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Volume LXX 

No. 1802 

January 7, 1974 


Exchanges of Remarks Between President Nixon and President Ceausescu 

and Texts of Joint Statements and Commtmique 1 

Statement by Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., and Text of Resolution 13 


For index see inside back cover 





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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Headers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 


Vol. LXX, No. 1802 
January 7, 1974 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of tlie Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

President Ceausescu of Romania Visits the United States 

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Coun- 
cil of State of the Socialist Republic of Ro- 
mania, met with President Nixon and other 
government officials at Washington Decem- 
ber Jt-6 during an official visit to the United 
States. Following are an exchange of greet- 
ings between President Nixon and President 
Ceausescu at a welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White Hojise on Decem- 
ber i, their exchange of toasts at a White 
House dinner that evening, and their re- 
marks upon signing a joint statement of 
principles on December 5, together with the 
texts of the joint statement of principles, a 
joint statement on economic cooperation 
issued on December 5, and a joint communi- 
que issued on December 7. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
December 10 

President Nixon 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ceausescu, and all of 
our distinguished guests: Mr. President, it 
was over three years ago that I had the honor 
of being the first American President to visit 
your country and when I had the honor to 
receive you here in Washington as the first 
President of Romania to visit our nation's 

In these past three years, we have seen a 
very great improvement in the relations be- 
tween our two countries — improvement that 
is indicated by the amount of trade that we 
have between our countries, the amount of 
exchange, and in other areas which we think 
are particularly important in the economic 
and political areas. 

What is also very significant, however, is 
that in those three years we have seen a 
great change in the world in which we live — 
a change that you and I first discussed in 
1967 when I visited your capital, Bucharest, 
as a private citizen. It was then that we 
talked of the necessity for a bridge between 
East and West. And since these three years, 
we have seen not only the visits I have re- 
ferred to, but a visit to the People's Repub- 
lic of China, to the Soviet Union, and the de- 
velopment of new relationships between the 
United States and nations in the Socialist 
part of the world, but new relationships be- 
tween Romania and nations in the non- 
Socialist part of the world. 

It is as we look at the world today that we 
recognize how those relationships came 
about, how two countries so very far apart 
geographically — one much larger than the 
other in terms of population, but each with 
a proud history — how two countries with 
different philosophies of government never- 
theless in the field of foreign policy had com- 
mon objectives, and that was to seek good 
relations with all nations, regardless of what 
their philosophical ideas were, a policy of re- 
specting the independence and sovereignty 
of every nation, large and small, in the 
world, and a policy of always recognizing 
that unless each nation has independence 
and that that independence is not infringed 
upon and not threatened by other nations, 
there cannot be real peace, lasting peace, in 
the world. 

This is the goal of our nation; it is the 
goal of your nation. It is one that we have 
discussed on several occasions before, and it 
is one that, in addition to the bipartisan mat- 
ters we will be discussing, I am sure we 

January 7, 1974 

shall discuss at len^h in our two-day visit 
on this occasion. 

We are happy that you and your wife will 
be able to visit not only Washington but a 
number of other cities in our country, and 
we know that you will receive here the same 
warmhearted welcome that made such an 
enormous impression on Mrs. Nixon and me 
and all the members of our party when we 
had the honor of visiting your country, Ro- 

President Ceausescu ' 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gen- 
tlemen: It is an occasion of particular pleas- 
ure for me, for my wife, and for my col- 
leagues here to find ourselves again in the 
United States to meet you again, Mr. Presi- 
dent, and to continue the dialogue we started 
in 1967 and which has proved to be so fruit- 
ful both for the relations between our two 
nations and also for the development of co- 
operation and peace in the world. 

It is true that after the visit you officially 
paid to Romania as the first President of the 
United States to be in my country, the visit 
you made together with Mrs. Nixon in 1969, 
the relations between our two countries have 
seen a continual progress. We have achieved 
significant developments in our economic co- 
operation. At the same time, our relations 
in the field of science, culture, exchanges of 
people in various fields, have developed also. 
Our peoples have started to know each other 
better and to cooperate together in the inter- 
est of general progress, of cooperation and 
peace in the world. 

Likewise, the visit I paid to the United 
States in 1970, the talks I had at that time 
with you, with other political, economic per- 
sonalities, with the representatives of the 
business community in the United States, 
have given a new impetus to the coopera- 
tion between our two countries. It is true 
since 1967, and then since your official 
visit to my country in 1969, a number of 
years have passed. And in these years many 
things have changed in the world, and these 

' President Ceausescu spoke in Romanian on all 

changes continue to take place and to become 
more accentuated, leading in the direction of 
a better cooperation among all peoples, in 
the direction of the assertion of each nation's 
independence, of the right for free economic 
and social development in conditions of ob- 
serving each people's right to organize its 
life as it wishes and deems fit without any 
outside interference. 

One can really say that the visit you paid 
to Romania was really a good .start and it 
marked favorable developments in the rela- 
tions of your country with the Socialist 
countries, followed by the visit to the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and your visit to the 
Soviet Union. It opened the course toward 
developing cooperation with other Socialist 
countries as well. This is certainly an impor- 
tant moment in the developments of the 
world today and in the general course to in- 
sure a lasting peace in this world of ours. 

In its policy, Romania starts from the 
premise that in the settlement of the great 
international problems all states have a part 
to play and they all should cooperate on an 
equal basis. No doubt the greater countries 
have greater responsibilities and a greater 
role to play, but life itself has demonstrated 
that the big international issues can only be 
settled with the participation and direct con- 
tribution of all states in international affairs. 

It is only on that basis that we can build a 
better world, a world with more justice. We 
are convinced that the peoples of the world 
will march ever more firmly in this direction. 

I am happy to be able to state that the re- 
lations between Romania and the United 
States are based precisely on these principles 
and that this has been confirmed in the years 
that have passed. I am persuaded that our 
visit to the United States and the talks with 
you, Mr. President, will establish an even 
more lasting basis to the cooperation be- 
tween our two countries in the interest of a 
better and brighter world. 

It is with these thoughts, Mr. President, 
that I address to you and to the people of 
America the feelings of friendship on be- 
half of the entire Romanian people. May I 
wish you and the American people progress 
and peace. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
December 10 

President Nixon 

President and Mrs. Ceausescu, and all of 
our very distinguished and honored guests : 
As I sit here at this head table in the State 
Dining Room with the President of Romania, 
I can imagine that many here in this dining 
room wonder what we talk about. Now of 
course I cannot disclose all of the conversa- 
tion [laughter], but I thought that it would 
be of interest to all of you, and those who 
can hear us through this recording [laugh- 
ter], how the President and I first came to 
meet and how two of us from, in some ways, 
very similar backgrounds and in other ways 
very different backgrounds have each tried 
to make a contribution to a cause everybody 
in this room, in both of our countries and, 
we believe, in the whole world, believes in. 

In 1967, when I was not in office and had 
no prospects of being in office, I visited Ro- 
mania, and the President was kind enough 
to receive me. And I was reminded of the 
subjects we discussed in 1967, just six years 
ago: the war in Viet-Nam, which then 
seemed endless; the relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, which 
then were, at best, at arm's length, certainly 
not in terms of the communication that we 
have today ; the relations between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China, 
which at that time were virtually nonex- 
istent in terms of communication. We talked 
of many other things, of course — of Roma- 
nia, the United States, and what this country, 
our country, owes to those of Romanian 
background who have come here and con- 
tributed so much to the diversity of our 
whole society. 

Since then, in 1969, when I had the honor 
of being the first American President ever 
to visit a Socialist country on a state visit, 
and then again in 1970, when on two occa- 
sions the President was here — one on a state 
visit — and then again today, 1973, I think, 
as you must think, of how much has hap- 
pened in those six years. 

That war — terribly difficult, costly, for the 
American people and of course even more 

so for the Vietnamese people on both sides 
who were involved — is ended. The United 
States has begun a new relationship with 
the People's Republic of China, one which 
began just a year ago and which continues 
to develop. The United States, in addition, 
has had two summit meetings with the lead- 
ers of the Soviet Union and of course meet- 
ings with other governments in Europe, in 
Africa, Latin America, around the world. 

Now, while these meetings of course have 
caught a great deal of attention from the 
press, particularly those involving the major 
powers, sometimes what is overlooked is the 
vitally important role that is played by lead- 
ers from proud countries but not the biggest 
countries — a leader like our distinguished 
guest tonight, because he, speaking with his 
candor for which he is very famous, spoke 
to me about then the relations between the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China, Europe, and of course Viet-Nam*. We 
did not agree about many of those subjects, 
but we both saw the profound need for new 
departures, for breakthroughs, for change, 
or otherwise the world would be frozen into 
a whole structure of confrontation which 
would inevitably lead to a configuration 
which could destroy the civilization as we 
know it. 

I am not suggesting that because the Pres- 
ident and I met in 1967 and had such a full 
and frank discussion, and met again on three 
other occasions in which these discussions 
were renewed, that those discussions were 
the reasons for the progress that has been 
made. What I do say, however, is this: that 
our distinguished guest tonight, of the 
world's statesmen, has played one of the most 
profound roles of any world statesman in 
seeing the whole problems that we confront 
in the world and not just those involving his 
own country and another country with whose 
leader he might be talking at a certain time. 
He has shown wisdom and understanding 
and has contributed enormously to the open- 
ing of dialogues that might otherwise have 
forever been closed. 

And so tonight, when we cannot, unfor- 
tunately, say that we have peace that will 
last forever, because it may not be possible 

January 7, 1974 

ever for that to be said for sure by anyone, 
while it cannot be said that because the lead- 
ers of the Soviet Union and the United States 
have met at two summit meetings that that 
means that the differences those two great 
powers have are ended, because they have 
not ended and they will not, because our in- 
terests are different- — something the Presi- 
dent recognizes, something we recognize — 
and it does not mean that the People's Re- 
public of China, with 800 million people, be- 
cause of a visit by the President of the 
United States and other diplomatic visits 
which followed, has so changed the relation- 
ship that those two nations and those two 
peoples will forever find themselves as 
friends, not just as individuals but as na- 
tions — but being the pragmatists that we 
are, the President and I, we both agree it 
means this : 

Something very profound and something 
very positive has happened in these past six 
years. The world has changed, and it has 
changed for the better. A war in which the 
United States was engaged, a very costly 
one, is over. A new relationship has been de- 
veloped between the two most powerful na- 
tions, and also a new relationship between 
the United States and the world's most pop- 
ulous nation. And all of this means that the 
chance that we can avoid a world struggle 
is greatly increa.sed. 

But the point I particularly want to make 
tonight is this : that as the eyes of the world 
inevitably turn to the meetings at the sum- 
mit involving the leaders of great powers, 
that as far as this nation is concerned, never 
at one of these meetings in the past, at least 
on the occasions of our participation in them 
since I have been in this office, and never in 
the future as long as our present policies 
are continued, will the United States, in de- 
veloping better relations with great powers, 
do so at the expense of the independence and 
the sovereignties of proud, fine people like 
our friends in Romania. 

I say that because there is a tendency 
sometimes for us to believe that all the 
world's problems would be so easily soluble 
if only those with great power would use 

their power to impose those solutions around 
the world. Now, the great powers have spe- 
cial responsibilities, but as far as the United 
States of America is concerned, we have a 
special feeling also in our hearts for people 
from a country like Romania, a proud people 
with a great background, who gave to Mrs. 
Nixon and me, I think, one of the warmest 
and most heartfelt welcomes we ever re- 
ceived in all of our travels abroad. And we 
believe that every nation, large and small, 
has the right to its independence, the right 
to choose its own way, and the right not to 
have that independence to be imposed upon, 
to be infringed upon, by any other -power. 

That is what U.S. foreign policy is really 
about. It is about, of course,, peace in 
the world. And that means negotiations with 
great powers and between them, those who 
have the power to affect the peace; but it 
also means having respect always for the 
rights of those nations, whether they be 
large or small, whether they be powerful or 
weak, who, except for our recognition of 
their right to independence, would be in very 
great jeopardy. 

The President of Romania has been a 
spokesman for what he calls the countries 
that are not the superpowers. He has been 
courageous, he has been candid, sometimes 
critical of our policy, sometimes critical of 
policies of other countries, but always stand- 
ing up for his own, and that is a quality we 
in America admire. 

We admire him. We admire his people be- 
cause of their belief in their independence 
and their sovereignty and their willingness 
to defend it. 

And so tonight, in proposing the toast to 
the President, I do so not simply because he 
is here again as a state guest but also be- 
cause he has made a major contribution to 
this profound change in the relations be- 
tween nations that has occurred over these 
past five years and also because he stands 
for a principle that we Americans believe in 
so deeply: the right of every nation, large 
or small, to its independence, to its freedom. 

And so I know all of you will want to join 
me in not only drinking to the health of our 

Department of State Bulletin 

distinguished guest, to the friendship be- 
tween our two peoples, but particularly to 
the leader of a great and friendly nation: 
President Ceausescu. 

President Ceausescu 

Mr. President, Madam, ladies and gentle- 
men : I should also like to refer briefly to 
some of the problems pertaining to the rela- 
tions between our two nations and also to 
international aff'airs today. 

We truly live in an era of great transfor- 
mation, both on a national and international 
level. Men who have obtained important suc- 
cess in the development of economy, science, 
culture, men who reached out into the outer 
space, are still preoccupied with a great 
many problems here on earth. 

There is still much inequality in the world. 
There are people and there are peoples who 
still live in underdevelopment. And there is 
a concern to establish relations between peo- 
ple and peoples on a better basis, on more 
justice, both on a national and on an inter- 
national level. 

No doubt there are many different opin- 
ions as to the various ways leading to this 
better world, to this world with more justice 
we are dreaming about. But today, more and 
more statesmen understand, as the peoples 
understand themselves, that a better world, 
a world with more justice, should necessarily 
come about. 

You talk, Mr. President, about our discus- 
sions in 1967. At that time I was not Presi- 
dent of the State Council myself. I was just 
the Secretary General of the party at that 
time. Therefore it was not a discussion be- 
tween two presidents at that time; it was a 
discussion between two statesmen who could 
talk frankly and openly. 

It appears that sometimes from time to 
time it may be necessary and useful, too, that 
people should talk not only in their official 
capacities, not only as political people, but 
as people, just as people. 

You have subsequently visited Romania as 
the first President of the United States to 
visit that country, and you were welcomed 

there as the Romanian people know how to 
welcome their friends, those who wish and 
do respect their independence and their right 
to a free life. 

We met again in 1970 in the United States, 
at the White House, and now again in '73 in 
the United States, here at the White House 

We have indeed talked about many ques- 
tions, including some, so to say, more philo- 
sophical. Mostly we talked, however, about 
the problems which were a source of con- 
cern to mankind at that time. 

It was then that we talked about the de- 
velopment of cooperation between our two 
countries, about the peace in Viet-Nam and 
in the Middle East, and about establishing 
relations among states on a new basis. We 
are able to note today with great satisfac- 
tion that quite a number of problems have 
found a solution. 

In Viet-Nam a peace agreement has been 
arrived at, although still more efforts will 
have to be made in order to secure a lasting 
peace in that area. 

Direct contacts and relations have been 
established between the People's Republic of 
China and the United States as a result of 
the visit you, Mr. President, paid to China. 

A number of agreements have been con- 
cluded with the Soviet Union as a result of 
your visit, sir, to the Soviet Union and of the 
visit paid by the Secretary General of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. 
Brezhnev, to the United States. 

No doubt all this has had, and is still hav- 
ing, an important role on the entire develop- 
ment of international affairs. But the picture 
will not be complete if we fail to talk about 
the fact that other changes have also oc- 
curred in the world. 

An ever-increasing number of nations is 
asserting more powerfully their words in in- 
ternational affairs and their desire to inde- 
pendent development, and they are playing 
an ever more active role in international 
life. Of course, the big countries, as the 
United States is, and other big countries as 
well, have an important part to play in in- 
ternational affairs ; but I will have to say on 

January 7, 1974 

this occasion again, in all frankness, that 
these countries alone are not in a position to 
totally insure a new course toward detente 
and a new course toward a better world and 
a world with more justice. 

The establishment of a new policy in the 
world, a policy based on equal rights and mu- 
tual respect, can only be the result of the 
united action of all states and of all nations. 
This is like on a national level in which a 
real policy of social justice can only be the 
result of the united effort of the entire peo- 

You have mentioned, Mr. President, the 
desire of the United States to act toward 
building new relations. No doubt in every- 
thing that has been done to settle a great 
number of problems we have mentioned be- 
fore, the United States has made its contri- 
bution. There is no secret to anyone today 
that it is precisely due to the fact that the 
President of the United States — you, sir — 
has taken action in this particular direction 
and made possible these results. 

But still more problems await a settle- 
ment, and without doubt more efforts, and 
sustained efforts, too, will have to be made 
in this particular direction, having in mind 
the need to insure cooperation among na- 
tions based on equal rights, equal rights ir- 
respective of size or of social system. 

During our talks today, we have reached 
a whole area of understanding, and some 
agreements for the further cooperation be- 
tween our two countries have been signed 

We would like to see the relations be- 
tween Romania and the United States — be- 
tween two countries having different social 
systems, two countries which are different 
in size, as one can easily see — we wish that 
these relations should really become an ex- 
ample of the way in which two countries 
can cooperate based on the principle of equal 
rights and mutual respect. 

We would like to be able to enable history 
to say that under difficult conditions two na- 
tions, a big one and a small one, were able to 
cooperate in such a way as to contribute 
toward establishing international relations 

on a better basis, on a basis of more justice. 

I think, and I shall not be to blame if I 
shall anticipate a little the declaration we 
are going to sign tomorrow, it is going to be 
a document of historical importance in its 
own way, by the were fact that it expands 
the relations and the principles that govern 
relations between countries which are differ- 
ent in many ways but which are united in 
their desire to cooperate in building friend- 
ship between them and in building a world 
of cooperation and peace. 

Since our talks in 1967, Mr. President, we 
have covered a long way to reach such a dec- 
laration which puts down fundamental prin- 
ciples of international relations. This no 
doubt speaks for itself, and it also shows 
and illustrates the changes that have taken 
place in the world. And it shows how the 
peoples of our two countries, how the lead- 
ers of our two countries, have been able to 
act in order to enforce mutual cooperation 
and international cooperation for the sake 
of peace and better cooperation. 

Taking as a starting point these changes 
that have worked their way in the world, we 
are able now to look upon the future with 
confidence. Notwithstanding the difficult 
problems that are still to be solved in the 
world, they are to be solved if all the peoples 
will act in unity to build a lasting peace 
based on equal rights and mutual respect. 

May I ask you to join me in this toast: To 
the President of the United States, who all 
through these years has an important role to 
play in the development of international life 
along this path, for the friendship and coop- 
eration between the peoples of the United 
States and Romania, for lasting peace and 
cooperation in the world. To your health, 
ladies and gentlemen. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
December 10 

President Nixon 

Mr. President and ladies and gentlemen : 
As you know, we have had statements of 

Department of State Bulletin 

principles that we have signed with major 
nations — with the Soviet Union, with the 
People's Republic of China. In this case we 
sign a statement of principles with Romania 
— Romania, which in the scale of size of pop- 
ulation is a smaller country. But on the other 
hand, the fact that this statement of princi- 
ples is signed between Romania and the 
United States has a very deep significance, 
and that significance is that while the United 
States considers its relations with major 
powers to be of enormous importance in 
terms of building a structure of peace in the 
world, we also consider it a cornerstone of 
our foreign policy that any agreements that 
we make must never be at the expense of the 
sovereignty and of the independence of small- 
er nations. 

Our relations with Romania have been 
particularly close during this administration 
due to the personal relationship that I have 
enjoyed with President Ceausescu, and we 
have seen growth in our economic communi- 
cations as well as in a number of other areas, 
as demonstrated by the agreements that 
were signed yesterday. But today, as we 
complete the signing of this document, we 
are in effect saying to the whole world that 
as far as the United States is concerned, we 
believe that the survival of nations, no mat- 
ter how small, no matter how weak they 
might be militarily, the survival of nations 
proud of their sovereignty, proud of their 
independence, is essential to building a struc- 
ture of peace in the world, one that we can 
be proud of. And so for that reason, we 
thought that having the ceremony here in the 
Cabinet Room with the members of our Cab- 
inet and the members of the President's offi- 
cial party here was particularly appropriate. 

President Ceausescu 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen : The 
signing of the joint declaration between the 
United States and Romania marks a new 
stage in the relations between our two coun- 

It is true that in the last few years, and in 
particular after the visit paid by President 

Nixon to Romania, the relations between 
Romania and the United States have seen a 
strong development in all fields of activity. 
These very days we have signed several doc- 
uments and agreements on our economic co- 
operation, and we adopted a statement on the 
principles of our economic cooperation. To- 
day we sign this declaration which places at 
the basis of the cooperation between Ro- 
mania and the United States the principles 
which are asserting themselves ever more 
strongly in international aff"airs. As such, 
they are the only principles apt to insure a 
lasting and just peace in the world, such as 
equal rights, respect for the sovereignty and 
independence of each nation, noninterference 
in the internal afl'airs, mutual advantage, 
and renunciation of force and of any threat 
with force in the settlement of international 

The signing of this declaration between 
our two countries — countries having differ- 
ent social systems, and which are different 
in size — is an important event which at the 
same time confirms the deep, growing 
changes which now occur in the world and 
which are accelerated today. 

We should like to see the significance of 
this document expand in the world and dem- 
onstrate that in the world today it is indeed 
possible for all countries, big, medium size, 
or small, to work together in full equality 
and to have the right of each nation asserted 
for its development according to its own 
wishes so that a better world, a world with 
more justice, will be built for all. 

There is no doubt that the happily existing 
relations between the United States and Ro- 
mania have reached the present stage also 
due to the fact that President Nixon and my- 
self have established good relations of coop- 
eration and friendship and that the Presi- 
dent of the United States himself has taken 
action in trying to apply these principles in 
the mutual relations with Romania. 

We dearly wish that the declaration we 
have signed today should form the lasting 
basis for the friendship between our two 
nations and should contribute at the same 
time to international peace and cooperation. 

January 7, 1974 


Joint Statement of the President of the United 
States of America, Richard Nixon, and the 
President of the Council of State of the So- 
cialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu 

The President of the United States of America, 
Richard Nixon, and the President of the Council of 
State of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae 

— having met in a cordial, constructive and 
friendly atmosphere, which provided the opportunity 
for a useful and comprehensive exchange of views, 

— having discussed United States-Romanian rela- 
tions, the principles underlying those relations, and 
the principal international problems of current con- 
cern in a spirit of full and mutual respect reflecting 
the interests of the American and Romanian jwoples 
in closer contacts, 

agreed on the following statement: 

They expressed the conviction that all nations, 
whatever their size, political, economic or social sys- 
tems or level of development, should contribute to a 
durable world peace, founded on freedom, equality, 
justice and respect for human rights. 

The two Presidents noted with satisfaction the 
favorable development of relations and the good 
results achieved following President Nixon's state 
visit to Romania in 1969 and his subsequent meeting 
with President Nicolae Ceausescu in Washington in 
1970. They agreed on the desirability of expanding 
and further developing relations between their two 
countries on a solid and lasting basis for the mutual 
benefit of the American and Romanian peoples. 


The two Presidents solemnly reaffirmed that the 
bilateral relations between the United States of 
America and the Socialist Republic of Romania are 
founded on the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter, and, consistent with these, espe- 
cially on the following closely interrelated princi- 

the right of each state to existence, independence, 
and sovereignty; 

the juridical equality of all states irrespective of 
their size, level of development, and political, eco- 
nomic and social systems; 

the right of each state freely to choose and de- 
velop its political, social, economic, and cultural sys- 

refraining from the threat or use of force in viola- 
tion of the United Nations Charter, respect for terri- 
torial integrity, and inviolability of frontiers; 

non-intervention, direct or indirect, for any rea- 

son whatever, in the internal affairs of any other 

the duty of states to settle their international dis- 
putes by peaceful means; 

cooperation in various fields of international rela- 
tions in order to promote international peace and 
security and economic and social progress. 


The two Presidents expressed their determination 
to develop the relations of the two countries in a 
spirit of esteem, respect and mutual advantage. They 
agreed to take measures as appropriate to encourage 
the expansion of trade as well as industrial, scien- 
tific and technical cooperation, in particular, such 
forms of collaboration as joint ventures and joint 
research between enterprises and institutions of the 
two countries. They also agreed to take appropriate 
measures to develop friendly relations between the 
two peoples, by creating conditions for better mutual 
knowledge of their spiritual and material values, by 
expanding and deepening contacts and exchanges in 
such fields as science, technology, culture, arts, edu- 
cation, information, and tourism, by relations be- 
tween institutions, organizations, associations, and 
enterprises, as well as by contacts between the citi- 
zens of the two countries. They will contribute to 
the solution of humanitarian problems on the basis 
of mutual confidence and good will. 


The two Presidents expressed their determination 
to act for the strengthening of the role of the 
United Nations in the maintenance and consolida- 
tion of international peace, the development of coop- 
eration among all nations, and the promotion of the 
norms of international law in relations among states. 

They stressed the importance of achieving effec- 
tive measures of disarmament conducive to the 
strengthening of international peace and security. 

They agreed to continue their support for the 
achievement of security and cooperation in Europe, 
noting that the Conference on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe and the negotiations on Mutual 
Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated 
Measures in Central Europe should contribute to this 
end. They agreed that the process of building Euro- 
pean security would produce closer relations among 
the participants and make a positive contribution to 
world peace. They further agreed that the develop- 
ment of good neighborly relations among Balkan 
countries will contribute to cooperation, security, 
and relaxation of tensions in Europe. 

Noting that international relations are in a period 
of intense change, the two Presidents welcomed the 
continuing progress toward relaxation of tensions 
and toward an era of negotiation rather than con- 
frontation. They welcomed the new opportunities 
for increasing participation by all interested states 

Department of State Bulletin 

in the resolution, by negotiation, of controversial 
pro^blems for the further improvement of interna- 
tional relations. 

They expressed their satisfaction with the agree- 
ment concerning the reestablishment of peace in 
Vietnam and their hope that it will be implemented 
to contribute to peace and stability in Indochina. 

They expressed their concern with the recent out- 
break of the conflict in the Middle East and empha- 
sized the importance they attach to current efforts 
to achieve a just and lasting peace. They expressed 
themselves in favor of the settlement of the con- 
flict by peaceful means in the spirit and on the basis 
of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 
1967. They stressed the need to proceed without 
delay to the negotiations called for by the Security 
Council Resolution of October 22, 1973 and to the 
convocation of the peace conference. 


The two Presidents expressed their conviction that 
the continued development of friendly relations be- 
tween the United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania, based on equality, mutual re- 
spect and due consideration for their respective in- 
terests, serves the cause of international peace and 

Stressing the value of personal contacts, they re- 
affirmed their commitment to deepen and expand 
relations between the two countries by consultations 
at various levels as well as through normaj diplo- 
matic channels. 

Washington, December 5, 1973 

Richard Nixon Nicolae Ceausescu 

President of the United President of the Council 
States of America of State of the Socialist 

Republic of Romania 


Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and 
Technological Cooperation Between the 
United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania, December 5, 1973 

On the occasion of his official visit in the United 
States of America the President of the State Council 
of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceau- 
sescu held talks with the President of the United 
States of America, Richard Nixon, on December 4 
and 5, 1973, with regard to the development of eco- 
nomic relations between Romania and the United 

Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, George 
Shultz, the Secretary of the Treasury, Frederick 

Dent, the Secretary of Commerce and other officials 
on the American side; and Manea Manescu, Vice 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman 
of the State Planning Committee, George Macovescu, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasile Pungan, 
Counsellor to the President and other Romanian 
officials also participated in discussions. 

The two Presidents have emphasized the favor- 
able development of economic relations between their 
two countries and they expressed their determina- 
tion to promote and expand economic, industrial and 
technological cooperation on the basis of respect for 
sovereignty, independence, non-interference in do- 
mestic affairs, juridical equality, mutual advantage, 
and refraining from the threat or use of force. 

President Nixon and President Ceausescu ex- 
pressed their satisfaction with the remarkable rate 
of growth in United States-Romanian trade, which 
has increased more than fourfold since President 
Nixon's visit to Bucharest in 1969. 

Both Presidents noted particularly the rapid 
growth in Romania's exports to the United States, 
due to the major efforts that Romania has made to 
promote its exports to the United States. 

It was anticipated that the trade will continue to 
grow at the same pace or better during 1974 and the 
following years. The two Presidents stressed that 
the two countries have taken several actions to en- 
courage and facilitate this growth in trade. 

The two Presidents noted the importance of the 
meetings and talks to be held by President Ceausescu 
with American business leaders aimed at finalizing 
agreements and understandings and generating new 
interest in doing business with Romania. 

The Presidents noted that, in recognition of Ro- 
mania's status as a developing country, the United 
States Overseas Private Investment Corporation is 
now prepared to assist in insuring and financing 
United States investments in Romania. 

The two Presidents noted that, since November 
1971, when President Nixon determined that United 
States exports to Romania should be eligible for 
United States Export-Import Bank credits and guar- 
antees, these credits and guarantees have effectively 
contributed to the expansion of trade. Private United 
States banks have also facilitated this expansion. 

The two Presidents have noted the importance of 
both countries' participation in the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade and the importance of the 
provisions and principles of this Agfreement for their 
respective economic policies. 

President Nixon reaffirmed his commitment to seek 
authority to provide most-favored-nation tariff 
treatment for Romania in recognition of the impor- 
tance of this reciprocal principle as a factor in inter- 
national relations and in the development and diversi- 
fication of economic relations between the two coun- 

The two Presidents further noted that Romania's 

January 7, 1974 

accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and to membership in the International Mone- 
tary Fund and to the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development were positive steps in 
broadening its world-wide economic and financial 
relations, and have created favorable conditions for 
collaboration between representatives of both coun- 
tries within the framework of these international 
organizations, with a view to developing their eco- 
nomic cooperation. 

The two Presidents welcomed the conclusion on the 
occasion of the visit of the Agreement between the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the 
Socialist Republic of Romania Chamber of Com- 
merce on setting up the Romanian-U.S. Economic 
Council, the Convention with respect to Taxes on 
Income and Property, the Agreement relating to 
Civil Air Transport and the Agreement regarding 
Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle At- 
lantic Ocean as well as specific conventions and 
understandings among Romanian enterprises and eco- 
nomic organizations and American firms with regard 
to economic, industrial and technological collabora- 
tion and cooperation in the fields of machine-building, 
electronics, chemicals and petrochemicals and other 
fields of mutual interest. 

They also noted that discussions regarding Ameri- 
can bondholder claims have been resumed. 

In order to further the development of economic 
relations between the United States and Romania, 
the two Presidents approved the following guide- 

1. The two Governments will facilitate, as appro- 
priate, cooperation between interested firms, com- 
panies and economic organizations of the two coun- 
tries with a view to the realization of joint projects, 
including joint manufacturing and marketing ven- 
tures, in the fields of industry, commerce, agricul- 
ture and natural resources, and other fields of mu- 
tual interest. 

Areas of particular interest for such cooperation 
include machine-building, electronic and electrical 
industries, energy, metallurgy, mining and petroleum, 
chemicals and petrochemicals, light industry, foods, 
telecommunications, building materials, agriculture, 
and tourism. 

2. Commercial and economic cooperation transac- 
tions will be effected on the basis of contractual ar- 
rangements between firms, companies and economic 
organizations of the two countries, and in accord- 
ance with the laws and regulations in force in both 
countries. Such contracts will generally be concluded 
on terms customary in international practice. 

Such contracts and arrangements may encompass 
such matters as: 

— construction of new industrial facilities, as well 
as the expansion and modernization of existing 

— joint manufacturing and marketing by means of 
joint ventures or otherwise; 

— licensing or patents and exchanges of economic 
and technical information on products, designs 
and technology, subject to the laws and regula- 
tions in effect in the two countries, including 
laws relating to transshipment and reexporta- 

— training and exchange of specialists and train- 

— establishment of banks and banking agencies in 
the two countries; 

— joint cooperative projects in third countries. 

Such contracts may provide for sharing and trans- 
fer of benefits, rights of participation in the manage- 
ment of the joint enterprises, procedures for dissolu- 
tion of the joint enterprise, and return and repatria- 
tion of capital on mutually agreeable terms. 

3. In their economic relations and in applying their 
policies within the framework of their laws and 
regulations, the two countries will take full account 
of the respective level of their economic development 
as well as the characteristics of the two economies. 
In this respect, it is noted that Romania, as a devel- 
oping country, could be eligible for treatment ac- 
corded to developing countries. 

4. Currency payments between firms, companies 
and economic organizations of the two countries will 
be made in United States dollars or any other freely 
convertible currency mutually agreed upon; other 
forms of payment may be agreed upon. 

5. Except for a public purpose, assets belonging 
to nationals, companies and economic organizations 
of one of the two countries will not be expropriated 
by the other country, nor will they be expropriated 
without the payment of prompt, adequate and effec- 
tive compensation. 

6. To the extent permitted by the laws and inter- 
national obligations of the two countries, equipment 
and materials imported temporarily into a country 
for purposes of contracts concluded between firms, 
companies and economic organizations of the two 
countries, will be exempt from customs duties, other 
taxes and any restrictions pertaining to importation. 
With a view to the development of economic coop- 
eration, both sides will examine ways and means for 
the application of further customs and fiscal facili- 
tation for goods assigned to, and resulting from co- 
operation projects within the provisions of customs 
legislation in force in the two countries. 

7. Each country will provide nationals, firms, com- 
panies and economic organizations of the other 
country protection of inventions, trademarks and 
trade names in accordance with the provisions of 
international agreements in the field to which the 
two countries are parties. 

8. Each country will accord firms, companies and 
economic organizations of the other nondiscrimina- 
tory treatment as regards payment, remittances and 


Department of State Bulletin 

transfers of funds or financial instruments, in ac- 
cordance with arrangements to be worked out be- 
tween the two countries. 

9. Each country will facilitate the entry and travel 
of official representatives, experts, advisors and tech- 
nicians of the other country employed in connection 
with commercial and economic cooperation transac- 
tions between their firms, companies and economic 
organizations, and of members of their immediate 

10. Each country will facilitate participation of 
their nationals, companies and economic organiza- 
tions in fairs and exhibitions, organized in the other 

11. Both countries will facilitate the exchange of 
economic, commercial and technical information in 
fields of mutual interest, including information con- 
cerning trade in major agricultural commodities, 
among institutions, enterprises and economic orga- 

12. Both countries reaffirm their desire promptly 
and equitably to settle on an amicable basis com- 
mercial disputes which may arise. Commercial con- 
tracts should include provisions concerning arbitra- 
tion of disputes resulting from commercial transac- 

Such understandings will stipulate that the arbi- 
tration be effected in accordance with the regulations 
of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris 
and will designate as place for arbitration a city 
in a country other than the United States or Ro- 
mania which is a party to the 1958 Convention on 
recognition and application of foreign arbitration 
decisions, or any other modality agreed upon in the 
terms of the contract. 

13. With the view of broadening and supporting 
economic relations between the two countries, it was 
agreed to establish a joint Romanian-American Eco- 
nomic Commission which will meet annually, alterna- 
tively in Bucharest and Washington. 

The Commission will consider questions and prob- 
lems relating to the reciprocal establishment of busi- 
ness facilities to promote economic cooperation, as 
well as any other matters arising in the course of 
their economic, industrial and technological coopera- 

The Commission will also facilitate as appropriate 
the establishment of joint consultative groups be- 
tween representatives of firms, companies and eco- 
nomic organizations of the two countries on matters 
of particular interest. 


At the invitation of Presiaent Richard Nixon and 
Mrs. Nixon, the President of the State Council of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania Nicolae Ceausescu and 
Mrs. Ceausescu paid an official visit to the United 

States of America, between December 4-7, 1973. They 
also visited Wilmington, N.C., Cleveland, Hartford, 
and New York. 

During his stay in Washington, President Ceau- 
sescu conducted talks with President Nixon on the 
development of US-Romanian relations as well as 
a number of international issues. The talks pro- 
ceeded in a cordial atmosphere of mutual esteem and 

Noting with deep satisfaction the fact that the 
relations between the United States and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania have been developing positively 
in many fields in the past years, the two Presidents 
concurrently expressed their interest in further ex- 
panding and diversifying US-Romanian cooperation. 

With the view to deepening and further develop- 
ing the relations between the United States and 
Romania and strengthening their contributions to the 
cause of peace and international security. President 
Nixon and President Ceausescu signed the Joint 
Statement of December 5, 1973 containing the princi- 
ples on which the relations between their two na- 
tions are based. 

The two Presidents also agreed that concrete steps 
would be taken in order to give a new impetus to 
economic cooperation. Fo'* this purpose, they adopted 
a Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Tech- 
nological Cooperation. 

On the occasion of the visit, the following bilateral 
agreements were signed: a Convention with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and Property, a Civil Air Trans- 
port Agreement, and an Agreement Regarding Fish- 
eries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Ro- 
manian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, at the 
same time, agreed to establish a Joint US-Romanian 
Economic Council to consider problems of business 
facilitation in an effort to broaden and support eco- 
nomic relations between the two countries. 

The two Presidents welcomed the continuing ex- 
pansion of cultural and scientific relations between 
the two countries. 

Their talks included useful and cordial exchanges 
of view on international issues including those relat- 
ing to Europe, the Middle East, South East Asia and 
cooperation in the United Nations. 

The two Presidents expressed satisfaction with the 
results of their talks and agrreed to continue the 
bilateral dialogue both through the usual diplomatic 
channels and by meetings at all levels. 

President and Mrs. Ceausescu expressed their 
cordial thanks to President and Mrs. Nixon for the 
friendly reception and hospitality extended to them 
during the visit, regarding it as an expression of the 
friendship and mutual esteem existing between the 
Romanian and American peoples. 

President Ceausescu invited President and Mrs. 
Nixon for an official visit to Romania. The invitation 
was accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place 
at a mutually agreeable future date. 

January 7, 1974 


U.S. and India Initial Agreement 
on U.S. Holdings of Indian Rupees 

Following is a statement issued by the 
U.S. Embassy at New Delhi on December 13. 

The Government of India and the Govern- 
ment of the United States today initialed an 
agreement providing for the disposition of 
U.S. holdings of Indian rupees accumulated 
as a result of U.S. economic assistance pro- 
grams to India over the last 20 years. Mr. 
M. G. Kaul, Secretary, Department of Eco- 
nomic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, initialed 
for the Government of India, and Ambassa- 
dor Daniel P. Moynihan initialed for the 
United States. 

Under the terms of the agreement the 
United States would grant 16.6 billion rupees 
(about $2.2 billion equivalent) to the mu- 
tually agreed-upon projects and programs 
during the period of India's fifth five-year 
plan. The United States would retain 8 bil- 
lion rupees (about $1.1 billion equivalent) 
to finance future U.S. Government expendi- 

Before the agreement may be signed and 
come into effect, it must lie for review before 
appropriate committees of the U.S. Congress 
for a period of time and also be finally ap- 
proved by the Government of India. 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day 
and Week 


Among the principles undergirding our Declara- 
tion of Independence in 1776 was the fundamental 
conviction that all men are endowed with certain 
inalienable rights and that the purpose of instituting 
governments is to secure these rights. The first Con- 
gress acted quickly to secure the basic rights of the 
American people by proposing ten amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States. These amend- 
ments, our Bill of Rights, came into effect one hun- 

• No. 4256; 38 Fed. Reg. 34101. 

dred eighty-two years ago, on December 15, 1791, and 
have served ever since as guiding ideals of our 
democracy. Each generation of Americans has con- 
tributed in its own way to realizing the promise 
of the Bill of Rights, ensuring its responsiveness to 
the increasingly complex conditions of American 

The continuing vitality of that promise depends 
upon our own steadfast dedication to the principles 
upon which this Republic was founded. Now, in this 
decade of our Bicentennial, it is especially appropri- 
ate for us to commemorate the anniversary of the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights and to recall with 
pride the efforts of our predecessors to make its 
ideals a true guarantee of the rights of all Amer- 

It is fitting that we take note at the same time of 
the progress made by the world community in its 
recognition of the rights of all members of the 
human family. This week marks the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted by the United Nations General As- 
sembly on December 10, 1948, to proclaim standards 
of freedom and equality common to all nations and 
all peoples. Though widely separated by time and 
authorship, the Bill of Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights share a common com- 
mitment to the ideals of equality, dignity, and indi- 
vidual worth. 

Our actions as Americans to strengthen the Bill of 
Rights are inseparable from our commitment to the 
ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The strength and success of our efforts to advance 
these goals here at home will have a positive impact 
on the cause of human rights throughout the world. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
December 10, 1973, as Human Rights Day and De- 
cember 15, 1973, as Bill of Rights Day. I call upon 
the people of the United States to observe the week 
beginning December 10, 1973, as Human Rights 
Week. Let us make this obser\'ance a time for reaf- 
firming the high principles of the Bill of Rights and 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
for making them a living reality in the daily lives 
of every American. For each of us, through our own 
example, can do a great deal to strengthen the cause 
of liberty and justice for all. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this seventh day of December, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-eighth. 



Department of State Bulletin 


U.N. Observes 25th Anniversary of Human Rights Declaration 

Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly on October 17 
by Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., Deputy Perma- 
nent Representative on the Economic and 
Social Council, together with the text of a 
resolution adopted by the committee on Oc- 
tober 19 and by the Assembly on November 2. 


USUN press release 94 dated October 17 

Twenty-five years ago when the Third 
Committee was meeting to prepare the draft 
of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the U.S. Government representative 
stated that this declaration was necessary to 
provide a basis for measuring performance 
of member states in carrying out the charter 
pledge to achieve respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 

The role that constitutions and laws play 
in the reordering of society changes with the 
passage of time. Frequently the original pur- 
pose or scope may become distorted or re- 
stricted, and the reality falls far short of 
the aspirations of the original draftsmen and 
legislators. Mr. Chairman, I think it in- 
structive on this occasion to look back 25 
years to the debates that were then taking 
place in the Palais de Chaillot and to read 
what the authors of the universal declaration 
said about the work on which they were then 

Rene Cassin, the delegate of France, 
placed the work of the committee in its his- 
torical perspective. Speaking in the great 
tradition of French liberalism, he said, "the 
Declaration of Human Rights is needed as a 
protest, the protest of humanity against the 
oppression and atrocities which so many 

millions have suffered throughout the ages in 
the past and more than ever in the 20th cen- 
tury during two major European wars and 
throughout the intervening period." Looking 
to the future, he said "the practical applica- 
tions of basic human rights must be the sine 
qua non condition of true and lasting peace." 
He saw the declaration as a common meeting 
ground for different ideologies, a concept 
expressed here only yesterday in the con- 
structive and thoughtful statement of Am- 
bassador Rydbeck of Sweden. 

The United Nations 25 years ago was re- 
stricted in membership, but the Third Com- 
mittee was careful in its draft to produce a 
comprehensive document, the first to define 
from a truly universal standpoint basic 
rights and fundamental freedoms to which all 
men everywhere are entitled. His Excellency 
Carlos Romulo, now the distinguished For- 
eign Minister of the Philippines, knew that 
the declaration had implications that tran- 
scended both time and circumstances. For 
him and many others its enduring signifi- 
cance lay in the fact that the declaration 
projects one's vision beyond the present to 
goals which are desirable for all men every- 
where, not only now but also in the future. 
"The declaration," he stated, "foreshadows 
certain high and noble ends which although 
not yet fully realized in many places in the 
world repi'esent the desire for progress and 
unending aspiration of the human spirit." 

Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States 
agreed and described the declaration as a 
common standard of achievement for all peo- 
ples of all nations. "The General Assembly," 
she said, "stands at the threshold of a great 
event both in the life of the United Nations 
and in the life of mankind. Behind the 
declaration lies man's desire for peace and 
this final text must be taken as a testimony 

January 7, 1974 


of common aspiration to lift men everywhere 
to a higiier standard of life and greater en- 
joyment of freedom." Mrs. Roosevelt saw 
with clarity the spiritual fact that the indi- 
vidual man must have freedom in which to 
develop his full stature and that the achieve- 
ment of many individuals would raise the 
level of human dignity. In her words, "the 
adoption of the declaration is indeed a great 
step forward but it is also a time to rededi- 
cate one's efforts to the unfinished tasks 
which lie ahead." 

Mr. Chairman, I must refer to one other 
statement made during this historic debate. 
Then, as now, the Third Committee was 
guided by a representative of Lebanon, Mr. 
Charles Malik. After having led the Third 
Committee through 85 meetings of discussion 
in an effort to arrive at the final text, Mr. 
Malik was perhaps in a better position than 
anyone else to explain the importance of the 
declaration for humanity and the individual 
human being. He explained that for the first 
time the principles of human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms were spelled out authori- 
tatively and in precise detail. Finally, it had 
become clear to him what his government 
had pledged itself to promote, achieve, and 
observe when it signed the Charter of the 
U.N. Now as an individual he felt that with 
the declaration as a constant guide he could 
work to have his government fulfill its pledge 
because the declaration could serve as a 
potent critic of existing conditions and a 
catalyst to help transform reality. 

In concluding his remarks Mr. Malik made 
a personal commitment which should con- 
tinue to guide us. He said, and I quote, 
"What we are, therefore, launching forth 
tonight is a document of the first order of 
importance. It can never be said, from now 
on, that the conscience of organized, respon- 
sible humanity has left ambiguous what in- 
herently belongs to my own humanity. If I 
fail to take full advantage of this responsible 
proclamation, it will be my fault." 

Twenty-five years later the world has 
changed in many ways, but the importance of 
this document has been confirmed by inter- 
vening events and its universality is now 
recognized in principle although, regrettably. 

its provisions are not universally applied in 

Seventy-seven countries have joined the 
U.N. in the last 25 years, and no part of this 
world has escaped the shock waves generated 
by the aspirations of all for freedom and 
equality. With the withdrawal of the former 
metropolitan powers, the newly independent 
governments now have the responsibility for 
assuring the enjoyment of human rights by 
their own people. Many countries have 
adopted sections of the declaration in their 
constitutions. The movement to greater free- 
dom and equality has indeed been the most 
characteristic social force of the last quarter 

While the world has praised and sometimes 
implemented the ideals contained in the dec- 
laration, we are still too far from a world in 
which human rights are everywhere observed 
by individuals and protected by governments. 
Serious violations remain all too prevalent, 
even in countries whose governments pay ful- 
some tribute to the ideals of the universal 
declaration. It is the responsibility of the 
governments here assembled each to renew 
their dedication to the achievement of all of 
the goals set forth in the declaration. 

The United States has historically at- 
tached the greatest importance to the mainte- 
nance and expansion of civil and political 
rights, but at no time more than in the past 
25 years. The declaration played an impor- 
tant part in creating the environment that 
made possible the subsequent success of the 
civil rights struggle in my own country. I 
would add that the United States attaches 
equal importance to the achievement of the 
goals of economic and social rights as con- 
tained in the declaration. 

In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like 
to refer to one of the many areas in which 
practice falls conspicuously short of the 
ideals of the universal declaration. Twenty- 
five years ago the members of this committee 
sought to achieve, among other goals, the 
elimination of racism and racial discrimina- 
tion. Unfortunately, the passage of a quarter 
of a century has been insufficient to eliminate 
this deep-rooted evil from the world. It is 
therefore appropriate that this committee 


Department of State Bulletin 

has decided to launch the Decade to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination on De- 
cember 10, 1973, the anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

Twenty-five yea'-s have proved again and 
again the truth of Rene Cassin's observation 
— the world cannot live in peace as long as 
human rights are flagrantly violated. To 
achieve peace both within national borders 
and among nations, governments must not 
only pay lipservice to the universal declara- 
tion, they must live by its provisions. 


The Genera! Assembly, 

Recalling that in its resolution 2860 (XXVI) of 
20 December 1971 it expressed its conviction of the 
historic significance and enduring value of the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations and its desire to mark, in 1973, the twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the Declaration in a manner 
which would fit the occasion and serve the cause of 
human rights, 

Also recalling that in its resolution 2906 (XXVII) 
of 19 October 1972, it reaffirmed its adherence to the 
principles, values and ideals contained in the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights, and approved a 
programme of suitable activities which could be 
undertaken in observance of the twenty-fifth anni- 
versary of the Declaration, 

Recalling its resolution 2919 (XXVII) of 15 No- 

' U.N. doc. A/RES/3060 (XXVIII); adopted by the 
Assembly without objection on Nov. 2. On Dec. 10 
the General Assembly held a special meeting to com- 
memorate the 25th anniversary of the declaration, in 
the course of which U.N. Human Rights Prizes were 

vember 1972 in which it decided to launch the Decade 
for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimina- 
tion and to inaugurate the activities thereof on 10 
December 1973, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 

Regretting that there are still many objectives of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
have not yet been implemented and urging renewed 
commitment by all peoples and all nations towards 
achieving this end. 

Having examined the progress report submitted by 
the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 
2906 (XXVII), 

Noting with satisfaction the measures and activi- 
ties undertaken or contemplated in connexion with 
the programme for the observance of the twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 

1. Urges Governments, the specialized agencies 
and other intergovernmental organizations, and non- 
governmental organizations in consultative status 
with the Economic and Social Council, to rededicate 
themselves during and after the observance of the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights to adopting further measures 
designed to serve the cause of human rights and the 
implementation of the Declaration; 

2. Invites States which have not yet done so to 
ratify the international instruments concluded in the 
field of human rights, in particular the following: 

(a) International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 

(6) International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Optional Protocol; 

(c) International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; 

3. Urges the world community to celebrate the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights in such a way as to contribute 
in a significant manner to the realization of the prin- 
ciples, values and ideals contained in the Declaration 
for the benefit of all mankind. 

January 7, 1974 


Calendar of International Conferences ^ 

Scheduled January Through March 

ECAFE Committee on Trade: 17th Session 

U.N. ECOSOC: Organizational Meetings of 56th Session 

IMCO Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites 

ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee . . ... 

OECD Executive Committee 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination .... 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women: 25th Session . 

UNDP Governing Council: 17th Session 

OECD Trade Committee Group on Preferences 

ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee 

WHO Executive Board: 53d Session 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Legal Protection of Computer Pro- 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Citrus . Fruits 

IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment: 11th Session . 

IMCO Legal Committee: 21st Session 

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of the African Member States 
Responsible for the Application of Science and Technology. 

ICAO Panel on .Application of Space Techniques Relating to Aviation 


Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture . . . 

NATO Allied Radio Frequency Agency: 6th Joint Civil-Military 

OECD Working Group on Listing of Securities 

ECE Inland Transport Committee 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 

Inter-American Permanent Executive Committee of the Council for 
Education, Science and Culture: 7th Meeting. 

ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources 

ICAO Aircraft Accident Data Reporting Panel: 2d Meeting . . . 

ITU/CCIR Study Groups 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee 

ICES/FAO/IOC Coordination Group for the Cooperative Investiga- 
tions of the Northern Part of Eastern Central Atlantic: 3d Joint 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Working Group on 
Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels: 15th Session . . 

ICAO North Atlantic Ocean System Planning Group 

WMO/ICAO Joint Financing Conference 

OECD Trade Committee 


New York . 
London . 

Paris . . 

New York . 

New York . 

New York . 

Paris . . 

Geneva . . 

Geneva . . 


London . . 

London . . 

Dakar . . 

Geneva . . 
Santo Domingo 

Paris . . 
Geneva . . 
Paris . . 

Geneva . 

New York 




Jan. 10-11 

Jan. 10-11 

Jan. 14-15 

Jan. 14-Feb. 1 

Jan. 15-16 

Jan. 15-22 

Jan. 15-25 

Jan. 15-25 

Jan. 17-19 

Jan. 21-25 

Jan. 21-25 

Jan. 21-30 

Jan. 21-Feb. 1 
Jan. 22-25 
Jan. 26-Feb. 1 
Jan. 28-30 

Jan. 28 

Jan. 28-Feb. 1 
Jan. 29-Feb. 1 

Feb. 1-11 
Feb. 4-15 
Feb. 5-Mar. 20 
Feb. 11 
Feb. 11-15 

Feb. 11-Mar. 1 

Feb. 17-Mar. 1 
Feb. 18-22 
Feb. 18-25 
Feb. 18-Mar. 1 
Feb. 19-20 

'This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 11, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period January-March 
1974. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; ECAFE, 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic 
and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, 
International Civil Aviation Organization; ICES, International Council for the Exploration of the Sea; ICRC, 
International Committee of the Red Cross; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; 
IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Pro- 
gram; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Or- 
ganization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 


Department of State Bulletin 

ICRC Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts. 

IMCO Ad Hoc Working Group on Revision of Safety of Life at Sea: 
2d Session. 

UNESCO Meeting on the Implementation of the Recommendations 
of the Conference of Asian Ministers of Education. 

UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for the Tsunami 
Warning System in the Pacific. 

UNCTAD/FAO Meeting on Tea 

U.N. Environment Program Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Environmental Programs. 

Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 9th Annual Meeting 

IMCO Marine Environment Protection Committee: 1st Session 

IMCO Subcommittee on Lifesaving Appliances: 7th Session . 

U.N. Environment Program Governing Council: 2d Session . 

IMCO Legal Committee: 22d Session 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: .'^Oth Session 

ECE Symposium on Application of Automation and Computer Tech- 
niques for Planning and Management of River Basins. 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Plenary Session . 

UNESCO/IOC Working Group on Training, Education and Mutual 
Assistance: 2d Session. 

WIPO Joint Ad Hoc Committee on the International Patent Classi- 
fication, Strasbourg Agreement. 

OECD Oil Committee High-Level Group 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Science and Technology for Develop- 
ment: 2d Session. 

Geneva Feb. 20-Mar. 29 

London Feb. 25-Mar. 1 

Manila February 

Wellington . . . February 

Rome February 

Nairobi February 

Brasilia .... February 

London Mar. 4-8 

London Mar. 11-15 

Nairobi Mar. 11-22 

London Mar. 18-22 

London Mar. 25-29 

Washington . . . Mar. 26-Apr. 4 

Colombo . . . 

. Mar. 27-Apr 
. March 


. March 

Paris .... 
New York . . . 

. March 
. March 

United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed beloiv) may be consxdted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica- 
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of the 
United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017. 

Security Council 

Progress Report of the Secretary General on the 
United Nations Emergency Force. S/11056. Oc- 
tober 28, 1973. 3 pp. 

Report of the Secretary General on the status of the 
cease-fire observation operations in the Middle 
East. S/11057. October 29, 1973. 4 pp. 

Report by the Secretary General on the United Na- 
tions operation in Cyprus, for the period June 1- 
December 1, 1973. S/11137. December 1, 1973. 27 

General Assembly 

International Law Commission. Most-favoured-na- 
tion clause. Digest of decisions of national courts 
relating to the most-favoured-nation clause, pre- 
pared by the Secretariat. A/CN.4/269. March 29, 
1973. 93 pp. 

Report of the International i^aw Commission on the 
work of its 25th session. May 7-July 13, 1973. 
A/9010. July 23, 1973. 198 pp. 

Report of the Conference of the Committee on Dis- 
armament on its deliberations for the period Feb- 
ruary 20-August 30, 1973. A/9141. September 7, 
1973. 280 pp. 

Cooperation between the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity. Report of the Sec- 
retary General. A/91fi2. September 26, 1973. 

Respect for human rights in armed conflicts. Exist- 
ing rules of international law concerning the pro- 
hibition or restriction of use of specific weapons. 
Survey prepared by the Secretariat. A/9215. No- 
vember 7, 1973. VoL I, 210 pp. Vol. II, 88 pp. 

Letter from the Permanent Representative of 
Algeria transmitting documents of the Fourth Con- 
ference of Heads of State or Government of Non- 
Aligned Countries, held at Algiers September 5-9, 
1973. A/9330. November 22, 1973. 100 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Report of the Governing Council of the United Na- 
tions Development Program on its 16th session, 
June 6-29, 1973. E/5365. July 3, 1973. 82 pp. 
Institutional arrangements for the implementation 
of special measures in favour of the least devel- 
oped among the developing countries, including the 
need for the creation of a special fund for these 
countries. Note by the Secretary General. E/5416. 
September 14, 1973. 
Population Commission: 

World Population Conference, 1974. Substantive 
preparations for the conference. Progress re- 
port of the Secretary General of the conference. 
E/CN.9/281. September 24, 1973. 13 pp. 

January 7, 1974 



balance in the bilateral exchange of benefits 
and to permit both sides to reevaluate this 
exchange after a period of operations by the 
airlines of the two countries. 

U.S. and Romania Sign Agreements 
on Aviation, Fisheries, and Taxes 


The Department of State announced on De- 
cember 4 (press release 436) that the United 
States and the Socialist Republic of Romania 
on that day signed at Washington a bilateral 
air transport agreement. Secretary Kissinger 
signed for the U.S. Government and George 
Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
signed for the Government of Romania. At 
the same time, formal letters were exchanged 
incorporating certain understandings re- 
garding implementation of the agreement. 
(For texts of the agreement and the ex- 
change of letters, see press release 436.) 

The new bilateral agreement will provide 
the formal framework for the continuation, 
and possible future expansion, of Pan Amer- 
ican World Airways operations to Bucharest 
and the inauguration of service to the United 
States by the Romanian national airline, 
TAROM. Pan American has been serving 
the Romanian capital since April 1971 on the 
basis of a unilateral permit issued by the 
Government of Romania, while TAROM 
plans to begin .scheduled service to New York 
during 1974 with the new Boeing 707 air- 
craft it has recently purchased. 

Under the new agreement, U.S. designated 
airlines will be authorized to serve Bucharest 
(and beyond Romania to points in the Near 
East and beyond) via various intermediate 
points in Europe, while Romanian desig- 
nated airlines will be able to operate to New 
York via intermediate stops at several Euro- 
pean points and Montreal. The letters ex- 
changed set forth the actual commercial op- 
portunities to be enjoyed by the airlines of 
both sides under the agreement. The ar- 
rangements agreed to in these letters are 
designed to maintain a reasonable overall 


The Department of State announced on 
December 4 (press release 437) that the 
United States and the Socialist Republic of 
Romania on that day signed at Washington 
a bilateral agreement regarding fisheries in 
the western region of the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean. (For text of the agreement, see press 
release 437.) Secretary Kissinger signed for 
the U.S. Government and George Macovescu, 
Minister of Foreign Aff'airs, signed for the 
Government of Romania. 

The new agreement emphasizes the need 
to conserve important fishery resources in 
the waters adjacent to the U.S. Atlantic 
coast. The organization and expansion of 
scientific and technical research pertaining 
to species of interest, the exchange of rele- 
vant scientific data, and the facilitation of 
joint scientific meetings are provided for. 

Under the agreement, terms are estab- 
lished for Romanian fishing vessels to call 
at the ports of Baltimore, New York, and 
Philadelphia to replenish provisions, obtain 
necessary repairs, and provide for crew rest. 
Romanian fi.shing vessels are permitted to 
exchange their entire crews once each year 
in the port of New York. Within two areas 
of the nine-mile fishery zone contiguous to 
the territorial sea of the United States, Ro- 
manian fishing vessels are authorized to con- 
duct loading operations during specified pe- 
riods of the year. Additionally, the U.S. 
Government agreed to facilitate the estab- 
lishment of a Romanian fisheries agent in 
the port of New York. 

The Government of Romania agreed to 
restrict the operations of its fishing vessels 
in several meaningful ways so as to provide 
additional protection for valuable species of 
interest to U.S. fishermen. Romanian fishing 
vessels will refrain from conducting special- 
ized fisheries for certain species, will refrain 
from fishing in two areas adjacent to the At- 


Department of State Bulletin 

lantic coast during extended periods of time, 
and will in certain other areas employ fishing 
gear that is incapable of catching ground 
fish of particular commercial interest to 
American fishermen. Assurances are given 
that Romanian fishing vessels will refrain 
from the intentional catching of lobster and 
will return all lobster caught to the sea. 


Department of the Treasury press release dated December 4 

The Treasury Department announced on 
December 4 the signing of an income tax 
treaty between the United States and the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. The treaty 
was signed on that day at Washington by 
Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz 
and by Vice President of the Council of 
Ministers and President of the State Plan- 
ning Committee of Romania, Manea Manes- 

The tax convention seeks to promote eco- 
nomic and cultural relations between the 
two countries by removing tax barriers to 
the flow of investment and individuals. 

The new treaty is similar to recent U.S. 
tax conventions with European countries. It 
incorporates the same basic principles with 
respect to the taxation of business income, 
personal service income, and income from 
investments and similar provisions for re- 
ciprocal administrative cooperation. It also 
assures nondiscriminatory tax treatment. 
Citizens and permanent establishments of 
residents of one nation may not be subject to 
more burdensome taxation in the other na- 
tion than that nation's own nationals and 

Under the new U.S.-Romania tax treaty, 
each country agrees to reduce its withhold- 
ing taxes on interest and cultural royalties 
derived by residents of the other country to 
not more than 10 percent, except that inter- 
est paid to the other government or on loans 
granted by or guaranteed by a government 
instrumentality will be exempt from tax at 
the source. The maximum rate on industrial 
royalties will be 15 percent. 

In addition, the treaty provides for a re- 

ciprocal withholding rate of not more than 
10 percent on dividends. This maintains the 
present Romanian statutory rate, which in 
combination with their corporate tax on 
mixed corporations (now 30 percent) is 
within the limits of the U.S. foreigiT tax 
credit. Equipment rentals will no longer be 
subject to the Romanian withholding tax of 
20 percent but will be subject to tax only if 
connected with a Romanian office (perma- 
nent establishment). 

The new tax treaty also provides that per- 
formers covered by a specific cultural ex- 
change arrangement will be exempt from 
tax in the host country, while other per- 
formers will be exempt from tax if they 
remain less than three months and earn 
less than $3,000. 

The tax convention is subject to approval 
by the U.S. Senate. It would take effect as 
of January 1, 1974, and would remain in 
force for a minimum of five years. It then 
would continue in force indefinitely unless 
terminated by either nation. 

Current Actions 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, December 17, 


Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 
1928, relating to international expositions, with ap- 
pendix and annex (TIAS 6548). Done at Paris No- 
vember 30, 1972.' 

Ratified by the President: December 18, 1973 (with 


Agreement on the GARP (Global Atmospheric Re- 
search Program) Atlantic Tropical Experiment 
(GATE) between the World Meteorological Orga- 
nization, the Government of the Republic of Sene- 
gal, and other member states of the World Mete- 
orological Organization participating in the ex- 

' Not in force. 

January 7, 1974 


periment. Done at Geneva June 27, 1973. En- 
tered into force June 27, 1973. 
Notification of acceptance : United States, Novem- 
ber 30, 1973 (with understandings). 
Entered into force for the United States: Novem- 
ber 30, 1973. 

North Atlantic Treaty — Status of Forces — Germany 

Agreement to amend the agreement of August 3, 
1959 (TIAS 5351), to supplement the agreement 
between the parties to the North Atlantic treaty 
regarding the status of their forces with respect 
to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Done at Bonn October 21, 1971. 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, December 19, 

Enters into force: January 18, 1974. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Australia, Novepiber 7, 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Spain, November 8, 1973. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London November 26, 1968.' 
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, October 1, 



Agreement regarding the provision of facilities for 
U.S. Air Force aircraft at Plaisance Airfield in 
connection with the Apollo project, with agreed 
minute. Signed at Port Louis September 3, 1968. 
Entered into force September 3, 1968. TIAS 6576. 
Terminated: October 29, 1973. 


Agreement extending the air transport agreement of 
August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS 
4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mexico and Tlatelolco December 5, 1973. Entered 
into force December 5, 1973. 


' Not in force. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Pitblicatioyis may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, B.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discottnt is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below include domestic postage. 

The United States and Japan: Prime Minister Tana- 
ka's Washington Visit, July 31-August 1, 1973, and 
the Tokyo Meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Commit- 
tee on Trade and Economic Affairs, July 16-17, 1973. 

Documentation relating to the above-mentioned meet- 
ings was reprinted from the Department of State 
Bulletin of August 27 and August 13, 1973, respec- 
tively. Pub. 8740. East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Series 210. 23 pp. SO^*. (Cat. No. S1.38:210). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. 

Agreement with Belgium. TIAS 7675. 9 pp. 25(?. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7675). 

Reciprocal Fishing Privileges. Agreement with Can- 
ada. TIAS 7676. 11 pp. 25t (Cat. No. 89.10:7676). 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Sudan. TIAS 
7677. 3 pp. 25t (Cat. No. S9.10:7677). 

Defense — Electrical Substation. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 7680. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the Interna- 
tional Finance Corporation. TIAS 7683. 2 pp. 25«f. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7683). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Thailand 
amending the agreement of March 17, 1972. TIAS 
7685. 9 pp. 25('-. (Cat. No. S9.10:7685). 

Continuance of LInited States Military Rights and 
Maritime Practices in the Bahamas. Agreement with 
the Bahamas. TIAS 7688. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Mexico ex- 
tending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as 
amended and extended. TIAS 7691. 3 pp. 25^. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:7691). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX January 7, 197!, Vol. LXX, No. 1802 

Economic Affairs. U.S. and Romania Si^ 
Agreements on Aviation, Fisheries, and 
Taxes 18 

Human Rights 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and 

Week (proclamation) 12 

U.N. Observes 25th Anniversary of Human 
Rights Declaration (Kitchen, text of resolu- 
tion) 13 

India. U.S. and India Initial Agreement on 

U.S. Holdings of Indian Rupees 12 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences . . 16 

Presidential Documents 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and 

Week (proclamation) 12 

President Ceausescu of Romania Visits the 
United States 1 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 20 


President Ceausescu of Romania Visits the 
United States (Ceausescu, Nixon, joint 
statement of principles, joint statement on 
economic cooperation, joint communique) . 1 

U.S. and Romania Sign Agreements on Avia- 
tion, Fisheries, and Taxes 18 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 19 

U.S. and Romania Sign Agreements on Avia- 
tion, Fisheries, and Taxes 18 

United Nations 

United Nations Documents 17 

U.N. Observes 25th Anniversary of Human 
Rights Declaration (Kitchen, text of resolu- 
tion) 13 

Name Index 

Ceausescu, Nicolae 1 

Kitchen, Robert W., Jr 13 

Nixon, President 1, 12 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 17 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
436 and 437 of December 4. 


Kissinger: departure remarks, 

Tel Aviv. 
U.S. and Haiti sign cotton textile 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Advisory Committee, Jan. 3. 
Advisory Committee on the Law 

of the Sea, Jan. 10-12. 
Kissinger: arrival remarks. Lis- 
bon, Dec. 17. 
Joint U.S.-Portugal communique, 

Dec. 18. 
Joint U.S.-Spain communique, 

Dec. 19. 
Kissinger: message to Foreign 

Minister Lopez Rodo of Spain 

on the death of Prime Minister 

Carrero Blanco. 
"Foreign Relations" volume on 

China for 1948 (for release 

Dec. 28). 
U.N. Liner Shipping Conference 

completes first session. 
Multilateral multifiber textile 

Martin named U.S. coordinator 

for World Food Conference 

McGuire sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Mali (biographic data). 
Kissinger: Middle East Peace 

Conference, Geneva, Dec. 21. 
Kissinger: arrival statement, 

Geneva, Dec. 20. 



















1464 12/21 





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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
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lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 




Volume LXX • No. 1803 • January 14, 1974 

Statements by Secretary Kissingei- 21 



Statements by Congressman Buchanan and Text of Resolution 29 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXX, No. 1803 
January 14, 1974 

Fof sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $29.80. foreign $37.25 

Single copy 60 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

rite Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides ttte public and 
interested agencies of tfie government 
witft information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tlie White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Middle East Peace Conference Opens in Geneva 

Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. dele- 
yation to the opening of the Middle East 
Peace Conference in Geneva December 21- 
22. Following are texts of his statement 
made upon arrival in Geneva on December 
20 and his statement before the conference 
on December 21. 


Press release 470 dated December 22 

I have come to Geneva today, at the behest 
of the President of the United States, in the 
cause of peace. 

The fate of Arabs and Jews has been inex- 
tricably linked throughout their history, ris- 
ing and falling together. In recent centuries 
both had been reduced to an equally cruel 
state — the one dispersed and persecuted 
throughout the world, the other deprived of 
autonomy and freedom in its own former 
empire. But over the past quarter century 
both have stood on the verge of overcoming 
their past, no longer restrained by outside 
forces but by their struggle with one another. 
Thus, in the land of Arabs and Jews, where 
the reality of mistrust and hate so tragically 
contradicts the spiritual message which orig- 
inates there, it is essential for the voice of 
reconciliation to be heard. 

The war that began last October 6, like its 
three predecessors, proved the futility of 
military solutions. There is no acceptable 
alternative to a negotiated settlement of the 
issues so long in dispute and to a determina- 
tion on the part of all the parties who will 
assemble here tomorrow to make these nego- 
tiations succeed. 

For its part, the United States comes here 
with that determination. President Nixon 
has instructed me to engage the influence and 

resources of the United States in a major 
effort to achieve a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East. I shall carry out my in- 
structions with all my heart and all my 

In my meetings with Arab and Israeli 
leaders over the course of the past 10 days I 
found none who wanted the war to continue, 
none who would not recognize that now is the 
time to break the cycle of uneasy truce and 
violent war. 

Upon us and what we do here depend the 
lives and hopes of people, and it is to the 
people we shall have to answer should we 
fail. The Middle East, whose dramatic, 
tragic, and heroic peoples have . produced 
three great faiths, is challenged today to 
another act of faith — that hatred can give 
way to reconciliation; that peace can become 
our purpose, compromise our method, and 
hope our inspiration. 


Press release 469 dated December 22 

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished For- 
eign Ministers, delegates: As one of the co- 
chairmen of this conference, let me express 
my gratitude to the United Nations and to 
you personally for providing such excellent 
facilities for the conference, for convening 
it, and for doing us all the honor of presiding 
at this historic moment. 

We are convened here at a moment of his- 
toric opportunity for the cause of peace in 
the Middle East and for the cause of peace 
in the world. For the first time in a genera- 
tion the peoples of the Middle East are sit- 
ting together to turn their talents to the 
challenge of a lasting peace. 

All of us must have the wisdom to grasp 

January 14, 1974 


this moment — to break the shackles of the 
past and to create at last a new hope for the 

Two months ago what we now refer to as 
the fourth Arab-Israeli war was coming to 
an end. Today there is the respite of an 
imperfect cease-fire, but the shadow of war 
still hangs over the Middle East. Either we 
begin today the process of correcting the con- 
ditions which produced that conflict, or we 
doom untold tens of thousands to travail, 
sorrow, and further inconclusive bloodshed. 

When the history of our era is written, it 
will speak not of a series of Arab-Israeli 
wars but of one war broken by periods of 
uneasy armistices and temporary cease-fires. 
That war has already lasted 25 years. 
Whether future histories will call this the era 
of the 25-year Arab-Israeli war, or the 30- 
year war, or the 50-year war, rests in large 
measure in our hands. And above all, it rests 
in the hands of the Israeli and Arab govern- 
ments, not only those whose distinguished 
representatives are seated around this table 
but also those who are absent and who we 
all hope will join us soon. 

We are challenged by emotions so deeply 
felt — by causes so passionately believed and 
pursued — that the tragic march from cata- 
clysm to cataclysm, each more costly and in- 
decisive than the last, sometimes seems pre- 
ordained. Yet our presence here today, in 
itself a momentous accomplishment, is a 
symbol of rejection of this fatalistic view. 
Respect for the forces of history does not 
mean blind submission to those forces. 

There is an Arab saying, Elli Fat Mat, 
which means that the past is dead. Let us 
resolve here today that we will overcome the 
legacy of hatred and suffering. Let us over- 
come old myths with new hope. Let us make 
the Middle East worthy of the messages of 
hope and reconciliation that have been 
carried forward from its stark soil by three 
great religions. 

Today there is hope for the future, for the 
conflict is no longer looked upon entirely in 
terms of irreconcilable absolutes. The pas- 
sionate ideologies of the past have, in part at 
least, been replaced by a recognition that all 

the peoples concerned have earned, by their 
sacrifice, a long period of peace. 

From two recent trips through the Middle 
East I have the impression that people on 
both sides have had enough of bloodshed. No 
further proof of heroism is necessary; no 
military point remains to be made. The Mid- 
dle East — so often the source of mankind's 
inspiration — is challenged to another act of 
hope and reconciliation, significant not only 
for its own peoples but for all mankind. 

What does each side seek? Both answer 
with a single word: peace. But peace has of 
course a concrete meaning for each. One side 
seeks the recovery of sovereignty and the 
redress of grievances suffered by a displaced 
people. The other seeks security and recogni- 
tion of its legitimacy as a nation. The com- 
mon goal of peace must surely be broad 
enough to embrace all these aspirations. 

For the United States, our objective is 
such a peace. 

I cannot promise success, but I can promise 
dedication. I cannot guarantee a smooth 
journey toward our goal. I can assure you of 
an unswerving quest for justice. 

The United States will make a determined 
and unflagging effort. 

President Nixon has sent me here because 
for five years he has endeavored to build a 
new structure of international peace in 
which ties with old friends are strengthened 
and new and constructive relationships re- 
place distrust and confrontation with adver- 

But world peace remains tenuous and in- 
complete so long as the Middle East is in 
perpetual crisis. Its turmoil is a threat to the 
hopes of all of us in this room. 

It is time to end it. 

The question is not whether there must be 
peace. The question is: How do we achieve 
it? What can we do here to launch new be- 

First, this conference must speak with a 
clear and unequivocal voice: The cease-fire 
called for by the Security Council must be 
scrupulously adhered to by all concerned. 
Prior to last October, the United States did 
all it could to prevent a new outbreak of 


Department of State Bulletin 

fighting. But we failed because frustration 
could no longer be contained. 

After the fighting began, we, in concert 
with the Soviet Union, helped bring an end 
to the hostilities by sponsoring a number of 
resolutions in the Security Council. The six- 
point agreement of November 11 consoli- 
dated the cease-fire. It helped create the 
minimal conditions necessary for carrying 
forward our efforts here. All these resolu- 
tions and agreements must be strictly imple- 

But regardless of these steps, we recog- 
nize that the cease-fire remains fragile and 
tentative. The United States is concerned 
over the evidence of increased military pre- 
paredness in recent days. A renewal of hos- 
tilities would be both foolhardy and danger- 
ous. We urge all concerned to refrain from 
the use of force and to give our efforts here 
the chance they deserve. 

Second, we must understand what can 
realistically be accomplished at any given 

The separation of military forces is cer- 
tainly the most immediate problem. Disen- 
gagement of military forces would help to 
reduce the danger of a new military out- 
break; it would begin the process of building 
confidence between the two sides. 

Based on intensive consultations with the 
leaders of the Middle East, including many 
in this room today, I believe that the first 
work of this conference should be to achieve 
early agreement on the separation of mili- 
tary forces and that such an agreement is 

Serious discussions have already taken 
place between the military representatives of 
Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101. It is 
important to build promptly on the progress 
achieved there. And on the Jordanian and 
Syrian fronts, a comparable base for the 
lessening of tensions and the negotiation of 
further steps toward peace must be found. 
Progress toward peace should include all the 
parties concerned. 

Third, the disengagement of forces is an 
essential first step — a consolidation of the 
cease-fire and a bridge to the "peaceful and 

accepted settlement" called for in Security 
Council Resolution 242. Our final objective is 
the implementation in all its parts of Reso- 
lution 242. This goal has the full support of 
the United States. 

Peace must bring a new relationship 
among the nations of the Middle East — a 
relationship that will not only put an end 
to the state of war which has persisted for 
the last quarter of a century but will also 
permit the peoples of the Middle East to live 
together in harmony and safety. It must re- 
place the reality of mistrust with a new 
reality of promise and hope. It must include 
concrete measures that make war less likely. 

A peace agreement must include these ele- 
ments, among others: withdi'awals, recog- 
nized frontiers, security arrangements, guar- 
antees, a settlement of the legitimate inter- 
ests of the Palestinians, and a recognition 
that Jerusalem contains places considered 
holy by three great religions. 

Peace will require that we relate the im- 
perative of withdrawals to the necessities of 
security, the requirement of guarantees to 
the sovereignty of the parties, the hopes of 
the displaced to the realities now existing. 

Fourth, we believe there must be realistic 
negotiations between the parties. Resolution 
338 provides just such a process. It is on the 
parties that the primary responsibility rests. 
The United States intends to help facilitate 
these talks in every feasible way, to encourage 
moderation and the spirit of accommodation. 
We are prepared to make concrete sugges- 
tions to either side if this will help promote 
practical progress. But we must always re- 
member that while a Middle East settlement 
is in the interest of us all, it is the people of 
the area that must live with the results. It 
must, in the final analysis, be acceptable to 

Peace, in short, cannot last unless it rests 
on the consent of the parties concerned. The 
wisest of realists are those who understand 
the power of a moral consensus. There is a 
measure of safety in power to prevent ag- 
gression, but there is greater security still in 
arrangements considered so just that no one 
wishes to overthrow them. 

January 14, 1974 


As we open this conference we take a mo- 
mentous step. We are challenging a history 
of missed opportunities, of mutual fear and 
bottomless distrust. Our backdrop is a war 
that has brought anguish and pain, death and 
destruction; a war that has been costly to 
both sides; that has brought neither victory 
nor defeat; that reflected the failure of all 
our past efforts at peaceful solutions. 

Mr. Secretary General, fellow delegates, 
President Nixon has sent me here with the 
purpose of affirming America's commitment 
to a just and lasting peace. 

We do not embark on this task with false 
expectations. We do not pretend that there 
are easy answers. A problem that has defied 
solution for a generation does not yield to 
simple remedies. 

In all efforts for peace the overriding 
problem is to relate the sense of individual 
justice to the common good. The great trage- 
dies of history occur not when right con- 
fronts wrong, but when two rights face each 

The problems of the Middle East today 
have such a character. There is justice on 
all sides, but there is a greater justice still in 
finding a truth which merges all aspira- 
tions in the realization of a common human- 
ity. It was a Jewish sage who, speaking for 
all mankind, expressed this problem well: 
"If I am not for myself who is for me, but 
if I am for myself alone who am I?" 

Fellow delegates, in the months ahead we 
will examine many problems. We will dis- 
cuss many expedients. We will know suc- 
cess — and I daresay we shall experience 
deadlock and despair. 

But let us always keep in mind our final 

We can exhaust ourselves in. maneuvers, or 
we can remember that this is the first real 
chance for peace the Middle East has had in 
three decades. 

We can concentrate on our resentments, or 
we can be motivated by the consciousness 
that this opportunity, once past, will not 

We can emphasize the very real causes of 
distrust, or we can remember that if we 
succeed our children will thank us for what 
they have been spared. 

We can make propaganda, or we can try 
to make progress. 

The American attitude is clear. We know 
we are starting on a journey whose outcome 
is uncertain and whose progress will be 
painful. We are conscious that we need wis- 
dom and patience and good will. But we 
know, too, that the agony of three decades 
must be overcome and that somehow we have 
to muster the insight and courage to put an 
end to the conflict between peoples who have 
so often ennobled mankind. 

So we are here to spare no effort in the 
quest of a lasting peace in the Middle East, a 
task which is as worthy as it may be agoniz- 
ing. In the words of the poet: 

"Pain that cannot forget 
falls drop by drop 
upon the heart 
until in our despair 
there comes wisdom 
through the awful 
grace of God." 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Middle East and Europe 

Prior to the opening of the Middle East 
Peace Conference in Geneva, Secretary Kis- 
singer visited Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Israel, Portugal, Spain, and France. 
In Paris he met with Le Due Tho, member of 
the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam. Following are statements made 
by Secretary Kissinger during the trip and 
the texts of communiques issued at the con- 
clusion of his visits to Portugal and Spain. 


Press release 454 dated December 13 

I am very happy to begin my voyage to the 
Middle East in Algeria. President Nixon and 
I have had very useful talks with Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika when 
he was recently in Washington. During a 
difficult period, your Minister spoke to us 
with much passion, realism, and conviction. 
President Nixon told your Minister that 
after the war we will deploy all our efforts to 
bring peace — a peace founded on justice, par- 
ticularly on the application of U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 242. 

I am here in Algiers to work toward the 
realization of that promise. I expect a great 
deal from my conversations with President 
Boumediene, for whom we have much ad- 
miration and who we hope will visit us some- 
day in the United States. 

If my stay is short, my conversations will 
be open and sincere. 


Press release 466 dated December 17 

Our meetings were as conversation among 
friends. The talks were very warm, very 
full, very useful, and very constructive. We 
reached complete agreement about the pro- 
cedures, the terms of reference, of the open- 

ing of the conference. We've been informed 
that if the other parties attend, Israel will 
send a delegation to Geneva. We also agreed 
that the opening phase of the conference 
should deal with the problems of the sepa- 
ration of forces. We had a very full, very 
useful discussion about the problems and 
issues and principles involved in that topic. 

It goes without saying that the United 
States will maintain the closest contact with 
the Government of Israel throughout the ne- 
gotiations, and I look forward personally to 
seeing my friend the Foreign Minister at the 
end of this week in Geneva. It remains for 
me only to thank the Government of Israel, 
especially the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Minister, and all their colleagues, for the ex- 
traordinary courtesy that has been extended 
to us, for the very useful talks that we've 


Press release 460 dated December 20 

The Foreign Minister, ladies and gentle- 
men: It is a great pleasure for me to visit 
Portugal for the first time. The Foreign Min- 
ister spoke correctly about the long ties of 
friendship and the recent history of alliance 
between our two countries, and he was right 
also when he said that Portugal has been a 
good and reliable friend of the United States. 
On this trip through the Middle East, I was 
reminded of the fact that Portugal stood by 
its allies during the recent difficulties, and 
the United States is extremely grateful for 
that. When visiting this country, which is 
known for its navigators who explored the 
world with an act of both physical and moral 
courage, I would like to say that as far as 
the United States is concerned, our journey 
together is not finished. 

I bring greetings from the President to 
the leaders of Portugal. I look forward to 

January 14, 1974 


full and frank and friendly talks, and I know 
that we will leave as even better friends than 
we are today. 

Thank you very much. 


Press release 461 dated December 20 

1. The Secretary of State of the United States of 
America, Dr. Henry Kissinger, made an official visit 
to Lisbon on December 17 and 18 at the invitation of 
the Portuguese Government. 

2. In the course of his visit he was received by the 
President of the Republic and had talks with the 
Prime Minister. In various meetings held at the 
Foreign Ministry, Dr. Henry Kissinger and the 
Foreign Minister, Dr. Rui Patricio, had the oppor- 
tunity to review the more important problems of the 
current international situation. There was a full 
discussion of bilateral United States-Portuguese re- 

3. The talks took place in a markedly friendly 
atmosphere and produced a frank exchange of views. 
There was a large area of agreement with respect to 
the problems of concern to the two countries. 

4. Dr. Kissinger, on behalf of all his associates, 
expressed warm appreciation for the cordiality and 
hospitality with which he was received. 


Press release 462 dated December 20 

1. The Secretary of State of the United States of 
America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, made an official 
visit to Spain on December 18 and 19, at the invi- 
tation of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Don Laureano Lopez Rodo. 

2. During his stay in Madrid, he was received by 
His Excellency the Head of State and by His Royal 
Highness the Prince of Spain. He also held conver- 
sations with the President of the Government, Ad- 
miral Carrero Blanco, and with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Seiior Lopez Rodo. In the Palace of 
Santa Cruz, the seat of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, two working meetings were held, in which 
the following subjects were examined with special 

a. The present state of Atlantic relations. 

b. The conflict in the Middle East. 

c. The situation in the Mediterranean. 

d. The existing energy situation. 

e. Matters relating to the Agreement of Friend- 
ship and Cooperation between Spain and the U.S. of 
6 August 1970. 

3. Secretary Kissinger was entertained by his 

Spanish colleague at a dinner in the Palace of Viana, 
and the Secretary hosted a working luncheon in the 
United States Embassy on December 19. 

4. The talks took place in an atmosphere of the 
greatest cordiality and understanding. Agreement 
was reached in principle to develop a joint U.S.- 
Spanish declaration of principles. Both parties 
agreed that Spain is essential for the security of the 
West and for the maintenance of peace. They agreed 
as well that Spain must participate on a basis of 
equality with the other countries of the Atlantic area 
in the establishment of a just and stable interna- 
tional order. 

5. The Governments of both countries declare 
their intention to continue these close contacts at a 
high level for the purpose of strengthening U.S.- 
Spanish friendship, promoting the resolution of 
problems of common interest, and contributing to 
world peace. 

6. The Secretary of State expressed his gratitude 
for the warm hospitality shown him by the Govern- 
ment of Spain. 

7. The Secretary of State invited Foreign Minister 
Lopez Rodo to visit the United States at a mutually 
convenient time, and this invitation was accepted 
with pleasure. 

U.S. Welcomes Release of American 
Civilian Prisoner in Viet-Nam 

Department Statement ^ 

We are delighted to confirm that Homer 
L. Elm, the American citizen civilian cap- 
tured on October 6 in Ba Xuyen Province, 
South Viet-Nam, was released today near 
Vi Thanh, which is near Can Tho, the capital 
of the delta. He was brought to Can Tho by 
an ICCS [International Commission of Con- 
trol and Supervision] helicopter. Two Viet- 
namese employees captured with Mr. Elm 
were released with him, and all three ap- 
peared to be in reasonable physical condition. 

Needless to say, we are glad Mr. Elm and 
those captured with him have been released, 
and we reaffirm hope that the other Amer- 
ican civilian known to be held in Indochina, 
Mr. Emmet Kay, a pilot for Continental Air 
Services, Inc., who was captured in northern 
Laos on May 7, 1973, will also be released 

' Read to news correspondents on Dec. 19 by Paul 
Hare, Deputy Director, Office of Press Relations. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. Deplores Terrorist Attack 
and Hijacking at Rome Airport 

On December 17 Arab terrorists attacked 
a Pan American World Airways plane at 
Leonardo da Vinci International Airport 
near Rome, killing 30 persons; the terrorists 
then hijacked a Lufthansa German Airlines 
plane, forcing it to fly to Athens, where a 
hostage was slain. On December 18 the plane 
flew to Damascus and then to Kmvait, ivhere 
the remaining hostages were released and 
the hijackers surrendered. Following are 
texts of a statement read to news corre- 
spo7idents on December 17 by Paul Hare, 
Deputy Director, Office of Press Relations, 
and a statement by President Nixon issued 
on December 18. 


We deeply regret the loss of American and 
other lives at the hand of terrorists who as- 
saulted innocent bystanders at Rome airport 

We are in touch with the Italian Govern- 
ment regarding this vicious attack and will 
continue to work closely with the Italians 
following up on this incident. 

We are also maintaining contact with 
other governments involved in the incident, 
which involves hostages of unconfirmed na- 

This new outrage underlines the urgent 
necessity to strengthen civil aviation security 
measures throughout the world. The U.S. 
Government deplores incidents such as this 
at any time, and particularly at a time when 
a peaceful settlement of the Middle East 
question — a factor apparently in the minds 
of the terrorists — is being sought by many 
peace-loving governments and individuals. 


White House press release dated November 18 

The Government and people of the United 
States are appalled by the tragedy which be- 
gan yesterday with the heavy loss of inno- 

cent lives at the Rome airport, a tragedy 
which is not yet ended. Our deep regrets and 
condolences go to the families of the victims 
of all nationalities. 

This new outrage only underlines the ur- 
gent necessity to accelerate improvements in 
international civil aviation security meas- 
ures and to find international agreement on 
prosecution of offenders such as those who 
committed this vicious crime. Terrorists 
must be made to understand that senseless 
violence against innocent bystanders, includ- 
ing helpless women and children in this in- 
stance, will not be tolerated by people and 
governments who wish to live in peace and 
within the law. Governments must resist 
terrorists' demands since appeasement will 
not put an end to this international scourge. 
The U.S. Government will continue to pro- 
vide leadership and all possible assistance in 
this humanitarian endeavor. 

The U.S. Government deplores incidents 
such as this at any time and particularly 
when a peaceful settlement of the Middle 
East question is being sought by many peace- 
loving governments and individuals. The 
perpetrators of such atrocities can only delay 
the day when peace and justice may return to 
the Middle East. 

United Nations Environment Program 
Participation Act of 1973 

Statement by President Nixon ^ 

I am pleased to have signed into law a bill 
authorizing a $40 million voluntary contribu- 
tion by the United States to the United Na- 
tions Environment Fund over the next five 
years. As I first proposed such a contribu- 
tion early last year and it has since been sup- 
ported by both Democrats and Republicans, 
this bill reflects broad agreement on the need 
for international action to halt the continu- 
ing degradation of the global environment. 

The indiscriminate depletion of natural re- 

' Issued on Dec. 17 (White House press release). 
As enacted, the bill (H.R. 6768) is Public Law 93- 
188, approved Dec. 15. 

January 14, 1974 


sources, the pollution of our environment, 
and the problems of sustaining the quality of 
life in urbanizing societies throughout the 
world require that we act as a community of 
nations. The United Nations Environment 
Fund, established by the United Nations 
General Assembly, will be used to coordinate 
and to fill gaps in existing international ac- 
tivities concerned with improving the world 
environment. A good beginning has already 
been made. Since the United Nations Con- 
ference on the Human Environment took 
place in 1972, the United States has been 
most active in developing this new environ- 
mental program and drafting several inter- 
national treaties concerning the conservation 
of the natural and cultural heritage of man- 
kind, protection of endangered species of 
plants and animals, and prevention of the 
contamination of the oceans from shipping 
and offshore disposal of wastes. 

But we need to do much more. We need 
additional knowledge about what the serious 
global problems are and how to cope with 
them; we need to monitor conditions and 
trends of pollutants in the oceans, in the at- 
mosphere, and in terrestrial environments; 
and we need to manage our natural resources 
more effectively. These are the kinds of 
activities that will be supported by the 
United Nations Environment Fund. 

We hold the earth — its environment and 
its resources — in trust for future genera- 
tions. We must not violate that trust, nor our 
obligation to the future, by permitting the 
increasing degradation of the environment. 
I call upon all nations to support the United 
Nations Environment Program and to work 
cooperatively to conserve and enhance the 
world environment so that others may enjoy 
and benefit from it as we have. 

U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific 
Cooperation Meets at Washington 

Jnuit Statement ^ 

The U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scien- 
tific and Technological Cooperation met in 
Washington on December 10-14, 1973. 

The Board reviewed 156 projects in the 
fields of agriculture, energy, ecology, tech- 
nology, health, transportation, and others 
and agreed to finance a large number of them 
from the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Fund estab- 
lished in accordance with the agreement of 
May 18, 1973. The Board noted that the U.S.- 
Yugoslav program had contributed sub.stan- 
tially to the advancement of scientific and 
technological research in such fields as agri- 
culture and the health sciences. 

The United States was represented by Dr. 
Oswald H. Ganley, Director, Soviet and 
Eastern European Scientific and Technical 
Programs Directorate, Bureau of Interna- 
tional Scientific and Technological Affairs, 
Department of State; Mr. David B. Bolen, 
Counselor for Economic Commercial Affairs, 
American Embassy, Belgrade and Mr. Wil- 
liam H. Mills, Scientific Attache, American 
Embassy, Belgrade. 

Yugoslavia was represented by Dr. Edo 
Pirkmajer, the Chairman of the Board and 
President of the Commission for Interna- 
tional Relations of the Inter-Republic Com- 
mittee for Coordination of Scientific and 
Technical Affairs, and Mr. Milos Rajacic, 
Scientific Counselor, Embassy of Yugoslavia, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Board agreed that its ne.xt meeting 
would take place in Belgrade next May. 

'Issued on Dec. 14 (press release 455). 


Department of State Bulletin 


General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Financing 
U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East 

Folloimig are statements by Congressman 
John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Representative 
to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Com- 
mittee V (Administrative and Budgetary) of 
the Assembly on November 21 and 23, to- 
gether with the text of a resolution adopted 
by the committee on November 23 and by the 
Assembly on December 11. 

Statement of November 21 

USUN press release 114 dated November 21 

The question which we are now consider- 
ing, agenda item 109, is one of the most im- 
portant issues before this committee at its 
current session. Late last month the Security 
Council adopted a number of resolutions to 
restore peace in the Middle East, among 
them being two which called for the estab- 
lishment and operationalization of the U.N. 
Emergency Force.' These resolutions marked 
the expeditious response of the Council to an 
urgent situation. Cosponsored by Guinea, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, 
Sudan, and Yugoslavia, Resolution 340 
(1973) established what has become known 
as UNEF; and it is operating under the au- 
thority of the Council itself. That resolution 
inter alia requested the Secretary General 
to "report within 24 hours" on steps taken to 
implement the resolution and requested "all 
Member States to extend their full co-opera- 

^ For U.S. statements and texts of the resolutions 
and the report of the Secretary General (S/11052/ 
Rev. 1), see Bulletin of Nov. \2, 1973, p. 598. 

tion to the United Nations in the implemen- 
tation of the present resolution." 

In subsequently approving the report of 
the Secretary General (S/11052/Rev. 1), the 
Security Council, in Resolution 341 (1973), 
concurred fully in the Secretary General's 
proposal to establish the Force "for an initial 
period of six months"; it also agreed that in 
financing UNEF the "costs of the Force shall 
be considered as expenses of the Organiza- 
tion to be borne by the Members in accord- 
ance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter." Shortly thereafter the Secretary 
General submitted his report on financing 
the Force (A/9285), in which he provided 
detailed cost estimates totaling $30 million 
for a Force of "7,000, all ranks" for a six- 
month period (October 25, 1973-April 24, 
1974). The Secretary General requested the 
General Assembly to authorize him to "enter 
into commitments for this Force at a rate not 
to exceed $5.0 million per month for the 
period 25 April 1974 to 31 October 1974 in- 
clusive, should it be necessary to continue the 
Force beyond the initial period of six 

My delegation believes that the task of this 
committee is to deal only with the financial 
aspects of the U.N. Emergency Force. It is 
not the responsibility of the Fifth Commit- 
tee — nor is it within the competence of this 
committee — to consider other matters which 
have been introduced, directly or indirectly, 
by some delegations, either during their par- 
ticipation in the committee's debate or by 
certain amendments to the 35-power draft 
resolution contained in A/C.5/1130/Rev. 1. 
We must be guided by the Security Council, 
which has exercised its primary responsibil- 

January 14, 1974 


ity for the maintenance of peace, and do our 
best to apportion the costs of the Emergency 
Force. We should not be distracted by con- 
siderations extraneous to the financial con- 
siderations. We must support the Council's 
action in establishing the Force. To do other- 
wise is likely to embroil this committee in an 
extensive debate which would ill serve the 
organization, the member states which we 
i-epresent, and most importantly, the cause of 
peace in the Middle East, to which we ai'e all 

Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like 
to take this oppoi-tunity to commend the 
Security Council for the swiftness with which 
it acted in response to a threat to "inter- 
national peace and security." We would also 
like to commend the Secretary General, who 
has moved rapidly to implement the various 
resolutions of that body. Similarly, we would 
like to express our appreciation to the ACA- 
BQ [Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions] for the dispatch 
with which it has dealt with the Secretary 
General's report on financing UNEF. It is 
important, if we are to contribute further to 
the cause of peace in the Middle East, that 
this committee continue the momentum which 
already has been generated. In saying this, 
my delegation recognizes the added burden 
which has been placed on the Fifth Commit- 
tee; our primary objective nevertheless is to 
facilitate an early decision by this committee 
on the important question now before us. 

