viable  alternatives. 


The  Need  for  a  World  Response 

All  of  this  is,  however,  really  only  a  part 
of  Project  Independence;  it  is  our  part.  What 
we  need  now  is  to  transform  a  U.S.  commit- 
ment into  a  world  response.  What  can  we  do 
together?  As  major  consuming  countries, 
we  share  the  common  problem  of  being  de- 
pendent upon  oil  imports  and  of  being  con- 
cerned about  the  impact  of  rising  costs  of 
such  imports.  If  we  join  together,  however, 


March  4,   1974 


213 


we  can  reduce  our  dependence  upon  one  set 
of  suppliers  and  stabilize  the  price  that  we 
pay  for  our  oil.  Here  is  what  we  can  do: 

Development  of  Neiv  Energy  Sources 

The  first  thing  that  we  should  consider  are 
ways  in  which,  cooperatively,  we  can  develop 
alternative  energy  supplies.  I  have  already 
described  to  you  what  we  in  the  United 
States  are  doing.  We  must  commence  dis- 
cussing immediately  a  program  for  coopera- 
tion in  such  fields  as  nuclear  technology;  coal 
extraction,  liquefaction,  and  gasification ; 
production  of  oil  from  shale  and  tar  sands; 
development  of  solar  and  geothermal  energy ; 
and  other  fields.  This  program  should  explore 
the  potential  for  sharing  information,  pat- 
ents, and  technical  information.  We  should 
use  this  conference  as  the  first  step  toward 
developing  a  program  for  doing  this.  To- 
gether, we  can  achieve  more  rapid  develop- 
ment of  alternative  energy  sources  for  each 
one  of  our  countries.  For  instance : 

a.  Nuclear  Energy.  We  are  rapidly  reach- 
ing the  stage  where  we  could  be  mass-pro- 
ducing floating  nuclear  power  plants.  Such 
power  plants  can  be  produced  in  quantity 
and  floated  to  locations  throughout  the  world 
to  produce  power  rapidly.  This  is  not  a  long- 
range  concept,  but  something  which  could  be 
initiated  immediately.  The  technology,  ideas, 
and  production  facilities  of  many  nations  can 
be  combined  in  developing  these  plants.  The 
technology  of  breeder  reactors,  for  instance, 
appears  to  be  more  advanced  in  France  and 
Britain  since  they  are  constructing  prototype 
breeder-reactor-powered  generating  stations. 
Germany,  Italy,  and  Japan  have  undertaken 
ambitious  reactor  development  programs.  All 
would  benefit  from  an  exchange  of  informa- 
tion. Certainly  all  countries  should  have  a 
vital  interest  in  pooling  technical  information 
which  concerns  the  safety  and  environmental 
impact  of  reactor  operation. 

b.  In  addition,  we  should  work  together  to 
encourage  development  of  these  relatively 
untapped  but  enormous  sources  of  hydro- 
carbons: U.S.  oil  shale  and  the  tar  sands  of 
Canada  and  Venezuela.  All  together,  these 
three  sources  alone  provide  an  enormous  po- 


tential for  recoverable  oil.  It  is  possible  that 
by  pooling  our  technical  resources  we  can 
produce  new  energy  from  these  three  rela- 
tively untapped  sources  beginning  in  1980. 

c.  Coal.  Development  of  newer  and  better 
processes  for  coal  conversion  is  in  progress 
in  a  number  of  countries,  especially  in  West 
Germany,  England,  and  France.  We  all  could 
benefit  from  this  technology,  and  we  should 
explore  how  we  can  pool  our  thinking  and 
technology  in  this  area  as  well  as  participate 
in  joint  cooperative  programs. 

Conservation 

In  addition  to  these  joint  efi^orts  to  develop 
energy  supplies,  we  must  work  together  to 
curb  the  explosive  growth  of  energy  demand. 
Conservation  eff'orts  and  sacrifices  must  be 
shared  equitably  by  all  of  us.  We  must  pledge 
ourselves  to  a  new  world  conservation  tthic 
— to  the  adoption  of  parallel  vigorous  pro- 
grams to  conserve  energy  and  promote  its 
more  efficient  use.  What  I  urge  is  that  energy 
consumption  in  one  country  not  simply  be 
governed  by  the  ability  to  obtain  additional 
supplies  at  the  cost  of  other  consumer  coun- 
tries. Rather,  there  must  be  a  basic  commit- 
ment to  share  internationally  available  sup- 
plies at  a  reasonable  level  of  consumption 
for  all. 

World  Energy  Data  Bank 

Finally,  energy  policy  can  only  be  ade- 
quately formulated  if  sufficient  accurate  data 
is  available  to  each  country.  We  must  develop 
a  world  energy  data  bank  and  information- 
sharing  arrangement  to  enable  individual 
nations  to  set  sound  policy  as  well  as  full 
coordination  of  world  energy  policy.  This 
would  serve  as  a  repository  for  public  data 
now  available  but  scattered  and  serve  as  a 
focal  point  for  eflForts  to  coordinate  our  re- 
spective national  energy  policies  and  adhere 
to  a  new  code  of  market  conduct. 

A  Future  of  Increased  Cooperation 

In  closing,  let  us  use  this  conference  as 
the  touchstone  for  a  future  of  increased  co- 
operation. Let  us  work  toward  an  open  sys- 
tem in  which  all  those  capable  of  finding, 


214 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I 


developing,  and  marketing  energy  resources 
can  have  an  opportunity  to  do  so.  Nationali- 
zation without  prompt,  adequate,  and  effec- 
tive compensation  by  producing  nations  or 
unconstrained  bilateral  deals  between  pro- 
ducing and  consuming  governments  will  be 
counterproductive  to  all.  Such  bilateral 
arrangements  will  result  in  divisive  competi- 
tion which  will  inevitably  work  to  the  detri- 
ment of  each  individual  buyer  as  well  as  the 
entire  world. 

We  are  facing  a  dramatically  changing 
situation  in  the  world  energy  scene. 

The  present  unstable  situation  is  not  in 
the  long-term  interest  of  current  oil  export- 
ers, although  the  short-term  flow  of  wealth 
and  political  power  may  make  it  hard  for 
them  to  see  the  long-term  disadvantages.  The 
world  is  reacting  to  high  prices  by  reducing 
demand  and  will  develop  alternate  sources 
of  energy  which  in  turn  will  lead  to  lower 
prices  in  the  world  market.  Moreover,  the 
shortrun  actions  of  the  oil  exporters  have 
made  oil  in  the  ground  a  relatively  poor  in- 
vestment because  its  value  will  fall  over  the 
next  decade.  For  example,  using  an  8  percent 
rate  of  return  and  a  price  of  $10  per  barrel 
in  1974,  the  price  of  a  barrel  of  oil  would 
have  to  rise  to  $21.59  by  1984  to  produce  the 
same  rate  of  return.  The  present  price  levels 
present  grave  potential  problems  for  all  con- 
suming nations.  The  oil-producing  nations 
cannot  benefit  from  price  levels  which  result 
in  unemployment  and  inflation  in  Europe  and 
Japan  and  damage  to  the  world  economy  as 
a  whole.  It  is  clearly  in  the  best  interests  of 
the  oil  producers  that  the  world  economy 
maintain  sound  growth. 

In  the  near  term,  prices  lower  than  those 
being  charged  at  present  would  be  in  the 
economic  interest  of  both  producers  and  con- 
sumers, particularly  if  consumers  had  confi- 
dence in  the  stability  of  supply.  High-cost 
alternative  sources  would  not  then  be  encour- 
aged to  so  great  an  extent,  and  producers 
could  expect  continued  gradual  increases  in 
their  national  incomes  as  their  economies 
developed  the  capacity  to  absorb  increasing 
imports  of  capital  and  technology.  Consum- 
ers now  sufi'er  from  the  effects  of  the  sharp 
and  sudden  upswing  in  prices.  Producers  are 


likely  to  suffer  at  some  later  time  from  the 
downswing  in  prices  caused  by  the  market's 
strong  reactions  to  present  high  prices. 

Ideally,  what  is  needed  is  a  diversity  of 
consumers  and  producers  operating  in  a  co- 
operative international  framework.  Recently 
we  have  seen  some  hopeful  signs  that  oil 
producers  are  also  interested  in  adjusting 
oil  prices  to  assure  a  stable  world  economy. 
We  should  work  cooperatively  to  see  that  this 
is  done. 

Together,  we  can  prevent  unemployment. 
Together,  we  can  prevent  a  worldwide  mone- 
tary ci-isis.  Together,  we  can  maintain  eco- 
nomic progress. 

I  believe  there  is  reason  for  optimism.  We 
have  the  capacity  and  resources  to  meet  our 
energy  needs,  and  the  United  States  stands 
ready  and  willing  to  help  build  a  structure 
of  international  cooperation  with  producers 
and  consumers  alike. 


STATEMENT  BY  TREASURY  SECRETARY  SHULTZ  i 

Finance  officials  have  a  duty  to  work  close- 
ly together  in  the  realization  that  even  our 
best  cooperative  efforts  will  offset  only  a 
fraction  of  the  serious  damage  which  has 
been  done  to  many  countries  by  the  abrupt 
and  spectacular  increases  in  oil  costs. 

At  the  same  time  we  must  carefully  avoid 
creating  the  misleading  impression  that  such 
cooperation  provides  any  panacea  for  the 
serious  economic  problems  before  us.  There 
is  no  international  financial  arrangement 
which  can  offset  the  real  effects  of  the  oil 
price  changes.  It  is  important  that  we  not  kid 
ourselves  here — that  we  not,  as  Ministers  of 
Finance,  give  the  impression  that  somehow 
or  other  we  can  print  up  some  money  and  use 
it  to  "paper  over"  very  real  problems. 

The  problems  are  there.  There  is  no  way 
to  concoct  a  financial  solution  that  will  avoid 
facing  up  to  severe  dislocations  and,  I  think, 
particularly  for  the  developing  countries — as 
has  been  brought  out  by  many  speakers  here 
— great  deprivation.  In  a  sense  we  have  that 
horrible  chain  in  which  the  lack  of  fuel  goes 


ury. 


'  Outline  released  by  the  Department  of  the  Treas- 


March  4,    1974 


215 


to  a  lack  of  fertilizer,  goes  to  a  lack  of  food, 
and  which  goes  to  starvation.  So  a  point  that 
I  want  to  make  is  that,  I  think  for  many,  the 
situation  is  not  one  in  which  we  say  to  our- 
selves :  "Yes,  we  see  the  problem.  Let  us 
understand  it,  and  then  figure  out  how  some- 
how through  financial  means  to  handle  it."  It 
is  for  many  not  a  manageable  problem  in  its 
present  state.  And  we  have  to  see  how  it  can 
be  changed  so  that  it  is  manageable. 

We  need  to  be  concerned  not  only  with  the 
direct  impact  of  higher  prices  and  supply  dis- 
turbances on  our  economies  but  also  with  the 
serious  threat  of  secondary  repercussions 
from  instability  in  financial  markets,  from 
inconsistency  in  internal  economic  manage- 
ment and  in  balance  of  payments  policies, 
and  from  impaired  economic  development. 
These  are  areas  in  which  we  can  make  a  con- 
tribution— and  why  now  more  than  ever  we 
have  an  obligation  to  seek  the  optimum  con- 
tribution from  close  international  economic 
cooperation. 

We  have  heard  reports  in  this  conference 
already  that  this  year,  and  over  the  next  few 
years,  the  standards  of  living  of  the  more 
developed  nations  will  be  reduced  signifi- 
cantly below  previous  expectations.  In  the 
short  run,  we  are  facing  the  problem  of  ad- 
justing to  reduced  supply;  and  this  has 
affected  our  immediate  prospects  for  growth. 
But  as  this  problem  is  met,  our  real  income 
will  continue  to  be  affected  both  by  the  higher 
costs  of  energy  imports  and  by  the  higher 
expenditures  which  nations  will  find  it  pru- 
dent to  make  in  reaching  reduced  future  de- 
pendence on  imported  energy.  Nonetheless 
the  standards  of  living  of  the  nations  here 
represented  will  remain  a  large  multiple  of 
those  of  some  of  the  less  favored  nations. 

In  contrast,  the  effects  of  the  oil  price 
changes  are  likely  to  be  near-catastrophic  for 
some  of  the  poor  areas  of  the  world.  In  some 
countries  it  is  even  probable  that  the  new 
energy  costs  will  result  in  a  reduction  of 
standards  of  living  over  the  next  few  years 
from  the  present  abysmally  low  level — to  the 
point,  in  some  cases,  of  starvation. 

We  have  heard  estimates  that  even  after 
projected  reductions  in  market  prices  of  oil 


below  present  levels  that  the  developed  coun- 
tries could  have  their  combined  current  ac- 
count deficits  worsened  by  as  much  as  $40  bil- 
lion, the  developing  countries  could  have  their 
current  account  deficits  increased  by  as  much 
as  $10  billion,  and  the  oil-producing  nations 
could  add  as  much  as  $50  billion  to  their  for- 
eign asset  holdings — all  in  the  one  year,  1974. 
In  the  face  of  such  possibilities,  I  suggest 
that  it  would  be  in  our  mutual  interest  to 
agree  on  some  basic  principles  on  how  we 
should  respond  in  our  economic  policies,  na- 
tional and  international.  I  put  forward  three 
principles  for  your  consideration: 

I.  First,  at  a  time  of  vast  new  uncertainty 
let  us  each  recognize  the  need  to  develop  in- 
ternal policies  that  maintain  our  production 
and  demand  and  deal  with  inflation  without 
aggravating  the  problems  of  others.  This  will 
require  not  only  particularly  careful  analy- 
sis but  also  particularly  close  international 
consultation  and  cooperation.  In  this  connec- 
tion, we  know  that  the  cost-push  effects  of  oil 
prices  reinforce  the  strong  upward  pressures 
on  our  price  levels.  Yet  at  the  same  time  we 
need  to  recognize  that  the  greatly  increased 
cost  of  our  oil  imports  could  affect  our  econ- 
omies as  would  a  massive  increase  in  taxes 
from  which  the  revenues  were  not  currently 
being  spent.  In  this  case,  of  course,  this  "tax" 
will  be  reflected  in  higher  dollar  imports 
rather  than  government  revenues.  But  that 
import  bill  should  not  carry  the  same  conno- 
tation or  draw  the  same  policy  response  that 
we  usually  associate  with  a  deteriorating 
trade  position.  We  must  realistically  take  ac- 
count of  potential  increases  in  exports  to  oil- 
producing  countries  and,  more  important 
quantitatively,  the  potential  large  availabil- 
ity— directly  and  indirectly — of  flows  of  in- 
vestment funds  from  the  producing  countries. 

II.  Second,  in  our  international  policies  we 
must  agree  to  keep  open  our  markets  for 
goods  and  capital  and  to  avoid  the  temptation 
of  competitive  devaluations.  No  nation  can 
impose  trade  restrictions  and  other  "beggar- 
my-neighbor"  policies  without  engendering 
retaliation,  so  that  the  whole  process  would 
be  self-defeating  and  destructive.  Now  more 


216 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


than  ever,  during  a  period  when  international 
adjustments  will  necessarily  have  to  be  large 
and  rapid,  governments  must  maintain  mo- 
mentum for  the  removal  of  existing  distor- 
tions from  the  international  economy.  They 
must  proceed  resolutely  with  planned  trade 
negotiations  and  with  feasible  further  dis- 
mantling of  capital  controls.  And  they  must 
agree  to  undertake  special  efforts  to  resist 
those  pressures  for  the  introduction  of  spe- 
cial-interest-serving government  controls  and 
interventions  which  are  likely  to  be  put  for- 
ward during  any  time  of  rapid  economic 
change. 

III.  Third,  in  our  development  policies  we 
should  endeavor  at  least  to  maintain  recent 
levels  of  assistance  to  the  most  seriously  dis- 
advantaged nations  and  encourage  oil-pro- 
ducing nations  with  rapidly  increasing  hold- 
ings of  foreign  assets  to  take  immediate  steps 
greatly  to  expand  their  programs  of  assist- 
ance for  the  least  developed  nations  in  full 
cooperation  with  industrial  nations  and  in- 
ternational institutions. 

In  the  light  of  the  new  burden  of  energy 
costs  upon  their  economies  and  their  balance 
of  payments,  it  will  not  be  easy  to  maintain  a 
climate  of  opinion  in  the  developed  nations 
to  maintain  or  increase  past  levels  of  assist- 
ance to  the  least  developed  nations.  But  in 
view  of  the  extreme  distress  faced  by  some 
areas  of  the  world  and  the  economic  and  po- 
litical consequences,  it  would  be  shortsighted 
and  inhumane  for  the  developed  nations  to 
curtail  assistance  plans  and  programs  at  this 
time  of  greatest  need. 

But  even  with  continued  assistance  from 
the  traditional  providers  of  aid,  the  least  de- 
veloped nations  are  faced  with  a  tremendous 
gap  in  needed  resources.  Some  of  the  most 
important  oil-producing  nations — themselves 
moving  rapidly  from  poverty  to  affluence  and 
with  natural  understanding  for  the  prob- 
lem— can  reasonably  be  called  upon  for  a 
major  contribution  toward  reducing  that  gap. 

No  channel  of  aid  should  be  neglected.  In- 
creased assistance  may  be  made  available 
through  direct  country-by-country  relation- 
ships, through  new  or  already  established  re- 


gional institutions,  and  through  increased 
contributions  to  the  existing  broad  multilat- 
ei-al  financial  institutions.  But  in  view  of  the 
extreme  need  and  the  weakened  financial  po- 
sition of  many  of  the  least  developed  nations, 
it  is  essential  that  a  substantial  proportion 
of  the  increases  in  assistance  be  in  the  form 
either  of  outright  grants  or  of  their  equiv- 
alent. 

As  we  seek  to  incorporate  these  general 
principles  into  practical  actions,  I  believe  our 
work  can  be  divided  naturally  into  four  broad 
areas  of  cooperation: 

1.  Measures  to  help  insure  that  we  main- 
tain open  markets. 

2.  Measures  we  can  take  to  deal  with  or 
reduce  the  uncertainties  inherent  in  the 
present  situation — uncertainties  related  both 
to  the  extent  of  oil  price  increases  and  to  the 
directions  in  which  the  flows  of  producing- 
country  money,  much  of  which  will  be  short 
term,  will  be  channeled. 

3.  Measures  we  can  take  to  facilitate  a 
larger  portion  of  these  funds  to  move  into 
longer  term  investment  in  ways  beneficial  to 
both  the  investing  and  recipient  nations. 

4.  Measures  we  can  take  to  encourage  and 
facilitate  the  flow  of  resources  from  oil-pro- 
ducing countries  to  LDC's,  particularly  the 
poorest  of  them. 

I.  Measures  To  Maintain  Open  Markets 

The  principle  of  avoiding  restrictions  on 
trade  and  payments  that  have  the  effect  of 
transferring  problems  to  others  has  wide 
support;  the  question  is  how  we  can  rein- 
force that  principle  in  practical  institutional 
and  operational  terms. 

The  countries  here  represented  include  the 
largest  trading  nations.  Should  we  not  pledge 
among  ourselves  here  and  now  to  take  no 
trade-restricting  measures — surcharges,  quo- 
tas, or  their  equivalent — for  balance  of  pay- 
ments purposes? 

For  the  future  we  would  be  willing  to  con- 
sider new  institutional  means  and  procedures 
whereby  we  would  pledge  no  trade-restrict- 
ing action  for  balance  of  payments  purposes 


March  4,   1974 


217 


without  prior  discussion  and  approval  by  the 
IMF  [International  Monetary  Fund]. 

II.  Measures  for  Dealhty  With  Uncertainty 

A.  We  know  in  the  aggregate  the  money 
spent  for  oil  and  not  used  for  our  exports 
will  flow  back,  largely  short  term.  But  each 
country  is  left  uncertain  as  to  the  size  of  its 
increased  import  bill  and  the  directions 
which  the  reflow  of  investment  money  will 
take.  Some  countries  may  naturally  attract 
more  or  less  of  this  money  than  their  in- 
creased balance  of  payments  drain. 

1.  Much  of  this  sorting  out  can  take  place 
in  private  markets  and  by  official  borrowing, 
where  necessary,  in  private  markets.  Obvi- 
ously the  flows  may  take  place  through  home 
markets  or  third  markets,  such  as  New  York 
or  the  Euro-currency  markets. 

2.  In  sheer  bulk,  this  is  mainly  a  problem 
for  developed  countries.  Because  some  LDC's 
may  have  special  difficulties  obtaining  credit, 
difi'erent  techniques  will  be  necessary  there. 

B.  One  thing  we  can  do  is  be  sure  private 
markets  are  sufficiently  free  to  do  the  recy- 
cling job. 

1.  Removal  of  U.S.  controls  has  opened  the 
largest  and  most  efficient  capital  market  once 
more  to  the  world.  Other  nations  have  made 
moves  in  the  same  direction.  I  believe  the  re- 
sults will  be  beneficial. 

2.  In  the  present  situation,  part  of  our  fi- 
nancial "ethic"  should  be  to  permit  our  na- 
tionals to  borrow  abroad,  particularly  for 
countries  facing  deficit.  Conversely,  potential 
surplus  countries  should  permit  funds  to  flow 
out. 

C.  Private  borrowings,  in  some  cases,  will 
need  to  be  supplemented  by  ofllicial  borrow- 
ing. Our  markets,  the  Euromarkets,  and  some 
others  are  open.  But  possibly  a  scramble  for 
money  and  sharp  pressures  on  one  market  or 
another  could  develop,  in  no  one's  interest. 
Therefore  it  may  be  worth  considering  at 
least  informal  and  confidential  exchanges  of 
information  about  prospective  borrowing  op- 
erations among  major  nations.  Then  nations 
could  act  in  the  knowledge  of  each  other's 
intentions  and  help  avoid  alternate  periods 


of  congestion  and  vacuums  in  money  and 
capital  markets  that  could  in  turn  aff'ect  ex- 
change markets. 

D.  At  times,  intergovernmental  borrowing 
may  be  necessary  and  desirable,  and  a  greater 
sense  of  certainty  that  such  facilities  would 
be  available  in  time  of  need  could  be  very 
useful — even  if  it  turns  out  in  the  end  that 
such  facilities  are  not  used  heavily,  or  at  all. 

1.  This  is  a  classic  purpose  of  IMF  credits, 
and  those  lines  fortunately  are  little  used  at 
present.  Consequently,  there  is  some  spare 
capacity. 

2.  A  further  line  of  defense,  which  can 
readily  be  expanded,  is  central  bank  "swap" 
lines.  We  have  indicated  a  willingness  to  do 
this,  at  least  on  a  selective  basis,  and  we 
would  welcome  discussion  of  the  appropriate 
role  and  limits  of  such  facilities. 

3.  Beyond  these  facilities,  the  question 
arises  as  to  whether  existing  international 
institutional  facilities  need  to  be  expanded 
and  rearranged  to  deal  with  uncertainty 
about  the  direction  in  which  funds  will  move 
and,  if  needed,  rechannel  funds  to  take  care 
of  balance  of  payments  needs  in  short  or  me- 
dium term.  As  we  understand  it,  the  proposal 
made  by  Mr.  Witteveen  [Johannes  Witte- 
veen.  Managing  Director  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund]  falls  into  this  category  and 
has  attracted  most  attention. 

a.  We  feel  it  essential,  in  evaluating  this 
proposal,  to  distinguish  sharply  the  problem 
of  uncertainty  and  the  need  for  rechanneling 
potentially  sizable  amounts  of  money  for  lim- 
ited terms  among  countries  able  to  repay  rel- 
atively promptly  from  the  more  severe  (but 
quantitatively  smaller)  problem  of  the  poor 
LDC's,  which  need  grants  and  heavily  con- 
cessional long-term  aid. 

b.  Even  among  developed  countries  and 
more  prosperous  LDC's,  a  Witteveen-type 
proposal  presents  difficult  technical  and  ne- 
gotiating problems  in  deciding  upon  suitable 
terms.  We  await  further  elaboration  of  Mr. 
Witteveen's  thoughts,  and  in  particular  how 
the  risk  of  building  up  nominally  short-term, 
but  in  fact  unrepayable,  credits  can  be  han- 
dled. We  intend  to  react  constructively. 


218 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


III.  Measures  To  Facilitate  Orderly  Longer 
Term  Investment  Patterns 

A.  Removal  of  restraints  on  longer  term 
investment  is  equally  relevant. 

B.  Given  the  vast  flow  of  potential  invest- 
ment, serious  and  difficult  questions  arise  in 
the  minds  of  both  investors  and  recipients 
that  may  hamper  flows. 

1.  The  investor  wants  and  needs  the  widest 
possible  diversity  of  outlets  (i.e.,  open  capital 
markets),  professional  investment  manage- 
ment, and  confidence  that  his  investments 
are  secure  from  political  action  by  recipients. 

2.  The  recipient  wants  to  have  some  assur- 
ance that  investments  will  not  be  managed 
for  political  purposes,  and  the  prospect  of 
reasonable  stability  in  flows. 

C.  I  have  no  specific  proposal  in  this  area. 
However,  I  raise  for  discussion  one  question: 
Should  we  consider  a  new  international  in- 
vestment institution,  a  kind  of  multinational 
joint  venture  with  participation  in  manage- 
ment by  both  investor  and  recipient  nations, 
as  a  means  of  helping  to  satisfy  the  concerns 
I  have  cited?  An  essential  aim  of  the  institu- 
tion would  be  to  achieve  a  diversity  of  prof- 
itable investment  outlets,  with  expert  invest- 
ment management,  for  the  producers.  At  the 
same  time  the  multilateral  umbrella  might 
help  put  to  rest  mutual  fears  of  political  re- 
prisals, thus  encouraging  recipient  countries 
to  permit  larger  amounts  of  investment  and 
encouraging  investor  countries  to  commit  siz- 
able funds  for  extended  periods. 

Obviously,  in  managing  such  an  institu- 
tion, the  investing  countries  would  legiti- 
mately maintain  control  over  some  basic 
decisions  concerning  the  volume  and  distri- 
bution of  the  funds.  Many  complex  organi- 
zational problems  would  arise.  Are  they 
worth  discussion  ? 

D.  We  might  exercise  our  collective  imag- 
ination to  devise  other  means  of  better  as- 
suring the  safety  and  stability  of  invest- 
ments. 

An  international  investment  guarantee 
agency  has  been  discussed  at  length  in  the 
past,  fruitlessly.    But  now  the  problem  ap- 


pears in  another  guise,  and  fresh  thinking 
with  the  producers  may  be  desirable. 

The  United  States  earlier  advanced  the 
concept  of  an  "investment  fund"  for  coun- 
tries with  large  ofl^cial  pools  of  investment 
money.  This  concept  rested  on  an  essentially 
simple  "code  of  conduct"  or  "rule  of  the 
road."  A  recipient  country  would  be  entitled 
to  know  how  much  investment  of  what  type 
was  being  made  by  other  governments  in  its 
currency  and  to  limit  the  aggregate  amount 
of  that  investment.  But  having  agreed  to 
that  investment,  it  would  also  agree  to  treat 
that  investment  in  a  nondiscriminatory  man- 
ner. 

These  questions  might  well  serve  as  the 
basis  for  further  international  study. 

IV.  Measures  To  Encourage  the  Flow  of  Re- 
sources From  Oil-Producing  Nations  to 
the  Less  Developed  Countries 

— The  LDC's  pose  a  special  problem.  The 
prospects  of  the  poor  nations,  even  before 
the  quadrupling  of  oil  prices,  were  marginal 
at  best.  To  all,  it  must  be  clear  that  for  some 
of  the  poorest  nations  oil  prices  at  current 
levels  spell  misery  and  even  starvation. 

— A  transfer  of  resources  cannot  be  done 
by  one  group  of  countries  alone.  The  indus- 
trial nations  must  continue  to  provide  their 
historical  levels  of  assistance  or  better.  This 
will  not  be  easy  in  the  face  of  growing  con- 
cern about  the  domestic  impact  of  the  energy 
crisis.  Our  Congress  has  illustrated  its  sensi- 
tivity to  this  problem  in  its  first  vote  on  the 
IDA  replenishment.  We  do  not  mean  to  let 
that  vote  stand  as  the  final  word. 

I  say  to  you  quite  frankly  that  the  vote  in 
our  House  of  Representatives  a  couple  of 
weeks  ago  on  the  fourth  IDA  replenishment 
(IDA  IV)  was  a  great  disappointment  to  us 
and  we  do  not  intend  to  let  it  stand.  We  in- 
tend to  work  to  turn  that  around  and  to 
maintain  the  flow  of  development  aid  from 
the  United  States  to  the  developing  countries. 
We  must  meet  the  argument  that  all  we  are 
doing  is  paying  out  aid  for  the  developing 
countries  to  flow  back  to  the  Arab  countries 
and  only  support  the  price  of  oil.  That  is  the 


March  4,   1974 


219 


argument  used  against  development  aid,  and 
we  think  there  are  good  arguments  against 
it,  and  we  intend  to  use  them  and  use  them 
aggressively. 

— At  the  same  time  industrial  nations  can- 
not be  expected  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  in- 
creased oil  bills  to  LDC's.  That  responsibility 
must  fall  primarily  on  the  oil  producers. 

— But  the  industrialized  nations  can  and 
must  cooperate  with  producers  to  facilitate 
the  required  flows  from  producers. 

The  United  States  would  be  pleased  to  join 
in  studying  concrete  proposals  to  bring  about 
this  goal  and  believes  the  following  items 
might  usefully  be  included  on  a  study  agen- 
da: 

1.  Assuring  that  the  oil  producers  play  a 
full  role  as  members  or  associate  members 
of  development  organizations,  including  the 
Development  Assistance  Committee  and  re- 
gional economic  institutions  as  well  as  the 
World  Bank  and  the  IMF.  In  view  of  their 
increased  economic  standing  and  the  greater 
financial  responsibility  they  are  being  asked 
to  assume,  a  prompt  provision  of  larger  vot- 
ing shares  in  the  latter  two  institutions  may 
be  appropriate. 

2.  Encouraging  greater  participation  in 
management  and  staff'  roles  in  these  organi- 
zations by  producer  nations  would  also  seem 
appropriate. 

3.  Expansion  of  the  World  Bank  and  the 
IMF  services  as  agents  to  the  producer  coun- 
tries for  loans  to  the  LDC's:  These  services 
can  include  participation  in  conventional 
loans  and  in  concessional  financing.  A  direct 
contribution  to,  or  alongside,  IDA  IV  would 
be  extremely  helpful.  Our  existing  institu- 
tions, as  well  as  national  governments,  can 
also  provide  direct  technical  assistance  to  bi- 
lateral and  regional  assistance  programs  of 
producers  to  achieve  a  high  level  of  assist- 
ance as  rapidly  as  possible. 

4.  A  larger  producer  share  in  planned 
world  and  regional  bank  borrowings:  These 
institutions,  instead  of  floating  issues  on  the 
world  capital  markets,  would  offer  bonds  at 
reasonable  rates  to  oil-producer  nations. 

5.  A  rechanneling  of  loans  from  existing 


oil-producer  loan  recipients — who  now  have 
more  funds  than  they  can  absorb  domestic- 
ally— to  the  poor  nations.  Newly  affluent 
countries  can  afford  prepayment  of  past 
loans  and  should  be  less  dependent  on  new 
loans.  The  potential  for  a  rechanneling  of 
loans  in  these  ways  is  substantial. 

6.  Beyond  the  redirection  of  planned  bor- 
rowing, the  World  Bank  already  has  guaran- 
tee capital  sufficient  to  permit  larger  lending 
and  larger  borrowing  in  producers'  markets, 
liending  from  ordinary  capital  raised  in  this 
manner  could  be  appropriate  for  some  LDC's, 
who  can  afford  to  pay  loans  at  near-market 
rates  provided  the  repayment  terms  are  long. 

I  must  stress  that  almost  all  of  the  above 
measures  involve  loans — not  grants,  near- 
grants,  or  heavily  concessional  terms.  The 
poorest  nations  require  a  major  direct  effort 
to  offset  the  devastating  impact  of  higher  oil 
prices.  The  oflfset  must  come  first  in  the  form 
of  lower  prices  and  then  from  grant  aid.  In- 
dustrial nations  can  and  must  be  expected  to 
contribute  in  historical  levels  of  money,  in- 
stitutional expertise,  and  technology  to  mix 
with  Arab  funds  in  providing  the  tools  to 
help  these  poorest  nations  do  the  job. 

This,  then,  brings  me  back  to  where  I 
started.  In  a  way,  the  problem  is  a  large  one, 
as  everyone  tells  each  other.  Cooperation  is 
essential,  as  everyone  tells  each  other;  but  at 
the  same  time  I  think  we  still  need  to  keep 
reminding  each  other  that  cooperation,  han- 
dling things  with  a  sense  of  balance,  finan- 
cially, is  not  a  substitute  for  changing  the 
problem  so  that  the  problem  is  more  manage- 
able. There  is  no  way  to  print  up  money  and 
use  it  to  "paper  over"  a  real  problem.  We 
must  face  the  real  problem  in  its  own  terms 
and  do  everything  we  can  to  solve  it. 

TEXT  OF  COMMUNIQUE 

Washington  Energy  Conference  doe.  17  (rev.  2) 
Summary  Statement 

1.  Foreign  Ministers  of  Belgium,  Canada,  Den- 
mark, France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  The  Netherlands, 
Nonvay,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States  met 


220 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


in  Washington  from  February  11  to  13,  1974.  The 
European  Community  was  represented  as  such  by  the 
President  of  the  Council  and  the  President  of  the 
Commission.  Finance  Ministers,  Ministers  with  re- 
sponsibility for  Energy  Affairs,  Economic  Affairs  and 
Science  and  Technology  Affairs  also  took  part  in  the 
meeting.  The  Secretary  General  of  the  OECD  also 
participated  in  the  meeting.  The  Ministers  examined 
the  international  energy  situation  and  its  implica- 
tions and  charted  a  course  of  actions  to  meet  this 
challenge  which  requires  constructive  and  compre- 
hensive solutions.  To  this  end  they  agreed  on  specific 
steps  to  provide  for  effective  international  coopera- 
tion. The  Ministers  affirmed  that  solutions  to  the 
world's  energy  problem  should  be  sought  in  consulta- 
tion  with   producer  countries   and   other  consumers. 

Analysis  of  the  Situation 

2.  They  noted  that  during  the  past  three  decades 
progress  in  improving  productivity  and  standards 
of  living  was  greatly  facilitated  by  the  ready  avail- 
ability of  increasing  supplies  of  energy  at  fairly 
stable  prices.  They  recognized  that  the  problem  of 
meeting  growing  demand  existed  before  the  current 
situation  and  that  the  needs  of  the  world  economy 
for  increased  energy  supplies  require  positive  long- 
term  solutions. 

3.  They  concluded  that  the  current  energy  situa- 
tion results  from  an  intensification  of  these  under- 
lying factors  and  from  political  developments. 

4.  They  reviewed  the  problems  created  by  the  large 
rise  in  oil  prices  and  agreed  with  the  serious  con- 
cern expressed  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund's 
Committee  of  Twenty  at  its  recent  Rome  meeting 
over  the  abrupt  and  significant  changes  in  prospect 
for  the  world  balance  of  payments  structure. 

5.  They  agreed  that  present  petroleum  prices  pre- 
sented the  structure  of  world  trade  and  finance  with 
an  unprecedented  situation.  They  recognized  that 
none  of  the  consuming  countries  could  hope  to  insu- 
late itself  from  these  developments,  or  expect  to  deal 
with  the  payments  impact  of  oil  prices  by  the  adop- 
tion of  monetary  or  trade  measures  alone.  In  their 
view,  the  present  situation,  if  continued,  could  lead 
to  a  serious  deterioration  in  income  and  employment, 
intensify  inflationary  pressures,  and  endanger  the 
welfare  of  nations.  They  believed  that  financial  meas- 
ures by  themselves  will  not  be  able  to  deal  with  the 
strains  of  the  current  situation. 

6.  They  expressed  their  particular  concern  about 
the  consecjuences  of  the  situation  for  the  developing 
countries  and  recognized  the  need  for  efforts  by  the 
entire  international  community  to  resolve  this  prob- 
lem. At  current  oil  prices  the  additional  energy  costs 
for  developing  countries  will  cause  a  serious  setback 
to  the  prospect  for  economic  development  of  these 
countries. 

7.  General  Conclusions.  They  affirmed,  that,  in  the 
pursuit  of  national  policies,  whether  in  trade,  mone- 
tary or  energy  fields,  efforts  should  be  made  to  har- 


monize the  interests  of  each  country  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  maintenance  of  the  world  economic 
system  on  the  other.  Concerted  international  coop- 
eration between  all  the  countries  concerned  including 
oil  producing  countries  could  help  to  accelerate  an 
improvement  in  the  supply  and  demand  situation, 
ameliorate  the  adverse  economic  consequences  of  the 
existing  situation  and  lay  the  groundwork  for  a  more 
equitable  and  stable  international  energy  relation- 
ship. 

8.  They  felt  that  these  considerations  taken  as  a 
whole  made  it  essential  that  there  should  be  a  sub- 
stantial increase  of  international  cooperation  in  all 
fields.  Each  participant  in  the  Conference  stated  its 
firm  intention  to  do  its  utmost  to  contribute  to  such 
an  aim,  in  close  cooperation  both  with  the  other 
consumer  countries  and  with  the  producer  countries. 

0.  They  concurred  in  the  need  for  a  comprehensive 
action  program  to  deal  with  all  facets  of  the  world 
energy  situation  by  cooperative  measures.  In  so 
doing  they  will  build  on  the  work  of  the  OECD.  They 
recognized  that  they  may  wish  to  invite,  as  appro- 
priate, other  countries  to  join  with  them  in  these 
efforts.  Such  an  action  program  of  international 
cooperation  would  include,  as  appropriate,  the  shar- 
ing of  means  and  efforts,  while  concerting  national 
policies,  in  such  areas  as: 

— The  conservation  of  energy  and  restraint  of 
demand. 

— A  system  of  allocating  oil  supplies  in  times  of 
emergency  and  severe  shortages. 

— The  acceleration  of  development  of  additional 
energy  sources  so  as  to  diversify  energy  supplies. 

— The  acceleration  of  energy  research  and  develop- 
ment programs  through  international  cooperative 
efforts." 

10.  With  respect  to  monetary  and  economic  ques- 
tions, they  decided  to  intensify  their  cooperation  and 
to  give  impetus  to  the  work  being  undertaken  in 
the  IMF,  the  World  Bank  and  the  OECD  on  the 
economic  and  monetary  consequences  of  the  current 
energy  situation,  in  particular  to  deal  with  balance 
of  payments  disequilibria.   They  agreed  that: 

— In  dealing  with  the  balance  of  payments  impact 
of  oil  prices  they  stressed  the  importance  of  avoiding 
competitive  depreciation  and  the  escalation  of  re- 
strictions on  trade  and  payments  or  disruptive  actions 
in  external  borrowing.*  ° 

— While  financial  cooperation  can  only  partially 
alleviate  the  problems  which  have  recently  arisen  for 
the  international  economic  system,  they  will  intensify 
work  on  short-term  financial  measures  and  possible 
longer-term  mechanisms  to  reinforce  existing  official 
and  market  credit  facilities.* 


''  France  does  not  accept  point  9.  [Footnote  in 
original.] 

"  In  point  10,  France  does  not  accept  paragraphs 
cited  with  asterisks.  [Footnote  in  original.] 


March  4,    1974 


221 


— They  will  pursue  domestic  economic  policies 
which  will  reduce  as  much  as  possible  the  diflficulties 
resulting  from  the  current  energy  cost  levels.*  ' 

— They  will  make  strenuous  efforts  to  maintain 
and  enlarge  the  flow  of  development  aid  bilaterally 
and  through  multilateral  institutions,  on  the  basis 
of  international  solidarity  embracing  all  countries 
with  appropriate  resources. 

11.  Further,  they  have  agreed  to  accelerate  wher- 
ever practicable  their  own  national  programs  of  new 
energy  sources  and  technology  which  will  help  the 
overall  world-wide  supply  and  demand  situation. 

12.  They  agreed  to  examine  in  detail  the  role  of 
international  oil  companies. 

13.  They  stressed  the  continued  importance  of 
maintaining  and  improving  the  natural  environment 
as  part  of  developing  energy  sources  and  agreed  to 
make  this  an  important  goal  of  their  activity. 

14.  They  further  agreed  that  there  was  need  to 
develop  a  cooperative  multilateral  relationship  with 
producing  countries,  and  other  consuming  countries 
that  takes  into  account  the  long-term  interests  of  all. 
They  are  ready  to  exchange  technical  information 
with  these  countries  on  the  problem  of  stabilizing 
energy  supplies  with  regard  to  quantity  and  prices. 

15.  They  welcomed  the  initiatives  in  the  UN  to 
deal  with  the  larger  issues  of  energy  and  primary 
products  at  a  world-wide  level  and  in  particular  for 
a  special  session  of  the  UN  General  Assembly. 

Establishment  of  Follow-on  Machinery 

16.  They  agreed  to  establish  a  coordinating  group 
headed  by  senior  officials  to  direct  and  to  coordinate 
the  development  of  the  actions  referred  to  above.  The 
coordinating  group  shall  decide  how  best  to  organize 
its  work.  It  should: 

— Monitor  and  give  focus  to  the  tasks  that  might 
be  addressed  in  existing  organizations; 

— Establish  such  ad  hoc  working  groups  as  may  be 
nec?ssary  to  undertake  tasks  for  which  there  are 
presently  no  suitable  bodies; 

— Direct  preparations  of  a  conference  of  consumer 
and  producer  countries  which  will  be  held  at  the 
earliest  possible  opportunity  and  which,  if  necessary, 
will  be  preceded  by  a  further  meeting  of  consumer 
countries.' 

17.  They  agreed  that  the  preparations  for  such 
meetings  should  involve  consultations  with  develop- 
ing countries  and  other  consumer  and  producer  coun- 
tries.' 


National  Port  Week,   1974 

A     PROCLAMATION! 

In  providing  services  to  promote  the  expansion  of 
United  States  exports,  our  commercial  ocean  and 
inland  ports  play  a  central  role  in  improving  our 
balance  of  trade.  The  building  of  World  Trade  Cen- 
ters in  several  ports  and  the  establishment  of  trade 
promotion  offices  in  major  manufacturing  areas  are 
among  the  methods  employed  by  United  States  ports 
to  encourage  export  expansion. 

Over  1.6  billion  tons  of  commerce  in  our  foreign 
and  domestic  waterbome  trades  moved  through  our 
port  gateways  in  1972.  The  foreign  portion  of  this 
total  was  valued  at  more  than  $47  billion.  The  many 
and  varied  port  handling  activities  required  to  serv- 
ice this  vast  trade  volume  alone  generate  about  $30 
billion  in  direct  dollar  income  to  local  and  regional 
economies  served  by  United  States  ports.  This 
amount  serves  to  stimulate  an  even  greater  economic 
chain  of  indirect  revenues  as  these  dollars  are  spent 
throughout  the  national  economy. 

Other  statistics  also  help  to  demonstrate  the  cen- 
tral role  of  port  facilities  in  the  American  economy. 
Public  and  private  port  interests  have  invested  over 
$5  billion  in  cargo  handling  facilities  since  the  end 
of  World  War  II.  Port-generated  activities  now  pro- 
vide employment  for  well  over  1.2  million  people — 
accounting  for  about  $12  billion  in  wages  each  year. 
A  total  of  over  $32  billion  a  year  is  being  poured  into 
the  American  economy  directly  and  indirectly  by 
waterfront  activities  in  our  national  port  system. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Richard  Nixon,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  in  order  to  remind 
Americans  of  the  importance  of  the  port  industry  of 
the  United  States  to  our  national  life,  do  hereby 
designate  the  week  beginning  on  the  last  Sunday  in 
September  as  National  Port  Week.  I  ask  that  public 
attention  be  directed  to  the  important  role  our 
Nation's  ports  play  in  the  American  economy 
through  appropriate  activities  and  ceremonies.  I  also 
ask  that  all  ships  in  United  States  ports  during  that 
week  dress  ship  in  tribute  to  our  port  industry. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  this  sixth  day  of  February,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-four,  and  of  the  In- 
dependence of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one 
hundred  and  ninety-eighth. 


'  In  point  10,  France  does  not  accept  paragraphs 
cited  with  asterisks.    [Footnote  in  original.] 

'  France  does  not  accept  points  16  and  17.  [Foot- 
note in  original.] 


C^2u^<^Ci^ 


'  No.  4265;  39  Fed.  Reg.  4867. 


222 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  February   13 


Press  release  50  dated  February  13 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  assuming  that 
those  of  you  who  have  written  constructive 
articles  during  the  week  have  received  copies 
of  the  communique.  [Laughter.] 

Let  me  make  a  few  observations  and  then 
answer  your  questions. 

The  basic  approach  that  led  to  this  confer- 
ence has  been  outlined  in  the  speech  that  I 
gave  to  the  Pilgrims  in  London  in  December. 
It  was  based  on  the  assumption,  on  our  con- 
viction, that  the  world  was  facing  a  problem 
that  had  come  upon  it — at  least  in  the  dimen- 
sions in  which  we  faced  it — somewhat  unex- 
pectedly. And  in  a  situation  of  seeming  sup- 
ply shortages  there  was  a  tendency  to  react 
with  panic,  produced  in  part  by  lack  of  in- 
formation, and  with  a  sense  that  perhaps  the 
control  over  our  destiny  had  escaped  us. 

To  this  supply  shortage  was  added  at  the 
end  of  December  the  serious  problem  of  the 
rapid  escalation  of  prices. 

The  United  States  holds  the  view  that  the 
problem  that  has  been  produced  by  these  two 
phenomena — the  demand,  at  least  for  a  while, 
outrunning  supply  and  the  rapid  increase  of 
prices — can  be  solved  only  on  a  global  basis 
and  by  multilateral  action. 

We  hold  this  view  not  to  vindicate  any 
particular  theory  of  the  organization  of  the 
world.  We  have  not  advocated  institutions 
simply  to  create  institutions.  We  were  con- 
vinced, and  remain  convinced,  that  it  is  a 
problem  of  global  nature  incapable  of  iso- 
lated solution  and  indeed  a  problem  par  ex- 
cellence in  which  the  general  interest  is  iden- 
tical with  the  individual  interest. 

For  this  reason  the  United  States  proposed 
at  the  opening  session  of  this  conference  a 
seven-point  program  in  which  we  offered  to 
share  technology,  resources,  and  supplies  as 


our  contribution  to  a  world  cooperative  sys- 
tem. 

We  do  not  conceive  that  this  initial  meet- 
ing of  consumers  should  lead  to  a  confronta- 
tion between  consumers  and  producers.  In- 
deed, if  what  I  said  earlier  about  the  general 
interest  being  identical  with  the  particular 
interest  is  true,  then  in  its  ultimate  sense 
there  is  no  difference,  there  is  no  incompati- 
bility of  interests,  between  the  consumers 
and  the  producers. 

During  the  conference,  Mr.  [William]  Si- 
mon presented  an  analysis  in  which  he  at- 
tempted to  show,  and  demonstrated  I  think 
quite  conclusively,  that  a  barrel  of  oil  at  a 
certain  price — which  would  then  be  invested 
at  compound  interest  over  a  10-year  period — 
that  that  price  would  have  to  more  than  dou- 
ble if  production  were  to  be  withheld  and  the 
same  income  were  to  be  achieved  10  years 
from  now. 

And  if  that  analysis  is  correct,  then  I  be- 
lieve that  a  well-prepared  meeting  of  con- 
sumers and  producers  can  establish  a  frame- 
work of  analysis  in  which  a  discussion  about 
the  nature  of  a  fair  price  can  take  place  in  a 
much  less  emotional  and  in  a  much  more  bal- 
anced atmosphere. 

Now,  as  you  know  from  the  briefings  that 
went  on  throughout  the  conference,  there 
was  some  debate  about  the  nature  of  followup 
machinery  and  how  one  should  prepare  for  a 
meeting  of  consumers  and  producers,  the  de- 
sirability of  which  everyone  accepted.  The 
conference,  with  one  negative  vote,  agreed 
on  the  establishment  of  a  followup  machinery 
that  would  correlate  the  efforts  already  going 
on  in  international  institutions,  that  would 
establish  ad  hoc  working  groups  that  might 
be  needed,  and  that  would  direct  prepara- 
tions of  a  conference  of  consumer  and  pro- 


March  4,  1974 


223 


ducer  countries,  if  necessary  with  a  prior 
meeting  of  consumer  countries  to  review  the 
work  that  is  going  on  in  these  various  bodies. 

So  we  beheve  that  a  cooperative  frame- 
work for  dealing  with  the  energy  crisis  has 
been  established.  We  are  grateful  for  the  co- 
operation of  the  participants,  and  we  believe 
that  what  has  been  established  is  a  recogni- 
tion not  only  of  the  importance  of  dealing 
with  this  particular  problem  on  a  cooperative 
basis  but  that  maybe  a  contribution  has  been 
made  to  a  general  attitude  of  dealing  with 
world  problems  cooperatively. 

With  this  as  a  background,  let  me  now  take 
your  questions  about  the  communique  or  any 
aspect  of  the  conference. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what,  at  this  point, 
would  he  the  point  of — what  are  the  pros- 
pects for  another  private  meeting  of  con- 
suming nations,  now  that  this  group  has  con- 
cluded its  meeting  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Whether  another 
meeting  of  consumer  nations  should  be  held 
will  be  determined  through  the  work  of  the 
coordinating  group  that  has  been  set  up  as  a 
result  of  this  meeting.  This  coordinating 
group,  which  will  be  composed  of  senior  for- 
eign office  officials  and  other  senior  officials, 
will  first  of  all  attempt  to  give  focus  to  the 
work  that  is  going  on  in  existing  institu- 
tions— OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development] ,  World  Bank, 
IMF  [International  Monetary  Fund],  and 
similar  institutions.  It  will  establish,  as  I 
pointed  out,  ad  hoc  working  groups  that  may 
be  necessary  to  undertake  tasks  for  which 
there  are  at  present  no  suitable  bodies. 

I  don't  think  we  can  decide  until  this  work- 
ing group  has  been  in  existence  for  some 
weeks  whether  another  meeting  of  consumer 
nations,  perhaps  including  those  from  less 
developed  countries,  is  necessary  to  assess  the 
work  of  the  coordinating  group  or  whether 
the  work  of  the  coordinating  group  is  in  it- 
self a  sufficient  basis  to  go  to  a  consumer- 
producer  conference. 

Our  view  about  a  consumer-producer  con- 
ference is  that  it  will  be  productive  only  to 
the  extent  that  there  is  careful,  detailed  prep- 


aration. We  are  not  dogmatic  about  the  need 
for  another  ministerial  conference.  We  do  be- 
lieve very  strongly  that  there  is  a  need  for 
follow-on  work,  and  that  need  has  been  rec- 
ognized by  the  conference  that  met  here. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  irhat  is  your  vietv  on 
having  representatives  from  the  producing 
nations  sitting  in  with  the  coordinating 
group  to  prepare  for  the  later  conference? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  there  are  two 
problems,  at  least,  in  the  work  of  the  coor- 
dinating group.  One  is  to  analyze  and  to  give 
impetus  to  certain  types  of  activities  which 
are  enumerated  in  the  communique,  such  as 
conservation  of  energy,  a  system  of  allocat- 
ing oil  supplies,  acceleration  of  the  develop- 
ment of  additional  energy  sources,  accelera- 
tion of  energy  research  and  development. 
Also  the  need  to  find  financial  mechanisms  to 
deal  with  some  of  the  problems  produced  by 
higher  prices.  That  work  of  the  coordinating 
group  seems  to  us  to  be  primarily  confined  to 
the  countries  that  participated  in  this  con- 
ference and  countries  with  similar  problems. 

As  far  as  the  preparations  for  the  pro- 
ducer meeting  are  concerned,  I  think  an  early 
consultation  with  representatives  from  pro- 
ducer nations  would  be  appropriate. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  French  opposition 
at  the  conference  here  run  deeper  than  you 
had  onginally  expected,  and  what  effects  do 
you  believe  the  divisions  that  occurred  here 
within  the  European  Common  Market  will 
have  on  the  future  of  the  Atlantic  alliance 
and  on  your  desire  to  reach  some  declarations 
with  the  European  Community? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  French  views 
were  reasonably  well  known,  at  least  in  the 
two  weeks  or  so  prior  to  the  conference.  And 
therefore  they  were  not  unexpected. 

The  impact  of  these  views  on  the  confer- 
ence was,  I  believe,  reflected  in  the  vote  of 
the  conference,  which  was  unanimous  on  all 
of  these  points,  with  one  exception. 

As  far  as  the  future  of  the  Atlantic  alli- 
ance is  concerned  and  the  future  of  our  Euro- 
pean-American relations  and  European  unity, 
the  United  States  considers  the  Atlantic  rela- 


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tionship  the  pivot  of  its  foreign  policy.  Our 
efforts  during  the  last  year  have  been  di- 
rected toward  strengthening  that  relation- 
ship. 

The  fact  that  there  are  some  differences  of 
view  between  us  and  France  on  how  this  At- 
lantic relationship  should  be  strengthened 
should  not  obscure  the  central  importance  we 
attach  to  it  nor  our  recognition  that  friend- 
ship with  all  European  countries,  including 
France,  is  essential  for  the  security  of  all  of 
the  nations  of  the  Atlantic  alliance. 

So  as  far  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, the  difficulties  that  existed  in  the  last 
few  days,  which  are  inseparable  from  any 
conclave  of  free  nations,  do  not  affect  the  re- 
lationship in  the  Atlantic  alliance  and  indeed 
will  probably  have  strengthened  it. 

Within  the  European  Community,  I  be- 
lieve the  various  countries  should  speak  for 
themselves.  But  certainly  there  were  many 
expressions  that  the  work  of  the  European 
Community  must  go  on.  And  of  course  the 
United  States  has  always  strongly  supported 
European  economic  and  political  unity  and 
continues  to  support  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  French  seem  to  have 
thought — it  may  not  have  been  the  intent — 
but  one  of  the  possible  objections  to  an  ad 
hoc  machinery  to  deal  with  this  problem  will 
be  an  American  supremacy  and  possibly 
American  policies  impinging  upon  Europe. 
What  arguments  were  you  able  to  use  against 
this  suspicion,  and  do  you  think  there  is  any 
justification  for  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  tried  to  ex- 
plain that  a  properly  conceived  solution  to 
this  problem  cannot  be  either  American  or 
British  or  French  or  Japanese,  or  any  na- 
tional solution.  We  are,  as  I  said  in  my  open- 
ing speech,  in  a  better  position  to  deal  with 
the  problem  on  a  national  basis.  Neverthe- 
less, if  we  deal  with  the  problem  on  a  purely 
national  basis,  the  end  result  will  be  a  loss 
of — a  blow  to  the  world  economy  and  a  blow 
to  the  structure  of  international  relations 
from  which,  in  the  medium  term,  we  would 
suffer  severely  ourselves. 

Therefore  it  is  not  in  our  interests,  nor  is 


it  our  intention,  to  establish  a  particular 
American  point  of  view  with  respect  to  the 
energy  problem;  nor  do  I  know  exactly  what 
a  purely  American  point  of  view  with  respect 
to  the  energy  problem  would  be. 

Throughout  the  conference  our  position 
was  not  to  turn  this  into  an  issue  between 
the  United  States  and  France.  And  through 
most  of  the  meetings  the  chief  arguments 
were  between  France  and  the  other  European 
countries,  rather  than  between  France  and 
the  United  States.  And  insofar  as  our  point 
of  view  prevailed,  it  was  because  we  pre- 
sented arguments  which  we  believed  to  be  in 
the  general  interest. 

I  want  to  repeat  again:  We  do  not  con- 
sider ourselves  in  a  confrontation  with 
France.  I  have  read  rather  extreme  articles 
in  the  European  press  about  a  divorce  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  France.  This  is 
absolutely  not  the  American  point  of  view, 
and  it  is  not  the  basis  on  which  to  build  fu- 
ture relationships. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  justification  is 
there  for  Mr.  Jobert's  statement,  on  this  po- 
dium, that  France  came  here  expecting  to 
talk  about  energy  and  instead  found  them- 
selves in  a  political  meeting? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  of  course  did  not 
have  the  privilege  of  listening  to  my  friend 
Jobert,  who  has  a  tendency  to  express  him- 
self in  very  Cartesian  and  sometimes  ex- 
tremely precise  language.  If  political  issues 
were  raised  at  the  meeting,  it  was  due  to  the 
difficulty  that  for  a  while  the  European  Com- 
munity attempted  to  take  a  common  position 
and  then,  in  its  inability  to  reach  a  common 
position,  had  to  decide  whether  to  operate  as 
a  group  of  individual  nations. 

As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
our  declarations  are  a  matter  of  public  rec- 
ord, and  we  did  not  introduce  any  political 
elements — except  of  course  when  Foreign 
Ministers  meet,  that  in  itself  is  a  political 
event.  So  I  cannot  agree  with  my  colleague 
and  friend  Michel  Jobert. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  folloiv  a  previous 
question,  if  the  problem  is  global  and  it  can 


March  4,   1974 


225 


only  be  solved  internationally,  why  did  you 
feel  you  had  to  have  a  separate  energy  con- 
ference rather  than  ivorking  through  exist- 
ing international  organizations'? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There's  no  existing 
international  organization  that  is  dealing 
with  the  energy  problem  on  the  comprehen- 
sive basis  that  we  have  put  before  the  con- 
ference. There  are  bits  and  pieces  of  it  that 
are  dealt  with  in  particular  organizations. 
We  have  specifically  affirmed  our  readiness, 
and  the  conference  has  affirmed  its  readiness, 
to  cooperate  with  those  institutions  that  are 
now  working  on  the  problem  and  indeed  to 
use  them  for  the  analyses  and  studies  that 
are  foreseen  as  a  result  of  this  conference. 

This  particular  group  of  nations  invited 
here  represented  the  high  level  energy  group 
of  the  OECD.  This  in  turn  was  composed  of 
the  nations  that  represent  85  percent  of  the 
energy  imports  in  the  world.  To  this  group 
was  added  the  members  of  the  European 
Community  who  are  not  members  of  the  high 
level  energy  committee.  And  therefore  prob- 
ably the  percentage  figure  I  gave  to  you  is 
in  fact,  by  a  few  percentage  points,  higher. 

It  seemed  to  us  important  that  the  consum- 
ing nations  first  understand  the  nature  of  the 
problem  and  the  range  of  possible  remedies 
before  there  is  a  general  conference  with  the 
producers.  And  this  was  the  logic  behind  the 
conference. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  do  the  results  of 
this  conference  mean  in  terms  of  the  future 
of  loiver  prices  around  the  world? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  is  of  course  not 
easy  to  predict.  The  results  of  this  confer- 
ence, if  they  are  followed  up  in  the  spirit  in 
which  the  conference  was  concluded,  should 
enable  the  consumers  to  get  a  much  better 
understanding  of  what  they  are  facing,  and 
it  should  enable  them  to  come  to  a  conference 
with  the  producers  with  the  ability  to  put  be- 
fore the  producers  their  best  judgment  of  the 
long-term  interests  of  both  consumers  and 
producers.  I  think  there's  a  general  agree- 
ment that  prices  for  oil  were  too  low  prior  to 
September  1973.  I  think  there  is  also  a  gen- 


eral agreement  among  the  nations  repre- 
sented here,  and  also  in  the  Committee  of 
Twenty  that  met  in  January,  that  prices  now 
are  too  high.  Now,  what  a  fair  price  is  of 
course  has  to  take  into  account  the  needs  of 
both  consumers  and  producers.  The  needs  of 
the  producers  are  for  a  source  of  long-term 
income;  and  the  need  of  the  consumers  is  a 
source  of  assured  supply. 

The  technical  studies  that  were  prepared 
with  great  meticulousness  by  the  American 
delegation,  and  which,  in  a  preliminary  form 
at  least,  seemed  to  be  accepted  by  most  of 
the  delegates  here — though  they  will  have  to 
be  looked  at  further — would  seem  to  indicate 
that  it  is  possible  to  arrive  at  a  definition  of 
fairness  that  takes  into  account  both  of  these 
interests.  That  would  be  lower  than  the  ex- 
isting prices  but  considerably  higher  than 
September  prices. 

How  this  will  be  arrived  at  we  will  have  to 
leave  to  the  evolution  of  the  machinery  fore- 
seen here  and  future  conferences. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  wonder  if  you  could 
spell  out  for  us  what  in  your  opinion  are  the 
most  concrete  accomplishments  of  this  con- 
ference; and  also  will  you  concede  that  there 
are  any  disappointments? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  conference 
achieved  in  terms  of  machinery  and  in  terms 
of  definition  of  the  objective  substantially 
what  we  had  thought  in  our  preliminary  de- 
liberations should  be  achieved.  In  this  sense 
we  consider  it  a  success.  The  chief  results 
were  that  there  was  an  agreed  analysis  of  the 
problem  and  in  paragraphs  9  through  17  a 
series  of  concrete  measures  or  directions  that 
require  exploration — all  of  them  together 
with  the  establishment  of  machinery  of  how 
to  implement  it. 

There  was  a  pervasive  conviction  that 
purely  national  efforts  were  not  adequate, 
that  therefore  the  efforts  of  all  the  nations 
represented  here  had  to  be  concerted. 

