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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




'3: 

7 



7SSi- 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1854 



January 6, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE 
AT BRUSSELS 1 

U.S. ABSTAINS ON PROPOSED OAS RESOLUTION 
TO RESCIND THE SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 8 

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: 

ADJUSTING TO PRESENT-DAY REALITIES 

Address by Ambassador William S. Mailliard 19 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1854 
January 6, 1975 



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The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by tfu 
Office of Media Services, Bureau al 
Public Affairs, provides tlie public ant 
interested agencies of tfie governmeiti 
witfi information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ani 
on tite work of the Department ani 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selectee 
press releases on foreign policy, issuei 
by the Wtiite House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses,, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases at 
international affairs and the functiont 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become « 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Xations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 



Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at Brus- 
sels on December 13 at the conclusion of the 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council. 

Press release 530 dated December 13 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, let me simply say that I thought this 
was a most useful, very amicable meeting. 
The new format of restricted sessions makes 
for a better dialogue and less formal state- 
ments. I recognize it also makes for more 
erratic briefings, since not all delegations 
interpret the restrictions in a similar man- 
ner; and we will sort that out by the next 
NATO meeting. So, for those of you who have 
suffered from an excessive scrupulousness 
by our spokesman, my apologies. 

Let me take your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a lot of confusion 
on this side of the Atlantic about a very im- 
portant matter which bears on what you 
discussed here, which is — exactly what is the 
American policy now with regard to the price 
of oil? I refer, of course, to the reports on 
the Enders [_Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant 
Secretary for Economic and Business Af- 
fairs] statement at Yale? 

Secretary Kissinger: My colleague Enders 
makes so many statements that when you say 
"at Yale" you imply that this is a very clearly 
circumscribed event. The American policy on 
the price of oil is that we believe that the 
present oil prices are too high and that, for 
the sake of the stability and progress of the 
world economy, it should be reduced and that 
this is also in the long-term interest of the 
producers. 

In the absence of these price reductions, it 
is our policy that the consuming nations 



should improve their cooperation in order 
to withstand the impact of these high prices 
and also to provide incentives for an ulti- 
mate reduction of prices. One of these efforts 
to mitigate the impact of high oil prices is to 
develop alternative sources of energy, and 
there have been some studies on whether an 
incentive should be created for these al- 
ternative sources of energy by creating a 
floor price so that if the price of oil sinks be- 
low that of the alternative sources of energy, 
there won't be massive economic dislocation. 
But at this point, this is a subject of study 
and consideration. It is not a governmental 
decision, and as I said, I think my colleague 
Enders was speaking in an academic environ- 
ment academically. 

Q. Concerning the energy problem, Mr. 
Secretary, do you think that there is any con- 
tradiction between the way the United States 
wants to start cooperation and the French 
ivay; and after your meeting with Mr. Saw- 
vagnargucs [Jean Sauvagnargties, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic] , 
do you think that agreement can be reached 
on the problem between both President Ford 
and Giscard d'Estaing in Martinique? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are approaching 
the meeting in Martinique with the attitude 
of intending to find a solution to the differ- 
ences that may exist. In principle, we do not 
believe that there is a contradiction ; in fact, 
we believe that consumer cooperation is the 
prerequisite to producer dialogue, because 
otherwise the consumer-producer dialogue is 
going to turn into a repetition on multi- 
lateral basis of the bilateral dialogues that 
are already going on. 

So we believe that solution is possible and 
that the two approaches, which are not con- 
tradictory, can be reconciled; and I would 



January 6, 1975 



like to point out that at the Washington 
Energy Conference last year [February 
1974] the United States proposed that con- 
sumer cooperation should be followed by con- 
sumer-producer dialogue. In short, we are 
going to Martinique with the attitude that a 
solution is possible in the common interest 
of all of the consumers and, ultimately, in 
the common interest of both consumers and 
producers. 

Q. I would like to know [after] the Atlan- 
tic Council, if you [feel] that there are yet 
major differences to overcome in the oil 
strategy, and second, if you are concerned 
about the present status of the alliance in the 
Mediterranean and if you ask of your allies 
an extra effort in this area? 

Secretary Kissinger: On oil strategy, I 
think there is agreement — or I had the im- 
pression that there is agreement — about the 
sequence of moves that should be undertaken. 
Whether the definition of what constitutes 
consumer cooperation is as yet homogeneous, 
I am not sure; but we will try to work that 
out in Martinique. We certainly do not be- 
lieve that the consumers should exhaust their 
energy in disputes among themselves. We are 
going to Martinique vi^ith a positive attitude 
and with the intention of finding a solution 
to the problem of the sequence, which I think 
will be relatively easy, and the definition of 
consumer cooperation, which we believe to 
be possible. 

With respect to the Mediterranean, this is 
of course an area of concern. It was dis- 
cussed in the NATO Council, and I do not 
think that there were significant diiferences 
of opinion. 

Q. We heard that in the ministerial meet- 
ing you mentioned to your colleagues that 
you are pessimistic regarding a peaceful 
settlement in the Middle East. Is it because 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or is it because 
of the oil crisis? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is totally untrue. 
I did not express pessimism about the possi- 
bility of a peaceful settlement. My sentence 
structure is so complicated that my colleagues 
sometimes miss the end of the sentence and 



concentrate on the beginning [laughter] . So 
I would like to make absolutely clear that 
I am not pessimistic about the possibility of 
a peaceful settlement. The United States is 
making a major effort to produce progress 
toward a peaceful settlement, and I am not 
at all pessimistic about it. Quite the contrary. 

Q. Can you put an end to these rumors 
that there is an American special army which 
is training now to occtipy Arab oilfields as 
one of your ivays to get — 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no American 
army that is being trained to take over Arab 
oilfields. 

Q. Do you see any hope of further politi- 
cal progress in the Middle East before Brezh- 
nev's visit to Cairo? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
cannot make its actions dependent on the 
travels of the General Secretary of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union, and there- 
fore we will do our best to make progress as 
rapidly as possible. As you know, I have had 
talks with the Foreign Minister of Israel, 
and I expect to see him again in January, but 
we are not following a timetable which is 
dictated by the travels of Mr. Brezhnev nor, 
may I say, have we been asked by any Arab 
government to gear our actions to the trav- 
els of Mr. Brezhnev. 

Q. / understand that the major part of the 
discussions held here this week dealt with 
questions of defense. What part of the Coun- 
cil time was devoted to the humanitarian 
problem of alleviating the suffering of 
200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who are 
spending the winter in tents ? 

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, I have 
spent personally a great deal of time with 
the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, 
seeing each of them several times each day 
with the intention of narrowing the differ- 
ences and finding an acceptable basis for ne- 
gotiation. I did this because ultimately the 
alleviation of the suffering of the refugees 
in Cyprus, with which the U.S. Government 
is profoundly concerned, can best be achieved 
through a political solution of the Cyprus 



Department of State Bulletin 



problem. While I do not want to make any 
comments about these conversations, I am 
more hopeful than I was before I arrived 
that progress is possible and may become 
visible as events unfold. 

In addition to this, the U.S. Government 
is profoundly concerned with the fate of the 
refugees and will in the interlude between 
now and a political settlement do its utmost 
to ease their plight. Morever, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment is prepared to use its influence with 
the parties to bring about a settlement which 
is just and equitable. 

As far as the NATO meeting itself is con- 
cerned, it was thought best not to turn it 
into a confrontation, and I must say the 
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey both 
spoke with restraint and wisdom and in a 
manner which I think contributed to the 
hopes for a peaceful solution which we all 
share, and which may have been brought 
somewhat closer. 

Q. Do you think that your talks with the 
two Ministers contributed to moderation be- 
tween the tivo countries and that after your 
talks with them that the intercommunal 
talks in Cyprus will start soon? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that with re- 
spect to the intercommunal talks that any 
announcement with respect to that would 
have to come from Nicosia. And this is a 
matter for the two communities to decide 
and not for the American Secretary of State 
to determine or to announce. It is my im- 
pression that the talks — I don't know wheth- 
er the talks contributed to an atmosphere of 
moderation or could build on an existing at- 
mosphere of moderation. As I said, I am 
more hopeful than I was when I came here 
that progress can be made. 

Q. I am a little puzzled by your expression 
of hope. A senior American official said ear- 
lier that very little could come out of these 
discussions in view of the American Con- 
gress' action to cut off aid to Turkey. Doesn't 
that still pertain? 

Secretary Kissinger: That still pertains to 
the substance of the talks. The question con- 
cerns procedures. I believe that conditions 



exist for progress and negotiations. I also 
believe that the actions of the American 
Congress, if they are maintained, will impede 
this progress. I have said so repeatedly. 

Q. What are your views on the anxiety of 
Mr. Brezhnev for the European summit — 
for the summit of the European Security 
Conference — and the recent talks iyi France 
tvhere France in some way endorsed the 
European Security Conference summit next 
year in Helsinki? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has maintained the position, which it adopted 
together with its other allies, that the deci- 
sion on whether there should be a summit 
should await the determination of the results 
of the second stage of the conference. This 
has been the American position and it re- 
mains the American position, and it is that 
if the results justify it we are prepared to go 
to a summit, and there has been no change 
in our position. I can't interpret the Franco- 
Soviet communique because it has been ex- 
plained to me that there are subtleties in the 
French language that are untranslatable into 
English [laughter]. If that is so, it may be 
that they follow the same principles that I 
have just announced. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your conversation 
ivith the Greek and Turkish Ministers, you 
are a little bit encouraged. Do you have the 
impression that a solution can be achieved 
if you could, for example, make a tnp to 
Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia? 

Secretary Kissinger: None of you will ever 
know whether I understand French or not 
[laughter], but it is not necessary for my 
answer [laughter]. I would like to repeat 
what I said in reply to Mr. Freed [Kenneth 
J. Freed, Associated Press]. Whether sub- 
stantive progress can be made depends in 
part on certain domestic legislative issues 
that are yet to be resolved in the United 
States. I would also like to emphasize again 
what I have said repeatedly — that the United 
States supports aid for Turkey not in order 
to take sides in the Greek-Turkish dispute 
and not as a favor to Turkey, but because it 
believes it is essential for the security of the 



January 6, 1975 



West. Now, if I understood the question cor- 
rectly — whether it involves travels to An- 
kara, Athens, and Nicosia — we believe that 
the major problem is to get the talks started. 
And once the talks are started with the right 
attitude, the United States will be prepared 
to do what the parties request to accelerate 
them and to help them along. But I think we 
cannot determine this until the talks have 
been started. But I hope that progress can 
be made, and fairly soon. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you speak French with- 
out subtlety. Very simply, it seems that some 
time ago you were very concerned about the 
internal Italian political situation. Are you 
still so concerned? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
I have stated any public views on the interior 
situation of Italy. It is always complicated 
and always seems to get solved, and I think 
that I have so much difficulty conducting 
foreign policy that I don't want to get in- 
volved in the domestic politics of the country 
that produced Machiavelli [laughter] . 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were 
not familiar with the subtleties of the French 
language, but I heard yesterday that you 
asked Mr. Sauvagnargues for his interpreta- 
tion of the paragraph of the Rambouillet 
communique on the European Security Con- 
ference. Mr. Sauvagnargiies gave it to you. 
He said that it had the same meaning as the 
Vladivostok communique, and you said that 
you did not agree. Is this true ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think as a matter 
of principle we should not begin the practice 
of restricted sessions by then discussing what 
went on in restricted session. If, as I pointed 
out before, the communique from Rambouil- 
let has the same meaning as the communique 
in Vladivostok, then, of course, we agree with 
it [laughter]. If it has a different meaning, 
then we would obviously have that degree 
of disagreement with it, since only two weeks 
before we found another formulation better. 
But I am willing to accept the French state- 
ment that it has exactly the same meaning. 



Q. You are the representative of the most 
powerful and the richest nation in the world. 
You therefore have an enormous influence 
to which is added your own well-known per- 
sonal dynamism. Hoivever, a number of coun- 
tries ayid people are concerned because your 
poiver gives you the appearance of an ele- 
phayit. When an elephant turns around, he 
sometimes does damage — even when making 
a gesture of friendship. What are you doing 
personally, Mr. Kissinger, to see to it that 
the elephant retains his goodness but is not 
too heavy when he leans in a certain direc- 
tion [laughter] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that this is a 
serious question actually, and it is a problem 
that the United States, because of its scale, 
can produce consequences with the best of 
intentions that are out of scale for some of 
its allies and partners. Now, knowing the 
problem doesn't necessarily mean that you 
know how to solve it, and as I pointed out 
yesterday to some of my colleagues, in the 
economic field, for example, we are prepared 
to discuss with our friends our long-term in- 
tentions and to hear their views before we 
make any irrevocable decisions. And the best 
solution we have is, one, that we should be 
aware of the problem, and secondly, that we 
should have intensive consultations with our 
allies in more fields than has been customary 
to give them an opportunity to learn our 
views and to give us an opportunity to learn 
their concerns. I know the word "consulta- 
tion" is one of these that produces linguis- 
tic difficulties, and we are happy to call it 
by some other name if it helps matters. 

Q. [Can you say what you feel will be the 
impact of] the economic recession and high 
oil prices on the NATO military alliance? 
Either now or in the future? 

Secretary Kissinger: Some of these ac- 
counts have an even greater sense of the dra- 
matic than the officials'. The basic issue is 
that in the twenties and thirties the problem 
of the industrialized countries was depres- 
sion. Gradually a theory was developed, the 



Department of State Bulletin 



Keynesian theory, which was a means of 
overcoming depressions, and when it was 
applied on a sufficiently massive scale, it 
worked. The problem of the industrialized 
world since the war has been inflation — and 
inflation that sometimes continues even dur- 
ing periods of recession. This is an inherent 
problem of all Western societies for which 
no adequate theory exists ; and therefore now 
under the impact of high oil prices, of con- 
current inflation and potential recession, it 
is necessary to take decisive action to main- 
tain both the economic stability and progress 
and the political stability of these countries. 
This is a well-known fact, and of course if it 
isn't mastered, political instability will grow, 
and therefore it is bound to affect defense. 
This is a problem with which I believe 
all my colleagues agreed, and some of whom 
stated it much more eloquently than I did, 
and in which I had the impression that all 
the delegations agreed to work with great 
seriousness even in the absence of the ade- 
quate conception of how to approach it. 

Q. Can we go back to the Turkish question? 
You said before leaviyig Washington that a 
cutoff in military aid to Turkey might under- 
mine your talks on the Cyprus question. You 
have now had three days of talks with the 
Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. Would 
you now say in fact that it did undermine 
your conversations? 

Secretary Kissinger: I maintain two points 
which I think it is important to keep in mind. 
I cannot repeat them often enough. 

American aid to Turkey is not given as a 
favor to Turkey. It is given for the common 
defense of the West. And when we start 
stopping aid to affect immediate tactical is- 
sues, we will over a period of time under- 
mine the cohesion of the alliance — the se- 
curity of the West — and create a totally 
wrong impression of the nature of our mili- 
tary aid. I therefore believe it is one of the 
most dangerous things that has been done. 

Secondly, with respect to the talks — the 
talks as they have been now have not yet 
been undermined by it. If the aid is discon- 



tinued, however, progress is extremely un- 
likely. Therefore we have held the talks up 
to now in the context of a situation in which 
progress can be made. It is my judgment that 
this progress will become very difficult if the 
aid is discontinued. 

Let me just make one other point. I'm not 
saying this in order to back Turkey against 
Greece. I stated on Saturday in Washington 
that the United States believes that concilia- 
tion on the part of Turkey is very important 
and that it will support a solution which is 
fair to all sides, and that was the spirit with 
which I talked to both Foreign Ministers. 

Q. Do yoii think that after this Ministerial 
Coxincil meeting NATO will remain more 
united and coherent? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think this meeting 
was probably the best that I've attended as 
Secretary of State. Probably because the for- 
mat of the restricted meeting and the absence 
of formal speeches and a freer give-and- 
take permitted a discussion of the more es- 
sential issues, and secondly, because I have 
the impression that the Foreign Ministers of 
the alliance understand the fundamental is- 
sues that confront the West and acted in a 
cooperative and constructive spirit, and there 
were no significant divisions. 



North Atlantic Ministerial Council 
Meets at Brussels 

Following is the text of a communique is- 
sued on December 13 at the conclusion of the 
regular ministerial meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council at Brussels. 

Press release 632 dated December 16 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Min- 
isterial session in Brussels on 12th and 13th 
December, 1974. At the close of the year 
which marked the 25th Anniversary of the 
Alliance, Ministers noted with satisfaction 
that member countries remain firmly com- 
mitted to the Alliance and that this had 



January 6, 1975 



found solemn expression in the Ottawa Dec- 
laration. 

2. Ministers reviewed developments in 
East-West relations. They noted the progress, 
albeit uneven, towards detente over the past 
six months. They stated their readiness to 
continue their efforts to make progress in 
their negotiations and exchanges with the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries 
aimed at steady improvement in East-West 
relations. Noting, however, the increase in 
the military strength of the Warsaw Pact 
countries, and bearing in mind that security 
is the prerequisite for the policy of detente, 
they expressed their determination to main- 
tain their own defensive military strength. 

3. Ministers had a broad discussion on the 
implications of the current economic situa- 
tion for the maintenance of Alliance defense 
and noted the efforts made at both the na- 
tional and international levels to overcome 
the difficulties confronting the economies of 
the allied countries. They reaffirmed their 
determination to seek appropriate solutions 
in the spirit of cooperation and mutual con- 
fidence which characterizes their i-elations. 
Ministers decided to continue to consult on 
the repercussions of economic developments 
on areas within the direct sphere of compe- 
tence of the Alliance. 

4. Ministers noted that at the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe there 
had been enough progress to show that sub- 
stantial results were possible. Nonetheless, 
important questions remain to be resolved. 
Ministers expressed the undiminished deter- 
mination of their Governments to work pa- 
tiently and constructively towards balanced 
and substantial results under all the agenda 
headings of the Conference, so as to bring 
about a satisfactory conclusion to the Con- 
ference as a whole as soon as may be possible. 

5. Ministers of the participating countries 
reviewed the state of the negotiations in 
Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions. These negotiations have as their gen- 
eral objective to contribute to a more stable 
relationship and to the strengthening of peace 
and security in Europe, and their success 
would advance detente. These Ministers were 
resolved to pursue these negotiations with a 



view to ensuring undiminished security for 
all parties, at a lower level of forces in Cen- 
tral Europe. They reaffirmed their commit- 
ment to the establishment of approximate 
parity in the form of an agreed common 
ceiling for the ground force manpower of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area of 
reductions. They considered that a first phase 
reduction agreement covering United States 
and Soviet ground forces would be an im- 
portant and practical first step in this direc- 
tion. They noted that the negotiations have, 
so far, not produced results and expressed 
the hope that a constructive response to the 
Allied proposals would soon be forthcoming. 
They reaffirmed the importance they attach 
to the principle to which they adhere in these 
negotiations that NATO forces should not 
be reduced except in the context of a Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reduction Agreement 
with the East. 

6. Ministers heard a report from the 
United States Secretary of State on the con- 
tinuing United States efforts towards the 
further limitation of strategic offensive arms 
in the light of President Ford's recent talks 
with Mr. Brezhnev. They noted with satis- 
faction the significant progress towards limi- 
tation of strategic nuclear weapons achieved 
in Vladivostok. They expressed the hope that 
this progress will lead to the early conclu- 
sion of a satisfactory SALT II Agreement. 
They also expressed appreciation for contin- 
uing consultations within the Alliance with 
respect to the SALT negotiations. 

7. The Ministers reviewed the develop- 
ments concerning Berlin and Germany which 
have taken place since their last meeting in 
June 1974, especially as regards the appli- 
cation of those provisions of the Quadri- 
partite Agreement relating to the Western 
Sectors of Berlin. They considered, in partic- 
ular, traffic and ties between the Western 
Sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the representation abroad of the inter- 
ests of those sectors by the Federal Republic 
of Germany. They emphasized the impor- 
tance to the viability and security of the city 
of all provisions of the Quadripartite Agree- 
ment. The Ministers also emphasized that 
there is an essential connection between de- 



Department of State Bulletin 



tente in Europe and the situation relating 
to Berlin. 

8. Ministers expressed their concern about 
the situation in the Middle East which could 
have dangerous consequences for world peace 
and thus for the security of the members of 
the Alliance. They reaffirmed the overriding 
importance they attach to fresh progress 
towards a just and lasting peace in this area. 
They likewise welcomed the contributions 
which Allied Governments continue to make 
to United Nations peace-keeping activities. 
Ministers noted the report on the situation 
in the Mediterranean prepared by the Per- 
manent Council on their instructions. They 
found the instability in the area disquieting, 
warranting special vigilance on the part of 
the Allies. They invited the Permanent Coun- 
cil to continue consultations on this subject 
and to report further. 

9. As regards Greek-Turkish relations, 
Ministers heard a report by the Secretary 
General under the terms of his watching 
brief established by the Ministerial session 
of May 1964. They expressed the firm hope 
that relations between these two Allied coun- 
tries would rapidly return to normal. 

10. Ministers noted the progress of the 
work of the Committee on the Challenges of 
Modern Society, especially on solar and geo- 
thermal energy resources as well as on coast- 
al water pollution, improved sewage disposal, 
urban transport and health care. Ministers 
also noted the start of projects on the dis- 
posal of hazardous wastes and action to fol- 
low up completed CCMS studies on the 
prevention of ocean oil spills, road safety 
improvement, cleaner air and purer river 
water, thus enhancing the quality of life for 
their citizens. 

11. The Ministers directed the Council in 
permanent session to consider and decide on 
the date and place of the Spring session of 
the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlan- 
tic Council. 



U.S. and Spain Hold Second Session 
of Talks on Cooperation 

Text of Joint Communique ' 

The second round of negotiations on Span- 
ish-American cooperation took place in 
Washington from December 9 to 12. The 
Spanish delegation was headed by Under 
Secretary for Foreign Aifairs, His Excel- 
lency Juan Jose Rovira, and included mem- 
bers of the Spanish Foreign Office and mili- 
tary representatives led by General Gutier- 
rez Mellado of the Spanish High General 
Staff. The American delegation was headed 
by Ambassador-at-Large Robert McCloskey 
and included members of the Department of 
State and representatives of the Department 
of Defense, led by Rear Admiral Patrick 
Hannifin. 

The conversations proceeded according to 
the agenda and work program adopted at the 
first round of talks held in Madrid in No- 
vember. This second round focussed on the 
defense aspects in the relationship between 
the two countries in the light of the Joint 
Declaration of Principles signed last July, 
and included exchanges of views on this sub- 
ject by the military advisors of the two del- 
egations.- Both sides described their respec- 
tive positions and proceeded to explore areas 
for more detailed discussions. 

The conversations took place in a frank 
and cordial atmosphere and it was agreed 
that the next round of talks will take place 
in Madrid on January 27. The Spanish Am- 
bassador, His Excellency, Jaime Alba, hosted 
a lunch for Acting Secretary of State Robert 
Ingersoll and the American delegation, and 
Ambassador McCloskey offered a lunch to 
Under Secretary Rovira and the Spanish del- 
egation. 



' Issued on Dec. 12 (text from press release 524). 
'' For text of the declaration, see Bulletin of 
Aug. 5, 1974, p. 231. 



January 6, 1975 



U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To Rescind 
the Sanctions Against Cuba 



The 15th Meeting of Consultation of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Organization of 
American States was held at Quito November 
8-12 to consider a resolutioyi to rescind the 
sanctions against Cuba. The resolution did 
not obtain the two-thirds majority required 
under the Inter-American Treaty of Recip- 
rocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Following is 
a statement made in the meeting on Novem- 
ber 12 by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Inger- 
soll, who tvas chairman of the U.S. delega- 
tion, together with the transcript of a news 
conference held after the meeting by William. 
D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, and William S. Mailliard, 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS. 



STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL 
IN THE OAS MEETING OF CONSULTATION 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Foreign Min- 
isters and Special Delegates: We have re- 
mained silent prior to the vote because we 
wished to avoid even the appearance of in- 
fluencing by our remarks or by our actions 
the outcome of this Meeting of Consultation. 
Now I think a word of explanation of our 
vote is in order. 

As most of you are aware, the United 
States was initially opposed to a review of 
Resolution I at this time. We were persuaded 
by other nations that the issue should be 
discussed. We voted for the convocation 
of this meeting. And we have carefully at- 
tended these sessions and considered the 
statements of each of the members. 

The resolution convoking this meeting re- 
ceived unanimous approval in the Perma- 
nent Council of the OAS. It placed before us 



the important question of sanctions against 
Cuba. Ten years have passed since Resolution 
I was enacted by the Ninth Meeting of Con- 
sultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
It is natural that we should review that 
decision. 

We recognize that a majority now exists 
for lifting sanctions. On the other hand, we 
also recall that the measures contained in 
Resolution I were adopted in 1964 by an over- 
whelming majority of the OAS member 
states. Some states here today were, with 
good reason, among the most persuasive ad- 
vocates of sanctions. For some of us, evidence 
of Cuban hostility is fresh in our minds. 
Though 10 years have passed, the states of 
the Americas have still received no clear 
satisfaction that Cuba has abandoned the 
export of revolution. 

We have also taken into account another 
consideration. It is of the essence of the 
new dialogue not merely that we consider 
the major issues confronting this hemi- 
sphere, but that we do so in the spirit Pres- 
ident Rodriguez Lara of our host country, 
Ecuador, so well laid before us Friday, when 
he said that a fundamental part of our re- 
sponsibility was to : 

. . . openly and freely express the position of our 
countries. —While at the same time seeing that the 
possible differences of opinion that may arise in no 
way affect the Inter-American solidarity that we 
seek to strengthen. 

We have considered all these factors in 
coming to our decision to abstain. But our 
abstention should not be taken as a sign of 
anything other than the fact that the United 
States has voted in accordance with its own 
perception of this question at this time. We 
respect the views of the majority who have 



Department of State Bulletin 



voted for this resolution. We have not voted 
"no," and we have not worked against the 
resolution. We also respect the views of 
those who entertain such serious reserva- 
tions with respect to Cuba and who therefore 
have felt it necessary to vote against. 

If this Meeting of Consultation has not 
produced a conclusive result, it has at least 
aired in a constructive way the fact that 
there is no easy solution to the problem of 
a country which deals vdth some on the basis 
of hostility and with others on the basis of 
a more normal relationship. 

I should add that the United States looks 
forward to the day when the Cuban issue is 
no longer a divisive issue for us. Cuba has 
absorbed far too much of our attention in 
recent years. We need to turn our energies 
to the more important questions. We must 
not let a failure of agreement on the Cuban 
issue at this time obscure our common in- 
terest in working together toward mutually 
beneficial relationships on the major issues 
of this decade. 

Finally, I would like to express my appre- 
ciation to the Government of Ecuador, to 
President Rodriguez Lara, and to Foreign 
Minister Lucio-Paredes, for acting as hosts 
of this important inter-American meeting. 
We are fortunate to have such an able and 
experienced chairman in Foreign Minister 
Lucio-Paredes. We are grateful for your ex- 
cellent preparations and hospitality. Your 
high sense of responsibility toward the inter- 
American system should be an example to 
us all. 



NEWS CONFERENCE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
ROGERS AND AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD 

Q. I would like to ask where you are going 
from here? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Back to Wash- 
ington. [Laughter.] 

Q. On this issue, what do you foresee ? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You mean on 
the Cuban issue in the international orga- 
nization concept? Well, I would say that since 



Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind 
the Sanctions Against Cuba ^ 

Draft Resolution Submitted by the Dele- 
gations OF Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Venezuela 

Whereas: 

The Permanent Council of the Organization 
of American States, by resolution CP/RES. 
117 (133-74) of September 20, 1974, which 
was approved unanimously, convoked this 
Meeting so that the Org-an of Consultation 
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, mindful of strict respect for the 
principle of non-intervention by one State in 
the affairs of other States, and bearing in 
mind the change in the circumstances prevail- 
ing when measures were adopted against the 
Government of Cuba, might decide whether 
the rescinding of Resolution I of the Ninth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, held in Washington, D.C., in 
1964, is justified; 

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the 
Special Delegates stated the position of their 
respective governments with regard to the 
subject matter of the resolution convoking 
the meeting, 

The Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation 
OF Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 

Resolves : 

1. To rescind Resolution I of the Ninth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For- 
eign Affairs, held in Washington in 1964. 

2. To request the Governments of the Amer- 
ican States to faithfully observe the principle 
of non-intervention and to abstain from any 
act inconsistent therewith. 

3. To inform the Security Council of the 
United Nations of the text of the present 
resolution. 



' The resolution did not obtain the two- 
thirds majority required for adoption; the 
vote was 12 to 3, with 6 abstentions (U.S.). 



the resolution failed, according to the terms 
of the treaty there's no change in the legal 
status. What may occur in bilateral relation- 
ships of various member countries remains 
to be seen. 

Q. On the basis of your intimate knowl- 
edge of what goes on inside the inter-Ameri- 



JanucHy 6, 1975 



can community, Mr. Ambassador, what coun- 
tnes do you think, as a result of having 
failed to get the two-thirds vote they wanted 
here, might just go ahead and recognize 
Cuba? 

Ambassador Mailliard: I don't think I'd 
want to name countries. A lot of statements 
have been made over the last few weeks and 
months by some countries that said no matter 
whether the sanctions were lifted or not 
they would not renew relations. Some others 
said they probably would. I don't think it's 
up to us to speculate on what another sov- 
ereign nation is going to do. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, is there any chance that 
the Cuban issue might come up in the in- 
terval before the new-dialogue meeting in 
March in Buenos Aires or the General As- 
sembly in April? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I suppose the 
answer is that there's a chance that it will. 
Obviously, this will not be the last time we 
will hear the Cuban issue, and it could come 
up in a variety of fora. I think it's important 
to point out that Resolution No. I of the 1964 
meeting of Foreign Ministers specifically pro- 
vides that the Permanent Council is author- 
ized to deal with the question of raising 
Cuban sanctions in a specific manner under 
specific terms set down in that very resolu- 
tion. So that the resolution itself establishes 
another forum in which this question can be 
raised, and there are a wide variety of other 
juridical ways that it's imaginable the ques- 
tion will come up in the OAS itself. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, we understand that there 
have been some private conversations around, 
I assume within the delegation and the other 
foreign delegations, as to what the United 
States might accept at this meeting. Could 
you tell us what it was that we might have 
accepted that they never offered us? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't 
have any fallback positions, Mr. Manitzas 
[Frank Manitzas, CBS]. I take it you're say- 
ing in terms of lifting the sanctions itself? 
No. Our posture, our position from the very 
beginning — and we attempted to make this 



clear to the other member states — was that " 
we were not opposed to the calling of this 
meeting if they thought it desirable, at the 
Foreign Ministers level, that we were pre- 
pared to come and participate and listen. 
We adopted the policy from the very outset, 
and carried it through with great care, of 
not influencing or arm-twisting any other 
.state with respect to their position or vote. 
That is a position we have followed through 
on from the beginning to the end of this 
conference. We regard that as an affirmative 
contribution to the dialogue itself at this 
conference, and that is essentially the posi- 
tion we brought from the beginning and 
carried through to the end of it. 

Q. Then there was no language that they 
could have offered you in the resolution on 
Cuba that you could have voted for — that 
the United States could have voted for? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't 
have any fallback position that we were pre- 
pared to accept on this. We wanted to listen 
to what everyone had to say and to see what 
the essential weight of opinion was on the 
part of the other states. 

Q. I'd like to ask you, if you could tell us 
7ww, the degree to which you made this clear, 
your delegation's position of abstention from 
debate, and any resolution, to Foreign Minis- 
ters with whom you or Secretary Ingersoll 
met here, and on what dates? What I am 
driving at is that it seems to have been the 
case that until Saturday, Latin delegations 
were not really sure of the policy you just 
described, and toe ourselves in briefing ses- 
sions here were being given the impression 
that there was a fallback position and that 
there were things that could have been done, 
whereas we now know, as do the Latin coun- 
tries, that your instructions were to abstain 
and there was no change in those instruc- 
tions. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That's a fair 
question. I think I'd like to divide the answer 
up into two parts, or at least our position up 
into two parts, because we thought about that 
very carefully. When I say that, I mean 
the time when we would announce the fact 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



that we were going to abstain with respect 
to the resolution drafted in Washington and 
which was on the table here at this meeting. 

We did decide at the very outset that we 
would adopt what I personally regard as a 
new and healthy posture on the part of the 
United States, and that was not to pressure 
any country with respect to our point of view 
about the issues at the meeting or with re- 
spect to how that country ought to vote. That 
posture we announced long before the meet- 
ing began, and as I say, we followed through 
the entire meeting, both in the halls of the 
meeting room itself and in our private con- 
versations with the other delegations, in a 
manner which was utterly consistent with 
that non-arm-twisting posture by the United 
States. 

We did not, you are quite right, an- 
nounce — before we arrived or at the time we 
arrived — that we were going to abstain un- 
der any circumstances. The reason was that, 
had we announced we were going to abstain 
with respect to the pending resolution, that 
in itself would have been inconsistent with 
the neutrality of a non-arm-twisting policy. 
Because that might have had an effect on 
certain delegations and committed them to 
a position of abstention before they had 
heard the views of the other member states. 

So that essentially our posture was divided 
up into those two aspects — one, our policy 
of non-arm-twisting, and two, the final vote 
we would take. The first part we announced 
at the very outset. The second part we did 
not announce until we were sure that each 
state had a chance to hear what the others 
had to say and had made up its mind as to 
how it was going to vote. 

Is that responsive to your question? 

Q. Yes it is, sir. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Good. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, ivhen did you actually 
make up your mind to abstain — here, while 
coming, or two weeks ago? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think that's 
a fair question and let me try to answer as 
quickly as I can. The answer is that we had, 
let's say, 90 percent or 80 percent decided 



to abstain with respect to that resolution, 
the one that had been predrafted in Wash- 
ington and was on the table here, assuming 
that we were correct in our prophecy as to 
what the parliamentary situation was going 
to be and what the general international 
situation was going to be, and assuming 
that no other new' and imaginative proposals 
were put on the table which we hadn't fore- 
seen. 

What I'm trying to say is that we were not 
locked into that position absolutely hard and 
fast, and had this matter, in terms of the 
parliamentary situations, positions of other 
delegations, or other factors been different 
than they finally turned out to be, we would 
reconsider that. 

Is that responsive to your question, Juan 
[Juan Walte, United Press International] ? 

Q. Mr. Rogers, if it were a differently 
worded resolution, could it have been voted 
for? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That is 
pretty hypothetical, Anita [Anita Gumpert, 
Agence France Presse], in terms of saying 
what had to really hit the table with a strong 
consensus of other Latin American support. 

Q. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, for pinning 
this dotvn slightly more. Did you or Am- 
bassador Mailliard or Secretary Kissinger, 
to your knowledge, at any time, give any 
tacit or passive encouragement to the spon- 
soring countries or give to them the impres- 
sion by smiles [laughter-'] that you might 
shift your position from abstention to favor- 
able under certain conditions? [Laughter.'] 
In other words, did you give them the im- 
pression at any time that you or the United 
States or the State Department would he 
glad to see the sanctions lifted with strictly 
Latin American support? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: These are 
really two different questions, I think. The 
first question was, did we ever signal to 
them by a smile or a hint, in other words a 
body-language diplomacy? [Laughter.] The 
answer I have to give you is that we didn't 
intend to. 

Q. Did you? 



January 6, 1975 



11 



Assistant Secretary Rogers: Did we? I 
don't have the foggiest idea. As I say, I may 
have smiled. If I did, I apologize if I 
did mislead them. I don't knovi^ [laughter], 
you learn something in this diplomatic game 
all the time. Did you prefer to comment on 
that? 

Ambassador MailUard: No, I think that's 
absolutely right. How they may have inter- 
preted things, I think is a little difficult for 
us to tell. But, certainly as far as the co- 
sponsors were concerned, we told them a 
long, long time ago that they shouldn't count 
on us for either opposition or support. 

Q. You told them that specifically, sir? 

Aynbassador Mailliard: Yes. Very spe- 
cifically. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, ive've seen the new dia- 
logue working here with no arm-twisting, 
etc., or at least it's ivhat you say is going on. 
What is going to happen when you see that 
they have the 14. votes? Will you still continue 
this new dialogue of sitting back and let it 
go or wait for them to come to you? Or 
is the new dialogue going to have "clause 
three" that we have to defend our interests 
and we tvill move out? In other words, in 
this case, you had a better count than the 
sponsors. There was never any need for you 
to move to tnake certain a position was 
not adopted against the position that you 
wanted. What happens when you see they 
have the lU votes? What happens to this 
new dialogue then? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: If I under- 
stand the question correctly, Frank, it is 
what would be our position in terms of 
pressure and arm-twisting and U.S. posture 
when there are 14 votes to lift the sanctions. 

Q. When there are H. votes against the 
position the United States has, hotv are you 
going to work the neiv dialogue? Obviously 
it is easy to see it working when someone is 
doing your wwk for you, in a sense. I'm 
not saying you ivere having it done for you, 
but they were doing it. What happens when 
you have to go out and start moving bodies 



and moving votes yourself? How are you 
going to do this with the new dialogue? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think you 
misstate the proposition, in a sense, Frank. 
We didn't have a position. We were not 
opposed to a lifting of the sanctions. 

Had we been opposed, if it had been some 
other measure and we had been opposed, 
we would have, in a new-dialogue way, 
frankly stated our position on this matter. 
That's part of the new dialogue — that every 
country ought to speak up with respect to 
its own interests. 

In this particular instance the fundamen- 
tal point of this conference is that the United 
States did not have a position in opposition 
to the lifting of the sanctions. We did not. 
And we didn't say to any country that we 
did. And we did not vote against it. We 
made perfectly clear to the sponsors, and 
they understood it, that they had a clear 
field. They had a clear shot at lifting those 
sanctions if they could make it work. And 
we were not going to lift a finger against 
them. And we played by that rule from the 
very beginning to the very end. 

Now, that, essentially, it seems to me is 
precisely consistent with the new dialogue. 
If we had a position in opposition, you would 
have heard about it, as has been the case in 
all the other conferences in the past. 

Ambassador Mailliard: You also made 
an assumption when you said that we had 
a better count. We didn't know for sure 
whether there would be 14 votes or not. 

Q. I'd like to pick up on the last part of 
the last question, and that is, if they had had 
the U votes would it have been in the in- 
terests of the United States to have the sanc- 
tions lifted without our having to cast a 
vote in favor? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I'm not 
sure — 

Q. The last part of the last question had 
to do with whether the United States really 
would have ivelcoyned the lifting of the sanc- 
tions without the United States having to 
cast a vote in favor of it. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We never 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



said that, because that would have been an 
announcement of our position. 

Q. No, I knoiv you didn't say it, hut would 
it he fair to say it would he an assumption? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You want to 
know what was in our secret hearts? 

Q. That's right. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That would 
be telling, wouldn't it? No, I don't mean to 
be captious about it. 

Ambassador Mailliard: I think that there 
is such a simple answer to that, it might be 
hard to believe; but if two-thirds of the 
member states had concluded that the sanc- 
tions should be lifted, then I think you have 
to question whether there were any sanc- 
tions at all. So that there wasn't a question 
of where our interests lay. It depended upon 
the parliamentary situation. If that over- 
whelming a majority of the Latins felt that 
this was no longer a viable position, it would 
have been pretty foolish for us, it seems to 
me, to take a contrary view. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, how do you view the 
effects of this vote on the strength of the 
OAS? Do you think that the potency of the 
OAS has heen increased by this vote, or do 
you think it has heen a setback for the OAS? 
And in your talks since the vote with other 
delegations, what have their feelings been as 
to the effect of this on the OAS? 

Ambassador Mailliard: A little bit. This 
meeting was convened under the Rio Treaty. 
The only reason this meeting was held was 
because of the concern of a number of coun- 
tries that the binding obligations of the Rio 
Treaty appeared not to be being observed, to 
the extent that several countries did not com- 
ply with their obligations under the treaty. I 
think this is really what has caused the 
whole thing to operate. 

So, I think if you are talking about the 
Rio Treaty alone and you're going to be 
candid, you got to say that if now, even 
though the sanctions are not lifted, an appre- 
ciable number of other countries renew 
bilateral relations, then the Rio Treaty is to 
some extent weakened. But to translate that 
into the destruction of the inter-American 



system, I think, is a vast exaggeration of the 
problem. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as far as you know, is 
the March meeting of the Foreign Ministers 
going to come off as scheduled in Buenos 
Air-es, and second, would this whole business 
C07ne up again at that meeting? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes. As far 
as we know the March meeting is on track. 
We look forward to it with a great sense 
of anticipation. The Secretary will be there. 
We will be discussing real new-dialogue 
issues across the board, the vast number of 
fundamental and first-order issues that were 
on the agendas, as you know, both at Tlate- 
lolco and Atlanta. We do not see this one- 
issue meeting here as having any serious 
effect on the March meeting in Buenos Aires. 

Q. [Question unintelligible but concerned 
correspondent's contention that "countries 
defeated were supposed to be democratic and 
representative governments," and countries 
which "won" were "vastly more aggres- 
sive."} Do you, think this has harmed the 
inter-American system? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don't know 
if the inter-American system is harmed by 
whether one category of countries wins or 
another category of countries loses. That 
tends to make distinctions between countries 
that I think are not a solid basis for the 
conduct of relations within an international 
organization. 

The fact of the matter is that the basic 
problem, as Ambassador Mailliard just has 
pointed out, is the structure — the juridical 
structure — of the Rio Treaty itself. The Rio 
Treaty itself, in the first instance, required 
that the sanctions be imposed on the basis 
of a two-thirds vote. 

At that time the proponents of the sanc- 
tions had the uphill struggle of getting two- 
thirds. They got enough or more than that 
because of the fact that Venezuela, as you 
know, one of the countries now a proponent 
of the lifting of the sanctions, felt itself 
threatened. And at that time, it was Romulo 
Betancourt's government — one of the em- 
battled democracies of all time, which was 
operating, as I well remember, under the 



January 6, 1975 



13 



threat of military attack or guerrilla attack 
on the elections at that time— which was one 
of the initiators of the sanctions. And the 
sanctions required a two-thirds vote then. 

The fact of the matter is that the same 
rule applies today under the Rio Treaty, for 
better or for worse, and two-thirds are re- 
quired to lift it, and the fact of the matter 
was that the lifting of the mandated sanc- 
tions under Resolution I of the 1964 meeting 
could not command a two-thirds majority. 

Now, there are lots of things you could 
say about that, and one of them may well 
be that the juridical structure of the Rio 
Treaty ought to be changed, and we are per- 
fectly prepared to look at that question. But 
I don't think we ought to talk about this 
as an ultimate and disturbing defeat for 
some people and a victory for others. It 
may indicate that we have got to look for 
better ways for arriving at consensuses 
within the system. And as I said, the United 
States is quite well prepared to do that. 

Q. I have a question about the participa- 
tion at the Buenos Aires meeting. One of 
the issues there is whether or not to invite 
Cuba. First, have you been asked by the 
Argentine Government how you feel about 
it, and how do you feel about it? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: The answer 
is no. 

Q. The second, how do you feel about it? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I'll wait 
till Vignes [Argentine Foreign Minister Al- 
berto Vignes] asks the Secretary. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a 
theoretical question. Under the terms of the 
Rio Treaty the signatories are bound by the 
decision, obviously. If there had been a 
two-thirds majority here in favor of lifting 
the sanctions, both commercial and diplo- 
matic, against Cuba, ivould the United States 
have gone along and resumed relations with 
Cuba immediately, or within a reasonable 
time ? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes, that's 
a fair question, and I think you're quite 
right to ask it in a way which emphasizes 



the difference between a resolution here 
which would ostensibly have repealed the 
1964 resolution of the Foreign Ministers 
meeting and what then happens bilaterally. 

Now, the legal effect of the resolution 
which didn't achieve the two-thirds majority 
at this meeting essentially would have been 
to repeal the adoption of the measures by 
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 
1964, which, in our legal view, became bind- 
ing on all the states — that they terminate 
diplomatic relations, that they terminate 
commercial relations, and that they do what- 
ever they can with respect to maritime com- 
merce to reduce trade with Cuba. Those 
were requirements which were and still are, 
in our view, binding on all member states 
of the OAS. Had those requirements been 
eliminated, it would then have been up to 
each country to decide what to do. 

The United States had terminated diplo- 
matic relations and had instituted a number 
of measures with respect to its commercial 
relations with Cuba prior to the 1964 reso- 
lution, and by the same token those measures 
— termination of diplomatic relations, and 
measures affecting commerce — would have 
legally survived the action here at Quito, 
had the resolution which was proposed 
gathered the two-thirds vote. Now, what 
we would thereafter have done bilaterally, 
if you will, with Cuba really would have been 
essentially a Cuba-U.S. question, and essen- 
tially it still is a Cuba-U.S. question. And 
we have made no statement with respect 
to our posture in terms of how quickly we 
would have moved on that issue, and on 
what basis. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Ford administration 
has said that the United States unilaterally 
ivould not review diplomatic relations with- 
out consultation with the OAS members, 
and that was the reason this meeting was 
called for; but now, we are sort of bound in 
the other direction, not to forge detente 
tvith Cuba. In other words, we sort of block 
off the whole liberal sector of the U.S. Con- 
gress by seeing this resolution fail today. 
Could that have been one of the Ford ad- 
ministration's approaches? 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don't think 
so. It seems to me what you are suggesting 
is that we manipulated the result here. And 
what I have been trying to say all day long 
is that we did our best — we may have 
failed just because we are who we are — but 
we really did our serious, legitimate best to 
eliminate any manipulation or pressure or 
arm-twisting by the United States. Now 
you may not credit that, or it may sound, 
in an inter-American context, difficult to be- 
lieve in view of the history we all know of 
U.S. efforts in this respect. But it is the case. 

Q. Well, you know, this is a very positive 
new stateynent. It comes out very positive, 
but the effect of your policy has had a very 
negative effect on the OAS. So I don't see 
how you can call it a positive policy when 
its effect is so negative. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: As I said, 
we don't regard the effect as negative on 
the OAS. In the first instance, with all due 
respect, there are lots of other issues in the 
inter-American system. I realize that Cuba 
is the big issue theatrically and in terms of 
public controversy. But we have a lot of 
other things that we have been attempting 
to talk about in the new-dialogue way with 
Latin America. And we think, in a sense, 
that the positive contribution we have made 
is to demonstrate that the United States is 
not going to dominate this inter-American 
system in the future; that we are not striv- 
ing for artificial consensus; that we are not 
trying to create synthetic agreement. This 
is a positive contribution not just to the 
discussion of the Cuban issue but to the 
discussion of a wide number of other issues, 
many of them in the minds of some people 
much more fundamental than this Cuban 
question. I will furthermore say that this 
is not the last time, I regret to say, that we 
are going to hear about the Cuban issue in 
the inter-American context or the last op- 
portunity that the inter-American system is 
going to have to come to grips with this 
narrowing question of sanctions. 

Q. (Spanish) [Question semi-intelligible 
but concerned correspondent's contention 



that countries like Chile and Paraguay had 
"won" and "democratically elected govern- 
ments such as Colombia and Venezuela had 
lost," and what effect this wotdd have on the 
inter-American system.] 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think it's 
unfair — or at least it's not a matter of sig- 
nificance which countries happen to line up 
on the same side of the vote, as I said, for 
the reasons that we have tried to make clear. 
That is to say, the desire of the United 
States was to avoid pressure and arm- 
twisting on this Cuban issue. 

The reasons the other countries voted the 
way they did were explained by the repre- 
sentatives of those countries. It is my firm 
belief that they did not vote the way they 
did just because the United States was vot- 
ing the way it did. They voted the way they 
did, as I think Minister Blanco [Uruguayan 
Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Blanco] in 
particular expressed very clearly as far as 
Uruguay was concerned, because they were 
not persuaded that Cuba has an equally neu- 
tral attitude with respect to internal affairs 
within Uruguay. Now, that essentially is 
the reason for the Uruguayan position. 

In the case of all the other countries, they 
took the positions they took for the reasons 
they took them, and the mere fact that 
country x is one category and country y is 
in another category, I regard as having little 
significance. 

Q. Let's carry Mr. O'Mara's [Richard 
O'Mara, Baltimore Sun] question a step fur- 
ther. Whatever the scenario may be in your 
own minds in Washington for developing 
bilateral relations with Cuba, whatever that 
timetable may be, has it now been affected, 
has it noiv been set back? Are you now 
incapable of moving ahead with whatever 
you might, in your own minds, want to move 
ahead with because of the decision taken 
here today? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Well, quite 
frankly, because we didn't have a timetable 
and we don't have an agenda for Cuban rela- 
tions, our basic position is that we have 
been and will continue to abide by the OAS 



January 6, 1975 



15 



resolution. As I say, as President Ford has 
said, as to when and to the extent that our 
Cuban policy changes, we will be doing that 
in consultation with the other members of 
the Organization and consistent with its reg- 
ulations. We have not had a timetable nor 
do we have a formal agenda for business 
with Cuba. Is that responsive to your ques- 
tion? 

Q. Can I carry it one step further? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Sure. 

Q. Does this prevent you from establish- 
ing any kind of timetable? In other words, 
does that question of bilateral relations now 
absolutely guide you with respect to the 
OAS? 

Assistayit Secretary Rogers: Well that's 
a fair question, and if I can answer it can- 
didly without you guys reading a lot into 
the entrails of my answer, let me say this. 
As a matter of law, we are forbidden, ob- 
viously, from having diplomatic relations 
with Cuba. That does not, however, pro- 
hibit us from considering whether to estab- 
lish. In other words, we can think unthink- 
able thoughts, even though we can't do il- 
legal things. I'll be quoted on that one, I 
can see it [laughter.] Don't write that down. 
[Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Rogers, could you give us some in- 
formation on the priorities of the United 
States vis-a-vis Latin America right now? 
It seems that the problems we are having 
now are over trade — in the economic fields. 
It seems to be less political, which means 
that Cuba is really not one of our considera- 
tions. Tell 2is something abotit the situation 
with the multinationals. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Right. I 
think that's a very good question. I think 
it does put the issues here somewhat better 
in perspective. I'm never sure whether it's 
an expression of my personal boredom 
with the Cuban issue or a legitimate feeling 
that the economic questions really are the 
dominant ones in the inter-American system 



today. But, whichever the reason for my 
feelings about it, I do feel that way. There 
is no doubt that these are the really great 
issues of the time. They are enormously 
complicated; they are enormously determi- 
native of the well-being of the people of 
Latin America; they get much closer, in 
my judgment, to the realities of life in 
this hemisphere and in the United States 
than the obstructions of the Cuban issue; 
and therefore, in my temperamental ap- 
proach to these problems, are much more 
important to think about now. 

What are they? They are essentially the 
issues we tend to lump under the heading 
economic, but they relate to a wide variety 
of things. As you point out, the issues that 
have come up with respect to transna- 
tional corporations. As you know — at the 
earlier meetings of the Foreign Ministers 
under the new dialogue — this has been a 
matter of great concern to them. It in- 
volves all kinds of questions ranging from 
across-the-board investment disputes to 
honoring of contracts and a wide variety 
of other things. 

The question of transfer of technology, 
which is a matter of fundamental concern 
throughout Latin America, whichever For- 
eign Ministers you talk to — all our Ambas- 
sadors report back constantly this pre- 
occupation with the question of access to 
technology and science. 

A wide variety of other questions having 
to do with access to raw materials, prices 
of raw materials including petroleum, and 
obviously the fundamental question for such 
enormous numbers of people throughout the 
world today; that is, food. 

These are the issues that we are very 
anxious to get on with, with the other mem- 
bers of the inter-American system. And it 
is my profound conviction that whatever 
the diagnosis of this Quito meeting, it does 
not affect the priority of those questions, 
nor the capacity of us in the hemisphere 
to come to grips with it. I have talked to a 
wide number of Foreign Ministers here, 
and I see no diminution in their desire to 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



come to grips in an inter-American context 
with those fundamental economic questions. 

Q. What could you tell us about the United 
States — the State Department's attitude 
toward today's decision. Could you say 
whether it is happy about it and pleased 
with this decision? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: No. I don't 
think we want to characterize a response In 
that sense. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, suppose six months from 
now the United States would like to establish 
relations with Cuba in such a meeting as 
this and suppose two-thirds of the members 
of the OAS oppose? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That's mar- 
velously hypothetical. [Laughter.] What 
would happen? I have a fundamental rule at 
press conferences never to answer a hypo- 
thetical question. But I think it's fair today 
to point out that there are a wide variety 
of ways in which the question of the 1964 
resolution can be approached in addition to 
the Foreign Ministers meeting that has been 
held here. 

Q. (unintelligible) 

Ambassador Mailliard: The Permanent 
Council is clearly authorized to do this and 
is sitting in Washington all the time. So 
any time that they got the right number 
of votes, this could be done expressly under 
the provision of the '64 resolution. But the 
Permanent Council also can convoke itself 
into an organ of consultation, meeting pro- 
visionally, so that anytime there's a will with 
the necessary two-thirds vote, it could be 
done very quickly if anybody wants to do it. 

Q. Mr. Rogers, even though the United 
States might seem to think that there are 
more important issues than the Cuban issue, 
this meeting was to consider the Cuban issue. 
If I look up Mr. Ingersoll's declaration this 
morning, I don't see very much about Cuba 
and about what the United States thinks 
about Cuba, [remainder of question unin- 
telligible.] 



Assistant Secretary Rogers: I suppose 
that the best answer was the statement in 
the press today which was attributed to an 
unnamed Latin American who said, "We de- 
nounce the United States when it pushes us 
around and we denounce the United States 
when it doesn't." 

We could easily have spoken to the ques- 
tion whether or not essentially Castro would 
have continued to affect the peace and secu- 
rity of the hemisphere. We decided not to do 
that. We could not have taken both postures. 
That is to say, we could not have taken 
our hands-off posture, our no-pressure pos- 
ture, and at the same time have spoken on 
the issue that the other countries did. We 
decided as I say, in this particular instance, 
to adopt a hands-off, no-pressure policy ; and 
basically that was the attitude with which 
we came to the meeting and stuck with all 
the way through. 

Q. I'd still like to go back to the question 
of how does this policy work? You have to 
disciiss and you have to move and you have 
to lobby. What are you going to call this 
new dialogue? Are we going to go back to 
1962, the way the United States worked 
then, or how is it going to work when you're 
obviously the underdog, which you were not 
this time? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't 
feel— 

Q. Well, you didn't care one way or the 
other. 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Right. 

Q. What do you do when you're the under- 
dog? How are you going to work this new 
dialogue ? 

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We're going 
to have to speak up. But I think what you're 
saying is correct, or at least I would affirm 
that we tend to regard the Cuban issue in 
terms of our posture as ever so much more 
sensitive than a wide variety of other issues. 

In other words, on a wide variety of other 
kinds of question — the economic questions 
we were talking about before, a number of 



January 6, 1975 



17 



other political questions— we don't have this 
sense that we have to be restrained. We 
don't have this feeling that taking a position 
on this is going to tend to be dominating. 

We do have that feeling on the Cuban 
question. And the history bears us out on 
that— history on the Cuban issue essentially, 
on which the United States has been quite 
outspoken. In any event, whatever the his- 
tory may have been, we feel that the Cuban 
issue is a very sensitized one and we feel that 
the best contribution we could make on that 
was the policy which I've tried to explain 
here, of restraint and no pressure. 

We will not feel that way with respect to 
a lot of other issues, and we don't. We speak 
up. It's not really a question of whether 
you're an underdog or overdog. Most of the 
questions that we're discussing in an inter- 
American context we don't discuss in the 
theatrical way we've done it here in Quito 
these last "few days. We discuss it in some- 
what more diplomatic fashion, and it doesn't 
work usually by adding up the votes on a 
yes-no-abstention kind of artificial approach 
to the problem. Most particularly, for ex- 
ample, at meetings of the Foreign Ministers' 
new dialogue, that was all done by con- 
sensus. They don't add up votes. 



Bill of Rights Day, 

Human Rights Day and Week 

A PROCLAMATION^ 

Two hundred years ago, in September 1774, the 
First Continental Congress assembled in Carpenters' 
Hall, in Philadelphia, and set in motion a course of 
human events which created the United States. The 
system of government begun there, and the high 
principles on which it rests, continues today as the 
source of vitality for our society. 

Anticipating the bicentennial of this Nation's in- 
dependence, now is an excellent time to pause and 
consider the groundwork the delegates to Philadel- 
phia laid for our independence. The First Continen- 
tal Congress adopted a resolution asserting, among 



No. 4337; 39 Fed. Reg. 4233B. 



other things, the rights of the American people to 
life, liberty, and property; to participation in the leg- 
islative councils of government; to the heritage of 
the common law; to trial by jury; and to assemble 
and petition for redress of grievances. This resolu- 
tion foreshadowed the Declaration of Independence 
and the Bill of Rights. 

It is altogether fitting to mark the 200th anniver- 
sary of this noble beginning of the Continental Con- 
gress. Beyond that, it is imperative that all of us 
study and cherish the ideas and ideals which bore 
fruit in the great constitutional documents of our 
country. At the same time, we should take the op- 
portunity, whenever possible, to strengthen the liber- 
ties which have been assured us in the Bill of Rights, 
ratified one hundred and eighty-three years ago this 
week, on December 15, 1791. 

America's concern with human rights is not some- 
thing that ends at our borders. Benjamin Franklin 
wrote to a friend in 1789: 

"God grant, that not only the Love of Liberty, but 
a thorough Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may 
pervade all the Nations of the Earth, so that a Phi- 
losopher may set his Foot anywhere on its Surface, 
and say, 'This is my Country'." 

Franklin's spirit of universality has found rich 
modern expression in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The link between it and our Bill of 
Rights is clear. On December 10, we celebrate the 
twenty-sixth anniversary of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights adopted by the United Na- 
tions General Assembly. The General Assembly said 
that the Universal Declaration stands as "a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and nations," 
reminding us that "recognition of the inherent dig- 
nity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world." 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
December 10, 1974, as Human Rights Day and De- 
cember 15, 1974, as Bill of Rights Day. I call upon 
the people of the United States to observe the week 
beginning December 10, 1974, as Human Rights 
Week. Further, I ask all Americans to reflect deeply 
on the values inherent in the Bill of Rights and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and draw 
on those values to promote peace, justice, and civil- 
ity at home and around the world. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this third day of December, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the In- 
dependence of the United States of America the one 
hundred ninety-ninth. 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Inter-American System: Adjusting to Present-Day Realities 



Address by William S. Mailliard 

Ambassador to the Organization of American States ^ 



Even perceptive and informed Americans 
who maintain a healthy interest in foreign 
affairs are not likely to have a comprehensive 
grasp of the inter-American system and the 
Organization of American States. Our east- 
ern press and media, for the most part, are 
Europe oriented. Here in the West they do 
pay more attention to Pacific affairs, but no- 
where except possibly in the states of the 
southern tier is there much emphasis on 
hemispheric happenings. 

This is not to say that Latin America is a 
lost continent or anything like it. But im- 
pressions gathered from the media are 
largely surface impressions dealing with 
generalities or with certain hot political is- 
sues. Thus we hear that Latin America is 
important but neglected, or we get stories 
about the Panama Canal issue or the Cuban 
issue. We do not see much in the way of 
treatment of the texture and significance of 
the web of relationships between the United 
States and its neighbors to the south that we 
call the inter-American system. 

The inter-American system has been a 
pathfinder in the field of international or- 
ganization. It is the name we give to a col- 
lection of multilateral institutions linking 
the United States with the nations of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. And many of the 
most important principles of the U.N. Char- 
ter, such as nonintervention and the juridical 
equality of states, first saw the light in the 
context of the inter-American relationship. 

The movement toward unity of the Amer- 



'■ Made before the Commonwealth Club of San 
Francisco at San Francisco, Calif., on Nov. 22. 



icas goes back a long way, to Simon Bolivar's 
Congress of Panama in 1826. At that time, 
George Washington's dictum of no entan- 
gling alliances held sway, and the debates of 
the Foreign Relations Committee of the 
Senate for that year show that Bolivar's 
dream of a Congress of the Americas was 
thought so novel an experiment and so 
fraught with unknown perils that the United 
States should not participate. In fact we did 
not. 

It was not until 1889 that the United 
States participated in an international con- 
ference of American states. Today's inter- 
American system has its roots in that meet- 
ing. 

I don't intend to try to escape from today's 
reality by taking refuge in history, but I 
think it is worth noting that we in the 
Western Hemisphere were the pioneers of the 
world in establishing a free association of 
sovereign nations to deal with mutual prob- 
lems. For many decades, until the F.D.R. 
Good Neighbor policy, we tended to look on 
Latin America as our private preserve. In 
turn the nations of Latin America tended to 
look at our multilateral association as a 
means of ordering state-to-state behavior 
and restricting the inclination of the United 
States to intervene whenever she perceived 
her interests to be involved. As time went on, 
we slowly came to accept, much as an emerg- 
ing adult accepts the rules of society, the 
need for rules of the road that would order 
the relationships among us. 

Thus has evolved an ever more complex 
inter-American system to maintain some kind 



January 6, 1975 



19 



of balance between what was originally a 
collection of relatively poor and weak nations 
and a disconcertingly and steadily increas- 
ingly powerful neighbor. 

Varied Activities of the OAS 

Now, what is the inter-American system 
as we know it today? Substantively, it deals 
with almost every facet of our association: 
with peace and security ; economic and social 
development; educational, scientific, and cul- 
tural cooperation; human rights; technical 
assistance and training; disaster relief; 
health; agricultural research; problems of 
women, children, and Indians; highways; 
ports and harbors; tourism; export promo- 
tion; and more. Most of this is dealt with 
by the OAS itself or by one of its specialized 
organizations, such as the Pan American 
Health Organization or the Inter-American 
Institute of Agricultural Sciences. But some 
hemispheric intergovernmental organizations 
are not part of the OAS structure, although 
they are considered part of the inter-Amer- 
ican system, the most important of these 
being the Inter- American Development Bank, 
created in 1959. 

I wonder if many people in this country 
fully realize how farflung and varied the 
total activities of the OAS really are, in 
fields other than peace and security and 
economic policy. The OAS, through its Gen- 
eral Secretariat — headed by former Ecua- 
dorean President Galo Plaza — and also 
through several specialized technical organi- 
zations, carries out action programs amount- 
ing to over $100 million a year. Most of this 
goes to operate programs of technical as- 
sistance related to promotion of Latin Amer- 
ican development. The OAS annually grants 
thousands of fellowships, conducts dozens 
of training courses, and issues technical pub- 
lications on a great variety of development- 
related subjects. 

I would like to cite one of the specialized 
organlizations, the Pan American Health 
Organization, which is also a regional agency 
of the World Health Organization. Orginally 
created in 1902 to stem the spread of commu- 
nicable diseases across national boundaries, 



PAHO today is recognized as the health agen- \ 
cy of the Americas. In addition to its work 
in the control of communicable diseases, 
PAHO is active in the development and pro- 
motion of health manpower, family health 
and population dynamics, health services and 
delivery of health care, and environmental 
health. 

There have been many notable achieve- 
ments in the health of the Americas through 
the efforts of PAHO, but perhaps none as 
successful as the smallpox eradication pro- 
gram. As part of the global effort to eradi- 
cate smallpox, PAHO's program in the Amer- 
icas achieved the ultimate in April 1971, 
when the last vestige of the disease in Brazil 
was declared eliminated and all of the Amer- 
icas free of the scourge of centuries. 

The OAS has done valuable and worth- 
while work in the field of human rights 
through the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, a commission of seven mem- 
bers chosen to serve in their personal capac- 
ity. 

In education the OAS has focused on 
innovative approaches to expanding educa- 
tional opportunities at the lowest possible 
cost. In the area of science the OAS has 
concentrated on developing the institutional 
structure to enable countries to capitalize on 
existing scientific know-how and to develop- 
ing in-country capacities to develop solutions 
to specific scientific and technological prob- 
lems. In culture the OAS has concentrated 
on developing an awareness of and publiciz- 
ing the rich cultural heritage of the region. 

Most OAS programs aim at increasing the 
technical proficiency of the countries. Some 
examples include assistance in hydrographic 
studies in the Andean region, assistance to 
Argentina in the establishment of a net- 
worth tax, and sending teams to assist in the 
reconstruction of Managua. In the fiscal year 
1972-73 this assistance involved over 600 ex- 
perts and also included contributions from 
European countries and Japan. 

An OAS committee conducts country re- 
views of the development programs and 
plans of the member states. These reviews 
bring together representatives of the coun- 
try, and of lending agencies such as the 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



World Bank, the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, and the U.S. Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, and have proved valua- 
ble in focusing attention on the need for 
economic planning and in developing in- 
creased technical and managerial expertise 
in the economic sectors of the nations. The 
OAS also provides the mechanism, through 
the relatively new Special Committee for 
Consultation and Negotiation, for the United 
States to meet in a relatively informal and 
nonpolitical setting to discuss U.S. economic 
policies and practices which have an impact 
on Latin America. 

I have deliberately overloaded your cir- 
cuits with seemingly dry facts about what 
the OAS really does with its money. 

As a practicing politician for many years 
and now as a practicing diplomat, I have 
learned that the allocation of resources de- 
termines to a great extent the priorities of 
an organization. It should be clear to you 
that the priorities of the inter-American sys- 
tem lie in the field of development. 

We are associated in this endeavor because 
it is in our national interest that all the peo- 
ple of Latin America reach high standards 
of economic well-being. There is a strong 
moral aspect to this that I would not slight, 
but beyond that, development contributes to 
political stability in the hemisphere and to 
the opening of new trade opportunities. 

One last word about the distribution of re- 
sources. We have accepted in international 
organizations the principle that the rich pay 
more. Perhaps it is proof of priorities that 
not only do the Latin American nations con- 
tribute more to the OAS than they do to the 
United Nations, but they also pay up more 
promptly ! 

Informal Procedures of the New Dialogue 

Any multinational organization is com- 
plex, with competing national interests try- 
ing to reach accommodation. Where these 
interests run head-on into each other, agree- 
ments are often impossible to achieve. For 
example, the deliberative bodies of the inter- 
American system can quibble endlessly over 
hypothetical points and legalistic interpreta- 



tions. But when the members want to take 
action, these same bodies are capable of rapid 
and forceful decision. 

Since the founding of the OAS in 1948, 
there have been no prolonged conflicts in the 
Western Hemisphere. The Dominican-Vene- 
zuelan crisis of 1960, the Cuban crisis of 
1962, and the Honduras-El Salvador five-day 
war in 1969 are examples which quickly 
come to mind in which the system demon- 
strated its ability to act decisively. 

Now, however, the increasingly interde- 
pendent nature of our world, growing na- 
tionalism in this hemisphere, and the shift 
from bipolarity to a multipolar scheme of 
world relationships have brought on an era 
of flux in the inter-American relationship. 
This sparked an eff'ort to adjust this rela- 
tionship to today's realities. 

In 1973 then-Foreign Minister of Colom- 
bia Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa suggested to 
the Secretary of State that there be a reap- 
praisal of relations between the United 
States and the rest of the nations of the hem- 
isphere. Secretary Kissinger responded to 
this overture in October when he addressed 
the Foreign Ministers of this hemisphere 
who were attending the U.N. General As- 
sembly, calling for a new dialogue among us. 
The Secretary's initiative was greeted with 
enthusiasm. 

The new dialogue was to involve new pro- 
cedures and a new atmosphere. It marked a 
new era in inter-American diplomacy in 
which problems and conflicts, even on the 
most sensitive issues, were brought out on 
the table and discussed frankly but without 
the need for public posturing. 

The new dialogue actually began at an in- 
formal meeting of Foreign Ministers last 
February in a part of Mexico City called 
Tlatelolco. Conversations centered on eight 
key issues that had been identified by the 
Latin American Foreign Ministers in a pre- 
paratory meeting in Colombia. These were 
cooperation for development, coercive meas- 
ures of an economic nature, restructuring of 
the inter-American system, solution of the 
Panama Canal question, structure of the in- 
ternational trade and monetary system, 
transnational or multinational enterprises, 



January 6, 1975 



21 



transfer of technology, and the general pan- 
orama of Latin American-U.S. relations. The 
issues were discussed in a constructive, in- 
formal manner without votes or resolutions. 
At Tlatelolco the Foreign Ministers called 
for "a new, vigorous spirit of inter-American 
solidarity." They expressed "confidence that 
the spirit of Tlatelolco will inspire a new cre- 
ative effort in their relations." 

The Ministers stressed that development 
should be integral, embracing the economic, 
social, and cultural life of their nations. Spe- 
cifically, the United States pledged to make 
maximum efforts to secure congressional ap- 
proval of the system of generalized prefer- 
ences and then work with the other coun- 
tries of the hemisphere to apply these pref- 
erences in the most beneficial manner. It fur- 
ther pledged to maintain present economic 
assistance levels and to facilitate the flow of 
resources toward countries most affected by 
rising energy costs. The United States also 
suggested the establishment of a factfinding 
or conciliation procedure that would limit 
the scope of controversies arising from pri- 
vate foreign investment by separating is- 
sues of fact from those of law, thus provid- 
ing an objective basis for solution of such 
disputes without detriment to sovereignty. 

They met again in Washington in April 
under the informal procedures of the dia- 
logue and a few days later implemented cer- 
tain decisions at the OAS General Assembly 
in Atlanta. They entrusted other major top- 
ics, such as the transfer of technology and 
multinational corporations to ad hoc work- 
ing groups. The Ministers are scheduled to 
meet again in Buenos Aires in March. 

The question logically arises as to why it 
was necessary to bypass, at least initially, 
the established regional institutions. In part 
it is because two participants in the dia- 
logue, Guyana and the Bahamas, are not at 
present members of the OAS. But in part it 
is also due to the rigidity and formalism of 
the OAS meetings such as the General As- 
sembly, which do not at present lend them- 
selves to real dialogue. The OAS is going 
through a period of reform, and there is 
general agreement — and some progress to 
date — to simplify and to admit the fresh 



winds of the dialogue into these structures. 
I would venture a personal opinion, not an 
official prediction, that in time the freedom 
and the informality of the dialogue will be 
married to the institutional framework of 
the OAS. 

Effect of the Quito Meeting 

Two weeks ago the Foreign Ministers of 
the hemisphere met in Quito to consider 
whether the diplomatic and economic sanc- 
tions impo.sed on Cuba in 1964 should be 
lifted. The resolution to lift the sanctions re- 
ceived a majority but fell short of the neces- 
sary two-thirds vote required by the Rio 
Treaty. The effect is to continue the obliga- 
tion to refrain from any diplomatic or eco- 
nomic commerce with the Castro regime. But 
in reality, five Rio Treaty countries and four 
other hemisphere countries already have 
such ties, and others may establish such ties. 

The position of the United States at this 
meeting was one of absolute neutrality, and 
we abstained on the resolution. The outcome 
— minus U.S. lobbying in any direction — 
demonstrates that Latin America does not 
have a single-minded view on the Cuban is- 
sue. As Deputy Secretary Ingersoll said: 

If this Meeting of Consultation has not produced 
a conclusive result, it has at least aired in a con- 
structive way the fact that there is no easy solution 
to the problem of a country which deals with some 
on the basis of hostility and with others on the basis 
of a more normal relationship. 

He also said: 

I should add that the United States looks forward 
to the day when the Cuban issue is no longer a di- 
visive issue for us. Cuba has absorbed far too much 
of our attention in recent years. We need to turn our 
energies to the more important questions. We must 
not let a failure of agreement on the Cuban issue 
at this time obscure our common interest in working 
together toward mutually beneficial relationships on 
the major issues of this decade. 

Since a majority of the countries favor 
removing sanctions, we have to ask ourselves 
if the procedures outlined in the treaty are 
appropriate; that is, should the treaty be 
amended to respond to majority will. This is 
one of the subjects presently being con- 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



sidered by the Special Committee to Study 
the OAS and Recommend Changes for Re- 
structuring It. 

The special committee has also been re- 
viewing the OAS system to assist in the de- 
velopment process. Some feel the system is 
deficient in that it does not provide a mech- 
anism to counter what are called "coercive 
acts" which, in a manner analogous to mili- 
tary aggression, threaten the economic se- 
curity of a country; and they advocate a 
mechanism similar to that of the Rio Treaty 
providing for collective denunciations, sanc- 
tions, et cetera. We feel this approach to the 
problems of development is wrong and that 
it distracts the attention of the member 
states from the real problems — and the 
realistic solutions. In one modern and inter- 
dependent world, numerous factors affect a 
country's development, including global mon- 
etary and trade developments and even 
national disasters. Many are beyond the 
power of any one country to cope with, and 
collective action is desirable. We have pro- 
posed, among other things, that the pro- 
visions for consulting together be expanded. 
We are working to achieve understanding 
on this issue. 

Only last week, as a member of the U.S. 
delegation to the Quito meeting, I heard re- 
peated predictions that the future of the 
inter-American system itself was at stake, 
that the failure of the Quito meeting to 
carry out the will of the majority would 
cause the entire inter-American system, in- 
cluding its very important defense treaty — 
the Rio Treaty — to crumble. But the system 
has been accustomed to crises throughout its 
long history. Eighty-four years have passed 
since its institutional beginnings. Consider- 
ing what has happened in the passage of 
those years, in the Americas and in the 
world, it is remarkable that an organization 
comprised of nations of so many different 
viewpoints could endure at all — but it has 
endured. 

Our commitment to the inter-American 
system is rooted in history and national in- 
terest. In my view the limitations on success 
are often inherent in associations of sover- 
eign states and reflect less strongly on the 



validity of the structure, in this instance the 
inter-American system, than on the wisdom 
of the governments that are its constituents. 
This was the 15th time that the Foreign 
Ministers have gathered on specific political 
issues since the 1948 OAS Charter of Bogota. 
Most of these meetings have produced im- 
portant results. 

I have been involved, one way or another, 
in OAS matters for nearly two decades. 
Since March 1974 I have been engaged in 
them full time. I am not tempted to engage 
in handwringing. I have been and still am 
critical, I hope constructively so, of certain 
attributes and aspects of the OAS. I believe 
the flaws are correctable, and intend to work 
to that end. Winston Churchill's dictum about 
democracy is easily transferable to the inter- 
American system. But on the whole there 
are more pluses than minuses, and I hope 
and believe that the inter-American system 
is susceptible to change and improvement 
so that its many components, particularly the 
OAS, can continue to serve the interests of 
all who live on this portion of our shrinking 
globe. If we didn't already have an OAS, we 
would almost surely have to invent one. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 2d Session 

Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and the Philip- 
pines. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. May 1-June 5, 1974. 127 pp. 

Implementation of the Lodge and Katzenbach Rec- 
ommendations on the United Nations. Report 
prepared for the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations and Movements of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs by the Department of 
State. June 1974. 39 pp. 

Review of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Organizations and Movements of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 18-20, 1974 
92 pp. 

Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations. Hearing before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 
16, 1974. 79 pp. 

Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the 
Economies of Eastern Europe. A compendium of 
papers submitted to the Joint Economic Com- 
mittee. August 16, 1974. 771 pp. 



January 6, 1975 



23 



Presidential Determination on Sale 
of Wheat and Rice to Syria 

MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 4, 1974 " 

[Presidential Determination No. 76-7] 
Finding and Determination — Syria 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State; 
the Secretary of Agriculture 

The White House, 
Washington, November i, 197i. 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), I here- 
by: 

(a) Find, pursuant to Section 103(d)(3) of the 
Act, that the making of an agreement with the Gov- 
ernment of Syria for the sale, under Title I of the 
Act, of 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25 
thousand metric tons of rice is in the national inter- 
est of the United States; and 

(b) Determine and certify, pursuant to Section 410 
of the Act and Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1961, as amended, that, in the event it 
may be applicable, it is in the national interest of the 
United States to waive the prohibitions contained in 
those sections against assistance under Title I of the 
Act for the sale to Syria of 75 thousand metric tons 
of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice. 

Statement of Reasons That Sales Under Title 
I OF THE Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as Amended (Pub. L. 
480), to Syria are in the National Interest 

Syria is a key to our eflForts to achieve a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. Our success will 
depend in part on Syrian confidence in our intention 
to develop a broad and constructive bilateral rela- 
tionship with that country. A program for conces- 
sional sales of agricultural commodities to Syria 
will constitute a tangible demonstration of our in- 
tended role in that regard. 

In response to current Syrian needs, it is proposed 



to export to that country 75 thousand metric tons of 
wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice financed 
under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development 
and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Pub. L. 
480). This amount is based on Syria's needs for not 
more than one fiscal year. 

In order to enter into an agreement with the Gov- 
ernment of Syria for such a sale under Title I, it is 
necessary that the President find and determine that 
such sales would be in the national interest of the 
United States. Section 103(d)(3) of Pub. L. 480 pro- 
hibits the sale of agricultural commodities under 
Title I of the Act to any nation which sells or fur- 
nishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry 
to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam any 
equipment, materials, or commodities (so long as 
those countries are governed by Communist re- 
gimes). However, if such activities are limited to the 
furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to 
Cuba medical supplies, non-strategic agricultural or 
food commodities, sales agreements may be made if 
the President finds they are in the national interest 
of the United States. 

Although Syria has been trading with Cuba in re- 
cent years, our information indicates that it has not 
traded with North Vietnam. Syrian ships or air- 
craft have not called at Cuba or North Vietnam. The 
best information available indicates that current 
Syrian trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic 
agricultural commodities within the meaning of Sec- 
tion 103(d)(3). 

Section 410 applies to assistance under Title I of 
Pub. L. 480 the prohibitions contained in Section 
620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, relating to naturalization [sic] or expro- 
priation of property owned by Americans; the pro- 
hibitions of Section 620(e), however, may be waived 
by the President if he determines and certifies that 
such a waiver is important to the national interest 
of the United States. There are several potential 
claims involving property rights and interests of 
Americans in Syria which might make Section 410 
applicable to Syria, and these will be the subject of 
separate negotiations with Syria. 

The considerations noted above, however, make 
the proposed sale important to the national interest 
of the United States notwithstanding the prohibi- 
tions contained in Sections 103(d)(3) and 410 of 
Pub. L. 480. 



• 39 Fed. Reg. 40005, Nov. 13, 1974. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences 

Scheduled January Through March ^ 

GATT/UNCTAD International Trade Center Joint Advisory Group Geneva Jan. 4-8 

U.N. ECOSOC Organizational Meeting for 58th Session .... New York Jan. 6-9 

UNIDROIT Committee of Experts on Hotelkeepers Rome Jan. 6-10 

ESCAP Committee on Economic Planning Bangkok Jan. 6-14 

UNCITRAL Working Group on Negotiable Instruments .... Geneva Jan. 6-17 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Social Development New York Jan. 6-24 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision, Stability, and Load Line: 17th London Jan. 13-17 

Session. 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Rice: 18th Session Rome Jan. 13-17 

Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises Washington .... Jan. 13-17 

ILO Working Party on Structure: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 13-20 

UNDP Governing Council: 19th Session New York Jan. 13-31 

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for Woodworking Industries: 2d Geneva Jan. 14-24 

Session. 

OAS Meeting on Private International Law: 1st Session .... Panama Jan. 14-31 

Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference/Exposition on Human New York Jan. 15-24 

Settlements: 1st Meeting. 

Customs Cooperation Council Working Party on Customs Enforce- Brussels Jan. 20-24 

ment: 3d Session. 

ECE Committee of Experts on Transport of Dangerous Goods . . Geneva Jan. 20-24 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Hard Fibers Manila Jan. 20-25 

UNIDO Permanent Committee: 5th Session, 2d Part Vienna Jan. 20-27 

WHO Executive Board: 55th Session Geneva Jan. 20-31 

ITU/CCITT Working Party of Study Groups I and II Geneva Jan. 20-Feb. 4 

U.N. ECOSOC Ad Hoc Working Group on Rules of Procedure . . New York Jan. 27-31 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights Working Groups . . Geneva Jan. 27-31 

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods: 24th Ses- London Jan. 27-31 

sion. 

ECE Committee of Experts on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs Geneva Jan. 27-31 

IMCO/ILO Joint Committee on Training Geneva Jan. 27-31 

Customs Cooperation Council Chemists Committee Brussels Jan. 27-Feb. 1 

UNCITRAL Working Group on International Shipping Legislation New York Jan. 27-Feb. 7 

ICAO Committee on Aircraft Noise: 4th Meeting Montreal Jan. 27-Feb. 14 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Protection of Phonograms . . . Geneva January 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Science and Technology for Develop- New York January 

ment Working Group. 

UNESCO/IBE Council: 11th Session Geneva January 



' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 13, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period 
January-March 1975. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCITT, International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative 
Committee; EGA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, 
Economic and Social Council; ESCAP, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; FAO, Food 
and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atom- 
ic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion; ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross; IGOSS, Integrated Global Ocean Station System; 
IHD, International Hydrological Decade; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union; OAS, Organization of American States; UNCITRAL, United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; UNIDROIT, Inter- 
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; 
WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

January 6, 1975 25 



ICAO Panel on Application of Space Techniques Relating to 

Aviation: 6tli Meeting. . , ^, i, , r, 

UNESCO/IOC Working Committee for an Integrated Global Ucean 
Station System: 4th Session. 

ECE Inland Transport Committee ,' ,' o' '■ ' 

IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment: 13th Session 

U.N ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations . 

U.n! Preparatory Committee for Nonproliferation Treaty Review 
Conference: 3d Meeting. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights . . . • • ■ • . • 

ICRC Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts: 2d Session. 

U.N Geneva Group Consultations 

UNESCO/IOC Working Committee for IGOSS and WHO Execu- 
tive Committee on Meteorological Aspects of Ocean Affairs: 4th 
Joint Meeting. . 

U.N. Conference on the Relation of States and International Orga- 
nizations. 

Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions .... 

IMCO Legal Committee: 25th Session 

UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for the Coopera- 
tive Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 7th 
Session 

UNCITRAL Working Group on International Sale of Goods . . 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 8th Session 

Customs Cooperation Council Harmonized System Committee: 5th 
Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Policy and Coordination Committee 

U.N. Outer Space Committee Legal Subcommittee 

WIPO Government Experts on Revision of the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property. 

ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Proce- 
dures. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport 

IMCO Ad Hoc Working Group on the IMCO Convention: 1st Ses- 
sion. 

FAO Committee on Wood-Based Panel Products: 4th Session . . 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs 

ILO Governing Body: 195th Session 

WIPO Coordination Committee: Extraordinary Session . . . . 

U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission 

ECE Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental 
Problems. 

ECA Conference of Ministers 

Customs Cooperation Council Working Party of the Technical 
Committee: 9th Session. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 14th Session . . 

ESCAP: 31st Session 

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (resumed) . . . 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 17th Session . . 

WMO Tropical Experiment Board: 7th Session 

IAEA Board of Governors 

UNESCO/IHD Bureau: 16th Session 

ECE Senior Economic Advisers . . 

UNESCO/IOC Executive Council of the Intergovernmental Ocean- 
ographic Commission: 5th Session 

Customs Cooperation Council: 87th and 88th Sessions 

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 18th Meeting 

ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels: 17th Session . 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination . . . . 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 6th Session 

ITU/CCITT Working Party III and Study Group I 

UNIDO: 2d General Conference 

WIPO Permanent Committee, Legal-Technical Program for Acqui- 
sition by Developing Countries of Technology Related to In- 
dustrial Property. 



Montreal January or 

February 

Paris Feb. 3 

Geneva Feb. 3-7 

London Feb. 3-7 

New York Feb. 3-7 

Geneva Feb. 3-14 

Geneva Feb. 3-Mar. 7 

Geneva Feb. 3-Apr. 18 

Geneva Feb. 4-5 

Paris Feb. 4-12 

Vienna Feb. 4-Mar. 15 

Washington .... Feb. 10-14 

Geneva Feb. 10-14 

London Feb. 10-14 

Jamaica Feb. 10-14 

New York Feb. 10-21 

Geneva Feb. 10-21 

Brussels Feb. 10-21 

New York Feb. 10-28 

New York Feb. 10-Mar. 7 

Geneva Feb. 11-17 

Geneva Feb. 17-21 

Geneva Feb. 17-21 

London Feb. 17-21 

New Delhi Feb. 17-21 

Geneva Feb. 17-Mar. 7 

Geneva Feb. 17-Mar. 7 

Geneva Feb. 18 

New York Feb. 18-28 

Geneva Feb. 24-28 

Nairobi Feb. 24-28 

Brussels Feb. 24-28 

London Feb. 24-28 

New Delhi Feb. 26-Mar. 7 

Geneva February 

London February 

Geneva February 

Vienna February 

Paris February 

Geneva Mar. 3-7 

Venice Mar. 3-8 

Brussels Mar. 3-14 

Washington .... Mar. 3-22 

Geneva Mar. 10-14 

London Mar. 10-14 

New York Mar. 10-14 

Geneva Mar. 10-21 

Geneva Mar. 10-21 

Lima Mar. 12-26 

Geneva Mar. 17-21 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 32d Session 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program 

3d U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: 3d Session .... 

Customs Cooperation Council Valuation Committee: 66th and 67th 
Sessions. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning 
Containers. 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Natural Resources 

FAO Study Group on Oilseeds, Fats, and Oils 

UNCITRAL: 8th Session 

U.N. Consultative Committee of Experts on the International 
Women's Year Conference. 

ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in 
Europe Regional Planning Group: 10th Meeting. 

ICAO Automated Data Interchange System Panel: 6th Meeting 

UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign To 
Save the Monuments of Nubia: 25th Session. 

UNESCO Meeting of Government Experts on the International 
Recognition of Studies, Diplomas, and Degrees in Higher Edu- 
cation in the Arab States. 

WIPO Joint Ad Hoc Committee on the International Patent Clas- 
sification, Strasbourg Agreement. 

Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Latin America 

WMO Panel on Meteorological Satellites: 2d Session 



Geneva Mar. 17-21 

London Mar. 17-21 

Rome Mar. 17-25 

Geneva Mar. 17-May 10 

Brussels Mar. 18-27 

Geneva Mar. 24-28 

Tokyo Mar. 24-Apr. 4 

Rome Mar. 26-28 

Geneva March 

Geneva March 

Paris March 

Montreal March 

Aswan March 

Middle East .... March 

Geneva March 

Buenos Aires .... March 

Geneva March 



U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts 
To Solve Refugee Problems 

Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Repre- 
sentative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on 
November 25. 

USUN press release 178 dated November 25 

The occasion for the review of the annual 
report of the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees ( UNHCR )i is always 
something of a sad one; for we must then 
focus our attention on the worldwide phe- 
nomenon of refugees, a picture of suffering, 
deprivation, and desolation. Refugee prob- 
lems differ widely from each other in their 
origin and in their nature. But they all pre- 
sent a picture of uprooted, homeless human 
beings casting their lot among and desper- 
ately placing their hopes in the more for- 
tunate people of other lands. 

But against this facade of tragedy we have 
reason for some solace and even some opti- 
mism. Surely we must all take heart from 



U.N. doc. A/9612 and addenda. 



the deeply constructive and determined ef- 
forts of the High Commissioner and his Of- 
fice as they direct the rehabilitation of the 
refugees. Indeed, the Office of the UNHCR— 
concerned as it is with rebuilding the lives of 
those who have been victims of oppression, 
persecution, warfare — stands as a shining 
symbol of man's humanitarian endeavor in 
behalf of his fellow man. The variety and 
complexity of the High Commissioner's wide- 
ranging services for refugees are a tribute 
to the conscientious and resourceful manner 
in which he approaches his task. 

During the past year, as in previous years, 
the UNHCR has devoted special attention 
where needed to the rehabilitation of se- 
verely handicapped refugees. These are ref- 
ugees who for any of a variety of physical, 
mental, or social disabilities are completely 
unable to fend for themselves. Through tire- 
less efforts and through unmatched exper- 
tise, working on an individual case basis, the 
UNHCR has continued to develop satisfac- 
tory solutions for these otherwise helpless 
individuals. The UNHCR program for the 
handicapped refugees is surely in the highest 
humanitarian tradition of the United Na- 
tions and reflects great credit upon it. 



January 6, 1975 



27 



Once again my government wishes to 
stress in this forum the overriding impor- 
tance among the High Commissioner's mani- 
fold activities of his function of providing 
international protection for refugees. It is 
difficult to overemphasize the significance to 
refugees of insuring liberal asylum policies 
and practices and, above all, of making cer- 
tain that no refugee is required to return to 
any country where he would face persecu- 
tion. It is the High Commissioner's task to 
work unceasingly toward affording such 
guarantee. His chief tools in so doing are the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Re- 
lating to the Status of Refugees. As the com- 
mittee knows, article 33 of the convention 
contains an unequivocal prohibition upon 
Contracting States against the refoulement 
of refugees "in any manner whatsoever" to 
territories where their life or freedom would 
be threatened on grounds of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular so- 
cial group, or political opinion. 

But beyond the insuring of asylum for ref- 
ugees, the High Commissioner, through his 
international protection role, is also charged 
with securing for refugees the status and 
rights within asylum countries or third coun- 
tries which will enable them to live in dig- 
nity, to become self-supporting, and to cease 
being refugees. Here again the international 
treaties which I have mentioned, the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol, form the principal 
instruments for the High Commissioner in 
securing for refugees the cardinal element of 
protection. 

The High Commissioner, Prince Sadrud- 
din Aga Khan, in paragraph 22, page 6, of 
his annual report, has deplored the fact that 
during the past year certain countries have 
repatriated refugees involuntarily, directly 
contrary to the Universal Declaration of Hu- 
man Rights and to article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention. My government join.s with the 
High Commissioner in condemning the inhu- 
mane practice of refoulement. The principle 
that refugees must not be repatriated against 
their will, and the right of a refugee to seek 



and secure asylum, have become ever more 
firmly embedded in international law. The 
general application of non-refoulement 
should be facilitated by the increasing ac- 
ceptance of the maxim that the granting of 
asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act 
and should not be regarded as an unfriendly 
act by any state. My government will con- 
tinue to attach primary importance, as con- 
cerns the work of the UNHCR, to his role of 
international protection. 

We are gratified to note in this connection 
that the High Commissioner in his annual 
report characterizes his role of international 
protection as "the prime function of UNHCR 
and the cornerstone of the work of assistance 
to refugees." My government wishes to com- 
mend the High Commissioner for the empha- 
sis he has placed on this aspect of his du- 
ties during the past year. We note particu- 
larly that during the year the High Commis- 
sioner made a renewed worldwide effort — 
both through public appeal and through in- 
dividual letters to governments — recommend- 
ing strongly to those nations which have not 
yet acceded to the protocol or convention that 
they do so. The rights for refugees which are 
embodied in these international treaties can 
lead to just and lasting solutions to refugee 
problems in humanitarian terms. Such solu- 
tions in turn can help promote the reduction 
of tensions, the solution of broader issues, 
and the stability of concerned nations. 

Last year, once again, the High Commis- 
sioner conducted his material assistance pro- 
gram in a highly constructive and imagina- 
tive manner. We note that the UNHCR de- 
voted the major share of total financial com- 
mitments under the program to problems in 
Africa, where the need is very great. The 
United States is fully in accord with that 
commitment. At the same time, we observe 
that the High Commissioner has pursued his 
material assistance program with equal ef- 
fectiveness in Latin America, Europe, and 
the Middle East. We salute the High Com- 
missioner for his promptness, effectiveness, 
and flexibility in meeting the diverse chal- 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



lenges involved in the relief and rehabilita- 
tion of refugees in many categories world- 
wide. 

It should not pass unnoticed that the 
UNHCR in all cases concerns himself at 
once with the total task of rehabilitating the 
refugee so that he can cease being a refugee 
and can take his place as a self-supporting 
person in the society of his new country. The 
combination of rights for refugees, secured 
through the international protection func- 
tion, and the tangible assistance and re- 
habilitation of the refugees which the mate- 
rial assistance program affords gives the 
refugee the opportunity to live in dignity, 
self-respect, and self-sufficiency. 

My country has a national heritage of con- 
cern for oppressed and homeless refugees. 
That concern dates back to the very founding 
of our Republic 200 years ago and is ex- 
pressed today in part through our worldwide 
support for refugee assistance programs. 
During fiscal year 1974 the United States 
contributed some $174 million, primarily in 
cash but also in food commodities, to assist 
refugees all over the world who fall within 
the concern of the UNHCR, and some 3149 
million additionally for refugees not within 
the UNHCR mandate. 

The past year has been an eventful one for 
the UNHCR in relation to the carrying out of 
the special tasks entrusted to it by the Sec- 
retary General under the UNHCR "good of- 
fices" function. It is indeed fortunate that 
the High Commissioner is willing and com- 
petent to respond so ably in meeting special 
emergency problems which lie beyond the 
normal boundaries of UNHCR concern. The 
UNHCR has perhaps-unequaled experience 
among United Nations agencies in dealing 
with emergency humanitarian needs of peo- 
ple and in solving their related problems. 
Thus we note that during the past year the 
High Commissioner has been deeply in- 
volved in the repatriation of uprooted Pak- 
istanis and Bengalees, in completing the 
search for homes for Asians who had to leave 
Uganda, with commencing an initiative to- 



ward the relief and rehabilitation of uprooted 
and displaced persons in all areas of Viet- 
Nam and Laos, with the relief and resettle- 
ment of refugees in and from Chile, and in 
carrying out his assigned role as coordinator 
of humanitarian assistance in Cyprus. 

My government strongly endorses the man- 
ner in which the High Commissioner has 
performed these imposing tasks. There can 
be no doubt that the successful implementa- 
tion and conclusion of the two-way repatria- 
tion movement between Bangladesh and Pak- 
istan contributed to reconcilation on the sub- 
continent, as the governments concerned have 
themselves declared. We welcome the High 
Commissioner's initiative in Indochina and 
will cooperate with it, as we have with re- 
spect to the UNHCR activities in behalf of 
Chilean refugees. The international commu- 
nity may take heart and solace in the deter- 
mined manner in which the UNHCR has suc- 
cessfully found permanent homes for every 
one of the Uganda Asians of undetermined 
nationality who had previously been moved 
by the UNHCR to transit centers in Europe. 

Finally, my Government is deeply gratified 
at the vigorous and successful manner in 
which the UNHCR is discharging his special 
role, assigned to him by the Secretary Gen- 
eral, as coordinator for humanitarian assist- 
ance in Cyprus. The United States has been 
pleased to respond to the High Commis- 
sioner's appeal for $22 million for this pur- 
pose with the pledge of a contribution of 
$7.3 million, in addition to the $3.2 million 
in assistance which we had provided before 
the UNHCR assumed this task. 

My government feels strongly that the in- 
crease in magnitude of the High Commis- 
sioner's material assistance program, and 
the increasing calls upon the UNHCR to use 
his "good offices" in situations which nor- 
mally do not fall within UNHCR concern 
(such as the Cyprus problem and the South 
Asian repatriation program) should not be 
allowed to impede or infringe upon the High 
Commissioner's first priority to provide in- 
ternational protection for refugees who are 



January 6, 1975 



29 



the regular concern of the UNHCR Office. I 
do not suggest that the High Commissioner 
has in any way been delinquent in carrying 
out his protection mandate. I merely wish to 
stress that my government, like the High 
Commissioner, attaches primary importance 
to international protection among all 
UNHCR activities. 

The wide-ranging and apparently ever- 
increasing scope of UNHCR activities in the 
field of material assistance — both for refu- 
gees who are normally of UNHCR concern 
and for those assisted under his "good of- 
fices"— surely justifies the High Commis- 
sioner's request that the General Assembly 
authorize him to allocate up to $2 million an- 
nually from the UNHCR Emergency Fund. 
Experience has shown that these allocations, 
up to $500,000 for any one emergency, are 
desperately needed in crisis situations. My 
government strongly supports this proposal. 

It is noted that the committee is again to 
consider the question of whether to establish 
a definite date for the convening of a confer- 
ence of plenipotentiaries to finalize the draft 
convention on territorial asylum. The United 
States is of course eager to see the advance- 
ment in the world of recognition and imple- 
mentation of the important humane principle 
of asylum. We support therefore the conven- 
ing in due course of a conference of plenipo- 
tentiaries toward the finalization and ulti- 
mate adoption of an effective, realistic treaty 
on asylum. The present draft is a promising 
start toward such a convention. We believe, 
however, that the draft raises quite a number 
of questions which need to be resolved and 
that it requires considerable work. The next 
step, in our view, therefore is to convene a 
committee to perform the task of perfecting 
the present draft. We believe that the draft 
which emanates from this committee should 
then be resubmitted to governments for their 
consideration prior to the setting of any def- 
inite date for a final conference of plenipo- 
tentiaries. I would like to stress that it is our 
belief that such a procedure would contribute 
to the prospects for ultimately opening for 
accession a treaty which would receive wide 
support among nations. 



I cannot conclude my remarks without 
making one more observation on the work of 
the High Commissioner and his staff. We 
have all heard others express the well-de- 
served tributes to him for his work, his ded- 
ication, and his zeal in looking after those 
who need and needed his help. Yet all this 
would not have been possible had it not been 
for the confidence and support my colleagues 
and their governments were able to give him. 
I wish therefore to express my government's 
appreciation, to which, if I may, I add my 
own personal thanks, to all of you for making 
possible the ways and means for the High 
Commissioner to be able to act with dispatch 
and with compassion in mitigating hard- 
ships among those who needed us and in 
giving some basis for hope, to those who 
yearned for it, that mankind had not for- 
saken them. 



United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section 
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 
10017. 

Economic and Social Council 

World Population Conference background papers: 

International mortality trends: some main facts 
and implications. Prepared by George J. Stol- 
nitz, professor of economics, Indiana University. 
E/CONF.60/CBP/17. June 4, 1974. 29 pp. 

Population, food supply and agricultural develop- 
ment. Prepared by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/25. June 4, 
1974. 27 pp. 

Health trends and prospects in relation to popu- 
lation and development. Prepared by the World 
Health Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/26. June 
5, 1974. 51 pp. 

Summary country statements concerning popula- 
tion change and development. E/CONF.60/ 
CBP/33. June 21, 1974. 68 pp. 

The role of international assistance in the popu- 
lation fields. Prepared by the U.N. Fund for 
Population Activities. E/CONF.60/CBP/24. July 
3, 1974. 36 pp. 

Summaries of background papers commissioned 
for the World Population Conference. E/CONF. 
60/CBP/35. July 12, 1974. 73 pp. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: De- 
cember 16, 1974. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 
1974. TIAS 7868. 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to works of stateless persons and 
refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered 
into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to the works of certain inter- 
national organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 
1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 
7868. 

Ratification deposited: Monaco, September 13, 
1974. 

Gas 

Protocol for the prohibition of the use of asphyxiat- 
ing, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriologi- 
cal methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 
1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928.- 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem- 
ber 16, 1974 (with reservation). 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment of article VII of the convention on 
facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 
1973.' 

Senate advice ajid consent to ratification: De- 
cember 16, 1974. 

