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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1854

January 6, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE
AT BRUSSELS 1

U.S. ABSTAINS ON PROPOSED OAS RESOLUTION
TO RESCIND THE SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 8

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM:

ADJUSTING TO PRESENT-DAY REALITIES

Address by Ambassador William S. Mailliard 19

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1854
January 6, 1975

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The Department of State BULLETIN
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Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels

Following is the transcript of a news con-
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at Brus-
sels on December 13 at the conclusion of the
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council.

Press release 530 dated December 13

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle-
men, let me simply say that I thought this
was a most useful, very amicable meeting.
The new format of restricted sessions makes
for a better dialogue and less formal state-
ments. I recognize it also makes for more
erratic briefings, since not all delegations
interpret the restrictions in a similar man-
ner; and we will sort that out by the next
NATO meeting. So, for those of you who have
suffered from an excessive scrupulousness
by our spokesman, my apologies.

Let me take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a lot of confusion
on this side of the Atlantic about a very im-
portant matter which bears on what you
discussed here, which is — exactly what is the
American policy now with regard to the price
of oil? I refer, of course, to the reports on
the Enders [_Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business Af-
fairs] statement at Yale?

Secretary Kissinger: My colleague Enders
makes so many statements that when you say
"at Yale" you imply that this is a very clearly
circumscribed event. The American policy on
the price of oil is that we believe that the
present oil prices are too high and that, for
the sake of the stability and progress of the
world economy, it should be reduced and that
this is also in the long-term interest of the
producers.

In the absence of these price reductions, it
is our policy that the consuming nations

should improve their cooperation in order
to withstand the impact of these high prices
and also to provide incentives for an ulti-
mate reduction of prices. One of these efforts
to mitigate the impact of high oil prices is to
develop alternative sources of energy, and
there have been some studies on whether an
incentive should be created for these al-
ternative sources of energy by creating a
floor price so that if the price of oil sinks be-
low that of the alternative sources of energy,
there won't be massive economic dislocation.
But at this point, this is a subject of study
and consideration. It is not a governmental
decision, and as I said, I think my colleague
Enders was speaking in an academic environ-
ment academically.

Q. Concerning the energy problem, Mr.
Secretary, do you think that there is any con-
tradiction between the way the United States
wants to start cooperation and the French
ivay; and after your meeting with Mr. Saw-
vagnargucs [Jean Sauvagnargties, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic] ,
do you think that agreement can be reached
on the problem between both President Ford
and Giscard d'Estaing in Martinique?

Secretary Kissinger: We are approaching
the meeting in Martinique with the attitude
of intending to find a solution to the differ-
ences that may exist. In principle, we do not
believe that there is a contradiction ; in fact,
we believe that consumer cooperation is the
prerequisite to producer dialogue, because
otherwise the consumer-producer dialogue is
going to turn into a repetition on multi-
lateral basis of the bilateral dialogues that
are already going on.

So we believe that solution is possible and
that the two approaches, which are not con-
tradictory, can be reconciled; and I would

January 6, 1975

like to point out that at the Washington
Energy Conference last year [February
1974] the United States proposed that con-
sumer cooperation should be followed by con-
sumer-producer dialogue. In short, we are
going to Martinique with the attitude that a
solution is possible in the common interest
of all of the consumers and, ultimately, in
the common interest of both consumers and
producers.

Q. I would like to know [after] the Atlan-
tic Council, if you [feel] that there are yet
major differences to overcome in the oil
strategy, and second, if you are concerned
about the present status of the alliance in the
Mediterranean and if you ask of your allies
an extra effort in this area?

Secretary Kissinger: On oil strategy, I
think there is agreement — or I had the im-
pression that there is agreement — about the
sequence of moves that should be undertaken.
Whether the definition of what constitutes
consumer cooperation is as yet homogeneous,
I am not sure; but we will try to work that
out in Martinique. We certainly do not be-
lieve that the consumers should exhaust their
energy in disputes among themselves. We are
going to Martinique vi^ith a positive attitude
and with the intention of finding a solution
to the problem of the sequence, which I think
will be relatively easy, and the definition of
consumer cooperation, which we believe to
be possible.

With respect to the Mediterranean, this is
of course an area of concern. It was dis-
cussed in the NATO Council, and I do not
think that there were significant diiferences
of opinion.

Q. We heard that in the ministerial meet-
ing you mentioned to your colleagues that
you are pessimistic regarding a peaceful
settlement in the Middle East. Is it because
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or is it because
of the oil crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: It is totally untrue.
I did not express pessimism about the possi-
bility of a peaceful settlement. My sentence
structure is so complicated that my colleagues
sometimes miss the end of the sentence and

concentrate on the beginning [laughter] . So
I would like to make absolutely clear that
I am not pessimistic about the possibility of
a peaceful settlement. The United States is
making a major effort to produce progress
toward a peaceful settlement, and I am not
at all pessimistic about it. Quite the contrary.

Q. Can you put an end to these rumors
that there is an American special army which
is training now to occtipy Arab oilfields as
one of your ivays to get —

Secretary Kissinger: There is no American
army that is being trained to take over Arab
oilfields.

Q. Do you see any hope of further politi-
cal progress in the Middle East before Brezh-
nev's visit to Cairo?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
cannot make its actions dependent on the
travels of the General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, and there-
fore we will do our best to make progress as
rapidly as possible. As you know, I have had
talks with the Foreign Minister of Israel,
and I expect to see him again in January, but
we are not following a timetable which is
dictated by the travels of Mr. Brezhnev nor,
may I say, have we been asked by any Arab
government to gear our actions to the trav-
els of Mr. Brezhnev.

Q. / understand that the major part of the
discussions held here this week dealt with
questions of defense. What part of the Coun-
cil time was devoted to the humanitarian
problem of alleviating the suffering of
200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who are
spending the winter in tents ?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, I have
spent personally a great deal of time with
the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey,
seeing each of them several times each day
with the intention of narrowing the differ-
ences and finding an acceptable basis for ne-
gotiation. I did this because ultimately the
alleviation of the suffering of the refugees
in Cyprus, with which the U.S. Government
is profoundly concerned, can best be achieved
through a political solution of the Cyprus

Department of State Bulletin

problem. While I do not want to make any
comments about these conversations, I am
more hopeful than I was before I arrived
that progress is possible and may become
visible as events unfold.

In addition to this, the U.S. Government
is profoundly concerned with the fate of the
refugees and will in the interlude between
now and a political settlement do its utmost
to ease their plight. Morever, the U.S. Gov-
ernment is prepared to use its influence with
the parties to bring about a settlement which
is just and equitable.

As far as the NATO meeting itself is con-
cerned, it was thought best not to turn it
into a confrontation, and I must say the
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey both
spoke with restraint and wisdom and in a
manner which I think contributed to the
hopes for a peaceful solution which we all
share, and which may have been brought
somewhat closer.

Q. Do you think that your talks with the
two Ministers contributed to moderation be-
tween the tivo countries and that after your
talks with them that the intercommunal
talks in Cyprus will start soon?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that with re-
spect to the intercommunal talks that any
announcement with respect to that would
have to come from Nicosia. And this is a
matter for the two communities to decide
and not for the American Secretary of State
to determine or to announce. It is my im-
pression that the talks — I don't know wheth-
er the talks contributed to an atmosphere of
moderation or could build on an existing at-
mosphere of moderation. As I said, I am
more hopeful than I was when I came here
that progress can be made.

Q. I am a little puzzled by your expression
of hope. A senior American official said ear-
lier that very little could come out of these
discussions in view of the American Con-
gress' action to cut off aid to Turkey. Doesn't
that still pertain?

Secretary Kissinger: That still pertains to
the substance of the talks. The question con-
cerns procedures. I believe that conditions

exist for progress and negotiations. I also
believe that the actions of the American
Congress, if they are maintained, will impede
this progress. I have said so repeatedly.

Q. What are your views on the anxiety of
Mr. Brezhnev for the European summit —
for the summit of the European Security
Conference — and the recent talks iyi France
tvhere France in some way endorsed the
European Security Conference summit next
year in Helsinki?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
has maintained the position, which it adopted
together with its other allies, that the deci-
sion on whether there should be a summit
should await the determination of the results
of the second stage of the conference. This
has been the American position and it re-
mains the American position, and it is that
if the results justify it we are prepared to go
to a summit, and there has been no change
in our position. I can't interpret the Franco-
Soviet communique because it has been ex-
plained to me that there are subtleties in the
French language that are untranslatable into
English [laughter]. If that is so, it may be
that they follow the same principles that I
have just announced.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your conversation
ivith the Greek and Turkish Ministers, you
are a little bit encouraged. Do you have the
impression that a solution can be achieved
if you could, for example, make a tnp to
Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia?

Secretary Kissinger: None of you will ever
know whether I understand French or not
[laughter], but it is not necessary for my
answer [laughter]. I would like to repeat
what I said in reply to Mr. Freed [Kenneth
J. Freed, Associated Press]. Whether sub-
stantive progress can be made depends in
part on certain domestic legislative issues
that are yet to be resolved in the United
States. I would also like to emphasize again
what I have said repeatedly — that the United
States supports aid for Turkey not in order
to take sides in the Greek-Turkish dispute
and not as a favor to Turkey, but because it
believes it is essential for the security of the

January 6, 1975

West. Now, if I understood the question cor-
rectly— whether it involves travels to An-
kara, Athens, and Nicosia — we believe that
the major problem is to get the talks started.
And once the talks are started with the right
attitude, the United States will be prepared
to do what the parties request to accelerate
them and to help them along. But I think we
cannot determine this until the talks have
been started. But I hope that progress can
be made, and fairly soon.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you speak French with-
out subtlety. Very simply, it seems that some
time ago you were very concerned about the
internal Italian political situation. Are you
still so concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that
I have stated any public views on the interior
situation of Italy. It is always complicated
and always seems to get solved, and I think
that I have so much difficulty conducting
foreign policy that I don't want to get in-
volved in the domestic politics of the country
that produced Machiavelli [laughter] .

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were
not familiar with the subtleties of the French
language, but I heard yesterday that you
asked Mr. Sauvagnargues for his interpreta-
tion of the paragraph of the Rambouillet
communique on the European Security Con-
ference. Mr. Sauvagnargiies gave it to you.
He said that it had the same meaning as the
Vladivostok communique, and you said that
you did not agree. Is this true ?

Secretary Kissinger: I think as a matter
of principle we should not begin the practice
of restricted sessions by then discussing what
went on in restricted session. If, as I pointed
out before, the communique from Rambouil-
let has the same meaning as the communique
in Vladivostok, then, of course, we agree with
it [laughter]. If it has a different meaning,
then we would obviously have that degree
of disagreement with it, since only two weeks
before we found another formulation better.
But I am willing to accept the French state-
ment that it has exactly the same meaning.

Q. You are the representative of the most
powerful and the richest nation in the world.
You therefore have an enormous influence
to which is added your own well-known per-
sonal dynamism. Hoivever, a number of coun-
tries ayid people are concerned because your
poiver gives you the appearance of an ele-
phayit. When an elephant turns around, he
sometimes does damage — even when making
a gesture of friendship. What are you doing
personally, Mr. Kissinger, to see to it that
the elephant retains his goodness but is not
too heavy when he leans in a certain direc-
tion [laughter] ?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that this is a
serious question actually, and it is a problem
that the United States, because of its scale,
can produce consequences with the best of
intentions that are out of scale for some of
its allies and partners. Now, knowing the
problem doesn't necessarily mean that you
know how to solve it, and as I pointed out
yesterday to some of my colleagues, in the
economic field, for example, we are prepared
to discuss with our friends our long-term in-
tentions and to hear their views before we
make any irrevocable decisions. And the best
solution we have is, one, that we should be
aware of the problem, and secondly, that we
should have intensive consultations with our
allies in more fields than has been customary
to give them an opportunity to learn our
views and to give us an opportunity to learn
their concerns. I know the word "consulta-
tion" is one of these that produces linguis-
tic difficulties, and we are happy to call it
by some other name if it helps matters.

Q. [Can you say what you feel will be the
impact of] the economic recession and high
oil prices on the NATO military alliance?
Either now or in the future?

Secretary Kissinger: Some of these ac-
counts have an even greater sense of the dra-
matic than the officials'. The basic issue is
that in the twenties and thirties the problem
of the industrialized countries was depres-
sion. Gradually a theory was developed, the

Department of State Bulletin

Keynesian theory, which was a means of
overcoming depressions, and when it was
applied on a sufficiently massive scale, it
worked. The problem of the industrialized
world since the war has been inflation — and
inflation that sometimes continues even dur-
ing periods of recession. This is an inherent
problem of all Western societies for which
no adequate theory exists ; and therefore now
under the impact of high oil prices, of con-
current inflation and potential recession, it
is necessary to take decisive action to main-
tain both the economic stability and progress
and the political stability of these countries.
This is a well-known fact, and of course if it
isn't mastered, political instability will grow,
and therefore it is bound to affect defense.
This is a problem with which I believe
all my colleagues agreed, and some of whom
stated it much more eloquently than I did,
and in which I had the impression that all
the delegations agreed to work with great
seriousness even in the absence of the ade-
quate conception of how to approach it.

Q. Can we go back to the Turkish question?
You said before leaviyig Washington that a
cutoff in military aid to Turkey might under-
mine your talks on the Cyprus question. You
have now had three days of talks with the
Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. Would
you now say in fact that it did undermine
your conversations?

Secretary Kissinger: I maintain two points
which I think it is important to keep in mind.
I cannot repeat them often enough.

American aid to Turkey is not given as a
favor to Turkey. It is given for the common
defense of the West. And when we start
stopping aid to affect immediate tactical is-
sues, we will over a period of time under-
mine the cohesion of the alliance — the se-
curity of the West — and create a totally
wrong impression of the nature of our mili-
tary aid. I therefore believe it is one of the
most dangerous things that has been done.

Secondly, with respect to the talks — the
talks as they have been now have not yet
been undermined by it. If the aid is discon-

tinued, however, progress is extremely un-
likely. Therefore we have held the talks up
to now in the context of a situation in which
progress can be made. It is my judgment that
this progress will become very difficult if the
aid is discontinued.

Let me just make one other point. I'm not
saying this in order to back Turkey against
Greece. I stated on Saturday in Washington
that the United States believes that concilia-
tion on the part of Turkey is very important
and that it will support a solution which is
fair to all sides, and that was the spirit with
which I talked to both Foreign Ministers.

Q. Do yoii think that after this Ministerial
Coxincil meeting NATO will remain more
united and coherent?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this meeting
was probably the best that I've attended as
Secretary of State. Probably because the for-
mat of the restricted meeting and the absence
of formal speeches and a freer give-and-
take permitted a discussion of the more es-
sential issues, and secondly, because I have
the impression that the Foreign Ministers of
the alliance understand the fundamental is-
sues that confront the West and acted in a
cooperative and constructive spirit, and there
were no significant divisions.

North Atlantic Ministerial Council
Meets at Brussels

Following is the text of a communique is-
sued on December 13 at the conclusion of the
regular ministerial meeting of the North
Atlantic Council at Brussels.

Press release 632 dated December 16

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Min-
isterial session in Brussels on 12th and 13th
December, 1974. At the close of the year
which marked the 25th Anniversary of the
Alliance, Ministers noted with satisfaction
that member countries remain firmly com-
mitted to the Alliance and that this had

January 6, 1975

found solemn expression in the Ottawa Dec-
laration.

2. Ministers reviewed developments in
East-West relations. They noted the progress,
albeit uneven, towards detente over the past
six months. They stated their readiness to
continue their efforts to make progress in
their negotiations and exchanges with the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries
aimed at steady improvement in East-West
relations. Noting, however, the increase in
the military strength of the Warsaw Pact
countries, and bearing in mind that security
is the prerequisite for the policy of detente,
they expressed their determination to main-
tain their own defensive military strength.

3. Ministers had a broad discussion on the
implications of the current economic situa-
tion for the maintenance of Alliance defense
and noted the efforts made at both the na-
tional and international levels to overcome
the difficulties confronting the economies of
the allied countries. They reaffirmed their
determination to seek appropriate solutions
in the spirit of cooperation and mutual con-
fidence which characterizes their i-elations.
Ministers decided to continue to consult on
the repercussions of economic developments
on areas within the direct sphere of compe-
tence of the Alliance.

4. Ministers noted that at the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe there
had been enough progress to show that sub-
stantial results were possible. Nonetheless,
important questions remain to be resolved.
Ministers expressed the undiminished deter-
mination of their Governments to work pa-
tiently and constructively towards balanced
and substantial results under all the agenda
headings of the Conference, so as to bring
about a satisfactory conclusion to the Con-
ference as a whole as soon as may be possible.

5. Ministers of the participating countries
reviewed the state of the negotiations in
Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions. These negotiations have as their gen-
eral objective to contribute to a more stable
relationship and to the strengthening of peace
and security in Europe, and their success
would advance detente. These Ministers were
resolved to pursue these negotiations with a

view to ensuring undiminished security for
all parties, at a lower level of forces in Cen-
tral Europe. They reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the establishment of approximate
parity in the form of an agreed common
ceiling for the ground force manpower of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area of
reductions. They considered that a first phase
reduction agreement covering United States
and Soviet ground forces would be an im-
portant and practical first step in this direc-
tion. They noted that the negotiations have,
so far, not produced results and expressed
the hope that a constructive response to the
Allied proposals would soon be forthcoming.
They reaffirmed the importance they attach
to the principle to which they adhere in these
negotiations that NATO forces should not
be reduced except in the context of a Mutual
and Balanced Force Reduction Agreement
with the East.

6. Ministers heard a report from the
United States Secretary of State on the con-
tinuing United States efforts towards the
further limitation of strategic offensive arms
in the light of President Ford's recent talks
with Mr. Brezhnev. They noted with satis-
faction the significant progress towards limi-
tation of strategic nuclear weapons achieved
in Vladivostok. They expressed the hope that
this progress will lead to the early conclu-
sion of a satisfactory SALT II Agreement.
They also expressed appreciation for contin-
uing consultations within the Alliance with
respect to the SALT negotiations.

7. The Ministers reviewed the develop-
ments concerning Berlin and Germany which
have taken place since their last meeting in
June 1974, especially as regards the appli-
cation of those provisions of the Quadri-
partite Agreement relating to the Western
Sectors of Berlin. They considered, in partic-
ular, traffic and ties between the Western
Sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany
and the representation abroad of the inter-
ests of those sectors by the Federal Republic
of Germany. They emphasized the impor-
tance to the viability and security of the city
of all provisions of the Quadripartite Agree-
ment. The Ministers also emphasized that
there is an essential connection between de-

Department of State Bulletin

tente in Europe and the situation relating
to Berlin.

8. Ministers expressed their concern about
the situation in the Middle East which could
have dangerous consequences for world peace
and thus for the security of the members of
the Alliance. They reaffirmed the overriding
importance they attach to fresh progress
towards a just and lasting peace in this area.
They likewise welcomed the contributions
which Allied Governments continue to make
to United Nations peace-keeping activities.
Ministers noted the report on the situation
in the Mediterranean prepared by the Per-
manent Council on their instructions. They
found the instability in the area disquieting,
warranting special vigilance on the part of
the Allies. They invited the Permanent Coun-
cil to continue consultations on this subject
and to report further.

9. As regards Greek-Turkish relations,
Ministers heard a report by the Secretary
General under the terms of his watching
brief established by the Ministerial session
of May 1964. They expressed the firm hope
that relations between these two Allied coun-
tries would rapidly return to normal.

10. Ministers noted the progress of the
work of the Committee on the Challenges of
Modern Society, especially on solar and geo-
thermal energy resources as well as on coast-
al water pollution, improved sewage disposal,
urban transport and health care. Ministers
also noted the start of projects on the dis-
posal of hazardous wastes and action to fol-
low up completed CCMS studies on the
prevention of ocean oil spills, road safety
improvement, cleaner air and purer river
water, thus enhancing the quality of life for
their citizens.

11. The Ministers directed the Council in
permanent session to consider and decide on
the date and place of the Spring session of
the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlan-
tic Council.

U.S. and Spain Hold Second Session
of Talks on Cooperation

Text of Joint Communique '

The second round of negotiations on Span-
ish-American cooperation took place in
Washington from December 9 to 12. The
Spanish delegation was headed by Under
Secretary for Foreign Aifairs, His Excel-
lency Juan Jose Rovira, and included mem-
bers of the Spanish Foreign Office and mili-
tary representatives led by General Gutier-
rez Mellado of the Spanish High General
Staff. The American delegation was headed
by Ambassador-at-Large Robert McCloskey
and included members of the Department of
State and representatives of the Department
of Defense, led by Rear Admiral Patrick
Hannifin.

The conversations proceeded according to
the agenda and work program adopted at the
first round of talks held in Madrid in No-
vember. This second round focussed on the
defense aspects in the relationship between
the two countries in the light of the Joint
Declaration of Principles signed last July,
and included exchanges of views on this sub-
ject by the military advisors of the two del-
egations.- Both sides described their respec-
tive positions and proceeded to explore areas
for more detailed discussions.

The conversations took place in a frank
and cordial atmosphere and it was agreed
that the next round of talks will take place
in Madrid on January 27. The Spanish Am-
bassador, His Excellency, Jaime Alba, hosted
a lunch for Acting Secretary of State Robert
Ingersoll and the American delegation, and
Ambassador McCloskey offered a lunch to
Under Secretary Rovira and the Spanish del-
egation.

' Issued on Dec. 12 (text from press release 524).
'' For text of the declaration, see Bulletin of
Aug. 5, 1974, p. 231.

January 6, 1975

U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To Rescind
the Sanctions Against Cuba

The 15th Meeting of Consultation of the
Foreign Ministers of the Organization of
American States was held at Quito November
8-12 to consider a resolutioyi to rescind the
sanctions against Cuba. The resolution did
not obtain the two-thirds majority required
under the Inter-American Treaty of Recip-
rocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Following is
a statement made in the meeting on Novem-
ber 12 by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Inger-
soll, who tvas chairman of the U.S. delega-
tion, together with the transcript of a news
conference held after the meeting by William.
D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, and William S. Mailliard,
U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS.

STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL
IN THE OAS MEETING OF CONSULTATION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Foreign Min-
isters and Special Delegates: We have re-
mained silent prior to the vote because we
wished to avoid even the appearance of in-
fluencing by our remarks or by our actions
the outcome of this Meeting of Consultation.
Now I think a word of explanation of our
vote is in order.

As most of you are aware, the United
States was initially opposed to a review of
Resolution I at this time. We were persuaded
by other nations that the issue should be
discussed. We voted for the convocation
of this meeting. And we have carefully at-
tended these sessions and considered the
statements of each of the members.

The resolution convoking this meeting re-
ceived unanimous approval in the Perma-
nent Council of the OAS. It placed before us

the important question of sanctions against
Cuba. Ten years have passed since Resolution
I was enacted by the Ninth Meeting of Con-
sultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
It is natural that we should review that
decision.

We recognize that a majority now exists
for lifting sanctions. On the other hand, we
also recall that the measures contained in
Resolution I were adopted in 1964 by an over-
whelming majority of the OAS member
states. Some states here today were, with
good reason, among the most persuasive ad-
vocates of sanctions. For some of us, evidence
of Cuban hostility is fresh in our minds.
Though 10 years have passed, the states of
the Americas have still received no clear
satisfaction that Cuba has abandoned the
export of revolution.

We have also taken into account another
consideration. It is of the essence of the
new dialogue not merely that we consider
the major issues confronting this hemi-
sphere, but that we do so in the spirit Pres-
ident Rodriguez Lara of our host country,
Ecuador, so well laid before us Friday, when
he said that a fundamental part of our re-
sponsibility was to :

. . . openly and freely express the position of our
countries. —While at the same time seeing that the
possible differences of opinion that may arise in no
way affect the Inter-American solidarity that we
seek to strengthen.

We have considered all these factors in
coming to our decision to abstain. But our
abstention should not be taken as a sign of
anything other than the fact that the United
States has voted in accordance with its own
perception of this question at this time. We
respect the views of the majority who have

Department of State Bulletin

voted for this resolution. We have not voted
"no," and we have not worked against the
resolution. We also respect the views of
those who entertain such serious reserva-
tions with respect to Cuba and who therefore
have felt it necessary to vote against.

If this Meeting of Consultation has not
produced a conclusive result, it has at least
aired in a constructive way the fact that
there is no easy solution to the problem of
a country which deals vdth some on the basis
of hostility and with others on the basis of
a more normal relationship.

I should add that the United States looks
forward to the day when the Cuban issue is
no longer a divisive issue for us. Cuba has
absorbed far too much of our attention in
recent years. We need to turn our energies
to the more important questions. We must
not let a failure of agreement on the Cuban
issue at this time obscure our common in-
terest in working together toward mutually
beneficial relationships on the major issues
of this decade.

Finally, I would like to express my appre-
ciation to the Government of Ecuador, to
President Rodriguez Lara, and to Foreign
Minister Lucio-Paredes, for acting as hosts
of this important inter-American meeting.
We are fortunate to have such an able and
experienced chairman in Foreign Minister
Lucio-Paredes. We are grateful for your ex-
cellent preparations and hospitality. Your
high sense of responsibility toward the inter-
American system should be an example to
us all.

NEWS CONFERENCE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ROGERS AND AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD

Q. I would like to ask where you are going
from here?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Back to Wash-
ington. [Laughter.]

Q. On this issue, what do you foresee ?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You mean on
the Cuban issue in the international orga-
nization concept? Well, I would say that since

Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind
the Sanctions Against Cuba ^

Draft Resolution Submitted by the Dele-
gations OF Colombia, Costa Rica and
Venezuela

Whereas:

The Permanent Council of the Organization
of American States, by resolution CP/RES.
117 (133-74) of September 20, 1974, which
was approved unanimously, convoked this
Meeting so that the Org-an of Consultation
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, mindful of strict respect for the
principle of non-intervention by one State in
the affairs of other States, and bearing in
mind the change in the circumstances prevail-
ing when measures were adopted against the
Government of Cuba, might decide whether
the rescinding of Resolution I of the Ninth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, held in Washington, D.C., in
1964, is justified;

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the
Special Delegates stated the position of their
respective governments with regard to the
subject matter of the resolution convoking
the meeting,

The Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation
OF Ministers of Foreign Affairs,

Resolves :

1. To rescind Resolution I of the Ninth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs, held in Washington in 1964.

2. To request the Governments of the Amer-
ican States to faithfully observe the principle
of non-intervention and to abstain from any
act inconsistent therewith.

3. To inform the Security Council of the
United Nations of the text of the present
resolution.

' The resolution did not obtain the two-
thirds majority required for adoption; the
vote was 12 to 3, with 6 abstentions (U.S.).

the resolution failed, according to the terms
of the treaty there's no change in the legal
status. What may occur in bilateral relation-
ships of various member countries remains
to be seen.

Q. On the basis of your intimate knowl-
edge of what goes on inside the inter-Ameri-

JanucHy 6, 1975

can community, Mr. Ambassador, what coun-
tnes do you think, as a result of having
failed to get the two-thirds vote they wanted
here, might just go ahead and recognize
Cuba?

Ambassador Mailliard: I don't think I'd
want to name countries. A lot of statements
have been made over the last few weeks and
months by some countries that said no matter
whether the sanctions were lifted or not
they would not renew relations. Some others
said they probably would. I don't think it's
up to us to speculate on what another sov-
ereign nation is going to do.

Q. Mr. Rogers, is there any chance that
the Cuban issue might come up in the in-
terval before the new-dialogue meeting in
March in Buenos Aires or the General As-
sembly in April?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I suppose the
answer is that there's a chance that it will.
Obviously, this will not be the last time we
will hear the Cuban issue, and it could come
up in a variety of fora. I think it's important
to point out that Resolution No. I of the 1964
meeting of Foreign Ministers specifically pro-
vides that the Permanent Council is author-
ized to deal with the question of raising
Cuban sanctions in a specific manner under
specific terms set down in that very resolu-
tion. So that the resolution itself establishes
another forum in which this question can be
raised, and there are a wide variety of other
juridical ways that it's imaginable the ques-
tion will come up in the OAS itself.

Q. Mr. Rogers, we understand that there
have been some private conversations around,
I assume within the delegation and the other
foreign delegations, as to what the United
States might accept at this meeting. Could
you tell us what it was that we might have
accepted that they never offered us?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't
have any fallback positions, Mr. Manitzas
[Frank Manitzas, CBS]. I take it you're say-
ing in terms of lifting the sanctions itself?
No. Our posture, our position from the very
beginning — and we attempted to make this

clear to the other member states — was that "
we were not opposed to the calling of this
meeting if they thought it desirable, at the
Foreign Ministers level, that we were pre-
pared to come and participate and listen.
We adopted the policy from the very outset,
and carried it through with great care, of
not influencing or arm-twisting any other
.state with respect to their position or vote.
That is a position we have followed through
on from the beginning to the end of this
conference. We regard that as an affirmative
contribution to the dialogue itself at this
conference, and that is essentially the posi-
tion we brought from the beginning and
carried through to the end of it.

Q. Then there was no language that they
could have offered you in the resolution on
Cuba that you could have voted for — that
the United States could have voted for?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't
have any fallback position that we were pre-
pared to accept on this. We wanted to listen
to what everyone had to say and to see what
the essential weight of opinion was on the
part of the other states.

Q. I'd like to ask you, if you could tell us
7ww, the degree to which you made this clear,
your delegation's position of abstention from
debate, and any resolution, to Foreign Minis-
ters with whom you or Secretary Ingersoll
met here, and on what dates? What I am
driving at is that it seems to have been the
case that until Saturday, Latin delegations
were not really sure of the policy you just
described, and toe ourselves in briefing ses-
sions here were being given the impression
that there was a fallback position and that
there were things that could have been done,
whereas we now know, as do the Latin coun-
tries, that your instructions were to abstain
and there was no change in those instruc-
tions.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That's a fair
question. I think I'd like to divide the answer
up into two parts, or at least our position up
into two parts, because we thought about that
very carefully. When I say that, I mean
the time when we would announce the fact

10

Department of State Bulletin

that we were going to abstain with respect
to the resolution drafted in Washington and
which was on the table here at this meeting.

We did decide at the very outset that we
would adopt what I personally regard as a
new and healthy posture on the part of the
United States, and that was not to pressure
any country with respect to our point of view
about the issues at the meeting or with re-
spect to how that country ought to vote. That
posture we announced long before the meet-
ing began, and as I say, we followed through
the entire meeting, both in the halls of the
meeting room itself and in our private con-
versations with the other delegations, in a
manner which was utterly consistent with
that non-arm-twisting posture by the United
States.

We did not, you are quite right, an-
nounce— before we arrived or at the time we
arrived — that we were going to abstain un-
der any circumstances. The reason was that,
had we announced we were going to abstain
with respect to the pending resolution, that
in itself would have been inconsistent with
the neutrality of a non-arm-twisting policy.
Because that might have had an effect on
certain delegations and committed them to
a position of abstention before they had
heard the views of the other member states.

So that essentially our posture was divided
up into those two aspects — one, our policy
of non-arm-twisting, and two, the final vote
we would take. The first part we announced
at the very outset. The second part we did
not announce until we were sure that each
state had a chance to hear what the others
had to say and had made up its mind as to
how it was going to vote.

Is that responsive to your question?

Q. Yes it is, sir.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Good.

Q. Mr. Rogers, ivhen did you actually
make up your mind to abstain — here, while
coming, or two weeks ago?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think that's
a fair question and let me try to answer as
quickly as I can. The answer is that we had,
let's say, 90 percent or 80 percent decided

to abstain with respect to that resolution,
the one that had been predrafted in Wash-
ington and was on the table here, assuming
that we were correct in our prophecy as to
what the parliamentary situation was going
to be and what the general international
situation was going to be, and assuming
that no other new' and imaginative proposals
were put on the table which we hadn't fore-
seen.

What I'm trying to say is that we were not
locked into that position absolutely hard and
fast, and had this matter, in terms of the
parliamentary situations, positions of other
delegations, or other factors been different
than they finally turned out to be, we would
reconsider that.

Is that responsive to your question, Juan
[Juan Walte, United Press International] ?

Q. Mr. Rogers, if it were a differently
worded resolution, could it have been voted
for?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That is
pretty hypothetical, Anita [Anita Gumpert,
Agence France Presse], in terms of saying
what had to really hit the table with a strong
consensus of other Latin American support.

Q. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, for pinning
this dotvn slightly more. Did you or Am-
bassador Mailliard or Secretary Kissinger,
to your knowledge, at any time, give any
tacit or passive encouragement to the spon-
soring countries or give to them the impres-
sion by smiles [laughter-'] that you might
shift your position from abstention to favor-
able under certain conditions? [Laughter.']
In other words, did you give them the im-
pression at any time that you or the United
States or the State Department would he
glad to see the sanctions lifted with strictly
Latin American support?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: These are
really two different questions, I think. The
first question was, did we ever signal to
them by a smile or a hint, in other words a
body-language diplomacy? [Laughter.] The
answer I have to give you is that we didn't
intend to.

Q. Did you?

January 6, 1975

11

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Did we? I
don't have the foggiest idea. As I say, I may
have smiled. If I did, I apologize if I
did mislead them. I don't knovi^ [laughter],
you learn something in this diplomatic game
all the time. Did you prefer to comment on
that?

Ambassador MailUard: No, I think that's
absolutely right. How they may have inter-
preted things, I think is a little difficult for
us to tell. But, certainly as far as the co-
sponsors were concerned, we told them a
long, long time ago that they shouldn't count
on us for either opposition or support.

Q. You told them that specifically, sir?

Aynbassador Mailliard: Yes. Very spe-
cifically.

Q. Mr. Rogers, ive've seen the new dia-
logue working here with no arm-twisting,
etc., or at least it's ivhat you say is going on.
What is going to happen when you see that
they have the 14. votes? Will you still continue
this new dialogue of sitting back and let it
go or wait for them to come to you? Or
is the new dialogue going to have "clause
three" that we have to defend our interests
and we tvill move out? In other words, in
this case, you had a better count than the
sponsors. There was never any need for you
to move to tnake certain a position was
not adopted against the position that you
wanted. What happens when you see they
have the lU votes? What happens to this
new dialogue then?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: If I under-
stand the question correctly, Frank, it is
what would be our position in terms of
pressure and arm-twisting and U.S. posture
when there are 14 votes to lift the sanctions.

Q. When there are H. votes against the
position the United States has, hotv are you
going to work the neiv dialogue? Obviously
it is easy to see it working when someone is
doing your wwk for you, in a sense. I'm
not saying you ivere having it done for you,
but they were doing it. What happens when
you have to go out and start moving bodies

and moving votes yourself? How are you
going to do this with the new dialogue?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think you
misstate the proposition, in a sense, Frank.
We didn't have a position. We were not
opposed to a lifting of the sanctions.

Had we been opposed, if it had been some
other measure and we had been opposed,
we would have, in a new-dialogue way,
frankly stated our position on this matter.
That's part of the new dialogue — that every
country ought to speak up with respect to
its own interests.

In this particular instance the fundamen-
tal point of this conference is that the United
States did not have a position in opposition
to the lifting of the sanctions. We did not.
And we didn't say to any country that we
did. And we did not vote against it. We
made perfectly clear to the sponsors, and
they understood it, that they had a clear
field. They had a clear shot at lifting those
sanctions if they could make it work. And
we were not going to lift a finger against
them. And we played by that rule from the
very beginning to the very end.

Now, that, essentially, it seems to me is
precisely consistent with the new dialogue.
If we had a position in opposition, you would
have heard about it, as has been the case in
all the other conferences in the past.

Ambassador Mailliard: You also made
an assumption when you said that we had
a better count. We didn't know for sure
whether there would be 14 votes or not.

Q. I'd like to pick up on the last part of
the last question, and that is, if they had had
the U votes would it have been in the in-
terests of the United States to have the sanc-
tions lifted without our having to cast a
vote in favor?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I'm not
sure —

Q. The last part of the last question had
to do with whether the United States really
would have ivelcoyned the lifting of the sanc-
tions without the United States having to
cast a vote in favor of it.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We never

12

Department of State Bulletin

said that, because that would have been an
announcement of our position.

Q. No, I knoiv you didn't say it, hut would
it he fair to say it would he an assumption?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You want to
know what was in our secret hearts?

Q. That's right.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That would
be telling, wouldn't it? No, I don't mean to
be captious about it.

Ambassador Mailliard: I think that there
is such a simple answer to that, it might be
hard to believe; but if two-thirds of the
member states had concluded that the sanc-
tions should be lifted, then I think you have
to question whether there were any sanc-
tions at all. So that there wasn't a question
of where our interests lay. It depended upon
the parliamentary situation. If that over-
whelming a majority of the Latins felt that
this was no longer a viable position, it would
have been pretty foolish for us, it seems to
me, to take a contrary view.

Q. Mr. Rogers, how do you view the
effects of this vote on the strength of the
OAS? Do you think that the potency of the
OAS has heen increased by this vote, or do
you think it has heen a setback for the OAS?
And in your talks since the vote with other
delegations, what have their feelings been as
to the effect of this on the OAS?

Ambassador Mailliard: A little bit. This
meeting was convened under the Rio Treaty.
The only reason this meeting was held was
because of the concern of a number of coun-
tries that the binding obligations of the Rio
Treaty appeared not to be being observed, to
the extent that several countries did not com-
ply with their obligations under the treaty. I
think this is really what has caused the
whole thing to operate.

So, I think if you are talking about the
Rio Treaty alone and you're going to be
candid, you got to say that if now, even
though the sanctions are not lifted, an appre-
ciable number of other countries renew
bilateral relations, then the Rio Treaty is to
some extent weakened. But to translate that
into the destruction of the inter-American

system, I think, is a vast exaggeration of the
problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as far as you know, is
the March meeting of the Foreign Ministers
going to come off as scheduled in Buenos
Air-es, and second, would this whole business
C07ne up again at that meeting?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes. As far
as we know the March meeting is on track.
We look forward to it with a great sense
of anticipation. The Secretary will be there.
We will be discussing real new-dialogue
issues across the board, the vast number of
fundamental and first-order issues that were
on the agendas, as you know, both at Tlate-
lolco and Atlanta. We do not see this one-
issue meeting here as having any serious
effect on the March meeting in Buenos Aires.

Q. [Question unintelligible but concerned
correspondent's contention that "countries
defeated were supposed to be democratic and
representative governments," and countries
which "won" were "vastly more aggres-
sive."} Do you, think this has harmed the
inter-American system?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don't know
if the inter-American system is harmed by
whether one category of countries wins or
another category of countries loses. That
tends to make distinctions between countries
that I think are not a solid basis for the
conduct of relations within an international
organization.

The fact of the matter is that the basic
problem, as Ambassador Mailliard just has
pointed out, is the structure — the juridical
structure — of the Rio Treaty itself. The Rio
Treaty itself, in the first instance, required
that the sanctions be imposed on the basis
of a two-thirds vote.

At that time the proponents of the sanc-
tions had the uphill struggle of getting two-
thirds. They got enough or more than that
because of the fact that Venezuela, as you
know, one of the countries now a proponent
of the lifting of the sanctions, felt itself
threatened. And at that time, it was Romulo
Betancourt's government — one of the em-
battled democracies of all time, which was
operating, as I well remember, under the

January 6, 1975

13

threat of military attack or guerrilla attack
on the elections at that time— which was one
of the initiators of the sanctions. And the
sanctions required a two-thirds vote then.

The fact of the matter is that the same
rule applies today under the Rio Treaty, for
better or for worse, and two-thirds are re-
quired to lift it, and the fact of the matter
was that the lifting of the mandated sanc-
tions under Resolution I of the 1964 meeting
could not command a two-thirds majority.

Now, there are lots of things you could
say about that, and one of them may well
be that the juridical structure of the Rio
Treaty ought to be changed, and we are per-
fectly prepared to look at that question. But
I don't think we ought to talk about this
as an ultimate and disturbing defeat for
some people and a victory for others. It
may indicate that we have got to look for
better ways for arriving at consensuses
within the system. And as I said, the United
States is quite well prepared to do that.

Q. I have a question about the participa-
tion at the Buenos Aires meeting. One of
the issues there is whether or not to invite
Cuba. First, have you been asked by the
Argentine Government how you feel about
it, and how do you feel about it?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: The answer
is no.

Q. The second, how do you feel about it?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I'll wait
till Vignes [Argentine Foreign Minister Al-
berto Vignes] asks the Secretary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a
theoretical question. Under the terms of the
Rio Treaty the signatories are bound by the
decision, obviously. If there had been a
two-thirds majority here in favor of lifting
the sanctions, both commercial and diplo-
matic, against Cuba, ivould the United States
have gone along and resumed relations with
Cuba immediately, or within a reasonable
time ?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes, that's
a fair question, and I think you're quite
right to ask it in a way which emphasizes

the difference between a resolution here
which would ostensibly have repealed the
1964 resolution of the Foreign Ministers
meeting and what then happens bilaterally.

Now, the legal effect of the resolution
which didn't achieve the two-thirds majority
at this meeting essentially would have been
to repeal the adoption of the measures by
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in
1964, which, in our legal view, became bind-
ing on all the states — that they terminate
diplomatic relations, that they terminate
commercial relations, and that they do what-
ever they can with respect to maritime com-
merce to reduce trade with Cuba. Those
were requirements which were and still are,
in our view, binding on all member states
of the OAS. Had those requirements been
eliminated, it would then have been up to
each country to decide what to do.

The United States had terminated diplo-
matic relations and had instituted a number
of measures with respect to its commercial
relations with Cuba prior to the 1964 reso-
lution, and by the same token those measures
— termination of diplomatic relations, and
measures affecting commerce — would have
legally survived the action here at Quito,
had the resolution which was proposed
gathered the two-thirds vote. Now, what
we would thereafter have done bilaterally,
if you will, with Cuba really would have been
essentially a Cuba-U.S. question, and essen-
tially it still is a Cuba-U.S. question. And
we have made no statement with respect
to our posture in terms of how quickly we
would have moved on that issue, and on
what basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Ford administration
has said that the United States unilaterally
ivould not review diplomatic relations with-
out consultation with the OAS members,
and that was the reason this meeting was
called for; but now, we are sort of bound in
the other direction, not to forge detente
tvith Cuba. In other words, we sort of block
off the whole liberal sector of the U.S. Con-
gress by seeing this resolution fail today.
Could that have been one of the Ford ad-
ministration's approaches?

14

Department of State Bulletin

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don't think
so. It seems to me what you are suggesting
is that we manipulated the result here. And
what I have been trying to say all day long
is that we did our best — we may have
failed just because we are who we are — but
we really did our serious, legitimate best to
eliminate any manipulation or pressure or
arm-twisting by the United States. Now
you may not credit that, or it may sound,
in an inter-American context, difficult to be-
lieve in view of the history we all know of
U.S. efforts in this respect. But it is the case.

Q. Well, you know, this is a very positive
new stateynent. It comes out very positive,
but the effect of your policy has had a very
negative effect on the OAS. So I don't see
how you can call it a positive policy when
its effect is so negative.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: As I said,
we don't regard the effect as negative on
the OAS. In the first instance, with all due
respect, there are lots of other issues in the
inter-American system. I realize that Cuba
is the big issue theatrically and in terms of
public controversy. But we have a lot of
other things that we have been attempting
to talk about in the new-dialogue way with
Latin America. And we think, in a sense,
that the positive contribution we have made
is to demonstrate that the United States is
not going to dominate this inter-American
system in the future; that we are not striv-
ing for artificial consensus; that we are not
trying to create synthetic agreement. This
is a positive contribution not just to the
discussion of the Cuban issue but to the
discussion of a wide number of other issues,
many of them in the minds of some people
much more fundamental than this Cuban
question. I will furthermore say that this
is not the last time, I regret to say, that we
are going to hear about the Cuban issue in
the inter-American context or the last op-
portunity that the inter-American system is
going to have to come to grips with this
narrowing question of sanctions.

Q. (Spanish) [Question semi-intelligible
but concerned correspondent's contention

that countries like Chile and Paraguay had
"won" and "democratically elected govern-
ments such as Colombia and Venezuela had
lost," and what effect this wotdd have on the
inter-American system.]

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think it's
unfair — or at least it's not a matter of sig-
nificance which countries happen to line up
on the same side of the vote, as I said, for
the reasons that we have tried to make clear.
That is to say, the desire of the United
States was to avoid pressure and arm-
twisting on this Cuban issue.

The reasons the other countries voted the
way they did were explained by the repre-
sentatives of those countries. It is my firm
belief that they did not vote the way they
did just because the United States was vot-
ing the way it did. They voted the way they
did, as I think Minister Blanco [Uruguayan
Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Blanco] in
particular expressed very clearly as far as
Uruguay was concerned, because they were
not persuaded that Cuba has an equally neu-
tral attitude with respect to internal affairs
within Uruguay. Now, that essentially is
the reason for the Uruguayan position.

In the case of all the other countries, they
took the positions they took for the reasons
they took them, and the mere fact that
country x is one category and country y is
in another category, I regard as having little
significance.

Q. Let's carry Mr. O'Mara's [Richard
O'Mara, Baltimore Sun] question a step fur-
ther. Whatever the scenario may be in your
own minds in Washington for developing
bilateral relations with Cuba, whatever that
timetable may be, has it now been affected,
has it noiv been set back? Are you now
incapable of moving ahead with whatever
you might, in your own minds, want to move
ahead with because of the decision taken
here today?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Well, quite
frankly, because we didn't have a timetable
and we don't have an agenda for Cuban rela-
tions, our basic position is that we have
been and will continue to abide by the OAS

January 6, 1975

15

resolution. As I say, as President Ford has
said, as to when and to the extent that our
Cuban policy changes, we will be doing that
in consultation with the other members of
the Organization and consistent with its reg-
ulations. We have not had a timetable nor
do we have a formal agenda for business
with Cuba. Is that responsive to your ques-
tion?

Q. Can I carry it one step further?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Sure.

Q. Does this prevent you from establish-
ing any kind of timetable? In other words,
does that question of bilateral relations now
absolutely guide you with respect to the
OAS?

Assistayit Secretary Rogers: Well that's
a fair question, and if I can answer it can-
didly without you guys reading a lot into
the entrails of my answer, let me say this.
As a matter of law, we are forbidden, ob-
viously, from having diplomatic relations
with Cuba. That does not, however, pro-
hibit us from considering whether to estab-
lish. In other words, we can think unthink-
able thoughts, even though we can't do il-
legal things. I'll be quoted on that one, I
can see it [laughter.] Don't write that down.
[Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Rogers, could you give us some in-
formation on the priorities of the United
States vis-a-vis Latin America right now?
It seems that the problems we are having
now are over trade — in the economic fields.
It seems to be less political, which means
that Cuba is really not one of our considera-
tions. Tell 2is something abotit the situation
with the multinationals.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Right. I
think that's a very good question. I think
it does put the issues here somewhat better
in perspective. I'm never sure whether it's
an expression of my personal boredom
with the Cuban issue or a legitimate feeling
that the economic questions really are the
dominant ones in the inter-American system

today. But, whichever the reason for my
feelings about it, I do feel that way. There
is no doubt that these are the really great
issues of the time. They are enormously
complicated; they are enormously determi-
native of the well-being of the people of
Latin America; they get much closer, in
my judgment, to the realities of life in
this hemisphere and in the United States
than the obstructions of the Cuban issue;
and therefore, in my temperamental ap-
proach to these problems, are much more
important to think about now.

What are they? They are essentially the
issues we tend to lump under the heading
economic, but they relate to a wide variety
of things. As you point out, the issues that
have come up with respect to transna-
tional corporations. As you know — at the
earlier meetings of the Foreign Ministers
under the new dialogue — this has been a
matter of great concern to them. It in-
volves all kinds of questions ranging from
across-the-board investment disputes to
honoring of contracts and a wide variety
of other things.

The question of transfer of technology,
which is a matter of fundamental concern
throughout Latin America, whichever For-
eign Ministers you talk to — all our Ambas-
sadors report back constantly this pre-
occupation with the question of access to
technology and science.

A wide variety of other questions having
to do with access to raw materials, prices
of raw materials including petroleum, and
obviously the fundamental question for such
enormous numbers of people throughout the
world today; that is, food.

These are the issues that we are very
anxious to get on with, with the other mem-
bers of the inter-American system. And it
is my profound conviction that whatever
the diagnosis of this Quito meeting, it does
not affect the priority of those questions,
nor the capacity of us in the hemisphere
to come to grips with it. I have talked to a
wide number of Foreign Ministers here,
and I see no diminution in their desire to

16

Department of State Bulletin

come to grips in an inter-American context
with those fundamental economic questions.

Q. What could you tell us about the United
States — the State Department's attitude
toward today's decision. Could you say
whether it is happy about it and pleased
with this decision?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: No. I don't
think we want to characterize a response In
that sense.

Q. Mr. Secretary, suppose six months from
now the United States would like to establish
relations with Cuba in such a meeting as
this and suppose two-thirds of the members
of the OAS oppose?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That's mar-
velously hypothetical. [Laughter.] What
would happen? I have a fundamental rule at
press conferences never to answer a hypo-
thetical question. But I think it's fair today
to point out that there are a wide variety
of ways in which the question of the 1964
resolution can be approached in addition to
the Foreign Ministers meeting that has been
held here.

Q. (unintelligible)

Ambassador Mailliard: The Permanent
Council is clearly authorized to do this and
is sitting in Washington all the time. So
any time that they got the right number
of votes, this could be done expressly under
the provision of the '64 resolution. But the
Permanent Council also can convoke itself
into an organ of consultation, meeting pro-
visionally, so that anytime there's a will with
the necessary two-thirds vote, it could be
done very quickly if anybody wants to do it.

Q. Mr. Rogers, even though the United
States might seem to think that there are
more important issues than the Cuban issue,
this meeting was to consider the Cuban issue.
If I look up Mr. Ingersoll's declaration this
morning, I don't see very much about Cuba
and about what the United States thinks
about Cuba, [remainder of question unin-
telligible.]

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I suppose
that the best answer was the statement in
the press today which was attributed to an
unnamed Latin American who said, "We de-
nounce the United States when it pushes us
around and we denounce the United States
when it doesn't."

We could easily have spoken to the ques-
tion whether or not essentially Castro would
have continued to affect the peace and secu-
rity of the hemisphere. We decided not to do
that. We could not have taken both postures.
That is to say, we could not have taken
our hands-off posture, our no-pressure pos-
ture, and at the same time have spoken on
the issue that the other countries did. We
decided as I say, in this particular instance,
to adopt a hands-off, no-pressure policy ; and
basically that was the attitude with which
we came to the meeting and stuck with all
the way through.

Q. I'd still like to go back to the question
of how does this policy work? You have to
disciiss and you have to move and you have
to lobby. What are you going to call this
new dialogue? Are we going to go back to
1962, the way the United States worked
then, or how is it going to work when you're
obviously the underdog, which you were not
this time?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't
feel—

Q. Well, you didn't care one way or the
other.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Right.

Q. What do you do when you're the under-
dog? How are you going to work this new
dialogue ?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We're going
to have to speak up. But I think what you're
saying is correct, or at least I would affirm
that we tend to regard the Cuban issue in
terms of our posture as ever so much more
sensitive than a wide variety of other issues.

In other words, on a wide variety of other
kinds of question — the economic questions
we were talking about before, a number of

January 6, 1975

17

other political questions— we don't have this
sense that we have to be restrained. We
don't have this feeling that taking a position
on this is going to tend to be dominating.

We do have that feeling on the Cuban
question. And the history bears us out on
that— history on the Cuban issue essentially,
on which the United States has been quite
outspoken. In any event, whatever the his-
tory may have been, we feel that the Cuban
issue is a very sensitized one and we feel that
the best contribution we could make on that
was the policy which I've tried to explain
here, of restraint and no pressure.

We will not feel that way with respect to
a lot of other issues, and we don't. We speak
up. It's not really a question of whether
you're an underdog or overdog. Most of the
questions that we're discussing in an inter-
American context we don't discuss in the
theatrical way we've done it here in Quito
these last "few days. We discuss it in some-
what more diplomatic fashion, and it doesn't
work usually by adding up the votes on a
yes-no-abstention kind of artificial approach
to the problem. Most particularly, for ex-
ample, at meetings of the Foreign Ministers'
new dialogue, that was all done by con-
sensus. They don't add up votes.

Bill of Rights Day,

Human Rights Day and Week

A PROCLAMATION^

Two hundred years ago, in September 1774, the
First Continental Congress assembled in Carpenters'
Hall, in Philadelphia, and set in motion a course of
human events which created the United States. The
system of government begun there, and the high
principles on which it rests, continues today as the
source of vitality for our society.

Anticipating the bicentennial of this Nation's in-
dependence, now is an excellent time to pause and
consider the groundwork the delegates to Philadel-
phia laid for our independence. The First Continen-
tal Congress adopted a resolution asserting, among

No. 4337; 39 Fed. Reg. 4233B.

other things, the rights of the American people to
life, liberty, and property; to participation in the leg-
islative councils of government; to the heritage of
the common law; to trial by jury; and to assemble
and petition for redress of grievances. This resolu-
tion foreshadowed the Declaration of Independence
and the Bill of Rights.

It is altogether fitting to mark the 200th anniver-
sary of this noble beginning of the Continental Con-
gress. Beyond that, it is imperative that all of us
study and cherish the ideas and ideals which bore
fruit in the great constitutional documents of our
country. At the same time, we should take the op-
portunity, whenever possible, to strengthen the liber-
ties which have been assured us in the Bill of Rights,
ratified one hundred and eighty-three years ago this
week, on December 15, 1791.

America's concern with human rights is not some-
thing that ends at our borders. Benjamin Franklin
wrote to a friend in 1789:

"God grant, that not only the Love of Liberty, but
a thorough Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may
pervade all the Nations of the Earth, so that a Phi-
losopher may set his Foot anywhere on its Surface,
and say, 'This is my Country'."

Franklin's spirit of universality has found rich
modern expression in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The link between it and our Bill of
Rights is clear. On December 10, we celebrate the
twenty-sixth anniversary of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly. The General Assembly said
that the Universal Declaration stands as "a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and nations,"
reminding us that "recognition of the inherent dig-
nity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world."

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
December 10, 1974, as Human Rights Day and De-
cember 15, 1974, as Bill of Rights Day. I call upon
the people of the United States to observe the week
beginning December 10, 1974, as Human Rights
Week. Further, I ask all Americans to reflect deeply
on the values inherent in the Bill of Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and draw
on those values to promote peace, justice, and civil-
ity at home and around the world.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this third day of December, in the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the In-
dependence of the United States of America the one
hundred ninety-ninth.

18

Department of State Bulletin

The Inter-American System: Adjusting to Present-Day Realities

Address by William S. Mailliard

Ambassador to the Organization of American States ^

Even perceptive and informed Americans
who maintain a healthy interest in foreign
affairs are not likely to have a comprehensive
grasp of the inter-American system and the
Organization of American States. Our east-
ern press and media, for the most part, are
Europe oriented. Here in the West they do
pay more attention to Pacific affairs, but no-
where except possibly in the states of the
southern tier is there much emphasis on
hemispheric happenings.

This is not to say that Latin America is a
lost continent or anything like it. But im-
pressions gathered from the media are
largely surface impressions dealing with
generalities or with certain hot political is-
sues. Thus we hear that Latin America is
important but neglected, or we get stories
about the Panama Canal issue or the Cuban
issue. We do not see much in the way of
treatment of the texture and significance of
the web of relationships between the United
States and its neighbors to the south that we
call the inter-American system.

The inter-American system has been a
pathfinder in the field of international or-
ganization. It is the name we give to a col-
lection of multilateral institutions linking
the United States with the nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean. And many of the
most important principles of the U.N. Char-
ter, such as nonintervention and the juridical
equality of states, first saw the light in the
context of the inter-American relationship.

The movement toward unity of the Amer-

'■ Made before the Commonwealth Club of San
Francisco at San Francisco, Calif., on Nov. 22.

icas goes back a long way, to Simon Bolivar's
Congress of Panama in 1826. At that time,
George Washington's dictum of no entan-
gling alliances held sway, and the debates of
the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate for that year show that Bolivar's
dream of a Congress of the Americas was
thought so novel an experiment and so
fraught with unknown perils that the United
States should not participate. In fact we did
not.

It was not until 1889 that the United
States participated in an international con-
ference of American states. Today's inter-
American system has its roots in that meet-
ing.

I don't intend to try to escape from today's
reality by taking refuge in history, but I
think it is worth noting that we in the
Western Hemisphere were the pioneers of the
world in establishing a free association of
sovereign nations to deal with mutual prob-
lems. For many decades, until the F.D.R.
Good Neighbor policy, we tended to look on
Latin America as our private preserve. In
turn the nations of Latin America tended to
look at our multilateral association as a
means of ordering state-to-state behavior
and restricting the inclination of the United
States to intervene whenever she perceived
her interests to be involved. As time went on,
we slowly came to accept, much as an emerg-
ing adult accepts the rules of society, the
need for rules of the road that would order
the relationships among us.

Thus has evolved an ever more complex
inter-American system to maintain some kind

January 6, 1975

19

of balance between what was originally a
collection of relatively poor and weak nations
and a disconcertingly and steadily increas-
ingly powerful neighbor.

Varied Activities of the OAS

Now, what is the inter-American system
as we know it today? Substantively, it deals
with almost every facet of our association:
with peace and security ; economic and social
development; educational, scientific, and cul-
tural cooperation; human rights; technical
assistance and training; disaster relief;
health; agricultural research; problems of
women, children, and Indians; highways;
ports and harbors; tourism; export promo-
tion; and more. Most of this is dealt with
by the OAS itself or by one of its specialized
organizations, such as the Pan American
Health Organization or the Inter-American
Institute of Agricultural Sciences. But some
hemispheric intergovernmental organizations
are not part of the OAS structure, although
they are considered part of the inter-Amer-
ican system, the most important of these
being the Inter- American Development Bank,
created in 1959.

I wonder if many people in this country
fully realize how farflung and varied the
total activities of the OAS really are, in
fields other than peace and security and
economic policy. The OAS, through its Gen-
eral Secretariat — headed by former Ecua-
dorean President Galo Plaza — and also
through several specialized technical organi-
zations, carries out action programs amount-
ing to over $100 million a year. Most of this
goes to operate programs of technical as-
sistance related to promotion of Latin Amer-
ican development. The OAS annually grants
thousands of fellowships, conducts dozens
of training courses, and issues technical pub-
lications on a great variety of development-
related subjects.

I would like to cite one of the specialized
organlizations, the Pan American Health
Organization, which is also a regional agency
of the World Health Organization. Orginally
created in 1902 to stem the spread of commu-
nicable diseases across national boundaries,

PAHO today is recognized as the health agen- \
cy of the Americas. In addition to its work
in the control of communicable diseases,
PAHO is active in the development and pro-
motion of health manpower, family health
and population dynamics, health services and
delivery of health care, and environmental
health.

There have been many notable achieve-
ments in the health of the Americas through
the efforts of PAHO, but perhaps none as
successful as the smallpox eradication pro-
gram. As part of the global effort to eradi-
cate smallpox, PAHO's program in the Amer-
icas achieved the ultimate in April 1971,
when the last vestige of the disease in Brazil
was declared eliminated and all of the Amer-
icas free of the scourge of centuries.

The OAS has done valuable and worth-
while work in the field of human rights
through the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, a commission of seven mem-
bers chosen to serve in their personal capac-
ity.

In education the OAS has focused on
innovative approaches to expanding educa-
tional opportunities at the lowest possible
cost. In the area of science the OAS has
concentrated on developing the institutional
structure to enable countries to capitalize on
existing scientific know-how and to develop-
ing in-country capacities to develop solutions
to specific scientific and technological prob-
lems. In culture the OAS has concentrated
on developing an awareness of and publiciz-
ing the rich cultural heritage of the region.

Most OAS programs aim at increasing the
technical proficiency of the countries. Some
examples include assistance in hydrographic
studies in the Andean region, assistance to
Argentina in the establishment of a net-
worth tax, and sending teams to assist in the
reconstruction of Managua. In the fiscal year
1972-73 this assistance involved over 600 ex-
perts and also included contributions from
European countries and Japan.

An OAS committee conducts country re-
views of the development programs and
plans of the member states. These reviews
bring together representatives of the coun-
try, and of lending agencies such as the

20

Department of State Bulletin

World Bank, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, and the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, and have proved valua-
ble in focusing attention on the need for
economic planning and in developing in-
creased technical and managerial expertise
in the economic sectors of the nations. The
OAS also provides the mechanism, through
the relatively new Special Committee for
Consultation and Negotiation, for the United
States to meet in a relatively informal and
nonpolitical setting to discuss U.S. economic
policies and practices which have an impact
on Latin America.

I have deliberately overloaded your cir-
cuits with seemingly dry facts about what
the OAS really does with its money.

As a practicing politician for many years
and now as a practicing diplomat, I have
learned that the allocation of resources de-
termines to a great extent the priorities of
an organization. It should be clear to you
that the priorities of the inter-American sys-
tem lie in the field of development.

We are associated in this endeavor because
it is in our national interest that all the peo-
ple of Latin America reach high standards
of economic well-being. There is a strong
moral aspect to this that I would not slight,
but beyond that, development contributes to
political stability in the hemisphere and to
the opening of new trade opportunities.

One last word about the distribution of re-
sources. We have accepted in international
organizations the principle that the rich pay
more. Perhaps it is proof of priorities that
not only do the Latin American nations con-
tribute more to the OAS than they do to the
United Nations, but they also pay up more
promptly !

Informal Procedures of the New Dialogue

Any multinational organization is com-
plex, with competing national interests try-
ing to reach accommodation. Where these
interests run head-on into each other, agree-
ments are often impossible to achieve. For
example, the deliberative bodies of the inter-
American system can quibble endlessly over
hypothetical points and legalistic interpreta-

tions. But when the members want to take
action, these same bodies are capable of rapid
and forceful decision.

Since the founding of the OAS in 1948,
there have been no prolonged conflicts in the
Western Hemisphere. The Dominican-Vene-
zuelan crisis of 1960, the Cuban crisis of
1962, and the Honduras-El Salvador five-day
war in 1969 are examples which quickly
come to mind in which the system demon-
strated its ability to act decisively.

Now, however, the increasingly interde-
pendent nature of our world, growing na-
tionalism in this hemisphere, and the shift
from bipolarity to a multipolar scheme of
world relationships have brought on an era
of flux in the inter-American relationship.
This sparked an eff'ort to adjust this rela-
tionship to today's realities.

In 1973 then-Foreign Minister of Colom-
bia Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa suggested to
the Secretary of State that there be a reap-
praisal of relations between the United
States and the rest of the nations of the hem-
isphere. Secretary Kissinger responded to
this overture in October when he addressed
the Foreign Ministers of this hemisphere
who were attending the U.N. General As-
sembly, calling for a new dialogue among us.
The Secretary's initiative was greeted with
enthusiasm.

The new dialogue was to involve new pro-
cedures and a new atmosphere. It marked a
new era in inter-American diplomacy in
which problems and conflicts, even on the
most sensitive issues, were brought out on
the table and discussed frankly but without
the need for public posturing.

The new dialogue actually began at an in-
formal meeting of Foreign Ministers last
February in a part of Mexico City called
Tlatelolco. Conversations centered on eight
key issues that had been identified by the
Latin American Foreign Ministers in a pre-
paratory meeting in Colombia. These were
cooperation for development, coercive meas-
ures of an economic nature, restructuring of
the inter-American system, solution of the
Panama Canal question, structure of the in-
ternational trade and monetary system,
transnational or multinational enterprises,

January 6, 1975

21

transfer of technology, and the general pan-
orama of Latin American-U.S. relations. The
issues were discussed in a constructive, in-
formal manner without votes or resolutions.
At Tlatelolco the Foreign Ministers called
for "a new, vigorous spirit of inter-American
solidarity." They expressed "confidence that
the spirit of Tlatelolco will inspire a new cre-
ative effort in their relations."

The Ministers stressed that development
should be integral, embracing the economic,
social, and cultural life of their nations. Spe-
cifically, the United States pledged to make
maximum efforts to secure congressional ap-
proval of the system of generalized prefer-
ences and then work with the other coun-
tries of the hemisphere to apply these pref-
erences in the most beneficial manner. It fur-
ther pledged to maintain present economic
assistance levels and to facilitate the flow of
resources toward countries most affected by
rising energy costs. The United States also
suggested the establishment of a factfinding
or conciliation procedure that would limit
the scope of controversies arising from pri-
vate foreign investment by separating is-
sues of fact from those of law, thus provid-
ing an objective basis for solution of such
disputes without detriment to sovereignty.

They met again in Washington in April
under the informal procedures of the dia-
logue and a few days later implemented cer-
tain decisions at the OAS General Assembly
in Atlanta. They entrusted other major top-
ics, such as the transfer of technology and
multinational corporations to ad hoc work-
ing groups. The Ministers are scheduled to
meet again in Buenos Aires in March.

The question logically arises as to why it
was necessary to bypass, at least initially,
the established regional institutions. In part
it is because two participants in the dia-
logue, Guyana and the Bahamas, are not at
present members of the OAS. But in part it
is also due to the rigidity and formalism of
the OAS meetings such as the General As-
sembly, which do not at present lend them-
selves to real dialogue. The OAS is going
through a period of reform, and there is
general agreement — and some progress to
date — to simplify and to admit the fresh

winds of the dialogue into these structures.
I would venture a personal opinion, not an
official prediction, that in time the freedom
and the informality of the dialogue will be
married to the institutional framework of
the OAS.

Effect of the Quito Meeting

Two weeks ago the Foreign Ministers of
the hemisphere met in Quito to consider
whether the diplomatic and economic sanc-
tions impo.sed on Cuba in 1964 should be
lifted. The resolution to lift the sanctions re-
ceived a majority but fell short of the neces-
sary two-thirds vote required by the Rio
Treaty. The effect is to continue the obliga-
tion to refrain from any diplomatic or eco-
nomic commerce with the Castro regime. But
in reality, five Rio Treaty countries and four
other hemisphere countries already have
such ties, and others may establish such ties.

The position of the United States at this
meeting was one of absolute neutrality, and
we abstained on the resolution. The outcome
— minus U.S. lobbying in any direction —
demonstrates that Latin America does not
have a single-minded view on the Cuban is-
sue. As Deputy Secretary Ingersoll said:

If this Meeting of Consultation has not produced
a conclusive result, it has at least aired in a con-
structive way the fact that there is no easy solution
to the problem of a country which deals with some
on the basis of hostility and with others on the basis
of a more normal relationship.

He also said:

I should add that the United States looks forward
to the day when the Cuban issue is no longer a di-
visive issue for us. Cuba has absorbed far too much
of our attention in recent years. We need to turn our
energies to the more important questions. We must
not let a failure of agreement on the Cuban issue
at this time obscure our common interest in working
together toward mutually beneficial relationships on
the major issues of this decade.

Since a majority of the countries favor
removing sanctions, we have to ask ourselves
if the procedures outlined in the treaty are
appropriate; that is, should the treaty be
amended to respond to majority will. This is
one of the subjects presently being con-

22

Department of State Bulletin

sidered by the Special Committee to Study
the OAS and Recommend Changes for Re-
structuring It.

The special committee has also been re-
viewing the OAS system to assist in the de-
velopment process. Some feel the system is
deficient in that it does not provide a mech-
anism to counter what are called "coercive
acts" which, in a manner analogous to mili-
tary aggression, threaten the economic se-
curity of a country; and they advocate a
mechanism similar to that of the Rio Treaty
providing for collective denunciations, sanc-
tions, et cetera. We feel this approach to the
problems of development is wrong and that
it distracts the attention of the member
states from the real problems — and the
realistic solutions. In one modern and inter-
dependent world, numerous factors affect a
country's development, including global mon-
etary and trade developments and even
national disasters. Many are beyond the
power of any one country to cope with, and
collective action is desirable. We have pro-
posed, among other things, that the pro-
visions for consulting together be expanded.
We are working to achieve understanding
on this issue.

Only last week, as a member of the U.S.
delegation to the Quito meeting, I heard re-
peated predictions that the future of the
inter-American system itself was at stake,
that the failure of the Quito meeting to
carry out the will of the majority would
cause the entire inter-American system, in-
cluding its very important defense treaty —
the Rio Treaty — to crumble. But the system
has been accustomed to crises throughout its
long history. Eighty-four years have passed
since its institutional beginnings. Consider-
ing what has happened in the passage of
those years, in the Americas and in the
world, it is remarkable that an organization
comprised of nations of so many different
viewpoints could endure at all — but it has
endured.

Our commitment to the inter-American
system is rooted in history and national in-
terest. In my view the limitations on success
are often inherent in associations of sover-
eign states and reflect less strongly on the

validity of the structure, in this instance the
inter-American system, than on the wisdom
of the governments that are its constituents.
This was the 15th time that the Foreign
Ministers have gathered on specific political
issues since the 1948 OAS Charter of Bogota.
Most of these meetings have produced im-
portant results.

I have been involved, one way or another,
in OAS matters for nearly two decades.
Since March 1974 I have been engaged in
them full time. I am not tempted to engage
in handwringing. I have been and still am
critical, I hope constructively so, of certain
attributes and aspects of the OAS. I believe
the flaws are correctable, and intend to work
to that end. Winston Churchill's dictum about
democracy is easily transferable to the inter-
American system. But on the whole there
are more pluses than minuses, and I hope
and believe that the inter-American system
is susceptible to change and improvement
so that its many components, particularly the
OAS, can continue to serve the interests of
all who live on this portion of our shrinking
globe. If we didn't already have an OAS, we
would almost surely have to invent one.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and the Philip-
pines. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. May 1-June 5, 1974. 127 pp.

Implementation of the Lodge and Katzenbach Rec-
ommendations on the United Nations. Report
prepared for the Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs by the Department of
State. June 1974. 39 pp.

Review of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 18-20, 1974
92 pp.

Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations. Hearing before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July
16, 1974. 79 pp.

Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the
Economies of Eastern Europe. A compendium of
papers submitted to the Joint Economic Com-
mittee. August 16, 1974. 771 pp.

January 6, 1975

23

Presidential Determination on Sale
of Wheat and Rice to Syria

MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 4, 1974 "

[Presidential Determination No. 76-7]
Finding and Determination — Syria

Memorandum for the Secretary of State;
the Secretary of Agriculture

The White House,
Washington, November i, 197i.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), I here-
by:

(a) Find, pursuant to Section 103(d)(3) of the
Act, that the making of an agreement with the Gov-
ernment of Syria for the sale, under Title I of the
Act, of 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25
thousand metric tons of rice is in the national inter-
est of the United States; and

(b) Determine and certify, pursuant to Section 410
of the Act and Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961, as amended, that, in the event it
may be applicable, it is in the national interest of the
United States to waive the prohibitions contained in
those sections against assistance under Title I of the
Act for the sale to Syria of 75 thousand metric tons
of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice.

Statement of Reasons That Sales Under Title
I OF THE Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as Amended (Pub. L.
480), to Syria are in the National Interest

Syria is a key to our eflForts to achieve a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East. Our success will
depend in part on Syrian confidence in our intention
to develop a broad and constructive bilateral rela-
tionship with that country. A program for conces-
sional sales of agricultural commodities to Syria
will constitute a tangible demonstration of our in-
tended role in that regard.

In response to current Syrian needs, it is proposed

to export to that country 75 thousand metric tons of
wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice financed
under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Pub. L.
480). This amount is based on Syria's needs for not
more than one fiscal year.

In order to enter into an agreement with the Gov-
ernment of Syria for such a sale under Title I, it is
necessary that the President find and determine that
such sales would be in the national interest of the
United States. Section 103(d)(3) of Pub. L. 480 pro-
hibits the sale of agricultural commodities under
Title I of the Act to any nation which sells or fur-
nishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry
to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam any
equipment, materials, or commodities (so long as
those countries are governed by Communist re-
gimes). However, if such activities are limited to the
furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to
Cuba medical supplies, non-strategic agricultural or
food commodities, sales agreements may be made if
the President finds they are in the national interest
of the United States.

Although Syria has been trading with Cuba in re-
cent years, our information indicates that it has not
traded with North Vietnam. Syrian ships or air-
craft have not called at Cuba or North Vietnam. The
best information available indicates that current
Syrian trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic
agricultural commodities within the meaning of Sec-
tion 103(d)(3).

Section 410 applies to assistance under Title I of
Pub. L. 480 the prohibitions contained in Section
620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, relating to naturalization [sic] or expro-
priation of property owned by Americans; the pro-
hibitions of Section 620(e), however, may be waived
by the President if he determines and certifies that
such a waiver is important to the national interest
of the United States. There are several potential
claims involving property rights and interests of
Americans in Syria which might make Section 410
applicable to Syria, and these will be the subject of
separate negotiations with Syria.

The considerations noted above, however, make
the proposed sale important to the national interest
of the United States notwithstanding the prohibi-
tions contained in Sections 103(d)(3) and 410 of
Pub. L. 480.

• 39 Fed. Reg. 40005, Nov. 13, 1974.

24

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences

Scheduled January Through March ^

GATT/UNCTAD International Trade Center Joint Advisory Group Geneva Jan. 4-8

U.N. ECOSOC Organizational Meeting for 58th Session .... New York Jan. 6-9

UNIDROIT Committee of Experts on Hotelkeepers Rome Jan. 6-10

ESCAP Committee on Economic Planning Bangkok Jan. 6-14

UNCITRAL Working Group on Negotiable Instruments .... Geneva Jan. 6-17

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Social Development New York Jan. 6-24

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision, Stability, and Load Line: 17th London Jan. 13-17

Session.

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Rice: 18th Session Rome Jan. 13-17

Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises Washington .... Jan. 13-17

ILO Working Party on Structure: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 13-20

UNDP Governing Council: 19th Session New York Jan. 13-31

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for Woodworking Industries: 2d Geneva Jan. 14-24

Session.

OAS Meeting on Private International Law: 1st Session .... Panama Jan. 14-31

Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference/Exposition on Human New York Jan. 15-24

Settlements: 1st Meeting.

Customs Cooperation Council Working Party on Customs Enforce- Brussels Jan. 20-24

ment: 3d Session.

ECE Committee of Experts on Transport of Dangerous Goods . . Geneva Jan. 20-24

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Hard Fibers Manila Jan. 20-25

UNIDO Permanent Committee: 5th Session, 2d Part Vienna Jan. 20-27

WHO Executive Board: 55th Session Geneva Jan. 20-31

ITU/CCITT Working Party of Study Groups I and II Geneva Jan. 20-Feb. 4

U.N. ECOSOC Ad Hoc Working Group on Rules of Procedure . . New York Jan. 27-31

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights Working Groups . . Geneva Jan. 27-31

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods: 24th Ses- London Jan. 27-31

sion.

ECE Committee of Experts on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs Geneva Jan. 27-31

IMCO/ILO Joint Committee on Training Geneva Jan. 27-31

Customs Cooperation Council Chemists Committee Brussels Jan. 27-Feb. 1

UNCITRAL Working Group on International Shipping Legislation New York Jan. 27-Feb. 7

ICAO Committee on Aircraft Noise: 4th Meeting Montreal Jan. 27-Feb. 14

WIPO Committee of Experts on Protection of Phonograms . . . Geneva January

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Science and Technology for Develop- New York January

ment Working Group.

UNESCO/IBE Council: 11th Session Geneva January

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 13, lists
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period
January-March 1975. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCITT, International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative
Committee; EGA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC,
Economic and Social Council; ESCAP, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; FAO, Food
and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atom-
ic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion; ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross; IGOSS, Integrated Global Ocean Station System;
IHD, International Hydrological Decade; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, Inter-
national Telecommunication Union; OAS, Organization of American States; UNCITRAL, United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; UNIDROIT, Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization;
WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

January 6, 1975 25

ICAO Panel on Application of Space Techniques Relating to

Aviation: 6tli Meeting. . , ^, i, , r,

UNESCO/IOC Working Committee for an Integrated Global Ucean
Station System: 4th Session.

ECE Inland Transport Committee ,' ,' o' '■ '

IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment: 13th Session

U.N ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations .

U.n! Preparatory Committee for Nonproliferation Treaty Review
Conference: 3d Meeting.

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights . . . • • ■ • . •

ICRC Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts: 2d Session.

U.N Geneva Group Consultations

UNESCO/IOC Working Committee for IGOSS and WHO Execu-
tive Committee on Meteorological Aspects of Ocean Affairs: 4th
Joint Meeting. .

U.N. Conference on the Relation of States and International Orga-
nizations.

Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions ....

IMCO Legal Committee: 25th Session

UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for the Coopera-
tive Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 7th
Session

UNCITRAL Working Group on International Sale of Goods . .

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 8th Session

Customs Cooperation Council Harmonized System Committee: 5th
Session.

U.N. ECOSOC Policy and Coordination Committee

U.N. Outer Space Committee Legal Subcommittee

WIPO Government Experts on Revision of the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property.

ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Proce-
dures.

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport

IMCO Ad Hoc Working Group on the IMCO Convention: 1st Ses-
sion.

FAO Committee on Wood-Based Panel Products: 4th Session . .

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs

ILO Governing Body: 195th Session

WIPO Coordination Committee: Extraordinary Session . . . .

U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission

ECE Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental
Problems.

ECA Conference of Ministers

Customs Cooperation Council Working Party of the Technical
Committee: 9th Session.

IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 14th Session . .

ESCAP: 31st Session

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (resumed) . . .

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 17th Session . .

WMO Tropical Experiment Board: 7th Session

IAEA Board of Governors

UNESCO/IHD Bureau: 16th Session

ECE Senior Economic Advisers . .

UNESCO/IOC Executive Council of the Intergovernmental Ocean-
ographic Commission: 5th Session

Customs Cooperation Council: 87th and 88th Sessions

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 18th Meeting

ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels: 17th Session .

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination . . . .

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 6th Session

ITU/CCITT Working Party III and Study Group I

UNIDO: 2d General Conference

WIPO Permanent Committee, Legal-Technical Program for Acqui-
sition by Developing Countries of Technology Related to In-
dustrial Property.

Montreal January or

February

Paris Feb. 3

Geneva Feb. 3-7

London Feb. 3-7

New York Feb. 3-7

Geneva Feb. 3-14

Geneva Feb. 3-Mar. 7

Geneva Feb. 3-Apr. 18

Geneva Feb. 4-5

Paris Feb. 4-12

Vienna Feb. 4-Mar. 15

Washington .... Feb. 10-14

Geneva Feb. 10-14

London Feb. 10-14

Jamaica Feb. 10-14

New York Feb. 10-21

Geneva Feb. 10-21

Brussels Feb. 10-21

New York Feb. 10-28

New York Feb. 10-Mar. 7

Geneva Feb. 11-17

Geneva Feb. 17-21

Geneva Feb. 17-21

London Feb. 17-21

New Delhi Feb. 17-21

Geneva Feb. 17-Mar. 7

Geneva Feb. 17-Mar. 7

Geneva Feb. 18

New York Feb. 18-28

Geneva Feb. 24-28

Nairobi Feb. 24-28

Brussels Feb. 24-28

London Feb. 24-28

New Delhi Feb. 26-Mar. 7

Geneva February

London February

Geneva February

Vienna February

Paris February

Geneva Mar. 3-7

Venice Mar. 3-8

Brussels Mar. 3-14

Washington .... Mar. 3-22

Geneva Mar. 10-14

London Mar. 10-14

New York Mar. 10-14

Geneva Mar. 10-21

Geneva Mar. 10-21

Lima Mar. 12-26

Geneva Mar. 17-21

26

Department of State Bulletin

ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 32d Session

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program

3d U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: 3d Session ....

Customs Cooperation Council Valuation Committee: 66th and 67th
Sessions.

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning
Containers.

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Natural Resources

FAO Study Group on Oilseeds, Fats, and Oils

UNCITRAL: 8th Session

U.N. Consultative Committee of Experts on the International
Women's Year Conference.

ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in
Europe Regional Planning Group: 10th Meeting.

ICAO Automated Data Interchange System Panel: 6th Meeting

UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign To
Save the Monuments of Nubia: 25th Session.

UNESCO Meeting of Government Experts on the International
Recognition of Studies, Diplomas, and Degrees in Higher Edu-
cation in the Arab States.

WIPO Joint Ad Hoc Committee on the International Patent Clas-
sification, Strasbourg Agreement.

Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Latin America

WMO Panel on Meteorological Satellites: 2d Session

Geneva Mar. 17-21

London Mar. 17-21

Rome Mar. 17-25

Geneva Mar. 17-May 10

Brussels Mar. 18-27

Geneva Mar. 24-28

Tokyo Mar. 24-Apr. 4

Rome Mar. 26-28

Geneva March

Geneva March

Paris March

Montreal March

Aswan March

Middle East .... March

Geneva March

Buenos Aires .... March

Geneva March

U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts
To Solve Refugee Problems

Following is a statement made in Commit-
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Repre-
sentative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on
November 25.

USUN press release 178 dated November 25

The occasion for the review of the annual
report of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees ( UNHCR )i is always
something of a sad one; for we must then
focus our attention on the worldwide phe-
nomenon of refugees, a picture of suffering,
deprivation, and desolation. Refugee prob-
lems differ widely from each other in their
origin and in their nature. But they all pre-
sent a picture of uprooted, homeless human
beings casting their lot among and desper-
ately placing their hopes in the more for-
tunate people of other lands.

But against this facade of tragedy we have
reason for some solace and even some opti-
mism. Surely we must all take heart from

U.N. doc. A/9612 and addenda.

the deeply constructive and determined ef-
forts of the High Commissioner and his Of-
fice as they direct the rehabilitation of the
refugees. Indeed, the Office of the UNHCR—
concerned as it is with rebuilding the lives of
those who have been victims of oppression,
persecution, warfare — stands as a shining
symbol of man's humanitarian endeavor in
behalf of his fellow man. The variety and
complexity of the High Commissioner's wide-
ranging services for refugees are a tribute
to the conscientious and resourceful manner
in which he approaches his task.

During the past year, as in previous years,
the UNHCR has devoted special attention
where needed to the rehabilitation of se-
verely handicapped refugees. These are ref-
ugees who for any of a variety of physical,
mental, or social disabilities are completely
unable to fend for themselves. Through tire-
less efforts and through unmatched exper-
tise, working on an individual case basis, the
UNHCR has continued to develop satisfac-
tory solutions for these otherwise helpless
individuals. The UNHCR program for the
handicapped refugees is surely in the highest
humanitarian tradition of the United Na-
tions and reflects great credit upon it.

January 6, 1975

27

Once again my government wishes to
stress in this forum the overriding impor-
tance among the High Commissioner's mani-
fold activities of his function of providing
international protection for refugees. It is
difficult to overemphasize the significance to
refugees of insuring liberal asylum policies
and practices and, above all, of making cer-
tain that no refugee is required to return to
any country where he would face persecu-
tion. It is the High Commissioner's task to
work unceasingly toward affording such
guarantee. His chief tools in so doing are the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees. As the com-
mittee knows, article 33 of the convention
contains an unequivocal prohibition upon
Contracting States against the refoulement
of refugees "in any manner whatsoever" to
territories where their life or freedom would
be threatened on grounds of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion.

But beyond the insuring of asylum for ref-
ugees, the High Commissioner, through his
international protection role, is also charged
with securing for refugees the status and
rights within asylum countries or third coun-
tries which will enable them to live in dig-
nity, to become self-supporting, and to cease
being refugees. Here again the international
treaties which I have mentioned, the Refugee
Convention and Protocol, form the principal
instruments for the High Commissioner in
securing for refugees the cardinal element of
protection.

The High Commissioner, Prince Sadrud-
din Aga Khan, in paragraph 22, page 6, of
his annual report, has deplored the fact that
during the past year certain countries have
repatriated refugees involuntarily, directly
contrary to the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and to article 33 of the Refugee
Convention. My government join.s with the
High Commissioner in condemning the inhu-
mane practice of refoulement. The principle
that refugees must not be repatriated against
their will, and the right of a refugee to seek

and secure asylum, have become ever more
firmly embedded in international law. The
general application of non-refoulement
should be facilitated by the increasing ac-
ceptance of the maxim that the granting of
asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act
and should not be regarded as an unfriendly
act by any state. My government will con-
tinue to attach primary importance, as con-
cerns the work of the UNHCR, to his role of
international protection.

We are gratified to note in this connection
that the High Commissioner in his annual
report characterizes his role of international
protection as "the prime function of UNHCR
and the cornerstone of the work of assistance
to refugees." My government wishes to com-
mend the High Commissioner for the empha-
sis he has placed on this aspect of his du-
ties during the past year. We note particu-
larly that during the year the High Commis-
sioner made a renewed worldwide effort —
both through public appeal and through in-
dividual letters to governments — recommend-
ing strongly to those nations which have not
yet acceded to the protocol or convention that
they do so. The rights for refugees which are
embodied in these international treaties can
lead to just and lasting solutions to refugee
problems in humanitarian terms. Such solu-
tions in turn can help promote the reduction
of tensions, the solution of broader issues,
and the stability of concerned nations.

Last year, once again, the High Commis-
sioner conducted his material assistance pro-
gram in a highly constructive and imagina-
tive manner. We note that the UNHCR de-
voted the major share of total financial com-
mitments under the program to problems in
Africa, where the need is very great. The
United States is fully in accord with that
commitment. At the same time, we observe
that the High Commissioner has pursued his
material assistance program with equal ef-
fectiveness in Latin America, Europe, and
the Middle East. We salute the High Com-
missioner for his promptness, effectiveness,
and flexibility in meeting the diverse chal-

28

Department of State Bulletin

lenges involved in the relief and rehabilita-
tion of refugees in many categories world-
wide.

It should not pass unnoticed that the
UNHCR in all cases concerns himself at
once with the total task of rehabilitating the
refugee so that he can cease being a refugee
and can take his place as a self-supporting
person in the society of his new country. The
combination of rights for refugees, secured
through the international protection func-
tion, and the tangible assistance and re-
habilitation of the refugees which the mate-
rial assistance program affords gives the
refugee the opportunity to live in dignity,
self-respect, and self-sufficiency.

My country has a national heritage of con-
cern for oppressed and homeless refugees.
That concern dates back to the very founding
of our Republic 200 years ago and is ex-
pressed today in part through our worldwide
support for refugee assistance programs.
During fiscal year 1974 the United States
contributed some $174 million, primarily in
cash but also in food commodities, to assist
refugees all over the world who fall within
the concern of the UNHCR, and some 3149
million additionally for refugees not within
the UNHCR mandate.

The past year has been an eventful one for
the UNHCR in relation to the carrying out of
the special tasks entrusted to it by the Sec-
retary General under the UNHCR "good of-
fices" function. It is indeed fortunate that
the High Commissioner is willing and com-
petent to respond so ably in meeting special
emergency problems which lie beyond the
normal boundaries of UNHCR concern. The
UNHCR has perhaps-unequaled experience
among United Nations agencies in dealing
with emergency humanitarian needs of peo-
ple and in solving their related problems.
Thus we note that during the past year the
High Commissioner has been deeply in-
volved in the repatriation of uprooted Pak-
istanis and Bengalees, in completing the
search for homes for Asians who had to leave
Uganda, with commencing an initiative to-

ward the relief and rehabilitation of uprooted
and displaced persons in all areas of Viet-
Nam and Laos, with the relief and resettle-
ment of refugees in and from Chile, and in
carrying out his assigned role as coordinator
of humanitarian assistance in Cyprus.

My government strongly endorses the man-
ner in which the High Commissioner has
performed these imposing tasks. There can
be no doubt that the successful implementa-
tion and conclusion of the two-way repatria-
tion movement between Bangladesh and Pak-
istan contributed to reconcilation on the sub-
continent, as the governments concerned have
themselves declared. We welcome the High
Commissioner's initiative in Indochina and
will cooperate with it, as we have with re-
spect to the UNHCR activities in behalf of
Chilean refugees. The international commu-
nity may take heart and solace in the deter-
mined manner in which the UNHCR has suc-
cessfully found permanent homes for every
one of the Uganda Asians of undetermined
nationality who had previously been moved
by the UNHCR to transit centers in Europe.

Finally, my Government is deeply gratified
at the vigorous and successful manner in
which the UNHCR is discharging his special
role, assigned to him by the Secretary Gen-
eral, as coordinator for humanitarian assist-
ance in Cyprus. The United States has been
pleased to respond to the High Commis-
sioner's appeal for $22 million for this pur-
pose with the pledge of a contribution of
$7.3 million, in addition to the $3.2 million
in assistance which we had provided before
the UNHCR assumed this task.

My government feels strongly that the in-
crease in magnitude of the High Commis-
sioner's material assistance program, and
the increasing calls upon the UNHCR to use
his "good offices" in situations which nor-
mally do not fall within UNHCR concern
(such as the Cyprus problem and the South
Asian repatriation program) should not be
allowed to impede or infringe upon the High
Commissioner's first priority to provide in-
ternational protection for refugees who are

January 6, 1975

29

the regular concern of the UNHCR Office. I
do not suggest that the High Commissioner
has in any way been delinquent in carrying
out his protection mandate. I merely wish to
stress that my government, like the High
Commissioner, attaches primary importance
to international protection among all
UNHCR activities.

The wide-ranging and apparently ever-
increasing scope of UNHCR activities in the
field of material assistance — both for refu-
gees who are normally of UNHCR concern
and for those assisted under his "good of-
fices"—surely justifies the High Commis-
sioner's request that the General Assembly
authorize him to allocate up to $2 million an-
nually from the UNHCR Emergency Fund.
Experience has shown that these allocations,
up to $500,000 for any one emergency, are
desperately needed in crisis situations. My
government strongly supports this proposal.

It is noted that the committee is again to
consider the question of whether to establish
a definite date for the convening of a confer-
ence of plenipotentiaries to finalize the draft
convention on territorial asylum. The United
States is of course eager to see the advance-
ment in the world of recognition and imple-
mentation of the important humane principle
of asylum. We support therefore the conven-
ing in due course of a conference of plenipo-
tentiaries toward the finalization and ulti-
mate adoption of an effective, realistic treaty
on asylum. The present draft is a promising
start toward such a convention. We believe,
however, that the draft raises quite a number
of questions which need to be resolved and
that it requires considerable work. The next
step, in our view, therefore is to convene a
committee to perform the task of perfecting
the present draft. We believe that the draft
which emanates from this committee should
then be resubmitted to governments for their
consideration prior to the setting of any def-
inite date for a final conference of plenipo-
tentiaries. I would like to stress that it is our
belief that such a procedure would contribute
to the prospects for ultimately opening for
accession a treaty which would receive wide
support among nations.

I cannot conclude my remarks without
making one more observation on the work of
the High Commissioner and his staff. We
have all heard others express the well-de-
served tributes to him for his work, his ded-
ication, and his zeal in looking after those
who need and needed his help. Yet all this
would not have been possible had it not been
for the confidence and support my colleagues
and their governments were able to give him.
I wish therefore to express my government's
appreciation, to which, if I may, I add my
own personal thanks, to all of you for making
possible the ways and means for the High
Commissioner to be able to act with dispatch
and with compassion in mitigating hard-
ships among those who needed us and in
giving some basis for hope, to those who
yearned for it, that mankind had not for-
saken them.

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
10017.

Economic and Social Council

World Population Conference background papers:

International mortality trends: some main facts
and implications. Prepared by George J. Stol-
nitz, professor of economics, Indiana University.
E/CONF.60/CBP/17. June 4, 1974. 29 pp.

Population, food supply and agricultural develop-
ment. Prepared by the Food and Agriculture
Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/25. June 4,
1974. 27 pp.

Health trends and prospects in relation to popu-
lation and development. Prepared by the World
Health Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/26. June
5, 1974. 51 pp.

Summary country statements concerning popula-
tion change and development. E/CONF.60/
CBP/33. June 21, 1974. 68 pp.

The role of international assistance in the popu-
lation fields. Prepared by the U.N. Fund for
Population Activities. E/CONF.60/CBP/24. July
3, 1974. 36 pp.

Summaries of background papers commissioned
for the World Population Conference. E/CONF.
60/CBP/35. July 12, 1974. 73 pp.

30

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972.'

Senate advice and consent to ratification: De-
cember 16, 1974.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10,
1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention, as revised, concerning the application of
that convention to works of stateless persons and
refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered
into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention, as revised, concerning the application of
that convention to the works of certain inter-
national organizations. Done at Paris July 24,
1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS
7868.

Ratification deposited: Monaco, September 13,
1974.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use of asphyxiat-
ing, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriologi-
cal methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17,
1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928.-
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem-
ber 16, 1974 (with reservation).

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on
facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19,
1973.'

Senate advice ajid consent to ratification: De-
cember 16, 1974.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March
24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.
Notification from World Intellectual Property
Organization that ratification deposited: Spain,
November 29, 1974.
Notification from World Intellectual Property
Organization that accession deposited: Aus-
tralia, November 12, 1974.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972.'
Ratification deposited : Brazil, November 26, 1974.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.
Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 19, 1974.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel-
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.

Signature : Empresa Nacional de Telecommuni-
caciones of Bolivia, December 19, 1974.

Satellites

Agreement concerning conditions for the furnish-
ing of assistance by NASA for the launching of
the French-German Symphonic communications
satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington June 21 and 24, 1974, between France and
the United States and between the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the United States. Entered
into force June 24, 1974.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form
of an international will, with annex. Done at
Washington October 26, 1973.'
Signature : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
December 17, 1974.'

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS
7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca
December 2, 1974. Entered into force December
2, 1974.

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and
exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15,
1974.'

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem-
ber 16, 1974.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the payment to the United
States of the net proceeds from the sale of de-
fense articles by E! Salvador. Effected by ex-
change of notes at San Salvador October 24 and

' Not in force.

- Not in force for the United States.

^ With statement.

January 6, 1975

31

December 6, 1974. Entered into force December
6, 1974; effective July 1, 1974.

Israel

Agreement for sales of agricultural commoditie.s.
Signed at Washington December 16, 1974. Entered
into force December 16, 1974.

Italy

Exchange of letters concerning the application of
the convention of March 30, 1955 (TIAS 3679),
for the avoidance of double taxation and the pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income. Effected by exchange of letters at Rome
December 13, 1974. Applicable provisionally on
and after January 1, 1974.

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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
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Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pursuant
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TIAS 7833. 3 pp. 25C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7833).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree
ment with the Republic of China amending the agree
ment of April 4, 1972. TIAS 7834. 4 pp. 25^. (Cat.
No. 89.10:7834).

Food and Agriculture Organization — Amendments
to the Constitution. TIAS 7836. 6 pp. 25('. (Cat. No.
89.10:7836).

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declara-
tion on the provisional accession of the Philippines.
TIAS 7839. 8 pp. 25('-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7839).

International Trade in Textiles. TIAS 7840. 62 pp
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ment with Spain. TIAS 7841. 39 pp. 45^ (Cat. No
89.10:7841).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Republic of Korea amending and ex-
tending the agreement of November 24, 1972. TIAS
7842. 18 pp. SOt*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7842).

Tracking Station — Kwajalein Island. Agreement
with Japan. TIAS 7843. 5 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:
7843).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Portugal. TIAS 7844. 33 pp. 40('. (Cat.
No. 89.10:7844).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Republic of Viet-Nam extending the
agreement of April 22, 1959, as amended and ex-
tended. TIAS 7846. 2 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7846)

Passport Visas. Agreement with Mexico amending
the agreement of October 28 and November 10 and
12, 1953. TIAS 7847. 3 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. 89.10:
7847).

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-South Africa Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with South Africa and the
International Atomic Energy Agency amending the
agreement of July 26, 1967. TIAS 7848. 3 pp. 25f.
(Cat. No. 89.10:7848).

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pursuant
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with Thai-
land and the International Atomic Energy Agency
terminating the agreement of September 30, 1964,
and the protocol of May 16, 1974. TIAS 7849. 3 pp.
25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7849).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Thailand. TIAS 7850. 16 pp. 30^. (Cat.
No. 89.10:7850).

32

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX Jamianj 6, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 185 A

Congress. Concessional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 23

Cuba

Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the

Sanctions Against Cuba 8

U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To
Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba (Inger-
soll, Mailliard, Rogers) 8

Cyprus. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con-
ference at Brussels 1

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con-
ference at Brussels 1

Foreign Aid. Presidential Determination on

Sale of Wheat and Rice to Syria (text) . . 24

France. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con-
ference at Brussels 1

Greece. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con-
ference at Brussels 1

Human Rights. Bill of Rights Day, Human

Rights Day and Week (proclamation) . . 18

International Organizations and Conferences.

Calendar of International Conferences . . 25

Latin America. The Inter- American System:
Adjusting to Present-Day Realities (Mail-
liard) 19

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Holds News
Conference at Brussels 1

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

North Atlantic Ministerial Council Meets at

Brussels (communique) 5

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference
at Brussels 1

Organization of American States

The Inter- American System: Adjusting to

Present-Day Realities (Mailliard) .... 19
Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the

Sanctions Against Cuba 8

U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To

Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba (Inger-

soU, Mailliard, Rogers) 8

Presidential Documents

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week (proclamation) 18

Presidential Determination on Sale of Wheat

and Rice to Syria 24

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 32

Refugees. U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To

Solve Refugee Problems (Ferguson) . . 27

Spain. U.S. and Spain Hold Second Session of
Talks on Cooperation (joint communique) . 7

Syria. Presidential Determination on Sale of

Wheat and Rice to Syria (text) .... 24

Treaty Information. Current Actions ... 31

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con-
ference at Brussels 1

United Nations

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week (proclamation) 18

United Nations Documents 30

U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To Solve Refu-
gee Problems (Ferguson) 27

Name Index

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 27

Ford, President 18,24

Ingersoll, Robert S 8

Kissinger, Secretary 1

Mailliard, William S 8,19

Rogers, William D 8

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 16 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
524 of December 12 and 530 of December 13.

>o. Date Siibjert

Kissinger: death of Walfer
Lippmann.

NATO ministerial meeting com-
munique, Brussels.

Kissing:er: news conference,
Martinique.

Britton sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Barbados and to Gre-
nada (biographic data).

Kissinger: Board of Foreign
Scholarships dinner.

Government Advisory Commit-
tee on International Book and
Library Programs.

Kissinger, Linowitz: remarks
following meeting, 12/17.

U.S.-Japan bilateral fisheries
agreements.

Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs, Jan. 21.

Biographic data on Secretary
Kissinger.

*531

12/16

532

12/16

t533

12/16

*534

12/17

t535

12/17

*536

12/17

t537

12/18

t538

12/18

*539

12/19

*540 12/20

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

j s. government printing office

washington. dc. 20402

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W/s^s-

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1855

January 13, 1975

PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING OF FRANCE

MEET IN MARTINIQUE 33

DEPARTMENT REVIEWS MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE STRA'?EGY

TO RESOLVE THE OIL CRISIS

Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 45

U.N. REJECTS MOVE TO CHANGE REPRESENTATION OF CAMBODIA
Statement by Ambassador Scali and Text of Resolution 50

JAN2CI !975

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I

Vol. LXXII, No. 1855
January 13, 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washinerton, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

,'i2 issues plus semiannual indexes.

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approved by the Director of the Office of

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Note: Contents of this publication are not

copyrighted and items contained herein may be

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides tlie public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing of France
Meet in Martinique

President Ford and President Valery Gis-
card d'Estaing met in Martinique December
lU-16. Following are remarks by the two
Presidents npon President Ford's arnval on
December H, their exchange of toasts at a
dinner given by President Giscard d'Estaing
that evening, their exchange of toasts at a
dinner given by President Ford on December
15, the transcript of a neivs conference held
by Secretary Kissinger on December 16, and
the text of a communique issued on Decem-
ber 16.

WELCOMING CEREMONY, DECEMBER 14

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23

President Giscard d'Estaing ^

Dear Mr. President: It is a great honor
for this French land of the West Indies to
welcome the President of the United States
of America.

It is a real pleasure for me to extend to
you and to all those accompanying you a
most cordial welcome. As soon as you came
into office, we both felt that we should
establish a direct and personal contact. Such
a contact is in keeping with the traditional
relations between France and the United
States. And in the present circumstances,
we thought this would be especially useful.

Faced with the enormous changes taking
place throughout the world, our two countries
have, in different capacities and to various
degrees, responsibilities to bear.

Belonging to the community of liberal de-

' President Giscard d'Estaing spoke in French
on all three occasions.

mocracies, their personality and their situa-
tion leave them sometimes — quite naturally,
I would say — to assume different stands in
the face of such changes. However, too old
are their ties of friendship for them not to
wish to harmonize such stands whenever
necessary, and they are too deeply attached
to the same ideal of freedom, progress, and
peace not to be determined to succeed.

All this points to the importance of our
meeting, as stressed by our partners in the
European Community, hence also the frank-
ness and cordiality with which I trust our
talks will start and be concluded.

Mr. President, France of the Martinique
offers to you and all those accompanying you
its charm and its beauty. From the bottom
of our heart, I wish you an excellent stay.
Welcome, Mr. President.

President Ford

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing,
ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for your
most gracious welcome to this beautiful,
gorgeous island. I am delighted to be here.

Mr. President, this is an opportunity for
us to become personally acquainted and to
discuss the serious issues which confront our
two countries. Our meeting vividly demon-
strates the importance we attach to working
together.

General Lafayette stopped here on his way
to assist America to achieve its independ-
ence. The friendship of our two countries
spans the oceans as well as the centuries. It is
fitting that you and I, both given responsibili-
ties for leadership in our respective countries
this year, are taking this early opportunity

January 13, 1975

33

to address problems of common interest and
common concern.

We must combine our efforts with those
of our friends and our allies if we are to
meet the challenges of the last quarter of
the 20th century. The list of the challenges
is long, including such vital issues as food,
energy, finance, and of course the fundamen-
tal security of our people and the quest for
further reductions in international tensions.

Just as our talks mark the beginning of
a personal relationship, I am confident that
our nations will reaflirm the tradition of
of Franco-American cooperation in great en-
deavors.

I look forward to our meetings for the ex-
changes they will permit and our resulting
understandings. In meeting here, we of
course will be mindful not only of American
and French interests but the contributions
our efforts can make toward a more peaceful,
stable, and prosperous world.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, DECEMBER 14

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23

President Giscard d'Estaing

Mr. President: A meeting between France
and the United States is always a rendezvous
of freedom and friendship. And what could
be a better place for it than this island of
Martinique, which cherishes the proud mem-
ory of having served as a naval base for the
French fleet during the American War of
Independence, and in two years' time, we
will be celebrating together the successful
outcome of that event.

It was in the name of freedom that our
friendship was born, and we shall celebrate
its 200th anniversary at the same time as
the bicentennial of American independence.

It was also in the name of freedom that
twice in the course of this centuiy the
active solidarity of the United States en-
abled France to preserve or to regain her
independence.

Different as we may be, what appeals so
much to us, the French, is all that in the
United States symbolizes and means free-

dom: your vast spaces, your openness to
new ideas and bold endeavors, your mastery
of technology, which gives man his power
over nature and lightens his burden.

Freedom and friendship have stamped
their mark on the relations between our two
countries. Freedom allows for their frank-
ness and independence; friendship demands
mutual understanding and cooperation.

This spirit of free dialogue and trust be-
tween partners who recognize the equality
of their rights and duties, even if they are
not equal in terms of resources or power,
is characteristic of Franco-American rela-
tions, and there is nothing to prevent that
the same spirit be applied to solving the
major problems of the world today.

For our part, we express the wish that
this spirit inspire the relations between the
United States and the Europe that we are
striving patiently — and we are bound to say
slowly — to build.

It is only on condition that it can exist by
its own accord that Europe will be for the
United States a firm and reliable partner and
for the world a factor of balance and peace.

We also wish that this spirit of dialogue
should govern our thinking on the profound
changes in the world scene.

As you were mentioning, you yourself,
Mr. President, on your arrival here, the
path of consultation, which is as far re-
moved from that of confrontation as it is
from that of capitulation, is the only one
which is in keeping with the political, eco-
nomic, and human needs of our time.

It is the path we followed when it was
time to emerge from the cold war and, on our
war-torn continent, to organize detente, en-
tente, and cooperation, while maintaining
actively our desire for independence in safe-
guarding our security.

It is the path we recommend be followed in
the Middle East, where, in spite of the
remarkable efforts of American diplomacy
and the useful progress it has achieved, the
situation remains a threatening one. A just
and lasting settlement must, in our view, take
into account the three legitimate aspirations
of all parties concerned — those of the State
of Israel, to live in peace within secure and

34

Department of State Bulletin

guaranteed boundaries; those of the Arab
states, to recover their territorial integrity;
and those of the Palestinian people, to have,
as all peoples, a homeland.

It is also through consultation that we shall
succeed in finding a solution to the problem
caused by the increase in oil prices. This in
no way excludes a prior harmonization of the
positions within each of the major categories
involved. It, however, presupposes that the
purpose of this harmonization process be
to prepare the meeting at the same table and
at a fixed date of countries willing to reconcile
their respective points of view in the peace-
ful interests of the world.

Mr. President, we shall be having talks in a
climate of mutual trust on all these subjects
of concern to the world today. These talks
will once again demonstrate that the frank-
ness of our discussions draws us together
much more than it divides us, as should be
between partners and allies when they have
for each other, as I have for your country, a
sense of their dignity and their sovereignty.

Mr. President, we all deeply regret the
absence of Mrs. Ford, and I would like to ask
you to be kind enough to convey to her our
very warm and respectful wishes for a
prompt recovery.

I drink this toast in your honor, Mr.
President, as well as to the great people of the
United States, to whom the French people,
through me, extend their greetings in testi-
mony of our two-centuries-old and ever-
young friendships like our two countries.

Thank you.

President Ford

Mr. President: The hospitality extended to
me has reflected in the warmth of the climate
of this most remarkable island and the spirit
of your kind words of welcome, and I am
deeply grateful.

I am very, very proud to be the first
American President in ofiice to visit this part
of the Caribbean, and I would like to express
again my appreciation to you personally for
suggesting Martinique as the location of our
first meeting.

The United States and France, we all

know, have been very, very close. We have
been extremely close friends for over two
centuries. From our American Revolution
through the darkest days of World War II,
our countries have stood together in mo-
ments of crisis. And today, of fundamental
importance to our countries and to the West,
a strong Atlantic alliance safeguards our
security.

As old friends and allies, Mr. President,
we have much to talk about. On many, many
points we shall agree; on others we may
differ. But it is of the greatest importance,
in my judgment, that we will talk with full
candor since we share the same ideals. A re-
lationship of confidence is absolutely essen-
tial. It is only through such a relationship,
Mr. President, that our common objectives
can best be served and our differing views
reconciled.

As in the past, we jointly face, Mr. Presi-
dent, major challenges. This time the im-
mediate danger is not war, but the problems
of peace: inflation, balance of payments
deficits, energy shortages, and, for many
throughout the world, shortages of food it-
self. These problems unfortunately accen-
tuate the interdependence of nations and the
need for communication and cooperation.

At stake is the stability of every economy,
the welfare of every nation. Unilateral
measures, Mr. President, can no longer suf-
fice in solving problems of such universal
dimension.

Mr. President, you recently described this
situation very vividly when you said the
world is unhappy. Indeed, the world is
troubled. But if we are to transcend our
difficulties and successfully meet our chal-
lenges we, France and the United States,
must cooperate.

We face a major problem in the field of
energy. In dealing with it on the basis of
consumer solidarity, we seek constructive
dialogue, not confrontation. The United
States is convinced that cooperation and soli-
darity among the consumer nations mark
the surest way to reach understanding with
the producer nations, which we all desire.

I am also looking forward, Mr. President,
to exchanging impressions on East- West re-

January 13, 1975

35

lations and on our recent meetings with
General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union]. I am sure
we will all agree that all of us in the West
will benefit from close relationships as the
policy of detente continues to develop.

Our interdependence requires that we —
together with our friends and our partners
— join in concerted measures or responses
to the dangers which confront us all. Let us
continue our historic relationship with re-
newed spirit and redoubled effort, as good
and responsible friends.