Regarding the Secretary General's cost 
estimates contained in annex I to A/9285, my 
delegation fully concurs in the recommenda- 
tions of the ACABQ as contained in its 
report, document A/9314. We note in par- 
ticular the conclusion of the Advisory Com- 
mittee that a "special account" should be es- 
tablished for UNEF, the desirability of in- 
viting voluntary contributions, and the need 
for early payment of assessments once the 
method of financing and the cost estimates 
have been agreed upon. The estimates sub- 
mitted by the Secretary General, based on 
facts now known, are the minimum amount 
required to operate the Force; any efforts to 
reduce these estimates would be an act of 

parsimony which could seriously jeopardize 
the cause of peace. 

My delegation listened with great interest 
to the very provocative, balanced, and infor- 
mative statement by the distinguished Repre- 
sentative of Brazil, Ambassador [David Sil- 
veiro] Da Mota, when he introduced the 
draft resolution contained in A/C.5/L.1130/ 
Rev. 1 on behalf of 34 other delegations. My 
delegation would like to recall for members 
of this committee a point made yesterday by 
the Representative of Australia. He said, and 
I quote: 

Just as Security Council Resolutions 340 and 341 
were achieved only after a process of lengthy con- 
sultations, taking into account all the views ex- 
pressed, so too was the draft resolution introduced 
... by Brazil arrived at only after long and arduous 
deliberation. It was the result of lengthy and often 
difficult consultations, during which all parties had 
the opportunity to express their views. And it was 
drafted only after the co-sponsors were satisfied 
that it was as close to a consensus as could be 

The hope of my delegation is that we will 
be able collectively to reach a consensus on 
the draft resolution now before us. The U.S. 
delegation fully supports that draft resolu- 

Mr. Chairman, my government would have 
preferred that the Force be financed under 
the regular scale of assessments. That scale 
is in itself a compromise solution to the vary- 
ing points of view held by the total member- 
ship of this organization. However, in a 
spirit of compromise, my delegation at an 
early date recognized that this approach to 
financing the Force would not be widely ac- 
ceptable. Furthermore, we understand that 
the permanent members of the Security 
Council, who have special responsibilities 
under the charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, are asked 
to accept a financial burden greater than that 
imposed under the regular scale of assess- 

We concluded therefore that the 35-power 
draft resolution, while it did not take cog- 
nizance of all of my own government's views, 
did incorporate certain principles which have 
been operative at one time or aKother in 


Department of State Bulletin 

maintaining similar operations such as 
UNEF. Foremost among these is that of 
collective responsibility of all members. The 
35-power draft resolution is founded on this 
concept. This point was made explicit by 
Ambassador Da Mota when he introduced 
the draft resolution. As I mentioned a mo- 
ment ago, my delegation is prepared to sup- 
port this draft resolution in a spirit of com- 
promise and in light of the particular ad hoc 
nature of the operation it is designed to fi- 
nance. It is, in a sense, a "compromise of a 

The balance of the draft resolution is ex- 
tremely delicate. In the final analysis, it is 
not a fully "objective scale" for apportioning 
UNEF costs and based solely on national in- 
come data; rather, it is a "peace and secu- 
rity" scale designed to meet a particular need. 
The draft establishes an approach on the 
basis of which my government will be able to 
continue its longstanding support of the 
United Nations in the field of peacekeeping. 

Turning to the various amendments which 
have been proposed, my delegation would be 
remiss if it did not express serious concern 
that these amendments, if adopted, would 
threaten to destroy the delicate balance found 
in the draft resolution before us and thus 
call into question its acceptability to many 
members. If this committee cannot find it 
possible to adopt a resolution which incorpo- 
rates the concept of collective responsibility 
for all in an acceptable manner, the future 
role of the United Nations in establishing 
and maintaining a peacekeeping force such 
as UNEF could be undermined and preju- 
diced. In the final analysis, perhaps what all 
delegations face here — and a point on which 
they should reflect — is whether or not the 
United Nations as an organization of mem- 
ber states can, when the need arises and its 
members are called on to act collectively, rise 
above the injection of divergent and distract- 
ing political arguments to reach an agree- 
ment which will preserve this organization's 
role not only in the current UNEF operation 
but in future peacekeeping operations as well. 

Mr. Chairman, we have heard various ra- 
tionales put forward by a number of dele- 

gations to justify the nonacceptability of 
collective responsibility of all members in 
financing UNEF. Under the 35-power draft 
resolution, it appears to my delegation that 
the various principles incorporated in pre- 
vious General Assembly resolutions on 
UNEF and ONUC [United Nations Opera- 
tion in the Congo], as well as those dealing 
with certain principles regarding peacekeep- 
ing forces in general, have been adhered to. 
In particular, the five principles incorporated 
in Resolution 1874 (S-IV) have been taken 
into account in the draft resolution before 
us.- Alleged inability to help finance the 
Force cannot be a justifiable basis for reject- 
ing the concept of collective responsibility 
since, in fact, a great number of member 
states will be required to contribute only a 
few thousand dollars. Special consideration 
already has been given to all developing 
member states, including those which would 
be permitted to opt out of the assessment 
scale if the amendment cosponsored by Cuba 
and Yemen (A/C.5/L.1135) was to be 
adopted. That amendment raises issues which 
are not germane to the obligation of this 
committee to determine the means of financ- 
ing decisions taken by the Security Council. 
It clearly is not for the Fifth Committee to 
make political judgments which the Council 
itself did not make. My delegation is strongly 
opposed to this amendment. We are also 
opposed to the amendment submitted by the 
Soviet Union in document A/C.5/L.1137, 
which would, in effect, reject the compromise 
which has been worked out so carefully by 
the 35 cosponsors of the draft resolution con- 
tained in A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.l. We also 
would have difficulties with any other amend- 
ments in view of the delicate balance of the 
draft resolution. 

My delegation would like, sir, to express its 
deep appreciation to the cosponsors who have 
worked so diligently to put before this com- 
mittee a draft resolution which is balanced, 
takes into account previous decisions of the 
General Assembly, and accommodates the 
basic interests of all member states. It is a 

" For text of General Assembly Resolution 1874 
(S-IV), see Bulletin of July 29, 1963, p. 182. 

January 14, 1974 


fair resolution, and one which should receive 
the support of a great majority of the mem- 
ber states represented in this committee. Any 
efforts to alter this resolution will ill serve 
the interests of the United Nations. We be- 
lieve that this committee must act with all 
dispatch in order that an apportionment 
scale for the Force may be agreed upon by 
the General Assembly and funds so badly 
needed by the Secretary General to maintain 
the Force will be forthcoming. 

In concluding my statement, I would like, 
with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to 
make a few final points. Those of us in this 
room must act for peace. We must support 
the decisions of the Security Council. We 
must enable the Secretary General to execute 
his responsibilities. The expeditious adoption 
of the 35-power draft resolution is the means 
to these ends. Any other action throws into 
question all that has been accomplished and 
the feasibility of international cooperation 
for peace and security. A brave beginning 
has been made. It must not be destroyed here 
and now because of particularistic desires or 
effoi'ts to settle political disputes instead of 
providing financial support to the Emer- 
gency Force. 

Statement of November 23 

USUN press release 116 dated November 23 

We believe the United Nations has dis- 
tinguished itself today by demonstrating 
that international cooperation for peace can 
unite us. Special commendation, of course, 
goes to the cosponsors, who worked so hard 
and consulted so broadly in the development 
of the compromise package which will pro- 
vide the financial support to the Secretary 
General to enable him to execute the deci- 
sions of the Security Council. 

As many of you know, I speak not only as 
a member of our delegation but as a member 
of the U.S. Congress as well. In this connec- 
tion I note that of course our support for this 
resolution will require action by the U.S. 

Congress, which controls the purse strings of 
our nation. I pledge to you that I will carry 
the message to the U.S. Congress that this 
great world organization has today re- 
sponded in a manner consistent with its pur- 
poses and principles and the high hopes of 
the drafters of the charter in adopting this 
resolution. I am confident my colleagues in 
the Congress will share my view that we 
have today taken a step toward peace which 
merits the fullest support of all states in the 

Mr. Chairman, in the Congress, it is my 
privilege to serve as ranking Republican on 
the Near East and South Asia Subcommittee 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and 
in that capacity, and on behalf of my delega- 
tion here at the United Nations, I would like 
to express particular appreciation for the 
high statesmanship that has been shown here 
by the distinguished Representative of Iran, 
the distinguished vice chairman of this com- 
mittee, and his delegation ; the distinguished 
Ambassador of Yemen and his delegation; by 
the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt and 
his delegation; and by the distinguished Rep- 
resentative of Jordan and that delegation for 
the strategic role they played in agreeing to 
the withdrawal of an amendment which was 
divisive and gave problems to many delega- 
tions and in support for the compromise 35- 
power resolution just passed by this commit- 
tee. Mr. Chairman, this is in the highest tra- 
dition of statesmanship and we appreciate it. 

I would also like to express the apprecia- 
tion of my delegation to the distinguished 
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the others who have with- 
drawn amendments and to the Group of 77 
and the role they have played here. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss 
if I did not express for my delegation our 
profound appreciation for the courage and 
the wisdom with which the distinguished 
chairman of this committee has guided us 
through the treacherous shoals toward the 
fulfillment of our assigned responsibility in 
this important matter. 


Department of State Bulletin 


The General Assembly, 

Having considered the report of the Secretary- 
General on the cost estimates of the United Nations 
Emergency Force established pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 for 
the period from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 and 
the report of the Advisory Committee on Adminis- 
trative and Budgetary Questions thereon, 

Reaffirming its previous decisions regarding the 
fact that, in order to meet the expenditures caused 
by such operations, a different procedure is required 
from that applied to meet expenditures of the regu- 
lar budget of the United Nations, 

Taking into account the fact that the economically 
more developed countries are in a position to make 
relatively larger contributions and that the economi- 
cally less developed countries have a relatively lim- 
ited capacity to contribute towards peace-keeping 
operations involving heavy expenditures. 

Also bearing in mind the special responsibilities of 
the States permanent members of the Security Coun- 
cil in the financing of such operations, as indicated 
in resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963 and other 
resolutions of the General Assembly, 

1. Decides to appropriate an amount of $30 million 
for the operation of the United Nations Emergency 
Force from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 inclu- 
sive and requests the Secretary-General to establish 
a special account for the Force; 

2. Decides, as an ad hoc arrangement, without 
prejudice to the positions of principle that may be 
taken by Member States in any consideration by the 
General Assembly of arrangements for the financing 
of peace-keeping operations 

(a) To apportion an amount of $18,945,000 for the 
above-mentioned six-month period among the States 
permanent members of the Security Council in the 
proportions determined by the scale of assessments 
for 1974-1976; 

»U.N. doc. A/RES/3101 (XXVIII) (A/C.5/1130/ 
Rev. 1); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 11 by a 
recorded vote of 108 (U.S.) to 3, with 1 abstention. 

(6) To apportion an amount of $10,434,000 for the 
above-mentioned six-month period among the eco- 
nomically developed Member States which are not 
permanent members of the Security Council in the 
proportions determined by the scale of assessments 
for 1974-1976; 

(c) To apportion an amount of $606,000 for the 
above-mentioned six-month period among the eco- 
nomically less developed Member States in the pro- 
portions determined by the scale of assessments for 

(d) To apportion an amount of $15,000 for the 
above-mentioned six-month period to the following 
countries among the economically less developed 
Member States in the proportions determined by the 
scale of assessments for 1974-1976: Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Demo- 
cratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Leso- 
tho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, LInited Republic 
of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Yemen; 

3. Decides that, for the purpose of the present 
resolution, the term "economically less developed 
Member States" in paragraph 2(c) above shall mean 
all Member States except Australia, Austria, Bel- 
gium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Re- 
public of), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem- 
bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, the Ukrain- 
ian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Member States 
referred to in paragraphs 2(a) and (d) above; 

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to enter into 
commitments for the United Nations Emergency 
Force at a rate not to exceed $5 million per month 
for the period from 25 April to 31 October 1974 in- 
clusive, should the Security Council decide to con- 
tinue the Force beyond the initial period of six 
months, the said amount to be apportioned among 
Member States in accordance with the scheme set 
out in the present resolution; 

5. Invites voluntary contributions to the United 
Nations Emergency Force both in cash and in the 
form of services and supplies acceptable to the 

January 1 4, 1 974 



U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: 
Lessons of the UNEF 

Following is a statement by William E. 
Schaufele, Jr., U.S. Deputy Representative 
on the U.N. Security Council, made on De- 
cember 5 before a joint hearing of the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations 
and Movements and the Subcommittee on the 
Near East and South Asia of the Hotise 
Committee on Foreign Affairs.^ 

USUN press release 127 dated December 6 

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to 
appear before the subcommittee this morn- 
ing to discuss United Nations peacekeeping. 
As an American citizen, I am especially grati- 
fied that you are holding hearings on a sub- 
ject which is the primary objective of the 
U.N. Charter and of diplomacy itself. One 
important reason which led me to welcome 
an assignment at the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations was the inclusion of peace- 
keeping as one of my principal responsibili- 

As you know, the U.N. Special Committee 
on Peacekeeping Operations has been vir- 
tually deadlocked for several years, after 
having made some initial progress in its 
efforts to reach agreement on the guidelines 
governing future peacekeeping operations. It 
is no secret that the major obstacle has been 
a difference between the United States and 
the Soviet Union regarding the respective 
authority and responsibilities of the Secre- 
tary General and the Security Council. The 
Soviet Union has steadfastly supported the 
principle that the Security Council be re- 
sponsible for day-to-day peacekeeping opera- 
tions, thus making any decision subject to the 

"The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

veto. The United States, on the other hand, 
has emphasized the necessity of leaving 
nearly all operational decisions to the Secre- 
tary General and the Force commander in the 
interests of efficiency and effective peace- 

Secretary of State Kissinger signaled a 
willingness to take a new look at U.S. policy 
in his September 24 speech to the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly when he said: 

The time has come to agree on peacekeeping 
guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, 
confidently, and effectively in future crises. To break 
the deadlock, the United States is prepared to con- 
sider how the Security Council can play a more 
central role in the conduct of peacekeeping opera- 

We are now exploring possibilities which 
would help achieve that end. In doing so, we 
hope that we can break the deadlock, facili- 
tate the rapid establishment of peacekeep- 
ing operations in response to crisis situa- 
tions, and achieve an agreement which ac- 
commodates the concerns of all. However, we 
expect other delegations, including the Soviet 
Union, which have significant peacekeeping 
interests and responsibilities to respond to 
the U.S. move. 

The peacekeeping operation in the Middle 
East which established a new U.N. Emer- 
gency Force (UNEF) encourages us to be- 
lieve that an acceptable compromise may be 
attainable. Before going into the lessons of 
UNEF or the establishment of peacekeeping 
guidelines, I would like to describe briefly the 
genesis of that operation. 

When it was demonstrated that the cease- 
fire established by Security Council Resolu- 
tion 338 and reiterated in Resolution 339 was 
at best a fragile thing, the Security Council 
on October 25 adopted Resolution 340, which 
set up the Force under the authority of the 
Security Council and requested the Secretary 
General to report on the steps taken to this 
effect. The Secretary General submitted a 


Department of State Bulletin 

comprehensive report the following day. On 
October 27 the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 341, which approved the Secre- 
tary General's report and established the 
Force for a six-month period at an estimated 
cost of $30 million. In the resolution provid- 
ing for the financing of the Force, the prin- 
ciple of collective responsibility has been ac- 
cepted. Although the United States would 
have preferred that the operation be financed 
on the regular scale of assessments, we ac- 
ceded to a compromise acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the membership. 
However, a special scale has been devised, 
and the United States and the other perma- 
nent members of the Security Council will 
pay 15 percent more than their scale of as- 
sessment for the regular budget. Developing 
countries will pay 80 or 90 percent less than 
their normal scale. 

The delay in final approval of the Secre- 
tary General's report was due primarily to 
extensive, intricate, and time-consuming con- 
sultations on the composition of the Force. 
The United States proposed an amendment 
to the original eight-power draft which 
would exclude contingents from the perma- 
nent members of the Security Council. This 
amendment was adopted despite the reserva- 
tions of the Soviet Union, France, and Great 
Britain. We believe that regardless of their 
special responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, it is often 
desirable that the permanent members be 
excluded in order to prevent polarization or 
confrontation which could have effects in or 
beyond the area in which the Force would 

The Soviets believe very strongly that the 
"Western" nations have dominated U.N. 
peacekeeping activities in the past. They 
particularly noted that the first UNEF con- 
tingents which were withdrawn from the 
peacekeeping operation in Cyprus comprised 
Swedes, Finns, and Austrians, whom, though 
neutral, the Soviets tend to describe as 
"Western." The United States, however, was 
and is in the first instance concerned with 
the efl!"ectiveness of the Force and the impar- 
tiality of the contributing countries as to the 
issues and the parties concerned in the dis- 

pute. The terms of reference of UNEF con- 
cerning the geographic distribution of the 
Force represent a compromise with which we 
are not entirely satisfied and which we cer- 
tainly do not regard as a precedent. 

What, then, can we learn from the estab- 
lishment of the U.N. Emergency Force in the 
absence of agreed guidelines? First, it has 
been demonstrated that the United Nations, 
for the benefit of all, can interpose itself in 
certain conflict situations. It can not only 
improve the situation on the ground, but also, 
we have reason to hope, it can provide a 
means by which the parties to a conflict can 
construct a permanent settlement of their 
differences. Second, we are encouraged by 
the fact that in the case of the new UNEF, 
there was no argument at all about the pri- 
macy of the Security Council. That is as it 
should be. The Secretary General proposed 
the terms of reference, and the Council ap- 
proved them. Since this is a "consent opei'a- 
tion," not an enforcement action under ar- 
ticle 42 of the U.N. Charter, the Security 
Council wisely enlisted the full cooperation 
of the parties concerned. The Council defined 
the mandate, established the maximum size 
of the Force, provided for equitable financing 
of the operation, and gave its consent to other 
decisions before the operation could be 

Another lesson is that the terms of refer- 
ence approved by the Security Council in- 
volved, in several instances, departures from 
positions previously held by several delega- 
tions in discussing peacekeeping guidelines 
in more theoretical terms. Our government 
made such concessions, and so have others. 
That is a healthy development, proving that 
it may not be necessary to formulate guide- 
lines so detailed as we had previously be- 
lieved. In particular cases we may find that 
agreement can — and perhaps should — be 
reached on either broader or narrower terms 
of reference as the situation may require. 
Thus the developments of late October and 
November provide practical examples of how 
some knotty problems discussed in the Peace- 
keeping Committee for years were resolved 
at a time of international crisis. We dis- 
covered that a peacekeeping operation could 

January 14, 1974 


in fact be established without predetermined 

Therefore we believe that the Peacekeep- 
ing Committee in its future work should not 
neglect the important lessons which we can 
draw from the way in which this operation 
was established, especially concerning such 
important matters as the establishment, fi- 
nancing, composition, size, and manner of 
termination of peacekeeping operations. 
Rather than taking comfort from our ability 
to establish UNEF in the absence of guide- 
lines, we should seize the opportunity which 
this operation presents us in order to pursue, 
perhaps in more imaginative and general 
ways, the goal which we have been seeking 
for eight years in the Peacekeeping Commit- 

Emergency Security Assistance 
for Israel and Cambodia 

Statement by Kenneth Rush 
Deputy Secretary of State ' 

I welcome this opportunity to appear be- 
fore you this morning to discuss the ad- 
minist>-ation's request for emergency assist- 
ance for Israel and Cambodia. We have 
already provided this committee with clas- 
sified documents detailing all aspects of 
this legislation and will of course provide 
additional documentation as our assessment 
of the military balance in the Middle East 

We are more hopeful now than at any 
time in the past that the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict, the source of four wars in the last 
25 years, may finally be settled by peaceful 
face-to-face negotiations. But in this deli- 
cate period, in which, hopefully, we move 
toward a peaceful solution to this dispute, 
we must make it clear to our friends in 
Israel, to our friends in the Arab world. 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on Dec. 13. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

and to those in the Arab world and else- 
where who choose to oppose our policies 
in the Middle East that Israel will be given 
the assistance and the equipment necessary 
to enable her to defend herself. 

The fighting in the Middle East was bitter 
and costly. The substantial equipment losses 
suffered by Egypt and Syria and Iraq have 
been and are being replaced by a massive 
Soviet resupply effort. We do not know what 
the repayment terms for this Soviet equip- 
ment are, although we have given the com- 
mittee our tentative estimates on a classified 
basis. We are certain, however, that re- 
payment terms are not holding up the flow 
of Soviet arms into the area. 

Israel has also suffered severe losses. She 
has purchased nearly $1 billion in equip- 
ment from us since October 6. As a result 
of these purchases, Israel has replaced nearly 
all the equipment lost during the recent 
fighting. Israel will need substantial 
amounts of additional equipment as well, 
minor amounts to replace losses but pri- 
marily to counterbalance the heavy flow 
of new and sophisticated Soviet weapons to 
Arab armies. This is particularly important 
as we look ahead to a round of negotiations 
which could lead to a permanent peace 
in the area. Without belaboring the point, 
I believe it is clear to anyone who looks 
at a map of the Middle East that Israel's 
military equipment needs would of necessity 
increase as the distance between the terri- 
tory she controls and the armies of her 
potential enemies decreases. There should 
be no doubt in anyone's mind that Israel 
was attacked suddenly and without warning 
during the recent fighting. We cannot ex- 
pect that Israel will be prepared to make 
significant compromises for peace unless her 
people are assured that they will have the 
weapons with which to defend themselves. 
If Arab armies had been on Israel's borders 
when the latest fighting took place, the out- 
come might have been very different. 

As you are aware, we have requested $2.2 
billion for Israel with the option to provide 
all or part of it on either a gi-ant or a 
credit basis. We do not at this time have 
a firm estimate of what amount we might 


Department of State Bulletin 

wish to provide on a grant basis and what 
amount we might wish to provide on a credit 
basis. The Israeli economy was in excellent 
shape before the fighting began. Subsequent 
economic demands and dislocations have been 
heavy. We wish to be in a position to as- 
sist Israel to obtain the equipment she needs 
without disrupting her economy. We will 
of course keep this committee and the Con- 
gress fully advised as we proceed in our 
supply effort. 

As I mentioned earlier, Israel has already 
purchased equipment valued at nearly $1 
billion which substantially replaces her 
losses. Part of the money we are requesting 
would be used to fund these purchases on 
either a grant or a credit basis. Israel has 
also requested additional equipment from us, 
the value of which exceeds substantially $1.2 
billion. We are studying these additional re- 
quests, but a total figure of $2.2 billion still 
represents our best estimate of the amount 
of assistance required to replace Israel's 
losses and to maintain the military balance 
in the Middle East in the immediate period 
ahead. We are not seeking to upset the arms 
balance in favor of Israel, but we do not wish 
to have it tilted in the other direction either. 
There will be difficult policy choices, for in 
the last analysis any military balance sheet 
contains imponderable elements concerning 
intentions, human resources, and the like. 
The $2.2 billion figure is our best estimate, 
and we attach great importance to securing 
all of it. All parties to the Middle East con- 
flict are aware of this figure and have reacted 
to it. The authorization of a lesser amount 
now could necessitate our asking for an addi- 
tional authorization in the future at a time 
when such a request could have an unsettling 
effect on efforts to negotiate a peaceful solu- 
tion to this dispute. 

In short, gentlemen, passage of this legis- 
lation will give us a firm basis to play a use- 
ful role in the negotiations ahead. 

I also wish to point out that this sum if 
appropriated will fall within the President's 
fiscal year 1974 budget ceiling. No other re- 
quests for authorizations and appropriations 
which have been submitted by the executive 
branch to the Congress will have to be re- 

duced to accommodate this authorization 
within the budget ceiling. We estimate that 
the net cost of this $2.2 billion authorization 
to the United States in FY 1974 will be ap- 
proximately $600 million. 

We also support the amendment made by 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee which 
will enable us to use some of the money au- 
thorized in this legislation to pay for our 
share of costs associated with maintaining 
the United Nations forces on the cease-fire 

Our policy objectives in the Middle East 
are clear. We seek a fundamental peace set- 
tlement in which all states in the area will 
be secure from the recurrent threat of war. 
Our military supply policy provides clear evi- 
dence that we will not allow military pre- 
ponderance to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute 
on the battlefield. Our efforts in the forth- 
coming negotiations will demonstrate both to 
Arab and to Israeli leaders that only with 
American assistance can peace be attained. 
Other states have sought to use the Arab- 
Israeli dispute to further interests which 
threaten the religious and national interests 
of Arab and Jew alike. We seek no such 
dominance. We have no ideological fish to fry. 
We seek merely a firm peace, a peace which 
will endure. This legislation will help us to 
attain this objective. 

A lasting peace is also our objective in 
Southeast Asia. The structure for the peace 
was established last January when the Paris 
agreements ended the active fighting in 
South Viet-Nam. At that time we hoped that 
cease-fires and peace agreements for Laos 
and Cambodia would quickly follow. In Laos 
they have, but in Cambodia the Communist 
side has responded to the peace overtures of 
the Cambodian Government, which included 
an offer of a cease-fire, with ever more vi- 
cious attacks. To permit these tactics to suc- 
ceed would embolden the other side and 
jeopardize the fragile structure of peace we 
have built in the area. 

The price of protecting and building this 
structure in Cambodia is modest. We are 
requesting an additional $200 million over 
our original request submitted earlier this 
year when our hopes for peace were high and 

January 14, 1974 


we were able to assist the Cambodian forces 
in their struggle with U.S. air support. The 
price of denying this request is incalculable, 
for it could result in the fall of Cambodia and 
the eventual undermining of all our efforts 
for peace in Southeast Asia. 

I realize that the fiscal year 1974 foreign 
assistance authorization bill gives us author- 
ity to draw upon Defense Department stocks 
to meet Cambodia's requirements. This au- 
thority and legislative history surrounding it 
clearly indicate that the Congress recognizes 
Cambodia's requirements. Under these cir- 

cumstances the authorization for appropria- 
tions for Cambodia contained in S. 2692 is no 
longer legally required. That authorization 
is contained in section 506 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act. We still of course need the 
appropriation which we have requested in 
order to reimburse the Defense Department 
to the extent that the drawdown authority is 

In both Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East the funds we are requesting will enable 
us to continue to build secure foundations for 
a lasting peace. 

Department Discusses Efforts To Account for Missing in Action in Laos 

Following is a statement made before the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy 
and Scientific Developments of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 
5 by Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to 
the Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoner 
of War/Missing in Action Matters.^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear be- 
fore this subcommittee to report on our con- 
tinuing efforts to account for our missing-in- 
action personnel in Indochina and to com- 
ment on the House concurrent resolutions 
expressing the sense of Congress on this se- 
rious subject. Let me say at the outset that 
the Department of State fully shares the con- 
cern expressed in the past by this subcom- 
mittee, and by the many Members of the Con- 
gress who have spoken on this subject or sub- 
mitted resolutions, about the Communist 
side's refusal to provide information on our 
missing men. It will soon be a year since the 
signing of the Viet-Nam agreement on Janu- 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

ary 27, 1973, and nine months since the last 
POW's were released. The Communist au- 
thorities have failed to account for a single 
one of our missing men since that time. 

My colleague from the Defense Depart- 
ment will speak on the activities of the Four- 
Party Joint Military Team, which has re- 
sponsibility for this subject under the Viet- 
Nam agreement, and on the Joint Casualty 
Resolution Center (JCRC), which has the 
mission of searching for our missing men in 
Southeast Asia. My testimony will concen- 
trate primarily on the POW/MIA situation 
in Laos. I will also discuss the subject of 
missing journalists and other civilians and 
will comment on the House concurrent 
resolutions that have been referred to this 

Before examining the situation in Laos, I 
would like to report that the International 
Conference of the Red Cross meeting in Teh- 
ran, Iran, on November 14 adopted a resolu- 
tion reaflfirming international concern about 
the accounting for the missing and dead in 
armed conflicts. The American Red Cross and 
U.S. Government delegations to this confer- 
ence took the lead in winning support for 
this resolution, which was approved unan- 


Department of State Bulletin 

imously. We have heard from our returned 
POW's that a resolution on treatment of pris- 
oners of war adopted by the International 
Red Cross Conference in 1969 may have been 
an important factor influencing the North 
Vietnamese to improve the treatment of our 
men in the fall of 1969. We can only hope 
that this new resolution will have a similar 
effect on the Communist authorities respon- 
sible for accounting for our missing men. 

I would be glad to provide the text of that 
resolution for the record of this hearing, 
with the text of the statement by Dr. Frank 
Stanton, chairman of the American National 
Red Cross and former president of CBS-TV, 
introducing the resolution at the Tehran con- 

Two agreements and a protocol govern the 
return of prisoners of war and accounting 
for the dead and missing in Laos. Under the 
Viet-Nam agreement of January 27, 1973, we 
have held North Viet-Nam responsible for 
the release of all American POW's held 
throughout Indochina. Pursuant to that 
agreement, the Communist side provided 
lists of American prisoners in three categor- 
ies: North Viet-Nam, the PRG [Provi- 
sional Revolutionary Government] , and Laos. 
Lists for North Viet-Nam and the PRG were 
given to U.S. oflicials in Paris on January 27. 
Names of nine U.S. prisoners listed as pris- 
oners of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) — 
the Pathet Lao — were given to U.S. officials 
by North Vietnamese officials in Paris five 
days later, on February 1. That list was 
smaller than we had been led to expect by 
previous statements by Pathet Lao officials, 
and American officials told the North Viet- 
namese that we did not accept it as a com- 
plete list of Americans captured in Laos. The 
nine men on that list were released in Hanoi 
on March 28, virtually the last prisoners re- 
leased from Communist captivity. Most of 
them had been held in North Viet-Nam dur- 
ing most of their captivity. 

The Agreement on the Restoration of 
Peace and Reconciliation in Laos, signed by 
the two Lao parties on February 21, 1973, 
further spelled out responsibility for the re- 
lease of prisoners and accounting for the 

missing. Article 5 of that agreement reads as 

Both Lao sides will return to each other all per- 
sons regardless of nationality that were captured 
during the war, including those imprisoned for co- 
operating with the other side. Their return will be 
carried out according to the procedures set up by 
the two sides, and, at the latest, must be completed 
within 60 days following the establishment of the 
Provisional Government of National Union and the 
Joint National Political Council. 

After all those who were captured have been re- 
turned, each side has the duty to gather information 
on those missing during the war and report the in- 
formation to the other side. 

From the day of the release of the Febru- 
ary 1 list, and before, senior American Em- 
bassy officials in Laos had made clear to the 
Communist side the importance we attached 
to the release of any remaining American 
prisoners and the fullest possible accounting 

Red Cross Conference Resolution 
on Accounting for Missing and Dead 

FoUoiving is the text of a resolution adopted 
iinanimously by the International Conference 
of the Red Cross at Tehran mi November H. 

The XXIInd International Conference of the 
Red Cross, 

Recognizing that one of the tragic conse- 
quences of armed conflicts is a lack of infor- 
mation on persons who are missing or who 
have died, including those who died in captiv- 
ity, and 

In conformity with the humanitarian tradi- 
tions of the Red Cross and with the spirit of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 

Calls oji parties to armed conflicts, during 
hostilities and after cessation of hostilities, to 
help locate and care for the graves of the dead, 
to facilitate the disinterment and return of 
remains, and to provide information about 
those who are missing in action, and 

Further calls o» parties to armed conflicts to 
cooperate with protecting powers, with the 
ICRC and its Central Tracing Agency, and 
with such other appropriate bodies as may be 
established for this purpose, including National 
Red Cross societies, to accomplish the human- 
itarian mission of accounting for the dead and 
missing, including those belonging to third 
countries not parties to the armed conflict. 

January 14, 1974 


for the missing. LPF officials with whom our 
representatives met took the position that 
prisoner-of-war and missing-in-action ques- 
tions could not be addressed until the pvoto- 
col implementing the February 21 agreement 
was agreed to and signed. Consequently, our 
Embassy representatives worked to speed the 
signing of that protocol and to insure that 
constructive POW/MIA provisions would be 
included in it. 

Article 18 of the protocol signed Septem- 
ber 14 by the two Lao parties includes a 
number of specific provisions on this sub- 
ject. It reads as follows: 

A. The return of all persons regardless of nation- 
ality who were captured and imprisoned for cooper- 
ating with the other side during the war will be ac- 
complished in three stages and completed at the 
same time as the withdrawal of foreign troops and 
military personnel. 

B. The return of prisoners at each stage from 
each side will be reported by number of persons, lo- 
cation, and time to the Joint Central Commission to 
Implement the Agreement (JCCIA) 48 hours in ad- 

C. Within 15 to 30 days, counting from the date of 
signing of this Protocol, each side will report the 
number of those captured and imprisoned to the 
JCCIA, indicating nationality and whether military 
or civilian, together with a list of names of those 
who died in captivity. 

D. After the return of the prisoners is completed, 
each side must report as quickly as possible to the 
JCCIA information it is able to obtain about persons 
missing during the war regardless of nationality. 

E. The return of those captured and imprisoned 
during the war and the gathering of information 
that each side will submit about the persons missing 
during the war is the responsibility of the JCCIA. 
When both sides in the JCCIA believe it necessary, 
they may request assistance from the International 
Control Commission. 

The language of article 18 calls for the re- 
lease of all prisoners "regardless of nation- 
ality" captured and held in Laos. This would 
apply to Lao personnel, to other Indochinese, 
and of course to any Americans. The release 
of prisoners is to take place in three stages 
and be completed at the same time as the 
withdrawal of foreign troops and military 
personnel, which is specified elsewhere in the 
protocol as 60 days from the date of forma- 
tion of the coalition government. The compo- 
sition of the coalition is also spelled out in 

the protocol, but the 60-day clock for pris- 
oner releases does not start until the coalition 
is actually formed, which has not yet hap- 

Paragraph C of article 18 provided that 
within "15 to 30 days" from the date of sign- 
ing of the protocol (September 14) each side 
was to report the number of those still held, 
with indication of their nationality and sta- 
tus, together with the list of names of any 
who died in captivity. This was the shortest 
time period for implementation specified in 
any part of the protocol, and the only one 
starting with the date of signing. Unfortu- 
nately, the Pathet Lao simply disregarded 
this provision. 

Article 18 further states that information 
about persons missing during the war should 
be reported as quickly as possible after the 
return of the prisoners is completed. The in- 
formation is to be reported to the Joint Cen- 
tral Commission to Implement the Agree- 
ment (JCCIA), composed of representatives 
of the sides. The JCCIA held its first formal 
meeting November 23, and we have drawn 
some encouragement from the fact that the 
LPF representative at that meeting reaf- 
firmed his recognition of the obligation to re- 
lease prisoners and account for the missing 
and dead. The JCCIA may, by mutual agree- 
ment, request assistance from the Interna- 
tional Control Commission (ICC) for Laos. 
It has not so far done so. 

It must be noted, however, that the Lao 
Patriotic Front has repeatedly stated pub- 
licly and directly to senior U.S. officials that 
there are no more American prisoners cap- 
tured or held in Laos — with the exception of 
a civilian, Emmet Kay, a pilot for Continen- 
tal Air Services, Inc., whose plane w'ent down 
in northwest Laos May 7, 1973. They have 
continued to describe the nine names pro- 
vided February 1 as the total list, reaffirm- 
ing this position following the signing of the 
September 14 protocol. 

Mr. Kay's capture was confirmed by LPF 
authorities soon after it took place, and let- 
ters from him have been received by his wife, 
who resides in Vientiane. Our Embassy has 
pressed repeatedly for his release, but the 


Department of State Bulletin 

LPF has said this must await further imple- 
mentation of the protocol — which suggests it 
will come in the 60-day period after forma- 
tion of the coalition. The International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate in 
Vientiane has also tried to intervene on Mr. 
Kay's behalf, also to no avail. 

Although U.S. officials in Laos have 
pressed the Communist side to allow search 
teams from our Joint Casualty Resolution 
Center to visit crash and grave sites in Laos, 
no provision to this effect was contained in 
the Laos agreement or protocol. We have ex- 
plained the peaceful, open, and humanitarian 
mission of the JCRC in the hope that the 
Communist authorities would permit our 
search teams to visit at least selected crash 
and grave sites, so far to no avail. 

Our representatives have also provided the 
Communist side with a detailed listing of our 
POW MIA's in Laos, including those listed 
as dead whose bodies were not recovered, 
with the request for information on these 
men. We have called particular attention to 
the cases of men who were previously ac- 
knowledged as captured in Laos or for whom 
there are indications that they survived 
shootdowns. Two of the most obvious cases 
are Air Force Lt. Col. David Hrdlicka, whose 
capture May 18, 1965, was openly confirmed 
by the Pathet Lao, and the American civilian, 
Eugene Debruin, of Air America, also con- 
firmed as a prisoner following his capture 
September 5, 1963. We continue to hope that 
the lists and information we have provided 
will help convince the LPF to provide addi- 
tional information on our missing men. 

As is clear from the foregoing, our repre- 
sentatives in Vientiane have maintained con- 
tinuing pressure on the Communist side on 
this subject. For example, when it became 
clear that the Communist side was ignoring 
the 30-day period specified in the protocol for 
provision of numbers of prisoners and names 
of those who died in captivity, our Embassy 
called on a Pathet Lao representative to make 
clear the importance we attached to prompt 
and full compliance with this provision. We 
noted that the government side was compil- 
ing data on prisoners it held and on those 

who died in captivity and urged the Pathet 
Lao to do likewise, pointing out that the pro- 
tocol gave first priority to this subject and 
did not link it to the formation of the coali- 
tion government. The Pathet Lao representa- 
tive, however, rejected this approach and 
said no information would be forthcoming 
until the JCCIA was constituted and the co- 
alition government was formed. 

On the question of JCRC access to Laos, 
the Pathet Lao representative flatly stated 
that no outside element could concern itself 
with POW/MIA's in what he described as 
the "liberated zone." He also rejected our 
suggestion of a possible role for the ICC or 
ICRC in crash- and grave-site inspections. 

The vast majority of crash and potential 
grave sites in Laos are located in areas that 
are under control of North Vietnamese 
forces. Thus, North Viet-Nam effectively con- 
trols the basic information on this subject. 
We have attempted to raise it with them in 
the Four-Party Joint Military Team in Sai- 
gon, but they have insisted that POW/MIA's 
in Laos must be discussed with the LPF. 

It goes without saying that we are seri- 
ously dissatisfied with the Communist side's 
performance on this subject thus far. Dur- 
ing the hearings on his confirmation as Sec- 
retary of State, Dr. Kissinger made clear 
that we will not be able to proceed with the 
economic assistance provisions of the Viet- 
Nam agreement until there is more satisfac- 
tory compliance with the MIA provisions. 

The June 13, 1973, joint communique 
signed by the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam (DRV) and the United States reaf- 
firmed the commitment of the two sides to 
implement the January agreement and re- 
stated the key provisions on accounting for 
the missing and dead. 

On July 29, 1973, we sent a formal note to 
the North Vietnamese Government strongly 
protesting their continued failure to fulfill 
their obligations on this humanitarian sub- 
ject. That note states in part: 

The accounting for the missing and the repatria- 
tion of remains are purely humanitarian obligations 
unrelated to other issues. They could have been 
largely caiTied out by now if a spirit of goodwill 
and cooperation had been manifested on this subject. 

January 14, 1974 


This would have brought solace to the families and 
loved ones of more than 1,300 Americans listed as 
missing, and of those who have died but whose 
bodies have not been returned. 

I would be glad to provide the text of the 
July 29 note for the record of this hearing. 

I would like to call attention to the contin- 
uing efforts by relatives of our POW/MIA's 
to stimulate public awareness on this subject 
and to appeal directly to the Communist au- 
thorities for information on our missing men. 
During October, 53 relatives of our men miss- 
ing in Laos traveled to Vientiane at private 
expense under the auspices of the National 
League of Families of American Prisoners 
and Missing in Southeast Asia in a dramatic 
direct attempt to elicit information from the 
Communist side. The trip was timed to coin- 
cide with the October 14 date specified in the 
Laos protocol for provision of the informa- 
tion on the number of prisoners and the 
names of those who died in captivity. A few 
members of the group met personally with 
Mr. Soth Petrasi, LPF representative in 
Vientiane, to convey their personal concern 
to him directly. We share the hope of the 
family members that these and other efforts 
will help convince the Communist side even at 
this late date to fulfill their humanitarian ob- 

While in Indochina, the family members 
also met with the representative of the ICRC 
in Laos, who told them of his continuing ef- 
forts to press the Communist side on this 
subject. The president of the ICRC, Dr. Eric 
Martin, with whom I met during the recent 
Tehran conference, assured me that his or- 
ganization would continue and redouble its 
efforts on this subject. 

In addition to the more than 1,300 U.S. 
military personnel who remain unaccounted 
for in Indochina, there continue to be some 
20 international journalists missing and pos- 
sibly captured, nearly all of them in Cam- 
bodia. We are in touch with organizations of 
journalists working on this subject and have 
supported their efforts to obtain information 
on their missing colleagues. 

In addition to journalists, there continue to 
be some 25 American civilians missing in 

South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. These 
include, for example, three missionaries of 
the Christian and Missionary Alliance, who 
were seen being led away by Communist 
forces on May 30, 1962. They have been miss- 
ing longer than any other Americans in Indo- 
china. Our efforts to obtain information ap- 
ply fully, of course, to civilians as well. 

One other American civilian, Mr. Homer 
L. Elm, of Arcadia, South Carolina, is a con- 
firmed prisoner in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Elm 
is an employee of Pacific Architects and En- 
gineers and was working in support of the 
International Commission of Control and 
Supervision (ICCS) for Viet-Nam. He was 
captured at 8 p.m. October 6, when the truck 
he was driving was attacked on National 
Highway 4 northeast of Thanh Tri in Ba 
Xuyen Province. Two Vietnamese employees 
were captured with Mr. Elm. His capture was 
especially disturbing since the truck was 
clearly marked as operating in support of the 
ICCS. The ICCS and we have pressed the 
Communist authorities I'epeatedly to return 
Mr. Elm and those captured with him. We 
continue to hope for his early release. 

I have left to the last our comments on the 
House concurrent resolutions that have been 
referred to this subcommittee. As is clear 
from my testimony, we share the concern of 
the many sponsors of these resolutions about 
the Communist side's failure to comply with 
the missing-in-action and accounting-for-the- 
dead provisions of the Viet-Nam and Laos 
agreements and protocols. The resolutions 
would declare it to be the sense of Congress 
that the U.S. Government should cease all 
consideration of aid, trade, diplomatic recog- 
nition, or other forms of accommodation with 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam or the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government until 
such time as the POW/MIA provisions of the 
agreements and protocols are fully complied 

It is already our consistent policy to use 
all useful means at our disposal to try to 
bring the Communist authorities into com- 
pliance with their obligations on this subject. 
For example, we have repeatedly made it 
clear to the North Vietnamese, in private ne- 


Department of State Bulletin 

gotiations and in numerous public state- 
ments, that we could not proceed with imple- 
mentation of the economic assistance provi- 
sions until there is satisfactory compliance 
with the MIA and return-of-remains require- 
ment and other important provisions of the 
agreement. Specifically, the DRV has been 
told that they could not expect the U.S. Gov- 
ernment — including the Congress — to ap- 
prove an economic assistance program until 
we are satisfied with their post-cease-fire 
performance. This is far from the case at 
present, in the accounting for our missing or 
captured men and on other serious questions 
such as the continued buildup of North Viet- 
Nam's forces in South Viet-Nam. The same 
reasoning applies to the questions of diplo- 
matic recognition, trade, and the other types 
of accommodation referred to in the resolu- 

In substance, therefore, our policies al- 
ready reflect what we take to be the basic in- 
tent of the resolutions, which is to put the 
North Vietnamese on notice that there can 
be no trade, aid, recognition, or other ac- 
commodation from the United States until 
they comply with their humanitarian obli- 
gation to account for our POW/MIA's. 

At the same time, and despite the bleak 
record thus far, we would consider it better 
not to foreclose the possibility that as a re- 
sult of inducements, deterrents, and persua- 
sion, the DRV may yet adopt a more reason- 
able policy on accounting for our MIA's and 
on other aspects of the agreements. The reso- 
lutions express the view that even considera- 
tion of this subject must await full compli- 
ance by North Viet-Nam. This appears to us 
to go too far. If adopted as a policy, it would 
close the door and limit our flexibility to an 
undesirable extent. We are and will remain 
seriously concerned about the Communist 
side's violations of the Viet-Nam agreement. 
But we do not yet think we should write oflf 
conclusively the chance of improved perform- 
ance by the DRV. We believe our policies 
should have the continuing purpose of trying 
to induce the North Vietnamese to choose the 
road of cooperation and peace — with fulfill- 
ment of their humanitarian obligations — 
rather than reverting to large-scale warfare. 


Current Actions 


Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971." 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, November 26, 1973. 


Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971.' 

Ratification deposited: United States, December 
21, 1973. 

Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973. Enters into force on the 30th 
day following date of deposit of the 22d instru- 
ment of ratification or accession. 
Signature: United States, December 28, 1973. 


Publications Distributed 

by Bureau of Public Affairs 

Single copies of reprints, Bureau of Public Affairs 
news releases, and other publications listed below 
are available free of charge as long as supplies last 
and may be ordered from the General Publications 
Division-B, Office of Media Services (PA/MS), De- 
partment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Durable Peace. 

Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger 
before the 28th session of the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly on September 24, 1973. Pub. 8724. 
General Foreign Policy Series 282. 10 pp. 

Special Economic Report: Summary of Controls on 
the International Movement of Capital. This study, 
prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

' Not in force. 

January 14, 1974 


and using the OECD Capital Movements Code as a 
point of departure, outlines the nature and variety 
of capital controls and the difficulties inherent in 
their removal. PA/MS news release. June 1973. IG 

Special Report : Pakistan Recuperates — A Chronol- 
ogy of Key Events Since the 1971 War. Chronology 
of Pakistan's key domestic and external events pre- 
pared by the Department of State's Bureau of In- 
telligence and Research. PA/MS news release. Sep- 
tember 1973. 15 pp. 

Special Economic Report: Living With Floating Ex- 
change Rates. Discusses the impact the floating ex- 
change rate system has had on foreign trade and 
investment, on rate stability and ease of adjustment, 
and on internal economic policies. PA/MS news re- 
lease. September 1973. 27 pp. 

A Simulation Analysis: $12 Billion Turnaround in 
the U.S. Trade Balance — Is It Feasible? Trade 

study with tables prepared by the Department of 
State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. PA/MS 
news release. October 1973. 42 pp. 

Special Report: Japan's Overseas Private Invest- 
ment — Growth and Change. This study on the chang- 
ing emphasis of Japan's overseas investment was 
prepared by the Department of State's Bureau of In- 
telligence and Research. PA/MS news release. Oc- 
tober 1973. 11 pp. 

Special Report: 1972 Indicators of Comparative East- 
West Economic Strength. Four tables prepared by 
the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research. PA/MS news release. October 1973. 3 pp. 

Special Report: U.S. Assists Emigration of Soviet 

Jews. This pamphlet, prepared by the State Depart- 
ment's Oflice of Refugee and Migration Affairs, out- 
lines the U.S. role in assisting refugee emigration 
from Eastern Europe. PA/MS news release. October 
1973. 4 pp. 


The Senate on December 18 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

Harry G. Barnes, Jr., to be Ambassador to Ro- 

L. Dean Brown to be Deputy Under Secretary of 
State [for Management]. 

William B. Buffum to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State [for International Organization Affairs]. 

Francis L. Dale to be the representative to the 
European office of the United Nations, with the rank 
of Ambassador. 

Robert Stephen Ingersoll to be an Assistant Secre- 
tary of State [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs]. 

Heyward Isham to be Ambassador to Haiti. 

Joseph J. Jova to be Ambassador to Mexico. 

Anthony D. Marshall to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Kenya. 

Ralph J. McGuire to be Ambassador to the Repub- 
lic of Mali. 

Francis E. Meloy, Jr., to be Ambassador to Guate- 

David D. Newsom to be Ambassador to the Repub- 
lic of Indonesia. 

David H. Popper to be Ambassador to Chile. 

Stuart Nash Scott to be Ambassador to Portugal. 

Francis T. Underbill, Jr., to be Ambassador to 

Viron P. Vakv to be Ambassador to Colombia. 


Departmenf of Stale Bulletin 

INDEX January H, 197i Vol. LXX, No. ISO-J 

Cambodia. Emergency Security Assistance for 

Israel and Cambodia (Rush) 36 

Chile. Popper confirmed as Ambassador . . 44 

Colombia. Vaky confirmed as Ambassador . 44 


Confirmations (Barnes, Brown, Buffum, Dale, 
Ingersoll, Isham, Jova, Marshall, McGuire, 
Meloy, Newsom, Popper, Scott, Underbill, 
Vaky) 44 

Department Discusses Efforts To Account for 
Missing in Action in Laos (Sieverts) . . 38 

Emergency Security Assistance for Israel and 
Cambodia (Rush) 36 

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons of the 
UNEF (Schaufele) 34 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Barnes, Brown, Buffum, Dale, Inger- 
soll, Isham, Jova, Marshall, McGuire, Meloy, 
Newsom, Popper, Scott, Underbill, Vaky) . 44 

Environment. United Nations Environment 

Program Participation Act of 1973 (Nixon) 27 

Foreign Aid. Emergency Security Assistance 
for Israel and Cambodia (Rush) .... 36 

Guatemala. Meloy confirmed as Ambassador 44 

Haiti. Isham confirmed as Ambassador . . 44 

Indonesia. Newsom confirmed as Ambassador 44 

International Red Cross. Red Cross Conference 
Resolution on Accounting for Missing and 
Dead (Text) 39 

Israel. Emergency Security Assistance for 

Israel and Cambodia (Rush) 36 

Kenya. Marshall confirmed as Ambassador . 44 

Laos. Department Discusses Efforts To Ac- 
count for Missing in Action in Laos 
(Sieverts) 38 

Malaysia. Underbill confirmed as Ambassador 44 

Mali. McGuire confirmed as Ambassador . . 44 

Mexico. Jova confirmed as Ambassador . . 44 

Middle East 

General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Fi- 
nancing U.N. Emergency Force in the 
Middle East (Buchanan, text of resolution) 29 

Middle East Peace Conference Opens in Ge- 
neva (Kissinger) 21 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Middle East and 

Europe (Kissinger, communiques) ... 25 

L'.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons of the 
UNEF (Schaufele) 34 


Scott confirmed as Ambassador 44 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Middle East and 

Europe (Kissinger, communiques) ... 25 

Presidential Documents 

United Nations Environment Program Par- 
ticipation .4ct of 1973 27 

U.S. Deplores Terrorist Attack and Hijacking 

at Rome Airport 27 

Publications. Publications Distributed by Bu- 
reau of Public .\ffairs 43 

Romania. Barnes confirmed as Ambassador . 44 

Spain. Secretary Kissinger Visits Middle East 

and Europe (Kissinger, communiques) . . 25 

Terrorism. U.S. Deplores Terrorist Attack and 
Hijacking at Rome Airport (Nixon, De- 
partment statement) 27 

Treaty Information. Current Actions ... 43 

United Nations 

General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Fi- 
nancing U.N. Emergency Force in the 

Middle East (Buchanan, text of resolution) 29 

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons of the 

UNEF (Schaufele) 34 


Department Discusses Efforts To Account for 

Missing in Action in Laos (Sieverts) . . 38 

U.S. Welcomes Release of .American Civilian 
Prisoner in Viet-Nam (Department state- 
ment) 26 

Yugoslavia. U.S.- Yugoslav Board on Scientific 
Cooperation Meets at Washington (joint 

statement) 28 

Name Index 

Barnes, Harry G., Jr 44 

Brown, L. Dean 44 

Buchanan, John H., Jr 29 

Buffum, William B 44 

Dale, Francis L 44 

Ingersoll, Robert Stephen ! 44 

Isham, Heyward 44 

Jova, Joseph J 44 

Kissinger, Secretary 21, 25 

Marshall, Anthony D . . . . . 44 

McGuire, Ralph J . . 44 

Meloy, Francis E., Jr ' 44 

Newsom, David D 44 

Nixon, President 27 

Popper, David H . . . 44 

Rush, Kenneth ] 36 

Scott, Stuart Nash 44 

Schaufele, William E., Jr ..... ' . 34 

Sieverts, Frank A ' 33 

Underbill, Francis T., Jr . . 44 

Vaky, Viron P [ 44 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 24-30 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 24 which 
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
454 of December 13, 455 of December 14, 456 
of December 17, 460, 461, and 462 of December 
20, and 469 and 470 of December 22. 



*471 12/27 Meloy sworn in as Ambassador 
to Guatemala (biographic 

t472 12/27 Kissinger: news conference. 

*475 12/28 Study group CCMT, U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for CCIR, 
Jan. 15. 

*476 12/28 Kissinger: departure statement, 
Geneva, Dec. 22. 

*473 12/27 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee Subcommittee on Code of 
Conduct for Liner Conferences, 
Jan. 8. 

*474 12/27 U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Jan. 14. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Dcx:uments 
U.S. government printing office 



Spsciol Fourth Clau Rot* task 

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 





Volume LXX 

No. 1804 

January 21, 1974 


by James Keogh, Director, U.S. Information Agency 57 



Statement by Mark Evans and Text of Resolution 6Jt 


For index Bee inside back cover 


Vol. LXX, No. 1804 
January 21, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Washington, D.C. 20402 


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and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 27 


Press release 472 dated December 27 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, I thought the way to give this confer- 
ence some focus is for me to make a brief 
summary of the highlights of this year's 
foreign policy as we see it and some attempt 
of projecting it into the future. 

First, let me begin with the event that 
started the year, which was of course the 
peace in Viet-Nam, and then let me go from 
there to the general design of the foreign pol- 
icy and how the various pieces — how we at- 
tempted to fit the various pieces together. 

The year began with ending the most di- 
visive, the most difficult, the most agonizing 
war in American history — certainly the most 
divisive and agonizing foreign war in Amer- 
ican history. 

Throughout the four years of President 
Nixon's first term, the basic debate had been 
on the terms by which the war should be 
ended. And the fundamental condition that 
the United States had set was that we would 
not end the war by overthrowing the govern- 
ment with which we had been allied but that 
we were prepared to withdraw our forces 
and to leave the evolution of events in Indo- 
china to the Indochinese. 

At the beginning of January, last year, we 
achieved a settlement which permitted the 
disengagement of American forces, which 
left the political resolution of the political 
future of Viet-Nam to be decided by negotia- 
tion among the Vietnamese parties, and 
which returned the American prisoners. It 
did not settle all the issues that had produced 
the conflict in the first place, a war that was 
partly a foreign invasion from the outside 

and partly civil war; an area that had been 
rent by conflict for 30 years could not pos- 
sibly go from war to peace immediately or 
painlessly or perhaps at all. 

We had defined the American role as per- 
mitting an evolution that left the destiny of 
the area in the hands of the people concerned. 
We had hoped — if you remember the speech 
of the President and my press conference — - 
we had hoped that the end of the war in 
Viet-Nam would permit also the beginning 
of an era of national reconciliation in this 
country. And much of the agony of the previ- 
ous years had been assumed to be overcome 
by the fact that both those who had opposed 
the manner of conducting the war and those 
who had wanted to bring it to a conclusion 
along the lines that were achieved could 
agree now that there was a need to turn to 
more positive tasks. 

For a variety of reasons, other issues arose 
that did not make this entirely possible. But 
the war in Viet-Nam is no longer — and the 
war in Indochina — is no longer a divisive na- 
tional issue; and as far as the administration 
is concerned, it will, as I have pointed out in 
my last press conference, heed the expres- 
sions of the Congress and stay true to the 
principles that it has consistently pursued. 

In any event, with the war in Viet-Nam 
ended, the major focus of our foreign policy 
attention could turn to the design of the 
structure of peace that has been the Presi- 
dent's principal goal since he came into office. 

In its first phase, this meant that the 
United States had to reduce many of its over- 
extended commitments and that the United 
States had to disengage gradually from any 
foreign involvement and, above all, that the 
United States should evoke a sense of re- 

January 21, 1974 


sponsibility for their own sake in many areas 
of the world. This was the so-called Nixon 
doctrine which characterized the first two or 
three years of the President's first term. 

It was the prelude to the initiatives toward 
China and the detente with the Soviet Union 
that were to lay the basis for a fundamental 
realignment of the postwar period which had 
been based on a rigid division between op- 
posing hostile blocs. 

So, by the time the second term of the 
President started, we faced an international 
situation in which the basic assumptions of 
the immediate postwar period had been sub- 
stantially altered. The rigid hostility between 
the Communist world and the non-Commu- 
nist world had been altered first by the di- 
visions within the Communist world itself 
and by the amelioration of relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, as 
well as the People's Republic of China and 
the United States. 

Europe and Japan had gained strength and 
political self-confidence. The economic sys- 
tem that had been created in the immediate 
postwar period had become fluid and was in 
need of redesigning. So the great task before 
this administration, as it will be before its 
successors, has been to construct an interna- 
tional system based on a sense of justice so 
that its participants would have a stake in 
maintaining it, with a sufficient balance of 
power so that no nation or group of nations 
would be dependent entirely on the good will 
of its neighbors, and based on a sense of par- 
ticipation so that all nations could share in 
the positive aspirations. 

This has been the basic architectural de- 
sign that cannot possibly be completed in any 
one administration, and the work which must 
continue in future administrations. And 
when we speak of institutionalizing foreign 
policy, we do not mean that designated com- 
mittees would carry out specific tasks, but 
that the basic goals of the long term are 
accepted by a sufficient consensus in America 
so that the future security of this country 
does not depend entirely on the vagaries of 
the political process. 

Detente With Communist Countries 

Now let me be more specific, and let me 
talk in various categories. Let me begin first 
with East- West relations. Our policy toward 
both the Soviet Union and the People's Re- 
public of China has been characterized as a 
policy of detente. And it is the characteristic 
of policies that become more or less accepted 
that the benefits are taken for granted and 
that some of the difficulties that were over- 
looked in the beginning become more and 
more apparent. 

Let me explain what we understand by 
detente. We do not say that detente is based 
on the compatibility of domestic systems. We 
recognize that the values and ideology of both 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China are opposed and sometimes hostile 
to ours. We do not say that there are no 
conflicting national interests. We do say that 
there is a fundamental change in the inter- 
national environment compared to any other 
previous period, a change which was ex- 
pressed by President Eisenhower more than 
20 years ago when he said, "There is no 
longer any alternative to peace." Under con- 
ditions of nuclear plenty, the decision to en- 
gage in general war involves consequences of 
such magnitude that no responsible states- 
man can base his policy on the constant 
threat of such a holocaust and every leader 
with a responsibility for these weapons must 
set himself the task of bringing about condi- 
tions which reduce the possibility of such a 
war to a minimum and, indeed, over any 
extended period of time reduce this possibili- 
ty to zero. 

So we do not say that we approve of the 
domestic evolution of the Soviet Union or of 
other Communist countries with which we 
are attempting to coexist. Nor do we accept 
that detente can be used for military expan- 
sion or for threatening weaker countries or 
for undermining our traditional friendships. 
But we do make a conscious eff'ort to set up 
rules of conduct and to establish a certain 
interconnection of interests and, above all, 
to establish communications between the top 
leaders and between officials at every level 


Department of State Bulletin 

that make it possible in times of crisis to 
reduce the danger of accident or miscalcula- 

This has been our policy with the Soviet 
Union, and it is the policy we have pursued 
as well with the People's Republic of China. 

With respect to the Soviet Union, it has 
led us into a series of negotiations on the 
limitations of strategic arms, on mutual and 
balanced force reductions (MBFR), on Euro- 
pean security, on such measures as the agree- 
ment for the prevention of nuclear war — into 
extended exchanges between the President 
and General Secretary Brezhnev designed 
to lay the basis for a more civil discourse. 

This does not preclude that this relation- 
ship can break down. 

Ideology, long-established relations, as well 
as the internal logic of certain areas such as 
the Middle East, can produce tensions and 
indeed can produce explosions that, whether 
or not they are fostered by the two super- 
powers, may bring them into conflict with 
each other. 

Nor is it foreordained that the behavior 
of the two protagonists necessarily lives up 
to the principles that they declare. In those 
cases, as happened at one phase during the 
Middle East crisis, the United States will 
maintain its commitments and will defend its 
international position and the position of its 

But we will not be easily deflected from 
the course of seeking a relaxation of tension 
— a course which proved itself even in ten- 
sion periods and a course which modern tech- 
nology will impose on any administration 
even if we should be prevented from carrying 
out all the measures by diflFerent opinions 
about what should be the purposes of detente 
— such as the degree to which we should at- 
tempt to use our foreign policy to affect the 
domestic structure of other countries. 

With respect to the People's Republic of 
China, we have established Liaison Offices in 
each other's capitals that are performing 
many of the functions that are normally car- 
ried out by embassies. We have had two visits 
by myself to Peking and also a substantial 
expansion of economic and other exchanges. 

So we believe that with respect to the two 
great Communist countries, we are on a 
course which is in the interests of all of man- 
kind and which is essential for the long-term 
prospects of peace. 

Relations With Atlantic Nations and Japan 

In our relations with our friends in Eu- 
rope, the year has been disappointing. It had 
been our intention, in what we called perhaps 
too rashly "the Year of Europe," to afl^rm 
that the important measures in foreign policy 
were not confined to relations with adver- 
saries but that traditional friends could also 
seize the opportunities of the future. We 
intended in our various initiatives to lay to 
rest concerns about the possibilities of a 
condominium between the United States and 
particularly the Soviet Union. We attempted 
to emphasize that the very successes of the 
Atlantic alliance had created a new situation 
which required a new act of vision, and we 
invited Europe and Japan to participate with 
us in this task of construction. 

Now there have been many debates about 
whether the tactics by which this objective 
was pursued were always ideal, and there 
were many comments about this or that ini- 
tiative. And obviously, any senior official pur- 
suing the policies of his government will 
always be convinced that the measures his 
administration took are correct, because 
otherwise he would not have taken them. But 
I do not believe that this is the key problem. 
There is one principal problem in our rela- 
tions with, especially, Europe at this moment 
that only the Europeans can answer — all the 
other criticisms can be relatively easily taken 
care of — and that question is: What is to be 
the shape of the emerging unified Europe? 
Is this Europe to be organized on a basis 
which seeks its identity in exclusivity to our 
position — or at least in distance from the 
United States? Or is it prepared, while affirm- 
ing its identity, to recognize that the oppor- 
tunities of the future require Atlantic co- 
operation ? 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
we have given our answer. All of our pro- 

January 21, 1974 


posals, however they were advanced, from 
the proposal of the Atlantic charter to the 
proposal of the common approach to energy, 
had one fundamental goal: to create a dia- 
logue between ourselves and the Europeans 
in terms of the challenges that lay ahead of 
us and in terms of the common problems 
that needed to be solved. 

That offer is still open. We believe that 
some progress was made in our recent talks 
in Europe, and we will continue both the 
work on the declarations with the European 
Community and v/ith our NATO partners, as 
well as the work on the Energy Action Group. 

But the United States is not concerned 
with developing some legal formula or with 
a document that responds to a single initia- 
tive. The problem before us is whether the 
nations of the Atlantic area, as well as Japan, 
faced with self-evident problems that affect 
them all, can develop a common approach or 
whether they will consume themselves in the 
sort of rivalry that has destroyed other civi- 
lizations. I will have a word to say about that 
when I discuss the energy problem. 

As far as Japan is concerned, we believed 
that we were well underway to developing a 
new and mature partnership when the energy 
crisis diverted energies, diverted concerns, 
and when it created many temporary obsta- 
cles. But we believe that Japan should be an 
integral part of the relationship we are also 
attempting to develop with Europe and that 
Japan's importance and its gi'owing strength 
and its political maturity entitle it to full 
consideration as an equal partner of the 
United States. 

The Crisis in the Middle East 

The most dramatic event of the year, of 
course, was the crisis in the Middle East. It 
is — it came upon us unexpectedly. We were 
not warned by any foreign government that 
there were any specific plans for an attack. 
The only warnings we received were general 
descriptions that the Middle East conflict — 
or that the tensions in the Middle East — 
might not be contained. And I have already 
described the kind of intelligence informa- 

tion that was available and which illustrated 
that facts are not self-explanatory, that one's 
preconceptions determine very importantly 
what interpretation is given to these facts. 

The war in the Middle East faced the 
United States with a number of profound 
issues. There was the commitment the 
United States has had through all postwar 
administrations to the security of Israel. It 
was our concern that another superpower not 
exploit the tensions in the area for its owti 
advantage. There was our interest in main- 
taining a balanced relationship with the Arab 
countries. And there came to be, increasingly, 
the problem of the energy crisis. 

Our policy had to go through several 

The first, during the military phase, was to 
bring — to contribute to a situation in which 
the postwar evolution would not be deter- 
mined by military success primarily, espe- 
cially by military success growing out of a 
surprise attack and achieved with Soviet 

And secondly, to conduct ourselves in such 
a manner that in the diplomacy that would 
follow the war, we would be able to talk to 
all of the parties involved — Arab as well as 

And thirdly, we had to conduct ourselves 
in such a way that the Middle East would 
not play the role of the Balkans in 1914, in 
which local rivalries produced a catastrophe 
from which Europe never recovered and in 
which, under contemporary conditions, if a 
general war occurred the world would never 

The result of these efforts was, first, the 
cease-fire of October 22; then, the six-point 
agreement that was signed in early Novem- 
ber; and the Geneva Peace Conference which 
started last week. 

We are at the very beginning of what will 
be a slow and agonizing effort to reconcile 
objectives that in many respects seem contra- 
dictory. But as I have said repeatedly, and as 
the President has emphasized, the United 
States is committed to making a major effort 
to bring about a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East that recognizes the security of 


Department of State Bulletin 

all the countries in the Middle East as well 
as the legitimate aspirations of all of the 
peoples in the area. 

We believe that the conference is well 
launched, and we hope that some progress 
can be made in the disengagement talks that 
are now going on between Egypt and Israel 
— and that could go on between Israel and 
the other Arab countries. 

The Global Energy Problem 

The Middle East — the war in the Middle 
East also brought to a head the energy crisis 
on a global basis. It brought it to a head, but 
it did not cause it. 

The basic cause of the energy crisis is that 
demand for energy has been growing expo- 
nentially while the incentives for supply have 
not kept pace. And in these conditions, sooner 
or later, the energy-consuming countries 
would have come up against the situation 
where their demand far outstripped the pos- 
sibilities of supply. 

And therefore, it is the U.S. view that the 
long-term problem in the field of energy 
makes it essential that a worldwide coopera- 
tive effort between consumers, and between 
consumers and producers, be started so that 
we car deal with the challenges on a long- 
term basis and not have to improvise re- 
sponses with every year. 

In this respect, the energy crisis may be 
only a forerunner of similar difficulties in 
other areas — and this is why the United 
States supported the World Food Conference 
that has now been called for 1974. 

Tasks for the Future 

These are some of the highlights of last 
year, and if one is to look ahead, one can see 
that the major task of building this interna- 
tional system remains to be done. 

In East-West relations, in negotiations 
with the Soviet Union, we have before us the 
problem of SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks], and as I have pointed out re- 
peatedly, no task is more urgent than to 
master the rapid technological change in 

which weapons may outstrip the capacity of 
political control. 

And therefore the United States will make 
a determined effort to fulfill the promise that 
President Nixon and General Secretary 
Brezhnev made to each other to try to have 
an agreement on SALT in 1974. It is a diffi- 
cult assignment, because the first SALT 
agreement dealt with quantitative change, 
the present negotiations deal with the prob- 
lem of qualitative change, which is both tech- 
nically and conceptually much more difficult. 

And we will continue to pursue the nego- 
tiations on mutual force reductions and Euro- 
pean security. 

In relations with the People's Republic of 
China, we will continue the policy of normali- 
zation that was started and seek to accel- 
erate it. 

Our relations with Europe — the offer that 
we made in April and December still remains 
on the table, and we are prepared to discuss 
with our European allies those aspects of our 
consultative processes that they find difficult. 
We believe that the problem of fears of con- 
dominium cannot be settled by abstract dec- 
larations, but only by a confident cooperation 
in trying to devise a future that we can all 
believe in. 

In the Middle East, we will strive for peace 
— based on justice and accepted by all of the 
parties. And we hope that the peace that has 
been so painfully achieved in Indochina can 
be preserved. 

These are the major tasks that we have set 
ourselves, together with an initiative toward 
Latin America which will culminate in a 
Foreign Ministers meeting at the end of 
February in Mexico City, in which the Latin 
American Foreign Ministers have responded 
to an initiative by the United States last Oc- 
tober that we should define together a new 
Western Hemisphere relationship. 

But I would like to stress again that the 
basic conviction of the administration is that 
the task that we have set ourselves cannot be 
completed in one administration or in one 
decade, because the international system that 
has grown up over many decades is funda- 
mentally altered and the new international 

January 21, 1974 


system will take many years to construct. 
But its ultimate objective must be to con- 
tribute to the peace and to the well-being of 
all mankind. 

Now I'll be glad to answer your questions. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, early on in your lecture 
you said that the great task before this ad- 
ministration is to create an international 
situation based on a structure so that its par- 
ticipants will have a stake in maintaifiing it, 
which is, I suppose, about the same as the 
late Secretary Dulles used to say when he 
said the Russians will keep any agreements 
that is to their benefit to keep. 

With that background of continuity in 
mind, I woidd like to ask you u^hether you 
can tell us at all what stake the Soviet Union 
has in maintaining the agreements that you 
have made so far in the Middle East, and if 
so, where their position is nou\ I am thinking 
of the various meetings that you have had 
with Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, 
Soviet Ambassador to the United States'] and 

Secretary Kissinger: There are two schools 
of thought about Soviet objectives in the 
Middle East. One school of thought is that the 
Soviet Union has an interest in maintaining 
the tension because that will guarantee 
permanent Arab hostility to the United 
States and enhances the possibilities of Soviet 
influence. The other school of thought is that 
while this may have started out to be the 
Soviet policy in the 1950's, there have been 
since then three wars which have consumed 
a great deal of Soviet resources and whose 
outcome has been inconclusive. It has been 
demonstrated that the conflict in the Middle 
East can bring the superpowers into positions 
of potential confrontation. And it is there- 
fore at least possible that the Soviet Union 
now has an interest in contributing to the 
stabilization of the situation in an area which 
neither superpower can really control by 

As far as the United States is concerned, 

we will deal with the Soviet Union as long as 
its actions are consistent with the second in- 
terpretation. That is to say, if the Soviet 
Union makes a responsible contribution to 
peace in the Middle East, we will be prepared 
to cooperate — not at the expense of our tra- 
ditional friends nor by imposing a settlement 
made together with the Soviet Union. We 
are in direct contact with all of the parties 
in the Middle East. But we are prepared to 
deal with the Soviet Union on an equitable 
basis as long as its motives — or as long as its 
actions are consistent with a responsible 

At Geneva, the Soviet Union contributed to 
a positive atmosphere. As you know. Foreign 
Minister [of the U.S.S.R. Andrei A.] Gromy- 
ko met with Foreign Minister [of Israel 
Abba] Eban. 

The Soviet Union cooperated also in focus- 
ing the discussions on the first issue of dis- 
engagement, which seemed more manageable 
than some of the more difficult ones that will 
come along further down the road. 

So as of now, judging the Soviet Union by 
its actions, we are willing to cooperate. 
Should Soviet behavior change, we can al- 
ways reexamine our policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the insti- 
tutionalizing of foreign policy again today. 
Perhaps you can comment on that in light 
of increasing piiblished stories that you have 
displayed an increasing penchant for secrecy 
and, instead of institutionalizing it, you have 
been personalizing it and making it entirely 
dependent on your own role. 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course the final 
judgment on foreign policy is the substance 
and not the procedure. The institutionaliza- 
tion of foreign policy is, in my view, the 
development of a set of principles of foreign 
policy and of a sufficient support among 
those who have to carry it out so that con- 
tinuity within the limits of the changes of 
the political process is assured. 

Now, I have read many of these stories. 
And of course I do not propose to engage 
in a public debate with the various sources 
of these stories. 


Department of State Bulletin 

I believe that I am working closely with 
the appropriate Assistant Secretaries who 
are responsible for the areas with which 
we are dealing-, and I believe that anyone 
who has a real knowledge of how policy is 
being made in the State Department today 
knows that there is a close sense of partici- 
pation by all of those who have responsibility 
for regional areas or for those functional 
areas that can most contribute to policy. 
How this filters down below the Assistant 
Secretary level is primarily the responsibility 
of the Assistant Secretaries. But I believe 
that after a period of six to nine months it 
will be quite obvious what has been done. 

Arab Oil Embargo 

Q. Mr. Secretary, noiv that the Arab 
states have lifted their oil embargo against 
Europe and Japan and have restored some of 
the production cutbacks, when do you expect 
them to start supplying the United States 
with oil again? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to spec- 
ulate on when the Arab countries will restore 
— will lift the boycott against the United 
States. As I have pointed out at several 
previous press conferences, the United States 
could understand certain actions by Arab 
countries at a time when the United States 
seemed to be — was supplying military equip- 
ment to one of the sides in a war. Now that 
the United States has publicly declared its 
commitment to bring about a just settlement, 
now that much of the progress that has been 
made toward a settlement can be traced to 
American actions, discriminatory measures 
against the United States become increas- 
ingly difficult to understand. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how m.uch knoivledge 
did you have, either before you left Wash- 
ington or after you left Saudi Arabia, that 
the Arab nations tvere about to make a 
change in their oil-export policy to take 
Europe and Japan off the hook? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I had no knowl- 
edge of this before I left Washington. And I 
had no precise knowledge of specific meas- 

ures when I left Saudi Arabia, except that 
I knew that certain measures were under 

Now, in analyzing the supply of oil, one 
has to consider that there are two problems 
involved. One is the problem of the embargo; 
the second is the problem of production. 
Lifting the embargo without increasing the 
production does not help a great deal, be- 
cause it means that more nations would 
compete for an inadequate supply. So both 
of these measures have to go hand in hand. 
And on the whole, we consider it a positive 
step that production has been increased. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yoti seem to be express- 
ing an increasing sense of irritation with the 
fact that Saudi Arabia, principally, has not 
lifted the oil embargo against the United 
States, though it has taken these other ac- 
tions toward Europe and Japan. Was there 
some action that you expected to happen by 
now from the Saudi Arabians that did not? 
Do you link a possible action to the disen- 
gagement talks in Geneva? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not express an 
increasing sense of irritation. I am express- 
ing the view that the United States has con- 
sistently taken and which I have expressed 
at every previous press conference; namely, 
that discriminatory action against the 
United States becomes increasingly inappro- 
priate when the United States is the princi- 
pal country engaging itself in the search for 
a just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
This is a position that has been taken by this 
administration from the beginning. It is not 
said in any spirit of irritation, but it is a 
statement of reality. 

I do not want to say what I expected. But 
the view that I have expressed here is not 
caused by any disappointment about what I 
had been led to believe. 

Q. Is there a link as well with the disen- 
gagement talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. position 
with respect to the oil embargo has been 
that we cannot discuss specific peace terms in 
relation to the lifting of the oil embargo, 

January 21, 1974 


that we can express our commitment to bring 
about a just and durable peace— or to help 
bring it about — based on Security Council 
Resolution 242. But as I have explained 
many times before, we cannot bargain indi- 
vidually with oil-producing countries and 
then enter into a peace conference in which 
the parties have to negotiate this process all 
over again. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have the impression 
that one of the problems with the SALT 
talks is that this government hasn't gotten 
its oivn ducks in a row. For example, do you 
go along with the apparent doctrine that ivas 
enunciated the other day by Dr. Schlesinger 
[Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] 
ivhich he called, for lack of a better name, 
"total equality"? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, how can you in 
an egalitarian society not accept total equal- 
ity? I will agree with you that our govern- 
ment has not thought through all the impli- 
cations of the problem of qualitative change. 
I agree with the phrase "total equality." But 
like all slogans, it does not supply its own 
answer. And I am certain that my friend 
Dr. Schlesinger would agree that once you 
have enunciated that doctrine you still have 
to give it content in terms of what it is that 
you want to have equal. Is it numbers, is it 
throw-weight, is it warheads, is it every- 
thing? How do you compare superiority in 
bombers to superiority in missiles? How do 
you compare the throw-weight or the carry- 
ing power of bombers with the throw-weight 
of missiles? These are the tough questions 
that have to be answered. 

And I am frank to say that while we have 
developed positions, and while I believe our 
positions are better than those of the Soviet 
Union, we have not — there is not the con- 
ceptual basis for the SALT Two that existed 
over a decade of previous work with respect 
to SALT One. However, I am confident that 
as far as the U.S. Government is concerned 
this problem will be substantially overcome 
in the very near future and that if the Soviet 

Union is prepared to proceed we have a 
chance of meeting our deadline of 1974. 

Q. Along those lines. Dr. Kissinger, about 
five or six weeks ago a senior U.S. official 
expressed the hope — / guess is the best word 
— that these problems you are talking about 
as far as both the Soviets and we are con- 
cerned would be settled by Christmas. Would 
it be fair to say, then, that these negotiations 
or your private discussions with Ambassador 
Dobrynin are behind schedule, and if so 
could you tell u^ why ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are some 
senior officials who get caught by giving too 
early deadlines. Whether a particular nego- 
tiation is on or behind schedule you can 
really only determine in retrospect, after it 
is completed. 

We expect to make progress in clarifying 
the various points of view within our govern- 
ment in the very near future. And I believe, 
based in part also on conversations I have 
recently had, that the Soviet Union is work- 
ing very seriously on the problem. How the 
various issues can then be reconciled re- 
mains to be seen. But I think everybody 
recognizes that the pace of technology is such 
that there is a certain urgency in pushing 
these negotiations, and they will be pushed. 

Q. Is this what you have been discussing 
with Mr. Dobrynin in the last two days? 

Secretary Kissinger: I never go into the 
discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin. 

Q. On the same question, do you think it is 
still conceivable that President Nixon could 
go to the Soviet Union this srimmer, or would 
the SALT negotiations make it more feasible 
to go later in the year? 

Secretary Kissinger: No date has been set, 
but the summer is certainly not ruled out. 

Q. What do you think, though? Do you 
think you could have a SALT agreement by 
this Slimmer? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not with O'Leary 
[Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Star-News] 
sitting next to you. I am not going to give 


Department of State Bulletin 

you another date on anything. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied by the 
degree of cooperation that you are getting 
from the Governments of Israel and Egypt 
and Jordan to get a peace in the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that one of 
the results of the two trips that I have made 
into the Middle East is that the governments 
that you have mentioned now have a much 
clearer common understanding of what needs 
to be done. They are now talking from a 
common base. And I have no complaint 
about the cooperation that I have received 
from any of these governments, and I believe 
that there is a good possibility of progress. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, if you have found a way 
to coexist with the Soviet Union and China, 
what is there to prevent a detente or coexist- 
ence with Cuba? Do you have any plans for 
attempting to achieve a rapprochement ivith 
Cuba or on your trip will you go to Havana ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I certainly have no 
plan to go to Havana on any trip that I am 
now planning. And the major obstacle to 
rapprochement with Cuba has been the hos- 
tility of the Cuban Government and its com- 
mitment to a revolutionary policy through- 
out the Western Hemisphere. 

The Middle East and U.S.-Soviet Detente 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have talked and 
given us a more specific definition of "de- 
tente" and some of the limitations on de- 
tente. And you also referred to the inter- 
connection between issues. I know you will 
not go into the discussions you've had with 
the Soviet Ambassador, but can you tell us 
in any more generalized way what the pres- 
ent interrelationship is of a solution of the 
Middle East crisis to the pattern of relation- 
ships with the Soviet Union — SALT, MBFR, 
these other issues? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is obvious 
that it is not possible for a country to exac- 
erbate tensions in one area and to seek re- 
laxation in another. This administration has 
consistently opposed the notion of selective 

detente, in which one area would be pacified 
while there would be very active conflict in 
another. Therefore, obviously we would have 
to judge the Soviet sincerity in seeking 
across-the-board relaxation of tensions by 
its behavior in all the negotiations in which 
we are engaged with it, including that of the 
Middle East. 

Now, I want to repeat: I'm not saying 
this in any particularly challenging manner, 
because the Soviet behavior in the prelude to 
the Geneva Conference and during the first 
phase of the Geneva Conference has been 
constructive and has been recognized to be 
constructive by all of the parties there. 

U.S. Relations With India 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, one gets the impression 
that lately, since you took over, there has 
been a vast improvement in India-America 
relations. Is it possible for you to put your 
relations with India in perspective against 
the background of the global peace that you 

Secretary Kissinger: We have always con- 
sidered, even during periods of diflicult rela- 
tionship — vve've always considered India as 
one of the major countries in the world. It 
is a great democracy, and a great democracy 
in an underdeveloped country, that can be a 
symbol for many other countries. There is a 
long history of friendship between India and 
the United States. And we have no conflict- 
ing national interests. And therefore, as far 
as the administration is concerned, we have 
made — you are quite correct — a serious 
effort to improve our relationship with India. 

I believe this effort has been reciprocated. 
One of its tangible expressions has been the 
recent rupee settlement, which we consider 
the beginning of a continually improving 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you get the kind of 
progress that you're talking about in disen- 
gagement, would it entail a quick opening of 
the Suez Canal? And do you consider that to 
be one of the principal Soviet objectives at 
this stage of the negotiation ? 

January 21, 1974 


Secretary Kissinger: I believe that — first, 
I don't want to speculate about what the 
specific terms of a disengagement scheme 
would be; but I do not believe that opening of 
the Suez Canal, however advantageous it 
might be to any of the parties, is the prin- 
cipal objective of the Soviet Union. 

I want to stress also that much of the di- 
plomacy that has preceded the opening of the 
Geneva talks was not one that was organized 
between us and the Soviet Union but was 
developed on several trips through the Mid- 
dle East by myself, on behalf of the adminis- 
tration, and in direct relationship with the 
parties in the Middle East. The Soviet 
Union has supported these effoi'ts. But it 
was not a solution that was achieved between 
Moscow and Washington and then handed to 
the parties in the conflict. Much of it has 
emerged out of the discussions that took 
place at kilometer 101 between the Egyptians 
and the Israelis without either U.S. or Soviet 
participation. So I do not believe that the 
principal Soviet interest would be the open- 
ing of the Suez Canal, even if that should 
turn out to be one of the results. 

Worldwide Problem of Terrorism 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a two-part question, if 
I may. In view of Kuwait's refusal to extra^ 
dite to Italy the Palestinians who were the 
self-admitted murderers of 16 American citi- 
zens, in view of Kuwait's continuation of the 
oil embargo, how is it that rve have reports 
that we have planned, as a nation, to supply 
this nation ivith continued military aid as 
well as agricultural products? That's the 
first part of the question, sir. 

Secretary Kissinger: My understanding is 
that there is a plan to extradite these terror- 
ists to the so-called Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, which has promised to punish 
them severely. 

Now, our interest is that this terrorism be 
ended, and the United States has made strong 
representations to that effect. With respect to 
other measures, they will have to await the 
actions of the Kuwaiti Government on other 

fronts, but we have not yet seen any reason 
to terminate them. 

Q. Well, in connection with his promise to 
punish them severely, I seem to recall your 
predecessor Secretary Rogers asked for the 
death penalty of those Palestinians that mur- 
dered Ambassador Noel last March. I 
checked with your Sudan desk this week and 
find that these terrorists have not even been 
brought to trial. Now, in consideration of 
that and reports that a group similar to this 
— or possibly the same group — planned to 
assassinate you, what is the administration 
prepared to do about this, other than regret 
it or plead for aviation security, usually in 
vain ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the adminis- 
tration has taken a very strong stand against 
any attacks on me. [Laughter.] 

But our position on terrorism is clear. We 
believe that it is a worldwide problem that 
must be stamped out. We will renew our 
eflforts to achieve a multilateral agreement 
which puts teeth into the enforcement of 
antiterrorist activity. But I do not want to 
comment on every individual action of every 
government concerned. 

New Element in Strategic Arms Equation 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the answer may be in 
your responses here; but the thing that I am 
still uncertain about is that, you will recall, 
in that saloon in the basement of the Na- 
tional Hotel in Moscow, when you briefed us 
on the SALT agreement, there was a certain 
amount of optimism about the future with 
respect to offensive nuclear weapons. I ac- 
knowledge it was qualified optimism. Now, 
who is responsible for the fact that things 
have not gone quite as well as you thought 
at the time? Now, if the premise of my ques- 
tion is ivrong, why, the answer is inoperative 
— / don't knoiv. [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think one 
would have to look again at the transcript of 
that press conference in order to be able to 


Department of State Bulletin 

determine what is meant by the phrase "It 
has not gone as well as one hoped." 

The agreement that was made in Moscow 
in 1972 was supposed to last for only five 
years. And it was to permit the negotiation 
of a more permanent agreement. 

It was recognized at the time that the 
pi'oblem of the multiple warheads would soon 
come to the fore. If the strategic problem 
had remained what it was in 1972 — that is 
to say, individual weapons with individual 
warheads — the situation would have been 
essentially stabilized by that agreement. 

The new element in the equation is the 
rapid evolution of technology, coupled with 
improvements in accuracy that have — even 
within the limits of that agreement — pro- 
duced vulnerabilities, perhaps a year or two 
more rapidly than one expected at the time. 

When I was a professor, I used to study 
the issue of arms control. All of the theoret- 
ical thinking was concentrated on the prob- 
lem of quantity, how to get control of quanti- 
tative change. How to master technology 
really has no good theoretical base. When we 
started the first SALT negotiations, there 
was a vast literature on which one could 
draw for an understanding of the problem of 

So if things have not gone as well — which 
I wouldn't quite concede — if we are now fac- 
ing new problems, it is not because anyone 
has done anything wrong. It is simply be- 
cause technology has been accelerating at a 
rate that threatens to outstrip the capacity 
to control it. 

Q. Technology has been accelerating from 
the Rtissian side, not from our side? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it's been accel- 
erating on both sides, but especially on the 
Russian side. 

Q. To folloiv up, Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: This young lady here 
has been very patient, and then we'll get the 
next question. 

Q. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Also a two- 

part question. I hope I can get a two-part 

Secretary Kissinger: You'll probably get a 
five-part! [Laughter.] 

Process of Middle East Negotiations 

Q. First of all, what can you tell us of the 
fate of the Israeli POW's in Syria? And, sec- 
ondly, what concessions do you expect Israel 
to make in the Geneva talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
Israeli prisoners in Syria, the United States 
has of course strongly supported their release 
and the provision at least of lists to the 

It is not correct — as has been pointed out 
— that we promised this as a condition of the 
cease-fire, though we did indicate that we 
had been given to understand that a major 
eff'ort would be made after Israel had already 
accepted the cease-fire. 

Nevertheless, the United States supports 
the fact that the lists should be produced and 
that the prisoners should be released as 
rapidly as possible. 

Q. Are they still alive? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have no inde- 
pendent information. We have no informa- 
tion that would indicate that they are not 
alive, but we have really no information of 
any kind — that is, of an independent source. 

What was the second one? 

Q. What do you expect the Israelis to do ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are not approach- 
ing the problem of negotiations by drawing 
up a list of concessions that either side should 
make. What we have attempted to do is dis- 
cover, as honestly as we could, on these trips 
through the Middle East, what the minimum 
requirements of each side were and then 
attempt to bring these into some relation to 
each other. 

To the extent that the parties have talked 
to each other, as the Egyptians and Israelis 
have on kilometer 101, some rapprochement 

January 21, 1974 


has developed out of the process of negotia- 
tion; but we are not starting with an abstract 
list of concessions which we are then asking 
any country to make. 

There was a followup question. 

Q. Yes. Mr. Secretary, you spoke just 
earlier of the lack of a conceptual basis for 
SALT Two to be one of the problems and 
then expressed confidence that this problem 
would be overcome in the very near future. 
Do you mean within our onm government 
only, or do you expect that perhaps in the 
near future there ivill be some agreement on 
a conceptual basis for SALT Two between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, as 
there rvas on a conceptual basis for SALT 
One in, I think, the spring of 1971 ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I hope for both. But 
of course there have to be two stages. First, 
we have to clear up our own thinking. But 
don't let me leave you with a misconception. 
The United States made a proposal last year 
which was perfectly adequate from our point 
of view and which reconciled many different 
points of view within our government. 

As you progress in a negotiation, you al- 
ways face the problem then of getting down 
to the essentials. And as we are getting 
down to the essentials, the need for a new 
conceptual base, or a more refined concep- 
tual base, has become apparent. 

Presidential Determination 
on Fishing Boat Seizures 

Presidential Determination No. 74-8 ' 

Transfer of Foreign Assistance Funds 
Programmed for Ecuador and Peru 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, December 11, 1973. 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 
5(b) of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, as 
amended, I hereby certify that it is in the national 
interest not to transfer to the Fishermen's Protec- 
tive Fund established pursuant to Section 9 of the 
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, as amended, 
funds from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 pro- 
grammed for Ecuador and Peru in the amount of 
$2,305,416, which amount is equal to the amounts 
reimbursed by the Secretary of the Treasury in 
accordance with Section 3 of the Fishermen's Pro- 
tective Act of 1967, as amended, for the twenty-two 
fishing boat seizures each by Ecuador and Peru 
occurring during the period November 12, 1972 
through February 10, 1973. 

You are requested on my behalf to convey this 
determination and certification to the Congress, as 
required by law. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 

' 38 Fed. Reg. 34799. 



Department of State Bulletin 

In this article adapted from an address he made before the 
Neiv York Chapter of the Public Relations Society of 
America on November H at New York, N.Y., Mr. Keogh 
discusses the programs of the United States Information 
Agency in fulfilling its work "of explaining our country and 
our people, of correcting or minimizing misunderstandings 
that clog or contaminate relations between the United States 
and other countries." 

Information and Modern Diplomacy 

by James Keogh 

Director, United States Information Agency 

What in the world is the United States In- 
formation Agency? 

In the world, it is a multifaceted tool of 
modern diplomacy with a well-defined role 
in U.S. foreign policy. 

In the United States, it is so little known 
and understood among the general public 
that even well-informed people are uncertain 
about what it is and what it does. 

When I was nominated to be Director of 
USIA a little less than a year ago and my 
friends came around to congratulate me, I 
soon discovered that many of them were not 
quite sure just what it was that I was going 
to do. Some thought I was going to run the 
CIA, while others thought surely U.S. Infor- 
mation must have something to do with the 
Library of Congress. Some were as confused 
as the distraught woman who called our 
Paris office in an effort to determine the 
whereabouts of her husband, who had failed 
to return to their hotel after a night on the 
town. She thought that surely the U.S. In- 
formation Agency ought to know what he 
was up to. 

This lack of information about the Infor- 
mation Agency is largely the result of legis- 
lation which specifically forbids the USIA to 
disseminate within the United States the in- 
formation and media products it distributes 
abroad. There is a sound rationale for this 

legislation. Its aim is to prevent USIA from 
becoming an internal propaganda force in 
the service of a sitting administration. Yet 
its effect has been to keep the American pub- 
lic too much in the dark about what USIA 
does. We are now trying — by strictly legal 
means — to throw some light on the subject. 

My interest in attempting to inform the 
rest of the world about the United States 
goes back a good many years. This interest 
was cultivated in the trips abroad that I took 
during my incarnation as an editor of Time. 
I recall flying from Honolulu to Sydney, 
Australia, a decade ago and stopping on the 
way at Nandi in the Fiji Islands. I walked 
into the lobby of the quite modern airport 
and saw a booth with a sign that read Fiji 
Chamber of Commerce. An attractive Fiji 
girl was in charge of the booth. Using up 
some of that airport waiting time, I struck 
up a conversation with her. 

"Are you going to stay here long?" she 
asked, in a polished British accent. "No," I 
said, "we will leave just as soon as the crew 
gets the plane serviced. This is just a stop- 
over." "Where are you from?" she asked. At 
that point, I drew myself up with some pride 
and I said, "I'm from the United States — 
from New York City." She seemed thought- 
ful, even puzzled, for a moment and then she 
said, "Ah, yes, New York City. I think that's 

January 21, 1974 


where one makes a stopover on the way to 

It was on this same trip, I recall, that I 
hired a car and driver so that my wife i.nd I 
could travel through the outback surround- 
ing Brisbane. It was a warm afternoon in 
January, and as we came to a small town I 
suggested to the Australian driver that we 
stop for something to drink. Searching for a 
place along the street, I saw a familiar sign 
and said, "Well, there's a Coca Cola sign. 
Let's stop there. It looks just like home." 
The driver turned to me with what seemed 
genuine surprise and said, "Oh, do you have 
Coke in the States, too?" 

Experiences such as these — and others 
with more depth but less anecdotal value — 
tended to punctuate my feeling that a strong 
information program is of great importance 
to the United States. This is not a new idea. 
From the time of the American Revolution 
the United States has employed information 
activities in one way or another to produce 
an impact in other countries. The merits of 
the American cause were argued abroad in 
the 18th century by a talented team of com- 
municators, headed by a wily old PR man 
named Benjamin Franklin. During the Civil 
War the Union actively sought support from 
antislavery elements in Europe. At one point, 
Abraham Lincoln even addressed an open 
letter directly to the people of England. 

If the history of American efforts to influ- 
ence foreign opinion is a long one, doubts 
about the importance or even the existence 
of public opinion are equally venerable. The 
Declaration of Independence, we recall, en- 
joins us to show a decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind. Dean Acheson wrote 
in 1965: "World opinion simply does not 
exist on matters that concern us." In his 
column a short time later, Walter Lippmann 

It is fashionable in certain circles to dismiss scorn- 
fully a serious concern about what foreign nations 
think of us. This is a reaction to the naive and often 
silly American wish to be loved by everybody. But 
the reaction has gone much too far. For it is not true 
that in the real world of affairs a great power, even 
the strongest, can afford to ignore the opinions of 
others. It must have friends who trust it and believe 

in it and have confidence that its power will be used 

It was pi'ecisely to nurture such friend- 
ships that USIA was established in 1953 as 
the first separate U.S. Government informa- 
tion service with a mission of presenting the 
American case abroad during times of rela- 
tive peace. Through the two decades of 
USIA's existence, the nature of its mission 
has evolved with the times. It is evolving 
now — perhaps more than ever. 