Patents 

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organization that ratification deposited: Spain, 
November 29, 1974. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organization that accession deposited: Aus- 
tralia, November 12, 1974. 



Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited : Brazil, November 26, 1974. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 
Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 19, 1974. 

Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel- 
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 

Signature : Empresa Nacional de Telecommuni- 
caciones of Bolivia, December 19, 1974. 

Satellites 

Agreement concerning conditions for the furnish- 
ing of assistance by NASA for the launching of 
the French-German Symphonic communications 
satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington June 21 and 24, 1974, between France and 
the United States and between the Federal Re- 
public of Germany and the United States. Entered 
into force June 24, 1974. 

Wills 

Convention providing a uniform law on the form 
of an international will, with annex. Done at 
Washington October 26, 1973.' 
Signature : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
December 17, 1974.' 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 
7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca 
December 2, 1974. Entered into force December 
2, 1974. 

Bulgaria 

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and 
exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 
1974.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem- 
ber 16, 1974. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the payment to the United 
States of the net proceeds from the sale of de- 
fense articles by E! Salvador. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at San Salvador October 24 and 



' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 

^ With statement. 



January 6, 1975 



31 



December 6, 1974. Entered into force December 
6, 1974; effective July 1, 1974. 

Israel 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commoditie.s. 
Signed at Washington December 16, 1974. Entered 
into force December 16, 1974. 

Italy 

Exchange of letters concerning the application of 
the convention of March 30, 1955 (TIAS 3679), 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income. Effected by exchange of letters at Rome 
December 13, 1974. Applicable provisionally on 
and after January 1, 1974. 



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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
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Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pursuant 
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TIAS 7833. 3 pp. 25C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7833). 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree 
ment with the Republic of China amending the agree 
ment of April 4, 1972. TIAS 7834. 4 pp. 25^. (Cat. 
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Food and Agriculture Organization — Amendments 
to the Constitution. TIAS 7836. 6 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 
89.10:7836). 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declara- 
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TIAS 7839. 8 pp. 25('-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7839). 

International Trade in Textiles. TIAS 7840. 62 pp 
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Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Spain. TIAS 7841. 39 pp. 45^ (Cat. No 
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Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the Republic of Korea amending and ex- 
tending the agreement of November 24, 1972. TIAS 
7842. 18 pp. SOt*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7842). 

Tracking Station — Kwajalein Island. Agreement 
with Japan. TIAS 7843. 5 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10: 
7843). 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Portugal. TIAS 7844. 33 pp. 40('. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:7844). 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the Republic of Viet-Nam extending the 
agreement of April 22, 1959, as amended and ex- 
tended. TIAS 7846. 2 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7846) 

Passport Visas. Agreement with Mexico amending 
the agreement of October 28 and November 10 and 
12, 1953. TIAS 7847. 3 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. 89.10: 
7847). 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-South Africa Cooperation 
Agreement. Agreement with South Africa and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency amending the 
agreement of July 26, 1967. TIAS 7848. 3 pp. 25f. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7848). 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pursuant 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with Thai- 
land and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
terminating the agreement of September 30, 1964, 
and the protocol of May 16, 1974. TIAS 7849. 3 pp. 
25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7849). 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Thailand. TIAS 7850. 16 pp. 30^. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:7850). 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Jamianj 6, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 185 A 



Congress. Concessional Documents Relating 
to Foreign Policy 23 

Cuba 

Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the 

Sanctions Against Cuba 8 

U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To 
Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba (Inger- 
soll, Mailliard, Rogers) 8 

Cyprus. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 
ference at Brussels 1 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 
ference at Brussels 1 

Foreign Aid. Presidential Determination on 

Sale of Wheat and Rice to Syria (text) . . 24 

France. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 
ference at Brussels 1 

Greece. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 
ference at Brussels 1 

Human Rights. Bill of Rights Day, Human 

Rights Day and Week (proclamation) . . 18 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences . . 25 

Latin America. The Inter- American System: 
Adjusting to Present-Day Realities (Mail- 
liard) 19 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Holds News 
Conference at Brussels 1 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

North Atlantic Ministerial Council Meets at 

Brussels (communique) 5 

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference 
at Brussels 1 

Organization of American States 

The Inter- American System: Adjusting to 

Present-Day Realities (Mailliard) .... 19 
Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the 

Sanctions Against Cuba 8 

U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To 

Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba (Inger- 

soU, Mailliard, Rogers) 8 

Presidential Documents 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and 

Week (proclamation) 18 

Presidential Determination on Sale of Wheat 

and Rice to Syria 24 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 32 

Refugees. U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To 

Solve Refugee Problems (Ferguson) . . 27 

Spain. U.S. and Spain Hold Second Session of 
Talks on Cooperation (joint communique) . 7 

Syria. Presidential Determination on Sale of 

Wheat and Rice to Syria (text) .... 24 

Treaty Information. Current Actions ... 31 



Turkey. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 
ference at Brussels 1 

United Nations 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and 

Week (proclamation) 18 

United Nations Documents 30 

U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To Solve Refu- 
gee Problems (Ferguson) 27 

Name Index 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 27 

Ford, President 18,24 

Ingersoll, Robert S 8 

Kissinger, Secretary 1 

Mailliard, William S 8,19 

Rogers, William D 8 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 16 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
524 of December 12 and 530 of December 13. 

>o. Date Siibjert 

Kissinger: death of Walfer 
Lippmann. 

NATO ministerial meeting com- 
munique, Brussels. 

Kissing:er: news conference, 
Martinique. 

Britton sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Barbados and to Gre- 
nada (biographic data). 

Kissinger: Board of Foreign 
Scholarships dinner. 

Government Advisory Commit- 
tee on International Book and 
Library Programs. 

Kissinger, Linowitz: remarks 
following meeting, 12/17. 

U.S.-Japan bilateral fisheries 
agreements. 

Advisory Commission on Inter- 
national Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, Jan. 21. 

Biographic data on Secretary 
Kissinger. 



*531 


12/16 


532 


12/16 


t533 


12/16 


*534 


12/17 


t535 


12/17 


*536 


12/17 


t537 


12/18 


t538 


12/18 


*539 


12/19 



*540 12/20 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

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W/s^s- 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1855 



January 13, 1975 



PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING OF FRANCE 

MEET IN MARTINIQUE 33 

DEPARTMENT REVIEWS MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE STRA'?EGY 

TO RESOLVE THE OIL CRISIS 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 45 

U.N. REJECTS MOVE TO CHANGE REPRESENTATION OF CAMBODIA 
Statement by Ambassador Scali and Text of Resolution 50 



JAN2CI !975 

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1855 
January 13, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

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PRICE: 

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domestic $29.80. foreign $37.25 

Single copy 60 cents 

Use of funds tor printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides tlie public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing of France 
Meet in Martinique 



President Ford and President Valery Gis- 
card d'Estaing met in Martinique December 
lU-16. Following are remarks by the two 
Presidents npon President Ford's arnval on 
December H, their exchange of toasts at a 
dinner given by President Giscard d'Estaing 
that evening, their exchange of toasts at a 
dinner given by President Ford on December 
15, the transcript of a neivs conference held 
by Secretary Kissinger on December 16, and 
the text of a communique issued on Decem- 
ber 16. 



WELCOMING CEREMONY, DECEMBER 14 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23 

President Giscard d'Estaing ^ 

Dear Mr. President: It is a great honor 
for this French land of the West Indies to 
welcome the President of the United States 
of America. 

It is a real pleasure for me to extend to 
you and to all those accompanying you a 
most cordial welcome. As soon as you came 
into office, we both felt that we should 
establish a direct and personal contact. Such 
a contact is in keeping with the traditional 
relations between France and the United 
States. And in the present circumstances, 
we thought this would be especially useful. 

Faced with the enormous changes taking 
place throughout the world, our two countries 
have, in different capacities and to various 
degrees, responsibilities to bear. 

Belonging to the community of liberal de- 



' President Giscard d'Estaing spoke in French 
on all three occasions. 



mocracies, their personality and their situa- 
tion leave them sometimes — quite naturally, 
I would say — to assume different stands in 
the face of such changes. However, too old 
are their ties of friendship for them not to 
wish to harmonize such stands whenever 
necessary, and they are too deeply attached 
to the same ideal of freedom, progress, and 
peace not to be determined to succeed. 

All this points to the importance of our 
meeting, as stressed by our partners in the 
European Community, hence also the frank- 
ness and cordiality with which I trust our 
talks will start and be concluded. 

Mr. President, France of the Martinique 
offers to you and all those accompanying you 
its charm and its beauty. From the bottom 
of our heart, I wish you an excellent stay. 
Welcome, Mr. President. 



President Ford 

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing, 
ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for your 
most gracious welcome to this beautiful, 
gorgeous island. I am delighted to be here. 

Mr. President, this is an opportunity for 
us to become personally acquainted and to 
discuss the serious issues which confront our 
two countries. Our meeting vividly demon- 
strates the importance we attach to working 
together. 

General Lafayette stopped here on his way 
to assist America to achieve its independ- 
ence. The friendship of our two countries 
spans the oceans as well as the centuries. It is 
fitting that you and I, both given responsibili- 
ties for leadership in our respective countries 
this year, are taking this early opportunity 



January 13, 1975 



33 



to address problems of common interest and 
common concern. 

We must combine our efforts with those 
of our friends and our allies if we are to 
meet the challenges of the last quarter of 
the 20th century. The list of the challenges 
is long, including such vital issues as food, 
energy, finance, and of course the fundamen- 
tal security of our people and the quest for 
further reductions in international tensions. 

Just as our talks mark the beginning of 
a personal relationship, I am confident that 
our nations will reaflirm the tradition of 
of Franco-American cooperation in great en- 
deavors. 

I look forward to our meetings for the ex- 
changes they will permit and our resulting 
understandings. In meeting here, we of 
course will be mindful not only of American 
and French interests but the contributions 
our efforts can make toward a more peaceful, 
stable, and prosperous world. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, DECEMBER 14 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23 

President Giscard d'Estaing 

Mr. President: A meeting between France 
and the United States is always a rendezvous 
of freedom and friendship. And what could 
be a better place for it than this island of 
Martinique, which cherishes the proud mem- 
ory of having served as a naval base for the 
French fleet during the American War of 
Independence, and in two years' time, we 
will be celebrating together the successful 
outcome of that event. 

It was in the name of freedom that our 
friendship was born, and we shall celebrate 
its 200th anniversary at the same time as 
the bicentennial of American independence. 

It was also in the name of freedom that 
twice in the course of this centuiy the 
active solidarity of the United States en- 
abled France to preserve or to regain her 
independence. 

Different as we may be, what appeals so 
much to us, the French, is all that in the 
United States symbolizes and means free- 



dom: your vast spaces, your openness to 
new ideas and bold endeavors, your mastery 
of technology, which gives man his power 
over nature and lightens his burden. 

Freedom and friendship have stamped 
their mark on the relations between our two 
countries. Freedom allows for their frank- 
ness and independence; friendship demands 
mutual understanding and cooperation. 

This spirit of free dialogue and trust be- 
tween partners who recognize the equality 
of their rights and duties, even if they are 
not equal in terms of resources or power, 
is characteristic of Franco-American rela- 
tions, and there is nothing to prevent that 
the same spirit be applied to solving the 
major problems of the world today. 

For our part, we express the wish that 
this spirit inspire the relations between the 
United States and the Europe that we are 
striving patiently — and we are bound to say 
slowly — to build. 

It is only on condition that it can exist by 
its own accord that Europe will be for the 
United States a firm and reliable partner and 
for the world a factor of balance and peace. 

We also wish that this spirit of dialogue 
should govern our thinking on the profound 
changes in the world scene. 

As you were mentioning, you yourself, 
Mr. President, on your arrival here, the 
path of consultation, which is as far re- 
moved from that of confrontation as it is 
from that of capitulation, is the only one 
which is in keeping with the political, eco- 
nomic, and human needs of our time. 

It is the path we followed when it was 
time to emerge from the cold war and, on our 
war-torn continent, to organize detente, en- 
tente, and cooperation, while maintaining 
actively our desire for independence in safe- 
guarding our security. 

It is the path we recommend be followed in 
the Middle East, where, in spite of the 
remarkable efforts of American diplomacy 
and the useful progress it has achieved, the 
situation remains a threatening one. A just 
and lasting settlement must, in our view, take 
into account the three legitimate aspirations 
of all parties concerned — those of the State 
of Israel, to live in peace within secure and 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



guaranteed boundaries; those of the Arab 
states, to recover their territorial integrity; 
and those of the Palestinian people, to have, 
as all peoples, a homeland. 

It is also through consultation that we shall 
succeed in finding a solution to the problem 
caused by the increase in oil prices. This in 
no way excludes a prior harmonization of the 
positions within each of the major categories 
involved. It, however, presupposes that the 
purpose of this harmonization process be 
to prepare the meeting at the same table and 
at a fixed date of countries willing to reconcile 
their respective points of view in the peace- 
ful interests of the world. 

Mr. President, we shall be having talks in a 
climate of mutual trust on all these subjects 
of concern to the world today. These talks 
will once again demonstrate that the frank- 
ness of our discussions draws us together 
much more than it divides us, as should be 
between partners and allies when they have 
for each other, as I have for your country, a 
sense of their dignity and their sovereignty. 

Mr. President, we all deeply regret the 
absence of Mrs. Ford, and I would like to ask 
you to be kind enough to convey to her our 
very warm and respectful wishes for a 
prompt recovery. 

I drink this toast in your honor, Mr. 
President, as well as to the great people of the 
United States, to whom the French people, 
through me, extend their greetings in testi- 
mony of our two-centuries-old and ever- 
young friendships like our two countries. 

Thank you. 

President Ford 

Mr. President: The hospitality extended to 
me has reflected in the warmth of the climate 
of this most remarkable island and the spirit 
of your kind words of welcome, and I am 
deeply grateful. 

I am very, very proud to be the first 
American President in ofiice to visit this part 
of the Caribbean, and I would like to express 
again my appreciation to you personally for 
suggesting Martinique as the location of our 
first meeting. 

The United States and France, we all 



know, have been very, very close. We have 
been extremely close friends for over two 
centuries. From our American Revolution 
through the darkest days of World War II, 
our countries have stood together in mo- 
ments of crisis. And today, of fundamental 
importance to our countries and to the West, 
a strong Atlantic alliance safeguards our 
security. 

As old friends and allies, Mr. President, 
we have much to talk about. On many, many 
points we shall agree; on others we may 
differ. But it is of the greatest importance, 
in my judgment, that we will talk with full 
candor since we share the same ideals. A re- 
lationship of confidence is absolutely essen- 
tial. It is only through such a relationship, 
Mr. President, that our common objectives 
can best be served and our differing views 
reconciled. 

As in the past, we jointly face, Mr. Presi- 
dent, major challenges. This time the im- 
mediate danger is not war, but the problems 
of peace: inflation, balance of payments 
deficits, energy shortages, and, for many 
throughout the world, shortages of food it- 
self. These problems unfortunately accen- 
tuate the interdependence of nations and the 
need for communication and cooperation. 

At stake is the stability of every economy, 
the welfare of every nation. Unilateral 
measures, Mr. President, can no longer suf- 
fice in solving problems of such universal 
dimension. 

Mr. President, you recently described this 
situation very vividly when you said the 
world is unhappy. Indeed, the world is 
troubled. But if we are to transcend our 
difficulties and successfully meet our chal- 
lenges we, France and the United States, 
must cooperate. 

We face a major problem in the field of 
energy. In dealing with it on the basis of 
consumer solidarity, we seek constructive 
dialogue, not confrontation. The United 
States is convinced that cooperation and soli- 
darity among the consumer nations mark 
the surest way to reach understanding with 
the producer nations, which we all desire. 

I am also looking forward, Mr. President, 
to exchanging impressions on East- West re- 



January 13, 1975 



35 



lations and on our recent meetings with 
General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Commu- 
nist Party of the Soviet Union]. I am sure 
we will all agree that all of us in the West 
will benefit from close relationships as the 
policy of detente continues to develop. 

Our interdependence requires that we — 
together with our friends and our partners 
— join in concerted measures or responses 
to the dangers which confront us all. Let us 
continue our historic relationship with re- 
newed spirit and redoubled effort, as good 
and responsible friends. 

Our common heritage gives me confidence 
that we will continue our joint endeavors 
for peace and stability in the world. Mr. 
President, it is with this objective that I 
look forward to our discussions tomorrow. 
I have every hope that our talks will 
strengthen the friendship between us, both 
in a bilateral sense and also as members 
of the alliance which Americans regard as 
the cornerstone of our foreign policy. 

Ladies and gentlemen, in the spirit of 
strengthening our historic ties, I ask all of 
you to stand and to raise your glasses in 
honor of the President of the French Re- 
public and his lovely wife. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, DECEMBER 15 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23 

President Ford 

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing, 
our distinguished guests: Let me say with 
great personal conviction and strong feel- 
ings, we have enjoyed being here in a part 
of France. The warmth of the welcome of 
the people, the superb atmosphere created 
by the beauties of nature, have made this 
trip a wonderful experience for all of us. 

Mr. President, the United States within 
a relatively few months is going to be cele- 
brating our 200th anniversary. Whenever 
we think about that anniversary, we can't 
help but feel the participation that France 
played in the achievement of our independ- 



ence. July 4, 1976, will bring back many, 
many memories of the help and assistance 
that France gave to our country at a very 
diflicult and controversial period in our early 
history in America. 

It is my understanding, Mr. President, 
that one of your ancestors. Admiral d'Es- 
taing, did have an intere.st in and did help 
us at a period when we, the United States, 
were in our formative years. For that we 
thank you, and for all of the other great 
Frenchmen who were assisting America in 
our early days. 

It is my understanding, Mr. President, 
that France is making a very meaningful 
contribution to our 200th anniversary with 
the "sight and sound" program that will be 
a highlight in Washington for the many, 
many thousands who will visit the Nation's 
Capital. We thank you for this contribution, 
and we are grateful for your feeling that 
France should participate in this way. 

If I might now turn to our own personal 
relationship, which I say without any hesi- 
tancy or qualification — it was a pleasure to 
meet you and to have the opportunity of 
broadening a relationship and developing a 
friendship. It seems to me this can be 
meaningful in our relations between France 
and the United States. But even more mean- 
ingful, on a far broader basis, I am grateful 
for your statesmanship; I am most appre- 
ciative for your views that we have ex- 
changed here on this occasion in a part of 
France. 

And so, Mr. President, may I offer a toast 
to you and Madame Giscard d'Estaing and to 
the Republic of France. It is a pleasure and 
a privilege. 



President Giscard d'Estaing 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Mr. 
President, we have both come into office 
very recently, only a few months ago, and 
so — this is a source of deep satisfaction — 
we are both extremely young. Indeed, one 
can say it is a secret of youth, in fact, to be 
elected President. 

Now, we are, however, young Presidents 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



of countries whose relations are very long- 
standing, indeed, as you yourself have just 
mentioned. And indeed, all you have to do 
is to look behind you at Fort-de-France — 
Fort-de-France, which has carried that name 
for three centuries and two centuries ago 
harbored the French fleet that sailed off the 
coast of the then young and new United 
States. 

I would add that the relations between 
France and the United States are not merely 
a matter of what you might call the pictur- 
esque site of history or simply a matter of 
stories on the subject. No, it is something 
which reflects a deep and reciprocal mutual 
interest; it is something which has been 
borne out in numerous circumstances. For 
instance, when at the time of the First 
World War the United States came to the 
defense of France, the landing of the Amer- 
icans on French territory was met with 
tremendous enthusiasm on the part of the 
French population. 

And so when at the end of the Second 
World War, I myself was involved in the 
last stages of the war, the unit that I served 
in was a part of the 1st French Army which 
itself was under the 7th U.S. Army. 

But the great problems of our times — 
even to those of us who, like ourselves, are 
deeply attached to tradition — the big prob- 
lems of our time, I say, are in fact ahead of 
us and will call for considerable imagina- 
tion and action. And that is why it was very 
important for me, Mr. President, to know 
whether these new problems and tasks could, 
in fact, be tackled with the very great coun- 
try that you represent in a spirit of openness 
and mutual understanding. 

And so, it was important for me to estab- 
lish this personal contact with you yourself, 
sir, and the distinguished persons accom- 
panying you. And yesterday morning, when 
I was meeting you at the airport, it occurred 
to me that during these two days we were 
in fact going to, perhaps, take initiatives 
and perform actions which would lead to 
solutions which could well have a lasting 
effect not only on our own relations but also, 
perhaps, on world affairs. 



The results of our talks will be embodied 
in a communique which will be issued at the 
end of tomorrow morning, and if I were to 
divulge right now what the results of our 
talks have been, this would deprive the 
members of our staff from the pleasures of 
the late evening and early morning during 
which they would engage in the arduous 
task of preparing the suitable form of 
words. 

But what I can say something about is 
the atmosphere of our talks, and what I 
would like to mention is their very cordial 
nature, the very simple way in which our 
talks have proceeded, the great frankness 
and the clarity of your positions, and the 
great competence with which you have led 
our discussions. 

Now, on international gatherings or occa- 
sions such as this, people tend to wonder, 
in fact, who won, who came out on top, who 
gave the concessions, who, in fact, was the 
victor. But at the very outset, you vdll re- 
call that I said it was my hope that, in fact, 
there would be neither a matter of conces- 
sions nor victors in a case like this, but we 
should both emerge from these talks with 
the feeling that we had, in fact, achieved 
something useful, realistic, and worthwhile 
in furthering the solutions of the problems 
that we are in fact discussing. 

And could I say very sincerely, Mr. Pres- 
ident, how very much Madame Giscard 
d'Estaing and myself deeply regret the ab- 
sence of Mrs. Ford. We had been looking 
forward very much to meeting her here on 
this occasion, and I may say that some of 
the arrangements that had been made had 
been made precisely in anticipation of the 
pleasure of, for instance, having her with 
us today at lunch. Now, there is one great 
advantage of this situation, and that is that 
the rights of international affairs dictate 
that one cannot, twice running, invite the 
same head of state. That means, therefore, 
that despite the great pleasure that this 
would afford us, it would not be possible for 
us to invite you, sir, again so soon. But we 
could, of course, invite Mrs. Ford. And we 
would very much hope that she would accept, 



January 13, 1975 



37 



and that you would be kind enough to 
accompany her. 

Now, people in this world of ours very 
often ask themselves all sorts of questions 
and, indeed, one of the things they often 
wonder about, apparently, is why statesmen, 
in fact, are statesmen and why they accept 
to sacrifice many aspects of their existence 
to the responsibilities of state. 

Now, as far as you are concerned — and I 
have seen this during our talks— and as far 
as I am concerned, the reason, perhaps, for 
which we do so is that we feel that we have, 
perhaps, a contribution to make in further- 
ing the affairs of the world. 

Now, the fact that the responsibilities that 
we have to shoulder at this particular time in 
history are particularly heavy at the same 
time means that our contribution will be a 
significant contribution. 

Now, it is clear, however, that the affairs 
of mankind and the peace of the world do 
not depend solely on the action or the efforts 
of one country alone — however big that 
country may be — but will always depend on 
the combination, on the conjunction of the 
efforts of several. And I now know that it 
is quite clear that we will be able to work 
together. 

Mr. President, when the French fleet left 
these waters two centuries ago for the North 
American Continent, there were doubtless, 
at the time of departure, great festivities 
on board, and I can well imagine that my 
ancestor may well have offered a toast on 
that occasion which would probably have 
had something to do with the vnshes that 
he would have expressed concerning the con- 
tinent that they were about to discover and 
would have expressed their hopes and their 
expectations. 

Now, this evening, today, the situation to 
some extent is the other way around in that 
it is we who are hosting you here in Marti- 
nique, but the French Martinique of two 
centuries ago and the French Martinique of 
today, Mr. President, are deeply proud of 
having here the visit today of the President 
of the United States. Our friend the 
President. 



SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, 
DECEMBER 16 

Press relpase 533 dated December 16 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, we have distributed the communique, 
which is substantially self-explanatory. Let 
me make a few preliminary points. 

First, as the President of the Republic 
said last night in his toast, both sides ap- 
proached these discussions with the attitude 
not of who would get the maximum number 
of concessions from the other or who would 
be the victor in the negotiations — because 
we don't think of each other as antagonists, 
but as allies. 

We looked at the outstanding problems, 
especially in the field of energy and eco- 
nomics, from the point of view of what was 
in the mutual benefit, the benefit of Europe 
and the United States, as well as the benefit 
of all the interested nations around the 
world. And therefore, with respect to the 
energy issue, which was one of the principal 
problems which was of course discussed, I 
think we achieved the synthesis of the 
French and American positions which took 
account of the American conviction that con- 
sumer cooperation was essential and the 
French belief — which, as a matter of fact, 
the United States has always shared — that 
consumer cooperation must lead rapidly to 
consumer-producer dialogue. 

I would like to add that in addition to the 
substance of the communique, the conversa- 
tions were conducted in an atmosphere of 
great cordiality and the relationship of con- 
fidence that has grown up between the two 
Presidents will help facilitate and guarantee 
the spirit of cooperation which we believe 
is one of the important results of this con- 
ference. 

Having attended many similar meetings 
between French and American leaders, I 
must say I found this atmosphere the most 
positive and the one between the two leaders 
and one in which as far as the United States 
is concerned — the French President will un- 
doubtedly speak for himself — we will con- 
tinue in the exchanges that will be necessary 
to implement the various aspects of the 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



communique as well as the cooperation that 
is foreseen in the communique. 

Now why don't I take your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give lis a ruiv- 
down on the sequence of events that are 
going to happen in these conferences con- 
cerning the oil crisis? Which one takes place 
first, and what happens after that? 

Secretary Kissinger: As the communique 
says, the steps should be taken in sequence, 
and the sequence is the one described in the 
communique; that is to say, there will first 
be an effort of some urgency to strengthen 
consumer cooperation in the field of conser- 
vation, of developing alternative sources of 
energy, and of setting up new mechanisms 
for financial solidarity. 

Based on progress among the consumers, 
this will then lead to a preparatory meeting 
between consumers and producers, for which 
we set a target date for March 1975. Of 
course it depends on the progress the con- 
sumers make among themselves, but the 
United States will cooperate in bringing 
about the preparatory conferences and ob- 
viously will not use delaying tactics. 

I think there is good will on all sides. We 
can make substantial progress among the 
consumers, and given the urgency of the 
situation, in fact, we must make substantial 
progress among the consumers. 

After the completion of the preparatory 
discussions, we have foreseen intensive con- 
sultation among the consumers to develop 
common positions and common attitudes 
toward the consumer-producer substantive 
conference. The preparatory meeting will 
deal with procedure, agenda, participants, 
and will not deal with substance. 

This is the sequence that the two Presi- 
dents have agreed upon, and again I would 
like to say that the United States has not 
considered its views as incompatible with 
those of France. In fact, at the Washington 
Energy Conference, we proposed that the 
consumer cooperation should lead to con- 
sumer-producer dialogue, and therefore we 
welcome the French initiative, and I think 
we can work cooperatively to achieve the 
common objective. 



Q. Will France participate in this con- 
sumer effort to strengthen solidarity? 

Secretary Kissinger: It says "existing in- 
stitutions and agreements." There are a 
number of factors. France, of course, is 
not a member of the lEA [International 
Energy Agency], and we have not asked 
France to be a member of the IE A. It is 
my impression that France will work in 
parallel to the lEA in the same direction. 
For example, we have had occasion to point 
out that the French conservation program 
is going in the same direction as that of the 
lEA and in some respects goes beyond it. 

The institutions or the mechanisms for 
financial solidarity we had proposed in my 
speech should be taken in the Group of Ten, 
in which France is of course a member; and 
therefore there is no difficulty about French 
participation in those. 

With respect to alternative sources of 
energy, it may be that they are initially 
discussed in the TEA, but there is also a role 
there for European institutions, so we are 
not concerned with the legal structure. 

It is our conviction that France will work 
parallel to our efforts and we will find the 
legal formula by which to implement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, doesn't that kind of 
informal arrangement give France the bene- 
fit of consiimer organization that has al- 
ready taken place without having any of 
the responsibilities, for example, in oil 
sharing ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is our view 
that we are concerned with the substance, 
and therefore how France participates, un- 
der what legal form, is not of decisive con- 
cern to us. 

As I pointed out, the financial institutions, 
for example, are not being done in the lEA 
to begin with. The conservation measures, 
once they have been agreed upon, do not 
really require any international party to 
implement. They can be implemented on a 
national basis. 

I have the impression that we should stop 
talking about Franco-American relations in 
terms of confrontation and who is taking 
advantage of whom but rather in terms of 



January 13, 1975 



39 



practical cooperation in which the actions 
of the two parties will be more important 
than the legal form— and that is our atti- 
tude, and it is our impression that was the 
French attitude at this meeting. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us 
what progress, if any, was made relative 
to your suggestion in Chicago of the $25 
billion fund for the shoring up of those 
economies that need it in light of the oil 
shortage ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We found the atti- 
tude of the French President very positive 
to this idea, and we have the impression that 
France will work with us in the Group of 
Ten to implement this idea. 

Q. How do you account for the French 
change? All of a sudden you have peace, 
and it is lovely. What caused this after 10 
years ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say there 
has been a French change. I described the 
results of this conference, and I can only 
say that both Presidents seem to me to be 
convinced of the urgent problems facing 
their countries and facing the industrialized 
countries and, indeed, facing the whole 
world. 

And it was a discussion that was not con- 
ducted in slogans, but in terms of the issues ; 
and when you confront the issues, I think 
certain conclusions are more or less inevi- 
table. 

I would also say that the manner in which 
both Presidents conducted the conversations, 
which was free of dogma on both sides — 

Q. Free of what? 

Secretary Kissinger: D-o-g-m-a — it is a 
Latin word, not German [laughter]. — con- 
tributed to the result but I don't want to 
claim any changes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, leaving aside the finan- 
cial side in the Group of Ten, will the French 
participation in the conservation side be 
through the EEC [European Economic Com- 
munity] ; that is to say, are you contemplat- 
ing here that the EEC will become an elec- 
tive member of the IE A ? 



Secretary Kissinger: This is one possi- 
bility. It is not for the United States to pre- 
scribe how Europe should organize its ener- 
gy policy. The United States would certainly 
have no objection and can see some advan- 
tages in a common energy policy on the part 
of Europe, and this in turn, of course, would 
permit the EEC to participate as a unit in 
the lEA. This is essentially up to the Euro- 
peans. 

Q. Do you think it will happen? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make a point. 
Obviously, the spirit of what has been 
agreed here in Martinique requires that 
France work in parallel on the same sub- 
stance as the other principal consumers, and 
we believe that this can be done. This is 
one device for doing it, but we are prepared 
to find other consultative devices. 

Q. Did you get any assurances from the 
President of France that they would be will- 
ing to do this at this meetiyig? 

Secretary Kissinger: That they would be 
prepared to have a common European en- 
ergy policy? 

Q. Or that EEC woidd join the IE A? 

Secretary Kissinger: We did not discuss 
the legal relationship of France to the lEA. 
We discussed the substantive relationship of 
the measures that needed to be taken ; and as 
we pointed out, it is our view — and I think 
it is the common view — that certain substan- 
tive steps have to be taken in order to make 
the consumer-producer dialogue useful. And 
the United States, obviously, will know 
whether these steps have been taken. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the March con- 
ference be confiposed of nations outside the 
major oil producers and also major oil con- 
sumers ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make two 
points. The March date is a target date. It 
is not an absolutely fixed date, but we will 
work seriously to see whether it can be im- 
plemented. The original proposal was that 
it might be tripartite; that is, that some of 
the less developed consuming countries 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



might also participate. The United States 
is not opposed to this in principle; or to put 
it positively, the United States is prepared 
for this but the exact composition of either 
the preparatory or the final meeting has not 
yet been settled. This is one of the issues 
that has to be settled. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us further 
elaboration on the Mideast discussions? How 
much of the time was spent talking about 
the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think, in the Mid- 
east discussion, the French point of view 
has been publicly stated and there was a full 
exchange of the respective points of view. 
No conclusions were reached or announced. 
This was mostly in the form of bringing 
about a fuller comprehension by each side 
of the views of the other. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you point two 
things out: What the gold agreement means 
and, also, what was our original request for 
compensation for the NATO bases? 

Secretary Kissinger: What the gold agree- 
ment means is this: That there has been a 
fixed price for the valuation of gold which 
does not reflect the market price, and it 
means that each country is free to adopt 
current market prices as the basis for eval- 
uation and therefore show on its books a 
value of gold reserves which corresponds 
more nearly to the market price of gold, 
which is about 31/2 to 4 times larger than 
the fixed price of gold and therefore reflects 
more accurately the capacity of the reserves 
of each country to pay for deficits. 

I frankly do not remember what the orig- 
inal figures were. I know the French figure 
that they first offered us was substantially 
below $100 million, and I am certain the 
figure we asked for was substantially above; 
and this seemed to us to represent a fair 
compromise, but I don't remember what the 
figure was that we originally asked for. 

Q. What of the apparent French suspi- 
cions that the United States is trying to 
dominate the policies of the industrialized 
world and dictating its terms? 



Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to com- 
ment about French suspicions that were not 
expressed at the meeting. At the meeting 
we discussed how to deal with concrete 
issues, and we reached the results which I 
have described, so that the suspicions that 
I occasionally read in the French press were 
not expressed by French officials, and I 
therefore don't feel the need to comment on 
that. 

Q. On the gold question, does the agree- 
ment you have reached imply also the central 
banks are free now to buy and sell gold at 
the market price? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to get 
into technical questions of gold purchases. 
What it means is that they can value their 
gold at the market price. 

Q. It does mean that? 

Secretary Kissinger: It goes no further 
than that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it the American view 
that the United States will do this or is it 
going to be a totally European proposition? 

Secretary Kissinger: The valuation? 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is up to each 
country. 

Q. I asked about the United States. Do 
you anticipate we will do it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have the im- 
pression that we will do it in the near future. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it the American view 
that a consumer-producer conference would 
have as a principal goal lower oil prices, 
and do the French share that view? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody 
agrees that lower oil prices are highly de- 
sirable, and it is the American view that oil 
prices should be stabilized at a lower level. 
I think we all agree that regardless of what 
happens to oil prices, the impact of the oil 
prices on the world economy and the means 
that are necessary to assure the stability of 



January 13, 1975 



41 



the economies of the industrialized nations 
as well as a fair progress for the producer 
nations must be a subject of a consumer- 
producer dialogue. But the preparatory 
meeting is designed precisely to define the 
agenda as well as the procedures of such a 
dialogue, so it isn't possible to be conclusive 
about it at this moment. 

Q. Hoiv is this going to be proposed to 
a country like Japan — consumer-producer 
country conference ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
we have been in the closest contact with the 
Government of Japan, and I had extensive 
conversations with the then Foreign Minis- 
ter Kimura, which have been reaffirmed by 
the new Japanese Government. And of course 
the French Foreign Minister had been in 
Japan at about the same time that we were 
there. So it is my impression that what has 
been agreed upon here will have the support 
of the Government of Japan and reflect ex- 
actly the idea that the Government of Japan 
expressed to both of us. And it is also my 
view, based on conversations with the Ger- 
man Chancellor and with other major con- 
suming nations in the NATO meeting in 
Brussels, that what was agreed to here will 
elicit a wide consensus. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in elaboration on the 
Middle East question, does it appear that 
there was French acceptance of the U.S. idea 
of a step-by-step solution to the Ay-ab- 
Israeli problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speak 
for France, particularly since the President 
of the Republic is waiting to appear here. 

My impression is that there is no French 
disagreement with the step-by-step ap- 
proach, but having a more Cartesian up- 
bringing than we, France may perhaps feel 
it more necessary than we do to define the 
terminal point at the outset. I don't think 
there is any French disagreement with the 
step-by-step approach, if it can be achieved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it says in the communi- 
que that there ha^ been accord on many 
questions. Could you point out the questions 
upon which there is disagreement? 



Secretary Kissinger: I am not leaving 
this meeting with a spirit that there has 
been substantial disagreement on any ques- 
tion. I think "many questions" refers to 
the fact that in a limited amount of time 
only particular issues could be discussed 
and did not mean to imply that any issues 
that were discussed were left open to dis- 
agreement. 

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 



TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, DECEMBER 16 

Communique Issued Following the Meetings of 
THE President of the United States of America 
and the President of the French Republic in 

Martinique 

The President of the United States, Gerald R. 
Ford, and the President of the French Republic, 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, met in Martinique De- 
cember 14-16, 1974, to discuss current issues of 
mutual concern. They were joined in their discus- 
sions by the Secretary of State and Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs Henry 
A. Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean 
Sauvagnargues, and by Secretary of the Treasury 
William Simon and Minister of Finance Jean-Pierre 
Fourcade. The Ministers also held complementary 
side talks. 

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of 
cordiality and mutual confidence. President Ford 
and President Giscard d'Estaing welcomed the op- 
portunity to conduct detailed substantive discussions 
on the whole range of subjects of mutual concern. 
As traditional friends and allies, the two nations 
share common values and goals and the two Presi- 
dents expressed their determination to cooperate 
on this basis in efforts to solve common problems. 

They reviewed the international situation in the 
economic, financial and monetary fields. 

The two Presidents agreed that the Governments 
of the United States and of the European Com- 
munity, in the name of which the French President 
spoke on this subject, must adopt consistent eco- 
nomic policies in order to be effective in avoiding 
unemployment while fighting inflation. In particular, 
they agreed on the importance of avoiding measures 
of a protectionist nature. And they decided to take 
the initiative in calling additional intergovernmental 
meetings should they prove necessary for achieve- 
ment of the desired consistency of basic economic 
policies among industrial nations. 

In the light of the rapid pace of change in inter- 
national financial positions in the world today, the 
Presidents were in full agreement on the desirability 
of maintaining the momentum of consideration of 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



closer financial cooperation both within the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund and through supplementary 
measures. As one specific measure to strengthen 
the existing financial framework, the Presidents 
agreed that it would be appropriate for any Govern- 
ment which wished to do so to adopt current market 
prices as the basis of valuation for its gold holdings. 

The two Presidents considered in depth the energy 
problem and its serious and disturbing effects on 
the world economy. They recognized the importance 
for the USA, the EEC and other industrialized 
nations of implementing policies for the conserva- 
tion of energy, the development of existing and 
alternative sources of energy, and the setting up 
of new mechanisms of financial solidarity. They 
stressed the importance of solidarity among oil im- 
porting nations on these issues. 

The two Presidents also exchanged views on the 
desirability of a dialogue between consumers and 
producers and in that connection discussed the 
proposal of the President of the French Republic of 
October 24 for a conference of oil exporting and 
importing countries. They agreed that it would be 
desirable to convene such a meeting at the earliest 
possible date. They regard it as important that all 
parties concerned should be better informed of their 
respective interests and concerns and that har- 
monious relations should be established among them 
in order to promote a healthy development of the 
world economy. 

The two Presidents noted that their views on 
these matters are complementary and, in this con- 
text, they agreed that the following interrelated 
steps should be taken in sequence: 

— They agreed that additional steps should be 
taken, within the framework of existing institutions 
and agreements to which they are a party, and in 
consultation with other interested consumers, to 
strengthen their cooperation. In particular, such 
cooperation should include programs of energy con- 
servation, for the development of existing and alter- 
native sources of energy and for financial solidarity. 

— Based on substantial progress in the foregoing 
areas, the two Presidents agreed that it will be 
desirable to propose holding a preparatory meeting 
between consumers and producers to develop an 
agenda and procedures for a consumer/producer con- 
ference. The target date for such a preparatory 
meeting should be March 1975. 

— The preparatory discussions will be followed 
by intensive consultations among consumer countries 
in order to prepare positions for the conference. 

The two Presidents agreed that the actions enu- 
merated above will be carried out in the most expe- 
ditious manner possible and in full awareness of 
the common interest in meeting this critical situa- 
tion shared by the United States and France and all 
other countries involved. 



President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing 
reviewed current developments in East-West rela- 
tions. They discussed their respective meetings with 
General Secretary Brezhnev, and Secretary Kis- 
singer reported on his discussions with leaders of 
the People's Republic of China. They exchanged 
views on developments in East-West negotiations, 
including the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe. They expressed their conviction that 
progress in easing tensions was being made. 

The two Presidents exchanged views on the pres- 
ent situation in the Middle East. They agreed on 
the importance of early progress toward a just and 
lasting peace in that area. 

President Giscard d'Estaing described current 
efforts by France and other members of the Euro- 
pean Community to further the process of European 
unity. President Ford reaffirmed the continuing 
support of the United States for efforts to achieve 
European unity. 

The two Presidents discussed the situation in 
Indochina. They noted that progress in Laos toward 
reconciliation and reunification was encouraging. 

The two Presidents agreed on the need for all 
parties to support fully the Paris Peace Agrreements 
on Vietnam. Regarding Cambodia, they expressed 
the hope that the contending parties would enter 
into negotiations in the near future rather than 
continuing the military struggle. They expressed 
the hope that following Laos, Cambodia and Viet- 
nam might also find their political way towards 
civil peace. 

The two Presidents renewed the pledges of both 
Governments to continue close relations in the field 
of defense as members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
They agreed that the cooperation between France 
and NATO is a significant factor in the security 
of Europe. 

They noted with satisfaction that the positive 
steps in negotiations on SALT taken during the 
Soviet-American meeting at Vladivostok have re- 
duced the threat of a nuclear arms race. The two 
Presidents explored how, as exporters of nuclear 
materials and technology, their two countries could 
coordinate their efforts to assure improved safe- 
guards of nuclear materials. 

The President of France indicated that his Govern- 
ment was prepared to reach a financial settlement 
in connection with the relocation of American forces 
and bases committed to NATO from France to other 
countries in 1967. The French offer of $100 million 
in full settlement was formally accepted by Presi- 
dent Ford. 

The two Presidents concluded that the personal 
contact and discussion in this meeting had demon- 
strated accord on many questions and expressed 
their determination to maintain close contact for 
the purpose of broad cooperation in areas of com- 
mon concern to the two countries. 



January 13, 1975 



43 



President Ford Sets Import Quotas 
for Cattle and Meat From Canada 

A PROCL AM ATION' 

Temporary Quantitative Limitation on the Im- 
portation Into the United States of Certain 
Cattle, Beef, Veal, Swine and Pork From Can- 
ada 

Whereas, Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) authorizes the 
President to impose duties or other import restric- 
tions on the products of any foreign country estab- 
lishing or maintaining unjustifiable import restric- 
tions against United States agricultural products 
which impair the value of tariff commitments made 
to the United States, oppress the commerce of the 
United States, or prevent the expansion of trade on 
a mutually advantageous basis; 

Whereas, Canada has imposed unjustifiable re- 
strictions on cattle and meat imports from the 
United States; 

Whereas, such restrictions violate the commit- 
ments of Canada made to the United States, includ- 
ing the provisions of Article XI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and impair the 
value of tariff commitments made to the United 
States, oppress the commerce of the United States 
and prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually 
advantageous basis; and 

Whereas, I deem it necessary and appropriate to 
impose the restrictions hereinafter proclaimed on 
imports of cattle, beef, veal, swine, and pork, which 
are the products of Canada, in order to obtain the 
removal of such unjustifiable restrictions and to 
provide access for United States cattle and meat 
to the markets of Canada on an equitable basis; 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, acting under the 
authority vested in me by the Constitution and 
statutes, including Section 252(a) of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), do 
hereby proclaim (until such time as the President 
otherwise proclaims) — 

(1) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) is 
amended by inserting in numerical sequence the 
following new items: 



Item Articles 

Whenever, in any 12-month period 
beginning August 12 in 1974 or 
in any succeeding year, the re- 
spective quantity or aggregate 
quantity of the cattle, the swine, 
the beef and veal, or the pork 
specified below, the product of 
Canada, has been entered, no 
such cattle, swine, beef and veal, 
or pork respectively, the product 
of Canada, may be entered dur- 
ing the remainder of such period: 

945.01 Cattle provided for in items 100.40, 

100.43. 100.45, 100.53. and 100.55 
of part 1, schedule 1. 

945.02 Swine provided for in item 100.85 

of part 1, schedule 1. 

945.03 Beef and veal, fresh, chilled, 

zen, prepared, or preserved, 
vided for in items 106.10 
107.60. part 2B, schedule 1. 

946.04 Pork, fresh, chilled, frozen. 

pared or preserved, provided for 
in items 106.40, 107.30 and 107.35. 
part 2B, schedule 1. 



Quota 
Quantity 



fro- 
pro- 
and 



pre- 



17,000 head (aggre- 
gate quantity) . 

50.000 head. 

17,000.000 pounds 
(aggregate quan- 
tity). 

36.000,000 pounds 
(aggregate quan- 
tity). 



' No. 4335; 39 Fed. Reg. 40741, Nov. 20, 1974. 



(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 
(1) hereof, not in excess of one-twelfth of the 
respective quota quantity specified for each item in 
said paragraph (1) may be entered, or withdrawn 
from warehouse, for consumption during the 30 day 
period beginning on the date of this proclamation. 

(3) The provisions of this proclamation shall 
become effective upon publication in the Federal 
Register, but the provisions of paragraph (1) hereof 
do not apply to any articles in excess of the respec- 
tive quota quantity specified for each item in said 
paragraph ( 1 ) which — 

(a) prior to such date of publication, have been 
duly entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for 
consumption or have been released under the pro- 
visions of section 448(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(19 U.S.C. 1448(b)), or 

(b) have been entered or withdrawn pursuant to 
paragraph (2) hereof. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this sixteenth day of November in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-four, and of 
the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred ninety-ninth. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Reviews Main Elements of the Strategy 
To Resolve the Oil Crisis 



Statement by Thomas O. Enders 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ^ 



The proposal made by Secretaries Kissin- 
ger and Simon [Secretary of the Treasury 
William E. Simon] for a $25 billion facility 
to back up capital markets over the next two 
years is part of a larger strategy to resolve 
the oil crisis. In this statement I propose to 
review the main elements of that strategy, 
situating the proposed financing facility in 
relation to them. 

The starting point for analysis is the belief 
that unless the consumers take action to 
limit their dependence on oil imports, OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] probably has the will and the capabil- 
ity to maintain the real price of the oil they 
export and the financial surplus they are 
earning at roughly constant levels over the 
next several years, and possibly indefinitely. 

OPEC is earning a total income of perhaps 
$110 billion at the current annual rate, of 
which they spend for imports a little less 
than one-half. OPEC's import expenditures 
will of course rise in the future, in part be- 
cause of inflation in the cost of manufactured 
goods they buy (but note that the current 
rate is only about 7 percent), in part because 
the new affluence and the new ambition of 
the producing countries will increase their 
spending. 

But OPEC's total income will also rise. To 



' Made before the Joint Economic Committee of 
the Congress on Nov. 29. The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. 



oil will be added a rapidly growing invest- 
ment income. The volume of oil imports into 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development] countries will 
increase as industrial growth resumes, per- 
haps at a rate of 4 or 5 percent a year. 

New oil may be found at a more rapid 
rate, in Mexico, Peru, Malaysia, China. But 
with even the poor countries such as Indo- 
nesia and Nigeria disposing of unprecedented 
liquid assets, the cartel may retain for years 
the capacity to cut back production to sus- 
tain and increase prices. 

Since total OPEC income has only to grow 
at a little more than one-half the annual rate 
of total OPEC spending to protect the finan- 
cial surplus at the $60 billion level, we must 
expect that in the absence of new action by 
the consumers the surplus will be sustained 
indefinitely. OECD estimates that if real 
prices for oil are constant, only in 1980 will 
the net surplus fall to $50 billion a year, by 
which time OPEC will have accumulated as- 
sets of $425 billion. Any increase in the real 
price of oil would be additional. 

Hopeful arguments have been advanced to 
convince us that this will not happen. 

Some say that OPEC members will see the 
damage an annual accumulation of this mag- 
nitude will cause to the industrial economies 
and let the real price of oil erode through in- 
flation. There is no question that this would 
be a prudent course for the producers to 
adopt in their own interest. But we cannot 
count on them to do so. Because of ideology 



January 13, 1975 



45 



(monopoly action to raise commodity prices 
is a main plank of the "New Economic Or- 
der"), because of real or imagined scores to 
settle for past exploitation, because of the 
power and authority the new money gives, 
OPEC members are unlikely to let real prices 
erode if they can help it. Even if individual 
countries may wish to move prices down- 
ward, they are unlikely to be able to do so 
alone. For as a matter of practical politics, 
no country will be able to explain to its pub- 
lic why it gets less for its oil than do other 
OPEC members. Nor would it be a full solu- 
tion simply to let prices erode by inflation; 
for sinking real prices would stimulate con- 
sumption again, thus slowing the absorption 
of the surplus. Thus, if the real price of oil 
were allowed to erode by one-third by the end 
of 1980, the cumulative OPEC surplus might 
fall only from $425 to about $375 billion. 

Others say that OPEC will tire of accu- 
mulating surpluses and will cut back produc- 
tion, keeping oil in the ground as an invest- 
ment rather than claims on the industrial 
economies. It is possible that this will hap- 
pen. But if it does, the surplus will, if any- 
thing, grow; for as oil becomes scarcer, the 
price it commands will go up. 

The important point is not to be able to 
make a precise forecast. There are too many 
variables for that. What matters is that 
there is a wide range of probable situations 
in which the OPEC financial surplus contin- 
ues essentially intact for an indefinite pe- 
riod or falls only slowly. 

What does that mean? It means that un- 
less they act, the industrial democracies face 
an inexorably rising danger of financial col- 
lapse or depression, or both, over the next 
decade. As oil debts pile up in the industrial 
countries, first the weaker, then the stronger, 
will find their credit unacceptable and will 
try to balance their external accounts by re- 
strictions on trade and on the level of eco- 
nomic activity. But one country's success in 
balancing its external accounts only will 
make the problem more urgent for others. 
For whether the industrial world runs its 
economies at a high level of activity or at a 
low level, the deficit to the oil producers will 
remain massive. Unless we are all willing to 



take 20 percent unemployment, there is no 
way that deflation or restrictions can solve 
the problem. 

But there is more. It is impossible that 
Europe, Japan, and America could undergo 
a decade of threatening financial collapse 
and low or no economic growth without the 
most shattering social and political upheav- 
als. Already this year we have seen how in- 
flation and no growth is embittering the po- 
litical life of all the great democracies, un- 
dercutting the authority of leaders, setting 
class against class. And this is only the first 
year. It is no accident that the Soviet Union 
and China, securely self-sufficient in energy, 
with a sustained growth rate, have begun to 
analyze and exploit a great new crisis in 
capitalism. 

Possible Effect of New Production on Prices 

Apart from the United States and Britain, 
none of the major oil importers have the pos- 
sibility of becoming self-sufficient within a 
decade, and self-sufficiency in energy cannot 
be the goal of the industrial economy as a 
whole for the foreseeable future. 

But invulnerability to cartel action to raise 
prices is both a possible and a necessary goal. 

At present, the consuming countries import 
approximately 30 million barrels of oil a 
day, mostly from OPEC sources. But current 
prices of about $10 a barrel f.o.b. gulf are 
very attractive, and a worldwide oil boom is 
underway. Substantial finds of oil have been 
reported from Mexico, Peru, China, Malay- 
sia; and the wave of exploration is just be- 
ginning. The owners of this new oil will un- 
derstandably want to sell it at the going 
price, but they will also want to develop it 
sufficiently so that they can receive a substan- 
tial income. Together they may already rep- 
resent the possibility of new production sev- 
eral years from now of 10 million barrels a 
day. And more will follow. 

The impact of this prospective new produc- 
tion on price depends on the development of 
the market as a whole. OPEC members have 
shown that they are willing to cut back out- 
put to sustain price; Arab producers are cur- 
rently working at less than three-quarters 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



capacity. With the enormous assets all pro- 
ducers are receiving, there is no doubt a mar- 
gin for further cuts, even in the poorest 
countries. Thus, if the overall market were 
to increase from 30 to 40 million barrels a 
day over the decade, it might be possible for 
OPEC to accommodate the new^ producers 
and still sustain the price. 

But if the market did not grow at all, the 
burden of adjustment on existing OPEC 
members would be more than they could ad- 
just to. States now launching ambitious de- 
velopment programs would find that by the 
end of the decade they were receiving only 
about half the expected revenues. Negotia- 
tion of the required cutbacks in production 
would become more and more difficult. First, 
clandestine, then open, violations of produc- 
tion quotas would occur. Ultimately all ef- 
forts to sustain the artificial price would be 
abandoned. 

There is no way we can know now the pre- 
cise size of market at which OPEC efforts 
to rig prices become inviable in the face of 
neW production. But it would clearly be 
wrong to start down this road with a goal 
that might turn out to be inadequate. To be 
sure they make this and any future oil cartel 
inviable, the goal of the consumers must be 
to hold their collective imports steady over 
the next 10 years. 

Limiting Dependence on Imported Oil 

This is a demanding goal, but we now be- 
lieve from the analysis in our own Project 
Independence report, and from the OECD's 
long-term energy assessment, that it can be 
attained. 

Our Project Independence report shows 
that we have many options for achieving sub- 
stantial self-sufficiency by 1985. 

On the supply side, policies to lease the 
Atlantic outer continental shelf, reopen the 
Pacific outer continental shelf, and tap the 
naval petroleum reserves can significantly in- 
crease domestic oil production. The Federal 
Energy Administration estimates potential 
increases at from 4 to 8 million barrels a 
day, depending on the level of price. 

On the demand side, energy conservation 



actions can significantly reduce the rate of 
growth of energy utilization by 1985. Stand- 
ards for more efficient new autos, incentives 
to reduce miles traveled, incentives for im- 
proved thermal efficiency in existing homes 
and offices, and minimal thermal standards 
for new homes and offices could all contrib- 
ute. Petroleum demand could be decreased 
by up to 2 million barrels a day, and electric- 
ity consumption would also fall. 

Also on the demand side, further savings of 
limited oil and gas supplies can be achieved 
by policies that require switching from oil 
and natural gas to coal or coal-fired electric 
power. Up to 2i/o million barrels a day of oil 
and 2V-i trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
might be saved by this method, although en- 
vironmental restrictions and capital costs are 
significant constraints. 

On November 14 Secretary Kissinger an- 
nounced the goal of reducing U.S. oil imports 
from over 6 million barrels a day to 1 mil- 
lion barrels a day in 1985. The administra- 
tion is now working to develop Project In- 
dependence policy options for decision by the 
President. The President expects to submit 
his proposals to Congress in January. 

The options open to Europe and Japan to 
limit their dependence on imported oil are 
less far-reaching, but they are by no means 
negligible. The OECD long-term energy as- 
sessment suggests that — with proper price 
policies — acceleration of North Sea oil and 
gas, the stabilization of coal production, and 
a major development of nuclear power could 
reduce European dependence on imported en- 
ergy from the present two-thirds to about 40 
percent. In Japan, a program of long-term 
conservation combined with the expected de- 
velopment of nuclear power could reduce de- 
pendence from 90 to about 80 percent. 

If the United States goes to substantial 
self-sufficiency and Europe and Japan reduce 
their dependence in the manner indicated 
above, the level of oil imports by industrial 
countries will be no greater in 1985 than 
now. 

Many policy instruments are available to 
achieve these goals. On the demand side, this 
choice ranges from voluntary programs of re- 
straint, mandatory fuel switching, price de- 



January 13, 1975 



47 



control, taxation, and various kinds of alloca- 
tion. On the supply side, energy investments 
will come in at various levels of return and 
risk, and countries will have to be sure that 
there are adequate incentives to yield the 
level of output desired. Policy instruments 
available for this purpose include tax incen- 
tives, long-term contracts, deficiency pay- 
ments, or subsidies for given projects and 
tariffs or other import protection. 

All of our studies show that both demand 
and output are quite responsive to effective 
internal prices. Our Project Independence re- 
port indicates that the United States has 
many options for achieving substantial self- 
sufficiency at prices lower than world prices 
today but higher than internal prices in the 
past, with both demand restraint and new 
supplies playing an important role. 

We must, however, distinguish between ef- 
fective price levels insofar as they affect con- 
sumers and investors, and the means by 
which they are achieved. Such instruments 
as price decontrol, taxes, and tariffs all have 
different income and policy impacts, but they 
can be used to achieve the same effective 
price to the consumer. On the investment 
side some instruments, such as purchase 
agreements and project subsidies, would af- 
fect only new investment. Others, such as 
tariffs and tax incentives, could affect all in- 
vestment. Each has different income and pol- 
icy implications. 

Each country will adopt the policy instru- 
ments best suited to its own energy and fiscal 
structure. However there are three potenti- 
ally important areas for common action : 

One is to adopt clear targets for the level 
of dependence each country wishes to achieve 
over the decade and national conservation 
and supply policies to achieve them. These 
targets and policies should then be examined 
and monitored together. 

Second, it may be useful for the consuming 
countries to agree on the minimum level (al- 
though not the policy instruments), at which 
they will support new investment. This would 
back up the dependence targets by creating 
stable investment expectations throughout 



the consuming countries; it would work to 
insure an equivalence of effort. 

Third, the consumers can magnify their 
several investment efforts by entering joint 
research and development projects in energy 
and by creating a common fund to guarantee 
or finance energy projects in consuming coun- 
tries. 



Proposed Immediate Measures by Consumers 

But these fundamental actions on supply 
and demand will take years to give results. 
How can we bring down our jeopardy to 
manageable proportions between now and 
then? Four things are needed. 

One is an oil safety net, to make sure that 
we can act in concert, on the basis of equita- 
ble sharing, to counter any new embargo di- 
rected against all or any of the consuming 
countries. This protection is already in place. 
In Paris last week, 16 countries formally ad- 
hered to the International Energy Program 
(lEP), committing themselves to a far- 
reaching program of preparedness for, and 
solidarity in, a new embargo. The lEP cre- 
ates a situation in which a restrictive act 
directed against any member becomes an 
act against all. It is the indispensable basis 
for all future cooperation among the con- 
sumers. Implementing legislation for this 
program will be submitted to Congress short- 
ly for its consideration. 

The second is an immediate effort by con- 
suming countries to conserve oil, the only 
way open to them to lessen the financial 
drain in the short term. Even now, after 
the embargo and price increases, our studies 
show that there remains a significant margin 
for further savings of oil in both industry 
and personal consumption that can be real- 
ized without jeopardizing output or jobs. 
Worldwide, that margin is probably at least 
3 million barrels a day. President Ford an- 
nounced a savings program of 1 miliion 
barrels a day in October. We are monitoring 
its execution carefully in order to reinforce 
it if needed ; and we are prepared to con- 
sider increasing the program to match others 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



in attaining the collective target of 3 million 
barrels. 

The third action, within the IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund] framework, is to 
make sure the financing needs of the develop- 
ing countries can be met while waiting for 
the price of oil to come down. It would be 
very wrong to force the developing countries 
to abandon their growth programs and goals. 
We estimate at $1.5-$2 billion the gap in 
1975 for which no financing has yet been 
found. Concessional terms will be needed. 
Secretaries Kissinger and Simon proposed 
that a new fund be established for this pur- 
pose, managed by the IMF and financed by 
oil producers, other contributions, and per- 
haps by profits from sales of IMF gold. 

The final requirement is for a financial 
safety net. This is needed to make sure that 
no country is forced to take unwarranted re- 
strictive trade or economic policy measures 
as a result of the maldistribution or instabil- 
ity of reflows of oil dollars and of the grow- 
ing burden of oil debts. 

So far private capital markets have per- 
formed well in receiving and redistributing 
the enormous flow of oil dollars. We believe 
there is substantial further room for expan- 
sion of the flows handled by private markets, 
but we cannot be sure of how great that ex- 
pansive capacity is. Already there are some 
indications of approaching constraints. In 
banking, for example, there have been no 
significant additions to capital since the start 
of the oil crisis. Yet the total assets and lia- 
bilities built upon a given capital structure 
have increased greatly. At some point it will 
not be prudent for the banks to expand fur- 
ther without substantial new additions to 
capital, which will be difficult and costly to 
raise in current market conditions. 

Thus, rather than test the limits of our 
present system. Secretaries Kissinger and 
Simon proposed creation of a new large-scale 
intergovernmental financing facility. This fa- 
cility would be : 

— Designed to back up, not substitute for, 
the workings of private capital markets. 
— Temporary, intended to enable the con- 



suming countries to pursue sound economic 
and trade policies while waiting for basic 
energy policy decisions to take effect. 

— Not an aid fund, but rather a facility 
lending at commercial terms on the basis of 
established criteria for appropriate economic 
and energy policies pursued by the borrower. 

— Structured so as to distribute risk equi- 
tably among the consuming countries. 

— Subject to approval by Congress. 

Each of the four proposed interim actions 
is important in itself; equally significant, 
both analytically and politically, is their link- 
age to each other and to the energy depend- 
ence targets and program. No country, cer- 
tainly not the United States, will want to 
help another financially unless that other 
country is helping itself by conserving oil 
and joining a long-term effort to lessen de- 
pendence. And we must adopt a clear strat- 
egy to bring the price of oil down, and back 
up that strategy with the appropriate policy 
decisions, in order to be sure that the loans 
under the proposed facility will be repaid. 

Need for Concerted Consumer Action 

It has often been suggested that we can 
talk or pressure the oil producers into ac- 
cepting a reduction in price. 

Neither approach, in our judgment, is 
likely to lead to more than tardy or partial 
results. And there would be significant costs 
to adopting them : the false security our peo- 
ple would feel that we were solving the en- 
ergy crisis when in reality we were only 
temporizing, or the damage to the structure 
of international security that might result. 

Instead what Secretary Kissinger has pro- 
posed is a program of action designed to 
change conditions within the consuming 
countries themselves. Its purpose is not to 
create a position of force which can then be 
imposed upon the producers but, rather, to 
create conditions in which a new long-term 
equilibrium between oil producers and con- 
sumers can be achieved. That equilibrium 
must be such that the producers receive an 
appropriate price for their products while the 



January 13, 1975 



49 



consumers can be free of the threat of em- 
bargo and of artificial action to raise prices. 

Achievement of this result depends criti- 
cally on the solidarity of the consuming coun- 
tries. Since the start of the energy crisis 
there has been for each country the tempta- 
tion to go it alone, try to work a special deal 
with the producers, or hope that the actions 
of others will end the crisis. In different ways 
each of us is uncomfortable with having his 
future depend so totally on others. But anal- 
ysis of each country's position shows that 
going it alone is not a superior option for 
any consumer. Over the decade only the 
United States and Britain can go to self- 
sufficiency ; all others will remain dependent 
on imported oil. All industrial countries, es- 
pecially those heavily involved in trade, will 
be vulnerable to financial crisis. And if the 
United States and Britain can eventually 
solve the price and financial transfer prob- 
lems by going self-sufficient, the only way 
Europe and Japan can is by cooperating with 
each other and with us. And in the meantime, 
no country, including the United States, can 
solve the price problem alone. 

The crisis gives us no alternative to con- 
certed consumer action. We believe that fi- 
nancial solidarity is an essential part. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 2d Session 

Western Investment in Communist Economies. A 
Selected Survey on Economic Interdependence. 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. August 5, 1974. 83 pp. 

Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Ju- 
diciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 
1975. Report to accompany H.R. 15404. S. Rept. 
93-1110. August 20, 1974. 53 pp. 

Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. Report to accom- 
pany S. 1134. S. Rept. 9.3-1116. August 21, 1974. 
68 pp. 

Passport Application Fees. Report to accompany H.R. 
15172. S. Rept. 93-1124. 5 pp. 

Report on Nutrition and the International Situation. 
Prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Com- 
mittee on Nutrition and Human Needs. September 
1974. 57 pp. 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.N. Rejects Move To Change 
Representation of Cambodia 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
General Assembly by U.S. Representative 
John Scali on November 27, together with 
the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Assembly in votes on Noveynber 27 and 
November 29. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI 

USUN press release 184 dated November 27 

The issue presented to this Assembly by 
the two resolutions before us is in essence 
very simple. One resolution proposes nego- 
tiations without preconditions for a peaceful 
settlement of the tragic conflict in Cambodia. 
The other demands a one-sided solution and 
offers only the prospect of continued war 
and more suffering by the Cambodian people. 
Which of these alternatives is consistent with 
the purposes for which this organization was 
founded? Which of these paths does our 
charter stake out as the road to justice and 
accepted international law? 

One resolution ^ would have the Assembly 
itself decide for the Khmer people that Cam- 
bodia is to be represented not by its present 
government, but by an exile regime located 
over 2,000 miles from Phnom Penh. It should 
come as no surprise that the only nation 
located anywhere near Cambodia which spon- 
sors this resolution is the country in whose 
capital this exiled regime happens to be 
located. 

The other resolution - is sponsored by 23 
nations, five of whom are among Cambodia's 
closest neighbors. They advocate a basic 
principle spelled out in this resolution by 
these opening lines: that the Khmer people 



' U.N. doc A/L.733. 
- U.N. doc. A/L.737. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



have a right themselves to solve their prob- 
lems peacefully, free from outside interfer- 
ence. This resolution, unlike the other, does 
not call on the United Nations or anyone else 
to prejudge the decision of the Cambodian 
people. Instead, it proposes that the United 
Nations contribute positively to settlement 
in Cambodia by calling on the parties them- 
selves to begin negotiations. Further, it asks 
the Secretary General to lend appropriate 
assistance, as he has done so effectively in 
the past. 

Finally, the resolution sponsored by Cam- 
bodia's neighbors calls on all U.N. member 
states to respect the outcome of these peace- 
ful discussions between the Cambodian par- 
ties, as my government is prepared to do. 
The United States supports efforts toward 
an honest compromise solution in Cambodia. 

I must, however, reply to some speakers 
who again, in discussing this item, have 
spread harsh and ugly charges against the 
United States. I reject these charges. They 
are false. If their accusations were true — 
that a brutal military dictatorship has been 
foisted on the Cambodian people — why is it 
that the Cambodian Government continues 
to operate effectively and that the Cambodian 
people continue to fight heroically and with 
increasing success against the invaders, all 
of this long after the United States has ended 
all air support and sharply reduced its mili- 
tary assistance? Could it be because the 
Cambodian people are fighting for their in- 
dependence against foreign troops on their 
soil? 

Attempts by some speakers to present their 
special version of Cambodian history, in our 
view, are an effort to divert this Assembly 
from the real questions — namely, which are 
the only foreign forces intervening in Cam- 
bodia today, and which action by this Assem- 
bly seeks to deprive the Cambodian people 
of their right to self-determination? 

For those who are unaware of, or who 
forget, Cambodia's real history, it may be 
useful to recall : 

— That Prince Sihanouk was not removed 
by a palace coup ; 

— That the Government of Cambodia 



which dismissed Prince Sihanouk in 1970 had 
been formed by Sihanouk himself less than 
a year before ; 

— That the Khmer National Assembly 
which ratified the decision and voted unan- 
imously to depose Sihanouk was composed 
of members whom Sihanouk had personally 
selected and supported for election; 

— That all during that period while Cam- 
bodians fought for their continued independ- 
ence the total American Government pres- 
ence in Phnom Penh consisted of two diplo- 
matic ofllicers and three military attaches; 
and 

— That negotiations between the Khmer 
Government and North Viet-Nam were brok- 
en off unilaterally by North Viet-Nam on 
March 25, 1970. Four days later North Viet- 
namese and Viet Cong forces attacked Khmer 
police and military posts. The present hostil- 
ities in Cambodia date from those attacks. 

The United States is proud of the role it 
has played in helping the Khmer Government 
and people to stave off the continuing mili- 
tary attacks by insurgents and foreign mili- 
tary forces. We have also, however, stressed 
the need to initiate negotiations to end this 
conflict and to bring reconciliation, harmony, 
and self-determination to all of Cambodia. 
The United States is quite prepared to see 
Cambodia ruled by whatever government 
the Cambodian people may freely decide 
upon. 

On August 12 President Ford told our 
Congress that the United States hopes to 
see an early compromise settlement in Cam- 
bodia. It is not the United States, but others, 
who have refused to leave Cambodia to the 
Cambodians. 

Certainly the Government of the Khmer 
Republic has not put any obstacle in the way 
of a negotiated settlement. On July 9, 1974, 
that government offered to enter into nego- 
tiations without conditions at any time, with 
any representatives of the other Cambodian 
party, in order to bring the conflict to an end. 

We have heard from some speakers a claim 
that the opposition forces in Cambodia con- 
trol 90 percent of that country's territory 
and 80 percent of its people. If this is true, 



January 13, 1975 



51 



then why, we must wonder, has the opposi- 
tion no capital, no government, no machinery, 
no parliament — in fact, none of the normal 
attributes of a government? Why, indeed, has 
their nominal chief of state taken refuge in 
a foreign capital ? Why does he not go home 
to receive the acclaim of the people, who, we 
are told, are eagerly awaiting his return? 
This seems to me a reasonable and funda- 
mental question. 

Reviewing the record I find, surprisingly, 
that these same speakers one year ago made 
identical claims in the debate in this hall. 
One year ago they claimed their proteges 
controlled 90 percent of the territory and 
80 percent of the population. One would have 
expected that a year of alleged new victories 
would have been reflected in more impressive 
statistics this year. Why not claim 98 percent 
of the territory and 95 percent of the people 
this year? Indeed, why not ignore the hard 
reality of the existence of the Government 
of Cambodia altogether and claim 100 per- 
cent? 

The fact is that despite the best efforts of 
a foreign inspired and assisted insurgency, 
and of the North Vietnamese Army, the 
Khmer Government has never ceased to 
maintain control over the vast majority of 
Cambodia's people and over the territory in 
which they live. North Vietnamese troops and 
their Cambodian supporters do indeed range 
through many areas of north and east Cam- 
bodia, but Sihanouk's supporters have ne- 
glected to explain to us that those areas of 
the country are very sparsely populated. The 
truth is that Prince Sihanouk does not return 
to lead his people because he has no safe 
haven in Cambodia, no real government or 
real following to return to. 

I would like to ask why should this Assem- 
bly be asked to choose between two rival 
claimants to Cambodia's seat in the United 
Nations, one of which happens to be located 
outside the country? It is our view the United 
Nations has no business deciding which is 
the legitimate government of any member 
state. 

I urge all members of this Assembly to 
consider carefully the views so eloquently 
set forth during this debate by the Asian 



neighbors of the Khmer Republic. Surely the 
vast majority of U.N. members must share 
their desire to see peace in their part of the 
world by allowing Cambodia to determine 
its own destiny. Surely we will heed their 
warning about the dangers of continued 
conflict and join in their call for a negotiated 
settlement to the present hostilities. Theirs 
is a decision which deeply involves their own 
security and their own future. We who live 
elsewhere, particularly those far away, have 
a responsibility to respect their views if we 
are to expect equal consideration in con- 
nection with problems in our areas. 

The U.S. Government believes that the 
United Nations has a fundamental obliga- 
tion to support the process of negotiation as 
the best means of resolving disputes and 
settling conflicts, wherever and whenever 
they arise. We are convinced that such a 
process serves the real interests of all parties 
to a dispute, in Cambodia as elsewhere. A 
negotiated settlement in Cambodia is over- 
due. This process should begin now. 

Surely no one of us can really wish to 
prolong the agony of that country or its 
people. Surely we can all agree that it is 
time for the fighting to stop, for negotiations 
to begin, for compromises to be reached, and 
for compatriots to be reconciled. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^ 

Restoiatio}i of the lawful rights of the Royal 
Government of National Union of Cambodia in 
the United Nations 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 



^U.N. doc. A/RES/3238 (XXIX) and Corr. 1. On 
Nov. 27 the Assembly adopted by a vote of 56 (U.S.) 
to 54, with 24 abstentions, draft resolution A/L.737/ 
Rev. 1 as revised, with the exception of the fifth 
preamhular paragraph, a separate vote on that para- 
graph having resulted in a tie vote of 51-51, with 31 
abstentions; on Nov. 29 the Assembly, by a vote of 
102 (U.S.) to 0, with 32 abstentions, rejected the 
paragraph, which reads, "Considering that the law- 
ful rights of the two Governments are only valid if 
it is determined that these rights emanate from the 
sovereign people of Cambodia as a whole,". Priority 
having been given to draft resolution A/L.737/Rev. 
1, draft desolution A/L.733 was not pressed to a 
vote. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



Recognizing that the situation in Cambodia is of 
concern to all Member States and especially to the 
countries situated close to the area, 

Taking into account that, while the Royal Govern- 
ment of National Union of Cambodia, presided over 
by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, exercises authority 
over a segment of Cambodia, the Government of the 
Khmer Republic still has control over a preponder- 
ant number of Cambodian people. 

Believing that the Cambodian people themselves 
should be allowed to solve their own political prob- 
lems peacefully, free from outside interference. 

Believing also that such political settlement 
should be reached by the indigenous parties con- 
cerned, without external influence, 

1. Calls upon all the Powers which have been 
influencing the two parties to the conflict to use 
their good oflSces for conciliation between these two 
parties with a view to restoring peace in Cambodia; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General, after due con- 
sultation, to lend appropriate assistance to the two 
contending parties claiming lawful rights in Cam- 
bodia and to report on the results to the General 
Assembly at its thirtieth session; 

3. Decides not to press for any further action 
until Member States have an opportunity to examine 
the report of the Secretary-General. 



U.S. Calls for Strengthening 
U.N. Disaster Relief Office 



Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. 
General Assembly by U.S. Representative 
Joseph M. Segel on October 30, together with 
the text of a resolution adopted by the com- 
mittee on November 6 and by the Assembly 
on November 29. 



STATEMENT BY MR. SEGEL 

USUN press release 163 dated October 30 

I have listened with both interest and deep 
concern to Ambassador Berkol's [Faruk N. 
Berkol, of Turkey, U.N. Disaster Relief Co- 
ordinator] explanation of the limitations and 
needs of his Office in attempting to perform 
the duties assigned to it by the General 
Assembly. I commend him for his efforts 
and dedication in this cause. 

Mr. Chairman, the subject we are dealing 



with today is one that potentially affects 
hundreds of millions of people — it is a matter 
to which we all should devote the most ear- 
nest attention. 

During the last 10 years alone, my govern- 
ment's records indicate that there have been 
430 natural disasters around the world re- 
sulting in 3.5 million deaths, 400 million vic- 
tims, and damage estimated at $11 billion. 

During this period, donor nations and or- 
ganizations provided $2.8 billion in emer- 
gency relief and rehabilitation — an immense 
effort involving monumental problems of co- 
ordination for which adequate machinery 
does not exist. One can only ask how much 
human suffering might have been alleviated 
if world disaster relief had been better or- 
ganized. 

As a further illustration of the problem 
we face, five weeks ago the U.S. Government, 
along with other governments, was provid- 
ing assistance simultaneously to the victims 
of eight foreign disasters. On another oc- 
casion, we were trying to cope simultaneously 
with the needs of victims of 27 disasters. 

Who in the General Assembly was really 
aware of the enormity of this problem when 
in 1971 it created the U.N. Disaster Relief 
Office and assigned to UNDRO a broad array 
of disaster relief and preparedness respon- 
sibilities, while giving it such limited re- 
sources? We now recognize, as does UNDRO 
itself, that its limited resources and staff have 
been a major constraint in the performance 
of the duties assigned by the General Assem- 
bly, particularly the much-needed function of 
donor coordination. 

As matters now stand, donor governments 
must "fly blind" during much of a disaster 
emergency. They have to make action de- 
cisions with no assurance that their aid may 
not be duplicating help being sent by another 
government. By the same token, assumptions 
that other donors may be providing certain 
aid may be in error, with the result that 
serious omission may occur. And sometimes 
the particular equipment and goods sent are 
just not what is really needed. 

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, Secre- 
tary of State Kissinger called for strength- 
ening UNDRO when he spoke to the Gen- 



January 13, 1975 



53 



eral Assembly on September 23, 1974. What 
Secretary Kissinger had in mind was that 
the new infusion of strength should be fo- 
cused on developing UNDRO's capability to 
coordinate — to serve as a worldwide clearing- 
house in collecting and disseminating timely 
information on disaster assessment, priority 
needs, donor offerings, storage and trans- 
portation availabilities. In the judgment of 
disaster experts, such a service would be of 
inestimable value to countries that suffer 
disasters and to donor countries as well. 
UNDRO is in a unique position to perform 
this essential role, coordinating assistance 
to disaster-stricken countries from govern- 
ments, intergovernmental organizations, and 
private organizations. 

We propose therefore that this Assembly 
authorize the Secretary General to undertake 
a management study, on a priority basis, 
which we believe can be completed within a 
month, to determine exactly what needs to 
be done to enable UNDRO to efficiently and 
effectively perform the function of mobiliz- 
ing and coordinating disaster relief along 
the lines described. We further propose that 
the Secretary General be authorized to 
promptly implement the action plan that 
should result from this study, and that suf- 
ficient financial resources be contributed on 
a voluntary basis for this express purpose. 
We believe this can and should be done with- 
out prejudice to the continuation and possible 
improvement of UNDRO's activities in re- 
lated areas, such as disaster prevention, 
predisaster planning, and training, which 
deserve separate consideration. 

Hence, while concurring in the general 
thinking behind ECOSOC [Economic and 
Social Council] Resolution 1891, we propose 
at this time a more concentrated capability 
focused specifically on coordination. This 
would include, as necessary, probable in- 
creases in staff, communications equipment, 
and related services for a disaster informa- 
tion center and adequate funds for travel — 
especially for immediate on-the-spot assess- 
ment — and for other operating expenses. 
The precise needs, of course, would evolve 
from the aforementioned management study. 

We specifically propose that the required 



funding for the first three years be met from 
voluntary contributions, with the method of 
onward financing subject to review. The U.S. 
Government is prepared to make a voluntary 
contribution of up to $750,000 to cover sub- 
stantially all of the first year's cost ; that is, 
for 1975. We would then expect to contribute 
our usual fair share of the voluntary contri- 
butions required to meet the costs for the 
succeeding biennium, and we hope others 
would contribute the balance required. Our 
offer is contingent, of course, on the devel- 
opment of a practical plan and budget and on 
the premise that the voluntary contributions 
resulting from this resolution would be de- 
voted exclusively to creating the clearing- 
house and coordinating capability that is so 
desperately needed. 

At the present time, Mr. Chairman, we are 
in the process of consulting with other dele- 
gations on this proposal, and we have a pre- 
liminary draft resolution for their study. We 
are trying to reach as many as possible, and 
we would be happy to give copies to any 
others who may be interested. After these 
consultations we expect to be in a position 
to propose a formal resolution for which we 
earnestly hope there will be wide support.^ 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2 

Strengthening of the Office of the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 De- 
cember 1971 by which it created the Office of the 
United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and es- 
tablished its primary functions of co-ordinating dis- 
aster relief, especially through its role as an infor- 
mation clearing-house, and of assisting in disaster 
prevention and preparedness, 

Endorsing Economic and Social Council resolution 
1891 (LVII) of 31 July 1974, in which the Council 
requested the Secretary-General to investigate the 
feasibility of measures to strengthen the disaster 
prevention, pre-disaster planning and co-ordinating 



' On Nov. 4 the United States introduced draft res- 
olution A/C.2/L.1364; the resolution, as orally re- 
vised, was adopted by the committee on Nov. 6 with- 
out a vote. 

= U.N. doc. A/RES/3243 (XXIX); adopted by the 
Assembly on Nov. 29 without a vote. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



roles of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Re- 
lief Co-ordinator and to submit his findings to the 
Council at its fifty-ninth session, and in which the 
Council recommended that the General Assembly, at 
its twenty-ninth session, should reconsider the pro- 
posals of the Secretary-General for additional staff 
resources, 

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the 
Secretary-General on assistance in cases of natural 
disaster and other disaster situations,' and of the 
statement made to the Second Committee by the 
United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator on the 
activities of his Office, 

Noting in partic^dar the statements in the Secre- 
tary-General's report that, while some progress has 
been made in the Office of the United Nations Disas- 
ter Relief Co-ordinator in establishing its assigned 
function of mobilizing and co-ordinating relief, the 
lack of staff and facilities, combined with the fre- 
quency, duration and simultaneity of disaster situa- 
tions, has seriously impaired the effectiveness of the 
Office in discharging these and other responsibilities. 

Concerned that lack of adequate co-ordination on 
a world-wide basis results, in some cases, in lapses in 
meeting priority needs and, in others, in costly du- 
plication and in the supply of unneeded assistance, 

Convinced that the Office of the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator is in a unique position, 
given adequate staff and facilities, to provide a 
world-wide system of mobilizing and co-ordinating 
disaster relief, including the collection and dissem- 
ination of information on disaster assessment, prior- 
ity needs and donor assistance. 

Convinced further that this capability should be 
strengthened, as a matter of priority and urgency 
and without prejudice to the disaster prevention and 
disaster preparedness roles assigned to the United 
Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, 

Convinced that disaster prevention and pre-disas- 
ter planning should form an integral part of the in- 
ternational development policy of Governments and 
of international organizations, 

1. Calls upon the Secretary-General to provide 
sufficient staff, equipment and facilities to strengthen 
the capacity of the Office of the United Nations Dis- 
aster Relief Co-ordinator to provide an efficient and 
effective world-wide service of mobilizing and co- 
ordinating disaster relief, including particularly the 
collection and dissemination of information on disas- 
ter assessment, priority needs and donor assistance; 

2. Decides that the additional costs of providing 
this strengthened capability should be met by volun- 
tary contributions during the first year, commencing 
as soon as possible, and during the biennium 1976- 
1977, at which time the method of financing for suc- 
ceeding periods shall be subject to review in the 
light of experience, with the understanding that the 
additional resources made available under the terms 



of the present resolution should be concentrated on 
strengthening the co-ordinating capability of the Of- 
fice of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordina- 
tor, but without prejudice to any improvements that 
can be made in the roles of that Office in disaster 
prevention and in pre-disaster planning within the 
resources otherwise available to it; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to take appro- 
priate measures, drawing upon the aforementioned 
voluntary funds, to prepare a plan and budget for 
this increased capability, and to proceed with its im- 
mediate implementation; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General, as called for 
in Economic and Social Council resolution 1891 
(LVII), to continue to investigate the feasibility of 
measures to strengthen the United Nations machin- 
ery with regard to disaster prevention and pre-disas- 
ter planning; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report on 
the implementation of the present resolution to the 
Economic and Social Council at its fifty-ninth session 
and to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.N. doc. A/9637. [Footnote in original.] 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven- 
tion on international civil aviation, as amended 
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna 
July 7, 1971. 
Ratifications deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 

October 22, 1974; Uganda, December 19, 1974. 
Entered into force: December 19, 1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse 
of opium and other drugs. Done at The Hague 
January 23, 1912. Entered into force February 
11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912. 

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 
1974. 

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions, and 
protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The 
Hague on January 23, 1912 (38 Stat. 1912), at 
Geneva on February 11, 1925, and February 19, 
1925, and July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), at Bang- 
kok on November 27, 1931, and at Geneva on 
June 26, 1936. Done at Lake Success, N.Y., De- 
cember 11, 1946. TIAS 1671, 1859. 
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 
1974. 



January 13, 1975 



55 



Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 
1967. TI.A.S 6298. 

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 
1974. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London November 26, 1968.' 

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, December 2, 1974." 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TLA.S 5780). Adopted 

at London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, December 2, 1974.- ' 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. 
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to 
certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, December 19, 1974.- 



BILATERAL 

Czechoslovakia 

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and 
related notes. Signed at Prague July 9, 1973.' 
Ratified by the President: December 16, 1974. 

Jordan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Amman November 27, 1974. Entered 
into force November 27, 1974. 

Norway 

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 
2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo 
November 19 and 27, 1974. Entered into force 
November 27, 1974. 

Panama 

Agreement concerning payment to the United States 
of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles 
furnished under the military assistance program. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama May 20 
and December 6, 1974. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 6, 1974; effective July 1, 1974. 



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56 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 13, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1855 



Cambodia. U.N. Rejects Move To Change 
Representation of Cambodia (Scali, text of 
resolution) 50 

Canada. President Ford Sets Import Quotas 
for Cattle and Meat From Canada (procla- 
mation) 44 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreig^n 

Policy 50 

Department Reviews Main Elements of the 

Strategy To Resolve the Oil Crisis (Enders) 45 

Economic Affairs 

President Ford and President Giscard 
d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique 
(Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, Kissinger, com- 
munique) 33 

President Ford Sets Import Quotas for Cattle 

and Meat From Canada (proclamation) . . 44 

Energy 

Department Reviews Main Elements of the 

Strategy To Resolve the Oil Crisis (Enders) 45 

President Ford and President Giscard 
d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique 
(Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, Kissinger, com- 
munique) 33 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Calls for Strengthening 
U.N. Disaster Relief Office (Segel, text of 
resolution) 53 

France. President Ford and President Giscard 
d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique 
(Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, Kissinger, com- 
munique) 33 

Petroleum. Department Reviews Main Ele- 
ments of the Strategy To Resolve the Oil 
Crisis (Enders) 45 

Presidential Documents 

President Ford and President Giscard 

d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique . . 33 
President Ford Sets Import Quotas for Cattle 

and Meat From Canada (proclamation) . . 44 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 56 
Treaty Information. Current Actions ... 55 

United Nations 

U.N. Rejects Move To Change Representation 

of Cambodia (Scali, text of resolution) . . 50 



U.S. Calls for Strengthening U.N. Disaster 
Relief Office (Segel, text of resolution) . . 



53 



Name Index 

Enders, Thomas O 45 

Ford, President 33,44 

Giscard d'Estaing, Valery 33 

Kissinger, Secretary 33 

Scali, John 50 

Segel, Joseph M 53 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 23-29 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to December 23 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
533 of December 16. 

No. Date Subject 

t541 12/23 "Foreign Relations," volume VI, 
the Far East and Australasia; 
1948 (for release Dec. 30). 

*542 12/23 Kissinger: news conference. 
United Nations, Dec. 21. 

t543 12/23 TW.\-Swissair airline capacity 
agreement. 

*544 12/26 Carlucci sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Portugal (biographic 
data). 

*545 12/26 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Mari- 
time Law, Jan. 24. 

*545A 12/25 Scotes sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Yemen Arab Republic 
(biographic data). 

*546 12/26 Study group 6 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the CC- 
IR. 

t547 12/26 U.S.-Romanian cultural and sci- 
entific agreement. 

* Not printed. 

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1856 



January 20, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE 57 

THE NEW DIALOGUE: TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA 
Address by Assistant Secretary Rogers 6i 

U.S. DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT ISSUES 
IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE 72 

UNITED NATIONS REAFFIRMS CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY 

IN KOREA 
Statement by Ambassador Bennett and Text of Resolution 82 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1856 
January 20, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Newsweek Magazine 



FoUoicing is the transcript of an inter- 
view with Secretary Kissinger on December 
18 by Newsweek Executive Editor Kenneth 
Auchincloss, Foreign Editor Edward Klein, 
and diplomatic correspondent Bruce van 
Voorst, which was published in the Decem- 
ber 30 issue of Newsiveek. 

Q. Looking back over the conduct of Amer- 
ican foreign policy in 1974, what have been 
your greatest satisfactions and greatest dis- 
appointments? 

Press release 2 dated January 3 

Secretary Kissinger: Strangely enough, 
the greatest satisfaction was that we man- 
aged the Presidential transition without a 
disaster. This was a rather heartbreaking 
period. I was extremely worried that while 
the central authority was in severe jeopardy, 
the transition might create basic weaknesses 
in the structure of our foreign policy. I 
considered our ability to continue an effec- 
tive foreign policy the most satisfying 
thing. Of course, individual events were 
important, too : I got great satisfaction from 
the Syrian disengagement. 

Q. In that transition period, tvas there a 
hiatus in which you could not function very 
well? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would say from 
July to October was a period in which we 
could not act with decisiveness. Every nego- 
tiation was getting more and more difficult 
because it involved the question of whether 
we could, in fact, carry out what we were 
negotiating. Secondly, we were not in a 
position to press matters that might involve 
serious domestic disputes. And I think this 
affected to some extent the summit in Mos- 
cow in July. But it affected many other 
things in more intangible ways. 



Q. How do you rank the SALT agreement 
in Vladivostok in the list of achievements 
for this past year? 

Secretary Kissinger: Very high, and of 
more permanent significance than perhaps 
anything else that was achieved. The various 
disengagement agreements in the Middle 
East were dramatic and important because 
they reversed a trend toward another out- 
break of a war and may have set the stage 
for making some important progress. But I 
think in terms of permanent achievements, 
I would rank the outline for a second SALT 
agreement at or near the top. And I think 
it will be so viewed by history. 

Q. How do you account for all the criticism 
of SALT Two? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have a 
difficult domestic situation right now. Many 
people remember, or think they remember, 
that foreign policy had certain domestic 
effects in 71 or 72. I don't agree with this. 
But I think it is in the back of some people's 
minds. 

Secondly, there is a general atmosphere 
of disillusionment with government. 

Thirdly, the liberal intellectual commu- 
nity, which used to lead American foreign 
policy, was alienated for a variety of reasons 
from the Johnson administration and then 
from the Nixon administration, and there- 
fore from this administration as well, at 
least at first. 

Now, what in fact is the significance of 
this agreement? The nightmare of the nu- 
clear age is the fear of strategic arms based 
on the expectation of what the other side is 
doing. One has to get one's priorities right. 
The first objective must be to get that cycle 
of self-fulfilling prophecies interrupted. 



January 20, 1975 



57 



That has now been substantially achieved. 
Once that is built into the planning of both 
sides, I think the negotiations on reductions 
will be easier. 

Q. Do you see those negotiatioyis for re- 
ductions taking place before the 10-year 
period covered by the agreement is over? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In fact, we have 
covered that in the aide memoire. A number 
of people gained the impression that the 
reductions were to start only after 198.5. 
The Vladivostok announcement, in fact, said 
that negotiations should start no later than 
1980 for reductions to take place after 1985. 
That has now been eliminated from the 
aide memoire because it was never intended 
to preclude an agreement on reductions to 
take place well before 1985. So it is clear 
that negotiations can start as soon as pos- 
sible and take effect as soon as there is an 
agreement. 

Q. Some people argue that the agreement 
sanctions MIRV \mxdtiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicle] levels that will 
lead to a first-strike capability by both sides 
and actually encourage a neiv arms race. 

Secretary Kissinger: The agreement has 
to be compared with what would have hap- 
pened in the absence of an agreement — not 
with a theoretical model. All our intelligence 
estimates indicate that in the absence of an 
agreement, Soviet MIRV levels would have 
been substantially higher than they will be 
under the agreement, as well as Soviet total 
levels, which in turn would have triggered 
another series of moves by us. The so-called 
new construction programs are the mini- 
mum planned construction programs ; they 
would certainly have been accelerated and 
expanded if the Soviet Union had in fact 
produced at the level that our intelligence 
estimates thought they could. And not only 
could, but would. I am talking now about 
the middle intelligence estimate. Generally 
three estimates are made — low, middle, and 
high. Both of the ceilings agreed in Vladi- 
vostok are below the low intelligence esti- 
mate, and substantially below the medium 
intelligence estimate. 



A myth is beginning to develop that in 
July we made a proposal of more severe 
limitations on MIRV's and that this, for 
some curious reason, was abandoned between 
July and December. This simply is not true. 
The July proposal, first of all, called for a 
five-year agreement. If you double the num- 
ber that we proposed for the five-year agree- 
ment, you would have a higher number than 
the one we settled on for 10 years. 

Q. The Soviets have issued a statement 
that they are not going to make any guaran- 
tees about Jeivish emigration from the 
Soviet Union. Does this statement and its 
possible impact on the trade bill concern 
you ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it concerns me. 
Certainly there is no one in Washington who 
has not heard me warn about this for years. 
Without saying anything, without making 
any claims for it, we managed to increase 
Jewish emigration from 400 a year in 1968 
to 35,000 before any of this debate started. 
We had managed to intercede quietly in be- 
half of a list of hardship cases, of which more 
than half were dealt with successfully. We 
never claimed a success ; we never took credit 
for it. We never said this was a result of 
detente. We just encouraged it to happen. 
We have warned constantly not to make this 
an issue of state-to-state relations, because 
we were afraid it would lead to a formal 
confrontation and defeat the objective of 
promoting emigration. Despite our deep mis- 
givings, we acquiesced when statements were 
made by some which implied that the Soviet 
Union had yielded to pressure, because we 
thought it was the result that was important, 
and we wanted to avoid a domestic debate 
that might have jeopardized the trade bill. 

The issue of Jewish emigration is, above 
all, a human problem. There is no legal agree- 
ment we can make with the Soviet Union 
that we can enforce. Whether the Soviet 
Union permits emigration depends on the 
importance they attach to their relationship 
with the United States and therefore on the 
whole context of the East- West relationship. 

If we can maintain a Soviet commitment 
to detente, and if we can make clear that this 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



is related to the emigration question, existing 
understandings will have a chance. But what 
we have had is, first, excessive claims. And 
now the Export-Import Bank bill has been 
encumbered with amendments that, to all 
practical purposes, virtually prevent loans of 
any substantial size to the Soviet Union. 

Loans are more important to the Soviet 
Union than most-favored-nation status, and 
in this respect the Soviets are worse off now, 
after three years of detente and even after 
increased Jewish emigration, than they were 
to begin with. We cannot simply keep saying 
that the Soviets must pay something for 
detente, and then not provide anything from 
our side to give them an interest in its con- 
tinuance. 

Q. Do you see any signs that detente has 
led Moscow to play a more positive role in 
the Mideast? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East is a 
very complicated issue for them and for us. 
I do not believe evidence supports the propo- 
sition that the Soviet Union produced the 
1973 war. On the other hand, the Soviet 
Union has not been prepared to risk its rela- 
tionship to some of the Arab states for the 
sake of Middle East tranquillity. What this 
proves is that detente does not mean that the 
Soviet Union and we have become collal> 
orators, but that we are partly rivals, partly 
ideologically incompatible, and partly edging 
toward cooperation. The Middle East has 
been an area where cooperation has been 
far from satisfactory. 

Q. Will detente help in the next round in 
the Mideast? 

Secretary Kissinger: Generally, yes, if all 
parties proceed with circumspection. Some of 
the participants in the Middle East conflict 
did not want an extremely active Soviet role. 
This was one inhibiting feature. The second 
is that a cooperative effort with the Soviet 
Union depends on the actual positions the 
Soviet Union takes. If the Soviet Union takes 
positions which are identical with one of the 
parties, then we are better off dealing with 
those parties directly. 



Q. What woidd be the necessary condi- 
tion before the Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation (PLO) and Israel cotdd sit down 
together and talk? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible for 
the United States to recommend negotiation 
with the PLO until the PLO accepts the 
existence of Israel as a legitimate state. As 
long as the PLO proposals envisage, in one 
form or another, the destruction of Israel, we 
don't see much hope for negotiation with the 
PLO. 

Q. Do you share the concern of many 
people now u-ho feel that both sides are 
hardening their positions? 

^ Secretary Kissinger: I have been through 
several Mideast negotiations, and they run 
a fever cycle. There is a great deal of exces- 
sive talk on both sides to prove that they 
have been tough, unyielding, and didn't make 
any concessions. We are now in the rela- 
tively early phases of these exchanges. I am 
not pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe 
another step is quite possible. Obviously, be- 
cause of the Rabat meeting, and the increas- 
ing complexity of the domestic situation of 
almost all of the participants, negotiations 
are more difficult now than they were a year 
ago. The stakes are also higher. But I be- 
lieve that progress is possible. We have to 
do it now by somewhat different methods 
than we did last year. If I compare where we 
are now with where we were at various 
stages during the Syrian negotiations, I think 
it looks far more encouraging than it did 
then. I am in fact quite hopeful. 

Q. Are you going to deemphasize "shuttle 
diplomacy" ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There was a time for 
shuttle diplomacy, and there is a time for 
quiet diplomacy. I cannot accept the princi- 
ple that whenever there is something to 
be settled, the Secretary of State must go to 
the area and stake his personal prestige on 
the conduct of the negotiations. I don't think 
that is a healthy situation. And therefore, 
while I don't exclude that in a concluding 
phase, or in a critical phase, I might go to 



January 20, 1975 



59 



the Middle East for three or four days, I 
will not do so unless conditions are i-ight 
and the stakes are important enough. 

Q. Do you think there can be any further 
progress before Leonid Brezhnev goes to 
Egypt in January? 

Secretary Kissinger: It would be a grave 
mistake for the United States to gear its own 
policies to the travels of the General Secre- 
tary of the Soviet Party. We will negotiate as 
rapidly as we can, but we don't want to get 
into the business of imposing settlements or 
of getting ahead of the parties. The art of 
negotiations is to make sure that all of the 
parties feel that their essential interests are 
safeguarded and that their dignity is re- 
spected. Our pace will be set not by Brezhnev 
but by how rapidly the parties move toward 
each other. 

Q. The military resupply of Israel, both 
during and after the 1973 war, seems to 
have stripped the American military estab- 
lishment of some of its materiel. Does this 
suggest that the United States will have a 
difficult time resupply ing Israel in any war 
of extended duration? 

Secretary Kissinger: I understand from 
Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger 
that these stories about stripping the Amer- 
ican military establishment are incorrect. 
And I understand that production in many 
of the essential categories is being stepped 
up. I don't think there is any physical in- 
capacity to do what is necessary. 

Q. Some people say that it would be to 
Israel's advantage to find an excuse to launch 
a preemptive strike. 

Secretary Kissinger: Based on my talks 
with Israeli leaders, I do not believe that any 
responsible Israeli leader operates on this as- 
sumption. They know that if a war starts it 
may start events of incalculable conse- 
quences. 

I think the responsible people in Israel 
realize that improved American relations 
with Arab countries are also in the interests 
of Israel, because they enable us to be a 
moderating influence. The Israeli leaders 



with whom I am dealing are genuinely inter- 
ested in moving toward peace. It is a very 
complicated problem because their margin of 
survival is so much narrower than ours that 
it is hard for Americans to understand some 
Israeli concerns. But I do not believe that 
any Israeli leader would deliberately engage 
in such a reckless course. 

Q. Given the Arab oil weapon and how it 
affects Western support of Israel, can Israel 
expect to suri'ive? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the survival 
of Israel is essential. The United States — 
and finally, in the last analysis, Europe — 
will not negotiate over the survival of Israel. 
This would be an act of such extraordinary 
cynicism that the world would be morally 
mortgaged if it ever happened. But it won't 
happen. 

Q. In your list of pluses and minuses for 
the year, tvc have not touched on eyiergy yet. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think next to SALT, 
I would consider the most lasting achieve- 
ment to be the energy policy that we devel- 
oped. I think the Washington Energy Con- 
ference, the International Energy Agency, 
the emergency sharing program, and the 
measures which we are currently pursuing 
may be the beginning of a restructuring of 
relationships among the advanced industrial 
countries and eventually serve as a bridge to 
the producing countries. 