Our common heritage gives me confidence
that we will continue our joint endeavors
for peace and stability in the world. Mr.
President, it is with this objective that I
look forward to our discussions tomorrow.
I have every hope that our talks will
strengthen the friendship between us, both
in a bilateral sense and also as members
of the alliance which Americans regard as
the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the spirit of
strengthening our historic ties, I ask all of
you to stand and to raise your glasses in
honor of the President of the French Re-
public and his lovely wife.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, DECEMBER 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23

President Ford

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing,
our distinguished guests: Let me say with
great personal conviction and strong feel-
ings, we have enjoyed being here in a part
of France. The warmth of the welcome of
the people, the superb atmosphere created
by the beauties of nature, have made this
trip a wonderful experience for all of us.

Mr. President, the United States within
a relatively few months is going to be cele-
brating our 200th anniversary. Whenever
we think about that anniversary, we can't
help but feel the participation that France
played in the achievement of our independ-

ence. July 4, 1976, will bring back many,
many memories of the help and assistance
that France gave to our country at a very
diflicult and controversial period in our early
history in America.

It is my understanding, Mr. President,
that one of your ancestors. Admiral d'Es-
taing, did have an intere.st in and did help
us at a period when we, the United States,
were in our formative years. For that we
thank you, and for all of the other great
Frenchmen who were assisting America in
our early days.

It is my understanding, Mr. President,
that France is making a very meaningful
contribution to our 200th anniversary with
the "sight and sound" program that will be
a highlight in Washington for the many,
many thousands who will visit the Nation's
Capital. We thank you for this contribution,
and we are grateful for your feeling that
France should participate in this way.

If I might now turn to our own personal
relationship, which I say without any hesi-
tancy or qualification — it was a pleasure to
meet you and to have the opportunity of
broadening a relationship and developing a
friendship. It seems to me this can be
meaningful in our relations between France
and the United States. But even more mean-
ingful, on a far broader basis, I am grateful
for your statesmanship; I am most appre-
ciative for your views that we have ex-
changed here on this occasion in a part of
France.

And so, Mr. President, may I offer a toast
to you and Madame Giscard d'Estaing and to
the Republic of France. It is a pleasure and
a privilege.

President Giscard d'Estaing

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Mr.
President, we have both come into office
very recently, only a few months ago, and
so — this is a source of deep satisfaction —
we are both extremely young. Indeed, one
can say it is a secret of youth, in fact, to be
elected President.

Now, we are, however, young Presidents

36

Department of State Bulletin

of countries whose relations are very long-
standing, indeed, as you yourself have just
mentioned. And indeed, all you have to do
is to look behind you at Fort-de-France —
Fort-de-France, which has carried that name
for three centuries and two centuries ago
harbored the French fleet that sailed off the
coast of the then young and new United
States.

I would add that the relations between
France and the United States are not merely
a matter of what you might call the pictur-
esque site of history or simply a matter of
stories on the subject. No, it is something
which reflects a deep and reciprocal mutual
interest; it is something which has been
borne out in numerous circumstances. For
instance, when at the time of the First
World War the United States came to the
defense of France, the landing of the Amer-
icans on French territory was met with
tremendous enthusiasm on the part of the
French population.

And so when at the end of the Second
World War, I myself was involved in the
last stages of the war, the unit that I served
in was a part of the 1st French Army which
itself was under the 7th U.S. Army.

But the great problems of our times —
even to those of us who, like ourselves, are
deeply attached to tradition — the big prob-
lems of our time, I say, are in fact ahead of
us and will call for considerable imagina-
tion and action. And that is why it was very
important for me, Mr. President, to know
whether these new problems and tasks could,
in fact, be tackled with the very great coun-
try that you represent in a spirit of openness
and mutual understanding.

And so, it was important for me to estab-
lish this personal contact with you yourself,
sir, and the distinguished persons accom-
panying you. And yesterday morning, when
I was meeting you at the airport, it occurred
to me that during these two days we were
in fact going to, perhaps, take initiatives
and perform actions which would lead to
solutions which could well have a lasting
effect not only on our own relations but also,
perhaps, on world affairs.

The results of our talks will be embodied
in a communique which will be issued at the
end of tomorrow morning, and if I were to
divulge right now what the results of our
talks have been, this would deprive the
members of our staff from the pleasures of
the late evening and early morning during
which they would engage in the arduous
task of preparing the suitable form of
words.

But what I can say something about is
the atmosphere of our talks, and what I
would like to mention is their very cordial
nature, the very simple way in which our
talks have proceeded, the great frankness
and the clarity of your positions, and the
great competence with which you have led
our discussions.

Now, on international gatherings or occa-
sions such as this, people tend to wonder,
in fact, who won, who came out on top, who
gave the concessions, who, in fact, was the
victor. But at the very outset, you vdll re-
call that I said it was my hope that, in fact,
there would be neither a matter of conces-
sions nor victors in a case like this, but we
should both emerge from these talks with
the feeling that we had, in fact, achieved
something useful, realistic, and worthwhile
in furthering the solutions of the problems
that we are in fact discussing.

And could I say very sincerely, Mr. Pres-
ident, how very much Madame Giscard
d'Estaing and myself deeply regret the ab-
sence of Mrs. Ford. We had been looking
forward very much to meeting her here on
this occasion, and I may say that some of
the arrangements that had been made had
been made precisely in anticipation of the
pleasure of, for instance, having her with
us today at lunch. Now, there is one great
advantage of this situation, and that is that
the rights of international affairs dictate
that one cannot, twice running, invite the
same head of state. That means, therefore,
that despite the great pleasure that this
would afford us, it would not be possible for
us to invite you, sir, again so soon. But we
could, of course, invite Mrs. Ford. And we
would very much hope that she would accept,

January 13, 1975

37

and that you would be kind enough to
accompany her.

Now, people in this world of ours very
often ask themselves all sorts of questions
and, indeed, one of the things they often
wonder about, apparently, is why statesmen,
in fact, are statesmen and why they accept
to sacrifice many aspects of their existence
to the responsibilities of state.

Now, as far as you are concerned — and I
have seen this during our talks— and as far
as I am concerned, the reason, perhaps, for
which we do so is that we feel that we have,
perhaps, a contribution to make in further-
ing the affairs of the world.

Now, the fact that the responsibilities that
we have to shoulder at this particular time in
history are particularly heavy at the same
time means that our contribution will be a
significant contribution.

Now, it is clear, however, that the affairs
of mankind and the peace of the world do
not depend solely on the action or the efforts
of one country alone — however big that
country may be — but will always depend on
the combination, on the conjunction of the
efforts of several. And I now know that it
is quite clear that we will be able to work
together.

Mr. President, when the French fleet left
these waters two centuries ago for the North
American Continent, there were doubtless,
at the time of departure, great festivities
on board, and I can well imagine that my
ancestor may well have offered a toast on
that occasion which would probably have
had something to do with the vnshes that
he would have expressed concerning the con-
tinent that they were about to discover and
would have expressed their hopes and their
expectations.

Now, this evening, today, the situation to
some extent is the other way around in that
it is we who are hosting you here in Marti-
nique, but the French Martinique of two
centuries ago and the French Martinique of
today, Mr. President, are deeply proud of
having here the visit today of the President
of the United States. Our friend the
President.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
DECEMBER 16

Press relpase 533 dated December 16

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle-
men, we have distributed the communique,
which is substantially self-explanatory. Let
me make a few preliminary points.

First, as the President of the Republic
said last night in his toast, both sides ap-
proached these discussions with the attitude
not of who would get the maximum number
of concessions from the other or who would
be the victor in the negotiations — because
we don't think of each other as antagonists,
but as allies.

We looked at the outstanding problems,
especially in the field of energy and eco-
nomics, from the point of view of what was
in the mutual benefit, the benefit of Europe
and the United States, as well as the benefit
of all the interested nations around the
world. And therefore, with respect to the
energy issue, which was one of the principal
problems which was of course discussed, I
think we achieved the synthesis of the
French and American positions which took
account of the American conviction that con-
sumer cooperation was essential and the
French belief — which, as a matter of fact,
the United States has always shared — that
consumer cooperation must lead rapidly to
consumer-producer dialogue.

I would like to add that in addition to the
substance of the communique, the conversa-
tions were conducted in an atmosphere of
great cordiality and the relationship of con-
fidence that has grown up between the two
Presidents will help facilitate and guarantee
the spirit of cooperation which we believe
is one of the important results of this con-
ference.

Having attended many similar meetings
between French and American leaders, I
must say I found this atmosphere the most
positive and the one between the two leaders
and one in which as far as the United States
is concerned — the French President will un-
doubtedly speak for himself — we will con-
tinue in the exchanges that will be necessary
to implement the various aspects of the

38

Department of State Bulletin

communique as well as the cooperation that
is foreseen in the communique.

Now why don't I take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give lis a ruiv-
down on the sequence of events that are
going to happen in these conferences con-
cerning the oil crisis? Which one takes place
first, and what happens after that?

Secretary Kissinger: As the communique
says, the steps should be taken in sequence,
and the sequence is the one described in the
communique; that is to say, there will first
be an effort of some urgency to strengthen
consumer cooperation in the field of conser-
vation, of developing alternative sources of
energy, and of setting up new mechanisms
for financial solidarity.

Based on progress among the consumers,
this will then lead to a preparatory meeting
between consumers and producers, for which
we set a target date for March 1975. Of
course it depends on the progress the con-
sumers make among themselves, but the
United States will cooperate in bringing
about the preparatory conferences and ob-
viously will not use delaying tactics.

I think there is good will on all sides. We
can make substantial progress among the
consumers, and given the urgency of the
situation, in fact, we must make substantial
progress among the consumers.

After the completion of the preparatory
discussions, we have foreseen intensive con-
sultation among the consumers to develop
common positions and common attitudes
toward the consumer-producer substantive
conference. The preparatory meeting will
deal with procedure, agenda, participants,
and will not deal with substance.

This is the sequence that the two Presi-
dents have agreed upon, and again I would
like to say that the United States has not
considered its views as incompatible with
those of France. In fact, at the Washington
Energy Conference, we proposed that the
consumer cooperation should lead to con-
sumer-producer dialogue, and therefore we
welcome the French initiative, and I think
we can work cooperatively to achieve the
common objective.

Q. Will France participate in this con-
sumer effort to strengthen solidarity?

Secretary Kissinger: It says "existing in-
stitutions and agreements." There are a
number of factors. France, of course, is
not a member of the lEA [International
Energy Agency], and we have not asked
France to be a member of the IE A. It is
my impression that France will work in
parallel to the lEA in the same direction.
For example, we have had occasion to point
out that the French conservation program
is going in the same direction as that of the
lEA and in some respects goes beyond it.

The institutions or the mechanisms for
financial solidarity we had proposed in my
speech should be taken in the Group of Ten,
in which France is of course a member; and
therefore there is no difficulty about French
participation in those.

With respect to alternative sources of
energy, it may be that they are initially
discussed in the TEA, but there is also a role
there for European institutions, so we are
not concerned with the legal structure.

It is our conviction that France will work
parallel to our efforts and we will find the
legal formula by which to implement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, doesn't that kind of
informal arrangement give France the bene-
fit of consiimer organization that has al-
ready taken place without having any of
the responsibilities, for example, in oil
sharing ?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is our view
that we are concerned with the substance,
and therefore how France participates, un-
der what legal form, is not of decisive con-
cern to us.

As I pointed out, the financial institutions,
for example, are not being done in the lEA
to begin with. The conservation measures,
once they have been agreed upon, do not
really require any international party to
implement. They can be implemented on a
national basis.

I have the impression that we should stop
talking about Franco-American relations in
terms of confrontation and who is taking
advantage of whom but rather in terms of

January 13, 1975

39

practical cooperation in which the actions
of the two parties will be more important
than the legal form— and that is our atti-
tude, and it is our impression that was the
French attitude at this meeting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us
what progress, if any, was made relative
to your suggestion in Chicago of the $25
billion fund for the shoring up of those
economies that need it in light of the oil
shortage ?

Secretary Kissinger: We found the atti-
tude of the French President very positive
to this idea, and we have the impression that
France will work with us in the Group of
Ten to implement this idea.

Q. How do you account for the French
change? All of a sudden you have peace,
and it is lovely. What caused this after 10
years ?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say there
has been a French change. I described the
results of this conference, and I can only
say that both Presidents seem to me to be
convinced of the urgent problems facing
their countries and facing the industrialized
countries and, indeed, facing the whole
world.

And it was a discussion that was not con-
ducted in slogans, but in terms of the issues ;
and when you confront the issues, I think
certain conclusions are more or less inevi-
table.

I would also say that the manner in which
both Presidents conducted the conversations,
which was free of dogma on both sides —

Q. Free of what?

Secretary Kissinger: D-o-g-m-a — it is a
Latin word, not German [laughter]. — con-
tributed to the result but I don't want to
claim any changes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, leaving aside the finan-
cial side in the Group of Ten, will the French
participation in the conservation side be
through the EEC [European Economic Com-
munity] ; that is to say, are you contemplat-
ing here that the EEC will become an elec-
tive member of the IE A ?

Secretary Kissinger: This is one possi-
bility. It is not for the United States to pre-
scribe how Europe should organize its ener-
gy policy. The United States would certainly
have no objection and can see some advan-
tages in a common energy policy on the part
of Europe, and this in turn, of course, would
permit the EEC to participate as a unit in
the lEA. This is essentially up to the Euro-
peans.

Q. Do you think it will happen?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make a point.
Obviously, the spirit of what has been
agreed here in Martinique requires that
France work in parallel on the same sub-
stance as the other principal consumers, and
we believe that this can be done. This is
one device for doing it, but we are prepared
to find other consultative devices.

Q. Did you get any assurances from the
President of France that they would be will-
ing to do this at this meetiyig?

Secretary Kissinger: That they would be
prepared to have a common European en-
ergy policy?

Q. Or that EEC woidd join the IE A?

Secretary Kissinger: We did not discuss
the legal relationship of France to the lEA.
We discussed the substantive relationship of
the measures that needed to be taken ; and as
we pointed out, it is our view — and I think
it is the common view — that certain substan-
tive steps have to be taken in order to make
the consumer-producer dialogue useful. And
the United States, obviously, will know
whether these steps have been taken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the March con-
ference be confiposed of nations outside the
major oil producers and also major oil con-
sumers ?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make two
points. The March date is a target date. It
is not an absolutely fixed date, but we will
work seriously to see whether it can be im-
plemented. The original proposal was that
it might be tripartite; that is, that some of
the less developed consuming countries

40

Department of State Bulletin

might also participate. The United States
is not opposed to this in principle; or to put
it positively, the United States is prepared
for this but the exact composition of either
the preparatory or the final meeting has not
yet been settled. This is one of the issues
that has to be settled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us further
elaboration on the Mideast discussions? How
much of the time was spent talking about
the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, in the Mid-
east discussion, the French point of view
has been publicly stated and there was a full
exchange of the respective points of view.
No conclusions were reached or announced.
This was mostly in the form of bringing
about a fuller comprehension by each side
of the views of the other.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you point two
things out: What the gold agreement means
and, also, what was our original request for
compensation for the NATO bases?

Secretary Kissinger: What the gold agree-
ment means is this: That there has been a
fixed price for the valuation of gold which
does not reflect the market price, and it
means that each country is free to adopt
current market prices as the basis for eval-
uation and therefore show on its books a
value of gold reserves which corresponds
more nearly to the market price of gold,
which is about 31/2 to 4 times larger than
the fixed price of gold and therefore reflects
more accurately the capacity of the reserves
of each country to pay for deficits.

I frankly do not remember what the orig-
inal figures were. I know the French figure
that they first offered us was substantially
below $100 million, and I am certain the
figure we asked for was substantially above;
and this seemed to us to represent a fair
compromise, but I don't remember what the
figure was that we originally asked for.

Q. What of the apparent French suspi-
cions that the United States is trying to
dominate the policies of the industrialized
world and dictating its terms?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to com-
ment about French suspicions that were not
expressed at the meeting. At the meeting
we discussed how to deal with concrete
issues, and we reached the results which I
have described, so that the suspicions that
I occasionally read in the French press were
not expressed by French officials, and I
therefore don't feel the need to comment on
that.

Q. On the gold question, does the agree-
ment you have reached imply also the central
banks are free now to buy and sell gold at
the market price?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to get
into technical questions of gold purchases.
What it means is that they can value their
gold at the market price.

Q. It does mean that?

Secretary Kissinger: It goes no further
than that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it the American view
that the United States will do this or is it
going to be a totally European proposition?

Secretary Kissinger: The valuation?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: That is up to each
country.

Q. I asked about the United States. Do
you anticipate we will do it?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have the im-
pression that we will do it in the near future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it the American view
that a consumer-producer conference would
have as a principal goal lower oil prices,
and do the French share that view?

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody
agrees that lower oil prices are highly de-
sirable, and it is the American view that oil
prices should be stabilized at a lower level.
I think we all agree that regardless of what
happens to oil prices, the impact of the oil
prices on the world economy and the means
that are necessary to assure the stability of

January 13, 1975

41

the economies of the industrialized nations
as well as a fair progress for the producer
nations must be a subject of a consumer-
producer dialogue. But the preparatory
meeting is designed precisely to define the
agenda as well as the procedures of such a
dialogue, so it isn't possible to be conclusive
about it at this moment.

Q. Hoiv is this going to be proposed to
a country like Japan — consumer-producer
country conference ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know,
we have been in the closest contact with the
Government of Japan, and I had extensive
conversations with the then Foreign Minis-
ter Kimura, which have been reaffirmed by
the new Japanese Government. And of course
the French Foreign Minister had been in
Japan at about the same time that we were
there. So it is my impression that what has
been agreed upon here will have the support
of the Government of Japan and reflect ex-
actly the idea that the Government of Japan
expressed to both of us. And it is also my
view, based on conversations with the Ger-
man Chancellor and with other major con-
suming nations in the NATO meeting in
Brussels, that what was agreed to here will
elicit a wide consensus.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in elaboration on the
Middle East question, does it appear that
there was French acceptance of the U.S. idea
of a step-by-step solution to the Ay-ab-
Israeli problem?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speak
for France, particularly since the President
of the Republic is waiting to appear here.

My impression is that there is no French
disagreement with the step-by-step ap-
proach, but having a more Cartesian up-
bringing than we, France may perhaps feel
it more necessary than we do to define the
terminal point at the outset. I don't think
there is any French disagreement with the
step-by-step approach, if it can be achieved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it says in the communi-
que that there ha^ been accord on many
questions. Could you point out the questions
upon which there is disagreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not leaving
this meeting with a spirit that there has
been substantial disagreement on any ques-
tion. I think "many questions" refers to
the fact that in a limited amount of time
only particular issues could be discussed
and did not mean to imply that any issues
that were discussed were left open to dis-
agreement.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, DECEMBER 16

Communique Issued Following the Meetings of
THE President of the United States of America
and the President of the French Republic in

Martinique

The President of the United States, Gerald R.
Ford, and the President of the French Republic,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, met in Martinique De-
cember 14-16, 1974, to discuss current issues of
mutual concern. They were joined in their discus-
sions by the Secretary of State and Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs Henry
A. Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean
Sauvagnargues, and by Secretary of the Treasury
William Simon and Minister of Finance Jean-Pierre
Fourcade. The Ministers also held complementary
side talks.

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of
cordiality and mutual confidence. President Ford
and President Giscard d'Estaing welcomed the op-
portunity to conduct detailed substantive discussions
on the whole range of subjects of mutual concern.
As traditional friends and allies, the two nations
share common values and goals and the two Presi-
dents expressed their determination to cooperate
on this basis in efforts to solve common problems.

They reviewed the international situation in the
economic, financial and monetary fields.

The two Presidents agreed that the Governments
of the United States and of the European Com-
munity, in the name of which the French President
spoke on this subject, must adopt consistent eco-
nomic policies in order to be effective in avoiding
unemployment while fighting inflation. In particular,
they agreed on the importance of avoiding measures
of a protectionist nature. And they decided to take
the initiative in calling additional intergovernmental
meetings should they prove necessary for achieve-
ment of the desired consistency of basic economic
policies among industrial nations.

In the light of the rapid pace of change in inter-
national financial positions in the world today, the
Presidents were in full agreement on the desirability
of maintaining the momentum of consideration of

42

Department of State Bulletin

closer financial cooperation both within the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and through supplementary
measures. As one specific measure to strengthen
the existing financial framework, the Presidents
agreed that it would be appropriate for any Govern-
ment which wished to do so to adopt current market
prices as the basis of valuation for its gold holdings.

The two Presidents considered in depth the energy
problem and its serious and disturbing effects on
the world economy. They recognized the importance
for the USA, the EEC and other industrialized
nations of implementing policies for the conserva-
tion of energy, the development of existing and
alternative sources of energy, and the setting up
of new mechanisms of financial solidarity. They
stressed the importance of solidarity among oil im-
porting nations on these issues.

The two Presidents also exchanged views on the
desirability of a dialogue between consumers and
producers and in that connection discussed the
proposal of the President of the French Republic of
October 24 for a conference of oil exporting and
importing countries. They agreed that it would be
desirable to convene such a meeting at the earliest
possible date. They regard it as important that all
parties concerned should be better informed of their
respective interests and concerns and that har-
monious relations should be established among them
in order to promote a healthy development of the
world economy.

The two Presidents noted that their views on
these matters are complementary and, in this con-
text, they agreed that the following interrelated
steps should be taken in sequence:

— They agreed that additional steps should be
taken, within the framework of existing institutions
and agreements to which they are a party, and in
consultation with other interested consumers, to
strengthen their cooperation. In particular, such
cooperation should include programs of energy con-
servation, for the development of existing and alter-
native sources of energy and for financial solidarity.

— Based on substantial progress in the foregoing
areas, the two Presidents agreed that it will be
desirable to propose holding a preparatory meeting
between consumers and producers to develop an
agenda and procedures for a consumer/producer con-
ference. The target date for such a preparatory
meeting should be March 1975.

— The preparatory discussions will be followed
by intensive consultations among consumer countries
in order to prepare positions for the conference.

The two Presidents agreed that the actions enu-
merated above will be carried out in the most expe-
ditious manner possible and in full awareness of
the common interest in meeting this critical situa-
tion shared by the United States and France and all
other countries involved.

President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing
reviewed current developments in East-West rela-
tions. They discussed their respective meetings with
General Secretary Brezhnev, and Secretary Kis-
singer reported on his discussions with leaders of
the People's Republic of China. They exchanged
views on developments in East-West negotiations,
including the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe. They expressed their conviction that
progress in easing tensions was being made.

The two Presidents exchanged views on the pres-
ent situation in the Middle East. They agreed on
the importance of early progress toward a just and
lasting peace in that area.

President Giscard d'Estaing described current
efforts by France and other members of the Euro-
pean Community to further the process of European
unity. President Ford reaffirmed the continuing
support of the United States for efforts to achieve
European unity.

The two Presidents discussed the situation in
Indochina. They noted that progress in Laos toward
reconciliation and reunification was encouraging.

The two Presidents agreed on the need for all
parties to support fully the Paris Peace Agrreements
on Vietnam. Regarding Cambodia, they expressed
the hope that the contending parties would enter
into negotiations in the near future rather than
continuing the military struggle. They expressed
the hope that following Laos, Cambodia and Viet-
nam might also find their political way towards
civil peace.

The two Presidents renewed the pledges of both
Governments to continue close relations in the field
of defense as members of the Atlantic Alliance.
They agreed that the cooperation between France
and NATO is a significant factor in the security
of Europe.

They noted with satisfaction that the positive
steps in negotiations on SALT taken during the
Soviet-American meeting at Vladivostok have re-
duced the threat of a nuclear arms race. The two
Presidents explored how, as exporters of nuclear
materials and technology, their two countries could
coordinate their efforts to assure improved safe-
guards of nuclear materials.

The President of France indicated that his Govern-
ment was prepared to reach a financial settlement
in connection with the relocation of American forces
and bases committed to NATO from France to other
countries in 1967. The French offer of $100 million
in full settlement was formally accepted by Presi-
dent Ford.

The two Presidents concluded that the personal
contact and discussion in this meeting had demon-
strated accord on many questions and expressed
their determination to maintain close contact for
the purpose of broad cooperation in areas of com-
mon concern to the two countries.

January 13, 1975

43

President Ford Sets Import Quotas
for Cattle and Meat From Canada

A PROCL AM ATION'

Temporary Quantitative Limitation on the Im-
portation Into the United States of Certain
Cattle, Beef, Veal, Swine and Pork From Can-
ada

Whereas, Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) authorizes the
President to impose duties or other import restric-
tions on the products of any foreign country estab-
lishing or maintaining unjustifiable import restric-
tions against United States agricultural products
which impair the value of tariff commitments made
to the United States, oppress the commerce of the
United States, or prevent the expansion of trade on
a mutually advantageous basis;

Whereas, Canada has imposed unjustifiable re-
strictions on cattle and meat imports from the
United States;

Whereas, such restrictions violate the commit-
ments of Canada made to the United States, includ-
ing the provisions of Article XI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and impair the
value of tariff commitments made to the United
States, oppress the commerce of the United States
and prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually
advantageous basis; and

Whereas, I deem it necessary and appropriate to
impose the restrictions hereinafter proclaimed on
imports of cattle, beef, veal, swine, and pork, which
are the products of Canada, in order to obtain the
removal of such unjustifiable restrictions and to
provide access for United States cattle and meat
to the markets of Canada on an equitable basis;

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of
the United States of America, acting under the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and
statutes, including Section 252(a) of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), do
hereby proclaim (until such time as the President
otherwise proclaims) —

(1) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) is
amended by inserting in numerical sequence the
following new items:

Item Articles

Whenever, in any 12-month period
beginning August 12 in 1974 or
in any succeeding year, the re-
spective quantity or aggregate
quantity of the cattle, the swine,
the beef and veal, or the pork
specified below, the product of
Canada, has been entered, no
such cattle, swine, beef and veal,
or pork respectively, the product
of Canada, may be entered dur-
ing the remainder of such period:

945.01 Cattle provided for in items 100.40,

100.43. 100.45, 100.53. and 100.55
of part 1, schedule 1.

945.02 Swine provided for in item 100.85

of part 1, schedule 1.

945.03 Beef and veal, fresh, chilled,

zen, prepared, or preserved,
vided for in items 106.10
107.60. part 2B, schedule 1.

946.04 Pork, fresh, chilled, frozen.

pared or preserved, provided for
in items 106.40, 107.30 and 107.35.
part 2B, schedule 1.

Quota
Quantity

fro-
pro-
and

pre-

17,000 head (aggre-
gate quantity) .

50.000 head.

17,000.000 pounds
(aggregate quan-
tity).

36.000,000 pounds
(aggregate quan-
tity).

' No. 4335; 39 Fed. Reg. 40741, Nov. 20, 1974.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph
(1) hereof, not in excess of one-twelfth of the
respective quota quantity specified for each item in
said paragraph (1) may be entered, or withdrawn
from warehouse, for consumption during the 30 day
period beginning on the date of this proclamation.

(3) The provisions of this proclamation shall
become effective upon publication in the Federal
Register, but the provisions of paragraph (1) hereof
do not apply to any articles in excess of the respec-
tive quota quantity specified for each item in said
paragraph ( 1 ) which —

(a) prior to such date of publication, have been
duly entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption or have been released under the pro-
visions of section 448(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1448(b)), or

(b) have been entered or withdrawn pursuant to
paragraph (2) hereof.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this sixteenth day of November in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-four, and of
the Independence of the United States of America
the one hundred ninety-ninth.

44

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Department Reviews Main Elements of the Strategy
To Resolve the Oil Crisis

Statement by Thomas O. Enders

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ^

The proposal made by Secretaries Kissin-
ger and Simon [Secretary of the Treasury
William E. Simon] for a $25 billion facility
to back up capital markets over the next two
years is part of a larger strategy to resolve
the oil crisis. In this statement I propose to
review the main elements of that strategy,
situating the proposed financing facility in
relation to them.

The starting point for analysis is the belief
that unless the consumers take action to
limit their dependence on oil imports, OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] probably has the will and the capabil-
ity to maintain the real price of the oil they
export and the financial surplus they are
earning at roughly constant levels over the
next several years, and possibly indefinitely.

OPEC is earning a total income of perhaps
$110 billion at the current annual rate, of
which they spend for imports a little less
than one-half. OPEC's import expenditures
will of course rise in the future, in part be-
cause of inflation in the cost of manufactured
goods they buy (but note that the current
rate is only about 7 percent), in part because
the new affluence and the new ambition of
the producing countries will increase their
spending.

But OPEC's total income will also rise. To

' Made before the Joint Economic Committee of
the Congress on Nov. 29. The complete transcript of
the hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.

oil will be added a rapidly growing invest-
ment income. The volume of oil imports into
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development] countries will
increase as industrial growth resumes, per-
haps at a rate of 4 or 5 percent a year.

New oil may be found at a more rapid
rate, in Mexico, Peru, Malaysia, China. But
with even the poor countries such as Indo-
nesia and Nigeria disposing of unprecedented
liquid assets, the cartel may retain for years
the capacity to cut back production to sus-
tain and increase prices.

Since total OPEC income has only to grow
at a little more than one-half the annual rate
of total OPEC spending to protect the finan-
cial surplus at the $60 billion level, we must
expect that in the absence of new action by
the consumers the surplus will be sustained
indefinitely. OECD estimates that if real
prices for oil are constant, only in 1980 will
the net surplus fall to $50 billion a year, by
which time OPEC will have accumulated as-
sets of $425 billion. Any increase in the real
price of oil would be additional.

Hopeful arguments have been advanced to
convince us that this will not happen.

Some say that OPEC members will see the
damage an annual accumulation of this mag-
nitude will cause to the industrial economies
and let the real price of oil erode through in-
flation. There is no question that this would
be a prudent course for the producers to
adopt in their own interest. But we cannot
count on them to do so. Because of ideology

January 13, 1975

45

(monopoly action to raise commodity prices
is a main plank of the "New Economic Or-
der"), because of real or imagined scores to
settle for past exploitation, because of the
power and authority the new money gives,
OPEC members are unlikely to let real prices
erode if they can help it. Even if individual
countries may wish to move prices down-
ward, they are unlikely to be able to do so
alone. For as a matter of practical politics,
no country will be able to explain to its pub-
lic why it gets less for its oil than do other
OPEC members. Nor would it be a full solu-
tion simply to let prices erode by inflation;
for sinking real prices would stimulate con-
sumption again, thus slowing the absorption
of the surplus. Thus, if the real price of oil
were allowed to erode by one-third by the end
of 1980, the cumulative OPEC surplus might
fall only from $425 to about $375 billion.

Others say that OPEC will tire of accu-
mulating surpluses and will cut back produc-
tion, keeping oil in the ground as an invest-
ment rather than claims on the industrial
economies. It is possible that this will hap-
pen. But if it does, the surplus will, if any-
thing, grow; for as oil becomes scarcer, the
price it commands will go up.

The important point is not to be able to
make a precise forecast. There are too many
variables for that. What matters is that
there is a wide range of probable situations
in which the OPEC financial surplus contin-
ues essentially intact for an indefinite pe-
riod or falls only slowly.

What does that mean? It means that un-
less they act, the industrial democracies face
an inexorably rising danger of financial col-
lapse or depression, or both, over the next
decade. As oil debts pile up in the industrial
countries, first the weaker, then the stronger,
will find their credit unacceptable and will
try to balance their external accounts by re-
strictions on trade and on the level of eco-
nomic activity. But one country's success in
balancing its external accounts only will
make the problem more urgent for others.
For whether the industrial world runs its
economies at a high level of activity or at a
low level, the deficit to the oil producers will
remain massive. Unless we are all willing to

take 20 percent unemployment, there is no
way that deflation or restrictions can solve
the problem.

But there is more. It is impossible that
Europe, Japan, and America could undergo
a decade of threatening financial collapse
and low or no economic growth without the
most shattering social and political upheav-
als. Already this year we have seen how in-
flation and no growth is embittering the po-
litical life of all the great democracies, un-
dercutting the authority of leaders, setting
class against class. And this is only the first
year. It is no accident that the Soviet Union
and China, securely self-sufficient in energy,
with a sustained growth rate, have begun to
analyze and exploit a great new crisis in
capitalism.

Possible Effect of New Production on Prices

Apart from the United States and Britain,
none of the major oil importers have the pos-
sibility of becoming self-sufficient within a
decade, and self-sufficiency in energy cannot
be the goal of the industrial economy as a
whole for the foreseeable future.

But invulnerability to cartel action to raise
prices is both a possible and a necessary goal.

At present, the consuming countries import
approximately 30 million barrels of oil a
day, mostly from OPEC sources. But current
prices of about $10 a barrel f.o.b. gulf are
very attractive, and a worldwide oil boom is
underway. Substantial finds of oil have been
reported from Mexico, Peru, China, Malay-
sia; and the wave of exploration is just be-
ginning. The owners of this new oil will un-
derstandably want to sell it at the going
price, but they will also want to develop it
sufficiently so that they can receive a substan-
tial income. Together they may already rep-
resent the possibility of new production sev-
eral years from now of 10 million barrels a
day. And more will follow.

The impact of this prospective new produc-
tion on price depends on the development of
the market as a whole. OPEC members have
shown that they are willing to cut back out-
put to sustain price; Arab producers are cur-
rently working at less than three-quarters

46

Department of State Bulletin

capacity. With the enormous assets all pro-
ducers are receiving, there is no doubt a mar-
gin for further cuts, even in the poorest
countries. Thus, if the overall market were
to increase from 30 to 40 million barrels a
day over the decade, it might be possible for
OPEC to accommodate the new^ producers
and still sustain the price.

But if the market did not grow at all, the
burden of adjustment on existing OPEC
members would be more than they could ad-
just to. States now launching ambitious de-
velopment programs would find that by the
end of the decade they were receiving only
about half the expected revenues. Negotia-
tion of the required cutbacks in production
would become more and more difficult. First,
clandestine, then open, violations of produc-
tion quotas would occur. Ultimately all ef-
forts to sustain the artificial price would be
abandoned.

There is no way we can know now the pre-
cise size of market at which OPEC efforts
to rig prices become inviable in the face of
neW production. But it would clearly be
wrong to start down this road with a goal
that might turn out to be inadequate. To be
sure they make this and any future oil cartel
inviable, the goal of the consumers must be
to hold their collective imports steady over
the next 10 years.

Limiting Dependence on Imported Oil

This is a demanding goal, but we now be-
lieve from the analysis in our own Project
Independence report, and from the OECD's
long-term energy assessment, that it can be
attained.

Our Project Independence report shows
that we have many options for achieving sub-
stantial self-sufficiency by 1985.

On the supply side, policies to lease the
Atlantic outer continental shelf, reopen the
Pacific outer continental shelf, and tap the
naval petroleum reserves can significantly in-
crease domestic oil production. The Federal
Energy Administration estimates potential
increases at from 4 to 8 million barrels a
day, depending on the level of price.

On the demand side, energy conservation

actions can significantly reduce the rate of
growth of energy utilization by 1985. Stand-
ards for more efficient new autos, incentives
to reduce miles traveled, incentives for im-
proved thermal efficiency in existing homes
and offices, and minimal thermal standards
for new homes and offices could all contrib-
ute. Petroleum demand could be decreased
by up to 2 million barrels a day, and electric-
ity consumption would also fall.

Also on the demand side, further savings of
limited oil and gas supplies can be achieved
by policies that require switching from oil
and natural gas to coal or coal-fired electric
power. Up to 2i/o million barrels a day of oil
and 2V-i trillion cubic feet of natural gas
might be saved by this method, although en-
vironmental restrictions and capital costs are
significant constraints.

On November 14 Secretary Kissinger an-
nounced the goal of reducing U.S. oil imports
from over 6 million barrels a day to 1 mil-
lion barrels a day in 1985. The administra-
tion is now working to develop Project In-
dependence policy options for decision by the
President. The President expects to submit
his proposals to Congress in January.

The options open to Europe and Japan to
limit their dependence on imported oil are
less far-reaching, but they are by no means
negligible. The OECD long-term energy as-
sessment suggests that — with proper price
policies — acceleration of North Sea oil and
gas, the stabilization of coal production, and
a major development of nuclear power could
reduce European dependence on imported en-
ergy from the present two-thirds to about 40
percent. In Japan, a program of long-term
conservation combined with the expected de-
velopment of nuclear power could reduce de-
pendence from 90 to about 80 percent.

If the United States goes to substantial
self-sufficiency and Europe and Japan reduce
their dependence in the manner indicated
above, the level of oil imports by industrial
countries will be no greater in 1985 than
now.

Many policy instruments are available to
achieve these goals. On the demand side, this
choice ranges from voluntary programs of re-
straint, mandatory fuel switching, price de-

January 13, 1975

47

control, taxation, and various kinds of alloca-
tion. On the supply side, energy investments
will come in at various levels of return and
risk, and countries will have to be sure that
there are adequate incentives to yield the
level of output desired. Policy instruments
available for this purpose include tax incen-
tives, long-term contracts, deficiency pay-
ments, or subsidies for given projects and
tariffs or other import protection.

All of our studies show that both demand
and output are quite responsive to effective
internal prices. Our Project Independence re-
port indicates that the United States has
many options for achieving substantial self-
sufficiency at prices lower than world prices
today but higher than internal prices in the
past, with both demand restraint and new
supplies playing an important role.

We must, however, distinguish between ef-
fective price levels insofar as they affect con-
sumers and investors, and the means by
which they are achieved. Such instruments
as price decontrol, taxes, and tariffs all have
different income and policy impacts, but they
can be used to achieve the same effective
price to the consumer. On the investment
side some instruments, such as purchase
agreements and project subsidies, would af-
fect only new investment. Others, such as
tariffs and tax incentives, could affect all in-
vestment. Each has different income and pol-
icy implications.

Each country will adopt the policy instru-
ments best suited to its own energy and fiscal
structure. However there are three potenti-
ally important areas for common action :

One is to adopt clear targets for the level
of dependence each country wishes to achieve
over the decade and national conservation
and supply policies to achieve them. These
targets and policies should then be examined
and monitored together.

Second, it may be useful for the consuming
countries to agree on the minimum level (al-
though not the policy instruments), at which
they will support new investment. This would
back up the dependence targets by creating
stable investment expectations throughout

the consuming countries; it would work to
insure an equivalence of effort.

Third, the consumers can magnify their
several investment efforts by entering joint
research and development projects in energy
and by creating a common fund to guarantee
or finance energy projects in consuming coun-
tries.

Proposed Immediate Measures by Consumers

But these fundamental actions on supply
and demand will take years to give results.
How can we bring down our jeopardy to
manageable proportions between now and
then? Four things are needed.

One is an oil safety net, to make sure that
we can act in concert, on the basis of equita-
ble sharing, to counter any new embargo di-
rected against all or any of the consuming
countries. This protection is already in place.
In Paris last week, 16 countries formally ad-
hered to the International Energy Program
(lEP), committing themselves to a far-
reaching program of preparedness for, and
solidarity in, a new embargo. The lEP cre-
ates a situation in which a restrictive act
directed against any member becomes an
act against all. It is the indispensable basis
for all future cooperation among the con-
sumers. Implementing legislation for this
program will be submitted to Congress short-
ly for its consideration.

The second is an immediate effort by con-
suming countries to conserve oil, the only
way open to them to lessen the financial
drain in the short term. Even now, after
the embargo and price increases, our studies
show that there remains a significant margin
for further savings of oil in both industry
and personal consumption that can be real-
ized without jeopardizing output or jobs.
Worldwide, that margin is probably at least
3 million barrels a day. President Ford an-
nounced a savings program of 1 miliion
barrels a day in October. We are monitoring
its execution carefully in order to reinforce
it if needed ; and we are prepared to con-
sider increasing the program to match others

48

Department of State Bulletin

in attaining the collective target of 3 million
barrels.

The third action, within the IMF [Inter-
national Monetary Fund] framework, is to
make sure the financing needs of the develop-
ing countries can be met while waiting for
the price of oil to come down. It would be
very wrong to force the developing countries
to abandon their growth programs and goals.
We estimate at $1.5-$2 billion the gap in
1975 for which no financing has yet been
found. Concessional terms will be needed.
Secretaries Kissinger and Simon proposed
that a new fund be established for this pur-
pose, managed by the IMF and financed by
oil producers, other contributions, and per-
haps by profits from sales of IMF gold.

The final requirement is for a financial
safety net. This is needed to make sure that
no country is forced to take unwarranted re-
strictive trade or economic policy measures
as a result of the maldistribution or instabil-
ity of reflows of oil dollars and of the grow-
ing burden of oil debts.

So far private capital markets have per-
formed well in receiving and redistributing
the enormous flow of oil dollars. We believe
there is substantial further room for expan-
sion of the flows handled by private markets,
but we cannot be sure of how great that ex-
pansive capacity is. Already there are some
indications of approaching constraints. In
banking, for example, there have been no
significant additions to capital since the start
of the oil crisis. Yet the total assets and lia-
bilities built upon a given capital structure
have increased greatly. At some point it will
not be prudent for the banks to expand fur-
ther without substantial new additions to
capital, which will be difficult and costly to
raise in current market conditions.

Thus, rather than test the limits of our
present system. Secretaries Kissinger and
Simon proposed creation of a new large-scale
intergovernmental financing facility. This fa-
cility would be :

— Designed to back up, not substitute for,
the workings of private capital markets.
— Temporary, intended to enable the con-

suming countries to pursue sound economic
and trade policies while waiting for basic
energy policy decisions to take effect.

— Not an aid fund, but rather a facility
lending at commercial terms on the basis of
established criteria for appropriate economic
and energy policies pursued by the borrower.

— Structured so as to distribute risk equi-
tably among the consuming countries.

— Subject to approval by Congress.

Each of the four proposed interim actions
is important in itself; equally significant,
both analytically and politically, is their link-
age to each other and to the energy depend-
ence targets and program. No country, cer-
tainly not the United States, will want to
help another financially unless that other
country is helping itself by conserving oil
and joining a long-term effort to lessen de-
pendence. And we must adopt a clear strat-
egy to bring the price of oil down, and back
up that strategy with the appropriate policy
decisions, in order to be sure that the loans
under the proposed facility will be repaid.

Need for Concerted Consumer Action

It has often been suggested that we can
talk or pressure the oil producers into ac-
cepting a reduction in price.

Neither approach, in our judgment, is
likely to lead to more than tardy or partial
results. And there would be significant costs
to adopting them : the false security our peo-
ple would feel that we were solving the en-
ergy crisis when in reality we were only
temporizing, or the damage to the structure
of international security that might result.

Instead what Secretary Kissinger has pro-
posed is a program of action designed to
change conditions within the consuming
countries themselves. Its purpose is not to
create a position of force which can then be
imposed upon the producers but, rather, to
create conditions in which a new long-term
equilibrium between oil producers and con-
sumers can be achieved. That equilibrium
must be such that the producers receive an
appropriate price for their products while the

January 13, 1975

49

consumers can be free of the threat of em-
bargo and of artificial action to raise prices.

Achievement of this result depends criti-
cally on the solidarity of the consuming coun-
tries. Since the start of the energy crisis
there has been for each country the tempta-
tion to go it alone, try to work a special deal
with the producers, or hope that the actions
of others will end the crisis. In different ways
each of us is uncomfortable with having his
future depend so totally on others. But anal-
ysis of each country's position shows that
going it alone is not a superior option for
any consumer. Over the decade only the
United States and Britain can go to self-
sufficiency ; all others will remain dependent
on imported oil. All industrial countries, es-
pecially those heavily involved in trade, will
be vulnerable to financial crisis. And if the
United States and Britain can eventually
solve the price and financial transfer prob-
lems by going self-sufficient, the only way
Europe and Japan can is by cooperating with
each other and with us. And in the meantime,
no country, including the United States, can
solve the price problem alone.

The crisis gives us no alternative to con-
certed consumer action. We believe that fi-
nancial solidarity is an essential part.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Western Investment in Communist Economies. A
Selected Survey on Economic Interdependence.
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. August 5, 1974. 83 pp.

Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Ju-
diciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill,
1975. Report to accompany H.R. 15404. S. Rept.
93-1110. August 20, 1974. 53 pp.

Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. Report to accom-
pany S. 1134. S. Rept. 9.3-1116. August 21, 1974.
68 pp.

Passport Application Fees. Report to accompany H.R.
15172. S. Rept. 93-1124. 5 pp.

Report on Nutrition and the International Situation.
Prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Nutrition and Human Needs. September
1974. 57 pp.

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.N. Rejects Move To Change
Representation of Cambodia

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. Representative
John Scali on November 27, together with
the text of a resolution adopted by the
Assembly in votes on Noveynber 27 and
November 29.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 184 dated November 27

The issue presented to this Assembly by
the two resolutions before us is in essence
very simple. One resolution proposes nego-
tiations without preconditions for a peaceful
settlement of the tragic conflict in Cambodia.
The other demands a one-sided solution and
offers only the prospect of continued war
and more suffering by the Cambodian people.
Which of these alternatives is consistent with
the purposes for which this organization was
founded? Which of these paths does our
charter stake out as the road to justice and
accepted international law?

One resolution ^ would have the Assembly
itself decide for the Khmer people that Cam-
bodia is to be represented not by its present
government, but by an exile regime located
over 2,000 miles from Phnom Penh. It should
come as no surprise that the only nation
located anywhere near Cambodia which spon-
sors this resolution is the country in whose
capital this exiled regime happens to be
located.

The other resolution - is sponsored by 23
nations, five of whom are among Cambodia's
closest neighbors. They advocate a basic
principle spelled out in this resolution by
these opening lines: that the Khmer people

' U.N. doc A/L.733.
- U.N. doc. A/L.737.

50

Department of State Bulletin

have a right themselves to solve their prob-
lems peacefully, free from outside interfer-
ence. This resolution, unlike the other, does
not call on the United Nations or anyone else
to prejudge the decision of the Cambodian
people. Instead, it proposes that the United
Nations contribute positively to settlement
in Cambodia by calling on the parties them-
selves to begin negotiations. Further, it asks
the Secretary General to lend appropriate
assistance, as he has done so effectively in
the past.

Finally, the resolution sponsored by Cam-
bodia's neighbors calls on all U.N. member
states to respect the outcome of these peace-
ful discussions between the Cambodian par-
ties, as my government is prepared to do.
The United States supports efforts toward
an honest compromise solution in Cambodia.

I must, however, reply to some speakers
who again, in discussing this item, have
spread harsh and ugly charges against the
United States. I reject these charges. They
are false. If their accusations were true —
that a brutal military dictatorship has been
foisted on the Cambodian people — why is it
that the Cambodian Government continues
to operate effectively and that the Cambodian
people continue to fight heroically and with
increasing success against the invaders, all
of this long after the United States has ended
all air support and sharply reduced its mili-
tary assistance? Could it be because the
Cambodian people are fighting for their in-
dependence against foreign troops on their
soil?

Attempts by some speakers to present their
special version of Cambodian history, in our
view, are an effort to divert this Assembly
from the real questions — namely, which are
the only foreign forces intervening in Cam-
bodia today, and which action by this Assem-
bly seeks to deprive the Cambodian people
of their right to self-determination?

For those who are unaware of, or who
forget, Cambodia's real history, it may be
useful to recall :

— That Prince Sihanouk was not removed
by a palace coup ;

— That the Government of Cambodia

which dismissed Prince Sihanouk in 1970 had
been formed by Sihanouk himself less than
a year before ;

— That the Khmer National Assembly
which ratified the decision and voted unan-
imously to depose Sihanouk was composed
of members whom Sihanouk had personally
selected and supported for election;

— That all during that period while Cam-
bodians fought for their continued independ-
ence the total American Government pres-
ence in Phnom Penh consisted of two diplo-
matic ofllicers and three military attaches;
and

— That negotiations between the Khmer
Government and North Viet-Nam were brok-
en off unilaterally by North Viet-Nam on
March 25, 1970. Four days later North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong forces attacked Khmer
police and military posts. The present hostil-
ities in Cambodia date from those attacks.

The United States is proud of the role it
has played in helping the Khmer Government
and people to stave off the continuing mili-
tary attacks by insurgents and foreign mili-
tary forces. We have also, however, stressed
the need to initiate negotiations to end this
conflict and to bring reconciliation, harmony,
and self-determination to all of Cambodia.
The United States is quite prepared to see
Cambodia ruled by whatever government
the Cambodian people may freely decide
upon.

On August 12 President Ford told our
Congress that the United States hopes to
see an early compromise settlement in Cam-
bodia. It is not the United States, but others,
who have refused to leave Cambodia to the
Cambodians.

Certainly the Government of the Khmer
Republic has not put any obstacle in the way
of a negotiated settlement. On July 9, 1974,
that government offered to enter into nego-
tiations without conditions at any time, with
any representatives of the other Cambodian
party, in order to bring the conflict to an end.

We have heard from some speakers a claim
that the opposition forces in Cambodia con-
trol 90 percent of that country's territory
and 80 percent of its people. If this is true,

January 13, 1975

51

then why, we must wonder, has the opposi-
tion no capital, no government, no machinery,
no parliament — in fact, none of the normal
attributes of a government? Why, indeed, has
their nominal chief of state taken refuge in
a foreign capital ? Why does he not go home
to receive the acclaim of the people, who, we
are told, are eagerly awaiting his return?
This seems to me a reasonable and funda-
mental question.

Reviewing the record I find, surprisingly,
that these same speakers one year ago made
identical claims in the debate in this hall.
One year ago they claimed their proteges
controlled 90 percent of the territory and
80 percent of the population. One would have
expected that a year of alleged new victories
would have been reflected in more impressive
statistics this year. Why not claim 98 percent
of the territory and 95 percent of the people
this year? Indeed, why not ignore the hard
reality of the existence of the Government
of Cambodia altogether and claim 100 per-
cent?

The fact is that despite the best efforts of
a foreign inspired and assisted insurgency,
and of the North Vietnamese Army, the
Khmer Government has never ceased to
maintain control over the vast majority of
Cambodia's people and over the territory in
which they live. North Vietnamese troops and
their Cambodian supporters do indeed range
through many areas of north and east Cam-
bodia, but Sihanouk's supporters have ne-
glected to explain to us that those areas of
the country are very sparsely populated. The
truth is that Prince Sihanouk does not return
to lead his people because he has no safe
haven in Cambodia, no real government or
real following to return to.

I would like to ask why should this Assem-
bly be asked to choose between two rival
claimants to Cambodia's seat in the United
Nations, one of which happens to be located
outside the country? It is our view the United
Nations has no business deciding which is
the legitimate government of any member
state.

I urge all members of this Assembly to
consider carefully the views so eloquently
set forth during this debate by the Asian

neighbors of the Khmer Republic. Surely the
vast majority of U.N. members must share
their desire to see peace in their part of the
world by allowing Cambodia to determine
its own destiny. Surely we will heed their
warning about the dangers of continued
conflict and join in their call for a negotiated
settlement to the present hostilities. Theirs
is a decision which deeply involves their own
security and their own future. We who live
elsewhere, particularly those far away, have
a responsibility to respect their views if we
are to expect equal consideration in con-
nection with problems in our areas.

The U.S. Government believes that the
United Nations has a fundamental obliga-
tion to support the process of negotiation as
the best means of resolving disputes and
settling conflicts, wherever and whenever
they arise. We are convinced that such a
process serves the real interests of all parties
to a dispute, in Cambodia as elsewhere. A
negotiated settlement in Cambodia is over-
due. This process should begin now.

Surely no one of us can really wish to
prolong the agony of that country or its
people. Surely we can all agree that it is
time for the fighting to stop, for negotiations
to begin, for compromises to be reached, and
for compatriots to be reconciled.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^

Restoiatio}i of the lawful rights of the Royal
Government of National Union of Cambodia in
the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations,

^U.N. doc. A/RES/3238 (XXIX) and Corr. 1. On
Nov. 27 the Assembly adopted by a vote of 56 (U.S.)
to 54, with 24 abstentions, draft resolution A/L.737/
Rev. 1 as revised, with the exception of the fifth
preamhular paragraph, a separate vote on that para-
graph having resulted in a tie vote of 51-51, with 31
abstentions; on Nov. 29 the Assembly, by a vote of
102 (U.S.) to 0, with 32 abstentions, rejected the
paragraph, which reads, "Considering that the law-
ful rights of the two Governments are only valid if
it is determined that these rights emanate from the
sovereign people of Cambodia as a whole,". Priority
having been given to draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.
1, draft desolution A/L.733 was not pressed to a
vote.

52

Department of State Bulletin

Recognizing that the situation in Cambodia is of
concern to all Member States and especially to the
countries situated close to the area,

Taking into account that, while the Royal Govern-
ment of National Union of Cambodia, presided over
by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, exercises authority
over a segment of Cambodia, the Government of the
Khmer Republic still has control over a preponder-
ant number of Cambodian people.

Believing that the Cambodian people themselves
should be allowed to solve their own political prob-
lems peacefully, free from outside interference.

Believing also that such political settlement
should be reached by the indigenous parties con-
cerned, without external influence,

1. Calls upon all the Powers which have been
influencing the two parties to the conflict to use
their good oflSces for conciliation between these two
parties with a view to restoring peace in Cambodia;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, after due con-
sultation, to lend appropriate assistance to the two
contending parties claiming lawful rights in Cam-
bodia and to report on the results to the General
Assembly at its thirtieth session;

3. Decides not to press for any further action
until Member States have an opportunity to examine
the report of the Secretary-General.

U.S. Calls for Strengthening
U.N. Disaster Relief Office

Following is a statement made in Commit-
tee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. Representative
Joseph M. Segel on October 30, together with
the text of a resolution adopted by the com-
mittee on November 6 and by the Assembly
on November 29.

STATEMENT BY MR. SEGEL

USUN press release 163 dated October 30

I have listened with both interest and deep
concern to Ambassador Berkol's [Faruk N.
Berkol, of Turkey, U.N. Disaster Relief Co-
ordinator] explanation of the limitations and
needs of his Office in attempting to perform
the duties assigned to it by the General
Assembly. I commend him for his efforts
and dedication in this cause.

Mr. Chairman, the subject we are dealing

with today is one that potentially affects
hundreds of millions of people — it is a matter
to which we all should devote the most ear-
nest attention.

During the last 10 years alone, my govern-
ment's records indicate that there have been
430 natural disasters around the world re-
sulting in 3.5 million deaths, 400 million vic-
tims, and damage estimated at $11 billion.

During this period, donor nations and or-
ganizations provided $2.8 billion in emer-
gency relief and rehabilitation — an immense
effort involving monumental problems of co-
ordination for which adequate machinery
does not exist. One can only ask how much
human suffering might have been alleviated
if world disaster relief had been better or-
ganized.

As a further illustration of the problem
we face, five weeks ago the U.S. Government,
along with other governments, was provid-
ing assistance simultaneously to the victims
of eight foreign disasters. On another oc-
casion, we were trying to cope simultaneously
with the needs of victims of 27 disasters.

Who in the General Assembly was really
aware of the enormity of this problem when
in 1971 it created the U.N. Disaster Relief
Office and assigned to UNDRO a broad array
of disaster relief and preparedness respon-
sibilities, while giving it such limited re-
sources? We now recognize, as does UNDRO
itself, that its limited resources and staff have
been a major constraint in the performance
of the duties assigned by the General Assem-
bly, particularly the much-needed function of
donor coordination.

As matters now stand, donor governments
must "fly blind" during much of a disaster
emergency. They have to make action de-
cisions with no assurance that their aid may
not be duplicating help being sent by another
government. By the same token, assumptions
that other donors may be providing certain
aid may be in error, with the result that
serious omission may occur. And sometimes
the particular equipment and goods sent are
just not what is really needed.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, Secre-
tary of State Kissinger called for strength-
ening UNDRO when he spoke to the Gen-

January 13, 1975

53

eral Assembly on September 23, 1974. What
Secretary Kissinger had in mind was that
the new infusion of strength should be fo-
cused on developing UNDRO's capability to
coordinate — to serve as a worldwide clearing-
house in collecting and disseminating timely
information on disaster assessment, priority
needs, donor offerings, storage and trans-
portation availabilities. In the judgment of
disaster experts, such a service would be of
inestimable value to countries that suffer
disasters and to donor countries as well.
UNDRO is in a unique position to perform
this essential role, coordinating assistance
to disaster-stricken countries from govern-
ments, intergovernmental organizations, and
private organizations.

We propose therefore that this Assembly
authorize the Secretary General to undertake
a management study, on a priority basis,
which we believe can be completed within a
month, to determine exactly what needs to
be done to enable UNDRO to efficiently and
effectively perform the function of mobiliz-
ing and coordinating disaster relief along
the lines described. We further propose that
the Secretary General be authorized to
promptly implement the action plan that
should result from this study, and that suf-
ficient financial resources be contributed on
a voluntary basis for this express purpose.
We believe this can and should be done with-
out prejudice to the continuation and possible
improvement of UNDRO's activities in re-
lated areas, such as disaster prevention,
predisaster planning, and training, which
deserve separate consideration.

Hence, while concurring in the general
thinking behind ECOSOC [Economic and
Social Council] Resolution 1891, we propose
at this time a more concentrated capability
focused specifically on coordination. This
would include, as necessary, probable in-
creases in staff, communications equipment,
and related services for a disaster informa-
tion center and adequate funds for travel —
especially for immediate on-the-spot assess-
ment— and for other operating expenses.
The precise needs, of course, would evolve
from the aforementioned management study.

We specifically propose that the required

funding for the first three years be met from
voluntary contributions, with the method of
onward financing subject to review. The U.S.
Government is prepared to make a voluntary
contribution of up to $750,000 to cover sub-
stantially all of the first year's cost ; that is,
for 1975. We would then expect to contribute
our usual fair share of the voluntary contri-
butions required to meet the costs for the
succeeding biennium, and we hope others
would contribute the balance required. Our
offer is contingent, of course, on the devel-
opment of a practical plan and budget and on
the premise that the voluntary contributions
resulting from this resolution would be de-
voted exclusively to creating the clearing-
house and coordinating capability that is so
desperately needed.

At the present time, Mr. Chairman, we are
in the process of consulting with other dele-
gations on this proposal, and we have a pre-
liminary draft resolution for their study. We
are trying to reach as many as possible, and
we would be happy to give copies to any
others who may be interested. After these
consultations we expect to be in a position
to propose a formal resolution for which we
earnestly hope there will be wide support.^

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2

Strengthening of the Office of the United Nations
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 De-
cember 1971 by which it created the Office of the
United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and es-
tablished its primary functions of co-ordinating dis-
aster relief, especially through its role as an infor-
mation clearing-house, and of assisting in disaster
prevention and preparedness,

Endorsing Economic and Social Council resolution
1891 (LVII) of 31 July 1974, in which the Council
requested the Secretary-General to investigate the
feasibility of measures to strengthen the disaster
prevention, pre-disaster planning and co-ordinating

' On Nov. 4 the United States introduced draft res-
olution A/C.2/L.1364; the resolution, as orally re-
vised, was adopted by the committee on Nov. 6 with-
out a vote.

= U.N. doc. A/RES/3243 (XXIX); adopted by the
Assembly on Nov. 29 without a vote.

54

Department of State Bulletin

roles of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Re-
lief Co-ordinator and to submit his findings to the
Council at its fifty-ninth session, and in which the
Council recommended that the General Assembly, at
its twenty-ninth session, should reconsider the pro-
posals of the Secretary-General for additional staff
resources,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the
Secretary-General on assistance in cases of natural
disaster and other disaster situations,' and of the
statement made to the Second Committee by the
United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator on the
activities of his Office,

Noting in partic^dar the statements in the Secre-
tary-General's report that, while some progress has
been made in the Office of the United Nations Disas-
ter Relief Co-ordinator in establishing its assigned
function of mobilizing and co-ordinating relief, the
lack of staff and facilities, combined with the fre-
quency, duration and simultaneity of disaster situa-
tions, has seriously impaired the effectiveness of the
Office in discharging these and other responsibilities.

Concerned that lack of adequate co-ordination on
a world-wide basis results, in some cases, in lapses in
meeting priority needs and, in others, in costly du-
plication and in the supply of unneeded assistance,

Convinced that the Office of the United Nations
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator is in a unique position,
given adequate staff and facilities, to provide a
world-wide system of mobilizing and co-ordinating
disaster relief, including the collection and dissem-
ination of information on disaster assessment, prior-
ity needs and donor assistance.

Convinced further that this capability should be
strengthened, as a matter of priority and urgency
and without prejudice to the disaster prevention and
disaster preparedness roles assigned to the United
Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator,

Convinced that disaster prevention and pre-disas-
ter planning should form an integral part of the in-
ternational development policy of Governments and
of international organizations,

1. Calls upon the Secretary-General to provide
sufficient staff, equipment and facilities to strengthen
the capacity of the Office of the United Nations Dis-
aster Relief Co-ordinator to provide an efficient and
effective world-wide service of mobilizing and co-
ordinating disaster relief, including particularly the
collection and dissemination of information on disas-
ter assessment, priority needs and donor assistance;

2. Decides that the additional costs of providing
this strengthened capability should be met by volun-
tary contributions during the first year, commencing
as soon as possible, and during the biennium 1976-
1977, at which time the method of financing for suc-
ceeding periods shall be subject to review in the
light of experience, with the understanding that the
additional resources made available under the terms

of the present resolution should be concentrated on
strengthening the co-ordinating capability of the Of-
fice of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordina-
tor, but without prejudice to any improvements that
can be made in the roles of that Office in disaster
prevention and in pre-disaster planning within the
resources otherwise available to it;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to take appro-
priate measures, drawing upon the aforementioned
voluntary funds, to prepare a plan and budget for
this increased capability, and to proceed with its im-
mediate implementation;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, as called for
in Economic and Social Council resolution 1891
(LVII), to continue to investigate the feasibility of
measures to strengthen the United Nations machin-
ery with regard to disaster prevention and pre-disas-
ter planning;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report on
the implementation of the present resolution to the
Economic and Social Council at its fifty-ninth session
and to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.N. doc. A/9637. [Footnote in original.]

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven-
tion on international civil aviation, as amended
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna
July 7, 1971.
Ratifications deposited: Trinidad and Tobago,

October 22, 1974; Uganda, December 19, 1974.
Entered into force: December 19, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse
of opium and other drugs. Done at The Hague
January 23, 1912. Entered into force February
11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4,
1974.

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions, and
protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The
Hague on January 23, 1912 (38 Stat. 1912), at
Geneva on February 11, 1925, and February 19,
1925, and July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), at Bang-
kok on November 27, 1931, and at Geneva on
June 26, 1936. Done at Lake Success, N.Y., De-
cember 11, 1946. TIAS 1671, 1859.
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4,
1974.

January 13, 1975

55

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24,
1967. TI.A.S 6298.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4,
1974.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London November 26, 1968.'

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, December 2, 1974."
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TLA.S 5780). Adopted

at London October 21, 1969.'

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, December 2, 1974.- '

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974.
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to
certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to
other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, December 19, 1974.-

BILATERAL

Czechoslovakia

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and
related notes. Signed at Prague July 9, 1973.'
Ratified by the President: December 16, 1974.

Jordan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Amman November 27, 1974. Entered
into force November 27, 1974.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS
2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo
November 19 and 27, 1974. Entered into force
November 27, 1974.

Panama

Agreement concerning payment to the United States
of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles
furnished under the military assistance program.
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama May 20
and December 6, 1974. Entered into force Decem-
ber 6, 1974; effective July 1, 1974.

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56

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX January 13, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1855

Cambodia. U.N. Rejects Move To Change
Representation of Cambodia (Scali, text of
resolution) 50

Canada. President Ford Sets Import Quotas
for Cattle and Meat From Canada (procla-
mation) 44

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreig^n

Policy 50

Department Reviews Main Elements of the

Strategy To Resolve the Oil Crisis (Enders) 45

Economic Affairs

President Ford and President Giscard
d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique
(Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, Kissinger, com-
munique) 33

President Ford Sets Import Quotas for Cattle

and Meat From Canada (proclamation) . . 44

Energy

Department Reviews Main Elements of the

Strategy To Resolve the Oil Crisis (Enders) 45

President Ford and President Giscard
d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique
(Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, Kissinger, com-
munique) 33

Foreign Aid. U.S. Calls for Strengthening
U.N. Disaster Relief Office (Segel, text of
resolution) 53

France. President Ford and President Giscard
d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique
(Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, Kissinger, com-
munique) 33

Petroleum. Department Reviews Main Ele-
ments of the Strategy To Resolve the Oil
Crisis (Enders) 45

Presidential Documents

President Ford and President Giscard

d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique . . 33
President Ford Sets Import Quotas for Cattle

and Meat From Canada (proclamation) . . 44

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 56
Treaty Information. Current Actions ... 55

United Nations

U.N. Rejects Move To Change Representation

of Cambodia (Scali, text of resolution) . . 50

U.S. Calls for Strengthening U.N. Disaster
Relief Office (Segel, text of resolution) . .

53

Name Index

Enders, Thomas O 45

Ford, President 33,44

Giscard d'Estaing, Valery 33

Kissinger, Secretary 33

Scali, John 50

Segel, Joseph M 53

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to December 23 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No.
533 of December 16.

No. Date Subject

t541 12/23 "Foreign Relations," volume VI,
the Far East and Australasia;
1948 (for release Dec. 30).

*542 12/23 Kissinger: news conference.
United Nations, Dec. 21.

t543 12/23 TW.\-Swissair airline capacity
agreement.

*544 12/26 Carlucci sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Portugal (biographic
data).

*545 12/26 Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Mari-
time Law, Jan. 24.

*545A 12/25 Scotes sworn in as Ambassador
to the Yemen Arab Republic
(biographic data).

*546 12/26 Study group 6 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for the CC-
IR.

t547 12/26 U.S.-Romanian cultural and sci-
entific agreement.

* Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1856

January 20, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE 57

THE NEW DIALOGUE: TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA
Address by Assistant Secretary Rogers 6i

U.S. DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT ISSUES
IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE 72

UNITED NATIONS REAFFIRMS CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY

IN KOREA
Statement by Ambassador Bennett and Text of Resolution 82

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1856
January 20, 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

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PRICE:

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approved by the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget {January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not

copyrighted and items contained herein may be

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF

STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Newsweek Magazine

FoUoicing is the transcript of an inter-
view with Secretary Kissinger on December
18 by Newsweek Executive Editor Kenneth
Auchincloss, Foreign Editor Edward Klein,
and diplomatic correspondent Bruce van
Voorst, which was published in the Decem-
ber 30 issue of Newsiveek.

Q. Looking back over the conduct of Amer-
ican foreign policy in 1974, what have been
your greatest satisfactions and greatest dis-
appointments?

Press release 2 dated January 3

Secretary Kissinger: Strangely enough,
the greatest satisfaction was that we man-
aged the Presidential transition without a
disaster. This was a rather heartbreaking
period. I was extremely worried that while
the central authority was in severe jeopardy,
the transition might create basic weaknesses
in the structure of our foreign policy. I
considered our ability to continue an effec-
tive foreign policy the most satisfying
thing. Of course, individual events were
important, too : I got great satisfaction from
the Syrian disengagement.

Q. In that transition period, tvas there a
hiatus in which you could not function very
well?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say from
July to October was a period in which we
could not act with decisiveness. Every nego-
tiation was getting more and more difficult
because it involved the question of whether
we could, in fact, carry out what we were
negotiating. Secondly, we were not in a
position to press matters that might involve
serious domestic disputes. And I think this
affected to some extent the summit in Mos-
cow in July. But it affected many other
things in more intangible ways.

Q. How do you rank the SALT agreement
in Vladivostok in the list of achievements
for this past year?

Secretary Kissinger: Very high, and of
more permanent significance than perhaps
anything else that was achieved. The various
disengagement agreements in the Middle
East were dramatic and important because
they reversed a trend toward another out-
break of a war and may have set the stage
for making some important progress. But I
think in terms of permanent achievements,
I would rank the outline for a second SALT
agreement at or near the top. And I think
it will be so viewed by history.

Q. How do you account for all the criticism
of SALT Two?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have a
difficult domestic situation right now. Many
people remember, or think they remember,
that foreign policy had certain domestic
effects in 71 or 72. I don't agree with this.
But I think it is in the back of some people's
minds.

Secondly, there is a general atmosphere
of disillusionment with government.

Thirdly, the liberal intellectual commu-
nity, which used to lead American foreign
policy, was alienated for a variety of reasons
from the Johnson administration and then
from the Nixon administration, and there-
fore from this administration as well, at
least at first.

Now, what in fact is the significance of
this agreement? The nightmare of the nu-
clear age is the fear of strategic arms based
on the expectation of what the other side is
doing. One has to get one's priorities right.
The first objective must be to get that cycle
of self-fulfilling prophecies interrupted.

January 20, 1975

57

That has now been substantially achieved.
Once that is built into the planning of both
sides, I think the negotiations on reductions
will be easier.

Q. Do you see those negotiatioyis for re-
ductions taking place before the 10-year
period covered by the agreement is over?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In fact, we have
covered that in the aide memoire. A number
of people gained the impression that the
reductions were to start only after 198.5.
The Vladivostok announcement, in fact, said
that negotiations should start no later than
1980 for reductions to take place after 1985.
That has now been eliminated from the
aide memoire because it was never intended
to preclude an agreement on reductions to
take place well before 1985. So it is clear
that negotiations can start as soon as pos-
sible and take effect as soon as there is an
agreement.

Q. Some people argue that the agreement
sanctions MIRV \mxdtiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle] levels that will
lead to a first-strike capability by both sides
and actually encourage a neiv arms race.

Secretary Kissinger: The agreement has
to be compared with what would have hap-
pened in the absence of an agreement — not
with a theoretical model. All our intelligence
estimates indicate that in the absence of an
agreement, Soviet MIRV levels would have
been substantially higher than they will be
under the agreement, as well as Soviet total
levels, which in turn would have triggered
another series of moves by us. The so-called
new construction programs are the mini-
mum planned construction programs ; they
would certainly have been accelerated and
expanded if the Soviet Union had in fact
produced at the level that our intelligence
estimates thought they could. And not only
could, but would. I am talking now about
the middle intelligence estimate. Generally
three estimates are made — low, middle, and
high. Both of the ceilings agreed in Vladi-
vostok are below the low intelligence esti-
mate, and substantially below the medium
intelligence estimate.

A myth is beginning to develop that in
July we made a proposal of more severe
limitations on MIRV's and that this, for
some curious reason, was abandoned between
July and December. This simply is not true.
The July proposal, first of all, called for a
five-year agreement. If you double the num-
ber that we proposed for the five-year agree-
ment, you would have a higher number than
the one we settled on for 10 years.

Q. The Soviets have issued a statement
that they are not going to make any guaran-
tees about Jeivish emigration from the
Soviet Union. Does this statement and its
possible impact on the trade bill concern
you ?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it concerns me.
Certainly there is no one in Washington who
has not heard me warn about this for years.
Without saying anything, without making
any claims for it, we managed to increase
Jewish emigration from 400 a year in 1968
to 35,000 before any of this debate started.
We had managed to intercede quietly in be-
half of a list of hardship cases, of which more
than half were dealt with successfully. We
never claimed a success ; we never took credit
for it. We never said this was a result of
detente. We just encouraged it to happen.
We have warned constantly not to make this
an issue of state-to-state relations, because
we were afraid it would lead to a formal
confrontation and defeat the objective of
promoting emigration. Despite our deep mis-
givings, we acquiesced when statements were
made by some which implied that the Soviet
Union had yielded to pressure, because we
thought it was the result that was important,
and we wanted to avoid a domestic debate
that might have jeopardized the trade bill.

The issue of Jewish emigration is, above
all, a human problem. There is no legal agree-
ment we can make with the Soviet Union
that we can enforce. Whether the Soviet
Union permits emigration depends on the
importance they attach to their relationship
with the United States and therefore on the
whole context of the East- West relationship.

If we can maintain a Soviet commitment
to detente, and if we can make clear that this

58

Department of State Bulletin

is related to the emigration question, existing
understandings will have a chance. But what
we have had is, first, excessive claims. And
now the Export-Import Bank bill has been
encumbered with amendments that, to all
practical purposes, virtually prevent loans of
any substantial size to the Soviet Union.

Loans are more important to the Soviet
Union than most-favored-nation status, and
in this respect the Soviets are worse off now,
after three years of detente and even after
increased Jewish emigration, than they were
to begin with. We cannot simply keep saying
that the Soviets must pay something for
detente, and then not provide anything from
our side to give them an interest in its con-
tinuance.

Q. Do you see any signs that detente has
led Moscow to play a more positive role in
the Mideast?

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East is a
very complicated issue for them and for us.
I do not believe evidence supports the propo-
sition that the Soviet Union produced the
1973 war. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union has not been prepared to risk its rela-
tionship to some of the Arab states for the
sake of Middle East tranquillity. What this
proves is that detente does not mean that the
Soviet Union and we have become collal>
orators, but that we are partly rivals, partly
ideologically incompatible, and partly edging
toward cooperation. The Middle East has
been an area where cooperation has been
far from satisfactory.

Q. Will detente help in the next round in
the Mideast?

Secretary Kissinger: Generally, yes, if all
parties proceed with circumspection. Some of
the participants in the Middle East conflict
did not want an extremely active Soviet role.
This was one inhibiting feature. The second
is that a cooperative effort with the Soviet
Union depends on the actual positions the
Soviet Union takes. If the Soviet Union takes
positions which are identical with one of the
parties, then we are better off dealing with
those parties directly.

Q. What woidd be the necessary condi-
tion before the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) and Israel cotdd sit down
together and talk?

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible for
the United States to recommend negotiation
with the PLO until the PLO accepts the
existence of Israel as a legitimate state. As
long as the PLO proposals envisage, in one
form or another, the destruction of Israel, we
don't see much hope for negotiation with the
PLO.

Q. Do you share the concern of many
people now u-ho feel that both sides are
hardening their positions?

^ Secretary Kissinger: I have been through
several Mideast negotiations, and they run
a fever cycle. There is a great deal of exces-
sive talk on both sides to prove that they
have been tough, unyielding, and didn't make
any concessions. We are now in the rela-
tively early phases of these exchanges. I am
not pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe
another step is quite possible. Obviously, be-
cause of the Rabat meeting, and the increas-
ing complexity of the domestic situation of
almost all of the participants, negotiations
are more difficult now than they were a year
ago. The stakes are also higher. But I be-
lieve that progress is possible. We have to
do it now by somewhat different methods
than we did last year. If I compare where we
are now with where we were at various
stages during the Syrian negotiations, I think
it looks far more encouraging than it did
then. I am in fact quite hopeful.

Q. Are you going to deemphasize "shuttle
diplomacy" ?

Secretary Kissinger: There was a time for
shuttle diplomacy, and there is a time for
quiet diplomacy. I cannot accept the princi-
ple that whenever there is something to
be settled, the Secretary of State must go to
the area and stake his personal prestige on
the conduct of the negotiations. I don't think
that is a healthy situation. And therefore,
while I don't exclude that in a concluding
phase, or in a critical phase, I might go to

January 20, 1975

59

the Middle East for three or four days, I
will not do so unless conditions are i-ight
and the stakes are important enough.

Q. Do you think there can be any further
progress before Leonid Brezhnev goes to
Egypt in January?

Secretary Kissinger: It would be a grave
mistake for the United States to gear its own
policies to the travels of the General Secre-
tary of the Soviet Party. We will negotiate as
rapidly as we can, but we don't want to get
into the business of imposing settlements or
of getting ahead of the parties. The art of
negotiations is to make sure that all of the
parties feel that their essential interests are
safeguarded and that their dignity is re-
spected. Our pace will be set not by Brezhnev
but by how rapidly the parties move toward
each other.

Q. The military resupply of Israel, both
during and after the 1973 war, seems to
have stripped the American military estab-
lishment of some of its materiel. Does this
suggest that the United States will have a
difficult time resupply ing Israel in any war
of extended duration?

Secretary Kissinger: I understand from
Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger
that these stories about stripping the Amer-
ican military establishment are incorrect.
And I understand that production in many
of the essential categories is being stepped
up. I don't think there is any physical in-
capacity to do what is necessary.

Q. Some people say that it would be to
Israel's advantage to find an excuse to launch
a preemptive strike.

Secretary Kissinger: Based on my talks
with Israeli leaders, I do not believe that any
responsible Israeli leader operates on this as-
sumption. They know that if a war starts it
may start events of incalculable conse-
quences.

I think the responsible people in Israel
realize that improved American relations
with Arab countries are also in the interests
of Israel, because they enable us to be a
moderating influence. The Israeli leaders

with whom I am dealing are genuinely inter-
ested in moving toward peace. It is a very
complicated problem because their margin of
survival is so much narrower than ours that
it is hard for Americans to understand some
Israeli concerns. But I do not believe that
any Israeli leader would deliberately engage
in such a reckless course.

Q. Given the Arab oil weapon and how it
affects Western support of Israel, can Israel
expect to suri'ive?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the survival
of Israel is essential. The United States —
and finally, in the last analysis, Europe —
will not negotiate over the survival of Israel.
This would be an act of such extraordinary
cynicism that the world would be morally
mortgaged if it ever happened. But it won't
happen.

Q. In your list of pluses and minuses for
the year, tvc have not touched on eyiergy yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I think next to SALT,
I would consider the most lasting achieve-
ment to be the energy policy that we devel-
oped. I think the Washington Energy Con-
ference, the International Energy Agency,
the emergency sharing program, and the
measures which we are currently pursuing
may be the beginning of a restructuring of
relationships among the advanced industrial
countries and eventually serve as a bridge to
the producing countries.

Q. What sorts of structure are you re-
ferring to?

Secretary Kissinger: The structure that
emerged in the immediate postwar period
was essentially geared to military defense.
Some of the difficulties that emerged in the
sixties and early seventies, as a result of the
growth of European unity and the emer-
gence of Japan, were that the military or-
ganization and the political and economic
organization had grown out of phase with
each other. It has proved difficult to bring
them back into phase by purely military ar-
rangements. This is what I attempted to say
in my "Year of Europe" speech, which was
a little premature, but many of whose basic

60

Department of State Bulletin

principles are now being accepted. Now the
problem of how the advanced industrialized
nations can give effect to the realities of
interdependence is one of the most serious
problems of our time — in the fields of energy,
of food, and of the whole nature of economic
policies.

Q. Is it American policy to organize the
oil-consuming nations so that they can nego-
tiate a reduction of oil prices with the pro-
ducers ?

Secretary Kissinger: We would like to
create the maximum incentives for a reduc-
tion of prices and, failing that, the maximum
capacity to withstand the high prices. The
two things are related. If we have effective
conservation measures, if we develop alter-
native sources of energy, and if new sources
of oil continue to be discovered, the balance
between supply and demand must inevitably
change. I have heard statements that the
producers can always keep up with us by
cutting production, but they will, I think,
find this increasingly difficult to implement.
If the industrialized nations implement meas-
ures of financial solidarity, we can reduce the
effect of the balance of payment deficits.
And when the emergency sharing program is
in effect in a few months, the capacity of
these countries to use embargoes for political
effect will be reduced.

Q. But while many of President Ford's
advisers have been urging him to take strin-
gent conservation measures, he has resisted
so far.

Secretary Kissinger: I am convinced that
the President will soon announce a program
that will give effect to the principle I have
outlined. I am confident that it will be a
good program and that it will be adequate
to our international responsibilities.

Q. Are French President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Hel-
mut Schmidt goiyig to he rnore cooperative
in these international structures? Are they
really frightened of what is going on in
Europe and the ivorld?

Secretary Kissinger: Both countries are

convinced that without a greater interaction
of economic policies, an economic disaster
for everybody is probable. And everybody
realizes that they cannot deal with the eco-
nomic policies on a purely national basis.

Secondly, there is a growing realization
that the political demoralization of the in-
dustrialized countries must be arrested. This
presupposes that governments can be seen
to be coping with the problems that con-
front them. And that again will drive some
more in the direction of interdependence.
Right now it is really irrelevant to discuss
what formula of consultation would be ade-
quate, because the necessities that are im-
posed on us by the energy crisis would pro-
duce their own formula.

Q. Do you thiyik the American public is
prepared for the consequences of such a
program ?

Secretary Kissinger: All I can say is that
it is the absolute duty of leaders to tell the
people what they believe is necessary. You
can make your life easier by not putting
tough choices to the public. But then when
the inevitable catastrophe occurs, you have
lost not only credibility but legitimacy. So I
don't think we really have any choice. I
think the administration will have to tell the
pubhc what is needed, and I know that the
President intends to do this. I think this is
basically a healthy society, and I think there
will be support.

Q. If all else should fail, ivoidd the United
States consider military intervention in the
Middle East to secure oil at prices that we
can afford?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that
would be a cause for military action.

Q. You don't think that the financial bank-
ruptcy of the West would be a casus belli?

Secretary Kissinger: The financial bank-
ruptcy of the West is avoidable by other
means. We will find other solutions.

Q. That doesn't ansiver the question, ivith
all due respect.

Secretary Kissinger: What we would do if

January 20, 1975

61

there were no other way of avoiding financial
bankruptcy and the whole collapse of the
Western structure, I cannot now speculate.
But I am convinced that we won't reach that
point.

Q. What concrete steps might the United
States take to induce the Third World coun-
tries to pursue a more realistic course in the
United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Third
World countries have to accept the fact that
they, too, live in an interdependent world.
They cannot both insist on cooperation from
the advanced industrial countries and con-
duct constant warfare — economic or political
— against the advanced industrial countries.
The spirit of cooperation must be mutual.
There will be disagreement, of course. That
is unavoidable. But if you have a group of
77 nations that automatically vote as a
group, regardless of the merits of the issue,
then the United Nations becomes a test of
strength and the web of cooperation on
which the development of all countries ulti-
mately depends will be severely strained. In
future sessions of the United Nations we
will look more carefully at the degree of
mutuality in the positions of the countries
with which we are dealing.

Q. Can you conceive of a situation in tvhich
the United States might decide to tempo-
rarily suspend itself from the United Na-
tions to protest the tyranny of the majority ?

Secretary Kissinger: I can conceive that if
an issue is too outrageously decided, that we
would suspend our activities in relation to
that issue. But it is hard to answer this ques-
tion in the abstract.

Q. Our detente with China seems to have
been stalled.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is the con-
stant position of Newsweek magazine. But it
is not our position. I believe that on the
level of bilateral relations between the two
countries we are essentially on course. I
found that essentially confirmed by my last
visit to the People's Republic of China. It is

a relationship of practical necessity, in which
two countries have made a decision to co-
operate for limited objectives with each
other. I don't accept the proposition that our
policy is stalled.

0. Do you think within the next year we
might move toward a normalization of rela-
tions ^vith Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: We were prepared
to accept a two-thirds vote of the Oi'ganiza-
tion of American States at its recent meet-
ing in Quito, and we were led to believe that
this two-thirds vote had been assured. Sud-
denly we found ourselves in the position of
being asked to produce votes for a resolution
which we could not possibly sponsor, given
the history of our involvement in the sanc-
tions. There will be another occasion next
year in a less structured meeting in Buenos
Aires to discuss the Cuban issue, where the
necessity of producing votes is less intense,
and where one can then chart a course on a
hemisphere basis more effectively. I think
there will be some evolution during the next
year.

Q. How do you evaluate your own situa-
tion now at the end of the year?

Secretary Kissinger: During the period of
President Nixon's crisis, I may have been
overprotected from congressional criticism
because many of the Senators and Congress-
men instinctively were fearful of doing dam-
age to our foreign policy and believed that
they had to preserve one area of our national
policy from partisan controversy. So it was
inevitable that after that restraint was re-
moved I would rejoin the human race and
be exposed to the normal criticisms of Secre-
taries of State.

I have spent a great deal of time with
Congress in the last few weeks, and I have
the impression that there is a solid relation-
ship. We worked out the Greek-Turkish aid
problem, I think, in a cooperative spirit. I
really feel passionately that if we don't main-
tain our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis,
we will be in the deepest trouble. Of course
fundamental issues ought to be discussed,

62

Department of State Bulletin

including fundamental foreign policy issues.
But there are various areas in which there is
or ought to be substantial agreement. And
as far as I am concerned, I am going to go
the absolute limit of maintaining it on a bi-
partisan basis.

Q. Do you thUik the pendulum has sumng
too far from one direction, from talk of
"Super K," to an overunllingness now to
criticize you?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no magic
and there are no supermen in foreign policj'.
The difference between a good and a mediocre
foreign policy is the accumulation of nuances.
It is meticulousness ; it is careful prepara-
tion. If a Secretary of State or anybody con-
cerned with foreign policy goes out to hit a
home run every time he goes up there, he
is putting a burden on himself and a strain
on the system.

Q. You have been quoted as saying that
Americans like the lone cowboy, walki)ig
into town with his six-guns blazing.

Secretary Kissinger: I think any society
needs individuals that symbolize what it
I stands for. It is difficult to run countries
without great figures.

Q. Have we great figures today?

Secretary Kissinger: One of the problems
of the modern age is that great figures are
not so easy to come by.

Q. Why?

Secretary Kissinger: It may be that the
process of reaching high ofl^ce is so consum-
ing that it leaves little occasion for reflection
about what one does. Moreover, modern man
doesn't like to stand alone. This is due largely
to the impact of the media, in which every-
body wants to check tomorrow morning's
editorials.

Q. What role do you think the media plays
in your conduct of foreign policy ?

Secretary Kissinger: The negative aspect
is that there is almost a daily pulling up of

the trees to see whether the roots are still
there. There is almost a daily necessity to
explain each day's actions. And in the process
there is a danger of losing the essence of a
substantial foreign policy, which is the rela-
tionship of moves to each other and the
overall design. In order to conduct a foreign
policy you must be prepared to act alone for
some period. You cannot get universal appro-
bation at every step of the way. And so the
media have a tendency to produce a con-
genital insecurity on the part of the top
people.

On the positive side, the need of public
explanation forces an awareness that would
not otherwise exist. The more sophisticated
of the journalists often have a reservoir of
knowledge and continuity that is better than
that of many of the top officials. I could name
individuals who, on arms control, on Viet-
Nam negotiations, could spot subtleties that
many of the officials could not see.

So I think that the interplay is on the
whole useful. But as one looks ahead, there
are several dangers. There is a danger of a
Caesaristic democracy in which the media
are manipulated by the government. There
is a danger of the media trying to substitute
themselves for the government. And you
know yourself that there are fads, that some-
times there is excessive praise and then it
swings back to excessive criticism.

Q. You are about to begin your seventh
year in Washington. Is there a seven-year
itch? Are you thinking of turning to some-
thing else?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to think
that the best time to leave is when you are
not under pressure. I have been here long
enough now so I don't have to continue being
here to prove something to myself.

On the other hand, I am also engaged in a
number of things from which it would be
either difl^cult to dissociate or painful to dis-
sociate. I would like to think that I will know
when to get out. But very few people have
mastered this. And most people are carried
out instead of walking out. I have no itch to
leave. But I also have no compulsion to stay.

January 20, 1975

63

The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship With Latin America

Address bij William D. Rogers

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^

A year ago today, Deputy Secretary Rush
addressed this distinguished audience. He
took the occasion to set out a few reflections
on the evolution of the historical relationship
between the United States and Latin Amer-
ica. He pointed to the forces of change which
were at work and which had eroded the old
patterns of paternalism that had long char-
acterized that relationship. Secretary Rush
noted that Secretary Kissinger had, only a
few weeks before, launched a new dialogue
with Latin America in an effort to work out
the basis for a new relationship.

A good deal has occurred in the year since,
both within the United States and in the area
of U.S. -Latin American policy. We now are
working toward a policy. I emphasize the
phrase "working toward a policy." Building
a new policy toward a group of two dozen
very diverse countries in an era of profound
change in global relationships is bound to be
a long-term process. There can be no pat for-
mulas, no grand designs that will automati-
cally bring about a new era in U.S.-Latin
American relations. As Ken Rush said here
last year, "The new relationship . . . can only
be worked out as specific issues are faced,
discussed, and resolved."

The specific issues were defined by the
Latin American Foreign Ministers last year
at Bogota. They include the patterns for co-
operation for Latin American development,
the question whether something by way of
principle could be agreed to for the future
transfer of technology, the behavior of trans-
national enterprises, and the restraint of co-

' Made before the Council of the Americas at New
York, N.Y., on Dec. 5.

ercive economic measures by one country
against another, as well as the Panama Canal
issue, the structuring of international trade,
and the reform of the Organization of Amer-
ican States.

The composition of the agenda, I believe, is
indicative of the deep and abiding Latin
American concern with the impact of the
United States on the development of their
economies and societies. The agenda also il-
lustrates that regional concerns can no longer
be separated from global problems.

Areas of U.S. Policy Response

Today I would like to talk about what I
conceive of as the two strands of that long-
term process. One strand consists of efforts
by the United States to adjust its policies to
the new realities in the hemisphere. Because
our weight in hemispheric affairs is so great,
any new relationship between the United
States and Latin America will require that
the United States adjust more than any sin-
gle Latin American country. The other strand
in building a new relationship is the effort
that all the countries in the hemisphere must
make together.

The United States has the elements of a
policy response in five general areas. These
are settling outstanding differences, avoiding
new disputes, intensifying consultations, im-
proving cooperation for development, and re-
shaping the inter-American system.

L Settling outstanding differences

We have had remarkable success in clear-
ing the board of old, festering investment

64

Department of State Bulletin

disputes and other longstanding controver-
sies. The celebrated problems with the Gov-
ernment of Peru have been happily resolved,
and our relationship with the Revolutionary
Government is very much on the mend. Nego-
tiations with the Government of Panama on
a new canal treaty are going forward nicely
in the cooperative spirit embodied in the
statement of principles signed between our
governments on February 7. Finally, I am
delighted to say that most outstanding in-
vestment disputes in Chile have been re-
solved. These disputes have been or are being
resolved because both parties have been will-
ing to make concessions to the other's point
of view.

II. Avoiding new disputes

Here, we are not so far along. We have
proposed the establishment of a factfinding
or conciliation procedure ; something along
these modest lines would permit us to con-
sider the modification of our legislation re-
garding expropriation cases. This legisla-
tion— the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amend-
ments— had been a major cause of the
charges of economic coercion leveled against
the United States. Unfortunately, the U.S.
proposal found no response in Latin Amer-
ica.

We also continue to believe that a balanced
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States could reduce the potential for future
disputes. Unfortunately, substantial differ-
ences still remain between the positions of
the developed countries and the developing
countries on the draft charter articles.

We are also prepared to accept — indeed,
we are a leading advocate of — the formal rec-
ognition of the essential interdependence of
the nations of the world and the need to rec-
ognize that economic security is collective
and indivisible. Here again, however, the dis-
cussions thus far within the special commit-
tee on restructuring the OAS have reflected
a difference of view between the Latin Amer-
ican countries who have spoken and ourselves
as to how collective economic security can be
achieved.

Finally, we have joined with the Latin

American countries in a Working Group on
Transnational Enterprises in an effort to
agree upon some principles which could serve
as guidelines for the interaction between gov-
ernments and foreign investors in Latin
America. This working group has only re-
cently begun its deliberations, and we are
hopeful it will produce something useful. It
will do so, however, only if it is recognized
that the United States will not unilaterally
renounce long-held positions on international
law.

Clearly, the task of preventing new con-
flicts is a difficult one. Perhaps, in keeping
with its greater power, the United States
will have to make somewhat greater adjust-
ments than it has been willing to thus far.
But it cannot be expected to make all the
concessions on matters of principle.

III. Increased consultations on matters of
concern

We have made good, and are making good,
on the Secretary's promise to consult — be-
forehand— on matters of U.S. policy of inter-
est to Latin America. The President's Special
Trade Representative, Ambassador [William
D.] Eberle, completed an extensive consulta-
tion mission to Latin America in April. Con-
sultations were held prior to the Law of the
Sea Conference, the World Food Conference,
the World Population Conference, and the
U.N. General Assembly. A team of U.S. for-
eign policy planning officials has just re-
turned from highly successful visits to four
Latin American countries. This is an area
where clearly the United States, as a major
actor on the world scene, must make the lion's
share of the effort.

IV. Cooperation for development

Our efforts to be responsive in this crucial
area depend importantly upon congressional
support, and the returns are not yet in. We
will need congressional support to enable us
to meet our commitment to maintain assist-
ance to Latin America at least at its current
levels. And it is not even certain that we will
have a fiscal year 1975 aid bill. Passage of

January 20, 1975

65

the Trade Reform Act with its provisions
for generalized tariff preferences for the less
developed countries intact and unencumbered
by restrictive amendments is absolutely es-
sential and will be debated in the Senate next
week.

Trade and market access are at the top of
the agenda for Latin America today. The
Latin Americans are striving to diversify
and expand their exports and look to us, who
supply them with nearly 40 percent of their
imports, as a logical market along with other
industrialized countries.

We are committed to assist the Latin
Americans in this effort, but I would be less
than candid if I did not acknowledge that our
credibility has been damaged somewhat by
countervailing-duty proceedings initiated in
recent months as the result of industry com-
plaint, backed up by court suits. The Latin
Americans have found it difficult to believe
that the U.S. Government had no discretion
and was performing its statutory duty in
compliance with legislation dating from 1897.
The proceedings have been seen in Latin
America as evidence of a renewed protection-
ist trade attitude.

Our ability to be responsive in the trade
field, of course, will be determined largely by
the fate of the Trade Reform Act. We have
been closely cooperating with others within
the administration to strongly urge that this
priority piece of legislation be enacted by the
current session of Congress, and I have
spoken with many Senators of the importance
of this bill to the conduct of our foreign pol-
icy with Latin America. We appreciate the
help that you and the council staff have made
to get the trade bill enacted. I would urge you
to redouble your efforts in these few days of
December remaining to enact a trade bill.

In addition to financial aid and trade, tech-
nology is regarded in Latin America as a
key element of development cooperation. We
have been participating vigorously in a
Working Group on Science and the Transfer
of Technology in an effort to see what steps
the United States and Latin America might

take to improve the flow of technology to the
region. The returns on this effort are not in
yet. So far, however, there has been a tend-
ency on the part of the Latin American par-
ticipants to criticize the United States for
not being willing to go far enough fast
enough. Again we have the problem of the
two strands of the relationship, of how much
the United States can be expected to do uni-
laterally and how much Latin America and
the United States can do together.

V. Reshaping the inter-American system

As the fifth new policy area, I cite the in-
ter-American system. Both we and the Latin
Americans are pretty well agreed that exist-
ing inter-American institutions must be re-
formed and revitalized. There is, however,
no consensus as to how — whether, for exam-
ple, to create a development council to take
charge of the array of regional economic de-
velopment matters which are such significant
grist in the OAS mill ; whether to take a new
look at the political side of the Organization,
including the General Assembly and the Per-
manent Council; whether to move a large
share of the OAS, such as its technical as-
sistance program and service functions, or
even its headquarters, to Latin America. The
problem seems to be that most of the member
countries are uncertain as to what they want
to use the OAS to accomplish. Here we need
as much effort and input from Latin America
as from the United States.

Proposal To Lift Sanctions Against Cuba

The United States can no longer, if in re-
ality it ever could, define by itself the pur-
poses of inter-American cooperation. And
there will no doubt be a great deal said on
the future of the inter-American system at
the Buenos Aires meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters, which itself, of course, will be outside
the formal OAS.

This anomaly leads me to a word or two
about the inter-American system and the
Quito meeting. Quito illustrated both the

66

Department of State Bulletin

challenges to and the strengths and promise
of the new dialogue.

The issue at Quito, as you are aware, was
whether the diplomatic and economic sanc-
tions voted by the OAS against Cuba in 1964
should be lifted. The resolution to remove
the sanctions was supported by a majority
but failed to receive the two-thirds vote re-
quired by the Rio Treaty [Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance]. The sanc-
tions therefore remain in effect, despite the
fact that five Rio Treaty countries and four
other hemispheric nations maintain either
diplomatic or commercial ties with Cuba.

What implications do the Quito results
carry for U.S. -Latin American relations?

While we are still too close to the event to
render definitive judgments, I think there are
certain aspects of the outcome that are worth
noting.

First, and perhaps most obviously, the
Quito results show that no consensus yet ex-
ists within the hemisphere regarding Cuba.

Second, the U.S. position at the meeting
was one of complete neutrality. We neither
lobbied for nor against the resolution, and
we abstained when the matter came to a
vote. Quito was a Latin American, not a
U.S., show. The significance of this point, I
am sure, will be apparent to all who have
followed U.S.-Latin American relations in
recent years. Our neutrality was a major
change.

What of the impact of the indecisive re-
sult at Quito on the future of the Rio Treaty
and the intei'-American system? Since a ma-
jority— 12 countries — voted in favor of re-
moving the sanctions, we must ask if the
procedures outlined in the treaty continue to
be appropriate. Quito demonstrated that the
time has come to give new impetus and po-
litical direction to the eflfort to update the
organization. For, in many respects, the Or-
ganization of American States, despite its
defects, remains the embodiment of our com-
mon aspirations in this hemisphere.

Of one thing I am certain, however, Cuba
has absorbed far too much of our time and

energies in recent years. The Cuba issue must
not be allowed to impede the important task
we have undertaken in the dialogue. Both we
and the Latin Americans are more aware of
this central fact as a result of Quito.

Hemisphere and Global Agenda

Where do we go from here? The goals of
"collective economic security" and "integral
development" advanced by the nations of
Latin America simply cannot be achieved in
this hemisphere alone without reference to
the larger international system. The prob-
lems which have been identified through
the dialogue — development cooperation, the
structure of trade and the monetary system,
transnational enterprises, and the transfer
of science and technology — are in fact the
priority items on the global agenda.

But progress can be made in this hemi-
sphere. And to the degree we can do some-
thing in the hemisphere, we will be shaping
the solution of the larger problems as well.

What we are engaged in is a process. It is
a process which requires not just unilateral
action by the United States, although as the
major power in the region we undoubtedly
must bear the major responsibility. It is a
process that involves not just Secretaries of
State, Foreign Ministers, and their respec-
tive governments. It is a process which to be
successful will require the active support and
participation of all elements of our societies.
The task before us then is to broaden and
deepen the dialogue.

As Secretary Kissinger put it, we must
"anchor the Western Hemisphere relation-
ship not only in the consciousness of our gov-
ernment but in the hearts of the people." -
With the continued support of organizations
such as your own, I am convinced we can suc-
ceed.

" For a toast by Secretary Kissinger on Oct. 2,
1974, at a luncheon honoring Latin American For-
eign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to
the United Nations, see Bulletin of Oct. 28, 1974,
p. 583.

January 20, 1975

67

Secretary Underlines Importance
of Western Hemisphere Policy

Secretary Kissinger met on December 17
with members of the Commission on United
States-Latin American Relations. Folloiving
are remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Sol
M. Linowitz, chairman of the commission,
made to the press after the meeting.

Press release 637 dated December 18

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Ladies and gentlemen : I came down here
primarily to introduce Sol Linowitz, an old
friend of mine, who has chaired a commission
that has studied the Western Hemisphere

policy.

We attach the greatest importance to re-
vitalizing the policy in the Western Hemi-
sphere. I think an important beginning was
made last year in the Foreign Ministers
meetings that took place in Tlatelolco, in
Mexico City, and in Washington. And an-
other one is planned for Buenos Aires in
Argentina, I think in the second half of
March.

We would like to give effect to our con-
viction of the interdependence which is the
chief characteristic of the modern period.
In this hemisphere, where we are connected
with so many countries with a long tradition
of friendship and cooperative action, we are
aware that there are many serious difficul-
ties. We realize that the history of the re-
lationship has had many ups and downs and
that the United States has not always shown
the requisite understanding for conditions in
Latin America. But we do want to work
together in a spirit that reflects the necessity
of our time. It is for this reason that the re-
port of the commission headed by Mr. Lino-
witz ' is taken so seriously by us. We believe
that it reflects a conceptual approach and a
structure which is very compatible with our

' The 54-page report entitled "The Americas in a
Changing World" is available from the Center for
Inter-American Relations, 680 Park Avenue, Xew
York, N.Y. 10021.

own. It contains many recommendations with
which we are extremely sympathetic.

I have just met for an hour with a group,
some of whose distinguished members are in
this room — and indeed we hired away one of
its members as Assistant Secretary for Latin
American relations. And I am delighted
that they have agreed that they would stay
in business and continue to meet and to give
us the benefit of their advice. I plan to meet
with them regularly. And as we get closer
to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Buenos
Aires, we will certainly check our conclusions
with them and hope prior to that to benefit
from their views.

So I came down here with Mr. Linowitz to
underline the importance we attach to his
report, the importance we attach to the West-
ern Hemisphere policy, and the hope that we
can bring about a dramatic improvement in
Western Hemisphere relationships.

Thank you very much.

MR. LINOWITZ

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. On behalf of
the commission, may I just say that we are
deeply appreciative of the opportunity to
meet with the Secretary today and to have
had the chance to exchange ideas with him
on a number of the most important problems
confronting U.S. -Latin American relations.
I ought to indicate that, as I see it, six
members of the commission who were present
at the meeting this afternoon are in the room.
And I would merely call your attention to the
fact that Dr. Harrison Brown, Secretary
Elliot Richardson, Mr. [Henry J.] Heinz,
Professor [Samuel P.] Huntington, Dr.
[Thomas M.] Messer, and Mr. [Nathaniel]
Samuels are all here with us. Mr. [Arnold]
Xachmanoff, who is the executive director
of the commission, is there, as are Mr. [Greg-
ory] Treverton, the rapporteur, and Mr.
[Abraham] Lowenthal, who served as our
consultant.

In the course of our meeting with the
Secretary, we had a chance to talk with him
about some of the most critical, contentious
problems and, in an informal, wholly free,

68

Department of State Bulletin

give-and-take atmosphere, exchange our ideas
and give him the benefit of our own thoughts
with respect to these particular issues.

The main point we wanted to make was
that in this changed world, where previous
assumptions and premises have to be re-
examined and reformulated, we must no
longer rely on policies which are no longer
applicable; that the premises which underlie
everything from the Good Neighbor policy
through the Alliance for Progress, indeed to
some of the more recent pronouncements, are
really not truly reflective of the kind of
world in which we are living; that we have
to recognize that Latin America is no longer
our sphere of influence ; that we can no
longer be patronizing or neglectful toward
the countries of the hemisphere ; and that we
have to enter into a whole new policy in this
country which will permit us to work with
the countries of Latin America in recog-
nition of our true interdependence at this
critical time and in recognition of the fact
that indeed, in the deepest sense, we need
one another.

It was with this in mind that we formu-
lated our recommendations based around five
major principles which we discussed with the
Secretary: First, that the United States and
Latin America have to work together in a
global context ; secondly, that American poli-
cies have to be sensitive to their impact in
this hemisphere; third, that we have to do
away with the patronizing and paternalistic
and discriminatory legislation and practices
which were prevalent in this hemisphere in
times in the past ; fourth, that we have to
cooperate in the strengthening of human
rights ; and fifth, that we have to evolve a
policy for economic cooperation which will
be mutually beneficial.

We touched in that context on a number of
issues which are referred to and discussed in
our report : Cuba, Chile, the whole business
of intervention, covert or overt, the problems
arising from economic sanctions in the hemi-
sphere, how we can do a better job of
strengthening human rights, what we ought
to be doing about relationships between gov-
ernments and between companies and govern-
ments in the economic area.

That really was the substance of our con-
versation. We were tremendously encouraged
by the Secretary's deep interest in our report
and this recommendation and his commit-
ment to the thrust of our report, his support
for the principles that we espoused, and his
assertion to us that he believed that the
main direction of our report was wholly
consistent with his own views.

It was also encouraging to have him ask
that we indeed go forward with our proposal
to meet from time to time in the months
ahead in order to take stock of what had
happened to our recommendations and to
issue statements as to how we find the devel-
oping situation in the hemisphere.

Secretary Kissinger Honors
Senator Fuibright

Following are remarks by Secretary Kis-
singer made at a dinner in honor of Senator
J. W. Fnlbright given by the Board of For-
eign Scholarships on December 16 at Wash-
ington.

Press release 535 dated December 17

We are here tonight to honor an American
statesman, and an old friend. Bill Fuibright
has been my colleague and mentor ever since
I came to Washington. We have not always
agreed, but I have come to value his opposi-
tion more than I would some other men's
support. For the force of his wisdom and sin-
cerity can leave no man's views untempered.

From the origin of democracy in Greece
down to the present, the question has been
posed whether a government of the people
could muster the vision and resolution which
the conduct of foreign policy requires.

It was Pericles, speaking to the Athenians,
who first stated our faith that a free people
can, through free discussion and free elec-
tions, sustain a wiser and more decisive pol-
icy than governments that find their unity in
discipline rather than common purpose.

Senator Fuibright has fulfilled this prom-
ise triumphantly in our own time. A son of
the State of Arkansas, he has represented its

January 20, 1975

69

people for a generation; and at the same
time, he has been a statesman who could look
beyond our own country to see, as clearly as
any man. the emerging challenges for our
policy abroad.

He was an architect, after 1946, of a post-
war international system built on the need
for Western unity in the face of a monolithic
Communist threat. But he also perceived
sooner than others that the cold war order
must give way to a more pluralist and toler-
ant system in which neither great power
would try to remold the world in its own
image. His voice was among the first to de-
fine ideas which have become pillars of our
policy today — detente with the Soviet Union
and China, more limited American involve-
ment in Indochina, an evenhanded approach
to settlement in the Middle East. Before the
word was used, he was a prophet of the in-
terdependence that has become our current
condition.

His views were often unpopular when first
advanced, but because he voiced them, opin-
ion came to terms more rapidly with the re-
ality he perceived. He has exercised his lead-
ership not to exalt his own position but to
bring his country abreast of his own under-
standing. He has earned a leader's highest
praise in a democracy, which is that he has
been the educator of a free people.

But in addition to honoring the service
and leadership of a masterful American
statesman, we also are here to mark an
achievement singular in its significance for
our time; for as the members of the Boai'd
of Foreign Scholarships attest by their pres-
ence, we honor this evening a career which
has been translated into an institution.

In his book "The Public Philo-sophy" Wal-
ter Lippmann noted that if we are to avoid
disaster we must deal with what Lippmann
called "the pictures in people's heads" — the
manmade environment in which ideas become
realities.

In an age when the technologies of com-
munication are improving faster than man's
ability to assimilate their consequences, and
at a time when the multiplication of differ-

ing perspectives and predispositions compli-
cates the achievement of global consensus,
Bill Fulbright conceived a program brilliant
in its simplicity and essential for our future.
He recognized that the dramatically accel-
erating pace of interaction among peoples
and institutions would not necessarily lead
to increased understanding or cooperation.
He fore.saw that interaction unguided by in-
telligent and humane direction and concern
had the potential to bring increased tension
and hostility rather than less.

The Fulbright exchange program was an
expansive concept founded upon a global vi-
sion. It has grown to meet new realities. A
program which once promoted the solidarity
of the West now sustains exchanges between
the United States and 122 countries around
the globe. It expressed, it helps us to master,
the growing interdependence of the world.

Personally, it is difficult for me to accept
that Senator Fulbright will now be leaving
the Senate. He has suffered the ultimate fate
of every politician, which is to leave the of-
fice he has made his own. But I will continue
to rely on his wise counsel as much in the fu-
ture as I have in the past. Bill Fulbright's
wisdom will not be lost to this nation.

As Pericles once said to the Athenians,
great leaders find :

. . . the grandest of all sepulchers . . . (is) the
minds of men, where their glory remains fresh to
stir to speech or action as the occasion comes by.
For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous
men; and their story is not graven only on stone
over their native earth, but lives on far away, with-
out visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other
men's lives.

Bill, we are confident you will go on to
new achievements. But your deeds are al-
ready woven into the fabric of our lives, into
our policy, into our way of perceiving the
world. And the Fulbright program will live
as the visible symbol of your gift to mankind.
We will always be grateful. On behalf of the
past and present members of the Board of
Foreign Scholarships, it is now my honor
and pleasure to present you with this scroll
of appreciation.

70

Department of State Bulletin

Economic and Technical Assistance
to Portugal

Department Announcement *

Following the most useful conversations
the President of the Republic had with Pres-
ident Ford and Secretary Kissinger in
Washington, the Governments of the United
States and Portugal agreed that a positive
demonstration of U.S. support and confidence
in Portugal's future would be timely and
helpful.