Communications Channels and Activities 

What is the mission of the U.S. Informa- 
tion Agency? As I see it, the mission is to 
support U.S. national interests by: 

— Conveying an understanding of what 
the United States stands for as a nation and 
as a people and presenting a true picture of 
the society, institutions, and culture in which 
our policies evolve; 

— Explaining U.S. policies and the reasons 
for them; and 

— Advising the U.S. Government on the 
implication of foreign opinion for the formu- 
lation and execution of our foreign policy. 

To do this we use all available means of 

The lai'gest element in USIA is the Voice 
of America, the radio arm of the Agency. 
It broadcasts in 36 languages around the 
world to an adult audience of many millions. 

USIA produces or acquires some 150 film 
and television documentaries annually for 
showing overseas. The vast majority of 
these productions are acquired from com- 
mercial sources. In addition, a variety of 
special-targeted programs and many news- 
clips are produced for foreign television. We 
also help television and film producers from 
other countries who want to do pieces about 
the United States. 

We radioteletype texts of official policy 
statements and interpretive material to 127 
overseas posts five days a week. Receiving ! 
the texts of such papers on an almost immedi- 
ate basis is often of crucial importance to 
U.S. representatives in dealing with both the 


Department of State Bulletin 

governments and the media in the host 

Special articles written by our staff and 
reprints from U.S. publications are regularly 
mailed to posts for placement in local media 
and for background information and use by 
Embassy officers. 

We publish magazines in 27 languages and 
distribute them in 100 countries. 

Every year we build and circulate abroad 
some 50 exhibits about life in the United 

We maintain or support almost 300 librar- 
ies in information centers, reading rooms, 
and binational centers in 98 countries. These 
libraries are used by about 121,2 million peo- 
ple each year. 

The educational and cultural exchange pro- 
grams which USIA administers abroad for 
the State Department form another vital ele- 
ment in the eff'ort to communicate with peo- 
ple around the world. 

Of course, the most important and effec- 
tive means of communication we have is the 
personal contact between our officers in 109 
countries and local opinion leaders. I recall 
Edward R. Murrow's remark, when he held 
the position that I now occupy, that USIA 
could easily and immediately transmit infor- 
mation 25,000 miles around the world. The 
difficulty, he noted, is in conveying it the last 
three feet. That is the all-important job of 
our overseas officers. 

These various communications channels 
and activities are brought together in a uni- 
fied coordinated program by means of Coun- 
try Plans drawn up by our posts overseas, 
cleared by the Ambassador, and finally ap- 
proved by our headquarters in Washington 
and the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the State 

The need for this kind of public diplomacy 
is widely recognized by the nations of the 
world. Back in 1954 a British study commis- 
sion reported: 

A modern government has to concern itself with 
public opinion abroad and be properly equipped to 
deal with it. . . . The information services must 
today be regarded as part of the normal apparatus 
of diplomacy of a great power. 

Picking up that cue, other major countries, 
including the Communist governments, have 
steadily expanded their cultural and infor- 
mation programs during the last decade. 
For example, appropriations for the French 
external cultural and information program 
reached $430 million in 1971 — more than 
double the 1961 level and more than twice 
the size of USIA's present budget. West 
Germany has increased its spending for this 
purpose substantially in recent years, and 
last year it reached $300 million, which is 
50 percent more than our budget. While no 
solid figures are ascertainable, it is estimated 
that the Soviet Union has expanded its cul- 
tural and information programs to the point 
at which it is spending almost $1 billion an- 
nually, an effort that dwarfs the U.S. com- 
mitment for this purpose. While all this has 
been going on, USIA resources have been 
shrinking. In real dollar terms, the USIA 
budget for this year is approximately the 
same as it was in 1953. 

This imbalance, to put it mildly, keeps us 
on our mettle. 

New Tasks and New Techniques 

In recent years, the environment in which 
we operate has changed tremendously — in 
both technological and political terms. This 
inevitably conditions our tasks as well as our 
methods of functioning. 

One change has been the extraordinary ex- 
pansion of new techniques and channels of 
communication. Technical developments such 
as transistor radios, satellite telecasting, 
video cassettes, videotape recordings, com- 
puter data banks, and so on, have been 
matched by the expansion around the world 
of television and radio networks, news agen- 
cies, and non-media channels of communica- 
tion involving business, tourism, and profes- 
sional and scholarly contacts. 

In this general area, I would like to men- 
tion just one of the new devices USIA is 
using. We call it the electronic dialogue. The 
first step in this process is the taping or 
filming of a speech or statement by a high 
government official or a distinguished leader 

January 21, 1974 


from the pi'ivate sector or academe discus- 
sing the discipline in which he or she is 
expert. A USIA post overseas will then 
gather that country's leaders in the field 
under discussion — men from government, 
the private sector, and academic life. They 
will watch the tape or film and then through 
a special international telephone connection 
will question and discuss the subject with the 
speaker for as much as an hour or more. On 
important matters of U.S. policy in which the 
other country has a mutual interest, we have 
found this to be a highly effective means of 

Some critics of USIA take the position that 
in this day of rapid and saturated communi- 
cation there is no longer any need for a U.S. 
information effort. Why, they ask, is it not 
possible to just let the regular news media 
take care of all that? 

There are very fundamental reasons why 
the news media — here or abroad — cannot be 
expected to perform the information func- 
tion for the U.S. Government. By its very 
definition, news is the unusual. The media, 
which are essentially and properly commer- 
cial enterprises, tend to highlight the special, 
the spectacular, and the bizarre, with a heavy 
tilt toward the negative. The broad sweep 
of the normal ongoing endeavors, develop- 
ments, and achievements of a society do not 
make very exciting headlines or bulletins. 
The news media have no desire to be the plat- 
form for official statements or explanations 
of U.S. policy. Replying to foreign critics is 
not their job. Nor have they any financial 
incentive to attempt to communicate with 
people in closed societies or underdeveloped 
nations. As a result, it is often a confused 
and distorted image of the United States 
that reaches foreign eyes and ears and be- 
comes an element in the balance sheet of our 
foreign relations. A continuing effort to 
explain the facts and underlying principles 
of our actions and policies and to correct the 
willful or unintentional distortions about our 
country abroad is the daily and vital task of 

The task has become more complicated as 
the political atmosphere in which we func- 

tion has changed. Some quite rapid changes 
have brought new opportunities as well as 
new problems. While a new climate for rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union and China has 
been developing, there has been an undeni- 
able erosion of old relations with some of our 
major allies. New problems have arisen; per- 
ceptions of national interest are changing. 
In Western Europe there is a generation of 
adults with no memory of World War II and 
the contribution of the United States to the 
defense and subsequent reconstruction of 
their countries. 

This changed American relationship with 
Europe was aptly explained by Congress- 
man Benjamin Rosenthal of New York as he 
was speaking to a group of parliamentarians 
from the Common Market countries. He said 
that too many Americans still seemed to be- 
lieve in "grandmotherly diplomacy — the idea 
that we have a delightful, charming, depend- 
able and unique relationship with Europe 
because all of our grandmothers and great- 
grandmothers came from Europe. We can't 
rely on our grandmothers anymore. We must 
rely on ourselves." 

Fostering Dialogue With Eastern Europe 

As our government seeks to resolve differ- 
ences through negotiations and engage 
former adversaries and old friends in con- 
structive dialogue, USIA must attempt to 
foster a better and more extensive under- 
standing of our purpose and policies. We 
must simultaneously listen attentively to the 
views and opinions of others, for an impor- 
tant part of our job is to make U.S. policy- 
makers aware of the attitudes, aspirations, 
and fears of other nations on issues of mu- 
tual concern. 

It is obvious that the policy of negotiation 
rather than confrontation, and the reality of 
detente, have presented the United States 
and the world with new opportunities for 
constructive dialogue which the USIA is in a 
unique position to foster. 

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
the officials and the people are much more 
receptive to our traveling exhibits than 


Department of State Bulletin 

before. During 1973 we have shown eight 
major exhibits in six countries in that part 
of the world, dealing with American ap- 
proaches to research and development, out- 
door recreation, progress and the environ- 
ment, educational technology, and auto life — 
an exposition of the way the automobile has 
affected the social, industrial, and environ- 
mental aspects of American life. 

More than 214 million people visited these 
exhibits. The Soviet Union not only coop- 
erated with us in staging these exhibits but, 
for the first time, even accorded them a 
guarded measure of favorable publicity. In 
addition, we also displayed nine exhibits of 
American fine arts in five Eastern European 

In September I went to the Soviet Union 
to open our exhibit on outdoor recreation in 
the city of Irkutsk. The reception we were 
accorded in Moscow, Leningrad, and Irkutsk 
could not have been more cordial. The Soviet 
officials and people that I met gave the gen- 
uine impression that they were deeply inter- 
ested in wider informational and cultural 
exchanges with the U.S. Government. Some 
of the officials may not have been entirely 
comfortable with the idea, but there seemed 
to be no question of their interest. 

In I'-kutsk, a city in the heart of Siberia, a 
city with a tradition of 300 years and a pres- 
ent that is filled with dramatic growth, our 
exhibit was the center of intense interest. It 
was welcomed with the greatest warmth by 
the Mayor of Irkutsk, a 50-year-old local 
patriot deeply concerned about the growth 
and development of the city where he was 
born. He had visited the United States, es- 
pecially the Pacific Northwest. As he showed 
us the illuminated chart of the plan for his 
city's development, he expressed one great 
goal: to make Irkutsk just like Seattle. I 
firmly believe that the importance of this 
kind of communication to the future of inter- 
national relationships — indeed, to the future 
of civilization- — cannot be overestimated. 

Perhaps of the greatest significance in our 
new communications relationship with the 
Soviet Union is the fact that the U.S.S.R. no 
longer jams the Voice of America. After 

five consecutive years of steady jamming, the 
electronic blockade ceased last September 10. 
This presented us with a new and vastly 
larger audience within the Soviet Union than 
we had before. When I was in the Soviet 
Union, the Voice of America was coming 
through loud and clear in Moscow, in Lenin- 
grad, and in the heart of Siberia. An Ameri- 
can correspondent living in Moscow told one 
of our officers that Russians he knows now 
consider it an "in" thing to listen to the 
Voice and do so openly at home and even on 
the street. Our spacemen in Moscow on the 
Apollo-Soyuz project have been told by their 
Russian counterparts that they and others 
in the scientific community now regularly 
listen to the Voice. The Russian-speaking 
guides with our traveling exhibits report a 
vast increase in VOA listenership. 

While detente has thus given us new and 
welcome opportunities for communication 
with the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, it would be naive — indeed, fool- 
hardy — for us to assume that all differences 
between our countries are about to be wiped 
out. Clearly there is no end to competition 
either in the political sphere or in the realm 
of ideas. General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid 
I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union] himself 
said of the new relationships: "The successes 
of this important matter do not signify in 
any way the possibility of relaxing the ideo- 
logical struggle." In this struggle, while we 
eschew polemics and the rhetoric of the cold 
war, we must meet international competition 
by insuring that a clear and balanced picture 
of the United States and its policies gets 
through abroad, both to those who make deci- 
sions and the public at large. 

In larger focus, the opportunities and 
challenges presented by this set of circum- 
stances were placed in historical context by 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he 

We are at one of those rare moments where 
through a combination of fortuitous circumstances 

' For Secretary Kissinger's address before the 
Third Pacem in Terris Conference at Washington on 
Oct. 8, 1973, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 1973, p. 525. 

January 21, 1974 


and design man seems in a position to shape his 
future. What we need is the confidence to discuss 
issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define 
together the nature of our world, as well as the 
vision to chart together a more just future. 

Information Support for Economic Programs 

In another way, changing world circum- 
stances have placed new demands on the for- 
eign affairs structure of government. As 
national priorities shift, USIA is shifting the 
emphasis of its own programs to lend infor- 
mation support to new foreign affairs objec- 
tives. Toward this end, and while still carry- 
ing on our larger and traditional role, we 
have launched a program to help improve the 
U.S. balance of payments in trade and tour- 
ism. I have called on Agency personnel in 
more than 100 countries to support the trade 
and promotion programs of the Department 
of State and Commerce. We seek to portray 
the United States as an attractive place to 
visit, and we report on scientific and techni- 
cal achievements, including the research and 
development of new techniques and products. 
USIA officers abroad will inform local busi- 
nessmen about U.S. products and services 
available. Our organization will carry on an 
intensive effort to keep the U.S. position 
strong in the world trade. We look forward 
to closer cooperation with the private sector 
in this effort. 

We see this part of our mission as going 
beyond the issue of the balance of payments 
— as important as that issue is. President 
Nixon recently expressed the wider view 
when he said:^ 

. . . trade leads to communication between peoples, 
not just governments but peoples. ... I believe that 
as we increase communication between peoples at all 
levels, the opportunity of discussing differences 
rather than fighting about differences is greatly 

Recently an old friend of mine — a jour- 
nalist — looked at me with an expression that 
can only be described as pity. "You must be 

' For President Nixon's remarks before the Presi- 
dent's Conference on Export Expansion at Washing- 
ton on Oct. 11, 1973, see Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1973, 
p. 553. 

having a terrible time," he said. "How can 
you possibly find anything good to say about 
the United States these days?" 

That point of view touches on a phenome- 
non that I believe is of the greatest signifi- 
cance for the picture of the United States 
which we deliver to the rest of the world. We 
must be careful not to be so obsessed with 
the short-term negatives in our society that 
we are blinded to the long-lasting positives. 
In telling America's story to the world, USIA 
does not try to say that this is a society with- 
out troubles. It would be ridiculous for us to 
do so. Hardline propaganda is a relic of the 
past. We try to explain what is happening 
in the United States in a way that is factual 
and with a perspective that places events in 
the context of the general thrust of the 
American society. 

What was on my friend's mind, of course, 
was that subject that seems so all-encompas- 
sing: Watergate and related matters. On 
our news programs on the Voice of America, 
we report the story of the Watergaie affair 
fairly and factually. We do not, however, 
deal in rumor, hearsay, speculation, or anony- 
mous accusations. When I set that policy 
some of my old friends in the news media 
complained that I had turned censor and was 
somehow suppressing the truth because I 
would not allow rumor, hearsay, speculation, 
and anonymous accusations to run at full 
stream on the Voice of America. It seemed 
to me the only responsible policy for the 
Voice to follow in reporting this story to the 
rest of the world. 

In explaining what is happening in this 
country as a result of the Watergate affair, 
we try to make the point to our overseas au- 
diences that what they are seeing and hear- 
ing is this free and open society working out 
a problem. Charges against people in high 
places have been brought forward and ex- 
tended largely by the free press. These 
charges are being investigated by the legisla- 
tive branch, through the Senate select com- 
mittee, and by the judicial branch, through 
the grand jury system. The interplay of all 
these forces in our society — the free press, 
the executive branch, the legislative branch. 


Department of State Bulletin 

the judicial branch — is being carried out 
very much in public. Ultimately the problem 
will be resolved. Whatever remedial steps 
may be necessary will be taken, and the so- 
ciety will move on. While some of our friends 
abroad ai-e appalled at what they see as a 
nation publicly destroying its own image, our 
unhysterical explanation of the free and open 
working of this society strikes a remarkably 
positive and calming reaction among the 
sophisticated in some lands where such open- 
ness is unknown. 

While it seems at times difficult to avoid 
being obsessed with the negatives that batter 
our eyes and ears here at home, we at USIA 
cannot lose sight of the fact that the prob- 
lems faced on many issues in many other 
countries make our own seem relatively 
minor. Take, for example, the omnipresent 
matter of the cost of living and inflation. It 
is a fact of life that a typical factory hand in 
Britain, France, or West Germany — to cite 
some of the most prominent — must work ap- 
proximately twice as long as one in the 
United States to buy a home, a car, a wash- 
ing machine, a television set, or a dozen 
eggs. As for inflation, the increase in the 
consumer price index from July 1972 to July 
1973 was less in the United States than in 
any major developed country. Shortages? 
Our complaints about shortages would be 
incomprehensible to many relatively ad- 
vanced societies of the world which have 
never known the plenty we have come to 
consider a right. 

In these volatile days, we even hear now 
and then that our country is adrift on the 
international seas. But what country was it 
that served as the catalyst in the effort to 
bring peace to the Middle East — however 
difficult and unending that effort might be? 
Which country is it that, amidst new ten- 
sions, was able to maintain and move toward 
greater development of its new relationships 
with old adversaries with approaches for 
lasting peace? 

Keeping as clear a perspective as we can, 
we at USIA see our foreign communications 
activities as part of a permanent long-range 
process whose effects are cumulative. 

Whether our officers are broadcasting on the 
Voice of America, or editing a magazine in 
Arabic, or scheduling a performance by Duke 
Ellington in Moscow, or setting up an ex- 
hibit in Bulgaria, or arranging a lecture by 
a Fulbright professor in New Delhi, or assist- 
ing a French TV producer to plan a series 
on American environmental programs, or 
giving the facts about U.S. trade policies to a 
Japanese editor, it is all part of the same 
effort: the extremely important work of ex- 
plaining our country and our people, of cor- 
recting or minimizing misunderstandings 
that clog or contaminate relations between 
the United States and other countries. 

These day-to-day contacts give substance 
to the continuing dialogue with foreign 
audiences. By providing facts and points of 
view and the human dimension of personal 
relations, we broaden and strengthen this 
discourse. Collectively and cumulatively 
these efforts affect attitudes and shape per- 
ceptions of the United States. 

On the occasion of his 75th birthday, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas 
expressed a view with which I am in whole- 
hearted agreement, although I am sure that 
if I were privileged to sit in deliberations 
with the Justice he and I might find our- 
selves on different sides of many more 
limited issues. Justice Douglas said: "I think 
the heart of America is sound, the conscience 
of America is bright and the future of 
America is great." 

This is the vision of the United States that 
we want to share and make comprehensible 
to the people abroad so that in our relations 
with other nations distortion and doubt will 
be replaced by confidence, respect, and under- 

Senate Confirms Dr. Ehrlich 
for WHO Executive Board 

The Senate on December 18 confirmed the 
nomination of Dr. S. Paul Ehrlich, Jr., to be 
the representative of the United States on 
the Executive Board of the World Health 

January 21, 1974 



U.S. Cosponsors Resolution Setting 1974 Work Program 
for U.N. Outer Space Committee 

Folloiving is a statement made in Com- 
mittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. 
General Assembly on December 7 by U.S. 
Representative Mark Evans, together with 
the text of a resolution adopted by the com- 
mittee on December 10 and by the Assembly 
on December 18. 


LISUN press release 129 dated December 7 

The First Committee is now considering 
the report of the most outward looking — and 
perhaps forward looking — organization in 
the United Nations family, the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.^ And all 
of us must have been impressed by how this 
expanding peaceful activity in space contin- 
ues to enlarge man's intellectual horizons. 

Just this week Pioneer 10 has fired our 
imaginations as it sped past Jupiter at more 
than 96,000 miles an hour, giving mankind 
its first closeup view of that giant planet. 
We eagerly await the analysis of the images 
and other data that Pioneer 10 has sent back 
and has still to transmit as it continues its 
voyage past the farthest reaches of the solar 
system and beyond. 

Pioneer 10 demonstrates mankind's in- 
genuity in devising technology to do his 
work in the vast distances of space still far 
beyond his reach. This month man himself 
will make his unique contribution to our 
knowledge of the universe when the Skylab 
astronauts take advantage of an unparalleled 
opportunity to observe the comet Kohoutek. 

' U.N. doc. A/9020. 

With the instruments on Skylab, they will be 
able to observe the comet when it is closest 
to the sun and at its brightest. At that time, 
ground-based observations will have very 
limited scope because of scattered sunlight 
in the atmosphere. The astronauts will also 
be able to react to such transient events as 
the sudden flaring and changes in shape that 
are characteristic of comets. 

But space research does far more than help 
man see himself and the universe truly and in 
perspective, important as that may be. Space 
research promises to improve the quality of 
life on earth as well. 

We are reminded daily of how space mete- 
orology and communication help us in our 
life and work here on the earth's surface. 
Participating in the World Weather Watch, 
over 70 countries now make direct use of 
data from U.S. weather satellites. Communi- 
cations satellites such as Intelsat link peoples 
and continents instantaneously. 

More and more, we are learning of the 
promise of a new form of earth-oriented 
space technology: remote sensing by satel- 
lites. To see if this promise can become a 
reality, scientists from 37 countries and two 
international organizations (the U.N. Food 
and Agriculture Organization and the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East) have, along with scientists in the 
United States, initiated investigations on the 
basis of data from the Earth Resources 
Technology Satellite ERTS-1 and the Earth 
Resources Experiment Package on Skylab. 
Brazil has joined Canada in establishing its 
own earth resources data acquisition and 
processing facilities, and other countries 
have expressed interest in doing the same. 


Department of State Bulletin 

One result of the investigations to date bears 
significantly on studies of the long drought 
in Sahelian Africa: the location of subsur- 
face water in close proximity to usable soils. 

We take particular note also of India's up- 
coming experiment in instructional television 
by satellite. Using the ATS-F satellite 
[Applications Technology Satellite], which 
the United States will make available for 
four to six hours a day during the experi- 
ment, India in 1975 will transmit its own 
programs, primarily on family planning and 
agricultural production, from its ground 
station at Ahmadabad via the spacecraft 
directly to some 2,000 specially equipped 
village ground receivers. 

The United States takes great pride in the 
degree to which our national space program 
is based on cooperation with other countries. 
That pride is based not only on our commit- 
ment to the principle of cooperation but es- 
pecially on our conviction that we have a 
better program because of it. The participa- 
tion of other nations in remote sensing in- 
vestigations, in the development of satellite 
meteorology and communications, and in 
scores of other flights and ground-based 
projects in space science and applications 
underlines the point. 

Expanding U.S. Cooperative Space Research 

We are pleased that during the past year 
the scope and depth of cooperation in space 
research was extended significantly. 

A prime example is the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project, the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. flight in 1975 
to test compatible rendezvous and docking 
systems. Flight crews have been named, and 
joint training has begun. U.S. and Soviet 
docking system development units are under- 
going joint testing; and a host of operational 
details have been worked out, such as trajec- 
tories, control center operations, and crew 
activities. At a joint midterm project review 
in October, senior representatives of NASA 
and the Soviet Academy of Sciences con- 
firmed that all joint working group activities 
were on schedule and that the mission could 
be expected to proceed on as planned. Our 

astronauts have just returned from the 

Also particularly worthy of note is the 
recent agreement between NASA and the 
European Space Research Organization 
which provides for development by Europe 
of a manned orbital laboratory, called Space- 
lab, for use in manned missions with the 
NASA Space Shuttle. ESRO will design, de- 
velop, manufacture, and deliver to NASA a 
Spacelab flight unit on behalf of the nine 
European countries which are funding the 
$400 million eff"ort. Spacelab will play an im- 
portant part in realizing the full potential of 
the shuttle. Its development will employ 
European skills on the frontiers of space 
technology. It will be available to many 
countries. Its availability will provide the 
first opportunity for experimenter astronauts 
from other countries to follow their Amer- 
ican counterparts into space and take advan- 
tage of that environment in their work. 

In addition to the joint manned mission 
and Spacelab projects, we are moving ahead 
on bilateral satellite and sounding rocket 
projects, as well as arrangements for launch 
services, with a number of countries. In all 
these activities the United States is guided by 
an underlying policy favoring the broadest 
possible international cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of outer space. This policy was 
first proclaimed by President Eisenhower, 
and it has been consistently upheld through 
all succeeding administrations. John F. Ken- 
nedy enunciated it with characteristic elo- 
quence a decade ago when, in praising the 
accomplishments of pioneer astronauts Yuri 
Gagarin and Alan Shepard, he said : 

We have a long way to go in the field of space. 
. . . But we are working hard and we are going to 
increase our effort. In addition, we are making 
available the scientific information which we have 
gathered to other scientists in the world community 
and people who share our view that the probe into 
space should be peaceful, and should be for the com- 
mon good, and that will continue to motivate us. 

Motivate us it has and does. Just next week 
in Washington a symposium will convene to 
evaluate further the results of the ERTS-1 
experiments, which, as I have noted, reflect 
international participation. The symposium 

January 21, 1974 


is thus the latest fulfillment of President 
Nixon's pledge to this Assembly that the 
United States will share the benefits of our 
earth resources survey program as it "pro- 
ceeds and fulfills its promise." 

Before leaving this survey of our coopera- 
tive activities in space, Mr. Chairman, I 
would like to extend my delegation's thanks 
for the many kind words addressed to us by 
previous speakers concerning those activities 
and U.S. space accomplishments generally. 
Once again, we consider that in a very real 
sense they all belong to mankind. 

U.N. Scientific and Technical Programs 

Turning now to the work of the United 
Nations in outer space affairs during the 
past year, let me say at the outset that my 
delegation thinks the results have been on 
the whole positive. The work, as we know, 
is concentrated in the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its sub- 
sidiary bodies, which have had a busy year. 

The Working Group on Remote Sensing of 
the Earth by Satellites held its fi/st substan- 
tive session. The Working Group on Direct 
Broadcast Satellites met for the first time 
since 1970. The Scientific and Technical and 
Legal Subcommittees held their regular ses- 
sions. All made progress. 

The Working Group on Remote Sensing, in 
our view, achieved a proper perspective for 
the next phase of its work when it recom- 
mended the creation from its ranks of a spe- 
cialized task force to identify, study, and an- 
alyze possible alternatives for international 
dissemination and optimum utilization of en- 
vironmental and resources data, keeping in 
mind the requirements for such data of 
developing countries. The overall purpose 
will be to promote the best possible use of 
remote sensing technology for the benefit of 
individual countries as well as the interna- 
tional community. 

My delegation is gratified that this sug- 
gested approach was approved both by the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and 
the parent committee and that, with the ap- 
proval of the General Assembly, the task 
force is to convene early next year. We think 

this practical, pragmatic approach is the best 
one to take at the present stage of remote 
sensing technology. The United States hopes 
to make a worthwhile contribution to the 
task force study. 

Besides reviewing the work of the Work- 
ing Group on Remote Sensing, the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee focused on the 
U.N. program on space applications, taking 
particular note of the report of the Expert on 
Space Applications, Dr. [H. G. S.] Murthy, 
of India. The subcommittee approved con- 
tinuation of the Expert's work on what we 
regard as a satisfactory, if not ideal, basis, 
keeping in mind the financial straits in which 
the United Nations finds itself. I want to take 
this occasion, however, to reiterate my gov- 
ernment's continuing support for Dr. Murthy 
and his program, which is well calculated to 
bring wider awareness of the prospective 
benefits of space applications to countries in 
varying stages of development. 

The Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
Satellites was asked to consider new devel- 
opments in the field since it last met in 1970. 
It had considerable ground to cover, and at 
the same time many delegations wanted to 
record their views in general debate. While 
relatively few conclusions were reached, the 
broad exchange of views clarified positions 
and resulted in generally acceptable guide- 
lines for the working group's next session in 
spring 1974. 

Delegations are of course aware that views 
differ on the question of possible principles 
on direct satellite broadcasting. The United 
States continues to believe that any meaning- 
ful consideration of such principles must also 
take relevant technical and economic factors 
into account. We are confident that the work- 
ing group will do this in light of paragraphs 
77-79 of its report,- as endorsed by the Outer 
Space Committee. 

Treaties on Registration and the Moon 

Let me now turn, Mr. Chairman, to a look 
at the work of the Legal Subcommittee, 
about which some delegations have expressed 

'U.N. doc. A/AC.105/117. 


Department of State Bulletin 

a degree of disappointment. We share their 
regret that it proved impossible for the sub- 
committee to complete the text either of 
the convention on registration of objects 
launched into outer space or of the treaty 
concerning exploration and use of the moon, 
planets, and other bodies of the solar system. 

I refer to the latter treaty in this fashion 
deliberately, since it is our understanding 
that such an expansion of the scope of the 
original draft treaty on the moon has been 
agreed to in principle. In this connection I 
would like to reiterate my delegation's appre- 
ciation to the distinguished Representative 
of Sweden for having originally brought be- 
fore us the cogent argument in favor of this 
limited extension of the reach of the treaty. 
Especially in view of the planetary explora- 
tion going on right now and projected for 
the near future, we cannot see any reason 
why rules applicable to the moon should not 
apply also to other bodies of the solar system. 

Regarding the issues which still remain 
unresolved in this treaty, my delegation con- 
tinues to hope that the most difficult of these 
— concerning possible future exploitation of 
natural resources — can be resolved. I would 
note that the persisting differences relate 
only to that period before an appropriate and 
mutually acceptable international regime for 
resource exploitation comes into effect. There 
seems to be no disagreement that such a re- 
gime should be established. 

Besides the resources question, it appears 
that only two other issues in the treaty are 
outstanding. These concern the timing of 
international notification of planned missions 
to the moon and other celestial bodies and 
the way in which the scope of the treaty is to 
be formulated. We continue to believe that 
once the resources issue is solved, the others 
should be within our ability to settle. 

The Legal Subcommittee came even closer 
to final agreement on the treaty on registra- 
tion of objects launched into outer space. The 
United States, responding to the stated inter- 
ests of other delegations, took a very active 
part in the subcommittee's negotiations on 
the registration treaty, even though we had 
not been previously convinced of the need to 
change the present system of voluntary regis- 

tration submissions to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. 

Showing the will toward mutual accommo- 
dation that has long characterized the work 
of the Legal Subcommittee, the negotiators 
made great progress. At the end of the sub- 
committee's session, only one issue remained : 
the question of external marking of objects 
launched into earth orbit or beyond. My dele- 
gation's views as to the lack of utility of such 
a provision are familiar; I would only repeat 
that we do not consider that a marking re- 
quirement could help in identifying a space 
object that might return to earth and cause 
damage, which we view as the basic purpose 
of a registration treaty. We hope that this 
point of view will in the end be persuasive to 
those members which up to now have re- 
garded a marking provision as necessary. 

Mr. Chairman, in view of such substantial 
areas of agreement in the draft treaties on 
registration and on the moon and other ce- 
lestial bodies, it is only logical to assign the 
highest priority to efforts to complete them 
at the Legal Subcommittee's next session. 
We therefore support the approach set out 
in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolu- 
tion contained in document A/C.1/L.669, of 
which my delegation is a cosponsor. And we 
agree with the scale of priorities for other 
items on the subcommittee's agenda as set 
out in operative paragraphs 6-8. I should like 
to record my delegation's genuine apprecia- 
tion to the drafter of the resolution for ac- 
curately reflecting the delicate balance of 
different views and interests in relation to 
these items. 

In fact, Mr. Chairman, it is our view that 
the draft resolution as a whole sets out the 
work program for the Outer Space Commit- 
tee and its subsidiary organs for 1974 and 
appropriate guidelines for the relationship 
between the committee and other U.N. bodies 
in a fair, balanced, and comprehensive way. 
We believe this committee should unani- 
mously recommend adoption of the resolution 
by the General Assembly. 

Mr. Chairman, I conclude with a personal 
remark. I recognize that what I am about to 
say has something in it of gazing into the 
crystal ball. But since space activity has 

January 21, 1974 


been born and developed so far so rapidly, 
perhaps you and our colleagues will forgive 
me for relating an experience that was mine 
and gives me great hope for tomorrow. 

Some years ago I spent two days in South- 
ern California at one of the aerospace com- 
panies which has done the most in pushing 
the space technology frontier outward. There 
I was shown a large enclosed area covered 
with strange-looking tripod devices. We were 
required to wear surgical masks, hats, and 
aprons — a precaution against any foreign 
matter, regardless how minuscule, jeopardiz- 
ing the many celestial missions whose jour- 
neys began on that assembly floor. At the end 
of our tour we sat mesmerized, enthralled as 
a modern-day prophet graphically depicted 
the possibility that one day satellites, equi- 
distant in the skies, could contain in com- 
puterized form all of mankind's knowledge 
to be drawn upon by all on earth — an almost 
incomprehensible library in the heavens. 

Visionary? Certainly. But that is the di- 
rection in which international space coopera- 
tion can lead us all. How appropriate that 
this item should be toward the end of our 
work, leaving a sense of realistic hope for 
our children and children's children. Let us 
here at the United Nations continue in that 
direction in the years to come as we share 
the inspiring adventure that is the peaceful 
uses of outer space. Like Neil Armstrong, 
we here take one small step for men — one 
giant step for mankind. 


The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 2914 (XXVII), 2915 
(XXVII), 2916 (XXVII) and 2917 (XXVII) of 9 
November 1972, 

Having considered the report of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 

Noting with appreciation the way in which the 
500th anniversary of the birth of Nicolaus Coperni- 
cus, the great Polish astronomer, had found its re- 
flection in space activities. 

''U.N. doc. A/RES/3182 (XXVIII) (A/C.1/L.669/ 
Rev.l); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 18 by a 
recorded vote of 77 (U.S.) to 0, with 10 abstentions. 

Reaffirming the common interest of mankind in 
furthering the exploration and use of outer space 
for peaceful purposes, 

Recalling its resolution 1721 B (XVI) of 20 De- 
cember 1961, in which it expressed the belief that 
the United Nations should provide a focal point for 
international co-operation in the peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space, 

Reaffirming further its belief that the benefits de- 
riving from space exploration can be extended to 
States at all stages of economic and scientific de- 
velopment on an expanding basis, if Member States 
conduct their space programmes increasingly with a 
view to promoting maximum international co-opera- 
tion, including the widest possible exchange of in- 
formation in this field, 

Convinced of the need for increased international 
efforts, particularly through the United Nations, to 
promote and expand practical applications of space 
technology and believing that wider participation by 
Member States in the activities of the United Nations 
relating to space matters may contribute to the 
objective of such increased international efforts. 

Bearing in mind that, since the establishment of 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
in 1961, the membership of the United Nations has 
been considerably increased and a corresponding en- 
largement of the Committee is therefore desirable. 

Reaffirming the importance of international co- 
operation in developing the rule of law in the peace- 
ful exploration and use of outer space, 

1. Endorses the report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Usf^s of Outer Space; 

2. Invites States which have not yet become par- 
ties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi- 
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, and the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, to give early consideration to ratifying or 
acceding to those international agreements, so that 
they may have the broadest possible effect; 

3. Notes that the Working Group on Direct Broad- 
cast Satellites has discussed the question of elabo- 
rating principles governing the use by States of ar- 
tificial earth satellites for direct television broadcast- 
ing referred to in General Assembly resolution 2916 
(XXVII) and endorses the decision of the Commit- 
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as set out in 
paragraph 66 of its report, to reconvene the Work- 
ing Group in 1974; 

4. Notes that, in responding to the request of the 
General Assembly, the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee 
have achieved further significant progress towards 
the completion of the draft treaty relating to the 


Department of State Bulletin 

Moon and the draft convention on registration of 
objects launclied into outer space; 

5. Recommends that the Legal Sub-Committee 
should, as a matter of highest priority, make its best 
efforts to complete the draft treaty relating to the 
Moon and the draft convention on registration at its 
next session; 

6. Recommends further that the Legal Sub-Com- 
mittee should consider at its next session, as a mat- 
ter of high priority, the question of elaborating 
principles governing the use by States of artificial 
earth satellites for direct television broadcasting 
with a view to concluding an international agree- 
ment or agreements in accordance with General 
Assembly resolution 2916 (XXVII), taking due ac- 
count of the interdisciplinary character of the subject 
and of the work of the Working Group on Direct 
Broadcast Satellites; 

7. Recommends also that the Legal Sub-Commit- 
tee, at its next session, should respond to the request 
for its views, by the Working Group on Remote 
Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, on the legal 
implications of the earth resources survey by remote 
sensing satellites, devoting part of that session to 
this purpose; 

8. Agrees that the Legal Sub-Committee at its 
next session, as time permits, should consider mat- 
ters relating to the definition and/or delimitation of 
outer space and outer space activities; 

9. Welcomes the comments of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, contained in 
paragraph 57 of its report, regarding the role and 
functions of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Com- 
mittee and agrees that, with regard to its future 
work, the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee 
should proceed on the lines indicated in section V 
of its report'; 

10. Notes with satisfaction that, in promoting 
international co-operation in the application of space 
technology, considerable attention has been given to 
the potential of remote sensing of the earth by satel- 
lites to development programmes of all countries, 
especially of developing countries; 

11. Welcotncs the various efforts envisaged by the 
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee of the Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the 
Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by 
Satellites with a view to bringing the benefit of this 
new technology to all countries, especially developing 
countries, including the preparation of a second sur- 
vey of potential users of remote sensing, in regard 
to which a questionnaire on remote sensing of the 
environment and natural resources from satellites, 
covering technical, legal and organizational aspects, 
has been sent to Member States; 

12. Commends this questionnaire to the attention 
of Member States and requests them to respond to it 

* U.N. doc. A/AC.105/115. 

as soon as possible with a view to making progress 
in identifying, studying and analysing the best 
means of disseminating remote sensing data; 

13. Requests the Committee to include in its 
report to the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth 
session, its views on further measures to promote 
international co-operation in the field of remote 
sensing of the earth by satellites; 

14. Considers that the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space and its appropriate subsidiary 
organs will have to give further in-depth considera- 
tion to the legal, organizational and other related 
aspects of remote sensing of the earth by satellites; 

15. Welcomes the continuing progress achieved in 
developing the United Nations programme on space 
applications into a significant means of promoting 
international co-operation in this field, commends 
this programme to the attention of Member States, 
the specialized agencies and interested United Na- 
tions bodies, and draws attention in this respect to 
the request contained in paragraph 43 of the Com- 
mittee's report; 

16. Endorses the United Nations programme on 
space applications as contained in paragraph 36 of 
the report of the Committee and recommends the 
continuing development of the programme, taking 
especially into account the needs of the developing 

17. Notes with appreciation that several Member 
States have offered educational and training facili- 
ties, under United Nations sponsorship, in the prac- 
tical application of space technology and draws the 
attention of Member States, particularly the devel- 
oping countries, to those opportunities as outlined in 
paragraphs 45 to 50 and 52 of the report of the 

18. Further notes the value of United Nations 
panels and training seminars in various fields of 
space application and hopes that Member States will 
continue to offer to serve as host to these panels and 
training seminars, with a view to the widest possible 
spread of information and sharing of cost in this 
new area of development, especially that of the 
developing countries; 

19. Welcomes the efforts of a number of Member 
States to share with other interested Member States 
the practical benefits that may be derived from 
programmes in space technology; 

20. Welcomes further efforts of Member States to 
keep the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space fully informed of their space activities and 
invites all Member States to do so; 

21. Approves continuing sponsorship by the 
United Nations of the Thumba Equatorial Rocket 
Launching Station in India and the CELPA Mar del 
Plata Station in Argentina, expresses its satisfac- 
tion at the work being carried out at those ranges in 
relation to the use of sounding rocket facilities for 

January 21, 1974 


international co-operation and training in the peace- 
ful and scientific exploration of outer space and 
recommends that Member States continue to give 
consideration to the use of those facilities for space 
research activities; 

22. Notes that, in accordance with General As- 
sembly resolution 1721 B (XVI), the Secretary- 
General continues to maintain a public registry of 
objects launched into orbit or beyond on the basis 
of information furnished by Member States and 
welcomes the co-operation of Member States in pro- 
viding relevant information to the Secretary-Gen- 

23. Notes with appreciation that a number of the 
specialized agencies, in particular, the World Mete- 
orological Organization, the International Telecom- 
munication Union, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
have continued to take an active part in the United 
Nations programme for the promotion of interna- 
tional co-operation in the practical application of 
space technology, including the organization of tech- 
nical panels; 

24. Agrees with the Committee that proper co- 
ordination is necessary for activities within the 
United Nations system relating to the peaceful uses 
of outer space; 

25. Requests, therefore, the specialized agencies 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency to con- 
tinue, as appropriate, to provide the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space with progress 
reports on their work relating to the peaceful uses 
of outer space and to examine and report to the 
Committee on the particular problems that may 
arise from the use of outer space in the fields within 
their competence and that should, in their opinion, 
be brought to the attention of the Committee; 

26. Reiterates its request to the World Meteoro- 
logical Organization to pursue actively the imple- 
mentation of its tropical cyclone project, continuing 
and intensifying its other related action programmes, 
including the World Weather Watch and, especially, 
the efforts being undertaken towards obtaining basic 
meteorological data and discovering ways and means 
to mitigate the harmful effects of tropical storms and 
to remove or minimize their destructive potential, 
and looks forward to its report thereon in accord- 
ance with General Assembly resolution 2914 

27. Notes that the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization has been involved in dis- 
cussions on the use of maritime satellites and ex- 
presses its interest in receiving information con- 
cerning activities in this field and other related 

28. Decides to enlarge the membership of the Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and re- 
quests the President of the General Assembly, in 
consultation with the regional groups and with the 

Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, to designate, at an early date and not 
later than 15 May 1974, not more than nine additional 
members, taking into account the principle of equi- 
table geographical distribution; 

29. Endorses the view expressed by the Committee 
in paragraph 68 of its report regarding measures for 
enhancing the effectiveness of the Outer Space 
Affairs Division in order to enable it to meet its ex- 
panding responsibilities in carrying out the United 
Nations programme on space applications and in 
assisting the Committee to discharge its co-ordinat- 
ing functions as the "focal point" in promoting 
international co-operation in this field, as envisaged 
by the General Assembly; 

30. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space to continue its work, as set out in 
the present resolution and in previous resolutions of 
the General Assembly, and to report to the Assem- 
bly at its twenty-ninth session. 

U.S. Gives Views on Strengthening 
the Role of the United Nations 

Following is a statement made in plenary 
session of the U.N. General Assembly on 
November 29 by U.S. Representative W. 
Tapley Bennett, Jr., together ivith the text 
of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on 
November 30. 


USUN press release 121 dated November 29 

My government has carefully studied the 
views of member countries contained in doc- 
ument A/9128 on "strengthening the role of 
the United Nations with regard to the main- 
tenance and consolidation of international 
peace and security," and we find much with 
which we can agree. The United States is 
gratified that several states noted the urgent 
need to achieve agreement on guidelines for 
U.N. peacekeeping operations. We, as other 
members have done, urge that greater use be 
made of the existing means for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, including the good 
offices of the Secretary General, a revitalized 
International Court of Justice, and the virtu- 
ally limitless possibilities of quiet diplomacy 


Department of State Bulletin 

practiced in a spirit of good will and mutual 
compromise. Finally, we are in full agree- 
ment with all those who noted that the suc- 
cess of the United Nations depends primarily 
on the political will of its members to apply 
the principles laid out in its charter. 

Today's consideration of ways to 
strengthen the United Nations seems an ap- 
propriate occasion to call attention to a trend 
which is having just the reverse effect and 
which, if it continues, could seriously weaken 
the U.N.'s potential as an instrument for 
international cooperation. What I am refer- 
ring to is a growing tendency on the part of 
this organization to adopt unenforceable or 
impractical resolutions and to reject con- 
structive if limited action in an effort to 
attain unrealistic "total" solutions. 

The United States supports constructive 
international cooperation along regional, 
political, economic, or ideological lines, in- 
side or outside the United Nations. We real- 
ize that international cooperation must be 
based on the perception of mutual interest 
among like-minded states. We are also suffi- 
ciently familiar with parliamentary practices 
to know that an Assembly of this size can 
only function on the basis of such groupings, 
the composition of which will normally vary 
from issue to issue. We believe that group 
action can play a constructive role, as my 
government was quick to acknowledge in the 
case of the contribution by the nonaligned 
members of the Security Council toward the 
setting up of a U.N. Emergency Force for the 
Middle East. 

However, recent voting patterns within the 
United Nations lead us to consider whether 
or not bloc voting is now too often being used 
in a manner which raises serious questions 
for the future effectiveness of this organiza- 

One concern is with the inclination of 
many U.N. members to support one-sided or 
simplistic resolutions on complicated or con- 
tentious issues, resolutions which do not 
necessarily represent the weight of world 
opinion and which, worse still, have not the 
slightest chance of being effectively imple- 
mented. The United Nations is not an instru- 
ment for wish fulfillment. Rather, it should 

be a catalyst for effective action on world 
problems. Marshaling majorities behind un- 
enforceable resolutions is a meaningless 
activity. It discredits the organization and 
brings ultimate frustration to those on both 
sides of the question who wish to see real 
progress on these difficult issues. 

The case for a responsible approach to the 
issues facing this Assembly was most elo- 
quently made by former Secretary General 
U Thant two years ago in his 1971 annual 
report, when he said: 

It is futile to adopt recommendations which every- 
one knows from the start will have no effect. To 
adopt recommendations which are realistic, which are 
fair to all the interests involved, is bound to influ- 
ence world opinion and to affect the course of events. 
The Assembly thus offers the smaller and the med- 
ium Powers not only a voice, but also a way of in- 
fluencing the course of events far in excess of what 
was previously available to them. To really exer- 
cise this influence, however, the majority must make 
it plain that they will listen to both sides of a case 
and not only to the larger faction. The majority 
must prove that they will seek a realistic way out of 
difficulties rather than resort to condemnations or 

It would be a grave pity if the smaller and medi- 
um Powers throw away their opportunity and fail to 
establish some collective credibility through a more 
realistic approach to what they can or cannot do. 

Another concern is with the willingness of 
some to stall or block U.N. action in areas 
where general if limited agreement may be 
attainable, on grounds of frustration with 
this organization's inability to provide im- 
mediate solutions for more deep-rooted, 
sometimes more fundamental problems 
which perforce require time for full and 
final solution. Progress on many of the great 
issues before us can only come about through 
the most patient, painstaking, and thorough 
processes of diplomacy. Solutions of the 
smaller difficulties and problems we face are 
often the paving stones on the road to solu- 
tions of the larger ones. We can only com- 
plete the journey if we take the necessary 
first steps. Each of us has a responsibility to 
help all of us move forward, to assist the 
world community in reaching a general con- 
sensus where it can, and to avoid destructive 
or dangerous contention where general 
agreement cannot be found. 

January 21, 1974 


The great power of the General Assembly 
lies in its ability to give expression to world 
opinion, to focus attention on problems, to 
point toward or suggest solutions, and to 
help create a climate in which problems can 
be solved. When we adopt patently unrealis- 
tic positions, we discredit this organization, 
and ultimately we further weaken its capac- 
ity to face realistically the very problems we 
want it to solve. Each state member, and 
particularly states whose security and influ- 
ence are most served by the existence of a 
strong United Nations, must be alert lest 
through careless or thoughtless action we 
end by contributing to the whittling away of 
the prestige of the United Nations. I do not 
omit my own delegation from this injunc- 

Each nation i-emains responsible for its 
own actions and thus for its own votes here 
in the United Nations. We have too often 
heard representatives privately admit that 
their delegation was voting against its own 
preferences and convictions on a given issue 
in the interests of one or another form of 
"solidarity." Sovereign states cannot so 
easily abdicate responsibility. Each of us 
must realize that others will judge us — and 
the organization as a whole — by what we do 
in public, not by what we say in private. 
History will judge the United Nations by 
what it accomplishes, not by what it says it 
would like to accomplish. 

The way the United Nations responded to 
last month's hostilities in the Middle East 
gives cause for optimism about this organi- 
zation's ability to function effectively even 
in the most difficult situations. I think we 
have all experienced a revival of spirit in 
recent weeks. If members of this organiza- 
tion can agree on action, tentative and pre- 
liminai'y though it may be, on such long- 
standing problems as the Middle East and 
Korea — as difficult and contentious as any 
issues before us — then there is indeed hope 
that the United Nations may yet come to ful- 
fill the dreams and expectations of its found- 
ers. It is particularly notable that in the 
instances cited all groups within the United 
Nations had their parts in proposing and in 
supporting constructive U.N. action. 

Our present discussion on strengthening 
the role of the United Nations is another ex- 
ample of how reasonable discourse and con- 
structive leadership can help to move this 
organization forward. My government 
wishes to express its appreciation for the 
sincere effort the Romanian delegation has 
made to focus attention on the central prob- 
lem before us all — how to make the United 
Nations more effective in the real world, how 
to move it from rhetoric to relevancy. 

We believe the Romanian delegation has 
made a genuine contribution to the evolution 
of thinking within the United Nations on 
these issues. My delegation intends to vote, 
despite a certain vagueness of language on 
some points, for the draft resolution con- 
tained in document A/L.713. We hope that 
each delegation will have time to study with 
care the many thoughtful statements which 
have been made here. Let us all profit from 
this useful exercise. 


The General Assembly, 

Having further considered the item entitled 
"Strengthening of the role of the United Nations 
with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of 
international peace and security, the development of 
co-operation among all nations and the promotion of 
the rules of international law in relations between 

Recalling its resolution 2925 (XXVII) of 27 No- 
vember 1972, 

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General 
prepared on the basis of that resolution, as well as 
of the views and suggestions expressed in the debate 
on the present item, 

Considering that the new steps taken towards 
achieving the universality of the United Nations are 
likely to contribute to an increase in the capacity of 
the Organization to take effective action for the 
strengthening of international peace and security 
and for the development of international co-opera- 

Aware that the affirmation of a new course in 
international life, aimed at the establishment of an 
atmosphere of confidence and understanding between 
States and at the settlement of international prob- 
lems of general interest with the broadest possible 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/3073 (XXVIII) (A/L. 713); 
adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 30. 


Department of State Bulletin 

participation of States, requires an adequate 
strengthening of the role of the United Nations as a 
centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. 

Concerned about the insufficient use of the frame- 
work provided by the United Nations for the settle- 
ment of problems affecting the interests of all Mem- 
ber States, 

1. Reaffirms that it is imperative that the United 
Nations should become a more effective instrument 
in safeguarding and strengthening the independence 
and sovereign equality of all States, as well as the 
inalienable right of every people to decide its own 
fate without any outside interference, and that it 
should take firm action, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, to oppose foreign 
domination and to prevent and suppress acts of ag- 
gression or any other acts which, in violating the 
Charter, may jeopardize international peace and 

2. Reiterates its appeal to all Member States to 
take full advantage of the framework and means 
provided by the United Nations in order to prevent 
the perpetuation of situations of tension, crisis and 
conflict, avert the creation of such new situations 
which endanger international peace and security, and 
settle international problems exclusively by peaceful 

3. Believes that the United Nations can bring an 
increased contribution to the strengthening of gen- 
eral peace and security by taking actions aimed at 
establishing the relations between all States on the 
basis of the principles of the Charter, and at using 
more actively the machinery and possibilities pro- 
vided by the Charter with a view to preventing con- 
flicts and encouraging the peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes between States; 

4. Considers that the strengthening of the role of 
the United Nations requires continuous improve- 
ment of the functioning and effectiveness of its 
principal organs in the exercise of their responsibili- 
ties under the Charter; 

5. Considers further that, in the context of en- 
deavours to strergthen the role of the United 
Nations, it is important to study and agree upon 
ways and means of enhancing, in accordance with 
the Charter, the effectiveness of the resolutions of 
the General Assembly and other organs of the 
United Nations, inter alia, by actively promoting the 
method of consultation among all Member States 
interested in their elaboration and adoption, as well 
as by evaluating, as appropriate, their practical 

6. Emphasizes that the active participation of all 
Member States in the efforts aimed at strengthening 
the United Nations and enhancing its role in con- 
temporary international relations is essential for the 
success of these efforts; 

7. Urges all Member States, in furtherance of 
these efforts, to fulfil their obligations under the 
Charter and, in accordance with its provisions, to 

implement the resolutions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council; 

8. Invites all Member States to communicate and 
further elaborate on their views, suggestions and 
proposals concerning the strengthening of the role 
of the United Nations not later than 30 April 1974; 

9. Believes that the efforts aimed at strengthening 
the role of the United Nations will be greatly assisted 
by grouping the views, suggestions and proposals 
made on this subject by Member States, so as to 
facilitate their consideration by the appropriate ex- 
isting organs of the United Nations; 

10. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a 
report presenting, in a systematized manner, those 
views, suggestions and proposals formulated at the 
twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth sessions of the 
General Assembly, as well as in the relevant commu- 
nications received from Member States, and to sub- 
mit that report to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth 

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda 
of its twenty-ninth session the item entitled 
"Strengthening of the role of the United Nations 
with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of 
international peace and security, the development of 
co-operation among all nations and the promotion of 
the rules of international law in relations between 

U.S. Calls for Declaration 
on Religious Intolerance 

Following is a statement by Congressman 
John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Representative 
to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Com- 
mittee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cul- 
tural) of the Assembly on October 30. 

USUN press release 106 dated October 30 

The U.S. delegation believes that this com- 
mittee can and should reach agreement in 
this session on a Declaration on the Elimina- 
tion of All Forms of Religious Intolerance. 

Positive action by this committee this year 
toward agreeing to a declaration of princi- 
ples on the basic human right of freedom of 
religion and conscience would not only be 
welcomed by citizens of the vast majority of 
nations but also would be a positive step 
toward achieving tolerance and understand- 
ing among nations. 

If the world's people are to know freedom 
of thought and conscience, we must individu- 

January 21, 1974 


ally and collectively do all within our power 
to help eliminate religious intolerance and to 
foster freedom of conscience. 

The U.S. delegation understands that in 
view of the complexity of the documentation 
some delegations have taken the position that 
it would be better to remand the draft dec- 
laration to the Human Rights Commission 
for further work. This would mean that no 
action will be taken on this vital issue during 
this year which marks the 25th anniversary 
of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and we do not agree with that posi- 
tion, although we do understand it. 

It is of course unfortunate that we do not 
have before this committee a complete draft 
that has been endorsed by the Human Rights 
Commission, but we believe we can and 
should take constructive action now. We be- 
lieve so for two reasons : 

First, the fundamental principles embod- 
ied in a Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Religious Intolerance should 
not be controversial. 

Those principles have been in the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the covenant [on civil and political rights]. 
They are also set forth in the fundamental 
law of most countries of the world. 

Second, my delegation believes that once a 
declaration has been approved establishing 
the broad principles, details can be left to 
the drafting of a convention on the subject 
in future years. 

What we hope to do here and now is simply 
to reaffirm basic general ideals. 

Those ideals have been an essential part of 
the American way of life. 

Our nation was founded in large part by 
individuals seeking to escape religious intol- 
erance. Pilgrims crossed perilous seas and 
settled in an uncharted wilderness in order 
to live, work, and worship as their con- 
sciences dictated. 

Unfortunately some of them then at- 
tempted to establish state churches in the 
American colonies and to cut off the voice of 
dissent and to punish dissenters. It was pre- 
cisely because of this right to dissent so often 

violated and free expression so often denied 
that our Founding Fathers sought to provide 
legal safeguards for freedom of religion in 
the new Republic. These safeguards are set 
down in the first amendment to our Constitu- 
tion, which states : "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 

Within our nation's Capital there are 
houses of worship of virtually every faith, 
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Islam, Bud- 
dhist, Hindu, Baha'i, and many others. Our 
laws protect the right to hold a religious 
faith, but they also protect the right of the 
individual to hold nontheistic or atheistic 
beliefs as well. 

While freedom of religion and belief has 
been attained in many countries, there are 
unfortunate millions of people throughout the 
world who suffer from religious intolerance 
and outright persecution. 

At this advanced point in human history, 
it seems strange and, indeed, quite irrational 
for any government to pit itself against the 
basic rights of its people and seek to thwart 
their noblest aspirations; yet in the area of 
religious repression and intolerance this re- 
mains a fact of life in the present world. In 
some instances such repression is directed 
against Protestant or Catholic Christians, in 
others against Moslems, and often against 
Jews. The adherents of virtually every great 
world faith have been the victims of such 
intolerance, somewhere on earth. 

If we could enact a declaration acknowl- 
edging our unified belief in the right of the 
individual to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, it would establish a standard of 
tolerance which would help to curb such 

We can and should act now, consistent 
with Resolution 3027 (XXVII) of December 
18, 1972, which decided to give priority to 
the adoption, if possible, of such a declara- 
tion. No one can say that this is not possible; 
we ought therefore to proceed to consider 
this matter article by article. 

The Netherlands draft, derived as it is 
from the work which has gone before, is a 


Department of State Bulletin 

document worthy of this subject and of our 
detailed consideration. It reflects a sensitivity 
to the diversity of nations, cultures, govern- 
mental systems, and philosophies represented 
in this chamber. 

In producing the amendments to the work- 
ing group text distributed today as A/C.3/ 
L.2027, the Netherlands delegation has 
performed a useful service to the committee 
by showing the close relationship between 
the two drafts. The broad principles of toler- 
ance proclaimed in both documents should be 
acceptable to men and women of good will 
the world over. 

In response to your very apt request that 
we move from generalities to specifics, Mr. 
Chairman, my delegation is prepared to use 
the working group draft in document A/8330 
as the basis for the discussion and to consider 
it in the light of the Netherlands amend- 
ments and such other amendments as delega- 
tions may wish to offer. The views of my 
government on the six articles of the working 
group draft are on record in document 

My government also has some views as to 
four additional articles which we would like 
to see included. These are set forth in annex 
II of A/8330, and we will be glad to discuss 
them at the appropriate time. 

It would of course be possible to prevent 
the adoption of this declaration during this 
anniversary year by too fine a regard for the 
details of drafting or by procedural obstruc- 
tion. But we believe that the failure of this 
committee to take action may be misinter- 
preted as lack of interest in this important 
subject. We can achieve an acceptable reso- 
lution if we will, and my delegation earnestly 
hopes that we will do so.* 


' In a resolution adopted by the committee by con- 
sensus on Oct. 31 and by the Assembly without ob- 
jection on Nov. 30 (A/RES/3069 (XXVIII)), the 
Assembly invited the Economic and Social Council 
"to request the Commission on Human Rights . . . 
to consider as a matter of priority, the elaboration of 
a draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Religious Intolerance . . . and to submit, if 
possible, a single draft Declaration to the Assembly 
at its twenty-ninth session. . . ." 

Current Actions 



Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Republic of Viet-Nam, Jan- 
uary 3, 1974. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 

Accessions deposited: People's Republic of China, 
October 5, 1973 (with declaration and reserva- 
tion) ; Hungary, September 25, 1973; Iran, Oc- 
tober 5, 1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva March 
25, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Cyprus, November 30, 1973. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London October 25, 1967.' 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, October 1, 



Protocol amending the agreement of February 28, 
1968, as amended (TIAS 6517, 7306), concerning 
civil uses of atomic energy, with exchange of 
notes. Signed at Washington March 28, 1973. 
Entered into force: December 21, 1973. 


Agreement on the establishment of a U.S. informa- 
tion center in Sarajevo in accordance with the 
memorandum of understanding of June 14, 1961. 
Signed at Belgrade July 18, 1973. Entered into 
force provisionally July 18, 1973. 
Entered into force definitively: December 14, 1973. 

' Not in force. 

January 21, 1974 


Second "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on China for 1948 Released 

I'li-ss ii-li-aw ■ll'.l chili'cl DiTiTiil.iT i;i (fell- leli'iisf I)i-i'fml>tT 2H) 

The Dciiiirtim'iil of StaU- released on Decemher 28 
volunie VIII in the series "ForeiRn Relations of the 
United States" for the year 1948. This volume is 
entitled "The Far East: China." 

This 986-page volume contains previously unpub- 
lished documentation relatins: principally to U.S. 
military and (>cononiic assistance to (^hina, as well as 
material on the withdrawal of 11. S. marines and the 
evacuation of .American citizens from China. 

This is the fourth of nine "Foreign Relations" 
volumes to be published on U.S. diplomacy in 1948. 
A companion volume on China (volume VII), cover- 
ing: principally the military and political situation, 
was released in AuRust 197M. 

The volumes are prejjared by the Historical Office, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. ('(>))ies of volume VlII 
(Department of State publication 8(>8;i; (iPO cat. 
no. Sl.l:948/v. VllI) may be obtained for $9.30. 
Checks or money orders should be made out to 
"Superintendent of Documents" and should be sent to 
the U.S. Government Bookstore, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Pnhlications may be ordered hy catalog or stock num- 
ber from the U.S. Govenimciit Printing Office Book- 
store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 
A SH-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
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Latin American Military Expenditures 1967-1971. 
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Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pana- 
ma, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. 
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.Antarctica — Measures in Furtherance of Principles 
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The Senate on Decem ber 19 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

Arthur A. Hartman to be an Assistant Secretary 
of State [for European Affairs]. 

Robert C. Hill to be .Ambassador to Argentina. 

Robert J. McCloskey to be an Ambassador at 

Lloyd 1. Miller to be Ambassador to Trinidad and 

Helmut Sonnenfeldt to be Counselor of the Depart- 
ment of State. 

^Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX January 21, 197 U 

Vol. LXX, No. ISOJt 

Argentina. Hill confirmed as Ambassador . . 76 


Confirmations (Hartman, Hill, McCloskey, Mil- 
ler, Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel) 76 

Senate Confirms Dr. Ehrlich for WHO Execu- 
tive Board 63 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of December 27 .-' . 45 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Hartman, Hill, McCloskey, Miller, 
Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel) 76 

Disarmament. Secretary Kissinger's News 

Conference of December 27 45 

Ecuador. Presidential Determination on Fish- 
ing Boat Seizures (text) 56 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of December 27 45 


Hartman confirmed as Assistant Secretary . 76 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of De- 
cember 27 45 

Human Rights. U.S. Calls for Declaration on 
Religious Intolerance (Buchanan) .... 73 

India. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of December 27 45 

Information Policy. Information and Modern 
Diplomacy (Keogh) 57 

International Organizations. Senate Confirms 

Dr. Ehrlich for WHO Executive Board . . 63 

Japan. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 

of December 27 45 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's New Con- 
ference of December 27 45 

Peru. Presidential Determination on Fishing 
Boat Seizures (text) 56 

Presidential Documents. Presidential Deter- 
mination on Fishing Boat Seizures .... 56 


GPO Sales Publications 76 

Second "Foreign Relations" Volume on China 
for 1948 Released 76 

Space. U.S. Cosponsors Resolution Setting 
1974 Work Program for U.N. Outer Space 
Committee (Evans, text of resolution) . . 64 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 75 

Trinidad and Tobago. Miller confirmed as Am- 
bassador 76 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of De- 
cember 27 45 

Stoessel confirmed as Ambassador 76 

United Nations 

U.S. Calls for Declaration on Religious Intol- 
erance (Buchanan) 73 

U.S. Cosponsors Resolution Setting 1974 
Work Program for U.N. Outer Space Com- 
mittee (Evans, text of resolution) .... 64 

U.S. Gives Views on Strengthening the Role 
of the United Nations (Bennett, text of res- 
olution) 70 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Kissinger's New Confer- 
ence of December 27 45 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 70 

Buchanan, John H., Jr 73 

Ehrlich, S. Paul, Jr 63 

Evans, Mark 64 

Hartman, Arthur A 76 

Hill, Robert C 76 

Keogh, James 57 

Kissinger, Secretary 45 

McCloskey, Robert J 76 

Miller, Lloyd I 76 

Nixon, President 56 

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut 76 

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 76 

No. Dnte 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Dec. 31 -Jan. 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 31 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
464 of December 21 and 472 of December 27. 


Kissinger: letter of sympathy to 
widow of Charles E. Bohlen. 

Popper sworn in as Ambassador to 
Chile (biographic data). 

Mrs. Hutar sworn in as U.S. Repre- 
sentative on U.N. Commission on 
the Status of Women (rewrite). 

Scott sworn in as Ambassador to 
Portugal (biographic data). 

Kissinger: news conference, San 
Clemente, Calif. Jan. 3. 

Marshall sworn in as Ambassador 
to Kenya (biographic data). 

Hill sworn in as Ambassador to 
Argentina (biographic data). 

Barnes sworn in as Ambassador to 
Romania (biographic data). 

Study group 8, U.S. National Com- 
mittee for CCIR. Jan. 18. 

Study group 1, U.S. National Com- 
mittee for CCITT, Jan. 31. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


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A 3: 





Volume LXX 

No. 1805 

January 28, 1974 




Statement by Ambassador Bennett and Text of Resolution 89 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXX, No. 1805 
January 28, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenta 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literatmre. 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public and 
interested agencies of tfie government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, isaued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresse$, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
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United States is or may become a 
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Publications of the Department of 
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international relations are also listed. 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 3 

Folloiving is the trmisoipt of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at San 
Clemente, Calif., on January 3. Gerald L. 
Warren, Deputy Press Secretary to President 
Nixon, introduced the Secretary. 

Pi-ess release 5 dated January 4 

Mr. Warren: The Secretary, as you know, 
has been in San Clemente for a few days in 
discussion with the President on foreign poli- 
cy, on the Geneva talks and the Middle East 
situation. He discussed various matters with 
the President this morning by telephone and 
will begin by taking your questions. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Kissi)ige)': Actually, we have 
been reviewing the Middle East situation as 
well as the whole gamut of foreign policy. 
It hasn't been confined to the Middle East. 
But I will be glad to answer your questions. 

Q. What are the prospects for an early 
peace and disengagement along the Suez? 

Secretai'y Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
we have encouraged negotiations on the sep- 
aration of forces first on the Egyptian front 
but, in principle, also on the other fronts to 
reduce the danger of war, to begin some 
movement toward a peace settlement. 

These talks took place first at kilometer 
101, and while they didn't lead to a settle- 
ment, they led to a clarification of the posi- 
tion of the two sides in a direction that of- 
fered some promise of further progress. 

As you all know, I expect to see Defense 
Minister Dayan, as was agreed when I last 
was in Israel, tomorrow; and unless there 
has been a basic change of view, which I do 
not believe, I expect that good progress can 
be made in the separation of forces along the 
Suez Canal. 

Q. What effect will the elections in Israel 
have 0)1 their staiiding in the talks? 

Sec)eta)y Kissinger: I don't believe that 
the elections will have any effect on the talks 
that are now going on with respect to dis- 
engagement, because there has been, as I 
understand it, a broad consensus in Israel 
that those talks can proceed even before a 
new government is formed. 

What the effect will be of the election on 
the ultimate settlement talks will depend in 
part on the composition of the Cabinet and 
on the negotiations that are now going on 
between the parties, and I think it would be 
premature for me to offer an opinion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you Jiave a timetable 
for when you think that disengagement 
might actually get started? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't have a 
timetable, because a great deal, of course, 
depends on the parties; but it has always 
been understood that after the Israeli elec- 
tions the talks might accelerate, and we 
would expect that after my talks with Dayan 
tomorrow, then when the talks resume next 
week we will then see during the month of 
January how much progress is possible. 

I am not predicting that there will be a 
solution during the month of January. I am 
just saying we will then see what can be 

Q. On a related subject, ivhat are the 
chances of the oil embargo being lifted in the 
ne.rt few weeks or the near future? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I know I keep 
repeating myself about the oil embargo. The 
principles that the President has adopted 
with respect to the oil embargo and that we 
are attempting to implement are as follows. 

January 28, 1974 


We have understanding for the initial Arab 
position. Nevertheless, we believe that it be- 
comes increasingly less appropriate for Arab 
governments to pursue discriminatory meas- 
ures against the United States when the 
United States has publicly declared its sup- 
port for Resolution 242 and has been the 
principal country promoting a settlement in 
the area. 

We cannot engage in negotiations with the 
Arab governments about the specific terms 
that we will support in negotiations in order 
to get the embargo lifted, because it would 
make our foreign policy then entirely subject 
to the producing nations' decisions and would 
set up an endless cycle. 

However, we will continue to make a seri- 
ous effort. We have told the Arab govern- 
ments the direction in which we are moving, 
and we have talked to the Israeli Govern- 

We therefore cannot tie it to any particular 
time frame, but we hope that there will be 
progress on the oil embargo issue, together 
with a general easing of the situation in the 
Middle East. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any thought of 
a counterembargo of some American raw tna- 
terials ivhich are used in the A?-a& countries? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are not planning 
any specific measures of this kind at this 
moment. First, let me make a few general 
observations about the energy problem. 

First, it is important to separate the Mid- 
dle East war aspect of it from the endemic 
long-range problem. There would have been 
an energy problem even without the Middle 
East war, and there will be an energy prob- 
lem after the embargo is lifted. 

The energy problem is produced in part. by 
the fact that the demand has outrun the in- 
centive for supply, and therefore there is a 
common problem on the part of all energy- 
consuming countries to develop new sources 
of energy, to adopt conservation measures 
for existing sources of energy, and to deal 
with this whole new complex of issues pro- 
duced by this rapid rise in energy prices. 

This is why the President asked me to 
propose the Energy Action Group between 

consumers and between consumers and pro- 
ducers, and we will take additional initiatives 
with respect to that within the next week, 
and we believe that that is the long-term 
solution to the energy problem. 

Recent Talks With Le Due Tho 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, did 
you in your talks with Le Due Tho leave him 
with any kind of a ivarning that a North 
Vietnamese offensive woidd be met ivith an 
American response? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, we have 
an agreement that we do not discuss the 
substance of these talks. 

Secondly, we had a general review of the 
situation in Indochina with particular em- 
phasis on the situation in Viet-Nam and 
measures that might be taken to ease the 

We are now both studying these positions. 
We will be in touch with each other in the 
next few weeks, and therefore the thrust of 
our talks concerns the ways to alleviate the 
situation and not particular responses we 
might make to this or that move. 

Q. If I could folloiv up, do you anticipate 
a North Vietnamese offensive now? 

Secretary Kissinger: My old associate Le 
Due Tho is not one of the most confiding of 
men, and he has not in the past been in the 
habit of sharing all his plans with me. I 
would think that on the whole, on narrow 
balance, I would expect that the North Viet- 
namese would recognize that nobody's inter- 
est would be served by an offensive in Viet- 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, will the energy problem 
affect the President's plans for foreign 

Secretary Kissinger: No, the energy prob- 
lem will not affect the President's plans for 
foreign travel. It of course is likely to be a 
subject in conversations, especially with Eu- 
ropean and Japanese leaders, if he should 
meet them later this year. 

The President's plans with respect to Eu- 
ropean travel have been geared to progress 


Department of State Bulletin 

that is being made on the various declara- 
tions that we are discussing now with our 
European allies — a declaration within the 
NATQ framework and a declaration between 
the Common Market countries and the United 

In both of these cases, substantial progress 
has been made, and there is another meeting 
of the Political Directors of the Common 
Market with our equivalent of political direc- 
toi-s, which is Assistant Secretary [for Euro- 
pean Affairs Walter J.] Stoessel and the new" 
Counselor of the State Department, Mr. 
[Helmut] Sonnenfeldt. And we believe that 
after the period in which there was a con- 
junction of the formation of European unity 
with our attempt to redefine Atlantic rela- 
tionships — and these two efforts tended to 
compete with each other for the attention 
of the leaders — that now there is a relation 
on both sides of the Atlantic, that these ef- 
forts are not competitive but complementary, 
and that relatively rapid progress will be 

Q. What can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, 
about the possibility of a European trip by 
the President this spring? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if we make the 
progress in Atlantic relations that I have 
indicated as possible, then it has always been 
foreseen that the President at that point 
might take a trip, and while no final decision 
has been made, this could very well happen 
this spring. 

Presidential Initiative on Energy Problem 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I take you back to 
ike Middle East for a moment. You discussed 
the proposal for a7i energy group. Energy 
Action Group, and you said that the adminis- 
tration intended to take additional initiatives 
within the next iveeks. Can you discuss at all 
what those might be or ivhat the general 
character of those initiatives might be? 

Secretary Kissinger:^ No, of course, this 
will become more apparent when these initia- 
tives are developed, but basically they will 
spell out in somewhat greater detail than I 

did in London our concept of cooperation 
between consumers and between consumers 
and producers. Incidentally, it is interesting 
to point out that some of the most positive 
reactions to this idea have come from the 
producing countries that also seem to feel 
the need for stabilizing what could otherwise 
turn into an extremely competitive and dis- 
ruptive situation, and since they are part of 
the same world economy everyone else is, the 
producing countries cannot have an interest 
in a massive depression. 

So what you will see is a spelling-out of 
the ideas that the President asked me to put 
forward in London, and the initiative will 
probably be undertaken at the Presidential 

Q. In a speech or a statement of some 

Secretary Kissinger: Probably in an ap- 
proach to the various leaders concerned. 

Q. Going back to Indochina for a moment, 
if I may, if there should be a North Viet- 
namese offensive, is it at all possible the 
United States might respond militarily? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to specu- 
late on what the United States would do in 
every circumstance. I have pointed out in 
Washington that we are conscious of the 
legal obligations under which this govern- 
ment operates and that we of course intend 
to observe them. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there have been reports 
that General Dayan is coming here so that 
the United States can coordinate a policy 
with Israel. In view of the fact that the situa- 
tion with the Arabs is so tenuous and you are 
trying to make progress in lifting the oil 
embargo, do you think it is proper fgr the 
U.S. policy to be so tied to the Israeli policy 
that there seeyns to be no separation? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have conducted 
our policy in the Middle East by talking at 
great length with all of the parties concerned. 
We have discussed our ideas on a settlement 
in exactly the same terms with every one 
of the parties involved. Every Arab country 
that is concerned is aware of Mr. Dayan's 

January 28, 1974 


visit to Washington, and I have every reason 
to believe that they welcome the fact that 
the United States is actively pursuing- the 
objective of the separation of forces and that 
they don't vievi^ it at all in the light you have 

Q. Going back to this Preside)itial ap- 
■proach to the producer nations, how high — 

Secretary Kissinger: And consumer na- 

Q. And consumer nations. How high is the 
United States iviUing to let the price of oil 
go; how serious is this situation as you see 
it now? Are you prepared to just let the 
price go on up, or are you going to try for 
some rollbacks or what? 

Secretary Kissinger: You have to under- 
stand that the very way you formulate the 
question demonstrates the nature of the prob- 
lem. It is not in the power of the United 
States to control the rise of these prices. 
These prices are being set by the producing 
countries and under conditions of totally un- 
restrained competition among all the con- 
sumer countries. There is no way any one 
consumer can affect the prices. 

The United States has made it clear that it 
is not in the long-term interest of even the 
producer countries to pursue a policy of un- 
restrained price increases because, as I 
pointed out earlier, the producers, too, are 
living in the same world economy that the 
consumers are. And a worldwide depression 
produced by an imbalance in balance of pay- 
ments and a complete overemphasis on the 
energy side would have the inevitable conse- 
quence of depressing also the situation of the 
producer countries. And many of them have 
come to realize this. 

The situation has developed in this way 
because the long-term demand for energy has 
grown so rapidly and the uses to which 
money can be put are relatively so limited 
that there has been little incentive to increase 
production and an almost unlimited seller's 

One reason why the United States has 
supported cooperative approaches among the 
consumers and between the consumers and 

producers is because — even with good will on 
both sides — unless there is a systematic ef- 
fort to address the problem, there is no way 
any one nation can solve it by itself, not 
even a nation as powerful as the United 
States. It is the example par excellence of 
how interdependent the world has become, 
how impossible purely selfish policies are, and 
how suicidal for everybody it is to pursue 
totally independent courses. 

We will make a major effort to bring the 
prices into some relationship to the needs of 
the growth of the world economy in which 
everybody has a share. And we are also pro- 
foundly convinced that as far as the consum- 
ing countries are concerned, unrestrained 
competition between them would be a disas- 
ter for everybody, and I say that even though 
in the short term we are better placed than 
anyone else to withstand such competition. 

Q. Are these going to be personal appeals 
by the President to King Faisal and — 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go 
into it. They will be announced at the ap- 
propriate moment. But they will be an at- 
tempt to embody the principles that I have 
outlined here, and they are of a very major 
concern of the President right now, to which 
he is giving a great deal of his personal 

Q. Will we get it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know how 
much of it will be made public all at once, 
but you will see the development of this 
approach over the next weeks. 

Common Interest in Energy Problem 

Q. Will one of the principles be an attempt 
to get the producer countries to forswear 
future oil boycotts of this kind? I mean, you 
spoke about our relative independence com- 
pared to Europe and Japan. But it seems to 
me those other countries would have a stake 
in wanting a promise along this line. 

Secretary Kissinger: There are two prob- 
lems, as I pointed out. One is the problem 
of the boycott — there are three problems : the 
boycott, the production, and the prices. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Leaving aside the question of the boycott, 
in the long term, if the Arab countries or if 
the producing countries — it isn't just a ques- 
tion of the Arab countries — if the producing 
countries do not increase their production, it 
will have the same objective consequences as 
a boycott did, because it will mean that there 
will be a constant shortfall of supplies. 

Secondly, if the prices keep rising, then it 
is already estimated that anywhere from 30 
to 50 percent of the foreign reserves of some 
countries will have to be devoted simply to 
the acquisition of energy, and this will affect 
their import policy toward other countries, 
and it will therefore have a very profound 
effect on the whole world economic situation. 

Now, in the short term, it is possible to 
conceive any number of bilateral deals that 
can be made between major consuming 
countries and major producing areas. In the 
short term, it is possible to see how particular 
producing countries can enrich themselves 
by an unrestrained use of their temporarily 
strong bargaining position. 

But in the long term, it is bound to lead 
to disaster for everybody. And therefore we 
are not trying to approach this on a piece- 
meal basis, but on a comprehensive approach 
to the energy problem now and in the fore- 
seeable future to see whether some thought- 
ful long-range policy can be developed. And 
it is peculiarly a case where the common 
interest is also everybody's selfish interest. 

Q. In view of all this, what do you see as 
the most hopeful sign in the Mideast right 
now, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think in the 
Mideast there is a good possibility of prog- 
ress in the separation-of-forces talks. This, 
in turn, will create very positive conditions 
for similar progress on other fronts, and it 
will be a good bridge into the general peace 
talks that will of course continue. 

The President has said, and it has been our 
policy and our conviction, that the chances 
for peace in the Middle East are better than 
they have been in 25 years. That doesn't 
mean that the negotiations won't be extreme- 
ly painful and extremely difficult. 

With respect to the energy situation, on 

the one hand, of course we are going through 
a rather painful period; on the other, there 
is a certain advantage in having the nature 
of a problem that was endemic precipitated 
in a way that one could deal with it compre- 
hensively and at an early enough stage so 
that we could get a look at all of its implica- 
tions on a worldwide basis. So even the dis- 
locations of this year can spur us to develop 
alternative sources of energy, to conserve 
energy in a systematic way, and to enable 
the consuming countries to work together 
and to work together with the producing 
countries to get a long-range policy. So this 
could be seen, this year — if we all act wisely 
and decisively — could be seen as a good tran- 
sitional period. 

Q. Wliat about a country like Japan? It is 
more than a pinch there. They are threatened 
with economic destruction. How long can you 
keep a country like that in check? 

Secirtary Kissinge)-: It is not a question of 
keeping a country like that in check, because 
that is not our attempt. Our attempt — if 
what we are attempting to do works, then 
obviously it must take into account the basic 
needs of Japan. And again, at the risk of 
repeating myself, I can only say that an 
attempt by Japan to deal with its problem on 
a purely national basis will bring it up 
against almost insoluble problems, either of 
price rises or of competition with other coun- 
tries, and I have every reason to believe that 
this is recognized by the Japanese, too. 

We have been talking about a structure of 
peace. We have been talking about the inter- 
connection of events in the world. And when 
we were talking about political matters, it 
sounded abstract and theoretical, but here we 
have a very concrete case in which isolated 
solutions will turn out to be impossible. We 
are not trying to contain Japan. We are try- 
ing to enable Japan to meet its requirements 
within the only framework in which it is 
possible to meet them, and I am confident 
that the Japanese see it in the same way. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you give tis a per- 
sonal note regarding the energy crisis? Com- 
ing out here you traveled commercially. I 

January 28, 1974 


just wondered what your reaction was to 
that flight and the attention you got on it. 
Did yon feel like an average traveler? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, they don't have 
stewardesses on Air Force One. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that same perso)ial 
note, there are a lot of people who are inter- 
ested — particularly women — interested in 
your future. Could you tell tis your mar- 
riage pla)is? 

Secretanj Kissinger: I don't plan them. 

Q. What can yon tell us about your plans 
to get married? 

Secretary Kissinger: I said three weeks 
ago when a particular plan was mentioned, 
that that particular plan — I commented on 
that particular plan and I said that I would 
not make any future comments on my per- 
sonal situation. I would be spending too much 
of my time. I don't want to upset too many 
people. [Laughter.] Humility has always 
been my outstanding trait. [Laughter.] Jerry 
is going to issue a statement putting that 
part off the record. [Laughter.] 

Declarations With Western Europe 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the President's trip 
to Europe which you say could take place as 
early as the spring, tvould there he two sep- 
arate declarations made? Do you foresee 
that, one loith the Common Market and one 
tvith NATO? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, the present plan 
is to have two declarations, one with the 
Common Market and one with NATO. The 
reason is that not every member of the Com- 
mon Market is also a member of NATO and 
therefore it would have been difficult, if not 
impossible, to construct a document that took 
care of both of these groupings. 

Secondly, in the Common Market, the nine 
members speak as a unit, while in NATO 
they are still represented in their capacities 
as individual nations. And therefore there 
will be two declarations: one dealing with 
the issues of mutual security and the political 

issues related to that, and the second one 
related to the emerging European identity, 
the American position vis-a-vis that and the 
united Europe's position vis-a-vis the United 
States, the economic issues, and that part of 
the political relationship that is relevant to 
the relations of a united Europe with the 
United States. 

As I said, we have made very good progress 
on the NATO declaration and we are also 
making progress on the declaration with the 
European Community. We have to stress 
again that to us this is not just a paper 
exercise, nor is it an attempt on our part 
to define legal obligations which can then be 
enforced by one party against the other, 
which is obviously not the case. It is an at- 
tempt on our part to give the democracies 
an opportunity to prove that not all achieve- 
ments in foreign policy are to be sought 
in relations with adversaries, but that those 
countries whose unity and strength and 
dynamism brought them to the point where 
relations with adversaries can be improved 
can also define a future for themselves in a 
world which is different from that of the 
early 1950's. 

It is an opportunity for creativity, not a 
legal haggle in which we are trying to get 
this or that clause, and in this process I think 
the effort has already generated a great deal 
of reexamination on both sides of the Atlan- 
tic and will in i-etrospect, I think, be seen as 
having made a useful contribution. 

Q. If you get these tivo declarations for 
the sake of clarity, then ivhen will the Presi- 
dent he makiyig the trip to Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: Whenever those dec- 
larations are ready for signature and for the 
final stages of the negotiations, the President 
would like — 

Q. No time frame? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I indicated that 
I thought when somebody mentioned this 
spring that that was a possibility. But the 
final decision has not been made, and we do 
not want to set a date and then give our- 
selves a deadline that puts us under pressure. 

We will follow the same procedure that we 


Department of State Bulletin 

followed in other negotiations; that is, we set 
the date when there is a reasonable progress 
in sight. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is impeachment 
floi)/f/ to affect the President's foreign policy 
i)i-itiatives in the comi)ig year — / mea)i, the 
whole fight over it and the threat in Con- 

Secretary Kissinger: I have no reason to 
assume that there will be an impeachment, 
and therefore I don't want to speculate on 
that. We can only conduct foreign policy on 
the assumption that the principles that we 
have attempted to implement of a new rela- 
tionship with our friends, of accelerating 
the progress in easing tensions with our ad- 
versaries, are basic principles of American 
policy which the President will continue to 
pursue because they are right and independ- 
ent of the situation to which you have re- 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there have been some 
reports that since the President lias been be- 
leaguered by the challenge and the complexi- 
ties of Watergate that you, as a Secretary of 
State, have been carrying out policy perhaps 
in a more independent way than in the first 
four ycai's, when you served as an adviser. 
I wonder, sir, if you could address yourself to 
that question. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have read 
those reports, and they are totally incorrect. 
I think the idea developed because now that I 
am Secretary of State the press is traveling 
with me and sees me more regularly than 
they did on previous trips and also there is a 
more detailed reporting of my day-to-day 
activities because of the necessity of daily 
press briefings emerging out of one of the 
great departments. 

I see the President when we are in town 
together every morning for a minimum of 
half an hour, but usually for a much moi'e 
extended period than that. When we are not 
in the same town, I cannot recall a day when 
we do not talk on the telephone. When I 
travel, I send the President a repoi't at the 
end of every day. I am in close touch with 
General Haig [Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 

Assistant to the President] and General 
Scowcroft [Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Dep- 
uty Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs], who are manning the 
White House, with whom I usually talk on 
the telephone even when I am on trips and 
from whom I always get a report. Before I 
go on a trip, the President and I sit down, 
as we always have, and he tells me what his 
general strategy is and what he wants me to 

Having worked as closely together as we 
have for five years, there is no necessity for 
him — and it isn't his style anyway — to go 
into every last tactical detail. But this is not 
new; this is the way it has always been. 

I do not believe that the great departments 
of the government can be personal fiefdoms 
of individual men. The constitutional respon- 
sibility for conducting foreign policy resides 
in the President. The Secretary of State has 
to be the agent of the President, or he repre- 
sents nothing. And in this present situation 
in America, I believe that government has to 
be regular and it has to be conducted on the 
basis of existing constitutional practice. And 
I therefore totally reject the idea that I am 
attempting to conduct an independent policy. 

Europe's Reaction to U.S. Initiatives 

Q. Mr. Seci'etary, going back to the two 
European declarations, did you really give us 
all the reasons why there are going to be two 
declarations? You had said in your New 
York speech that you tvanted a new Atlantic 
charter, and you had spoken of defense, po- 
litical, and economic matters as realistically 
being connected. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. 

Q. The Europeans came back and said, no, 
no, we don't want them connected; we want 
two declarations. Isn't this really jvhat hap- 
pened or lias been evolving? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. What happened 
was when we made the proposal, I think it is 
fair to say that we did not expect that we 
were raising a controversial issue. We had 
reason to believe, on the basis of conversa- 

January 28, 1974 


tions which the President had had with the 
British Prime Minister and exchanges which 
the President had had with other European 
leaders, that this would be an issue that 
would be relatively noncontroversial, would 
be greeted with some enthusiasm, and would 
lead fairly rapidly to a general declaration. 

In this respect, as I pointed out last week, 
the European reaction surprised us and, I am 
frank to say, disappointed us. Now, what 
was the reason for this? 

There were many causes, one of them 
being that this was also the year in which 
the Europeans attempted to form their po- 
litical union and that some of the European 
countries thought that there was an inconsist- 
ency between at one and the same time fos- 
tering European union and greater Atlantic 

Given the way the constitution of the Eu- 
ropean Community is written, one or two 
countries can block the views of the major- 
ity, because it requires the approval of all of 

Secondly, many European countries had 
domestic problems of their own, and there- 
fore the process by which they responded to 
the initiative was somewhat slow and some- 
what uncertain. It was reflected, for exam- 
ple, in the fact that the Europeans could not 
decide among themselves how to respond. 
That is to say, there was one proposal which 
still existed at the time of the meeting be- 
tween the President and President Pompidou 
at Reykjavik, that the declaration should be 
developed at the level of the Deputy Foreign 
Ministers of the individual countries. We 
agreed to that. 

Then there was a proposal that there be a 
series of bilateral meetings between the 
United States and key European countries. 
We had 15 bilateral meetings between the 
United States and key European countries, 
including five by the President himself, with 
Foreign Ministers of other countries, in one 
case the British Cabinet Secretary. And at 
that time we were still talking about a com- 
prehensive declaration because we were deal- 
ing with the European countries as individ- 
ual countries. 

At the end of July, without, incidentally, 
discussing the matter with us, the Europeans 
decided that for the part that concerned 
economics they were going to attempt to use 
our initiative as a device to form European 
unity and to go for the first time in their 
experience through the exercise of develop- 
ing a common political position. 

So at that point, when the Europeans de- 
cided that some issues were going to be 
handled by the Nine and others were going 
to be handled by NATO, we agreed that the 
two could be split but would be signed essen- 
tially simultaneously so that their total effect 
would be in any event one common approach. 

Then, having decided that we were going 
to do it on a common basis, it took the Euro- 
peans three months to develop a common 
declaration. And while it was a major 
achievement for them to get anything agreed 
to among nine countries, its content, in our 
view, did not reflect the difficulty of achiev- 
ing a consensus, and therefore it led to 
another set of negotiations. 

This is the history as I see it. Now, I know 
there were many criticisms made that we 
were trying to link together political, econom- 
ic, and military things and that that was not 
appropriate. The fact of the matter is that 
in practice they are linked, whether they are 
in two declarations or in one declaration. 
And the fact of the matter, however, even 
more importantly, is we do not conceive 
these declarations as a means of blackmail 
on the Europeans. We do not conceive them 
as something that we can use in defining a 
legal obligation from which we can develop 
certain demands. 

What we are trying to do is to see whether 
the free countries in totally changed condi- 
tions from those of the 1950's can define a 
future for themselves and can work coop- 
eratively along these ranges of issues. 

If we want a confrontation with the Eu- 
ropeans on economic matters, those of you 
who know Washington will be aware of the 
fact that we don't need a declaration. Our 
economic agencies are delighted to have a 

With a declaration, what we are trying to 


Department of State Bulletin 

do is to have a long-term political objective 
which would put at rest all of these argu- 
ments : Is the United States planning a con- 
dominium with the Soviet Union — an argu- 
ment that cannot be answered in the ab- 

We have told the Europeans, "For God's 
sake, let's sit down together. What is the 
world we are trying to bring about? We are 
willing to discuss with you what policies 
should be done unilaterally, what policies 
should be done jointly, and we are willing 
to put our detente thinking before you and 
you put yours before us, and let's talk about 
it on that basis." 

All we want from these declarations is that 
they create the framework for it, not a legal 
dicker in which one side then produces a 
document as if we were going to court. 

Q. If the short answer, then, is that there 
aren't going to be any trade concessions — 

Secretary Kissinger: There are no short 
answers in my press conferences. [Laugh- 
ter.] These guys have gotten totally out of 
control since I stopped briefing them. 

Q. If the short answer is that there aren't 
going to he any trade concessions, how 
rapidly and at xvhat pace ivill the administra- 
tion begin reevaluating our military contri- 
bution to Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying the 
short answer is that there won't be any trade 
concessions, because there are negotiations 
going on within the GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariff's and Trade] framework in 
which, of course, our trade bill will be an 
essential component and we expect that there 
will be an agreement also on trade matters. 

However, the new reality that has been 
created by the energy crisis, in terms of re- 
serves and so forth, will force all countries 
to take a new look at their economic rela- 
tionships. And I think it will make some of 
what you previously considered to be irri- 
tating competitive aspects seem somewhat 
less important and will make their solution 
somewhat easier. 

Q. Just a piece of detail. How many coun- 
tries would you like to see involved as con- 
sumers and producers in any kind of group? 
To put it another way, how many tvill 
appeals be made to? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will announce 
that next week. We are in the process of dis- 
cussing it, and it is one of the issues which 
the President has yet to decide. But we have 
a pretty clear idea already. 

Q. On the order of 20? 

Secretary Kissinger: In that general area. 

Detente and Soviet Domestic Policies 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the 
publication of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's book will 
have any effect on our detente with Russia? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our view about de- 
tente has never been geared to our approval 
of the Soviet domestic system. We have 
always maintained that we recognize that 
there is an important difference and, in many 
significant respects, incompatibility between 
the Soviet domestic system and our system. 

It did not indicate moral approval in any 
respect of the Soviet system — even less, of 
course, of the conditions described in that 

Our view about detente is produced by the 
horrors that a nuclear war would inflict on 
mankind and therefore the obligation that is 
imposed on the leaders of all countries to do 
their utmost to prevent such a catastrophe 
from arising. 

This is why we are seeking to moderate 
Soviet foreign policy conduct. This is why 
we believe it is essential for high-level con- 
tact to be maintained, and easy communica- 
tion between the President and the rulers of 
the Soviet Union. And therefore, while we 
have our own views of the conditions which 
are described in this book, they do not ob- 
viate the necessities that I have described. 

Q. Incidental to an earlier question about 
travel, is there a possibility, and if so how 
strong, of another visit by the President to 

January 28, 1974 


the Soviet Union this coming year and also 
one to Japan ? 

Secretary Kissingo': There has been al- 
ready an agreement in principle that the 
President would visit Japan this year, and 
we believe that this is an agreement that can 
be carried out. 

There has also been an agi'eement which 
was reached at the last summit that the 
President would visit the Soviet Union this 
year, and this, too, in fact we are planning 

Now, the exact date of the visit to the 
Soviet Union will depend on progress in 
negotiations which would justify Presiden- 
tial participation in meetings with the Gen- 
eral Secretary, principally SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I follow irp on the 
impeachment question, which I don't think 
yon answered the first time I asked it. Do 
you think the President can be the leader of 
the free world in pretty ambitions schemes 
to maintain economic stability and world 
peace while he is under unprecedented attack 
at home and fighting for the very Presidency 
here in the coming months? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the 
President can do it, and I believe that his 
foreign policy will be recognized as valid in 
the years ahead. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, if I could follow on Pat's 
[Patrick J. Sloyan, Hearst Neivspapers] 
question, do you think it is possible that new 
foreign policy initiatives would be part of 
the President's defense on impeachment? 

Secretary Kissinger: The foreign policy 
of the United States, I think, will be seen to 
have been carried out in a consistent, respon- 
sible manner over the years, according to 
principles that have been laid down in annual 
foreign policy reports, and I believe that it 
will be recognized that the measures are con- 
ducted on their own merit and not for do- 
mestic reasons. 

The Press: Thank you very much, Mr. 

United States Protests Attack 
on Search Mission in Viet-Nam 

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the 
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam at Pajis by the U.S. Embassy on De- 
cember 17. 

Press release 45fiA dated Decemlier 17 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has 
the honor to refer to the Agreement on End- 
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
Nam of January 27, 1973. 

On December 15, 1973, communist forces 
attacked three unarmed helicopters of the 
Four-Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) 
in Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province 
of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This attack 
resulted in the destruction of one helicopter, 
the death of one American and one Viet- 
namese and the wounding of several Amer- 
icans and Vietnamese in the party. These 
helicopters and personnel were engaged in 
the search for missing personnel, a humani- 
tarian mission specifically authorized by the 
Agreement. The helicopters were clearly 
marked in orange, the color designating them 
as FPJMT vehicles. As is customary, the 
communist side had been notified in advance 
of the details of this search mission and had 
been invited to participate. 

The United States condemns in strongest 
terms this unprovoked act by the communist 
side and deplores the unnecessary loss of life 
which has resulted. The United States is 
gravely concerned over this latest contempti- 
ble violation of the Agreement by the com- 
munist side. The United States notes that the 
communist side has consistently adopted a 
callous attitude toward the provisions of the 
Agreement that call for a full accounting of 
the missing-in-action. Now, not content with 
obstructing the implementation of those pro- 
visions through its indifference and total lack 
of cooperation, the communist side has again 
resorted to criminal acts to prevent their 


Department of State Bulletin 

The United States urges the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam to promptly identify 
and punish those on its side who were re- 
sponsible for the deplorable attack in Gia 
Dinh. Beyond that, the United States once 
again calls on the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam to fulfill its undertakings as speci- 
fied in the Agreement and to demonstrate in 
real terms its cooperation in accounting for 
the missing-in-action. The Democratic Re- 
public of Viet-Nam will recognize clearly the 
grave responsibilities it has in this matter. 