At  the  same  time,  of  course,  a  great  deal 
depends  now  whether  the  spirit  reflected  in 
this  communique  can  be  sustained  in  the 
follow-on  work.  The  United  States  will  make 
a  major  effort  both  in  contributing  to  the 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


work  of  the  follow-on  groups  as  well  as  in 
implementing  the  offers  that  were  made  in 
the  various  speeches  to  give  concrete  content 
to  what  has  been  accomplished. 

I  could  not  list  a  major  disappointment, 
because  it  substantially  reflects  our  concep- 
tion. 

Q.  M?-.  Secretary,  when  will  the  coordi- 
nating group  meet,  where  will  it  meet,  is 
there  a  chairman  pro  tem,  and  tvho  will  rep- 
resent  the  United  States  in  the  coordinating 
grotip? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  will  probably  take 
the  initiative  in  convening  the  coordinating 
group.  We  are  openminded  about  its  location. 
And  we  believe  that  once  the  coordinating 
group  has  been  convened  it  should  establish 
its  own  internal  organization.  In  other 
words,  we  do  not  insist  en  the  chairmanship 
of  this  coordinating  group. 

We  believe  that  it  should  meet  as  soon  as 
possible,  which  is  commensurate  with  the 
importance  of  the  problem.  And  the  United 
States  will  be,  in  all  probability,  represented 
by  Under  Secretary  [for  Security  Assistance 
William  H.]  Donaldson  and  Mr.  Simon  and 
other  officials  that  may  be  needed,  depending 
on  the  subject  matter. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  you  or  your  col- 
leagues during  the  session  produce  further 
details  about  the  plan  for  sharing  either  con- 
ventional energy  or  nuclear  energy  beyond 
the  outline  given  in  the  seven  points? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
was  prepared  to  present  to  the  conference 
in  greater  detail  elaborations  of  each  of  the 
seven  points  that  was  made.  As  it  turned  out, 
a  great  deal  of  the  time  of  the  conference 
had  to  be  spent  on  the  procedural  issues  and 
on  the  negotiations  leading  to  the  communi- 
que. The  United  States,  however,  will  be 
prepared  to  make  concrete  proposals  in  the 
follow-on  groups  in  all  of  the  areas  in  which 
it  did  not  have  an  opportunity  to  follow  on 
here. 

We  did  make  concrete  proposals  on  finan- 
cial mechanisms  and  a  rather  detailed  analy- 
sis of  the  substance  of  the  issue.  But  we  had 
foreseen  that  some  working  groups  might  be 


established  already  while  the  conference  met 
here.  While  they  met,  they  did  not  have  the 
time  to  report  back  to  the  conference  due  to 
the  amount  of  energy  that  had  to  be  expended 
on  the  communique. 

Q.  What  subjects  were  represented?  And 
will  other  information  be  made  public  now 
that  they  have  been  presented  to  the  confer- 
ence? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  haven't  made  a 
decision  on  this,  but  in  principle  I  see  no 
objection  to  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ivhat  does  it  mean  that 
France  ivill  not  accept  the  folloivup  proce- 
dures? Will  France  nevertheless  participate 
in  the  subsequent  conferences?  And  will 
France  participate  in  any  of  the  working 
groups? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  My  impression  is  that 
France  will  certainly  participate  in  the  con- 
sumer or  producer  meetings.  France  did  not 
express  itself,  in  my  hearing  at  least,  as  to 
what  its  attitude  will  be  about  participation 
in  the  working  groups.  I  think  that  is  a  ques- 
tion that  can  be  more  appropriately  answered 
by  France. 

I  believe,  however,  that  as  time  goes  on  it 
will  be  seen  by  all  the  countries  concerned 
that  this  is  not  a  political  issue  but  an  issue 
of  world  stability  and  world  cooperation. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  is  your  reaction — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  can't  see  anybody 
behind  the  light. 

Q.  What  is  your  reaction  concerning  the 
events  concerning  [Alexander]  Solzhenitsyn? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Can  we  save  ques- 
tions on  matters  not  connected  with  energy? 
I'll  take  this  later. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  give  us  yoiir 
reaction  to  the  cancellation  of  the  Tripoli 
meeting,  and  ivhether  or  not  you  now  feel 
that  perhaps  your  hopes  about  an  early  end 
to  the  oil  boycott  might  be  premature? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  know  whether 
the  Tripoli  meeting  was  canceled  or  post- 
poned, and  therefore  I  don't  want  to  express 


March  4,    1974 


227 


any  views  on  its  significance.  Our  statements 
were  based  on  the  best  judgments,  based  on 
the  best  information  we  then  had  available; 
and  events  will  have  to  determine  whether 
these  expectations  will  materialize. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  spoke  in  your  earlier 
remarks  to  the  conference,  and  Mr.  [Walter] 
Scheel  did  also,  about  the  need  for  codes  of 
conduct  to  govern  the  bilateral  agreements 
that  vanovs  countries  are  snaking  with  the 
producer  countries;  but  there's  no  mention 
of  this  in  the  communique.  I  was  wondering 
whether  you  could  give  us  your  opinion  about 
where  these  bilateral  agreements  stand  noiv 
and  what  determination  was  made  by  the 
conference  on  the  wisdom  of  having  them  or 
not. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  again,  I  want  to 
stress  that  to  us  this  is  not  an  issue  of  prin- 
ciple; this  is  an  issue  of  our  analysis  of  the 
situation.  Obviously  most  of  world  trade 
flows  in  bilateral  channels,  and  we  are  not 
opposed  to  the  fact  that  deals  will  be  made 
on  a  bilateral  basis.  In  fact,  it  is  inevitable 
that  many  of  the  arrangements  will  be  made 
on  a  bilateral  basis.  What  we  believe  is  going 
to  be  disastrous  for  the  world  economy  is  if 
bilateral  deals  are  made  unconstrained  by 
any  general  rules  of  conduct,  because  we  be- 
lieve that  this  will  either  stabilize  prices  at 
too  high  a  level  or  bid  prices  up  even  higher 
and  in  general  create  a  relationship  among 
the  major  consuming  nations  of  economic 
warfare — which  inevitably  will  affect,  in 
time,  their  political  relationship. 

Within  such  a  framework  and  in  the  long 
term,  the  producers  will  also  suffer  from  the 
weakening  of  the  world  economy,  which  will 
be  the  inevitable  result  of  such  types  of  ac- 
tivity. 

We  therefore  believe  that  this  is  an  issue 
that  is  still  before  the  nations  that  were  at 
this  conference;  and  it  can  be  discussed  in 
the  coordinating  committee  as  one  of  the 
goals  that  consumers  will  reach. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  are  yoti  still  holding  to 
your  previous  deadline  of  May  1  for  conclu- 
sion of  the  consumer  conference? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Our  belief  is  that  this 


is  a  reasonable  deadline,  but  I  think  one  can 
form  a  better  judgment  on  that  after  the 
coordinating  group  has  begun  its  work. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  presume  that  according 
to  paragrapli  !'>  of  the  communique  the  U.S. 
Governmoit  will  a>iswer  in  the  affirmative 
to  the  special  meeting  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly of  the  United  Nations.  If  this  special 
meeting  takes  place,  don't  you  see  some  pos- 
sible contradictions  between  the  future  work 
of  the  organization  created  by  this  special 
meeting  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  co- 
ordinating group? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  our  view  has 
been  that  a  meeting  between  consumers  and 
producers,  to  be  effective,  requires  very  care- 
ful preparation  on  the  part  of  the  consumers 
and,  for  that  matter,  between  consumers  and 
producers,  before  they  actually  meet.  We  do 
not  believe  that  a  United  Nations  meeting 
will  serve  that  particular  purpose.  A  United 
Nations  meeting  will  be  useful — can  make  a 
contribution  to  expressing  the  general  atti- 
tudes of  the  participating  nations  and  to 
clarify  particular  points  of  view.  We  do  not 
believe  that  it  will  solve  the  particular  prob- 
lems to  which  this  conference  was  addressed 
or  to  which  the  follt)w-on  activities  of  this 
conference  are  addressed. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  question  has  been 
raised  ivhether,  had  this  conference  been  bet- 
ter prepared,  had  one  taken  more  time  ivith 
it,  some  of  the  problems  that  arose  wotdd 
not  have  arisen.  What  is  your  feeling  about 
that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  believe  that  this 
conference  was  extremely  carefully  prepared 
over  a  period  of  six  weeks.  The  agenda  items 
were  distributed  many  weeks  in  advance. 
The  Ambassadors  of  the  countries  concerned, 
and  the  governments  of  the  countries  con- 
cerned, were  carefully  briefed.  Several  gov- 
ernments had  been  in  touch  with  us  through 
senior  officials.  And  as  it  turned  out,  we  did 
not  have  an  opportunity  to  present  even  a 
fraction  of  the  work  that  had  been  done  on 
our  side  to  the  work  of  the  conference. 

I  believe  that  the  disagreements  that  arose 
at  this  conference  were  due  to  certain  differ- 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ences  of  philosophic  perspective  about  the 
purposes  of  the  conference,  which  I  believe 
were  eased  to  some  extent  through  the  con- 
ference. But  preparation  was  not  the  issue. 
Sometimes  there  are  disagreements  not 
because  people  do  not  understand  each  other 
but  because  they  understand  each  other  only 
too  well.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  may  we  move  on  to  that 
second  phase?  Solzhenitsyyi? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Let's  say  I'll  take 
two  more  questions  on  energy  and  then  we'll 
move  on  to  the  next  phase. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Yes. 

Q.  — U'liat  is  your  reaction  to  Europea)i 
plans  for  increasing  negotiatio)is  with  the 
Arab  countries  en  bloc? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  no  objection 
to  the  Europeans  negotiating  as  a  unit.  We 
have  a  general  view  about  bilateral  arrange- 
ments that  do  not  follow  general  rules  of 
conduct,  but  these  two  objectives  can  be  rec- 
onciled. And  secondly,  of  course  we  have  a 
general  interest — as  does  Europe — in  politi- 
cal contacts  that  may  occur  that  may  con- 
tribute, or  not,  to  the  evolution  of  peace  in 
the  Middle  East. 

I'll  take  one  more  question — yes — on  en- 
ergy. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  keeping  in  mind  the 
points  which  we  agreed  upon  at  this  confer- 
ence— such  as  sharing  of  resources  and  tech- 
nology— what  would  be  the  effect  or  the  im- 
pact on  the  U.S.  acceptance  of  something  in 
the  area  of  the  Charter  of  Economic  Rights 
and  Duties? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You  mean  the  Mexi- 
can charter? 

Q.  Yes.  Considering  that  you  have  agreed 
upon  so  many  points  which  are  in  the  area. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I'm  going  to  be  in 
Mexico  in  two  weeks,  and  I'm  going  to  save 
my  answer  for  that  occasion.  But  the  United 
States  expressed  its  views  on  President  Eche- 


verria's  idea  on  the  Charter  of  Economic 
Plights  and  Duties  in  my  speech  at  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly.  Our  view  is  that  the  concept 
is  useful  and  that  we  are  prepared  to  coop- 
erate with  elaborating  a  charter  that  spells 
out  the  rights  and  obligations  of  all  coun- 
tries— of  developed,  as  well  as  developing, 
countries.  So  we  find  the  concept  useful,  and 
we  will  have  to  see  now  what  can  be  negoti- 
ated in  the  forums  that  are  open.  And  there 
is  a  negotiation  on  it  going  on  now  in  Geneva. 

Now,  on  Solzhenitsyn:  The  United  States 
has  always  looked  with  sympathy  and  great 
appreciation  on  the  expression  of  freedom  of 
thought  in  all  societies.  We  have  regretted 
some  of  the  manifestations  that  interrupt 
this. 

We  do  not  know  enough  about  the  specific 
circumstances  of  the  departure  of  Mr.  Sol- 
zhenitsyn. And  the  only  problem  that  we  have 
seen  here  is  the  extent  to  which  our  human, 
moral,  and  intellectual  concern  for  Solzhe- 
nitsyn and  people  of  similar  convictions 
should  affect  the  day-to-day  conduct  of  our 
foreign  policy.  In  any  event,  we  are  delighted 
that  Solzhenitsyn  is  not  in  some  of  the  diffi- 
culties that  were  feared  yesterday. 

Q.  To  follow  that  up,  Mr.  Secretary,  would 
Mr.  Solzhenitsyn  be  welcome  in  the  United 
States  if  he  sought  to  reside  here? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  He  would  certainly  be 
welcome  to  reside  in  the  United  States  if  he 
desired. 

Q.  How  ivould  this  affect  detente? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Our  constant  view 
has  been  that  the  necessity  for  detente,  as 
we  conceive  it,  does  not  reflect  approbation 
of  the  Soviet  domestic  structure.  The  neces- 
sity of  detente  is  produced  by  the  unaccepta- 
bility  of  general  nuclear  war  under  present 
conditions.  The  accumulation  of  nuclear  arms 
has  to  be  constrained  if  mankind  is  not  to  de- 
stroy itself. 

This  is  a  question  that  will  be  before  hu- 
manity under  all  circumstances,  and  before 
American  governments,  as  long  as  the  accu- 
mulation of  nuclear  arms  continues.  So  the 
United  States  will  pursue  a  policy  to  reduce 


March  4,    1974 


229 


the  dangers  of  war,  to  increase  the  possibili- 
ties of  peace,  and  to  limit  the  danger  of  nu- 
clear conflict. 

Q.  Sir,  do  ijou  think  Mr.  Solzhenitsyn  is 
really  better  off  today  than  he  was  yesterday 
with  his  ivife  still  in  the  Soviet  Union? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  I  cannot  judge  to 
what  extent  his  wife  will  be  kept  in  the  So- 
viet Union,  and  I  don't  think  it  would  be 
helpful  to  make  a  final  judgment  until  all  the 
circumstances  can  be  more  clearly  seen. 

The  press:  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 


President  Nixon  Honors  Energy  Conference  Representatives 
at  White   House  Dinner 


Following  is  an  exchange  of  toasts  between 
President  Nixon  and  Walter  Scheel,  Federal 
German  Foreign  Minister  and  President  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  European 
Communities,  at  a  dinner  at  the  White  House 
on  February  11. 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated  February  18 

PRESIDENT   NIXON 

Gentlemen  and  Miss  Ray  [Dixy  Lee  Ray, 
Chairman,  Atomic  Energy  Commission] :  It 
is  for  all  of  us  in  this  house  a  very  great 
honor  to  have  such  a  distinguished  company 
on  this  occasion. 

And  as  I  welcome  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
the  12  nations  that  are  represented  at  this 
conference,  as  well  as  the  Finance  Ministers 
and  other  Ministers  of  Economic  Affairs,  I 
want  you  to  know  that  we  are  privileged  to 
have  you  here  again.  Most  of  you  have  been 
here  before,  when  either  the  heads  of  govern- 
ment or  heads  of  state  have  visited  the 
United  States. 

In  speaking  to  you  today,  I  am  not  going  to 
get  into  some  of  the  technical  matters  that  I 
understand  have  been  covered  at  rather  con- 
siderable length  in  your  discussions  earlier  in 
the  day. 

I  thought  that  perhaps  it  would  be  more 
useful  for  this  distinguished  company  if  I 
were  to  speak  to  you  not  simply  in  terms  of 
the  energy  problem,  which  very  properly  has 
been  the  subject  of  primary  discussion,  but 


to  put  that  problem  in  a  larger  context  of  the 
world  in  which  we  live  and  the  other  prob- 
lems which  we  face  to  which  that,  of  course, 
is  very,  very  closely  related. 

I  think  everybody  in  this  room  is  aware  of 
the  fact  that  we  are  here  at  what  I  would 
call  a  watershed  of  world  history.  We  are 
here  at  a  time  when  we  have  seen  the  con- 
clusion of  a  very  long  and  difficult  war  in 
which  the  United  States  was  involved  in 
Viet-Nam,  a  time  when  we  have  seen  the  be- 
ginnings toward  movement,  toward  what  we 
hope  would  be  not  just  a  temporary  but  a 
permanent  peace  in  the  Mideast. 

Also  over  the  past  few  years  during  the 
time  that  I  have  been  in  this  office  and  during 
the  time  that  most  of  you  have  been  in  the 
offices  you  hold,  we  have  seen  the  whole  world 
Changs.  Not  only  the  United  States  but  other 
free-world  nations  have  opened  a  new  dia- 
logue with  the  Soviet  Union  and  with  the 
People's  Republic  of  China. 

We  have  also  seen  that  at  the  present  time, 
as  a  result  of  that  dialogue,  negotiations  are 
taking  place  that  no  one  would  have  predicted 
three  or  four  years  ago — negotiations  with 
regard  to  the  reduction  of  forces  in  Europe, 
negotiations  insofar  as  the  European  Se- 
curity Conference  is  concerned,  negotiations 
which  are  taking  place  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  field  of 
limiting  nuclear  arms. 

When  we  look  at  this  record  and  of  all  of 
the  events  that  have  come  together  before 


230 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


this  day  on  which  we  maet,  we  realize  that 
the  world  now  faces  an  unprecedented  chal- 
lenge. That  has  probably  been  said  before  at 
other  times  in  the  world's  history,  but  prob- 
ably it  has  never  been  so  true,  certainly  not 
so  true  since  World  War  II  than  today.  And 
that  challenge  is  to  build  a  world  of  peace, 
not  simply  a  peace  that  is  an  interlude  be- 
tween wars,  but  a  peace  that  has  a  chance  to 
be  permanent. 

I  would  not  suggest  to  this  sophisticated 
group  that  building  that  peace  and  keeping 
that  peace  will  be  easy.  We  all  know  the  com- 
plex situation  in  the  Middle  East,  and  all  of 
us  will  be  working  toward  a  solution  that  will 
be  permanent  and  just  and  fair  to  all  con- 
cerned. We  all  know  that  in  the  relations 
between  the  great  powers  and  the  smaller 
powers,  between  what  is  known  as  the  Com- 
munist world  and  the  free  world,  that  one 
must  never  assume  that  simply  because  nego- 
tiations are  taking  place  that  confrontation 
may  not  later  occur. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  think  that  we  can  say 
that  because  we  are  living  in  an  era  of  nego- 
tiation rather  than  confrontation  where  the 
free  world  and  the  Communist  world  is  con- 
cerned, because  we  have  seen  the  end  of  those 
wars,  small  though  they  were  but  very  pain- 
ful they  also  were,  which  plagued  us  for  the 
past  generation — although  that  has  hap- 
pened, we  realize  that  in  order  to  build  the 
peace  and  to  keep  it,  that  it  is  essential  that 
we  maintain  the  strength  and  the  unity  that 
brought  us  where  we  are. 

Having  spoken  in  that  particular  area,  the 
area  of  security,  let  me  now  relate  it  to  the 
other  areas  with  which  this  conference  is 
more  closely  identified,  the  area  of  economics 
or,  should  I  say,  of  the  whole  field  of  not 
only  how  do  we  have  peace  in  the  terms  of 
simply  absence  of  war  but  how  do  we  have 
peace  in  which  we  build  an  era  of  progress 
for  all  of  our  people — the  people  of  the  free 
nations  and,  for  that  matter,  of  the  Commu- 
nist nations  of  the  world. 

It  is  this  challenge  that  confronts  us  today. 

I  would  like  to  speak  quite  directly  to  this 
audience  with  regard  to  what  I  see  in  the 
world  and  what  I  see  in  the  United  States  as 
we  face  this  challenge. 


We  must  examine  what  is  a  truism,  I  would 
say,  in  virtually  every  country  represented 
here  today.  There  are  people,  very  well-inten- 
tioned people,  but  people  who  I  think  are 
erroneous  with  regard  to  their  views,  who 
in  each  of  our  countries  would  take  the  point 
of  view  that  now  that  we  have  peace  the  time 
has  come  for — they  would  not  call  it  isola- 
tionism, but  basically  for  each  country  to  look 
after  its  own  interest. 

There  are  those  who  say  that  at  the  time 
when  we  needed  the  mutual  security  which 
built  the  great  alliances  in  the  past  no  longer 
exists  or  at  least  not  to  the  same  extent. 

I  would  be  less  than  candid  if  I  were  not 
to  say  that  within  the  United  States  there 
has  been  growing  in  recent  years,  and  per- 
haps it  has  been  accelerated  to  a  certain 
extent  by  our  very  difficult  experience  in 
Viet-Nam,  a  growing  sense  of  isolationism, 
not  just  about  security — those,  for  example, 
who  believe  that  the  United  States  unilater- 
ally should  withdraw  its  forces  from  Europe 
and  for  that  matter  withdraw  forces  from  all 
over  the  world  and  make  our  treaty  commit- 
ments to  other  nations  in  the  Far  East  and 
in  Europe  meaningless — but  also  with  regard 
to  trade,  where  those  who  completely  oppose 
the  initiatives  we  have  undertaken  in  the 
trade  area  and  who  oppose  even  some  of  the 
initiatives  in  the  international  monetary  area 
that  you  are  all  familiar  with. 

I  think  the  ladies  and  gentlemen  in  this 
room  are  aware  of  the  fact  that  this  admin- 
istration, and  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  I 
believe  that  the  view  I  now  express  goes  far 
beyond  simply  a  partisan  viewpoint  because 
there  are  many  Democrats  as  well  as  Re- 
publicans who  support  the  point  of  view  that 
I  will  now  express,  reject  the  idea  that  the 
United  States  should  now  listen  to  the  voices 
of  isolation  which  plagued  us  before  World 
War  II  and  which  always  seems  to  rise  to  a 
new  crescendo  after  each  war  in  which  we 
were  engaged. 

We  reject  it,  for  example,  in  the  field  of 
trade.  We  believe  that  it  is  vitally  important 
to  go  forward  with  the  great  trade  initiatives 
that  have  been  undertaken,  as  Secretary 
[of  the  Treasury  George  P.]  Shultz  has  often 
stated  in  his  meetings  with  his  counterparts 


March  4,    1974 


231 


represented  here  at  this  meeting.  We  believe 
it  is  vitally  important  in  the  field  of  monetary 
affairs  that  the  United  States  play  a  responsi- 
ble role  vi'ith  other  nations  in  the  free  world 
in  developing  a  more  stable  system,  one  that 
will  not  be  affected  by  the  shocks  that  have 
so  often  over  the  past  10  years  shaken  the 
world  monetary  institutions  to  their  very 
foundations. 

We  also  believe  this  in  the  terms  of  se- 
curity, as  I  have  already  indicated,  where 
we  oppose  the  idea  that  the  United  States, 
because  we  have  entered  into  a  period  of 
peace  which  we  long  wanted,  now  can  reduce 
its  forces  unilaterally  without  having  a  com- 
pensatory reduction  among  others  or  where 
the  United  States  will  turn  away  from  the 
treaty  commitments  that  it  has,  whether  it  is 
in  Europe  or  in  Asia. 

Let  me  now  relate  this  particular  discus- 
sion in  the  field  of  security,  in  the  field  of 
trade,  in  the  field  of  monetary  affairs,  to  the 
subject  of  energy. 

Here  I  think  it  is  understandable  that  lead- 
ers and  those  who  affect  leaders  in  each  of 
the  countries  that  we  represent  might  well 
take  the  point  of  view  that  each  nation  for 
its  own  reasons  should,  in  effect,  go  into  busi- 
ness for  itself,  that  each  nation  should  seek 
to  make  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  oil- 
producing  nations,  even  though  that  bilateral 
agreement  might  not  be  one  which  would  be 
in  the  interests  of  all  of  the  nations — and 
85  percent  of  all  of  the  oil  consumed  is  repre- 
sented here  in  this  room,  the  oil  consumed 
in  the  free  world. 

This  point  of  view,  which  of  course  I  would 
describe  as  isolation  in  the  energy  field,  is 
one  that  perhaps  has  some  currency  in  some 
of  your  countries.  It  also  has  some  in  ours. 

I  note  that  some  have  interpreted  this  ad- 
ministration's initiative  for  Project  Inde- 
pendence, in  which  we  have  set  the  year  1980 
as  the  year  in  which  we,  because  we  are 
blessed  by  great  natural  resources,  can  and 
will  become  totally  independent,  we  believe, 
of  any  outside  source  for  energy,  that  that 
in  itself  is  an  indication  that  the  United 
States  in  the  energy  field  will  go  into  business 
for  itself,  that  we  will   reject  the  idea   of 


being  not  only  dependent  on  any  foreign 
sources  but  of  working  with  other  govern- 
ments, including  the  governments  in  this 
room,  and  for  that  matter,  of  working  with 
those  nations  which  presently  furnish  oil 
exports  to  us  and  to  other  nations  in  the 
years  ahead. 

The  purpose  of  our  Project  Independence, 
let  me  emphasize,  is  not  isolation.  The  pur- 
pose is  for  this  nation,  the  United  States,  to 
do  what  any  one  of  you  would  do  if  you  were 
in  our  position :  to  develop  your  own  re- 
sources  so   that   you   can   be   self-sufficient. 

But  our  purpose  beyond  that  is  not  then 
to  turn  away  from  a  position  of  trading  with 
other  nations,  of  not  engaging  with  other  na- 
tions in  the  development  of  their  resources 
and  trading  our  resources  when  it  serves 
our  interest;  what  we  desire  is  a  world  in 
which  there  will  be  trade  between  nations 
and  among  them,  a  world  in  which  there  will 
be  enough  energy  for  all  the  people  of  the 
world.  The  United  States  can  play  a  signifi- 
cant role  in  that  respect. 

And  what  we  learn  and  what  we  develop 
in  our  efforts  toward  Project  Independence, 
I  can  assure  you,  will  be  not  only  for  our 
own  benefit,  but  we  would  hope  for  the  bene- 
fit of  all  peoples  in  the  world  who  wish  to 
share  in  whatever  those  particular  enter- 
prises may  produce. 

I  would  say,  too,  in  this  whole  area,  that 
in  a  group  like  this  it  is  well  to  gloss  over 
all  the  differences.  But  we  recognize  that 
each  of  us  has  a  responsibility,  and  I  recog- 
nize this  particularly,  to  look  after  the  inter- 
ests of  his  own  country. 

We  respect  you  for  it,  we  understand  it, 
but  I  would  respectfully  submit  that  in  the 
present  world  situation  when  we  look  at 
energy  that  these  conclusions  could  well  be 
drawn. 

I  go  back  to  security.  We  can  have  no  real 
security  in  the  world  unless  we  are  all  secure 
and  unless  we  all  cooperate.  In  the  field  of 
trade  we  cannot  have  a  new  trading  system 
in  which  we  will  all  benefit,  where  each  tries 
to  gain  at  the  expense  of  others.  Each,  of 
course,  must  bargain  hard.  But  the  world  is 
only  going  to  be  one  in  which  we  have  a 


232 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


trading  pattern  which  will  be  for  the  benefit 
of  all  if  we  have  mutual  benefit  on  both 
sides. 

The  same  is  true  of  what  negotiations  we 
may  engage  in  in  terms  of  monetary  affairs, 
and  I  would  suggest  to  you  also  in  the  field 
of  energy. 

Short  term,  the  parochial  politician  might 
say,  "Make  the  best  deal  you  can."  And  there 
are  those  who  suggest  that  for  us  and  I  know 
for  some  of  the  countries  represented  here. 
That  is  good  short-term  politics. 

To  me  it  is  long-term  very  bad  statesman- 
ship and  I  say  it  for  this  reason :  that  if  the 
energy-consuming  nations,  each  of  them, 
rather  than  working  together,  not  as  a  com- 
bine at  the  expense  of  the  oil-producing  na- 
tions, because  it  is  in  their  interest  as  well 
that  we  meet  in  order  to  develop  a  common 
policy  that  will  assure  a  stable  supply  at  a 
price  that  will  be  reasonable  for  them  and 
reasonable  for  us,  but  I  would  suggest  that 
where  we  do  follow  that  kind  of  a  policy  it  is 
possibly  good  short-term  politics,  but  disas- 
trous long-term  statesmanship,  for  this  rea- 
son— because  if  each  of  the  nations  in  eff'ect 
goes  off  on  its  own  or,  as  I  have  put  it,  goes 
into  business  for  himself,  the  inevitable  effect 
will  be  this :  it  will  drive  the  prices  of  energy 
up,  it  will  drive  our  economies  down,  and  it 
will  drive  all  of  us  apart. 

That  is  not  in  the  interest  of  certainly  the 
United  States,  and  I  would  respectfully  sug- 
gest it  is  not  in  the  interest  of  the  nations  of 
the  free  world  represented  at  this  very  dis- 
tinguished gathering  tonight. 

I  would  simply  conclude  with  this  thought. 
Sometimes  it  is  thought  that  the  United 
States,  because  we  are  in  a  position  of  rather 
considerable  military  power  and  economic 
strength,  tends  to  throw  its  weight  around. 
We  do  not  intend  to  do  that. 

What  we  do  want  to  do,  as  I  have  already 
indicated,  is  to  build  in  the  field  of  security 
on  that  great  base  which  brought  us  where 
we  are,  the  beginning  of  what  we  think  can 
be  an  era  of  permanent  peace  in  the  world. 

And  what  we  want  to  do,  however,  is  that 
having  achieved  peace  in  the  sense  of  the 
absence  of  war,  we  will  not  follow  a  genera- 


tion plagued  with  wars  with  a  generation 
plagued  with  economic  warfare. 

I  would  be  less  than  candid  also  if  I  were 
not  to  say  that  competition  among  free  peo- 
ples is  inevitable  and  it  is  desirable.  We  wel- 
come it ;  you  welcome  it. 

But  I  am  simply  suggesting  that  this  con- 
ference, in  which  there  has  been  a  spirited 
discussion,  as  it  should  be,  in  which  there  has 
been  consideration  of  our  mutual  interest,  as 
there  should  be,  I  believe,  that  the- — let  me 
put  it  that  the  enlightened  selfish  interest  of 
each  nation  here  is  better  served  by  coop- 
eration in  security,  by  cooperation  in  trade, 
and  by  cooperation  in  developing  our  sources 
of  energy  and  in  acquiring  the  energy  we 
need  to  keep  the  great  industrial  complex  of 
the  free  world  moving  ahead  to  ever  and  ever 
higher  plateaus. 

And  so,  gentlemen,  all  of  our  distinguished 
guests  tonight,  I  want  to  thank  you  for  the 
work  that  you  have  done  in  coming  to  this 
conference. 

As  Mr.  Sharp  [Canadian  Secretary  of 
State  for  External  Affairs  Mitchell  Sharp] 
pointed  out,  it  was  called  perhaps  on  rather 
short  notice,  and  yet  the  problem  was  one 
that  required  immediate  attention.  I  thank 
you  for  coming.  I  urge  you  to  continue  the 
deliberations  that  you  are  already  engaged 
in,  looking  toward  a  goal  greater  than  who 
is  going  to  make  the  best  deal  next  month, 
next  year,  on  his  energy,  but  looking  at  the 
problem  in  terms  of  the  common  goal  we 
all  have  of  building  a  structure  of  peace  in 
the  world  that  will  last. 

Security  and  economic  considerations  are 
inevitably  linked,  and  energy  cannot  be  sep- 
arated from  either.  And  it  is  for  that  reason 
that  when  we  talk  about  developing  policies 
in  the  energy  field  that  we  are  talking  about 
one  of  the  fundamental  pillars  in  that  struc- 
ture of  peace  that  we  all  want  to  build,  a 
structure  that  will  last,  we  trust,  many  gen- 
erations after  all  of  us  are  here. 

Tonight,  of  course  it  is  always  the  custom 
to  propose  a  toast  to  someone  in  the  audience. 
And  my  difliiculty  is  that  here  at  this  what  is 
supposed  to  be  a  head  table  are  the  ranking 
guests,  all  of  whom  are  Foreign  Ministers. 


March  4,   1974 


233 


And  as  I  looked  over  the  guest  list,  I  was 
trying  to  think  which  of  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ters should  receive  the  toast.  We  have  at  least 
two  Foreign  Ministers  here  who  have  been 
former  Prime  Ministers,  so  they  might  rate. 
However,  we  have  one  who  is  especially  dis- 
tinguished. And  I  was  thinking,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  before  I  found  that  we  could  get  the 
Army  Chorus  free,  that  we  might  call  on  Mr. 
Scheel  to  perform,  but  having  sold  400,000 
records  his  price  was  simply  too  high.  We 
could  not  afford  it.  [Laughter.] 

But  then  as  I  looked  over  the  list  of  For- 
eign Ministers  I  found  that,  distinguished  as 
their  past  careers  were  and  as  their  futures 
may  be,  there  is  only  one  of  the  Foreign 
Ministers  tonight  here  who  is  also  a  Presi- 
dent. And  so  in  proposing  a  toast  to  all  of 
you,  and  that  is  what  I  intend  to  do,  I  pro- 
pose that  we  raise  our  glasses  to  President 
Scheel :  President  Scheel. 


PRESIDENT  SCHEEL  OF  THE  COUNCIL 
OF  MINISTERS  OF  THE  EC 

Mr.  President:  When  I  left  the  office  last 
Saturday  to  come  here,  the  doorman  at  our 
Foreign  Office  asked  me,  "Where  are  you 
going  this  time?"  I  said,  "To  Washington. 
We  will  be  discussing  energy."  The  doorman 
replied,  "Oh,  preventing  the  world  from 
being  blown  into  pieces." 

Apparently  the  man  had  heard  something 
about  atomic  energy  and  thought  our  con- 
ference would  be  dealing  with  a  bomb.  He 
was  not  entirely  wrong.    [Laughter.] 

So  our  subject  is  not  the  bomb,  but  who 
would  deny  that  there  was  some  explosive 
force  in  our  conference,  too?  Energy  is  a 
challenge  to  all  of  us,  but  at  the  same  time  it 
offers  an  opportunity.  Who  would  say  that 
our  governments  and  our  societies  had  fore- 
seen all  the  difficulties,  had  initiated  the 
necessary  steps  in  good  time,  had  not  been 
taken  by  surprise? 

Energy  is  the  driving  force  of  our  lives, 
and  yet  haven't  we  behaved  for  years  as  if 
we  got  it  for  practically  nothing?  Did  we 
not  all  think   that   substitutes   would   have 


been  found  by  the  time  the  oil  resources  were 
completely  exhausted  and  that  until  then, 
until  the  turn  of  the  century,  there  would  be 
ample  time? 

We  all  live  in  a  society  of  affluence  with 
all  its  waste  and  extravagance.  Only  when 
we  were  confronted  with  sudden  political 
developments  did  we  become  alive  to  the  real 
situation.  These  events  make  us  aware  of  the 
implications  of  problems  with  which  we  had 
been  living  all  along  without  realizing  them. 

We  should  indeed  be  grateful  for  this, 
since  without  that  experience  we  might  have 
been  aroused  too  late.  By  that  time  the 
energy  sources  would  have  been  largely  ex- 
hausted. 

But  now  it  is  still  possible  for  us  to  cope 
with  the  problem  by  means  of  prices,  the 
market,  and  cooperation  among  governments. 
Now  we  can  still  make  arrangements  to 
strengthen  the  basic  elements  of  world  trade 
and  to  avoid  its  disruption  and  a  relapse 
into  a  sacro  egoismo. 

This  is  our  opportunity.  If  the  conference 
initiates  joint  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
dustrialized, the  oil-producing,  and  the  de- 
veloping countries,  we  will  have  taken  a  first 
step  in  the  right  direction,  but  only  a  first 
step,  no  more. 

We  cannot  yet  expect  solutions.  The  time 
is  too  short  for  this,  and  we  are  not  yet  suffi- 
ciently aware  of  the  community  of  our  inter- 
ests. The  problems  are  varied.  The  degree  of 
dependence  differs  from  one  industrialized 
country  to  the  other.  It  was  a  good  thing, 
therefore,  that  the  least  dependent  country, 
the  United  States,  has  taken  the  initiative  to 
convene  the  present  conference. 

The  question  of  the  right  price  will  con- 
tinue to  occupy  us  for  quite  some  time.  There 
can  be  no  dispute  that  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  crisis  the  price  of  crude  oil  was  too  low 
in  view  of  the  existing  market  situation.  As 
early  as  the  late  sixties,  the  crude  oil  market 
had  changed  from  a  buyers'  to  a  sellers'  mar- 
ket without  this  having  had  any  effect  on 
prices,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  prices 
demanded  now  are  too  high. 

In  the  medium  and  long  term,  they  would 
have   adverse   effects    on    the   oil-producing 


234 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


countries,  too.  It  will  be  essential  for  pro- 
ducers and  consumers  jointly  to  find  the  price 
that  assures  the  long-term  competitiveness  of 
oil  as  compared  with  other  energy  sources. 

This  question  cannot  be  considered  among 
industrialized  countries  alone.  The  result 
would  be  bound  to  arouse  the  suspicion  of  the 
producing  countries. 

At  long  last,  producers  and  consumers  will 
have  to  get  together  to  develop  a  joint  basic 
concept. 

And  finally,  let  us  not  forget  the  economic 
and  the  monetary  consequences  of  the  pres- 
ent international  emergency  situation.  It  is 
not  only  the  industrialized  countries  that 
suffer  from  them ;  many  developing  countries 
which  do  not  have  oil  resources  of  their  own 
are  also  affected  in  that  an  unbearable  bur- 
den is  imposed  on  their  already  unfavorable 
foreign  exchange  balance. 

This  gives  rise  to  great  complexities.  The 
disorder  in  the  international  monetary  sys- 
tem, the  frequent  change  of  parities,  were 
one  of  the  causes  for  the  upward  movement 
of  oil  prices.  We  now  have  to  make  a  point 
of  avoiding  that  the  price  changes  on  their 
part  do  not  make  the  international  monetary 
structure  disintegrate  altogether. 

Our  governments  are  now  called  upon  to 
act  jointly.  The  prosperity  of  our  nations  is 
based  on  the  orderly  development  of  inter- 
national trade.  Its  disruption  would  be  to 
nobody's  interest.  It  would  benefit  neither 
energy  producers  nor  the  producers  of  raw 
materials  in  general.  Nor  would  it  be  to  the 
advantage  of  either  developing  or  industrial- 
ized countries. 

This  again  confirms  the  truth  of  the  words 
of  John  Donne,  "No  man  is  an  island,  entire 
of  itself."  It  is  now  essential  for  us  that  we 
stand  the  test.  We  all  must  bear  social  re- 
sponsibility, social  responsibility  in  the  wid- 
est sense  of  the  word,  toward  the  community 
of  nations  and  toward  our  own  citizens. 

I  raise  my  glass  and  drink  to  the  health  of 
our  host,  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  to  the  well-being  of  the  American  people, 
to  that  of  the  countries'  representatives  at 
the  conference  and  to  the  success  of  our  joint 
efforts. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  seizure 
of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Ha^e  December  16, 
1970.  Entered  into  force  October  14,  1971.  TIAS 
7192. 

Ratifications    deposited:    Austria,    February     11, 
1974;  New  Zealand,  February  12,  1974. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 26,  1973.    TIAS  7570. 

Ratifications    deposited:     Austria,    February    11, 
1974;  New  Zealand,  February  12,  1974. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  development, 
production  and  stockpiling  of  bacteriological  (bio- 
logical) and  toxin  weapons  and  on  their  destruc- 
tion. Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow 
April  10,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited:    Finland,  February  4,  1974. 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers  (CSC), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  2,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Hungary,  January  9,  1974. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  containers,  1972,  with  an- 
nexes and  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  December  2, 
1972.' 

Ratification    deposited:     Hungary,    December    12, 
1973. 

Energy 

Communique  concerning  the  international  energy 
situation.     Issued    at    Washington    February    13, 

1974. 

Exhibitions 

Protocol  revising  the  convention  of  November  22, 
1928,  as  amended  (TIAS  6548,  6549),  relating  to 
international  expositions,  with  appendix  and  an- 
nex. Done  at  Paris  November  20,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited:  United  States  (with  reser- 
vation), January  18,  1974. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization.    Done  at  Geneva  March  6, 


'  Not  in  force. 


March  4,    1974 


235 


1948.    Entered  into  force   March   17,  1958.    TIAS 

4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Tanzania,  January  8,  1974. 

Postal  Matters 

Additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union  with  final  protocol  signed  at 
Vienna  July  10,  1964  (TIAS  5881),  general  regu- 
lations with  final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the  uni- 
versal postal  convention  with  final  protocol  and 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Tokyo  November 
14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1971,  except 
for  article  V  of  the  additional  protocol,  which 
entered  into  force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 
Accessions  deposited:  Jamaica,  December  10,  1973; 
Republic  of  Maldives,  December  20,  1973. 

Property — Industrial 

Trademark    registration    treaty,    with    regulations. 

Done  at  Vienna  June  12,  1973." 

Signatures:  Austria,  December  27,  1973;  Den- 
mark, December  19,  1973;  Finland,  December 
27,  1973;  Norway,  December  19,  1973;  Romania, 
December  31,  1973;  Sweden,  December  20,  1973. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for  pre- 
venting collisions  at  sea,  1972.    Done  at  London 
October  20,  1972." 
Accession  deposited:   Liberia,  December  28,  1973. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  damage 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  March  29,  1972.  Entered  into 
force  September  1,  1972;  for  the  United  States 
October  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Ratification  deposited:  Iran,  February  13,  1974. 

Tonnage 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measurement 
of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at  London 
June  23,  1969." 

Acceptance  deposited:   Ghana,  December  13,  1973. 
Accession  deposited:    Iran,  December  28,  1973. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  August  6,  1973  (TIAS 
7711).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Dacca 
December  10  and  28,  1973.  Entered  into  force 
December  28,  1973. 

Mexico 

Agreement  providing  additional  helicopters  and  re- 
lated assistance  to  Mexico  in  support  of  its  efforts 
to  curb  production  and  traffic  in  illegal  narcotics. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  Febru- 
ary 1,  1974.    Entered  into  force  February  1,  1974. 


Singapore 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  January  19, 
1971  (TIAS  7048),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton 
textiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Singa- 
pore October  30,  1973,  and  January  29,  1974.  En- 
tered into  force  January  29,  1974;  effective  Oc- 
tober 1,  1973. 

Agreement  relating  to  exports  of  wool  and  man-made 
fiber  textile  products  from  Singapore,  with  an- 
nexes. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Singapore 
October  30,  1973,  and  January  29,  1974.  Entered 
into  force  January  29,  1974;  effective  October  1, 
1973. 

VIet-Nam 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  July  8,  1970  (TIAS 
6983).  Signed  at  Saigon  January  21,  1974.  En- 
tered into  force  January  21,  1974. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  November  9,  1973 
(TIAS  7768).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Saigon  January  21,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
January  21,  1974. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Not  in  force. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  February  8  confirmed  the  following 
nominations: 

James  F.  Campbell  to  be  Ambassador  to  El  Salva- 
dor. 

G.  McMurtrie  Godley  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Re- 
public of  Lebanon. 

William  J.  Jorden  to  be  Ambassador  to  Panama. 

Thomas  W.  McElhiney  to  be  Ambassador  to  Ethi- 
opia. 

William  J.  Porter  to  be  Ambassador  to  Canada. 

Nancy  V.  Rawls  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Togo. 

Joseph  John  Sisco  to  be  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Political  Affairs. 

Robert  S.  Smith  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Ivory  Coast. 


Appointments 

William  G.  Hyland  as  Director,  Bureau  of  Intelli- 
gence and  Research,  effective  January  24. 


236 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     March  A,  197i     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1810 


Canada.   Porter  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .     .       236 

Congress.  Confirmations  (Campbell,  Godley, 
Jorden,  McElhiney,  Porter,  Rawls,  Sisco, 
Smith) 236 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 
Confirmations      (Campbell,     Godley,     Jorden, 

McElhiney,  Porter,  Rawls,  Sisco,  Smith)  .     .       236 
Hyland  appointed  Director,  Bureau  of  Intelli- 
gence and  Research 236 

El  Salvador.  Campbell  confirmed  as  Ambas- 
sador       236 

Energy 

Major  Oil-Consuming  Countries  Meet  at 
Washington  To  Discuss  the  Energy  Problem 
(Kissinger,  Shultz,  Simon,  text  of  confer- 
ence   communique) 201 

President  Nixon  Expresses  Satisfaction  With 

Outcome  of  Energy  Conference  (statement)       203 

President  Nixon  Honors  Energy  Conference 
Representatives  at  White  House  Dinner 
(Nixon,  Scheel) 230 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
February  13 223 

Ethiopia.  McElhiney  confirmed  as  Ambassa- 
dor      236 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Major  Oil-Consuming  Countries  Meet  at 
Washington  To  Discuss  the  Energy  Problem 
(Kissinger,  Shultz,  Simon,  text  of  confer- 
ence communique) 201 

President  Nixon  Expresses  Satisfaction  With 

Outcome  of  Energy  Conference  (statement)       203 

Ivory  Coast.   Smith  confirmed  as  Ambassador      236 

Lebanon.    Godley  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .      236 

Panama.  Jorden  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .     .       236 

Presidential  Documents 

National  Port  Week,  1974  (proclamation)  .  .  222 
Pre;  ident  Nixon  Expresses  Satisfaction  With 

Outcome  of  Energy  Conference 203 

President   Nixon   Honors   Energy  Conference 

Representatives  at  White  House  Dinner  .     .      230 

Togo.   Rawls  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .     .     .       236 

Trade.  National  Port  Week,  1974  (proclama- 
tion)        222 

Treaty   Information.    Current  Actions  .     .     .       235 

U.S.S.R.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence of  February  13 223 


Name  Index 

Campbell,  James   F 236 

Godley,   G.   McMurtrie 236 

Hyland,    William   G 236 

Jorden,  William  J 236 

Kissinger,  Secretary 201,  223 

McElhiney,  Thomas  W 236 

Nixon,   President 203,  222,  230 

Porter,  William  J 236 

Rawls,  Nancy   V 236 

Scheel,  Walter 230 

Shultz,  George  P 201 

Simon,   William 201 

Sisco,   Joseph   John 236 

Smith,  Robert  S 236 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  February  11—17 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Oflice  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.     Date  Subject 

46     2/11     Kissinger:      Washington      Energy 
Conference. 

*47  2/11  U.S.  and  Singapore  sign  textile 
agreements. 

*48  2/12  Shipping  Coordinating  Committee 
Subcommittee  on  Code  of  Con- 
duct for  Liner  Conferences,  Feb. 
28. 

*49     2/13     American  specialists  to  visit  Carib- 
bean, Feb.  12-22. 
50     2/13     Kissinger:  news  conference. 

*51  2/14  McCloskey  sworn  in  as  Ambassa- 
dor at  Large  (biographic  data). 

*52  2/14  Regional  Foreign  Policy  Confer- 
ence, Philadelphia,  Mar.  19. 

t53  2/15  Rush:  Conference  of  Presidents  of 
Major  American  Jewish  Organi- 
zations, New  York. 

*54  2/15  Shipping  Coordinating  Committee, 
Mar.  19. 

*55  2/15  Study  group  1  of  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  for  the  CCITT,  Mar.  5. 

*56  2/15  Study  group  1  of  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  for  the  CCITT,  Mar. 
14. 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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/  V^'U 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1811 


March  11, 1974 


EUROPEAN-AMERICAN  RELATIONS: 

A  CASE  FOR  COOPERATIVE  ENDEAVOR 

Address  by  Deputy  Secretary  Rusk    237 

DEPARTMENT  GIVES  VIEWS  ON  U.S.  COMMITMENTS  TO  NATO 
Statement  by  Assistant  Secretary  Hartman    2A3 

THE  WORLD  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT 
Statement  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Shultz    250 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETI 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1811 
March  11,  1974 


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the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  o( 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tJie  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  tlie  government 
witft  information  on  developments  in 
tfie  field  of  US.  foreign  relations  and 
on  tfte  work  of  tlie  Department  and 
tfie  Foreign  Service. 
Tlie  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  tfie  Wliite  House  and  tfie  DeparU 
ment,  and  statements,  addresset, 
and  news  conferences  of  tlie  President 
and  tlie  Secretary  of  State  and  otiier 
officers  of  tlie  Department,  as  well  attr 
special  articles  on  various  pfiases  of 
international  affairs  and  tfie  function! 
of  tlie  Department.  Information  It 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inteiA 
national  agreements  to  whicli  thi 
United  States  is  or  may  become  it 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  tfte  Department  of 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  ani 
legislative  material  in  the  field  of 
international  relations  are  also  listei. 


European-American  Relations:  A  Case  for  Cooperative  Endeavor 


Address  by  Deputy  Secretary  Kenneth  Rush  ^ 


It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  be  with  you 
this  afternoon  to  honor  Jack  Stein.  Jack's 
term  of  office  has  spanned  the  most  danger- 
ous— and  the  most  helpful — period  in  the 
modern  history  of  the  Middle  East.  The 
fourth  Arab-Israeli  war,  fought  with  the 
world's  most  advanced  conventional  weap- 
ons, was  more  terrible  and  expensive  of  life 
and  treasure  than  its .  predecessors.  The 
trauma  of  the  October  war  and  the  subse- 
quent changes  in  both  Arab  and  Israeli  per- 
ceptions of  Middle  East  realities  have  pro- 
duced the  best  chance  yet  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  rigid  political  positions 
and  false  assumptions  which  before  the  war 
prevented  movement  toward  peace  have  been 
transformed  into  a  willingness  on  both  sides 
to  take  prudent  risks  in  pursuit  of  a  real 
peace.  Arab  and  Israeli  negotiators  have  met 
and  together  solved  problems  and  reached 
agreements.  The  role  of  the  United  States 
has  been  to  assist  this  process,  to  help  where 
it  can  in  bringing  the  parties  together  across 
the  chasm  of  hostility  and  mistrust  which 
has  separated  them  for  so  long.  The  agree- 
ments reached  thus  far  reflect  the  needs  and 
desires  of  the  parties  themselves,  which  is  as 
it  should  be  since  it  is  they  who  inevitably 
must  live  out  their  national  lives  as  neigh- 
bors. I  know  that  many  of  you  share  with  me 
pride  in  the  fact  that  President  Nixon  and 
Secretary  Kissinger  have  been  so  helpful  in 
the  search  for  solutions.  We  are  pleased  that 
the  peace  process  has  begun  and  has  achieved 


'  Made  at  New  York  on  Feb.  15  at  a  luncheon  in 
honor  of  Jacob  Stein,  retiring  chairman  of  the  Con- 
ference of  Presidents  of  Major  Jewish  Organizations 
(press  release  53). 


some  success.  We  are  aware  of  how  much 
more  must  be  done  before  a  just  and  durable 
peace,  in  which  both  Arabs  and  Israelis  can 
live  without  fear  of  attack  by  the  other,  can 
be  achieved. 

But  you  have  all  heard  and  read  much  re- 
cently about  the  Middle  East.  My  desire  this 
afternoon  is  to  say  a  few  words  about  another 
part  of  the  world.  You  are  aware  that  I  have 
had  more  direct  involvement  myself  in  devel- 
opments in  Europe.  I  know  many  of  you  fol- 
low European  affairs  perhaps  as  closely  as  I. 
When  I  spoke  before  the  United  Synagogue 
of  America  in  December,  I  was  asked  a  num- 
ber of  questions  concerning  the  extent  to 
which  we  could  continue  to  rely  on  our  Euro- 
pean allies  and  the  extent  to  which  the  con- 
tinued presence  of  U.S.  troops  in  Europe  was 
justified.  These  were  understandable  ques- 
tions, but  they  represent  trends  of  thinking 
that  disturb  me  very  much.  At  this  time  of 
detente  with  the  Soviet  Union,  these  are 
questions  which  your  government  must  an- 
swer for  you.  I  hope  to  do  so  this  afternoon. 

President  Nixon's  policies  in  the  realm  of 
foreign  affairs  have  been  rooted  in  a  quest 
for  peace,  security,  and  rising  standards  of 
life  for  all  men.  In  that  search,  a  sound  and 
truly  reciprocal  transatlantic  relationship 
remains  the  linchpin  of  our  efforts. 

As  the  President  said  in  an  address  to  a 
joint  session  of  the  Congress  on  June  1, 
1972: 

...  we  must  stand  steadfastly  with  our  NATO 
partners  if  negotiations  leading  to  a  new  detente  and 
a  mutual  reduction  of  forces  in  Europe  are  to  be 
productive.  Maintaining  the  strength,  integrity,  and 
steadfastness  of  our  free-world  alliances  is  the  foun- 


March   11,   1974 


237 


dation  on  which  all  of  our  other  initiatives  for  peace 
and  security  in  the  world  must  rest.  As  we  seek 
better  relations  with  those  who  have  been  our  adver- 
saries, we  will  not  let  down  our  friends  and  allies 
around  the  world. 

Because  of  the  ties  of  history  and  heritage 
and  a  close  perception  of  the  responsibilities 
which  the  Atlantic  states  bear  in  the  world 
at  large,  the  United  States  helped  in  large 
measure  to  rebuild  a  shattered  Europe  at  the 
end  of  World  War  II.  Western  Europe  has 
waxed  wealthy  and  has  been  moving,  not 
without  difficulty,  toward  economic  and  per- 
haps ultimately  political  unity.  The  United 
States  welcomes  this  and  sees  this  transi- 
tional time  as  a  critical  juncture.  We  should 
move  to  strengthen  and  to  adapt  our  relations 
with  Western  Europe  to  reflect  better  the 
realities  and  resource  capabilities  of  the  in- 
creasingly complex  and  multipolar  world  of 
the  seventies. 

We  are  determined  to  forge  a  strengthened 
Atlantic  relationship.  As  a  result,  we  are 
currently  engaged  in  several  urgent  diplo- 
matic efforts.  We  and  our  Western  partners 
are  together  drafting  declarations  of  princi- 
ples designed  to  set  the  future  pattern  of  our 
association  in  the  political,  security,  and  eco- 
nomic fields. 

We  now  envisage  one  declaration  setting 
forth  defense  principles  for  the  NATO  na- 
tions and  another  concentrating  on  political 
and  economic  principles  to  govern  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the  European 
Community.  Further,  the  United  States 
favors  strongly  a  third  declaration,  sub- 
scribed to  by  Europe,  America,  and  Japan, 
which  would  include  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  declarations  we  are  drafting 
with  the  Western  Europeans  as  well  as  a 
number  of  goals  we  share  with  the  Japanese. 

We  think  the  philosophic  tone  of  these 
declarations  is  as  important  as  their  form 
and  their  content.  These  documents  must  be 
expressions  of  that  basic  unity  of  purpose 
which  is  essential  if  the  Atlantic  powers  and 
Japan  are  to  be  able  to  grapple  successfully 
with  the  problems  before  them. 

New  issues — reflecting  the  complexities  of 
the  highly  technological  and  developing  so- 
cieties of  this  decade — press  upon  us  in  the 


fields  of  trade  and  monetary  adjustment,  de- 
velopmental assistance,  environment  pollu- 
tion, and  the  politics  and  economics  of  energy. 
This  week  in  Washington  we  have  had  a  con- 
ference of  13  Foreign  Ministers,  together 
with  the  senior  officials  of  the  European 
Community  and  the  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment], as  well  as  a  number  of  Finance  Min- 
isters and  chiefs  of  national  energy  pro- 
grams and  science  and  technology,  to  see 
whether  the  nations  that  import  and  con- 
sume three-quarters  of  the  world's  energy 
transfers  can  manage,  through  a  cooperative 
effort,  the  massive  international  energy  re- 
source problem  which  faces  us  today.  The 
conference  agreed  on  the  need  for  a  compre- 
hensive action  program  to  deal  with  the 
many  aspects  of  this  global  problem.  This 
work,  when  completed,  will  lead  to  a  meeting 
between  consumers  and  producers  to  work 
out  a  new  cooperative  multilateral  relation- 
ship. This  consumer-producer  conference 
may  be  preceded  by  a  further  consumer  meet- 
ing to  review  the  work.  Less  developed  con- 
sumer countries  should  be  represented. 

As  Secretary  Kissinger  said  to  the  Pil- 
grims at  London  last  December: 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to  make  a  very 
major  financial  and  intellectual  contribution  to  the 
objective  of  solving  the  energy  problem  on  a  common 
basis.  There  is  no  technological  problem  that  the 
great  democracies  do  not  have  the  capacity  to  solve 
together — if  they  can  muster  the  will  and  imagina- 
tion. .  .  . 

We  have  every  reason  of  duty  and  self-interest  to 
preserve  the  most  successful  partnership  in  history. 
The  United  States  is  committed  to  making  the  At- 
lantic community  a  vital  positive  force  for  the  future 
as  it  was  for  the  past.  What  has  been  recently  taken 
for  granted  must  now  be  renewed.  This  is  not  an 
American  challenge  to  Europe;  it  is  history's  chal- 
lenge to  us  all. 

The  Western  alliance  has  proved  to  be  a 
stout  shield  of  collective  defense.  Without 
such  a  credible  defense,  those  measures  of 
detente  gained  in  negotiation  would  not  have 
been  possible.  Continued  progress  toward 
further  detente  demands  a  continued  reliable 
and  resolute  defense  which  can  flow  only 
from  a  sound  alliance. 

For  our  part,  in  the  light  of  the  present 


238 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


strategic  balance  and  of  similar  efforts  by 
our  allies,  we  must  not  only  maintain  but 
improve  our  forces  in  Europe.  We  should 
not  reduce  them  unless  there  is  reciprocal 
action  by  our  adversaries.  This  pledge  rests 
on  a  fundamental  judgment — certainly  as 
valid  today  as  it  has  been  for  the  past  quarter 
century:  The  security  of  Western  Europe  is 
inseparable  from  our  own. 

American  forces  are  in  Europe  because  of 
our  national  security  needs.  They  constitute 
a  vital  element  in  the  common  defense  of  the 
West.  Their  future  effective  presence,  how- 
ever, will  depend — out  of  simple  necessity — 
on  a  more  equitable  burden-sharing  equation 
between  us  and  our  allies. 

Today's  world  is  characterized  by  an  ever- 
growing complex  interrelationship — not  only 
among  the  various  forces  in  any  given  coun- 
try but  also  among  nations  in  their  foreign 
policies.  The  capability  and  will  for  military 
strength  is  closely  related  to  a  nation's  eco- 
nomic vigor.  In  our  view,  that  forms  the 
nexus  between  defense,  money,  trade,  and, 
now,  energy.  This  assertion  is  not  a  prescrip- 
tion for  blackmail;  it  is  simply  a  fact  of  life. 
As  President  Nixon  said  at  the  White  House 
Monday  night  at  the  Energy  Conference  din- 
ner: 

Security  and  economic  considerations  are  inevita- 
bly linked,  and  energy  cannot  be  separated  from 
either.  And  it  is  for  that  reason  that  when  we  talk 
about  developing  policies  in  the  energy  field  that  we 
are  talking  about  one  of  the  fundamental  pillars  in 
that  structure  of  peace  that  we  all  want  to  build,  a 
structure  that  will  last,  we  trust,  many  generations 
after  all  of  us  are  here. 

I  spoke  before  of  this  being  a  time  of  tran- 
sition which  offers  large  opportunities  for 
imaginative  and  bold  thrusts  of  diplomacy. 
This  applies  not  only  to  evolving  relation- 
ships in  the  West  but  also  in  the  sphere  of 
East-West  encounter.  The  tensions  of  the 
cold  war  are  being  eased.  We  strive  for 
broader  areas  of  detente  in  the  cause  of  glo- 
bal tranquillity  and  heightened  prosperity. 
This  is  in  no  way  a  condominium  between  the 
Soviet  and  American  superpowers,  but  an 
engagement  in  the  interests  of  all. 

In  the  past,  shifts  in  our  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  proved  to  be  largely  episodic — 


understandings  that  were  more  atmospheric 
than  real.  What  has  been  established  at  the 
two  summits  between  General  Secretary 
Brezhnev  and  President  Nixon,  however,  we 
believe  to  be  more  durable.  It  is  based  on 
solid,  definitive  achievements  that  grip  the 
interests  of  both  parties. 

The  dangers  inherent  in  a  world  of  mas- 
sive nuclear  weaponry  are  so  immense  that 
we  believe  it  imperative  to  make  a  deter- 
mined, sustained  effort  to  relax  international 
tensions,  to  define  rules  of  conduct,  and  to 
build  an  increasing  interconnection  of  inter- 
ests and  communication  in  widening  fields  of 
concern  at  every  level  of  national  life. 

In  the  continuation  of  close  consultation. 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  visited  Washing- 
ton at  our  invitation  February  3-5.  As  a 
result  of  the  talks  held  with  him  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  Secretary  Kissinger,  a  mutual  de- 
termination was  reaffirmed  to  developing 
further  our  relations  along  the  lines  estab- 
lished during  the  President's  visit  to  the 
Soviet  Union  in  1972  and  the  General  Secre- 
tary's visit  to  the  United  States  in  1973  and 
reflected  in  the  agreements  concluded  at 
those  times.  It  was  agreed  further  that  Sec- 
retary Kissinger  will  travel  to  Moscow  early 
this  spring  in  connection  with  preparations 
for  President  Nixon's  visit  to  the  Soviet 
Union  later  in  the  year. 

Let  me  emphasize  for  you  one  aspect  of 
what  we  mean  by  detente.  Our  attitude 
toward  detente  has  never  implied  approval 
of  the  Soviet  domestic  system.  We  have  al- 
ways recognized  that  there  exist  fundamental 
incompatibilities  between  our  two  ways  of 
life. 

The  United  States  vdll  never  condone  the 
internal  policies  of  closed  societies.  We  are 
not  neutral  in  the  cause  of  liberty.  As  long 
as  we  remain  powerful,  we  will  use  our  in- 
fluence to  promote  freedom  in  its  largest 
sense.  We  seek  to  do  so  in  the  most  effective 
way.  There  are,  however,  limits  to  our 
ability. 