Within the resources immediately avail-
able to it, the U.S. Government has offered to
begin at once a program of economic assist-
ance and cooperation which will address
itself to the Portuguese Government's high-
priority needs in the fields of housing,
agriculture, transportation, public admin-
istration, education, and health and in the
areas of finance and economy.

The program of economic assistance and
cooperation is intended as an earnest of U.S.
Government support for Portugal in its effort
to construct a free and democratic society.

The principal elements of the present phase
of economic assistance and cooperation are
the following:

— The U.S. Government will guarantee up
to $20 million in private American loans for
the construction of housing in Portugal.

— U.S. Government experts in the fields
of agriculture, transportation, public ad-
ministration, education, and health will be
made available to Portugal on a short-term
basis at no charge when requested by the
Portuguese Government.

— Opportunities for Portuguese to study
and train in the United States will be in-
creased in accordance with Portugal's present
needs.

— The Export-Import Bank will give
sympathetic consideration to financing U.S.
goods and services needed for Portuguese de-
velopment projects.

— In addition to direct bilateral assistance,
the United States at the request of the
Government of Portugal will :

a. Support Portugal in international or-
ganizations, such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development;

b. Urge other friendly countries to help
Portugal, too, either bilaterally or in con-
junction with the United States.

Appropriate Ministries of the two govern-
ments are beginning immediately to work
out the details of the program so that it can
begin at once.

In addition, the administration strongly
supports the congressional proposal for aid
to Portugal. This proposal, if enacted, would
authorize loan funds and grant aid, to be
divided equally between Portugal and
African territories under Portuguese ad-
ministration and former territories.

Letters of Credence

German Democratic Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
German Democratic Republic, Rolf Sieber,
presented his credentials to President Ford
on December 20.'

Morocco

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Kingdom of Morocco, Abdelhadi Boutaleb,
presented his credentials to President Ford
on December 20.^

Yemen Arab Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Yemen Arab Republic, Hasan Makki, pre-
sented his credentials to President Ford on
December 20.'

'■ Issued on Dec. 13 (text from press release 527).

' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release dated Dec. 20.

January 20, 1975

71

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. General Assembly Debate

Following are statements made in Com-
mittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N.
General Assembly on October 21 by Senator
St7(art Symington, U.S. Representative to
the General Assembly, and on October SO
and November 20 and 22 by Joseph Martin,
Jr., U.S. Representative to the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament and Ad-
viser to the U.S. delegation to the General
Assembly, together with the texts of tivo
resolutions adopted by the Assembly on De-
cember 9.

U.S. STATEMENTS

Senator Symington, October 21

USUN press release 140 dated October 21 (prepared text)

As we start our annual disarmament de-
bate, my government believes it appropriate
to devote its initial statement on disarma-
ment questions exclusively to one of the most
critical matters before the 29th General As-
sembly— the objective of limiting the growth
and spread of nuclear weapons.

Since the advent of the nuclear age, we
have been forced to live with the dilemma of
the dual nature of nuclear energy. We have
held high expectations concerning the con-
tribution that nuclear energy could make to
human welfare; but we have always been
painfully aware that tied to these expected
benefits is a growing potential for mankind's
destruction. The rapidly expanding use of
nuclear reactors to generate electric power
in recent years has made this dilemma one
of the most urgent issues of our time.

An inevitable result of the massive growth
of nuclear-generated power will be the tre-
mendous increase in worldwide production

of plutonium. Estimates are that by 1980
close to 1 million pounds of plutonium will
have been produced worldwide in electric
power reactors, enough to manufacture over
50,000 nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, rising demands for enriched
uranium as a nuclear reactor fuel will re-
quire a marked expansion of uranium enrich-
ment capacity.

Widespread development of enrichment fa-
cilities, perhaps involving new enrichment
techniques, could create a capability for pro-
ducing weapons-gi'ade uranium at many lo-
cations throughout the world.

This increasing availability of nuclear
fuels and materials, as well as the continu-
ing dissemination of nuclear technology,
threatens to place a nuclear explosive capa-
bility, and the accompanying capability to
produce nuclear weapons, within the reach
of an ever-widening group of states. As per-
ilous as the situation was when there were
only two states with a nuclear weapons ca-
pability— and is now with six — stability
would be vastly more precarious in a world
of many nuclear powers.

Such a world is not to be feared more by
one group of states than another. All nations
would stand to lose.

States fortunate enough to be located in
regions now free of nuclear weapons would
suddenly find themselves faced with nuclear-
armed neighbors. This would bring them un-
der strong pressures to acquire nuclear weap-
ons themselves. Even minor conflicts would
then involve the risk of escalation to nuclear
war. The probability of the use of nuclear
weapons — whether by design, miscalculation,
or accident — would increase sharply. Pros-
pects for significant arms control and dis-
armament measures would deteriorate as all

72

Department of State Bulletin

states felt the need to prepare for a larger
and more disparate range of contingencies.

Many have assumed that time was on our
side — that every year without the use of nu-
clear weapons, every year without an addi-
tional nuclear power, every step in East-West
detente, and every measure to curb the arms
race have all been part of a steady progres-
sion to where we would no longer fear the
possibility of nuclear war. But it is obvious,
in light of the worldwide energy crisis and
the emergence after a 10-year hiatus of an
additional state with a nuclear explosive ca-
pability, that we cannot afford to be com-
placent.

Hopefully, these developments will at least
have the positive effect of making us fully
alert to the dangers of the further spread of
nuclear explosives and of encouraging a de-
termined international effort to avert that
possibility.

We are now at an important juncture, per-
haps a decisive one. The challenge, as Secre-
tary Kissinger well described it to the Gen-
eral Assembly on September 23, is "to real-
ize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technol-
ogy without contributing to the growth of
nuclear weapons or to the number of states
possessing them."

The United States does not believe that a
world of many nuclear powers is inevitable.
Nor does it believe that the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy must necessarily be cut back
because of the risk that nuclear technology
will be diverted to military purposes. How-
ever, we cannot expect to take full advantage
of the expanding use of nuclear energy un-
less we are willing to strengthen the system
for assuring one another that there is noth-
ing to fear in the continued diffusion of nu-
clear materials and technology.

While working toward a more universal
and effective system of assurances or safe-
guards, we must also strengthen the political
and economic incentives for resisting the
temptation to acquire nuclear explosive ca-
pabilities. Those capabilities would inevita-
bly be perceived as a threat to others and
therefore trigger a competition in the de-
structive potential of nuclear devices.

No state or group of states can meet the
challenge alone. What is required in the
months and years ahead is a sustained and
concerted international effort involving nu-
clear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon
states, nuclear suppliers and importers, par-
ties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and states which have not yet seen it in their
interest to join the treaty. My government
would like to suggest several tasks which
members of the world community, individu-
ally and collectively, should undertake in
meeting this challenge.

First, cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy shoidd be continued. It could
be argued that the most appropriate response
to the increasing risk of diversion of nuclear
technology to hostile purposes would simply
be to cut back on international cooperation in
the nuclear energy field. The United States
does not believe such a course of action would
serve nonproliferation objectives, nor would
it be responsive to the pressing need through-
out the world to receive the benefits of this
important new source of energy. The United
States recognizes fully that the vast poten-
tial benefits of nuclear energy cannot be
monopolized by a handful of advanced indus-
trial states. This is especially true at a time
when many of the world's developing coun-
tries are among the hardest hit by global
economic difficulties.

As a member of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy of the Congress, I have been
privileged to participate in U.S. efforts to
make the peaceful applications of atomic en-
ergy widely available. The U.S. Government
has facilitated the participation of American
industry in atomic power activities abroad.
It has sponsored large international confer-
ences to share our technical know-how. It
has shipped materials abroad to help others
move ahead in nuclear technology. And it
has given strong support to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
to that Agency's programs in the nuclear
field. All told, it has spent hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars to promote peaceful uses
worldwide. We intend to continue this ef-
fort, both through our bilateral cooperative

January 20, 1975

73

arrangements and our support for the work
of the IAEA.

Second, we should intoisify our search for
effective measures to curb the competition in
nuclear arms. We are mindful that serious
risks are involved in the further accumula-
tion of nuclear weapons by states now pos-
sessing them, as well as in the spread of
weapons capabilities to additional states.
Moreover, we know that we cannot expect
non-nuclear-weapon states to show restraint
unless nuclear powers also practice restraint.

As one of the principal nuclear powers, the
United States recognizes its special responsi-
bility in this area. We are aware of the con-
cerns expressed by a number of countries
about the pace of progress in nuclear dis-
armament. Although proud of achievements
already made, we would agree that pi'ogress
has been disappointingly slow. We under-
stand the impatience of others, and our-
selves are anxious to proceed faster. But it
must be recognized that these complicated
issues, touching upon the vital interests of
all states, are rarely susceptible to quick and
easy solutions.

U.S. and Soviet negotiators recently recon-
vened their talks in Geneva on strategic arms
limitations. We attach the utmost importance
to these negotiations, in which members of
this body have also expressed much interest.

The talks are currently aimed at conclud-
ing an equitable agreement placing quantita-
tive and qualitative limitations on offensive
strategic weapons. We will make every ef-
fort to reach such an agreement at the ear-
liest possible date. In addition, the United
St-ates remains firmly committed to seek an
adequately verified comprehensive test ban.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated
in Moscow last summer, has significance not
only for its restraining effect on U.S.-Soviet
nuclear arms competition but also as a step
toward our ultimate goal of a comprehensive
ban. Indeed, in the first article of that treaty,
we reaffirm our commitment to pursue fur-
ther negotiations toward that goal.

Third, steps should be taken to insure the
widest possible adherence to the Nonprolif-
eration Treaty. It is noteworthy that, while

treaty parties have sometimes urged faster
implementation of provisions of the Non-
proliferation Treaty, there is virtual una-
nimity among them that the treaty's basic
concepts and structure are sound and that
the treaty continues to provide a valuable le-
gal framework for dealing with both the
peaceful and military applications of nuclear
energy. My government continues to regard
the NPT as one of the most significant inter-
national agreements of the post- World War
II era. Recently, President Ford called the
treaty "one of the pillars of United States
foreign policy."

The Nonproliferation Treaty has been crit-
icized as discriminatory in that it divides the
world into two categories of states: those
with nuclear explosive devices and those
without. But the NPT did not create that dis-
tinction, nor is it intended to condone it. The
negotiators of the NPT recognized that the
only promising and realistic approach was to
start with the world the way it was. Accord-
ingly the treaty calls for a halt to the further
spread of explosive capabilities and obligates
existing nuclear powers to speed limitations
and reductions of their own stockpiles.

If there had been no effort, such as the
NPT, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons
or if the effort had been postponed until nu-
clear-weapon states had abolished their arse-
nals, we would have found ourselves in a
world of so many nuclear powers that fur-
ther attempts to stop "vertical prolifera-
tion"— that is, to limit and reduce nuclear
weapons — would be futile.

The distinguished leader of the Swedish
disarmament delegation, Mrs. [Inga] Thors-
son, put this matter in the proper perspective
at the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament on July 30 of this year when she
said :

The NPT is by nature discriminatory, but its pur-
pose is such that it has been supported by the ma-
jority, and needs to be supported by the entirety, of
the world community. It is in the interest of every
single country in the world that this purpose be ful-
filled.

As we approach the May 1975 Review
Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty,

74

Department of State Bulletin

we should consider ways of making the
treaty more attractive to existing and pro-
spective parties. Last summer my govern-
ment announced that parties to the NPT
will be given preferential consideration in
the donation by the United States of special
nuclear materials — primarily enriched ura-
nium for use in IAEA medical research proj-
ects. We have also decided to give preference
to NPT parties in allocating training and
equipment grants for IAEA technical assist-
ance programs. And we encourage others to
adopt similar policies.

We would welcome further suggestions for
increasing incentives for NPT membership.

Fourth, thorough international considera-
tion should be given to the question of peace-
ful nuclear explosions (PNE's). The dilemma
of the dual nature of nuclear energy is no-
where more evident than in the problem of
PNE's. Indeed, because the technologies of
PNE's and nuclear weapons are indistin-
guishable, it is impcssible for a non-nuclear-
weapon state to develop a capability to con-
duct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes
without, in the process, acquiring a device
which could be used as a nuclear weapon. For
this reason, the objective of preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons is incompatible
with the development or acquisition of peace-
ful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon
states.

Article V of the NPT was developed to as-
sure the states that give up the option of de-
veloping nuclear explosives that they will re-
ceive any benefits of peaceful nuclear explo-
sions that eventually might materialize. To
date, however, the commercial utility of
PNE's has not been proved. Moreover, the
use of PNE's is a highly complicated matter
politically and legally, which has ramifica-
tions for the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the
case of excavation projects and which would
pose problems in relation to any test ban
treaty.

The United States stands ready to honor
its article V obligation to make the benefits
of PNE's available on a nondiscriminatory
basis when and if their feasibility and prac-
ticability are established. In the meantime,

we support the steps already taken in the
IAEA context to implement article V, in-
cluding the development of guidelines for
PNE observation, the adoption of procedures
for responding to requests for PNE serv-
ices, and the approval of a U.S. -sponsored
resolution authorizing the Director General
to establish, at an appropriate time, an of-
fice in the IAEA Secretariat to deal with
PNE reque.sts.

We are willing to consider other sugges-
tions concerning organizational arrange-
ments for an international service.

Fifth, we should work urgently toward
strengthening the system of international
safeguards against the diversion of nuclear
materials and technology to the mamifacture
of nuclear explosives. The interests of nu-
clear exporters and importers alike would be
served by a system which provided confidence
that nuclear technology was not being mis-
used. Actions designed to inhibit the abuses
of nuclear technology .should not impede the
full exploitation of its peaceful potential.
The realization of peaceful benefits -should be
facilitated by a broad international commit-
ment to curb the spread of nuclear explosive
capabilities.

We should step up our efforts to improve
the effectiveness and achieve the broadest
possible acceptance of IAEA safeguards. In
this connection, let us note that in his mes-
sage to the recent IAEA General Conference,
President Ford reaflirmed the U.S. offer to
permit the application of IAEA safeguards
to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of
direct national .security significance. We have
offered to permit such safeguards to demon-
strate our belief that there is no threat to
proprietary information and no risk of suf-
fering commercial disadvantage under NPT
safeguards.

Nuclear exporters should make special ef-
forts to insure that their transfers of nuclear
materials and equipment do not contribute
to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capa-
bilities. The U.S. will shortly approach the
principal supplier countries with specific pro-
posals for making safeguards more effective.
One of the problems to be faced in the

January 20, 1975

75

years ahead is the challenge of meeting rap-
idly increasing demands for uranium en-
richment and chemical reprocessing services
without undermining safeguards. An alterna-
tive to developing national facilities for these
services — one which would be both economi-
cal and conducive to effective safeguards —
might be the establishment of multinational
plants capable of satisfying world demands.

Sixth, steps should be taken to insure the
■phijsical security of nuclear facilities and ma-
terials. As the civil nuclear industry expands
throughout the world, nuclear materials will
become an increasing factor in international
commerce and the threat of theft or diversion
could become acute. While physical security
must be the primary responsibility of na-
tional governments, we believe the world
community can play an important role. Ac-
cordingly, Secretary Kissinger stated on Sep-
tember 23 that the United States will urge
the IAEA to develop an international conven-
tion for enhancing physical security against
theft or diversion of nuclear material.

Such a convention should outline specific
standards and techniques for protecting ma-
terials while in use, storage, and transfer.
The United States, moreover, agrees with
Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund's rec-
ommendation that the IAEA should prepare
itself to be a source of advice and assistance
to nations that wish to improve their physi-
cal security practices.

Seventh, and finally, ive shoidd support and
encourage the development of regional ar-
rangements which contribute to nonprolif-
eration objectives. While the NPT has played
a central role in efforts to curb nuclear pro-
liferation, the United States believes that
complementary tools should also be used to
serve that objective. Accordingly, we sup-
port the treaty establishing a nuclear-free
zone in Latin America, so far the only
densely populated region in the world to set
up a formal regime to ban nuclear weapons.

We also welcome the interest shown in nu-
clear-free zones at this General Assembly, in
particular in the proposals for creating nu-
clear-free zones in the Middle East and
South Asia.

On several occasions my government has
put forward four criteria for the establish-
ment of nuclear-free zones :

1. The initiative should be taken by the
states in the region concerned.

2. The zone should preferably include all
states in the area whose participation is
deemed important.

3. The creation of the zone should not dis-
turb necessary security arrangements.

4. Provision should be made for adequate
verification.

We would take these criteria into account
in assessing any specific regional arrange-
ment.

Another factor my government would take
into account would be the treatment of PNE's
in any nuclear-free-zone proposal. When the
United States adhered to Additional Proto-
col II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu-
clear Weapons in Latin America, it was with
the understanding that the treaty does not
permit nonnuclear states party to the treaty
to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices.
We accordingly regard the Latin American
nuclear-free zone as consistent with our ob-
jective of curbing the spread of independent
nuclear explosive capabilities.

We have suggested the principal tasks
which we think should be undertaken in deal-
ing with the vital issues of nuclear arms con-
trol and look forward to hearing the views of
other delegations on these suggestions. A
broadly based collective effort should be made
by all — nuclear and nonnuclear, NPT parties
and nonparties, industrially advanced and de-
veloping states alike — if we are to save our
own and future generations from a world of
many nuclear powers and unrestrained nu-
clear arms competition.

Ambassador Martin, October 30

USUN press release 152 dated October 30

In his statement to this committee October
21, Senator Symington discussed the tasks
that we feel should be undertaken in a broad
international effort to curb the further spread
of nuclear explosive technology. Today I

76

Department of State Bulletin

would like to review the other important
arms control issues before the Assembly at
the current session.

In spite of some disappointment that we
have not progressed further toward our dis-
armament objectives, my government con-
tinues to believe that encouraging progress
has been made in the past decade. In recent
years states have worked together seriously
and cooperatively on arms control and dis-
armament to a degree which would not have
been thought possible 10 years ago. The
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between
my country and the Soviet Union, the dis-
cussions on mutual reductions of armed
forces and armaments in Central Europe,
and the successful negotiation of the Limited
Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty,
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America, the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, the Seabed Arms Con-
trol Treaty, the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty are
solid evidence of the progress that has been
made.

Since our discussion of disarmament is-
sues a year ago, encouraging progress has
been made on the problem of chemical weap-
ons. We were impressed by the submission
by the delegation of Japan to the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament of a draft
convention on chemical weapons, an impor-
tant contribution to the deliberations on the
question of effective international restraints
on chemical weapons. Of equal interest have
been the extensive comments and sugges-
tions concerning the Japanese draft offered
by other CCD delegations. We are taking
careful note of the Japanese draft and these
comments in our continuing review of possi-
ble actions in the chemical weapons field.

We were also gratified that, at the initia-
tive of Sweden, the Conference of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament this summer held
a productive informal meeting on technical
chemical weapons questions, in which 22
experts from 13 countries discussed the best
ways of defining chemical agents for pur-
poses of international restraints, the scope
of possible chemical weapons limitations,

and the possibilities of devising effective
means of verification. Such discussions
should provide a basis to make informed
judgments on the question of chemical
weapons restraints.

Furthermore, members of this committee
will recall that the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed at the 1974 summit
to consider a joint initiative in the Con-
ference of the Committee on Disarmament
with respect to the conclusion, as a first step,
of an international convention dealing with
the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical
warfare.

At its current session this committee will
also address the problem of the dangers of
the use of environment modification tech-
niques for military purposes. In recent years
new scientific and technical advances in the
environmental sciences have given hope that
man may be able to work purposefully to
change the environment to his benefit. At
present, although there has been promising
progress in efforts in certain localities and
under limited conditions to increase snow-
fall, lessen the severity of hailstorms, affect
precipitation, and disperse fog, the limited
success of these efforts thus far demon-
strates how little we understand the inter-
action of natural forces and how rudimen-
tary are man's attempts to influence those
forces. Techniques may, however, one day
be developed to alleviate drought, to miti-
gate the destructive power of hurricanes
and typhoons, prevent floods, and perhaps
eventually to change climate to respond to
the universal desire for opportunity to
increase living standards.

We believe that environment modification
techniques, which are yet little understood
and remain largely hypothetical, could have
considerable potential for peaceful purposes.
Unfortunately, the techniques to accomplish
these goals might also be used for hostile
purposes that could have widespread, long-
lasting, and severe effects harmful to human
welfare. Scientists have expressed concern
about the future possibilities of triggering
earthquakes, generating tidal waves and
long-term climatic changes.

January 20, 1975

77

The United States has declared that it
would not use climate modification tech-
niques for hostile purposes even if such tech-
niques come to be developed in the future.
In the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement on en-
vironmental warfare at the summit meeting,
we expressed our willingness to examine
with the Soviet Union what measures could
be effective to overcome the dangers of the
use of environment modification techniques
for military purposes. We are prepared to
study this question and to examine the
measures that might become the subject of
international agreement. If it is the general
view that this question should be referred
by the Assembly to the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament, we could sup-
port referral if it were accomplished without
prejudgments of the Committee's considera-
tion of the question.

In regard to international consideration
of the question of napalm, other incendiaries,
and certain other conventional weapons, the
constructive and useful first step was taken
by the International Committee of the Red
Cross when it recently convened a meeting
on this subject of government experts at
Lucerne, Switzerland [Sept. 24-Oct. 18].
U.S. experts participated fully in this meet-
ing; some useful data were compiled, and
the report of the experts' group merits care-
ful review.

We believe that no position on possible
restrictions on these weapons can be devel-
oped until government experts have more
extensively examined the technical, legal,
military, medical, and humanitarian prob-
lems involved. We are gratified that this
process is underway. We would consider it
unrealistic, however, to try to impose a dead-
line on the work of the experts in this com-
plex field.

The question of a world disarmament con-
ference is again on our agenda. In three
separate solicitations of views by the United
Nations, a wide diversity of views on such a
conference has been revealed. Some govern-
ments have suggested beginning prepara-
tions for such a conference soon; some
others have stated their view that certain
preconditions must be met; many have

stated that the conference could prove use-
ful only if all nuclear powers were prepared
to participate.

The views of the United States on this
subject are unchanged. We recognize that
a world disarmament conference could serve
a useful function at an appropriate time, but
we do not believe that such a conference now
or in the near future would produce useful
results. It is not the lack of a suitable forum,
but the lack of political agreement, which
prevents us from taking more far-reaching
steps toward disarmament. A world con-
ference could not in the foreseeable future
solve this problem and thus would merely
disappoint the hopes of its proponents.

Members of this committee have received
a report on the question of the possible re-
duction of military budgets, prepared by
a group of expert consultants to the Secre-
tary General.' Although my delegation ab-
stained on the resolution requesting this
report,- for reasons which we explained at
the time, we welcomed the suggestion of
such a study because we recognized that the
most promising path to genuine progress on
this question of military expenditures is
through a careful and thorough study of the
issues. We are gratified that the experts' re-
poi"t examines the whole range of technical
questions related to the feasibility of agreed
reductions of military budgets. It analyzes
the economic benefits that could result from
allocating to social and economic develop-
ment funds that might be saved bj' budget
reductions. It also points out that "reducing
military budgets without diminishing the
security of states would require careful and
thorough preparation. Specifically, the pre-
conditions for military budget reductions
would include both agreement on what is
and "what is not to be included in military
budgets and also the provision by all parties
concei-ned of detailed data on military ex-
penditures for the purpose of comparative
measurement. The study brings out the
necessity of guarding against destabilizing
shifts in spending and the necessity for

' U.N. doc. A/9770.

^' A RES '3093 (XXVIII), adopted by the Assem-
bly on Dec. 7, 1973.

78

Department of State Bulletin

adequate verification of compliance with any
agreed reductions.

Finally, the experts' study implicitly rec-
ognizes the need for greater openness in
defense expenditures. My government re-
gards openness as a particularly important
point. We vi^elcomed the suggestion made
by Svi^eden last spring that the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament should
consider the possibilities of ascertaining the
willingness of states to account for their
defense expenditures in comparable terms
and to explain how their defense expendi-
tures are allocated. We agree that greater
knowledge about the defense expenditures
of others could allay concerns that arise out
of suspicion and misunderstandings, and
thus promote confidence among states. The
technical sections of the experts' report pro-
vide valuable guidelines which could be
the basis of greater openness in defense
expenditures.

We were gratified that a consensus was
reached at the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament this year to invite five na-
tions— the Federal Republic of Germany, the
German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru,
and Zaire — to join the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament. On behalf of
my government I warmly welcome these
nations to the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament. Their inclusion will make
the Conference of the Committee on Disar-
mament a more representative body and will
enhance its expertise without, however, en-
larging it to a point that would impair its
effectiveness as a negotiating body. We think
that with these additions the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament will con-
tinue to be a valuable disarmament forum,
contributing significantly to the work of the
United Nations and to the furtherance of
our disarmament objectives.

Ambassador Martin, November 20

The United States has strongly supported
the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690
as a constructive step toward our com-
mon nonproliferation objective. Indeed, the
efforts of the Japanese, Netherlands, and

Canadian delegations, as well as of others,
in developing this draft resolution must be
greatly appreciated, certainly by all the
members of this committee who voted for it.
The United States wishes to explain its
vote in one respect; namely, with regard to
the statement in the sixth preambular para-
graph, which reads:

. . . that it has not yet proven possible to differ-
entiate between the technology for nuclear weapons
and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful
purposes.

For countries in the early stage of de-
veloping a nuclear explosive capability, we
cannot see how it would be possible to de-
velop such a capability for peaceful purposes
without in the process acquiring a device
which could be used as a nuclear weapon.
In the case of advanced nuclear-weapon
states, however, it may be possible, under
certain conditions, to develop criteria that
would be adequate to insure that nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes are not used
to further nuclear-weapon development.
But, I should add, if such criteria could be
developed they would not be applicable to
the problem posed by the development of
a nuclear explosive capability by a non-
nuclear-weapon state.

Ambassador Martin, November 22

The United States supports the concept of
a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and be-
lieves that it could make a considerable con-
tribution to stability and nonproliferation
in the area. We have therefore voted in
favor of this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.700,
as amended].

At the same time, we are dubious of the
approach taken in operative paragraph 2 of
the draft resolution, which urges states in
the region to undertake immediate commit-
ments with regard to the zone, in advance of
actual negotiations and the conclusion of an
agreement. Frankly, we do not believe this
is an approach that will advance the pur-
poses of the draft resolution.

Notwithstanding that reservation, we are
prepared to lend our full cooperation to

January 20, 1975

79

efforts to realize the aims of the draft reso-
lution. We assume that in the further formu-
lation of the zone it will be made clear that
the prohibitions of the zone apply to the
development of nuclear explosive capability
for any purpose.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 3261 D (XXIX)^

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions on the urgent need for
prevention of nuclear proliferation,

Recalling also its resolution 2829 (XXVI) of 16
December 1971,

Recognizing that the acceleration of the nuclear
arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons
endangers the security of all States,

Convinced that recent international developments
have underlined the urgent necessity for all States,
in particular nuclear-weapon States, to take effective
measures to reverse the momentum of the nuclear
arms race and to prevent further proliferation of
nuclear weapons.

Further convinced that the achievement of these
goals would be advanced by an effective comprehen-
sive test ban.

Bearing in mind that it has not yet proven pos-
sible to differentiate between the technology for
nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive
devices for peaceful purposes.

Noting with concern that, in the course of this
year, six States have engaged' in nuclear testing.

Recognizing that even those States which re-
nounce the possession of nuclear weapons may wish
to be able to enjoy any benefits which may materi-
alize from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
Noting with great concern that, as a result of
the wider dissemination of nuclear technology and
nuclear materials, the possible diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful to military uses would present
a serious danger for world peace and security,

Considering therefore that the planning and con-
ducting of peaceful nuclear explosions should be
carried out under agreed and non-discriminatory
international arrangements, such as those envisaged
in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which are designed to help prevent the
proliferation of nuclear explosive devices and the
intensification of the nuclear arms race.

' A/C.1/L.690, as amended; adopted by Committee
I on Nov. 20 by a vote of 91 (U.S.) to 3, with 11
abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a
vote of 115 (U.S.) to 3, with 12 abstentions (text
from U.N. press release GA/5194).

Recalling the statements made at the 1577th meet-
ing of the First Committee, held on 31 May 1968,
by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and the United States of America con-
cerning the provisions of article V of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which
relate to the conclusion of a special international
agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes,

Notixg that the review conference of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be
held in Geneva in May 1975,

Noting further that, in the introduction to his
report on the work of the Organization dated 30
August 1974, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations pointed out the possible danger of peaceful
nuclear explosions leading to nuclear weapons pro-
liferation and suggested that the question of peace-
ful nuclear explosions in all its aspects should now
be a subject for international consideration,

1. Appeals to all States, in particular nuclear-
weapon States, to exert concei-ted efforts in all the
appropriate international forums with a view to
working out promptly effective measures for the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the
prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear
weapons;

2. Requests the International Atomic Energy
Agency to continue its studies on the peaceful appli-
cations of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasi-
bility, including legal, health and safety aspects, and
to report on these questions to the General Assem-
bly at its thirtieth session;

3. Calls npon the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, in submitting its report to the Gen-
eral Assembly at its thirtieth session on the elabora-
tion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive
test ban, to include a section on its consideration
of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear
explosions and, in so doing, to take account of the
views of the International .Atomic Energy -Agency
as requested in paragraph 2 above;

4. Expresses the hope that the review conference
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, to be held in Geneva in May 1975, will
also give consideration to the role of peaceful nu-
clear explosions as provided for in that Treaty and
will, inform the General .Assembly at its thirtieth
session of the results of its deliberations;

5. Invites, in this connexion, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of .'Amer-
ica to provide the review conference of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with
information concerning such steps as they have
taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or
intend to take, for the conclusion of the special basic
international agreement on nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes which is envisaged in article V
of the Treaty;

80

Department of State Bulletin

6. Ixvitcs the Secretary-General, should he deem
it appropriate, to submit further comments on this
matter, taking into account the reports referred to
in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

Resolution 3263 (XXIX)'

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the establish-
ment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of
the Middle East,

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security by bolstering and
expanding the existing regional and global struc-
tures for the prohibition and/or prevention of the
further spread of nuclear weapons,

Realizing that the establishment of nuclear-
weapon-free zones with an adequate system of safe-
guards could accelerate the process towards nuclear
disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and
complete disarmament under effective international
control,

Recalling the resolution adopted by the Council
of the League of Arab States at its sixty-second
session, held in Cairo from 1 to 4 September 1974,
on this subject.

Recalling the message sent by His Imperial
Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran on 16 September
1974 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the region of the Middle East,'

Considering that the establishment of zones free
from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the States
situated within each zone concerned, is one of the
measures which can contribute most effectively to
halting the proliferation of those instruments of
mass destruction and to promoting progress towards
nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruc-
tion of all nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery.

Mindful of political conditions particular to the
region of the Middle East and of the potential
danger emanating therefrom, which would be fur-
ther aggravated by the introduction of nuclear
weapons in the area.

Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the

' A/C.1/L.700, as amended; adopted by Commit-
tee I on Nov. 22 by a vote of 103 (U.S.) to 0, with 3
abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a
vote of 128 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions (text
from U.N. press release GA/5194). By Resolution
3261F, adopted on Dec. 9, the General Assembly also
requested the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament to make "a comprehensive study of the
question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its
aspects" and to submit the study in its report to
the General Assembly at its 30th session.

'U.N. doc. A/9693/Add. 3. [Footnote in original.]

countries of the region from becoming involved in
a ruinous nuclear arms race.

Recalling the Declaration on Denuclearization of
Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State
and (jovernment of the Organization of African
Unity in July 1964,

Noting that establishment of a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in the region of the Middle East would
contribute effectively to the realization of aims
enunciated in the above-mentioned Declaration on
Denuclearization of Africa,

Recalling the notable achievement of the countries
of Latin America in establishing a nuclear-free zone,

Also recalling resolution B of the Conference of
Non-Nuclear- Weapon States, convened at Geneva
on 29 August 1968, in which the Conference recom-
mended that non-nuclear-weapon States not com-
prised in the Latin American nuclear-free zone
should study the possibility and desirability of
establishing military denuclearization of their re-
spective zones,

Recalling the aims pursued by the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in par-
ticular, the goal of preventing the further spread of
nuclear weapons.

Recalling resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June
1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest
possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-
weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. Commends the idea of the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle
East;

2. Considers that, in order to advance the idea
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the
Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties
concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and imme-
diately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal
basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring
or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;

3. Calls upon the parties concerned in the area
to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons;

4. Expresses the hope that all States and, in par-
ticular, the nuclear-weapon States, will lend their
full co-operation for the effective realization of the
aims of this resolution;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to ascertain
the views of the parties concerned with respect to
the implementation of the present resolution, in
particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3,
and to report to the Security Council at an early
date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at
its thirtieth session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda
of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Establish-
ment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of
the Middle East".

January 20, 1975

81

United Nations Reaffirms Continuing Responsibility
in Korea

Following is a statement made in Commit-
tee I (Political and Security) of the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. Representative
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on December 2, to-
gether with the text of a resolution adopted
by the committee on December 9 and by the
Assembly on December 17.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 183 dated December 2

For more than 20 years the United Nations
has played an indispensable role in main-
taining peace on the Korean Peninsula. In
1953, the commander in chief of U.N. forces
in Korea signed the armistice agreement,
which halted a war that had raged for three
years. Since that time, the U.N. Command
has participated in the meetings of the Mil-
itary Armistice Commission, which was until
1972 the sole channel of communications be-
tween the two sides. The armistice agree-
ment remains to this day the sole basis for
the current state of peace in Korea. In con-
sidering the Korean question once again, this
committee confronts two basic questions:
how to preserve the peace in Asia and how
to promote the peaceful reunification of
Korea in a manner acceptable to all its
people. In formulating our response to these
questions, it is important that we not tamper
with the present structure for peace without
first having assured that a satisfactory alter-
native is in its place.

This committee should recall that last year
the General Assembly reached an agreed con-
clusion aimed at promoting practical steps
toward peace and accommodation in Korea.
In a consensus statement read from the

Chair, it noted with satisfaction the July
1972 joint communique of North and South
Korea and urged the two governments to con-
tinue their dialogue. In accordance with the
Commission's recommendation, it also de-
cided to terminate the U.N. Commission for
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

The United States warmly supported this
outcome. We believe that it appropriately
highlighted the need for further progress in
discussions between the two Koreas.

We were disappointed, therefore, when
some member states, evidently at the urging
of North Korea, chose to burden this Assem-
bly again this year with a request to inscribe
a one-sided partisan item on the agenda of
the Assembly. We saw no reason for such a
debate. We concluded, however, that if the
Assembly were to take up this question, it
should do so in a reasonable and balanced
manner. For this reason, the United States
and many other countries urgently requested
inclusion of a Korean item on the agenda and
simultaneously introduced the draft resolu-
tion contained in document A C.1/L.676 for
the Assembly's consideration. The subsequent
introduction of the resolution contained in
document A/C.1/L.677 confirmed our fears
that its cosponsors looked to an intemperate
and contentious debate. The First Committee
now faces an important and fundamental
choice. On the one hand it can reinforce its
unanimous decision of last year by adopting
the resolution in A/C.1/L.676, which once
again urges the parties to reconcile their
diff'erences and arrive jointly at a new ar-
rangement for peace. On the other hand, in
resolution A/C.1/L.677 the committee is be-
ing asked to reverse last year's consensus
and, in the process, to recommend abandon-

82

Department of State Bulletin

ing the arrangement which has preserved
peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than
20 years.

Mr. Chairman, let us look for a moment
at what lies behind the various words of
these draft resolutions. For example, one
suggests that peace might be maintained
and peaceful reunification might be expedited
by the removal of U.S. troops from Korea.
History does not support this view, however.
This particular solution to the Korean issue
has already been tried once. It failed badly.
In 1949, soon after World War II, American
military forces were completely removed
from the territory of South Korea. Within a
year, North Korea launched an all-out mili-
tary attack on South Korea.

I do not wish to dwell on the history of
those unhappy events, the memory of which
has poisoned international relations in Asia
and elsewhere for the last 20 years. I do ask
that each delegate weigh this tragic experi-
ence most carefully before he accepts the
facile assertion that the way to solve all the
problems of the Korean Peninsula is to re-
move foreign forces.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. forces were sent to
Korea in 1950 in accordance with U.N. Se-
curity Council resolutions because we and
other members of this organization were con-
vinced that international aggression had to
be stopped. We were also convinced that pre-
vention of such aggression was, and is, a
cardinal purpose of the United Nations.
Therefore, I repeat, U.S. forces were dis-
patched to help South Korea defend itself
in accordance with resolutions of the Security
Council adopted in June and July of 1950.

After the armistice agreement was signed
by the commander in chief of U.N. forces and
by military representatives of the other side,
two essential tasks remained.

The first was to maintain the armistice
agreement and to carry out the obligations
and responsibilities of the commander in
chief of U.N. forces as a signatory of that
agreement. This commander has been joined
in the performance of his duties by repre-
sentatives of many of the countries, origi-
nally numbering 16, which so generously lent

their assistance to the Republic of Korea.

The second essential task was to main-
tain peace and preserve stability on the
Korean Peninsula until such time as con-
ditions permitted more normal discourse and
more definitive solutions among the countries
of that area.

For this purpose, the United States and
the Republic of Korea concluded a Mutual
Defense Treaty in 1954, which was duly
registered with the United Nations in accord-
ance with article 102 of the charter. Under
this treaty, U.S. forces remain in Korea with
the full agreement of our two governments.

That these arrangements have provided an
important element of stability on the Korean
Peninsula is evidenced by the absence of
major armed conflict there since 1953. That
these arrangements have not prevented the
opening of a more normal discourse between
the two Koreas is clearly demonstrated by the
North-South discussions which have been
held since 1971.

It is against this background that the First
Committee should carefully consider the two
resolutions before it. One of these drafts,
contained in L.677, rests on assumptions that
are dangerous for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. This resolution
would precipitately dismantle the arrange-
ments which have for so many years pre-
served peace and security in Korea. It fails
even to mention the need to maintain peace.
It fails to mention the need to maintain the
armistice agreement which has maintained
peace in that area. And it fails to reaffirm in
its operative portions the need for continuing
dialogue and mutual accommodation between
the two Koreas, by which peace can best be
maintained in the future.

Fortunately, this session of the General
Assembly has an alternative before it. There
is another draft resolution which provides
an opportunity to encourage a positive evolu-
tion of the situation in the Korean Peninsula.
It would do so by encouraging the North-
South dialogue as the most realistic means of
promoting a reduction of tensions, of increas-
ing contacts and exchanges, and furthering
steps toward an eventual peaceful reuni-

January 20, 1975

83

rtcation. Moreover, the draft resolution in
L.676 would not precipitately and danger-
ously destabilize the arrangements which
have preserved peace in the area since 1953.

This resolution, which my government and
27 other member states have cosponsored, re-
affirms the consensus reached last year by the
General Assembly to urge the two Koreas to
continue their dialogue and to expedite the
peaceful reunification of Korea.

It recognizes the continuing importance
of the armistice agreement of 1953 for the
maintenance of peace and security in the
Korean Peninsula.

It seeks to have the parties directly con-
cerned discuss how peace and security on the
peninsula is to be maintained, before the
present arrangements are changed.

These are important steps. They insure
that the existing equilibrium on the Koi-ean
Peninsula, within which the first tentative
steps toward reconciliation have already been
taken, will not be altered to the disadvantage
of one side or the other.

This resolution would also encourage the
parties directly concerned to discuss those
aspects of the Korean question which fall
within the responsibility of the Security
Council, the most important of which is the
U.N. Command and its relationship to the
armistice agreement.

The U.S. Government and the Republic of
Korea have both made it clear that they are
willing to consider an alternative to these
present arrangements, one which would help
preserve the present armistice between the
two sides and the machinery which supports
it. We fully agree that the time has come —
and is perhaps overdue — for reconsideration
of the role played by the United Nations un-
der the arrangements established by the Se-
curity Council in 1950.

But we are also convinced that such re-
consideration cannot take place at the ex-
pense of the military stability on the Korean
Peninsula which these very arrangements
brought about and helped maintain. 'We need
to be assured that, in the course of discus-
sions between North and South Korea, North
Korea and its associates are pledged to main-

tain and improve the conditions of peace and
stability brought about by the armistice
agreement, that they will continue to respect
the provisions of the armistice agreement,
and that they will continue to participate in
the machinery established to administer that
agreement.

We believe this is a reasonable objective,
in light of the history of armed conflict on
the peninsula and the continuing intransigent
public statements of the North Korean au-
thorities, such as that made by the North
Korean Representative to this committee on
November 25 or that of the North Korean
Foreign Minister on November 8, when he
said, speaking of the Government of the
Republic of Korea, "we can never make any
compromise with the splitters, nor can we
join hands with the betrayers."

President Ford during his recent visit to
the Republic of Korea reaffirmed that for its
part the United States will continue its best
efforts to insure the peace and security of
the Pacific region. President Ford reiterated
the support of the United States for eff'orts
by the Republic of Korea to maintain a dia-
logue with North Korea designed to reduce
tensions and establish peace on the Korean
Peninsula and to lead eventually to the peace-
ful reunification of Korea.

Our President further joined President
Park Chung Hee in expressing the hope that
the current session of the General Assembly
would recognize the importance of the se-
curity arrangements which have now pre-
served peace on the Korean Peninsula for
more than two decades.

Finally, President Ford reaffirmed the de-
termination of the United States to render
prompt and effective assistance to repel
armed attack against the Republic of Korea
in accordance with the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of
Korea and the United States.

The United States believes it is time to
bring to a close the cold war on the Korean
Peninsula. We have made serious efforts in
that direction. The Republic of Korea, for its
part, has made clear it would welcome good
relations with any country regardless of

84

Department of State Bulletin

ideology. The Republic of Korea has also
made it clear that as an interim measure
pending reunification, it would welcome the
entry of the Republic of Korea and the Dem-
ocratic People's Republic of Korea as mem-
bers of the United Nations. The United States
supports these objectives. We look forward
to a time of accommodation between North
and South Korea, when there can be normal
political, economic, and social ties between
both sides leading to eventual reunification,
the goal of all Koreans.

Progress must be achieved, however, with-
out damage to either side and without
threatening the existing balance and sta-
bility on the Korean Peninsula. We are con-
vinced that the measures contained in our
draft resolution will make a constructive
contribution. We are equally convinced that
the adoption of the resolution in L.677 would
obstruct, not encourage, the movement to-
ward durable arrangements for maintaining
peace on the peninsula.

This overall peace on the Korean Peninsula
is a precious asset of the people of both North
and South Korea and of the wider world com-
munity. We should not take actions which
could disrupt those arrangements which have
been so successful in keeping the peace in
this troubled area of the world. These ar-
rangements can, and should, be modernized,
but this must be done only with the cooper-
ation of all the parties directly concerned.

My government strongly hopes that the
General Assembly will once again urge upon
the parties the negotiating process which
offers them and the world the only hope of
peaceful change in the Korean Peninsula. ^

TEXT OF RESOLUTION =

Question of Korea

The General Assembly,

Desiruig that progress be made towards the at-
tainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of
Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of
the Korean people,

Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the
joint communique at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4
July 1972 and the declared intention of both the
South and the North of Korea to continue the dia-
logue between them,

Aicai-e, however, that tension in Korea has not
been totally eliminated and that the Armistice
Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to
the maintenance of peace and security in the area.

Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
regarding the maintenance of international peace
and security, the United Nations has a continuing
responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal
on the Korean peninsula,

1. Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as ex-
pressed in the consensus statement adopted by the
General Assembly on 28 November 1973,^ and urges
both the South and the North of Korea to continue
their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification
of Korea;

2. Expresses the hope that the Security Council,
bearing in mind the need to ensure continued ad-
herence to the Armistice Agreement and the full
maintenance of peace and security in the area, will
in due course give consideration, in consultation
with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects
of the Korean question which fall within its re-
sponsibilities, including the dissolution of the United
Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate
arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement
which is calculated to preserve peace and security
in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and
conciliation between the two Korean Governments
leading to a lasting peace between them.

^ On Dec. 9 the committee adopted draft resolu-
tion A/C.l/L/676/Rev. 1, as amended, by a rollcall
vote of 61 (U.S.) to 42, with 32 abstentions; draft
resolution A/C.1/L.677 was not adopted, the vote
being 48 in favor and 48 (U.S.) against, with 38
abstentions.

"A/RES/3333 (XXIX) (text from U.N. doc.
A/9973); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by
a rollcall vote of 61 (U.S.) to 43, with 31 absten-
tions.

" For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1973, p. 775.

January 20, 1975

85

OECD Environment Committee Ministerial Meeting
Adopts Declaration on Environmental Policy

The Environment Committee of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) met at ministerial
level at Paris November IS-H. Following is
a statement made in the meeting on Novem-
ber 13 by Christian A. Herter, Jr., Deputii
Assistant Secretary for Environmental and
Population Matters,^ together with the texts
of a press communique and a Declaration on
Environmental Policy issued at the conclu-
sion of the meeting on November IJt.

STATEMENT BY MR. HERTER

I should stress at the outset, Madam Chair-
man, that the United States views this meet-
ing as extremely important.

In this regard, I should like to read the
following message from President Ford :

The United States has viewed the collaborative
efforts of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development in the environmental area as
a good example of the constructive progress nations
can achieve in harmonizing national policies to
achieve common goals. We therefore regard the
meeting of the OECD Environment Committee at
ministerial level as most important.

In the aftermath of last winter's energy crisis, and
with the need to bring inflation under control, I have
noted expressions of concern in the United States
and elsewhere that environmental protection might
have to be sacrificed to current exigencies. I wish to
assure the member states of the OECD that the
United States remains firmly committed to its en-
vironmental goals. In my view, the achievement of
our economic objectives and environmental improve-
ment are not incompatible. Indeed, there are nu-
merous areas such as energy conservation in which
Bound energy and environmental policies can be
mutually reinforcing.

' Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), who was to serve as
U.S. Representative at the meeting, was unavoidably
prevented from attending.

The United States looks forward to continued close
collaboration with the other OECD member-countries
in the pursuit of environmental quality. Your meet-
ing provides an exceptional opportunity for all mem-
bers of the OECD to reaffirm their continuing com-
mitment to the protection of the environment. I
wish you and your associates every success in your
deliberations.

The President's message serves to under-
score our belief that this is a particularly
appropriate time for a meeting of this char-
acter, bearing in mind that the member
countries of this body face all sorts of new
and difficult environmental challenges. This
conference also offers an unusual opportunity
for policy-level assessment and guidance re-
garding OECD's future role in the environ-
mental field during a period when the com-
mittee's mandate is being reviewed.

In approaching the future, it is useful for
us to first take stock of where we have been
in the past.

In the past decade, industrialized societies
have come to realize that nature's resources
are limited and that they cannot be ex-
ploited and expended with impunity in a
pursuit of material wealth. They also have
witnessed a massive and encouraging public
revulsion against environmental degradation,
as well as the evolution of a new ethic that
recognizes that increased production and
consumption are not the only components in
an improved quality of life.

Indeed, most governments now have en-
vironmental ministries and comprehensive
programs to abate and reverse pollution.
Environmental considerations now loom
large in the planning and execution of major
governmental projects; many universities
now offer programs in the environmental sci-
ences ; and there is a widely felt appreciation
that future generations can be the victims

86

Department of State Bulletin

of unwise environmental decisions made to-
day.

Within my country, for example, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1970 was
a turning point in our concern for environ-
mental values. We have been endeavoring,
with gratifying success, to attack some of
our more pressing environmental problems:
air and water pollution, use of pesticides,
ocean dumping, strip mining, urban sprawl,
and waste management.

In this respect we also have witnessed
much encouraging international cooperation
born out of a realization that many of our
most pressing problems pay no heed to na-
tional boundaries and require collective ac-
tion for solution.

The United States believes that the OECD
has been most helpful in fostering coopera-
tion and harmony among its members in the
formulation of their national environmental
policies. In a relatively short period, notable
strides have been made by the Organization
in fashioning common policies, such as the
"polluter pays" principle, to help encourage
sound environmental practices and avoid
trade distortion.

Systematic exchanges and cooperation
have been initiated to solve some of the
critical problems related to air and water
pollution and to identify and control poten-
tially harmful substances, including toxic
chemicals. Some of the most challenging
problems related to the urban environment
are being collectively faced, and the environ-
mental benefits of waste utilization, re-
cycling, and conservation are being assessed.

We are jointly seeking to determine how
to more effectively address some of the criti-
cal environmental problems posed by pro-
spective energy demands and alternative
sources of energy supply. And we are en-
gaged in an important pioneering effort to
frame new norms for resolving pollution
problems of a transboundary character.

We further believe that the OECD can
continue to provide a valuable forum for
cooperative actions to safeguard and improve
the environment, both nationally and inter-
nationally. We therefore are pleased that the

mandate of the Environment Committee has
been extended.

OECD members can take pride in this
progress, but we recognize that we face some
current difficulties. In our own country, for
example, important elements are question-
ing the priority to be given to environmental
goals, citing the current inflation and high
cost of oil and other raw materials and the
pressure to reduce dependency on external
sources of supply. Under these circumstances,
we are sometimes asked whether the United
States now regards the environmental move-
ment as passe, whether we are easing up on
our environmental policies and goals. To my
mind, President Ford's message to this body
gave the answer ; namely, a resounding No.

We also are sometimes confronted with
another question: Can we "afford" environ-
mental protection in the light of current
conditions? The accu.sation has recently
been heard that the cost of antipollution
measures has significantly contributed to in-
flation. Within the United States the studies
that I have seen tend to strongly dispute the
assertion that environmental controls are
contributing significantly to inflationary
pressures. Our own organization, the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, for example,
recently conducted an analysis of the impact
of environmental programs on the U.S.
economy. At most, we found that these pro-
grams account for roughly one-half of 1 per-
cent of our current 11 percent rate of infla-
tion. Put in perspective, expenditures made
during 1973 to satisfy requirements of U.S.
Federal water and air pollution control legis-
lation amounted to approximately 1 percent
of our gross national product. Projections
for the future show similar results.

In a democratic society, of course, the
priorities that the public ascribes to environ-
mental values can be highly significant in
determining future directions. Here, too, the
data we have been able to pull together for
our part is encouraging. Several recent sur-
veys of U.S. public opinion indicate that
environmental values remain extremely im-
portant in the mind of the U.S. public. More-
over, the current concerns about the avail-
ability of energy and inflation appear to have

January 20, 1975

87

had little effect on this attitude. Quite to the
contrary, during the energy crisis in the
United States it became clear that the public
was tired of watching opposing groups place
the blame on one another. It became clear
that the people want both adequate energy
and environmental quality. They are calling
for workable solutions, not contrived issues.

As we look to the future, we face problems
and challenges, of course, in the full achieve-
ment of our desires and goals for environ-
mental protection.

First, the pressures on the environment
of economic growth will continue to in-
crease. In 1950, when the gross world prod-
uct (GWP) reached its first trillion, there
was little concern about pollution. The GWP
is now $3.5 trillion and may reach roughly
$12 trillion by the year 2000. This expected
and continued huge expansion of production,
especially in the presently developed coun-
tries of the world, will mean ever-increasing
exploitation, processing, and consumption of
resources. Such expansion will create pro-
gressively increasing demands for lower
quality resources, whose recovery and use
will accelerate pollution of the environment
unless adequate protective measures keep
apace.

What we urgently require is a concept of
economic growth that takes into account the
quality of life as well as the quantity of
goods produced. We were delighted to see
that this concept has been incorporated in
the draft declaration now before us.

Second, as environmentalists, I believe we
shall face some significant new problems in
the years ahead in relating to the public,
industry, and governments. While public
support for environmental programs re-
mains high, I believe we have to recognize
that our task in justifying our efforts may
become harder, particularly so long as cur-
rent adverse economic trends continue. In a
period of economic retrenchment, we shall
have to do a continually effective job in
convincing the average worker that we are
not simply concerned with the niceties of
life but with compelling problems relating
to human health and survival. We will have
to develop better scientific information to

show that the benefits of environmental ac-
tions justify the costs.

Third, and without discounting the diffi-
culties, I believe it is high time to bury the
old misconceptions that there are insuperable
incompatibilities between economic growth,
with its associated technological advances,
and the preservation of environmental
values. Rather, I am hopeful that we are
entering a more sophisticated era where
extremism and polarizations will be put
aside; and when the environmentalist will
no longer be characterized by his detractors
as an elitist endeavoring to halt technology.
Our objective should be to assure that en-
vironmental considerations are fully taken
into account in all relevant decisions.

Fourth, the solution of environmental a.s
well as most of the other major problems
facing us today is dependent upon solving
the population problem. If world population
continues to grow at its current rate, there
will be at least 6.7 billion men, women, and
children on our planet by the year 2000 and
35 billion by 2074. This rate of increase
clearly will create insuperable problems in
feeding and providing other basic necessi-
ties for the populations of many regions of
the world. It is clear to me that if we do
not take early international cooperative ac-
tion to effectively limit population growth,
nature will take more drastic measures,
making our concern about environmental
quality in the affected regions largely aca-
demic. Therefore the United States strongly
endorses the recently adopted World Popu-
lation Plan of Action, which is aimed at
achieving a balance between the number of
people on earth and the planet's carrying
capacity.

Turning to the future work of the En-
vironment Committee, I would first like to
make a few general remarks. While the
United States fully appreciates the pressing
need for budgetary restraint in this and
other international organizations at this
time, we hope the resulting impact on the
work program of the Environment Com-
mittee can be minimized.

Furthermore, the United States would
favor the concentration of our program on

88

Department of State Bulletin

a more limited number of high-priority
projects than in the past. We would hope
the committee could create some sort of over-
all review mechanism to promote this end.

As to program content, my country recog-
nizes that in the field of toxic chemicals,
including carcinogens, we face enormously
complex problems. The difficulties we in the
United States are encountering in how to
deal with vinyl chloride serve as ju.st one
example of many. The OECD is making,
and can continue to make, useful contribu-
tions in this area by encouraging nations
systematically to identify potentially toxic
chemicals prior to use. It also can continue
to encourage the adoption of common tech-
niques to facilitate the comparability of data
and harmonization of policies and to follow
the movement of key chemicals in interna-
tional commerce.

The concept of framing general principles
to govern significant episodes of trans-
boundary pollution from land-based sources
has occupied much of the committee's re-
cent attention. Like others around this table,
my government ascribes considerable im-
portance to this activity. In some respects
we consider the action proposal on this sub-
ject to be one of the most important be-
fore this body and a good touchstone of our
willingness to cooperate in solving common
problems.

We further strongly recommend that the
Environment Committee, which has been
considering this matter, now address itself
to more concrete ways nations can cooperate
to redress or adjudicate significant trans-
boundary pollution problems.

There are a number of practical activities
to which the committee might usefully direct
its attention in addition to those studies of
legal questions already underway. An area
of interest might be the development of
joint contingency plans for response to inci-
dents of pollution affecting more than one
country. Further, we might develop compati-
ble procedures for the identification of trans-
frontier pollution problems and for correct-
ing them. Such measures as cooperative air
and water quality baseline studies might be
undertaken. Joint air and water quality ob-

jectives might be developed, and considera-
tion could be given to developing compatible
national programs to realize such agreed-
upon objectives.

Procedures related to environmental as-
sessment ofl!'er another area where the
OECD can do useful work. As you may be
aware, the United States is required by law
to prepare environmental impact statements
concerning all major Federal actions likely
to significantly affect the human environ-
ment. The purpose of this requirement is to
help assure that environmental implica-
tions are factored into the decisionmaking
process. We support the action proposal that
would urge us all to assure that meaningful
assessments are performed on significant
projects and to exchange information on our
experiences. For our part, we are attempt-
ing to improve our procedures for quantify-
ing the environmental data that go into our
assessments. We shall be happy to share
these results with others.

Our experience within the United States
has impressed us with the fact that there
are some real gaps in ecological data and
hence in our ability to perform meaningful
assessments. We suspect this is true of other
nations as well. This, in our view, under-
scores the absolute necessity for the mem-
bers of this Organization to vigorously sup-
port environmental research in the years
ahead and exchange the products of their
efforts.

As environmentalists, one of our most
serious concerns for the next decade relates
to the need to assure that our pattern of
energy consumption and use will take place
under terms that appropriately safeguard
environmental values. As the consuming na-
tions move together in developing new-
energy sources and policies, they have a com-
panion interest in assuring that the environ-
ment is protected. This committee has al-
ready been supporting useful and relevant
work in this area, in the air and water sector
groups; and we commend the action pro-
posal captioned "Energy and the Environ-
ment," which urges the Secretariat to in-
augurate new and timely exchanges in this
field.

January 20, 1975

89

We need to move further in assessing the
ecological effects on aquatic systems of ther-
mal and chemical discharges ; and the change
in effects and costs of alternative control
techniques.

We need to continue to concert our ef-
forts in developing a consensus and under-
standing of the magnitude of the sulfate
problem, including the contribution of nat-
ural and manmade sources, the health impli-
cations, the transnational effects, and the
contributions being made by powerplants
and other sources, as well as the merits of
alternate control strategies.

We also should continue to study the
international environmental implications of
energy resource development, particularly in
the sensitive coastal zone and near-offshore
areas. The United States has performed a
number of studies in this area, the results
of which we shall be pleased to make avail-
able.

Clearly, conservation of energy should be
one of our prime mutual objectives in the
decade ahead, and it is noteworthy that the
recent Energy Coordinating Group high-
lighted this as a priority topic. Obviously,
if we can reduce our demand or better
utilize our energy resources, we will be fos-
tering our environmental goals, adding to
our self-sufficiency, and helping to reduce
inflation. Projects aimed at studying the
environmental implications of husbanding
our energy resources, including recycling,
waste-heat utilization, and demand restraint,
all merit this committee's support.

We foresee a continuously useful role in
the years ahead for those OECD activities
that relate to problems of the urban en-
vironment and transportation. The automo-
bile consumes a high percentage of our
energy supplies and is a major contributor
to urban air pollution. In considering the
relevant action proposal now before us, I
should note that a major effort must be
made to make our cars more efficient by re-
design and maximized use of improved tech-
nology. Studies in this field should continue
to be undertaken by the relevant OECD
member states, recognizing that they pro-
duce most of the world's motor vehicles.

One of the major challenges we all face in
this decade will relate to the improved use
of land. This is an area where a number of
European countries have made advances
from which we can all benefit. Studies are
being conducted in the United States to give
us a better idea of the impact of various
patterns of urban growth on the quality of
life. Within the United States our Council
on Environmental Quality just issued a new
study entitled "Costs of Sprawl" that con-
cludes that higher density planned urban
development, as contrasted to single-family
conventional housing units, results in lower
economic and environmental costs and nat-
ural resource consumption. For example, in-
vestment costs would be 44 percent lower,
and air pollution 45 percent less. We are
prepared to share the results of our studies
with the members of this body and hope
they will prove useful to local planning offi-
cials. A summary of CEQ's first report is
available for each delegation.

Finally, a few words about the longer
term. Over the next five to ten years, I be-
lieve we shall have to seriously devise new
mechanisms and devices for assessing some
of the longer term developments of an en-
vironmental character covering such mat-
ters as land use, population growth, and
alternate environmental strategies. This is
an area where I would hope we would develop
intensive dialogues between the interested
governmental authorities, private environ-
mental institutions, and indu.strial groups
that have given serious thought to environ-
mental problems.

As we look ahead, I also suspect that our
focus increasingly will encompass our re-
sponsibilities toward the developing coun-
tries. I believe the OECD's Development
Center could provide a useful forum for con-
certing our efforts. I recommend that our
Secretariat explore possibilities for assuring
greater environmental input into OECD's
Development Center, which has already is-
sued interesting studies, for instance, on
population. In looking at the developing
world, I look to an era, not of confrontation,
but one in which the advanced nations can
work increasingly with the poorer nations

90

Department of State Bulletin

in solving common problems, whether they
involve energy conservation, deforestation,
desertification, or assurance of a sound eco-
logical base for meeting the growing de-
mands for food. Indeed, it is because of this
global concern encompassing both the de-
veloping and the developed world that the
United States also puts considerable empha-
sis on and support of the U.N. Environment
Program.

I close with an exhortation to all of us
not only to continue the efforts which have
so effectively been started but to intensify
those programs and actions which will as-
sure for our peoples and those of the entire
world a better quality of life, with both a
higher material standard of living and a
more healthful, wholesome environment in
which to live.

TEXTS OF PRESS COMMUNIQUE
AND DECLARATION

Press Communique

1. The Environment Committee of tiie OECD met
at Ministerial Level on 13th and 14th November,
1974, at the Organisation's headquarters. The meet-
ing elected as Chairman, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundt-
land, Norwegian Minister of Environment; three
Vice-Chairmen were elected; Dr. Cass (Australia),
Mr. Gutierrez Cano (Spain) and Mr. Mohri (Japan).

2. Four years after the creation of the OECD En-
vironment Committee, Ministers approved on behalf
of their Governments a Declaration on Environmental
Policy reaffirming their determination to pursue,
under changing socio-economic conditions, their effort
to protect and improve the human environment and
quality of life. This important statement expresses
inter alia the determination of OECD Member
countries to promote a new approach to economic
growth "that will take into account all components
of the quality of life and not only the quantity of
goods produced".

3. There was a general consensus that environ-
mental policies should be pursued vigorously. It was
agreed that environmental problems would continue
to be a major challenge to Governments for the fore-
seeable future, calling for co-ordinated national poli-
cies and concerted international actions. Ministers
were of the view that the present economic and
energy situation should not adversely affect the
stringency of environmental policies.

4. Ministers noted the significant results the OECD

has achieved over the last four years in analysing
the economic and technical aspects of major environ-
mental questions confronting the Member countries,
in formulating generally agreed policy guidelines
and in contributing international solutions to prob-
lems of common interest.

5. Focussing on environmental policies for the next
decade, which was the main theme of the meeting,
and mindful of the need to translate further into
action the results of the Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment, Ministers stressed che
great importance they ascribed to:

(i) meeting the challenges of continued popula-
tion growth bearing in mind the stresses it might
place on limited natural resources;

(ii) ensuring that environmental policies are
carefully integrated with efforts to increase the
world's food production;

(iii) continued efforts to husband, recycle and
otherwise achieve a more rational use of natural re-
sources, including energy supplies, bearing in mind
that energy and environmental policies can be mu-
tually reinforcing;

(iv) protecting mankind and nature, as much as
possible through preventive measures against short-
term and long-term hazards created by all forms of
pollution;

(v) ensuring that the public is made fully aware
of the concrete benefits of policies for environmental
improvement with a view to facilitating informed
public participation in the relevant decision-making
processes;

(vi) ensuring that the environmental consequences
of human activities are fully understood, by means
of continued research and development in this field
and by the application of sound assessment proce-
dures;

(vii) improving the human environment particu-
larly in cities and other urban settlements, through
better land use planning and the implementation of
other relevant policies.

6. Ministers moreover agreed that a number of
problems arising during the next ten years could only
be solved by further strengthening international co-
operation particularly through the OECD. In this
regard, they stressed:

(i) the need for jointly reviewing actions under-
taken or proposed in the Member countries in order
to achieve the above-mentioned objectives;

(ii) the importance they attached to continued
work within the Organisation favouring the har-
monization of environmental policies and avoiding
restrictive effects or distortions such policies might
create in international trade and investment;

(iii) their determination to join in seeking solu-
tions to environmental problems such as transfrontier
pollution or the management of shared environmental
resources, which are inherently international;

January 20, 1975

91

(iv) the need to reinforce co-operation with the
developing countries in the resolution of common en-
vironmental problems, bearing in mind the growing
interdependence between nations.

7. Turning to the more immediate problems calling
for international co-operation, Ministers adopted ten
Action Proposals which took the form of Recom-
mendations by the Organisation to the Member
countries. These texts, which are made public, con-
cern:

(i) The Assessment of the Potential Environ-
mental Effects of Chemicals;

(ii) The Analysis of the Environmental Conse-
quences of Significant Public and Private Projects;
(iii) Noise Prevention and Abatement;
(iv) Traffic Limitation and Low-Cost Improve-
ment of the Urban Environment;

(v) Measures Required for Further Air Pollu-
tion Control;

(vi) Control of Eutrophication of Waters;
(vii) Strategies for Specific Water Pollutants
Control;

(viii) Energy and Environment;
(ix) Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Prin-
ciple;

(x) Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollu-
tion.

8. Ministers emphasized the importance of these
Recommendations which will, in several major areas,
guide or strengthen the policies of Member countries,
as well as OECD action, and they pointed to the
need for these recommendations to be implemented
as soon as possible.

Declaration on Environmental Policy

The Governments of OECD Member countries : '

Recognising that increasing population, industrial-
isation and urbanisation place growing pressures
on the limited assimilative capacity of the environ-
ment, and on the finite stock of natural resources;

Conscious of the responsibility they share to safe-
guard and improve the quality of the environment,
both nationally and in a global context, and at the
same time to promote economic development, and
confident that the achievement of these goals is
within the reach of their national economies;

Noting the unique contribution the OECD can make
in this field;

Recalling the Declaration adopted at tlie first
United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment held in Stockholm in 1972, to which they unani-
mously subscribed;

' The mention of "Governments" is deemed to apply
also to the European Communities. [Footnote in
origrinal.]

Declare that:

1. The protection and progressive improvement of
the quality of the environment is a major objective of
the OECD Member countries.

2. The improvement of the environment should re-
flect and promote a new approach to economic growth
that will take into account all components of the
quality of life and not only the quantity of goods
produced. Therefore, economic and social develop-
ment policies must be pursued in close connection
with sound environment policies, in order to ensure
a balanced contribution to the improvement of human
well-being.

3. The enhancement of the human environment will
require further action to evaluate and deal with the
problems of cities.

4. The development, extraction, transportation,
storage, use of energy and related waste disposal
from existing and new sources as well as of other
scarce resources, should take place under conditions
that safeguard environmental values.

5. Their governments will actively seek to protect
the environment by encouraging (i) the promotion
of non-polluting technologies, (ii) conservation of
energy and other scarce resources, (iii) intensified
efforts to recycle materials, and (iv) the develop-
ment of substitutes for scarce or environmentally
harmful substances.

6. They will continue to observe and further refine
the "Polluter-Pays Principle" and other agreed prin-
ciples to encourage environmental protection and to
avoid international economic distortions, and where
desirable encourage the harmonisation of environ-
mental policies.

7. They will cooperate towards solving transfron-
tier pollution problems in a spirit of solidarity and
with the intention of further developing international
law in this field.

8. Comprehensive environmental planning, including
that pertaining to land use should constitute an
important element of government policy.

9. In order to prevent future environmental de-
terioration, prior assessment of the environmental
consequences of significant public and private activ-
ities should be an essential element of policies ap-
plied at the national, regional and local levels.

10. Particular attention should be given to the rati-
fication and implementation of international conven-
tions for the protection and conservation of the
environment and to the development of new conven-
tions.

11. They will undertake, extend and strengthen the
foregoing efforts and their co-operation with other
international organisations and other countries,
conscious of the special circumstances of developing
countries, including those which are Members of
OECD; in so doing they are prepared to make the
benefits of OECD co-operation with respect to en-
vironmental improvement readily available to all
countries.

92

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Administration Urges Senate Approval of the Geneva Protocol of 1925
and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972

Following is a statement by Fred C. Ikle,
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, made before the Senate Com-
m,ittee on Foreign Relations on December
10.'

ACDA press release 74-10 dated December 10

I appreciate the opportunity to testify this
morning on the Geneva Protocol of 1925
[Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare] and the Biological Weapons Con-
vention of 1972. Ratification of these two
arms control agreements in the field of chem-
ical and biological warfare has the strong
support of the President and the executive
branch. We welcome the initiative of the
committee in holding this hearing, which we
hope will lead to prompt ratification of both
agreements.

As you know, the Geneva Protocol of 1925
prohibits the use — in effect, the first use — of
chemical and biological agents in war. Ex-
cept for the United States, all militarily im-
portant countries are parties to the protocol.

The extensive hearings on the protocol
held by this committee in March 1971 exam-
ined the reasons why U.S. ratification of the
protocol has been so long delayed. In the in-
terest of brevity, I shall not go back over this
record now, although I would of course be
happy to respond to any questions regarding
the history of the protocol.

During the 1971 hearings, differing views
were expressed on the question of including

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

riot control agents and herbicides within the
seeps of the protocol. As a result, the com-
mittee requested that the executive branch
reexamine its interpretation of the protocol's
scope.

In response to the committee's request, the
executive branch has undertaken a compre-
hensive review. We have reconsidered our
legal interpretation and analyzed possible al-
ternatives for resolving differences of opin-
ion en the scope of the protocol. We have
evaluated the military utility of riot control
agents and herbicides. And we have of course
carefully considered alternative approaches
that would accomplish our arms control ob-
jectives.

Mr. Chairman, the President considers it
important that the United States ratify the
Geneva Protocol at the earliest possible date.
On the basis of an interagency review he has
very recently taken decisions with a view to
achieving Senate advice and consent to rati-
fication. The President has authorized me to
announce those decisions today.

The President has authorized me to state
on his behalf that he is prepared, in reaf-
firming the current U.S. understanding of
the scope of the protocol, to renounce as a
matter of national policy:

1. First use of herbicides in war except
use, under regulations applicable to their do-
mestic use, for control of vegetation within
U.S. bases and installations or around their
immediate defensive perimeters.

2. First use of riot control agents in war
except in defensive military modes to save
lives such as:

0. Use of riot control agents in riot con-
trol circumstances to include controlling riot-

January 20, 1975

93

ing prisoners of war. This exception would
permit use of riot control agents in riot sit-
uations in areas under direct and distinct
U.S. military control.

b. Use of riot control agents in situations
where civilian casualties can be reduced or
avoided. This use would be restricted to sit-
uations in which civilians are used to mask
or screen attacks.

c. Use of riot control agents in rescue mis-
sions. The use of riot control agents would be
permissible in the recovery of remotely iso-
lated personnel such as downed aircrews
(and passengers).

d. Use of riot control agents in rear-eche-
lon areas outside the combat zone to protect
convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists,
and paramilitary organizations.

The President intends to conform U.S. pol-
icy to this position, assuming the Senate con-
sents.

Finally, the President, under an earlier di-
rective still in force, must approve in ad-
vance any use of riot control agents and
chemical herbicides in war.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that you may have
several specific questions concerning this pol-
icy. I would be happy to respond to such
questions at this time before I proceed to
the section of my statement dealing with the
Biological Weapons Convention.

The second agreement before the commit-
tee is the Biological Weapons Convention of
1972. The full title is the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biologi-
cal) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De-
struction. As the title suggests, this conven-
tion completely prohibits biological and toxin
weapons. Since it provides for the elimina-
tion of existing weapons, it is a true dis-
armament measure.

The convention is entirely consistent with
U.S. policy concerning biological and toxin
weapons, since the U.S. had already uni-
laterally renounced these weapons before the
convention was negotiated. In fact, our en-
tire stockpile of biological and toxin agents
and weapons has already been destroyed. Our

biological warfare facilities have been con-
verted to peaceful uses.

Since opening the convention for signa-
ture in April 1972, 110 nations have become
signatories. This includes all members of the
Warsaw Pact and all members of NATO ex-
cept France. In order for this treaty to come
into force it must be ratified by the three
depositaries — the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. — and at least 19
other countries. Enough countries have now
i-atified, some 36, so that only ratification by
depositaries is still required. The British have
completed all the parliamentary procedures
for ratification and the Soviet Union has
announced that it intends to ratify before the
end of 1974. It is particularly important that
U.S. ratification be accomplished in the near
future so that we will not be the ones who
prevent this treaty from coming into force.

There is one aspect of the convention to
which I would like to give particular atten-
tion: the question of verification. Verification
of compliance with this convention in coun-
tries with relatively closed societies is diffi-
cult, particularly for the prohibition of the
development of these weapons.

Nevertheless, in our judgment, it is in the
net interest of the United States to enter
into this convention, basically for three rea-
sons:

— First, the military utility of these weap-
ons is dubious at best: the effects are unpre-
dictable and potentially uncontrollable, and
there exists no military experience concern-
ing them. Hence the prohibitions of this con-
vention do not deny us a militarily viable
option, and verifiability is therefore less
important.

— Second, biological weapons are partic-
ularly repugnant from a moral point of view.

— Third, widespread adherence to the con-
vention can help discourage some misguided
competition in biological weapons.

It is to be feared that without such a pro-
hibition, new developments in the biological
sciences might give rise to concern because
they could be abused for weapons purposes.

94

Department of State Bulletin

Such anxieties could foster secretive mili-
tary competition in a field of science that
would otherwise remain open to interna-
tional cooperation and be used solely for the
benefit of mankind.

It is important, however, that the limited
verifiability of this convention should not be
misconstrued as a precedent for other arms
limitation agreements where these special
conditions would not obtain.

Mr. Chairman, the administration believes
that the Biological Weapons Convention rep-
resents a useful arms control measure. We
hope the United States will not prevent the
treaty from entering into force through its
failure to ratify. By failing to ratify, we
would deny ourselves the benefit of having
other countries legally committed not to pro-
duce weapons that we have already given up.
And we would deny 109 other countries the
benefit of a treaty that they have already
signed.

This completes my prepared statement. I
would be happy to respond to any further
questions on either the Geneva Protocol or
the Biological Weapons Convention.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

International Council for Exploration of the Sea. Re-
port to accompany Ex. V, 93-1. S. Ex. Kept. 93-31.
August 22, 1974. 3 pp.

Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy.
Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of
International Scientific Mobility. Prepared for
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and
Scientific Developments of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs Divi-
sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, as part of an extended study of the
interactions of science and technology with United
States foreign policy. September 1974. 272 pp.

Consular Convention With the Czechoslovak Social-
ist Republic. Report to accompany Ex. A, 93-2.
S. Ex. Rept. 93-32. September 16, 1974. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Catalysts of
Platinum and Carbon Used in Producing Capro-
lactam. Report to accompany H.R. 13370. S. Rept.
93-1176. September 25, 1974. 4 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done
at Oslo November 15, 1973.'

Ratification deposited: Canada (with declara-
tions), December 16, 1974.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport
of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with an-
nexes and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva
January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7,
1960; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS
6633.
Accession deposited: Canada, November 26, 1974.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947.
Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Oman, January 3, 1975.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain
cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague
April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937.
50 Stat. 1317.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4,
1974.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.
Accession deposited: Oman, January 3, 1975.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel-
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August
20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973
TIAS 7532.
Signature: Oman, January 3, 1975.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery,
as amended (TIAS 3532). Concluded at Geneva
September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9,
1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46
Stat. 2183.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4
1974.

'' Not in force.

January 20, 1975

95

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade, and institutions and practice's
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the
United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4,
1974.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex-
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December
20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974,
except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which
entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, December 5, 1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974.
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to
certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to
other provisions.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, December 27,
1974; Cuba (with declarations), December 30,
1974.
Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 27, -1974.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of
an international will, with annex. Done at Wash-
ington October 26, 1973.'

Signature: Czechoslovakia (with a statement),
December 30, 1974.

Women — Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force
July 7, 1954.-"

Accession deposited: Lesotho (with a reserva-
tion), November 4, 1974.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement regarding the holding of "The Exhibi-
tion of Archeological Finds of the People's Repub-
lic of China" in the United States, with annexes
and related notes. Effected by exchange of letters
at Peking October 28, 1974. Entered into force
October 28, 1974.

Gilbert and Elllce Islands

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.
Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Tarawa
November 12 and 20, 1974. Entered into force
November 20, 1974.

Rwanda

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Rwanda. Effected by exchange
of notes at Kigali December 20, 1974. Entered
into force December 20, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Governmeyit Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20i02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superinteyident of Documents, must accompany
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.

Telecommunications — Promotion of Safety on the
Great Lakes by Means of Radio. Agreement with
Canada. TIAS 7837. 32 pp. 40(*. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7837).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with South Africa amending and extending
the agreement of July 8, 1957, as amended and
extended. TIAS 7845. 12 pp. SOc'. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7845).

Patents. Second revision of the implementing pro-
cedures for the agreement for safeguarding of
secrecy of inventions relating to defense. TIAS 7853.
32 pp. 50('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7853).

Narcotic Drugs — Detection of Opium Poppy Culti-
vation. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7863. 7 pp.
25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7863).

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pursuant
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with Aus-
tralia suspending the agreement of September 26,
1966. TIAS 7865. 3 pp. 25c'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7865).

96

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX January 20, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1856

China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Newsweek Magazine 57

Congress

Administration Urges Senate Approval of the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological
Weapons Convention of 1972 (Ikle) ... 93

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 95

Secretary Kissinger Honors Senator Fulbright
(remarks at Board of Foreign Scholarships
dinner) 69

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for
News\\eek Magazine 57

Disarmament

Administration Urges Senate Approval of the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological
Weapons Convention of 1972 (Ikle) ... 93

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for News-
week Magazine 57

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N.
General Assembly Debate (Martin, Syming-
ton, texts of two resolutions) 72

Economic Affairs

The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship

With Latin .America (Rogers) fi4

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for News-
week Magazine 57

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Secretary
Kissinger Honors Senator Fulbright (re-
marks at Board of Foreign Scholarships din-
ner) 69

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Newsweek Magazine 57

Environment. OECD Environment Committee
Ministerial Meeting Adopts Declaration on
Environmental Policy (Herter, press com-
munique and declaration) 86

German Democratic Republic. Letters of Cre-
dence (Sieber) 71

International Organizations and Conferences.

OECD Environment Committee Ministerial
Meeting Adopts Declaration on Environmen-
tal Policy (Herter, press communique and
declaration) 86

Korea. United Nations Reaffirms Continuing
Responsibility in Korea (Bennett, text of
resolution) 82

Latin America

The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship

With Latin America (Rogers) 64

Secretary Underlines Importance of Western

Hemisphere Policy (Kissinger, Linowitz) . 68

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
for Newsweek Magazine 57

Morocco. Letters of Credence (Boutaleb) . . 71

Portugal. Economic and Technical Assistance

to Portugal (Department announcement) . 71

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 96

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 95

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for
Newsweek Magazine 57

United Nations

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for News-
week Magazine 57

United Nations Reaffirms Continuing Respon-
sibility in Korea (Bennett, text of resolu-
tion) 82

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N.
General Assembly Debate (Martin, Syming-
ton, texts of two resolutions) 72

Yemen Arab Republic. Letters of Credence

(Makki) 71

Name Index

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 82

Boutaleb, Abdelhadi 71

Herter, Christian A., Jr 86

Ikle, Fred C 93

Kissinger, Secretary 57, 68, 69

Linowitz, Sol M 68

Makki, Hasan 71

Martin, Joseph, Jr ' . . 72

Rogers, William D 64

Sieber, Rolf 71

Symington, Stuart 72

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: December 30-January 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 30 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
527 of December 13, 535 of December 17, 537
of December 18, and 543 of December 23.

No. Date

Subject

*1 1/2 Parker sworn in as Ambassador to
Algeria (biographic data).

t2 1/2 Kissinger: interview with Business
Week magazine.
3 1/2 Kissinger: interview with Newsweek
magazine.

*4 1/3 Robinson sworn in as Under Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs (bio-
graphic data) .

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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3

VSS7

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1857

January 27, 1975

SECRETARY -KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR BUSINESS WEEK MAGAZINE 97

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: A HIGH-PRIORITY PROGRAM

Address by Sheldon B. Vance 108

U.S. WARNS THAT PRESENT VOTING TRENDS MAY OVERSHADOW

POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Statements by Ambassador Scali and Texts of Resolutions 114

U.S. REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR GOALS
OF WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION 124-

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POUCY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1857
January 27, 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing OiBce

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well at
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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business Week Magazine

Following is the transcript of an interview
ivith Secretary Kissinger on December 23 by
Business Week Editor in Chief Leivis H.
Young, Washi7igton Bureau Chief Robert E.
Farrell, and Boyd France, State Department
correspondent for the magazine, which was
published in the January 13 issue of Business
Week.

Press release 2 dated Januai-y 2

Q. Until recently it was the U.S. position
that the energy crisis could be solved only by
an immediate and substantial rediictioyi in the
price of imported oil. Why has that policy
changed?

Secretary Kissinger: I would disagree with
the word "immediate." It has been the U.S.
position that the energy crisis cannot be fun-
damentally changed without a substantial re-
duction in the price of oil. This remains our
view. It is also our view that the prospects
for an immediate reduction in oil prices are
poor. I have always had the most serious
doubts that an immediate reduction in oil
prices could be achieved, because I did not
see the incentives for the oil producers to do
this in the absence of consumer solidarity. A
reduction in energy prices is important. It
must be achieved, and we mu.st organize our-
selves to bring it about as rapidly as possible.

Q. Why ivas it impossible to reduce the
price of oil immediately?

Secretary Kissinger: Because in the ab-
sence of consumer solidarity, pressures re-
quired to bring oil prices down would create
a political crisis of the first magnitude. And
this would tempt other consuming countries
simply stepping into the vacuum created by
the United States and would therefore not be
effective.

Q. Can you describe the kind of political
problems that would develop ivithout con-
sumer solidarity?

Secretary Kis.singer: The only chance to
bring oil prices down immediately would be
massive political warfare against countries
like Saudi Arabia and Iran to make them
risk their political stability and maybe their
security if they did not cooperate. That is too
high a price to pay even for an immediate re-
duction in oil prices.

If you bring about an overthrow of the ex-
isting system in Saudi Arabia and a Qadhafi
takes over, or if you break Iran's image of
being capable of resisting outside pressures,
you're going to open up political trends
which could defeat your economic objectives.
Economic pressures or incentives, on the
other hand, take time to organize and cannot
be effective without consumer solidarity.
Moreover, if we had created the political cri-
sis that I described, we would almost cer-
tainly have had to do it against the opposi-
tion of Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

Q. In your University of Chicago speech
[Nov. H, 197i], you said, "The price of oil
will come down only when objective condi-
tions for a reduction are created, and not be-
fore." What are these objective conditions,
and when do yoii think they will be achieved?

Secretary Kissinger: The objective condi-
tions depend upon a number of factors: One,
a degree of consumer solidarity that makes
the consumers less vulnerable to the threat of
embargo and to the dangers of financial col-
lapse. Secondly, a systematic effort at energy
consei-vation of sufficient magnitude to im-
pose difficult choices on the producing coun-
tries. Thirdly, institutions of financial soli-

January 27, 1975

97

darity so that individual countries are not so
obsessed by their sense of impotence that
they are prepared to negotiate on the pro-
ducers' terms. Fourth, and most important,
to bring in alternative sources of energy as
rapidly as possible so that that combination
of new discoveries of oil, new oil-producing
countries, and new sources of energy creates
a supply situation in which it will be increas-
ingly difficult for the cartel to operate. We
think the beginning of this will occur within
two to three years.

Q. Over the past year the oil producers
have been able to cut back production as de-
mand has declined. Doesn't that indicate that
conservation alone will not break the oil car-
tel?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there's a
limit beyond which that cannot go. Many
producers are dependent on their revenues
for economic development. Countries which
can cut production most painlessly are those
that are simply piling up balances. Countries
that need oil revenues for their economic de-
velopment, like Algeria, Iran, and Venezuela,
do not have an unlimited capacity to cut
their production. If the production of these
countries is cut by any significant percentage,
their whole economic development plan will
be in severe jeopardy. Therefore the problem
of distributing the cuts is going to become
more and more severe. I understand that
Libya has already had to take a dispropor-
tionate amount of the reductions, which it
can do because it has really no means of
spending all its income. In the absence of an
Arab-Israeli explosion, Saudi Arabia's incen-
tive to cut production indefinitely is limited
for political reasons. Other countries will
have less and less of an economic incentive
to cut production. As the number of OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] countries increases and as alternative
sources come in, I think these cuts will grow
increasingly difficult to distribute.

Q. Are the conservation goals to cut some-
thing like 3 million barrels a day in 1975
enough ?

Secretary Kissinger: I think 3 million bar-

rels a day will be enough, plus alternative
sources, plus an increase in later years. We
have to continue this conservation over the
years.

Q. Are the Europeans accepting your pro-
posal for a 1-million-barrel-a-day cut by the
United States and a 2-million-barrel-a-day
cut by the other consumers? Or are they
pressing for a more equal distribution ?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to announce
our conservation plans more concretely be-
fore we will have an efi^ective negotiating po-
sition with the Europeans. I believe that the
major objective of our strategy can be im-
plemented, and the desire of some European
countries for a consumer-producer confer-
ence can be used to accelerate consumer co-
operation. We will not go to a consumer-pro-
ducer conference without prior agreement on
consumer cooperation.

Q. Are there any political pressures the
United States can briyig to bear on the oil
cartel ?

Secretary Kissinger: A country of the
magnitude of the United States is never with-
out political recourse. Certainly countries
will have to think twice about raising their
prices, because it would certainly involve
some political cost. But I don't want to go
into this very deeply.

Q. Businessmen ask why we haven't been
able to exploit King Faisal's fear of commu-
nism to help lower prices.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a delicate
problem there. It is to maintain the relation-
ship of friendship that they have felt for us,
yet make clear the consequences of these
prices on the structure of the West and of
the non-Communist world.

I think we will find that Saudi Arabia will
not be the leader in the reduction of prices
but that it will not be an impediment to a re-
duction if enough momentum can be created
in the Arab world — indeed, it will be dis-
creetly encouraging.

The Saudi Government has performed the
enormously skillful act of surviving in a lead-
ership position in an increasingly radical

98

Department of State Bulletin

Arab world. It is doing that by carefully bal-
ancing itself among the various factions and
acting as a resultant of a relation of forces
and never getting too far out ahead. There-
fore I never for a moment believed, nor do I
believe today, that the lead in cutting prices
will be taken by Saudi Arabia. On the other
hand, the Saudis will happily support a cut
in prices proposed by others. The Saudis have
no interest in keeping up prices. They don't
know what to do with their income today.

Q. But all along it lias seemed that the
Saudis have takeii the lead in saying they
want to get the price of oil down and that
has never happened. In fact the joke is ive
can't take another cut in oil prices from the
Saudis because ive can't afford it.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that's true.
I have always assessed the Saudi statements
in the context of their positioning them-
selves in a general constellation of forces.
In my opinion, they will not take the lead.
But they will not oppose it.

Q. Wlio is likely to take the lead, or what
producer nations?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my opinion
that a reduction in prices cannot come from
Iran alone, though its voice is important,
given the powerful personality of the Shah.

Among the Arab countries Algeria is im-
portant; Kuwait could be important; Syria,
even though it's not an OPEC country, has
a moral influence for political reasons. But
it will not come, in my view, from Saudi
Arabia.

Q. Do you think there is something that
coidd happen in the Arab-Israeli situation
that cotdd result in a reduction in oil prices?

Secretary Kissinger: Not really. I think
that if the situation deteriorates there could
be a reduction in supply. I don't believe it is
wise for us to try to sell the Israeli conces-
sions for a reduction in oil prices, because
this would create the basis for pressures in
the opposite direction during a stalemate.
Every time the OPEC countries want some-
thing from us politically, they could threaten
to raise the prices again.

Q. So there's nothing tied to the Jeru-
salem problem or the refugee problem that
ivoidd have anything to do with the price of
oil?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it has never
been raised.

Q. Many bankers claim that all the
schemes for recycling oil money — including
the one you suggested in the University of
Chicago speech — are only band-aids because
each scheme piles bad debt on top of good.
Most of the countries have no way to ever
repay the loans. Do you see hoiv the $25
billion fund you proposed would be repaid?

Secretary Kissinger: We have two prob-
lems. We have an economic problem, and we
have a political problem. The political prob-
lem is that the whole Western world, with
the exception pei'haps of the United States,
is suffering from political malaise, from
inner uncertainty and a lack of direction.
This also affects economic conditions because
it means that you have no settled expecta-
tions for the future and therefore a lowered
willingness to take risks.

One of the principal objectives of our
energy policy is to restore among the indus-
trialized countries some sense that they can
master their own fate. And even if this
would involve some questionable debts, these
are debts that have to be met somehow.
It would be enormously important for the
general cohesion of the industrialized world,
and for its capacity to deal with the future,
that they are dealt with systematically and
not as the outgrowth of some crisis. More-
over, one way of disciplining some of the
industrial countries is by the conditions that
are attached to the funds that might be
available.

Q. Where would this $25 billion come
from ?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States,
the Federal Republic of Germany, small
sums from other countries.

Q. But the United States and West Ger-
many 7vould bear the bnmt?

Secretary Kissinger: That's probably true.

January 27, 1975

99

But you have to look at it as a guarantee
rather than as a debt.

Q. Will this require congressional ap-
proval?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm told that we
could actually do it by borrowing and not
require congressional approval. However,
we have decided that in undertaking even
potential obligations of this magnitude we'd
better seek some congressional concurrence.

Q. Hoiv long will it take this program to
really get rolling?

Secretary Kissinger: We will not go to a
pi-oducer-consumer conference without hav-
ing this program well established. If we
don't have consumer solidarity, we're better
off conducting bilateral negotiations with
the producers. However, I think that within
the next three months — by the end of March
certainly— the major elements of our pro-
gram will be in place.

Q. Who will have the job of getting these
elements in place?

Secreta)y Kissi)iger: Our new Under Sec-
retary for Economic Affairs, Mr. [Charles
W.] Robinson; Tom Enders [Assistant Sec-
retary for Economic and Business Affairs
Thomas 0. Enders]. Of course, the Treasury
Department has a vital role. Secretary [of
the Treasury William E.] Simon has been
intimately associated with the entire pro-
gram. We have a committee dealing with
the international implications of the oil
crisis. It is composed of myself, Simon,
Bennett [Jack F. Bennett, Under Secretary
of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs],
Robinson, Ingersoll [Deputy Secretary of
State Robert S. Ingersoll], Burns [Ai'thur
F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System]. Another
committee, under Secretary [of the Interior
Rogers C. B.] Morton, links domestic and
international policy.

Q. Have you had any discussion with the
Soviets about what their position would be
if there were a confrontation between the

oil cartel and the Western consumer govern-
ments?

Secretary Kissinger: No, and I think it
would be a very foolish question to ask them.

Q. Do you know if the Arabs are using
their petrodollars to force a favorable reso-
lutioi of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think they've
done it up to now. If we don't have consumer
solidarity that may happen eventually.

Q. There ivas some concern last month
about the British pound.

Secretary Kissi)iger: I've seen these re-
ports. They were denied. It is certainly an
option they have. And that is one reason
why we are so determined to create institu-
tions of financial solidarity; because if you
have these institutions, then that sort of
pressure will not be possible. The producers
could not take on one currency then.

Q. Is it possible that we may have to
engage in an emergency financial bailout of
Italy or Britain before the financial facility
is in place?

Secretary Kissinger: Very possibly, in
this sense, the proposed facility merely insti-
tutionalizes what will have to happen any-
way, because if present trends continue,
there will have to be a bailout sooner or
later. But it makes a lot of difference
whether you bail somebody out in an emer-
gency and therefore enhance the sense of
vulnerability and create conditions for a new
emergency. Or whether, having perceived
the emergency, you can convey to the public
that there is a structure that makes it pos-
sible to master your fate and to deal with
difliculties institutionally.

Q. How do you rate the chances for ati-
other Arab-Israeli tvar in the spring?

Secretary Kissinger: In the absence of a
political settlement there is always the dan-
ger of another Arab-Israeli war. On the
other hand, war is talked about much too
loosely. Both sides lost grievously in the

100

Department of State Bulletin

last war. Neither side really won. I think
the readiness of either side to go to war is
often exaggerated. I also believe that there
is some possibility of political progress be-
fore the spring.

Q. Then you don't anticipate the possi-
bility of another oil embargo soon?

Secretary Kissinger: Not unless there is
a war.

Q. Well, what abont after the spring?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't anticipate an
oil embargo in the absence of war. I am
not even sure of an oil embargo in the event
of a war. It would now be a much more
serious decision than it was the last time.
We're now engaged in rather delicate nego-
tiations and these still show promise, so why
speculate about their failure while they're
still in train?

Q. The Shah of Iran has indicated that
in the next war he'd be on the side of tlie
Arabs. Does this represent to you a shift-
ing of forces over there?

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to ana-
lyze exactly what he said. In the past the
Shah maintained a rather neutral position.
What he means by being on the side of the
Arabs I would have to understand a little
better. But obviously the trends in the Mos-
lem world are in the direction of greater
solidarity.

Q. Have the Israelis indicated to you a
willingyiess to give back the oil lands in the
Sinai they captured iyi the 1967 war?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go
into the details of any specific ideas the
Israelis may have suggested, but the Israelis
have indicated their willingness to make
some further territorial withdrawals.

Q. One of the things we also hear from
businessmen is that in the long run the only
answer to the oil cartel is some sort of mili-
tary action. Have you considered military
action on oil?

Secretary Kissinger: Military action on
oil prices?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: A very dangerous
course. We should have learned from Viet-
Nam that it is easier to get into a war than
to get out of it. I am not saying that there's
no circumstance where we would not use
force. But it is one thing to use it in the
case of a dispute over price; it's another
where there is some actual strangulation of
the industrialized world.

Q. Do you worry about what the Soviets
would do in the Middle East if there were
any military action against the cartel?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this
is a good thing to speculate about. Any Pres-
ident who would resort to military action in
the Middle East without worrying what the
Soviets would do would have to be reckless.
The question is to what extent he would
let himself be deterred by it. But you can-
not say you would not consider what the
Soviets would do. I want to make clear,
however, that the use of force would be
considered only in the gravest emergency.

Q. What do you expect is going to be
achieved iyi the first meeting between the
consumers and the producers?

Secretary Kissinger: The industrialized
nations suffer in general from the illusion
that talk is a substitute for substance. And
what might happen is used as an excuse for
not doing what can happen. What can hap-
pen at a consumer-producer meeting depends
entirely upon whether the consumers manage
to bring about concrete cooperation and
whether they can concert common posi-
tions before the conference. In the absence of
these two conditions, the consumer-producer
conference will not take place with our par-
ticipation. If it did take place, it would only
repeat in a multilateral forum the bilateral
dialogues that are already going on.

There is too much talk to the effect that
there is no consumer-producer dialogue now.
There's plenty of dialogue. We talk to all

January 27, 1975

101

of the producers. We have excellent rela-
tions with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The
Europeans are talking to the producers ; the
Japanese are talking to the producers.

We do not suffer from the absence of dia-
logue, but from the absence of a systematic
approach, the lack of a clear direction in
which to go. If you don't have a systematic
coordinated approach, then a consumer-
producer conference can only repeat in a
multilateral forum under worse circum-
stances what is already going on bilaterally.
So you ought to ask me the question again
in about two months, when we're further
down the road.

But I want to make absolutely clear that
the United States is willing to have this
conference. It is in fact eager to have a
consumer-producer dialogue. In our original
proposals to the Washington Energy Con-
ference in February, we argued that con-
sumer cooperation must lead as soon as pos-
sible to a consumer-producer dialogue. At
that time we envisaged it for the fall of 1974.
But we also want the dialogue to be serious
and concrete.

It must deal with the problem of recycling.
It must deal with the problem of the less
developed countries. It must deal with the
problem of price over a period of time. In
terms of the producers, we can consider
some assurance of long-term development
for them. But all this requires some very
careful preparation.

Q. Does President Giscard d'Estaing now
share our views as to how the co7isumer-
producer conference should go forward?

Secretary Kissinger: It's my impression
that he shares it. Of course he has to speak
for himself. But he can be under no mis-
apprehension of our view of the matter.

Q. Many people have felt that the U.N.
meeting on population in Bucharest last
summer and the meeting on food in Rome
were unsuccessful because there were too
many countries represented at them. Will
this problem plague the oil meetings, too ?

Secretary Kissinger: None of the organiz-
ing countries have yet decided how many

countries to invite and in what manner to
conduct the negotiations. Personally, I would
favor a rather small negotiating group, but
we will not make an issue of it. A lot of
countries will favor this in theoi-y until they
come to the problem of whom to invite and
whom to exclude, so the tendency will be
toward expanding the membership. In gen-
eral I would say the larger the membership
the more unwieldy the procedures are likely
to be and the more difficult it will be to
achieve a consensus.

We worked hard to make the World Food
Conference a success. I think that the pro-
posals we made in Rome will probably be
the basis of food policy for some time to
come. Our basic point was that there already
exists a large global food deficit which is
certain to grow. The gap cannot be closed
by the United States alone or even primarily.
Whether our food aid is 4 million tons or 3
million tons is important for moral and hu-
manitarian reasons; it is not decisive in deal-
ing with the world food deficit, which is al-
ready approaching 25 million tons and which
can grow to 80 million tons in 10 years.

What we need is a systematic effort to
increase world food production, especially
in the less developed countries, to have the
exporting countries organize themselves so
that they know where to put their efforts,
and to improve world food distribution and
financing. That was the major thrust of
our ideas.

In addition, we're willing to give the max-
imum food aid that our economy can stand.
But food aid by the United States cannot be
decisive. It's a pity that it turned out to be
the principal issue in the public debate.
What happened after the conference in terms
of setting up food reserves, exporters groups,
and so forth actually indicates that prog-
ress is being made. The conference was
quite successful, but the focus of some of
the domestic debate was off center.

Q. What policy do you think the ivorld has
to adopt for making sure countries have ac-
cess to raw materials?

Secretary Kissinger: Last year at the
special session of the General Assembly, I

102

Department of State Bulletin

pointed out that we are facing a substantial
change in world economic patterns. In the
past, even the very recent past, almost all
producing countries were afraid of sui'-
pluses. We're now in a period in which the
idea of surpluses will seem a relic of a golden
era. The pressures of population, industriali-
zation, and increasing interdependence of
the world economy impose on us some form
of rational planning and interaction.

I proposed a systematic study of world
resources, of raw materials, to obtain a
systematic estimate of what we will be up
against, even with good will, over a period
of the next decade or so. I believe that we
need the sort of coherent approach which is
now being attempted in the field of energy;
it will either be imposed on us or we will
have to take the lead in developing it in
other fields, including food. One of our
efforts at the Rome food conference was to
show how a constructive approach might
work in contrast to a restrictive cartel ap-
proach of the energy producers.

Q. Do you think there will he any legis-
lation in the United States because the food
situation, in ivhich ive have the position of
the OPEC countries, is an explosive political
question domestically?

Secretary Kissinger: We're going to face
a problem. We have to come to an under-
standing with the Congress about the proper
relationship between the executive and the
legislative functions — what Congress should
legislate and what should be left to execu-
tive discretion. The attempt to prescribe
every detail of policy by congressional action
can, over a period of time, so stultify flexi-
bility that you have no negotiating room left
at all. We recognize that the Congress must
exercise ultimate policy control. But what
is meant by that, how much detail, is what
we intend to discuss very seriously with the
congressional leadership when it reassem-
bles. I would hope that the Congress would
keep in mind that we need some flexibility.

Now back to your question of how we can
allocate food for use abroad and yet not
drive food prices too high in this country.
That's a tough problem. We have to make

decisions on that periodically in the light of
crop reports, in the light of sustainable
prices. Suppose we put on export controls
that drove the prices down domestically,
then we would also have a problem. We
have to be prepared to pay some domestic
price for our international position.

If Japan were suddenly cut ofi" from major
imports of American agricultural goods, you
would almost certainly have a dramatic re-
orientation of Japanese political life. That
would have profound economic consequences
for us also over a period of time. They may
not be measurable today, they certainly are
not fully demonstrable, but the consequences
are certain.

On the other hand, if you undermine your
domestic position totally in the sense that
the American public thinks the high food
prices are largely due to foreign sales, then
you have another unmanageable problem. On
the whole, the United States is a healthy
society, so that the national leadership, if
it explains its position properly, has a good
chance of carrying the day.

Q. How long do you think the economies
of Italy, the United Kingdom, and France
can go tvithout serious trouble because of
the strains imposed by the oil deficits?

Secretary Kissinger: All West European
economies, with the exception of the Federal
Republic of Germany, are going to be in
more or less serious trouble within the next
18 months. Which is another reason for
striving for a much closer coordination of
economic policies.

Q. Can this econom,ic trouble lead to po-
litical trouble ?

Secretary Kissinger: Without any ques-
tion. Every government is judged not only
by its performance but whether it is believed
to be trying to master the real problems be-
fore it. F. D. Roosevelt could go along for
several years without a great improvement in
the economic conditions because the public
believed he was dealing with the problems.
The danger of purely national policies is that
they are patently inadequate for dealing with
economic problems — especially in Europe —

January 27, 1975

103

and as the sense of impotence magnifies, the
whole political base will erode.

As it is, the Communist vote in Italy, and
to some extent in France, has remained con-
stant regardless of economic conditions. A
substantial proportion of the population has
felt sufficiently disaffected with the system,
even when the system was performing well,
that they voted Communist in order to keep
pressure on. As the Communist vote grows,
the flexibility of the political system dimin-
ishes. Economic decline in Europe would
therefore have serious political consequences.

Q. There appears to be a rise in enthicsi-
asm for the far right, too, a feeling that what
is needed is an authoritative man that can
cope with these labor problems, these infla-
tion problems, et cetera.

Secretary Kissinger: If you have a major
economic crisis, the emergence of authori-
tarian governments of the left or the right is
a distinct possibility.

Q. In Europe, the charge is made that you
have sold out Western civilization for 18
months of peace in the Middle East. Why do
Europeans feel this hostility toward the
United States and toioard you?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course I'd
like to know who these Europeans are — for
my own education. What would they have
had us do?

Q. They're talking about military action.

Secretary Kissinger: The fact of the mat-
ter is that the governments they represent
systematically opposed every move we made
in the Middle East; every strong action that
was taken in the Middle East was taken by
the United States. Had we taken military ac-
tion in the Middle East, we would have faced
violent opposition from their own govern-
ments.

Our difficulty in the Middle East is caused
in part by our inability to organize coopera-
tion even for nonmilitary action. The efforts
the administration made diplomatically to lift
the oil embargo reduced, at least for a time,
the dangers in the Middle East. It gave ev-
eryone a breathing space. We gave up noth-

ing. Except the possibility of military ac-
tion, which was a chimerical idea.

When we went on a military alert for one
day, we were accused of having done it for
political reasons. Was it conceivable that in
the middle of Watergate the United States
take military action? And for what purpose?

Why are the Europeans so hostile to the
United States? I think they suffer from an
enormous feeling of insecurity. They recog-
nize that their safety depends on the United
States, their economic well-being depends on
the United States, and they know that we're
essentially right in what we're doing. So the
sense of impotence, the inability to do domes-
tically what they know to be right, produces
a certain peevishness which always stops just
short of policy actions. No foreign minister
ever says this.

Q. Even though the trade bill has been
passed, do you think the economic difficulties
here in the United States and abroad will
make it possible to reduce tariffs and non-
tariff barriers?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is essential
that we go into these trade negotiations with
the attitude of creating a new international
trading system. It is the only hope we have
of avoiding the political consequences we
talked about earlier. If we begin to draw
into ourselves, we will cause a loss of con-
fidence. We must act as if these problems
can be overcome. Maybe they can't be, but
they will never be licked if we do not build
a new international economic environment
with some conviction.

Q. Will Congress' restrictions on Export-
Import Bank credits have any impact on
trade with the Soviet Union or detente?

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional
restrictions have deprived the United States
of important and maybe fundamental lever-
age. The Soviet Union was much more in-
terested in credits than it was in trade,
because for the next four or five years it
will have very little to give in reciprocal
trade.

And this is one of those examples I had
in mind before. If the Congress cannot trust

104

Department of State Bulletin

the executive enough to use its credit au-
thority with discretion, then Congress will
not be able to deal with the problem by the
sort of restrictions it put on — aimed at de-
priving the credit authority granted by Con-
gress of any effective meaning.

Three hundred million dollars over a pe-
riod of four years is simply not enough to
use as a bargaining chip with a major coun-
try. It has no significant impact on its econ-
omy, and therefore it is the surest guarantee
it will be wasted.

For two years, against the opposition of
most newspapers, we refused to extend
credit to the Soviet Union until there was
an amelioration of its foreign policy conduct.
You remember various congressional amend-
ments were introduced urging us to liberal-
ize trade. The corollary of this was if there
was more moderate Soviet conduct, trade
and credits could open up. I believe that
the recent Soviet statements on Jewish emi-
gration have been caused, in part, by Soviet
disappointment with the credit restrictions.

But beyond that, a President who has only
$300 million of credit flexibility over four
years is forced in a crisis more and more to
rely on diplomatic or military pressures. He
has no other cards. The economic card has
been effectively removed from his hand.

Q. We were intrigued by the timing of the
Soviet statement; it came ivhen the trade
bill was still in conference.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Soviets
wanted to make clear ahead of time what
their attitude was so later they could not be
accused of having doublecrossed us.

Q. Do you think that Soviet disappoint-
ment over credits will cause a hardening of
their position on emigration of Jews?

Secretary Kissinger: If these trends con-
tinue in the United States, you can expect
a general hardening of the Soviet position
across the board over a period of time. They
will not go back to the cold war in one day.
But there are many things the Soviet Union
could do that would make our position much
more complicated. What could happen in
Europe, in the Middle East, in Southeast

Asia, if the Soviet Union pursued a policy
of maximizing our difficulties? Most of the
criticism leveled at the Soviet Union these
days is that they are not solving our difficul-
ties, not that they are exacerbating them.
I think the restrictions on Exim credits will
have an unfortunate effect on U.S.-Soviet re-
lations.

Q. Do you see any ivay that the countries
of the world can better coordinate their
economic and financial policies?

Secretary Kissinger: One interesting fea-
ture of our recent discussions with both the
Europeans and Japanese has been this em-
phasis on the need for economic coordina-
tion. In April 1973, in my "Year of Europe"
speech, I proposed the coordination of eco-
nomic policies and of energy policies. At that
time, the proposal was generally resisted on
the grounds that we were trying to produce
a linkage where the obligations had never
run to economic matters. In all the recent
meetings of the President with heads of gov-
ernment, and all the meetings I have had
with Foreign Ministers, our allies and
friends have absolutely insisted that we co-
ordinate economic policies. So you have had
a 180-degree turn in one year.

How you in fact coordinate policies is yet
an unsolved problem, but it must be solved.
Otherwise we will have a succession of
beggar-thy-neighbor policies and countries
trying to take a free ride on the actions of
their partners.

Q. Do you believe we have to go beyond
what is done at the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know if we
need new structures, but I think we need
new approaches to existing structures. I
haven't thought through whether we need
new structures.

In the next 10 years you will have co-
ordinated fiscal policy, including ours. I am
not saying they have to be identical, but they
have to be coordinated.

We have greater latitude than the others
because we can do much on our own. The
others can't. But it is an important aspect

January 27, 1975

105

of leadership to exercise our freedom of ac-
tion with restraint and to let others partici-
pate in decisions affecting their future.

Q. Is there any chance of coordinativ p
better U.S. international economic policy,
particularly since the Council on Interna-
tional Economic Policy seems to be losing its
power?

Secretary Kissinger: You can't look at
policies of a government in terms of organi-
zational mechanisms. The Council on Inter-
national Economic Policy was created at a
time when the National Security Council was
essentially divorced from economic policies.
Then it became clear that every economic
policy had profound foreign policy implica-
tions and really required political inspiration
and leadership to make it effective. You
could never implement the energy policy as
a purely economic matter ; it has been a for-
eign policy matter from the beginning.

When that happens, the issue tends to be
pulled back into the orbit of the National
Security Council. What you have had is
a greater foreign policy involvement in eco-
nomic policy decisions.

On the other hand, I think the relations
between the State Department and Treasury
have never been better, despite the occa-
sional disagreements that surface in the
newspapers. You expect disagreements. The
issue is not whether there are disagreements,
but how they are settled. And they are
always settled in a constructive, positive
way.

On energy we have a group, which I de-
scribed before, of Arthur Burns, Simon, my-
self, Robinson, and a few others who meet
regularly to set the basic strategy in the
international field. Whether we meet as the
Council on International Economic Policy or
as the National Security Council, the group
has essentially the same membership.