Q. What sorts of structure are you re- 
ferring to? 

Secretary Kissinger: The structure that 
emerged in the immediate postwar period 
was essentially geared to military defense. 
Some of the difficulties that emerged in the 
sixties and early seventies, as a result of the 
growth of European unity and the emer- 
gence of Japan, were that the military or- 
ganization and the political and economic 
organization had grown out of phase with 
each other. It has proved difficult to bring 
them back into phase by purely military ar- 
rangements. This is what I attempted to say 
in my "Year of Europe" speech, which was 
a little premature, but many of whose basic 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



principles are now being accepted. Now the 
problem of how the advanced industrialized 
nations can give effect to the realities of 
interdependence is one of the most serious 
problems of our time — in the fields of energy, 
of food, and of the whole nature of economic 
policies. 

Q. Is it American policy to organize the 
oil-consuming nations so that they can nego- 
tiate a reduction of oil prices with the pro- 
ducers ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We would like to 
create the maximum incentives for a reduc- 
tion of prices and, failing that, the maximum 
capacity to withstand the high prices. The 
two things are related. If we have effective 
conservation measures, if we develop alter- 
native sources of energy, and if new sources 
of oil continue to be discovered, the balance 
between supply and demand must inevitably 
change. I have heard statements that the 
producers can always keep up with us by 
cutting production, but they will, I think, 
find this increasingly difficult to implement. 
If the industrialized nations implement meas- 
ures of financial solidarity, we can reduce the 
effect of the balance of payment deficits. 
And when the emergency sharing program is 
in effect in a few months, the capacity of 
these countries to use embargoes for political 
effect will be reduced. 

Q. But while many of President Ford's 
advisers have been urging him to take strin- 
gent conservation measures, he has resisted 
so far. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am convinced that 
the President will soon announce a program 
that will give effect to the principle I have 
outlined. I am confident that it will be a 
good program and that it will be adequate 
to our international responsibilities. 

Q. Are French President Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Hel- 
mut Schmidt goiyig to he rnore cooperative 
in these international structures? Are they 
really frightened of what is going on in 
Europe and the ivorld? 

Secretary Kissinger: Both countries are 



convinced that without a greater interaction 
of economic policies, an economic disaster 
for everybody is probable. And everybody 
realizes that they cannot deal with the eco- 
nomic policies on a purely national basis. 

Secondly, there is a growing realization 
that the political demoralization of the in- 
dustrialized countries must be arrested. This 
presupposes that governments can be seen 
to be coping with the problems that con- 
front them. And that again will drive some 
more in the direction of interdependence. 
Right now it is really irrelevant to discuss 
what formula of consultation would be ade- 
quate, because the necessities that are im- 
posed on us by the energy crisis would pro- 
duce their own formula. 

Q. Do you thiyik the American public is 
prepared for the consequences of such a 
program ? 

Secretary Kissinger: All I can say is that 
it is the absolute duty of leaders to tell the 
people what they believe is necessary. You 
can make your life easier by not putting 
tough choices to the public. But then when 
the inevitable catastrophe occurs, you have 
lost not only credibility but legitimacy. So I 
don't think we really have any choice. I 
think the administration will have to tell the 
pubhc what is needed, and I know that the 
President intends to do this. I think this is 
basically a healthy society, and I think there 
will be support. 

Q. If all else should fail, ivoidd the United 
States consider military intervention in the 
Middle East to secure oil at prices that we 
can afford? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that 
would be a cause for military action. 

Q. You don't think that the financial bank- 
ruptcy of the West would be a casus belli? 

Secretary Kissinger: The financial bank- 
ruptcy of the West is avoidable by other 
means. We will find other solutions. 

Q. That doesn't ansiver the question, ivith 
all due respect. 

Secretary Kissinger: What we would do if 



January 20, 1975 



61 



there were no other way of avoiding financial 
bankruptcy and the whole collapse of the 
Western structure, I cannot now speculate. 
But I am convinced that we won't reach that 
point. 

Q. What concrete steps might the United 
States take to induce the Third World coun- 
tries to pursue a more realistic course in the 
United Nations? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Third 
World countries have to accept the fact that 
they, too, live in an interdependent world. 
They cannot both insist on cooperation from 
the advanced industrial countries and con- 
duct constant warfare — economic or political 
— against the advanced industrial countries. 
The spirit of cooperation must be mutual. 
There will be disagreement, of course. That 
is unavoidable. But if you have a group of 
77 nations that automatically vote as a 
group, regardless of the merits of the issue, 
then the United Nations becomes a test of 
strength and the web of cooperation on 
which the development of all countries ulti- 
mately depends will be severely strained. In 
future sessions of the United Nations we 
will look more carefully at the degree of 
mutuality in the positions of the countries 
with which we are dealing. 

Q. Can you conceive of a situation in tvhich 
the United States might decide to tempo- 
rarily suspend itself from the United Na- 
tions to protest the tyranny of the majority ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I can conceive that if 
an issue is too outrageously decided, that we 
would suspend our activities in relation to 
that issue. But it is hard to answer this ques- 
tion in the abstract. 

Q. Our detente with China seems to have 
been stalled. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is the con- 
stant position of Newsweek magazine. But it 
is not our position. I believe that on the 
level of bilateral relations between the two 
countries we are essentially on course. I 
found that essentially confirmed by my last 
visit to the People's Republic of China. It is 



a relationship of practical necessity, in which 
two countries have made a decision to co- 
operate for limited objectives with each 
other. I don't accept the proposition that our 
policy is stalled. 

0. Do you think within the next year we 
might move toward a normalization of rela- 
tions ^vith Cuba? 

Secretary Kissinger: We were prepared 
to accept a two-thirds vote of the Oi'ganiza- 
tion of American States at its recent meet- 
ing in Quito, and we were led to believe that 
this two-thirds vote had been assured. Sud- 
denly we found ourselves in the position of 
being asked to produce votes for a resolution 
which we could not possibly sponsor, given 
the history of our involvement in the sanc- 
tions. There will be another occasion next 
year in a less structured meeting in Buenos 
Aires to discuss the Cuban issue, where the 
necessity of producing votes is less intense, 
and where one can then chart a course on a 
hemisphere basis more effectively. I think 
there will be some evolution during the next 
year. 

Q. How do you evaluate your own situa- 
tion now at the end of the year? 

Secretary Kissinger: During the period of 
President Nixon's crisis, I may have been 
overprotected from congressional criticism 
because many of the Senators and Congress- 
men instinctively were fearful of doing dam- 
age to our foreign policy and believed that 
they had to preserve one area of our national 
policy from partisan controversy. So it was 
inevitable that after that restraint was re- 
moved I would rejoin the human race and 
be exposed to the normal criticisms of Secre- 
taries of State. 

I have spent a great deal of time with 
Congress in the last few weeks, and I have 
the impression that there is a solid relation- 
ship. We worked out the Greek-Turkish aid 
problem, I think, in a cooperative spirit. I 
really feel passionately that if we don't main- 
tain our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis, 
we will be in the deepest trouble. Of course 
fundamental issues ought to be discussed, 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



including fundamental foreign policy issues. 
But there are various areas in which there is 
or ought to be substantial agreement. And 
as far as I am concerned, I am going to go 
the absolute limit of maintaining it on a bi- 
partisan basis. 

Q. Do you thUik the pendulum has sumng 
too far from one direction, from talk of 
"Super K," to an overunllingness now to 
criticize you? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no magic 
and there are no supermen in foreign policj'. 
The difference between a good and a mediocre 
foreign policy is the accumulation of nuances. 
It is meticulousness ; it is careful prepara- 
tion. If a Secretary of State or anybody con- 
cerned with foreign policy goes out to hit a 
home run every time he goes up there, he 
is putting a burden on himself and a strain 
on the system. 

Q. You have been quoted as saying that 
Americans like the lone cowboy, walki)ig 
into town with his six-guns blazing. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think any society 
needs individuals that symbolize what it 
I stands for. It is difficult to run countries 
without great figures. 

Q. Have we great figures today? 

Secretary Kissinger: One of the problems 
of the modern age is that great figures are 
not so easy to come by. 

Q. Why? 

Secretary Kissinger: It may be that the 
process of reaching high ofl^ce is so consum- 
ing that it leaves little occasion for reflection 
about what one does. Moreover, modern man 
doesn't like to stand alone. This is due largely 
to the impact of the media, in which every- 
body wants to check tomorrow morning's 
editorials. 

Q. What role do you think the media plays 
in your conduct of foreign policy ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The negative aspect 
is that there is almost a daily pulling up of 



the trees to see whether the roots are still 
there. There is almost a daily necessity to 
explain each day's actions. And in the process 
there is a danger of losing the essence of a 
substantial foreign policy, which is the rela- 
tionship of moves to each other and the 
overall design. In order to conduct a foreign 
policy you must be prepared to act alone for 
some period. You cannot get universal appro- 
bation at every step of the way. And so the 
media have a tendency to produce a con- 
genital insecurity on the part of the top 
people. 

On the positive side, the need of public 
explanation forces an awareness that would 
not otherwise exist. The more sophisticated 
of the journalists often have a reservoir of 
knowledge and continuity that is better than 
that of many of the top officials. I could name 
individuals who, on arms control, on Viet- 
Nam negotiations, could spot subtleties that 
many of the officials could not see. 

So I think that the interplay is on the 
whole useful. But as one looks ahead, there 
are several dangers. There is a danger of a 
Caesaristic democracy in which the media 
are manipulated by the government. There 
is a danger of the media trying to substitute 
themselves for the government. And you 
know yourself that there are fads, that some- 
times there is excessive praise and then it 
swings back to excessive criticism. 

Q. You are about to begin your seventh 
year in Washington. Is there a seven-year 
itch? Are you thinking of turning to some- 
thing else? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to think 
that the best time to leave is when you are 
not under pressure. I have been here long 
enough now so I don't have to continue being 
here to prove something to myself. 

On the other hand, I am also engaged in a 
number of things from which it would be 
either difl^cult to dissociate or painful to dis- 
sociate. I would like to think that I will know 
when to get out. But very few people have 
mastered this. And most people are carried 
out instead of walking out. I have no itch to 
leave. But I also have no compulsion to stay. 



January 20, 1975 



63 



The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship With Latin America 



Address bij William D. Rogers 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^ 



A year ago today, Deputy Secretary Rush 
addressed this distinguished audience. He 
took the occasion to set out a few reflections 
on the evolution of the historical relationship 
between the United States and Latin Amer- 
ica. He pointed to the forces of change which 
were at work and which had eroded the old 
patterns of paternalism that had long char- 
acterized that relationship. Secretary Rush 
noted that Secretary Kissinger had, only a 
few weeks before, launched a new dialogue 
with Latin America in an effort to work out 
the basis for a new relationship. 

A good deal has occurred in the year since, 
both within the United States and in the area 
of U.S. -Latin American policy. We now are 
working toward a policy. I emphasize the 
phrase "working toward a policy." Building 
a new policy toward a group of two dozen 
very diverse countries in an era of profound 
change in global relationships is bound to be 
a long-term process. There can be no pat for- 
mulas, no grand designs that will automati- 
cally bring about a new era in U.S.-Latin 
American relations. As Ken Rush said here 
last year, "The new relationship . . . can only 
be worked out as specific issues are faced, 
discussed, and resolved." 

The specific issues were defined by the 
Latin American Foreign Ministers last year 
at Bogota. They include the patterns for co- 
operation for Latin American development, 
the question whether something by way of 
principle could be agreed to for the future 
transfer of technology, the behavior of trans- 
national enterprises, and the restraint of co- 



' Made before the Council of the Americas at New 
York, N.Y., on Dec. 5. 



ercive economic measures by one country 
against another, as well as the Panama Canal 
issue, the structuring of international trade, 
and the reform of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States. 

The composition of the agenda, I believe, is 
indicative of the deep and abiding Latin 
American concern with the impact of the 
United States on the development of their 
economies and societies. The agenda also il- 
lustrates that regional concerns can no longer 
be separated from global problems. 

Areas of U.S. Policy Response 

Today I would like to talk about what I 
conceive of as the two strands of that long- 
term process. One strand consists of efforts 
by the United States to adjust its policies to 
the new realities in the hemisphere. Because 
our weight in hemispheric affairs is so great, 
any new relationship between the United 
States and Latin America will require that 
the United States adjust more than any sin- 
gle Latin American country. The other strand 
in building a new relationship is the effort 
that all the countries in the hemisphere must 
make together. 

The United States has the elements of a 
policy response in five general areas. These 
are settling outstanding differences, avoiding 
new disputes, intensifying consultations, im- 
proving cooperation for development, and re- 
shaping the inter-American system. 

L Settling outstanding differences 

We have had remarkable success in clear- 
ing the board of old, festering investment 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



disputes and other longstanding controver- 
sies. The celebrated problems with the Gov- 
ernment of Peru have been happily resolved, 
and our relationship with the Revolutionary 
Government is very much on the mend. Nego- 
tiations with the Government of Panama on 
a new canal treaty are going forward nicely 
in the cooperative spirit embodied in the 
statement of principles signed between our 
governments on February 7. Finally, I am 
delighted to say that most outstanding in- 
vestment disputes in Chile have been re- 
solved. These disputes have been or are being 
resolved because both parties have been will- 
ing to make concessions to the other's point 
of view. 

II. Avoiding new disputes 

Here, we are not so far along. We have 
proposed the establishment of a factfinding 
or conciliation procedure ; something along 
these modest lines would permit us to con- 
sider the modification of our legislation re- 
garding expropriation cases. This legisla- 
tion — the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amend- 
ments — had been a major cause of the 
charges of economic coercion leveled against 
the United States. Unfortunately, the U.S. 
proposal found no response in Latin Amer- 
ica. 

We also continue to believe that a balanced 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States could reduce the potential for future 
disputes. Unfortunately, substantial differ- 
ences still remain between the positions of 
the developed countries and the developing 
countries on the draft charter articles. 

We are also prepared to accept — indeed, 
we are a leading advocate of — the formal rec- 
ognition of the essential interdependence of 
the nations of the world and the need to rec- 
ognize that economic security is collective 
and indivisible. Here again, however, the dis- 
cussions thus far within the special commit- 
tee on restructuring the OAS have reflected 
a difference of view between the Latin Amer- 
ican countries who have spoken and ourselves 
as to how collective economic security can be 
achieved. 

Finally, we have joined with the Latin 



American countries in a Working Group on 
Transnational Enterprises in an effort to 
agree upon some principles which could serve 
as guidelines for the interaction between gov- 
ernments and foreign investors in Latin 
America. This working group has only re- 
cently begun its deliberations, and we are 
hopeful it will produce something useful. It 
will do so, however, only if it is recognized 
that the United States will not unilaterally 
renounce long-held positions on international 
law. 

Clearly, the task of preventing new con- 
flicts is a difficult one. Perhaps, in keeping 
with its greater power, the United States 
will have to make somewhat greater adjust- 
ments than it has been willing to thus far. 
But it cannot be expected to make all the 
concessions on matters of principle. 

III. Increased consultations on matters of 
concern 

We have made good, and are making good, 
on the Secretary's promise to consult — be- 
forehand — on matters of U.S. policy of inter- 
est to Latin America. The President's Special 
Trade Representative, Ambassador [William 
D.] Eberle, completed an extensive consulta- 
tion mission to Latin America in April. Con- 
sultations were held prior to the Law of the 
Sea Conference, the World Food Conference, 
the World Population Conference, and the 
U.N. General Assembly. A team of U.S. for- 
eign policy planning officials has just re- 
turned from highly successful visits to four 
Latin American countries. This is an area 
where clearly the United States, as a major 
actor on the world scene, must make the lion's 
share of the effort. 

IV. Cooperation for development 

Our efforts to be responsive in this crucial 
area depend importantly upon congressional 
support, and the returns are not yet in. We 
will need congressional support to enable us 
to meet our commitment to maintain assist- 
ance to Latin America at least at its current 
levels. And it is not even certain that we will 
have a fiscal year 1975 aid bill. Passage of 



January 20, 1975 



65 



the Trade Reform Act with its provisions 
for generalized tariff preferences for the less 
developed countries intact and unencumbered 
by restrictive amendments is absolutely es- 
sential and will be debated in the Senate next 
week. 

Trade and market access are at the top of 
the agenda for Latin America today. The 
Latin Americans are striving to diversify 
and expand their exports and look to us, who 
supply them with nearly 40 percent of their 
imports, as a logical market along with other 
industrialized countries. 

We are committed to assist the Latin 
Americans in this effort, but I would be less 
than candid if I did not acknowledge that our 
credibility has been damaged somewhat by 
countervailing-duty proceedings initiated in 
recent months as the result of industry com- 
plaint, backed up by court suits. The Latin 
Americans have found it difficult to believe 
that the U.S. Government had no discretion 
and was performing its statutory duty in 
compliance with legislation dating from 1897. 
The proceedings have been seen in Latin 
America as evidence of a renewed protection- 
ist trade attitude. 

Our ability to be responsive in the trade 
field, of course, will be determined largely by 
the fate of the Trade Reform Act. We have 
been closely cooperating with others within 
the administration to strongly urge that this 
priority piece of legislation be enacted by the 
current session of Congress, and I have 
spoken with many Senators of the importance 
of this bill to the conduct of our foreign pol- 
icy with Latin America. We appreciate the 
help that you and the council staff have made 
to get the trade bill enacted. I would urge you 
to redouble your efforts in these few days of 
December remaining to enact a trade bill. 

In addition to financial aid and trade, tech- 
nology is regarded in Latin America as a 
key element of development cooperation. We 
have been participating vigorously in a 
Working Group on Science and the Transfer 
of Technology in an effort to see what steps 
the United States and Latin America might 



take to improve the flow of technology to the 
region. The returns on this effort are not in 
yet. So far, however, there has been a tend- 
ency on the part of the Latin American par- 
ticipants to criticize the United States for 
not being willing to go far enough fast 
enough. Again we have the problem of the 
two strands of the relationship, of how much 
the United States can be expected to do uni- 
laterally and how much Latin America and 
the United States can do together. 

V. Reshaping the inter-American system 

As the fifth new policy area, I cite the in- 
ter-American system. Both we and the Latin 
Americans are pretty well agreed that exist- 
ing inter-American institutions must be re- 
formed and revitalized. There is, however, 
no consensus as to how — whether, for exam- 
ple, to create a development council to take 
charge of the array of regional economic de- 
velopment matters which are such significant 
grist in the OAS mill ; whether to take a new 
look at the political side of the Organization, 
including the General Assembly and the Per- 
manent Council; whether to move a large 
share of the OAS, such as its technical as- 
sistance program and service functions, or 
even its headquarters, to Latin America. The 
problem seems to be that most of the member 
countries are uncertain as to what they want 
to use the OAS to accomplish. Here we need 
as much effort and input from Latin America 
as from the United States. 



Proposal To Lift Sanctions Against Cuba 

The United States can no longer, if in re- 
ality it ever could, define by itself the pur- 
poses of inter-American cooperation. And 
there will no doubt be a great deal said on 
the future of the inter-American system at 
the Buenos Aires meeting of Foreign Minis- 
ters, which itself, of course, will be outside 
the formal OAS. 

This anomaly leads me to a word or two 
about the inter-American system and the 
Quito meeting. Quito illustrated both the 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



challenges to and the strengths and promise 
of the new dialogue. 

The issue at Quito, as you are aware, was 
whether the diplomatic and economic sanc- 
tions voted by the OAS against Cuba in 1964 
should be lifted. The resolution to remove 
the sanctions was supported by a majority 
but failed to receive the two-thirds vote re- 
quired by the Rio Treaty [Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance]. The sanc- 
tions therefore remain in effect, despite the 
fact that five Rio Treaty countries and four 
other hemispheric nations maintain either 
diplomatic or commercial ties with Cuba. 

What implications do the Quito results 
carry for U.S. -Latin American relations? 

While we are still too close to the event to 
render definitive judgments, I think there are 
certain aspects of the outcome that are worth 
noting. 

First, and perhaps most obviously, the 
Quito results show that no consensus yet ex- 
ists within the hemisphere regarding Cuba. 

Second, the U.S. position at the meeting 
was one of complete neutrality. We neither 
lobbied for nor against the resolution, and 
we abstained when the matter came to a 
vote. Quito was a Latin American, not a 
U.S., show. The significance of this point, I 
am sure, will be apparent to all who have 
followed U.S.-Latin American relations in 
recent years. Our neutrality was a major 
change. 

What of the impact of the indecisive re- 
sult at Quito on the future of the Rio Treaty 
and the intei'-American system? Since a ma- 
jority — 12 countries — voted in favor of re- 
moving the sanctions, we must ask if the 
procedures outlined in the treaty continue to 
be appropriate. Quito demonstrated that the 
time has come to give new impetus and po- 
litical direction to the eflfort to update the 
organization. For, in many respects, the Or- 
ganization of American States, despite its 
defects, remains the embodiment of our com- 
mon aspirations in this hemisphere. 

Of one thing I am certain, however, Cuba 
has absorbed far too much of our time and 



energies in recent years. The Cuba issue must 
not be allowed to impede the important task 
we have undertaken in the dialogue. Both we 
and the Latin Americans are more aware of 
this central fact as a result of Quito. 

Hemisphere and Global Agenda 

Where do we go from here? The goals of 
"collective economic security" and "integral 
development" advanced by the nations of 
Latin America simply cannot be achieved in 
this hemisphere alone without reference to 
the larger international system. The prob- 
lems which have been identified through 
the dialogue — development cooperation, the 
structure of trade and the monetary system, 
transnational enterprises, and the transfer 
of science and technology — are in fact the 
priority items on the global agenda. 

But progress can be made in this hemi- 
sphere. And to the degree we can do some- 
thing in the hemisphere, we will be shaping 
the solution of the larger problems as well. 

What we are engaged in is a process. It is 
a process which requires not just unilateral 
action by the United States, although as the 
major power in the region we undoubtedly 
must bear the major responsibility. It is a 
process that involves not just Secretaries of 
State, Foreign Ministers, and their respec- 
tive governments. It is a process which to be 
successful will require the active support and 
participation of all elements of our societies. 
The task before us then is to broaden and 
deepen the dialogue. 

As Secretary Kissinger put it, we must 
"anchor the Western Hemisphere relation- 
ship not only in the consciousness of our gov- 
ernment but in the hearts of the people." - 
With the continued support of organizations 
such as your own, I am convinced we can suc- 
ceed. 



" For a toast by Secretary Kissinger on Oct. 2, 
1974, at a luncheon honoring Latin American For- 
eign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to 
the United Nations, see Bulletin of Oct. 28, 1974, 
p. 583. 



January 20, 1975 



67 



Secretary Underlines Importance 
of Western Hemisphere Policy 

Secretary Kissinger met on December 17 
with members of the Commission on United 
States-Latin American Relations. Folloiving 
are remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Sol 
M. Linowitz, chairman of the commission, 
made to the press after the meeting. 



Press release 637 dated December 18 

SECRETARY KISSINGER 

Ladies and gentlemen : I came down here 
primarily to introduce Sol Linowitz, an old 
friend of mine, who has chaired a commission 
that has studied the Western Hemisphere 

policy. 

We attach the greatest importance to re- 
vitalizing the policy in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. I think an important beginning was 
made last year in the Foreign Ministers 
meetings that took place in Tlatelolco, in 
Mexico City, and in Washington. And an- 
other one is planned for Buenos Aires in 
Argentina, I think in the second half of 
March. 

We would like to give effect to our con- 
viction of the interdependence which is the 
chief characteristic of the modern period. 
In this hemisphere, where we are connected 
with so many countries with a long tradition 
of friendship and cooperative action, we are 
aware that there are many serious difficul- 
ties. We realize that the history of the re- 
lationship has had many ups and downs and 
that the United States has not always shown 
the requisite understanding for conditions in 
Latin America. But we do want to work 
together in a spirit that reflects the necessity 
of our time. It is for this reason that the re- 
port of the commission headed by Mr. Lino- 
witz ' is taken so seriously by us. We believe 
that it reflects a conceptual approach and a 
structure which is very compatible with our 



' The 54-page report entitled "The Americas in a 
Changing World" is available from the Center for 
Inter-American Relations, 680 Park Avenue, Xew 
York, N.Y. 10021. 



own. It contains many recommendations with 
which we are extremely sympathetic. 

I have just met for an hour with a group, 
some of whose distinguished members are in 
this room — and indeed we hired away one of 
its members as Assistant Secretary for Latin 
American relations. And I am delighted 
that they have agreed that they would stay 
in business and continue to meet and to give 
us the benefit of their advice. I plan to meet 
with them regularly. And as we get closer 
to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Buenos 
Aires, we will certainly check our conclusions 
with them and hope prior to that to benefit 
from their views. 

So I came down here with Mr. Linowitz to 
underline the importance we attach to his 
report, the importance we attach to the West- 
ern Hemisphere policy, and the hope that we 
can bring about a dramatic improvement in 
Western Hemisphere relationships. 

Thank you very much. 



MR. LINOWITZ 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. On behalf of 
the commission, may I just say that we are 
deeply appreciative of the opportunity to 
meet with the Secretary today and to have 
had the chance to exchange ideas with him 
on a number of the most important problems 
confronting U.S. -Latin American relations. 
I ought to indicate that, as I see it, six 
members of the commission who were present 
at the meeting this afternoon are in the room. 
And I would merely call your attention to the 
fact that Dr. Harrison Brown, Secretary 
Elliot Richardson, Mr. [Henry J.] Heinz, 
Professor [Samuel P.] Huntington, Dr. 
[Thomas M.] Messer, and Mr. [Nathaniel] 
Samuels are all here with us. Mr. [Arnold] 
Xachmanoff, who is the executive director 
of the commission, is there, as are Mr. [Greg- 
ory] Treverton, the rapporteur, and Mr. 
[Abraham] Lowenthal, who served as our 
consultant. 

In the course of our meeting with the 
Secretary, we had a chance to talk with him 
about some of the most critical, contentious 
problems and, in an informal, wholly free, 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



give-and-take atmosphere, exchange our ideas 
and give him the benefit of our own thoughts 
with respect to these particular issues. 

The main point we wanted to make was 
that in this changed world, where previous 
assumptions and premises have to be re- 
examined and reformulated, we must no 
longer rely on policies which are no longer 
applicable; that the premises which underlie 
everything from the Good Neighbor policy 
through the Alliance for Progress, indeed to 
some of the more recent pronouncements, are 
really not truly reflective of the kind of 
world in which we are living; that we have 
to recognize that Latin America is no longer 
our sphere of influence ; that we can no 
longer be patronizing or neglectful toward 
the countries of the hemisphere ; and that we 
have to enter into a whole new policy in this 
country which will permit us to work with 
the countries of Latin America in recog- 
nition of our true interdependence at this 
critical time and in recognition of the fact 
that indeed, in the deepest sense, we need 
one another. 

It was with this in mind that we formu- 
lated our recommendations based around five 
major principles which we discussed with the 
Secretary: First, that the United States and 
Latin America have to work together in a 
global context ; secondly, that American poli- 
cies have to be sensitive to their impact in 
this hemisphere; third, that we have to do 
away with the patronizing and paternalistic 
and discriminatory legislation and practices 
which were prevalent in this hemisphere in 
times in the past ; fourth, that we have to 
cooperate in the strengthening of human 
rights ; and fifth, that we have to evolve a 
policy for economic cooperation which will 
be mutually beneficial. 

We touched in that context on a number of 
issues which are referred to and discussed in 
our report : Cuba, Chile, the whole business 
of intervention, covert or overt, the problems 
arising from economic sanctions in the hemi- 
sphere, how we can do a better job of 
strengthening human rights, what we ought 
to be doing about relationships between gov- 
ernments and between companies and govern- 
ments in the economic area. 



That really was the substance of our con- 
versation. We were tremendously encouraged 
by the Secretary's deep interest in our report 
and this recommendation and his commit- 
ment to the thrust of our report, his support 
for the principles that we espoused, and his 
assertion to us that he believed that the 
main direction of our report was wholly 
consistent with his own views. 

It was also encouraging to have him ask 
that we indeed go forward with our proposal 
to meet from time to time in the months 
ahead in order to take stock of what had 
happened to our recommendations and to 
issue statements as to how we find the devel- 
oping situation in the hemisphere. 



Secretary Kissinger Honors 
Senator Fuibright 

Following are remarks by Secretary Kis- 
singer made at a dinner in honor of Senator 
J. W. Fnlbright given by the Board of For- 
eign Scholarships on December 16 at Wash- 
ington. 

Press release 535 dated December 17 

We are here tonight to honor an American 
statesman, and an old friend. Bill Fuibright 
has been my colleague and mentor ever since 
I came to Washington. We have not always 
agreed, but I have come to value his opposi- 
tion more than I would some other men's 
support. For the force of his wisdom and sin- 
cerity can leave no man's views untempered. 

From the origin of democracy in Greece 
down to the present, the question has been 
posed whether a government of the people 
could muster the vision and resolution which 
the conduct of foreign policy requires. 

It was Pericles, speaking to the Athenians, 
who first stated our faith that a free people 
can, through free discussion and free elec- 
tions, sustain a wiser and more decisive pol- 
icy than governments that find their unity in 
discipline rather than common purpose. 

Senator Fuibright has fulfilled this prom- 
ise triumphantly in our own time. A son of 
the State of Arkansas, he has represented its 



January 20, 1975 



69 



people for a generation; and at the same 
time, he has been a statesman who could look 
beyond our own country to see, as clearly as 
any man. the emerging challenges for our 
policy abroad. 

He was an architect, after 1946, of a post- 
war international system built on the need 
for Western unity in the face of a monolithic 
Communist threat. But he also perceived 
sooner than others that the cold war order 
must give way to a more pluralist and toler- 
ant system in which neither great power 
would try to remold the world in its own 
image. His voice was among the first to de- 
fine ideas which have become pillars of our 
policy today — detente with the Soviet Union 
and China, more limited American involve- 
ment in Indochina, an evenhanded approach 
to settlement in the Middle East. Before the 
word was used, he was a prophet of the in- 
terdependence that has become our current 
condition. 

His views were often unpopular when first 
advanced, but because he voiced them, opin- 
ion came to terms more rapidly with the re- 
ality he perceived. He has exercised his lead- 
ership not to exalt his own position but to 
bring his country abreast of his own under- 
standing. He has earned a leader's highest 
praise in a democracy, which is that he has 
been the educator of a free people. 

But in addition to honoring the service 
and leadership of a masterful American 
statesman, we also are here to mark an 
achievement singular in its significance for 
our time; for as the members of the Boai'd 
of Foreign Scholarships attest by their pres- 
ence, we honor this evening a career which 
has been translated into an institution. 

In his book "The Public Philo-sophy" Wal- 
ter Lippmann noted that if we are to avoid 
disaster we must deal with what Lippmann 
called "the pictures in people's heads" — the 
manmade environment in which ideas become 
realities. 

In an age when the technologies of com- 
munication are improving faster than man's 
ability to assimilate their consequences, and 
at a time when the multiplication of differ- 



ing perspectives and predispositions compli- 
cates the achievement of global consensus, 
Bill Fulbright conceived a program brilliant 
in its simplicity and essential for our future. 
He recognized that the dramatically accel- 
erating pace of interaction among peoples 
and institutions would not necessarily lead 
to increased understanding or cooperation. 
He fore.saw that interaction unguided by in- 
telligent and humane direction and concern 
had the potential to bring increased tension 
and hostility rather than less. 

The Fulbright exchange program was an 
expansive concept founded upon a global vi- 
sion. It has grown to meet new realities. A 
program which once promoted the solidarity 
of the West now sustains exchanges between 
the United States and 122 countries around 
the globe. It expressed, it helps us to master, 
the growing interdependence of the world. 

Personally, it is difficult for me to accept 
that Senator Fulbright will now be leaving 
the Senate. He has suffered the ultimate fate 
of every politician, which is to leave the of- 
fice he has made his own. But I will continue 
to rely on his wise counsel as much in the fu- 
ture as I have in the past. Bill Fulbright's 
wisdom will not be lost to this nation. 

As Pericles once said to the Athenians, 
great leaders find : 

. . . the grandest of all sepulchers . . . (is) the 
minds of men, where their glory remains fresh to 
stir to speech or action as the occasion comes by. 
For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous 
men; and their story is not graven only on stone 
over their native earth, but lives on far away, with- 
out visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other 
men's lives. 

Bill, we are confident you will go on to 
new achievements. But your deeds are al- 
ready woven into the fabric of our lives, into 
our policy, into our way of perceiving the 
world. And the Fulbright program will live 
as the visible symbol of your gift to mankind. 
We will always be grateful. On behalf of the 
past and present members of the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships, it is now my honor 
and pleasure to present you with this scroll 
of appreciation. 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



Economic and Technical Assistance 
to Portugal 

Department Announcement * 

Following the most useful conversations 
the President of the Republic had with Pres- 
ident Ford and Secretary Kissinger in 
Washington, the Governments of the United 
States and Portugal agreed that a positive 
demonstration of U.S. support and confidence 
in Portugal's future would be timely and 
helpful. 

Within the resources immediately avail- 
able to it, the U.S. Government has offered to 
begin at once a program of economic assist- 
ance and cooperation which will address 
itself to the Portuguese Government's high- 
priority needs in the fields of housing, 
agriculture, transportation, public admin- 
istration, education, and health and in the 
areas of finance and economy. 

The program of economic assistance and 
cooperation is intended as an earnest of U.S. 
Government support for Portugal in its effort 
to construct a free and democratic society. 

The principal elements of the present phase 
of economic assistance and cooperation are 
the following: 

— The U.S. Government will guarantee up 
to $20 million in private American loans for 
the construction of housing in Portugal. 

— U.S. Government experts in the fields 
of agriculture, transportation, public ad- 
ministration, education, and health will be 
made available to Portugal on a short-term 
basis at no charge when requested by the 
Portuguese Government. 

— Opportunities for Portuguese to study 
and train in the United States will be in- 
creased in accordance with Portugal's present 
needs. 

— The Export-Import Bank will give 
sympathetic consideration to financing U.S. 
goods and services needed for Portuguese de- 
velopment projects. 



— In addition to direct bilateral assistance, 
the United States at the request of the 
Government of Portugal will : 

a. Support Portugal in international or- 
ganizations, such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development; 

b. Urge other friendly countries to help 
Portugal, too, either bilaterally or in con- 
junction with the United States. 

Appropriate Ministries of the two govern- 
ments are beginning immediately to work 
out the details of the program so that it can 
begin at once. 

In addition, the administration strongly 
supports the congressional proposal for aid 
to Portugal. This proposal, if enacted, would 
authorize loan funds and grant aid, to be 
divided equally between Portugal and 
African territories under Portuguese ad- 
ministration and former territories. 



Letters of Credence 

German Democratic Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
German Democratic Republic, Rolf Sieber, 
presented his credentials to President Ford 
on December 20.' 

Morocco 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Morocco, Abdelhadi Boutaleb, 
presented his credentials to President Ford 
on December 20.^ 

Yemen Arab Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Yemen Arab Republic, Hasan Makki, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Ford on 
December 20.' 



'■ Issued on Dec. 13 (text from press release 527). 



' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated Dec. 20. 



January 20, 1975 



71 



U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. General Assembly Debate 



Following are statements made in Com- 
mittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. 
General Assembly on October 21 by Senator 
St7(art Symington, U.S. Representative to 
the General Assembly, and on October SO 
and November 20 and 22 by Joseph Martin, 
Jr., U.S. Representative to the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament and Ad- 
viser to the U.S. delegation to the General 
Assembly, together with the texts of tivo 
resolutions adopted by the Assembly on De- 
cember 9. 



U.S. STATEMENTS 



Senator Symington, October 21 

USUN press release 140 dated October 21 (prepared text) 

As we start our annual disarmament de- 
bate, my government believes it appropriate 
to devote its initial statement on disarma- 
ment questions exclusively to one of the most 
critical matters before the 29th General As- 
sembly — the objective of limiting the growth 
and spread of nuclear weapons. 

Since the advent of the nuclear age, we 
have been forced to live with the dilemma of 
the dual nature of nuclear energy. We have 
held high expectations concerning the con- 
tribution that nuclear energy could make to 
human welfare; but we have always been 
painfully aware that tied to these expected 
benefits is a growing potential for mankind's 
destruction. The rapidly expanding use of 
nuclear reactors to generate electric power 
in recent years has made this dilemma one 
of the most urgent issues of our time. 

An inevitable result of the massive growth 
of nuclear-generated power will be the tre- 
mendous increase in worldwide production 



of plutonium. Estimates are that by 1980 
close to 1 million pounds of plutonium will 
have been produced worldwide in electric 
power reactors, enough to manufacture over 
50,000 nuclear explosive devices. 

In addition, rising demands for enriched 
uranium as a nuclear reactor fuel will re- 
quire a marked expansion of uranium enrich- 
ment capacity. 

Widespread development of enrichment fa- 
cilities, perhaps involving new enrichment 
techniques, could create a capability for pro- 
ducing weapons-gi'ade uranium at many lo- 
cations throughout the world. 

This increasing availability of nuclear 
fuels and materials, as well as the continu- 
ing dissemination of nuclear technology, 
threatens to place a nuclear explosive capa- 
bility, and the accompanying capability to 
produce nuclear weapons, within the reach 
of an ever-widening group of states. As per- 
ilous as the situation was when there were 
only two states with a nuclear weapons ca- 
pability — and is now with six — stability 
would be vastly more precarious in a world 
of many nuclear powers. 

Such a world is not to be feared more by 
one group of states than another. All nations 
would stand to lose. 

States fortunate enough to be located in 
regions now free of nuclear weapons would 
suddenly find themselves faced with nuclear- 
armed neighbors. This would bring them un- 
der strong pressures to acquire nuclear weap- 
ons themselves. Even minor conflicts would 
then involve the risk of escalation to nuclear 
war. The probability of the use of nuclear 
weapons — whether by design, miscalculation, 
or accident — would increase sharply. Pros- 
pects for significant arms control and dis- 
armament measures would deteriorate as all 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



states felt the need to prepare for a larger 
and more disparate range of contingencies. 

Many have assumed that time was on our 
side — that every year without the use of nu- 
clear weapons, every year without an addi- 
tional nuclear power, every step in East-West 
detente, and every measure to curb the arms 
race have all been part of a steady progres- 
sion to where we would no longer fear the 
possibility of nuclear war. But it is obvious, 
in light of the worldwide energy crisis and 
the emergence after a 10-year hiatus of an 
additional state with a nuclear explosive ca- 
pability, that we cannot afford to be com- 
placent. 

Hopefully, these developments will at least 
have the positive effect of making us fully 
alert to the dangers of the further spread of 
nuclear explosives and of encouraging a de- 
termined international effort to avert that 
possibility. 

We are now at an important juncture, per- 
haps a decisive one. The challenge, as Secre- 
tary Kissinger well described it to the Gen- 
eral Assembly on September 23, is "to real- 
ize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technol- 
ogy without contributing to the growth of 
nuclear weapons or to the number of states 
possessing them." 

The United States does not believe that a 
world of many nuclear powers is inevitable. 
Nor does it believe that the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy must necessarily be cut back 
because of the risk that nuclear technology 
will be diverted to military purposes. How- 
ever, we cannot expect to take full advantage 
of the expanding use of nuclear energy un- 
less we are willing to strengthen the system 
for assuring one another that there is noth- 
ing to fear in the continued diffusion of nu- 
clear materials and technology. 

While working toward a more universal 
and effective system of assurances or safe- 
guards, we must also strengthen the political 
and economic incentives for resisting the 
temptation to acquire nuclear explosive ca- 
pabilities. Those capabilities would inevita- 
bly be perceived as a threat to others and 
therefore trigger a competition in the de- 
structive potential of nuclear devices. 



No state or group of states can meet the 
challenge alone. What is required in the 
months and years ahead is a sustained and 
concerted international effort involving nu- 
clear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon 
states, nuclear suppliers and importers, par- 
ties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and states which have not yet seen it in their 
interest to join the treaty. My government 
would like to suggest several tasks which 
members of the world community, individu- 
ally and collectively, should undertake in 
meeting this challenge. 

First, cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy shoidd be continued. It could 
be argued that the most appropriate response 
to the increasing risk of diversion of nuclear 
technology to hostile purposes would simply 
be to cut back on international cooperation in 
the nuclear energy field. The United States 
does not believe such a course of action would 
serve nonproliferation objectives, nor would 
it be responsive to the pressing need through- 
out the world to receive the benefits of this 
important new source of energy. The United 
States recognizes fully that the vast poten- 
tial benefits of nuclear energy cannot be 
monopolized by a handful of advanced indus- 
trial states. This is especially true at a time 
when many of the world's developing coun- 
tries are among the hardest hit by global 
economic difficulties. 

As a member of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy of the Congress, I have been 
privileged to participate in U.S. efforts to 
make the peaceful applications of atomic en- 
ergy widely available. The U.S. Government 
has facilitated the participation of American 
industry in atomic power activities abroad. 
It has sponsored large international confer- 
ences to share our technical know-how. It 
has shipped materials abroad to help others 
move ahead in nuclear technology. And it 
has given strong support to the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
to that Agency's programs in the nuclear 
field. All told, it has spent hundreds of mil- 
lions of dollars to promote peaceful uses 
worldwide. We intend to continue this ef- 
fort, both through our bilateral cooperative 



January 20, 1975 



73 



arrangements and our support for the work 
of the IAEA. 

Second, we should intoisify our search for 
effective measures to curb the competition in 
nuclear arms. We are mindful that serious 
risks are involved in the further accumula- 
tion of nuclear weapons by states now pos- 
sessing them, as well as in the spread of 
weapons capabilities to additional states. 
Moreover, we know that we cannot expect 
non-nuclear-weapon states to show restraint 
unless nuclear powers also practice restraint. 

As one of the principal nuclear powers, the 
United States recognizes its special responsi- 
bility in this area. We are aware of the con- 
cerns expressed by a number of countries 
about the pace of progress in nuclear dis- 
armament. Although proud of achievements 
already made, we would agree that pi'ogress 
has been disappointingly slow. We under- 
stand the impatience of others, and our- 
selves are anxious to proceed faster. But it 
must be recognized that these complicated 
issues, touching upon the vital interests of 
all states, are rarely susceptible to quick and 
easy solutions. 

U.S. and Soviet negotiators recently recon- 
vened their talks in Geneva on strategic arms 
limitations. We attach the utmost importance 
to these negotiations, in which members of 
this body have also expressed much interest. 

The talks are currently aimed at conclud- 
ing an equitable agreement placing quantita- 
tive and qualitative limitations on offensive 
strategic weapons. We will make every ef- 
fort to reach such an agreement at the ear- 
liest possible date. In addition, the United 
St-ates remains firmly committed to seek an 
adequately verified comprehensive test ban. 
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated 
in Moscow last summer, has significance not 
only for its restraining effect on U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear arms competition but also as a step 
toward our ultimate goal of a comprehensive 
ban. Indeed, in the first article of that treaty, 
we reaffirm our commitment to pursue fur- 
ther negotiations toward that goal. 

Third, steps should be taken to insure the 
widest possible adherence to the Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty. It is noteworthy that, while 



treaty parties have sometimes urged faster 
implementation of provisions of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty, there is virtual una- 
nimity among them that the treaty's basic 
concepts and structure are sound and that 
the treaty continues to provide a valuable le- 
gal framework for dealing with both the 
peaceful and military applications of nuclear 
energy. My government continues to regard 
the NPT as one of the most significant inter- 
national agreements of the post- World War 
II era. Recently, President Ford called the 
treaty "one of the pillars of United States 
foreign policy." 

The Nonproliferation Treaty has been crit- 
icized as discriminatory in that it divides the 
world into two categories of states: those 
with nuclear explosive devices and those 
without. But the NPT did not create that dis- 
tinction, nor is it intended to condone it. The 
negotiators of the NPT recognized that the 
only promising and realistic approach was to 
start with the world the way it was. Accord- 
ingly the treaty calls for a halt to the further 
spread of explosive capabilities and obligates 
existing nuclear powers to speed limitations 
and reductions of their own stockpiles. 

If there had been no effort, such as the 
NPT, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons 
or if the effort had been postponed until nu- 
clear-weapon states had abolished their arse- 
nals, we would have found ourselves in a 
world of so many nuclear powers that fur- 
ther attempts to stop "vertical prolifera- 
tion" — that is, to limit and reduce nuclear 
weapons — would be futile. 

The distinguished leader of the Swedish 
disarmament delegation, Mrs. [Inga] Thors- 
son, put this matter in the proper perspective 
at the Conference of the Committee on Dis- 
armament on July 30 of this year when she 
said : 

The NPT is by nature discriminatory, but its pur- 
pose is such that it has been supported by the ma- 
jority, and needs to be supported by the entirety, of 
the world community. It is in the interest of every 
single country in the world that this purpose be ful- 
filled. 

As we approach the May 1975 Review 
Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty, 



74 



Department of State Bulletin 



we should consider ways of making the 
treaty more attractive to existing and pro- 
spective parties. Last summer my govern- 
ment announced that parties to the NPT 
will be given preferential consideration in 
the donation by the United States of special 
nuclear materials — primarily enriched ura- 
nium for use in IAEA medical research proj- 
ects. We have also decided to give preference 
to NPT parties in allocating training and 
equipment grants for IAEA technical assist- 
ance programs. And we encourage others to 
adopt similar policies. 

We would welcome further suggestions for 
increasing incentives for NPT membership. 

Fourth, thorough international considera- 
tion should be given to the question of peace- 
ful nuclear explosions (PNE's). The dilemma 
of the dual nature of nuclear energy is no- 
where more evident than in the problem of 
PNE's. Indeed, because the technologies of 
PNE's and nuclear weapons are indistin- 
guishable, it is impcssible for a non-nuclear- 
weapon state to develop a capability to con- 
duct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes 
without, in the process, acquiring a device 
which could be used as a nuclear weapon. For 
this reason, the objective of preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons is incompatible 
with the development or acquisition of peace- 
ful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon 
states. 

Article V of the NPT was developed to as- 
sure the states that give up the option of de- 
veloping nuclear explosives that they will re- 
ceive any benefits of peaceful nuclear explo- 
sions that eventually might materialize. To 
date, however, the commercial utility of 
PNE's has not been proved. Moreover, the 
use of PNE's is a highly complicated matter 
politically and legally, which has ramifica- 
tions for the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the 
case of excavation projects and which would 
pose problems in relation to any test ban 
treaty. 

The United States stands ready to honor 
its article V obligation to make the benefits 
of PNE's available on a nondiscriminatory 
basis when and if their feasibility and prac- 
ticability are established. In the meantime, 



we support the steps already taken in the 
IAEA context to implement article V, in- 
cluding the development of guidelines for 
PNE observation, the adoption of procedures 
for responding to requests for PNE serv- 
ices, and the approval of a U.S. -sponsored 
resolution authorizing the Director General 
to establish, at an appropriate time, an of- 
fice in the IAEA Secretariat to deal with 
PNE reque.sts. 

We are willing to consider other sugges- 
tions concerning organizational arrange- 
ments for an international service. 

Fifth, we should work urgently toward 
strengthening the system of international 
safeguards against the diversion of nuclear 
materials and technology to the mamifacture 
of nuclear explosives. The interests of nu- 
clear exporters and importers alike would be 
served by a system which provided confidence 
that nuclear technology was not being mis- 
used. Actions designed to inhibit the abuses 
of nuclear technology .should not impede the 
full exploitation of its peaceful potential. 
The realization of peaceful benefits -should be 
facilitated by a broad international commit- 
ment to curb the spread of nuclear explosive 
capabilities. 

We should step up our efforts to improve 
the effectiveness and achieve the broadest 
possible acceptance of IAEA safeguards. In 
this connection, let us note that in his mes- 
sage to the recent IAEA General Conference, 
President Ford reaflirmed the U.S. offer to 
permit the application of IAEA safeguards 
to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of 
direct national .security significance. We have 
offered to permit such safeguards to demon- 
strate our belief that there is no threat to 
proprietary information and no risk of suf- 
fering commercial disadvantage under NPT 
safeguards. 

Nuclear exporters should make special ef- 
forts to insure that their transfers of nuclear 
materials and equipment do not contribute 
to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capa- 
bilities. The U.S. will shortly approach the 
principal supplier countries with specific pro- 
posals for making safeguards more effective. 
One of the problems to be faced in the 



January 20, 1975 



75 



years ahead is the challenge of meeting rap- 
idly increasing demands for uranium en- 
richment and chemical reprocessing services 
without undermining safeguards. An alterna- 
tive to developing national facilities for these 
services — one which would be both economi- 
cal and conducive to effective safeguards — 
might be the establishment of multinational 
plants capable of satisfying world demands. 

Sixth, steps should be taken to insure the 
■phijsical security of nuclear facilities and ma- 
terials. As the civil nuclear industry expands 
throughout the world, nuclear materials will 
become an increasing factor in international 
commerce and the threat of theft or diversion 
could become acute. While physical security 
must be the primary responsibility of na- 
tional governments, we believe the world 
community can play an important role. Ac- 
cordingly, Secretary Kissinger stated on Sep- 
tember 23 that the United States will urge 
the IAEA to develop an international conven- 
tion for enhancing physical security against 
theft or diversion of nuclear material. 

Such a convention should outline specific 
standards and techniques for protecting ma- 
terials while in use, storage, and transfer. 
The United States, moreover, agrees with 
Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund's rec- 
ommendation that the IAEA should prepare 
itself to be a source of advice and assistance 
to nations that wish to improve their physi- 
cal security practices. 

Seventh, and finally, ive shoidd support and 
encourage the development of regional ar- 
rangements which contribute to nonprolif- 
eration objectives. While the NPT has played 
a central role in efforts to curb nuclear pro- 
liferation, the United States believes that 
complementary tools should also be used to 
serve that objective. Accordingly, we sup- 
port the treaty establishing a nuclear-free 
zone in Latin America, so far the only 
densely populated region in the world to set 
up a formal regime to ban nuclear weapons. 

We also welcome the interest shown in nu- 
clear-free zones at this General Assembly, in 
particular in the proposals for creating nu- 
clear-free zones in the Middle East and 
South Asia. 



On several occasions my government has 
put forward four criteria for the establish- 
ment of nuclear-free zones : 

1. The initiative should be taken by the 
states in the region concerned. 

2. The zone should preferably include all 
states in the area whose participation is 
deemed important. 

3. The creation of the zone should not dis- 
turb necessary security arrangements. 

4. Provision should be made for adequate 
verification. 

We would take these criteria into account 
in assessing any specific regional arrange- 
ment. 

Another factor my government would take 
into account would be the treatment of PNE's 
in any nuclear-free-zone proposal. When the 
United States adhered to Additional Proto- 
col II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu- 
clear Weapons in Latin America, it was with 
the understanding that the treaty does not 
permit nonnuclear states party to the treaty 
to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices. 
We accordingly regard the Latin American 
nuclear-free zone as consistent with our ob- 
jective of curbing the spread of independent 
nuclear explosive capabilities. 

We have suggested the principal tasks 
which we think should be undertaken in deal- 
ing with the vital issues of nuclear arms con- 
trol and look forward to hearing the views of 
other delegations on these suggestions. A 
broadly based collective effort should be made 
by all — nuclear and nonnuclear, NPT parties 
and nonparties, industrially advanced and de- 
veloping states alike — if we are to save our 
own and future generations from a world of 
many nuclear powers and unrestrained nu- 
clear arms competition. 

Ambassador Martin, October 30 

USUN press release 152 dated October 30 

In his statement to this committee October 
21, Senator Symington discussed the tasks 
that we feel should be undertaken in a broad 
international effort to curb the further spread 
of nuclear explosive technology. Today I 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



would like to review the other important 
arms control issues before the Assembly at 
the current session. 

In spite of some disappointment that we 
have not progressed further toward our dis- 
armament objectives, my government con- 
tinues to believe that encouraging progress 
has been made in the past decade. In recent 
years states have worked together seriously 
and cooperatively on arms control and dis- 
armament to a degree which would not have 
been thought possible 10 years ago. The 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between 
my country and the Soviet Union, the dis- 
cussions on mutual reductions of armed 
forces and armaments in Central Europe, 
and the successful negotiation of the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, 
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America, the Nuclear Non- 
proliferation Treaty, the Seabed Arms Con- 
trol Treaty, the Biological Weapons Conven- 
tion, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty are 
solid evidence of the progress that has been 
made. 

Since our discussion of disarmament is- 
sues a year ago, encouraging progress has 
been made on the problem of chemical weap- 
ons. We were impressed by the submission 
by the delegation of Japan to the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament of a draft 
convention on chemical weapons, an impor- 
tant contribution to the deliberations on the 
question of effective international restraints 
on chemical weapons. Of equal interest have 
been the extensive comments and sugges- 
tions concerning the Japanese draft offered 
by other CCD delegations. We are taking 
careful note of the Japanese draft and these 
comments in our continuing review of possi- 
ble actions in the chemical weapons field. 

We were also gratified that, at the initia- 
tive of Sweden, the Conference of the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament this summer held 
a productive informal meeting on technical 
chemical weapons questions, in which 22 
experts from 13 countries discussed the best 
ways of defining chemical agents for pur- 
poses of international restraints, the scope 
of possible chemical weapons limitations, 



and the possibilities of devising effective 
means of verification. Such discussions 
should provide a basis to make informed 
judgments on the question of chemical 
weapons restraints. 

Furthermore, members of this committee 
will recall that the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed at the 1974 summit 
to consider a joint initiative in the Con- 
ference of the Committee on Disarmament 
with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, 
of an international convention dealing with 
the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical 
warfare. 

At its current session this committee will 
also address the problem of the dangers of 
the use of environment modification tech- 
niques for military purposes. In recent years 
new scientific and technical advances in the 
environmental sciences have given hope that 
man may be able to work purposefully to 
change the environment to his benefit. At 
present, although there has been promising 
progress in efforts in certain localities and 
under limited conditions to increase snow- 
fall, lessen the severity of hailstorms, affect 
precipitation, and disperse fog, the limited 
success of these efforts thus far demon- 
strates how little we understand the inter- 
action of natural forces and how rudimen- 
tary are man's attempts to influence those 
forces. Techniques may, however, one day 
be developed to alleviate drought, to miti- 
gate the destructive power of hurricanes 
and typhoons, prevent floods, and perhaps 
eventually to change climate to respond to 
the universal desire for opportunity to 
increase living standards. 

We believe that environment modification 
techniques, which are yet little understood 
and remain largely hypothetical, could have 
considerable potential for peaceful purposes. 
Unfortunately, the techniques to accomplish 
these goals might also be used for hostile 
purposes that could have widespread, long- 
lasting, and severe effects harmful to human 
welfare. Scientists have expressed concern 
about the future possibilities of triggering 
earthquakes, generating tidal waves and 
long-term climatic changes. 



January 20, 1975 



77 



The United States has declared that it 
would not use climate modification tech- 
niques for hostile purposes even if such tech- 
niques come to be developed in the future. 
In the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement on en- 
vironmental warfare at the summit meeting, 
we expressed our willingness to examine 
with the Soviet Union what measures could 
be effective to overcome the dangers of the 
use of environment modification techniques 
for military purposes. We are prepared to 
study this question and to examine the 
measures that might become the subject of 
international agreement. If it is the general 
view that this question should be referred 
by the Assembly to the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament, we could sup- 
port referral if it were accomplished without 
prejudgments of the Committee's considera- 
tion of the question. 

In regard to international consideration 
of the question of napalm, other incendiaries, 
and certain other conventional weapons, the 
constructive and useful first step was taken 
by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross when it recently convened a meeting 
on this subject of government experts at 
Lucerne, Switzerland [Sept. 24-Oct. 18]. 
U.S. experts participated fully in this meet- 
ing; some useful data were compiled, and 
the report of the experts' group merits care- 
ful review. 

We believe that no position on possible 
restrictions on these weapons can be devel- 
oped until government experts have more 
extensively examined the technical, legal, 
military, medical, and humanitarian prob- 
lems involved. We are gratified that this 
process is underway. We would consider it 
unrealistic, however, to try to impose a dead- 
line on the work of the experts in this com- 
plex field. 

The question of a world disarmament con- 
ference is again on our agenda. In three 
separate solicitations of views by the United 
Nations, a wide diversity of views on such a 
conference has been revealed. Some govern- 
ments have suggested beginning prepara- 
tions for such a conference soon; some 
others have stated their view that certain 
preconditions must be met; many have 



stated that the conference could prove use- 
ful only if all nuclear powers were prepared 
to participate. 

The views of the United States on this 
subject are unchanged. We recognize that 
a world disarmament conference could serve 
a useful function at an appropriate time, but 
we do not believe that such a conference now 
or in the near future would produce useful 
results. It is not the lack of a suitable forum, 
but the lack of political agreement, which 
prevents us from taking more far-reaching 
steps toward disarmament. A world con- 
ference could not in the foreseeable future 
solve this problem and thus would merely 
disappoint the hopes of its proponents. 

Members of this committee have received 
a report on the question of the possible re- 
duction of military budgets, prepared by 
a group of expert consultants to the Secre- 
tary General.' Although my delegation ab- 
stained on the resolution requesting this 
report,- for reasons which we explained at 
the time, we welcomed the suggestion of 
such a study because we recognized that the 
most promising path to genuine progress on 
this question of military expenditures is 
through a careful and thorough study of the 
issues. We are gratified that the experts' re- 
poi"t examines the whole range of technical 
questions related to the feasibility of agreed 
reductions of military budgets. It analyzes 
the economic benefits that could result from 
allocating to social and economic develop- 
ment funds that might be saved bj' budget 
reductions. It also points out that "reducing 
military budgets without diminishing the 
security of states would require careful and 
thorough preparation. Specifically, the pre- 
conditions for military budget reductions 
would include both agreement on what is 
and "what is not to be included in military 
budgets and also the provision by all parties 
concei-ned of detailed data on military ex- 
penditures for the purpose of comparative 
measurement. The study brings out the 
necessity of guarding against destabilizing 
shifts in spending and the necessity for 



' U.N. doc. A/9770. 

^' A RES '3093 (XXVIII), adopted by the Assem- 
bly on Dec. 7, 1973. 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



adequate verification of compliance with any 
agreed reductions. 

Finally, the experts' study implicitly rec- 
ognizes the need for greater openness in 
defense expenditures. My government re- 
gards openness as a particularly important 
point. We vi^elcomed the suggestion made 
by Svi^eden last spring that the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament should 
consider the possibilities of ascertaining the 
willingness of states to account for their 
defense expenditures in comparable terms 
and to explain how their defense expendi- 
tures are allocated. We agree that greater 
knowledge about the defense expenditures 
of others could allay concerns that arise out 
of suspicion and misunderstandings, and 
thus promote confidence among states. The 
technical sections of the experts' report pro- 
vide valuable guidelines which could be 
the basis of greater openness in defense 
expenditures. 

We were gratified that a consensus was 
reached at the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament this year to invite five na- 
tions — the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru, 
and Zaire — to join the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament. On behalf of 
my government I warmly welcome these 
nations to the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament. Their inclusion will make 
the Conference of the Committee on Disar- 
mament a more representative body and will 
enhance its expertise without, however, en- 
larging it to a point that would impair its 
effectiveness as a negotiating body. We think 
that with these additions the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament will con- 
tinue to be a valuable disarmament forum, 
contributing significantly to the work of the 
United Nations and to the furtherance of 
our disarmament objectives. 

Ambassador Martin, November 20 

The United States has strongly supported 
the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 
as a constructive step toward our com- 
mon nonproliferation objective. Indeed, the 
efforts of the Japanese, Netherlands, and 



Canadian delegations, as well as of others, 
in developing this draft resolution must be 
greatly appreciated, certainly by all the 
members of this committee who voted for it. 
The United States wishes to explain its 
vote in one respect; namely, with regard to 
the statement in the sixth preambular para- 
graph, which reads: 

. . . that it has not yet proven possible to differ- 
entiate between the technology for nuclear weapons 
and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful 
purposes. 

For countries in the early stage of de- 
veloping a nuclear explosive capability, we 
cannot see how it would be possible to de- 
velop such a capability for peaceful purposes 
without in the process acquiring a device 
which could be used as a nuclear weapon. 
In the case of advanced nuclear-weapon 
states, however, it may be possible, under 
certain conditions, to develop criteria that 
would be adequate to insure that nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes are not used 
to further nuclear-weapon development. 
But, I should add, if such criteria could be 
developed they would not be applicable to 
the problem posed by the development of 
a nuclear explosive capability by a non- 
nuclear-weapon state. 



Ambassador Martin, November 22 

The United States supports the concept of 
a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and be- 
lieves that it could make a considerable con- 
tribution to stability and nonproliferation 
in the area. We have therefore voted in 
favor of this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.700, 
as amended]. 

At the same time, we are dubious of the 
approach taken in operative paragraph 2 of 
the draft resolution, which urges states in 
the region to undertake immediate commit- 
ments with regard to the zone, in advance of 
actual negotiations and the conclusion of an 
agreement. Frankly, we do not believe this 
is an approach that will advance the pur- 
poses of the draft resolution. 

Notwithstanding that reservation, we are 
prepared to lend our full cooperation to 



January 20, 1975 



79 



efforts to realize the aims of the draft reso- 
lution. We assume that in the further formu- 
lation of the zone it will be made clear that 
the prohibitions of the zone apply to the 
development of nuclear explosive capability 
for any purpose. 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 



Resolution 3261 D (XXIX)^ 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions on the urgent need for 
prevention of nuclear proliferation, 

Recalling also its resolution 2829 (XXVI) of 16 
December 1971, 

Recognizing that the acceleration of the nuclear 
arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
endangers the security of all States, 

Convinced that recent international developments 
have underlined the urgent necessity for all States, 
in particular nuclear-weapon States, to take effective 
measures to reverse the momentum of the nuclear 
arms race and to prevent further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 

Further convinced that the achievement of these 
goals would be advanced by an effective comprehen- 
sive test ban. 

Bearing in mind that it has not yet proven pos- 
sible to differentiate between the technology for 
nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive 
devices for peaceful purposes. 

Noting with concern that, in the course of this 
year, six States have engaged' in nuclear testing. 

Recognizing that even those States which re- 
nounce the possession of nuclear weapons may wish 
to be able to enjoy any benefits which may materi- 
alize from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 
Noting with great concern that, as a result of 
the wider dissemination of nuclear technology and 
nuclear materials, the possible diversion of nuclear 
energy from peaceful to military uses would present 
a serious danger for world peace and security, 

Considering therefore that the planning and con- 
ducting of peaceful nuclear explosions should be 
carried out under agreed and non-discriminatory 
international arrangements, such as those envisaged 
in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, which are designed to help prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear explosive devices and the 
intensification of the nuclear arms race. 



' A/C.1/L.690, as amended; adopted by Committee 
I on Nov. 20 by a vote of 91 (U.S.) to 3, with 11 
abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a 
vote of 115 (U.S.) to 3, with 12 abstentions (text 
from U.N. press release GA/5194). 



Recalling the statements made at the 1577th meet- 
ing of the First Committee, held on 31 May 1968, 
by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics and the United States of America con- 
cerning the provisions of article V of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which 
relate to the conclusion of a special international 
agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful 
purposes, 

Notixg that the review conference of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be 
held in Geneva in May 1975, 

Noting further that, in the introduction to his 
report on the work of the Organization dated 30 
August 1974, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations pointed out the possible danger of peaceful 
nuclear explosions leading to nuclear weapons pro- 
liferation and suggested that the question of peace- 
ful nuclear explosions in all its aspects should now 
be a subject for international consideration, 

1. Appeals to all States, in particular nuclear- 
weapon States, to exert concei-ted efforts in all the 
appropriate international forums with a view to 
working out promptly effective measures for the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the 
prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons; 

2. Requests the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to continue its studies on the peaceful appli- 
cations of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasi- 
bility, including legal, health and safety aspects, and 
to report on these questions to the General Assem- 
bly at its thirtieth session; 

3. Calls npon the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, in submitting its report to the Gen- 
eral Assembly at its thirtieth session on the elabora- 
tion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive 
test ban, to include a section on its consideration 
of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear 
explosions and, in so doing, to take account of the 
views of the International .Atomic Energy -Agency 
as requested in paragraph 2 above; 

4. Expresses the hope that the review conference 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, to be held in Geneva in May 1975, will 
also give consideration to the role of peaceful nu- 
clear explosions as provided for in that Treaty and 
will, inform the General .Assembly at its thirtieth 
session of the results of its deliberations; 

5. Invites, in this connexion, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of .'Amer- 
ica to provide the review conference of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with 
information concerning such steps as they have 
taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or 
intend to take, for the conclusion of the special basic 
international agreement on nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes which is envisaged in article V 
of the Treaty; 



80 



Department of State Bulletin 



6. Ixvitcs the Secretary-General, should he deem 
it appropriate, to submit further comments on this 
matter, taking into account the reports referred to 
in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above. 



Resolution 3263 (XXIX)' 

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in the region of the Middle East 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the question of the establish- 
ment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of 
the Middle East, 

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security by bolstering and 
expanding the existing regional and global struc- 
tures for the prohibition and/or prevention of the 
further spread of nuclear weapons, 

Realizing that the establishment of nuclear- 
weapon-free zones with an adequate system of safe- 
guards could accelerate the process towards nuclear 
disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and 
complete disarmament under effective international 
control, 

Recalling the resolution adopted by the Council 
of the League of Arab States at its sixty-second 
session, held in Cairo from 1 to 4 September 1974, 
on this subject. 

Recalling the message sent by His Imperial 
Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran on 16 September 
1974 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in the region of the Middle East,' 

Considering that the establishment of zones free 
from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the States 
situated within each zone concerned, is one of the 
measures which can contribute most effectively to 
halting the proliferation of those instruments of 
mass destruction and to promoting progress towards 
nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruc- 
tion of all nuclear weapons and their means of 
delivery. 

Mindful of political conditions particular to the 
region of the Middle East and of the potential 
danger emanating therefrom, which would be fur- 
ther aggravated by the introduction of nuclear 
weapons in the area. 

Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the 



' A/C.1/L.700, as amended; adopted by Commit- 
tee I on Nov. 22 by a vote of 103 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 
abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a 
vote of 128 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions (text 
from U.N. press release GA/5194). By Resolution 
3261F, adopted on Dec. 9, the General Assembly also 
requested the Conference of the Committee on Dis- 
armament to make "a comprehensive study of the 
question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its 
aspects" and to submit the study in its report to 
the General Assembly at its 30th session. 

'U.N. doc. A/9693/Add. 3. [Footnote in original.] 



countries of the region from becoming involved in 
a ruinous nuclear arms race. 

Recalling the Declaration on Denuclearization of 
Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and (jovernment of the Organization of African 
Unity in July 1964, 

Noting that establishment of a nuclear-weapon- 
free zone in the region of the Middle East would 
contribute effectively to the realization of aims 
enunciated in the above-mentioned Declaration on 
Denuclearization of Africa, 

Recalling the notable achievement of the countries 
of Latin America in establishing a nuclear-free zone, 

Also recalling resolution B of the Conference of 
Non-Nuclear- Weapon States, convened at Geneva 
on 29 August 1968, in which the Conference recom- 
mended that non-nuclear-weapon States not com- 
prised in the Latin American nuclear-free zone 
should study the possibility and desirability of 
establishing military denuclearization of their re- 
spective zones, 

Recalling the aims pursued by the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in par- 
ticular, the goal of preventing the further spread of 
nuclear weapons. 

Recalling resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 
1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest 
possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Pro- 
liferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear- 
weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, 

1. Commends the idea of the establishment of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle 
East; 

2. Considers that, in order to advance the idea 
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the 
Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties 
concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and imme- 
diately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal 
basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring 
or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons; 

3. Calls upon the parties concerned in the area 
to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons; 

4. Expresses the hope that all States and, in par- 
ticular, the nuclear-weapon States, will lend their 
full co-operation for the effective realization of the 
aims of this resolution; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to ascertain 
the views of the parties concerned with respect to 
the implementation of the present resolution, in 
particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, 
and to report to the Security Council at an early 
date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at 
its thirtieth session; 

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda 
of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Establish- 
ment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of 
the Middle East". 



January 20, 1975 



81 



United Nations Reaffirms Continuing Responsibility 
in Korea 



Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. 
General Assembly by U.S. Representative 
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on December 2, to- 
gether with the text of a resolution adopted 
by the committee on December 9 and by the 
Assembly on December 17. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT 

USUN press release 183 dated December 2 

For more than 20 years the United Nations 
has played an indispensable role in main- 
taining peace on the Korean Peninsula. In 
1953, the commander in chief of U.N. forces 
in Korea signed the armistice agreement, 
which halted a war that had raged for three 
years. Since that time, the U.N. Command 
has participated in the meetings of the Mil- 
itary Armistice Commission, which was until 
1972 the sole channel of communications be- 
tween the two sides. The armistice agree- 
ment remains to this day the sole basis for 
the current state of peace in Korea. In con- 
sidering the Korean question once again, this 
committee confronts two basic questions: 
how to preserve the peace in Asia and how 
to promote the peaceful reunification of 
Korea in a manner acceptable to all its 
people. In formulating our response to these 
questions, it is important that we not tamper 
with the present structure for peace without 
first having assured that a satisfactory alter- 
native is in its place. 

This committee should recall that last year 
the General Assembly reached an agreed con- 
clusion aimed at promoting practical steps 
toward peace and accommodation in Korea. 
In a consensus statement read from the 



Chair, it noted with satisfaction the July 
1972 joint communique of North and South 
Korea and urged the two governments to con- 
tinue their dialogue. In accordance with the 
Commission's recommendation, it also de- 
cided to terminate the U.N. Commission for 
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. 

The United States warmly supported this 
outcome. We believe that it appropriately 
highlighted the need for further progress in 
discussions between the two Koreas. 

We were disappointed, therefore, when 
some member states, evidently at the urging 
of North Korea, chose to burden this Assem- 
bly again this year with a request to inscribe 
a one-sided partisan item on the agenda of 
the Assembly. We saw no reason for such a 
debate. We concluded, however, that if the 
Assembly were to take up this question, it 
should do so in a reasonable and balanced 
manner. For this reason, the United States 
and many other countries urgently requested 
inclusion of a Korean item on the agenda and 
simultaneously introduced the draft resolu- 
tion contained in document A C.1/L.676 for 
the Assembly's consideration. The subsequent 
introduction of the resolution contained in 
document A/C.1/L.677 confirmed our fears 
that its cosponsors looked to an intemperate 
and contentious debate. The First Committee 
now faces an important and fundamental 
choice. On the one hand it can reinforce its 
unanimous decision of last year by adopting 
the resolution in A/C.1/L.676, which once 
again urges the parties to reconcile their 
diff'erences and arrive jointly at a new ar- 
rangement for peace. On the other hand, in 
resolution A/C.1/L.677 the committee is be- 
ing asked to reverse last year's consensus 
and, in the process, to recommend abandon- 



82 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing the arrangement which has preserved 
peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than 
20 years. 

Mr. Chairman, let us look for a moment 
at what lies behind the various words of 
these draft resolutions. For example, one 
suggests that peace might be maintained 
and peaceful reunification might be expedited 
by the removal of U.S. troops from Korea. 
History does not support this view, however. 
This particular solution to the Korean issue 
has already been tried once. It failed badly. 
In 1949, soon after World War II, American 
military forces were completely removed 
from the territory of South Korea. Within a 
year, North Korea launched an all-out mili- 
tary attack on South Korea. 

I do not wish to dwell on the history of 
those unhappy events, the memory of which 
has poisoned international relations in Asia 
and elsewhere for the last 20 years. I do ask 
that each delegate weigh this tragic experi- 
ence most carefully before he accepts the 
facile assertion that the way to solve all the 
problems of the Korean Peninsula is to re- 
move foreign forces. 

Mr. Chairman, U.S. forces were sent to 
Korea in 1950 in accordance with U.N. Se- 
curity Council resolutions because we and 
other members of this organization were con- 
vinced that international aggression had to 
be stopped. We were also convinced that pre- 
vention of such aggression was, and is, a 
cardinal purpose of the United Nations. 
Therefore, I repeat, U.S. forces were dis- 
patched to help South Korea defend itself 
in accordance with resolutions of the Security 
Council adopted in June and July of 1950. 

After the armistice agreement was signed 
by the commander in chief of U.N. forces and 
by military representatives of the other side, 
two essential tasks remained. 

The first was to maintain the armistice 
agreement and to carry out the obligations 
and responsibilities of the commander in 
chief of U.N. forces as a signatory of that 
agreement. This commander has been joined 
in the performance of his duties by repre- 
sentatives of many of the countries, origi- 
nally numbering 16, which so generously lent 



their assistance to the Republic of Korea. 

The second essential task was to main- 
tain peace and preserve stability on the 
Korean Peninsula until such time as con- 
ditions permitted more normal discourse and 
more definitive solutions among the countries 
of that area. 

For this purpose, the United States and 
the Republic of Korea concluded a Mutual 
Defense Treaty in 1954, which was duly 
registered with the United Nations in accord- 
ance with article 102 of the charter. Under 
this treaty, U.S. forces remain in Korea with 
the full agreement of our two governments. 

That these arrangements have provided an 
important element of stability on the Korean 
Peninsula is evidenced by the absence of 
major armed conflict there since 1953. That 
these arrangements have not prevented the 
opening of a more normal discourse between 
the two Koreas is clearly demonstrated by the 
North-South discussions which have been 
held since 1971. 

It is against this background that the First 
Committee should carefully consider the two 
resolutions before it. One of these drafts, 
contained in L.677, rests on assumptions that 
are dangerous for the maintenance of inter- 
national peace and security. This resolution 
would precipitately dismantle the arrange- 
ments which have for so many years pre- 
served peace and security in Korea. It fails 
even to mention the need to maintain peace. 
It fails to mention the need to maintain the 
armistice agreement which has maintained 
peace in that area. And it fails to reaffirm in 
its operative portions the need for continuing 
dialogue and mutual accommodation between 
the two Koreas, by which peace can best be 
maintained in the future. 

Fortunately, this session of the General 
Assembly has an alternative before it. There 
is another draft resolution which provides 
an opportunity to encourage a positive evolu- 
tion of the situation in the Korean Peninsula. 
It would do so by encouraging the North- 
South dialogue as the most realistic means of 
promoting a reduction of tensions, of increas- 
ing contacts and exchanges, and furthering 
steps toward an eventual peaceful reuni- 



January 20, 1975 



83 



rtcation. Moreover, the draft resolution in 
L.676 would not precipitately and danger- 
ously destabilize the arrangements which 
have preserved peace in the area since 1953. 

This resolution, which my government and 
27 other member states have cosponsored, re- 
affirms the consensus reached last year by the 
General Assembly to urge the two Koreas to 
continue their dialogue and to expedite the 
peaceful reunification of Korea. 

It recognizes the continuing importance 
of the armistice agreement of 1953 for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the 
Korean Peninsula. 

It seeks to have the parties directly con- 
cerned discuss how peace and security on the 
peninsula is to be maintained, before the 
present arrangements are changed. 

These are important steps. They insure 
that the existing equilibrium on the Koi-ean 
Peninsula, within which the first tentative 
steps toward reconciliation have already been 
taken, will not be altered to the disadvantage 
of one side or the other. 

This resolution would also encourage the 
parties directly concerned to discuss those 
aspects of the Korean question which fall 
within the responsibility of the Security 
Council, the most important of which is the 
U.N. Command and its relationship to the 
armistice agreement. 

The U.S. Government and the Republic of 
Korea have both made it clear that they are 
willing to consider an alternative to these 
present arrangements, one which would help 
preserve the present armistice between the 
two sides and the machinery which supports 
it. We fully agree that the time has come — 
and is perhaps overdue — for reconsideration 
of the role played by the United Nations un- 
der the arrangements established by the Se- 
curity Council in 1950. 

But we are also convinced that such re- 
consideration cannot take place at the ex- 
pense of the military stability on the Korean 
Peninsula which these very arrangements 
brought about and helped maintain. 'We need 
to be assured that, in the course of discus- 
sions between North and South Korea, North 
Korea and its associates are pledged to main- 



tain and improve the conditions of peace and 
stability brought about by the armistice 
agreement, that they will continue to respect 
the provisions of the armistice agreement, 
and that they will continue to participate in 
the machinery established to administer that 
agreement. 

We believe this is a reasonable objective, 
in light of the history of armed conflict on 
the peninsula and the continuing intransigent 
public statements of the North Korean au- 
thorities, such as that made by the North 
Korean Representative to this committee on 
November 25 or that of the North Korean 
Foreign Minister on November 8, when he 
said, speaking of the Government of the 
Republic of Korea, "we can never make any 
compromise with the splitters, nor can we 
join hands with the betrayers." 

President Ford during his recent visit to 
the Republic of Korea reaffirmed that for its 
part the United States will continue its best 
efforts to insure the peace and security of 
the Pacific region. President Ford reiterated 
the support of the United States for eff'orts 
by the Republic of Korea to maintain a dia- 
logue with North Korea designed to reduce 
tensions and establish peace on the Korean 
Peninsula and to lead eventually to the peace- 
ful reunification of Korea. 

Our President further joined President 
Park Chung Hee in expressing the hope that 
the current session of the General Assembly 
would recognize the importance of the se- 
curity arrangements which have now pre- 
served peace on the Korean Peninsula for 
more than two decades. 

Finally, President Ford reaffirmed the de- 
termination of the United States to render 
prompt and effective assistance to repel 
armed attack against the Republic of Korea 
in accordance with the Mutual Defense 
Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of 
Korea and the United States. 

The United States believes it is time to 
bring to a close the cold war on the Korean 
Peninsula. We have made serious efforts in 
that direction. The Republic of Korea, for its 
part, has made clear it would welcome good 
relations with any country regardless of 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



ideology. The Republic of Korea has also 
made it clear that as an interim measure 
pending reunification, it would welcome the 
entry of the Republic of Korea and the Dem- 
ocratic People's Republic of Korea as mem- 
bers of the United Nations. The United States 
supports these objectives. We look forward 
to a time of accommodation between North 
and South Korea, when there can be normal 
political, economic, and social ties between 
both sides leading to eventual reunification, 
the goal of all Koreans. 

Progress must be achieved, however, with- 
out damage to either side and without 
threatening the existing balance and sta- 
bility on the Korean Peninsula. We are con- 
vinced that the measures contained in our 
draft resolution will make a constructive 
contribution. We are equally convinced that 
the adoption of the resolution in L.677 would 
obstruct, not encourage, the movement to- 
ward durable arrangements for maintaining 
peace on the peninsula. 

This overall peace on the Korean Peninsula 
is a precious asset of the people of both North 
and South Korea and of the wider world com- 
munity. We should not take actions which 
could disrupt those arrangements which have 
been so successful in keeping the peace in 
this troubled area of the world. These ar- 
rangements can, and should, be modernized, 
but this must be done only with the cooper- 
ation of all the parties directly concerned. 

My government strongly hopes that the 
General Assembly will once again urge upon 
the parties the negotiating process which 
offers them and the world the only hope of 
peaceful change in the Korean Peninsula. ^ 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION = 

Question of Korea 

The General Assembly, 

Desiruig that progress be made towards the at- 
tainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of 
Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of 
the Korean people, 

Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the 
joint communique at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 
July 1972 and the declared intention of both the 
South and the North of Korea to continue the dia- 
logue between them, 

Aicai-e, however, that tension in Korea has not 
been totally eliminated and that the Armistice 
Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to 
the maintenance of peace and security in the area. 

Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
regarding the maintenance of international peace 
and security, the United Nations has a continuing 
responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal 
on the Korean peninsula, 

1. Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as ex- 
pressed in the consensus statement adopted by the 
General Assembly on 28 November 1973,^ and urges 
both the South and the North of Korea to continue 
their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification 
of Korea; 

2. Expresses the hope that the Security Council, 
bearing in mind the need to ensure continued ad- 
herence to the Armistice Agreement and the full 
maintenance of peace and security in the area, will 
in due course give consideration, in consultation 
with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects 
of the Korean question which fall within its re- 
sponsibilities, including the dissolution of the United 
Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate 
arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement 
which is calculated to preserve peace and security 
in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and 
conciliation between the two Korean Governments 
leading to a lasting peace between them. 



^ On Dec. 9 the committee adopted draft resolu- 
tion A/C.l/L/676/Rev. 1, as amended, by a rollcall 
vote of 61 (U.S.) to 42, with 32 abstentions; draft 
resolution A/C.1/L.677 was not adopted, the vote 
being 48 in favor and 48 (U.S.) against, with 38 
abstentions. 



"A/RES/3333 (XXIX) (text from U.N. doc. 
A/9973); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by 
a rollcall vote of 61 (U.S.) to 43, with 31 absten- 
tions. 

" For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1973, p. 775. 



January 20, 1975 



85 



OECD Environment Committee Ministerial Meeting 
Adopts Declaration on Environmental Policy 



The Environment Committee of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) met at ministerial 
level at Paris November IS-H. Following is 
a statement made in the meeting on Novem- 
ber 13 by Christian A. Herter, Jr., Deputii 
Assistant Secretary for Environmental and 
Population Matters,^ together with the texts 
of a press communique and a Declaration on 
Environmental Policy issued at the conclu- 
sion of the meeting on November IJt. 

STATEMENT BY MR. HERTER 

I should stress at the outset, Madam Chair- 
man, that the United States views this meet- 
ing as extremely important. 

In this regard, I should like to read the 
following message from President Ford : 

The United States has viewed the collaborative 
efforts of the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development in the environmental area as 
a good example of the constructive progress nations 
can achieve in harmonizing national policies to 
achieve common goals. We therefore regard the 
meeting of the OECD Environment Committee at 
ministerial level as most important. 

In the aftermath of last winter's energy crisis, and 
with the need to bring inflation under control, I have 
noted expressions of concern in the United States 
and elsewhere that environmental protection might 
have to be sacrificed to current exigencies. I wish to 
assure the member states of the OECD that the 
United States remains firmly committed to its en- 
vironmental goals. In my view, the achievement of 
our economic objectives and environmental improve- 
ment are not incompatible. Indeed, there are nu- 
merous areas such as energy conservation in which 
Bound energy and environmental policies can be 
mutually reinforcing. 



' Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), who was to serve as 
U.S. Representative at the meeting, was unavoidably 
prevented from attending. 



The United States looks forward to continued close 
collaboration with the other OECD member-countries 
in the pursuit of environmental quality. Your meet- 
ing provides an exceptional opportunity for all mem- 
bers of the OECD to reaffirm their continuing com- 
mitment to the protection of the environment. I 
wish you and your associates every success in your 
deliberations. 

The President's message serves to under- 
score our belief that this is a particularly 
appropriate time for a meeting of this char- 
acter, bearing in mind that the member 
countries of this body face all sorts of new 
and difficult environmental challenges. This 
conference also offers an unusual opportunity 
for policy-level assessment and guidance re- 
garding OECD's future role in the environ- 
mental field during a period when the com- 
mittee's mandate is being reviewed. 

In approaching the future, it is useful for 
us to first take stock of where we have been 
in the past. 

In the past decade, industrialized societies 
have come to realize that nature's resources 
are limited and that they cannot be ex- 
ploited and expended with impunity in a 
pursuit of material wealth. They also have 
witnessed a massive and encouraging public 
revulsion against environmental degradation, 
as well as the evolution of a new ethic that 
recognizes that increased production and 
consumption are not the only components in 
an improved quality of life. 

Indeed, most governments now have en- 
vironmental ministries and comprehensive 
programs to abate and reverse pollution. 
Environmental considerations now loom 
large in the planning and execution of major 
governmental projects; many universities 
now offer programs in the environmental sci- 
ences ; and there is a widely felt appreciation 
that future generations can be the victims 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



of unwise environmental decisions made to- 
day. 

Within my country, for example, the Na- 
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1970 was 
a turning point in our concern for environ- 
mental values. We have been endeavoring, 
with gratifying success, to attack some of 
our more pressing environmental problems: 
air and water pollution, use of pesticides, 
ocean dumping, strip mining, urban sprawl, 
and waste management. 

In this respect we also have witnessed 
much encouraging international cooperation 
born out of a realization that many of our 
most pressing problems pay no heed to na- 
tional boundaries and require collective ac- 
tion for solution. 

The United States believes that the OECD 
has been most helpful in fostering coopera- 
tion and harmony among its members in the 
formulation of their national environmental 
policies. In a relatively short period, notable 
strides have been made by the Organization 
in fashioning common policies, such as the 
"polluter pays" principle, to help encourage 
sound environmental practices and avoid 
trade distortion. 

Systematic exchanges and cooperation 
have been initiated to solve some of the 
critical problems related to air and water 
pollution and to identify and control poten- 
tially harmful substances, including toxic 
chemicals. Some of the most challenging 
problems related to the urban environment 
are being collectively faced, and the environ- 
mental benefits of waste utilization, re- 
cycling, and conservation are being assessed. 

We are jointly seeking to determine how 
to more effectively address some of the criti- 
cal environmental problems posed by pro- 
spective energy demands and alternative 
sources of energy supply. And we are en- 
gaged in an important pioneering effort to 
frame new norms for resolving pollution 
problems of a transboundary character. 

We further believe that the OECD can 
continue to provide a valuable forum for 
cooperative actions to safeguard and improve 
the environment, both nationally and inter- 
nationally. We therefore are pleased that the 



mandate of the Environment Committee has 
been extended. 

OECD members can take pride in this 
progress, but we recognize that we face some 
current difficulties. In our own country, for 
example, important elements are question- 
ing the priority to be given to environmental 
goals, citing the current inflation and high 
cost of oil and other raw materials and the 
pressure to reduce dependency on external 
sources of supply. Under these circumstances, 
we are sometimes asked whether the United 
States now regards the environmental move- 
ment as passe, whether we are easing up on 
our environmental policies and goals. To my 
mind, President Ford's message to this body 
gave the answer ; namely, a resounding No. 

We also are sometimes confronted with 
another question: Can we "afford" environ- 
mental protection in the light of current 
conditions? The accu.sation has recently 
been heard that the cost of antipollution 
measures has significantly contributed to in- 
flation. Within the United States the studies 
that I have seen tend to strongly dispute the 
assertion that environmental controls are 
contributing significantly to inflationary 
pressures. Our own organization, the Coun- 
cil on Environmental Quality, for example, 
recently conducted an analysis of the impact 
of environmental programs on the U.S. 
economy. At most, we found that these pro- 
grams account for roughly one-half of 1 per- 
cent of our current 11 percent rate of infla- 
tion. Put in perspective, expenditures made 
during 1973 to satisfy requirements of U.S. 
Federal water and air pollution control legis- 
lation amounted to approximately 1 percent 
of our gross national product. Projections 
for the future show similar results. 

In a democratic society, of course, the 
priorities that the public ascribes to environ- 
mental values can be highly significant in 
determining future directions. Here, too, the 
data we have been able to pull together for 
our part is encouraging. Several recent sur- 
veys of U.S. public opinion indicate that 
environmental values remain extremely im- 
portant in the mind of the U.S. public. More- 
over, the current concerns about the avail- 
ability of energy and inflation appear to have 



January 20, 1975 



87 



had little effect on this attitude. Quite to the 
contrary, during the energy crisis in the 
United States it became clear that the public 
was tired of watching opposing groups place 
the blame on one another. It became clear 
that the people want both adequate energy 
and environmental quality. They are calling 
for workable solutions, not contrived issues. 

As we look to the future, we face problems 
and challenges, of course, in the full achieve- 
ment of our desires and goals for environ- 
mental protection. 

First, the pressures on the environment 
of economic growth will continue to in- 
crease. In 1950, when the gross world prod- 
uct (GWP) reached its first trillion, there 
was little concern about pollution. The GWP 
is now $3.5 trillion and may reach roughly 
$12 trillion by the year 2000. This expected 
and continued huge expansion of production, 
especially in the presently developed coun- 
tries of the world, will mean ever-increasing 
exploitation, processing, and consumption of 
resources. Such expansion will create pro- 
gressively increasing demands for lower 
quality resources, whose recovery and use 
will accelerate pollution of the environment 
unless adequate protective measures keep 
apace. 

What we urgently require is a concept of 
economic growth that takes into account the 
quality of life as well as the quantity of 
goods produced. We were delighted to see 
that this concept has been incorporated in 
the draft declaration now before us. 

Second, as environmentalists, I believe we 
shall face some significant new problems in 
the years ahead in relating to the public, 
industry, and governments. While public 
support for environmental programs re- 
mains high, I believe we have to recognize 
that our task in justifying our efforts may 
become harder, particularly so long as cur- 
rent adverse economic trends continue. In a 
period of economic retrenchment, we shall 
have to do a continually effective job in 
convincing the average worker that we are 
not simply concerned with the niceties of 
life but with compelling problems relating 
to human health and survival. We will have 
to develop better scientific information to 



show that the benefits of environmental ac- 
tions justify the costs. 

Third, and without discounting the diffi- 
culties, I believe it is high time to bury the 
old misconceptions that there are insuperable 
incompatibilities between economic growth, 
with its associated technological advances, 
and the preservation of environmental 
values. Rather, I am hopeful that we are 
entering a more sophisticated era where 
extremism and polarizations will be put 
aside; and when the environmentalist will 
no longer be characterized by his detractors 
as an elitist endeavoring to halt technology. 
Our objective should be to assure that en- 
vironmental considerations are fully taken 
into account in all relevant decisions. 

Fourth, the solution of environmental a.s 
well as most of the other major problems 
facing us today is dependent upon solving 
the population problem. If world population 
continues to grow at its current rate, there 
will be at least 6.7 billion men, women, and 
children on our planet by the year 2000 and 
35 billion by 2074. This rate of increase 
clearly will create insuperable problems in 
feeding and providing other basic necessi- 
ties for the populations of many regions of 
the world. It is clear to me that if we do 
not take early international cooperative ac- 
tion to effectively limit population growth, 
nature will take more drastic measures, 
making our concern about environmental 
quality in the affected regions largely aca- 
demic. Therefore the United States strongly 
endorses the recently adopted World Popu- 
lation Plan of Action, which is aimed at 
achieving a balance between the number of 
people on earth and the planet's carrying 
capacity. 

Turning to the future work of the En- 
vironment Committee, I would first like to 
make a few general remarks. While the 
United States fully appreciates the pressing 
need for budgetary restraint in this and 
other international organizations at this 
time, we hope the resulting impact on the 
work program of the Environment Com- 
mittee can be minimized. 

Furthermore, the United States would 
favor the concentration of our program on 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



a more limited number of high-priority 
projects than in the past. We would hope 
the committee could create some sort of over- 
all review mechanism to promote this end. 

As to program content, my country recog- 
nizes that in the field of toxic chemicals, 
including carcinogens, we face enormously 
complex problems. The difficulties we in the 
United States are encountering in how to 
deal with vinyl chloride serve as ju.st one 
example of many. The OECD is making, 
and can continue to make, useful contribu- 
tions in this area by encouraging nations 
systematically to identify potentially toxic 
chemicals prior to use. It also can continue 
to encourage the adoption of common tech- 
niques to facilitate the comparability of data 
and harmonization of policies and to follow 
the movement of key chemicals in interna- 
tional commerce. 

The concept of framing general principles 
to govern significant episodes of trans- 
boundary pollution from land-based sources 
has occupied much of the committee's re- 
cent attention. Like others around this table, 
my government ascribes considerable im- 
portance to this activity. In some respects 
we consider the action proposal on this sub- 
ject to be one of the most important be- 
fore this body and a good touchstone of our 
willingness to cooperate in solving common 
problems. 

We further strongly recommend that the 
Environment Committee, which has been 
considering this matter, now address itself 
to more concrete ways nations can cooperate 
to redress or adjudicate significant trans- 
boundary pollution problems. 

There are a number of practical activities 
to which the committee might usefully direct 
its attention in addition to those studies of 
legal questions already underway. An area 
of interest might be the development of 
joint contingency plans for response to inci- 
dents of pollution affecting more than one 
country. Further, we might develop compati- 
ble procedures for the identification of trans- 
frontier pollution problems and for correct- 
ing them. Such measures as cooperative air 
and water quality baseline studies might be 
undertaken. Joint air and water quality ob- 



jectives might be developed, and considera- 
tion could be given to developing compatible 
national programs to realize such agreed- 
upon objectives. 

Procedures related to environmental as- 
sessment ofl!'er another area where the 
OECD can do useful work. As you may be 
aware, the United States is required by law 
to prepare environmental impact statements 
concerning all major Federal actions likely 
to significantly affect the human environ- 
ment. The purpose of this requirement is to 
help assure that environmental implica- 
tions are factored into the decisionmaking 
process. We support the action proposal that 
would urge us all to assure that meaningful 
assessments are performed on significant 
projects and to exchange information on our 
experiences. For our part, we are attempt- 
ing to improve our procedures for quantify- 
ing the environmental data that go into our 
assessments. We shall be happy to share 
these results with others. 

Our experience within the United States 
has impressed us with the fact that there 
are some real gaps in ecological data and 
hence in our ability to perform meaningful 
assessments. We suspect this is true of other 
nations as well. This, in our view, under- 
scores the absolute necessity for the mem- 
bers of this Organization to vigorously sup- 
port environmental research in the years 
ahead and exchange the products of their 
efforts. 

As environmentalists, one of our most 
serious concerns for the next decade relates 
to the need to assure that our pattern of 
energy consumption and use will take place 
under terms that appropriately safeguard 
environmental values. As the consuming na- 
tions move together in developing new- 
energy sources and policies, they have a com- 
panion interest in assuring that the environ- 
ment is protected. This committee has al- 
ready been supporting useful and relevant 
work in this area, in the air and water sector 
groups; and we commend the action pro- 
posal captioned "Energy and the Environ- 
ment," which urges the Secretariat to in- 
augurate new and timely exchanges in this 
field. 



January 20, 1975 



89 



We need to move further in assessing the 
ecological effects on aquatic systems of ther- 
mal and chemical discharges ; and the change 
in effects and costs of alternative control 
techniques. 

We need to continue to concert our ef- 
forts in developing a consensus and under- 
standing of the magnitude of the sulfate 
problem, including the contribution of nat- 
ural and manmade sources, the health impli- 
cations, the transnational effects, and the 
contributions being made by powerplants 
and other sources, as well as the merits of 
alternate control strategies. 

We also should continue to study the 
international environmental implications of 
energy resource development, particularly in 
the sensitive coastal zone and near-offshore 
areas. The United States has performed a 
number of studies in this area, the results 
of which we shall be pleased to make avail- 
able. 

Clearly, conservation of energy should be 
one of our prime mutual objectives in the 
decade ahead, and it is noteworthy that the 
recent Energy Coordinating Group high- 
lighted this as a priority topic. Obviously, 
if we can reduce our demand or better 
utilize our energy resources, we will be fos- 
tering our environmental goals, adding to 
our self-sufficiency, and helping to reduce 
inflation. Projects aimed at studying the 
environmental implications of husbanding 
our energy resources, including recycling, 
waste-heat utilization, and demand restraint, 
all merit this committee's support. 

We foresee a continuously useful role in 
the years ahead for those OECD activities 
that relate to problems of the urban en- 
vironment and transportation. The automo- 
bile consumes a high percentage of our 
energy supplies and is a major contributor 
to urban air pollution. In considering the 
relevant action proposal now before us, I 
should note that a major effort must be 
made to make our cars more efficient by re- 
design and maximized use of improved tech- 
nology. Studies in this field should continue 
to be undertaken by the relevant OECD 
member states, recognizing that they pro- 
duce most of the world's motor vehicles. 



One of the major challenges we all face in 
this decade will relate to the improved use 
of land. This is an area where a number of 
European countries have made advances 
from which we can all benefit. Studies are 
being conducted in the United States to give 
us a better idea of the impact of various 
patterns of urban growth on the quality of 
life. Within the United States our Council 
on Environmental Quality just issued a new 
study entitled "Costs of Sprawl" that con- 
cludes that higher density planned urban 
development, as contrasted to single-family 
conventional housing units, results in lower 
economic and environmental costs and nat- 
ural resource consumption. For example, in- 
vestment costs would be 44 percent lower, 
and air pollution 45 percent less. We are 
prepared to share the results of our studies 
with the members of this body and hope 
they will prove useful to local planning offi- 
cials. A summary of CEQ's first report is 
available for each delegation. 

Finally, a few words about the longer 
term. Over the next five to ten years, I be- 
lieve we shall have to seriously devise new 
mechanisms and devices for assessing some 
of the longer term developments of an en- 
vironmental character covering such mat- 
ters as land use, population growth, and 
alternate environmental strategies. This is 
an area where I would hope we would develop 
intensive dialogues between the interested 
governmental authorities, private environ- 
mental institutions, and indu.strial groups 
that have given serious thought to environ- 
mental problems. 

As we look ahead, I also suspect that our 
focus increasingly will encompass our re- 
sponsibilities toward the developing coun- 
tries. I believe the OECD's Development 
Center could provide a useful forum for con- 
certing our efforts. I recommend that our 
Secretariat explore possibilities for assuring 
greater environmental input into OECD's 
Development Center, which has already is- 
sued interesting studies, for instance, on 
population. In looking at the developing 
world, I look to an era, not of confrontation, 
but one in which the advanced nations can 
work increasingly with the poorer nations 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 



in solving common problems, whether they 
involve energy conservation, deforestation, 
desertification, or assurance of a sound eco- 
logical base for meeting the growing de- 
mands for food. Indeed, it is because of this 
global concern encompassing both the de- 
veloping and the developed world that the 
United States also puts considerable empha- 
sis on and support of the U.N. Environment 
Program. 

I close with an exhortation to all of us 
not only to continue the efforts which have 
so effectively been started but to intensify 
those programs and actions which will as- 
sure for our peoples and those of the entire 
world a better quality of life, with both a 
higher material standard of living and a 
more healthful, wholesome environment in 
which to live. 



TEXTS OF PRESS COMMUNIQUE 
AND DECLARATION 



Press Communique 

1. The Environment Committee of tiie OECD met 
at Ministerial Level on 13th and 14th November, 
1974, at the Organisation's headquarters. The meet- 
ing elected as Chairman, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundt- 
land, Norwegian Minister of Environment; three 
Vice-Chairmen were elected; Dr. Cass (Australia), 
Mr. Gutierrez Cano (Spain) and Mr. Mohri (Japan). 

2. Four years after the creation of the OECD En- 
vironment Committee, Ministers approved on behalf 
of their Governments a Declaration on Environmental 
Policy reaffirming their determination to pursue, 
under changing socio-economic conditions, their effort 
to protect and improve the human environment and 
quality of life. This important statement expresses 
inter alia the determination of OECD Member 
countries to promote a new approach to economic 
growth "that will take into account all components 
of the quality of life and not only the quantity of 
goods produced". 

3. There was a general consensus that environ- 
mental policies should be pursued vigorously. It was 
agreed that environmental problems would continue 
to be a major challenge to Governments for the fore- 
seeable future, calling for co-ordinated national poli- 
cies and concerted international actions. Ministers 
were of the view that the present economic and 
energy situation should not adversely affect the 
stringency of environmental policies. 

4. Ministers noted the significant results the OECD 



has achieved over the last four years in analysing 
the economic and technical aspects of major environ- 
mental questions confronting the Member countries, 
in formulating generally agreed policy guidelines 
and in contributing international solutions to prob- 
lems of common interest. 