The  view  of  some,  based  on  very  real  and 
valid  concerns  for  human  freedoms,  is  most 
dramatically  expressed  in  congressional 
amendments  to  the  pending  Trade  Reform 


March   11,   1974 


239 


Act  which  would  deny  equal  tariff  treatment 
and  government  credits  to  Russia  and  certain 
other  Socialist  states  which  impose  restric- 
tions on  the  right  of  their  citizens  to  emi- 
grate. 

Let  me  say  to  you  today:  This  administra- 
tion understands  and  fully  shares  the  objec- 
tives of  human  rights  and  freedoms,  in  de- 
fense of  which  the  Jewish  community  has  al- 
ways been  on  the  front  lines. 

It  is  not  the  goal,  nor  a  question  of  priori- 
ties, that  is  at  issue  here;  it  is  simply  a 
matter  of  tactics.  We  believe  that  in  the 
long  run  greater  trade  and  closer  economic 
relations  with  the  Soviets  will  be  a  far  more 
effective  liberalizing  influence  than  continued 
isolation  and  lack  of  contact  between  us. 

No  discussion  involving  the  question  of 
human  rights  in  the  Soviet  Union  would  be 
complete  without  reference  to  the  situation 
of  Alexander  Solzhenitsyn,  whose  forced  de- 
parture from  his  native  Russia  has  evoked 
worldwide  attention  and  sympathy.  Secre- 
tary Kissinger  has  already  expressed  what  he 
so  appropriately  called  our  "human,  moral, 
and  intellectual"  concern  for  Alexander  Sol- 
zhenitsyn. This  concern  is  founded  in  the 
importance  which  we  place  upon  both  free- 
dom of  thought  and  freedom  of  the  press. 

There  are  those  who  now  suggest  that 
Soviet  treatment  of  Solzhenitsyn  reveals  the 
failure  of  our  policy  of  seeking  a  detente  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  I  respectfully  submit  that 
this  approach  is  not  valid.  We  have  repeat- 
edly emphasized  that  our  effort  to  seek  a  re- 
laxation of  tension  with  the  world's  other 
superpower  does  not  imply  approval  of  So- 
viet internal  policies  and  practices.  Detente 
is  based  on  the  presumption  that  nuclear  war 
is  unacceptable.  A  reduction  of  this  threat 
and  an  improvement  of  the  prospects  for 
peace  are  what  we  seek  to  achieve  through 
detente.  Such  a  policy,  like  our  concern  for 
the  safety  and  freedom  of  Alexander  Solzhe- 
nitsyn, is  rooted  in  our  concern  for  the  dig- 
nity of  man. 

I  would  like  to  recall  in  this  connection  the 
words  of  Roy  Medvedev,  the  distinguished 


Soviet  historian  and  friend  of  Solzhenitsyn, 
who  pointed  out  last  fall  that: 

It  is  precisely  under  conditions  of  international 
detente  that  the  efficacy  of  international  public  opin- 
ion and  its  influence  on  the  internal  policy  of  great 
nations  is  heightened.  For  a  country  that  is  isolated 
from  the  outside  world,  that  fences  itself  off  from 
the  world  with  the  various  barriers  of  the  "cold 
war,"  will  become  insensitive  to  the  protests  and  the 
opinion  of  the  world's  people.  .  .  . 

In  the  cause  of  Soviet  Jewry — which  is 
always  in  our  minds — we  have  made  our  po- 
sition unmistakably  clear,  and  the  forward 
movement  has  been  substantial;  the  exit  tax 
on  emigrating  Soviet  Jews  is  not  being  col- 
lected; we  have  received  assurances  that  it 
will  not  be  reapplied:  the  annual  rate  of  Jew- 
ish emigration  from  the  U.S.S.R.  has  most 
recently  been  in  the  tens  of  thousands,  where 
before  it  was  only  a  slight  trickle.  In  1968, 
before  President  Nixon's  term,  only  400  emi- 
grated; in  1971  it  was  14,000;  in  1972,  31,500. 
Throughout  1973  this  sizable  flow  continued 
and  registered  a  further  increase  to  33,500. 

These  are  hopeful  developments,  and  the 
question  must  arise  whether  increased  ten- 
sion between  our  two  countries — brought 
about  through  a  frustration  of  our  efforts  to 
achieve  accommodation  in  political,  security, 
and  economic  terms — would  encourage  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  present  increased  flow  or 
rather  have  the  opposite  effect.  Progress 
which  is  continuing  must  not  be  put  in  jeop- 
ardy without  careful  consideration. 

We  think  this  is  evidence  of  the  rightness 
of  our  efforts  to  reduce  tensions  and  to  ex- 
plore possible  future  cooperation.  We  don't 
claim  that  trade  prevents  hostilities;  we  do 
maintain  that  economic  and  commercial  in- 
terchange promotes  a  freer  interchange  of 
people  and  ideas  and  that  this  can  foster 
greater  international  understanding  and  co- 
operation. 

Gradually,  over  a  period  of  time,  as  we  re- 
move the  causes  of  mutual  irritations — many 
of  which  are  in  fact  economic  and  commer- 
cial— the  atmosphere  is  improved  for  relaxa-  I 
tion  of  political  and  diplomatic  defensive- 
ness.    This  applies,  as  well,  to  relationships 


240 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


within  the  market-oriented,  industriaHzed 
Western  world.  Practically  every  section  of 
i  the  administration's  bill  is  aimed  at  reducing 
the  possible  causes  of  economic  isolationism, 
autarky,  and  restrictionism  in  the  non-Com- 
munist world.  We  think  this  approach  can 
also  achieve  real  benefits  when  applied  to 
countries  governed  under  a  different  political 
system. 

In  fact,  a  real  and  lasting  detente  with  the 
Socialist  powers  is  itself  related  to  the  degree 
of  harmony  we  can  maintain  in  the  West.  We 
need  the  authorities  in  the  trade  bill  to  help 
us  improve  relationships — political  as  well  as 
economic — with  Europe,  Japan,  and  the  de- 
veloping countries. 

Those  improvements  can  help  pave  the  way 
for  more  open  and  equitable  relations  with 
the  Communist  nations.  And  that,  in  turn,  is 
a  sounder  basis  on  which  to  negotiate  re- 
moval of  political  irritants. 

We  recognize  the  intensity  of  the  desire  to 
register  popular  opposition  to  restrictions  on 
human  rights,  which  support  of  the  Jackson- 
Vanik  amendments  reflects  in  Congress.  We 
are  by  no  means  asking  that  this  overwhelm- 
ing sentiment  not  be  expressed.  We  are  hope- 
ful that  it  can  be  expressed  in  a  way  which 
does  not  foreclose  the  possibility  of  opening 
up  new  commercial  and  economic  channels  of 
communication  and  influence  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  Communist  governments. 
Secretary  Kissinger  has  indicated,  and  I 
think  it  is  important  to  reiterate  here,  that 
we  are  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  a 
means  for  readjustment  can  be  found  to  re- 
solve what  has  become  largely  a  question  of 
the  best  tactics  to  achieve  the  same  humani- 
tarian objectives. 

My  friends,  this  is  a  time  of  grand  and 
even  noble  opportunity  on  the  international 
diplomatic  stage.  Such  opportunities  have 
arisen  from  time  to  time  in  the  past,  only  to 
be  dashed  as  nations  turned  back  to  classi- 
cally narrow,  selfish,  and  divisive  ways. 
Those  lost  chances  should  be  well  remem- 
bered, for  as  George  Santayana  observed: 
"Those  who  cannot  remember  the  past  are 
condemned  to  repeat  it." 


Foreign   Ministers  of  Saudi  Arabia 
and   Egypt  Visit  Washington 

President  Nixon  met  on  February  19  with 
Foreign  Minister  Sayyid  Umar  al-Saqqaf  of 
Saudi  Arabia  arid  Foreign  Minister  Ismail 
Fahmi  of  Egypt.  Following  are  remarks 
made  to  the  press  by  President  Nixon  and  the 
Foreign  Ministers  after  the  meeting. 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated  February  25 

PRESIDENT  NIXON 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  Foreign  Minister 
Saqqaf  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Foreign  Minis- 
ter Fahmi  of  Egypt,  Dr.  Kissinger,  and  I 
have  just  had  an  extended  and  very  con- 
structive discussion  with  regard  to  our 
achieving  the  goal  of  a  permanent  peace  in 
the  Mideastern  area. 

With  regard  to  the  various  steps  that  have 
been  taken,  the  first  of  which,  of  course,  was 
the  disengagement  on  the  Egyptian  front, 
the  immediate  problem  that  concerns  us  all  is 
to  obtain  disengagement  on  the  Syrian  front. 

The  two  Foreign  Ministers  are  here  repre- 
senting not  only  their  own  governments  but 
also  four  heads  of  state,  as  they  will  indi- 
cate, and  at  the  request  of  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ters conveying  the  requests  of  the  heads  of 
government,  we  believe  that  steps  should  now 
be  taken  to  get  the  talks  begun  between  the 
Syrians  and  the  Israelis  with  regard  to  dis- 
engagement. 

Consequently,  at  their  request,  I  have 
asked  Dr.  Kissinger,  when  he  completes  his 
trip  to  Mexico  City,  to  go  to  the  Mideast 
again,  where  he  will  meet  with  the  Syrians 
and  with  the  Israelis  with  the  objective  of 
getting  talks  started  with  regard  to  the  prob- 
lem of  disengagement  on  the  Syrian  front. 

In  addition  to  that,  we  discussed  other 
matters  of  mutual  concern  having  to  do  par- 
ticularly with  the  need  to  have  a  permanent 
settlement  in  the  Mideast,  and  I  would  say — 
and  I  would  allow  of  course  each  of  them,  or 
would  ask  each  of  them,  to  comment  as  they 


March   11,    1974 


241 


see  fit  with  regard  to  the  point  I  will  be  mak- 
ing now — that  the  goal  of  all  governments — 
these  two  governments,  with  which  we  have 
had  very  friendly  relations  in  recent  times, 
and  some  over  a  longer  time- — the  goal  of  our 
governments  is  to  have  not  simply  a  tempo- 
rary settlement  but  a  permanent  settlement, 
with  normal  relations,  economically,  diplo- 
matically, and  in  other  ways  in  that  area  of 
the  world  and  with  all  of  the  countries  of 
that  area  of  the  world. 

As  our  senior  guest  we  will  call  on  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  Saudi  Arabia  to  say 
anything  he  would  like:    Mr.  Saqqaf. 


welcome  his  approval  of  dispatching  the 
Secretary  of  State  to  the  area  again  to  start 
contacts  with  the  Syrians  and  the  Israelis  to 
start  working  on  a  disengagement  on  that 
front  as  the  United  States  actively  partici- 
pated before  so  far  as  the  Egyptian  front  and 
there  was  a  successful  result  from  the  U.S. 
efforts  in  that  regard. 
Thank  you. 


Defense  Articles  and  Services 
for  Spain 


FOREIGN   MINISTER  AL-SAQQAF 

My  friend,  thank  you  very  much.  I  think 
you  see  me  now  for  the  third  time.  You 
might  notice  that  I  am  better  relaxed.  The 
reason  is  that  I  have  had  a  very  good  and 
constructive  discussion  with  the  President 
and  with  the  Secretary. 

I  think  Mr.  President  summarized  every- 
thing, and  I  don't  need  to  add  anything,  ex- 
cept that  we  feel  hopeful  that  something  will 
happen,  and  soon,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
United  States,  of  the  Middle  East,  for  the 
world  as  a  whole. 

Thank  you. 


FOREIGN  MINISTER  FAHMI 

We  had,  as  the  President  has  just  said,  an 
extended  discussion,  and  very  constructive, 
and  we  are  very  pleased,  after  conveying  to 
the  President  the  decisions  which  were  taken 
unanimously  by  the  four  heads  of  govern- 
ment in  Algeria.  We  are  very  pleased,  as  you 
have  heard  the  President,  that  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  work  for  a  permanent 
and  just  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  countries  of  this  area,  and  we 


Presidential  Determination  No.  74-10 ' 

Presidential  Determination — Spain 

Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  State 

The  White  House, 
Washington,  December  20,  197S. 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  Section 
614(a)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as 
amended,  I  hereby: 

(a)  Determine  the  use  of  not  to  exceed  $3.4  mil- 
lion in  FY  1974  for  the  granting  of  defense  articles, 
defense  services  and  training,  together  with  excess 
defense  articles,  to  Spain,  and  the  use  of  up  to  $3 
million  in  Security  Supporting  Assistance  funds  to 
finance  programs  of  non-military  cooperation  with 
Spain,  without  regard  to  Section  620 (m)  of  the  Act, 
is  important  to  the  security  of  the  United  States; 

(b)  Authorize  such  use  up  to  $3.4  million  for  the 
grant  of  defense  articles,  defense  services,  and  train- 
ing to  Spain,  and  the  use  of  up  to  $3  million  in  Se- 
curity Supporting  Assistance  funds  to  finance  pro- 
grams of  non-military  cooperation  with  Spain,  with- 
out regard  to  the  limitations  of  Section  620(m)  of 
the  Act. 

This  determination  shall  be  published  in  the  Fed- 
eral Register. 


(^2jjL/^K:,U, 


'  39  Fed.  Reg.  4463. 


242 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Gives  Views  on  U.S.  Commitments  to  NATO 


Statement  b%j  Arthur  A.  Hartman 
Assistant  Secretarxj  for  European  Affairs  ^ 


"It  is  apparent  to  anyone  who  reads  the 
newspapers  that  this  is  a  time  of  uncertainty 
and  reassessment  in  Western  Europe  .  .  ." 

These  words,  Mr.  Chairman  [Representa- 
tive William  J.  Randall],  you  will  recognize 
as  a  quotation  from  the  report  of  the  Special 
Subcommittee  on  NATO  Commitments, 
which  you  chaired,  on  "The  American  Com- 
mitment to  NATO"  of  August  1972.  Yet 
1972  for  most  Western  European  countries 
was  a  relatively  good  year.  It  was  a  year  of 
solid  economic  growth.  By  and  large,  Euro- 
pean foreign  accounts  were  in  surplus,  while 
the  dollar  was  under  pressure.  And  in  Oc- 
tober 1972  the  nine  members  of  the  recently 
enlarged  European  Community  felt  enough 
confidence  in  the  future  solemnly  to  pro- 
claim at  the  Paris  summit  meeting  their  in- 
tention to  transform,  within  the  decade,  "the 
whole  complex  of  their  relations  into  a  Euro- 
pean Union." 

But  if  there  were  undercurrents  of  uncer- 
tainty in  Western  Europe  in  1972,  today  the 
region  is  deeply  troubled.  The  energy  crisis 
has  already  removed  one  of  the  givens  in  the 
equation  of  European  prosperity — an  un- 
limited supply  of  oil  at  a  reasonable  price. 
Rates  of  economic  growth  are  dropping,  the 
level  of  prices  will  rise  more  steeply,  pay- 


^  Made  before  the  Ad  Hoc  Subcommittee  on  U.S. 
Military  Commitments  in  Europe  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Armed  Services  on  Feb.  15.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the 
committee  and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


ments  balances  are  shifting  into  deficit,  and 
foreign  exchange  reserves  will  decline. 

On  the  integration  front  the  Community 
is  in  disarray.  Transition  to  the  next  stage 
of  economic  and  monetary  union  has  been 
postponed,  and  the  French  have  withdrawn 
the  franc  from  the  Community  monetary 
agreement.  The  Community  is  still  strug- 
gling unsuccessfully  to  evolve  a  common 
energy  policy.  It  has  failed  to  date  to  resolve 
an  impasse  over  establishment  of  a  regional 
fund.  And  the  situation  has  grown  so 
strained  that  many  Europeans  are  question- 
ing openly  whether  the  nine  member  coun- 
tries possess  the  will  to  move  ahead  to  fur- 
ther unity  or  will  allow  the  Community  to 
stagnate  or  fall  apart. 

These  developments  will  severely  test  both 
the  internal  social  and  political  balance  of 
the  member  countries  of  the  Community  and 
their  relations  with  each  other.  Their  an- 
nounced goal  of  a  "European  Union"  by  1980 
would  have  been  hard  enough  to  achieve  in 
a  period  of  undiminished  prosperity  and 
close  cooperation.  It  will  become  much  more 
difficult  now. 

Meanwhile,  our  ideological  adversaries  al- 
ready cheerfully  proclaim  the  imminent 
crisis  of  the  capitalist  system.  Boris  Pono- 
marev,  alternate  member  of  the  Political 
Bureau  and  Secretary  of  the  Soviet  Commu- 
nist Party  said  on  January  18  that  "bour- 
geois society  has  come  face  to  face  with  such 
a  sharpening  of  all  its  contradictions,  which 
allows  one  to  speak  of  a  certain  qualitative 
shift  in  the  development  of  the  general  crisis 


March    11,    1974 


243 


of  capitalism,  of  an  all-round  deepening  of 
this  crisis."  This  prophecy  of  doom  will  join 
those  that  preceded  it  in  the  dustbin  of  his- 
tory. I  have  great  confidence  in  the  strength 
and  resilience  of  market  economies  and  free 
societies.  North  America  and  Western  Eu- 
rope will  adapt,  adjust,  and  learn  to  meet  the 
new  challenge. 

But  the  safe  navigation  of  this  rough 
passage  is  not  foreordained  and  inevitable. 
It  will  take  political  seamanship  of  a  very 
high  order.  Certainly  this  is  not  the  time  to 
throw  overboard  the  ballast  provided  by  the 
American  commitment  to  the  security  of 
Western  Europe. 

The  earnest  of  that  commitment  is,  and  will 
remain,  the  presence  of  U.S.  forces  in  West- 
ern Europe.  Modest  unilateral  reductions  of 
U.S.  forces,  if  I  may  once  again  quote  the 
special  subcommittee  report  of  August  1972, 
"would  have  an  adverse  psychological  im- 
pact .  .  .  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  actual 
military  effect  of  such  reductions."  The 
policy  implications  of  that  judgment,  Mr. 
Chairman,  are  even  more  pertinent  in  the 
winter  of  1974  than  they  were  in  the  summer 
of  1972. 

We  maintain  the  present  level  of  U.S. 
forces  in  Europe  not  as  an  act  of  political 
charity  but  from  calculations  of  national 
interest.  Nothing  has  occurred  to  alter  the 
judgment  made  in  your  1972  report  that 
without  the  independence  and  security  of 
Western  Europe,  "the  U.S.  position  in  the 
world,  strategically  and  economically,  would 
be  seriously  reduced."  The  Atlantic  alliance 
is  the  cornerstone  of  the  structure  of  peace 
we  seek  to  erect.  And  the  alliance  draws  its 
cohesion  from  the  presence  of  U.S.  troops  on 
European  soil. 

This  was  essentially  the  judgment  of  the 
special  subcommittee  majority  report  in  Au- 
gust 1972.  What  has  happened  since  then 
confirms,  in  my  opinion,  the  soundness  of 
that  judgment.  I  will  touch  in  this  statement 
upon  some  of  the  developments  of  the  past 
year  and  a  half  and  will  be  happy  to  answer 
your  questions  about  others. 

Among  the  countries  on  both  shores  of  the 
Atlantic  there  is  a  profound  identity  of  in- 


terest. Yet  the  public  perception  of  the  At- 
lantic relationship  has  become  clouded  with 
images  of  political  dissonance  and  commer- 
cial rivalry.  Last  April,  Secretary  Kissinger 
proposed  that  we  and  our  allies  should  rede- 
fine our  common  interests,  in  the  light  of 
changed  circumstances  and  of  the  exigencies 
of  the  future.  He  suggested  that  we  articu- 
late a  clear  set  of  common  objectives  to  guide 
the  conduct  of  particular  aspects  of  our  rela- 
tions. While  the  allies  will  not  always  agree 
on  approaches  to  problems,  especially  those 
arising  outside  of  the  treaty  area,  the  Secre- 
tary cautioned  that  we  require  an  under- 
standing of  what  should  be  done  jointly  and 
of  the  limits  we  should  impose  on  the  scope 
of  our  autonomy. 

While  the  energy  crisis  and  associated 
problems  will  impede  the  evolution  of  Euro- 
pean unity,  we  should  assume  that  the  long- 
term  trend  will  be  toward  greater  rather 
than  less  cohesion  among  the  member  states 
of  the  Community.  In  particular,  the  Nine 
are  developing  new  processes  of  political 
consultation  and  attempting  to  reach  joint 
positions  on  some  foreign  policy  issues. 
There  is  no  necessary  conflict  between  Euro- 
pean identity  and  Atlantic  community.  But 
the  transatlantic  relationship  must  adapt  to 
new  realities. 

Since  the  Secretary's  speech  last  April,  we 
have  been  developing  with  the  nine  members 
of  the  European  Community  and  with  our 
allies  in  NATO  two  declarations  designed  to 
establish  the  framework  for  our  future  col- 
laboration— on  the  one  hand  with  the  emerg- 
ing entity  of  the  Nine  and  on  the  other 
among  the  15  members  of  the  Atlantic  alli- 
ance. We  are  also  discussing  a  third  declara- 
tion that  would  associate  Japan  with  this 
undertaking,  as  well  as  a  bilateral  U.S.-Span- 
ish  declaration.  We  are  moving  forward  and 
hope  these  important  documents  will  be 
ready  for  signature  this  spring.  They  will 
assert  the  intention  of  the  United  States  and 
its  partners  to  continue  their  close  associa- 
tion, taking  into  account  the  new  factors  in 
their  relations. 

There  is  of  course  no  contradiction  be- 
tween these  efforts  to  put  Atlantic  relations 


244 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


on  a  new  and  firmer  basis  and  the  pursuit  of 
negotiations  with  the  East.  Indeed,  the  two 
endeavors  are  complementary.  East  and 
West  are  no  longer  locked  in  rigid  confronta- 
tion. It  has  become  possible  to  manage  more 
rationally  our  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  to  reduce  the  risks  of  conflict. 
But  we  cannot  carry  out  such  a  policy  from  a 
basis  of  military  weakness  and  political  dis- 
unity in  the  West. 

East-West   Negotiations 

Over  five  years  after  the  allies  proposed 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
(MBFR)  in  Central  Europe,  preliminary 
talks  opened  in  January  1973,  and  actual  ne- 
gotiations are  now  underway  in  Vienna.  The 
initial  positions  of  the  Eastern  and  Western 
sides  have  been  advanced.  Arduous  negotia- 
tions lie  ahead.  So  far  both  sides  have  agreed 
that  MBFR  would  contribute  to  the  goal  of 
insuring  security  and  stability  in  Europe  and 
that  any  agreement  reached  should  not  di- 
minish the  security  of  either  side. 

Specifically,  the  Eastern  side  has  proposed 
reductions  based  on  equal  percentage  cuts 
that  would  preserve  current  force  ratios  in 
Central  Europe.  They  also  seek  the  inclusion 
of  air  and  nuclear  forces. 

For  its  part,  the  West  proceeds  from  the 
perception  that  the  objective  of  a  more 
stable  balance  requires  taking  into  account 
the  existing  disparities  in  Central  Europe. 
The  East  has  more  ground  force  manpower 
and  tanks  in  the  area  than  does  NATO. 
Moreover,  Soviet  forces  withdrawn  from 
Central  Europe  would  have  to  travel  only  a 
few  hundred  kilometers  to  return  to  the 
front,  while  U.S.  forces  would  have  to  cross 
the  Atlantic.  We  believe  that  by  working  to 
achieve  a  stable  relationship  in  ground 
forces,  we  will  be  taking  the  most  direct  path 
open  to  us  for  lessening  the  risks  of  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  and  thereby  reducing  the 
risk  of  escalation. 

Accordingly,  the  West  has  proposed  that 
the  final  goal  of  ground  force  reductions  by 
both  sides  be  a  common  ceiling  for  overall 
ground  force  manpower.   At  present  NATO 


has  777,000  men  in  its  ground  forces  in  the 
area;  the  Warsaw  Pact  has  925,000  men.  The 
disparity  of  nearly  150,000  men  between 
these  figures  is  a  substantial  one,  and  we  be- 
lieve the  main  objective  of  the  negotiations 
should  be  to  eliminate  it. 

The  negotiation  of  these  reductions,  we  be- 
lieve, should  be  taken  in  two  steps,  beginning 
with  reductions  in  U.S.  and  Soviet  ground 
forces,  followed  by  a  second  phase  for  com- 
pletion of  movement  toward  the  common 
ceiling. 

If  MBFR  agreements  can  be  reached,  and 
we  are  sanguine  that  they  can,  they  would 
advance  the  cause  of  detente  in  a  practical 
and  tangible  way  and  might  lead  to  other 
arms  control  measures. 

There  is  obviously  very  little  chance  of 
achieving  our  goals  in  MBFR  if  the  United 
States  reduces  its  forces  unilaterally.  To  risk 
these  negotiations,  now  in  midstream,  would 
be  a  high  price  indeed  to  pay  for  the  modest 
balance  of  payments  savings  that  would  ac- 
crue from  the  immediate  return  of  some  U.S. 
forces  from  Europe. 

In  another  context,  the  signature  in  June 
1972  of  the  four-power  agreement  on  Berlin 
opened  the  way  to  convening  the  Conference 
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe.  The 
second  phase  of  this  conference  is  now  tak- 
ing place  at  Geneva.  The  35  nations  partici- 
pating look  forward  to  its  conclusion  at  a 
high-level  meeting  this  year.  It  will  likely 
result  in  general  statements  on  basic  prin- 
ciples of  interstate  relations;  East- West  coop- 
eration in  economic  and  other  fields;  and  in- 
ci'eased  human  contacts  and  cultural  ex- 
changes. We  have  not  entered  these  talks 
with  false  expectations.  For  the  conference 
will  not  yield  a  surrogate  World  War  II  peace 
treaty.  It  will  not  reunite  Europe,  or  elimi- 
nate the  possibilities  of  future  friction.  But 
it  can  be  a  step  in  the  right  direction. 

We  recognize  that  the  two  great  nuclear 
powers  have  a  special  responsibility  to  the 
international  community.  In  June  1973  we 
signed  with  the  Soviet  Union  an  agreement 
on  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war.  We  are 
also  carrying  forward  discussions  on  the 
limitation  of  strategic  armaments.   The  out- 


March  11,   1974 


245 


come  of  those  talks  will  be  a  further  impor- 
tant gauge  of  the  extent  to  which  we  can 
reduce  the  risks  of  confrontation. 

Maintaining  U.S.  Force  Levels  in  Europe 

But  none  of  the  agreements  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  whether  already  signed  or  in  pros- 
pect, can  replace  the  security  we  derive  from 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  and  the  collective 
defense  arrangements  associated  with  it. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  embarked  upon  an  am- 
bitious program  of  missile  testing  and  devel- 
opment that  has  already  largely  eliminated 
the  margin  of  superiority  we  once  enjoyed  in 
strategic  armaments.  Soviet  and  Warsaw 
Pact  conventional  forces  in  the  European 
central  region  are  being  provided  with  the 
most  modern  equipment.  And  the  Soviet 
Navy,  once  essentially  a  coastal  defense 
force,  steadily  strengthens  its  presence  on 
the  open  seas.  There  is  no  rational  alterna- 
tive, in  a  period  of  rough  nuclear  parity,  to  a 
credible  conventional  defense  posture. 

Some  would  admit  this  proposition  but  ask 
why  the  European  allies  should  not  replace 
the  U.S.  forces  which,  nearly  30  years  after 
World  War  II,  they  believe  we  should  begin 
to  withdraw.  The  answer,  Mr.  Chairman,  is 
simply  that  Western  Europe  is  not  a  single 
entity  but  a  number  of  separate  states,  all 
living  under  the  shadow  of  enormous  Soviet 
power  which  none  of  them  can  hope  to 
match.  Many  Western  European  govern- 
ments calculate  that  their  own  military  estab- 
lishments would  have  little  relevance  to  their 
security  unless  linked  to  an  American  com- 
mitment within  a  collective  framework.  They 
read  the  level  of  U.S.  forces  in  Europe  as  the 
barometer  of  our  commitment.  It  is  thus 
quite  unrealistic  to  expect  that  the  Europe- 
ans would  increase  their  forces  to  compen- 
sate for  American  withdrawals. 

But  if  we  carry  out  the  President's  policy 
of  maintaining  and  improving  our  own 
forces  in  Europe,  the  allies  will  follow  our 
lead  and  we  can  continue  the  gradual  process, 
already  underway,  of  sharing  more  fairly 
the  burden  of  the  common  defense. 

Your   1972   report,    Mr.   Chairman,    con- 


cluded that  "the  European  partners  could  do 
more  and  should  do  more"  for  the  collective 
defense.  We  agreed  with  that  conclusion, 
and  we  have  strongly  urged  our  allies  to 
shoulder  more  of  the  burden.  Every  stand- 
ard of  measurement  of  relative  effort  shows 
an  improved  European  performance:  in  the 
proportion  Europe  contributes  to  NATO's 
total  defense  spending,  in  the  percent  of 
GNP  devoted  to  defense,  and  in  the  number 
of  men  under  arms. 

For  example,  in  1970  the  European  allies 
spent  slightly  over  $24  billion  for  defense, 
compared  to  $76  billion  by  the  United  States. 
In  1973,  European  defense  budgets  rose  to 
$39  billion,  while  our  own  stayed  nearly  con- 
stant at  $78  billion.  American  outlays  for 
defense,  as  a  proportion  of  GNP,  went  from 
8.4  percent  in  1970  to  less  than  7  percent  in 
1973,  while  those  of  our  allies  increased  dur- 
ing that  period  from  4  percent  to  4.2  percent. 

We  have  ended  conscription  in  the  United 
States.  Most  allies  still  impose  it.  The  total 
number  of  Americans  in  military  service 
continues  to  decline  each  year ;  by  the  end  of 
fiscal  1974,  it  will  be  less  than  2.2  million. 
However,  now  as  in  1972,  the  Europeans 
have  over  3.3  million  men  under  arms. 

The  European  Defense  Improvement  Pro- 
gram (EDIP) ,  described  in  your  1972  report, 
has  brought  significant  improvements  in 
NATO's  forces  in  those  critical  areas  identi- 
fied by  the  study  of  the  alliance  defense 
problems  for  the  seventies.  For  example,  the 
EDIP  program  will  pay  for  the  construction 
of  some  1,600  aircraft  shelters  at  73  NATO 
airfields.  Over  700  of  these  are  already  in 
use — many  by  American  aircraft — and  the 
remainder  will  be  completed  by  the  end  of 
1975.  The  EDIP  program  has  continued 
every  year  with  a  new  force  improvement 
package.  The  $2.9  billion  program  in  1973 
represented  an  increase  of  between  3  and  4 
percent,  in  real  terms,  in  the  defense  budgets 
of  the  10  Eurogroup  members.  The  Euro- 
group  has  recently  announced  a  $2  billion  in- 
crease in  their  budgets  for  1974. 

Another  aspect  of  burden  sharing  that  has 
been  of  concern  to  the  subcommittee  and  to 
the  Congress  as  a  whole  has  been  the  U.S. 


246 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


balance  of  payments  deficit  on  military  ac- 
count. In  his  foreign  policy  report  to  the 
Congress  on  May  3,  1973,  the  President 
called  upon  the  alliance  to  examine  this  prob- 
lem. The  allies  responded  by  setting  up  a 
Burdensharing  Study  Group  in  August  1973, 
or  well  before  the  passage  of  the  Jackson- 
Nunn  amendment,  to  consider  ways  of  solv- 
ing the  problem.  At  the  December  1973 
NATO  ministerial  meeting  the  Defense  Min- 
isters examined  the  report  of  the  study  group 
and  declared  in  their  communique  the  inten- 
tion of  their  countries  to  participate  in  multi- 
lateral or  bilateral  arrangements  to  find  a 
common  solution  to  their  problem. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  now  in  the  final 
stages  of  our  negotiations  with  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  for  bilateral  offset  ar- 
rangements to  cover  balance  of  payments 
costs  of  stationing  our  forces  in  Germany. 
We  hope  to  be  able  to  announce  a  successful 
conclusion  to  these  negotiations  in  the  near 
future. 

However,  Mr.  Chairman,  as  you  know,  our 
overall  balance  of  payments  position  has  im- 
proved dramatically  from  a  $9  billion  deficit 
in  1972  to  a  surplus  in  1973.  At  the  same 
time,  higher  oil  prices  will  bring  massive  bal- 
ance of  payments  problems  for  most  of  the 
European  allies.  This  sharp  reversal  of  rela- 
tive positions  is  something  that  I  am  sure  the 
subcommittee  will  wish  to  weigh  very  care- 
fully. 

Let  me  conclude,  Mr.  Chairman.  The  case 
for  keeping  our  troops  in  Europe  is  stronger 
now  than  it  was  when  the  subcommittee  ad- 
dressed the  question  in  1972.  Unilateral 
American  withdrawals  would  be  more  dam- 
aging to  European  will  and  self-confi- 
dence in  1974  than  in  1972.  We  need  to 
strengthen  Atlantic  ties,  as  the  President  has 
proposed,  not  to  weaken  them.  Negotiations 
for  mutual  force  reductions  with  the  East  are 
now  well  underway.  The  European  allies  are 
improving  their  forces.  Their  contribution  to 
the  common  defense  is  growing,  relative  to 
our  own.  The  national  interest,  now  as 
before,  is  best  served  by  keeping  our  forces 
in  Europe  at  present  levels  until  mutual  re- 
ductions can  be  negotiated. 


In  summary,  those  who  have  argued  over 
the  past  decade  for  unilateral  reductions  by 
the  United  States  have  not,  in  our  view,  ad- 
duced arguments  for  abandoning  our  na- 
tional posture  toward  Europe  that  outweigh 
the  overriding  national  interests  that  we 
would  sacrifice.  The  net  judgment  of  succes- 
sive administrations  has  been,  and  remains, 
that  the  costs  in  terms  of  money  and  man- 
power are  small  in  comparison  with  the  risks 
that  would  ensue  from  withdrawal  and  its 
destabilizing  consequences. 


President  Reports  to  Congress 
on   NATO  Burden  Sharing 

Message  to  the  Congress  ^ 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

In  accordance  with  Section  812(d)  of  the 
Department  of  Defense  Appropriation  Au- 
thorization Act,  1974  (Public  Law  93-155), 
I  am  pleased  to  submit  the  following  report 
to  the  Congress  on  the  progress  made  in 
implementing  the  provisions  of  Section  812 
of  the  Act  cited  above. 

Several  months  prior  to  the  enactment  of 
Section  812,  this  Administration  took  the 
initiative  to  seek  Allied  cooperation  in  devel- 
oping a  solution  to  the  financial  problems 
arising  from  the  stationing  of  U.S.  forces  in 
NATO  Europe.  We  initiated  discussions 
with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in 
May  1973  with  a  view  toward  negotiating 
another  bilateral  offset  agreement  covering 
fiscal  years  1974  and  1975.  Then  at  the  June 
1973  meeting  of  NATO  Defense  Ministers, 
Defense  Secretary  Schlesinger  proposed  to 
the  Allies  that  they  develop  a  program  to  re- 
lieve the  U.S.  of  balance  of  payments  burden 
we  bear  as  a  result  of  stationing  forces  in 
NATO  Europe.  He  also  asked  that  the  U.S. 
be  relieved  of  the  additional  budgetary  costs 
involved  in  stationing  forces  in  NATO  Eu- 
rope rather  than  in  the  U.S.   A  NATO  study 


^Transmitted  on  Feb.  20   (White  House  press  re- 
lease). 


March   11,    1974 


247 


group  was  established  to  examine  the  prob- 
lem. This  group  submitted  a  report  on  Oc- 
tober 20  to  the  North  Atlantic  Council,  giv- 
ing an  analysis  of  the  financial  problems 
arising  from  the  stationing  of  U.S.  forces  in 
the  territory  of  other  NATO  countries  and 
developed  options  for  Allied  action  to  deal 
with  these  problems. 

On  November  29,  1973,  following  the  en- 
actment of  the  Department  of  Defense  Ap- 
propriation Authorization  Act,  1974,  Am- 
bassador Rumsfeld,  the  U.S.  Permanent  Rep- 
resentative to  the  North  Atlantic  Council, 
tabled  an  illustrative  program  of  military 
procurement  and  budgetary  support  which 
would  satisfy  the  requirements  of  Section  812 
of  the  Act  and  thereby  avoid  unilateral  U.S. 
force  reductions  in  NATO  Europe.  Subse- 
quently, during  the  December  1973  meeting 
of  NATO  defense  ministers,  our  Allies  de- 
clared their  intention  "to  participate  in  mul- 
tilateral or  bilateral  arrangements  towards 
providing  a  common  solution  to  the  United 
States  problem",  agreed  "to  examine  how  the 
share  of  the  United  States  in  the  civil  and 
military  budgets  of  NATO  and  in  the  infra- 
structure program  might  be  substantially 
reduced",  and  noted  that  "consideration  was 
being  given  to  widening  the  eligibility  of 
projects  for  funding  under  the  common  in- 
frastructure program."  We  are  continuing 
to  point  out  in  the  North  Atlantic  Council 
and  elsewhere  the  importance  we  attach  to 
meeting  the  requirements  of  Section  812  if 
we  are  to  avoid  unilateral  U.S.  force  reduc- 
tions. We  continue  to  stress,  therefore,  the 
urgent  need  for  Allied  action  to  fulfill  the 
intentions  declared  at  the  December  1973 
meeting  of  NATO  Defense  Ministers,  re- 
gardless of  the  evolving  balance  of  payments 
position  of  the  U.S.  and  its  Allies. 

Pursuant  to  Section  812(a)  of  the  Act 
cited  above,  a  working  group  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce, the  Comptroller  General  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  has  de- 
veloped concepts  for  use  in  calculating  the 
pertinent  deficit  once  the  receipt  and  expendi- 
ture information  becomes  available  for  all  of 
fiscal  year  1974.   An  inter-agency  committee 


within  the  Executive  Branch  has  prepared 
recommendations  concerning  what  acceptable 
actions  our  Allies  could  take  to  offset  the 
expected  deficit.  Applying  the  concepts  de- 
veloped by  the  working  group  chaired  by  the 
Department  of  Commerce,  the  Department  of 
Defense  estimates  that  U.S.  expenditures  en- 
tering the  balance  of  payments  as  a  result  of 
the  deployment  of  forces  in  NATO  Europe 
in  fulfillment  of  treaty  commitments  and 
obligations  of  the  United  States  in  fiscal  year 
1974  will  be  approximately  $2.1  billion.  In 
response  to  a  U.S.  request,  a  study  is  now 
underway  in  NATO  to  collect  more  complete 
data  than  in  the  past  on  Allied  military  pro- 
curement from  the  U.S.  in  fiscal  year  1974. 
A  high  level  of  military  procurement  will  be 
essential  if  the  requirements  of  Section  812 
are  to  be  met. 

Bilateral  ofl^set  negotiations  with  the  FRG 
constitute  the  major  element  in  our  effort  to 
obtain  Allied  payments  to  offset  these  ex- 
penditures. The  current  discussions  are  based 
on  a  German  offer  which  represents  an  in- 
crease over  the  amount  of  military  procure- 
ment and  budgetary  support  included  in  the 
FY  1972-73  agreement.  However,  major  cost 
increases  of  deploying  our  forces  in  Ger- 
many, international  economic  and  financial 
developments,  and  the  multilateral  burden- 
sharing  discussions  have  combined  to  make 
the  negotiations  unusually  complex  and  time 
consuming.  Once  a  satisfactory  bilateral 
offset  agreement  has  been  concluded,  we  will 
look  to  our  other  Allies  for  the  remaining 
amount  needed  to  offset  our  estimated  ex- 
penditures of  approximately  $2.1  billion. 
Although  the  energy  crisis  and  the  changing 
overall  balance  of  payments  positions  of  the 
U.S.  and  the  European  NATO  countries  have 
made  it  more  difficult  for  the  other  Allies  to 
respond  promptly  to  our  request  for  burden- 
sharing  assistance,  we  are  continuing  to 
stress  to  them  the  urgent  need  to  develop 
a  specific  program  to  ensure  that  our  military 
expenditures  are  fully  offset. 

Action  to  reduce  the  U.S.  balance  of  pay- 
ments costs  and  budgetary  burdens  associ- 
ated with  the  stationing  of  U.S.  forces  in 
NATO  Europe,  while  important,  are  not  the 


248 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


only  measure  of  equity  in  sharing  the  com- 
mon defense  burden.  Our  European  Allies 
are  continuing  to  improve  their  forces  for 
NATO.  These  improvements,  reflected  in  in- 
creasing European  defense  budgets,  are  an 
important  aspect  in  sharing  the  defense 
burden.  We  are  encouraging  our  Allies  to 
continue  these  improvements  and,  when  pos- 
sible, to  direct  their  increased  spending  into 
areas  which  serve  also  to  reduce  the  U.S. 
share  of  the  common  burden. 

Richard  Nixon. 

The  White  House,  February  20, 197Jt. 


1975-76  Appropriation   Authorization 
Requested  for  Arms  Control  Agency 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  dated  Feb- 
ruary 7  from  President  Nixon  to  Carl  Albert, 
Speaker  of  the  House.  An  identical  letter 
was  sent  to  Gerald  R.  Ford,  President  of  the 
Senate. 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated  February  11 

February  7,  1974. 

Dear  Mr.  Speaker:  I  am  transmitting 
herewith  proposed  legislation  to  extend  the 
appropriation  authorization  for  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency,  along 
with  a  letter  from  the  Director  of  that 
Agency  in  support  of  this  legislation. 

Major  progress  has  been  made  toward  this 
Administration's  high  priority  foreign  policy 
and  national  security  objective  of  establish- 
ing effective  arms  control  arrangements. 
Most  importantly,  the  Strategic  Arms  Limi- 
tation Talks  with  the  Soviet  Union  have  re- 


sulted in  definitive  treaty  limitations  on  stra- 
tegic defensive  systems  and  an  agreement 
for  interim  limitations  on  strategic  offensive 
systems.  The  continuing  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks,  accelerated  by  agreements 
reached  at  the  June,  1973,  Summit  Confer- 
ence, now  are  focused  on  achieving  definitive 
treaty  limitations  on  strategic  offensive  sys- 
tems. Also  of  major  importance  was  the  ini- 
tiation last  year  of  negotiations  to  reduce  the 
military  confrontation  in  Central  Europe. 

The  objective  of  this  Administration  to 
replace  the  dangers  of  a  continuing  un- 
checked arms  race  with  the  greater  security 
afforded  by  the  establishment  of  reliable  con- 
trols over  armaments  has  been  well  served 
by  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency.  This  has  been  demonstrated  espe- 
cially by  the  Agency's  key  role  in  the  Stra- 
tegic Arms  Limitation  Talks  and  the  talks  on 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions  in  Cen- 
tral Europe.  The  work  of  the  Agency  in  these 
and  other  forums  is  vital  to  future  progress 
in  the  difficult  area  of  arms  control  and  dis- 
armament. 

The  draft  legislation  I  am  transmitting 
today  would  authorize  appropriations  for  the 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  for 
fiscal  years  1975  and  1976.  It  also  amends 
the  Agency's  authority  to  procure  the  serv- 
ices of  experts  and  consultants  so  as  to  make 
this  authority  comparable  to  that  prevailing 
elsewhere  in  the  Executive  Branch.  This 
change  is  necessary  for  the  Agency  to  con- 
tinue to  attract  highly  qualified  consultants 
to  assist  it  in  its  tasks. 

I  urge  the  Congress  to  give  this  bill  prompt 
and  favorable  consideration. 
Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon. 


March   11,    1974 


249 


The  World  Economic  Environment 


Statement  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  George  P.  Shultz  ^ 


Since  your  review  of  the  economy  last  sum- 
mer, we  have  witnessed  an  abrupt  change  in 
world  economic  circumstances.  The  cutback 
in  oil  production  and  the  precipitous  increase 
in  oil  prices  have  dramatically  affected  pros- 
pects for  world  production,  employment, 
price  stability,  and  balance  of  payments  equi- 
librium. The  lives  of  people  in  all  parts  of 
the  world  are  directly  affected,  with  poten- 
tially devastating  effects  on  those  in  the  poor- 
est countries  who  can  afford  it  least. 

Chairman  [Herbert]  Stein  and  his  col- 
leagues on  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers 
have  discussed  with  you  the  prospects  for  our 
domestic  economy  in  light  of  these  develop- 
ments. My  statement  today  will  concentrate 
on  the  world  economic  environment  and  its 
implications  for  our  policies  in  the  period 
ahead. 

Boom,   Shortages,  and   Inflation 

The  oil  crisis  developed  late  in  1973.  It 
came  on  top  of  a  situation  already  character- 
ized by  worldwide  shortages  of  foodstuffs 
and  industrial  raw  materials  and  the  most 
serious  general  inflation  since  the  World 
War  II  period. 

To  a  considerable  extent,  these  conditions 
were  an  outgrowth  of  world  boom.  The  ma- 
jor industrial  countries  for  the  first  time 
since    the    Korean    war    found    themselves 


^  Made  before  the  Joint  Economic  Committee  of  the 
Congress  on  Feb.  8  (Department  of  the  Treasury 
press  release).  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402. 


facing  similar  cyclical  situations,  with  strong 
demand  pressures,  strains  on  capacity,  and 
rapid  inflation.  Price  increases,  summarized 
in  the  first  table  attached  to  this  statement, 
were  of  depressing  magnitudes.  For  the 
major  industrial  countries  as  a  group,  con- 
sumer prices  increased  about  91/2  percent. 
U.S.  consumer  price  increases,  at  8.8  percent, 
were  only  slightly  less  than  average.  The 
pressure  on  commodity  prices  was  reflected 
in  the  much  sharper  wholesale  price  increases 
in  almost  all  countries,  with  the  increase  in 
the  United  States  amounting  to  15.5  percent. 

As  this  contrast  suggests,  v/hat  the  world 
experienced  last  year  was  essentially  a  com- 
modity price  inflation.  World  commodity 
prices  rose  two  or  three  times  as  fast  as 
prices  of  finished  goods  and  services,  and  the 
pressure  on  commodities  accounted  fully  for 
the  acceleration  in  rates  of  inflation.  Food 
prices  alone  may  have  been  responsible  for 
half  the  increase  in  consumer  prices  in  the 
major  industrialized  countries,  and  toward 
the  end  of  the  year  particularly,  energy 
prices  also  contributed  heavily. 

Supply  deficiencies  at  a  time  of  worldwide 
boom  were  the  principal  factors  behind  the 
escalation  of  commodity  prices.  The  combina- 
tion of  natural  forces  which  led  to  inadequate 
harvests  over  the  past  two  years — there  was 
in  fact  a  fall  in  worldwide  agricultural  pro- 
duction per  capita  in  1972 — produced  a 
scramble  for  food  supplies  in  a  world  accus- 
tomed to  worrying  about  surpluses.  Shortages 
of  other  raw  materials,  such  as  nonferrous 
mstals  and  timber,  also  developed. 

Domestic  markets  in  some  countries,  where 
currencies  appreciated  during  the  year,  were 


250 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


partially  shielded  from  the  strong  interna- 
tional price  pressures.  Others,  whose  curren- 
cies depreciated,  such  as  the  United  States 
during  the  first  half  of  the  year,  were  not 
only  fully  exposed  to  the  world  trend  but  had 
to  absorb  an  additional  source  of  inflationary 
pressure.  But  these  exchange  rate  changes — 
which  made  an  essential  contribution  to 
restoration  of  international  payments  balance 
— should  not  obscure  the  main  point  that  no 
country  could  escape  a  pervasive  worldwide 
phenomenon. 

The  cuts  in  oil  production  imposed  in  the 
Middle  East  for  essentially  noneconomic 
reasons  then  created  supply  difficulties  in 
another  critical  area,  and  the  resulting  in- 
creases in  oil  prices  dramatically  altered 
world  economic  prospects.  From  a  $2-per- 
barrel  range  in  September,  we  saw  open  mar- 
ket prices  of  crude  rise  to  in  excess  of  $15 
per  barrel  within  a  brief  period. 

The  low  point  of  oil  production  seems  to 
have  been  reached  in  November ;  by  January, 
production  was  about  at  the  same  levels  as 
consumption,  which  has  of  course  been  re- 
duced. With  easing  of  supplies  and  the  con- 
tinuing efforts  to  reduce  consumption  around 
the  world,  arm's  length  market  prices  have 
declined.  By  the  end  of  January  it  appeared 
that  spot  market  prices  had  fallen  to  the 
$10-to-$ll-per-barrel  range.  There  can  be  no 
certainty  how  greatly  consumers — and  their 
governments — will  be  inclined  to  reduce  their 
consumption  in  the  light  of  the  higher  prices. 
But  it  seems  likely  that  consumption  this 
year  at  anything  even  approaching  present 
prices  would  be  significantly  less  than  what 
the  free  world  could  produce  through  re- 
sponsible and  efficient  use  of  existing  and 
planned  facilities.  It  seems  likely  therefore 
that  market  forces  will  push  in  the  direction 
of  further  reductions  in  the  open  market 
price  of  oil  in  the  international  market. 

Moreover,  looked  at  as  an  economic  phe- 
nomenon, I  am  convinced  the  current  levels 
of  international  oil  prices  are  neither  sus- 
tainable nor  tolerable  over  a  longer  period. 
As  we  look  ahead,  additional  sources  of  ener- 
gy can  and  will  be  developed  at  lower  cost. 
Yet  compared  to  earlier  years,  the  future 
cost  of  energy  will  be  high.  This  implies  a 


Price  Increases  in  Major  Industrial  Countries, 
1969-73 

(Average  annual  rate  of  increase) 


Consumer 

Wholesale 

prices ' 

prices 

1  2 

1969-72 

1973 

1969-72 

1973 

United  States  .     . 

4.6 

8.8 

3.9 

15.5 

Canada    .... 

4.0 

9.1 

4.6 

18.1 

Japan      .... 

6.0 

15.0 

3.0 

13.5 

United    Kingdom 

7.2 

9.9 

7.1 

10.0 

France     .... 

6.1 

8.7 

6.3 

13.5 

Germany     .     .     . 

4.9 

7.0 

3.9 

8.3 

Italy 

5.4 

11.3 

6.2 

28.0 

Total  OECD    .     . 

5.0 

9.6 

4.3 

14.2 

'  Percentages  for  1973  are  calculated  for  the  latest 
12-month  period  available. 

^  Since  aggregate  wholesale  price  indices  are  not 
generally  available,  indices  are  those  of  the  whole- 
sale prices  of  manufactured  goods  or  closest  avail- 
able alternative. 

Source:  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD),  Department  of  Labor. 


fundamental  change  in  the  world  economy — 
a  reevaluation  of  one  of  the  basic  tenets  of 
a  world  industrial  society  built  on  the  as- 
sumption of  relatively  cheap  and  plentiful 
oil. 

Fortunately,  in  areas  other  than  oil  a  few 
encouraging  signs  are  visible  in  the  battle 
against  inflation.  Food  production  is  expand- 
ing rapidly,  and  with  normal  weather  a 
record  crop  is  in  prospect  this  year.  The 
prospective  slowdown  of  the  boom  in  the 
industrial  countries  should  temper  pressures 
on  raw  material  and  commodity  prices.  Also, 
for  the  United  States,  the  recent  strengthen- 
ing of  the  dollar  and  consequent  fall  in  the 
cost  of  our  imports  can  help  dampen  infla- 
tionary pressures. 

Internationally,  one  possible  danger  is  that 
attempts  will  be  made  to  maintain  exorbitant 
commodity  prices  through  the  exercise  of 
sheer  monopoly  restraint  on  supplies.  It 
should  be  possible  to  avoid  this  danger  with- 
out confrontation  through  a  constructive 
dialogue  aimed  at  identifying  and  meeting 
the  legitimate  needs  of  consumers  and  pro- 
ducers alike. 

At  home,  it  is  important  that  the  effects  of 
the  rise  in  commodity  prices  are  not  aggra- 


March   11,   1974 


251 


vated  by  irresponsible  pricing  policies  or 
abandonment  of  the  responsible  pattern  of 
wage  settlements  we  have  seen  in  the  past 
year — a  process  that  in  the  end  would  only  be 
self-defeating  by  twisting  the  cost-price 
screw  another  turn.  Finally,  as  we  pass  from 
an  overheated  boom  and  face  the  new  prob- 
lems of  production  and  employment  imposed 
by  energy  shortages,  we  must  not  lose  sight 
of  the  inflationary  dangers  of  lax  budgeting 
or  excessive  money.  We  should  be,  and  we 
are,  prepared  to  adapt  our  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies  flexibly  as  the  need  is  demon- 
strated. But  as  we  appraise  that  need,  let  us 
recognize  that  more  money  is  not  a  substitute 
for  more  oil. 


International   Payments 

The  prospect  that  the  world  was  moving 
toward  a  better  balance  of  payments  equilib- 
rium has  been  vastly  altered  by  the  recent 
oil  price  increases. 

There  have  been  suggestions  that  current 
price  levels  imply  a  $75  billion  jump  world- 
wide in  the  annual  costs  of  imported  oil. 
These  estimates  assume  the  price  rise  comes 
on  top  of  previous  forecasts  of  oil  consump- 
tion. This  same  calculation  would  imply  an 
increase  of  perhaps  as  much  as  $10  billion 
in  the  annual  oil  import  costs  of  the  less  de- 
veloped countries  which  are  not  oil  producers, 
an  amount  exceeding  the  total  official  assist- 
ance they  have  been  receiving. 

These  calculations  are  obviously  purely 
mechanical.  In  fact,  no  one  knows  what 
prices  the  consuming  nations  will  be  paying 
for  oil  imports  this  year.  Higher  oil  prices 
and  conservation  measures  do  lead  to  reduced 
oil  consumption  and  a  lesser  volume  of  im- 
ports. With  higher  revenues,  oil  exporters 
will  expand  their  purchases,  mainly  from  in- 
dustrial countries. 

Even  making  some  allowances  for  these 
factors,  there  have  been  estimates  that  the 
investable  funds  of  oil  producers  could  in- 
crease this  year  by  more  than  $50  billion. 
This  would  imply  a  deterioration  in  the  cur- 
rent account  position  of  the  rest  of  the  world 
of  a  corresponding  magnitude. 

The  implications  of  a  change  of  this  mag- 


nitude, coming  with  such  abruptness,  are 
difficult  to  comprehend.  For  a  number  of  de- 
veloping countries,  the  calculations  must 
plainly  have  an  air  of  frightening  unreality. 
They  simply  do  not  have  the  funds  to  pay,  or 
any  realistic  prospect  of  repaying,  loans  in 
the  large  volume  that  would  be  required.  Nor 
can  industrialized  countries  find  the  conse- 
quences acceptable,  even  though  in  the  aggre- 
gate they  can  anticipate  large  flows  of  invest- 
ment from  the  oil  producers. 

We  therefore  must  act  promptly  to  bring 
the  problem  within  manageable  proportions 
both  by  reducing  its  magnitude  and  by  de- 
veloping cooperative  techniques  for  handling 
it.  In  doing  so,  we  believe  we  can  be  working 
with,  and  not  against,  the  legitimate  aspira- 
tions of  the  oil  exporters  for  fair  compensa- 
tion for  their  resources  and  for  stable  and 
profitable  investment  outlets.  The  conse- 
quences of  failure  are  evident.  We  are  already 
beginning  to  see  tensions  mount  as  countries 
begin  to  react  to  the  prospect  of  swollen  oil 
import  bills.  The  exporting  countries  can 
have  no  real  interest  in  actions  which  severe- 
ly disrupt  the  economies  of  their  customers. 

Obviously,  the  pressures  and  the  means  for 
handling  them  are  not  evenly  distributed 
among  all  nations.  The  United  States  and 
some  other  countries  could,  if  necessary, 
through  their  own  actions  cope  with  the 
problems  which  these  oil  price  increases 
create,  although  the  impact  on  the  United 
States  will  be  a  good  deal  more  serious  than 
many  seem  to  realize.  The  United  States  was 
prospectively  the  world's  single  largest  im- 
porter of  oil,  and  under  any  foreseeable  cir- 
cumstances, our  oil  import  bill  will  soar  in 
the  near  term.  Oil  imports  were  expected  to 
represent  a  bigger  proportion  of  our  total 
imports  than  is  true  of  most  major  European 
countries. 

On  the  other  hand,  our  strength  is  that 
even  in  the  short  term  we  are  in  a  better 
position  than  many  to  consei-ve  on  our  con- 
sumption of  oil  and  to  cut  back  our  oil  im- 
ports. We  are  the  world's  largest  producer  of 
oil,  with  many  good  possibilities  for  increas- 
ing our  output;  and  over  the  longer  term, 
we  are  capable  of  becoming  fully  independent 
of  foreign  oil.  While  I  would  discount  sub- 


252 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


stantially  the  fact  that  in  December  we  had 
the  largest  monthly  trade  surplus  in  our  his- 
tory— over  $940  million — we  fortunately  do 
not  start  from  a  deficit  balance  of  payments 
position. 

The  strong  turnaround  in  the  U.S.  balance 
of  payments  last  year  is  traced  in  an  attached 
table.-  Although  the  final  figures  for  the 
fourth  quarter  are  not  yet  available,  we 
expect  that  they  will  confirm  that  the  marked 
improvement  in  the  trade  balance  was  accom- 
panied by  better  results  in  the  other  accounts. 


An   Integrated  Approach 

No  matter  what  the  precise  impact  on  the 
United  States  and  other  countries  is  indi- 
vidually, the  very  substantial  adjustments 
the  world  now  faces  present  a  sharp  and 
fresh  challenge  to  our  ability  to  work  to- 
gether in  the  common  good.  The  challenge 
needs  to  be  met  on  four  fronts,  each  crucial 
to  the  whole :  by  devising  new  forms  of  co- 
operation to  deal  with  the  energy  situation, 
by  completing  our  negotiations  for  reform 
of  the  international  economic  system  and  to 
liberalize  world  trade,  by  maintaining  the 
momentum  of  development,  and  by  working 
to  restore  the  fabric  of  international  stability 
torn  by  inflation,  payments  imbalances,  and 
now  the  oil  crisis. 

1.  Energy  Cooperation 

We  hope  that  the  international  energy 
meeting  to  be  held  next  week  will  succeed  in 
reaching  a  common  analysis  and  understand- 
ing of  the  energy  problem  and  will  begin  to 
define  the  nature  and  scope  of  new  forms  of 
cooperation  to  deal  with  it.  The  agenda  for 
the  meeting  includes  questions  of  reliable 
supply,  conservation,  development  of  alterna- 
tive energy  sources,  research  and  develop- 
ment, emergency  sharing  of  supplies,  and 
financial  management.  We  are  looking  for- 
ward to  consultation  with  developing  coun- 
tries, and  we  want  to  lay  the  base  for 
constructive  discussions  with  producing  na- 
tions. 

What  we  want  is   not  confrontation  but 


'  Not  printed  here. 


cooperation,  in  the  conviction  that  in  the  end 
producers  and  consumers  both  will  find  a 
large  common  interest  in  reconciling  their 
needs  in  a  manner  which  is  consistent  with 
economic  stability,  open  trade,  and  rapid 
development.  All  nations  need  to  have  confi- 
dence that  goods  they  need  will  not  be  arbi- 
trarily restricted  and  that,  conversely,  mar- 
kets will  not  be  closed  to  them.  All  will  benefit 
from  increased  supplies  of  energy.  All  need 
a  framework  of  financial  stability. 

2.  Monetary  and  Trade  Reform 

Our  efforts  to  reform  the  international 
monetary  system  were  reassessed  in  the  light 
of  uncertainties  related  to  the  oil  situation 
at  a  meeting  of  the  Committee  of  Twenty 
(C-20)  in  Rome  last  month.  The  committee 
decided  it  should  complete  its  work  on  the 
main  features  of  a  reformed  monetary  sys- 
tem as  quickly  as  possible — hopefully  at  its 
next  meeting,  scheduled  for  mid-June.  At  the 
same  time,  we  recognized  that  in  some  areas 
the  desired  approach  could  only  be  imple- 
mented over  time  in  an  evolutionary  way  and 
that  a  number  of  important  operating  char- 
acteristics of  the  system  would  need  to  be 
worked  out  in  detail  later. 

It  was  also  agreed  that,  in  light  of  recent 
developments,  intensive  attention  should  be 
given  to  certain  needs  that  are  both  immedi- 
ate and  "do-able,"  in  order  that  elements  of 
reform  of  particular  relevance  to  present 
conditions  can  be  put  in  place  as  promptly 
as  possible. 

One  critical  requirement  is  to  find  new  pro- 
cedures for  improving  the  effectiveness  of 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and 
continuing  cooperation  among  financial  offi- 
cials. A  long  step  toward  that  objective  was 
taken  by  agreement  that  a  20-member  Coun- 
cil of  Governors  would  be  established  in  the 
IMF  or,  pending  the  formal  and  legal  estab- 
lishment of  the  Council,  a  temporary  commit- 
tee. The  Council  would  meet  regularly,  three 
or  four  times  a  year,  with  broad  and  con- 
tinuing authority  to  manage  and  adapt  the 
monetary  system,  to  oversee  the  continued 
operation  of  the  international  balance  of  pay- 
ments adjustment  process,  and  to  deal  with 
sudden  disturbances  which  might  threaten 


March    11,    1974 


253 


the  monetary  system.  The  Council,  or  the 
temporary  committee,  would  come  into  being 
when  the  C-20  finishes  its  work  and  would 
be  charged  with  continuing  the  evolutionary 
process  of  reform  within  the  context  that  the 
C-20  has  established. 