Q. Should there be additional legislation
to protect U.S. industry from ownership by
Arab oil moyiey? If so, what shape should
the legislation take?

Secretary Kissinger: We are now study-

ing the ways that oil producers' money could
be invested in the United States and what
we should protect against. We haven't come
to any conclusions because if you get a man-
ageable minority interest, that would be in
our interest. If you get actual control over
strategic industries, then you have to deter-
mine how that control would be exercised
before you know how to avoid it. There are
some industrial segments we would not want
to be dominated by potentially hostile in-
vestors. Since we haven't completed the
study, I can't give you a conclusive answer.
By the middle of January we will have con-
cluded the study.

Q. Do you think a request for legislation
ivill be the result of that study?

Secretary Kissinger: It may be a request
for some sort of a board to monitor foreign
investment, and the board would formulate
some proposal. I am not sure about the shape
of the proposal, but we need a systematic
monitoring.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1974
Signed into Law

Statement by President Ford '

I have signed S. 3394, the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1974, with some reservations but
with appreciation for the spirit of construc-
tive compromise which motivated the Con-
gress.

I sought a bill which would serve the in-
terests of the United States in an increas-
ingly interdependent world in which the
strength and vitality of our own policies and
society require purposeful and responsible
participation in the international commu-
nity. Foreign assistance is indispensable in
exercising the role of leadership in the coop-
erative and peaceful resolution of conflicts,
in pursuing political stability and economic

' Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 30 (text from White
House press release) ; as enacted, the bill is Public
Law 93-559, approved Dec. 30, 1974.

106

Department of State Bulletin

progress, and in expressing the American
spirit of helping those less fortunate than
we are.

In most respects, the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974 will serve those ends. It includes,
however, several restrictions that may pose
severe problems to our interests. I must
bring them to the attention of the Congress as
matters which will be of continuing concern
and which may require our joint efforts to
remedy if circumstances require.

First are the numerous and detailed limi-
tations on assistance to Indochina. The eco-
nomic and military assistance levels for Cam-
bodia, particularly, are clearly inadequate to
meet minimum basic needs. Our support is
vital to help effect an early end to the fighting
and a negotiated settlement. This is also the
objective of the U.N. General Assembly,
which approved a resolution calling for a ne-
gotiated settlement. I intend to discuss this
critical issue with the congressional leader-
ship at the earliest possible time.

In South Viet-Nam, we have consistently
sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese
people to determine their own futures free
from enemy interference. It would be tragic
indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the
progress we have achieved by failing to pro-
vide the relatively modest but crucial aid
which is so badly needed there. Our objective
is to help South Viet-Nam to develop a viable,
self-sufficient economy and the climate of se-
curity which will make that development pos-
sible. To this end, the economic aid requested
represented the amount needed to support
crucial capital development and agricultural
productivity efforts. The lower amount fi-
nally approved makes less likely the achieve-
ment of our objectives and will significantly
prolong the period needed for essential de-
velopment.

I appreciate the spirit of compromise which
motivated the Congress to extend to Febru-
ary 5, 1975, the period during which military

assistance to Turkey may continue under
specified circumstances. I regret, however,
that the restriction was imposed at all. Tur-
key remains a key element of U.S. security
and political interests in the eastern Medi-
terranean. The threat of cutoff of aid, even
if unfulfilled, cannot fail to have a damaging
effect on our relations with one of our
staunch NATO allies whose geographic posi-
tion is of great strategic importance. This, in
turn, could have a detrimental effect on our
efforts to help achieve a negotiated solution
of the Cyprus problem.

I regret the action of the Congress in cut-
ting off the modest program of military as-
sistance to Chile. Although I share the con-
cern of the Congress for the protection of
human rights and look forward to continuing
consultation with the Chilean Government on
this matter, I do not regard this measure as
an effective means for promoting that inter-
est.

Finally, the Congress has directed that
during the current fiscal year no more than
30 pei'cent of concessional food aid should be
allocated to countries which are not among
those most seriously affected by food short-
ages— unless the President demonstrates that
such food is required solely for humanitarian
purposes. I understand and share the spirit
of humanitarianism that prompted a state-
ment of congressional policy on this subject.
But that policy could unduly bind the flexibil-
ity of the United States in an arbitrary way
in meeting the needs of friendly countries
and in pursuing our various interests abroad.

As with other differences which the Con-
gress and the executive branch worked out
in consideration of this bill, I look forward to
working with the 94th Congress in meeting
and solving the problems that are still before
us. We share the common goal of best serving
the interests of the people of the United
States. Working together, we shall continue
to serve them responsibly.

January 27, 1975

107

International Narcotics Control: A High-Priority Program

Address bij Sheldon B. Vance ^

Alcohol and drug problems are genuine
concerns of anyone with management re-
sponsibilities, and in this sense my personal
involvement is not new. However, my inter-
est has been more immediate and full time
since early this year when Secretary Kissin-
ger named me his Senior Adviser on Nar-
cotics Matters.

The Federal international narcotics con-
trol program is a combined effort of several
U.S. agencies, operating within the frame-
work of the Cabinet Committee on Interna-
tional Narcotics Control, which is chaired by
Secretary of State Kissinger. I also serve as
the Executive Director of the Cabinet Com-
mittee and therefore direct or coordinate, un-
der the President's and Secretary's control,
what our Federal Government is attempting
to do abroad in this field, whether in the en-
forcement, treatment, or prevention areas.

My remarks today will not address alcohol
abuse, not because we believe alcohol a lesser
or insignificant problem — we definitely do
not — but because our international narcotics
control program does not extend to alcohol.
The Cabinet Committee was, in fact, formed
largely in response to the tragic victimization
of American youth by heroin traffickers in
the late 1960's and early 1970's. As you know,
the same period also saw a sharp rise in the
abuse of other drugs over which we seek
tighter controls, including marihuana, hash-
ish, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates.

' Made before the North American Congress on Al-
cohol and Drug Problems at San Francisco, Calif.,
on Dec. 17. Ambassador Vance is Senior Adviser to
the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Interna-
tional Narcotics Matters.

tranquilizers, and LSD and other hallucino-
gens. Poly-drug abuse, the mixing or alter-
nating consumption of diff'erent drugs, also
emerged as a problem requiring special at-
tention.

The American drug scene is not confined
to our borders. It extends to our military
forces and other Americans residing abroad,
as well as to tourists. As of September 30 of
this year, 1,289 U.S. citizens were languish-
ing in foreign prisons on narcotics charges,
principally in Mexico, Germany, Spain, and
Canada. The 1,289 compares with the figure
of 242 in September of 1969.

However hard we fight the problem of
drug abuse at home, we cannot move signifi-
cantly to solve it unless we succeed in win-
ning and maintaining comprehensive and ef-
fective cooperation of foreign governments.
Some of the key drugs of abuse originate in
foreign countries. There is a legitimate need
for opium as a source for codeine and other
medicinal compounds, but illicit opium —
from which heroin can be processed — has
been produced in such countries as Turkey
(prior to its ban), Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Burma, Thailand, Laos, and neighboring
Mexico. Opium is also being produced legally
in India and Turkey for export and in Iran
and a number of other countries for domestic
medical and research utilization.

Some idea of the dimensions of our prob-
lem can be gained when we consider that the
world's annual legal production of opium is
close to 1,500 tons and illegal production is
estimated at 1,200 tons. Similarly, the co-
caine used in the United States is of foreign
origin, produced as the coca plant princi-

108

Department of State Bulletin

pally in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Colom-
bia transforms more coca paste into cocaine
than other countries. Cannabis, from which
we get marihuana and hashish, is both im-
ported and grown in the United States; the
biggest supplier of the U.S. market is Mex-
ico, followed by Jamaica.

We have had our problems with U.S. -man-
ufactured amphetamines, barbiturates, and
other mind-bending drugs. We are attempt-
ing to deal with the U.S. sources through do-
mestic measures, but for the foreign sub-
stances we must look to other governments
for cooperation. Frequently, it has been a
case of persuading them that the problem is
not just ours but is also theirs.

We have been increasingly successful in
these efforts since mid-1971, when stopping
the flow of narcotics to the United States —
with emphasis on heroin and cocaine — be-
came one of our principal foreign policy ob-
jectives. At that time, the Department of
State was assigned the primary responsibil-
ity for developing an intensified interna-
tional narcotics control effort and for man-
aging the expenditures under the program.

To encourage cooperation from other gov-
ernments and to assist them and internation-
al organizations to strengthen their antidrug
capabilities, we have provided an annual
average of $22 million in grant assistance
over the past three years. Our request for
international control funds for the current
fiscal year is $42.5 million. Our bilateral
programs emphasize cooperative law enforce-
ment and exchange of intelligence. The ma-
jor categories of grant assistance are train-
ing programs and equipment for foreign en-
forcement personnel and financial assistance
for crop substitution and related agricul-
tural projects. We are also exploring useful
cooperative ventures in the fields of drug
abuse education, treatment, and prevention.

During the past two months, I visited
many of the countries in Latin America, the
Near East, and Asia to examine our pro-
grams and look for ways to strengthen them.
I can report that all of these governments
expressed a sincere willingness to help stamp
out illicit production and trafficking. But

these governments also face serious internal
problems. The opium poppy, for example,
usually flourishes in the more isolated areas
where central government control is weak or
nonexistent. In many areas it is the only cash
crop of unbelievably poor tribesmen, and it
also provides their only medication and relief
from serious disease and hardship.

On my trip I saw something of the poppy-
growing areas in Afghanistan in Badakshan
and Nangarhar Provinces and of the Buner
and Swabi poppy-producing areas of Pak-
istan's Northwest Frontier Province when I
drove from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Pesha-
war, Pakistan, through the Kabul Gorge and
Khyber Pass and then went on to Islamabad
by Pakistani Government helicopter. I also
helicoptered over the northern mountains of
Thailand, where the Meo hill tribes grow
opium like the tribesmen in the neighboring
mountains of Burma and Laos in what is
called the Golden Triangle.

The experience vividly demonstrated to me
the conditions which make it very difficult
for these governments — despite a genuine
desire to stamp out illegal opium — to control
production effectively any time soon. We and
producing countries cannot expect to see a
high degree of success in our cooperative en-
forcement eflforts until significant adjust-
ments are made in the social attitudes and
economic conditions in the opium-growing
areas.

Western Hemisphere Control Programs

Mexico — Today, the number-one priority
country in our international narcotics con-
trol eflforts is Mexico. The Mexican opium
crop and heroin laboratories are the current
source of more than half of the heroin on our
streets. The so-called Mexican brown heroin
has not only moved into our largest cities
but is also spreading to some of the smaller
cities throughout our country. When Presi-
dent Ford met with President Echeverria in
October, narcotics control was very high on
their agenda and they agreed that an even
more intensified joint effort is needed.

The Mexican Government under President

January 27, 1975

109

Echeverria has assigned high priority to its
antidrug campaign and has directed Attor-
ney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada to coor-
dinate its eradication and control efforts.

We are helping them by providing air-
craft, mainly helicopters, to assist in the
eradication of opium poppy cultivation in
the western mountains. This cultivation is il-
legal in Mexico, and there is no question of
the Mexican Government offering income
substitution to the farmer. There is also a
crash program to strengthen antismuggling
controls on both sides of the border. Our
crooks smuggle guns and appliances into
Mexico, in coordination with their crooks
who supply ours with heroin and marihuana.
U.S.-Mexican cooperative measures are pay-
ing off, but much remains to be done before
illicit trafficking can be reduced in a major
way.

For fiscal year 1975, about $10 million, or
almost one-quarter, of our international nar-
cotics control funds are being allocated to the
Mexican program. Our Mexican neighbors
are spending much more. My colleague John
Bartels, Administrator of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA), and I meet
three or four times a year with our friend
Pedro Ojeda Paullada, either in Mexico City
or Washington, in order to coordinate our
respective efforts.

Colombia — A country with extensive coast-
lines and huge land areas, Colombia is the
major transit point for illegal shipments of
cocaine entering the U.S. market. The Co-
lombian Government has launched a great
effort to eliminate the criminal element, to
combat drug trafficking, and to crack down
on the laboratories processing coca base
smuggled in from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Chile. The United States is moving for-
ward with an assistance program tailored to
help the new Colombian Government thrust.
We are furnishing such enforcement items
as jeeps, motorcycles, radios, and laboratory
equipment. We are also providing antinar-
cotics technical training for the Judicial Po-
lice, the National Police, and Customs.

Jamaica — This Caribbean island has
emerged as a major supplier of marihuana

to the United States, surpassed only by Mex-
ico. Moreover, there is evidence that Jamaica
is a transit point for the smuggling of co-
caine and heroin to our country from South
America. Within the past year, the Jamaican
Government has undertaken major steps to
curb illicit drug activities. In response to ur-
gent requests for assistance from the Jamai-
can Government, U.S. technical assistance
and equipment was extended to a Jamaican
task force set up to intercept boats and air-
craft engaged in narcotics smuggling, to dis-
rupt trafficking rings, and to destroy commer-
cial marihuana cultivation. Well over 600,000
pounds of commercially grown marihuana
have been destroyed thus far. U.S. support
consists of loaning of helicopters and trans-
fers of communications equipment and in-
vestigative-enforcement aids together with
training and technical assistance.

The Situation in Turkey

Turkey — In 1971, with the realization that
a substantial amount of opium legally pro-
duced in Turkey was being diverted to illicit
narcotics trafficking, the Turkish Govern-
ment concluded that a total ban on poppy
growing would be the most effective way to
stop the leakage. However, the Turkish Gov-
ernment which assumed office in January
1974 reconsidered the ban, amid great in-
ternal political debate, and on July 1 re-
scinded it on the grounds that what is grown
in Turkey is a sovereign decision of the
Turks.

In high-level dialogue between our two
governments we have made clear our very
deep concern at the possibility of a renewed
massive flow of heroin from Turkish opium
to the United States. We stressed our hope
they would adopt effective controls. A spe-
cial U.N. team held discussions on this sub-
ject in Turkey on the invitation of the Turk-
ish Government, which has stated publicly
many times that it will not allow its resump-
tion of poppy cultivation to injure other peo-
ples.

In mid-September, the Turkish Govern-
ment issued a statement that it would adopt

110

Department of State Bulletin

a method of harvesting the poppies called the
poppy straw process, which involves the col-
lection by the Turkish Government of the
whole poppy pod rather than opium gum.
This was the procedure recommended by the
U.N. experts. Traditionally, the opium gum
was taken by the farmers thi'ough lancing
the pod in the field, and it was a portion of
this gum that was illegally bought by the
traffickers.

Last month I talked with senior Turkish
Government officials and with police officials.
The word has moved all the way down the
chain to the poppy farmer that opium gum
production is definitely prohibited, and the
enforcement mechanism is moving into place.
Turkey and the U.N. narcotics organization
are cooperating fully in this eff"ort, and all
will be watching closely to endeavor to pre-
vent and to head off' diversions into the illicit
traffic.

Joint Efforts in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia — The Golden Triangle
area, where Burma, Laos, and Thailand come
together, is the largest source of illicit opium
in the world, with an estimated annual pro-
duction of 600-700 tons. Most of this produc-
tion is consumed by opium or heroin smokers
in Southeast Asia. Since 1970, when heroin
processed from opium in Golden Triangle re-
fineries began to become widely available to
U.S. troops in Viet-Nam, we have been con-
cerned that heroin from this source would
increasingly reach the United States, espe-
cially as the ban on opium production in Tur-
key and disruption eflforts along the way
dried up the traditional Middle Eastern-
European route to the United States.

For the past three years, therefore, we
have made Southeast Asia a major object of
our international control efforts. We have de-
voted a significant share of our suppression
efforts and resources to our cooperative pro-
grams in Thailand, Laos, Viet-Nam, the Phil-
ippines, and Hong Kong. The biggest concen-
tration has been in Thailand, which serves as
the major transit area for Burmese-origin
opium. A recent series of agreements for

U.S. assistance to Thailand include helicop-
ters, communications equipment, vehicles,
and training programs. Important steps were
also taken on the income-substitution side,
including the approval of an aerial survey of
northern Thailand, where opium is grown by
the hill tribes. In Burma, the government has
stepped up its antinarcotics efforts. For fiscal
year 1975, Southeast Asia will account for
over $10 million of our international nar-
cotics control funds.

While our joint suppression efforts are
making some headway in Southeast Asia, we
should not view the situation there through
rose-colored glasses. Antinarcotics efforts in
Southeast Asia run up against several unique
problems. Burma and Thailand are threat-
ened by insurgent groups which control or
harass large areas of the opium-growing re-
gions. The governments have limited re-
sources and few trained personnel available
for narcotics control. In addition, the lack of
internal security hampers police action and
intelligence operations against traffickers.
The Government of Burma, for example, does
not have effective administrative control over
a significant portion of the area where most
Asian poppies are grown.

The topography of the Golden Triangle
area is mountainous, wild, and uncontrolla-
ble. When one smuggling route is uncovered
and plugged by police and customs teams, the
traffickers can easily detour to alternate
routes and modes of transportation. We need
only look at the difficulties that our own well-
trained and well-equipped law enforcement
agencies have in blocking narcotics traffic
across our clearly defined peaceful border
with Mexico to gain a better appreciation of
the difficulties in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, use of opium has been tolerated
in the area, and opium has been regarded as
a legitimate commodity of commerce for cen-
turies under both colonial and indigenous
governments. For the hill tribes, opium is
still the principal source of medicinal relief
for endemic diseases and is also the most lu-
crative crop to sell or barter for basic neces-
sities. We are actively seeking alternative
crops and other sources of income for these

January 27, 1975

m

peoples, in close cooperation with similar ef-
forts by the U.N. narcotics organizations;
but progress will be slow, as a way of life
of primitive and remote peoples must be mod-
ified.

And so the situation in Southeast Asia is
complex and long term.

Multilateral Approaches

Concurrently with our bilateral action pro-
grams, we have given full support to the
multilateral or international eflforts in the
fight against illicit narcotics production and
trafficking.

For example, the United States was a lead-
ing proponent of the establishment of the
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Con-
trol. To date, we have contributed $10 million
of the $13.5 million made available to the
Fund by all countries. In Thailand, the Fund
is assisting in a comprehensive program de-
signed to develop alternate economic oppor-
tunities for those who grow opium; the Fund
has a similar project in Lebanon for the de-
velopment of alternatives to cannabis pro-
duction. Within the past year, the Fund has
financed a World Health Organization world-
wide study of the epidemiology of drug de-
pendence which we hope will contribute to-
ward clarifying the nature of the problem we
seek to solve. It is also financing treatment
and rehabilitation activities for drug addicts
in Thailand, fellowships and consultancies in
rehabilitation in various countries, and semi-
nars on community rehabilitation programs
in Europe.

The U.S. Government has also taken a
leading role in formulating two major pieces
of international narcotics legislation. The
first relates to the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs. I am happy to report that
the U.S.-sponsored amending protocol, which
would considerably strengthen controls over
illicit production and trafficking, has been
ratified by 32 of the 40 countries necessary
for its coming into force. The United States
was one of the first countries to ratify the
pi-otocol, on November 1, 1972.

The second major area of international
legislation pertains to the Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances, which would provide
international control over LSD and other
hallucinogens, the amphetamines, barbitu-
rates, and tranciuilizers. The administration
submitted the convention to the Senate in
mid-1971 with a request for its ratification.
We are now waiting for congressional ap-
proval of the proposed enabling domestic
legislation that would pave the way for rati-
fication of this essential international treaty.
U.S. approval of the Psychotropic Conven-
tion would strengthen our hand in obtaining
cooperation from other governments in con-
trolling the classic narcotic substances.

The approach to a successful antidrug pro-
gram cannot, of course, relate to supply
alone. Nor is an attack on the demand side
alone the answer. Only through a combined
eflfort can the job be done. Thus the initial
objective of our international program has
been to reduce availabilities of illicit supplies
so that addicts will be driven into treatment
and others will be deterred from experimen-
tation. We are also examining ways to foster
international cooperation in the fields of
treatment and prevention to augment aware-
ness that drug abuse is not exclusively an
American problem but one that seriously af-
fects developing countries just as it plagues
the affluent. We also hope to demonstrate our
progress in treatment and prevention and to
learn from other countries the methods that
they have found effective.

As many of you know, we have several co-
operative treatment and research projects
with a number of concerned governments
throughout the world. For example, with the
Government of Mexico through Dr. Guido
Belsasso's organization, the Mexican Center
for Drug Dependency Research, we have pro-
vided some assistance to the Mexican epide-
miological study and we are jointly studying
heroin use along our common border.

I think we can point with pride to our role
over the past three years toward a tightening
of international controls. Worldwide seizures
and arrests of traffickers have become more

112

Department of State Bulletin

and more significant as other countries have
joined in the battle. And there has been a
move in the direction of more effective con-
trols through treaty obligations. However,
the job is far from done. It should be ap-
parent to us all that abundant supplies of
narcotics — both in storage and under cultiva-
tion— quickly respond to illicit high profits.
Our task, then, is to further strengthen the
international control mechanism to reduce
illicit trafficking.

On October 18, John Bartels, the Admin-
istrator of DEA, Dr. Robert DuPont, Direc-
tor of the Special Action Office for Drug
Abuse Prevention, and I met with President
Ford to review the U.S. drug abuse pro-
grams. The President stated that he had per-
sonally seen examples of the human devasta-
tion caused by drug abuse and said he wanted
every appropriate step taken to further the
U.S. Government's drug abuse program both
at home and abroad. On the international
front, the President specifically directed that
all American Ambassadors be made aware of
the prime importance he attaches to our ef-
forts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs to the
United States and requested that each Am-
bassador review the activities of his mission
in support of the drug program.

Thus, drug control continues to be a high-
priority foreign policy issue. In cooperation
with our missions abroad and the govern-
ments to which they are accredited, we shall
carry on with our efforts against the scourge
of drug abuse.

Department Welcomes TWA-Swissair
Agreement on Airline Capacity

Department Announcement '

The Department of State welcomes the
announcement by Trans World Airlines
(TWA) that it has reached an agreement
with Swissair for tiie reduction of airline ca-
pacity in the U.S.-Switzerland market for
the summer 1975 season. The agreement,
which is subject to the approval of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, will reduce the overall
capacity in the U.S.-Switzerland market by
over 25 percent compared with the 1973
base year. The Swissair reduction will be
even larger because the agreement calls for
an expansion of TWA services in order to
improve its position in the U.S.-Switzerland
market.

The United States had earlier requested
consultations with Switzerland concerning
the problem of excess capacity. The U.S.
Government is now considering whether the
proposed agreement between the two air-
lines will make intergovernmental talks un-
necessary insofar as the upcoming summer
season is concerned.

The reduction of excess capacity in the
transatlantic market is part of the Presi-
dent's seven-point action program to assist
the U.S. international airline industry.

'Issued on Dec. 23 (text from press release 543);
the announcement by TWA was included in the De-
partment's press release.

January 27, 1975

113

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. Warns That Present Voting Trends May Overshadow
Positive Achievements of the United Nations

Folloiving are statements made in the
U.N. General Assembly on December 6 and
12 by U.S. Representative John Scali, to-
gether with the texts of two resolutions
adopted by the Assembly on December 12.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

Statement of December 6

USUN press release 191 dated December 6

Last year the U.S. delegation sought to
call attention to a trend which we believed
threatened the U.N.'s potential as an instru-
ment for international cooperation. We were
deeply concerned then over the growing
tendency of this organization to adopt one-
sided, unrealistic resolutions that cannot be
implemented.

Today, more than a year later, my delega-
tion feels that we must return to this sub-
ject because this trend has not only con-
tinued but accelerated. Added to this, there
is now a new threat — an arbitrary disre-
gard of U.N. rules, even of its charter. What
my delegation spoke of 12 months ago as a
potential threat to this organization, un-
happily, has become today a clear and pres-
ent danger.

The U.S. Government has already made
clear from this rostrum its concern over a
number of Assembly decisions taken during
the sixth special session last spring and
during the current session. These decisions
have dealt with some of the most important,
the most controversial, and the most vexing
issues of our day: the global economic crisis.

the turmoil in the Middle East, and the
injustice in southern Africa. I will not today
discuss again our main concerns with each
of these decisions. Rather, I wish to take
this opportunity to discuss the more general
question of how self-centered actions en-
danger the future of this organization.

The United Nations, and this Assembly
in particular, can walk one of two paths.
The Assembly can seek to represent the
views of the numerical majority of the day,
or it can try to act as a spokesman of a
more general global opinion. To do the first
is easy. To do the second is infinitely more
difficult. But, if we look ahead, it is infinitely
more useful.

There is certainly nothing wrong with
like-minded groups of nations giving voice to
the views they hold in common. However,
organizations other than the United Nations
exist for that purpose. Thus, there are
organizations of African states, of Asian
states, of Arab states, of European states,
and of American states. There are groups
of industrialized nations, of developing na-
tions, of Western and Eastern nations, and
of nonaligned nations. Each of these organi-
zations exists to promote the views of its
membership.

The United Nations, however, exists not
to serve one or more of these special-interest
groups while remaining insensitive to the
others. The challenge of the United Nations
is to meld and reflect the views of all of
them. The only victories with meaning are
those which are victories for us all.

The General Assembly fulfills its true
function when it reconciles opposing views

114

Department of State Bulletin

and seeks to bridge the differences among
its member states. The most meaningful
test of whether the Assembly has succeeded
in this task is not whether a majority can
be mobilized behind any single draft resolu-
tion, but whether those states whose co-
operation is vital to implement a decision
will support it in fact. A better world can
only be constructed on negotiation and com-
promise, not on confrontation, which inevi-
tably sows the seeds of new conflicts. In
the words of our charter, the United Nations
is "to be a center for harmonizing the ac-
tions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends."

No observer should be misled by the co-
incidental similarities between the General
Assembly and a legislature. A legislature
passes laws. The General Assembly passes
resolutions, which are in most cases advisory
in nature. These resolutions are sometimes
adopted by Assembly majorities which rep-
resent only a small fraction of the people
of the world, its wealth, or its territory.
Sometimes they brutally disregard the sensi-
tivity of the minority.

Because the General Assembly is an ad-
visory body on matters of world policy, the
pursuit of mathematical majorities can be
a particularly sterile form of international
activity. Sovereign nations, and the other
international organs which the Assembly
advises through its resolutions, sometimes
accept and sometimes reject that advice.
Often they do not ask how many nations
voted for a resolution, but who those nations
were, what they represented, and what they
advocated.

Members of the United Nations are en-
dowed with sovereign equality; that is, they
are equally entitled to their independence,
to their rights under the charter. They are
not equal in size, in population, or in wealth.
They have different capabilities and there-
fore different responsibilities, as the charter
makes clear.

Similarly, because the majority can direct-
ly affect only the internal administration of
this organization, it is the United Nations
itself which suffers most when a majority.

in pursuit of an objective it believes over-
riding, forgets that responsibility must bear
a reasonable relationship to capability and
to authority.

Each time this Assembly adopts a resolu-
tion which it knows will not be implemented,
it damages the credibility of the United
Nations. Each time that this Assembly
makes a decision which a significant minor-
ity of members regards as unfair or one-
sided, it further erodes vital support for
the United Nations among that minority.
But the minority which is so offended may
in fact be a practical majority in terms of
its capacity to support this organization and
implement its decisions.

Unenforceable, one-sided resolutions de-
stroy the authority of the United Nations.
Far more serious, however, they encourage
disrespect for the charter and for the tradi-
tions of our organization.

No organization can function without an
agreed-upon framework of rules and regu-
lations. The framework for this organiza-
tion was built in the light of painful lessons
learned from the disastrous failure of its
predecessor, the League of Nations. Thus,
the U.N. Charter was designed to insure
that the important decisions of this organi-
zation reflected real power relationships and
that decisions, once adopted, could be en-
forced.

One of the principal aims of the United
Nations, expressed in the preamble of its
charter, is "to practice tolerance and live
together in peace with one another as good
neighbors." The promise the American
people and the peoples of the other founding
nations made to each other — not as a matter
of law, but as a matter of solemn moral
and political obligation — was to live up to
the charter and the duly made rules unless
or until they were modified in an orderly,
constitutional manner.

The function of all parliaments is to pro-
vide expression to the majority will. Yet,
when the rule of the majority becomes the
tyranny of the majority, the minority will
cease to respect or obey it, and the parlia-
ment will cease to function. Every majority

January 27, 1975

115

must recognize that its authority does not
extend beyond the point where the minority
becomes so outraged that it is no longer
willing to maintain the covenant which binds
them.

My countrymen have made a great invest-
ment in this world organization over the
years — as host country, as the leading finan-
cial contributor, and as a conscientious par-
ticipant in its debates and negotiations and
operational programs. Americans have loy-
ally continued these efforts in a spirit of
good faith and tolerance, knowing that there
would be words spoken which we did not
always like and resolutions adopted which
we could not always support.

As the 29th General Assembly draws to a
close, however, many Americans are ques-
tioning their belief in the United Nations.
They are deeply disturbed.

During this 29th General Assembly, reso-
lutions have been passed which uncritically
endorse the most far-reaching claims of one
side in dangerous international disputes.
With this has come a sharply increased tend-
ency in this Assembly to disregard its nor-
mal procedures to benefit the side which
enjoys the favor of the majority and to
silence, and even exclude, the representatives
of member states whose policies the major-
ity condemns. In the wake of some of the
examples of this Assembly, the General Con-
ference of UNESCO [United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion] has strayed down the same path, with
the predictable consequences of adverse re-
action against the United Nations. Innocent
bystanders such as UNICEF [United Na-
tions Children's Fund] already have been
affected.

We are all aware that true compromise is
difficult and time consuming, while bloc vot-
ing is fast and easy. But real progress on
contentious issues must be earned. Paper
triumphs are, in the end, expensive even for
the victors. The cost is borne first of all by
the United Nations as an institution and,
in the end, by all of us. Our achievements
cannot be measured in paper.

A strong and vital United Nations is im-

portant to every member state ; and actions
which weaken it weaken us all, particularly
the smaller and the developing nations. Their
security is particularly dependent on a col-
lective response to aggression. Their pros-
perity particularly depends on access to an
open and expanding international economy.
Their ability to project their influence in
the world is particularly enhanced by mem-
bership in international bodies such as the
United Nations.

In calling attention to the dangerous
trends, I wish also to call attention to the
successes of the United Nations during the
past year.

U.N. members overcame many differences
at the World Population Conference and the
World Food Conference. There was also
progress at the Law of the Sea Conference.
There was agreement on programs encour-
aging states to maintain a population which
they can feed and feed the population which
they maintain. As a result of these U.N.
conferences the world community has at last
begun to grapple with the two fundamental
issues which are central to any meaningful
attempt to provide a better life for most
of mankind.

In the Middle East a unique combination
of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy has
succeeded in halting last year's war and in
separating the combatants. With good will
and cooperation, the Security Council has
renewed the mandate for the peace forces,
allowing time for a step-by-step negotiating
process to bear fruit. My government be-
lieves that this negotiating process continues
to hold the best hope in more than a quarter
of a century for a just and lasting peace in
that area.

On Cyprus, the Security Council, the As-
sembly, and our Secretary General have all
contributed to progress toward peace and
reconciliation. Much remains to be done, but
movement toward peace has been encour-
aged.

Perhaps the U.N.'s most overlooked suc-
cess of the past year resulted from the mis-
sion of the Secretary General's representa-
tive, Mr. [Luis] Weckmann-Munoz. This

116

Department of State Bulletin

effort, which was undertaken at the request
of the Security Council, succeeded in medi-
ating a particularly dangerous border dis-
pute between Iran and Iraq. This example
of how to prevent a small conflict from
blowing up into a much bigger war must
rank among the U.N.'s finest, if least
heralded, achievements.

Thus, despite the disturbing trend toward
the sterile pursuit of empty majorities, re-
cent U.N. achievements demonstrate that this
organization can still operate in the real
world in the interests of all its members.
Unfortunately, failure and controversy are
threatening to overshadow the record of suc-
cesses. Its lapses are long remembered and
remain a source of lasting grievance for
those who feel wronged.

Before concluding my remarks, I would
like to say a few words, not as the U.S. Rep-
resentative to this organization but as an
American who has believed deeply in the
United Nations since 1945 when, as a young
reporter just returned from the war, I ob-
served the birth of this organization.

I must tell you that recent decisions of
this Assembly and of other U.N. bodies
have deeply affected public opinion in my
country. The American people are deeply
disturbed by decisions to exclude member
states and to restrict their participation in
discussions of matters of vital concern to
them. They are concerned by moves to con-
vert humanitarian and cultural programs
into tools of political reprisal. Neither the
American public nor the American Congress
believes that such actions can be reconciled
with the spirit or letter of the U.N. Charter.
They do not believe that these decisions are
in accord with the purposes for which this
organization was founded. They believe the
United Nations, in its forums, must show
the same understanding, fair play, and re-
sponsibility which its resolutions ask of in-
dividual members.

My country cannot participate effectively
in the United Nations without the support of
the American people and of the American
Congress. For years they have provided that
support generously. But I must tell you

honestly that this support is eroding — in
our Congress and among our people. Some
of the foremo-st American champions of this
organization are deeply distressed at the
trend of recent events.

A majority of our Congress and our people
are still committed to a strong United Na-
tions. They are still committed to achieving
peaceful solutions to the issues which con-
front this organization — in the Middle East,
in South Africa, and elsewhei-e. They are
■still committed to building a more just world
economic order. But the trends and deci-
sions of the past few months are causing
many to reflect and reassess what our role
should be.

I have not come to the General Assembly
today to suggest that the American people
are going to turn away from the United
Nations. I believe that World War II taught
Americans the tragic cost of standing aside
from an organized international effort to
bring international law and justice to bear
on world problems. But, like every nation,
we must from time to time reassess our
priorities, review our commitments, and re-
direct our energies. In the months ahead,
I will do all in my power to persuade my
countrymen that the United Nations can re-
turn to the path the charter has laid out
and that it can continue to serve the in-
terests of all of its members.

If the United Nations ceases to work for
the benefit of all of its members, it will
become increasingly irrelevant. It will fade
into the shadow world of rhetoric, abandon-
ing its important role in the real world of
negotiation and compromise.

We must join to prevent this. The reasons
for which this world organization was
founded remain as valid and as compelling
today as they were in 1945. If anything,
there is added reason: the specters of nu-
clear holocaust, world depression, mass
famine, overpopulation, and a permanently
ravaged environment.

If we are to succeed, we m.ust now renew
our commitment to the central principles of
tolerance and harmony upon which the U.N.
Charter was built. We must redouble our

January 27, 1975

117

efforts to use this organization as the world's
ultimate instrument for compromise and
negotiation. I pledge my nation to these
efforts.

Statement of December 12

USUN press release 196 dated December 12

My delegation will vote in favor of draft
resolution A/L.748. This resolution reflects
the views of the U.S. Government on
strengthening the role of the United Nations.

My delegation also welcomes the initiative
of the Australian delegation contained in its
draft resolution A/L.749 on peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes. We are
pleased to announce my delegation will vote
in favor of this resolution.

I want also to take the occasion to thank
my colleagues who have spoken since this
discussion began last Friday. I do not agree
with everything I have heard, just as others
disagree with some of the points I made.

I am encouraged that the debate has
turned into a constructive dialogue with
much sober reflection. If we can maintain
this willingness to listen carefully to one
another, we can write a record that peoples
everywhere can applaud.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 3282 (XXIX)'

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations
with regard to the maintenance and consolidation
of international peace and security, the develop-
ment of co-operation among all nations and the
promotion of the rules of international law in
relations between States

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2925 (XXVII) of 27
November 1972 and 3073 (XXVIII) of 30 November
1973,

Emphasizing that the active participation of all
Member States in efforts aimed at strengrthening the
United Nations and enhancing its role in contempo-
rary international relations is essential for the
success of those efforts,

Aware that strengthening- of the role of the
United Nations requires continuous improvement in
the functioning and effectiveness of its principal
organs in the exercise of their responsibilities under
the United Nations Charter,

Considering that it is desirable for the General
Assembly to keep constantly under review the over-
all problems connected with the role and the effec-
tiveness of the United Nations and to consider them
periodically with a view to evaluating the progress
achieved and adopting appropriate measures aimed
at strengthening the role of the world Organization
in international life,

1. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolutions
2925 (XXVII) and 3073 (XXVIII) concerning the
strengthening of the role of the United Nations in
contemporary international relations;

2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of
the Secretary-General,- prepared pursuant to resolu-
tion 3073 (XXVIII), containing the views, sugges-
tions and proposals of Member States regarding
the strengthening of the role of the United Nations;

3. Transmits to its thirtieth session for considei'a-
tion, the views, suggestions and proposals of Mem-
ber States contained in the above-mentioned report
and in any communications that may be submitted
in accordance with paragraph 5 below with regard
to improving the functioning and effectiveness of
the General Assembly in the exercise of its respon-
sibilities under the United Nations Charter;

4. Draws the attention of the other principal
organs of the United Nations to the views, sugges-
tions and proposals of Member States contained in
the relevant sections of the report of the Secretary-
General so that they may be taken into consideration
in the process of effectively improving the activities
and functioning' of those organs and invites them
to keep the General Assembly informed on this
subject in such manner as they may consider
appropriate;

5. Requests Member States to give further study
to ways and means of strengthening the role of the
United Nations and enhancing its effectiveness and
to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later
than 30 June 1975, their views, suggestions and
proposals in that regard with a view to supplement-
ing the report prepared on the basis of resolution
3073 (XXVIII);

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of
its thirtieth session the item entitled "Strengthen-
ing of the role of the United Nations with regard
to the maintenance and consolidation of intema-

' Draft resolution A/L.748; adopted by the As-
sembly on Dec. 12 by consensus (text from U.N.
press release GA/5194).

- U.N. doc. A/9695. [Footnote in original.]

118

Department of State Bulletin

tional peace and security, the development of co-
operation among all nations and the promotion of
the rules of international law in relations between
States".

Resolution 3283 (XXIX) "<

Peaceful settlement of international disputes

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Charter of the United Nations
obliges Member States to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered.

Recalling in particular that the Security Council
is charged under the terms of Article 24 of the
Charter with primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security, and
that disputes may be brought to the attention of
the Council for purposes of pacific settlement under
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter,

Recalling also that Article 33 of the Charter
directs that parties to any dispute, the continuation
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of all,
seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peace-
ful means of their own choice.

Recalling further that the International Court
of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations and, as such, is available to Mem-
bers for the settlement of legal disputes, that it
has recently amended its Rules of Court with a view
to simplifying its procedure so as to avoid delays
and simplify hearings, and that it may establish
chambers to hear and determine cases by summary
procedure allowing for the speediest possible settle-
ment of disputes,

Mindful of the existence of other facilities and
machinery available for the settlement of disputes
by mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial
settlement, including the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration at The Hague and established regional
agencies or arrangements,

Reaffirming that recourse to peaceful settlement
of international disputes shall in no way constitute
an unfriendly act between States,

Mindful also of the continuing threat to inter-
national peace and security posed by serious dis-
putes of various kinds and the need for early action

^ Draft resolution A/L.749, as amended; adopted
by the Assembly on Dec. 12 by a recorded vote of
68 (U.S.) to 10, with 35 abstentions (text from U.N.
press release GA/5194).

to resolve such disputes by resort in the first in-
stance to the means recommended in Article 33 of
the Charter,

1. Draws the attention of States to established
machinery under the Charter of the United Nations
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes;

2. Urges Member States not already parties to in-
struments establishing the various facilities and
machinery available for the peaceful settlement of
disputes to consider becoming parties to such instru-
ments and, in the case of the International Court of
Justice, recognizes the desirability that States study
the possibility of accepting, with as few reserva-
tions as possible, the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with Article 36 of the Statute of
the Court;

3. Calls upon Member States to make full use and
seek improved implementation of the means and
methods provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations and elsewhere for the exclusively peaceful
settlement of any dispute or any situation, the con-
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security, includ-
ing negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, good offices including
those of the Secretary-General, or other peaceful
means of their own choice;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare an
up-to-date report concerning the machinery estab-
lished under the Charter relating to the peaceful
.settlement of international disputes, inviting his
attention in particular to the following resolutions
of the General Assembly:

(a) Resolution 268 D (III) of 28 April 1949, in
which the Assembly established the Panel for In-
quiry and Conciliation;

(b) Resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,
section B, in which the Assembly established the
Peace Obser\'ation Commission;

(c) Resolution 1262 (XIII) of 14 November 1958,
in which the Assembly considered the question of
establishing arbitral procedure for settling disputes;

(d) Resolution 2329 (XXII) of 18 December 1967,
in which the Assembly established a United Nations
register of experts for fact-finding;

(e) Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970,
in which the Assembly approved the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning FViendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Invites the attention of the Security Council,
the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations,
the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-
General to the present resolution.

January 27, 1975

119

U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of the U.N. Charter

Statement by Robert Rosenstock •

As the Sixth Committee considers sugges-
tions regarding the review of the U.N. Char-
ter, my delegation is again impressed with
the profound implications of the questions
we are discussing and with the diversity of
those suggestions which have been made.

The charter, as any fundamental govern-
ing document, must have the capacity to al-
low those who adhere to it to deal efficiently
and effectively with the questions they face.
Because of the broad spectrum of interests,
the full range of political diversity, and the
considerable discrepancy in the types of con-
tributions which can be made by the various
members of the United Nations, the charter
must truly be an extraordinary document in
order to provide the basic ground rules with-
in which we all can agree to attempt to solve
our common problems.

The charter has generally proven to be
such an extraordinary document for the past
29 years. For this we all owe a profound ap-
preciation to those who developed its text
during those complex and difficult negotia-
tions in San Francisco. Neither then nor now
have sensible persons believed all the charter
language was perfect and immutable for all
time. We know of no significant governing
document with a long life which is or could
be perfect or immutable.

This is not to suggest that our organiza-
tional problems have been overcome or that
the United Nations has always dealt effec-
tively with the challenges before it. It is to

' Made in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly on Dec. 5 (text from USUN press
release 190). Mr. Rosenstock is Legal Affairs Ad-
viser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

suggest, however, that those problems are
solvable by full and proper use of the ma-
chinery we have, rather than by creating
new machinery. We certainly hope we can
engage in self-criticism without opening the
entire charter to the whims of the moment.
In this we associate ourselves with the views
of the late Krishna Menon which were re-
called this morning.

We are surprised by the comments of some
that the charter has been unchanged since
194.5. Quite apart from the several amend-
ments which have been made to the text and
to which I shall refer later, the charter has,
by the normal process of interpretation and
evolution, gone through very significant mod-
ifications as times and circumstances have
changed, as new members with new views
have joined the United Nations, and as we
have been able through years of experience
to understand better the needs of this central
multinational organization.

The fact that the present charter has al-
lowed such flexibility is clear evidence of the
fundamental value and wisdom of its text.
As general political needs have changed, so
in many cases, have our collective interpre-
tations of charter provisions.

These changes have taken place gradually
and effectively — a con.structive evolution in
which all members have participated. Such
an evolution is, in our view, an invaluable
way in which the charter is maintained as a
living, current document, an avenue of
change vastly preferable to sudden radical
shifts which, by virtue of the extreme di-
versity among the member states, almost in-
evitably would result in loss of the funda-

120

Department of State Bulletin

mental consensus which is the foundation of
the charter. The loss or weakening of that
consensus can only result in diminution of the
effectiveness of the organization and thus the
meaningfulness of any changes which some
might urge.

Evolution has taken place in some of the
most important provisions of the charter.
For example, if in 1945 or 1950 we had as-
serted that the charter granted peoples the
right to self-determination, most members
would have disagreed. If in 1960 we had
made the same assertion, many would have
pointed out that all that existed as a matter
of law was a principle, not a right. Today if
anyone questioned the interpretation that
there exists a charter right to self-determi-
nation, his views would be considered pre-
posterous or, at the least, anachronistic and
wrong.

In 1964 some states asserted that there
was no charter prohibition on inten'cntion
by states in the domestic affairs of other
states. If anyone asserted that view today
we would think him mad or worse.

Can anyone deny that article 2, paragraph
7, means something different from what it
meant before various decisions by the Secu-
rity Council, before the adoption of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and be-
fore the numerous subsequent resolutions
which deal with human rights and various
forms of denial of those rights, such as apart-
heid ?

In 1950 certain delegations attacked Reso-
lution 377A (V) as illegal and contrary to
the charter. In 1967 the state which led the
earlier attack against that resolution relied
upon it in moving to convene an emergency
session of the Assembly.

The Friendly Relations Declaration with
its interpretations of key concepts of the
charter, including the prohibition of the
threat or use of force, nonintervention, equal
rights and self-determination, and peaceful
settlement, is merely one of the more obvious
examples of the process of evolution. The
Friendly Relations Declaration was negoti-
ated and unanimously adopted essentially by
today's membership.

If we proceed pellmell into a review exer-
cise without the reciuisite broad agreement,
we shall encourage states to harden posi-
tions; we shall widen the difference among
us and reduce our own flexibility to compro-
mise. We shall harm the chances for contin-
ued evolutionary change. A review exercise
may well prove the greatest impediment to
change rather than a catalyst for change.

During the past two days we have heard
several delegations for diverse reasons call
for a variety of modifications to the charter.
We have heard delegations state that reluc-
tance to consider or make such modifications
in one specific way — namely, through the
proposed ad hoc committee — would amount
to obstruction of the will of the majority of
states and would demonstrate opposition to
the basic idea of any change in the charter
at all. Because of the importance and the
sensitivity of these questions, I would like
again to express the position of my govern-
ment on these issues.

In the first place we have participated, in
some cases by leading, in the many evolu-
tionary changes that have taken place since
1945. At no time have w^e sought to oppose
this concept of the charter as a living, breath-
ing document which must be made to respond
flexibly to the contemporary needs of the or-
ganization.

In the second place we have been in the
forefront of those who supported the amend-
ments which have been adopted. Nor can
these amendments be lightly passed over. For
example, the expansion of the Security Coun-
cil has breathed new life into the general
consensus principle which has and must un-
derlie the functioning of the Security Coun-
cil. In 1955 no decision could be taken by the
Security Council over the objections of the
East or the West. In the late fifties and early
sixties the membership of the organization
underwent a fundamental change. Today a
majority of the membership of the Council
represents what is frequently called the
Third World. Not only may no decision be
taken without the active support of these
members, but most of the decisions which are
taken in the Council these days are at their

January 27, 1975

121

request and based upon proposals drafted by
one or more of them. The peacekeeping forces
in the Middle East, for example, were cre-
ated largely because the states of India, Ken-
ya, and Yugoslavia took the lead to press the
Council to establish them rather than a U.S.-
Soviet peacekeeping force.

Finally, in addition to supporting evolu-
tionary change and specific amendments to
the charter we have sought to retain an open
mind on the concept of charter review. In
our reply to the Secretary General's request
for the views of states on the question of re-
view,- we expressed a willingness to partici-
pate even in a charter review conference if
it is the general view of the membership that
the outcome of such a conference would be
constructive. I think it fair to say that there
is not such a feeling that an overall review
would solve problems. There is certainly no
broad agreement at this time on what spe-
cific changes might be desirable. There does
seem to be widespread recognition that very
great damage could be done to confidence in
the basic fabric of the United Nations if con-
siderable care is not exercised to insure very
broad support before any type of review of
the charter is undertaken.

It is the view of my delegation that such
broad support can most realistically be
amassed if we approach charter review on a
case-by-case basis. We have amended the
charter successfully in the past by this ap-
proach, enlarging the Security Council and
the Economic and Social Council when the
requisite measure of consensus has been
achieved.

We are dealing, in this field of interna-
tional cooperation, with an activity based es-
sentially not on the ability of some states to
compel action by others but rather, on our
ability to find standards of behavior and
ground rules for cooperation to which we are
all willing to adhere.

We have all freely accepted the charter.
We must obviously take great care to develop
that consensus, particularly for changes so
significant as those to the U.N. Charter, if

= U.N. doc. A/8746/ Add. 1, p. 13.

we intend to maintain it as a realistic instru-
ment by which all member states will be
guided. This may be a cautious approach, but
it emphatically is not a negative approach.
We have amended the charter in the past;
we can, and presumably will, amend the char-
ter in the future.

Although we and others have not and pre-
sumably will not always agree with every
suggestion made for amendment of the char-
ter, we have recognized and we do recognize
the usefulness of giving serious and thorough
consideration to any specific proposal when
it appears to be a constructive effort to im-
prove our ability to deal with the problems
we face and when it will preserve the deli-
cate balance which we have developed to al-
low so many nations so different from each
other to work together. There may well be
variations in the formula under which that
balance can be maintained. If there is broad
and serious support for a specific proposal
for change, it should at the least be fully con-
sidered.

It would, however, do neither member
states nor the organization itself any service
to proceed with any specific amendments
without being confident at least of basic
agreement among the member states on a
given amendment, much less to undertake a
general review. The risk is too great both of
poisoning the cooperative atmosphere which
is essential for our work and of polarizing
this highly diversified body without construc-
tive gain. We are well aware of the protec-
tion afforded us by article 108; our fears are
for the very foundations of the United Na-
tions.

In our view the establishment of the pro-
posed ad hoc committee would almost inevi-
tably result in a general, wide-ranging re-
view of the charter. Even among the few
replies received from states and among the
fewer still which urge change, there is a very
broad range of suggestions for modification
of the charter, many of them mutually ex-
clusive. For these reasons we strongly oppose
the draft resolution contained in A/C.6/L.
1002. We are prepared to vote in favor of
the draft contained in A/C.6/L.1001 or any

122

Department of State Bulletin

ether text which commands sufficiently broad
support and which does not endanger the
foundations of our institution.

We, like ethers, were moved by General
Romulo's speech [Carlos Romulo, Philippine
Secretary of Foreign Affairs]. While we do
not believe that there is now sufficient agree-
ment to make it useful to undertake a proc-
ess of review and revision, the time may well
come when a basis for agreement will exist.
General Romulo continues his very great
service to the international community by re-
minding us from time to time to examine
whether the requisite widespread agreement
exists.

In order to strike a balance between our
important common interests in insuring that
the charter is kept responsive to a changing
world and in insuring that there is essen-
tially overwhelming agreement to any
changes in our basic ground rules, the
United States believes that an appropriate
step for this committee to recommend might
be to request the Secretary General to under-
take a detailed assessment of which of the
suggestions for charter amendments so far
received have broad support among the U.N.
members and which of the goals behind such
suggestions might be accomplished without
charter revision. Member states which have
net yet done so should be invited to submit
their views on this subject.

Although it is commonly understood that
the percentage of states which reply to re-
quests for their views on particular issues is
usually not high, we are not dealing here
with an ordinary matter. We are dealing
here with the most basic and fundamental
rules of international cooperation. It has
been suggested that a reason for charter re-
view is that only 51 of the present 138 mem-
bers of the United Nations were present at
San Francisco. Surely it is of even greater
significance that only 38 of the present 138
member states have so far submitted their
views on suggestions regarding charter re-
view. This is not an ordinary questionnaire ;

we owe it to ourselves not to settle for such
a small number of responses before under-
taking a review exercise.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as we have
repeatedly stated, the United States is fully
prepared to maintain an open mind regard-
ing modifications to the charter which are
broadly supported. It is as much in our in-
terest as that of any other state to insure
that the charter is a viable, up-to-date, and
respected document. We must not be afraid
to consider appropriate modifications to that
document; yet we must not confuse dissatis-
faction with policies of states with inade-
quacy of the charter. If there is broad desire
to consider a particular amendment, let us
in an appropriate forum undertake such a
consideration as we have in the past.

Let us first, however, take care first to de-
termine that support. At the least, an assess-
ment by the Secretary General of the states'
views he has received and a concentrated ef-
fort to obtain the comments of the vast ma-
jority of member states should precede any
such specific deliberations, much less the es-
tablishment of an ad hoc committee. We shall
vote in favor of L.lOOl ; we shall vote against
L.1002 if it is put to a vote. The resolution
contained in L.lOOl also commends itself to
my delegation — not because it perfectly ex-
presses our view but because we would hope
it is a middle ground toward which the over-
whelming majority could move.-'

Let us, above all, do nothing to erode the
foundations of the only international insti-
tution concerned with peace and security
which through its flexible adaptability to the
contemporary needs of the world community
has stood the test of over a quarter of a cen-
tury.

'Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1002, establishing an
Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Na-
tions, was adopted by the committee on Dec. 9 by a
roUcall vote of 77 to 20 (U.S.), with .32 abstentions,
and by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by a recorded vote
of 82 to 15 (U.S.), with 36 abstentions (A/RES/
3349 (XXIX)). Draft resolutions A/C.2/L.1001 and
A/C.2/L.1011 were not put to the vote.

January 27, 1975

123

U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals of World Population Plan of Action

Folloiving are texts of a statement made
in Committee II (Economic and Financial)
of the U.N. General Assembly on December
2 by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the General Assembly, and a
statement ynade in plenary session of the As-
sembly on December 17 by U.S. Representa-
tive Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., together
with the text of a resolution adopted by the
committee on December 5 and by the Assem-
bly on December 17.

U.S. STATEMENTS

Senator Percy, Commiffee II, December 2

USUN press release 185 dated December 2

I am pleased to have the opportunity to
express the views of the U.S. delegation on
the report of the World Population Confer-
ence.'

The conference was convened in an at-
tempt to focus the attention of the interna-
tional community on one of the most com-
plex problems of our time: spiraling global
population growth. The difficulty in dealing
with population problems lies in the fact
that population questions are entirely inter-
related with virtually every other problem
that currently confronts people and nations.
They cannot be dealt with in isolation. They
must be considered within the context of
other social and economic issues — health
care, education, racial and sexual equality,
housing, agriculture, nutrition, old age se-
curity, religious and moral values, economic
development, and others.

The United States believes that the World
Population Conference achieved real success
and that its success is a direct result of the

'U.N. doc. 5585; for U.S. statements at the World
Population Conference at Bucharest Aug. 19-30 and
an unofficial text of the World Population Plan of
Action, see Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1974, p. 429.

consideration of population in its social and
economic context. The World Population
Conference attained a most significant goal:
It brought to the attention of all nations the
concept that population is an integral as-
pect of the quality of life of all people.

Certainly the consensus of participating
nations on the World Population Plan of Ac-
tion was the major triumph of the confer-
ence, and the United States is extremely
hopeful that the plan will be accepted by this
committee and subsequently by the General
Assembly because of what we believe are the
plan's many very positive and helpful rec-
ommendations and resolutions. The United
States believes that the plan of action con-
tains provisions which will have immeasur-
ably beneficial consequences for people ev-
erywhere for generations to come.

Although the United States does not in-
tend to comment on each of the provisions
of the plan of action, we do wish to high-
light a few items which we feel are of spe-
cial significance.

The pronouncement within the plan of ac-
tion which the United States views as the
foundation for all the others is the afl^rma-
tion of the basic human right of individuals
"to decide freely and responsibly the number
and spacing of their children and to have the
information, education and means to do so."
The United States strives to assure this ba-
sic right in our own country, and we welcome
its acceptance by the world community.

Although the plan of action does not make
outright recommendations of target dates
for specific population goals, the concept of
quantitative goals is included. The United
States believes that the mention of quantita-
tive goals to reduce mortality, increase life
expectancy, and reduce fertility and rates of
population growth will give those countries
choosing to do so helpful targets at which to
aim. The United States particularly wel-

124

Department of State Bulletin

comes the concurrence of nations of all levels
of development and all points of view on the
inclusion of these possible goals in the World
Population Plan of Action.

While in Bucharest I stated my hope that
the conference would take a clear and strong
stand on the future role of women in devel-
oped as well as developing nations. Perhaps
the most unexpected positive development of
the World Population Conference and one
that the United States considers to be an
outstanding accomplishment was the rela-
tively easily reached agreement among na-
tions that additional emphasis on the role of
women in population policies and in eco-
nomic and social development should be in-
cluded in the plan of action. Thus one of the
plan's objectives became:

To promote the status of women and expansion of
their roles, the full participation of women in the
formulation and implementation of socio-economic
policy including population policies, and the creation
of awareness among all women of their current and
potential roles in national life.

A number of specific recommendations in
the areas of education, planning and devel-
opment, legislation, and family life are made
that would allow countries to achieve this
objective. The United States strongly sup-
ports those recommendations.

These provisions in the World Population
Plan of Action are based on the recognition
by all governments that an improved status
for women will yield progress not only for
individual women but for their societies as
well. Development and implementation of
population policies can most particularly
benefit from expanded participation by
women. The United States is making strong
efforts to improve the status of women in
our own country and welcomes this goal as
part of the plan of action.

The report of the World Population Con-
ference and the plan of action reflect that
the nations of the world are in agreement on
a very important point: Population policies
and goals cannot be achieved without accom-
panying economic and social development.

One of the major contributions of the de-
bate at Bucharest was to focus attention on
the reciprocal relationship — the interface be-

tween population factors and development.

The United States believes that the under-
lying reasons for countries requesting assist-
ance for their population or family planning
programs is that such programs form a part
— and only a part, but an essential part — of
overall economic and social development ef-
forts. The guidance of Bucharest is that any
country wishing to succeed in either will be
wise to press both. Many countries have
found that despite their development efforts,
population growth has caused their per cap-
ita standard of living to stand still or even
recede. They have in effect been running
hard to stand still or have even lost ground.
The balance of attention to each program will
of course vary according to the situation of
the individual country and according to its
own sovereign determination.

One of the major innovations of the World
Population Plan of Action was its recom-
mendation (Par. 31) that countries wishing
to affect levels of fertility should give prior-
ity to those factors of development that have
a greater impact on fertility than others.
This recommendation was based on much re-
cent evidence and thinking that some fac-
tors of development do have this effect. They
are listed in paragraph 32. We agree with
this concept and with the call of paragraph
31 for priority in international coopei'ation
for carrying out such strategies.

The United States is sensitive to the con-
tinuing large gap between the developed and
developing nations with regard to levels of
economic development. Because the United
States recognizes the relationship between
population growth rates and economic devel-
opment, we affirm the inclusion in the World
Population Plan of Action of emphasis on ef-
ficient use of resources. The plan states:

It is imperative that all countries, and within them
all social sectors, should adapt themselves to more
rational utilization of natural resources, without ex-
cess, so that some are not deprived of what others
waste.

We further affirm that the United States
will continue to seek to reduce wasteful con-
sumption of resources in our own country
and will encourage other nations to do the
same.

January 27, 1975

125

At Bucharest we regretted the lack of at-
tention given to the role of population growth
on present availability of food for the peo-
ples of the developing countries — although
the Deputy Director General of the Food and
Agriculture Organization in his address
there warned in the most somber terms:

First, that action must be initiated now to reduce
the rate of population growth if we are to have any
chance at all of meeting the world's food needs 25
years from now.

Second, while family planning and population pol-
icy are matters for individuals and governments,
there is at the same time a clear need for interna-
tional action.

The documents prepared by FAO authori-
ties for the Rome Conference [World Food
Conference, November 5-16] recognize
clearly that the main reason for the growing
imbalance between the food supply and de-
mand is the rate of population growth, which
in the developing countries is twice as fast
as in the developed world. They call on all
countries to recognize urgently the gravity
of the challenge to feed growing populations
and to formulate and implement policies for
population growth control.

It was with these thoughts in mind that
the Rome Conference adopted a special reso-
lution calling on governments and people
everywhere to support sound population pol-
icies relevant to national needs within a
strategy of development which would assure
the right of all couples to decide the spacing
and size of their own families.

The conclusion is inescapable that the ef-
forts already being made by many countries
to reduce population growth rates must suc-
ceed— and more rapidly than at present. At
the same time, it is both fair and essen-
tial that developed countries reduce their
population growth and their consumption of
foods produced by wasteful means in order
that more can be available for those in grave
need.

Mr. Chairman, the word "population" de-
rives from the Latin word "populus" for
"people." The United States reaffirms the
report of the World Population Conference
and supports the provisions of the World
Population Plan of Action, for we believe

that they truly seek to improve the quality
of life of the earth's people. We will con-
tinue to support and cooperate in those ef-
forts of the international community that
approach that same goal. In this spirit, my
delegation is pleased to be a cosponsor of
draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.l.-

Ambassador Ferguson, Plenary, December 17

My delegation, with deep regret, abstained
on draft resolution VI, ' this despite the fact
that, as is well known, my delegation and my
government have been committed to the study
of world population questions for some time.

We regret it very much, but the presence
of a single paragraph, paragraph 5, in the
draft resolution, which reads:

Stresses that the implementation of the World
Population Plan of Action should take full account
of the Programme of Action on the Establishment
of the New International Economic Order, and thus
contribute to its implementation ;

is the sole reason my delegation abstained.
We object to the substance of the paragraph,
and I must state on behalf of my delegation
that we also very much regret the manner
in which, procedurally, that paragraph was
negotiated.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION^

The Geyieral Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2211 (XXI) of 17 Decem-
ber 1966 on population growth and economic devel-
opment following the World Population Conference
in 1965 and Economic and Social Council resolution
1484 (XLVIII) of 3 April 1970 calling for a World
Population Conference which would be the first held
at the intergovernmental level.

Recalling further that the Economic and Social
Council in resolution 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974,

= Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.2, as amend-
ed, was adopted by the committee on Dec. 5 by a
vote of 108 to 0, with 2 abstentions (U.S., Niger).

' Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.2, as amend-
ed, was recommended to the Assembly as draft reso-
lution VI in part II of the Committee II report (U.N.
doc. A/9886/ Add.l) on agenda item 12, "Report of
the Economic and Social Council."

*A/RES/3344 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly
on Dec. 17 by a vote of 131 to 0, with 1 abstention
(U.S.) (text from U.N. press release GA/5194).

126

Department of State Bulletin

considered that the results of the Conference would
constitute an important contribution to the prepara-
tions for the special session of the General Assembly-
devoted to development and international economic
co-operation,

Recalling further the decision adopted by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, at its resumed fifty-sev-
enth session on 19 November 1974, on the report of
the World Population Conference,

Recalling further its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and
3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 containing the Declara-
tion and the Programme of Action on the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order,

Greatly concerned with the gap between developed
and developing countries and with the inequities and
injustices still existing in international economic re-
lations.

Stressing that the formulation and implementa-
tion of population policies are the sovereign right of
each nation, and that such a right is to be exercised
in accordance with national objectives and needs and
without external interference, taking into account
universal solidarity in order to improve the quality
of life of the peoples of the world.

Recognizing that population and development are
interrelated and that, consequently, the basis for an
effective solution of population problems is, above
all, socio-economic transformation and development.

Further recognizing that the consideration of pop-
ulation problems cannot be reduced to the analysis
of population trends exclusively.

Believing that, in the formulation of population
policies, consideration must be given, together with
other economic and social factors, to the supplies and
characteristics of natural resources, the quality of
the environment, and particularly, to all aspects of
food supply, and that attention must be given to the
just distribution of resources and minimization of
wasteful aspects of their use throughout the world.

Having considered the report, resolutions, recom-
mendations and the World Population Plan of Ac-
tion adopted by the World Population Conference,
held at Bucharest from 19 to 30 August 1974,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of
the World Population Conference, including the reso-
lutions and recommendations of the Conference and
the World Population Plan of Action;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Government
of Romania for its co-operation and gracious hospi-
tality;

3. Commends the Secretary-General and the Sec-
retary-General of the World Population Conference
for the successful organization of the Conference;

4. Affirms that the World Population Plan of Ac-
tion is an instrument of the international community
for the promotion of economic development, quality
of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms
within the broader context of the internationally
adopted strategies for national and international
progress ;

5. Stresses that the implementation of the World
Population Plan of Action should take full account
of the Programme of Action on the Establishment
of the New International Economic Order, and thus
contribute to its implementation;

6. Invites Governments to consider the recommen-
dations for action at the national level and to imple-
ment population policies and programmes which
they determine are appropriate;

7. Calls upon the Population Commission and the
governing bodies of the United Nations Development
Programme, the United Nations Fund for Population
Activities, the regional economic commissions, the
specialized agencies and all other United Nations
bodies which report to the Economic and Social
Council to determine how each can best assist in the
implementation of the World Population Plan of Ac-
tion and on adjustments which may be necessary in
their work programmes and to report thereon to the
Economic and Social Council;

8. Requests the Economic and Social Council,
within the in-depth consideration of the report of the
World Population Conference at its fifty-eighth ses-
sion, to pay particular attention to the implementa-
tion of the World Population Plan of Action, includ-
ing the functions of the monitoring and review and
appraisal of the Plan also at the regional level;

9. Invites the Economic and Social Council to con-
tinue to provide over-all policy guidance within the
United Nations system on population-related matters
and to this end to consider these issues on a regular
basis, in a manner to be determined by it;

10. Requests the Population Commission at its
eighteenth session, within its competence, to report
to the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth
session on the implications of the World Population
Conference, including the implications for the Pop-
ulation Commission itself;

11. Requests the Economic and Social Council at
its fifty-eighth session to forward its views and rec-
ommendations through the Preparatory Committee
to the seventh special session and the thirtieth reg-
ular session of the General Assembly;

12. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the
Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth ses-
sion on ways and means of strengthening the over-
all capacity of the relevant units of the Secretariat,
within the existing framework to meet the need for
a broad approach in the population field, consonant
with the principles and the objectives of the World
Population Plan of Action;

13. Urges that assistance to developing countries
should be increased in accordance with the goals of
the Second United Nations Development Decade and
that international assistance in the population field
should be expanded, particularly to the United Na-
tions Fund for Population Activities, for the proper
implementation of the World Population Plan of Ac-
tion.

January 27, 1975

127

United States Calls for Renewal
of World Commitment to UNRWA

FoUoiving is a statement made in the
Special Political Committee of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly on December 5 by U.S. Rep-
resentative William E. Schaufele, Jr.

USUN press release 188 dated December 5

The United States has expressed each year
in this forum its admiration and apprecia-
tion for the dedicated and skillful work of the
Commissioner General of UNRWA [United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near East] and his
associates in the face of difficult circum-
stances. More than any time in UNRWA's
history, the last 12 months have presented
even greater challenges and have demanded
even higher qualities of leadership and dedi-
cation. War and its aftermath, the uncertain-
ties of the ensuing search for peace, the
internationalization of inflation, and short-
ages of key commodities — all of these have
presented the Commissioner General and his
colleagues with increasingly complicated and
interrelated financial and administrative
problems.

These problems are not abstract issues in
management and financing. They are prob-
lems of people — because the money which
must be found and eff'ectively disbursed is
the indispensable means to continue educa-
tion programs, to provide or to improve hous-
ing, and to assure necessary health services ;
in short, to preserve for the promising if un-
certain future even the limited material se-
curity and the cautious hope which UNRWA
in the past has been able to bring to those
it serves.

In the year ahead, UNRWA faces a finan-
cial crisis of unprecedented seriousness.
Other speakers here have called for recogni-
tion of this crisis and for action to avert it.
We share their apprehension. We intend to
do our part, and we strongly urge others to
do the same.' This is not an easy time for
most nations to increase financial commit-
ments of any kind. Many of us have difficulty

enough simply to maintain the present level
of financial outlays in both our national and
international activities. Nevertheless, in view
of drastic redistributions of the world's
wealth in recent months, other governments
with vastly increased resources can appro-
priately do more than they felt able to do in
the past. I strongly urge them to do so.

Our basic humanitarian standards, and the
principles of international life to which we
are committed by the U.N. Charter, demand
that we respond fully to this human require-
ment to which the work of UNRWA is di-
rected. Just as those standards and those
principles were initially proclaimed and
accepted voluntarily by each nation member
of the United Nations, so it is right and
proper that the response to them represented
by UNRWA's program should be a volun-
tary one.

It is in this spirit that we introduce this
resolution today. It acknowledges the contin-
uing importance and justice of the human-
itarian demands which UNRWA and the
condition of the Palestinian refugees make
on all, on every member of the international
community. Finally, it renews UNRWA's
tenure for another three years, a period in
which we hope that its task will at last be
fully accomplished.

Taking all these elements into account
this resolution represents a firm call for the
renewal and reaffirmation of the commitment
of each nation represented here to insure
that UNRWA will in fact be able to carry
out its work. The commitment is clear. It
obligates each of us, individually and collec-
tively, to act to fulfill it.-

' On Dec. 3 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee
of the General Assembly for the Announcement of
Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations Re-
lief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East, Ambassador Schaufele announced
the U.S. pledge of $24,940,000 to UNRWA for calen-
dar year 1975. For his statement in the ad hoc com-
mittee, see USUN press release 186 dated Dec. 3.

'The U.S. draft resolution (A/SPC/L.317) was
adopted by the committee on Dec. 6 by a vote of 106
to 0, with 2 abstentions, and by the Assembly on
Dec. 17 by a vote of 122 to 0, with 3 abstentions
(A/RES/3331A (XXIX)).

128

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements
on Pacific Fisheries

Pr-ess release 538 dated December 18

Representatives of the United States and
Japan reached agreement on December 13
on two fishery agreements dealing primarily
with fishing in the northeastern Pacific and
the Bering Sea following discussions held
in Tokyo November 15-December 13. Thomas
A. Clingan, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans and International En-
vironmental and Scientific Affairs, initialed
for the United States, and Hiromu Fukada,
Deputy Director General, American Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initialed
for Japan.

The new agreements do not change the
stipulation in previous agreements, first
signed in 1967, that Japan will refrain from
fishing within the nine-mile contiguous fish-
ery zone of the United States, except in cer-
tain selected areas, primarily in the Aleutian
Islands.

In order to preserve the fish resources of
the northern Pacific, the first new agreement
establishes new and better balances between
fishing and the condition and size of fishery
resources in the northeastern Pacific and
eastern Bering Sea. The principal features
of this new agreement include :

1. In order to protect declining pollock re-
sources, the Japanese pollock catch in the
eastern Bering Sea will be reduced to 1.1
million metric tons from the over 1.5 million
metric tons of pollock Japan caught in 1973.

2. For conservation purposes, controls will
also be placed on the harvest of other fin-
fishes, such as Pacific Ocean perch, in both
the Bering Sea and the northeastern Pacific
Ocean in areas of special concern to the U.S.
fisheries. These controls are being imple-

mented by means of catch limitations and
area and time closures.

3. The agreement stipulates that Japan
may fish within the contiguous zone of the
United States and conduct loading and trans-
fer operations in certain specified areas. In
return, Japan has agreed to refrain from
fishing in certain areas of the high seas dur-
ing prescribed periods in order to avoid con-
flicts with American fishermen arising out
of differences in types of fishing gear.

4. Japan has also agreed to adopt pro-
cedures and measures to reduce and control
incidental catches of king and tanner crabs
in their trawl fisheries. As one means of
achieving this objective, Japanese fishermen
will equip their trawl gear with bobbins
during months when crabs are concentrated
to reduce incidental crab catches.

The second agreement involves fishing for
king and tanner crabs in the eastern Bering
Sea. These fisheries are important to both
the United States and Japan. Under the
new agreement, Japan's king crab quota is
reduced by nearly 60 percent, from 700,000
to 300,000 crabs (953 metric tons). Japan's
tanner crab quota (14 million in 1974) is
reduced by a smaller percentage, but that
portion of their total quota which can be
taken in the traditional grounds, which are
also fished by U.S. fishermen, was reduced by
a substantial amount (about 70-80 percent).

As a result of the new arrangements, the
United States will become the principal
harvester of crab resources in the traditional
grounds in the southeastern Bering Sea. It
should be noted that the United States claims
that both the king and tanner crabs are
"creatures of the U.S. continental shelf" and
that we have complete jurisdiction over these
resources.

The two countries also emphasized the
need to take all possible measures to refrain
from polluting the seas and to avoid dumping
undesirable products in the water. Both
governments also agreed to inform each other
of lost fishing gear which may create danger
to navigation.

January 27, 1975

129

The new arrangements provide for en-
forcement measures more stringent than ever
implemented before, with both governments
agreeing to cooperate fully in their enforce-
ment efforts. In this connection, U.S. ob-
servers will be provided the opportunity to
observe the conduct of enforcement and to
work closely with their counterparts from
Japan.

The U.S. delegation also included Robert
Schoning, Director, National Marine Fish-
eries Service, National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, Department of Com-
merce, and fishing industry representatives
from Alaska and the Pacific Northwest, as
well as experts from the concerned Federal
and state government agencies.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873,
5284, 7668.

Acceptance deposited: Mauritius, December 31,
1974.

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: The Gambia, December 27,
1974.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22,
1928, as amended (TIAS 6548, 6549), relating to
international expositions, with appendix and an-
nex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.^
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, November
25, 1974.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En-
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Grenada, December 4, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regu-
lating the distribution of narcotic drugs, with pro-
tocol of signature, as amended by the protocol

signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946 (TIAS
1671, 1859). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered
into force July 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1543.
Xotification of succession : Lesotho, November 4,

1974.
Protocol bringing under international control drugs
outside the scope of the convention of July 13,
1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543),
as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Suc-
cess on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859).
Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into
force December 1, 1949; for the United States
September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4,

1974.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. En-
tered into force September 1, 1974."
Notification of approval: Jamaica, October 4,
1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pro-
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into
force September 1, 1974.-

Notification of approval: Jamaica, October 4,
1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid con-
vention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974,
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974,
with respect to other provisions.
Proclaimed bii the Presidc7it : December 31, 1974.

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TLA.S 7144). Done at Washington
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974,
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974,
with respect to other provisions.
Proclaimed by the President : December 31, 1974.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement
of May 9, 1972, as extended (TIAS 7603, 7770,
7862), concerning shrimp. Eff"ected by exchange of
notes at Brasilia December 30 and 31, 1974. En-
tered into force December 31, 1974.

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of May 18 and
June 28 and 29, 1965, as amended and extended
(TIAS 5826, 6646, 7102), relating to a seismic re-
search program known as VELA UNIFORM. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Ottawa August 14
and December 19, 1974. Entered into force De-
cember 19, 1974; effective July 1, 1974.

' Not in force.

- Not in force for the United States.

130

Department of State Bulletin

Japan

Convention for the protection of migratory birds and
birds in danger of extinction, and their environ-
ment, with annex. Signed at Tokyo March 4, 1972.
Entered into force September 19, 1974.
Proclaimed by the President: December 31, 1974.

Agreement relating to salmon fishing in waters con-
tiguous to the United States territorial sea, with
agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington December 20, 1972. Entered into force
December 20, 1972. TIAS 7528.
Terminated : December 24, 1974.

Agreement concerning salmon fishing in waters con-
tiguous to the territorial sea of the United States,
with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. Entered into
force December 24, 1974.

Agreement regarding the king and tanner crab fish-
eries in the eastern Bering Sea, with appendix,
agreed minutes, and Japanese note. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington December 20,
1972. Entered into force December 20, 1972. TIAS
7527.
Terminated : January 1, 1975.

Agreement concerning king and tanner crab fisher-
ies in the eastern Bering Sea, with appendix,
agreed minutes, and related notes. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. En-
tered into force December 24, 1974; effective Jan-
uary 1, 1975.

Agreement concerning certain fisheries off the coast
of the United States, with related note and agreed
minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo
December 24, 1974. Entered into force December
24, 1974; effective January 1, 1975.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul De-
cember 7, 1974. Entered into force December 7,
1974.

Malaysia

-Agreement amending and extending the agreement
of September 8, 1970, as amended, relating to
trade in wool and man-made fiber textile products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur
December 23 and 27, 1974. Entered into force
December 27, 1974.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement
of September 8, 1970, relating to trade in cotton
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala
Lumpur December 23 and 27, 1974. Entered into
force December 27, 1974.

Mexico

Agreement relating to a training program for Mexi-
can helicopter pilots and mechanics as part of U.S.-
Mexican cooperative efforts to reduce traffic in il-
legal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico September 30, 1974. Entered into force Sep-
tember 30, 1974.

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance
to Mexico in narcotics enforcement training ac-
tivities. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico

December 4, 1974. Entered into force December 4,
1974.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 24, 1974
(TIAS 7907) providing additional helicopters and
related assistance to Mexico in support of its ef-
forts to curb production and traffic in illegal nar-
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico
December 4, 1974. Entered into force December 4,
1974.

Agreement relating to cooperative arrangements to
support Mexican efl'orts to curb the illegal traffic
in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico December 11, 1974. Entered into force De-
cember 11, 1974.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the following: agreement of
June 21, 1973, on certain fishery problems on the
high seas in the western areas of the middle At-
lantic Ocean (TIAS 7664); and agreements of
February 21, 1973, (1) on certain fisheries prob-
lems in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean
off the coast of the United States of America
(TIAS 7573), (2) relating to fishing operations in
the northeastern Pacific Ocean (TIAS 7572), and
(3) relating to fishing for king and tanner crab
(TIAS 7571). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington December 31, 1974. Entered into force
December 31, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on
Far East and Australasia Released

Press release 541 dated December 23

The Department of State released on December 30
volume VI in the series "Foreign Relations of the
United States" for the year 1948. This volume is
entitled "The Far East and Australasia."

Two volumes on China for the year 1948 (volumes
VII and VIII) were released in August and Decem-
ber 1973, so that the publication of volume VI com-
pletes the issuance in the series of material on the
Far East for 1948.

This volume of 1,379 pages contains previously un-
published documentation showing U.S. policy on
many important topics including nationalist opposi-
tion to restoration of French rule in Indochina and
Netherlands rule in the East Indies (Indonesia), as
well as lengthy sections on occupation and control of
Japan and events leading to the establishment of the
Republic of Korea.

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office,

January 27, 1975

131

Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VI (De-
partment of State publication 8681; GPO cat. no.
S l.l:948/v. VI) may be obtained for $14.40 (domes-
tic postpaid). Check.s or money orders should be
made out to the Superintendent of Documents and
should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store,
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Snperintevdent of Docnmevts, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or
more copies of any one publication mailed to the same
address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent
of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown
below, tvhich include domestic postage, are subject
to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur-
rently in stock— at least 140— $21.80; 1-year sub-
scription service for appro.ximately 77 updated or
new Notes— $2.3.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single
copies of those listed below are available at 30(' each.

Austria

Bolivia

China, People's Republic of

Cuba ....

Ireland . .

Malta . . .

Mauritius . .

Qatar . . .

South Viet-Nam

Yemen, People's Democratic
Republic of

Cat. No. S1.123:AU 7
Pub. 7955 6 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:B 63
Pub. 8032 7 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:C 44
Pub. 7751 11 pp.
Cat. No. S1.123:C 89
Pub. 8347 8 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:IR 2
Pub. 7974 5 pp.
Cat.No. S1.123:M29/6
Pub. 8220 4 pp.
Cat. No. S1.123:M 44
Pub. 8023 5 pp.
Cat. No. S1.123:Q 1
Pub. 7906 4 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:V 67
Pub. 7933 11 pp.
Cat. No. S1.123:508Y/
Pub. 8170 5 pp.

An Action Program for World Investment. Re-
marks by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic and Business Affairs, at the
National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Busi-
ness Executives held at the Department of State
in Washington, D.C, September 5 and 6, 1974. Pub.
8780. General Foreign Policy Series 289. 14 pp. 35''-.
(Cat. No. 81.71:289).

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the I'nited States-Spain Cooperation Agree-
ment. Agreement with Spain and the International
.\tomic Energy .\gency amending the agreement of
December 9, 1966. TIAS 7856. 5 pp. 25<'-. (Cat. No.
89.10:7856).

Safeguarding of Classified Information. Agreement
with Iran. TIAS 7857. 5 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7857).

Defense — Relinquishment of Certain Land at Camp
Wallace. Agreement with the Philippines. TI.AS
7858. 2 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. S9.10:7858).

Suez Canal — Salvage or Removal of Navigational
Hazards. Arrangement with Egvpt. TIAS 7859. 4 pp.
25r-. (Cat. No. S9.10:7859).

.Agricultural Commodities. .Agreement with Guinea
amending the agreement of May 8, 1974, as amended.
TIAS 7860. 3 pp. 25--. (Cat. No. S9. 10:7860).

Pollution — Contingency Plans for Spills of Oil and
Other Noxious Substances. .Agreement with Canada.
TIAS 7861. 4 pp. 25r. (Cat. No. 89.10:7861).

Fisheries — Shrimp. Agreement with Brazil extend-
ing the agreement of May 9, 1972, as extended. TIAS
7862. 2 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. 89.10:7862).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on December 13 confirmed the fol-
lowing nominations:

Richard B. Parker to be .Ambassador to the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of .Algeria.

Dixy Lee Ray to be an Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs.

Leonard F. Walentynowicz to be Administrator,
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

The Senate on December 19 confirmed the follow-
ing nominations:

Monroe Leigh to be Legal Adviser of the Depart-
ment of State.

Michael A. Samuels to be .Ambassador to Sierra
Leone.

William Saxbe to be Ambassador to India.

Thomas J. Scotes to be Ambassador to the Yemen
Arab Republic.

132

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX January 27, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1857

Algeria. Parker confirmed as Ambassador . 132

Aviation. Department Welcomes TWA-Swiss-

air Agreement on Airline Capacity . . . 113

Congress

Confirmations (Leigh, Parker, Ray, Samuels,

Saxbe, Scotes, Walentynowicz) 132

Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 Signed Into

Law (Ford) 106

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Leigh, Parker, Ray, Samuels, Saxbe,
Scotes, Walentynowicz) 132

Economic Affairs

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business

Week Magazine 97

U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on Pacific
Fisheries 129

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Business Week Magazine 97

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Business Week Magazine 97

Foreign Aid. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974

Signed Into Law (Ford) 106

India. Saxbe confirmed as Ambassador . . . 132

Japan. U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on

Pacific Fisheries 129

Middle East

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business

Week Magazine 97

United States Calls for Renewal of World

Commitment to UNRWA (Schaufele) . . 128

Narcotics Control. International Narcotics
Control: A High-Priority Program (Vance) 108

Population. U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals
of World Population Plan of Action (Fer-
guson, Percy, text of resolution) .... 124

Presidential Documents. Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974 Signed Into Law 106

Publications

GPO Sales Publications 132

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Far
East, Australasia Released 131

Refugees. United States Calls for Renewal of
World Commitment to UNRWA (Schau-
fele) 128

.Sierra Leone. Samuels confirmed as Ambas-
sador 132

Switzerland. Department Welcomes TWA-

Swissair Agreement on Airline Capacity . 113

Treaty Information

Current Actions 130

U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on Pacific

Fisheries 129

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Business Week Magazine 97

United Nations

United States Calls for Renewal of World

Commitment to UNRWA (Schaufele) . . 128

U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of

the U.N. Charter (Rosenstock) 120

U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals of World
Population Plan of Action (Fei-guson,
Percy, text of resolution) 124

U.S. Warns That Present Voting Trends May
Overshadow Positive Achievements of the
United Nations (Scali, texts of resolutions) 114

Yemen Arab Republic. Scotes confirmed as
Ambassador 132

Name Index

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 124

Ford, President 106

Kissinger, Secretary 97

Leigh, Monroe 132

Parker, Richard B 132

Percy, Charles H 124

Ray, Dixy Lee 132

Rosenstock, Robert 120

Samuels, Michael -A. 132

Saxbe, William 132

Scali, John 114

Schaufele, William E., Jr 128

Scotes, Thomas J 132

Vance, Sheldon B 108

Walentynowicz, Leonard F 132

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 6—12

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to January 6 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 538
of December 18, 541 and 543 of December 23,
and 2 of January 2.

No. Date Subject

*5 1/6 Study Group 1 of the U.S. National
Committee for the CCITT, Feb.
13.

*6 1/7 Study Group 8 of the U.S. National
Committee for the CCIR, Feb.
13.

*7 1/7 Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S.
National Committee for the
CCIR, Feb. 6.

*8 1/8 Laise appointed Director General
of the Foreign Service.

*9 1/8 Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee of the CCITT,
Feb. 6.

*10 1/10 Soviet journalists visit U.S., Jan.
10-24.

til 1/10 Kissinger, Sultan of Oman: ex-
change of toasts, Jan. 9.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 2040z

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'.3:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1858

February 3, 1975

THE STATE OF THE UNION
Excerpts From President Ford's Address Before the Congress 133

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 14 139

U.S. VOTES AGAINST CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS

AND DUTIES OF STATES
Statement by Senator Percy and Text of U.N. Resolution H.6

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPROVES DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION
U.S. Statements and Text of Resolution 155

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B [J L L E T I

i\

Vol. LXXII, No. 1858
February 3, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau ott
Public Affairs, provides the public ani
interested agencies of the government,
with information on developments iri
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
t/ie Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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included concerning treaties and inter-
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Publications of the Department of
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The State of the Union

Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpts)

Economic disruptions we and others are
experiencing stem in part from the fact that
the world price of petroleum has quadrupled
in the last year.

But in all honesty, we cannot put all of
the blame on the oil-exporting nations. We,
the United States, are not blameless. Our
growing dependence upon foreign sources
has been adding to our vulnerability for
years and years, and we did nothing to pre-
pare ourselves for such an event as the
embargo of 1973.

During the 1960's, this country had a sur-
plus capacity of crude oil which we were
able to make available to our trading part-
ners whenever there was a disruption of
supply. This surplus capacity enabled us to
influence both supplies and prices of crude
oil throughout the world. Our excess capac-
ity neutralized any effort at establishing
an effective cartel, and thus the rest of the
world was assured of adequate supplies of
oil at reasonable prices.

By 1970 our surplus capacity had van-
ished, and as a consequence, the latent
power of the oil cartel could emerge in full
force. Europe and Japan, both heavily de-
pendent on imported oil, now struggle to
keep their economies in balance. Even the
United States, our country, which is far
more self-sufficient than most other indus-
trial countries, has been put under serious
pressure.

I am proposing a program which will
begin to restore our country's surplus ca-

' Delivered on Jan. 15 (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 20).

pacity in total energy. In this way we will
be able to assure ourselves reliable and ade-
quate energy and help foster a new world
energy stability for other major consuming
nations.

But this nation, and in fact the world,
must face the prospect of energy difficulties
between now and 1985. This program will
impose burdens on all of us, with the aim
of reducing our consumption of energy and
increasing our production. Great attention
has been paid to the considerations of fair-
ness, and I can assure you that the burden
will not fall more harshly on those less able
to bear them.

I am recommending a plan to make us
invulnerable to cutoffs of foreign oil. It will
require sacrifices, but it — and this is most
important — it will work.

I have set the following national energy
goals to assure that our future is as secure
and as productive as our past:

— First, we must reduce oil imports by
1 million barrels per day by the end of this
year and by 2 million barrels per day by the
end of 1977.

— Second, we must end vulnerability to
economic disruption by foreign suppliers by
1985.

— Third, we must develop our energy tech-
nology and resources so that the United
States has the ability to supply a significant
share of the energy needs of the free world
by the end of this century.

To attain these objectives, we need im-
mediate action to cut imports. Unfortunate-
ly, in the short term there are only a limited
number of actions which can increase do-

February 3, 1975

133

mestic supply. I will press for all of them.

I urge quick action on the necessary legis-
lation to allow commercial production at the
Elk Hills, California, Naval Petroleum Re-
serve. In order that we make greater use
of domestic coal resources, I am submitting
amendments to the Energy Supply and En-
vironmental Coordination Act, which will
greatly increase the number of power plants
that can be promptly converted to coal.

Obviously, voluntary conservation con-
tinues to be essential, but tougher programs
are needed, and needed now. Therefore I
am using Presidential powers to raise the
fee on all imported crude oil and petroleum
products.

The crude oil fee level will be increased
$1 per barrel on February 1, by $2 per bar-
rel on March 1, and by $3 per barrel on
April 1. I will take action to reduce undue
hardships on any geographical region. The
foregoing are interim administrative actions.
They will be rescinded when the broader
but necessary legislation is enacted.

To that end, I am requesting the Congress
to act within 90 days on a more compre-
hensive energy tax program. It includes:
excise taxes and import fees totaling $2 per
barrel on product imports and on all crude
oil, deregulation of new natural gas, and
enactment of a natural gas excise tax. I
plan to take Presidential initiative to de-
control the price of domestic crude oil on
April 1. I urge the Congress to enact a
windfall profits tax by that date to insure
that oil producers do not profit unduly.

The sooner Congress acts the more effec-
tive the oil conservation program will be
and the quicker the Federal revenues can be
returned to our people.

I am prepared to use Presidential author-
ity to limit imports, as necessary, to guaran-
tee success.

I want you to know that before deciding
on my energy conservation program, I con-
sidered rationing and higher gasoline taxes
as alternatives. In my judgment, neither
would achieve the desired results, and both
would produce unacceptable inequities.

A massive program must be initiated to

increase energy supply, to cut demand, and
provide new standby emergency programs
to achieve the independence we want by
1985. The largest part of increased oil pro-
duction must come from new frontier areas
on the outer continental shelf and from the
Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 in Alaska.
It is the intent of this administration to
move ahead with exploration, leasing, and
production on those frontier areas of the
outer continental shelf where the environ-
mental risks are acceptable.

Use of our most abundant domestic re-
source— coal — is severely limited. We must
strike a reasonable compromise on environ-
mental concerns with coal. I am submitting
Clean Air [Act] Amendments which will
allow greater coal use without sacrificing
clean air goals.

I vetoed the strip-mining legislation passed
by the last Congress. With appropriate
changes, I will sign a revised version when
it comes to the White House.

I am proposing a number of actions to
energize our nuclear power program. I will
submit legislation to expedite nuclear leas-
ing [licensing] and the rapid selection of
sites.

In recent months, utilities have canceled
or postponed over 60 percent of planned nu-
clear expansion and 30 percent of planned
additions to nonnuclear capacity. Financing
problems for that industry are worsening.
I am therefore recommending that the one-
year investment tax credit of 12 percent be
extended an additional two years to specifi-
cally speed the construction of power plants
that do not use natural gas or oil. I am also
submitting proposals for selective reform of
state utility commission regulations.

To provide the critical stability for our
domestic energy production in the face of
world price uncertainty, I will request legis-
lation to authorize and require tariff' import
quotas or price floors to protect our energy
prices at levels which will achieve energy
independence.

Increasing energy supplies is not enough.
We must take additional steps to cut long-
term consumption.

134

Department of State Bulletin

I therefore propose to the Congress legis-
lation to make thermal efficiency standards
mandatory for all new buildings in the
United States; a new tax credit of up to
$150 for those homeowners who install insu-
lation equipment ; the establishment of an
energy conservation program to help low-
income families purchase insulation supplies ;
and legislation to modify and defer auto-
motive pollution standards for five years
which will enable us to improve automobile
gas mileage by 40 percent by 1980.

These proposals and actions, cumulatively,
can reduce our dependence on foreign energy
supplies from 3 to 5 million barrels per day
by 1985.

To make the United States invulnerable
to foreign disruption, I propose standby
emergency legislation and a strategic stor-
age program of 1 billion barrels of oil for
domestic needs and 300 million barrels for
national defense purposes.

I will ask for the funds needed for energy
research and development activities. I have
established a goal of 1 million barrels of
synthetic fuels and shale-oil production per
day by 1985, together with an incentive pro-
gram to achieve it.

I have a veiy deep belief in America's
capabilities. Within the next 10 years, my
program envisions 200 nuclear power plants,
250 major new coal mines, 150 major coal-
fired power plants, 30 major new [oil] re-
fineries, 20 major new synthetic fuel plants,
the drilling of many thousands of new oil
wells, the insulation of 18 million homes, and
the manufacturing and the sale of millions of
new automobiles, trucks, and buses that use
much less fuel.

I happen to believe that we can do it. In
another crisis, the one in 1942, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt said this country
would build 60,000 [50,000] military air-
craft. By 1943, production in that program
had reached 125,000 aircraft annually. They
did it then. We can do it now.

If the Congress and the American people
will work with me to attain these targets,
they will be achieved and will be surpassed.

Now let me turn, if I might, to the inter-
national dimension of the present crisis. At
no time in our peacetime history has the
state of the nation depended more heavily
on the state of the world; and seldom, if
ever, has the state of the world depended
more heavily on the state of our nation.

The economic distress is global. We will
not solve it at home unless we help to
remedy the profound economic dislocation
abroad. World trade and monetary struc-
ture provides markets, energy, food, and
vital raw material for all nations. This
international system is now in jeopardy.

This nation can be proud of significant
achievements in recent years in solving
problems and crises; the Berlin agreement,
the SALT agreements, our new relationship
with China, the unprecedented efi'orts in the
Middle East are immen.sely encouraging, but
the world is not free from crisis.

In a world of 150 nations — where nuclear
technology is proliferating and regional con-
flicts continue — international security can-
not be taken for granted.

So, let there be no mistake about it ; inter-
national cooperation is a vital factor of our
lives today. This is not a moment for the
American people to turn inward. More than
ever before, our own well-being depends on
America's determination and America's lead-
ership in the whole wide world.

We are a great nation — spiritually, politi-
cally, militarily, diplomatically, and econom-
ically. America's commitment to interna-
tional security has sustained the safety of
allies and friends in many areas — in the
Middle East, in Europe, and in Asia. Our
turning away would unleash new instabili-
ties, new dangers, around the globe, which
in turn would threaten our own security.

At the end of World War II, we turned
a similar challenge into an historic oppor-
tunity, and I might add, an historic achieve-
ment. An old order was in disarray; politi-
cal and economic institutions were shattered.
In that period, this nation and its partners
built new institutions, new mechanisms of
mutual support and cooperation. Today, as
then, we face an historic opportunity.

February 3, 1975

135

If we act imaginatively and boldly, as we
acted then, this period will in retrospect be
seen as one of the great creative moments
of our nation's history. The whole world is
watching to see how we respond.

A resurgent American economy would do
more to restore the confidence of the world
in its own future than anjlhing else we can
do. The program that this Congress passes
can demonstrate to the world that w-e have
started to put our own house in order. If
we can show that this nation is able and
willing to help other nations meet the com-
mon challenge, it can demonstrate that the
United States will fulfill its responsibilities
as a leader among nations.

Quite frankly, at stake is the future of
industrialized democracies, which have per-
ceived their destiny in common and sus-
tained it in common for 30 years.

The developing nations are also at a turn-
ing point. The poorest nations see their
hopes of feeding their hungry and develop-
ing their societies shattered by the economic
crisis. The long-term economic future for
the producers of raw materials also depends
on cooperative solutions.

Our relations with the Communist coun-
tries are a basic factor of the world environ-
ment. We must seek to build a long-term
basis for coexistence. We will stand by our
principles. We will stand by our interests.
We will act firmly when challenged. The
kind of a world we want depends on a broad
policy of creating mutual incentives for re-
straint and for cooperation.

As we move forward to meet our global
challenges and opportunities, we must have
the tools to do the job.

Our military forces are strong and ready.
This military strength deters aggression
against our allies, stabilizes our relations
with former adversaries, and protects our
homeland. Fully adequate conventional and
strategic forces cost many, many billions,
but these dollars are sound insurance for our
safety and for a more peaceful world.

Military strength alone is not sufficient.
Effective diplomacy is also essential in pre-
venting conflict in building world under-

standing. The Vladivostok negotiations with
the Soviet Union represent a major step in
moderating strategic arms competition. My
recent discussions with the leaders of
the Atlantic community, Japan, and South
Korea have contributed to meeting the com-
mon challenge.

But we have serious problems before us
that require cooperation between the Presi-
dent and the Congress. By the Constitution
and tradition, the e.xecution of foreign policy
is the responsibility of the President. In
recent years, under the stress of the Viet-
Nam war, legislative restrictions on the
President's ability to execute foreign policy
and military decisions have proliferated. As
a Member of the Congress I opposed some,
and I approved others. As President I wel-
come the advice and cooperation of the
House and the Senate.

But if our foreign policy is to be success-
ful, we cannot rigidly restrict in legislation
the ability of the President to act. The con-
duct of negotiations is ill suited to such limi-
tations. Legislative restrictions intended for
the best motives and purposes can have the
opposite result, as we have seen most re-
cently in our trade relations with the Soviet
Union.

For my part, I pledge this administration
will act in the closest consultation with the
Congress as we face delicate situations and
troubled times throughout the globe.

When I became President only five months
ago, I promised the last Congress a policy
of communication, conciliation, compromise,
and cooperation. I renew that pledge to the
new Members of this Congress.

Let me sum it up. America needs a new
direction, which I have sought to chart here
today, a change of course which will put the
unemployed back to work, increase real in-
come and production, restrain the growth
of Federal Government spending, achieve
energy independence, and advance the cause
of world understanding.

We have the ability. We have the know-
how. In partnership with the American
people, we will achieve these objectives. As
our 200th anniversary approaches, we owe

136

Department of State Bulletin

it to ourselves and to posterity to rebuild
our political and economic strength.

Let us make America once again and for
centuries more to come what it has so long
been, a stronghold and a beacon light of
liberty for the whole world.

President Ford Signs Trade Act
of 1974

Remarks by Presideyit Ford '

Mr. Vice President, distinguished membei's
of the Cabinet, Members of the Congress, in-
cluding the leadership, ladies and gentlemen:

The Trade Act of 1974, which I am sign-
ing into law today, will determine for many,
many years American trade relations with
the rest of the world. This is the most sig-
nificant trade legislation passed by the Con-
gress since the beginning of trade agreement
programs some four decades ago.

It demonstrates our deep commitment to
an open world economic order and interde-
pendence as essential conditions of mutual
economic health. The act will enable Amer-
icans to work with others to achieve expan-
sion of the international flow of goods and
services, thereby increasing economic well-
being throughout the world.

It will thus help reduce international ten-
sions caused by trade disputes. It will mean
more and better jobs for American workers,
with additional purchasing power for the
American consumer.

There are four very basic elements to this
Trade Act: authority to negotiate further re-
ductions and elimination of trade barriers ; a
mandate to work with other nations to im-
prove the world trading system and thereby
avoid impediments to vital services as well
as markets ; reform of U.S. laws involving
injurious and unfair competition; and im-
provement of our economic relations with

' Made in the East Room at the White House on
Jan. 3 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents dated Jan. 6). As enacted, the bill
(H.R. 10710) is Public Law 93-618, approved Jan. 3.

nonmarket economies and developing coun-
tries.

Our broad negotiating objectives under
this act are to obtain more open and equita-
ble market access for traded goods and serv-
ices, to assure fair access to essential sup-
plies at reasonable prices, to provide our
citizens with an increased opportunity to
purchase goods produced abroad, and to seek
modernization of the international trading
system.

Under the act, the administration will pro-
vide greater relief for American industry
suffering from increased imports and more
effective adjustment assistance for workers,
firms, and communities.

The legislation allows us to act quickly and
to effectively counter foreign import actions
which unfairly place American labor and in-
dustry at a disadvantage in the world mar-
ket. It authorizes the administration, under
certain conditions, to extend nondiscrimina-
tory tariff treatment to countries whose im-
ports do not currently receive such treat-
ment in the United States.

This is an important part of our commer-
cial and overall relations with Communist
countries. Many of the act's provisions in
this area are very complex and may well
prove difficult to implement. I will of course
abide by the terms of the act, but I must ex-
press my reservations about the wisdom of
legislative language that can only be seen
as objectionable and discriminatory by other
sovereign nations.

The United States now joins all other ma-
jor industrial countries, through this legis-
lation, in a system of tariff preferences for
imports from developing countries.

Although I regret the rigidity and the un-
fairness in these provisions, especially with
respect to certain oil-producing countries, I
am now undertaking the first steps to imple-
ment this preference system by this summer.
Most developing countries are clearly eligi-
ble, and I hope that still broader participa-
tion can be possible by that time.

As I have indicated, this act contains cer-
tain provisions to which we have some ob-
jection and others which vary somewhat

February 3, 1975

137

from the language we might have preferred.
In the spirit of cooperation, spirit of cooper-
ation with the Congress, I will do my best to
work out any necessary accommodations.

The world economy will continue under
severe strain in the months ahead. This act
enables the United States to constructively
and to positively meet challenges in interna-
tional trade. It affords us a basis for coop-
eration with all trading nations. Alone, the
problems of each can only multiply ; together,
no difficulties are insurmountable.

We must succeed ! I believe we will.

This is one of the most important meas-
ures to come out of the 93d Congress. I wish
to thank very, very generously and from the
bottom of my heart the Members of Con-
gress and members of this administration —
as well as the public — who contributed so
much to this legislation's enactment. At this
point I will sign the bill.

Oil Cargo Preference Bill
Vetoed by President Ford

Memorayidum of Disapproval '

I am withholding my approval from H.R.
8193, the Energy Transportation Security
Act of 1974.

The bill would initially require that 20
peixent of the oil imported into the United
States be carried on U.S. flag tankers. The
percentage would increase to 30 percent af-
ter June 30, 1977.

This bill would have the most serious con-
sequences. It would have an adverse impact

' Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 30 (text from White
House press release).

on the United States economy and on our
foreign relations. It would create serious in-
flationary pressures by increasing the cost
of oil and raising the prices of all products
and services which depend on oil. It would
further stimulate inflation in the ship con-
struction industry and cut into the indus-
try's ability to meet ship construction for
the U.S. Navy.

In addition, the bill would serve as a prec-
edent for other countries to increase protec-
tion of their industries, resulting in a serious
deterioration in beneficial international com-
petition and trade. This is directly contrary
to the objectives of the trade bill which the
Congress has just passed. In addition, it
would violate a large number of our treaties
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.

Although this bill would undoubtedly ben-
efit a limited group of our working popula-
tion, such benefit would entail disproportion-
ate costs and produce undesirable effects
which could extend into other areas and in-
dustries. The waiver provisions which the
Congress included in an effort to meet a few
of my concerns fail to overcome the serious
objections I have to the legislation.

Accordingly, I am not approving this bill
because of the substantial adverse effect on
the Nation's economy and international in-
terest.

I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate
my commitment to maintaining a strong U.S.
Merchant Marine. I believe we can and will
do this under our existing statutes and pro-
grams such as those administered by the
Maritime Administration in the Department
of Commerce.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, December 30, 1974.

138

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 14

FoUoiring is the transcript of a neivs
conference held by Secretary Kissinger in
the press briefing room at the Department of
State at 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday, January 14.

Press release 13 ilaleil .lanuar.v 14

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle-
men, I am sorry to get you all together at
this hour. We had originally agreed with the
Soviet Government to make a statement,
which I am about to read, on Thursday. But
there have been a number of inquiries this
afternoon which led us to believe that there
might be stories that were based on inade-
quate information and perhaps based on
misunderstandings. And in order to avoid
exacerbating the situation, and in an al-
ready rather delicate moment, we asked the
Soviet Embassy whether we might release
the statement this evening.

So I will now read a statement, of which
the Soviet Government is aware, and we
will have copies for you when you leave.
Now, the te.xt of the statement is as follows:

Since the President signed the Trade Act on
January 3, we have been in touch with the Soviet
Government concerning the steps necessary to
bring the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement into
force.

Article 9 of that agreement provides for an ex-
change of written notices of acceptance, following
which the agreement, including reciprocal exten-
sion of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment (MFN)
[most-favored-nation] would enter into force. In
accordance with the recently enacted Trade Act,
prior to this exchange of written notices, the
President would transmit to the Congress a num-
ber of documents, including the 1972 agreement,
the proposed written notices, a formal proclama-
tion extending MFN to the U.S.S.R., and a state-
ment of reasons for the 1972 agreement. Either
House of Congress would then have had 90 legis-
lative days to veto the agreement.

In addition to these procedures, the President
would also take certain steps, pursuant to the

Trade Act, to waive the applicability of the Jack-
son-Vanik amendment. These steps would include
a report to the Congress stating that the waiver
will substantially promote the objectives of the
amendment and that the President has received
assurances that the emigration practices of the
U.S.S.R. will henceforth lead substantially to the
achievement of the objectives of the amendment.

It was our intention to include in the required
exchange of written notices with the Soviet Gov-
ernment language, required by the provisions of
the Trade Act, that would have made clear that
the duration of three years referred to in the 1972
Trade Agreement with the U.S.S.R. was subject
to continued legal authority to carry out our obli-
gations. This caveat was necessitated by the fact
that the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment
would be applicable only for an initial period of
18 months, with provision for renewal thereafter.

The Soviet Government has now informed us
that it cannot accept a trading relationship based
on the legislation recently enacted in this country.
It considers this legislation as contravening both
the 1972 Trade Agreement, which had called for
an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade
restrictions, and the principle of noninterfer-
ence in domestic affairs. The Soviet Government
states that it does not intend to accept a trade
status that is discriminatory and subject to politi-
cal conditions and, accordingly, that it will not
put into force the 1972 Trade Agreement. Finally,
the Soviet Government informed us that if state-
ments were made by the United States, in the terms
required by the Trade Act, concerning assurances
by the Soviet Government regarding matters it
considers within its domestic jurisdiction, such
statements would be repudiated by the Soviet Gov-
ernment.

In view of these developments, we have con-
cluded that the 1972 Trade Agreement cannot be
brought into force at this time and that the
President will therefore not take the steps re-
quired for this purpose by the Trade Act. The
President does not plan at this time to exercise
the waiver authority.

The administration regrets this turn of events.
It has regarded and continues to regard an orderly
and mutually beneficial trade relationship with the
Soviet Union as an important element in the
overall improvement of relations. It will, of course,

February 3, 1975

139

continue to pursue all available avenues for such
an improvement, including efforts to obtain legis-
lation that will permit normal trading relationships.

Now, since undoubtedly a number of you
will raise questions and some of you have
already raised questions about the implica-
tions of this for our political relationships
with the Soviet Union, let me make a few
observations :

The problem of peace in the nuclear age
must be of paramount concern for both nu-
clear powers. The question of bringing
about a more stable international environ-
ment depends importantly on improved rela-
tions between the United States and the
Soviet Union. This essentially bipartisan
effort will be continued by this administra-
tion.

We have no reason to believe that the
rejection of the provisions of the trade bill
has implications beyond those that have
been communicated to us. It goes without
saying that, should it herald a period of
intensified pressure, the United States would
resist with great determination and as a
united people. We do not expect that to
happen, however, and as far as the United
States is concerned, we will continue to pur-
sue the policy of relaxation of tensions and
of improving or seeking to improve relation-
ships leading toward a stable peace.

As far as our domestic debate is con-
cerned, we see no point in reviewing the
debate of recent months. We want to make
clear that there was no disagreement as to
objectives. We differed with some of the
Members of Congress about the methods to
achieve these objectives — these disagree-
ments are now part of a legislative history.

As far as the administration is concerned,
it will pursue the objectives that I have
outlined in a spirit of cooperation with the
Congress.

And when I have testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Fri-
day, I will seek their advice as to the steps
that in their judgment might be desirable
in promoting the cause and the purposes
which we all share.

And now I will be glad to answer your
questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going to your last re-
marks, arc you suggesting that Congress is at
fault in great part for what has happened,
and if that is what you are suggesting, why
did you and Congress equally engage in this
exchange of letters [Oct. 18, 197Jt\ ivhich
seem to tell the American people that those
assurances had been received?

Secretary Kissiiiger: I think that all of
you can review the public statements that
I have made over the years of this debate
expressing our judgment as to the likely
consequences of this course.

You will also recall that in my testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee on
December 3 I stated explicitly that if any
claim were made that this was a govern-
ment-to-government transaction and if any
assertions were made that assurances had
been extended that those would be repudi-
ated by the Soviet Government.

I believe that there were a number of
reasons that led to the Soviet decision. The
purpose of my remarks was not to put the
blame anywhere, but in order to put the
debate behind us and to turn us toward the
futui'e.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are some of those
reasons do you think that led the Soviets to
this move?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe, as I have
already stated publicly, that since the ex-
change of letters, there have been many
public statements that were difficult for the
Soviet Union to accept. And the decision
with respect to the Eximbank [Export-Im-
port Bank] ceiling was undoubtedly an im-
portant factor in leading to this turn of
events.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what you
think this means for the future of emigra-
tion of people from the Soviet Union, espe-
cially Jews?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been given
no official communication.

Q. Do you think the number will go down?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not want to
speculate. The United States has made clear

140

Department of State Bulletin

before that we favored the widest possible
emigration, and we did so privately. And,
for a time, not ineffectively.