5. Focussing on environmental policies for the next 
decade, which was the main theme of the meeting, 
and mindful of the need to translate further into 
action the results of the Stockholm Conference on 
the Human Environment, Ministers stressed che 
great importance they ascribed to: 

(i) meeting the challenges of continued popula- 
tion growth bearing in mind the stresses it might 
place on limited natural resources; 

(ii) ensuring that environmental policies are 
carefully integrated with efforts to increase the 
world's food production; 

(iii) continued efforts to husband, recycle and 
otherwise achieve a more rational use of natural re- 
sources, including energy supplies, bearing in mind 
that energy and environmental policies can be mu- 
tually reinforcing; 

(iv) protecting mankind and nature, as much as 
possible through preventive measures against short- 
term and long-term hazards created by all forms of 
pollution; 

(v) ensuring that the public is made fully aware 
of the concrete benefits of policies for environmental 
improvement with a view to facilitating informed 
public participation in the relevant decision-making 
processes; 

(vi) ensuring that the environmental consequences 
of human activities are fully understood, by means 
of continued research and development in this field 
and by the application of sound assessment proce- 
dures; 

(vii) improving the human environment particu- 
larly in cities and other urban settlements, through 
better land use planning and the implementation of 
other relevant policies. 

6. Ministers moreover agreed that a number of 
problems arising during the next ten years could only 
be solved by further strengthening international co- 
operation particularly through the OECD. In this 
regard, they stressed: 

(i) the need for jointly reviewing actions under- 
taken or proposed in the Member countries in order 
to achieve the above-mentioned objectives; 

(ii) the importance they attached to continued 
work within the Organisation favouring the har- 
monization of environmental policies and avoiding 
restrictive effects or distortions such policies might 
create in international trade and investment; 

(iii) their determination to join in seeking solu- 
tions to environmental problems such as transfrontier 
pollution or the management of shared environmental 
resources, which are inherently international; 



January 20, 1975 



91 



(iv) the need to reinforce co-operation with the 
developing countries in the resolution of common en- 
vironmental problems, bearing in mind the growing 
interdependence between nations. 

7. Turning to the more immediate problems calling 
for international co-operation, Ministers adopted ten 
Action Proposals which took the form of Recom- 
mendations by the Organisation to the Member 
countries. These texts, which are made public, con- 
cern: 

(i) The Assessment of the Potential Environ- 
mental Effects of Chemicals; 

(ii) The Analysis of the Environmental Conse- 
quences of Significant Public and Private Projects; 
(iii) Noise Prevention and Abatement; 
(iv) Traffic Limitation and Low-Cost Improve- 
ment of the Urban Environment; 

(v) Measures Required for Further Air Pollu- 
tion Control; 

(vi) Control of Eutrophication of Waters; 
(vii) Strategies for Specific Water Pollutants 
Control; 

(viii) Energy and Environment; 
(ix) Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Prin- 
ciple; 

(x) Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollu- 
tion. 

8. Ministers emphasized the importance of these 
Recommendations which will, in several major areas, 
guide or strengthen the policies of Member countries, 
as well as OECD action, and they pointed to the 
need for these recommendations to be implemented 
as soon as possible. 



Declaration on Environmental Policy 

The Governments of OECD Member countries : ' 

Recognising that increasing population, industrial- 
isation and urbanisation place growing pressures 
on the limited assimilative capacity of the environ- 
ment, and on the finite stock of natural resources; 

Conscious of the responsibility they share to safe- 
guard and improve the quality of the environment, 
both nationally and in a global context, and at the 
same time to promote economic development, and 
confident that the achievement of these goals is 
within the reach of their national economies; 

Noting the unique contribution the OECD can make 
in this field; 

Recalling the Declaration adopted at tlie first 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environ- 
ment held in Stockholm in 1972, to which they unani- 
mously subscribed; 



' The mention of "Governments" is deemed to apply 
also to the European Communities. [Footnote in 
origrinal.] 



Declare that: 

1. The protection and progressive improvement of 
the quality of the environment is a major objective of 
the OECD Member countries. 

2. The improvement of the environment should re- 
flect and promote a new approach to economic growth 
that will take into account all components of the 
quality of life and not only the quantity of goods 
produced. Therefore, economic and social develop- 
ment policies must be pursued in close connection 
with sound environment policies, in order to ensure 
a balanced contribution to the improvement of human 
well-being. 

3. The enhancement of the human environment will 
require further action to evaluate and deal with the 
problems of cities. 

4. The development, extraction, transportation, 
storage, use of energy and related waste disposal 
from existing and new sources as well as of other 
scarce resources, should take place under conditions 
that safeguard environmental values. 

5. Their governments will actively seek to protect 
the environment by encouraging (i) the promotion 
of non-polluting technologies, (ii) conservation of 
energy and other scarce resources, (iii) intensified 
efforts to recycle materials, and (iv) the develop- 
ment of substitutes for scarce or environmentally 
harmful substances. 

6. They will continue to observe and further refine 
the "Polluter-Pays Principle" and other agreed prin- 
ciples to encourage environmental protection and to 
avoid international economic distortions, and where 
desirable encourage the harmonisation of environ- 
mental policies. 

7. They will cooperate towards solving transfron- 
tier pollution problems in a spirit of solidarity and 
with the intention of further developing international 
law in this field. 

8. Comprehensive environmental planning, including 
that pertaining to land use should constitute an 
important element of government policy. 

9. In order to prevent future environmental de- 
terioration, prior assessment of the environmental 
consequences of significant public and private activ- 
ities should be an essential element of policies ap- 
plied at the national, regional and local levels. 

10. Particular attention should be given to the rati- 
fication and implementation of international conven- 
tions for the protection and conservation of the 
environment and to the development of new conven- 
tions. 

11. They will undertake, extend and strengthen the 
foregoing efforts and their co-operation with other 
international organisations and other countries, 
conscious of the special circumstances of developing 
countries, including those which are Members of 
OECD; in so doing they are prepared to make the 
benefits of OECD co-operation with respect to en- 
vironmental improvement readily available to all 
countries. 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Administration Urges Senate Approval of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 



Following is a statement by Fred C. Ikle, 
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency, made before the Senate Com- 
m,ittee on Foreign Relations on December 
10.' 

ACDA press release 74-10 dated December 10 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify this 
morning on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
[Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare] and the Biological Weapons Con- 
vention of 1972. Ratification of these two 
arms control agreements in the field of chem- 
ical and biological warfare has the strong 
support of the President and the executive 
branch. We welcome the initiative of the 
committee in holding this hearing, which we 
hope will lead to prompt ratification of both 
agreements. 

As you know, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
prohibits the use — in effect, the first use — of 
chemical and biological agents in war. Ex- 
cept for the United States, all militarily im- 
portant countries are parties to the protocol. 

The extensive hearings on the protocol 
held by this committee in March 1971 exam- 
ined the reasons why U.S. ratification of the 
protocol has been so long delayed. In the in- 
terest of brevity, I shall not go back over this 
record now, although I would of course be 
happy to respond to any questions regarding 
the history of the protocol. 

During the 1971 hearings, differing views 
were expressed on the question of including 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



riot control agents and herbicides within the 
seeps of the protocol. As a result, the com- 
mittee requested that the executive branch 
reexamine its interpretation of the protocol's 
scope. 

In response to the committee's request, the 
executive branch has undertaken a compre- 
hensive review. We have reconsidered our 
legal interpretation and analyzed possible al- 
ternatives for resolving differences of opin- 
ion en the scope of the protocol. We have 
evaluated the military utility of riot control 
agents and herbicides. And we have of course 
carefully considered alternative approaches 
that would accomplish our arms control ob- 
jectives. 

Mr. Chairman, the President considers it 
important that the United States ratify the 
Geneva Protocol at the earliest possible date. 
On the basis of an interagency review he has 
very recently taken decisions with a view to 
achieving Senate advice and consent to rati- 
fication. The President has authorized me to 
announce those decisions today. 

The President has authorized me to state 
on his behalf that he is prepared, in reaf- 
firming the current U.S. understanding of 
the scope of the protocol, to renounce as a 
matter of national policy: 

1. First use of herbicides in war except 
use, under regulations applicable to their do- 
mestic use, for control of vegetation within 
U.S. bases and installations or around their 
immediate defensive perimeters. 

2. First use of riot control agents in war 
except in defensive military modes to save 
lives such as: 

0. Use of riot control agents in riot con- 
trol circumstances to include controlling riot- 



January 20, 1975 



93 



ing prisoners of war. This exception would 
permit use of riot control agents in riot sit- 
uations in areas under direct and distinct 
U.S. military control. 

b. Use of riot control agents in situations 
where civilian casualties can be reduced or 
avoided. This use would be restricted to sit- 
uations in which civilians are used to mask 
or screen attacks. 

c. Use of riot control agents in rescue mis- 
sions. The use of riot control agents would be 
permissible in the recovery of remotely iso- 
lated personnel such as downed aircrews 
(and passengers). 

d. Use of riot control agents in rear-eche- 
lon areas outside the combat zone to protect 
convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, 
and paramilitary organizations. 

The President intends to conform U.S. pol- 
icy to this position, assuming the Senate con- 
sents. 

Finally, the President, under an earlier di- 
rective still in force, must approve in ad- 
vance any use of riot control agents and 
chemical herbicides in war. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that you may have 
several specific questions concerning this pol- 
icy. I would be happy to respond to such 
questions at this time before I proceed to 
the section of my statement dealing with the 
Biological Weapons Convention. 

The second agreement before the commit- 
tee is the Biological Weapons Convention of 
1972. The full title is the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biologi- 
cal) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De- 
struction. As the title suggests, this conven- 
tion completely prohibits biological and toxin 
weapons. Since it provides for the elimina- 
tion of existing weapons, it is a true dis- 
armament measure. 

The convention is entirely consistent with 
U.S. policy concerning biological and toxin 
weapons, since the U.S. had already uni- 
laterally renounced these weapons before the 
convention was negotiated. In fact, our en- 
tire stockpile of biological and toxin agents 
and weapons has already been destroyed. Our 



biological warfare facilities have been con- 
verted to peaceful uses. 

Since opening the convention for signa- 
ture in April 1972, 110 nations have become 
signatories. This includes all members of the 
Warsaw Pact and all members of NATO ex- 
cept France. In order for this treaty to come 
into force it must be ratified by the three 
depositaries — the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. — and at least 19 
other countries. Enough countries have now 
i-atified, some 36, so that only ratification by 
depositaries is still required. The British have 
completed all the parliamentary procedures 
for ratification and the Soviet Union has 
announced that it intends to ratify before the 
end of 1974. It is particularly important that 
U.S. ratification be accomplished in the near 
future so that we will not be the ones who 
prevent this treaty from coming into force. 

There is one aspect of the convention to 
which I would like to give particular atten- 
tion: the question of verification. Verification 
of compliance with this convention in coun- 
tries with relatively closed societies is diffi- 
cult, particularly for the prohibition of the 
development of these weapons. 

Nevertheless, in our judgment, it is in the 
net interest of the United States to enter 
into this convention, basically for three rea- 
sons: 

— First, the military utility of these weap- 
ons is dubious at best: the effects are unpre- 
dictable and potentially uncontrollable, and 
there exists no military experience concern- 
ing them. Hence the prohibitions of this con- 
vention do not deny us a militarily viable 
option, and verifiability is therefore less 
important. 

— Second, biological weapons are partic- 
ularly repugnant from a moral point of view. 

— Third, widespread adherence to the con- 
vention can help discourage some misguided 
competition in biological weapons. 

It is to be feared that without such a pro- 
hibition, new developments in the biological 
sciences might give rise to concern because 
they could be abused for weapons purposes. 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



Such anxieties could foster secretive mili- 
tary competition in a field of science that 
would otherwise remain open to interna- 
tional cooperation and be used solely for the 
benefit of mankind. 

It is important, however, that the limited 
verifiability of this convention should not be 
misconstrued as a precedent for other arms 
limitation agreements where these special 
conditions would not obtain. 

Mr. Chairman, the administration believes 
that the Biological Weapons Convention rep- 
resents a useful arms control measure. We 
hope the United States will not prevent the 
treaty from entering into force through its 
failure to ratify. By failing to ratify, we 
would deny ourselves the benefit of having 
other countries legally committed not to pro- 
duce weapons that we have already given up. 
And we would deny 109 other countries the 
benefit of a treaty that they have already 
signed. 

This completes my prepared statement. I 
would be happy to respond to any further 
questions on either the Geneva Protocol or 
the Biological Weapons Convention. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 2d Session 

International Council for Exploration of the Sea. Re- 
port to accompany Ex. V, 93-1. S. Ex. Kept. 93-31. 
August 22, 1974. 3 pp. 

Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. 
Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of 
International Scientific Mobility. Prepared for 
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and 
Scientific Developments of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs Divi- 
sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, as part of an extended study of the 
interactions of science and technology with United 
States foreign policy. September 1974. 272 pp. 

Consular Convention With the Czechoslovak Social- 
ist Republic. Report to accompany Ex. A, 93-2. 
S. Ex. Rept. 93-32. September 16, 1974. 5 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Catalysts of 
Platinum and Carbon Used in Producing Capro- 
lactam. Report to accompany H.R. 13370. S. Rept. 
93-1176. September 25, 1974. 4 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Conservation 

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done 
at Oslo November 15, 1973.' 

Ratification deposited: Canada (with declara- 
tions), December 16, 1974. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international transport 
of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with an- 
nexes and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva 
January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 
1960; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 
6633. 
Accession deposited: Canada, November 26, 1974. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. 
Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Oman, January 3, 1975. 

Nationality 

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain 
cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague 
April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937. 
50 Stat. 1317. 

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 
1974. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 
Accession deposited: Oman, January 3, 1975. 

Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel- 
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 
20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973 
TIAS 7532. 
Signature: Oman, January 3, 1975. 

Slavery 

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, 
as amended (TIAS 3532). Concluded at Geneva 
September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 
1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 
Stat. 2183. 

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4 
1974. 



'' Not in force. 



January 20, 1975 



95 



Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav- 
ery, the slave trade, and institutions and practice's 
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the 
United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 
1974. 

Trade 

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 
20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, 
except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which 
entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, December 5, 1974. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. 
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to 
certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Ratifications deposited: Austria, December 27, 
1974; Cuba (with declarations), December 30, 
1974. 
Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 27, -1974. 

Wills 

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of 
an international will, with annex. Done at Wash- 
ington October 26, 1973.' 

Signature: Czechoslovakia (with a statement), 
December 30, 1974. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done 
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.-" 

Accession deposited: Lesotho (with a reserva- 
tion), November 4, 1974. 



BILATERAL 

China 

Agreement regarding the holding of "The Exhibi- 
tion of Archeological Finds of the People's Repub- 
lic of China" in the United States, with annexes 
and related notes. Effected by exchange of letters 
at Peking October 28, 1974. Entered into force 
October 28, 1974. 



Gilbert and Elllce Islands 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Tarawa 
November 12 and 20, 1974. Entered into force 
November 20, 1974. 

Rwanda 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Rwanda. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Kigali December 20, 1974. Entered 
into force December 20, 1974. 



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' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



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Telecommunications — Promotion of Safety on the 
Great Lakes by Means of Radio. Agreement with 
Canada. TIAS 7837. 32 pp. 40(*. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
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ment with South Africa amending and extending 
the agreement of July 8, 1957, as amended and 
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96 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 20, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1856 



China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

Newsweek Magazine 57 

Congress 

Administration Urges Senate Approval of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 1972 (Ikle) ... 93 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 95 

Secretary Kissinger Honors Senator Fulbright 
(remarks at Board of Foreign Scholarships 
dinner) 69 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
News\\eek Magazine 57 

Disarmament 

Administration Urges Senate Approval of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 1972 (Ikle) ... 93 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for News- 
week Magazine 57 

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. 
General Assembly Debate (Martin, Syming- 
ton, texts of two resolutions) 72 

Economic Affairs 

The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship 

With Latin .America (Rogers) fi4 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for News- 
week Magazine 57 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Secretary 
Kissinger Honors Senator Fulbright (re- 
marks at Board of Foreign Scholarships din- 
ner) 69 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

Newsweek Magazine 57 

Environment. OECD Environment Committee 
Ministerial Meeting Adopts Declaration on 
Environmental Policy (Herter, press com- 
munique and declaration) 86 

German Democratic Republic. Letters of Cre- 
dence (Sieber) 71 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

OECD Environment Committee Ministerial 
Meeting Adopts Declaration on Environmen- 
tal Policy (Herter, press communique and 
declaration) 86 

Korea. United Nations Reaffirms Continuing 
Responsibility in Korea (Bennett, text of 
resolution) 82 

Latin America 

The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship 

With Latin America (Rogers) 64 

Secretary Underlines Importance of Western 

Hemisphere Policy (Kissinger, Linowitz) . 68 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for Newsweek Magazine 57 

Morocco. Letters of Credence (Boutaleb) . . 71 



Portugal. Economic and Technical Assistance 

to Portugal (Department announcement) . 71 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 96 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 95 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Newsweek Magazine 57 

United Nations 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for News- 
week Magazine 57 

United Nations Reaffirms Continuing Respon- 
sibility in Korea (Bennett, text of resolu- 
tion) 82 

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. 
General Assembly Debate (Martin, Syming- 
ton, texts of two resolutions) 72 

Yemen Arab Republic. Letters of Credence 

(Makki) 71 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 82 

Boutaleb, Abdelhadi 71 

Herter, Christian A., Jr 86 

Ikle, Fred C 93 

Kissinger, Secretary 57, 68, 69 

Linowitz, Sol M 68 

Makki, Hasan 71 

Martin, Joseph, Jr ' . . 72 

Rogers, William D 64 

Sieber, Rolf 71 

Symington, Stuart 72 



Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: December 30-January 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 30 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
527 of December 13, 535 of December 17, 537 
of December 18, and 543 of December 23. 



No. Date 



Subject 



*1 1/2 Parker sworn in as Ambassador to 
Algeria (biographic data). 

t2 1/2 Kissinger: interview with Business 
Week magazine. 
3 1/2 Kissinger: interview with Newsweek 
magazine. 

*4 1/3 Robinson sworn in as Under Secre- 
tary for Economic Affairs (bio- 
graphic data) . 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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3 



VSS7 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1857 



January 27, 1975 



SECRETARY -KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR BUSINESS WEEK MAGAZINE 97 

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: A HIGH-PRIORITY PROGRAM 

Address by Sheldon B. Vance 108 

U.S. WARNS THAT PRESENT VOTING TRENDS MAY OVERSHADOW 

POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Statements by Ambassador Scali and Texts of Resolutions 114 

U.S. REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR GOALS 
OF WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION 124- 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POUCY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1857 
January 27, 1975 



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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information it 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department at 
State, United Nations documents, end 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business Week Magazine 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
ivith Secretary Kissinger on December 23 by 
Business Week Editor in Chief Leivis H. 
Young, Washi7igton Bureau Chief Robert E. 
Farrell, and Boyd France, State Department 
correspondent for the magazine, which was 
published in the January 13 issue of Business 
Week. 

Press release 2 dated Januai-y 2 

Q. Until recently it was the U.S. position 
that the energy crisis could be solved only by 
an immediate and substantial rediictioyi in the 
price of imported oil. Why has that policy 
changed? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would disagree with 
the word "immediate." It has been the U.S. 
position that the energy crisis cannot be fun- 
damentally changed without a substantial re- 
duction in the price of oil. This remains our 
view. It is also our view that the prospects 
for an immediate reduction in oil prices are 
poor. I have always had the most serious 
doubts that an immediate reduction in oil 
prices could be achieved, because I did not 
see the incentives for the oil producers to do 
this in the absence of consumer solidarity. A 
reduction in energy prices is important. It 
must be achieved, and we mu.st organize our- 
selves to bring it about as rapidly as possible. 

Q. Why ivas it impossible to reduce the 
price of oil immediately? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because in the ab- 
sence of consumer solidarity, pressures re- 
quired to bring oil prices down would create 
a political crisis of the first magnitude. And 
this would tempt other consuming countries 
simply stepping into the vacuum created by 
the United States and would therefore not be 
effective. 



Q. Can you describe the kind of political 
problems that would develop ivithout con- 
sumer solidarity? 

Secretary Kis.singer: The only chance to 
bring oil prices down immediately would be 
massive political warfare against countries 
like Saudi Arabia and Iran to make them 
risk their political stability and maybe their 
security if they did not cooperate. That is too 
high a price to pay even for an immediate re- 
duction in oil prices. 

If you bring about an overthrow of the ex- 
isting system in Saudi Arabia and a Qadhafi 
takes over, or if you break Iran's image of 
being capable of resisting outside pressures, 
you're going to open up political trends 
which could defeat your economic objectives. 
Economic pressures or incentives, on the 
other hand, take time to organize and cannot 
be effective without consumer solidarity. 
Moreover, if we had created the political cri- 
sis that I described, we would almost cer- 
tainly have had to do it against the opposi- 
tion of Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. 

Q. In your University of Chicago speech 
[Nov. H, 197i], you said, "The price of oil 
will come down only when objective condi- 
tions for a reduction are created, and not be- 
fore." What are these objective conditions, 
and when do yoii think they will be achieved? 

Secretary Kissinger: The objective condi- 
tions depend upon a number of factors: One, 
a degree of consumer solidarity that makes 
the consumers less vulnerable to the threat of 
embargo and to the dangers of financial col- 
lapse. Secondly, a systematic effort at energy 
consei-vation of sufficient magnitude to im- 
pose difficult choices on the producing coun- 
tries. Thirdly, institutions of financial soli- 



January 27, 1975 



97 



darity so that individual countries are not so 
obsessed by their sense of impotence that 
they are prepared to negotiate on the pro- 
ducers' terms. Fourth, and most important, 
to bring in alternative sources of energy as 
rapidly as possible so that that combination 
of new discoveries of oil, new oil-producing 
countries, and new sources of energy creates 
a supply situation in which it will be increas- 
ingly difficult for the cartel to operate. We 
think the beginning of this will occur within 
two to three years. 

Q. Over the past year the oil producers 
have been able to cut back production as de- 
mand has declined. Doesn't that indicate that 
conservation alone will not break the oil car- 
tel? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there's a 
limit beyond which that cannot go. Many 
producers are dependent on their revenues 
for economic development. Countries which 
can cut production most painlessly are those 
that are simply piling up balances. Countries 
that need oil revenues for their economic de- 
velopment, like Algeria, Iran, and Venezuela, 
do not have an unlimited capacity to cut 
their production. If the production of these 
countries is cut by any significant percentage, 
their whole economic development plan will 
be in severe jeopardy. Therefore the problem 
of distributing the cuts is going to become 
more and more severe. I understand that 
Libya has already had to take a dispropor- 
tionate amount of the reductions, which it 
can do because it has really no means of 
spending all its income. In the absence of an 
Arab-Israeli explosion, Saudi Arabia's incen- 
tive to cut production indefinitely is limited 
for political reasons. Other countries will 
have less and less of an economic incentive 
to cut production. As the number of OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] countries increases and as alternative 
sources come in, I think these cuts will grow 
increasingly difficult to distribute. 

Q. Are the conservation goals to cut some- 
thing like 3 million barrels a day in 1975 
enough ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think 3 million bar- 



rels a day will be enough, plus alternative 
sources, plus an increase in later years. We 
have to continue this conservation over the 
years. 

Q. Are the Europeans accepting your pro- 
posal for a 1-million-barrel-a-day cut by the 
United States and a 2-million-barrel-a-day 
cut by the other consumers? Or are they 
pressing for a more equal distribution ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have to announce 
our conservation plans more concretely be- 
fore we will have an efi^ective negotiating po- 
sition with the Europeans. I believe that the 
major objective of our strategy can be im- 
plemented, and the desire of some European 
countries for a consumer-producer confer- 
ence can be used to accelerate consumer co- 
operation. We will not go to a consumer-pro- 
ducer conference without prior agreement on 
consumer cooperation. 

Q. Are there any political pressures the 
United States can briyig to bear on the oil 
cartel ? 

Secretary Kissinger: A country of the 
magnitude of the United States is never with- 
out political recourse. Certainly countries 
will have to think twice about raising their 
prices, because it would certainly involve 
some political cost. But I don't want to go 
into this very deeply. 

Q. Businessmen ask why we haven't been 
able to exploit King Faisal's fear of commu- 
nism to help lower prices. 

Secretary Kissinger: We have a delicate 
problem there. It is to maintain the relation- 
ship of friendship that they have felt for us, 
yet make clear the consequences of these 
prices on the structure of the West and of 
the non-Communist world. 

I think we will find that Saudi Arabia will 
not be the leader in the reduction of prices 
but that it will not be an impediment to a re- 
duction if enough momentum can be created 
in the Arab world — indeed, it will be dis- 
creetly encouraging. 

The Saudi Government has performed the 
enormously skillful act of surviving in a lead- 
ership position in an increasingly radical 



98 



Department of State Bulletin 



Arab world. It is doing that by carefully bal- 
ancing itself among the various factions and 
acting as a resultant of a relation of forces 
and never getting too far out ahead. There- 
fore I never for a moment believed, nor do I 
believe today, that the lead in cutting prices 
will be taken by Saudi Arabia. On the other 
hand, the Saudis will happily support a cut 
in prices proposed by others. The Saudis have 
no interest in keeping up prices. They don't 
know what to do with their income today. 

Q. But all along it lias seemed that the 
Saudis have takeii the lead in saying they 
want to get the price of oil down and that 
has never happened. In fact the joke is ive 
can't take another cut in oil prices from the 
Saudis because ive can't afford it. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that's true. 
I have always assessed the Saudi statements 
in the context of their positioning them- 
selves in a general constellation of forces. 
In my opinion, they will not take the lead. 
But they will not oppose it. 

Q. Wlio is likely to take the lead, or what 
producer nations? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is my opinion 
that a reduction in prices cannot come from 
Iran alone, though its voice is important, 
given the powerful personality of the Shah. 

Among the Arab countries Algeria is im- 
portant; Kuwait could be important; Syria, 
even though it's not an OPEC country, has 
a moral influence for political reasons. But 
it will not come, in my view, from Saudi 
Arabia. 

Q. Do you think there is something that 
coidd happen in the Arab-Israeli situation 
that cotdd result in a reduction in oil prices? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not really. I think 
that if the situation deteriorates there could 
be a reduction in supply. I don't believe it is 
wise for us to try to sell the Israeli conces- 
sions for a reduction in oil prices, because 
this would create the basis for pressures in 
the opposite direction during a stalemate. 
Every time the OPEC countries want some- 
thing from us politically, they could threaten 
to raise the prices again. 



Q. So there's nothing tied to the Jeru- 
salem problem or the refugee problem that 
ivoidd have anything to do with the price of 
oil? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it has never 
been raised. 

Q. Many bankers claim that all the 
schemes for recycling oil money — including 
the one you suggested in the University of 
Chicago speech — are only band-aids because 
each scheme piles bad debt on top of good. 
Most of the countries have no way to ever 
repay the loans. Do you see hoiv the $25 
billion fund you proposed would be repaid? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have two prob- 
lems. We have an economic problem, and we 
have a political problem. The political prob- 
lem is that the whole Western world, with 
the exception pei'haps of the United States, 
is suffering from political malaise, from 
inner uncertainty and a lack of direction. 
This also affects economic conditions because 
it means that you have no settled expecta- 
tions for the future and therefore a lowered 
willingness to take risks. 

One of the principal objectives of our 
energy policy is to restore among the indus- 
trialized countries some sense that they can 
master their own fate. And even if this 
would involve some questionable debts, these 
are debts that have to be met somehow. 
It would be enormously important for the 
general cohesion of the industrialized world, 
and for its capacity to deal with the future, 
that they are dealt with systematically and 
not as the outgrowth of some crisis. More- 
over, one way of disciplining some of the 
industrial countries is by the conditions that 
are attached to the funds that might be 
available. 

Q. Where would this $25 billion come 
from ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, small 
sums from other countries. 

Q. But the United States and West Ger- 
many 7vould bear the bnmt? 

Secretary Kissinger: That's probably true. 



January 27, 1975 



99 



But you have to look at it as a guarantee 
rather than as a debt. 

Q. Will this require congressional ap- 
proval? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'm told that we 
could actually do it by borrowing and not 
require congressional approval. However, 
we have decided that in undertaking even 
potential obligations of this magnitude we'd 
better seek some congressional concurrence. 

Q. Hoiv long will it take this program to 
really get rolling? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will not go to a 
pi-oducer-consumer conference without hav- 
ing this program well established. If we 
don't have consumer solidarity, we're better 
off conducting bilateral negotiations with 
the producers. However, I think that within 
the next three months — by the end of March 
certainly— the major elements of our pro- 
gram will be in place. 

Q. Who will have the job of getting these 
elements in place? 

Secreta)y Kissi)iger: Our new Under Sec- 
retary for Economic Affairs, Mr. [Charles 
W.] Robinson; Tom Enders [Assistant Sec- 
retary for Economic and Business Affairs 
Thomas 0. Enders]. Of course, the Treasury 
Department has a vital role. Secretary [of 
the Treasury William E.] Simon has been 
intimately associated with the entire pro- 
gram. We have a committee dealing with 
the international implications of the oil 
crisis. It is composed of myself, Simon, 
Bennett [Jack F. Bennett, Under Secretary 
of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs], 
Robinson, Ingersoll [Deputy Secretary of 
State Robert S. Ingersoll], Burns [Ai'thur 
F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System]. Another 
committee, under Secretary [of the Interior 
Rogers C. B.] Morton, links domestic and 
international policy. 

Q. Have you had any discussion with the 
Soviets about what their position would be 
if there were a confrontation between the 



oil cartel and the Western consumer govern- 
ments? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, and I think it 
would be a very foolish question to ask them. 

Q. Do you know if the Arabs are using 
their petrodollars to force a favorable reso- 
lutioi of the Arab-Israeli conflict? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think they've 
done it up to now. If we don't have consumer 
solidarity that may happen eventually. 

Q. There ivas some concern last month 
about the British pound. 

Secretary Kissi)iger: I've seen these re- 
ports. They were denied. It is certainly an 
option they have. And that is one reason 
why we are so determined to create institu- 
tions of financial solidarity; because if you 
have these institutions, then that sort of 
pressure will not be possible. The producers 
could not take on one currency then. 

Q. Is it possible that we may have to 
engage in an emergency financial bailout of 
Italy or Britain before the financial facility 
is in place? 

Secretary Kissinger: Very possibly, in 
this sense, the proposed facility merely insti- 
tutionalizes what will have to happen any- 
way, because if present trends continue, 
there will have to be a bailout sooner or 
later. But it makes a lot of difference 
whether you bail somebody out in an emer- 
gency and therefore enhance the sense of 
vulnerability and create conditions for a new 
emergency. Or whether, having perceived 
the emergency, you can convey to the public 
that there is a structure that makes it pos- 
sible to master your fate and to deal with 
difliculties institutionally. 

Q. How do you rate the chances for ati- 
other Arab-Israeli tvar in the spring? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the absence of a 
political settlement there is always the dan- 
ger of another Arab-Israeli war. On the 
other hand, war is talked about much too 
loosely. Both sides lost grievously in the 



100 



Department of State Bulletin 



last war. Neither side really won. I think 
the readiness of either side to go to war is 
often exaggerated. I also believe that there 
is some possibility of political progress be- 
fore the spring. 

Q. Then you don't anticipate the possi- 
bility of another oil embargo soon? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not unless there is 
a war. 

Q. Well, what abont after the spring? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't anticipate an 
oil embargo in the absence of war. I am 
not even sure of an oil embargo in the event 
of a war. It would now be a much more 
serious decision than it was the last time. 
We're now engaged in rather delicate nego- 
tiations and these still show promise, so why 
speculate about their failure while they're 
still in train? 

Q. The Shah of Iran has indicated that 
in the next war he'd be on the side of tlie 
Arabs. Does this represent to you a shift- 
ing of forces over there? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to ana- 
lyze exactly what he said. In the past the 
Shah maintained a rather neutral position. 
What he means by being on the side of the 
Arabs I would have to understand a little 
better. But obviously the trends in the Mos- 
lem world are in the direction of greater 
solidarity. 

Q. Have the Israelis indicated to you a 
willingyiess to give back the oil lands in the 
Sinai they captured iyi the 1967 war? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go 
into the details of any specific ideas the 
Israelis may have suggested, but the Israelis 
have indicated their willingness to make 
some further territorial withdrawals. 

Q. One of the things we also hear from 
businessmen is that in the long run the only 
answer to the oil cartel is some sort of mili- 
tary action. Have you considered military 
action on oil? 



Secretary Kissinger: Military action on 
oil prices? 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: A very dangerous 
course. We should have learned from Viet- 
Nam that it is easier to get into a war than 
to get out of it. I am not saying that there's 
no circumstance where we would not use 
force. But it is one thing to use it in the 
case of a dispute over price; it's another 
where there is some actual strangulation of 
the industrialized world. 

Q. Do you worry about what the Soviets 
would do in the Middle East if there were 
any military action against the cartel? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this 
is a good thing to speculate about. Any Pres- 
ident who would resort to military action in 
the Middle East without worrying what the 
Soviets would do would have to be reckless. 
The question is to what extent he would 
let himself be deterred by it. But you can- 
not say you would not consider what the 
Soviets would do. I want to make clear, 
however, that the use of force would be 
considered only in the gravest emergency. 

Q. What do you expect is going to be 
achieved iyi the first meeting between the 
consumers and the producers? 

Secretary Kissinger: The industrialized 
nations suffer in general from the illusion 
that talk is a substitute for substance. And 
what might happen is used as an excuse for 
not doing what can happen. What can hap- 
pen at a consumer-producer meeting depends 
entirely upon whether the consumers manage 
to bring about concrete cooperation and 
whether they can concert common posi- 
tions before the conference. In the absence of 
these two conditions, the consumer-producer 
conference will not take place with our par- 
ticipation. If it did take place, it would only 
repeat in a multilateral forum the bilateral 
dialogues that are already going on. 

There is too much talk to the effect that 
there is no consumer-producer dialogue now. 
There's plenty of dialogue. We talk to all 



January 27, 1975 



101 



of the producers. We have excellent rela- 
tions with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The 
Europeans are talking to the producers ; the 
Japanese are talking to the producers. 

We do not suffer from the absence of dia- 
logue, but from the absence of a systematic 
approach, the lack of a clear direction in 
which to go. If you don't have a systematic 
coordinated approach, then a consumer- 
producer conference can only repeat in a 
multilateral forum under worse circum- 
stances what is already going on bilaterally. 
So you ought to ask me the question again 
in about two months, when we're further 
down the road. 

But I want to make absolutely clear that 
the United States is willing to have this 
conference. It is in fact eager to have a 
consumer-producer dialogue. In our original 
proposals to the Washington Energy Con- 
ference in February, we argued that con- 
sumer cooperation must lead as soon as pos- 
sible to a consumer-producer dialogue. At 
that time we envisaged it for the fall of 1974. 
But we also want the dialogue to be serious 
and concrete. 

It must deal with the problem of recycling. 
It must deal with the problem of the less 
developed countries. It must deal with the 
problem of price over a period of time. In 
terms of the producers, we can consider 
some assurance of long-term development 
for them. But all this requires some very 
careful preparation. 

Q. Does President Giscard d'Estaing now 
share our views as to how the co7isumer- 
producer conference should go forward? 

Secretary Kissinger: It's my impression 
that he shares it. Of course he has to speak 
for himself. But he can be under no mis- 
apprehension of our view of the matter. 

Q. Many people have felt that the U.N. 
meeting on population in Bucharest last 
summer and the meeting on food in Rome 
were unsuccessful because there were too 
many countries represented at them. Will 
this problem plague the oil meetings, too ? 

Secretary Kissinger: None of the organiz- 
ing countries have yet decided how many 



countries to invite and in what manner to 
conduct the negotiations. Personally, I would 
favor a rather small negotiating group, but 
we will not make an issue of it. A lot of 
countries will favor this in theoi-y until they 
come to the problem of whom to invite and 
whom to exclude, so the tendency will be 
toward expanding the membership. In gen- 
eral I would say the larger the membership 
the more unwieldy the procedures are likely 
to be and the more difficult it will be to 
achieve a consensus. 

We worked hard to make the World Food 
Conference a success. I think that the pro- 
posals we made in Rome will probably be 
the basis of food policy for some time to 
come. Our basic point was that there already 
exists a large global food deficit which is 
certain to grow. The gap cannot be closed 
by the United States alone or even primarily. 
Whether our food aid is 4 million tons or 3 
million tons is important for moral and hu- 
manitarian reasons; it is not decisive in deal- 
ing with the world food deficit, which is al- 
ready approaching 25 million tons and which 
can grow to 80 million tons in 10 years. 

What we need is a systematic effort to 
increase world food production, especially 
in the less developed countries, to have the 
exporting countries organize themselves so 
that they know where to put their efforts, 
and to improve world food distribution and 
financing. That was the major thrust of 
our ideas. 

In addition, we're willing to give the max- 
imum food aid that our economy can stand. 
But food aid by the United States cannot be 
decisive. It's a pity that it turned out to be 
the principal issue in the public debate. 
What happened after the conference in terms 
of setting up food reserves, exporters groups, 
and so forth actually indicates that prog- 
ress is being made. The conference was 
quite successful, but the focus of some of 
the domestic debate was off center. 

Q. What policy do you think the ivorld has 
to adopt for making sure countries have ac- 
cess to raw materials? 

Secretary Kissinger: Last year at the 
special session of the General Assembly, I 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



pointed out that we are facing a substantial 
change in world economic patterns. In the 
past, even the very recent past, almost all 
producing countries were afraid of sui'- 
pluses. We're now in a period in which the 
idea of surpluses will seem a relic of a golden 
era. The pressures of population, industriali- 
zation, and increasing interdependence of 
the world economy impose on us some form 
of rational planning and interaction. 

I proposed a systematic study of world 
resources, of raw materials, to obtain a 
systematic estimate of what we will be up 
against, even with good will, over a period 
of the next decade or so. I believe that we 
need the sort of coherent approach which is 
now being attempted in the field of energy; 
it will either be imposed on us or we will 
have to take the lead in developing it in 
other fields, including food. One of our 
efforts at the Rome food conference was to 
show how a constructive approach might 
work in contrast to a restrictive cartel ap- 
proach of the energy producers. 

Q. Do you think there will he any legis- 
lation in the United States because the food 
situation, in ivhich ive have the position of 
the OPEC countries, is an explosive political 
question domestically? 

Secretary Kissinger: We're going to face 
a problem. We have to come to an under- 
standing with the Congress about the proper 
relationship between the executive and the 
legislative functions — what Congress should 
legislate and what should be left to execu- 
tive discretion. The attempt to prescribe 
every detail of policy by congressional action 
can, over a period of time, so stultify flexi- 
bility that you have no negotiating room left 
at all. We recognize that the Congress must 
exercise ultimate policy control. But what 
is meant by that, how much detail, is what 
we intend to discuss very seriously with the 
congressional leadership when it reassem- 
bles. I would hope that the Congress would 
keep in mind that we need some flexibility. 

Now back to your question of how we can 
allocate food for use abroad and yet not 
drive food prices too high in this country. 
That's a tough problem. We have to make 



decisions on that periodically in the light of 
crop reports, in the light of sustainable 
prices. Suppose we put on export controls 
that drove the prices down domestically, 
then we would also have a problem. We 
have to be prepared to pay some domestic 
price for our international position. 

If Japan were suddenly cut ofi" from major 
imports of American agricultural goods, you 
would almost certainly have a dramatic re- 
orientation of Japanese political life. That 
would have profound economic consequences 
for us also over a period of time. They may 
not be measurable today, they certainly are 
not fully demonstrable, but the consequences 
are certain. 

On the other hand, if you undermine your 
domestic position totally in the sense that 
the American public thinks the high food 
prices are largely due to foreign sales, then 
you have another unmanageable problem. On 
the whole, the United States is a healthy 
society, so that the national leadership, if 
it explains its position properly, has a good 
chance of carrying the day. 

Q. How long do you think the economies 
of Italy, the United Kingdom, and France 
can go tvithout serious trouble because of 
the strains imposed by the oil deficits? 

Secretary Kissinger: All West European 
economies, with the exception of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, are going to be in 
more or less serious trouble within the next 
18 months. Which is another reason for 
striving for a much closer coordination of 
economic policies. 

Q. Can this econom,ic trouble lead to po- 
litical trouble ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Without any ques- 
tion. Every government is judged not only 
by its performance but whether it is believed 
to be trying to master the real problems be- 
fore it. F. D. Roosevelt could go along for 
several years without a great improvement in 
the economic conditions because the public 
believed he was dealing with the problems. 
The danger of purely national policies is that 
they are patently inadequate for dealing with 
economic problems — especially in Europe — 



January 27, 1975 



103 



and as the sense of impotence magnifies, the 
whole political base will erode. 

As it is, the Communist vote in Italy, and 
to some extent in France, has remained con- 
stant regardless of economic conditions. A 
substantial proportion of the population has 
felt sufficiently disaffected with the system, 
even when the system was performing well, 
that they voted Communist in order to keep 
pressure on. As the Communist vote grows, 
the flexibility of the political system dimin- 
ishes. Economic decline in Europe would 
therefore have serious political consequences. 

Q. There appears to be a rise in enthicsi- 
asm for the far right, too, a feeling that what 
is needed is an authoritative man that can 
cope with these labor problems, these infla- 
tion problems, et cetera. 

Secretary Kissinger: If you have a major 
economic crisis, the emergence of authori- 
tarian governments of the left or the right is 
a distinct possibility. 

Q. In Europe, the charge is made that you 
have sold out Western civilization for 18 
months of peace in the Middle East. Why do 
Europeans feel this hostility toward the 
United States and toioard you? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course I'd 
like to know who these Europeans are — for 
my own education. What would they have 
had us do? 

Q. They're talking about military action. 

Secretary Kissinger: The fact of the mat- 
ter is that the governments they represent 
systematically opposed every move we made 
in the Middle East; every strong action that 
was taken in the Middle East was taken by 
the United States. Had we taken military ac- 
tion in the Middle East, we would have faced 
violent opposition from their own govern- 
ments. 

Our difficulty in the Middle East is caused 
in part by our inability to organize coopera- 
tion even for nonmilitary action. The efforts 
the administration made diplomatically to lift 
the oil embargo reduced, at least for a time, 
the dangers in the Middle East. It gave ev- 
eryone a breathing space. We gave up noth- 



ing. Except the possibility of military ac- 
tion, which was a chimerical idea. 

When we went on a military alert for one 
day, we were accused of having done it for 
political reasons. Was it conceivable that in 
the middle of Watergate the United States 
take military action? And for what purpose? 

Why are the Europeans so hostile to the 
United States? I think they suffer from an 
enormous feeling of insecurity. They recog- 
nize that their safety depends on the United 
States, their economic well-being depends on 
the United States, and they know that we're 
essentially right in what we're doing. So the 
sense of impotence, the inability to do domes- 
tically what they know to be right, produces 
a certain peevishness which always stops just 
short of policy actions. No foreign minister 
ever says this. 

Q. Even though the trade bill has been 
passed, do you think the economic difficulties 
here in the United States and abroad will 
make it possible to reduce tariffs and non- 
tariff barriers? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is essential 
that we go into these trade negotiations with 
the attitude of creating a new international 
trading system. It is the only hope we have 
of avoiding the political consequences we 
talked about earlier. If we begin to draw 
into ourselves, we will cause a loss of con- 
fidence. We must act as if these problems 
can be overcome. Maybe they can't be, but 
they will never be licked if we do not build 
a new international economic environment 
with some conviction. 

Q. Will Congress' restrictions on Export- 
Import Bank credits have any impact on 
trade with the Soviet Union or detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional 
restrictions have deprived the United States 
of important and maybe fundamental lever- 
age. The Soviet Union was much more in- 
terested in credits than it was in trade, 
because for the next four or five years it 
will have very little to give in reciprocal 
trade. 

And this is one of those examples I had 
in mind before. If the Congress cannot trust 



104 



Department of State Bulletin 



the executive enough to use its credit au- 
thority with discretion, then Congress will 
not be able to deal with the problem by the 
sort of restrictions it put on — aimed at de- 
priving the credit authority granted by Con- 
gress of any effective meaning. 

Three hundred million dollars over a pe- 
riod of four years is simply not enough to 
use as a bargaining chip with a major coun- 
try. It has no significant impact on its econ- 
omy, and therefore it is the surest guarantee 
it will be wasted. 

For two years, against the opposition of 
most newspapers, we refused to extend 
credit to the Soviet Union until there was 
an amelioration of its foreign policy conduct. 
You remember various congressional amend- 
ments were introduced urging us to liberal- 
ize trade. The corollary of this was if there 
was more moderate Soviet conduct, trade 
and credits could open up. I believe that 
the recent Soviet statements on Jewish emi- 
gration have been caused, in part, by Soviet 
disappointment with the credit restrictions. 

But beyond that, a President who has only 
$300 million of credit flexibility over four 
years is forced in a crisis more and more to 
rely on diplomatic or military pressures. He 
has no other cards. The economic card has 
been effectively removed from his hand. 

Q. We were intrigued by the timing of the 
Soviet statement; it came ivhen the trade 
bill was still in conference. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Soviets 
wanted to make clear ahead of time what 
their attitude was so later they could not be 
accused of having doublecrossed us. 

Q. Do you think that Soviet disappoint- 
ment over credits will cause a hardening of 
their position on emigration of Jews? 

Secretary Kissinger: If these trends con- 
tinue in the United States, you can expect 
a general hardening of the Soviet position 
across the board over a period of time. They 
will not go back to the cold war in one day. 
But there are many things the Soviet Union 
could do that would make our position much 
more complicated. What could happen in 
Europe, in the Middle East, in Southeast 



Asia, if the Soviet Union pursued a policy 
of maximizing our difficulties? Most of the 
criticism leveled at the Soviet Union these 
days is that they are not solving our difficul- 
ties, not that they are exacerbating them. 
I think the restrictions on Exim credits will 
have an unfortunate effect on U.S.-Soviet re- 
lations. 

Q. Do you see any ivay that the countries 
of the world can better coordinate their 
economic and financial policies? 

Secretary Kissinger: One interesting fea- 
ture of our recent discussions with both the 
Europeans and Japanese has been this em- 
phasis on the need for economic coordina- 
tion. In April 1973, in my "Year of Europe" 
speech, I proposed the coordination of eco- 
nomic policies and of energy policies. At that 
time, the proposal was generally resisted on 
the grounds that we were trying to produce 
a linkage where the obligations had never 
run to economic matters. In all the recent 
meetings of the President with heads of gov- 
ernment, and all the meetings I have had 
with Foreign Ministers, our allies and 
friends have absolutely insisted that we co- 
ordinate economic policies. So you have had 
a 180-degree turn in one year. 

How you in fact coordinate policies is yet 
an unsolved problem, but it must be solved. 
Otherwise we will have a succession of 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies and countries 
trying to take a free ride on the actions of 
their partners. 

Q. Do you believe we have to go beyond 
what is done at the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know if we 
need new structures, but I think we need 
new approaches to existing structures. I 
haven't thought through whether we need 
new structures. 

In the next 10 years you will have co- 
ordinated fiscal policy, including ours. I am 
not saying they have to be identical, but they 
have to be coordinated. 

We have greater latitude than the others 
because we can do much on our own. The 
others can't. But it is an important aspect 



January 27, 1975 



105 



of leadership to exercise our freedom of ac- 
tion with restraint and to let others partici- 
pate in decisions affecting their future. 

Q. Is there any chance of coordinativ p 
better U.S. international economic policy, 
particularly since the Council on Interna- 
tional Economic Policy seems to be losing its 
power? 

Secretary Kissinger: You can't look at 
policies of a government in terms of organi- 
zational mechanisms. The Council on Inter- 
national Economic Policy was created at a 
time when the National Security Council was 
essentially divorced from economic policies. 
Then it became clear that every economic 
policy had profound foreign policy implica- 
tions and really required political inspiration 
and leadership to make it effective. You 
could never implement the energy policy as 
a purely economic matter ; it has been a for- 
eign policy matter from the beginning. 

When that happens, the issue tends to be 
pulled back into the orbit of the National 
Security Council. What you have had is 
a greater foreign policy involvement in eco- 
nomic policy decisions. 

On the other hand, I think the relations 
between the State Department and Treasury 
have never been better, despite the occa- 
sional disagreements that surface in the 
newspapers. You expect disagreements. The 
issue is not whether there are disagreements, 
but how they are settled. And they are 
always settled in a constructive, positive 
way. 

On energy we have a group, which I de- 
scribed before, of Arthur Burns, Simon, my- 
self, Robinson, and a few others who meet 
regularly to set the basic strategy in the 
international field. Whether we meet as the 
Council on International Economic Policy or 
as the National Security Council, the group 
has essentially the same membership. 

Q. Should there be additional legislation 
to protect U.S. industry from ownership by 
Arab oil moyiey? If so, what shape should 
the legislation take? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are now study- 



ing the ways that oil producers' money could 
be invested in the United States and what 
we should protect against. We haven't come 
to any conclusions because if you get a man- 
ageable minority interest, that would be in 
our interest. If you get actual control over 
strategic industries, then you have to deter- 
mine how that control would be exercised 
before you know how to avoid it. There are 
some industrial segments we would not want 
to be dominated by potentially hostile in- 
vestors. Since we haven't completed the 
study, I can't give you a conclusive answer. 
By the middle of January we will have con- 
cluded the study. 

Q. Do you think a request for legislation 
ivill be the result of that study? 

Secretary Kissinger: It may be a request 
for some sort of a board to monitor foreign 
investment, and the board would formulate 
some proposal. I am not sure about the shape 
of the proposal, but we need a systematic 
monitoring. 



Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 
Signed into Law 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I have signed S. 3394, the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1974, with some reservations but 
with appreciation for the spirit of construc- 
tive compromise which motivated the Con- 
gress. 

I sought a bill which would serve the in- 
terests of the United States in an increas- 
ingly interdependent world in which the 
strength and vitality of our own policies and 
society require purposeful and responsible 
participation in the international commu- 
nity. Foreign assistance is indispensable in 
exercising the role of leadership in the coop- 
erative and peaceful resolution of conflicts, 
in pursuing political stability and economic 



' Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 30 (text from White 
House press release) ; as enacted, the bill is Public 
Law 93-559, approved Dec. 30, 1974. 



106 



Department of State Bulletin 



progress, and in expressing the American 
spirit of helping those less fortunate than 
we are. 

In most respects, the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1974 will serve those ends. It includes, 
however, several restrictions that may pose 
severe problems to our interests. I must 
bring them to the attention of the Congress as 
matters which will be of continuing concern 
and which may require our joint efforts to 
remedy if circumstances require. 

First are the numerous and detailed limi- 
tations on assistance to Indochina. The eco- 
nomic and military assistance levels for Cam- 
bodia, particularly, are clearly inadequate to 
meet minimum basic needs. Our support is 
vital to help effect an early end to the fighting 
and a negotiated settlement. This is also the 
objective of the U.N. General Assembly, 
which approved a resolution calling for a ne- 
gotiated settlement. I intend to discuss this 
critical issue with the congressional leader- 
ship at the earliest possible time. 

In South Viet-Nam, we have consistently 
sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese 
people to determine their own futures free 
from enemy interference. It would be tragic 
indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the 
progress we have achieved by failing to pro- 
vide the relatively modest but crucial aid 
which is so badly needed there. Our objective 
is to help South Viet-Nam to develop a viable, 
self-sufficient economy and the climate of se- 
curity which will make that development pos- 
sible. To this end, the economic aid requested 
represented the amount needed to support 
crucial capital development and agricultural 
productivity efforts. The lower amount fi- 
nally approved makes less likely the achieve- 
ment of our objectives and will significantly 
prolong the period needed for essential de- 
velopment. 

I appreciate the spirit of compromise which 
motivated the Congress to extend to Febru- 
ary 5, 1975, the period during which military 



assistance to Turkey may continue under 
specified circumstances. I regret, however, 
that the restriction was imposed at all. Tur- 
key remains a key element of U.S. security 
and political interests in the eastern Medi- 
terranean. The threat of cutoff of aid, even 
if unfulfilled, cannot fail to have a damaging 
effect on our relations with one of our 
staunch NATO allies whose geographic posi- 
tion is of great strategic importance. This, in 
turn, could have a detrimental effect on our 
efforts to help achieve a negotiated solution 
of the Cyprus problem. 

I regret the action of the Congress in cut- 
ting off the modest program of military as- 
sistance to Chile. Although I share the con- 
cern of the Congress for the protection of 
human rights and look forward to continuing 
consultation with the Chilean Government on 
this matter, I do not regard this measure as 
an effective means for promoting that inter- 
est. 

Finally, the Congress has directed that 
during the current fiscal year no more than 
30 pei'cent of concessional food aid should be 
allocated to countries which are not among 
those most seriously affected by food short- 
ages — unless the President demonstrates that 
such food is required solely for humanitarian 
purposes. I understand and share the spirit 
of humanitarianism that prompted a state- 
ment of congressional policy on this subject. 
But that policy could unduly bind the flexibil- 
ity of the United States in an arbitrary way 
in meeting the needs of friendly countries 
and in pursuing our various interests abroad. 

As with other differences which the Con- 
gress and the executive branch worked out 
in consideration of this bill, I look forward to 
working with the 94th Congress in meeting 
and solving the problems that are still before 
us. We share the common goal of best serving 
the interests of the people of the United 
States. Working together, we shall continue 
to serve them responsibly. 



January 27, 1975 



107 



International Narcotics Control: A High-Priority Program 



Address bij Sheldon B. Vance ^ 



Alcohol and drug problems are genuine 
concerns of anyone with management re- 
sponsibilities, and in this sense my personal 
involvement is not new. However, my inter- 
est has been more immediate and full time 
since early this year when Secretary Kissin- 
ger named me his Senior Adviser on Nar- 
cotics Matters. 

The Federal international narcotics con- 
trol program is a combined effort of several 
U.S. agencies, operating within the frame- 
work of the Cabinet Committee on Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control, which is chaired by 
Secretary of State Kissinger. I also serve as 
the Executive Director of the Cabinet Com- 
mittee and therefore direct or coordinate, un- 
der the President's and Secretary's control, 
what our Federal Government is attempting 
to do abroad in this field, whether in the en- 
forcement, treatment, or prevention areas. 

My remarks today will not address alcohol 
abuse, not because we believe alcohol a lesser 
or insignificant problem — we definitely do 
not — but because our international narcotics 
control program does not extend to alcohol. 
The Cabinet Committee was, in fact, formed 
largely in response to the tragic victimization 
of American youth by heroin traffickers in 
the late 1960's and early 1970's. As you know, 
the same period also saw a sharp rise in the 
abuse of other drugs over which we seek 
tighter controls, including marihuana, hash- 
ish, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates. 



' Made before the North American Congress on Al- 
cohol and Drug Problems at San Francisco, Calif., 
on Dec. 17. Ambassador Vance is Senior Adviser to 
the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Interna- 
tional Narcotics Matters. 



tranquilizers, and LSD and other hallucino- 
gens. Poly-drug abuse, the mixing or alter- 
nating consumption of diff'erent drugs, also 
emerged as a problem requiring special at- 
tention. 

The American drug scene is not confined 
to our borders. It extends to our military 
forces and other Americans residing abroad, 
as well as to tourists. As of September 30 of 
this year, 1,289 U.S. citizens were languish- 
ing in foreign prisons on narcotics charges, 
principally in Mexico, Germany, Spain, and 
Canada. The 1,289 compares with the figure 
of 242 in September of 1969. 

However hard we fight the problem of 
drug abuse at home, we cannot move signifi- 
cantly to solve it unless we succeed in win- 
ning and maintaining comprehensive and ef- 
fective cooperation of foreign governments. 
Some of the key drugs of abuse originate in 
foreign countries. There is a legitimate need 
for opium as a source for codeine and other 
medicinal compounds, but illicit opium — 
from which heroin can be processed — has 
been produced in such countries as Turkey 
(prior to its ban), Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Burma, Thailand, Laos, and neighboring 
Mexico. Opium is also being produced legally 
in India and Turkey for export and in Iran 
and a number of other countries for domestic 
medical and research utilization. 

Some idea of the dimensions of our prob- 
lem can be gained when we consider that the 
world's annual legal production of opium is 
close to 1,500 tons and illegal production is 
estimated at 1,200 tons. Similarly, the co- 
caine used in the United States is of foreign 
origin, produced as the coca plant princi- 



108 



Department of State Bulletin 



pally in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Colom- 
bia transforms more coca paste into cocaine 
than other countries. Cannabis, from which 
we get marihuana and hashish, is both im- 
ported and grown in the United States; the 
biggest supplier of the U.S. market is Mex- 
ico, followed by Jamaica. 

We have had our problems with U.S. -man- 
ufactured amphetamines, barbiturates, and 
other mind-bending drugs. We are attempt- 
ing to deal with the U.S. sources through do- 
mestic measures, but for the foreign sub- 
stances we must look to other governments 
for cooperation. Frequently, it has been a 
case of persuading them that the problem is 
not just ours but is also theirs. 

We have been increasingly successful in 
these efforts since mid-1971, when stopping 
the flow of narcotics to the United States — 
with emphasis on heroin and cocaine — be- 
came one of our principal foreign policy ob- 
jectives. At that time, the Department of 
State was assigned the primary responsibil- 
ity for developing an intensified interna- 
tional narcotics control effort and for man- 
aging the expenditures under the program. 

To encourage cooperation from other gov- 
ernments and to assist them and internation- 
al organizations to strengthen their antidrug 
capabilities, we have provided an annual 
average of $22 million in grant assistance 
over the past three years. Our request for 
international control funds for the current 
fiscal year is $42.5 million. Our bilateral 
programs emphasize cooperative law enforce- 
ment and exchange of intelligence. The ma- 
jor categories of grant assistance are train- 
ing programs and equipment for foreign en- 
forcement personnel and financial assistance 
for crop substitution and related agricul- 
tural projects. We are also exploring useful 
cooperative ventures in the fields of drug 
abuse education, treatment, and prevention. 

During the past two months, I visited 
many of the countries in Latin America, the 
Near East, and Asia to examine our pro- 
grams and look for ways to strengthen them. 
I can report that all of these governments 
expressed a sincere willingness to help stamp 
out illicit production and trafficking. But 



these governments also face serious internal 
problems. The opium poppy, for example, 
usually flourishes in the more isolated areas 
where central government control is weak or 
nonexistent. In many areas it is the only cash 
crop of unbelievably poor tribesmen, and it 
also provides their only medication and relief 
from serious disease and hardship. 

On my trip I saw something of the poppy- 
growing areas in Afghanistan in Badakshan 
and Nangarhar Provinces and of the Buner 
and Swabi poppy-producing areas of Pak- 
istan's Northwest Frontier Province when I 
drove from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Pesha- 
war, Pakistan, through the Kabul Gorge and 
Khyber Pass and then went on to Islamabad 
by Pakistani Government helicopter. I also 
helicoptered over the northern mountains of 
Thailand, where the Meo hill tribes grow 
opium like the tribesmen in the neighboring 
mountains of Burma and Laos in what is 
called the Golden Triangle. 

The experience vividly demonstrated to me 
the conditions which make it very difficult 
for these governments — despite a genuine 
desire to stamp out illegal opium — to control 
production effectively any time soon. We and 
producing countries cannot expect to see a 
high degree of success in our cooperative en- 
forcement eflforts until significant adjust- 
ments are made in the social attitudes and 
economic conditions in the opium-growing 
areas. 



Western Hemisphere Control Programs 

Mexico — Today, the number-one priority 
country in our international narcotics con- 
trol eflforts is Mexico. The Mexican opium 
crop and heroin laboratories are the current 
source of more than half of the heroin on our 
streets. The so-called Mexican brown heroin 
has not only moved into our largest cities 
but is also spreading to some of the smaller 
cities throughout our country. When Presi- 
dent Ford met with President Echeverria in 
October, narcotics control was very high on 
their agenda and they agreed that an even 
more intensified joint effort is needed. 

The Mexican Government under President 



January 27, 1975 



109 



Echeverria has assigned high priority to its 
antidrug campaign and has directed Attor- 
ney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada to coor- 
dinate its eradication and control efforts. 

We are helping them by providing air- 
craft, mainly helicopters, to assist in the 
eradication of opium poppy cultivation in 
the western mountains. This cultivation is il- 
legal in Mexico, and there is no question of 
the Mexican Government offering income 
substitution to the farmer. There is also a 
crash program to strengthen antismuggling 
controls on both sides of the border. Our 
crooks smuggle guns and appliances into 
Mexico, in coordination with their crooks 
who supply ours with heroin and marihuana. 
U.S.-Mexican cooperative measures are pay- 
ing off, but much remains to be done before 
illicit trafficking can be reduced in a major 
way. 

For fiscal year 1975, about $10 million, or 
almost one-quarter, of our international nar- 
cotics control funds are being allocated to the 
Mexican program. Our Mexican neighbors 
are spending much more. My colleague John 
Bartels, Administrator of the Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration (DEA), and I meet 
three or four times a year with our friend 
Pedro Ojeda Paullada, either in Mexico City 
or Washington, in order to coordinate our 
respective efforts. 

Colombia — A country with extensive coast- 
lines and huge land areas, Colombia is the 
major transit point for illegal shipments of 
cocaine entering the U.S. market. The Co- 
lombian Government has launched a great 
effort to eliminate the criminal element, to 
combat drug trafficking, and to crack down 
on the laboratories processing coca base 
smuggled in from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Chile. The United States is moving for- 
ward with an assistance program tailored to 
help the new Colombian Government thrust. 
We are furnishing such enforcement items 
as jeeps, motorcycles, radios, and laboratory 
equipment. We are also providing antinar- 
cotics technical training for the Judicial Po- 
lice, the National Police, and Customs. 

Jamaica — This Caribbean island has 
emerged as a major supplier of marihuana 



to the United States, surpassed only by Mex- 
ico. Moreover, there is evidence that Jamaica 
is a transit point for the smuggling of co- 
caine and heroin to our country from South 
America. Within the past year, the Jamaican 
Government has undertaken major steps to 
curb illicit drug activities. In response to ur- 
gent requests for assistance from the Jamai- 
can Government, U.S. technical assistance 
and equipment was extended to a Jamaican 
task force set up to intercept boats and air- 
craft engaged in narcotics smuggling, to dis- 
rupt trafficking rings, and to destroy commer- 
cial marihuana cultivation. Well over 600,000 
pounds of commercially grown marihuana 
have been destroyed thus far. U.S. support 
consists of loaning of helicopters and trans- 
fers of communications equipment and in- 
vestigative-enforcement aids together with 
training and technical assistance. 

The Situation in Turkey 

Turkey — In 1971, with the realization that 
a substantial amount of opium legally pro- 
duced in Turkey was being diverted to illicit 
narcotics trafficking, the Turkish Govern- 
ment concluded that a total ban on poppy 
growing would be the most effective way to 
stop the leakage. However, the Turkish Gov- 
ernment which assumed office in January 
1974 reconsidered the ban, amid great in- 
ternal political debate, and on July 1 re- 
scinded it on the grounds that what is grown 
in Turkey is a sovereign decision of the 
Turks. 

In high-level dialogue between our two 
governments we have made clear our very 
deep concern at the possibility of a renewed 
massive flow of heroin from Turkish opium 
to the United States. We stressed our hope 
they would adopt effective controls. A spe- 
cial U.N. team held discussions on this sub- 
ject in Turkey on the invitation of the Turk- 
ish Government, which has stated publicly 
many times that it will not allow its resump- 
tion of poppy cultivation to injure other peo- 
ples. 

In mid-September, the Turkish Govern- 
ment issued a statement that it would adopt 



110 



Department of State Bulletin 



a method of harvesting the poppies called the 
poppy straw process, which involves the col- 
lection by the Turkish Government of the 
whole poppy pod rather than opium gum. 
This was the procedure recommended by the 
U.N. experts. Traditionally, the opium gum 
was taken by the farmers thi'ough lancing 
the pod in the field, and it was a portion of 
this gum that was illegally bought by the 
traffickers. 

Last month I talked with senior Turkish 
Government officials and with police officials. 
The word has moved all the way down the 
chain to the poppy farmer that opium gum 
production is definitely prohibited, and the 
enforcement mechanism is moving into place. 
Turkey and the U.N. narcotics organization 
are cooperating fully in this eff"ort, and all 
will be watching closely to endeavor to pre- 
vent and to head off' diversions into the illicit 
traffic. 

Joint Efforts in Southeast Asia 

Southeast Asia — The Golden Triangle 
area, where Burma, Laos, and Thailand come 
together, is the largest source of illicit opium 
in the world, with an estimated annual pro- 
duction of 600-700 tons. Most of this produc- 
tion is consumed by opium or heroin smokers 
in Southeast Asia. Since 1970, when heroin 
processed from opium in Golden Triangle re- 
fineries began to become widely available to 
U.S. troops in Viet-Nam, we have been con- 
cerned that heroin from this source would 
increasingly reach the United States, espe- 
cially as the ban on opium production in Tur- 
key and disruption eflforts along the way 
dried up the traditional Middle Eastern- 
European route to the United States. 

For the past three years, therefore, we 
have made Southeast Asia a major object of 
our international control efforts. We have de- 
voted a significant share of our suppression 
efforts and resources to our cooperative pro- 
grams in Thailand, Laos, Viet-Nam, the Phil- 
ippines, and Hong Kong. The biggest concen- 
tration has been in Thailand, which serves as 
the major transit area for Burmese-origin 
opium. A recent series of agreements for 



U.S. assistance to Thailand include helicop- 
ters, communications equipment, vehicles, 
and training programs. Important steps were 
also taken on the income-substitution side, 
including the approval of an aerial survey of 
northern Thailand, where opium is grown by 
the hill tribes. In Burma, the government has 
stepped up its antinarcotics efforts. For fiscal 
year 1975, Southeast Asia will account for 
over $10 million of our international nar- 
cotics control funds. 

While our joint suppression efforts are 
making some headway in Southeast Asia, we 
should not view the situation there through 
rose-colored glasses. Antinarcotics efforts in 
Southeast Asia run up against several unique 
problems. Burma and Thailand are threat- 
ened by insurgent groups which control or 
harass large areas of the opium-growing re- 
gions. The governments have limited re- 
sources and few trained personnel available 
for narcotics control. In addition, the lack of 
internal security hampers police action and 
intelligence operations against traffickers. 
The Government of Burma, for example, does 
not have effective administrative control over 
a significant portion of the area where most 
Asian poppies are grown. 

The topography of the Golden Triangle 
area is mountainous, wild, and uncontrolla- 
ble. When one smuggling route is uncovered 
and plugged by police and customs teams, the 
traffickers can easily detour to alternate 
routes and modes of transportation. We need 
only look at the difficulties that our own well- 
trained and well-equipped law enforcement 
agencies have in blocking narcotics traffic 
across our clearly defined peaceful border 
with Mexico to gain a better appreciation of 
the difficulties in Southeast Asia. 

Moreover, use of opium has been tolerated 
in the area, and opium has been regarded as 
a legitimate commodity of commerce for cen- 
turies under both colonial and indigenous 
governments. For the hill tribes, opium is 
still the principal source of medicinal relief 
for endemic diseases and is also the most lu- 
crative crop to sell or barter for basic neces- 
sities. We are actively seeking alternative 
crops and other sources of income for these 



January 27, 1975 



m 



peoples, in close cooperation with similar ef- 
forts by the U.N. narcotics organizations; 
but progress will be slow, as a way of life 
of primitive and remote peoples must be mod- 
ified. 

And so the situation in Southeast Asia is 
complex and long term. 

Multilateral Approaches 

Concurrently with our bilateral action pro- 
grams, we have given full support to the 
multilateral or international eflforts in the 
fight against illicit narcotics production and 
trafficking. 

For example, the United States was a lead- 
ing proponent of the establishment of the 
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Con- 
trol. To date, we have contributed $10 million 
of the $13.5 million made available to the 
Fund by all countries. In Thailand, the Fund 
is assisting in a comprehensive program de- 
signed to develop alternate economic oppor- 
tunities for those who grow opium; the Fund 
has a similar project in Lebanon for the de- 
velopment of alternatives to cannabis pro- 
duction. Within the past year, the Fund has 
financed a World Health Organization world- 
wide study of the epidemiology of drug de- 
pendence which we hope will contribute to- 
ward clarifying the nature of the problem we 
seek to solve. It is also financing treatment 
and rehabilitation activities for drug addicts 
in Thailand, fellowships and consultancies in 
rehabilitation in various countries, and semi- 
nars on community rehabilitation programs 
in Europe. 

The U.S. Government has also taken a 
leading role in formulating two major pieces 
of international narcotics legislation. The 
first relates to the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. I am happy to report that 
the U.S.-sponsored amending protocol, which 
would considerably strengthen controls over 
illicit production and trafficking, has been 
ratified by 32 of the 40 countries necessary 
for its coming into force. The United States 
was one of the first countries to ratify the 
pi-otocol, on November 1, 1972. 



The second major area of international 
legislation pertains to the Convention on Psy- 
chotropic Substances, which would provide 
international control over LSD and other 
hallucinogens, the amphetamines, barbitu- 
rates, and tranciuilizers. The administration 
submitted the convention to the Senate in 
mid-1971 with a request for its ratification. 
We are now waiting for congressional ap- 
proval of the proposed enabling domestic 
legislation that would pave the way for rati- 
fication of this essential international treaty. 
U.S. approval of the Psychotropic Conven- 
tion would strengthen our hand in obtaining 
cooperation from other governments in con- 
trolling the classic narcotic substances. 

The approach to a successful antidrug pro- 
gram cannot, of course, relate to supply 
alone. Nor is an attack on the demand side 
alone the answer. Only through a combined 
eflfort can the job be done. Thus the initial 
objective of our international program has 
been to reduce availabilities of illicit supplies 
so that addicts will be driven into treatment 
and others will be deterred from experimen- 
tation. We are also examining ways to foster 
international cooperation in the fields of 
treatment and prevention to augment aware- 
ness that drug abuse is not exclusively an 
American problem but one that seriously af- 
fects developing countries just as it plagues 
the affluent. We also hope to demonstrate our 
progress in treatment and prevention and to 
learn from other countries the methods that 
they have found effective. 

As many of you know, we have several co- 
operative treatment and research projects 
with a number of concerned governments 
throughout the world. For example, with the 
Government of Mexico through Dr. Guido 
Belsasso's organization, the Mexican Center 
for Drug Dependency Research, we have pro- 
vided some assistance to the Mexican epide- 
miological study and we are jointly studying 
heroin use along our common border. 

I think we can point with pride to our role 
over the past three years toward a tightening 
of international controls. Worldwide seizures 
and arrests of traffickers have become more 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



and more significant as other countries have 
joined in the battle. And there has been a 
move in the direction of more effective con- 
trols through treaty obligations. However, 
the job is far from done. It should be ap- 
parent to us all that abundant supplies of 
narcotics — both in storage and under cultiva- 
tion — quickly respond to illicit high profits. 
Our task, then, is to further strengthen the 
international control mechanism to reduce 
illicit trafficking. 

On October 18, John Bartels, the Admin- 
istrator of DEA, Dr. Robert DuPont, Direc- 
tor of the Special Action Office for Drug 
Abuse Prevention, and I met with President 
Ford to review the U.S. drug abuse pro- 
grams. The President stated that he had per- 
sonally seen examples of the human devasta- 
tion caused by drug abuse and said he wanted 
every appropriate step taken to further the 
U.S. Government's drug abuse program both 
at home and abroad. On the international 
front, the President specifically directed that 
all American Ambassadors be made aware of 
the prime importance he attaches to our ef- 
forts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs to the 
United States and requested that each Am- 
bassador review the activities of his mission 
in support of the drug program. 

Thus, drug control continues to be a high- 
priority foreign policy issue. In cooperation 
with our missions abroad and the govern- 
ments to which they are accredited, we shall 
carry on with our efforts against the scourge 
of drug abuse. 



Department Welcomes TWA-Swissair 
Agreement on Airline Capacity 

Department Announcement ' 

The Department of State welcomes the 
announcement by Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) that it has reached an agreement 
with Swissair for tiie reduction of airline ca- 
pacity in the U.S.-Switzerland market for 
the summer 1975 season. The agreement, 
which is subject to the approval of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, will reduce the overall 
capacity in the U.S.-Switzerland market by 
over 25 percent compared with the 1973 
base year. The Swissair reduction will be 
even larger because the agreement calls for 
an expansion of TWA services in order to 
improve its position in the U.S.-Switzerland 
market. 

The United States had earlier requested 
consultations with Switzerland concerning 
the problem of excess capacity. The U.S. 
Government is now considering whether the 
proposed agreement between the two air- 
lines will make intergovernmental talks un- 
necessary insofar as the upcoming summer 
season is concerned. 

The reduction of excess capacity in the 
transatlantic market is part of the Presi- 
dent's seven-point action program to assist 
the U.S. international airline industry. 



'Issued on Dec. 23 (text from press release 543); 
the announcement by TWA was included in the De- 
partment's press release. 



January 27, 1975 



113 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Warns That Present Voting Trends May Overshadow 
Positive Achievements of the United Nations 



Folloiving are statements made in the 
U.N. General Assembly on December 6 and 
12 by U.S. Representative John Scali, to- 
gether with the texts of two resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly on December 12. 



STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI 



Statement of December 6 

USUN press release 191 dated December 6 

Last year the U.S. delegation sought to 
call attention to a trend which we believed 
threatened the U.N.'s potential as an instru- 
ment for international cooperation. We were 
deeply concerned then over the growing 
tendency of this organization to adopt one- 
sided, unrealistic resolutions that cannot be 
implemented. 

Today, more than a year later, my delega- 
tion feels that we must return to this sub- 
ject because this trend has not only con- 
tinued but accelerated. Added to this, there 
is now a new threat — an arbitrary disre- 
gard of U.N. rules, even of its charter. What 
my delegation spoke of 12 months ago as a 
potential threat to this organization, un- 
happily, has become today a clear and pres- 
ent danger. 

The U.S. Government has already made 
clear from this rostrum its concern over a 
number of Assembly decisions taken during 
the sixth special session last spring and 
during the current session. These decisions 
have dealt with some of the most important, 
the most controversial, and the most vexing 
issues of our day: the global economic crisis. 



the turmoil in the Middle East, and the 
injustice in southern Africa. I will not today 
discuss again our main concerns with each 
of these decisions. Rather, I wish to take 
this opportunity to discuss the more general 
question of how self-centered actions en- 
danger the future of this organization. 

The United Nations, and this Assembly 
in particular, can walk one of two paths. 
The Assembly can seek to represent the 
views of the numerical majority of the day, 
or it can try to act as a spokesman of a 
more general global opinion. To do the first 
is easy. To do the second is infinitely more 
difficult. But, if we look ahead, it is infinitely 
more useful. 

There is certainly nothing wrong with 
like-minded groups of nations giving voice to 
the views they hold in common. However, 
organizations other than the United Nations 
exist for that purpose. Thus, there are 
organizations of African states, of Asian 
states, of Arab states, of European states, 
and of American states. There are groups 
of industrialized nations, of developing na- 
tions, of Western and Eastern nations, and 
of nonaligned nations. Each of these organi- 
zations exists to promote the views of its 
membership. 

The United Nations, however, exists not 
to serve one or more of these special-interest 
groups while remaining insensitive to the 
others. The challenge of the United Nations 
is to meld and reflect the views of all of 
them. The only victories with meaning are 
those which are victories for us all. 

The General Assembly fulfills its true 
function when it reconciles opposing views 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



and seeks to bridge the differences among 
its member states. The most meaningful 
test of whether the Assembly has succeeded 
in this task is not whether a majority can 
be mobilized behind any single draft resolu- 
tion, but whether those states whose co- 
operation is vital to implement a decision 
will support it in fact. A better world can 
only be constructed on negotiation and com- 
promise, not on confrontation, which inevi- 
tably sows the seeds of new conflicts. In 
the words of our charter, the United Nations 
is "to be a center for harmonizing the ac- 
tions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends." 

No observer should be misled by the co- 
incidental similarities between the General 
Assembly and a legislature. A legislature 
passes laws. The General Assembly passes 
resolutions, which are in most cases advisory 
in nature. These resolutions are sometimes 
adopted by Assembly majorities which rep- 
resent only a small fraction of the people 
of the world, its wealth, or its territory. 
Sometimes they brutally disregard the sensi- 
tivity of the minority. 

Because the General Assembly is an ad- 
visory body on matters of world policy, the 
pursuit of mathematical majorities can be 
a particularly sterile form of international 
activity. Sovereign nations, and the other 
international organs which the Assembly 
advises through its resolutions, sometimes 
accept and sometimes reject that advice. 
Often they do not ask how many nations 
voted for a resolution, but who those nations 
were, what they represented, and what they 
advocated. 

Members of the United Nations are en- 
dowed with sovereign equality; that is, they 
are equally entitled to their independence, 
to their rights under the charter. They are 
not equal in size, in population, or in wealth. 
They have different capabilities and there- 
fore different responsibilities, as the charter 
makes clear. 

Similarly, because the majority can direct- 
ly affect only the internal administration of 
this organization, it is the United Nations 
itself which suffers most when a majority. 



in pursuit of an objective it believes over- 
riding, forgets that responsibility must bear 
a reasonable relationship to capability and 
to authority. 

Each time this Assembly adopts a resolu- 
tion which it knows will not be implemented, 
it damages the credibility of the United 
Nations. Each time that this Assembly 
makes a decision which a significant minor- 
ity of members regards as unfair or one- 
sided, it further erodes vital support for 
the United Nations among that minority. 
But the minority which is so offended may 
in fact be a practical majority in terms of 
its capacity to support this organization and 
implement its decisions. 

Unenforceable, one-sided resolutions de- 
stroy the authority of the United Nations. 
Far more serious, however, they encourage 
disrespect for the charter and for the tradi- 
tions of our organization. 

No organization can function without an 
agreed-upon framework of rules and regu- 
lations. The framework for this organiza- 
tion was built in the light of painful lessons 
learned from the disastrous failure of its 
predecessor, the League of Nations. Thus, 
the U.N. Charter was designed to insure 
that the important decisions of this organi- 
zation reflected real power relationships and 
that decisions, once adopted, could be en- 
forced. 

One of the principal aims of the United 
Nations, expressed in the preamble of its 
charter, is "to practice tolerance and live 
together in peace with one another as good 
neighbors." The promise the American 
people and the peoples of the other founding 
nations made to each other — not as a matter 
of law, but as a matter of solemn moral 
and political obligation — was to live up to 
the charter and the duly made rules unless 
or until they were modified in an orderly, 
constitutional manner. 

The function of all parliaments is to pro- 
vide expression to the majority will. Yet, 
when the rule of the majority becomes the 
tyranny of the majority, the minority will 
cease to respect or obey it, and the parlia- 
ment will cease to function. Every majority 



January 27, 1975 



115 



must recognize that its authority does not 
extend beyond the point where the minority 
becomes so outraged that it is no longer 
willing to maintain the covenant which binds 
them. 

My countrymen have made a great invest- 
ment in this world organization over the 
years — as host country, as the leading finan- 
cial contributor, and as a conscientious par- 
ticipant in its debates and negotiations and 
operational programs. Americans have loy- 
ally continued these efforts in a spirit of 
good faith and tolerance, knowing that there 
would be words spoken which we did not 
always like and resolutions adopted which 
we could not always support. 

As the 29th General Assembly draws to a 
close, however, many Americans are ques- 
tioning their belief in the United Nations. 
They are deeply disturbed. 

During this 29th General Assembly, reso- 
lutions have been passed which uncritically 
endorse the most far-reaching claims of one 
side in dangerous international disputes. 
With this has come a sharply increased tend- 
ency in this Assembly to disregard its nor- 
mal procedures to benefit the side which 
enjoys the favor of the majority and to 
silence, and even exclude, the representatives 
of member states whose policies the major- 
ity condemns. In the wake of some of the 
examples of this Assembly, the General Con- 
ference of UNESCO [United Nations Edu- 
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion] has strayed down the same path, with 
the predictable consequences of adverse re- 
action against the United Nations. Innocent 
bystanders such as UNICEF [United Na- 
tions Children's Fund] already have been 
affected. 

We are all aware that true compromise is 
difficult and time consuming, while bloc vot- 
ing is fast and easy. But real progress on 
contentious issues must be earned. Paper 
triumphs are, in the end, expensive even for 
the victors. The cost is borne first of all by 
the United Nations as an institution and, 
in the end, by all of us. Our achievements 
cannot be measured in paper. 

A strong and vital United Nations is im- 



portant to every member state ; and actions 
which weaken it weaken us all, particularly 
the smaller and the developing nations. Their 
security is particularly dependent on a col- 
lective response to aggression. Their pros- 
perity particularly depends on access to an 
open and expanding international economy. 
Their ability to project their influence in 
the world is particularly enhanced by mem- 
bership in international bodies such as the 
United Nations. 

In calling attention to the dangerous 
trends, I wish also to call attention to the 
successes of the United Nations during the 
past year. 

U.N. members overcame many differences 
at the World Population Conference and the 
World Food Conference. There was also 
progress at the Law of the Sea Conference. 
There was agreement on programs encour- 
aging states to maintain a population which 
they can feed and feed the population which 
they maintain. As a result of these U.N. 
conferences the world community has at last 
begun to grapple with the two fundamental 
issues which are central to any meaningful 
attempt to provide a better life for most 
of mankind. 

In the Middle East a unique combination 
of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy has 
succeeded in halting last year's war and in 
separating the combatants. With good will 
and cooperation, the Security Council has 
renewed the mandate for the peace forces, 
allowing time for a step-by-step negotiating 
process to bear fruit. My government be- 
lieves that this negotiating process continues 
to hold the best hope in more than a quarter 
of a century for a just and lasting peace in 
that area. 

On Cyprus, the Security Council, the As- 
sembly, and our Secretary General have all 
contributed to progress toward peace and 
reconciliation. Much remains to be done, but 
movement toward peace has been encour- 
aged. 

Perhaps the U.N.'s most overlooked suc- 
cess of the past year resulted from the mis- 
sion of the Secretary General's representa- 
tive, Mr. [Luis] Weckmann-Munoz. This 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



effort, which was undertaken at the request 
of the Security Council, succeeded in medi- 
ating a particularly dangerous border dis- 
pute between Iran and Iraq. This example 
of how to prevent a small conflict from 
blowing up into a much bigger war must 
rank among the U.N.'s finest, if least 
heralded, achievements. 

Thus, despite the disturbing trend toward 
the sterile pursuit of empty majorities, re- 
cent U.N. achievements demonstrate that this 
organization can still operate in the real 
world in the interests of all its members. 
Unfortunately, failure and controversy are 
threatening to overshadow the record of suc- 
cesses. Its lapses are long remembered and 
remain a source of lasting grievance for 
those who feel wronged. 

Before concluding my remarks, I would 
like to say a few words, not as the U.S. Rep- 
resentative to this organization but as an 
American who has believed deeply in the 
United Nations since 1945 when, as a young 
reporter just returned from the war, I ob- 
served the birth of this organization. 

I must tell you that recent decisions of 
this Assembly and of other U.N. bodies 
have deeply affected public opinion in my 
country. The American people are deeply 
disturbed by decisions to exclude member 
states and to restrict their participation in 
discussions of matters of vital concern to 
them. They are concerned by moves to con- 
vert humanitarian and cultural programs 
into tools of political reprisal. Neither the 
American public nor the American Congress 
believes that such actions can be reconciled 
with the spirit or letter of the U.N. Charter. 
They do not believe that these decisions are 
in accord with the purposes for which this 
organization was founded. They believe the 
United Nations, in its forums, must show 
the same understanding, fair play, and re- 
sponsibility which its resolutions ask of in- 
dividual members. 

My country cannot participate effectively 
in the United Nations without the support of 
the American people and of the American 
Congress. For years they have provided that 
support generously. But I must tell you 



honestly that this support is eroding — in 
our Congress and among our people. Some 
of the foremo-st American champions of this 
organization are deeply distressed at the 
trend of recent events. 

A majority of our Congress and our people 
are still committed to a strong United Na- 
tions. They are still committed to achieving 
peaceful solutions to the issues which con- 
front this organization — in the Middle East, 
in South Africa, and elsewhei-e. They are 
■still committed to building a more just world 
economic order. But the trends and deci- 
sions of the past few months are causing 
many to reflect and reassess what our role 
should be. 

I have not come to the General Assembly 
today to suggest that the American people 
are going to turn away from the United 
Nations. I believe that World War II taught 
Americans the tragic cost of standing aside 
from an organized international effort to 
bring international law and justice to bear 
on world problems. But, like every nation, 
we must from time to time reassess our 
priorities, review our commitments, and re- 
direct our energies. In the months ahead, 
I will do all in my power to persuade my 
countrymen that the United Nations can re- 
turn to the path the charter has laid out 
and that it can continue to serve the in- 
terests of all of its members. 

If the United Nations ceases to work for 
the benefit of all of its members, it will 
become increasingly irrelevant. It will fade 
into the shadow world of rhetoric, abandon- 
ing its important role in the real world of 
negotiation and compromise. 

We must join to prevent this. The reasons 
for which this world organization was 
founded remain as valid and as compelling 
today as they were in 1945. If anything, 
there is added reason: the specters of nu- 
clear holocaust, world depression, mass 
famine, overpopulation, and a permanently 
ravaged environment. 

If we are to succeed, we m.ust now renew 
our commitment to the central principles of 
tolerance and harmony upon which the U.N. 
Charter was built. We must redouble our 



January 27, 1975 



117 



efforts to use this organization as the world's 
ultimate instrument for compromise and 
negotiation. I pledge my nation to these 
efforts. 



Statement of December 12 

USUN press release 196 dated December 12 

My delegation will vote in favor of draft 
resolution A/L.748. This resolution reflects 
the views of the U.S. Government on 
strengthening the role of the United Nations. 

My delegation also welcomes the initiative 
of the Australian delegation contained in its 
draft resolution A/L.749 on peaceful settle- 
ment of international disputes. We are 
pleased to announce my delegation will vote 
in favor of this resolution. 

I want also to take the occasion to thank 
my colleagues who have spoken since this 
discussion began last Friday. I do not agree 
with everything I have heard, just as others 
disagree with some of the points I made. 

I am encouraged that the debate has 
turned into a constructive dialogue with 
much sober reflection. If we can maintain 
this willingness to listen carefully to one 
another, we can write a record that peoples 
everywhere can applaud. 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 



Resolution 3282 (XXIX)' 

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations 
with regard to the maintenance and consolidation 
of international peace and security, the develop- 
ment of co-operation among all nations and the 
promotion of the rules of international law in 
relations between States 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 2925 (XXVII) of 27 
November 1972 and 3073 (XXVIII) of 30 November 
1973, 

Emphasizing that the active participation of all 
Member States in efforts aimed at strengrthening the 
United Nations and enhancing its role in contempo- 
rary international relations is essential for the 
success of those efforts, 



Aware that strengthening- of the role of the 
United Nations requires continuous improvement in 
the functioning and effectiveness of its principal 
organs in the exercise of their responsibilities under 
the United Nations Charter, 

Considering that it is desirable for the General 
Assembly to keep constantly under review the over- 
all problems connected with the role and the effec- 
tiveness of the United Nations and to consider them 
periodically with a view to evaluating the progress 
achieved and adopting appropriate measures aimed 
at strengthening the role of the world Organization 
in international life, 

1. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolutions 
2925 (XXVII) and 3073 (XXVIII) concerning the 
strengthening of the role of the United Nations in 
contemporary international relations; 

2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of 
the Secretary-General,- prepared pursuant to resolu- 
tion 3073 (XXVIII), containing the views, sugges- 
tions and proposals of Member States regarding 
the strengthening of the role of the United Nations; 

3. Transmits to its thirtieth session for considei'a- 
tion, the views, suggestions and proposals of Mem- 
ber States contained in the above-mentioned report 
and in any communications that may be submitted 
in accordance with paragraph 5 below with regard 
to improving the functioning and effectiveness of 
the General Assembly in the exercise of its respon- 
sibilities under the United Nations Charter; 

4. Draws the attention of the other principal 
organs of the United Nations to the views, sugges- 
tions and proposals of Member States contained in 
the relevant sections of the report of the Secretary- 
General so that they may be taken into consideration 
in the process of effectively improving the activities 
and functioning' of those organs and invites them 
to keep the General Assembly informed on this 
subject in such manner as they may consider 
appropriate; 

5. Requests Member States to give further study 
to ways and means of strengthening the role of the 
United Nations and enhancing its effectiveness and 
to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later 
than 30 June 1975, their views, suggestions and 
proposals in that regard with a view to supplement- 
ing the report prepared on the basis of resolution 
3073 (XXVIII); 

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of 
its thirtieth session the item entitled "Strengthen- 
ing of the role of the United Nations with regard 
to the maintenance and consolidation of intema- 



' Draft resolution A/L.748; adopted by the As- 
sembly on Dec. 12 by consensus (text from U.N. 
press release GA/5194). 

- U.N. doc. A/9695. [Footnote in original.] 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



tional peace and security, the development of co- 
operation among all nations and the promotion of 
the rules of international law in relations between 
States". 



Resolution 3283 (XXIX) "< 

Peaceful settlement of international disputes 

The General Assembly, 

Noting that the Charter of the United Nations 
obliges Member States to settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are 
not endangered. 

Recalling in particular that the Security Council 
is charged under the terms of Article 24 of the 
Charter with primary responsibility for the main- 
tenance of international peace and security, and 
that disputes may be brought to the attention of 
the Council for purposes of pacific settlement under 
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, 

Recalling also that Article 33 of the Charter 
directs that parties to any dispute, the continuation 
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, 
seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peace- 
ful means of their own choice. 

Recalling further that the International Court 
of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations and, as such, is available to Mem- 
bers for the settlement of legal disputes, that it 
has recently amended its Rules of Court with a view 
to simplifying its procedure so as to avoid delays 
and simplify hearings, and that it may establish 
chambers to hear and determine cases by summary 
procedure allowing for the speediest possible settle- 
ment of disputes, 

Mindful of the existence of other facilities and 
machinery available for the settlement of disputes 
by mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial 
settlement, including the Permanent Court of Arbi- 
tration at The Hague and established regional 
agencies or arrangements, 

Reaffirming that recourse to peaceful settlement 
of international disputes shall in no way constitute 
an unfriendly act between States, 

Mindful also of the continuing threat to inter- 
national peace and security posed by serious dis- 
putes of various kinds and the need for early action 



^ Draft resolution A/L.749, as amended; adopted 
by the Assembly on Dec. 12 by a recorded vote of 
68 (U.S.) to 10, with 35 abstentions (text from U.N. 
press release GA/5194). 



to resolve such disputes by resort in the first in- 
stance to the means recommended in Article 33 of 
the Charter, 

1. Draws the attention of States to established 
machinery under the Charter of the United Nations 
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes; 

2. Urges Member States not already parties to in- 
struments establishing the various facilities and 
machinery available for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes to consider becoming parties to such instru- 
ments and, in the case of the International Court of 
Justice, recognizes the desirability that States study 
the possibility of accepting, with as few reserva- 
tions as possible, the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court in accordance with Article 36 of the Statute of 
the Court; 

3. Calls upon Member States to make full use and 
seek improved implementation of the means and 
methods provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations and elsewhere for the exclusively peaceful 
settlement of any dispute or any situation, the con- 
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the main- 
tenance of international peace and security, includ- 
ing negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, good offices including 
those of the Secretary-General, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare an 
up-to-date report concerning the machinery estab- 
lished under the Charter relating to the peaceful 
.settlement of international disputes, inviting his 
attention in particular to the following resolutions 
of the General Assembly: 

(a) Resolution 268 D (III) of 28 April 1949, in 
which the Assembly established the Panel for In- 
quiry and Conciliation; 

(b) Resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, 
section B, in which the Assembly established the 
Peace Obser\'ation Commission; 

(c) Resolution 1262 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, 
in which the Assembly considered the question of 
establishing arbitral procedure for settling disputes; 

(d) Resolution 2329 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, 
in which the Assembly established a United Nations 
register of experts for fact-finding; 

(e) Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, 
in which the Assembly approved the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning FViendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accord- 
ance with the Charter of the United Nations; 

5. Invites the attention of the Security Council, 
the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, 
the International Court of Justice and the Secretary- 
General to the present resolution. 



January 27, 1975 



119 



U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of the U.N. Charter 



Statement by Robert Rosenstock • 



As the Sixth Committee considers sugges- 
tions regarding the review of the U.N. Char- 
ter, my delegation is again impressed with 
the profound implications of the questions 
we are discussing and with the diversity of 
those suggestions which have been made. 

The charter, as any fundamental govern- 
ing document, must have the capacity to al- 
low those who adhere to it to deal efficiently 
and effectively with the questions they face. 
Because of the broad spectrum of interests, 
the full range of political diversity, and the 
considerable discrepancy in the types of con- 
tributions which can be made by the various 
members of the United Nations, the charter 
must truly be an extraordinary document in 
order to provide the basic ground rules with- 
in which we all can agree to attempt to solve 
our common problems. 

The charter has generally proven to be 
such an extraordinary document for the past 
29 years. For this we all owe a profound ap- 
preciation to those who developed its text 
during those complex and difficult negotia- 
tions in San Francisco. Neither then nor now 
have sensible persons believed all the charter 
language was perfect and immutable for all 
time. We know of no significant governing 
document with a long life which is or could 
be perfect or immutable. 

This is not to suggest that our organiza- 
tional problems have been overcome or that 
the United Nations has always dealt effec- 
tively with the challenges before it. It is to 



' Made in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly on Dec. 5 (text from USUN press 
release 190). Mr. Rosenstock is Legal Affairs Ad- 
viser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. 



suggest, however, that those problems are 
solvable by full and proper use of the ma- 
chinery we have, rather than by creating 
new machinery. We certainly hope we can 
engage in self-criticism without opening the 
entire charter to the whims of the moment. 
In this we associate ourselves with the views 
of the late Krishna Menon which were re- 
called this morning. 

We are surprised by the comments of some 
that the charter has been unchanged since 
194.5. Quite apart from the several amend- 
ments which have been made to the text and 
to which I shall refer later, the charter has, 
by the normal process of interpretation and 
evolution, gone through very significant mod- 
ifications as times and circumstances have 
changed, as new members with new views 
have joined the United Nations, and as we 
have been able through years of experience 
to understand better the needs of this central 
multinational organization. 

The fact that the present charter has al- 
lowed such flexibility is clear evidence of the 
fundamental value and wisdom of its text. 
As general political needs have changed, so 
in many cases, have our collective interpre- 
tations of charter provisions. 

These changes have taken place gradually 
and effectively — a con.structive evolution in 
which all members have participated. Such 
an evolution is, in our view, an invaluable 
way in which the charter is maintained as a 
living, current document, an avenue of 
change vastly preferable to sudden radical 
shifts which, by virtue of the extreme di- 
versity among the member states, almost in- 
evitably would result in loss of the funda- 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



mental consensus which is the foundation of 
the charter. The loss or weakening of that 
consensus can only result in diminution of the 
effectiveness of the organization and thus the 
meaningfulness of any changes which some 
might urge. 

Evolution has taken place in some of the 
most important provisions of the charter. 
For example, if in 1945 or 1950 we had as- 
serted that the charter granted peoples the 
right to self-determination, most members 
would have disagreed. If in 1960 we had 
made the same assertion, many would have 
pointed out that all that existed as a matter 
of law was a principle, not a right. Today if 
anyone questioned the interpretation that 
there exists a charter right to self-determi- 
nation, his views would be considered pre- 
posterous or, at the least, anachronistic and 
wrong. 

In 1964 some states asserted that there 
was no charter prohibition on inten'cntion 
by states in the domestic affairs of other 
states. If anyone asserted that view today 
we would think him mad or worse. 

Can anyone deny that article 2, paragraph 
7, means something different from what it 
meant before various decisions by the Secu- 
rity Council, before the adoption of the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and be- 
fore the numerous subsequent resolutions 
which deal with human rights and various 
forms of denial of those rights, such as apart- 
heid ? 

In 1950 certain delegations attacked Reso- 
lution 377A (V) as illegal and contrary to 
the charter. In 1967 the state which led the 
earlier attack against that resolution relied 
upon it in moving to convene an emergency 
session of the Assembly. 

The Friendly Relations Declaration with 
its interpretations of key concepts of the 
charter, including the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, nonintervention, equal 
rights and self-determination, and peaceful 
settlement, is merely one of the more obvious 
examples of the process of evolution. The 
Friendly Relations Declaration was negoti- 
ated and unanimously adopted essentially by 
today's membership. 



If we proceed pellmell into a review exer- 
cise without the reciuisite broad agreement, 
we shall encourage states to harden posi- 
tions; we shall widen the difference among 
us and reduce our own flexibility to compro- 
mise. We shall harm the chances for contin- 
ued evolutionary change. A review exercise 
may well prove the greatest impediment to 
change rather than a catalyst for change. 

During the past two days we have heard 
several delegations for diverse reasons call 
for a variety of modifications to the charter. 
We have heard delegations state that reluc- 
tance to consider or make such modifications 
in one specific way — namely, through the 
proposed ad hoc committee — would amount 
to obstruction of the will of the majority of 
states and would demonstrate opposition to 
the basic idea of any change in the charter 
at all. Because of the importance and the 
sensitivity of these questions, I would like 
again to express the position of my govern- 
ment on these issues. 

In the first place we have participated, in 
some cases by leading, in the many evolu- 
tionary changes that have taken place since 
1945. At no time have w^e sought to oppose 
this concept of the charter as a living, breath- 
ing document which must be made to respond 
flexibly to the contemporary needs of the or- 
ganization. 

In the second place we have been in the 
forefront of those who supported the amend- 
ments which have been adopted. Nor can 
these amendments be lightly passed over. For 
example, the expansion of the Security Coun- 
cil has breathed new life into the general 
consensus principle which has and must un- 
derlie the functioning of the Security Coun- 
cil. In 1955 no decision could be taken by the 
Security Council over the objections of the 
East or the West. In the late fifties and early 
sixties the membership of the organization 
underwent a fundamental change. Today a 
majority of the membership of the Council 
represents what is frequently called the 
Third World. Not only may no decision be 
taken without the active support of these 
members, but most of the decisions which are 
taken in the Council these days are at their 



January 27, 1975 



121 



request and based upon proposals drafted by 
one or more of them. The peacekeeping forces 
in the Middle East, for example, were cre- 
ated largely because the states of India, Ken- 
ya, and Yugoslavia took the lead to press the 
Council to establish them rather than a U.S.- 
Soviet peacekeeping force. 