Other  aspects  of  reform  will  also  be  in- 
cluded in  the  substantive  agreement  that  we 
expect  the  C-20  will  reach  in  June.  One  need 
is  to  establish  techniques  for  valuing  the 
SDR  [special  drawing  right]  in  situations — 
like  the  present — in  which  most  of  the  major 
currencies  are  floating,  and  important  ele- 
ments of  an  agreement  on  that  point  were 
developed  in  Rome.  More  broadly,  the  long 
discussion  of  the  need  to  develop  codes  of 
conduct  to  guide  the  operation  of  the  adjust- 
ment process  should  be  brought  to  a  conclu- 
sion. I  am  encouraged  that  discussion  on 
appropriate  guidelines  for  floating  will  be- 
come more  intensive  in  coming  months,  and 
some  convergence  of  approach  seems  to  be 
developing. 

Developments  of  the  past  year  lead  us  also 
to  consider  new  priorities  in  the  trade  ne- 
gotiations. More  emphasis  is  needed  with 
respect  to  restrictions  on  the  supply  of  inter- 
nationally traded  commodities,  alongside  the 
traditional  emphasis  on  access  to  markets. 
The  barter  deals  some  countries  are  negotiat- 
ing with  oil  producers  raise  anew  the  old 
questions  about  the  role  of  bilateral  trading 
arrangements  in  a  multilateral  order  and 
how  they  may  be  placed  within  a  framework 
of  generally  agreed  rules.  I  think  it  essential 
that  the  debate  on  these  issues — and  debate 
it  will  be,  for  there  is  certainly  no  consensus 
— should  be  initiated  promptly. 

The  tensions  inherent  in  the  major  trade 
and  balance  of  payments  adjustments  that 
countries  will  experience  shortly — even  with 
more  reasonable  oil  prices — underscore  the 
importance  of  maintaining  the  impetus  to- 
ward trade  liberalization.  The  difficult  prob- 
lems ahead  can  be  solved  more  easily  within 
a  context  of  expanding  world  trade,  encour- 
aged by  renewed  progress  toward  trade 
liberalization. 

I  hope  the  Congress  will  move  expeditious- 
ly to  complete  action  on  the  trade  legislation 
before  it.  Few  things  would  be  more  damag- 


ing to  the  prospects  for  cooperative  solutions 
to  our  common  problems  than  the  appearance 
that  the  United  States  was  faltering  in  its 
commitment  to  a  liberal  and  reformed  inter- 
national trading  order. 

3.  Economic  Development 

The  third  task  I  cited  earlier  was  to  main- 
tain the  momentum  of  economic  development. 
I  have  already  emphasized  the  new  burden 
on  developing  countries  from  the  higher  oil 
prices.  I  see  no  way  that  aspect  of  the  prob- 
lem can  be  reasonably  handled  unless  those 
oil  producers  with  excess  funds  provide  grant 
and  other  concessional  assistance  to  offset  the 
soaring  cost  of  oil  imports  to  the  LDC's  [less 
developed  countries].  But  such  assistance 
devised  to  meet  new  needs  in  no  way  can 
substitute  for  the  assistance  programs  now 
in  place  financed  by  the  industrialized  world. 
Indeed,  the  need  for  maintaining,  and  even 
expanding  in  an  orderly  way,  those  programs 
is  at  least  as  urgent  as  before.  The  new 
problem  of  the  oil  situation  simply  cannot  be 
an  excuse  for  further  compounding  the  ex- 
treme difficulties  of  the  poorest  people  in  the 
world,  further  widening  the  gap  between  the 
"haves"  and  the  "have-nots." 

The  United  States  is  being  asked — and 
properly  so — to  bear  a  fair  share  of  that  cost. 
We  cannot,  in  my  judgment,  fail  to  answer 
that  call  without  severely  damaging  the  en- 
tire fabric  of  the  cooperative  world  order 
that  we  promote.  In  that  context,  the  action 
by  the  House  of  Representatives  last  month 
in  voting  down  the  bill  for  replenishment  of 
the  resources  of  the  International  Develop- 
ment Association  is  particularly  disturbing. 
We  want  to  work  closely  with  the  Congress 
in  the  period  ahead  with  the  objective  of 
carrying  out  our  share  of  this  joint  effort — 
a  share,  I  should  point  out,  that  has  been 
reduced  at  our  request  to  one-third  from  the 
40  percent  level  maintained  earlier. 

4.  Maintaining  International  Economic  Sta- 
bility 

As  we  move  ahead  in  those  areas,  we  need 
to  deal  on  a  continuing  basis  with  the  threats 
to  international  economic  stability  inherent 
in   the   present   situation.    Temptations   for 


254 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


individual  countries  to  seek  their  economic 
salvation  at  the  expense  of  their  trading 
partners  are  present.  Fortunately,  it  is  equal- 
ly apparent  that  such  actions  would  not  only 
be  self-defeating  in  their  immediate  objective 
but  could  leave  us  all  worse  off,  caught  in  a 
maze  of  controls,  restrictions,  and  disloca- 
tions that  impair  growth  and  stability.  The 
need  is  to  make  sure  that  that  intellectual 
understanding  of  the  common  danger  is, 
under  the  pressure  of  swiftly  moving  events, 
made  effective  in  our  national  decisionmak- 
ing. 

In  approaching  this  problem  against  the 
background  of  large  imbalances  in  interna- 
tional payments,  sudden  changes  in  payments 
flows,  and  rapid  inflation,  I  believe  there  is 
a  general  consensus  that,  for  the  time  being, 
a  general  system  of  par  values  and  fixed 
exchange  rates  would  not  be  workable  or  de- 
sirable. While  the  sizable  changes  in  exchange 
rates  in  the  past  year  have  posed  some  prob- 
lems, floating  rates  have  probably  worked 
better  than  any  other  system  that  could  have 
been  devised  during  the  past  year.  We  have 
seen  trade  and  investment  continue  to  pros- 
per, and  businessmen  and  bankers  have  been 
able  to  accommodate  to  the  situation.  At  the 
same  time,  the  new  uncertainties  created  by 
the  rise  in  oil  prices  emphasize  again  the 
need  for  exchange  rate  policies  which  are 
internationally  responsible,  whether  par  val- 
ues or  floating  rates  are  used,  if  the  destruc- 
tiveness  of  competitive  devaluation  is  to  be 
avoided. 

A  floating  regime,  like  a  par  value  system, 
requires  agreed  principles  of  good  conduct  if 
conflicts  are  to  be  avoided.  We  believe  cri- 
teria relevant  in  a  par  value  system  are  also 
relevant  to  floating.  For  instance,  under 
either  regime,  the  aim  should  be  to  avoid 
prolonged  imbalances,  and  significant  move- 
ments in  reserves  can  help  tell  us  when  gov- 
ernments unduly  resist  market  forces  and 
suggest  when  policies  need  to  be  adapted.  In 
either  regime,  we  should  not  use  widespread 
controls  on  trade  or  capital  to  maintain  an 
undervalued  exchange  rate.  As  I  suggested 
earlier,  in  coming  months  I  hope  we  can 
reach  agreement  on  broad  guidelines  to  help 
assure  cooperative  behavior  in  this  area. 


At  the  end  of  January,  the  United  States 
was  able  to  announce  the  effective  elimination 
of  our  capital  control  programs.  This  move 
was  of  course  made  possible  by  the  improve- 
ment in  our  balance  of  payments  position 
and  the  stronger  performance  of  the  dollar. 
We  also  felt  that,  at  a  time  when  many  coun- 
tries are  concerned  about  how  they  might 
finance  deficits  in  their  current  balance  of 
payments,  ending  of  our  controls  could  pro- 
vide an  important  element  of  reassurance.  I 
am  gratified  that  the  move  has  been  widely 
accepted  as  constructive,  and  a  number  of 
other  countries  have  also  reduced  controls. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  problems  in  the  year 
ahead  pose  the  greatest  challenge  to  the  spirit 
of  international  cooperation  since  we  viewed 
the  ruins  of  World  War  II.  Our  success  in 
the  past  quarter  century  in  finding  coopera- 
tive solutions  gives  us  grounds  for  hope  that 
we  can  do  so  again.  If  we  are  to  expect  of 
our  partners  the  responsible  conduct  now  re- 
quired, we  must  not  fail  in  our  own  responsi- 
bilities. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to   Foreign   Policy 


93d   Congress,    1st  Session 

Convention  on  the  International  Regulations  for  Pre- 
venting Collisions  at  Sea,  1972.  Message  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  transmitting  the 
convention  done  at  London,  October  20,  1972.  S. 
Ex.  W.  November  9,  1973.   29  pp. 

Protocol  Amending  the  1928  Convention  on  Interna- 
tional Expositions.  Report  to  accompany  Ex.  N, 
93-1.   S.  Ex.  Rept.  93-24.   November  9,  1973.   11  pp. 

Privileges  and  Immunities  for:  The  Organization  of 
African  Unity.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  8219. 
S.  Rept.  93-492.  November  9,  1973.  2  pp. 

U.S.  Information  Agency  Appropriations  Authoriza- 
tion Act  of  1973.  Report  to  accompany  S.  2681.  S. 
Rept.  93-493.  November  9,  1973.  3  pp. 

Report  on  Examination  of  Financial  Statements  of 
the  Export-Import  Bank  of  the  United  States  for 
Fiscal  Year  1973.  Communication  from  the  Comp- 
troller General  of  the  United  States  transmitting 
the  report.  H.  Doc.  93-190.  November  13,  1973. 
7  pp. 

United  Nations  Environment  Program.  Conference 
report  to  accompany  H.R.  6768.  H.  Rept.  93-642. 
November  15,  1973.  2  pp. 

International  Travel  Act  of  1961  Authorization.  Re- 
port  to   accompany   H.R.   9427.    H.    Rept.   93-651. 

.     November  15,  1973.  11  pp. 


March   11,   1974 


255 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  seizure 
of   aircraft.     Done    at   The    Hague    December    16, 
1970.    Entered  into  force  October  14,  1971.    TIAS 
7192. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  February  19,  1974. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 26,  1973.   TIAS  7570. 

Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  February  19,  1974. 
Accession  deposited:  Libya,  February  19,  1974. 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers  (CSC), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  2,  1972.' 
Signatures:  Austria,  May  16,  1973;  Byelorussian 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic  (with  reservations), 
November  9,  1973;  Czechoslovakia  (with  decla- 
ration), December  28,  1973;  Finland,  December 
20,  1973;  Romania  (subject  to  ratification  and 
with  declaration),  December  19,  1973;  Ukrainian 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic  (with  reservations), 
November  9,  1973;  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics (with  reservations),  August  23,  1973. 

International   Court  of  Justice 

Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (59 
Stat.   1055). 

Notification  of  termination  of  declaration  recog- 
nizing compulsory  jurisdiction:  France,  January 
10,  1974. 

Law  of  the  Sea 

Convention  on  the  territorial  sea  and  the  contiguous 

zone.   Done  at  Geneva  April  29,  1958.   Entered  into 

force  September  10,  1964.    TIAS  5639. 

Accession  deposited:   German   Democratic   Repub- 
lic  (with  a  declaration  and  a  reservation),  De- 
cember 27,  1973. 
Convention  on  the  high  seas.    Done  at  Geneva  April 

29,  1958.    Entered  into  force  September  30,  1962. 

TIAS  5200. 

Accession   deposited:   German   Democratic   Repub- 
lic (with  declarations  and  a  reservation),  Decem- 
ber 27,  1973. 
Convention  on  the  continental  shelf.   Done  at  Geneva 

April  29,  1958.    Entered  into  force  June  10,  1964. 

TIAS  5578. 

Accession  deposited:  German  Democratic  Repub- 
lic (with  a  declaration),  December  27,  1973. 


Maritime   Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative  Organization.  Done  at  Geneva  March  6, 
1948.    Entered   into   force  March   17,   1958.    TIAS 
4044. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Oman,  January  30,  1974. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 
1968.     Entered   into   force    March   5,    1970.    TIAS 
6839. 
Accession  deposited:  Gabon,  February  19,  1974. 

Ocean   Dumping 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollution  by 
dumping   of  wastes    and   other   matter,   with    an- 
nexes.   Done  at  London,  Mexico  City,  Moscow,  and 
Washington  December  29,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  February  21,  1974. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for  pre- 
venting collisions   at   sea,   1972.    Done   at  London 
October  20,  1972.' 
Accession  deposited:  Nigeria,  January  17,  1974. 

War 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  wounded  and  sick  in  armed  forces  in 
the  field; 

Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  wounded,  sick,  and  shipwrecked  mem- 
bers of  armed  forces  at  sea; 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment  of  pris- 
oners of  war; 

Geneva    convention    relative    to    the    protection    of 
civilian  persons  in  time  of  war. 
Done   at  Geneva   August   12,   1949.    Entered  into 
force   October  21,   1950;   for  the   United   States 
February  2,   1956.    TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364,  and 
3365,  respectively. 
Accession  deposited:  Oman,  January  31,  1974. 


BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  December  20,  1972. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  La  Paz  December 
28,  1973.    Entered  into  force  December  28,  1973. 

International   Atomic   Energy  Agency 

Amendment  to  the  agreement  of  May  11,  1959  (TIAS 
4291),  for  cooperation  in  the  civil  uses  of  atomic 
energy.  Signed  at  Vienna  February  12,  1974. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  on  which  each  party 
shall  have  received  from  the  other  written  notifica- 
tion that  it  has  complied  with  all  requirements  for 
such  entry  into  force. 


'  Not  in  force. 


256 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     March  11, 197A     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1811 


Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 255 

Department  Gives  Views  on  U.S.  Commit- 
ments to  NATO    (Hartman) 243 

1975-76  Appropriation  Authorization  Re- 
quested for  Arms  Control  Agency  (Nixon)  .      249 

President  Reports  to  Congress  on  NATO  Bur- 
den Sharing  (message  to  the  Congress)  .     .       247 

The  World  Economic  Environment  (Shultz)  .       250 

Disarmament.  1975-76  Appropriation  Authori- 
zation Requested  for  Arms  Control  Agency 
(Nixon) 249 

Economic  Affairs.  The  World  Economic  En- 
vironment   (Shultz) 250 

Energy.    The   World   Economic   Environment 

(Shultz) 250 

Europe 

Department  Gives  Views  on  U.S.  Commit- 
ments to  NATO    (Hartman) 243 

European- American    Relations:     A    Case    for 

Cooperative    Endeavor    (Rush) 237 

Foreign  Aid.  Defense  Articles  and  Services 
for  Spain  (Presidential  determination)   .     .      242 

Middle  East 

European- American  Relations:  A  Case  for 
Cooperative   Endeavor    (Rush) 237 

Foreign  Ministers  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Egypt 
Visit  Washington  (Nixon,  al-Saqqaf, 
Fahmi) 241 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

Department  Gives  Views  on  U.S.  Commit- 
ments to  NATO   (Hartman) 243 

European- American    Relations:     A    Case    for 

Cooperative    Endeavor    (Rush) 237 

President  Reports  to  Congress  on  NATO  Bur- 
den Sharing  (message  to  the  Congress)  .     .      247 

Presidential  Documents 

Defense    Articles    and    Services    for    Spain 

(Presidential  determination) 242 

Foreign  Ministers  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Egypt 
Visit  Washington 241 

1975-76  Appropriation  Authorization  Re- 
quested for  Arms  Control  Agency  ....      249 

President  Reports  to  Congress  on  NATO  Bur- 
den  Sharing 247 

Spain.     Defense    Articles    and    Services    for 

Spain  (Presidential  determination)  ....       242 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....      256 


U.S.S.R. 

Department  Gives  Views  on  U.S.  Commit- 
ments to  NATO   (Hartman) 243 

European- American    Relations:     A    Case    for 

Cooperative    Endeavor    (Rush) 237 

Name  Index 

al-Saqqaf,   Sayyid   Umar 241 

Fahmi,  Ismail 241 

Hartman,  Arthur  A 243 

Nixon,   President 241,242,247,249 

Rush,  Kenneth 237 

Shultz,  George  P 250 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:   February   18—24 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  February  18  which 
appears  in  this  issue  of  the  BULLETIN  is  No.  53 
of  February  15. 

No.       Date  Subject 

*57  2/19  Porter  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Canada  (biographic  data). 

*58  2/19  Sisco  sworn  in  as  Under  Secretary 
for  Political  Affairs  (biographic 
data). 

*59  2/20  Godley  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Lebanon   (biographic  data). 

*60  2/21  Kissinger:  arrival  statement,  Mexi- 
co City,  Feb.  20. 

tei  2/21  Foreign  Service  officer  examina- 
tion. 

t62  2/21  Kissinger:  Conference  of  Tlatelol- 
co. 

*63  2/21  Deputy  Secretary  Rush  to  head 
U.S.  delegation  to  ANZUS 
meeting. 

*64  2/22  Smith  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
the  Ivory  Coast  (biographic 
data). 

*65  2/23  U.S.  tennis  team  to  tour  Middle 
East. 

t66  2/23  Kissinger:  news  conference,  Mexi- 
co City. 

t67     2/24     Declaration  of  Tlatelolco. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXX 


No.  1812 


March  18, 1974 


COUNTRIES  OF  THE  AMERICAS  ENDORSE  CONTINUED  DIALOGUE 
IN  CONFERENCE  OF  TLATELOLCO 

Statement  by  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  Text  of  Declaration  of  Tlatelolco    257 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER  HOLDS  NEWS  CONFERENCE 
FOLLOWING  CONFERENCE  OF  TLATELOLCO  265 

THE  U.S.  GOVERNMENT  RESPONSE  TO  TERRORISM: 

A  GLOBAL  APPROACH 

Address  by  Leivis  Ho ff acker    27 U 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  Bee  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1812 
March  18,  1974 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

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Single  copy  60  cents 

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approved    by    the    Director    of    the    Office    of 

Management  and   Budget    (January  29,   1971). 

Note:    Contents   of   this    publication    are    not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE    BULLETIN    as    the    source    will    be 

appreciated.     The   BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  V.S.  foreign  relations  and 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  and 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements,  addresses, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  tfie  functions 
of  the  Department.  Information  is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
national agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  or  may  become  a 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  of 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  and 
legislative  material  in  the  field  of 
international  relations  are  also  listed. 


I 


Countries  of  the  Americas  Endorse  Continued  Dialogue 
in  Conference  of  Tiateloico 


Foreign  Ministers  of  25  Western  Hemi- 
sphere countries  participated  in  the  Confer- 
ence of  Tiateloico  at  Mexico  City  February 
18-23.  Following  is  a  statement  made  before 
the  conference  by  Secretary  Kissinger  on 
February  21,  together  with  the  text  of  the 
Declaration  of  Tiateloico  issued  on  February 
2h. 


STATEMENT   BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 

Press  release  62  dated  February  21 

We  owe  our  host  country  and  its  leaders 
a  profound  debt  of  gratitude  for  sponsoring 
this  meeting.  Personally,  I  have  spent  many 
happy  days  in  this  great  country.  And  I 
have  had  the  privilege  of  the  advice,  wisdom, 
and  on  occasion  the  tenacious  opposition  of 
your  President  and  Foreign  Minister.  I  look 
forward  to  an  equally  frank,  friendly,  in- 
tense, but  constructive  dialogue  at  this  con- 
ference. 

On  a  plaque  in  Mexico's  imposing  Museum 
of  Anthropology  are  etched  phrases  which 
carry  special  meaning  for  this  occasion: 

Nations  find  courage  and  confidence  to  face  the 
future  looking  to  the  greatness  of  their  past.  Mexi- 
can, seek  yourself  in  the  mirror  of  this  greatness. 
Stranger,  confirm  here  the  unity  of  human  destiny. 
Civilizations  pass;  but  we  will  always  reflect  the 
glory  of  the  struggle  to  build  them. 

We  assemble  in  the  splendid  shadows  of 
history's  monuments.  They  remind  us  of 
what  can  be  achieved  by  inspiration  and  of 
what  can  be  lost  when  peoples  miss  their 
opportunity.  We  in  the  Americas  now  have 
a  great  opportunity  to  vindicate  our  old 
dream  of  building  a  new  world  of  justice  and 


peace,  to  assure  the  well-being  of  our  peoples, 
and  to  leave  what  we  achieve  as  a  monument 
to  our  striving. 

Our  common  impulse  in  meeting  here  is 
to  fulfill  the  promise  of  America  as  the  con- 
tinent which  beckoned  men  to  fulfill  what 
was  best  in  them.  Our  common  reality  is  the 
recognition  of  our  diversity.  Our  common 
determination  is  to  derive  strength  from  that 
diversity.  Our  common  task  is  to  forge  our 
historical  and  geographical  links  into  shared 
purpose  and  endeavor. 

In  this  spirit  the  United  States  offered  a 
new  dialogue  last  October.  In  this  spirit 
the  countries  of  the  Americas  responded 
in  Bogota  last  November. 

We  meet  here  as  equals — representatives 
of  our  individual  modes  of  life,  but  united 
by  one  aspiration:  to  build  a  new  community. 

We  have  a  historic  foundation  on  which  to 
build.  We  live  in  a  world  that  gives  our 
enterprise  a  special  meaning  and  urgency. 

On  behalf  of  President  Nixon,  I  commit 
the  United  States  to  undertake  this  venture 
with  dedication  and  energy. 

The  U.S.   Commitment 

One  concern  has  dominated  all  others  as 
I  have  met  privately  with  some  of  my  col- 
leagues in  this  room.  Does  the  United  States 
really  care?  Is  this  another  exercise  of  high- 
sounding  declarations  followed  by  long  pe- 
riods of  neglect?  What  is  new  in  this  dia- 
logue? 

These  questions — not  unrelated  to  histori- 
cal experience — define  our  task.  On  behalf 
of  my  colleagues  and  myself,  let  me  stress 
that  we  are  here  to  give  effect  to  a  new  atti- 


March   18,   1974 


257 


tude  and  to  help  shape  a  new  policy.  The 
presence  of  so  many  distinguished  leaders 
from  the  U.S.  Congress  underlines  the  depth 
of  the  U.S.  concern  for  its  neighbors  and 
the  determination  of  our  government  to  im- 
plement our  agreements  through  a  partner- 
ship between  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches. 

The  time  has  come  to  infuse  the  Western 
Hemisphere  relationships  with  a  new  spirit. 
In  the  19th  and  early  20th  centuries,  the 
United  States  declared  what  those  outside 
this  hemisphere  should  not  do  within  it. 
In  the  1930's  we  stipulated  what  the  United 
States  would  not  do.  Later  we  were  prone 
to  set  standards  for  the  political,  economic, 
and  social  structures  of  our  sister  republics. 

Today  we  meet  on  the  basis  of  your  agenda 
and  our  common  needs.  We  agree  with  one 
of  my  distinguished  colleagues  who  said 
on  arrival  that  the  time  had  come  to  meet 
as  brothers,  not  as  sons.  Today,  together, 
we  can  begin  giving  expression  to  our  com- 
mon aspirations  and  start  shaping  our  com- 
mon future. 

In  my  view,  our  fundamental  task  at  this 
meeting,  more  important  even  than  the  spe- 
cifics of  our  agenda,  is  to  set  a  common  di- 
rection and  infuse  our  efforts  with  new  pur- 
pose. Let  us  therefore  avoid  both  condescen- 
sion and  confrontation.  If  the  United  States 
is  not  to  presume  to  supply  all  the  answers, 
neither  should  it  be  asked  to  bear  all  the 
responsibilities.  Let  us  together  bring  about 
a  new  commitment  to  the  inter-American 
community.  Let  us  use  the  specific  issues 
we  discuss  here  as  a  roadmap  for  the  future. 

Let  us  not  be  satisfied  with  proclamations 
but  chart  a  program  of  work  worthy  of  the 
challenge  before  us. 

Let  us  create  a  new  spirit  in  our  relations 
— the  spirit  of  Tlatelolco. 

An   Interdependent  World 

A  century  ago  a  U.S.  President  described 
to  the  Congress  the  difficulties  facing  the 
country:  "It  is  a  condition  which  confronts 
us — not  a  theory."  The  condition  we  con- 
front today  is  a  world  where  interdependence 
is  a  fact,  not  a  choice. 


The  products  of  man's  technical  genius —  i 
weapons  of  incalculable  power,  a  global  eco- 
nomic system,  instantaneous  communica- 
tions, a  technology  that  consumes  finite  re- 
sources at  an  ever-expanding  rate — have 
compressed  this  planet  and  multiplied  our 
mutual  dependence.  The  problems  of  peace, 
of  justice,  of  human  dignity,  of  hunger  and 
inflation  and  pollution,  of  the  scarcity  of 
physical  materials  and  the  surplus  of  spirit- 
ual despair,  cannot  be  resolved  on  a  national 
basis.  All  are  now  caught  up  in  the  tides  of 
world  events — consumers  and  producers,  the 
affluent  and  the  poor,  the  free  and  the  op- 
pressed, the  mighty  and  the  weak. 

The  world  and  this  hemisphere  can  re- 
spond in  one  of  two  ways: 

There  is  the  path  of  autarky.  Each  na- 
tion can  try  to  exploit  its  particular  advan- 
tages in  resources  and  skills  and  bargain  bi- 
laterally for  what  it  needs.  Each  nation  can 
try  to  look  after  itself  and  shrug  its  shoul- 
ders at  the  plight  of  those  less  well  endowed. 
But  history  tells  us  that  this  leads  to  ever 
more  vicious  competition,  the  waste  of  re- 
sources, the  stunting  of  technological  ad- 
vance, and  most  fundamentally,  growing  po- 
litical tensions  which  unravel  the  fabric  of 
global  stability.  If  we  take  this  route,  we 
and  our  children  will  pay  a  terrible  price. 

Or  we  can  take  the  path  of  collaboration. 
Nations  can  recognize  that  only  in  working 
with  others  can  they  most  effectively  work 
for  themselves.  A  cooperative  world  reflects 
the  imperatives  of  technical  and  economic 
necessity  but,  above  all,  the  sweep  of  human 
aspirations. 

The  United  States  is  pledged  to  this  second 
course.  We  believe  that  we  of  the  Americas 
should  undertake  it  together. 

This  hemisphere  is  a  reflection  of  mankind. 
Its  diversity  reflects  the  diversity  of  the 
globe.  It  knows  the  afflictions  and  frustra- 
tions of  the  impoverished.  At  the  same  time 
many  of  its  members  are  leaders  among 
modernizing  societies.  Much  has  been  done 
to  overcome  high  mortality  rates,  widespread 
illiteracy,  and  grinding  poverty.  This  hemi- 
sphere uniquely  includes  the  perceptions  of 


258 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  postindustrial  societies,  of  those  who  are 
only  beginning  to  sample  the  benefits  of 
modernization,  and  of  those  who  are  in  mid- 
passage. 

The  Americas  reach  out  to  other  constella- 
tions as  well.  The  nations  of  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean  share  much  of  the  stir- 
rings of  the  Third  World.  The  United  States 
is  engaged  in  the  maintenance  of  peace  on 
a  global  basis.  Pursuing  our  separate  ways 
narrowly,  we  could  drift  apart  toward  dif- 
ferent poles.  Working  together,  we  can  re- 
inforce our  well-being  and  strengthen  the 
prospects  for  global  cooperation. 

So  let  us  begin  here  in  this  hemisphere. 
If  we  here  in  this  I'oom  fail  to  grasp  the 
consequences  of  interdependence,  if  we  can- 
not make  the  multiplicity  of  our  ties  a  source 
of  unity  and  strength,  then  the  prospects  for 
success  elsewhere  are  dim  indeed.  The  world 
community  which  we  seek  to  build  should 
have  a  Western  Hemisphere  community  as 
one  of  its  central  pillars. 

President  Echeverria  foresaw  the  gather- 
ing force  of  interdependence  in  1972  w^hen 
he  set  forth  his  Charter  of  the  Economic 
Rights  and  Duties  of  States  as  a  guide  for 
the  conduct  of  relations  among  countries  at 
different  levels  of  economic  development. 
Last  September  before  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly I  endorsed  that  concept.  At  first, 
some  were  concerned  because  they  saw  the 
charter  as  a  set  of  unilateral  demands;  it 
has  since  become  clear  that  it  is  a  farsighted 
concept  of  mutual  obligations.  In  the  emerg- 
ing world  of  interdependence,  the  weak  as 
well  as  the  strong  have  responsibilities,  and 
the  world's  interest  is  each  nation's  interest. 

We  can  start  by  making  the  concept  of 
the  charter  a  reality  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. 

The  U.S.  View  of  the  American  Community 

The  United  States  will  do  its  full  part 
to  see  that  our  enterprise  succeeds.  We  can 
make  a  major  contribution,  but  it  would 
be  in  nobody's  interest  if  we  raised  impossi- 
ble expectations,  leaving  our  peoples  frus- 
trated and  our  community  empty.    We  will 


promise  only  what  we  can  deliver.    We  will 
make  what  we  can  deliver  count. 

I  have  carefully  studied  the  agenda  for 
this  meeting  you  prepared  in  Bogota.  I 
will  respond  in  detail  to  its  specifics  in  our 
private  sessions.  But  I  will  say  here  that  I 
have  come  to  a  greater  understanding  of 
the  deeply  felt  motivations  behind  the 
phrases.    You   are  concerned: 

— That  the  United  States  has  put  aside  its 
special  commitment  to  the  hemisphere. 

— That  we  w^ill  allow  old  issues  to  go  un- 
resolved while  new  ones  are  created. 

— That  we  seek  not  community  but  dom- 
inance. 

— That  our  relationship  does  not  ade- 
quately contribute  to  human  welfare  in  the 
hemisphere,  that  it  is  often  irrelevant  to 
your  needs  and  an  obstacle  to  their  fulfill- 
ment. 

In  response  let  me  outline  the  direction 
the  United  States  proposes  to  its  friends  in 
rededicating  itself  to  a  new  era  of  Western 
Hemisphere  relationships.  I  look  forward  to 
hearing  your  own  views  so  that  together  we 
can  make  the  Western  Hemisphere  commu- 
nity a  reality. 

The  United  States  will  do  its  utmost  to 
settle  outstanding  differences.  During  the 
past  year,  the  United  States  and  Mexico 
solved  the  longstanding  Colorado  River  salin- 
ity dispute.  Two  weeks  ago  Panama  and  the 
United  States,  taking  account  of  the  advice 
of  their  partners  at  Bogota,  signed  a  docu- 
ment that  foreshadows  a  new  relationship. 
And  just  48  hours  ago,  Peru  and  the  United 
States  settled  a  dispute  over  compensation 
for  the  exercise  of  Peru's  sovereign  right  to 
nationalize  property  for  public  purposes. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to  work 
with  the  other  nations  of  this  hemisphere 
on  methods  to  eliminate  new  disputes  or  to 
mitigate  their  effect. 

Some  of  our  most  troublesome  problems 
have  arisen  over  differences  concerning  the 
respective  rights  and  obligations  of  private 
U.S.  firms  operating  in  foreign  countries 
and  the  countries  which  host  them.  These 
differences   are   based   largely   on    differing 


March   18,   1974 


259 


conceptions  of  state  sovereignty  and  state 
responsibility. 

On  the  one  hand,  in  keeping  with  the 
Calvo  doctrine,  most  nations  of  this  hemi- 
sphere affirm  that  a  foreign  investor  has 
no  right  to  invoke  the  protection  of  his 
home  government.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
United  States  has  held  that  nations  have  the 
right  to  espouse  the  cause  of  their  investors 
if  they  believe  they  have  been  unfairly 
treated.  This  conviction  is  reflected  in  the 
legislative  provisions  of  the  Gonzalez  and 
Hickenlooper  amendments. 

Realistically,  we  must  admit  that  these 
two  elements  cannot  be  easily  or  quickly  rec- 
onciled. But  the  United  States  is  prepared 
to  begin  a  process  to  this  end  and  to  mitigate 
their  effects.  Even  before  a  final  resolution 
of  the  philosophical  and  legal  issues,  we  are 
ready  to  explore  means  by  which  disputes 
can  be  removed  from  the  forefront  of  our 
intergovernmental  relations. 

In  our  private  meetings  I  shall  make  spe- 
cific proposals  to  establish  agreed  machinery 
which  might  narrow  the  scope  of  disputes. 
For  example,  we  might  consider  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  working  group  to  examine 
various  procedures  for  factfinding,  concili- 
ation, or  the  settlement  of  disputes.  Other 
approaches  are  possible,  and  I  shall  welcome 
the  views  of  my  colleagues.  Let  me  affirm 
here  that  a  procedure  acceptable  to  all  the 
parties  would  remove  these  disputes  as  fac- 
tors in  U.S.  Government  decisions  respecting 
assistance  relationships  with  host  countries. 
We  would  be  prepared  to  discuss  with  our 
Congress  appropriate  modifications  of  our 
legislation. 

But  we  cannot  achieve  our  goals  simply 
by  remedying  specific  grievances  or  even  by 
creating  mechanisms  that  will  eliminate  the 
sources  of  disputes.  A  special  community  can 
only  emerge  if  we  infuse  it  with  life  and 
substance. 

We  must  renew  our  political  commitment 
to  a  Western  Hemisphere  system.  Thomas 
Macaulay  once  observed,  "It  is  not  the  ma- 
chinery we  employ  but  the  spirit  we  are  of 
that  binds  men  together."  We  are  here  be- 
cause we  recognize  the  need  for  cooperation. 


Yet  we  can  only  cooperate  if  our  people 
truly  believe  that  we  are  united  by  common 
purposes  and  a  sense  of  common  destiny. 

The  United  States  will  be  guided  by  these 
principles: 

— We  will  not  impose  our  political  pref- 
erences. 

— We  will  not  intervene  in  the  domestic 
affairs  of  others. 

— We  will  seek  a  free  association  of  proud 
peoples. 

In  this  way,  the  Western  Hemisphere  com- 
munity can  make  its  voice  and  interests 
felt  in  the  world. 

We  realize  that  U.S.  global  interests  some- 
times lead  to  actions  that  have  a  major  effect 
on  our  sister  republics.  We  understand,  too, 
that  there  is  no  wholly  satisfactory  solution 
to  this  problem. 

However,  to  contribute  to  the  sense  of 
community  we  all  seek,  the  United  States 
commits  itself  to  close  and  constant  consul- 
tation with  its  hemispheric  associates  on  po- 
litical and  economic  issues  of  common  inter- 
est, particularly  when  these  issues  vitally 
affect  the  interests  of  our  partners  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

In  my  view,  the  best  way  to  coordinate 
policies  is  to  make  a  systematic  attempt  to 
shape  the  future.  I  therefore  recommend 
that  today's  meeting  be  considered  the  first 
of  a  series.  The  Foreign  Ministers  assembled 
here  should  meet  periodically  for  an  informal 
review  of  the  international  situation  and  of 
common  hemispheric  problems.  In  the  in- 
terval between  our  meetings,  the  heads  of 
our  planning  staffs  or  senior  officials  with 
similar  responsibilities  should  meet  on  a 
regular  basis  to  assess  progress  on  a  com- 
mon agenda.  The  principle  of  consultation 
on  matters  affecting  each  other's  interests 
should  be  applied  to  the  fullest  extent  pos- 
sible.  Specifically: 

— The  United  States  is  prepared  to  consult 
and  adjust  its  positions  on  the  basis  of 
reciprocity,  in  the  multilateral  trade  nego- 
tiations. 

— The  United  States  also  recognizes  a 
fundamental   congruity  of  interests  among 


260 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  countries  of  the  hemisphere  in  global 
monetary  matters.  We  favor  a  strong  voice 
for  Latin  America  in  the  management  of  a 
new  monetary  system,  just  as  we  favor  its 
effective  participation  in  the  reform  of  this 
system. 

— The  United  States  is  ready  to  undertake 
prior  consultation  in  other  international  ne- 
gotiations such  as  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference, the  World  Food  Conference,  and  the 
World  Population  Conference. 

The  Western  Hemisphere  community 
should  promote  a  decent  life  for  all  its 
citizens.  No  community  is  worthy  of  its 
name  that  does  not  actively  foster  the  dig- 
nity and  prosperity  of  its  peoples.  The 
United  States  as  the  richest  and  most  power- 
ful country  in  the  hemisphere  recognizes  a 
special  obligation  in  this  regard. 

Let  me  sketch  here  the  program  which 
President  Nixon  has  authorized  and  which 
I  shall  discuss  in  greater  detail  with  my 
colleagues  this  afternoon: 

— First,  in  trade.  During  the  period  of 
great  economic  uncertainty  arising  from  the 
energy  situation,  it  is  essential  that  nations 
behave  cooperatively  and  not  take  protective 
or  restrictive  action.  I  pledge  to  you  today 
that  the  United  States  will  do  its  utmost  to 
avoid  placing  any  new  limitations  on  access 
by  Latin  America  to  its  domestic  market. 

In  the  same  spirit  we  renew  our  commit- 
ment to  the  system  of  generalized  tariff 
preferences.  We  shall  strongly  support  this 
legislation.  Once  it  is  enacted,  we  will  con- 
sult closely  with  you  on  how  it  can  be  most 
beneficial  to  your  needs. 

— Second,  in  science  and  technology.  We 
want  to  improve  our  private  and  govern- 
mental efforts  to  make  available  needed  tech- 
nology, suited  to  varying  stages  of  develop- 
ment in  such  vital  areas  as  education,  hous- 
ing, and  agriculture.  Private  enterprise  is 
the  most  effective  carrier  of  technology 
across  national  borders.  But  government, 
while  not  a  substitute,  can  usefully  appraise 
the  overall  needs  and  spur  progress.  The 
United  States  therefore  recommends  that  we 
establish  an  inter-American  commission  on 


technology.  It  should  be  composed  of  lead- 
ing scientists  and  experts  from  all  the 
Americas  and  report  to  governments  on  the 
basis  of  regular  meetings. 

— Third,  in  energy.  This  hemisphere,  link- 
ing oil-producing  and  oil-consuming  coun- 
tries, is  uniquely  situated  for  cooperative 
solutions  of  this  problem.  The  United  States 
is  prepared  to  share  research  for  the  devel- 
opment of  energy  sources.  We  will  encour- 
age the  Inter-American  Development  Bank 
to  adapt  its  lending  and  fundraising  activi- 
ties to  cushion  the  current  strains.  We  are 
also  prepared  to  explore  ways  of  financing 
oil  deficits,  including  the  removal  of  remain- 
ing institutional  impediments  to  your  access 
to  U.S.  capital  markets. 

— Fourth,  in  development  assistance.  The 
U.S.  Government  in  its  executive  branch  is 
committed  to  maintain  our  aid  levels,  despite 
rising  energy  costs.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
development  problem  can  no  longer  be  re- 
solved simply  by  accelerating  official  assist- 
ance. We  need  a  comprehensive  review  and 
recommendations  on  how  all  flows  of  capital 
and  technology — whether  from  concessional 
assistance,  world  capital  markets,  or  export 
credits — can  contribute  most  effectively  to 
hemispheric  needs.  I  recommend  charging 
the  inter-American  body  with  these  tasks. 

— Fifth,  in  reshaping  the  inter-American 
system.  We  must  identify  and  preserve  those 
aspects  of  the  Rio  Treaty  and  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States  which  have  shielded 
the  hemisphere  from  outside  conflict  and 
helped  preserve  regional  peace. 

Some  form  of  institutional  structure  for 
peace  and  cooperation  is  clearly  necessary. 
However,  we  must  reinforce  the  formal 
structure  of  the  OAS  by  modernizing  its 
institutions  and  agreeing  on  the  principles 
of  inter-American  relations.  The  United 
States  is  prepared  to  cooperate  in  creative 
adjustments  to  meet  new  conditions. 

A  Spanish  poet  once  wrote:  "Traveler, 
there  is  no  path;  paths  are  made  by  walk- 
ing." This  is  our  most  immediate  need.  We 
are  not  here  to  write  a  communique,  but  to 
chart  a  course.  Our  success  will  be  measured 
by  whether  we  in  fact  start  a  journey.    I 


March   18,   1974 


261 


suggest  we  move  ahead  in  three  ways: 

— First,  let  us  make  clear  to  our  peoples 
that  we  do  have  a  common  destiny  and  a 
modern  framework  for  effective  cooperation. 

— Second,  let  us  agree  on  an  agenda  for 
the  Americas,  a  course  of  actions  that  will 
give  substance  to  our  consensus  and  inspira- 
tion to  our  peoples. 

— Third,  let  us  define  a  program  to  bring 
that  agenda  to  life. 

Mr.  President,  my  distinguished  col- 
leagues, four  centuries  ago  totally  alien  cul- 
tures met  for  the  first  time  near  here.  We 
are  moving  toward  a  world  whose  demands 
upon  us  are  nearly  as  alien  to  our  experience 
as  were  the  Spaniards  and  the  Aztecs  to 
each  other. 

Today,  if  we  are  to  meet  the  unprecedented 
challenge  of  an  interdependent  woi'ld,  we 
will  also  have  to  summon  courage,  faith, 
and  dedication.  The  United  States  believes 
we  can  build  a  world  worthy  of  the  best  in 
us  in  concert  with  our  friends  and  neighbors. 
We  want  future  generations  to  say  that  in 
1974,  in  Mexico,  the  nations  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  took  a  new  road  and  proclaimed 
that  in  the  Americas  and  the  world  they  have 
a  common  destiny. 


TEXT  OF  DECLARATION  OF  TLATELOLCO 

Press  release  67  dated  February  24 

I 

At  the  request  of  President  Nixon,  Secretary  of 
State  Kissinger  invited  the  Foreign  Ministers  and 
other  representatives  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  attending  the  28th  Session  of  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly  to  meet  with  him  on  Oc- 
tober 5,  1973.  At  that  time  the  Secretary  of  State 
suggested  the  initiation  of  a  new  dialogue  to  deal 
with  matters  of  concern   to   the   Americas. 

Mindful  of  this  important  Initiative,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Colombia  extended  an  invitation  to  Dr. 
Kissinger  to  participate  actively  and  personally  in 
such  a  dialogue  at  an  opportune  time.  Dr.  Kissinger 
immediately  accepted  this  invitation.  Thereafter, 
the  Government  of  Colombia  convoked  the  "Confer- 
ence of  Foreign  Ministers  of  Latin  America  for  Con- 
tinental Cooperation,"  held  in  Bogota  from  Novem- 
ber 14-16,  1973.   On  that  occasion  the  Foreign  Minis- 


ters of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  agreed  it 
would  be  advantageous  to  initiate  a  dialogue  on  the 
following  topics: 

Cooperation  for  Development 
Coercive  Measures  of  an  Economic  Nature 
Restructuring  of  the  Inter-American  System 
Solution  of  the  Panama  Canal  Question 
Structure   of  International   Trade   and   the   Mone- 
tary System 
Transnational  Enterprises 
Transfer  of  Technology 

General  Panorama  of  the  Relations  between  Latin 
America  and  the  United  States  of  America 

In  accordance  with  the  agreement  reached  at  the 
"Conference  of  Foreign  Ministers  of  Latin  Amer- 
ica for  Continental  Cooperation,"  and  with  the  con- 
currence of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  the  Government  of  the  United  Mexican 
States  convoked  the  Conference  of  Tlatelolco.  This 
Conference  took  place  in  Mexico  City  from  February 
18-23,  1974. 

The  agenda  of  the  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  com- 
prised the  eight  items  listed  above,  with  the  addi- 
tion of  two  others  suggested  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  in  accordance  with  the  agreement  reached  in 
Bogota  regarding  "the  willingness  of  the  participat- 
ing countries  to  discuss  any  other  matters  the  United 
States  of  America  wishes  to  propose."  The  topics 
suggested  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
were  "Review  of  the  International  Situation"  and 
"The  Energy  Crisis." 

Attending  the  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  were  the 
Foreign  Ministers  of  Argentina,  Bahamas,  Barbados, 
Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  the 
Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Guate- 
mala, Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico, 
Nicaragua,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  the  United  States  of  America,  Uruguay  and 
Venezuela. 

The  Conference  was  held  in  two  parts,  one  with 
exclusively  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  participa- 
tion from  February  18-20  and  the  other  from  Febru- 
ary 21-23,  with  the  participation  of  Secretary  of 
State  Kissinger.  In  the  first  phase  of  the  Confer- 
ence of  Tlatelolco,  the  Latin  American  and  Carib- 
bean Foreign  Ministers  agreed  on  procedures  for  the 
initiation  of  the  new  dialogue,  which  Secretary  Kis- 
singer had  proposed  be  founded  on  "friendship  based 
on  equality  and  respect  for  the  dignity  of  all,"  and 
upon  methods  for  delineating  the  "bases  for  a  new 
dialogue  between  Latin  America  and  the  United 
States."  The  Secretary  of  State  agreed  to  these  pro- 
cedures. 

II 

The  Conference  took  place  in  an  atmosphere  of 
cordiality,  free  from  the  old  rigidities  which  have 
so    often    obstructed    our   dialogues   in    more    tradi- 


262 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tional  forums.  The  participants  met  as  equals,  con- 
scious that  the  policy  initiated  here  may  be  of  deep 
historical  significance.  But  for  it  to  be  so  we  must 
recognize  that  we  are  at  a  turning  point  and  be 
prepared  to  dedicate  ourselves  to  new  horizons  of 
understanding  and  cooperation. 

The  Foreign  Ministers  agreed  that  the  Americas 
have  arrived  at  an  historic  moment — a  time  of  un- 
precedented opportunity  for  achieving  the  goals  of 
justice,  peace  and  human  dignity  which  have  for  so 
lonfj  been  the  essential   promise   of  the   new  world. 

They  recognized  that  in  the  modern  age  the  de- 
mands of  technology  and  the  drive  of  human  aspira- 
tions make  impossible  the  narrow  pursuit  of  purely 
national  interests. 

They  agreed,  as  well,  that  interdependence  has  be- 
come a  physical  and  moral  imperative,  and  that  a 
new,  vigorous  spirit  of  inter-American  solidarity  is 
therefore  essential. 

Relations  between  the  countries  of  the  Americas 
must  be  placed  in  the  context  of  today's  world;  a 
world  characterized  by  interdependence,  the  emer- 
gence onto  the  world  stage  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries, and  the  need  to  overcome  inequalities.  The 
existence  of  a  modern  inter-American  system,  the 
affirmation  of  the  reality  of  Latin  American  unity, 
and  the  similarity  of  the  problems  of  Latin  .America 
and  those  of  other  developing  countries  are  the  foun- 
dation for  a  dialogue  and  a  frank  and  realistic  rela- 
tionship with  the  United  States. 

Inter-American  relations  should  be  based  on  an 
effective  equality  between  states,  on  non-intervention, 
on  the  renunciation  of  the  use  of  force  and  coercion, 
and  on  the  respect  for  the  right  of  countries  to 
choose  their  own  political,  economic  and  social  sys- 
tems. Inter-American  relationships,  thus  redefined 
by  an  authentic  political  will,  would  create  the 
necessary  conditions  for  living  together  in  harmony 
and  working  cooperatively  for  expanded  and  self- 
sustaining  economic  development. 

The  Foreign  Ministers  reaffirmed  the  principle 
that  every  State  has  the  right  to  choose  its  own 
political,  economic  and  social  system  without  foreign 
interference  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  State  to 
refrain  from  intervening  in  the  affairs  of  another. 

The  new  opportunities  for  cooperative  development 
call  for  a  revision  of  the  concept  of  regional  secu- 
rity, which  cannot,  and  should  not,  be  based  solely  on 
political-military  criteria,  but  must  also  encompass  a 
practical  commitment  to  peaceful  relations,  coopera- 
tion and  solidarity  among  states. 

To  this  end,  inter-American  cooperation  should  be 
supplemented  by  the  establishment  of  a  system  of 
collective  economic  security  that  protects  the  essen- 
tial requirements  of  integral  development;  that  is  to 
say,  parallel  progress  in  the  social,  economic  and 
cultural  fields. 

By  mandate  of  the  United  Nations  General  Assem- 
bly, a  group  of  countries  representing  diverse  eco- 


nomic systems  is  engaged  in  examining  the  possibili- 
ties of  restructuring  international  economic  relations, 
through  the  preparation  of  a  draft  charter  on  the 
economic  rights  and  duties  of  states.  This  charter 
can  create  the  general  framework  for  facing  speci- 
fic problems  through  practical  and  fair  regulations 
and  mechanisms. 

The  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  agreed  that  a  just 
application  of  the  principles  of  the  charter  can  foster 
the  internal  and  external  conditions  necessary  for 
the  American  nations  to  satisfy  their  own  needs  and 
ensure  their  full  development  on  an  equitable  basis. 
The  Conference  also  recognized  that  peace  and  prog- 
ress, in  order  to  be  solid  and  enduring,  must  always 
be  based  on  respect  for  the  rights  of  others,  and  the 
recognition  of  reciprocal  responsibilities  and  obliga- 
tions  among  developed   and  developing  countries. 

Ill 

In  the  course  of  permanent  dialogue  that  has  been 
successfully  initiated  at  the  Conference  of  Tlatelolco, 
a  continuing  effort  should  be  made  to  reach,  as  soon 
as  possible,  joint  solutions  to  the  pending  questions 
included  in  the  Bogota  document,  which  served  as 
the  basis  for  this  Conference. 

IV 

The  Conference  goes  on  record  as  follows: 

(1)  The  Foreign  Ministers  recognized  that  the 
success  of  the  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  emphasizes 
the  value  of  the  new  dialogue  of  the  Americas.  Mind- 
ful of  the  growing  interaction  between  themselves 
and  the  rest  of  the  world  and  that  their  countries 
have  different  needs  and  different  approaches  on 
foreign  policy,  the  Foreign  Ministers  were  neverthe- 
less agreed  that  the  relations  between  their  coun- 
tries, which  history,  geography  and  sentiment  have 
produced  and  continued  to  sustain,  call  for  an  ex- 
pansion of  the  processes  of  consultation  between 
their  governments. 

As  an  initial  step  in  this  continuing  process  of 
consultation,  they  agreed  to  continue  on  April  17, 
1974,  at  Atlanta,  Georgia,  in  the  United  States  of 
America,  the  dialogue  initiated  in  Mexico.  In  the 
same  spirit  they  agreed  to  consult  with  the  view 
to  seeking,  as  far  as  possible,  common  positions  in 
appropriate  international  consultations,  including 
multilateral  trade  negotiations. 

(2)  The  Conference  welcomes  the  agreement 
reached  in  Panama  City  on  February  7,  1974,  by  the 
Governments  of  Panama  and  the  United  States  of 
America,  by  which  they  established  the  guiding  prin- 
ciples for  their  current  negotiations  leading  to  a 
new  Canal  treaty.  The  Conference  holds  that  this 
agreement  is  a  significant  step  forward  on  the  road 
to  a  definitive  solution  of  that  question. 

(3)  The  Foreign  Ministers  agreed  that,  if  prog- 
ress toward  a  new  inter-American  solidarity  is  to  be 
made,  solutions  must  be  found  not  only  to  existing 


March   18,   1974 


263 


differences,  but  means  must  also  be  provided  for  the 
solution  of  problems  that  may  arise. 

(4)  In  this  spirit,  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  Latin 
America  have  taken  due  note  and  will  continue  to 
examine  the  suggestion  advanced  by  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States  of  America  with  re- 
spect to  the  controversies  that  may  arise  from  mat- 
ters  involving  private   foreign  investment. 

The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  pro- 
posed the  establishment  of  a  fact-finding  or  concilia- 
tion procedure  that  would  limit  the  scope  of  such 
controversies  by  separating  the  issues  of  fact  from 
those  of  law.  This  could  provide  an  objective  basis 
for  the  solution  of  disputes  without  detriment  to 
sovereignty. 

He  further  proposed  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
American  working  group  to  study  the  appropriate 
procedures  that  might  be  adopted. 

(5)  With  regard  to  the  problems  of  transnational 
corporations,  the  Foreign  Ministers  discussed  the 
different  aspects  of  their  operation  in  Latin  America 
and  have  agreed  to  continue  the  examination  of  the 
matter  at  a  later  meeting. 

(6)  The  Foreign  Ministers  agreed  on  the  need 
for  intensifying  work  on  the  restructuring  of  the 
inter-American  system. 

(7)  The  Foreign  Ministers  agreed  that  one  of  the 
principal  objectives  is  the  accelerated  development 
of  the  countries  of  the  Americas  and  the  promotion 
of  the  welfare  of  all  their  peoples.  In  this  regard, 
the  United  States  accepts  a  special  responsibility; 
and  the  more  developed  countries  of  the  Americas 
recognize  that  special  attention  should  be  paid  to  the 
needs  of  the  lesser  developed. 

They  further  agreed  that  development  should  be 
integral,  covering  the  economic,  social  and  cultural 
life  of  their  nations. 

(8)  The  United  States  offered  to  promote  the  in- 
tegral development  of  the  region  in  the  following 
fields: 

Trade 

(A)  Make  maximum  efforts  to  secure  passage  of 
the  legislation  on  the  system  of  generalized  prefer- 
ences during  the  present  session  of  Congress,  and 
then  work  with  the  other  countries  of  the  hemi- 
sphere to  apply  these  preferences  in  the  most  bene- 
ficial manner. 

(B)  Avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  the  implementation 
of  any  new  measures  that  would  restrict  access  to 
the  United  States  market. 

Loans  for  Development 

(A)  Maintain,  as  a  minimum,  present  aid  levels 
despite  growing  costs. 

(B)  Cooperate  throughout  the  region  and  in  inter- 
national institutions  to  facilitate  the  flow  of  new 
concessional  and  conventional  resources  toward  those 
countries  most  affected  by  growing  energy  costs. 

(C)  Examine    with    others    in   the    Committee    of 


Twenty  and  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank 
all  restrictions  on  the  entry  of  hemispheric  countries 
to  capital  markets  in  the  United  States  and  other 
industrialized  countries. 

(9)  The  Foreign  Ministers  further  declare: 

(A)  They  reaffirm  the  need  of  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  countries  for  an  effective  participation  of 
their  countries  in  an  international  monetary  reform. 

It  was  acknowledged  that  the  net  transfer  of  real 
resources  is  basic,  and  that  ways  to  institutionalize 
transfers  through  adequate  mechanisms  should  be 
considered. 

It  was  reaffirmed  that  external  financial  coopera- 
tion should  preferably  be  channeled  through  multi- 
lateral agencies  and  respect  the  priorities  estab- 
lished for  each  country,  without  political  ties  or 
conditions. 

(B)  With  respect  to  "transfers  of  technology,"  the 
Foreign  Ministers  agreed  to  promote  policies  facili- 
tating transfers  of  both  patented  and  unpatented 
technical  knowledge  among  the  respective  countries 
in  the  fields  of  industry  as  well  as  education,  housing 
and  agriculture,  taking  into  account  conditions  pre- 
vailing in  each  country  and  in  particular  the  needs  of 
the  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  countries  for 
introduction  of  new  manufactures  for  greater  utiliza- 
tion of  the  human  and  material  resources  available  in 
each  country,  for  increased  local  technical  develop- 
ment and  for  creation  of  products  for  export.  It  was 
further  agreed  that  transfers  of  technology  should  be 
on  fair  and  equitable  terms  without  restraint  upon  the 
recipient  country.  Particular  emphasis  is  to  be 
placed  upon  sharing  knowledge  and  technology  for 
development  of  new  sources  of  energy  and  possible 
alternatives. 

(10)  The  Foreign  Ministers  agreed  that  it  would 
be  desirable  to  establish  an  inter-American  Com- 
mission of  Science  and  Technology.  They  left  over 
for  later  decision  whether  this  Commission  should  be 
adapted  from  existing  institutions  or  whether  a  new 
body  should  be  formed. 


In  adopting  this  document,  the  Foreign  Ministers 
expressed  their  confidence  that  the  spirit  of  Tlate- 
lolco  will  inspire  a  new  creative  effort  in  their  rela- 
tions. They  recognized  that  they  are  at  the  begin- 
ning of  a  road  that  will  acquire  greater  significance 
through  regular  meetings  and  constant  attention  to 
the  matters  under  study. 

The  Conference  expresses  its  satisfaction  over  the 
fact  that  the  mutual  understanding  which  has  pre- 
vailed throughout  encourages  the  hope  that  future 
conferences  of  a  similar  nature,  within  a  permanent 
framework  devoid  of  all  rigid  formality,  will  pro- 
duce fruitful  results  for  the  benefit  of  the  peoples  of 
the  Americas. 

Tlatelolco  DF,  February  2i,  197i. 


264 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Secretary  Kissinger  Holds  News  Conference 
Following  Conference  of  Tiateloico 


Following  is  the  transcript  of  a  neivs  con- 
ference held  by  Secretary  Kissinger  at  Mex- 
ico City  on  February  23. 

Press  release  66  dated  February  23 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Ladies  and  gentle- 
men, I  will  move  very  quickly  to  your  ques- 
tions. Let  me  make  a  few  general  comments 
first. 

To  begin  with,  on  behalf  of  all  my  col- 
leagues on  the  American  delegation,  I  would 
like  to  thank  the  Government  of  Mexico, 
especially  President  Echeverria  and  Mr. 
Rabasa  [Emilio  0.  Rabasa,  Secretary  of  For- 
eign Relations],  for  the  spirit  with  which 
they  called  this  conference  and  the  extraor- 
dinary manner  in  which  it  was  organized 
and  for  the  progress  to  which  they  contrib- 
uted in  the  relationship  of  the  countries  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere. 

We  came  here  very  much  aware  of  the 
concern  of  our  friends  in  Latin  America 
and  in  the  Caribbean  that  the  United  States 
had  not  paid  sufl!icient  attention  to  their 
problems.  Our  basic  purpose  was  to  start  a 
new  dialogue,  and  therefore  yesterday  we 
went  through  the  agenda  of  Bogota  point 
by  point,  giving  our  reaction  and  the  pos- 
sibilities of  achieving  them. 

It  has  been  our  view  as  well  as  that  of 
all  of  my  colleagues,  the  Foreign  Ministers 
of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  that 
our  meeting  here  should  start  a  process  and 
not  another  proclamation  that  would  be  for- 
gotten a  few  months  after  it  was  issued.  I 
believe  we  are  on  the  way  to  accomplishing 
this;  and  I  believe  that  I  speak  for  my  col- 
leagues, but  I  certainly  speak  for  myself, 
when  I  express  our  gratification  for  having 
had  this  opportunity  and  our  conviction  that 
what  was  started  here  will  lead  to  a  new 


relationship  between  the  United  States  and 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Having 
said  this,  I'll  take  your  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  define  for  us, 
if  there  is  no  such  definition  after  this  con- 
ference is  over,  the  characteristics — the  per- 
spectives of  the  essential  characteristics  of 
the  change  that  may  take  place  in  the  rela- 
tions of  the  hemisphere  as  a  result  of  the 
meetiyig  and  the  attitude  and  the  limitations 
of  the  delegations  attending  this  meeting 
with  regard  to  the  discussion  of  the  agenda 
programed  for  this  conference? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  is  growing  out 
of  this  conference  is  a  better  comprehension 
of  the  problems  and  challenges  that  we  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  face.  Secondly, 
there  has  grown  out  of  the  conference  a  de- 
termination to  deal  with  these  problems  co- 
operatively and  in  a  spirit  of  solidarity.  We 
have  recognized  that  many  of  these  issues 
require  more  careful  detailed  study  than  we 
could  give  at  this  meeting.  We  are  therefore 
going  to  start  mechanisms  that  will  enable 
us  to  continue  working  on  these  problems, 
and  we  are  going  to  meet  at  regular  intervals 
at  various  levels  to  give  effect  to  this  deter- 
mination. 

The  attitude  of  the  delegations  at  the  meet- 
ing has  been  extraordinarily  constructive. 
We  did  not  repeat  the  conventional  plati- 
tudes. Our  friends  from  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean  did  not  hesitate  to  tell  us 
honestly  what  their  concerns  were,  and  this 
is  what  the  meeting  was  all  about.  For  us 
to  pretend  that  there  are  not  concerns  in 
Latin  America  would  have  been  an  insult 
to  the  intelligence  of  everyone  assembled 
here.  We  discussed  in  frankness,  and  we  on 
the  U.S.  delegation,  backed  up  by  one  of  the 


March  18,   1974 


265 


most  distinguished  congressional  delegations 
that  has  attended  any  international  confer- 
ence, stated  honestly  what  we  believe  it  is 
possible  to  do,  what  it  will  take  immediately, 
what  it  will  take  a  longer  time  to  achieve, 
and  what  under  the  present  circumstances 
we  do  not  perceive  can  be  done  at  all. 

I  come  away  with  a  spirit  of  great  confi- 
dence that  we  have  started  a  new  relation- 
ship, and  I  am  glad  to  express  on  this  occa- 
sion my  appreciation  for  the  constructive 
attitude  shown  by  every  single  delegation  at 
the  meeting. 

Q.  When  you  speak  about  a  historic  com- 
Tnunity  for  Latin  America  and  the  United 
States,  do  you  mean  that  together  you  will 
receive  the  benefits  and  also  confront  the 
world  conflicts? 

Secretary  Kissiyiger:  First,  let  me  make 
clear  what  we  mean  by  the  word  "com- 
munity." We  don't  mean  a  juridical  struc- 
ture with  formal  rules  that  require  formal 
support.  For  example,  the  U.S.  delegation 
put  on  the  agenda  of  the  conference  two  top- 
ics: the  energy  crisis  and  a  review  of  inter- 
national affairs.  We  did  this  not  in  order  to 
obtain  the  approval  of  the  other  countries 
at  this  conference.  We  did  it  in  the  spirit 
that  the  United  States,  with  its  global  con- 
cerns, was  engaged  in  many  problems  around 
the  world  whose  consequences  would  affect 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  and  that, 
having  the  privilege  of  being  assembled  with 
our  colleagues  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean,  they  were  entitled  to  hear  our 
views,  what  our  plans  were,  and  what  our 
considerations  were.  We  did  not  ask  them 
for  joint  action  or  endorsement. 