President Names Export Council 
and Interagency Committee 

Folloiciiifj is a Wliite House cnnioiiucement 
issued on December 20, together with the text 
of a mcmo)(uidnm signed by President Nixon 
that day establishing the President's Inter- 
agency Committee on Export Expansion. 


White House press release clate<l December 20 

President Nixon announced on December 
20 the appointment of 22 persons as members 
of the President's Export Council. They are : 

Fletcher L. Byrom, of Pittsburgh, Pa., chairman of 
the board, Koppers Company, Inc., Pittsburgh. Mr. 
Byrom will serve as Chairman of the Council. 

F. Perry Wilson, of New York, N.Y., chairman of 
the board and chief executive officer, Union Car- 
bide Corporation, New York. Mr. Wilson will serve 
as Vice Chairman of the Council. 

James H. Binns, of Lancaster, Pa., president and 
director, Armstrong Cork Company, and director, 
Campbell Soup Company. 

Werner C. Brown, of Wilmington, Del., president 
and chief executive officer, Hercules, Inc., Wil- 

Hugh G. Chatham, of Elkin, N.C., chairman of the 
board, Chatham Manufacturing, Elkin ; director. 
Business Foundation of North Carolina, North 
Carolina Textile Foundation, American Textile 
Manufacturers Association, and Hanes Dye and 
Finishing Company. 

Edward W. Cook, of Germantown, Tenn., president 
of Cook and Company, Memphis, Tenn. 

R. Hal Dean, of Glendale, Mo., chief executive officer 
and director, Ralston Purina Company, St. Louis, 

E. Mandell de Windt, of Lyndhurst. Ohio, chair- 
man and president of the board, Eaton Corpora- 
tion, Cleveland, Ohio. 

J. Robert Fluor, of Pasadena, Calif., chairman of 
the board and chief executive officer, Fluor Corpo- 
ration, Los Angeles, Calif. 

John L. Hanigan, of Glencoe, 111., president and 
chief executive officer, Brunswick Corporation, 
Chicago, 111. 

John W. Hanley, of St. Louis, Mo., president and 
chief executive officer, Monsanto Corporation, St. 

John D. Harper, of Pittsburgh, Pa., chairman of the 
board. Aluminum Company of America, Pitts- 

Robert Hatfield, of Greenwich, Conn., chairman of 
the board, president, and chief financial and ex- 
ecutive officer. Continental Can Company, New 
York, N.Y. 

Melvin C. Holm, of Fayetteville, N.Y., president, 
chief executive officer, and chairman of the board, 
Carrier Corporation, Syracuse, N.Y. 

John V. James, of Dallas, Tex., president, chief 
executive officer, and director. Dresser Industries, 
Inc., Dallas. 

Reginald H. Jones, of Greenwich, Conn., chairman 
of the board, chief executive officer, and president, 
General Electric Company, New York, N.Y. 

J. Paul Lyet, of Bronxville, N.Y., director, Sperry 
Rand Corporation, New York, N.Y. 

David C. Scott, of Milwaukee, Wis., chairman of the 
board, Allis Chalmers Corporation, Milwaukee. 

Mark Shepard, Jr., of Dallas, Tex., president, Texas 
Instruments, Dallas. 

Lynn A. Townsend, of Bloomfield Hills, Mich., 
chairman of the board and chief executive officer, 
Chrysler Corporation, Detroit, Mich. 

Calvin W. Verity, Jr., of Middletown, Ohio, chair- 
man of the board, Ai-mco Steel Corporation, Mid- 

T. A. Wilson, of Seattle, Wash., chief executive 
officer, Boeing Corporation, Seattle. 

The President's Export Council was estab- 
lished on December 20 by Executive order.^ 
On October 11, 1973, the President an- 
nounced that he would establish the Council, 
and a new President's Interagency Commit- 
tee on Export Expansion, also established on 
December 20. On October 11, the President 
also announced that he would appoint Mr. 
Byrom as Chairman and Mr. Wilson as Vice 
Chairman of the President's Export Council. 

' No. 11753 ; for text, see 38 Fed. Reg. 34983. 

January 28, 1974 


The President's Export Council and tiie 
President's Interagency Committee on Ex- 
port Expansion, working through the Coun- 
cil on International Economic Policy, will 
recommend short-term action to achieve ma- 
terial improvement in the U.S. trade account, 
long-term programs to achieve equilibrium 
in the U.S. balance of payments, and action 
to remove domestic impediments to U.S. ex- 
ports and improve or supplement existing 

The Committee will submit within 90 days its first 
report on recommendations concerning impediments 
to U.S. exports. 

Richard Nixon. 

Interest Equalization Tax 

Tveasurii Department Announcement 


White House press release dated December 20 

December 20, 1973. 
Memorandum for: 

The Secretary of Agriculture 

The Secretary op Commerce 

The Secretary of Labor 

The Secretary of Transportation 

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 

Deputy Secretary op the Treasury 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi- 

President, Export-Import Bank of the United 

Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission 

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Executive Director, Council on International 
Economic Policy 

This memorandum establishes the President's In- 
teragency Committee on Export Expansion, which 
will report to the President through the Council on 
International Economic Policy. The Secretary of 
Commerce will serve as Chairman with the other ad- 
dressees as members. The President's Interagency 
Committee on Export Expansion will ensure that 
programs and policies that affect the United States 
export performance are coordinated and operate ef- 
fectively to achieve common objectives. 

The Committee will identify, evaluate and make 
recommendations concerning impediments to U.S. 
exports, especially those which are under Federal 
control. It will also consider analysis of other aspects 
of the U.S. export performance such as the ongoing 
interagency evaluation of U.S. export promotion pro- 
grams chaired by 0MB. 

The Treasury Department today [Decem- 
ber 26] announced that, pursuant to an 
Executive order signed by the President,- the 
interest equalization tax (lET) applicable to 
acquisitions of foreign stock and foreign 
debt obligations will be reduced from the 
present rate of approximately three-quarters 
of 1 percent to a new rate of approximately 
one-quarter of 1 percent. The new lower lET 
rate schedule will be applicable to trades and 
acquisitions of foreign stock or obligations 
made after December 31, 1973. 

The lET has been in effect since July 1963 
as a means of helping to restrain flows of 
capital from the United States into portfolio 
investments in other developed countries. 
Under the lET law, the President has au- 
thority to vary the effective rate of tax 
between zero and the equivalent of IV-j per- 
cent per annum on purchases of foreign 
securities subject to the tax. The last change 
in the rate of the tax was on April 5, 1969, 
when it was reduced from li/j. percent to 
three-quarters of 1 percent per annum. 

' Issued on Dec. 26 (Department of the Treasury 
press release). On the same day the Department of 
Commerce announced changes in the foreign direct 
investment program and the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System issued amendments to 
the voluntary foreign credit restraint guidelines. 
The Treasury Department also noted that it will be 
conferring with the Congress during 1974 on the 
question of eliminating the withholding and estate 
taxes applicable to foreign investors in the United 

' No. 11754; for text, see 38 Fed. Reg. 35423. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.N. General Assembly Adopts Convention 
on Protection of Diplomats 

Following is a statement made in plenav]) 
session of the U.N. General Assembly on 
December H by U.S. Representative W. 
Tapley Bennett, Jr., together with the text 
of a resolution adopted by the Assembly that 


USUN press release 134 <lated December 14 

This Assembly can justly be proud of hav- 
ing successfully completed its work on this 
important convention. 

A debt of gratitude is owed to the Interna- 
tional Law Commission. The Commission 
produced the excellent draft which was the 
basis of the Assembly's work and which by 
its excellence greatly facilitated our task. 
Since work of the highest caliber is what we 
can routinely expect from the Commission 
by now, it is worth noting that the Com- 
mission produced this draft at a single ses- 
sion in response to the request of the Assem- 

This effort which the Assembly has 
brought to fruition was in response to an 
urgent need. The long-established principle 
of the inviolability of diplomatic agents was 
being threatened by random acts of violence 
in various parts of the world. The continued 
effectiveness of diplomatic channels, the 
means by which states communicate with one 
another, has been jeopardized. Although the 
legal obligation to protect these persons was 
never questioned, the mechanism for inter- 
national cooperation to insure that perpe- 
trators of serious attacks against such per- 
sons are brought to justice, no matter to 
where they may flee, was lacking. 

The Assembly here and now declares to the 
world that under no circumstances may a 
diplomat be attacked with impunity. In addi- 
tion, the convention sets up a valuable legal 
mechanism which requires submission for 
prosecution or extradition of persons alleged 
to have committed serious crimes against 
diplomats. This mechanism is similar to that 
employed in the field of interference with 
civil aviation — specifically in the Hague (Hi- 
jacking) and Montreal (Sabotage) Conven- 
tions.' Indeed, many of the provisions of the 
new convention have been modeled on pro- 
visions of the Hague and Montreal Conven- 
tions. While the new convention in several 
cases makes drafting improvements or re- 
finements, these are intended simply to 
clarify the intention of the previous conven- 

Paragraph 2 of article 1 defines the term 
"alleged offender." The definition, while 
couched in apparently technical language, 
must of course be read more broadly so it can 
be applied by the various legal systems. We 
shall regard it as incorporating the standard 
applied in determining whether there are 
sufficient grounds for extradition in accord- 
ance with normal extradition practice. 

Article 2 of the convention defines the 
crimes covered. The Legal Committee de- 
cided to cover serious crimes, as was the 
initial intention of the International Law 
Commission. Subparagraph 1(a) has been 
clarified so that instead of referring to "vio- 
lent attack" it refers to "murder, kidnap- 
ping or other attack." Obviously, the words 
"other attack" mean attacks of a similar 

' For texts of the conventions, see Bulletin of 
Jan. 11, 1971, p. 53, and Oct. 12, 1971, p. 465. 

January 28, 1974 


United Stales Signs Convention 
on Protection of Diplomats 

Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr} 

I am gratified to sign today on behalf of the 
United States the Convention on the Preven- 
tion and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter- 
nationally Protected Persons, Including Diplo- 
matic Agents. 

As Ambassador Bennett assured the plenary 
in his statement on this subject, in the two 
weeks since the adoption of the convention by 
the Assembly my government has undertaken 
an urgent review of the final text of the con- 
vention. We have concluded that the text on 
the whole is excellent. In signing the conven- 
tion, the United States signifies its intention 
to begin the necessary process of submitting 
the convention to the Congress and of seeking 
appropriate legislation in order to put us in a 
position to be able to ratify the convention. 

Since the United States thinks this conven- 
tion should go into force as promptly as possi- 
ble, we have acted with a sense of urgency. 
Both the International Law Commission and 
the General Assembly considered the adoption 
of this convention a most urgent matter. In- 
deed, the preamble of the convention itself 
points to the concern generated in the interna- 
tional community by attacks on diplomats. 
The United States hopes that all other govern- 
ments will consider the matter with a similar 
sense of urgency and take prompt action so 
that this convention can be brought into force 
as promptly as possible on a wide geographical 

' Made at U.N. Headquarters on Dec. 28 
(USUN press release 140). Ambassador 
Schaufele is U.S. Deputy Representative in the 
U.N. Security Council. 

serious nature to those expressly mentioned 
— murder and kidnapping. Covering threats, 
attempts, and accessoryship is appropriate 
because of the initial seriousness of the acts 
covered under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of 
paragraph 1. 

The crimes covered in paragraph 1 of 
article 2 are those to which reference is made 
throughout the convention by the phrase "the 
crimes set forth in Article 2." Paragraph 3 
of article 2 does not add to the crimes cov- 

ered by the convention but merely states a 
basic fact that would be true whether or not 
this paragraph were included in the conven- 

Together with articles 1, 2, and 3, articles 
6, 7, and 8 join to form the basic mechanism 
of the convention. This mechanism is ob- 
viously central to the object and purpose of 
the convention, and without it the convention 
could not operate effectively. 

Article 6 establishes the obligation upon 
states parties to insure the continued pres- 
ence for the purpose of prosecution or extra- 
dition of an alleged offender when he is on 
the territory of that state party. The phrase 
"upon being satisfied that the circumstances 
so warrant" merely reflects the fact that 
before a state may take action it must know 
of the presence of the alleged offender in its 

The obligation in article 7 is clearly stated 
to be "without exception whatsoever." It 
forms a central part of the mechanism of the 

Several articles in the convention deal with 
cooperation among states in the prevention 
and punishment of the covered crimes. These 
are articles 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11. Article 4 deals 
with taking all practicable measures to pre- 
vent preparation for the commission of the 
covered crimes. The United States under- 
stands this obligation to refer to doing the 
utmost to prevent attempts to commit such 
crimes or conspiracy to commit such crimes. 
Article 10 is notable in that it substantially 
improves the prospects for proper presenta- 
tion of cases when prosecutions are con- 
ducted outside the territory of the state 
party in whose territory the crime was com- 
mitted. In such cases assistance in connec- 
tion with the criminal proceedings, as well 
as the supply of all evidence at the disposal 
of other states parties, including witnesses 
who are willing or can be convinced to attend 
proceedings in another state, will be neces- 
sary for the mechanism of the convention to 
operate successfully. 

Article 12 is a compromise article which 
was the result of a difficult negotiation. While 
the United States does not see the need for 
such an article in this convention, we recog- 


Department of State Bulletin 

nize that there are some other countries that 
believe it essential that such an article be 
included. This having been said, we worked 
cooperatively with those countries to draft 
an article that is limited in its scope and 
clear in its language. The article states that 
this convention shall not affect the applica- 
tion of treaties on asylum in force as be- 
tween parties to those treaties inter se. That 
is to say, even if the alleged offender is pres- 
ent on the territory of one party to such a 
treaty and the state on the territory of which 
the crime has taken place is also a party to 
such a treaty, if the internationally protected 
person attacked exercised his functions on 
behalf of a state not party to such a treaty 
or the alleged offender was a national of a 
state not party to such a treaty, the state 
where the alleged offender is present may 
not invoke that treaty with respect to the 
non-party state. Thus, the non-party state 
can hold the state where the alleged offender 
is present to its obligations under article 7 
and may, if it wishes, request extradition 
under article 8. 

The United States would have preferred a 
stronger dispute-settlement provision than 
the one contained in article 13. The U.S. 
delegation made proposals to this end dur- 
ing the negotiations. However, many coun- 
tries preferred to follow the model of the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions. Nonethe- 
less, we are gratified that minor technical 
improvements have been made in paragraph 
1 of article 13, which we consider reflect 
more precisely the intention of the drafters 
of the provisions in the Hague and Montreal 

We are also pleased that an acceptable 
compromise has been arrived at with regard 
to the final clauses which permits the widest 
possible adherence to the convention without 
placing the Secretary General in an impossi- 
ble position. 

Since the Assembly did such excellent work 
in completing the convention, we were 
pleased to vote in favor of the resolution 
which constitutes the formal act of adoption 
of the convention. Such a resolution consti- 
tutes the procedural step by which the inter- 
national community, whether operating in 

the context of the General Assembly or a 
diplomatic conference specially convened for 
the purpose, concludes its legislative actions. 
While this resolution contains some para- 
graphs which we would not have considered 
necessary, we nevertheless see no particular 
harm in their inclusion since they do not pur- 
port to impinge — and of course cannot im- 
pinge — upon the convention. One such para- 
graph restated propositions we were all 
pleased to accept in the authoritative 
Friendly Relations Declaration at the 25th 
session. It is perhaps always useful to recog- 
nize fundamental human rights, including 
the legitimate exercise of the right of self- 
determination in accordance with the char- 

Regarding the injunction in paragraph 6 
of the resolution to the United Nations to 
publish the resolution in conjunction with the 
convention, we consider that this requires 
the convention to be published as part of the 
United Nations volumes of resolutions of the 
General Assembly; in addition, the idea of 
including the resolution in the treaty series 
for information purposes could be regarded 
as useful in that those referring to the treaty 
series can conveniently have ready access to 
the resolution. 

The convention will be opened for signa- 
ture today, and my government has begun 
the necessary review of the final text in order 
to enable us to sign it before the end of the 
year. We hope a number of others will do 

The convention would not have been possi- 
ble without the positive cooperation of all 
regional groups. Such cooperation was 
forthcoming, and as a result this Assembly 
has a major positive achievement. 


The General Assembly, 

Considering that the codification and progressive 
development of international law contributes to the 
implementation of the purposes and principles set 
forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 

-U.N. doc. A/RES/3166 (XXVIII); adopted by 
the Assembly without objection on Dec. 14. 

January 28, 1974 


Recalling that in response to the request made in 
General Assembly resolution 2780 (XXVI) of 3 
December 1971, the International Law Commission, 
at its twenty-fourth session, studied the question of 
the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents 
and other persons entitled to special protection under 
international law and prepared draft articles on the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against such 

Having considered the draft articles and also the 
comments and observations thereon submitted by 
States and by specialized agencies and intergovern- 
mental organizations in response to the invitation 
made in General Assembly resolution 2926 (XXVII) 
of 28 November 1972, 

Convinced of the importance of securing interna- 
tional agreement on appropriate and effective meas- 
ures for the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against diplomatic agents and other internationally 
protected persons in view of the serious threat to 
the maintenance and promotion of friendly relations 
and co-operation among States created by the com- 
mission of such crimes, 

Having elaborated for that purpose the provisions 
contained in the Convention annexed hereto, 

1. Adopts the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Pro- 
tected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, an- 
nexed to the present resolution ; 

2. Re-cmi)hasizcs the great importance of the rules 
of international law concerning the inviolability of 
and special protection to be afforded to internation- 
ally protected persons and the obligations of States 
in relation thereto; 

3. Considers that the annexed Convention will en- 
able States to carry out their obligations more effec- 
tively ; 

4. Recognizes also that the provisions of the an- 
nexed Convention could not in any way prejudice 
the exercise of the legitimate right to self-deter- 
mination and independence in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of Inter- 
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations by peoples strug- 
gling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign 
occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid; 

5. Invites States to become parties to the an- 
nexed Convention ; 

6. Decides that the present resolution, whose pro- 
visions are related to the annexed Convention, shall 
always be published together with it. 


Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
OF Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 

The States Parties to this Convention, 

Having in mind the purposes and principles of the 

Charter of the United Nations concerning the main- 
tenance of international peace and the promotion of 
friendly relations and co-operation among States, 

Considering that crimes against diplomatic agents 
and other internationally protected persons jeopard- 
izing the safety of these persons create a serious 
threat to the maintenance of normal international 
relations which are necessary for co-operation among 

Believing that the commission of such crimes is a 
matter of grave concern to the international com- 

Convinced that there is an urgent need to adopt 
appropriate and effective measures for the preven- 
tion and punishment of such crimes, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

For the purposes of this Convention: 

1. "internationally protected person" means: 

(a) a Head of State, including any member of a 
collegial body performing the functions of a Head 
of State under the constitution of the State con- 
cerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, whenever any such person is in a 
foreign State, as well as members of his family who 
accompany him ; 

(b) any representative or official of a State or 
any official or other agent of an international orga- 
nization of an intergovernmental character who, at 
the time when and in the place where a crime 
against him, his official premises, his private accom- 
modation or his means of transport is committed, is 
entitled pursuant to international law to special 
protection from any attack on his person, freedom 
or dignity, as well as members of his family forming 
part of his household; 

2. "alleged offender" means a person as to whom 
there is sufficient evidence to determine prima facie 
that he has committed or participated in one or more 
of the crimes set forth in article 2. 

Article 2 
1. The intentional commission of: 

(a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon 
the person or liberty of an internationally protected 
person ; 

(b) a violent attack upon the official premises, the 
private accommodation or the means of transport 
of an internationally protected person likely to en- 
danger his person or liberty; 

(c) a threat to commit any such attack; 

(d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and 

(e) an act constituting participation as an ac- 
complice in any such attack 

shall be made by each State Party a crime under its 
internal law. 


Department of State Bulletin 

2. Each State Party shall make these crimes pun- 
ishable by appropriate penalties which take into 
account their grave nature. 

3. Parag:raphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way 
derogate from the obligations of States Parties 
under international law to take all appropriate 
measures to prevent other attacks on the person, 
freedom or dignity of an internationally protected 

Article 3 

1. Each State Party shall take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the crimes set forth in article 2 in the following 

(a) when the crime is committed in the territory 
of that State or on board a ship or aircraft regis- 
tered in that State; 

(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that 

(c) when the crime is committed against an inter- 
nationally protected person as defined in article 1 
who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions 
which he exercises on behalf of that State. 

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its juris- 
diction over these crimes in cases where the alleged 
offender is present in its territory and it does not 
e.xtradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the 
States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article. 

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal 

Article 4 

States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention 
of the crimes set forth in article 2, particularly by: 

(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent 
preparations in their respective territories for the 
commission of those crimes within or outside their 
territories ; 

(b) exchanging information and co-ordinating the 
taking of administrative and other measures as ap- 
propriate to prevent the commission of those crimes. 

Article 5 

1. The State Party in which any of the crimes 
set forth in article 2 has been committed shall, if it 
has reason to believe that an alleged offender has 
fled from its territory, communicate to all other 
States concerned, directly or through the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, all the pertinent 
facts regarding the crime committed and all available 
information regarding the identity of the alleged 

2. Whenever any of the crimes set forth in 
article 2 has been committed against an interna- 
tionally protected person, any State Party which has 
information concerning the victim and the circum- 

stances of the crime shall endeavour to transmit it, 
under the conditions pi'ovided for in its internal law, 
fully and promptly to the State Party on whose 
behalf he was exercising his functions. 

Article 6 

1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so 
warrant, the State Party in whose territory the 
alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate 
measures under its internal law so as to ensure his 
presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradi- 
tion. Such measures shall be notified without delay 
directly or through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to; 

(a) the State where the crime was committed; 

(b) the State or States of which the alleged 
offender is a national or, if he is a stateless person, 
in whose territory he permanently resides; 

(c) the State or States of which the internation- 
ally protected person concerned is a national or on 
whose behalf he was exercising his functions; 

(d) all other States concerned; and 

(e) the international organization of which the 
internationally protected person concerned is an 
official or an agent. 

2. Any person regarding whom the measures 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are being 
taken shall be entitled: 

(a) to communicate without delay with the nearest 
appropriate representative of the State of which he 
is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect 
his rights or, if he is a stateless person, which he 
requests and which is willing to protect his rights; 

(b) to be visited by a representative of that State. 

Article 7 

The State Party in whose territory the alleged 
offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, 
submit, without exception whatsoever and without 
undue delay, the case to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings 
in accordance with the laws of that State. 

Article 8 

1. To the extent that the crimes set forth in article 
2 are not listed as extraditable offences in any extra- 
dition treaty existing between States Parties, they 
shall be deemed to be included as such therein. 
States Parties undertake to include those crimes as 
extraditable offenses in every future extradition 
treaty to be concluded between them. 

2. If a State Party which makes extradition con- 
ditional on the existence of a treaty receives a re- 
quest for extradition from another State Party with 
which it has no extradition treaty, it may, if it 
decides to extradite, consider this Convention as the 
legal basis for extradition in respect of those crimes. 

January 28, 1974 


Extradition shall be subject to the procedural provi- 
sions and the other conditions of the law of the 
requested State. 

3. States Parties which do not make extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recog- 
nize those crimes as extraditable offences between 
themselves subject to the procedural provisions and 
the other conditions of the law of the requested State. 

4. Each of the crimes shall be treated, for the pur- 
pose of extradition between States Parties, as if it 
had been committed not only in the place in which it 
occurred but also in the territories of the States re- 
quired to establish their jurisdiction in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of article 3. 

Article 9 

Any person regarding whom proceedings are being 
carried out in connexion with any of the crimes set 
forth in article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment 
at all stages of the proceedings. 

Article 10 

1. States Parties shall afford one another the 
greatest measure of assistance in connexion with 
criminal proceedings brought in respect of the crimes 
set forth in article 2, including the supply of all evi- 
dence at their disposal necessary for the proceed- 

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article 
shall not affect obligations concerning mutual judi- 
cial assistance embodied in any other treaty. 

Article 11 

The State Party where an alleged offender is pros- 
ecuted shall communicate the final outcome of the 
proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall transmit the information to the 
other States Parties. 

Article 12 

The provisions of this Convention shall not affect 
the application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force 
at the date of the adoption of this Convention, as 
between the States which are parties to those Trea- 
ties; but a State Party to this Convention may not 
invoke those Treaties with respect to another State 
Party to this Convention which is not a party to those 

Article 13 

1. Any dispute between two or more States Par- 
ties concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention which is not settled by negotiation 
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted 
to arbitration. If within six months from the date of 
the request for arbitration the parties are unable to 
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one 
of those parties may refer the dispute to the Inter- 

national Court of Justice by request in conformity 
with the Statute of the Court. 

2. Each State Party may at the time of signature 
or ratification of this Convention or accession there- 
to declare that it does not consider itself bound by 
paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties 
shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of this article 
with respect to any State Party which has made such 
a reservation. 

3. Any State Party which has made a reservation 
in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at 
any time withdraw that reservation by notification 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

Article 14 

This Convention shall be open for signature by all 
States, until 31 December 1974 at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York. 

Article 15 

This Convention is subject to ratification. The 
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

Article 16 

This Convention shall remain open for accession 
by any State. The instruments of accession shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 

Article 17 

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the 
twenty-second instrument of ratification or acces- 
sion with the Secretary-General of the United Na- 

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Con- 
vention after the deposit of the twenty-second instru- 
ment of ratification or accession, the Convention 
shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after 
deposit by such State of its instrument of ratifica- 
tion or accession. 

Article 18 

1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention 
by written notification to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 

2. Denunciation shall take effect six months fol- 
lowing the date on which notification is received by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

Article 19 

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
inform all States, inter alia: 

(a) of signatures to this Convention, of the de- 
posit of instruments of ratification or accession in 


Department of State Bulletin 

accordance with articles 14, 15 and 16 and of notifi- 
cations made under article 18. 

(b) of the date on which this Convention will enter 
into force in accordance with article 17. 

Article 20 

The original of this Convention, of which the Chi- 
nese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations, who shall send 
certified copies thereof to all States. 

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, being duly 
authorized thereto by their respective Governments, 
have signed this Convention, opened for signature at 
New York on 14 December 1973. 

U.S. Approves UNHCR Efforts 
To Secure Rights for Refugees 

Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Hnmanitarian and Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly on November 
26 by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde 
Ferguson, Jr., together ivitli the text of a 
)-esoliition adopted by the committee on 
November 27 and by the Assembly o)i De- 
cember ]!(. 


USUN press release 118 ilatetl November 26 

My government wishes to commend the 
High Commissioner for his excellent report.' 
It is a particular pleasure for me to note the 
fine humanitarian work that he is doing 
throughout the world. I personally count it a 
privilege to have been able to work with the 
High Commissioner on other occasions on 
many matters of great import. 

Perhaps no other group has suffered the 
almost complete deprivation of human rights 
as have had refugees. No other group has 
been so shorn of hope. It is the task of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) to rebuild that hope. This re- 
quires above all the restoration to refugees 

' U.N. doc. .\/9012. 

of a great many of those very rights which 
are so clearly enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

We consider that Prince Sadruddin Aga 
Khan has brought the influence of his office 
to bear, in the most salutary fashion, upon 
the lives of refugees the world over. His 
humanitarian work has also contributed sig- 
nificantly to the stability of the countries of 
asylum for refugees. 

My government has consistently stressed 
the overriding importance of the function of 
international protection of refugees among 
the activities of the UNHCR. In the first in- 
stance it is essential that effective safe haven 
or asylum be secured for refugees. The pro- 
vision of asylum is the function and the duty 
of the counti-y into which the refugee has 
fled. But it is likewise the duty of the High 
Commissioner to maintain close coordination 
with governments of asylum countries, with 
the view to insuring that the forcible return 
of refugees to their country of origin — re- 
foulement — shall not take place. Indeed, the 
High Commissioner is given a supervisory 
function in that respect by two international 
treaties — the 1951 U.N. Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 

These treaties are surely two of the most 
important instruments yet formulated to 
implement the Universal Declaration of Hu- 
man Rights. Both treaties recognize the 
priority need for protecting the actual safety 
of the refugee. Some 67 nations have thus 
far acceded to one or both of these interna- 
tional treaties. Yet it remains true that 
roughly one-half of the nations of the world 
have not yet accepted either treaty. My gov- 
ernment applauds the High Commissioner for 
his unrelenting efforts to secure further rati- 
fications of the refugee convention and proto- 

My government finds it particularly dis- 
turbing to learn that cases of refoulement 
continue to occur. We deplore the fact that 
any country would knowingly depart from 
the time-honored U.N. principle that any 
repatriation of refugees must be voluntary. 

January 28, 1974 


and we lend our complete support to the 
persistent efforts of the High Commissioner 
toward terminating this practice. 

As the committee knows, the two refugee 
treaties also contain provisions which would 
guarantee a number of specified rights to 
refugees which are fully consistent with the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These rights in toto form the 
basis enabling the refugee to cease being a 
refugee and through his own eff"orts to take 
his place in the life of his new community, 
living in dignity, self-support, and self- 
respect. The High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees has carried out thoroughgoing measures 
vis-a-vis contracting parties to these treaties 
in the eft'ort to secure their full and rightful 
implementation in the territories concerned. 

My government was interested and grati- 
fied that the World Peace Through Law 
Center, at its sixth biennial world conference 
held at Abidjan in August 1973, devoted 
major attention to the subject of interna- 
tional protection for refugees. I was pleased 
to have been able to participate in the con- 
ference. The conference stressed the direct 
link between the achievement of world peace 
and the attainment of human rights for refu- 
gees. We applaud this concentration of atten- 
tion on this subject on the part of a broad 
cross section of the most eminent of the 
world's lawyers and judges, and we will 
watch with great interest the progress of 
followup action planned by the World Peace 
Through Law Center. 

The UNHCR has extended life-sustaining 
assistance to hundreds of thousands of refu- 
gees through his material assistance pro- 
gram. The High Commissioner has done this 
through projects which from their inception 
are designed to lead ultimately to the com- 
plete rehabilitation of the refugee. 

As the High Commissioner notes, the pur- 
pose of UNHCR assistance is to enable the 
refugee to cease being a refugee. Thus, we 
applaud the High Commissioner's constant 
efforts with asylum countries to facilitate 
naturalization of refugees. Here the High 
Commissioner has used his material assist- 
ance program as an essential complement to 

his international protection function. The 
end objective is to remove the refugee from 
dependence on international resources and to 
assimilate him in new national communities 
with all the rights and protections enjoyed by 

I cannot conclude these remarks without 
particular recognition of the splendid per- 
formance of the UNHCR in carrying out the 
special duties assigned him by the Secretary 
General. First, we wish to commend the High 
Commissioner for his successful efforts in 
providing care and maintenance and finding 
resettlement opportunities for the stateless 
Asians of Uganda. In this connection I may 
note that the United States provided 1,500 
resettlement opportunities in the United 
States for stateless Asians from LTganda. 

At the request of the Secretary General, 
as the Assembly is aware, the High Commis- 
sioner continued his emergency relief pro- 
gram within the Sudan through October of 
this year. My government wishes to congrat- 
ulate the UNHCR on the completion with 
great efficiency of an important and diflicult 
operation. The United States in 1972, and 
subsequently, contributed a very substantial 
portion of the total contribution to the 
UNHCR budgets for the Uganda Asian and 
Sudanese programs. 

Finally, my government wishes to express 
its full confidence that the UNHCR will be 
successful in carrying out his special assign- 
ment as Executive Agent in coordinating the 
exchange of persons in South Asia. The High 
Commissioner has already displayed great 
imagination and an exemplary sense of ur- 
gency in pursuit of this historic task. My 
government is making initial contributions 
totaling $2,150,000 to this special program. 

We should all be grateful that the High 
Commissioner has achieved such a large 
measure of success, in both his regular and 
his special assignments, and that he is press- 
ing so insistently toward necessary ends 
which have not yet been achieved. Of equal 
import is the fact that the High Commis- 
sioner has maintained all of his activities on 
a completely nonpolitical basis. This has been 
one of the key reasons for his great success in 


Department of State Bulletin 

giving meaning to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as it touches upon the lives 
of refugees. 


The General Assembly, 

Having considered the report of the United Na- 
tions High Commissioner for Refugees concerning 
the activities of his Office and having heard his state- 

Noting with appreciation the manner in which the 
High Commissioner has, in accordance with the rele- 
vant resolutions of the General Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Council and the directives of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, carried out essential humanitarian 

Bearing in mind the importance of the increas- 
ingly useful co-operation between the High Commis- 
sioner and other members of the United Nations 
system, resulting in better co-ordination of action 
and greater efficiency in fields of common interest, 

Recognizing the importance of voluntary repatria- 
tion as a permanent solution to the problem of refu- 
gees and the useful role played by the High Com- 
missioner in co-operation with other members of the 
United Nations system and non-governmental 
agencies in assisting them. 

Noting with satisfaction the increasing number of 
Governments contributing to the High Commission- 
er's programme and the generous attitude adopted by 
Governments in supporting various activities of the 
High Commissioner, 

Commending accessions to the Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the protocol relat- 
ing to the Status of Refugees of 1967 and other 
relevant instruments, 

1. Expresses its deep satisfaction at the efficient 
manner in which the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees and his staff continue to accom- 
plish their humanitarian task, and appeals to him to 
consider favourably his re-election on account of the 
unflagging dedication which he has manifested since 
he assumed the responsibilities of his present post; 

2. Requests the High Commissioner to continue 
his assistance and protection activities in favour of 
refugees within his mandate as well as for those to 
whom he extends his good offices or is called upon to 
assist in accordance with relevant resolutions of the 
General Assembly; 

3. Requests the High Commissioner to continue his 

= U.N. doc. A/RES/3143 (XXVIII); adopted by the 
Assembly without objection on Dec. 14. 

efl'orts, in co-operation with Governments, United 
Nations bodies and voluntary agencies, to promote 
permanent and speedy solutions through voluntary 
repatriation, assistance in rehabilitation where neces- 
sary, integration in countries of asylum or resettle- 
ment in other countries; 

4. Urges Governments to continue to lend their 
support to the High Commissioner's humanitarian 
action by: 

(a) Facilitating the accomplishment of his task 
in the field of international protection; 

(b) Co-operating in the promotion of permanent 
solutions to refugee problems; 

(c) Providing the necessary means to attain the 
financial targets established with the approval of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 

U.S. Votes for November 1974 
World Food Conference 

Folloiving is a statement ryiade in plenary 
session of the U.N. General AssemhUj on 
December 17 by U.S. Representative W. Tap- 
ley Bennett, Jr., together with the text of a 
resolution adopted by the Assembly that day. 


USUN pi-ess release 136 dated December 17 

I wish to express the appreciation of my 
government for the cooperation of all mem- 
bers who have contributed their time and 
their ideas to the consideration of plans for 
the World Food Conference. It is a credit to 
the United Nations system that in the short 
time since this matter was proposed to the 
General Assembly in late September, it has 
been reviewed and approved by the 17th Gen- 
eral Conference of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the Economic and Social Coun- 
cil, the Second Committee, and now the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

My government takes satisfaction in 
events leading to passage by the General 
Assembly of the resolution calling for the 
convening of a World Food Conference. Sec- 
retary Kissinger called attention to the 

January 28, 1974 


pressing nature of the problem in his speech 
to the General Assembly on September 24 
when he said : 

The growing threat to the world's food supply 
deserves the urgent attention of this Assembly. Since 
1969, global consumption of cereals has risen more 
rapidly than production; stocks are at the lowest 
levels in years. We now face the prospect that — even 
with bumper crops — the world may not rebuild its 
seriously depleted reserves in this decade. 

My government believes that a World Food 
Conference can significantly assist the world 
community in meeting this challenge of 
global proportions. The purpose of the con- 
ference, as we and many other delegates here 
have noted, would be to explore means to 
maintain adequate food supplies in the face 
of rising world demand and to prevent 
hunger and malnutrition resulting from na- 
tional disasters. The conference will offer 
an opportunity to agree on principles appli- 
cable to all governments in this effort. 

The U.S. proposal for a World Food 
Conference is fully consistent with the 
multilateral trade negotiations just now 
beginning. We believe that they are com- 
plementary. Questions of trade and of the 
supply and demand for food are highly inter- 
related. On the one hand we hope to see the 
multilateral trade negotiations reaching 
agreement on specific commitments by coun- 
tries to deal with all the factors that under- 
lie trade distortions and trade in agricultural 
products specifically. We see the World Food 
Conference, on the other hand, not as a ne- 
gotiating forum for agricultural trade issues 
but as an opportunity for arriving at gen- 
erally accepted principles and objectives in 
the agricultural field which can facilitate 
negotiations in other international fora. 

Turning to preparations for the food con- 
ference, we are pleased to note that there is 
general agreement that the conference should 
be preceded by a careful analysis of factors 
directly relevant to the food situation. In our 
view this review should include assessment of 
the demand and supply outlook, the projected 
pace of technological change, and the pros- 
pects of the developing countries improving 
their food production, both for their own 

domestic consumption and for export. We 
believe that this type of information will 
provide an essential basis for eflfective plan- 
ning by the international community. 

Mr. Chairman, it is generally recognized 
that increasing food production in develop- 
ing countries is a fundamental requirement 
if we are to assure long-term world food 
security. Increasing this food production, as 
many delegates have pointed out, involves a 
vast range of agricultural, trade, and devel- 
opmental issues — issues that often transcend 
the strictly agricultural field. A single con- 
ference cannot reach useful decisions on all 
these questions. Accordingly, we believe that 
the World Food Conference must concentrate 
on a few key issues where improved inter- 
national cooperation can reasonably be ex- 
pected to produce substantial results quickly. 

For example, one means of increasing food 
availabilities within a relatively short time 
in the developing countries lies in devising 
more effective measures to prevent the large 
crop losses which regularly occur as a result 
of pests, plant diseases, and inadequate stor- 
age facilities. 

Another measure, on which work is al- 
ready being done, is the maintenance of ade- 
quate stocks of food to enable the world 
to cope effectively with shortfalls in produc- 
tion and surges in demand. The World Food 
Conference may wish to build on the work of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization in 
this field by developing a set of principles 
that would define the responsibilities of all 
countries for the maintenance of adequate 
stocks. In this connection, attention should 
also be paid to the role of independently held 
commercial stocks as an important part of 
world food reserves. 

In addition to food reserves, the United 
States believes that food aid and disaster 
relief are areas that would benefit from im- 
proved international coordination. Guidelines 
for both donor and recipient nations should 
be worked out that will insure that food aid 
is used as effectively as possible, both to meet 
disaster relief needs and also to encourage 
agricultural productivity. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States believes 


Department of State Bulletin 

that the nations of the world have in the 
World Food Conference a unique opportunity 
to rededicate themselves to the goal of pro- 
viding sufficient food for all the world's 
people, a goal which, as Secretary Kissinger 
said on September 24, is an essential element 
and a prerequisite for the sort of world com- 
munity we all seek. 


The General Assembly, 

Recognizing that the principal task of a world 
food conference, on which the greatest effort should 
be concentrated, consists in developing ways and 
means whereby the international community as a 
whole could take specific action to resolve the woi'ld 
food problem within the broader context of devel- 
opment and international economic co-operation. 

Believing that a world food conference would 
provide members with a forum in which to bring: 
about the improvement of world food security and 
emergency assistance, 

Recognizing that the conference should, in the first 
instance, place emphasis on additional measures for 
increasing the food production, consumption and 
trade of developing countries. 

Recalling that the Fourth Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held 
at Algiers from 5 to 9 September 1973, called for 
the convening, as a matter of urgency, of a confer- 
ence on food problems at the ministerial level, spon- 
sored jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion of the United Nations and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, and further 
recalling the proposal of the United States of Amer- 
ica for the convocation of a world food conference 
under the auspices of the United Nations, 

1. Decides to convene a World Food Conference 
under the auspices of the United Nations for about 
two weeks, in November 1974, in Rome; 

2. Recommends that the Conference be an inter- 
governmental conference at the ministerial level ; 

3. Entrusts the Economic and Social Council with 
over-all responsibility for the Conference; 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/3180 (XXVIII); adopted by 
the Assembly without vote on Dec. 17. 

4. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulta- 
tion with the Director-General of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development, to appoint as 
soon as possible a Secretary-General of the Confer- 
ence, and to set up a small Conference secretariat 
drawing pai'ticularly upon the expertise and com- 
petence of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, the United Nations Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development and other relevant 
bodies of the United Nations system; 

5. Recommends that in preparing for the World 
Food Conference, proper account be taken of the 
recommendations of the seventeenth Conference of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations and of the recommendations made by legisla- 
tive bodies of other organizations in the United Na- 
tions system concerning the goals and objectives of 
the Conference, as requested by the Economic and 
Social Council in its decision of 18 October 1973; 

6. Invites all the competent organizations of the 
United Nations system to collaborate closely in the 
organization of the Conference; 

7. Accepts with appreciation the invitation of the 
Government of Italy to act as host to the Conference 
in Rome. 

Ambassador Martin To Coordinate 
U.S. Participation in Food Conference 

Secretary Kissinger announced on De- 
cember 21 (press release 467) the appoint- 
ment of Ambassador Edwin M. Martin as 
Coordinator of U.S. participation in the 
World Food Conference. The U.N. General 
Assembly adopted unanimously on December 
17 a resolution providing that the conference 
should be held in November 1974. The hold- 
ing of the conference was proposed by Secre- 
tary Kissinger in his inaugural speech to the 
U.N. General Assembly in September. Am- 
bassador Martin, who will report directly to 
the Secretary of State, will take up his new 
duties early in 1974. (For biographic data, 
see press release 467.) 

January 28, 1974 


United States Opposes Move To Change Representation 
of Cambodia in the United Nations 

Statement by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 

U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly ' 

Last week this Assembly discussed means 
of strengthening the United Nations. During 
that debate the United States called attention 
to the growing tendency of some of our mem- 
bers to propose simplistic one-sided resolu- 
tions on the most complex and difficult of 
issues, resolutions often totally unacceptable 
to the parties concerned. My delegation 
pointed out then that in divorcing itself from 
reality in this manner, the General Assembly 
was weakening its ability to have impact on 
the real problems we face in many parts of 
the world. 

Regrettably, the resolution we are consid- 
ering today is particularly notable both for 
its one-sidedness and for its failure to take 
account of the real situation as it presently 
exists in Cambodia and in East Asia. One 
can only wonder at the curious twists of 
logic which have produced a resolution 
through which some members of the non- 
aligned movement appear to support great- 
power hegemony in Asia, through which 
self-proclaimed revolutionary governments 
appear to support the divine right of a royal 
pretender, and through which some of those 
among us who are the most vociferous in 
denouncing outside interference in the affairs 
of sovereign states now propose that this As- 
sembly instruct the Khmer people on who is 
to represent them. 

Certainly the complexities of the issue 

' Made in plenary session of the U.N. General 
Assembly on Dec. 5 (USUN press release 126, corr. 

before us are worthy of a more balanced, 
considered approach than that taken by this 
resolution. One must wonder whether its 
sponsors have thought through seriously the 
consequences of what they propose. Have 
they asked themselves, for example, why it is 
that only one East Asian member govern- 
ment supports seating Prince Sihanouk's 

Many delegations here have been quick to 
voice their concern over any appearance of 
great-power domination and their resent- 
ment whenever they believe they sense the 
possibility of a great-power dictate. Have 
they, I wonder, thought about the implica- 
tions of this resolution for Asia ? Have they 
asked the views of their many East Asian 
colleagues? Have they considered that they 
would be siding with the great power of the 
area against the smaller ones? 

Yesterday the distinguished Representa- 
tive of Thailand referred to the views of 
seven Asian and Pacific states — Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philip- 
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. These states 
have formulated their position on the issue 
before us and have circulated it among the 
U.N. membership in document A/9254. I 
believe that all of us have an obligation to 
examine these views carefully. Many mem- 
bers here have, in other circumstances, in- 
sisted on the importance of giving primacy 
to states of a region or their regional group- 
ing in seeking solutions to problems of their 
respective area. In this case, it seems to me. 


Department of State Bulletin 

we are fortunate to have a regional con- 
sensus before us, and we should certainly 
give it the greatest weight in our considera- 

The argumentation made in support of the 
"Royal Government of National Union of 
Cambodia" seems to rest largely on the prin- 
ciple that since Prince Sihanouk is at its 
head, it must be the true government of Cam- 
bodia. But with all due respect to Prince 
Sihanouk's once intimate, often constructive 
role in earlier Cambodian developments, I 
submit that we can find some more objective 
and reliable criteria for deciding who gov- 
erns Cambodia. Better yet, can we not allow 
the Cambodian people the privilege of mak- 
ing this determination themselves? The 
Cambodian people have not, so far as I know, 
granted Prince Sihanouk any irrevocable 
right to rule over them. Neither, I submit, 
should we. 

Among the sponsors of the resolution 
before us are some of the most vocal sup- 
porters of the principle of noninterference in 
the internal afi^airs of sovereign states. Have 
they fully considered the basic conflict be- 
tween this principle and support for a resolu- 
tion by which foreigners would tell the 
Khmer people who is to represent them in 
this world organization? 

It is hard to conceive of a more gross or 
more blatant interference in the internal 
affairs of a member state. If this were to 
become a precedent, who is to say what 
member state in this Assembly might not be 
the next victim of such a procedure? 

All of us who have been reading the inter- 
national press — reputable journals such as 
Le Monde of Paris and the Guardian of Brit- 
ain, which enjoy a large audience here in 
the United Nations — are aware that Prince 
Sihanouk himself admits that he is not in 
control of his "government" and that his 
"government" is not in control of Cambodia. 
Prince Sihanouk does not head a govern- 
ment-in-exile; he is a non-government-in- 
exile. Have the supporters of the resolution 
before us given thought to the precedent they 
are setting in seeking to have the United 
Nations decide the issue of Cambodian rep- 

resentation not on the basis of who actually 
governs Cambodia, but rather who they 
would like to have govern Cambodia? 

But let us leave the never-never land of the 
"Royal Government of National Union of 
Cambodia" and resolution A/L.714. Let us 
turn our attention to the real world, to what 
has happened in Cambodia, what is happen- 
ing, and what my delegation believes most of 
us hope will happen. 

In March of 1970, Prince Norodom Siha- 
nouk was removed as the Chief of State of 
Cambodia by a unanimous vote of the Cam- 
bodian Parliament under the terms of the 
constitution then in effect, the constitution 
that Prince Sihanouk himself had pro- 
claimed. The complaint against the Prince 
which led to his removal was his open and 
since publicly admitted complicity with 
North Vietnamese forces in the prosecution 
of their war against the Republic of Viet- 
Nam. His activity included his giving per- 
mission for large-scale use of Cambodian ter- 
ritory by South Vietnamese Communists and 
the North Vietnamese Army over a period of 
years. This occupation began to supplant the 
indigenous Cambodian inhabitants and, in a 
de facto manner, to annex the areas occu- 
pied. Here is the real intervention by a for- 
eign force. This is the intervention that 
began the tragedy of Cambodia. 

The removal of Prince Sihanouk was not 
a palace coup. It resulted from popular dis- 
affection and general discontent with the 
then existing situation. The initial demon- 
strations began in the provinces, protesting 
North Vietnamese occupation of their terri- 
tory, and quickly spread to the capital, cul- 
minating in the Parliament's unanimous de- 
cision to remove Prince Sihanouk from the 

I might note that Prince Sihanouk's re- 
moval from office was not accompanied by 
any change of government. The government 
in existence at the time had been chosen by 
the Prince in August of the preceding year, 
and the Parliament had been elected in 1966 
from his own political organization. This 
government remained in office, reiterated its 
adherence to all treaties and agreements, and 

January 28, 1974 


made no substantive changes in its own com- 

No sooner had the Cambodian Govern- 
ment made the single change of removing 
Sihanouk and begun negotiations with Viet- 
namese Communist representatives for the 
withdrawal of their troops from Cambodia, 
.than those troops began to attack police and 
army posts in and near their areas of occu- 
pation, to widen their zones of control, and 
to protect their base areas. How many here 
protested that interference by foreign forces 
in the internal affairs of a member state? 

Following his removal from office, Siha- 
nouk turned to an insurgent group which he 
had previously tried, with considerable suc- 
cess, to suppress, the Khmer Rouge, and to 
the Vietnamese occupation forces in an effort 
to regain his personal power. He himself 
has chosen to live in Peking. The principal 
bases of his mandate to rule Cambodia — 
North Vietnamese troops, Chinese diplo- 
macy, and an externally supported insur- 
gency — do not enhance the legitimacy of his 

The situation at present is that the Gov- 
ernment of Cambodia is fighting alone, with- 
out the assistance of foreign ti'oops or for- 
eign advisers, against a local insurgency led, 
equipped, and substantially assisted by the 
forces of a foreign country. North Viet-Nam. 

The Government of the Khmer Republic 
has never ceased to maintain its clear con- 
trol of the machinery of government, the 
support of a great majority of the population, 
and administration of the crucial urban areas 
and territories in which the greatest portion 
of the economic, social, and political life of 
the Khmer people takes place. It thus com- 
mands the resources and enjoys the support 
of the people of the state and consequently 
is in a position to carry out the obligations of 
Cambodia under the U.S. Charter. 

My delegation flatly rejects as untrue the 
assertions by the delegation of Algeria and 
the delegation of China that the insurgents 
in Cambodia control a majority of the Khmer 
people. We have all, of course, unfortunately 

grown accustomed to the shrill insistence of 
the Algerian delegation that they must be 
the one-sided arbiter of almost every issue 
that comes before this body, and few will 
be surprised to know that the Algerian dele- 
gation has resorted to gross invention and 

The General Assembly should be more 
concerned that the delegation of China has, 
regrettably, chosen to repeat the false 
charges and misstatements of fact which we 
heard from its representative in the Gen- 
eral Committee. And I am sorry to see that 
it has once again employed harsh invective 
against my country. Repetition does not 
make false allegations and misstatements of 
fact true. China is, after all, a permanent 
member of the Security Council. We believe 
China's privileged position in this organiza- 
tion entails certain responsibilities, including 
the responsibility of the Chinese delegation 
to present its views in a reasonable tone, free 
from propaganda excesses and intentional 

It is true that North Vietnamese and in- 
surgent forces have disrupted government 
control, in the military sense, of some parts 
of the territory of Cambodia. Claims by the 
insurgents and their foreign supporters that 
they control 90 percent of the territory and 
80 percent of the population are patently 
false. The deep water port of Kompong Som 
and 16 of the 20 Provincial capitals are 
controlled by the Government of the Khmer 
Republic. The four Provincial capitals ex- 
cepted, all in the northeast of the country, 
were abandoned to the North Vietnamese 
Army in June of 1970. The bulk of the 
Khmer population lives along the lines of 
communications and rivers. These are gen- 
erally controlled by forces loyal to the gov- 
ernment in Phnom Penh. We estimate that 
more than 70 percent of the population is 
administered by the Government of the 
Khmer Republic. 

The territory in which the North Vietnam- 
ese and the Khmer Rouge hold sway is pri- 
marily rural in character. The areas of cen- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tral importance to the main functions of 
government and the social patterns of Cam- 
bodian hfe, as well as the major markets and 
other ports, are clearly under full govern- 
ment control. Neutral foreign observers are 
free to visit the areas under Phnom Penh 
control and do so as a matter of course. It 
should also be noted that even in those areas 
under the military control of North Vietnam- 
ese and insurgent forces, a large part of 
the population retains its allegiance to the 
Government of the Khmer Republic. The 
thousands of refugees who flee the fighting 
in contested zones go only to territories in 
wliich the government has clear control. 

In any case, the fact that government con- 
trol of certain parts of the territory of Cam- 
bodia has been interrupted by North Viet- 
namese and insurgent forces has no neces- 
sary relationship to the question of the de- 
gree of effective authority exercised by the 
self-styled Sihanouk "government." That 
entity, which has long had its base in a for- 
eign capital far distant from the territory of 
Cambodia, has not even demonstrated its 
control over the insurgent forces operating 
in Cambodia. Nor is there any indication 
that that entity controls any sort of adminis- 
trative machinery which might exercise gov- 
ernmental authority in territory under the 
military control of insurgent and North Viet- 
namese forces. 

The fighting in Cambodia goes on, and as 
long as the North Vietnamese are willing to 
continue, there is no end in sight. Should 
we, in view of this long, costly, and still-un- 
resolved conflict, conclude that the Khmer 
people were wrong to resent and resist for- 
eign aggression ? Should we declare that they 
were naive to believe their country could 
avoid the domination of its powerful neigh- 
bors to the north? Should we now explain to 
them that they must accept a regime based in 
Peking, that they must allow North Viet- 
Nam to occupy and control much of their ter- 
ritory, and that they must never again seek 
to change their policies, nor their Chief of 
State, without first securing the approval of 

China, North Viet-Nam, and this Assembly? 
We cannot believe that states valuing their 
own sovereignty and represented in this 
Assembly would display such arrogance in 
trying to dictate to the people of a member 
state of the United Nations. 

As for the Khmer people, they chose not 
to accept the dictates of a cynical realpolitik 
which took no account of their national 
pride, their dignity, and their freedom. In 
removing Prince Sihanouk from office, the 
Government of Cambodia sought to preserve 
its neutrality, its independence, and its sov- 
ereignty, national rights which it felt Prince 
Sihanouk had ceased to defend. Are we to 
tell the Khmer people that these principles 
are only words, that they do not apply to 
small, weak states with strong aggressive 
neighbors? Has this organization so for- 
gotten the ideals of its founders? Have we so 
departed from the principles of our charter? 

Clearly there is much disagreement among 
us as to how the present situation in Cam- 
bodia came about or as to how it should be 
resolved. But the United States would hope 
that we could all agree that a negotiated set- 
tlement is preferable to a military solution. 
Let us all read the public statements and 
study the private actions of the Government 
of the Khmer Republic, and on the other 
hand those of Prince Sihanouk, to determine 
which of the two is truly seeking peace, 
which of the two has off"ered to negotiate, 
and which of the two has accepted the need 
for conciliation. It is the Government of the 
Khmer Republic that has repeatedly stated 
its willingness to negotiate a political settle- 
ment. It is Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer 
Rouge who seek to prolong the violence and 
the bloodshed. Let us not therefore seek to 
discredit those who are seeking a peaceful 
settlement. Let us not take any action which 
can only complicate the situation and further 
block the path to peace.- 

- On Dec. 5 the Assembly adopted, by a rollcall vote 
of 53 (U.S.) to 50, with 21 abstentions, a motion that 
consideration of the item be adjourned until the 29th 
General Assembly. 

January 28, 1974 


U.S. Discusses Situation 
in Namibia 

Statement bij W. Tapley Bennett, J/J 

Given recent events, it is entirely fitting 
and in fact necessary that the Council again 
review the unique role of the United Nations 
with regard to Namibia and that we examine 
the situation in the territory. We would like 
to take this opportunity to thank the Secre- 
tary General for his conscientious efforts in 
carrying out his mandate under the terms of 
Security Council Resolutions 309, 319, and 
323 and to express our appreciation for the 
detailed report of April 30 on his contacts 
with representatives of the Government of 
South Africa.- With hindsight, perhaps it 
would have been more useful had the Council 
met sooner to consider the conclusions 
reached by the Secretary General in his re- 

It has been nearly two years since the 
Council first invited the Secretary General to 
initiate contacts to enable the people of 
Namibia to exercise their right to self-deter- 
mination. The situation in Namibia today 
appears on the surface much as it was when 
Resolution 309 was passed. It has been said, 
accordingly, that the contacts between the 
Secretary General and the South African 
Government have not been successful in 
meeting the objectives set by the Council. 

Rather than simply accepting this asser- 
tion, however, let us examine what has taken 
place. Through the Secretary General's con- 
sultations, U.N. officials visited Namibia, 
examined conditions firsthand, and met with 
Namibians. These visits were a concrete 
illustration to the people of the territory, and 
to the world, of the U.N.'s concern and re- 
sponsibility for Namibia. 

We should not undervalue the Secretary 
General's achievement in obtaining South 
Africa's assurances on Namibia. Foreign 

'Made in the U.N. Security Council on Dec. 11 
(USUN press release 131). Ambassador Rennett is 
U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations. 

= U.N. doc. S/10921. 

Minister Muller stated that South Africa 
would respect the wishes of the whole popula- 
tion in Namibia and would allow all political 
parties "full and free participation in the 
process leading to self-determination and 
independence." He added that South Africa 
had no intention of delaying self-determina- 
tion and would cooperate with the Secretary 
General to determine measures to achieve 
this goal. The South African Government 
also asserted that it did not foresee the sud- 
den independence of individual population 
groups. On balance — and I believe that his- 
tory will support this view — we believe that 
the Secretary General's efforts have been 
beneficial to U.N. involvement in the Nami- 
bian question. 

We have followed recent events in Na- 
mibia, however, with deepening concern. We 
believe that the South African Government 
could have avoided, and still can avoid, such 
developments which call into question its 
good faith. We have in mind in particular 
that government's persistence in implement- 
ing its so-called homelands policy in evident 
contradiction to previous assurances given 
the Secretary General. The numerous arrests, 
the arbitrary suppression of political activity, 
and the public floggings of dissidents conflict 
sharply with the tenor of South Africa's 
statements to the Secretary General. 

The reaction of my own government to 
South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia in 
fact predates these moves. Since May 1970 
we have followed a policy of discouraging 
further American investment there and have 
advised potential investors that we will not 
intercede to protect their investments against 
claims of a future legitimate government in 
that territory. 

As Council members will recall, it was on 
July 29, 1970, that the Security Council re- 
quested the International Court of Justice to 
give an advisory opinion on the following 
question : What are the legal consequences 
for states of the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970)? 

The United States participated in both the 
written and oral phases of the argument of 
the case. The U.S. position was that the 


Department of State Bulletin 

United Nations had succeeded to the super- 
visory powers of the League of Nations over 
the mandate granted South Africa to admin- 
ister Namibia and that therefore the General 
Assembly had validly terminated that man- 
date by its Resolution 2145 of October 27, 
1966. The United Nations had assumed di- 
rect responsibility for the territory, and 
South Africa was under an obligation to 
withdraw its administration. Until it did so, 
however, its responsibilities to the people of 
Namibia continued. On June 21, 1971, the 
Court handed down its advisory opinion, the 
conclusions of which were consonant with the 
U.S. position. 

The United States regrets, Mr. President, 
that South Africa has not abided by the 
spirit of its discussions with the Secretary 
General. Yet we are reluctant to eliminate 
the possibility of future talks. As we are all 
aware, a number of seemingly intractable 
international conflicts and problems have 
been solved during the past several years by 
patient, dogged negotiations. Are the people 
of Namibia not deserving of similar efforts? 
The United States continues to believe that 
such discussions are also the most realistic 
way of gaining self-determination for the 
people of Namibia. A number of questions 
concerning South Africa's plans for Namibia 
require more specific replies. What timetable 
does South Africa propose for Namibia's 
self-government? What steps is South Africa 
willing to take now to improve political and 
social conditions in the territory? The Secre- 
tary General should be free to seek answers 
and to look into the welfare of Namibians 
reportedly arrested for speaking with visit- 
ing U.N. officials. 

We should not delude ourselves that prog- 
ress toward Namibian self-determination 
will be quick. As the Secretary General has 
cautioned, time and protracted discussion 
will be required. Nonetheless, we believe con- 
tacts between the Secretary General and 
South Africa are valuable in illuminating 
South Africa's policies and actions. It is ne- 
gotiation on Namibia, as on other differences, 
which holds the promise of ultimate success. 

No matter what one might think of the 
sincerity of the Soutii African Government, 

responses already given to the Secretary 
General by Foreign Minister Muller repre- 
sented important departures from previous 
policy. They signal openings which are ad- 
mittedly narrow but which we believe to be 
worth further exploration.^ 

U.N. Defers Action on Proposal 
for Human Rights Commissioner 

Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cidtural) 
of the U.N. General Asscmblij on December 5 
by U.S. Representative William F. Buckley, 
Jr., together with the text of a resolution 
adopted by the committee on December 4 and 
by the Assembly on December H. 


USUN jiress release 1:^5 <laled Decemher o 

My government desires to explain its ab- 
stention yesterday on the two votes in this 
committee that followed the truncated debate 
on the motion of creating a High Commis- 
sioner for Human Rights.' 

It is our understanding that the purpose of 
this committee is to devise means of promot- 
ing human rights around the world. The 
arguments of tiiose opposed to the creation 
of a High Commissioner appeared to center 
on the concern that said High Commissioner 
would interfere in the internal affairs of 
their countries. Our understanding was that 
suitable precautions against such interfer- 
ences, in violation of the United Nations 
Charter, were built into the pending pro- 

"In a resolution (S/RES/342 (1973)) adopted 
unanimously on Dec. 11, the Security Council decided 
"to discontinue further efforts on the basis of resolu- 
tion 309 (1972)" and requested the Secretary General 
"to keep the Security Council fully informed about 
any new important developments concerning the 
question of Namibia." 

' On Dec. 4 the United States abstained on a sep- 
arate vote on the words "thirtieth session" in opera- 
tive paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, as well as 
on the draft resolution as a whole. 

January 28, 1974 


posal. On the other hand, we cannot deny 
that there is a sense in which the mere es- 
pousal of human rights in an international 
organization is to interfere philosophically 
with the internal affairs of some countries. 
Human rights is an ideal to which we all pay 
lipservice. Even the best intentioned among 
us serve that ideal asymptotically; in some 
societies, with such studied unsuccess as to 
call into question whether we can really call 
human rights a shared ideal. Among those 
who spoke yesterday in opposition to a High 
Commissioner for Human Rights were states 
who would have you believe that such is the 
congestion of human rights within their fron- 
tiers that it is necessary to surround them- 
selves with great walls and oceans to prevent 
these human rights from emigrating. 

My government registers its sorrow that 
all the work that in the last eight years has 
gone into the concept of a High Commis- 
sioner, who might have proved technically 
useful in promoting human rights, has ap- 
parently been of no avail. We regret that the 
noble resolution proposed by the distin- 
guished delegates of Sweden and Costa Rica, 
for which we intended enthusiastically to 
vote, was not submitted for action in this 

Mr. Chairman, why did the United States 
then abstain on the proffered resolution, as 

For one thing there was the lack of clarity. 

It was not clear yesterday, and it is no 
clearer this morning — indeed, my distin- 
guished colleagues appear to be divided on 
the interpretation — what exactly is the mean- 
ing of the phrase "alternative approaches" 
as used in the third paragraph of the adopted 
resolution, recording that we have decided to 
include in the provisional agenda of the 30th 
session of the General Assembly an item 
entitled "Alternative approaches and ways 
and means within the United Nations system 
for improving the effective enjoyment of hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms." 

"Alternative" suggests a choice. As used in 
the adopted resolution, it could be held to 
mean "other than." Other than what? Other 
than a High Commissioner? But this com- 

mittee has not rejected the idea of a High 
Commissioner. It can only be understood, by 
all members here present, as having agreed 
to postpone action. The ambiguity, however, 
remains. Since the Government of the United 
States is in favor of a High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, it is obvious that we could 
not vote for a resolution which might be 
interpreted as suggesting that we reject a 
Human Rights Commissioner as a means of 
promoting the cause of human rights. It is 
more likely, Mr. Chairman, that the majority 
of my distinguished colleagues intended that 
the phrase "alternative approaches" meant 
something more accurately given as "sup- 
plementary approaches" ; that is to say, 
approaches — not excluding a High Com- 
missioner — for improving the effective en- 
joyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that go beyond those approaches 
already institutionalized in the United Na- 

However, Mr. Chairman, even if that am- 
biguity had been clarified, my government 
could not in good conscience have voted to 
put off stimulating the pursuit of human 
freedoms until the 30th session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. To suggest, as one of my 
distinguished colleagues did, that we need 
more time in order to permit our ideas to 
"mature" is a melancholy reflection on the 
priorities given to human liberty, reminding 
us that in the recorded history of our planet, 
human rights are as a grain of sand in a huge 
beach. It is, as several of my colleagues sug- 
gested yesterday, infinitely disappointing to 
the people of the world that the United 
Nations does not do more of a concrete na- 
ture to serve the cause of human rights. It is 
grotesque that the United Nations should de- 
cline formally to meditate the problem until 
1975. If, as the Secretary General said on a 
recent occasion, to satisfy the human hunger 
for rights is as necessary in its way as to 
satisfy the human hunger for bread, then we 
can be held to have acted as callously as the 
keeper of the granary who will wait two 
years before listening to the supplications of 
the hungry. 

Even so, Mr. Chairman, my government 


Department of State Bulletin 

could not vote against any resolution that 
commits us to the search for means of im- 
proving the effective enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms at any 
time, not even if the resolution had called for 
turning our attention to the subject in 1985 
rather than 1975. 

This, then, the explanation of my govern- 
ment, most respectfully registered. 


The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 2841 (XXVI) of 18 De- 
cember 1971 and Economic and Social Council reso- 
lution 1237 (XLII) of 6 June 1967, 

Taking note of the deliberations of the General 
Assembly, since its twentieth session, on the item 
entitled "Creation of the post of United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights", 

Taking note also of the note by the Secretary- 
General on the question,' 

Bearing in mind the Proclamation of Teheran of 
13 May 1968," 

Having regard to the existing machinery and pro- 
cedures within the United Nations system for the 
implementation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, to the proceedings of the various organs 
and bodies of the United Nations and to the various 
modalities suggested in the course of the delibera- 
tions of those bodies for the more effective imple- 
mentation of human rights and fundamental free- 

Expressing its hope that the International Cove- 
nants on Human Rights will enter into force in the 
near future, 

1. Reaffirms its conviction that further measures 
should be considered to ensure universal realization 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction of any kind; 

2. Decides to keep under review the consideration 
of alternative approaches and ways and means 
within the United Nations system for improving 
the effective enjoyment of human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms; 

= U.N. doc. A/RES/3136 (XXVIII); adopted by 
the Assembly on Dec. 14 by a recorded vote of 105 
to 0, with 23 abstentions, the United States voting 
in favor of the resolution. 

' U.N. doc. A/9139. 

' For text of the proclamation adopted by the U.N. 
International Conference on Human Rights at Teh- 
ran on May 13, 1968, see Bulletin of Sept. 2, 1968, 
p. 258. 

3. Decides accordingly to include in the provisional 
agenda of its thirtieth session an item entitled "Al- 
ternative approaches and ways and means within the 
United Nations system for improving the effective 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental free- 


Current Actions 



Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Entered into force April 18, 1973. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratification deposited: United 

States, December 10, 1973. 
Enters into force: United States, March 10, 1974. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the uni- 
versal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which en- 
tered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratification deposited: Guinea, July 26, 1973. 

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Ratification deposited: Guinea, July 26, 1973. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Notification of intention to apply transitional pro- 
visions: Uruguay, November 19, 1973. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 

January 28, 1974 


1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for tiie 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Sudan, November 15, 1973. 
Notification of intention to appli/ transitional pro- 
visions: India, November 19, 1973. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. 
Proclaimed by the President: November 21, 1973. 


International whaling convention and schedule of 
whaling regulations. Done at Washington Decem- 
ber 2, 1946. Entered into force November 10, 
1948. TIAS 1849. 
Adherence deposited: Brazil, January 4, 1974. 

Protocol to the international whaling convention of 
December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Wash- 
ington November 19, 1956. Entered into force 
May 4, 1959. TIAS 4228. 
Adherence deposited: Brazil, January 4, 1974. 


Treaty on extradition. Signed at Asuncion May 24, 
Ratified l)ij the President : November 21, 1973. 


Treaty on extradition and cooperation in penal mat- 
ters. Signed at Washington April 6, 1973.' 
Ratified by the President: November 21, 1973. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of November 9, 1973. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon December 
18, 1973. Entered into force December 18, 1973. 




Agreement establishing a cooperative program for 
the operation and maintenance of a network 
of rawinsonde observation stations in Brazil. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro 
March 12," 1968. Entered into force March 12, 
1968. TIAS 6500. 
Terminated: November 19, 1973. 


Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Tehran February 1, 1973. 
Entered into force: January 9, 1974. 

Agreement extending the agreement of October 6, 
1947, as amended and extended (TIAS 1666, 1924, 
2068, 2947, 3112, 3520, 6594, 6886, 7070, 7207, 
7576), relating to a military mission. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Tehran August 8 and Decem- 
ber 12, 1973. Entered into force December 12, 


Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 
Ratified by the President: November 21, 1973. 

Khmer Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 
7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom 
Penh December 14, 1973. Entered into force De- 
cember 14, 1973. 

Not in force. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock num- 
ber from the U.S. Government Printing Office Book- 
store, Department of State, Washington, B.C. 20520. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium 
amending annex B to the agreement of January 27, 
1950. TIAS 7695. 3 pp. 25<''. (Cat. No. 89.10:7695). 

International Field Year for the Great Lakes. Agree- 
ment with Canada. TIAS 7698. 7 pp. 25(*. (Cat. No. 

Supporting Assistance Loan. Agreement, with annex, 
with Malta. TIAS 7699. 10 pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with the Netherlands. TIAS 7700. 7 pp. 25('. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7700). 

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Rinder- 
pest. Agreement with El Salvador. TIAS 7701. 10 
pp. 25(<. (Cat. No. 89.10:7701). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the 
Khmer Republic. TIAS 7703. 10 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem- 
bourg amending annex B to the agreement of Janu- 
ary 27, 1950. TIAS 7705. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX Jarmanj 28, 197i Vol. LXX, No. 1805 

Agriculture. U.S. Votes for November 1974 
World Food Conference (Bennett, text of 
resolution) 97 

Cambodia. United States Opposes Move To 
Change Representation of Cambodia in the 
United Nations (Bennett) 'T . 100 

Department and Foreign Service. Ambassador 
Martin To Coordinate U.S. Participation in 
Food Conference 99 

Economic Affairs 

Interest Equalization Tax Reduced (Treasury 

announcement) 88 

President Names Export Council and Inter- 
agency Committee (White House announce- 
ment, memorandum from President Nixon) 87 

U.S. Votes for November 1974 World Food 

Conference (Bennett, text of resolution) . . 97 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 3 77 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 3 77 

Human Rights. U.N. Defers Action on Pro- 
posal for Human Rights Commissioner 
(Buckley, text of resolution) 105 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of January 3 77 

Namibia. U.S. Discusses Situation in Namibia 

(Bennett) 104 

Presidential Documents. President Names Ex- 
port Council and Interagency Committee . . 87 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 108 

Refugees. U.S. Approves UNHCR Efforts To 
Secure Rights for Refugees (Ferguson, text 
of resolution) 95 

South Africa. U.S. Discusses Situation in 

Namibia (Bennett) 104 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 107 

U.N. General Assembly Adopts Convention on 
Protection of Diplomats (Bennett, text of 

resolution) 89 

United States Signs Convention on Protection 

of Diplomats (Schaufele) 90 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 3 77 

United Nations 

Ambassador Martin To Coordinate U.S. Par- 
ticipation in Food Conference 99 

U.N. Defers Action on Proposal for Human 
Rights Commissioner (Buckley, text of res- 
olution) 105 

U.N. General Assembly Adopts Convention on 
Protection of Diplomats (Bennett, text of 
resolution) 89 

U.S. Approves UNHCR Efforts To Secure 
Rights for Refugees (Ferguson, text of res- 
olution) 95 

U.S. Discusses Situation in Namibia (Bennett) 104 

United States Opposes Move To Change Rep- 
resentation of Cambodia in the United Na- 
tions (Bennett) 100 

U.S. Votes for November 1974 World Food 

Conference (Bennett, text of resolution) . . 97 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
January 3 77 

United States Protests Attack on Search Mis- 
sion in Viet-Nam (U.S. note) 86 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Taplev, Jr 89, 97, 100, 104 

Buckley, William F., Jr 105 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 95 

Kissinger, Secretary 77 

Martin, Edwin M 99 

Nixon, President 87 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 90 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 7—13 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 7 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
456A of December 17, 467 of December 21, and 
5 of January 4. 

No. Date Subject 

"^ll 1/7 Sonnenfeldt swom in as Coun- 
selor of the Department (bio- 
graphic data). 

*12 1/7 Isham sworn in as Ambassador 
to Haiti (biographic data). 

*13 1/8 IngersoU sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs (biographic 

tl4 1/10 Kissinger, Simon: joint news 

*15 1/11 Dale sworn in as U.S. Represen- 
tative to the European Office of 
the United Nations (biographic 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Volume LXX • No. 1806 • February 4, 1974 



Texts of Letters to Heads of Government 
of Oil-Consuming and Oil-Producing Countries 123 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXX, No. 1806 
February 4, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washinfrton, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic $29.80, foreign $87.26 

Single copy 60 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
witli information on developments in 
tite field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and tlie functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Kissinger and Federal Energy Administrator Simon 
Hold Joint News Conference 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held on Janitary 10 by Secretary Kis- 
singer and William Simon, Administrator, 
Federal Energy Office. 

Press release 14 <latetl January 10 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I wanted to 
welcome His Majesty the energy czar to the 
State Department. We will do this press con- 
ference in two parts. I will talk about the 
foreign policy aspects of the President's let- 
ter to the consumer nations and also to the 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries] members;' and Mr. Simon 
will discuss the relationship of this initiative 
to the domestic energy concerns, and we will 
both take questions on that subject. Then, at 
an appropriate point, we will switch to other 
foreign policy subjects, which I alone will 
answer, Mr. Simon. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Simo)i: I can understand that, because 
at the appropriate time, Mr. Secretary, you 
will press a button and I will disappear into 
the ground. [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: So let me discuss the 
philosophy and intention behind the letters 
which the President has sent yesterday to the 
consuming nations, as well as to the members 
of OPEC. 

It is the President's conviction that the 
energy crisis reflects a basic problem for the 
entire international community for the fore- 
seeable future that today concerns energy 
but that in the future may concern other raw 
materials or foodstuffs where incentives for 
supply are out of proportion to the demand. 

We face two major problems in connection 
with energy. One is that demand has far out- 
stripped incentives for supply. The second is 

' See p. 123. 

that the rise in prices that has been decided 
upon by the OPEC countries recently, and the 
pattern that may be established as a result 
of this, may have a revolutionary impact on 
the world economy, affecting balance of pay- 
ments of all of the advanced as well as the 
less developed consuming nations and creat- 
ing a situation in which the producing na- 
tions, as well, can become victims of their 
own actions and in which there exists as of 
this moment no framework in which compre- 
hensive long-range decisions can be taken. 

If anything was needed to illustrate the 
interdependence of nations in this world, it is 
what has happened in the field of energy. 

No single country is capable of solving the 
problem by itself. Indeed, no group of coun- 
tries, as between consumers and producers, 
can solve the problem by themselves. And 
therefore we feel very strongly that what the 
President has proposed should not be seen as 
a confrontation between consumers and pro- 
ducers ; rather, it should be seen as creating 
a framework within which decisions can be 
taken by both consumers and producers that 
take into account the long-term necessities 
of both sides and that can assure a construc- 
tive evolution of the world economy and of 
international relations and can prevent cer- 
tain very dangerous and potentially cata- 
strophic consequences. 

We are proposing to proceed in two or 
three stages. 

The invitation to the Foreign Ministers 
conference on February 11 was addressed to 
the nations comprising the High Level Oil 
Committee of the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development]. 
They are the nations that import 75 to 80 
percent of the world's energy imports. They 

February 4, 1974 


are the nations that have worked together on 
that committee to take certain emergency 

The President has proposed that the meet- 
ing be moved to the Foreign Ministers level 
because the issues that have been raised, 
both on the supply side as well as by the 
increase in prices, now far transcend the 
technical issues that are normally involved 
in simply allocating available energy sources. 

However, we view this meeting as a pre- 
lude to a discussion with other consuming 
nations, especially consuming nations from 
the less developed parts of the w^orld, who 
have been even more profoundly affected in 
terms of their capacities by the recent price 
rises than the developed nations. Our esti- 
mate is that their bill may approach $30 bil- 
lion, which of course far exceeds any of the 
aid flows that anyone has ever projected and 
indeed makes the whole international aid pro- 
gram a problematical and different exercise 
compared to the additional exactions that 
have been imposed on these countries. 

And we will move from there, with the 
agreement, of course, of the countries con- 
cerned, to a meeting between consumer na- 
tions, both developed and less developed na- 
tions, and the producing nations, in order to 
assess and to develop a pattern of supply 
that is just to the concerns of all of the coun- 
tries concerned, that will produce prices that 
are sustainable over an indefinite future, and 
that will discuss the impact on the world 
economy, in which all of these nations will 
live, of the energy needs on a global scale. 

Tasks for Energy-Consuming Countries 

At the meeting of the consumers, the first 
task will have to be to see whether we can 
come to an agreement about the nature of the 
problem that is facing us — whether the con- 
suming nations can agree between them- 
selves about the impact of the supply situa- 
tion on their economies and the necessities 
that are produced for all of their economies 
by the prices that now exist. 

We believe it is important that we will 
discuss together alternative sources of 

energy, efforts to pool the research and de- 
velopment efforts of the major consuming 
countries, and attempts to share between the 
major consuming countries the energy 
sources that become available as a result of 
these efforts. Therefore we believe that it 
may be appropriate that working groups be 
formed to study these problems, as well as 
the international economic problems that are 
raised by the present patterns. And Secretary 
[of the Treasury George P.] Shultz will raise 
some of these issues at the C-20 [Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund Committee of Twenty] 
meetings that he is attending in Rome next 

Now, we are aware of the fact that there 
are temptations toward bilateral arrange- 
ments. And we, of course, are in the best 
position of any consuming country to engage 
in bilateral efforts on our own. We have sub- 
stantial sources of energy in our own coun- 
try. We have large capabilities for research 
and development. And we are in possession 
of much of the advanced technology that is 
necessary in exploring the seabeds, for ex- 

Nevertheless, we believe that unrestricted 
bilateral competition will be ruinous for all 
of the countries concerned and that the seem- 
ing victories that can be achieved will be at 
the cost of world stability and of the world 
economy. And therefore, even though we are 
well placed in this competition and even 
though we have the capability to withstand 
it better than any potential competitor, we 
believe that it is essential for all of the de- 
veloped countries to understand that we are 
now truly interdependent and that it is a 
problem that must be solved on a common 
basis if we are not going to suffer very 
severe consequences for international sta- 
bility and for the international economy. 

We also, in the developed nations, have a 
special obligation toward the consuming de- 
veloping nations, so that as a result of the 
situation that has developed so suddenly, the 
hard-won gains of 20 years of effort are not 
dissipated and the international efforts to 
bring about a greater equality between the 
developed and less developed nations are not 


Department of State Bulletin ' 

destroyed as a result of decisions that cer- 
tainly did not take all the consequences into 

So, as far as the consuming nations are 
concerned, the energy situation, and what it 
portends for the future, will be a test of the 
whole approach toward the international 
system that we and other developing nations 
have pursued — and other developed nations 
have pursued toward each other and toward 
developing nations for the last 25 years. 

It is a test of the proposition that the world 
has become truly interdependent and that 
isolation and selfish approaches must be 
destructive for all concerned. 

Problem of Global Significance 

As for the relations between the consum- 
ing and the producing nations, the same is 
essentially true. In the framework that now 
exists, the producing nations have no alter- 
native except to maximize their short-term 
benefits. There does not exist a framework 
in which they can assess the impact on them 
of the changes in the economies of the de- 
veloped nations that are produced by the 
producing nations. And therefore the evolu- 
tion that the President is proposing, which 
seeks a greater understanding by the con- 
suming nations of the whole range of their 
energy concerns as well as of the impact on 
energy needs on their economies, provides 
also a framework within which the producing 
nations can guarantee to themselves the in- 
ternational stability within which alone the 
seeming benefits that they are gaining can be 

The basic conviction of the President and 
of his associates is that it is a problem of 
truly global significance in which selfish 
advantages cannot be attained, or if attained, 
cannot be sustained, either among consuming 
nations or between consuming and produc- 
ing nations. It is in this spirit that the 
United States will make its proposals, first at 
the meeting on February 11, and at the sub- 
sequent meetings that will, we hope, flow 
from that. And it will be in a spirit that we 
are constructing a solution for all of man- 

kind, and not of particular benefit to any one 
segment of it, that the President has ad- 
dressed both the consuming and the produc- 
ing nations to start a process which we hope 
will provide long-term answers to the prob- 
lem of supply as well as to the problems of 
the economy. 

Now, Bill, would you like to talk about 
the domestic side? 

Domestic and International Approaches 

Mr. Simon: Basically the energy policy of 
the United States, domestic as well as inter- 
national, can be broken down into five parts. 

From the domestic side, number one, we 
must establish a new energy ethic. We must 
reduce demand in this country, as you have 
all often heard me say. With a nation that 
has 6 percent of the world's population and 
consumes 35 percent of the world's energy, 
we have been a nation of great energy 
wastrels. There is great waste in our con- 
sumption. This must be reduced. We must 
have this change in lifestyles that I have 
spoken about so often. 

A new government relationship must be 
forged with the domestic as well as interna- 
tional energy problem and energy industries. 
We must create this agency in government 
that brings together for the first time all 
components of energy under one roof so 
that we can more effectively deal with this 

Fourth, and most important, is what we 
like to call Project Independence. The energy 
problem, as far as the United States is con- 
cerned, is the most infinitely soluble prob- 
lem in our country today. We have been 
blessed with a superabundance of natural re- 
sources and technology. We have the ability 
to become self-suflficient. We are today do- 
mestically 85 percent self-sufficient in energy 
— that other 15 percent is going to be 
achieved over the next decade to decade and 
a half. 

And finally, this dovetails with what Secre- 
tary Kissinger has been explaining: inter- 
national cooperation. 

Our domestic goals are completely compat- 

February 4, 1974 


ible with our international role of reducing 
demand, of the apportionment of critically 
short supplies, not only during short-term 
emergencies such as this but to deal with the 
long-term energy problem. And this prob- 
lem is not going to go away, domestically or 
internationally, even after the embargo is 
lifted. This has been a problem that you 
have been warned about for years in the 
United States. The embargo is what brought 
it home. Demand continues to rise at 4 to 5 
percent domestically. Our production peaked 
in 1970. Our exploration peaked in 1956. 
We have to get about the regeneration of our 
coal industry domestically, the utilization of 
oil shale — a Manhattan-type project, or com- 
parable to the synthetic rubber experience 
during World War II, to utilize the imagina- 
tion, technology, and just great thrust of this 
free enterprise system. 

Our technology — we must work with other 
nations of the world in sharing our technol- 
ogy, the development with them of alternate 
sources of energy. 

And, finally, world oil prices. Obviously, 
we must deal with these world oil prices, be- 
cause the long-term interests of the world are 
best served by a world economy that is 

I look forward to working with my col- 
leagues in the State Department in moving 
forward with the rest of the world in solving 
this very difficult problem. 

Thank you. 

Secretary Kissinger: If I can just add one 
point to what Mr. Simon said: As the United 
States achieves self-sufficiency in energy and, 
in time, surplus, we are prepared, as part of 
these discussions with the other consuming 
nations, as well as with any other interested 
nation, to discuss sharing our energy sources 
as they develop over the long-term future 
and, above all, to share the research and 
development efforts. 

Q. Mr. Simon and Mr. Secretary, to deal 
tvith the present hard situation, the oil price 
squeeze, to what extent do you think the oil 
companies themselves have created a fanci- 
ful situation? Should they be implicated in 

our minds with the problems we are under- ' 
going? I have heard no mention from either i 
of you about the role of the oil companies in 
the futtire. How about the present, though? 
Is this oil squeeze some of their doing? 

Mr. Simon: Actually, you did hear me 
allude in one of my five parts, as far as our 
energy policy is concerned — and that was the 
second part, the new government relation- 
ship that is going to be forged — that we 
are going to have to take a brandnew look at 
what the government role is to be, interna- 
tionally as well as domestically, in our energy 

Q. Are you including pricing, sir? 

Mr. Simon: I would include pricing. I 
would include government negotiation versus 
the way it is done now, in a company-to- 
government manner. I would not preclude 
looking at absolutely everything but would 
not give you any final solution today until 
we forge this new role that government is 
going to hold. Industry and government co- 
operation to bring on the alternate sources 
of energy — there are many things that must 
be done. 

Immediate and Long-Term Problems 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: 
Chicago Daily News] . 

Peter [Peter Lisagor, 

Q. How do both of you reconcile the state- 
ments of the President with tvhat you have 
ju^t said? The President said that we mv^t 
become self-sufficient — and I think you, Mr. 
Simon, have said it often, you have just said 
it — so that we would not be subject to black- 
mail from foreign sources or dependent upon 
foreign sources. Secretary Kissinger says 
we are a world that is truly interdependent 
and we can't solve this problem alone. Now, 
how do you reconcile those two views? 

Mr. Simon: Well, that basically — Mr. Sec- 
retary, would you like to start? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: We can solve prob- 
ably the immediate problem of energy by a 


Department of State Bulletin 

unilateral effort, although it would still leave 
a gap of about five to ten years in which this 
15 percent shortage of which Mr. Simon 
spoke would exist. So when the President 
speaks of achieving independence, he is talk- 
ing about the late seventies, early eighties. 
He is not talking of any short-term future. 

Secondly, as I indicated in my presenta- 
tion, we could probably achieve, even in the 
period between 1970 and 1980, a preferential 
position for ourselves by an exercise of bi- 
lateral diplomacy, using the strength of our 
economy and our political strength to achieve 
a preferred position with respect to energy. 
And it could be that we will be driven to this. 
But the intent to do so would heighten the 
difficulties of all other consuming nations in 
this interim period. And therefore we believe 
that as we achieve greater independence with 
respect to energy, we must let the other na- 
tions participate in this effort. 

The problem of bringing in new sources 
of energy, expanding our research and de- 
velopment, is not an effort which we should 
conduct, if we have a choice, entirely by our- 

And therefore, while we can in time be- 
come independent, our preferred course 
would be to use our technological capability 
to help solve the problems on a common basis, 
because if the economies of other nations — if 
one looks at the statistics, for example, of the 
impact on the balance of payments of other 
developed countries of the price rises, they 
have a really revolutionary impact for the 
other countries; they have a relatively less 
decisive impact on us. 

Nevertheless, if the economies of other 
countries are weakened, in time the world 
economy will suffer. And therefore we may 
bring about a situation in which it will be 
demonstrated that no nation can prosper in 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do yon have any hope 
that by the time the conference begins on 
February 11 there will be any resumption of 
Arab oil deliveries, and tvhat effect, if that 
were to take place, would that have on the 

Secretary Kissinger: You ladies and gen- 
tlemen know that we have a firm policy, in 
this building at least, not to put any deadlines 
on our expectation with respect to the em- 
bargo. Nevertheless, the problem that I have 
described here is essentially independent of 
the embargo. Even if there had been no 
embargo, the problem would have existed on 
both levels that I have indicated. It would 
have existed on the level of supply, because 
unless the producing nations increased their 
production there would have been a shortfall 
in any event; and it would of course have 
existed on the level of price, independent of 
the embargo. 

So what we are proposing here is not a 
device to get the embargo ended. But of 
course it remains our strong conviction that 
the embargo is becoming increasingly inap- 
propriate and it is a matter that should be 
considered seriously by those countries im- 
posing it. But this is not the purpose of these 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there has been a situa- 
tion described here today in which we are, 
in the United States, 83 percent self-suffi- 
cient and we have other countries, our allies, 
that are 80 percent dependent on foreign 
sotirces of oil. Is the United States pre- 
pared to start sharing noiv, before this con- 
ference begins, in order to discourage efforts 
at bilateral deals? 

Secretary Kissinger: The conference is 
proposed for February 11 or any other con- 
venient day in that week. We will put before 
those nations — the nations that have been 
invited^ — and before all other interested na- 
tions our ideas as to the long-term evolution 
of the energy situation. The purpose of this 
conference is not to prevent nations between 
now and February 11 from making bilateral 
deals. The argument with respect to bilat- 
eral deals is a more fundamental one than 
the immediate situation. It has to do with 
the impact on everybody of unrestricted com- 
petition once it is unleashed. 

Do you want to say something? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you elaborate, sir. 

February 4, 1974 


on your statement at the outset of your 
presentation that there may be shortages in 
other commodities? Was this a reference to 

Secretary Kissinger: One looks ahead over 
the next 10 to 15 years. It is conceivable, 
though not in such an acute form, that other 
raw materials may become scarce in relation 
to demand, and we saw temporarily some 
pressure on the food situation last year. I 
think it behooves all nations to take a look at 
their long-term problems so that we can deal 
thoughtfully with them before they become 

Now, as you know, we have proposed a 
World Food Conference which will address 
itself to these issues. And we have started, 
within our government, a study of what 
may happen with respect to other commodi- 
ties over the next 10 years. And if our con- 
clusions should lead us to the view that a 
repetition of some of these difficulties could 
arise, we hope to make proposals at an 
early time. 

Participation in Energy Conference 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the Eastern Euro- 
peans have not been invited — 

Secretary Kissinger: I have to understand 
the system by which this works, where one 
points to one person and — 

Q. Oh, ivere you looking at somebody else ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it's my glasses. 

Q. Since the Eastern European countries 
have not been invited, how will this confer- 
ence have an impact — u'hat ivill be the im- 
pact of this conference on detente with the 
Soviet Union? Tioo, aren't we getting into 
the position of 19U7-Jt8 when the Marshall 
plan was launched that precipitated in some 
form the cold war? And three, perhaps you 
can say ivhat tvill be the impact of the con- 
ference on countries tvhich are not invited at 
present bid have hopes for entry? I mean 
how will they get in? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the ' 
East European countries, it is our under- 
standing that the Socialist countries of East- 
ern Europe are substantially self-sufficient 
as of this moment through their cooperative 
arrangements. We see no reason why this 
should produce in any sense the cold war, or 
a resumption of the cold war, because there is 
no stretch of the imagination by which this 
could be construed as directed against the 
Soviet Union or against any other group of 
nations. It is an attempt to produce a com- 
mon solution. 

Secondly, with respect to the participation 
of other countries — we are prepared, for ex- 
ample, if the European Community should 
feel that all its members should participate in 
this conference and that there should not be 
preferential membership — we would be pre- 
pared to carry out what I said in my Pil- 
grims speech, that it is up to the European 
Community to decide the form and nature of 
its participation. 

Thirdly, after the conclusion of the meet- 
ing of the consumers, we would be prepared 
to extend an essentially open-ended invita- 
tion to other interested parties to participate 
in those fields of the work of the consumers, 
and consumers and producers, that is appro- 
priate to them. 

We have no intention here of producing a 
closed club. But it is important to point out 
that the nations that are invited between 
themselves represent 75 to 80 percent of all 
the energy imports in the world, which is 
going to be one of the chief topics. 

Let me turn over here. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: I'm so terrified of Mr. 
O'Leary [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington 
Star-News] that I am ready to recognize 
him. Go ahead. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier of, if 
need be, using the strength of our economy 
and our political strength. What forms of 
political strength do you have in mind? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, when you talk 


Department of State Bulletin 

about the strength of the economy, it is clear 
that if the balance of payments situation is 
as we described it, we could withstand com- 
petitive bidding better than some other na- 
tions. Secondly, since we have long-estab- 
lished political relationships with many of 
the producing countries, we are not badly 
placed to deal with those countries in a bilat- 
eral context. 

I repeat, however, that this is not our pre- 
ferred solution, that the temporary benefits 
that one would gain by this approach would 
in the long term damage even the United 

Q. Mr. Secretarij, Secretary of Defense 
[James R.'] Schlesinger the other day sug- 
gested that the energy crisis might produce 
pressures to use force to get oil. How serious 
do you consider the dangers of countries 
going to war over oil? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I under- 
stood Secretary Schlesinger, he was explain- 
ing theoretical situations that might arise if 
the squeeze became excessive. If I undei*- 
stand him correctly, he also pointed out that 
this point had not yet been reached. So it is 
hard to answer your question. 

But why don't we save the purely foreign 
policy questions for a little later? 

Study of Impact of Rising Oil Prices 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you convinced that it 
will he necessary to roll back oil prices which 
have already been announced in order to pre- 
vent a worldwide depression? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all of the eco- 
nomic experts that have studied the problem 
believe that the bill, as it stands now, cannot 
be paid by most of the countries concerned. 
Now, what the remedy to this is — whether it 
is a reduction of prices or some other method 
— I think I would like to defer the answer on 
that until our own studies have been further 

We hope to put forward some suggestions 
at the meeting in February. But we have not 
been able to come up with any conclusive 

answers ourselves — unless Mr. Simon is hid- 
ing them from us. 

Q. Well, I would like to hear what Mr. 
Simon thinks about this. 

Mr. Simon : I think that, as I said, the long- 
term interests of the world are best served in 
a world economy that is healthy. And one 
must gauge the impact of these prices on the 
world economy, and it must be done on a 
country-by-country basis. As the Secretary 
says, these studies cannot be done overnight. 
Before we gauge the impact to see whether 
or not we must roll back these prices, we 
have to complete this work. And it will be 
completed before the conference. 

Secretary Kissinger: Marvin [Marvin 
Kalb, CBS News]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I teas going to ask you 
— at the last news conference you said that 
you were not increasingly irritated by the 
continuing embargo, and yet some people 
might draw that conclusion from your com- 
ment today, from perhaps the indirect com- 
ment of the Defense Secretary a few days 
ago, the Vice President a fetv days ago. And 
I ivas 7vondering whether there is here an 
attempt to orchestrate what might he inter- 
preted as a national threat, and if that is the 
case, what kind of threat? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all of you who 
know the essential equanimity of my nature 
would find it difficult to believe that I would 
be irritated. 

Of course our government is convinced, as 
I have pointed out at every press conference 
that I have held on this subject since Novem- 
ber, that we understand the reasons that led 
some producing nations to impose an em- 
bargo at a time when they perceived us to be 
taking sides in a military conflict in which 
they were engaged. 

At the same time, since we were the coun- 
try that played a principal role in ending that 
conflict, since we are the country that, after 
the end of that conflict, has made the major 
eff'ort to promote a just and lasting' settle- 
ment and to produce whatever progress has 

February 4, 1974 


been achieved in the negotiations, or contrib- 
ute to producing it, we believe it is inappro- 
priate to maintain the postures of confron- 
tation that existed before. This reflects no 
irritation. It reflects a statement of our con- 
viction. And since the various parts of our 
government are obviously in communication 
vv^ith each other, it should not surprise you 
that the various members say essentially the 
same thing. 
Mr. O'Leary. 