Finally, in addition to supporting evolu- 
tionary change and specific amendments to 
the charter we have sought to retain an open 
mind on the concept of charter review. In 
our reply to the Secretary General's request 
for the views of states on the question of re- 
view,- we expressed a willingness to partici- 
pate even in a charter review conference if 
it is the general view of the membership that 
the outcome of such a conference would be 
constructive. I think it fair to say that there 
is not such a feeling that an overall review 
would solve problems. There is certainly no 
broad agreement at this time on what spe- 
cific changes might be desirable. There does 
seem to be widespread recognition that very 
great damage could be done to confidence in 
the basic fabric of the United Nations if con- 
siderable care is not exercised to insure very 
broad support before any type of review of 
the charter is undertaken. 

It is the view of my delegation that such 
broad support can most realistically be 
amassed if we approach charter review on a 
case-by-case basis. We have amended the 
charter successfully in the past by this ap- 
proach, enlarging the Security Council and 
the Economic and Social Council when the 
requisite measure of consensus has been 
achieved. 

We are dealing, in this field of interna- 
tional cooperation, with an activity based es- 
sentially not on the ability of some states to 
compel action by others but rather, on our 
ability to find standards of behavior and 
ground rules for cooperation to which we are 
all willing to adhere. 

We have all freely accepted the charter. 
We must obviously take great care to develop 
that consensus, particularly for changes so 
significant as those to the U.N. Charter, if 



= U.N. doc. A/8746/ Add. 1, p. 13. 



we intend to maintain it as a realistic instru- 
ment by which all member states will be 
guided. This may be a cautious approach, but 
it emphatically is not a negative approach. 
We have amended the charter in the past; 
we can, and presumably will, amend the char- 
ter in the future. 

Although we and others have not and pre- 
sumably will not always agree with every 
suggestion made for amendment of the char- 
ter, we have recognized and we do recognize 
the usefulness of giving serious and thorough 
consideration to any specific proposal when 
it appears to be a constructive effort to im- 
prove our ability to deal with the problems 
we face and when it will preserve the deli- 
cate balance which we have developed to al- 
low so many nations so different from each 
other to work together. There may well be 
variations in the formula under which that 
balance can be maintained. If there is broad 
and serious support for a specific proposal 
for change, it should at the least be fully con- 
sidered. 

It would, however, do neither member 
states nor the organization itself any service 
to proceed with any specific amendments 
without being confident at least of basic 
agreement among the member states on a 
given amendment, much less to undertake a 
general review. The risk is too great both of 
poisoning the cooperative atmosphere which 
is essential for our work and of polarizing 
this highly diversified body without construc- 
tive gain. We are well aware of the protec- 
tion afforded us by article 108; our fears are 
for the very foundations of the United Na- 
tions. 

In our view the establishment of the pro- 
posed ad hoc committee would almost inevi- 
tably result in a general, wide-ranging re- 
view of the charter. Even among the few 
replies received from states and among the 
fewer still which urge change, there is a very 
broad range of suggestions for modification 
of the charter, many of them mutually ex- 
clusive. For these reasons we strongly oppose 
the draft resolution contained in A/C.6/L. 
1002. We are prepared to vote in favor of 
the draft contained in A/C.6/L.1001 or any 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



ether text which commands sufficiently broad 
support and which does not endanger the 
foundations of our institution. 

We, like ethers, were moved by General 
Romulo's speech [Carlos Romulo, Philippine 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs]. While we do 
not believe that there is now sufficient agree- 
ment to make it useful to undertake a proc- 
ess of review and revision, the time may well 
come when a basis for agreement will exist. 
General Romulo continues his very great 
service to the international community by re- 
minding us from time to time to examine 
whether the requisite widespread agreement 
exists. 

In order to strike a balance between our 
important common interests in insuring that 
the charter is kept responsive to a changing 
world and in insuring that there is essen- 
tially overwhelming agreement to any 
changes in our basic ground rules, the 
United States believes that an appropriate 
step for this committee to recommend might 
be to request the Secretary General to under- 
take a detailed assessment of which of the 
suggestions for charter amendments so far 
received have broad support among the U.N. 
members and which of the goals behind such 
suggestions might be accomplished without 
charter revision. Member states which have 
net yet done so should be invited to submit 
their views on this subject. 

Although it is commonly understood that 
the percentage of states which reply to re- 
quests for their views on particular issues is 
usually not high, we are not dealing here 
with an ordinary matter. We are dealing 
here with the most basic and fundamental 
rules of international cooperation. It has 
been suggested that a reason for charter re- 
view is that only 51 of the present 138 mem- 
bers of the United Nations were present at 
San Francisco. Surely it is of even greater 
significance that only 38 of the present 138 
member states have so far submitted their 
views on suggestions regarding charter re- 
view. This is not an ordinary questionnaire ; 



we owe it to ourselves not to settle for such 
a small number of responses before under- 
taking a review exercise. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as we have 
repeatedly stated, the United States is fully 
prepared to maintain an open mind regard- 
ing modifications to the charter which are 
broadly supported. It is as much in our in- 
terest as that of any other state to insure 
that the charter is a viable, up-to-date, and 
respected document. We must not be afraid 
to consider appropriate modifications to that 
document; yet we must not confuse dissatis- 
faction with policies of states with inade- 
quacy of the charter. If there is broad desire 
to consider a particular amendment, let us 
in an appropriate forum undertake such a 
consideration as we have in the past. 

Let us first, however, take care first to de- 
termine that support. At the least, an assess- 
ment by the Secretary General of the states' 
views he has received and a concentrated ef- 
fort to obtain the comments of the vast ma- 
jority of member states should precede any 
such specific deliberations, much less the es- 
tablishment of an ad hoc committee. We shall 
vote in favor of L.lOOl ; we shall vote against 
L.1002 if it is put to a vote. The resolution 
contained in L.lOOl also commends itself to 
my delegation — not because it perfectly ex- 
presses our view but because we would hope 
it is a middle ground toward which the over- 
whelming majority could move.-' 

Let us, above all, do nothing to erode the 
foundations of the only international insti- 
tution concerned with peace and security 
which through its flexible adaptability to the 
contemporary needs of the world community 
has stood the test of over a quarter of a cen- 
tury. 



'Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1002, establishing an 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, was adopted by the committee on Dec. 9 by a 
roUcall vote of 77 to 20 (U.S.), with .32 abstentions, 
and by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by a recorded vote 
of 82 to 15 (U.S.), with 36 abstentions (A/RES/ 
3349 (XXIX)). Draft resolutions A/C.2/L.1001 and 
A/C.2/L.1011 were not put to the vote. 



January 27, 1975 



123 



U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals of World Population Plan of Action 



Folloiving are texts of a statement made 
in Committee II (Economic and Financial) 
of the U.N. General Assembly on December 
2 by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the General Assembly, and a 
statement ynade in plenary session of the As- 
sembly on December 17 by U.S. Representa- 
tive Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
committee on December 5 and by the Assem- 
bly on December 17. 

U.S. STATEMENTS 

Senator Percy, Commiffee II, December 2 

USUN press release 185 dated December 2 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
express the views of the U.S. delegation on 
the report of the World Population Confer- 
ence. ' 

The conference was convened in an at- 
tempt to focus the attention of the interna- 
tional community on one of the most com- 
plex problems of our time: spiraling global 
population growth. The difficulty in dealing 
with population problems lies in the fact 
that population questions are entirely inter- 
related with virtually every other problem 
that currently confronts people and nations. 
They cannot be dealt with in isolation. They 
must be considered within the context of 
other social and economic issues — health 
care, education, racial and sexual equality, 
housing, agriculture, nutrition, old age se- 
curity, religious and moral values, economic 
development, and others. 

The United States believes that the World 
Population Conference achieved real success 
and that its success is a direct result of the 



'U.N. doc. 5585; for U.S. statements at the World 
Population Conference at Bucharest Aug. 19-30 and 
an unofficial text of the World Population Plan of 
Action, see Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1974, p. 429. 



consideration of population in its social and 
economic context. The World Population 
Conference attained a most significant goal: 
It brought to the attention of all nations the 
concept that population is an integral as- 
pect of the quality of life of all people. 

Certainly the consensus of participating 
nations on the World Population Plan of Ac- 
tion was the major triumph of the confer- 
ence, and the United States is extremely 
hopeful that the plan will be accepted by this 
committee and subsequently by the General 
Assembly because of what we believe are the 
plan's many very positive and helpful rec- 
ommendations and resolutions. The United 
States believes that the plan of action con- 
tains provisions which will have immeasur- 
ably beneficial consequences for people ev- 
erywhere for generations to come. 

Although the United States does not in- 
tend to comment on each of the provisions 
of the plan of action, we do wish to high- 
light a few items which we feel are of spe- 
cial significance. 

The pronouncement within the plan of ac- 
tion which the United States views as the 
foundation for all the others is the afl^rma- 
tion of the basic human right of individuals 
"to decide freely and responsibly the number 
and spacing of their children and to have the 
information, education and means to do so." 
The United States strives to assure this ba- 
sic right in our own country, and we welcome 
its acceptance by the world community. 

Although the plan of action does not make 
outright recommendations of target dates 
for specific population goals, the concept of 
quantitative goals is included. The United 
States believes that the mention of quantita- 
tive goals to reduce mortality, increase life 
expectancy, and reduce fertility and rates of 
population growth will give those countries 
choosing to do so helpful targets at which to 
aim. The United States particularly wel- 



124 



Department of State Bulletin 



comes the concurrence of nations of all levels 
of development and all points of view on the 
inclusion of these possible goals in the World 
Population Plan of Action. 

While in Bucharest I stated my hope that 
the conference would take a clear and strong 
stand on the future role of women in devel- 
oped as well as developing nations. Perhaps 
the most unexpected positive development of 
the World Population Conference and one 
that the United States considers to be an 
outstanding accomplishment was the rela- 
tively easily reached agreement among na- 
tions that additional emphasis on the role of 
women in population policies and in eco- 
nomic and social development should be in- 
cluded in the plan of action. Thus one of the 
plan's objectives became: 

To promote the status of women and expansion of 
their roles, the full participation of women in the 
formulation and implementation of socio-economic 
policy including population policies, and the creation 
of awareness among all women of their current and 
potential roles in national life. 

A number of specific recommendations in 
the areas of education, planning and devel- 
opment, legislation, and family life are made 
that would allow countries to achieve this 
objective. The United States strongly sup- 
ports those recommendations. 

These provisions in the World Population 
Plan of Action are based on the recognition 
by all governments that an improved status 
for women will yield progress not only for 
individual women but for their societies as 
well. Development and implementation of 
population policies can most particularly 
benefit from expanded participation by 
women. The United States is making strong 
efforts to improve the status of women in 
our own country and welcomes this goal as 
part of the plan of action. 

The report of the World Population Con- 
ference and the plan of action reflect that 
the nations of the world are in agreement on 
a very important point: Population policies 
and goals cannot be achieved without accom- 
panying economic and social development. 

One of the major contributions of the de- 
bate at Bucharest was to focus attention on 
the reciprocal relationship — the interface be- 



tween population factors and development. 

The United States believes that the under- 
lying reasons for countries requesting assist- 
ance for their population or family planning 
programs is that such programs form a part 
— and only a part, but an essential part — of 
overall economic and social development ef- 
forts. The guidance of Bucharest is that any 
country wishing to succeed in either will be 
wise to press both. Many countries have 
found that despite their development efforts, 
population growth has caused their per cap- 
ita standard of living to stand still or even 
recede. They have in effect been running 
hard to stand still or have even lost ground. 
The balance of attention to each program will 
of course vary according to the situation of 
the individual country and according to its 
own sovereign determination. 

One of the major innovations of the World 
Population Plan of Action was its recom- 
mendation (Par. 31) that countries wishing 
to affect levels of fertility should give prior- 
ity to those factors of development that have 
a greater impact on fertility than others. 
This recommendation was based on much re- 
cent evidence and thinking that some fac- 
tors of development do have this effect. They 
are listed in paragraph 32. We agree with 
this concept and with the call of paragraph 
31 for priority in international coopei'ation 
for carrying out such strategies. 

The United States is sensitive to the con- 
tinuing large gap between the developed and 
developing nations with regard to levels of 
economic development. Because the United 
States recognizes the relationship between 
population growth rates and economic devel- 
opment, we affirm the inclusion in the World 
Population Plan of Action of emphasis on ef- 
ficient use of resources. The plan states: 

It is imperative that all countries, and within them 
all social sectors, should adapt themselves to more 
rational utilization of natural resources, without ex- 
cess, so that some are not deprived of what others 
waste. 

We further affirm that the United States 
will continue to seek to reduce wasteful con- 
sumption of resources in our own country 
and will encourage other nations to do the 
same. 



January 27, 1975 



125 



At Bucharest we regretted the lack of at- 
tention given to the role of population growth 
on present availability of food for the peo- 
ples of the developing countries — although 
the Deputy Director General of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization in his address 
there warned in the most somber terms: 

First, that action must be initiated now to reduce 
the rate of population growth if we are to have any 
chance at all of meeting the world's food needs 25 
years from now. 

Second, while family planning and population pol- 
icy are matters for individuals and governments, 
there is at the same time a clear need for interna- 
tional action. 

The documents prepared by FAO authori- 
ties for the Rome Conference [World Food 
Conference, November 5-16] recognize 
clearly that the main reason for the growing 
imbalance between the food supply and de- 
mand is the rate of population growth, which 
in the developing countries is twice as fast 
as in the developed world. They call on all 
countries to recognize urgently the gravity 
of the challenge to feed growing populations 
and to formulate and implement policies for 
population growth control. 

It was with these thoughts in mind that 
the Rome Conference adopted a special reso- 
lution calling on governments and people 
everywhere to support sound population pol- 
icies relevant to national needs within a 
strategy of development which would assure 
the right of all couples to decide the spacing 
and size of their own families. 

The conclusion is inescapable that the ef- 
forts already being made by many countries 
to reduce population growth rates must suc- 
ceed — and more rapidly than at present. At 
the same time, it is both fair and essen- 
tial that developed countries reduce their 
population growth and their consumption of 
foods produced by wasteful means in order 
that more can be available for those in grave 
need. 

Mr. Chairman, the word "population" de- 
rives from the Latin word "populus" for 
"people." The United States reaffirms the 
report of the World Population Conference 
and supports the provisions of the World 
Population Plan of Action, for we believe 



that they truly seek to improve the quality 
of life of the earth's people. We will con- 
tinue to support and cooperate in those ef- 
forts of the international community that 
approach that same goal. In this spirit, my 
delegation is pleased to be a cosponsor of 
draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.l.- 

Ambassador Ferguson, Plenary, December 17 

My delegation, with deep regret, abstained 
on draft resolution VI, ' this despite the fact 
that, as is well known, my delegation and my 
government have been committed to the study 
of world population questions for some time. 

We regret it very much, but the presence 
of a single paragraph, paragraph 5, in the 
draft resolution, which reads: 

Stresses that the implementation of the World 
Population Plan of Action should take full account 
of the Programme of Action on the Establishment 
of the New International Economic Order, and thus 
contribute to its implementation ; 

is the sole reason my delegation abstained. 
We object to the substance of the paragraph, 
and I must state on behalf of my delegation 
that we also very much regret the manner 
in which, procedurally, that paragraph was 
negotiated. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION^ 

The Geyieral Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 2211 (XXI) of 17 Decem- 
ber 1966 on population growth and economic devel- 
opment following the World Population Conference 
in 1965 and Economic and Social Council resolution 
1484 (XLVIII) of 3 April 1970 calling for a World 
Population Conference which would be the first held 
at the intergovernmental level. 

Recalling further that the Economic and Social 
Council in resolution 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974, 



= Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.2, as amend- 
ed, was adopted by the committee on Dec. 5 by a 
vote of 108 to 0, with 2 abstentions (U.S., Niger). 

' Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.2, as amend- 
ed, was recommended to the Assembly as draft reso- 
lution VI in part II of the Committee II report (U.N. 
doc. A/9886/ Add.l) on agenda item 12, "Report of 
the Economic and Social Council." 

*A/RES/3344 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly 
on Dec. 17 by a vote of 131 to 0, with 1 abstention 
(U.S.) (text from U.N. press release GA/5194). 



126 



Department of State Bulletin 



considered that the results of the Conference would 
constitute an important contribution to the prepara- 
tions for the special session of the General Assembly- 
devoted to development and international economic 
co-operation, 

Recalling further the decision adopted by the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council, at its resumed fifty-sev- 
enth session on 19 November 1974, on the report of 
the World Population Conference, 

Recalling further its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 
3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 containing the Declara- 
tion and the Programme of Action on the Establish- 
ment of a New International Economic Order, 

Greatly concerned with the gap between developed 
and developing countries and with the inequities and 
injustices still existing in international economic re- 
lations. 

Stressing that the formulation and implementa- 
tion of population policies are the sovereign right of 
each nation, and that such a right is to be exercised 
in accordance with national objectives and needs and 
without external interference, taking into account 
universal solidarity in order to improve the quality 
of life of the peoples of the world. 

Recognizing that population and development are 
interrelated and that, consequently, the basis for an 
effective solution of population problems is, above 
all, socio-economic transformation and development. 

Further recognizing that the consideration of pop- 
ulation problems cannot be reduced to the analysis 
of population trends exclusively. 

Believing that, in the formulation of population 
policies, consideration must be given, together with 
other economic and social factors, to the supplies and 
characteristics of natural resources, the quality of 
the environment, and particularly, to all aspects of 
food supply, and that attention must be given to the 
just distribution of resources and minimization of 
wasteful aspects of their use throughout the world. 

Having considered the report, resolutions, recom- 
mendations and the World Population Plan of Ac- 
tion adopted by the World Population Conference, 
held at Bucharest from 19 to 30 August 1974, 

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of 
the World Population Conference, including the reso- 
lutions and recommendations of the Conference and 
the World Population Plan of Action; 

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Government 
of Romania for its co-operation and gracious hospi- 
tality; 

3. Commends the Secretary-General and the Sec- 
retary-General of the World Population Conference 
for the successful organization of the Conference; 

4. Affirms that the World Population Plan of Ac- 
tion is an instrument of the international community 
for the promotion of economic development, quality 
of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
within the broader context of the internationally 
adopted strategies for national and international 
progress ; 



5. Stresses that the implementation of the World 
Population Plan of Action should take full account 
of the Programme of Action on the Establishment 
of the New International Economic Order, and thus 
contribute to its implementation; 

6. Invites Governments to consider the recommen- 
dations for action at the national level and to imple- 
ment population policies and programmes which 
they determine are appropriate; 

7. Calls upon the Population Commission and the 
governing bodies of the United Nations Development 
Programme, the United Nations Fund for Population 
Activities, the regional economic commissions, the 
specialized agencies and all other United Nations 
bodies which report to the Economic and Social 
Council to determine how each can best assist in the 
implementation of the World Population Plan of Ac- 
tion and on adjustments which may be necessary in 
their work programmes and to report thereon to the 
Economic and Social Council; 

8. Requests the Economic and Social Council, 
within the in-depth consideration of the report of the 
World Population Conference at its fifty-eighth ses- 
sion, to pay particular attention to the implementa- 
tion of the World Population Plan of Action, includ- 
ing the functions of the monitoring and review and 
appraisal of the Plan also at the regional level; 

9. Invites the Economic and Social Council to con- 
tinue to provide over-all policy guidance within the 
United Nations system on population-related matters 
and to this end to consider these issues on a regular 
basis, in a manner to be determined by it; 

10. Requests the Population Commission at its 
eighteenth session, within its competence, to report 
to the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth 
session on the implications of the World Population 
Conference, including the implications for the Pop- 
ulation Commission itself; 

11. Requests the Economic and Social Council at 
its fifty-eighth session to forward its views and rec- 
ommendations through the Preparatory Committee 
to the seventh special session and the thirtieth reg- 
ular session of the General Assembly; 

12. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the 
Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth ses- 
sion on ways and means of strengthening the over- 
all capacity of the relevant units of the Secretariat, 
within the existing framework to meet the need for 
a broad approach in the population field, consonant 
with the principles and the objectives of the World 
Population Plan of Action; 

13. Urges that assistance to developing countries 
should be increased in accordance with the goals of 
the Second United Nations Development Decade and 
that international assistance in the population field 
should be expanded, particularly to the United Na- 
tions Fund for Population Activities, for the proper 
implementation of the World Population Plan of Ac- 
tion. 



January 27, 1975 



127 



United States Calls for Renewal 
of World Commitment to UNRWA 

FoUoiving is a statement made in the 
Special Political Committee of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly on December 5 by U.S. Rep- 
resentative William E. Schaufele, Jr. 

USUN press release 188 dated December 5 

The United States has expressed each year 
in this forum its admiration and apprecia- 
tion for the dedicated and skillful work of the 
Commissioner General of UNRWA [United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales- 
tine Refugees in the Near East] and his 
associates in the face of difficult circum- 
stances. More than any time in UNRWA's 
history, the last 12 months have presented 
even greater challenges and have demanded 
even higher qualities of leadership and dedi- 
cation. War and its aftermath, the uncertain- 
ties of the ensuing search for peace, the 
internationalization of inflation, and short- 
ages of key commodities — all of these have 
presented the Commissioner General and his 
colleagues with increasingly complicated and 
interrelated financial and administrative 
problems. 

These problems are not abstract issues in 
management and financing. They are prob- 
lems of people — because the money which 
must be found and eff'ectively disbursed is 
the indispensable means to continue educa- 
tion programs, to provide or to improve hous- 
ing, and to assure necessary health services ; 
in short, to preserve for the promising if un- 
certain future even the limited material se- 
curity and the cautious hope which UNRWA 
in the past has been able to bring to those 
it serves. 

In the year ahead, UNRWA faces a finan- 
cial crisis of unprecedented seriousness. 
Other speakers here have called for recogni- 
tion of this crisis and for action to avert it. 
We share their apprehension. We intend to 
do our part, and we strongly urge others to 
do the same.' This is not an easy time for 
most nations to increase financial commit- 
ments of any kind. Many of us have difficulty 



enough simply to maintain the present level 
of financial outlays in both our national and 
international activities. Nevertheless, in view 
of drastic redistributions of the world's 
wealth in recent months, other governments 
with vastly increased resources can appro- 
priately do more than they felt able to do in 
the past. I strongly urge them to do so. 

Our basic humanitarian standards, and the 
principles of international life to which we 
are committed by the U.N. Charter, demand 
that we respond fully to this human require- 
ment to which the work of UNRWA is di- 
rected. Just as those standards and those 
principles were initially proclaimed and 
accepted voluntarily by each nation member 
of the United Nations, so it is right and 
proper that the response to them represented 
by UNRWA's program should be a volun- 
tary one. 

It is in this spirit that we introduce this 
resolution today. It acknowledges the contin- 
uing importance and justice of the human- 
itarian demands which UNRWA and the 
condition of the Palestinian refugees make 
on all, on every member of the international 
community. Finally, it renews UNRWA's 
tenure for another three years, a period in 
which we hope that its task will at last be 
fully accomplished. 

Taking all these elements into account 
this resolution represents a firm call for the 
renewal and reaffirmation of the commitment 
of each nation represented here to insure 
that UNRWA will in fact be able to carry 
out its work. The commitment is clear. It 
obligates each of us, individually and collec- 
tively, to act to fulfill it.- 



' On Dec. 3 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the General Assembly for the Announcement of 
Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations Re- 
lief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East, Ambassador Schaufele announced 
the U.S. pledge of $24,940,000 to UNRWA for calen- 
dar year 1975. For his statement in the ad hoc com- 
mittee, see USUN press release 186 dated Dec. 3. 

'The U.S. draft resolution (A/SPC/L.317) was 
adopted by the committee on Dec. 6 by a vote of 106 
to 0, with 2 abstentions, and by the Assembly on 
Dec. 17 by a vote of 122 to 0, with 3 abstentions 
(A/RES/3331A (XXIX)). 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements 
on Pacific Fisheries 

Pr-ess release 538 dated December 18 

Representatives of the United States and 
Japan reached agreement on December 13 
on two fishery agreements dealing primarily 
with fishing in the northeastern Pacific and 
the Bering Sea following discussions held 
in Tokyo November 15-December 13. Thomas 
A. Clingan, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State for Oceans and International En- 
vironmental and Scientific Affairs, initialed 
for the United States, and Hiromu Fukada, 
Deputy Director General, American Affairs 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initialed 
for Japan. 

The new agreements do not change the 
stipulation in previous agreements, first 
signed in 1967, that Japan will refrain from 
fishing within the nine-mile contiguous fish- 
ery zone of the United States, except in cer- 
tain selected areas, primarily in the Aleutian 
Islands. 

In order to preserve the fish resources of 
the northern Pacific, the first new agreement 
establishes new and better balances between 
fishing and the condition and size of fishery 
resources in the northeastern Pacific and 
eastern Bering Sea. The principal features 
of this new agreement include : 

1. In order to protect declining pollock re- 
sources, the Japanese pollock catch in the 
eastern Bering Sea will be reduced to 1.1 
million metric tons from the over 1.5 million 
metric tons of pollock Japan caught in 1973. 

2. For conservation purposes, controls will 
also be placed on the harvest of other fin- 
fishes, such as Pacific Ocean perch, in both 
the Bering Sea and the northeastern Pacific 
Ocean in areas of special concern to the U.S. 
fisheries. These controls are being imple- 



mented by means of catch limitations and 
area and time closures. 

3. The agreement stipulates that Japan 
may fish within the contiguous zone of the 
United States and conduct loading and trans- 
fer operations in certain specified areas. In 
return, Japan has agreed to refrain from 
fishing in certain areas of the high seas dur- 
ing prescribed periods in order to avoid con- 
flicts with American fishermen arising out 
of differences in types of fishing gear. 

4. Japan has also agreed to adopt pro- 
cedures and measures to reduce and control 
incidental catches of king and tanner crabs 
in their trawl fisheries. As one means of 
achieving this objective, Japanese fishermen 
will equip their trawl gear with bobbins 
during months when crabs are concentrated 
to reduce incidental crab catches. 

The second agreement involves fishing for 
king and tanner crabs in the eastern Bering 
Sea. These fisheries are important to both 
the United States and Japan. Under the 
new agreement, Japan's king crab quota is 
reduced by nearly 60 percent, from 700,000 
to 300,000 crabs (953 metric tons). Japan's 
tanner crab quota (14 million in 1974) is 
reduced by a smaller percentage, but that 
portion of their total quota which can be 
taken in the traditional grounds, which are 
also fished by U.S. fishermen, was reduced by 
a substantial amount (about 70-80 percent). 

As a result of the new arrangements, the 
United States will become the principal 
harvester of crab resources in the traditional 
grounds in the southeastern Bering Sea. It 
should be noted that the United States claims 
that both the king and tanner crabs are 
"creatures of the U.S. continental shelf" and 
that we have complete jurisdiction over these 
resources. 

The two countries also emphasized the 
need to take all possible measures to refrain 
from polluting the seas and to avoid dumping 
undesirable products in the water. Both 
governments also agreed to inform each other 
of lost fishing gear which may create danger 
to navigation. 



January 27, 1975 



129 



The new arrangements provide for en- 
forcement measures more stringent than ever 
implemented before, with both governments 
agreeing to cooperate fully in their enforce- 
ment efforts. In this connection, U.S. ob- 
servers will be provided the opportunity to 
observe the conduct of enforcement and to 
work closely with their counterparts from 
Japan. 

The U.S. delegation also included Robert 
Schoning, Director, National Marine Fish- 
eries Service, National Oceanic and Atmos- 
pheric Administration, Department of Com- 
merce, and fishing industry representatives 
from Alaska and the Pacific Northwest, as 
well as experts from the concerned Federal 
and state government agencies. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 
5284, 7668. 

Acceptance deposited: Mauritius, December 31, 
1974. 

Disputes 

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 

Ratification deposited: The Gambia, December 27, 
1974. 

Exhibitions 

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 
1928, as amended (TIAS 6548, 6549), relating to 
international expositions, with appendix and an- 
nex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.^ 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, November 
25, 1974. 

Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En- 
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United 
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: Grenada, December 4, 1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regu- 
lating the distribution of narcotic drugs, with pro- 
tocol of signature, as amended by the protocol 



signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946 (TIAS 
1671, 1859). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered 
into force July 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1543. 
Xotification of succession : Lesotho, November 4, 

1974. 
Protocol bringing under international control drugs 
outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 
1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating 
the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543), 
as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Suc- 
cess on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). 
Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into 
force December 1, 1949; for the United States 
September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308. 
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 

1974. 

Telecommunications 

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. En- 
tered into force September 1, 1974." 
Notification of approval: Jamaica, October 4, 
1974. 

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pro- 
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into 
force September 1, 1974.- 

Notification of approval: Jamaica, October 4, 
1974. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid con- 
vention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, 
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Proclaimed bii the Presidc7it : December 31, 1974. 

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TLA.S 7144). Done at Washington 
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, 
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Proclaimed by the President : December 31, 1974. 



BILATERAL 

Brazil 

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement 
of May 9, 1972, as extended (TIAS 7603, 7770, 
7862), concerning shrimp. Eff"ected by exchange of 
notes at Brasilia December 30 and 31, 1974. En- 
tered into force December 31, 1974. 

Canada 

Agreement extending the agreement of May 18 and 
June 28 and 29, 1965, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 5826, 6646, 7102), relating to a seismic re- 
search program known as VELA UNIFORM. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Ottawa August 14 
and December 19, 1974. Entered into force De- 
cember 19, 1974; effective July 1, 1974. 



' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



Japan 

Convention for the protection of migratory birds and 
birds in danger of extinction, and their environ- 
ment, with annex. Signed at Tokyo March 4, 1972. 
Entered into force September 19, 1974. 
Proclaimed by the President: December 31, 1974. 

Agreement relating to salmon fishing in waters con- 
tiguous to the United States territorial sea, with 
agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington December 20, 1972. Entered into force 
December 20, 1972. TIAS 7528. 
Terminated : December 24, 1974. 

Agreement concerning salmon fishing in waters con- 
tiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, 
with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. Entered into 
force December 24, 1974. 

Agreement regarding the king and tanner crab fish- 
eries in the eastern Bering Sea, with appendix, 
agreed minutes, and Japanese note. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington December 20, 
1972. Entered into force December 20, 1972. TIAS 
7527. 
Terminated : January 1, 1975. 

Agreement concerning king and tanner crab fisher- 
ies in the eastern Bering Sea, with appendix, 
agreed minutes, and related notes. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. En- 
tered into force December 24, 1974; effective Jan- 
uary 1, 1975. 

Agreement concerning certain fisheries off the coast 
of the United States, with related note and agreed 
minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo 
December 24, 1974. Entered into force December 
24, 1974; effective January 1, 1975. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul De- 
cember 7, 1974. Entered into force December 7, 
1974. 

Malaysia 

-Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of September 8, 1970, as amended, relating to 
trade in wool and man-made fiber textile products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur 
December 23 and 27, 1974. Entered into force 
December 27, 1974. 

Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of September 8, 1970, relating to trade in cotton 
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala 
Lumpur December 23 and 27, 1974. Entered into 
force December 27, 1974. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to a training program for Mexi- 
can helicopter pilots and mechanics as part of U.S.- 
Mexican cooperative efforts to reduce traffic in il- 
legal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico September 30, 1974. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 30, 1974. 

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance 
to Mexico in narcotics enforcement training ac- 
tivities. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico 



December 4, 1974. Entered into force December 4, 
1974. 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 24, 1974 
(TIAS 7907) providing additional helicopters and 
related assistance to Mexico in support of its ef- 
forts to curb production and traffic in illegal nar- 
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico 
December 4, 1974. Entered into force December 4, 
1974. 

Agreement relating to cooperative arrangements to 
support Mexican efl'orts to curb the illegal traffic 
in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico December 11, 1974. Entered into force De- 
cember 11, 1974. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending the following: agreement of 
June 21, 1973, on certain fishery problems on the 
high seas in the western areas of the middle At- 
lantic Ocean (TIAS 7664); and agreements of 
February 21, 1973, (1) on certain fisheries prob- 
lems in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean 
off the coast of the United States of America 
(TIAS 7573), (2) relating to fishing operations in 
the northeastern Pacific Ocean (TIAS 7572), and 
(3) relating to fishing for king and tanner crab 
(TIAS 7571). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington December 31, 1974. Entered into force 
December 31, 1974. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on 
Far East and Australasia Released 

Press release 541 dated December 23 

The Department of State released on December 30 
volume VI in the series "Foreign Relations of the 
United States" for the year 1948. This volume is 
entitled "The Far East and Australasia." 

Two volumes on China for the year 1948 (volumes 
VII and VIII) were released in August and Decem- 
ber 1973, so that the publication of volume VI com- 
pletes the issuance in the series of material on the 
Far East for 1948. 

This volume of 1,379 pages contains previously un- 
published documentation showing U.S. policy on 
many important topics including nationalist opposi- 
tion to restoration of French rule in Indochina and 
Netherlands rule in the East Indies (Indonesia), as 
well as lengthy sections on occupation and control of 
Japan and events leading to the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea. 

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office, 



January 27, 1975 



131 



Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VI (De- 
partment of State publication 8681; GPO cat. no. 
S l.l:948/v. VI) may be obtained for $14.40 (domes- 
tic postpaid). Check.s or money orders should be 
made out to the Superintendent of Documents and 
should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Snperintevdent of Docnmevts, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the same 
address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent 
of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown 
below, tvhich include domestic postage, are subject 
to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock— at least 140— $21.80; 1-year sub- 
scription service for appro.ximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $2.3.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 30(' each. 



Austria 

Bolivia 

China, People's Republic of 

Cuba .... 

Ireland . . 

Malta . . . 

Mauritius . . 

Qatar . . . 

South Viet-Nam 

Yemen, People's Democratic 
Republic of 



Cat. No. S1.123:AU 7 
Pub. 7955 6 pp. 

Cat. No. S1.123:B 63 
Pub. 8032 7 pp. 

Cat. No. S1.123:C 44 
Pub. 7751 11 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:C 89 
Pub. 8347 8 pp. 

Cat. No. S1.123:IR 2 
Pub. 7974 5 pp. 
Cat.No. S1.123:M29/6 
Pub. 8220 4 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:M 44 
Pub. 8023 5 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:Q 1 
Pub. 7906 4 pp. 

Cat. No. S1.123:V 67 
Pub. 7933 11 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:508Y/ 
Pub. 8170 5 pp. 



An Action Program for World Investment. Re- 
marks by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic and Business Affairs, at the 
National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Busi- 
ness Executives held at the Department of State 
in Washington, D.C, September 5 and 6, 1974. Pub. 
8780. General Foreign Policy Series 289. 14 pp. 35''-. 
(Cat. No. 81.71:289). 



Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the I'nited States-Spain Cooperation Agree- 
ment. Agreement with Spain and the International 
.\tomic Energy .\gency amending the agreement of 
December 9, 1966. TIAS 7856. 5 pp. 25<'-. (Cat. No. 
89.10:7856). 

Safeguarding of Classified Information. Agreement 
with Iran. TIAS 7857. 5 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
7857). 

Defense — Relinquishment of Certain Land at Camp 
Wallace. Agreement with the Philippines. TI.AS 
7858. 2 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. S9.10:7858). 

Suez Canal — Salvage or Removal of Navigational 
Hazards. Arrangement with Egvpt. TIAS 7859. 4 pp. 
25r-. (Cat. No. S9.10:7859). 

.Agricultural Commodities. .Agreement with Guinea 
amending the agreement of May 8, 1974, as amended. 
TIAS 7860. 3 pp. 25--. (Cat. No. S9. 10:7860). 

Pollution — Contingency Plans for Spills of Oil and 
Other Noxious Substances. .Agreement with Canada. 
TIAS 7861. 4 pp. 25r. (Cat. No. 89.10:7861). 

Fisheries — Shrimp. Agreement with Brazil extend- 
ing the agreement of May 9, 1972, as extended. TIAS 
7862. 2 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. 89.10:7862). 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on December 13 confirmed the fol- 
lowing nominations: 

Richard B. Parker to be .Ambassador to the Demo- 
cratic and Popular Republic of .Algeria. 

Dixy Lee Ray to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State for Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs. 

Leonard F. Walentynowicz to be Administrator, 
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. 

The Senate on December 19 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

Monroe Leigh to be Legal Adviser of the Depart- 
ment of State. 

Michael A. Samuels to be .Ambassador to Sierra 
Leone. 

William Saxbe to be Ambassador to India. 

Thomas J. Scotes to be Ambassador to the Yemen 
Arab Republic. 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 27, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1857 



Algeria. Parker confirmed as Ambassador . 132 

Aviation. Department Welcomes TWA-Swiss- 

air Agreement on Airline Capacity . . . 113 

Congress 

Confirmations (Leigh, Parker, Ray, Samuels, 

Saxbe, Scotes, Walentynowicz) 132 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 Signed Into 

Law (Ford) 106 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Leigh, Parker, Ray, Samuels, Saxbe, 
Scotes, Walentynowicz) 132 

Economic Affairs 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business 

Week Magazine 97 

U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on Pacific 
Fisheries 129 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

Business Week Magazine 97 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

Business Week Magazine 97 

Foreign Aid. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 

Signed Into Law (Ford) 106 

India. Saxbe confirmed as Ambassador . . . 132 

Japan. U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on 

Pacific Fisheries 129 

Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business 

Week Magazine 97 

United States Calls for Renewal of World 

Commitment to UNRWA (Schaufele) . . 128 

Narcotics Control. International Narcotics 
Control: A High-Priority Program (Vance) 108 

Population. U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals 
of World Population Plan of Action (Fer- 
guson, Percy, text of resolution) .... 124 

Presidential Documents. Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1974 Signed Into Law 106 

Publications 

GPO Sales Publications 132 

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Far 
East, Australasia Released 131 

Refugees. United States Calls for Renewal of 
World Commitment to UNRWA (Schau- 
fele) 128 

.Sierra Leone. Samuels confirmed as Ambas- 
sador 132 

Switzerland. Department Welcomes TWA- 

Swissair Agreement on Airline Capacity . 113 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 130 

U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on Pacific 

Fisheries 129 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

Business Week Magazine 97 

United Nations 

United States Calls for Renewal of World 

Commitment to UNRWA (Schaufele) . . 128 



U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of 

the U.N. Charter (Rosenstock) 120 

U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals of World 
Population Plan of Action (Fei-guson, 
Percy, text of resolution) 124 

U.S. Warns That Present Voting Trends May 
Overshadow Positive Achievements of the 
United Nations (Scali, texts of resolutions) 114 

Yemen Arab Republic. Scotes confirmed as 
Ambassador 132 



Name Index 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 124 

Ford, President 106 

Kissinger, Secretary 97 

Leigh, Monroe 132 

Parker, Richard B 132 

Percy, Charles H 124 

Ray, Dixy Lee 132 

Rosenstock, Robert 120 

Samuels, Michael -A. 132 

Saxbe, William 132 

Scali, John 114 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 128 

Scotes, Thomas J 132 

Vance, Sheldon B 108 

Walentynowicz, Leonard F 132 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 6—12 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 6 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 538 
of December 18, 541 and 543 of December 23, 
and 2 of January 2. 

No. Date Subject 

*5 1/6 Study Group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCITT, Feb. 
13. 

*6 1/7 Study Group 8 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCIR, Feb. 
13. 

*7 1/7 Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. 
National Committee for the 
CCIR, Feb. 6. 

*8 1/8 Laise appointed Director General 
of the Foreign Service. 

*9 1/8 Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee of the CCITT, 
Feb. 6. 

*10 1/10 Soviet journalists visit U.S., Jan. 
10-24. 

til 1/10 Kissinger, Sultan of Oman: ex- 
change of toasts, Jan. 9. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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'.3: 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1858 



February 3, 1975 



THE STATE OF THE UNION 
Excerpts From President Ford's Address Before the Congress 133 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 14 139 

U.S. VOTES AGAINST CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS 

AND DUTIES OF STATES 
Statement by Senator Percy and Text of U.N. Resolution H.6 

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPROVES DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION 
U.S. Statements and Text of Resolution 155 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

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the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B [J L L E T I 



i\ 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1858 
February 3, 1975 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau ott 
Public Affairs, provides the public ani 
interested agencies of the government, 
with information on developments iri 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
t/ie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



The State of the Union 



Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpts) 



Economic disruptions we and others are 
experiencing stem in part from the fact that 
the world price of petroleum has quadrupled 
in the last year. 

But in all honesty, we cannot put all of 
the blame on the oil-exporting nations. We, 
the United States, are not blameless. Our 
growing dependence upon foreign sources 
has been adding to our vulnerability for 
years and years, and we did nothing to pre- 
pare ourselves for such an event as the 
embargo of 1973. 

During the 1960's, this country had a sur- 
plus capacity of crude oil which we were 
able to make available to our trading part- 
ners whenever there was a disruption of 
supply. This surplus capacity enabled us to 
influence both supplies and prices of crude 
oil throughout the world. Our excess capac- 
ity neutralized any effort at establishing 
an effective cartel, and thus the rest of the 
world was assured of adequate supplies of 
oil at reasonable prices. 

By 1970 our surplus capacity had van- 
ished, and as a consequence, the latent 
power of the oil cartel could emerge in full 
force. Europe and Japan, both heavily de- 
pendent on imported oil, now struggle to 
keep their economies in balance. Even the 
United States, our country, which is far 
more self-sufficient than most other indus- 
trial countries, has been put under serious 
pressure. 

I am proposing a program which will 
begin to restore our country's surplus ca- 



' Delivered on Jan. 15 (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 20). 



pacity in total energy. In this way we will 
be able to assure ourselves reliable and ade- 
quate energy and help foster a new world 
energy stability for other major consuming 
nations. 

But this nation, and in fact the world, 
must face the prospect of energy difficulties 
between now and 1985. This program will 
impose burdens on all of us, with the aim 
of reducing our consumption of energy and 
increasing our production. Great attention 
has been paid to the considerations of fair- 
ness, and I can assure you that the burden 
will not fall more harshly on those less able 
to bear them. 

I am recommending a plan to make us 
invulnerable to cutoffs of foreign oil. It will 
require sacrifices, but it — and this is most 
important — it will work. 

I have set the following national energy 
goals to assure that our future is as secure 
and as productive as our past: 

— First, we must reduce oil imports by 
1 million barrels per day by the end of this 
year and by 2 million barrels per day by the 
end of 1977. 

— Second, we must end vulnerability to 
economic disruption by foreign suppliers by 
1985. 

— Third, we must develop our energy tech- 
nology and resources so that the United 
States has the ability to supply a significant 
share of the energy needs of the free world 
by the end of this century. 

To attain these objectives, we need im- 
mediate action to cut imports. Unfortunate- 
ly, in the short term there are only a limited 
number of actions which can increase do- 



February 3, 1975 



133 



mestic supply. I will press for all of them. 

I urge quick action on the necessary legis- 
lation to allow commercial production at the 
Elk Hills, California, Naval Petroleum Re- 
serve. In order that we make greater use 
of domestic coal resources, I am submitting 
amendments to the Energy Supply and En- 
vironmental Coordination Act, which will 
greatly increase the number of power plants 
that can be promptly converted to coal. 

Obviously, voluntary conservation con- 
tinues to be essential, but tougher programs 
are needed, and needed now. Therefore I 
am using Presidential powers to raise the 
fee on all imported crude oil and petroleum 
products. 

The crude oil fee level will be increased 
$1 per barrel on February 1, by $2 per bar- 
rel on March 1, and by $3 per barrel on 
April 1. I will take action to reduce undue 
hardships on any geographical region. The 
foregoing are interim administrative actions. 
They will be rescinded when the broader 
but necessary legislation is enacted. 

To that end, I am requesting the Congress 
to act within 90 days on a more compre- 
hensive energy tax program. It includes: 
excise taxes and import fees totaling $2 per 
barrel on product imports and on all crude 
oil, deregulation of new natural gas, and 
enactment of a natural gas excise tax. I 
plan to take Presidential initiative to de- 
control the price of domestic crude oil on 
April 1. I urge the Congress to enact a 
windfall profits tax by that date to insure 
that oil producers do not profit unduly. 

The sooner Congress acts the more effec- 
tive the oil conservation program will be 
and the quicker the Federal revenues can be 
returned to our people. 

I am prepared to use Presidential author- 
ity to limit imports, as necessary, to guaran- 
tee success. 

I want you to know that before deciding 
on my energy conservation program, I con- 
sidered rationing and higher gasoline taxes 
as alternatives. In my judgment, neither 
would achieve the desired results, and both 
would produce unacceptable inequities. 

A massive program must be initiated to 



increase energy supply, to cut demand, and 
provide new standby emergency programs 
to achieve the independence we want by 
1985. The largest part of increased oil pro- 
duction must come from new frontier areas 
on the outer continental shelf and from the 
Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 in Alaska. 
It is the intent of this administration to 
move ahead with exploration, leasing, and 
production on those frontier areas of the 
outer continental shelf where the environ- 
mental risks are acceptable. 

Use of our most abundant domestic re- 
source — coal — is severely limited. We must 
strike a reasonable compromise on environ- 
mental concerns with coal. I am submitting 
Clean Air [Act] Amendments which will 
allow greater coal use without sacrificing 
clean air goals. 

I vetoed the strip-mining legislation passed 
by the last Congress. With appropriate 
changes, I will sign a revised version when 
it comes to the White House. 

I am proposing a number of actions to 
energize our nuclear power program. I will 
submit legislation to expedite nuclear leas- 
ing [licensing] and the rapid selection of 
sites. 

In recent months, utilities have canceled 
or postponed over 60 percent of planned nu- 
clear expansion and 30 percent of planned 
additions to nonnuclear capacity. Financing 
problems for that industry are worsening. 
I am therefore recommending that the one- 
year investment tax credit of 12 percent be 
extended an additional two years to specifi- 
cally speed the construction of power plants 
that do not use natural gas or oil. I am also 
submitting proposals for selective reform of 
state utility commission regulations. 

To provide the critical stability for our 
domestic energy production in the face of 
world price uncertainty, I will request legis- 
lation to authorize and require tariff' import 
quotas or price floors to protect our energy 
prices at levels which will achieve energy 
independence. 

Increasing energy supplies is not enough. 
We must take additional steps to cut long- 
term consumption. 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



I therefore propose to the Congress legis- 
lation to make thermal efficiency standards 
mandatory for all new buildings in the 
United States; a new tax credit of up to 
$150 for those homeowners who install insu- 
lation equipment ; the establishment of an 
energy conservation program to help low- 
income families purchase insulation supplies ; 
and legislation to modify and defer auto- 
motive pollution standards for five years 
which will enable us to improve automobile 
gas mileage by 40 percent by 1980. 

These proposals and actions, cumulatively, 
can reduce our dependence on foreign energy 
supplies from 3 to 5 million barrels per day 
by 1985. 

To make the United States invulnerable 
to foreign disruption, I propose standby 
emergency legislation and a strategic stor- 
age program of 1 billion barrels of oil for 
domestic needs and 300 million barrels for 
national defense purposes. 

I will ask for the funds needed for energy 
research and development activities. I have 
established a goal of 1 million barrels of 
synthetic fuels and shale-oil production per 
day by 1985, together with an incentive pro- 
gram to achieve it. 

I have a veiy deep belief in America's 
capabilities. Within the next 10 years, my 
program envisions 200 nuclear power plants, 
250 major new coal mines, 150 major coal- 
fired power plants, 30 major new [oil] re- 
fineries, 20 major new synthetic fuel plants, 
the drilling of many thousands of new oil 
wells, the insulation of 18 million homes, and 
the manufacturing and the sale of millions of 
new automobiles, trucks, and buses that use 
much less fuel. 

I happen to believe that we can do it. In 
another crisis, the one in 1942, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt said this country 
would build 60,000 [50,000] military air- 
craft. By 1943, production in that program 
had reached 125,000 aircraft annually. They 
did it then. We can do it now. 

If the Congress and the American people 
will work with me to attain these targets, 
they will be achieved and will be surpassed. 



Now let me turn, if I might, to the inter- 
national dimension of the present crisis. At 
no time in our peacetime history has the 
state of the nation depended more heavily 
on the state of the world; and seldom, if 
ever, has the state of the world depended 
more heavily on the state of our nation. 

The economic distress is global. We will 
not solve it at home unless we help to 
remedy the profound economic dislocation 
abroad. World trade and monetary struc- 
ture provides markets, energy, food, and 
vital raw material for all nations. This 
international system is now in jeopardy. 

This nation can be proud of significant 
achievements in recent years in solving 
problems and crises; the Berlin agreement, 
the SALT agreements, our new relationship 
with China, the unprecedented efi'orts in the 
Middle East are immen.sely encouraging, but 
the world is not free from crisis. 

In a world of 150 nations — where nuclear 
technology is proliferating and regional con- 
flicts continue — international security can- 
not be taken for granted. 

So, let there be no mistake about it ; inter- 
national cooperation is a vital factor of our 
lives today. This is not a moment for the 
American people to turn inward. More than 
ever before, our own well-being depends on 
America's determination and America's lead- 
ership in the whole wide world. 

We are a great nation — spiritually, politi- 
cally, militarily, diplomatically, and econom- 
ically. America's commitment to interna- 
tional security has sustained the safety of 
allies and friends in many areas — in the 
Middle East, in Europe, and in Asia. Our 
turning away would unleash new instabili- 
ties, new dangers, around the globe, which 
in turn would threaten our own security. 

At the end of World War II, we turned 
a similar challenge into an historic oppor- 
tunity, and I might add, an historic achieve- 
ment. An old order was in disarray; politi- 
cal and economic institutions were shattered. 
In that period, this nation and its partners 
built new institutions, new mechanisms of 
mutual support and cooperation. Today, as 
then, we face an historic opportunity. 



February 3, 1975 



135 



If we act imaginatively and boldly, as we 
acted then, this period will in retrospect be 
seen as one of the great creative moments 
of our nation's history. The whole world is 
watching to see how we respond. 

A resurgent American economy would do 
more to restore the confidence of the world 
in its own future than anjlhing else we can 
do. The program that this Congress passes 
can demonstrate to the world that w-e have 
started to put our own house in order. If 
we can show that this nation is able and 
willing to help other nations meet the com- 
mon challenge, it can demonstrate that the 
United States will fulfill its responsibilities 
as a leader among nations. 

Quite frankly, at stake is the future of 
industrialized democracies, which have per- 
ceived their destiny in common and sus- 
tained it in common for 30 years. 

The developing nations are also at a turn- 
ing point. The poorest nations see their 
hopes of feeding their hungry and develop- 
ing their societies shattered by the economic 
crisis. The long-term economic future for 
the producers of raw materials also depends 
on cooperative solutions. 

Our relations with the Communist coun- 
tries are a basic factor of the world environ- 
ment. We must seek to build a long-term 
basis for coexistence. We will stand by our 
principles. We will stand by our interests. 
We will act firmly when challenged. The 
kind of a world we want depends on a broad 
policy of creating mutual incentives for re- 
straint and for cooperation. 

As we move forward to meet our global 
challenges and opportunities, we must have 
the tools to do the job. 

Our military forces are strong and ready. 
This military strength deters aggression 
against our allies, stabilizes our relations 
with former adversaries, and protects our 
homeland. Fully adequate conventional and 
strategic forces cost many, many billions, 
but these dollars are sound insurance for our 
safety and for a more peaceful world. 

Military strength alone is not sufficient. 
Effective diplomacy is also essential in pre- 
venting conflict in building world under- 



standing. The Vladivostok negotiations with 
the Soviet Union represent a major step in 
moderating strategic arms competition. My 
recent discussions with the leaders of 
the Atlantic community, Japan, and South 
Korea have contributed to meeting the com- 
mon challenge. 

But we have serious problems before us 
that require cooperation between the Presi- 
dent and the Congress. By the Constitution 
and tradition, the e.xecution of foreign policy 
is the responsibility of the President. In 
recent years, under the stress of the Viet- 
Nam war, legislative restrictions on the 
President's ability to execute foreign policy 
and military decisions have proliferated. As 
a Member of the Congress I opposed some, 
and I approved others. As President I wel- 
come the advice and cooperation of the 
House and the Senate. 

But if our foreign policy is to be success- 
ful, we cannot rigidly restrict in legislation 
the ability of the President to act. The con- 
duct of negotiations is ill suited to such limi- 
tations. Legislative restrictions intended for 
the best motives and purposes can have the 
opposite result, as we have seen most re- 
cently in our trade relations with the Soviet 
Union. 

For my part, I pledge this administration 
will act in the closest consultation with the 
Congress as we face delicate situations and 
troubled times throughout the globe. 

When I became President only five months 
ago, I promised the last Congress a policy 
of communication, conciliation, compromise, 
and cooperation. I renew that pledge to the 
new Members of this Congress. 

Let me sum it up. America needs a new 
direction, which I have sought to chart here 
today, a change of course which will put the 
unemployed back to work, increase real in- 
come and production, restrain the growth 
of Federal Government spending, achieve 
energy independence, and advance the cause 
of world understanding. 

We have the ability. We have the know- 
how. In partnership with the American 
people, we will achieve these objectives. As 
our 200th anniversary approaches, we owe 



136 



Department of State Bulletin 



it to ourselves and to posterity to rebuild 
our political and economic strength. 

Let us make America once again and for 
centuries more to come what it has so long 
been, a stronghold and a beacon light of 
liberty for the whole world. 



President Ford Signs Trade Act 
of 1974 

Remarks by Presideyit Ford ' 

Mr. Vice President, distinguished membei's 
of the Cabinet, Members of the Congress, in- 
cluding the leadership, ladies and gentlemen: 

The Trade Act of 1974, which I am sign- 
ing into law today, will determine for many, 
many years American trade relations with 
the rest of the world. This is the most sig- 
nificant trade legislation passed by the Con- 
gress since the beginning of trade agreement 
programs some four decades ago. 

It demonstrates our deep commitment to 
an open world economic order and interde- 
pendence as essential conditions of mutual 
economic health. The act will enable Amer- 
icans to work with others to achieve expan- 
sion of the international flow of goods and 
services, thereby increasing economic well- 
being throughout the world. 

It will thus help reduce international ten- 
sions caused by trade disputes. It will mean 
more and better jobs for American workers, 
with additional purchasing power for the 
American consumer. 

There are four very basic elements to this 
Trade Act: authority to negotiate further re- 
ductions and elimination of trade barriers ; a 
mandate to work with other nations to im- 
prove the world trading system and thereby 
avoid impediments to vital services as well 
as markets ; reform of U.S. laws involving 
injurious and unfair competition; and im- 
provement of our economic relations with 



' Made in the East Room at the White House on 
Jan. 3 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents dated Jan. 6). As enacted, the bill 
(H.R. 10710) is Public Law 93-618, approved Jan. 3. 



nonmarket economies and developing coun- 
tries. 

Our broad negotiating objectives under 
this act are to obtain more open and equita- 
ble market access for traded goods and serv- 
ices, to assure fair access to essential sup- 
plies at reasonable prices, to provide our 
citizens with an increased opportunity to 
purchase goods produced abroad, and to seek 
modernization of the international trading 
system. 

Under the act, the administration will pro- 
vide greater relief for American industry 
suffering from increased imports and more 
effective adjustment assistance for workers, 
firms, and communities. 

The legislation allows us to act quickly and 
to effectively counter foreign import actions 
which unfairly place American labor and in- 
dustry at a disadvantage in the world mar- 
ket. It authorizes the administration, under 
certain conditions, to extend nondiscrimina- 
tory tariff treatment to countries whose im- 
ports do not currently receive such treat- 
ment in the United States. 

This is an important part of our commer- 
cial and overall relations with Communist 
countries. Many of the act's provisions in 
this area are very complex and may well 
prove difficult to implement. I will of course 
abide by the terms of the act, but I must ex- 
press my reservations about the wisdom of 
legislative language that can only be seen 
as objectionable and discriminatory by other 
sovereign nations. 

The United States now joins all other ma- 
jor industrial countries, through this legis- 
lation, in a system of tariff preferences for 
imports from developing countries. 

Although I regret the rigidity and the un- 
fairness in these provisions, especially with 
respect to certain oil-producing countries, I 
am now undertaking the first steps to imple- 
ment this preference system by this summer. 
Most developing countries are clearly eligi- 
ble, and I hope that still broader participa- 
tion can be possible by that time. 

As I have indicated, this act contains cer- 
tain provisions to which we have some ob- 
jection and others which vary somewhat 



February 3, 1975 



137 



from the language we might have preferred. 
In the spirit of cooperation, spirit of cooper- 
ation with the Congress, I will do my best to 
work out any necessary accommodations. 

The world economy will continue under 
severe strain in the months ahead. This act 
enables the United States to constructively 
and to positively meet challenges in interna- 
tional trade. It affords us a basis for coop- 
eration with all trading nations. Alone, the 
problems of each can only multiply ; together, 
no difficulties are insurmountable. 

We must succeed ! I believe we will. 

This is one of the most important meas- 
ures to come out of the 93d Congress. I wish 
to thank very, very generously and from the 
bottom of my heart the Members of Con- 
gress and members of this administration — 
as well as the public — who contributed so 
much to this legislation's enactment. At this 
point I will sign the bill. 



Oil Cargo Preference Bill 
Vetoed by President Ford 

Memorayidum of Disapproval ' 

I am withholding my approval from H.R. 
8193, the Energy Transportation Security 
Act of 1974. 

The bill would initially require that 20 
peixent of the oil imported into the United 
States be carried on U.S. flag tankers. The 
percentage would increase to 30 percent af- 
ter June 30, 1977. 

This bill would have the most serious con- 
sequences. It would have an adverse impact 



' Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 30 (text from White 
House press release). 



on the United States economy and on our 
foreign relations. It would create serious in- 
flationary pressures by increasing the cost 
of oil and raising the prices of all products 
and services which depend on oil. It would 
further stimulate inflation in the ship con- 
struction industry and cut into the indus- 
try's ability to meet ship construction for 
the U.S. Navy. 

In addition, the bill would serve as a prec- 
edent for other countries to increase protec- 
tion of their industries, resulting in a serious 
deterioration in beneficial international com- 
petition and trade. This is directly contrary 
to the objectives of the trade bill which the 
Congress has just passed. In addition, it 
would violate a large number of our treaties 
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. 

Although this bill would undoubtedly ben- 
efit a limited group of our working popula- 
tion, such benefit would entail disproportion- 
ate costs and produce undesirable effects 
which could extend into other areas and in- 
dustries. The waiver provisions which the 
Congress included in an effort to meet a few 
of my concerns fail to overcome the serious 
objections I have to the legislation. 

Accordingly, I am not approving this bill 
because of the substantial adverse effect on 
the Nation's economy and international in- 
terest. 

I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate 
my commitment to maintaining a strong U.S. 
Merchant Marine. I believe we can and will 
do this under our existing statutes and pro- 
grams such as those administered by the 
Maritime Administration in the Department 
of Commerce. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, December 30, 1974. 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 14 



FoUoiring is the transcript of a neivs 
conference held by Secretary Kissinger in 
the press briefing room at the Department of 
State at 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday, January 14. 

Press release 13 ilaleil .lanuar.v 14 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, I am sorry to get you all together at 
this hour. We had originally agreed with the 
Soviet Government to make a statement, 
which I am about to read, on Thursday. But 
there have been a number of inquiries this 
afternoon which led us to believe that there 
might be stories that were based on inade- 
quate information and perhaps based on 
misunderstandings. And in order to avoid 
exacerbating the situation, and in an al- 
ready rather delicate moment, we asked the 
Soviet Embassy whether we might release 
the statement this evening. 

So I will now read a statement, of which 
the Soviet Government is aware, and we 
will have copies for you when you leave. 
Now, the te.xt of the statement is as follows: 

Since the President signed the Trade Act on 
January 3, we have been in touch with the Soviet 
Government concerning the steps necessary to 
bring the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement into 
force. 

Article 9 of that agreement provides for an ex- 
change of written notices of acceptance, following 
which the agreement, including reciprocal exten- 
sion of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment (MFN) 
[most-favored-nation] would enter into force. In 
accordance with the recently enacted Trade Act, 
prior to this exchange of written notices, the 
President would transmit to the Congress a num- 
ber of documents, including the 1972 agreement, 
the proposed written notices, a formal proclama- 
tion extending MFN to the U.S.S.R., and a state- 
ment of reasons for the 1972 agreement. Either 
House of Congress would then have had 90 legis- 
lative days to veto the agreement. 

In addition to these procedures, the President 
would also take certain steps, pursuant to the 



Trade Act, to waive the applicability of the Jack- 
son-Vanik amendment. These steps would include 
a report to the Congress stating that the waiver 
will substantially promote the objectives of the 
amendment and that the President has received 
assurances that the emigration practices of the 
U.S.S.R. will henceforth lead substantially to the 
achievement of the objectives of the amendment. 

It was our intention to include in the required 
exchange of written notices with the Soviet Gov- 
ernment language, required by the provisions of 
the Trade Act, that would have made clear that 
the duration of three years referred to in the 1972 
Trade Agreement with the U.S.S.R. was subject 
to continued legal authority to carry out our obli- 
gations. This caveat was necessitated by the fact 
that the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
would be applicable only for an initial period of 
18 months, with provision for renewal thereafter. 

The Soviet Government has now informed us 
that it cannot accept a trading relationship based 
on the legislation recently enacted in this country. 
It considers this legislation as contravening both 
the 1972 Trade Agreement, which had called for 
an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade 
restrictions, and the principle of noninterfer- 
ence in domestic affairs. The Soviet Government 
states that it does not intend to accept a trade 
status that is discriminatory and subject to politi- 
cal conditions and, accordingly, that it will not 
put into force the 1972 Trade Agreement. Finally, 
the Soviet Government informed us that if state- 
ments were made by the United States, in the terms 
required by the Trade Act, concerning assurances 
by the Soviet Government regarding matters it 
considers within its domestic jurisdiction, such 
statements would be repudiated by the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. 

In view of these developments, we have con- 
cluded that the 1972 Trade Agreement cannot be 
brought into force at this time and that the 
President will therefore not take the steps re- 
quired for this purpose by the Trade Act. The 
President does not plan at this time to exercise 
the waiver authority. 

The administration regrets this turn of events. 
It has regarded and continues to regard an orderly 
and mutually beneficial trade relationship with the 
Soviet Union as an important element in the 
overall improvement of relations. It will, of course, 



February 3, 1975 



139 



continue to pursue all available avenues for such 
an improvement, including efforts to obtain legis- 
lation that will permit normal trading relationships. 

Now, since undoubtedly a number of you 
will raise questions and some of you have 
already raised questions about the implica- 
tions of this for our political relationships 
with the Soviet Union, let me make a few 
observations : 

The problem of peace in the nuclear age 
must be of paramount concern for both nu- 
clear powers. The question of bringing 
about a more stable international environ- 
ment depends importantly on improved rela- 
tions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. This essentially bipartisan 
effort will be continued by this administra- 
tion. 

We have no reason to believe that the 
rejection of the provisions of the trade bill 
has implications beyond those that have 
been communicated to us. It goes without 
saying that, should it herald a period of 
intensified pressure, the United States would 
resist with great determination and as a 
united people. We do not expect that to 
happen, however, and as far as the United 
States is concerned, we will continue to pur- 
sue the policy of relaxation of tensions and 
of improving or seeking to improve relation- 
ships leading toward a stable peace. 

As far as our domestic debate is con- 
cerned, we see no point in reviewing the 
debate of recent months. We want to make 
clear that there was no disagreement as to 
objectives. We differed with some of the 
Members of Congress about the methods to 
achieve these objectives — these disagree- 
ments are now part of a legislative history. 

As far as the administration is concerned, 
it will pursue the objectives that I have 
outlined in a spirit of cooperation with the 
Congress. 

And when I have testified before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Fri- 
day, I will seek their advice as to the steps 
that in their judgment might be desirable 
in promoting the cause and the purposes 
which we all share. 

And now I will be glad to answer your 
questions. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, going to your last re- 
marks, arc you suggesting that Congress is at 
fault in great part for what has happened, 
and if that is what you are suggesting, why 
did you and Congress equally engage in this 
exchange of letters [Oct. 18, 197Jt\ ivhich 
seem to tell the American people that those 
assurances had been received? 

Secretary Kissiiiger: I think that all of 
you can review the public statements that 
I have made over the years of this debate 
expressing our judgment as to the likely 
consequences of this course. 

You will also recall that in my testimony 
before the Senate Finance Committee on 
December 3 I stated explicitly that if any 
claim were made that this was a govern- 
ment-to-government transaction and if any 
assertions were made that assurances had 
been extended that those would be repudi- 
ated by the Soviet Government. 

I believe that there were a number of 
reasons that led to the Soviet decision. The 
purpose of my remarks was not to put the 
blame anywhere, but in order to put the 
debate behind us and to turn us toward the 
futui'e. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are some of those 
reasons do you think that led the Soviets to 
this move? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe, as I have 
already stated publicly, that since the ex- 
change of letters, there have been many 
public statements that were difficult for the 
Soviet Union to accept. And the decision 
with respect to the Eximbank [Export-Im- 
port Bank] ceiling was undoubtedly an im- 
portant factor in leading to this turn of 
events. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what you 
think this means for the future of emigra- 
tion of people from the Soviet Union, espe- 
cially Jews? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have been given 
no official communication. 

Q. Do you think the number will go down? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not want to 
speculate. The United States has made clear 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



before that we favored the widest possible 
emigration, and we did so privately. And, 
for a time, not ineffectively. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, right noiv, do you have 
any reason to believe that the Soviet Union 
is or will begin to apply intensive pressure 
in any particular region of the ivorld? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have no reason 
to suppose so. I simply stated this to make 
clear what our attitude would be if this 
should happen. I also want to make clear 
that the United States will pursue a policy 
of relaxation of tensions, that the political 
premises of our policy of detente remain in 
full force, and that we are prepared to con- 
sult with the Congress to see how the objec- 
tives of the trade bill can be applied to the 
Soviet Union under conditions that are per- 
haps more acceptable. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would yo7i care to char- 
acterize the Soviet letter of rejection? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it was fac- 
tual. 

Q. When loas it received, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: It was received on 
Friday, and the further discussions with 
respect to it were concluded yesterday. 

Q. Do you think this refects any change 
tvithin the Soviet leadership? Do you think 
that there is a change of which this is one 
result ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have no evidence 
whatever to that effect. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, after the Vladivostok 
meeting, voices were raised in Congress say- 
ing that since it has been proved possible to 
be tough ivith the Russians on the trade 
bill, that ive shoidd therefore go back and 
renegotiate the Vladivostok agreement and 
get loiver ceilings loith them. Do you think 
that sort of public statement had any im- 
pact ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to 
go into individual public statements. I tried 
to point out on several occasions the limits 
of what a superpower can accept. And you 



may remember that I warned in a press con- 
ference about the impact on detente of such 
a debate with respect to Vladivostok. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect now that 
the visit of Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezh- 
nev, General Secretary of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union] to this country might be put into 
question ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have absolutely no 
reason to suppose this. All the communica- 
tions we have received from the Soviet Gov- 
ernment seem to suggest that the political 
orientation is unchanged. And we will con- 
duct our policy until we receive evidence to 
the contrary on the basis of carrying for- 
ward the policy of detente. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Lend-Lease Agree- 
ment, as I recall it, said that the Soviet 
Union did not have to make any further 
payments after this year if it did not 
receive most-favored-nation. So can we 
assume that that means the Soviet Union 
will also not be paying any further lend-lease 
payments, and that in turn raises the ques- 
tion of should they still be entitled to any 
credits at all? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with respect to 
the lend-lease, we have not sorted out specifi- 
cally from what obligations the Soviet Union 
would be relieved. But I think your inter- 
pretation of the agreement is a reasonable 
one. 

As you know, the granting of new credits 
has been linked to the implementation of 
the MFN, and therefore your second ques- 
tion is really moot, because no new credits 
can be extended under the existing legisla- 
tion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hotv did the Soviet 
Union first communicate with you that they 
intended to do this? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, after the pas- 
sage of the Trade Act and the Exim legis- 
lation, the Soviet Union made clear in a 
number of ways, including public comments, 
its displeasure with the legislation. But it 
did not communicate with us formally. 
After the Trade Act was signed, we in- 



February 3, 1975 



141 



formed the Soviet Union of tlie precise steps 
that would have to be taken under the 
Trade Act to implement the Trade Agree- 
ment and to put into effect the waiver pro- 
visions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 

In response to these provisions, which 
made it impossible for us to apply the waiver 
without some Soviet action, the Soviet Union 
informed us that they would not participate 
in these actions. These actions specifically 
were that the Trade Agreement would have 
to be amended to run not for a period of 
three years, but to provide for the fact 
that it might lapse after 18 months in case 
MFN were not extended. And we had to 
have assurances that we could make state- 
ments with respect to Soviet emigration 
practices, or rather assurances that we had 
been given with respect to emigration prac- 
tices, which they would not repudiate. 

Now, as I have pointed out on many oc- 
casions, the assurances which we had re- 
ceived — and you may have seen stories that 
we had resisted the word "assurance" 
throughout our discussions with the Con- 
gress — that the information we had received 
concerned the application of Soviet law and 
the implementation of Soviet practices. And 
as I had made clear on December 3, any as- 
surances concerning the Soviet Government 
were bound to be rejected, and they have 
been. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that 
many officials in this government have ex- 
pressed concern that the Soviet Union is not 
getting enough out of detente — and one of 
its main purposes in having a detente with 
the United States ^vas in improving its trade, 
getting technology, getting credits from the 
United States — can you tell us on what you 
base your optimism that the other aspects 
of detente can continue? 

Secretary Kissinger: I stated that the 
communications that we have so far re- 
ceived have indicated that the Soviet Union 
wishes this political relationship to continue. 
We have no other evidence. 

And we will, of course, base our 
own conclusions on the actions of the 



Soviet Government and not on the note. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, evidently publicity and 
congressional debate had a great deal to do 
with the Soviet decision. Does this raise the 
question whether a democracy like ours can 
purstte openly a detente policy ivith the 
Soviet Union, or must it be pursued in secret 
and rnsk failure if the public is brought into 
it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really do not 
think any useful purpose would be served 
by speculating on all the causes of the pres- 
ent state of affairs. 

I believe that any foreign policy of the 
United States that is not based on public 
support and, above all, on congressional 
support will not have a firm foundation. 
At the same time, there is the problem of 
the degree to which this control is exer- 
cised and in what detail. And this is a 
matter that will require constant adjust- 
ment and discussion between the executive 
and the Congress. 

I repeat — we shared the objective of those 
with whose tactics we disagree, and we do 
not think that these tactics were in any 
sense improper or unreasonable. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any link be- 
tween the Soviet action that you are dis- 
cussing and recent reports that Mr. Brezhnev 
has been imder criticism at home for his 
detente approach? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all I know 
about those stories is what I read in the 
newspapers. And we have to base our poli- 
cies on the actions and communications of 
the Soviet Government. And therefore I 
don't want to speculate on the internal posi- 
tion of various Soviet leaders. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do yoti expect the Soviets 
to reduce their purchases of American prod- 
ucts to further give evidence of this dis- 
pleasure ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not stated 
that there is Soviet displeasure with the 
United States. I stated that the Soviet 
Union objected to certain legislative provi- 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



sions. I have no evidence one way or the 
other about what Soviet commercial prac- 
tices will be henceforth, and it is quite pos- 
sible that they have not made a decision. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivould you characterize 
it as being accurate to say that during the 
months of negotiations with the Senators 
you had information from the Soviets to the 
effect that you could negotiate in good faith 
with the Senators on these specific emigra- 
tion issues but over the past fetv iveeks the 
Soviet Union has changed its policy whereby 
it no longer can stand by the information 
that it had given to you duriyig those months 
of negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: The reason the nego- 
tiations with the Senators took so long was 
our concern to make sure that we would 
communicate nothing that we could not 
back up. The Soviet Union gave us certain 
descriptions of their domestic practices, 
which we attempted to communicate as 
accurately as we could. Obviously those who 
were concerned with promoting emigration 
attempted to make these descriptions as 
precise and as detailed as possible. And that 
is perfectly understandable. 

I think what may have happened is, when 
the Soviet Union looked at the totality of 
what it had to gain from this trading rela- 
tionship as against the intrusions in its 
domestic affairs, it drew the balance sheet 
of which we have the result today. But they 
have never disavowed the assurances or the 
statements in my letter. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say that there is no 
reason to believe that there are implications 
beyond this. Hoivever, was not one of the 
incentives that we used in relations with the 
Soviet Union the trade incentive — to that 
extent, linkage — and to that extent, is there 
not some implication? 

Secretary Kissinger: It would be my judg- 
ment that the interest in the preservation 
of peace must be equally shared by both 
sides. I have stated the administration posi- 
tion in many statements before the Con- 
gress in which I pointed out that it is our 



view, and it remains our view, that it is 
desirable to establish the maximum degree 
of links between the two countries in order 
to create the greatest incentive for the 
preservation of stable relationships. 

We are prepared to continue exploring 
these possibilities. And we are certain that 
the Congress will deal with us in a con- 
ciliatory and constructive manner. So we 
look at this as an interruption and not as a 
final step. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm a little confused 
about exactly what happened. Administra- 
tion officials had said when the trade bill 
passed that they could live ivith it. You ivere 
asked at one point whether you would rec- 
ommend vetoing of the Eximbank legislation, 
and you didn't answer it directly, and the 
President signed it. Did rjou have any idea 
that this was coming? Coiddn't you have 
taken a step like vetoing the Eximbank to 
have prevented this? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are faced 
with a situation in which there were differ- 
ences of view as to what the traffic would 
bear. I don't believe that anybody reading 
my statements over the years can have any 
question about what my view was, and my 
statements are on the public record. And 
there was disagreement as to the validity 
of this. 

For the United States to veto legislation 
which made credits available to American 
business for trading with the whole world 
because of an unsatisfactory limitation with 
respect to the Soviet Union at the end of 
a prolonged period of negotiation was a 
decision which the President felt he could 
not take, and it is a decision with which I 
agreed. It came down to a fine judgment. It 
would not have changed the basic problem, 
anyway, because with the Exim legisla- 
tion vetoed, the Soviet Union would have 
had no reason to put into effect the trade 
provisions in any event. So we were faced 
with a very difficult choice. In one case they 
would get $300 million; in the other case 
they could get nothing. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 



February 3, 1975 



143 



U.S. Protests North Viet-Nam's 
Violations of Peace Accords 

Following is the text of a note trans- 
mitted to U.S. missions on January 11 for 
deliverij to non-Vietnamese participants in 
the International Conference on Viet-Nam 
and to members of the International Com- 
mission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).' 

Press release 12 dated January l-'i 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to [recipient of this note] and has the honor 
to refer to the Agreement on Ending the 
War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam 
signed at Paris January 27, 1973, and to 
the Act of the International Conference on 
Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973. 

When the Agreement was concluded 
nearly two years ago, our hope was that it 
would provide a framework under which the 
Vietnamese people could make their own 
political choices and resolve their own prob- 
lems in an atmosphere of peace. Unfortu- 
nately this hope, which was clearly shared 
by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the South 
Vietnamese people, has been frustrated by 
the persistent refusal of the Democratic Re- 
public of Viet-Nam to abide by the Agree- 
ment's most fundamental provisions. Specif- 
ically, in flagrant violation of the Agreement, 
the North Vietnamese and "Provisional 
Revolutionary Government" authorities 
have: 

— built up the North Vietnamese main- 
force army in the South through the illegal 
infiltration of over 160,000 troops ; 

— tripled the strength of their armor in 
the South by sending in over 400 new ve- 
hicles, as well as greatly increased their 
artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry; 

— improved their military logistics system 
running through Laos, Cambodia and the 
Demilitarized Zone as well as within South 
Viet-Nam, and expanded their armament 
stockpiles ; 

— refused to deploy the teams which 
under the Agreement were to oversee the 
cease-fire ; 



— refused to pay their prescribed share 
of the expenses of the International Com- 
mission of Control and Supervision; 

—failed to honor their commitment to 
cooperate in resolving the status of Ameri- 
can and other personnel missing in action, 
even breaking off all discussions on this 
matter by refusing for the past seven 
months to meet with U.S. and Republic of 
Viet-Nam representatives in the Four-Party 
Joint Military Team ; 

— broken off all negotiations with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam including the political 
negotiations in Paris and the Two Party 
Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon, 
answering the Republic of Viet-Nam's re- 
peated calls for unconditional resumption of 
the negotiations with demands for the over- 
throw of the government as a pre-condition 
for any renewed talks; and 

— gradually increased their military pres- 
sure, over-running several areas, including 
11 district towns, which were clearly and 
unequivocally held by the Republic of Viet- 
Nam at the time of the cease-fire. Their 
latest and most serious escalation of the 
fighting began in early December with of- 
fensives in the southern half of South Viet- 
Nam which have brought the level of casual- 
ties and destruction back up to what it was 
before the Agreement. These attacks— 
which included for the first time since the 
massive North Vietnamese 1972 offensive 
the over-running of a province capital (Song 
Be in Phuoc Long Province) — appear to re- 
flect a decision by Hanoi to seek once again 
to impose a military solution in Viet-Nam. 
Coming just before the second anniversary 
of the Agreement, this dramatically belies 
Hanoi's claims that it is the United States 
and the Republic of Viet-Nam who are vio- 
lating the Agreement and standing in the 
way of peace. 

The United States deplores the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam's turning from 
the path of negotiation to that of war, not 



^ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's 
Republic of China, United Kingdom, France, Hun- 
gary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and U.N. Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim. 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



only because it is a grave violation of a 
solemn international agreement, but also 
because of the cruel price it is imposing on 
the people of South Viet-Nam. The Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam must accept 
the full consequences of its actions. We are 
deeply concerned about the threat posed to 
international peace and security, to the 
political stability of Southeast Asia, to the 
progress which has been made in removing 
Viet-Nam as a major issue of great-power 
contention, and to the hopes of mankind for 
the building of structures of peace and the 
strengthening of mechanisms to avert war. 
We therefore reiterate our strong support 
for the Republic of Viet-Nam's call to the 
Hanoi-'Trovisional Revolutionary Govern- 
ment" side to reopen the talks in Paris and 
Saigon which are mandated by the Agree- 
ment. We also urge that the [addressee | 
call upon the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam to halt its military offensive and join 
the Republic of Viet-Nam in re-establishing 
stability and seeking a political solution. 

January 11, 1975. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 2d Session 

A Recommended National Emergencies Act. In- 
terim Report. S. Rept. 93-1170. September 24, 
1974. 10 pp. 

National Emergencies Act. Report to accompany 
S. 3957. S. Rept. 93-1193. September 30, 1974. 
50 pp. 

Icebreaking Operations in Foreign Waters. Report 
to accompany H.R. 13791. H. Rept. 93-1390. 
September 30, 1974. 7 pp. 

The United States and Cuba: A Propitious Moment. 
A report to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations by Senators Jacob K. Javits and Clai- 
borne Pell on their trip to Cuba, September 27-30, 
1974. October 1974. 13 pp. 



Dues for U.S. Membership in International Criminal 
Police Organization. Report to accompany H R 
14597. S. Rept. 93-1199. October 1, 1974. 5 pp! 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms 

of Zinc. Conference report to accompany H R 

^ 6191. H. Rept. 93-1399. October 1, 1974. 4 pp. 

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on 
Certain Bicycle Parts and Accessories. Conference 
report to accompany H.R. 6642. H. Rept. 93-1400 
October 1, 1974. 5 pp. 

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on 
Certain Classifications of Yarns of Silk. Con- 
ference report to accompany H.R. 7780. H Rept 
93-1401. October 1, 1974. 6 pp. 

Duty-Free Entry of Methanol. Conference report 
to accompany H.R. 11251. H. Rept. 93-1402 
October 1, 1974. 5 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Synthetic Rutile. 
Conference report to accompany H.R 11830. H 
Rept. 93-1404. 3 pp. 

Extending Until July 1, 1975, the Suspension of 
Duty on Certain Carboxymethyl Cellulose Salts. 
Conference report to accompany H.R. 12035. H. 
Rept. 9,3-1405. October 1, 1974. 6 pp. 

Extending Until July 1, 1975, the Suspension of 
Duties on Certain Forms of Copper. Conference 
report to accompany H.R. 12281. H. Rept. 93-1406. 
October 1, 1974. 3 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Horses. 
Conference report to accompany H.R. 13631. H. 
Rept. 93-1407. October 1, 1974. 4 pp. 

Authorizing the President To Declare by Proclama- 
tion Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn an Honorary Citi- 
zen of the United States. Report to accompany 
S.J. Res. 188. S. Rept. 93-1216. October 2, 1974. 
3 pp. 

Export -Administration Act Amendments. Confer- 
ence report to accompany S. 3792. H. Rept. 
93-1412. October 2, 1974. 14 pp. 

-Amending the Communications Act of 1934 With 
Respect to the Granting of Radio Licenses in the 
Safety and Special and Experimental Radio Serv- 
ices to Aliens. Report to accompany S. 2547. H. 
Rept. 93-1423. October 3, 1974. 8 pp. 

Authorizing U.S. Contributions to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Forces. Report to accompany H.R. 
16982. H. Rept. 93-1432. October 7, 1974. 3 pp. 

World Food Situation. Report to accompany H Res. 
1399. H. Rept. 93-1433. October 7, 1974. 3 pp. 

Export-Import Bank Act Amendment. Conference 
report to accompany H.R. 15977. H. Rept. 93-1439 
October 8, 1974. 11 pp. 

Metropolitan Museum Exhibition in the Soviet 
Union. Report to accompanv H.J. Res. 1115. H. 
Rept. 93-1444. October 8, 1974. 3 pp. 
State Department, USIA Authorizations. Conference 
report to accompany S. 3473. H. Rept. 93-1447 
October 8, 1974. 14 pp. 



February 3, 1975 



145 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 



Following is a statement made in Com- 
mittee II (Economic and Financial) of the 
U.N. General Assembly ow December 6 by 
Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representa- 
tive to the General Assembly, together with 
the text of a re.wlntion adopted by the com- 
mittee on December 6 and by the Assembly 
on December 12. 



STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY 

t'SUX press release 111'.' ilateil I'eeeinlier 6 

It is with deep regret that my delegation 
could not support the proposed Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. 

When President Echeverria of Mexico 
initiated the concept of such a charter two 
years ago, he had what is indeed a worthy 
vision. The U.S. Government shares the con- 
viction that there is a real need for basic 
improvements in the international economic 
system, and we supported in principle the 
formulation of new guidelines to this end. 
We welcomed President Echeverria's initia- 
tive. Secretary of State Kissinger, in address- 
ing this Assembly last year, confirmed the 
fact that the United States favored the 
concept of a charter. He said it would make 
a significant and historic contribution if it 
reflected the true aspirations of all nations. 
He added that, to command general support 
— and to be implemented — the proposed 
rights and duties must be defined equitably 
and take into account the concerns of in- 
dustrialized as well as of developing coun- 
tries. 

In extensive negotiations in Mexico City, 
Geneva, and here in New York, the United 
States woi'ked hard and sincerely with other 



countries in trying to formulate a charter 
that would achieve such a balance. We tried 
to go the extra mile in particular because of 
our close and friendly relations with Mexico. 
We are indebted, as I believe is the entire 
Assembly, to Foreign Minister Rabasa 
[Emilio 0. Rabasa, Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, United Mexican States] for his patient 
and tireless efforts as a negotiator. One 
must recognize the difficulty of his tasks in 
seeking to reconcile such fundamentally di- 
vergent views as have been apparent in a 
group of this size and disparity. Despite the 
chasm which it has thus far proved impos- 
sible to bridge, he labored up to the last 
moment seeking an agreed consensus. In- 
deed, agreement was reached on many im- 
portant articles, and our support for those 
was shown in the vote we have just taken. 
On others, however, agreement has not 
been reached. Our views on these provisions 
are apparent in the amendments proposed 
by the United States and certain other 
countries, but these regrettably have been 
rejected by the majority here.' Many of the 
unagreed provisions, in the view of my 
government, are fundamental and are un- 
acceptable in their present form. To cite a 
few: the treatment of foreign investment in 
terms which do not fully take into account 
respect for agreements and international 
obligations, and the endorsement of con- 
cepts of producer cartels and indexation of 



^ In 17 rollcall votes on Dec. fi, the committee re- 
jected amendments cosponsored by the United 
States and other countries which included the dele- 
tion of subpar. (i) of chapter I and arts. 5, 15, 
16, 19, and 28 and revised language for preambular 
pars. 4, 5(c), and 7; the introductory sentence and 
subpar. (f) of chapter I; and arts. 2, 4, 6, 14 his 
(to replace art. 31), 26, and 30. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



prices. As a result, Mr. Chairman, we have 
before us a draft charter which is unbal- 
anced and which fails to achieve the pur- 
pose of encouraging harmonious economic 
relations and needed development. More- 
over, the provisions of the charter would 
discourage rather than encourage the cap- 
ital flow which is vital for development. 

There is much in the charter which the 
United States supports. The bulk of it is the 
result of sincere negotiations, as demon- 
strated by the voting pattern today. It was 
to demonstrate this fact that the United 
States asked for an article-by-article vote 
on the charter." 

Mr. Chairman, my government was pre- 
pared to continue these negotiations until 
agreement could be reached, as we much 
preferred agreement to confrontation. For 
that reason, we supported the proposed 
resolution to continue negotiating next year 
with a view to acting on a generally agreed 
charter in the Assembly next September.'' 

For all these reasons, Mr. Chairman, my 
delegation felt compelled to vote against the 
charter as a whole." We have not closed our 
minds, however, to the possibility of further 
reconsideration at some future date should 
others come to the conclusion that an 
agreed charter would still be far preferable 
to one that is meaningless without the 
agreement of countries whose numbers may 
be small but whose significance in inter- 
national economic relations and development 
can hardly be ignored. We stand ready to 
resume negotiations on a charter which 
could command the support of all countries. 



-"The United States voted against the seventh 
preambular paragraph; art. 2, pars. 1 and 2 (a), (b), 
and (c) ; and art. 26. The United States abstained 
on the fourth preambular paragraph; the intro- 
ductory sentence of chapter I; and arts. 4, 6, 29, 
30, 32, and 34. No separate vote was taken on 
provisions where an amendment to delete had been 
rejected (see footnote 1 above). The United States 
voted in favor of provisions not otherwise specified. 

' Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1419 was rejected by 
the committee on Dec. 6, the vote being 81 against 
and 20 (U.S.) in favor, with 15 abstentions. 

' The committee adopted the charter as a whole, 
as cosponsored by 90 developing countries, by a 
rollcall vote of 115 to 6 (U.S.), with 10 abstentions. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 

The General Aftsemhli/. 

Recalling that the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, in its resolution 45 (III) 
of 18 May 1972, stressed the urgency "to estab- 
lish generally accepted norms to govern interna- 
tional economic relations systematically" and recog- 
nized that "it is not feasible to establish a just 
order and a stable world as long as the Charter 
to protect the rights of all countries, and in par- 
ticular the developing States, is not formulated". 

Recalling further that in the same resolution it 
was decided to establish a Working Group of gov- 
ernmental representatives to draw up a draft Char- 
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
which the General Assembly, in its resolution 3037 
(XXVII) of 19 December 1972, decided should be 
composed of 40 Member States, 

Noting that in its resolution 3082 (XXVIII) of 
6 December 1973, it reaffirmed its conviction of the 
urgent need to establish or improve norms of uni- 
versal application for the development of inter- 
national economic relations on a just and equitable 
basis and urged the Working Group on the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States to com- 
plete, as the first step, in the codification and de- 
velopment of the matter, the elaboration of a final 
draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, to be considered and approved by the Gen- 
eral Assembly at its twenty-ninth session. 

Bearing in mind the spirit and terms of its reso- 
lutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, 
containing the Declaration and the Programme of 
Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, which underlined the vital im- 
portance of the Charter to be adopted by the Gen- 
eral Assembly at its twenty-ninth session and 
stressed the fact that the Charter shall constitute 
an effective instrument towards the establishment 
of a new system of international economic relations 
based on equity, sovereign equality, and inter- 
dependence of the interests of developed and de- 
veloping countries, 

Haxnng examined the report of the Working 
Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States on its fourth session," transmitted 
to the General Assembly by the Trade and Develop- 
ment Board at its fourteenth session. 



■■A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (text from U.N. press 
release G A/5194) ; adopted by the Assembly on 
Dec. 12 by a rollcall vote of 120 to 6 (U.S., Bel- 
gium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Luxembourg, U.K.), with 10 abstentions (Austria, 
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Neth- 
erlands, Norway, Spain). Separate votes were taken 
on subpar. (o) of chapter I and on art. 3; the 
United States voted in favor of these provisions. 

°U.N. doc. TD/B/AC.12/4. [Footnote in origi- 
nal.] 



February 3, 1975 



147 



Expressing its appreciation to the Workine: 
Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States which, as a result of the task per- 
formed in its four sessions held between February 
1973 and June 1974, assembled the elements re- 
quired for the completion and adoption of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assem- 
bly, as previously recommended. 

Adopts and solemnly proclaims the following: 

CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF STATES 

Preamble 

The General Assembly, 

Reaffirming the fundamental purposes of the 
United Nations, in particular, the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the development 
of friendly relations among nations and the achieve- 
ment of international co-operation in solving inter- 
national problems in the economic and social fields, 

Affirming the need for strengthening interna- 
tional co-operation in these fields. 

Reaffirming further the need for strengthening 
international co-operation for development. 

Declaring that it is a fundamental purpose of 
this Charter to promote the establishment of the 
new international economic order, based on equity, 
sovereign equality, interdependence, common inter- 
est and co-operation among all States, irrespective 
of their economic and social systems, 

Desirous of contributing to the creation of con- 
ditions for: 

(a) The attainment of wider prosperity among 
all countries and of higher standards of living for 
all peoples, 

(b) The promotion by the entire international 
community of economic and social progress of all 
countries, especially developing countries, 

(c) The encouragement of co-operation, on the 
basis of mutual advantage and equitable benefits 
for all peace-loving States which are willing to 
carry out the provisions of this Charter, in the 
economic, trade, scientific and technical fields, re- 
gardless of political, economic or social systems, 

(d) The overcoming of main obstacles in the 
way of economic development of the developing 
countries, 

(e) The acceleration of the economic growth of 
developing countries with a view to bridging the 
economic gap between developing and developed 
countries, 

(f) The protection, preservation and enhancement 
of the environment, 

Mindful of the need to establish and maintain 
a just and equitable economic and social order 
through : 

(a) The achievement of more rational and equi- 



table international economic relations and the en- 
couragement of structural changes in the world 
economy, 

(b) The creation of conditions which permit the 
further expansion of trade and intensification of 
economic co-operation among all nations, 

(c) The strengthening of the economic inde- 
pendence of developing countries, 

(d) The establishment and promotion of inter- 
national economic relations taking into account 
the agreed differences in development of the de- 
veloping countries and their specific needs. 

Determined to promote collective economic secu- 
rity for development, in particular of the developing 
countries, with strict respect for the sovereign 
equality of each State and through the co-opera- 
tion of the entire international community. 

Considering that genuine co-operation among 
States, based on joint consideration of and con- 
certed action regarding international economic 
problems, is essential for fulfilling the international 
community's common desire to achieve a just and 
rational development of all parts of the world. 

Stressing the importance of ensuring appropri- 
ate conditions for the conduct of normal economic 
relations among all States, irrespective of differ- 
ences in social and economic systems, and for the 
full respect for the rights of all peoples, as well as 
the strengthening of instruments of international 
economic co-operation as means for the consolida- 
tion of peace for the benefit of all. 

Convinced of the need to develop a system of 
international economic relations on the basis of 
sovereign equality, mutual and equitable benefit 
and the close interrelationship of the interests 
of all States, 

Reiterating that the responsibility for the de- 
velopment of every country rests primarily upon 
itself but that concomitant and effective interna- 
tional co-operation is an essential factor for the 
full achievement of its own development goals. 

Firmly convinced of the urgent need to evolve a 
substantially improved system of international 
economic relations. 

Solemnly adopts the present Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States. 

Chapter I 

Fundamentals of international economic relations 

Economic as well as political and other relations 
among States shall be governed, inter alia, by the 
following principles: 

(a) Sovereignty, territorial integrity and politi- 
cal independence of States; 

(b) Sovereign equality of all States; 

(c) Non-aggression; 

(d) Non-intervention; 

(e) Mutual and equitable benefit; 

(f) Peaceful coexistence; 



148 



Department of State Bulletin 



(g) Equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples; 

(h) Peaceful settlement of disputes; 

(i) Remedying of injustices which have been 
brought about by force and which deprive a nation 
of the natural means necessary for its normal de- 
velopment; 

(j) Fulfilment in good faith of international obli- 
gations; 

(k) Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms ; 

(1) No attempt to seek hegemony and spheres 
of influence; 

(m) Promotion of international social justice; 

(n) International co-operation for development; 

(o) Free access to and from the sea by land- 
locked countries within the framework of the above 
principles. 

Chapter II 
Economic rights and duties of States 

Article 1 

Every State has the sovereign and inalienable 
right to choose its economic system as well as its 
political, social and cultural systems in accordance 
with the will of its people, without outside inter- 
ference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever. 

Article 2 

1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full 
permanent sovereignty, including possession, use 
and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources 
and economic activities. 

2. Each State has the right: 

(a) To regulate and exercise authority over for- 
eign investment within its national jurisdiction in 
accordance with its laws and regulations and in 
conformity with its national objectives and priori- 
ties. No State shall be compelled to grant preferen- 
tial treatment to foreign investment; 

(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of 
transnational corporations within its national 
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such 
activities comply with its laws, rules and regula- 
tions and conform with its economic and social 
policies. Transnational corporations shall not inter- 
vene in the internal afl'airs of a host State. Every 
State should, with full regard for its sovereign 
rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise 
of the right set forth in this subparagraph ; 

(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer own- 
ership of foreign property in which case appropri- 
ate compensation should be paid by the State adopt- 
ing such measures, taking into account its relevant 
laws and regulations and all circumstances that 
the State considers pertinent. In any case where 
the question of compensation gives rise to a contro- 
versy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of 
the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless 



it is freely and mutually agreed by all States con- 
cerned that other peaceful means be sought on the 
basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of 
means. 

Article 3 

In the exploitation of natural resources shared 
by two or more countries, each State must co- 
operate on the basis of a system of information 
and prior consultations in order to achieve opti- 
mum use of such resources without causing dam- 
age to the legitimate interest of others. 

Article U 

Every State has the right to engage in inter- 
national trade and other forms of economic co- 
operation irrespective of any differences in political, 
economic and social systems. No State shall be 
subjected to discrimination of any kind based solely 
on such differences. In the pursuit of international 
trade and other forms of economic co-operation, 
every State is free to choose the forms of organi- 
zation of its foreign economic relations and to 
enter into bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
consistent with its international obligations and 
with the needs of international economic co-opera- 
tion. 

Article 5 

All States have the right to associate in organi- 
zations of primary commodity producers in order 
to develop their national economies to achieve 
stable financing for their development, and in pur- 
suance of their aims assisting in the promotion of 
sustained growth of the world economy, in par- 
ticular accelerating the development of developing 
countries. Correspondingly all States have the duty 
to respect that right by refraining from applying 
economic and political measures that would limit it. 

Article 6 

It is the duty of States to contribute to the de- 
velopment of international trade of goods particu- 
larly by means of arrangements and by the con- 
clusion of long-term multilateral commodity agree- 
ments, where appropriate, and taking into account 
the interests of producers and consumers. All 
States share the responsibility to promote the reg- 
ular flow and access of all commercial goods traded 
at stable, remunerative and equitable prices, thus 
contributing to the equitable development of the 
world economy, taking into account, in particular, 
the interests of developing countries. 

Article 7 

Every State has the primary responsibility to 
promote the economic, social and cultural develop- 
ment of its people. To this end, each State has 
the right and the responsibility to choose its means 
and goals of development, fully to mobilize and 



February 3, 1975 



149 



use its resources, to implement progressive eco- 
nomic and social reforms and to ensure the full 
participation of its people in the process and bene- 
fits of development. All States have the duty, indi- 
vidually and collectively, to co-operate in order to 
eliminate obstacles that hinder such mobilization 
and use. 

Article S 

States should co-operate in facilitating niore ra- 
tional and equitable international economic rela- 
tions and in encouraging structural changes in the 
context of a balanced world economy in harmony 
with the needs and interests of all countries, espe- 
cially developing countries, and should take appro- 
priate measures to this end. 

Article 9 

All States have the responsibility to co-operate 
in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and tech- 
nological fields for the promotion of economic and 
social progress thi-oughout the world, especially 
that of the developing countries. 

Article 10 

All States are juridically equal and, as equal 
members of the international community, have the 
right to participate fully and effectively in the 
international decision-making process in the solu- 
tion of world economic, financial and monetary 
problems, inter alia, through the appropriate inter- 
national organizations in accordance with their 
existing and evolving rules, and to share equitably 
in the benefits resulting therefrom. 

Article 11 

All States should co-operate to strengthen and 
continuously improve the efficiency of international 
organizations in implementing measures to stimu- 
late the general economic progress of all countries, 
particularly of developing countries, and therefore 
should co-operate to adapt them, when appropriate, 
to the changing needs of international economic 
co-operation. 

Article 12 

1. States have the right, in agreement with 
the parties concerned, to participate in subregional, 
regional and interregional co-operation in the pur- 
suit of their economic and social development. All 
States engaged in such co-operation have the duty 
to ensure that the policies of those groupings to 
which they belong correspond to the provisions of 
the Charter and are outward-looking, consistent 
with their international obligations and with the 
needs of international economic co-operation and 
have full regard for the legitimate interests of 
third countries, especially developing countries. 

2. In the case of groupings to which the States 
concerned have transferred or may transfer cer- 



tain competences as regards matters that come 
within the scope of this Charter, its provisions 
shall also apply to those groupings, in regard to 
such matters, consistent with the responsibilities 
of such States as members of such groupings. Those 
States shall co-operate in the observance by the 
groupings of the provisions of this Charter. 

Article 13 

1. Every State has the right to benefit from the 
advances and developments in science and tech- 
nology for the acceleration of its economic and 
social development. 

2. All States should promote international scien- 
tific and technological co-operation and the trans- 
fer of technology, with proper regard for all legiti- 
mate interests including, inter alia, the rights and 
duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of tech- 
nology. In particular, all States should facilitate: 
the access of developing countries to the achieve- 
ments of modern science and technology, the trans- 
fer of technology and the creation of indigenous 
technology for the benefit of the developing coun- 
tries in forms and in accordance with procedures 
which are suited to their economies and their needs. 

3. Accordingly, developed countries should co- 
operate with the developing countries in the estab- 
lishment, strengthening and development of their 
scientific and technological infrastructures and 
their scientific research and technological activities 
so as to help to expand and transform the econo- 
mies of developing countries. 

4. All States should co-operate in exploring with 
a view to evolving further internationally ac- 
cepted guidelines or regulations for the transfer 
of technology taking fully into account the inter- 
ests of developing countries. 