Q. Mr. Secretary, right noiv, do you have
any reason to believe that the Soviet Union
is or will begin to apply intensive pressure
in any particular region of the ivorld?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no reason
to suppose so. I simply stated this to make
clear what our attitude would be if this
should happen. I also want to make clear
that the United States will pursue a policy
of relaxation of tensions, that the political
premises of our policy of detente remain in
full force, and that we are prepared to con-
sult with the Congress to see how the objec-
tives of the trade bill can be applied to the
Soviet Union under conditions that are per-
haps more acceptable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would yo7i care to char-
acterize the Soviet letter of rejection?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it was fac-
tual.

Q. When loas it received, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: It was received on
Friday, and the further discussions with
respect to it were concluded yesterday.

Q. Do you think this refects any change
tvithin the Soviet leadership? Do you think
that there is a change of which this is one
result ?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no evidence
whatever to that effect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after the Vladivostok
meeting, voices were raised in Congress say-
ing that since it has been proved possible to
be tough ivith the Russians on the trade
bill, that ive shoidd therefore go back and
renegotiate the Vladivostok agreement and
get loiver ceilings loith them. Do you think
that sort of public statement had any im-
pact ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to
go into individual public statements. I tried
to point out on several occasions the limits
of what a superpower can accept. And you

may remember that I warned in a press con-
ference about the impact on detente of such
a debate with respect to Vladivostok.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect now that
the visit of Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezh-
nev, General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union] to this country might be put into
question ?

Secretary Kissinger: I have absolutely no
reason to suppose this. All the communica-
tions we have received from the Soviet Gov-
ernment seem to suggest that the political
orientation is unchanged. And we will con-
duct our policy until we receive evidence to
the contrary on the basis of carrying for-
ward the policy of detente.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Lend-Lease Agree-
ment, as I recall it, said that the Soviet
Union did not have to make any further
payments after this year if it did not
receive most-favored-nation. So can we
assume that that means the Soviet Union
will also not be paying any further lend-lease
payments, and that in turn raises the ques-
tion of should they still be entitled to any
credits at all?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with respect to
the lend-lease, we have not sorted out specifi-
cally from what obligations the Soviet Union
would be relieved. But I think your inter-
pretation of the agreement is a reasonable
one.

As you know, the granting of new credits
has been linked to the implementation of
the MFN, and therefore your second ques-
tion is really moot, because no new credits
can be extended under the existing legisla-
tion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, hotv did the Soviet
Union first communicate with you that they
intended to do this?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, after the pas-
sage of the Trade Act and the Exim legis-
lation, the Soviet Union made clear in a
number of ways, including public comments,
its displeasure with the legislation. But it
did not communicate with us formally.
After the Trade Act was signed, we in-

February 3, 1975

141

formed the Soviet Union of tlie precise steps
that would have to be taken under the
Trade Act to implement the Trade Agree-
ment and to put into effect the waiver pro-
visions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

In response to these provisions, which
made it impossible for us to apply the waiver
without some Soviet action, the Soviet Union
informed us that they would not participate
in these actions. These actions specifically
were that the Trade Agreement would have
to be amended to run not for a period of
three years, but to provide for the fact
that it might lapse after 18 months in case
MFN were not extended. And we had to
have assurances that we could make state-
ments with respect to Soviet emigration
practices, or rather assurances that we had
been given with respect to emigration prac-
tices, which they would not repudiate.

Now, as I have pointed out on many oc-
casions, the assurances which we had re-
ceived— and you may have seen stories that
we had resisted the word "assurance"
throughout our discussions with the Con-
gress— that the information we had received
concerned the application of Soviet law and
the implementation of Soviet practices. And
as I had made clear on December 3, any as-
surances concerning the Soviet Government
were bound to be rejected, and they have
been.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that
many officials in this government have ex-
pressed concern that the Soviet Union is not
getting enough out of detente — and one of
its main purposes in having a detente with
the United States ^vas in improving its trade,
getting technology, getting credits from the
United States — can you tell us on what you
base your optimism that the other aspects
of detente can continue?

Secretary Kissinger: I stated that the
communications that we have so far re-
ceived have indicated that the Soviet Union
wishes this political relationship to continue.
We have no other evidence.

And we will, of course, base our
own conclusions on the actions of the

Soviet Government and not on the note.

Q. Mr. Secretary, evidently publicity and
congressional debate had a great deal to do
with the Soviet decision. Does this raise the
question whether a democracy like ours can
purstte openly a detente policy ivith the
Soviet Union, or must it be pursued in secret
and rnsk failure if the public is brought into
it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really do not
think any useful purpose would be served
by speculating on all the causes of the pres-
ent state of affairs.

I believe that any foreign policy of the
United States that is not based on public
support and, above all, on congressional
support will not have a firm foundation.
At the same time, there is the problem of
the degree to which this control is exer-
cised and in what detail. And this is a
matter that will require constant adjust-
ment and discussion between the executive
and the Congress.

I repeat — we shared the objective of those
with whose tactics we disagree, and we do
not think that these tactics were in any
sense improper or unreasonable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any link be-
tween the Soviet action that you are dis-
cussing and recent reports that Mr. Brezhnev
has been imder criticism at home for his
detente approach?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all I know
about those stories is what I read in the
newspapers. And we have to base our poli-
cies on the actions and communications of
the Soviet Government. And therefore I
don't want to speculate on the internal posi-
tion of various Soviet leaders.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do yoti expect the Soviets
to reduce their purchases of American prod-
ucts to further give evidence of this dis-
pleasure ?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not stated
that there is Soviet displeasure with the
United States. I stated that the Soviet
Union objected to certain legislative provi-

142

Department of State Bulletin

sions. I have no evidence one way or the
other about what Soviet commercial prac-
tices will be henceforth, and it is quite pos-
sible that they have not made a decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivould you characterize
it as being accurate to say that during the
months of negotiations with the Senators
you had information from the Soviets to the
effect that you could negotiate in good faith
with the Senators on these specific emigra-
tion issues but over the past fetv iveeks the
Soviet Union has changed its policy whereby
it no longer can stand by the information
that it had given to you duriyig those months
of negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: The reason the nego-
tiations with the Senators took so long was
our concern to make sure that we would
communicate nothing that we could not
back up. The Soviet Union gave us certain
descriptions of their domestic practices,
which we attempted to communicate as
accurately as we could. Obviously those who
were concerned with promoting emigration
attempted to make these descriptions as
precise and as detailed as possible. And that
is perfectly understandable.

I think what may have happened is, when
the Soviet Union looked at the totality of
what it had to gain from this trading rela-
tionship as against the intrusions in its
domestic affairs, it drew the balance sheet
of which we have the result today. But they
have never disavowed the assurances or the
statements in my letter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say that there is no
reason to believe that there are implications
beyond this. Hoivever, was not one of the
incentives that we used in relations with the
Soviet Union the trade incentive — to that
extent, linkage — and to that extent, is there
not some implication?

Secretary Kissinger: It would be my judg-
ment that the interest in the preservation
of peace must be equally shared by both
sides. I have stated the administration posi-
tion in many statements before the Con-
gress in which I pointed out that it is our

view, and it remains our view, that it is
desirable to establish the maximum degree
of links between the two countries in order
to create the greatest incentive for the
preservation of stable relationships.

We are prepared to continue exploring
these possibilities. And we are certain that
the Congress will deal with us in a con-
ciliatory and constructive manner. So we
look at this as an interruption and not as a
final step.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm a little confused
about exactly what happened. Administra-
tion officials had said when the trade bill
passed that they could live ivith it. You ivere
asked at one point whether you would rec-
ommend vetoing of the Eximbank legislation,
and you didn't answer it directly, and the
President signed it. Did rjou have any idea
that this was coming? Coiddn't you have
taken a step like vetoing the Eximbank to
have prevented this?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are faced
with a situation in which there were differ-
ences of view as to what the traffic would
bear. I don't believe that anybody reading
my statements over the years can have any
question about what my view was, and my
statements are on the public record. And
there was disagreement as to the validity
of this.

For the United States to veto legislation
which made credits available to American
business for trading with the whole world
because of an unsatisfactory limitation with
respect to the Soviet Union at the end of
a prolonged period of negotiation was a
decision which the President felt he could
not take, and it is a decision with which I
agreed. It came down to a fine judgment. It
would not have changed the basic problem,
anyway, because with the Exim legisla-
tion vetoed, the Soviet Union would have
had no reason to put into effect the trade
provisions in any event. So we were faced
with a very difficult choice. In one case they
would get $300 million; in the other case
they could get nothing.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

February 3, 1975

143

U.S. Protests North Viet-Nam's
Violations of Peace Accords

Following is the text of a note trans-
mitted to U.S. missions on January 11 for
deliverij to non-Vietnamese participants in
the International Conference on Viet-Nam
and to members of the International Com-
mission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).'

Press release 12 dated January l-'i

The Department of State of the United
States of America presents its compliments
to [recipient of this note] and has the honor
to refer to the Agreement on Ending the
War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam
signed at Paris January 27, 1973, and to
the Act of the International Conference on
Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973.

When the Agreement was concluded
nearly two years ago, our hope was that it
would provide a framework under which the
Vietnamese people could make their own
political choices and resolve their own prob-
lems in an atmosphere of peace. Unfortu-
nately this hope, which was clearly shared
by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the South
Vietnamese people, has been frustrated by
the persistent refusal of the Democratic Re-
public of Viet-Nam to abide by the Agree-
ment's most fundamental provisions. Specif-
ically, in flagrant violation of the Agreement,
the North Vietnamese and "Provisional
Revolutionary Government" authorities
have:

— built up the North Vietnamese main-
force army in the South through the illegal
infiltration of over 160,000 troops ;

— tripled the strength of their armor in
the South by sending in over 400 new ve-
hicles, as well as greatly increased their
artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry;

— improved their military logistics system
running through Laos, Cambodia and the
Demilitarized Zone as well as within South
Viet-Nam, and expanded their armament
stockpiles ;

— refused to deploy the teams which
under the Agreement were to oversee the
cease-fire ;

— refused to pay their prescribed share
of the expenses of the International Com-
mission of Control and Supervision;

—failed to honor their commitment to
cooperate in resolving the status of Ameri-
can and other personnel missing in action,
even breaking off all discussions on this
matter by refusing for the past seven
months to meet with U.S. and Republic of
Viet-Nam representatives in the Four-Party
Joint Military Team ;

— broken off all negotiations with the Re-
public of Viet-Nam including the political
negotiations in Paris and the Two Party
Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon,
answering the Republic of Viet-Nam's re-
peated calls for unconditional resumption of
the negotiations with demands for the over-
throw of the government as a pre-condition
for any renewed talks; and

— gradually increased their military pres-
sure, over-running several areas, including
11 district towns, which were clearly and
unequivocally held by the Republic of Viet-
Nam at the time of the cease-fire. Their
latest and most serious escalation of the
fighting began in early December with of-
fensives in the southern half of South Viet-
Nam which have brought the level of casual-
ties and destruction back up to what it was
before the Agreement. These attacks—
which included for the first time since the
massive North Vietnamese 1972 offensive
the over-running of a province capital (Song
Be in Phuoc Long Province) — appear to re-
flect a decision by Hanoi to seek once again
to impose a military solution in Viet-Nam.
Coming just before the second anniversary
of the Agreement, this dramatically belies
Hanoi's claims that it is the United States
and the Republic of Viet-Nam who are vio-
lating the Agreement and standing in the
way of peace.

The United States deplores the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam's turning from
the path of negotiation to that of war, not

^ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's
Republic of China, United Kingdom, France, Hun-
gary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and U.N. Secretary
General Kurt Waldheim.

144

Department of State Bulletin

only because it is a grave violation of a
solemn international agreement, but also
because of the cruel price it is imposing on
the people of South Viet-Nam. The Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam must accept
the full consequences of its actions. We are
deeply concerned about the threat posed to
international peace and security, to the
political stability of Southeast Asia, to the
progress which has been made in removing
Viet-Nam as a major issue of great-power
contention, and to the hopes of mankind for
the building of structures of peace and the
strengthening of mechanisms to avert war.
We therefore reiterate our strong support
for the Republic of Viet-Nam's call to the
Hanoi-'Trovisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment" side to reopen the talks in Paris and
Saigon which are mandated by the Agree-
ment. We also urge that the [addressee |
call upon the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam to halt its military offensive and join
the Republic of Viet-Nam in re-establishing
stability and seeking a political solution.

January 11, 1975.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

A Recommended National Emergencies Act. In-
terim Report. S. Rept. 93-1170. September 24,
1974. 10 pp.

National Emergencies Act. Report to accompany
S. 3957. S. Rept. 93-1193. September 30, 1974.
50 pp.

Icebreaking Operations in Foreign Waters. Report
to accompany H.R. 13791. H. Rept. 93-1390.
September 30, 1974. 7 pp.

The United States and Cuba: A Propitious Moment.
A report to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations by Senators Jacob K. Javits and Clai-
borne Pell on their trip to Cuba, September 27-30,
1974. October 1974. 13 pp.

Dues for U.S. Membership in International Criminal
Police Organization. Report to accompany H R
14597. S. Rept. 93-1199. October 1, 1974. 5 pp!

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms

of Zinc. Conference report to accompany H R

^ 6191. H. Rept. 93-1399. October 1, 1974. 4 pp.

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on
Certain Bicycle Parts and Accessories. Conference
report to accompany H.R. 6642. H. Rept. 93-1400
October 1, 1974. 5 pp.

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on
Certain Classifications of Yarns of Silk. Con-
ference report to accompany H.R. 7780. H Rept
93-1401. October 1, 1974. 6 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Methanol. Conference report
to accompany H.R. 11251. H. Rept. 93-1402
October 1, 1974. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Synthetic Rutile.
Conference report to accompany H.R 11830. H
Rept. 93-1404. 3 pp.

Extending Until July 1, 1975, the Suspension of
Duty on Certain Carboxymethyl Cellulose Salts.
Conference report to accompany H.R. 12035. H.
Rept. 9,3-1405. October 1, 1974. 6 pp.

Extending Until July 1, 1975, the Suspension of
Duties on Certain Forms of Copper. Conference
report to accompany H.R. 12281. H. Rept. 93-1406.
October 1, 1974. 3 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Horses.
Conference report to accompany H.R. 13631. H.
Rept. 93-1407. October 1, 1974. 4 pp.

Authorizing the President To Declare by Proclama-
tion Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn an Honorary Citi-
zen of the United States. Report to accompany
S.J. Res. 188. S. Rept. 93-1216. October 2, 1974.
3 pp.

Export -Administration Act Amendments. Confer-
ence report to accompany S. 3792. H. Rept.
93-1412. October 2, 1974. 14 pp.

-Amending the Communications Act of 1934 With
Respect to the Granting of Radio Licenses in the
Safety and Special and Experimental Radio Serv-
ices to Aliens. Report to accompany S. 2547. H.
Rept. 93-1423. October 3, 1974. 8 pp.

Authorizing U.S. Contributions to United Nations
Peacekeeping Forces. Report to accompany H.R.
16982. H. Rept. 93-1432. October 7, 1974. 3 pp.

World Food Situation. Report to accompany H Res.
1399. H. Rept. 93-1433. October 7, 1974. 3 pp.

Export-Import Bank Act Amendment. Conference
report to accompany H.R. 15977. H. Rept. 93-1439
October 8, 1974. 11 pp.

Metropolitan Museum Exhibition in the Soviet
Union. Report to accompanv H.J. Res. 1115. H.
Rept. 93-1444. October 8, 1974. 3 pp.
State Department, USIA Authorizations. Conference
report to accompany S. 3473. H. Rept. 93-1447
October 8, 1974. 14 pp.

February 3, 1975

145

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

Following is a statement made in Com-
mittee II (Economic and Financial) of the
U.N. General Assembly ow December 6 by
Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representa-
tive to the General Assembly, together with
the text of a re.wlntion adopted by the com-
mittee on December 6 and by the Assembly
on December 12.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY

t'SUX press release 111'.' ilateil I'eeeinlier 6

It is with deep regret that my delegation
could not support the proposed Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.

When President Echeverria of Mexico
initiated the concept of such a charter two
years ago, he had what is indeed a worthy
vision. The U.S. Government shares the con-
viction that there is a real need for basic
improvements in the international economic
system, and we supported in principle the
formulation of new guidelines to this end.
We welcomed President Echeverria's initia-
tive. Secretary of State Kissinger, in address-
ing this Assembly last year, confirmed the
fact that the United States favored the
concept of a charter. He said it would make
a significant and historic contribution if it
reflected the true aspirations of all nations.
He added that, to command general support
— and to be implemented — the proposed
rights and duties must be defined equitably
and take into account the concerns of in-
dustrialized as well as of developing coun-
tries.

In extensive negotiations in Mexico City,
Geneva, and here in New York, the United
States woi'ked hard and sincerely with other

countries in trying to formulate a charter
that would achieve such a balance. We tried
to go the extra mile in particular because of
our close and friendly relations with Mexico.
We are indebted, as I believe is the entire
Assembly, to Foreign Minister Rabasa
[Emilio 0. Rabasa, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, United Mexican States] for his patient
and tireless efforts as a negotiator. One
must recognize the difficulty of his tasks in
seeking to reconcile such fundamentally di-
vergent views as have been apparent in a
group of this size and disparity. Despite the
chasm which it has thus far proved impos-
sible to bridge, he labored up to the last
moment seeking an agreed consensus. In-
deed, agreement was reached on many im-
portant articles, and our support for those
was shown in the vote we have just taken.
On others, however, agreement has not
been reached. Our views on these provisions
are apparent in the amendments proposed
by the United States and certain other
countries, but these regrettably have been
rejected by the majority here.' Many of the
unagreed provisions, in the view of my
government, are fundamental and are un-
acceptable in their present form. To cite a
few: the treatment of foreign investment in
terms which do not fully take into account
respect for agreements and international
obligations, and the endorsement of con-
cepts of producer cartels and indexation of

^ In 17 rollcall votes on Dec. fi, the committee re-
jected amendments cosponsored by the United
States and other countries which included the dele-
tion of subpar. (i) of chapter I and arts. 5, 15,
16, 19, and 28 and revised language for preambular
pars. 4, 5(c), and 7; the introductory sentence and
subpar. (f) of chapter I; and arts. 2, 4, 6, 14 his
(to replace art. 31), 26, and 30.

146

Department of State Bulletin

prices. As a result, Mr. Chairman, we have
before us a draft charter which is unbal-
anced and which fails to achieve the pur-
pose of encouraging harmonious economic
relations and needed development. More-
over, the provisions of the charter would
discourage rather than encourage the cap-
ital flow which is vital for development.

There is much in the charter which the
United States supports. The bulk of it is the
result of sincere negotiations, as demon-
strated by the voting pattern today. It was
to demonstrate this fact that the United
States asked for an article-by-article vote
on the charter."

Mr. Chairman, my government was pre-
pared to continue these negotiations until
agreement could be reached, as we much
preferred agreement to confrontation. For
that reason, we supported the proposed
resolution to continue negotiating next year
with a view to acting on a generally agreed
charter in the Assembly next September.''

For all these reasons, Mr. Chairman, my
delegation felt compelled to vote against the
charter as a whole." We have not closed our
minds, however, to the possibility of further
reconsideration at some future date should
others come to the conclusion that an
agreed charter would still be far preferable
to one that is meaningless without the
agreement of countries whose numbers may
be small but whose significance in inter-
national economic relations and development
can hardly be ignored. We stand ready to
resume negotiations on a charter which
could command the support of all countries.

-"The United States voted against the seventh
preambular paragraph; art. 2, pars. 1 and 2 (a), (b),
and (c) ; and art. 26. The United States abstained
on the fourth preambular paragraph; the intro-
ductory sentence of chapter I; and arts. 4, 6, 29,
30, 32, and 34. No separate vote was taken on
provisions where an amendment to delete had been
rejected (see footnote 1 above). The United States
voted in favor of provisions not otherwise specified.

' Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1419 was rejected by
the committee on Dec. 6, the vote being 81 against
and 20 (U.S.) in favor, with 15 abstentions.

' The committee adopted the charter as a whole,
as cosponsored by 90 developing countries, by a
rollcall vote of 115 to 6 (U.S.), with 10 abstentions.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

The General Aftsemhli/.

Recalling that the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, in its resolution 45 (III)
of 18 May 1972, stressed the urgency "to estab-
lish generally accepted norms to govern interna-
tional economic relations systematically" and recog-
nized that "it is not feasible to establish a just
order and a stable world as long as the Charter
to protect the rights of all countries, and in par-
ticular the developing States, is not formulated".

Recalling further that in the same resolution it
was decided to establish a Working Group of gov-
ernmental representatives to draw up a draft Char-
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
which the General Assembly, in its resolution 3037
(XXVII) of 19 December 1972, decided should be
composed of 40 Member States,

Noting that in its resolution 3082 (XXVIII) of
6 December 1973, it reaffirmed its conviction of the
urgent need to establish or improve norms of uni-
versal application for the development of inter-
national economic relations on a just and equitable
basis and urged the Working Group on the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States to com-
plete, as the first step, in the codification and de-
velopment of the matter, the elaboration of a final
draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, to be considered and approved by the Gen-
eral Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.

Bearing in mind the spirit and terms of its reso-
lutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974,
containing the Declaration and the Programme of
Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, which underlined the vital im-
portance of the Charter to be adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly at its twenty-ninth session and
stressed the fact that the Charter shall constitute
an effective instrument towards the establishment
of a new system of international economic relations
based on equity, sovereign equality, and inter-
dependence of the interests of developed and de-
veloping countries,

Haxnng examined the report of the Working
Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States on its fourth session," transmitted
to the General Assembly by the Trade and Develop-
ment Board at its fourteenth session.

■■A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (text from U.N. press
release G A/5194) ; adopted by the Assembly on
Dec. 12 by a rollcall vote of 120 to 6 (U.S., Bel-
gium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Luxembourg, U.K.), with 10 abstentions (Austria,
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, Norway, Spain). Separate votes were taken
on subpar. (o) of chapter I and on art. 3; the
United States voted in favor of these provisions.

°U.N. doc. TD/B/AC.12/4. [Footnote in origi-
nal.]

February 3, 1975

147

Expressing its appreciation to the Workine:
Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States which, as a result of the task per-
formed in its four sessions held between February
1973 and June 1974, assembled the elements re-
quired for the completion and adoption of the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assem-
bly, as previously recommended.

Adopts and solemnly proclaims the following:

CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF STATES

Preamble

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the fundamental purposes of the
United Nations, in particular, the maintenance of
international peace and security, the development
of friendly relations among nations and the achieve-
ment of international co-operation in solving inter-
national problems in the economic and social fields,

Affirming the need for strengthening interna-
tional co-operation in these fields.

Reaffirming further the need for strengthening
international co-operation for development.

Declaring that it is a fundamental purpose of
this Charter to promote the establishment of the
new international economic order, based on equity,
sovereign equality, interdependence, common inter-
est and co-operation among all States, irrespective
of their economic and social systems,

Desirous of contributing to the creation of con-
ditions for:

(a) The attainment of wider prosperity among
all countries and of higher standards of living for
all peoples,

(b) The promotion by the entire international
community of economic and social progress of all
countries, especially developing countries,

(c) The encouragement of co-operation, on the
basis of mutual advantage and equitable benefits
for all peace-loving States which are willing to
carry out the provisions of this Charter, in the
economic, trade, scientific and technical fields, re-
gardless of political, economic or social systems,

(d) The overcoming of main obstacles in the
way of economic development of the developing
countries,

(e) The acceleration of the economic growth of
developing countries with a view to bridging the
economic gap between developing and developed
countries,

(f) The protection, preservation and enhancement
of the environment,

Mindful of the need to establish and maintain
a just and equitable economic and social order
through :

(a) The achievement of more rational and equi-

table international economic relations and the en-
couragement of structural changes in the world
economy,

(b) The creation of conditions which permit the
further expansion of trade and intensification of
economic co-operation among all nations,

(c) The strengthening of the economic inde-
pendence of developing countries,

(d) The establishment and promotion of inter-
national economic relations taking into account
the agreed differences in development of the de-
veloping countries and their specific needs.

Determined to promote collective economic secu-
rity for development, in particular of the developing
countries, with strict respect for the sovereign
equality of each State and through the co-opera-
tion of the entire international community.

Considering that genuine co-operation among
States, based on joint consideration of and con-
certed action regarding international economic
problems, is essential for fulfilling the international
community's common desire to achieve a just and
rational development of all parts of the world.

Stressing the importance of ensuring appropri-
ate conditions for the conduct of normal economic
relations among all States, irrespective of differ-
ences in social and economic systems, and for the
full respect for the rights of all peoples, as well as
the strengthening of instruments of international
economic co-operation as means for the consolida-
tion of peace for the benefit of all.

Convinced of the need to develop a system of
international economic relations on the basis of
sovereign equality, mutual and equitable benefit
and the close interrelationship of the interests
of all States,

Reiterating that the responsibility for the de-
velopment of every country rests primarily upon
itself but that concomitant and effective interna-
tional co-operation is an essential factor for the
full achievement of its own development goals.

Firmly convinced of the urgent need to evolve a
substantially improved system of international
economic relations.

Solemnly adopts the present Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.

Chapter I

Fundamentals of international economic relations

Economic as well as political and other relations
among States shall be governed, inter alia, by the
following principles:

(a) Sovereignty, territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence of States;

(b) Sovereign equality of all States;

(c) Non-aggression;

(d) Non-intervention;

(e) Mutual and equitable benefit;

(f) Peaceful coexistence;

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Department of State Bulletin

(g) Equal rights and self-determination of
peoples;

(h) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(i) Remedying of injustices which have been
brought about by force and which deprive a nation
of the natural means necessary for its normal de-
velopment;

(j) Fulfilment in good faith of international obli-
gations;

(k) Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms ;

(1) No attempt to seek hegemony and spheres
of influence;

(m) Promotion of international social justice;

(n) International co-operation for development;

(o) Free access to and from the sea by land-
locked countries within the framework of the above
principles.

Chapter II
Economic rights and duties of States

Article 1

Every State has the sovereign and inalienable
right to choose its economic system as well as its
political, social and cultural systems in accordance
with the will of its people, without outside inter-
ference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

Article 2

1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full
permanent sovereignty, including possession, use
and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources
and economic activities.

2. Each State has the right:

(a) To regulate and exercise authority over for-
eign investment within its national jurisdiction in
accordance with its laws and regulations and in
conformity with its national objectives and priori-
ties. No State shall be compelled to grant preferen-
tial treatment to foreign investment;

(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of
transnational corporations within its national
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such
activities comply with its laws, rules and regula-
tions and conform with its economic and social
policies. Transnational corporations shall not inter-
vene in the internal afl'airs of a host State. Every
State should, with full regard for its sovereign
rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise
of the right set forth in this subparagraph ;

(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer own-
ership of foreign property in which case appropri-
ate compensation should be paid by the State adopt-
ing such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that
the State considers pertinent. In any case where
the question of compensation gives rise to a contro-
versy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of
the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless

it is freely and mutually agreed by all States con-
cerned that other peaceful means be sought on the
basis of the sovereign equality of States and in
accordance with the principle of free choice of
means.

Article 3

In the exploitation of natural resources shared
by two or more countries, each State must co-
operate on the basis of a system of information
and prior consultations in order to achieve opti-
mum use of such resources without causing dam-
age to the legitimate interest of others.

Article U

Every State has the right to engage in inter-
national trade and other forms of economic co-
operation irrespective of any differences in political,
economic and social systems. No State shall be
subjected to discrimination of any kind based solely
on such differences. In the pursuit of international
trade and other forms of economic co-operation,
every State is free to choose the forms of organi-
zation of its foreign economic relations and to
enter into bilateral and multilateral arrangements
consistent with its international obligations and
with the needs of international economic co-opera-
tion.

Article 5

All States have the right to associate in organi-
zations of primary commodity producers in order
to develop their national economies to achieve
stable financing for their development, and in pur-
suance of their aims assisting in the promotion of
sustained growth of the world economy, in par-
ticular accelerating the development of developing
countries. Correspondingly all States have the duty
to respect that right by refraining from applying
economic and political measures that would limit it.

Article 6

It is the duty of States to contribute to the de-
velopment of international trade of goods particu-
larly by means of arrangements and by the con-
clusion of long-term multilateral commodity agree-
ments, where appropriate, and taking into account
the interests of producers and consumers. All
States share the responsibility to promote the reg-
ular flow and access of all commercial goods traded
at stable, remunerative and equitable prices, thus
contributing to the equitable development of the
world economy, taking into account, in particular,
the interests of developing countries.

Article 7

Every State has the primary responsibility to
promote the economic, social and cultural develop-
ment of its people. To this end, each State has
the right and the responsibility to choose its means
and goals of development, fully to mobilize and

February 3, 1975

149

use its resources, to implement progressive eco-
nomic and social reforms and to ensure the full
participation of its people in the process and bene-
fits of development. All States have the duty, indi-
vidually and collectively, to co-operate in order to
eliminate obstacles that hinder such mobilization
and use.

Article S

States should co-operate in facilitating niore ra-
tional and equitable international economic rela-
tions and in encouraging structural changes in the
context of a balanced world economy in harmony
with the needs and interests of all countries, espe-
cially developing countries, and should take appro-
priate measures to this end.

Article 9

All States have the responsibility to co-operate
in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and tech-
nological fields for the promotion of economic and
social progress thi-oughout the world, especially
that of the developing countries.

Article 10

All States are juridically equal and, as equal
members of the international community, have the
right to participate fully and effectively in the
international decision-making process in the solu-
tion of world economic, financial and monetary
problems, inter alia, through the appropriate inter-
national organizations in accordance with their
existing and evolving rules, and to share equitably
in the benefits resulting therefrom.

Article 11

All States should co-operate to strengthen and
continuously improve the efficiency of international
organizations in implementing measures to stimu-
late the general economic progress of all countries,
particularly of developing countries, and therefore
should co-operate to adapt them, when appropriate,
to the changing needs of international economic
co-operation.

Article 12

1. States have the right, in agreement with
the parties concerned, to participate in subregional,
regional and interregional co-operation in the pur-
suit of their economic and social development. All
States engaged in such co-operation have the duty
to ensure that the policies of those groupings to
which they belong correspond to the provisions of
the Charter and are outward-looking, consistent
with their international obligations and with the
needs of international economic co-operation and
have full regard for the legitimate interests of
third countries, especially developing countries.

2. In the case of groupings to which the States
concerned have transferred or may transfer cer-

tain competences as regards matters that come
within the scope of this Charter, its provisions
shall also apply to those groupings, in regard to
such matters, consistent with the responsibilities
of such States as members of such groupings. Those
States shall co-operate in the observance by the
groupings of the provisions of this Charter.

Article 13

1. Every State has the right to benefit from the
advances and developments in science and tech-
nology for the acceleration of its economic and
social development.

2. All States should promote international scien-
tific and technological co-operation and the trans-
fer of technology, with proper regard for all legiti-
mate interests including, inter alia, the rights and
duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of tech-
nology. In particular, all States should facilitate:
the access of developing countries to the achieve-
ments of modern science and technology, the trans-
fer of technology and the creation of indigenous
technology for the benefit of the developing coun-
tries in forms and in accordance with procedures
which are suited to their economies and their needs.

3. Accordingly, developed countries should co-
operate with the developing countries in the estab-
lishment, strengthening and development of their
scientific and technological infrastructures and
their scientific research and technological activities
so as to help to expand and transform the econo-
mies of developing countries.

4. All States should co-operate in exploring with
a view to evolving further internationally ac-
cepted guidelines or regulations for the transfer
of technology taking fully into account the inter-
ests of developing countries.

Article IJ,

Every State has the duty to co-operate in pro-
moting a steady and increasing expansion and
liberalization of world trade and an improvement
in the welfare and living standards of all peoples,
in particular those of developing countries. Ac-
cordingly, all States should co-operate, inter alia.
towards the progressive dismantling of obstacles to
trade and the improvement of the international
framework for the conduct of world trade and,
to these ends, co-ordinated efforts shall be made to
solve in an equitable way the trade problems of all
countries taking into account the specific trade prob-
lems of the developing countries. In this connexion.
States shall take measures aimed at securing addi-
tional benefits for the international trade of de-
veloping countries so as to achieve a substantial
increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the
diversification of their exports, the acceleration of
the rate of growth of their trade, taking into ac-
count their development needs, an improvement in
the possibilities for these countries to participate

150

Department of State Bulletin

in the expansion of world trade and a balance more
favourable to developing countries in the sharing
of the advantages resulting from this expansion,
through, in the largest possible measure, a substan-
tial improvement in the conditions of access for
the products of interest to the developing countries
and, wherever appropriate, measures designed to
attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices
for primary products.

Article 15

All States have the duty to promote the achieve-
ment of general and complete disarmament under
effective international control and to utilize the
resources freed by effective disarmament measures
for the economic and social development of coun-
tries, allocating a substantial portion of such re-
sources as additional means for the development
needs of developing countries.

Article 16

1. It is the right and duty of all States, indi-
vidually and collectively, to eliminate colonialism,
apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism
and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation
and domination, and the economic and social con-
sequences thereof, as a prerequisite for develop-
ment. States which practice such coercive policies
are economically responsible to the countries, terri-
tories and peoples affected for the restitution and
full compensation for the exploitation and deple-
tion of, and damages to, the natural and all other
resources of those countries, territories and peoples.
It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to
them.

2. No State has the right to promote or encour-
age investments that may constitute an obstacle to
the liberation of a territory occupied by force.

Article 17

International co-operation for development is the
shared goal and common duty of all States. Every
State should co-operate with the efforts of develop-
ing countries to accelerate their economic and so-
cial development by providing favourable external
conditions and by extending active assistance to
them, consistent with their development needs and
objectives, with strict respect for the sovereign
equality of States and free of any conditions dero-
gating from their sovereignty.

Article 18

Developed countries should extend, improve and
enlarge the system of generalized non-reciprocal and
non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the devel-
oping countries consistent with the relevant agreed
conclusions and relevant decisions as adopted on
this subject, in the framework of the competent
international organizations. Developed countries
should also give serious consideration to the adop-

tion of other differential measures, in areas where
this is feasible and appropriate and in ways which
will provide special and more favourable treat-
ment, in order to meet trade and development needs
of the developing countries. In the conduct of inter-
national economic relations the developed countries
should endeavour to avoid measures having a nega-
tive effect on the development of the national econ-
omies of the developing countries, as promoted by
generalized tariff preferences and other generally
agreed differential measures in their favour.

Article 19

With a view to accelerating the economic growth
of developing countries and bridging the economic
gap between developed and developing countries,
developed countries should grant generalized pref-
erential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory
treatment to developing countries in those fields of
international economic co-operation where it may
be feasible.

Article 20

Developing countries should, in their efforts to
increase their over-all trade, give due attention
to the possibility of expanding their trade with
socialist countries, by granting to these countries
conditions for trade not inferior to those granted
normally to the developed market economy countries.

Article 21

Developing countries should endeavour to pro-
mote the expansion of their mutual trade and to
this end, may, in accordance with the existing and
evolving provisions and procedures of international
agreements where applicable, grant trade prefer-
ences to other developing countries without being
obliged to extend such preferences to developed
countries, provided these arrangements do not
constitute an impediment to general trade liberali-
zation and expansion.

Article 22

1. All States should respond to the generally
recognized or mutually agreed development needs
and objectives of developing countries by promot-
ing increased net flows of real resources to the
developing countries from all sources, taking into
account any obligations and commitments under-
taken by the States concerned, in order to rein-
force the efforts of developing countries to ac-
celerate their economic and social development.

2. In this context, consistent with the aims and
objectives mentioned above and taking into ac-
count any obligations and commitments undertaken
in this regard, it should be their endeavour to in-
crease the net amount of financial flows from offi-
cial sources to developing countries and to improve
the terms and conditions.

February 3, 1975

151

3. The flow of development assistance resources
should include economic and technical assistance.

Article 23
To enhance the effective mobilization of their
own resources, the developing countries should
strengthen their economic co-operation and expand
their mutual trade so as to accelerate their eco-
nomic and social development. All countries, espe-
cially developed countries, individually as well as
through the competent international organizations
of which they are members, should provide appro-
priate and effective support and co-operation.

Article 2U

All States have the duty to conduct their mutual
economic relations in a manner which takes into
account the interests of other countries. In par-
ticular, all States should avoid prejudicing the
interests of developing countries.

Article 25

In furtherance of world economic development,
the international community, especially its devel-
oped members, shall pay special attention to the
particular needs and problems of the least de-
veloped among the developing countries, of land-
locked developing countries and also island devel-
oping countries, with a view to helping them to
overcome their particular difficulties and thus con-
tribute to their economic and social development.

Article 26

All States have the duty to coexist in tolerance
and live together in peace, irrespective of differ-
ences in political, economic, social and cultural
systems, and to facilitate trade between States
having different economic and social systems. Inter-
national trade should be conducted without preju-
dice to generalized non-discriminatory and non-
reciprocal preferences in favour of developing
countries, on the basis of mutual advantage, equita-
ble benefits and the exchange of most-favoured-
nation treatment.

Article 27

1. Every State has the right to fully enjoy the
benefits of world invisible trade and to engage in
the expansion of such trade.

2. World invisible trade, based on efficiency and
mutual and equitable benefit, furthering the expan-
sion of the world economy, is the common goal of
all States. The role of developing countries in world
invisible trade should be enhanced and strength-
ened consistent with the above objectives, particu-
lar attention being paid to the special needs of de-
veloping countries.

3. All States should co-operate with developing
countries in their endeavours to increase their
capacity to earn foreign exchange from invisible
transactions, in accordance with the potential and

needs of each developing country, and consistent
with the objectives mentioned above.

Article 28

All States have the duty to co-operate in achiev-
ing adjustments in the prices of exports of develop-
ing countries in relation to prices of their imports
so as to promote just and equitable terms of trade
for them, in a manner which is remunerative for
producers and equitable for producers and con-
sumers.

Chapter III

Common responsibilities
towards the international community

Article 29

The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
as well as the resources of the area, are the com-
mon heritage of mankind. On the basis of the
principles adopted by the General Assembly in
resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, all
States shall ensure that the exploration of the
area and exploitation of its resources are carried
out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the
benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by
all States, taking into account the particular inter-
ests and needs of developing countries; an inter-
national regime applying to the area and its re-
sources and including appropriate international
machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be
established by an international treaty of a uni-
versal character, generally agreed upon.

Article 30

The protection, preservation and the enhance-
ment of the environment for the present and fu-
ture generations is the responsibility of all States.
All States shall endeavour to establish their own
environmental and developmental policies in con-
formity with such responsibility. The environ-
mental policies of all States should enhance and
not adversely affect the present and future de-
velopment potential of developing countries. All
States have the responsibility to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion. All States should co-operate in evolving inter-
national norms and regulations in the fields of
the environment.

Chapter IV

Final provisions

Article 31

All States have the duty to contribute to the
balanced expansion of the world economy, taking
duly into account the close interrelationship be-
tween the well-being of the developed countries

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Department of State Bulletin

and the growth and development of the developing
countries and that the prosperity of the interna-
tional community as a whole depends upon the
prosperity of its constituent parts.

Article 32
No State may use or encourage the use of eco-
nomic, political or any other type of measures to
coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.

Article 33

1. Nothing in the present Charter shall be con-
strued as impairing or derogating from the provi-
sions of the Charter of the United Nations or ac-
tions taken in pursuance thereof.

2. In their interpretation and application, the
provisions of the present Charter are interrelated
and each provision should be construed in the con-
text of the other provisions.

Article 34
An item on the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States shall be inscribed on the agenda
of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session,
and thereafter on the agenda of every fifth ses-
sion. In this way a systematic and comprehensive
consideration of the implementation of the Charter,
covering both progress achieved and any improve-
ments and additions which might become necessary,
would be carried out and appropriate measures
recommended. Such consideration should take into
account the evolution of all the economic, social,
legal and other factors related to the principles
upon which the present Charter is based and on
its purpose.

U.S. Urges Early Conclusion

of Law of the Sea Treaty

Following is a statement by John R.
Stevenson, Special Representative of the
President for the Law of the Sea Conference,
made in the U.N. General Assembly on
December 17.

USUN press release 202 dated December 17

It is well known that my government
attaches great importance to a successful
law of the sea treaty and to the achievement
of that goal before the pressure of events
and the erosion of momentum place it be-
yond our reach.

A few weeks ago, in an extensive inter-
view in the New York Times, Secretary
Kissinger stressed that our interdependent
world has approached a time when we must

find creative solutions to mutual problems or
face chaos. Similar thoughts were expressed
by many speakers from all regions during
the general debate in this body.

There are few problems so uniquely ex-
pressive of our global interdependence as the
legal order of the oceans. We have made
a good beginning in Caracas. Like many
others, I am disappointed that our accom-
plishments were not greater, but I am not
discouraged about our capacity to achieve a
treaty, given the will and the devotion to
the task that is necessary to meet the time-
table set by this Assembly in its resolution
last year. That resolution — wisely, as it
turned out — envisioned the probability that
in addition to the Caracas session we would
if necessary "convene not later than 1975
any subsequent session or sessions as may
be decided upon by the Conference and ap-
proved by the General Assembly."

It seems to my delegation that this resolu-
tion was a clear mandate to complete our
work in 1975. I do not believe there is any
fundamental disagreement among us about
the magnitude of that task. It is not merely
the process of political decisions by govern-
ments on difficult issues — frequently involv-
ing important domestic interests — and the
process of negotiation of the precise details
of the many individual issues that must be
written into final texts; it is also the sheer
weight of the management problem of so
many nations negotiating so many issues
and the time that will inevitably be required,
after detailed texts of individual articles are
negotiated, to construct their final place in
the overall treaty.

No government will be more pleased than
mine if we can complete that task during the
time allotted to our meeting in Geneva, but
I do not believe that we should foreclose the
possibility of further work during 1975 if
necessary to complete the treaty.

Timetables, of course, are not immutable.
I am aware of the many understandable con-
cerns and, in some cases, genuine personal
and governmental hardships that have been
reflected in the negotiation of the resolution
now before this Assembly. Nevertheless, they
should be measured against the probability

February 3, 1975

153

that with more delay, the passage of time
and not our own efforts may well determine
the outcome of our negotiations.

My government reluctantly supports the
resolution before this Assembly.' I say "re-
luctantly" because we would strongly prefer
that the Secretary General be given specific
authority to schedule a second substantive
session in 1975 if necessary and to begin
making the arrangements that cannot be
satisfactorily made in a few weeks or a few
months. However, we believe that the resolu-
tion as it .stands would not preclude the pos-
sibility for additional intersessional work in
1975. It would be our understanding that the
Secretariat could proceed to do the best it can
to insure that, if the conference determines
such work is necessary, appropriate arrange-
ments would be forthcoming. We welcome
in particular the reference to the conference's
acceptance of the invitation of the Govern-
ment of Venezuela to return to Caracas to
sign the final act and related instruments and
the authorization to the Secretary General
to make the necessary arrangements to that
end.

Mr. President, this conference has been
called one of the most important held since
the creation of the United Nations. This is
true not only because of the importance of
the oceans to the future well-being of all
nations but also because its outcome may well
determine whether we have the will and the
institutional structure to achieve cooperative
solutions for important global problems.

As the many experienced negotiators in
this room know, there comes a time in any
negotiation when its course moves rapidly
forward toward perceived solutions, or a
breakdown occurs. It seems to me evident
that that moment must come at Geneva. If
the will is there to make the decisions and
the accommodations that are necessary, we
will have the momentum to move to a suc-
cessful conclusion.

^Resolution 3334 (XXIX) approving in operative
paragraph 1 "the convening of the next session of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea for the period 17 March to 10 May 1975 at
Geneva" was adopted by the Assembly unanimously
on Dec. 17.

Though my government is second to none
in pressing for a timely solution by the Law
of the Sea Conference and in seeking a work
program to that end, our support for a timely
conference should not be misread as a willing-
ness to sacrifice essential national interests.
My nation will go to Geneva to negotiate.
Geneva can succeed, however, only if all na-
tions approach our work in that spirit. And
it can succeed only if all nations identify
their essential national interests and real-
ize in turn that others have essential in-
terests that must be accommodated.

Mr. President, I would also like to state our
gratification at the willingness of the Gen-
eral Assembly to invite the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands to participate as an
observer in the work of the Law of the Sea
Conference. While we have always taken into
account Micronesia's views and interests in
formulating our positions, we think it ad-
visable that Micronesia should be able to
state its own views with regard to law of
the sea issues.

Mr. President, I would like to state the
appreciation of the United States for the
role played by Constantin Stavropoulos who,
until November of this year, contributed
much and wisely as the Special Represent-
ative of Secretary General Waldheim to the
Law of the Sea Conference. Recalling Mr.
Stavropoulos' 20 years of service as Legal
Counsel of the United Nations, it is only
appropriate that we acknowledge with pro-
found gratitude his intelligence, his insight,
his wisdom, his humanity, and his friend-
ship. Our loss is the gain of his homeland,
Greece, to which he has now returned.

We also applaud the decision of the Sec-
retary General to appoint as his new Special
Representative Dr. Bernardo Zuleta, a dis-
tinguished lawyer-diplomat and the Alter-
nate Representative of Colombia to the
United Nations. We have known and admired
Dr. Zuleta for a number of years. Both the
Seabed Committee and the Law of the Sea
Conference have benefited from his qualities
of leadership, tolerance, industry, and wit.
In this case, the loss to Colombia is the gain
to the international community.

154

Department of State Bulletin

U.N. General Assembly Approves Definition of Aggression

Following are texts of a statement made
in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly on October 18 by Robert
Rosenstock, Legal Affairs Adviser to the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and a
statement made in plenary sessioyi of the
Assembly on December lU by U.S. Repre-
sentative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., together
ivith the text of a resolution adopted by the
Committee on November 21 and by the As-
sembly on December H.

U.S. STATEMENTS

Mr. Rosenstock, Committee VI, October 18

USUX press release 142 dated October IS

My delegation wishes to take this oppor-
tunity to reiterate our appreciation for the
work of Professor Broms [Bengt H. G. A.
Broms, of Finland, chairman of the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Ag-
gression], who guided the deliberations, to
Mr. Sanders [Joseph Sanders, of Guyana,
rapporteur of the special committee], who
not only oversaw the report but contributed
to the consensus and introduced the report
in this committee in a particularly lucid,
succinct, and instructive manner.

The United States has always had a meas-
ure of skepticism as to the utility of defining
aggression. We recognized the widespread
desire of others, however, to make the at-
tempt, and we cooperated in the effort.
Although I cannot state that our skepticism
has been wholly dispelled, my delegation
was part of the consensus in the special
committee. We stated our views on the de-
tails of the text at that time, and they are
set forth in annex I of the report of the

special committee.^ They remain our views,
and hence we will not repeat them in detail
now.

We, like many others, do not regard the
definition as perfect. There is material in it
we regard as unnecessary and there are
phrases we regard as unfeiicitous ; there are,
moreover, omissions from the definition
which we regard as unfortunate. There is
nothing remarkable in these facts. The prod-
uct of years of intensive negotiations among
large and small states, states with differing
social systems, and states with different
legal traditions can never fully reflect the
desires of each state. The text is inevitably
a compromise. It has the strengths and
weaknesses of a compromise. What is re-
markable is that we have succeeded at all
when previous generations have failed.

We should recognize this compromise as
a hopeful sign of a growing spirit of inter-
national cooperation and understanding, a
sign that states have matured to the point
of not insisting that their parochial concerns
must be accepted in full by the international
community, that they no longer insist on
using the definition to settle other issues.
What state is there here which does not
have a particular security, economic, or
other concern which it believes is not per-
fectly reflected? If states were to insist on
the perfect expression of their special con-
cerns, we would not postpone the produc-
tion of a definition; we would be deciding
once and for all that a definition is impos-
sible. In this connection, my delegation
notes the forbearance shown by the delegate
of Afghanistan.

'U.N. doc. A/9619; for a statement by Mr.
Rosenstock made in the special committee on Apr.
12, see Bulletin of May 6, 1974, p. 498.

February 3, 1975

155

What the special committee has forwarded
to the Assembly is not a substitute for the
type of definition one would seek in a dic-
tionary. That would serve no useful pur-
pose; we are not defining a term in the ab-
stract, but seeking to provide guidance for
the understanding of the meaning and func-
tion of the term as set forth in article 39
of the Charter of the United Nations.

The definition, moreover, does not and
should not seek to establish obligations and
rights of states; for that is not the function
of article 39 of the charter. The United Na-
tions has already completed a major exer-
cise in the field of rules concerning use of
force when it adopted the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration. The definition of aggres-
sion neither adds to nor subtracts from that
important declaration. The draft text under-
lines this fact in its preambular reaffirma-
tion of the Friendly Relations Declaration.

The draft before us is a recommendation
by the General Assembly designed to pro-
vide guidance for the Security Council in
the exercise of its primary responsibility
under the charter to maintain and, where
necessary, to restore international peace
and security. The second, fourth, and tenth
paragraphs of the preamble and articles 2
and 4 clearly reflect the intention of the
drafters to work within the framework of
the charter, which grants disci'etion to the
Security Council. There is nothing the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Security Council can
do under the charter to alter the discretion
of the Council. The Assembly can provide
suggested guidance to the Security Council,
and since the membership of the Council is
drawn from the membership of the Assem-
bly, there is every reason to assume the
Security Council will give due weight to this
important recommendation.

The structure of the draft definition accu-
rately reflects the function of such a defini-
tion and the charter limits within which
the assembly is obliged to work. Article 1
of the draft is a general statement based on
article 2 of the charter. Like article 2 of the
charter, it makes no distinction on the basis
of the means of armed force used. Article 1,
moreover, makes clear by the phrase "as

set out in this Definition" that article 1 may
not be read in isolation from the other arti-
cles and that not all illegal uses of armed
force should be regarded as capable of de-
nomination as acts of aggression.

Article 2 of the text suggests considera-
tions the Security Council should bear in
mind in analyzing a particular situation
which may be brought before it. The phrase
"p7ima facie evidence" is fully consistent
with the legal structure of chapter VII of
the charter, which i-equires that a finding
of an act of aggression must result from a
positive.^ decision of the Security Council.
Article 2 in particular and the definition in
general is fully consistent with the manner
in which the Security Council may, and
in fact does, approach problems of this
nature. The Council examines all the rele-
vant facts and circumstances and then
seeks the most pragmatic available means
of dealing with the situation. This draft
definition is an eff"ort to provide guidance
in that process of examination.

Article 3 of the text represents an effort
to set forth certain examples of the use of
force which the Security Council could rea-
sonably consider, in the manner suggested
by article 2, to qualify as potential acts of
aggression. The problems some have imag-
ined with regard to this article are false
problems. That the subparagraphs of article
3 cannot be read in vacuo is made clear by
common sense — "Bombardment by the armed
forces of a State against the territory of
another State" cannot be imagined to con-
stitute aggression if, for example, it is exer-
cised pursuant to the inherent right of self-
defense. But the text does not merely rely
on common sense. Article 3 expressly states
that it is "subject to . . . article 2," and
article 8 requires us to accept the inter-
related nature of all the articles. Any ac-
tion which might qualify as an act of ag-
gression must be a use of force in contra-
vention of the charter. Surely no one here
would wish to assert a right to use force "in
contravention of the Charter." For these
reasons my delegation sees no legal basis
for objecting to the inclusion of any of the
subparagraphs of article 3 and no greater

156

Department of State Bulletin

basis for clarifying subparagraph (b) than
subparagraph (d) or (a) or (c), et cetera.

The subparagraphs of article 3 do not, of
course, purport to spell out in detail all the
illicit uses of force which could qualify as
an act of aggression. The subparagraphs
must be understood as a summary, and
I'eference to such documents as the Declara-
tion of Friendly Relations is particularly
helpful in understanding some of the sub-
paragraphs. For example, some have sug-
gested that subparagraphs (f) and (g) fail
accurately to reflect present-day realities.
Although my delegation would certainly
have seen great value in more detailed cov-
erage of those acts which have been such a
source of violence in the second half of this
century, our concern is ameliorated by the
fact that the ground summarily covered by
these paragraphs is already more fully set
out in the Friendly Relations Declaration.

Article 4 is a useful emphasis of the in-
herently inexhaustive nature of any listing
of specific acts and a further reaffirmation
of the discretion of the Security Council.

Articles 5, 6, and 7 are not properly part
of the definition of aggression but, rather,
set forth some of the legal consequences
which would flow from a finding of aggres-
sion by the Security Council and contain
certain savings clauses expressly indicating
some of the situations or rights not af-
fected by the first four articles.

Article 6 reminds us that a definition of
the term "aggression" as set forth in arti-
cle 39 of the charter creates no new rights
and does not cut across existing rights and
obligations. It does not support the restric-
tive meaning some have sought to place on
article 53 of the charter. The definition
neither restricts nor expands the inherent
right of self-defense. The special committee
wisely recognized that defining the inherent
right of self-defense was beyond the scope
of a definition of aggression. We trust no
delegation would wish to assert the need,
in the course of approving a definition of
aggression, to expand the right of self-de-
fense. Any such move, even if directed only
at a subparagraph, would make our action
into a negative contribution.

Article 7 expressly affirms the fact that
the purpose of this exercise is to define
aggression and not the entitlement of all
peoples to equal rights and self-determina-
tion. This article, particularly when read in
conjunction with article 6, does not and can
not legitimize acts of armed force which
would otherwise be illegal.

We believe the draft definition, which is
the product of the many years of careful
work, deserves unanimous acceptance by
the General Assembly. In expressing this
view we are mindful of the need not to place
too great an emphasis on what we have
accomplished. The Security Council must
not be tempted to pursue the question of
whether aggression has been committed if
to do so would delay expeditious action
under chapter VII pursuant to a finding of
a "threat to the peace" or a "breach of the
peace." The definition will do far more harm
than good if it ever serves to distract the
Council and cause any delay in action the
Council could otherwise have taken.

We hope the guidelines set forth in the
definition will contribute to the more effec-
tive functioning of the collective security
system of the United Nations and thus to
the maintenance of international peace and
security. For this reason we are prepared
to continue to form part of the consensus.

Ambassador Bennett, Plenary, December 14

rSUN press release 199 dated December 14

The U.S. delegation believes the adoption
by consensus of this definition is one of the
positive achievements of this 29th General
Assembly. The adoption of this definition
coming after so many years of considera-
tion and negotiation is in fact, in our view,
a historic moment. We believe this accom-
plishment may in large measure be attrib-
uted to the working methods used by the
special committee. My delegation has ex-
pressed its views on the details of the defi-
nition at the 1,480th meeting of the Legal
Committee as well as at the 113th meeting
of the special committee. These remain our
views, and I see no need to reiterate them
in extenso here today.

February 3, 1975

157

We indicated there that, while we would
have preferred more explicit and detailed
coverage of certain very contemporary
forms of violence, we were satisfied that
these indirect uses of force were indeed
covered. We have stressed the importance
that we attach to the express recognition of
the fact that the specific list of acts set
forth in article 3 of the definition is not
exhaustive, and we have stressed the im-
portance we attach to the fact that the text
neither expands nor diminishes the permis-
sible uses of force.

We believe the recommendations included
in the definition are, by and large, likely to
provide useful guidance to the Security
Council, which, after all, is the function of
the definition. This is particularly so since,
as is made clear by operative paragraph 4
of the resolution, nothing in the definition
alters or purports to alter the discretion of
the Security Council. This is quite proper,
of course, since neither the General Assem-
bly nor indeed the Security Council itself is
empowered to change the discretion of the
Council, that discretion being derived from
the language of the charter itself.

We see nothing in any of the various ex-
planatory notes which affects the substance
of the text of the definition or affects our
views of it.

The United States fully shares the hope
expressed in the preamble of these guide-
lines that they will contribute to the more
effective functioning of the collective secu-
rity system of the United Nations and thus
to the maintenance of international peace
and security.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Special Com-
mittee on the Question of Defining Agression,
established pursuant to its resolution 2330 (XXII)
of 18 December 1967, covering the work of its
seventh session held from 11 March to 12 April
1974, including the draft Definition of Aggression

-U.N. doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX); adopted by the
Assembly on Dec. 14 without a vote.

adopted by the Special Committee by consensus and
recommended for adoption by the General .\ssembly,
Deeply convinced that the adoption of the Defini-
tion of Aggression would contribute to the strength-
ening of international peace and security,

1. Approves the Definition of Aggression, the text
of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Com-
mittee on the Question of Defining Aggression for
its work which resulted in the elaboration of the
Definition of Aggression;

3. Calls upon all States to refrain from all acts
of aggression and other uses of force contrar>' to
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations;

4. Calls the attention of the Security Council to
the Definition of Aggression, as set out below, ami
recommends that it should, as appropriate, take
account of that Definition as guidance in determin-
ing, in accordance with the Charter, the existence
of an act of aggression.

ANNEX
Definition of Aggression

The General Assembly,

Basing itself on the fact that one of the funda-
mental purposes of the United Nations is to main-
tain international peace and security and to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace.

Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance
with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,
shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what meas-
ures shall be taken in accordance with .\rticles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security.

Recalling also the duty of States under the Char-
ter to settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in order not to endanger international peace,
security and justice,

Bearing in mind that nothing in this Definition
shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the
scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect
to the functions and powers of the organs of the
United Nations,

Considering also that, since aggression is the
most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use
of force, being fraught, in the conditions created
by the existence of all types of weapons of mass
destruction, with the possible threat of a world

(

158

Department of State Bulletin

conflict and all its catastrophic consequences, ag-
gression should be defined at the present stage,

Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-deter-
mination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt
territorial integrity.

Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall
not be violated by being the object, even tempo-
rarily, of military occupation or of other measures of
force taken by another State in contravention of
the Charter, and that it shall not be the object of
acquisition by another State resulting from such
measures or the threat thereof,

Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations,

Convinced that the adoption of a definition of
aggression ought to have the effect of deterring
a potential aggressor, would simplify the determina-
tion of acts of aggression and the implementation
of measures to suppress them and would also facili-
tate the protection of the rights and lawful inter-
ests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the
victim,

Belieiung that, although the question whether an
act of aggression has been committed must be con-
sidered in the light of all the circumstances of each
particular case, it is nevertheless desirable to formu-
late basic principles as guidance for such deteiTni-
nation.

Adopts the following Definition of Aggression: ''

Article 1
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State

° Explanatory notes on articles 3 and 5 are to be
found in paragraph 20 of the report of the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression
(Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-
ninth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/9619 and
Corr. 1)). Statements on the Definition are con-
tained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report of the
Sixth Committee (A/9890). [Footnote in original.]

Following are explanatory notes included in para-
graph 20 of U.N. doc. 9619:

1. With reference to article 3, subparagraph (b),
the Special Committee agreed that the expression
"any weapons" is used without making a distinc-
tion between conventional weapons, weapons of mass
destruction and any other kind of weapon.

2. With reference to the first paragraph of article
5, the Committee had in mind, in particular, the
principle contained in the Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations according to
which "No State or group of States has the right
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason

against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations, as set out in this Definition.

Explanatory note: In this Definition the term

"State";

(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of
recognition or to whether a State is a Member of
the United Nations;

(6) Includes the concept of a "group of States"
where appropriate.

Article 2

The first use of armed force by a State in con-
travention of the Charter shall constitute prima
facie evidence of an act of aggression although the
Security Council may, in conformity with the Char-
ter, conclude that a determination that an act of
aggression has been committed would not be justi-
fied in the light of other relevant circumstances,
including the fact that the acts concerned or their
consequences are not of sufficient gravity.

Article 3

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declara-
tion of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with
the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of
aggression:

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces
of a State of the territory of another State, or any
military occupation, however temporary, resulting
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by
the use of force of the territory of another State
or part thereof;

whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any
other State".

3. With reference to the second paragrraph of
article 5, the words "international responsibility"
are used without prejudice to the scope of this term.

4. With reference to the third paragraph of article
5, the Committee states that this paragraph should
not be construed so as to prejudice the established
principles of international law relating to the inad-
missibility of territorial acquisition resulting from
the threat or use of force.

Following are paragraphs 9 and 10 of U.N. doc.
9890:

9. The Sixth Committee agreed that nothing in
the Definition of Aggression, and in particular arti-
cle 3 (c), shall be construed as a justification for a
State to block, contrary to international law, the
routes of free access of a land-locked country to
and from the sea.

10. The Sixth Committee agreed that nothing in
the Definition of Aggression, and in particular
article 3 (d), shall be construed as in any way
prejudicing the authority of a State to exercise its
rights within its national jurisdiction, provided such
exercise is not inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations.

February 3, 1975

159

(6) Bombardment by the armed forces of a
State against the territory of another State or the
use of any weapons by a State against the territory
of another State;

(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a
State by the armed forces of another State;

(d) An attaclt by the armed forces of a State
on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air
fleets of another State;

(c) The use of armed forces of one State which
are within the territory of another State with
the agreement of the receiving State, in contra-
vention of the conditions provided for in the agree-
ment or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

(/) The action of a State in allowing its terri-
tory, which it has placed at the disposal of another
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrat-
ing an act of aggression against a third State;

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

Article h

The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive
and the Security Council may determine that other
acts constitute aggression under the provisions of
the Charter.

Article 5

1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve
as a justification for aggression.

2. A war of aggression is a crime against inter-
national peace. Aggression gives rise to interna-
tional responsibility.

3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage
resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized
as lawful.

Article 6

Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as
in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of
the Charter, including its provisions concerning
cases in which the use of force is lawful.

Article 7

Nothing in this Definition, and in particular
article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence, as
derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly de-
prived of that right and referred to in the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination;

nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that
end to seek and receive support, in accordance with
the principles of the Charter and in conformity with
the above-mentioned Declaration.

Article 8

In their interpretation and application the above
provisions are interrelated and each provision
should be construed in the context of the other
provisions.

U.S. Declines To Participate
in U.N. Special Fund

Fullowing is a statement made iu tin
U.N. General Assembly on December 18 bj/
U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Fei-
guson, Jr.

TSTN press rfleasp 201 dnfixl December IS

The draft resolution before us, contained
in document A, 9952,' finally establishes the
Special Fund called for by the special ses-
sion of the General Assembly in Resolution
3202 of May 1, 1974. In that special session
my delegation repeatedly expressed its
doubts as to the viability of a Special Fund
to respond to the urgent emergency needs
of countries most seriously affected by eco-
nomic imbalances principally attributable to
sudden and traumatic tripled and quad-
rupled prices of petroleum. We expressed
the view that time was of the essence, that
the most expeditious way of responding to
unquestioned needs would be a consistent
plan utilizing existing channels of assistance
and existing institutions. Regrettably, the
views of my government were not heeded
nor, in our opinion, in any way taken into
account in the provisions of Resolution 3202
of the sixth special session. -

Disappointed as we were with that out-
come— a disappointment we have expressed
in the special session, in the session of
ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council],

' Report of the Second Committee on agenda
item 98, "Programme of Action on the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order."

■ For a U.S. statement and texts of resolutions
adopted by the sixth special session of the U.N.
General Assembly on May 1, see Bulletin of May
18, 1974, p. 569.

160

Department of State Bulletin

and in the Second Committee — we nonethe-
less acquiesced in the will of the majority.
Mr. President, the United States takes seri-
ously its obligations as a member state in
this organization. In that spirit, we partici-
pated in the work of the ad hoc committee
to establish the Special Fund. We will con-
sequently, but with regret, acquiesce in the
adoption of the draft resolution without a
vote.'-

Despite the strong views of my govern-
ment regarding a new international eco-
nomic order, we have no desire to obstruct
the work of the Special Fund or the work
of any other body of the United Nations. It
may well be that for the newly rich member
states without established patterns and in-
stitutions for rendering assistance, the Spe-
cial Fund might be attractive. For the
United States, however, we shall be con-
sistent in our views and position regarding
the most effective means of responding to
the plight of the most seriously affected.

We did not believe last May that this
new institution was needed or could be a
viable means of rendering emergency as-
sistance. We do not believe today that the
Fund is needed. We do not today believe it
is viable. Consequently, my government will
not pledge or contribute to the Special Fund.

Mr. President, I should like to call the
Assembly's attention to paragraph 10 of
document A 9952, wherein the Second Com-
mittee recommended that at the first elec-
tion for the Board of Governors for the
Special Fund, the Assembly should elect as
Governors those states which were members
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Special
Program. Although my government was a
member of the ad hoc committee, we will,
for all the foregoing reasons, decline elec-
tion to the Board of Governors. We believe
the Board of Governors should logically
consist of those expecting to contribute or
expecting to receive assistance from the
Special Fund. We should not have wished
to create the impression through our par-

' Resolution 3356 (XXIX), setting forth provi-
sions for the operation of the Special Fund as an
organ of the General Assembly, was adopted by
the Assembly on Dec. 18 without a vote.

ticipation in the Board that eventual U.S.
support would have been likely. Our declina-
tion of election to the Board is thus an ac-
tion consistent with our expressed views
and intentions.

In conclusion, Mr. President, we must
also take note that the cost of the projected
staffing and administration even now ap-
pears unnecessarily high for an institution
with dim prospects of meaningful resources.
We fear — as we had predicted last May and
last July — that the principal function of
this Fund is to insert yet another layer of
bureaucracy between donors and those who
so desperately need assistance.

U.S. Deplores Continued Occupation
of Namibia by South Africa

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative
John Scali on December 17, together tvith
the text of a resolution adopted by the Coun-
cil that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

rsrX press rele.ise 200 dated December 17

U.N. concern over the South African ad-
ministration of Namibia spans the life of
this organization. For the seventh consecu-
tive year, the Security Council is consider-
ing this same question of Namibia. Since
the Security Council met last December to
discuss the future of Namibia, we are all
aware that political developments of great
importance to Namibia and the rest of south-
ern Africa have taken place.

The April events in Portugal have irrev-
ocably altered the political map of southern
Africa. These events have set in motion a
continuing and dramatic movement toward
full decolonization in Portuguese Africa.
More recently, meetings held in Zambia in-
volving the various political forces on the
Rhodesian scene have raised hopes that a
solution to the Rhodesian issue acceptable
to a majority of the people may soon be

February 3, 1975

161

negotiated. These developments, we believe,
must necessarily impel South Africa to re-
examine its basic policies regarding Namibia
in light of the new realities.

The position of my government on the
Namibian question is clear and unequivocal.
We have informed the Government of South
Africa of our views on this issue and will
continue to do so when appropriate. We
believe that there is an urgent need to re-
solve this longstanding and contentious is-
sue peacefully and as soon as possible.

We are encouraged by recent indications
that South Africa may be reviewing its
policies in Namibia. The South African Gov-
ernment has announced that the people of
Namibia will be called upon to decide their
own future, that all options including full
independence are open to them, and that
the people of the territory may exercise
their right to self-determination "consider-
ably sooner" than the 10-year forecast made
by the South African Foreign Minister in
1973.

We believe that a peaceful and realistic
solution should be sought now. We under-
stand that a meeting is planned between
representatives of various groups in the
territory and the leaders of the white popu-
lation to discuss the constitutional develop-
ment of the territory. We believe no signifi-
cant element of the Namibian people or of
Namibian political life should be excluded.

However, as much as we welcome the
changes in recent South African Govern-
ment statements on Namibia, we wish to
state in all candor our view that these state-
ments lack necessary precision and detail.
It is this very precision, along with positive
actions, which is required to lay to rest the
skepticism with which South African pro-
nouncements on Namibia have been received
in many quarters. What is called for is a
specific, unequivocal statement of South
Africa's intention with regard to the terri-
tory. We urge that government to make
known as soon as possible its plans to permit
the people of Namibia to exercise their right
to self-determination in the near future.

We further favor the development of re-

newed contacts between the Secretary Gen-
eral and the South African Government to
assist South Africa in arranging for the
exercise of self-determination. The construc-
tive involvement of the United Nations and
the Secretary General can be of significant
importance to assure an orderly transition
of power in the territory, which is to every-
one's benefit. We also believe South Africa
should abolish discriminatory laws and prac-
tices and encourage freer political expres-
sion within the whole territory.

While awaiting further South African
clarification of its Namibian policy, the
United States will continue to adhere to its
present policy with regard to the territory.
As we have since 1970, we will continue to
discourage U.S. investment in Namibia and
deny Export-Import Bank guarantees and
other facilities for trade with Namibia. We
will continue to withhold U.S. Government
protection of U.S. investments, made on the
basis of rights acquired through the South
African Government after 1966, against the
claims of a future lawful government of
Namibia. This policy reflects our belief that
South Africa should act quickly and posi-
tively to end its illegal occupation of Nami-
bia.

In addition, we are pleased that we were
able to join together in advance consulta-
tions with members of the African group
to adopt this important new resolution.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION'

The Security Couttcil,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145
(XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South
Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia,
and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 1967, which estab-
lished a United Nations Council for Namibia, as
well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia,
in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 Decem-
ber 1974,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968)
of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968,
264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12
August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970)

'U.N. doc. S RES 366 (1974); adopted by the
Council unanimously on Dec. 17.

162

Department of State Bulletin

of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July
1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of
20 October 1971 and 310 (1972) of 4 February
1972, which confirmed General Assembly decisions.

Recalling the advisory opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South
Africa is under obligation to withdraw its pres-
ence from the Territory,

Concerned about South Africa's continued il-
legal occupation of Namibia and its persistent re-
fusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of
the General Assembly and the Security Council,
as well as the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal re-
pression of the Namibian people and its persistent
violation of their human rights, as well as its
efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial
integrity of Namibia,

1. Condemns the continued illegal occupation of
the Territory of Namibia by South Africa ;

2. Condemns the illegal and arbitrary applica-
tion by South Africa of racially discriminatory
and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;

3. Demands that South Africa make a solemn
declaration that it will comply with the resolutions
and decisions of the United Nations and the ad-
visory opinion of the International Court of Jus-
tice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and
that it recognizes the territorial integrity and
unity of Namibia as a nation, such declaration to
be addressed to the Security Council of the United
Nations;

4. Demands that South Africa take the necessary
steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with
resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969), of its il-
legal administration maintained in Namibia and to
transfer power to the people of Namibia with the
assistance of the United Nations;

5. Demands further that South Africa, pending
the transfer of powers provided for in the preced-
ing paragraph:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, in-
cluding those imprisoned or detained in connexion
with offences under so-called internal security laws,
whether such Namibians have been charged or
tried or are held without charge and whether held
in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all
racially discriminatory and politically repressive
laws and practices, particularly bantustans and
homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians
currently in exile for political reasons full facili-
ties for return to their country without risk of
arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to
meet on or before 30 May 1975 for the purpose of
reviewing South Africa's compliance with the
terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-
compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of
considering the appropriate measures to be taken
under the Charter.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC),
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.'
Accession deposited: New Zealand (with declara-
tion), December 23, 1974.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of pho-
nograms against unauthorized duplication of
their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29,
1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the
United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Xotification from World Intellectual Property

Organization that ratification deposited: India,

November 12. 1974.
E:ctension by the United Kingdom to: Bermuda,

British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibral-

ter. Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Montserrat, St.

Lucia, and Seychelles, December 4, 1974.

Postal

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general reg-
ulations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo No-
vember 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971,
except for article V of the additional protocol,
which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS
7150.

Ratifications deposited: Argentina (with declara-
tions), November 6, 1974; Cameroon, Novem-
ber 21, 1974; Cuba, July 4, 1974; Nigeria,
February 6, 1974.
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree-
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force

^ Not in force.

February 3, 1975

163

July 1, 1971; for the United States December

31, 1971. TIAS 7236.

Approval deposited: Argentina, November 6, 1974.

Property — Industrial

Nice aKreenient concerning the international clas-
sification of goods and services for the purposes
of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered
into force March 18, 1970; for the United States
May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.

Xo'tificatioii from World Intellectual Property
OrgaiiUatioii that ratification deposited: Bel-
gium, November 12, 1974.
Notification from World Intellectual Propertii
Organization that accession deposited: Luxem-
bourg, December 24, 1974.
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20. 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Notification from World Intellectual Property
Organisation that ratifications deposited: Bel-
gium, November 12, 1974; Dahomey, December
12, 1974; Luxembourg, Poland," South Af-
rica," December 24, 1974.
Notification from World Intellectual Property
Organization that accession deposited: Brazil,-'
December 24, 1974.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July
14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for
the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, October 31,
1974; Dahomey, December 9, 1974; Luxem-
bourg, December 19, 1974; Poland, South Af-
rica, December 23, 1974.
Accession deposited: Brazil, December 20, 1974.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: Greece, December 17, 1974.

International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1974. Done at London November 1, 1974.'
Signature: Argentina, December 12, 1974.'

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973.'
Signatures: Guatemala, December 12, 1974;
United Kingdom, December 13, 1974; Yugo-
slavia, December 17, 1974.

BILATERAL

Israel

Agreement amending the agreement of July 12,
1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079,
5723, 5909, 6071), for cooperation concerninu
civil uses of atomic energy, with related notes.
Signed at Washington January 13, 1975. Enters
into force on the date on which each govern-
ment shall have received from the other written
notification that it has complied with all statu-
tory and constitutional requirements for entry
into force.

Romania

Agreement on cooperation and exchanges in the
cultural, educational, scientific and technological
fields. Signed at Bucharest December 13, 1974.
Entered into force January 1, 1975.

Uruguay

Agreement relating to payment to the United
States of the net proceeds from the sale of de-
fense articles by Uruguay. Effected by exchange
of notes at Montevideo December 11 and 30,
1974. Entered into force December 30, 1974; ef-
fective July 1, 1974.

' Not in force.

- With a reservation.

' Articles 1 through 12 excepted.

' Subject to ratification.

164

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX February 3, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1858

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating

to Foreign Policy 145

Economic Affairs

Oil Cargo Preference Bill Vetoed by President

Ford (memorandum of disapproval) . . . 138

U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (Percy, text
of resolution) 146

Energy. The State of the Union (excerpts) . 133

Law of the Sea. U.S. Urges Early Conclusion
of Law of the Sea Treaty (Stevenson) . . 153

Namibia. U.S. Deplores Continued Occupation
of Namibia by South Africa (Scali, text
of resolution) 161

Presidential Documents

Oil Cargo Preference Bill Vetoed by President

Ford 138

President Ford Signs Trade Act of 1974 . . 137
The State of the Union (excerpts) .... 133

South Africa. U.S. Deplores Continued Occu-
pation of Namibia by South Africa (Scali,
text of resolution) 161

Trade. President Ford Signs Trade Act of

1974 (remarks) 137

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 163

United Nations

U.N. General Assembly Approves Definition
of Aggression (Bennett, Rosenstock, text
of resolution) 155

U.S. Declines To Participate in U.N. Special

Fund (Ferguson) 160

U.S. Deplores Continued Occupation of Na-
mibia by South Africa (Scali, text of reso-
lution) 161

U.S. Urges Early Conclusion of Law of the

Sea Treaty (Stevenson) 153

U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (Percy, text
of resolution) 146

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
ence of January 14 139

Viet-Nam. U.S. Protests North Viet-Nam's
Violations of Peace Accords (note to partic-
ipants in International Conference on Viet-
Nam and members of ICCS) 144

Name Index

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 155

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 160

Ford, President 133, 137, 138

Kissinger, Secretary 139

Percy, Charles H 146

Rosenstock, Robert 155

Scali, John 161

Stevenson, John R 153

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.

Subject

12 1/13 Diplomatic note on Viet-Nam

agreement.

13 1/14 Kissinger: news conference.

*14 1/15 Regional Foreign Policy Confer-
ence, San Diego, Jan. 23.

*15 1/16 U.S. -Malaysia textile agreements
extended.

i"15 1/16 Kissinger: interview with Bill
Moyers.

*17 1/16 American scholars visit Carib-
bean.

♦18 1/17 U.S.-Canadian officials meet on ef-
fects of Garrison Diversion Unit.

* Not printed.

1 Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

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■3:

'^//8^?

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXn

No. 1859

February 10, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR "BILL MOYERS' JOURNAL" 165

AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000
Address by Under Secretary Sisco 182

THE ENERGY CRISIS AND EFFORTS TO ASSURE ITS SOLUTION
Address by Assistant Secretai'y Hartman 189

M-.pr

DEPOSITORY

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POUCY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN*

Vol. LXXII, No. 1859
February 10, 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printingr Office

Washingrton, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes.

domestic $42.50. foreign $63.15

Sine:le copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication
approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).
Note' Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN.'
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

i

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill Moyers' Journal'

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Kissinger by Bill Moyers on
January 15 for the Public Broadcast Service
series "Bill Moyers' Journal: International
Re/port."

Press release 16 dated January 16

Mr. Moyers: Mr. Secretary, I was think-
ing coming down here of a conversation we
had when you were teaching at Harvard in
1968, six months before you came to the
White House. You had a very reasonably
clear view, a map of the world iti your mind
at that time, a ivorld based on the stability
brought about by the main poivers. I am
wondering what that map is like in yovr
mind now of the world.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I thought at the
time, and I still do, that you cannot have a
peaceful world without most of the coun-
tries, and preferably all of the countries,
feeling that they have a share in it. This
means that those countries that have the
greatest capacity to determine peace or war
— that is, the five major centers — be reason-
ably agreed on the general outlines of what
that peace should be like. But at the same
time, one of the central facts of our period
is that more than 100 nations have come
into being in the last 15 years, and they, too,
must be central participants in this process.
So that for the first time in history foreign
policy has become truly global and therefore
truly complicated.

Mr. Moyers: What about the fow of wealth
to countries in the Middle East? Hasn't that
upset considerably the equilibrium that you
thought would be possible between the five
centers of poiver?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the world that
we all knew in 1968, when you and I talked,
is extraordinarily diff'ei-ent today. At that
time we had the rigid hostility between the
Communist world and the non-Communist
world. At that time Communist China, the
People's Republic of China, was outside the
mainstream of events. And at that time, you
are quite right, the oil-producing countries
were not major factors. The change in influ-
ence of the oil-producing countries, the flow
of resources to the oil-producing countries
in the last two years in a way that was un-
expected and is unprecedented, is a major
change in the international situation to
which we are still in the process of attempt-
ing to adjust.

Mr. Moyers: All of these changes brought
to mind something you once ivrote. You said
"statesmen know the future, they feel it in
their bones, but they are incapable of proving
the truth of their vision." And I am tvo7ider-
ing, what are your bones telling you now
about the future, with all of these new forces
at work?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I feel we are
at a watershed. We are at a period which
in retrospect is either going to be seen as a
period of extraordinary creativity or a pe-
riod when really the international order
came apart, politically, economically, and
morally.

I believe that with all the dislocations we
now experience, there also exists an extraor-
dinary opportunity to form for the first time
in history a truly global society, carried by
the pi'inciple of interdependence. And if we
act wisely and with vision, I think we can
look back to all this turmoil as the birth

February 10, 1975

165

pangs of a more creative and better system.
If we miss the opportunity, I think there is
going to be chaos.

Mr. Moyers: But at the same time the
opportunity exists, as you yourself have said,
the political problem is that the Western
world — and this is a direct quote of yours—
is suffering "from inner uncertainty" and a
sense of misdirection.' What is causing that
imier uncertainty? Is it external, is it in-
ternal, or is it siynply we don't know rvhat
we really tvant to do?

Secretary Kissinger: Bill, I think you are
quite right. The aspect of contemporary hfe
that worries me most is the lack of purpose
and direction of so much of the Western
world. There are many reasons for this. The
European countries have had to adjust in
this century to two world wars, to an enor-
mous change in their position, to a dramatic,
really social revolution in all of them — and
now to the process of European unification.

The new countries are just beginning to
develop a coherent picture of the interna-
tional world, having spent most of their
energies gaining independence.

And in the United States, we have had a
traumatic decade — the assassination of a
President and his brother, the Viet-Nam
war, the Watergate period.

So we have this great opportunity, at a
moment when the self-confidence in the
whole Western world has been severely
shaken.

On the other hand, as far as the United
States at least is concerned, I believe we are
a healthy country, and I believe we are
capable of dealing with the problem that I
have described creatively.

Mr. Moyers: But you also used a "per-
haps" in that statement. You said that every
country in the Western world is suffering
from inner uncertainty with the exception
perhaps of the United States. And I am
xvondering why you brought in the "per-
haps."

' For the transcript of an interview with Secre-
tary Kissinger for Business Week magazine, see
Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1975, p. 97.

Secretary Kissinger: Because no countr\
can go through what the United States has
gone through without suffering, on the one
hand, some damage but also gaining in wis-
dom. I think it is the process of growing up
to learn one's limits and derive from that a
consciousness of what is possible within
these limits.

Through the greater part of our history
we felt absolutely secure. In the postwar
period we emerged from a victorious war
with tremendous resources. Now the last
decade has taught America that we cannot
do everything and that we cannot achieve
things simply by wishing them intensely.
On the other hand, while that has been a
difficult experience for us, it also should have
given us a new sense of perspective.

So I used the word "perhaps" because our
reaction to these experiences will determine
how we will master the future. But I am
really quite confident that if we act in con-
cert, and if we regain — as I think we can
and must — our national consensus, that we
can do what is necessary.

Progress Toward Consensus on Energy

Mr. Moyers: In the postwar world, the
consensus between Europe and America was
built around a common defense against a
mutual danger. That has disappeared. The
defense structure is very weak in the West
at the moment, and a new factor, the eco-
nomic imperative, has arisen. Europe and
Japan are much more dependent, for exam-
ple, on Middle Eastern oil than we are.
Doesn't that make them less dependable as
members of this new consensus?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not. Bill,
agree that the defense is weak. Actually, we
have had considerable success in building a
quite strong defensive system between us
and Europe and between us and Japan —
especially between us and Europe. The diffi-
culty is that the perception of the threat
has diminished and so many new problems
have arisen that simply a common defense is
not enough by itself to provide the cement
of unity.

166

Department of State Bulletin

You pointed out the economic problem. It
is an interesting fact that in April 1973 I
called for the economic unity of the indus-
trialized countries. At that time this was
rejected as carrying the alliance much too
far. Today every one of our friends insists
that we coordinate our economic policies,
because they recognize that their prosperity
depends on our economic programs.

Now, the problem of relations to the oil
producers, for example, has in Europe and
in Japan evoked a much greater sense of
vulnerability than in the United States, be-
cause it is based on fact.

Mr. Moyers: Wouldn't we be worried if
7oe ivere in their position?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely. I am not
criticizing either the Europeans or the
Japanese for their reaction. We have at-
tempted to create in them a sense that to-
gether with us we can master the energy
problem. And in all the discussions of con-
servation, recycling, alternative sources of
energy, financial solidarity, there are many
technical solutions. We have always chosen
the one that in our judgment has the great-
est potential to give our friends a sense that
they can master their fate and to overcome
the danger of impotence which is a threat
at one and the same time to their interna-
tional as well as to their domestic positions.
This process is not yet completed. And as
we go through it, there are many ups and
downs.

On the other hand, we have to remember
it is only one year since the Washington
Energy Conference has been called — less
than a year. In that time an International
Energy Agency has been created, a con-
servation program has been agreed to,
emergency sharing has been developed for
the contingency of new embargoes.

I am absolutely confident that within a
very short time, a matter of weeks, we will
have agreed on financial solidarity. And
within a month we will make proposals on
how to develop alternative resources.

One of the problems is that each country
is so concerned with its domestic politics

that these very important events are coming
to pass in a very undramatic manner and in
a way that does not galvanize the sort of
support that the Marshall plan did. But the
achievements, in my view, have not been
inconsiderable and may be in retrospect seen
as the most significant events of this period.

Mr. Moyers: Is it conceivable to expect
Europe and Japan to go with tis on our
Middle Eastern policy when they have to get
most of their oil from the OPEC [Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Coimtries]
countries and ice do not?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is not only
conceivable— I think it is, above all, in their
own interests. Because we have to under-
stand what is our Middle East policy.

Our Middle East policy is to enable Europe
and Japan to put themselves into the maxi-
mum position of invulnerability toward out-
side pressures but at the same time to en-
gage in a dialogue with the producers to
give eff'ect to the principle of interdepend-
ence on a global basis.

We recognize — in fact, we were the first
to advance the proposition — that the oil pro-
ducers must have a sense that the arrange-
ments that are made are not only just but
are likely to be long lasting.

We have pursued a dialogue with the pro-
ducers on the most intensive basis. We have
set up commissions with Iran and Saudi
Arabia, and we have very close relationships
in economic discussions with Algeria and
other countries in which we are trying to
relate our technical know-how to their re-
sources and in which we are attempting to
demonstrate that jointly we can progress
to the benefit of all of mankind.

Now, we are prepared later this year, as
soon as some common positions have been
developed with the consumers, on the basis
of the discussions we had with the French
President at Martinique, to have a multi-
lateral talk between consumers and pro-
ducers. And therefore our vision of what
should happen is a cooperative arrangement
between consumers and producers. And I
believe that it is in the interests of Europe

February 10, 1975

167

and Japan to participate in this, and their
actions indicate that they believe that, too.

Relations With Developing Countries

Mr. Moijers: Does your concept of inter-
dependence stop with the regional interde-
pendence of the industrial world, the indus-
trial consumers, or do you go far enough
to include the global interdependence that
comes from the billion people in the southern
half of the globe who feel excluded from the
discussions that are going on with the oil-
producing countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, our idea
includes as an essential component the
billion people in the southern half of the
globe. And again, if I may remind you, at the
Washington Energy Conference we made
clear that the cooperation among the con-
sumers should be followed by immediate
talks, first with the consuming less devel-
oped countries and then with the producing
countries. So the idea of a consumer-pro-
ducer dialogue was first advanced by us.

But we are happy to go along with the
Fi'ench proposal if and when, which we be-
lieve will be fairly soon, the essential pre-
requisites have been met.

But obviously a world in which the vast
majority of mankind does not feel that its
interests and purposes are recognized can-
not be a stable world. And therefore we
have continually supported foreign aid. We
have this week put before the Finance Min-
isters of the International Monetary Fund
that is meeting here the importance of
creating a special trust fund for the less
developed countries that have been hard hit
by rising oil prices. And we believe that they
must be an essential part of the community
I am talking about.

Mr. Moyers: Our foreign aid program,
which you raised, has been about constant
the last few years and therefore in real dol-
lars is down.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Mr, Moyers: We — almost virtually alone

among the industrial nations — have not
helped the underdeveloped world with its
manufactured goods on our tariff policy. A
lot of the food that we are giving right notv
is going into political areas, strategical areas,
lather than humanitarian areas. The Brazil-
ians and Indians say we are excluding them
from the definition of "consumer." And the
impression you get from talking to repre-
sentatives of the developing world is that
they really do not agree that we are very
conscious of their consideration and needs.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think quite
honestly there is a difference between what
they say publicly and what they say privately.

It is a fact that in many of the less devel-
oped countries it is politically not unhelpful
to seem to be at least aloof from the most
powerful country in the world and to give the
impression that one is not dominated by this
colossus. And therefore the rhetoric of many
of these countries is much more strident than
the reality of their foreign policy.

Now, it is true that the American people
have been disillusioned by some of their ex-
periences in international affairs. And inev-
itably during a recession it is difficult to
mobilize public support for a very large
foreign aid program. And these are obstacles
with which we contend.

Now, with respect to the tariff preferences.
More restrictions were put on them by the
Congress than we thought wise. And some
of the penalties that were attached to par-
ticular groupings affected countries like
Ecuador which really are members of the
oil-producing cartel by courtesy only or
countries like Venezuela with which we have
a long tradition of Western Hemisphere
solidarity. And we have regretted these par-
ticular limitations. In addition, there have
been restrictions on certain products about
which Brazil and India complain that affect
these countries unfavorably.

We have indicated that after we have had
an opportunity to study it we would bring
to the attention of the Congress the special
inequities that have been caused by this leg-
islation.

168

Department of State Bulletin

On the other hand, I cannot accept your
statement that this legislation does not per-
mit additional access of industrial goods. For
example, Mexico, which yesterday pointed
out some of the inequities to us, nevertheless
benefits to the extent of $350 million of its
products in the U.S. market by the new
Trade Act. And I am sure a similar study
could be made for Brazil and India and other
countries.

So while we don't think the Trade Act
went as far as we should have wished, I
think it went generally in the right direction.
And we are determined to work with Con-
gress to improve it.

But your question suggests a more funda-
mental problem. Many of these new countries
— this doesn't apply to the Latin American
countries — but many of the new countries
formed their identity in opposition to the
industrial countries, and they are caught in
a dilemma. Their rhetoric is a rhetoric of
confrontation. The reality is a reality of in-
terdependence. And we have seen in the
United Nations and elsewhere that the rhet-
oric doesn't always match the necessities.
And one of the problems of international
order is to bring them closer together.

Approaches to World Food Problem

Mr. Moyers: One of the issues they point
to, for example, is the fact that the oil-
producing countries have recently allocated
some $2 billion in aid to these UO or so poor
countries in the world. That is roughly the
amount of the increase in the price these
countries are paying for oil. They are paying
us about a billion dollars more for food and
fertilizer. And yet we have not adjusted our
assistance to them to compensate for this.
So they say they are being driven into a
"tyranny of the majority" by turning to
the OPEC countries fm- the kind of assist-
ance that interdependence makes necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: Well I don't think it
is correct that we are not adjusting. For
example, our P.L. 480 program, which is
our food contribution, is on the order of

about $1.5 billion, or almost that large. And
we have opted, after all the discussions, for
the highest proposal that was made, or sub-
stantially the highest proposal.

I also don't agree with you that we are
giving most of our food aid for strategic
purposes.

Mr. Moyers: I didn't say "most." I didn't
mean to say "most." I mean a substantial
amount.

Secretary Kissinger: We are giving some
in countries in which political relationships
are of importance to us. And it stands to
reason that when a country has a vital re-
source that it keeps in mind the degree of
friendship that other countries show for it
before it distributes this resource, essentially
on a grant basis.

But the vast majority — the considerable
majority of our food aid goes for humani-
tarian purposes. And even in those countries
where political considerations are involved,
those are still countries with a very real and
acute food shortage.

Mr. Moyers: You said recently that we
have to be prepared to pay some domestic
price for our international position. More
food aid is going to mean increased prices
at home. And I am wondering what are
some of the other prices you anticipate
Americans are going to have to be paying
because of this international position.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think first of
all we have to understand that what seems
to be a domestic price in the long term is
the best investment we can make, because
if the United States lives in a hostile world,
the United States lives in a depressed world;
then inevitably, given our dependence on the
raw materials of the world and given our
essential interest in peace, in the long term
we will suffer.

We have to recognize domestically, first
of all, that foreign aid programs, as they are
now being developed, are in our interest;
secondly, that in developing such programs
as financial solidarity and conservation of
energy, even though they are painful, they

February 10, 1975

169

are absolutely essential for the United States
to be able to play a major role internation-
ally and to master its domestic problems.
And of course we have to be prepared to
pay the price for national security.

Mr. Morje7-s: In Europe recently I found
so7ne feeling of concern that the e7nphasis
on interdependence, and because of the ec-
onomic and energy crisis in particular, is
going to bring an alignment of the old rich,
the industrial nations, against the new rich,
the oil nations and commodity nations, at
the exclusion of the poor. And if I hear you
correctly, you are saying we cannot let that
happen.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, we
are not talking of an alliance of the old rich
against the new rich, because we are seeking
cooperation between the old rich and the
new rich. Both need each other. And neither
can really prosper or, indeed, survive except
in an atmosphere of cooperation. And it
seems to us that the old rich and the new
rich must cooperate in helping the poor part
of the world.

Take the problem of food, which you men-
tioned. There is no way the United States
can feed the rest of the world. And from
some points of view, the level of our food aid
has mostly a symbolic significance, because
the ultimate solution to the food problem
depends on raising the productivity of the
less developed countries. This requires fer-
tilizer, help in distribution, and similar proj-
ects. This in turn can only be done through
the cooperation of the technical know-how
of the old rich with the new resources of
the new rich.

And we will, within the next two months,
make a very concrete proposal of how all of
this can be put together to increase dras-
tically the food production in the poor part
of the world.

Dislocations Caused by High Oil Prices

Mr. Moyers: What about the psychological
adjustment that all of this is causing us to
make? Does it disturb you that a handful
of Arab sheikhs in a sense have so much

new power and so much dominance on the
ivorld scene?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a new fact to
which we all have to adjust, including the
oil-producing countries. But I think that, on
the whole, everybody is trjMng to deal with
these long-range problems in a cooperative
spirit, although of course obviously the level
of experience in dealing with global problems
differs between various nations.

Mr. Moyers: Is our specific purpose of
our policy toward the oil-producing countries
to arrest the flow of wealth to them?

Secretary Kissinger: No. Our concern is
that the flow of wealth, which is inevitable,
is channeled in such a way that it does not
disrupt the international — the well-being of
all the rest of the world.

If you take countries like Iran, for ex-
ample, or Algeria, that use most of their
wealth for their own development, which
means in effect that they are spending the
energy income in the industrialized part of
the world, this is not a basically disruptive
effect. It has certain dislocations. But I think
this is not basically disruptive.

What presents a particular problem is in
those areas where the balances accumulate
and where the investment of large sums or
the shifting around of large sums can pro-
duce economic crises that are not necessarily
intended; this makes the problem of finding
financial institutions which can handle these
tremendous sums — $60 billion in one year,
which is more than our total foreign invest-
ment over 100 years, just to give one a sense
of the magnitude — to have those sums in-
vested in a way that does not produce eco-
nomic chaos.

Mr. Moyers: What are the consequences
if we don't find those international mone-
tary structures?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the
consequences will be rampant inflation, the
potential economic collapse of some of the
weaker nations, and the long-term backlash,
economically, will be on the oil producers as
well as on the consumers. But I am confident

170

Department of State Bulletin

we will find the institutions, and I think you
will find that the discussions of the Finance
Ministers taking place this week are making
very substantial progress in developing these
financial institutions.

Mr. Moyers: Some people have said that
we are on the edge of a global economic
crisis akin to that of the 1930' s. I know you
ivere just a boy in the 1930' s. But that part
of your life you remember quite well. Do you
see similarities?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't understand
too much about economics at that time. I was
better versed in football than economics. But
I think there are similarities in the sense
that when you are faced with economic diflfi-
culties, you have the choice of retreating
into yourself or trying to find a global solu-
tion. Retreating into yourself is a defensive
attitude which, over a period of time, accel-
erates all the difficulties that led you to do
it in the first place.

I think our necessity is to find a global
solution. It is our necessity and our oppor-
tunity. And in many ways we are on the
way to doing it. Although with all the de-
bates that are going on, this is not always
apparent.

Mr. Moyers: Isn't what is happening in
the Middle East, and particidarly the flow
of ivealth to the Middle Eastern oil-pro-
ducing cotmtries, simply an adjustment of
history? Isn't it a rhythm of history? Wasn't
it natural that when they finally got control
of their own oil production they would use it
for their oivn benefits?

Secretary Kissinger: That was inevitable.
I don't know whether it was inevitable that
God would place the oil in exactly those
places.

Mr. Moyers: Or that he would place the
Arabs there.

Secretary Kissinger: But once it was
placed there, it was inevitable that sooner
or later these trends would develop. And
we are not fighting these trends.

Mr. Moyers: But the price was kept down

for four decades by Western control of the
production of oil. That is gone.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want
to speculate about what kept the price down,
because it could happen that the price will
go down again. This depended on the re-
lationship of supply and demand in a very
important way. The oil resources of the
Middle East were so vast compared to the
energy requirements of the world that that
kept the price down. It was only in the last
decade — when I came to Washington in 1969
people were still talking about oil surplus,
and they were still talking about how to
restrict the importation of foreign oil lest
the prices go down even more — it is only in
the last six years that there has been such a
dramatic increase in the energy requirements
that the opportunity for raising the prices
existed.

I believe that before then there was — it
was roughly in balance between supply and
demand.

Mr. Moyers: You talk about the solidarity
of consumers in dealing with and negotiating
with the oil-producing companies. What will
that solidarity produce; what economic pres-
sure, Mr. Secretary, do we have on the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is a
question of economic pressure. I think there
are two possibilities. Right now every con-
sumer, or every group of consumers, has its
own dialogue going on with the producers.
It is not that there is no dialogue going on.
There is a European dialogue with the
Arabs. There is an American dialogue going
on with both Arab countries and with Iran.
The question is whether a multilateral con-
ference, that is to say, getting all consumers
together with all of the producers, how that
can advance matters. In our view it can
advance matters only if the consumers do
not repeat at such a conference all the dis-
agreements that they already have. I believe
that in such a conference, if both sides are
well prepared, one should address the ques-
tion of long-term supply. That is to give the
oil producers an assurance that they will
have a market for a fairly long future.

February 10, 1975

171

There has to be some discussion about
price. There has to be some discussion about
international facilities, both for the beneiit
of the poor countries and to make sure that
the investments are channeled in such a way
that they do not produce economic crisis.

We are working hard on all of these
issues, and we believe all of them are solu-
ble in a constructive manner.

Mr. Moyers: And you don't believe that
pressure is the ivay.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that
pressure will — that in such a negotiation,
that such a negotiation can be based upon
pressure. But each side, obviously, has to
be aware of its own interests and has to
defend its own interests in a reasonable
manner. We don't blame the producers for
doing it, and they cannot blame the con-
sumers for doing it. But the attitude must
be cooperative, conciliatory, and looking for
a long-term solution.

Mr. Moyers: Do you think the oil-produc-
ing countries have an interest in that kind
of negotiation — dialogue ?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the
vast majority of them do.

Question of Use of Force

Mr. Moyers: Well, if pressure isn't that
important a part of the scenario, I need to
ask you what did you have in mind when
you gave that intervietv to Business Week
and talked about the possible strangulation
of the West? What ivas going through your
mind at just that minute?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, the
sentence that has attracted so much atten-
tion is too frequently taken totally out of
context, and it was part of a very long inter-
view in which I put forward essentially the
conception that I have developed here; that
is to say, of a cooperative relationship be-
tween the consumers and producers. In addi-
tion, I made clear that political and economic
warfare, or military action, is totally in-
appropriate for the solution of oil prices.

recycling problems, et cetera. The contin-
gency, and the only contingency, to which
I addressed myself was an absolutely hypo-
thetical case in which the actual strangula-
tion of the entire industrialized world was
being attempted ; in other words, in which
the confrontation was started by the pro-
ducers.

I have said repeatedly, and I want to say
now, I do not believe that such an event is
going to happen. I was speaking hypotheti-
cally about an extreme situation. It would
have to be provoked by other countries.

I think it is self-evident that the United
States cannot permit itself to be strangled.
But I also do not believe that this will really
be attempted. And therefore we were talk-
ing about a hypothetical case that all our
efforts are attempting to avoid and that we
are confident we can avoid.

We were not talking, as is so loosely said,
about the seizure of oilfields. That is not
our intention. That is not our policy.

Mr. Moyers: What intrigues so many
people, it seems to me, was that, a few days
before, you had given a similar interview to
Neivsioeek and much the same thing has been
said with no particular alarm. Then a feir
days later a similar statement is made, and
it is seized upon. And some of us thought
perhaps you had calcidated between the first
interview and the second interview to be
more precise in some kind of message.

Secretary Kissinger: I was astonished
when this was seized upon. We were not the
ones who spread it. I think there ai-e many
people who have spread this around, frankly,
in order to sow some dispute between us
and the oil producers.

Our whole policy toward the producers
has been based on an eff"ort of achieving co-
operation. We have spent tremendous efforts
to promote peace in the Middle East pre-
cisely to avoid confrontations. We were
talking about a very extreme case, about
which only the most irresponsible elements
among producers are even speaking, and it
is not our policy to use military force to
settle any of the issues that we are now
talking about.

172

Department of State Bulletin

Mr. Moyers: But neither, if I understand
your philosophical view of diplomacy, can a
power ever rule out any contingency.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, no nation can
announce that it will let itself be strangled
without reacting. And I find it very difficult
to see what it is that people are objecting
to. We are saying the United States will not
permit itself or its allies to be strangled.

Somebody else would have to make the
first move to attempt the strangulation. It
isn't being attempted now.

Mr. Moyers: Well, I was in Europe about
the time and some of them almost came out
of their skins, because depending as they do
on Middle East oil, and with our troops on
their soil, they could see a confrontation
between us and the oil-producing countries
that tvould have them the innocent bystander
and victim. That is ivhy they seized upon it.

Secretary Kissinger: I find it difficult to
understand how they would want to an-
nounce "please strangle us." We did not say
— and I repeat here — that any of the issues
that are now under discussion fall into this
category. There would have to be an overt
move of an extremely drastic, dramatic, and
aggressive nature before this contingency
could ever be considered.

Mr. Moyers: Who, Mr. Secretary, has a
stake in division bettveen ?<s and the oil-pro-
ducing countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I think there are
many forces, and I don't want to speculate
on that.

Middle East Diplomacy

Mr. Moyers: Let me ask you this. I am
curious not about hoiv you see a possible final
solution in the Middle East but by what in
history ayid in your oivn philosophy makes
you believe that people ivho have fought so
bitterly over so long a period of time can
ever settle a confict like that peaceably.

Secretary Kissinger: If you are in my posi-
tion, you often find yourself in a situation
where as a historian you would say the

problem is insoluble and yet as a statesman
you have absolutely no choice except to at-
tempt to settle it. Because what is the alter-
native? If we say there is no solution, then
another war is guaranteed. Then the con-
frontation between oil producers and con-
sumers that it is our policy to attempt to
avoid will be magnified — the risk of this will
be magnified. The danger of a confrontation
between the Soviet Union and the United
States will be increased.

And therefore, with all the difficulties and
with all the anguish that is involved, we
must make a major effort to move step by
step toward a solution. And some progress
has already been made that most people
thought was difficult. And we find ourselves
often in a situation, and many national
leaders do, where if you attempt something
new, there is no historical precedent for it,
and you have to go on an uncharted road.

Mr. Moyers: You never announce that you
are giving up hope.

Secretary Kissinger: Not only can you not
announce you are giving up hope; you must
not give up hope. You must believe in what
you are doing.

Mr. Moyers: Is our step-by-step diplomacy
on the Middle East on track?

Secretary Kissinger: Our step-by-step di-
plomacy is facing increasing difficulties. As
one would expect, as you make progress you
get to the more difficult circumstances.

I believe we have an opportunity. I believe
that progress can be made. And I expect
that over the next months progress will be
made.

Mr. Moyers: In the ultimate extremity of
war, wouldn't the level of violence be in-
creased by the sale of arms we have made to
the Arabs and the arms we have shipped to
Israel? Aren't ive in a sense guaranteeing
that any war —

Secretary Kissinger: Well, none of the
states that are likely — none of the Arab
states likely to fight in a war have received
American arms. The sale of arms to Israel
is necessitated by the fact that the Arab

February 10, 1975

173

countries are receiving substantial supplies
from the Soviet Union and because the
security of Israel has been an American
objective in all American administrations
since the end of World War II.

Mr. Moyers: There is some confusion out
there as to whether or not you have s^js-
tematicaUy excluded the Soviets from play-
ing a peacekeeping role in the Middle East
and whether, if you have, this is to our ad-
vantage. Is it possible to have a solution
there that does not involve the Soviets?

Secretary Kissinger: A final solution must
involve the Soviet Union. And it has never
been part of our policy to exclude the Soviet
Union from a final solution. The individual
steps that have been taken have required —
have been based on the methods which we
judge most effective. And at the request of
all of the parties. We have proceeded in the
manner in which we have, but we have al-
ways kept the Soviet Union generally in-
formed of what we were doing.

Mr. Moyers: Is there any evidence that
under the general rubric of detente the
Soviets have been playing adversary politics
in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissiyiger: I think the Soviet
Union has not been exceptionally helpful,
but it has also not been exceptionally ob-
structive. And I do not believe it is correct
to say they have been playing adversary
politics.

Detente With the Soviet Union

Mr. Moyers: On the ivord "detente," I
wish you would define it for us.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the problem of
detente is often put as if the United States
were making concessions to the Soviet Union
in order to achieve peace. Basically the prob-
lem of detente, the necessity of detente, is
produced by the fact that nuclear war in this
period is going to involve a catastrophe for
all of humanity. When the decision of peace
and war involves the survival of tens of
millions of people, you are no longer playing
power politics in the traditional sense. And

for this reason, every American President
in the postwar period, no matter how differ-
ent their background, no matter what their
party, has sooner or later been driven to
making the problem of peace the central
preoccupation of his foreign policy. This is
the case also, obviously, in this administra-
tion.

We would like to leave a legacy of having
made the world safer than when we found
it, as must every administration. To conduct
confrontation politics where the stakes are
going to be determined by nuclear weapons
is the height of irresponsibility. This is
what we mean by detente. We have sought
systematically to improve political relations,
to increase trade relations in order to pro-
duce a maximum number of links between
us and the Soviet Union, and to create a
cooperative environment to reduce the dan-
gers of war.

Mr. Moyers: But in the 20 years immedi-
ately after World War II there ivas nuclear
peace, one could say. Every Secretary of
State has said ''That is my objective — 7iot to
have a nuclear ivar." What are the special
reasons for detente as a systematic policy?
What have we got from it, beyond nuclear
peace?

Secretary Kissinger: What we have got
from detente is — first of all, the situation in
Europe is more peaceful than it has ever
been. As late as the Kennedy administra-
tion, in the 1960's, there was a massive con-
frontation over Berlin between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Throughout
the sixties there was a confrontation be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union over the question of nuclear arms,
over the question of the ultimate shape of
the European arrangements, and over the
whole evolution of world policy.

In the last three years, European issues
have been substantially, if not settled, I
think substantially eased. In all parts of the
world except the Middle East, the United
States and the Soviet Union have pursued
substantially compatible and, in some cases,
cooperative policies. A trade relationship has
developed for the first time that would give

174

Department of State Bulletin

both countries an incentive — and especially
the Soviet Union — an incentive to conduct
moderate foreign policies. And most impor-
tantly, two major steps have been taken to
arrest the nuclear arms race. For the first
time, agreed ceilings exist to reduce the
danger — to eliminate the danger, in fact, or
at any rate to substantially reduce it — that
both sides will be raising or conducting an
arms race out of fear of what the other side
will do.

I think these are major steps forward
which must be built upon and which I am
confident will be built on, no matter who is
President in this country.

M7\ Moyers: I would like to come back in
just a moment to the Vladivostok agree-
ment. But before we leave detente, we
seem to be leaving it on very precarions legs,
with the announcement this tveek — if trade
is important — that the Soviet Union was not
going to fulfill the recent agreement on trade.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think it
is correct to say that the Soviet Union will
not fulfill the recent agreement on trade.
Unfortunately, the Congress has seen fit to
pass legislation that imposed on the Soviet
Union special conditions which were not
foreseeable when the trade agreement was
negotiated in 1972 and which the Soviet
Union considers an interference in its domes-
tic affairs.

We warned against this legislation for
two years. We went along with it only with
the utmost reluctance. And I think that
this event proves that it is absolutely essen-
tial for Congress and the executive to woi'k
out a common understanding of what is pos-
sible in foreign policy and what can be sub-
ject to legislation and what must be subject
to other forms of congressional advice and
consent.

Mr. Moyers: Did Congress kill the agree-
ment by imposing too strict a limitation?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to assess
blame. I believe that the legislative restric-
tions, coupled with the restriction on Exim
[Export-Import Bank] credits, had the effect
of causing the Soviet Union to reject the

agreement. We shared the objectives of
those in Congress who were pushing this
legislation. We differed with them as to
tactics and as to the suitability of enshrin-
ing these objectives in legislation. We were
prepared to make them part of our execu-
tive negotiations, and we had in fact brought
about an emigration of 35,000 before this
legislative attempt was made, and the emi-
gration now is lower than this.

But I repeat, as I said yesterday, that we
will go back to the Congress with the atti-
tude that both sides should learn from this
experience and with the recognition that as
a coequal partner they must have an impor-
tant part in shaping American foreign policy.

Mr. Moyers: Is detente on precarious legs
as a result of the events this week?

Secretary Kissinger: I think detente has
had a setback. But I think the imperative
that I described earlier — of preventing nu-
clear war, which in turn requires political
understanding — will enable us to move for-
ward again, and we will immediately begin
consultations with the Congress on how the
legislative and executive branch can cooper-
ate in implementing this.