Pitfalls of Bilateral Arrangements 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken about 
the pitfalls of bilateral arrangements. Some 
nations have already taken care of their bi- 
lateral requirements, notably France. What 
makes you think France has any interest at 
all in ivhatever you might have to say to them 
on February 11 or beyond, and ivhat kind of 
cards do the industrial nations of the world 
really have to play in the decade ahead 
against the countries that have the oil that 
we are not at this moment prepared to share 
with them as we will later? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. O'Leary, 
I don't believe that it is correct to say that 
France has taken care of its needs. France 
has made an arrangement for a small part 
of its needs on a bilateral basis. And other 
nations no doubt may make bilateral arrange- 

Our point is that an unrestricted bilateral- 
ism is going to be counterproductive for all 
the countries concerned, including those vi^ho 
may steal a march on some others on a tem- 
porary basis by making this or that deal. 
The conditions w^hich I described of unre- 
stricted competition cannot be avoided by 
unilateral efforts. And therefore the challenge 
to the statesmanship of all of the consuming 
nations is whether they are able to recognize 
this fact — because if not, reality will impose 
it on them. 

It is not an American proposal for our own 
selfish benefit. Indeed, any country can prob- 
ably gain in any six-month period some tem- 
porary benefits for itself. But over a five- 

year period, the result of such a course, if 
adopted by everybody else, would be ex- 
tremely unfortunate, including for the coun- 
tries that seem to be gaining a temporary 

Now, as for the relationship between the 
consumers and the producers — I believe that 
a considerable number of the producers 
realize today that it cannot be in their inter- 
ests to bring about a worldvdde economic 
depression, that if they are to benefit from 
the resources which they control, it must be 
within the framework of a healthy world 
economy. And one interesting result of our 
initiative has been that no producing nation 
has yet expressed the slightest opposition to 
it. And several producing nations indicated 
that they support the concept of consumer- 
producer meetings in order to lay out the 
long-term goals of energy policy for both 

Under the present framework, the produc- 
ing nations are forced to look only primarily 
at their short-term problems and they have 
to assess them in terms of the immediate 
supply-and-demand situation. 

If there was some assured demand over a 
medium-term future and if the producing 
nations had some assurance and understand- 
ing of what is ahead for them, they could 
make their price decisions on a much more 
long-range basis. And therefore what we 
are proposing is not intended as a confron- 
tation, but it is intended to permit a rational 
consideration of issues in which the long- 
term interests of the consumers and produc- 
ers are not necessarily divergent. 

Sequence of Energy Conferences 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you originally started 
with the premise of beginning this process 
with a meeting of producing and consuming 
nations. Could you tell us, sir, what hap- 
pened to that original concept? Are the Arab 
nations nmv holding off from this process 
until there is further advancement in re- 
solving the Arab-Israeli conflict? And third- 
ly, can you be any more precise about the 
sequence of conferences that will take place 


Department of State Bulletin 

after the initial meeting of the consuming 

Secretary Kissinger: First, Murrey [Mur- 
rey Marder, Washington Post], the original 
proposal did not go into any detail as to the 
sequence of moves. But I can assure you that 
it was always the President's intention to fol- 
low the sequence that we are now proposing. 
So there has been no change in the concept 
between the Pilgrims speech and the formal 
letter that the President sent yesterday to 
the consuming and producing nations. 

Secondly, no producing nation has linked 
its response to a further evolution of the 
Arab-Israeli negotiations. And we believe 
that this linkage would be irrelevant to the 
basic problem. But there is no sense com- 
menting on it, since no nation has made this 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what will you do if the 
Arabs refuse to come? 

Secretary Kissinger: What was the last 
part of the question ? 

Q. The remaining part was hoio do you 
envision the process going — 

Secretary Kissinger: Oh — how do we en- 
vision the process. We envision that the 
consumer-producer conference will meet 
within three months of the original consum- 
er conference and that the other consulta- 
tions with developing consuming nations and 
other interested parties will take place be- 
tween February 11 and the time that the 
consumer-producer conference takes place, 
which we will propose should be no later than 
three months after the original proposal. 

What do we do if the producers don't 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, then we can't 
have a consumer-producer conference. 

Clark [Clark R. Mollenhoff, Des Moines 
Register and Tribune]. 

Q. In the light of the admitted disasters of 
the wheat deal and also in the light of the 

talk of one-dollar bread and the Agriculture 
Department posturing itself to become an 
importer of wheat, what confidence can the 
American people have of the representatives 
of the United States not being caught in 
another ripoff for the consumers and tax- 
payers ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. Mollen- 
hoff, in order to answer that question, we 
would have to have a long discussion of the 
structure of the wheat deal and what pro- 
duced it. But the short answer to your ques- 
tion would be this. The wheat deal was the 
result of certain assumptions about the na- 
ture of our surpluses — certain lack of infor- 
mation about the nature of the purchases 
that were being made. And it is precisely to 
avoid having to make decisions on the basis 
of inadequate information and inadequate 
understanding of the future that we are 
proposing an approach which takes a com- 
prehensive look at all the factors involved 
and which would reflect the basic necessities 
of the American people as well as of the 
rest of mankind. 

Q. In the initial wheat deals you were 
relying to a large degree upon the wheat and 
the international grain trade, as I under- 
stand it, plus the Agriculture Department. 
Do you have any reason to believe that you 
will get straight figures from the oil indus- 
try, which provides most of the figures we 
have in this country at this stage? 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Mollenhoff, it is 
difficult to compare a one-time negotiation, 
which was on a scale that was unprecedented 
and therefore which the existing framework 
could not handle, with a long-term generic 
problem that will be with us for decades. We 
have every confidence that for the sort of 
enterprise that we are now proposing with 
respect to energy, it will not fail for lack of 
correct information. It may fail for lack of 
wisdom and for the inability to develop a 
long-range view on the part of all the com- 
ponents that are involved internationally. 

But with all respect, I would say there is 
no comparison between the long-term en- 

February 4, 1974 


ergy problem and a one-time wheat deal. 

Q. Are you concerned about the wheat 
importation situation — 

Factors in Energy Crisis 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to clar- 
ify something that n-as asked, I think, in the 
first question. Let me be more specific. To 
what extent are the major oil companies to 
bla77ie for our current 'pricing problems? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have to let Mr. 
Simon answer this. 

Mr. Simon: Basically their arrangement 
has been changed, and changed quite often, 
over the past few years. It is a feeling on the 
part of the nations of the Mideast that they 
have sold their oil too cheaply, and indeed as 
we move into different arrangements — we 
use the term "negotiations" in Vienna; I 
suggest that is a dignified term for the de- 
mands, if you will, for higher prices. They 
are just announcing higher prices, what they 
are going to demand. It is not the 25 percent 
equity any longer. But obviously they are 
going to demand a majority interest in the 
oil in the ground. They are also, because they 
own 67 percent of the world's proven re- 
serves — they believe that they can now make 
up for oil, looking back. And anyone who 
looks back on a market can understand that 
maybe he would have done things differently. 
That they will indeed charge a price for it. 
And that is what is going on. 

As far as the specifics of blaming the oil 
companies, that is a very popular game 
everyone is playing today. We are in the 
blame syndrome now — let's find out who is to 
blame and let's hang him. And I will suggest 
that over the years — and you can go back to 
the Paley Commission in the Truman admin- 
istration, who warned of this impending 
crisis — you can go back for the past five 
years, or just the 14 months I have been in 
government, as Chairman of the President's 
Oil Policy Committee, warning of this im.- 
pending crisis — forgetting the embargo. 
That we are looking back on a period where 

we had a low-cost abundant energy base. We 
are now in a high-cost scarce energy base. 
And our alternatives right now to the eco- 
nomic and political blackmail — importing 
today 6'/) to 7 million barrels a day, if in- 
deed the embargo were over, to upward of 
10 or 12 million barrels per day by the end of 
this decade, and being subject to whatever 
price perhaps they wish to put on it. 

Q. Mr. Sim,on — 

Mr. Simon: We have the alternative to 
bring on at a reasonable level alternate 
sources of energy in this country to give us 
the ability for self-sufficiency, thereby re- 
moving a demand from the rest of the world 
for this oil and removing a pressure from 
the marketplace. 

Q. Mr. Simon, you described a "game" 
that everybody is playing. Could you be more 
specific about this game, whether we're try- 
ing to find who's at fault and trying to hang 

Mr. Simon: Well, I can — 

Q. Are there any other examples in this 
game that you can give us? 

Mr. Simon: No. As I say, we're all look- 
ing for the scapegoat right now. And I can 
go back, sure; and I'll go back and point to 
various government actions and inactions 
over the past 20 years that have created the 
economic disincentives, if you will, for the 
oil industry to do exactly what's happened 
internationally, as far as drilling in the Mid- 
dle East is concerned. You can go back to 
the Phillips decision of 1954 on the regula- 
tion of natural gas, and how this discouraged 
necessary exploration and production in this 
country. On the environmental impacts, on 
the mandatory oil import policy that acted as 
a disincentive to building needed refinery 
capacity, the Clean Air Act and need for 
implementation of the primary and second- 
ary standards — it is for many reasons. 

I'm not saying that the oil industry should 
have had a little bit more responsibility. Fine, 
they should have. And we're going to look at 
the specifics of that. But let's not say that 


Department of State Bulletin 

it's been just one thing to blame; there are 
a whole series of events. 

Q. Mr. Secretanj, at this stage, is it still 
possible to enlarge the February 11 confer- 
ence beyond the eight invited countries, or 
would you rather tell other interested con- 
sumer nations to join later on in the working 
group level? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I pointed 
out, we are prepared, if the European Com- 
munity would prefer this, to have the nine 
members of the Community participate, so 
that it would not appear as though we wanted 
to make a distinction between the members 
of the European Community. 

Beyond that, we believe that it would be 
most efficient if the future participation were 
at the working group level and at other con- 
ferences that will develop out of this, such 
as between the developed consumer nations 
and the developing consumer nations — and 
of course the consumer-producer conference 
that will take place later on. 

Variables AfFecfing Energy Shorffall 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned some fig- 
ures in your answer a moment ago of restor- 
ing our delivery of oil to 6y2 to 7 million 
barrels a day. 

Mr. Simon: That's what our estimates 
are as to what the demand would be now. 

Q. In the future it's 10 million as com- 
pared to 2, 2^2, that we're bringing in now. 
Could you appraise for us quantitatively or 
qualitatively how much of a difference it 
would make for us to have the Arab oil em- 
bargo lifted on this nation's economy? 

Mr. Simon: Well, right now, as I've said 
many times right from the first press con- 
ference — which was shortly after our figures 
were published, as far as the extent of the 
shortfall — and let's get a real handle on that 
right at the outset, because there's a great 
deal of problems with that favorite word of 
"credibility" today on the extent of the short- 
fall — in the job which we have of managing 

a shortage, rather than just forecasting 
what the shortage may be, we can gauge, and 
we can gauge with hard numbers, the exact 
amount of oil, assuming an effective em- 
bargo, that we are not going to bring into 
this country. And this is the number that 
we use if we are going to responsibly manage 
this shortage — manage it to the extent that 
industry and jobs and employment in this 
country aren't going to suffer unduly. 

Fine, it's going to have economic impact. 
Then we take a look at the variables, and the 
variables are obviously weather. And we've 
had a great break in the fourth quarter of 
1973 on the weather, and that took care of 
reducing demand. Then our conservation 
measures reduced, and that helped. There 
was leakage in the embargo, which many 
people predicted — although the extent of the 
leakage is extremely difficult to predict. 

So all of these variables move into play 
to reduce the shoi'tfall; and this is where 
other people, utilizing some of these assump- 
tions — they say, "The shortfall won't be that 
bad; the government's wrong." Well, we're 
not wrong. We believe it won't be that bad 
if the American people do their job. But I 
can't bet on jobs in this country — and the 
comfort and health of the American people 
— by betting these variables are going to 
work to this, that, or another extent. 

As I've said from the very first day, with 
a nation — 6 percent of the world's popula- 
tion, utilizing 35 percent — we waste almost 
as much as we use. Some estimates show we 
waste between 30 and 40 percent of our 
energy utilization. We can make up this 
shortfall with simple changes in our life- 

Now, these aren't going to be done over- 
night; we understand that. Industry can do 
a great deal, and they are doing a great deal 
overnight. We obviously can't stop driving 
some of the the gas-burners we all drive 
around today; but we can drive them less, we 
can drive them slower. There are many 
things we can do. And I think the figures we 
put out every week show that we are reduc- 
ing our demand and we're moving toward 

February 4, 1974 


the elimination of this shortfall. Whether we 
make it or not is uncertain, and for that rea- 
son we recommended to the President that he 
put the rationing program into effect [on a 
contingency basis]. 

Secretary Kissinger: Since Mr. Simon is 
obviously gaining on me and since this can- 
not be permitted in this building [Laughter] , 
we'll have — sit down for a minute, Marvin; 
I'm in the middle of a very important an- 
nouncement [Laughter] . 

Mr. Simon: Can I hold a separate confer- 
ence outside? Did they shut my microphone 
off? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: Since, in fact, we're 
going to open the trapdoor under Mr. Simon ! 

Just a minute — w^e'll take one more ques- 
tion on energy, and then we'll take a few 
questions on other aspects of foreign policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretai^j, I think you've already 
implied the answer to this question; but I 
wonder if the United States is prepared to 
set kind of a moral lead by forswearing any 
kind of bilateral advantage in the immediate 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
will make proposals at the conference that 
will start on February 11 which will reflect 
the philosophy that I have described here, 
and I'm not aware of any bilateral U.S. deals 
that are in process between now and Febru- 
ary 11. 

And now should we switch to questions 
on — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yoti recently have just 
had discussions with the Japanese Deputy 
Prime Minister. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Now, there's a little doubt in the minds 
of some of tis who talked with some officials 
later as to whether or not they were going 
to go along wholeheartedly with the U.S. 
initiative. Now, I'm wondering what role 
you feel countries like Japan, xcho are so 
vulnerable to the need for oil in Arab de- 

mands, can play in the type of initiative that 
ijou have in mind. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is my under- 
standing that the Japanese Government is 
meeting today to decide its answer to the 
President's letter. And I don't think that I 
should prejudge what the answer of the 
Japanese Government will be. 

Our proposal is designed to enable the 
Japanese Government, as well as all other 
invitees, to meet their energy needs over the 
indefinite future. Each government con- 
cerned will have to decide for itself whether 
by participating in an examination of its 
long-term problems it is jeopardizing its 
short-term situation. We do not believe that 
this is the case. We are making this proposal 
precisely to reduce, and in time to eliminate, 
the insecurity under which particularly those 
countries suffer that import a much larger 
percentage of their energy than we do. But 
I cannot predict what the Japanese reaction 
will be. 

Q. If the nonmembers of the Community 
ivant to attend? Yoti didn't mean to single 
out certain ones? And in your Pilgrims 
speech you said the Community might decide 
to participate with one voice. Would that 
still be welcome in the February 11 confer- 

Secretary Kissinger: We will leave it to 
the Community to decide the form of its 
participation; yes. 

Middle East Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. — you are going to leave for Egypt at 
midnight — 

Secretary Kissinger: So are you. [Laugh- 

Q. — and then go to Israel and go back to 

Egypt. And that schedule suggests that you 
expect to come home rvith an agreement. Is 
that the case? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. What we expect 


Department of State Bulletin 

to do on this trip is to see whether we can 
transform the general ideas that have up to 
now been advanced into a concrete proposal. 
And we hope that when such a concrete pro- 
posal exists, it will lead to a serious negotia- 
tion between Egypt and Israel on the issue 
of the separation of forces. Therefore, if the 
Israeli Cabinet decides after my first visit 
there to make a proposal, we will be prepared 
to take it to Egypt. But the more likely out- 
come of this would be not that there would 
be an agreement but that there would be a 
negotiation which would be conducted at 

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't there a danger of 
an overplaying of your oivn role in this? If 
the effort, as you've described it from the 
very beginning, is to induce the parties to 
come up ivith their own settlement, is there 
not the danger, by your going back time and 
again, that you become too fixed an element 
in the negotiation and deprive the parties of 
the chance to negotiate themselves? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this particular 
trip was made at the request of the parties 
and not at our initiative. And therefore, 
while the basic consideration is valid, in the 
crucial initial phase — where confidence has 
to be built and where a process has to be 
started — we would think that it is most im- 
portant to get the progress made. 

Once the initial phase is behind us, then 
we believe that the negotiation should be con- 
ducted at Geneva and that higher level par- 
ticipation should occur only when there is an 
overwhelming deadlock. 

Q. Sir, it's become more or less enshrined 
in the press in recent weeks that the Israelis 
have proposed a ivithdrawal to a line about 
20 miles east of the Suez Canal in return for 
a thinning-out of Egyptian troops. Is this the 
kind of proposal you'd be bringing to Asivan? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I'm not bring- 
ing, on my first trip, any particular proposal 
to Aswan. What I intend to do is to discuss 
with President Sadat his ideas, to give him 

my impression of some of the general Israeli 
ideas; and any specific proposals would have 
to await a decision by the Israeli Govern- 
ment, as the Israeli Ambassador pointed out 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me get questions 
over here [pointing] . 

Q. Sir, if I could return for a moment to 
your energy proposal, you said that the 
object of the series of meetings would be to 
establish — a "framework" ivas the word you 
used — for solving these problems between 
the developed industrial nations which need 
the fuel and the nations ivhich have the fuel 
that are not developed. Essentially, that's it. 

Now, perhaps "framework" is a term of 
the art; and I don't cover the diplomatic cir- 
cuit. But ivhat kind of a frameivork are you 
talking about — some sort of series of actvxd 
agreements among nations on the world 
economy? And if so, is there any precedent 
in past diplomacy for such a broad, all- 
encompassing approach to the entire world 
economy ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no prece- 
dent in past diplomacy for this particular 
approach, but there is also no precedent in 
past diplomacy for this particular problem. 
What we are talking about is a series of 
agreements or understandings in a series of 
related areas — areas of sharing of technol- 
ogy, of determining the nature of the de- 
mand, of the concept of measures that can 
be taken with respect to the conservation of 
energy resources. 

Other problems — there are other problems 
to which we, frankly, haven't even the begin- 
ning of an answer — such as, what happens 
to the consuming developing nations that we 
used to think were in need of substantial aid 
flows, where all of the aid flows have been 
outstripped in one afternoon's decision by 
the price increase that has been imposed on 
these countries by the producing nations. The 
balance of payments issues that I raised with 

February 4, 1974 


you have now been understood in terms of 
numbers, but in terms of solutions we have, 
frankly, not come up with any answers that 
we are as yet prepared to put before other 

Moreover, we do not believe that we alone 
have the obligation to come up with all of the 
answers. We are inviting the other countries 
concerned to share with us their thinking on 
a problem that, after all, concerns them at 
least as much as us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians expressed 
concern that a disengagement agreement 
would simply result in a freezing of another 
cease-fire line in the Middle East. Do you 
share that concern ? And if so, are you seek- 
ing assurances from Israel that political talks 
will take place and will lead to further 
Israeli tvithdraivals ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been 
understood that disengagement would be the 
first phase in a process toward a final 
settlement and that negotiations toward that 
final settlement would continue. And that is 
the American position; and we believe that 
it is the position of the parties concerned. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what 
has been accomplished in talks between Pan- 
ama and the United States in the last cou- 
ple of days that didn't exist before and 
whether this involved the Panamanians ac- 
cepting — agreeing to some principles that 
we proposed, or vice versa, or both? 

Secretary Kissinger: As in all negotia- 
tions, the progress reflected a modification 
by both sides of some of the positions they 
previously held. I think substantial progress 
has been made toward a statement of prin- 
ciples, which now have to be filled in by con- 
crete negotiations. But since those principles 
are still ad referendum, which means that 

they still require the approval of the govern- 
ments concerned, I don't want to go into 
greater detail. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you made very clear at 
the beginning of the press conference the 
principles of tvorld interdependence. You 
also made very clear the basic necessity of 
fuel, like food and water, which all nations 
need. Now, aside from any theoretical propo- 
sitions to xvhich you referred earlier, inas- 
much OS these are very basic needs, would 
yotc foresee that failure to recognize the prin- 
ciples that you outline here today could even- 
tually lead to hostilities for the very basic 
things of life ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to 
predict exactly what will happen if the short- 
sightedness of man should triumph over his 
clear necessities, but obviously it will be a 
much more tense and extremely competitive 
world that would then emerge, in which col- 
laborative relationships in many fields would 
severely suffer. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Cuban 
Ambassador in Mexico said that talks with 
the United States would be possible if the 
United States agrees to lift the economic em- 
bargo. Now, some have interpreted his re- 
marks as one of the mildest yet coming out 
of Cuba or from a Cuban official. Ho^v do 
yoti see his statement? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not had 
an opportunity to analyze all the subtleties 
of the statement. Our position is that our 
objection to Cuban policy has concerned its 
attempt to export its revolution to subvert 
existing governments in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Our attitude would be subject to 
change if Cuba pursued a more restrained 
international course. 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Nixon Extends Invitations to Conference on Energy 

Following are the texts of letters sent by 
President Nixon on January 9 to the heads 
of governmeyit of major iyidustrial oil-con- 
suming countries and member states of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC). 


White House press release dated January 10 

January 9, 1974. 

Developments in the international energy 
situation have brought consumer and pro- 
ducer nations to an historic crossroad. The 
world's nations face a fundamental choice 
that can profoundly affect the structure of 
international political and economic relations 
for the remainder of this century. 

Today the energy situation threatens to 
unleash political and economic forces that 
could cause severe and irreparable damage 
to the prosperity and stability of the world. 
Two roads lie before us. We can go our own 
separate ways, with the prospect of progres- 
sive division, the erosion of vital interdepend- 
ence, and increasing political and economic 
conflict; or we can work in concert, develop- 
ing enlightened unity and cooperation, for 
the benefit of all mankind — producer and 
consumer countries alike. 

It was with these thoughts in mind that I 
asked Secretary of State Kissinger in his 
December speech to the Society of Pilgrims 
in London to propose establishment of an 
Energy Action Group and to urge a concerted 
action program among consumers and pro- 

ducers to meet the world's energy needs in a 
manner which would satisfy the legitimate 
interests of both the consuming and produc- 
ing countries. 

As a first step to carry out this concept, I 
invite (name of country) to a meeting of 
major industrial consumer nations to be held 
at the Foreign Minister level on February 11, 
1974, or any other convenient date that 
week. I would like to take this opportunity to 
invite you to send your representative to 
such a meeting here in Washington. After I 
know your views, I plan to send a Special 
Representative to discuss with your Govern- 
ment the specifics of this meeting, including 
suggestions on agenda and substance.- 

Our concept is that the Foreign Ministers 
meeting would agree on an analysis of the 
situation and the work to be done. It would 
establish a task force drawn from the con- 
suming countries which would formulate a 
consumer action program.. Part of this pro- 
gram would be concerned with new coopera- 
tive measures designed to deal with the ex- 
plosive growth of global energy demand and 
to accelerate the coordinated development of 
new energy sources. Another task would be 
to develop a concerted consumer position for 
a new era of petroleum consumer-producer 
relations which would meet the legitimate 
interests of oil producing countries while as- 
suring the consumer countries adequate 
supplies at fair and reasonable prices. 

' Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
the United Kingdom; the Secretary General of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- 
opment was also invited to attend. 

" The following paragraph was added between 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of President Nixon's letter to 
Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Federal Republic of 

"As was pointed out in the original proposal we 
would wish to leave it to the European Community 
to decide whether and how it may wish to partici- 
pate in the meeting in Washington. I am bringing 
this point to your attention in your capacity as head 
of the government now in the presidency of the 
Community and will be very pleased to extend an 
invitation to a representative of the Community. I 
shall appreciate it if you would inform me of the 
Community's decision." 

February 4, 1974 


In calling for a meeting of the major in- 
dustrial consumer countries, we are fully 
conscious that the energy problem is one of 
vital importance to all consuming countries, 
particularly those of the developing world 
whose hope for a better life critically depends 
on access to energy on reasonable terms. 
Whereas our immediate concern is to get 
preparations underway as promptly and ef- 
fectively as possible, clearly the interests of 
all consumers, including the developing coun- 
tries, will have to be represented in an appro- 
priate manner. 

A concerted effort of this kind is but a first 
and essential step toward the establishment 
of new arrangements for international ener- 
gy and related economic matters. To this end, 
a meeting of consumer and producer repre- 
sentatives would be held within 90 days. I am 
sending personal messages to the heads of 
government of the OPEC states to assure 
that they understand the purpose of the pro- 
posed meeting of consumer states. 

We face a profound challenge to turn this 
period of crisis into one of opportunity for 
constructive and creative cooperation which 
will be of benefit to all the peoples of the 
world. I look forward to hearing your reply 
and comments. 

critical importance of energy to the pros- 
perity and stability of the international 
economy. Severe disruptions of economic 
activity and of the world monetary system, 
whether caused by insufficiency of energy 
supplies or abrupt price movements could 
prove disastrous for consumers and produc- 
ers alike. 

Oil importing nations are vitally concerned 
with mechanisms which will assure adequate 
supplies at reasonable prices. Oil producing 
states, in turn, are concerned with arrange- 
ments that will assure fair payment for 
and rational use of their non-renewable re- 

Accordingly, as suggested by Secretary of 
State Kissinger in his speech in London in 
December, the United States believes it is 
necessary to deal with these matters urgently. 

The United States is undertaking this 
initiative as a constructive and positive step, 
consistent with the publicly stated views of a 
number of oil producing nations which have 
called for a consultative relationship between 
producers and consumers. It is my hope that 
the results of the forthcoming meeting will 
lead to an early joint conference of consumer 
and producer nations. 


Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

White House press release dated January 10 

January 9, 1974. 

Today I have invited governments of the 
major oil consuming countries to send repre- 
sentatives to a meeting in Washington on 
February eleventh. The purpose of this meet- 
ing will be to seek a consensus among the 
participants, looking toward a meeting of 
consumers and producers, which would es- 
tablish new mutually beneficial arrangements 
for international energy and related eco- 
nomic matters. 

Recent developments have emphasized the 

' Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and Venezuela. 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

The Great Lakes. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House Commit- 
tee on Foreign Affairs. Part I: The 1973 Floods 
and Activities of the International Joint Commis- 
sion, United States and Canada. March 23-May 1, 
1973. 715 pp. 

Oil Negotiations, OPEC, and the Stability of Supply. 
Hearings before the Subcommittees on Foreign 
Economic Policy and on the Near East and South 
Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
April 10-September 18, 1973. 300 pp. 

Energy and Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. May 30^31, 
1973. 239 pp. 

U.S. Forces in Europe. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Arms Control, International Law and 
Organization of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. July 25-27, 1973. 386 pp. 

Travel Agents Registration. Report to accompany 
S. 2300. S. Rept. 93-458. October 10, 1973. 19 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. Supports U.N. Programs Against Drug Abuse 

Following is a statement by Congressman 
John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Representative 
to the U.N. General Assembly, made in- Com- 
mittee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cul- 
tural) of the Assembly on November 28, to- 
gether with the texts of three resolutions 
adopted by the committee on November 29 
and by the Assembly on December lU. 


USUN press release 120 dated November 28 

As we meet for the annual discussion of 
narcotics control in this committee, we can 
observe two major and conflicting trends on 
the international drug control scene. 

On the one hand, we can perceive a steady 
increase, noted in the report of the Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control Board for 1972, in 
the volume, geographic extent, and number 
of persons affected by drug abuse. 

On the other hand, and running contrary 
to the spread of drug abuse, we can observe 
a steady progression of events which cannot 
but provide solid basis for hope in the fu- 
ture. I refer to the increased national and 
international efforts directed at stopping the 
illicit traffic, eradicating the illicit produc- 
tion, and reducing the demand for drugs of 

These latter efforts have been undertaken 
within national borders, within the context 
of bilateral agreements, and multilaterally 
through the many international organiza- 
tions cooperating in drug abuse control in 
accordance with their capabilities and re- 

The strenuous efforts of my own country 
are already known to you. Suffice it to repeat, 
as President Nixon pointed out at a White 

House conference on drug matters two 
months ago, that we have attacked drug 
abuse on all fronts — supply, trafficking, and 
demand. The Federal Government, for ex- 
ample, now spends 10 times as much on the 
treatment of drug addiction as it did four 
and a half years ago. These efforts have 
attained some success, for as the President 
stated, "We have turned the corner on drug 
addiction in the United States. . . ." We in 
this country know we must maintain our 
efforts, however, because as the President 
also pointed out, "There is a long road after 
turning that corner before we get to our 
goal of getting (drug abuse) really under 
control. . . ." But we approach the future 
confident that increased efforts will bear 

Our own efforts will be increased both na- 
tionally and internationally. Both the U.S. 
House of Representatives and the Senate 
have approved legislation providing $42.5 
million for each of two years in bilateral and 
multilateral programs. This measure is 
awaiting final action and represents an even 
stronger commitment on the part of my 
country to combating international drug 

Other nations also have undertaken pro- 
grams designed to eliminate the sources and 
to moderate the effects of the illicit traffic in 
drugs of abuse. These national programs de- 
rive increased scope and effectiveness from 
mutual cooperation and assistance — some- 
times through bilateral arrangements, some- 
times on a regional basis, and sometimes on a 
global basis. Time does not permit citation of 
all the activities of nations directed toward 
eliminating drug abuse. I would be remiss, 
however, if I did not express my govern- 
ment's deep gratification on observing these 

February 4, 1974 


efforts and our sincere hope for their con- 
tinuing success. 

These successes, however, have not been 
without cost — in some cases heavy costs to 
the nations involved. There has been not 
only a burden on resources, but there has 
also been the far greater cost of human life. 
My country respects and appreciates the 
dedication of those countries in their com- 
mitment to curbing the deadly traffic in nar- 
cotics. The United States is proud to partici- 
pate in this expanding international effort. 

The organs created by the world commu- 
nity for dealing with drug problems present 
grounds for hope in the world struggle 
against drug abuse. Those organizations, 
which are the mind and hands of the world 
community in drug matters, are alert and 
dadicated to our common goal. 

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND), with an expanded membership aug- 
mented by numerous .states representatives 
who have made signal contributions as ob- 
servers, has addressed the international 
emergency energetically and effectively. In 
the 25th session it focused upon actions re- 
quired and recommended resolutions for 
adoption by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) which the Council approved at 
its 54th session. Among the more important, 
in our view, were the establishment of a Sub- 
commission on Illicit Traffic in the Middle 
East and the authorization of an Ad Hoc 
Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Far East. 
We expect that the special session of the 
CND scheduled for early 1974 will be equally 
helpful to the international community in 
clarifying problems and in recommending 

It should be a source of satisfaction to us 
all, parties to the drug control conventions 
and beneficiaries of the international conti'ol 
system, that the International Narcotics Con- 
trol Board (INCB) is actively pursuing its 
responsibilities and defending our common 
interests under the treaties. The Board Sec- 
retariat, under the able leadership of its 
Secretary, Joseph Dittert, maintains a high 
standard of service to the treaty parties. 

We support the efforts by the Secretary 
General to achieve better coordination among 

the various international drug control bodies 
in accordance with the draft resolution rec- 
ommended by the 25th session of the Com- 
mission and approved by ECOSOC. 

We cannot afford duplication or waste or 
inefficiency in our international effort. But 
we are equally impressed with the impor- 
tance of continuing the present special admin- 
istrative arrangements between the Board 
and the Secretariat, which seek to assure the 
technical independence of the INCB in carry- 
ing out its treaty functions. Those arrange- 
ments, which were approved by the Economic 
and Social Council as recently as May of this 
year, have well served the interests of the 
international community. It would not be 
desirable, in our view, to have the INCB's 
activities or personnel merged with those of 
any other body. 

The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control is now promoting and supporting an 
expanded program of assistance, as was its 
objective. The report of the Acting Execu- 
tive Director gives us cause to be pleased by 
the variety of the work accomplished, the 
quality of projects still underway, and by the 
scope of the programs under consideration. 
Although we all recognize the difficulty of 
acliieving a balance among programs affect- 
ing the three aspects of the drug problem — 
supply, trafficking, and demand — the Fund 
has pursued this objective with a consider- 
able measure of success. Thus the Fund has 
ongoing programs of assistance not only in 
training of law enforcement officers and re- 
placement of illicit narcotics production with 
other crops but in prevention, treatment, 
and rehabilitation and research. 

My country has been impressed by the ini- 
tial successes of this program, despite its 
embryonic stage. But additional resources 
will be needed if the Fund is to increase its 
efforts. The United States is willing, where 
appropriate and desirable, to reinforce the 
efforts of the Fund by complementary pro- 
grams designed to achieve shared goals. 

It is obvious from the Fund's recent activi- 
ties that increasing emphasis is being given 
to coordination with other U.N. agencies 
working on drug matters under Fund leader- 
ship. I believe all governments will view this 


Department of State Bulletin 

development with satisfaction. The report of 
the Administrative Committee on Coordina- 
tion (ACC), Issued In September of this 
year, is a significant prelude to even better 
coordination In the future. 

We are also pleased to note the beginnings 
of program evaluation included in the most 
recent ACC report. This will be responsive 
to the views and expectations of the CND as 
expressed by many representatives at the 
25th session. We also look forward to the 
realization of the Fund's plans for assigning 
regional advisers to the principal geograph- 
ical areas, to enable the United Nations to be 
more responsive more promptly to countries' 
requests for advice and assistance in meet- 
ing their international obligations. 

The appointment of a regional adviser for 
the Middle East recently announced by the 
distinguished Acting Executive Director of 
the Fund, whom we are honored to have here 
with us today, provides evidence of the 
Fund's determination to acquire the capacity 
to respond to the needs of the world com- 

The U.N. Fund has been in existence for 
only a short period. Established to provide 
extraordinary resources for emergency 
needs, the Fund can give to the United Na- 
tions the capacity to respond to requests for 
assistance from countries with significant 
drug abuse control problems. The mainte- 
nance of this capacity is the responsibility of 
every nation represented here, because the 
Fund can act only with the resources pro- 
vided to it by the international community. 
We hope that all nations will contribute on a 
sustained basis to the resources of the Fund 
as generously as they are able. 

This discussion would be incomplete with- 
out mention of the basic agreements which 
underlie our cooperation in this field; that is, 
the series of international conventions de- 
signed to control drugs of abuse. 

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
has now been accepted by 102 nations, its 
amending protocol by 14 nations, and the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances by 
13 nations. Most countries which have not 
yet ratified the protocol and Psychotropic 
Convention are making preparations to do so. 

As a result of international confei'ences 
there is a moral commitment, which the 
the United States respects, to perfect and up- 
date this international control system in the 
interest of all nations and peoples. 

The world drug scene is dominated today 
by the spread of drug abuse and by the ener- 
gization of nations and international orga- 
nizations to combat this pollution of human 

My government believes that energetic and 
sustained action by the world community 
through programs directed at the supply, 
traflicking, and demand for illicit drugs will 
in time permit the peoples of the world to 
"turn the corner" on the problem of drug 

Extraordinary eff'orts are required, but the 
hope of success is real if we maintain our 
national commitments and continue our co- 
operation with other nations and with inter- 
national organizations. I pledge that my 
government will carry on with its eff"orts 
both within the United States and in coopera- 
tion with other nations to reduce drug abuse 
and bring it under eff"ective control. 


General Assembly Resolution 3145 ' 

Assistance to the developing countries in the field 
of narcotics control 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 2859 (XXVI) of 20 De- 
cember 1971 and 3012 (XXVII) of 18 December 

Considering that some developing countries, owing 
to the lack of technical and financial means, are un- 
able to contribute to the control of narcotic drugs 
as effectively as they earnestly desire, 

Recognizing that in order to do so they would be 
required to make an extensive effort to improve 
especially the economic and social conditions of 
some of their often isolated and impoverished regions 
where traditionally the revenue derived from the 
cultivation of opium poppy or other narcotic drugs is 
in some cases the principal means of livelihood for 
the populations concerned, 

Recognizing further that in those regions of the 

' Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 14 by a vote of 
118 (U.S.) to 0, with 10 abstentions. 

February 4, 1974 


above-mentioned developing countries the replace- 
ment of a traditionally drug-oriented economy by 
other agricultural and economic activities should be 
undertaken in such a way as to minimize hardship 
for the populations concerned and to assist in estab- 
lishing new adequate sources of revenue and means 
of livelihood for them, 

Being fully aware that to embark on such compre- 
hensive programmes these countries need substantial 
technical and financial assistance from the interna- 
tional community, 

Conscious that the United Nations Fund for Drug 
Abuse Control, in order to be able to participate 
financially in these programmes and to continue to 
support training, research and other scientific activi- 
ties and rehabilitation efforts in the interest of all 
States, whatever their individual stage of develop- 
ment, requires funding on a continuous basis, 

1. Considers that the United Nations system, 
through the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control, can make a major contribution in this 
respect ; 

2. Welcomes the fact that some of the developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America, in co-operation 
with the Fund have initiated or are about to initiate 
programmes aimed at the effective elimination of 
illicit traffic, illicit production and abuse of narcotic 

3. Commends the Governments which have already 
contributed to the Fund and urges them to continue, 
and if possible, to increase their contribution ; 

4. Urges all States, according to their capacities, 
to make substantial and sustained contributions to 
the Fund and also to provide technical and financial 
assistance to the developing countries directly con- 
cerned which request such assistance for bringing 
narcotic drugs under effective control ; 

5. Appeals to international financial institutions 
to assist these developing countries in carrying out 
their respective narcotics control programmes. 

General Assembly Resolution 3146- 

Support for and voluntary contributioyis to the 
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control 

The General Assembly, 

Noting with concern the report of the Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control Board for 1972 that drug 
abuse is still increasing in volume, geographical 
extent and number of people affected. 

Encouraged by the Board's assessment that there 
has at the same time been a deepening realization at 
all levels of society that this grave and complex 
phenomenon can only be met successfully by a sus- 

tained, united effort on the part of the world com- 
munity by Governments acting in concert with one 

1. Commends the action already taken by Govern- 
ments to reduce illicit production, traffic and con- 
sumption ; 

2. Expresses the hope that tfiese actions will con- 
tinue and that even greater concerted efforts will be 

3. Recognizes that a number of countries will need 
assistance to enable them to carry out their drug 
abuse control programmes; 

4. Reaffirms its declaration in resolution 3012 
(XXVII) of 18 December 1972 that the fulfilment 

by the developing countries of their obligations under 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, calls 
for technical and financial assistance from the inter- 
national community; 

5. Urgently appeals to Governments for sustained 
support and increased voluntary contributions to the 
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, in 
any form and according to their capacities. 

General Assembly Resolution 3147- 

Accession to drug control treaties 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 3013 (XXVII) of 18 De- 
cember 1972 calling for adherence to the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, the Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, and the 1972 Pro- 
tocol Amending the Single Convention, 

Gratified that since this resolution was adopted a 
number of States have acceded to one or more of 
these instruments, 

1. Stresses the importance to international drug 
control of universal accession to all three treaties and 
to the earliest possible entry into force of the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1972 
Protocol Amending the Single Convention ; 

2. Urges Governments of countries directly related 
to the manufacturing and production of psycho- 
tropic substances to ratify or accede to the said Con- 
vention as soon as possible; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to draw the 
present resolution to the attention of all Govern- 

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to report 
to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session 
on the progress made towards universal acceptance 
of all three treaties. 

' Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 14 by a vote of 
119 (U.S.) to 0, with 10 abstentions. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. Reviews Progress on Disarmament Issues in 1973 
Before U.N. General Assembly 

Following are statements by Joseph Mar- 
tin, Jr., U.S. Representative to the Confer- 
ence of the Committee on Disarmament 
(CCD) and Adviser to the U.S. delegation to 
the U.N. General Assembly, made in Com- 
mittee I (Political and Security) of the Gen- 
eral Assembly on October 23 and November 
23, together with the texts of two resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly on December 18. 


USUN press release 97 dated October 23 

Writing about the atomic bomb in 1945, 
Albert Einstein reluctantly saw a certain 
merit in the specter of danger it had intro- 
duced. "It may intimidate the human race," 
he said, "into bringing order into its inter- 
national affairs, which, without the pressure 
of fear, it would not do." 

Certainly no one would question that nu- 
clear weapons and other forms of advanced 
technology have had the most pervasive 
effects on human society. But has this tech- 
nology had an influence over international 
affairs as Einstein anticipated? The answer 
is, obviously, yes — but perhaps not as much 
as he expected. One reason is that the human 
race becomes partially inured to almost any- 
thing, including danger. Another reason is 
that it changes its thought habits only very 
slowly; many people today still think in terms 
of an earlier era of conventional weaponry. 

All the more credit therefore seems due to 
those who have read the implication of tech- 
nology correctly and who have labored 

against considerable odds to bring it under 
control. Those who work in the arms control 
field should draw courage, I think, from yet 
another consideration : Difficult and frustrat- 
ing as these efforts may be over the long run, 
they are bound to have an effect on the 
thoughts and trends of governments, even 
before specific results are achieved. 

As the First Committee begins once again 
today to explore the problems of arms con- 
trol and disarmament, there are certainly 
many factors on the world scene which are a 
source of apprehension. It is easy under these 
circumstances to be discouraged about the 
prospects for arms control; however, if we 
take stock of the events of the past decade, 
we can, I believe, be encouraged by how far 
we have come. 

Only a decade ago, arms control and dis- 
armament often seemed just another issue 
which, despite its importance, had become 
enmeshed in the cold war. Proposals were 
often made with no thought of their ultimate 
acceptance; speakers seemed intent upon 
scoring propaganda victories rather than 
achieving progress toward meaningful arms 
control measures. 

This fall we can cite more than a body of 
agreements already concluded. We can point 
to promising negotiations now underway or 
about to begin on strategic arms limitations, 
on mutual and balanced force reductions 
(MBFR) in Central Europe, and on Euro- 
pean security and cooperation. The Confer- 
ence of the Committee on Disarmament con- 
tinues its efforts to come to grips realistically 
with important subjects: a comprehensive 
test ban and limitations on chemical weapons. 

The past year has seen encouraging signs 
of further movement toward stability. The 

February 4, 1974 


Viet-Nam and Laos agreements have already 
reduced the scope of the conflict that has torn 
Southeast Asia for so long. Although fighting 
has occurred in the Middle East, it has been 
possible to arrange a cease-fire. My country 
will of course continue its eff'orts to help 
arrange a peaceful settlement of the Middle 
East conflict. Elsewhere in the world, prog- 
ress has been made toward relaxing tensions. 

Here at the United Nations we have the 
clear duty to move ahead in our work on 
arms control, whatever the difficulties facing 
us. It is up to us to build on the base of agree- 
ments already achieved in order to take those 
further steps which may now be feasible. 

Nuclear arms control naturally enjoys pri- 
ority in our efl^'orts. In this area as in others, 
the coming years hold the promise of further 
progress, building upon that of the past five 

In 1969, President Nixon pledged to the 
United Nations that the United States was 
embarked on a "determined eflfort not only to 
limit the buildup of strategic arms but to 
reverse it." In 1972, we concluded with the 
Soviet Union agreements limiting each side 
to two ABM [antiballistic missile] sites and 
freezing ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched 
ballistic missile] launcher levels for five 
years. In the U.S.-Soviet agreement con- 
cluded on June 21, 1973, President Nixon 
and General Secretary Brezhnev stated their 
intention of reaching a permanent agree- 
ment on more complete measures on the limi- 
tation of arms, as well as their subsequent 
reduction. They also announced that the two 
sides would make serious eff"orts to work out 
the provisions of the permanent agreement 
with the objective of signing it in 1974. U.S. 
and Soviet negotiators are now meeting in 
Geneva in order to try to carry out that 

The SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] represent a fundamental change 
in international relationships. Each side has 
set a goal of breaking the momentum and 
moderating the process of strategic arms 

On October 30, historic talks will begin in 

Vienna aiming at reductions in the level of 
military forces now stationed in Central 
Europe. How important these negotiations 
are is evident from the area involved. Central 
Europe has been since World War II a region 
of major East-West confrontation. It has 
long been a battleground of many peoples 
and nations. Preserving security undimin- 
ished in that region at lower levels of forces 
would represent a major breakthrough to- 
ward a more rational world order. We and 
our allies plan to negotiate in Vienna with 
dedication, bearing in mind that not just the 
interests of the actual participants will be 
served by our success but international peace 
and security will generally be strengthened. 

Nonproliferation Treaty 

Neither negotiations on strategic arms nor 
the forthcoming talks on mutual and bal- 
anced force reductions in Europe are directly 
concerned With the question of the interna- 
tional proliferation of nuclear arms. In the 
end, however, their purpose is similar to that 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty. For the 
many nations which negotiated the Nonpro- 
liferation Treaty shared the same goals as 
the SALT and MBFR negotiators : to achieve 
greater stability in a world living under the 
nuclear threat, to reduce the chances of nu- 
clear war breaking out whether by design 
or by accident, and to lessen the burden of 
armaments on the world. The Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty reflects the desire of its more 
than 100 signatories to call a halt to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons before an 
increasing number of countries felt com- 
pelled to invest substantial resources into 
building their own deteri-ent forces. The 
benefits of the treaty have flowed to nuclear- 
weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states alike. 
The world as a whole has profited from the 
fact that no country has joined the "nuclear 
club" since 1964. One can well ask where we 
would be today if, in addition to the other 
conflicts in the world, the last few years had 
seen a desperate action-reaction cycle as ad- 
ditional countries acquired nuclear-weapon 


Department of State Bulletin 

It will not be on the basis of the short five 
years of its existence, but over the decades 
to come, that future generations will judge 
the usefulness of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. Strengthening that treaty and its 
underlying principles is one of our heaviest 
responsibilities. During the past year, the 
treaty did indeed receive increasing support 
with the adherence of six additional states. 
Another important development was the 
signing last April of the verification agree- 
ment between the IAEA [International 
Atomic Energy Agency] and the European 
Community, removing one obstacle to wider 
adherence to the treaty. We earnestly hope 
that additional countries, particularly those 
with an advanced nuclear technology, will 
adhere to the treaty. 

Article VIII of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty calls for a review conference five 
years after the entry into force of the treaty. 
We look forward to that conference. We re- 
gard it as an important opportunity to pro- 
vide additional impetus to the treaty and its 
principles. We intend to cooperate fully with 
other treaty parties in insuring that the con- 
ference will be carefully organized. To that 
end, we are now beginning to consult with 
the other depositaries and parties on how 
best to proceed with the arrangements for 
the conference in a manner satisfactory to 
all the parties. 

Comprehensive Ban on Nuclear Testing 

An important objective involved in the 
control of nuclear arms remains a compre- 
hensive ban on nuclear testing. Resolutions of 
the United Nations General Assembly have 
often drawn attention to the priority that a 
comprehensive ban should receive in disar- 
mament negotiations. 

We share the general assessment that the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty has made a sub- 
stantial contribution to international arms 
control efforts. Our common objective of lim- 
iting the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
would have been more difficult to achieve 
except for the willingness of states to accept 
the constraints placed on them by the Lim- 

ited Test Ban Treaty in the knowledge that 
other states were accepting the same con- 
straints. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, as 
the initial breakthrough after years of stalled 
arms control negotiations, improved the in- 
ternational climate and hence helped to make 
possible the later arms control agreements. 
For all its value, however, the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty has been regarded as a step, 
albeit a most important one, to a ban on all 
nuclear testing. The United States has al- 
ways supported the objective of an adequate- 
ly verified comprehensive test ban. President 
Nixon stated in his May 3, 1973, foreign 
policy report to Congress : 

The United States has continued to support the 
objective of an adequately verified agreement to ban 
all nuclear weapons testing. 

Some countries maintain that national means of 
verification would be sufficient to monitor such a ban 
with confidence. We disagree. Despite substantial 
progress in detecting and identifying seismic events, 
including underground nuclear tests, we believe that 
national means of verification still should be supple- 
mented by some on-site inspection. 

The United States shares the view of many other 
nations that an adequately verified comprehensive 
test ban would be a positive contribution to moderat- 
ing the arms race. For this reason we are giving 
high priority to the problem of verification. We will 
continue to cooperate with other nations in working 
toward eventual agreement on this important issue. 

Regarding our common goal of achieving 
a halt to all nuclear testing, we have made 
progress toward establishing the basis for a 
ban. Our understanding of seismic detection 
and identification capabilities has improved 
significantly over the past decade. My coun- 
try, in particular, has devoted very substan- 
tial resources to research and development 
in the field of seismology. At this summer's 
CCD session, we submitted a working paper 
analyzing in detail our recent progress in 
seismic verification research. That paper de- 
scribed our current plans to construct 15 or 
20 new seismic research stations in coopera- 
tion with other interested nations at key 
places in the world. It also outlined our plans 
to install a data management system to col- 
lect, store, and distribute to interested gov- 
ernments and other institutions and indi- 

February 4, 1974 


viduals the enormous quantities of data 
wliich will flow from this expanded seismic 
network. These plans call for seismic data 
to be available on a routine basis by late next 
year or early in 1975. 

My country, along with others interested 
in a comprehensive test ban, benefited from 
an intensive four-day exchange of views on 
this subject at informal meetings of the CCD 
last July. Those meetings, attended by ex- 
perts from nine countries, were, in our opin- 
ion, among the most useful ever held at the 
CCD. I would like here to express our ap- 
preciation to Japan for its efforts in pro- 
posing and helping to arrange the meetings. 

The past year has also seen progress in a 
less universal, but nevertheless very impor- 
tant, arms control measure. As a party to 
Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, the United States was most grati- 
fied to note the adherence during the year 
to that protocol of two additional nuclear- 
weapon states : France and the People's Re- 
public of China. We are pleased to see the 
Latin American nuclear-free zone gain this 
new support. Full credit must be given to the 
Mexican Government and its Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, Am- 
bassador [Alfonso] Garcia Robles, for their 
dedication and unflagging support of this 

Limiting Chemical Weapons 

During the past year, the CCD devoted a 
large part of its eff'orts to discussing limita- 
tions on chemical weapons (CW). At the end 
of the spring session, a group of eight non- 
aligned members presented their views on a 
possible treaty to the Committee. On August 
21, the Japanese delegation tabled the outline 
of a draft treaty for the consideration of the 
Committee. During the year, the CCD looked 
carefully at many aspects of chemical weap- 
ons, including those related to possible agree- 
ments. Such careful consideration of all rele- 
vant issues is the way to make progress 
toward the achievement of treaty restraints. 

The memorandum of the nonaligned coun- 
tries performed a useful service to the CCD 
in providing detailed views on the many 

interconnected elements in any possible CW 
agreement. The delegation of the United 
States commented in a systematic fashion on 
the key points in the nonaligned memo- 
randum. We agreed with the point in the 
memorandum that prohibition on chemical 
weapons must be coupled with adequate veri- 
fication and that verification in turn has both 
technical and political aspects which interact 
with the question of the scope of prohibitions. 
We presented our views about how best to 
achieve our mutual objective of a balanced 
agreement. Thus, the nonaligned memoran- 
dum served not only to put on record the 
views of eight CCD members but gave rise to 
an examination in depth at the CCD of many 
of the key elements involved in any agree- 
ment to limit chemical weapons. 

The Japanese working paper tabled shortly 
before the end of the CCD session has al- 
ready begun to receive wide consideration. 
We are giving the Japanese proposal the 
serious and careful study it deserves. In 
doing so, we are conscious that the Japanese 
delegation had itself taken into consideration 
the views of other CCD members, including 
those contained in the nonaligned memoran- 
dum, in preparing the proposal. One of our 
own views — that there must be an essential 
relationship between the scope of activities 
to be prohibited and the possibilities of veri- 
fication — is reflected in the Japanese working 
paper. We have also considered that the al- 
ternative of a gradual approach to the prob- 
lem of chemical weapons should be held open, 
as indeed it is in the Japanese proposal. 

During the past year, the CCD carried out 
important work in deepening our mutual 
understanding of the elements involved in 
limiting chemical weapons. Its value as a 
forum was rarely more evident than in the 
detailed discussions held about chemical 
weapons. These discussions, in which virtu- 
ally every CCD member joined, covered the 
widest possible range of issues. 

The United States remains committed to 
seeking effective limitations on chemical 
weapons. We will continue our search for 
workable means of restricting these weapons 
during the coming year, while exercising 
restraint in our own program. 


Department of State Bulletin 

As I told the CCD on August 30, we have 
not produced any lethal chemical weapons 
since 1968 and in fact have been phasing out 
parts of our CW stockpiles. 

Question of Disarmament Forums 

I should like now to turn to the question of 
disarmament forums. As you all know, a 
number of suggestions have been advanced. 
We would like to make our views known on 
these suggestions. 

The CCD remains, in our view, a valuable 
forum which has proven itself over more 
than a decade. Its limited size and its free- 
dom from external pressures have permitted 
the CCD delegations to establish close work- 
ing relations with each other. They have ac- 
quired a detailed understanding of the tech- 
nical issues involved in arms control issues 
and have evolved procedures which have per- 
mitted the work of the Committee to proceed 
smoothly. These factors have enabled the 
CCD to achieve truly constructive results. 
We believe that the United Nations should 
continue to provide full support to this Com- 
mittee which has been responsible for so 
much of the progress that we have made in 
arms control. 

Some countries have called for the conven- 
ing of a world disarmament conference with 
preparations for such a meeting to begin as 
soon as possible. Other countries have stated 
their view that such a conference would 
prove useful only if all the nuclear powers 
agreed to participate in it. The views of the 
United States, which are well known, remain 
unchanged. While we agree that a world dis- 
armament conference could serve a useful 
function at a later stage in the disarmament 
process, we do not believe that such a con- 
ference at this time would produce useful 
results. For such a conference not to dis- 
appoint the hopes of all those wishing to see 
rapid progress in disarmament, the confer- 
ence would have to be able to offer real 
prospects of agreement on significant arms 
control measures. However, it is not the lack 
of a suitable forum but the lack of political 
agreement which prevents us from taking 
more far-reaching steps toward a more 

peaceful order with reduced levels of arma- 
ments. A world disarmament conference 
would be less likely to overcome this lack of 
agreement than to fall victim to it. The end 
result could well be a slowdown in our work 
combined with the dashing of expectations 
everywhere. Therefore, we oppose convening 
a world disarmament conference or setting a 
date or starting preparations for one at this 

Some speakers at this session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly have already alluded to the 
possibility of reconvening the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission (UNDC). You 
will recall that the Commission last met in 
1965, when there had been no [complete] 
General Assembly session and hence no dis- 
armament debate. 

We find it difficult to see how the UNDC 
could usefully tackle the problems facing us 
today. We doubt seriously that such a large 
conference could, despite the best of inten- 
tions, tackle the working out of concrete 
treaty agreements. On the other hand, if the 
conference were only to continue the ex- 
change of views which we will be having 
here, it is difficult to see how it could add 
to the debate in this committee. Moreover, 
a prolonged debate might give rise to heated 
exchanges not relevant to the solution of 
arms control and disarmament problems. 
Such exchanges would only set back the cause 
of disarmament. 

I have tried to sum up where we stand in 
our work. Obviously we have not moved 
ahead as rapidly as we would have liked to 
on all fronts. In this respect, we must recog- 
nize frankly that there are elements of divi- 
sion and mistrust which have existed in the 
world for a long time. A process of compro- 
mise, of overcoming longstanding political 
diff'erences, and of relegating ideological dif- 
ferences to their proper place will be needed 
before we can attain a more rapid rate of 
progress in all sectors of arms control and 

But we must equally recognize that this 
is by no means a time for despair — rather the 
contrary. In the realm of strategic arms con- 
trol there has been very substantial progress 
indeed, with good prospects for future prog- 

February 4, 1974 


ress in the not too distant future. In the 
realm of conventional forces, we will soon be 
witness to an undertaking of transcendental 
importance, with the start of actual negotia- 
tions on the mutual and balanced reduction 
of forces and armaments in Central Europe. 
Of all the areas of dangerous confrontation, 
perhaps none over time has occupied our 
thoughts more starkly or more relentlessly 
than this one, for a conflagration in this area 
would scarcely leave any part of the world 

Finally, and perhaps above all, we can 
draw encouragement from the growth, 
worldwide, of an idea— an idea which is the 
cardinal principle of all work in arms control 
and disarmament: that limitations can as- 
sure security and stability better than even 
the highest levels of armaments. 

later time will be free to join the committee. 
We also think that the committee should be 
ready to receive suggestions by interested 
countries concerning its work. 

Early in its deliberations the committee 
will, no doubt, wish to consider inviting the 
IAEA to provide assistance for the substan- 
tive preparation of the conference, as well as 
to send experts to participate in the confer- 

We think that the draft resolution in docu- 
ment A/C.1/L.665 merits the support of all 
delegations that approve the objectives of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. For our part, we 
look forward to cooperating actively in insur- 
ing that the conference in 1975 will result 
in a serious and constructive review of the 
operation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. 


The U.S. delegation is happy to cosponsor 
the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665 
on the Nonproliferation Treaty review con- 
ference. We attach importance to the confer- 
ence, and we consider it to be in the general 
interest to insure that the conference is care- 
fully prepared and that appropriate facilities 
and services are provided. These purposes 
are served by the draft resolution in docu- 
ment A/C.1/L.665. 

Operative paragraph 2 requests the Secre- 
tary General to render assistance and provide 

Operative paragraph 1 takes note that a 
preparatory committee has been formed, 
comprised of parties to the Nonproliferation 
Treaty serving on the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Board or [represented] at 
the Conference of the Committee on Dis- 

We believe that those criteria represent 
the best practical solution to the problem of 
constituting a committee that is fully repre- 
sentative of the interests of all parties to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. 

We favor a wide interpretation of those 
criteria so that any party meeting them at a 


General Assembly Resolution 31848^ 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 
1968, in which it commended the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and expressed 
the hope for the widest possible adherence to that 

Noting that article VIII, paragraph 3, of the 
Treaty provides that: 

"Five years after the entry into force of this 
Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall 
be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review 
the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring 
that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions 
of the Treaty are being realized", 

Bearing in mind that the Treaty will have been 
in force for five years on 5 March 1975 and expecting 
that the review conference called for in the Treaty 
will take place soon after that date, 

1. Notes that, following appropriate consultation, 
a preparatory committee has been formed of parties 
serving on the Board of Governors of the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency or represented at the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the 
necessary assistance and to provide such services, 

' A/C.1/L.665; adopted by Committee I on Nov. 23 
by a vote of 66 (U.S.) to 2, with 10 abstentions, and 
by the Assembly on Dec. 18 by a recorded vote of 
100 (U.S.) to 2, with 11 abstentions. 


Department of State Bulletin 

including summary records, as may be required for 
the review conference and its preparation. 

General Assembly Resolution 3183- 

The General Assembly, 

Conscious of the responsibility of the United Na- 
tions under the Charter for the maintenance of in- 
ternational peace and for disarmament, 

Convinced that all peoples of the world have a 
vital interest in the success of disarmament negotia- 

Deeply convinced that substantial progress in the 
field of disarmament can be achieved only by ensur- 
ing adequate conditions of security for all States, 

Convinced also that all States should contribute 
to the adoption of measures for the achievement of 
this goal. 

Believing that it is imperative that all States exert 
further efforts for the adoption of effective measures 
of disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear dis- 

Believing also that a world disarmament confer- 
ence, adequately prepared and convened at an appro- 
priate time, could promote the realization of such 
aims and that the co-operation of all nuclear Powers 
would considerably facilitate their attainment. 

Recalling resolution 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 

Recalling also resolution 2930 (XXVII) of 29 No- 
vember 1972, by which it decided to establish a 
Special Committee on the Woi-ld Disarmament Con- 

Bearing in mind the note of the Secretary-General, 
of 17 October 1973, and the statements made during 
the consideration by the First Committee of agenda 
item 32, 

Noting that, before any conclusion may be reached 
with regard to preparation for the convening of a 
world disarmament conference, it will be necessary 
to carry out considerable study of the relevant 
existing conditions, 

1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to 
examine all the views and suggestions expressed by 
Governments on the convening of a world disarma- 
ment conference and related problems, including 
conditions for the realization of such a conference, 
and to submit, on the basis of consensus, a report to 
the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session; 

2. Decides further that the Ad Hoc Committee 
shall consist of the following 40 non-nuclear-weapon 
Member States appointed by the President of the 
General Assembly after consultation with all re- 
gional groups : Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 

^ A/C.1/L.673; adopted by Committee I unani- 
mously on Dec. 13 and by the Assembly unanimously 
on Dec. 18. 

Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia; 

3. Invites the States possessing nuclear weapons 
to co-operate or maintain contact with the Ad Hoc 
Committee, it being understood that they will enjoy 
the same rights as the designated members of the 

4. Invites all States to communicate as soon as 
possible to the Secretary-General, for transmission 
to the Ad Hoc Committee, any views and sugges- 
tions they deem pertinent to present for the purpose 
defined in paragraph 1 above; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to render all 
necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee in its 
work, including the preparation of summary records; 

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of 
its twenty-ninth session the item entitled "World 
Disarmament Conference". 

United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from, the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Economic and Social Council 

Population Commission: 

Population program of the United Nations. Report 
of the Secretary General. E/CN.9/289. October 
1, 1973. 35 pp. 

Work programs in population of organizations in 
the United Nations system. E/CN.9/284. Oc- 
tober 4, 1973. 91 pp. 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Re- 
port of the Secretary General. E/5425. October 

3, 1973. 37 pp. 
Commission on the Status of Women: 

Study on UNESCO activities of special interest to 
women. E/CN.6/580. October 9, 1973. 58 pp. 

Consideration of proposals concerning a new in- 
strument or instruments of international law 
to eliminate discrimination against women. 
Working paper by the Secretary General. E/ 
CN.6/573. November 6, 1973. 44 pp. 

Study on the interrelationship of the status of 
women and family planning. Report of the Spe- 
cial Rapporteur. E/CN.6/575. November 27, 
1973. 22 pp. 

International Women's Year. Report of the Secre- 
tary General. E/CN.6/576. December 4, 1973. 

February 4, 1974 



New Multilateral Multifiber Textile 
Arrangement Negotiated 

Press release 466 dated December 21 

On December 20, the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Textile 
Negotiating Group, meeting in Geneva, 
agreed to a comprehensive multilateral ar- 
rangement to regulate world trade in man- 
made fiber, wool, and cotton textiles. The 
new arrangement has been under negotiation 
since July 1973 and is effective from January 
1, 1974, for a four-year term. 

The arrangement, which is considered a 
major accomplishment within the GATT, in- 
volves over 50 countries with divergent in- 
terests in textile trade. No countries made 
reservations regarding the arrangement. 
Each country will officially accede to the 
arrangement by notifying the GATT. 

Current Actions 



Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Greece, September 20, 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratification deposited: Greece, January 15, 1974. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.' 
Ratification deposited: United States, January 14, 


International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with anne.xes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Signature : France (with reservation), December 
13, 1973. 


Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973. Enters into force when two- 
thirds of the members of the World Health Orga- 
nization have deposited an acceptance. 
Acceptances deposited: Fiji, November 15, 1973; 
Egypt, January 14, 1974. 

Additional regulations amending articles 1, 21, 63, 
71, and 92 of the international health regulations 
of July 25, 1969 (TIAS 7026). Adopted at Ge- 
neva May 23, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 

Seals — Antarctic 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, 
with anne.x and final act. Done at London June 
1, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Norway, December 10, 



Agreement confirming the agreement between the 
Colombian Ministry of Agriculture and the United 
States Department of Agriculture for the control 
and eradication of foot and mouth disease in Co- 
lomljia. EflFected by exchange of notes at Bogota 
November 27, December 3, 14, and 17, 1973. En- 
tered into force December 17, 1973. 


Agreement regarding exports of cotton velveteen 
fabrics from Italy, with related note. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington January 9, 1974. 
Entered into force January 9, 1974; effective Oc- 
tober 1, 1973. 


Agreement amending the agreement of December 3, 
1973, concerning the provision of four helicopters 
and related assistance by the United States to 
help Mexico in curbing traflic in illegal narcotics. 
Efl'ected by exchange of notes at Mexico Decem- 
ber 21, 1973. Entered into force December 21, 

' Not in force. 

' In force for all members of the World Health 
Organization except as follows: Not bound — Aus- 
tralia, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, 
Singapore, and South Africa. Position not defined — 
Bahamas, Botswana, China, The Gambia, Holy See, 
and Nauru. Position not defined pending acceptance 
of reservations — Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, 
Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Thailand, 
and Yugoslavia. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX February U, 197h Vol. LXX, No. 1806 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 124 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger and Federal En- 
ergy Administrator Simon Hold Joint News 
Conference 109 

Disarmament. U.S. Reviews Progress on Dis- 
armament Issues in 1973 Before U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly (Martin, texts of resolutions) 129 

Economic Affairs 

New Multilateral Multifiber Textile Arrange- 
ment Negotiated 136 

Secretary Kissinger and Federal Energy Ad- 
ministrator Simon Hold Joint News Confer- 
ence 109 


President Nixon Extends Invitations to Con- 
ference on Energy (texts of letters) . . . 123 

Secretary Kissinger and Federal Energy Ad- 
ministrator Simon Hold Joint News Confer- 
ence 109 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger and Federal En- 
ergy Administrator Simon Hold Joint News 
Conference 109 

Japan. Secretary Kissinger and Federal En- 
ergy Administrator Simon Hold Joint News 
Conference 109 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger and Federal 
Energy Administrator Simon Hold Joint 
News Conference 109 

Narcotics Control. U.S. Supports U.N. Pro- 
grams Against Drug Abuse (Buchanan, 
texts of resolutions) 125 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger and Federal En- 
ergy Administrator Simon Hold Joint News 
Conference 109 

Petroleum. President Nixon Extends Invita- 
tions to Conference on Energy (texts of let- 
ters) 123 

Presidential Documents. President Nixon Ex- 
tends Invitations to Conference on Energy 
(texts of letters) 123 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 136 

New Multilateral Multifiber Textile Arrange- 
ment Negotiated 136 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger and Federal En- 
ergy Administrator Simon Hold Joint News 
Conference 109 

United Nations 

United Nations Documents 135 

U.S. Reviews Progress on Disarmament Is- 
sues in 1973 Before U.N. General Assembly 
(Martin, texts of resolutions) 129 

U.S. Supports U.N. Programs Against Drug 

Abuse (Buchanan, texts of resolutions) . . 125 

Name Index 

Buchanan, John H., Jr 125 

Kissinger, Secretary 109 

Martin, Joseph, Jr 129 

Nixon, President 123 

Simon, William 109 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 14—20 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 14 which 
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
466 of December 21 and 14 of January 10. 

No. Date Subject 

*16 1/14 Jova sworn in as Ambassador to 
Mexico (biographic data). 

*17 1/14 Hartman sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*18 1/14 Newsom sworn in as Ambassador 
to Indonesia (biographic data). 

*19 1/16 Study group 5, U.S. National Com- 
mittee for CCIR. Feb. 1. 

*20 1/16 Underbill sworn in as Ambassador 
to Malaysia (biographic data). 

*21 1/17 Dr. Chen Ning Yang. Nobel Prize- 
winning physicist, to visit South 
America as Lincoln lecturer. 

*22 1/17 U.S. and Italy sign cotton textile 
agreement, Jan. 9. 

*23 1/18 Miller sworn in as Ambassador to 
Trinidad and Tobago (biograph- 
ic data). 

*24 1/18 U.S. and Bermuda sign agreement 
on preclearance of U.S.-bound 
air travelers. 

* Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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Washington, D.C. 20520. 




Volume LXX 

No. 1807 

February 11, 1974 

OF JANUARY 22 137 



Remarks by President Nixon US 


Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Shultz 

and Text of Communique 147 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXX, No. 1807 
February 11, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. B.C. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and tlie functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of tlie Department ol 
State, United Nations documents, ani 
legislative material in the field oi 
international relations are also listed, 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 22 

Press release 28 daterl January 22 

Secretary Kissinger: I will go right to the 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ive had a number of 
second- and third-hand reports from senior 
American officials and Congressmen, and so 
forth, about the question of whether you on 
your trip in concluding this [Egyptian-Is- 
raeli] agreement, or getting it concluded, 
made any commitments on behalf of the 
United States — or beyond that, whether there 
are any tmpublished understandings which 
put the United States in the position of being 
a diplomatic guarantor. And I thought it 
would be helpful if you would tell us your- 
self about this. 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me sum up the 
documents that exist and then explain our 
understanding of their significance. 

First, there is an agreement between 
Egypt and Israel signed by the Chiefs of 
Staff of Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101 — 
and which has been published in the news- 

Secondly, there exists an undertaking 
about the limitation of forces in the zones 
of limited armament, and elsewhere, between 
Egypt and Israel that came about as the re- 
sult, technically, of a U.S. proposal made by 
the United States to both sides. The reason 
was that both sides found it easier to accept 
a U.S. proposal as to the limitation of their 
forces than to accept limitations which 
seemed to be demanded by the other side 
about their deployment. 

This proposal was transmitted in a letter 
by the President to the heads of government 
of Egypt and Israel in which it was pointed 
out that acceptance of this identical docu- 

ment — that signature of this document would 
constitute acceptance and that it would there- 
by become part of the basic agreement. It 
therefore does not constitute a U.S. guaran- 
tee, but it was a device by which the United 
States made it possible to convey to the 
other their acceptance of certain limitations 
on the armaments. This, at the request of 
both sides, has not been published; and since 
it is not a U.S. obligation, we felt we had to 
acquiesce in the views of the parties. 

Thirdly, in the process of negotiating the 
agreement, both of the parties asked us ques- 
tions about the intentions of the other that 
were not part of the formal agreement but 
that nevertheless made it easier for them to 
plan their own course. 

And we therefore, sometimes in writing, 
sometimes orally, would do one of two things. 
We would either ask one of the parties what 
its intention was with respect to the problem 
at issue, and we would then communicate 
that statement of intentions to the other side, 
in effect saying: "We have been informed 
that the Egyptian Government" — or that the 
Israeli Government — "plans to do the fol- 
lowing." Sometimes we were asked what our 
interpretation was of certain clauses, and in 
that case we did that — sometimes in writing, 
sometimes orally. In the cases that now come 
to my mind, it turned out that our interpre- 
tations were identical with the interpreta- 
tions of both of the parties, and therefore it 
was essentially irrelevant. 

Now, are we guarantors of the agreement? 

In the sense of having a formal obligation 
to take specific action in case of violation of 
the agreement, we are not guarantors. 

In the sense that we will be in some way 
involved if the agreement breaks down, all 

February 11, 1974 


of recent history in the Middle East indi- 
cates that if there is an outbreak in the Mid- 
dle East, the United States is involved 
whether or not it has engaged in prior diplo- 
matic activity. It is certain that if there is 
another conflict, one or both of the parties 
are going to ask us for diplomatic support — 
and in that sense it is of course true that our 
judgment as to who violated the agreement 
will affect the course that we will pursue. 
But in the legal sense, there is no obligation 
that the United States has taken to enforce 
the agreement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you will follow up 
this question — having read the four or five 
whatever you call them, assurances, it struck 
me that all of them tvere given to Israel. 
Didn't Egypt need any? Was Mr. Sadat so 
self-assured that he didn't ask for any — 

Secretary Kissinger: No, there were some 
assurances given to Egypt as well. 

Q. Would you tell us some more? We have 
read in the papers those you gave to Israel, 
but nothing about Egypt. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the ones you 
read in the papers that were given to Israel 
had previously been leaked by the Govern- 
ment of Israel. The ones that were given to 
Egypt have not been released — but they are 
of the same nature. 

Prospects for End of Arab Oil Embargo 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said at your previ- 
ous, or last, neivs conference, that it tvas in- 
creasingly inappropriate for the Arab oil 
embargo to continue while the United States 
was engaged in a mediating effort. Now that 
that effort has been successful, in its first 
stage at least, what is your feeling about the 
continuation of the oil embargo? And can 
you report any progress in that area? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have had 
every reason to believe that success in the 
negotiations would mark a major step toward 
ending the oil embargo. We would therefore 
think that failure to end the embargo in a 

reasonable time would be highly inappropri- 
ate and would raise serious questions of con- 
fidence in our minds with respect to the Arab 
nations with whom we have dealt on this is- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the question of \ 
the documents — doesn't this leave the public 
record of the administration, and the United 
States, in a rather strange position with 
these unpublished documents? And does this 
not raise a question of where the administra- 
tion is heading in its relations with Con- 
gress, where there have been very strong de- 
mands in recent years for full documentation 
of international accords? 

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional 
leaders were given a detailed account of all 
of these assurances as well as of the content 
of any unpublished document. 

Secondly, it makes a great deal of differ- 
ence whether we publish a document to which ' 
the United States is a party and which there- 
fore spells out an American obligation — or i 
whether we publish a document which, in ef- 
fect, spells out the obligations of other par- 
ties and in which we played a mediating role 
because of the confidence these other parties 
had in us. I would suggest that there is an 
enormous difference in these two situations. 
Nevertheless the congressional leaders have 
been informed about these matters. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to your an- 
swer on oil, you mentioned that — you u^ed 
the phrase something about a "reasonable" 
period of time that this could be lifted. Is it a 
proper assumption that when the disengage- 
ment has been completed, when this iO-day 
cycle is over, that it is at that time you would 
think the oil embargo ought to be lifted? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think in more am- 
bitious terms. 

Q. Do you mean even before that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is word from — 

Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute — 

Q. Have you got some assurances from 


Department of State Bulletin 

Mr. Sadat that lie would use his influence in 
the oil-pyoducing countries in this embargo? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it would 
be appropriate to go into all the details of the 
conversation between President Sadat and 
myself, but I have made clear the U.S. posi- 
tion on the oil embargo and I believe that it 
is clearly understood by all of the leaders 
with whom I have spoken. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you were away, it 
was disclosed here through the White House 
and the Pentagon that the U.S. military had 
been receiving certain unauthorized National 
Security Council (NSC) documents by such 
devices as going through your briefcase, be- 
cause they tcere worried about your policy on 
China and the Soviet Union, and further, 
that when you heard about it, that you ivere 
furious and demanded the transfer of the 
guilty parties. 

This becomes a matter of curiosity to me 
because I found myself wondering and want- 
ing to ask you hoiv you knew that these 
things ivere happening, when I recall your 
stvorn testimony before the Senate was that 
you didn't know about the existence of the 
"plumbers," had no contact with David 
Young, and thought he ivas doing sotnething 

Secretary Kissinger: I missed you on the 
trip, Mr. O'Leary [Jeremiah O'Leary, Wash- 
ington Star-News]. [Laughter.] Let me an- 
swer the question in terms of my knowledge 
of this particular episode. 

This incident arose out of the leakage of 
highly classified documents containing min- 
utes of meetings of the Washington Special 
Action Group on the India-Pakistan crisis 
to a columnist. As a result of this leak, Mr. 
[John D.] Ehrlichman, who was in charge 
of all internal security investigations in the 
White House, started an investigation of this 
particular leak. 

Sometime after this. Admiral Welander 
[Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander], who was 
in charge of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] 
liaison oflice at the NSC, came to General 
[Alexander M.] Haig and told him that the 
internal evidence of at least one of the docu- 

ments suggested to him that the leak to the 
columnist had occurred from his office. I was 
out of town at the time. When General Haig 
informed me of this, I told him to turn that 
matter over to Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Sometime later — I don't have the exact 
dates, several weeks later — Mr. Ehrlichman 
let me see, or rather listen to, the interroga- 
tion of Admiral Welander with respect to 
this particular incident. And in the course 
of this interrogation, there was developed an 
allegation not only with respect to the source 
of the leak but also about the unauthorized 
transfer of documents from my office to the 
office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. Beyond this one interrogation, I was 
told nothing about the investigation, either 
preceding or following this interrogation. 

I was amazed by this allegation, since the 
office of the Chairman and my office had 
worked closely together. I agree with what 
Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, 
Chairman, JCS] said on television last week, 
that there was a full flow of information 
between my office and his office; and I had 
no reason to suppose, on the basis of my 
experience, that there was any conflict be- 
tween the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my office. 
And therefore I have no reason to question 
the argument that has been made by Admiral 
Moorer that this incident of the unauthorized 
transfer of papers from my office to his office 
reflected overzealousness on the part of sub- 
ordinates and, in any case, gave him no infor- 
mation that he did not already possess. 

I add that I was not aware of the 
fact that a report was being prepared by 
Mr. Ehrlichman, and I have never seen that 
report. Nor have I seen the report of the 
investigation that was conducted by Secre- 
tary Laird's [Melvin R. Laird, then Secre- 
tary of Defense] office. And therefore what 
I am saying is based on my personal knowl- 
edge of the incident, which is confined to this 
one interrogation of one individual who vol- 
unteered his information first to my office. 
These reports must have come to conclusions 
similar to the ones I have outlined here, 
because no disciplinary action was taken by 
the addressees of this report. 

February 11, 1974 


After these allegations became known to 
me, it was decided in consultation between 
Admiral Moorer and myself to close the liai- 
son office attached to my staff. 

With respect to my statements before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee made 
under oath, I reaffirm here every word that I 
have said to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and I assert that they were fully 
consistent with the allegations of the un- 
named sources that have been made while I 
was on my trip last week. To be specific, I 
did not know that David Young was conduct- 
ing an investigation into the matter of the 
[Jack] Anderson leaks. He never talked to 
me about this, or any other subject, while he 
was conducting what I now know was his 
investigation. I did not instruct him, nor did 
I request it. I never saw the report, nor did I 
know that the report existed until I read it 
in a newspaper early last week.' 

I have called both Senator Fulbright and 
Senator Stennis and told them that I would 
be prepared to meet with their committees to 
answer any questions that they might have 
on this subject. 

Q. One quick folloivup. Who interrogated 
Admiral Welander? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe he was in- 
terrogated by David Young, but from this 
one could not suppose that David Young was 
conducting an investigation. 

Q. Did you know David Young had per- 
formed the interrogation? 

Secretary Kissinger: I knew that David 
Young had performed the interrogation, but 
I had assumed that since we had sent Ad- 
miral Welander to Mr. Ehrlichman's office, 
Mr. Ehrlichman had designated one of his 
staff members to take whatever report Ad- 
miral Welander had to give. 

I repeat again, we were not told about 
either the investigation preceding it or the 
investigation following it, and I had no con- 

' General Haig has himself assured me that he had 
no contact with David Young on the report or related 
matters. [.Added to the record subsequent to the 
press conference.] 

tact whatever with David Young during that 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify, you said you 
participated in the interrogation. 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not participate 
in the interrogation. 

Q. Could yon clarify that you read or 
listeru'd to a tape of the interrogation? 

Secretary Kissinger: I listened to a portion 
of the tape of the interrogation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, why did)i't you find, out 
the total results of the investigation and the 
interrogation of Admiral Welander? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because I was told 
that I was not to be informed of it. 

Q. By whom were you told? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have said all that I 
will say on this subject. All internal security 
matters in the White House after May 1970 
were handled by Mr. Ehrlichman's office, and 
therefore it was not unusual for this to be 
conducted in the established framework. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps your lack of 
precision on the oil question is deliberate, but 
I wonder if I could try to pin you down once 
more. Can you tell us what you would define 
to be a reasonable period of time? And you 
said if nothing did happen, that it would 
raise a question of confidence. What is the 
implication of that question ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It would not be useful 
for me to go beyond this. But we have carried 
out in good faith what we have told both 
sides we would do. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has 
stated its opposition to any one country domi- 
nating affairs in Asia or in other parts of the 
world. Hoiv do you look upon (a) the Paracel 
Islands question and (b) the island question 
that is dividing North and South Korea? 
There seem to be disputes over both sets of 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think either of 
those issues raises the question of dominating 


Department of State Bulletin 

the area or dominating the world. 

With respect to the Paracel Islands, there 
has been a dispute between various countries 
as to the ownership of these islands. The 
United States regrets the use of military 
force in settling this dispute, but it does not 
raise an issue of world domination. 

With respect to the Korean islands, those 
were assigned to South Korea as the result 
of the armistice agreement, and the United 
States supports that position. 

Further Middle East Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects 
now for aqreements between Israel and Syria 
and Israel and Jordan? And in that connec- 
tion, has your own personal diplomacy super- 
seded the Geneva Conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Syria 
and Israel, on the occasion of my visit to 
Syria the Syrian Government put forward 
some ideas with respect to the disengagement 
of forces on the Syrian front. It's the first 
time that the Syrian Government put for- 
ward concrete suggestions on any phase of 
the negotiations. We have transmitted those 
ideas to the Government of Israel, which is 
now studying them and which has promised 
us an answer sometime after their Cabinet 
meets next Sunday. 

We hope that a process can be generated 
by which the disengagement of forces on the 
Syrian side can be negotiated with the same 
seriousness as on the Egyptian side, and we 
have indicated that we would be prepared, if 
the two parties request it, to offer our good 

I might say also that the visit to Syria led 
to an improvement in the bilateral relations 
between the United States and Syria, one 
example of which is the fact that an Amer- 
ican citizen who has been held in Syria on 
the charge of espionage since July of 1972 is 
being released tomorrow. His name is John 
Bates, and Mr. Vest [George S. Vest, Special 
Assistant to the Secretary for Press Rela- 
tions] can give any of you who want to pur- 
sue it further particulars. 

With respect to Jordan, the United States 

believes that all parties that have frontiers 
with Israel should participate in the process 
of negotiation, and we favor negotiations, as 
well, between Israel and Jordan. 

The framework for the negotiations that 
have taken place was established by the Ge- 
neva Conference. The cochairmanship be- 
tween us and the Soviet Union is taken very 
seriously by us; and we are keeping, and have 
kept, the Soviet Union informed of all of the 
actions which we have taken, which we be- 
lieve are consistent with the consensus reso- 
lution M'hich ended the last meeting of the 
Geneva Conference and which carried out the 
spirit of this. 

My personal role has been produced by the 
fact that both parties found it easier to con- 
vey certain ideas through an intermediary 
and because, given the hostility in the area, 
it was useful to have a more impartial third 
party convey certain considerations and par- 
ticular assurances. It is to be hoped that as 
these negotiations develop, and as the par- 
ties gain confidence in each other, the role of 
a mediator will become less crucial. But given 
the importance to the peace of the whole 
world of making progress toward a settle- 
ment in the Middle East, I don't want to take 
a dogmatic position on that issue. 

Q. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Kissinger: Marilyn [Marilyn 
Berger, Washington Post]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in mentioning the docu- 
ments that do exist you said the second docu- 
ment is an undertaking of limited forces in 
zones of limited armaments and elsewhere. 
Can you spell that out a little bit, and does 
this involve limitation on tveapons that could 
reach the other side ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It concerns primarily 
the limitation of weapons within the zones 
of limited armaments and some understand- 
ings with respect to offensive capabilities. 

Q. Does each side then take on the respon- 
sibility not to acquire offensive capability? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is strictly a de- 
ployment question. 

February 11, 1974 


Q. Mr. Secretary, President Sadat is 
qrioted today in Algeria as saying that there 
has been a significant change since three 
months ago in U.S. policy ton-ard the Middle 
East. I tvonder if you could tell us ivhat it 
was that you either said or did while yon 
toere in Egypt that would cause President 
Sadat to reach that conclusion. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think — of course I 
am not a spokesman for President Sadat — 
but it is obvious that the United States has 
played a much more active role in the Middle 
East in pursuing a settlement than has been 
the case previously and the United States has 
attempted to take into account the legiti- 
mate concerns of both sides in urging a set- 
tlement. So I would think that the change to 
which President Sadat referred concerns the 
degree of our activity and our general partic- 
ipation in producing a settlement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect now that 
there will be a swift resumption of diplo- 
matic relations with Egypt ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the conditions 
for that have been improved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the Arab states, 
or oil-producing states, are said to be mi7iing 
their oil fields in a direct response to Secre- 
tary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger's 
speech of January 6 in which he said that 
ptiblic opinion might force a shon- of force 
by the West. What is your opinion about the 
likelihood of such a shoiv of force by the 
West if the embargo goes too far? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think 
the embargo will go too far, so that this is es- 
sentially an academic question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, following your last 
round of conversations with the Chinese 
leadership, you expressed the hope that the 
process of normalization could be accelerated. 
Cotdd you tell us as to 7vhat precisely yoti 
mean by normalization? Is it establishment 
of full diplomatic relations? And if so, hotv 
tvould you go about it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in our relations 

with the Chinese we have always stressed 
that the practical improvement of our rela- 
tions is more important than the legal form 
in which it is expressed. Therefore we have 
always stressed particular concrete steps. We 
are at the moment negotiating a number of 
issues with the Chinese Government on 
blocked assets and claims of both sides, which 
are progressing, and we are proceeding along 
the lines which we have previously outlined. 
But by normalization of relations we mean 
at this stage closer contact, improved com- 
munications, and a greater interconnection 
of various activities. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ehrlichman is gone, 
but have yon been assured since then that 
you never again will be denied information 
which properly falls within your sphere of 

Secretary Kissinger: I had no reason to 
complain about the matter, because I thought 
it was a reasonable division of labor that I 
would not participate in internal security 

Preparations for Energy Conference 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've talked — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what's the status of the 
preparations for the energy conference? And 
have you yet dispatched the special emissary 
to the European countries for the prepara- 

Secretary Kissinger: The question is what 
is the status of preparations for the energy 
conference and have we dispatched the emis- 

Very active work went on in the prepara- 
tions for the energy conference as a result of 
a task force composed of Mr. Donaldson, Mr. 
Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Lord [Under Secretary for 
Security Assistance William H. Donaldson, 
Counselor of the Department Helmut Son- 
nenfeldt, Director of Planning and Coordina- 
tion Winston Lord], and Mr. Cooper from 
the National Security Council [Deputy As- 
sistant to the President for NSC Interna- 
tional Economic Affairs Charles A. Cooper], 


Department of State Bulletin 

together with representatives from other de- 
partments, Mr. Bennett from the Treasury 
[Deputy Under Secretary for Monetary Af- 
fairs Jack F. Bennett], a representative of 
the Energy Office. 

Now, we are having daily meetings on the 
subject this week, and when our preparations 
have progressed to a certain point, no later 
than the end of this week, we will be pre- 
pared to talk to our allies and to other in- 
vitees. I will have to talk to Mr. Donaldson on 
what the best use of his time is, whether the 
best use of his time between now and the be- 
ginning of the conference is by taking a trip 
or whether we can brief the other partici- 
pants here. And that decision will be made 
in the next few days. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a debate 
irithin the government over many years as 
to ichether it is good or bad for the United 
States that the Sxiez Canal be open. What is 
your view noic, since one byproduct of this 
negotiation may be the opening of the canaU 

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that ob- 
viously the United States has no overwhelm- 
ing reason of its own to get the Suez Canal 
opened. So the arguments pro and con have 
to be seen within the context of the general 
contribution that opening of the Suez Canal 
would make to peace in the Middle East. In 
that context, the United States would feel 
that it would be a positive step toward peace 
in the Middle East and the greater ease by 
which the Soviet Union can transfer its fleet 
from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean 
can be compensated both by the greater ease 
with which we can transfer some of our ships 
into the Indian Ocean and other measures 
that can be taken of a different nature. 

Progress on U.S. -Europe Declarations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, last fall when Foreign 
Minister Jobert was here yoii spoke of the 
constructive role that France was playing in 
the dialogue between the United States and 
Europe. I was wonder-ing if you would still 
use that description for French policy in 
view of the initial steps that France has 

taken with regard to the franc and the nega- 
tive attitude the French have taken U7itil now 
toward your projected energy conference. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course the 
steps that France has taken with respect to 
the franc are similar to the steps that we 
have taken with respect to the dollar. And 
we can't blame France for pursuing a fiscal 
policy similar to our own. 

With respect to the negotiations on the 
various declarations, they are now in proc- 
ess. I am quite optimistic that the NATO 
declaration can be settled fairly quickly. The 
declaration with the European Community is 
in the process of being redrafted. And there 
will be another meeting of our representa- 
tives with those of the Nine early in Febru- 
ary, and it will be easier to form a judgment 

With respect to energy, our views and 
those of France are quite opposed. And to 
the extent that we, of course, believe that we 
are correct, I could not characterize the 
French attitude as constructive. 

Q. To follow up, at your San Clemente 
press conference, the last time you talked 
about Europe, you mentioned only two dec- 
larations. What happened to the third one, 
was it dropped — the idea? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Eu- 
rope, we are working on two declarations: a 
declaration defining the relationship between 
the European Community and the United 
States and a declaration defining the basic 
principles on which NATO should proceed. 

There is a project that we strongly sup- 
port for a third declaration, including Eu- 
rope, the United States, and Japan, and en- 
compassing the basic principles of both of 
the declarations we are drafting with Eu- 
rope, plus certain objectives we share to- 
gether with Japan. The U.S. position is that 
we strongly favor such a trilateral declara- 
tion, and we have not changed our policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if France does not come 
to the oil conference, then would you go 
ahead with it anyivay? 

February 11,1 974 


Secretary Kissinger: We would proceed in 
any event. Yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that the 
removal of the oil embargo is not really 
enough, is not the real problem, but that the 
production cutbacks must be restored as tvell 
— otherwise, everybody tvould be competing 
for the same amount of scarce oil? Do you 
have reason to believe that that xvill happen, 
as well as the lifting of the embargo? 

Secretary Kissinger: I maintain the posi- 
tion that I advanced at previous press con- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the Senators who 
n^as at a meeting tvith you yesterday said 
that the Russian cooperation ivas mainly not 
objecting to what you were achieving in the 
Middle East. Could you give us an example 
of the more positive Soviet cooperation? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union 
played a very useful role and a very crucial 
role in helping to get the Geneva Conference 
organized. It played a very constructive role 
at the Geneva Conference itself. Neither of 
those events could have occurred without ac- 
tive and constructive Soviet participation. 

With respect to disengagement, it was al- 
ways understood by the Soviet Union and 
ourselves that we were in a tactically better 
position to promote progress on that issue. 

And therefore, at the military committee 
that was meeting in Geneva, it was agreed 
from the beginning that the Israeli and 
Egyptian discussions should take place under 
the auspices of a U.N. representative rather 
than under the auspices of the cochairmen. 

Now, in the last phase of the negotiations, 
the tactical details were handled primarily 
by the United States, but the Soviet Union 
was informed and indicated its strong sup- 
port for the effort — and we consider this a 
constructive step. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned opening 
a new dialogue — your desire to open a new 
dialogue with the countries in South Amer- 
ica, and there has been some talk about a 

trip, perhaps to Panama, and your trip to 
Mexico City at the end of the month and pos- 
sibly a larger trip to the continent in April. 
I would like to ask you if you could be more 
specific at this time about your plans and 
whether you would rule out a meeting in 
Mexico ivith an emissary of the Cuban Gov- 

New Dialogue With Latin America 

Secretary Kissinger: I have indicated at a 
previous press conference that there has been 
an agreement ad referendum, which means 
for current examination, by the U.S. and 
Panamanian Governments about the basic 
principles on which a negotiation leading to 
a new treaty for the Panama Canal should be 
based. These principles are now being stud- 
ied in our government, and when they are 
approved, it is possible that I may take a 
trip to Panama to mark the agreement on 
these principles. 

The meeting in Mexico City grew out of a 
speech I made to the Latin American Foreign 
Ministers during the U.N. General Assem- 
bly, in which I pointed out that the United 
States was eager to start a new dialogue with 
Latin America on the basis of equality and 
geared to the realities of the current situa- 

At this lunch, the Foreign Minister of 
Colombia responded to my speech and in- 
vited the Foreign Ministers of all Latin 
American countries to a meeting in Bogota 
to formulate a preliminary response to this 
American initiative. That meeting took place 
in November and came up with what we con- 
sider a very constructive document that out- 
lines an agenda for a proposed meeting be- 
tween the other nations of the Western Hem- 
isphere and the United States. 

This meeting is now scheduled for the pe- 
riod of February 21st to the 23d in Mexico 
City. The Latin American Foreign Ministers 
will meet several days before then to formu- 
late their ideas even more precisely than was 
possible in Bogota. I have been in close touch 


Department of State Bulletin 

with various Foreign Ministers who are ac- 
tive in Latin America and who are actively 
engaged in this, and I am quite optimistic 
that we can take a significant step in Mexico 
City, and we are hard at work in preparing 
an American position in response to this 
Latin American initiative. 

With respect to a possible meeting with a 
Cuban representative, there is no such plan. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you had 
a chance to be fully briefed on certain 
changes in strategic nuclear weapons poli- 
cies that Secretary Schlesinger has publicly 
talked about, involving retargeting of nu- 
clear warheads and also the improvements in 
the accuracy of our nuclear warheads — and 
if so, rvhat effect do you think these deci- 
sions might have on our relations with the 
Soviets, and what effect, if any, on the SALT 
Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks'] dis- 
cussions ? 

Secretary Kissinger: All decisions of this 
nature are taken within the framework of 
the National Security Council system and 
therefore, in my capacity as Assistant to the 
President as well as in my capacity as Sec- 
retary of State, I'm of course familiar with 
these various matters. 

I would say that they underline the inex- 
orable nature of the arms race and the essen- 
tial necessity of making progress on the lim- 
itation of arms. 

If the strategic arms race continues un- 
checked, it is inevitable that both sides will 
refine the number of their weapons, multiply 
their warheads, increase their accuracies, 
and develop strategies which will sooner or 
later create the threat of a gap between the 
first-strike and the second-strike capability — 
which was considered to be a principal ele- 
ment of insecurity in the 1950's and early 
1960's — which would put a premium on strik- 
ing first and therefore contribute to the dan- 
ger of the outbreak of nuclear war. 

Q. Thank you very much — 

Secretary Kissinger: This is why we be- 

lieve that this is a year in which major prog- 
ress should be made on strategic arms limi- 

The press 

: Thank you very much, Mr. Sec- 

U.S. Announces Egypt-Israel 
Agreement on Force Separation 

Remarks by President Nixon ' 

Ladies and gentlemen: I have an announce- 
ment that I am sure will be welcome news, 
not only to all Americans but to people all 
over the world. The announcement has to do 
with the Mideast, and it is being made simul- 
taneously at 3 o'clock Washington time in 
Cairo and in Jerusalem, as well as in Wash- 

The announcement is as follows : 

In accordance with the decision of the Geneva 
Conference, the Governments of Egypt and Israel, 
with the assistance of the Government of the United 
States, have reached agreement on the disengage- 
ment and separation of their military forces. The 
agreement is scheduled to be signed by the Chiefs of 
Staff of Egypt and Israel at noon Egypt-Israel time, 
Friday, January 18, at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo- 
Suez Road. The Commander of the United Nations 
Emergency Force, General Siilasvuo, has been asked 
by the parties to witness the signing. 

A brief statement with regard to this an- 
nouncement, I think, is in order. 

First, congratulations should go to Presi- 
dent Sadat, to Prime Minister Meir, and 
their colleagues, for the very constructive 
spirit they have shown in reaching an agree- 
ment on the very difficult issues involved 
which made this announcement possible. 