Article IJ, 

Every State has the duty to co-operate in pro- 
moting a steady and increasing expansion and 
liberalization of world trade and an improvement 
in the welfare and living standards of all peoples, 
in particular those of developing countries. Ac- 
cordingly, all States should co-operate, inter alia. 
towards the progressive dismantling of obstacles to 
trade and the improvement of the international 
framework for the conduct of world trade and, 
to these ends, co-ordinated efforts shall be made to 
solve in an equitable way the trade problems of all 
countries taking into account the specific trade prob- 
lems of the developing countries. In this connexion. 
States shall take measures aimed at securing addi- 
tional benefits for the international trade of de- 
veloping countries so as to achieve a substantial 
increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the 
diversification of their exports, the acceleration of 
the rate of growth of their trade, taking into ac- 
count their development needs, an improvement in 
the possibilities for these countries to participate 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



in the expansion of world trade and a balance more 
favourable to developing countries in the sharing 
of the advantages resulting from this expansion, 
through, in the largest possible measure, a substan- 
tial improvement in the conditions of access for 
the products of interest to the developing countries 
and, wherever appropriate, measures designed to 
attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices 
for primary products. 

Article 15 

All States have the duty to promote the achieve- 
ment of general and complete disarmament under 
effective international control and to utilize the 
resources freed by effective disarmament measures 
for the economic and social development of coun- 
tries, allocating a substantial portion of such re- 
sources as additional means for the development 
needs of developing countries. 

Article 16 

1. It is the right and duty of all States, indi- 
vidually and collectively, to eliminate colonialism, 
apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism 
and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation 
and domination, and the economic and social con- 
sequences thereof, as a prerequisite for develop- 
ment. States which practice such coercive policies 
are economically responsible to the countries, terri- 
tories and peoples affected for the restitution and 
full compensation for the exploitation and deple- 
tion of, and damages to, the natural and all other 
resources of those countries, territories and peoples. 
It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to 
them. 

2. No State has the right to promote or encour- 
age investments that may constitute an obstacle to 
the liberation of a territory occupied by force. 

Article 17 

International co-operation for development is the 
shared goal and common duty of all States. Every 
State should co-operate with the efforts of develop- 
ing countries to accelerate their economic and so- 
cial development by providing favourable external 
conditions and by extending active assistance to 
them, consistent with their development needs and 
objectives, with strict respect for the sovereign 
equality of States and free of any conditions dero- 
gating from their sovereignty. 

Article 18 

Developed countries should extend, improve and 
enlarge the system of generalized non-reciprocal and 
non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the devel- 
oping countries consistent with the relevant agreed 
conclusions and relevant decisions as adopted on 
this subject, in the framework of the competent 
international organizations. Developed countries 
should also give serious consideration to the adop- 



tion of other differential measures, in areas where 
this is feasible and appropriate and in ways which 
will provide special and more favourable treat- 
ment, in order to meet trade and development needs 
of the developing countries. In the conduct of inter- 
national economic relations the developed countries 
should endeavour to avoid measures having a nega- 
tive effect on the development of the national econ- 
omies of the developing countries, as promoted by 
generalized tariff preferences and other generally 
agreed differential measures in their favour. 

Article 19 

With a view to accelerating the economic growth 
of developing countries and bridging the economic 
gap between developed and developing countries, 
developed countries should grant generalized pref- 
erential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory 
treatment to developing countries in those fields of 
international economic co-operation where it may 
be feasible. 

Article 20 

Developing countries should, in their efforts to 
increase their over-all trade, give due attention 
to the possibility of expanding their trade with 
socialist countries, by granting to these countries 
conditions for trade not inferior to those granted 
normally to the developed market economy countries. 

Article 21 

Developing countries should endeavour to pro- 
mote the expansion of their mutual trade and to 
this end, may, in accordance with the existing and 
evolving provisions and procedures of international 
agreements where applicable, grant trade prefer- 
ences to other developing countries without being 
obliged to extend such preferences to developed 
countries, provided these arrangements do not 
constitute an impediment to general trade liberali- 
zation and expansion. 

Article 22 

1. All States should respond to the generally 
recognized or mutually agreed development needs 
and objectives of developing countries by promot- 
ing increased net flows of real resources to the 
developing countries from all sources, taking into 
account any obligations and commitments under- 
taken by the States concerned, in order to rein- 
force the efforts of developing countries to ac- 
celerate their economic and social development. 

2. In this context, consistent with the aims and 
objectives mentioned above and taking into ac- 
count any obligations and commitments undertaken 
in this regard, it should be their endeavour to in- 
crease the net amount of financial flows from offi- 
cial sources to developing countries and to improve 
the terms and conditions. 



February 3, 1975 



151 



3. The flow of development assistance resources 
should include economic and technical assistance. 

Article 23 
To enhance the effective mobilization of their 
own resources, the developing countries should 
strengthen their economic co-operation and expand 
their mutual trade so as to accelerate their eco- 
nomic and social development. All countries, espe- 
cially developed countries, individually as well as 
through the competent international organizations 
of which they are members, should provide appro- 
priate and effective support and co-operation. 

Article 2U 

All States have the duty to conduct their mutual 
economic relations in a manner which takes into 
account the interests of other countries. In par- 
ticular, all States should avoid prejudicing the 
interests of developing countries. 

Article 25 

In furtherance of world economic development, 
the international community, especially its devel- 
oped members, shall pay special attention to the 
particular needs and problems of the least de- 
veloped among the developing countries, of land- 
locked developing countries and also island devel- 
oping countries, with a view to helping them to 
overcome their particular difficulties and thus con- 
tribute to their economic and social development. 

Article 26 

All States have the duty to coexist in tolerance 
and live together in peace, irrespective of differ- 
ences in political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, and to facilitate trade between States 
having different economic and social systems. Inter- 
national trade should be conducted without preju- 
dice to generalized non-discriminatory and non- 
reciprocal preferences in favour of developing 
countries, on the basis of mutual advantage, equita- 
ble benefits and the exchange of most-favoured- 
nation treatment. 

Article 27 

1. Every State has the right to fully enjoy the 
benefits of world invisible trade and to engage in 
the expansion of such trade. 

2. World invisible trade, based on efficiency and 
mutual and equitable benefit, furthering the expan- 
sion of the world economy, is the common goal of 
all States. The role of developing countries in world 
invisible trade should be enhanced and strength- 
ened consistent with the above objectives, particu- 
lar attention being paid to the special needs of de- 
veloping countries. 

3. All States should co-operate with developing 
countries in their endeavours to increase their 
capacity to earn foreign exchange from invisible 
transactions, in accordance with the potential and 



needs of each developing country, and consistent 
with the objectives mentioned above. 

Article 28 

All States have the duty to co-operate in achiev- 
ing adjustments in the prices of exports of develop- 
ing countries in relation to prices of their imports 
so as to promote just and equitable terms of trade 
for them, in a manner which is remunerative for 
producers and equitable for producers and con- 
sumers. 

Chapter III 

Common responsibilities 
towards the international community 

Article 29 

The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 
as well as the resources of the area, are the com- 
mon heritage of mankind. On the basis of the 
principles adopted by the General Assembly in 
resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, all 
States shall ensure that the exploration of the 
area and exploitation of its resources are carried 
out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the 
benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by 
all States, taking into account the particular inter- 
ests and needs of developing countries; an inter- 
national regime applying to the area and its re- 
sources and including appropriate international 
machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be 
established by an international treaty of a uni- 
versal character, generally agreed upon. 

Article 30 

The protection, preservation and the enhance- 
ment of the environment for the present and fu- 
ture generations is the responsibility of all States. 
All States shall endeavour to establish their own 
environmental and developmental policies in con- 
formity with such responsibility. The environ- 
mental policies of all States should enhance and 
not adversely affect the present and future de- 
velopment potential of developing countries. All 
States have the responsibility to ensure that ac- 
tivities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic- 
tion. All States should co-operate in evolving inter- 
national norms and regulations in the fields of 
the environment. 

Chapter IV 

Final provisions 

Article 31 

All States have the duty to contribute to the 
balanced expansion of the world economy, taking 
duly into account the close interrelationship be- 
tween the well-being of the developed countries 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



and the growth and development of the developing 
countries and that the prosperity of the interna- 
tional community as a whole depends upon the 
prosperity of its constituent parts. 

Article 32 
No State may use or encourage the use of eco- 
nomic, political or any other type of measures to 
coerce another State in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights. 

Article 33 

1. Nothing in the present Charter shall be con- 
strued as impairing or derogating from the provi- 
sions of the Charter of the United Nations or ac- 
tions taken in pursuance thereof. 

2. In their interpretation and application, the 
provisions of the present Charter are interrelated 
and each provision should be construed in the con- 
text of the other provisions. 

Article 34 
An item on the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States shall be inscribed on the agenda 
of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, 
and thereafter on the agenda of every fifth ses- 
sion. In this way a systematic and comprehensive 
consideration of the implementation of the Charter, 
covering both progress achieved and any improve- 
ments and additions which might become necessary, 
would be carried out and appropriate measures 
recommended. Such consideration should take into 
account the evolution of all the economic, social, 
legal and other factors related to the principles 
upon which the present Charter is based and on 
its purpose. 



U.S. Urges Early Conclusion 

of Law of the Sea Treaty 

Following is a statement by John R. 
Stevenson, Special Representative of the 
President for the Law of the Sea Conference, 
made in the U.N. General Assembly on 
December 17. 

USUN press release 202 dated December 17 

It is well known that my government 
attaches great importance to a successful 
law of the sea treaty and to the achievement 
of that goal before the pressure of events 
and the erosion of momentum place it be- 
yond our reach. 

A few weeks ago, in an extensive inter- 
view in the New York Times, Secretary 
Kissinger stressed that our interdependent 
world has approached a time when we must 



find creative solutions to mutual problems or 
face chaos. Similar thoughts were expressed 
by many speakers from all regions during 
the general debate in this body. 

There are few problems so uniquely ex- 
pressive of our global interdependence as the 
legal order of the oceans. We have made 
a good beginning in Caracas. Like many 
others, I am disappointed that our accom- 
plishments were not greater, but I am not 
discouraged about our capacity to achieve a 
treaty, given the will and the devotion to 
the task that is necessary to meet the time- 
table set by this Assembly in its resolution 
last year. That resolution — wisely, as it 
turned out — envisioned the probability that 
in addition to the Caracas session we would 
if necessary "convene not later than 1975 
any subsequent session or sessions as may 
be decided upon by the Conference and ap- 
proved by the General Assembly." 

It seems to my delegation that this resolu- 
tion was a clear mandate to complete our 
work in 1975. I do not believe there is any 
fundamental disagreement among us about 
the magnitude of that task. It is not merely 
the process of political decisions by govern- 
ments on difficult issues — frequently involv- 
ing important domestic interests — and the 
process of negotiation of the precise details 
of the many individual issues that must be 
written into final texts; it is also the sheer 
weight of the management problem of so 
many nations negotiating so many issues 
and the time that will inevitably be required, 
after detailed texts of individual articles are 
negotiated, to construct their final place in 
the overall treaty. 

No government will be more pleased than 
mine if we can complete that task during the 
time allotted to our meeting in Geneva, but 
I do not believe that we should foreclose the 
possibility of further work during 1975 if 
necessary to complete the treaty. 

Timetables, of course, are not immutable. 
I am aware of the many understandable con- 
cerns and, in some cases, genuine personal 
and governmental hardships that have been 
reflected in the negotiation of the resolution 
now before this Assembly. Nevertheless, they 
should be measured against the probability 



February 3, 1975 



153 



that with more delay, the passage of time 
and not our own efforts may well determine 
the outcome of our negotiations. 

My government reluctantly supports the 
resolution before this Assembly.' I say "re- 
luctantly" because we would strongly prefer 
that the Secretary General be given specific 
authority to schedule a second substantive 
session in 1975 if necessary and to begin 
making the arrangements that cannot be 
satisfactorily made in a few weeks or a few 
months. However, we believe that the resolu- 
tion as it .stands would not preclude the pos- 
sibility for additional intersessional work in 
1975. It would be our understanding that the 
Secretariat could proceed to do the best it can 
to insure that, if the conference determines 
such work is necessary, appropriate arrange- 
ments would be forthcoming. We welcome 
in particular the reference to the conference's 
acceptance of the invitation of the Govern- 
ment of Venezuela to return to Caracas to 
sign the final act and related instruments and 
the authorization to the Secretary General 
to make the necessary arrangements to that 
end. 

Mr. President, this conference has been 
called one of the most important held since 
the creation of the United Nations. This is 
true not only because of the importance of 
the oceans to the future well-being of all 
nations but also because its outcome may well 
determine whether we have the will and the 
institutional structure to achieve cooperative 
solutions for important global problems. 

As the many experienced negotiators in 
this room know, there comes a time in any 
negotiation when its course moves rapidly 
forward toward perceived solutions, or a 
breakdown occurs. It seems to me evident 
that that moment must come at Geneva. If 
the will is there to make the decisions and 
the accommodations that are necessary, we 
will have the momentum to move to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. 



^Resolution 3334 (XXIX) approving in operative 
paragraph 1 "the convening of the next session of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea for the period 17 March to 10 May 1975 at 
Geneva" was adopted by the Assembly unanimously 
on Dec. 17. 



Though my government is second to none 
in pressing for a timely solution by the Law 
of the Sea Conference and in seeking a work 
program to that end, our support for a timely 
conference should not be misread as a willing- 
ness to sacrifice essential national interests. 
My nation will go to Geneva to negotiate. 
Geneva can succeed, however, only if all na- 
tions approach our work in that spirit. And 
it can succeed only if all nations identify 
their essential national interests and real- 
ize in turn that others have essential in- 
terests that must be accommodated. 

Mr. President, I would also like to state our 
gratification at the willingness of the Gen- 
eral Assembly to invite the Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands to participate as an 
observer in the work of the Law of the Sea 
Conference. While we have always taken into 
account Micronesia's views and interests in 
formulating our positions, we think it ad- 
visable that Micronesia should be able to 
state its own views with regard to law of 
the sea issues. 

Mr. President, I would like to state the 
appreciation of the United States for the 
role played by Constantin Stavropoulos who, 
until November of this year, contributed 
much and wisely as the Special Represent- 
ative of Secretary General Waldheim to the 
Law of the Sea Conference. Recalling Mr. 
Stavropoulos' 20 years of service as Legal 
Counsel of the United Nations, it is only 
appropriate that we acknowledge with pro- 
found gratitude his intelligence, his insight, 
his wisdom, his humanity, and his friend- 
ship. Our loss is the gain of his homeland, 
Greece, to which he has now returned. 

We also applaud the decision of the Sec- 
retary General to appoint as his new Special 
Representative Dr. Bernardo Zuleta, a dis- 
tinguished lawyer-diplomat and the Alter- 
nate Representative of Colombia to the 
United Nations. We have known and admired 
Dr. Zuleta for a number of years. Both the 
Seabed Committee and the Law of the Sea 
Conference have benefited from his qualities 
of leadership, tolerance, industry, and wit. 
In this case, the loss to Colombia is the gain 
to the international community. 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.N. General Assembly Approves Definition of Aggression 



Following are texts of a statement made 
in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly on October 18 by Robert 
Rosenstock, Legal Affairs Adviser to the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and a 
statement made in plenary sessioyi of the 
Assembly on December lU by U.S. Repre- 
sentative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., together 
ivith the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Committee on November 21 and by the As- 
sembly on December H. 



U.S. STATEMENTS 

Mr. Rosenstock, Committee VI, October 18 

USUX press release 142 dated October IS 

My delegation wishes to take this oppor- 
tunity to reiterate our appreciation for the 
work of Professor Broms [Bengt H. G. A. 
Broms, of Finland, chairman of the Special 
Committee on the Question of Defining Ag- 
gression], who guided the deliberations, to 
Mr. Sanders [Joseph Sanders, of Guyana, 
rapporteur of the special committee], who 
not only oversaw the report but contributed 
to the consensus and introduced the report 
in this committee in a particularly lucid, 
succinct, and instructive manner. 

The United States has always had a meas- 
ure of skepticism as to the utility of defining 
aggression. We recognized the widespread 
desire of others, however, to make the at- 
tempt, and we cooperated in the effort. 
Although I cannot state that our skepticism 
has been wholly dispelled, my delegation 
was part of the consensus in the special 
committee. We stated our views on the de- 
tails of the text at that time, and they are 
set forth in annex I of the report of the 



special committee.^ They remain our views, 
and hence we will not repeat them in detail 
now. 

We, like many others, do not regard the 
definition as perfect. There is material in it 
we regard as unnecessary and there are 
phrases we regard as unfeiicitous ; there are, 
moreover, omissions from the definition 
which we regard as unfortunate. There is 
nothing remarkable in these facts. The prod- 
uct of years of intensive negotiations among 
large and small states, states with differing 
social systems, and states with different 
legal traditions can never fully reflect the 
desires of each state. The text is inevitably 
a compromise. It has the strengths and 
weaknesses of a compromise. What is re- 
markable is that we have succeeded at all 
when previous generations have failed. 

We should recognize this compromise as 
a hopeful sign of a growing spirit of inter- 
national cooperation and understanding, a 
sign that states have matured to the point 
of not insisting that their parochial concerns 
must be accepted in full by the international 
community, that they no longer insist on 
using the definition to settle other issues. 
What state is there here which does not 
have a particular security, economic, or 
other concern which it believes is not per- 
fectly reflected? If states were to insist on 
the perfect expression of their special con- 
cerns, we would not postpone the produc- 
tion of a definition; we would be deciding 
once and for all that a definition is impos- 
sible. In this connection, my delegation 
notes the forbearance shown by the delegate 
of Afghanistan. 



'U.N. doc. A/9619; for a statement by Mr. 
Rosenstock made in the special committee on Apr. 
12, see Bulletin of May 6, 1974, p. 498. 



February 3, 1975 



155 



What the special committee has forwarded 
to the Assembly is not a substitute for the 
type of definition one would seek in a dic- 
tionary. That would serve no useful pur- 
pose; we are not defining a term in the ab- 
stract, but seeking to provide guidance for 
the understanding of the meaning and func- 
tion of the term as set forth in article 39 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 

The definition, moreover, does not and 
should not seek to establish obligations and 
rights of states; for that is not the function 
of article 39 of the charter. The United Na- 
tions has already completed a major exer- 
cise in the field of rules concerning use of 
force when it adopted the Friendly Rela- 
tions Declaration. The definition of aggres- 
sion neither adds to nor subtracts from that 
important declaration. The draft text under- 
lines this fact in its preambular reaffirma- 
tion of the Friendly Relations Declaration. 

The draft before us is a recommendation 
by the General Assembly designed to pro- 
vide guidance for the Security Council in 
the exercise of its primary responsibility 
under the charter to maintain and, where 
necessary, to restore international peace 
and security. The second, fourth, and tenth 
paragraphs of the preamble and articles 2 
and 4 clearly reflect the intention of the 
drafters to work within the framework of 
the charter, which grants disci'etion to the 
Security Council. There is nothing the Gen- 
eral Assembly or the Security Council can 
do under the charter to alter the discretion 
of the Council. The Assembly can provide 
suggested guidance to the Security Council, 
and since the membership of the Council is 
drawn from the membership of the Assem- 
bly, there is every reason to assume the 
Security Council will give due weight to this 
important recommendation. 

The structure of the draft definition accu- 
rately reflects the function of such a defini- 
tion and the charter limits within which 
the assembly is obliged to work. Article 1 
of the draft is a general statement based on 
article 2 of the charter. Like article 2 of the 
charter, it makes no distinction on the basis 
of the means of armed force used. Article 1, 
moreover, makes clear by the phrase "as 



set out in this Definition" that article 1 may 
not be read in isolation from the other arti- 
cles and that not all illegal uses of armed 
force should be regarded as capable of de- 
nomination as acts of aggression. 

Article 2 of the text suggests considera- 
tions the Security Council should bear in 
mind in analyzing a particular situation 
which may be brought before it. The phrase 
"p7ima facie evidence" is fully consistent 
with the legal structure of chapter VII of 
the charter, which i-equires that a finding 
of an act of aggression must result from a 
positive.^ decision of the Security Council. 
Article 2 in particular and the definition in 
general is fully consistent with the manner 
in which the Security Council may, and 
in fact does, approach problems of this 
nature. The Council examines all the rele- 
vant facts and circumstances and then 
seeks the most pragmatic available means 
of dealing with the situation. This draft 
definition is an eff"ort to provide guidance 
in that process of examination. 

Article 3 of the text represents an effort 
to set forth certain examples of the use of 
force which the Security Council could rea- 
sonably consider, in the manner suggested 
by article 2, to qualify as potential acts of 
aggression. The problems some have imag- 
ined with regard to this article are false 
problems. That the subparagraphs of article 
3 cannot be read in vacuo is made clear by 
common sense — "Bombardment by the armed 
forces of a State against the territory of 
another State" cannot be imagined to con- 
stitute aggression if, for example, it is exer- 
cised pursuant to the inherent right of self- 
defense. But the text does not merely rely 
on common sense. Article 3 expressly states 
that it is "subject to . . . article 2," and 
article 8 requires us to accept the inter- 
related nature of all the articles. Any ac- 
tion which might qualify as an act of ag- 
gression must be a use of force in contra- 
vention of the charter. Surely no one here 
would wish to assert a right to use force "in 
contravention of the Charter." For these 
reasons my delegation sees no legal basis 
for objecting to the inclusion of any of the 
subparagraphs of article 3 and no greater 



156 



Department of State Bulletin 



basis for clarifying subparagraph (b) than 
subparagraph (d) or (a) or (c), et cetera. 

The subparagraphs of article 3 do not, of 
course, purport to spell out in detail all the 
illicit uses of force which could qualify as 
an act of aggression. The subparagraphs 
must be understood as a summary, and 
I'eference to such documents as the Declara- 
tion of Friendly Relations is particularly 
helpful in understanding some of the sub- 
paragraphs. For example, some have sug- 
gested that subparagraphs (f) and (g) fail 
accurately to reflect present-day realities. 
Although my delegation would certainly 
have seen great value in more detailed cov- 
erage of those acts which have been such a 
source of violence in the second half of this 
century, our concern is ameliorated by the 
fact that the ground summarily covered by 
these paragraphs is already more fully set 
out in the Friendly Relations Declaration. 

Article 4 is a useful emphasis of the in- 
herently inexhaustive nature of any listing 
of specific acts and a further reaffirmation 
of the discretion of the Security Council. 

Articles 5, 6, and 7 are not properly part 
of the definition of aggression but, rather, 
set forth some of the legal consequences 
which would flow from a finding of aggres- 
sion by the Security Council and contain 
certain savings clauses expressly indicating 
some of the situations or rights not af- 
fected by the first four articles. 

Article 6 reminds us that a definition of 
the term "aggression" as set forth in arti- 
cle 39 of the charter creates no new rights 
and does not cut across existing rights and 
obligations. It does not support the restric- 
tive meaning some have sought to place on 
article 53 of the charter. The definition 
neither restricts nor expands the inherent 
right of self-defense. The special committee 
wisely recognized that defining the inherent 
right of self-defense was beyond the scope 
of a definition of aggression. We trust no 
delegation would wish to assert the need, 
in the course of approving a definition of 
aggression, to expand the right of self-de- 
fense. Any such move, even if directed only 
at a subparagraph, would make our action 
into a negative contribution. 



Article 7 expressly affirms the fact that 
the purpose of this exercise is to define 
aggression and not the entitlement of all 
peoples to equal rights and self-determina- 
tion. This article, particularly when read in 
conjunction with article 6, does not and can 
not legitimize acts of armed force which 
would otherwise be illegal. 

We believe the draft definition, which is 
the product of the many years of careful 
work, deserves unanimous acceptance by 
the General Assembly. In expressing this 
view we are mindful of the need not to place 
too great an emphasis on what we have 
accomplished. The Security Council must 
not be tempted to pursue the question of 
whether aggression has been committed if 
to do so would delay expeditious action 
under chapter VII pursuant to a finding of 
a "threat to the peace" or a "breach of the 
peace." The definition will do far more harm 
than good if it ever serves to distract the 
Council and cause any delay in action the 
Council could otherwise have taken. 

We hope the guidelines set forth in the 
definition will contribute to the more effec- 
tive functioning of the collective security 
system of the United Nations and thus to 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security. For this reason we are prepared 
to continue to form part of the consensus. 

Ambassador Bennett, Plenary, December 14 

rSUN press release 199 dated December 14 

The U.S. delegation believes the adoption 
by consensus of this definition is one of the 
positive achievements of this 29th General 
Assembly. The adoption of this definition 
coming after so many years of considera- 
tion and negotiation is in fact, in our view, 
a historic moment. We believe this accom- 
plishment may in large measure be attrib- 
uted to the working methods used by the 
special committee. My delegation has ex- 
pressed its views on the details of the defi- 
nition at the 1,480th meeting of the Legal 
Committee as well as at the 113th meeting 
of the special committee. These remain our 
views, and I see no need to reiterate them 
in extenso here today. 



February 3, 1975 



157 



We indicated there that, while we would 
have preferred more explicit and detailed 
coverage of certain very contemporary 
forms of violence, we were satisfied that 
these indirect uses of force were indeed 
covered. We have stressed the importance 
that we attach to the express recognition of 
the fact that the specific list of acts set 
forth in article 3 of the definition is not 
exhaustive, and we have stressed the im- 
portance we attach to the fact that the text 
neither expands nor diminishes the permis- 
sible uses of force. 

We believe the recommendations included 
in the definition are, by and large, likely to 
provide useful guidance to the Security 
Council, which, after all, is the function of 
the definition. This is particularly so since, 
as is made clear by operative paragraph 4 
of the resolution, nothing in the definition 
alters or purports to alter the discretion of 
the Security Council. This is quite proper, 
of course, since neither the General Assem- 
bly nor indeed the Security Council itself is 
empowered to change the discretion of the 
Council, that discretion being derived from 
the language of the charter itself. 

We see nothing in any of the various ex- 
planatory notes which affects the substance 
of the text of the definition or affects our 
views of it. 

The United States fully shares the hope 
expressed in the preamble of these guide- 
lines that they will contribute to the more 
effective functioning of the collective secu- 
rity system of the United Nations and thus 
to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the report of the Special Com- 
mittee on the Question of Defining Agression, 
established pursuant to its resolution 2330 (XXII) 
of 18 December 1967, covering the work of its 
seventh session held from 11 March to 12 April 
1974, including the draft Definition of Aggression 



-U.N. doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX); adopted by the 
Assembly on Dec. 14 without a vote. 



adopted by the Special Committee by consensus and 
recommended for adoption by the General .\ssembly, 
Deeply convinced that the adoption of the Defini- 
tion of Aggression would contribute to the strength- 
ening of international peace and security, 

1. Approves the Definition of Aggression, the text 
of which is annexed to the present resolution; 

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Com- 
mittee on the Question of Defining Aggression for 
its work which resulted in the elaboration of the 
Definition of Aggression; 

3. Calls upon all States to refrain from all acts 
of aggression and other uses of force contrar>' to 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declara- 
tion on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations; 

4. Calls the attention of the Security Council to 
the Definition of Aggression, as set out below, ami 
recommends that it should, as appropriate, take 
account of that Definition as guidance in determin- 
ing, in accordance with the Charter, the existence 
of an act of aggression. 

ANNEX 
Definition of Aggression 

The General Assembly, 

Basing itself on the fact that one of the funda- 
mental purposes of the United Nations is to main- 
tain international peace and security and to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup- 
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace. 

Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance 
with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what meas- 
ures shall be taken in accordance with .\rticles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 

Recalling also the duty of States under the Char- 
ter to settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in order not to endanger international peace, 
security and justice, 

Bearing in mind that nothing in this Definition 
shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the 
scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect 
to the functions and powers of the organs of the 
United Nations, 

Considering also that, since aggression is the 
most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use 
of force, being fraught, in the conditions created 
by the existence of all types of weapons of mass 
destruction, with the possible threat of a world 



( 



158 



Department of State Bulletin 



conflict and all its catastrophic consequences, ag- 
gression should be defined at the present stage, 

Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed 
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-deter- 
mination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt 
territorial integrity. 

Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall 
not be violated by being the object, even tempo- 
rarily, of military occupation or of other measures of 
force taken by another State in contravention of 
the Charter, and that it shall not be the object of 
acquisition by another State resulting from such 
measures or the threat thereof, 

Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, 

Convinced that the adoption of a definition of 
aggression ought to have the effect of deterring 
a potential aggressor, would simplify the determina- 
tion of acts of aggression and the implementation 
of measures to suppress them and would also facili- 
tate the protection of the rights and lawful inter- 
ests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the 
victim, 

Belieiung that, although the question whether an 
act of aggression has been committed must be con- 
sidered in the light of all the circumstances of each 
particular case, it is nevertheless desirable to formu- 
late basic principles as guidance for such deteiTni- 
nation. 

Adopts the following Definition of Aggression: '' 

Article 1 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State 



° Explanatory notes on articles 3 and 5 are to be 
found in paragraph 20 of the report of the Special 
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression 
(Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- 
ninth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/9619 and 
Corr. 1)). Statements on the Definition are con- 
tained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report of the 
Sixth Committee (A/9890). [Footnote in original.] 

Following are explanatory notes included in para- 
graph 20 of U.N. doc. 9619: 

1. With reference to article 3, subparagraph (b), 
the Special Committee agreed that the expression 
"any weapons" is used without making a distinc- 
tion between conventional weapons, weapons of mass 
destruction and any other kind of weapon. 

2. With reference to the first paragraph of article 
5, the Committee had in mind, in particular, the 
principle contained in the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations according to 
which "No State or group of States has the right 
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 



against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or polit- 
ical independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as set out in this Definition. 

Explanatory note: In this Definition the term 

"State"; 

(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of 
recognition or to whether a State is a Member of 
the United Nations; 

(6) Includes the concept of a "group of States" 
where appropriate. 

Article 2 

The first use of armed force by a State in con- 
travention of the Charter shall constitute prima 
facie evidence of an act of aggression although the 
Security Council may, in conformity with the Char- 
ter, conclude that a determination that an act of 
aggression has been committed would not be justi- 
fied in the light of other relevant circumstances, 
including the fact that the acts concerned or their 
consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 

Article 3 

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declara- 
tion of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with 
the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of 
aggression: 

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces 
of a State of the territory of another State, or any 
military occupation, however temporary, resulting 
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by 
the use of force of the territory of another State 
or part thereof; 



whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State". 

3. With reference to the second paragrraph of 
article 5, the words "international responsibility" 
are used without prejudice to the scope of this term. 

4. With reference to the third paragraph of article 
5, the Committee states that this paragraph should 
not be construed so as to prejudice the established 
principles of international law relating to the inad- 
missibility of territorial acquisition resulting from 
the threat or use of force. 

Following are paragraphs 9 and 10 of U.N. doc. 
9890: 

9. The Sixth Committee agreed that nothing in 
the Definition of Aggression, and in particular arti- 
cle 3 (c), shall be construed as a justification for a 
State to block, contrary to international law, the 
routes of free access of a land-locked country to 
and from the sea. 

10. The Sixth Committee agreed that nothing in 
the Definition of Aggression, and in particular 
article 3 (d), shall be construed as in any way 
prejudicing the authority of a State to exercise its 
rights within its national jurisdiction, provided such 
exercise is not inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. 



February 3, 1975 



159 



(6) Bombardment by the armed forces of a 
State against the territory of another State or the 
use of any weapons by a State against the territory 
of another State; 

(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a 
State by the armed forces of another State; 

(d) An attaclt by the armed forces of a State 
on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air 
fleets of another State; 

(c) The use of armed forces of one State which 
are within the territory of another State with 
the agreement of the receiving State, in contra- 
vention of the conditions provided for in the agree- 
ment or any extension of their presence in such 
territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 

(/) The action of a State in allowing its terri- 
tory, which it has placed at the disposal of another 
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrat- 
ing an act of aggression against a third State; 

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 

Article h 

The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive 
and the Security Council may determine that other 
acts constitute aggression under the provisions of 
the Charter. 

Article 5 

1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether 
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve 
as a justification for aggression. 

2. A war of aggression is a crime against inter- 
national peace. Aggression gives rise to interna- 
tional responsibility. 

3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage 
resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized 
as lawful. 

Article 6 

Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as 
in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of 
the Charter, including its provisions concerning 
cases in which the use of force is lawful. 

Article 7 

Nothing in this Definition, and in particular 
article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to 
self-determination, freedom and independence, as 
derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly de- 
prived of that right and referred to in the Declara- 
tion on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and 
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; 



nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that 
end to seek and receive support, in accordance with 
the principles of the Charter and in conformity with 
the above-mentioned Declaration. 

Article 8 

In their interpretation and application the above 
provisions are interrelated and each provision 
should be construed in the context of the other 
provisions. 



U.S. Declines To Participate 
in U.N. Special Fund 

Fullowing is a statement made iu tin 
U.N. General Assembly on December 18 bj/ 
U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Fei- 
guson, Jr. 

TSTN press rfleasp 201 dnfixl December IS 

The draft resolution before us, contained 
in document A, 9952,' finally establishes the 
Special Fund called for by the special ses- 
sion of the General Assembly in Resolution 
3202 of May 1, 1974. In that special session 
my delegation repeatedly expressed its 
doubts as to the viability of a Special Fund 
to respond to the urgent emergency needs 
of countries most seriously affected by eco- 
nomic imbalances principally attributable to 
sudden and traumatic tripled and quad- 
rupled prices of petroleum. We expressed 
the view that time was of the essence, that 
the most expeditious way of responding to 
unquestioned needs would be a consistent 
plan utilizing existing channels of assistance 
and existing institutions. Regrettably, the 
views of my government were not heeded 
nor, in our opinion, in any way taken into 
account in the provisions of Resolution 3202 
of the sixth special session. - 

Disappointed as we were with that out- 
come — a disappointment we have expressed 
in the special session, in the session of 
ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council], 



' Report of the Second Committee on agenda 
item 98, "Programme of Action on the Establish- 
ment of a New International Economic Order." 

■ For a U.S. statement and texts of resolutions 
adopted by the sixth special session of the U.N. 
General Assembly on May 1, see Bulletin of May 
18, 1974, p. 569. 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



and in the Second Committee — we nonethe- 
less acquiesced in the will of the majority. 
Mr. President, the United States takes seri- 
ously its obligations as a member state in 
this organization. In that spirit, we partici- 
pated in the work of the ad hoc committee 
to establish the Special Fund. We will con- 
sequently, but with regret, acquiesce in the 
adoption of the draft resolution without a 
vote.'- 

Despite the strong views of my govern- 
ment regarding a new international eco- 
nomic order, we have no desire to obstruct 
the work of the Special Fund or the work 
of any other body of the United Nations. It 
may well be that for the newly rich member 
states without established patterns and in- 
stitutions for rendering assistance, the Spe- 
cial Fund might be attractive. For the 
United States, however, we shall be con- 
sistent in our views and position regarding 
the most effective means of responding to 
the plight of the most seriously affected. 

We did not believe last May that this 
new institution was needed or could be a 
viable means of rendering emergency as- 
sistance. We do not believe today that the 
Fund is needed. We do not today believe it 
is viable. Consequently, my government will 
not pledge or contribute to the Special Fund. 

Mr. President, I should like to call the 
Assembly's attention to paragraph 10 of 
document A 9952, wherein the Second Com- 
mittee recommended that at the first elec- 
tion for the Board of Governors for the 
Special Fund, the Assembly should elect as 
Governors those states which were members 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Special 
Program. Although my government was a 
member of the ad hoc committee, we will, 
for all the foregoing reasons, decline elec- 
tion to the Board of Governors. We believe 
the Board of Governors should logically 
consist of those expecting to contribute or 
expecting to receive assistance from the 
Special Fund. We should not have wished 
to create the impression through our par- 



' Resolution 3356 (XXIX), setting forth provi- 
sions for the operation of the Special Fund as an 
organ of the General Assembly, was adopted by 
the Assembly on Dec. 18 without a vote. 



ticipation in the Board that eventual U.S. 
support would have been likely. Our declina- 
tion of election to the Board is thus an ac- 
tion consistent with our expressed views 
and intentions. 

In conclusion, Mr. President, we must 
also take note that the cost of the projected 
staffing and administration even now ap- 
pears unnecessarily high for an institution 
with dim prospects of meaningful resources. 
We fear — as we had predicted last May and 
last July — that the principal function of 
this Fund is to insert yet another layer of 
bureaucracy between donors and those who 
so desperately need assistance. 



U.S. Deplores Continued Occupation 
of Namibia by South Africa 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
John Scali on December 17, together tvith 
the text of a resolution adopted by the Coun- 
cil that day. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI 

rsrX press rele.ise 200 dated December 17 

U.N. concern over the South African ad- 
ministration of Namibia spans the life of 
this organization. For the seventh consecu- 
tive year, the Security Council is consider- 
ing this same question of Namibia. Since 
the Security Council met last December to 
discuss the future of Namibia, we are all 
aware that political developments of great 
importance to Namibia and the rest of south- 
ern Africa have taken place. 

The April events in Portugal have irrev- 
ocably altered the political map of southern 
Africa. These events have set in motion a 
continuing and dramatic movement toward 
full decolonization in Portuguese Africa. 
More recently, meetings held in Zambia in- 
volving the various political forces on the 
Rhodesian scene have raised hopes that a 
solution to the Rhodesian issue acceptable 
to a majority of the people may soon be 



February 3, 1975 



161 



negotiated. These developments, we believe, 
must necessarily impel South Africa to re- 
examine its basic policies regarding Namibia 
in light of the new realities. 

The position of my government on the 
Namibian question is clear and unequivocal. 
We have informed the Government of South 
Africa of our views on this issue and will 
continue to do so when appropriate. We 
believe that there is an urgent need to re- 
solve this longstanding and contentious is- 
sue peacefully and as soon as possible. 

We are encouraged by recent indications 
that South Africa may be reviewing its 
policies in Namibia. The South African Gov- 
ernment has announced that the people of 
Namibia will be called upon to decide their 
own future, that all options including full 
independence are open to them, and that 
the people of the territory may exercise 
their right to self-determination "consider- 
ably sooner" than the 10-year forecast made 
by the South African Foreign Minister in 
1973. 

We believe that a peaceful and realistic 
solution should be sought now. We under- 
stand that a meeting is planned between 
representatives of various groups in the 
territory and the leaders of the white popu- 
lation to discuss the constitutional develop- 
ment of the territory. We believe no signifi- 
cant element of the Namibian people or of 
Namibian political life should be excluded. 

However, as much as we welcome the 
changes in recent South African Govern- 
ment statements on Namibia, we wish to 
state in all candor our view that these state- 
ments lack necessary precision and detail. 
It is this very precision, along with positive 
actions, which is required to lay to rest the 
skepticism with which South African pro- 
nouncements on Namibia have been received 
in many quarters. What is called for is a 
specific, unequivocal statement of South 
Africa's intention with regard to the terri- 
tory. We urge that government to make 
known as soon as possible its plans to permit 
the people of Namibia to exercise their right 
to self-determination in the near future. 

We further favor the development of re- 



newed contacts between the Secretary Gen- 
eral and the South African Government to 
assist South Africa in arranging for the 
exercise of self-determination. The construc- 
tive involvement of the United Nations and 
the Secretary General can be of significant 
importance to assure an orderly transition 
of power in the territory, which is to every- 
one's benefit. We also believe South Africa 
should abolish discriminatory laws and prac- 
tices and encourage freer political expres- 
sion within the whole territory. 

While awaiting further South African 
clarification of its Namibian policy, the 
United States will continue to adhere to its 
present policy with regard to the territory. 
As we have since 1970, we will continue to 
discourage U.S. investment in Namibia and 
deny Export-Import Bank guarantees and 
other facilities for trade with Namibia. We 
will continue to withhold U.S. Government 
protection of U.S. investments, made on the 
basis of rights acquired through the South 
African Government after 1966, against the 
claims of a future lawful government of 
Namibia. This policy reflects our belief that 
South Africa should act quickly and posi- 
tively to end its illegal occupation of Nami- 
bia. 

In addition, we are pleased that we were 
able to join together in advance consulta- 
tions with members of the African group 
to adopt this important new resolution. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION' 

The Security Couttcil, 

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 
(XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South 
Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, 
and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 1967, which estab- 
lished a United Nations Council for Namibia, as 
well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, 
in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 Decem- 
ber 1974, 

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) 
of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 
264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 
August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) 



'U.N. doc. S RES 366 (1974); adopted by the 
Council unanimously on Dec. 17. 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 
1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 
20 October 1971 and 310 (1972) of 4 February 
1972, which confirmed General Assembly decisions. 

Recalling the advisory opinion of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South 
Africa is under obligation to withdraw its pres- 
ence from the Territory, 

Concerned about South Africa's continued il- 
legal occupation of Namibia and its persistent re- 
fusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of 
the General Assembly and the Security Council, 
as well as the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, 

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal re- 
pression of the Namibian people and its persistent 
violation of their human rights, as well as its 
efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial 
integrity of Namibia, 

1. Condemns the continued illegal occupation of 
the Territory of Namibia by South Africa ; 

2. Condemns the illegal and arbitrary applica- 
tion by South Africa of racially discriminatory 
and repressive laws and practices in Namibia; 

3. Demands that South Africa make a solemn 
declaration that it will comply with the resolutions 
and decisions of the United Nations and the ad- 
visory opinion of the International Court of Jus- 
tice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and 
that it recognizes the territorial integrity and 
unity of Namibia as a nation, such declaration to 
be addressed to the Security Council of the United 
Nations; 

4. Demands that South Africa take the necessary 
steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with 
resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969), of its il- 
legal administration maintained in Namibia and to 
transfer power to the people of Namibia with the 
assistance of the United Nations; 

5. Demands further that South Africa, pending 
the transfer of powers provided for in the preced- 
ing paragraph: 

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with 
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; 

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, in- 
cluding those imprisoned or detained in connexion 
with offences under so-called internal security laws, 
whether such Namibians have been charged or 
tried or are held without charge and whether held 
in Namibia or South Africa; 

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all 
racially discriminatory and politically repressive 
laws and practices, particularly bantustans and 
homelands; 

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians 
currently in exile for political reasons full facili- 
ties for return to their country without risk of 
arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment; 



6. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to 
meet on or before 30 May 1975 for the purpose of 
reviewing South Africa's compliance with the 
terms of this resolution and, in the event of non- 
compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of 
considering the appropriate measures to be taken 
under the Charter. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.' 
Accession deposited: New Zealand (with declara- 
tion), December 23, 1974. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of pho- 
nograms against unauthorized duplication of 
their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 
1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the 
United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808. 
Xotification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratification deposited: India, 

November 12. 1974. 
E:ctension by the United Kingdom to: Bermuda, 

British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibral- 

ter. Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Montserrat, St. 

Lucia, and Seychelles, December 4, 1974. 

Postal 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general reg- 
ulations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol 
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo No- 
vember 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, 
except for article V of the additional protocol, 
which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 
7150. 

Ratifications deposited: Argentina (with declara- 
tions), November 6, 1974; Cameroon, Novem- 
ber 21, 1974; Cuba, July 4, 1974; Nigeria, 
February 6, 1974. 
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 



^ Not in force. 



February 3, 1975 



163 



July 1, 1971; for the United States December 

31, 1971. TIAS 7236. 

Approval deposited: Argentina, November 6, 1974. 

Property — Industrial 

Nice aKreenient concerning the international clas- 
sification of goods and services for the purposes 
of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as 
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered 
into force March 18, 1970; for the United States 
May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419. 

Xo'tificatioii from World Intellectual Property 
OrgaiiUatioii that ratification deposited: Bel- 
gium, November 12, 1974. 
Notification from World Intellectual Propertii 
Organization that accession deposited: Luxem- 
bourg, December 24, 1974. 
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20. 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organisation that ratifications deposited: Bel- 
gium, November 12, 1974; Dahomey, December 
12, 1974; Luxembourg, Poland," South Af- 
rica," December 24, 1974. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organization that accession deposited: Brazil,-' 
December 24, 1974. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 
14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for 
the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, October 31, 
1974; Dahomey, December 9, 1974; Luxem- 
bourg, December 19, 1974; Poland, South Af- 
rica, December 23, 1974. 
Accession deposited: Brazil, December 20, 1974. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Greece, December 17, 1974. 



International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974. Done at London November 1, 1974.' 
Signature: Argentina, December 12, 1974.' 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Signatures: Guatemala, December 12, 1974; 
United Kingdom, December 13, 1974; Yugo- 
slavia, December 17, 1974. 



BILATERAL 



Israel 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 12, 
1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 
5723, 5909, 6071), for cooperation concerninu 
civil uses of atomic energy, with related notes. 
Signed at Washington January 13, 1975. Enters 
into force on the date on which each govern- 
ment shall have received from the other written 
notification that it has complied with all statu- 
tory and constitutional requirements for entry 
into force. 

Romania 

Agreement on cooperation and exchanges in the 
cultural, educational, scientific and technological 
fields. Signed at Bucharest December 13, 1974. 
Entered into force January 1, 1975. 

Uruguay 

Agreement relating to payment to the United 
States of the net proceeds from the sale of de- 
fense articles by Uruguay. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Montevideo December 11 and 30, 
1974. Entered into force December 30, 1974; ef- 
fective July 1, 1974. 



' Not in force. 

- With a reservation. 

' Articles 1 through 12 excepted. 

' Subject to ratification. 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 3, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1858 



Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 145 

Economic Affairs 

Oil Cargo Preference Bill Vetoed by President 

Ford (memorandum of disapproval) . . . 138 

U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (Percy, text 
of resolution) 146 

Energy. The State of the Union (excerpts) . 133 

Law of the Sea. U.S. Urges Early Conclusion 
of Law of the Sea Treaty (Stevenson) . . 153 

Namibia. U.S. Deplores Continued Occupation 
of Namibia by South Africa (Scali, text 
of resolution) 161 

Presidential Documents 

Oil Cargo Preference Bill Vetoed by President 

Ford 138 

President Ford Signs Trade Act of 1974 . . 137 
The State of the Union (excerpts) .... 133 

South Africa. U.S. Deplores Continued Occu- 
pation of Namibia by South Africa (Scali, 
text of resolution) 161 

Trade. President Ford Signs Trade Act of 

1974 (remarks) 137 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 163 

United Nations 

U.N. General Assembly Approves Definition 
of Aggression (Bennett, Rosenstock, text 
of resolution) 155 

U.S. Declines To Participate in U.N. Special 

Fund (Ferguson) 160 

U.S. Deplores Continued Occupation of Na- 
mibia by South Africa (Scali, text of reso- 
lution) 161 

U.S. Urges Early Conclusion of Law of the 

Sea Treaty (Stevenson) 153 

U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (Percy, text 
of resolution) 146 



U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of January 14 139 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Protests North Viet-Nam's 
Violations of Peace Accords (note to partic- 
ipants in International Conference on Viet- 
Nam and members of ICCS) 144 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 155 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 160 

Ford, President 133, 137, 138 

Kissinger, Secretary 139 

Percy, Charles H 146 

Rosenstock, Robert 155 

Scali, John 161 

Stevenson, John R 153 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 



Subject 



12 1/13 Diplomatic note on Viet-Nam 

agreement. 

13 1/14 Kissinger: news conference. 

*14 1/15 Regional Foreign Policy Confer- 
ence, San Diego, Jan. 23. 

*15 1/16 U.S. -Malaysia textile agreements 
extended. 

i"15 1/16 Kissinger: interview with Bill 
Moyers. 

*17 1/16 American scholars visit Carib- 
bean. 

♦18 1/17 U.S.-Canadian officials meet on ef- 
fects of Garrison Diversion Unit. 



* Not printed. 

1 Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
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■3: 



'^//8^? 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXn 



No. 1859 



February 10, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR "BILL MOYERS' JOURNAL" 165 

AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000 
Address by Under Secretary Sisco 182 

THE ENERGY CRISIS AND EFFORTS TO ASSURE ITS SOLUTION 
Address by Assistant Secretai'y Hartman 189 



M-.pr 



DEPOSITORY 

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POUCY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN* 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1859 
February 10, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printingr Office 

Washingrton, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic $42.50. foreign $63.15 

Sine:le copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note' Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN.' 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



i 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill Moyers' Journal' 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by Bill Moyers on 
January 15 for the Public Broadcast Service 
series "Bill Moyers' Journal: International 
Re/port." 

Press release 16 dated January 16 

Mr. Moyers: Mr. Secretary, I was think- 
ing coming down here of a conversation we 
had when you were teaching at Harvard in 
1968, six months before you came to the 
White House. You had a very reasonably 
clear view, a map of the world iti your mind 
at that time, a ivorld based on the stability 
brought about by the main poivers. I am 
wondering what that map is like in yovr 
mind now of the world. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I thought at the 
time, and I still do, that you cannot have a 
peaceful world without most of the coun- 
tries, and preferably all of the countries, 
feeling that they have a share in it. This 
means that those countries that have the 
greatest capacity to determine peace or war 
— that is, the five major centers — be reason- 
ably agreed on the general outlines of what 
that peace should be like. But at the same 
time, one of the central facts of our period 
is that more than 100 nations have come 
into being in the last 15 years, and they, too, 
must be central participants in this process. 
So that for the first time in history foreign 
policy has become truly global and therefore 
truly complicated. 

Mr. Moyers: What about the fow of wealth 
to countries in the Middle East? Hasn't that 
upset considerably the equilibrium that you 
thought would be possible between the five 
centers of poiver? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, the world that 
we all knew in 1968, when you and I talked, 
is extraordinarily diff'ei-ent today. At that 
time we had the rigid hostility between the 
Communist world and the non-Communist 
world. At that time Communist China, the 
People's Republic of China, was outside the 
mainstream of events. And at that time, you 
are quite right, the oil-producing countries 
were not major factors. The change in influ- 
ence of the oil-producing countries, the flow 
of resources to the oil-producing countries 
in the last two years in a way that was un- 
expected and is unprecedented, is a major 
change in the international situation to 
which we are still in the process of attempt- 
ing to adjust. 

Mr. Moyers: All of these changes brought 
to mind something you once ivrote. You said 
"statesmen know the future, they feel it in 
their bones, but they are incapable of proving 
the truth of their vision." And I am tvo7ider- 
ing, what are your bones telling you now 
about the future, with all of these new forces 
at work? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I feel we are 
at a watershed. We are at a period which 
in retrospect is either going to be seen as a 
period of extraordinary creativity or a pe- 
riod when really the international order 
came apart, politically, economically, and 
morally. 

I believe that with all the dislocations we 
now experience, there also exists an extraor- 
dinary opportunity to form for the first time 
in history a truly global society, carried by 
the pi'inciple of interdependence. And if we 
act wisely and with vision, I think we can 
look back to all this turmoil as the birth 



February 10, 1975 



165 



pangs of a more creative and better system. 
If we miss the opportunity, I think there is 
going to be chaos. 

Mr. Moyers: But at the same time the 
opportunity exists, as you yourself have said, 
the political problem is that the Western 
world — and this is a direct quote of yours— 
is suffering "from inner uncertainty" and a 
sense of misdirection.' What is causing that 
imier uncertainty? Is it external, is it in- 
ternal, or is it siynply we don't know rvhat 
we really tvant to do? 

Secretary Kissinger: Bill, I think you are 
quite right. The aspect of contemporary hfe 
that worries me most is the lack of purpose 
and direction of so much of the Western 
world. There are many reasons for this. The 
European countries have had to adjust in 
this century to two world wars, to an enor- 
mous change in their position, to a dramatic, 
really social revolution in all of them — and 
now to the process of European unification. 

The new countries are just beginning to 
develop a coherent picture of the interna- 
tional world, having spent most of their 
energies gaining independence. 

And in the United States, we have had a 
traumatic decade — the assassination of a 
President and his brother, the Viet-Nam 
war, the Watergate period. 

So we have this great opportunity, at a 
moment when the self-confidence in the 
whole Western world has been severely 
shaken. 

On the other hand, as far as the United 
States at least is concerned, I believe we are 
a healthy country, and I believe we are 
capable of dealing with the problem that I 
have described creatively. 

Mr. Moyers: But you also used a "per- 
haps" in that statement. You said that every 
country in the Western world is suffering 
from inner uncertainty with the exception 
perhaps of the United States. And I am 
xvondering why you brought in the "per- 
haps." 



' For the transcript of an interview with Secre- 
tary Kissinger for Business Week magazine, see 
Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1975, p. 97. 



Secretary Kissinger: Because no countr\ 
can go through what the United States has 
gone through without suffering, on the one 
hand, some damage but also gaining in wis- 
dom. I think it is the process of growing up 
to learn one's limits and derive from that a 
consciousness of what is possible within 
these limits. 

Through the greater part of our history 
we felt absolutely secure. In the postwar 
period we emerged from a victorious war 
with tremendous resources. Now the last 
decade has taught America that we cannot 
do everything and that we cannot achieve 
things simply by wishing them intensely. 
On the other hand, while that has been a 
difficult experience for us, it also should have 
given us a new sense of perspective. 

So I used the word "perhaps" because our 
reaction to these experiences will determine 
how we will master the future. But I am 
really quite confident that if we act in con- 
cert, and if we regain — as I think we can 
and must — our national consensus, that we 
can do what is necessary. 

Progress Toward Consensus on Energy 

Mr. Moyers: In the postwar world, the 
consensus between Europe and America was 
built around a common defense against a 
mutual danger. That has disappeared. The 
defense structure is very weak in the West 
at the moment, and a new factor, the eco- 
nomic imperative, has arisen. Europe and 
Japan are much more dependent, for exam- 
ple, on Middle Eastern oil than we are. 
Doesn't that make them less dependable as 
members of this new consensus? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not. Bill, 
agree that the defense is weak. Actually, we 
have had considerable success in building a 
quite strong defensive system between us 
and Europe and between us and Japan — 
especially between us and Europe. The diffi- 
culty is that the perception of the threat 
has diminished and so many new problems 
have arisen that simply a common defense is 
not enough by itself to provide the cement 
of unity. 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



You pointed out the economic problem. It 
is an interesting fact that in April 1973 I 
called for the economic unity of the indus- 
trialized countries. At that time this was 
rejected as carrying the alliance much too 
far. Today every one of our friends insists 
that we coordinate our economic policies, 
because they recognize that their prosperity 
depends on our economic programs. 

Now, the problem of relations to the oil 
producers, for example, has in Europe and 
in Japan evoked a much greater sense of 
vulnerability than in the United States, be- 
cause it is based on fact. 

Mr. Moyers: Wouldn't we be worried if 
7oe ivere in their position? 

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely. I am not 
criticizing either the Europeans or the 
Japanese for their reaction. We have at- 
tempted to create in them a sense that to- 
gether with us we can master the energy 
problem. And in all the discussions of con- 
servation, recycling, alternative sources of 
energy, financial solidarity, there are many 
technical solutions. We have always chosen 
the one that in our judgment has the great- 
est potential to give our friends a sense that 
they can master their fate and to overcome 
the danger of impotence which is a threat 
at one and the same time to their interna- 
tional as well as to their domestic positions. 
This process is not yet completed. And as 
we go through it, there are many ups and 
downs. 

On the other hand, we have to remember 
it is only one year since the Washington 
Energy Conference has been called — less 
than a year. In that time an International 
Energy Agency has been created, a con- 
servation program has been agreed to, 
emergency sharing has been developed for 
the contingency of new embargoes. 

I am absolutely confident that within a 
very short time, a matter of weeks, we will 
have agreed on financial solidarity. And 
within a month we will make proposals on 
how to develop alternative resources. 

One of the problems is that each country 
is so concerned with its domestic politics 



that these very important events are coming 
to pass in a very undramatic manner and in 
a way that does not galvanize the sort of 
support that the Marshall plan did. But the 
achievements, in my view, have not been 
inconsiderable and may be in retrospect seen 
as the most significant events of this period. 

Mr. Moyers: Is it conceivable to expect 
Europe and Japan to go with tis on our 
Middle Eastern policy when they have to get 
most of their oil from the OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Coimtries] 
countries and ice do not? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is not only 
conceivable— I think it is, above all, in their 
own interests. Because we have to under- 
stand what is our Middle East policy. 

Our Middle East policy is to enable Europe 
and Japan to put themselves into the maxi- 
mum position of invulnerability toward out- 
side pressures but at the same time to en- 
gage in a dialogue with the producers to 
give eff'ect to the principle of interdepend- 
ence on a global basis. 

We recognize — in fact, we were the first 
to advance the proposition — that the oil pro- 
ducers must have a sense that the arrange- 
ments that are made are not only just but 
are likely to be long lasting. 

We have pursued a dialogue with the pro- 
ducers on the most intensive basis. We have 
set up commissions with Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, and we have very close relationships 
in economic discussions with Algeria and 
other countries in which we are trying to 
relate our technical know-how to their re- 
sources and in which we are attempting to 
demonstrate that jointly we can progress 
to the benefit of all of mankind. 

Now, we are prepared later this year, as 
soon as some common positions have been 
developed with the consumers, on the basis 
of the discussions we had with the French 
President at Martinique, to have a multi- 
lateral talk between consumers and pro- 
ducers. And therefore our vision of what 
should happen is a cooperative arrangement 
between consumers and producers. And I 
believe that it is in the interests of Europe 



February 10, 1975 



167 



and Japan to participate in this, and their 
actions indicate that they believe that, too. 

Relations With Developing Countries 

Mr. Moijers: Does your concept of inter- 
dependence stop with the regional interde- 
pendence of the industrial world, the indus- 
trial consumers, or do you go far enough 
to include the global interdependence that 
comes from the billion people in the southern 
half of the globe who feel excluded from the 
discussions that are going on with the oil- 
producing countries? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, our idea 
includes as an essential component the 
billion people in the southern half of the 
globe. And again, if I may remind you, at the 
Washington Energy Conference we made 
clear that the cooperation among the con- 
sumers should be followed by immediate 
talks, first with the consuming less devel- 
oped countries and then with the producing 
countries. So the idea of a consumer-pro- 
ducer dialogue was first advanced by us. 

But we are happy to go along with the 
Fi'ench proposal if and when, which we be- 
lieve will be fairly soon, the essential pre- 
requisites have been met. 

But obviously a world in which the vast 
majority of mankind does not feel that its 
interests and purposes are recognized can- 
not be a stable world. And therefore we 
have continually supported foreign aid. We 
have this week put before the Finance Min- 
isters of the International Monetary Fund 
that is meeting here the importance of 
creating a special trust fund for the less 
developed countries that have been hard hit 
by rising oil prices. And we believe that they 
must be an essential part of the community 
I am talking about. 

Mr. Moyers: Our foreign aid program, 
which you raised, has been about constant 
the last few years and therefore in real dol- 
lars is down. 

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. 

Mr, Moyers: We — almost virtually alone 



among the industrial nations — have not 
helped the underdeveloped world with its 
manufactured goods on our tariff policy. A 
lot of the food that we are giving right notv 
is going into political areas, strategical areas, 
lather than humanitarian areas. The Brazil- 
ians and Indians say we are excluding them 
from the definition of "consumer." And the 
impression you get from talking to repre- 
sentatives of the developing world is that 
they really do not agree that we are very 
conscious of their consideration and needs. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think quite 
honestly there is a difference between what 
they say publicly and what they say privately. 

It is a fact that in many of the less devel- 
oped countries it is politically not unhelpful 
to seem to be at least aloof from the most 
powerful country in the world and to give the 
impression that one is not dominated by this 
colossus. And therefore the rhetoric of many 
of these countries is much more strident than 
the reality of their foreign policy. 

Now, it is true that the American people 
have been disillusioned by some of their ex- 
periences in international affairs. And inev- 
itably during a recession it is difficult to 
mobilize public support for a very large 
foreign aid program. And these are obstacles 
with which we contend. 

Now, with respect to the tariff preferences. 
More restrictions were put on them by the 
Congress than we thought wise. And some 
of the penalties that were attached to par- 
ticular groupings affected countries like 
Ecuador which really are members of the 
oil-producing cartel by courtesy only or 
countries like Venezuela with which we have 
a long tradition of Western Hemisphere 
solidarity. And we have regretted these par- 
ticular limitations. In addition, there have 
been restrictions on certain products about 
which Brazil and India complain that affect 
these countries unfavorably. 

We have indicated that after we have had 
an opportunity to study it we would bring 
to the attention of the Congress the special 
inequities that have been caused by this leg- 
islation. 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



On the other hand, I cannot accept your 
statement that this legislation does not per- 
mit additional access of industrial goods. For 
example, Mexico, which yesterday pointed 
out some of the inequities to us, nevertheless 
benefits to the extent of $350 million of its 
products in the U.S. market by the new 
Trade Act. And I am sure a similar study 
could be made for Brazil and India and other 
countries. 

So while we don't think the Trade Act 
went as far as we should have wished, I 
think it went generally in the right direction. 
And we are determined to work with Con- 
gress to improve it. 

But your question suggests a more funda- 
mental problem. Many of these new countries 
— this doesn't apply to the Latin American 
countries — but many of the new countries 
formed their identity in opposition to the 
industrial countries, and they are caught in 
a dilemma. Their rhetoric is a rhetoric of 
confrontation. The reality is a reality of in- 
terdependence. And we have seen in the 
United Nations and elsewhere that the rhet- 
oric doesn't always match the necessities. 
And one of the problems of international 
order is to bring them closer together. 

Approaches to World Food Problem 

Mr. Moyers: One of the issues they point 
to, for example, is the fact that the oil- 
producing countries have recently allocated 
some $2 billion in aid to these UO or so poor 
countries in the world. That is roughly the 
amount of the increase in the price these 
countries are paying for oil. They are paying 
us about a billion dollars more for food and 
fertilizer. And yet we have not adjusted our 
assistance to them to compensate for this. 
So they say they are being driven into a 
"tyranny of the majority" by turning to 
the OPEC countries fm- the kind of assist- 
ance that interdependence makes necessary. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well I don't think it 
is correct that we are not adjusting. For 
example, our P.L. 480 program, which is 
our food contribution, is on the order of 



about $1.5 billion, or almost that large. And 
we have opted, after all the discussions, for 
the highest proposal that was made, or sub- 
stantially the highest proposal. 

I also don't agree with you that we are 
giving most of our food aid for strategic 
purposes. 

Mr. Moyers: I didn't say "most." I didn't 
mean to say "most." I mean a substantial 
amount. 

Secretary Kissinger: We are giving some 
in countries in which political relationships 
are of importance to us. And it stands to 
reason that when a country has a vital re- 
source that it keeps in mind the degree of 
friendship that other countries show for it 
before it distributes this resource, essentially 
on a grant basis. 

But the vast majority — the considerable 
majority of our food aid goes for humani- 
tarian purposes. And even in those countries 
where political considerations are involved, 
those are still countries with a very real and 
acute food shortage. 

Mr. Moyers: You said recently that we 
have to be prepared to pay some domestic 
price for our international position. More 
food aid is going to mean increased prices 
at home. And I am wondering what are 
some of the other prices you anticipate 
Americans are going to have to be paying 
because of this international position. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think first of 
all we have to understand that what seems 
to be a domestic price in the long term is 
the best investment we can make, because 
if the United States lives in a hostile world, 
the United States lives in a depressed world; 
then inevitably, given our dependence on the 
raw materials of the world and given our 
essential interest in peace, in the long term 
we will suffer. 

We have to recognize domestically, first 
of all, that foreign aid programs, as they are 
now being developed, are in our interest; 
secondly, that in developing such programs 
as financial solidarity and conservation of 
energy, even though they are painful, they 



February 10, 1975 



169 



are absolutely essential for the United States 
to be able to play a major role internation- 
ally and to master its domestic problems. 
And of course we have to be prepared to 
pay the price for national security. 

Mr. Morje7-s: In Europe recently I found 
so7ne feeling of concern that the e7nphasis 
on interdependence, and because of the ec- 
onomic and energy crisis in particular, is 
going to bring an alignment of the old rich, 
the industrial nations, against the new rich, 
the oil nations and commodity nations, at 
the exclusion of the poor. And if I hear you 
correctly, you are saying we cannot let that 
happen. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, we 
are not talking of an alliance of the old rich 
against the new rich, because we are seeking 
cooperation between the old rich and the 
new rich. Both need each other. And neither 
can really prosper or, indeed, survive except 
in an atmosphere of cooperation. And it 
seems to us that the old rich and the new 
rich must cooperate in helping the poor part 
of the world. 

Take the problem of food, which you men- 
tioned. There is no way the United States 
can feed the rest of the world. And from 
some points of view, the level of our food aid 
has mostly a symbolic significance, because 
the ultimate solution to the food problem 
depends on raising the productivity of the 
less developed countries. This requires fer- 
tilizer, help in distribution, and similar proj- 
ects. This in turn can only be done through 
the cooperation of the technical know-how 
of the old rich with the new resources of 
the new rich. 

And we will, within the next two months, 
make a very concrete proposal of how all of 
this can be put together to increase dras- 
tically the food production in the poor part 
of the world. 

Dislocations Caused by High Oil Prices 

Mr. Moyers: What about the psychological 
adjustment that all of this is causing us to 
make? Does it disturb you that a handful 
of Arab sheikhs in a sense have so much 



new power and so much dominance on the 
ivorld scene? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is a new fact to 
which we all have to adjust, including the 
oil-producing countries. But I think that, on 
the whole, everybody is trjMng to deal with 
these long-range problems in a cooperative 
spirit, although of course obviously the level 
of experience in dealing with global problems 
differs between various nations. 

Mr. Moyers: Is our specific purpose of 
our policy toward the oil-producing countries 
to arrest the flow of wealth to them? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. Our concern is 
that the flow of wealth, which is inevitable, 
is channeled in such a way that it does not 
disrupt the international — the well-being of 
all the rest of the world. 

If you take countries like Iran, for ex- 
ample, or Algeria, that use most of their 
wealth for their own development, which 
means in effect that they are spending the 
energy income in the industrialized part of 
the world, this is not a basically disruptive 
effect. It has certain dislocations. But I think 
this is not basically disruptive. 

What presents a particular problem is in 
those areas where the balances accumulate 
and where the investment of large sums or 
the shifting around of large sums can pro- 
duce economic crises that are not necessarily 
intended; this makes the problem of finding 
financial institutions which can handle these 
tremendous sums — $60 billion in one year, 
which is more than our total foreign invest- 
ment over 100 years, just to give one a sense 
of the magnitude — to have those sums in- 
vested in a way that does not produce eco- 
nomic chaos. 

Mr. Moyers: What are the consequences 
if we don't find those international mone- 
tary structures? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the 
consequences will be rampant inflation, the 
potential economic collapse of some of the 
weaker nations, and the long-term backlash, 
economically, will be on the oil producers as 
well as on the consumers. But I am confident 



170 



Department of State Bulletin 



we will find the institutions, and I think you 
will find that the discussions of the Finance 
Ministers taking place this week are making 
very substantial progress in developing these 
financial institutions. 

Mr. Moyers: Some people have said that 
we are on the edge of a global economic 
crisis akin to that of the 1930' s. I know you 
ivere just a boy in the 1930' s. But that part 
of your life you remember quite well. Do you 
see similarities? 

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't understand 
too much about economics at that time. I was 
better versed in football than economics. But 
I think there are similarities in the sense 
that when you are faced with economic diflfi- 
culties, you have the choice of retreating 
into yourself or trying to find a global solu- 
tion. Retreating into yourself is a defensive 
attitude which, over a period of time, accel- 
erates all the difficulties that led you to do 
it in the first place. 

I think our necessity is to find a global 
solution. It is our necessity and our oppor- 
tunity. And in many ways we are on the 
way to doing it. Although with all the de- 
bates that are going on, this is not always 
apparent. 

Mr. Moyers: Isn't what is happening in 
the Middle East, and particidarly the flow 
of ivealth to the Middle Eastern oil-pro- 
ducing cotmtries, simply an adjustment of 
history? Isn't it a rhythm of history? Wasn't 
it natural that when they finally got control 
of their own oil production they would use it 
for their oivn benefits? 

Secretary Kissinger: That was inevitable. 
I don't know whether it was inevitable that 
God would place the oil in exactly those 
places. 

Mr. Moyers: Or that he would place the 
Arabs there. 

Secretary Kissinger: But once it was 
placed there, it was inevitable that sooner 
or later these trends would develop. And 
we are not fighting these trends. 

Mr. Moyers: But the price was kept down 



for four decades by Western control of the 
production of oil. That is gone. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want 
to speculate about what kept the price down, 
because it could happen that the price will 
go down again. This depended on the re- 
lationship of supply and demand in a very 
important way. The oil resources of the 
Middle East were so vast compared to the 
energy requirements of the world that that 
kept the price down. It was only in the last 
decade — when I came to Washington in 1969 
people were still talking about oil surplus, 
and they were still talking about how to 
restrict the importation of foreign oil lest 
the prices go down even more — it is only in 
the last six years that there has been such a 
dramatic increase in the energy requirements 
that the opportunity for raising the prices 
existed. 

I believe that before then there was — it 
was roughly in balance between supply and 
demand. 

Mr. Moyers: You talk about the solidarity 
of consumers in dealing with and negotiating 
with the oil-producing companies. What will 
that solidarity produce; what economic pres- 
sure, Mr. Secretary, do we have on the Arabs? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is a 
question of economic pressure. I think there 
are two possibilities. Right now every con- 
sumer, or every group of consumers, has its 
own dialogue going on with the producers. 
It is not that there is no dialogue going on. 
There is a European dialogue with the 
Arabs. There is an American dialogue going 
on with both Arab countries and with Iran. 
The question is whether a multilateral con- 
ference, that is to say, getting all consumers 
together with all of the producers, how that 
can advance matters. In our view it can 
advance matters only if the consumers do 
not repeat at such a conference all the dis- 
agreements that they already have. I believe 
that in such a conference, if both sides are 
well prepared, one should address the ques- 
tion of long-term supply. That is to give the 
oil producers an assurance that they will 
have a market for a fairly long future. 



February 10, 1975 



171 



There has to be some discussion about 
price. There has to be some discussion about 
international facilities, both for the beneiit 
of the poor countries and to make sure that 
the investments are channeled in such a way 
that they do not produce economic crisis. 

We are working hard on all of these 
issues, and we believe all of them are solu- 
ble in a constructive manner. 

Mr. Moyers: And you don't believe that 
pressure is the ivay. 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
pressure will — that in such a negotiation, 
that such a negotiation can be based upon 
pressure. But each side, obviously, has to 
be aware of its own interests and has to 
defend its own interests in a reasonable 
manner. We don't blame the producers for 
doing it, and they cannot blame the con- 
sumers for doing it. But the attitude must 
be cooperative, conciliatory, and looking for 
a long-term solution. 

Mr. Moyers: Do you think the oil-produc- 
ing countries have an interest in that kind 
of negotiation — dialogue ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the 
vast majority of them do. 

Question of Use of Force 

Mr. Moyers: Well, if pressure isn't that 
important a part of the scenario, I need to 
ask you what did you have in mind when 
you gave that intervietv to Business Week 
and talked about the possible strangulation 
of the West? What ivas going through your 
mind at just that minute? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, the 
sentence that has attracted so much atten- 
tion is too frequently taken totally out of 
context, and it was part of a very long inter- 
view in which I put forward essentially the 
conception that I have developed here; that 
is to say, of a cooperative relationship be- 
tween the consumers and producers. In addi- 
tion, I made clear that political and economic 
warfare, or military action, is totally in- 
appropriate for the solution of oil prices. 



recycling problems, et cetera. The contin- 
gency, and the only contingency, to which 
I addressed myself was an absolutely hypo- 
thetical case in which the actual strangula- 
tion of the entire industrialized world was 
being attempted ; in other words, in which 
the confrontation was started by the pro- 
ducers. 

I have said repeatedly, and I want to say 
now, I do not believe that such an event is 
going to happen. I was speaking hypotheti- 
cally about an extreme situation. It would 
have to be provoked by other countries. 

I think it is self-evident that the United 
States cannot permit itself to be strangled. 
But I also do not believe that this will really 
be attempted. And therefore we were talk- 
ing about a hypothetical case that all our 
efforts are attempting to avoid and that we 
are confident we can avoid. 

We were not talking, as is so loosely said, 
about the seizure of oilfields. That is not 
our intention. That is not our policy. 

Mr. Moyers: What intrigues so many 
people, it seems to me, was that, a few days 
before, you had given a similar interview to 
Neivsioeek and much the same thing has been 
said with no particular alarm. Then a feir 
days later a similar statement is made, and 
it is seized upon. And some of us thought 
perhaps you had calcidated between the first 
interview and the second interview to be 
more precise in some kind of message. 

Secretary Kissinger: I was astonished 
when this was seized upon. We were not the 
ones who spread it. I think there ai-e many 
people who have spread this around, frankly, 
in order to sow some dispute between us 
and the oil producers. 

Our whole policy toward the producers 
has been based on an eff"ort of achieving co- 
operation. We have spent tremendous efforts 
to promote peace in the Middle East pre- 
cisely to avoid confrontations. We were 
talking about a very extreme case, about 
which only the most irresponsible elements 
among producers are even speaking, and it 
is not our policy to use military force to 
settle any of the issues that we are now 
talking about. 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Moyers: But neither, if I understand 
your philosophical view of diplomacy, can a 
power ever rule out any contingency. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, no nation can 
announce that it will let itself be strangled 
without reacting. And I find it very difficult 
to see what it is that people are objecting 
to. We are saying the United States will not 
permit itself or its allies to be strangled. 

Somebody else would have to make the 
first move to attempt the strangulation. It 
isn't being attempted now. 

Mr. Moyers: Well, I was in Europe about 
the time and some of them almost came out 
of their skins, because depending as they do 
on Middle East oil, and with our troops on 
their soil, they could see a confrontation 
between us and the oil-producing countries 
that tvould have them the innocent bystander 
and victim. That is ivhy they seized upon it. 

Secretary Kissinger: I find it difficult to 
understand how they would want to an- 
nounce "please strangle us." We did not say 
— and I repeat here — that any of the issues 
that are now under discussion fall into this 
category. There would have to be an overt 
move of an extremely drastic, dramatic, and 
aggressive nature before this contingency 
could ever be considered. 

Mr. Moyers: Who, Mr. Secretary, has a 
stake in division bettveen ?<s and the oil-pro- 
ducing countries? 

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I think there are 
many forces, and I don't want to speculate 
on that. 



Middle East Diplomacy 

Mr. Moyers: Let me ask you this. I am 
curious not about hoiv you see a possible final 
solution in the Middle East but by what in 
history ayid in your oivn philosophy makes 
you believe that people ivho have fought so 
bitterly over so long a period of time can 
ever settle a confict like that peaceably. 

Secretary Kissinger: If you are in my posi- 
tion, you often find yourself in a situation 
where as a historian you would say the 



problem is insoluble and yet as a statesman 
you have absolutely no choice except to at- 
tempt to settle it. Because what is the alter- 
native? If we say there is no solution, then 
another war is guaranteed. Then the con- 
frontation between oil producers and con- 
sumers that it is our policy to attempt to 
avoid will be magnified — the risk of this will 
be magnified. The danger of a confrontation 
between the Soviet Union and the United 
States will be increased. 

And therefore, with all the difficulties and 
with all the anguish that is involved, we 
must make a major effort to move step by 
step toward a solution. And some progress 
has already been made that most people 
thought was difficult. And we find ourselves 
often in a situation, and many national 
leaders do, where if you attempt something 
new, there is no historical precedent for it, 
and you have to go on an uncharted road. 

Mr. Moyers: You never announce that you 
are giving up hope. 

Secretary Kissinger: Not only can you not 
announce you are giving up hope; you must 
not give up hope. You must believe in what 
you are doing. 

Mr. Moyers: Is our step-by-step diplomacy 
on the Middle East on track? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our step-by-step di- 
plomacy is facing increasing difficulties. As 
one would expect, as you make progress you 
get to the more difficult circumstances. 

I believe we have an opportunity. I believe 
that progress can be made. And I expect 
that over the next months progress will be 
made. 

Mr. Moyers: In the ultimate extremity of 
war, wouldn't the level of violence be in- 
creased by the sale of arms we have made to 
the Arabs and the arms we have shipped to 
Israel? Aren't ive in a sense guaranteeing 
that any war — 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, none of the 
states that are likely — none of the Arab 
states likely to fight in a war have received 
American arms. The sale of arms to Israel 
is necessitated by the fact that the Arab 



February 10, 1975 



173 



countries are receiving substantial supplies 
from the Soviet Union and because the 
security of Israel has been an American 
objective in all American administrations 
since the end of World War II. 

Mr. Moyers: There is some confusion out 
there as to whether or not you have s^js- 
tematicaUy excluded the Soviets from play- 
ing a peacekeeping role in the Middle East 
and whether, if you have, this is to our ad- 
vantage. Is it possible to have a solution 
there that does not involve the Soviets? 

Secretary Kissinger: A final solution must 
involve the Soviet Union. And it has never 
been part of our policy to exclude the Soviet 
Union from a final solution. The individual 
steps that have been taken have required — 
have been based on the methods which we 
judge most effective. And at the request of 
all of the parties. We have proceeded in the 
manner in which we have, but we have al- 
ways kept the Soviet Union generally in- 
formed of what we were doing. 

Mr. Moyers: Is there any evidence that 
under the general rubric of detente the 
Soviets have been playing adversary politics 
in the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissiyiger: I think the Soviet 
Union has not been exceptionally helpful, 
but it has also not been exceptionally ob- 
structive. And I do not believe it is correct 
to say they have been playing adversary 
politics. 

Detente With the Soviet Union 

Mr. Moyers: On the ivord "detente," I 
wish you would define it for us. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the problem of 
detente is often put as if the United States 
were making concessions to the Soviet Union 
in order to achieve peace. Basically the prob- 
lem of detente, the necessity of detente, is 
produced by the fact that nuclear war in this 
period is going to involve a catastrophe for 
all of humanity. When the decision of peace 
and war involves the survival of tens of 
millions of people, you are no longer playing 
power politics in the traditional sense. And 



for this reason, every American President 
in the postwar period, no matter how differ- 
ent their background, no matter what their 
party, has sooner or later been driven to 
making the problem of peace the central 
preoccupation of his foreign policy. This is 
the case also, obviously, in this administra- 
tion. 

We would like to leave a legacy of having 
made the world safer than when we found 
it, as must every administration. To conduct 
confrontation politics where the stakes are 
going to be determined by nuclear weapons 
is the height of irresponsibility. This is 
what we mean by detente. We have sought 
systematically to improve political relations, 
to increase trade relations in order to pro- 
duce a maximum number of links between 
us and the Soviet Union, and to create a 
cooperative environment to reduce the dan- 
gers of war. 

Mr. Moyers: But in the 20 years immedi- 
ately after World War II there ivas nuclear 
peace, one could say. Every Secretary of 
State has said ''That is my objective — 7iot to 
have a nuclear ivar." What are the special 
reasons for detente as a systematic policy? 
What have we got from it, beyond nuclear 
peace? 

Secretary Kissinger: What we have got 
from detente is — first of all, the situation in 
Europe is more peaceful than it has ever 
been. As late as the Kennedy administra- 
tion, in the 1960's, there was a massive con- 
frontation over Berlin between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Throughout 
the sixties there was a confrontation be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union over the question of nuclear arms, 
over the question of the ultimate shape of 
the European arrangements, and over the 
whole evolution of world policy. 

In the last three years, European issues 
have been substantially, if not settled, I 
think substantially eased. In all parts of the 
world except the Middle East, the United 
States and the Soviet Union have pursued 
substantially compatible and, in some cases, 
cooperative policies. A trade relationship has 
developed for the first time that would give 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



both countries an incentive — and especially 
the Soviet Union — an incentive to conduct 
moderate foreign policies. And most impor- 
tantly, two major steps have been taken to 
arrest the nuclear arms race. For the first 
time, agreed ceilings exist to reduce the 
danger — to eliminate the danger, in fact, or 
at any rate to substantially reduce it — that 
both sides will be raising or conducting an 
arms race out of fear of what the other side 
will do. 

I think these are major steps forward 
which must be built upon and which I am 
confident will be built on, no matter who is 
President in this country. 

M7\ Moyers: I would like to come back in 
just a moment to the Vladivostok agree- 
ment. But before we leave detente, we 
seem to be leaving it on very precarions legs, 
with the announcement this tveek — if trade 
is important — that the Soviet Union was not 
going to fulfill the recent agreement on trade. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think it 
is correct to say that the Soviet Union will 
not fulfill the recent agreement on trade. 
Unfortunately, the Congress has seen fit to 
pass legislation that imposed on the Soviet 
Union special conditions which were not 
foreseeable when the trade agreement was 
negotiated in 1972 and which the Soviet 
Union considers an interference in its domes- 
tic affairs. 

We warned against this legislation for 
two years. We went along with it only with 
the utmost reluctance. And I think that 
this event proves that it is absolutely essen- 
tial for Congress and the executive to woi'k 
out a common understanding of what is pos- 
sible in foreign policy and what can be sub- 
ject to legislation and what must be subject 
to other forms of congressional advice and 
consent. 

Mr. Moyers: Did Congress kill the agree- 
ment by imposing too strict a limitation? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to assess 
blame. I believe that the legislative restric- 
tions, coupled with the restriction on Exim 
[Export-Import Bank] credits, had the effect 
of causing the Soviet Union to reject the 



agreement. We shared the objectives of 
those in Congress who were pushing this 
legislation. We differed with them as to 
tactics and as to the suitability of enshrin- 
ing these objectives in legislation. We were 
prepared to make them part of our execu- 
tive negotiations, and we had in fact brought 
about an emigration of 35,000 before this 
legislative attempt was made, and the emi- 
gration now is lower than this. 

But I repeat, as I said yesterday, that we 
will go back to the Congress with the atti- 
tude that both sides should learn from this 
experience and with the recognition that as 
a coequal partner they must have an impor- 
tant part in shaping American foreign policy. 

Mr. Moyers: Is detente on precarious legs 
as a result of the events this week? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think detente has 
had a setback. But I think the imperative 
that I described earlier — of preventing nu- 
clear war, which in turn requires political 
understanding — will enable us to move for- 
ward again, and we will immediately begin 
consultations with the Congress on how the 
legislative and executive branch can cooper- 
ate in implementing this. 

Mr. Moyers: What is the proper relation- 
ship between Congress and the conduct of 
foreign policy? If I ivere a member of Con- 
gress, I would be very wary, after the Bay 
of Pigs and after the Gulf of Tonkin resolu- 
tion, of giving the administration a blank 
check. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Congress 
is absolutely correct in insisting on legisla- 
tive oversight over the conduct of foreign 
policy. And I would say that no President 
or Secretary of State, if he is wise, would 
ask for a blank check, because the responsi- 
bility is too great and in a democracy a 
major foreign policy requires public sup- 
port. You cannot have public support if you 
do not have congressional support. So it is 
in our interests to work in close partnership 
with Congress. 

What we have to work out with Congress 
is the degree of oversight that a body that, 
after all, contains over 550 members, or over 



February 10, 1975 



175 



500 members, can properly exercise. I think 
on the major directions of policy, con- 
gressional oversight, even expressed in 
legislative restrictions, is essential. We dis- 
agree with those in the Congress who want 
to cut off or limit aid to Viet-Nam, but we 
do not challenge that this is a legitimate 
exercise of congressional supervision. 

The difficulties arise when the Congress 
attempts to legislate the details of diplo- 
matic negotiations, such as on the trade 
bill, on Vladivostok, and other matters. 
There we have to work out not a blank check 
but an understanding by which Congress can 
exercise its participation by means other 
than forming legislation. 

Vladivostok Agreement on Strategic Arms 

Mr. Moijers: We have just a few minutes 
left, Mr. Secretary. You raised the Vladi- 
vostok agreement that puts a ceiling on the 
number of launchers and MIRV'ed [multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicle] 
missiles that both the Soviet Union and the 
United States can have. The question being 
raised is ivhat you have done is escalate the 
equilibrium, the military equilibrium, at 
xvhat appears to many people to be an un- 
necessarily high level. Why couldn't ive just 
stop? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say 
that the people who say "unnecessarily high" 
have never negotiated with the Soviet Union. 
The level at which that has been set is 200 
delivery vehicles below what the Soviet 
Union already has. And therefore I find it 
difficult to understand how they can say it 
was escalated. 

If we were willing to live with our present 
forces when the Soviet Union had 2,600 
missiles and bombers, then we should be able 
to live with our present forces when the 
Soviet Union will have under the agreement 
only 2,400 missiles and bombers. 

So there is nothing in the agreement that 
forces us to build up. And there is something 
in the agreement that forces the Soviet 
Union to reduce. Whether we build up or not 
is a strategic decision which we would have 



to make in any event and which would face 
us much more acutely under conditions of 
an arms race. 

So we put a ceiling on the Soviet arms de- 
ployment below their present level, and 
therefore it enables us to consider our ceil- 
ings with less pressure than would be the 
case otherwise. 

Secondly, once a ceiling exists, both mili- 
tary establishments can plan without the 
fear that the other one will drive the race 
through the ceiling, which is one of these 
self-fulfilling prophecies which has fueled 
the arms race. 

Thirdly, once you have ceilings estab- 
lished, the problem of reductions will become 
much easier. The reason reductions are so 
difficult now is when both sides are building 
up, you never know against what yardsticks 
to plan your reductions. And I am confident 
that if the Vladivostok agreement is com- 
pleted, it will be seen as one of the turning 
points in the history of the post- World War 
II arms race. 

Mr. Moyers: What is the next step? 

Secretary Kissinger: The next step is to 
complete the Vladivostok agreement, on 
which only a general understanding exists 
up to now. Once that is completed, we will 
immediately turn to negotiations on the re- 
duction of armaments — 

Mr. Moyers: The reduction of the ceilings? 

Secretary Kissinger: The reduction of the 
ceilings, both of MIRV's and of total num- 
bers, and actually I believe this will be an 
easier negotiation than the one which we 
have just concluded at Vladivostok, be- 
cause it is going to be difficult to prove that 
when you already have an enormous capacity 
to devastate humanity, that a few hundred 
extra missiles make so much difference. 

Mr. Moyers: The Vladivostok agreement 
ivould run until 1985. Is it possible that re- 
ductions in the ceilings could begin many 
years before that? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the aide memoire 
that has been exchanged between us and 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that 
reduction in — that the negotiations on re- 
ductions can start immediately upon the 
completion of the other agreement. They 
can start at any time before. They must 
start no later than 1980, but they can start 
at any time before then. 

Mr. Moyers: To set aside the figures for a 
moment, and put it in the way that laymen 
ask me, ivhy do we keep on? This is going 
to mean, eveyi if it does have a ceiling, more 
money for defense — we are going ahead 
xvith — 

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me. The 
agreement doesn't mean more money for 
defense. More money for defense was inher- 
ent in the arms race. The question that the 
agreement poses is whether more should be 
spent on top of what was already planned. 
I do not believe that the agreement will 
make it easier to reduce the spending. 

Mr. Moyers: Do you see any end in the 
foreseeable future to the arms race, both 
nuclear and conventional? 

Secretary Kissinger: One of my over- 
whelming preoccupations has been to put an 
end to the arms race. And the reason I have 
been such a strong supporter of the SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negoti- 
ations is to turn down the arms race. And I 
believe that the Vladivostok agreement will 
permit over the 10 years — will lead to re- 
ductions that could involve substantial sav- 
ings. And that will be our principal objective. 



Morality and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy 

Mr. Moyers: Just a couple of more ques- 
tions. You wrote once, "An excessively prag- 
matic policy luill be empty of vision and 
humanity .... America cannot be true to 
itself without moral purpose."^ 

One of the chief criticisms of your tenure 
as Secretary of State in the last several 



" For Secretary Kissinger's address before the 
Pacem in Terris Conference at Washington, D.C., 
on Oct. 8, 1973, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1973. 



years has been that we have been long on 
expediency and pragmatism, and it may have 
helped us strategically, but we have been 
short of humanity — the invasion of Cam- 
bodia, the bombing of Hanoi at Christmas, 
the tilting in favor of Pakistan, the mainte- 
yiance of a constant level of foreign assist- 
ance, our preference for a change in the 
Allende government [Salvador Allende of 
Chile]. These all add up, your critics say, to 
an excessively pragmatic policy, devoid of 
humanity and vision. 

Secretary Kissinger: Any statesman faces 
the problem of relating morality to what 
is possible. As long as the United States 
was absolutely secure, behind two great 
oceans, it could afford the luxury of moral 
pronouncements — divorced from the reality 
of the world in which other countries have 
to make the decisions, or to make an impor- 
tant part of the decisions, which determine 
whether you can implement them. 

I still agree with the statement that I 
made some years ago. A purely pragmatic 
policy is unsuited to the American charac- 
ter and in any event leads to paralysis. 

An excessively moralistic policy would be 
totally devoid of contacts with reality and 
would lead to empty posturing. 

In foreign policy, you always face difficult 
choices. And you always face the problem 
that when you make your decision, you do 
not know the outcome. So your moral con- 
victions are necessary to give you the 
strength to make the difficult choices when 
you have no assurance of success. 

Now, the particular events which you 
mentioned, one could go into — it would 
be impossible to do justice to it in the limited 
time we have. 

Several of them had to do with the con- 
duct of the war in Viet-Nam. And there 
really the criticism is between those who 
wanted to end it more or less at any price 
and those who believed that it was essential 
to end it in a manner so that the American 
people did not feel that all these efforts had 
only led to a turning over by the United 
States of people who had depended on it to 



February 10, 1975 



177 



outside invasion. It is an issue that we will 
not settle in this debate. But this was our 
judgment from which the various military 
moves flowed. 

On the issue of how to vindicate human 
rights in foreign countries, I think we have 
never denied their importance. We have, 
however, always claimed that we could 
achieve our objectives more effectively, 
quietly, without making it a confrontation. 
This is why we never made anything of the 
fact that between 1969 and 1973 we in- 
creased Jewish emigration from the Soviet 
Union from 400 to 35,000 without ever an- 
nouncing it. And I believe when all the 
facts are out, it will turn out that a sub- 
stantial number of the releases from Chilean 
prisons were negotiated by the United States 
without ever making anything of it, not 
because we did not believe in these human 
rights, but because we believed it would 
facilitate the objective of implementing 
these human rights if we did not make an 
issue of it. So some of it concerns methods 
toward agreed objectives. 

Mr. Moyers: I think ivhat concerns a lot of 
people is that ive are liable in our search for 
stability to be linked ivith strong, authorita- 
tive, unrepresentative governments at the 
expense of open and more liberal govern- 
ments. You say that is a necessity sometimes ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very 
difficult to make an abstract pronouncement 
on that. Ideally we should be able to achieve 
our objective by working with governments 
whose basic values we support. But just as 
during World War II we became allies of 
Stalin, even though his values were quite 
different from ours, so in some concrete 
situations we occasionally find ourselves 
under the necessity of choosing whether we 
want to achieve important objectives with 
governments of whose domestic policies we 
do not approve or whether we sacrifice 
those interests. 

Sometimes we can make the wrong choice. 
But it is important to recognize that it is a 
difficult choice. Everybody in his own life 



knows that the difficult issues are those 
when two desirable objectives clash, or two 
undesirable objectives clash, and you have 
to choose the less undesirable. It is not a 
black and white problem. 

I understand the criticism that is being 
made. But I think the critics should under- 
stand that the day-to-day conduct of for- 
eign policy is more complex than can be 
encapsuled in a slogan. 

Mr. Moyers: Finally, you have talked 
about stable structures of peace, and you 
have talked about institutionalizing the con- 
duct of foreign policy. But if you are not the 
Secretary of State for life, what will you 
leave behind, and what do you care the most 
about? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what I would 
care most about is to leave behind a world 
which is organically safer than the one I 
found. By organically safer, I mean that has 
a structure which is not dependent on con- 
stant juggling and on tours de force for 
maintaining the peace. But just as in the 
period from 1945 to 1950 it can be said that 
the United States constructed an interna- 
tional system that had many permanent 
features, as permanent features go in for- 
eign policy — say a decade is a permanent 
feature in foreign policy — so it would be 
desirable to leave behind something that 
does not depend on the constant manage- 
ment of crisis to survive. 

And within this Department I would like 
to leave behind an attitude and a group of 
people committed to such a vision, so that 
succeeding Presidents can be confident that 
there is a group of dedicated, experienced, 
and able men that can implement a policy of 
peace and stability and progress. I think we 
have the personnel in this Department to 
do it. 

And when I say I want to institutionalize 
it, I don't mean lines on an organization 
chart. I mean a group of people that already 
exist, that work to the full extent of their 
capabilities. And this is why sometimes I 
drive them so hard. 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Ford's News Conference 
of January 21 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Ford in the Old 
Executive Office Bidlding on January 21.^ 



Q. On recent occasions, several times you 
have warned of the serious possibility of 
another war in the Middle East. Why, then, 
is the United States contributing so heavily 
to the military buildup there? And I have a 
followup. 

President Ford: The United States does 
feel that the danger of war in the Middle 
East is very serious. I have said it repeat- 
edly, and I say it again here today. But in 
order to avoid that, we are maximizing our 
diplomatic efforts with Israel as well as with 
several Arab states. 

In order to maintain the internal security 
of the various countries, in order to main- 
tain equilibrium in arms capability, one 
nation against the other, we are supplying 
some arms to various states in that region. 
I think, while we negotiate, or while we ex- 
pand our diplomatic efforts, it is important 
to maintain a certain degree of military 
capability on all sides. 

Q. Mr. President, both you and Secretary 
Kissinger have said that in case of strangu- 
lation of the West by oil producers you ivould 
use military force, and you were hypotheti- 
cally speaking. I think on that same basis 
the American people would like to know 
whether yon would require a congressional 
declaration of war or whether you ivould 
bypass that constitutional process as some 
of your predecessors have done. 

President Ford: I can assure you that 
on any occasion where there was any com- 
mitment of U.S. military personnel to any 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27, 
1975. 



engagement we would use the complete con- 
stitutional process that is required of the 
President. 

Q. Mr. President, are there circumstances 
in 7vhich the United States might actively 
reenter the Viet-Nam rear? 

President Ford: I cannot foresee any at 
the moment. 

Q. Are you riding out the possibility of 
bombing, U.S. bombing, over there or naval 
action? 

President Ford: I don't think it is appro- 
priate for me to forecast any specific ac- 
tions that might be taken. I would simply 
say that any military actions, if taken, 
would be only taken following the actions 
under our constitutional and legal proce- 
dures. 

Q. Mr. President, I ivould like to follow up 
on Helen Thomas' question. There has been 
considerable discussion, as you know, about 
this question of military intervention in the 
Middle East, and you and others have said 
that it might be considered if the West's 
economies were strangled. Mr. President, as 
you know, the Charter of the United Nations 
says that all members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat of the 
use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state. Now, 
Mr. President, I would like to know ivhether 
this section of the Charter of the United 
Nations was considered, taken under con- 
sideration before these statements were 
made by members of the administration, and 
if not, why not? 

President Ford: Well, the hypothetical 
question which was put to Secretai-y Kis- 
singer, a hypothetical question of the most 
extreme kind, I think called for the answer 
that the Secretary gave and I fully endorse 
that answer. 

I can't tell you whether Secretary Kis- 
singer considered that part of the U.N. 



February 10, 1975 



179 



Charter at the time he made that comment, 
but if a country is being strangled— and I 
use "strangled" in the sense of the hypo- 
thetical question— that, in effect, means that 
a country has the right to protect itself 
against death. 

Q. Mr. President, would a neiv oil embargo 
be considered strangulation? 

President Ford: Certainly none compara- 
ble to the one in 1973. 

Q. Mr. President, does the state of the 
American economy permit additional mili- 
tarrj and economic aid to Viet-Nam or Cam- 
bodia? 

President Furd: I believe it does. When 
the budget was submitted for fiscal 1975, in 
January of 1974, the request was for $1.4 
billion for military assistance. The Congress 
cut that to $700 million. 

The request that I will submit for mili- 
tary assistance in a supplemental will be 
$300 million. I think it is a proper action by 
us to help a nation and a people prevent 
aggression in violation of the Paris accords. 

Q. Mr. President, could you bring us up to 
date with an evaluation of the state of de- 
tente with the Soviet Union in the light of 
what happened to the Trade Agreement? 

President Ford: It is my judgment that 
the detente with the Soviet Union will be 
continued, broadened, expanded. I think that 
is in our interest, and I think it is in the 
interest of the Soviet Union. 

I of course was disappointed that the 
Trade Agreement was canceled, but it is my 
judgment that we can continue to work with 
the Soviet Union to expand trade regardless. 
And I would hope that we can work with the 
Congress to eliminate any of the problems 
in the trade bill that might have precipitated 
the action by the Soviet Union. 

Q. Mr. President, a two-part follorvup on 
Viet-Nam. What is your assessment of the 
military situation there, and are you con- 
sidering any additional measures, beyond a 



supplemental, of assistance to the South 
Vietnamese Government? 

President Ford: The North Vietnamese 
have infiltrated with substantial military 
personnel and many, many weapons, in vio- 
lation of the Paris accords. They are attack- 
ing in many instances major metropolitan 
areas and province capitals. 

The South Vietnamese are fighting as 
skillfully and with firmness against this 
attack by the North Vietnamese. I think it 
is essential for their morale as well as for 
their security that we proceed with the 
supplemental that I am recommending, 
which will be submitted either this week or 
next week. 

Now, I am not anticipating any further 
action beyond that supplemental at this time. 

Q. Mr. President, in your state of the 
Union message, you urged Congress not to 
restrict your ability to conduct foreign pol- 
icy. Did you have in mind Senator Jackson's 
amendment on the emigration of Soviet 
Jews, and do you consider this to be an 
example of the meddling by Congress in 
foreign policy? 

President Ford: I don't wish to get in any 
dispute with Members of Congress. I think 
that such restrictive amendments as the one 
that was imposed on the trade bill and the 
Eximbank [Export-Import Bank] legislation 
and the limitation that was imposed on sev- 
eral pieces of legislation involving the con- 
tinuation of military aid to Turkey — those 
kinds of limitations, in my judgment, are 
harmful to a President in the execution and 
implementation of foreign policy. 

I don't think that I should speculate as to 
what actually precipitated the action of the 
Soviet Union in the cancellation of the Trade 
Agreement. 

Q. Mr. President, in an earlier Viet-Nam 
question you left open the option for yourself 
of possibly asking Congress for the authority 
to engage in bombing or naval action in the 
future. In light of the lengthy involvement 
by the United States in Viet-Nam and the 
pains that that created, can you say noiv 



180 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



irhether or not there are any circumstances 
under which you might foresee yotirself 
doing that, or woidd you care to rule out 
that prospect? 

President Ford: I don't think it is appro- 
priate for me to speculate on a matter of 
that kind. 



Q. Mr. President, in view of the rapport 
you seem to hare established with Mr. Brezh- 
nev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union] at Vladivostok, 
can you shed any light on the conflicting re- 
ports about his current political and per- 
sonal health? Specifically, have you had any 
direct contact with him since your trip? 

President Ford: I have not had any direct 
contact. We have communicated on several 
occasions, but we have had no personal or 
direct contact. 