Now,  with  respect  to  the  consultation  we 
foresee,  we  have  no  intention  of  forming  a 
political  bloc.  It  is  not  our  intention  to  create 
an  obligation  for  mutual  political  support. 
It  is  our  intention  to  give  some  reality  to 
a  relationship  that  has  existed  for  genera- 
tions, that  has  led  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  and  that  indeed  has 
brought  us  together  here — the  Foreign  Min- 
isters of  all  countries  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere with  the  exception  of  Canada.  This 
means  that  as  far  as  the  United  States  is 


concerned  we  have  a  special  obligation  to 
take  seriously  the  concerns  of  our  friends 
from  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  It 
means  that  we  will  make  serious  efforts  to 
meet  their  legitimate  complaints  and  to  lis- 
ten to  all  of  their  concerns  in  a  spirit  of 
cooperation.  It  means  also  that  we  are  pre- 
pared in  international  forums  before  we 
make  final  decisions  to  listen  to  the  views 
of  our  colleagues  from  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean. 

As  far  as  the  countries  of  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean  are  concerned,  it  would 
seem  to  us,  of  course,  natural  that  through 
the  processes  of  consultation  they  will  hear 
our  point  of  view.  What  they  will  do  with 
respect  to  that  is  their  own  sovereign  de- 
cision. But  there  are  enough  blocs  in  the 
world  without  our  attempting  to  oi-ganize 
another  one.  We  are  talking  about  an  at- 
titude, a  spirit,  a  sense  of  cooperation.  We 
are  prepared  to  give  it  effect  through  actions 
which  I  have  explained  both  in  my  public 
speech  and  in  the  private  sessions,  but  we 
are  not  asking  for  a  juridical  system,  and 
that  idea  has  never  been  put  forward  by 
the  American  delegation. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  two  of  the  things  you 
came  here  to  discuss — the  energy  crisis  and 
U.S.  policy  toivard  the  Middle  East — /  wori- 
der  if  you  coidd  look  ahead  to  the  trip  yozi 
have  coming  up  in  two  days  and  tell  us  as 
specifically  as  you  can  ivhat  you  hope  to 
accomplish?  Tell  us  what  effect  or  added 
difficulty  the  uncertainty  in  the  Israeli  Gov- 
ernment has? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  all  respect,  I 
believe  that  to  this  group  I  should  answer 
primarily  the  questions  that  concern  the 
conference.  Briefly,  what  I  put  before  my 
colleagues  was  our  view  of  where  the  inter- 
national situation  stood.  The  Middle  East 
was  only  one  of  the  topics,  which  also  in- 
cluded the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
and  our  general  approach  to  foreign  policy. 
So  what  I  expect  to  accomplish  in  the  Middle 
East  I  think  I  should  leave  for  another  press 
conference.  Primarily  it  is  to  get  talks 
started  between  Syria  and  Israel. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  been  charac- 


266 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


terized  as  the  great  eliminator  of  the  failures 
of  the  foreign  policy  of  your  country.  What 
is  the  reason,  then,  of  your  coming  here  to 
present  to  the  Foreign  Miyiisters,  as  if  it 
were  a  new  concept,  the  thesis  of  the  hemi- 
spheric community  which  is  exactly  the  same 
as  pan- Americanism,  inter- Americanism,  and 
the  Alliance  for  Progress,  which  are  the 
oldest  skeletons  kept  in  the  closet  of  the  De- 
partment of  State? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  come  here  in 
response  to  the  request  of  many  of  the  col- 
leagues from  the  countries  of  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean  in  order  to  express  what 
the  United  States  is  willing  to  do  in  response 
to  their  concerns.  Our  proposals  and  their 
future  depend  entirely  on  our  colleagues 
from  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
There  will  be  no  American  pressure  to  im- 
plement any  of  the  proposals  which  we  have 
made.  And  indeed  if  you  analyze  our  pro- 
posals, the  vast  majority  of  them  concern 
complaints  that  have  been  made  about  our 
actions,  and  there  have  been  very  few  recip- 
rocal requests  we  have  made  of  our  col- 
leagues from  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean. 

It  is  our  conviction  that  the  great  problem 
of  the  world  today,  the  big  problem  of  world 
peace,  is  to  bring  about  a  structure  in  the 
world  in  which  the  nations  of  the  world 
feel  they  have  had  a  share  in  building  it  and 
therefore  they  have  an  obligation  to  help 
maintain  it.  It  can  be  brought  about  only 
through  dialogue  and  consensus.  It  cannot 
be  brought  about  by  pressure.  Then  one  has 
to  ask  oneself,  in  the  name  of  what  are  we 
meeting  and  for  what  purpose?  This  is  the 
objective  of  this  conference.  It  is  our  inten- 
tion to  go  beyond  the  formulas  of  previous 
periods  to  a  living  reality.  That  living  real- 
ity can  make  sense  only  if  it  has  the  willing 
support  growing  out  of  its  own  convictions 
of  our  friends  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  I  can  say  flatly  there  will  be  no 
American  pressure,  direct  or  indirect,  to 
bring  it  about. 

Q.  All  right,  I'll  repeat  the  question,  sir. 
If  this  is  not  an  OAS  conference,  in  the 
spirit  of  what  you  have  been  talking  about 


as  the  Western  community  and  the  coopera- 
tive efforts  of  the  countries,  is  there  any  plan 
or  was  there  anything  discussed  with  the 
Ministers  and  with  you  related  to  Canada 
and  Cuba  being  invited  in  the  future? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  was  discussion 
of  both  problems.  The  United  States  of 
course  has  no  objection  to  the  participation 
of  Canada.  For  the  purposes  of  this  con- 
ference, while  we  listen  with  respect  to  the 
views  expressed  by  some  of  our  colleagues, 
we  believe  that  the  primary  objective  of 
this  conference  was  to  introduce  a  new  spirit 
and  a  new  dialogue  into  the  relationship  with 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  As  for 
the  United  States,  we  did  not  believe  this 
would  be  an  appropriate  forum  to  discuss 
Cuba. 

Q.  Who  is  responsible  for  the  definite  res- 
olution that  would  permit  American  auto- 
mobile companies  established  in  Argentina 
to  sell  cars  to  Cuba,  and  when  will  it  be 
able  to  obtain  a  definite  resolution? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  issue  of  the  sale 
by  American  companies  licensed  in  foreign 
countries,  specifically  Argentina,  to  Cuba  is 
now  under  study  in  the  U.S.  Government. 
No  final  determination  has  been  made,  and 
of  course  when  it  is  made  we  will  discuss 
it  first  with  the  Government  of  Argentina. 
But  no  final  decision  has  been  made. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  understand  that  you 
have  reiterated  your  commitment  to  the 
Latin  American  and  Caribbean  Foreign  Min- 
isters over  a  consultation  with  them  for  any 
possible  future  change  in  the  U.S.  position 
toward  Cuba.  Can  you  now  elaborate  to 
the  point  of  telling  us  whether  this  will  be 
a  personal  consultation  in  the  form  of  a 
committee  or  meeting  or  if  this  will  be  just 
a  notification  to  them  of  an  impending 
change? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  form  of  consul- 
tation has  not  been  decided,  but  it  will  be 
something  other  than  the  notification  of  an 
impending  change.  Those  countries  that 
have  taken  a  position  similar  to  ours  are 
entitled  to  express  their  views  in  case  there 


March  18,  1974 


267 


are  any  other  considerations  on  the  part  of 
the  U.S.  Government. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  United  Nations  rec- 
ognized last  year  that  there  was  a  colonial 
status  in  Puerto  Rico.  What  form  will  yoiir 
new  dialogue  with  that  American  colony 
take? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course  the  United 
States  does  not  accept  the  proposition  that 
Puerto  Rico  has  colonial  status,  and  I  do  not 
believe  this  is  an  appropriate  subject  for 
this  dialogue. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  think  that  the 
commitment  signed  in  Tlatelolco  by  the  Latin 
American  Ministers  will  start  a  permanent 
political  and  economic  dialogue  of  justice  in 
America? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  is  our  belief  that 
a  political  and  economic  dialogue  with  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  is  very  impor- 
tant. We  are  prepared  to  undertake  with 
open  mind  and  to  give  very  serious  consid- 
eration to  the  concerns  of  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean,  and  we  are  confident  that 
this  will  be  one  of  the  results  of  this  meet- 
ing here  in  Mexico. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  spoken  so 
warmly  of  the  spirit  of  this  conference  also 
with  the  Europeans — the  Western  Europeans 
— and  tvoidd  you  like  to  recommend  it  for 
continuing  Atlantic  dialogue? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  each  rela- 
tionship has  its  historical  mood  and  its  par- 
ticular necessities,  but  I  would  think  that 
the  spirit  that  has  been  shown  here,  with 
the  differences  that  exist,  and  I  must  say 
with  all  the  legacy  of  the  past,  is  one  that 
was  very  positive,  and  the  general  attitude 
of  mutual  respect  and  open  discussion  is 
one  that  we  are  of  course  prepared  to  follow 
in  relations  with  our  European  allies.  I  tend 
to  believe  the  Europeans  are  ready  to  some 
extent,  but  the  difference  is  that  the  ma- 
chinery in  relation  to  our  European  allies 
is  more  formalized,  and  this  permitted  here 
a  more  informal  discussion  which  was  [com- 
pletely] useful. 

Q.   Mr.   Secretary,   if   the    conference    of 


foreign  relations  ministers  is  of  a  regional 
nature  and  it  has  a  local  importance  for  this 
hemisphere,  what  would  its  importance  be 
in  the  world  scene? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  the  United 
States  is  committed  to  easing  tensions  wher- 
ever it  is  within  our  power  to  do  so  and  in- 
dependent of  any  other  relationship  that 
exists  in  this  hemisphere.  Nevertheless,  to 
the  extent  that  we  can  contribute  in  any 
conference  or  in  any  forum  to  a  world  which 
is  built  on  consensus,  where  the  nations  of 
the  world  feel  that  they  have  a  stake,  and 
where  the  dialogue  is  based  on  mutual  re- 
spect for  dignity  of  all  nations,  it  must  con- 
tribute to  the  general  peace  in  the  world. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  get  back  to  Western 
Europe  and  Latin  America  for  a  moment, 
considering  the  events  of  the  last  year — your 
AP  speech,  the  speech  before  the  AP  writers 
last  April,  the  meeting  with  Mr.  Pompidou, 
the  European  negotiations,  and  now  the 
meeting  here — has  your  experience  here  at 
this  conference  made  you  reexamine  the  de- 
sire of  countries  in  Westerii  Europe  and  dif- 
ferent Latin  American  pressures  for  bilateral 
relations  of  their  own  on  an  extensive  basis 
and  to  have  broad  access  to  international 
forums  such  as  the  United  Nations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  I  believe  that 
inevitably  in  any  dialogue  with  other  coun- 
tries there  is  a  tendency  to  emphasize  those 
issues  on  which  there  is  controversy.  With 
respect  to  Western  Europe,  the  basic  princi- 
ples that  we  thought  should  be  expressed 
about  the  relationship  across  the  Atlantic 
will  be  concluded  within  the  next  few  weeks 
and  will  result  in  the  kind  of  document  that 
we  had  in  mind.  With  respect  to  Latin  Amer- 
ica, we  aim  for  a  much  less  formal  procedure 
because  Latin  America  is  not  as  organized  as 
a  unit  as  Europe  is  and  because  our  historical 
relationship  has  been  somewhat  different. 

Inevitably,  the  concern  of  different  parts  of 
the  world  in  local  foreign  policy  varies,  and 
inevitably  the  most  intensive  dialogues  that 
are  possible  are  on  those  issues  that  are  of 
most  immediate  concern  to  the  countries  in- 
volved and  that,  too,  differs  as  between  West- 
ern   Europe   and    Latin    America    and    the 


268 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  > 


Caribbean,  but  no  one  ever  supposed  that  to 
move  from  a  two-power  world  to  a  world  in 
which  many  nations  are  attempting  to  play 
a  role — and  many  regions  are  attempting  to 
organize  themselves — no  one  ever  thought 
that  this  could  be  expressed  in  one  document 
or  that  a  day  would  come  when  you  could 
say  this  process  is  completed.  It  has  to  be  a 
living  process  and,  dealing  with  free  people, 
a  complicated  process — and  we  think  that  it 
is  one  that  has  to  be  continued  and  will  be 
continued. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  tell  us  which 
is  your  persotml  attitude  toivard  the  reunion, 
of  Cuba  to  the  Organization  of  American 
States? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  stated  the  U.S. 
position  with  respect  to  this  on  many  previ- 
ous occasions,  and  we  believe  that  this  issue 
can  only  be  addressed  in  a  wider  context  and 
not  at  this  particular  moment. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  coidd  you  tell  us  what 
ivoidd  he  the  immediate  steps  to  start  the 
implementation  of  the  points  discussed  in 
this  conference  and  which  would  be  the  main 
economic,  political,  social,  historical,  or  legal 
obstacles  to  be  conquered  in  order  to  achieve 
the  purpose  of  this  conference? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  the  basic 
objective  of  this  conference  was  to  introduce 
a  new  spirit  into  inter-American  relations.  I 
believe  that  that  has  been  achieved.  Then,  the 
problem  is  how  to  give  effect  to  this  new 
spirit  in  a  series  of  complete  fields.  Some  of 
these  fields  are  extremely  complicated:  the 
issue  of  transnational  corporations ;  the  issue 
of  investment  issues  and  how  to  deal  with 
them ;  the  issue  of  how  we  can  take  account 
of  the  concern  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  with  respect  to  American  legisla- 
tion such  as  the  Hickenlooper-Gonzalez 
amendment  and  how  this  concern  relates  to 
some  of  the  investment  issues.  All  of  this 
cannot  possibly  be  settled  at  this  meeting. 
However,  we  have  agreed  that  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  OAS  meeting  the  Foreign  Min- 
isters meeting  here  will  meet  again  in  an 
informal  atmosphere  and  continue  our  delib- 


erations on  issues  on  which  we  never  ex- 
pected to  come  to  a  final  conclusion  here. 

Other  issues — such  as  the  concept  of  eco- 
nomic collective  security,  which  is  of  great 
concern  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean, 
is  one  whose  basic  objectives  the  United 
States  can  accept;  but  having  stated  it,  the 
problem  is  how  to  give  it  concrete  meaning. 
The  United  States  has  agreed  already  last 
September,  and  has  reiterated  here,  that  the 
concept  put  forward  by  the  President  of 
Mexico  for  a  Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and 
Duties  can  be  a  useful  instrument  by  which 
the  nations  of  the  world  and  the  nations  of 
the  hemisphere  can  put  into  practice  this 
aspiration  for  economic  security  and  prog- 
ress, by  which  the  rights  and  obligations  of 
all  nations  can  be  expressed.  That,  too,  is  a 
process  that  will  continue  in  truth  at  the  next 
meeting  of  the  U.N.  committee  and  will  be 
perhaps  completed  at  the  sessions  of  the 
General  Assembly  in  the  fall. 

So  there  are  many  points  before  us.  For 
example,  the  United  States  has  offered  at 
this  meeting  that  we  study  and  give  special 
attention  to  the  petitions  made  by  the  coun- 
tries of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  for 
inclusion  in  our  list  after  the  Trade  Act  has 
passed.  However,  the  Trade  Act  remains  to 
be  passed.  We  have  offered  consultations 
prior  to  various  international  negotiations, 
such  as  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations, 
and  to  take  the  Latin  American  and  Carib- 
bean points  of  view  into  account  during  the 
negotiations.  We  have  agreed  in  principle 
here.  It  has  to  be  put  into  practice  later.  And 
let  me  say  right  now,  however  eloquent  or 
however  vague  the  final  declaration  that 
emerges  here,  all  of  us  here  have  been  to 
enough  international  conferences  to  know 
that  the  documents  are  soon  forgotten  if  they 
are  not  turned  into  a  living  reality  and  if 
they  do  not  lead  to  a  new  spirit  and  a  new 
attitude. 

The  test  of  what  we  achieve  here  is  not  the 
assessment  of  our  final  declaration,  which  we 
are  certain  will  be  satisfactory,  but  rather 
our  ability  to  put  in  practice  what  I  have 
tried  to  describe  here,  and  therefore  some  of 
the  decisions  will  be  taken  in  the  months 
and  years  ahead. 


March  18,  1974 


269 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  1965  the  United 
States  intervened  militarilij  in  the  Dominican 
Republic  in  response  to  military  actio7i  that 
occurred  there.  If  a  similar  thing  were  to 
occur,  would  you  support  an  invasion  of 
North  American  troops  onto  Doyninican  soil? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  stated  in  my  open- 
ing address  two  things  that  should  be  kept 
in  mind:  (1)  the  United  States  will  not  inter- 
fere in  the  domestic  affairs  of  its  sister  re- 
publics and  (2)  what  we  say  here  counts. 

I'll  take  two  more  questions. 

Q.  Returning  to  the  matter  of  the  sale  of 
automobiles  from  Argentina,  do  you  believe 
that  the  United  States  has  the  right  to  make 
a  decision  in  this  case?  Doesn't  this  constitute 
a  violation  of  the  sovereignty  of  Argentina? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  issue  that  has  to 
be  considered  is  the  relationship  of  a  decision 
of  the  Organization  of  American  States.  The 
general  legislation  of  the  United  States  with 
respect  to  companies  with  headquarters  in 
the  United  States  and  the  sovereign  right  of 
a  country  to  determine  its  own  laws — I  dis- 
cussed this  issue  with  the  Foreign  Minister 
of  Argentina  in  a  spirit  of  attempting  to  find 
a  constructive  solution,  and  until  we  have 
made  a  decision  that  we  can  communicate  to 
the  Argentine  Government,  which  it  has  a 
total  sovereign  right  to  accept  or  reject,  I 
do  not  think  it  would  be  appropriate  for  me 
to  engage  in  a  public  debate.  But  I  do  want 
to  say  that  the  discussions  that  took  place 
between  us  were  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation 
and  friendship. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  just  stated  that 
the  United  States  will  not  intervene  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  any  Latin  American  coun- 
try. Does  this  mean  that  in  this  meeting  there 
will  be  changes  or  that  the  mutual  military 
aid  treaty  will  be  abrogated  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Latin  American  coun- 
tries ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course  this  de- 
pends on  many  things.  We  would  not  in- 
terpret treaties  that  have  been  freely  entered 
into  by  sovereign  countries  as  an  interference 
in  their  domestic  affairs.  As  I  pointed  out  in 


my  speech,  there  are  a  number  of  realities 
that  we  all  have  to  face.  The  United  States, 
by  its  size,  its  weight,  its  power,  is  inevitably 
going  to  affect  the  Latin  American  and  Car- 
ibbean countries.  The  conduct  of  foreign 
policy  of  any  nation  to  some  extent  involves 
an  attempt  to  influence  the  action  of  other 
nations.  It  is  true  of  the  foreign  policy  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  accords  us,  and 
so  it  is  of  our  foreign  policy  toward  them. 
What  I  have  tried  to  say  here  is  that  we 
will  not  attempt  to  make  our  foreign  policy 
depend  on  a  particular  domestic  structure  of 
individual  countries;  that  beyond  what  is 
implicit  in  the  relationship  of  nations  to  each 
other  that  I  have  just  defined,  we  will  not 
interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  other 
states;  and  that  our  objective  is  to  bring 
about  a  world  in  which  the  nations  feel  that 
it  is  also  their  world  and  not  one  that  has 
been  imposed  upon  them.  But  that  is  a  monu- 
mental task  that  will  take  many  years  to 
achieve  and  in  which,  after  all,  the  nations 
themselves  can  judge  for  themselves  whether 
this  reflects  their  real  aspirations  or  not. 

The  press:  Thank  you  very  much. 


President  Nixon's  News  Conference 
of  February  25 

Following  are  excerpts  relating  to  foreign 
policy  from  the  transcript  of  a  news  con- 
ference held  by  President  Nixon  in  the  East 
Room  of  the  White  House  on  February  25.^ 


Q.  Mr.  President,  I  would  like  to  follow 
up  on  your  discussion  of  the  energy  situation. 
When  you  said  that  the  crisis  is  ended,  that 
the  problem  is  still  ivith  us,  I  think  for  most 
people  the  problem  is  ivaiting  for  a  long 
time  in  line  for  gasoline  and  another  part 
of  it  is  the  price  of  gasoline  going  up  as 
it  has  been.  What  can  you  tell  the  Ameri- 
can people  about  when  lines  for  gasoline 


'  For  the  complete  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  dated  Mar.  4. 


270 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


may  become  shorter  under  your  program, 
and  irhat  do  you  see  in  terms  of  the  future 
of  the  price  of  gasoline? 

President  Nixon:  I  believe  that  the  lines 
for  gasoline  will  become  shorter  in  the  spring 
and  summer  months.  In  fact,  that  is  the 
purpose  of  our  program  and  I  think  we  will 
achieve   it. 

As  far  as  the  price  of  gasoline  is  con- 
cerned, I  would  be  less  than  candid  if  I  were 
not  to  say  that  the  price  of  gasoline  is  not 
going  to  go  down  until  more  supplies  of 
gasoline  come  into  the  country  and  also 
until  other  fuels  come  on  stream  which  will 
reduce  the  pressure  which  is  upward  on  the 
price  of  gasoline. 

Obviously,  too,  when  the  embargo  is  lifted, 
that  is,  and  will  have  some  effect  on  the  price 
of  gasoline. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  ivhen  do  you  think  the 
embargo  might  be  lifted? 

President  Nixon:  The  embargo  question  is 
one  that  I  know  is  on  the  minds  of  all  of 
us,  and  it  is  one  that  presently  is  under  con- 
sideration, as  you  know,  by  the  oil-producing 
countries. 

I  should  point  out  here  that  Dr.  Kissinger's 
trip  to  the  Mideast  is  directed  toward  getting 
a  disengagement — or  getting  talks  started 
with  regard  to  a  disengagement  on  the 
Syrian  front.  That,  following  on  the  dis- 
engagement on  the  Egyptian  front,  I  think, 
will  have  a  positive  effect,  although  it  is  not 
linked  to  the  problem  of  the  embargo  di- 
rectly. 

If  I  could  perhaps  elaborate  just  a  bit 
on  that,  as  far  as  the  oil-producing  countries 
are  concerned  we  believe  it  is  in  their  in- 
terest to  lift  the  embargo.  They  should  do 
that  independently  of  what  happens  on  the 
front  of  the  negotiation  with  regard  to  de- 
veloping a  permanent  peace  in  the  Mideast. 

As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  believe 
that  getting  a  permanent  peace  in  the  Mid- 
east is  a  goal  worth  achieving  apart  from 
the  embargo. 

But  while  they  are  not  conditioned  on  one 
another  by  either  party,  what  happens  in 
one  area  inevitably  affects  what  happens  in 


the  other.  And  I  can  say,  based  on  the 
conversations  I  have  had  with  the  Foreign 
Ministers  I  met  with  last  week  and  based 
on  the  reports  I  have  received  to  date,  I 
believe  we  are  going  to  make  continued  prog- 
ress on  the  peace  front.  I  believe  that  will 
be  helpful  in  bringing  progress  on  getting 
the  embargo  lifted. 

By  the  same  token,  if  the  embargo  is  not 
lifted,  it  will  naturally  slow  down  the  efforts 
that  we  are  making  on  the  peace  front. 
And  it  is  because  I  believe  that  we  are  going 
to  make  progress  in  developing  those  par- 
ticular items  that  are  essential  toward  move- 
ment toward  a  permanent  peace  in  the  Mid- 
east that  the  oil-producing  countries  will 
conclude  that  they  should  move  on  the  em- 
bargo front. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  the  Shah  of  Iran  said 
in  an  interview  that  the  United  States  is 
getting  a^  much  oil  now  as  it  did.  before  the 
embargo,  and  Mr.  Simon  of  the  Federal  En- 
ergy Office  said  that  such  a  statement  is 
irresponsible  and  reckless.  Can  you  straight- 
en us  out?  Are  we  getting  as  much  oil,  and 
ivhy  would  the  Shah  say  this? 

President  Nixon:  Well,  first,  I  would  not 
say  that  the  Shah  was  irresponsible  and  reck- 
less. However,  his  information,  I  think,  is 
different  from  ours,  and  we  have  good  rea- 
son to  know  what  we  are  getting. 

We  are  getting  substantially  less  from  the 
oil-producing  countries  in  the  Mideast  than 
we  were  before  the  embargo.  That  is  why 
we  are  of  course  very  anxious  to  get  the 
embargo  lifted  as  soon  as  possible. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  what  is  your  personal 
reaction  to  the  expulsion  by  the  Soviet  Union 
of  Alexander  Solzhenitsyn,  and  will  it  in 
any  ivay  affect  our  policy  of  detente? 

President  Nixon:  Well,  my  personal  reac- 
tion is  that  I  am  of  course  an  admirer  of  a 
man  who  has  won  a  Nobel  Prize  for  litera- 
ture and  one  who  has  also  shown,  as  he  has 
shown,  such  great  courage. 


March   18,   1974 


271 


Second,  as  far  as  our  relations  with  the 
Soviets  are  concerned,  if  I  thought  that 
breaking  relations  with  the  Soviets  or  turn- 
ing off  our  policy  of  negotiation  and  turning 
back  to  confrontation  would  help  him  or 
help  thousands  of  others  like  him  in  the  So- 
viet Union,  we  might  do  that. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  look  back  to  the 
years  of  confrontation,  and  I  find  that  men 
like  him,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  rather  than  be- 
ing sent  to  Paris,  would  have  been  sent  to 
Siberia  or  probably  worse. 

As  far  as  our  relations  with  the  Soviets 
are  concerned,  we  shall  continue.  We  shall 
continue  to  negotiate,  recognizing  that  they 
don't  like  our  system  or  approve  of  it  and 
I  don't  like  their  system  or  approve  of  it. 

Mr.  Brezhnev  knows  that,  and  I  know  it, 
and  we  have  discussed  it  quite  bluntly  and 
directly.  However,  it  is  essential  that  both 
nations,  being  the  superpowers  that  we  are, 
continue  to  make  progress  toward  limiting 
arms,  toward  avoiding  confrontations  which 
might  explode  into  war,  as  it  might  have  in 
the  Mideast  if  we  had  not  had  this  period 
of  negotiation,  and  also  continuing  those  ne- 
gotiations for  reduction  of  forces  in  Europe 
and  reduction  of  arms  or  certainly  the  limi- 
tation of  arms  and  the  various  other  initia- 
tives that  we  are  undertaking  with  the  So- 
viets. 

In  a  nutshell,  this  is  what  we  have  to  con- 
sider: Do  we  want  to  go  back  to  a  period 
when  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Un- 
ion, the  two  great  superpowers,  stood  in 
confrontation  against  each  other  and  risk  a 
runaway  nuclear  arms  race  and  also  crisis 
in  Berlin,  in  the  Mideast,  even  again  in 
Southeast  Asia  or  other  places  of  the  world, 
or  do  we  want  to  continue  on  a  path  in 
which  we  recognize  our  differences  but  try 
to  recognize  also  the  fact  that  we  must 
either  live  together  or  we  will  all  die  to- 
gether? 

Q.  In  your  state  of  the  Union  address,  you 
mentioned  that  Arab  leaders  had  assured  you 
that  they  were  calling  an  urgent  meeting  to 
discuss  or  consider  the  lifting  of  the  em- 


bargo.  Were  you  misled  by  the  Arab  leaders, 
or  what  happened  to  that  meeting? 

President  Nixon:  Mr.  Lisagor  [Peter  Lisa- 
gor,  Chicago  Daily  News] ,  we  were  informed 
that  they  were  calling  an  urgent  meeting. 
We  expected  that  to  take  place  on  the  14th 
of  February.  But  the  Arab  leaders,  as  you 
know,  are  not  a  united  group  necessarily, 
and  that  is  an  understatement.  Under  the 
circumstances,  while  the  Arab  leaders  who 
had  given  us  this  assurance  tried  to  go  for- 
ward with  the  meeting,  they  were  unable  to 
get  the  cooperation  of  others. 

I  believe  now,  however,  that  they  will  get 
that  cooperation,  that  the  meeting  will  be 
held,  and  I  believe  that  they  will  lift  the 
embargo. 

The  press :  Thank  you,  Mr.  President. 


U.S.  and  Peru  Reach  Agreement 
on  Certain  Investment  Disputes 

Following  is  a  statement  by  President 
Nixon  issued  on  February  19,  together  with 
a  White  House  fact  sheet  released  to  the 
press  that  day. 

STATEMENT   BY  PRESIDENT  NIXON 

White  House  press  release  dated  February  19 

I  am  pleased  that  this  morning  in  Lima, 
Peru,  the  United  States  and  the  Government 
of  Peru  have  concluded  an  agreement  which 
resolves  a  number  of  investment  dispute 
problems  that  have  clouded  relations  between 
our  two  governments  for  the  past  five  years. 
This  agreement  is  consistent  with  my  deep 
concern  about  just  treatment  of  U.S.  invest- 
ments overseas  and  constitutes  another  step 
in  strengthening  the  mature  partnership  in 
this  hemisphere  to  which  I  am  strongly  com- 
mitted. 

Investment  disputes  in  recent  years  have 
unfortunately  troubled  our  traditionally  good 
relations  with  a  few  Latin  American  coun- 


272 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tries.  We  are  gratified  at  the  successful  out- 
come of  these  particular  negotiations.  The 
best  solution  to  these  problems  is  for  the 
parties  involved  to  settle  their  disputes  di- 
rectly. But  there  is  a  clear  need  for  a  new 
approach — for  a  way  to  solve  such  problems 
without  lengthy  negotiations  and  without 
complicating  good  relations  between  friends. 
We  should  establish  an  effective,  impartial 
mechanism  to  resolve  these  questions  within 
the  inter-American  family.  I  have  asked  the 
Secretary  of  State  to  explore  this  possibility 
when  he  meets  later  this  week  with  the  Latin 
American  and  Caribbean  Foreign  Ministers 
in  Mexico  City. 


WHITE   HOUSE   FACT  SHEET 

White  House  press  release  dated  February  19 

On  August  9,  1973,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Revolu- 
tionary Government  of  the  Armed  Forces  of 
Peru  announced  that  they  had  agreed  to  hold 
conversations  on  certain  aspects  of  some  U.S. 
investments  in  Peru  and  that  for  this  pur- 
pose President  Nixon  had  designated  Mr. 
James  R.  Greene  as  his  special  emissary. 
Following  the  announcement,  Mr.  Greene 
traveled  to  Peru  on  five  occasions  to  hold 
conversations  concerning  those  problems 
with  a  specially  designated  group  of  Minis- 
ters of  the  Government  of  Peru  under  the 
chairmanship  of  its  Prime  Minister,  Maj. 
Gen.  Edgardo  Mercado  Jarrin.  Mr.  Greene 
has  been  operating  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Council  on  International  Economic  Policy 
with  particular,  close  collaboration  with  the 
Departments  of  State  and  Treasury. 

As  a  result  of  those  conversations,  the 
Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Peru, 
desirous  of  arriving  at  a  definite  solution  of 
pending  problems,  signed  an  intergovern- 
mental agreement  at  Lima  on  February  19. 

The  objective  and  expectation  of  both  gov- 
ernments is  that  this  agreement  will  con- 
tribute to  the  improvement  of  their  relations, 
making  them  more  cordial  and  constructive. 

At  the  time  of  signature  of  the  agreement, 
the  Government  of  Peru  agreed  to  deliver  a 


lump  sum  of  $76  million  to  the  Government 
of  the  United  States.  The  distribution  of 
this  sum  falls  within  the  exclusive  compe- 
tence of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
without  any  responsibility  arising  therefrom 
on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  Peru.  The 
Government  of  the  United  States  will  deposit 
the  $76  million  in  a  trust  account  in  the  U.S. 
Treasury  until  distribution  pursuant  to  a 
determination  by  the  Secretary  of  State. 
The  process  of  identifying  valid  claims  and 
deciding  upon  the  distribution  of  the  money 
among  valid  claimants  is  expected  to  take 
some  time. 

In  connection  with  this  settlement,  the 
U.S.  Government,  through  its  good  offices, 
arranged  for  $74  million  in  direct  remit- 
tances from  the  Government  of  Peru  to  sev- 
eral U.S.  companies  with  assets  in  Peru 
which  were  either  expropriated  or  taken  per- 
manently by  the  Government  of  Peru  prior 
to  the  date  of  this  agreement. 


Defense  Articles  and   Services 
for  Cambodia 

Presidential  Determination  No.  74-12  i 

Determination  To  Authorize  the  Ordering  of 
Defense  Articles  From  Department  of  Defense 
Stocks  and  Defense  Services  for  Military  As- 
sistance to  Cambodia 

Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  State 

The  White  House, 
Washington,  December  2i,  1973. 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  Section 
506(a)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as 
amended,  I  hereby  determine  that  the  ordering  of  up 
to  $200  million  in  defense  articles  from  the  stocks  of 
the  Department  of  Defense  and  defense  services  to 
provide  military  assistance  for  Cambodia  is  in  the 
security  interests  of  the  United  States. 

This  Determination  shall  be  published  in  the  Fed- 
eral Register. 


(^/hjL^^^Hj/^ 


'  39  Fed.  Reg.  3539. 


March   18,   1974 


273 


The   U.S.   Government  Response  to  Terrorism: 
A  Global   Approach 

Address  by  Lewis  Hoffacker  ^ 


The  world  has  Uved  with  violence  and 
terror  since  the  beginning  of  time.  But  we 
now  are  experiencing  new  forms  of  inter- 
national terrorism  which  have  reached  the 
point  where  innocent  people  far  removed 
from  the  source  of  a  dispute  can  be  victim- 
ized. Nothing  has  more  dramatically  under- 
scored this  fact  than  the  cruel  tragedies  at 
the  Munich  Olympics  of  1972,  the  virtual 
epidemic  of  kidnapings  in  Latin  America, 
and  the  wanton  murder  of  two  of  our  dip- 
lomats and  a  Belgian  official  in  the  Sudan. 

These  and  other  incidents  bear  witness 
to  the  terrible  potential  of  a  disturbed  or 
determined  person  or  group  to  terrorize  the 
international  community.  Moreover,  this 
capability  for  traumatic  disruption  of  society 
appears  to  expand  with  the  increasing  tech- 
nological and  economic  complexity  of  our 
society  and  with  the  added  incentive  of  wide 
and  rapid  publicity. 

What  is  terrorism?  Last  summer  a  U.N. 
group  failed  to  agree  on  a  definition  of  the 
term  and  became  diverted  by  an  inconclusive 
discussion  of  the  causes  and  motives  of  ter- 
rorists. Such  disagreement,  however,  should 
not  deter  us  from  getting  on  with  the  busi- 
ness at  hand,  which  we,  for  our  working 
purposes,  regard  as  defense  against  violent 
attacks  by  politically  or  ideologically  moti- 
vated parties  on  innocent  bystanders  who  fall 
under  our   protective   responsibility.    I   am 


'  Made  before  the  Mayor's  Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Relations  and  Trade  and  the  Foreign 
Relations  Association  at  New  Orleans,  La.,  on  Feb. 
28.  Ambassador  Hoffacker  is  Special  Assistant  to 
the  Secretary  and  Coordinator  for  Combating  Ter- 
rorism. 


talking  primarily  of  Americans  abroad  and 
foreign  officials  and  their  families  in  this 
country.  At  the  same  time,  we  are  concerned 
with  terrorism  throughout  the  world,  even 
though  our  people  may  not  be  directly  in- 
volved, since  this  is  a  global  phenomenon 
to  which  we  are  all  vulnerable  and  which  we 
cannot  solve  without  global  attention. 

The  U.S.  Government  has  responded  forth- 
rightly  to  this  serious  challenge  in  fulfillment 
of  its  traditional  responsibilities  to  protect 
its  citizens  and  its  foreign  guests.  In  Sep- 
tember of  1972  President  Nixon  established 
a  Cabinet  Committee  To  Combat  Terrorism 
to  consider,  in  his  words,  "the  most  effective 
means  by  which  to  prevent  terrorism  here 
and  abroad."  The  Secretary  of  State  chairs 
this  Committee,  which  includes  also  the  Sec- 
retaries of  the  Treasury,  Defense,  and  Trans- 
portation, the  Attorney  General,  our  Ambas- 
sador to  the  United  Nations,  the  Director  of 
the  FBI,  and  the  President's  Assistants  on 
National  Security  and  Domestic  Afi'airs.  This 
body  is  directed  to  coordinate  interagency 
activity  for  the  prevention  of  terrorism  and, 
should  acts  of  terrorism  occur,  to  devise  pro- 
cedures for  reacting  swiftly  and  efi'ectively. 

Under  the  Cabinet  Committee,  a  Work- 
ing Group  composed  of  personally  designated 
senior  representatives  of  the  members  of  the 
Cabinet  Committee  meets  regularly.  It  is 
this  Group  which  I  chair  and  which  is  in 
daily  contact  as  issues  arise  and  incidents 
occur.  While  we  would  prefer  to  be  a  policy 
planning  body  dealing  in  preventive  meas- 
ures, we  are  geared  to  respond  to  emergen- 
cies. 


274 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Over  the  past  year  and  a  half,  this  inter- 
agency group  has  dealt  with  a  wide  variety 
of  matters  and  in  my  view  has  made  us  as 
a  government  more  effective  in  responding  to 
the  continuing  threat  from  a  variety  of  orga- 
nizations or  individuals  seeking  to  strike  at 
us  at  home  and  abroad.  This  is  not  to  say 
that  we  have  solved  all  the  problems  facing 
us.  But  we  are  using  governmentwide  re- 
sources to  better  advantage  and  have  at  least 
reduced  the  risk  to  our  people  and  our  for- 
eign guests.  We  must  face  the  reality  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  100  percent  se- 
curity. But  we  are  doing  our  job  if  we  re- 
duce risks  to  a  practical  minimum. 


Resources  To  Deter  Terrorism 

I  would  like  to  make  clear  at  the  outset 
that  individual  departments  and  agencies 
continue  to  manage  programs  dealing  with 
terrorism  under  their  respective  mandates. 
The  important  difference  is  that  these  efforts, 
which  individually  deserve  commendation, 
are  now  fully  coordinated  and  consequently 
are  greater  deterrents  to  potential  terrorists. 

Intelligence  is  one  of  our  more  valuable 
resources  in  this  self-defense  endeavor.  All 
security  agencies  have  improved  the  quality 
of  their  intelligence  relating  to  terrorism, 
and  the  Working  Group  insures  that  this 
product  is  fully  shared  and  coordinated 
throughout  the  government. 

Abroad,  security  at  our  embassies  and 
consulates  has  been  steadily  improved.  Last 
summer  the  President  submitted  to  the  Con- 
gress a  request  for  $21  million  for  personnel 
and  materials  to  better  our  overseas  security 
and,  hopefully,  reduce  the  risk  which  our  of- 
ficial personnel  suffer  throughout  the  world. 
These  funds  are  now  being  disbursed,  based 
on  highest  priority  needs  at  our  posts  abroad. 

We  are  mindful  that  our  mandate  also 
covers  private  citizens  as  well  as  American 
officials.  For  example,  we  are  pleased  to  ad- 
vise American  businessmen  with  overseas 
interests.  Qur  embassies  and  consulates  are 
in  constant  touch  with  American  businesses 
abroad,  especially  in  such  places  as  Argen- 


tina, where  they  are  particularly  vulnerable. 
We  are  prepared  to  share  with  them  security 
techniques  and  experiences.  Although  we 
may  not  agree  on  tactics  such  as  the  advisa- 
bility of  paying  ransom,  it  is  important  that 
we  stick  together  in  tight  situations  such  as 
Buenos  Aires,  where  terrorists  have  taken 
advantage  of  serious  internal  security  defi- 
ciencies to  kidnap  businessmen  for  increas- 
ingly higher  ransoms.  We  were  concerned 
with  the  Bank  of  America  case  in  Beirut, 
where  a  representative  of  Douglas  Aircraft 
was  murdered  by  bank  robbers  posing  un- 
convincingly  as  fedayeen. 

Visa,  immigration,  and  customs  procedures 
have  been  tightened.  The  regulation  allowing 
a  foreigner  to  transit  the  United  States  with- 
out a  visa  has  been  suspended  except  for 
passengers  with  immediate  onward  reserva- 
tions to  a  point  outside  the  United  States. 
This  suspension  applies  to  every  traveler  on 
a  nondiscriminatory  basis  and  closes  a  loop- 
hole through  which  600,000  visitors  per  year 
formerly  passed. 

In  several  categories  of  visa  applicants 
which  have  been  particularly  susceptible  to 
terrorist  penetration,  deeper  screening  of  ap- 
plications has  shown  some  useful  results. 

In  the  fall  of  1972  Congress  approved  a 
public  law  aimed  at  increasing  protection  for 
foreign  officials  and  their  immediate  families 
in  this  country  through  the  creation  of  Fed- 
eral criminal  offenses  for  various  acts  di- 
rected at  them  and  at  other  official  guests. 
Under  this  legislation  the  FBI  has  investi- 
gative jurisdiction  concurrent  with  that  al- 
ready held  by  local  law  enforcement  author- 
ities. This  expanded  legal  coverage  of  our 
foreign  guests  will,  hopefully,  add  a  further 
deterrent  to  those  who  might  be  tempted  to 
molest  them.  There  has  been  one  conviction 
under  this  law,  and  several  other  cases  are 
now  before  Federal  courts  or  are  expected 
to  be  submitted  soon. 

For  some  time  the  Postal  Service  has 
alerted  post  offices  and  other  likely  targets 
of  letter-bomb  activity.  Many  hundreds  of 
such  devices  have  been  circulating  interna- 
tionally. Some  have  been  intercepted  in  this 
country   by   alert   customs   and   postal    em- 


March   18,   1974 


275 


ployees,  with  one  injury  sustained  by  a  postal 
clerk  in  the  process.  Unfortunately  a  letter 
bomb  exploded  in  the  British  Embassy  last 
September,  maiming  a  secretary  and  illus- 
trating dramatically  that  international  ter- 
rorists can  probably  penetrate  our  security 
screen. 

Hijacking  within  the  United  States  has 
fallen  off  significantly  since  the  beginning  of 
last  year.  This  happy  trend  is  not  just  a 
stroke  of  luck.  Aside  from  the  rigorous  air- 
port security  program  now  underway,  a  prin- 
cipal factor  in  this  favorable  evolution  is  the 
bilateral  agreement  with  Cuba  whereby  hi- 
jackers are  denied  asylum  in  that  country. 
Other  countries,  with  or  without  our  encour- 
agement, have  taken  similar  steps  to  close 
their  doors  to  individuals  who  look  for  refuge 
from  prosecution  after  a  hijacking.  Let  us 
recall,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  domestic 
variety  of  hijacker  in  the  United  States  is 
usually  different  from  those  who  operate 
abroad,  often  with  special  ruthlessness,  under 
the  control  of  terrorist  organizations. 

U.S.  International  Initiatives 

The  United  States  has  been  busy  interna- 
tionally. We  have  been  in  the  forefront  of 
those  who  have  sought  tightened  interna- 
tional air  security. 

We  have  pressed  for  three  important  mul- 
tilateral conventions  dealing  with  hijacking: 
the  1963  Tokyo  Convention,  which  in  effect 
requires  countries  to  return  a  plane  and 
passengers  if  it  has  been  hijacked;  the  1970 
Hague  Convention,  which  says  that  countries 
should  either  extradite  or  prosecute  the  sky- 
jackers; and  the  1971  Montreal  Convention, 
requiring  that  any  kind  of  sabotage  of  avia- 
tion such  as  blowing  up  planes  on  the  ground 
be  dealt  with  by  prosecution  or  extradition 
of  the  offenders.  We  had  modest  expectations 
as  we  sent  a  delegation  to  two  conferences 
in  Rome  last  summer  in  the  hope  that  the 
international  community  would  advance  a 
step  forward  in  tightening  controls  on  sky- 
jackers and  aerial  saboteurs. 

Despite  our  disappointment  over  the 
meager  results  in  Rome,  we  are  confident 
that  there  remains  a  sufficient  sense  of  inter- 


national responsibility  and  national  self- 
interest  to  make  possible  other  steps  to  dis- 
courage those  who  would  threaten  interna- 
tional air  travelers.  For  one  thing,  we  are 
seeing  a  steady  stream  of  accessions  to  the 
aforementioned  conventions  by  countries  rep- 
resenting all  ideologies.  This  in  itself  should 
have  a  good  deterrent  effect. 

In  Interpol  [International  Criminal  Police 
Organization] ,  in  the  Organization  of  Amer- 
ican States,  and  in  other  appropriate  forums, 
we  achieve  what  is  feasible  in  the  way  of 
multilateral  discouragement  of  the  interna- 
tional terrorist.  Simultaneously  we  maintain 
quiet  liaison  with  individual  governments 
which  share  our  abhorrence  of  terrorism.  We 
are  pleased  to  assist  others  when  they  suffer 
hijackings  by  providing  communications  and 
other  services  even  though  the  affected  plane 
may  not  be  over  or  in  our  country. 

At  the  United  Nations  in  1972  we  sought 
to  prohibit  the  export  of  violence  to  inno- 
cent persons  who  are  many  countries,  some- 
times continents,  removed  from  the  scene  of 
a  conflict.  This  approach  became  bogged 
down  in  debate  over  what  some  countries 
called  justifiable,  as  opposed  to  illegal,  vio- 
lence even  against  innocent  parties.  Accord- 
ingly, for  the  time  being  we  have  narrowed 
our  objectives  to  more  specific  categories  of 
offenses  which,  because  of  grave  and  inhu- 
man effect  on  innocent  individuals  or  because 
of  their  serious  interference  with  the  vital 
machinery  of  international  life,  should  be 
condemned  by  states  of  every  ideology  and 
alignment.  We  therefore  supported  in  the 
last  General  Assembly  a  convention  for  pro- 
tection of  diplomats.  The  Assembly  agreed 
in  December  to  this  measure,  which  requires 
that  persons  who  attack  or  kidnap  diplomats 
or  officials  of  foreign  governments  or  inter- 
national organizations  be  extradited  or  pros- 
ecuted. 

Dealing  With  Crisis  Situations 

If  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts,  an  act  of 
terrorism  should  occur,  we  are  prepared  to 
deal  with  it  as  swiftly  and  effectively  as 
possible.  Within  the  State  Department,  task 
forces  can  be  assembled  on  short  notice  to 


276 


Department  of  Stote  Bulletin 


manage  such  critical  events  as  the  Southern 
Airways  hijacking,  the  seizure  of  American 
diplomats  in  Haiti,  the  murder  of  two  of 
our  officers  in  the  Sudan,  the  kidnaping  of 
our  consul  general  in  Guadalajara,  the  hi- 
jacking last  summer  of  the  Japanese  airliner 
out  of  Amsterdam,  the  attack  on  emigrant 
Jews  in  Austria  last  fall,  various  incidents 
at  Rome  and  Athens  airports,  and  the  recent 
terrorism  in  Karachi  and  Singapore  harbors 
and  in  Kuwait. 

Such  task  forces  are  composed  of  selected 
specialists  who  can  call  on  the  full  resources 
of  the  U.S.  Government  to  rescue,  or  at  least 
to  monitor,  the  beleaguered  parties.  The 
State  Department  Operations  Center,  which 
is  the  site  of  such  task  forces,  is  in  instant 
contact  with  the  White  House,  Pentagon, 
CIA,  and  other  agencies  concerned,  as  well 
as  with  foreign  governments  and  overseas 
posts.  By  swift  and  intelligent  action  in 
such  circumstances  we,  hopefully,  can  over- 
come the  terrorists  by  one  means  or  another. 

Firmness  in   Response  to  Terrorism 

Tactics  vary  in  each  crisis  situation,  but 
one  consistent  factor  should  be  understood 
by  all  parties  concerned:  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment will  not  pay  ransom  to  kidnapers.  We 
urge  other  governments  and  individuals  to 
adopt  the  same  position,  to  resist  other  forms 
of  blackmail,  and  to  apprehend  the  criminal 
attackers. 

I  hasten  to  underline  the  importance  which 
we  attach  to  human  life.  We  do  not  glibly 
sacrifice  hostages  for  the  sake  of  this  ad- 
mittedly firm  policy.  We  believe  that  firm- 
ness in  response  to  terrorists'  threats,  if  ap- 
plied with  the  best  diplomacy  we  can  muster, 
can  save  lives  in  the  long  run  and  probably 
in  the  short  run  as  well. 

We  have  had  more  terrorist  experiences 
than  we  had  anticipated  in  the  past  five 
years,  during  which  period  25  of  our  officials 
abroad  who  normally  enjoy  diplomatic  pro- 
tection were  kidnaped.  Ten  of  these  indi- 
viduals were  murdered  and  12  wounded. 
When  we  Foreign  Service  people  elected  to 
follow  this  career,  we  appreciated  that  there 
were   risks  different  in  type  and  intensity 


from  those  to  which  we  are  exposed  in  this 
country.  Abi-oad  we  experience  increased 
threats  of  subversion,  kidnaping,  blackmail, 
civil  disturbances,  and  politically  motivated 
violence,  including  assassination. 

In  my  23  years'  Foreign  Service  experi- 
ence, mostly  abroad  in  the  Middle  East  and 
Africa,  I  have  not  seen  any  of  our  people 
behave  cowardly  in  a  dangerous  situation. 
We  have  learnad  to  take  reasonable  precau- 
tions. We  do  not  want  to  live  in  fortresses 
or  armed  camps.  We  use  ingenuity  to  reduce 
risks.  Most  importantly,  we  must  remind 
the  host  government  of  its  undoubted  respon- 
sibility for  protecting  foreigners  within  its 
territory.  I  recall,  for  example,  when  I  was 
once  put  under  house  arrest  by  an  angry 
Minister,  I  reminded  him  and  his  government 
that  that  government  continued  to  be  respon- 
sible for  my  personal  security  and  would  face 
dire  consequences  if  anything  happened  to 
me.  I  am  glad  to  report  that  my  consular 
colleagues  rallied  round  me  and  after  a  week 
I  was  able  to  resume  my  normal  movements. 

It  would  be  unfair  to  assign  labels  to 
countries  as  to  their  hawklike  or  dovelike 
qualities  in  facing  up  to  the  terrorist  chal- 
lenge. Each  country  naturally  performs  in 
the  light  of  its  own  interests,  which  may 
vary  from  case  to  case.  Some  are  more 
cautious  than  others  to  avoid  provoking  mili- 
tants who  engage  in  terrorism.  Even  coun- 
tries friendly  to  us  are  understandably  self- 
ish about  their  sovereign  right  to  decide  what 
is  best  in  a  terrorist  confrontation;  e.g., 
whether  or  not  to  yield  to  demands  for  ran- 
som, release  of  prisoners,  et  cetera.  More- 
over, we  in  the  United  States  have  not  found 
ourselves  in  excruciating  circumstances  such 
as  some  countries  like  Haiti  or  Mexico  have 
undergone  with  foreign  diplomats  held  in 
their  territory  under  terrorists'  guns. 

The  U.S.  approach  to  counterterrorism  is 
based  on  the  principle  derived  from  our  lib- 
eral heritage,  as  well  as  from  the  U.N.  Dec- 
laration of  Human  Rights,  which  affirms  that 
every  human  being  has  a  right  to  life,  liberty, 
and  "security  of  person."  Yet  the  violence 
of  international  terrorism  violates  that  prin- 
ciple.   The  issue  is  not  war.    The  issue  is 


March   18,   1974 


277 


not  the  strivings  of  people  to  achieve  self- 
determination  and  independence.  Rather  the 
issue  is — and  here  I  quote  from  former  Sec- 
retary of  State  Rogers  before  the  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly: " 

(The  issue  is)  whether  millions  of  air  travelers 
can  continue  to  fly  in  safety  each  year.  It  is  whether 
a  person  who  receives  a  letter  can  open  it  without 
fear  of  being  blown  up.  It  is  whether  diplomats  can 
safely  carry  out  their  duties.  It  is  whether  interna- 
tional meetings — like  the  Olympic  games,  like  this 
Assembly — can  proceed  without  the  ever-present 
threat  of  violence. 

In  short,  the  issue  is  whether  the  vulnerable  lines 
of  international  communication — the  airways  and  the 
mails,  diplomatic  discourse  and  international  meet- 
ings— can  continue,  without  disruption,  to  bring 
nations  and  peoples  together.  All  who  have  a  stake 
in  this  have  a  stake  in  decisive  action  to  suppress 
these  demented  acts  of  terrorism. 

We  are  all  aware  that,  aside  from  the  psychotic 
and  the  purely  felonious,  many  criminal  acts  of  ter- 
rorism derive  from  political  origins.  We  all  recog- 
nize that  issues  such  as  self-determination  must  con- 
tinue to  be  addressed  seriously  by  the  international 
community.  But  political  passion,  however  deeply 
held,  cannot  be  a  justification  for  criminal  violence 
against  innocent  persons. 

The  United  States  has  attempted  to  show 
leadership  in  stimulating  a  global  preoccupa- 
tion with  this  apparently  growing  interna- 
tional threat.  We  have  not  achieved  all  that 
we  have  sought  in  international  cooperation. 
Our  multilateral,  bilateral,  and  unilateral  ef- 
forts must  continue  because  the  outlook  is 
not  as  promising  as  it  might  be.  There 
seems  to  be  increased  collaboration  among 
terrorist  groups  of  different  nationalities. 
Such  groups  seem  to  be  moving  farther  and 
farther  afield,  including  toward  North  Amer- 
ica. There  is,  moreover,  evidence  of  ample 
financial  sources  for  some  terrorist  groups 
not  only  from  ransoms  collected  but  also 
from  governments  which,  for  one  reason  or 
another,  are  sympathetic  toward  certain  ter- 
rorist groups.   And  last  but  not  least,  there 


"  For  Secretary  Rogers'  statement  before  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  Sept.  25,  1972,  see  BULLETIN  of 
Oct.  16,  1972,  p.  425. 


seems  to  be  no  shortage  of  politico-economic- 
social  frustrations  to  spawn  terrorists  on 
all  continents. 

Accordingly,  we  must  increase  our  vigi- 
lance, our  expertise,  and  our  determination  in 
the  face  of  what  may  be  an  expanding  threat 
to  our  personnel  and  other  interests  abroad, 
as  well  as  on  the  homefront.  In  fact,  this 
global  epidemic  still  threatens  the  very  fabric 
of  international  order. 

We  as  a  government  must  be  cool  and 
tough — and  I  might  add,  sensitive — in  re- 
sponding to  these  vicious  attacks  against  our 
citizens  and  other  interests.  As  we  seek  to 
defend  ourselves  against  this  viciousness,  we 
are  not  unmindful  of  the  motivation  inspir- 
ing the  frustrated  political  terrorist  who 
feels  he  has  no  other  way  to  deal  with  his 
grievances  than  by  terrorist  action.  As  ways 
are  found  to  convince  him  to  reason  other- 
wise, he  must  be  made  to  understand  now 
that  it  is  unprofitable  for  him  to  attack  in- 
nocent bystanders. 

In  the  meantime  also,  we  as  a  government 
have  a  continuing  obligation  to  safeguard 
the  most  fundamental  right  of  all — -the  right 
of  life.  There  is  no  reason  why  protection 
of  this  right  and  of  our  citizens  need  neces- 
sarily conflict  with  other  human  rights  such 
as  self-determination  and  individual  liberty. 


Ambassador  Vance  Represents  U.S. 
at  U.N.  Narcotics  Commission  Session 

President  Nixon  announced  on  February  6 
(White  House  press  release)  the  designation 
of  Sheldon  B.  Vance,  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Zaire,  as  the  Representative  of  the  United 
States  to  the  Third  Special  Session  of  the 
Commission  on  Narcotic  Drugs  of  the  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Council  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, scheduled  to  be  held  at  Geneva  Febru- 
ary 17-March  1.  (For  biographic  data,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  February  6.) 


278 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  CONGRESS 


The  Impact  of  the  Middle  East  Crisis  on  the  Atlantic  Alliance 


Following  are  statements  by  Arthur  A. 
Hartman,  Assistant  Secretary  for  European 
Affairs,  and  Rodger  P.  Davies,  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs,  made  before  a  joint  hearing  of 
the  Subcommittee  on  Europe  and  the  Sub- 
committee on  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  February  19.^ 


STATEMENT  BY  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  HARTMAN 

In  late  November,  when  Secretary  Kissin- 
ger was  asked  at  a  press  conference  to  assess 
the  effect  of  the  Middle  East  crisis  on  the 
North  Atlantic  alliance,  he  significantly  be- 
gan his  response  by  stressing  that  NATO 
remains  the  core  of  American  foreign  policy. 
Similarly,  in  a  discussion  of  the  subject  at 
hand  today,  it  is  essential  to  place  recent 
developments  in  perspective  and  to  begin  at 
the  beginning;  that  is,  to  keep  in  mind  that 
in  our  view  nothing  has  changed  the  fact  that 
the  alliance  remains  the  foundation  of  our 
foreign  policy  and  remains  essential  to  the 
peace,  stability,  and  economic  welfare  of  the 
world.  This  is  why  the  overriding  aim  of 
our  European  policy  during  most  of  the  past 
year,  as  you  know,  has  been  directed  toward 
the  revitalization,  not  the  deemphasis,  of  the 
alliance.  Whatever  differences  have  arisen 
over  the  Middle  East  crisis  or  any  other  issue, 
we  and  our  allies  are  convinced  that  NATO 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing. Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


is  still  relevant  and  vital  to  the  security  of 
the  West. 

This  is  neither  to  make  light  of  the  differ- 
ences that  occurred  last  fall  nor  to  withdraw 
one  word  of  our  critical  reaction  to  them. 
But  we  must,  especially  with  the  distance  of 
several  months  now,  begin  to  look  at  the  dis- 
agreement in  an  objective  way.  Only  in  this 
way  will  it  be  possible  for  all  members  of 
the  alliance  to  evaluate  the  past  and,  above 
all,  to  learn  from  the  past.  This,  I  assume,  is 
the  purpose  of  your  hearings  today,  and  I 
approach  them  in  this  spirit. 

With  the  outbreak  of  fighting  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  we  devoted  all  our  diplomatic  ef- 
forts to  bringing  the  hostilities  to  an  end  as 
soon  as  possible,  to  achieving  a  cease-fire 
agreement  that  would  lead  to  a  negotiated 
settlement,  and  finally,  to  limiting  Soviet 
and  radical  Arab  influences  in  the  area. 
When  the  hostilities  continued  and  when  the 
Soviets  began  airlifting  large  quantities  of 
military  equipment  to  the  Middle  East,  we 
confronted  the  threat  of  an  Arab  victory 
gained  through  Soviet  arms.  We  had  no 
choice  but  to  match  the  Soviet  airlift.  The 
situation  became  still  more  grave,  however, 
when  the  Soviets  launched  a  series  of  menac- 
ing military  and  diplomatic  initiatives,  with 
the  result  that  we  had  to  place  our  own  forces 
on  alert.  The  introduction  of  Soviet  combat 
forces  into  the  Middle  East,  which  is  what 
was  threatened,  would  have  fundamentally 
altered  the  East-West  political  and  military 
balance,  with  incalculable  results. 

Mr.  Davies  will  develop  these  points  in  his 
remarks,  and  I  outline  the  course  of  events 


March   18,   1974 


279 


in  passing  only  to  show  why  we  were  con- 
vinced that  our  aims  wei'e  as  much  in  West- 
ern European  interests  as  in  our  own.  We 
also  believed  that  the  failure  of  the  European 
allies  to  give  us  their  fullest  support  not 
only  demonstrated  a  regrettable  lack  of  alli- 
ance, solidarity  but  also  placed  Europe's  own 
long-term  security  at  risk.  I  should  like  to 
emphasize  that  we  do  not  question  Europe's 
right  to  its  own  view  regarding  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  in  itself.  What  we  did  not 
understand,  and  what  disappointed  us,  was 
the  failure  of  the  European  allies  to  appreci- 
ate the  extent  of  the  Soviet  threat  in  the 
Middle  East  and  their  consequent  reluctance 
fully  to  support  our  operations  during  the 
crisis. 

How  did  these  differences  arise?  I  believe 
there  can  be  no  question  that  European  gov- 
ernments are  all  committed  in  a  general  way 
to  the  existence  of  a  secure  Israeli  state. 
However,  some  allies  have  closer  links  to  the 
Arabs  than  to  Israel,  and  many  have  long 
had  a  different  perception  than  we  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  situation,  at  least  since  1967. 
As  a  consequence,  several  European  states 
— among  them  Greece,  Turkey,  and  Spain — 
publicly  declared  themselves  neutral  in  the 
conflict. 

A  more  significant  consideration  than  this 
was  the  drastic  European  dependence  on 
Arab  oil  supplies.  You  have  requested  some 
precise  information  on  this  subject,  and  we 
have,  in  response,  drawn  up  a  chart  with  a 
country-by-country  breakdown  of  the  figures. 
The  figures  suggest  why  European  govern- 
ments in  varying  degrees  felt  themselves  hos- 
tage to  Arab  policies.  In  short,  the  European 
allies  simply  assessed  their  national  interests 
in  a  different  way  than  we  did  ours. 