Also, we in the United States can be proud 
of the role that our government has played 
and particularly the role that has been played 
by Secretary Kissinger and his colleagues in 

' Made in the press briefing room at the White 
House on Jan. 17 and broadcast on television and 
radio (White House press release). 

February 11, 1974 


working to bring the parties together so that 
an agreement could be reached, which we 
have just read. 

The other point that I would make is with 
regard to the significance of the agreement. 
In the past generation there have been, as 
we know, four wars in the Mideast, followed 
by uneasy truces. This, I would say, is the 
first significant step toward a permanent 
peace in the Mideast. I do not understate, by 
making the statement that I have just made, 
the difl!iculties that lie ahead in settling the 
differences that must be settled before a 
permanent peace is reached, not only here but 
between the other countries involved. But 
this is a very significant step reached directly 
as a result of negotiations between the two 
parties and therefore has, it seems to me, a 
great deal of meaning to all of us here in this 
country and around the world who recognize 
the importance of having peace in this part 
of the world. 

The other point that I would make is with 
regard to the role of the United States. Our 
role has been one of being of assistance to 
both parties to bring them together, to help 
to narrow differences, working toward a fair 
and just settlement for all parties concerned 
where every nation in that area will be able 
to live in peace and also to be secure insofar 
as its defense is concerned. 

Looking to the situation in the world gen- 
erally, I think we could probably say that the 
area of the world that potentially is the one 
in which the great powers can be brought 
into confrontation is the Mideast, that that 
area more than any other is in that category, 
as recent events have indicated. 

Now, the announcement we have made 
today is only a first step, but it is a very 
significant step. It paves the way for more 
steps which can lead to a permanent peace. 

And I personally shall see that all negotia- 
tions, any efforts which could lead to that 
permanent peace, not only between Egypt 
and Israel but between the other countries 
involved, have the full and complete support 
of the Government of the United States. 
Thank you. 

Administration Regrets House Action 
on IDA Replenishment Bill 

Follotving is a joint statement by Secre- 
tanj Kissinger and Seo'etary of the Treasury 
George P. Shultz issued on January 23. 

Tress release 31 dated Januai'y 23 

The administration deeply regrets the ac- 
tion of the House of Representatives today 
in voting down the administration bill for 
a four-year replenishment of the Interna- 
tional Development Association totaling $1.5 
billion. This money formed part of an equi- 
tably shared effort among all industrialized 
nations to provide the capital and know-how 
to help the poorest and developing countries. 
In this most critical of times for interna- 
tional amity and harmony, this action repre- 
sents a major setback to all efforts of coop- 
eration and to the ability of the United States 
to provide leadership in the world where 
there is an increasingly serious tendency for 
nations to believe their best interest lies in 
going it alone. 

We intend to confer immediately with 
members of both parties of the Congress in 
an effort to find a way in which the United 
States can continue to play a role of leader- 
ship fully consistent with our own economic 


Department of State Bulletin 

IMF Committee of Twenty Meets at Rome 

The Committee of the Board of Governors 
o) the Internatioval Monetary Fund on Re- 
form of the International. Monetary System 
and Related Issues met at Rome January 17- 
18. FolloH'ing is a statement made in the com- 
mittee on January 17 by Secretary of the 
Treasury George P. Shultz, together with the 
text of a communique issued at the conclu- 
sion of the meeting on January 18. 


Department of the Treasury press i-elease Hated January 17 

We scheduled this meeting because we had 
a common belief that, working together, 
there was much we could accomplish through 
improving our international monetary ar- 
rangements. We felt we could reach agree- 
ments which, together with those achieved 
elsewhere, would promote international co- 
operation and allow each of our nations to 
derive greater benefit from international 
trade and investment. 

Since the meeting was scheduled, most of 
the nations represented here — both more de- 
veloped and less developed — have found the 
prospects for their economic activity, prices, 
and balance of payments sharply worsened. 
Any economic betterment we can contribute 
through international cooperation is, there- 
fore, now even more urgently needed than 
before. And that international cooperation is 
all the more essential since we do not know 
with any certainty which nations among us 
are likely to be most seriously afflicted by the 
new developments. 

In these circumstances, the logic seems to 
me compelling to act as do the members of a 

mutual insurance society who recognize a 
common interest in pledging to spread the 
impact of a calamity which could otherwise 
fall with concentrated foi'ce on any one of the 
members. At the same time, of course, we 
must not only insure against the risk. Our 
more basic task is to do all we can to reduce 

It is imperative, therefore, that we make 
the most of our meeting. But after a change 
in economic circumstances without precedent 
in magnitude and suddenness in peacetime, 
we obviously must rethink our priorities in 
the area of monetary reform. And we must 
act in the financial area with a full realiza- 
tion that our response to the current threat 
of economic instability will be viewed as a 
fundamental test of our willingness to coop- 
erate internationally. 

A number of governments, the oil export- 
ers, have demonstrated that they can act in 
pursuit of immediate political and economic 
objectives. In doing so, the clear danger is 
that they will create severe economic disrup- 
tion for other nations and ultimately for 
themselves as well. 

Now we must demonstrate that we can 
achieve joint action among a much larger 
number of countries and in a more broadly 
beneficial manner. We must develop a broad- 
er cooperation which meets the legitimate as- 
pirations of the oil producers for an appro- 
priate level of compensation for their cur- 
rent production and for secure and profitable 
opportunities for investing their financial re- 
sources while assuring that they in turn meet 
their responsibilities for producing in rea- 
sonable amounts without capricious manipu- 
lation of supplies or prices. We must develop 

February 11, 1 974 


u broader cooperation that does not under- 
mine economic development in any areas of 
our world. 

This meeting of Ministers of Finance is 
not the proper forum for discussions of all 
the implications of the new developments in 
the field of energy. Primary work must be 
undertaken elsewhere on agreements for the 
maintenance of appropriate levels of supplies 
and prices, on research and development, on 
conservation, on alternative energy sources, 
and on emergency sharing of supplies. 

President Nixon, to insure that all this 
work is undertaken promptly, has issued an 
invitation for a meeting in Washington to 
ministers of a number of oil-consuming coun- 
tries, together with the Secretary General of 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development], and the Presi- 
dent of the Commission of the EC [European 
Communities]. It is the President's belief, I 
know, that this small group can launch most 
expeditiously the preparatory work which 
will permit substantive and productive meet- 
ings to take place in the near future on a 
broader basis among representatives of the 
oil producers and the oil consumers from all 
parts of the world. The ultimate objective is 
a set of international arrangements which 
will permit economic development to continue 
on a secure basis in all parts of the world. 

Economic Impact of New Oil Developments 

The recent price increases and supply dis- 
turbances of oil have created uncertainty, 
which — even apart from the direct costs in- 
volved — is detrimental to economic develop- 
ment. And when the newly announced prices 
are applied to estimates of oil consumption 
which are in the neighborhood of previous 
forecasts for 1974 and later years, the arith- 
metic results are staggering. We have seen 
estimates, for example, of an increase in the 
costs of imported oil in 1974 of more than 
$75 billion just from the price increases of 
the last few months. Similar calculations for 
later years yield even larger numbers. 

In appraising these estimates, however, I 

believe we must be driven to the conclusion 
they are simply not realistic. At the prices 
used in these calculations the consuming 
countries will not — and in some cases prob- 
ably cannot — import such large volumes. In 
the more developed countries the combina- 
tion of consumer choice and government con- 
trols is bound to restrict consumption of im- 
ported oil substantially, even in the short run. 
Increasingly over time, imports will fall even 
further behind earlier forecasts, not only 
from reductions in consumption but also from 
increases in production from alternative en- 
ergy sources which have become economic by 
comparison. With the economic incentives 
which now exist, I suspect we shall all be sur- 
prised by the new ways of producing and of 
saving energy which "come out of the wood- 

The impossibility of the initial projections 
of mammoth increases in import bills for oil 
is particularly obvious for the less developed 
countries which are not oil producers. I have 
seen estimates that their import bill alone 
would increase by more than $10 billion in 
1974, an amount in excess of the total of offi- 
cial assistance which they have been receiv- 
ing in recent years. Clearly it would not be 
possible for these countries to absorb such 
increases. Conceivably these countries could 
turn to the oil producers to borrow some por- 
tion of the increased cost. But many of these 
governments are already near the limits of 
prudent indebtedness. Moreover, it is one 
thing to borrow for a promising investment 
project which will generate increasing reve- 
nues in the future, but it is a far different 
and dangerous course to borrow large 
amounts to cover current consumption. Of 
course the more developed nations must 
maintain their assistance programs; but in 
addition, to meet the new needs some of the 
oil producers must provide a substantial 
amount of grant assistance if current welfare 
and future development are not to be dras- 
tically reduced in many areas whose levels of 
economic welfare are already abysmally low. 

Even after the inevitable reduction in fu- 
ture levels of imports, the increasing cost of 


Department of State Bulletin 

imported energy in the near future will still 
be huge. The secondary effects in terms of 
the availability of such derived products as 
fertilizer must also be recognized. The extra 
funds paid by the importers will inevitably 
mean a decline in their terms of trade, a bur- 
den upon their economies, and a heavy bur- 
den on efforts to manage common affairs co- 
operatively. Of course the funds paid by 
importers will not disappear from the face 
of the earth. They will be used by the recipi- 
ents in part for increased purchases of goods 
and services and in substantial part for in- 
vestment in other countries. These reflows 
will collectively redress the payments posi- 
tions of those countries. But in the new cir- 
cumstances there inevitably is great uncer- 
tainty as to which countries will receive these 

Naturally we in the U.S. Government are 
hopeful that our businessmen will be com- 
petitive with their exports, and we know 
that we have a large and smoothly function- 
ing market for investments. Yet, for us as 
for others, there is great uncertainty as to 
what will be the net impact of the new oil de- 
velopments on our payments position. We 
had, after all, been scheduled to be the 
world's single largest importer of oil during 
the next few years. The oil price increases 
are likely in the short run to cause for us an 
even larger percentage increase in the total 
cost of imports than will be the case for most 
major countries in Europe, since oil looms 
larger among our imports. 

Implications for Monetary Reform 

For me these new developments have three 
basic implications for our work on monetary 
reform in the Committee of Twenty: 

— First, we must demonstrate that we can 
achieve international economic cooperative 
agreements in a timely fashion. It is impera- 
tive that we reach a substantive agreement 
by the date which we have already set for 
ourselves, July 31 of this year. 

— Second, in doing so, we must reorder our 

thinking to take fully into account the new 
conditions and the new uncertainties which 
have been thrust upon our international af- 
fairs. Our monetary reform agreements must 
not attempt to impose upon the system a ri- 
gidity which hampers response to future de- 
velopments, including, for instance, the pos- 
sibility of a surfeit of energy supplies around 
the world in a few years' time. Rather, we 
must agree on rules and procedures to insure 
there will be prompt adjustment in response 
to developing international monetary imbal- 
ances. We must try to avoid the mistake of 
giving too much weight to present conditions 
by simply extrapolating them far into the fu- 
ture, while setting the flexibility necessary to 
adapt and evolve the system to meet future 

— Third, we must design financial mecha- 
nisms and arrangements to deal with the 
present problem. But we must be realistic 
and recognize that the present problem is lit- 
erally unmanageable for many countries. The 
oil-producing countries have to recognize this 
simple fact and cooperate with the rest of the 
world in scaling down the magnitude of the 
financial problem to manageable proportions. 
Once that is accomplished, we must still bring 
together the countries that have investment 
opportunities with oil-producing countries 
which have investable funds so that major 
destabilizing forces in the world economy are 

If we manage our affairs pi'operly, it will 
plainly make economic sense all around for 
producers to pump oil in excess of their cur- 
rent revenue needs so that oil wealth can be 
put to uses which generate a greater return 
than would result from letting that oil in- 
crease — or possibly decrease — in value while 
lying in the ground. In fact, however, that oil 
is not likely to be produced unless the pro- 
ducers of the oil and the custodians of the in- 
vestment projects can be brought together in 
a manner in which each participant feels he 
can rely on the contractual relationships with 
the other. There may be possibilities for col- 
lective action which should be given consid- 
eration in this area. 

February 11, 1974 


All these tasks I have just mentioned are 
ones for which we as Finance Ministers must 
take primary responsibility. But our respon- 
sibilities for constructive response to the new 
circumstances will not end there. We also 
have a vital role to play in facilitating future 
trade negotiations. 

The recent experience of abrupt major 
shifts in world supply-demand relationships 
in certain commodities has caused us all to 
lethink our policies and our methods of eco- 
nomic management, domestically and inter- 
nationally. In this rethinking, some have con- 
cluded that recent proposals for trade nego- 
tiations should be put aside in view of more 
pressing problems like the energy supply 
constrictions and price rises or alleged world 
food shortages. That is the wrong conclusion. 

The effort to embark on trade negotiations 
has much in common with our efforts in the 
monetary field: on the one hand, to solve spe- 
cific problems, and on the other hand, to 
bring about a negotiating process and im- 
proved framework for trade relations which 
would help deal more effectively with new 
problems as they arise. The recent diflficulties, 
to me, argue more strongly than ever for 
getting moving on the process of trade nego- 

The exact way in which we go about this 
and the new priorities that may be emerg- 
ing — including the avoidance of export re- 
strictions — will need close examination. But 
it is imperative that the process itself be set 
in motion now. 

While this broader process is getting un- 
derway we have to insure that nothing is 
done to make the situation worse now. No 
country can take unilateral restrictive trade 
or monetary measures to benefit some se- 
lected section of its economy or its current 
balance of payments at the cost of others 
without generating still greater turmoil in 
world economic relations. There would inev- 
itably be countermeasures. Unilateral trade 
or monetary actions which are generated by 
energy problems or similar difficulties would 
be counterproductive. Any new trade or mon- 
etary actions should be considered in the 
most careful way in this delicate time and 

should be kept consistent with mutual inter- 
ests and obligations. Bilateral agreements be- 
tween oil-producing and oil-consuming coun- 
tries should themselves be fitted into an in- 
ternationally agreed framework. 

As Finance Ministers, with our particular 
knowledge of the dangers of economic insta- 
bility and autarkic policies, we must impress 
upon our national colleagues the dangers of 
attempting to "go it alone" in international 
economic affairs in today's circumstances. 
We must recognize that monetary coopera- 
tion plays a large part, but still only a part, 
in the broad effort needed to respond to the 
new economic challenges. With cooperation, 
we can find a balance in the essential needs 
of oil producers and consumers. With intelli- 
gence and understanding, we can avoid un- 
employment through excesses of financial 
restraint at home. If we approach our prob- 
lems in common, we can maintain a fabric of 
reasonable stability and freedom in interna- 
tional commodity and exchange markets to 
the benefit of all our citizens. 

The new challenges have come upon us 
with a brutal suddenness. But the collision 
between growing energy demands and the 
slower gi-owth in apparent supply was in- 
evitable in any event. Let us now attempt to 
insure that we derive one important benefit 
from our recent jolting experience. Let us 
resolve to delay no longer and to proceed at 
once with the reordering of our research ef- 
forts, our production plans, and our con- 
sumption patterns to fit our new conception 
of the world's energy balance. In doing so, 
let us achieve that broad consistency among 
our individual actions that is essential to the 
success of the total effort. 


1. The Committee of the Board of Governors of 
the International Monetary Fund on Reform of the 
International Monetary System and Related Issues 
(the Committee of Twenty) held their fifth meeting 
in Rome on January 17 and 18, 1974, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Ali Wardhana, Minister of Fi- 
nance for Indonesia. Mr. Johannes Witteveen, Man- 
aging Director of the International Monetary Fund, 


Department of State Bulletin 

took part in the meeting which was also attended hy 
Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice-President of the 
E.E.C., Mr. Rene Larre, General Manatjer of the 
B.I.S, [T'.ank for International Settlements], Mr. 
Emile van Lennep, Secretary-General of the O.E.C.D., 
Mr. Olivier Long, Director-General of the G.A.T.T. 
[General .Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], Mr. 
Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Secretary-General of the 
U.N.C.T..A.D. [United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development], and Sir Denis Rickett, Vice- 
President of the I.B.R.D. [International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development]. 

2. Members of the Committee began by reviewing 
important recent developments including the large 
rise in oil prices and the implications for the world 
economy. They expressed serious concern at the 
abrupt and significant changes in prospect for the 
world lialance of payments structure. They recog- 
nised that the current account surpluses of oil-pro- 
ducing countries would be very greatly increased, and 
that many other countries — both developed and de- 
veloping — would have to face large current account 
deficits. In these difficult circumstances the Commit- 
tee agreed that in managing their international pay- 
ments countries must not adopt policies which would 
merely aggravate the problems of other countries. 
.Accordingly, they stressed the importance of avoid- 
ing competitive depreciation and the escalation of 
restrictions on trade and payments. They further 
resolved to pursue policies that would sustain appro- 
priate levels of economic activity and employment, 
while minimising inflation. They recognised that seri- 
ous difficulties would be created for many developing 
countries and that their needs for financial resources 
will be greatly increased; and they urged all coun- 
tries with available resources to make every effort to 
supply these needs on appropriate terms. The Com- 
mittee agreed that there should be the closest inter- 
national cooperation and consultation in pursuit of 
these objectives. They noted that the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other interna- 
tional organisations are concerned to find orderly 
means by which the changes in current account posi- 
tions may be financed, and they urged that these 
organisations should cooperate in finding an early 
solution to these questions, particularly in relation 
to the difficult problems facing non-oil-producing 
developing countries. In particular, while recognising 
the uncertainties with regard to future developments 
in the field of energy, the Committee agreed that the 
proposal of the Managing Director of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund for a temporary supplemen- 
tary facility should be urgently explored. It is 
recognised that such a facility poses operational 
problems which must be resolved and would, particu- 
larly for non-oil-producing developing countries, be 
only a partial measure, in view of the nature and 
magnitude of the balance of payments problems 

3. The Committee expressed its determination to 

complete its work on the main features of a reformed 
international monetary system in the coming months. 
They recognised that, in the light of the recent de- 
velopments in the world economy noted above, pri- 
ority should be given to certain important aspects of 
reform affecting the interests both of developed and 
developing countries, with a view to their early 
implementation. Other aspects of reform could be 
agreed with the understanding that their operational 
provisions would be developed and implemented at 
a later date. The Committee agreed that the Deputies 
should arrange to study the broad question of the 
transfer of real resources, including all aspects of 
capital transfers, and that there should be a report 
to the next meeting of the Committee. 

4. The Committee discussed the valuation and 
yield of the SDR [special drawing right]. They 
agreed that further attention should be given to the 
question of protecting the SDR's capital value 
against depreciation. In the present circumstances 
the Committee agreed that, for an interim period 
and without prejudice to the method of valuation 
to be adopted in the reformed system, it would be 
appropriate to base the valuation of the SDR on a 
"basket" of currencies. They invited the Executive 
Board to work urgently on the composition of a 
basket of currencies, the effective interest rate, and 
other outstanding questions, with a view to early 
adoption by the Fund of this method of valuation. 

5. The Committee discussed certain aspects of the 
future structure of the International .Monetary Fund. 
They agreed that in the reformed system it would be 
desirable to establish, between the full Board of 
Governors and the Executive Directors, a permanent 
and representative Council of Governors with twenty 
members. They agreed that the Council should meet 
regularly, three or four times a year as required, 
and should have the necessary decision-making pow- 
ers to manage and adapt the monetary system, to 
oversee the continuing operation of the adjustment 
process and to deal with sudden disturbances which 
might threaten the system, while maintaining the 
role of the Executive Board. As an interim step, 
pending the establishment of the Council, it was 
agreed that a Committee of the Board of Governors 
should be created, with an advisory role in the same 
areas as the Council and with the same composition 
and procedures. This Committee would come into 
being when the Committee of Twenty has completed 
its work. The Executive Board was invited to prepare 
for the Board of Governors a draft Resolution to 
create such a Committee, giving due consideration to 
the need for adequate consultative machinery and 
the protection of the interests of all Fund members. 

6. The Committee received reports from the Chair- 
man of the Deputies on the progress of the Technical 
Groups set up after the Nairobi meeting and urged 
them to complete their work if possible before the 
next meeting of the Deputies. They also received a 
report on the Deputies' preliminary discussion of con- 
ditions and rules for floating in the reformed system. 

February 11, 1974 


They instructed the Deputies, in cooperation with the 
Executive Board, to continue to work on these ques- 
tions and to report to the next meeting of the 

7. The Committee discussed their future pro- 
gramme. They agreed that, following meetings of 
the Deputies in March and May, the Committee 
would aim to complete its work on the reform at a 
meeting to be held in Washington on June 12-13, 

U.N. Liner Shipping Conference 
Completes First Session 

Following is a report on the first session 
of the United Nations Conference of Pleni- 
potentiaries on a Code of Conduct for Liner 
Conferences prepared by the Office of Man- 
time Affairs, Bureav of Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs. 

The 84-country United Nations Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct 
for Liner Conferences completed its first ses- 
sion December 15 after five weeks of meet- 
ings at Geneva. Its purpose, in accordance 
with a December 1972 United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution, was "to consider 
and adopt a convention or any other multi- 
lateral legally binding instrument on a code 
of conduct for liner conferences." ' 

The conference was held, following two 
sessions of a preparatory committee which 
met in January and June 1973, under the 
auspices of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development and was the fruit 
of developing countries' pressure to bring 
shipping liner conferences under interna- 
tional regulation. Although originally sched- 

' Liner conferences are two or more shipping lines 
grouped together to fix uniform freight rates and 
sometimes to concert their business activities in 
other ways. Conferences transport the large major- 
ity of the world's oceanborne general cargo (as dis- 
tinguished from bulk cargo). Conferences serving 
U.S. trade have been subject to U.S. regulation 
through the Federal Maritime Commission or its 
predecessor since 1916. Most U.S. shipping lines are 
conference members. 

uled to conclude its work in one session, the 
conference will have a three-week resumed 
session beginning March 11, at which time it 
hopes to complete its work. 

The U.S. delegation to the U.N. conference 
was headed by Raymond J. Waldmann, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Transportation and Telecommunications, 
and included representatives from U.S. mari- 
time agencies, interested congressional com- 
mittees, and private industry. 

Despite failure to complete its task at the 
first session, the conference made consider- 
able progress in the work on the Code of 
Conduct. The basis of its work was a text 
with many alternative provisions for the code 
which had emerged from the June prepara- 
tory committee meeting. The conference suc- 
ceeded in reaching agreement on the texts of 
a majority of the substantive provisions of 
the code as well as on the most appropriate 
approach for the implementation of the code. 

This progress resulted from a fairly thor- 
ough exploration of some of the technical 
aspects of the code's provisions as well as 
from a number of major concessions from 
both the traditional maritime states and the 
developing countries. The maritime states 
were willing to concede a considerable role of 
government in the operation of the code, 
more stringent controls over the setting of 
freight rates, and some provisions for cargo 
sharing in the code. For their part, the de- 
veloping countries abandoned their former 
insistence on a mandatory and binding inter- 
national arbitration system for enforcing the 
code, relinquished their .strict 40-40-20 
cargo-sharing formula for a somewhat more 
flexible formula, lessened their demand for 
preferential treatment in the code for the 
economic interests of developing countries, 
and agreed to a slightly diminished role of 

Although differences over a large number 
of minor provisions were resolved and there 
was considerable rapprochement on major 
issues, several of the latter still loom as ma- 
jor problem areas for the March session. 


Department of State Bulletin 

These include the definitive provisions on 
cargo sharing and especially the degree of 
flexibility in any formula, the degree of con- 
trols to be set over freight rate increases, and 
especially whether the mandatory (but not 
binding) conciliation procedure for solving 
disputes arising under the code will apply to 
freight rate matters. 

A key role was played in the U.N. confer- 
ence by its President, C. P. Srivastava of 
India, who had also presided at the two pre- 
paratory committee sessions and who became 
Secretary General of the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization on Jan- 
uary 1. During the latter part of the session 
Mr. Srivastava prepared, on the basis of dis- 
cussions within a high-level select negotiat- 
ing committee, a statement of principles on 
major issues. The statement was accepted by 
all of the developing countries, Eastern Eu- 
ropean Socialist countries, and some mari- 
time countries. Other maritime countries 
explicitly stated they could not accept it. The 
United States was unable to accept all of the 
statement but was prepared to use it as a 
basis for continuing negotiations, which in 
fact is what happened. 

The conference concluded its session De- 
cember 15 with the adoption of a resolution 
which stated the progress achieved, the ad- 
herence of a majority of countries to the 
above-mentioned statement of principles, and 
the scheduled resumption of the conference 
on March 11, at which time already agreed 
texts are not to be reopened for substantive 

The United States will participate in the 
March session also, and in preparation 
therefor the Department of State plans to 
conduct intensive discussions with appropri- 
ate government agencies, congressional com- 
mittees, and the maritime industry. In gen- 
eral, the United States seeks a code which 
will be consistent with U.S. trade and trans- 
port objectives and which will be favorable 
to the development of fair and efficient rela- 
tionships in international shipping on a 
worldwide basis. 

President Establishes Commission 
for World Population Year 


Establishing a National Commission 
FOR THE Observance of World Population Year 

In a message to the Congress on July 18, 1969, I 
stated that "One of the most serious challenges to 
human destiny in the last third of this century will 
be the growth of the population. Whether man's re- 
sponse to that challenge will be a cause for pride or 
for despair in the year 2000 will depend very much 
on what we do today. If we now begin our work in 
an appropriate manner, and if we continue to devote 
a considerable amount of attention and energy to this 
problem, then mankind will be able to surmount this 
challenge as it has surmounted so many during the 
long march of civilization". 

The General Assembly of the United Nations, by 
a resolution approved at its twenty-fifth session, has 
designated the year 1974 as World Population Year. 
This action was designed to focus international at- 
tention on various aspects of the population problem 
and to encourage appropriate and relevant coopera- 
tive activity in this field. In the same resolution, 
the General Assembly called upon member states 
and international organizations to participate fully 
in the World Population Year and to devote the year 
1974 to appropriate efforts and undertakings con- 
cerning the population ((uestion. The .Secretary Gen- 
eral of the United Nations has called upon member 
states to begin preparatory work immediately. 

Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested 
in me as President of the United States, it is ordered 
as follows: 

Section 1. Establishment of Commission, (a) 
There is hereby established a National Commission 
for the Observance of World Population Year, 1974. 

(b) The Commission shall consist of not more than 
twenty members to be appointed by the President 
from among citizens in private life. The President 
shall designate the Chairman and two Vice Chairmen 
of the Commission from among its members. 

(c) The members shall serve without compensa- 
tion, but shall be entitled to receive travel expenses, 
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as author- 
ized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703). 

Sec 2. Functions of the Commission, (a) The 
Commission shall promote the appropriate observ- 
ance in the United States of 1974 as World Popula- 
tion Year. To this end, the Commission shall seek 
to create within the United States a better under- 

' No. 11763; 39 Fed. Reg. 2349. 

February 11, 1974 


standing of the causes, nature, scope, and conse- 
quences of the problem of population growth, both 
national and international, and the relationship of 
this problem to the quality of human life. 

(b) The Commission shall keep itself informed of 
activities undertaken or planned by various organiza- 
tions and groups in the United States in observance 
of the Year and shall seek to consult with such 
groups and to stimulate such activities. 

(c) The Commission shall hold meetings, public or 
private, at such times and places as the Chairman 
shall determine. It may assemble and disseminate 
information, issue reports and other publications, and 
conduct such other activities as it may deem appro- 
priate to provide for the effective participation of the 
United States in the observance of World Population 

(d) The Commission may establish such subcom- 
mittees or working groups, the membership of which 
may include persons not members of the Commission, 
as it may deem necessary for the fulfillment of its 

(e) The Commission shall conclude its work by the 
end of the year 1974 and shall make a report to the 
President on its work within thirty days thereafter, 
at which time the Commission shall be deemed to be 

Sec. 3. Assistance and Cooperation, (a) The Com- 
mission is authorized to request any agency of the 
executive branch of the Government to furnish the 
Commission with such information and advice and 
services as may be useful to it for the fulfillment of 
its functions under this Order. Each such agency is 
authorized, to the e.xtent permitted by law and with- 
in the limits of available funds, to furnish such 
information, advice, and services to the Commission 
upon request of the Chairman or Executive Secretary 
of the Commission. 

(b) Subject to the availability of funds, the Com- 
mission may procure the temporary services of ex- 
perts to assist in its work, in accordance with the 
provisions of section .3109 of title 5 of the United 
States Code. 

(c) The Departments of State and of Health, Edu- 
cation, and Welfare shall, to the extent permitted 
by law, provide the Commission with administrative 
services, facilities, and funds necessary for its activi- 
ties. The Department of State shall provide an Exec- 
utive Secretary for the Commission. 

(d) The Secretaries of State and Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare shall participate with the Com- 
mission in order that activities which may be under- 
taken by the executive branch of the United States 
Government in obsen^ance of World Population Year 
and those undertaken by the Commission may be 
properly coordinated. 

(e) The President of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives shall be invited to 
designate two Members of each House to participate 
with the Commission in order that activities which 

may be undertaken by the Congress in observance 
of World Population Year and those undertaken by 
the Commission may be properly coordinated. 


The White House, Januayy 17, 1974. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions of Federal 
Law Now in Effect Delegating to the Executive 
Extraordinary Authority in Time of National 
Emergency. Report of the Senate Special Com- 
mittee on the Termination of the National Emer- 
gency. September 1973. 607 pp. 

The Impact of the October Middle East War. Hear- 
ings before the Subcommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia of the House Committee on For- 
eign Affairs. October 3-November 29, 1973. 159 

Ocean Dumping Convention Implementation. Report 
to accompany H.R. 5450. H. Rept. 93-568. October 
10, 1973. 17 pp. 

Trade Reform Act of 1973. Report, together with 
dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 10710. H. 
Rept. 93-571. October 10, 1973. 204 pp. 

Arctic Winter Games Authorization. Report to ac- 
company S. 907. H. Rept. 93-583. October 12, 1973. 
8 pp. 

Patent Cooperation Treaty and Annexed Regula- 
tions. Report to accompany Ex. S, 92-2. S. Ex. 
Rept. 93-20. October 18, 1973. 10 pp. 

Strasbourg Patent Classification Agreement. Report 
to accompany Ex. E, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-21. Oc- 
tober 18, 1973. 5 pp. 

World Tourism Organization. Report to accompany 
Ex. R, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-22. October 18, 1973. 
7 pp. 

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage. Report to accom- 
pany Ex. F, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-23. October 18, 
1973. 9 pp. 

Metric Conversion Act of 1973. Report, together 
with additional views, to accompany H.R. 11035. 
H. Rept. 93-604. October 23, 1973. 22 pp. 

Authorize Appropriations for the United States In- 
formation Agency. Veto message from the Presi- 
dent of the United States returning without ap- 
proval the bill (S. 1317) entitled "The United 
States Information Agency Appropriations Au- 
thorization Act of 1973." S. Doc. 93-41. October 
26, 1973. 4 pp. 

Review of Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. 
Report to accompany S. Res. 174. S. Rept. 93-481. 
October 30, 1973. 3 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Current Actions 



Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 
1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 
Ratified by the President : January 14, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accessio7i deposited: Pakistan, January 24, 1974. 


Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971.' 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to works of stateless persons and 
refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.' 

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to the works of certain interna- 
tional organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, October 18, 1973.' 


Customs convention on the international transit of 
goods (ITI convention). Done at Vienna June 7, 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: January 
21, 1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 
1967. TIAS 6298. 

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, December 3, 1973.' 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 
5881), as amended by additional protocol, general 
regulations with final protocol and annex, and 
the universal postal convention with final protocol 
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo Novem- 
ber 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, 
except for article V of the additional protocol, 

' Not in force. 

- Applicable to Land Berlin. 

which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 

Accession deposited: Bahrain, April 4, 1973. 
Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regula- 
tions with final protocol and annex, and the uni- 
versal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which 
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, November 26, 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Ghana, December 7, 1973. 
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics (with statements), November 9, 1973. 


Convention on international liability for damage 

caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 

London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. 

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 22, 


Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4; enters into 
force April 1, 1974, for article 2, paragraphs 2, 
3, and 4. 
Acceptance : United States, December 28, 1973. 



Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of June 30, 1953 (TIAS 2856). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul November 
27, 1973, and January 14, 1974. Entered into force 
January 14, 1974; effective June 30, 1973. 


Consular convention. Signed at Washington Septem- 
ber 2, 1969. 
Proclaimed by the President: January 22, 1974. 


Agreement on preclearance of U.S. -bound air travel- 
ers before departure from Bermuda, with annex. 
Signed at Hamilton January 15, 1974. Entered into 
force January 15, 1974. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 24, 1973 (TIAS 

February 11, 1974 


7623). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota De- 
cember 11, 1973. Entered into force December 11, 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement amending the agreement of November 
20, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5518, 7386, 7507, 7607, 
7735), for conducting certain educational exchange 
programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn 
January 11, 1974. Entered into force January 11, 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of February 14, 1973 
(TIAS 7589). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Jakarta December 31, 1973. Entered into force De- 
cember 31, 1973. 


Agreement relating to travel group charter flights 
and advance booking charter flights, with memo- 
randum of understanding. Effected by exchange of 
notes at The Hague July 11, 1973. 
Entoed into force definitively : January 21, 1974. 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of 
ail-worthiness certifications. Effected by exchange 
of notes at The Hague January 16, 1974. Enters 
into force on the date of receipt by the United 
States of a notification from the Netherlands that 
the approval constitutionally required in the Neth- 
erlands has been obtained. 


Agreement amending the agreement of September 5, 
1972 (TIAS 7433), relating to trade in cotton tex- 
tiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
January 9 and 18, 1974. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 18, 1974. 


Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of March 15, 1967, as amended and extended (TIAS 
6228, 6835), relating to trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
January 22, 1974. Entered into force January 22, 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, B.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Energy: Cooperative World Action To Solve Short- 
ages. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy 
series is based on an address by William J. Casey, 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Sep- 
tember 18, 1973, before the Johns Hopkins Confer- 
ence for Corporation Executives. Pub. 8741. General 
Foreign Policy Series 281. 6 pp. 25t*. (Cat. No. 

Defense — Use of Facilities at Goose Bay Airport, 
Newfoundland. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 7702. 
6 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. S9.10:7702). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
October 2, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7706. 2 pp. 2B«f 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7706). 

Extradition — Continued Application to Fiji of the 
United States-United Kingdom Treaty of December 
22, 1931. Agreement with Fiji. TIAS 7707. 3 pp. 25«'. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7707). 

Cooperation in Combating Illicit International Traf- 
fic in Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs — Com- 
munications Equipment. Agreement with Mexico. 
TIAS 7709. 4 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7709). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangla- 
desh. TIAS 7711. 10 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7711). 


Deportment of State Bulletin 

INDEX February 11, 197 i Vol. LXX, No. 1807 

Asia. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of January 22 137 


Administration Regrets House Action on IDA 
Replenishment Bill (Kissinger, Shultz) . . 146 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 154 

Economic Affairs 

IMF Committee of Twenty Meets at Rome 

(Shultz, text of communique) 147 

U.N. Liner Shipping Conference Completes 
First Session 152 

Egypt. U.S. Announces Egypt-Israel Agree- 
ment on Force Separation (Nixon) . . . 145 


IMF Committee of Twenty Meets at Rome 

(Shultz, text of communique) 147 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
January 22 137 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 22 137 

Foreign Aid. Administration Regrets House 
Action on IDA Replenishment Bill (Kissin- 
ger, Shultz) 146 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

IMF Committee of Twenty Meets at Rome 
(Shultz, text of communique) 147 

Israel. U.S. Announces Egypt-Israel Agree- 
ment on Force Separation (Nixon) .... 145 

Japan. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 22 137 

Latin America. Secretary Kissinger's News 
Conference of January 22 137 

Maritime Affairs. U.N. Liner Shipping Con- 
ference Completes First Session 152 

Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 

January 22 137 

U.S. Announces Egypt-Israel Agreement on 

Force Separation (Nixon) 145 

Population. President Establishes Commission 
for World Population Year (Executive 
order) 153 

Presidential Documents 

President Establishes Commission for World 
Population Year (Executive order) . . . 153 

U.S. Announces Egypt-Israel Agreement on 
Force Separation 145 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 156 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 155 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 22 137 

United Nations 

President Establishes Commission for World 

Population Year (Executive order) ... 153 
U.N. Liner Shipping Conference Completes 

First Session 152 

Name Index 

Kissinger, Secretary 137, 146 

Nixon, President 145^ 153 

Shultz, George P 146, 147 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

.Vo. Date Subject 

t25 1/21 Rush: Cleveland Council on For- 
eign Relations. 

*26 1/21 Caribbean scholars to visit the 
United States. 

*27 1/22 Stoessel sworn in as Ambassador 

to U.S.S.R. (biographic data). 
28 1/22 Kissinger: news conference. 

*29 1/23 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Feb. 26. 

*30 1/23 Subcommittee on Code of Conduct 
for Liner Conferences, Feb. 5. 
31 1/23 Kissinger, Shultz: statement on 
House vote on ID.A. replenish- 

*32 1/24 Hyland sworn in as Director, Bu- 
reau of Intelligence and Research 
(biographic data). 

*33 1/25 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, Feb. 26. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



Special Fourth-Class Rate 

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 




Volume LXX 

No. 1808 

February 18, 1974 


Excerpts From President Nixon's Address 

and Message to the Congress 157 

Statement by Under Secretary Casey 170 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXX, No. 1808 
February 18, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic $29.80. foreign $S7.2B 

Single copy 60 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
Tlie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tite White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

The State of the Union 

Following are excerpts from President 
Nixon's address made before a joint session 
of the Congress on January 30, together with 
excerpts from his message presented to the 
Congress that day.^ 


Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, my colleagues 
in the Congress, our distinguished guests, my 
fellow Americans: We meet here tonight at 
a time of great challenge and great oppor- 
tunities for America. We meet at a time 
when we face great problems at home and 
abroad that will test the strength of our fiber 
as a nation. But we also meet at a time when 
that fiber has been tested and it has proved 

America is a great and good land, and we 
are a great and good land because we are a 
strong, free, creative people and because 
America is the single greatest force for 
peace anywhere in the world. Today, as al- 
ways in our history, we can base our confi- 
dence in what the American people will 
achieve in the future on the record of what 
the American people have achieved in the 

Tonight, for the first time in 12 years a 
President of the United States can report to 
the Congress on the state of a Union at peace 
with every nation of the world. Because of 
this, in the 22,000-word message on the state 
of the Union that I have just handed to the 
Speaker of the House and the President of 
the Senate I have been able to deal primarily 
with the problems of peace — with what we 
can do here at home in America for the 
American people — rather than with the prob- 
lems of war. 

' For the complete texts, see Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 4. 

The measures I have outlined in this mes- 
sage set an agenda for truly significant prog- 
ress for this Nation and the world in 1974. 

Before we chart where we are going, let 
us see how far we have come. 

It was five years ago on the steps of this 
Capitol that I took the oath of office as your 
President. In those five years, because of the 
initiatives undertaken by this administra- 
tion, the world has changed; America has 
changed. As a result of those changes Amer- 
ica is safer today, more prosperous today, 
with greater opportunity for more of its 
people than ever before in our history. 

Five years ago America was at war in 
Southeast Asia. We were locked in confron- 
tation with the Soviet Union. We were in 
hostile isolation from a quarter of the world's 
people who lived in Mainland China. 

Five years ago the spiraling rise in drug 
addiction was threatening human and social 
tragedy of massive proportion, and there was 
no program to deal with it. 

Five years ago — as young Americans had 
done for a generation before that — America's 
youth still lived under the shadow of the mili- 
tary draft. 

We met the challenges we faced five years 
ago, and we will be equally confident of meet- 
ing those that we face today. 

Let us see for a moment how we have met 
them. After more than 10 years of military 
involvement, all of our troops have returned 
from Southeast Asia, and they have returned 
with honor. And we can be proud of the fact 
that our courageous prisoners of war, for 
whom a dinner was held in Washington to- 
night, that they came home with their heads 
high — on their feet and not on their knees. 

February 18, 1974 


In our relations with the Soviet Union, we 
have turned away from a policy of confron- 
tation to one of negotiation. For the first 
time since World War II, the world's two 
strongest powers are working together to- 
ward peace in the world. With the People's 
Republic of China, after a generation of hos- 
tile isolation we have begun a period of 
peaceful exchange and expanding trade. 

A massive campaign against drug abuse 
has been organized. And the rate of new 
heroin addiction, the most vicious threat of 
all, is decreasing rather than increasing. 

For the first time in a generation no young 
Americans are being drafted into the Armed 
Services of the United States. 

As we look back over our history, the years 
that stand out as the ones of signal achieve- 
ment are those in which the administration 
and the Congress, whether one party or the 
other, working together, had the wisdom and 
the foresight to select those particular ini- 
tiatives for which the Nation was ready and 
the moment was right — and in which they 
seized the moment and acted. 

Looking at the year 1974 which lies before 
us, there are 10 key areas in which landmark 
accomplishments are possible this year in 
America. If we make these our national 
agenda, this is what we will achieve in 1974: 

— We will break the back of the energy 
crisis; we will lay the foundation for our 
future capacity to meet America's energy 
needs from America's own resources. 

— And we will take another giant stride 
toward lasting peace in the world, not only 
by continuing our policy of negotiation 
rather than confrontation where the great 
powers are concerned but also by helping 
toward the achievement of a just and lasting 
settlement in the Middle East. 

— We will check the rise in prices without 
administering the harsh medicine of reces- 
sion, and we will move the economy into a 
steady period of growth at a sustainable 

— We will establish a new system that 
makes high-quality health care available to 
every American in a dignified manner and at 
a price he can afford. 

—We will make our States and localities 
more responsive to the needs of their own 

— We will make a crucial breakthrough 
toward better transportation in our towns 
and in our cities across America. 

— We will reform our system of Federal 
aid to education to provide it when it is 
needed, where it is needed, so that it will do 
the most for those who need it the most. 

— We will make an historic beginning on 
the task of defining and protecting the right 
of personal privacy for every American. 

— And we will start on a new road toward 
reform of a welfare system that bleeds the 
taxpayer, corrodes the community, and de- 
means those it is intended to assist. 

— And together with the other nations of 
the world, we will establish the economic 
framework within which Americans will 
share more fully in an expanding worldwide 
trade and pi'osperity in the years ahead, with 
more open access to both markets and sup- 

In all of the 186 state of the Union mes- 
sages delivered from this place in our his- 
tory, this is the first in which the one prior- 
ity, the first priority, is energy. 

Let me begin by reporting a new develop- 
ment which I know will be welcome news to 
every American. As you know, we have 
committed ourselves to an active role in 
helping to achieve a just and durable peace 
in the Middle East on the basis of full 
implementation of Security Council Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338. The first step in the proc- 
ess is the disengagement of Egyptian and 
Israeli forces which is now taking place. 

Because of this hopeful development I can i 
announce tonight that I have been assured 
through my personal contacts with friendly ' 
leaders in the Middle Eastern area that an ! 
urgent meeting will be called in the immedi- 
ate future to discuss the lifting of the oil 


Department of State Bulletin 

This is an encouraging sign. However, it 
should be clearly understood by our friends 
in the Middle East that the United States will 
not be coerced on this issue. 

Regardless of the outcome of this meeting, 
the cooperation of the American people in 
our enei'gy conservation program has al- 
ready gone a long way toward achieving a 
goal to which I am deeply dedicated. Let us 
do everything we can to avoid gasoline ra- 
tioning in the United States of America. 

Last week I sent to the Congress a compre- 
hensive special message setting forth our 
energy situation, recommending the legis- 
lative measures which are necessary to 
a program for meeting our needs. If the 
embargo is lifted, this will ease the crisis, 
but it will not mean an end to the energy 
shortage in America. Voluntary conserva- 
tion will continue to be necessary. And let 
me take this occasion to pay tribute once 
again to the splendid spirit of cooperation 
the American people have shown, which has 
made possible our success in meeting this 
emergency up to this time. 

The new legislation I have requested will 
also remain necessary. Therefore I urge 
again that the energy measures that I have 
proposed be made the first priority of this 
session of the Congress. These measures will 
require the oil companies and other energy 
producers to provide the public with the nec- 
essary information on their supplies. They 
will prevent the injustice of windfall profits 
for a few as a result of the sacrifices of the 
millions of Americans. And they will give 
us the organization, the incentives, the 
authorities, needed to deal with the short- 
term emergency and to move toward meeting 
our long-term needs. 

Just as 1970 was the year in which we 
began a full-scale effort to protect the en- 
vironment, 1974 must be the year in which 
we organize a full-scale eff'ort to provide for 
our energy needs not only in this decade but 
through the 21st century. 

As we move toward the celebration two 
years from now of the 200th anniversary of 
this Nation's independence, let us press vigor- 

ously on toward the goal I announced last 
November for Project Independence. Let this 
be our national goal. At the end of this 
decade, in the year 1980, the United States 
will not be dependent on any other country 
for the energy we need to provide our jobs, 
to heat our homes, and to keep our transpor- 
tation moving. 

To indicate the size of the government 
commitment to spur energy research and 
development, we plan to spend $10 billion in 
Federal funds over the next five years. That 
is an enormous amount. But during the same 
five years private enterprise will be invest- 
ing as much as $200 billion — and in 10 years, 
$500 billion — to develop the new resources, 
the new technology, the new capacity Amer- 
ica will require for its energy needs in the 
1980's. That is just a measure of the magni- 
tude of the project we are undertaking. 

But America performs best when called 
to its biggest tasks. It can truly be said that 
only in America could a task so tremendous 
be achieved so quickly, and achieved not by 
regimentation but through the effort and in- 
genuity of a free people working in a free 

America's own prosperity in the years 
ahead depends on our sharing fully and 
equitably in an expanding world prosperity. 
Historic negotiations will take place this 
year that will enable us to insure fair treat- 
ment in international markets for American 
workers, American farmers, American in- 
vestors, and American consumers. 

It is vital that the authorities contained in 
the trade bill I submitted to the Congress be 
enacted so that the United States can nego- 
tiate flexibly and vigorously on behalf of 
American interests. These negotiations can 
usher in a new era of international trade that 
not only increases the prosperity of all na- 
tions but also strengthens the peace among 
all nations. 

In the past five years we have made more 
progress toward a lasting structure of peace 
in the world than in any comparable time in 
the Nation's history. We could not have made 

February 18, 1974 


that progress if we had not maintained the 
military strength of America. Thomas Jef- 
ferson once observed that the price of liberty 
is eternal vigilance. By the same token and 
for the same reason, in today's world the 
price of peace is a strong defense as far as 
the United States is concerned. 

In the past five years, we have steadily 
reduced the burden of national defense as a 
share of the budget, bringing it down from 
44 percent in 1969 to 29 percent in the cur- 
rent year. We have cut our military man- 
power over the past five years by more than 
a third, from 3'/-j million to 2.2 million. 

In the coming year, however, increased ex- 
penditures will be needed. They will be need- 
ed to assure the continued readiness of our 
military forces, to preserve present force 
levels in the face of rising costs, and to give 
us the military strength we must have if our 
security is to be maintained and if our ini- 
tiatives for peace are to succeed. 

The question is not whether we can afford 
to maintain the necessary strength of our 
defense; the question is whether we can af- 
ford not to maintain it — and the answer to 
that question is no. We must never allow 
America to become the second strongest 
nation in the world. 

I do not say this with any sense of bellig- 
erence, because I recognize that fact that is 
recognized around the world: America's 
military strength has always been main- 
tained to keep the peace, never to break it; it 
has always been used to defend freedom, 
never to destroy it. The world's peace as 
well as our own depends on our remaining as 
strong as we need to be as long as we need 
to be. 

In this year 1974 we will be negotiating 
with the Soviet Union to place further limits 
on strategic nuclear arms. Together with 
our allies, we will be negotiating with the 
nations of the Warsaw Pact on mutual and 
balanced reduction of forces in Europe. And 
we will continue our efforts to promote 
peaceful economic development in Latin 
America, in Africa, in Asia. We will press 
for full compliance with the peace accords 
that brought an end to American fighting in 

Indochina, including particularly a provision 
that promised the fullest possible accounting 
for those Americans who are missing in 

And having in mind the energy crisis to 
which I have referred to earlier, we will be 
working with the other nations of the world 
toward agreement on means by which oil 
supplies can be assured at reasonable prices 
on a stable basis in a fair way to the consum- 
ing and producing nations alike. 

All of these are steps toward a future in 
which the world's peace and prosperity — and 
ours as well — as a result are made more 

Throughout the five years that I have 
served as your President, I have had one 
overriding aim, and that was to establish a 
new structure of peace in the world that can 
free future generations of the scourge of 
war. I can understand that others may have 
different priorities. This has been and this 
will remain my first priority and the chief 
legacy I hope to leave from the eight years of 
my Presidency. 

This does not mean that we shall not have 
other priorities, because as we strengthen the 
peace we must also continue each year a 
steady strengthening of our society here at 
home. Our conscience requires it, our inter- 
ests require it, and we must insist upon it. 

As we create more jobs, as we build a 
better health care system, as we improve our 
education, as we develop new sources of 
energy, as we provide more abundantly for 
the elderly and the poor, as we strengthen the 
system of private enterprise that produces 
our prosperity, as we do all of this and even 
more, we solidify those essential bonds that 
hold us together as a nation. 

Even more importantly, we advance what 
in the final analysis government in America 
is all about. What it is all about is more 
freedom, more security, a better life, for each 
one of the 211 million people that live in this 

We cannot afford to neglect progress at 
home while pursuing peace abroad. But 
neither can we afford to neglect peace abroad 
while pursuing progress at home. With a 


Department of State Bulletin 

stable peace all is possible, but without peace 
nothing is possible. 

In the written message that I have just 
delivered to the Speaker and to the President 
of the Senate, I commented that one of the 
continuing challenges facing us in the legis- 
lative process is that of the timing and pac- 
ing of our initiatives, selecting each year 
among many worthy projects those that are 
ripe for action at that time. 

What is true in terms of our domestic ini- 
tiatives is true also in the world. This period 
we now are in in the world — and I say this as 
one who has seen so much of the world, not 
only in these past five years but going back 
over many years — we are in a period which 
presents a juncture of historic forces unique 
in this century. They provide an opportunity 
we may never have again to create a struc- 
ture of peace solid enough to last a lifetime 
and more — not just peace in our time but 
peace in our children's time as well. It is on 
the way we respond to this opportunity more 
than anything else that history will judge 
whether we in America have met our respon- 
sibility, and I am confident we will meet that 
great historic responsibility which is ours 

It was 27 years ago that John F. Kennedy 
and I sat in this Chamber as freshmen Con- 
gressmen, hearing our first state of the 
Union address delivered by Harry Truman. 
I know from my talks with him as members 
of the Labor Committee, on which we both 
served, that neither of us then even dreamed 
that either one or both might eventually be 
standing in this place that I now stand in 
now and that he once stood in before me. 

It may well be that one of the freshmen 
Members of the 93d Congress, one of you out 
there, will deliver his own state of the Union 
message 27 years from now, in the year 

Well, whichever one it is, I want you to be 
able to look back with pride and to say that 
your first years here were great years and 
recall that you were here in this 93d Con- 
gress when America ended its longest war 
and began its longest peace. 


To the Congress of the United States: 

We enter 1974 not at the beginning of an 
historical cycle, but in the middle of one. 
Beginnings have been made in many vital 
areas, beginnings which we now must build 
upon. New needs have arisen w^hich we are 
in the process of addressing. Opportunities 
are coalescing which give us a chance to 
make historic progress toward a stable peace 
and e.xpanding prosperity. 

In looking at the agenda for 1974, we can- 
not consider the work of this or of any one 
year in isolation. What we select as our tasks 
in 1974 must build on the work of the years 
before, and anticipate needs of those ahead. 
Indeed, one of the continuing challenges fac- 
ing us in the legislative process is that of the 
timing and pacing of our initiatives. 

It would be as false to pretend that we 
could do — or afford to do — everything at 
once, as it would be to maintain that we can 
do nothing. Therefore, we must strive to 
maintain steady progress, selecting each year 
among many worthy projects those that are 
ripe for action at that time, and that can be 
accommodated within the constraints of our 
budget — but pressing to ensure that the most 
that can be done is done. 

In discussing my legislative recommenda- 
tions for this Congressional session, there- 
fore, I shall do so in the context of the ad- 
vances that have already been made, the 
problems that remain, and the special oppor- 
tunities we have in 1974 to make further 

Meeting Our Energy Needs 

At the start of this Congressional session, 
the number one legislative concern must be 
the energy crisis. 

The cooperative efforts of the American 
people, together with measures already taken 
by the Administration, have significantly re- 
duced the immediate impact of the energy 
crisis. There has been some economic dislo- 
cation and some individual hardships, but 
these have been minimized by our policy of 

February 18, 1974 


encourag'ing broad conservation measures 
and allocating scarce energy resources so as 
to do the least possible harm to jobs and the 
economy. The object has been to keep our 
farms and factories producing, to keep our 
workers on the job, and to keep our goods 
and services flowing, even if this means that 
we must live and work in somewhat less 
comfortable surroundings and drive fewer 
miles at slower speeds. 

Even with the full cooperation of most 
Americans, however, we will still face real 
challenges — and genuine shortages — in the 
months and years immediately ahead. To 
meet these challenges, we must change our 
patterns of energy consumption and produc- 
tion, we must press forward with the devel- 
opment of reliable new energy sources, and 
we must adjust to the fact that the age of 
unlimited supplies of cheap energy is ended. 

The immediate energy crisis began with 
the oil embargo imposed in the Middle East 
last fall. But the embargo only hastened a 
shortage that was already anticipated. For a 
number of years our fuel consumption had 
been climbing while our production of domes- 
tic energy supplies declined. We became more 
and more heavily dependent on oil imports 
and, consequently, more vulnerable to any in- 
terruption or reduction in those imports, as 
well as to sudden increases in foreign prices. 
Today, we have an interruption in supplies 
and we face sharply increased prices for 
those supplies when they are restored. 

Irrespective of the possibility of restoring 
the flow of Middle East oil, we must act now 
to ensure that we are never again dependent 
on foreign sources of supply for our energy 
needs. We must continue to slow the rise in 
our rate of consumption, and we must 
sharply increase our domestic production. 

The effects of energy conservation can be 
felt at once. Already the responsiveness of 
the American people to the recent crisis has 
proved to be the major factor in helping to 
avoid the serious consequences that the 
winter might have brought. That conserva- 
tion must continue. 

The required increase in domestic sup- 
plies cannot be achieved so rapidly. It will 
involve the development of entirely new 

sources of energy as well as the expanded 
development of oil and coal resources; it will 
require a significant expansion of our re- 
search and development eff"orts; it will re- 
quire a shift from the use of scarce fuels to 
those which are more plentiful but also more 
expensive than the cheap energy to which 
we have been accustomed; it will require that 
we encourage both exploration and produc- 
tion; it will mean that as we act to prevent 
the energy industry from making uncon- 
scionable windfall profits, we must also avoid 
crippling that industry with punitive legisla- 
tion; and finally, it will require that we make 
some diflicult decisions as we sort out our 
economic and environmental priorities. 

As we seek to act domestically to increase 
fuel supplies, we will act internationally in 
an effort to obtain oil at reasonable prices. 
Unreasonable increases in the cost of so vital 
a commodity as oil poses a threat to the 
entire structure of international economic 
relations. Not only U.S. jobs, prices and in- 
comes are at stake, but the general pattern 
of international cooperation is at stake as 
well. It is our hope that we can work out co- 
operative efforts with our friends abroad so 
that we can all meet our energy needs with- 
out disrupting our economies and without 
disrupting our economic relationships. 

Last week I sent to the Congress a compre- 
hensive special message setting forth our 
energy situation, our energy prospects, our 
energy needs, and the legislative measures I 
consider necessary for meeting those needs. 
I shall not repeat that analysis nor the full 
list of those recommendations today. 

I do want to urge, however, that the criti- 
cal energy measures which I have proposed 
be made the first order of legislative business 
in this session of the Congress, and that work 
go forward expeditiously on the others. 
Those measures which I request be given the 
highest priority are the following: 

— A special energy act which would per- 
mit additional restrictions on energy con- 
sumption and would postpone temporarily 
certain Clean Air Act requirements for 
power plants and automotive emissions; 

— A windfall profits tax which would pre- 


Department of State Bulletin 

vent private profiteei-inpf at the expense of 
public sacrifice; 

— Unemployment insurance for people in 
areas impacted by serious economic disloca- 
tion; and 

— Mandatory reporting by major energy 
companies on their inventories, their produc- 
tion and their reserves. 

I am also asking that the Congress quickly 
establish the Federal Energy Administration 
and the Energy Research and Development 
Administration to provide the appropriate 
organizational structure for administering 
the national energy policy, as we work to- 
ward the establishment of a Department of 
Energy and Natural Resources. 

The 13 other energy measures I requested 
last week deal with longer-term needs, ex- 
tending beyond the present emergency. But 
these also require expeditious action if we are 
to achieve the goal of Project Independence 
— a capacity for energy self-sufficiency by 
1980. The success of Project Independence 
is essential to the continued strength of our 
position in world trade, and also to our inde- 
pendence of action as a great power. 

I hope that our joint efforts now to resolve 
the energy crisis and to move toward a ca- 
pacity for self-sufficiency in energy will en- 
able the President who addresses the 98th 
Congress a decade from now to look back and 
say we made it possible for America to enjoy 
continued peace and prosperity in the 1980s. 

The Nation's Economy 
The World Economy 

During the past three years the United 
States has reached an unprecedented level of 
material prosperity. Industrial output has 
set new records. Trade has flourished. Con- 
sumption has risen to the highest levels in 
history. Even our inflation rate — the most 
serious economic problem we now face — has 
been one of the lowest in the industrialized 
free world. 

The major policy decisions we took in 
1971 contributed significantly to this pros- 
perity — both here and in other countries. It 
was clear, for example, as we moved into the 

197()s that the international monetary sys- 
tem adopted after World War II needed 
major adjustments. Unsustainable imbal- 
ances had developed, threatening a resur- 
gence of protectionism and a disi'uption of 
woi-ld trade. This is why I decided to take 
some very strong measures in August of 
1971, measures that have resulted in a major 
realignment of world currency values, prog- 
ress toward new and more flexible interna- 
tional monetary management, and negotia- 
tions toward a more open and equitable trad- 
ing system. 

These adjustments, while essential, were 
not easy. But now we have finally entered 
into a more flexible and realistic interna- 
tional financial system. Much remains to be 
done to complete the transition, but its bene- 
ficial results are already clear. 

The realignment of currency values helped 
produce an increase of 80 percent — or more 
than $50 billion— in the rate of U.S. exports 
during the past two years, along with a 
major improvement in our trade balance. 
This improvement was good not only for us, 
but also for the of the world. In addition, 
the shocks to the world economy arising from 
reduced food supplies in 1972 and 1973, and 
in recent months from the oil embargo and 
the arbitrary increases in the price of oil, 
all were managed without panic under the 
new arrangements. Indeed, world trade has 
continued to expand, despite these temporary 

International Trade Barriers 

A vigorous international trade is vital to 
the American economy. Jobs for American 
workers depend on our ability to develop 
foreign markets. Moreover, American con- 
sumers deserve access to foreign-made prod- 
ucts that might be less expensive, or more 
interesting, or unavailable in the United 
States. But if trade is to be advantageous 
over the long run, it must be conducted on a 
basis which is fair to all participants. 

There are still many unnecessary barriers 
to trade which need to be lowered or re- 
moved. While improvements have been made 
in this situation during the last 10 years, we 

February 18, 1974 


need now to build on this progress and to 
negotiate for more open access both to mar- 
kets and supplies. This is why I call upon the 
Congress with special urgency to complete 
action on my proposed Trade Reform Act, in 
order to provide the authority we will need 
to negotiate effectively for reductions in bar- 
riers to trade, to improve the trading system, 
and to manage trade problems at home more 

As the Senate considers this legislation, I 
would draw its attention particularly to pro- 
visions added in the House which would 
seriously impede our efforts to achieve 
more harmonious international relationships. 
These provisions would effectively prevent 
both the extension of nondiscriminatory tar- 
iff treatment and of credits to certain Com- 
munist counti'ies unless they followed a 
policy which allowed unrestricted emigra- 
tion. I am convinced that such a prohibition 
would only make more difficult the kind of 
cooperative effort between the United States 
and other governments which is necessary 
if we are to work together for peace in the 
Middle East and throughout the world. I am 
confident that by working with the Congress 
we can find a solution to this problem that 
will avoid a major setback in our peacemak- 
ing efforts. 

At the same time, we must move forward 
with current negotiations to reform the in- 
ternational payments system under the aus- 
pices of the International Monetary Fund. 
These negotiations are designed to increase 
the opportunities for all nations to trade and 
invest profitably. The U.S. has already pre- 
sented proposals for deterring the growth of 
significant imbalances in international mone- 
tary affairs while preserving for each nation 
a wide freedom in choosing how necessary 
adjustments can best be accomplished. In 
addition, the system will also have to accom- 
modate the increased payments flow and 
prospective reserve accumulations occasioned 
by higher oil prices. If, however, other na- 
tions share with us the will to preserve a 
healthy and growing world economy, I am 
confident that a mutually acceptable solution 
to this problem will be achieved. 

In practice, this means that our markets 
must increasingly be open to imports from 
developing countries — a condition that would 
be significantly facilitated by enactment of 
the Trade Reform Act. It also means that 
the Congress must continue to authorize and 
appropriate our fair share of both bilateral 
and multilateral economic assistance, includ- 
ing a substantial contribution to the Interna- 
tional Development Association which helps 
the poorest countries. In 1973 we success- 
fully negotiated a reduction of the United 
States share from 40 percent to one-third of 
IDA funds. We cannot let the action of the 
House in voting against IDA stand as our 
final answer. We will work hard with the 
Congress to ensure that this country con- 
tinues to play a leadership role, consistent 
with our own economic situation, so that 
long-term economic development can con- 
tinue to be planned in an orderly manner. 

Along with trade and monetary problems, 
new international agreements on investment 
policies and new mechanisms for dispute 
settlement are high on our negotiating 
agenda for the coming year. We must con- 
tinue to work for economic arrangements 
which permit the beneficial flow of interna- 
tional investment so that all may derive the 
maximum benefit from their own resources. 
To that end, I am glad to be able to note that 
this week the United States completed the 
phaseout of controls on flows of capital from 
this country. 

The recent oil embargo and especially ar- 
bitrary increases in the price of oil have 
created major economic problems for many 
countries, including the United States. If 
continued, these policies would require enor- 
mous transfers of goods and assets from oil 
importing nations, transfers which would 
represent a serious burden for even the 
wealthiest countries and which would be 
virtually unbearable for the less developed 

Our objectives are clear — we must get 
world oil prices down from levels that are 
arbitrary and exploitative. We must also 
cooperate to ensure that the international 
and domestic economic policies of the ad- 


Department of State Bulletin 

vanced countries do not compound the eco- 
nomic disturbances created by the current 
emergency but rather that we do all that can 
be done to contain and limit those disturb- 

A Healthy Agricultural Economy 

Abundance is the primary goal of our farm 
policy — abundance that can guarantee lower 
food prices for every American and higher 
incomes for all American farmers. 

Five years ago, agriculture was a troubled 

— Government controls were reducing in- 
centives for production and costing the tax- 
payers over $3 billion a year in farm subsi- 
dies designed to hold down production. 

— Farm income was low ($14.7 billion) 
and the long hours worked by farmers earned 
them an average income that was 26 percent 
below the nonfarm average. Farm families 
had been leaving the farm at an average rate 
of over 100,000 a year. 

Today, that picture has been dramatically 

— Farm markets have expanded dramatic- 
ally. Farm exports have set new records in 
each of the last four years, becoming the 
largest single factor in the Nation's balance 
of payments and strengthening the dollar in 
international money markets. 

— Farm production has reached new record 
levels in each of the last three years, and a 
new record harvest should be forthcoming 
in 1974. 

— The billions of tax dollars which used to 
go for farm price support payments for basic 
commodities every year will be reduced to 
nearly zero. 

— Farm income has reached record levels. 
By 1973, the gap between farm income and 
nonfarm income had closed from 26 to 7 per- 
cent. Net farm income was up from $14.7 
billion to $26.1 billion. 

We are making this progress not through 
more Government regulation but less. One 
of the proudest achievements of this Admin- 

istration was the enactment of the Agricul- 
ture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, 
which places production decisions where they 
belong — with farmers, not with the Govern- 

A primary challenge for Federal agricul- 
ture policies now is to encourage greater pro- 
duction of agricultural goods — which will 
mean more income for the farmer, greater 
international trading benefits for the Nation, 
and reasonable food prices for the consumer. 
I am therefore asking the Congress to re- 
vamp the programs which still require re- 
strictive Federal control over the production 
of some remaining farm commodities — espe- 
cially rice, peanuts, tobacco, sugar, and extra 
long staple cotton. 

To further enhance agricultural activity, 
the Administration will also: 

— Promote longer-run soil and water con- 
servation practices. 

— Consolidate the locations of local offices 
of Federal agricultural agencies — specific- 
ally, the Agricultural Stabilization and Con- 
servation Service, the Soil Conservation 
Service, the Farmers Home Administration, 
and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
— creating one-stop agricultural service cen- 
ters on the local level to make things easier 
for the farmer and less costly for the Govern- 

— Place high priority on directing agricul- 
tural research into those areas which will as- 
sure plentiful agricultural goods at reason- 
able prices, maintain our competitive advan- 
tage in world agricultural production, and 
protect the land. 

At my direction. Secretary Kissinger re- 
cently proposed to the United Nations that 
it convene a World Food Conference, a con- 
cern made urgent by acute food shortages in 
many parts of the world. This conference, 
to be held in November of 1974, should prove 
of particular importance to the American 
farmer, whose extraordinary productivity 
has made this Nation the world's leading 
food exporter and whose own prosperity will 
continue to increase as we help to meet the 
needs of a hungry world. 

February 18, 1974 


Our farm policy must of course address 
not only the needs of the farmer but also 
those of the consumer. During 1973, we ex- 
perienced a period of rapidly increasing- food 
prices. Those prices leveled off in late 1973, 
but now we appear to be heading into a 
period of increasing food prices for at least 
the next few months. It is our intention to 
hold these increases to the smallest possible 
rate through executive actions such as lifting 
the quota on wheat imports, an action that I 
took last week. But the most significant force 
in the battle against higher food prices is 
higher production. This summer and fall, 
the large 1974 harvest should be coming on 
the market, serving as the best possible 
damper on higher prices. 

Ending Drug Abuse 

During the decade of the '60s, increasing 
numbers of Americans — including a high 
percentage of young people — each year 
turned to heroin and other drugs in search 
of "new highs" and "synthetic solutions" to 
the problems of life. In this retreat from 
reality, the Nation's drug problem grew 
dramatically. Residents of our proudest 
cities were gripped by fear as addicts turned 
to crime to support their habits, and thou- 
sands of families suffered devastating per- 
sonal tragedies. 

I am pleased to be able to report that since 
then. Federal spending on drug treatment 
and enforcement have increased tenfold, and 
progress has been made. We have indeed 
turned the corner on hard drugs: 

— Better drug law enforcement, at home 
and abroad, has caused an acute heroin 
shortage throughout much of the country. 

— Enough treatment capacity has now 
been created so that virtually all addicts who 
want medical help and counselling can get it. 

— Our drug abuse indicators ail suggest 
that we have at last succeeded in reducing 
both the total number of heroin addicts and 
the number of new addicts. 

Nevertheless, the drug battle is far from 

For the sake of the next generation, I am 

determined to keep the pressure on — -to en- 
sure that the heartening progress made to 
date is translated into a lasting victory over 
heroin and other drugs. 

As enforcement efforts meet with success 
in one area of the world, pressure increases 
on other trafficking routes. To meet these 
new threats, we will step up our support of 
joint drug enforcement programs. I have 
also directed that plans for increased vigi- 
lance at our own borders be put into effect. 

In the treatment area, we are intensifying 
our efforts to encourage hard-core addicts to 
undergo treatment. 

To provide added incentive for those not 
motivated to seek help on their own, I have 
directed Federal agencies to expand their 
support for local programs which direct 
addicts charged with crimes into treatment 
pending trial and sentencing. 

Continued progress will also require help 
from the Congress: 

— I will shortly recommend severe new 
penalties for both heroin traffickers and 
those engaged in illegal distribution of other 
illicit drugs. This legislation will supplement 
my proposals currently pending before the 

— The Psychotropic Convention, a key in- 
ternational treaty regulating manufactured 
drugs worldwide, has — after 2io years — still 
to be ratified. Affirmative action in this ses- 
sion is of the utmost importance. 

I will continue to pursue a balanced ap- 
proach to the drug problem in the next year 
by emphasizing both vigorous law enforce- 
ment, and treatment and rehabilitation pro- 
grams to help speed the return of ex-addicts 
to productive lives in society. 

Enhancing the Environment 

Both our Nation and the world have made 
imposing strides during recent years in cop- 
ing with the problems of our natural envi- 
ronment. Building upon well-justified con- 
cerns, we have created institutions, developed 
policies and strategies, and deepened public 
understanding of the problems that face us. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Improving the World Environment 

On our small planet, pollution knows no 
boundaries. World concern for the environ- 
ment is as necessary as it is encouraging. 
Many significant international actions have 
been taken in recent years, and the United 
States can be proud of its leadership. 

These actions have included the signing of 
international conventions to protect endan- 
gered species of wildlife, to regulate ocean 
dumping, to extend the national park concept 
to the world, and to control marine pollution. 

A United Nations Environment Program 
was established last year. With it, the UN 
Environment Program Fund came into 
being, fulfilling a proposal I had made in 

Under the US-USSR Environment Agree- 
ment, which I signed in Moscow in May, 
1972, Soviet and American scientists and en- 
vironmentalists have been actively working 
together on serious environmental problems. 

America and the World 

When this Administration took oflfice, it 
was apparent that the world had changed in 
fundamental ways, and that America's for- 
eign policy had to change in equally funda- 
mental ways. 

We needed to end our military involve- 
ment in the Vietnam war in a manner con- 
sistent with our responsibilities and commit- 
ments as a major world power. 

We needed to adjust to the changes in the 
strategic situation between the Soviet Union 
and the United States which presented a 
unique opportunity to build a solid founda- 
tion for peace but which also threatened our 
own security if that foundation could not be 

We needed to end a quarter century of 
hostile isolation which had kept one-fourth 
of the world's population outside the frame- 
work of international cooperation. The world 
could not aflford another generation of hos- 
tility between the United States and the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China. 

We needed to adjust our partnerships with 

Western Europe and Japan, recognizing 
their increasing political and economic 
strength and self-reliance, and emphasizing 
our important common goals. 

We needed to alter the world monetary sys- 
tem to reflect the new realities of the inter- 
national economic system and America's 
place in it. 

During the past five years we have made 
striking progress in meeting each of these 

Continuing Responsibility in Vietnam 

The United States is at peace for the first 
time in more than a decade. But peace must 
be something more than the absence of the 
active engagement of American forces in con- 

We must guard against the tendency to 
express relief at our military extrication 
from Southeast Asia by "washing our hands" 
of the whole affair. Men and women are still 
dying there. We still have a responsibility 
there. We must provide those ravaged lands 
with the economic assistance needed to sta- 
bilize the structures of their societies and 
make future peace more likely. We must pro- 
vide, as well, the continued military aid 
grants required to maintain strong, self- 
reliant defense forces. And we will continue 
to insist on full compliance with the terms of 
the agreements reached in Paris, including a 
full accounting of all of our men missing in 
Southeast Asia. 

Building New Relationships 

As we work through detente to reduce 
conflict in areas of the world where both we 
and the Soviet Union have important inter- 
ests, we must also continue to work to reduce 
the potential causes of conflict between us. 

We must persevere in our negotiations 
with the Soviet Union to place further limits 
on strategic arms competition and in our 
talks with the Warsaw Pact nations to reduce 
forces in Europe in a way that will increase 
security and stability for all. 

We will pursue our relations with the 
Soviet Union in the climate of detente estab- 
lished two years ago in Moscow and reaf- 

February 18, 1974 


firmed by General Secretary Brezhnev's visit 
to Washington last year. During the fateful 
weeks of the Middle East war last October, 
the strength of our detente was severely 
tested. Since then, American diplomatic 
leadership and initiative have played a cen- 
tral role in the search for a final settlement 
in the long-troubled Middle East. This began 
with the ceasefire of October 22, worked out 
with the Soviet Union's assistance, and was 
later strengthened by the Six-Point Agree- 
ment in November to consolidate the cease- 
fire, then by the Geneva Peace Conference — 
under the co-sponsorship of the United 
States and the Soviet Union — and most re- 
cently by the agreement on the disengage- 
ment of Egyptian and Israeli military forces, 
which is being implemented in cooperation 
with the United Nations Emergency Force. 
These steps are but the beginning of broad- 
ened efforts to find a lasting settlement of 
the area's problems. 

The process of building a .normal relation- 
ship with the People's Republic of China 
continues. Liaison offices have been estab- 
lished in our respective capitals and there 
continues to be fruitful contact between our 
governments at very high levels. 

Strengthening Our Free Wo7id Partnerships 

As our relationships with old adversaries 
are changing, so are our relationships with 
old friends. Western Europe and Japan have 
put behind them the post-war struggle to 
rebuild their economies, re-order their so- 
cieties and re-establish their political force. 
Their success in these endeavors is some- 
thing we helped to foster and in which we 
can take pride. But now times have changed 
and our past role in their success cannot be 
the sole basis for a continuing relationship. 
We must instead adjust our relationships to 
recognize their new economic capacities and 
their international political objectives. We 
must accommodate all of these within the 
framework of the friendship and goodwill of 
our allies and our whole past history of co- 
operation in the pursuit of our common 
goals. This is a cornerstone of the structure 
of peace we are seeking to build. 

With our closest neighbors, here in the 
Western Hemisphere, we shall continue to 
seek additional ways of working coopera- 
tively to solve the problems which face the 
Americas. Secretary of State Kissinger will 
be meeting in a few weeks with the foreign 
ministers of Latin America to begin a new 
and constructive dialogue in the family of 
American states. 

International Trade and Commerce 

As we turn from an era of confrontation 
to one of cooperation, trade and commerce 
become more important. We have moved 
from a position of virtual economic hegem- 
ony in the world to a new role in a more 
interdependent world economy. We must 
create an equitable and efficient system of 
integrating our own economy with that of 
the rest of the world. 

Much has already been accomplished on 
this front. The markets of the USSR and 
China are now accessible, thereby providing 
jobs for American workers. Our major trad- 
ing partners in Western Europe and Japan 
share our interest in further reducing inter- 
national trade barriers and increasing world 
trade. The rigid and outmoded international 
monetary system which over-valued the dol- 
lar and impeded our foreign trade has been 
decisively altered. After two years of trade 
deficits, America achieved a trade surplus 
in 1973. 

But we must persevere in our international 
monetary, investment and trade negotiations. 
The greatest tasks still lie ahead and the 
stakes are high. Avoiding the economic and 
political disruptions associated with interna- 
tional monetary turmoil and restrictive trade 
and investment practices increases in impor- 
tance as international interdependence grows. 

As I noted earlier in this message, prompt 
passage of the pending Trade Reform Act 
is essential to achieving the goal of a less 
restrictive and more equitable international 
economic system. In addition, we must move 
forward with the current negotiations to re- 
form the international payments system un- 
der the auspices of the International Mone- 
tary Fund, reforms which will markedly 


Department of State Bulletin 

increase the opportunities for nations to 
trade and invest profitably. 

We must also strengthen our resolve as 
the world's most prosperous nation to help 
less fortunate countries. In the world of 
today, no nation will be fully secure or pros- 
perous until all nations are. As in the past, 
we will take pride in our efforts to work with 
developing nations which aspire to greater 
economic and social well-being. The United 
States has called for the World Food Con- 
ference which will be held in November un- 
der the auspices of the United Nations. We 
will also actively observe 1974 as World 
Population Year, as proclaimed by the 
United Nations. 

Maintaining a Strong Defense Force 

But as we work for peace, we must be 
conscious that the opportunity to build a 
structure of peace came because our arms 
have served as a deterrent to war. We must 
maintain that deterrent. 

In the last five years, outlays for the De- 
partment of Defense have been reduced by 
about 1/;^— measured in constant dollars — 
and military personnel have been cut from 
3.5 million to 2.2 million. 

This year, I will recommend a substantial 
increase in the 1975 budget for the Depart- 
ment of Defense. These increases are neces- 
sary to improve the readiness of our armed 
forces, to build up levels of e.ssential equip- 
ment and supplies and to preserve present 
force levels in the face of rising costs. 


Throughout these five years, I have had 
one overriding aim : to establish a structure 
of peace in the world that can free future 
generations from the scourge of war. Others 
may have different priorities; this has been 
and will remain my first priority, the chief 
legacy that I hope to leave from the eight 
years of my Presidency. 

As we strengthen the peace, we must also 
continue each year a steady strengthening 

of our society here at home. Our conscience 
requires it. Our interests require it. We 
must insist on it. 

As w'e create more jobs, as we build a 
better health care system, and improve edu- 
cation ; as we develop new sources of energy, 
as we provide more abundantly for the el- 
derly and the poor, as we strengthen the 
system of private enterprise that produces 
our prosperity — as we do all this and more, 
we solidify those essential bonds that hold 
us together as a Nation. Even more im- 
portantly, we advance what in the final anal- 
ysis government in America is all about: 
more freedom, more security, a better life, 
for each one of the 211 million individual 
persons who are America. 

We cannot afford to neglect progress at 
home while pursuing peace abroad. But 
neither can we aff"ord to neglect peace abroad 
while pursuing progress at home. 

With a stable peace, all is possible; with- 
out peace, nothing is possible. 

Earlier in this message, I comment that 
"one of the continuing challenges facing us 
in the legislative process is that of the tim- 
ing and pacing of our initiatives . . . select- 
ing each year among many worthy projects 
those that are ripe for action at that 
time . . ." 

What is true in terms of our domestic ini- 
tiatives is true also in the world. This period 
we now are in — these few years — presents 
a juncture of historic forces unique in this 
century, which provide an opportunity we 
may never have again to create a structure 
of peace solid enough to last a lifetime and 
more — not just peace in our time but peace 
in our children's time as well. It is on the 
way we respond to this opportunity, more 
than anything else, that history will judge 
whether we in America have met our respon- 

I have full confidence that we will meet 
that responsibility. 

Richard Nixon. 
The White House, January 30, 1974. 

February 18, 1974 


Foreign Investment and Free Capital Markets 

Statement by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 

From the earliest days of the Republic we 
have maintained a policy of welcoming for- 
eign investment. As part of our efforts since 
the 1930's to forge an open world economy, 
we have urged others to do the same. We 
have been a moving force behind the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] Code of Liberalization of Cap- 
ital Movements; we have entered into a net- 
work of bilateral treaties of friendship, com- 
merce, and navigation or of amity and 
economic relations to secure and to grant na- 
tional treatment to foreign investment; 
through our tax laws and bilateral tax trea- 
ties we have sought to achieve neutrality 
with regard to whether income is earned in 
this country or abroad. We have encouraged 
foreign investment because of its contribu- 
tion to economic development and questioned 
the wisdom of policies such as expropriation, 
which if adequately compensated sends capi- 
tal out of a country, and if not, has an ad- 
verse effect on private investment flows. 

To abandon our traditional hospitality to- 
ward foreign investment would make it diffi- 
cult to resist restrictions against our own 
economically much more significant foreign 
investment. Even more important, it would 
bring into question the U.S. commitment to 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous- 
ing and Urban Affairs on Jan. 23. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

the type of open world economy which we are 
trying to achieve through the current inter- 
national monetary and trade negotiations. 

However, it is clear that concern has de- 
veloped, particularly in recent months, about 
the prospect that foreign investors may wish 
and be able to sharply increase their owner- 
ship in American industry. This concern 
seemed to come from the ability of foreign 
interests to acquire devalued dollars cheap 
and buy into U.S. companies at bargain base- 
ment prices in a depressed stock market. We 
have seen the devalued dollar turn around 
sharply in recent weeks. This concern also 
comes from the possibility that the huge 
money flows which escalated oil prices will 
bring to oil-producing countries may be ap- 
plied to acquire control over significant seg- 
ments of the American economy. The inquiry 
which this committee is initiating today pro- 
vides a timely forum for a careful reevalua- 
tion of our traditional open door policy of 
encouraging and welcoming foreign invest- 
ment in the United States. 

While recognizing the validity of these new 
concerns, it continues to be the view of the 
Department of State that it would be dam- 
aging to the United States and to the world 
economy and our interests, both political and 
economic, to create barriers to the inflow of 
foreign capital and the technology and skills 
which frequently accompany it. There are 
many reasons for this conclusion. We believe 
that our traditional policy of welcoming for- 
eign investment and fostering the free flow 
of investment as it finds opportunity and 


Department of State Bulletin 

need around the world has worked well for 
us and for others. 

We will not be able to establish significant 
barriers to foreign investment in the United 
States without risking the imposition of re- 
strictions on our investment abroad. We are 
much more exposed and have more to lose 
from this than anyone else. 

The U.S. investment abroad now runs close 
to $100 million — $94 million at the end of 
1972 as reported by the Commerce Depart- 
ment. The direct foreign investment in the 
United States at that time was set at $14.4 
million, less than 15 percent of our direct in- 
vestment abroad. On top of that we had port- 
folio investments of about $34 billion, while 
foreign holdings of American stocks and 
bonds ran to about $45 billion. Thus, U.S. to- 
tal investments abroad, at $128 billion, run 
more than twice foreign investment in the 
United States, which amounts to about $60 
billion. Of U.S. investments abroad about 75 
percent represent direct ownership of busi- 
ness abroad, while in the case of foreign in- 
vestment here the ratio is just the opposite — 
about 25 percent direct ownership and with 
75 percent representing investment in stocks 
and bonds and other portfolio assets. 

Our $6 billion-plus trade deficit in 1972 
was oflfset by a $10 billion net inflow in divi- 
dends, interest, royalties, et cetera, from our 
private investments abroad (or $8 billion if 
interest income paid to foreign central banks 
is included). This inflow is expected to in- 
crease by a further 25 to 30 percent for 1973. 

We have become a service economy, where 
two out of three workers produce services, 
while only the third produces the goods that 
are the stuff of trade. This kind of an econ- 
omy must rely increasingly on receipts from 
dividends and royalties from investments 
abroad and from services, especially financial 
and management services exported largely in 
the form of multinational enterprises' invest- 
ments. To balance off these investments, we 
must export securities and bring in foreign 
investments to the United States. As a coun- 
try which faces increasing needs for re- 

sources of energy and raw materials from 
abroad, we will have to invest abroad and in- 
crease the inflow of investment earnings to 
justify that investment. 

To balance off that investment we will 
have to attract investments from abroad. We 
will have to maintain and strengthen our 
ability to raise capital throughout the world 
as well as at home. 

We have restricted the export of capital 
from the United States for some 10 years — 
through the interest equalization tax on the 
purchase of foreign securities and restric- 
tions on the degree to which American com- 
panies and banks could make direct invest- 
ments and extend credit abroad. This has had 
the effect of shifting the center of the inter- 
national capital market from New York to 
Europe. We have scaled down these capital 
export restrictions substantially and plan to 
eliminate them sometime this year. This 
seems likely to result in some increase in 
equity and loan capital going abroad, and it 
should be offset by an increase in the repatri- 
ation of earnings and in investments from 

To avoid excessive drains on our balance 
of payments from this freeing of our capital 
market, we should encourage investment in 
the United States and facilitate the joining 
of American savings with funds generated 
abroad to generate the worldwide financing 
which the needs of our rapidly changing 
world require. The time has come for great- 
er American participation in international 
capital markets. 

Interdependence in a Time of Scarcities 

There is a growing economic interdepend- 
ence which links all parts of the world. I be- 
lieve this to be of great value and importance 
in building political and security as well as 
economic welfare. We have experienced the 
serious consequences which follow when any 
one of those links, whether it be oil or soy- 
beans or money, is broken or interrupted. 
This interdependence is made even more crit- 

February 18, 1974 


ical by the scarcities around us, the rate at 
which resources are being depleted, and the 
degree to which commodities essential to 
modern life are concentrated in a few coun- 

The need for energy and raw materials 
and for the ability to absorb waste and pol- 
lution will in the next few years require a re- 
organization and relocation of industry, an 
expansion of transportation facilities, a rate 
of new plant construction, and a mobilization 
of capital which will dwarf anything we have 
seen before. 

We believe particularly that now, when the 
world faces shortages and escalating prices 
in oil, in food, in metals, in fibers, is no time 
to cut off and isolate the natural tendency of 
capital, technology, and management skills to 
go where resources, opportunity, and need 
are to be found. 

With sharply escalated oil prices shifting 
large flows of money to oil-producing states 
and placing the financial' reserves and the 
economies of both developed and under- 
developed nations under great pressure, the 
stability of the world's monetary and trading 
system may depend on our ability and the 
ability of other nations to keep these funds 
in circulation in part by attracting invest- 
ments from oil-producing states directly and 
indirectly through financial intermediaries 
and capital markets and through ventures 
with or investments in the corporate organi- 
zations in Europe, the United States, Japan, 
and elsewhere which have experience and 
capability in mobilizing and applying the 
ingredients of production and economic de- 
velopment. It would, in our view, be a par- 
ticularly inappropriate time to establish a 
maginot line against foreign investment. 

The United States has a very great oppor- 
tunity and obligation to respond to the 
world's need for energy. We are less depend- 
ent on foreign energy sources than Europe 
and Japan. The quantum leap in prices will 
attract investment to create and find new en- 
ergy resources. We have the assets most 
likely to attract these investment flows — the 

oil- and gas-finding experience, the offshore 
drilling and technology, the evaluated sites, 
the nuclear technology, the coal and shale, 
the advanced technologies to create new en- 
ergy sources from the atom, hydrogen, and 
the sun as well as to make available resources 
go further through more efficient transmis- 
sion, storage, and use of energy. 

To develop new technologies, to extract oil 
and gas from coal and shale and build nuclear 
power plants at home, and to carry out ex- 
ploration throughout the world, offshore and 
onshore, we will have to raise hundreds of 
billions of dollars in this next decade. 

We will need to get some of this capital 
from foreign sources. We will need to send 
capital abroad. We will need to harness our 
own capital and capital from oil-producing 
states to apply technology and skill to the de- 
velopment needs of less developed countries 
if they are to be able to continue their devel- 
opment while paying higher fuel bills. 

In short, if we are to overcome the re- 
source shortages, manage the payment defi- 
cits, and meet the development needs that 
loom ahead, we must rely heavily on the two- 
way flow of capital and technology and man- 
agement skills around the world. For us to 
establish barriers to investment in the United 
States would represent a very serious back- 
ward step. 

We hear the fear expressed that foreigners 
are buying up the United States. I've already 
indicated that we're ahead 6 to 1 against the 
world in foreign investment. There has been 
a significant acceleration in foreign direct in- 
vestment. Foreign interests building plants 
here and buying interests in companies ex- 
ceeding 25 percent has taken an increase 
three times from $700 million to $2 billion 
from 1972 to 1973. But that $2 billion is less 
than one-fifth of 1 percent of the value of all 
stock outstanding and about 27 percent of 
the new capital we raised in the United 
States last year. It will take a very long time 
for anyone to buy up the American economy. 
That doesn't mean that we should not watch 
carefully the impact of foreign investment 


Department of State Bulletin 

on particular sectors of the economy where 
it might acquire a significant position if con- 

Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements 

Let me now turn to how we have articu- 
lated policies and understandings on foreign 
investment and what we are now doing to 
develop these policies further. 

We have 130 treaties of the type known as 
FCN — friendship, commerce, and naviga- 
tion—beginning with France in 1778. The 
basic concept in all these treaties is either 
national treatment or most-favored-nation 
treatment. National treatment means the 
same treatment a country gives its own citi- 
zens. Most-favored-nation treatment means 
the treatment that a country extends to na- 
tionals of the foreign country which is enti- 
tled to the most favorable treatment, which 
may be less favorable than national treat- 

In recent years, national treatment has 
been the norm, supplemented by specific pro- 
visions to assure that, irrespective of the 
treatment actually accorded to nationals, the 
nationals and companies of the other party 
receive treatment no less favorable than that 
required by international law. These are re- 
ciprocal; the rights which we seek for Amer- 
ican investors abroad must be those we seek 
to accord to foreign investors in the United 
States. However, national treatment is al- 
ways subject to reasonable exceptions, and 
how it is applied varies with circumstances 
in each country. Treaties are the products of 
negotiation. They reflect the concerns not 
only of the United States but also of the 
country with which the treaty was con- 

Although FCN treaties still provide for 
most international obligations in the area of 
foreign investment, we may expect that in 
this, as in other areas of international eco- 
nomic activity, bilateralism will eventually 
give way to more pervasive multilateral 

To date, the principal multilateral agree- 
ment is the Code of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements, or Capital Movements Code, 
adopted by the OECD in 1961. All OECD 
members except Canada adhere to the code. 
Its purpose is to extend the liberalization of 
capital movement worldwide. It makes little 
attempt to establish sanctions for noncom- 
pliance and in fact expressly prohibits retali- 
ation against states which lodge reservations 
or invoke derogations — in short, do not want 
to comply in one respect or another. 

The basic obligations set forth in the code 
are: first, to abolish progressively restric- 
tions on movements of capital "to the extent 
necessary for effective economic coopera- 
tion"; second, to accord the same treatment 
to all nonresident-owned assets; and third, to 
permit liquidation of nonresident-owned as- 
sets and the transfer of the proceeds there- 
from. By liberalization is meant the granting, 
upon request, of any authorization required 
for a specific type of transaction as well as 
the transfer of funds to accomplish the trans- 
actions. Countries may enter reservations at 
any time with regard to certain specified 
transactions. With regard to others, also 
listed, the country must enter its reservation 
when it adheres or when that type of trans- 
action is added to the list. 

These obligations are far less restrictive 
than the obligations contained in our bilat- 
eral treaties. At the most, a country is re- 
quired to extend most-favored-nation treat- 
ment to other member states with respect to 
the transactions listed in the two lists. Al- 
though the Code contains a normative stand- 
ard, "liberalization," there is no obligation 
to accord fully liberalized treatment with re- 
spect to any transaction, but only to move to- 
ward liberalization at a rate to be determined 
by the country itself. 

At our request, the OECD Council has de- 
cided that the provisions of the code do not 
apply to an action by one of our States which 
comes within the jurisdiction of that State. 
As far as our Federal Government is con- 
cerned, we have lodged a reservation with 

February 18, 1974 


respect to the liberalization of direct invest- 
ment transactions by aliens in sectors from 
which they are excluded by statute. 

Our consistently liberal attitude toward 
foreign investment in the United States has 
undoubtedly been a positive factor in con- 
vincing other nations to adopt similar poli- 
cies with respect to our investment. 

Steps Toward International Consensus 

All this highlights the need for some inter- 
national consensus on foreign investment is- 
sues — a consensus recognizing the important 
positive role that foreign investment plays 
in the world economy and permitting agree- 
ment on some ground rules to be observed by 
both governments and corporations. 

Given the wide national and regional dif- 
ferences in economic development, legal sys- 
tems, and other factors, we consider it pre- 
mature to try to develop a single new inter- 
national forum for handling the whole range 
of foreign investment issues — better, we 
think, to tackle investment issues individu- 
ally and in the forum judged most appropri- 
ate to the purpose. On a number of invest- 
ment issues, it will be easier to obtain a 
consensus among the developed countries, 
certainly for the time being. 

The OECD Capital Movements Code has 
been useful, but it is only a beginning. It does 
not cover the question of national treatment 
for foreign-owned enterprises once an invest- 
ment has been made. Nor does it cover gov- 
ernment incentives to attract investment on 
the one hand and taxes to restrict it on the 
other. Nor do our FCN treaties go far 
enough. Their highly qualified statement of 
national treatment may be an adequate solu- 
tion to the treatment of our foreign invest- 
ment once it is in place. The permitted ex- 
ceptions to national treatment vary, however, 
from treaty to treaty. There are many coun- 
tries with whom we have no FCN treaty at 
all. Canada, our most important investment 
partner, is the outstanding example. 

Given the rapid growth of foreign invest- 
ment, the important lacunae in existing in- 

ternational agreements, and the domestic 
pressures in a number of countries to adopt 
more restrictive policies, the administration 
has placed a high priority on sitting down 
with the other developed countries to deter- 
mine where we go from here. 

We have taken a leading role in the review 
of investment issues now underway in the 
OECD under the general coordination of the 
Executive Committee meeting in Special Ses- 
sion, called the XCSS. In the five meetings 
which we in the XCSS have held since De- 
cember 1972 and in two ancillary meetings 
of government investment experts, we have 
pressed for the establishment of consultation 
machinery which would give any member 
country a forum to air its concerns about the 
investment policies, either restrictive or 
encouraging, of another member country. 
We hope that the consultation machinery 
will include a review procedure. Considerable 
progress has been made in this direction. 
Much hard work remains to be done over the 
coming months. 

Of great importance, too, is the work going 
forward in the OECD on multinational cor- 
porations. This involves highly technical 
problems for the most part. Because the com- 
plexity of these issues is not widely realized, 
more heat than light is often shed in public 
discussions. I am pleased that the various 
specialized committees of the OECD are in- 
tensifying their analyses of these problems, 
with the results to serve as a well-documented 
and well-studied basis for considering the 
extent to which we can in fact develop bal- 
anced guidelines for the relationships of gov- 
ernments and companies, and the avoidance 
of problems which can spill over into our 
foreign relations. 

We recognize of course that some foreign 
investment matters will have to be treated 
in broader fora which include the developing 
countries and the Socialist states. Accord- 
ingly, we are cooperating in the studies of 
foreign investment and multinational corpo- 
ration activities currently going forward in 
the various member organizations of the 
U.N. family— ECOSOC, ILO, UNCTAD, and 


Department of State Bulletin 

UNCITRAL [Economic and Social Council; 
International Labor Organization; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment; United Nations Commission on Inter- 
national Trade Law]. 

These studies can make valuable contribu- 
tions to the state of our knowledge on foreign 
investment matters. Several of our major 
companies are cooperating with the United 
Nations, because they realize, as we do, that 
international benchmarks will contribute 
greatly to a stable atmosphere in which to 
do business. This government will likewise 
cooperate with these U.N. initiatives and 
through our participation try to make cer- 
tain that the studies are objective and sup- 
portive of the development of an interna- 
tional consensus on foreign investment. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on 
Certain Bicycle Parts and Accessories. Report to 
accompany H.R. 6642. H. Kept. 93-611. October 
30, 1973. 3 pp. 

Energy Facts. Prepared for the Subcommittee on 
Energy of the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics by the Science Policy Research Di- 
vision, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. November 1973. 539 pp. 