U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany 
Hold Talks on Cultural Relations 

Joint Statement, January 20 

Press release 22 dated January 21 

Delegations from the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United States met in 
Washington January 20 for the third in a 
series of annual talks on Cultural Relations. 

The German delegation was led by Dr. 
Hans Arnold, Director for Cultural Relations 



at the German Foreign Office ; the American 
group was headed by Assistant Secretary 
of State John Richardson, Jr. 

As in previous years, the talks were in- 
formal and covered a wide array of subjects. 
The two delegations focused considerable 
attention on the recommendations of a Con- 
ference on German-American Cultural Re- 
lations held under the auspices of the Ford 
Foundation and the two governments at 
Harrison House, Glen Cove, Long Island, 
New York, January 16-18, which had as- 
sembled a group of private citizens from 
the two countries, including representatives 
of organized labor, youth, women's groups, 
the communications media and the fields of 
art and literature. In their talks in Wash- 
ington, the government representatives re- 
viewed the results of the Conference and 
decided that they would encourage increased 
interaction between groups and individuals 
in both countries. Each government also 
plans to review the results of the Conference 
and any follow-on activities with the non- 
governmental participants later this year. 
In the view of the two governments, the 
Conference acted as a useful stimulant for 
more specific exchange activities and it is 
their intention to encourage the holding of a 
similar conference every two to three years. 

The two government delegations also re- 
viewed plans for the celebration of the 
American Revolution Bicentennial both in 
the United States and Germany. They also 
agreed to continue the study, initiated last 
year, looking toward new guidelines in the 
application of the equivalency of academic 
degrees. 



February 10, 1975 



181 



America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward the Year 2000 



Address by Joseph J. Sisco 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 



There is an inscription on the Chapel of 
Saint Gilgen near Salzburg which states that 
man should not look mournfully into the past 
because it does not come back again; that 
he should wisely improve the present because 
it is his ; and that he should go forth to meet 
the future, without fear, and with a manly 
heart. We have now passed the threshold into 
the last quarter of the 20th century, and it 
is a good moment for Americans to ask basic 
questions about the future. 

With the energy crisis, the food crisis, the 
recession-inflation dilemma, the new rela- 
tionships with China and the Soviet Union, 
we are all conscious that this nation and the 
world are experiencing rapid and radical 
change; each of us is asking what is the 
direction this change is taking, what kind 
of world is coming into existence, and what 
are the prospects for the future. The chal- 
lenges we face are complex as well as per- 
plexing, but they also ofl'er us historic oppor- 
tunities to create a more stable and equitable 
world order. We are at a watershed — we are 
at a new period of creativity or at the be- 
ginning of a slide to international anarchy. 
America has faced great and seemingly 
overwhelming challenges before in its his- 
tory and has shown its inherent capacity to 
overcome them and, indeed, to create some- 
thing new from the old. This is the critical 
task before us. 

We face new realities. 



' Made at San Diego, Calif., on Jan. 23 before 
a regional foreign policy conference cosponsored 
by the World Affairs Council of San Diego and 
the Department of State (as delivered). 



We have gone through a very difficult 
period. Here at home : 

— We have witnessed the assassination of 
a President and other leaders, the decision 
by another President not to run again, and 
the forced resignation of another. 

— We have experienced the pain and an- 
guish of Viet-Nam and the ignominy of 
Watergate. 

— We have the sense that perhaps we are 
less in control of our destiny than in the past. 

— There is perhaps, too, a certain loss of 
purpose and direction, of self-confidence. 

— But I hope we've gained some added 
wisdom as well. 

Abroad, there have also been dramatic 
changes. We are living in an interdependent 
world, living literally in each other's back- 
yards. What happens here has effect on 
others, and what happens overseas affects 
us. Moreover, no longer can we make the 
distinction between domestic and interna- 
tional policies as was the case in the 19th 
century. 

— For most of the postwar period Amer- 
ica enjoyed predominance in physical re- 
sources and political power. Now, like most 
other nations in history, we find that our 
most difficult task is how to apply limited 
means to the accomplishment of carefully 
defined ends. 

— While we are no longer directly engaged 
in war, we know that peace cannot be taken 
for granted. The new nuclear equation makes 
restraint imperative, for the alternative is 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



nuclear holocaust. While maintaining a 
strong national defense, we have come to 
realize that in the nuclear age the relation- 
ship between military strength and politi- 
cally usable power is the most complex in 
history. 

— We have learned, I believe, that our 
resources are not unlimited, that there can- 
not be a Washington blueprint or panacea 
for every international problem. It is within 
this context we face the very profound and 
awesome task of achieving a stable and 
peaceful world order. 

— For two decades the solidarity of our 
alliances seemed as constant as the threats 
to our security. Now our allies have regained 
strength, and relations with adversaries have 
improved. The perception of the threat has 
diminished. All this has given rise to un- 
certainties over the sharing of burdens with 
friends and the impact of reduced tensions 
on the cohesion of alliances. 

— Since World War II the world has dealt 
with the economy as if its constant advance 
were inexorable. Now the warning signs of 
a major economic crisis are evident. Rates 
of recession and inflation are sweeping de- 
veloping and developed nations alike. The 
threat of global famine and mass starvation 
is an afi'ront to our values and an intolerable 
threat to our hopes for a better world. The 
abrupt rise of energy costs and the ensuing 
threats of monetary crisis and economic 
stagnation threaten to undermine the eco- 
nomic system that nourished the world's 
well-being for over 30 years. 

In other areas, chronic conflicts in the 
Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and 
Indochina threaten to erupt with new inten- 
sity and unpredictable results. 

And as if the situation were not compli- 
cated enough, most of these problems are 
dealt with in a clearly inadequate framework. 
National solutions continue to be pursued 
when, manifestly, their very futility is the 
crisis we face. 

In the face of these challenges we must 
ask ourselves. What is America's response? 
Our traditional confidence that we can solve 



all problems has been shaken, and we seem 
less certain of our purposes. To some extent 
this may be a .sign of growing maturity in 
a nation which no longer possesses unlimited 
power. But it must be seasoned, it seems to 
me, with an equal awareness of what is re- 
quired to protect our welfare and our secu- 
rity and what the consequences would be 
for ourselves and for the world of a largely 
passive foreign policy, one geared to with- 
drawal rather than creation. 

Moreover, let us remind ourselves that 
we've got plenty going for us. We are still 
blessed with great natural resources, re- 
gardless of our wasteful tendencies. We are 
still a hard-working people, even though, 
unfortunately, our work ethic in recent years 
has been weakened. We are still the strongest 
military and economic power in the world, 
even though we exist in a world of nuclear 
parity rather than one of nuclear superi- 
ority. And Watergate must not be permitted 
to undermine our historical role as a bulwark 
of stability and security, a beacon of politi- 
cal freedom, of social progress and human- 
itarianism. 

It's important to recall that: 

— We are the only nation in the world 
which can engage the Soviet Union in the 
essential task of halting and reversing the 
nuclear arms race. 

— We, as the leading industrial nation, 
with large natural, economic, and social re- 
sources, can provide the example and the 
initiatives to unite the industrialized nations, 
prevent a slide into global depression, and 
shape a new economic order. 

— We are the only nation which can deal 
with both Arabs and Israelis, attempting to 
eliminate the greatest immediate threat to 
world peace. 

We have recognized these new realities, 
and I believe it is fair to say that we have 
already achieved some positive results: 

— Who just five years ago would have 
predicted that summits between our Presi- 
dent and the Soviet leaders would be regular 
events on the international agenda? Despite 



February 10, 1975 



183 



our differences with the Soviets, which will 
persist, who would have imagined the prog- 
ress we have made in mutual understand- 
ing, arms control, and cooperation? 

— Who five years ago would have predicted 
that China and the United States would have 
ended two decades of estrangement and made 
such progress in normalizing relations? 

— Who five years ago would have predicted 
that while maintaining our close relations 
with Israel we could contribute so signifi- 
cantly to nurturing the negotiating process 
and have improved relations with key Arab 
nations at the same time? 

As we look ahead it is clear that the world 
to which we have grown accustomed over 
the past quarter century is giving way to 
something quite different. At the same time, 
I am confident that America's contribution 
can be major, even decisive. It must, however, 
be a role not of withdrawal or looking in- 
ward, but of selective engagement; and we 
must be fully aware of the potential and 
limits of power, aware that we are neither 
omniscient nor omnipresent. 

Let us look ahead to the next quarter 
century. 

First, over the next 25 years our values, 
our interests, and our purposes will continue 
to be most closely aligned with the indus- 
trialized democracies of Europe, Canada, 
and Japan. We are convinced that at the very 
heart of a stable world must be a community 
of nations sharing common goals, common 
ideals, and a common perspective of how to 
deal with problems and threats confronting 
us. 

New relationships with countries with 
different systems and ideologies are only 
possible if old relationships with allies re- 
main strong. A central goal of our foreign 
policy must be to strengthen cooperative en- 
deavors with a unifying Europe and to revi- 
talize Atlantic ties. Success in building a sta- 
ble and creative world order will be measured 
in many respects by the progress we achieve 
in preserving and enhancing cooperation 
among the great democracies. 

Second, over the next 25 years I believe 



the relationship between the United States 
and the Soviet Uriion will determine more 
than any other single factor whether our 
hopes for peace and stability in the world 
are realized. This is not intended to dero- 
gate from the fact that since World War II 
about 100 countries have come into being 
and want a piece of the action. We know 
there cannot be a peaceful world unless most 
of the nations feel they have a share in it. 
But our relations with the Soviets are key. 

Our relationship with the Soviet Union, 
once characterized simply by the degree of 
hostility, is now defined by a complex mix- 
ture of competition and cooperation. Detente 
— the relaxation of tensions and the exercise 
of mutual restraint — is an imperative in a 
nuclear world. From the ideological point 
of view, there can be no compromise. How- 
ever, coexistence of two essentially different 
social systems is the essential element of 
world peace in the next quarter century. 
There is simply no rational alternative to the 
pursuit of a relaxation of tensions. For this 
reason, we are engaged with the Soviets in 
an unprecedented range of negotiations, such 
as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 
Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotia- 
tions, and the European Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation, which address the 
hard political and security issues confront- 
ing us and which seek to provide greater 
stability. There is continuing need from now 
to the end of the century of a system of secu- 
rity which our peoples can support and 
which our adversaries will respect in a 
period of lessened tension. 

Third, over the next 25 years Asia will 
increasingly shape global hopes for peace 
and security. Half of mankind lives in Asia. 
The interests of four of the world's powers 
intersect in the Pacific. Three times in a 
single generation this nation has been drawn 
into Asian conflict. It is important that the 
region continue to evolve in the direction of 
greater stability and increased cooperation, 
that the major powers respect each other's 
legitimate interests, and that the United 
States and China continue to deepen mutual 
understanding and deepen our ties. There 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



cannot be a stable peace in Asia, or in the 
world, without a pattern of peaceful inter- 
national relationships that includes this 
powerful and talented nation. 

Fourth, over the next 25 years there will 
continue to be local flash points which could 
ignite world war if steps are not taken now 
to defuse them. The Arab-Israeli dispute is 
a prime example. 

The Middle East problem is one that has 
occupied my attention for many years. For 
too long, the peoples of the area have been 
locked in incessant struggle, a cycle of wars 
followed by uneasy cease-fires, followed again 
by bloodshed and tragedy. Thus two peoples 
were thrown together in what history will 
undoubtedly recall not as a series of wars 
but as one long war broken by occasional 
armistices and temporary cease-fires. It has 
been a history of lost opportunities. 

The interests and concerns of two global 
powers meet in the Middle East. It is an area 
of vital interest to the United States. A stable 
and lasting peace in the world requires a 
stable and durable settlement in the Middle 
East. When war came again to the Middle 
East in October 1973, we had two immedi- 
ate objectives : First, to bring about a cease- 
fire and, second, to do so in a manner that 
would leave us in a position to play a con- 
structive role with both the Arabs and 
Israelis in shaping a more secure peace. It 
was evident that the search for peace would 
be arduous and that a lasting settlement 
could only be approached through a series 
of limited steps in which the settlement of 
any particular issue would not be dependent 
upon the settlement of all issues. What have 
we accomplished? 

— For the most part, but not entirely, the 
guns are silent. Disengagement agreements 
between Israel and Egypt and Israel and 
Syria in 1974 have been completed. They 
have provided more time to explore further 
possibilities for practical progress toward 
peace; they were important first steps. 

— We have demonstrated that the United 
States can maintain its support for Israel's 
survival and security and have relations of 



understanding with Arab nations. This will 
require careful and continuous nurturing. 
We have helped both the Arabs and Israelis 
to move at least the first difficult steps to- 
ward mutual accommodation. The situation 
was defused somewhat; however, the risk 
of renewal of hostilities remains unless more 
progress can be made. 

— The focus of discussion is still on prog- 
ress on a step-by-step basis toward peace. 
This was made possible because most of the 
countries in the area have adopted a more 
moderate course. Instead of concentrating 
solely on preparations for war, a number 
have demonstrated that they are ready to 
consider, however tentatively, the possible 
fruits of peace. Most of the people of the 
Middle East are plain tired and fed up with 
the cycle of violence and counterviolence and 
recurrent wars, and the October 1973 war 
changed the objective conditions in the area. 
The Arabs no longer feel they need to go to 
negotiations weak and with head bowed; 
the 1973 war in their eyes erased the shame 
of the 1967 war. And in Israel the shock and 
trauma of the October war gave new impetus 
to support for negotiations. 

— We are convinced that there must be 
further stages in the diplomatic process. 
While in a sense it will be even more difficult 
as we approach the more fundamental issues 
of an overall settlement, it is also true that 
each step creates a new situation that may 
make it less difficult to envisage further 
steps. To this end, discussions with both 
sides are being actively pursued, the most 
recent being those held with Israeli Foreign 
Minister Allon in Washington last week. 
These talks were useful, and while a number 
of key problems remain to be solved, some 
progress was made in defining a conceptual 
framework for the next stage of the nego- 
tiating process. 

— In sum, quiet diplomacy is proceeding, 
and we remain cautiously hopeful that fur- 
ther practical progress is possible. If there 
is to be peace and stability over the next 
quarter century, this problem must be solved. 

Fifth, over the next 25 years the imbal- 



February 10, 1975 



185 



ance between limited resources and unlimited 
demand will continue and intensify the eco- 
nomic challenge before us. The temptation 
for nations to seek seliish advantage will be 
great. It is essential that the international 
community respond to the challenges of en- 
ergy, food, and inflation with a collaborative 
approach. 

As for our participation in meeting the 
energy crisis, President Ford has put forward 
the administration's energy program with 
a view to ending vulnerability to economic 
disruption by foreign suppliers by 1985. We 
cannot afford to mortgage our security and 
economy to outside forces. There can be no 
solution without consumer cooperation and 
solidarity. Equally, it is essential that there 
be a constructive consumer-producer dia- 
logue and that the rhetoric of confrontation 
give way to the reality of interdependence. 
The former is a necessary prerequisite to 
the latter. Assistant Secretary Hartman has 
addressed these issues in detail this morn- 
ing. I will only say that the sacrifices will 
be required by us all — sacrifices which I be- 
lieve the American people are ready to make 
in the overall interest of all citizens. 

The food problem also is an important as- 
pect of global interdependence. The fact is 
that food production has not matched popu- 
lation growth. In our food assistance pro- 
gram, i.e., our Public Law 480 program, we 
are making a major eflfort approaching al- 
most $1.5 billion. It is true that we give some 
of this food aid to countries with which we 
have important political relationships. How- 
ever, there and elsewhere the greater part 
of our food assistance goes for humanitarian 
purposes. 

At the World Food Conference in Rome 
last November, the United States set forth 
a comprehensive program to meet man's 
needs foi' ''ood. But we cannot do it alone; 
it is global. No aspect of American foreign 
policy over the past generation has had 
greatc- support than our effort to help avert 
starvation and increase the poorer countries' 
production of food. This is not only in the 
best tradition of America's humanitarian 
concerns but is essential to the stability of 
the entire world, for the gap between 

186 



what the poorest countries produce and 
what they need is growing. It will require 
increased food production by us but also 
by others as well — developed as well as de- 
veloping nations. Reserves will be needed, 
and financing. It will require more deter- 
mined efforts on the population problem. 
There can be no real stability in the world 
unless this problem is solved. 

Sixth, over the next quarter of a century 
the success or failure of international insti- 
tutions such as the United Nations to meet 
global challenges will be of significant im- 
portance. Any balanced assessment of the 
world organization must take into account 
its capacities as well as its limitations. 

We overestimated the potential of the 
United Nations at its birth in 1945. We 
tended to view the creation of this institu- 
tion as synonymous with solutions to the 
problems. We know better today. At the 
same time, we must exercise care not to 
underestimate its positive contributions to 
peace. The United Nations is not an entity 
apart from its membership. The U.N.'s im- 
perfections mirror the imperfections of the 
world in which the United Nations operates. 
Power and responsibility in the now-inflated 
General Assembly of 138 is out of kilter; 
bloc voting has become all too frequent; pro- 
grams are all too often voted which strain 
available resources; political issues have 
tended to deflect the work of many of the 
specialized agencies. At the same time we 
must bear in mind that U.N. peacekeeping 
forces are playing an indispensable role in 
such trouble spots as Cyprus and the Middle 
East; the U.N. Development Program has 
been over the years an unheralded success in 
helping smaller countries unharness and 
utilize their resources for the benefit of their 
peoples. The U.N. specialized agencies are 
helping make a global attack on the global 
problems of food, environment, population, 
and health. They are part of the broad effort 
of the international community in attacking 
the underlying root causes of war — poverty, 
disease, social maladjustments. 

These are meaningful contributions to ! 
peace. It is not in our interest to turn our 
back on the United Nations, despite its 

Department of State Bulletin 



obvious shortcomings and our understand- 
able disappointments. Picking up our mar- 
bles and going home would only leave the 
United Nations in the hands of our adver- 
saries to shape it in their own image. In 
short, for the next quarter century, there 
is no real alternative but to redouble our 
efforts to help assure responsible and respon- 
sive decisions in the U.N. system; for to 
try to create something new from scratch 
would be doomed to fail, leaving the inter- 
national community weaker rather than 
stronger to cope with meaningful issues of 
the future. 

Finally, I wish to conclude with an ob- 
servation closer to home. Our foreign 
policy, to be effective, must rest on a broad 
national base and reflect a shared com- 
munity of values. This does not mean 
rubberstamping, and we cannot expect 
unanimity. Responsible people obviously 
will continue to have serious differences. 
We are in danger, I believe, of being overly 
critical of ourselves, overly introspective. 
We have to recapture the habit of concen- 
trating on what binds us together. It is 
essential in the present environment that 
we work together to shape a broad con- 
sensus, a new unity, a renewed trust, and 
fresh confidence. 

In this respect, the relationship between 
the executive and the Legislature is criti- 
cal. America can only take the initiatives 
required to protect its interests if we make 
a new start here at home. A new Congress 
and a new administration present us with 
that opportunity. If both branches of the 
new government engage in a serious dia- 
logue, a new consensus can be reached. 

It is essential also that a dialogue be re- 
established between the public and the 
government, for it is through such a proc- 
ess that confidence in our institutions can 
in time be restored. The most important 
task we have in foreign policy is to see 
that it is anchored in the support of the en- 
tire American people, and that can only 
be accomplished through the free and open 
exchange of ideas. As Adlai Stevenson once 
stated: In a democracy, "Government can- 
not be stronger or more tough-minded than 



its people. It cannot be more inflexibly 
committed to the task than they. It can- 
not be wiser than the people." 

As we prepare to celebrate America's 
bicentennial, I hope we can all engage our- 
selves in the critical effort to build a better 
future. We are a healthy country capable 
of dealing with these problems, and I would 
urge each of you — important leaders of 
the community — to approach these prob- 
lems in a hopeful spirit. 



Secretary Kissinger Gives Dinner 
Honoring Visiting Sultan of Oman 

His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id of 
Oman made a private visit to the United 
States January 9-11. Following is an ex- 
change of toasts between Secretary Kissin- 
ger and Sidtan Qaboos at a dinner at the 
Department of State on January 9. 

Press rrieasp 11 dated January 10 

SECRETARY KISSINGER 

Your Majesty, Excellencies: It is a great 
pleasure to welcome His Majesty on his 
first visit to the United States. Since this is 
a very special occasion, we have spared him 
the usual treatment by bureaus, which is 
to give our visiting guest a toast — which I 
dare not deliver — giving him the choice of 
responding to something he has read or to 
something he has heard. 

But Your Majesty comes from an area 
that is very much on our minds and from a 
country with which our relationships go 
back, as it turns out, 140 years. 

The Middle East is, of course, an area 
very much in the news and with very 
many tensions, and also it contains many 
of the resources on which the economy of 
the whole world depends. But it also con- 
tains many states that are not directly part 
of the political conflicts and whose share in 
the energy problem is not of the largest 
magnitude. And nevertheless their future 
depends on the security of the whole area 



February 10, 1975 



187 



and their progress depends on the ability 
of all the nations to work out relationships 
based on cooperation and conciliation. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
we will do our utmost to promote peace in 
the Middle East on the basis of justice and 
taking into account the aspirations of all 
of the peoples. And we want to promote an 
international economic order which is nego- 
tiated cooperatively, in which producers and 
consumers will realize that their joint wel- 
fare requires understanding by both sides. 

But, finally, we also take a strong interest 
in the independence and sovereignty and 
progress of our old friends, such as His 
Majesty, who faces in his own country some 
pressures from his neighbors and who 
nevertheless has striven successfully to 
bring development and progress and con- 
ciliation to his people and to his neighbors. 

We have had very warm and friendly 
and useful talks this afternoon, and I look 
forward to the opportunity to continue them 
tomorrow. 

So this visit by His Majesty reflects the 
intense interest of the United States in 
peace and progress in the Middle East and 
our dedication to the friendly relations be- 
tween Oman and the United States. 

So I would like to ask you all to join me 
in drinking to the health, long life, of our 
honored guest: His Majesty the Sultan of 
Oman. 



HIS MAJESTY SULTAN QABOOS BIN SA'ID 

Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests: I am 
very pleased to be visiting the United States, 
to acquaint myself with its friendly people 
and its distinguished leadership. 

We appreciate the great efforts your 
country is making, Mr. Secretary, for the 
sake of bringing about a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East; and we have pro- 
found hope that your efforts will be success- 
ful. 

The relations between Oman and the 
United States, as you just mentioned, Mr. 
Secretary, go back to many years. Indeed, 
Oman was among the first Arab states to 
have relations with your great country. 



My visit today is but an expression of our 
desire for the continuation of our long- 
standing good ties and also our hope that 
thebe ties would be strengthened even more 
in the future for the mutual benefit of our 
two countries. 

We realize, as you do, Mr. Secretary, that 
stability and peace in the world cannot be 
achieved and strengthened without the com- 
bined efforts of all nations, in coping in a 
positive and cooperative spirit with con- 
temporary world problems, in particular the 
Middle East conflict, where our joint hope 
for a just and lasting peace is unfortu- 
nately yet to be realized. 

We are aware, also, of the serious eco- 
nomic problems which the world is faced 
with. But we are convinced at the same time 
that no matter what the differences in the 
viewpoints regarding causes of the existing 
economic problems, logical and sound solu- 
tions to these problems could only come 
through negotiation and not through con- 
frontation — which would only aggravate 
the world economic conditions. 

As we mentioned this afternoon during 
our meeting with His Excellency the Presi- 
dent of the United States, I would like to 
repeat, Mr. Secretary, that Oman, though a 
developing country, is determined to fully 
devote its efforts and utilize its natural re- 
sources to promote its economic development 
and thereby raise the standards of living of 
its people. 

In our endeavors to achieve these goals, 
we shall seek the assistance and avail our- 
selves of the experience of friendly ad- 
vanced nations — among which we hold the 
United States in high regard. 

In concluding my remai'ks, Mr. Secretary, 
I would like to share your hope for a greater 
and more dedicated cooperation on the part 
of all nations toward strengthening world 
peace and stability and promoting economic 
prosperity for peoples of all nations. 

Our own endeavors to contribute to the 
realization of this noble hope shall never 
cease. 

Gentlemen, now I propose a toast to the 
distinguished Secretary of the United 
States. 



188 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Energy Crisis and Efforts To Assure Its Solution 



Address by Arthur A. Hartman 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^ 



I thank you for your very warm welcome. 
The interest displayed by San Diego in this 
conference gives evidence of the close in- 
volvement of this community in the foreign 
policy process; that process today is very 
close to home indeed. With international 
events now more than ever intimately re- 
lated to the activities of our daily lives, such 
involvement is more essential than ever. If 
any of us have wishfully believed that the 
process of detente and a less active Ameri- 
can role in many areas of the world have 
cushioned us from the impact of foreign 
developments, we must surely see that the 
energy crisis has disabused us of this pipe- 
dream. 

As President Ford put it in his state of 
the Union address last week : 

At no time in our peacetime history has the state 
of the nation depended more heavily on the state 
of the world; and seldom, if ever, has the state of 
the world depended more heavily on the state of 
our nation. 

This fact — the close and inevitable inter- 
relationship between foreign and domestic 
developments — forms the all-important back- 
drop to the issue I would like to address 
today: The impact of the energy crisis and 
the need for cooperative efforts to assure its 
solution — cooperative efforts both nationally 
and internationally. 

In April 1973, prior to the onset of the oil 



crisis in October, Secretary Kissinger called 
for a creative effort to meet the new chal- 
lenges faced by the world's major industrial 
powers. He recalled the security and eco- 
nomic challenges that had been successfully 
met in the immediate post-World War II 
period, and he foresaw that without similar 
common programs the freedom of all our 
nations could once more be put in jeopardy. 
Mastering our fate domestically or inter- 
nationally requires an act of political will, 
and it was that act of will that he called for. 

It took us a year of what seemed unneces- 
sary bickering to produce a declaration of 
principles with our Atlantic allies.^ But 
those discussions about the meaning of con- 
sultations and the necessity for common 
action to govern the detente process and 
maintain our security also produced new in- 
sights into the interrelationships of the 
economies of Europe, North America, and 
Japan. It took the concrete illustration of 
the energy crisis resulting from the October 
war in the Middle East to remove once and 
for all the illusory search for go-it-alone 
policies. 

Without exception, the industrialized na- 
tions of the non-Communist world now stand 
face to face with the extraordinary economic 
problem of burgeoning rates of inflation in 
the midst of deepening recession. This un- 
precedented situation — in large measure a 
product of the international energy crisis — 



' Made at San Diego, Calif., on Jan. 23 before a 
regional foreign policy conference cosponsored by 
the World Affairs Council of San Diego and the 
Department of State (text from press release 26). 



- For text of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations 
adopted by the ministerial meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council at Ottawa on June 19, 1974, see 
Bulletin of July 8, 1974, p. 42. 



February 10, 1975 



189 



continues to be aggravated by oil prices, 
which are today four times higher than they 
were just a little over a year ago. 

The mounting bill for oil imports has put 
a severe strain on the external accounts of 
all consumer countries as well as on the 
political cohesion of many nations. For some, 
the cumulative financial debt will rapidly 
become unsustainable unless a cooperative 
answer is found to the problem of world 
petroleum markets. 

The 24-nation Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
comprised of advanced industrialized coun- 
tries, warned in its semiannual survey is- 
sued last month that, based on existing poli- 
cies, its member nations could be headed for 
the deepest and longest recession since the 
1930's, with lower production and growing 
unemployment continuing into 1976. The in- 
dustrial democracies face a test, the report 
concluded, "probably unprecedented outside 
time of war." Without concerted and effec- 
tive remedial action, the Organization feared 
that the economic slippage could develop into 
an avalanche. 



Central U.S. Role in World Economy 

This gloomy picture has transformed in- 
ternational economic problems from arcane 
matters dealt with by obscure experts into 
the central foreign policy issue of the day. 
Nor are economic and political issues easily 
separable. Quite clearly, the strength of 
particular Western European economies re- 
lates directly to the internal political 
strength of the nations involved and there- 
fore the strength and cohesion of the NATO 
alliance. Similarly, the tremendous new eco- 
nomic leverage now available to some oil- 
producing countries has a potential impact 
on the course of events in the Middle East. 

Nor are the poorer nations of the world 
spared the impact of the crisis. The addi- 
tional squeeze on some developing countries, 
whose weak economies were already under 
stress, poses a specter of economic collapse 
and starvation. 

In the face of this situation, solutions 
must link our objectives at home to our ob- 



190 



jectives abroad. They must be posed in 
terms of both domestic and international 
goals : 

— We must combat rising unemployment 
while dampening inflation at home. 

— We in the United States must work to 
reduce substantially our external oil bill, 
which increased by about $16 billion in 1974 
to a total of about $25 billion. 

— We must continue to insure the eco- 
nomic strength and political cohesion of the 
Western alliance. 

— We must seek to avoid severe disrup- 
tion in those developing countries seriously 
aff'ected by the oil crisis. 

The President's state of the Union and 
energy messages provide a clear and force- 
ful set of proposals designed to meet these 
ends. The domestic aspects of these pro- 
posals will be considered in the context of 
their impact on all strata of our national 
economy. The international dimension, in 
addition, must be pursued to a large degree 
in concert with other nations, most particu- 
larly the industrialized countries of North 
America, Western Europe, and Japan. 

These nations hold in their hands the cen- 
tral responsibility for a prosperous world 
economic system. If our economies slide, 
others will be drawn down also. America's 
central role as the industrial base of the 
world economy imposes a special burden of 
leadership and example upon us. With our 
gross national product comprising close to 
half of the total GNP of the non-Communist 
world, it is not difficult to see why the meas- 
ures we take to cure our domestic economic 
ills are of intense concern to others. 

Given this high degree of interdependence 
among advanced economies, as well as the 
evolving interrelationships among the mem- 
bers of the European Community as they 
work at building a more integrated Euro- 
pean political structure, the nature of the 
economic ties among us takes on great sensi- 
tivity and importance. 

In this connection, you may have heard 
talk about the concept of "trilateralism" 
among industrialized countries. There are 
indeed three concentrations of industrial 



Department of State Bulletin 



power in the non-Communist world — that of 
Western Europe, North America, and Japan. 
But beyond that, the relation is anything but 
a neat geometric design. It is rather an intri- 
cate set of interrelationships and interde- 
pendencies. It rests on a base of shared 
political objectives and, of course, includes 
the Atlantic alliance, which has represented 
the principal cornerstone of Western secu- 
rity for 21/0 decades. 



Common Action on the Energy Crisis 

The energy crisis is the most severe test 
of the fabric of this alliance since it was 
formed. The Atlantic nations, together with 
Japan, must not only stand firm but take the 
necessary collective action to overcome the 
albatross of energy dependence that weighs 
so heavily on our future. A significant de- 
gree of unanimity is required. I am happy 
to say that the prospects for such common 
action in the face of the current threat to 
the world economy are now perceptibly 
brighter than they were when Secretary 
Kissinger first called for that creative effort 
to assert our common political will. 

In the period between the Middle East war 
of October 1973 and last February when the 
Washington Energy Conference took place, 
a go-it-alone atmosphere prevailed, with a 
number of Western nations scrambling to 
protect their independent sources of supply. 
Mistrust and bickering continued over the 
concept and procedures for consultations be- 
tween the United States and Europe. And at 
the Washington Energy Conference itself, 
there was an acrimonious and much publi- 
cized split with the French which left an 
unfortunate residue of ill feeling. 

Coming back from that nadir of political 
relationships a year ago, and demonstrating 
not only an impressive resilience but also a 
renewed spirit of constructive compromise, 
we and our partners in Europe and Japan 
have moved together in a number of impor- 
tant respects: 

— Last May the OECD adopted an impor- 
tant new trade pledge to avoid a self-defeat- 
ing series of new trade restrictions to offset 



the oil deficit in one OECD country at the 
expense of others. 

— Practical steps were taken to improve 
the consultative procedure between the 
European Community and the United States. 

— As a followup to the Washington 
Energy Conference, a new International 
Energy Agency was established under the 
auspices of the OECD. This new Agency is 
based on a common commitment by major 
consumers to respond jointly in any future 
emergency or embargo situation. Under such 
circumstances, it enables the countries in- 
volved to build up their oil stocks, to take 
mandatory measures curtailing demand, and 
to pool available resoui'ces. The Agency will 
also act as the principal forum for the de- 
velopment of a broader energy strategy. 

— An unusual series of summit meetings 
among leaders of the major industrialized 
countries has taken place, leading, I am con- 
vinced, to a considerably higher level of 
confidence and understanding. In recent 
months. President Ford has discussed domes- 
tic and international economic issues with 
the heads of government of Italy, Canada, 
Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and France. The Martinique meeting with 
French President Giscard d'Estaing was 
marked by a new spirit of cooperation and 
frankness. The United States and France 
have common objectives in the energy field 
and in economic policies generally, and we 
look forward to continued close consultation 
and joint enterprise with France in the 
period ahead. Later this month, the Presi- 
dent will also meet with Prime Minister 
Wilson of Great Britain. The very serious 
expressions of concern about the necessity 
for common action to avoid world recession 
expressed during these meetings had, I am 
certain, an important influence on subse- 
quent decisions reached within the U.S. 
Government and the governments of these 
other countries. 

— The international financial system has 
made substantial progress in moving us to- 
ward financial solidarity by assuring that 
necessary funds are available to countries in 
need of help in funding their balance of pay- 
ments deficits. At the suggestion of Secre- 



February 10, 1975 



191 



tary Kissinger and OECD Secretary General 
Emile van Lennep, it was agreed just last 
week at meetings in Washington to create 
a special new $25 billion facility. This fund 
would serve as a financial safety net for 
OECD member nations. It would be available 
to finance the deficits of countries experienc- 
ing difficulties until such time as longer 
term policies designed to respond to the oil 
crisis are in effect. 

Long-Term Strategy for Reducing Oil Imports 

Although this series of actions consti- 
tutes, I believe, a very solid list of accom- 
plishments, it represents only a beginning 
in the solution of the international oil prob- 
lem. Any long-term strategy for dealing with 
the energy crisis must reduce the depend- 
ence of industrialized countries on imported 
oil. Only by means of reduced dependence 
can consumer countries stem the steady out- 
ward flow of funds and the accumulation of a 
staggering financial debt to producer coun- 
tries. This massive debt is currently running 
at a rate of some $40 billion a year for the 
OECD countries and another $20 billion for 
less developed countries, for an annual total 
of about $60 billion per year. 

Only by reducing their dependency can 
the industrialized countries establish a stable 
and equitable long-term relationship with 
the producing countries. Along with our 
partners in the International Energy 
Agency, we are now in the midst of develop- 
ing methods to achieve this goal. Among the 
latter are coordinated programs of energy 
conservation to make possible a reduced de- 
mand for oil, and accelerated development 
of existing fossil fuel resources available 
outside of the nations belonging to the Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries, and concerted research and develop- 
ment efforts on new forms of energy. 

Instituting this program will not by any 
means be easy. It will require, among other 
things, strong internal measures in all con- 
sumer nations — measures not calculated to 
be domestically popular. Included, in other 
words, are programs that will be tough medi- 
cine to swallow politically but which the 

192 



public of all our countries will see as the 
necessary underpinning of efforts to control 
their destinies. 

Putting these measures into effect will 
also take time. The OECD has recently fore- 
cast that by 1985 its member countries can 
reduce dependence on imported oil to 20 
percent of total energy consumption. For 
our part, the President has announced our 
intention to reduce U.S. imports of oil by 1 
million barrels per day by the end of 1975. 
In addition, we expect further to reduce 
imports by 2 million barrels per day by the 
end of 1977. These initiatives are not bein^ 
taken in isolation. We are seeking an equita 
ble sharing of this burden with other indus- 
trial nations. 

The institution of measures to gain self- 
sufficiency can and must be accelerated by 
the new programs we are developing. In the 
interim, we must rely on joint financial ar- 
rangements to insure that each consumer 
economy can survive the current trade im- 
balance caused by high oil prices. 

Let me underline, however, this basic fact : 
There is available no acceptable alternative 
to the long-term strategy I have outlined. 
To continue to import large quantities of oil 
at current high prices will, sooner or later, 
run some consumer countries into insol- 
vency ; they simply will no longer be able to 
pay for needed oil imports, and this will lead 
to collapse of their industrial structure and 
to political turmoil. 

The United States is not likely to be the 
first to reach such a point. Our basic eco- 
nomic and political structure is too sound, 
and we have a large enough reserve of oil 
and other fossil fuels to sustain ourselves. 
But this fact should not make us complacent. 
Given the interdependence of our economies, 
we have good reason to make sure a finan- 
cial collapse does not happen anywhere. The 
breakdown of any industrialized democracy 
would constitute an immediate threat to our 
national interests. It would have adverse 
consequences on our trade and investments. 
It could seriously damage the NATO alli- 
ance. And certainly it would gravely threaten 
the entire international structure of peace 
that we have struggled so laboriously to 

Department of State Bulletin 



construct. If we work together with other 
industrialized nations, such calamities need 
not come about. I am confident that with the 
momentum that now exists, our negotiations 
with our Western European partners and 
Japan will soon produce results. 

Although some have urged an immediate 
meeting of producer and consumer countries, 
we have consistently taken the view that 
such a multilateral conference cannot be pro- 
ductive until the consumers first consolidate 
their own positions. Otherwise, various dis- 
agreements would simply be repeated and 
recorded at the conference itself with little 
or no productive result. 

The United States has, instead, urged a 
procedure involving four interrelated se- 
quential stages: First, the establishment of 
concerted programs among consumers in the 
fields of conservation, accelerated develop- 
ment of alternate energy sources, and finan- 
cial solidarity; second, the convening of a 
preparatory meeting with producers to de- 
velop the agenda and procedures for a con- 
sumer-producer conference — the preparatory 
meeting is tentatively tai'geted for March — 
third, the preparation of common consumer 
positions on the agenda items for the con- 
ference; and, finally, the holding of a con- 
sumer-producer conference. 

The sequence was agreed to by President 
Giscard d'Estaing and President Ford at 
their Martinique meeting and was also en- 
dorsed at a meeting of the Governing Board 
of the International Energy Agency last 
month. We can take satisfaction, therefore, 
that U.S. proposals for consumer solidarity 
are going forward before we enter into a 
conference with producing nations. 

In sum, the energy crisis, both in its roots 
and in its impact, is quintessentially politi- 
cal. It will require both the resolute domes- 
tic action called for by the President in his 
state of the Union address and close col- 
laboration with other industrial nations. 
Failure to rise to the challenge would pose 
immense dangers. But, as Secretary Kis- 
singer stated in Chicago last November: 
"Let there be no doubt, the energy problem 
is soluble. It will overwhelm us only if we 
retreat from its reality." 



Meetings of IMF Interim Committee 
and Group of Ten Held at Washington 

Folloiving is a Department statement read 
to neirs correspondents on January 17 by 
Paul Hare, Deputy Director, Office of Press 
Relations, together with the texts of com- 
muniqiies issued on January 16 at the con- 
clusion of a ministerial meeting of the Group 
of Ten and a meeting of the Interim Com- 
mittee of the Board of Governors of the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund. Secretary of the 
Treasury William E. Simon headed the U.S. 
delegations to the meetings. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JANUARY 17 

We are extremely pleased and encouraged 
by the agreement reached by the Group of 
Ten Ministers to establish the $25 billion 
solidarity fund by the end of February. This 
historic agreement among the Ten Ministers 
sets the framework for early agreement by 
all OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development] countries which 
choose to participate in the fund arrange- 
ment. The agreement of the Ministers in 
Washington therefore constitutes a decisive 
step toward establishment of the fund and 
thereby contributes significantly to pros- 
pects for international economic stability. 

The underpinning of the international 
financial system achieved through the fund 
will give all participating governments 
greater confidence and flexibility in our col- 
laborative efl'orts to reinvigorate our econo- 
mies and meet the energy challenge. 



TEXTS OF COMMUNIQUES, JANUARY 16 

Ministerial Meetings of the Group of Ten 

1. The Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
of the ten countries participating in the General 
Arrangements to Borrow met in Washington on 
the 14th and 16th of January, 1975, under the 
Chairmanship of Mr. Masayoshi Ohira, Minister 
of Finance of Japan. 

The Managing Director of the Intei-national 
Monetary Fund, Mr. H. J. Witteveen, took part in 



February 10, 1975 



193 



the meetings, which were also attended by the 
President of the Swiss National Bank, Mr. F. Leut- 
wiler, the Secretary-General of the OECD, Mr. 
E. van Lennep, the General Manager of the Bank 
for International Settlements, Mr. R. Larre, and 
the Vice-President of the Commission of the E.E.C. 
[European Economic Community], Mr. W. Hafer- 
kamp. 

2. After hearing a report from the Chairman of 
their Deputies, Mr. Rinaldo Ossola, the Ministers 
and Governors agreed that a solidarity fund, a new 
financial support arrangement, open to all members 
of the OECD, should be established at the earliest 
possible date, to be available for a period of two 
years. Each participant will have a quota which 
will serve to determine its obligations and borrow- 
ing rights and its relative weight for voting pui-- 
poses. The distribution of quotas will be based 
mainly on GNP and foreign trade. The total of all 
participants' quotas will be approximately $25 bil- 
lion. 

3. The aim of this arrangement is to support the 
detei-mination of participating countries to pursue 
appropriate domestic and international economic 
policies, including cooperative policies to encourage 
the increased production and conservation of energy. 
It was agreed that this arrangement will be a safety 
net, to be used as a last resort. Participants re- 
questing loans under the new arrangement will be 
required to show that they are encountering serious 
balance-of-payments difficulties and are making the 
fullest appropriate use of their own reserves and of 
resources available to them through other channels. 
All loans made through this arrangement will be 
subject to appropriate economic policy conditions. 
It was also agreed that all participants will jointly 
share the default risks on loans under the arrange- 
ment in proportion to, and up to the limits of, their 
quotas. 

4. In response to a request by a participant for a 
loan, the other participants will take a decision, 
by a two-thirds majority, on the granting of the 
loan and its tei-ms and conditions, in the case of 
loans up to the quota, and as to whether, for bal- 
ance-of-payments reasons, any country should not 
be required to make a direct contribution in the 
case of any loan. The granting of a loan in excess 
of the quota and up to 200 per cent of the quota 
will require a very strong majority and beyond 
that will require a unanimous decision. If one or 
more participants are not required to contribute 
to the financing of a loan, the requirements for 
approval of the loan must also be met with respect 
to the contributing participants. 

5. Further work is needed to determine financing 
methods. These might include direct contributions 
and/or joint borrowing in capital markets. Until 
the full establishment of the new arrangement, 
there might also be temporary financing through 
credit arrangements between central banks. 

6. Ministers and Governors agreed to recommend 



the immediate establishment of an ad hoc OECD 
Working Group, with representatives from all inter- 
ested OECD countries, to prepare a draft agreement 
in line with the above principles. In their view this 
work should be concluded in time to permit ap- 
proval by the OECD Council by the end of Febru- 
ary, 1975. 



Interim Committee of IMF Board of Governors 

P}-ess Communique of the Interim Committee of 
the Board of Governors on the International 
Monetary System 

1. The Interim Committee of the International 
Monetary Fund held its second meeting in Wash- 
ington, D.C. on January 15 and 16, 1975. Mr. John 
N. Turner, Minister of Finance of Canada, was in 
the chair. Mr. H. Johannes Witteveen, Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund, par- 
ticipated in the meeting. The following observers 
attended during the Committee's discussions of the 
matters referred to in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 below: 
Mr. Henri Konan Bedie, Chairman, Bank-F^nd De- 
velopment Committee; Mr. Gamani Corea, Secretary 
General, UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development] ; Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp, 
Vice President, EC Commission; Mr. Mahjoob A. 
Hassanain, Chief, Economics Department, OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]; 
Mr. Rene Larre, General Manager, BIS; Mr. Emile 
van Lennep, Secretary General, OECD; Mr. Olivier 
Long, Director General, GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade]; Mr. Robert S. McNamara, 
President, IBRD [International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development]. 

2. The Committee discussed the world economic 
outlook and against this background the interna- 
tional adjustment process. Great concern was ex- 
pressed about the depth and duration of the present 
recessionary conditions. It was urged that anti- 
recessionary policies should be pursued while con- 
tinuing to combat inflation, particularly by countries 
in a relatively strong balance of payments position. 
It was obsei-ved that very large disequilibria persist 
not only between major oil exporting countries as a 
group and all other countries, but also among 
countries in the latter group, particularly between 
industrial and primary producing countries. Anxiety 
was also voiced that adequate financing might not 
become available to cover the very large aggregate 
current account deficits, of the order of US$30 bil- 
lion, in prospect for the developing countries other 
than major oil exporters in 1975. 

3. The Committee agreed that the Oil Facility 
should be continued for 1975 on an enlarged basis. 
They urged the Managing Director to undertake as 
soon as possible discussions with major oil exporting 
members of the Fund, and with other members in 
strong reserve and payments positions, on loans by 



194 



Department of State Bulletin 



them for the purpose of financing the Facility. The 
Committee agreed on a figure of SDR [special draw- 
ing rights] 5 billion as the total of loans to be 
sought for this purpose. It was also agreed that any 
unused portion of the loans negotiated in 1974 
should be available in 1975. The Committee agreed 
that in view of the uncertainties inherent in present 
world economic conditions, it was necessai'y to keep 
the operation of the Oil Facility under constant 
review so as to be able to take whatever further ac- 
tion might be necessary in the best interests of the 
international community. It was also understood 
that during the coming months it would be useful 
to review the policies, practices, and resources of 
the Fund since it would be appropriate to make 
increased use of the Fund's ordinary holdings of 
currency to meet the needs of members that were 
encountering diflnculties. 

4. The Committee emphasized the need for de- 
cisive action to help the most seriously affected 
developing countries. In connection with the Oil 
Facility, the Committee fully endorsed the recom- 
mendation of the Managing Director that a special 
account should be established with appropriate con- 
tributions by oil exporting and industrial countries, 
and possibly by other members capable of contrib- 
uting, and that the Fund should administer this 
account in order to reduce for the most seriously 
affected members the burden of interest payable by 
them under the Oil Facility. 

5. The Committee considered questions relating 
to the sixth general review of the quotas of mem- 
bers, which is now under way, and agreed, subject 
to satisfactory amendment of the Articles, that the 
total of present quotas should be increased by 32.5 
per cent and rounded up to SDR 39 billion. It was 
understood that the period for the next general 
review of quotas would be reduced from five years 
to three years. The Committee also agreed that the 
quotas of the major oil exporters should be sub- 
stantially increased by doubling their share as a 
group in the enlarged Fund, and that the collective 
share of all other developing countries should not 
be allowed to fall below its present level. There 
was a consensus that because an important purpose 
of increases in quotas was strengthening the Fund's 
liquidity, arrangements should be made under which 
all the Fund's holdings of currency would be usable 
in accordance with its policies. The Committee in- 
vited the Executive Directors to examine quotas on 
the basis of the foregoing understandings, and to 
make specific recommendations as promptly as pos- 
sible on increases in the quotas of individual mem- 
ber countries. 

6. I. The Committee considered the question of 
amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the 
Fund. It was agreed that the Executive Directors 
should be asked to continue their work on this sub- 
ject and, as soon as possible, submit for considera- 
tion by the Committee draft amendments on the 
following subjects: 



(a) The transformation of the Interim Committee 
into a permanent Council at an appropriate time, 
in which each member would be able to east the 
votes of the countries in his constituency separately. 
The Council would have decision-making authority 
under powers delegated to it by the Board of Gov- 
ernors. 

(b) Improvements in the General Account, which 
would include (i) elimination of the obligation of 
member countries to use gold to make such pay- 
ments to the Fund as quota subscriptions and re- 
purchases and the determination of the media of 
payment, which the Executive Directors would study, 
and (ii) arrangements to ensure that the Fund's 
holdings of all currencies would be usable in its 
operations under satisfactory safeguards for all 
members. 

(c) Improvements in the characteristics of the 
SDR designed to promote the objective of making 
it the principal reserve asset of the international 
monetary system. 

(d) Provision for stable but adjustable par values 
and the floating of currencies in particular situa- 
tions, subject to appropriate rules and surveillance 
of the Fund, in accordance with the Outline of Re- 
form. 

II. The Committee also discussed a possible 
amendment that would establish a link between allo- 
cations of SDRs and development finance, but there 
continues to be a diversity of views on this matter. 
It was agreed to keep the matter under active study, 
but at the same time to consider other ways for in- 
creasing the transfer of real resources to developing 
countries. 

7. The Committee also agreed that the Executive 
Directors should be asked to consider possible im- 
provements in the Fund's facilities on the com- 
pensatory financing of export fluctuations and the 
stabilization of prices of primary products and to 
study the possibility of an amendment of the Arti- 
cles of Agreement that would permit the Fund to 
provide assistance directly to international buffer 
stocks of primary products. 

8. There was an intensive discussion of future 
arrangements for gold. The Committee reaffirmed 
that steps should be taken as soon as possible to 
give the special drawing right the central place in 
the international monetary system. It was generally 
agreed that the official price for gold should be 
abolished and obligatory payments of gold by mem- 
ber countries to the Fund should be eliminated. 
Much progress was made in moving toward a com- 
plete set of agreed amendments on gold, including 
the abolition of the official price and freedom for 
national monetary authorities to enter into gold 
transactions under certain specific arrangements, 
outside the Articles of the Fund, entered into be- 
tween national monetary authorities in order to 
ensure that the role of gold in the international 
monetary system would be gradually reduced. It is 



February 10, 1975 



195 



expected that after further study by the Executive 
Directors, in which the interests of all member 
countries would be taken into account, full agree- 
ment can be reached in the near future so that it 
would be possible to combine these amendments 
with the package of amendments as described in 
paragraphs 6 and 7 above. 

9. The Committee agreed to meet again in the 
early part of June, 1975 in Paris, France. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their de- 
struction. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow April 10, 1972.' 
Ratified by the President: January 22, 1975. 

Gas 

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of 
bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at 
Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force Febru- 
ary 8, 1928.= 

Ratified by the President: January 22, 1975 (with 
reservation). 

Genocide 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 



9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.= 
Accession deposited: Lesotho, November 29, 1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Accession deposited: Iceland, December 18, 1974. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damago 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972; for the United 
States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: Australia, January 20, 1975. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 
1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with re- 
spect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with 
respect to other provisions. 

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, January 21, 
1975. 

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid con- 
vention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. 
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect 
to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect 
to other provisions. 

Accession deposited: Luxembourg, January 21, 
1975. 



BILATERAL 

Khmer Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 10, 1974. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh 
January 14, 1975. Entered into force January 
14, 1975. 



' Not in force. 

■ Not in force for the United States. 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Februanj 10, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1859 



Asia: America's Foreign Policy Agenda: 
Toward the Year 2000 (Sisco) 182 

Cultural Affairs. U.S. and Federal Republic 
of Germany Hold Talks on Cultural Rela- 
tions (joint statement) 181 

Economic Affairs 

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward the 
Year 2000 (Sisco) 182 

The Energy Crisis and Efforts To Assure Its 

Solution (Hartman) 189 

Meetings of IMF Interim Committee and 
Group of Ten Held at Washington (Depart- 
ment statement, texts of communiques) . . 193 

Energy 

The Energy Crisis and Efforts To Assure Its 

Solution (Hartman) 189 

Meetings of IMF Interim Committee and 
Group of Ten Held at Washington (Depart- 
ment statement, texts of communiques) . . 193 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill 
Moyers' Journal" 165 

Europe 

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward 
the Year 2000 (Sisco) 182 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill 
Moyers' Journal" 165 

Foreign Aid. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for "Bill Moyers' Journal" 165 

Germany. U.S. and Federal Republic of Ger- 
many Hold Talks on Cultural Relations 
(joint statement) 181 

Human Rights. Secretary Kissinger Inter- 
viewed for "Bill Moyers' Journal" .... 165 

Middle East 

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward the 

Year 2000 (Sisco) 182 

President Ford's News Conference of January 

21 (excerpts) 179 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill 

Moyers' Journal" 165 

Oman. Secretary Kissinger Gives Dinner Hon- 
oring Visiting Sultan of Oman (exchange 
of toasts) 187 

Presidential Documents. President Ford's 

News Conference of January 21 (excerpts) 179 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 196 

U.S.S.R. 

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward 
the Year 2000 (Sisco) 182 

President Ford's News Conference of January 
21 (excerpts) 179 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill 

Moyers' Journal" 165 



United Nations. America's Foreign Policy 
Agenda: Toward the Year 2000 (Sisco) . . 



182 



Viet-Nam. President Ford's News Conference 

of January 21 (excerpts) 179 



Name Index 

Ford, President 179 

Hartman, Arthur A 189 

Kissinger, Secretary 165, 187 

Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id 187 

Sisco, Joseph J 182 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 20 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
11 of January 10 and 16 of January 16. 

No. Date Snbject 

t20 1/20 U.S. and Canadian officials meet 
on West Coast tanker traffic: 
joint statement. 

*21 1/21 Leigh sworn in as Legal Adviser 

(biographic data). 
22 1/21 U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany 
cultural talks: joint statement. 

t23 1/21 U.S.-India Economic and Commer- 
cial Subcommission: joint com- 
munique. 

*24 1/23 Walentynowicz sworn in as Ad- 
ministrator of the Bureau of 
Security and Consular Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*25 1/23 Sisco: Regional Foreigrn Policy 
Conference, San Diego (as pre- 
pared for delivery). 
26 1/23 Hartman: Regional Foreign Policy 
Conference, San Diego. 

t27 1/24 Kissinger: Los Angeles World 
Affairs Council. 

*28 1/24 Ocean Affairs Advisory Meeting, 
Feb. 27. 

t29 1/24 "Foreign Relations," volume IX, 
1949, the Far East: China (for 
release Jan. 31). 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



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13 
/J: 



73. 



mo 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1860 



February 17, 1975 



A NEW NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP 
Address by Secretary Kissinger 197 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 28 205 

"A CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT FORD"— AN INTERVIEW 

FOR NBC TELEVISION AND RADIO 

Excerpt From Transcript 219 

PRESIDENT FORD REQUESTS ADDITIONAL FUNDS 

FOR ASSISTANCE TO VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA 

Message to the Congress 229 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



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S^j^y,.i„tHn<!ent of Documents 



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PRICE: 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1860 
February 17, 1975 



The Department of State BULLETI. 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau al 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
tlie field of U.S. foreign relations ani 
on the work of the Department ani 
the Foreign Service. ' 

The BULLETIN includes selecteo 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addressei 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and othei 
officers of the Department, as well oi 
special articles on various phases oi 
international affairs and the functiom 
of the Department. Information m 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which tfu 
United States is or may become i , 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department oi 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field oi 
international relations are also listed 



A New National Partnership 



Address by Secretary Kissinger ^ 



A half century ago Winston Churchill, in 
his book "The World Crisis," observed that 
in happier times it was the custom for 
statesmen to "rejoice in that protecting 
Providence which had preserved us through 
so many dangers and brought us at last into 
a secure and prosperous age." But "little 
did they know," Churchill wrote, "that the 
worst perils had still to be encountered, and 
the greatest triumphs had yet to be won." 

The same may be said of our age. We are 
at the end of three decades of a foreign 
policy which, on the whole, brought peace 
and prosperity to the world and which was 
conducted by administrations of both our 
major parties. Inevitably there were failures, 
but they were dwarfed by the long-term 
accomplishments. 

Now we are entering a new era. Old inter- 
national patterns ai-e crumbling; old slogans 
are uninstructive ; old solutions are unavail- 
ing. The world has become interdependent 
in economics, in communications, in human 
aspirations. No one nation, no one part of 
the world, can prosper or be secure in iso- 
lation. 

For America, involvement in world affairs 
is no longer an act of choice, but the ex- 
pression of a reality. When weapons span 
continents in minutes, our security is bound 
up with world security. When our factories 
and farms and our financial strength are so 
closely linked with other countries and 
peoples, our prosperity is tied to world pros- 



' Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 24 (text from 
press release 27). 



perity. The first truly world crisis is that 
which we face now. It requires the first truly 
global solutions. 

The world stands uneasily poised between 
unprecedented chaos and the opportunity for 
unparalleled creativity. The next few years 
will determine whether interdependence will 
foster common progress or common disaster. 
Our generation has the opportunity to shape 
a new cooperative international system; if 
we fail to act with vision, we will condemn 
ourselves to mounting domestic and inter- 
national crises. 

Had we a choice, America would not have 
selected this moment to be so challenged. 
We have endured enough in the past decade 
to have earned a respite: assassinations, 
racial and generational turbulence, a divisive 
war, the fall of one President and the resig- 
nation of another. 

Nor are the other great democracies better 
prepared. Adjusting to a loss of power and 
influence, assailed by recession and inflation, 
they, too, feel their domestic burdens weigh- 
ing down their capacity to act boldly. 

But no nation can choose the timing of its 
fate. The tides of history take no account of 
the fatigue of the helmsman. Posterity will 
reward not the difficulty of the challenge, 
only the adequacy of the response. 

For the United States, the present situa- 
tion is laced with irony. A decade of upheaval 
has taught us the limitations of our power. 
Experience and maturity have dispelled any 
illusion that we could shape events as we 
pleased. Long after other nations, we have 
acquired a sense of tragedy. Yet our people 



Februory 17, 1975 



197 



and our institutions have emerged from our 
trials with a resihence that is the envy of 
other nations, who know — even when we 
forget— that America's strength is unique 
and American leadership indispensable. In 
the face of all vicissitudes, our nation con- 
tinues to be the standard-bearer of political 
freedom, economic and social progress, and 
humanitarian concern — as it has for 200 
years. 

Thirty years ago America, after centuries 
of isolation, found within itself unimagined 
capacities of statesmanship and creativity. 
Men of both parties and many persuasions 
— like Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg 
and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles — built a 
national consensus for responsible American 
leadership in the world. 

Their work helped fashion the economic 
recovery of Europe and Japan and stabilized 
the postwar world in a period of interna- 
tional tension. These were the indispensable 
foundations on which, in recent years, we 
have been able to regularize relations with 
our adversaries and chart new dimensions 
of cooperation with our allies. 

To marshal our energies for the challenge 
of interdependence requires a return to 
fundamentals. It was a confident — perhaps 
even brash — America that launched its post- 
war labors. It was an America essentially 
united on ultimate goals that took on the 
task of restoring order from the chaos of 
war. Three decades of global exertions and 
the war in Viet-Nam have gravely weakened 
this sense of common purpose. We have no 
more urgent task than to rediscover it. 

Only in this way can we give effect to the 
root reality of our age which President Ford 
described in his state of the Union address : 

At no time in our peacetime history has the state 
of the nation depended more heavily on the state of 
the world; and seldom, if ever, has the state of the 
world depended more heavily on the state of our 
nation. 

Let me turn, then, to an examination of 
the issues before us in international affairs: 
Our traditional agenda of peace and war, 
the new issues of interdependence, and the 
need for a partnership between the executive 
and legislative branches of our government. 



The Traditional Agenda of Peace and War 

The traditional issues of peace and war 
addressed by the postwar generation will 
require our continuing effort, for we live in 
a world of political turmoil and proliferating 
nuclear technology. 

Our foreign policy is built upon the bed- 
rock of solidarity with our allies. Geography, 
history, economic ties, shared heritage, and 
common political values bind us closely to- 
gether. The stability of the postwar world — 
and our recent progress in improving our 
relations with our adversaries — have cru- 
cially depended on the strength and con- 
stancy of our alliances. Today, in a new era 
of challenge and opportunity, we naturally 
turn first to our friends to seek cooperative 
solutions to new global issues such as energy. 
This is why we have sought to strengthen 
our ties with our Atlantic partners and 
Japan and have begun a new dialogue in the 
Western Hemisphere. 

The second major traditional effort of our 
foreign policy has been to fashion more 
stable relations with our adversaries. 

There can be no peaceful international 
order without a constructive relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union — the two nations with the power to 
destroy mankind. 

The moral antagonism between our two 
systems cannot be ignored ; it is at the heart 
of the problem. Nevertheless we have suc- 
ceeded in reducing tensions and in beginning 
to lay the basis for a more cooperative fu- 
ture. The agreements limiting strategic 
arms, the Berlin agreement, the significant 
easing of tensions across the heart of Eu- 
rope, the growing network of cooperative 
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union — 
these mark an undeniable improvement over 
the situation just a few years ago. 

The recent Vladivostok accord envisages 
another agreement placing a long-term ceil- 
ing on the principal strategic weapons of 
both sides. For the first time in the nuclear 
age, the strategic planning of each side will 
take place in the context of stable and there- 
fore more reassuring assumptions about the 
programs of the other side instead of being 



198 



Department of State Bulletin 



driven by fear or self-fulfilling projections. 
The stage will be set for negotiations aimed 
at reducing the strategic arsenals of both 
sides. We shall turn to that task as soon as 
we have transformed the Vladivostok prin- 
ciples into a completed agreement. 

The course of improving U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tions will not always be easy, as the recent 
Soviet rejection of our trade legislation has 
demonstrated. It must nevertheless be pur- 
sued with conviction, despite disappoint- 
ments and obstacles. In the nuclear age there 
is no alternative to peaceful coexistence. 

Just as we have recognized that a stable 
international environment demands a more 
productive relationship with the Soviet 
Union, so we have learned that there can be 
no real assurance of a peaceful world so long 
as one-quarter of the world's people are ex- 
cluded from the family of nations. We have 
therefore ended a generation of estrange- 
ment and confrontation with the People's 
Republic of China and sought to develop a 
new relationship in keeping with the princi- 
ples of the Shanghai communique. Progress 
in our bilateral relations has opened useful 
channels of communication and reduced re- 
gional and global tensions. Our new and 
growing relationship with the People's Re- 
public of China is now an accepted and en- 
during feature of the world scene. 

A third traditional element of our foreign 
policy has been the effort to resolve conflicts 
without war. In a world of 150 nations, many 
chronic disputes and tensions continue to 
spawn human suffering and dangers to peace. 
It has always been America's policy to offer 
our help to promote peaceful settlement and 
to separate local disputes from big-power 
rivalry. In the Middle East, in Cyprus, in 
Indochina, in South Asia, on urgent multi- 
lateral issues such as nuclear proliferation, 
the United States stands ready to serve the 
cause of peace. 

The New Issues of Interdependence 

Progress in dealing with our traditional 
agenda is no longer enough. A new and un- 
precedented kind of issue has emerged. The 
problems of energy, resources, environment, 



population, the uses of space and the seas, 
now rank with the questions of military se- 
curity, ideology, and territorial rivalry which 
have traditionally made up the diplomatic 
agenda. 

With hindsight, there is little difficulty in 
identifying the moments in history when 
humanity broke from old ways and moved 
in a new direction. But for those living 
through such times it is usually difficult to 
see events as more than a series of unrelated 
crises. How often has man been able to per- 
ceive the ultimate significance of events oc- 
curring during his lifetime? How many 
times has he been able to summon the will 
to shape rather than submit to destiny? 

The nuclear age permanently changed 
America's conviction that our security was 
assured behind two broad oceans. Now the 
crises of energy and food foreshadow an 
equally dramatic recognition that the very 
basis of America's strength — its economic 
vitality — is inextricably tied to the world's 
economic well-being. 

Urgent issues illustrate the reality of 
interdependence : 

— The industrial nations built a genera- 
tion of prosperity on imported fuel at sus- 
tainable prices. Now we confront a cartel 
that can manipulate the supply and price of 
oil almost at will, threatening jobs, output, 
and stability. 

— We and a few other countries have 
achieved immense productivity in agricul- 
ture. Now we see the survival and well-being 
of much of humanity threatened because 
world food production has not kept pace 
with population growth. 

— For 30 years we and the industrial coun- 
tries achieved steady economic growth. Now 
the economies of all industrialized countries 
are simultaneously afflicted by inflation and 
recession, and no nation can solve the prob- 
lem alone. 

Yet the interdependence that earlier fos- 
tered our prosperity and now threatens our 
decline can usher in a new period of progress 
if we perceive our common interest and act 
boldly to serve it. It requires a new level of 



February 17, 1975 



199 



political wisdom, a new standard of responsi- 
bility, and a new vigor of diplomacy. 

Overcoming the Energy Crisis 

Clearly, the energy crisis is the most 
pressing issue on the new agenda. In the 
American view, a permanent solution is pos- 
sible based on the following principles. 

The first imperative is solidarity among 
the major consumers. Alone, no consuming 
country, except possibly the United States, 
can defend itself against an oil embargo or 
a withdrawal of oil money. Alone, no coun- 
try, except perhaps the United States, can 
invest enough to develop new energy sources 
for self-sufficiency. But if the United States 
acted alone, it would doom the other indus- 
trialized nations to economic stagnation and 
political weakness ; this would soon under- 
mine our own economic well-being. Only by 
collective action can the consuming countries 
free their economies from excessive depend- 
ence on imported oil and their political life 
from a sense of impotence. 

We have made important progress since 
the Washington Energy Conference met less 
than a year ago. Last November, the United 
States and 15 other countries signed an un- 
precedented agreement to assist each other 
in the event of a new oil emergency. That 
agreement commits each nation to build an 
emergency stock of oil ; in case of a new 
embargo, each will cut its consumption by 
the same percentage and available oil will 
be shared. Thus, selective pressure would be 
blunted and an embargo against one would 
be an embargo against all. 

Equally important, we have moved dra- 
matically toward financial solidarity. Only 
last week, the major consuming nations 
agreed to create a solidarity fund of $25 
billion, less than two months after it was 
first proposed by the United States. Through 
the creation of this fund, the industrial na- 
tions have gained significant protection 
against shifts, withdrawals, or cutoff's of 
funds from the petrodollar earners. The in- 
dustrial countries will now be able to off'set 
financial shifts of oil producer funds by loans 



to each other from the $25 billion mutual 
insurance fund. The United States considers 
this rapid and decisive decision for the crea- 
tion of the solidarity fund to be of the great- 
est political and economic significance. 

The second imperative is a major reduc- 
tion in consumer dependence on imported 
oil. The safety nets of sharing and financial 
guarantees are important for the short term. 
But our long-term security requires a deter- 
mined and concerted effort to reduce energy 
consumption — on the highways and in our 
homes, in the very style of our lives. Equally 
important will be a speedup in the develop- 
ment of alternative energy sources such as 
nuclear power, coal, oil shale, and the oil of 
the outer continental shelf, Alaska, the 
North Sea, and elsewhere. 

Cooperative action among the consumer 
nations will reinforce our own efforts in this 
country. The International Energy Agency 
(lEA), created last year, and other coun- 
tries acting in parallel with it, such as 
France, are responding to the crisis with 
substantial conservation programs of their 
own. And the United States will shortly pro- 
pose to the lEA a large-scale collective pro- 
gram to develop alternative energy sources 
through price and other incentives to in- 
vestors and through joint research and de- 
velopment. 

Such policies will be costly and complex; 
some will be unpleasant and politically un- 
popular. But we face a choice: Either we 
act now, and decisively, to insure national 
self-sufficiency in energy by 1985, or we re- 
main prey to economic disruption and to an 
increasing loss of control over our future. 
This, bluntly, is the meaning of President 
Ford's energy program which he laid before 
the Congress in his state of the Union mes- 
sage. 

The third imperative is an eventual dia- 
logue between consumers and producers. 
Ultimately the energy problem must be 
solved through cooperation between con- 
sumers and producers. The United States, 
as a matter of evident necessity, seeks such 
a dialogue in a spirit of good will and of 
conciliation. But just as the producers are 



200 



Department of State Bulletin 



free to concert and discuss among them- 
selves, so too are the consumers. 

A principal purpose of consumer coopera- 
tion will be to prepare substantive positions 
for a producer dialogue to insure that it 
will be fruitful. The consumer nations should 
neither petition nor threaten. They should 
be prepared to discuss the whole range of 
issues of interdependence: assured supplies, 
a fair return to the producers of a depleting 
resource, security of investment, the rela- 
tionship between oil and the state of the 
world economy. 

Over the long term, producers and con- 
sumers, developed and developing nations, 
all depend on the same global economic sys- 
tem for the realization of their aspirations. 
It is this system which is now in jeopardy, 
and therefore the well-being of all nations 
is threatened. We must — together and in 
a cooperative spirit — restore the vitality 
of the world economy in the interests of all 
mankind. 

Though we are far from having overcome 
the energy crisis, the outlines of a solution 
are discernible. The right course is clear, 
progress is being made, and success is well 
within our capacity. Indeed, the energy 
crisis which accelerated the economic diffi- 
culties of the industrial democracies can be- 
come the vehicle by which they reclaim 
control over their future and shape a more 
cooperative world. 

Meeting Present and Projected Food Deficit 

At a time when the industrial world calls 
for a sense of global responsibility from the 
producers of raw materials, it has an obliga- 
tion to demonstrate a similar sense of re- 
sponsibility with respect to its own surplus 
commodities. 

Nowhere is this more urgent than in the 
case of food. A handful of countries, led by 
the United States, produce most of the 
world's surplus food. Meanwhile, in other 
parts of the globe, hundreds of millions do 
not eat enough for decent and productive 
lives. In many areas, up to 50 percent of the 
children die before the age of five, millions 



of them from malnutrition. And according 
to present projections, the world's food 
deficit could rise from the current 25 million 
tons to 85 million tons by 1985. 

The current situation, as well as the even 
more foreboding future, is inconsistent with 
international stability, disruptive of coopera- 
tive global relationships, and totally repug- 
nant to our moral values. 

For these reasons the United States called 
for the World Food Conference which met in 
Rome last November. It was clear to us — as 
we emphasized at the conference — that no 
one nation could possibly produce enough to 
make up the world's food deficit and that a 
comprehensive international effort was re- 
quired on six fronts: 

— To expand food production in exporting 
countries and to coordinate their agricul- 
tural policies so that their capacity is used 
fully and well. 

— To expand massively food production in 
the developing countries. 

— To develop better means of food distri- 
bution and financing. 

— To improve not just the quantity but 
also the quality of food which the poorest 
and most vulnerable groups receive. 

— To insure against emergencies through 
an international system of global food re- 
serves. 

— To augment the food aid of the United 
States and other surplus countries until food 
production in developing countries increases. 

In the next two months the United States 
will make further proposals to implement 
this program, and we will substantially in- 
crease our own food assistance. 

However, food aid is essentially an emer- 
gency measure. There is no chance of meet- 
ing an 85-million-ton deficit without the 
rapid application of technology and capital 
to the expansion of food production where it 
is most needed, in the developing world. 
Other surplus producers, the industrialized 
nations, and the oil producers must j6in in 
this enteiprise. 

Energy and food are only two of the most 
urgent issues. At stake is a restructuring 



February 17, 1975 



201 



of the world economy in commodities, trade, 
monetary relations, and investment. 

Politically, if we succeed, it means the 
shaping of a new international order. For 
the industrial democracies, it involves re- 
gaining their economic health and the sense 
that their future is in their own hands ; for 
the producing and developing nations, it 
liolds the promise of a stable long-term eco- 
nomic relationship that can insure mutual 
progress for the remainder of the century. 

The Need for National Unity 

The agenda of war and peace, fuel and 
food, places a great responsibility upon 
America. The urgency of our challenges, the 
magnitude of the effort required, and the 
impact which our actions will have on our 
entire society all require an exceptional de- 
gree of public understanding and the effec- 
tive participation and support of Congress. 

Our foreign policy has been most effective 
when it reflected broad nonpartisan support. 
Close collaboration between the executive 
and legislative branches insured the success 
of the historic postwar American initiatives 
and sustained our foreign policy for two 
decades thereafter. More recently, during 
the harrowing time of Watergate, the spirit 
of responsible bipartisanship insulated our 
foreign policy from the trauma of domestic 
institutional crisis. For this, the nation owes 
the Congress a profound debt of gratitude. 

A spirit of nonpartisan cooperation is even 
more essential today. The bitterness that 
has marked so much of our national dialogue 
for over a decade no longer has reason or 
place. Public debate once again must find its 
ultimate limit in a general recognition that 
we are engaged in a common enterprise. 

To appeal for renewed nonpartisan co- 
operation in foreign policy reflects not a 
preference but a national necessity. Foreign 
nations must deal with our government as 
an entity, not as a complex of divided insti- 
tutions. They must be able to count on our 
maintaining both our national will and our 
specific undertakings. If they misjudge 
either, they may be tempted into irresponsi- 
bility or grow reluctant to link their destiny 



to ours. If our divisions lead to a failure of 
policy, it is the country which will suffer, 
not one group or one party or one admin- 
istration. If our cooperation promotes suc- 
cess, it is the nation which will benefit. 

In his first address to Congress, President 
Ford pledged his administration to the prin- 
ciple of communication, conciliation, compro- 
mise, and cooperation. In that spirit, and on 
behalf of the President, I invite the Con- 
gress to a new national partnership in the 
conduct of our foreign policy. Topether with 
new conceptions of foreign policy, we must 
define new principles of executive-legislative 
relations — principles which reconcile the un- 
mistakable claims of congressional super- 
vision and the urgent requirements of pur- 
poseful American world leadership. 

The administration will make every effort 
to meet congressional concerns. We will 
dedicate ourselves to strengthening the mu- 
tual sense of trust with the Congress. We 
do not ask for a blank check. We take seri- 
ously the view that over the past decade 
there often has been a breakdown of com- 
munication between the executive and legis- 
lative branches. 

We have made major efforts to consult 
the Congress and to keep it informed. As 
Secretary of State, confirmed by the Senate, 
I have considered this a principal responsi- 
bility of my ofiice. Therefore, in less than 
16 months in office, I have testified 37 times 
before congressional committees and have 
consulted even more frequently with indi- 
vidual Members and groups. 

Nevertheless, we recognize that a new 
partnership requires a willingness to explore 
new approaches. Specifically, the admin- 
istration will strive to evoke the advice and 
consent of the Congress in its broadest 
sense. We know that congressional support 
presupposes that both Houses are kept in- 
formed of the administration's premises and 
purposes as well as of the facts on which its 
decisions are based. In the process, the ad- 
ministration will seek the views of as many 
Members of Congress concerned with a par- 
ticular issue as possible. In short, the ad- 
ministration will strongly support the effort 
of the Congress to meet its constitutional 



202 



Department of State Bulletin 



obligations with wisdom and imagination. 

Beyond the general requirement of advice 
and consent, the role of legislation and ap- 
propriations in defining the basic directions 
of policy is traditional. The administration 
may disagree with a particular decision; we 
may argue vigorously for a different course, 
as we have, for example, concerning the 
necessity of adequate aid to support the 
self-defense of allies in Indochina. But we 
welcome the indispensable contribution of 
Congress to the general direction of national 
policy. 

At the same time, it is important to recog- 
nize that the legislative process — delibera- 
tion, debate, and statutory law — is much less 
well-suited to the detailed supervision of the 
day-to-day conduct of diplomacy. Legal pre- 
scriptions, by their very nature, lose sight 
of the sense of nuance and the feeling for 
the interrelationship of issues on which for- 
eign policy success or failure so often de- 
pends. This is why the conduct of negotia- 
tions has always been preeminently an exec- 
utive responsibility, though the national 
commitments which a completed agreement 
entails must necessarily have legislative and 
public support. 

The growing tendency of the Congress to 
legislate in detail the day-to-day or week- 
to-week conduct of our foreign affairs raises 
grave issues. American policy — given the 
wide range of our interests and responsi- 
bilities — must be a coherent and a purpose- 
ful whole. The way we act in our relations 
with one country almost inevitably affects 
our relationship with others. To single out 
individual countries for special legislative 
attention has unintended but inevitable con- 
sequences and risks unraveling the entire 
fabric of our foreign policy. 

Paradoxically, the President and the Con- 
gress share the same immediate objectives 
on most of the issues that have recently be- 
come sources of dispute. Too often, differ- 
ences as to tactics have defeated the very 
purposes that both branches meant to serve, 
because the legislative sanctions were too 
public or too drastic or too undiscriminat- 
ing. Our inability to implement the trade 
agreement with the Soviet Union is a case 



in point; another is the impact of restric- 
tions on aid to Turkey on our efforts both 
to advance the Cyprus peace negotiations 
and to safeguard our wider security inter- 
ests in the eastern Mediterranean; yet an- 
other is the damage to our Western Hemi- 
sphere relations, specifically in Ecuador and 
Venezuela, caused by an amendment de- 
signed to withhold special tariff pi-eferences 
from OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries] countries. 

In fairness, it must be pointed out that 
Congressmen and Senators must represent 
the particular views of their constituencies. 
All reflect an electorate impatient with for- 
eign turmoil and insistent that international 
responsibilities be shared more equitably. 
In a period of domestic recession the case 
for foreign aid becomes increasingly difficult 
to make. And yet the reality of interdepend- 
ence links our destiny ever more closely with 
the rest of the world. 

It is therefore understandable that one 
of the issues on which the Congress and the 
executive branch have recently divided is 
the degree to which foreign aid cutoffs — 
military or economic — can be used to bring 
about changes in the policies of other na- 
tions. Whether foreign aid should be used 
as an instrument of pressure depends on the 
way foreign aid is conceived. 

The administration is convinced that for- 
eign aid to be viable must serve American 
national interests above all, including the 
broad interest we have in a stable world. If 
an important American interest is served 
by the aid relationship, it is a wise invest- 
ment; if not, our resources are being squan- 
dered, even if we have no specific grievances 
against the recipient. 

For moral and practical reasons, we must 
recognize that a challenge to the recipient's 
sovereignty tends to generate reactions that 
far transcend the merit of most of the issues 
in dispute. Instead of influencing conduct in 
ways we desire, cutting aid is likely to 
harden positions. The very leverage we need 
is almost always lost; our bilateral political 
relationship is impaired, usually for no com- 
mensurable benefit; and other friends and 
allies begin to question whether we under- 



February 17, 1975 



203 



stand our own national interest and whether 
we can be a rehable longer term partner. 

These issues have little to do with the age- 
old tension between morality and expediency. 
Foreign policy, by its nature, must combine 
a desire to achieve the ideal with a recogni- 
tion of what is practical. The fact of sover- 
eignty implies compromise, and each com- 
promise involves an element of pragmatism. 
On the other hand, a purely expedient policy 
will lack all roots and become the prisoner 
of events. The difficult choices are not be- 
tween principle and expediency but between 
two objectives both of which are good, or 
between courses of action both of which are 
difficult or dangerous. To achieve a fruitful 
balance is the central dilemma of foreign 
policy. 

The effort to strengthen executive-legis- 
lative bonds is complicated by the new char- 
acter of the Congress. New principles of 
participation and organization are taking 
hold. The number of Congressmen and Sen- 
ators concerned with foreign policy issues 
has expanded beyond the traditional com- 
mittees. Traditional procedures — focused as 
they are on the congressional leadership and 
the committees — may no longer prove ade- 
quate to the desires of an increasingly indi- 
vidualistic membership. 

As the range of consultation expands, the 
problem of confidentiality increases. Confi- 
dentiality in negotiations facilitates compro- 
mise; it must not be considered by the Con- 
gress as a cloak of deception ; it must not be 
used by the executive to avoid its responsi- 
bilities to the Congress. 

Some of these problems are inherent in 
the system of checks and balances by which 
we have thrived. The separation of powers 
produces a healthy and potentially creative 
tension between the executive and the legis- 
lative branches of government. Partnership 
should not seek to make either branch a 
rubber stamp for the other. But if old pat- 
terns of executive-legislative relations are in 
flux, now is the time for both branches to 



concert to fashion new principles and prac- 
tices of collaboration. The administration 
stands ready to join with the Congress in 
devising procedures appropriate to the need 
for a truly national and long-range foreign 
policy. We would welcome congressional sug- 
gestions through whatever device the Con- 
gress may choose, and we will respond in 
the same spirit. 

In the meantime, the administration will 
strive to achieve a national consensus 
through close consultation, the nonpartisan 
conduct of foreign policy, and restraint in 
the exercise of executive authority. 

The problem of achieving a new national 
partnership is difficult. I am confident that, 
working together, the executive and tha 
Congress will solve it and thereby enhance 
the vitality of our democratic institutions 
and the purposefulness of our foreign policy. 

In 1947, when another moment of crisis 
summoned us to consensus and creation, a 
Member of the Senate recalled Lincoln's 
words to the Congress: 

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to 
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with 
difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As 
our case is new, so we must think anew and act 
anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we 
shall save our country. 

We have learned more than once that this 
century demands much of America. And now 
we are challenged once again "to think anew 
and act anew" so that we may help ourselves 
and the world find the way to a time of 
hope. Let us resolve to move forward to- 
gether, transforming challenge into oppor- 
tunity and opportunity into achievement. 

No genuine democracy can or should ob- 
tain total unanimity. But we can strive for 
a consensus about our national goals and 
chart a common course. If we act with large 
spirit, history could record this as a time of 
great creativity, and the last quarter of this 
century could be remembered as that period 
when mankind fashioned the first truly 
global community. 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 28 



Press release 35 dated January 28 

Secretary Kissinger: We will go right into 
questions. Stewart [Stewart Hensley, United 
Press International]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, this question deals ivith 
the decision of the Government of Argentina 
to postpone, cancel, or otherwise delay the 
proposed March meeting of Foreign Min- 
isters, and their explanation that it's due to 
the rigidity and lack of equity on the part 
of the U.S. trade bill toioard Ecuador and 
Venezuela. I have two questions on it. 

One is, do you think this is a totality of the 
reasons, or do you think that Cuba figures 
in it to some extent? And the second ques- 
tion is 2vhether in view of this you feel that 
your effort to begin a netv dialogue has really 
suffered a severe setback. 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
postponement of the meeting in Argentina, 
I have been in very close contact with For- 
eign Minister [of Argentina Alberto] Vignes 
and with other of my colleagues in the West- 
ern Hemisphere. 

Their reason seems to me, as stated, their 
objection to the provision in the Trade Act 
which includes Ecuador and Venezuela in 
the ban on generalized preferences. And as 
you know, that is because they are members 
of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries]. 

Now, I stated the administration position 
on this yesterday. I testified against this 
provision when the Trade Act was being 
considered. The President, in signing the 
Trade Act, had this provision in mind when 
he pointed out that not all of the provisions 
were agreeable to the administration. The 
State Department issued a statement some- 
time afterward, pointing out that it thought 



the application of this provision to Venezuela 
and Ecuador was too rigid. 

Nevertheless, we believe that even though 
we disagree with the action of the Congress 
— we believe that the action of those two 
governments in refusing to come to the 
Buenos Aires meeting was unjustified. They 
knew very well that, according to our con- 
stitutional processes, no relief could be given 
until we have had an opportunity for full 
consultation with the Congress. And they 
knew also that we would consult with the 
Congress and that we had reason to believe 
that the Congress would be sympathetic to 
our views. 

Now, moreover, even though we objected 
to some of the provisions of the trade bill 
with respect to Latin America, it is impor- 
tant to keep in mind that $750 million in 
Latin American exports are going to enter 
the United States duty free under the pi'o- 
visions of the Trade Act and that whatever 
inequities existed could have been worked 
out. 

And as I pointed out yesterday, as part 
of the new dialogue the United States has 
declared that it would not use pressure with 
respect to its neighbors in the Western 
Hemisphere but it is also inappropriate that 
our neighbors should attempt to use pres- 
sure against the United States. 

Now, with respect to your specific ques- 
tion: Cuba had absolutely nothing to do 
with this ; because we had had full consulta- 
tions on how to handle the issue of Cuba 
with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, 
and a substantial consensus was emerging 
on how the issue of Cuba sanctions could 
be handled at the Buenos Aires meeting, and 
there had been no dispute with respect to 
that. 



February 17, 1975 



205 



Do I believe that the new dialogue is in 
jeopardy? As with respect to the setback 
that was suffered by detente, the postpone- 
ment of the Buenos Aires meeting is obvi- 
ously not to be desired. 

On the other hand, any foreign policy to 
be effective must reflect the mutual inter- 
ests of all parties. 

The United States believes very strongly 
that a strengthening of Western Hemisphere 
ties is in the interest of all of the countries 
in the Western Hemisphere. We have been 
prepared, and remain prepared, to make 
strengthened hemisphere relations one of 
the cardinal aspects of our foreign policy. 
And we are convinced that the mutuality of 
interests and the long tradition of coopera- 
tion in the Western Hemisphere will over- 
come this temporary difficulty. And we look 
forward to working very closely with our 
friends in the Western Hemisphere and 
strengthening our relationship. 

"Crisis of Authority" 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been quoted in 
the newspaper recently as having grave 
doubts about the loyig-term power of survival 
of American society. Did you say that, and 
do you believe it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I stated — I don't 
knov^f what this particular story refers to — 
that I believe that all of Western democra- 
cies at the present are suffering from a 
crisis of authority. And I believe that it is 
very difficult to conduct policy when govern- 
ments are unwilling to make short-term 
sacrifices — unwilling or unable — for the 
long-term benefit. So I believe, as a historian 
and as an analyst, that there is this problem. 

I believe at the same time, as somebody 
in a position of responsibility, that these 
problems are solvable and that we can solve 
them. And therefore I am confident in our 
ability to overcome our diflSculties. But I 
don't think that this has to take the form of 
denying that difficulties exist. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvith regard to the sud- 
den Soviet cancellation of the '72 trade pact, 
do you intend to lead a neio effort to try to 



get the restrictions, the congressional restric- 
tions that encumbered that Trade Act that 
led to the cancellation, removed in the com- 
ing weeks or months? 

Secretary Kissinger: I continue to believe 
in the principles that were reflected in the 
Trade Agreement in 1972 that could not be 
carried out. I think now that we should 
assess the situation in the light of the 
Soviet refusal to accept some of the provi- 
sions in the legislation that was passed by 
the Congress. We will then, in some weeks, 
begin consultation with the Congress as to 
the appropriate steps to be taken so that the 
next time we put forward trade legislation 
it will be on the basis of some consensus be- 
tween the administration and the Congress, 
in order to avoid some of the difficulties that 
arose previously. 

Q. In order to get the Jackson amend- 
ment removed? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the particular 
methods that should be used and how to 
deal with the objections should be worked 
out in consultation between the administra- 
tion and those leaders of the Congress that 
have a particular interest in this issue. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you mean when 
you say you believe the Western democracies 
are suffering from a crisis of authority? Do 
you 7nean that their central governments are 
not strong enough, or that the leaders aren't 
strong enough? I don't know exactly what 
you mean by that "crisis of authority." 

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't had a 
crisis resulting from public statements by 
me in quite a while. [Laughter.] In at least 
two weeks. [Laughter.] 

I am saying the problem for any society 
is, first, whether it is able to recognize the 
problems it is facing, secondly, whether it 
is willing to deal with these problems on the 
basis of long-range decisions. 

At the time the problems can be mastered, 
it is never possible to prove that an action 
is in fact necessary, and you always face 
one set of conjectures with another set of 
conjectures. 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



So what is needed is a consensus in the 
leadership and between the leadership and 
the parliament that enables the government, 
or the society, to act with confidence and 
with some long-range mission. I think this 
is a problem in many countries today, and 
it has many causes. Part of the cause is the 
complexity of the issues, which makes it 
very difficult to subject them to the sort of 
debate that was easier when one dealt with 
much more simple problems. 

It's often been remarked that on such 
issues as the defense budget it is very diffi- 
cult for the layman to form an opinion on 
the basis of the facts that he can absorb, 
even if they are all available to him. So this 
is a problem. 

It is a problem, however — and I repeat — 
which is solvable. It is a problem which I 
attempted to address last week when I called 
for new cooperation between the admin- 
istration and the Congress. It is not a prob- 
lem to be solved by confrontation. 

The Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the difficulty 
of this phase of the Middle East negotia- 
tions, and noiv looking hack at the reaction 
to your remarks, do you think it was a 
mistake to leave open the possibility of 
American military intervention in the Middle 
East oilfields in the gravest of emergencies? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think what I 
said and the way it was interpreted were not 
always identical. I believe that what I said 
was true and it was necessary. It is irrele- 
vant to the issues which we now confront. 
And I have repeatedly stated that the 
United States will deal with the issues of 
energy on the basis of a dialogue with the 
producers and with an attitude of concilia- 
tion and cooperation. 

The contingency to which I referred, as 
I pointed out previously, could arise only if 
warfare were originated against the United 
States. And I don't foresee this. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to 
date on the diplomatic situation in the Middle 
East? Specifically, what are your travel 



plans? Secondly, do you think it's possible 
to reconcile Egypt's desire for further re- 
gaining of territory — in particular the 
passes and the oilfields which President 
Sadat referred to — with Israel's desire for 
further political acceptance by the Arabs? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think you all 
recognize that we are dealing in the Middle 
East with an enormously delicate problem 
affecting the relations between Israel and 
its neighbors, the relations of Israel's neigh- 
bors to each other, and the relationship of 
outside powers to the whole area. And in 
this extremely complex and very dangerous 
situation, it is necessary for us to move with 
care and, hopefully, with some thoughtful- 
ness. 

My plans are within the next few weeks 
— and the precise date has not yet been set, 
but I hope to be able to announce it early 
next week — to go within the next few weeks 
on an exploratory trip to the Middle East. 
It will not be a trip designed to settle any- 
thing or to generate a "shuttle diplomacy." 
It will be designed to have firsthand talks 
with all of the major participants — all of 
the Arab countries that I previously visited, 
as well as Israel — in order to see what the 
real possibilities of a solution might be. 

I personally believe that the two interests 
— which you correctly defined — of Egypt for 
the return of some territory, and of Israel 
for some progress toward peace, can be 
reconciled. And I believe also that the alter- 
native to reconciling it will be serious for 
all of the parties concerned. 



Public and Congressional Accountability 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your references earlier 
to a crisis of authority in the West — some 
members of Congress, of course, woidd say 
that there is a crisis of accountability that 
has caused the difficidty in the conduct of 
foreign affair's. Hoiv do you reconcile these 
two problems? 

And if you ivould, I woidd like to direct 
your attention particidarly to the ongoing 
state of U.S.-Soviet relations. After the cur- 
rent problem ice have on trade, we have the 



February 17, 1975 



207 



additional larger problem in many respects 
coming tip on SALT [Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks] negotiations. Note, you face 
these two problems, authority and account- 
ability. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think you are abso- 
lutely right, Murrey [Murrey Marder, Wash- 
ington Post]. Any democracy faces the 
problem of how to reconcile the need for 
authority with the requirements of account- 
ability. You need authority because foreign 
countries can only deal with a government. 
They can not, and should not, begin to lobby 
in the legislative process of a society. And 
therefore the ability to conduct foreign pol- 
icy depends on the expectation of other 
countries of the degree to which one's com- 
mitments can be carried out and one's word 
means anything. 

On the other hand, obviously in a democ- 
racy there must be full accountability. I 
have attempted to be understanding of this 
problem. As I pointed out previously, I have 
testified 38 times before congressional com- 
mittees in 16 months in office and have met 
nearly a hundred times with other congres- 
sional groups on an informal basis. 

At the same time, I recognize that the 
necessity of presenting a united front to 
foreign countries may impose additional re- 
quirements of consultation, and I am pre- 
pared to undertake them and so is the entire 
administration. 

Now, with respect to the SALT agree- 
ment, we shall brief the relevant congres- 
sional committees of the essential features 
of our plans. I think we have to come to 
some understanding with the Congress about 
the necessity on the one hand of keeping the 
Congress properly informed and, on the 
other hand, of not having every detail of the 
negotiation become subject to public contro- 
versy, because that would freeze the nego- 
tiating process and would lead to rigidity. 

So all I can say is I'm aware of the prob- 
lem. I'm not saying it should be solved by 
giving the executive discretion. I think it 
requires self-restraint on both the execu- 
tive's part and the Congress' part. 

Q. / ivould like to pursue that one bit. On 



the question of accountability you are obvi- 
ously facing — the administration is facing — 
not a congressional desire to grant greater 
authority for the conduct of secret diplomacy 
but, on the contrary, a demand for greater 
openness and increasing restrictiveness on 
secret diplomacy. 

Notv, is this not one of the fundamental 
problems here — that while you referred, for 
example, to having testified 38 times, most of 
that testimony was in closed session? Don't 
you feel some need here to be more respon- 
sive to the public discussion of foreign policy 
which you have referred to in the past but 
it appears to have diminished? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Murrey, un- 
fortunately, I don't have the statistics here 
of the number of public speeches I have 
given and the number of press conferences 
Fve held. And it seems that criticism modu- 
lates between not being sufficiently avail- 
able to the press and seducing the press. 
But be that as it may, I recognize the need 
for public accountability as well as congres- 
sional accountability. I believe at the same 
time that it is necessary for everyone inter- 
ested in accountability also to recognize the 
limits of the detail to which this can take 
place at particular stages of negotiations. 
We will do the maximum that we think is 
consistent with the national interest. And 
we will interpret this very widely. And we 
are open to suggestions as to how the public 
presentation can be improved. 

But I think it is necessary for everybody 
concerned with the problem of public ac- 
countability, as well as everyone concerned 
with the question of authority, to look agairi 
at the limits to which they should push their 
claims. 



The Trade Act and the Soviet Union 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a public im- 
pression that the administration accepted the 
conditions of the Jackson amendment, how- 
ever reluctantly. I would like to ask you 
whether, if you had anticipated the Soviet 
reaction to the trade bill, whether you woidd 
have advised the President not to sign it. 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go 
into a debate about every detail of tiie nego- 
tiations that led to the so-called compromise. 
And once matters had reached this point 
where it became necessary, we were already 
at a very narrow margin. I don't want to 
review all these events, because we should 
look into the future — because there is no 
pui-pose being served. 

Would I have recommended to the Presi- 
dent that he not sign it? That's very hard 
to know. One has to remember that it was 
believed that the trade bill was in the essen- 
tial interests of the United States and in 
the essential interests of a more open trad- 
ing system among all of the industrialized 
countries, as well as giving special benefits 
to the developing countries in the special 
preference system. And, therefore, to recom- 
mend the President to veto this because 
there were aspects of it in the granting of 
MFN [most favored nation] to the Soviet 
Union would have been a very heavy respon- 
sibility. 

As it turned out, I believed that, while it 
would be a close call, the agreement that was 
made with Senator Jackson would probably 
stick. And therefore I agree with those who 
say that it was entered into in good faith 
by all of the parties. So the issue never 
arose. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in Los 
Angeles you referred to your dissatisfaction 
ivith legislative restrictions on foreign pol- 
icy. Does this dissatisfaction lead you to 
attempt to try to repeal or modify the 
Church-Case amendment or the War Powers 
Act? Or, more importantly, the restrictions 
on the end use of military aid? 

Secretary Kissinger: Now, let's get the 
distinctions clear. First of all, let me make 
one point with respect to what Murrey said 
previously. 

The issue isn't secret diplomacy. Some 
diplomacy has to be secret, and some of it 
has to be open. And I think that balance 
can be established. 

Now, with respect to legislative restric- 
tions, I made a distinction between two cate- 
gories of legislative restrictions: those that 



attempt to set main lines of policy, such as 
the Church-Case amendment. With those the 
administration can agree or disagree, but it 
cannot challenge the right of the Congress 
to set the main lines of the policy by legis- 
lation. The second is the attempt to write 
into law detailed prescriptions, country by 
country, for specific measures. That, we 
believe, will generally have consequences 
that are out of proportion to the objectives 
that are sought to be obtained. Those we 
deplore, and those we will attempt to resist. 
Now, if the Congress passes a law on the 
main direction of a policy with which we 
disagree, we may ask them to change it. 
The two cases you have mentioned, even 
though they were passed at the time over 
administration objection, at least the first 
one, we will not ask them to reverse. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the thing that troubles 
me about that is, do you — and I think you 
do, and why do you is really the question — 
put Jackson-Vanik in the second category 
and not in the first? Didn't Jackson-Vanik 
indeed represent a national attitude about 
freedom and democracy, et cetera, and not 
really some tinkering with day-to-day minor 
details? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'm glad that you 
already answered the first of your two ques- 
tions — 

Q. I think you do put it in category 2. 

Secretary Kissinger: When we get these 
press conferences back on a more frequent 
basis, I guess we will get two-thirds of the 
questions answered by those who put them. 

On the Jackson-Vanik — I don't think 
I want to insist, on a theoretical point, on 
whether it is in the first category or in the 
second category. On the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, the administration always sup- 
ported the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment. And the administration, before 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment was ever 
introduced, had managed to bring about an 
increase in emigration from an average of 
400 to a level of about 38,000 a year. So 
there was no dispute whatever between the 
administration and the supporters of Jack- 



February 17, 1975 



209 



son-Vanik about basic values and basic ob- 
jectives. The administration consistently 
maintained that the method of a legislative 
prescription in this case was not the appro- 
priate method and might backfire. 

Now, whether that was because it was in 
the second category that I pointed out or in 
the first category, I don't really want to 
insist upon. Nor do I want to challenge the 
right of the Congress to pass such an action. 

And finally, I really don't think much pur- 
pose is served by prolonging the debate 
over the past — of how we got to this point 
— because we did try to work together with 
the Congress on a good-faith basis, once it 
had embarked on a course which we con- 
sidered unwise, to try to resolve the ensuing 
difficulty. 

If we go back on the trade legislation, we 
will try to achieve the objectives which we 
share with the Congress by methods that 
may be more appropriate to the objective. 
We will not give up. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us hoiv you 
estimate the prospects of a smmnit meeting 
with regard to the CSCE Conference [Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe] and what sigyiificance a summit 
could have for detente, East-West detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that 
the European Security Conference is making 
good progress. The issues — as you know, 
they are discussing them in various cate- 
gories called "baskets," and the issues in 
most of these categories are beginning to 
be resolved. There are some unresolved is- 
sues with respect to general principles and 
some unresolved issues with respect to 
human contacts. But progress has been 
made in all of these categories. 

I believe, therefore, that if the confer- 
ence is concluded along the lines that are 
now foreseeable, a summit conclusion is 
highly probable. I believe that a successful 
outcome of the European Security Confer- 
ence would contribute to detente. 

Cyprus Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, next week, February 5, 
is the deadline by ivhich time the admin- 



istration has to report progress on Cyprus. 
What kind of report do you think you will 
be able to give to Congress by that date? 
Otherwise aid to Turkey is cut off. 

Secretary Kissinger: I can only stress 
what I have said previously. 

The United States gives aid to Turkey 
not as a favor to Turkey, but in the interests 
of Western security. And I think anybody 
looking at a map and analyzing foreseeable 
trouble spots must recognize this. Therefore 
the administration is opposed to the cutoff 
of aid to Turkey, regardless of what prog- 
ress may be made in the negotiations. 

Secondly, the administration favors rapid 
progress in the negotiations over Cyprus 
and has supported this progress. And I be- 
lieve that all of the parties, including the 
Greek side — and especially the Greek side — 
would have to agree that the United States 
has made major efforts. 

I believe that some progress is possible 
and will be made — can be made before Feb- 
ruary 5. And we will be in touch with the 
Congress either late this week or early next 
week. And I have stayed in very close con- 
tact with those Members of the Congress 
and the Senate that have had a particular 
interest in this question to keep them in- 
formed of the state of the negotiations. 