Mr. Moyers: What is the proper relation-
ship between Congress and the conduct of
foreign policy? If I ivere a member of Con-
gress, I would be very wary, after the Bay
of Pigs and after the Gulf of Tonkin resolu-
tion, of giving the administration a blank
check.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Congress
is absolutely correct in insisting on legisla-
tive oversight over the conduct of foreign
policy. And I would say that no President
or Secretary of State, if he is wise, would
ask for a blank check, because the responsi-
bility is too great and in a democracy a
major foreign policy requires public sup-
port. You cannot have public support if you
do not have congressional support. So it is
in our interests to work in close partnership
with Congress.

What we have to work out with Congress
is the degree of oversight that a body that,
after all, contains over 550 members, or over

February 10, 1975

175

500 members, can properly exercise. I think
on the major directions of policy, con-
gressional oversight, even expressed in
legislative restrictions, is essential. We dis-
agree with those in the Congress who want
to cut off or limit aid to Viet-Nam, but we
do not challenge that this is a legitimate
exercise of congressional supervision.

The difficulties arise when the Congress
attempts to legislate the details of diplo-
matic negotiations, such as on the trade
bill, on Vladivostok, and other matters.
There we have to work out not a blank check
but an understanding by which Congress can
exercise its participation by means other
than forming legislation.

Vladivostok Agreement on Strategic Arms

Mr. Moijers: We have just a few minutes
left, Mr. Secretary. You raised the Vladi-
vostok agreement that puts a ceiling on the
number of launchers and MIRV'ed [multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicle]
missiles that both the Soviet Union and the
United States can have. The question being
raised is ivhat you have done is escalate the
equilibrium, the military equilibrium, at
xvhat appears to many people to be an un-
necessarily high level. Why couldn't ive just
stop?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say
that the people who say "unnecessarily high"
have never negotiated with the Soviet Union.
The level at which that has been set is 200
delivery vehicles below what the Soviet
Union already has. And therefore I find it
difficult to understand how they can say it
was escalated.

If we were willing to live with our present
forces when the Soviet Union had 2,600
missiles and bombers, then we should be able
to live with our present forces when the
Soviet Union will have under the agreement
only 2,400 missiles and bombers.

So there is nothing in the agreement that
forces us to build up. And there is something
in the agreement that forces the Soviet
Union to reduce. Whether we build up or not
is a strategic decision which we would have

to make in any event and which would face
us much more acutely under conditions of
an arms race.

So we put a ceiling on the Soviet arms de-
ployment below their present level, and
therefore it enables us to consider our ceil-
ings with less pressure than would be the
case otherwise.

Secondly, once a ceiling exists, both mili-
tary establishments can plan without the
fear that the other one will drive the race
through the ceiling, which is one of these
self-fulfilling prophecies which has fueled
the arms race.

Thirdly, once you have ceilings estab-
lished, the problem of reductions will become
much easier. The reason reductions are so
difficult now is when both sides are building
up, you never know against what yardsticks
to plan your reductions. And I am confident
that if the Vladivostok agreement is com-
pleted, it will be seen as one of the turning
points in the history of the post- World War
II arms race.

Mr. Moyers: What is the next step?

Secretary Kissinger: The next step is to
complete the Vladivostok agreement, on
which only a general understanding exists
up to now. Once that is completed, we will
immediately turn to negotiations on the re-
duction of armaments —

Mr. Moyers: The reduction of the ceilings?

Secretary Kissinger: The reduction of the
ceilings, both of MIRV's and of total num-
bers, and actually I believe this will be an
easier negotiation than the one which we
have just concluded at Vladivostok, be-
cause it is going to be difficult to prove that
when you already have an enormous capacity
to devastate humanity, that a few hundred
extra missiles make so much difference.

Mr. Moyers: The Vladivostok agreement
ivould run until 1985. Is it possible that re-
ductions in the ceilings could begin many
years before that?

Secretary Kissinger: In the aide memoire
that has been exchanged between us and

176

Department of State Bulletin

the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that
reduction in — that the negotiations on re-
ductions can start immediately upon the
completion of the other agreement. They
can start at any time before. They must
start no later than 1980, but they can start
at any time before then.

Mr. Moyers: To set aside the figures for a
moment, and put it in the way that laymen
ask me, ivhy do we keep on? This is going
to mean, eveyi if it does have a ceiling, more
money for defense — we are going ahead
xvith —

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me. The
agreement doesn't mean more money for
defense. More money for defense was inher-
ent in the arms race. The question that the
agreement poses is whether more should be
spent on top of what was already planned.
I do not believe that the agreement will
make it easier to reduce the spending.

Mr. Moyers: Do you see any end in the
foreseeable future to the arms race, both
nuclear and conventional?

Secretary Kissinger: One of my over-
whelming preoccupations has been to put an
end to the arms race. And the reason I have
been such a strong supporter of the SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negoti-
ations is to turn down the arms race. And I
believe that the Vladivostok agreement will
permit over the 10 years — will lead to re-
ductions that could involve substantial sav-
ings. And that will be our principal objective.

Morality and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy

Mr. Moyers: Just a couple of more ques-
tions. You wrote once, "An excessively prag-
matic policy luill be empty of vision and
humanity .... America cannot be true to
itself without moral purpose."^

One of the chief criticisms of your tenure
as Secretary of State in the last several

" For Secretary Kissinger's address before the
Pacem in Terris Conference at Washington, D.C.,
on Oct. 8, 1973, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1973.

years has been that we have been long on
expediency and pragmatism, and it may have
helped us strategically, but we have been
short of humanity — the invasion of Cam-
bodia, the bombing of Hanoi at Christmas,
the tilting in favor of Pakistan, the mainte-
yiance of a constant level of foreign assist-
ance, our preference for a change in the
Allende government [Salvador Allende of
Chile]. These all add up, your critics say, to
an excessively pragmatic policy, devoid of
humanity and vision.

Secretary Kissinger: Any statesman faces
the problem of relating morality to what
is possible. As long as the United States
was absolutely secure, behind two great
oceans, it could afford the luxury of moral
pronouncements — divorced from the reality
of the world in which other countries have
to make the decisions, or to make an impor-
tant part of the decisions, which determine
whether you can implement them.

I still agree with the statement that I
made some years ago. A purely pragmatic
policy is unsuited to the American charac-
ter and in any event leads to paralysis.

An excessively moralistic policy would be
totally devoid of contacts with reality and
would lead to empty posturing.

In foreign policy, you always face difficult
choices. And you always face the problem
that when you make your decision, you do
not know the outcome. So your moral con-
victions are necessary to give you the
strength to make the difficult choices when
you have no assurance of success.

Now, the particular events which you
mentioned, one could go into — it would
be impossible to do justice to it in the limited
time we have.

Several of them had to do with the con-
duct of the war in Viet-Nam. And there
really the criticism is between those who
wanted to end it more or less at any price
and those who believed that it was essential
to end it in a manner so that the American
people did not feel that all these efforts had
only led to a turning over by the United
States of people who had depended on it to

February 10, 1975

177

outside invasion. It is an issue that we will
not settle in this debate. But this was our
judgment from which the various military
moves flowed.

On the issue of how to vindicate human
rights in foreign countries, I think we have
never denied their importance. We have,
however, always claimed that we could
achieve our objectives more effectively,
quietly, without making it a confrontation.
This is why we never made anything of the
fact that between 1969 and 1973 we in-
creased Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union from 400 to 35,000 without ever an-
nouncing it. And I believe when all the
facts are out, it will turn out that a sub-
stantial number of the releases from Chilean
prisons were negotiated by the United States
without ever making anything of it, not
because we did not believe in these human
rights, but because we believed it would
facilitate the objective of implementing
these human rights if we did not make an
issue of it. So some of it concerns methods
toward agreed objectives.

Mr. Moyers: I think ivhat concerns a lot of
people is that ive are liable in our search for
stability to be linked ivith strong, authorita-
tive, unrepresentative governments at the
expense of open and more liberal govern-
ments. You say that is a necessity sometimes ?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very
difficult to make an abstract pronouncement
on that. Ideally we should be able to achieve
our objective by working with governments
whose basic values we support. But just as
during World War II we became allies of
Stalin, even though his values were quite
different from ours, so in some concrete
situations we occasionally find ourselves
under the necessity of choosing whether we
want to achieve important objectives with
governments of whose domestic policies we
do not approve or whether we sacrifice
those interests.

Sometimes we can make the wrong choice.
But it is important to recognize that it is a
difficult choice. Everybody in his own life

knows that the difficult issues are those
when two desirable objectives clash, or two
undesirable objectives clash, and you have
to choose the less undesirable. It is not a
black and white problem.

I understand the criticism that is being
made. But I think the critics should under-
stand that the day-to-day conduct of for-
eign policy is more complex than can be
encapsuled in a slogan.

Mr. Moyers: Finally, you have talked
about stable structures of peace, and you
have talked about institutionalizing the con-
duct of foreign policy. But if you are not the
Secretary of State for life, what will you
leave behind, and what do you care the most
about?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what I would
care most about is to leave behind a world
which is organically safer than the one I
found. By organically safer, I mean that has
a structure which is not dependent on con-
stant juggling and on tours de force for
maintaining the peace. But just as in the
period from 1945 to 1950 it can be said that
the United States constructed an interna-
tional system that had many permanent
features, as permanent features go in for-
eign policy — say a decade is a permanent
feature in foreign policy — so it would be
desirable to leave behind something that
does not depend on the constant manage-
ment of crisis to survive.

And within this Department I would like
to leave behind an attitude and a group of
people committed to such a vision, so that
succeeding Presidents can be confident that
there is a group of dedicated, experienced,
and able men that can implement a policy of
peace and stability and progress. I think we
have the personnel in this Department to
do it.

And when I say I want to institutionalize
it, I don't mean lines on an organization
chart. I mean a group of people that already
exist, that work to the full extent of their
capabilities. And this is why sometimes I
drive them so hard.

178

Department of State Bulletin

President Ford's News Conference
of January 21

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Ford in the Old
Executive Office Bidlding on January 21.^

Q. On recent occasions, several times you
have warned of the serious possibility of
another war in the Middle East. Why, then,
is the United States contributing so heavily
to the military buildup there? And I have a
followup.

President Ford: The United States does
feel that the danger of war in the Middle
East is very serious. I have said it repeat-
edly, and I say it again here today. But in
order to avoid that, we are maximizing our
diplomatic efforts with Israel as well as with
several Arab states.

In order to maintain the internal security
of the various countries, in order to main-
tain equilibrium in arms capability, one
nation against the other, we are supplying
some arms to various states in that region.
I think, while we negotiate, or while we ex-
pand our diplomatic efforts, it is important
to maintain a certain degree of military
capability on all sides.

Q. Mr. President, both you and Secretary
Kissinger have said that in case of strangu-
lation of the West by oil producers you ivould
use military force, and you were hypotheti-
cally speaking. I think on that same basis
the American people would like to know
whether yon would require a congressional
declaration of war or whether you ivould
bypass that constitutional process as some
of your predecessors have done.

President Ford: I can assure you that
on any occasion where there was any com-
mitment of U.S. military personnel to any

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27,
1975.

engagement we would use the complete con-
stitutional process that is required of the
President.

Q. Mr. President, are there circumstances
in 7vhich the United States might actively
reenter the Viet-Nam rear?

President Ford: I cannot foresee any at
the moment.

Q. Are you riding out the possibility of
bombing, U.S. bombing, over there or naval
action?

President Ford: I don't think it is appro-
priate for me to forecast any specific ac-
tions that might be taken. I would simply
say that any military actions, if taken,
would be only taken following the actions
under our constitutional and legal proce-
dures.

Q. Mr. President, I ivould like to follow up
on Helen Thomas' question. There has been
considerable discussion, as you know, about
this question of military intervention in the
Middle East, and you and others have said
that it might be considered if the West's
economies were strangled. Mr. President, as
you know, the Charter of the United Nations
says that all members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat of the
use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state. Now,
Mr. President, I would like to know ivhether
this section of the Charter of the United
Nations was considered, taken under con-
sideration before these statements were
made by members of the administration, and
if not, why not?

President Ford: Well, the hypothetical
question which was put to Secretai-y Kis-
singer, a hypothetical question of the most
extreme kind, I think called for the answer
that the Secretary gave and I fully endorse
that answer.

I can't tell you whether Secretary Kis-
singer considered that part of the U.N.

February 10, 1975

179

Charter at the time he made that comment,
but if a country is being strangled— and I
use "strangled" in the sense of the hypo-
thetical question— that, in effect, means that
a country has the right to protect itself
against death.

Q. Mr. President, would a neiv oil embargo
be considered strangulation?

President Ford: Certainly none compara-
ble to the one in 1973.

Q. Mr. President, does the state of the
American economy permit additional mili-
tarrj and economic aid to Viet-Nam or Cam-
bodia?

President Furd: I believe it does. When
the budget was submitted for fiscal 1975, in
January of 1974, the request was for $1.4
billion for military assistance. The Congress
cut that to $700 million.

The request that I will submit for mili-
tary assistance in a supplemental will be
$300 million. I think it is a proper action by
us to help a nation and a people prevent
aggression in violation of the Paris accords.

Q. Mr. President, could you bring us up to
date with an evaluation of the state of de-
tente with the Soviet Union in the light of
what happened to the Trade Agreement?

President Ford: It is my judgment that
the detente with the Soviet Union will be
continued, broadened, expanded. I think that
is in our interest, and I think it is in the
interest of the Soviet Union.

I of course was disappointed that the
Trade Agreement was canceled, but it is my
judgment that we can continue to work with
the Soviet Union to expand trade regardless.
And I would hope that we can work with the
Congress to eliminate any of the problems
in the trade bill that might have precipitated
the action by the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. President, a two-part follorvup on
Viet-Nam. What is your assessment of the
military situation there, and are you con-
sidering any additional measures, beyond a

supplemental, of assistance to the South
Vietnamese Government?

President Ford: The North Vietnamese
have infiltrated with substantial military
personnel and many, many weapons, in vio-
lation of the Paris accords. They are attack-
ing in many instances major metropolitan
areas and province capitals.

The South Vietnamese are fighting as
skillfully and with firmness against this
attack by the North Vietnamese. I think it
is essential for their morale as well as for
their security that we proceed with the
supplemental that I am recommending,
which will be submitted either this week or
next week.

Now, I am not anticipating any further
action beyond that supplemental at this time.

Q. Mr. President, in your state of the
Union message, you urged Congress not to
restrict your ability to conduct foreign pol-
icy. Did you have in mind Senator Jackson's
amendment on the emigration of Soviet
Jews, and do you consider this to be an
example of the meddling by Congress in
foreign policy?

President Ford: I don't wish to get in any
dispute with Members of Congress. I think
that such restrictive amendments as the one
that was imposed on the trade bill and the
Eximbank [Export-Import Bank] legislation
and the limitation that was imposed on sev-
eral pieces of legislation involving the con-
tinuation of military aid to Turkey — those
kinds of limitations, in my judgment, are
harmful to a President in the execution and
implementation of foreign policy.

I don't think that I should speculate as to
what actually precipitated the action of the
Soviet Union in the cancellation of the Trade
Agreement.

Q. Mr. President, in an earlier Viet-Nam
question you left open the option for yourself
of possibly asking Congress for the authority
to engage in bombing or naval action in the
future. In light of the lengthy involvement
by the United States in Viet-Nam and the
pains that that created, can you say noiv

180

Department of Stale Bulletin

irhether or not there are any circumstances
under which you might foresee yotirself
doing that, or woidd you care to rule out
that prospect?

President Ford: I don't think it is appro-
priate for me to speculate on a matter of
that kind.

Q. Mr. President, in view of the rapport
you seem to hare established with Mr. Brezh-
nev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union] at Vladivostok,
can you shed any light on the conflicting re-
ports about his current political and per-
sonal health? Specifically, have you had any
direct contact with him since your trip?

President Ford: I have not had any direct
contact. We have communicated on several
occasions, but we have had no personal or
direct contact.

U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany
Hold Talks on Cultural Relations

Joint Statement, January 20

Press release 22 dated January 21

Delegations from the Federal Republic
of Germany and the United States met in
Washington January 20 for the third in a
series of annual talks on Cultural Relations.

The German delegation was led by Dr.
Hans Arnold, Director for Cultural Relations

at the German Foreign Office ; the American
group was headed by Assistant Secretary
of State John Richardson, Jr.

As in previous years, the talks were in-
formal and covered a wide array of subjects.
The two delegations focused considerable
attention on the recommendations of a Con-
ference on German-American Cultural Re-
lations held under the auspices of the Ford
Foundation and the two governments at
Harrison House, Glen Cove, Long Island,
New York, January 16-18, which had as-
sembled a group of private citizens from
the two countries, including representatives
of organized labor, youth, women's groups,
the communications media and the fields of
art and literature. In their talks in Wash-
ington, the government representatives re-
viewed the results of the Conference and
decided that they would encourage increased
interaction between groups and individuals
in both countries. Each government also
plans to review the results of the Conference
and any follow-on activities with the non-
governmental participants later this year.
In the view of the two governments, the
Conference acted as a useful stimulant for
more specific exchange activities and it is
their intention to encourage the holding of a
similar conference every two to three years.

The two government delegations also re-
viewed plans for the celebration of the
American Revolution Bicentennial both in
the United States and Germany. They also
agreed to continue the study, initiated last
year, looking toward new guidelines in the
application of the equivalency of academic
degrees.

February 10, 1975

181

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward the Year 2000

Address by Joseph J. Sisco

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

There is an inscription on the Chapel of
Saint Gilgen near Salzburg which states that
man should not look mournfully into the past
because it does not come back again; that
he should wisely improve the present because
it is his ; and that he should go forth to meet
the future, without fear, and with a manly
heart. We have now passed the threshold into
the last quarter of the 20th century, and it
is a good moment for Americans to ask basic
questions about the future.

With the energy crisis, the food crisis, the
recession-inflation dilemma, the new rela-
tionships with China and the Soviet Union,
we are all conscious that this nation and the
world are experiencing rapid and radical
change; each of us is asking what is the
direction this change is taking, what kind
of world is coming into existence, and what
are the prospects for the future. The chal-
lenges we face are complex as well as per-
plexing, but they also ofl'er us historic oppor-
tunities to create a more stable and equitable
world order. We are at a watershed — we are
at a new period of creativity or at the be-
ginning of a slide to international anarchy.
America has faced great and seemingly
overwhelming challenges before in its his-
tory and has shown its inherent capacity to
overcome them and, indeed, to create some-
thing new from the old. This is the critical
task before us.

We face new realities.

' Made at San Diego, Calif., on Jan. 23 before
a regional foreign policy conference cosponsored
by the World Affairs Council of San Diego and
the Department of State (as delivered).

We have gone through a very difficult
period. Here at home :

— We have witnessed the assassination of
a President and other leaders, the decision
by another President not to run again, and
the forced resignation of another.

— We have experienced the pain and an-
guish of Viet-Nam and the ignominy of
Watergate.

— We have the sense that perhaps we are
less in control of our destiny than in the past.

— There is perhaps, too, a certain loss of
purpose and direction, of self-confidence.

— But I hope we've gained some added
wisdom as well.

Abroad, there have also been dramatic
changes. We are living in an interdependent
world, living literally in each other's back-
yards. What happens here has effect on
others, and what happens overseas affects
us. Moreover, no longer can we make the
distinction between domestic and interna-
tional policies as was the case in the 19th
century.

— For most of the postwar period Amer-
ica enjoyed predominance in physical re-
sources and political power. Now, like most
other nations in history, we find that our
most difficult task is how to apply limited
means to the accomplishment of carefully
defined ends.

— While we are no longer directly engaged
in war, we know that peace cannot be taken
for granted. The new nuclear equation makes
restraint imperative, for the alternative is

182

Department of State Bulletin

nuclear holocaust. While maintaining a
strong national defense, we have come to
realize that in the nuclear age the relation-
ship between military strength and politi-
cally usable power is the most complex in
history.

— We have learned, I believe, that our
resources are not unlimited, that there can-
not be a Washington blueprint or panacea
for every international problem. It is within
this context we face the very profound and
awesome task of achieving a stable and
peaceful world order.

— For two decades the solidarity of our
alliances seemed as constant as the threats
to our security. Now our allies have regained
strength, and relations with adversaries have
improved. The perception of the threat has
diminished. All this has given rise to un-
certainties over the sharing of burdens with
friends and the impact of reduced tensions
on the cohesion of alliances.

— Since World War II the world has dealt
with the economy as if its constant advance
were inexorable. Now the warning signs of
a major economic crisis are evident. Rates
of recession and inflation are sweeping de-
veloping and developed nations alike. The
threat of global famine and mass starvation
is an afi'ront to our values and an intolerable
threat to our hopes for a better world. The
abrupt rise of energy costs and the ensuing
threats of monetary crisis and economic
stagnation threaten to undermine the eco-
nomic system that nourished the world's
well-being for over 30 years.

In other areas, chronic conflicts in the
Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and
Indochina threaten to erupt with new inten-
sity and unpredictable results.

And as if the situation were not compli-
cated enough, most of these problems are
dealt with in a clearly inadequate framework.
National solutions continue to be pursued
when, manifestly, their very futility is the
crisis we face.

In the face of these challenges we must
ask ourselves. What is America's response?
Our traditional confidence that we can solve

all problems has been shaken, and we seem
less certain of our purposes. To some extent
this may be a .sign of growing maturity in
a nation which no longer possesses unlimited
power. But it must be seasoned, it seems to
me, with an equal awareness of what is re-
quired to protect our welfare and our secu-
rity and what the consequences would be
for ourselves and for the world of a largely
passive foreign policy, one geared to with-
drawal rather than creation.

Moreover, let us remind ourselves that
we've got plenty going for us. We are still
blessed with great natural resources, re-
gardless of our wasteful tendencies. We are
still a hard-working people, even though,
unfortunately, our work ethic in recent years
has been weakened. We are still the strongest
military and economic power in the world,
even though we exist in a world of nuclear
parity rather than one of nuclear superi-
ority. And Watergate must not be permitted
to undermine our historical role as a bulwark
of stability and security, a beacon of politi-
cal freedom, of social progress and human-
itarianism.

It's important to recall that:

— We are the only nation in the world
which can engage the Soviet Union in the
essential task of halting and reversing the
nuclear arms race.

— We, as the leading industrial nation,
with large natural, economic, and social re-
sources, can provide the example and the
initiatives to unite the industrialized nations,
prevent a slide into global depression, and
shape a new economic order.

— We are the only nation which can deal
with both Arabs and Israelis, attempting to
eliminate the greatest immediate threat to
world peace.

We have recognized these new realities,
and I believe it is fair to say that we have
already achieved some positive results:

— Who just five years ago would have
predicted that summits between our Presi-
dent and the Soviet leaders would be regular
events on the international agenda? Despite

February 10, 1975

183

our differences with the Soviets, which will
persist, who would have imagined the prog-
ress we have made in mutual understand-
ing, arms control, and cooperation?

— Who five years ago would have predicted
that China and the United States would have
ended two decades of estrangement and made
such progress in normalizing relations?

— Who five years ago would have predicted
that while maintaining our close relations
with Israel we could contribute so signifi-
cantly to nurturing the negotiating process
and have improved relations with key Arab
nations at the same time?

As we look ahead it is clear that the world
to which we have grown accustomed over
the past quarter century is giving way to
something quite different. At the same time,
I am confident that America's contribution
can be major, even decisive. It must, however,
be a role not of withdrawal or looking in-
ward, but of selective engagement; and we
must be fully aware of the potential and
limits of power, aware that we are neither
omniscient nor omnipresent.

Let us look ahead to the next quarter
century.

First, over the next 25 years our values,
our interests, and our purposes will continue
to be most closely aligned with the indus-
trialized democracies of Europe, Canada,
and Japan. We are convinced that at the very
heart of a stable world must be a community
of nations sharing common goals, common
ideals, and a common perspective of how to
deal with problems and threats confronting
us.

New relationships with countries with
different systems and ideologies are only
possible if old relationships with allies re-
main strong. A central goal of our foreign
policy must be to strengthen cooperative en-
deavors with a unifying Europe and to revi-
talize Atlantic ties. Success in building a sta-
ble and creative world order will be measured
in many respects by the progress we achieve
in preserving and enhancing cooperation
among the great democracies.

Second, over the next 25 years I believe

the relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Uriion will determine more
than any other single factor whether our
hopes for peace and stability in the world
are realized. This is not intended to dero-
gate from the fact that since World War II
about 100 countries have come into being
and want a piece of the action. We know
there cannot be a peaceful world unless most
of the nations feel they have a share in it.
But our relations with the Soviets are key.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union,
once characterized simply by the degree of
hostility, is now defined by a complex mix-
ture of competition and cooperation. Detente
— the relaxation of tensions and the exercise
of mutual restraint — is an imperative in a
nuclear world. From the ideological point
of view, there can be no compromise. How-
ever, coexistence of two essentially different
social systems is the essential element of
world peace in the next quarter century.
There is simply no rational alternative to the
pursuit of a relaxation of tensions. For this
reason, we are engaged with the Soviets in
an unprecedented range of negotiations, such
as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotia-
tions, and the European Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation, which address the
hard political and security issues confront-
ing us and which seek to provide greater
stability. There is continuing need from now
to the end of the century of a system of secu-
rity which our peoples can support and
which our adversaries will respect in a
period of lessened tension.

Third, over the next 25 years Asia will
increasingly shape global hopes for peace
and security. Half of mankind lives in Asia.
The interests of four of the world's powers
intersect in the Pacific. Three times in a
single generation this nation has been drawn
into Asian conflict. It is important that the
region continue to evolve in the direction of
greater stability and increased cooperation,
that the major powers respect each other's
legitimate interests, and that the United
States and China continue to deepen mutual
understanding and deepen our ties. There

184

Department of State Bulletin

I

cannot be a stable peace in Asia, or in the
world, without a pattern of peaceful inter-
national relationships that includes this
powerful and talented nation.

Fourth, over the next 25 years there will
continue to be local flash points which could
ignite world war if steps are not taken now
to defuse them. The Arab-Israeli dispute is
a prime example.

The Middle East problem is one that has
occupied my attention for many years. For
too long, the peoples of the area have been
locked in incessant struggle, a cycle of wars
followed by uneasy cease-fires, followed again
by bloodshed and tragedy. Thus two peoples
were thrown together in what history will
undoubtedly recall not as a series of wars
but as one long war broken by occasional
armistices and temporary cease-fires. It has
been a history of lost opportunities.

The interests and concerns of two global
powers meet in the Middle East. It is an area
of vital interest to the United States. A stable
and lasting peace in the world requires a
stable and durable settlement in the Middle
East. When war came again to the Middle
East in October 1973, we had two immedi-
ate objectives : First, to bring about a cease-
fire and, second, to do so in a manner that
would leave us in a position to play a con-
structive role with both the Arabs and
Israelis in shaping a more secure peace. It
was evident that the search for peace would
be arduous and that a lasting settlement
could only be approached through a series
of limited steps in which the settlement of
any particular issue would not be dependent
upon the settlement of all issues. What have
we accomplished?

— For the most part, but not entirely, the
guns are silent. Disengagement agreements
between Israel and Egypt and Israel and
Syria in 1974 have been completed. They
have provided more time to explore further
possibilities for practical progress toward
peace; they were important first steps.

— We have demonstrated that the United
States can maintain its support for Israel's
survival and security and have relations of

understanding with Arab nations. This will
require careful and continuous nurturing.
We have helped both the Arabs and Israelis
to move at least the first difficult steps to-
ward mutual accommodation. The situation
was defused somewhat; however, the risk
of renewal of hostilities remains unless more
progress can be made.

— The focus of discussion is still on prog-
ress on a step-by-step basis toward peace.
This was made possible because most of the
countries in the area have adopted a more
moderate course. Instead of concentrating
solely on preparations for war, a number
have demonstrated that they are ready to
consider, however tentatively, the possible
fruits of peace. Most of the people of the
Middle East are plain tired and fed up with
the cycle of violence and counterviolence and
recurrent wars, and the October 1973 war
changed the objective conditions in the area.
The Arabs no longer feel they need to go to
negotiations weak and with head bowed;
the 1973 war in their eyes erased the shame
of the 1967 war. And in Israel the shock and
trauma of the October war gave new impetus
to support for negotiations.

— We are convinced that there must be
further stages in the diplomatic process.
While in a sense it will be even more difficult
as we approach the more fundamental issues
of an overall settlement, it is also true that
each step creates a new situation that may
make it less difficult to envisage further
steps. To this end, discussions with both
sides are being actively pursued, the most
recent being those held with Israeli Foreign
Minister Allon in Washington last week.
These talks were useful, and while a number
of key problems remain to be solved, some
progress was made in defining a conceptual
framework for the next stage of the nego-
tiating process.

— In sum, quiet diplomacy is proceeding,
and we remain cautiously hopeful that fur-
ther practical progress is possible. If there
is to be peace and stability over the next
quarter century, this problem must be solved.

Fifth, over the next 25 years the imbal-

February 10, 1975

185

ance between limited resources and unlimited
demand will continue and intensify the eco-
nomic challenge before us. The temptation
for nations to seek seliish advantage will be
great. It is essential that the international
community respond to the challenges of en-
ergy, food, and inflation with a collaborative
approach.

As for our participation in meeting the
energy crisis, President Ford has put forward
the administration's energy program with
a view to ending vulnerability to economic
disruption by foreign suppliers by 1985. We
cannot afford to mortgage our security and
economy to outside forces. There can be no
solution without consumer cooperation and
solidarity. Equally, it is essential that there
be a constructive consumer-producer dia-
logue and that the rhetoric of confrontation
give way to the reality of interdependence.
The former is a necessary prerequisite to
the latter. Assistant Secretary Hartman has
addressed these issues in detail this morn-
ing. I will only say that the sacrifices will
be required by us all — sacrifices which I be-
lieve the American people are ready to make
in the overall interest of all citizens.

The food problem also is an important as-
pect of global interdependence. The fact is
that food production has not matched popu-
lation growth. In our food assistance pro-
gram, i.e., our Public Law 480 program, we
are making a major eflfort approaching al-
most $1.5 billion. It is true that we give some
of this food aid to countries with which we
have important political relationships. How-
ever, there and elsewhere the greater part
of our food assistance goes for humanitarian
purposes.

At the World Food Conference in Rome
last November, the United States set forth
a comprehensive program to meet man's
needs foi' ''ood. But we cannot do it alone;
it is global. No aspect of American foreign
policy over the past generation has had
greatc- support than our effort to help avert
starvation and increase the poorer countries'
production of food. This is not only in the
best tradition of America's humanitarian
concerns but is essential to the stability of
the entire world, for the gap between

186

what the poorest countries produce and
what they need is growing. It will require
increased food production by us but also
by others as well — developed as well as de-
veloping nations. Reserves will be needed,
and financing. It will require more deter-
mined efforts on the population problem.
There can be no real stability in the world
unless this problem is solved.

Sixth, over the next quarter of a century
the success or failure of international insti-
tutions such as the United Nations to meet
global challenges will be of significant im-
portance. Any balanced assessment of the
world organization must take into account
its capacities as well as its limitations.

We overestimated the potential of the
United Nations at its birth in 1945. We
tended to view the creation of this institu-
tion as synonymous with solutions to the
problems. We know better today. At the
same time, we must exercise care not to
underestimate its positive contributions to
peace. The United Nations is not an entity
apart from its membership. The U.N.'s im-
perfections mirror the imperfections of the
world in which the United Nations operates.
Power and responsibility in the now-inflated
General Assembly of 138 is out of kilter;
bloc voting has become all too frequent; pro-
grams are all too often voted which strain
available resources; political issues have
tended to deflect the work of many of the
specialized agencies. At the same time we
must bear in mind that U.N. peacekeeping
forces are playing an indispensable role in
such trouble spots as Cyprus and the Middle
East; the U.N. Development Program has
been over the years an unheralded success in
helping smaller countries unharness and
utilize their resources for the benefit of their
peoples. The U.N. specialized agencies are
helping make a global attack on the global
problems of food, environment, population,
and health. They are part of the broad effort
of the international community in attacking
the underlying root causes of war — poverty,
disease, social maladjustments.

These are meaningful contributions to !
peace. It is not in our interest to turn our
back on the United Nations, despite its

Department of State Bulletin

obvious shortcomings and our understand-
able disappointments. Picking up our mar-
bles and going home would only leave the
United Nations in the hands of our adver-
saries to shape it in their own image. In
short, for the next quarter century, there
is no real alternative but to redouble our
efforts to help assure responsible and respon-
sive decisions in the U.N. system; for to
try to create something new from scratch
would be doomed to fail, leaving the inter-
national community weaker rather than
stronger to cope with meaningful issues of
the future.

Finally, I wish to conclude with an ob-
servation closer to home. Our foreign
policy, to be effective, must rest on a broad
national base and reflect a shared com-
munity of values. This does not mean
rubberstamping, and we cannot expect
unanimity. Responsible people obviously
will continue to have serious differences.
We are in danger, I believe, of being overly
critical of ourselves, overly introspective.
We have to recapture the habit of concen-
trating on what binds us together. It is
essential in the present environment that
we work together to shape a broad con-
sensus, a new unity, a renewed trust, and
fresh confidence.

In this respect, the relationship between
the executive and the Legislature is criti-
cal. America can only take the initiatives
required to protect its interests if we make
a new start here at home. A new Congress
and a new administration present us with
that opportunity. If both branches of the
new government engage in a serious dia-
logue, a new consensus can be reached.

It is essential also that a dialogue be re-
established between the public and the
government, for it is through such a proc-
ess that confidence in our institutions can
in time be restored. The most important
task we have in foreign policy is to see
that it is anchored in the support of the en-
tire American people, and that can only
be accomplished through the free and open
exchange of ideas. As Adlai Stevenson once
stated: In a democracy, "Government can-
not be stronger or more tough-minded than

its people. It cannot be more inflexibly
committed to the task than they. It can-
not be wiser than the people."

As we prepare to celebrate America's
bicentennial, I hope we can all engage our-
selves in the critical effort to build a better
future. We are a healthy country capable
of dealing with these problems, and I would
urge each of you — important leaders of
the community — to approach these prob-
lems in a hopeful spirit.

Secretary Kissinger Gives Dinner
Honoring Visiting Sultan of Oman

His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id of
Oman made a private visit to the United
States January 9-11. Following is an ex-
change of toasts between Secretary Kissin-
ger and Sidtan Qaboos at a dinner at the
Department of State on January 9.

Press rrieasp 11 dated January 10

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Your Majesty, Excellencies: It is a great
pleasure to welcome His Majesty on his
first visit to the United States. Since this is
a very special occasion, we have spared him
the usual treatment by bureaus, which is
to give our visiting guest a toast — which I
dare not deliver — giving him the choice of
responding to something he has read or to
something he has heard.

But Your Majesty comes from an area
that is very much on our minds and from a
country with which our relationships go
back, as it turns out, 140 years.

The Middle East is, of course, an area
very much in the news and with very
many tensions, and also it contains many
of the resources on which the economy of
the whole world depends. But it also con-
tains many states that are not directly part
of the political conflicts and whose share in
the energy problem is not of the largest
magnitude. And nevertheless their future
depends on the security of the whole area

February 10, 1975

187

and their progress depends on the ability
of all the nations to work out relationships
based on cooperation and conciliation.

As far as the United States is concerned,
we will do our utmost to promote peace in
the Middle East on the basis of justice and
taking into account the aspirations of all
of the peoples. And we want to promote an
international economic order which is nego-
tiated cooperatively, in which producers and
consumers will realize that their joint wel-
fare requires understanding by both sides.

But, finally, we also take a strong interest
in the independence and sovereignty and
progress of our old friends, such as His
Majesty, who faces in his own country some
pressures from his neighbors and who
nevertheless has striven successfully to
bring development and progress and con-
ciliation to his people and to his neighbors.

We have had very warm and friendly
and useful talks this afternoon, and I look
forward to the opportunity to continue them
tomorrow.

So this visit by His Majesty reflects the
intense interest of the United States in
peace and progress in the Middle East and
our dedication to the friendly relations be-
tween Oman and the United States.

So I would like to ask you all to join me
in drinking to the health, long life, of our
honored guest: His Majesty the Sultan of
Oman.

HIS MAJESTY SULTAN QABOOS BIN SA'ID

Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests: I am
very pleased to be visiting the United States,
to acquaint myself with its friendly people
and its distinguished leadership.

We appreciate the great efforts your
country is making, Mr. Secretary, for the
sake of bringing about a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East; and we have pro-
found hope that your efforts will be success-
ful.

The relations between Oman and the
United States, as you just mentioned, Mr.
Secretary, go back to many years. Indeed,
Oman was among the first Arab states to
have relations with your great country.

My visit today is but an expression of our
desire for the continuation of our long-
standing good ties and also our hope that
thebe ties would be strengthened even more
in the future for the mutual benefit of our
two countries.

We realize, as you do, Mr. Secretary, that
stability and peace in the world cannot be
achieved and strengthened without the com-
bined efforts of all nations, in coping in a
positive and cooperative spirit with con-
temporary world problems, in particular the
Middle East conflict, where our joint hope
for a just and lasting peace is unfortu-
nately yet to be realized.

We are aware, also, of the serious eco-
nomic problems which the world is faced
with. But we are convinced at the same time
that no matter what the differences in the
viewpoints regarding causes of the existing
economic problems, logical and sound solu-
tions to these problems could only come
through negotiation and not through con-
frontation— which would only aggravate
the world economic conditions.

As we mentioned this afternoon during
our meeting with His Excellency the Presi-
dent of the United States, I would like to
repeat, Mr. Secretary, that Oman, though a
developing country, is determined to fully
devote its efforts and utilize its natural re-
sources to promote its economic development
and thereby raise the standards of living of
its people.

In our endeavors to achieve these goals,
we shall seek the assistance and avail our-
selves of the experience of friendly ad-
vanced nations — among which we hold the
United States in high regard.

In concluding my remai'ks, Mr. Secretary,
I would like to share your hope for a greater
and more dedicated cooperation on the part
of all nations toward strengthening world
peace and stability and promoting economic
prosperity for peoples of all nations.

Our own endeavors to contribute to the
realization of this noble hope shall never
cease.

Gentlemen, now I propose a toast to the
distinguished Secretary of the United
States.

188

Department of State Bulletin

The Energy Crisis and Efforts To Assure Its Solution

Address by Arthur A. Hartman
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^

I thank you for your very warm welcome.
The interest displayed by San Diego in this
conference gives evidence of the close in-
volvement of this community in the foreign
policy process; that process today is very
close to home indeed. With international
events now more than ever intimately re-
lated to the activities of our daily lives, such
involvement is more essential than ever. If
any of us have wishfully believed that the
process of detente and a less active Ameri-
can role in many areas of the world have
cushioned us from the impact of foreign
developments, we must surely see that the
energy crisis has disabused us of this pipe-
dream.

As President Ford put it in his state of
the Union address last week :

At no time in our peacetime history has the state
of the nation depended more heavily on the state
of the world; and seldom, if ever, has the state of
the world depended more heavily on the state of
our nation.

This fact — the close and inevitable inter-
relationship between foreign and domestic
developments — forms the all-important back-
drop to the issue I would like to address
today: The impact of the energy crisis and
the need for cooperative efforts to assure its
solution — cooperative efforts both nationally
and internationally.

In April 1973, prior to the onset of the oil

crisis in October, Secretary Kissinger called
for a creative effort to meet the new chal-
lenges faced by the world's major industrial
powers. He recalled the security and eco-
nomic challenges that had been successfully
met in the immediate post-World War II
period, and he foresaw that without similar
common programs the freedom of all our
nations could once more be put in jeopardy.
Mastering our fate domestically or inter-
nationally requires an act of political will,
and it was that act of will that he called for.

It took us a year of what seemed unneces-
sary bickering to produce a declaration of
principles with our Atlantic allies.^ But
those discussions about the meaning of con-
sultations and the necessity for common
action to govern the detente process and
maintain our security also produced new in-
sights into the interrelationships of the
economies of Europe, North America, and
Japan. It took the concrete illustration of
the energy crisis resulting from the October
war in the Middle East to remove once and
for all the illusory search for go-it-alone
policies.

Without exception, the industrialized na-
tions of the non-Communist world now stand
face to face with the extraordinary economic
problem of burgeoning rates of inflation in
the midst of deepening recession. This un-
precedented situation — in large measure a
product of the international energy crisis —

' Made at San Diego, Calif., on Jan. 23 before a
regional foreign policy conference cosponsored by
the World Affairs Council of San Diego and the
Department of State (text from press release 26).

- For text of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations
adopted by the ministerial meeting of the North
Atlantic Council at Ottawa on June 19, 1974, see
Bulletin of July 8, 1974, p. 42.

February 10, 1975

189

continues to be aggravated by oil prices,
which are today four times higher than they
were just a little over a year ago.

The mounting bill for oil imports has put
a severe strain on the external accounts of
all consumer countries as well as on the
political cohesion of many nations. For some,
the cumulative financial debt will rapidly
become unsustainable unless a cooperative
answer is found to the problem of world
petroleum markets.

The 24-nation Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD),
comprised of advanced industrialized coun-
tries, warned in its semiannual survey is-
sued last month that, based on existing poli-
cies, its member nations could be headed for
the deepest and longest recession since the
1930's, with lower production and growing
unemployment continuing into 1976. The in-
dustrial democracies face a test, the report
concluded, "probably unprecedented outside
time of war." Without concerted and effec-
tive remedial action, the Organization feared
that the economic slippage could develop into
an avalanche.

Central U.S. Role in World Economy

This gloomy picture has transformed in-
ternational economic problems from arcane
matters dealt with by obscure experts into
the central foreign policy issue of the day.
Nor are economic and political issues easily
separable. Quite clearly, the strength of
particular Western European economies re-
lates directly to the internal political
strength of the nations involved and there-
fore the strength and cohesion of the NATO
alliance. Similarly, the tremendous new eco-
nomic leverage now available to some oil-
producing countries has a potential impact
on the course of events in the Middle East.

Nor are the poorer nations of the world
spared the impact of the crisis. The addi-
tional squeeze on some developing countries,
whose weak economies were already under
stress, poses a specter of economic collapse
and starvation.

In the face of this situation, solutions
must link our objectives at home to our ob-

190

jectives abroad. They must be posed in
terms of both domestic and international
goals :

— We must combat rising unemployment
while dampening inflation at home.

— We in the United States must work to
reduce substantially our external oil bill,
which increased by about $16 billion in 1974
to a total of about $25 billion.

— We must continue to insure the eco-
nomic strength and political cohesion of the
Western alliance.

— We must seek to avoid severe disrup-
tion in those developing countries seriously
aff'ected by the oil crisis.

The President's state of the Union and
energy messages provide a clear and force-
ful set of proposals designed to meet these
ends. The domestic aspects of these pro-
posals will be considered in the context of
their impact on all strata of our national
economy. The international dimension, in
addition, must be pursued to a large degree
in concert with other nations, most particu-
larly the industrialized countries of North
America, Western Europe, and Japan.

These nations hold in their hands the cen-
tral responsibility for a prosperous world
economic system. If our economies slide,
others will be drawn down also. America's
central role as the industrial base of the
world economy imposes a special burden of
leadership and example upon us. With our
gross national product comprising close to
half of the total GNP of the non-Communist
world, it is not difficult to see why the meas-
ures we take to cure our domestic economic
ills are of intense concern to others.

Given this high degree of interdependence
among advanced economies, as well as the
evolving interrelationships among the mem-
bers of the European Community as they
work at building a more integrated Euro-
pean political structure, the nature of the
economic ties among us takes on great sensi-
tivity and importance.

In this connection, you may have heard
talk about the concept of "trilateralism"
among industrialized countries. There are
indeed three concentrations of industrial

Department of State Bulletin

power in the non-Communist world — that of
Western Europe, North America, and Japan.
But beyond that, the relation is anything but
a neat geometric design. It is rather an intri-
cate set of interrelationships and interde-
pendencies. It rests on a base of shared
political objectives and, of course, includes
the Atlantic alliance, which has represented
the principal cornerstone of Western secu-
rity for 21/0 decades.

Common Action on the Energy Crisis

The energy crisis is the most severe test
of the fabric of this alliance since it was
formed. The Atlantic nations, together with
Japan, must not only stand firm but take the
necessary collective action to overcome the
albatross of energy dependence that weighs
so heavily on our future. A significant de-
gree of unanimity is required. I am happy
to say that the prospects for such common
action in the face of the current threat to
the world economy are now perceptibly
brighter than they were when Secretary
Kissinger first called for that creative effort
to assert our common political will.

In the period between the Middle East war
of October 1973 and last February when the
Washington Energy Conference took place,
a go-it-alone atmosphere prevailed, with a
number of Western nations scrambling to
protect their independent sources of supply.
Mistrust and bickering continued over the
concept and procedures for consultations be-
tween the United States and Europe. And at
the Washington Energy Conference itself,
there was an acrimonious and much publi-
cized split with the French which left an
unfortunate residue of ill feeling.

Coming back from that nadir of political
relationships a year ago, and demonstrating
not only an impressive resilience but also a
renewed spirit of constructive compromise,
we and our partners in Europe and Japan
have moved together in a number of impor-
tant respects:

— Last May the OECD adopted an impor-
tant new trade pledge to avoid a self-defeat-
ing series of new trade restrictions to offset

the oil deficit in one OECD country at the
expense of others.

— Practical steps were taken to improve
the consultative procedure between the
European Community and the United States.

— As a followup to the Washington
Energy Conference, a new International
Energy Agency was established under the
auspices of the OECD. This new Agency is
based on a common commitment by major
consumers to respond jointly in any future
emergency or embargo situation. Under such
circumstances, it enables the countries in-
volved to build up their oil stocks, to take
mandatory measures curtailing demand, and
to pool available resoui'ces. The Agency will
also act as the principal forum for the de-
velopment of a broader energy strategy.

— An unusual series of summit meetings
among leaders of the major industrialized
countries has taken place, leading, I am con-
vinced, to a considerably higher level of
confidence and understanding. In recent
months. President Ford has discussed domes-
tic and international economic issues with
the heads of government of Italy, Canada,
Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and France. The Martinique meeting with
French President Giscard d'Estaing was
marked by a new spirit of cooperation and
frankness. The United States and France
have common objectives in the energy field
and in economic policies generally, and we
look forward to continued close consultation
and joint enterprise with France in the
period ahead. Later this month, the Presi-
dent will also meet with Prime Minister
Wilson of Great Britain. The very serious
expressions of concern about the necessity
for common action to avoid world recession
expressed during these meetings had, I am
certain, an important influence on subse-
quent decisions reached within the U.S.
Government and the governments of these
other countries.

— The international financial system has
made substantial progress in moving us to-
ward financial solidarity by assuring that
necessary funds are available to countries in
need of help in funding their balance of pay-
ments deficits. At the suggestion of Secre-

February 10, 1975

191

tary Kissinger and OECD Secretary General
Emile van Lennep, it was agreed just last
week at meetings in Washington to create
a special new $25 billion facility. This fund
would serve as a financial safety net for
OECD member nations. It would be available
to finance the deficits of countries experienc-
ing difficulties until such time as longer
term policies designed to respond to the oil
crisis are in effect.

Long-Term Strategy for Reducing Oil Imports

Although this series of actions consti-
tutes, I believe, a very solid list of accom-
plishments, it represents only a beginning
in the solution of the international oil prob-
lem. Any long-term strategy for dealing with
the energy crisis must reduce the depend-
ence of industrialized countries on imported
oil. Only by means of reduced dependence
can consumer countries stem the steady out-
ward flow of funds and the accumulation of a
staggering financial debt to producer coun-
tries. This massive debt is currently running
at a rate of some $40 billion a year for the
OECD countries and another $20 billion for
less developed countries, for an annual total
of about $60 billion per year.

Only by reducing their dependency can
the industrialized countries establish a stable
and equitable long-term relationship with
the producing countries. Along with our
partners in the International Energy
Agency, we are now in the midst of develop-
ing methods to achieve this goal. Among the
latter are coordinated programs of energy
conservation to make possible a reduced de-
mand for oil, and accelerated development
of existing fossil fuel resources available
outside of the nations belonging to the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, and concerted research and develop-
ment efforts on new forms of energy.

Instituting this program will not by any
means be easy. It will require, among other
things, strong internal measures in all con-
sumer nations — measures not calculated to
be domestically popular. Included, in other
words, are programs that will be tough medi-
cine to swallow politically but which the

192

public of all our countries will see as the
necessary underpinning of efforts to control
their destinies.

Putting these measures into effect will
also take time. The OECD has recently fore-
cast that by 1985 its member countries can
reduce dependence on imported oil to 20
percent of total energy consumption. For
our part, the President has announced our
intention to reduce U.S. imports of oil by 1
million barrels per day by the end of 1975.
In addition, we expect further to reduce
imports by 2 million barrels per day by the
end of 1977. These initiatives are not bein^
taken in isolation. We are seeking an equita
ble sharing of this burden with other indus-
trial nations.

The institution of measures to gain self-
sufficiency can and must be accelerated by
the new programs we are developing. In the
interim, we must rely on joint financial ar-
rangements to insure that each consumer
economy can survive the current trade im-
balance caused by high oil prices.

Let me underline, however, this basic fact :
There is available no acceptable alternative
to the long-term strategy I have outlined.
To continue to import large quantities of oil
at current high prices will, sooner or later,
run some consumer countries into insol-
vency ; they simply will no longer be able to
pay for needed oil imports, and this will lead
to collapse of their industrial structure and
to political turmoil.

The United States is not likely to be the
first to reach such a point. Our basic eco-
nomic and political structure is too sound,
and we have a large enough reserve of oil
and other fossil fuels to sustain ourselves.
But this fact should not make us complacent.
Given the interdependence of our economies,
we have good reason to make sure a finan-
cial collapse does not happen anywhere. The
breakdown of any industrialized democracy
would constitute an immediate threat to our
national interests. It would have adverse
consequences on our trade and investments.
It could seriously damage the NATO alli-
ance. And certainly it would gravely threaten
the entire international structure of peace
that we have struggled so laboriously to

Department of State Bulletin

construct. If we work together with other
industrialized nations, such calamities need
not come about. I am confident that with the
momentum that now exists, our negotiations
with our Western European partners and
Japan will soon produce results.

Although some have urged an immediate
meeting of producer and consumer countries,
we have consistently taken the view that
such a multilateral conference cannot be pro-
ductive until the consumers first consolidate
their own positions. Otherwise, various dis-
agreements would simply be repeated and
recorded at the conference itself with little
or no productive result.

The United States has, instead, urged a
procedure involving four interrelated se-
quential stages: First, the establishment of
concerted programs among consumers in the
fields of conservation, accelerated develop-
ment of alternate energy sources, and finan-
cial solidarity; second, the convening of a
preparatory meeting with producers to de-
velop the agenda and procedures for a con-
sumer-producer conference — the preparatory
meeting is tentatively tai'geted for March —
third, the preparation of common consumer
positions on the agenda items for the con-
ference; and, finally, the holding of a con-
sumer-producer conference.

The sequence was agreed to by President
Giscard d'Estaing and President Ford at
their Martinique meeting and was also en-
dorsed at a meeting of the Governing Board
of the International Energy Agency last
month. We can take satisfaction, therefore,
that U.S. proposals for consumer solidarity
are going forward before we enter into a
conference with producing nations.

In sum, the energy crisis, both in its roots
and in its impact, is quintessentially politi-
cal. It will require both the resolute domes-
tic action called for by the President in his
state of the Union address and close col-
laboration with other industrial nations.
Failure to rise to the challenge would pose
immense dangers. But, as Secretary Kis-
singer stated in Chicago last November:
"Let there be no doubt, the energy problem
is soluble. It will overwhelm us only if we
retreat from its reality."

Meetings of IMF Interim Committee
and Group of Ten Held at Washington

Folloiving is a Department statement read
to neirs correspondents on January 17 by
Paul Hare, Deputy Director, Office of Press
Relations, together with the texts of com-
muniqiies issued on January 16 at the con-
clusion of a ministerial meeting of the Group
of Ten and a meeting of the Interim Com-
mittee of the Board of Governors of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Secretary of the
Treasury William E. Simon headed the U.S.
delegations to the meetings.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JANUARY 17

We are extremely pleased and encouraged
by the agreement reached by the Group of
Ten Ministers to establish the $25 billion
solidarity fund by the end of February. This
historic agreement among the Ten Ministers
sets the framework for early agreement by
all OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development] countries which
choose to participate in the fund arrange-
ment. The agreement of the Ministers in
Washington therefore constitutes a decisive
step toward establishment of the fund and
thereby contributes significantly to pros-
pects for international economic stability.

The underpinning of the international
financial system achieved through the fund
will give all participating governments
greater confidence and flexibility in our col-
laborative efl'orts to reinvigorate our econo-
mies and meet the energy challenge.

TEXTS OF COMMUNIQUES, JANUARY 16

Ministerial Meetings of the Group of Ten

1. The Ministers and Central Bank Governors
of the ten countries participating in the General
Arrangements to Borrow met in Washington on
the 14th and 16th of January, 1975, under the
Chairmanship of Mr. Masayoshi Ohira, Minister
of Finance of Japan.

The Managing Director of the Intei-national
Monetary Fund, Mr. H. J. Witteveen, took part in

February 10, 1975

193

the meetings, which were also attended by the
President of the Swiss National Bank, Mr. F. Leut-
wiler, the Secretary-General of the OECD, Mr.
E. van Lennep, the General Manager of the Bank
for International Settlements, Mr. R. Larre, and
the Vice-President of the Commission of the E.E.C.
[European Economic Community], Mr. W. Hafer-
kamp.

2. After hearing a report from the Chairman of
their Deputies, Mr. Rinaldo Ossola, the Ministers
and Governors agreed that a solidarity fund, a new
financial support arrangement, open to all members
of the OECD, should be established at the earliest
possible date, to be available for a period of two
years. Each participant will have a quota which
will serve to determine its obligations and borrow-
ing rights and its relative weight for voting pui--
poses. The distribution of quotas will be based
mainly on GNP and foreign trade. The total of all
participants' quotas will be approximately $25 bil-
lion.

3. The aim of this arrangement is to support the
detei-mination of participating countries to pursue
appropriate domestic and international economic
policies, including cooperative policies to encourage
the increased production and conservation of energy.
It was agreed that this arrangement will be a safety
net, to be used as a last resort. Participants re-
questing loans under the new arrangement will be
required to show that they are encountering serious
balance-of-payments difficulties and are making the
fullest appropriate use of their own reserves and of
resources available to them through other channels.
All loans made through this arrangement will be
subject to appropriate economic policy conditions.
It was also agreed that all participants will jointly
share the default risks on loans under the arrange-
ment in proportion to, and up to the limits of, their
quotas.

4. In response to a request by a participant for a
loan, the other participants will take a decision,
by a two-thirds majority, on the granting of the
loan and its tei-ms and conditions, in the case of
loans up to the quota, and as to whether, for bal-
ance-of-payments reasons, any country should not
be required to make a direct contribution in the
case of any loan. The granting of a loan in excess
of the quota and up to 200 per cent of the quota
will require a very strong majority and beyond
that will require a unanimous decision. If one or
more participants are not required to contribute
to the financing of a loan, the requirements for
approval of the loan must also be met with respect
to the contributing participants.

5. Further work is needed to determine financing
methods. These might include direct contributions
and/or joint borrowing in capital markets. Until
the full establishment of the new arrangement,
there might also be temporary financing through
credit arrangements between central banks.

6. Ministers and Governors agreed to recommend

the immediate establishment of an ad hoc OECD
Working Group, with representatives from all inter-
ested OECD countries, to prepare a draft agreement
in line with the above principles. In their view this
work should be concluded in time to permit ap-
proval by the OECD Council by the end of Febru-
ary, 1975.

Interim Committee of IMF Board of Governors

P}-ess Communique of the Interim Committee of
the Board of Governors on the International
Monetary System

1. The Interim Committee of the International
Monetary Fund held its second meeting in Wash-
ington, D.C. on January 15 and 16, 1975. Mr. John
N. Turner, Minister of Finance of Canada, was in
the chair. Mr. H. Johannes Witteveen, Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund, par-
ticipated in the meeting. The following observers
attended during the Committee's discussions of the
matters referred to in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 below:
Mr. Henri Konan Bedie, Chairman, Bank-F^nd De-
velopment Committee; Mr. Gamani Corea, Secretary
General, UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development] ; Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp,
Vice President, EC Commission; Mr. Mahjoob A.
Hassanain, Chief, Economics Department, OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries];
Mr. Rene Larre, General Manager, BIS; Mr. Emile
van Lennep, Secretary General, OECD; Mr. Olivier
Long, Director General, GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade]; Mr. Robert S. McNamara,
President, IBRD [International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development].

2. The Committee discussed the world economic
outlook and against this background the interna-
tional adjustment process. Great concern was ex-
pressed about the depth and duration of the present
recessionary conditions. It was urged that anti-
recessionary policies should be pursued while con-
tinuing to combat inflation, particularly by countries
in a relatively strong balance of payments position.
It was obsei-ved that very large disequilibria persist
not only between major oil exporting countries as a
group and all other countries, but also among
countries in the latter group, particularly between
industrial and primary producing countries. Anxiety
was also voiced that adequate financing might not
become available to cover the very large aggregate
current account deficits, of the order of US$30 bil-
lion, in prospect for the developing countries other
than major oil exporters in 1975.

3. The Committee agreed that the Oil Facility
should be continued for 1975 on an enlarged basis.
They urged the Managing Director to undertake as
soon as possible discussions with major oil exporting
members of the Fund, and with other members in
strong reserve and payments positions, on loans by

194

Department of State Bulletin

them for the purpose of financing the Facility. The
Committee agreed on a figure of SDR [special draw-
ing rights] 5 billion as the total of loans to be
sought for this purpose. It was also agreed that any
unused portion of the loans negotiated in 1974
should be available in 1975. The Committee agreed
that in view of the uncertainties inherent in present
world economic conditions, it was necessai'y to keep
the operation of the Oil Facility under constant
review so as to be able to take whatever further ac-
tion might be necessary in the best interests of the
international community. It was also understood
that during the coming months it would be useful
to review the policies, practices, and resources of
the Fund since it would be appropriate to make
increased use of the Fund's ordinary holdings of
currency to meet the needs of members that were
encountering diflnculties.

4. The Committee emphasized the need for de-
cisive action to help the most seriously affected
developing countries. In connection with the Oil
Facility, the Committee fully endorsed the recom-
mendation of the Managing Director that a special
account should be established with appropriate con-
tributions by oil exporting and industrial countries,
and possibly by other members capable of contrib-
uting, and that the Fund should administer this
account in order to reduce for the most seriously
affected members the burden of interest payable by
them under the Oil Facility.

5. The Committee considered questions relating
to the sixth general review of the quotas of mem-
bers, which is now under way, and agreed, subject
to satisfactory amendment of the Articles, that the
total of present quotas should be increased by 32.5
per cent and rounded up to SDR 39 billion. It was
understood that the period for the next general
review of quotas would be reduced from five years
to three years. The Committee also agreed that the
quotas of the major oil exporters should be sub-
stantially increased by doubling their share as a
group in the enlarged Fund, and that the collective
share of all other developing countries should not
be allowed to fall below its present level. There
was a consensus that because an important purpose
of increases in quotas was strengthening the Fund's
liquidity, arrangements should be made under which
all the Fund's holdings of currency would be usable
in accordance with its policies. The Committee in-
vited the Executive Directors to examine quotas on
the basis of the foregoing understandings, and to
make specific recommendations as promptly as pos-
sible on increases in the quotas of individual mem-
ber countries.

6. I. The Committee considered the question of
amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the
Fund. It was agreed that the Executive Directors
should be asked to continue their work on this sub-
ject and, as soon as possible, submit for considera-
tion by the Committee draft amendments on the
following subjects:

(a) The transformation of the Interim Committee
into a permanent Council at an appropriate time,
in which each member would be able to east the
votes of the countries in his constituency separately.
The Council would have decision-making authority
under powers delegated to it by the Board of Gov-
ernors.

(b) Improvements in the General Account, which
would include (i) elimination of the obligation of
member countries to use gold to make such pay-
ments to the Fund as quota subscriptions and re-
purchases and the determination of the media of
payment, which the Executive Directors would study,
and (ii) arrangements to ensure that the Fund's
holdings of all currencies would be usable in its
operations under satisfactory safeguards for all
members.

(c) Improvements in the characteristics of the
SDR designed to promote the objective of making
it the principal reserve asset of the international
monetary system.

(d) Provision for stable but adjustable par values
and the floating of currencies in particular situa-
tions, subject to appropriate rules and surveillance
of the Fund, in accordance with the Outline of Re-
form.

II. The Committee also discussed a possible
amendment that would establish a link between allo-
cations of SDRs and development finance, but there
continues to be a diversity of views on this matter.
It was agreed to keep the matter under active study,
but at the same time to consider other ways for in-
creasing the transfer of real resources to developing
countries.

7. The Committee also agreed that the Executive
Directors should be asked to consider possible im-
provements in the Fund's facilities on the com-
pensatory financing of export fluctuations and the
stabilization of prices of primary products and to
study the possibility of an amendment of the Arti-
cles of Agreement that would permit the Fund to
provide assistance directly to international buffer
stocks of primary products.

8. There was an intensive discussion of future
arrangements for gold. The Committee reaffirmed
that steps should be taken as soon as possible to
give the special drawing right the central place in
the international monetary system. It was generally
agreed that the official price for gold should be
abolished and obligatory payments of gold by mem-
ber countries to the Fund should be eliminated.
Much progress was made in moving toward a com-
plete set of agreed amendments on gold, including
the abolition of the official price and freedom for
national monetary authorities to enter into gold
transactions under certain specific arrangements,
outside the Articles of the Fund, entered into be-
tween national monetary authorities in order to
ensure that the role of gold in the international
monetary system would be gradually reduced. It is

February 10, 1975

195

expected that after further study by the Executive
Directors, in which the interests of all member
countries would be taken into account, full agree-
ment can be reached in the near future so that it
would be possible to combine these amendments
with the package of amendments as described in
paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

9. The Committee agreed to meet again in the
early part of June, 1975 in Paris, France.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their de-
struction. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow April 10, 1972.'
Ratified by the President: January 22, 1975.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of
bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at
Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force Febru-
ary 8, 1928.=

Ratified by the President: January 22, 1975 (with
reservation).

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December

9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.=
Accession deposited: Lesotho, November 29, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.'
Accession deposited: Iceland, December 18, 1974.

Space

Convention on international liability for damago
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered
into force September 1, 1972; for the United
States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: Australia, January 20, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2,
1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with re-
spect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with
respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, January 21,
1975.

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid con-
vention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974.
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect
to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect
to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Luxembourg, January 21,
1975.

BILATERAL

Khmer Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of August 10, 1974.
Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh
January 14, 1975. Entered into force January
14, 1975.

' Not in force.

■ Not in force for the United States.

196

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX Februanj 10, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1859

Asia: America's Foreign Policy Agenda:
Toward the Year 2000 (Sisco) 182

Cultural Affairs. U.S. and Federal Republic
of Germany Hold Talks on Cultural Rela-
tions (joint statement) 181

Economic Affairs

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward the
Year 2000 (Sisco) 182

The Energy Crisis and Efforts To Assure Its

Solution (Hartman) 189

Meetings of IMF Interim Committee and
Group of Ten Held at Washington (Depart-
ment statement, texts of communiques) . . 193

Energy

The Energy Crisis and Efforts To Assure Its

Solution (Hartman) 189

Meetings of IMF Interim Committee and
Group of Ten Held at Washington (Depart-
ment statement, texts of communiques) . . 193

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill
Moyers' Journal" 165

Europe

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward
the Year 2000 (Sisco) 182

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill
Moyers' Journal" 165

Foreign Aid. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
for "Bill Moyers' Journal" 165

Germany. U.S. and Federal Republic of Ger-
many Hold Talks on Cultural Relations
(joint statement) 181

Human Rights. Secretary Kissinger Inter-
viewed for "Bill Moyers' Journal" .... 165

Middle East

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward the

Year 2000 (Sisco) 182

President Ford's News Conference of January

21 (excerpts) 179

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill

Moyers' Journal" 165

Oman. Secretary Kissinger Gives Dinner Hon-
oring Visiting Sultan of Oman (exchange
of toasts) 187

Presidential Documents. President Ford's

News Conference of January 21 (excerpts) 179

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 196

U.S.S.R.

America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Toward
the Year 2000 (Sisco) 182

President Ford's News Conference of January
21 (excerpts) 179

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Bill

Moyers' Journal" 165

United Nations. America's Foreign Policy
Agenda: Toward the Year 2000 (Sisco) . .

182

Viet-Nam. President Ford's News Conference

of January 21 (excerpts) 179

Name Index

Ford, President 179

Hartman, Arthur A 189

Kissinger, Secretary 165, 187

Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id 187

Sisco, Joseph J 182

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to January 20 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
11 of January 10 and 16 of January 16.

No. Date Snbject

t20 1/20 U.S. and Canadian officials meet
on West Coast tanker traffic:
joint statement.

*21 1/21 Leigh sworn in as Legal Adviser

(biographic data).
22 1/21 U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany
cultural talks: joint statement.

t23 1/21 U.S.-India Economic and Commer-
cial Subcommission: joint com-
munique.

*24 1/23 Walentynowicz sworn in as Ad-
ministrator of the Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs
(biographic data).

*25 1/23 Sisco: Regional Foreigrn Policy
Conference, San Diego (as pre-
pared for delivery).
26 1/23 Hartman: Regional Foreign Policy
Conference, San Diego.

t27 1/24 Kissinger: Los Angeles World
Affairs Council.

*28 1/24 Ocean Affairs Advisory Meeting,
Feb. 27.

t29 1/24 "Foreign Relations," volume IX,
1949, the Far East: China (for
release Jan. 31).

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 20402

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Washington, D.C. 20520.

13
/J:

73.

mo

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1860

February 17, 1975

A NEW NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
Address by Secretary Kissinger 197

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 28 205

"A CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT FORD"— AN INTERVIEW

FOR NBC TELEVISION AND RADIO

Excerpt From Transcript 219

PRESIDENT FORD REQUESTS ADDITIONAL FUNDS

FOR ASSISTANCE TO VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA

Message to the Congress 229

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. LXXII, No. 1860
February 17, 1975

The Department of State BULLETI.
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau al
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
tlie field of U.S. foreign relations ani
on the work of the Department ani
the Foreign Service. '

The BULLETIN includes selecteo
press releases on foreign policy, issuet
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addressei
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and othei
officers of the Department, as well oi
special articles on various phases oi
international affairs and the functiom
of the Department. Information m
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which tfu
United States is or may become i ,
party and on treaties of general inter
national interest.

Publications of the Department oi
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legislative material in the field oi
international relations are also listed

A New National Partnership

Address by Secretary Kissinger ^

A half century ago Winston Churchill, in
his book "The World Crisis," observed that
in happier times it was the custom for
statesmen to "rejoice in that protecting
Providence which had preserved us through
so many dangers and brought us at last into
a secure and prosperous age." But "little
did they know," Churchill wrote, "that the
worst perils had still to be encountered, and
the greatest triumphs had yet to be won."

The same may be said of our age. We are
at the end of three decades of a foreign
policy which, on the whole, brought peace
and prosperity to the world and which was
conducted by administrations of both our
major parties. Inevitably there were failures,
but they were dwarfed by the long-term
accomplishments.

Now we are entering a new era. Old inter-
national patterns ai-e crumbling; old slogans
are uninstructive ; old solutions are unavail-
ing. The world has become interdependent
in economics, in communications, in human
aspirations. No one nation, no one part of
the world, can prosper or be secure in iso-
lation.

For America, involvement in world affairs
is no longer an act of choice, but the ex-
pression of a reality. When weapons span
continents in minutes, our security is bound
up with world security. When our factories
and farms and our financial strength are so
closely linked with other countries and
peoples, our prosperity is tied to world pros-

' Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 24 (text from
press release 27).

perity. The first truly world crisis is that
which we face now. It requires the first truly
global solutions.

The world stands uneasily poised between
unprecedented chaos and the opportunity for
unparalleled creativity. The next few years
will determine whether interdependence will
foster common progress or common disaster.
Our generation has the opportunity to shape
a new cooperative international system; if
we fail to act with vision, we will condemn
ourselves to mounting domestic and inter-
national crises.

Had we a choice, America would not have
selected this moment to be so challenged.
We have endured enough in the past decade
to have earned a respite: assassinations,
racial and generational turbulence, a divisive
war, the fall of one President and the resig-
nation of another.

Nor are the other great democracies better
prepared. Adjusting to a loss of power and
influence, assailed by recession and inflation,
they, too, feel their domestic burdens weigh-
ing down their capacity to act boldly.

But no nation can choose the timing of its
fate. The tides of history take no account of
the fatigue of the helmsman. Posterity will
reward not the difficulty of the challenge,
only the adequacy of the response.

For the United States, the present situa-
tion is laced with irony. A decade of upheaval
has taught us the limitations of our power.
Experience and maturity have dispelled any
illusion that we could shape events as we
pleased. Long after other nations, we have
acquired a sense of tragedy. Yet our people

Februory 17, 1975

197

and our institutions have emerged from our
trials with a resihence that is the envy of
other nations, who know — even when we
forget— that America's strength is unique
and American leadership indispensable. In
the face of all vicissitudes, our nation con-
tinues to be the standard-bearer of political
freedom, economic and social progress, and
humanitarian concern — as it has for 200
years.

Thirty years ago America, after centuries
of isolation, found within itself unimagined
capacities of statesmanship and creativity.
Men of both parties and many persuasions
— like Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg
and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles — built a
national consensus for responsible American
leadership in the world.

Their work helped fashion the economic
recovery of Europe and Japan and stabilized
the postwar world in a period of interna-
tional tension. These were the indispensable
foundations on which, in recent years, we
have been able to regularize relations with
our adversaries and chart new dimensions
of cooperation with our allies.

To marshal our energies for the challenge
of interdependence requires a return to
fundamentals. It was a confident — perhaps
even brash — America that launched its post-
war labors. It was an America essentially
united on ultimate goals that took on the
task of restoring order from the chaos of
war. Three decades of global exertions and
the war in Viet-Nam have gravely weakened
this sense of common purpose. We have no
more urgent task than to rediscover it.

Only in this way can we give effect to the
root reality of our age which President Ford
described in his state of the Union address :

At no time in our peacetime history has the state
of the nation depended more heavily on the state of
the world; and seldom, if ever, has the state of the
world depended more heavily on the state of our
nation.

Let me turn, then, to an examination of
the issues before us in international affairs:
Our traditional agenda of peace and war,
the new issues of interdependence, and the
need for a partnership between the executive
and legislative branches of our government.

The Traditional Agenda of Peace and War

The traditional issues of peace and war
addressed by the postwar generation will
require our continuing effort, for we live in
a world of political turmoil and proliferating
nuclear technology.

Our foreign policy is built upon the bed-
rock of solidarity with our allies. Geography,
history, economic ties, shared heritage, and
common political values bind us closely to-
gether. The stability of the postwar world —
and our recent progress in improving our
relations with our adversaries — have cru-
cially depended on the strength and con-
stancy of our alliances. Today, in a new era
of challenge and opportunity, we naturally
turn first to our friends to seek cooperative
solutions to new global issues such as energy.
This is why we have sought to strengthen
our ties with our Atlantic partners and
Japan and have begun a new dialogue in the
Western Hemisphere.

The second major traditional effort of our
foreign policy has been to fashion more
stable relations with our adversaries.

There can be no peaceful international
order without a constructive relationship
between the United States and the Soviet
Union — the two nations with the power to
destroy mankind.

The moral antagonism between our two
systems cannot be ignored ; it is at the heart
of the problem. Nevertheless we have suc-
ceeded in reducing tensions and in beginning
to lay the basis for a more cooperative fu-
ture. The agreements limiting strategic
arms, the Berlin agreement, the significant
easing of tensions across the heart of Eu-
rope, the growing network of cooperative
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union —
these mark an undeniable improvement over
the situation just a few years ago.

The recent Vladivostok accord envisages
another agreement placing a long-term ceil-
ing on the principal strategic weapons of
both sides. For the first time in the nuclear
age, the strategic planning of each side will
take place in the context of stable and there-
fore more reassuring assumptions about the
programs of the other side instead of being

198

Department of State Bulletin

driven by fear or self-fulfilling projections.
The stage will be set for negotiations aimed
at reducing the strategic arsenals of both
sides. We shall turn to that task as soon as
we have transformed the Vladivostok prin-
ciples into a completed agreement.

The course of improving U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions will not always be easy, as the recent
Soviet rejection of our trade legislation has
demonstrated. It must nevertheless be pur-
sued with conviction, despite disappoint-
ments and obstacles. In the nuclear age there
is no alternative to peaceful coexistence.

Just as we have recognized that a stable
international environment demands a more
productive relationship with the Soviet
Union, so we have learned that there can be
no real assurance of a peaceful world so long
as one-quarter of the world's people are ex-
cluded from the family of nations. We have
therefore ended a generation of estrange-
ment and confrontation with the People's
Republic of China and sought to develop a
new relationship in keeping with the princi-
ples of the Shanghai communique. Progress
in our bilateral relations has opened useful
channels of communication and reduced re-
gional and global tensions. Our new and
growing relationship with the People's Re-
public of China is now an accepted and en-
during feature of the world scene.

A third traditional element of our foreign
policy has been the effort to resolve conflicts
without war. In a world of 150 nations, many
chronic disputes and tensions continue to
spawn human suffering and dangers to peace.
It has always been America's policy to offer
our help to promote peaceful settlement and
to separate local disputes from big-power
rivalry. In the Middle East, in Cyprus, in
Indochina, in South Asia, on urgent multi-
lateral issues such as nuclear proliferation,
the United States stands ready to serve the
cause of peace.

The New Issues of Interdependence

Progress in dealing with our traditional
agenda is no longer enough. A new and un-
precedented kind of issue has emerged. The
problems of energy, resources, environment,

population, the uses of space and the seas,
now rank with the questions of military se-
curity, ideology, and territorial rivalry which
have traditionally made up the diplomatic
agenda.

With hindsight, there is little difficulty in
identifying the moments in history when
humanity broke from old ways and moved
in a new direction. But for those living
through such times it is usually difficult to
see events as more than a series of unrelated
crises. How often has man been able to per-
ceive the ultimate significance of events oc-
curring during his lifetime? How many
times has he been able to summon the will
to shape rather than submit to destiny?

The nuclear age permanently changed
America's conviction that our security was
assured behind two broad oceans. Now the
crises of energy and food foreshadow an
equally dramatic recognition that the very
basis of America's strength — its economic
vitality — is inextricably tied to the world's
economic well-being.

Urgent issues illustrate the reality of
interdependence :

— The industrial nations built a genera-
tion of prosperity on imported fuel at sus-
tainable prices. Now we confront a cartel
that can manipulate the supply and price of
oil almost at will, threatening jobs, output,
and stability.

— We and a few other countries have
achieved immense productivity in agricul-
ture. Now we see the survival and well-being
of much of humanity threatened because
world food production has not kept pace
with population growth.

— For 30 years we and the industrial coun-
tries achieved steady economic growth. Now
the economies of all industrialized countries
are simultaneously afflicted by inflation and
recession, and no nation can solve the prob-
lem alone.

Yet the interdependence that earlier fos-
tered our prosperity and now threatens our
decline can usher in a new period of progress
if we perceive our common interest and act
boldly to serve it. It requires a new level of

February 17, 1975

199

political wisdom, a new standard of responsi-
bility, and a new vigor of diplomacy.

Overcoming the Energy Crisis

Clearly, the energy crisis is the most
pressing issue on the new agenda. In the
American view, a permanent solution is pos-
sible based on the following principles.

The first imperative is solidarity among
the major consumers. Alone, no consuming
country, except possibly the United States,
can defend itself against an oil embargo or
a withdrawal of oil money. Alone, no coun-
try, except perhaps the United States, can
invest enough to develop new energy sources
for self-sufficiency. But if the United States
acted alone, it would doom the other indus-
trialized nations to economic stagnation and
political weakness ; this would soon under-
mine our own economic well-being. Only by
collective action can the consuming countries
free their economies from excessive depend-
ence on imported oil and their political life
from a sense of impotence.

We have made important progress since
the Washington Energy Conference met less
than a year ago. Last November, the United
States and 15 other countries signed an un-
precedented agreement to assist each other
in the event of a new oil emergency. That
agreement commits each nation to build an
emergency stock of oil ; in case of a new
embargo, each will cut its consumption by
the same percentage and available oil will
be shared. Thus, selective pressure would be
blunted and an embargo against one would
be an embargo against all.

Equally important, we have moved dra-
matically toward financial solidarity. Only
last week, the major consuming nations
agreed to create a solidarity fund of $25
billion, less than two months after it was
first proposed by the United States. Through
the creation of this fund, the industrial na-
tions have gained significant protection
against shifts, withdrawals, or cutoff's of
funds from the petrodollar earners. The in-
dustrial countries will now be able to off'set
financial shifts of oil producer funds by loans

to each other from the $25 billion mutual
insurance fund. The United States considers
this rapid and decisive decision for the crea-
tion of the solidarity fund to be of the great-
est political and economic significance.

The second imperative is a major reduc-
tion in consumer dependence on imported
oil. The safety nets of sharing and financial
guarantees are important for the short term.
But our long-term security requires a deter-
mined and concerted effort to reduce energy
consumption — on the highways and in our
homes, in the very style of our lives. Equally
important will be a speedup in the develop-
ment of alternative energy sources such as
nuclear power, coal, oil shale, and the oil of
the outer continental shelf, Alaska, the
North Sea, and elsewhere.

Cooperative action among the consumer
nations will reinforce our own efforts in this
country. The International Energy Agency
(lEA), created last year, and other coun-
tries acting in parallel with it, such as
France, are responding to the crisis with
substantial conservation programs of their
own. And the United States will shortly pro-
pose to the lEA a large-scale collective pro-
gram to develop alternative energy sources
through price and other incentives to in-
vestors and through joint research and de-
velopment.

Such policies will be costly and complex;
some will be unpleasant and politically un-
popular. But we face a choice: Either we
act now, and decisively, to insure national
self-sufficiency in energy by 1985, or we re-
main prey to economic disruption and to an
increasing loss of control over our future.
This, bluntly, is the meaning of President
Ford's energy program which he laid before
the Congress in his state of the Union mes-
sage.

The third imperative is an eventual dia-
logue between consumers and producers.
Ultimately the energy problem must be
solved through cooperation between con-
sumers and producers. The United States,
as a matter of evident necessity, seeks such
a dialogue in a spirit of good will and of
conciliation. But just as the producers are

200

Department of State Bulletin

free to concert and discuss among them-
selves, so too are the consumers.

A principal purpose of consumer coopera-
tion will be to prepare substantive positions
for a producer dialogue to insure that it
will be fruitful. The consumer nations should
neither petition nor threaten. They should
be prepared to discuss the whole range of
issues of interdependence: assured supplies,
a fair return to the producers of a depleting
resource, security of investment, the rela-
tionship between oil and the state of the
world economy.

Over the long term, producers and con-
sumers, developed and developing nations,
all depend on the same global economic sys-
tem for the realization of their aspirations.
It is this system which is now in jeopardy,
and therefore the well-being of all nations
is threatened. We must — together and in
a cooperative spirit — restore the vitality
of the world economy in the interests of all
mankind.

Though we are far from having overcome
the energy crisis, the outlines of a solution
are discernible. The right course is clear,
progress is being made, and success is well
within our capacity. Indeed, the energy
crisis which accelerated the economic diffi-
culties of the industrial democracies can be-
come the vehicle by which they reclaim
control over their future and shape a more
cooperative world.

Meeting Present and Projected Food Deficit

At a time when the industrial world calls
for a sense of global responsibility from the
producers of raw materials, it has an obliga-
tion to demonstrate a similar sense of re-
sponsibility with respect to its own surplus
commodities.

Nowhere is this more urgent than in the
case of food. A handful of countries, led by
the United States, produce most of the
world's surplus food. Meanwhile, in other
parts of the globe, hundreds of millions do
not eat enough for decent and productive
lives. In many areas, up to 50 percent of the
children die before the age of five, millions

of them from malnutrition. And according
to present projections, the world's food
deficit could rise from the current 25 million
tons to 85 million tons by 1985.

The current situation, as well as the even
more foreboding future, is inconsistent with
international stability, disruptive of coopera-
tive global relationships, and totally repug-
nant to our moral values.

For these reasons the United States called
for the World Food Conference which met in
Rome last November. It was clear to us — as
we emphasized at the conference — that no
one nation could possibly produce enough to
make up the world's food deficit and that a
comprehensive international effort was re-
quired on six fronts:

— To expand food production in exporting
countries and to coordinate their agricul-
tural policies so that their capacity is used
fully and well.

— To expand massively food production in
the developing countries.

— To develop better means of food distri-
bution and financing.

— To improve not just the quantity but
also the quality of food which the poorest
and most vulnerable groups receive.

— To insure against emergencies through
an international system of global food re-
serves.

— To augment the food aid of the United
States and other surplus countries until food
production in developing countries increases.

In the next two months the United States
will make further proposals to implement
this program, and we will substantially in-
crease our own food assistance.

However, food aid is essentially an emer-
gency measure. There is no chance of meet-
ing an 85-million-ton deficit without the
rapid application of technology and capital
to the expansion of food production where it
is most needed, in the developing world.
Other surplus producers, the industrialized
nations, and the oil producers must j6in in
this enteiprise.

Energy and food are only two of the most
urgent issues. At stake is a restructuring

February 17, 1975

201

of the world economy in commodities, trade,
monetary relations, and investment.

Politically, if we succeed, it means the
shaping of a new international order. For
the industrial democracies, it involves re-
gaining their economic health and the sense
that their future is in their own hands ; for
the producing and developing nations, it
liolds the promise of a stable long-term eco-
nomic relationship that can insure mutual
progress for the remainder of the century.

The Need for National Unity

The agenda of war and peace, fuel and
food, places a great responsibility upon
America. The urgency of our challenges, the
magnitude of the effort required, and the
impact which our actions will have on our
entire society all require an exceptional de-
gree of public understanding and the effec-
tive participation and support of Congress.

Our foreign policy has been most effective
when it reflected broad nonpartisan support.
Close collaboration between the executive
and legislative branches insured the success
of the historic postwar American initiatives
and sustained our foreign policy for two
decades thereafter. More recently, during
the harrowing time of Watergate, the spirit
of responsible bipartisanship insulated our
foreign policy from the trauma of domestic
institutional crisis. For this, the nation owes
the Congress a profound debt of gratitude.

A spirit of nonpartisan cooperation is even
more essential today. The bitterness that
has marked so much of our national dialogue
for over a decade no longer has reason or
place. Public debate once again must find its
ultimate limit in a general recognition that
we are engaged in a common enterprise.

To appeal for renewed nonpartisan co-
operation in foreign policy reflects not a
preference but a national necessity. Foreign
nations must deal with our government as
an entity, not as a complex of divided insti-
tutions. They must be able to count on our
maintaining both our national will and our
specific undertakings. If they misjudge
either, they may be tempted into irresponsi-
bility or grow reluctant to link their destiny

to ours. If our divisions lead to a failure of
policy, it is the country which will suffer,
not one group or one party or one admin-
istration. If our cooperation promotes suc-
cess, it is the nation which will benefit.

In his first address to Congress, President
Ford pledged his administration to the prin-
ciple of communication, conciliation, compro-
mise, and cooperation. In that spirit, and on
behalf of the President, I invite the Con-
gress to a new national partnership in the
conduct of our foreign policy. Topether with
new conceptions of foreign policy, we must
define new principles of executive-legislative
relations — principles which reconcile the un-
mistakable claims of congressional super-
vision and the urgent requirements of pur-
poseful American world leadership.

The administration will make every effort
to meet congressional concerns. We will
dedicate ourselves to strengthening the mu-
tual sense of trust with the Congress. We
do not ask for a blank check. We take seri-
ously the view that over the past decade
there often has been a breakdown of com-
munication between the executive and legis-
lative branches.

We have made major efforts to consult
the Congress and to keep it informed. As
Secretary of State, confirmed by the Senate,
I have considered this a principal responsi-
bility of my ofiice. Therefore, in less than
16 months in office, I have testified 37 times
before congressional committees and have
consulted even more frequently with indi-
vidual Members and groups.

Nevertheless, we recognize that a new
partnership requires a willingness to explore
new approaches. Specifically, the admin-
istration will strive to evoke the advice and
consent of the Congress in its broadest
sense. We know that congressional support
presupposes that both Houses are kept in-
formed of the administration's premises and
purposes as well as of the facts on which its
decisions are based. In the process, the ad-
ministration will seek the views of as many
Members of Congress concerned with a par-
ticular issue as possible. In short, the ad-
ministration will strongly support the effort
of the Congress to meet its constitutional

202

Department of State Bulletin

obligations with wisdom and imagination.

Beyond the general requirement of advice
and consent, the role of legislation and ap-
propriations in defining the basic directions
of policy is traditional. The administration
may disagree with a particular decision; we
may argue vigorously for a different course,
as we have, for example, concerning the
necessity of adequate aid to support the
self-defense of allies in Indochina. But we
welcome the indispensable contribution of
Congress to the general direction of national
policy.

At the same time, it is important to recog-
nize that the legislative process — delibera-
tion, debate, and statutory law — is much less
well-suited to the detailed supervision of the
day-to-day conduct of diplomacy. Legal pre-
scriptions, by their very nature, lose sight
of the sense of nuance and the feeling for
the interrelationship of issues on which for-
eign policy success or failure so often de-
pends. This is why the conduct of negotia-
tions has always been preeminently an exec-
utive responsibility, though the national
commitments which a completed agreement
entails must necessarily have legislative and
public support.

The growing tendency of the Congress to
legislate in detail the day-to-day or week-
to-week conduct of our foreign affairs raises
grave issues. American policy — given the
wide range of our interests and responsi-
bilities— must be a coherent and a purpose-
ful whole. The way we act in our relations
with one country almost inevitably affects
our relationship with others. To single out
individual countries for special legislative
attention has unintended but inevitable con-
sequences and risks unraveling the entire
fabric of our foreign policy.

Paradoxically, the President and the Con-
gress share the same immediate objectives
on most of the issues that have recently be-
come sources of dispute. Too often, differ-
ences as to tactics have defeated the very
purposes that both branches meant to serve,
because the legislative sanctions were too
public or too drastic or too undiscriminat-
ing. Our inability to implement the trade
agreement with the Soviet Union is a case

in point; another is the impact of restric-
tions on aid to Turkey on our efforts both
to advance the Cyprus peace negotiations
and to safeguard our wider security inter-
ests in the eastern Mediterranean; yet an-
other is the damage to our Western Hemi-
sphere relations, specifically in Ecuador and
Venezuela, caused by an amendment de-
signed to withhold special tariff pi-eferences
from OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries] countries.

In fairness, it must be pointed out that
Congressmen and Senators must represent
the particular views of their constituencies.
All reflect an electorate impatient with for-
eign turmoil and insistent that international
responsibilities be shared more equitably.
In a period of domestic recession the case
for foreign aid becomes increasingly difficult
to make. And yet the reality of interdepend-
ence links our destiny ever more closely with
the rest of the world.

It is therefore understandable that one
of the issues on which the Congress and the
executive branch have recently divided is
the degree to which foreign aid cutoffs —
military or economic — can be used to bring
about changes in the policies of other na-
tions. Whether foreign aid should be used
as an instrument of pressure depends on the
way foreign aid is conceived.

The administration is convinced that for-
eign aid to be viable must serve American
national interests above all, including the
broad interest we have in a stable world. If
an important American interest is served
by the aid relationship, it is a wise invest-
ment; if not, our resources are being squan-
dered, even if we have no specific grievances
against the recipient.

For moral and practical reasons, we must
recognize that a challenge to the recipient's
sovereignty tends to generate reactions that
far transcend the merit of most of the issues
in dispute. Instead of influencing conduct in
ways we desire, cutting aid is likely to
harden positions. The very leverage we need
is almost always lost; our bilateral political
relationship is impaired, usually for no com-
mensurable benefit; and other friends and
allies begin to question whether we under-

February 17, 1975

203

stand our own national interest and whether
we can be a rehable longer term partner.

These issues have little to do with the age-
old tension between morality and expediency.
Foreign policy, by its nature, must combine
a desire to achieve the ideal with a recogni-
tion of what is practical. The fact of sover-
eignty implies compromise, and each com-
promise involves an element of pragmatism.
On the other hand, a purely expedient policy
will lack all roots and become the prisoner
of events. The difficult choices are not be-
tween principle and expediency but between
two objectives both of which are good, or
between courses of action both of which are
difficult or dangerous. To achieve a fruitful
balance is the central dilemma of foreign
policy.

The effort to strengthen executive-legis-
lative bonds is complicated by the new char-
acter of the Congress. New principles of
participation and organization are taking
hold. The number of Congressmen and Sen-
ators concerned with foreign policy issues
has expanded beyond the traditional com-
mittees. Traditional procedures — focused as
they are on the congressional leadership and
the committees — may no longer prove ade-
quate to the desires of an increasingly indi-
vidualistic membership.

As the range of consultation expands, the
problem of confidentiality increases. Confi-
dentiality in negotiations facilitates compro-
mise; it must not be considered by the Con-
gress as a cloak of deception ; it must not be
used by the executive to avoid its responsi-
bilities to the Congress.

Some of these problems are inherent in
the system of checks and balances by which
we have thrived. The separation of powers
produces a healthy and potentially creative
tension between the executive and the legis-
lative branches of government. Partnership
should not seek to make either branch a
rubber stamp for the other. But if old pat-
terns of executive-legislative relations are in
flux, now is the time for both branches to

concert to fashion new principles and prac-
tices of collaboration. The administration
stands ready to join with the Congress in
devising procedures appropriate to the need
for a truly national and long-range foreign
policy. We would welcome congressional sug-
gestions through whatever device the Con-
gress may choose, and we will respond in
the same spirit.

In the meantime, the administration will
strive to achieve a national consensus
through close consultation, the nonpartisan
conduct of foreign policy, and restraint in
the exercise of executive authority.

The problem of achieving a new national
partnership is difficult. I am confident that,
working together, the executive and tha
Congress will solve it and thereby enhance
the vitality of our democratic institutions
and the purposefulness of our foreign policy.

In 1947, when another moment of crisis
summoned us to consensus and creation, a
Member of the Senate recalled Lincoln's
words to the Congress:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with
difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As
our case is new, so we must think anew and act
anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we
shall save our country.

We have learned more than once that this
century demands much of America. And now
we are challenged once again "to think anew
and act anew" so that we may help ourselves
and the world find the way to a time of
hope. Let us resolve to move forward to-
gether, transforming challenge into oppor-
tunity and opportunity into achievement.

No genuine democracy can or should ob-
tain total unanimity. But we can strive for
a consensus about our national goals and
chart a common course. If we act with large
spirit, history could record this as a time of
great creativity, and the last quarter of this
century could be remembered as that period
when mankind fashioned the first truly
global community.

204

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 28

Press release 35 dated January 28

Secretary Kissinger: We will go right into
questions. Stewart [Stewart Hensley, United
Press International].

Q. Mr. Secretary, this question deals ivith
the decision of the Government of Argentina
to postpone, cancel, or otherwise delay the
proposed March meeting of Foreign Min-
isters, and their explanation that it's due to
the rigidity and lack of equity on the part
of the U.S. trade bill toioard Ecuador and
Venezuela. I have two questions on it.

One is, do you think this is a totality of the
reasons, or do you think that Cuba figures
in it to some extent? And the second ques-
tion is 2vhether in view of this you feel that
your effort to begin a netv dialogue has really
suffered a severe setback.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the
postponement of the meeting in Argentina,
I have been in very close contact with For-
eign Minister [of Argentina Alberto] Vignes
and with other of my colleagues in the West-
ern Hemisphere.

Their reason seems to me, as stated, their
objection to the provision in the Trade Act
which includes Ecuador and Venezuela in
the ban on generalized preferences. And as
you know, that is because they are members
of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries].

Now, I stated the administration position
on this yesterday. I testified against this
provision when the Trade Act was being
considered. The President, in signing the
Trade Act, had this provision in mind when
he pointed out that not all of the provisions
were agreeable to the administration. The
State Department issued a statement some-
time afterward, pointing out that it thought

the application of this provision to Venezuela
and Ecuador was too rigid.

Nevertheless, we believe that even though
we disagree with the action of the Congress
— we believe that the action of those two
governments in refusing to come to the
Buenos Aires meeting was unjustified. They
knew very well that, according to our con-
stitutional processes, no relief could be given
until we have had an opportunity for full
consultation with the Congress. And they
knew also that we would consult with the
Congress and that we had reason to believe
that the Congress would be sympathetic to
our views.

Now, moreover, even though we objected
to some of the provisions of the trade bill
with respect to Latin America, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that $750 million in
Latin American exports are going to enter
the United States duty free under the pi'o-
visions of the Trade Act and that whatever
inequities existed could have been worked
out.

And as I pointed out yesterday, as part
of the new dialogue the United States has
declared that it would not use pressure with
respect to its neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere but it is also inappropriate that
our neighbors should attempt to use pres-
sure against the United States.

Now, with respect to your specific ques-
tion: Cuba had absolutely nothing to do
with this ; because we had had full consulta-
tions on how to handle the issue of Cuba
with our Western Hemisphere neighbors,
and a substantial consensus was emerging
on how the issue of Cuba sanctions could
be handled at the Buenos Aires meeting, and
there had been no dispute with respect to
that.

February 17, 1975

205

Do I believe that the new dialogue is in
jeopardy? As with respect to the setback
that was suffered by detente, the postpone-
ment of the Buenos Aires meeting is obvi-
ously not to be desired.

On the other hand, any foreign policy to
be effective must reflect the mutual inter-
ests of all parties.

The United States believes very strongly
that a strengthening of Western Hemisphere
ties is in the interest of all of the countries
in the Western Hemisphere. We have been
prepared, and remain prepared, to make
strengthened hemisphere relations one of
the cardinal aspects of our foreign policy.
And we are convinced that the mutuality of
interests and the long tradition of coopera-
tion in the Western Hemisphere will over-
come this temporary difficulty. And we look
forward to working very closely with our
friends in the Western Hemisphere and
strengthening our relationship.

"Crisis of Authority"

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been quoted in
the newspaper recently as having grave
doubts about the loyig-term power of survival
of American society. Did you say that, and
do you believe it?

Secretary Kissinger: I stated — I don't
knov^f what this particular story refers to —
that I believe that all of Western democra-
cies at the present are suffering from a
crisis of authority. And I believe that it is
very difficult to conduct policy when govern-
ments are unwilling to make short-term
sacrifices — unwilling or unable — for the
long-term benefit. So I believe, as a historian
and as an analyst, that there is this problem.

I believe at the same time, as somebody
in a position of responsibility, that these
problems are solvable and that we can solve
them. And therefore I am confident in our
ability to overcome our diflSculties. But I
don't think that this has to take the form of
denying that difficulties exist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvith regard to the sud-
den Soviet cancellation of the '72 trade pact,
do you intend to lead a neio effort to try to

get the restrictions, the congressional restric-
tions that encumbered that Trade Act that
led to the cancellation, removed in the com-
ing weeks or months?

Secretary Kissinger: I continue to believe
in the principles that were reflected in the
Trade Agreement in 1972 that could not be
carried out. I think now that we should
assess the situation in the light of the
Soviet refusal to accept some of the provi-
sions in the legislation that was passed by
the Congress. We will then, in some weeks,
begin consultation with the Congress as to
the appropriate steps to be taken so that the
next time we put forward trade legislation
it will be on the basis of some consensus be-
tween the administration and the Congress,
in order to avoid some of the difficulties that
arose previously.

Q. In order to get the Jackson amend-
ment removed?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the particular
methods that should be used and how to
deal with the objections should be worked
out in consultation between the administra-
tion and those leaders of the Congress that
have a particular interest in this issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you mean when
you say you believe the Western democracies
are suffering from a crisis of authority? Do
you 7nean that their central governments are
not strong enough, or that the leaders aren't
strong enough? I don't know exactly what
you mean by that "crisis of authority."

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't had a
crisis resulting from public statements by
me in quite a while. [Laughter.] In at least
two weeks. [Laughter.]

I am saying the problem for any society
is, first, whether it is able to recognize the
problems it is facing, secondly, whether it
is willing to deal with these problems on the
basis of long-range decisions.

At the time the problems can be mastered,
it is never possible to prove that an action
is in fact necessary, and you always face
one set of conjectures with another set of
conjectures.

206

Department of State Bulletin

So what is needed is a consensus in the
leadership and between the leadership and
the parliament that enables the government,
or the society, to act with confidence and
with some long-range mission. I think this
is a problem in many countries today, and
it has many causes. Part of the cause is the
complexity of the issues, which makes it
very difficult to subject them to the sort of
debate that was easier when one dealt with
much more simple problems.

It's often been remarked that on such
issues as the defense budget it is very diffi-
cult for the layman to form an opinion on
the basis of the facts that he can absorb,
even if they are all available to him. So this
is a problem.

It is a problem, however — and I repeat —
which is solvable. It is a problem which I
attempted to address last week when I called
for new cooperation between the admin-
istration and the Congress. It is not a prob-
lem to be solved by confrontation.

The Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the difficulty
of this phase of the Middle East negotia-
tions, and noiv looking hack at the reaction
to your remarks, do you think it was a
mistake to leave open the possibility of
American military intervention in the Middle
East oilfields in the gravest of emergencies?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think what I
said and the way it was interpreted were not
always identical. I believe that what I said
was true and it was necessary. It is irrele-
vant to the issues which we now confront.
And I have repeatedly stated that the
United States will deal with the issues of
energy on the basis of a dialogue with the
producers and with an attitude of concilia-
tion and cooperation.

The contingency to which I referred, as
I pointed out previously, could arise only if
warfare were originated against the United
States. And I don't foresee this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to
date on the diplomatic situation in the Middle
East? Specifically, what are your travel

plans? Secondly, do you think it's possible
to reconcile Egypt's desire for further re-
gaining of territory — in particular the
passes and the oilfields which President
Sadat referred to — with Israel's desire for
further political acceptance by the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think you all
recognize that we are dealing in the Middle
East with an enormously delicate problem
affecting the relations between Israel and
its neighbors, the relations of Israel's neigh-
bors to each other, and the relationship of
outside powers to the whole area. And in
this extremely complex and very dangerous
situation, it is necessary for us to move with
care and, hopefully, with some thoughtful-
ness.

My plans are within the next few weeks
— and the precise date has not yet been set,
but I hope to be able to announce it early
next week — to go within the next few weeks
on an exploratory trip to the Middle East.
It will not be a trip designed to settle any-
thing or to generate a "shuttle diplomacy."
It will be designed to have firsthand talks
with all of the major participants — all of
the Arab countries that I previously visited,
as well as Israel — in order to see what the
real possibilities of a solution might be.

I personally believe that the two interests
— which you correctly defined — of Egypt for
the return of some territory, and of Israel
for some progress toward peace, can be
reconciled. And I believe also that the alter-
native to reconciling it will be serious for
all of the parties concerned.

Public and Congressional Accountability

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your references earlier
to a crisis of authority in the West — some
members of Congress, of course, woidd say
that there is a crisis of accountability that
has caused the difficidty in the conduct of
foreign affair's. Hoiv do you reconcile these
two problems?

And if you ivould, I woidd like to direct
your attention particidarly to the ongoing
state of U.S.-Soviet relations. After the cur-
rent problem ice have on trade, we have the

February 17, 1975

207

additional larger problem in many respects
coming tip on SALT [Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks] negotiations. Note, you face
these two problems, authority and account-
ability.

Secretary Kissinger: I think you are abso-
lutely right, Murrey [Murrey Marder, Wash-
ington Post]. Any democracy faces the
problem of how to reconcile the need for
authority with the requirements of account-
ability. You need authority because foreign
countries can only deal with a government.
They can not, and should not, begin to lobby
in the legislative process of a society. And
therefore the ability to conduct foreign pol-
icy depends on the expectation of other
countries of the degree to which one's com-
mitments can be carried out and one's word
means anything.

On the other hand, obviously in a democ-
racy there must be full accountability. I
have attempted to be understanding of this
problem. As I pointed out previously, I have
testified 38 times before congressional com-
mittees in 16 months in office and have met
nearly a hundred times with other congres-
sional groups on an informal basis.

At the same time, I recognize that the
necessity of presenting a united front to
foreign countries may impose additional re-
quirements of consultation, and I am pre-
pared to undertake them and so is the entire
administration.

Now, with respect to the SALT agree-
ment, we shall brief the relevant congres-
sional committees of the essential features
of our plans. I think we have to come to
some understanding with the Congress about
the necessity on the one hand of keeping the
Congress properly informed and, on the
other hand, of not having every detail of the
negotiation become subject to public contro-
versy, because that would freeze the nego-
tiating process and would lead to rigidity.

So all I can say is I'm aware of the prob-
lem. I'm not saying it should be solved by
giving the executive discretion. I think it
requires self-restraint on both the execu-
tive's part and the Congress' part.

Q. / ivould like to pursue that one bit. On

the question of accountability you are obvi-
ously facing — the administration is facing —
not a congressional desire to grant greater
authority for the conduct of secret diplomacy
but, on the contrary, a demand for greater
openness and increasing restrictiveness on
secret diplomacy.

Notv, is this not one of the fundamental
problems here — that while you referred, for
example, to having testified 38 times, most of
that testimony was in closed session? Don't
you feel some need here to be more respon-
sive to the public discussion of foreign policy
which you have referred to in the past but
it appears to have diminished?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Murrey, un-
fortunately, I don't have the statistics here
of the number of public speeches I have
given and the number of press conferences
Fve held. And it seems that criticism modu-
lates between not being sufficiently avail-
able to the press and seducing the press.
But be that as it may, I recognize the need
for public accountability as well as congres-
sional accountability. I believe at the same
time that it is necessary for everyone inter-
ested in accountability also to recognize the
limits of the detail to which this can take
place at particular stages of negotiations.
We will do the maximum that we think is
consistent with the national interest. And
we will interpret this very widely. And we
are open to suggestions as to how the public
presentation can be improved.

But I think it is necessary for everybody
concerned with the problem of public ac-
countability, as well as everyone concerned
with the question of authority, to look agairi
at the limits to which they should push their
claims.

The Trade Act and the Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a public im-
pression that the administration accepted the
conditions of the Jackson amendment, how-
ever reluctantly. I would like to ask you
whether, if you had anticipated the Soviet
reaction to the trade bill, whether you woidd
have advised the President not to sign it.

208

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go
into a debate about every detail of tiie nego-
tiations that led to the so-called compromise.
And once matters had reached this point
where it became necessary, we were already
at a very narrow margin. I don't want to
review all these events, because we should
look into the future — because there is no
pui-pose being served.

Would I have recommended to the Presi-
dent that he not sign it? That's very hard
to know. One has to remember that it was
believed that the trade bill was in the essen-
tial interests of the United States and in
the essential interests of a more open trad-
ing system among all of the industrialized
countries, as well as giving special benefits
to the developing countries in the special
preference system. And, therefore, to recom-
mend the President to veto this because
there were aspects of it in the granting of
MFN [most favored nation] to the Soviet
Union would have been a very heavy respon-
sibility.

As it turned out, I believed that, while it
would be a close call, the agreement that was
made with Senator Jackson would probably
stick. And therefore I agree with those who
say that it was entered into in good faith
by all of the parties. So the issue never
arose.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in Los
Angeles you referred to your dissatisfaction
ivith legislative restrictions on foreign pol-
icy. Does this dissatisfaction lead you to
attempt to try to repeal or modify the
Church-Case amendment or the War Powers
Act? Or, more importantly, the restrictions
on the end use of military aid?

Secretary Kissinger: Now, let's get the
distinctions clear. First of all, let me make
one point with respect to what Murrey said
previously.

The issue isn't secret diplomacy. Some
diplomacy has to be secret, and some of it
has to be open. And I think that balance
can be established.

Now, with respect to legislative restric-
tions, I made a distinction between two cate-
gories of legislative restrictions: those that

attempt to set main lines of policy, such as
the Church-Case amendment. With those the
administration can agree or disagree, but it
cannot challenge the right of the Congress
to set the main lines of the policy by legis-
lation. The second is the attempt to write
into law detailed prescriptions, country by
country, for specific measures. That, we
believe, will generally have consequences
that are out of proportion to the objectives
that are sought to be obtained. Those we
deplore, and those we will attempt to resist.
Now, if the Congress passes a law on the
main direction of a policy with which we
disagree, we may ask them to change it.
The two cases you have mentioned, even
though they were passed at the time over
administration objection, at least the first
one, we will not ask them to reverse.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the thing that troubles
me about that is, do you — and I think you
do, and why do you is really the question —
put Jackson-Vanik in the second category
and not in the first? Didn't Jackson-Vanik
indeed represent a national attitude about
freedom and democracy, et cetera, and not
really some tinkering with day-to-day minor
details?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm glad that you
already answered the first of your two ques-
tions—

Q. I think you do put it in category 2.

Secretary Kissinger: When we get these
press conferences back on a more frequent
basis, I guess we will get two-thirds of the
questions answered by those who put them.

On the Jackson-Vanik — I don't think
I want to insist, on a theoretical point, on
whether it is in the first category or in the
second category. On the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, the administration always sup-
ported the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment. And the administration, before
the Jackson-Vanik amendment was ever
introduced, had managed to bring about an
increase in emigration from an average of
400 to a level of about 38,000 a year. So
there was no dispute whatever between the
administration and the supporters of Jack-

February 17, 1975

209

son-Vanik about basic values and basic ob-
jectives. The administration consistently
maintained that the method of a legislative
prescription in this case was not the appro-
priate method and might backfire.

Now, whether that was because it was in
the second category that I pointed out or in
the first category, I don't really want to
insist upon. Nor do I want to challenge the
right of the Congress to pass such an action.

And finally, I really don't think much pur-
pose is served by prolonging the debate
over the past — of how we got to this point
— because we did try to work together with
the Congress on a good-faith basis, once it
had embarked on a course which we con-
sidered unwise, to try to resolve the ensuing
difficulty.

If we go back on the trade legislation, we
will try to achieve the objectives which we
share with the Congress by methods that
may be more appropriate to the objective.
We will not give up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us hoiv you
estimate the prospects of a smmnit meeting
with regard to the CSCE Conference [Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe] and what sigyiificance a summit
could have for detente, East-West detente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that
the European Security Conference is making
good progress. The issues — as you know,
they are discussing them in various cate-
gories called "baskets," and the issues in
most of these categories are beginning to
be resolved. There are some unresolved is-
sues with respect to general principles and
some unresolved issues with respect to
human contacts. But progress has been
made in all of these categories.

I believe, therefore, that if the confer-
ence is concluded along the lines that are
now foreseeable, a summit conclusion is
highly probable. I believe that a successful
outcome of the European Security Confer-
ence would contribute to detente.

Cyprus Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, next week, February 5,
is the deadline by ivhich time the admin-

istration has to report progress on Cyprus.
What kind of report do you think you will
be able to give to Congress by that date?
Otherwise aid to Turkey is cut off.

Secretary Kissinger: I can only stress
what I have said previously.

The United States gives aid to Turkey
not as a favor to Turkey, but in the interests
of Western security. And I think anybody
looking at a map and analyzing foreseeable
trouble spots must recognize this. Therefore
the administration is opposed to the cutoff
of aid to Turkey, regardless of what prog-
ress may be made in the negotiations.

Secondly, the administration favors rapid
progress in the negotiations over Cyprus
and has supported this progress. And I be-
lieve that all of the parties, including the
Greek side — and especially the Greek side —
would have to agree that the United States
has made major efforts.

I believe that some progress is possible
and will be made — can be made before Feb-
ruary 5. And we will be in touch with the
Congress either late this week or early next
week. And I have stayed in very close con-
tact with those Members of the Congress
and the Senate that have had a particular
interest in this question to keep them in-
formed of the state of the negotiations.