Inter-American Relations. A Collection of Docu- 
ments, Legislation, Descriptions of Inter-American 
Organizations, and Other Material Pertaining to 
Inter-American Affairs. Printed for the use of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Novem- 
ber 1973. 780 pp. 

Intervention on the High Seas Act. Report to accom- 
pany S. 1070. S. Rept. 93-482. November 2, 1973. 
6 pp. 

United States Contributions to International Organi- 
zations. Letter from the Secretary of State 
transmitting the 21st report on the extent and 
disposition of U.S. contributions to international 
organizations, for fiscal year 1972. H. Doc. 93-195. 
November 5, 1973. 86 pp. 

China Report. Report of a special congressional dele- 
gation. July 1973. S. Doc. 93-43. November 7, 1973. 
13 pp. 

A Letter From the Chairman, National Advisory 
Council on International Monetary and Financial 
Policies, Transmitting a Special Report to the 
President and to the Congress on the Proposed 

Replenishment of the Resources of the Interna- 
tional Development Association. H. Doc. 93-181. 
November 7, 1973. 84 pp. 

A Letter From the Chairman, National Advisory 
Council on International Monetary and Financial 
Policies, Transmitting a Special Report to the 
President and to the Congress on a Proposed Con- 
tribution and Subscription of Resources to the 
Asian Development Bank. H. Doc. 93-182. No- 
vember 7, 1973. 106 pp. 

Protocol to the Convention for the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Message 
from the President of the United States transmit- 
ting the protocol done at Copenhagen on August 
13, 1970. S. Ex. V. November 9, 1973. 5 pp. 

National MIA Awareness Day 


Over 1,200 Americans are still missing and unac- 
counted for in Southeast Asia. The bodies of more 
than 1,100 men who were killed in the same area 
have never been recovered. 

.Although the Vietnam Agreement of January 27, 
1973, obligates North Vietnam and its allies to ac- 
count for the missing and to return the remains of 
those who died, communist authorities have failed to 
account for our missing, or to return the remains of 
our dead in the year that has elapsed since the 
Vietnam .Agreement was signed. As a result, the 
families of our missing men continue to live with the 
anguish of uncertainty about the fate of their loved 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America do hereby designate 
Sunday, January 27, 1974, as National MIA Aware- 
ness Day, a day dedicated to the many .Americans 
who remain missing and unaccounted for in Indo- 
china, and to their families. I call upon all Americans 
to join on this occasion in expressing the clear, 
continuing commitment of the American people and 
their Government to seek the fullest possible account- 
ing for Americans missing in Southeast .-^sia and the 
return of the remains of those who died. I also call 
upon State and local officials and private organiza- 
tions to obser\-e this day with appropriate ceremonies 
and activities. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-fifth day of January, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-eighth. 


' No. 4261 ; 39 Fed. Reg. 3535. 

February 18, 1974 


Assistant Secretary Sisco Discusses Progress 
in Middle East Negotiations 

Following are remarks by Joseph J. Sisco, 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asiayi Affairs, made on January 25 
before representatives of the American So- 
ciety of Association Executives at a White 
House conference on energy. 

Mr. Sisco: I am just going to try to give 
you two or three minutes on the recent trip 
which, as all of you know, resulted in a 
disengagement-of-forces agreement between 
Egypt and Israel and open it up for questions 
and give you the maximum time to develop 
areas of interest. 

Let me say first of all that I do feel that 
this disengagement-of-forces agreement be- 
tween Egypt and Israel could mark a turn- 
ing point in the Middle East. We were able 
to achieve this result because, I think, we 
find in the Middle East today a different 
perception of the situation than that which 
existed before the October war of last year. 
By that I mean that each side, it seems, has 
had enough of war and there is a realization 
that neither side can achieve a decisive vic- 
tory in a military sense and therefore there 
is no better alternative to negotiations. 

The Geneva Conference that was convened 
in December was a major achievement; 
for the first time the parties sat across 
the conference table, meeting in the presence 
of the two major powers and the United 
Nations. The fact that Egypt, Israel, and 
Jordan were willing to take that unprece- 
dented step reflects the view that any next 
war is very likely to be an attritional war be- 
tween the two sides, a war that is likely to 
be very costly to each side, and therefore 
each side for his own reasons has decided to 
try the path of negotiations. 

Now, in achieving a disengagement of 
forces between Egypt and Israel it is im- 

portant to underscore that it is only a first 
step toward the overall settlement. In addi- 
tion, we believe it reduces the likelihood of 

Hopefully, the agreement also will help 
set the climate for further negotiations be- 
tween Egypt and Israel. We hope, too, that 
from the disengagement-of-forces agreement 
between Egypt and Israel it will be possible 
in time to achieve a similar agreement be- 
tween Syria and Israel. 

The U.S. role, and it has been a very active 
ona, has been to help achieve a cease-fire and 
a consolidation of that cease-fire. 

The interesting thing about our role is 
that the United States has become acceptable 
to both sides as an intermediary. This is 
of major significance. It places a special 
responsibility on the United States, and I 
think it off'ers us a great opportunity to try 
to help achieve the kind of results which 
could lead to a durable and just peace. We 
are under no illusions that 25 years of sus- 
picion and mistrust can be dispelled very 
easily. The principal way to succeed, it 
seems to me, is on the basis of a step-by-step 
approach, one piece of the problem at a 
time, until a meaningful and real peace is 

Without sounding pollyannaish, I believe 
the changed circumstances in the area, the 
relative equilibrium in the area between the 
principal combatants, the realization that a 
military victory of a decisive character can- 
not be achieved by one side or the other, 
the realization that both sides would like to 
begin to put more of their resources to 
peaceful pursuits rather than the very heavy 
budgets involved in maintaining the kind of 
war establishment that each side has had 
to maintain — I believe these realistic appre- 
ciations, appreciations that we have not too 


Department of State Bulletin 

often lieretofore seen in the area, are hopeful 
signs. The attitude of both sides has been 
constructive. In these circumstances, active 
American diplomacy can be helpful to the 

I will stop right there and take your ques- 

Q. Mr. Sisco, xvhen do you see the Suez 
Canal reopening, and ivhat effect will that 
Iiave on the energy situation? 

Mr. Sisco: First, let me say that there 
are no specific undertakings as it relates to 
the opening of the Suez Canal in the agree- 
ment itself. However, we do expect that one 
of the results of this disengagement agree- 
ment will be the beginning of work on the 
opening of the canal at a reasonably early 

We also feel that the disengagement agree- 
ment itself should lead within a reasonable 
time frame to the lifting of the embargo 
and production restrictions. This is our hope, 
if not our expectation, and I think we will 
have to wait and see. 

The decision on the embargo was a col- 
lective decision between certain of the pro- 
ducers. I am sure that consultations on this 
matter will ensue. My hope is that there 
will be easing at an early date. 

Q. Mr. Sisco, is the United States in any 
sense a guarantor of this agreement so that 
it might have to intervene in case one side 
or the other does not keep it? 

Mr. Sisco: We are not a guarantor of this 
agreement in the sense that we have under- 
taken any specific legal obligations to inter- 
vene. We have in certain instances had to 
interpret one side to the other. We have had 
to convey, for example, assurances from one 
side to the other. If something goes wrong 
with the agreement, we are going to hear 
about it. In my judgment, we are involved 
because of our overall political, economic, and 
strategic interests in the area. We are in- 
volved in the sense that I have described by 
way of having been the principal interme- 
diary in bringing about the agreement. I 
have no doubt that if there should be any 
difficulties that arise about interpretations 

or whether one side or another is carrying 
out the agreement, the United States would 
have to become active diplomatically. 

Q. On the Suez Canal prohleyn I under- 
stand after ive get a political decision it will 
take three to five years to clean it up. 

Mr. Sisco: The estimate we have been 
given on the cleaning up and preparing the 
Suez Canal for operation is somewhere be- 
tween six and eight months. 

Q. Mr. Sisco, the United States responded 
forcefully to the Russian threat to introduce 
troops into the Middle East and subsequent 
to that played a major role in the negotia- 
tions. Where do these events noiv leave the 
Soviet Unioyi in the Middle East? 

Mr. Sisco: The Soviet Union has a con- 
tinuing interest in the area, and it will con- 
tinue to manifest that interest. We and the 
Soviet Union are cochairmen of the Geneva 
Conference. It played a constructive role at 
Geneva. Throughout this whole exercise of 
the last month we kept them informed; we 
remained in touch with the Soviet Union. 
It was the desire of both parties that we 
play the intermediary role. The Soviet 
Union, of course, does not have diplomatic 
relations with Israel, nor efli'ective contact 
with it. We have good contacts with both 

Q. Secretary [of the Treasury George P.] 
Shidtz talked last iveek to the Foreign Min- 
isters in Rome and urged them, urged the 
Arab countries to take a new look at their 
price hikes and so forth, he felt the price 
was too high. Do you think there is any 
chance that they ivill take that kind of urg- 
ing seriously? 

Mr. Sisco: I really ought not to speculate 
on that, simply because neither Secretary 
Kissinger nor I raised that particular ques- 
tion in any direct sense. We had our hands 
full with what we were negotiating. There- 
fore I think Secretary Shultz is in a much 
better position to make a judgment on that 
than I am. 

Q. As you move frotn the very encourag- 

February 18, 1974 


ing steps of disengagement to Geneva have 
you any idea at what pomt there might be 
some real joint control over terrorist groups 
that seem to have a potential to upset the 

Mr. Sisco: First, with respect to the ter- 
rorists let me say that such acts are acts 
of desperation. I believe that to the degree 
to which the more militant guerrilla elements 
have had to resort to these individual grand- 
stand acts of terrorism, this is in a sense 
a reflection of the failure of the guerrilla 
movement as an effective military force in 
the area. Whatever the Arabs achieved 
militarily on the ground against the Israelis 
in the October war was achieved by the 
Arab states themselves, not the guerrillas. 
The established Arab states carried the 
brunt, and the guerrillas were not actively 
involved militarily. 

Now to broaden the question — are we ever 
going to achieve a political solution and some- 
thing which is durable and meaningful un- 
less we resolve the so-called Palestinian is- 
sue? There is no doubt in my mind that 
unless an overall settlement meets the legiti- 
mate interests of the Palestinians, we are 
not going to get a durable settlement. If 
you look at the history of the Middle East 
over the last 25 years, you must assume that 
there will always be a small group that will 
remain unreconstructed insofar as the settle- 
ment is concerned. There will always be a 
small group that will oppose it by any and 
all means. 

But I happen to believe that the majority 
of the people both on the Israeli side and 
on the Arab side, Palestinian and non- 
Palestinian, are fed up with war and they 
are ready for a settlement which meets 
fairly and impartially the concerns of both 
sides. If we are able to achieve this — and 
it is a big "if," of course — if we are able 
to achieve this, I believe that not only most 
of the Arab states will be in support of 
such an agreement but also most of the 

What the eventual settlement will be as 
far as Palestinians specifically are concerned 
is very hard to say ; the Palestinians are di- 

vided. When one talks about Palestinian 
representation, you have to ask who speaks 
for the Palestinians. Certainly King Hus- 
sein's answer to that is difi'erent from that 
of [Yasir] Arafat. So it is an Lssue which 
at the moment does not arise in a very con- 
crete sense, but as we get closer to the 
basic elements of peace, as we make more 
progress toward peace, I believe there may 
well be continuing individual acts of violence 
by terrorists since a peace settlement is not 
viewed with sympathy by this small group of 

Q. Mr. Sisco, what is your diagnosis on 
the Western relations in the wake of the 
petroleum price increase? 

Mr. Sisco: You mean with our Western 

Q. Yes. 

Mr. Sisco: Our approach has been and 
will be one of trying to find ways to cooperate 
with our allies. This is not going to be a 
very easy task, as is evident from what we 
have seen in the last few weeks. We have 
the energy action conference coming up, 
which I am sure a number of others have 
spoken about here today, opening on the 
11th of February. On the other hand, one 
sees members of the European Community 
itself very busily engaged in trying to make 
certain arrangements of their own. One 
would hope that we can find common ground 
in order to attack the longer range problem 
in a cooperative way. 

The Arab-Israeli dispute is not the cause 
of the energy problem. The resolution of 
the Arab-Israeli problem is not going to 
eliminate our energy problem or the energy 
problem for Europe and the principal con- 
sumers around the world. The Arab-Israeli 
dispute has been a complicating factor. 
Whether we will be able to develop the kind 
of cooperative relationships which I think 
will be in our mutual interest, only time will 
tell. I hope so, because I think the alterna- 
tive is an unleashing of the kind of competi- 
tion which in the long run could be injurious 
to all, even though our situation is more 
manageable than that of the Europeans since 


Department of State Bulletin 

they are much more reliant on Middle East- 
ern oil than we are. If one looks at the 
long-range situation, we do have the overall 
capacity to become self-sufficient in time. It 
is essential that we develop the capacity to 
become self-sufficient so that no undue in- 
fluence in the long run can be exercised on us. 

Q. Mr. Sisco, to what extent do you think 
some of the other materials that are con- 
trolled bij small groups of countries are likely 
to be used as paw)is for exerting other in- 
fluence on us, and also increase the price? 

Mr. Sisco: I am not really the man to 
respond to that in any technical sense. The 
studies that I have looked at tend to cast 
some doubts as to how useful that particular 
approach is, but I am not sufficiently knowl- 
edgeable from a technical point of view to 
express any conclusive judgment. 

Interest Equalization Tax Rate 
Reduced to Zero 

Treasury Department Announcement ^ 

The Treasury Department announces that 
the effective rate of interest equalization tax 
(lET) has been reduced to zero, in accord- 
ance with an Executive order signed by the 
President.- The new zero rate will be appli- 
cable to trades and acquisitions of any for- 
eign stock or debt obligations made after 
January 29. 

Under the interest equalization tax legisla- 
tion, the President has the authority to re- 
duce the rate of the lET to zero when that 
action is consistent with the balance of pay- 
ments objectives of the United States. The 
lET has been applied since July 1963 in order 
to help restrain the outflow of capital from 
the United States into portfolio investments 

'Issued on Jan. 29 (Department of the Treasury 
press release). On the same day the Department of 
Commerce announced the termination of foreign 
direct investment controls, and the Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve System announced the 
termination of the voluntary foreign credit restraint 

" No. 11736; for text, see 39 Fed. Reg. 3807. 

in other developed countries. The rate of tax 
has been changed from time to time. The last 
such change became effective January 1, 
1974, when the rate was reduced from 11.25 
percent to 3.75 percent with respect to for- 
eign stocks and from a rate equivalent to a 
charge of approximately 0.75 percent per 
annum to a rate of approximately 0.25 per- 
cent per annum on foreign debt obligations. 
The Internal Revenue Service will provide 
guidelines on the effect of this order on re- 
porting and compliance procedures in forth- 
coming information releases. 

President Suspends Import Quotas 
for Wheat and Milled Wheat Products 


Amending Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States with Respect 
TO the Importation of Agricultural Commodi- 

Whereas, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricul- 
tural Adjustment .^ct, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), 
limitations have been imposed by Presidential proc- 
lamations on the quantities of wheat and milled 
wheat products which may be imported into the 
United States in any quota year; and 

Whereas the import restrictions proclaimed pur- 
suant to said section 22 are set forth in part 3 of the 
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United 
States; and 

Whereas, at my request, the United States Tariff 
Commission has made an investigation under the 
authority of subsection (b) of section 22 of the Agri- 
cultural Adjustment Act to determine whether the 
import quotas on wheat and milled wheat products 
provided for in item 950.60 of part 3 of the Appendix 
to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) 
may be suspended without rendering or tending to 
render ineffective, or materially interfering with, the 
loan and payment programs now conducted by the 
Department of Agriculture for wheat or reducing 
substantially the amount of products processed in the 
United States from domestic wheat; and 

Whereas the United States Tariff Commission has 
submitted to me a report with respect to this matter; 

Whereas, on the basis of such investigation and 

'No. 4260; 39 Fed. Reg. 3533. 

February 18, 1974 


report, I find and declare that the entry of additional 
quantities of wheat and milled wheat products result- 
ing from the suspension during the period ending 
June 30, 1974, of the quantitative limitations pro- 
vided for in item 950.60 of the TSUS will not render 
or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere 
with, the loan and payment programs now being 
conducted by the Department of Agriculture for 
wheat and will not reduce substantially the amount 
of products processed in the United States from 
domestic wheat, that the circumstances which re- 
quired the imposition of such quantitative limita- 
tions on wheat and milled wheat products no longer 
exist, and that such quantitative limitations should 
be suspended during the period ending June 30, 1974; 
Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me as President, 
and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and 
the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby pro- 
claim that headnote 3(a) of part 3 of the Appendix 
to the Tariff Schedules of the United States is 
amended by adding a new subdivision as follows: 

(ix) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
part the quantitative limitations for the articles pro- 
vided for in item 950.60 shall be suspended during 
the period beginning January 26, 1974, and ending 
June 30, 1974. Quantities of such articles entered 
during the period of May 29, 1974, through June 30, 
1974, shall not be deducted from the quantities which 
may be entered during the twelve month period be- 
ginning May 29, 1974, under the quantitative limita- 
tions provided for in item 950.60. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-fifth day of January, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of 
the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred ninety-eighth. 


Current Actions 




Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of 
the International Labor Organization. Done at 
Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 
20, 1948. TIAS 1868. 

Admission to membership: German Democratic 
Republic, January 1, 1974. 


Amendments to paragraphs 4(1) (a), (b); 6(l)-(5); 
7(a); 8(a), (e)-(h); 9(a), (b); 10(b), (c); 15; 17 
(c)(1), (2) of the schedule to the international 
whaling convention of December 2, 1946 (TIAS 
1849). Adopted at London June 29, 1973. Entered 
into force October 4, 1973, with the exceptions of 
paragraphs 8(a) and 8(h), which entered into force 
January 2, 1974, except for Japan and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 



Agreement extending the agreement of May 9, 1972, 
concerning shrimp (TIAS 7603). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Brasilia December 31, 1973. En- 
tered into force December 31, 1973. 


Amendment to the agreement of December 30, 1965 
(TIAS 6059), for cooperation concerning civil uses 
of atomic energy. Signed at Washington Novem- 
ber 2, 1973. Entered into force January 29, 1974. 


Deportment of State Bulletin 

INDEX Februarij 18,197', Vol. LXX, No. ISOS 


President Suspends Import Quotas for Wheat 
and Milled Wheat Products (proclamation) . 179 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Nixon's address and message to the 
Congress) 157 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 175 

Foreign Investment and Free Capital Markets 

(Casey) - .' 170 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Nixon's address and message to the 
Congress) 157 

Economic Affairs 

Foreign Investment and Free Capital Markets 

(Casey) 170 

Interest Equalization Tax Rate Reduced to 
Zei'o (Treasury Department announcement) 179 

President Suspends Import Quotas for Wheat 

and Milled Wheat Products (proclamation) . 179 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Nixon's address and message to the 
Congress) 157 

Energy. The State of the Union (excerpts 
from President Nixon's address and mes- 
sage to the Congress) 157 

Environment. The State of the Union (ex- 
cerpts from President Nixon's address and 
message to the Congress) 157 

Middle East. Assistant Secretary Sisco Dis- 
cusses Progress in Middle East Negotiations 
(remarks at White House conference on 
energy) 176 

Narcotics Control. The State of the Union 
(excerpts from President Nixon's address 
and message to the Congress) 157 

Presidential Documents 

National MIA .•Awareness Day (proclamation) 175 

President Suspends Import Quotas for Wheat 

and Milled Wheat Products (proclamation) . 179 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Nixon's address and message to the 
Congress) 157 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 180 

Viet-Nam. National MIA Awareness Day 

(proclamation) ". 175 

Name Inde.v 

Casey, William J 170 

Nixon, President 157, 175, 179 

Sisco, Joseph J 176 

Check list of Department of State 
Press Releases: Jan. 28-Feb. 3 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

So. Diitr Subject 

*34 1/28 Study group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCITT, Feb. 

*35 1/28 Study group 7 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCIR, Feb. 

*36 1/29 Springsteen designated Special As- 
sistant to the Secretary and Ex- 
ecutive Secretary of the Depart- 
ment (biographic data). 

*37 2/1 U.S. delegation to Intelsat Assem- 
bly of Parties, Feb. 4-8. 

* Not printed. 

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u.s. government printing office 

washington, dc. 20402 



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Washington, D.C. 20520. 






Volume LXX 

No. 1809 

February 25, 1974 


Address by Secretary Kissinger 
and Text of Joint Statement of Principles 181 

Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 186 


by Raymond J. Waldmann 192 


For index see intide back cover 




Vol. LXX, No. 1809 
February 25, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenta 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual Indexes, 

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approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

ST.\TE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ofl 
on the work of the Department n 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, l$su 
by the White House and the Depa 
ment, and statements, addreuet 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and othm 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases « 
international affairs and the functlom 
of the Department. Information i 
included concerning treaties and inttr 
national agreements to which ih 
United States is or may become i 
party and on treaties of general intv 
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Publications of the Department • 
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international relations are also listd 

U.S. and Panama Agree on Principles for Negotiation 
of New Panama Canal Treaty 

Ow Fehruarxj 7 at Panaind, Secretary Kis- 
singer and Juan Antonio Tack, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Panama, initialed a joint 
statetnent of principles for negotiation of a 
neiv Panama Canal treaty. Following is an 
address made by Secretary Kissinger at the 
ceremony, together with the text of the joint 


Press release 42 dated February 7 

We meet here today to embark upon a new 
adventure together. Our purpose is to begin 
replacing an old treaty and to move toward 
a new relationship. What we sign today, 
hopefully, marks as well the advent of a new 
era in the history of our hemisphere and 
thus makes a major contribution to the struc- 
ture of world peace. 

Meeting as we do on this isthmus which 
links North with South and Atlantic with 
Pacific, we cannot but be conscious of history 
— a history which has profoundly changed 
the course of human affairs. Four centuries 
ago the conquistadors landed here bringing 
faith and taking booty. They were represen- 
tatives of the traditional style and use of 
power. Seventy years ago, when the Panama 
Canal was begun, strength and influence re- 
mained the foundations of world order. 

Today we live in a profoundly transformed 
environment. Among the many revolutions 
of our time none is more significant than the 
change in the nature of world order. Power 
has grown so monstrous that it defies calcu- 
lation; the quest for justice has become uni- 
versal. A stable world cannot be imposed by 

force; it must derive from consensus. Man- 
kind can achieve community only on the basis 
of shared aspirations. 

This is why the meeting today between 
representatives of the most powerful nation 
of the Western Hemisphere and one of the 
smallest holds great significance. In the past 
our negotiation would have been determined 
by relative strength. Today we have come 
together in an act of conciliation. We recog- 
nize that no agreement can endure unless the 
parties to it want to maintain it. Participa- 
tion in partnership is far preferable to reluc- 
tant acquiescence. 

What we do here today contains a message, 
as well, for our colleagues in the Western 
Hemisphere who, in their recent meeting in 
Bogota, gave impetus to this negotiation. The 
method of solution and the spirit of partner- 
ship between Panama and the United States 
as embodied in this agreement are an example 
of what we mean by the spirit of community 
in the Western Hemisphere; it can be the 
first step toward a new era which we believe 
will be given fresh hope and purpose when 
we meet again with the Foreign Ministers of 
all the hemisphere in two weeks' time. 

The United States and Panama 

The relationship between Panama and the 
United States is rooted in extraordinary hu- 
man accomplishment — the Panama Canal, a 
monument to man's energy and creative 
genius. But as is so often the case, man's 
technological triumph outstripped his politi- 
cal imagination: 

— For 60 years the safe, efficient, and equi- 
table operation of the canal has given to 

February 25, 1974 


Panama, to the United States, and to all 
nations benefits beyond calculation. 

— Yet the canal still operates under the 
terms of a treaty signed in 1903, when the 
realities of international affairs were still 
shaped by traditional precepts of power. 

— The tensions generated by these contra- 
dictions, the endless debates over the costs 
and benefits of the convention of 1903, have 
jeopardized the ability of our two countries 
not only to work together to meet future de- 
mands upon the canal but also to develop a 
constructive relationship as friends. 

We must assess the document we have just 
signed against this background. Above all, we 
must judge it in the context of what it means 
for the peoples of the United States and 
Panama and what it can mean for the people 
of the Western Hemisphere. 

The eight principles in this agreement 
constitute, as General Torrijos [Brig. Gen. 
Omar Torrijos, Head of Government of Pan- 
ama] has said, a "philosophy of understand- 
ing." Sacrificing neither interest nor self- 
respect, Panama and the United States have 
made a choice for partnership. Meeting in 
dignity and negotiating with fairness, we 
have acknowledged that cooperation is im- 
posed on us by our mutual need and by our 
mutual recognition of the necessity for a 
cooperative world order. Foreign Minister 
Tack and Ambassador Bunker [Ambassador 
at Large Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. chief nego- 
tiator for the Panama Canal treaty] have 
shown that Panama's sovereignty and the 
vital interests of the United States in the 
Panama Canal can be made compatible. They 
have engaged in an act of statesmanship im- 
pelled by the conviction that we are part of a 
larger community in the Americas and in 
the world. 

In that spirit of partnership the United 
States and Panama have met as equals and 
have determined that a just solution must 
recognize : 

— First, that Panama and the United 
States have a mutual stake in the isthmus : 
Panama in its greatest natural resource, and 
the United States in the use and defense of 
the canal. 

— Second, that the arrangement which may 
have been suitable 70 years ago to both the 
United States and Panama must be adjusted 
to meet the realities of the contemporary 

—Third, that a new treaty is required 
which will strengthen the relationship be- 
tween us while protecting what is essential to 
each. A new agreement must restore Pan- 
ama's territorial sovereignty while preserv- 
ing the interests of the United States and its 
participation in what is for us an indispensa- 
ble international waterway. 

While we have taken a great stride for- 
ward, we must still travel a difficult distance 
to our goal. There is opposition in both our 
countries to a reasonable resolution of our 
differences. Old slogans are often more com- 
forting than changes that reflect new reali- 
ties. It is the essence of revolutions that to 
their contemporaries they appear as irritat- 
ing interruptions in the course of a comforta- 
ble normalcy. But it is equally true that those 
who fail to understand new currents are 
inevitably engulfed by them. 

We are determined to shape our own 
destiny. Our negotiators will require wisdom, 
purposefulness, tenacity. They will meet ob- 
stacles and disagreements. Yet they will suc- 
ceed — for our relations and our commitments 
to a new community among us and in this 
hemisphere demand it. 

In the President's name, I hereby commit 
the United States to complete this negotiation 
successfully and as quickly as possible. 

The Western Hemisphere Community 

We are here today not just as two sov- 
ereign nations, but as representatives of our 
hemisphere. We meet at the place where 
Simon Bolivar enunciated the concept of an 
inter-American system. We meet at a point 
of time between meetings of Foreign Min- 
isters in Bogota and Mexico City which can 
mark a historic turning point in making 
Bolivar's vision come true. 

I know that many of my country's south- 
ern neighbors believe they have been the sub- 
ject of too many surveys and too few policies. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The United States is accused of being better 
at finding slogans for its Latin American 
policy than at finding answers to the prob- 
lems that face us all. 

Some of these criticisms are justified. At 
times rhetoric has exceeded performance. 
But the United States has been torn by many 
problems ; only from afar does it appear as 
if all choices are equally open to us. We have 
not been willfully neglectful. And in any case, 
we have recognized that the time for a new 
approach is overdue. 

I have come here today to tell you on behalf 
of our President that we are fully committed 
to a major effort to build a vital Western 
Hemisphere community. We understand our 
own needs : 

— To live in a hemisphere lifted by prog- 
ress, not torn by hatreds ; 

- — To insure that the millions of people 
south of us will lead lives of fulfillment not 
embittered by frustration and despair; and 

— Above all, to recognize that in the great 
dialogue between the developed and the less 
developed nations, we cannot find answers 
anywhere if we do not find them here in the 
Western Hemisphere. 

It is in this spirit that I shall meet my col- 
leagues in Mexico City later this month to 
deal with the issues posed by them in their 
Bogota meeting. We attach particular sig- 
nificance to the fact that the meeting in Mexi- 
co City — its substance and its impetus — is 
the product of Latin American initiative. It 
is a response to the necessities of the times 
such as the United States had hoped to 
achieve with partners elsewhere in the world. 

The United States will not come to Mexico 
City with a program that presumes to have 
all the answers. Nor will we pretend that our 
lost opportunities can be remedied by yet 
another freshly packaged program labeled 
"Made in the U.S.A." But we shall come with 
an open mind and, perhaps more importantly, 
with an open heart. We are at a moment of 
truth, and we shall speak the truth. 

We know that our neighbors are worried 
about the blackmail of the strong. We want 
them to know that we are sympathetic to this 
concern. At the same time, blackmail is no 

more acceptable from any other source. We 
need each other. So let us all seek solutions 
free of pressure and confrontation, based on 
reciprocity and mutual respect. In Mexico 
City we can but lay the foundations for the 
future. But building upon what we achieve in 
Mexico City we can, over the months and 
years ahead, erect an edifice of true partner- 
ship, real trust, and fruitful collaboration. 

Thus we approach the meeting in Mexico 
with but one prejudice: a profound belief 
that the Americas, too, have arrived at a 
moment of basic choice, a time of decision 
between fulfillment together and frustration 
apart. Our choice will be found in the an- 
swers we give to these critical questions : 

— Can we make our diversity a source of 
strength, drawing on the richness of our 
material and moral heritage? 

— In short, can the countries of Latin 
America, the Caribbean, and the United 
States, each conscious of its own identity, 
fashion a common vision of the world and of 
this hemisphere — not just as they are, but as 
they are becoming and as we feel they should 
be — so that we can move together toward the 
achievement of common goals? 

We will conduct the broader dialogue we 
have all set for ourselves in Mexico City with 
the same commitment to reciprocity, the 
same consideration of each other's interests, 
that marked the negotiations between the 
United States and Panama. 

For centuries men everywhere have seen 
this hemisphere as offering mankind the 
chance to break with their eternal tragedies 
and to achieve their eternal hopes. That was 
what was new about the New World. It was 
the drama of men choosing their own desti- 

An American poet has written : 

We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 

Panama and the United States have now 
begun this exploration. Our sister republics 
can make the same choice. Our creativity, 
our energy, and our sense of community will 
be on trial. But if we are equal to the oppor- 

Februory 25, 1974 


tunity, we will indeed arrive where we 
started — a hemisphere which apain inspires 
the world with hope by its example. Then we 
shall indeed know the place for the first time, 
because for the first time we shall truly have 
fulfilled its promise. 


Joint Statement by the Honorable Henry 
A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of 
THE United States of America, and 
His Excellency Juan Antonio Tack, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Panama, on February 7, 
1974 AT Panama 

The United States of America and the 
Republic of Panama have been engaged in 
negotiations to conclude an entirely new 
treaty respecting the Panama Canal, negotia- 
tions which were made possible by the Joint 
Declaration between the two countries of 
April 3, 1964, agreed to under the auspices 
of the Permanent Council of the Organiza- 
tion of American States acting provisionally 
as the Organ of Consultation.' The new 
treaty would abrogate the treaty existing 
since 1903 and its subsequent amendments, 
establishing the necessary conditions for a 
modern relationship between the two coun- 
tries based on the most profound mutual 

Since the end of last November, the au- 
thorized representatives of the two govern- 
ments have been holding important conver- 
sations which have permitted agreement to 
be reached on a set of fundamental principles 
which will serve to guide the negotiators in 
the effort to conclude a just and equitable 
treaty eliminating, once and for all, the 
causes of conflict between the two countries. 

The principles to which we have agreed, on 
behalf of our respective governments, are as 
follows : 

1. The treaty of 1903 and its amendments 
will be abrogated by the conclusion of an 
entirely new interoceanic canal treaty. 

' For text of the joint declaration, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 656. 

2. The concept of perpetuity will be elimi- 
nated. The new treaty concerning the lock 
canal shall have a fixed termination date. 

3. Termination of United States jurisdic- 
tion over Panamanian territory shall take 
place promptly in accordance with terms 
specified in the treaty. 

4. The Panamanian territory in which the 
canal is situated shall be returned to the 
jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. The 
Republic of Panama, in its capacity as terri- 
torial sovereign, shall grant to the United 
States of America, for the duration of the 
new interoceanic canal treaty and in accord- 
ance with what that treaty states, the right 
to use the lands, waters and airspace which 
may be necessary for the operation, mainte- 
nance, protection and defense of the canal 
and the transit of ships. 

5. The Republic of Panama shall have a 
just and equitable share of the benefits de- 
rived from the operation of the canal in its 
territory. It is recognized that the geographic 
position of its territory constitutes the prin- 
cipal resource of the Republic of Panama. 

6. The Republic of Panama shall partici- 
pate in the administration of the canal, in 
accordance with a procedure to be agreed 
upon in the treaty. The treaty shall also 
provide that Panama will assume total re- 
sponsibility for the operation of the canal 
upon the termination of the treaty. The Re- 
public of Panama shall grant to the United 
States of America the rights necessary to 
regulate the transit of ships through the 
canal and operate, maintain, protect and de- 
fend the canal, and to undertake any other 
specific activity related to those ends, as may 
be agreed upon in the treaty. 

7. The Republic of Panama shall partici- 
pate with the United States of America in 
the protection and defense of the canal in 
accordance with what is agreed upon in the 
new treaty. 

8. The United States of America and the 
Republic of Panama, recognizing the impor- 
tant services rendered by the interoceanic 
Panama Canal to international maritime 
traflic, and bearing in mind the possibility 
that the present canal could become inade- 
quate for said traflic, shall agree bilaterally 


Department of State Bulletin 

on provisions for new projects which will 
enlarge canal capacity. Such provisions will 
be incorporated in the new treaty in accord 
with the concepts established in principle 2. 

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
Visits Washington 

Following is the text of a communique 
issued on February 5 at the conclusion of a 
visit to Washington by A7idrei A. Gromyko. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. 

White House press release dated February o 

At the invitation of the United States Gov- 
ernment, Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the 
Politburo of the CPSU [Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union] Central Committee ^nd 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 
visited Washington, D.C., from February 3 
to February 5, 1974. During his visit he held 
talks with President Nixon and Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger. 

Also taking part in the talks were : 

On the American side: 

Under Secretary-designate for Political 
Affairs Joseph Sisco; Counselor of the De- 
partment of State Helmut Sonnenfeldt; 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 
Arthur Hartman; Ambassador-designate to 
the USSR Walter Stoessel. 

On the Soviet side: 

Ambassador to the United States, A. F. 
Dobrynin; Member of the Collegium of the 
Foreign Ministry of the USSR G. M. Korni- 
yenko; Assistant to the Foreign Minister of 
the USSR V. G. Makarov ; and Y. M. Voront- 
sov, Minister-Counsellor of the Soviet Em- 

In accordance with the understandings 

reached in May 1972 and June 1973 that the 
practice of consultations between the two 
countries should continue, an exchange of 
views took place on a number of subjects of 
mutual interest. 

Both sides reaffirmed their determination 
to continue developing their relations along 
the lines established during President Nix- 
on's visit to the Soviet Union in 1972 and 
General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the 
United States in 1973 and reflected in the 
agreements concluded on those occasions. 

In reviewing their bilateral relations, the 
two Sides discussed questions relating to the 
further limitation of strategic arms and 
prospects for the development of trade and 
economic relations between the two countries, 
as well as other pertinent matters. They ex- 
pressed their agreement on the desirability of 
achieving progress in these and other areas. 

The two Sides also held discussions on a 
number of current international topics. 

Special attention was devoted to the Mid- 
dle Both Sides attached particular im- 
portance to their special role at the Geneva 
conference, the need for a peaceful Middle 
East settlement and for progress toward that 
end within the framework of the Geneva 
Peace Conference. 

In exchanging views on the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, both 
Sides agreed that the Conference should 
reach a successful conclusion as soon as pos- 
sible. The question of mutual force reduction 
in Central Europe was touched on. 

The exchange of views was conducted in a 
businesslike and constructive manner and 
was considered useful by both Sides. 

It was agreed that Secretary Kissinger 
will visit Moscow in the second half of March 
1974 in connection with preparations for the 
visit to the Soviet Union of President Nixon, 
which will take place this year in accordance 
with the agreement reached in June 1973. 

February 25, 1974 


America and Asia: The Old and the New 

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush 

In coming to Cleveland this evening, I 
have kept in mind the fact that there has 
been in the last few months much discussion 
about our relations in Europe and about the 
energy crisis and that we have just witnessed 
a major diplomatic feat accomplished by Sec- 
retary Kissinger in the Middle East. You are 
all very much aware of these recent develop- 
ments. I decided, therefore, to raise an issue 
which has not been discussed as frequently 
in the last year or so as it had been during 
the past decade. 

I will be departing next month on a major 
tour of Asian nations; and I would like to 
speak to you tonight about Asia and America, 
about the old and the new in our relation- 
ship, about our views of one another and of 

An Englishman once wrote condescend- 
ingly of Americans : Youth is their oldest tra- 
dition — it has been going on now for 200 
years. We are a young nation — young in 
spirit, in ideas, and in our aspirations. But 
we are also in a sense one of the world's old- 
est nations, for we built some time ago many 
of the institutions which the vast majority 
of mankind is still striving to construct; we 
are the world's oldest constitutional democ- 
racy and the most developed industrial so- 
ciety. Thus our political and economic sys- 
tems aj"e simultaneously among the longest 
lived and the most likely to live long. 

If America is a young nation with old in- 
stitutions, Asia is composed of old nations 
with young institutions. For while Ameri- 

^ Made before the Cleveland Council on Foreign 
Relations on Jan. 21 (press release 25). 


cans are gaining a new appreciation for 
Asia's ageless cultural and intellectual values, 
most of Asia's political structures have 
emerged since the Second World War and 
many Asians are only now entering the In- 
dustrial Revolution. Rapid and unsettling 
change is natural as Asians seek political 
strength, economic progress, and national 

The perceptions that emerge from this 
complex blend of the old and the new guide 
the restructuring of America's policies 
toward Asia. 

First, we must expect and accept change 
in Asia. 

But second, as a mature nation the United 
States can and must provide an essential ele- 
ment of stability in this area of turbulent 

And third, as President Nixon stated in his 
1971 foreign policy report, the United States 
"must strike a balance between doing too 
much and thus preventing self-reliance, and 
doing too little and thus undermining self- 

The flood of events in recent years may 
have overwhelmed us, obscuring the pro- 
found transformation which these policies 
have helped achieve. Consider our situation 
just a few shoi't years ago: 

— Two decades of hostility and estrange- 
ment from Asia's largest and the world's 
most populous nation, the People's Republic 
of China, had yet to end; 

— American forces were still fully engaged 
in this nation's longest and most frustrating 
war, Viet-Nam; and 

Department of State Bulletii 


— Relations with our closest Asian ally, 
Japan, were severely strained by an inevi- 
table but painful adjustment of our relation- 
ship; for example, the necessity to correct an 
unprecedented $4 billion trade deficit. 

But two years ago next month President 
Nixon visited Peking; a year ago this month 
we signed the Paris accords ending American 
combat involvement in Viet-Nam; and in re- 
cent months we have made steady progress 
toward a more equal and balanced relation- 
ship with Japan. 

Thus as I depart next month to visit sev- 
eral Asian nations, I do so confident that we 
have removed some major impediments to 
construction of a new American relationship 
with Asia. We have freed ourselves from 
preoccupation with containing the threats 
of the past. Now we can concentrate on real- 
izing the opportunities of the future. 

Some Americans still view Asia as an area 
of less vital concern to the United States than 
Europe. But the fact that Asia has been less 
frequently on the front pages of our news- 
papers in recent months can be ascribed more 
to the wisdom of that phrase "no news is 
good news" than to the intrinsic importance 
of Asia to our interests. 

Let me briefly mention a few obvious but 
sometimes forgotten factors : 

— Half the world's people live in Asia, and 
that proportion is increasing; 

— Our trade with Asia now equals 85 per- 
cent of our trade with Western Europe and 
is growing more rapidly; 

— Twice in a single generation we have 
been drawn into war in Asia, while Europe 
has remained relatively more stable; every 
American war since World War I has started 
in Asia; and 

— Four of the world's major powers — the 
United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet 
Union — come together only in the Pacific. 

Thus our policies toward Asia are central 
to our policies toward the entire world. 

In his address to the U.N. General Assem- 
bly last September, Secretary Kissinger sug- 
gested that the world has come to what may 

be described as an open moment in history, 
a time when nations will l)e making funda- 
mental choices, choices which will profoundly 
affect the future shape of the international 

All over the world, familiar landmarks — 
political, economic, social, psychological — are 
disappearing, changing, being challenged, 
and being forged into new shapes. We are at 
one of those rare moments in human history 
v/hen a concerted effort can determine the 
framework of international relations for 
decades to come. But should the United 
States and like-minded nations fail to gen- 
erate the momentum to propel international 
events in the direction they prefer, it is cer- 
tain that others will make them move in the 
direction they want — or events will just drift 
aimlessly and chaotically. 

In this formative period our policies in 
Asia have two basic and mutually reinforc- 
ing purposes: 

— First, to build a network of mutual un- 
der.'^tanding and mutual restraint among the 
major powers in Asia: Japan, China, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States; and 

— Second, with the smaller nations in Asia, 
to pursue the Nixon doctrine's goal of shared 
responsibilities and shared burdens for de- 
velopment and defense. 

We must pursue both these purposes if we 
are to hope for success in either one. Only 
by continuing to demonstrate our determina- 
tion to assist smaller nations can we con- 
vince major powers that they must work 
with us to reduce tensions. Conversely, only 
by pursuing increased cooperation among the 
major powers can we reduce the tensions 
which have stimulated confrontation and 
conflict among the smaller nations. 

New Relationship Among Major Powers 

Let me deal with each of these two policies 
in turn. 

The world has been brought to this forma- 
tive moment in part because, for the first 
time in approximately 2.5 years, international 
politics are no longer dominated by rigid, 

February 25, 1974 


sterile confrontation between the Communist 
and non-Communist powers. The changed 
climate of relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and between the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China have contributed importantly to this 
hopeful evolution. 

U.S. policy with both of our adversaries 
aims to build with each a fabric of mutually 
beneficial relationships, relationships which 
provide the substance of what President 
Nixon has called a structure of peace. 

With the Soviet Union we are engaged in 
a web of concrete negotiations; with China 
we are opening a new relationship. With the 
Soviet Union we are endeavoring to insure 
peace and stability through agreement to 
exercise mutual restraint in international 
relations and through reaching specific 
agreements on normalizing trade and other 
forms of cooperation in bilateral relations. 
With China we are seeking to bridge two 
decades of isolation and hostility, an atmos- 
phere in which misunderstanding was as- 
sured and miscalculation was a constant 

We cannot take for granted the present 
reduction of international tensions. Both 
Moscow and Peking continue to view their 
relationships with us and our allies as funda- 
mentally competitive — politically, strategi- 
cally, economically, and ideologically. It is not 
necessary to read the minds of men in the 
Soviet Union and in the People's Republic of 
China to realize this. But the agreements we 
are seeking with both countries are designed 
to promote the interests of the United States 
and of its allies, regardless of what may be 
the motivations of our opponents in reaching 
those agreements. Ultimately, of course, we 
believe that all parties benefit from these 
agreements; for a sound peace can only rest 
on mutually beneficial arrangements. 

Our ability to build elements of coopera- 
tion into our relationship with the two Com- 
munist powers has been possible only because 
the leaders in the two capitals have been re- 
ceptive. Looking ahead, while we cannot say 
with certainty that Soviet and Chinese poli- 


cies will continue along present lines, we can 
encourage that outcome by institutionalizing 
our relationship as much as possible through 
the concrete and mutually beneficial arrange- 
ments which I have discussed. 

Japan is our major partner in this en- 
deavor. We view Japan not only as an essen- 
tial factor in Asia but as one of the principal 
factors in the global situation. We have con- 
sistently stressed the need for Japan to par- 
ticipate fully in the relationship we are cre- 
ating with Western Europe. Japan's global 
economic power and its emerging political 
power make highly important its participa- 
tion in the formulation of new basic objec- 
tives by the advanced industrialized democ- 

A major aspect of the new relationship we 
and Japan are building with China and the 
Soviet Union is agreement to oppose at- 
tempts by anyone to impose hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific region. In fact, agreement 
among the major powers to exercise re- 
straint has led to a marked slowing down of 
the action-reaction cycle so prevalent in 
recent years. A more considered approach 
results from the need to take into account 
the interests of more countries. 

Shared Responsibilities and Shared Burdens 

Smaller nations benefit equally from this 
positive momentum. In fact probably the 
two most important results of this adminis- 
tration's policies in Asia have been: 

— First, that there has been a substantial 
relaxation of tensions throughout Asia and 
a reduction of the threat of conflict and con- 
frontation; and 

— Second, that our allies and friends are 
achieving the essence of the Nixon doctrine 
by shouldering a greater part of the burden 
for their own security and economic develop- 

These two basic changes in the Asian scene 
have made it possible and appropriate for the 
United States to adjust its role toward a less 
direct involvement in the affairs of Asia. 
Since President Nixon took office in 1969, 

Deportment of State Bulletin 

U.S. forces in Asia have been reduced to 
about one-fourth of their previous size, leav- 
ing about 200,000 U.S. troops in the area, 
and U.S. military assistance to Asia has been 
cut by about 40 percent to approximately $1.4 

We are particularly pleased by growing 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and 
by the efforts of the Association of South- 
East Asian Nations to involve Indochina in 
this process. And we support the growing 
role of Australia and New Zealand in Asia's 
future, a role I will be discussing with their 
Foreign Ministers at our regular ANZUS 
meeting next month. 

Of all areas in the world, Indochina has 
been one of the last to benefit from the heal- 
ing winds of detente: 

— In Laos the cease-fire has held extremely 
well, and there is progress toward a single 

— In Cambodia fighting unfortunately 
continues, but the Cambodian Government 
has reiterated its proposal that all parties 
join in reaching a political settlement. There 
is hope that if the Khmer Rouge realize they 
cannot obtain a military solution they will 
agree to engage in negotiations. 

— And in Viet-Nam the level of hostilities 
was substantially lower in 1973 than in ear- 
lier years. This was an encouraging decline. 
South Viet-Nam has demonstrated increasing 
ability to defend itself. But we remain con- 
cerned about failure to implement the peace 
agreement. While the possibility of a North 
Vietnamese offensive in 1974 cannot be ruled 
out, we hope that last year's decline will con- 
tinue this year. We also continue to hope 
that North Viet-Nam will concentrate on 
peaceful reconstruction of its shattered econ- 
omy and society instead of vainly pursuing 
war in the South. The United States remains 
ready to contribute to this effort when North 
Viet-Nam fulfills its obligations under the 
Paris accords, including its obligation to 
make a full accounting of our missing in 

In realigning our role in Asia the United 
States must not fall prey to the dangerous 

temptation of total withdrawal. The essence 
of the Nixon doctrine is shared burdens and 
shared responsibilities, not unilateral abroga- 
tion of responsibility by the United States. 
Given the continuing critical importance of 
the balancing role we now play in Asia, 
American withdrawal would only lead to a 
reappearance of severe instability. Thus we 
should not contemplate further substantial 
reductions in U.S. forces in Asia until the 
continuing tensions in the area have substan- 
tially diminished. Equally important, we 
must continue to extend adequate security 
and economic assistance. Only by making this 
effort can we assure that the nations of Asia 
will achieve the secure peace that their sac- 
rifices, and ours, were designed to create. 

Shortages Threatening World Economy 

As the saying goes, we often find that "the 
best of times is the worst of times." Just as 
we are making major progress in the area 
of our greatest concern over the past quarter 
century by reducing the threat to man's phys- 
ical security, energy and other resource 
shortages have arisen to threaten the world's 
economic security. 

In another era the United States could have 
remained relatively unconcerned about this 
development. But this is no longer the case, 
as you in Cleveland know with one of the na- 
tion's major ports, as all in Ohio know with 
the nation's fourth largest exports of indus- 
trial goods, and as all in America know with 
the current problems facing us both as con- 
sumers and producers. America's ability to 
grow is tied to our imports, and our ability to 
pay for these imports is tied to our exports. 
It is increasingly clear that to control our in- 
flation, to save our environment, to preserve 
our very way of life, we must seek new forms 
of international cooperation. 

The United States would survive better 
than most in a world torn asunder by unre- 
strained competition caused by man's de- 
mands upon this small planet's finite re- 
sources. But the developed and developing 
nations of Asia have a much smaller margin 
of survival. Many Asian nations have bene- 

February 25, 1974 


fited from the world's fastest economic 
growth rates to maintain domestic political 
stability. Should, for example, sharply re- 
duced energy supplies and sharply rising en- 
ergy prices bring their economic growth to a 
standstill, this could cause unpredictable po- 
litical and social instability. 

Thus it is in the interest of both Asia and 
America to insure that we achieve an unprec- 
edented level of international cooperation to 
meet an unprecedented international chal- 
lenge. Nations are only just beginning to un- 
derstand the magnitude of this challenge. It 
is not just a problem of oil supplies but of 
prices, not just a matter of energy but of all 
natural resources, not just a question of econ- 
omics but of politics and security, not just an 
issue for 1974 but for the rest of this cen- 

The oceans present another excellent ex- 
ample of the uncharted but pressing chal- 
lenge of our growing interdependence. The 
United Nations, through its third Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, is this year writing 
what will in essence be a constitution for an 
area covering two-thirds of the earth's sur- 
face. Whether it is the protein, the minerals, 
or the oil which the oceans contain or their 
increasing importance for international 
transportation and national security, this 
conference will confront problems of unprec- 
edented complexity and challenge. 

Nations are only beginning to understand 
the magnitude of the problem presented by 
growing interdependence. No one nation can 
provide the answers. We must all work to- 
gether. Our initial objective is to develop a 
framework to provide incentives for coopera- 
tion and discourage attempts to satisfy one's 
own demands at the expense of others. 

Three-Point Program on Energy 

To address the specific problem of energy, 
President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger 
have developed a three-point program: 

— First, to expand sources of supplies 
within the United States and dampen de- 
mand and thus to reduce the pressure on the 

international petroleum market and decrease 
our dependence on foreign sources of supply; 

— Second, to invite Foreign Ministers of 
the major consuming nations to meet in 
Washington early next month to develop co- 
operative action among industrial consuming 
nations looking toward a dialogue with the 
petroleum-exporting countries; and 

— Third, to propose the establishment of 
an international Energy Action Group that 
would bring consumer and supplier nations 
together to develop new international cooper- 
ation benefiting consumer and producer alike. 
The stake of the oil producers in an expand- 
ing global economy is growing. Together 
with consumer nations, they have a vital in- 
terest in maintaining the monetary and trad- 
ing system which promises them so much. 

We want Japan to be one of our principal 
partners in this endeavor, for we are keenly 
aware of her nearly total dependence on for- 
eign oil. The Japanese have told us that to 
continue to play an active economic role in 
the world they recognize the need to play a 
political role as well. We welcome this ap- 
proach, for we believe that we share broad 
common concerns and interests. 

Energy price rises are causing hardships 
on the developing nations of Asia. These 
hardships threaten to destroy the accomplish- 
ments of decades. The interests of these na- 
tions must be fully represented and pro- 
tected. We would hope that the consumer na- 
tions in the developing world could concert 
to encourage a more reasonable approach on 
the part of producer nations — who are them- 
selves still developing or are recently devel- 
oped. Development prospects over the next 
decade may well depend on progress in low- 
ering prices and transferring capital re- 
sources from the oil producers to the less 
well-endowed nations. 

Let me conclude. 

Americans have understandably grown 
tired of the burdens of world leadership. And 
as I have attempted to outline, this adminis- 
tration has sought to lighten this burden and 
to transform its nature. 

But the two most recent international 


Department of State Bulletin 

crises — in the Middle East and in energy^ — 
have once again demonstrated the role which 
only the United States can play. Who else 
could have brought the Arabs and the Is- 
raelis to the negotiating table after two dec- 
ades of conflict, conflict which threatened to 
engulf the major powers as well? And who 
else could provide the vision and the will to 
bring together oil consumers and producers 
so that together we can halt the otherwise 
inevitable collapse of the world's economy? 

Americans can be proud of these contribu- 
tions, and we can I'egain from them the con- 
fidence required to pursue an active and 
imaginative foreign policy not only in Asia 
but throughout the world. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Argentine Republic, Alejandro Jose Luis Or- 
fila, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on February 1. For texts of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and the President's re- 
ply, see Department of State press release 
dated February 1. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Cyprus, Nicos G. Dimitriou, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
February 1. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated Feb- 
ruary 1. 

El Salvador 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of El Salvador, Francisco Bertrand 
Galindo, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Nixon on February 1. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 

reply, see Department of State press release 
dated February 1. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Korea, Dr. Pyong-choon Hahm, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on February 1. For texts of the Ambassa- 
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated Feb- 
ruary 1. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Sultanate of Oman, Ahmed Macki, presented 
his credentials to President Nixon on Febru- 
ary 1. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated February 1. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Sahabzada 
Yaqub Khan, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on February 1. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated February 1. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Tunisia, Ali Hedda, presented his 
credentials to President Nixon on February 
1. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated February 1. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Zaire, Mbeka Makosso, presented 
his credentials to President Nixon on Febru- 
ary 1. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated February 1. 

February 25, 1974 


In this article based on an address he made before the Inter- 
national Aviation Club at Washington on January 22, Mr. 
Waldmann, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trans- 
portation and Telecoryimunications, discusses current prob- 
lems and policy developments in the field of international 

International Aviation: The Fuel Crisis and Other Problems 

by Raymond J. Waldmann 

If something seems to be working well, as 
the international aviation system is, I believe 
it should be left alone. When changes are 
necessary, however, we should not hesitate 
to make them. We do have a number of prob- 
lems these days which require attention. I 
won't produce any magic formulas or pana- 
ceas for solving them, but will explain some 
actions and policies to deal with them. 

In the last three months many of us in gov- 
ernment have learned far more about petro- 
leum than we ever wanted to know. Middle 
distillate, kerosene, naphtha based, JP-4, 
bonded fuel — all these terms have found 
their way into our vocabularies. At the De- 
partment, we first learned of the jet fuel 
shortage in a very direct way around Novem- 
ber 1 when our phones began to light up. In 
the first 10 days of November we set about 
combating problems arising from forthcom- 
ing fuel shortfalls and resultant cutbacks in 
service. We also found that there was at 
least some disagreement about our goals. 

We at the Department assumed, for exam- 
ple, that we live in an interdependent world. 
Each nation has to modify its own activities 
to the extent that they impinge upon other 
nations. No nation in 1973, we believed, was 
either so omnipotent or isolated that it could 
chart its course without regard to the effects 
on other nations. 

Further, we believed that international 
travel and commerce are important. We be- 
lieved that it is in the interest of the United 

States to maintain a system of international 
aviation services with other countries. We 
believed that this system has in law and in 
fact no greater or lesser priority than our 
domestic system — that our international and 
domestic economic policies are intertwined. 
We soon learned that these views were not 
universally shared. 

Shortfalls of Bonded Jet Fuels 

Our most immediate problem in mid-No- 
vember was with bonded jet fuels, fuels pro- 
duced outside the United States, held in bond 
at U.S. airports, and used for international 
flights. Bonded jet fuels were projected to 
have far greater shortfalls than domestic 
fuels. And to make a bad situation worse, 
the projected shortfalls varied widely. Two 
of the four major suppliers stated that they 
would be unable to meet commitments while 
two others, whose supplies came from Africa 
and Venezuela, said they had few problems. 
So we faced the real possibility that between 
two carriers serving the same international 
market, one carrier would continue its full 
schedule while the other carrier might be 
wiped out. 

When this situation became widely under- 
stood, foreign ministries around the world 
began dialing the State Department's num- 
ber and our appointment calendars began to 
bulge with Ambassadors bearing diplomatic 
protests. We had many specific requests, 


Department of State Bulletin 

hardship cases, and just plain complaints to 
handle. Their points were well made. In 
most foreign countries there was no distinc- 
tion between domestic and bonded fuels and 
nondiscriminatory treatment was being ac- 
corded U.S. airlines. 

Nations requested similar treatment from 
the United States. Any fine lines we drew 
between bonded and domestic fuels were 
viewed as thinly veiled attempts to discrim- 
inate against foreign carriers. It was clear to 
us that any inequitable treatment of foreign 
airlines would quickly lead, through retali- 
ation, to some severing of international avia- 
tion connections with the rest of the world. 
Quite simply put, if we did not provide for- 
eign-flag carriers fuel in the United States 
they would cut off our carriers in their coun- 

We first favored the allocation or sharing 
of bonded fuels for international operations. 
Because of legal and other difficulties with 
this solution we then turned to other methods 
of assuring carriers fuel. The shortfalls in 
bonded fuel will be made up through the use 
of domestic fuel, and bonded fuel itself will 
not be allocated. Shortfalls expected in 
bonded fuel can be made up by relatively 
small diversions from domestic fuel stocks. 

We now have a situation we can live with ; 
we have finally given birth to a nondiscrim- 
inatory jet fuel program. This will aid us 
immensely in protecting our carriers over- 
seas from arbitrary restrictions and discrim- 
inatory policy in other countries. That the 
public can still fly overseas today with rela- 
tive ease has been no small accomplishment 
and one that brings us a certain satisfaction. 

But we're not completely out of the woods 
yet. The most crucial problem now is the 
price of fuel. Bonded fuel will have to find 
its international level if it is to continue to 
flow to the United States. The question of 
finding an equitable pricing system for both 
domestic and international airlines remains 
unanswered. Regardless of the price of 
domestic fuel for international carriers, the 
net effect of all this will be a dramatic in- 
crease in the airlines' fuel bill and higher 
prices for foreign travel. The impact on 
international traffic could be substantial. 

coming as it does at a time of generally soft- 
ening travel markets. 

Problem of Excess Airline Capacity 

The fuel crisis came at us when many felt 
that there was already excess airline capacity 
— that is, too many flights — in some interna- 
tional markets. With the blessings of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), U.S. and 
foreign airlines have already reached agree- 
ment to reduce capacity in some markets and 
have eliminated flights unilaterally in others. 
Airlines are also restructuring part of the 
U.S. international air transport system. Ex- 
amples include the proposed PanAm-TWA 
route swap involving Ireland and East Africa 
and the proposed exchange of South Pacific 
and Caribbean routes between PanAm and 
American. The underlying causes for these 
swaps predate the fuel crisis, but they may 
have been accelerated by it. 

Under the Bermuda system,' which this 
country has espoused for over 25 years, gov- 
ernments agree to allow competition in avia- 
tion rather than enforcing rigid bilateral reg- 
ulation. Do capacity agreements and route 
swaps mark the demise of the Bermuda sys- 
tem? There may be some who think it is high 
time we scrapped it. The fact is that, how- 
ever, while the basic principles of Bermuda 
have not changed, our application of those 
principles throughout the years has not been 
immutable. For example, we have been able 
to conclude Bermuda-type air transport 
agreements with a number of countries — 
such as Italy, Spain, and Iran, to mention a 
few — whose aviation philosophy is quite dif- 
ferent from ours. We have satisfied these 
countries as to U.S.-airline capacity plans. 
And of course we now have part 213 of the 
CAB regulations, which permits the United 
States to retaliate against foreign airlines 
whose governments are restricting our op- 
erating rights. 

I do not believe that the basic elements of 
the Bermuda system are dead or even dying. 
These principles derive from our common 

' For text of the final act of the U.S.-U.K. confer- 
ence on civil aviation held in Bermuda Jan. 15-Feb. 
11, 1946, see BulIuETIN of Apr. 7, 1946, p. 584. 

February 25, 1974 


conception that governments should not be in 
the business of making commercial decisions. 
On the other hand, we should not forget that 
Bermuda is a system of regulation. Conse- 
quently, just as it seems that the nature and 
extent of domestic regulation may be chang- 
ing, so it may be internationally. 

The Department and other concerned 
agencies are initiating a study, utilizing the 
services of outside research groups, to deter- 
mine what changes in U.S. policies, if any, 
are necessary to meet the new challenges. 
Moreover, we are also examining means to 
put teeth into the standard provisions of bi- 
lateral agreements which deal with excess 
capacity. We are particularly concerned 
about excess capacity dedicated to carrying 
fifth- or sixth-freedom traffic, traffic outside 
the primary market between the bilateral 
partners. When this government gets itself 
equipped with the appropriate tools, we may 
be able to talk to our bilateral partners about 
this kind of problem with something more 
than moral indignation. 

Negotiation of Route Agreements 

Anyone who has kept a tabulation of U.S. 
air transport negotiations over the last few 
years will have noted that almost all of them 
have ended without agreement. This does not 
reflect some basic difficulty in the process of 
negotiating; it does reflect the fact that we 
are insisting on getting as much as we give. 
The reason is quite simple: In recent times 
quite a few countries, including some in 
larger markets, have been getting more out 
of bilateral agreements than we think they 
are due, both in terms of revenues and in 
terms of balance of payments. 

Not only are we turning these countries 
away when they ask for more ; we are trying 
to do something to correct those agreements 
which are grossly inequitable. Since in most 
cases there is nothing additional we want, the 
only means of correcting the imbalance 
would be to take away rights foreign coun- 
tries already have, a difficult solution at 
best — although we do have the option to de- 
nounce and renegotiate an agreement. We 
are acutely conscious of the problem, and we 

do not attempt to push it under the rug sim- 
ply because it is hard to solve. 

The Department is also determined to pro- 
tect our airline services abroad and to ex- 
pand them where it is in the U.S. interest. 
However, in a world where few things are 
free we have to pay for what we want. With- 
in this government there is not always a 
unanimous view whether the price paid is 
worth the benefit achieved. I have found that 
these differences tend to be more over a prin- 
ciple than over a pragmatic calculation of the 
dollars-and-cents value. One may question 
whether the price we are asked to pay is jus- 
tified in order that U.S. airlines may serve 
the far corners of the globe. Is it really nec- 
essary for either commercial or national in- 
terest reasons for U.S. airlines to sei've just 
about every country there is? 

Foreign Restrictive Practices 

Capacity and routes are the basic questions 
of our international services, but we are be- 
coming increasingly concerned by foreign re- 
strictive practices which impair the ability of 
our carriers to get a fair crack at the foreign 
market. The use of restrictions to achieve 
what cannot be achieved openly is not con- 
fined to international aviation. The nontariff 
barrier, after all, was widespread in Europe 
during the 1930's, when international avia- 
tion was in its infancy. 

The subject has, however, been given re- 
cent prominence by virtue of a report pi-e- 
pared by the CAB from reports supplied 
from our Embassies abroad. In our view, 
foreign restrictive practices fall into two cat- 

First, there are those practices which are 
so embedded in the cultural, social, or politi- 
cal way of life of a country that there is little 
or nothing we can reasonably do to change 
them, no matter how foreign they may be to 
our thinking. Socialist countries refuse to al- 
low foreign enterprises to sell tickets for lo- 
cal currency. Foreign governments may en- 
courage preferential treatment for their air- 
lines or monopolize domestic-origin traffic. 
Since the practice cannot be changed by any 


Department of State Bulletin 

action on our part, the only remedy is to ad- 
just the benefits under the agreement ac- 
cordingly and decrease the ability of the for- 
eign airline to penetrate the U.S. market. We 
have followed this course in our air transport 
agreements with Eastern European coun- 
tries, for example. 

The second category contains practices 
adopted by regulation or order of a foreign 
government which could be rescinded if the 
United States had effective means to retali- 
ate. This may include practices such as re- 
quiring that ground handling be performed 
by the national airline or a government- 
controlled monopoly. And of course in our 
free enterprise economy the U.S. Government 
cannot force compensating actions such as 
having foreign airlines contract with partic- 
ular companies for ground handling in the 
United States. Foreign governments may re- 
fuse to allow reasonable remittance of reve- 
nues or may grant tax or foreign exchange 
advantages to travelers using foreign airlines 
while denying the same advantages to travel- 
ers on U.S. airlines. The efi'ective means of 
retaliation are not easy to find, however, be- 
cause finance authorities around the world 
seem to be impervious to aviation considera- 

We must look elsewhere for effective lever- 
age; this probably means doing something to 
the schedules of the foreign airlines. In new 
agreements, we are insisting on "doing busi- 
ness" provisions which guarantee the remit- 
tance of revenues, the right to sell tickets and 
post employees abroad, and so on. The United 
States itself cannot adopt discriminatory 
practices if it expects others to forgo this 
form of protectionism. Other countries have 
been quick to point out, for example, that the 
Domestic International Sales Corporation 
law, which gives a minimal but clearly pref- 
erential tax break to U.S. export companies 
which ship on U.S.-flag aircraft, is discrim- 
inatory, in their view. We must keep our own 
house in order. 

Charter Services 

In the Department we have taken very se- 
riously the statement approved by the Presi- 

dent that "Charter services are a most val- 
uable component of the international air 
tiansportation system, and they should be en- 
couraged." - 

We have sought to achieve the regular iza- 
tion of charter services through intergovern- 
mental agreements called for by the policy 
statement. I suspect at times that some may 
have wished we displayed somewhat less zeal 
in this pursuit. We are convinced of the im- 
portance of charters as a way of making in- 
ternational travel available at reasonable 
prices to a great part of the public. Our 
scheduled carriers, as well, have found char- 
ter operations to be an important part of 
their business. It was through the energetic 
charter activities of both scheduled and non- 
scheduled carriers that the U.S.-flag share of 
North Atlantic travel overall has improved 
at a time when our share of the scheduled 
market remained constant. 

Within the last year we were able to ne- 
gotiate successfully the first comprehensive 
bilateral agreement on charters with Yugo- 
slavia and agreements with Canada and Jor- 
dan. These agreements, while significant as 
precedents, do not cover the major travel 
markets for the United States. A recent de- 
velopment of perhaps greater importance is 
the decision of the European Civil Aviation 
Conference. ECAC has expressed willingness 
to reconsider its recommendation against its 
members' negotiating bilateral charter agree- 
ments with us. Further work with ECAC is 
required, but we intend to pursue energetic- 
ally our goal to negotiate agreements on 
charters with our important aviation part- 

This past year, too, has seen an important 
experiment in the charter field with the ad- 
vent of the "advance booking charter," which 
allows individuals to participate, under cer- 
tain conditions, in nonscheduled flights. The 
Department has played a leading role first in 
establishing the international principles in 
the so-called Ottawa Declaration and subse- 
quently in negotiating specific bilateral ar- 

' For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
June 22, 1970, and a statement of international air 
transportation policy, see Bulletin of July 20, 1970, 
p. 86. 

February 25, 1974 


rangements with European countries.^ 

We are very much aware that the returns 
are not yet in on this experiment. Charters of 
affinity groups such as clubs, churches, and 
so on, have until recently been the major ve- 
hicle for promoting low-cost travel, but they 
are nonetheless discriminatory and are a 
headache because they invite abuses. 

It is our hope that the experiment will be 
successful and that the advance booking con- 
cept will become the basic international form 
of charter. Until that happens, however, we 
must maintain the affinity charter because so 
many of our citizens now depend on it. We 
are pleased that the Europeans have decided 
to permit U.S.-origin affinity charters to con- 
tinue despite their decision to discontinue 
European-origin affinities. 

Need for Simplified Tare Structure 

For a while last year it looked as if we had 
discovered an airfare equivalent of the sun- 
spot theory of the business cycle. It looked as 
if we would have an open-rate confrontation 
over the North Atlantic about every 10 years; 
that is, operations without international 
agreement about rates. The aviation commu- 
nity found it necessary last spring to con- 
tinue a fare pattern not really supported by 
anyone, because neither the International Air 
Transport Association (lATA) nor govern- 
ments could agree on new, imaginative solu- 

On the substance of the issue we have sup- 
ported and will continue to support the CAB 
in seeking a simplified structure that the pub- 
lic can understand. We believe that the struc- 
ture should realistically reflect costs and 
more fairly weigh the comparative values of 
products offered. One class of passengers 
should not subsidize the travel of another. 

Nevertheless we must remind ourselves 
that international aviation is in fact interna- 
tional. In a complicated world of nations, 
jealous over their sovereignties, few if any 
are quite ready to accept the principle that 
all wisdom is located at a particular set of 

" For background and text of the declaration, see 
Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1973 p. 20. 

latitude and longitude coordinates. In other 
words, no one government can impose its 
views upon the rest. We must insist, how- 
ever, that other governments deal with us 
fairly and objectively in finding a construc- 
tive middle ground. Given the range of social 
and economic views in this field, the task is 
not simple. It will require the patient and 
dedicated and creative cooperation of all con- 
cerned to maintain a healthy international 
air transport system. 

Following these precepts, the latest North 
Atlantic fare package is an improvement. 
More importantly from our point of view, it 
was achieved without confrontation and 
without the open-rate situation which some 
feared was looming over us. It remains to be 
seen what ideas lATA can produce, not only 
to deal with the annual fare problem but also 
the restructuring of routes, costs, and serv- 
ices that might flow in the wake of the energy 

Dealing With Hijacking 

We had a good year in 1973 in one respect: 
Hijacking in the United States dropped to 
zero. However, periodic incidents arising 
abroad dramatically and painfully highlight 
the need for improved aviation security 
throughout the world. 

Just before Christmas, 30 travelers quietly 
waiting at the Rome airport were suddenly 
and senselessly killed in a savage terrorist at- 
tack on a Pan American plane. These passen- 
gers had little in common, certainly not na- 
tionality, race, religion, or politics. In fact, 
the only thing they did have in common was 
that they were all travelers. It is not surpris- 
ing that the Rome attack was universally 
condemned; for example, the Saudi Arabian 
Foreign Ministry characterized the act as 
criminal and one which "none but the worst 
enemies of the Arab and Islamic nations 
could commit." 

Combating hijacking is not a simple prob- 
lem. There are political forces which inhibit 
the governments from taking the forthright 
action necessary to make air travel secure. 
The fruitless and frustrating attempt at the 


Department of State Bulletin 

International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Conference in Rome last year to de- 
velop an enforcement convention confirmed 
the strength of these forces. We were ex- 
tremely disappointed by this setback, but we 
are not discouraged. We intend to continue 
vigorous efforts to combat hijacking, to 
tighten physical security measures, to en- 
courage ICAO to be more active, and to pur- 
sue efforts with other nations to find a more 
effective legal structure for dealing with 
criminals who threaten international aviation 

Maintaining and Expanding Aerospace Exports 

There used to be a fable passed around to 
the effect that the State Department was 
only interested in air transport; the aircraft 
manufacturers were said to be left in a state 
of benign neglect. This myth was already 
outdated when I came to the Department 
some 10 months ago, but I would like to make 
it clear that aerospace exports are of major 
concern to the Department and to our Em- 
bassies abroad. 

As those who work in the aerospace indus- 
try or follow it know, the risks in aerospace 
are not all concentrated on the astronauts. 
Since 1968, employment in this key U.S. in- 
dustry has dropped a staggering 42 percent. 
Even in 1973, which was on the whole a good 
year for the industry, employment dropped 
3 percent below 1972. The one bright spot in 
this picture has been the growth of exports, 
which expanded 38 percent in 1973 to reach 
an alltime peak. The net result of this slow- 
ing down of overall production and increase 
in exports has been an industry increasingly 
dependent on foreign sales. Last year they 
constituted almost 40 percent of total mili- 
tary and civilian aircraft shipments, up from 
20 percent in 1968. It has been estimated that 
161,000 full-time jobs in the aerospace indus- 
try depend on exports. It is our objective to 
maintain and expand what has become the 
largest positive industrial element in the U.S. 
balance of trade. 

The maintenance of a high level of U.S. 
aerospace exports is important to the United 

States, but it is also an asset to the air trans- 
port industry and to the traveling public 
everywhere. Aerospace development costs 
and fuel costs are skyrocketing here and 
abroad. Our commercial advantages from de- 
valuation may be transitory. The benefits of 
the U.S. industry's efficiency and long pro- 
duction runs are important to all nations de- 
siring inexpensive and safe air transporta- 
tion. New possibilities are opening up in 
Eastern Europe and in the People's Republic 
of China. These markets pose special prob- 
lems for the industry and the government on 
which we have to work together closely. 

In this review of the international aviation 
scene, I have touched on a number of issues. 
In my view, the system, international avia- 
tion, and the policies are in pretty good 
shape. We have problems, of course; we have 
new issues to deal with; and we will have to 
adjust to future events. I think we can take 
these problems in stride. 

Authorization of Funds for Defense 
Articles and Services for Portugal 

Presidential Determination No. 74-7 ' 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State 
Presidential Determination — Portugal 

November 2, 1973. 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 
614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, I hereby: 

(a) Determine the use of not to exceed $1,000,000 
in FY 1974 for the grant of defense articles, defense 
services and training to Portugal, without regard to 
Section 620 (m) of the Act, is important to the secu- 
rity of the United States; and 

(b) Authorize such use up to $1,000,000 for the 
grant of defense articles, defense services and train- 
ing to Portugal, without regard to the limitations of 
Section 620(m) of the Act. 

This determination shall be published in the Fed- 
eral Register. 


' 39 Fed. Reg. 1423. 

February 25, 1974 


U.S. Announces 1975-76 Pledge 
to U.N.-FAO World Food Program 

Following is a statement made before the 
pledging conference of the World Food Pro- 
gram (WFP) at the United Nations on Feb- 
ruary Jf by Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture Richard E. Bell, who was head 
of the U.S. delegation to the pledging confer- 

USUN press release 6 dated February 4 

As a primary sponsor and major supporter 
of the World Food Program, the United 
States attaches special significance to this 
sixth opportunity to participate in a pledg- 
ing conference. We join the community of 
nations in marking the beginning of the 
World Food Program's second decade of pro- 
viding help and hope for millions of people 
throughout the world. 

It is a tribute to the Program's initiative 
and vitality that during a period of world 
commodity supply problems the World Food 
Program has apparently exceeded its 1973- 
74 pledging target by some $15 million. 

Prospects for record production of world 
grain and oilseed crops this year give rise to 
optimism. However, the combination of in- 
creasing populations, sharply reduced global 
stocks, the push toward impi-oved diets, and 
the need for replenishing and building stocks 
is expected to result in tight supplies for the 
immediate future. In this connection, Secre- 
tary of Agriculture [Earl L.] Butz empha- 
sized, in addressing the Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization's biennial conference last 
November, that the food supply involves 
more than just the visible amount of a com- 
modity. It involves the capacity of soil to 
produce, the often capricious influences of 
weather, the ability of people to take the 
product, process it, transport it, and make it 
available to people at prices they can afford 
to pay. It requires the total cooperative effort 
of not only food producers, consumers, and 
traders but of those who also provide the ba- 
sic inputs for food production. 

I believe we can agree that as our mutual 
problems have become more clearly identified, 
our concern over them has sharpened and ac- 
tions toward reaching acceptable resolutions 
are showing more promise. FAO's leadership 
in dealing with the possibilities for minimum 
world food security and the joint efforts of 
the United Nations, FAO, and other world 
bodies in preparing for the World Food Con- 
ference in November 1974 give hope and 
promise to the objective of more adequate 
food supplies. 

Too, we have seen in the World Food Pro- 
gram an excellent example of how a multi- 
lateral organization can take effective action 
in meeting the needs and alleviating the suf- 
fering of people. As noted in Dr. Aquino's 
[Francisco Aquino, Executive Director of the 
World Food Program] report to the 24th ses- 
sion of the Intergovernmental Committee, the 
World Food Program has committed over 
$1.5 billion to development projects and 
emergency operations involving over 25 mil- 
lion people and including nearly 100 coun- 

While WFP's pledging target has increased 
from its original target of $100 million (for 
a three-year period) to the current target of 
$440 million for the 1975-76 biennium, the 
Program has not been able to avoid hardships 
during the year just ended. For the first time 
since its inception, the Program's Executive 
Director could not present new projects for 
approval of the Intergovernmental Commit- 
tee because of a reduction in resources avail- 
able to the Program. Although representing 
a significant increase, the $440 million target 
may not call forward the volume of commodi- 
ties represented by the previous $340 million 
target because of expected higher prices. The 
minimum nature of the $440 million target 
was stressed in Dr. Aquino's recent letter to 
states members of the United Nations and of 
FAO. In short, the need is greater and the 
obligation broader than can be accommodated 
through traditional sources. 

Against this background, I turn to our 
pledge to the World Food Program for the 
1975-76 biennium. The United States pledges 


Department of State Bulletin 

commodities, shipping services, and cash up 
to a total of $140 million toward the $440 
million pledge target for the 1975-76 period. 
This pledge includes up to $97 million in com- 
modities, subject to the condition that the 
U.S. contribution does not exceed 32 percent 
of the total contributions from all govern- 
ments in commodities and in cash used for 
the purchase of commodities. 

The United States will also furnish ship- 
ping services to transport all of the commodi- 
ties provided by the United States to the 
World Food Program. The value of such serv- 
ices is presently estimated at $40 million for 
the $97 million worth of commodities. The 
United States will also contribute $3 million 
in cash, which may be utilized together with 
cash pledges of other nations, to provide ad- 
ministrative direction of the Program for the 
1975-76 biennium. 

Our pledge makes real our traditionally 
stated desire to give WFP a truly multilat- 
eral character and to encourage both present 
and new donors to respond more fully to 
WFP requirements. It mirrors our continued 
strong support of multilateral aid through 
WFP and our sensitivity to those in need. 
It is made possible by our free, incentive- 
oriented farm economy. 

This pledge, it must be recognized, is sub- 
ject to the availability of funds and com- 
modities. The kinds and quantities of com- 
modities to be supplied are to be worked out 
with the Executive Director of the WFP on 
the basis of requirements and availabilities at 
the time the commodities are needed and in 
accordance with the applicable U.S. laws and 
regulations. For planning purposes, WFP 
may assume that the kinds of commodities 
that will be provided by the United States 
will likely be the same as those provided in 
the past. 

Although one cannot be certain about the 
future, let me say that we look forward to 
continuing cooperation with other nations 
participating in the World Food Program 
and that we regard the level of interest 
shown here today as a favorable omen for 
the Program's future. 

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Proposed 
1974 Tuna Conservation Program 

Joint U.S.-Mexico Statement ' 

Delegations representing the United States 
and Mexico met in Mexico City from January 
29 to February 1, 1974, to study the system 
for the control of yellowfin tuna fishing in the 
eastern tropical Pacific during 1974. The 
talks between the delegations were the result 
of an agreement reached at the 15th Inter- 
governmental Meeting on the Conservation 
of Yellowfin Tuna, the last phase of which 
took place in Washington, D.C., in December 

A draft resolution agreed upon by the two 
delegations will be forwarded for approval to 
the Governments of Canada, Costa Rica, 
France, Japan, Nicaragua and Panama, 
which participated in the Intergovernmental 
Meeting and are members of the Inter-Amer- 
ican Tropical Tuna Commission [lATTC]. 
If these Governments approve the resolution, 
it will be implemented by the Commission. 

Under the agreement, the fishing season 
will be divided into two periods, the first of 
which will be a free fishing season in which 
the fleets of all member countries will be able 
to fish for yellowfin tuna without restriction. 
In the second, closed season, vessels of these 
fleets of less than 400 tons capacity will be 
permitted to fish up to a limit of 6,000 tons 
per country. Lastly, the agreement provides 
that vessels with special problems will be 
permitted to fish during the closed season up 
to a limit of 8,000 tons of yellowfin tuna. 
The participating delegations at all times 
sought to ensure the protection of the tuna 

The Mexican delegation was headed by 
Ambassador Fernando Castro y Castro, Di- 
rector General of the Secretariat of External 
Relations, and included also Minister Joaquin 
Mercado, of that Secretariat, as well as Mexi- 
can lATTC Commissioners Arturo Diaz 
Rojo, Pedro Mercado, Amin Zarur and Luis 

' Issued at Mexico City and Washington on Feb. 5 
(press release 40). 

February 25, 1974 


Garcia Cacho, all of the Secretariat of Indus- 
try and Commerce. 

The delegation of the United States was 
headed by Wilvan G. Van Campen, of the 
Office of the Special Assistant to the Secre- 
tary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife, and 
included also U.S. lATTC Commissioners 
John G. Driscoll, Jr., Steven Schanes, Donald 
P. Loker and Robert C. Macdonald, as well as 
John L. Martin and Mary Beth West of the 
Department of State, George B. Rees of the 
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Gerald V. Howard, 
Brian S. Hallman and William W. Fox of the 
Department of Commerce, and Doyle E. 
Gates of the State of California. 

First Secretary Yoichi Watanabe of the 
Japanese Embassy in Mexico attended as ob- 
server and Dr. James Joseph, lATTC Direc- 
tor of Research, acted as adviser to the 

Representatives of various elements of the 
tuna industries of both countries, including 
officers of vessel owners' associations, proc- 
essing companies, cooperatives and fisher- 
men's unions, attended the sessions as 
advisers to their respective government dele- 

Mrs. Hutar Named U.S. Representative 
on U.N. Status of Women Commission 

The Department of State announced on 
January 3 (press release 3) that Mrs. Pa- 
tricia Hutar had been sworn in that day as 
U.S. Representative on the Commission of 
the Status of Women of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council. (For bio- 
graphic data, see press release 3.) Mrs. Hu- 
tar's initial assignment was to represent the 
United States at the 25th session of the Com- 
mission on the Status of Women January 
14-31 at the United Nations in New York. 


Current Actions 



Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En- 
tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Liberia, February 7, 1974. 



Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or in- 
sured by the United States Government and its 
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Feb- 
ruary 6, 1974. Entered into force February 6, 1974. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of payments under P.L. 480 title I agricul- 
tural commodity agreements, with annexes. Signed 
at Washington February 6, 1974. Entered into force 
February 6, 1974. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of certain debts owed to the Agency for In- 
ternational Development (AID) pursuant to cer- 
tain loan agreements, with schedules. Signed at 
Washington February 6, 1974. Enters into force, 
except as AID may otherwise agree in writing, 
when Chile, within 30 days from date of signature 
of agreement, furnishes to AID, in form and sub- 
stance satisfactory to ATD, a legal opinion of 
counsel satisfactory to AID that this agreement 
has been duly authorized or ratified by, and exe- 
cuted and delivered on behalf of, Chile and consti- 
tutes a valid and legally binding obligation of Chile 
in accordance with its terms. 


Agreement amending the agreement for the contin- 
ued operation and expansion of the space vehicle 
tracking and communications station on the Island 
of Gran Canaria of April 14, 1966 (TIAS 6003). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid January 
15, 1974. Entered into force January 15, 1974. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX February 25, 197 Jt Vol. LXX, No. 1809 

Agriculture. U.S. Announces 1975-76 Pledge to 

U.N.-FAO World Food Program (Bell) . . 198 

Argentina. Letters of Credence (Orfila) . . 191 

Asia. America and Asia: The Old and the New 

(Rush) 186 

Aviation. International Aviation: The Fuel 

Crisis and Other Problems (Waldmann) . . 192 

Cyprus. Letters of Credence (Dimitriou) . . 191 

Economic Affairs 

America and Asia: The Old and the New 

(Rush) 186 

International Aviation: The Fuel Crisis and 

Other Problems (Waldmann) 192 

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Proposed 1974 Tuna 

Conservation Program (joint statement) . 199 

El Salvador. Letters of Credence (Bertrand 
Galindo) 191 

Energy. International Aviation: The Fuel 

Crisis and Other Problems (Waldmann) . . 192 

Foreign Aid 

Authorization of Funds for Defense Articles 
and Services for Portugal (Presidential de- 
termination) 197 

U.S. Announces 1975-76 Pledge to U.N.-FAO 

World Food Program (Bell) 198 

Japan. America and Asia: The Old and the 

New (Rush) 186 

Korea. Letters of Credence (Hahm) .... 191 

Latin America. U.S. and Panama Agree on 
Principles for Negotiation of New Panama 
Canal Treaty (Kissinger, joint statement) . 181 

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Agree on Proposed 
1974 Tuna Conservation Program (joint 
statement) 199 

Oman. Letters of Credence (Macki) .... 191 

Pakistan. Letters of Credence (Yaqub Khan) . 191 

Panama. U.S. and Panama Agree on Princi- 
ples for Negotiation of New Panama Canal 
Treaty (Kissinger, joint statement) . . . 181 

Portugal. Authorization of Funds for Defense 
Articles and Services for Portugal (Presi- 
dential determination) 197 

Presidential Documents. Authorization of 
Funds for Defense Articles and Services for 
Portugal (Presidential determination) . . 197 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 200 

Tunisia. Letters of Credence (Hedda) . . . 191 

U.S.S.R. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
Visits Washington (communique) .... 185 

United Nations 

Mrs. Hutar Named U.S. Representative on 

U.N. Status of Women Commission . . . 200 

U.S. Announces 1975-76 Pledge to U.N.-FAO 

World Food Program (Bell) 198 

Zaire. Letters of Credence (Mbeka) .... 191 

Name Index 

Bell, Raymond E 198 

Bertrand Galindo, Francisco 191 

Dimitriou, Nicos G 191 

Hahm, Pyong-choon 191 

Hedda, AH 191 

Hutar, Mrs. Barbara 200 

Kissinger, Secretary 181 

Macki, Ahmed 191 

Mbeka Makosso 191 

Nixon, President 197 

Orfila, Alejandro Jose Luis 191 

Rush, Kenneth 186 

Waldmann, Raymond J 192 

Yaqub Khan, Sahabzada 191 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: February 4—10 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to February 4 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
3 of January 3 and 25 of January 21. 

Xo. Date Subject 

"38 2/4 Study group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCITT, Feb. 

*39 2/4 Buffum sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for International Organi- 
zation Affairs (biographic data). 
40 2/5 U.S. -Mexico tuna conservation pro- 

*41 2/6 Kissinger: Harvard-Princeton-Yale 
Club, Washington. 
42 2/7 Kissinger: address at Panama City. 

*43 2/7 Secretary Kissinger to speak in 
Missoula and San Francisco. 

*44 2/8 National Review Board for Center 
for Cultural and Technical In- 
terchange between East and 
West, Honolulu, Mar. 4. 

*45 2/8 Advisory Committee on Private In- 
ternational Law Study Group, 
Cambridge, Mass., Mar. 1. 

* Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



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Washington, D.C. 20520. 






Volume LXX 

No. 1810 

March 4, 1974 



TJ.S. Statements and Text of Conference Communique 201 





For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXX, No. 1810 
March 4, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 


The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations a, 
on the work of the Department a, 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
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United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
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legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at Washington 
To Discuss the Energy Problem 

FoUotving are statements made before the 
Washington Energy Conference on February 
11 by Secretary Kissinger and Federal En- 
ergy Administrator William Simon and an 
outline of a statement made that day by Sec- 
retary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, 
together with the text of a communique 
issued at the conclusion of the conference on 
February 13. 


Press release 46 dated February 11 

On behalf of the President of the United 
States, I welcome you to this conference. 

My great predecessor Dean Acheson once 
observed that sometimes there is nothing 
man can do to avert disaster but more often 
our failure lies "in meeting big, bold, de- 
manding problems with half measures, tim- 
orous and cramped." The nations gathered 
in this room are confronted with an unprece- 
dented challenge to our prosperity and to the 
entire structure of international cooperation 
so laboriously constructed over the last gen- 
eration. The impact of the energy crisis 
reaches around the world, raising funda- 
mental questions about the future of the 
developing countries, the prospects for eco- 
nomic growth of all nations, and the hopes 
for global stability. 

The dimensions of the problems were 
recognizable at least a year ago; indeed, we 
addressed them as part of our original pro- 
posal for a new relationship with Europe and 
Japan. The challenge will be with us for at 
least the rest of this decade and perhaps 
beyond. The seriousness of the problem, its 

pervasiveness, and the impossibility of na- 
tional solutions all compel international co- 
operation — among major consumer nations, 
among developed and developing nations, and 
among producer and consumer nations. 

The United States has called this confer- 
ence for one central purpose: to move urgent- 
ly to resolve the energy problem on the basis 
of cooperation among all nations. Failure to 
do so would threaten the world with a vicious 
cycle of competition, autarky, rivalry, and de- 
pression such as led to the collapse of world 
order in the thirties. Fortunately, the prob- 
lem is still manageable multilaterally: Na- 
tional policies are still evolving, practical so- 
lutions to the energy problem are technically 
achievable, and cooperation with the produc- 
ing countries is still politically open to us. 

Let me summarize the U.S. views on the 
maior issues confronting us: 

First, the energy situation poses severe 
economic and political problems for all na- 
tions. Isolated solutions are impossible. Even 
those countries, like Canada and the United 
States, capable of solving the energy problem 
by largely national means would still suffer 
because of the impact on them of a world 
economic crisis. Consumer or producer, 
affluent or poor, mighty or weak — all have a 
stake in the prosperity and stability of the 
international economic system. 

Second, this challenge can be met success- 
fully only through concerted international 
action. Its impact is controllable if we work 
together; it is unmanageable if we do not. 

Third, the developing countries must 
quickly be drawn into consultation and col- 
laboration. Their futures are the most pro- 
foundly affected of all. Unable to meet pres- 

March 4, 1974 


ent prices for oil and fertilizer, they face the 
threat of starvation and the tragedy of 
abandoned hopes for further economic devel- 
opment. In the name both of humanity and 
common sense we cannot permit this. 

Fourth, cooperation not confrontation 
must mark our relationships with the pro- 
ducers. We each have legitimate interests. 
We each face looming dangers. We need 
each other. If we move rapidly and coopera- 
tively toward collective action, all will bene- 

Fifth, the United States recognizes its own 
national responsibility to contribute signifi- 
cantly to a collective solution. While we are 
less immediately affected than others, we see 
it as a matter of enlightened self-interest — 
and moral responsibility — to collaborate in 
the survival and restoration of the world 
economic system. Project Independence, 
which will reduce the American demand for 
world supplies, can be a way station on the 
road to a new Project Interdependence. We 
are willing to share American advances in 
energy technology, to develop jointly new 
sources of supply, and to establish a system 
of emergency sharing. We are prepared to 
make specific proposals in these areas in the 
follow-on work of this conference. 

The Energy Problem 

The energy crisis has three dimensions; 
first, the oil embargo; second, the shortage of 
supply; and finally, the quantum increase in 

The embargo now is directed largely at the 
United States. We will deal with this issue 
and ask for no assistance. But while the em- 
bargo's immediate economic impact may be 
selective, its political dimension should be of 
more general concern. For it carries pro- 
found implications for the world community 
— the manipulation of raw material supplies 
in order to prescribe the foreign policies of 
importing countries. 

The basic economic problem goes deeper, 
however. The explosion of demand has out- 
stripped the incentives of producers to in- 
crease production. Inflationary pressures in 

the consumer countries have tended to create 
incentives to withhold production. This is es- 
pecially true in a sellers' market, where the 
producing countries can increase their in- 
come by raising prices rather than output. 

But there are hopeful signs. World demand 
has been reduced in recent weeks — partly be- 
cause of rising prices — and may well remain 
below last September's level. Thus we may 
be at the beginning of a dramatic change in 
the long-term outlook for the world petro- 
leum market. Determined conservation ef- 
forts in the consuming countries and vigor- 
ous pursuit of alternative energy sources can 
further reduce the rate of growth in demand 
for oil. 

The most immediate and critical problem 
concerns price. Current price levels are sim- 
ply not sustainable. At these levels, the in- 
dustrial countries alone will incur a current 
account deficit of $36-$40 billion in 1974. 
Such large increases in costs would seriously 
magnify both unemployment and inflation in 
the importing countries, while the effect on 
domestic production would be deflationary. 
Pressures for import quotas will become ir- 
resistible; a general decline in world trade 
will follow inevitably. 

The threat to the world's poorer nations is 
even more profound. At present prices the 
less developed nations will face a current 
account deficit of $25-$30 billion in 1974, of 
which more than $10 billion is caused by the 
increase in oil prices. This deficit is three 
times the total aid flow of the entire world in 
recent years. Neither the developing nations 
nor traditional aid donors can finance such 
a sum. Even the attempt would destroy two 
decades of hard-won progress, leaving in its 
wake a legacy of political tension, social tur- 
moil, and human despair. 

Moreover, as a direct result of the oil price 
hikes the poorer nations' supply of crucial 
fertilizer has been severely reduced in recent 
months. Fertilizer prices have at least 
doubled, raising the specter of famine. We 
cannot permit this to happen. 

The producing countries themselves will 
not be spared these consequences. Their un- 
precedented opportunity for dramatic and 


Department of State Bulletin 

rapid economic progress cannot escape the 
effect of global inflation, mounting restric- 
tions in the world's trading and monetary 
system, and the political tensions of un- 
bridled competition. A major task before 
this confei'ence is to begin creating a frame- 
work of cooperation that will fulfill both the 
hopes of the producing and the needs of the 
consuming nations. 

These global dilemmas cannot be avoided 
through exclusive bilateral arrangements. 
We do not dispute the right of sovereign na- 
tions to make individual arrangements. But 
we believe that it is essential that these ar- 
rangements follow agreed rules of conduct. 
In their absence, unrestrained bilateralism is 
certain to produce disastrous political and 
economic consequences. 

No conceivable increase in bilateral trade 
with the producing nations can cover the 
massive payments deficits that each nation 
faces. The only result of unmanaged bilater- 
alism will be to bid up prices, perhaps even 
beyond present levels, and to stabilize them 
at levels that will ruin the countries making 
the bilateral arrangements before they ruin 
everyone else. 

Thus the ultimate challenge is to the frag- 
ile fabric of international principles and 
institutions. If we fail to achieve a coopera- 
tive solution, each of us will be tempted to 
transfer the problem onto others. This was 
the approach the industrial world followed 
during the "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies of 
the 1930's. We all know the consequences. 

A Seven-Point Approach to Cooperation 

The great goal of American policy for the 
past quarter century has been to try to 
achieve a more cooperative world, to put 
permanently behind us the narrowly compet- 
itive approach which has traditionally ended 
in conflict — economic or military or both. 
We maintain our faith in the validity of this 
goal. In pursuit of the common interest, the 
United States is willing to make a major con- 
tribution, in effort, in science, in technology, 
and in resources, to a common solution to the 
energy problem. 

President Nixon Expresses Satisfaction 
With Outcome of Energy Conference 

Statement by President Nixon ' 

I would like to express my satisfaction with 
the outCome of the international energy con- 
ference which has just been meeting in Wash- 
ington. The United States has approached the 
energy problem in a spirit of cooperativeness 
— among consumers and between consumers 
and producers — and I am pleased that this atti- 
tude struck a responsive chord with the partici- 
pants of the Washington Conference. 

I believe that we are now well launched on an 
international effort to deal with all aspects of 
the problem. At the same time, this is only a 
beginning, and all the nations concerned must 
now pool their efforts and their ingenuity in the 
following up of the work of the conference. 
The United States is ready to do so and looks 
forward to working with all the other countries 

' Issued on Feb. 13 (White House press re- 
lease. Key Biscayne, Fla.). 