The  allies  also  differed  with  us  regarding 
the  relationship  of  the  crisis  to  NATO.  We 
felt  the  situation,  as  it  developed  in  the 
Middle  East,  ultimately  constituted  a  threat 
to  the  members  of  the  alliance.  But  it  is  true 
that  while  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  em- 
bodies specific  commitments  with  respect  to 
the  treaty  area  itself,  it  does  not  oblige  mem- 
bers to  support  the  policies  of  other  members 
outside  the  treaty  area.  Throughout  NATO's 
history,  member  governments  have  had  sharp 


disagreement  over  this  issue.  In  the  1950's, 
for  example,  the  French  complained  about 
our  lack  of  support  for  their  policy  in  Al- 
geria. So  it  is  not  surprising  that  when  last 
fall's  Middle  East  conflict  occurred,  some  of 
the  allies  observed  that  the  alliance  had  never 
had  a  unified  view  on  the  Middle  East. 

Moreover,  there  were  complaints  that  we 
did  not  keep  the  allies  well  enough  informed 
and  failed  to  consult  with  them  in  a  timely 
way.  It  is  possible,  if  not  probable,  that  the 
European  allies  did  not  possess  the  informa- 
tion we  had  at  our  disposal ;  and  in  the  crisis 
situation  at  the  time  we  were  unable  to  con- 
vey all  this  information  and  our  evaluation 
of  it.  Most  significantly,  perhaps,  the  allies 
appear  not  to  have  believed  that  Soviet  ac- 
tions in  the  area  threatened  to  alter  the 
delicate  balance  in  the  Middle  East  in  a  way 
that  could  be  turned  against  the  West  as  a 
whole. 

And  it  is  over  this  point  that  the  gulf  in 
the  alliance  developed,  with  the  result  that 
the  allies  did  not  reach  the  conclusions  we 
reached  nor  did  they  give  us  the  support  we 
thought  we  deserved.  What  we  found  most 
disturbing  was  that  the  European  allies  evi- 
dently did  not  take  into  account  the  dangers 
for  the  alliance  and  for  the  West  which  were 
inherent  in  the  Soviet  effort  to  upset  the 
precarious  balance  in  the  Middle  East  and 
possibly  to  establish  a  military  presence 
there.  Although  outside  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  area,  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East 
obviously  affects  in  a  vital  and  direct  way 
the  overall  security  of  the  members  of  the 
alliance.  We  have  never  disguised  our  dis- 
appointment. Both  in  diplomatic  channels 
and  publicly,  we  made  our  concern  known  to 
the  allies. 

With  respect  to  the  allied  reaction  to  our 
resupply  operations,  I  should  like  to  make  a 
number  of  observations.  Here,  as  with  other 
aspects  of  our  Middle  East  policy,  none  of 
the  allies  criticized  our  fundamental  aims  or 
policies.  However,  given  their  neutral  stance, 
several  countries — among  them  Greece,  Tur- 
key, and  Spain — publicly  declared  that  our 
bases  in  those  countries  could  not  be  used  in 
connection  with  the  Middle  East  crisis.  The 
Spanish  Government  cited  the  terms  of  our 


280 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


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281 


base  agreement.  The  Greek  Government 
stated  that  it  could  not  participate  in  any 
direct  or  indirect  activities  which  might  lead 
to  eventual  actions  against  the  Arab  states. 
And  it  was  similarly  the  publicly  expressed 
view  of  the  Turkish  Government  that  facili- 
ties available  to  the  United  States  were  for 
use  only  in  jointly  agreed  NATO  defense 
operations.  But  the  fact  is  that  no  requests 
were  made  to  these  countries  for  landing  or 
overflight  rights.  Because  we  could  use  our 
bases  in  the  Azores,  we  did  not  have  to  de- 
pend upon  overflight  or  landing  rights  else- 
where. 

There  has  been  some  speculation  that  the 
difi'erences  within  the  alliance  were,  in  part 
at  least,  the  result  of  our  failure  adequately 
to  consult  with  the  allies.  However,  as  Sec- 
retary Kissinger  pointed  out  last  fall,  the 
facts  are  that  the  countries  which  were  most 
thoroughly  consulted  found  it  most  difficult 
to  cooperate  while  those  who  were  most  co- 
operative appeared  to  require  less  consulta- 
tion. Nonetheless,  we  informed  the  allies,  as 
a  result  of  the  disagreements  over  the  Middle 
East,  that  we  were  willing  to  review  our 
consultation  procedures  and  to  improve  con- 
sultative mechanisms  where  improvements 
seem  desirable.  At  the  December  meeting  of 
the  NATO  Foreign  Ministers,  we  conse- 
quently made  specific  suggestions  on  how  the 
alliance  might  intensify  consultation  in  the 
future. 

I  am  convinced  that  whatever  strains  re- 
sulted from  the  Middle  East  crisis,  there  has 
been  no  fundamental  or  permanent  damage 
to  the  alliance.  Proof  of  this,  I  think,  is  that 
virtually  all  of  our  European  allies  have  been 
making  strong  efforts  to  be  cooperative  with 
us  in  the  energy  field. 

Although  there  was  some  apprehension 
beforehand  that  the  recent  Energy  Confer- 
ence might  risk  a  producer-consumer  con- 
frontation, the  general  European  response  to 
our  proposal  reflected  a  strong  desire  to  work 
with  us  to  make  the  conference  a  success  and 
to  mend  whatever  harm  was  done  to  relation- 
ships as  a  result  of  the  Middle  East  crisis. 
This    determination    was    quite   clearly    re- 


flected in  the  vote  of  the  conference  on  the 
final  communique,  which  was  unanimous 
except  for  France.  But  even  the  fact  that  we 
diff'ered  with  France  does  not,  as  Secretary 
Kissinger  said  to  the  press  at  the  conclusion 
of  the  conference  last  week,  obscure  the  fact 
that  close  American  ties  with  Western  Eu- 
rope are  as  essential  as  ever  to  the  security 
of  us  all.  We  regarded  such  differences  as 
existed  during  the  conference  as  unavoidable 
at  a  conference  of  free  countries,  and  we  are 
convinced  that  the  results  of  the  conference 
will  strengthen  the  alliance,  for  it  has  shown 
the  effectiveness  of  full  and  candid  consulta- 
tion on  a  topic  of  overriding  concern  to  us  all. 

This  brings  me  back  to  the  point  where 
I  began.  Despite  allied  differences,  and  de- 
spite our  own  keen  disappointment  with  some 
of  the  allies  during  the  Middle  East  crisis, 
NATO  proved  itself  strong  enough  to  survive 
a  situation  where  we  had  to  agree  to  dis- 
agree. We  must  now  look  to  the  future:  to 
strengthen  the  alliance,  to  reach  agreement 
within  NATO  on  closer  cooperation  and  bet- 
ter consultation,  and  to  decide  where  mem- 
bers of  the  alliance  must  act  together  and 
where  they  can  legitimately  act  independ- 
ently. 

Beginning  last  April,  Secretary  Kissinger 
had  embarked  on  just  such  a  course.  He 
asked,  not  in  particular  anticipation  of  this 
problem,  that  our  allies  join  us  in  an  effort 
to  search  for  new  means  to  carry  out  our 
common  purposes  and  indeed  to  redefine 
these  common  purposes.  We  are  well  on  our 
way  to  formulating  these  common  views ;  and 
while  that  alone  will  not  solve  our  problems, 
it  may  offer  us  a  better  basis  for  consulta- 
tions in  the  future. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.   DAVIES 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss  with 
you  last  fall's  Arab-Israeli  conflict  and  its 
impact  on  our  relations  with  two  of  our 
NATO  allies,  Greece  and  Turkey.  I  have  a 
brief  statement  to  make,  and  then  I  shall  be 
happy  to  try  to  answer  your  questions. 


282 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  position  which  the  Governments  of 
Greece  and  Turkey  adopted  during  the  Oc- 
tober war  naturally  reflected  longstanding 
attitudes  of  these  two  countries  toward  their 
neighbors  in  the  Near  East. 

In  the  case  of  Greece,  there  has  tradition- 
ally been  a  strong  interest  in  that  area  not 
only  because  of  geographical  proximity  but 
also  because  of  commercial  interests,  includ- 
ing oil  interests,  and  because  of  the  presence 
of  a  fairly  large  number  of  Greeks  residing 
in  the  Arab  countries.  The  Greeks  have  also 
had  a  special  interest  in  Jerusalem  because 
of  the  presence  in  the  Old  City  of  the  Ortho- 
dox Patriarchate.  For  these  reasons,  Greek 
governments  have  consistently  sought  to 
maintain  friendly  ties  with  the  Arab  nations. 
Greece,  however,  recognizes  the  State  of 
Israel  and  maintains  diplomatic  relations 
with  it.  Greece  has  also  supported  the  imple- 
mentation of  Resolution  242  of  the  Security 
Council  and  other  U.N.  efforts  to  achieve 
peace  in  the  Near  East. 

Shortly  after  fighting  began  last  fall,  the 
then  Foreign  Minister  of  Greece  made  the 
following  statement: 

Greece's  friendly  relations  with  Arab  countries  ex- 
clude any  participation,  either  direct  or  indirect,  in 
an  eventual  action  aimed  against  them.  That  state- 
ment which  was  made  in  August  1972  not  only  ap- 
plies also  today,  but  in  addition  lies  within  the  frame- 
work of  neutrality  which  our  position  imposes  in 
view  of  the  military  operations  in  the  Middle  East. 
Naturally,  Greece  follows  with  vigilance  the  develop- 
ment of  the  present  crisis,  and  feels  that  it  is  time 
for  an  activation  of  all  international  factors,  which 
are  interested,  but  also  bear  responsibility  for  the 
suspension  of  hostilities  and  restoration  of  calm. 

Later  the  Greek  Government  offered  to 
place  observers  or  military  units  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  United  Nations  for  dispatch  to 
the  Near  East. 

Though  the  Greek  Government  remained 
neutral  during  the  conflict,  it  was  also  highly 
conscious  of  the  increased  Soviet  military 
activity  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean  and  of 
the  implications  of  this  activity  for  the 
NATO  alliance.  Thus,  the  Greeks  were  fully 
cooperative  in  allowing  access  to  our  commu- 
nications facilities  in  Greece  and  to  other 


facilities,  such  as  Athenai  Airbase  and  Souda 
Bay  Airfield.  There  were  no  restrictions 
placed  on  the  movements  of  6th  Fleet  vessels 
homeported  in  the  Athens  area,  or  on  the 
use  of  logistical  facilities  for  the  resupply 
of  the  6th  Fleet.  This  security  relationship 
was  an  important  ingredient  in  the  strength 
of  the  political-military  posture  of  the  United 
States  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean  during 
this  crisis.  In  sum,  we  consider  that  within 
the  framework  of  its  policy  of  neutrality, 
the  Greek  Government  played  a  constructive 
role  during  the  Near  East  conflict. 

Turkey's  history  and  geographic  situation 
have  led  successive  Turkish  governments  to 
maintain  and  insist  upon  a  balanced  ap- 
proach to  the  Arab-Israeli  problem.  While 
Turkey  has  since  1967  tended  to  support  the 
Arab  view  that  Israel  must  vacate  Arab 
lands  occupied  in  that  encounter,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Turkey  has  resisted  Arab  de- 
mands that  it  break  diplomatic  relations  with 
Israel.  Last  October's  war,  like  previous 
Arab-Israeli  conflicts,  put  severe  strains  on 
Turkey's  neutrality  but  did  not  alter  the 
basic  orientation. 

Throughout  the  October  crisis  Turkey  per- 
mitted the  United  States  the  normal  use  of 
Common  Defense  Installations,  which  we  and 
Turkey  maintain  in  accordance  with  our 
joint  defense  responsibilities  under  NATO 
and  U.S.-Turkish  bilateral  security  arrange- 
ments. Recognizing  the  uncomfortable  posi- 
tion in  which  Turkey  was  placed  by  the 
Arab-Israeli  war,  and  because  there  were 
alternative  routes  and  facilities  available  to 
us,  the  United  States  thought  it  best  not  to 
seek  to  use  these  installations  in  connection 
with  the  U.S.  resupply  operation  to  Israel. 
On  the  other  hand,  Turkey  did  not  object  to 
our  use  of  these  facilities  in  operations  re- 
lated to  the  U.N.  Emergency  Force. 

The  Turkish  Government  was  quite  obvi- 
ously distressed  by  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
in  the  Middle  East  and  hoped  for  an  early 
end  to  the  conflict.  Subsequent  to  the  cease- 
fire, Turkey  has  supported  international 
efforts  toward  disengagement  and  the  search 
for  a  lasting  solution  to  the  problems  of  the 


March  18,  1974 


283 


area.  The  Government  of  Turkey  recognizes 
that  instability  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
invites  pressures  from  outside  detrimental  to 
the  stable  structure  of  peace  which  the 
NATO  countries  are  trying  to  maintain. 


International   Economic   Report 
Transmitted  to  the  Congress 

Following  is  the  text  of  President  Nixon's 
message  transmitted  to  the  Congress  on  Feb- 
ruary 7,  together  irith  a  White  House  fact 
sheet  released  to  the  press  that  day.^ 

MESSAGE  FROM   PRESIDENT   NIXON 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

Last  year,  when  I  submitted  my  first  In- 
ternational Economic  Report,  the  Nation  had 
just  concluded  its  involvement  in  a  lengthy 
and  tragic  war.  We  were  thus  able  to  turn 
greater  energies  to  building  a  more  lasting 
and  secure  world  peace. 

A  major  part  of  our  peace-building  effort 
lies  in  resolving  international  economic  prob- 
lems, and  today  we  can  look  back  upon  a  year 
of  progress  on  that  front.  We  have  strength- 
ened our  competitive  position  in  the  world. 
We  have  moved  ahead  toward  vitally  needed 
reforms  of  the  world  economic  structure  and 
we  have  improved  our  trade  balance  beyond 
our  expectations,  reflecting  our  ability  to 
compete  more  effectively  at  home  and  abroad 
with  foreign  producers.  Our  strengthened 
trade  position  has  in  turn  contributed  sig- 
nificantly to  the  expansion  of  jobs  and  in- 
come for  our  people,  and  has  led  to  renewed 
confidence  in  the  dollar  in  the  world's  money 
markets. 

One  of  the  greatest  challenges  facing  the 
international  community  is  to  overhaul  our 


'  The  President's  message,  together  with  the  An- 
nual Report  of  the  Council  on  International  Economic 
Policy,  is  printed  in  "International  Economic  Report 
of  the  President,  Transmitted  to  the  Congress  Feb- 
ruary 1974";  for  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402  (113  pp.,  $2.45;  stock  no.  4115-00055). 


world  monetary  and  trading  systems.  Dur- 
ing this  past  year,  I  have  been  heartened 
by  the  progress  that  the  Committee  of 
Twenty,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund,  has  made  toward 
reforming  the  international  monetary  system 
and  by  the  way  that  transitional  monetary 
arrangements  have  proven  effective  under 
conditions  of  stress.  Meanwhile,  over  100 
nations,  meeting  in  Tokyo  this  past  Septem- 
ber, opened  a  new  round  of  international 
trade  negotiations.  And  the  trade  legislation 
we  submitted  last  April  has  moved  through 
the  House  for  further  consideration  in  the 
Senate. 

Despite  tliis  significant  progress,  1973  was 
also  a  year  in  which  new  problems  vividly 
brought  home  to  us  the  degree  to  which 
our  own  economy  is  affected  by  developments 
elsewhere.  This  past  year  the  major  indus- 
trial nations  experienced  simultaneous  boom 
conditions  for  the  first  time  since  1951.  This 
complicated  economic  policy-making,  demon- 
strating that  the  same  interdependence  which 
can  contribute  so  much  to  world  prosperity 
through  trade  can  also  contribute  to  national 
problems.  One  such  problem  is  inflation. 
While  we  continue  to  attack  the  causes  of 
excessive  price  increases  within  the  United 
States,  we  must  also  realize  that  inflation 
has  been  a  world-wide  problem  driving  up 
the  cost  of  world-traded  goods. 

Two  new  problems  also  arose  in  1973, 
reminding  us  of  the  impact  that  other  econo- 
mies have  upon  our  own:  last  summer's  food 
shortages  and  the  current  oil  crisis.  There 
was  an  unprecedented  and  unforeseen  surge 
in  international  demand  for  American  agri- 
cultural products  last  year.  The  causes 
ranged  from  poor  harvests  abroad  to  food 
policy  shifts  by  foreign  governments,  affect- 
ing their  demand  for  agricultural  imports. 
These  significant  shifts  could  not  help  but 
have  a  strong  impact  upon  our  domestic 
economy:  on  the  one  hand,  expanded  sales 
helped  the  recovery  of  our  trade  balance  and 
helped  ensure  our  position  as  a  reliable 
world  supplier  of  agricultural  goods;  but  on 
the  other  hand,  world-wide  shortages  caused 
our  food  prices  to  rise  significantly.   A  num- 


284 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ber  of  measures  have  now  been  taken  at 
home  and  abroad  to  help  prevent  a  recur- 
rence of  such  problems.  We  have  brought 
land  back  into  production,  we  have  taken 
every  step  we  can  to  expand  our  harvests, 
and  we  have  established  an  agricultural 
export  monitoring  system.  In  addition,  we 
have  called  for  a  World  Food  Conference  to 
meet  in  Rome  this  year,  where  the  neWly 
developing  problems  of  agricultural  supply 
and  demand  can  be  addressed  by  both  pro- 
ducer and  consumer  nations. 

The  second  major  problem — the  oil  em- 
bargo and  its  accompanying  price  increases 
— has  given  us  further  evidence  of  our  inter- 
dependence with  other  nations.  While  our 
country  is  relatively  less  dependent  upon  for- 
eign supplies  for  our  energy  than  are  most 
industrial  nations,  these  developments  are 
adversely  affecting  many  sectors  of  our  econ- 
omy. Again,  as  we  have  done  with  regard 
to  food  shortages,  we  have  taken  vigorous 
actions  to  meet  energy  shortages.  The  ac- 
tions taken  by  the  Executive,  the  Congress, 
and  especially  by  the  American  people  have 
enabled  us  to  make  significant  progress.  The 
consumption  of  almost  every  form  of  energy 
has  been  dramatically  reduced.  But  much 
more  needs  to  be  done  in  order  not  only  to 
alleviate  the  current  emergency  but  also  to 
assure  that  the  United  States  can  develop 
greater  energy  resources  of  its  own.  This 
January,  I  submitted  to  the  Congress  my 
third  special  message  on  energy,  outlining 
further  needed  legislation.  I  have  also  in- 
vited the  foreign  ministers  of  the  major  oil- 
consuming  nations  to  Washington  this 
month,  initiating  cooperative  discussions  on 
these  problems.  Those  who  will  attend  this 
conference  recognize  that  the  large  price 
increases  announced  late  last  year  can  only 
create  hardships  for  the  major  industrialized 
economies  and  could  have  a  disastrous  im- 
pact upon  the  world's  poorest  nations. 

The  new  problems  we  face  are  of  such 
enormity  that  there  may  be  a  temptation 
to  delay  further  progress  toward  trade  and 
monetary  reform.  Nothing  could  be  more 
foolish.  It  is  particularly  important  that 
we  move  forward  in  a  multinational  attempt 


to  reduce  trade  barriers  so  that  individual 
nations  are  not  tempted  to  "go  it  alone"  in 
seeking  solutions.  I  consider  it  essential  that 
we  continue  to  construct  a  consultative 
framework  in  which  new  as  well  as  old  is- 
sues can  be  addressed.  The  current  trade 
and  monetary  discussions  provide  such  a 
framework  and  also  allow  us  to  continue  our 
long-term  effort  to  build  a  more  effective 
world  economic  order.  To  make  this  possible, 
the  Trade  Reform  Act  should  be  promptly 
passed  without  restrictions  upon  our  ability 
to  end  trade  discrimination  against  other 
nations. 

The  Annual  Report  of  the  Council  on  In- 
ternational Economic  Policy  provides  back- 
ground and  analysis  which  should  be  highly 
useful  to  the  Congress  as  it  considers  these 
complex  and  important  issues. 

Richard  Nixon. 

The  White  House,  Febnmry  7,  197 Jt. 


WHITE   HOUSE   FACT  SHEET 

White  House  press  release  dated  February  7 

The  second  International  Economic  Report  of  the 
President,  together  with  the  Annual  Report  of  the 
Council  on  International  Economic  Policy  (CIEP), 
will  be  signed  by  the  President  and  submitted  to 
the  Congress  today.  The  report  describes  the  admin- 
istration's international  economic  policies,  as  well 
as  the  background  realities  on  which  policy  decisions 
in  this  area  must  be  made. 

Some  domestic  and  international  economic  prob- 
lems which  have  emerged  in  recent  months,  espe- 
cially the  petroleum  crisis,  have  overshadowed  the 
improvement  made  in  1973  in  the  U.S.  international 
economic  position  and  the  progress  made  toward 
reforming  world  trade,  monetary,  and  investment 
systems.  A  few  of  the  highlights  of  the  report  are 
listed  below. 

Progress  in  1973 

— Our  trade  balance,  $6.4  billion  in  deficit  a  year 
ago,  has  recovered  dramatically  to  a  $1.7  billion 
surplus.  The  $8.1  billion  swing  was  the  largest  in 
history.  Exports  grew  at  almost  twice  the  rate  of 
imports.  While  the  value  of  our  exports  of  agricul- 
tural products  accounted  for  a  large  part  of  the 
improvement,  exports  of  manufactured  products  also 
grew  rapidly. 

— The   dollar   has    recovered    from    the    depressed 


March  18,   1974 


285 


rates  and  lack  of  confidence  seen  a  year  ago  and  is 
now  trading  on  the  average  near  the  levels  estab- 
lished at  the  Smithsonian  meeting  in  December 
1971.  The  transitional  monetary  arrangement  of 
floating  exchange  rates  has  proven  effective  in 
periods  of  stress.  Contrary  to  many  predictions, 
trade  has  continued  to  grow  rapidly  under  the  flexi- 
ble exchange  rate  system. 

— U.S.  Government  capital  controls  imposed  dur- 
ing the  1960's  affecting  U.S.  investment  abroad  have 
been  lifted.  Many  other  countries  have  also  re- 
moved restrictions  on  capital  flows. 

— A  new  round  of  trade  negotiations  was  officially 
launched  by  over  100  nations  at  the  Tokyo  GATT 
[General  Ag^-eement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  session 
in  September.  Work  on  the  negotiations  has  pro- 
gressed steadily,  and  a  trade  negotiations  committee 
is  now  working  at  Geneva  on  negotiating  procedures. 

— The  administration's  Trade  Reform  Act  has 
been  passed  by  the  House  and  is  now  before  the 
Senate. 

—Discussions  of  international  monetary  reform 
have  progressed  in  the  Committee  of  Twenty,  and  a 
basic  outline  of  the  reformed  system  is  to  be  com- 
pleted by  June  of  this  year. 

— We  have  made  substantial  progress  in  develop- 
ing better  international  policies  toward  investment. 
The  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  De- 
velopment is  considering  U.S.  proposals  which  will 
harmonize  international  investment  policies  and  pro- 
vide procedures  and  guidelines  for  consultations  on 
international  investment  problems.  The  CIEP  has 
reviewed  U.S.  policies  toward  foreign  investment  in 
the  United  States  and  recommended  against  impos- 
ing any  new  restrictions  at  this  time. 

New  and  Continuing  Challenges 

1.  Agriculture  Shortages 

— Short  supplies  and  rising  prices  of  agricultural 
products  were  a  major  problem  in  1973.  Despite 
strains  on  productive  capacity  and  reserves,  the 
United  States  was  able  to  make  a  substantial  contri- 
bution to  meeting  the  world's  food  needs.  The  com- 
ing year  may  see  some  easing  of  the  tight  supply 
situation,  but  international  cooperation  is  needed  to 
insure  that  we  do  not  continue  in  a  cycle  of  alternate 
overproduction  and  shortage.  In  response  to  a  U.S. 
proposal,  the  United  Nations  will  hold  a  World  Food 
Conference  in  Rome  in  November  of  this  year. 

2.  Energy  and  Impact  of  Oil  Price  Increases 

— An  assessment  of  the  current  energy  crisis  in- 
dicates that  its  most  damaging  impact  will  occur 
during  the  first  half  of  1974  and  that  after  that  the 
industrialized  economies  are  likely  to  accelerate  once 
again. 

— The  President  has  invited  the  Foreign  Ministers 
of  the  major  industrialized  nations  to  Washington 


next  week  to  begin  the  process  of  seeking  coopera- 
tive approaches  to  the  world's  energy  problems. 

— If  the  present  world  petroleum  prices  persist 
through  1974,  the  major  oil  producers  will  receive 
nearly  $100  billion  in  revenues.  About  half  of  these 
revenues  can  be  spent  this  year  on  goods  and  serv- 
ices or  secure  long-term  investments.  Most  will  end 
up  in  short-term  securities  as  Eurodollars  or  de- 
posits. 

— The  overall  balance  of  payments  position  of 
many  countries  (and  the  current  account  of  vir- 
tually all  nations)  will  seriously  deteriorate  this 
year  because  of  the  higher  prices  for  imported 
petroleum  and  because  there  is  no  necessary  rela- 
tionship between  a  country's  higher  oil  import  bill 
and  the  reflow  of  investment  funds  from  the  oil- 
producing  states.  Some  developed  countries  may  be 
tempted  to  use  import  restrictions  or  export  sub- 
sidies to  overcome  their  balance  of  payments  prob- 
lems, with  the  risk  of  provoking  a  "trade  war" 
damaging  to  all.  The  ongoing  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  provide  an  important  forum  in  which 
cooperative  means  of  avoiding  such  a  trend  can  be 
devised. 

— ^The  payments  position  of  the  less  developed 
countries  will  be  especially  hurt.  The  higher  prices 
they  have  to  pay  for  oil  this  year  is  about  equivalent 
to  all  official  aid  that  will  be  received  from  the 
developed  world. 

— Last  year  the  developed  nations  were  able  to 
negotiate  a  replenishment  of  funds  for  the  Interna- 
tional Development  Agency — simultaneously  increas- 
ing the  resources  of  the  IDA  and  reducing  the  U.S. 
share  of  contributions.  Rather  than  letting  the  ac- 
tion of  the  House  in  voting  against  the  IDA  replen- 
ishment stand  as  our  final  answer,  we  will  work 
with  the  Congress  to  insure  that  this  nation,  con- 
sistent with  its  own  economic  situation,  acts  respon- 
sibly to  enable  long-term  economic  development  to 
be  planned  in  an  orderly  manner. 

3.  Inflationary  Pressures 

— The  simultaneous  upswing  in  the  world  economy 
in  1973  benefited  income  and  employment.  It  also 
caused  product  shortages.  This,  combined  with  har- 
vest problems  and  huge  hikes  in  oil  prices  by  major 
petroleum  exporters,  caused  the  most  serious  world- 
wide inflation  in  two  decades. 

— In  1973  higher  food  prices  accounted  for  about 
half  the  increase  in  U.S.  consumer  prices;  the  recent 
jump  in  world  oil  prices  will  mean  that  inflationary 
pressures  will  remain  strong  through  1974. 

Other  Issues 

— Other  sections  of  the  report  assess  the  impact 
of  international  technology  transfer,  the  economic 
aspects  of  the  law  of  the  sea,  and  other  trade  and 
financial  issues. 


286 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Atomic   Energy 

Protocol  suspending  the  agreement  of  September  18 
and  November  25,  1964  (TIAS  5884),  between  the 
United  States,  the  International  Atomic  Energy- 
Agency,  and  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  for  the 
application  of  safeguards  and  providing  for  the 
application  of  safeguards  pursuant  to  the  nonpro- 
liferation  treaty  of  July  1,  1968  (TIAS  6839). 
Signed  at  Mexico  City  October  3,  1972. 
Entered  into  force:  January  9,  1974. 

Aviation 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  conven- 
tion on  international  civil  aviation,  as  amended 
(TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170,  7616).  Done  at  Vienna 
July  7,  1971.' 

Ratification,   deposited:    United    States,    February 
25,  1974. 

Convention    for    the    suppression    of    unlawful    acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.    Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.   Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 26,  1973.    TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Chile,  February  28,   1974. 

Exhibitions 

Protocol   revising   the   convention   of   November   22, 
1928,  as  amended   (TIAS  6548,  6549),  relating  to 
international   expositions,   with  appendix   and   an- 
nex.   Done  at  Paris  November  20,  1972.' 
Signatures:  Austria  (subject  to  ratification),  Sep- 
tember 28,   1973;   Portugal    (subject  to  ratifica- 
tion), November  29,  1973;  Romania  (subject  to 
ratification  and  with  reservation),  November  8, 
1973. 

Judicial   Procedure 

Convention  on  the  service  abroad  of  judicial  and  ex- 
trajudicial documents  in  civil  or  commercial  mat- 
ters. Done  at  The  Hague  November  15,  1965. 
Entered  into  force  February  10,  1969.  TIAS  6638. 
Ratification  deposited:  Portugal,  December  27, 
1973. 

Ocean   Dumping 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollution  by 
dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London,  Mexico  City,  Moscow,  and 
Washington  December  29,  1972.' 


'  Not  in  force. 


Signatures:  Belgium  (with  reservation),  Septem- 
ber 25,  1973;  Greece  (with  reservations),  Novem- 
ber 9,  1973;  Ireland,  December  31,  1973;  Monaco 
(with  declaration),  October  5,  1973;  Togo,  No- 
vember 21,  1973. 

Oil   Pollution 

International  convention  relating  to  intervention  on 

the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil  pollution  casualties, 

with  annex.   Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969." 

Ratification  deposited:  United  States,  February  21, 

1974. 

Satellite   Communications  System 

Agreement  relating  to  the  International  Telecom- 
munications Satellite  Organization  (Intelsat), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Washington  August  20, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  February  12,  1973.  TIAS 
7532. 
Accession  deposited:  Cyprus,  March  1,  1974. 

Operating  agreement  relating  to  the  International 
Telecommunications  Satellite  Organization  (Intel- 
sat), with  annex.  Done  at  Washington  August  20, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  February  12,  1973.  TIAS 
7532. 

Signature:  Cyprus  Telecommunications  Authority 
of  Cyprus  March  1,  1974. 

Trade 

Ninth  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional  accession  of  Tunisia  to  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
November  7,  1973.  Enters  into  force  between 
Tunisia  and  any  participating  government  as  soon 
as  it  has  been  accepted  by  Tunisia  and  such  gov- 
ernment. 


BILATERAL 


Brazil 

Agreement  relating  to  the  continued  operation  of  the 
Doppler  geodetic  satellite  tracking  station  in  Bra- 
zil. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brasilia 
December  4,  1973,  and  February  12,  1974.  Entered 
into  force  February  12,  1974. 

India 

Agreement  on  Public  Law  480  and  other  funds,  with 
annexes.  Signed  at  New  Delhi  February  18,  1974. 
Entered  into  force  February  18,  1974. 

Malta 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  June  14, 
1967,  as  extended,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  tex- 
tiles. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Valletta 
February  15,  1974.  Entered  into  force  February 
15,  1974. 

Peru 

Agreement  concerning  the  settlement  of  certain 
claims,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Lima  February 
19,  1974.   Entered  into  force  February  19,  1974. 


March   18,   1974 


287 


Sri   Lanka 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  November  23,  1973 
(TIAS  7753).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Colombo  January  18  and  February  21,  1974.  En- 
tered into  force  February  21,  1974. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities  of  August  29,  1972  (TIAS 
7452).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Saigon 
February  8,  1974.  Entered  into  force  February  8, 
1974. 


PUBLICATIONS 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN    SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  February  27  confirmed  the  follow- 
ing nominations: 

David  B.  Bolen  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Botswana,  to  the  Kingdom  of  Lesotho,  and  to 
the   Kingdom  of  Swaziland. 

Davis  Eugene  Boster  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
People's  Republic  of  Bangladesh. 

Donald  B.  Easum  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State   [for  African  Affairs]. 

Robert  E.  Fritts  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Re- 
public  of  Rwanda. 

Marshall  Green,  now  Ambassador  to  Australia, 
to  serve  concurrently  as  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Nauru. 

Martin   F.   Herz  to   be   Ambassador  to   Bulgaria. 

A.  Linwood  Holton  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State   [for  Congressional  Relations]. 

Max  V.  Krebs  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Guyana. 

Philip  W.  Manhard  to  be  Ambassador  to  Mauritius. 

David  L.  Osborn  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  the  Union  of  Burma. 

Thomas  R.  Pickering  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Hashemite   Kingdom  of  Jordan. 

Armistead  I.  Selden,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to 
New  Zealand  and  to  serve  concurrently  as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Fiji,  to  the  Kingdom  of  Tonga,  and  to  West- 
ern Samoa. 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock  num- 
ber from  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office  Book- 
store, Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 
A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or 
more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superin- 
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Bahamas Cat.  No.   S1.123:B14 

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Greece Cat.   No.   S1.123:G81 

Pub.  8198  8  pp. 

Malaysia Cat.  No.  S1.123:M29 

Pub.  7753  8  pp. 

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Pub.  7904  8  pp. 

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Pub.  8661  4  pp. 

Switzerland Cat.  No.  S1.123:SW6 

Pub.  8132  8  pp. 

Status  of  the  World's  Nations.  This  Geographic 
Bulletin,  in  its  fifth  revision,  provides  the  nomencla- 
ture used  by  the  U.S.  Government  for  the  148  inde- 
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Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Viet-Nam 
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amended.  TIAS  7710.  3  pp.  25^  (Cat.  No.  S9.10: 
7710). 

Technical  Assistance  in  Tax  Administration.  Agree- 
ment with  Trinidad  and  Tobago.  TIAS  7712.  11  pp. 
25if.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7712). 

Space  Research  Program.  Agreement  with  Australia. 
TIAS  7713.  3  pp.   25^.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7713). 


288 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     March  18, 197k     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1812 


Cambodia.  Defense  Articles  and  Services  for 

Cambodia   (Presidential  determination)   .     .      273 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Bolen,  Boster,  Easum,  Fritts, 
Green,  Herz,  Holton,  Krebs,  Manhard,  Os- 
born,    Pickering,    Selden) 288 

The  Impact  of  the  Middle  East  Crisis  on  the 

Atlantic    Alliance    (Davies,    Hartman)     .     .       279 

International  Economic  Report  Transmitted  to 
the  Congress  (message  from  President 
Nixon,  White  House  fact  sheet)     .     .     .  _j      284 

Cuba.  Secretary  Kissinger  Holds  News  Con- 
ference Following  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  .      265 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirma- 
tions (Bolen,  Boster,  Easum,  Fritts,  Green, 
Herz,  Holton,  Krebs,  Manhard,  Osborn, 
Pickering,  Selden) 288 

Economic  Affairs 

International  Economic  Report  Transmitted  to 
the  Congress  (message  from  President 
Nixon,  White  House  fact  sheet)     ....       284 

U.S.  and  Pei-u  Reach  Agreement  on  Certain 
Investment  Disputes  (Nixon,  White  House 
fact  sheet) 272 

Energy.    President  Nixon's  News  Conference 

of  February  25  (excerpts) 270 

Europe.  -Secretary  Kissinger  Holds  News  Con- 
ference Following  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  .      265 

Latin  America 

Countries  of  the  Americas  Endorse  Continued 
Dialogue  in  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  (Kis- 
singer, text  of  Declaration  of  Tlatelolco     .       257 

Secretary   Kissinger  Holds   News   Conference 

Following  Conference  of  Tlatelolco  ....      265 

Middle  East.  The  Impact  of  the  Middle  East 
Crisis  on  the  Atlantic  Alliance  (Davies, 
Hartman) 279 

Narcotics  Control.  Ambassador  Vance  Repre- 
sents U.S.  at  U.N.  Narcotics  Commission 
Session .     .       278 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  The  Im- 
pact of  the  Middle  East  Crisis  on  the  Atlan- 
tic Alliance  (Davies,  Hartman) 279 

Peru.  U.S.  and  Peru  Reach  Agreement  on 
Certain  Investment  Disputes  (Nixon,  White 
House  fact  sheet) 272 

Presidential  Documents 

Defense  Articles  and   Services  for  Cambodia 

(Presidential  determination) 273 

International  Economic  Report  Transmitted 
to  the  Congress 284 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Febru- 
ary 25  (excerpts) 270 

U.S.  and  Peru  Reach  Agreement  on  Certain 
Investment  Disputes 272 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  ....      288 

Terrorism.  The  U.S.  Government  Response  to 

Terrorism:   A  Global  Approach  (Hoff acker)       274 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....      287 

U.S.S.R.  President  Nixon's  News  Confer- 
ence of  February  25  (excerpts) 270 


Name  Index 

Bolen,  David  B 288 

Boster,  Davis  Eugene 288 

Davies,  Rodger  P 279 

Easum,  Donald  B 288 

Fritts,   Robert  E 288 

Green,    Marshall 288 

Hartman,  Arthur  A 279 

Herz,  Martin  F 288 

Hoffacker,  Lewis 274 

Holton,  A.  Linwood 288 

Kissinger,  Secretary 257,  265 

Krebs,  Max  V 288 

Manhard,  Philip   W 288 

Nixon,    President 270,272,273,284 

Osborn,  David   L 288 

Pickering,  Thomas  R 288 

Selden,   Armistead  I.,   Jr 288 

Vance,  Sheldon  B 278 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  February  25-March  3 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  February  25  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos. 
62  of  February  21,  66  of  February  23,  and  67  of 
February  24. 

-So.       Date  Subject 

t68  2/25  Meeting  of  energy  Coordinating 
Group  (rewrite). 

*69  2/25  Study  group  on  Hotelkeepers'  Lia- 
bility, Secretary's  Advisory 
Committee  on  Private  Interna- 
tional Law,  New  York,  Feb.  28. 

*70  2/28  Seminar  on  technology  exchange 
with  the  U.S.S.R. 

t71  2/28  Department  releases  1974  edition 
of  "Treaties  in  Force." 

*72  2/28  U.S.  and  Malta  sign  cotton  textile 
agreement. 

*73  2/28  Pickering  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Jordan  (biographic  data). 

t74  2/28  Casey:  seminar  on  technology  ex- 
change with  the  U.S.S.R. 

t75    2/28     Casey:  Public  Affairs  Council. 

*76  2/28  Holton  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Congressional  Rela- 
tions (biographic  data). 

*77  3/1  Donaldson:  San  Francisco  regional 
foreign  policy  conference,  Feb. 
28  (as  prepared  for  delivery). 

*78  3/1  Study  group  5  of  the  U.S.  National 
Committee  for  the  CCITT,  Mar. 
28. 

*79  3/1  Study  group  on  International  Sale 
of  Goods,  Secretary's  Advisory 
Committee  on  Private  Interna- 
tional Law,  New  York,  Apr.  5. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume  LXX        •        No.  1813        •        March  25, 1974 


CHALLENGES  OF  AN  INTERDEPENDENT  WORLD 
Address  by  Under  Secretary  Donaldson    289 

JAPAN  AND  ITS  RELATIONSHIP  WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Address  by  Assistant  Secretary  Ingersoll    296 

INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  AFFAIRS  IN  1974 
Address  by  Under  Secretary  Casey    302 

THE  PREVENTION  OF  NUCLEAR  WAR  IN  A  WORLD  OF  UNCERTAINTY 

Address  by  Fred  C.  Ikle,  Director, 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency    3H 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXX,  No.  1813 
March  25,  1974 


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appreciated.     The    BULLETIN    is    indexed    in 

the    Readers*    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  and 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  and 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements,  addresses, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  as 
special  articles  on  various  phases  of 
international  affairs  and  the  functions 
of  the  Department.  Information  is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
national agreements  to  which  the 
United  States  is  or  may  become  a 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter- 
national interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  o\ 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  am 
legislative  material  in  the  field  oi 
international  relations  are  also  listed, 


i 


challenges  of  an  Interdependent  World 


Address  by  William  H.  Donaldson 
Under  Secretary  for  Security  Assistance 


It  has  been  said  that  "the  history  of  free 
men  is  never  really  written  by  chance  but  by 
choice — their  choice."  The  current  pace  of 
U.S.  diplomacy,  encompassing  such  new  di- 
mensions as  detente,  vigorous  dialogue  with 
our  allies,  and  other  urgent  global  problems 
such  as  energy,  food,  and  inflation,  creates  an 
environment  of  unprecedented  complexity 
and  change.  Moreover,  the  international 
agenda  confronting  this  nation  seems  to  grow 
longer  each  day.  As  a  result,  we  face  the 
necessity  for  developing  a  new  American 
consensus  concerning  our  role  in  the  world 
and  the  consequent  need  for  a  fundamental 
restructuring  of  our  foreign  policy  aims  and 
objectives.  This  is  the  challenge  confronting 
the  United  States  today.  We  can  seize  this 
unique  opportunity  to  determine  our  own 
destiny  by  actively  sharing  in  the  shaping 
of  the  evolving  global  order,  or  we  can  be- 
come rigid  in  our  posture  and  face  the  pros- 
pect of  being  literally  overwhelmed  by  the 
complexity  of  an  increasing  integrated  and 
interdependent  world. 

The  United  States  is  at  a  moment  of  choice, 
a  time  for  fundamental  decisions  on  the 
shape  and  the  content  of  her  role  in  the 
world.  If  the  decisions  of  this  nation  are  to 
be  equal  to  the  opportunities  before  it,  they 
will  have  to  be  developed  through  a  contin- 
uing dialogue  between  Americans  and  their 
government — the  kind  of  dialogue  I  hope  we 
can  carry  forward  today. 


'  Made  at  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  on  Feb.  28  before 
a  regional  foreign  policy  conference  cosponsored  by 
the  World  Affairs  Council  of  Northern  California 
and  the  Department  of  State  (as  delivered) . 


Paul  Tillich  wrote  that  the  central  prob- 
lem of  modern  man  is  to  learn  to  live  com- 
fortably with  ambiguity.  The  assumptions 
and  certainties  that  have  guided  U.S.  foreign 
policy  during  the  past  decades  have  been 
eroded  and  diminished.  Now  the  rush  of 
events,  the  uncertainty  about  political  and 
philosophical  reference  points,  the  complexi- 
ty of  the  issues,  can  all  too  easily  produce  a 
sense  of  futility.  Yet  the  flux  and  change 
of  the  familiar  gives  us  the  opportunity  to 
choose.  And  the  consequences  of  our  choice 
make  it  essential  that  we  choose  well. 

To  choose  at  all,  we  must  first  determine 
where  we  are. 

It  is  evident  that  the  international  environ- 
ment has  dramatically  changed.  For  the 
decade  following  World  War  II  the  United 
States  was  preeminent  in  the  world.  But 
changed  conditions,  many  of  them  produced 
by  the  success  of  our  policies,  have  ended  this 
preeminence.  Power,  once  concentrated  and 
homogeneous,  has  been  diff'used  and  trans- 
formed. 

— Our  allies  in  Europe  and  Asia  have  re- 
covered their  self-confidence  and  economic 
strength. 

— The  Soviet  Union  after  years  of  effort  is 
increasingly  able  to  exercise  its  power  on  a 
global  scale  and  has  achieved  approximate 
equivalence  in  strategic  nuclear  weapons. 

— China  has  established  an  independent 
identity  and  presence. 

— In  the  developing  world  individual  na- 
tions have  gained  both  economic  strength  and 
political  vitality. 

— Perhaps  most  important,  the  nature  of 


March  25,   1974 


289 


power  has  been  drastically  altered.  Once  po- 
litical, military,  and  economic  power  were 
closely  related.  But  in  the  modern  world, 
military  muscle  is  not  by  itself  the  guaran- 
tor of  political  authority;  economic  giants 
can  be  politically  weak;  countries  can  exert 
great  political  influence  without  possessing 
either  military  strength  or  economic  might. 
These  are  the  conditions — most  dramatically 
and  recently  demonstrated  by  the  oil  crisis — 
which  underline  a  new  era  of  global  interde- 
pendence, an  era  in  which  nations  are  forced 
to  face  problems  that  they  cannot  solve  alone, 
even  though  for  many  a  sense  of  their  special 
strengths  tempts  them  to  try. 

This  nation  and  all  nations  face  the  reality 
that  the  changing  currents  of  the  1970's  offer 
no  guarantee  that  stability  and  creativity  will 
emerge  from  the  forces  that  are  being  un- 
leashed. 

Alternatives  to   Cold   War  Structure 

Thus  in  1974,  the  task  of  statecraft  and  the 
challenge  to  statesmanship  are  to  move  de- 
cisively and  intelligently  to  create  something 
constructive  and  hopeful  in  the  place  of  a 
cold  war  structure  that  is  ending.  We  seek  a 
network  of  relations  and  interdependencies 
that  restrains  the  arbitrary  use  of  power — a 
network  that  removes  the  incentive  for  war 
and  deepens  the  stake  in  peace. 

We  are  no  longer  locked  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  in 
a  relationship  of  total  hostility  and  distrust. 
The  seeds  of  something  more  positive  were 
sown  during  the  President's  visits  to  Moscow 
and  to  Peking,  visits  which  defined  the  prin- 
ciples which  would  govern  our  relations  with 
each  other.  While  competition  between  us 
will  continue,  with  both  nations  we  are  com- 
mitted to  avoiding  the  pursuit  of  unilateral 
advantage  and  to  building  instead  coopera- 
tive relationships. 

Within  these  principles  we  pursue  a  policy 
of  detente.  Detente  is  not  based  on  a  judgment 
that  there  are  no  conflicts  of  interest — politi- 
cal, military,  economic,  and  strategic — be- 
tween ourselves  and  those  two  powers.  De- 
tente does  not  mean  that  we  are  blind  to  the 
very  profound  differences  in  ideology  and 


values  between  our  system  and  theirs.  De- 
tente does  not  mean  that  we  approve  of  the 
domestic  decisions  in  the  Soviet  Union  or  in 
other  Communist  countries. 

Detente  instead  is  founded  on  a  belief  that 
when  nations  hold  the  power  to  destroy  each 
other  and  the  world  many  times  over,  it  is 
irrational  to  base  peace  solely  on  the  threat 
of  holocaust.  We  seek  therefore  to  place  our 
relationship  on  a  more  stable,  positive  basis 
through  agreements  and  continuing  dialogue 
with  both  Moscow  and  Peking.  Significantly, 
the  1972  strategic  arms  limitation  agree- 
ments with  the  Soviet  Union  are  the  first 
steps  in  bringing  the  arms  race  under  con- 
trol. The  continuing  SALT  [Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks]  negotiations  in  Geneva, 
the  1973  agreement  on  the  prevention  of  nu- 
clear war,  and  negotiations  in  Vienna  on  re- 
duction of  armed  forces  in  Central  Europe 
are  all  parts  of  this  continuing  effort  to  build 
security  against  the  dangers  of  conflict.  Be- 
yond these  essential  foundations,  however,  we 
believe  that  our  new  relationships  should 
evolve  across  a  broad  front  of  interrelated 
efforts.  Economic,  cultural,  and  human  con- 
tacts should  develop  in  concert  with  in- 
creased understandings  as  to  political  and 
security  subjects. 

In  this  context,  let  me  speak  specifically  of 
trade. 

Because  we  seek  to  build  in  positive  incen- 
tives, we  are  asking  Congress  for  discretion- 
ary authority  to  offer,  when  it  is  in  our 
interest  to  do  so,  normal  trade  relations  to 
any  country,  including  Communist  nations. 
Unfortunately  the  term  involved — "most 
favored  nation" — has  led  to  a  great  misun- 
derstanding. In  fact  it  only  means  conduct- 
ing trade  on  the  same  terms  as  we  already  do 
with  nearly  all  other  nations  in  the  world. 

Strong,  healthy  alliances  with  old  friends 
in  Europe  and  in  Asia  are  the  foundation  on 
which  we  can  build  new  relations  with 
others.  Thus  the  adjustment  and  invigora- 
tion  of  our  alliances  has  been  a  major  pur- 
pose of  our  foreign  policy. 

As  tensions  in  Asia  and  Europe  recede,  as 
Europe  seeks  unity,  as  the  economies  in  Ja- 
pan and  in  Europe  prosper,  our  ties  to  old 


290 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


friends  compel  this  adjustment.  Security  and 
prosperity — the  goals  of  our  unity — test  our 
cohesion.  With  Europe  and  with  Japan  there 
is  a  danger  that  we  may  define  our  relation- 
ship by  the  degree  of  our  competition  rather 
than  the  firmness  of  our  association. 

To  assure  that  the  relations  with  our  Euro- 
pean partners  would  serve  the  future  as  well 
as  the  past,  in  1973  the  United  States  called 
for  a  new  initiative  to  infuse  this  relation- 
ship with  a  sense  of  common  achievement  and 
joint  destiny,  with  a  new  dynamism  and 
vision. 

Now  we  have  almost  completed  the  work 
on  declarations  with  our  European  friends 
which  should  provide  inspiration  to  our  peo- 
ples and  give  an  alliance  formed  in  peace  a 
new  positive  purpose.  We  want  to  associate 
with  Japan  in  this  endeavor. 

Any  lasting  structure  of  international  rela- 
tions will  only  emerge  through  the  participa- 
tion of  the  developing  nations,  where  two- 
thirds  of  mankind  lives.  The  political  and 
economic  vitality  of  these  nations  makes 
their  participation  both  possible  and  essen- 
tial. The  Nixon  doctrine  is  our  response  to 
this  possibility  and  this  necessity  and  is 
based  on  three  fundamental  concepts: 

— First,  we  are  committed  to  assisting 
the  developing  nations  in  their  efforts  to 
bring  a  better,  more  secure  life  to  their  citi- 
zens. Our  commitment  rests  on  this  country's 
sense  of  justice,  history  of  humanitarian  con- 
cern, and  a  deepened  sense  of  economic  inter- 
dependence. We  also  know  that  we  cannot 
expect  the  support  of  poorer  nations  on 
issues  of  importance  to  us  if  we  do  not  show 
a  continuing  commitment  to  the  issues  of 
greatest  importance  to  them,  most  particu- 
larly development. 

— Second,  our  strengths  must  supplement, 
not  replace,  the  efforts  by  the  developing  na- 
tions themselves.  In  reducing  our  involve- 
ment we  do  not  seek  to  lessen  our  burden. 
Rather  our  goal  is  to  evoke  the  maximum 
effort  for  development  and  for  defense  from 
those  most  directly  concerned. 

— Third,  we  will  distinguish  among  de- 
veloping nations  and  areas,  not  to  discrimi- 
nate among  them  but  to  realistically  recog- 


nize the  uniqueness  of  each  so  that  our  poli- 
cies can  most  effectively  realize  our  mutual 
goals. 


Energy  and  Interdependence 

Now  let  me  turn  to  a  current  responsibility 
of  mine  within  the  State  Department,  your 
most  painful  problem,  and  our  mutual  obses- 
sion— energy.  The  energy  crisis  has  brought 
together  in  one  issue  all  the  strands  of  our 
foreign  policy.  Two  dimensions  stand  out : 

— First,  it  is  a  long-term  problem  affecting 
all  nations,  one  accentuated  by  the  Middle 
East  conflict,  but  one  whose  seeds  were  sown 
well  before  the  October  war  and  one  which 
will  outlive  that  conflict  by  many  years. 

— Second,  the  urgency  and  nature  of  the 
problem  compel  a  massive  cooperative  inter- 
national effort. 

Although  launching  such  an  effort  is  a 
painful  process,  success  in  its  launching  can 
make  the  energy  crisis  a  cohesive  rather  than 
a  divisive  force  in  the  world.  We  are  encour- 
aged by  the  results  of  the  Washington  Ener- 
gy Conference  to  believe  that  a  cooperative 
world  is  both  possible  and  a  mutual  goal  and 
that  abundant  energy  can  be  developed  for  all 
nations. 

The  conference  stimulated  an  awareness  of 
the  consequences  of  "going  it  alone."  The 
initial  temptation  in  recent  months  to  seek 
narrow  national  advantage  from  this  crisis 
has  threatened  to  pit  Japan,  Western  Europe, 
and  the  United  States  against  one  another 
in  unlimited  competition  for  the  world's  lim- 
ited resources,  thus  irreparably  damaging 
our  alliances.  It  has  also  threatened  to  engulf 
all  nations,  producers  and  consumers  alike, 
in  a  dangerous  spiral  of  inflation,  monetary 
and  trade  disruption,  and  global  economic  re- 
cession. 

Failure  to  meet  the  challenge  of  energy 
threatens  the  entire  fabric  which  holds  the 
world's  security  and  economy  together. 

The  immediate  problem  we  confronted  was 
that  in  the  framework  which  existed,  the 
energy-producing  nations  had  no  alternative 
except  to  attempt  to  maximize  their  short- 
term  benefits.  They  could  not  assess  the  im- 


March  25,  1974 


291 


pact  on  themselves  of  the  changes  in  the 
economies  of  the  consuming  nations  that 
were  caused  by  their  actions.  Nor  could  the 
developed  consumer  nations  measure  the  im- 
pact of  unrestricted  competition  on  the  whole 
fabric  of  their  relationship.  And  there  was 
no  clear  concept  of  the  potentially  irreparable 
damage  which  might  be  done  to  the  develop- 
ing nations  by  decisions  that  certainly  did  not 
take  all  the  consequences  into  account. 

The  energy  crisis  confronts  us  with  three 
specific  difficulties :  first,  the  oil  embargo ; 
second,  the  shortage  of  supply;  and  finally, 
the  quantum  increase  in  prices. 

The  embargo  against  the  United  States  is 
increasingly  inappropriate  in  view  of  our  role 
as  the  principal  nation  engaged  in  the  search 
for  a  just  and  durable  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that  the 
producer  nations  are  beginning  to  share  this 
perspective. 

Lifting  the  embargo  without  increasing 
production  would  not  solve  immediately  the 
world's  long-term  need  for  abundant  energy. 
The  explosion  of  demand  has  outstripped  the 
incentives  of  producers  to  increase  produc- 
tion. Inflationary  pressure  in  the  consumer 
countries  have  tended  to  create  incentives  to 
withhold  production.  This  is  especially  true 
in  a  sellers'  market,  where  the  producing 
countries  can  increase  their  income  by  rais- 
ing prices  rather  than  output. 

But  there  are  hopeful  signs.  World  demand 
has  been  reduced  in  recent  weeks — partly 
because  of  rising  prices— and  may  well  re- 
main below  last  September's  level.  Thus  we 
may  be  at  the  beginning  of  a  dramatic  change 
in  the  long-term  outlook  for  the  world  pe- 
troleum market.  Determined  conservation 
efi'orts  in  the  consuming  countries  and  vig- 
orous pursuit  of  alternative  energy  sources 
can  further  reduce  the  rate  of  growth  in 
demand  for  oil. 

The  most  immediate  and  critical  problem 
concerns  price.  Current  price  levels  are 
simply  not  sustainable.  At  these  levels,  the 
industrial  countries  alone  will  incur  a  current 
account  deficit  of  between  $36  and  $40  billion 
in  1974.  Such  large  increases  in  cost  would 
seriously  magnify  both  unemployment  and 


inflation  in  the  importing  countries.  Pres- 
sures for  selfish  restrictive  measures  could 
become  irresistible,  and  a  general  decline  in 
world  trade  would  inevitably  follow. 

To  meet  these  problems  the  Energy  Con- 
ference in  Washington  three  weeks  ago  set  as 
its  goal  a  new  framework  of  global  coopera- 
tion and  understanding — understanding  by 
the  consuming  nations  of  the  economic  as- 
pirations of  the  producers  and  understanding 
by  the  producing  nations  of  the  vulnerability 
of  the  world  economy  to  dramatic  changes 
unilaterally  imposed  on  free  market  condi- 
tions. We  must  insure  that  the  producers 
have  a  secure  stake  in  an  expanding  global 
economy  and  the  consumers  a  secure  source 
of  supply.  We  will  be  moving  vigorously  in 
the  next  few  months  to  attempt  to  achieve 
this  goal. 

Equally  important,  we  will  be  striving 
with  the  major  consuming  nations  to  con- 
serve available  supplies,  to  develop  alterna- 
tive sources  of  supply,  and  through  research 
and  development  exchange,  ultimately  to  find 
the  means  to  assure  energy  abundance  for  all 
nations. 

I  have  just  come  from  the  first  meeting  of 
the  Coordinating  Group  established  by  the 
Washington  Foreign  Ministers  conference. 
We  are  beginning  to  take  the  first  steps  to- 
ward a  specific  program  of  cooperation.  But 
we  should  not  be  lulled  by  the  progress  to 
date.  We  still  confront  a  major  intellectual 
challenge,  in  my  view,  in  devising  a  program 
adequate  to  the  complexities  of  the  energy 
problem  and  a  major  political  challenge  in 
jointly  making  the  political  act  of  will  re- 
quired to  commit  our  nations  to  fulfilling 
such  a  program. 

Radically  Altered   International  Environment 

Resolution  of  the  energy  problem  is  im- 
portant by  itself.  But  it  is  also,  and  more 
significantly,  a  test  of  man's  ability  to  create 
a  framework  of  cooperation  for  tomorrow,  to 
set  a  pattern  for  the  issues  of  the  future.  The 
energy  crisis  this  year  and  the  food  crisis  last 
year  signaled  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  for 


292 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


America  and  for  the  world — an  era  of  inter- 
dependence. 

We  must  recognize  that  interdependence  is 
a  fact,  not  a  choice. 

— It  is  a  fact  that  during  the  1960's  world 
trade  grew  8  percent  annually,  while  world 
production  grew  5  percent  annually,  thus 
creating  an  increasingly  integrated  global 
economy. 

— It  is  a  fact  that  a  dramatic  rise  in  the 
price  of  petroleum  initiated  by  some  coun- 
tries can  lead  directly  to  famine  in  other 
countries. 

— It  is  a  fact  that  of  the  13  basic  raw  ma- 
terials required  by  a  modern  economy,  the 
United  States  in  1950  was  dependent  on  im- 
ports for  more  than  half  of  its  supplies  of 
only  four,  by  the  1970's  the  list  had  grown 
to  six,  and  by  1985  it  is  projected  to  grow  to 
9  out  of  13. 

In  short  the  world's  rapidly  growing  inter- 
dependence has  created  a  radically  altered 
environment  in  which  governments  must  de- 
velop and  pursue  in  an  integrated  manner, 
both  foreign  and  domestic  policies. 

— This  new  environment  has  effectively 
linked  foreign  and  domestic  policies.  Hunger, 
pollution,  inflation,  the  scarcity  of  raw  ma- 
terials, cannot  be  resolved  on  a  national  basis. 

— Short-term  national  decisions  must  be 
based  on  long-term  international  perspec- 
tives. As  the  energy  and  food  shortages  dem- 
onstrate, no  nation  can  determine  its  own 
destiny  in  an  atmosphere  of  constant  and 
unexpected  crisis.  We  must  begin  to  foresee 
and  resolve  global  problems  or  the  complex 
fabric  of  modern  society  will  be  shattered  by 
repeated  and  unexpected  shocks. 

— Interdependence  can  bring  confrontation 
as  well  as  cooperation.  Nations  will  protect 
their  vital  national  interests.  If  the  members 
of  the  world  community  are  being  drawn  into 
proximity  at  an  accelerating  rate,  it  is  a 
proximity  for  which  many  are  politically  un- 
prepared, for  which  certain  institutions  are 
presently  inadequate,  and  for  which  there 
are  virtually  no  precedents  in  diplomacy.  We 
can  either  acknowledge  our  interdependence 


and  cooperate  in  its  management  or  literally 
consume  ourselves  in  nationalistic  rivalry 
which  the  realities  of  interdependence  make 
suicidal. 

This  can  be  a  year  of  qualitative  advance 
in  our  consciousness  of  the  necessity  for 
cooperation.  For  in  1974  we  are  addressing 
an  unprecedented  agenda  in  conferences  on 
energy,  food,  population,  the  oceans,  trade, 
and  monetary  problems.  Americans  can  take 
pride  in  the  fact  that  the  United  States  pro- 
posed, or  joined  in  proposing,  each  of  these 
conferences.  We  must  approach  the  challenge 
we  have  set  for  ourselves  with  a  larger  vision 
of  the  world  we  are  seeking  to  create. 

As  I  have  already  noted,  this  country  is 
now  in  the  position  of  conducting  its  foreign 
relations  as  most  nations  have  done  through- 
out history — applying  limited  means  to  clear- 
ly defined  objectives.  Now,  as  we  seek  to  de- 
fine what  means  we  will  make  available  and 
what  will  be  our  objectives,  there  are  many 
fundamental  choices  we  will  have  to  make  to- 
gether. For  unless  we  develop  a  national 
response,  our  foreign  policy  will  increasingly 
become  a  matter  controlled  by  partisan 
rather  than  national  interest.  As  a  start 
toward  a  national  dialogue  and  ultimately 
consensus,  let  me  suggest  some  questions 
which  I  believe  we  must  answer: 

— Is  there  a  rational  alternative  to  pursuit 
of  detente?  Can  we  responsibly  base  our  hope 
for  peace  only  on  the  threat  of  holocaust — 
on  an  uneasy  equilibrium  between  hostile 
giants?  If  not,  how  do  we  bring  about  and 
sustain  a  more  positive  relationship?  We  be- 
lieve it  is  possible  by  building  into  our  rela- 
tionships with  China  and  with  the  Soviet 
Union  vested  interests  in  cooperation  and  in 
restraint.  Do  others  who  question  the  pur- 
pose of  detente  doubt  its  necessity? 