So by the end of this week — as you know, 
the parties now meet twice a week in Nicosia 
— and by the end of this week, after their 
second meeting this week, I will be in touch 
with the parties, and we will discuss that 
with the Congress. 

Assistance to Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Robert Byrd 
said this morning the leaders of both parties 
in Congress have told President Ford that 
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get 
more aid to South Viet-Nam. Where does 
that leave the situation? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let us make 
clear what it is we have asked for. And let 
me express the hope that what we are asking 
for doesn't rekindle the entire debate on 
Viet-Nam, because that is emphatically not 
involved. 



210 



Department of State Bulletin 



Last year the administration asked for 
$1.4 billion for military aid to Viet-Nam. The 
Congress authorized $1 billion. It appropri- 
ated $700 million. We are asking the Con- 
gress to appropriate the $300 million differ- 
ence between what it had already authorized 
and what it actually appropriated, in the 
light of the stepped-up military operations 
in Viet-Nam. 

This is not an issue of principle of whether 
or not we should be in Viet-Nam. The issue 
is whether any case at all can be made for 
giving inadequate aid to Viet-Nam. And we 
believe there can be no case for a deliberate 
decision to give less than the adequate aid, 
and aid that the Congress had already au- 
thorized to be given, so that it could not 
have been even an issue of principle for the 
Congress. 

Q. Mr. Secfetary, on the Middle East, sev- 
eral months ago you said you wouldn't he 
returning to the Middle East unless you 
were fairly sure that your presence there 
would lead to an agreement. Yon are now 
saying that you are going back there on an 
exploratory mission. Why have you changed 
your tactics? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have changed my 
tactics at the request of all of the parties, 
and based on the belief that the urgency of 
the situation requires that this step be 
taken. I have also pointed out in this press 
conference that I am hopeful that progress 
can be made. And I am going there with 
that attitude. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvith respect to your 
saying that it serves no useful purpose to go 
over the Jackson-Vanik amendment, it has 
become an issue in Washington to apportion 
some blame on this issue. Noiv, this has 
ramifications for U.S. relations with the 
Soviet Union because some people say the 
Soviet Union reneged. It has ramifications 
for your dealing with Congress because some 
people feel you have blamed Congress. Be- 
cause of that problem, could you deal icith 
this a little further and talk to us about the 
situation? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I stated my view, 



and the administration's view, with respect 
to the amendment in two public testimonies 
before the Congress in which I pointed out 
why we were opposed not to the objectives — 
I want to repeat that — but to the methods. 

I don't think any purpose is served in try- 
ing to apportion blame now. I agree with 
those who say that the discussions between 
the Congress and the administration were 
conducted in good faith by both sides. At this 
point, we should address the question of 
where we go in the future, and not how we 
got where we ai-e. 

Military Situation in Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your 
assessment of the situation in Indochina, 
particidarly Viet-Nam, two years after the 
agreement ivhich you labored over, and what 
went ivrong? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think if you re- 
member the intense discussions that were 
going on in the United States during the ne- 
gotiation of the agreement, you will recall 
that the overwhelming objective that was 
attempted to be served was to disengage 
American military forces from Indochina 
and to return our prisoners from North Viet- 
Nam. 

Under the conditions that we then con- 
fronted — which was an increasing domestic 
debate on this issue — those were the princi- 
pal objectives that could be achieved. The 
alternative — namely, to impose a different 
kind of solution — would have required a more 
prolonged military operation by the United 
States. 

Secondly, what has gone wrong, if any- 
thing has gone wrong, is that it was the 
belief of those who signed the agreement — 
certainly a belief that was encouraged by 
the United States, as well as by the public 
debate here — that the objection in the United 
States was not to our supporting a govern- 
ment that was trying to defend itself by its 
own efforts. Our national objection was to 
the presence of American forces in Viet-Nam. 

Now, the military situation in Viet-Nam 
was reasonably good until last June. At that 



February 17, 1975 



211 



point, we had to impose cuts — no new equip- 
ment could be sent, and only inadequate 
ammunition. This brought about a reduction 
in the ammunition expenditure by the Viet- 
namese Army. This in turn led to an increase 
in casualties, to a loss of mobility, and there- 
fore to a deterioration in the military situ- 
ation. 

All that we have ever said was that the 
settlement would put South Viet-Nam in a 
position where it had a chance to defend it- 
self. That chance exists. That chance depends 
on adequate American assistance. And that 
is the chance we are asking for. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question I ivould 
like to follow up on your first reply on the 
Middle East. In that reply, you said that you 
believe the Egyptian desire for additional 
territory in Sinai, together with the Israeli 
desire for specific political concessions, can 
be reconciled. I understand that you probably 
don't tvant to get into the specific demands 
that Israel is asking from Egypt. But perhaps 
you ca)i give us some general criteria for 
what types of political acts Egypt may offer 
to Israel that ivould satisfy Israel. And the 
second part of the question is — the ques- 
tioner had specifically referred to the oil- 
fields and the passes — were you referring to 
those specific points as possibly being rec- 
onciled ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think all of you 
have to accept the fact that I cannot possibly 
go into the details of the negotiation before 
I have gone to the Middle East. And there- 
fore, with all due respect, I cannot possibly 
answer this question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, along this line, but not 
asking you to go into any details of the nego- 
tiations, in your disciissions with the Arab 
countries in the Middle East, have you foimd 
any evidence that the Arab world is prepared 
to accept the existence of Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is my impression 
that there is an increasing willingness to 
accept the existence of Israel as part of the 
process of peace, yes. 



Detente and Southeast Asia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the areas where 
detente has never worked very well is in 
Soutlieast Asia. During the course of the 
time ivhen detente was running relatively 
smoothly, did you ever try to make it clear to 
the Soviets that responsible behavior in the 
form of limiting military supplies — which 
tend to wind up in South Viet-Nam and fuel 
the war there — would not be acceptable? In 
other words, have you tried to ivork out that 
end of the equation? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it is an 
interesting question to determine what you 
mean by the phrase "is not acceptable." The 
answer to your question depends on what 
is it we would do if the Soviet Union ignores 
us. And if you look at the catalogue of things 
available for us to do under present circum- 
stances in the way of either retaliation or of 
benefits, you will find that it is not an in- 
finitely large one. 

The answer to your question is, yes, we 
have raised this issue both with the Soviet 
Union and with the People's Republic of 
China. And I think the efficacy of it cannot 
be determined by determining whether sup- 
plies have stopped altogether, but has to be 
seen in relation to how much more might 
have been done and then to assess it in 
relationship to that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to travel to 
Latin America during the month of Feb- 
rtiary ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I plan — I don't think 
I have announced it, as some of my colleagues 
seem to have announced — I do plan to travel 
to Latin America, certainly before the OAS 
meeting here in April. The exact date I would 
like to work out after my trip to the Middle 
East has been more firmly settled. But I want 
to say now that I place great stress on our 
relationship with Latin America and that I 
will go at the earliest opportunity that I can 
do justice to this visit. 

Q. Could you tell us about your meeting 
with the former President this weekend? 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



Specifically, could you tell us if you discussed 
with him his cooperating in any way with 
the current iyivestigations into the CIA op- 
eration ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not discuss 
with the former President anything what- 
ever having to do with any investigation 
now being conducted in Washington, and 
specifically not that investigation. It was a 
general review of the international situation 
and personal talk. It had no specific mission. 
But it seemed to me that a man who has 
appointed me to two senior positions in the 
government deserved the courtesy of a visit 
when I was that close. 

Stewart [Stewart Hensley]. 

Q. Well, this is just tying up a loose end. 
But ivhen you were responding to Mr. Freed's 
{Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press] ques- 
tion about the illness tvhich afflicts some of 
the democratic countries, you said it was 
easier to get a consensus between the execu- 
tive and the parliament when problems were 
simpler. 

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. 

Q. In answering Mr. Marder's question 
about accountability, you harked back to the 
— / think it was the Chicago speech, or 
possibly Los Angeles, in which you said 
you promised wider cons2dtation but with 
increased confidentiality, which seems rather 
paradoxical to me, although I'm ivilling to be- 
lieve you can do it. [Laughter.] But there's 
one more element, and I'm tvo7idering if that 
element is not ivhat is missing from what 
you told Mr. Freed about in the answer to 
his question — and that is that problems now 
are not as simple as they ivere at the time 
of Senator Vandenberg and the bipartisan 
foreign policy. And how do you get around 
the complexity of these problems in your 
accountability? 

Secretary Kissinger: Look, I'm not trying 
to score points here now. I'm trying to call 
attention to a very serious problem — and a 
a problem that if as societies we do not solve, 
it will not be a victory for an administration 



or a victory for the countries; it will be a 
defeat for everything we stand for — every- 
thing we are trying to achieve. 

I did not say I want more consultation and 
more confidentiality. I listed a whole set 
of problems that are very real problems. 
One is how you can have congressional con- 
trol without legislative restriction. I frankly 
do not know the answer exactly to this. 

Q. That is what I wanted to know. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is one prob- 
lem — how you can have congressional control 
without the Congress necessarily passing 
laws. 

The second problem is how you can have 
increased consultation and at the same time, 
on key issues, maintain increased confiden- 
tiality. 

Now, I have to say that recently I have 
been briefing some key members of the Con- 
gress on some of the key aspects of the 
Cyprus negotiation and there have been no 
leaks whatsoever and I consider this a very 
important achievement — I don't want to im- 
ply that there have been leaks previously. 

And what I wanted to do in my speech 
was to call attention to what really may be- 
come a major problem for this country and, 
because so much depends on this country, a 
major problem for all free countries. I did 
not mean to blame anybody. I don't think it 
does any good to aim for victories by either 
branch. I think we have to explore a serious 
solution — to which I confess I do not know 
all the answers. 

Q. That was what prompted my question. 

Arms Policy in Persian Gulf 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been concern 
expressed in Congress aboiit the buildup of 
various countries in the Persian Gulf and 
of American arms going to these countries. 
There tvere expressions of concern about 
arms going to Oman when they had not gone 
before and a feeling that war could break 
out at any time, once these countries build 
up enough, without enough reason for war 
to break out, and that the United States has 



February 17, 1975 



213 



taken a major role in this. Could you talk 
about oitr interest in the Persian Gulf and 
why the United States is doing ivhat it's 
doing? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in determining 
whether the United States is unnecessarily 
giving arms or determining the wisdom of 
American arms policy in the area, one has 
to ask a number of questions. 

First, what is the security concern of the 
countries involved — that is to say, do they 
perceive that they face a real threat? The 
second question is: Is this security concern 
well founded? Thirdly, does the United States 
have any relationship to that security con- 
cern? Fourthly, what would happen if the 
United States did not supply the arms? 

And I think each of these arms programs 
has to be assessed in relation to these or 
similar questions. And I think you will find — 
or at least I hope you would find — that we 
could answer, in the overwhelming majority 
of the cases, these questions in a positive 
sense — that is to say, that there is a secu- 
rity problem which these countries feel ; that 
often the security problem is caused by a 
neighbor supported by Soviet or other Com- 
munist arms; that, therefore, if the country 
did not receive the arms, it would be sub- 
ject to this neighbor or else it would get 
these arms from other sources. 

And these are the principles we are trying 
to apply in our arms sales, especially in an 
area such as the Persian Gulf, in which we 
have, after all, a very major strategic in- 
terest. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you outline some of 
the main topics ivhich you think will be 
discussed ivhen Mr. Wilson comes here — and, 
particularly, can yon say ivhether the issue 
of the Persian Gulf will be discussed? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
our relationship with the Government of the 
United Kingdom is extremely close, and we 
keep each other informed about our major 
foreign policy initiatives and our major ap- 



proach to international affairs in the frankest 
possible way. 

One result is that there is rarely a very 
set agenda for the meetings — or, rather, the 
agenda is the world situation broken down 
into its constituent elements. Therefore it 
is reasonable to assume that the Middle East, 
including the Persian Gulf, will play a sig- 
nificant role in the discussions with Prime 
Minister Wilson. 

I don't know whether the Persian Gulf will 
be specially singled out. These discussions 
are usually rather unstructured, but they're 
extremely frank ; and we will put our entire 
views before Prime Minister Wilson. 

TJie press: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Secretary. 



U.S. Regrets Postponement 
of Buenos Aires Meeting 

Department Statement, Ja}iuary 27 

The United States regrets that the Gov- 
ernment of Argentina, in consultation with 
the other countries of the hemisphere, has 
postponed the Buenos Aires meeting of For- 
eign Ministers scheduled for late March. 

The proximate cause of the postponement 
is the apparent exclusion of all OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] countries, including Ecuador and 
Venezuela, from the new tariff preference 
system. As is well known, the administra- 
tion opposed this and other restrictions con- 
tained in the trade bill and has pledged to 
work with the Congress to correct them. 
The President and Secretary of State Kis- 
singer so stated publicly, as did our Repre- 
sentative to the Permanent Council of the 
Organization of American States last week. 

Given these statements regarding our 
views and intentions, we cannot but consider 
it inappropriate that some Latin American 
countries have insisted on conditions for the 
Buenos Aires meeting which they know to 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 



be incompatible with our constitutional 
processes, as well as substantively unjust. 

There is no question — and we have em- 
phasized this to our Latin American friends 
— that, despite certain deficiencies in the 
Trade Act, there are many benefits. For ex- 
ample, under our proposed system of tariff" 
preferences, we estimate that more than 30 
percent by value of dutiable Latin American 
exports to the United States will be granted 
tarifi'-free treatment. In absolute amounts, 
tariff's will be eliminated on over $750 mil- 
lion worth of Latin American exports to the 
United States. It should also be noted that 
Latin American exports to the United States 
have more than doubled in value since 1972. 

The Trade Act also authorizes us to begin 
the multilateral trade negotiations in Ge- 
neva. These negotiations will lead to reduc- 
tion of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade 
of great importance to all the developing 
countries, including Latin America. More- 
over, they will benefit Latin America and, in- 
deed, the entire world trading community 
by providing a deterrent to protectionism 
around the world — a matter of vital import 
given today's economic climate. 

The United States, in the fall of 1973, 
began a new dialogue with Latin America 
to improve relations with our traditional 
friends in the Western Hemisphere. We 
hoped that both sides would develop a closer 
understanding of each other's problems. 
Over the past year we have jointly made 
significant progress toward this objective. 
In this process the United States has re- 
nounced any method of pressure as obsolete 
and inappropriate to the new relationship 
we seek. We believe this is a reciprocal 
obligation. Pressure from the south is as 
inappropriate as pressure from the north. 

We will continue to work with our Latin 
American friends on the problems which 
have arisen in connection with the Trade 
Act in a spirit of friendship. We will address 
cooperatively the many issues which com- 
prise the agenda of the new dialogue in the 
same spirit of conciliation and friendship. 



The Trade Act and Latin America 

FoUoiving is the text of a memorandiim 
irliich was distributed to Latin A7nerican and 
Caribbean Ambassadors at a briefing at the 
Department of State on Jannary lU. 

The Trade Act and Latin America 

The Trade Act, signed into law by the Pres- 
ident on January 3, 1975, is of considerable 
importance to Latin America. 

It is a long and complex statute. The Act 
touches nearly every aspect of U.S. trade 
policy. And, although the legislation was 
under consideration in the Congress for 
nearly two years, the Committees responsible 
for it were making changes in its text until 
the final day of Congressional consideration. 
In fact, the text of the Act, because it is so 
long, is not yet generally available from the 
Government Printing Office. Early comment 
about the legislation has therefore been 
forced to rely on press reports, some of which 
have been partial or inaccurate. 

It is the purpose of this Memorandum to 
summarize the legislation as it relates to the 
nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
to make clear the policy the United States 
will adopt in implementing the Act, and to 
analyze the important benefits which Latin 
America may anticipate as the law is put 
into eff"ect. The Memorandum addresses 
three major issues: 

— the authorization for the U.S. Govern- 
ment to implement a system of generalized 
tariff" preferences (GSP) for imports from 
developing countries ; 

— the forthcoming worldwide multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN), which the Trade 
Act has now made possible; and 

— the significance of the legislation for the 
U.S. countervailing duty system. 

]. Generalized Preferences. The Trade Act 
of 1974 contains authority for the United 
States to grant tariff preferences to imports 
from developing countries — GSP, in short. 



February 17, 1975 



215 



The new law provides that the United States 
may accord temporary (10-year) duty-free 
treatment for a range of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured products and selected 
agricultural and primary products. Eighteen 
other nations have similar — though in some 
cases much less liberal — preference systems. 

The new U.S. preferences will fulfill a 
commitment undertaken in the Declaration 
of Tlatelolco that the U.S. Government would 
make a maximum effort to secure passage 
of such legislation. 

GSP and most-favored-nation (MFN) tar- 
iff concessions are two very different con- 
cepts. GSP is temporary and nonbinding. 
Each industrialized country is free to with- 
draw it at any time. MFN tariff cuts are 
bound. MFN tariff reductions cannot be with- 
drawn from GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] members without the 
granting of compensation. The major GSP 
systems of most major countries have quanti- 
tative limitations in the form of tariff quotas 
and competitive need ceilings which trigger a 
return to ordinary — nonpreferential — MFN 
tariff duty rates. Thus, various products of 
substantial interest to the Latin American 
countries are not eligible for the preferences 
of the other developed nations and will not be 
eligible for the new U.S. GSP. Those products 
will, however, be eligible for the multilateral 
tariff reductions anticipated in the course and 
as a part of the trade negotiations them- 
selves. Thus, even with GSP, on a significant 
number of products it will be in the long- 
term interest of the Latin American countries 
to have the ordinary rates of duty negotiated 
down to as low a point as possible in the 
MTN. 

In general, U.S. tariffs are already low. 
This is the result of successive rounds of 
tariff negotiations. Now, nearly 60 percent 
of U.S. imports from Latin America enter 
duty free. The duty on the remainder aver- 
ages only 8 percent. Therefore, while pref- 
erences may be marginally helpful in the 
short run in some particular product areas, 
over the longer run MFN tariff reductions 
and action on nontariff barriers — as set 
forth in the following section of this Mem- 



orandum — will prove to be far more im- 
portant and beneficial to most Latin Ameri- 
can countries. 

The Administration worked closely with 
the Latin American countries to solicit their 
requests for specifications of products to be 
included in our GSP product lists. The GSP 
product lists are now nearing completion. 
Wherever possible, these lists include the 
products requested by the Latin American 
countries. As a result the lists of agricul- 
tural and primary products to be submitted 
later this month to the International Trade 
Commission will be significantly larger in 
terms both of numbers of items and dollar 
trade coverage than were the illustrative 
lists prepared for and submitted to the UN- 
CTAD and OECD [United Nations Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development; Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] in 1970. Preliminary indications are 
that over 30 percent by value of the remain- 
ing U.S. dutiable imports from Latin Amer- 
ica — that is to say, over three quarters of a 
billion dollars of Latin American exports to 
the United States based on 1972 trade values 
— will be included in our system of GSP. 

The new legislation, unfortunately, con- 
tains provisions which could exclude certain 
categories of developing countries from pref- 
erences. The Administration consistently op- 
posed these criteria as being excessively rigid. 
We are currently examining the legislation to 
determine what leeway it may contain. We 
will work in a spirit of cooperation with the 
Congress to seek necessary accommodations. 

2. The Multilateral Trade Negotiatioyis. 
While GSP will be helpful in encouraging 
Latin American export diversification, the 
multilateral trade negotiations now made 
possible by the new Trade Act will go deeper, 
and be of considerably more lasting impor- 
tance for all of Latin America. These nego- 
tiations will fix the structure of global trade 
for a long term future, and will touch the 
export interests of every country in the 
hemisphere. 

In September 1973, 102 countries agreed, 
in the celebrated Tokyo Declaration, to un- 
dertake a new round of multilateral trade 



216 



Department of State Bulletin 



negotiations. The negotiations anticipated 
by the Declaration were dedicated to the 
I following aims: 

— the expansion and liberalization of 
world trade through significant dismantling 
of tariff barriers, of nontariff barriers and 
of other conditions and restraints which dis- 
tort world trade ; 

— the improvement in the world trading 
system, so that it conforms more closely to 
current conditions and realities ; and 

— the securing of benefits for the trade 
of developing countries, including substan- 
tially greater access for their products to 
markets around the world. 

Without the authority established in the 
Trade Act, the international efi'ort contem- 
plated by the Tokyo Declaration to expand 
trade and to reform the world trading sys- 
tem — in which almost all Latin American 
countries are participating — would have 
been aborted. In other words, the conse- 
quences of not having the negotiating power 
in the Trade Act, particularly in view of 
the current world economic conditions, 
would have been severe, and most adverse 
in fact to the very countries whose develop- 
ment goals depend most heavily on diversi- 
fying and expanding exports. Rather than 
opening new opportunities for trade, the 
virtually certain result of a failure to enact 
the new U.S. Trade Act would have been 
contraction. 

With the Trade Act now in hand, the 
United States is prepared to move toward 
the achievement of the aims set out in the 
Tokyo Declaration. The United States will 
move rapidly. 

Committees and working parties have 
been meeting in Geneva. A further meeting 
in Geneva of the Trade Negotiating Com- 
mittee is scheduled for February; this will 
mark the real beginning of the trade nego- 
tiations. The U.S. Government will be there. 
It hopes that all Latin American countries 
will actively participate. 

The tariff cutting authority provided in 
the Trade Act is substantial — 6 percent of 
existing duty rates above 5 percent ad va- 



lorem, and authority to go to zero for rates 
of 5 percent ad valorem or less. It is the 
firm intention of the United States to use 
this authority vigorously, to secure the 
greatest possible reciprocal reduction in 
tariffs among the major developed trading 
countries. Major beneficiaries of such re- 
ductions will be the developing countries, 
including particularly Latin America. 

Even more important than the lowering of 
tariff barriers will be the elimination or re- 
duction of nontariff barriers. As tariffs have 
been progressively reduced over the years, 
nontariff barriers and other similar measures 
distorting trade have played an increasingly 
pernicious role as restraints on trade ex- 
pansion. The Trade Act provides unprece- 
dented authority for the harmonization, re- 
duction or elimination of the nontariff 
barriers in this country and in all other ma- 
jor trading nations which now burden inter- 
national trade, including that of Latin 
America. 

The United States is acutely aware that in 
many cases these nontariff barriers are par- 
ticularly burdensome to the exports of devel- 
oping countries. It anticipates that some of 
the more onerous of these nontariff barriers 
may be subject to reduction or elimination 
through the negotiation of new sets of in- 
ternational rules on market access. Such new 
rules are also provided for in the Trade Act. 
The United States will do what it can to 
bring this about. For example, the United 
States will seek revision of the existing in- 
ternational safeguard procedures under the 
GATT to deal with problems associated with 
an exceptionally rapid growth of imports 
in a way which will make resort to safe- 
guard actions less politically contentious and 
subject all the while to greater international 
surveillance and discipline, while hopefully 
eliminating import quotas maintained il- 
legally under present GATT rules. Similarly, 
the problem of export subsidies and corre- 
sponding countervailing duties can be ap- 
proached by the development of an inter- 
national code on these issues, as can problems 
of government procurement and product 
standardization. 



February 17, 1975 



217 



The United States will adopt a strategy 
in the forthcoming negotiations which will 
give particular consideration to the interests 
and needs of developing countries, including 
Latin American interests. The United States 
is committed to consult closely with the 
Latin Americans in the course of the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations to develop common 
positions. In part toward this end, there has 
been formed among the various U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies an interdepartmental Sub- 
group on Latin America. This Subgroup is 
reviewing the effects of our trade policies on 
Latin America. It will ensure that Latin 
American trade interests are fully considered 
in the implementation of U.S. trade policy 
in the coming multilateral trade negotiations. 

3. Countervailing Duties. Finally, the Act 
also contains important new developments 
in connection with countervailing duty pro- 
ceedings. In addition to the possibility of a 
multilateral code governing export subsidies 
and countervailing action, referred to above, 
the Trade Act also gives the Secretary of the 
Treasury discretionary authority to refrain 
from imposing duties for up to four years in 
those special cases where (1) adequate steps 
have been taken to reduce or eliminate the 
adverse effects of the bounty or grant; and 
(2) there is a reasonable prospect that suc- 
cessful trade agreements will be entered into 
on nontariff barriers; and (3) the imposition 
of duties would seriously jeopardize these 
negotiations. 

4. Conclusion. The Trade Act of 1974 con- 
tains many elements. Only a few have been 
mentioned here. It is not a perfect law. Every 



provision in it is not as the Administration 
would have wished. But its major, overriding 
significance is clear — the demonstration that 
the United States remains committed to a 
liberal and open world trading system, and 
is prepared to make considerable concessions 
for that purpose, and will work with other 
countries in the Geneva trade negotiations in 
pursuit of that commitment. 

The United States is convinced that such 
a system is in the best interest of all coun- 
tries — developed and developing — and es- 
sential to the achievement of the common 
objective of a stable, healthy world economic 
order. 

This is a matter of profound importance 
to Latin America. If the trade negotiations 
which are now made possible by the new Act 
are successful, Latin America will be able to 
look forward to increased opportunities for 
export earnings in the United States and in 
the other industrialized countries as well. 
Had the Act not been passed, those nego- 
tiations would not have been possible. Given 
the international economic situation, the 
strong tendencies of the major trading na- 
tions would have been toward isolationist 
trade policies. This would have had pro- 
foundly adverse effects on the export pros- 
pects of the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 

The United States is in the process of 
working out the implementation of the Trade 
Act. In that process, we look forward to a 
continuing dialogue and cooperation with the 
countries of the hemisphere. 

Washington, D.C, January u, 1975. 



218 



Department of State Bulletin 



"A Conversation With President Ford"— An Interview 
for NBC Television and Radio 



FoUoioing are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of an interview 
with President Ford by John Chancellor and 
Tom Brokaiv broadcast live on NBC tele- 
vision and radio on Jamiary 23.^ 



Mr. Chancellor: Noiv you told, I think it 
was Time magaziyie, that we might have gas 
rationing if we get aiiother oil embargo. Is 
that correct? 

President Ford: Another oil embargo 
which would deprive us of anywhere from 6 
to 7 million barrels of oil a day would create 
a very serious crisis. 

Mr. Chancellor: But is that a likelihood, 
sir? As I understand it, of those 7 million 
barrels a day, only about 8 percent come 
from the Arab countries, or 10 or something 
like that. 

President Ford: I can't give you that par- 
ticular statistic. It would depend, of course, 
on whether the Shah of Iran or Venezuela or 
some of the other oil-producing countries 
cooperated. 

At the time of the October 1973 oil em- 
bargo, we did get some black-market oil. We 
got it from some of the noncooperating coun- 
tries; but in the interval, the OPEC [Orga- 
nization of Peti'oleum Exporting Countries] 
nations have solidified their organization a 
great deal more than they did before. So, we 
might have a solid front this time rather 
than one that was more flexible. 

Mr. Chancellor : I)i other words, you are 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27. 



worried not about an Arab oil boycott but a 
boycott by all the oil-producing countries 
that belong to OPEC? 

President Ford: That is correct. 

Mr. Chancellor: Do you regard that as a 
political — 

President Ford: It is a possibility. 

Mr. Chancellor: And in that case, that 
tuoidd produce the necessity for a gas ration- 
ing system ? 

President Ford: It would produce the 
necessity for more drastic action. I think gas 
rationing in and of itself would probably be 
the last resort, just as it was following the 
1973 embargo. 

At that time, as you remember, John, in 
order to be prepared. Bill Simon, who was 
then the energy boss, had printed I don't 
know how many gas rationing coupons. We 
have those available now ; they are in storage. 
I think they cost about $10 million to print, 
but they are available in case we have the 
kind of a crisis that would be infinitely more 
serious than even the one of 1973. 

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, you have 
talked also about energy independence, and it 
is a key to your whole program. As I recall, 
of the 17 million barrels of oil a day we use 
in this country, about 7, as you say, come 
from other countries. 

Let me just put it to you in a tendentious 
ivay. An awful lot of experts are saying that 
it will he impossible for us by 1985 to be 
totally free of foreign supplies of energy. Do 
you really think loe can make it? 

President Ford: The plan that I have sub- 
mitted does not contemplate that we will be 



February 17, 1975 



219 



totally free of foreign oil, but the percentage 
of reliance we have, or will have, on foreign 
oil will be far less. 

At the present time, for example, John, 37 
percent of our crude oil use comes from 
foreign sources. In contrast to 1960 — we 
were exporting oil. But in the interval be- 
tween 1960 and the present time — we are 
now using 37 to 38 percent of foreign oil 
for our energy uses. 

Now, if my plan goes through, if the 
Congress accepts it and we implement it 
and everything goes well, by 1985, if I recall, 
instead of 37 or 38 percent dependence on 
foreign oil, we will be down to about 10 per- 
cent. Well, a 10 percent cutoff, with all the 
contingency plans we might have, we can 
handle without any crisis. 

Mr. Chancellor: Tom. may I just folloiv up 
on that? 

Mr. Brokaw: You are doing just fine, John. 

Mr. Chancellor: The other day at yonr 
press conference, you ivere asked about Dr. 
Kissinger's quote on the possibility of mili- 
tary intervention. And something surprised 
me, sir. Yoti have been in politics for a long 
time, and you are as expert a question- 
diicker as anybody in that trade. Why didn't 
you duck that question? Why didn't you just 
say, "Well that's hypothetical?" You did go 
into some detail on it. 

President Ford: I did. I in part reiterated 
what I had said, I think, at a previous news 
conference. I wanted it made as clear as I 
possibly could that this country, in case of 
economic strangulation — and the key word 
is "strangulation" — we had to be prepared, 
without specifying what we might do, to 
take the necessary action for our self-pres- 
ervation. 

When you are being strangled, it is a 
question of either dying or living. And when 
you use the word "strangulation" in relation- 
ship to the existence of the United States or 
its nonexistence, I think the public has to 
have a reassurance, our people, that we are 
not going to permit America to be strangled 
to death. And so, I, in my willingness to be 
as frank — but with moderation — I thought I 



ought to say what I said then. And I have am-' 
plified it, I hope clarified it, hei-e. 

Mr. Chancellor: The Neiv Republic this 
iveek has a story saying that there are three 
American divisions being sent to the Middle 
East, or being prepared for the Middle East. 
We called the Pentagon, and ive got a con- 
firmation on that, that one is air mobile, one 
is airborne, and one is armored. And it is 
a little unclear as to ivhether this is a con- 
tingency plan, because ive don't know ivhere 
we ivould put the divisions in the Middle 
East. Could you shed any light on that? 

President Ford: I don't think I ought to 
talk about any particular military contin- 
gency plans, John. I think what I said con- 
cerning strangulation and Dr. Kissinger's 
comment is about as far as I ought to go. j 

Mr. Chancellor: Then ive have reached a 
point ivhere another question woidd be un- 
productive on that? 

President Ford: I think you are right. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, you said the 
other day that — speaking of that general 
area — you thiuk there is a serious danger 
of war in the Middle East. Earlier this year, 
you were quoted as saying, something over 
70 percent. Has it gone up recently? 

President Ford: I don't think I ought to 
talk in terms of percentage, Tom. There is a 
serious danger of war in the Middle East. I 
have had conferences with representatives of 
all the nations, practically, in the Middle 
East. I have talked to people in Europe. I 
have talked to other experts, and everybody 
says it is a very potentially volatile situation. 

It is my judgment that we might have a 
very good opportunity to be successful in 
what we call our step-by-step process. I hope 
our optimism is borne out. We are certainly 
going to try. 

Mr. Brokaw: Is it tied to Secretary Kis- 
singer's next trip to that part of the world? 

President Ford: Well, he is going because 
we think it might be fruitful, but we don't 
want to raise expectations. We have to be 



220 



Department of State Bulletin 



realistic, but if we don't try to move in this 
direction at this time, I think we might lose 
a unique opportunity. 

Mr. Brokaw: Should ive not succeed this 
time, Mr. President, do you think it is prob- 
ably time that we have to abandon this step- 
by-step process and go on to Geneva as the 
Soviets woidd like to have us do? 

President Ford: I think that is a distinct 
possibility. We prefer the process that has 
been successful so far, but if there is no prog- 
ress, then I think we undoubtedly would be 
forced to go to Geneva. 

I wouldn't be any more optimistic; in fact, 
I would be less optimistic if the matter was 
thrown on the doorstep of Geneva. 

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, really, the 
Russians have been shut out of Middle East- 
ern diplomacy since Dr. Kissinger began 
step-by-step diplomacy.- Why was that? 
Coiddn't the Russians play more of a positive 
role than they are doing? They are arming 
the Arabs to the teeth, and that is really 
about all we have been able to see or all they 
have been allowed to do under the way that 
ive have set otir policies. 

President Ford: I am not as authoritative 
on what was done during the October war 
of 1973 in the Middle East as I am now, of 
course. I can assure you that we do keep 
contact with the Soviet Union at the present 
time. We are not trying to shut them out 
of the process of trying to find an answer 
in the Middle East. They can play, and they 
have played, a constructive role, even under 
the current circumstances. 

So, I think it is unfair and not accurate to 
say that they are not playing a part. We are 
taking a course of action where it is more 
visible perhaps that we are doing something, 
but I say sincerely that the Soviet Union is 
playing a part even at the present time. 

Mr. Chancellor: Would you tell us what 
you think about the idea that is going around 
a little bit — and perhaps you have heard it 
as well, perhaps you know a great deal about 
it, I don't know — that if the Israelis made a 



significant pidlback on various fronts in the 
Middle East that that coidd be followed by 
some sort of American guarantee for their 
seciirity? 

President Ford: John, I really do not think 
I ought to get into the details of what might 
or might not be the grounds for a negotiated 
settlement. This is a very difficult area be- 
cause of the long history of jealousies, antag- 
onisms, and it is so delicate I really do not 
think I ought to get into the details of what 
might or might not be the grounds for a 
settlement. 

Mr. Chancellor: Woidd you entertain a 
question based on the reported Israeli desire 
for a threefold increase in our aid to them? 

President Ford: The United States, over 
the years, has been very generous in eco- 
nomic and military aid for Israel. On the 
other hand, we have been quite generous to 
a number of Arab nations. The State of 
Israel does need adequate military capability 
to protect its boundaries, or its territorial 
integrity. 

I think because of the commonality of in- 
terest that we have with Israel in the Middle 
East that it is in our interest as well as 
theirs to be helpful to them, both militarily 
and economically. There has been no deter- 
mination by me or by us as to the amount of 
that aid. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, I wonder if 
toe can come back at yozi again about Israel's 
security in another ivay. As you know, re- 
porters don't give up easily on some of these 
questions. 

President Ford: I found that out, Tom. 

Mr. Brokaw: On a long-range basis, do 
you think that it is possible for Israel to 
be truly sectire in the Middle East ivithout 
a U.S. guarantee of some kind? 

President Ford: Well, of course, Israel, 
to my knowledge, Tom, has never asked for 
any U.S. manpower or any guarantee from 
us for their security or their territorial in- 
tegrity. I think the Israelis, if they are 



February 17, 1975 



221 



given adequate arms and sufficient economic 
help, can handle the situation in the Middle 
East. Now, the last wai-, unfortunately, was 
much more severe from their point of view 
than the three previous ones. And I suspect 
that with the Arabs having more sophisti- 
cated weapons and probably a better mili- 
tary capability, another war might even be 
worse. That is one reason why we wish to 
accelerate the efforts to find some answers 
over there. 

But, I think the Israelis, with adequate 
equipment and their determination and suf- 
ficient economic aid, won't have to have U.S. 
guarantees of any kind. 

Mr. Brokaw: I iconder if ivc ca)t move to 
another area in the world, or ivould you 
like to go hack to the Middle East? 

Mr. Chancellor: I have one question I 
would like to put to the President. 

Sir, when ive talk about strangulation — 
and I hope we don't talk about it any more 
tonight after this, because I do think it is 
the hypothetical — / agree tvith you on that — 
what about the moral implications? If a 
country is being strangled by another coun- 
try or set of countries that own a natural 
resource, is it moral to go and take that? It 
is their oil; it is not ours. Isn't that a 
troublesome question? 

President Ford: I think it is a troublesome 
question. It may not be right, John, but I 
think if you go back over the history of 
mankind, wars have been fought over nat- 
ural resources from time immemorial. I 
would hope that in this decade or in this 
century and beyond, we would not have to 
have wars for those purposes, and we cer- 
tainly are not contemplating any such action. 
But history, in the years before us, indicates 
quite clearly that that was one of the reasons 
why nations fought one another. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, what are our 
objectives now in Southeast Asia, in Viet- 
Nam, particularly? 

President Ford: Viet-Nam, after all the 
lives that were lost there, Americans, over 
50,000, and after the tremendous expendi- 
tures that we made in American dollars, 



several years, more than $30 billion a year — 
it seems to me that we ought to try and give 
the South Vietnamese the opportunity 
through military assistance to protect their 
way of life. 

This is what we have done traditionally as 
Americans. Certainly, since the end of World 
War II, we have helped innumerable nations 
in military arms and economic a.ssistance to 
help themselves to maintain their own free- 
dom. 

The American people believe, I think, his- 
torically that if a country and a people want 
to protect their way of life against aggres- 
sion, we will help them in a humanitarian 
way and in a military way with arms and 
funds if they are willing to fight for them- 
selves. This is within our tradition as 
Americans. 

And the South Vietnamese apparently do 
wish to maintain their national integrity and 
their independence. I think it is in our best 
tradition as Americans to help them at the 
present time. 

Mr. Brokair: How miich longer and how 
deep does our commitment go to the South 
Vietnamese? 

President Ford: I don't think there is any 
long-term commitment. As a matter of fact, 
the American Ambassador there, Graham 
Martin, has told me, as well as Dr. Kissinger, 
that he thinks if adequate dollars which are 
translated into arms and economic aid — if 
that was made available that within two or 
three years the South Vietnamese would be 
over the hump militarily as well as eco- 
nomically. 

Now, I am sure we have been told that 
before, but they had made substantial prog- 
ress until they began to run a little short of 
ammunition, until inflation started in the 
last few months to accelerate. 

I happen to think that Graham Martin, 
who is a very hardnosed, very dedicated man, 
and very realistic, is right. And I hope 
the Congress will go along with this extra 
supplemental that I am asking for to help 
the South Vietnamese protect themselves. 

Mr. Chancellor: Sir, that is $300 million 



222 



Department of State Bulletin 



yoH have asked for the South Vietnamese. 
And given what ifou have just said — well, I 
am. just going to phrase it this way — ivill we 
see the light at the end of the tunnel if we 
give them $300 million? 

President Ford: The best estimates of the 
experts that are out there, both military and 
civilian, tell me that $300 million in this 
fiscal year is the minimum. A year ago 
when the budget was submitted for military 
assistance for South Viet-Nam, it was $1.4 
billion. Congress cut it in half, which meant 
that South Vietnamese rangers going out on 
patrol instead of having an adequate supply 
of hand grenades and weapons were cut in 
half, which of course has undercut their 
military capability and has made them con- 
serve and not be as strong. 

Now, $300 million doesn't take them back 
up to where they were or where it was pro- 
posed they should be. But the experts say 
who are on the scene, who have seen the 
fighting and have looked at the stocks and 
the reserves, tell me that that would be 
adequate for the current circumstances. 

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, does it 
make you uneasy to sit on that couch in this 
room and have experts in Viet-Nam saying 
only a little hit ynore, and it will he all right? 
We did hear that for so many years. 

President Ford: I think you have to think 
pretty hard about it, but a lot of skeptics, 
John, said the money we were going to make 
available for the rehabilitation of Europe 
after World War II wouldn't do any good, 
and of course the investment we made did 
pay off. A lot of people have said the money 
that we made available to Israel wouldn't 
be helpful in bringing about the peace that 
has been achieved there for the last year and 
a half or so, but it did. It helped. 

I think an investment of $300 million at 
this time in South Viet-Nam could very like- 
ly be a key for the preservation of their 
freedom and might conceivably force the 
North Vietnamese to stop violating the Paris 
accords of January 1973. 

When you look at the agreement that was 
signed — and I happened to be there at the 



time of the signing in January of 1973 — the 
North Vietnamese agreed not to infiltrate. 
The facts are they have infiltrated with 
countless thousands — I think close to 100,000 
from North Viet-Nam down to South Viet- 
Nam. They are attacking cities, metropoli- 
tan areas. They have refused to permit us 
to do anything about our U.S. missing in 
action in North Viet-Nam. They have re- 
fused to negotiate any political settlement 
between North Viet-Nam and South Viet- 
Nam. They have called off the meetings 
either in Paris or in Saigon. 

So here is a counti-y- — South Viet-Nam — 
that is faced with an attitude on the part 
of the North Vietnamese of total disregard 
of the agreement that was signed about two 
years ago. I think the South Vietnamese de- 
serve some help in this crisis. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, underlying 
all of this in much of this interview is a 
kind of supposition on your part, J guess, 
that the American puhlic is willing to carry 
the hurdens that it has carried in the past. 
Do you believe that? Is that your view of 
the ivorld, kind of, and the view of this 
coimtry ? 

President Ford: Yes, and I am proud of 
that, Tom. The United States — we are for- 
tunate. We have a substantial economy. We 
have good people who by tradition — certain- 
ly since the end of World War II — have 
assumed a great responsibility. We rehabili- 
tated Europe. We helped Japan — both in the 
case of Germany and Japan, enemies that 
we defeated. 

We have helped underdeveloped countries 
in Latin America, in Africa, in Southeast 
Asia. I think we should be proud of the 
fact that we are willing to share our great 
wealth with others less fortunate than we. 

And it gives us an opportunity to be a 
leader setting an example for others. And 
when you look at it from our own selfish 
point of view, what we have done has basi- 
cally helped America ; but in addition, it has 
helped millions and millions of other people. 
We should be proud of it. We should not be 
critical of our efforts. 



February 17, 1975 



223 



Proclamation Raising Import Fees 
for Oil and Oil Products Signed 

Remarks by President Ford ' 

In my state of the Union address, I set 
forth the nation's energy goals to assure that 
our future is as secure and productive as 
our past. This proclamation that I am about 
to sign is the first step down the long and 
difficult road toward regaining our energy 
freedom. The proclamation will gradually 
impose higher fees on imported oil, and this 
will result in substantial energy conserva- 
tion by the United States. 

As we begin to achieve our near-term con- 
servation goals, the nation will once again 
be going in the right direction, which is away 
from energy dependence. Each day that 
passes without strong and tough action, 
which this proclamation is, results in a 
further drain on our national wealth and 
on the job it creates for the American people. 
Each day without action means that our 
economy becomes more and more vulnerable 
to serious disruption. Each day without 
action increases the threat to our national 
security and welfare. 

This proclamation, which is just as fair 
and equitable as the law permits, must now 
be followed by positive congressional action. 
The nation needs a fully comprehensive and 
long-range energy program, one that in- 
creases domestic energy supplies and en- 
courages lasting conservation. To reach our 
national goals, we need the help of each 
American and especially their representa- 
tives in the Congress. 

I look forward to vigorous debate and seri- 
ous congressional hearings on our compre- 
hensive energy plan. The crucial point is 
that this proclamation moves us in the right 
direction while we work to enact the energy 
legislation. The tactics of delay and proposals 
which would allow our dependency and vul- 
nerability to increase will not be tolerated 



' Made in the Oval Office at the White House on 
Jan. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents dated Jan. 27). For text of Procla- 
mation 4341, see 40 Fed. Reg. 3965. 



by the American people, nor should they be. 

The new energy-saving fees put us on the 
right path. There are problems ahead. There 
will be hardships. Let us get on with the job 
of solving this serious energy problem. 



Ambassador Johnson Discusses 
Prospects for SALT Talks 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limi- 
tation Talks (SALT) resumed at Geneva on 
January 31. FoUoiving is the transcript of 
an intervieiv ivith Ambassador at Large U. 
Alexis Johnson, U.S. Representative to the 
talks, conducted at Washington by Paid 
Sisco of United Press International, for 
broadcast on Eurovision on January 29. 

Press release 36 dated January 29 

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, the SALT 
talks resume at the tail end of January in 
Geneva. What would you say is the prime 
aim of this session? 

A)nbassador Johnson: Well, we have been 
given the mandate by the leaders on both 
sides — by President Ford and by General 
Secretary Brezhnev — to conclude, or to write, 
an agreement which will implement the 
agreement which they entered into and 
agreed upon in Vladivostok in November. 

They agreed upon, you might say, the 
broad outlines of the agreement; and the job 
that the Soviet negotiator. Minister Semenov 
[Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Seme- 
nov] , and I will be having, together with our 
delegations, will be to translate this into the 
specifics of an agreement which can be 
signed by both governments. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, now, obviously you enter 
these talks optimistic, but are you optimistic 
that something concrete will come out of this 
particular session? 

Ambassador Johnson: I certainly am, be- 
cause I think that the agreement that was 
entered into at Vladivostok is so concrete 
and contains such constructive elements in 
it that I feel that it is going to be possible 



224 



Department of State Bulletin 



for us to write an agreement which will 
commend itself to both governments. 

Now, this doesn't mean it is going to be 
easy. Vladivostok did not seek to answer 
all the questions, but it does mean that we 
have a more solid basis now than we have 
ever had in the past for writing a new 
agreement. 

Mr. Sisco: Of course, I am sure you arc 
atvare of certain criticisms of the Vladivo- 
stok agreement, that the 2,U00 nuclear missile 
total many people thought far too high. How 
do you feel about that? Is there a chance 
that that can be reduced when we get down 
to the fine print? 

Ambassador Johnson: I have no inhibi- 
tions or reservations whatsoever about the 
validity, importance, and desirability of the 
Vladivostok agreement. The Vladivostok 
agreement, to my mind, represented a very 
significant breakthrough, as the term has 
been used, and I agree, given my own back- 
ground, that it was a breakthrough. 

Since I entered the negotiations, we have 
been talking over the past few years about 
reductions; and we, the United States, have 
been taking the position that in order to 
negotiate reductions, it was first necessary 
for the two sides to arrive at a common 
level and then reduce from that level. 

Well, up to now, the problem has always 
been the difficulty of arriving at an agree- 
ment on a common level. The Soviets have 
insisted upon there being compensations, 
they call it — that is, their having a somewhat 
higher number because of various factors — 
and thus they would start from a higher 
figure than we would start from. 

The big breakthrough at Vladivostok was 
that the Soviets agreed with us on starting 
from a common level. Now, having reached 
that common level, I think it will facilitate 
negotiations in the future on reductions. In 
fact, that Vladivostok agreement says that 
we will enter into negotiations on reduc- 
tions. 

Now, the agreement has been criticized be- 
cause it doesn't include reductions, also. How- 
ever, you have to start some place. And I 



think that the Vladivostok agreement is a 
very important breakthrough toward start- 
ing on a further path that will lead both sides 
toward reductions. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, you don't believe that that 
2,Jt00 figure was just arbitrarily set too 
high. One part of that criticism, if I may 
add — some people say the Russians actually 
wanted a loiver figure. Is that right? Is 
that true? 

Ambassador Johyison: I never heard that 
statement made. 

Mr. Sisco: That was in some press clip- 
pings I have seen. 

Ambassador Johnson: As a matter of fact, 
the 2,400 figure is a figure somewhat in be- 
tween what we have and what the Russians 
have. So it is a compromise figure, you might 
say. 

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if 
you feel that your job in the last few iveeks 
has become harder because of the Russian's 
rejections of the trade treaty, apparently a 
little bit cracking of this U.S.-Soviet detente. 
Do you think perhaps they are going to be a 
little tougher? 

Ambassador Johnson: I don't want to pre- 
dict what their attitude is going to be, except 
that I go into these talks with the conviction 
that both sides want them to succeed. No 
matter what other problems there may be in 
our relations, it seems to me that both coun- 
tries have an overwhelming interest in pre- 
venting the holocaust of a nuclear war. And 
I am going into these talks with the idea 
that they are going to succeed. I hope and ex- 
pect that my Soviet colleague will be doing 
the same. 

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, on the sam,e 
plane, sort of, the United States and Soviets 
are at least talking to limit nuclear weapons. 
What about the proliferation of nuclear 
tveaponry for other nations? I am thinking 
really of the Mideast where obviously the 
Arabian countries are going to have the 
money, at least, perhaps to get into the »^t- 
clear race. Is there something that the United 



February 17, 1975 



225 



states and the Soviets together can do to 
limit the spreading of nuclear weapons? 

Amhassador Johnson: Well, as you know, 
both countries have signed the Nonprolifer- 
ation Treaty (NPT) and both countries have 
supported the Nonproliferation Treaty. And, 
as you know, also an NPT review conference 
will be taking place in the course of this year. 
So both countries are still supporting the 
principles involved in the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. We in the SALT talks do not di- 
rectly deal with this matter. 

Mr. Sisco: What are some of the nuts and 
bolts of this talk? How long do you expect 
to be there, and something along that line? 

Ambassador Johnson: Well, that's a ques- 
tion my wife asks me. I am not able to an- 
swer it that firmly. I expect to be there as 
long as it is necessary to do the job. 

Mr. Sisco: Looking ivay down the road, 
and a bit philosophically, can you foresee a 
time ivhen perhaps there will be no nuclear 
weaponry, and we don't have this big thing 
hanging over our shoulders and minds? 

Ambassador Johnson: I wish I could say 
that, but I don't see the possibility at the 
present time. 

In this connection, Mr. Sisco, in connec- 
tion with this agreement, I think people un- 
derstandably keep searching for some magic 
formula that will dispose of this whole ques- 
tion once and for all — eliminate all nuclear 
weapons — or there be a definitive agreement 
between ourselves and the Soviet Union that 
will last for a long time, last indefinitely into 
the future. 

I just don't think that there is such a 
formula. I think that, given the growth of 
technology, given the developments in both 
countries, between the two countries as well 
as elsewhere in the world, I think this whole 
question of arms limitation, and particularly 
the limitation of strategic arms, is going to 
be something that both countries are going 
to have to deal with on a continuing basis 
now and into the future. 

I think this is one of the advantages of 
this present agreement at Vladivostok. It 



was agreed that we will not try to write 
something that will last indefinitely into th>' 
future. It was agreed that we will try to 
write something that will have a life of 10 
years. Ten years is a span in this field that 
it is possible to foresee and anticipate de- 
velopments, and thus I think that we have 
brought this into a framework which makes 
it manageable. 

This agreement isn't going to end all prob- 
lems. This agreement, as I said, is simply, 
I think, the beginning of — or let's say, a 
further step in this process of negotiating 
and reaching understandings between our- 
selves and the Soviet Union in this very 
dynamic field. 

Mr. Sisco: If I may touch on something 
that you touched on earlier, I am wondering 
whether perhaps the decliyie of Mr. Brezhnev 
— you mentioned Mr. Brezhnev and Presi- 
dent Ford signed the agreement — and there 
is a strong feeling that perhaps he lost some 
influence in the Soviet Union. Do you think 
this makes your job harder, or do you know 
anything that might go along that line? 

Ambassador Johnson: I just don't think 
it would be useful for me to speculate. I 
deal with the representative of the Soviet 
Government. He deals with it as a represen- 
tative of that government. 

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, just on an- 
other philosophical note, do you feel that 
perhaps it might have been better not to 
have nuclear weaponry at all in the last 25- 
30 years? 

Ambassador Johnson: Yes, I would cer- 
tainly agree, if it had been possible. And 
you will recall that the United States, when 
it had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry, 
made a proposal, the Baruch proposal, 
wasn't it, back in 1946, that nuclear weapons 
be outlawed, in eflfect, and that all nuclear 
energy be brought under international con- 
trol. And you will recall that that was turned 
down at the time. 

Now, as long as nuclear weapons exist, I 
think it important that the United States 
maintain its deterrent posture. And of 



226 



Department of State Bulletin 



?ourse the Soviet Union has been seeking 
parity with the United States in nuclear 
weapons. 

As long as deterrence can be maintained, 
I have hopes that nuclear war can be averted 
between the two powers, and that, in effect, 
is what the SALT talks are all about. The 
SALT talks are not about eliminating all 
nuclear weapons. The SALT talks are estab- 
lishing a relationship between the two coun- 
tries on the level of weapons such as not to 
encourage either side to initiate nuclear war. 

The theme of the talks, if you will, as far 
as I am concerned, in many ways, is sta- 
bility; that is, that our weapons systems 
and our strategic nuclear forces are not such 
as to bring about instability, particularly in 
a crisis situation, so that deterrence can be 
maintained and stability can be maintained 
in relationships between our two countries. 

Mr. Sisco: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 



U.S. -India Economic and Commercial 
Subcommission Meets at Washington 

Joi7it Communique ^ 

The Economic and Commercial Subcom- 
mission of the India-U.S. Joint Commission 
held its first meeting in Washington on 
January 20-21, 1975, to discuss ways to 
broaden economic and commercial relation- 
ships between the two countries. Progress 
made by the Subcommission underscored a 
new stage in U.S.-Indian economic relations 
based on an increasing and closer coopera- 
tion in a wide range of activities in trade, 
agricultural inputs, taxation, investment and 
industry. 

The meetings were chaired by Indian Fi- 
nance Secretary M. G. Kaul and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs Thomas O. Enders. Two other 
subcommissions, one on science and tech- 
nology and one on education and culture, 
will meet during the next few weeks. The 



'Issued on Jan. 21 (text from press release 23). 



subcommission meetings are in preparation 
for a meeting of the Joint Commission, 
chaired by the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry 
A. Kissinger, and the Minister for External 
Affairs, Shri Y. B. Chavan, which will be 
held in Washington on March 13-14, 1975. 

The Subcommission decided on specific 
steps to expand economic relations between 
the two countries. Toward this objective, the 
two sides agreed that a Joint Business 
Council should be established to increase 
direct contacts between the business sectors, 
including Indian public sector enterprises, 
in industrial and commercial projects of 
high priority. 

Indian officials expressed their interest in 
expanding the scope and magnitude of In- 
dian exports to the United States and agreed 
to provide a list of non-traditional products 
with potential for increased exports to the 
United States. The U.S. delegation provided 
a list of product categories in which the U.S. 
is interested in expanding its exports to 
India. Both sides agreed to cooperate in such 
trade expansion on a Government-Govern- 
ment and Government-private business 
basis. Both sides also agreed upon the need 
for a regular and timely exchange of infor- 
mation on marketing conditions and regula- 
tions which might affect their exports to 
each other. 

The Indian and U.S. delegations exchanged 
views on the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. The 
Subcommission discussed provisions con- 
sidered to be of particular relevance and 
benefit to India, and also examined ques- 
tions relating to the implementation of a 
U.S. system of generalized tariff prefer- 
ences. 

Concerning problems faced by India as a 
result of recent short supply of key com- 
modities, U.S. agricultural experts gave a 
detailed presentation of current and pro- 
jected market developments, especially in 
the areas of fertilizers and pesticides. Con- 
sidering the importance of agriculture to 
the two economies, the delegates decided to 
form a special working group which will 
meet immediately to concentrate on the 
supply of certain agricultural inputs in 
short supply including developing long-term 



February 17, 1975 



227 



Indian capacity for production of these 
items. 

To improve the climate for U.S. invest- 
ment in India, the two sides agreed to hold 
talks within the ne.\t few weeks on a pos- 
sible double taxation treaty. 

The Subcommission also explored new 
ways to stimulate cooperation between U.S. 
and Indian firms in the development of high 
technology and export oriented industries 
and in cooperative ventures in third coun- 
tries. Both Governments, in cooperation with 
the proposed Joint Business Council, will 
actively cooperate to assure that such op- 
portunities are fully utilized. 



President Vetoes Bill To Provide 
Nontariff Barrier on Filberts 

Memorandum of Disapproval > 

I am withholding my approval from H.R. 
2933, a bill which would amend the Agri- 
cultural Marketing Agreement Act to make 
existing grade and quality restrictions on 
certain imported commodities applicable to 
imported filberts. 

In my judgment, the bill would be unfair 
to the American consumer and the American 
farmer, as well as prejudicial to the interests 
of American trade policy. 

H.R. 2933 would be unfair to the consumer 
because it could unnecessarily increase prices 
for filbert products. Existing law already 
requires all imported foodstuffs to meet 
health standards prescribed under the Food 
and Drug Act. 

The bill could also produce unfair conse- 
quences for the farmer by causing the loss of 
some of his important markets abroad. It 
could result at best in comparatively limited 
benefits for domestic producers while risking 



' Issued on Jan. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 13). 



retaliation from abroad against the larger 
volume of other products exported by our 
farmers. 

Finally, the bill would be prejudicial to 
our trade policy because it would be incon- 
sistent with our obligations under the Gen- 
eral Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. It 
would erect a non-tariff trade barrier at a 
time when we are trying to persuade other 
nations to dismantle theirs. 

Although there are other commodities 
which are subject to the same statutory re- 
strictions that H.R. 2933 would impose on 
filberts, no new commodities have been in- 
cluded in that list since January of 1971. I 
cannot in good conscience support the addi- 
tion of a new commodity just after signing 
into law the new Trade Act which has a 
major aim of eliminating non-tariff trade 
barriers. 

For the foregoing reasons, I am compelled 
to withhold my approval from H.R. 2933. 

Gerald R. Ford 

The White House, January 3, 1975. 



Notice of Time for Filing Claims 
Against Syria by U.S. Nationals 

Department Announcement ^ 

Notice is hereby given that the Depart- 
ment of State will receive at its Office of 
the Legal Adviser, located at 2201 C Street, 
N.W., Washington, D. C. 20520, during the 
period beginning February 3, 1975, and end- 
ing August 4, 1975, claims against the Gov- 
ernment of the Syrian Arab Republic by 
U.S. nationals for the nationalization, ex- 
propriation or sequestration of, or other 
measures directed against their property by 
the Government of the Syrian Arab Re- 
public. 



'Issued on Jan. 27 (text from press release 30). 



228 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



President Ford Requests Additional Funds 
for Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia 

Message to the Congress ^ 



To the Congress of the United States: 

Two years ago the Paris Agreement was 
signed, and several weeks later was endorsed 
by major nations including the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, France and the 
People's Republic of China. We had suc- 
ceeded in negotiating an Agreement that 
provided the framework for lasting peace 
in Southeast Asia. This Agreement would 
have worked had Hanoi matched our side's 
efforts to implement it. Unfortunately, the 
other side has chosen to violate most of the 
major provisions of this Accord. 

The South Vietnamese and Cambodians 
are fighting hard in their own defense, as 
recent casualty figures clearly demonstrate. 
With adequate U.S material assistance, they 
can hold their own. We cannot turn our 
backs on these embattled countries. U.S. un- 
willingness to provide adequate assistance 
to allies fighting for their lives would seri- 
ously affect our credibility throughout the 
world as an ally. And this credibility is 
essential to our national security. 

Vietnam 

When the Paris Agreement was signed, 
all Americans hoped that it would provide 
a framework under which the Vietnamese 
people could make their own political choices 
and resolve their own problems in an atmos- 
phere of peace. 



'Transmitted on Jan. 28 (text from White House 
press release). 



In compliance with that Agreement, the 
United States withdrew its forces and its 
military advisors from Vietnam. In further 
compliance with the Agreement, the Re- 
public of Vietnam offered a comprehensive 
political program designed to reconcile the 
differences between the South Vietnamese 
parties and to lead to free and supervised 
elections throughout all of South Vietnam. 
The Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly re- 
iterated this offer and has several times 
proposed a specific date for a free election 
open to all South Vietnamese political groups. 

Unfortunately, our hopes for peace and 
for reconciliation have been frustrated by the 
persistent refusal of the other side to abide 
by even the most fundamental provisions of 
the Agreement. North Vietnam has sent its 
forces into the South in such large numbers 
that its army in South Vietnam is now 
greater than ever, close to 289,000 troops. 
Hanoi has sent tanks, heavy artillery, and 
anti-aircraft weapons to South Vietnam by 
the hundreds. These troops and equipment 
are in South Vietnam for only one reason — 
to forceably impose the will of Hanoi on 
the South Vietnamese people. Moreover, 
Hanoi has refused to give a full accounting 
for our men missing in action in Vietnam. 

The Communists have also violated the 
political provisions of the Paris Agreement. 
They have refused all South Vietnamese 
offers to set a specific date for free elections, 
and have now broken off negotiations with 
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. 



February 17, 1975 



229 



In fact, they say that they will not negotiate 
with that Government as it is presently 
constituted, although they had committed 
themselves to do so. 

Recent events have made it clear that 
North Vietnam is again trying to impose a 
solution by force. Earlier this month. North 
Vietnamese forces captured an entire prov- 
ince, the population centers of which were 
clearly under the control of the South Viet- 
namese Government when the Paris Agree- 
ment was signed. Our intelligence indicates, 
moreover, that their campaign will intensify 
further in coming months. 

At a time when the North Vietnamese 
have been building up their forces and 
pressing their attacks, U.S. military aid to 
the South Vietnamese Government has not 
been sufficient to permit one-to-one replace- 
ment of equipment and supplies used up or 
destroyed, as permitted by the Paris Agree- 
ment. In fact, with the $700 million appro- 
priation available in the current fiscal year, 
we have been able to provide no new tanks, 
airplanes, trucks, artillery pieces, or other 
major equipment, but only essential con- 
sumable items such as ammunition, gasoline, 
spare parts, and medical supplies. And in 
the face of the increased North Vietnamese 
pressure of recent months, these supplies 
have not kept pace with minimally essential 
expenditure. Stockpiles have been drawn 
down and will soon reach dangerously low 
levels. 

Last year, some believed that cutting back 
our military assistance to the South Vietnam- 
ese Government would induce negotiations 
for a political settlement. Instead, the oppo- 
site has happened. North Vietnam is refus- 
ing negotiations and is increasing its mili- 
tary pressure. 

I am gravely concerned about this situa- 
tion. I am concerned because it poses a 
serious threat to the chances for political 
stability in Southeast Asia and to the prog- 
ress that has been made in removing Viet- 
nam as a major issue of contention between 
the great powers. 

I am also concerned because what happens 
in Vietnam can affect the rest of the world. 



It cannot be in the interests of the United 
States to let other nations believe that we 
are prepared to look the other way when 
agreements that have been painstakingly 
negotiated are contemptuously violated. It 
cannot be in our interest to cause our friends 
all over the world to wonder whether we 
will support them if they comply with agree- 
ments that others violate. 

When the United States signed the Paris 
Agreement, as when we pursued the policy 
of Vietnamization, we told the South Viet- 
namese, in efi'ect, that we would not defend 
them with our military forces, but that we 
would provide them the means to defend 
themselves, as permitted by the Agreement. 
The South Vietnamese have performed ef- 
fectively in accepting this challenge. They 
have demonstrated their determination and 
ability to defend them.selves if they are pro- 
vided the necessary military materiel with 
which to do so. We, however, may be judged 
remiss in keeping our end of the bargain. 

We — the Executive and Legislative 
Branches together — must meet our responsi- 
bilities. As I have said earlier, the amount 
of assistance appropriated by the previous 
Congress is inadequate to the requirements 
of the situation. 

I am, therefore, proposing: 

— A supplemental appropriation of $300 
million for military assistance to South 
Vietnam. 

The $300 million in supplemental military 
assistance that I am requesting for South 
Vietnam represents the difference between 
the $1 billion which was authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal year 1975 and the 
$700 million which has been appropriated. 
This amount does not meet all the needs of 
the South Vietnamese army in its defense 
against North Vietnam. It does not, for 
example, allow for replacement of equip- 
ment lost in combat. It is the minimum 
needed to prevent serious reversals by pro- 
viding the South Vietnamese with the urgent 
supplies required for their self-defense 
against the current level of North Vietnam- 
ese attacks. 



230 



Department of State Bulletin 



I believe that this additional aid will help 
to deter the North Vietnamese from further 
escalating their military pressure and pro- 
vide them additional incentive to i-esume the 
political discussions envisaged under the 
Paris Agreement. 

All Americans want to end the U.S. role 
in Vietnam. So do I. I believe, however, 
that we mu.st end it in a way that will 
enhance the chances of world peace and 
sustain the purposes for which we have 
sacrificed so much. 

Cambodia 

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore 
peace and to allow the Khmer people an 
opportunity to decide freely who will govern 
them. To this end, our immediate goal in 
Cambodia is to facilitate an early negotiated 
settlement. The Cambodian Government has 
repeatedly called for talks without precondi- 
tions with the other Khmer parties. We have 
fully supported these proposals as well as 
the resolution passed by the United Nations 
General Assembly calling for early negotia- 
tions among Khmer parties. 

Regrettably, there has been no progress. 
In fact, the Communists have intensified 
hostilities by attacking on the outskirts of 
Phnom Penh and attempting to cut the land 
and water routes to the capital. We must 
continue to aid the Cambodian Government 
in the face of externally supported military 
attacks. To refuse to provide the assistance 
needed would threaten the survival of the 
Khmer Republic and undermine the chances 
for peace and stability in the area. 

The Cambodian Government forces, given 
adequate assistance, can hold their own. 
Once the insurgents realize that they cannot 
win by force of arms, I believe they will look 
to negotiations rather than war. 

I am, therefore, proposing: 

— Legislation to eliminate the current ceil- 
ings on military and economic assistance to 
Cambodia, and to authorize the appropria- 
tion of an additional $222 million for mili- 
tary aid for Cambodia, and 



— An amendment to the fiscal year 1975 
budget for the additional $222 million. 

To provide the assistance necessary, the 
present restrictions on our military and eco- 
nomic aid to Cambodia must be removed and 
additional money provided. The $200 million 
in military assistance currently authorized 
was largely expended during the past six 
months in response to the significantly in- 
tensified enemy offensive action. In addition, 
I have utilized the $75 million drawdown of 
Department of Defense stocks authorized by 
Congress for this emergency situation. Since 
the beginning of the Communist offensive on 
January 1, ammunition expenditures have 
risen and will exhaust all available funds 
well before the end of this fiscal year. To 
meet minimum requirements for the survival 
of the Khmer Republic, I am requesting an 
additional $222 million in military assist- 
ance and the elimination of the pre.sent $200 
million ceiling on military assistance to Cam- 
bodia. I am also requesting elimination of 
the $377 million ceiling on overall assistance 
to Cambodia. This is necessary to enable 
us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, 
under the Food for Peace program, to assure 
adequate food for the victims of war and 
to prevent the economic collapse of the coun- 
try. 

I know we all seek the same goals for 
Cambodia — a situation wherein the suffering 
and destruction has stopped and the Khmer 
people have the necessary security to re- 
build their society and their country. These 
goals are attainable. With the minimal re- 
sources and flexibility I am requesting from 
you, the Congress, we can help the people 
of Cambodia to have a choice in determining 
their future. The consequences of refusing 
them this assistance will reach far beyond 
Cambodia's borders and impact severely on 
prospects for peace and stability in that 
region and the world. There is no question 
but that this assistance would serve the in- 
terests of the United States. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, January 28, 1975. 



February 17, 1975 



231 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Outer Space Registration Convention 
Signed by United States 

Statement by John Scali 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 

I am happy to sign on behalf of the United 
States the Convention on Registration of Ob- 
jects Launched into Outer Space. 

The United States was one of the leaders 
in the long negotiations that led to the Regis- 
tration Convention, as we were in negotiating 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Astro- 
naut Assistance and Return Agreement of 
1968, and the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob- 
jects of 1971. The new Registration Conven- 
tion is another step in developing a coopera- 
tive and mutually beneficial legal order for 
the conduct of outer space activities. We hope 
it will meet with broad support and accept- 
ance around the world. 

The Registration Convention was nego- 
tiated over a three-year period beginning in 
1972 and was agreed to in 1974 by all the 
states participating in the 37-member U.N. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. 

It secures three objectives sought by the 
United States and other like-minded nations : 

First, the convention will encourage every 
country launching objects into orbit around 
the earth or into other sustained space tran- 
sit to maintain an orderly record of their 
launches. 

Second, it establishes an international reg- 
ister of manmade space objects in orbit, to be 
kept by the Secretary General and to which 
there will be full and open access. This reg- 
ister will contain information concerning 
each object launched into space or beyond, 
including the name of the launching state 



or states, an appropriate designator for, or 
the registration number of, the object, the 
location and date of launch, basic orbital 
parameters, and a description of the general 
function of the object. 

Third, the convention will provide for 
cooperative assistance by countries which 
have space monitoring and tracking facilities 
in the event that a country is unable to iden- 
tify the nation of origin of a manmade space 
object which lands in its territory and causes 
damage. 

U.S. and Romania Sign Five- Year 
Agreement on Exchanges 

Following are texts of a Department an- 
nouncement issued December 26 and the 
U.S.-Romania five-year Agreement on Cul- 
tural and Scientific Exchanges and Coopera- 
tion signed at Bucharest on December 13. 

Press release 647 dated December 26 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

On December 13, 1974, the United States 
and Romania signed a new five-year Agree- 
ment on Cultural and Scientific Exchanges 
and Cooperation, replacing the previous two- 
year accords at a lower level for programs 
in these fields. The agreement, which enters 
into force on January 1, 1975, provides for 
expanded cultural, scientific, and informa- 
tional activity and incorporates in a sepa- 
rate article the 1969 understanding between 
the two countries which led to the establish- 
ment of the American Library in Bucharest. 

A document outlining the specific program 
of exchanges and cooperation for the next 
two years was also signed by American 
Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, Jr., and Ro- 
manian Deputy Foreign Minister Vasile 
Gliga in a ceremony attended by members of 
the American Embassy and officials of the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Afi'airs and 
other Romanian institutions involved in the 
program.' 



' Made at U.N. Headquarters on Jan. 24 (text 
from USUN press release 4). 



' For text of the 1975-76 program, see press re- 
lease 547 dated Dec. 26. 



232 



Department of State Bulletin 



The agreement and program provide for 
exchanges of students, researchers, and uni- 
versity lecturers in Romanian and American 
studies, as well as for short-term visitors 
in all fields. Continuing and expanding ex- 
changes and cooperation between Romanian 
agencies and American private and govern- 
mental organizations in the fields of science 
and technology were also incorporated in the 
accords as well as provisions for activities 
in the performing and creative arts, motion 
pictures, exhibits, communications media, 
and sports. The accords also provide for ex- 
changes of political leaders. 

TEXT OF AGREEMENT 

Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government 
OF THE Socialist Republic of Romania on Co- 
operation and Exchanges in the Cultural, 
Educational, Scientific and Technological 
Fields 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania, 

Considering the historic ties of friendship between 
the American and Romanian peoples; 

Believing that exchanges and cooperation in cul- 
tural, educational, scientific, technological and other 
fields will contribute to further knowledge and 
mutual understanding between the American and 
Romanian peoples and to the continued development 
of mutually beneficial relations between the two 
countries; 

Recognizing that exchanges and cooperation be- 
tween institutions of the two countries will con- 
tribute to the cultural and material development of 
their peoples; 

Considering the existing exchanges and coopera- 
tion in these fields between the two countries, and 
desiring their further expansion; 

Desiring to develop their relations on the basis of 
the principles set forth in the joint statement of 
the Presidents of the two States on December 5, 
1973, 

Agree as follows: 

Article I 

1. The Parties will encourage and develop ex- 
changes and cooperation in the arts, culture, com- 
munications media, education, tourism, sports, and 
in other fields of common interest on the basis of 
mutual benefit and respect. They will provide oppor- 
tunities for and facilitate appropriate direct contacts 
and cooperative activities between organizations, 



institutions, and individuals of the two countries. 
Such exchanges, contacts and activities may include, 
but need not be limited to the following: 

A. Exchange of students, instructors, professors, 
lecturers, researchers, education officials and spe- 
cialists; 

B. Exchange of books, periodicals, educational and 
teaching materials, including visual aids; 

C. Organization of conferences, symposia, and 
seminars as well as joint research projects; 

D. Direct cooperation and exchanges between 
universities and other institutions of higher educa- 
tion; 

E. Study of the language, literature and culture 
of the two countries, at the University and other 
levels; 

F. Exhibits of an artistic, cultural, educational or 
general informational nature; 

G. Visits and e.xchanges of representatives in the 
fields of architecture, art, literature, music, theater 
and other arts, including professional and amateur 
groups of performing artists in music, dance and 
theater; 

H. Showing of documentary and feature films, the 
organization of film weeks, as well as exchanges 
and other activities in the field of cinematography; 

1. Visits and exchanges of athletes and athletic 
teams, as well as specialists in the fields of physical 
education and sports; 

J. Visits and exchanges of journalists, editors, 
publishers and translators of literary works as well 
as cooperative activities between organizations in 
the fields of press, radio and television. 

2. The Parties will facilitate: 

A. Distribution of cultural, informational and 
other materials designed to enrich the mutual knowl- 
edge of the peoples and their cultural values. 

B. Access to libraries, museums, cultural centers, 
reading rooms and archives and the development of 
direct relations between these and other cultural 
institutions through exchanges of social, cultural, 
technical and scientific books, publications and mi- 
crofilms. 

3. The Parties will encourage, with the consent of 
the authors and in accordance with the legal require- 
ments of the two countries, the translation and 
publication of literary and scientific works as well 
as works of a general nature, of the other country. 

Article II 

The Parties will continue to facilitate the activi- 
ties of the American and Romanian Libraries in 
conformity with the Understanding of August 3, 
1969. 

Article III 

1. The Parties will encourage and develop ex- 
changes and cooperation in the fields of science. 



February 17, 1975 



233 



technology and health on the basis of mutual bene- 
fit. They will facilitate, as appropriate, cooperative 
activities and direct contacts betvifeen organizations, 
institutions and specialists of the two coiintries. 
Such activities, contacts, and exchanges may include, 
but need not be limited to the following: 

A. Joint research, development and implementa- 
tion of programs and projects in basic and applied 
sciences, as well as exchanges of experience and 
research results; 

B. Visits, study trips, and exchanges between 
scientists and specialists; 

C. Organization of joint courses, conferences, 
seminars and symposia; 

D. Organization of scientific and technical ex- 
hibits and displays on a non-commercial basis; 

E. Exchanges of scientific and technical documen- 
tation and information, including scientific and 
technical films; 

F. Other forms of scientific and technical co- 
operation as may be mutually agreed. 

2. The Parties will take all appropriate measures 
to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of agree- 
ments and understandings mentioned in periodic 
programs of exchanges. 

Article IV 

The Parties will also encourage the conclusion, 
when considered necessary and mutually beneficial, 
of other understandings, arrangements and periodic 
programs of exchanges in the fields covered by this 
Agreement. 

Article V 

This Agreement, and the exchanges, contacts, and 
activities under it will be carried out subject to the 
Constitution and to applicable laws and regulations 
of each country. Within this framework, both Parties 
will exert their best efforts to promote favorable 
conditions for the fulfillment of the Agreement and 
the exchanges, contacts and cooperative activities 
under it. 

Article VI 

For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, 
the Parties will conclude periodic programs of ex- 
changes which will detail the activities and ex- 
changes, as well as the financial conditions, to be 
carried out. 

The Parties will meet periodically to review cur- 
rent activities, to take appropriate measures, and to 
consider future activities. 

Article VII 

This Agreement will enter into force on January 
1, 1975. The Agreement is valid for five years and 
may be automatically extended for additional periods 
of five years. It may be modified only by prior 
agreement of the Parties. 



The Agreement may be terminated by either 
Party upon written notice to the other Party at least 
six months prior to its expiration. 

Done at Bucharest, in duplicate, the day of 
December 13, 1974, in the English and Romanian 
languages, both equally authentic. 

For the Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica: 

Harry G. Barnes, Jr. 

For the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania: 

Vasile Gliga 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratification deposited: Poland (with a reserva- 
tion), January 28, 1975. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 
1972.' 

Accessions deposited: German Democratic Repub- 
lic (with declarations), October 4, 1974; New 
Zealand, December 20, 1974.= 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment of article VII of the convention on 
facilitation of international maritime traflSc, 1965 
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 
1973.' 
Acceptances deposited: Canada, December 19, 

1974; France (with a declaration), December 12, 

1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 
24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 
Accession deposited: Iceland, December 18, 1974. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Accession deposited: Thailand, January 9, 1975. 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971." 



' Not in force. 

■ Not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, and the 

Tokelau Islands. 



234 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ratification deposited: Poland (with resei-va- 

tions), January 3, 1975. 
Accession deposited : Iceland, December 18, 1974. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended. Done at 
London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 
26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. 
TIAS 4900, 6109. 

Acceptance deposited: Malta, January 10, 1975. 
International convention relating to inter%'ention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (with a declaration), December 30, 

1974. 

Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. 
Done at London November 2, 1973.' 
Signatures: Australia (with a declaration), De- 
cember 24, 1974; Brazil, December 12, 1974;' 
Ireland,' Netherlands,- December 30, 1974. 
Protocol relating to inten'ention on the high seas 
in cases of marine pollution by substances other 
than oil. Done at London November 2, 1971.' 
Signatures: Netherlands, December 30, 1974; 
New Zealand, December 23, 1974;- Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, December 30, 1974; 
United Kingdom, December 19, 1974. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratification deposited: Monaco, December 3, 1974. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done 
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into 
force October 4, 1967; for the United States 
November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Zaire, Januai-y 13, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974. Done at London November 1, 1974.' 
Signatures: Belgium, December 17, 1914;' Pol- 
and, January 10, 1975.' 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975. Enters into force on deposit 
of the fifth instrument of ratification. 
Signatures : France, January 14, 1975; United 
States, January 24, 1975. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 



Signatures: Australia, Italy, December 30, 1974; 
Romania (with a reservation), December 27, 
1974. 

Trade 

Protocol for the accession of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh to the general agreement on tariffs 
and trade, with annex. Done at Geneva November 
7, 1972. Entered into force December 16, 1972. 
TIAS 7552. 
Acceptance deposited: Pakistan, January 17, 1975. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, 
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 27, 

1975. 
Accession deposited: Nigeria, January 28, 1975. 

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid con- 
vention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, 
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 27, 
1975. 



BILATERAL 

Bulgaria 

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and 
exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 
1974.' 
Ratified bij the President: January 28, 1975. 

Republic of China 

Agreement extending the agreement of January 23, 
1969, relating to cooperation in science and tech- 
nology. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei 
January 21, 1975. Entered into force January 23, 
1975. 

Malta 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 14, 
1967, as extended, relating to trade in cotton 
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Valletta 
December 27, 1974. Entered into force December 
27, 1974. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267, 
6659, 6861), for cooperation on the uses of atomic 
energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at 
Washington July 22, 1974. 
Entered into force: January 27, 1975. 



' Not in force. 

- Not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, and 
the Tokelau Islands. 
^ Subject to ratification. 



February 17, 1975 



235 



PUBLICATIONS 



First "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on China for 1949 Released 

Press release 29 dated January 24 (for release January 31) 

The Department of State released on January 
31 volume IX in the series "Foreign Relations of 
the United States" for the year 1949. This volume 
is entitled "The Far East: China" and is one of two 
dealing with China for that year. The companion 
volume (VIII) is to be published subsequently. 

The 1,441 pages of previously unpublished docu- 
mentation contained in this volume set forth U.S. 
policy in a variety of important topics including the 
question of recognition of the new regime in main- 
land China, policy toward Taiwan, military and 
economic assistance to the Republic of China, finan- 
cial and trade policy, the status of Tibet, and 
evacuation of Americans from the mainland. Docu- 
ments are also included on the preparation and 
publication in August 1949 of "United States Rela- 
tions With China" (also known as "the China White 
Paper"). The political and militai-y situation in 
China and the status of U.S. diplomatic missions on 
the mainland will be covered in volume VIII. 

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office, 
Bureau of Public Afl^airs. Copies of Volume IX 
(Department of State publication 8774; GPO cat. 
no. Sl.l:949/v. IX) may be obtained for $14.75 (do- 
mestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should 
be made out to "Superintendent of Documents" and 
should be sent to the U.S. Government Bookstore, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20i02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Bel- 
gium amending annex B to the agreement of Janu- 
ary 27, 1950. TIAS 7866. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
7866). 



Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft 
Products and Components. Agreement with the 
Netherlands. TIAS 7869. 9 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. S9. 
10:7869). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Republic 
of Korea. TIAS 7871. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
7871). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Ethiopia. 
TIAS 7872. 3 pp. 250. (Cat. No. 89.10:7872). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of September 10, 1973, as 
amended. TIAS 7874. 3 pp. 30<*. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
7874). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Philip- 
pines. TIAS 7875. 3 pp. 30c. (Cat. No. S9.10:7875). 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Jan. 27-Feb. 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 27 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
547 of December 26, 23 of January 21, and 27 
and 29 of January 24. 

No. Date Subject 

30 1/27 Notice of time for filing claims 
against Syria by U.S. nationals. 

*31 1/27 Advisory Committee on the Law 
of the Sea, Mar. 1. 

t32 1/27 U.S. -France Cooperative Science 
Program meeting. 

*33 1/28 U.S.-Malta textile agreement ex- 
tended. 

*34 1/28 Program for the official visit of the 
Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, Harold Wilson, Jan. 
29-Feb. 1. 

35 1/28 Kissinger: news conference. 

36 1/29 Johnson: interview for Eurovision. 
*37 1/29 Ray sworn in as Assistant Secre- 
tary for Oceans and Environ- 
mental and Scientific AflFairs 
(biographic data). 

*38 1/29 National Review Board for the 
Center for Cultural and Techni- 
cal Interchange between East 
and West, Honolulu, Mar. 17-18. 

*39 1/31 Todman sworn in as Ambassador 
to Costa Rica (biographic data). 

*40 1/31 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and Cul- 
tural Afl'airs, Feb. 25. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



236 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 17, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1860 



Asia. A New National Partnership (Kis- 
singer) 197 

Claims. Notice of Time for Filing Claims 

Against Syria by U.S. Nationals .... 228 

Congress 

A New National Partnership (Kissinger) . . 197 
President Ford Requests Additional Funds for 
Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia 

(message to the Congress) 229 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
January 28 205 

Disarmament. Ambassador Johnson Discusses 
Prospects for S.A.LT Talks (transcript of 
interview) 224 

Economic Affairs 

A New National Partnership (Kissinger) . . 197 

President Vetoes Bill To Provide Nontariff 
Barrier on Filberts (memorandum of dis- 
approval) 228 

The Trade .\ct and Latin America (Depart- 
ment memorandum) 215 

U.S. -India Economic and Commercial Subcom- 
mission Meets at Washington (joint com- 
munique) 227 

U.S. Regrets Postponement of Buenos Aires 

Meeting (Department statement) .... 214 

i Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and 
Romania Sign Five-Year Agreement on Ex- 
changes (Department announcement, text 
of agreement) 232 

Energy. A New National Partnership (Kis- 
singer) 197 

Europe 

A New National Partnership (Kissinger) . . 197 
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
January 28 205 

Food. A New National Partnership (Kis- 
singer) 197 

India. U.S. -India Economic and Commercial 
Subcommission Meets at Washington (joint 
communique) 227 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia). President Ford 
Requests Additional Funds for Assistance 
to Viet-Nam and Cambodia (message to 
the Congress) 229 

Latin America 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
January 28 205 

The Trade Act and Latin America (Depart- 
ment memorandum) 215 

U.S. Regrets Postponement of Buenos Aires 

Meeting (Department statement) .... 214 

Middle East. "A Conversation With President 
Ford" — An Interview for NBC Television 
and Radio (excerpt) 219 



Petroleum. Proclamation Raising Import Fees 
for Oil and Oil Products Signed (remarks 
by President Ford) 224 

Presidential Documents 

"A Conversation With President Ford" — An 
Interview for NBC Television and Radio 
(excerpt) 219 

President Ford Requests Additional Funds for 

Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia . . 229 

President Vetoes Bill To Provide Nontariff 

Barrier on Filberts 228 

Proclamation Raising Import Fees for Oil and 

Oil Products Signed 224 

Publications 

GPO Sales Publications 236 

First "Foreign Relations" Volume on China 
for 1949 Released 236 

Romania. U.S. and Romania Sign Five-Year 
Agreement on Exchanges (Department an- 
nouncement, text of agreement) .... 232 

Space. Outer Space Registration Convention 

Signed by United States (Scali) .... 232 

Syria. Notice of Time for Filing Claims 

Against Syria by U.S. Nationals .... 228 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 234 

Outer Space Registration Convention Signed 

by United States (Scali) 232 

U.S. and Romania Sign Five-Year Agreement 
on Exchanges (Department announcement, 
text of agreement) 232 

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of January 28 205 

U.S.S.R. 

Ambassador Johnson Discusses Prospects for 

SALT Talks (transcript of interview) . . 224 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
January 28 205 

Viet-Nam 

"A Conversation With President Ford" — An 
Inten'iew for NBC Television and Radio 
(excerpt) 219 

President Ford Requests Additional Funds 
for Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia 
(message to the Congress) 229 

Secretary Kissinger's News (Conference of 
January 28 205 



Name Index 

Ford, President 219, 224, 228, 229 

Johnson, U. Alexis 224 

Kissinger, Secretary 197, 205 

Scali, John 232 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXII 



No. 1861 



February 24, 1975 



ENERGY : THE NECESSITY OF DECISION 

Address by Secretary Kissinger and Questions and Answers 

Before the National Press Club 237 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION 

FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Habib 255 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET! 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1861 
February 24, 1975 



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The Department of State BULLE% 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public all 
interested agencies of the governmei 
with information on developments i 
the field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department an 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETtN includes selectt 
press releases on foreign policy, issue 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresse- 
and news conferences of the Presidet 
and the Secretary of State and othi 
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special articles on various phases ij 
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included concerning treaties and intei 
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United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intet 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department o 
State, United Nations documents, am. 
legislative material in the field a 
international relations are also listei 



Energy: The Necessity of Decision 



ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to speak to 
you on the question of energy. 

The subject is timely, for this week marks 
an important moment in both our national 
and international response to the energy 
crisis. 

On Wednesday, the Governing Board of 
the International Energy Agency (lEA) 
convenes in Paris for its monthly meeting. 
This organization, which grew out of the 
Washington Energy Conference, represents 
one of the major success stories of coopera- 
tion among the industrialized democracies 
in the past decade. In recent months it has 
begun to mobilize and coordinate the efforts 
of the industrial democracies in energy con- 
servation, research, and development of new 
energy sources. The lEA already has put in 
place many of the building blocks of a co- 
ordinated energy policy. At the forthcoming 
meeting, the United States will advance 
comprehensive proposals for collective ac- 
tion, with special emphasis on the develop- 
ment of new energy sources and the prepa- 
ration of a consumer position for the forth- 
coming dialogue with the producers. 

Equally important, we are now engaged 
in a vital national debate on the purposes 
and requirements of our national energy 
program. Critical decisions will soon be made 
by the Congress, decisions that will vitally 
affect other nations as well as ourselves. 

The international and national dimensions 
of the energy crisis are crucially linked. 
What happens with respect to international 
energy policy will have a fundamental effect 



^ Made before the National Press Club at Washing- 
ton on Feb. 3; as prepared for delivery (text from 
press release 42). 



on the economic health of this nation. And 
the international economic and energy crisis 
cannot be solved without purposeful action 
and leadership by the United States. Domes- 
tic and international programs are inex- 
tricably linked. 

The energy crisis burst upon our con- 
sciousness because of sudden, unsuspected 
events. But its elements have been develop- 
ing gradually for the better part of two 
decades. 

In 1950, the United States was virtually 
self-sufficient in oil. In 1960, our reliance on 
foreign oil had grown to 16 percent of our 
requirements. In 1973, it had reached 35 
percent. If this trend is allowed to continue, 
the 1980's will see us dependent on imported 
oil for fully half of our needs. The impact 
on our lives will be revolutionary. 

This slow but inexorable march toward 
dependency was suddenly intensified in 1973 
by an oil embargo and price increases of 400 
percent in less than a single year. These ac- 
tions — largely the result of political deci- 
sions — created an immediate economic crisis, 
both in this country and around the 
world. A reduction of only 10 percent of 
the imported oil, and lasting less than half 
a year, cost Americans half a million jobs 
and over 1 percent of national output; it 
added at least 5 percentage points to the 
price index, contributing to our worst in- 
flation since World War II; it set the stage 
for a serious recession; and it expanded the 
oil income of the OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations 
from $23 billion in 1973 to a current annual 
rate of $110 billion, thereby effecting one of 
the greatest and most sudden transfers of 
wealth in history. 

The impact on other countries much more 



February 24, 1975 



237 



dependent on oil impoi'ts has been corre- 
spondingly greater. In all industrial coun- 
tries, economic and political difficulties that 
had already reached the margin of the abil- 
ity of governments to manage have threat- 
ened to get out of control. 

Have we learned nothing from the past 
year? If we permit our oil consumption to 
grow without restraint, the vulnerability of 
our economy to external disruptions will be 
grossly magnified. And this vulnerability 
will increase with every passing year. Unless 
strong corrective steps are taken, a future 
embargo would have a devastating impact 
on American jobs and production. More than 
10 percent of national employment and out- 
put, as well as a central element of the price 
structure of the American economy, would 
be subject to external decisions over which 
our national policy can have little influence. 

As we learned grimly in the 1920's and 
1930's, profound political consequences in- 
evitably flow from massive economic disloca- 
tions. Economic distress fuels social and 
political turmoil; it erodes the confidence of 
the people in democratic government and the 
confidence of nations in international har- 
mony. It is fei'tile ground for conflict, both 
domestic and international. 

The situation is not yet so grave. But it 
threatens to become so. The entire indus- 
trialized world faces at the same time a 
major crisis of the economy, of the body 
politic, and of the moral fiber. We and our 
partners are being tested — not only to show 
our technical mastery of the problems of 
energy but, even more important, to show if 
we can act with foresight to regain control 
of our future. 

For underlying all difficulties, and com- 
pounding them, is a crisis of the spirit — the 
despair of men and nations that they have 
lost control over their destiny. Forces seem 
loose beyond the power of government and 
society to manage. 

In a sense we in America are fortunate 
that political decisions brought the energy 
problem to a head before economic trends 
had made our vulnerability irreversible. 
Had we continued to drift, we would even- 
tually have found ourselves swept up by 



forces much more awesome than those we 
face today. 

As it is, the energy crisis is still soluble. 
Of all nations, the United States is most 
aff'ected by the sudden shift from near self- 
sufficiency to severe dependence on imported 
energy. But it is also in the best position to 
meet the challenge. A major eff"ort now — of 
conservation, of technological innovation, of 
international collaboration — can shape a 
diff'erent future for us and for the other 
countries of the world. A demonstration of 
American resolve now will have a decisive 
efi'ect in leading other industrial nations to 
work together to reverse present trends to- 
ward dependency. Today's apparently per- 
vasive crisis can in retrospect prove to have 
been the beginning of a new period of cre- 
ativity and cooperation. 

One of our highest national priorities 
must be to reduce our vulnerability to sup- 
ply interruption and price manipulation. But 
no one country can solve the problem alone. 
Unless we pool our risks and fortify the 
international financial system, balance-of- 
payments crises will leave all economies ex- 
posed to financial disruption. Unless all con- 
suming nations act in parallel to reduce 
energy consumption through conservation 
and to develop new sources of supply, the 
eff'orts of any one nation will prove futile, 
the price structure of oil will not be re- 
formed, and the collective economic burden 
will grow. And unless consumers concert 
their views, the dialogue with the producers 
will not prove fruitful. 

The actions which the United States takes 
now are central to any hope for a global solu- 
tion. The volume of our consumption, and its 
potential growth, are so great that a deter- 
mined national conservation program is es- 
sential. Without the application of American 
technology and American enterprise, the 
rapid development of significant new sup- 
plies and alternative sources of energy will 
be impossible. 

There is no escape. The producers may 
find it in their interest to ease temporarily 
our burdens. But the price will be greater 
dependence and greater agony a few years 
from now. Either we tackle our challenge 



238 



Department of State Bulletin 



immediately, or we will confront it again and 
again in increasingly unfavorable circum- 
stances in the years to come. If it is not dealt 
with by this Administration, an even worse 
crisis will be faced by the next — and with 
even more anguishing choices. 

History has given us a great opportunity 
disguised as a crisis. A determined energy 
policy will not only ease immediate diffi- 
culties, it will help restore the international 
economy, the vitality of all the major indus- 
trial democracies, and the hopes of mankind 
for a just and prosperous world. 



The Strategy of Energy Cooperation 

We and our partners in the International 
Energy Agency have been, for a year, pursu- 
ing strategy in three phases: 

— The first phase is to protect against 
emergencies. We must be prepared to deter 
the use of oil or petrodollars as political 
weapons, and if that fails, we must have put 
ourselves in the best possible defensive posi- 
tion. To do this, we have established emer- 
gency sharing programs to cope with new 
embargoes and created new mechanisms to 
protect our financial institutions against dis- 
ruption. This stage of our common strategy 
is well on the way to accomplishment. 

— The second phase is to transform the 
market conditions for OPEC oil. If we act 
decisively to reduce our consumption of im- 
ported oil and develop alternative sources, 
pressure on prices will increase. Measures 
to achieve this objective are now before the 
International Energy Agency or national 
parliaments; we expect to reach important 
agreements on them before the end of 
March. 

— Once the consumer nations have taken 
these essential steps to reduce their vulner- 
ability, we will move to the third stage of 
our strategy: to meet with the producers to 
discuss an equitable price, market structure, 
and long-term economic relationship. Assum- 
ing the building blocks of consumer solidar- 
ity are in place, we look toward a prepara- 
tory meeting for a producer-consumer con- 
ference before the end of March. 



Our actions in all these areas are inter- 
related. It is not possible to pick and choose; 
since they are mutually reinforcing, they are 
essential to each other. No emergency pro- 
gram can avail if each year the collective 
dependence on OPEC oil increases. New 
sources of energy, however vast the invest- 
ment program, will be ineffective unless 
strict measures are taken to halt the run- 
away, wasteful growth in consumption. Un- 
less the industrial nations demonstrate the 
political will to act effectively in all areas, 
the producers will be further tempted to 
take advantage of our vulnerability. 

In recent months we and our partners 
have taken important steps to implement 
our overall strategy. Two safety nets against 
emergencies have been put in place. In 
November, the lEA established an unprece- 
dented plan for mutual assistance in the 
event of a new embargo. Each participating 
nation is committed to build an emergency 
stock of oil. In case of embargo, each nation 
will cut its consumption by the same per- 
centage, and available oil will be shared. An 
embargo against one will become an embargo 
against all. 

And in January, the major industrial na- 
tions decided to create a $25 billion solidar- 
ity fund for mutual support in financial 
crises — less than two months after it was 
first proposed by the United States. This 
mutual insurance fund will furnish loans and 
guarantees to those hardest hit by payments 
deficits, thus safeguarding the international 
economy against shifts, withdrawals, or cut- 
offs of funds by the producers. 

The next steps should be to accelerate our 
efforts in the conservation and development 
of new energy sources. Action in these areas, 
taken collectively, will exert powerful pres- 
sures on the inflated price. No cartel is so 
insulated from economic conditions that its 
price structure is invulnerable to a trans- 
formation of the market. Because of the 
reduced consumption in the past year, OPEC 
has already shut down a fourth of its capac- 
ity, equaling 9 million barrels a day, in order 
to keep the price constant. New oil explora- 
tion, accelerated by the fivefold-higher price, 
is constantly discovering vast new reserves 



February 24, 1975 



239 



outside of OPEC. The $10 billion in new 
energy research in the United States — on 
the scale of the Manhattan project and the 
moon-landing program — is certain to pro- 
duce new breakthroughs sooner or later. 

As the industrialized nations reduce con- 
sumption and increase their supply, it will 
become increasingly difficult for OPEC to 
allocate the further production cuts that will 
be required among its members. Even now, 
some OPEC members are shaving prices to 
keep up their revenue and their share of the 
market. Indeed, it is not too soon in this 
decade of energy shortages to plan for the 
possibility of energy surpluses in the 1980's. 

The strategy we have been pursuing with 
our partners since the Washington Energy 
Conference has linked our domestic and 
international energy policies into a coherent 
whole. We have made remarkable progress, 
but much remains to be done. The question 
now is whether the industrialized countries 
have the will to sustain and reinforce these 
promising initiatives. Conservation and the 
development of new sources of energy are 
the next priorities on our common agenda. 

Conservation 

Unconstrained consumption of cheap oil is 
the principal cause of the present vulner- 
ability of the industrial countries. Neither 
the United States nor other consumers can 
possibly reduce their dependence on imports 
until they reverse the normal— which is to 
say wasteful — growth of consumption. 

There is simply no substitute for conser- 
vation. Alternative energy supplies will not 
be available for five or ten years. In the next 
few years conservation, and only conserva- 
tion, will enable us both to absorb the pres- 
ent burden of high energy costs and to begin 
to restore the balance of consumer-producer 
relations. 

Only a determined program of conserva- 
tion can demonstrate that we and our part- 
ners have the will to resist pressures. If the 
industrialized nations are unwilling to make 
the relatively minor sacrifices involved in 
conservation, then the credibility of all our 



other eff'orts and defensive measures is 
called into question. 

Some say we face a choice between con- 
servation and restoring economic growth. 
The contrary is true. Only by overcoming 
exorbitant international energy costs can we 
achieve reliable long-term growth. If we 
doom ourselves to 50 percent dependence on 
imported energy, with the supply and price 
of a central element of our economy subject 
to external manipulation, there is no way 
we can be sure of restoring and sustaining 
our jobs and growth. These decisions will 
depend on foreign countries for whom our 
prosperity is not necessarily a compelling 
objective. 

To be sure, conservation — by any method 
— will have an economic cost. The restructur- 
ing away from production and consumption 
of energy-intensive goods which it entails 
incurs shortrun dislocations. At a time of 
recession, this must concern us. Yet these 
costs are small compared to what will be ex- 
acted from us if we do not act. Without con- 
servation, we will perpetuate the vulnerabil- 
ity of our economy and our national policy. 
And we will perpetuate as well the excessive 
international energy prices which are at the 
heart of the problem. 

At present, the United States — in the 
midst of recession — is importing 6.7 million 
barrels of oil a day. When our economy re- 
turns to full capacity that figure will rise; 
by 1977, it will be 8 or 9 million barrels a 
day in the absence of conservation. Imports 
will continue to grow thereafter. Even with 
new production in Alaska and the outer 
continental shelf, this import gap will re- 
main if we do not reduce consumption signifi- 
cantly and rapidly. 

With these prospects in mind. President 
Ford has set the goal of saving a million 
barrels a day of imports by the end of this 
year and 2 million by 1977. That amounts to 
the increase in dependence that would occur 
as the economy expands again, in the ab- 
sence of a conservation program. 

Our conservation efforts will be powerfully 
reinforced by the actions of our lEA part- 
ners and of other interested countries such 



240 



Department of State Bulletin 



as France. Their collective oil consumption 
equals ours, and they are prepared to join 
with us in a concerted program of conserva- 
tion ; indeed, some of them have already 
instituted their own conservation measures. 
But any one country's efforts will be nulli- 
fied unless they are complemented by other 
consumers. This is why the United States 
has proposed to its lEA partners that they 
match our respective conservation targets. 
Together we can save 2 million barrels a day 
this year and at least 4 million barrels in 
1977. 

If these goals are reached, under current 
economic conditions OPEC will have to re