The United States is prepared to join with 
the nations assembled here, and later with 
the producers and other consumers, to make 
a truly massive effort toward this major 
goal: the assurance of abundant energy at 
reasonable costs to meet the entire world's 
requirements for economic growth and hu- 
man needs. 

To this end, we suggest that this confer- 
ence consider seven areas for cooperative ex- 
ploration: conservation, alternative energy 
sources, research and development, emer- 
gency sharing, international financial coop- 
eration, the less developed countries, con- 
sumer-producer relations. 

1. Consei'vation: The development of a 
new energy ethic designed to promote the 
conservation and most efficient use of exist- 
ing energy supplies is crucial. We need a 
basic commitment to share the sacrifices and 
costs of conservation and thus reduce pres- 
sures on world supply. The United States 
recognizes that it is the world's most profli- 

March 4, 1974 


gate energy consumer. Yet our own national 
program has, within the past four months, 
reduced government energy use by 20 per- 
cent, industrial consumption by more than 10 
percent, gasoline consumption by 9 percent, 
and natural gas and electricity consumed in 
residential and commercial buildings by 6 
and 10 percent respectively. We shall con- 
tinue to expand this program. We are pre- 
pared as well to join other consumers in 
pledging a sustained conservation effort. The 
United States is willing to collaborate in a 
review of the national programs of each con- 
sumer country, in an appraisal of their effec- 
tiveness, and in recommendations to govern- 
ments for additional measures. 

2. Alternative Energy Sources: The de- 
mands of this decade cannot be met unless 
we expand available supplies through vigor- 
ous development of alternative energy 

To produce quick results, we must concen- 
trate on known fuel resources. Coal is in 
abundant supply, but w^e need to develop the 
technology neglected during the period of 
low-cost oil. Continental shelves and non- 
conventional deposits — coal, shale, and simi- 
lar resources — need to be developed rapidly. 

The United States is prepared to explore 
the following possibilities for consumer coop- 

— A collective commitment to develop the 
fossil fuel resources that are available within 
our respective borders. 

— Coordinated policies to encourage the 
flow of private capital into the new higher 
cost energy industries, such as synthetic oils 
and gas from coal and shale. 

— Governmental arrangements to accele- 
rate the global search for new energy sources 
such as offshore oil. 

— International programs to reduce the 
vulnerability of the major industrial coun- 
tries to the interruption and manipulation of 
supply, such as the orderly conversion of key 
sectors away from petroleum. 

3. Research and Development: New tech- 
nologies, and not only new explorations, can 
provide us with additional sources of energy. 

Many of our countries are launching large 
new programs. Our own national program 
contemplates the expenditure of more than 
$11 billion in government funds over the next 
five years and an expected investment of 
$12.5 billion in private funds in the same 
period. But we have no monopoly on the most 
advanced and promising approaches. It is to 
our mutual benefit to coordinate and combine 
our efforts. Thus the United States is pre- 
pared to make a major contribution of its 
most advanced energy research and develop- 
ment to a broad program of international 
cooperation in energy. 

Without a doubt, a significant portion of 
new energy will be supplied from nuclear 
reactors, for which increased quantities of 
enriched uranium will be needed. Within a 
framework of broad cooperation in energy, 
the United States is prepared to examine the 
sharing of enrichment technology — diffusion 
and centrifuge. Such a multilateral enrich- 
ment effort could be undertaken in a frame- 
work of assured supply, geographic disper- 
sion, and controls against further prolifera- 
tion. We shall submit principles to guide such 
a cooperative enterprise for the follow-on 
work which we are proposing. 

4. Emergency Sharing: The allocation of 
available supplies in time of emergencies and 
prolonged shortages is essential. 

None of us can be certain how the world 
balance of supply and demand for petroleum 
will develop or what political contingencies 
may arise. But we cannot leave our security 
or our national economies to forces outside 
our control. 

The United States declares its willingness 
to share available energy in times of emer- 
gency or prolonged shortages. We would be 
prepared to allocate an agreed portion of our 
total petroleum supply provided other con- 
suming countries with indigenous production 
do likewise. As we move toward self-sufficien- 
cy, our ability for sharing would of course 

Building on the earlier work done in the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development], definite recommenda- 
tions should be submitted to governments 


Department of State Bulletin 

— A sharing formula ; 

— Criteria to determine when a supply 
shortage exists ; 

■ — -A mechanism which would implement 
and terminate the sharing arrangement; and 

— Complementary programs such as stock- 
piling and standby rationing schemes. 

5. International Financial Cooperation: 
The structure and strength of the world's 
trading and monetary system must be re- 
stored and strengthened. If there is no way 
for the industrial countries collectively to 
eliminate the trade deficits created by their 
higher oil import bills, they can attempt to do 
so individually only at the cost of enlarging 
someone else's problems. In addition, the 
producing nations are accumulating financial 
claims against the consuming nations at a 
rate unprecedented in history. 

In the past, the various national and inter- 
national money markets have efficiently re- 
cycled oil revenue funds back into the econo- 
mies of the consuming countries. At least for 
industrial countries, these markets can in 
large part continue to perform that function. 
The removal of our capital controls and the 
easing of controls in other countries should 
help. But the magnitude of the new flows 
could put serious strains on the operations 
of these markets. The funds flowing to par- 
ticular consumer countries may not reflect 
their needs for balance of payments financ- 
ing; severe instability could result if these 
funds were repeatedly shifted across curren- 
cy boundaries without adequate financial 
cooperation among the industrialized coun- 
tries. Here again there is a crucial congruent 
interest between the producers and consum- 
ers and an urgent need for cooperative solu- 

Measures to deal with the economic eff'ects 
of high oil prices must be adopted on a broad 
front. Recommendations should include: 

— New mechanisms to facilitate the distri- 
bution of international capital flows from oil 
revenue surpluses. 

— Means for producers and consumers to 
cooperate in building confidence in invest- 
ment policies and the integrity of invest- 

— Steps to facilitate the fuller participa- 
tion of producing nations in existing inter- 
national institutions and to contribute to the 
urgent needs of the developing consumer 

6. The Less Developed Countries: The 
needs of the developing countries are a par- 
ticularly urgent dimension of the energy 
crisis. Massive increases in oil import costs 
are occurring at a time when the export pros- 
pects of many less developed countries have 
sharply diminished as a result of the slow- 
down in world economic activity. Even at 
lower oil prices, the balance of payments 
problems of the less developed countries 
would require sustained attention. 

Our approach to this human and economic 
challenge should be based on several princi- 

— The developing consumer countries 
should be invited to join the next stage of our 

— Developed countries should avoid cutting 
their concessional aid programs in response 
to balance of payments problems. In this 
regard, the United States will urge the Con- 
gress to restore our contribution to the Inter- 
national Development Association (IDA). 

— The wealth of the producer nations 
opens up a potential new source of large- 
scale capital assistance for development. The 
producer nations should have a special under- 
standing for the problems facing the poorer 
nations. We should encourage and facilitate 
their participation in international and re- 
gional institutions. 

— Urgent measures must be taken to as- 
sure sufficient fertilizer supplies for the 
coming year. The immediate problem is to 
provide oil at a price that will allow existing 
fertilizer production capacity to be fully uti- 
lized. The longer term problem is to create 
sufficient capacity to meet the world's rapidly 
growing needs. The United States would be 
prepared to contribute its technological skills 
to such a joint enterprise. 

7. Co7isumer-Producer Relations: Our ulti- 
mate goal must be to create a cooperative 
framework within which producers and con- 

March 4, 1974 


sumers will be able to accommodate their 
differences and reconcile their needs and as- 
pirations. Only in this way can we assure the 
evolution and growth of the world economy 
and the stability of international relations. 
We must work toward the objective of pre- 
venting coercion of the weak by the strong 
as of the strong by the weak ; the producing 
nations must be given a secure stake in an 
expanding world economy and the consuming 
nations a secure source of supply. 

It seems clear that enlightened self-interest 
of consumers and producers need not and 
should not be in conflict. Future generations 
may not enjoy a permanent source of petrole- 
um. Excessively high prices are already call- 
ing forth massive investments in alternative 
energy sources, which raises the prospect of 
lower prices and shrunken export markets 
for the producers in the future. But stable oil 
earnings, at just prices, wisely invested and 
increasing by the principle of compound 
interest, will be available as a long-term 
source of income. 

Thus the producers must have an interest 
in a "just" price and in stable long-term 
political and economic relations. Therefore, 
at the consumer-producer conference for 
which we are heading, let us discuss what 
constitutes a just price and how to assure 
long-term investments. A well-conceived pro- 
ducer-consumer meeting, in which the con- 
sumers do not seek selfish advantages either 
as a group or individually, far from leading 
to confrontation, could instead lay the basis 
of a new cooperative relationship. But it will 
do so only if it is well prepared — and if the 
consumers have first constructed a solid basis 
of cooperation among themselves. 

The Next Steps 

The United States is not interested in es- 
tablishing new institutions for their own 
sake. We are solely concerned with practical 
results. Some of the tasks I have suggested 
can be carried out by existing international 
mechanisms; others will break new ground. 
The essential requirement is to see that 
concrete recommendations are submitted to 

the next conference. In order to carry our 
work forward, we believe a coordinating 
group should be established with the follow- 
ing responsibilities: 

— To relate the tasks that are assigned to 
existing bodies to our future work. 

— To undertake those tasks for which 
there are presently no suitable bodies. 

— To prepare for the next meeting. 

Another conference of consumers should 
then be called at the foreign minister level to 
assess the work in all seven areas. This con- 
ference could include representatives of the 
less developed countries. 

This meeting would lead to a third confer- 
ence of consumers and producers. 

We are open to suggestions about the locale 
of these next conferences. We should aim to 
complete the entire process by May 1. 

The approach to global cooperation out- 
lined here has prompted the President's invi- 
tations to you to join us here today. This 
conception is ambitious, but the need is great. 
Therefore let us resolve : 

— To meet the special challenges and op- 
portunities facing the major consuming na- 
tions with a program of cooperation. 

— To bring the developing nations into 
immediate consultation and collaboration 
with us. 

— To prepare for a positive and productive 
dialogue with the producing nations. 

As we look toward the end of this century, 
we know that the energy crisis indicates the 
birth pains of global interdependence. Our 
response could well determine our capacity 
to deal with the international agenda of the 

We confront a fundamental decision. Will 
we consume ourselves in nationalistic rivalry 
which the realities of interdependence make 
suicidal? Or will we acknowledge our inter- 
dependence and shape cooperative solutions? 

Our choice is clear, our responsibility com- 
pelling : We must demonstrate to future gen- 
erations that our vision was equal to our 


Department of State Bulletin 


WashinKton Energy Conference doc. 10 

The world economy is undergoing a period 
of rapid change and growth. Decisions made 
in one country affect the patterns of life for 
the rest of the world. Such decisions demand 
not only the collective wisdom of world lead- 
ership but also a continuing spirit of coopera- 
tion among the countries of the world. By 
building an international framework of co- 
operation among nations, I am convinced that 
we can overcome the problems that face all 
of us in the energy area today and can es- 
tablish a permanent structure for worldwide 
economic development. 

The explanation of our current problems 
lies in ourselves — in our own failure to ac- 
knowledge our interdependence and plan for 

There are several areas in which we have 
failed. On an individual basis, we in the 
United States and other individual industri- 
alized nations have misused our energy re- 
sources and failed to gain control over the 
rate of growth of energy demand, largely be- 
cause our shortsightedness has lulled us into 
believing that abundant and cheap energy 
supplies could continue indefinitely. Further, 
we have failed to develop available domestic 
energy resources adequately. As a group, all 
of the major consuming countries have failed 
to develop and agree upon allocation pro- 
grams to meet emergency shortage situa- 
tions. Further, we have failed to coordinate 
our national energy policies or even to ade- 
quately discuss their interrelations at a high 
political level. In fact, we do not have an ade- 
quate supply of information and data on 
world demand and supply, oil supply arrange- 
ments between consumer and producer na- 
tions, and future prospective resources in 
order to adopt realistic energy policies. 

Because of these failures, we now find our- 
selves at a crossroads faced with a choice 
which will influence the history of future 
generations of the modern world. We can ig- 
nore the lessons of the past and be doomed to 
relive them, or we can learn from them and 

forge together a new atmosphere for orderly 
world economic growth. 

As such, we must commit ourselves to work 
against unconstrained bilateral deals which 
will be counterproductive to all of our goals. 
In fact, we must seek to redefine bilateralism 
so that bilateral arrangements only occur 
within the umbrella of international coopera- 

Today I would like to present to you our 
views on how we can do this. At a time when 
the energy shortage has caused a sense of 
paralysis that grips many people of the 
world, we must calmly place the issues in the 
l)roper perspective. We must wring the emo- 
tions out of our considerations of these is- 
sues and carefully assess where we are and 
where we must go from here. 

The World Energy Situation 

In order to understand the nature of the 
problem we now face and how we can over- 
come it, I think it is important to review the 
world energy situation, in particular with re- 
spect to production, consumption, and energy 
prices, as well as the impact which these fac- 
tors have on balance of payments, on employ- 
ment, and on the world economy. 

Production and Consumption 

First of all, let us review the world pro- 
duction-consumption picture. During Sep- 
tember 1973 free-world petroleum produc- 
tion averaged 47.8 million barrels per day. 

In the subsequent months, after the out- 
break of war in the Middle East, production 
declined as a result of intentional cutbacks by 
a few of the oil-producing countries border- 
ing on the Persian Gulf. The low point in 
production was reached in November, when 
free-world production was estimated to be 
only 43.2 million barrels per day. By January 
1974 production had increased to an esti- 
mated 46.2 million barrels per day, a level 
about 8 percent below prewar estimates of 
the level of January production. 

Consumption in January was probably 
about equal to January production. There 
had been some drawdown in stocks of crude 

March 4, 1974 


and petroleum products, but the cumulative 
reduction by the end of January is estimated 
to have been only on the order of magnitude 
of 100 million barrels. 

For the calendar year 1974 as a whole, it 
is estimated that through responsible and ef- 
ficient use of existing and planned facilities 
the free world could produce about 51.4 mil- 
lion barrels per day. Whether conditions in 
1974 will be such that producers will choose 
to produce that much and consumers will con- 
sume and add to inventories that much oil is 
very difficult to predict. 


In September 1973 the arm's-length open- 
market f.o.b. price for a new short-duration 
sale of a cargo of Arabian light crude was on 
the order of $2.12 per barrel. In November 
some crude sales apparently were at prices 
in excess of the equivalent of $15 per barrel 
for Arabian light. By the end of January the 
comparable spot market price had appar- 
ently fallen to the $10-to-$ll-per-barrel 

In light of continuing efforts to reduce con- 
sumption around the world, the potential 
clearly exists for spot market prices to con- 
tinue to decline. There can be no certainty 
how greatly consumers — and their govern- 
ments — will be inclined to reduce their con- 
sumption below the prewar forecast of about 
51.4 million barrels per day in consumption 
plus normal inventory buildup in 1974. 

A rough estimate now would be for free- 
world 1974 consumption of about 46.4 million 
barrels per day if oil prices around the world 
average in 1974 a level consistent with an 
Arabian-light f.o.b. price of $8.50 per barrel. 
On a comparable basis, estimated consump- 
tion would be on the order of 50.3 million 
barrels per day with an Arabian-light price 
of $4.50 per barrel. 

To these consumption estimates must be 
added estimates for the buildup of invento- 
ries. Companies and governments will un- 
doubtedly wish over coming months to add to 
their inventories, not only to return to levels 
considered normal in the past but also to pro- 
vide greater security against the demon- 

strated insecurity of imported supplies. Ulti- j 
mate objectives for inventories will probably 
be considerably in excess of targets to be 
reached by the end of 1974. A reasonable es- 
timate of targets for yearend 1974 might be 
levels 5 percent above what would have been 
considered normal in prewar days. On that 
basis it can be roughly estimated that 200 
million barrels will need to be added to in- 
ventories in 1974 to build up from present 
levels to the yearend target. That addition to 
inventory would increase 1974 total demand 
to 48.8 million barrels per day at the $8.50 
price and 50.8 million barrels per day at the 
$4.50 price. 

Spare Capacity 

At either of these illustrative combinations 
of price and oil use in 1974, the world's fore- 
cast "normal" oil production capacity would 
not be fully employed during the year. 
Whether some oil-producing nations will 
choose to allow sonie of their "normal" pro- 
duction capacity to lie idle, with accompany- 
ing loss of revenue, is of course problemati- 

Assuming as at present, most producers 
wish to maintain production, relatively sharp 
cutbacks would be necessary by the remain- 
ing producers at the $8.50 price. For in- 
stance, if only Saudi Arabia restrained its 
production, then for the year Saudi produc- 
tion would average only 3.6 million barrels 
per day, only about 44 percent of its poten- 
tial output. If 1974 production restraint were 
borne on an equal percentage basis by Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Qatar, then the production for each 
would be about 67 percent of capacity. At the 
$4.50 price, on these assumptions there would 
still be a margin of excess capacity in these 

Certainly at the higher of the two illustra- 
tive price levels, and quite possibly at the 
lower level as well, production in other oil \ 
countries would grow faster than world de- 
mand over the years after 1974, so that the 
relative production restraint would need to 
be increased over time to maintain those 


Department of State Bulletin 

Balance of Payments Impacts 

The impact of such higher costs of im- 
ported oil will be severe upon the economies 
of many oil-consuming nations. The increased 
costs in 1974 for the less developed nations 
alone would be on the order of $9 billion at 
the $8.50 price and approaching $5 billion at 
the $4.50 price. As a consequence of these 
changes in oil payments, the projected 1974 
current account deficit for the LDC's [less 
developed countries] would be estimated at 
about $22 billion at the $8.50 price and on 
the order of $18 billion at the $4.50 price. 

The incidence of the higher oil prices 
among individual LDC's will vary widely. 
Some of the hardest hit countries, such as 
India, Bangladesh, and the drought-ridden 
regions of western Africa, not only face a 
significant increase in their import bill, but 
their low per capita incomes and slow rates 
of growth of output and of exports will make 
it difficult to finance anything approaching 
the same volume of imports as in 1973. Other 
countries, such as Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, and 
Turkey, while facing a significant increase in 
their import bill, will have a greater capacity 
to finance increased oil payments in the short 
run with their relatively high level of re- 

Employment and Inflation 

These large increases in payments will 
worsen both the employment and inflation 
situation in oil-importing countries. Even af- 
ter adjustment in monetary and fiscal poli- 
cies, these increased import bills will have a 
deflationary impact on demand for domestic 
production as purchasing power is diverted 
from domestically produced goods and serv- 
ices in order to meet increased oil import 

At the same time that demand for domes- 
tic production is being decreased, cost-push 
inflationary pressures will be increased as a 
result of the direct impact of oil price rises 
on price indexes and possibly also as a result 
of intensified labor pressures attempting to 
secure a wage increase sufficient to offset the 
decrease in the standard of living implied by 

the increased price of oil. There is also likely 
to be a temporary increase in unemployment 
and decline in output as patterns of consump- 
tion and production are readjusted to the 
levels of energy costs. Particularly hard hit 
will be such products as automobiles, plastics, 
fertilizers, and boating and camping equip- 

It is estimated that for a number of the 
large industrial countries these factors, even 
after appropriate adjustments in fiscal and 
monetary policies, could combine to reduce 
rates of real economic growth by 1 to li/i 
percent during 1974 if an $8.50 level of prices 
prevailed. There could be 2 to 3 percent addi- 
tional upward pressure on prices in many 
countries. At a $4.50 level of prices these im- 
pacts would be considerably less. 

The Economic Impact of Higher Oil Prices 

In general, then, projections of the eco- 
nomic impact for 1974 of higher price levels 
for oil indicate that oil-consuming nations 
will experience lower rates of growth, higher 
rates of inflation, higher levels of unemploy- 
ment, lower levels of real income, and no- 
tably less favorable trade balances than pre- 
viously anticipated. The economic impact of 
higher oil prices will vary widely among 
countries, reflecting not only differing de- 
grees of dependence on imported oil but also 
differing degrees of financial strength and 
economic adaptability. All industrial nations, 
with the possible exception of Canada, could 
experience serious economic difliculties, as 
will many LDC's. For LDC's with inadequate 
reserves, low per capita incomes, and slow 
rates of output and export growth, the eco- 
nomic impact of higher oil prices could be ex- 
tremely severe. 

For the developed countries — which in re- 
cent years have typically run current ac- 
count surpluses in the order of $10 billion 
per year — the increased oil costs at the $8.50- 
per-barrel price would mean a current ac- 
count deficit of more than $30 billion. At the 
$4.50 price, the deficit for the developed 
countries would still be in the range of $5- 
$10 billion. For the OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] producers, 

March 4, 1974 


even after taking into account an assumed in- 
crease in tiieir imports, an $8.50 price would 
yield a current account surplus in the order 
of $55 billion. The $4.50 price would still 
yield a surplus in excess of the $20 billion 
range. The corresponding increases during 
1974 in the foreign asset holdings of the pro- 
ducing countries, while large, will still be 
equal to only a small fraction of the assets 
traded in the financial markets of the OECD 

The incidence among the developed coun- 
tries is relatively evenly spread, with projec- 
tions of increased oil payments as a percent 
of total imports falling in the range of 10 to 
20 percent for most countries. Japan will be 
particularly hard hit, with a projected in- 
crease in oil payments approaching one-third 
of total 1973 imports. Canada, on the other 
hand, with oil exports of roughly the same 
magnitude as imports, should feel virtually 
no net balance of payments impact from the 

Project Independence 

At this point I think it is important to 
carefully assess these projections of energy 
production, consumption, and prices and rec- 
ognize that they are flashing warning signals 
to which we must respond. We must realize 
that these projections depend upon the basic 
assumption that recent trends in world de- 
mand for energy, in the sources of energy, 
and in the form in which energy is supplied, 
will continue largely unchanged. Together, 
we can prevent this from happening. 

The projections do show — clearly and viv- 
idly — that we face far-reaching changes in 
our energy balances. We must accept that the 
rising demand for energy will lead to a sub- 
stantial increase in real costs. We cannot be 
blind to the concentrated location of the ex- 
isting resources which can be made available 
for the years immediately ahead. 

But there is another side. These projec- 
tions show us what needs to be done. If we 
approach it bilaterally, a potential crisis will 
become a reality. However, if we make the 
commitment to join together, a potential 
crisis may be translated into a real opportu- 

nity. In essence, the energy problem is the 
most infinitely solvable one we have — but we 
must approach it together. Action by con- 
suming countries, with a long view of their 
best interest, is required now. 

We in the United States — in our actions 
and in our planning — are participating in 
this process with the greatest sense of ur- 

In November 1973 the President of the 
United States inaugurated Project Independ- 
ence, designed to insure an expansion in do- 
mestic energy production so that our nation 
would no longer be subject to economic dis- 
ruption, or the threat of such disruption, 
from a sudden curtailment of vital energy 
supplies. Project Independence is designed: 

1. To conserve energy — to establish a new 
energy ethic that will greatly reduce our 
growing demand for energy; 

2. To increase production of all forms of 
energy in the United States; and 

3. To meet our energy needs at the lowest 
cost consistent with the protection of both 
national security and environment. 

As we begin this conference, we must not 
view Project Independence as a move toward 
autarky, but rather we must see it as part of 
a worldwide effort to bring greater balance to 
world energy supply and demand. Our cur- 
rent energy problems magnify the fact that 
we live in an interdependent world. We in 
the United States view Project Independence 
as a means for us to reduce our call on oil 
available to the international market. More- 
over, it is our way to become exporters of en- 
ergy by 1985. Seen in this way, this eflfort 
will be our contribution to the rest of the 
world. Let us now look carefully at Project 
Independence and relate this initiative to 
what we all can and must do together. 

The first major thrust of U.S. energy pol- 
icy is to eliminate waste and conserve energy 
resources. The United States is the largest 
energy consumer, using one-third of the 
world's energy. Our pattern of energy con- 
sumption has in part resulted from the rela- 
tively low cost of energy in the past. As 
prices rise, normal market forces will result 


Department of State Bulletin 

in a reduction in demand. The problem, how- 
ever, is that we cannot wait for these forces 
to operate. We must force adoption of energy 
conservation and demand curtailment as an 
individual and collective ethic now. In turn, 
efficient energy utilization will become a na- 
tional "way of life" and not simply a tempo- 
rary expedient to be followed during this pe- 
riod of acute shortage. 

Our objectives are to eliminate waste, hus- 
band our scarce resources, and extend the 
available supplies to insure that essential 
needs are fully met. In this way a "less is 
better" ethic can cushion the impact of en- 
ergy shortfalls on the economy and yield an 
improved quality of life. This means less 
weight and horsepower in our automobiles, 
less speed on our highways, less heat and heat 
loss in our homes, less empty seats on our 
planes, trains, and buses, less waste in our in- 
dustrial processes and powerplants, less 
throwaway containers. All of these will en- 
hance rather than detract from our eco- 
nomic well-being and living standard. 

With such a program, our goal is to cut 
our annual growth rate in energy consump- 
tion from the present 4 to 5 percent down to 
2 or 3 percent by 1980. If we can do this, our 
estimates show that we could save as much 
as 7 million barrels of oil per day. Although 
much of the expected 7-million-barrels-per- 
day saving can result from adherence with 
current conservation policies, there is consid- 
erable research we plan to do which is aimed 
at permanently reducing consumption of en- 
ergy. For example, better insulation of 
houses, more efficient automobile engines, and 
more efficient power cycles can save energy 
without causing economic or social disloca- 
tion. Thus our research program will con- 
centrate on these areas. 

The second major thrust of Project Inde- 
pendence is to stimulate the development and 
production of domestic energy resources and 
to develop alternative new energy sources. 
Specifically, our program will include the 

— Developing our coal reserves more ef- 
fectively. We have 1.5 trillion tons of identifi- 
able coal reserves, or half of the non-Com- 

munist world's reserves, 425 billion tons of 
which are economically recoverable now. We 
must develop ways to utilize this abundant 
resource. We must mount major i-esearch and 
development efforts in gasification and lique- 
faction of coal. Further, we must develop 
techniques for mining surface coal that do 
not desti'oy the landscape permanently. We 
must also develop ways to deep-mine coal 
that protect the health and safety of miners. 

— We have talked for years about the pro- 
duction of oil from our oil shale. There are 
an estimated 1.8 trillion barrels of oil in the 
shale resources in the United States, and just 
those reserves that we presently know are 
exploitable could satisfy our needs for oil for 
over 100 years. We need an increased effort 
by both the Federal Government and private 
industry to develop this potentially produc- 
tive resource. I am especially encouraged 
by recent progress in the m? situ processes for 
extracting shale oil. This process suggests 
that it may be possible to produce shale oil 
at much less than the current cost of Persian 
Gulf crude. In situ extraction should also 
have minimal impact on the environment, and 
its development must be expedited. 

— We also have to push forward in the 
development and utilization of nuclear power. 
Currently, nuclear power provides only 1 
percent of our energy needs after 30 years of 
development. It could easily provide 10 per- 
cent by 1985. We will take every step to 
expedite the licensing and construction of 
nuclear power plants, which are an essential 
part of our program for achieving energy 
self-sufficiency. We will also develop a broad 
nuclear program which looks toward liquid 
metal and other breeder reactors. In addition, 
top priority will continue to be given to 
assuring that nuclear power plants are built 
and operated safely with acceptable environ- 
mental impact. 

— We have also talked for years about 
development of such relatively distant al- 
ternatives to fossil fuels as fusion, geother- 
mal, and solar energy. For the next decade 
these alternatives are still very much in the 
research and development stage of growth, 
and they could not come into widespread use 
until after 1990. Nevertheless, although we 

March 4, 1974 


will invest in the development of these alter- 
natives, at the same time we must focus now 
on nearer term measures for expanding ener- 
gy supplies. 

With this overall approach in mind, let us 
examine in more detail novv' the specifics of 
Project Independence. 

We have tried to visualize our policy in 
terms of what must be done in the relatively 
short range, up to the mid-1980's; and what 
must be done in the long term, beyond the 
1980's. The strategies appropriate for deal- 
ing with the short range are in general not 
the same as those appropriate for the long 
range, and so I will discuss them separately. 

Short Range 

In the short range our efforts must be 
toward development of the existing state of 
the art, and in addition to our conservation 
efforts our underlying strategy will be: 

1. To increase our domestic supply of gas 
and oil, including development of the Outer 
Continental Shelf, our resources in Alaska, 
as well as our large gas reserves. 

2. To supplement this development of oil 
and gas with expanded use of alternative 
energy, mainly coal and nuclear power and 
oil shale. 

Research can make some contribution to- 
ward implementing these short-range strate- 
gies, but the real rewards from research will 
come in the next decade. Our progress be- 
tween now and 1980 will depend, for the most 
part, on our ability to implement existing 
technology rather than on the results of new 

1. Increase domestic supply of gas and oil. 

To increase our domestic supply of gas and 
oil involves both the application of existing 
technology and the creation of new tech- 
nology. Application of existing technology 
would include such techniques as secondary 
and tertiary recovery from existing oilfields 
and greatly expanded exploration for new oil 
and gas reservoirs, particularly on the Outer 
Continental Shelf. 

The undiscovered oil and gas on Federal 

lands and beneath our Outer Continental 
Shelf can provide a significant portion of the 
energy necessary to make us self-sufficient. 
The total U.S. offshore lands, including the 
Outer Continental Shelf, are estimated to 
contain 42 percent (160 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent) of the remaining discoverable oil 
and gas reserves in the United States. We 
are now increasing the acreage leased on the 
Outer Continental Shelf to 10 million acres 
beginning in 1975, more than tenfold what 
had been planned two years ago. In later 
years, the amount of acreage to be leased will 
be based on market needs and on industry's 
record of performance in exploring and de- 
veloping leases. 

In addition to the Outer Continental Shelf 
program, we will move rapidly to exploit our 
resources in Alaska. The Alaskan pipeline, 
when completed, will result in more than 2 
million barrels of oil a day by 1980. This is 
equal to one-third of current U.S. oil imports. 
As important, approval of the Alaskan pipe- 
line will encourage additional development of 
Alaskan fields. Projections indicate that the 
North Slope has potential reserves of as much 
as 80 billion barrels. Thus, eventually we 
could achieve an Alaskan production of be- 
tween 5 and 6 million barrels a day. 

Further, it has long been clear that while 
an Alaskan oil pipeline was needed, it alone 
will not be enough. In addition to the huge 
oil reserves in the North Slope of Alaska, 
there are also gas reserves there of at least 
26 trillion cubic feet — enough to heat 10 mil- 
lion homes for 20 years. We are now working 
to determine the need for future Alaskan oil 
and gas pipeline capacity, including the best 

2. Supplement oil and gas through devel- 
opment of coal and nuclear energy. 

In addition to these increased efforts in the 
oil and gas areas, we will move to develop 
coal and nuclear energy as alternatives. We 
can identify two separate approaches : direct 
substitution and coal conversion. 

a. Direct use of coal for oil and. gas in 
industrial and utility applications. Substitu- 
tion requires research, since the main prob- 


Department of State Bulletin 

lem in burning coal is tlie environmental 
impact. We have a large program devoted to 
stack-gas cleanup, and there is every reason 
to expect this program will be successful, 
thus allowing us to substitute coal for a sub- 
stantial amount of the oil and gas we now 
burn. Some have estimated that by 1985 we 
might save as much as 6 million barrels per 
day through direct substitution: 2 million 
barrels per day through direct replacement 
of oil under utility boilers, 1 million barrels 
per day in residential and commercial space 
heating (primarily through heat pumps), 
and 3 million barrels per day in industrial 

b. Conversion of coal into liqicids and 
gases. Techniques for liquefying and gasify- 
ing coal are fairly well known. However, in 
general these methods are expensive and will 
require further development before they be- 
come commercially feasible. We are under- 
taking a crash program now, and we estimate 
that we might be able to replace as much as 
3 million barrels per day of oil with synthetic 
fuels made from coal. 

We thus visualize coal emerging as a very 
central element in our energy picture by 
1985. There are some estimates that suggest 
that by then we shall have to mine as much 
as 1,500 or even 1,800 million tons of coal 
per year. This represents a tripling of our 
coal production. 

c. Expanding the use of nuclear energy 
requires research on nuclear safety, waste 
disposal, siting of nuclear reactors, and tho- 
rium systems, as well as providing additional 
separative work capacity. Siting is also an 
important element of our nuclear strategy 
since, in the absence of a rational siting policy 
for nuclear reactors, the nuclear option may 
be jeopardized. 

Long Range 

All of these developments can take place 
in a relatively short-range time frame. Long 
range, our goal is to gradually transform the 
base of our energy system from the non- 
renewable fossil fuels to nonfossil fuels, 
mainly nuclear, geothermal, and solar. 

To accomplish this, we have provided sub- 
stantial funds for energy research and de- 

velopment. Last June the President an- 
nounced a $10 billion Federal program over 
the next five years, but he stressed that we 
would spend whatever additional sums that 
could reasonably be spent to accomplish our 
task. Last month the President announced 
that in fiscal year 1975 — the first year of the 
five-year energy R. & D. program — the total 
Federal commitment for direct energy re- 
search and development will be increased to 
$1.8 billion, almost double the level of a year 

Our research will retain as much flexibility 
as possible. In the coal area, the challenge is 
to learn how to transform our different types 
of coal through a variety of processes into 
acceptable gaseous and liquid fuels suitable 
as substitutes and replacements for dwin- 
dling supplies of petroleum and gas. Thus, 
low-BTU gas, which is probably marginal in 
the short range, looms with high priority in 
the long range. And perfection of processes 
for coal hydrogenation leading to production 
of syncrude and syngas will be supported to 
the limit of scientific creativity. 

Finally, nuclear energy holds the most im- 
portance for the long range, primarily be- 
cause it gives mankind an essentially inex- 
haustible energy source, one that is relatively 
independent of mineral resource costs. At the 
present time the breeder reactor is the only 
nuclear technology that can be counted upon 
today to achieve the nuclear promise. Thus, 
research and development on other breeder 
reactor concepts (light water breeder, gas- 
cooled fast breeder, and molten salt breeder) 
will be supported and expanded to retain 
them as viable alternatives. 

The Need for a World Response 

All of this is, however, really only a part 
of Project Independence; it is our part. What 
we need now is to transform a U.S. commit- 
ment into a world response. What can we do 
together? As major consuming countries, 
we share the common problem of being de- 
pendent upon oil imports and of being con- 
cerned about the impact of rising costs of 
such imports. If we join together, however, 

March 4, 1974 


we can reduce our dependence upon one set 
of suppliers and stabilize the price that we 
pay for our oil. Here is what we can do: 

Development of Neiv Energy Sources 

The first thing that we should consider are 
ways in which, cooperatively, we can develop 
alternative energy supplies. I have already 
described to you what we in the United 
States are doing. We must commence dis- 
cussing immediately a program for coopera- 
tion in such fields as nuclear technology; coal 
extraction, liquefaction, and gasification ; 
production of oil from shale and tar sands; 
development of solar and geothermal energy ; 
and other fields. This program should explore 
the potential for sharing information, pat- 
ents, and technical information. We should 
use this conference as the first step toward 
developing a program for doing this. To- 
gether, we can achieve more rapid develop- 
ment of alternative energy sources for each 
one of our countries. For instance : 

a. Nuclear Energy. We are rapidly reach- 
ing the stage where we could be mass-pro- 
ducing floating nuclear power plants. Such 
power plants can be produced in quantity 
and floated to locations throughout the world 
to produce power rapidly. This is not a long- 
range concept, but something which could be 
initiated immediately. The technology, ideas, 
and production facilities of many nations can 
be combined in developing these plants. The 
technology of breeder reactors, for instance, 
appears to be more advanced in France and 
Britain since they are constructing prototype 
breeder-reactor-powered generating stations. 
Germany, Italy, and Japan have undertaken 
ambitious reactor development programs. All 
would benefit from an exchange of informa- 
tion. Certainly all countries should have a 
vital interest in pooling technical information 
which concerns the safety and environmental 
impact of reactor operation. 

b. In addition, we should work together to 
encourage development of these relatively 
untapped but enormous sources of hydro- 
carbons: U.S. oil shale and the tar sands of 
Canada and Venezuela. All together, these 
three sources alone provide an enormous po- 

tential for recoverable oil. It is possible that 
by pooling our technical resources we can 
produce new energy from these three rela- 
tively untapped sources beginning in 1980. 

c. Coal. Development of newer and better 
processes for coal conversion is in progress 
in a number of countries, especially in West 
Germany, England, and France. We all could 
benefit from this technology, and we should 
explore how we can pool our thinking and 
technology in this area as well as participate 
in joint cooperative programs. 


In addition to these joint efi^orts to develop 
energy supplies, we must work together to 
curb the explosive growth of energy demand. 
Conservation eff'orts and sacrifices must be 
shared equitably by all of us. We must pledge 
ourselves to a new world conservation tthic 
— to the adoption of parallel vigorous pro- 
grams to conserve energy and promote its 
more efficient use. What I urge is that energy 
consumption in one country not simply be 
governed by the ability to obtain additional 
supplies at the cost of other consumer coun- 
tries. Rather, there must be a basic commit- 
ment to share internationally available sup- 
plies at a reasonable level of consumption 
for all. 

World Energy Data Bank 

Finally, energy policy can only be ade- 
quately formulated if sufficient accurate data 
is available to each country. We must develop 
a world energy data bank and information- 
sharing arrangement to enable individual 
nations to set sound policy as well as full 
coordination of world energy policy. This 
would serve as a repository for public data 
now available but scattered and serve as a 
focal point for eflForts to coordinate our re- 
spective national energy policies and adhere 
to a new code of market conduct. 

A Future of Increased Cooperation 

In closing, let us use this conference as 
the touchstone for a future of increased co- 
operation. Let us work toward an open sys- 
tem in which all those capable of finding, 


Department of State Bulletin 


developing, and marketing energy resources 
can have an opportunity to do so. Nationali- 
zation without prompt, adequate, and effec- 
tive compensation by producing nations or 
unconstrained bilateral deals between pro- 
ducing and consuming governments will be 
counterproductive to all. Such bilateral 
arrangements will result in divisive competi- 
tion which will inevitably work to the detri- 
ment of each individual buyer as well as the 
entire world. 

We are facing a dramatically changing 
situation in the world energy scene. 

The present unstable situation is not in 
the long-term interest of current oil export- 
ers, although the short-term flow of wealth 
and political power may make it hard for 
them to see the long-term disadvantages. The 
world is reacting to high prices by reducing 
demand and will develop alternate sources 
of energy which in turn will lead to lower 
prices in the world market. Moreover, the 
shortrun actions of the oil exporters have 
made oil in the ground a relatively poor in- 
vestment because its value will fall over the 
next decade. For example, using an 8 percent 
rate of return and a price of $10 per barrel 
in 1974, the price of a barrel of oil would 
have to rise to $21.59 by 1984 to produce the 
same rate of return. The present price levels 
present grave potential problems for all con- 
suming nations. The oil-producing nations 
cannot benefit from price levels which result 
in unemployment and inflation in Europe and 
Japan and damage to the world economy as 
a whole. It is clearly in the best interests of 
the oil producers that the world economy 
maintain sound growth. 

In the near term, prices lower than those 
being charged at present would be in the 
economic interest of both producers and con- 
sumers, particularly if consumers had confi- 
dence in the stability of supply. High-cost 
alternative sources would not then be encour- 
aged to so great an extent, and producers 
could expect continued gradual increases in 
their national incomes as their economies 
developed the capacity to absorb increasing 
imports of capital and technology. Consum- 
ers now sufi'er from the effects of the sharp 
and sudden upswing in prices. Producers are 

likely to suffer at some later time from the 
downswing in prices caused by the market's 
strong reactions to present high prices. 

Ideally, what is needed is a diversity of 
consumers and producers operating in a co- 
operative international framework. Recently 
we have seen some hopeful signs that oil 
producers are also interested in adjusting 
oil prices to assure a stable world economy. 
We should work cooperatively to see that this 
is done. 

Together, we can prevent unemployment. 
Together, we can prevent a worldwide mone- 
tary ci-isis. Together, we can maintain eco- 
nomic progress. 

I believe there is reason for optimism. We 
have the capacity and resources to meet our 
energy needs, and the United States stands 
ready and willing to help build a structure 
of international cooperation with producers 
and consumers alike. 


Finance officials have a duty to work close- 
ly together in the realization that even our 
best cooperative efforts will offset only a 
fraction of the serious damage which has 
been done to many countries by the abrupt 
and spectacular increases in oil costs. 

At the same time we must carefully avoid 
creating the misleading impression that such 
cooperation provides any panacea for the 
serious economic problems before us. There 
is no international financial arrangement 
which can offset the real effects of the oil 
price changes. It is important that we not kid 
ourselves here — that we not, as Ministers of 
Finance, give the impression that somehow 
or other we can print up some money and use 
it to "paper over" very real problems. 

The problems are there. There is no way 
to concoct a financial solution that will avoid 
facing up to severe dislocations and, I think, 
particularly for the developing countries — as 
has been brought out by many speakers here 
— great deprivation. In a sense we have that 
horrible chain in which the lack of fuel goes 


' Outline released by the Department of the Treas- 

March 4, 1974 


to a lack of fertilizer, goes to a lack of food, 
and which goes to starvation. So a point that 
I want to make is that, I think for many, the 
situation is not one in which we say to our- 
selves : "Yes, we see the problem. Let us 
understand it, and then figure out how some- 
how through financial means to handle it." It 
is for many not a manageable problem in its 
present state. And we have to see how it can 
be changed so that it is manageable. 

We need to be concerned not only with the 
direct impact of higher prices and supply dis- 
turbances on our economies but also with the 
serious threat of secondary repercussions 
from instability in financial markets, from 
inconsistency in internal economic manage- 
ment and in balance of payments policies, 
and from impaired economic development. 
These are areas in which we can make a con- 
tribution — and why now more than ever we 
have an obligation to seek the optimum con- 
tribution from close international economic 

We have heard reports in this conference 
already that this year, and over the next few 
years, the standards of living of the more 
developed nations will be reduced signifi- 
cantly below previous expectations. In the 
short run, we are facing the problem of ad- 
justing to reduced supply; and this has 
affected our immediate prospects for growth. 
But as this problem is met, our real income 
will continue to be affected both by the higher 
costs of energy imports and by the higher 
expenditures which nations will find it pru- 
dent to make in reaching reduced future de- 
pendence on imported energy. Nonetheless 
the standards of living of the nations here 
represented will remain a large multiple of 
those of some of the less favored nations. 

In contrast, the effects of the oil price 
changes are likely to be near-catastrophic for 
some of the poor areas of the world. In some 
countries it is even probable that the new 
energy costs will result in a reduction of 
standards of living over the next few years 
from the present abysmally low level — to the 
point, in some cases, of starvation. 

We have heard estimates that even after 
projected reductions in market prices of oil 

below present levels that the developed coun- 
tries could have their combined current ac- 
count deficits worsened by as much as $40 bil- 
lion, the developing countries could have their 
current account deficits increased by as much 
as $10 billion, and the oil-producing nations 
could add as much as $50 billion to their for- 
eign asset holdings — all in the one year, 1974. 
In the face of such possibilities, I suggest 
that it would be in our mutual interest to 
agree on some basic principles on how we 
should respond in our economic policies, na- 
tional and international. I put forward three 
principles for your consideration: 

I. First, at a time of vast new uncertainty 
let us each recognize the need to develop in- 
ternal policies that maintain our production 
and demand and deal with inflation without 
aggravating the problems of others. This will 
require not only particularly careful analy- 
sis but also particularly close international 
consultation and cooperation. In this connec- 
tion, we know that the cost-push effects of oil 
prices reinforce the strong upward pressures 
on our price levels. Yet at the same time we 
need to recognize that the greatly increased 
cost of our oil imports could affect our econ- 
omies as would a massive increase in taxes 
from which the revenues were not currently 
being spent. In this case, of course, this "tax" 
will be reflected in higher dollar imports 
rather than government revenues. But that 
import bill should not carry the same conno- 
tation or draw the same policy response that 
we usually associate with a deteriorating 
trade position. We must realistically take ac- 
count of potential increases in exports to oil- 
producing countries and, more important 
quantitatively, the potential large availabil- 
ity — directly and indirectly — of flows of in- 
vestment funds from the producing countries. 

II. Second, in our international policies we 
must agree to keep open our markets for 
goods and capital and to avoid the temptation 
of competitive devaluations. No nation can 
impose trade restrictions and other "beggar- 
my-neighbor" policies without engendering 
retaliation, so that the whole process would 
be self-defeating and destructive. Now more 


Department of State Bulletin 

than ever, during a period when international 
adjustments will necessarily have to be large 
and rapid, governments must maintain mo- 
mentum for the removal of existing distor- 
tions from the international economy. They 
must proceed resolutely with planned trade 
negotiations and with feasible further dis- 
mantling of capital controls. And they must 
agree to undertake special efforts to resist 
those pressures for the introduction of spe- 
cial-interest-serving government controls and 
interventions which are likely to be put for- 
ward during any time of rapid economic 

III. Third, in our development policies we 
should endeavor at least to maintain recent 
levels of assistance to the most seriously dis- 
advantaged nations and encourage oil-pro- 
ducing nations with rapidly increasing hold- 
ings of foreign assets to take immediate steps 
greatly to expand their programs of assist- 
ance for the least developed nations in full 
cooperation with industrial nations and in- 
ternational institutions. 

In the light of the new burden of energy 
costs upon their economies and their balance 
of payments, it will not be easy to maintain a 
climate of opinion in the developed nations 
to maintain or increase past levels of assist- 
ance to the least developed nations. But in 
view of the extreme distress faced by some 
areas of the world and the economic and po- 
litical consequences, it would be shortsighted 
and inhumane for the developed nations to 
curtail assistance plans and programs at this 
time of greatest need. 

But even with continued assistance from 
the traditional providers of aid, the least de- 
veloped nations are faced with a tremendous 
gap in needed resources. Some of the most 
important oil-producing nations — themselves 
moving rapidly from poverty to affluence and 
with natural understanding for the prob- 
lem — can reasonably be called upon for a 
major contribution toward reducing that gap. 

No channel of aid should be neglected. In- 
creased assistance may be made available 
through direct country-by-country relation- 
ships, through new or already established re- 

gional institutions, and through increased 
contributions to the existing broad multilat- 
ei-al financial institutions. But in view of the 
extreme need and the weakened financial po- 
sition of many of the least developed nations, 
it is essential that a substantial proportion 
of the increases in assistance be in the form 
either of outright grants or of their equiv- 

As we seek to incorporate these general 
principles into practical actions, I believe our 
work can be divided naturally into four broad 
areas of cooperation: 

1. Measures to help insure that we main- 
tain open markets. 

2. Measures we can take to deal with or 
reduce the uncertainties inherent in the 
present situation — uncertainties related both 
to the extent of oil price increases and to the 
directions in which the flows of producing- 
country money, much of which will be short 
term, will be channeled. 

3. Measures we can take to facilitate a 
larger portion of these funds to move into 
longer term investment in ways beneficial to 
both the investing and recipient nations. 

4. Measures we can take to encourage and 
facilitate the flow of resources from oil-pro- 
ducing countries to LDC's, particularly the 
poorest of them. 

I. Measures To Maintain Open Markets 

The principle of avoiding restrictions on 
trade and payments that have the effect of 
transferring problems to others has wide 
support; the question is how we can rein- 
force that principle in practical institutional 
and operational terms. 

The countries here represented include the 
largest trading nations. Should we not pledge 
among ourselves here and now to take no 
trade-restricting measures — surcharges, quo- 
tas, or their equivalent — for balance of pay- 
ments purposes? 

For the future we would be willing to con- 
sider new institutional means and procedures 
whereby we would pledge no trade-restrict- 
ing action for balance of payments purposes 

March 4, 1974 


without prior discussion and approval by the 
IMF [International Monetary Fund]. 

II. Measures for Dealhty With Uncertainty 

A. We know in the aggregate the money 
spent for oil and not used for our exports 
will flow back, largely short term. But each 
country is left uncertain as to the size of its 
increased import bill and the directions 
which the reflow of investment money will 
take. Some countries may naturally attract 
more or less of this money than their in- 
creased balance of payments drain. 

1. Much of this sorting out can take place 
in private markets and by official borrowing, 
where necessary, in private markets. Obvi- 
ously the flows may take place through home 
markets or third markets, such as New York 
or the Euro-currency markets. 

2. In sheer bulk, this is mainly a problem 
for developed countries. Because some LDC's 
may have special difficulties obtaining credit, 
difi'erent techniques will be necessary there. 

B. One thing we can do is be sure private 
markets are sufficiently free to do the recy- 
cling job. 

1. Removal of U.S. controls has opened the 
largest and most efficient capital market once 
more to the world. Other nations have made 
moves in the same direction. I believe the re- 
sults will be beneficial. 

2. In the present situation, part of our fi- 
nancial "ethic" should be to permit our na- 
tionals to borrow abroad, particularly for 
countries facing deficit. Conversely, potential 
surplus countries should permit funds to flow 

C. Private borrowings, in some cases, will 
need to be supplemented by ofllicial borrow- 
ing. Our markets, the Euromarkets, and some 
others are open. But possibly a scramble for 
money and sharp pressures on one market or 
another could develop, in no one's interest. 
Therefore it may be worth considering at 
least informal and confidential exchanges of 
information about prospective borrowing op- 
erations among major nations. Then nations 
could act in the knowledge of each other's 
intentions and help avoid alternate periods 

of congestion and vacuums in money and 
capital markets that could in turn aff'ect ex- 
change markets. 

D. At times, intergovernmental borrowing 
may be necessary and desirable, and a greater 
sense of certainty that such facilities would 
be available in time of need could be very 
useful — even if it turns out in the end that 
such facilities are not used heavily, or at all. 

1. This is a classic purpose of IMF credits, 
and those lines fortunately are little used at 
present. Consequently, there is some spare 

2. A further line of defense, which can 
readily be expanded, is central bank "swap" 
lines. We have indicated a willingness to do 
this, at least on a selective basis, and we 
would welcome discussion of the appropriate 
role and limits of such facilities. 

3. Beyond these facilities, the question 
arises as to whether existing international 
institutional facilities need to be expanded 
and rearranged to deal with uncertainty 
about the direction in which funds will move 
and, if needed, rechannel funds to take care 
of balance of payments needs in short or me- 
dium term. As we understand it, the proposal 
made by Mr. Witteveen [Johannes Witte- 
veen. Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund] falls into this category and 
has attracted most attention. 

a. We feel it essential, in evaluating this 
proposal, to distinguish sharply the problem 
of uncertainty and the need for rechanneling 
potentially sizable amounts of money for lim- 
ited terms among countries able to repay rel- 
atively promptly from the more severe (but 
quantitatively smaller) problem of the poor 
LDC's, which need grants and heavily con- 
cessional long-term aid. 

b. Even among developed countries and 
more prosperous LDC's, a Witteveen-type 
proposal presents difficult technical and ne- 
gotiating problems in deciding upon suitable 
terms. We await further elaboration of Mr. 
Witteveen's thoughts, and in particular how 
the risk of building up nominally short-term, 
but in fact unrepayable, credits can be han- 
dled. We intend to react constructively. 


Department of State Bulletin 

III. Measures To Facilitate Orderly Longer 
Term Investment Patterns 

A. Removal of restraints on longer term 
investment is equally relevant. 

B. Given the vast flow of potential invest- 
ment, serious and difficult questions arise in 
the minds of both investors and recipients 
that may hamper flows. 

1. The investor wants and needs the widest 
possible diversity of outlets (i.e., open capital 
markets), professional investment manage- 
ment, and confidence that his investments 
are secure from political action by recipients. 

2. The recipient wants to have some assur- 
ance that investments will not be managed 
for political purposes, and the prospect of 
reasonable stability in flows. 

C. I have no specific proposal in this area. 
However, I raise for discussion one question: 
Should we consider a new international in- 
vestment institution, a kind of multinational 
joint venture with participation in manage- 
ment by both investor and recipient nations, 
as a means of helping to satisfy the concerns 
I have cited? An essential aim of the institu- 
tion would be to achieve a diversity of prof- 
itable investment outlets, with expert invest- 
ment management, for the producers. At the 
same time the multilateral umbrella might 
help put to rest mutual fears of political re- 
prisals, thus encouraging recipient countries 
to permit larger amounts of investment and 
encouraging investor countries to commit siz- 
able funds for extended periods. 

Obviously, in managing such an institu- 
tion, the investing countries would legiti- 
mately maintain control over some basic 
decisions concerning the volume and distri- 
bution of the funds. Many complex organi- 
zational problems would arise. Are they 
worth discussion ? 

D. We might exercise our collective imag- 
ination to devise other means of better as- 
suring the safety and stability of invest- 

An international investment guarantee 
agency has been discussed at length in the 
past, fruitlessly. But now the problem ap- 

pears in another guise, and fresh thinking 
with the producers may be desirable. 

The United States earlier advanced the 
concept of an "investment fund" for coun- 
tries with large ofl^cial pools of investment 
money. This concept rested on an essentially 
simple "code of conduct" or "rule of the 
road." A recipient country would be entitled 
to know how much investment of what type 
was being made by other governments in its 
currency and to limit the aggregate amount 
of that investment. But having agreed to 
that investment, it would also agree to treat 
that investment in a nondiscriminatory man- 

These questions might well serve as the 
basis for further international study. 

IV. Measures To Encourage the Flow of Re- 
sources From Oil-Producing Nations to 
the Less Developed Countries 

— The LDC's pose a special problem. The 
prospects of the poor nations, even before 
the quadrupling of oil prices, were marginal 
at best. To all, it must be clear that for some 
of the poorest nations oil prices at current 
levels spell misery and even starvation. 

— A transfer of resources cannot be done 
by one group of countries alone. The indus- 
trial nations must continue to provide their 
historical levels of assistance or better. This 
will not be easy in the face of growing con- 
cern about the domestic impact of the energy 
crisis. Our Congress has illustrated its sensi- 
tivity to this problem in its first vote on the 
IDA replenishment. We do not mean to let 
that vote stand as the final word. 

I say to you quite frankly that the vote in 
our House of Representatives a couple of 
weeks ago on the fourth IDA replenishment 
(IDA IV) was a great disappointment to us 
and we do not intend to let it stand. We in- 
tend to work to turn that around and to 
maintain the flow of development aid from 
the United States to the developing countries. 
We must meet the argument that all we are 
doing is paying out aid for the developing 
countries to flow back to the Arab countries 
and only support the price of oil. That is the 

March 4, 1974 


argument used against development aid, and 
we think there are good arguments against 
it, and we intend to use them and use them 

— At the same time industrial nations can- 
not be expected to pay for the cost of in- 
creased oil bills to LDC's. That responsibility 
must fall primarily on the oil producers. 

— But the industrialized nations can and 
must cooperate with producers to facilitate 
the required flows from producers. 

The United States would be pleased to join 
in studying concrete proposals to bring about 
this goal and believes the following items 
might usefully be included on a study agen- 

1. Assuring that the oil producers play a 
full role as members or associate members 
of development organizations, including the 
Development Assistance Committee and re- 
gional economic institutions as well as the 
World Bank and the IMF. In view of their 
increased economic standing and the greater 
financial responsibility they are being asked 
to assume, a prompt provision of larger vot- 
ing shares in the latter two institutions may 
be appropriate. 

2. Encouraging greater participation in 
management and staff' roles in these organi- 
zations by producer nations would also seem 

3. Expansion of the World Bank and the 
IMF services as agents to the producer coun- 
tries for loans to the LDC's: These services 
can include participation in conventional 
loans and in concessional financing. A direct 
contribution to, or alongside, IDA IV would 
be extremely helpful. Our existing institu- 
tions, as well as national governments, can 
also provide direct technical assistance to bi- 
lateral and regional assistance programs of 
producers to achieve a high level of assist- 
ance as rapidly as possible. 

4. A larger producer share in planned 
world and regional bank borrowings: These 
institutions, instead of floating issues on the 
world capital markets, would offer bonds at 
reasonable rates to oil-producer nations. 

5. A rechanneling of loans from existing 

oil-producer loan recipients — who now have 
more funds than they can absorb domestic- 
ally — to the poor nations. Newly affluent 
countries can afford prepayment of past 
loans and should be less dependent on new 
loans. The potential for a rechanneling of 
loans in these ways is substantial. 

6. Beyond the redirection of planned bor- 
rowing, the World Bank already has guaran- 
tee capital sufficient to permit larger lending 
and larger borrowing in producers' markets, 
liending from ordinary capital raised in this 
manner could be appropriate for some LDC's, 
who can afford to pay loans at near-market 
rates provided the repayment terms are long. 

I must stress that almost all of the above 
measures involve loans — not grants, near- 
grants, or heavily concessional terms. The 
poorest nations require a major direct effort 
to offset the devastating impact of higher oil 
prices. The oflfset must come first in the form 
of lower prices and then from grant aid. In- 
dustrial nations can and must be expected to 
contribute in historical levels of money, in- 
stitutional expertise, and technology to mix 
with Arab funds in providing the tools to 
help these poorest nations do the job. 

This, then, brings me back to where I 
started. In a way, the problem is a large one, 
as everyone tells each other. Cooperation is 
essential, as everyone tells each other; but at 
the same time I think we still need to keep 
reminding each other that cooperation, han- 
dling things with a sense of balance, finan- 
cially, is not a substitute for changing the 
problem so that the problem is more manage- 
able. There is no way to print up money and 
use it to "paper over" a real problem. We 
must face the real problem in its own terms 
and do everything we can to solve it. 


Washington Energy Conference doe. 17 (rev. 2) 
Summary Statement 

1. Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Den- 
mark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Nonvay, the United Kingdom, the United States met 


Department of State Bulletin 

in Washington from February 11 to 13, 1974. The 
European Community was represented as such by the 
President of the Council and the President of the 
Commission. Finance Ministers, Ministers with re- 
sponsibility for Energy Affairs, Economic Affairs and 
Science and Technology Affairs also took part in the 
meeting. The Secretary General of the OECD also 
participated in the meeting. The Ministers examined 
the international energy situation and its implica- 
tions and charted a course of actions to meet this 
challenge which requires constructive and compre- 
hensive solutions. To this end they agreed on specific 
steps to provide for effective international coopera- 
tion. The Ministers affirmed that solutions to the 
world's energy problem should be sought in consulta- 
tion with producer countries and other consumers. 

Analysis of the Situation 

2. They noted that during the past three decades 
progress in improving productivity and standards 
of living was greatly facilitated by the ready avail- 
ability of increasing supplies of energy at fairly 
stable prices. They recognized that the problem of 
meeting growing demand existed before the current 
situation and that the needs of the world economy 
for increased energy supplies require positive long- 
term solutions. 

3. They concluded that the current energy situa- 
tion results from an intensification of these under- 
lying factors and from political developments. 

4. They reviewed the problems created by the large 
rise in oil prices and agreed with the serious con- 
cern expressed by the International Monetary Fund's 
Committee of Twenty at its recent Rome meeting 
over the abrupt and significant changes in prospect 
for the world balance of payments structure. 

5. They agreed that present petroleum prices pre- 
sented the structure of world trade and finance with 
an unprecedented situation. They recognized that 
none of the consuming countries could hope to insu- 
late itself from these developments, or expect to deal 
with the payments impact of oil prices by the adop- 
tion of monetary or trade measures alone. In their 
view, the present situation, if continued, could lead 
to a serious deterioration in income and employment, 
intensify inflationary pressures, and endanger the 
welfare of nations. They believed that financial meas- 
ures by themselves will not be able to deal with the 
strains of the current situation. 

6. They expressed their particular concern about 
the consecjuences of the situation for the developing 
countries and recognized the need for efforts by the 
entire international community to resolve this prob- 
lem. At current oil prices the additional energy costs 
for developing countries will cause a serious setback 
to the prospect for economic development of these 

7. General Conclusions. They affirmed, that, in the 
pursuit of national policies, whether in trade, mone- 
tary or energy fields, efforts should be made to har- 

monize the interests of each country on the one 
hand and the maintenance of the world economic 
system on the other. Concerted international coop- 
eration between all the countries concerned including 
oil producing countries could help to accelerate an 
improvement in the supply and demand situation, 
ameliorate the adverse economic consequences of the 
existing situation and lay the groundwork for a more 
equitable and stable international energy relation- 

8. They felt that these considerations taken as a 
whole made it essential that there should be a sub- 
stantial increase of international cooperation in all 
fields. Each participant in the Conference stated its 
firm intention to do its utmost to contribute to such 
an aim, in close cooperation both with the other 
consumer countries and with the producer countries. 

0. They concurred in the need for a comprehensive 
action program to deal with all facets of the world 
energy situation by cooperative measures. In so 
doing they will build on the work of the OECD. They 
recognized that they may wish to invite, as appro- 
priate, other countries to join with them in these 
efforts. Such an action program of international 
cooperation would include, as appropriate, the shar- 
ing of means and efforts, while concerting national 
policies, in such areas as: 

— The conservation of energy and restraint of 

— A system of allocating oil supplies in times of 
emergency and severe shortages. 

— The acceleration of development of additional 
energy sources so as to diversify energy supplies. 

— The acceleration of energy research and develop- 
ment programs through international cooperative 

10. With respect to monetary and economic ques- 
tions, they decided to intensify their cooperation and 
to give impetus to the work being undertaken in 
the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD on the 
economic and monetary consequences of the current 
energy situation, in particular to deal with balance 
of payments disequilibria. They agreed that: 

— In dealing with the balance of payments impact 
of oil prices they stressed the importance of avoiding 
competitive depreciation and the escalation of re- 
strictions on trade and payments or disruptive actions 
in external borrowing.* ° 

— While financial cooperation can only partially 
alleviate the problems which have recently arisen for 
the international economic system, they will intensify 
work on short-term financial measures and possible 
longer-term mechanisms to reinforce existing official 
and market credit facilities.* 

'' France does not accept point 9. [Footnote in 

" In point 10, France does not accept paragraphs 
cited with asterisks. [Footnote in original.] 

March 4, 1974 


— They will pursue domestic economic policies 
which will reduce as much as possible the diflficulties 
resulting from the current energy cost levels.* ' 

— They will make strenuous efforts to maintain 
and enlarge the flow of development aid bilaterally 
and through multilateral institutions, on the basis 
of international solidarity embracing all countries 
with appropriate resources. 

11. Further, they have agreed to accelerate wher- 
ever practicable their own national programs of new 
energy sources and technology which will help the 
overall world-wide supply and demand situation. 

12. They agreed to examine in detail the role of 
international oil companies. 

13. They stressed the continued importance of 
maintaining and improving the natural environment 
as part of developing energy sources and agreed to 
make this an important goal of their activity. 

14. They further agreed that there was need to 
develop a cooperative multilateral relationship with 
producing countries, and other consuming countries 
that takes into account the long-term interests of all. 
They are ready to exchange technical information 
with these countries on the problem of stabilizing 
energy supplies with regard to quantity and prices. 

15. They welcomed the initiatives in the UN to 
deal with the larger issues of energy and primary 
products at a world-wide level and in particular for 
a special session of the UN General Assembly. 

Establishment of Follow-on Machinery 

16. They agreed to establish a coordinating group 
headed by senior officials to direct and to coordinate 
the development of the actions referred to above. The 
coordinating group shall decide how best to organize 
its work. It should: 

— Monitor and give focus to the tasks that might 
be addressed in existing organizations; 

— Establish such ad hoc working groups as may be 
nec?ssary to undertake tasks for which there are 
presently no suitable bodies; 

— Direct preparations of a conference of consumer 
and producer countries which will be held at the 
earliest possible opportunity and which, if necessary, 
will be preceded by a further meeting of consumer 

17. They agreed that the preparations for such 
meetings should involve consultations with develop- 
ing countries and other consumer and producer coun- 

National Port Week, 1974 


In providing services to promote the expansion of 
United States exports, our commercial ocean and 
inland ports play a central role in improving our 
balance of trade. The building of World Trade Cen- 
ters in several ports and the establishment of trade 
promotion offices in major manufacturing areas are 
among the methods employed by United States ports 
to encourage export expansion. 

Over 1.6 billion tons of commerce in our foreign 
and domestic waterbome trades moved through our 
port gateways in 1972. The foreign portion of this 
total was valued at more than $47 billion. The many 
and varied port handling activities required to serv- 
ice this vast trade volume alone generate about $30 
billion in direct dollar income to local and regional 
economies served by United States ports. This 
amount serves to stimulate an even greater economic 
chain of indirect revenues as these dollars are spent 
throughout the national economy. 

Other statistics also help to demonstrate the cen- 
tral role of port facilities in the American economy. 
Public and private port interests have invested over 
$5 billion in cargo handling facilities since the end 
of World War II. Port-generated activities now pro- 
vide employment for well over 1.2 million people — 
accounting for about $12 billion in wages each year. 
A total of over $32 billion a year is being poured into 
the American economy directly and indirectly by 
waterfront activities in our national port system. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, in order to remind 
Americans of the importance of the port industry of 
the United States to our national life, do hereby 
designate the week beginning on the last Sunday in 
September as National Port Week. I ask that public 
attention be directed to the important role our 
Nation's ports play in the American economy 
through appropriate activities and ceremonies. I also 
ask that all ships in United States ports during that 
week dress ship in tribute to our port industry. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this sixth day of February, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the In- 
dependence of the United States of America the one 
hundred and ninety-eighth. 

' In point 10, France does not accept paragraphs 
cited with asterisks. [Footnote in original.] 

' France does not accept points 16 and 17. [Foot- 
note in original.] 


' No. 4265; 39 Fed. Reg. 4867. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of February 13 

Press release 50 dated February 13 

Secretary Kissinger: I am assuming that 
those of you who have written constructive 
articles during the week have received copies 
of the communique. [Laughter.] 

Let me make a few observations and then 
answer your questions. 

The basic approach that led to this confer- 
ence has been outlined in the speech that I 
gave to the Pilgrims in London in December. 
It was based on the assumption, on our con- 
viction, that the world was facing a problem 
that had come upon it — at least in the dimen- 
sions in which we faced it — somewhat unex- 
pectedly. And in a situation of seeming sup- 
ply shortages there was a tendency to react 
with panic, produced in part by lack of in- 
formation, and with a sense that perhaps the 
control over our destiny had escaped us. 

To this supply shortage was added at the 
end of December the serious problem of the 
rapid escalation of prices. 

The United States holds the view that the 
problem that has been produced by these two 
phenomena — the demand, at least for a while, 
outrunning supply and the rapid increase of 
prices — can be solved only on a global basis 
and by multilateral action. 

We hold this view not to vindicate any 
particular theory of the organization of the 
world. We have not advocated institutions 
simply to create institutions. We were con- 
vinced, and remain convinced, that it is a 
problem of global nature incapable of iso- 
lated solution and indeed a problem par ex- 
cellence in which the general interest is iden- 
tical with the individual interest. 

For this reason the United States proposed 
at the opening session of this conference a 
seven-point program in which we offered to 
share technology, resources, and supplies as 

our contribution to a world cooperative sys- 

We do not conceive that this initial meet- 
ing of consumers should lead to a confronta- 
tion between consumers and producers. In- 
deed, if what I said earlier about the general 
interest being identical with the particular 
interest is true, then in its ultimate sense 
there is no difference, there is no incompati- 
bility of interests, between the consumers 
and the producers. 

During the conference, Mr. [William] Si- 
mon presented an analysis in which he at- 
tempted to show, and demonstrated I think 
quite conclusively, that a barrel of oil at a 
certain price — which would then be invested 
at compound interest over a 10-year period — 
that that price would have to more than dou- 
ble if production were to be withheld and the 
same income were to be achieved 10 years 
from now. 

And if that analysis is correct, then I be- 
lieve that a well-prepared meeting of con- 
sumers and producers can establish a frame- 
work of analysis in which a discussion about 
the nature of a fair price can take place in a 
much less emotional and in a much more bal- 
anced atmosphere. 

Now, as you know from the briefings that 
went on throughout the conference, there 
was some debate about the nature of followup 
machinery and how one should prepare for a 
meeting of consumers and producers, the de- 
sirability of which everyone accepted. The 
conference, with one negative vote, agreed 
on the establishment of a followup machinery 
that would correlate the efforts already going 
on in international institutions, that would 
establish ad hoc working groups that might 
be needed, and that would direct prepara- 
tions of a conference of consumer and pro- 

March 4, 1974 


ducer countries, if necessary with a prior 
meeting of consumer countries to review the 
work that is going on in these various bodies. 

So we beheve that a cooperative frame- 
work for dealing with the energy crisis has 
been established. We are grateful for the co- 
operation of the participants, and we believe 
that what has been established is a recogni- 
tion not only of the importance of dealing 
with this particular problem on a cooperative 
basis but that maybe a contribution has been 
made to a general attitude of dealing with 
world problems cooperatively. 

With this as a background, let me now take 
your questions about the communique or any 
aspect of the conference. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what, at this point, 
would he the point of — what are the pros- 
pects for another private meeting of con- 
suming nations, now that this group has con- 
cluded its meeting ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Whether another 
meeting of consumer nations should be held 
will be determined through the work of the 
coordinating group that has been set up as a 
result of this meeting. This coordinating 
group, which will be composed of senior for- 
eign office officials and other senior officials, 
will first of all attempt to give focus to the 
work that is going on in existing institu- 
tions — OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] , World Bank, 
IMF [International Monetary Fund], and 
similar institutions. It will establish, as I 
pointed out, ad hoc working groups that may 
be necessary to undertake tasks for which 
there are at present no suitable bodies. 

I don't think we can decide until this work- 
ing group has been in existence for some 
weeks whether another meeting of consumer 
nations, perhaps including those from less 
developed countries, is necessary to assess the 
work of the coordinating group or whether 
the work of the coordinating group is in it- 
self a sufficient basis to go to a consumer- 
producer conference. 

Our view about a consumer-producer con- 
ference is that it will be productive only to 
the extent that there is careful, detailed prep- 

aration. We are not dogmatic about the need 
for another ministerial conference. We do be- 
lieve very strongly that there is a need for 
follow-on work, and that need has been rec- 
ognized by the conference that met here. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, irhat is your vietv on 
having representatives from the producing 
nations sitting in with the coordinating 
group to prepare for the later conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are two 
problems, at least, in the work of the coor- 
dinating group. One is to analyze and to give 
impetus to certain types of activities which 
are enumerated in the communique, such as 
conservation of energy, a system of allocat- 
ing oil supplies, acceleration of the develop- 
ment of additional energy sources, accelera- 
tion of energy research and development. 
Also the need to find financial mechanisms to 
deal with some of the problems produced by 
higher prices. That work of the coordinating 
group seems to us to be primarily confined to 
the countries that participated in this con- 
ference and countries with similar problems. 

As far as the preparations for the pro- 
ducer meeting are concerned, I think an early 
consultation with representatives from pro- 
ducer nations would be appropriate. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did French opposition 
at the conference here run deeper than you 
had onginally expected, and what effects do 
you believe the divisions that occurred here 
within the European Common Market will 
have on the future of the Atlantic alliance 
and on your desire to reach some declarations 
with the European Community? 

Secretary Kissinger: The French views 
were reasonably well known, at least in the 
two weeks or so prior to the conference. And 
therefore they were not unexpected. 

The impact of these views on the confer- 
ence was, I believe, reflected in the vote of 
the conference, which was unanimous on all 
of these points, with one exception. 

As far as the future of the Atlantic alli- 
ance is concerned and the future of our Euro- 
pean-American relations and European unity, 
the United States considers the Atlantic rela- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tionship the pivot of its foreign policy. Our 
efforts during the last year have been di- 
rected toward strengthening that relation- 

The fact that there are some differences of 
view between us and France on how this At- 
lantic relationship should be strengthened 
should not obscure the central importance we 
attach to it nor our recognition that friend- 
ship with all European countries, including 
France, is essential for the security of all of 
the nations of the Atlantic alliance. 

So as far as the United States is con- 
cerned, the difficulties that existed in the last 
few days, which are inseparable from any 
conclave of free nations, do not affect the re- 
lationship in the Atlantic alliance and indeed 
will probably have strengthened it. 

Within the European Community, I be- 
lieve the various countries should speak for 
themselves. But certainly there were many 
expressions that the work of the European 
Community must go on. And of course the 
United States has always strongly supported 
European economic and political unity and 
continues to support it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the French seem to have 
thought — it may not have been the intent — 
but one of the possible objections to an ad 
hoc machinery to deal with this problem will 
be an American supremacy and possibly 
American policies impinging upon Europe. 
What arguments were you able to use against 
this suspicion, and do you think there is any 
justification for it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have tried to ex- 
plain that a properly conceived solution to 
this problem cannot be either American or 
British or French or Japanese, or any na- 
tional solution. We are, as I said in my open- 
ing speech, in a better position to deal with 
the problem on a national basis. Neverthe- 
less, if we deal with the problem on a purely 
national basis, the end result will be a loss 
of — a blow to the world economy and a blow 
to the structure of international relations 
from which, in the medium term, we would 
suffer severely ourselves. 

Therefore it is not in our interests, nor is 

it our intention, to establish a particular 
American point of view with respect to the 
energy problem; nor do I know exactly what 
a purely American point of view with respect 
to the energy problem would be. 

Throughout the conference our position 
was not to turn this into an issue between 
the United States and France. And through 
most of the meetings the chief arguments 
were between France and the other European 
countries, rather than between France and 
the United States. And insofar as our point 
of view prevailed, it was because we pre- 
sented arguments which we believed to be in 
the general interest. 

I want to repeat again: We do not con- 
sider ourselves in a confrontation with 
France. I have read rather extreme articles 
in the European press about a divorce be- 
tween the United States and France. This is 
absolutely not the American point of view, 
and it is not the basis on which to build fu- 
ture relationships. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what justification is 
there for Mr. Jobert's statement, on this po- 
dium, that France came here expecting to 
talk about energy and instead found them- 
selves in a political meeting? 

Secretary Kissinger: I of course did not 
have the privilege of listening to my friend 
Jobert, who has a tendency to express him- 
self in very Cartesian and sometimes ex- 
tremely precise language. If political issues 
were raised at the meeting, it was due to the 
difficulty that for a while the European Com- 
munity attempted to take a common position 
and then, in its inability to reach a common 
position, had to decide whether to operate as 
a group of individual nations. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
our declarations are a matter of public rec- 
ord, and we did not introduce any political 
elements — except of course when Foreign 
Ministers meet, that in itself is a political 
event. So I cannot agree with my colleague 
and friend Michel Jobert. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to folloiv a previous 
question, if the problem is global and it can 

March 4, 1974 


only be solved internationally, why did you 
feel you had to have a separate energy con- 
ference rather than ivorking through exist- 
ing international organizations'? 

Secretary Kissinger: There's no existing 
international organization that is dealing 
with the energy problem on the comprehen- 
sive basis that we have put before the con- 
ference. There are bits and pieces of it that 
are dealt with in particular organizations. 
We have specifically affirmed our readiness, 
and the conference has affirmed its readiness, 
to cooperate with those institutions that are 
now working on the problem and indeed to 
use them for the analyses and studies that 
are foreseen as a result of this conference. 

This particular group of nations invited 
here represented the high level energy group 
of the OECD. This in turn was composed of 
the nations that represent 85 percent of the 
energy imports in the world. To this group 
was added the members of the European 
Community who are not members of the high 
level energy committee. And therefore prob- 
ably the percentage figure I gave to you is 
in fact, by a few percentage points, higher. 

It seemed to us important that the consum- 
ing nations first understand the nature of the 
problem and the range of possible remedies 
before there is a general conference with the 
producers. And this was the logic behind the 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do the results of 
this conference mean in terms of the future 
of loiver prices around the world? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is of course not 
easy to predict. The results of this confer- 
ence, if they are followed up in the spirit in 
which the conference was concluded, should 
enable the consumers to get a much better 
understanding of what they are facing, and 
it should enable them to come to a conference 
with the producers with the ability to put be- 
fore the producers their best judgment of the 
long-term interests of both consumers and 
producers. I think there's a general agree- 
ment that prices for oil were too low prior to 
September 1973. I think there is also a gen- 

eral agreement among the nations repre- 
sented here, and also in the Committee of 
Twenty that met in January, that prices now 
are too high. Now, what a fair price is of 
course has to take into account the needs of 
both consumers and producers. The needs of 
the producers are for a source of long-term 
income; and the need of the consumers is a 
source of assured supply. 

The technical studies that were prepared 
with great meticulousness by the American 
delegation, and which, in a preliminary form 
at least, seemed to be accepted by most of 
the delegates here — though they will have to 
be looked at further — would seem to indicate 
that it is possible to arrive at a definition of 
fairness that takes into account both of these 
interests. That would be lower than the ex- 
isting prices but considerably higher than 
September prices. 

How this will be arrived at we will have to 
leave to the evolution of the machinery fore- 
seen here and future conferences. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could 
spell out for us what in your opinion are the 
most concrete accomplishments of this con- 
ference; and also will you concede that there 
are any disappointments? 

Secretary Kissinger: The conference 
achieved in terms of machinery and in terms 
of definition of the objective substantially 
what we had thought in our preliminary de- 
liberations should be achieved. In this sense 
we consider it a success. The chief results 
were that there was an agreed analysis of the 
problem and in paragraphs 9 through 17 a 
series of concrete measures or directions that 
require exploration — all of them together 
with the establishment of machinery of how 
to implement it. 

There was a pervasive conviction that 
purely national efforts were not adequate, 
that therefore the efforts of all the nations 
represented here had to be concerted. 

At the same time, of course, a great deal 
depends now whether the spirit reflected in 
this communique can be sustained in the 
follow-on work. The United States will make 
a major effort both in contributing to the 


Department of State Bulletin 

work of the follow-on groups as well as in 
implementing the offers that were made in 
the various speeches to give concrete content 
to what has been accomplished. 

I could not list a major disappointment, 
because it substantially reflects our concep- 

Q. M?-. Secretary, when will the coordi- 
nating group meet, where will it meet, is 
there a chairman pro tem, and tvho will rep- 
resent the United States in the coordinating 

Secretary Kissinger: We will probably take 
the initiative in convening the coordinating 
group. We are openminded about its location. 
And we believe that once the coordinating 
group has been convened it should establish 
its own internal organization. In other 
words, we do not insist en the chairmanship 
of this coordinating group. 

We believe that it should meet as soon as 
possible, which is commensurate with the 
importance of the problem. And the United 
States will be, in all probability, represented 
by Under Secretary [for Security Assistance 
William H.] Donaldson and Mr. Simon and 
other officials that may be needed, depending 
on the subject matter. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you or your col- 
leagues during the session produce further 
details about the plan for sharing either con- 
ventional energy or nuclear energy beyond 
the outline given in the seven points? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
was prepared to present to the conference 
in greater detail elaborations of each of the 
seven points that was made. As it turned out, 
a great deal of the time of the conference 
had to be spent on the procedural issues and 
on the negotiations leading to the communi- 
que. The United States, however, will be 
prepared to make concrete proposals in the 
follow-on groups in all of the areas in which 
it did not have an opportunity to follow on 

We did make concrete proposals on finan- 
cial mechanisms and a rather detailed analy- 
sis of the substance of the issue. But we had 
foreseen that some working groups might be 

established already while the conference met 
here. While they met, they did not have the 
time to report back to the conference due to 
the amount of energy that had to be expended 
on the communique. 

Q. What subjects were represented? And 
will other information be made public now 
that they have been presented to the confer- 

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't made a 
decision on this, but in principle I see no 
objection to it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat does it mean that 
France ivill not accept the folloivup proce- 
dures? Will France nevertheless participate 
in the subsequent conferences? And will 
France participate in any of the working 

Secretary Kissinger: My impression is that 
France will certainly participate in the con- 
sumer or producer meetings. France did not 
express itself, in my hearing at least, as to 
what its attitude will be about participation 
in the working groups. I think that is a ques- 
tion that can be more appropriately answered 
by France. 

I believe, however, that as time goes on it 
will be seen by all the countries concerned 
that this is not a political issue but an issue 
of world stability and world cooperation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction — 

Secretary Kissinger: I can't see anybody 
behind the light. 

Q. What is your reaction concerning the 
events concerning [Alexander] Solzhenitsyn? 

Secretary Kissinger: Can we save ques- 
tions on matters not connected with energy? 
I'll take this later. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us yoiir 
reaction to the cancellation of the Tripoli 
meeting, and ivhether or not you now feel 
that perhaps your hopes about an early end 
to the oil boycott might be premature? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know whether 
the Tripoli meeting was canceled or post- 
poned, and therefore I don't want to express 

March 4, 1974 


any views on its significance. Our statements 
were based on the best judgments, based on 
the best information we then had available; 
and events will have to determine whether 
these expectations will materialize. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke in your earlier 
remarks to the conference, and Mr. [Walter] 
Scheel did also, about the need for codes of 
conduct to govern the bilateral agreements 
that vanovs countries are snaking with the 
producer countries; but there's no mention 
of this in the communique. I was wondering 
whether you could give us your opinion about 
where these bilateral agreements stand noiv 
and what determination was made by the 
conference on the wisdom of having them or 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, again, I want to 
stress that to us this is not an issue of prin- 
ciple; this is an issue of our analysis of the 
situation. Obviously most of world trade 
flows in bilateral channels, and we are not 
opposed to the fact that deals will be made 
on a bilateral basis. In fact, it is inevitable 
that many of the arrangements will be made 
on a bilateral basis. What we believe is going 
to be disastrous for the world economy is if 
bilateral deals are made unconstrained by 
any general rules of conduct, because we be- 
lieve that this will either stabilize prices at 
too high a level or bid prices up even higher 
and in general create a relationship among 
the major consuming nations of economic 
warfare — which inevitably will affect, in 
time, their political relationship. 

Within such a framework and in the long 
term, the producers will also suffer from the 
weakening of the world economy, which will 
be the inevitable result of such types of ac- 

We therefore believe that this is an issue 
that is still before the nations that were at 
this conference; and it can be discussed in 
the coordinating committee as one of the 
goals that consumers will reach. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are yoti still holding to 
your previous deadline of May 1 for conclu- 
sion of the consumer conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our belief is that this 

is a reasonable deadline, but I think one can 
form a better judgment on that after the 
coordinating group has begun its work. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I presume that according 
to paragrapli !'> of the communique the U.S. 
Governmoit will a>iswer in the affirmative 
to the special meeting of the General Assem- 
bly of the United Nations. If this special 
meeting takes place, don't you see some pos- 
sible contradictions between the future work 
of the organization created by this special 
meeting of the United Nations and the co- 
ordinating group? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, our view has 
been that a meeting between consumers and 
producers, to be effective, requires very care- 
ful preparation on the part of the consumers 
and, for that matter, between consumers and 
producers, before they actually meet. We do 
not believe that a United Nations meeting 
will serve that particular purpose. A United 
Nations meeting will be useful — can make a 
contribution to expressing the general atti- 
tudes of the participating nations and to 
clarify particular points of view. We do not 
believe that it will solve the particular prob- 
lems to which this conference was addressed 
or to which the follt)w-on activities of this 
conference are addressed. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the question has been 
raised ivhether, had this conference been bet- 
ter prepared, had one taken more time ivith 
it, some of the problems that arose wotdd 
not have arisen. What is your feeling about 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that this 
conference was extremely carefully prepared 
over a period of six weeks. The agenda items 
were distributed many weeks in advance. 
The Ambassadors of the countries concerned, 
and the governments of the countries con- 
cerned, were carefully briefed. Several gov- 
ernments had been in touch with us through 
senior officials. And as it turned out, we did 
not have an opportunity to present even a 
fraction of the work that had been done on 
our side to the work of the conference. 

I believe that the disagreements that arose 
at this conference were due to certain differ- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ences of philosophic perspective about the 
purposes of the conference, which I believe 
were eased to some extent through the con- 
ference. But preparation was not the issue. 
Sometimes there are disagreements not 
because people do not understand each other 
but because they understand each other only 
too well. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may we move on to that 
second phase? Solzhenitsyyi? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let's say I'll take 
two more questions on energy and then we'll 
move on to the next phase. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. — U'liat is your reaction to Europea)i 
plans for increasing negotiatio)is with the 
Arab countries en bloc? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have no objection 
to the Europeans negotiating as a unit. We 
have a general view about bilateral arrange- 
ments that do not follow general rules of 
conduct, but these two objectives can be rec- 
onciled. And secondly, of course we have a 
general interest — as does Europe — in politi- 
cal contacts that may occur that may con- 
tribute, or not, to the evolution of peace in 
the Middle East. 

I'll take one more question — yes — on en- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind the 
points which we agreed upon at this confer- 
ence — such as sharing of resources and tech- 
nology — what would be the effect or the im- 
pact on the U.S. acceptance of something in 
the area of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties? 

Secretary Kissinger: You mean the Mexi- 
can charter? 

Q. Yes. Considering that you have agreed 
upon so many points which are in the area. 

Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to be in 
Mexico in two weeks, and I'm going to save 
my answer for that occasion. But the United 
States expressed its views on President Eche- 

verria's idea on the Charter of Economic 
Plights and Duties in my speech at the Gen- 
eral Assembly. Our view is that the concept 
is useful and that we are prepared to coop- 
erate with elaborating a charter that spells 
out the rights and obligations of all coun- 
tries — of developed, as well as developing, 
countries. So we find the concept useful, and 
we will have to see now what can be negoti- 
ated in the forums that are open. And there 
is a negotiation on it going on now in Geneva. 

Now, on Solzhenitsyn: The United States 
has always looked with sympathy and great 
appreciation on the expression of freedom of 
thought in all societies. We have regretted 
some of the manifestations that interrupt 

We do not know enough about the specific 
circumstances of the departure of Mr. Sol- 
zhenitsyn. And the only problem that we have 
seen here is the extent to which our human, 
moral, and intellectual concern for Solzhe- 
nitsyn and people of similar convictions 
should affect the day-to-day conduct of our 
foreign policy. In any event, we are delighted 
that Solzhenitsyn is not in some of the diffi- 
culties that were feared yesterday. 

Q. To follow that up, Mr. Secretary, would 
Mr. Solzhenitsyn be welcome in the United 
States if he sought to reside here? 

Secretary Kissinger: He would certainly be 
welcome to reside in the United States if he 

Q. How ivould this affect detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our constant view 
has been that the necessity for detente, as 
we conceive it, does not reflect approbation 
of the Soviet domestic structure. The neces- 
sity of detente is produced by the unaccepta- 
bility of general nuclear war under present 
conditions. The accumulation of nuclear arms 
has to be constrained if mankind is not to de- 
stroy itself. 

This is a question that will be before hu- 
manity under all circumstances, and before 
American governments, as long as the accu- 
mulation of nuclear arms continues. So the 
United States will pursue a policy to reduce 

March 4, 1974 


the dangers of war, to increase the possibili- 
ties of peace, and to limit the danger of nu- 
clear conflict. 

Q. Sir, do ijou think Mr. Solzhenitsyn is 
really better off today than he was yesterday 
with his ivife still in the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot judge to 
what extent his wife will be kept in the So- 
viet Union, and I don't think it would be 
helpful to make a final judgment until all the 
circumstances can be more clearly seen. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

President Nixon Honors Energy Conference Representatives 
at White House Dinner 

Following is an exchange of toasts between 
President Nixon and Walter Scheel, Federal 
German Foreign Minister and President of 
the Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities, at a dinner at the White House 
on February 11. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 18 


Gentlemen and Miss Ray [Dixy Lee Ray, 
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission] : It 
is for all of us in this house a very great 
honor to have such a distinguished company 
on this occasion. 

And as I welcome the Foreign Ministers of 
the 12 nations that are represented at this 
conference, as well as the Finance Ministers 
and other Ministers of Economic Affairs, I 
want you to know that we are privileged to 
have you here again. Most of you have been 
here before, when either the heads of govern- 
ment or heads of state have visited the 
United States. 

In speaking to you today, I am not going to 
get into some of the technical matters that I 
understand have been covered at rather con- 
siderable length in your discussions earlier in 
the day. 

I thought that perhaps it would be more 
useful for this distinguished company if I 
were to speak to you not simply in terms of 
the energy problem, which very properly has 
been the subject of primary discussion, but 

to put that problem in a larger context of the 
world in which we live and the other prob- 
lems which we face to which that, of course, 
is very, very closely related. 

I think everybody in this room is aware of 
the fact that we are here at what I would 
call a watershed of world history. We are 
here at a time when we have seen the con- 
clusion of a very long and difficult war in 
which the United States was involved in 
Viet-Nam, a time when we have seen the be- 
ginnings toward movement, toward what we 
hope would be not just a temporary but a 
permanent peace in the Mideast. 

Also over the past few years during the 
time that I have been in this office and during 
the time that most of you have been in the 
offices you hold, we have seen the whole world 
Changs. Not only the United States but other 
free-world nations have opened a new dia- 
logue with the Soviet Union and with the 
People's Republic of China. 

We have also seen that at the present time, 
as a result of that dialogue, negotiations are 
taking place that no one would have predicted 
three or four years ago — negotiations with 
regard to the reduction of forces in Europe, 
negotiations insofar as the European Se- 
curity Conference is concerned, negotiations 
which are taking place between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the field of 
limiting nuclear arms. 

When we look at this record and of all of 
the events that have come together before 


Department of State Bulletin 

this day on which we maet, we realize that 
the world now faces an unprecedented chal- 
lenge. That has probably been said before at 
other times in the world's history, but prob- 
ably it has never been so true, certainly not 
so true since World War II than today. And 
that challenge is to build a world of peace, 
not simply a peace that is an interlude be- 
tween wars, but a peace that has a chance to 
be permanent. 

I would not suggest to this sophisticated 
group that building that peace and keeping 
that peace will be easy. We all know the com- 
plex situation in the Middle East, and all of 
us will be working toward a solution that will 
be permanent and just and fair to all con- 
cerned. We all know that in the relations 
between the great powers and the smaller 
powers, between what is known as the Com- 
munist world and the free world, that one 
must never assume that simply because nego- 
tiations are taking place that confrontation 
may not later occur. 

On the other hand, I think that we can say 
that because we are living in an era of nego- 
tiation rather than confrontation where the 
free world and the Communist world is con- 
cerned, because we have seen the end of those 
wars, small though they were but very pain- 
ful they also were, which plagued us for the 
past generation — although that has hap- 
pened, we realize that in order to build the 
peace and to keep it, that it is essential that 
we maintain the strength and the unity that 
brought us where we are. 

Having spoken in that particular area, the 
area of security, let me now relate it to the 
other areas with which this conference is 
more closely identified, the area of economics 
or, should I say, of the whole field of not 
only how do we have peace in the terms of 
simply absence of war but how do we have 
peace in which we build an era of progress 
for all of our people — the people of the free 
nations and, for that matter, of the Commu- 
nist nations of the world. 

It is this challenge that confronts us today. 

I would like to speak quite directly to this 
audience with regard to what I see in the 
world and what I see in the United States as 
we face this challenge. 

We must examine what is a truism, I would 
say, in virtually every country represented 
here today. There are people, very well-inten- 
tioned people, but people who I think are 
erroneous with regard to their views, who 
in each of our countries would take the point 
of view that now that we have peace the time 
has come for — they would not call it isola- 
tionism, but basically for each country to look 
after its own interest. 

There are those who say that at the time 
when we needed the mutual security which 
built the great alliances in the past no longer 
exists or at least not to the same extent. 

I would be less than candid if I were not 
to say that within the United States there 
has been growing in recent years, and per- 
haps it has been accelerated to a certain 
extent by our very difficult experience in 
Viet-Nam, a growing sense of isolationism, 
not just about security — those, for example, 
who believe that the United States unilater- 
ally should withdraw its forces from Europe 
and for that matter withdraw forces from all 
over the world and make our treaty commit- 
ments to other nations in the Far East and 
in Europe meaningless — but also with regard 
to trade, where those who completely oppose 
the initiatives we have undertaken in the 
trade area and who oppose even some of the 
initiatives in the international monetary area 
that you are all familiar with. 

I think the ladies and gentlemen in this 
room are aware of the fact that this admin- 
istration, and I would like to point out that I 
believe that the view I now express goes far 
beyond simply a partisan viewpoint because 
there are many Democrats as well as Re- 
publicans who support the point of view that 
I will now express, reject the idea that the 
United States should now listen to the voices 
of isolation which plagued us before World 
War II and which always seems to rise to a 
new crescendo after each war in which we 
were engaged. 

We reject it, for example, in the field of 
trade. We believe that it is vitally important 
to go forward with the great trade initiatives 
that have been undertaken, as Secretary 
[of the Treasury George P.] Shultz has often 
stated in his meetings with his counterparts 

March 4, 1974 


represented here at this meeting. We believe 
it is vitally important in the field of monetary 
affairs that the United States play a responsi- 
ble role vi'ith other nations in the free world 
in developing a more stable system, one that 
will not be affected by the shocks that have 
so often over the past 10 years shaken the 
world monetary institutions to their very 

We also believe this in the terms of se- 
curity, as I have already indicated, where 
we oppose the idea that the United States, 
because we have entered into a period of 
peace which we long wanted, now can reduce 
its forces unilaterally without having a com- 
pensatory reduction among others or where 
the United States will turn away from the 
treaty commitments that it has, whether it is 
in Europe or in Asia. 

Let me now relate this particular discus- 
sion in the field of security, in the field of 
trade, in the field of monetary affairs, to the 
subject of energy. 

Here I think it is understandable that lead- 
ers and those who affect leaders in each of 
the countries that we represent might well 
take the point of view that each nation for 
its own reasons should, in effect, go into busi- 
ness for itself, that each nation should seek 
to make a bilateral agreement with the oil- 
producing nations, even though that bilateral 
agreement might not be one which would be 
in the interests of all of the nations — and 
85 percent of all of the oil consumed is repre- 
sented here in this room, the oil consumed 
in the free world. 

This point of view, which of course I would 
describe as isolation in the energy field, is 
one that perhaps has some currency in some 
of your countries. It also has some in ours. 

I note that some have interpreted this ad- 
ministration's initiative for Project Inde- 
pendence, in which we have set the year 1980 
as the year in which we, because we are 
blessed by great natural resources, can and 
will become totally independent, we believe, 
of any outside source for energy, that that 
in itself is an indication that the United 
States in the energy field will go into business 
for itself, that we will reject the idea of 

being not only dependent on any foreign 
sources but of working with other govern- 
ments, including the governments in this 
room, and for that matter, of working with 
those nations which presently furnish oil 
exports to us and to other nations in the 
years ahead. 

The purpose of our Project Independence, 
let me emphasize, is not isolation. The pur- 
pose is for this nation, the United States, to 
do what any one of you would do if you were 
in our position : to develop your own re- 
sources so that you can be self-sufficient. 

But our purpose beyond that is not then 
to turn away from a position of trading with 
other nations, of not engaging with other na- 
tions in the development of their resources 
and trading our resources when it serves 
our interest; what we desire is a world in 
which there will be trade between nations 
and among them, a world in which there will