— What  is  the  proper  purpose  of  foreign 
policy  in  relations  with  differing  systems? 
Americans  are  deeply  concerned  with  the 
liberty  of  our  fellow  man.  Some  argue  that 
we  must  express  this  concern  by  confronting 
other  nations  with  demands  to  change  their 
domestic  policies.  But  perpetual  confronta- 


March  25,   1974 


293 


tion  threatens  to  weaken  our  own  democratic 
liberties.  And  such  international  confronta- 
tion sustains,  in  my  view,  rather  than  eases 
domestic  repression  in  foreign  nations. 

— What  is  the  level  and  the  composition  of 
the  military  threat  to  us  and  to  our  allies  and 
how  do  we  most  effectively  meet  it?  What 
kind  of  forces  must  we  have  to  maintain  the 
confidence  of  our  allies  and  the  respect  of 
our  adversaries?  This  is  not  an  academic 
exercise.  The  Middle  East  showed  that.  Now, 
as  we  move  further  into  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks  with  the  Soviets  and  the 
negotiations  to  reduce  the  military  forces  in 
Central  Europe,  we  must  establish  a  defense 
philosophy  that  meets  our  needs  and  that  we 
can  support  as  a  nation. 

— What  is  the  nature  of  our  alliances  ?  Can 
we  afford  to  act  as  if  the  threat  that  produced 
them  has  ended  when  it  has  only  receded? 
If  not,  what  costs  are  we  willing  to  bear  to 
maintain  them?  Should  we  not  see  our  al- 
liances as  vital  building  blocks  in  an  inter- 
dependent world,  not  as  only  links  in  a  de- 
fensive chain? 

— What  is  the  nature  of  sovereignty  in  an 
interdependent  world?  The  United  States 
better  than  most  countries  can  pursue  a 
policy  of  autarky.  But  we  cannot  prosper, 
and  we  cannot  remain  secure,  if  we  are  iso- 
lated from  our  allies.  Are  there  any  alterna- 
tives to  proceeding  further  down  the  road 
of  cooperative  interdependence,  knowing  that 
if  we  do  not  we  will  pay  a  very  high  price 
as  nations  plunge  into  reckless  competition 
for  scarce  goods  and  resources? 

We  owe  it  to  this  and  future  generations 
that  our  answers  be  the  correct  ones.  We 
have  to  find  in  ourselves  the  ability  to  deal 
with  nuance,  the  confidence  to  move  easily 
with  complexity,  the  strength  to  accept  the 
dilemmas  that  are  thrust  upon  us  without 
shrinking. 

This  is  a  wholly  new  challenge  for  Amer- 
ica, but  as  we  approach  our  200th  anniver- 
sary we  can  display  to  the  world  by  the 
breadth  of  our  vision  and  the  strength  of 
our  purpose  that  these  two  centuries  have 
brought  not  the  weariness  of  old  age  but  the 
wisdom  of  maturity. 


President  Nixon's  News  Conference 
of  March  6 

Following  are  excerpts  relating  to  foreign 
policy  from  the  transcript  of  a  neivs  confer- 
ence held  by  President  Nixon  in  the  East 
Room  of  the  White  House  on  March  6} 


Q.  Mr.  President,  Secretary  Kissinger 
lias  reported  to  you  on  his  recent  Middle  East 
mission.  Did  lie  bring  an  optimistic  report 
on  the  lifting  of  the  oil  embargo? 

President  Nixon:  The  oil  embargo  is  a 
matter  the  discussion  of  which  would  not 
serve  a  useful  purpose  at  this  time,  except 
to  say  that  a  meeting  is  now  scheduled,  as  I 
understand  it,  on  the  11th  of  March  by  the 
oil-producing  countries. 

It  will  not  take  place  in  Egypt,  I  think, 
which  of  course  is  not  an  oil-producing  coun- 
try but  where  apparently  the  Egyptians  have 
some  influence  on  that  decision. 

However,  as  I  pointed  out  about  10  days 
ago  in  my  news  conference,  progress  on  the 
diplomatic  front,  while  it  is  not  linked  to 
lifting  of  the  embargo,  inevitably  has  an 
effect  on  it. 

We  have  had  progress  on  the  diplomatic 
front,  first  the  settlement  for  the  disengage- 
ment on  the  Egyptian  front,  and  second, 
while  it  is  an  even  more  difficult  problem 
than  the  Egyptian  disengagement,  the  agree- 
ment of  the  Syrians  and  the  Israelis  to  come 
to  Washington  two  weeks  from  now  to  dis- 
cuss how  a  disengagement  can  be  worked  out 
on  the  Syrian  front. 

The  United  States  will  use  its  influence 
just  as  strongly  as  we  can  with  both  parties 
to  get  a  disengagement  on  the  Syrian  front, 
as  quickly  as  possible,  which  is  just  and 
equitable  to  both  sides. 

We  believe  that  the  progress,  the  motion 
I  should  describe,  that  is  taking  place  on  the 
diplomatic  front,  will  inevitably  have  a  con- 
structive effect  on  the  oil-producing  com- 
panies  [countries]  insofar  as  their  decision 


'  For  the  complete  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  dated  Mar.  11. 


294 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


on  the  embargo,  but  I  am  going  to  leave  that 
decision  to  them  because  indicating  what 
they  will  do  might  lead  them  to  do  other- 
wise. 


and  Chairman  Mahon  will  be  responsible,  and 
the  cuts,  if  they  are  made,  will  be  ones  that 
will  not  weaken  the  United  States. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  you  met  this  week  with 
the  leaders  of  the  Appropriations  Committee, 
partly  in  regard  to  the  defense  budget,  and 
later  Senator  McClellan  said  he  woxdd  favw 
slashing  $3  billion  from  the  budget,  which 
as  you  know  is  nearly  $90  billion — higher 
than  in  tvartime.  Would  you  tell  us  if  you 
think  that  is  a  dangerous  cut,  and  if  so,  why? 

President  Nixon:  Senator  McClellan  told 
me  that  he  wanted  to  cut  the  budget  $3  bil- 
lion, and  he  is  a  watchdog  of  the  Treasury — 
and,  incidentally,  so  is  Congressman  Mahon. 
They  both  indicated  they  wanted  to  cut  the 
budget.  However,  neither  of  them  indicated 
that  they  wanted  to  take  the  muscle  out  of 
defense. 

I  would  say  the  primary  part  of  our  dis- 
cussion was  with  regard  to  the  necessity  for 
having  the  defense  budget  where  it  was.  I 
also  pointed  out  to  them,  because  Senator 
McClellan  was  particularly  interested  in  this, 
that  we  were  negotiating  at  this  time  for  a 
mutual  balanced  reduction  of  forces  in 
Europe.  I  said  in  order  to  accomplish  that, 
we  had  to  maintain  our  forces  at  the  present 
level  in  order  to  get  a  reduction  on  the  other 
side,  rather  than  to  do  it  unilaterally. 

I  believe,  finally,  that  Senator  McClellan 


Energy  Coordinating  Group 
Meets  at  Washington 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
February  25  (press  release  68)  that  the  first 
meeting  of  the  energy  Coordinating  Group 
established  by  the  Washington  Energy  Con- 
ference was  held  at  Washington  that  day. 

The  U.S.  delegation  was  headed  by  Under 
Secretary  for  Security  Assistance  William  H. 
Donaldson,  who  chaired  the  meeting.  Federal 
Energy  Administrator  William  E.  Simon, 
and  other  U.S.  oflJicials.  They  were  joined 
by  senior  officials  from  the  countries  partici- 
pating in  the  group,  which  include  Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg, 
the  Netherlands,  Norway,  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 

The  meeting  addressed  the  organizational 
aspects  of  the  Coordinating  Group,  such  as 
chairmanship  and  time  and  place  of  future 
meetings,  and  began  examination  of  the  work 
program  and  modalities  to  implement  the 
decisions  of  the  Washington  Energy  Confer- 
ence. 


March  25,  1974 


295 


Japan  and  Its  Relationship  With  the  United  States 


Address  by  Robert  S.  IngersoU 

Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  ^ 


I  have  just  completed  a  six-week  journey 
which  took  me  to  virtually  every  country  in 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  These  travels,  and 
the  opportunities  they  presented  to  talk  with 
scores  of  governmental,  business,  and  aca- 
demic leaders  in  14  countries,  impressed  me 
with  the  vitality  of  East  Asia,  the  ever- 
increasing  economic  interdependence  of  the 
Pacific  Basin,  and  the  extraordinary  breadth 
of  U.S.  political,  security,  and  commercial 
interests  throughout  the  area. 

Everywhere  I  went  I  saw  evidence  of  the 
fundamental  importance  of  preserving  close, 
cooperative  relations  with  Japan.  Through- 
out the  Pacific  area  statesmen  recognize  our 
security  ties  with  the  Japanese  as  a  funda- 
mental pillar  of  regional  stability.  The  eco- 
nomic prosperity  and  growth  prospects  of 
the  area  depend  heavily  on  continued  U.S. 
and  Japanese  economic  assistance,  invest- 
ment funds,  and  access  to  our  respective 
markets.  The  political  calculations  of  re- 
gional leaders  are  premised  to  an  important 
extent  on  the  continuation  of  a  close,  coop- 
erative relationship  between  Tokyo  and 
Washington.  I  return  more  convinced  than 
ever  that  wise  management  of  our  relations 
with  Japan  will  promote  the  advancement  of 
U.S.  interests  throughout  East  Asia;  con- 
versely, mismanagement  of  those  relations 
will  surely  have  a  "multiplier  effect"  on  diffi- 
culties we  can  expect  elsewhere. 

In  speaking  today  about  U.S.-Japan  rela- 
tions, instead  of  dwelling  on  current  issues 


'  Made  at  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  on  Feb.  28  before 
a  regional  foreign  policy  conference  cosponsored  by 
the  World  Affairs  Council  of  Northern  California 
and  the  Department  of  State. 


or  possible  future  problems  and  opportunities 
I  would  like  to  offer  a  few  brief  observations 
on  a  curious  paradox  which  struck  me  with 
increasing  force  during  my  tenure  in  Tokyo: 
Despite  the  repeated  success  we  and  the  Jap- 
anese have  had  in  surmounting  practical 
problems  in  our  bilateral  relations,  the  ap- 
pearance of  every  new  source  of  friction 
invariably  gives  rise  to  anxious  oflScial  soul- 
searching  and  widespread  journalistic  spec- 
ulation about  the  survival  of  the  relationship 
itself.  The  durability  of  the  U.S.-Japan 
relationship  is  demonstrated  by  its  survival 
of  periodic  crises;  yet  doubts  about  its  re- 
silience and  adaptability  persist. 

What  accounts  for  the  successful  manage- 
ment of  practical  difficulties?  Why  do  Amer- 
icans and  Japanese  frequently  overreact  to 
each  new  problem?  What  can  be  done  about 
this? 

There  is  certainly  no  question  about  the  fact 
that  our  relations  with  Japan  have  undergone 
a  profound  transformation  and  adjustment 
to  novel  conditions  in  recent  years. 

Politically  we  are  both  pursuing  efforts 
to  improve  our  ties  with  the  major  Commu- 
nist powers.  Recurring  references  to  the  so- 
called  "Nixon  shock"  of  July  1971  notwith- 
standing, the  somewhat  different  approaches 
we  have  both  developed  for  dealing  with 
China,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  divided 
countries  in  Korea  and  Indochina  have 
proved  mutually  compatible,  and  their  evolu- 
tion has  been  marked  by  continuing  and 
frank  consultations. 

Two  years  ago  our  security  relations  with 
Japan  were  an  extremely  contentious  issue  in 
Japanese  domestic  politics.  Since  that  time, 
however,  the  Okinawa  reversion  issue  has 


296 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


been  finally  removed  from  the  agenda  of  our 
bilateral  relations.  Adjustments  in  our  rela- 
tions with  China  have  transformed  the 
Mutual  Security  Treaty  from  an  instrument 
of  containment  into  a  key  element  of  an 
evolving  security  system  in  which  all  the  ma- 
jor powers  in  Asia  have  a  stake.  An  end  to 

,  U.S.  involvement  in  the  Viet-Nam  conflict 
removed  a  critical  source  of  emotional  oppo- 
sition to  the  U.S.  presence  in  Japan.  The 
orderly  consohdation  of  our  military  facili- 

!  ties  in  Japan — formulated  and  implemented 
with  the  administrative  and  financial  assist- 
ance of  the  Japanese  Government — has 
rationalized  our  use  of  scarce  land,  permitted 
us  sizable  budgetary  savings,  and  lanced 
potentially  troublesome  political  problems  in 
heavily  populated  areas  of  Japan.  The  refine- 
ment of  consultative  channels  has  facilitated 
the  "smooth  and  effective"  implementation  of 
the  treaty  and  enables  us  increasingly  to 
anticipate  rather  than  merely  react  to  prob- 
lems. 

Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  adjustments 
have  taken  place  in  the  trade  field.  In  1972 
we  ran  a  $4.2  billion  bilateral  deficit  with 
Japan.  In  1973  this  figure  was  reduced  to 
$1.3  billion — a  remarkable  turnaround  in  a 
single  year.  The  recovery  of  the  Japanese 
economy  from  its  1972  slump  surely  helped, 
as  did  the  general  inflation  of  world  com- 
modity prices.  Equally  important,  however, 
the  Japanese,  acknowledging  their  own  eco- 
nomic strength  and  their  own  stake  in  re- 
ciprocal treatment  in  foreign  markets, 
eliminated  a  host  of  outdated  restrictions  on 
the  import  of  goods  and  capital,  modified 
longstanding  export  promotion  practices,  re- 
valued their  currency,  introduced  an  expan- 
sionary budget  and  adjusted  their  distribu- 
tion system — thereby  promoting  a  sharp 
increase  in  imports,  especially  from  the 
United  States. 

Thus,  whether  one  looks  at  political,  se- 
curity, or  commercial  relations,  important 
adjustments  have  been  made,  problems  have 
been  resolved,  points  of  contention  have  been 
eased  or  removed,  the  benefits  of  cooperation 
have  been  sustained  even  as  the  methods  and 
terms  of  cooperation  have  in  some  cases  been 
significantly  redefined. 


"Fine  Tuning"   the  U.S.-Japan   Relationship 

In  the  light  of  this  experience  it  is  all  the 
more  surprising  that  so  many  people  devote 
so  much  time  and  attention  to  an  exercise 
one  of  my  colleagues  in  the  State  Department 
calls  "taking  the  temperature  of  the  U.S.- 
Japan relationship."'  Too  many  people  expend 
too  much  energy  worrying  whether  the  ap- 
pearance of  any  symptom  of  ill  health  may 
signal  the  demise  of  the  patient.  Perhaps 
this  reflects  historic  memories  of  rivalry.  It 
is  testimony  to  the  fact  that,  unlike  some 
other  American  alliances,  our  relations  with 
Japan  are  not  underpinned  by  a  common 
language,  religion,  or  cultural  legacy.  They 
are,  however,  grounded  in  an  extraordinary 
range  of  common  interests.  And  I  believe 
that  it  is  high  time  we  stop  worrying  about 
the  survival  of  cooperative  U.S.-Japanese  ties 
and  focus  our  attention  on  the  important 
business  of  "fine  tuning"  the  relationship  to 
the  changing  requirements  of  a  rapidly 
changing  world. 

By  fine  tuning  the  relationship,  I  mean 
adjusting  the  policies  of  both  governments 
to  meet  new  problems  or  accommodate  new 
developments  in  old  problem  areas.  As  we  go 
about  this  business,  we  might  well  keep  the 
following  propositions  in  mind : 

— It  is  neither  desirable  nor  possible  to 
escape  the  imperatives  of  our  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  strategic  interdependence  with 
Japan.  The  tangible  and  intangible  benefits 
of  that  association  are  extraordinarily  di- 
verse and  rich.  Our  well-being  as  consum- 
ers— with  a  stake  in  fighting  inflation — the 
prosperity  of  many  of  our  industries,  our 
ability  to  project  our  influence  effectively 
onto  the  Asian  scene,  our  capacity  to  promote 
the  further  relaxation  of  tensions  in  areas  of 
former  conflicts  in  Asia  all  depend  impor- 
tantly on  the  preservation  of  close,  mutually 
beneficial  relations  with  Japan.  We  are  not 
mere  temporary  allies ;  we  are  destined  to  be 
permanent  friends. 

— Obviously,  between  societies  as  dynamic 
as  ours  and  economies  as  competitive  as  ours 
there  will  be  constant  sources  of  friction.  The 
problems  of  trade  and  money  and  energy, 
moreover,  directly  engage  the  interests  of  a 


March  25,   1974 


297 


host  of  powerful  domestic  interests  in  both 
countries.  Accommodating  the  interests  of 
domestic  constituencies  with  the  require- 
ments of  international  cooperation  can  be 
difficult  as  well  as  time  consuming  and  frus- 
trating. But  it  is  an  essential  task,  and  it  is 
a  sign  of  maturity  that  we  and  the  Japanese 
are  not  sweeping  thorny  problems  under  the 
rug  but  dealing  with  them  head  on  and  in  an 
increasingly  open  and  hardheaded  manner. 
There  is  a  difference  between  not  ducking 
problems  and  being  panicked  by  them.  Better 
an  occasionally  stormy  marriage  than  a 
quiet,  sullen  divorce. 

— We  need  to  discriminate  more  carefully 
between  differing  circumstances  and  diverg- 
ing interests.  Obviously,  important  differ- 
ences will  continue  to  mark  the  security, 
economic,  and  political  circumstances  of 
Japan  and  the  United  States.  The  United 
States  possesses  strategic  military  power 
with  a  global  reach ;  Japan's  military  posture 
is  confined  to  limited  conventional  arma- 
ments designed  exclusively  for  the  defense  of 
the  Japanese  home  islands  and  the  Ryukyus. 
Commercially  we  sell  Japan  primarily  food- 
stuffs, raw  materials,  and  high-technology 
items  while  we  purchase  in  return  a  wide 
variety  of  consumer  and  industrial  goods. 
Politically,  we  have  articulated  a  rather 
comprehensive  design  for  a  structure  of 
world  order;  the  Japanese  are  developing  a 
broader  vision  of  their  political  responsibili- 
ties, but  Japanese  instincts  have  been  shaped 
by  the  pursuit  for  most  of  the  past  two  dec- 
ades of  a  "low"  foreign  policy  profile.  We 
can  dwell  too  much  on  such  differences.  Com- 
plementary relations  are  forged  by  peoples 
experiencing  different  circumstances,  yet 
pursuing  converging  aims. 

— Fine  tuning  U.S.-Japan  relations  will  re- 
quire constant  attentiveness  to  opportunities 
to  upgrade  the  common  interests.  In  our 
bilateral  trade,  for  example,  comparative 
advantages  will  shift  over  time,  as  will  our 
respective  balances  of  trade  and  payments. 
But  we  have  a  common  stake  in  promoting  a 
rapid  expansion  in  the  overall  volume  of 
trade  and  in  assuring  the  principle  of  reci- 
procity. Such  common  interests  are  some- 
times more  readily  discernible  if  the  focus 


is  shifted  away  from  the  bilateral  context  to 
a  wider  multilateral  framework.  Indeed  that 
is  precisely  what  we  are  attempting  to  ac- 
complish in  the  trade  and  monetary  fields. 
Having  achieved  a  more  equitable  and  re- 
ciprocal bilateral  trade  balance  and  more 
appropriate  relationship  of  currency  values, 
we  are  seeking  to  reform  the  monetary  sys- 
tem and  roll  back  additional  tariff  and  non- 
tariff  barriers  to  trade  through  multilateral 
negotiations  in  the  GATT  and  IMF  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund]. 

Politically,  we  are  also  seeking  to  strength- 
en the  multilateral  dimensions  of  U.S.-Japan 
relations.  Once  those  relations  were  defined 
principally  against  the  backdrop  of  a  bi- 
lateral security  treaty  and  a  bilateral  trade 
relationship.  As  we  both  diversify  our  po- 
litical and  economic  relationships,  I  believe 
we  are  developing  a  more  complete  and  more 
detached  appreciation  of  the  broad  range  of 
interests  we  share. 


Multilateral  and  Bilateral   Solutions 

We  are  looking  for  a  coherent  framework 
within  which  we  may  approach  new  problems 
in  a  cooperative  way.  It  is  increasingly  ap- 
parent that  the  issues  most  central  to  the 
livelihood  of  our  peoples  and  the  policy  con- 
cerns of  our  governments — the  stability  of 
currencies,  the  rules  governing  international 
trade,  assuring  adequate  supplies  of  energy 
at  reasonable  prices — cannot  be  met  by  either 
the  United  States  or  Japan  in  isolation.  They 
will  not  yield  to  bilateral  solutions.  Nor  can  j 
they  be  treated  within  an  essentially  Atlantic 
framework.  They  are  global  problems.  But 
they  engage  the  interests  of  the  advanced 
industrial  democracies  of  Western  Europe, 
North  America,  and  Japan  most  immediately 
and  most  extensively.  We  think  that  the  elab- 
oration of  more  intensive  modes  of  coopera- 
tions among  those  countries  is  an  essential 
part  of  any  serious  effort  to  cope  with  these 
problems.  It  was  with  this  in  mind  that  we 
have  been  seeking  to  associate  Japan  with 
our  endeavor  to  work  out  a  Declaration  of 
Principles  with  other  advanced  industrial 
democracies. 


298 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I  have  been  suggesting  that  we  need  to 
avoid  being  panicked  by  problems,  that  we 
need  to  cease  worrying  so  much  about  the 
durability  of  cordial  U.S. -Japanese  relations, 
and  that  we  need  to  recognize  that  the  central 
task  is  one  of  adjustment.  But  where  is  the 
fine  tuning  most  likely  to  be  required  in  the 
near  future? 

In  the  bilateral  area  fewer  critical  adjust- 
ments seem  required  than  has  frequently 
been  the  case  in  the  past.  We  will  obviously 
have  to  keep  a  sharp  eye  on  trade  problems. 
The  rising  cost  of  energy  supplies  will  pro- 
vide us  both  with  incentives  to  cover  the 
costs  through  expanded  exports.  But  all  con- 
sumer nations  face  rising  costs;  all  cannot, 
obviously,  run  trade  surpluses  with  each 
other. 

The  Japanese  have  substantially  liberal- 
ized restrictions  on  foreign  capital  invest- 
ment in  Japan.  They  are  also  rapidly  becom- 
ing a  major  creditor  nation  and  a  potent 
source  of  overseas  investment  funds,  as  I 
hardly  need  tell  a  California  audience.  This 
is  to  be  welcomed.  We  all  stand  to  gain  from 
freer  flows  of  capital  as  well  as  goods.  But  of 
course  we  can  also  expect  some  problems. 
Japanese  businessmen — as  well  as  our  own 
— are  having  to  learn  to  be  good  citizens  of 
countries  in  which  they  are  developing  their 
business  ventures.  In  Japan,  American  firms 
have  had  to  adjust  to  a  difl^erent  pattern  of 
labor-management  relations.  For  our  part  we 
hope  that  as  the  Japanese  expand  their  in- 
vestments in  the  United  States,  they  will  find 
employment-generating  projects  especially 
attractive  and  not  concentrate  too  much  in 
real  estate  and  recreational  investments. 
Geographical  dispersion  throughout  the  coun- 
try would  also  be  desirable. 

In  the  security  area  we  will  have  to  make 
continuing  adjustment  in  the  structure  and 
functioning  of  our  bases  in  Japan  to  suit  the 
realities  of  both  countries.  And  of  course 
there  will  be  an  even  greater  need  in  the 
future  for  a  sophisticated  dialogue  on  se- 
curity issues  as  we  both  adjust  our  defense 
postures  and  our  diplomatic  strategies  for 
dealing  with  the  changing  realities  of  the 
Asian  scene. 

In  the  multilateral  area  the  most  demand- 


ing challenges  for  fine  tuning  are  likely  to 
come  in  the  field  of  energy  and  natural  re- 
sources. Clearly  our  national  situations  are 
vastly  different.  For  the  United  States, 
achieving  self-sufficiency  in  energy  supplies 
is  a  plausible  possibility  and  policy  objective. 
For  the  Japanese  it  is  an  impossible  dream. 
Diversification  of  sources  rather  than  self- 
sufiiciency  of  supplies  is  the  central  aim  of 
Japan.  But  it  is  misleading  to  suggest,  as 
some  have,  that  contrasting  requirements 
and  vulnerabilities  necessarily  dictate  diverg- 
ing policies.  On  the  contrary,  we  share  with 
Japan  a  host  of  common  interests  in  this 
field. 

— As  the  world's  largest  importers  of  pe- 
troleum we  share  a  stake  in  avoiding  forms 
of  competition  that  will  merely  bid  up  the 
prices  for  everyone  while  creating  chaos  in 
world  oil  markets  and  stimulating  political 
rivalries. 

— As  advanced  countries  which  consume  a 
disproportionate  share  of  world  energy  and 
raw  material  supplies,  we  have  a  common 
interest  in  imposing  restraints  on  the  rate  of 
increase  in  demand  for  increasingly  scarce 
supplies  and  in  developing  more  efficient 
means  of  utilizing  fuels  and  industrial  raw 
materials. 

— As  technically  sophisticated  countries 
with  mounting  energy  requirements,  we  have 
an  opportunity  to  pool  our  research  and  de- 
velopment efforts  in  order  to  obtain  alterna- 
tive energy  sources  without  wasteful  dupli- 
cation of  effort. 

— As  nations  whose  prosperity  depends  on 
the  successful  development  of  generally  ac- 
cepted rules  for  managing  the  international 
economic  system,  we  have  an  obvious  stake 
in  developing  a  stable  pattern  of  consumer- 
producer  relations  in  the  energy  field  and 
managing  the  massive  shift  of  oil  dollars  to 
the  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum  Ex- 
porting Countries]  countries  in  a  manner 
that  is  consistent  with  a  liberalization  of 
world  trading  arrangements,  stabilization  of 
the  international  monetary  system,  and  the 
promotion  of  continued  economic  grovii;h  in 
the  less  developed  countries. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  there  will  be  no 


March  25,    1974 


299 


elements  of  competition  between  us  in  tliis 
field.  We  can  expect  difficulties  in  coordinat- 
ing our  national  policies.  But  within  this 
broad  framework  of  common  and  complemen- 
tary interests,  the  harmonization  of  policies 
should  be  possible.  It  is  certainly  necessary. 
That  appropriate  adjustments  can  be  made 
was  clearly  demonstrated  by  the  broad  areas 
of  agreement  developed  between  us  at  the 
Washington  Energy  Conference  held  earlier 
this  month. 

Looking  back  over  the  years  since  World 
War  II,  both  Americans  and  Japanese  can 
take  pride  in  the  relationship  that  has  been 
forged  between  these  two  societies  so  alike 
and  so  different  in  many  ways.  In  breadth 
and  depth  that  relationship  has  no  equal  in 
the  history  of  contact  between  East  and 
West.  This  has  not  been  the  work  of  govern- 
ments alone;  individual  private  groups  and  a 
variety  of  organizations  have  contributed 
mightily  to  this  accomplishment.  We  all  now 
must  share  in  the  task  of  refining  and  adapt- 
ing this  relationship  to  meet  the  challenges 
and  opportunities  which  lie  ahead.  The  re- 
ward for  our  success  will  be  the  contribution 
we  shall  make  thereby  to  building  that  struc- 
ture of  lasting  peace  on  which  the  happiness 
and  prosperity  of  our  people  depend. 


U.S.  and  Germany  Discuss  Cooperation 
in  Science  and  Technology  R.  &  D. 

Following  is  a  joint  statement  issued  at 
Washington  and  Bonn  on  March  8  at  the  con- 
clusion of  a  visit  to  the  United  States  by 
Horst  Ehmke,  Minister  of  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany  for  Research  and  Tech- 
nology. 

Press  release  89  dated  March  8 

Federal  Minister  Professor  Horst  Ehmke 
visited  the  United  States  March  2-8  to  dis- 
cuss common  interests  in  the  programs  and 
plans  of  both  countries  in  science  and  tech- 
nology research  and  development  [R.  &  D.]. 

During   his    long-planned    visit,    Minister 


Ehmke  met  with  the  Honorable  Rogers  C.  B. 
Morton,  Secretary  of  the  Interior;  the  Hon- 
orable Roy  L.  Ash,  Director,  Office  of  Man- 
agement and  Budget;  the  Honorable  Edward 
M.  Kennedy,  U.S.  Senator;  the  Honorable 
William  J.  Casey,  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Economic  Affairs ;  the  Honorable  William 
E.  Simon,  Deputy  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
and  Administrator,  Federal  Energy  Office; 
the  Honorable  E.  T.  Klassen,  Postmaster 
General ;  the  Honorable  Dixy  Lee  Ray,  Chair- 
man, Atomic  Energy  Commission ;  the  Hon- 
orable Russell  E.  Train,  Administrator, 
Environmental  Protection  Agency;  the  Hon- 
orable H.  Guyford  Stever,  Director,  National 
Science  Foundation ;  the  Honorable  James  C. 
Fletcher,  Administrator,  National  Aero- 
nautics and  Space  Administration;  the 
Honorable  Helmut  Sonnenfeldt,  Counselor  of 
the  Department  of  State.  He  also  visited  the 
gaseous  diffusion  enrichment  facility  at  Oak 
Ridge  and  the  research  and  development 
facilities  of  the  Oak  Ridge  National  Labora- 
tory. 

During  the  meetings  the  mutual  conviction 
was  expressed  that  industrialized  nations 
must  relate  their  advanced  research  and  tech- 
nology resources  to  the  challenges  of  modern 
society. 

Minister  Ehmke  and  the  Chairman  of  the 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Dr.  Dixy  Lee 
Ray,  signed  a  technical  exchange  and  coop- 
eration agreement  between  the  Atomic  Ener- 
gy Commission  and  the  Federal  Ministry  of 
Research  and  Technology  on  reactor  safety 
research  and  development. 

Besides  traditional  fields  of  cooperation  in 
nuclear  energy  development  and  in  space  re- 
search and  technology,  areas  considered 
particularly  appropriate  for  emphasis  in- 
clude : 

— R.  &  D.  in  energy  and  natural  resources 
(e.g.,  coal  gasification  and  liquefaction,  trans- 
portation and  storage  of  energy,  rational 
utilization  of  energy). 

— Reactor  safety. 

— Radioactive  waste  treatment  and  stor- 
age. 

— Biomedical  research  and  technology. 


300 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 


— Environmental  research  and  technology. 
— Transportation  technology. 
— Communication  technology. 
— Ocean  research  and  technology. 

It  was  agreed  that  there  should  be  further 
consultation  on  cooperation  in  these  areas 
and  that  such  cooperation  should  be  expanded 
gradually  and  with  flexibility  considering  the 
special  characteristics  of  each  sector.  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States  also  agree  that 
it  is  useful  to  continue  exchanges  of  experi- 
ence in  the  planning  and  assessment  of 
R.  &  D.  relating  to  modern  societal  needs. 

The  traditionally  close  relations  existing 
between  the  two  governments,  various  re- 
search agencies  and  institutions,  and  indi- 
vidual scientists  have  led  to  a  growing 
exchange  of  information  and  have  contrib- 
uted fruitfully  to  development  in  both 
countries.  Minister  Ehmke  noted  that  these 
relations  have  been  highly  important,  partic- 
ularly in  their  first  years,  in  fostering  the 
growing  German  ability  to  innovate  and  to 
utilize  research  and  technology  in  key  areas 
in  the  solution  of  economic  and  societal  prob- 
lems. They  are  now  concentrated  on  problems 
which  are  shared  by  both  countries. 

The  United  States  and  Germany  have 
never  considered  their  relations  to  be  exclu- 
sively bilateral.  This  has  been  demonstrated 
by  the  cooperation  between  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Community  in  areas  such 
as  nuclear  research  and  technological  devel- 
opment, and  later  in  European-U.S.  space 
cooperation,  to  which  Germany  is  contrib- 
uting actively.  It  is  the  hope  of  both  countries 
that  such  relations  will  continue  to  grow. 

The  United  States  and  Germany  agree  that 
continued  cooperation  should  primarily  com- 
prise those  areas  in  which  governments  have 
particular  responsibility.  However,  to  the 
extent  possible,  partners  from  industry  and 
nongovernment    research    participating    in 


individual  areas  will  be  included  in  the 
R.  &  D.  programs  effected  between  the  two 
governments. 

Both  countries  envisage  the  expansion  of 
their  cooperation,  particularly  in  energy, 
with  the  addition  as  appropriate  of  other 
countries,  in  order  to  incorporate  their  rela- 
tions in  the  cooperative  framework  sought  by 
Europe  and  the  United  States.  It  is  also  en- 
visaged that  cooperation  in  energy  research 
and  development  will  be  organized  on  the 
basis  of  the  communique  of  the  February 
10-13  Washington  Energy  Conference. 


Sales  to  Government  of  Ecuador 
Under  Foreign  Military  Sales  Act 

Presidential   Determination   No.   74-13' 

Sales,  Credits  or  Guaranties  to  the  Government 
OF  Ecuador  Under  the  Foreign  Military  Sales 
Act 

Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  State 

The  White  House, 
Washington,  January  21,  1974. 

I  hereby  determine  that  the  waiver  of  the  provi- 
sions of  Section  3(b)  of  the  Foreign  Military  Sales 
Act,  as  amended,  with  respect  to  the  Government 
of  Ecuador  is  important  to  the  security  of  the  United 
States  and,  therefore,  the  provisions  of  that  Section 
are  hereby  waived  insofar  as  they  relate  to  sales, 
credits  or  guaranties  to  the  Government  of  Ecuador. 

You  are  requested  on  my  behalf  to  report  this 
determination  and  waiver  to  the  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  and  to  the  Chairman  of 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  as  re- 
quired by  law. 

This  determination  shall  be  published  in  the  Fia)- 
eral  Register. 


(^/hJL^^'K:/^ 


'  39  Fed.  Reg.  5179. 


March  25,   1974 


301 


International   Economic  Affairs  in   1974 


Address  by  William  J.  Casey 

Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ' 


We  have  seen  remarkable,  and  often  un- 
settling, developments  in  the  international 
economic  scene  in  the  last  year:  an  oil  boy- 
cott, shortages  of  many  other  commodities, 
turbulence  on  the  world  monetary  markets, 
and  a  renewed  surge  of  inflation  in  the  in- 
dustrialized nations.  What  is  striking  about 
these  developments  is  the  high  degree  to 
which  they  all  are  interrelated.  For  example, 
the  oil  boycott  coupled  with  the  higher  prices 
for  crude  oil  has  inflationary  trade  and  mone- 
tary implications.  Substantial  price  rises 
have  occurred  in  food,  fibers,  and  metals.  A 
World  Food  Conference  is  being  called  to 
deal  with  problems  arising  from  worldwide 
shortfalls  in  agricultural  production.  These 
interrelationships,  and  others  too  numerous 
to  detail  here,  illustrate  the  interdependence 
which  is  the  key  to  understanding  economic 
trends  and  developments  in  the  world. 

As  we  are  moving  on  a  number  of  fronts 
to  deal  with  the  consequences  of  increased  in- 
terdependence, it  is  important  to  keep  in 
mind  that  we  cannot  carry  on  negotiations 
in  an  atmosphere  of  preemptory  demands 
and  confrontation.  We  are  in  a  situation 
where  all  gain  or  all  lose.  The  nations  of  the 
world  are  inextricably  tied  together,  and  the 
intensity  with  which  economic  interests  are 
pursued  reflects  not  a  basic  disparity  of  in- 
terest but  the  closeness  of  our  interdepend- 
ence. Let  us  now  look  at  the  major  areas 
in  which  attention  and  activity  must  be  fo- 
cused in  1974.  These  are  all  areas  in  which 
prompt  action  must  be  taken  lest  we  find 


^  Made  before  the  Public  Affairs  Council  at  Wash- 
ington on  Feb.  28  (press  release  75). 


ourselves  facing  intractable  problems  in  a 
very  few  years. 

Our  economic  relations  with  Europe  and 
Japan  are  highly  complex  and  have  under- 
gone considerable  evolution  in  recent  years. 
To  keep  this  relationship  relevant  to  chang- 
ing requirements,  we  have  engaged  in  a  com- 
plex of  negotiations  to  reform  the  interna- 
tional monetary  system,  to  improve  and  lib- 
eralize the  international  trading  system,  to 
develop  investment  guidelines,  and  to  meet 
the  challenges  of  the  energy  situation. 

Since  the  trade  bill  was  introduced  in  Con- 
gress just  under  11  months  ago,  the  trading 
system — with  unexpected  suddenness — has 
been  faced  with  its  most  severe  challenge. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  energy  situation,  the 
world  has  been  confronted  with  a  renewed 
temptation  to  cast  aside  the  discipline  of  in- 
ternationally accepted  norms  and  to  return 
to  bilateralism  and  protectionism.  Failure 
to  resist  that  temptation  would  threaten  a 
breakdown  in  multilateral  economic  coopera- 
tion and  the  real  possibility  of  worldwide 
recession. 

We  are  determined  to  avoid  actions  on  our 
part  which  would  contribute  to  that  result. 
We  are  convinced  that  only  through  coopera- 
tive international  endeavors  can  we  avoid  a 
serious  do\\Titurn  in  our  own  economic  wel- 
fare and  that  of  other  countries.  At  the 
Washington  Energy  Conference  last  month 
11  other  countries,  including  our  major 
trading  partners,  joined  with  us  in  charting 
a  course  of  action  structured  around  coopera- 
tive multilateral  programs  which  we  believe 
are  essential  to  meet  both  the  immediate  and 


302 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  longer  term  challenges  of  the  energy  sit- 
uation. Included  in  that  program  is  agree- 
ment on  the  need  for  all  countries  to  avoid 
competitive  currency  devaluations  and  the 
escalation  of  trade  restrictions  in  response  to 
the  uncertain  impact  on  their  balance  of  pay- 
ments of  high  oil  prices. 

Multilateral  Trade   Negotiations 

The  energy  situation  has  raised  questions 
which  are  immediately  relevant  to  the  trade 
bill  and  to  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations. 

First,  the  trade  negotiations,  opened  last 
September  in  Tokyo,  stand  as  visible  evi- 
dence of  the  commitment  on  the  part  of  over 
100  countries  to  multilateral  cooperation  and 
to  restraint  against  unilateral  measures  to 
shift  to  others  the  burden  of  economic  pres- 
sures like  the  energy  situation.  These  nego- 
tiations must  now  proceed  with  a  new  sense 
of  urgency.  The  preparatory  work  now 
underway  in  Geneva  must  move  ahead  as 
rapidly  as  possible  so  that  actual  negotiations 
may  begin. 

The  trade  bill,  on  which  the  Senate  Fi- 
nance Committee  will  commence  hearings 
next  week,  provides  the  authority  the  admin- 
istration needs  to  participate  in  these  nego- 
tiations and  to  enable  us  to  lessen  discrimina- 
tion against  our  goods  in  foreign  markets, 
further  liberalize  world  trade  on  a  reciprocal 
basis,  and  improve  the  international  frame- 
work in  which  world  trade  is  conducted. 
Only  in  the  larger  forum  provided  by  multi- 
lateral negotiations  can  we  adequately  re- 
solve the  specific  and  often  contentious  trade 
issues  that  evade  solution  on  a  bilateral  basis. 

Secondly,  by  resulting  in  a  more  efficient 
allocation  of  the  world's  resources,  trade  lib- 
eralization will  further  the  capacity  of  our 
economy  and  those  of  others  to  adjust  to 
higher  energy  costs,  including  a  higher  cost 
for  petroleum.  In  a  period  where  the  growth 
of  the  world  economy  will  undoubtedly  be 
affected  adversely  by  higher  energy  costs,  it 
is  even  more  important  that  we  have  the 
stimulation  to  growth  and  the  anti-inflation- 
ary impact  which  result  from  a  reduction  in 
trade  barriers. 


Third,  the  oil  situation  raises  the  more 
general  question  of  the  rights  and  obligations 
of  both  consuming  and  producing  countries 
in  the  area  of  scarce  resources.  Past  trade 
negotiations  largely  have  been  concerned 
with  access  to  markets  rather  than  access  to 
vital  raw  materials.  Existing  international 
trading  rules  deal  inadequately  with  the  con- 
ditions governing  such  access.  In  the  trade 
negotiations  we  have  the  opportunity  to  look 
at  this  issue  in  greater  depth  and  to  examine 
the  need  for  bringing  export  restrictions,  like 
import  barriers,  under  similar  forms  of  in- 
ternational discipline. 

Only  in  the  larger  multilateral  forum 
which  the  trade  negotiations  provide  can  we: 

— Take  account  of  the  effects  on  trade  of 
the  changes  occurring  in  the  structure  of  the 
world  economy. 

— Avoid  attempts  to  solve  national  prob- 
lems at  the  expense  of  others. 

— Keep  world  markets  open  and  resolve 
contentious  trade  issues. 

— Reexamine  and  improve  the  existing 
rules  governing  international  trade  so  that 
they  are  equitable  and  provide  sufficient  re- 
straint against  destructive  unilateral  actions. 

— Develop  a  positive  constructive  approach 
to  international  trade  issues  which  will 
strengthen  and  not  break  up  our  political  and 
security  partnerships. 

EfFect  of  Oil   Prices  on   Payments  System 

While  we  are  negotiating  to  develop  a  more 
open  and  more  reliable  world  trading  system, 
the  abrupt  increase  in  oil  prices  will  give  us 
urgent  and  pressing  problems  in  maintaining 
a  satisfactory  flow  of  goods  and  money. 
Higher  oil  prices  will  bring  about  a  vast 
transformation  of  the  international  pay- 
ments pattern  this  year  as  some  $85-$110 
billion  is  abruptly  shifted  from  familiar  trad- 
ing channels  to  oil-producing  countries. 

Unless  the  oil  producers'  earnings  flow 
quickly  back  to  the  consumer  states — as  pur- 
chases of  goods  and  services  or  as  investment 
capital — in  a  distribution  which  permits  rea- 
sonable growth  to  be  maintained,  some  coun- 


March  25,    1974 


303 


tries  will  experience  reduction  in  employment 
and  output  comparable  to  that  which  would 
result  from  a  very  large  unexpended  tax  in- 
crease. Though  the  attractiveness  of  the  U.S. 
capital  market  to  Arab  investors  would  seem 
to  reduce  its  vulnerability  to  this  initial  im- 
pact, we  will  not  be  immune  from  a  "ripple 
effect"  from  other  countries. 

Equally  serious  dangers  stem  from  the 
possibility  that  uncoordinated  efforts  by  indi- 
vidual countries  to  improve  their  own  posi- 
tions might  lead  to  a  destructive  round  of 
mutually  offsetting  actions. 

Some  actions  taken  so  far  by  principal 
consuming  countries — piecemeal,  ill  coordi- 
nated, and  aimed  in  various  directions — re- 
flect both  the  breadth  of  the  problem  and  the 
limited  understanding  of  its  implications. 
Several  countries  are  exploring  the  possibil- 
ity of  bilateral  deals  with  oil  producers, 
though  only  France  appears  to  have  gone 
very  far  in  this  direction.  To  moderate  the 
damage  that  these  deals  can  do  to  the  world- 
wide trading  system,  we  have  urged  some 
kind  of  rules  of  the  road  and  the  EC  [Euro- 
pean Communities]  Commission  is  attempt- 
ing to  draft  a  "general  code"  to  govern  mem- 
ber countries'  direct  oil  deals. 

The  initial  actions  of  several  countries 
have  centered  upon  the  practical  matter  of 
financing,  through  credits,  oil  import  require- 
ments for  the  coming  months.  France,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  Italy  are  floating  or 
about  to  float  sizable  loans  in  the  internation- 
al capital  markets.  Italy  has  increased  its 
swap  line  with  the  United  States  by  $1  bil- 
lion and  is  seeking  a  $1.2  billion  standby  com- 
mitment from  the  IMF  [International  Mone- 
tary Fund] .  The  EC  Commission  is  drawing 
up  a  strategy  for  concerted  action  among  the 
member  states  in  seeking  international  cred- 
its to  cover  the  higher  oil  import  costs.  Fur- 
thermore, since  removal  of  the  U.S.  capital 
control  programs  January  29,  West  Ger- 
many, Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and  France 
have  all  reduced  their  barriers  to  capital  in- 
flows. This  will  assist  those  countries  to  at- 
tract money  from  foreign  sources.  The  IMF's 


decision  late  last  month  to  approve  the  Bank 
for  International  Settlements  as  a  holder  of 
SDK's  [special  drawing  rights]  should  also 
facilitate  short-term  financing  of  oil-related 
payments  deficits. 

The  dilemma  faced  by  each  consumer  coun- 
try is  how  to  generate  sufficient  foreign  ex- 
change to  pay  its  increased  oil  import  bill 
without  cutting  down  on  non-oil  imports.  To 
do  the  latter  would  lead  eventually  to  reduced 
employment  and  output,  both  domxestically 
and  in  the  countries  from  which  imports  are 
purchased.  Such  measures  as  exchange  rate 
depreciation,  import  restriction,  export  sub- 
sidization, controls  on  capital  outflow,  and  in- 
terest rate  or  other  incentives  to  encourage 
capital  inflow  are  of  little  use  in  the  present 
situation  because  the  terms  of  trade  have 
shifted  against  all  oil-importing  countries 
simultaneously.  Use  of  any  of  these  tools  by 
individual  nations  would  quickly  be  frus- 
trated by  similar  actions  on  the  part  of  their 
trading  partners.  This  could  lead  to  a  competi- 
tive wave  of  restrictive  measures  or  bidding 
for  capital  that  would  risk  a  serious  drop  in 
world  trade,  a  deflationary  downspiral,  and 
possibly  worldwide  depression.  On  the  other 
hand,  concerted  multilateral  efforts  to  bolster 
the  international  payments  mechanism  can 
facilitate  the  very  difficult  adjustments  which 
must  take  place  and  keep  the  inevitable  dis- 
ruptiojis  to  trade,  output,  and  employment 
at  a  minimum. 

Short-Term   Liquidity  Measures 

The  huge  amounts  of  money  which  Saudi 
Arabia,  Kuwait,  and  a  few  other  oil  produc- 
ers cannot  spend  on  imports  of  goods  and 
services  will  not  disappear  entirely  from  the 
world's  production,  trade,  and  payments 
cycle.  These  funds  will,  rather,  make  a  de- 
tour through  either  direct  or  portfolio  invest- 
ment in  advanced  countries  and  increased  aid 
flows  to  poorer  countries.  But  this  rerouting 
poses  two  major  problems. 

First,  the  balance  of  payments  structure 
of  most  countries  will  be  sharply  changed. 


304 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Consumer  countries  will  now  tend  to  have 
large  current  account  deficits,  which  in  most 
cases  will  not  be  fully  offset  by  investment  in- 
flows. Placements  of  Arab  money  are  likely 
to  be  based,  in  the  first  instance  at  least, 
upon  prudent  investment  criteria  and  other 
concerns  of  special  importance  to  the  Arabs, 
rather  than  upon  the  need  to  maintain  the 
existing  world  payments  balance.  If  a  long- 
term  contraction  of  world  trade  and  produc- 
tion is  to  be  avoided,  these  capital  flows  must 
therefore  be  redirected  in  some  manner  to 
the  consumer  countries  in  reasonable  pro- 
portion to  the  way  the  impact  of  higher  oil 
prices  was  distributed. 

Secondly,  it  is  improbable  that  Arab  oil 
money  can  work  its  way  through  investment 
channels  into  production  and  consumption 
without  significant  time  lags  and  frictional 
dislocations.  The  consumer  countries'  cur- 
rent international  reserves  are  almost  cer- 
tainly insufficient  to  support  simultaneously 
both  moderate  growth  of  non-oil  world  trade 
and  the  immediate  requirements  of  higher 
priced  oil  imports. 

These  two  problems  seem  thus  to  call  for 
additional  international  liquidity  to  take  up 
the  slack  during  the  present  year  and  one  or 
possibly  more  years  thereafter  and  for  a  re- 
cycling mechanism  to  speed  the  reflow  of  oil 
money  through  the  system  and  to  distribute 
ii  in  a  manner  designed  to  reestablish  equilib- 
rium with  minimum  disruption. 

Though  it  will  be  necessary  to  approach 
the  recycling  problem  in  a  number  of  differ- 
ent ways,  since  no  single  solution  seems  likely 
to  suffice,  the  best  starting  point  might  be  to 
strengthen  existing  market  mechanisms  or  to 
adapt  them  in  whatever  ways  seem  appropri- 
ate to  the  task.  The  reduction  of  capital  con- 
trols referred  to  earlier,  as  well  as  the  IMF 
approval  of  the  Bank  for  International  Set- 
tlements as  a  holder  of  SDR's,  should  en- 
hance the  market's  capability  of  mobilizing 
the  oil  producers'  excess  funds  for  the  pur- 
pose of  financing  energy-related  payments 
deficits.  Expansion  of  the  $19  billion  net- 
work  of   central  bank   swap   arrangements 


should  also  be  considered  as  a  recycling  aid, 
as  should  other  forms  of  intergovernmental 
borrowing  and  IMF  credits. 

There  might  also  be  a  role  for  one  or  more 
new  international  institutions  to  act  as  fi- 
nancial intermediaries  between  Arab  inves- 
tors and  the  consuming  countries  in  order  to 
reconcile — insofar  as  this  is  possible — the 
difference  between  the  goals  of  the  one  group 
and  the  needs  of  the  other.  Treasury  Secre- 
tary Shultz  suggested  such  a  "multinational 
joint  venture"  at  the  Washington  Energy 
Conference. 

Suggesting  a  slightly  different  approach, 
IMF  Managing  Director  [Johannes]  Witte- 
veen  last  month  proposed  that  the  IMF  act 
as  a  temporary  intermediary.  While  the  de- 
tails of  this  proposal  have  to  be  worked  out, 
it  would  involve  the  possibility  of  drawing 
on  the  IMF  to  help  finance  the  oil  price  im- 
pact upon  a  country's  current  account.  The 
amount  to  be  drawn,  as  well  as  the  terms  and 
conditions,  would  depend  upon  the  size  of  the 
adverse  oil  price  impact  on  the  drawing  coun- 
try, the  country's  capacity  to  generate  its 
own  financing,  and  perhaps  the  size  of  its 
international  reserves. 

The  international  development  banks  are 
also  exploring  ways  of  capturing  oil  money 
and  channeling  it  to  non-oil  LDC's  [less  de- 
veloped countries].  A  few  IBRD  [Interna- 
tional Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment] bond  flotations  have  already  been 
placed  in  Arab  countries.  On  February  21 
the  Shah  of  Iran  told  World  Bank  President 
[Robert  S.]  McNamara  and  IMF  Managing 
Director  Witteveen  that  during  1974  Iran 
would  invest  some  $200-$300  million  in 
IBRD  bonds  and  would  be  prepared  to  lend 
$600-$700  million  to  the  IMF's  proposed  oil- 
financing  facility.  He  also  proposed  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  new  development  institution 
under  worldwide  auspices  to  provide  $2-$3 
billion  annually  in  soft  loans  to  LDC's.  He 
suggested  that  the  oil-producing  countries 
and  the  principal  industrialized  consumers 
each  contribute  about  $150  million  per  year 
to  this  fund.    The  support  of  the  other  oil 


March  25,   1974 


305 


producers,  particularly  Saudi  Arabia,  will 
obviously  be  crucial  to  the  implementation  of 
this  plan. 

Energy  and   Raw  Material   Shortages 

To  make  short-term  liquidity  measures 
safe  and  workalile  there  will  have  to  be  per- 
ceptibly, over  the  horizon,  the  formulation 
and  implementation  of  major  investment  and 
development  pi'ojects  to  overcome  long-term 
energy  and  raw  material  shortages. 

The  implementation  of  Project  Independ- 
ence is  a  major  key  to  attracting  and  using 
investment  capital  with  initiatives  like  these: 

— A  major  energy  research  and  commer- 
cial development  program  financed  through 
an  energy  trust  fund,  including  programs  for 
government  loans,  grants,  and  guarantees 
for  the  energy  and  energy  equipment  indus- 
tries. 

— A  major  leasing  program  for  mineral 
rights  to  Federal  lands  involving  at  least  24 
million  additional  acres  offered  for  sale  prior 
to  the  end  of  1978.  The  program  will  include 
a  broad  geophysical  assessment  program  and 
experimental  drilling  on  the  Outer  Conti- 
nental Shelf  and  the  Gulf  of  Alaska  by  1975. 

— A  major  program  to  develop  plants  to 
produce  significant  quantities  of  synthetic 
gas  and  oil  from  coal  by  1980. 

— A  crash  program  for  developing  oil  from 
oil  shale  designed  to  yield  a  minimum  of 
500,000  barrels  per  day  by  1980. 

— Construction  of  100  new  light  water 
nuclear  power  reactors  yielding  a  total  of 
120,000  megawatts  of  installed  capacity  of 
power  by  1980  and  extensive  research  into 
other  nuclear  techniques,  including  breeder 
reactors,  both  gas  cooled  and  liquid  metal, 
and  fusion,  designed  to  insure  that  our  nu- 
clear technology  and  capabilities  advance. 

— Major  research  and  development  plus 
commercial  exploitation  of  geothermal,  solar, 
magnetohydrodynamics,  energy  transmis- 
sion, fuel  cells,  hydrogen  use,  and  other  ad- 
vanced energy  techniques. 

— Greater  use  of  mass  transit.  Today  83 
percent  of  Americans  use  private  vehicles  for 


home-to-work  transportation  and  almost  80 
percent  ride  alone  in  their  cars.  We  can  in- 
crease mass  ti'ansportation  facilities  so  that 
by  1980  a  majority  of  our  commuters  will  use 
mass  transportation  or  car  pools. 

Rising  prices  and  frequent  shortages  of 
lumber  and  newsprint  will  come  from  the 
fact  that  the  earth  is  gradually  being  de- 
forested. Pressure  on  food  supplies  and  the 
need  to  put  more  land  into  crops  comes  from 
rising  living  standards,  resulting  in  heavier 
consumption  of  meat,  and  from  the  fact  that 
the  oceans  are  being  fished  out — not  so  grad- 
ually. Shortages  of  natural  fibers,  cotton  and 
wool,  are  compounded  by  the  fact  that  rising 
prices  for  petroleum  will  restrict  substitu- 
tion by  manmade  fibers. 

Shortages  in  energy,  labor,  and  materials, 
together  with  fear  of  pollution,  will  move 
whole  industries  to  places  where  problems 
can  be  overcome.  It  is  clear  that  the  Soviets 
have  decided  that  the  way  to  accelerate  their 
economic  development  is  to  acquire  technol- 
ogy, capital,  and  management  skills  from 
American,  European,  and  Japanese  corpora- 
tions by  giving  them  the  opportunity  to  work 
on  the  large  ore  and  gas  deposits  and  great 
forest  resources  which  exist  within  the  So- 
viet Union.  Beyond  that  they  seem  prepared 
to  offer  opportunities  to  build  production 
facilities  which  have  high  energy  needs  near 
their  hydroelectric  plants,  which  can  provide 
cheap  energy  and  to  which  accessible  and 
cheap  raw  materials  can  be  easily  brought. 

Japan,  in  its  five-year  plan,  has  made  a 
decision  to  encourage  energy-intensive  indus- 
tries, polluting  industries,  and  labor-inten- 
sive industries  to  move  south  to  other  off- 
shore islands  and  the  Southeast  Asian  Penin- 
sula. Germany  recognizes  that  it  has  been 
able  to  increase  its  production  sufficiently 
to  pass  the  United  States  as  the  world's 
largest  exporter  of  manufactured  goods  only 
by  bringing  in  very  large  numbers  of  foreign 
workers  from  Portugal,  Spain,  Turkey,  and 
other  countries  in  southern  Europe.  They 
now  recognize  that  they  have  gone  about  as 
far  as  they  can  in  that  direction  and  are  be- 
ginning to  seek  further  economic  expansion 


306 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


by   bringing  plants  to  the   workers   rather 
than  workers  to  their  plants. 

To  extract  oil  and  gas  from  coal  and  shale, 
to  build  nuclear  power  plants  at  home,  to 
carry  out  oil  exploration  throughout  the 
world,  offshore  and  onshore,  to  meet  other 
shortages,  to  overcome  pollution,  and  to  de- 
velop the  less  developed  parts  of  the  world, 
we  will  have  to  raise  hundreds  of  billions  of 
dollars  in  this  next  decade. 

As  we  assess  the  international  economic 
position  of  the  United  States,  it  becomes 
clear  that  we  have  the  need  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  a  stronger  American  role  in 
world  capital  markets.  Our  $6  billion  trade 
deficit  last  year  was  offset  by  a  $7  billion  net 
inflow  in  dividends,  interest,  royalties,  et 
cetera,  from  our  investments  abroad.  As  a 
country  which  faces  increasing  needs  for  re- 
sources of  energy  and  raw  materials  from 
abroad,  we  will  have  to  invest  abroad  and  in- 
crease the  inflow  of  investment  earnings  to 
justify  that  investment. 

To  balance  off  that  investment  we  will 
have  to  attract  investments  from  abroad.  We 
will  have  to  make  securities  an  export.  We 
will  have  to  maintain  and  strengthen  our 
ability  to  raise  capital  throughout  the  world 
as  well  as  at  home. 

I  would  also  like  you  to  know  that  the  State 
Department  pays  close  and  continuing  atten- 
tion to  the  needs  and  interests  of  American 
investment  abroad.  We  recognize  its  grow- 
ing importance  to  our  need  for  fuel  and  other 
raw  materials  and  to  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments of  an  economy  in  which  two  out  of 
three  people  produce  services  rather  than 
goods.  This  kind  of  economy  must  rely  in- 
creasingly on  receipts  from  dividends,  royal- 
ties, and  services — especially  financial  and 
management  services  exported  largely  in  the 
form  of  multinational  enterprises — and  from 


the  export  of  securities  and  other  invest- 
ments. 

At  the  same  time,  the  less  developed  parts 
of  the  world  have  an  accentuated  need  for 
capital  and  technology  if  their  development 
is  not  to  be  set  back  as  higher  costs  of  oil 
substantially  cancel  out  the  money  that  flow 
to  the  LDC's  in  foreign  aid.  As  Secretary 
Kissinger  spelled  out  in  last  week's  meeting 
of  Foreign  Ministers  in  Mexico  City,  we  are 
prepared  to  address  this  problem  seriously. 

The  multinational  corporations  you  repre- 
sent are  very  effective  agents  of  development. 
While  we  will  make  every  effort  to  maintain 
the  level  of  official  development  assistance, 
this  is  no  time  to  lose  the  flow  of  technology, 
organization  and  skill,  and  private  capital 
which  multinational  corporations  can  bring 
to  the  less  developed  world.  We  must  recog- 
nize that  less  developed  nations  have  deep 
concerns  and  strong  fears  about  the  impact 
and  influence  of  foreign  investors  on  their 
economies  and  societies  while  investors  have 
concerns  and  fears  arising  from  widespread 
expropriations  without  adequate  compensa- 
tion. It  is  very  important  to  address  both  sets 
of  concerns  and  to  work  out  understandings 
which  will  maintain  the  level  of  development 
effort  and  the  flow  of  capital,  technology,  and 
skill.  The  officers  of  our  multinationals  have 
a  vital  role  to  play  in  this.  Of  first  importance 
is  for  them  to  see  that  their  companies  are 
good  corporate  citizens  when  they  invest 
abroad,  that  they  adhere  to  local  laws  and 
mesh  their  business  activities  with  the  devel- 
opment objectives  of  their  host  governments. 
We,  on  our  part,  are  working  in  the  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development],  in  the  United  Nations,  in 
multilateral  meetings  such  as  Secretary  Kis- 
singer participated  in  at  Mexico  City  last 
week,  to  develop  a  better  climate  for  and  bet- 
ter understanding  of  foreign  investment. 


March  25,    1974 


307 


Technological  Exchange  and  Detente 


Address  by  William  J.  Casey 

Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ^ 


It  is  my  pleasure  to  welcome  you  to  the 
State  Department  today  to  discuss  with  us 
and  with  each  other  the  trading  of  tech- 
nology— one  of  the  key  aspects  of  the  nor- 
malization of  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  economic  rela- 
tions. The  expansion  of  civilian  technological 
exchange  with  the  West,  and  particularly 
with  the  United  States,  was  clearly  a  strong 
incentive  for  the  Communist  nations  in  de- 
veloping a  new  relationship  with  us  over  the 
last  few  years.  These  economic  motivations 
spill  over  and  become  a  significant  factor  in 
improving  political  relations,  which,  taken 
all  together,  means  detente. 

The  Soviet  leaders — and  this  applies  also 
to  the  Eastern  Europeans  and  the  Chinese — 
want  faster  movement  in  meeting  the  de- 
mands of  their  people,  and  of  their  economic 
planners,  for  improved  quality,  quantity,  and 
range  of  consumer  and  industrial  products. 
They  have  turned  to  us,  to  Western  Europe, 
and  to  Japan  for  the  industrial  technology 
they  require  to  improve  their  labor  produc- 
tivity, their  transportation  systems,  and 
their  energy  supplies  and  to  upgrade  their 
research  and  development  efforts,  as  well  as 
to  produce  for  their  domestic  consumers  and 
for  export  to  hard-currency  areas. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  face  of  their  recog- 
nized needs,  I  expect  the  expansion  of  tech- 
nological exchange  with  the  East  to  be  grad- 
ual.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this : 

— The  Soviet  shortage  of  convertible  cur- 
rencies and  their  limited  ability  to  rapidly 


'  Made  on  Feb.  28  before  a  seminar  on  technology 
exchange  with  the  U.S.S.R.  held  jointly  by  the  De- 
partments of  State  and  Commerce  and  the  Industrial 
Research  Institute  and  attended  by  representatives 
of  87  U.S.  firms  (press  release  74). 


increase  their  exports.  Development  of  new 
export  resources  and  markets,  after  all,  takes 
time. 