So by the end of this week — as you know,
the parties now meet twice a week in Nicosia
— and by the end of this week, after their
second meeting this week, I will be in touch
with the parties, and we will discuss that
with the Congress.

Assistance to Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Robert Byrd
said this morning the leaders of both parties
in Congress have told President Ford that
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get
more aid to South Viet-Nam. Where does
that leave the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let us make
clear what it is we have asked for. And let
me express the hope that what we are asking
for doesn't rekindle the entire debate on
Viet-Nam, because that is emphatically not
involved.

210

Department of State Bulletin

Last year the administration asked for
$1.4 billion for military aid to Viet-Nam. The
Congress authorized $1 billion. It appropri-
ated $700 million. We are asking the Con-
gress to appropriate the $300 million differ-
ence between what it had already authorized
and what it actually appropriated, in the
light of the stepped-up military operations
in Viet-Nam.

This is not an issue of principle of whether
or not we should be in Viet-Nam. The issue
is whether any case at all can be made for
giving inadequate aid to Viet-Nam. And we
believe there can be no case for a deliberate
decision to give less than the adequate aid,
and aid that the Congress had already au-
thorized to be given, so that it could not
have been even an issue of principle for the
Congress.

Q. Mr. Secfetary, on the Middle East, sev-
eral months ago you said you wouldn't he
returning to the Middle East unless you
were fairly sure that your presence there
would lead to an agreement. Yon are now
saying that you are going back there on an
exploratory mission. Why have you changed
your tactics?

Secretary Kissinger: I have changed my
tactics at the request of all of the parties,
and based on the belief that the urgency of
the situation requires that this step be
taken. I have also pointed out in this press
conference that I am hopeful that progress
can be made. And I am going there with
that attitude.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvith respect to your
saying that it serves no useful purpose to go
over the Jackson-Vanik amendment, it has
become an issue in Washington to apportion
some blame on this issue. Noiv, this has
ramifications for U.S. relations with the
Soviet Union because some people say the
Soviet Union reneged. It has ramifications
for your dealing with Congress because some
people feel you have blamed Congress. Be-
cause of that problem, could you deal icith
this a little further and talk to us about the
situation?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I stated my view,

and the administration's view, with respect
to the amendment in two public testimonies
before the Congress in which I pointed out
why we were opposed not to the objectives —
I want to repeat that — but to the methods.

I don't think any purpose is served in try-
ing to apportion blame now. I agree with
those who say that the discussions between
the Congress and the administration were
conducted in good faith by both sides. At this
point, we should address the question of
where we go in the future, and not how we
got where we ai-e.

Military Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your
assessment of the situation in Indochina,
particidarly Viet-Nam, two years after the
agreement ivhich you labored over, and what
went ivrong?

Secretary Kissinger: I think if you re-
member the intense discussions that were
going on in the United States during the ne-
gotiation of the agreement, you will recall
that the overwhelming objective that was
attempted to be served was to disengage
American military forces from Indochina
and to return our prisoners from North Viet-
Nam.

Under the conditions that we then con-
fronted— which was an increasing domestic
debate on this issue — those were the princi-
pal objectives that could be achieved. The
alternative — namely, to impose a different
kind of solution — would have required a more
prolonged military operation by the United
States.

Secondly, what has gone wrong, if any-
thing has gone wrong, is that it was the
belief of those who signed the agreement —
certainly a belief that was encouraged by
the United States, as well as by the public
debate here — that the objection in the United
States was not to our supporting a govern-
ment that was trying to defend itself by its
own efforts. Our national objection was to
the presence of American forces in Viet-Nam.

Now, the military situation in Viet-Nam
was reasonably good until last June. At that

February 17, 1975

211

point, we had to impose cuts — no new equip-
ment could be sent, and only inadequate
ammunition. This brought about a reduction
in the ammunition expenditure by the Viet-
namese Army. This in turn led to an increase
in casualties, to a loss of mobility, and there-
fore to a deterioration in the military situ-
ation.

All that we have ever said was that the
settlement would put South Viet-Nam in a
position where it had a chance to defend it-
self. That chance exists. That chance depends
on adequate American assistance. And that
is the chance we are asking for.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question I ivould
like to follow up on your first reply on the
Middle East. In that reply, you said that you
believe the Egyptian desire for additional
territory in Sinai, together with the Israeli
desire for specific political concessions, can
be reconciled. I understand that you probably
don't tvant to get into the specific demands
that Israel is asking from Egypt. But perhaps
you ca)i give us some general criteria for
what types of political acts Egypt may offer
to Israel that ivould satisfy Israel. And the
second part of the question is — the ques-
tioner had specifically referred to the oil-
fields and the passes — were you referring to
those specific points as possibly being rec-
onciled ?

Secretary Kissinger: I think all of you
have to accept the fact that I cannot possibly
go into the details of the negotiation before
I have gone to the Middle East. And there-
fore, with all due respect, I cannot possibly
answer this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, along this line, but not
asking you to go into any details of the nego-
tiations, in your disciissions with the Arab
countries in the Middle East, have you foimd
any evidence that the Arab world is prepared
to accept the existence of Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my impression
that there is an increasing willingness to
accept the existence of Israel as part of the
process of peace, yes.

Detente and Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the areas where
detente has never worked very well is in
Soutlieast Asia. During the course of the
time ivhen detente was running relatively
smoothly, did you ever try to make it clear to
the Soviets that responsible behavior in the
form of limiting military supplies — which
tend to wind up in South Viet-Nam and fuel
the war there — would not be acceptable? In
other words, have you tried to ivork out that
end of the equation?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it is an
interesting question to determine what you
mean by the phrase "is not acceptable." The
answer to your question depends on what
is it we would do if the Soviet Union ignores
us. And if you look at the catalogue of things
available for us to do under present circum-
stances in the way of either retaliation or of
benefits, you will find that it is not an in-
finitely large one.

The answer to your question is, yes, we
have raised this issue both with the Soviet
Union and with the People's Republic of
China. And I think the efficacy of it cannot
be determined by determining whether sup-
plies have stopped altogether, but has to be
seen in relation to how much more might
have been done and then to assess it in
relationship to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to travel to
Latin America during the month of Feb-
rtiary ?

Secretary Kissinger: I plan — I don't think
I have announced it, as some of my colleagues
seem to have announced — I do plan to travel
to Latin America, certainly before the OAS
meeting here in April. The exact date I would
like to work out after my trip to the Middle
East has been more firmly settled. But I want
to say now that I place great stress on our
relationship with Latin America and that I
will go at the earliest opportunity that I can
do justice to this visit.

Q. Could you tell us about your meeting
with the former President this weekend?

212

Department of State Bulletin

Specifically, could you tell us if you discussed
with him his cooperating in any way with
the current iyivestigations into the CIA op-
eration ?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not discuss
with the former President anything what-
ever having to do with any investigation
now being conducted in Washington, and
specifically not that investigation. It was a
general review of the international situation
and personal talk. It had no specific mission.
But it seemed to me that a man who has
appointed me to two senior positions in the
government deserved the courtesy of a visit
when I was that close.

Stewart [Stewart Hensley].

Q. Well, this is just tying up a loose end.
But ivhen you were responding to Mr. Freed's
{Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press] ques-
tion about the illness tvhich afflicts some of
the democratic countries, you said it was
easier to get a consensus between the execu-
tive and the parliament when problems were
simpler.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right.

Q. In answering Mr. Marder's question
about accountability, you harked back to the
— / think it was the Chicago speech, or
possibly Los Angeles, in which you said
you promised wider cons2dtation but with
increased confidentiality, which seems rather
paradoxical to me, although I'm ivilling to be-
lieve you can do it. [Laughter.] But there's
one more element, and I'm tvo7idering if that
element is not ivhat is missing from what
you told Mr. Freed about in the answer to
his question — and that is that problems now
are not as simple as they ivere at the time
of Senator Vandenberg and the bipartisan
foreign policy. And how do you get around
the complexity of these problems in your
accountability?

Secretary Kissinger: Look, I'm not trying
to score points here now. I'm trying to call
attention to a very serious problem — and a
a problem that if as societies we do not solve,
it will not be a victory for an administration

or a victory for the countries; it will be a
defeat for everything we stand for — every-
thing we are trying to achieve.

I did not say I want more consultation and
more confidentiality. I listed a whole set
of problems that are very real problems.
One is how you can have congressional con-
trol without legislative restriction. I frankly
do not know the answer exactly to this.

Q. That is what I wanted to know.

Secretary Kissinger: That is one prob-
lem— how you can have congressional control
without the Congress necessarily passing
laws.

The second problem is how you can have
increased consultation and at the same time,
on key issues, maintain increased confiden-
tiality.

Now, I have to say that recently I have
been briefing some key members of the Con-
gress on some of the key aspects of the
Cyprus negotiation and there have been no
leaks whatsoever and I consider this a very
important achievement — I don't want to im-
ply that there have been leaks previously.

And what I wanted to do in my speech
was to call attention to what really may be-
come a major problem for this country and,
because so much depends on this country, a
major problem for all free countries. I did
not mean to blame anybody. I don't think it
does any good to aim for victories by either
branch. I think we have to explore a serious
solution — to which I confess I do not know
all the answers.

Q. That was what prompted my question.

Arms Policy in Persian Gulf

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been concern
expressed in Congress aboiit the buildup of
various countries in the Persian Gulf and
of American arms going to these countries.
There tvere expressions of concern about
arms going to Oman when they had not gone
before and a feeling that war could break
out at any time, once these countries build
up enough, without enough reason for war
to break out, and that the United States has

February 17, 1975

213

taken a major role in this. Could you talk
about oitr interest in the Persian Gulf and
why the United States is doing ivhat it's
doing?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in determining
whether the United States is unnecessarily
giving arms or determining the wisdom of
American arms policy in the area, one has
to ask a number of questions.

First, what is the security concern of the
countries involved — that is to say, do they
perceive that they face a real threat? The
second question is: Is this security concern
well founded? Thirdly, does the United States
have any relationship to that security con-
cern? Fourthly, what would happen if the
United States did not supply the arms?

And I think each of these arms programs
has to be assessed in relation to these or
similar questions. And I think you will find —
or at least I hope you would find — that we
could answer, in the overwhelming majority
of the cases, these questions in a positive
sense — that is to say, that there is a secu-
rity problem which these countries feel ; that
often the security problem is caused by a
neighbor supported by Soviet or other Com-
munist arms; that, therefore, if the country
did not receive the arms, it would be sub-
ject to this neighbor or else it would get
these arms from other sources.

And these are the principles we are trying
to apply in our arms sales, especially in an
area such as the Persian Gulf, in which we
have, after all, a very major strategic in-
terest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you outline some of
the main topics ivhich you think will be
discussed ivhen Mr. Wilson comes here — and,
particularly, can yon say ivhether the issue
of the Persian Gulf will be discussed?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know,
our relationship with the Government of the
United Kingdom is extremely close, and we
keep each other informed about our major
foreign policy initiatives and our major ap-

proach to international affairs in the frankest
possible way.

One result is that there is rarely a very
set agenda for the meetings — or, rather, the
agenda is the world situation broken down
into its constituent elements. Therefore it
is reasonable to assume that the Middle East,
including the Persian Gulf, will play a sig-
nificant role in the discussions with Prime
Minister Wilson.

I don't know whether the Persian Gulf will
be specially singled out. These discussions
are usually rather unstructured, but they're
extremely frank ; and we will put our entire
views before Prime Minister Wilson.

TJie press: Thank you very much, Mr.
Secretary.

U.S. Regrets Postponement
of Buenos Aires Meeting

Department Statement, Ja}iuary 27

The United States regrets that the Gov-
ernment of Argentina, in consultation with
the other countries of the hemisphere, has
postponed the Buenos Aires meeting of For-
eign Ministers scheduled for late March.

The proximate cause of the postponement
is the apparent exclusion of all OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] countries, including Ecuador and
Venezuela, from the new tariff preference
system. As is well known, the administra-
tion opposed this and other restrictions con-
tained in the trade bill and has pledged to
work with the Congress to correct them.
The President and Secretary of State Kis-
singer so stated publicly, as did our Repre-
sentative to the Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States last week.

Given these statements regarding our
views and intentions, we cannot but consider
it inappropriate that some Latin American
countries have insisted on conditions for the
Buenos Aires meeting which they know to

214

Department of State Bulletin

be incompatible with our constitutional
processes, as well as substantively unjust.

There is no question — and we have em-
phasized this to our Latin American friends
— that, despite certain deficiencies in the
Trade Act, there are many benefits. For ex-
ample, under our proposed system of tariff"
preferences, we estimate that more than 30
percent by value of dutiable Latin American
exports to the United States will be granted
tarifi'-free treatment. In absolute amounts,
tariff's will be eliminated on over $750 mil-
lion worth of Latin American exports to the
United States. It should also be noted that
Latin American exports to the United States
have more than doubled in value since 1972.

The Trade Act also authorizes us to begin
the multilateral trade negotiations in Ge-
neva. These negotiations will lead to reduc-
tion of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade
of great importance to all the developing
countries, including Latin America. More-
over, they will benefit Latin America and, in-
deed, the entire world trading community
by providing a deterrent to protectionism
around the world — a matter of vital import
given today's economic climate.

The United States, in the fall of 1973,
began a new dialogue with Latin America
to improve relations with our traditional
friends in the Western Hemisphere. We
hoped that both sides would develop a closer
understanding of each other's problems.
Over the past year we have jointly made
significant progress toward this objective.
In this process the United States has re-
nounced any method of pressure as obsolete
and inappropriate to the new relationship
we seek. We believe this is a reciprocal
obligation. Pressure from the south is as
inappropriate as pressure from the north.

We will continue to work with our Latin
American friends on the problems which
have arisen in connection with the Trade
Act in a spirit of friendship. We will address
cooperatively the many issues which com-
prise the agenda of the new dialogue in the
same spirit of conciliation and friendship.

The Trade Act and Latin America

FoUoiving is the text of a memorandiim
irliich was distributed to Latin A7nerican and
Caribbean Ambassadors at a briefing at the
Department of State on Jannary lU.

The Trade Act and Latin America

The Trade Act, signed into law by the Pres-
ident on January 3, 1975, is of considerable
importance to Latin America.

It is a long and complex statute. The Act
touches nearly every aspect of U.S. trade
policy. And, although the legislation was
under consideration in the Congress for
nearly two years, the Committees responsible
for it were making changes in its text until
the final day of Congressional consideration.
In fact, the text of the Act, because it is so
long, is not yet generally available from the
Government Printing Office. Early comment
about the legislation has therefore been
forced to rely on press reports, some of which
have been partial or inaccurate.

It is the purpose of this Memorandum to
summarize the legislation as it relates to the
nations of Latin America and the Caribbean,
to make clear the policy the United States
will adopt in implementing the Act, and to
analyze the important benefits which Latin
America may anticipate as the law is put
into eff"ect. The Memorandum addresses
three major issues:

— the authorization for the U.S. Govern-
ment to implement a system of generalized
tariff" preferences (GSP) for imports from
developing countries ;

— the forthcoming worldwide multilateral
trade negotiations (MTN), which the Trade
Act has now made possible; and

— the significance of the legislation for the
U.S. countervailing duty system.

]. Generalized Preferences. The Trade Act
of 1974 contains authority for the United
States to grant tariff preferences to imports
from developing countries — GSP, in short.

February 17, 1975

215

The new law provides that the United States
may accord temporary (10-year) duty-free
treatment for a range of manufactured and
semi-manufactured products and selected
agricultural and primary products. Eighteen
other nations have similar — though in some
cases much less liberal — preference systems.

The new U.S. preferences will fulfill a
commitment undertaken in the Declaration
of Tlatelolco that the U.S. Government would
make a maximum effort to secure passage
of such legislation.

GSP and most-favored-nation (MFN) tar-
iff concessions are two very different con-
cepts. GSP is temporary and nonbinding.
Each industrialized country is free to with-
draw it at any time. MFN tariff cuts are
bound. MFN tariff reductions cannot be with-
drawn from GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] members without the
granting of compensation. The major GSP
systems of most major countries have quanti-
tative limitations in the form of tariff quotas
and competitive need ceilings which trigger a
return to ordinary — nonpreferential — MFN
tariff duty rates. Thus, various products of
substantial interest to the Latin American
countries are not eligible for the preferences
of the other developed nations and will not be
eligible for the new U.S. GSP. Those products
will, however, be eligible for the multilateral
tariff reductions anticipated in the course and
as a part of the trade negotiations them-
selves. Thus, even with GSP, on a significant
number of products it will be in the long-
term interest of the Latin American countries
to have the ordinary rates of duty negotiated
down to as low a point as possible in the
MTN.

In general, U.S. tariffs are already low.
This is the result of successive rounds of
tariff negotiations. Now, nearly 60 percent
of U.S. imports from Latin America enter
duty free. The duty on the remainder aver-
ages only 8 percent. Therefore, while pref-
erences may be marginally helpful in the
short run in some particular product areas,
over the longer run MFN tariff reductions
and action on nontariff barriers — as set
forth in the following section of this Mem-

orandum— will prove to be far more im-
portant and beneficial to most Latin Ameri-
can countries.

The Administration worked closely with
the Latin American countries to solicit their
requests for specifications of products to be
included in our GSP product lists. The GSP
product lists are now nearing completion.
Wherever possible, these lists include the
products requested by the Latin American
countries. As a result the lists of agricul-
tural and primary products to be submitted
later this month to the International Trade
Commission will be significantly larger in
terms both of numbers of items and dollar
trade coverage than were the illustrative
lists prepared for and submitted to the UN-
CTAD and OECD [United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development; Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] in 1970. Preliminary indications are
that over 30 percent by value of the remain-
ing U.S. dutiable imports from Latin Amer-
ica— that is to say, over three quarters of a
billion dollars of Latin American exports to
the United States based on 1972 trade values
— will be included in our system of GSP.

The new legislation, unfortunately, con-
tains provisions which could exclude certain
categories of developing countries from pref-
erences. The Administration consistently op-
posed these criteria as being excessively rigid.
We are currently examining the legislation to
determine what leeway it may contain. We
will work in a spirit of cooperation with the
Congress to seek necessary accommodations.

2. The Multilateral Trade Negotiatioyis.
While GSP will be helpful in encouraging
Latin American export diversification, the
multilateral trade negotiations now made
possible by the new Trade Act will go deeper,
and be of considerably more lasting impor-
tance for all of Latin America. These nego-
tiations will fix the structure of global trade
for a long term future, and will touch the
export interests of every country in the
hemisphere.

In September 1973, 102 countries agreed,
in the celebrated Tokyo Declaration, to un-
dertake a new round of multilateral trade

216

Department of State Bulletin

negotiations. The negotiations anticipated
by the Declaration were dedicated to the
I following aims:

— the expansion and liberalization of
world trade through significant dismantling
of tariff barriers, of nontariff barriers and
of other conditions and restraints which dis-
tort world trade ;

— the improvement in the world trading
system, so that it conforms more closely to
current conditions and realities ; and

— the securing of benefits for the trade
of developing countries, including substan-
tially greater access for their products to
markets around the world.

Without the authority established in the
Trade Act, the international efi'ort contem-
plated by the Tokyo Declaration to expand
trade and to reform the world trading sys-
tem— in which almost all Latin American
countries are participating — would have
been aborted. In other words, the conse-
quences of not having the negotiating power
in the Trade Act, particularly in view of
the current world economic conditions,
would have been severe, and most adverse
in fact to the very countries whose develop-
ment goals depend most heavily on diversi-
fying and expanding exports. Rather than
opening new opportunities for trade, the
virtually certain result of a failure to enact
the new U.S. Trade Act would have been
contraction.

With the Trade Act now in hand, the
United States is prepared to move toward
the achievement of the aims set out in the
Tokyo Declaration. The United States will
move rapidly.

Committees and working parties have
been meeting in Geneva. A further meeting
in Geneva of the Trade Negotiating Com-
mittee is scheduled for February; this will
mark the real beginning of the trade nego-
tiations. The U.S. Government will be there.
It hopes that all Latin American countries
will actively participate.

The tariff cutting authority provided in
the Trade Act is substantial — 6 percent of
existing duty rates above 5 percent ad va-

lorem, and authority to go to zero for rates
of 5 percent ad valorem or less. It is the
firm intention of the United States to use
this authority vigorously, to secure the
greatest possible reciprocal reduction in
tariffs among the major developed trading
countries. Major beneficiaries of such re-
ductions will be the developing countries,
including particularly Latin America.

Even more important than the lowering of
tariff barriers will be the elimination or re-
duction of nontariff barriers. As tariffs have
been progressively reduced over the years,
nontariff barriers and other similar measures
distorting trade have played an increasingly
pernicious role as restraints on trade ex-
pansion. The Trade Act provides unprece-
dented authority for the harmonization, re-
duction or elimination of the nontariff
barriers in this country and in all other ma-
jor trading nations which now burden inter-
national trade, including that of Latin
America.

The United States is acutely aware that in
many cases these nontariff barriers are par-
ticularly burdensome to the exports of devel-
oping countries. It anticipates that some of
the more onerous of these nontariff barriers
may be subject to reduction or elimination
through the negotiation of new sets of in-
ternational rules on market access. Such new
rules are also provided for in the Trade Act.
The United States will do what it can to
bring this about. For example, the United
States will seek revision of the existing in-
ternational safeguard procedures under the
GATT to deal with problems associated with
an exceptionally rapid growth of imports
in a way which will make resort to safe-
guard actions less politically contentious and
subject all the while to greater international
surveillance and discipline, while hopefully
eliminating import quotas maintained il-
legally under present GATT rules. Similarly,
the problem of export subsidies and corre-
sponding countervailing duties can be ap-
proached by the development of an inter-
national code on these issues, as can problems
of government procurement and product
standardization.

February 17, 1975

217

The United States will adopt a strategy
in the forthcoming negotiations which will
give particular consideration to the interests
and needs of developing countries, including
Latin American interests. The United States
is committed to consult closely with the
Latin Americans in the course of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations to develop common
positions. In part toward this end, there has
been formed among the various U.S. Govern-
ment agencies an interdepartmental Sub-
group on Latin America. This Subgroup is
reviewing the effects of our trade policies on
Latin America. It will ensure that Latin
American trade interests are fully considered
in the implementation of U.S. trade policy
in the coming multilateral trade negotiations.

3. Countervailing Duties. Finally, the Act
also contains important new developments
in connection with countervailing duty pro-
ceedings. In addition to the possibility of a
multilateral code governing export subsidies
and countervailing action, referred to above,
the Trade Act also gives the Secretary of the
Treasury discretionary authority to refrain
from imposing duties for up to four years in
those special cases where (1) adequate steps
have been taken to reduce or eliminate the
adverse effects of the bounty or grant; and
(2) there is a reasonable prospect that suc-
cessful trade agreements will be entered into
on nontariff barriers; and (3) the imposition
of duties would seriously jeopardize these
negotiations.

4. Conclusion. The Trade Act of 1974 con-
tains many elements. Only a few have been
mentioned here. It is not a perfect law. Every

provision in it is not as the Administration
would have wished. But its major, overriding
significance is clear — the demonstration that
the United States remains committed to a
liberal and open world trading system, and
is prepared to make considerable concessions
for that purpose, and will work with other
countries in the Geneva trade negotiations in
pursuit of that commitment.

The United States is convinced that such
a system is in the best interest of all coun-
tries— developed and developing — and es-
sential to the achievement of the common
objective of a stable, healthy world economic
order.

This is a matter of profound importance
to Latin America. If the trade negotiations
which are now made possible by the new Act
are successful, Latin America will be able to
look forward to increased opportunities for
export earnings in the United States and in
the other industrialized countries as well.
Had the Act not been passed, those nego-
tiations would not have been possible. Given
the international economic situation, the
strong tendencies of the major trading na-
tions would have been toward isolationist
trade policies. This would have had pro-
foundly adverse effects on the export pros-
pects of the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean.

The United States is in the process of
working out the implementation of the Trade
Act. In that process, we look forward to a
continuing dialogue and cooperation with the
countries of the hemisphere.

Washington, D.C, January u, 1975.

218

Department of State Bulletin

"A Conversation With President Ford"— An Interview
for NBC Television and Radio

FoUoioing are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of an interview
with President Ford by John Chancellor and
Tom Brokaiv broadcast live on NBC tele-
vision and radio on Jamiary 23.^

Mr. Chancellor: Noiv you told, I think it
was Time magaziyie, that we might have gas
rationing if we get aiiother oil embargo. Is
that correct?

President Ford: Another oil embargo
which would deprive us of anywhere from 6
to 7 million barrels of oil a day would create
a very serious crisis.

Mr. Chancellor: But is that a likelihood,
sir? As I understand it, of those 7 million
barrels a day, only about 8 percent come
from the Arab countries, or 10 or something
like that.

President Ford: I can't give you that par-
ticular statistic. It would depend, of course,
on whether the Shah of Iran or Venezuela or
some of the other oil-producing countries
cooperated.

At the time of the October 1973 oil em-
bargo, we did get some black-market oil. We
got it from some of the noncooperating coun-
tries; but in the interval, the OPEC [Orga-
nization of Peti'oleum Exporting Countries]
nations have solidified their organization a
great deal more than they did before. So, we
might have a solid front this time rather
than one that was more flexible.

Mr. Chancellor : I)i other words, you are

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27.

worried not about an Arab oil boycott but a
boycott by all the oil-producing countries
that belong to OPEC?

President Ford: That is correct.

Mr. Chancellor: Do you regard that as a
political —

President Ford: It is a possibility.

Mr. Chancellor: And in that case, that
tuoidd produce the necessity for a gas ration-
ing system ?

President Ford: It would produce the
necessity for more drastic action. I think gas
rationing in and of itself would probably be
the last resort, just as it was following the
1973 embargo.

At that time, as you remember, John, in
order to be prepared. Bill Simon, who was
then the energy boss, had printed I don't
know how many gas rationing coupons. We
have those available now ; they are in storage.
I think they cost about $10 million to print,
but they are available in case we have the
kind of a crisis that would be infinitely more
serious than even the one of 1973.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, you have
talked also about energy independence, and it
is a key to your whole program. As I recall,
of the 17 million barrels of oil a day we use
in this country, about 7, as you say, come
from other countries.

Let me just put it to you in a tendentious
ivay. An awful lot of experts are saying that
it will he impossible for us by 1985 to be
totally free of foreign supplies of energy. Do
you really think loe can make it?

President Ford: The plan that I have sub-
mitted does not contemplate that we will be

February 17, 1975

219

totally free of foreign oil, but the percentage
of reliance we have, or will have, on foreign
oil will be far less.

At the present time, for example, John, 37
percent of our crude oil use comes from
foreign sources. In contrast to 1960 — we
were exporting oil. But in the interval be-
tween 1960 and the present time — we are
now using 37 to 38 percent of foreign oil
for our energy uses.

Now, if my plan goes through, if the
Congress accepts it and we implement it
and everything goes well, by 1985, if I recall,
instead of 37 or 38 percent dependence on
foreign oil, we will be down to about 10 per-
cent. Well, a 10 percent cutoff, with all the
contingency plans we might have, we can
handle without any crisis.

Mr. Chancellor: Tom. may I just folloiv up
on that?

Mr. Brokaw: You are doing just fine, John.

Mr. Chancellor: The other day at yonr
press conference, you ivere asked about Dr.
Kissinger's quote on the possibility of mili-
tary intervention. And something surprised
me, sir. Yoti have been in politics for a long
time, and you are as expert a question-
diicker as anybody in that trade. Why didn't
you duck that question? Why didn't you just
say, "Well that's hypothetical?" You did go
into some detail on it.

President Ford: I did. I in part reiterated
what I had said, I think, at a previous news
conference. I wanted it made as clear as I
possibly could that this country, in case of
economic strangulation — and the key word
is "strangulation" — we had to be prepared,
without specifying what we might do, to
take the necessary action for our self-pres-
ervation.

When you are being strangled, it is a
question of either dying or living. And when
you use the word "strangulation" in relation-
ship to the existence of the United States or
its nonexistence, I think the public has to
have a reassurance, our people, that we are
not going to permit America to be strangled
to death. And so, I, in my willingness to be
as frank — but with moderation — I thought I

ought to say what I said then. And I have am-'
plified it, I hope clarified it, hei-e.

Mr. Chancellor: The Neiv Republic this
iveek has a story saying that there are three
American divisions being sent to the Middle
East, or being prepared for the Middle East.
We called the Pentagon, and ive got a con-
firmation on that, that one is air mobile, one
is airborne, and one is armored. And it is
a little unclear as to ivhether this is a con-
tingency plan, because ive don't know ivhere
we ivould put the divisions in the Middle
East. Could you shed any light on that?

President Ford: I don't think I ought to
talk about any particular military contin-
gency plans, John. I think what I said con-
cerning strangulation and Dr. Kissinger's
comment is about as far as I ought to go. j

Mr. Chancellor: Then ive have reached a
point ivhere another question woidd be un-
productive on that?

President Ford: I think you are right.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, you said the
other day that — speaking of that general
area — you thiuk there is a serious danger
of war in the Middle East. Earlier this year,
you were quoted as saying, something over
70 percent. Has it gone up recently?

President Ford: I don't think I ought to
talk in terms of percentage, Tom. There is a
serious danger of war in the Middle East. I
have had conferences with representatives of
all the nations, practically, in the Middle
East. I have talked to people in Europe. I
have talked to other experts, and everybody
says it is a very potentially volatile situation.

It is my judgment that we might have a
very good opportunity to be successful in
what we call our step-by-step process. I hope
our optimism is borne out. We are certainly
going to try.

Mr. Brokaw: Is it tied to Secretary Kis-
singer's next trip to that part of the world?

President Ford: Well, he is going because
we think it might be fruitful, but we don't
want to raise expectations. We have to be

220

Department of State Bulletin

realistic, but if we don't try to move in this
direction at this time, I think we might lose
a unique opportunity.

Mr. Brokaw: Should ive not succeed this
time, Mr. President, do you think it is prob-
ably time that we have to abandon this step-
by-step process and go on to Geneva as the
Soviets woidd like to have us do?

President Ford: I think that is a distinct
possibility. We prefer the process that has
been successful so far, but if there is no prog-
ress, then I think we undoubtedly would be
forced to go to Geneva.

I wouldn't be any more optimistic; in fact,
I would be less optimistic if the matter was
thrown on the doorstep of Geneva.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, really, the
Russians have been shut out of Middle East-
ern diplomacy since Dr. Kissinger began
step-by-step diplomacy.- Why was that?
Coiddn't the Russians play more of a positive
role than they are doing? They are arming
the Arabs to the teeth, and that is really
about all we have been able to see or all they
have been allowed to do under the way that
ive have set otir policies.

President Ford: I am not as authoritative
on what was done during the October war
of 1973 in the Middle East as I am now, of
course. I can assure you that we do keep
contact with the Soviet Union at the present
time. We are not trying to shut them out
of the process of trying to find an answer
in the Middle East. They can play, and they
have played, a constructive role, even under
the current circumstances.

So, I think it is unfair and not accurate to
say that they are not playing a part. We are
taking a course of action where it is more
visible perhaps that we are doing something,
but I say sincerely that the Soviet Union is
playing a part even at the present time.

Mr. Chancellor: Would you tell us what
you think about the idea that is going around
a little bit — and perhaps you have heard it
as well, perhaps you know a great deal about
it, I don't know — that if the Israelis made a

significant pidlback on various fronts in the
Middle East that that coidd be followed by
some sort of American guarantee for their
seciirity?

President Ford: John, I really do not think
I ought to get into the details of what might
or might not be the grounds for a negotiated
settlement. This is a very difficult area be-
cause of the long history of jealousies, antag-
onisms, and it is so delicate I really do not
think I ought to get into the details of what
might or might not be the grounds for a
settlement.

Mr. Chancellor: Woidd you entertain a
question based on the reported Israeli desire
for a threefold increase in our aid to them?

President Ford: The United States, over
the years, has been very generous in eco-
nomic and military aid for Israel. On the
other hand, we have been quite generous to
a number of Arab nations. The State of
Israel does need adequate military capability
to protect its boundaries, or its territorial
integrity.

I think because of the commonality of in-
terest that we have with Israel in the Middle
East that it is in our interest as well as
theirs to be helpful to them, both militarily
and economically. There has been no deter-
mination by me or by us as to the amount of
that aid.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, I wonder if
toe can come back at yozi again about Israel's
security in another ivay. As you know, re-
porters don't give up easily on some of these
questions.

President Ford: I found that out, Tom.

Mr. Brokaw: On a long-range basis, do
you think that it is possible for Israel to
be truly sectire in the Middle East ivithout
a U.S. guarantee of some kind?

President Ford: Well, of course, Israel,
to my knowledge, Tom, has never asked for
any U.S. manpower or any guarantee from
us for their security or their territorial in-
tegrity. I think the Israelis, if they are

February 17, 1975

221

given adequate arms and sufficient economic
help, can handle the situation in the Middle
East. Now, the last wai-, unfortunately, was
much more severe from their point of view
than the three previous ones. And I suspect
that with the Arabs having more sophisti-
cated weapons and probably a better mili-
tary capability, another war might even be
worse. That is one reason why we wish to
accelerate the efforts to find some answers
over there.

But, I think the Israelis, with adequate
equipment and their determination and suf-
ficient economic aid, won't have to have U.S.
guarantees of any kind.

Mr. Brokaw: I iconder if ivc ca)t move to
another area in the world, or ivould you
like to go hack to the Middle East?

Mr. Chancellor: I have one question I
would like to put to the President.

Sir, when ive talk about strangulation —
and I hope we don't talk about it any more
tonight after this, because I do think it is
the hypothetical — / agree tvith you on that —
what about the moral implications? If a
country is being strangled by another coun-
try or set of countries that own a natural
resource, is it moral to go and take that? It
is their oil; it is not ours. Isn't that a
troublesome question?

President Ford: I think it is a troublesome
question. It may not be right, John, but I
think if you go back over the history of
mankind, wars have been fought over nat-
ural resources from time immemorial. I
would hope that in this decade or in this
century and beyond, we would not have to
have wars for those purposes, and we cer-
tainly are not contemplating any such action.
But history, in the years before us, indicates
quite clearly that that was one of the reasons
why nations fought one another.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, what are our
objectives now in Southeast Asia, in Viet-
Nam, particularly?

President Ford: Viet-Nam, after all the
lives that were lost there, Americans, over
50,000, and after the tremendous expendi-
tures that we made in American dollars,

several years, more than $30 billion a year —
it seems to me that we ought to try and give
the South Vietnamese the opportunity
through military assistance to protect their
way of life.

This is what we have done traditionally as
Americans. Certainly, since the end of World
War II, we have helped innumerable nations
in military arms and economic a.ssistance to
help themselves to maintain their own free-
dom.

The American people believe, I think, his-
torically that if a country and a people want
to protect their way of life against aggres-
sion, we will help them in a humanitarian
way and in a military way with arms and
funds if they are willing to fight for them-
selves. This is within our tradition as
Americans.

And the South Vietnamese apparently do
wish to maintain their national integrity and
their independence. I think it is in our best
tradition as Americans to help them at the
present time.

Mr. Brokair: How miich longer and how
deep does our commitment go to the South
Vietnamese?

President Ford: I don't think there is any
long-term commitment. As a matter of fact,
the American Ambassador there, Graham
Martin, has told me, as well as Dr. Kissinger,
that he thinks if adequate dollars which are
translated into arms and economic aid — if
that was made available that within two or
three years the South Vietnamese would be
over the hump militarily as well as eco-
nomically.

Now, I am sure we have been told that
before, but they had made substantial prog-
ress until they began to run a little short of
ammunition, until inflation started in the
last few months to accelerate.

I happen to think that Graham Martin,
who is a very hardnosed, very dedicated man,
and very realistic, is right. And I hope
the Congress will go along with this extra
supplemental that I am asking for to help
the South Vietnamese protect themselves.

Mr. Chancellor: Sir, that is $300 million

222

Department of State Bulletin

yoH have asked for the South Vietnamese.
And given what ifou have just said — well, I
am. just going to phrase it this way — ivill we
see the light at the end of the tunnel if we
give them $300 million?

President Ford: The best estimates of the
experts that are out there, both military and
civilian, tell me that $300 million in this
fiscal year is the minimum. A year ago
when the budget was submitted for military
assistance for South Viet-Nam, it was $1.4
billion. Congress cut it in half, which meant
that South Vietnamese rangers going out on
patrol instead of having an adequate supply
of hand grenades and weapons were cut in
half, which of course has undercut their
military capability and has made them con-
serve and not be as strong.

Now, $300 million doesn't take them back
up to where they were or where it was pro-
posed they should be. But the experts say
who are on the scene, who have seen the
fighting and have looked at the stocks and
the reserves, tell me that that would be
adequate for the current circumstances.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, does it
make you uneasy to sit on that couch in this
room and have experts in Viet-Nam saying
only a little hit ynore, and it will he all right?
We did hear that for so many years.

President Ford: I think you have to think
pretty hard about it, but a lot of skeptics,
John, said the money we were going to make
available for the rehabilitation of Europe
after World War II wouldn't do any good,
and of course the investment we made did
pay off. A lot of people have said the money
that we made available to Israel wouldn't
be helpful in bringing about the peace that
has been achieved there for the last year and
a half or so, but it did. It helped.

I think an investment of $300 million at
this time in South Viet-Nam could very like-
ly be a key for the preservation of their
freedom and might conceivably force the
North Vietnamese to stop violating the Paris
accords of January 1973.

When you look at the agreement that was
signed — and I happened to be there at the

time of the signing in January of 1973 — the
North Vietnamese agreed not to infiltrate.
The facts are they have infiltrated with
countless thousands — I think close to 100,000
from North Viet-Nam down to South Viet-
Nam. They are attacking cities, metropoli-
tan areas. They have refused to permit us
to do anything about our U.S. missing in
action in North Viet-Nam. They have re-
fused to negotiate any political settlement
between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-
Nam. They have called off the meetings
either in Paris or in Saigon.

So here is a counti-y- — South Viet-Nam —
that is faced with an attitude on the part
of the North Vietnamese of total disregard
of the agreement that was signed about two
years ago. I think the South Vietnamese de-
serve some help in this crisis.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, underlying
all of this in much of this interview is a
kind of supposition on your part, J guess,
that the American puhlic is willing to carry
the hurdens that it has carried in the past.
Do you believe that? Is that your view of
the ivorld, kind of, and the view of this
coimtry ?

President Ford: Yes, and I am proud of
that, Tom. The United States — we are for-
tunate. We have a substantial economy. We
have good people who by tradition — certain-
ly since the end of World War II — have
assumed a great responsibility. We rehabili-
tated Europe. We helped Japan — both in the
case of Germany and Japan, enemies that
we defeated.

We have helped underdeveloped countries
in Latin America, in Africa, in Southeast
Asia. I think we should be proud of the
fact that we are willing to share our great
wealth with others less fortunate than we.

And it gives us an opportunity to be a
leader setting an example for others. And
when you look at it from our own selfish
point of view, what we have done has basi-
cally helped America ; but in addition, it has
helped millions and millions of other people.
We should be proud of it. We should not be
critical of our efforts.

February 17, 1975

223

Proclamation Raising Import Fees
for Oil and Oil Products Signed

Remarks by President Ford '

In my state of the Union address, I set
forth the nation's energy goals to assure that
our future is as secure and productive as
our past. This proclamation that I am about
to sign is the first step down the long and
difficult road toward regaining our energy
freedom. The proclamation will gradually
impose higher fees on imported oil, and this
will result in substantial energy conserva-
tion by the United States.

As we begin to achieve our near-term con-
servation goals, the nation will once again
be going in the right direction, which is away
from energy dependence. Each day that
passes without strong and tough action,
which this proclamation is, results in a
further drain on our national wealth and
on the job it creates for the American people.
Each day without action means that our
economy becomes more and more vulnerable
to serious disruption. Each day without
action increases the threat to our national
security and welfare.

This proclamation, which is just as fair
and equitable as the law permits, must now
be followed by positive congressional action.
The nation needs a fully comprehensive and
long-range energy program, one that in-
creases domestic energy supplies and en-
courages lasting conservation. To reach our
national goals, we need the help of each
American and especially their representa-
tives in the Congress.

I look forward to vigorous debate and seri-
ous congressional hearings on our compre-
hensive energy plan. The crucial point is
that this proclamation moves us in the right
direction while we work to enact the energy
legislation. The tactics of delay and proposals
which would allow our dependency and vul-
nerability to increase will not be tolerated

' Made in the Oval Office at the White House on
Jan. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents dated Jan. 27). For text of Procla-
mation 4341, see 40 Fed. Reg. 3965.

by the American people, nor should they be.

The new energy-saving fees put us on the
right path. There are problems ahead. There
will be hardships. Let us get on with the job
of solving this serious energy problem.

Ambassador Johnson Discusses
Prospects for SALT Talks

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Talks (SALT) resumed at Geneva on
January 31. FoUoiving is the transcript of
an intervieiv ivith Ambassador at Large U.
Alexis Johnson, U.S. Representative to the
talks, conducted at Washington by Paid
Sisco of United Press International, for
broadcast on Eurovision on January 29.

Press release 36 dated January 29

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, the SALT
talks resume at the tail end of January in
Geneva. What would you say is the prime
aim of this session?

A)nbassador Johnson: Well, we have been
given the mandate by the leaders on both
sides — by President Ford and by General
Secretary Brezhnev — to conclude, or to write,
an agreement which will implement the
agreement which they entered into and
agreed upon in Vladivostok in November.

They agreed upon, you might say, the
broad outlines of the agreement; and the job
that the Soviet negotiator. Minister Semenov
[Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Seme-
nov] , and I will be having, together with our
delegations, will be to translate this into the
specifics of an agreement which can be
signed by both governments.

Mr. Sisco: Well, now, obviously you enter
these talks optimistic, but are you optimistic
that something concrete will come out of this
particular session?

Ambassador Johnson: I certainly am, be-
cause I think that the agreement that was
entered into at Vladivostok is so concrete
and contains such constructive elements in
it that I feel that it is going to be possible

224

Department of State Bulletin

for us to write an agreement which will
commend itself to both governments.

Now, this doesn't mean it is going to be
easy. Vladivostok did not seek to answer
all the questions, but it does mean that we
have a more solid basis now than we have
ever had in the past for writing a new
agreement.

Mr. Sisco: Of course, I am sure you arc
atvare of certain criticisms of the Vladivo-
stok agreement, that the 2,U00 nuclear missile
total many people thought far too high. How
do you feel about that? Is there a chance
that that can be reduced when we get down
to the fine print?

Ambassador Johnson: I have no inhibi-
tions or reservations whatsoever about the
validity, importance, and desirability of the
Vladivostok agreement. The Vladivostok
agreement, to my mind, represented a very
significant breakthrough, as the term has
been used, and I agree, given my own back-
ground, that it was a breakthrough.

Since I entered the negotiations, we have
been talking over the past few years about
reductions; and we, the United States, have
been taking the position that in order to
negotiate reductions, it was first necessary
for the two sides to arrive at a common
level and then reduce from that level.

Well, up to now, the problem has always
been the difficulty of arriving at an agree-
ment on a common level. The Soviets have
insisted upon there being compensations,
they call it — that is, their having a somewhat
higher number because of various factors —
and thus they would start from a higher
figure than we would start from.

The big breakthrough at Vladivostok was
that the Soviets agreed with us on starting
from a common level. Now, having reached
that common level, I think it will facilitate
negotiations in the future on reductions. In
fact, that Vladivostok agreement says that
we will enter into negotiations on reduc-
tions.

Now, the agreement has been criticized be-
cause it doesn't include reductions, also. How-
ever, you have to start some place. And I

think that the Vladivostok agreement is a
very important breakthrough toward start-
ing on a further path that will lead both sides
toward reductions.

Mr. Sisco: Well, you don't believe that that
2,Jt00 figure was just arbitrarily set too
high. One part of that criticism, if I may
add — some people say the Russians actually
wanted a loiver figure. Is that right? Is
that true?

Ambassador Johyison: I never heard that
statement made.

Mr. Sisco: That was in some press clip-
pings I have seen.

Ambassador Johnson: As a matter of fact,
the 2,400 figure is a figure somewhat in be-
tween what we have and what the Russians
have. So it is a compromise figure, you might
say.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if
you feel that your job in the last few iveeks
has become harder because of the Russian's
rejections of the trade treaty, apparently a
little bit cracking of this U.S.-Soviet detente.
Do you think perhaps they are going to be a
little tougher?

Ambassador Johnson: I don't want to pre-
dict what their attitude is going to be, except
that I go into these talks with the conviction
that both sides want them to succeed. No
matter what other problems there may be in
our relations, it seems to me that both coun-
tries have an overwhelming interest in pre-
venting the holocaust of a nuclear war. And
I am going into these talks with the idea
that they are going to succeed. I hope and ex-
pect that my Soviet colleague will be doing
the same.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, on the sam,e
plane, sort of, the United States and Soviets
are at least talking to limit nuclear weapons.
What about the proliferation of nuclear
tveaponry for other nations? I am thinking
really of the Mideast where obviously the
Arabian countries are going to have the
money, at least, perhaps to get into the »^t-
clear race. Is there something that the United

February 17, 1975

225

states and the Soviets together can do to
limit the spreading of nuclear weapons?

Amhassador Johnson: Well, as you know,
both countries have signed the Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty (NPT) and both countries have
supported the Nonproliferation Treaty. And,
as you know, also an NPT review conference
will be taking place in the course of this year.
So both countries are still supporting the
principles involved in the Nonproliferation
Treaty. We in the SALT talks do not di-
rectly deal with this matter.

Mr. Sisco: What are some of the nuts and
bolts of this talk? How long do you expect
to be there, and something along that line?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, that's a ques-
tion my wife asks me. I am not able to an-
swer it that firmly. I expect to be there as
long as it is necessary to do the job.

Mr. Sisco: Looking ivay down the road,
and a bit philosophically, can you foresee a
time ivhen perhaps there will be no nuclear
weaponry, and we don't have this big thing
hanging over our shoulders and minds?

Ambassador Johnson: I wish I could say
that, but I don't see the possibility at the
present time.

In this connection, Mr. Sisco, in connec-
tion with this agreement, I think people un-
derstandably keep searching for some magic
formula that will dispose of this whole ques-
tion once and for all — eliminate all nuclear
weapons — or there be a definitive agreement
between ourselves and the Soviet Union that
will last for a long time, last indefinitely into
the future.

I just don't think that there is such a
formula. I think that, given the growth of
technology, given the developments in both
countries, between the two countries as well
as elsewhere in the world, I think this whole
question of arms limitation, and particularly
the limitation of strategic arms, is going to
be something that both countries are going
to have to deal with on a continuing basis
now and into the future.

I think this is one of the advantages of
this present agreement at Vladivostok. It

was agreed that we will not try to write
something that will last indefinitely into th>'
future. It was agreed that we will try to
write something that will have a life of 10
years. Ten years is a span in this field that
it is possible to foresee and anticipate de-
velopments, and thus I think that we have
brought this into a framework which makes
it manageable.

This agreement isn't going to end all prob-
lems. This agreement, as I said, is simply,
I think, the beginning of — or let's say, a
further step in this process of negotiating
and reaching understandings between our-
selves and the Soviet Union in this very
dynamic field.

Mr. Sisco: If I may touch on something
that you touched on earlier, I am wondering
whether perhaps the decliyie of Mr. Brezhnev
— you mentioned Mr. Brezhnev and Presi-
dent Ford signed the agreement — and there
is a strong feeling that perhaps he lost some
influence in the Soviet Union. Do you think
this makes your job harder, or do you know
anything that might go along that line?

Ambassador Johnson: I just don't think
it would be useful for me to speculate. I
deal with the representative of the Soviet
Government. He deals with it as a represen-
tative of that government.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, just on an-
other philosophical note, do you feel that
perhaps it might have been better not to
have nuclear weaponry at all in the last 25-
30 years?

Ambassador Johnson: Yes, I would cer-
tainly agree, if it had been possible. And
you will recall that the United States, when
it had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry,
made a proposal, the Baruch proposal,
wasn't it, back in 1946, that nuclear weapons
be outlawed, in eflfect, and that all nuclear
energy be brought under international con-
trol. And you will recall that that was turned
down at the time.

Now, as long as nuclear weapons exist, I
think it important that the United States
maintain its deterrent posture. And of

226

Department of State Bulletin

?ourse the Soviet Union has been seeking
parity with the United States in nuclear
weapons.

As long as deterrence can be maintained,
I have hopes that nuclear war can be averted
between the two powers, and that, in effect,
is what the SALT talks are all about. The
SALT talks are not about eliminating all
nuclear weapons. The SALT talks are estab-
lishing a relationship between the two coun-
tries on the level of weapons such as not to
encourage either side to initiate nuclear war.

The theme of the talks, if you will, as far
as I am concerned, in many ways, is sta-
bility; that is, that our weapons systems
and our strategic nuclear forces are not such
as to bring about instability, particularly in
a crisis situation, so that deterrence can be
maintained and stability can be maintained
in relationships between our two countries.

Mr. Sisco: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

U.S. -India Economic and Commercial
Subcommission Meets at Washington

Joi7it Communique ^

The Economic and Commercial Subcom-
mission of the India-U.S. Joint Commission
held its first meeting in Washington on
January 20-21, 1975, to discuss ways to
broaden economic and commercial relation-
ships between the two countries. Progress
made by the Subcommission underscored a
new stage in U.S.-Indian economic relations
based on an increasing and closer coopera-
tion in a wide range of activities in trade,
agricultural inputs, taxation, investment and
industry.

The meetings were chaired by Indian Fi-
nance Secretary M. G. Kaul and Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs Thomas O. Enders. Two other
subcommissions, one on science and tech-
nology and one on education and culture,
will meet during the next few weeks. The

'Issued on Jan. 21 (text from press release 23).

subcommission meetings are in preparation
for a meeting of the Joint Commission,
chaired by the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry
A. Kissinger, and the Minister for External
Affairs, Shri Y. B. Chavan, which will be
held in Washington on March 13-14, 1975.

The Subcommission decided on specific
steps to expand economic relations between
the two countries. Toward this objective, the
two sides agreed that a Joint Business
Council should be established to increase
direct contacts between the business sectors,
including Indian public sector enterprises,
in industrial and commercial projects of
high priority.

Indian officials expressed their interest in
expanding the scope and magnitude of In-
dian exports to the United States and agreed
to provide a list of non-traditional products
with potential for increased exports to the
United States. The U.S. delegation provided
a list of product categories in which the U.S.
is interested in expanding its exports to
India. Both sides agreed to cooperate in such
trade expansion on a Government-Govern-
ment and Government-private business
basis. Both sides also agreed upon the need
for a regular and timely exchange of infor-
mation on marketing conditions and regula-
tions which might affect their exports to
each other.

The Indian and U.S. delegations exchanged
views on the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. The
Subcommission discussed provisions con-
sidered to be of particular relevance and
benefit to India, and also examined ques-
tions relating to the implementation of a
U.S. system of generalized tariff prefer-
ences.

Concerning problems faced by India as a
result of recent short supply of key com-
modities, U.S. agricultural experts gave a
detailed presentation of current and pro-
jected market developments, especially in
the areas of fertilizers and pesticides. Con-
sidering the importance of agriculture to
the two economies, the delegates decided to
form a special working group which will
meet immediately to concentrate on the
supply of certain agricultural inputs in
short supply including developing long-term

February 17, 1975

227

Indian capacity for production of these
items.

To improve the climate for U.S. invest-
ment in India, the two sides agreed to hold
talks within the ne.\t few weeks on a pos-
sible double taxation treaty.

The Subcommission also explored new
ways to stimulate cooperation between U.S.
and Indian firms in the development of high
technology and export oriented industries
and in cooperative ventures in third coun-
tries. Both Governments, in cooperation with
the proposed Joint Business Council, will
actively cooperate to assure that such op-
portunities are fully utilized.

President Vetoes Bill To Provide
Nontariff Barrier on Filberts

Memorandum of Disapproval >

I am withholding my approval from H.R.
2933, a bill which would amend the Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act to make
existing grade and quality restrictions on
certain imported commodities applicable to
imported filberts.

In my judgment, the bill would be unfair
to the American consumer and the American
farmer, as well as prejudicial to the interests
of American trade policy.

H.R. 2933 would be unfair to the consumer
because it could unnecessarily increase prices
for filbert products. Existing law already
requires all imported foodstuffs to meet
health standards prescribed under the Food
and Drug Act.

The bill could also produce unfair conse-
quences for the farmer by causing the loss of
some of his important markets abroad. It
could result at best in comparatively limited
benefits for domestic producers while risking

' Issued on Jan. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 13).

retaliation from abroad against the larger
volume of other products exported by our
farmers.

Finally, the bill would be prejudicial to
our trade policy because it would be incon-
sistent with our obligations under the Gen-
eral Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. It
would erect a non-tariff trade barrier at a
time when we are trying to persuade other
nations to dismantle theirs.

Although there are other commodities
which are subject to the same statutory re-
strictions that H.R. 2933 would impose on
filberts, no new commodities have been in-
cluded in that list since January of 1971. I
cannot in good conscience support the addi-
tion of a new commodity just after signing
into law the new Trade Act which has a
major aim of eliminating non-tariff trade
barriers.

For the foregoing reasons, I am compelled
to withhold my approval from H.R. 2933.

Gerald R. Ford

The White House, January 3, 1975.

Notice of Time for Filing Claims
Against Syria by U.S. Nationals

Department Announcement ^

Notice is hereby given that the Depart-
ment of State will receive at its Office of
the Legal Adviser, located at 2201 C Street,
N.W., Washington, D. C. 20520, during the
period beginning February 3, 1975, and end-
ing August 4, 1975, claims against the Gov-
ernment of the Syrian Arab Republic by
U.S. nationals for the nationalization, ex-
propriation or sequestration of, or other
measures directed against their property by
the Government of the Syrian Arab Re-
public.

'Issued on Jan. 27 (text from press release 30).

228

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

President Ford Requests Additional Funds
for Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia

Message to the Congress ^

To the Congress of the United States:

Two years ago the Paris Agreement was
signed, and several weeks later was endorsed
by major nations including the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, France and the
People's Republic of China. We had suc-
ceeded in negotiating an Agreement that
provided the framework for lasting peace
in Southeast Asia. This Agreement would
have worked had Hanoi matched our side's
efforts to implement it. Unfortunately, the
other side has chosen to violate most of the
major provisions of this Accord.

The South Vietnamese and Cambodians
are fighting hard in their own defense, as
recent casualty figures clearly demonstrate.
With adequate U.S material assistance, they
can hold their own. We cannot turn our
backs on these embattled countries. U.S. un-
willingness to provide adequate assistance
to allies fighting for their lives would seri-
ously affect our credibility throughout the
world as an ally. And this credibility is
essential to our national security.

Vietnam

When the Paris Agreement was signed,
all Americans hoped that it would provide
a framework under which the Vietnamese
people could make their own political choices
and resolve their own problems in an atmos-
phere of peace.

'Transmitted on Jan. 28 (text from White House
press release).

In compliance with that Agreement, the
United States withdrew its forces and its
military advisors from Vietnam. In further
compliance with the Agreement, the Re-
public of Vietnam offered a comprehensive
political program designed to reconcile the
differences between the South Vietnamese
parties and to lead to free and supervised
elections throughout all of South Vietnam.
The Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly re-
iterated this offer and has several times
proposed a specific date for a free election
open to all South Vietnamese political groups.

Unfortunately, our hopes for peace and
for reconciliation have been frustrated by the
persistent refusal of the other side to abide
by even the most fundamental provisions of
the Agreement. North Vietnam has sent its
forces into the South in such large numbers
that its army in South Vietnam is now
greater than ever, close to 289,000 troops.
Hanoi has sent tanks, heavy artillery, and
anti-aircraft weapons to South Vietnam by
the hundreds. These troops and equipment
are in South Vietnam for only one reason —
to forceably impose the will of Hanoi on
the South Vietnamese people. Moreover,
Hanoi has refused to give a full accounting
for our men missing in action in Vietnam.

The Communists have also violated the
political provisions of the Paris Agreement.
They have refused all South Vietnamese
offers to set a specific date for free elections,
and have now broken off negotiations with
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

February 17, 1975

229

In fact, they say that they will not negotiate
with that Government as it is presently
constituted, although they had committed
themselves to do so.

Recent events have made it clear that
North Vietnam is again trying to impose a
solution by force. Earlier this month. North
Vietnamese forces captured an entire prov-
ince, the population centers of which were
clearly under the control of the South Viet-
namese Government when the Paris Agree-
ment was signed. Our intelligence indicates,
moreover, that their campaign will intensify
further in coming months.

At a time when the North Vietnamese
have been building up their forces and
pressing their attacks, U.S. military aid to
the South Vietnamese Government has not
been sufficient to permit one-to-one replace-
ment of equipment and supplies used up or
destroyed, as permitted by the Paris Agree-
ment. In fact, with the $700 million appro-
priation available in the current fiscal year,
we have been able to provide no new tanks,
airplanes, trucks, artillery pieces, or other
major equipment, but only essential con-
sumable items such as ammunition, gasoline,
spare parts, and medical supplies. And in
the face of the increased North Vietnamese
pressure of recent months, these supplies
have not kept pace with minimally essential
expenditure. Stockpiles have been drawn
down and will soon reach dangerously low
levels.

Last year, some believed that cutting back
our military assistance to the South Vietnam-
ese Government would induce negotiations
for a political settlement. Instead, the oppo-
site has happened. North Vietnam is refus-
ing negotiations and is increasing its mili-
tary pressure.

I am gravely concerned about this situa-
tion. I am concerned because it poses a
serious threat to the chances for political
stability in Southeast Asia and to the prog-
ress that has been made in removing Viet-
nam as a major issue of contention between
the great powers.

I am also concerned because what happens
in Vietnam can affect the rest of the world.

It cannot be in the interests of the United
States to let other nations believe that we
are prepared to look the other way when
agreements that have been painstakingly
negotiated are contemptuously violated. It
cannot be in our interest to cause our friends
all over the world to wonder whether we
will support them if they comply with agree-
ments that others violate.

When the United States signed the Paris
Agreement, as when we pursued the policy
of Vietnamization, we told the South Viet-
namese, in efi'ect, that we would not defend
them with our military forces, but that we
would provide them the means to defend
themselves, as permitted by the Agreement.
The South Vietnamese have performed ef-
fectively in accepting this challenge. They
have demonstrated their determination and
ability to defend them.selves if they are pro-
vided the necessary military materiel with
which to do so. We, however, may be judged
remiss in keeping our end of the bargain.

We — the Executive and Legislative
Branches together — must meet our responsi-
bilities. As I have said earlier, the amount
of assistance appropriated by the previous
Congress is inadequate to the requirements
of the situation.

I am, therefore, proposing:

— A supplemental appropriation of $300
million for military assistance to South
Vietnam.

The $300 million in supplemental military
assistance that I am requesting for South
Vietnam represents the difference between
the $1 billion which was authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 1975 and the
$700 million which has been appropriated.
This amount does not meet all the needs of
the South Vietnamese army in its defense
against North Vietnam. It does not, for
example, allow for replacement of equip-
ment lost in combat. It is the minimum
needed to prevent serious reversals by pro-
viding the South Vietnamese with the urgent
supplies required for their self-defense
against the current level of North Vietnam-
ese attacks.

230

Department of State Bulletin

I believe that this additional aid will help
to deter the North Vietnamese from further
escalating their military pressure and pro-
vide them additional incentive to i-esume the
political discussions envisaged under the
Paris Agreement.

All Americans want to end the U.S. role
in Vietnam. So do I. I believe, however,
that we mu.st end it in a way that will
enhance the chances of world peace and
sustain the purposes for which we have
sacrificed so much.

Cambodia

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore
peace and to allow the Khmer people an
opportunity to decide freely who will govern
them. To this end, our immediate goal in
Cambodia is to facilitate an early negotiated
settlement. The Cambodian Government has
repeatedly called for talks without precondi-
tions with the other Khmer parties. We have
fully supported these proposals as well as
the resolution passed by the United Nations
General Assembly calling for early negotia-
tions among Khmer parties.

Regrettably, there has been no progress.
In fact, the Communists have intensified
hostilities by attacking on the outskirts of
Phnom Penh and attempting to cut the land
and water routes to the capital. We must
continue to aid the Cambodian Government
in the face of externally supported military
attacks. To refuse to provide the assistance
needed would threaten the survival of the
Khmer Republic and undermine the chances
for peace and stability in the area.

The Cambodian Government forces, given
adequate assistance, can hold their own.
Once the insurgents realize that they cannot
win by force of arms, I believe they will look
to negotiations rather than war.

I am, therefore, proposing:

— Legislation to eliminate the current ceil-
ings on military and economic assistance to
Cambodia, and to authorize the appropria-
tion of an additional $222 million for mili-
tary aid for Cambodia, and

— An amendment to the fiscal year 1975
budget for the additional $222 million.

To provide the assistance necessary, the
present restrictions on our military and eco-
nomic aid to Cambodia must be removed and
additional money provided. The $200 million
in military assistance currently authorized
was largely expended during the past six
months in response to the significantly in-
tensified enemy offensive action. In addition,
I have utilized the $75 million drawdown of
Department of Defense stocks authorized by
Congress for this emergency situation. Since
the beginning of the Communist offensive on
January 1, ammunition expenditures have
risen and will exhaust all available funds
well before the end of this fiscal year. To
meet minimum requirements for the survival
of the Khmer Republic, I am requesting an
additional $222 million in military assist-
ance and the elimination of the pre.sent $200
million ceiling on military assistance to Cam-
bodia. I am also requesting elimination of
the $377 million ceiling on overall assistance
to Cambodia. This is necessary to enable
us to provide vital commodities, mostly food,
under the Food for Peace program, to assure
adequate food for the victims of war and
to prevent the economic collapse of the coun-
try.

I know we all seek the same goals for
Cambodia — a situation wherein the suffering
and destruction has stopped and the Khmer
people have the necessary security to re-
build their society and their country. These
goals are attainable. With the minimal re-
sources and flexibility I am requesting from
you, the Congress, we can help the people
of Cambodia to have a choice in determining
their future. The consequences of refusing
them this assistance will reach far beyond
Cambodia's borders and impact severely on
prospects for peace and stability in that
region and the world. There is no question
but that this assistance would serve the in-
terests of the United States.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, January 28, 1975.

February 17, 1975

231

TREATY INFORMATION

Outer Space Registration Convention
Signed by United States

Statement by John Scali

U.S. Representative to the United Nations '

I am happy to sign on behalf of the United
States the Convention on Registration of Ob-
jects Launched into Outer Space.

The United States was one of the leaders
in the long negotiations that led to the Regis-
tration Convention, as we were in negotiating
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Astro-
naut Assistance and Return Agreement of
1968, and the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects of 1971. The new Registration Conven-
tion is another step in developing a coopera-
tive and mutually beneficial legal order for
the conduct of outer space activities. We hope
it will meet with broad support and accept-
ance around the world.

The Registration Convention was nego-
tiated over a three-year period beginning in
1972 and was agreed to in 1974 by all the
states participating in the 37-member U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.

It secures three objectives sought by the
United States and other like-minded nations :

First, the convention will encourage every
country launching objects into orbit around
the earth or into other sustained space tran-
sit to maintain an orderly record of their
launches.

Second, it establishes an international reg-
ister of manmade space objects in orbit, to be
kept by the Secretary General and to which
there will be full and open access. This reg-
ister will contain information concerning
each object launched into space or beyond,
including the name of the launching state

or states, an appropriate designator for, or
the registration number of, the object, the
location and date of launch, basic orbital
parameters, and a description of the general
function of the object.

Third, the convention will provide for
cooperative assistance by countries which
have space monitoring and tracking facilities
in the event that a country is unable to iden-
tify the nation of origin of a manmade space
object which lands in its territory and causes
damage.

U.S. and Romania Sign Five- Year
Agreement on Exchanges

Following are texts of a Department an-
nouncement issued December 26 and the
U.S.-Romania five-year Agreement on Cul-
tural and Scientific Exchanges and Coopera-
tion signed at Bucharest on December 13.

Press release 647 dated December 26

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

On December 13, 1974, the United States
and Romania signed a new five-year Agree-
ment on Cultural and Scientific Exchanges
and Cooperation, replacing the previous two-
year accords at a lower level for programs
in these fields. The agreement, which enters
into force on January 1, 1975, provides for
expanded cultural, scientific, and informa-
tional activity and incorporates in a sepa-
rate article the 1969 understanding between
the two countries which led to the establish-
ment of the American Library in Bucharest.

A document outlining the specific program
of exchanges and cooperation for the next
two years was also signed by American
Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, Jr., and Ro-
manian Deputy Foreign Minister Vasile
Gliga in a ceremony attended by members of
the American Embassy and officials of the
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Afi'airs and
other Romanian institutions involved in the
program.'

' Made at U.N. Headquarters on Jan. 24 (text
from USUN press release 4).

' For text of the 1975-76 program, see press re-
lease 547 dated Dec. 26.

232

Department of State Bulletin

The agreement and program provide for
exchanges of students, researchers, and uni-
versity lecturers in Romanian and American
studies, as well as for short-term visitors
in all fields. Continuing and expanding ex-
changes and cooperation between Romanian
agencies and American private and govern-
mental organizations in the fields of science
and technology were also incorporated in the
accords as well as provisions for activities
in the performing and creative arts, motion
pictures, exhibits, communications media,
and sports. The accords also provide for ex-
changes of political leaders.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government
OF THE Socialist Republic of Romania on Co-
operation and Exchanges in the Cultural,
Educational, Scientific and Technological
Fields

The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Romania,

Considering the historic ties of friendship between
the American and Romanian peoples;

Believing that exchanges and cooperation in cul-
tural, educational, scientific, technological and other
fields will contribute to further knowledge and
mutual understanding between the American and
Romanian peoples and to the continued development
of mutually beneficial relations between the two
countries;

Recognizing that exchanges and cooperation be-
tween institutions of the two countries will con-
tribute to the cultural and material development of
their peoples;

Considering the existing exchanges and coopera-
tion in these fields between the two countries, and
desiring their further expansion;

Desiring to develop their relations on the basis of
the principles set forth in the joint statement of
the Presidents of the two States on December 5,
1973,

Agree as follows:

Article I

1. The Parties will encourage and develop ex-
changes and cooperation in the arts, culture, com-
munications media, education, tourism, sports, and
in other fields of common interest on the basis of
mutual benefit and respect. They will provide oppor-
tunities for and facilitate appropriate direct contacts
and cooperative activities between organizations,

institutions, and individuals of the two countries.
Such exchanges, contacts and activities may include,
but need not be limited to the following:

A. Exchange of students, instructors, professors,
lecturers, researchers, education officials and spe-
cialists;

B. Exchange of books, periodicals, educational and
teaching materials, including visual aids;

C. Organization of conferences, symposia, and
seminars as well as joint research projects;

D. Direct cooperation and exchanges between
universities and other institutions of higher educa-
tion;

E. Study of the language, literature and culture
of the two countries, at the University and other
levels;

F. Exhibits of an artistic, cultural, educational or
general informational nature;

G. Visits and e.xchanges of representatives in the
fields of architecture, art, literature, music, theater
and other arts, including professional and amateur
groups of performing artists in music, dance and
theater;

H. Showing of documentary and feature films, the
organization of film weeks, as well as exchanges
and other activities in the field of cinematography;

1. Visits and exchanges of athletes and athletic
teams, as well as specialists in the fields of physical
education and sports;

J. Visits and exchanges of journalists, editors,
publishers and translators of literary works as well
as cooperative activities between organizations in
the fields of press, radio and television.

2. The Parties will facilitate:

A. Distribution of cultural, informational and
other materials designed to enrich the mutual knowl-
edge of the peoples and their cultural values.

B. Access to libraries, museums, cultural centers,
reading rooms and archives and the development of
direct relations between these and other cultural
institutions through exchanges of social, cultural,
technical and scientific books, publications and mi-
crofilms.

3. The Parties will encourage, with the consent of
the authors and in accordance with the legal require-
ments of the two countries, the translation and
publication of literary and scientific works as well
as works of a general nature, of the other country.

Article II

The Parties will continue to facilitate the activi-
ties of the American and Romanian Libraries in
conformity with the Understanding of August 3,
1969.

Article III

1. The Parties will encourage and develop ex-
changes and cooperation in the fields of science.

February 17, 1975

233

technology and health on the basis of mutual bene-
fit. They will facilitate, as appropriate, cooperative
activities and direct contacts betvifeen organizations,
institutions and specialists of the two coiintries.
Such activities, contacts, and exchanges may include,
but need not be limited to the following:

A. Joint research, development and implementa-
tion of programs and projects in basic and applied
sciences, as well as exchanges of experience and
research results;

B. Visits, study trips, and exchanges between
scientists and specialists;

C. Organization of joint courses, conferences,
seminars and symposia;

D. Organization of scientific and technical ex-
hibits and displays on a non-commercial basis;

E. Exchanges of scientific and technical documen-
tation and information, including scientific and
technical films;

F. Other forms of scientific and technical co-
operation as may be mutually agreed.

2. The Parties will take all appropriate measures
to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of agree-
ments and understandings mentioned in periodic
programs of exchanges.

Article IV

The Parties will also encourage the conclusion,
when considered necessary and mutually beneficial,
of other understandings, arrangements and periodic
programs of exchanges in the fields covered by this
Agreement.

Article V

This Agreement, and the exchanges, contacts, and
activities under it will be carried out subject to the
Constitution and to applicable laws and regulations
of each country. Within this framework, both Parties
will exert their best efforts to promote favorable
conditions for the fulfillment of the Agreement and
the exchanges, contacts and cooperative activities
under it.

Article VI

For the purpose of implementing this Agreement,
the Parties will conclude periodic programs of ex-
changes which will detail the activities and ex-
changes, as well as the financial conditions, to be
carried out.

The Parties will meet periodically to review cur-
rent activities, to take appropriate measures, and to
consider future activities.

Article VII

This Agreement will enter into force on January
1, 1975. The Agreement is valid for five years and
may be automatically extended for additional periods
of five years. It may be modified only by prior
agreement of the Parties.

The Agreement may be terminated by either
Party upon written notice to the other Party at least
six months prior to its expiration.

Done at Bucharest, in duplicate, the day of
December 13, 1974, in the English and Romanian
languages, both equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica:

Harry G. Barnes, Jr.

For the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Romania:

Vasile Gliga

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at
Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Ratification deposited: Poland (with a reserva-
tion), January 28, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an-
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2,
1972.'

Accessions deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic (with declarations), October 4, 1974; New
Zealand, December 20, 1974.=

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on
facilitation of international maritime traflSc, 1965
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19,
1973.'
Acceptances deposited: Canada, December 19,

1974; France (with a declaration), December 12,

1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964; for the United States June
24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Iceland, December 18, 1974.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.'
Accession deposited: Thailand, January 9, 1975.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971."

' Not in force.

■ Not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, and the

Tokelau Islands.

234

Department of State Bulletin

Ratification deposited: Poland (with resei-va-

tions), January 3, 1975.
Accession deposited : Iceland, December 18, 1974.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended. Done at
London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July
26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961.
TIAS 4900, 6109.

Acceptance deposited: Malta, January 10, 1975.
International convention relating to inter%'ention on
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties,
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.'
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (with a declaration), December 30,

1974.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes.
Done at London November 2, 1973.'
Signatures: Australia (with a declaration), De-
cember 24, 1974; Brazil, December 12, 1974;'
Ireland,' Netherlands,- December 30, 1974.
Protocol relating to inten'ention on the high seas
in cases of marine pollution by substances other
than oil. Done at London November 2, 1971.'
Signatures: Netherlands, December 30, 1974;
New Zealand, December 23, 1974;- Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, December 30, 1974;
United Kingdom, December 19, 1974.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14,
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Monaco, December 3, 1974.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into
force October 4, 1967; for the United States
November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Zaire, Januai-y 13, 1975.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1974. Done at London November 1, 1974.'
Signatures: Belgium, December 17, 1914;' Pol-
and, January 10, 1975.'

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Opened for signature at New York
January 14, 1975. Enters into force on deposit
of the fifth instrument of ratification.
Signatures : France, January 14, 1975; United
States, January 24, 1975.

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973.'

Signatures: Australia, Italy, December 30, 1974;
Romania (with a reservation), December 27,
1974.

Trade

Protocol for the accession of the People's Republic
of Bangladesh to the general agreement on tariffs
and trade, with annex. Done at Geneva November
7, 1972. Entered into force December 16, 1972.
TIAS 7552.
Acceptance deposited: Pakistan, January 17, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974,
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974,
with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 27,

1975.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, January 28, 1975.

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid con-
vention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974,
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974,
with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 27,
1975.

BILATERAL

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and
exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15,
1974.'
Ratified bij the President: January 28, 1975.

Republic of China

Agreement extending the agreement of January 23,
1969, relating to cooperation in science and tech-
nology. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei
January 21, 1975. Entered into force January 23,
1975.

Malta

Agreement extending the agreement of June 14,
1967, as extended, relating to trade in cotton
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Valletta
December 27, 1974. Entered into force December
27, 1974.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending and extending the agreement
of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267,
6659, 6861), for cooperation on the uses of atomic
energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at
Washington July 22, 1974.
Entered into force: January 27, 1975.

' Not in force.

- Not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, and
the Tokelau Islands.
^ Subject to ratification.

February 17, 1975

235

PUBLICATIONS

First "Foreign Relations" Volume
on China for 1949 Released

Press release 29 dated January 24 (for release January 31)

The Department of State released on January
31 volume IX in the series "Foreign Relations of
the United States" for the year 1949. This volume
is entitled "The Far East: China" and is one of two
dealing with China for that year. The companion
volume (VIII) is to be published subsequently.

The 1,441 pages of previously unpublished docu-
mentation contained in this volume set forth U.S.
policy in a variety of important topics including the
question of recognition of the new regime in main-
land China, policy toward Taiwan, military and
economic assistance to the Republic of China, finan-
cial and trade policy, the status of Tibet, and
evacuation of Americans from the mainland. Docu-
ments are also included on the preparation and
publication in August 1949 of "United States Rela-
tions With China" (also known as "the China White
Paper"). The political and militai-y situation in
China and the status of U.S. diplomatic missions on
the mainland will be covered in volume VIII.

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Afl^airs. Copies of Volume IX
(Department of State publication 8774; GPO cat.
no. Sl.l:949/v. IX) may be obtained for $14.75 (do-
mestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should
be made out to "Superintendent of Documents" and
should be sent to the U.S. Government Bookstore,
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20i02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Bel-
gium amending annex B to the agreement of Janu-
ary 27, 1950. TIAS 7866. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7866).

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft
Products and Components. Agreement with the
Netherlands. TIAS 7869. 9 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. S9.
10:7869).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Republic
of Korea. TIAS 7871. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7871).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Ethiopia.
TIAS 7872. 3 pp. 250. (Cat. No. 89.10:7872).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan
amending the agreement of September 10, 1973, as
amended. TIAS 7874. 3 pp. 30<*. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7874).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Philip-
pines. TIAS 7875. 3 pp. 30c. (Cat. No. S9.10:7875).

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Jan. 27-Feb. 2

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to January 27 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
547 of December 26, 23 of January 21, and 27
and 29 of January 24.

No. Date Subject

30 1/27 Notice of time for filing claims
against Syria by U.S. nationals.

*31 1/27 Advisory Committee on the Law
of the Sea, Mar. 1.

t32 1/27 U.S. -France Cooperative Science
Program meeting.

*33 1/28 U.S.-Malta textile agreement ex-
tended.

*34 1/28 Program for the official visit of the
Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, Harold Wilson, Jan.
29-Feb. 1.

35 1/28 Kissinger: news conference.

36 1/29 Johnson: interview for Eurovision.
*37 1/29 Ray sworn in as Assistant Secre-
tary for Oceans and Environ-
mental and Scientific AflFairs
(biographic data).

*38 1/29 National Review Board for the
Center for Cultural and Techni-
cal Interchange between East
and West, Honolulu, Mar. 17-18.

*39 1/31 Todman sworn in as Ambassador
to Costa Rica (biographic data).

*40 1/31 U.S. Advisory Commission on In-
ternational Educational and Cul-
tural Afl'airs, Feb. 25.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

236

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX February 17, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1860

Asia. A New National Partnership (Kis-
singer) 197

Claims. Notice of Time for Filing Claims

Against Syria by U.S. Nationals .... 228

Congress

A New National Partnership (Kissinger) . . 197
President Ford Requests Additional Funds for
Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia

(message to the Congress) 229

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of
January 28 205

Disarmament. Ambassador Johnson Discusses
Prospects for S.A.LT Talks (transcript of
interview) 224

Economic Affairs

A New National Partnership (Kissinger) . . 197

President Vetoes Bill To Provide Nontariff
Barrier on Filberts (memorandum of dis-
approval) 228

The Trade .\ct and Latin America (Depart-
ment memorandum) 215

U.S. -India Economic and Commercial Subcom-
mission Meets at Washington (joint com-
munique) 227

U.S. Regrets Postponement of Buenos Aires

Meeting (Department statement) .... 214

i Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and
Romania Sign Five-Year Agreement on Ex-
changes (Department announcement, text
of agreement) 232

Energy. A New National Partnership (Kis-
singer) 197

Europe

A New National Partnership (Kissinger) . . 197
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of
January 28 205

Food. A New National Partnership (Kis-
singer) 197

India. U.S. -India Economic and Commercial
Subcommission Meets at Washington (joint
communique) 227

Khmer Republic (Cambodia). President Ford
Requests Additional Funds for Assistance
to Viet-Nam and Cambodia (message to
the Congress) 229

Latin America

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of
January 28 205

The Trade Act and Latin America (Depart-
ment memorandum) 215

U.S. Regrets Postponement of Buenos Aires

Meeting (Department statement) .... 214

Middle East. "A Conversation With President
Ford" — An Interview for NBC Television
and Radio (excerpt) 219

Petroleum. Proclamation Raising Import Fees
for Oil and Oil Products Signed (remarks
by President Ford) 224

Presidential Documents

"A Conversation With President Ford" — An
Interview for NBC Television and Radio
(excerpt) 219

President Ford Requests Additional Funds for

Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia . . 229

President Vetoes Bill To Provide Nontariff

Barrier on Filberts 228

Proclamation Raising Import Fees for Oil and

Oil Products Signed 224

Publications

GPO Sales Publications 236

First "Foreign Relations" Volume on China
for 1949 Released 236

Romania. U.S. and Romania Sign Five-Year
Agreement on Exchanges (Department an-
nouncement, text of agreement) .... 232

Space. Outer Space Registration Convention

Signed by United States (Scali) .... 232

Syria. Notice of Time for Filing Claims

Against Syria by U.S. Nationals .... 228

Treaty Information

Current Actions 234

Outer Space Registration Convention Signed

by United States (Scali) 232

U.S. and Romania Sign Five-Year Agreement
on Exchanges (Department announcement,
text of agreement) 232

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-
ference of January 28 205

U.S.S.R.

Ambassador Johnson Discusses Prospects for

SALT Talks (transcript of interview) . . 224

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of
January 28 205

Viet-Nam

"A Conversation With President Ford" — An
Inten'iew for NBC Television and Radio
(excerpt) 219

President Ford Requests Additional Funds
for Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia
(message to the Congress) 229

Secretary Kissinger's News (Conference of
January 28 205

Name Index

Ford, President 219, 224, 228, 229

Johnson, U. Alexis 224

Kissinger, Secretary 197, 205

Scali, John 232

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'//Si,/

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1861

February 24, 1975

ENERGY : THE NECESSITY OF DECISION

Address by Secretary Kissinger and Questions and Answers

Before the National Press Club 237

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION

FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA

Statement by Assistant Secretary Habib 255

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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Vol. LXXII, No. 1861
February 24, 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

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Note: Contents of this publication are not

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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLE%
a weekly publication issued by
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Public Affairs, provides the public all
interested agencies of the governmei
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Energy: The Necessity of Decision

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER '

I appreciate this opportunity to speak to
you on the question of energy.

The subject is timely, for this week marks
an important moment in both our national
and international response to the energy
crisis.

On Wednesday, the Governing Board of
the International Energy Agency (lEA)
convenes in Paris for its monthly meeting.
This organization, which grew out of the
Washington Energy Conference, represents
one of the major success stories of coopera-
tion among the industrialized democracies
in the past decade. In recent months it has
begun to mobilize and coordinate the efforts
of the industrial democracies in energy con-
servation, research, and development of new
energy sources. The lEA already has put in
place many of the building blocks of a co-
ordinated energy policy. At the forthcoming
meeting, the United States will advance
comprehensive proposals for collective ac-
tion, with special emphasis on the develop-
ment of new energy sources and the prepa-
ration of a consumer position for the forth-
coming dialogue with the producers.

Equally important, we are now engaged
in a vital national debate on the purposes
and requirements of our national energy
program. Critical decisions will soon be made
by the Congress, decisions that will vitally
affect other nations as well as ourselves.

The international and national dimensions
of the energy crisis are crucially linked.
What happens with respect to international
energy policy will have a fundamental effect

^ Made before the National Press Club at Washing-
ton on Feb. 3; as prepared for delivery (text from
press release 42).

on the economic health of this nation. And
the international economic and energy crisis
cannot be solved without purposeful action
and leadership by the United States. Domes-
tic and international programs are inex-
tricably linked.

The energy crisis burst upon our con-
sciousness because of sudden, unsuspected
events. But its elements have been develop-
ing gradually for the better part of two
decades.

In 1950, the United States was virtually
self-sufficient in oil. In 1960, our reliance on
foreign oil had grown to 16 percent of our
requirements. In 1973, it had reached 35
percent. If this trend is allowed to continue,
the 1980's will see us dependent on imported
oil for fully half of our needs. The impact
on our lives will be revolutionary.

This slow but inexorable march toward
dependency was suddenly intensified in 1973
by an oil embargo and price increases of 400
percent in less than a single year. These ac-
tions— largely the result of political deci-
sions— created an immediate economic crisis,
both in this country and around the
world. A reduction of only 10 percent of
the imported oil, and lasting less than half
a year, cost Americans half a million jobs
and over 1 percent of national output; it
added at least 5 percentage points to the
price index, contributing to our worst in-
flation since World War II; it set the stage
for a serious recession; and it expanded the
oil income of the OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations
from $23 billion in 1973 to a current annual
rate of $110 billion, thereby effecting one of
the greatest and most sudden transfers of
wealth in history.

The impact on other countries much more

February 24, 1975

237

dependent on oil impoi'ts has been corre-
spondingly greater. In all industrial coun-
tries, economic and political difficulties that
had already reached the margin of the abil-
ity of governments to manage have threat-
ened to get out of control.

Have we learned nothing from the past
year? If we permit our oil consumption to
grow without restraint, the vulnerability of
our economy to external disruptions will be
grossly magnified. And this vulnerability
will increase with every passing year. Unless
strong corrective steps are taken, a future
embargo would have a devastating impact
on American jobs and production. More than
10 percent of national employment and out-
put, as well as a central element of the price
structure of the American economy, would
be subject to external decisions over which
our national policy can have little influence.

As we learned grimly in the 1920's and
1930's, profound political consequences in-
evitably flow from massive economic disloca-
tions. Economic distress fuels social and
political turmoil; it erodes the confidence of
the people in democratic government and the
confidence of nations in international har-
mony. It is fei'tile ground for conflict, both
domestic and international.

The situation is not yet so grave. But it
threatens to become so. The entire indus-
trialized world faces at the same time a
major crisis of the economy, of the body
politic, and of the moral fiber. We and our
partners are being tested — not only to show
our technical mastery of the problems of
energy but, even more important, to show if
we can act with foresight to regain control
of our future.

For underlying all difficulties, and com-
pounding them, is a crisis of the spirit — the
despair of men and nations that they have
lost control over their destiny. Forces seem
loose beyond the power of government and
society to manage.

In a sense we in America are fortunate
that political decisions brought the energy
problem to a head before economic trends
had made our vulnerability irreversible.
Had we continued to drift, we would even-
tually have found ourselves swept up by

forces much more awesome than those we
face today.

As it is, the energy crisis is still soluble.
Of all nations, the United States is most
aff'ected by the sudden shift from near self-
sufficiency to severe dependence on imported
energy. But it is also in the best position to
meet the challenge. A major eff"ort now — of
conservation, of technological innovation, of
international collaboration — can shape a
diff'erent future for us and for the other
countries of the world. A demonstration of
American resolve now will have a decisive
efi'ect in leading other industrial nations to
work together to reverse present trends to-
ward dependency. Today's apparently per-
vasive crisis can in retrospect prove to have
been the beginning of a new period of cre-
ativity and cooperation.

One of our highest national priorities
must be to reduce our vulnerability to sup-
ply interruption and price manipulation. But
no one country can solve the problem alone.
Unless we pool our risks and fortify the
international financial system, balance-of-
payments crises will leave all economies ex-
posed to financial disruption. Unless all con-
suming nations act in parallel to reduce
energy consumption through conservation
and to develop new sources of supply, the
eff'orts of any one nation will prove futile,
the price structure of oil will not be re-
formed, and the collective economic burden
will grow. And unless consumers concert
their views, the dialogue with the producers
will not prove fruitful.

The actions which the United States takes
now are central to any hope for a global solu-
tion. The volume of our consumption, and its
potential growth, are so great that a deter-
mined national conservation program is es-
sential. Without the application of American
technology and American enterprise, the
rapid development of significant new sup-
plies and alternative sources of energy will
be impossible.

There is no escape. The producers may
find it in their interest to ease temporarily
our burdens. But the price will be greater
dependence and greater agony a few years
from now. Either we tackle our challenge

238

Department of State Bulletin

immediately, or we will confront it again and
again in increasingly unfavorable circum-
stances in the years to come. If it is not dealt
with by this Administration, an even worse
crisis will be faced by the next — and with
even more anguishing choices.

History has given us a great opportunity
disguised as a crisis. A determined energy
policy will not only ease immediate diffi-
culties, it will help restore the international
economy, the vitality of all the major indus-
trial democracies, and the hopes of mankind
for a just and prosperous world.

The Strategy of Energy Cooperation

We and our partners in the International
Energy Agency have been, for a year, pursu-
ing strategy in three phases:

— The first phase is to protect against
emergencies. We must be prepared to deter
the use of oil or petrodollars as political
weapons, and if that fails, we must have put
ourselves in the best possible defensive posi-
tion. To do this, we have established emer-
gency sharing programs to cope with new
embargoes and created new mechanisms to
protect our financial institutions against dis-
ruption. This stage of our common strategy
is well on the way to accomplishment.

— The second phase is to transform the
market conditions for OPEC oil. If we act
decisively to reduce our consumption of im-
ported oil and develop alternative sources,
pressure on prices will increase. Measures
to achieve this objective are now before the
International Energy Agency or national
parliaments; we expect to reach important
agreements on them before the end of
March.

— Once the consumer nations have taken
these essential steps to reduce their vulner-
ability, we will move to the third stage of
our strategy: to meet with the producers to
discuss an equitable price, market structure,
and long-term economic relationship. Assum-
ing the building blocks of consumer solidar-
ity are in place, we look toward a prepara-
tory meeting for a producer-consumer con-
ference before the end of March.

Our actions in all these areas are inter-
related. It is not possible to pick and choose;
since they are mutually reinforcing, they are
essential to each other. No emergency pro-
gram can avail if each year the collective
dependence on OPEC oil increases. New
sources of energy, however vast the invest-
ment program, will be ineffective unless
strict measures are taken to halt the run-
away, wasteful growth in consumption. Un-
less the industrial nations demonstrate the
political will to act effectively in all areas,
the producers will be further tempted to
take advantage of our vulnerability.

In recent months we and our partners
have taken important steps to implement
our overall strategy. Two safety nets against
emergencies have been put in place. In
November, the lEA established an unprece-
dented plan for mutual assistance in the
event of a new embargo. Each participating
nation is committed to build an emergency
stock of oil. In case of embargo, each nation
will cut its consumption by the same per-
centage, and available oil will be shared. An
embargo against one will become an embargo
against all.

And in January, the major industrial na-
tions decided to create a $25 billion solidar-
ity fund for mutual support in financial
crises — less than two months after it was
first proposed by the United States. This
mutual insurance fund will furnish loans and
guarantees to those hardest hit by payments
deficits, thus safeguarding the international
economy against shifts, withdrawals, or cut-
offs of funds by the producers.

The next steps should be to accelerate our
efforts in the conservation and development
of new energy sources. Action in these areas,
taken collectively, will exert powerful pres-
sures on the inflated price. No cartel is so
insulated from economic conditions that its
price structure is invulnerable to a trans-
formation of the market. Because of the
reduced consumption in the past year, OPEC
has already shut down a fourth of its capac-
ity, equaling 9 million barrels a day, in order
to keep the price constant. New oil explora-
tion, accelerated by the fivefold-higher price,
is constantly discovering vast new reserves

February 24, 1975

239

outside of OPEC. The $10 billion in new
energy research in the United States — on
the scale of the Manhattan project and the
moon-landing program — is certain to pro-
duce new breakthroughs sooner or later.

As the industrialized nations reduce con-
sumption and increase their supply, it will
become increasingly difficult for OPEC to
allocate the further production cuts that will
be required among its members. Even now,
some OPEC members are shaving prices to
keep up their revenue and their share of the
market. Indeed, it is not too soon in this
decade of energy shortages to plan for the
possibility of energy surpluses in the 1980's.

The strategy we have been pursuing with
our partners since the Washington Energy
Conference has linked our domestic and
international energy policies into a coherent
whole. We have made remarkable progress,
but much remains to be done. The question
now is whether the industrialized countries
have the will to sustain and reinforce these
promising initiatives. Conservation and the
development of new sources of energy are
the next priorities on our common agenda.

Conservation

Unconstrained consumption of cheap oil is
the principal cause of the present vulner-
ability of the industrial countries. Neither
the United States nor other consumers can
possibly reduce their dependence on imports
until they reverse the normal— which is to
say wasteful — growth of consumption.

There is simply no substitute for conser-
vation. Alternative energy supplies will not
be available for five or ten years. In the next
few years conservation, and only conserva-
tion, will enable us both to absorb the pres-
ent burden of high energy costs and to begin
to restore the balance of consumer-producer
relations.

Only a determined program of conserva-
tion can demonstrate that we and our part-
ners have the will to resist pressures. If the
industrialized nations are unwilling to make
the relatively minor sacrifices involved in
conservation, then the credibility of all our

other eff'orts and defensive measures is
called into question.

Some say we face a choice between con-
servation and restoring economic growth.
The contrary is true. Only by overcoming
exorbitant international energy costs can we
achieve reliable long-term growth. If we
doom ourselves to 50 percent dependence on
imported energy, with the supply and price
of a central element of our economy subject
to external manipulation, there is no way
we can be sure of restoring and sustaining
our jobs and growth. These decisions will
depend on foreign countries for whom our
prosperity is not necessarily a compelling
objective.

To be sure, conservation — by any method
— will have an economic cost. The restructur-
ing away from production and consumption
of energy-intensive goods which it entails
incurs shortrun dislocations. At a time of
recession, this must concern us. Yet these
costs are small compared to what will be ex-
acted from us if we do not act. Without con-
servation, we will perpetuate the vulnerabil-
ity of our economy and our national policy.
And we will perpetuate as well the excessive
international energy prices which are at the
heart of the problem.

At present, the United States — in the
midst of recession — is importing 6.7 million
barrels of oil a day. When our economy re-
turns to full capacity that figure will rise;
by 1977, it will be 8 or 9 million barrels a
day in the absence of conservation. Imports
will continue to grow thereafter. Even with
new production in Alaska and the outer
continental shelf, this import gap will re-
main if we do not reduce consumption signifi-
cantly and rapidly.

With these prospects in mind. President
Ford has set the goal of saving a million
barrels a day of imports by the end of this
year and 2 million by 1977. That amounts to
the increase in dependence that would occur
as the economy expands again, in the ab-
sence of a conservation program.

Our conservation efforts will be powerfully
reinforced by the actions of our lEA part-
ners and of other interested countries such

240

Department of State Bulletin

as France. Their collective oil consumption
equals ours, and they are prepared to join
with us in a concerted program of conserva-
tion ; indeed, some of them have already
instituted their own conservation measures.
But any one country's efforts will be nulli-
fied unless they are complemented by other
consumers. This is why the United States
has proposed to its lEA partners that they
match our respective conservation targets.
Together we can save 2 million barrels a day
this year and at least 4 million barrels in
1977.

If these goals are reached, under current
economic conditions OPEC will have to re-
duce its production further; even when full
employment returns, OPEC will have sur-
plus capacity. More reductions will be hard
to distribute on top of the existing cutbacks
of 9 million barrels a day. As a result, pres-
sures to increase production or to lower
prices will build up as ambitious defense and
development programs get underway. By
1977, some oil producers will have a pay-
ments deficit; competition between them for
the available market will intensify. The
cartel's power to impose an embargo and to
use price as a weapon will be greatly dimin-
ished.

But if America — the least vulnerable and
most profligate consumer — will not act,
neither will anyone else. Just as our action
will have a multiplier effect, so will our in-
action stifle the efforts of others. Instead of
reducing our collective imports, we will have
increased them by 2-4 million barrels a day.
OPEC's ability to raise prices, which is now
in question, will be restored. In exchange
for a brief respite of a year or two, we will
have increased the industrialized world's
vulnerability to a new and crippling blow
from the producers. And when that vulner-
ability is exposed to public view through a
new embargo or further price rises, the
American people will be entitled to ask why
their leaders failed to take the measures
they could have when they should have.

One embargo — and one economic crisis —
should be enough to underline the implica-
tions of dependency.

The Importance of New Supplies

Conservation measures alone, crucial as
they are, cannot permanently reduce our de-
pendence on imported oil. To eliminate de-
pendence over the long term, we must ac-
celerate the development of alternative
sources of energy. This will involve a mas-
sive and complex task. But for the country
which broke the secret of fission in five years
and landed men on the moon in eight years,
the challenge should be exciting. The Ad-
ministration is prepared to invest in this
enterprise on a scale commensurate with
those previous pioneering efforts; we are
ready as well to share the results with our
lEA partners on an equitable basis.

Many of the industrialized countries are
blessed with major energy reserves which
have not yet been developed — North Sea oil,
German coal, coal and oil deposits in the
United States, and nuclear power in all coun-
tries. We have the technical skill and re-
sources to create synthetic fuels from shale
oil, tar sands, and coal gasification and
liquefaction. And much work has already
been done on such advanced energy sources
as breeder reactors, fusion, and solar power.

The cumulative effort will of necessity be
gigantic. The United States alone shall seek
to generate capital investments in enei'gy of
$500 billion over the next 10 years. The
Federal Government will by itself invest $10
billion in research into alternative energy
sources over the next five years, a figure
likely to be doubled when private investment
in research is included.

But if this effort is to succeed, we must
act now to deal with two major problems —
the expense of new energy sources and the
varying capacities of the industrialized coun-
tries.

New energy sources will cost considerably
more than we paid for energy in 1973 and
can never compete with the production costs
of Middle Eastern oil.

This disparity in cost poses a dilemma. If
the industrial countries succeed in develop-
ing alternative sources on a large scale, the
demand for OPEC oil will fall, and inter-

February 24, 1975

241

national prices may be sharply reduced. In-
expensive imported oil could then jeopardize
the investment made in the alternative
sources; the lower oil prices would also re-
stimulate demand, starting again the cycle
of rising imports, increased dependence, and
vulnerability.

Thus, paradoxically, in order to protect
the major investments in the industrialized
countries that are needed to bring the inter-
national oil prices down, we must insure that
the price for oil on the domestic market does
not fall below a certain level.

The United States will therefore make the
following proposal to the International
Energy Agency this Wednesday:

In order to bring about adequate invest-
ment in the development of conventional
nuclear and fossil energy sources, the major
oil-importing nations should agree that they
will not allow imported oil to be sold domes-
tically at prices which would make those new
sources noncompetitive.

This objective could be achieved in either
of two ways. The consumer nations could
agree to establish a common floor price for
imports, to be implemented by each country
through methods of its own choosing such
as import tariffs, variable levies, or quotas.
Each country would thus be free to obtain
balance-of-payments and tax benefits with-
out restimulating consumption, if the inter-
national price falls below agreed levels.
Alternatively, TEA nations could establish
a common lEA tariff on oil imports. Such a
tariff could be set at moderate levels and
phased in gradually as the need arises.

President Ford is seeking legislation re-
quiring the executive branch to use a floor
price or other appropriate measures to
achieve price levels necessary for our na-
tional self-sufflciency goals.

Intensive technical study would be needed
to determine the appropriate level at which
prices should be protected. We expect that
they will be considerably below the current
world oil prices. They must, however, be
high enough to encourage the long-range
development of alternative energy sources.

These protected prices would in turn be a
point of reference for an eventual consumer-

producer agreement. To the extent that
OPEC's current high prices are caused by
fear of precipitate later declines, the con-
suming countries, in return for an assured
supply, should be prepared to offer producers
an assured price for some definite period so
long as this price is substantially lower than
the current price.

In short, the massive development of al-
ternative sources by the industrial countries
will confront OPEC with a choice: they can
accept a significant price reduction now in
return for stability over a longer period, or
they can run the risk of a dramatic break
in prices when the program of alternative
sources begins to pay off. The longer OPEC
waits, the stronger our bargaining position
becomes.

The second problem is that the capacities
of the industrialized countries to develop
new energy sources vary widely. Some have
rich untapped deposits of fossil fuels. Some
have industrial skills and advanced technol-
ogy. Some have capital. Few have all three.

Each of these elements will be in great
demand, and ways must be found to pool
them effectively. The consumers therefore
have an interest in participating in each
other's energy development programs.

Therefore the United States will propose
to the lEA this Wednesday the creation of a
synthetic fuel consortium within lEA. Such
a body would enable countries willing to
provide technology and capital to participate
in each other's synthetic energy projects.
The United States is committed to develop a
national synthetic fuel capacity of 1 miflion
barrels a day by 1985; other countries will
establish their own programs. These pro-
grams should be coordinated and lEA mem-
bers should have an opportunity to shai-e in
the results by participating in the invest-
ment. Qualifying participants would have
access to the production of the synthetics
program in proportion to their investment.

In addition, the United States will propose
the creation of an energy research and de-
velopment consortium within lEA. Its pri-
mary task will be to encourage, coordinate,
and pool large-scale national research efforts
in fields — like fusion and solar power — where

242

Department of State Bulletin

the costs in capital equipment and skilled
manpower are very great, the lead times
veiy long, but the ultimate payoff in low-cost
energy potentially enormous.

The consortium also would intensify the
comprehensive program of information ex-
change which — with respect to coal, nuclear
technology, solar energy, and fusion — has
already begun within the lEA. We are pre-
pared to earmark a substantial proportion
of our own research and development re-
sources for cooperative efforts with other
lEA countries which are willing to contrib-
ute. Pooling the intellectual effort of the
great industrial democracies is bound to pro-
duce dramatic results.

When all these measures are implemented,
what started as crisis will have been trans-
formed into opportunity; the near-panic of
a year ago will have been transformed into
hope; vulnerability will have been trans-
formed into strength.

Mutual Interests of Consumers and Producers

Consumer solidarity is not an end in itself.
In an interdependent world, our hopes for
prosperity and stability rest ultimately on a
cooperative long-term relationship between
consumers and producers.

This has always been our objective. It is
precisely because we wish that dialogue to
be substantive and constructive that we have
insisted that consumers first put their own
house in order. Collective actions to restore
balance to the international economic struc-
ture, and the development in advance of
common consumer views on the agenda, will
contribute enormously to the likelihood of
the success of the projected consumer-pro-
ducer dialogue. Without these measures,
discussions will only find us restating our
divisions and tempt some to seek unilateral
advantages at the expense of their partners.
The result will be confusion, demoralization,
and inequity, rather than a just reconcilia-
tion between the two sides.

A conciliatory solution with the producers
is imperative, for there is no rational alter-
native. The destinies of all countries are
linked to the health of the world economy.

The producers seek a better life for their
peoples and a future free from dependence
on a single depleting resource; the indus-
trialized nations seek to preserve the hard-
earned economic and social progress of cen-
turies ; the poorer nations seek desperately to
resume their advance toward a more hopeful
existence. The legitimate claims of producers
and consumers, developed and developing
countries, can and must be reconciled in a
new equilibrium of interest and mutual bene-
fit.

We must begin from the premise that we
can neither return to past conditions nor
tolerate present ones indefinitely. Before
1973, market conditions were often unfair
to the producers. Today, they are unbearable
for the consumers; they threaten the very
fabric of the international economic system,
on which, in the last analysis, the producers
are as dependent for their well-being as the
consumers.

As the consumers approach their prepara-
tory meeting with the producers, what are
the basic principles that should guide them?

The United States will propose the follow-
ing approach to its partners in the lEA:

First, we should explore cooperative con-
sumer-producer action to recycle the huge
financial surpluses now accumulating. The
oil producers understand that these new
assets— which are far greater than they can
absorb — may require new management
mechanisms. At the same time, the indus-
trial nations know that the stability of the
global economic structure requires the con-
structive participation of the producers.

Second, and closely related to this, is the
need to examine our internal investment
policies. The oil producers need productive
outlets for their revenues; the industrial
democracies, while they should welcome new
investment, will want to retain control of
essential sectors of their economies. These
needs can be reconciled through discussion
and agreement between consumers and pro-
ducers.

Third, we must help the producer nations
find productive use for their wealth in their
own development and in reducing their de-

February 24, 1975

243

pendence on a depleting resource. New in-
dustries can be established, combining the
technology of the industrialized world with
the energy and capital of the producers for
their own benefit and that of the poorer
nations. The creation of fertilizer and petro-
chemical plants is among the more promis-
ing possibilities.

Fourth, the oil-producing countries and
the industrial consuming countries share a
responsibility to ease the plight of the poor-
est nations, whose economies have been
devastated by OPEC's price increases. Tech-
nology and capital must be combined in an
international efi'ort to assist those most seri-
ously affected by the current economic crisis.

Fifth is the need to provide consumers
with a secure source of supply. Another at-
tempt to use oil as a weapon would gravely
threaten the economies of the industrial na-
tions and destroy the possibilities of con-
sumer-producer cooperation. Oil-sharing ar-
rangements by the consumers would blunt
its impact at first, but over time an at-
mosphere of confrontation would be in-
evitable. Thus, if the producer-consumer
dialogue is to be meaningful, understandings
on long-term supplies are essential.

A central issue, of course, will be price.
It is vital to agree on prices for the long run
which will satisfy the needs of consumers
and producers alike. The balance-of-pay-
ments crisis of the consumers must be
eased ; at the same time, the producers are
entitled to know that they can count on a
reasonable level of income over a period of
time.

The United States is ready to begin con-
sultations with the other major consuming
nations on this agenda. We will be prepared
to expand on these pi'oposals and will wel-
come the suggestions of our friends so that
we can fashion together a common and posi-
tive program.

In sum, consumers and producers are at a
crossroads. We have the opportunity to forge
new political and institutional relationships,
or we can go our separate ways, each paying
the price for our inability to take the long
view. Mutual interest should bring us closer

together; only selfishness can keep us apart.
The American approach will be conciliatory.
The implications for the structure of
world politics are profound. If we act with
statesmanship we can shape a new relation-
ship between consumer and producer, be-
tween developed and developing nations, that
will mark the last quarter of the 20th cen-
tury as the beginning of the first truly
global, truly cooperative international com-
munity.

The Need for United Action

The United States will soon celebrate the
200th anniversary of its independence. In
those 200 years Americans have gloried in
freedom, used the blessings of nature pro-
ductively, and jealously guarded our right to
determine our fate. In so doing, we have be-
come the most powerful nation on earth and
a symbol of hope to those who yearn for
progress and value justice. Yet now we
sometimes seem uncertain of our future, dis-
turbed by our recent past, and confused as
to our purpose. But we must persevere, for
we have no other choice. Either we lead, or
no one leads; either we succeed, or the world
will pay for our failure.

The energy challenge is international; it
can only be met by the cooperative actions
of all the industrial democracies. We are far
advanced with our partners toward turning
a major challenge into bold creation and
determined response.

But our hopes for the future rest heavily
on the decisions we take on our own domestic
energy program in the days and weeks
ahead. Our example — for good or ill — will
chart the course for more than ourselves
alone. If we hesitate or delay, so will our
partners. Undoing measures already insti-
tuted, without putting an alternative pro-
gram in their place, will have implications
far transcending the immediate debate.

The United States bears world responsi-
bility not simply from a sense of altruism
or abstract devotion to the common good,
although those are attributes hardly deserv-
ing of apology. We bear it, as well, because
we recognize that America's jobs and pros-

244

Department of Stale Bulletin

perity — and our hopes for a better future —
decisively depend upon a national effort to
fashion a unified effort with our partners
abroad. Together we can retain control over
our affairs and build a new international
structure with the producers. Apart we are
hostages to fate.

A domestic program that will protect ou)-
independence, a cooperative program with
other consumers, and accommodation with
producers — these are the indispensable and
inseparable steps toward a new equilibrium
of interest and justice. No one step can suc-
ceed in the absence of the other two.

It is the glory of our nation that when
challenged, we have always stepped forward
with spirit and a will to dare great things.
It is now time to do so again and in so doing
to reaffirm to ourselves and to the world
that this generation of Americans has the
integrity of character to carry on the noble
experiment that began two centuries ago.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The Chairman [William Broom, president,
National Press Club~\: Thank you, Mr. Sec-
retary.

Mr. Secretary, in November you, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, and Mr. Arthur Burns,
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
all made speeches emphasizing the impera-
tive need to bring about a loivering of the
OPEC prices of oil. Noiv the Administration
is advocating an energy policy based upon a
price even higher than the OPEC price. What
happened between November and no%v?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it is
correct to say that the Administration's
energy policy is based on an increase in price.
The Administration's energy policy attempts
to reduce consumption. The increase in price
that is designed to reduce consumption will
be rebated to the American public so that
the inflationary impact will be severely mini-
mized, if not eliminated. So we are not deal-
ing here with an increase in price that pro-
duces a balance-of-payments drain. We are
dealing with a technical measure designed

to reduce consumption for the reasons that
I have explained, and the increase will then
be rebated in various ways to the American
people.

Q. Our audience has many questions for
you today, Mr. Secretary. A second one here
concerns what you anticipate from our allies.
The first questioner asks, what result anight
you foresee if lEA nations do not all agree
on some method of establishing foor prices;
specifically, what results if only the U.S.A.
does so? And secondly, someone ivonders if
you can identify or expect any European
country or any consuming nation not to act
in parallel in the consumer bloc.

Secretary Kissinger: The proposal about
a floor price will of course only be formally
submitted to our allies on Wednesday. But
we have had some exploratory conversations
which lead us to believe that the proposal
will receive a sympathetic reception. The
United States is of course in a position to
establish such a price for itself, and given
the scale of its investment, it could carry
out a very massive program for the develop-
ment of alternative energy sources. But in
order to achieve the objectives which I have
described, the cooperation of all the con-
sumers would be extremely important.

I would not want to identify — indeed, I do
not know any consumers that are likely to
disagree. I believe that the cooperation of
the nations in lEA, as I pointed out in my
speech, has been one of the great success
stories of the last decade and a half. Within
the space of less than a year, very major
steps have been taken in the field of con-
servation, in the field of emergency sharing,
and in the field of financial solidarity. And
I have every confidence that the spirit of
cooperation that has brought us to this point
will hold in the months ahead.

Q. A yiumber of questions on price. What
do you estimate the protected price of oil will
be? For hoiv long ivill it be protected? How
will the long-term protected price be affected
by infation? And based on your remarks,
what do you believe is the minimum price per
barrel for domestic oil that will be required
to keep U.S. investments competitive?

February 24, 1975

245

Secretary Kissiyiger: Well, the precise
price would have to be established first by
more detailed technical studies and then in
consultation with our partners that also
have an interest in the problem. However,
it can be stated now that the protected price
would be substantially below the existing
world price. It would have to be protected
for a period of time sufficient to justify the
massive investment in the alternative
sources that are called for.