— The  Soviet  economic  structure.  Its  heavy 
reliance  on  centralized  planning  and  decision- 
making poses  problems  of  flexibility  for  the 
rapid  introduction  of  new,  and  particularly 
foreign,  technology. 

— Their  lack  of  personnel,  both  labor  and 
supervisory,  experienced  in  Western  produc- 
tion methods  and  processes  and  of  compo- 
nents and  materials  equivalent  to  those  we 
employ. 

— Our  continuing  restrictions  on  the  ex- 
port of  technologies  which  have  military  as 
well  as  civilian  applications  when  we  con- 
clude that  the  risk  to  U.S.  security  is  unac- 
ceptable. 

The  last  point — the  only  point  in  my  list 
where  U.S.  policy  is  involved — is  one  you  will 
hear  more  on  this  morning.  The  impact  of 
increased  technological  trade  with  the  East 
on  our  national  security  is  a  consideration 
which  no  American  is  prepared  to  take  light- 
ly. Because  so  much  of  our  technology  is 
multipurpose — that  is,  it  is  potentially  im- 
portant to  a  variety  of  both  civilian  and 
military  applications — the  judgment  prob- 
lems involved  in  the  export  control  process 
are  complex. 

It  is  the  clear  responsibility  of  the  U.S. 
Government  to  evaluate  carefully,  on  a  case- 
by-case  basis,  the  possibility  that  approving 
the  export  would  make  a  significant  contribu- 
tion to  the  military  potential  of  the  recipient 
which  would  prove  detrimental  to  the  na- 
tional security  of  the  United  States. 

For  some  years,  our  export  control  legisla- 
tion   specifically    prohibited    exports    which 


308 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


would  make  "a  significant  contribution  to  the 
.  .  .  economic  potential  of  such  nation  or 
nations  which  would  prove  detrimental  to 
.  .  .  the  United  States."  This  is  no  longer 
our  posture.  The  Export  Administration  Act 
of  1969  removed  the  "economic  potential" 
criterion  and,  in  addition,  provided  a  con- 
gressional endorsement  of  expansion  of 
peaceful  trade  with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  other 
Communist  countries.  This  means  we  no 
longer  subscribe  to  the  proposition  that  any 
technological  export  that  strengthens  the 
other's  economy  or  industrial  capability  nec- 
essarily or  automatically  threatens  our 
security.  We  recognize  that  each  case  must 
be  examined  on  its  own  merits.  This  analysis 
poses  its  own  special  difficulties. 

We  can  start  the  analysis,  quite  reason- 
ably, with  the  premise  that  Soviet  leaders 
may  seek  to  use  U.S.  technology  to  upgrade 
Soviet  military  capability. 

We  clearly  have  no  intention  of  knowingly 
contributing  to  that  process.  At  the  same 
time,  we  appreciate  that  in  the  pursuit  of 
detente  the  Soviet  leadership  has  other  ob- 
jectives and  commitments  toward  its  econ- 
omy and  people,  not  the  least  of  which  is  an 
improvement  in  those  aspects  of  their  econ- 
omy which  are  most  important  to  the  quality 
of  life.  In  that  task,  U.S.  technology  can 
play  an  important  part. 

Let  me  pause  to  put  the  subject  of  our 
conference  in  some  perspective.  In  the  broad- 
est sense,  detente  stems  from  a  need  to  avoid 
the  dangers  of  war.  This  theme  underlies  our 
improving  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
which  are  founded  on  a  set  of  agreements 
and  continuing  negotiations  aimed  at  reduc- 
ing the  risks  of  conflict.  These  include  the 
SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
interim  agreement,  the  continuing  negotia- 
tions in  Geneva  aimed  at  a  more  lasting 
treaty  on  offensive  weapons,  the  1973  agree- 
ment on  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war,  and 
the  ongoing  negotiations  in  Vienna  on  the 
reduction  of  armed  forces  in  Central  Europe. 
Beyond  this  essential  foundation  of  physical 
security,  however,  we  see  relations  evolving 
along  a  broad  front  of  interrelated  subjects. 
These  will  involve  increased  economic,  tech- 
nical, cultural,  and  human  contact,  as  well  as 


deepening  understanding  and  agreement  on 
political  and  security  issues.  We  have  learned 
over  the  past  several  years  that  this  range  of 
contacts  is  not  only  interrelated  but  is  mu- 
tually reinforcing.  It  also  creates  interest 
among  a  widening  range  of  groups  in  main- 
taining stable  and  mutually  advantageous 
relations  between  the  participating  countries. 

The  Socialist  countries'  interest  in  includ- 
ing technical  assistance  as  a  component  of  a 
deal  and  their  clear  preference  for  financing 
the  deal  by  reexporting  a  part  of  the  produc- 
tion to  the  U.S.  firm  also  poses  problems, 
especially  because  of  the  general  reluctance 
to  permit  participation  from  our  side  in  the 
management  of  the  enterprise.  Some  East- 
ern European  countries — Yugoslavia,  Ro- 
mania, and  Hungary — have  undertaken 
joint-venture  arrangements  with  Western 
firms,  primarily  to  overcome  these  difl^culties. 
Poland  is  currently  developing  legislation  to 
permit  a  similar  approach.  We  favor  such 
arrangements,  in  the  belief  that  they  offer  a 
greater  potential  benefit  for  the  U.S.  business 
and  at  the  same  time  help  to  create  the  kind 
of  working  ties  between  the  United  States 
and  the  other  side's  economies  which  serve 
the  purposes  of  detente  and  of  making  eco- 
nomic relationships  work  for  both  countries. 
As  these  ties  develop  and  expand,  the  number 
of  people  in  leadership  roles  in  the  Commu- 
nist countries  who  have  a  personal  vested 
interest  in  stable  positive  relations  with  the 
United  States  will  increase. 

In  this  context,  I  believe  we  will  see  a 
gradual  easing  of  the  restrictions  on  techno- 
logical exports  to  the  East.  The  rate  of  prog- 
ress will  depend  in  part  on  progress  in  other 
areas,  particularly  in  the  reduction  of  po- 
litical and  military  tensions.  We  are  all — you, 
your  government,  and  the  leaders  of  the  So- 
cialist countries — embarked  on  a  learning 
process.  Naturally  we  will  each,  quite  prop- 
erly, proceed  with  caution,  but  we  will  pro- 
ceed. 

I  have  earlier  listed  some  of  the  possible 
obstacles  I  see  to  a  rapid  expansion  of  tech- 
nological trade  with  the  East.  There  are 
others — obstacles  with  which  some  of  you,  at 
least,  are  already  familiar.  The  Soviet  ne- 
gotiators are  often  far  removed,  bureaucrati- 


March  25,   1974 


309 


cally,  from  the  enterprises  which  will  use  the 
imported  technology.  It  may  be  hard  for  them 
— and  of  course  for  you — to  pin  down  the 
significant  details  of  what  is  wanted,  how  it 
will  be  used,  the  work  environment  in  which 
it  is  to  be  used,  and  so  forth.  Perhaps  one 
of  the  reasons  for  the  apparent  Soviet  prefer- 
ence for  dealing  with  multinational  corpora- 
tions is  the  fact  that  our  multinationals  can 
offer  a  combination  of  U.S.  technology,  which 
the  Soviets  seem  to  prefer,  with  management 
representation  from  Western  Europe,  where 
experience  in  working  with  Soviet  enter- 
prises has  developed  over  a  longer  period.  In 
any  case,  as  the  level  of  U.S.-Soviet  tech- 
nology exchanges  increases,  it  will  be  all  the 
more  important  that  we  continue  the  ex- 
change of  views  and  experience  between  in- 
dustry and  government  which  we  are  initiat- 
ing in  this  seminar  today. 

Let  me  say  a  few  words  about  quid  pro 
quos.  We  can  point  already  to  important 
evidence  of  the  value  of  detente  from  the 
international  political  standpoint,  especially 
with  regard  to  reducing  the  danger  of  war, 
and  we  clearly  hope  for  and  expect  even 
greater  political  benefits  as  the  process  de- 
velops. We  believe  increasing  technology 
trade  will  yield  not  only  increasing  economic 
gains  but  also  political  returns. 

However,  we  do  not  expect  U.S.  industry  to 
accept  business  disadvantage  in  the  name  of 
international  political  benefits.  We  expect  you 
to  negotiate  the  best  business  deals  you  can 
make  and  to  refuse  deals  which  do  not  serve 
your  individual  corporate  interests  as  you  see 
them.  Clearly,  return  on  your  investment  and 
increased  profit  are  the  most  immediate  and 
tangible  reciprocity  involved.  As  good  busi- 
nessmen, you  know  that  you  are  going  to 
have  to  deliver  the  goods — and  stand  behind 
them — if  you  are  to  continue  to  develop  the 
market.  We  are  confident  that  your  doing 
just  that  wall  support  the  broader  purposes 
of  detente.  In  time,  we  expect  also  that  you 
will,  in  this  process,  find  opportunities  to 
import  technology  from  the  other  side  and 
use  it  for  the  advantage  of  your  firms  and  of 
U.S.  consumers.  The  range  of  technology  the 
other  side  currently  has  to  offer  may  be  lim- 


ited, but  some  of  it  is  very  good.  The  bureau- 
cratic obstacles  on  the  other  side  which  I 
spoke  of  earlier  are  obstacles  to  the  reverse 
flow  of  technology,  also.  As  you  and  your 
counterparts  gain  experience  in  working  to- 
gether, I  am  confident  that  these  obstacles 
will  be  overcome  and  that  you  will  establish 
a  useful  reciprocity  in  technological,  as  well 
as  monetary,  terms. 

Technological  trade  with  the  East  has  al- 
ready gained  significant  momentum.  Prior  to 
1972,  the  U.S.  share  of  Soviet  imports  of 
plant  and  equipment  from  the  West  was 
about  5  percent.  Currently  U.S.  firms  are 
getting  20  percent  of  this  business.  Of  total 
Soviet  purchases  for  such  goods  of  about  $3 
billion  since  the  beginning  of  1972,  $600  mil- 
lion has  been  contracted  with  U.S.  firms, 
making  us  second  only  to  Germany  as  a 
source.  I  believe  this  is  a  remarkable  achieve- 
ment when  we  recognize  that  Germany, 
France,  Britain,  and  Japan  have  been  pur- 
suing the  Soviet  market  intensively  for  10 
years  and  have  the  advantage  of  geographic 
proximity. 

There  are  those  who  fear  any  flow  of  tech- 
nology to  the  East  on  security  grounds  or  on 
the  grounds  that  selling  a  share  in  our  tech- 
nology base  would  permit  the  Socialist  coun- 
tries to  undermine  the  U.S.  share  of  the 
world  market.  Both  of  these  possibilities 
must  be  viewed  seriously.  I  have  every  con- 
fidence, however,  that  our  export  control 
procedures  will  insure  us  against  undue  risk 
to  our  national  security.  I  am  confident  also 
that  so  long  as  we  continue  to  invest  our 
resources  and  our  best  talents  in  technologi- 
cal innovation,  we  will  retain  our  world 
leadership  in  technology  in  all  those  areas 
vital  to  our  security  and  to  our  economic 
progress.  Moreover,  the  U.S.S.R.  and  East- 
ern European  countries  have  been  willing  to 
sign  contracts  which  expressly  restrict  the 
exports  of  joint  ventures  in  third  markets. 
In  any  case,  surely  we  cannot  maintain  our 
leadership  position  by  standing  pat  or  by 
attempting  to  lock  up  the  benefits  of  our 
technology  for  our  exclusive  use. 

We  became  world  leaders  in  technological 
innovation  because  of  our  aggressive  pursuit 


310 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


of  that  goal.  Our  corporate  managements 
embraced  the  challenge  with  enthusiasm  and 
imagination.  Our  universities  responded 
through  curriculum  innovation  and  a  high 
level  of  basic  and  applied  research  without 
historical  precedent  or  parallel  abroad.  Our 
investing  public  provided  the  necessary  risk 
capital.  In  the  last  few  years,  the  enterprise 
faltered  and  the  enterprisers  went  through  a 
crisis  of  confidence.  I  believe  that  we  are 
regaining  our  earlier  momentum.  Govern- 
ment R.  &  D.  funding  is  rising,  as  is  cor- 
porate investment.  An  excessive  pool  of 
unemployed  R.  &  D.  scientists  and  engineers 
is  rapidly  disappearing.  Exciting  new  tech- 
nological potentials  are  opening  up.  This  is 
surely  the  answer  to  the  challenges  we  face 
in  the  world  marketplace  and  the  best 
answer,  as  well,  to  insuring  our  national 
security. 


President  Nixon   Proclaims 
Vietnam  Veterans  Day 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  President 
Nixon  in  the  Cabinet  Room  of  the  White 
House  on  February  26,  together  with  the  text 
of  a  proclamation  signed  that  day. 

REMARKS   BY  PRESIDENT  NIXON 

Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated  March  4 

This  proclamation  that  I  am  now  signing, 
all  of  the  Members  of  the  House  and  the 
Senate  who  have  sponsored  it  ai-e  aware  of 
it ;  the  members  of  the  press  and  perhaps  the 
Nation  are  not  aware  of  why  we  have  a 
proclamation  designating  March  29  as  Viet- 
nam Veterans  Day. 

That  is  the  day  that  the  last  American 
combat  soldier  left  Viet-Nam — the  day, 
therefore,  that  marks  the  final  conclusion  of 
America's  longest,  and  without  question  its 
most  diflicult,  war. 

It  seems  to  me  appropriate  that  in  signing 
this  proclamation  that  reference  be  made  to 


those  who  fought  in  that  war,  those  who 
served  in  that  war,  why  they  fought,  and 
why  their  service  was  not  only  in  the  inter- 
est of  the  country  but  in  the  highest  tradition 
of  service  to  the  United  States  of  America  as 
far  as  the  wars  in  which  we  have  been  en- 
gaged throughout  our  history,  wars  which 
we  trust  we  will  not  have  to  be  engaged  in  in 
the  future  if  our  foi'eign  policy  is  as  success- 
ful as  we  hope  to  make  it. 

I  know  that  there  are  some  who  quarrel 
with  the  phrase  that  I  have  often  used,  that 
our  men  in  Viet-Nam  and  those  who  served  in 
the  Armed  Forces  finally  achieved  what 
many  thought  was  impossible — peace  with 
honor. 

I  do  not  use  this  phrase  in  any  jingoistic 
sense.  I  use  it  because  when  I  consider  the 
alternative  I  realize  how  much  those  who 
served  did  for  their  country  under  diflficult 
circumstances. 

This  has  been  described  as  a  war  without 
heroes,  without  heroes,  perhaps,  except  for 
those  who  occasionally  receive  a  Medal  of 
Honor  that  we  hand  out,  but  very  little  atten- 
tion given  to  it;  those  without  heroes,  a  war 
in  which  for  the  first  time  our  prisoners  of 
war  come  home  and  for  a  few  fleeting  months 
are  recognized  for  the  character  that  they 
showed  as  prisoners.  But  when  I  refer  to 
peace  with  honor  achieved  by  over  2V2  mil- 
lion who  served  in  Viet-Nam,  I  think  of  what 
would  have  happened  had  they  not  served  and 
had  we  failed  in  our  objective. 

I  am  not  now  going  to  go  into  how  the  war 
began.  It  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to 
point  out  the  diflferences  that  some  of  us  have 
had  as  to  how  the  war  was  conducted,  but 
I  do  know  this :  It  was  important  to  bring  it 
to  a  conclusion  in  the  right  way,  in  a  way  that 
America  remained  respected  throughout  the 
world,  in  a  way  in  which  our  allies  had  con- 
fidence in  us,  the  neutrals  did  not  lose  their 
faith  in  us,  and  particularly  where  those  who 
might  be  our  opponents  still  respected  us, 
respected  not  only  our  power  but  respected 
our  strength  in  terms  of  will  and  willingness 
to  use  that  strength  for  a  cause  to  which  we 
were  committed. 

What  would  have  happened  had  we  not 


March  25,   1974 


311 


ended  the  war  in  the  way  that  we  did  end  it? 
Seventeen  million  people  in  South  Viet-Nam, 
instead  of  having  a  government  which  is  non- 
Communist,  with  a  right  to  choose  for  the 
future,  would  now  be  under  Communist  con- 
trol. 

The  7  million  people  of  Cambodia,  who  are 
fighting  against  very  great  odds,  would  cer- 
tainly now  be  under  Communist  control.  The 
small  countries  of  Malaysia  and  Singapore, 
the  much  larger  country  of  Indonesia,  Thai- 
land, the  200  million  people  that  live  in  the 
perimeter  of  Southeast  Asia — those  nations 
would  have  a  much  greater  danger  threaten- 
ing them  of  aggression  sweeping  over  the 
entire  peninsula  of  Southeast  Asia. 

People  say  the  domino  theory  really  is  not 
accurate.  The  difficulty  is  they  have  never 
asked  the  dominoes;  because  when  we  find 
in  visiting  those  areas,  as  many  of  us  have, 
that  they  are  watching  what  the  United 
States  does  in  terms  of  its  relations  to  a 
small  country  so  far  away  in  a  very  difficult 
war,  when  they  reach  a  conclusion  that  the 
United  States  is  not  a  dependable  ally,  that 
the  United  States  will  be  pushed  over  when 
faced  with  Communist  aggression,  then  they 
lose  confidence  in  us  and  they  accept  the 
inevitable — that  the  tide  of  aggression  will 
engulf  them  also. 

So  we  are  grateful  to  our  men  who  served, 
because  as  a  result  250  million  people,  and 
perhaps  more  in  the  Southeast  Asian  efl'ort 
have  a  chance — not  a  guarantee,  but  a  chance 
— to  choose  their  own  way,  a  chance  to  re- 
main free  from  a  takeover  by  aggression 
from  outside  forces. 

Our  part  will  in  the  future  be,  under  the 
Nixon  doctrine,  not  to  furnish  troops,  but  to 
furnish  within  our  capacities  and  depending 
upon  their  ability  to  use  it,  to  furnish  the 
economic  and  military  supplies  so  that  they 
can  have  what  they  need  to  defend  them- 
selves. 

But,  also,  the  way  that  this  war  ended  had 
a  much  greater  significance.  There  have  been 
some  foreign  policy  developments  over  the 
past  five  years,  and  particularly  over  the  past 
two  years,  that  in  my  opinion  would  not  have 
occurred,  could  not  have  been  accomplished. 


had  not  the  United  States  proved  that  it  was 
a  dependable  ally  and  also  demonstrated  in 
Viet-Nam  that  it  would  not  join  an  enemy  to 
overthrow  an  ally. 

What  I  am  referring  to  is,  very  simply, 
that  when  a  great  power  in  any  of  its  rela- 
tions with  any  countries,  large  or  small, 
shows  a  lack  of  will,  it  loses  respect  not  only 
in  that  area  but  it  loses  respect  all  over  the 
world,  and  particularly  among  those  who 
might  oppose  it  in  the  future  and  who  might 
be  tempted  to  engage  in  adventurism,  pro- 
ceeding on  the  assumption  that  the  United 
States,  having  backed  down  one  place,  might 
do  so  somewhere  else. 

So,  in  conclusion,  I  simply  want  to  say  to 
the  Members  of  the  Congress  present,  both 
Democrat  and  Republican,  that  we  do  owe  a 
great  debt  of  honor  to  those  who  served  here, 
a  great  debt  that  is  difficult  to  repay  because 
this  has  been  a  misunderstood  war,  this  has 
been  one  in  which  Americans  have  been  hon- 
estly divided  and  we  trust  that  that  may 
never  come  again. 

But  as  we  see  what  would  have  happened 
had  these  men  not  stood  firm  and  had  we 
not  backed  them  up,  let  me  say  the  chance 
now  to  go  forward  with  great  initiatives  for 
peace,  with  the  United  States  strong  and  re- 
spected, we  would  not  have. 

So  the  2',  2  million  who  served  in  Viet-Nam 
deserve  our  thanks.  They  deserve,  I  would 
say  to  Mr.  Johnson  [Donald  E.  Johnson,  Ad- 
ministrator of  Veterans  Aff'airs],  as  he  may 
have  noted  from  the  press  conference  last 
night,  special  attention  insofar  as  those  who 
have  suff'ered  from  the  wounds  of  war,  and  I 
want  particularly  personal  attention  given  to 
any  indications  that  our  laws  are  not  being 
adequately  carried  out  in  that  respect,  in  pro- 
viding the  benefits  for  them. 

And  finally,  looking  to  the  future,  the  way 
that  we  can  pay  the  debt  that  we  owe  those 
who  served,  those  who  died,  those  who  were 
wounded,  those  who  have  been  prisoners,  and 
those  who  served  and  came  back  with  very 
little  in  terms  of  praise  or  applause,  the  best 
way  we  can  repay  that  debt  is  to  have  a 
strong  America  militarily,  but  an  America 
that  is  respected  throughout  the  world,  an 


312 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


America  that  will  not  back  away  from  its 
great  and  destined  role  to  be  the  peacemaker 
of  the  world,  whether  it  is  in  the  Mideast,  in 
Europe,  in  Asia,  or  in  any  other  area  of  the 
world. 

That  is  our  goal,  and  as  we  designate  this 
as  being  Vietnam  Veterans  Day,  let  us  set  as 
our  goal  that  we  in  the  United  States  will  be 
able  to  avoid  not  only  more  Viet-Nams  but 
build  a  structure  of  peace  in  which  all  people 
in  the  world  will  be  able  to  avoid  a  future 
war,  large  or  small. 


their  enthusiastic  support  to  appropriate  ceremonies 
and  observances  throughout  the  Nation. 

I  urge  all  citizens  of  every  age  to  participate  in  the 
events  of  this  day  as  one  means  of  honoring  those 
men  and  women  who  served  their  country  faithfully 
and  courageously  during  the  Vietnam  conflict. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  this  twenty-sixth  day  of  February,  in  the  year 
of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  seventy-four,  and  of 
the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America 
the  one  hundred  ninety-eighth. 


C/IjL/^IC:^ 


TEXT  OF  PROCLAMATION  4270  > 

Vietnam  Veterans  Day 

As  America  enters  its  second  year  of  peace  after 
a  decade  of  conflict,  it  is  highly  appropriate  for  us  to 
acknowledge  the  debt  we  owe  to  those  veterans  who 
served  in  the  Armed  Forces  during  the  conflict  in 
Southeast  Asia.  The  untiring  devotion  that  charac- 
terized our  Armed  Forces  during  this  trying  conflict 
is  a  tribute  to  the  national  character. 

There  are  over  six  and  one-half  million  Vietnam- 
era  veterans,  of  whom  more  than  two  and  one-half 
million  served  in  Vietnam.  Despite  significant  dis- 
ruptions in  their  lives  and  other  personal  sacrifices, 
they  answered  the  call  of  their  country  and  served 
with  great  distinction. 

As  a  Nation,  we  have  acknowledged  our  deep 
respect  and  admiration  by  setting  aside  March  29, 
1974,  as  Vietnam  Veterans  Day  to  remember  that  the 
honorable  peace  America  achieved  came  through 
great  sacrifice.  Those  who  served,  those  who  gave 
their  lives,  those  who  were  disabled,  and  those  who 
are  still  missing  in  Southeast  Asia — and  whose  full 
accounting  we  shall  continue  to  seek — deserve  the 
profound  gratitude  of  their  countrymen.  For  this 
purpose,  the  Congress  has  authorized  and  requested 
me  to  issue  a  proclamation  designating  March  29, 
1974,  as  Vietnam  Veterans  Day. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Richard  Nixon,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  urge  the  people  of  this 
Nation  to  join  in  commemorating  Friday,  March  29, 
1974,  as  Vietnam  Veterans  Day  with  suitable  observ- 
ances. 

I  direct  the  appropriate  ofliicials  of  the  Government 
to  arrange  for  the  display  of  the  flag  of  the  United 
States  on  all  public  buildings  on  that  day;  and  I 
request  ofliicials  of  Federal,  State,  and  local  Govern- 
ments, and  civic  and  patriotic  organizations,  to  give 


'  39  Fed.  Reg.  7773. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

93d   Congress,    1st  Session 

Amendment  to  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Con- 
vention. Report,  together  with  individual  views,  to 
accompany  Ex.  Q,  93d  Cong.,  1st  sess.  S.  Ex.  Rept. 
93-25.  November  15,  1973.  5  pp. 

Military  Construction  Appropriation  Bill,  1974.  Re- 
port to  accompany  H.R.  11459.  S.  Rept.  93-548. 
November  19,  1973.  84  pp. 

Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1973.  Conference  report 
to  accompany  S.  1443.  H.  Rept.  93-664.  November 
27,  1973.   55  pp. 

The  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation.  A 
report  by  the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Economic 
Policy  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs. 
H.  Rept.  93-672.  November  29,  1973.  39  pp. 

Report  of  Special  Study  Mission  to  Southern,  East, 
and  West  Africa.  Composed  of  Hon.  Jonathan  B. 
Bingham,  New  York,  Hon.  Edward  G.  Blester,  Jr., 
Pennsylvania,  pursuant  to  H.  Res.  267,  authorizing 
the  committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  to  conduct  thor- 
ough studies  and  investigations  of  all  matters 
coming  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  committee. 
H.  Rept.  93-673.    November  29,  1973.    23  pp. 

Data  and  Analysis  Concerning  the  Possibility  of  a 
U.S.  Food  Embargo  as  a  Response  to  the  Present 
Arab  Oil  Boycott.  Prepared  for  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Affairs  by  the  Foreign  Affairs 
Division,  Congressional  Research  Service,  Library 
of  Congress.  H.  Rept.  93-674.  November  29,  1973. 
7  pp. 

Emergency  Security  Assistance  Act  of  1973.  Hear- 
ings before  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Af- 
fairs.   November  30-December  3,  1973.    90  pp. 

U.S.  Security  Issues  in  Europe:  Burden  Sharing  and 
Offset,  MBFR  and  Nuclear  Weapons.  September 
1973.  A  staff  report  prepared  for  the  use  of  the 
Subcommittee  on  U.S.  Security  Agreements  and 
Commitments  Abroad  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations.    December  2,  1973.    27  pp. 


March  25,   1974 


313 


The  Prevention  of  Nuclear  War  In  a  World  of  Uncertainty 


Address  by  Fred  C.  Ikle 

Director,  U.S.  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  ^ 


When  officials  come  from  Washington  to 
give  a  talk  in  Cambridge,  they  usually  try  to 
establish  the  intellectual  depth  of  official 
policies.  But  since  I  used  to  go  down  to 
Washington  from  Cambridge  far  more  often 
than  I  have  been  coming  up  from  Washing- 
ton, I  don't  mind  doing  things  upside  down 
today.  Hence,  I  don't  intend  to  dwell  upon 
the  intellectual  content  of  the  arms  control 
policies  of  our  government.  Instead,  I  am 
going  to  start  by  pointing  out  what  seem 
to  me  the  limitations  of  a  lot  of  current 
thinking  on  arms  control  within  the  Amer- 
ican intellectual  community  as  a  whole. 

Then  I  will  suggest  various  lines  of  action 
that  have  to  be  pursued  to  supplement  our 
efforts  for  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war.  My 
hope  is  that  I  can  stimulate  your  thinking 
about  these  supplementary  programs  and 
enlist  your  support. 

Where  many  in  this  field  make  a  dangerous 
mistake,  it  seems  to  me,  is  in  forgetting  that 
our  policies  for  preventing  nuclear  war  must 
succeed  indefinitely  in  a  world  with  a  great 
many  uncertainties.  Their  mistake  is  to 
assume  too  much  certainty  and  not  to  look 
far  enough  ahead. 

In  particular,  it  is  usually  assumed  that 
the  essential  features  of  deterrence  can  be 
calculated  in  advance.  Many  of  you  are  fa- 
miliar with  calculations  of  so-called  "missile 
exchanges" — often  referred  to  in  arms  con- 
trol literature  and  in  congressional  debates. 

These  calculations  continue  to  be  promi- 
nent in  our  thinking  because  we  really  know 


'  Made  before  the  Joint  Harvard-MIT  Arms  Con- 
trol Seminar  at  Cambridge,  Mass.,  on  Feb.  20. 


how  to  do  them.  Much  as  in  a  freshman's 
algebra  test,  we  have  tailored  the  problem  to 
our  capability  to  calculate.  The  seemingly 
rigorous  models  of  nuclear  deterrence  are 
built  on  the  rule,  "What  you  can't  calculate 
you  leave  out."  For  example,  the  "missile 
duels"  usually  ignore  fallout.  And  the  calcu- 
lations are  unable  to  cope  with  critical  details 
regarding  unreliability.  Nor  can  they  fully 
encompass  other  nuclear  forces  such  as  bomb- 
ers and  sea-based  missiles  and  their  many 
possible  interactions. 

These  limitations  of  analysis  are  not  the 
only  reason  why  we  must  apply  greater  cau- 
tion in  drawing  sweeping  conclusions  from 
our  work.  Our  entire  structure  of  thinking 
about  deterrence  lacks  empiricism.  Like  no 
other  field  of  human  endeavor,  nuclear  deter- 
rence is  unique  in  demanding — absolutely 
compellingly — that  we  work  out  successful 
solutions  without  directly  relevant  experi- 
ence, without  experimentation.  There  can  be 
no  trial  and  error  here,  no  real  learning. 

Curiously,  when  we  confront  the  task  of 
calculating  traditional  conventional  military 
campaigns,  we  are  far  more  modest  than 
with  our  calculations  about  nuclear  deter- 
rence. In  fact,  the  more  battle  experience 
military  analysts  have,  the  more  modest  they 
become  in  predicting  the  course  of  conven- 
tional war. 

But  about  nuclear  war,  we  pretend  that  we 
can  analyze  all  that  is  relevant.  We  work 
with  simplistic  abstractions  and  are  not  too 
troubled  by  the  discrepancies  between  these 
abstractions  and  the  possible  reality,  a  reality 
that  is  so  hard  to  imagine. 

The  current  overemphasis   on   numerical 


314 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


calculations  to  test  the  stability  of  deterrence 
is  only  one  of  several  weaknesses  in  the  pub- 
lic discussions  of  arms  control  policy.  An- 
other weakness  is  the  widespread  belief  that 
nuclear  deterrence  is  all  that  counts. 

Our  efforts  to  prevent  nuclear  war  could 
fail,  as  all  of  you  know,  not  only  because  of 
an  inadequate  retaliatory  capability  to  deter 
a  deliberate  attack,  but  for  other  reasons, 
such  as  an  accident,  an  unintended  process 
of  escalation,  or  a  combination  of  failures 
and  causes  we  could  not  have  anticipated  or 
even  imagined.  Put  in  such  terms,  no  one 
ever  disagrees  with  the  proposition  that  a 
situation  of  mutual  deterrence  does  not  by 
itself  guarantee  the  prevention  of  nuclear 
war.  Yet  nearly  everyone  keeps  debating 
arms  control  policies  and  nuclear  strategy  in 
terms  of  naked  deterrence. 

Thus,  it  has  been  argued  that  a  mutual 
hostage  relationship  between  America  and 
Russia  was  the  principal  factor  in  preventing 
nuclear  war  since  World  War  II.  How  can 
we  know  what  factors  to  credit  for  the  fact 
that  nuclear  weapons  have  not  been  used 
since  August  1946?  The  formidable  confron- 
tation of  massive  and  complicated  missile 
forces  that  we  face  today  has  lasted  for  one 
decade  only. 

Should  we  credit  principally  the  results  of 
our  calculations  regarding  our  so-called  re- 
taliatory capability?  Shouldn't  we  also  credit 
the  good  fortune  that  there  has  been  no 
massive  failure  of  the  safeguards  holding 
back  these  missile  forces?  And  that  there  has 
been  no  miscalculation  and  no  unintended 
interaction  of  alert  measures  leading  to  some 
use  of  nuclear  weapons  and  subsequently  to 
a  breakdown  of  communications  and  control? 
If  one  asks  why  there  has  been  no  nuclear 
war  in  the  past  decades,  I  would  add  still 
another  reason ;  namely,  a  general  posture  of 
prudence  of  our  potential  adversaries  and 
ourselves. 

The  danger  of  relying  on  naked  deterrence 
is  heightened  by  the  current  emphasis  on 
speed  in  planning  the  response  to  a  nuclear 
attack.  Many  of  you  have  heard  me  say  this 
before,  but  according  to  a  Russian  proverb, 
repetition  is  the  mother  of  learning.  For 
various  historical  reasons,  most  of  our  nu- 


clear arms  and  perhaps  the  nuclear  arms  of 
other  countries  are  built  to  go  into  action 
with  the  least  delay  and  to  operate  at  the 
greatest  speed.  In  the  real  world  we  live  in, 
the  unpredictable  perils  of  split-second  alert 
and  launching  procedures  could  create  a  sit- 
uation in  which  there  is  absolutely  no  time 
for  correction. 

Another  fiction  has  it  that  mutual  deter- 
rence can  be  safely  relied  on  to  prevent 
nuclear  war  because  we  have  achieved  the 
necessary  consensus  between  our  views  and 
Soviet  views  about  strategic  doctrine  and 
strategic  forces.  This  notion  of  a  stable  and 
efficient  consensus  leaves  out  two  realities : 

— First,  there  are  not  just  two  nuclear 
powers  in  the  world;  other  nuclear  powers 
may  produce  turbulence  and  dangerous  shifts 
in  the  nuclear  balance  and  in  the  views  about 
stability. 

— Second,  intellectual  evolution  is  always 
possible  among  the  leaders  and  specialists 
who  determine  policy  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  here  as  well.  Nor,  indeed,  should  we  al- 
ways oppose  the  emergence  of  new  ideas.  As 
Blake  put  it:  "The  man  who  never  alters 
his  opinion  is  like  standing  water,  and  breeds 
reptiles  of  the  mind."  Evolution  in  strategic 
thinking  might  produce  situations  better,  or 
worse,  than  what  confronts  us  now. 

Let  us  admit  that  we  are  dealing  in  this 
field  with  arguments  based  on  only  plausibil- 
ity, not  experience.  Many  of  these  arguments 
can  be  constructed  just  as  convincingly  in 
their  logical  opposites.  And  since  nuclear 
policy  cannot  possibly  be  based  on  actual 
experience — let  us  hope  and  pray  it  never 
can — it  tends  to  feed  on  itself.  It  gets  no 
feedback  from  the  real  world,  no  empirical 
evidence  of  the  incontrovertible  kind  that 
buttresses  the  physical  and  even  the  social 
sciences.  In  this  sense  we  are  a  ship  sailing 
through  the  night  guided  only  by  the  light 
at  the  prow. 

Because  nuclear  strategy  cannot  offer  posi- 
tive proof,  I  think  it  is  more  like  a  theology 
than  a  science.  Hence  we  run  the  risk  that 
our  "theologies" — ours  and  the  Russians' — 
may  not  be  in  harmony.  Sudden  incompati- 
bilities can  develop  in  military  thinking  and 


March  25,   1974 


315 


could  lead  to  catastropha.  All  the  more  rea- 
son, then,  for  us  to  keep  our  minds  open  and 
not  plan  the  future  by  listening  only  to  the 
echo  of  our  old  ideas. 

There  is  a  further  aspect  of  accepted  doc- 
trine which  should  trouble  us  even  more.  As 
the  President's  foreign  policy  report  of  last 
May  said : 

While  the  specter  of  an  unacceptable  response  is 
fundamental  to  deterrence,  the  ability  to  kill  tens  of 
millions  of  people  is  not  the  only  or  necessarily  the 
most  effective  deterrent  to  every  challenge.  .  .  . 
Moreover,  the  measurement  of  the  effectiveness  of 
our  strategic  forces  in  terms  of  the  numbers  of  dead 
is  inconsistent  with  American  values. 

I  wish  that  this  reminder  had  received  a 
warmer  and  brighter  response. 

Many  arms  control  specialists  maintain 
that  deterrence  requires  the  threat  of  geno- 
cide— although  they  would  call  it  "city  tar- 
geting" or  "mutual  hostage  relationship," 
since  few  people  have  the  stomach  for  full 
honesty  in  these  matters.  According  to  this 
thinking,  a  deterrent  will  succeed  as  long 
as — according  to  our  calculations  about  "mis- 
sile duels" — it  can  result  in  enough  people 
killed  on  the  other  side. 

Actually,  the  more  simplified  the  calcula- 
tion, the  greater  is  the  distance  between  this 
atrocious  abstraction  and  the  incomprehensi- 
ble real  atrocity  for  which  it  serves  as  a  dis- 
guise. 

Much  as  we  should  not  plan  this  country's 
arms  control  policy  on  the  basis  of  intellec- 
tualized  abstractions  and  fictions,  we  also 
must  not  develop  arms  control  policy  with  a 
stunted  moral  conscience. 

I  would  be  the  first  to  admit  a  certain 
guilt  in  the  history  of  our  own  American 
thinking  on  nuclear  weapons.  Our  guilt  can 
be  traced  back  to  the  Anglo-American  ap- 
proach to  strategic  bombing  in  World  War 
II.  The  idea  of  destroying  the  morale  of  Nazi 
Germany  and  Imperial  Japan  by  killing  Ger- 
man and  Japanese  women  and  children  did 
have  an  understandable  explanation  in  terms 
of  that  period.  It  can  be  traced  in  part  to  the 
emotions  of  that  time.  But  to  a  large  part 
this   strategy   simply    rationalized   the   fact 


that  bombing  in  those  days  was  so  inaccurate 
that  it  could  only  destroy  residential  areas. 
In  any  event,  the  thinking  of  World  War  II 
strongly  influenced  our  earliest  planning  on 
nuclear  war  in  the  late  forties  and  early  fif- 
ties. 

But  just  because  certain  errors  can  be  ex- 
plained in  terms  of  their  historical  origin 
doesn't  mean  that  we  should  plan  to  perpetu- 
ate them.  We  have  had  enough  time  now  to 
think  these  problems  through. 

To  deter  a  decision  to  attack  us  we  have 
to  influence  those  who  might  make  that  deci- 
sion. If  the  only  means  to  that  end  were  the 
threatened  murder  of  as  many  innocent  by- 
standers as  possible,  that  might  be  justified — 
to  the  extent  that  the  end  justifies  the  means. 

But  nobody  has  proved  that  the  threat  of 
killing  bystanders  is  the  only  way  to  deter. 

At  the  same  time,  avoiding  this  error,  we 
should  not  commit  the  opposite  error ;  we 
should  never  assume  that  nuclear  weapons 
could  be  used  without  an  enormous  risk  of 
leading  to  further  nuclear  escalation  and 
thus  to  unprecedented  civilian  death  and 
sufi'ering.  It  is  this  very  uncertainty  which 
must  be  a  powerful  deterrent  for  any  sane 
leader.  Why  then  should  we  rig  our  terrible 
engines  of  destruction  in  such  a  way  as  to 
make  genocide  certain?  Doesn't  it  make  sense 
to  introduce  a  last  chance — should  something 
go  wrong — to  prevent  the  utmost  catastro- 
phe? 

Many  thoughtful  people  manage  to  feel 
almost  comfortable  with  the  prospect  of  an 
enduring  confrontation  of  threatened  geno- 
cide. How  is  such  an  attitude  possible?  Only 
by  thinking  the  weapons  will  never  be  used. 
Yet  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  usa- 
bility of  nuclear  weapons  is  built  into  them. 
Indeed,  as  we  all  know,  nuclear  arms  are 
carefully  designed  and  primed  for  ready  use. 

Our  moral  conscience  therefore  ought  to 
be  concerned  with  this  fact  of  usability.  We 
cannot  take  leave  from  the  problem  by  ar- 
guing that  we  do  not  intend  actual  use, 
particularly  since  the  threat  leaves  too 
much  to  chance.  Actual  use,  should  it  ever 
occur,  would  be  triggered  by  a  sudden  turn 


316 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


of  events  that  provoked  a  deliberate  decision 
by  a  few  men,  or  by  some  other  processes. 

And  even  if  it  were  a  deliberate  decision, 
the  ensuing  cataract  of  horror  would  be  too 
immense  to  be  made  the  moral  responsibility 
of  a  few  misguided  men.  We  do  not  blame 
the  destruction  of  four  empires  and  the 
deaths  of  at  least  10  million  in  World  War  I 
on  the  assassin  of  the  Archduke  at  Sarajevo. 
The  blame  belongs  to  the  system  that  failed 
to  avert  disaster. 

In  calling  attention  to  the  defects  of 
fashionable  current  thinking  as  I  have  done, 
I  do  not  for  a  moment  say  that  we  should 
edge  away  from  the  policy  of  deterrence.  I 
say  only  that  naked  deterrence  is  not  enough. 
Looking  ahead  into  the  next  10  to  20  years, 
I  am  convinced  that  we  must  supplement 
deterrence,  underpin  it,  by  a  whole  series  of 
positive  actions  in  the  technical,  military, 
and  political  fields. 

At  this  point  let  me  outline  a  few  of  the 
actions  I  would  like  to  see  started  without 
delay.  They  ought  to  be  started  on  many 
intellectual  fronts  at  once,  here  in  Cam- 
bridge and  in  other  centers  of  research 
around  the  country.  I  shall  mention  four 
such  directions. 

One  of  the  tasks  falls  on  those  of  our  engi- 
neers and  physical  scientists  who  wish  to 
make  a  contribution  toward  the  prevention 
of  nuclear  war.  In  my  opinion,  these  tech- 
nical experts  must  work  harder  to  invent 
nuclear  arms  that  do  not  have  to  be  used 
quickly  lest  they  be  destroyed.  The  present 
nuclear  arsenals  in  all  their  many  compo- 
nents must  be  made  less  dangerous.  I  am  op- 
timistic that  more  imaginative  designs  of  nu- 
clear arms  can  still  make  major  contributions 
toward  our  arms  control  objectives.  And  as  a 
complementary  requirement,  new  arms  con- 
trol agreements  should  permit,  or  even  en- 
courage, such  technical  development  of  safer 
arms. 

Second,  another  front  for  action  concerns 
command  and  control  and  operational  plan- 
ning. A  high-priority  task  in  this  field,  I  am 
convinced,  is  to  provide  for  the  reversibility 
of  crises. 


What  do  I  mean  by  this  phrase?  The  best 
way  I  can  explain  it  is  to  remind  you  of  one 
crisis  that  became  irreversible.  This  was  the 
ever-famous,  or  ever-infamous,  crisis  of  the 
last  few  days  before  the  outbreak  of  World 
War  I. 

A  momentum  toward  war  took  control  of 
Europe  and  could  not  be  stopped.  On  July 
28  and  30  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia 
ordered  their  forces  mobilized.  The  next  day 
Germany  gave  Russia  12  hours  to  stop  its 
mobilization.  When  no  word  came,  Germany 
not  only  declared  war  on  Russia  but  also 
began  to  move  against  France. 

This  was  the  death  sentence  on  at  least  10 
million  Europeans,  most  of  them  young  men 
in  the  prime  of  life.  The  mechanism  of  mo- 
bilization worked  with  a  ratchet  eff'ect;  it 
could  move  notch  by  notch  toward  war  and 
into  war  but  never  back  toward  conciliation 
and  peace. 

What  should  give  pause  to  all  of  us  who 
work  on  arms  control  is  that  the  two  Hague 
Peace  Conferences  in  1899  and  1907  never 
had  this  ratchet  effect  of  mobilizations  on 
their  agenda.  While  the  conferences  repre- 
sented a  serious  eff'ort,  and  while  many  of  the 
participants  had  a  real  sense  of  foreboding 
about  the  next  war,  their  imagination  did 
not  encompass  the  process  that  was  to  trigger 
the  catastrophe  of  1914 — the  interlocking 
mobilization  schedules. 

Where  nuclear  arms  are  involved,  we  are 
not  dealing  with  mobilization  schedules  and 
warning  times  measured  in  days.  A  move  by 
one  side  can  produce  a  countermove  by  the 
other  in  a  matter  of  minutes.  Command  and 
control  procedures  could  collapse  under  the 
strain  of  time  urgency  even  without  nuclear 
damage.  Priority  messages  to  execute  alert 
measures  would  pile  into  message  centers 
like  an  avalanche;  other  priority  messages 
explaining  errors  and  correcting  oversights 
might  well  be  buried  and  unread. 

The  "hot  line"  between  Washington  and 
Moscow  might,  of  course,  be  useful  in  help- 
ing to  keep  an  American-Soviet  crisis  rever- 
sible. But  additional  arrangements  ought  to 
be  invented  to  make  crises  more  easily  rever- 


March  25,   1974 


317 


sible,  and  some  of  these  arrangements  might 
sensibly  be  the  topic  of  arms  control  negotia- 
tions. This  is  a  rather  neglected  field  for 
constructive  contributions  by  arms  control 
experts. 

Third  on  my  compressed  list  of  what  needs 
to  be  done  on  many  fronts,  let  us  not  under- 
rate the  more  traditional  arms  control  agree- 
ments to  limit  specific  weapons.  Such  agree- 
ments, apart  from  their  immediate  impact, 
can  also  advance  our  long-term  objectives. 
For  example,  by  beginning  a  process  of  re- 
ductions in  the  levels  of  nuclear  armaments, 
we  bring  down  the  potential  destructiveness 
of  the  accumulated  arsenals.  In  the  long  run, 
moreover,  a  process  of  reduction  could  help 
to  throttle  the  bureaucratic  drives  for  the 
quantitative  and  qualitative  arms  competi- 
tion. 

We  would  have  to  reduce  without,  of 
course,  shutting  our  eyes  to  political  realities 
or  the  requirements  of  strategic  stability. 
Indeed,  reductions  should  lead  toward  safer 
deployments  of  nuclear  forces. 

Finally,  we  have  to  place  our  efforts  to 
prevent  nuclear  war  into  the  larger  context 
of  international  affairs.  Here  again  we 
ought  to  pay  careful  attention  to  the  uncer- 
tainties of  the  real  world.  What  are  the 
changing  local  sources  of  conflict  that  could 
entrap  us  in  dangerous  nuclear  confronta- 
tions? What  are  the  risks  of  shifting  alli- 
ances? What  are  the  problems  of  several 
national  nuclear  forces  that  will  increasingly 
intermingle  in  various  oceans  and  continue 
in  hostile  juxtaposition  on  the  Eurasian  con- 
tinent? 

In  summing  up  my  message  to  you,  I  would 
say  that  we  must  reexamine  our  premises 
rather  than  simply  preserve  them  as  if  they 
were  articles  of  faith.  Sometimes  I  think  we 
have  behaved  like  missionaries,  driven  to  in- 
tense exertions  by  our  belief  in  an  abstract 
world  of  certainty. 

Perhaps  it  is  time  for  us,  instead,  to  be- 
have like  anthropologists,  sensitive  to  the 
uncertainties  in  our  views  of  the  world  and 
willing  to  study  our  own  cultural  strait- 
jackets  as  well  as  those  of  our  adversaries. 
Such  relativism  will  permit  a  deeper  under- 
standing of  the  limitations  of  calculations 


and  analysis  and  permit  us  to  develop  arms 
control  policies  that  pay  more  attention  to 
uncertainty.  Comfortable  notions  such  as 
"mutual  deterrence,"  strategic  "stability," 
and  "safe  retaliatory  forces"  should  be  re- 
garded as  hypotheses  in  a  continuing  search 
for  better  solutions — not  as  declarations  of 
faith.  A  declaration  of  faith,  according  to  an 
old  Portuguese  expression,  is  an  auto-da-fe, 
an  act  that  ends  in  a  mass  burning. 


Foreign  Service  Examination 

Press  release  61  dated  February  21 

More  than  13,700  persons  took  the  written 
examination  for  the  Foreign  Service  on  De- 
cember 8,  1973,  in  cities  throughout  the 
United  States  and  at  many  Foreign  Service 
posts  abroad.  This  is  about  2,500  more  than 
have  taken  any  previous  examination  in  the 
50  years  since  the  modern  Foreign  Service 
was  established. 

The  written  examination,  given  once  a 
year  in  December,  is  the  first  step  in  the 
competitive  selection  of  new  Foreign  Service 
officers  and  Foreign  Service  information  offi- 
cers for  appointment  to  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  U.S.  Information  Agency.  The 
1,600  who  passed  the  most  recent  written 
examination  are  now  eligible  for  an  oral 
examination  given  by  panels  of  examiners  in 
Washington  and  in  a  number  of  other  large 
cities  in  the  United  States.  From  those  who 
are  successful  on  the  oral  examination,  the 
Department  of  State  plans  to  appoint  about 
165  new  officers  and  USIA  about  20  during 
the  next  fiscal  year. 

The  Department  of  State  has  increased  its 
eff'orts  to  recruit  more  junior  officers  who 
not  only  have  the  broad  general  background 
required  of  all  officers  of  the  Foreign  Service 
but  who  also  possess  special  skills  required 
in  greater  number  by  the  Department,  par- 
ticularly in  economics  and  management.  The  ' 
success  of  this  drive,  conducted  in  graduate 
schools  of  economics  and  business  throughout 
the  country,  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  some 
43  percent  more  took  the  examination  for  the 
economic-commercial  specialty  than  in  1972. 


318 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Department  and  USIA  also  hope  to 
increase  the  proportion  of  women  and  mem- 
bers of  minority  groups  entering  the  Foreign 
Service  and  have  conducted  specialized  re- 
cruiting for  them. 

The  Foreign  Service  is  open  to  U.S.  citi- 
zens 21  years  of  age  and  over.  There  are  no 
specific  educational  requirements,  and  al- 
though most  successful  candidates  are  college 
graduates,  no  formal  college  degree  is  re- 
quired. Information  about  the  December  1974 
examination  will  be  available  in  June  and 
may  be  obtained  by  writing  to  the  Board  of 
Examiners  for  the  Foreign  Service,  Post 
Office  Box  9317,  Rosslyn  Station,  Arlington, 
Va.  22209. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  of  the  convention 
on  international  civil  aviation,  as  amended  (TIAS 
1591,  3756).   Done  at  Montreal  June  21,  1961.   En- 
tered into  force  July  17,  1962.   TIAS  5170. 
Ratification  deposited:   Iraq,  October  3,  1973. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  convention 
on  international  civil  aviation,  as  amended  (TIAS 
1591,  3756,  5170).  Done  at  New  York  March  12, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  January  16,  1973.  TIAS 
7616. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Costa  Rica,  November  14, 
1973;  Sudan,  November  21,  1973. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  conven- 
tion on  international  civil  aviation,  as  amended 
(TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170).  Done  at  Vienna  July  7, 
1971.' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Mexico,  September  4,  1973; 
Nicaragua,  October  31,  1973;  Pakistan,  October 
25,  1973. 

Convention    for    the    suppression    of    unlawful    acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.    Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.    Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 26,  1973.   TIAS  7570. 
Ratification  deposited:  Paraguay,  March  5,  1974. 


'  Not  in  force. 


Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the   international  transit  of 
goods    (ITI  convention).    Done  at  Vienna  June  7, 
1971.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:  March  2,  1974. 

Exhibitions 

Protocol  revising  the  convention  of  November  22, 
1928,  as  amended  (TIAS  6548,  6549),  relating  to 
international  expositions,  with  appendix  and  an- 
nex. Done  at  Paris  November  20,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands,  February  11, 
1974. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done  at 
Vienna  February  21,  1971.' 

Extended  to:  Territory  of  the  Sahara  by  Spain, 
December  20,  1973. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations.   Done  at 
Washington  June  19,  1970.' 
Accession  deposited:  Chad,  February  12,  1974. 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers  of  phono- 
grams against  unauthorized  duplication  of  their 
phonograms.  Done  at  Geneva  October  29,  1971. 
Entered  into  force  April  18,  1973;  for  the  United 
States  March  10,  1974. 

Notification  from  World  Intellectual  Property  Or- 
ganization that  ratification  deposited:  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  (applicable  to  West  Ber- 
lin), February  18,  1974. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for  pre- 
venting collisions  at  sea,  1972.    Done  at  London 
October  20,  1972.' 
Ratification  deposited :  Denmark,  January  24, 1974. 


BIUTERAL 

Finland 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  acceptance  of 
certificates  of  airworthiness  for  imported  civil 
glider  aircraft  and  civil  aircraft  appliances. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
March  7,  1974.    Entered  into  force  March  7,  1974. 

Agreement  concerning  the  reciprocal  acceptance  of 
certificates  of  airworthiness  for  imported  civil 
glider  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  November  3,  1965.  Entered  into  force 
November  3,  1965.  TIAS  5885. 
Terminated:  March  7,  1974. 

Portugal 

Parcel  post  agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  for 
execution,  between  the  United  States  and  Macao. 
Signed  at  Macao  February  23  and  Washington 
June  8,  1973.' 

Approved  and  ratified  by  the  President:  February 
28,   1974. 


March  25,   1974 


319 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  Releases   1974  Edition 
of  "Treaties  in  Force" 


is    published    weekly   in    the    Department   of    State 
Bulletin. 

The  1974  edition  of  "Treaties  in  Force"  (426  pp., 
Department  of  State  publication  8755;  GPO  cat.  no. 
S9.14:974)  is  for  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Book- 
store, Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20402, 
for  $3.00. 


Press  release  71  dated  February  28 

The  Department  of  State  on  February  28  pub- 
lished "Treaties  in  Force:  A  List  of  Treaties  and 
Other  International  Agreements  of  the  United  States 
in  Force  on  January  1,  1974." 

This  is  a  collection  reflecting  the  bilateral  rela- 
tions of  the  United  States  with  159  countries  or  other 
political  entities  and  the  multilateral  relations  of  the 
United  States  with  other  contracting  parties  to  more 
than  375  treaties  and  agreements  on  88  subjects. 
The  1974  edition  lists  some  320  new  treaties  and 
agreements  including  the  agreements  on  ending  the 
war  and  restoring  peace  in  Viet-Nam,  with  proto- 
cols; the  convention  on  the  international  liability  for 
damage  caused  by  space  objects;  the  Geneva  conven- 
tion for  the  protection  of  producers  of  phonograms 
against  unauthorized  duplication  of  their  phono- 
grams; the  arrangement  regarding  international 
trade  in  textiles;  the  agreement  with  Mexico  ap- 
proving minute  242  of  the  International  Boundary 
and  Water  Commission  setting  forth  a  permanent 
and  definitive  solution  to  the  international  problem 
of  the  salinity  of  the  Colorado  River;  the  agreements 
with  the  U.S.S.R.  on  prevention  of  nuclear  war,  sci- 
entific and  technical  cooperation  in  the  field  of  peace- 
ful uses  of  atomic  energy,  and  cultural  contacts,  ex- 
changes and  cooperation;  the  agreement  with  Cuba 
on  the  hijacking  of  aircraft  and  vessels  and  other 
offenses;  and  the  consular  conventions  with  Hungary, 
Poland,  and  Romania. 

The  bilateral  treaties  and  other  agreements  are 
arranged  by  country  or  other  political  entity,  and  the 
multilateral  treaties  and  other  agreements  are  ar- 
ranged by  subject  with  names  of  countries  which 
have  become  parties.  Date  of  signature,  date  of 
entry  into  force  for  the  United  States,  and  citations 
to  texts  are  furnished  for  each  agreement. 

This  edition  includes  citations  to  volumes  1 
through  11  of  the  new  compilation  entitled  "Treaties 
and  Other  International  Agreements  of  the  United 
States  of  America  1776-1949"  (Bevans). 

"Treaties  in  Force"  provides  information  concern- 
ing treaty  relations  with  numerous  newly  independ- 
ent states,  indicating  wherever  possible  the  pro- 
visions of  their  constitutions  and  independence 
arrangements  regarding  assumption  of  treaty  obli- 
gations. 

Information  on  current  treaty  actions,  supplement- 
ing the  information  contained  in  "Treaties  in  Force," 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Bookstore,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading 
list.  (A  complete  set  of  all  Background  Notes  cur- 
rently in  stock — at  least  140 — $16.35;  1-year  sub- 
scription service  for  approximately  77  updated  or 
new  Notes — $14.50;  plastic  binder — $1.50.)  Single 
copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  25(?  each. 

Albania Cat.    No.    S1.123:AL1 

Pub.  8217  4  pp. 

Cameroon Cat.    No.     S1.123:C14 

Pub.  8010  4  pp. 

India Cat.  No.  S1.123:IN2/2 

Pub.  7847  7  pp. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Pakistan. 
TIAS  7714.   8  pp.   25(f.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:7714). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Bangla- 
desh amending  the  agreement  of  August  6,  1973. 
TIAS  7715.     2  pp.     25^.     (Cat.  No.  89.10:7715). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Jordan. 
TIAS  7716.    17  pp.   &0(f.    (Cat.  No.  89.10:7716). 

Trade  in  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber  Textiles.  Under- 
standing with  Japan  modifying  the  arrangement  of 
January  3,  1972.  TIAS  7717.  3  pp.  25«».  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:7717). 

Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles.  Understanding  with  Japan 
modifying  and  extending  the  arrangement  of  January 
28,  1972,  as  amended.  TIAS  7718.  3  pp.  25(?.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:7718). 

Atomic  Energy — Application  of  Safeguards  Pursuant 
to  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty.  Protocol  with  Nor- 
way and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
suspending  the  agreement  of  May  4,  1967,  as 
amended.  TIAS  7721.  3  pp.  25!^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10: 
7721). 


320 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     March  25, 1974     Vol.  LXX,  No.  1813 


Asia.   Challenges  of  an  Interdependent  World 

(Donaldson) 289 

Congress.    Consressional  Documents  Relating 

to  Foreign  Policy 313 

Department    and    Foreign    Service.     Foreign 

Service  Examination 318 

Disarmament.  The  Prevention  of  Nuclear  War 
in  a  World  of  Uncertainty  (Ikle)  ....       314 

Economic  AfiFairs 

International      Economic      Affairs      in      1974 

(Casey) 302 

Japan  and  Its  Relationship  With  the  United 
States  (Ingersoll) 296 

Technological  Exchange  and  Detente  (Casey)       308 

Ecuador.  Sales  to  Government  of  Ecuador 
Under  Foreign  Military  Sales  Act  (Presi- 
dential   determination) 301 

Energy 

Challenges  of  an  Interdependent  World  (Don- 
aldson)         289 

Energy  Coordinating  Group  Meets  at  Wash- 
ington   .  • 295 

International      Economic     Affairs      in      1974 

(Casey) 302 

Japan  and  Its  Relationship  With  the  United 

States  (Ingersoll) 296 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  March  6 

(excerpts)       294 

U.S.  and  Germany  Discuss  Cooperation  in  Sci- 
ence and  Technology  R.  &  D.  (joint  state- 
ment)      300 

Europe 

Challenges  of  an  Interdependent  World  (Don- 
aldson)   289 

Technology  Exchange  and  Detente  (Casey)     .      308 

Germany.  U.S.  and  Germany  Discuss  Coopera- 
tion in  Science  and  Technology  R.  &  D. 
(joint  statement) 300 

Japan.  Japan  and  Its  Relationship  With  the 
United  States   (Ingersoll) 296 

Middle  East.  President  Nixon's  News  Confer- 
ence of  March  6   (excerpts) 294 

Military  AfiFairs.  President  Nixon's  News  Con- 
ference of  March  6  (excerpts) 294 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  March 
6  (excerpts) 294 

President  Nixon  Proclaims  Vietnam  Veterans 
Day  (remarks,  proclamation) 311 

Sales  to  Government  of  Ecuador  Under  For- 
eign Military  Sales  Act  (Presidential  deter- 
mination)     301 

Publications 

Department  Releases  1974  Edition  of  "Treaties 

in  Force" 320 

GPO  Sales  Publications 320 

Science.  U.S.  and  Germany  Discuss  Coopera- 
tion in  Science  and  Technology  R.  &  D. 
(joint  statement) 300 


Trade 

International      Economic      Affairs     in      1974 

(Casey) 302 

Technological  Exchange  and  Detente  (Casey)  .       308 

Treaty  Information.   Current  Actions  ....       319 

U.S.S.R.   Technological  Exchange  and  Detente 

(Casey) 308 

Viet-Nam.  President  Nixon  Proclaims  Vietnam 
Veterans  Day  (remarks,  proclamation)   .     .      311 


Name  Index 

Casey,  William  J 302,308 

Donaldson,   William   H 289 

Ikle,  Fred  C 314 

Ingersoll,   Robert   S 296 

Nixon,   President 294,301,311 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  March  4—10 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  March  4  which  ap- 
pear in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  61 
of  February  21,  68  of  February  25,  and  71,  74, 
and  75  of  February  28. 

No.       Date  Subject 

t80     3/4      Casey:    Adelphi    University,    Gar- 
den City.  N.Y.,  Mar.  3. 

*81      3/4      Fritts  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Rwanda  (biographic  data). 

*82      3/4     Vaky  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Colombia  (biographic  data). 

*83      3/4      Kissinger:    news  conference,  Brus- 
sels. 

*84      3/5      U.S.  and  Poland  sign  cotton  tex- 
tile agreement. 

*85      3/6      Krebs  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Guyana   (biographic  data). 

t86      3/7      Kissinger:    Senate    Finance    Com- 
mittee. 

*87     3/7      Boster  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Bangladesh  (biographic  data). 

*88  3/8  Selden  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
New  Zealand,  Fiji,  Tonga,  and 
Western  Samoa  (biographic 
data). 
89  3/8  Joint  statement  on  U.S.-German 
cooperation  in  research  and  de- 
velopment. 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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