With respect to the impact of inflation on
the protected price, if a long-term price ar-
rangement were made with the producers
and if the price were pegged at a level con-
siderably below current world prices, the
United States would not exclude discussing
indexing in relation to it.

Q. If the cost of oil in the United States
and in the major industrial nations remains
above the level of exported oil or Communist
country prices, how are U.S. or European
exporters of petrochemicals going to cope
with competition from Eastern European or
other nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this assumes
that there is an unlimited capacity by the
Soviet Union to expand its oil exports at
lower prices, and we doubt seriously that
this capacity exists.

Q. Have you had any reaction as yet from
the oil-producing coimtries' leaders regard-
ing President Ford's plan to impose the im-
port levy on oil in this country? What is the
possibility that the oil-producing countries
will use that as a reason for a further price
increase ?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not had any
reaction from the oil-producing countries
with respect to the President's import tax.
I believe also that the oil producers very
clearly understand the difference between a
price increase that compounds a balance-of-
payments deficit and a price increase that is
rebated to the consumers.

Q. Do you agree, Mr. Secretary, with Sen-
ator Church's proposal that the United States
set up an oil purchasing agency as one ivay

of eliminating unnecessary competition for
profits and supplies?

Secretary Kissinger: I have frankly not
had an opportunity to study this proposal in
great detail, and I therefore would rather
withhold judgment.

Q. An enterprising member of the audience
asks, can we trade U.S. wheat for Russian
oil?

Seo'etary Kissinger: That, too, is some-
thing I would like to examine a little bit.
[Laughter and applause.]

Q. We have a number of questions on other
countries, particularly the Middle East, where
you ivill be going icithin a very short space
of time. Will it be possible to arrange a fur-
ther military disengagement on the Sinai
ivith Egypt without further progress ivith
Syria on the Golan Heights? And secondly,
u'ill the time come ivhen the United States
will have to deal with the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) ?

Secretary Kissinger: If I didn't believe
that there was some possibility of progress
in further negotiations I would not, obvi-
ously, go to the Middle East. Of course any
step that is taken should only be considered
as an interim step toward a final peace. And
all other of the nations in the Middle East
will have to participate in that next step —
or will have to participate, not in the forth-
coming step, but will have to participate in
a negotiation for a final peace.

With respect to the PLO, we have stated
our position repeatedly, that there is no
possibility of a negotiation as long as the
PLO does not recognize the existence of
Israel.

Q. How do you explain shipments of
American airplanes to the Middle East and
to the Arab countries in view of the possi-
bility of the renewal of an Arab embargo on
oil?

Secretary Kissinger: In my press confer-
ence last week, I explained the American
policy with respect to arms shipments to
other countries as follows: The questions

246

Department of State Bulletin

that have to be answered are whether a
threat to the security of these countries
exists in the minds of these countries ;
whether the United States considers this a
realistic appraisal; whether the United
States has an interest in the stability and
security of the countries concerned ; and
finally, whether, if the United States does
not supply these weapons, these countries
would remain without weapons.

In the case of the arms shipments to
which the United States has agreed, we be-
lieve that the answer to each question can
be affirmative — and in view of the various
balance-of-payments considerations that I
have earlier outlined, also in our interest.
But the controlling decision is not a com-
mercial one. The controlling decision is the
political one that I explained.

Q. Four or five questions on Cuba. The
first one asks whether you have any com-
ment on Senator Sparkman's recent remarks
about resuming U.S. relations with Cuba
and ivhat are the chances that U.S. policy
toward Cuba will change this year.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm brave but not
reckless. [Laughter.]

In the spirit of partnership between the
Congress and the executive that I called for
recently, I would like to say that we are
examining our policy toward Cuba — that we
are prepared to look at various of the meas-
ures that have been taken in the inter-Amer-
ican system with a view toward seeing what
can be done in our Cuban relationship.

Q. Do you see any possibility, Mr. Secre-
tary, of an opportunity for the United States
to sell some goods to Cuba in the near future
to help us with our balance of payments?

Secretary Kissinger: Whatever decision
will be made on Cuba is not going to be dic-
tated by economic considerations. It will
grow out of our assessment in the inter-
national context, as well as our overall rela-
tionships with the Western Hemisphere.

Q. Let's switch to the Eastern Hemisphere
for a moment. A member of the audience
notes that Chinese leaders are reportedly dis-

satisfied at the pace of Sino-American rap-
prochement. When will the United States
recognize mainland China? Will it be during
President Ford's visit to China this year?
And, presuming, lohen will tve withdraw U.S.
troops from Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: I read these accounts
with great interest, but of course we can
only deal with the expressions that the
Chinese leaders make to American oflficials.
And we do not have the impression that the
Chinese leaders are dissatisfied with the
state of Chinese-American relations. We are
committed in the Shanghai communique to
proceed toward the normalization of rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China.
We are determined to carry out not only the
letter but the spirit of the Shanghai com-
munique, and we will base our improving
relations with the People's Republic of
China on these principles.

Q. Within a few days, the Prime Minister
of Pakistan xvill be paying a visit to Wash-
ington. Is the United States ready to lift the
embargo on arms to Pakistan when Prime
Minister Bhutto is here this iveek?

Secretary Kissinger: The question about
Pakistan, an ally which is in the curious
position of being subject to American em-
bargo, is always before us — especially at a
time when the Prime Minister of Pakistan
visits the United States. No decisions have
yet been made, and I doubt that any final
decision will be made while Prime Minister
Bhutto is here. But of course it is always a
subject that is seriously examined in prepa-
ration for his visit and of course will be
discussed.

Q. A pair of questions on Viet-Nam. Is the
division of South Viet-Nam into Government
and Viet Cong regions a feasible way to stop
the fighting? Or — to put it another ivay —
another questioner asks, despite any agree-
ments that have been made or will be made,
do you feel there can be peace in Viet-Nam
as long as North Vietnamese troops occupy
any part of South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States

February 24, 1975

247

has always been prepared, together with the
Government in Saigon, to see to it that peace
is maintained in South Viet-Nam along the
demarcation lines that existed when the
armistice agreement was signed. It is the
Communist side which has consistently re-
fused to agree to a demarcation and to de-
ploy the international control teams by
which such a demarcation would be insured.
Under the agreement in January 1973,
there was no requirement for the with-
drawal of the North Vietnamese troops
which were then in South Viet-Nam. But
there was a flat prohibition against any
further increase in their numbers — or, in-
deed, a flat prohibition against sending any
new personnel. This prohibition has been
consistently violated from the very first day
of the agreement. And the only security
problem in South Viet-Nam is the presence
of North Vietnamese military forces.

Q. Back to the Western Hemisphere. To-
day's Washington Post reported some con-
clusions by former Chilean Ambassador
Orlando LeteUer, who alleged that he had
been deceived about CIA involvement with
the opposition to the Allende government.
In retrospect, shoidd any of the CIA's activ-
ities have been different — do you regret the
outcome?

Secretary Kissinger: I found it amazing
that the front page of a leading newspaper
would report a totally unsupported story by
an individual who, after all, was not exactly
disinterested and who told a rather amazing
tale that he had been invited to the house
of a Washington columnist to receive a spe-
cial message from me.

Now, it would be an interesting question
— who exactly passed that message to him
that he should come to the house of that
columnist. That columnist does not remem-
ber such an incident; I do not remember
such an incident. And while our denial was
duly reported in the last paragraph of the
story, one would not be able to determine
that from the front page of an article that
can only be designed to prove that I was
telling a lie for purposes that are totally

unclear by a man who has a pi'ofound inter-
est in the problem. And I might say I find i")
it particularly painful because I have not
been uninvolved in his release from prison
in Chile. [Applause.]

Q. A pair of questions here about food as
it relates to the present energy crisis. One
questioner wants to know if there is a plan
to use food as a weapon in the strategy of the
consuming nations against the oil-producing
countries.

Secretary Kissinger: In my first public
statement as Secretary of State, two days
after I was sworn in, I proposed the conven-
ing of a World Food Conference. I did so
because it seemed to me that if we were
serious about our assertions that the world
was interdependent and that a new world
order had to be instituted based on this prin-
ciple, then we had a moral and political
obligation to use the resource which we have
in surplus for the benefit of all of mankind.
We made pi'oposals at the World Food Con-
ference which were designed to alleviate the
chronic food shortage that exists all over
the world ; and we emphasized that whatever
the level of American food aid, we would not
be able to deal with the chronic problem by
American food alone — that it was necessary
to increase the productivity, especially in
less developed countries, to improve the dis-
tribution, and to take other fundamental
measures of agricultural reform, to which
the United States will contribute.

With respect to American food aid, which
is a separate problem, a very large per-
centage of this food aid is given for primar-
ily humanitarian purposes. There are, of
course, countries where we are conscious
that this food aid also helps us politically,
and we have no reason to apologize for this.
But even in those countries there is a pro-
found need for food.

We have worked closely with Senator
Humphrey, with Senator Hatfield — first, to
produce the maximum level of food aid that
was possible and, secondly, to allocate it in
a manner that met both the humanitarian
and other needs of this country.

248

Department of State Bulletin

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, in the
'Mat moments of drafting the budget, $178
nillion tvas apparenthj added to the total
tvailable for the P.L. A80 Food for Peace
orogram. Some people are crediting you with
irguing for the addition of that $178 million.
Who is going to receive it? How much of the
'otal food aid available ivill go to most seri-
ously affected (MSA) countries? Have Cam-
bodia and South Viet-Nam been added to
the MSA list?

Secretary Kissinger: I can hardly keep up
with the newspaper reports printing the
breakdown of various working papers with
respect to food aid, none more recent, inci-
dentally, than two months. I, frankly, don't
know the exact figure that was added in
recent weeks to the budget. But, again, if
you remember — I don't know why I assume
tliat each of you remember every detail of
every speech I gave ; I look at my staff here
and they have to open staff meetings by
rehearsing them, in spite of their prayers.
[Laughter.]

But in that speech I indicated that the
United States would support the highest
possible level of food aid. The only reason
we did not announce the level then was be-
cause of the impact on American domestic
prices and because we were afraid that if
the result of announcing a high level of food
aid would be to push up the American do-
mestic food prices, that then congressional
support for the food aid program might
evaporate altogether. Therefore we have
consistently been at the highest level that
was compatible with our domestic price
structure.

Now that the recent crop reports have
indicated that we have adequate food sup-
plies, we have, as a matter of course, gone
to the high levels. And it is not the case that
this was suddenly jury-rigged in order to
produce a particular effect. With respect to
the allocations required by the Congress be-
tween the humanitarian and other purposes,
we have worked out this arrangement with
all the Senators and Congressmen who have
shown a particular interest in the problem.

To answer your specific question, Viet-

Nam and Cambodia have not been added to
the MSA list, even though, in fairness, the
only reason they are not on the MSA list of
the United Nations is because Viet-Nam is
not in the United Nations.

British Prime Minister Wilson
Visits Washington

Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, made ayi official visit to Washing-
ton January 29-February 1. Following are
an exchange of greetings between President
Ford and Prime Minister Wilson at a wel-
coming ceremony on the South Lawn of the
White House on January 30 and their ex-
change of toasts at a White House dinner
that evening.

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 3

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen:
It gives me a very great deal of pleasure to
welcome you again to the United States. You
are no stranger, of course, to this city and
to this house. Your visits here over the years
as a staunch ally and a steadfast friend are
continuing evidence of the excellence of the
ties between our countries and our people.

You, Mr. Prime Minister, are the honored
leader of one of America's truest allies and
oldest friends. Any student of American his-
tory and American culture knows how sig-
nificant is our common heritage. We have
actually continued to share a wonderful com-
mon history.

Americans can never forget how the very
roots of our democratic political system and
of our concepts of liberty and government
are to be found in Britain.

Over the years, Britain and the United
States have stood together as trusting friends
and allies to defend the cause of freedom on

February 24, 1975

249

a worldwide basis. Today, the North Atlantic
alliance remains the cornerstone of our com-
mon defense.

However, we and other members of the
Atlantic community face a new dimension
of challenges. That these challenges today
are different from those that we have con-
fronted in the past does not mean that they
are any less perilous.

What is at stake is the future of indus-
trialized democracies which have perceived
and sustained their destiny in common for
30 years. The problems of recession, inflation,
and of assuring equitable access to fairly
priced resources threaten the stability of
every economy and the welfare of people in
developed as well as developing nations alike.
These problems defy solution by national
means alone.

Mr. Prime Minister, as I recently said in
my state of the Union address, if we act
imaginatively and boldly to deal with our
present problems, as we acted after World
War II, then this period will, in retrospect,
be seen as one of the great creative moments
in our history.

Britain's role then, as now, was crucial.
Only by working together can the indus-
trialized democracies and the nations of the
world overcome these great challenges. Only
in this manner can we insure a better life
and a better world for all peoples.

The United States, for its part, is fully
prepared to give our closest cooperation to
this joint enterprise. A start has already
been made — an international energy pro-
gram, an International Energy Agency, and
an international financial facility have been
created.

Consultations such as you and I will have
today and tomorrow are setting the stage
for further cooperation. Your government
plays a very essential part. We recognize and
we applaud the support that Britain has
shown for strengthened international co-
operation and your contribution to dealing
with the global problems of inflation, food,
and energy.

Mr. Prime Minister, I look forward with
pleasure to the discussions that we will have
on the major security, political, and economic

250

issues before our two countries. As befit;
talks between close friends, I know tha
they will be wide-ranging and candid. Thej
will confirm our mutual trust and serve oui
common goals.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and your partjl
are most welcome in our country.

Prime Minister Wilson

Mr. President : First, may I thank you for
your very warm welcome, symbolic in eveiy
way of the close friendship and the very real
ties which, as you have said, have always
existed between our countries over the gen-
erations.

It is today a privilege that the Foreign
Secretary and I should have the opportunity
to join with you and the Secretary of State
in what I am sure will be wide-ranging and
deep discussions about the problems we face
together as friends, as partners, and as allies.
We could not be meeting at a time of
greater moment for the causes for which our
two countries have worked and fought over
the years— the continuing strength to pro-
tect and fortify peace and lo bring security
to all peoples, and especially at this time,
our declared pledges to our own peoples and
to the wider world of our determination to
meet this new and menacing world economic
crisis.

For we know that the urgency of meeting
this challenge is not simply a question of
economic mechanisms and economic insti-
tutions ; it IS vital for the economic security,
the jobs, and the living standards of the
millions of families whose interests we are
here to protect and to serve.
Mr. President, I thank you.

TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 3

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson, our
distinguished guests: We are very deeply
honored, and we are greatly pleased to have
both of you and your party here with us this

Department of State Bulletin

veiling. You have been guests in this house
etore, and I hope you have enjoyed it to-
ight as well as you have enjoyed your pre-
ious occasions. My wife and I consider our-
elves very fortunate to have this opportunity
0 extend our hospitality to both of you, both
fficially as well as personally.

The great heritage that we have, that we
hare, draws our two countries together,
leorge Bernard Shaw once remarked that we
re two nations separated by the same lan-
Liage. Nevertheless I believe you will agree
hat what unites us is vastly more significant
han our differences.

As you put it so well on a previous visit,
Av. Prime Minister, Britons and Americans
onimunicate effectively because we share a
onimon background of understanding. And
ach of us is aware that behind these few
vnrds lie volumes of thought and experience
vhich do not need to be articulated, and of
■ourse this is a priceless asset to both our
lations and our enduring friendship.

Mr. Prime Minister, another aspect of our
ommon heritage is our devotion to democ-
•acy, our faith in the wisdom of people — and
,'ou and I have spent most of our adult life
11 government in one capacity or another.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of
your election as a Member of the Parliament,
where you have built an extraordinary record
of achievement, leadership, and service to
your country.

My own election to the House of Repre-
sentatives was in 1948, when one of our
guests, Hubert Humphrey, and I were both
elected, he to a more prestigious office in the
minds of some Members of the Congress
[laughter] ; but none of us in those days
could have foreseen what would happen in
the 1970's.

Today, the task is not to rebuild and to
reorder a world torn by war but to face the
challenges of peace and to face the problems
of recession, inflation, balance-of-payments
deficit, the shortages of energy and fuel as
well as food, and the safeguarding of our
security while trying to reduce the inter-
national tensions that are difficult as we try
to strengthen our international relationships.
The problems underlying our interdepend-

February 24, 1975

ence of nations and the need for communi-
cation are vastly important, and our two
nations, I think, can set an example for the
problems that we face in this regard.

Recently, the world honored the 100th an-
niversary of Sir Winston Churchill's birth-
day, and it is almost unbelievable that today
marks the 10th anniversary of Sir Winston
Churchill's death. So, we think of him and of
our difficulties and challenges. We are re-
minded of his courage and optimism in the
face of great peril.

He told the world in December of 1941 —
and I think this is appropriate to mention
now:

We have not journeyed all this way across the
centuries, across the oceans, across the mountains,
across the prairies because we are made of sugar
candy.

Mr. Prime Minister, the challenges we face
are serious, they are different and, in many
ways, much more complex than those con-
fronted in the Second World War; yet I am
confident by working together the free and
democratic nations can again triumph. We
are still made not of sugar candy.

I look forward, Mr. Prime Minister, to con-
tinuing our constructive discussions tomor-
row that we initiated today. It was most en-
joyable to have an opportunity to be in the
company of our British friends.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and I talked be-
fore dinner of a sport that apparently we
both enjoy, but we don't do too competently.
It is a sport better known among the Scottish,
but loved by Americans as well as the British.
You know, I especially like to play golf
with our Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,
who is with us tonight. Henry is undoubt-
edly one of the greatest diplomats this world
has ever known. Let me tell you why I can
make that categorical statement. The last
time we played, I found myself in a sand
trap. There was a water hazard beyond that,
and then 95 feet before we found the first
hole. Henry conceded the putt. [Laughter.]

Mr. Prime Minister, with profound ap-
preciation for your presence with us today
and tonight, I offer a toast to Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth and to you and Mrs. Wilson.
To the Queen.

251

Prime Minister Wilson

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, Mr. Vice Presi-
dent, Mrs. Rockefeller, Your Excellencies,
distinguished fellow parliamentarians of both
Houses of Congress, ladies and gentlemen:
On behalf, Mr. President, of all those who
have traveled with me for this meeting this
week I should like to express our sincere
thanks for your warm hospitality and for
your kindness in inviting tonight so great
and distinguished a company of your fellow
countrymen, many of them old friends of
mine, very many of whom to my personal
knowledge have contributed to the full in
maintaining and strengthening our trans-
atlantic friendship.

The tradition of meetings between the
governments of our two countries is rooted
deep in our history. The very informality and
friendship of these meetings, as we have
found again today, so far from being a bar
to the deep and wide-ranging probing of
world problems, these things are themselves
a guarantee that these problems fearlessly
faced will be resolutely handled.

In my experience, the value of these Anglo-
American intergovernmental and equally,
may I say, interparliamentary associations
that strengthen our relationship — the value
of them rests in the fact that when we meet,
there is so much that just does not need to
be said between us.

It is all taken for granted, whether it be
the assertion of the principles which we
jointly hold or whether it be the obligations
upon us to work together toward the solu-
tion of our own problems and those of the
world, and it saves a great deal of time be-
cause we don't even have to go back to first
base and repeat these things one to another.
From my experience of intergovernmental
meetings in this city and in London, now go-
ing back more than a quarter of a century,
I repeat tonight what I said to my hosts on
Capitol Hill this afternoon. I repeat that I
cannot recall a time when our relationship
was so close or our understanding so deep
as it is at this time as we meet, Mr. Presi-
dent, this week.

In the past years and for more than a ge
eration — many would say for many gener-
tions — our peoples have worked togethr
and indeed fought together to secure ai
strengthen the peace of the world and t?
role that democracy can play and must ph?
within that world.

Last year 15 North American and Eur-
pean nations celebrated the 25th annive-
sary of the Atlantic alliance. As a survivii;
member of the Attlee Cabinet in Britai
which jointly with President Truman's Ai-
ministration played so large a part in crea^
ing that alliance, I asked last year at the ceL
brations how many of us in 1949 could ha\
foreseen the enduring strength of the all
ance, still less foresee the contribution :
would make and is making for peace and fo
the defense of democracy in some of thos
dangerous years which have lain between.

But whenever peace was in danger, when
ever democracy was threatened, there wer
always leaders in our two countries read;
to work together in joint action and in ;
wider setting to meet whatever challengi
faced us, nor at any time did those leader;
lack the unstinted support of their peoples.

But always we set before us the objective
not just of building strength for its own sak«
or even building strength just for our owr
defense; always we have looked on strengt?
as a means to peace and to reconciliation anc
to detente.

It is these aims that we are together againi
this week pursuing with world leaders. It
is these aims that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment will continue to assert when the For-
eign Secretary and I visit Moscow in two
weeks' time.

But, Mr. President, in a wider sense, our
talks this week are being directed to still
gi-eater, still wider, still newer problems
which have arisen to threaten the economic
life of our own nations and of so many other
nations of the world, rich and poor. It is out
of the very nature of the challenges we have
faced together — challenges which now are
to the economic advance, challenges to the
well-being for all the peoples of the world

252

Department of State Bulletin

is out of the nature of the very challenge,
is also out of the understandings developed
,etween us in the past that we must now in
his new situation forge still newer instru-
nents for meeting the economic problems,
hese problems the gravity of which— and
hey are grave— serve only to strengthen the
oint resolution which we shall put forward
ogether.

In this spirit, Mr. President, thanking you
igain for your wonderful hospitality today
md this evening, it is in this spirit that we
undertake together the discussions of this
»veek, and it is in this spirit, too, that we
shall go forward together.

In that spirit, Mr. President, may I now
have the honor, on behalf of your visitors
here this week and of this great company, of
proposing the health and prosperity of the
President of the United States and of Mrs.
Ford.

President Ford's News Conference
at Atlanta February 4

Followiyig are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a neivs confer-
ence held by President Ford at Atlanta, Ga.,
on Febriiary ^.'

Q. hi the last 2k hours you have spoken at
length about domestic concerns. I ivould like
to ask you what options you will have to help
maintain a non-Communist government in
Viet-Nam if the Congress does not go along
ivith your supplemental appropriation re-
quest as well as this fiscal year '76 request
for Viet-Nam?

President Ford: If the Congress does not
respond to the requested additional military
assistance for the current fiscal year, an
amount which the Congress last year pre-
viously authorized, it will certainly compli-
cate the military situation from the point of
view of the South Vietnamese.

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 10, 1974.

The South Vietnamese on their own, with
our financial assistance, our military aid,
have done very well; but the Congress did
not fully fund the requested military assist-
ance that was requested. I believe that if the
Congress funds the additional money that I
have proposed for this fiscal year and contin-
ues the money that I have recommended for
next fiscal year, the South Vietnamese can
and will be able to defend themselves against
the aggressors from the North.

Q. The question is, if the Congress fails to
do that, what options will you have then?

President Ford: I do not think that the
time for me to answer that question is at
the present. I, in the first place, believe Con-
gress will fund the money that I have re-
quested ; and if they do, then I have no need
to look at any other options, because they
will be capable of defending themselves.
The good judgment of the Congress will fund,
the South Vietnamese will defend themselves,
and I do not think there will be any other
needed options.

Q. Mr. President, when tjou left Vladivo-
stok in November, we were led to under-
stand that General Secretary Brezhnev would
be in Washington in May or June. The time
is running short, a lot has happened in Amer-
ican-Soviet relations since then. Do you still
look forivard to welcoming Mr. Brezhnev just
three or four months from now?

President Ford: Mr. Cormier [Frank Cor-
mier, Associated Press], I look forward to
having the General Secretary in the United
States in the summer of 1975. The negotia-
tions which we concluded in Vladivostok are
moving along in the negotiations that are
necessary to put the final draft. These nego-
tiations are taking place in Geneva.

I see no reason why we cannot reconcile
any of the relatively minor differences. The
basic agreement is still in effect, and I am
confident that we can welcome the General
Secretary to the United States in the summer
of 1975, and I look forward to it.

February 24, 1975

253

President Ford Warns of Effects
of Military Aid Cutoff to Turkey

Statement by President Ford ^

Legislation enacted by Congress requires
that arms deliveries to Turkey must be sus-
pended February 5. The Administration will
comply fully with the law. However, it should
be made clear that military aid to Turkey is
not given in the context of the Cyprus issue,
nor has it been granted as a favor to Turkey.
Rather, it is based on our common conclu-
sions that the security of Turkey is vital to
the security of the eastern Mediterranean
and to the security of the United States and
its allies.

A suspension of military aid to Turkey is
likely to impede the negotiation of a just
Cyprus settlement. Furthermore, it could
have far-reaching and damaging effects on
the security and hence the political stability
of all the countries in the region. It will affect
adversely not only Western security but the
strategic situation in the Middle East. It
cannot be in the interest of the United States
to take action that will jeopardize the system
on which our relations in the eastern Med-
iterranean have been based for 28 years.

When it is seen that the United States is
taking action which is clearly incompatible
with its own interests, this will raise grave
doubts about the conduct of American foreign
relations even among countries that are not
directly involved in that area.

The Administration judges these advert I
effects of a suspension of aid to Turkey to ;
so serious that it urges the Congress to r-
consider its action and authorize the resum.
tion of our assistance relationship with Tu-
key.

Letters of Credence

Bolivia

The newly appointed Ambassador of th
Republic of Bolivia, Roberto Capriles, pn
sented his credentials to President Ford o
January 29.'

Dominican Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of th
Dominican Republic. Dr. Horacio Vicios
Soto, presented his credentials to Presiden
Ford on January 29.'

Ecuador

The newly appointed Ambassador of th
Republic of Ecuador, Jose Corsino Cardenas
presented his credentials to President Fore
on January 29.'

Sudan

The newly appointed Ambassador of th
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Dr
Francis Mading Deng, presented his creden
tials to President Ford on January 29.'

)

' Issued on Feb. 5 (te.\t from White House press
release).

" For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release dated Jan. 29.

254

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Request for Supplemental Appropriation
for Military Assistance to Cambodia

Statement by Philip C. Habib

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs '

In both Viet-Nam and Cambodia there has
been a recent significant escalation of mih-
tary action by Communist forces. This has
placed new and severe strains on the re-
sources of the governments of those coun-
tries and has rendered the assistance we
provide to them inadequate to meet its in-
tended objectives. The President has there-
fore asked Congress to make available addi-
tional funds for military aid to Viet-Nam
and Cambodia and to remove impediments
to the use of funds already appropriated to
provide essential food aid to Cambodia.

The Viet-Nam supplemental, a Defense
appropriation, will be formally considered on
another occasion. The authority to increase
food aid for Cambodia does not require any
additional appropriation. My testimony to-
day therefore is primarily in support of our
request for appropriations for military aid
for Cambodia. But in my remarks this after-
noon I will attempt to address the problem of
Cambodia in the broader context of our
overall Indochina policy.

Two years ago we concluded an agreement
in Paris which we hoped would end the war
in Viet-Nam and pave the way for settle-
ments in Laos and Cambodia. The Paris

' Made before the Subcommittee on Government
Operations of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions on Feb. 3. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.

agreement was the end result of a long and
tortuous negotiating process. In its final
form, the agreement was one which we felt
honored the sacrifices and respected the
sense of justice of both sides. It implied a
rejection of absolutes, an acceptance of re-
straint, an acknowledgment of limitations —
as must any accord. From the standpoint of
the United States, the agreement in large
measure met what had been our purpose
throughout the long history of our efforts
in Viet-Nam: it ended our direct military
involvement there and established a formula
through which the people of South Viet-Nam
could determine their political future with-
out outside interference.

Things have not worked out as we had
hoped. Only in Laos have the contending
parties moved from military confrontation
to political competition. In Viet-Nam, after a
period of relative quiescence, warfare again
rages and the structure created by the agree-
ment for working toward a political settle-
ment is endangered. In Cambodia, there has
been no amelioration of the conflict, and the
military balance in that country is gravely
threatened.

I cannot profess surprise at these devel-
opments. The Paris agreement contained no
self-enforcing mechanisms. For that agree-
ment to be effective and to achieve its pur-
pose, both sides were required to act in
accordance with the principles of restraint,
compromise, and minimal good faith which
must underlie the resolution of any indeci-

February 24, 1975

255

sive conflict. Those qualities have been con-
spicuously absent from Hanoi's approach.
In Cambodia, also, a negotiated settlement
demands that both sides accept the impera-
tives of compromise. The Cambodian Com-
munists have instead sought military vic-
tory.

While its focus was on Viet-Nam, the
Paris agreement also contained provisions
relating to Laos and Cambodia. The signa-
tories were enjoined to respect the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of those
countries, and all foreign troops were to
have been withdrawn. South Viet-Nam and
the United States have abided by those
strictures. Hanoi has not. North Viet-Nam
continues to use the territory of Laos to
send forces and war materiel to South Viet-
Nam and continues to station troops in re-
mote areas of that country. North Viet-Nam
uses the territory of Cambodia to support
its military operations in South Viet-Nam.
In addition, Hanoi gives material assistance
and battlefield advice to Communist forces
operating against the Cambodian Govern-
ment.

Let me now turn specifically to the situa-
tion in Cambodia. The conflict in Cambodia
is complex, and its origins are widely mis-
understood. Sihanouk was deposed in 1970
by a government which he himself had
formed less than a year before. That action
was ratified by a National Assembly whose
members Sihanouk had personally selected.
The United States played no role in the
matter. (Our total presence in Cambodia at
that time consisted of two diplomatic officers
and three military attaches.) Several days
after those events. North Vietnamese forces
attacked Cambodian Government outposts
in the eastern region of the country. Armed
hostilities in Cambodia date from those at-
tacks. Under North Vietnamese auspices,
insurgent forces were formed and joined the
fray.

Warfare has since been unremitting and
often intense. The human and material cost
has been high. The economic life of Cam-
bodia has been shattered. What was once a
rich agricultural country producing con-

256

sistent rice surpluses is now heavily de-
pendent on outside assistance for even the
most basic necessities. Perhaps as many as
1.5 million people, over a fifth of the total
population, have become refugees. Thou-
sands of Cambodians — soldiers and civilians
— have lost their lives.

Cambodia's battle against an externally
supported insurgent movement has been in
tensified still further in recent weeks. On
January 1, Communist forces launched a
new off"ensive, stepping up attacks in the
area near Phnom Penh and against several
provincial capitals and making strong eff"orts
to cut the vital Mekong supply corridor.
Total casualties for both sides are running
at least 1,000 a day— killed, wounded, oi
missing — and more than 60,000 new refu
gees have been created. The already stricken
economic life of the country is further
ravaged.

Cambodian Government forces have fought
remarkably well in the face of difficult odds.
In little more than four years, a small and
largely ceremonial army has grown into a
sizable and increasingly effective fighting
force. In this connection, I have seen a num-
ber of recent press articles alleging waste
of ammunition by Cambodian forces. They
require comment. While this was partly true
a year ago, as noted by the Inspector Gen
eral for Foreign Assistance in a recent re-
port, that report also notes that steps have
been taken to improve ammunition conser
vation. Because of those efforts, Cambodian
forces are undoubtedly making better use of
their ammunition this year than last. But
combat intensity remains the primary deter-
minant of ammunition expenditure — and the
Communists have raised the intensity mark-
edly since January 1.

I would also add that it is misleading to
compare the ammunition expenditures of
defending forces with those of insurgents.
As in Viet-Nam, Communist forces — having
no population centers or fixed positions to
defend — are able to mass forces at times
and places of their choosing; this allows
them economies unavailable to widely dis-
persed defenders.

li

Department of State Bulletin

[(

In Cambodia, even more than in Viet-Nam,
h.e material resources the nation must have
or its defense are strained to the limit. If
iouth Viet-Nam faces a harsh choice in
llocating diminishing defense resources, it
"' s not inaccurate to say that Cambodia has
10 choice. If it is to avoid collapse and chaos,
md if there is to be any prospect for a
ompromise solution, additional aid must be
)rovided without delay.

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore
jeace and to allow the Cambodian people an
)pportunity to decide freely the political
future of their country. It has never been
"jjur belief, or a premise of our policy toward
'iCambodia, that the conflict would end in
"Izonclusive military victory by Cambodian
Government forces. Nor, however, should it
end in military victory by the Communists.
We believe the only logical and fair solution
is one involving negotiations and a compro-
mise settlement. The Cambodian Govern-
ment has repeatedly called for talks with
the opposing side, without preconditions. We
have fully supported these proposals as well
as the resolution, sponsored by Cambodia's
Southeast Asian neighbors and adopted in
the last session of the U.N. General Assem-
bly, calling for early negotiations. The Com-
munists, however, have been adamantly op-
posed to a negotiated settlement. Their atti-
tude is unlikely to change unless and until
they conclude that military victory is not
possible. The first imperative, therefore, and
the aim of our military assistance to the
Cambodian Government, is to preserve a
military balance and thereby to promote
negotiations.

Present restrictions on our military and
economic assistance to Cambodia, contained
in the 1974 amendment to the Foreign As-
sistance Act, make it impossible to accom-
plish that goal. The Administration origi-
nally requested $390 million in military aid
for this fiscal year. The $200 million in
military aid authorized for this fiscal year
was expended during the past six months,
on the basis of continuing-resolution author-
ity, in response to significantly intensified
Communist ofl'ensive actions. Since the be-

ginning of the latest Communist offensive
on January 1, ammunition expenditures have
gone higher, of necessity, and even the $75
million drawdown of Defense Department
stocks authorized for this emergency situa-
tion will not meet the needs. In addition to
this stringent situation with respect to mili-
tary supplies, Cambodia also faces an im-
pending severe rice shortage.

Therefore, to meet minimum requirements
for the survival of the Khmer Republic,
President Ford has asked the Congress to
do three things:

— First, to eliminate the existing $200 mil-
lion ceiling on military assistance for Cam-
bodia.

— Second, to authorize and appropriate
$222 million in military aid, in addition to
appropriating the $200 million currently
authorized. Our original request to the Con-
gress for military assistance to Cambodia
during the current fiscal year, $390 million,
was an amount we regarded then as the
minimum needed. With unexpectedly in-
creased Communist pressures, and in view
of the sharp rise in the cost of ammunition
— the largest single item in the program —
$222 million in additional funds is now
clearly required. That amount, plus the $200
million in aid funds and the $75 million in
Department of Defense drawdown already
authorized, will bring total military assist-
ance for the year to a level generally com-
parable to our original estimates of the need
and our original request to the Congi'ess.

—Third, to eliminate the $377 million
ceiling on our overall aid to Cambodia, or at
least to exempt Public Law 480 food from
that ceiling. This is necessary to enable us
to provide vital commodities, mostly food,
as soon as possible. The inability to use
funds already included in the Department of
Agriculture appropriation will cause a break
in the food supply pipeline beginning in June
unless procurement action is begun by late
March. New authority therefore is needed
urgently. We anticipate, as we have through-
out the year in appearances before you, that
between $73 million and $100 million in

February 24, 1975

257

additional rice and wheat will have to be
provided to Cambodia this fiscal year. Eco-
nomic collapse, and even starvation, may
otherwise result.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, we wish, as do
you, to see an early end to the suffering of
the Cambodian people and to the destruction
of their country. The only equitable way in
which this can be accomplished is to
strengthen conditions which will permit a
negotiated solution to take place. It is for
this purpose that additional military assist-
ance and economic assistance authority for
Cambodia is an urgent necessity.

This request — and the one we are sub-
mitting separately for Viet-Nam — does not
represent the beginning of a new and open-
ended commitment for the United States.
Nor does it reflect any change in policy on
the part of the United States. The additional
funds and authorities which we are asking
the Congress to make available for Cam-
bodia are vitally needed, for the reasons I
have set forth, in support of a policy which
has in large measure proven appropriate to
the difficult circumstances of Indochina. That
policy, borne out in the record of our actions,
is one of steady disengagement — in a man-
ner designed to prevent new upheavals in
Indochina, new instability in the East Asia
region, and renewed contention among the
major powers.

Cambodia cannot be considered separately
from Viet-Nam and Laos, and the whole of
Indochina cannot be isolated from larger
world issues. The consequences of a decision
to withhold vitally needed assistance to
Cambodia would extend beyond the confines
of Indochina — and they would be inimical
to the broad sweep of our interests in this
small and interdependent world. Such a deci-
sion would amount to a conscious act to
abandon a small country to a forcible Com-
munist takeover, an action without prece-
dent in our history. The amounts we are
requesting for Cambodia are not large when
measured against the sacrifices we and the
people of Indochina have already made. They
are, however, vital to the restoration of con-
ditions which can lead to peace in Cambodia.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949-50
Historical Series. Hearings held in executive ses
sion before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re
lations. (1949 and 1950). Made public Januarj
1974. 280 pp.

Reviews of the World Situation: 1949-50. Historica
Series. Hearings held in executive session befo

r,

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (19
and 1950). Made public June 1974. 447 pp.

The Energy Crisis: Impact on Development in Latii
America and the Caribbean. Hearing before thi
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of tin
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March L'T
1974. 41 pp.

International Terrorism. Hearings before the Sub
committee on the Near East and South Asia o1
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Junf
11-24, 1974. 219 pp.

Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Acti\-
ities. Hearings before the Special Subcommitt. i
on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Hou.^t
Committee on Armed Services. May 8-July 2, 1971
71 pp.

Resolutions of Inquiry Into Proposed Nuclear Agree-
ments With Egypt and Israel. Hearing before tin
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July ''
1974. 6 pp.

Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations. Hearing befon
the House Committee on Foreign Relations uj
H. Con. Res. 507 and identical and similar resolu-
tions relating to the resumption of opium produc-
tion by and the termination of foreign assistaiir.
to Turkey. July 16, 1974. 79 pp.

World Population and Food Supply and Demaml
Situation. Hearings before the Subcommittee mi
Department Operations of the House Committct
on Agriculture. July 23-25, 1974. 188 pp.

Cyprus— 1974. Hearings before the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee t'li
Europe. August 19-20, 1974. 85 pp.

Report on Nutrition and the International Situation.
Prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Com
mittee on Nutrition and Human Needs. September
1974. 57 pp.

U.S. Policy and World Food Needs. Hearings before
the Subcommittees on International Organization.?
and Movements and on Foreign Economic Policy
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sep-
tember 10-12, 1974. 163 pp.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Export of Nuclear Tecli-
nology to the Middle East. Hearings before tli"
Subcommittees on International Organizations and
Movements and on the Near East and South Asia
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June
25-September 16, 1974. 333 pp.

Briefings on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate. Hear-
ings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions with Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations. Executive hearing.-;
held on April 11, 1974; made public November •"■'
1974. 47 pp.

258

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

:urrent Actions

MULTILATERAL

lonservation

lonvention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices.
Done at Washington March 3, 19'73.'
Signatures: Bolivia, December 23, 1974; Ecuador
December 12, 1974; Ghana, December 16, 1974,
Ireland, November 1, 1974; Netherlands De-
cember 30, 1974; Norway, December 23, 1974,
Peru, December 30, 1974; Portugal, December

6 1974
Ratification deposited: Cyprus, October 18, 1974.
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates,

November 21, 1974.

Copyright .

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention, as revised, concerning the application ot
that convention to works of stateless persons and
refugees Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered
into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Ratification deposited: Spain (with reservation),
October 16, 1974.

iCotton ^ .

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Insti-
tute! as amended (TIAS 6184). Done at Washing-
ton January 17, 1966. Entered into force February
23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, February 4, 1975.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation
Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December
15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 195-
for the United States November 5, 1970. llAb

'^AcLsion deposited: Liberia, J^^^^J. J' ^„^J„^^^,
Customs convention on containers, ^.t^i ^™^^^^
and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva May
18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, 1959 for
th; United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6634.
Extended to: Hong Kong, effective March 12,
1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic^ substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971.^

Ratification deposited: France, January 28, 19_/5.
Accessions deposited: Barbados, January -8,
1975; Saudi Arabia, January 29, 1975.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at

February 24, 1975

Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Notifications from World Intellectual Property
Organization that ratifications deposited: Al-
geria (with a declaration and a reser\'ation),
Cameroon, January 20, 1975; Cuba (with a
declaration and a reservation), January 8, 1975;
Holy See, Japan (articles 1 to 12 excepted),
January 24, 1975.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14,
1967 Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratifications deposited: Algeria, January 16,

1975- Holy See, Japan, January 20, 1975.
Accessions deposited: Cuba (with a declaration),

December 27, 1974; Egypt, January 21, 1975.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973.
TIAS 7532. ^ ^^^^

Ratification deposited: Iceland, February 7, 1975.

Women — Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force
Julv 7, 1954.=

Accession deposited: Australia (with a reserva-
tion), December 10, 1974.'

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Pans
November 16, 1972.'

Ratifications deposited: Nigeria, October 23, 1974;
ZaTre, September 23, 1974.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement modifying the agreement of March 31
and June 12, 1967, as amended (TIAS 6268, 6626 ,
relating to pre-sunrise operations of certain stand-
ard (AM) radio broadcasting stations. Effected
by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 12,
1974, and January 22, 1975. Entered into force
January 22, 1975.

Agreement relating to the establishment of the
Radiation Effects Research Foundation. Effected
by exchange of notes at Tokyo December 27, 1974.
Entered into force December 27, 1974.

' Not in force.

'Not in force for the United States.

= Not applicable to Papua New Guinea.

259

Paraguay

Agreement relating to the deposit by Paraguay of
10 percent of the value of grant military assist-
ance and excess defense articles furnished by the
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Asuncion May 12, 1972. Entered into force May
12, 1972; effective February 7, 1972. TIAS 7461.
Terminated: January 27, 1975.

Spain

Supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at
Madrid January 25, 1975. Enters into force upon
exchange of instruments of ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402. A 25-percent discount is inade on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, 7nust accompany
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.

U.S. Relations With Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf
Countries. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign
Policy series is a statement by Alfred L. Atherton,
Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, before the House Sub-
committee on the Near East of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Pub. 8777. Near East and South
Asian Series 83. 8 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S1.86:83).

Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and De-
velopment. Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. TIAS 7867. 9 pp. 30^. (Cat. No.
S9.10:7867).

Copyright. Universal Copyright Convention, as
amended. TIAS 7868. 81 pp. $1.15. (Cat. No.
89.10:7868).

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Egypt re-
lating to the agreement of June 29, 1963. TIAS
7870. 3 pp. 25(*. (Cat. No. S9.10:7870).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Paraguay.
TIAS 7873. 4 pp. 25c'. (Cat. No. S9. 10:7873).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign Ai
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Nicaragu
TIAS 7876. 4 pp. SOt'. (Cat. No. S9.10:7876).

Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance. Agree
ment with Bangladesh. TIAS 7877. 7 pp. 30^. (Ca
No. 89.10:7877).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Hur
garian People's Republic amending the agreement
August 13, 1970, as amended. TIAS 7878. 2 pp. 25r
(Cat. No. 89.10:7878).

Control and Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease

Agreement with Colombia amending the agreemen
of November 27 and December 3, 14, and 17, 197c
TIAS 7879. 3 pp. 30^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7879).

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Lao
and the Khmer Republic. Agreements with th
International Committee of the Red Cross amendinj
the agreement of November 1, 1973. TIAS 788C

4 pp. 25c'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7880).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Czech
oslovak Socialist Republic amending and extendinj
the agreement of February 28, 1969, as amended anc
extended. TIAS 7881. 4 pp. 25c'. (Cat. No. 89.10
7881).

Suez Canal — Clearance of Mines and Unexplodet
Ordnance. Arrangement with Egypt. TIAS 7882.

5 pp. 30('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7882).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Haiti mod
ifying the agreement of October 19 and Novembei
3, 1971, as amended. TIAS 7883. 2 pp. 25c'. (Cat
No. 89.10:7883).

Meteorology — Global Atmospheric Research Pro
gram (GARP) Atlantic Tropical ExperimenI
(GATE). Agreement with the World Meteorologica
Organization. TIAS 7884. 29 pp. 45('. (Cat. No
89.10:7884).

Relations. Joint statement with Jordan. TIAS 7885
2 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7885).

Air Transport Services. Agreements with Mexico
extending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as
amended and extended. TIAS 7886. 6 pp. 25'*
(Cat. No. 89.10:7886).

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Helicopters and Re-
lated Assistance. Agreement with Burma. TIAS
7887. 4 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7887).

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Rinder-
pest. Agreement with Panama amending the agree-
ment of June 21 and October 5, 1972. TIAS 7888.
16 pp. 35c'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7888).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Thai-
land amending the agreement of March 17, 1972,
as amended. TIAS 7889. 2 pp. 25c'. (Cat. No
89.110:7889).

260

Department of State Bulletin

'«NDEX

Bolivia.
China.

February 2U, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No.

Letters of Credence (Capriles) . .
Energy: The Necessity of Decision

254

237

1861

President Ford's News Conference at Atlanta

February 4 (excerpts) ''^•^

(Kissinger)
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Demrtment Di'scusses Request for' Supple-
^'^e^tal Appropriation for Mihtary Assist- ^^^

ance to Cambodia (Habib)

Cuba. Energy: The Necessity of Decision

(Kissinger)

Dominican Republic. Letters of Credence

(Soto)

Ecuador. Letters of Credence (Cardenas) . .
Energy. Energy: The Necessity of Decision

(Kissinger)

Food. Energy: The Necessity of Decision

(Kissinger)

Foreign Aid. Department Discusses Request
fo^^Supplemental Appropriation for Mili-
tary Assistance to Cambodia (Habib) . •
Khmer Republic (Cambodia). Department
^Susses'^Sequest for Supplementa Appro-
priation for Military Assistance to Cam-
bodia (Habib)

Middle East. Energy: The Necessity of De-
cision (Kissinger)

Pakistan. Energy: The Necessity of Decision ^^^
■ (Kissinger)

Ssfp^L^SIt^r Wilson Visits Wash- ^^^

pSent Ford Warns of Effects of Military ^^^

Prti^eSt^ fL^s Je^w^Sonf erence- at Atlanta ^^^

February 4 (excerpts)

Publications. GPO Sales Publications
Sudan. Letters of Credence (Deng) .

258

237

254
254

237

237

255

255

237

Name Index

254

Capriles, Roberto . ._ .-,^.

Cardenas, Jose Corsmo |^

Deng, Francis Madmg • • • ^^^

Ford, President 249, 2bd, ^M

Habib, Philip C fon

Kissinger, Secretary g.

Soto, Horacio Vicioso „.g

Wilson, Harold

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of btate,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Date

*41
42

*43
*44

2/3
2/3

2/3
2/3

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . •
Turkey. President Ford Wanis of Effects of
MiUtkry Aid Cutoif to Turkey (statement)

Energy: The Necessity of Decision (Kis-

PrSdent Ford's News Conference' at Atlanta
February 4 (excerpts)

United Kingdom. British Prime Minister Wil-
son Vlsitfwashington (Ford, Wilson) . .

SSment Discusses Request Jor^ afst-
mental Appropriation for Military Assis
ance to Cambodia (HabiD). . ; . • ■ •

Energy: The Necessity of Decision (Kis-
singer)

260
254
259

t45 2/4

*46 2/4

*47

264

237
253

249

255
237

Saxbe sworn in as Ambassador to
India (biographic data).

Kissinger: address and question
and answer period. National
Press Club.

U.S.-Singapore textile agreement

extended. „ . , ■ -^ *<.!,„

Program for the official visit of the

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zul-

fikar Ali Bhutto, Feb. 4-7.
"Foreign Relations," 1948, volume

III, Western Europe (for release

Feb. 11). .

U.S.-Nicaragua textile agreement

GxtGndcd .
2/4 Program for official visit of the
Prime Minister of Pakistan: cor-
rection. . ,. . „
U.S.-U.S.S.R. fisheries discussions

convened. . ,

Kissinger, Rusk, Reston: jnterviews
by Reg Murphy, Atlanta Consti-
tution, for Public Broadcasting
System program "Great Deci-
sions '75." „„^ .... .
•{•50 2/5 Department releases 1975 edition ot
"Treaties in Force."

Study Group 2 of the U.S. National
CommHt^ for the CCIR, Mar. 6.

Meeting on international gram re-
serves, London, Feb. 10-11.

Kissinger: interview for Wether-
lands television.

*48
♦49

2/4
2/5

*51
*52
t53

2/7
2/8
2/7

t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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U.S. OOVERNMENT PRIMTINO OFFICE

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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted

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lems involving your subscription will receive im-
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

/;

Ymj^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1862

March 3, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR NETHERLANDS TELEVISION 261

ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Address by Deputy Secretary IngersoU 26U

PRIME MINISTER ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN
VISITS WASHINGTON 269

PROMOTING A NEW SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISE

IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Address by Ambassador Scali 27 It-

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. LXXII, No. 1862
March 3, 1975

The Department of State BULLETR
a weekly publication issued by
Office of Media Services, Bureau '\
Public Affairs, provides tlie public
interested agencies of tJie governmeM
witli information on developments in
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and
on tfie work of tfie Department and
tfte Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by tlte Wfiite House and ttie Depart'
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of tfie President
and tfie Secretary of State and otfier
officers of tfie Department, as well at
special articles on various pfiaaes oi
international affairs and tfie functions
of tfie Department. Information i»
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to wliicfi tfie
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of tlte Department of
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legislative material in tfie field of
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Netherlands Television

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretanj Kissinger on February 8 at
Washington by Thomas W. Braden, Los
Angeles Times Syndicate columnist, and
Klaas J. Hindriks of the Netherlands Broad-
casting Foundation (N.O.S.) for broadcast
on N.O.S. on February 9.

Press release 53 dated February 8

Mr. Hindriks: Mr. Secretary, a lot of
people nowadays in Europe believe that in
foreign policy, in Washington, that you are
setting the tone. Is it possible for you to
give us your assessment of the role of Europe
in major foreign policy now and for the
future ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that the
contribution that Europe can make in foreign
policy is essential, because in many of the
issues that we are now discussing — in fact
in all of them — the dominant fact is the in-
terdependence of the industrial world and
without the cooperative efforts of all of the
industrial democracies the problems cannot
be solved.

Now, where the ideas originate is really
not as important as whether in fact they
are accepted with the conviction of the people
that have to execute them. It is true that
some of the ideas have originated here. It
is also true that in some others, such as in
conservation, Europe has been way ahead
of the United States.

But to me, the encouraging thing about
the last year is that in various fields, Europe
and the United States have moved together
through a free exchange of views and devel-
oped a consensus.

Mr. Hindnks: Well, after the Washington
Energy Conference last year in February,

it seems to us that there was a lot of division
betiveen Europe and the United States. What
in fact did you do ? What were you trying to
achieve? Yon got the French more or less
on your side.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, there
have been several changes of government
since then. And I thought, in any event, that
the disagreements of the Washington Energy
Conference were really between one country
and all the others and that they were made
too melodramatic.

I believe that the underlying necessity
of the Western countries working together
was bound to reassert itself.

Mr. Braden: Mr. Secretary, you are about
to enter into very serious negotiations in
the Middle East, and you seem to be under
increasing attack at home. Senator Bentsen
[Lloijd M. Bentsen, Jr.] said ijou wear too
ynany hats. Senator Stevenson [Adlai E.
Stevenson III] says that you are too secre-
tive, and Mr. [Charles W.] Colson says the
former President thought you were precipi-
tous. Do you feel hampered as you go off
on an important journey?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to put
Mr. Colson in the same category as the other
two gentlemen.

Mr. Braden: He just got out of jail, you
know.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to deal
with Colson at all.

I think it is inevitable that as a result
of Watergate, which had the curious effect
of insulating foreign policy from the national
debate for a while, that there should now
be a number of comments to bring foreign

Morch 3, 1975

261

policy back into the mainstream of the de-
bate.

I don't happen to agree with the particular
comments that were made, because I think
if one looks at the requirements of foreign
policy in the present period, one will find
that some things must be done secretively.

On the other hand, I have met over 110
times with congressional groups in 16 months
in office. So I have made an efi'ort to explain,
as much as I could, what was being done.

On the number of hats that are being
worn, I think one should judge that by the
results rather than by administrative theory.

But I understand that foreign policy has
to be part of the democratic debate, and I
can handle what needs to be done.

Mr. Braden: But is it not difficult to go off
on serious negotiations with this trumpeting
at home?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is a new
experience.

Mr. Hiudriks: Well, if you go to the Middle
East, what if your mission, fails? We sup-
ported in Enrope, especially in the Nether-
lands, the step-by-step approach as one of
the solutions possible. Will that meayi that
you will go to Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I don't
expect the mission to fail. Secondly, I have
never looked at Geneva as an alternative to
the step-by-step approach. I have always
said that at some point Geneva should be
reconvened, that everything depends on the
framework within which Geneva should be
reconvened. It is what the expectations of
the various parties at Geneva will be. We
believe, of course, that a successful next
step would create a better framework for
Geneva, and so I don't consider the two ap-
proaches contradictory. Nor is it so diffi-
cult to reassemble Geneva. The question is
what is going to happen when we get there.

Mr. Braden: What will be the signs of a
successful mission?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the next trip is
exploratory. The trip on which I am starting
does not in itself, will not yield results. I am

making only one stop in each capital, ex-
cept I am going twice to Israel, in order to
get a feel for the real convictions of the
chief protagonists, who might be reluctant
to put their thoughts down in writing.

After I've had this, I will come back here,
formulate an American view on the matter,
and then return to the Middle East and con-
clude the negotiations.

Mr. Hindriks: Can you see at a certain
moment — let's say a point of vieio, saying
it's impossible to meet the criticism at home
and conduct foreign policy in the xoay you
have done it in the last couple of years?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't expect that
to happen.

Mr. Hindriks: One more question, Mr.
Secretary. I am Jiere as a Di'tchman, and
the relationship between HoUand and the
United States has one problem in Holland's
foreign policy — tliat the United States might
curtail our airline. Is there any solution?

Secretary Kissinger: I have had extensive
talks with your Foreign Minister on the
subject. I have seen few subjects which
have so moved the Dutch, as the issue of
KLM. So he isn't the only Dutch friend who
has approached me.

The problem is that looked at from a
strictly technical point of view there is con-
siderable merit in the view of our technical
agencies. Your leaders have convinced me
that it is not simply a technical issue. And
I have therefore agreed to reopen the negotia-
tions from a wider perspective. And while
they are going on, I don't want to discuss
the outcome except to say that I personally
am aware of the particular sensitivity of
the KLM issue to Holland, to the Nether-
lands, and that I will conduct my discussions
on it with your Foreign Minister, Mr. van
der Stoel, in a very intimate way, with an
attitude very constructive. And I consider
him in any event a good friend and a coura-
geous man.

Mr. HindHks: Anyioay, some kind of
detente between the United States and Hol-
land. But just to mention the word "detente"

262

Department of State Bulletin

— do you have the feeling that detente, for
the European countries, has had a setback?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have said
publicly that it has had a setback as a result
of the discussions on the Trade Agreement.
I believe that it can be restored.

As you know, I am meeting Foreign Min-
ister [of the U.S.S.R. Andrei A.] Gromyko
in Geneva. And while the original impetus
that brought us together is the Middle East,
I am positive that we will be reviewing the
whole problem.

Mr. Braden: One more question on de-
tente. There seems to be — as you are going
to meet with Mr. Gromyko, the NATO alli-
ance seems to be leaning a little on both ends,
one in Portugal and one in Turkey. Can you
prop this together? Can we?

Secretary Kissinger: Not with Mr. Gro-
myko [laughter]. We'll have to do our best
to bring it together.

Mr. Braden: What is your opinion right
now, how do you judge?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the problem
with Turkey is a self-inflicted wound, and
we are now talking with the Congress in
order to work out what I hope will be a con-
structive solution.

Mr. Braden: You mean it is a self-inflicted
wound by this country, by this Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

In Portugal it's the legacy of a generation
of authoritarian rule. We will do our best
to be helpful there, but that is less subject
to direct American influence.

Mr. Hindriks: What can all nations — and

this is, in effect, my last question — to touch
a little bit on your vision for the future,
tvhat can all natioyis, in fact, do for the
futm-e to lessen the danger of war? How do
you see what is growing around us?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is
necessary first to bring the arms race under
control. This is why we have made major
efforts in SALT [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks] —

Mr. Hindriks: The SALT agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: That is right — the
Vladivostok agreement, mutual force reduc-
tion and other negotiations on the limita-
tions of arms, the threshold test ban, and the
whole series of similar measures.

Secondly, we have to develop, insofar as
we can, cooperative relationships with the
Communist world in order to give them a
stake in a peaceful world.

Thirdly, industrial democracies have to re-
store their vitality so that their weaknesses
don't carry out all over the world.

Those will be the major objectives.

Mr. Hindriks: Do you see this as a per-
manent line of American foreign policy for
the future?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the
basic principles of the foreign policy that
we are now conducting will be carried out
by other administrations.

I would like to say that, whatever noise
is going on in the United States right now,
it is my profound conviction that our foreign
policy is essentially bipartisan.

Mr. Braden: Thank you.

Mr. Hindriks: Thank you very much.

March 3, 1975

263

Energy and International Cooperation

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll

I want to talk about energy and conserva-
tion this afternoon, and I will stress two
points. The first is that this nation has no
choice but to get moving, now, on a national
energy effort. We cannot afford to wait.

The second point is that we have a sound
strategy for meeting the challenge of energy.
It is a strategy which rests on two pillars:
National unity and international cooperation.
We are doing much better in the field of in-
ternational cooperation than in our efforts
to forge national unity. The energy crisis of
the past 16 months has presented our country
and our closest allies with a challenge as se-
vere as any in our history. The basic prem-
ise of our era — the progressive betterment
of the human condition — is founded on the
sources of energy which have enabled man-
kind to begin to master the forces of nature.
This foundation has been seriously shaken.
If we fail to take steps to deal with this
crisis, our ability to do so will be diminished
as our dependence on Middle East oil in-
creases.

The damage will not be confined to econom-
ics. In an increasingly interdependent world,
widespread inflation, recession, and commod-
ity shortages could lead to a breakdown in
the international trading system. It could
fuel frustration and destroy political sta-
bility. Nations could turn from a search for
moderate solutions to radical departures,
from cooperative efforts to narrow national-
ism.

We are now at a crucial point in our efforts

' Made before a combined luncheon of the Yale-
Harvard-Princeton Clubs at Washington on Feb. 13
(text from press release 64).

to cope with the energy crisis. We must
recognize, as Secretary Kissinger observed
last week, that :

History has given us a great opportunity dis-
guised as a crisis. A determined energy policy will
not only ease immediate difficulties, it will help
restore the international economy, the vitality of all
the major industrial democracies, and the hopes of
mankind for a just and prosperous world.

Most of the press comment devoted to
the Secretary's energy speech on February
3 has been directed at a single point : A floor
price for oil to insure that alternative sources
of energy are not rendered uncompetitive
by imported fuel should the price of oil
eventually be reduced. Our strategy and ac-
complishments in the field of international
cooperation and the crying necessity for a
program of conservation have been largely
overlooked.

Let me outline briefly what we have done
and are planning to do internationally. The
most important vehicle for international
cooperation in meeting the challenge of
energy is the lEA — the International Energy
Agency — an organization which grew out of
last year's Washington Energy Conference.
In less than a year the 18 participating
countries of the lEA have reached agree-
ment on concrete, significant programs to
cope with the energy crisis. We and our
partners in the lEA have been following a
three-phase strategy to gain control of our
energy destiny and bring us to the point
where we can engage the producing nations
in a meaningful dialogue.

The first phase has been to protect our-
selves against future emergencies such as

264

Department of State Bulletin

the oil embargo of 1973. This task essentially
has been accomplished by an unprecedented
agreement to help each other through future
crisis. Each participating nation is committed
to build an emergency stock of oil. In case
of embargo each nation will cut its consump-
tion by the same percentage and available
oil will be shared. An embargo against one
will be an embargo against all.

The other potential emergency is financial,
and the industrialized nations have also acted
to meet this threat. The major industrial
nations agreed in January to create a $25
billion solidarity fund for mutual support
in financial crisis. We believe Congress and
the legislatures of other consumer nations
will recognize the crucial nature of this
agreement and take steps quickly to approve
their respective contributions. This financial
safety net will provide assistance to those
hardest hit by payments deficits and safe-
guard all participants against shifts, with-
drawals, or cutoffs of funds by the producers.

The second phase of our strategy is to
take the steps necessary to improve our sup-
ply and demand situation in world oil mar-
kets. We are working with other industrial
countries in a concerted effort to reduce en-
ergy demand and to stimulate new sources.
Last week's decision by the lEA countries to
reduce petroleum imports this year by 2 mil-
lion barrels a day is one indication that we
are making real progress on this point.

Once these coordinated programs have
been completed, we will be ready to move
into the third stage of our strategy : a serious
dialogue with the producing nations to dis-
cuss an equitable price, market structure,
and long-term economic relationships. It has
long been clear to the Administration that
no solution to the energy problem is possible
without a cooperative dialogue between pro-
ducers and consumers. It has also been clear
that no dialogue could succeed unless the
consumers had a position of their own. We
now have an agreed consumer strategy on
the financial safety net and a common ap-
proach to energy conservation. We are work-
ing with our lEA partners to develop a co-
operative framework to accelerate the de-
velopment of alternative energy sources.

Hopefully, agreement on this element can
be achieved in time to hold a preparatory
meeting with producers late next month.

Consumers must cooperate, but they must
also act to become relevant to each other's
energy needs. That is why we have proposed
that other countries match one for one our
conservation effort of 1 million barrels a
day by the end of 1975 and begin consider-
ing objectives for 1976-77 and beyond. That
is why President Ford established the goal
for the United States of once again becoming
a net energy supplier to the industrialized
world by the end of the century. This effort,
which will coincide with the growing de-
pletion of world petroleum resources, will
utilize conventional energy sources not yet
exploited and those sources still in the re-
search stage.

In our effort to reduce dependence on im-
ported oil and accelerate development of
new energy supplies the industrialized coun-
tries fortunately have major energy reserves
which have not yet been exploited. North
Sea oil, oil and gas resources in Canadian
frontier areas, German coal, underdeveloped
coal and oil deposits in the United States
(such as Alaska and offshore), and nuclear
power in all countries are a few examples.
Beyond that we have a massive potential
for development of synthetic fuels, fusion,
breeder reactors, and other nonconventional
energy resources.

It is our hope that each consumer nation
will establish similar energy development
objectives and coordinate them in the IE A.
These new energy supplies are going to be
relatively expensive. Eventually some of them
should be available at a price substantially
below the current world oil price. But with-
out exception they will be higher than prices
we were accustomed to pay for our energy
in the years prior to 1973. Moreover, they
are all much more expensive than the cost
of production of OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil.

Our international strategy must also rec-
ognize that the industrialized countries have
a wide disparity in energy potential. Some
are relatively rich in the conventional fossil
fuels of oil, gas, and coal. Others, such as

March 3, 1975

265

Japan, lack the fossil fuel resources which
are key to energy self-sufficiency over the
next decade. We must insure that consumer
nations poor in resources are given a direct
stake in the development of new energy
supplies outside of their own countries.

The United States wants the International
Energy Agency to develop procedures which
will enable its members to participate in, and
draw upon, each other's technological in-
novations. The United States is going to de-
velop a synthetic fuel capability of 1 million
barrels a day by 1985. lEA countries which
provide capital or technology should be able
to call on this output in proportion to their
sharing of the costs.

Countries such as the United States must
also have long-term assurances that their
investment in the development of new energy
sources does not unjustly penalize their econ-
omies by locking them into high-cost energy.
We seek to prevent any future drop in OPEC
oil prices from jeopardizing our investment
in additional energy sources. We are there-
fore proposing a floor price plan or some
similar mechanism to protect investment re-
quired to develop new sources of conventional
fossil fuels and nuclear energy. These are
the sources which will help meet our energy
requirements over the next decade. The tech-
nology for their exploitation already exists,
but the cost of exploitation is significantly
higher today than when most of our conven-
tional sources of energy were brought into
production. The United States therefore pro-
posed at last week's lEA meeting in Paris
that a synthetic fuels consortium be estab-
lished to enable member nations to develop
cooperative synthetic energy projects such
as coal gasification, oil shale, and tar sands.

We also suggested an energy research
and development consortium for joint re-
search efforts and pooled technology on large-
scale, long-range, capital-intensive projects
like fusion and solar power where the poten-
tial payoff in low-cost energy is enormous.
The United States will commit $10 billion to
energy research over the next five years.
We are prepared to spend a substantial por-
tion of these funds in joint efforts with other
lEA countries.

The best laid international plans, however,
will be of no avail unless we can do what is
required of us at home. We cannot ask other
major consumers to reduce their consump-
tion of energy unless we are prepared to do
so and to take the lead in this regard. No
one is going to do it for us.

Nor can we expect the oil producers to
respect our position in the negotiations ahead
unless we launch a serious effort to conserve
energy at home. There are legitimate differ-
ences about tactics, but it is imperative that
a comprehensive program of conservation
begin now. We cannot wait, since further
delay by the United States can only further
convince our consumer allies and the pro-
ducing states that our leadership on conser-
vation and in the search for new sources of
energy is wholly lacking.

There are two essential issues in the energy
crisis — price and assured supply. Both are
of deep concern to us. But ultimately, the
supply of energy, our economy's lifeline, is
of fundamental importance. Adjustment to
higher energy prices is a painful process
which can affect our standard of living and
way of life, but it can be done. But it is
inconceivable to me that the economic and
military security of our nation should be-
come contingent on the decisions of a few oil
producers whether to continue or halt our
supply of oil.

Secretary Kissinger signaled this concern
in his address to the National Press Club
last week. Our dependence on imported oil
increased from nil in 1950 to 35 percent in
1973. If this trend is permitted to continue,
we will be dependent on imported oil for
fully half our needs in the 1980's. Let us
have no illusions about the impact of such
growing dependence on the security and pros-
perity of this nation. The foundation of our
political and military strength has always
been and will continue to be our economy.
An oil embargo lasting less than six months
at its worst reduced our petroleum imports
by 15 percent and yet created severe eco-
nomic dislocations in this country. Imagine
the consequences if half our supply was
suddenly denied.

The present prospect is difficult and pain-

266

Department of State Bulletin

ful, but the future will be far worse unless
we take prompt remedial action. If the shock
of embargo, the resulting economic crisis,
and the potential for future interruptions in
our supply are not sufficient to compel us to
action, we must begin to ask whether this na-
tion still has the will to preserve its strength
and independence. The decision to reverse
the trend of growing dependence can only be-
come harder as we become increasingly re-
liant on foreign sources of energy.

The time for action on conservation has
arrived. In the next few weeks we must
reach agreement on a comprehensive national
energy program. If Congress does not agree
with the Administration's program then it
has a responsibility to set forth an alterna-
tive of its own.

We cannot continue to attack one another.
We must turn our efforts to attacking the
problem. And we must do so now.

President Ford's News Conference
at Topeka February 1 1

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Ford at Topeka, Kans.,
on February 11.^

Q. Mr. President, your energy and eco-
nomic concerns will go down the drain for
nnught if tve have war in the Middle East.
Could you please give tis your latest infor-
mation on Dr. Kissinger's negotiations in
the Middle East and whether or not you
think there is the possibility of a quick
settlement in the wake of those negotiations?

President Ford: Mr. Morgan, [Ray Mor-
gan, Kansas City Star], the Secretary of
State left Sunday night for a most impor-
tant mission in the Middle East. He will be
gone approximately 10 days, visiting a num-
ber of Arab, as well as Israeli — and he will

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated February
17.

be more or less on an exploratory mission.
We believe that the possibility exists for a
step-by-step progress in the Middle East,
but no one can be certain in that very vola-
tile and very difficult area.

The Secretary of State will come back,
hopefully, with some encouraging news, and
then, if the news is encouraging, he will
probably go back shortly thereafter for what
we would hope would be a settlement on a
step-by-step basis.

It is my judgment that unless progress
is made, there is a very serious prospect of
another war in the Middle East, which, if
it did occur, of course raises the possibility
of another oil embargo.

I would hope that by the Secretary of
State's efforts that we can make this prog-
ress, avoiding another conflict and avoiding
the prospects of another oil embargo.

The Secretary of State has my full back-
ing. I think we are fortunate to have a per-
son with that knowledge, that dedication,
and that record of success. So I am an op-
timist; but it is a difficult assignment, and
I think he deserves the full support of the
American people and the Congress because
it is in our benefit and the world as a whole.

Q. Mr. President, I understand that your
advance planning schedule shows a tenta-
tive visit by President Thieu [President
Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Viet-
Na)n'\ to this country in late April. Can you
tell us if you are seriously considering such
an invitation, and why?

President Ford: Well, Mr. Beckman [Aldo
Beckman, Chicago Tribune], I am not fa-
miliar with any invitation. I am not familiar
with any prospective visit.

Q. Would you consider inviting Mr. Thieu
to this country?

President Ford: I really had not thought
of it and I know of no prospective visit.

Q. Mr. President, are you and Dr. Kissin-
ger still insisting on increased aid to Viet-
Nam, South Viet-Nam? And if so, why?

March 3, 1975

267

President Ford: Well, the United States
made a very significant contribution in
Southeast Asia. Unfortunately and tragic-
ally, we lost some 55,000 American lives,
spent literally billions.

The South Vietnamese are now trying to
carry on on their own. We have no U.S.
military forces there. We are living up to
the Paris accords. The last Congress author-
ized $300 million more in military assistance
for South Viet-Nam on the basis that that
would give them sufficient military assist-
ance so that they could fight aggression by
North Viet-Nam.

I am convinced that $300 million would
give to the South Vietnamese an opportunity
to defend themselves against aggression. I
strongly believe that it is a proper recom-
mendation to the Congress. I hope that the
Congress will respond.

Q. But ivould you accept some so7-t of
compromise proposal from those Members of
Congress who don't think the tvay yon do?

President Ford: Well, I think $300 million
in further military assistance is the right
answer to give the South Vietnamese the
necessary military hardware to defend them-
selves. Anything less than that makes their
defense of their country less effective, and
I think they ought to be given enough to de-
fend themselves. And $300 million, accord-
ing to my advisers, is the minimum for
that purpose.

National MIA Awareness Day

A PROCLAMATION'

January 27, 1975, marks the second anniversary
of the signing of the Paris Agreement ending
United States combat involvement in Vietnam. Al-
though the Agreement contains specific obligations
on accounting for the missing and the return of the
remains of the dead, the communist authorities have
failed either to provide this information or to follow
through on the return of the remains of our dead.
Over 2400 Americans are still unaccounted for —
some 900 of them still listed as missing, the remain-
der declared dead with their bodies never recovered.
The families of these men continue to live with the
anguish of uncertainty aljout the ultimate fate of
these loved ones.

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of
the United States of America, do hereby designate
Monday, Januarj' 27, 1975, as National MIA Aware-
ness Day, dedicated to the many Americans who
remain missing or unaccounted for in Indochina,
and to their families. I call upon all Americans to
join in voicing once again the clear, continuing
commitment of the American people and their Gov-
ernment to seek the fullest possible accounting for
.Americans missing in Southeast Asia and the return
of the remains of those who died.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this twenty-fifth day of January, in the year
of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of
the Independence of the United States of America
the one hundred ninetv-ninth.

^^r^^. ^^n^

'No. 4342; 40 Fed. Reg. 4115.

268

Department of State Bulletin

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan
Visits Washington

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan made an official
tnsit to Washington Fehruarij U-7. Follow-
ing is an exchange of toasts between Presi-
dent Ford and Prime Minister Bhutto at a
White House dinner on February 5, together
with the text of a joint statement issued on
February 7 at the conclusion of the Prime
Minister's visit.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, FEBRUARY 5

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 10

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Begum Bhutto,
and our distinguished guests from Pakistan
as well as from the United States: We are
deeply grateful that all of you are here, and
we are especially thankful that the distin-
guished guests have come to our great
country.

We think this is a very special evening.
We, as Americans, have the honor of wel-
coming a true friend of America, the head
of state of Pakistan, to our Nation's Capital,
Washington, D.C.

I am delighted to have had the opportu-
nity this morning to meet with the Prime
Minister. We had a fruitful, beneficial, and
enjoyable meeting this morning, and we are
delighted, Mr. Prime Minister, to have you
and Begum Bhutto with us this evening.

We are also especially pleased and honored
to have your two children — two of your
four children — with us on this occasion. I

think it is interesting, but also somewhat
unique, that your children are going to school
in our great country, and we are delighted
to have them, and we hope that they have
enjoyed themselves and are enjoying them-
selves. We are not only pleased but honored
that they are with us in the United States
for this experience.

It is, I think, particularly noteworthy, Mr.
Prime Minister, that you and Begum Bhutto
are here and that she has particularly joined
you in this visit as she has joined you on
previous occasions working for the best in-
terests of your people in your country. And
I compliment her as well as yourself for these
efforts.

The world knows, Mr. Prime Minister,
that the burdens of leadership fell on you at
a time in the history of Pakistan which was
one of the most critical and the most serious
in the history of your country.

But with confidence and great determina-
tion, you have guided your nation through a
period, an era, of peace and reconciliation.
Your accomplishments, as well as your
courage, I think, have received the highest
praise, both within your country and without.

Our first oflicial meeting represents an-
other link in the chain of a much longer
association between the leaders and the
peoples of Pakistan and the United States.
And we want to maintain and to strengthen
that relationship and that friendship that
has been most important between your coun-
try and ours.

The talks that we had this morning, I
think, helped to strengthen and to broaden
that relationship.

March 3, 1975

269

As we know, peace in the world depends
upon peace in its various parts. Your leader-
ship, Mr. Prime Minister, has enabled Paki-
stan to move forward with India toward
achieving peace in that very important area
of the world.

I am tremendously impressed by the efforts
that you are promoting in economic and
agricultural development for Pakistan de-
spite the serious problems posed, as we all
know, by the rapid rise of price levels for
essential goods in your country.

And as you persevere, Mr. Prime Minister,
persevere in your task, you may be sure that
this government regards the sovereignty and
the territorial integrity of a strong, secure,
and prosperous Pakistan as a fundamental
element in maintaining regional and world
peace.

So, if I might, Mr. Prime Minister, let
me propose a toast to you. Prime Minister
and Begum Bhutto, to the ideals and to the
hopes they personify so very well, and to
further strengthening of our relations be-
tween our two countries. To Prime Minister
and Begum Bhutto.

Prime Minister Bhutto

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished
friends: At the outset, I would like to say
that my companions — those who have come
with me from Pakistan — on their behalf and
on behalf of the people of my country and
on my own behalf, we would like to thank
you, Mr. President, and your government
for the very warm and generous hospitality
which you have extended to us.

I have been here on a number of occasions,
and each occasion has been a memorable one
because it has been a journey to the capital
of a great power, a superpower, a power to
reckon with, a power which has a role to
play in the tranquilization of the world
situation and has exercised a formidable in-
fluence on men and matters for a very long
period of time.

Here at this table we had the honor of

having a very congenial conversation with
Mrs. Ford and the very dangerous man
sitting on my right [columnist Art Buch-
wald]. [Laughter.]

He told us that this evening he came to
the White House in a taxi, so that reminded
me of one occasion during my many visits
to your great capital, and it was in 1985.
President Ayub was then in charge of the
de.stiny of our country, and we had pro-
longed discussions with President Johnson.
And the discussions went well, but at the
same time we left the room a little depressed.
So I and some of my companions went to all
the nightclubs in Washington. [Laughter.]
And when we left the last place, we told the
taxi driver, "Take us to Blair House." He
said, "Are you kidding?" [Laughter.]

Be that as it may, we warmly cherish our
friendship and our association with the great
American people.

As I told you this morning, Mr. President,
the vitality and the energy of the American
people have impressed us very much and has
impressed the world at large.

I have often thought of your great values.
I might be wrong, but I feel that it lies in
your institutions and it lies in the leadership
that the American Government has given to
its own people and to the world at large at
critical times.

These are critical times, and you have
been summoned by destiny to take charge
of the affairs of your country at a time
when the world stands at the watershed.
And many of your decisions might make or
mar the course of events.

We feel that with your vision and with the
very able lieutenants that you have, espe-
cially in the field of foreign affairs, that you
will overcome one challenge after another
and promote the cause of peace and good
will.

There are problems which confront you
internally. There are problems which con-
front you in the world outside. The Middle
East, Europe, your efforts to promote a
detente, j'our dialogue with China — all this

270

Department of State Bulletin

the world watches. Every step you take is
observed. And so we hope, with the passage
of time, we will turn the corner, all of us
put together — the whole world.

You will make a very major contribution,
but whatever little contribution — small, in-
significant— underdeveloped countries like
ours can make, we would all be happy to
see a happier world.

And I can assure you that on our part we
will try to promote peace and consolidate
the tissues of peace. We would not like to
add tension to tension. We would not like to
aggravate the situation in our own region.
And the world at large can move forward
to a situation where our children, at least,
will feel more secure and happier, and they
will admire the role that this present gen-
eration made to achieve that noble end.

This is a beautiful world, and we must
preserve its beauty. Future generations
should not say that, like Shelley, the super-
powers found an Ozymandias. They should
say that the superpowers, with bravery and
with vision and with courage, reckoned with
the problems and overcame them.

We know that you have the capacity and
the material and the ability to do so, and we
leave your shores feeling more reassured
with the measures that you have taken to
promote those Olympian ends.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to
reiterate our gratitude to you, to your Sec-
retary of State, to your colleagues here, to
the Senators we met today, for the under-
standing of the problems that we face and
for their objective appreciation of our diffi-
culties. This has been a fruitful and a con-
structive visit.

I better not say more than that, because
the Secretary of State has told me that
you must be very careful of what you say.
[Laughter.]

So, I would like everyone to join me in
a toast to the President of the United States,
to Mrs. Ford, to the great American people,
and to the role of the United States in the
consolidation of world peace. Mr. President.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 7

White House press release dated February 7

Joint Statement on the Occasion of Pakistani
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Visit
to Washington

President Ford and Prime Minister Bhutto held
cordial and useful discussions during the Prime
Minister's visit to Washington February 4-7. They
welcomed the opportunity to establish a personal
relationship in the spirit of cooperation and under-
standing which has traditionally existed between
leaders of the two countries. The President and the
Prime Minister stressed their commitment to the
strengthening of the close ties which have been
maintained between the United States and Pakistan
for many years.

The two leaders discussed the important interna-
tional political developments of the past eighteen
months with particular emphasis on the significant
steps taken in furthering international detente, the
vital efforts to secure a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East, and proposals to increase coopera-
tion between developing and developed countries.

They also reviewed the important steps taken to
bring about more normal relations among the na-
tions of South Asia. The Prime Minister expressed
Pakistan's determination to continue to play a con-
structive role in the search for peaceful solutions
to regional disputes, so as to promote the establish-
ment of durable peace in the Subcontinent. Presi-
dent Ford assured the Prime Minister that support
for the independence and territorial integrity of
Pakistan remains an enduring principle of American
foreign policy. The two leaders also discussed their
mutual security concerns in the context of the
commitment of their Governments to the strength-
ening of regional and world peace.

President Ford expressed his deep sympathy over
the loss of life resulting from the devastating
earthquake which recently struck northern Paki-
stan. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation
for the contributions of the United States Govern-
ment toward the relief efforts now underway.

The Prime Minister discussed the serious short-
fall experienced by Pakistan in foodgrain produc-
tion in recent months. He noted his concern with
drought conditions which persist throughout the
wheat-producing areas, a problem which has been
accentuated by the unexpected delay in commission-
ing the Tarbela Dam. He noted, in this regard, his
appreciation for the substantial assistance rendered
Pakistan under the PL 480 program during the past
several years. President Ford told the Prime Min-
ister that the United States Government was pleased

March 3, 1975

271

to be able to offer 300,000 tons of wheat under
PL 480 Title I for immediate delivery, in addition
to the 100,000 tons already made available during
this fiscal year. The President assured the Prime
Minister that Pakistan's needs vi-ould continue to
receive priority consideration in determining addi-
tional allocations this year and next.

The two leaders also reviewed economic coopera-
tion between the two countries. Prime Minister
Bhutto described the important economic develop-
ment programs now underway in Pakistan, includ-
ing the high priorities placed on agricultural de-
velopment and population planning — areas in which
assistance from the United States and other donors
has made a valuable contribution. President Ford
pledged continued priority attention to Pakistan's
development assistance requirements.

Prime Minister Bhutto renewed his invitation to
President Ford to visit Pakistan. President Ford
expressed his warm appreciation for this invitation
and reiterated his hope that the visit would be
possible later this year.

U.S. and Canadian Officials Discuss
West Coast Tanker Traffic

Joint Statement, January 17

Press release 20 dated January 20

U.S. and Canadian officials met in Wa.sh-
ington on January 17 to discuss mutual prob-
lems related to the expected increase in oil
transport and refining on the Pacific Coast.
Central to these discussions was the prob-
lem of how to assure that marine transit
and refining of oil in the Puget Sound/
Straits of Juan de Fuca area can be accom-
plished in the most environmentally respon-
sible fashion. The two sides expressed their
satisfaction at the progress being made in
bilateral efforts to ensure the protection of
the environment of the area.

U.S. and Canadian officials reviewed the
status of plans for joint vessel traffic man-
agement systems in the Puget Sound/Juan
de Fuca area. It was announced that a vol-
untary traffic separation plan will go into
effect on March 1, 1975. The system was
developed and implemented jointly by the
United States and Canada. Officials also dis-
cussed proposed offshore routes to be used

by tankers from Alaska to west coast ports.

U.S. officials tabled at the meeting a draft
report on present and proposed U.S. scien-
tific investigations in the Juan de Fuca/
Puget Sound area. Canadian officials had
tabled a similar report at the committee's
previous meeting in Ottawa. It was agreed
that technical representatives of both gov-
ernments would review and assess the com-
patibility of existing research programs in
both countries and that the committee would
make recommendations to the governments
early this spring on priorities and joint co-
ordination of research activities.

Officials also discussed questions relating
to liability and compensation for oil spills.
Both sides undertook to provide detailed
responses in the near future to questions
regarding relevant domestic legislation. U.S.
officials noted that further legislation affect-
ing this field may soon be introduced in the
Congress.

A State of Washington study on the feasi-
bility of establishing offshore petroleum
transfer facilities in the state's coastal
waters was described in detail at the meet-
ing. The study outlines several possible alter-
natives to tanker traffic into Puget Sound
including terminals at or near Port Angeles,
Washington on the Straits of Juan de Fuca.
The representative of the State of Wash-
ington also raised a number of alternatives
to avoid increased oil tanker traffic.

U.S. officials inquired about the status of
Canadian plans for additional oil refining
capacity in British Columbia. Canadian offi-
cials stated that consideration of any expan-
sion of refinery capacity is at an early stage.
In any event, the expanded facilities under
consideration are expected to be supplied by
pipeline and therefore should be fully com-
patible with the present bilateral effort to
protect the marine environment in the re-
gion. U.S. officials also noted that increased
shortfalls of Canadian natural gas and crude
oil increased the requirements for tanker
traffic to meet U.S. regional energy require-
ments.

Examination of the technical aspects of
these problems will continue between the

272

Department of State Bulletin

agencies concerned. The agencies repre-
sented on the American side were the De-
partments of State and Interior, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the Council on Environmental Quality, the
Coast Guard, the Water Resources Council,
the Corps of Engineers and the State of
Washington. On the Canadian side, the De-
partments of External Affairs, Environment,
Energy, Mines and Resources, Finance and
the Province of British Columbia were rep-
resented.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

United States Caribbean Policy— Part I. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Inter-Amencan Af-
fairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
September 19-21, 1973. 107 pp. .

South Asia, 1974: Political, Economic, and Agricul-
tural Challenges. Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on the Near East and South Asia of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. September 19-24,
1974. 216 pp.

JVIalthus and America. A Report About Food and
People by the Subcommittee on Department Oper-
ations of the House Committee on Agriculture.
October 1974. 17 pp.

Our Commitments in Asia. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 13-
October 2, 1974. 274 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. September 24-
October 3, 1974. 241 pp.

Crisis on Cyprus: 1974. A study mission report pre-
pared for the use of the Subcommittee to Investi-
gate Problems Connected with Refugees and Es-
capees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
October 14, 1974. 116 pp.

To Facilitate the Entry Into Foreign Ports of
United States Nuclear Warships. Report to ac-
company H.J. Res. 1161. H. Rept. 93-1467. Octo-
ber 16, 1974. 8 pp.
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments. Conference
report to accompany H.R. 15977. H. Rept. 93-1582.
December 12, 1974. 12 pp.

President Ford Establishes Committee
on Illegal Aliens

Following is a memorandum dated Jan-
uary 6 from President Ford to members of
the Domestic Council.

White House press release dated January 6

JANUARY 6, 1975.

Memorandum for: The Domestic Council

Secretary of State

Secretary of the Treasury

Attorney General

Secretary of the Interior

Secretary of Agriculture

Secretary of Commerce

Secretary of Labor

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

Secretary of Transportation

Assistant to the President Baroody

Director, Office of Management and Budget

Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality

Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency
Director, ACTION

Subject: Domestic Council Committee on
Illegal Aliens

I am today establishing a new Domestic
Council Committee on Illegal Aliens. This
Committee will develop, coordinate and pre-
sent to me policy issues that cut across
agency lines to provide better programs for
dealing with this National problem. The
Attorney General will serve as the Chairman
of this Committee. The membership of the
Committee will consist of the Secretary of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce,
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Assistant to the
President Baroody [William J. Baroody,
Jr.], and the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget.

Gerald R. Ford.

March 3, 1975

273

Promoting a New Spirit of Constructive Compromise
in the United Nations

Address by John Scali

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^

At the opening of this decade we Ameri-
cans had already started to think of our-
selves as a nation in perpetual crisis. And
today our world still seems to be changing
too fast for comfort. Our children come home
from school with some curious ideas and
sometimes behave in ways that are difficult
to understand. Many of our most cherished
values and ideals have been questioned, ana-
lyzed, and assaulted. Our "sweet land of lib-
erty" has become a sweet land of liberation
movements. Women's lib was one of these,
and adjustment didn't always come easy.
These social problems are real, important,
and continuing.

In the international arena, new, unex-
pected problems have erupted to challenge
us even as we seek answers to the old ones.
The painful memory of Viet-Nam is reviving
at the same time trouble spots like the
Middle East and Cyprus threaten the peace
of the world. New crises of food and energy
were only prophecies a few years ago. Today
they are realities and have sent shock waves
through the economies of the world. In the
last 12 months alone, $60 billion in surplus
oil revenues have poured into the treasuries
of oil-producing countries under the label
of petrodollars. This economic earthquake
has coincided with drought, food shortages,
and crop failures in many areas of the world.
Along with this have come sharply increased

' Made before the Massachusetts State Federation
of Women's Clubs at Boston, Mass., on Jan. 29 (text
from USUN press release 6/corr.l dated Jan. 28).

inflation and unemployment in the United
States and other countries.

This unnerving combination of economic
and political developments has led some to
advocate a new economic order for the world
and related changes in the old political order.

Nowhere has the cry for a new economic
and political order in this world of growing
interdependence been louder than in the
forums of the United Nations. The glass
palace of the United Nations is sometimes
a distorted mirror. Generally, however, it
reflects all too clearly the stresses and
strains, the frustrations and the crises, of
the entire world community.

In its brief 28-year history, the United
Nations ranks as still too modest an element
in the world community to warrant the
blame for developments it did not cause and
cannot magically dispel. Nevertheless, among
our other frustrations, the shortcomings
and failings of the United Nations have re-
cently attracted more attention than at any
time in the past decade. Statesmen, public
opinion leaders, and mass communications
media have found much to criticize in the
United Nations during the past year. Some
of this criticism has been exaggerated. Some
of it has been unjust. But much of it, I
submit, has been well deserved.

Supporters of the United Nations are al-
ways quick to point out that while this or-
ganization's occasional failings receive wide-
spread press and public attention, its many
solid accomplishments go largely unnoticed.

274

Department of State Bulletin

Basically, I agree. I know that whenever I
criticize the United Nations, I may add to
this problem for the short term. I also know,
however, that one cannot improve an insti-
tution by talking only about its strong
points. One must give credit where it is due
— as I hope I have — but only a frank and
open discussion of an organization's weak-
nesses can help to correct them.

The mounting criticism of the United Na-
tions in this country reflects a number of
real concerns and poses some legitimate
questions. In my view, those who dismiss the
new criticism of the United Nations as com-
plaints from fair-weather friends or dis-
guised enemies seriously misread the mood
of the American people. I continue to be a
strong supporter of the United Nations. I
also believe that it can benefit from con-
structive, reasoned criticism. The United
Nations is strong enough to withstand such
criticism, it is flexible enough to profit from
it, and it is important enough to justify it.

Widespread Desire for Greater Dialogue

Last month I spoke to the General As-
sembly about a series of recent U.N. deci-
sions which increasingly disturbed the U.S.
Government. I deplored several actions by
the Assembly which tended to inflame some
of the world's most sensitive problems
rather than help solve them. On highly emo-
tional issues like the invitation to Yasir
Arafat to speak before the General Assem-
bly, the suspension of South Africa, and the
current world economic situation, it is our
view that the Assembly had adopted enor-
mously controversial, partisan resolutions.
Worse still, the majority bloc which passed
these resolutions appeared willing to pursue
their objectives in violation of the traditions
and Charter of the United Nations. Consti-
tutionalism went out the window while the
Assembly voted to exclude South Africa. On
some issues majorities seemed to forget that
in a democracy a majority cannot safely
push a minority too far.

My statement to the Assembly coincided
with those of several Western European

representatives who expressed concerns very
similar to our own. Delegates from the Third
World seemed surprised by this serious new
criticism, but they quickly regrouped to re-
spond.

Eventually delegates from 50 member
states representing all shades of world opin-
ion rose to express their government's views
in what developed into a "great debate."
Some speakers agreed with us while othei's
did not. The exchange of views was vigor-
ous, forthright, but generally without ran-
cor. For several days the Assembly thus
found itself engaged in a thoughtful and un-
precedented examination of its future and
that of the U.N. system. I am proud the
United States was able to stimulate this
long-overdue debate.

Despite the wide range of opinion ex-
pressed, there was general agreement on the
proposition that the fundamental purpose of
the United Nations is to harmonize conflict-
ing views, as the charter says, and to pro-
mote orderly change. The wealthier nations
naturally tended to emphasize the need for
order. The Third World understandably
placed its priority on the need for rapid
change. Opinion in the Assembly certainly
varied, but on this central issue the differ-
ence was one of degree, not of principle.

During this debate, all speakers seemed
to agree that the United Nations functioned
best through dialogue and negotiation. Com-
ing at the end of an Assembly session
marked by heightened confrontation, this
widespread desire for greater dialogue was
welcome. It was a welcome sign that others,
too, realized that we were headed in the
wrong direction.

In a farewell press conference as the As-
sembly ended, this year's Assembly Presi-
dent, Algerian Foreign Minister [Abdelaziz]
Bouteflika, added his voice to those calling
for more dialogue between the Third World
and older member nations. I share his wish,
and I am genuinely pleased that my remarks
of December 6 helped open the door to a
greater and franker exchange within the
Assembly. I intend in the coming months to
do whatever I can to build on and enlarge the

March 3, 1975

275

scope of this two-way exchange. The time
has come to create a new spirit of construc-
tive compromise in the United Nations. To
do so, there will need to be less emphasis on
rounding up bloc votes and more on accom-
modation and conciliation.

In the weeks ahead we will consult inten-
sively with those expressing different as well
as similar viewpoints. If such consultations
are to be worthwhile, however, there must
be a genuine dialogue. There must be a readi-
ness to move from the initial position each
side expresses. It is time we begin to talk
to one another instead of at one another.

On too many occasions, negotiations with
the dominant Third World group of countries
have not involved a sufficient degree of thi.>
necessary give-and-take. On many important
issues the initial position of the Third World
countries often turned out to be their final
position. Failure to accept their unchanging
stand was often regarded as a stubborn re-
fusal to acknowledge how the world has
changed. This created more confrontation
than conciliation.

Accomplishments of the United Nations

Although I have in my remarks today
focused on some areas where we seek im-
provement of the United Nations, it is only
fair that I note that in many ways the or-
ganization has moved effectively, considering
our complicated world.

It is worth remembering, for instance,
that the same recent session of the General
Assembly which adopted decisions which
alarmed the United States also approved the
recommendations of the recent World Food
Conference in Rome and of the World Popu-
lation Conference in Bucharest. In so doing,
the Assembly flexibly responded to world-
wide demands for action on two issues fun-
damental to man's future on this planet.

This same session of the Assembly took
a number of other steps strongly supported
by the United States. These included meas-
ures to strengthen the U.N.'s facilities for
disaster relief, to improve the status of
women, and to encourage greater interna-

tional cooperation in locating soldiers miss-
ing in action. These programs join with U.N.
efforts to control narcotics, protect the en-
vironment, determine who owns the wealth
in and at the bottom of the sea.

This same session provided funds for and
renewed the mandate of U.N. peacekeeping
forces in the Middle East. After lengthy de-
bate, it rejected ill-advised one-sided resolu-
tions on Cambodia and Korea.

Even as press and public attention is irre-
sistibly drawn to the verbal battle in the
General Assembly, dedicated international
civil servants are engaged in productive and
vitally important U.N. work in fields such as
health, child care, food, disaster relief,
human rights, and economic development.
My colleague and friend Patricia Hutar
[U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commis-
sion on the Status of Women] spoke to you
this morning about the pioneering efforts in
the United Nations to improve the status of
women.

Let me, from my own experience, add
still one more example of how quickly and
effectively the United Nations can act, par-
ticularly in a crisis.

In October of 1973, at the height of the
Yom Kippur war in the Middle East, the
Security Council agreed to establish a new
U.N. Emergency Force to help restore the
peace. Within just a few hours of that deci-
sion, the first contingents of U.N. troops be-
gan arriving on the Sinai battlefront. They
moved quickly into the midst of the fighting
to separate the combatants. Within a few
days this Force had brought about the cease-
fire which was an indispensable prelude to
negotiation. This cease-fire remains in eflfect
today.

This delicate and dangerous task required
cooperation, courage, discipline, and the kind
of experience in peacekeeping which only the
United Nations has. Can you imagine the
time, the eft'ort, and additional crises that
would have been necessary to create any-
thing resembling this impartial Force if the
United Nations had not existed, ready to act
as the respected emergency peacekeeper of
the world? Indeed, could such a force have

276

Department of State Bulletin

been created in time if the United Nations
did not exist? The visible success of the blue-
helmeted troops in the Middle East reflects
highly not only on these officers and men
who serve but also on the U.N. Secretariat
in New York, which so effectively organizes,
directs, and maintains them in place.

Solutions Through Cooperation

I began my remarks by noting that there
has been a growing criticism of the United
Nations in this country. I also said that
much of this criticism is justified. The ques-
tion is, what are we going to do about it?

I do not have any pat answers to this
question. Our government is reviewing our
policies toward the United Nations. I hope
that through this review we can develop
some new approaches to these difficult is-
sues. I cannot forecast the results. I slai't
out with the premise that you do not solve
a problem by walking away from it. Frank
criticism can help curb irresponsible be-
havior, but it must be combined with re-
sponsible, imaginative leadership if it is to
have a positive impact on our search for
peace and a better world.

In an organization of 138 member nations,
the United States cannot expect to prevail
on every issue, regardless of our power and
position. But as long as we press our views
vigorously, while recognizing we do not
possess a monopoly of the world's wisdom,
the result eventually can be an acceptable
compromise of conflicting views.

There are some who feel that when the
United Nations acts contrary to U.S. inter-
ests, we should simply turn our back upon
it or even withdraw. I am not one of these.

Without the United States, the United
Nations would persist. Only it would be
worse, not better. If we could erase the
United Nations from the pages of history—
and we cannot — there would inevitably be a
new organization, because interdependence
is an incontrovertible fact of our times. It
is growing rather than lessening. It means
that the United States cannot advance its
own interests single-handedly, but only in

concert with other nations, because the solu-
tions demand action by the United States
and others working together.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose
diplomatic achievements have eased tensions
around the world, sketched the dimensions
of the problems confronting us in these
words in an interview January 16:

. . . one of the central facts of our period is that
more than 100 nations have come into being in the
last 15 years, and they, too, must be central partici-
pants in this process. So that for the first time in
history foreign policy has become truly global and
therefore truly complicated.

... we are at a watershed. We are at a period
which in retrospect is either going to be seen as a
period of extraordinary creativity or a period when
really the international order came apart, politically,
economically, and morally.

I believe that with all the dislocations we now
experience, there also exists an extraordinary oppor-
tunity to form for the first time in history a truly
global society, carried by the principle of inter-
dependence. And if we act wisely and with vision,
I think we can look back to all this turmoil as the
birth pangs of a more creative and better system.

To exercise positive leadership in the
United Nations, our people must join to-
gether in support of a truly national foreign
policy. The United States must be able to
speak with one voice. Our leaders must be
able to enter into meaningful discussions
with their foreign colleagues, and these for-
eign statesmen must be confident that the
American people stand behind their leaders.

We must also recognize that America
often leads best by example. Thus, our success
in solving our economic and social difficulties
at home strengthens our voice around the
negotiating table. Our willingness to accept
sacrifices and inconveniences in meeting the
world's energy crisis will be viewed as a test
of our leadership of the free world. The
truth evident in our world today is that a
vigorous domestic policy and an active inter-
national role depend heavily on each other
for success. Thus, only a combination of
national and international action can solve
global problems like inflation, rising unem-
ployment, and shortages of food, energy,
and other key resources.

March 3, 1975

277

I believe America is ready to do what it
must do — at home and internationally — both
within and outside the United Nations. Even
the most vigorous and imaginative Ameri-
can leadership cannot guarantee success, but
a halfhearted America can insure defeat.

Reversing the current trend toward divi-
sion and confrontation in the United Nations
does not depend on our efforts alone. I am
convinced, however, that we must walk the
extra mile to overcome suspicion. We are not
the guardians of the status quo. We are
proud of our heritage as a revolutionary
country which seeks to promote freedom.
Some may question whether the flame of
liberty burns as bright as we approach our
200th birthday. We must demonstrate by
our actions that we remain dedicated not
only to freedom, equality, and human dig-
nity but to a more just world. I have pledged
the United States to seek to promote this
new spirit of constructive compromise in the
United Nations. Others must join us.

As Britain's Representative to the United
Nations, Ambassador Ivor Richard, said in
his address before the annual meeting of the
Pilgrims of the United States in New York
January 22:

Our task is to show that the interests of the de-
veloped and the developing are complementary, not
antagonistic. All must understand the realities which
limit the possibilities for action, and all must make
a deliberate attempt to find the common interest
and act on it to a point where all can see that they
gain as well as give.

Ambassador Richard has pointed out the
only path to a truly effective United Nations,
one which can serve all members, regardless
of size, wealth, or aspirations.

It is not the radical extremists of the right
or the left who will draw the blueprint of
tomorrow's more just world order. There are
thoughtful, responsible representatives at
the United Nations from every continent
and in every grouping. We must join our
own efforts to the wisdom and energy of
these individuals to pursue this goal— and
in so doing revitalize the organization.

U.S. and France Hold Annual Meeting
of Cooperative Science Program

Joint Statement '

The annual meeting of the United States-
France Cooperative Science Program was
held in Washington on January 23-25, 1975,
to review the broad scope of on-going bi-
lateral programs in scientific and technical
fields. Following discussions during the re-
cent summit meeting between French Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing and United States
President Ford, the two delegations focused
special attention on increased collaboration
in cancer research. During substantive dis-
cussions with representatives of the National
Cancer Institute at the National Institutes
of Health, it was agreed that such enhanced
cooperation would lead to periodic meet-
ings, intensified exchange of information,
and joint action. A meeting will be held this
spring to discuss the preparation of a specific
arrangement between responsible agencies.
During the review, meetings were held
with Dr. H. Guyford Stever, Director,
National Science Foundation ; Dr. Dixy Lee
Ray, Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau
of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs; Dr. Frank Rauscher,
Director, National Cancer Institute; and
representatives of other agencies. It was
agreed that the next review meeting would
take place in Paris in the fall of 1975.

Professor Hubert Curien, Director of the
General Delegation for Scientific and Tech-
nological Research (DGRST), headed the
French delegation. He was accompanied by
Xavier de Nazelle, Director for Scientific
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; Charles
Maisonnier, Counselor for Foreign Affairs,
Science Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;
and Michel Peissik, Director, Division of
Foreign Relations, DGRST. The U.S. par-
ticipants in the program review were led by
Dr. Allen V. Astin, Director Emeritus, U.S.

Issued on Jan. 27 (text from press release 32).

278

Department of State Bulletin

National Bureau of Standards and U.S. Co-
ordinator of the U.S.-France Cooperative
Science Program.

The U.S.-France Cooperative Science Pro-
gram was established in 1969 by agreement
between the French Minister for Industrial
and Scientific Development and the Presi-
dent's Science Advisor. Collaborative pro-
.grams in such fields as oceanography, space,
environment, health and agriculture involve
over 15 United States government agencies.
Projects in energy conservation, improve-
ment of industrial working conditions,
recycling of waste products and increased
university-to-university cooperation were
identified in this year's meeting as areas of
further cooperation.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June
10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the
United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Accession deposited: Cuba (with declaration),
December 30, 1974.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973.
Entered into force September 1, 1974.'
Notifications of approval: German Democratic
Republic, October 28, 1974; Madagascar, No-
vember 6, 1974; Netherlands, December 3, 1974.
Telephone regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered
into force September 1, 1974.'
Notifications of approval: German Democratic
Republic, October 28, 1974; Madagascar, No-
vember 6, 1974; Netherlands, December 3, 1974.
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremo-
linos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January
1, 1975.'

' Not in force for the United States.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 12,

1974.
Accession deposited: South Africa, December 28,

1974.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex-
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December
20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974,
except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which
entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Acceptances deposited: Poland, December 17,
1974; Romania (with declaration), January 22
1975.
Accession deposited: Paraguay (subject to rati-
fication), December 23, 1974.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with an-
nex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.'
Ratification deposited: Sweden, February 4, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974,
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974,
with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Libya, February 13, 1975.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Loan agreement to provide for financing foreign
exchange costs of acquiring and importing agri-
cultural inputs and related services, with annex.
Signed at Dacca January 15, 1975. Entered into
force January 15, 1975.

Agreement relating to investment guaranties, with
related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at
Dacca January 17 and 20, 1975. Enters into force
on the date of the note by which Bangladesh
communicates to the United States that the agree-
ment has been approved in conformity with Ban-
gladesh's constitutional procedures.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS
7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca
January 27, 1975. Entered into force January 27,
1975.

Egypt

Agreement extending the agreement of May 10,
1974, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Cairo December 28 and
31, 1974. Entered into force December 31, 1974.

India

Agreement concerning fulfillment of India's obliga-
tions under the agreement of May 16, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1532; 8 Bevans 1233), on settle-
ment for lend-lease, reciprocal aid, surplus war
property, and claims. Effected by exchange of
letters at New Delhi January 24, 1975. Entered
into force January 24, 1975.

^ Not in force.

March 3, 1975

279

Nigeria

Investment guarantee agreement, with agreed min-
ute. Signed at Lagos August 3, 1974.
Entered into force: Febmary 10, 1975.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of October 30,
1973, and January 20, 1974, relating to exports of
wool and man-made fiber textile products from
Singapore. Effected by exchange of notes at
Singapore January 3 and 13, 1975. Entered into
force January 13, 1975.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of October 8, 1974 (TIAS
7952). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon
January 30, 1975. Entered into force January 30,
1975.

PUBLICATIONS

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on Western Europe Released

Press release 45 dated February 4 (for release February 11)

The Department of State released on February 11
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1948,
volume III, "Western Europe." Six other volumes,
dealing with Central and Eastern Europe, the Far
East, and the Western Hemisphere, have already
been published for the year 1948, and the two re-
maining volumes (General; Near East, South Asia,
and Africa) are in preparation. The "Foreign
Relations" series has been published continuously
since 1861 as the official record of American foreign
policy.

This volume of 1,165 pages contains previously
unpublished documentation on U.S. encouragement
of a Western European Union, the antecedents of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the diplo-
macy of the European Recovery Program, establish-
ment of the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation, and American policies and actions relating
to individual countries of Western Europe. Among
the principal personages who appear prominently in
these documents are President Truman, Secretary of
State Marshall, Clement R. Attlee, Ernest Bevin,
Georges Bidault, Alcide De Gasperi, Charles de
Gaulle, James V. Forrestal, George F. Kennan,
Robert A. Lovett, Robert Schuman, and Arthur H.
Vandenberg.

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume HI
(Department of State publication 8779; GPO cat.
no. Sl.l:948/v. HI) may be purchased for $12.90
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should
be made out to the Superintendent of Documents
and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book-
store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
Wi02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accoinpany
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.

Finance — Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certain
Debts. Agreements with India. TIAS 7890. 11 pp.
30«'. (Cat. No. S9.10:7890).

Earth Resources — Cooperative Research in Remote
Sensing for Earth Surveys. Agreement with Mexico
extending the agreement of December 20, 1968, as
amended and extended. TIAS 7891. 3 pp. 25c'. (Cat.
No. 89.10:7891).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Tunisia. TIAS

7892. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10:7892).

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Bolivia. TIAS

7893. 4 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7893).

Agricultural Commodities. .Agreement with the Re-
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of
November 9, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7894. 4 pp.
25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7894).

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aeronau-
tical Products and Components. Agreement with
Italy. TIAS 7895. 9 pp. 30«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7895).

Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call
attention to the following error which appears
in the January 27 issue:

p. 123, col. 2: Line 29 should read "con-
tained in L.lOll also commends itself to."

280

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX March 3, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1862

Canada. U.S. and Canadian Officials Discuss

West Coast Tanker Traffic (joint statement) 272

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating

to Foreign Policy 273

Energy. Energy and International Coopera-
tion (Ingersoll) 264

Environment. U.S. and Canadian Officials Dis-
cuss West Coast Tanker Traffic (joint state-
ment) 272

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Netherlands Television 261

France. U.S. and France Hold Annual Meet-
ing of Cooperative Science Program (joint
statement) 278

Immigration. President Ford Establishes
Committee on Illegal Aliens (memorandum
to Domestic Council members) 273

Middle East

President Ford's News Conference at Topeka

February 11 (excerpts) 267

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Nether-
lands Television 261

Netherlands. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
for Netherlands Television 261

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre-
tary Kissinger Interviewed for Netherlands
Television 261

Pakistan. Prime Minister Zulfikar All Bhutto
of Pakistan Visits Washington (Bhutto,
Ford, joint statement) 269

Portugal. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Netherlands Television 261

Presidential Documents

National MIA Awareness Day (proclamation) 268

President Ford Establishes Committee on
Illegal Aliens 273

President Ford's News Conference at Topeka

February 11 (excerpts) 267

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Paki-
stan Visits Washington 269

Publications

GPO Sales Publications 280

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Western
Europe Released 280

Science. U.S. and France Hold Annual Meet-
ing of Cooperative Science Program (joint
statement) 278

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 279

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Netherlands Television 261

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for

Netherlands Television 261

United Nations. Promoting a New Spirit of
Constructive Compromise in the United Na-
tions (Scali) 274

Viet-Nam

National MIA Awareness Day (proclamation) 268

President Ford's News Conference at Topeka

February 11 (excerpts) 267

Name Index

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 269

Ford, President 267, 268, 269, 273

Ingersoll, Robert S 264

Kissinger, Secretary 261

Scali, John 274

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to February 10 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are
Nos. 20 of January 20, 32 of January 27, 45
of February 4, and 53 of February 8.

No. Date Subject

154 2/11 Mildred Marcy appointed Coordi-
nator for International Women's
Year (biographic data).

*55 2/11 Regional foreign policy confer-
ence, Dallas, Tex., Feb. 18.

*56 2/11 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Mar. 11.

*57 2/11 Secretary's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law,
Study Group on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments, Mar. 8.

*58 2/11 Study Group 7 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for the CCIR,
Mar. 13.

t59 2/11 Kissinger, AUon: arrival, Tel Aviv,
Feb. 10.

t60 2/12 Kissinger, Allon: dinner toasts,
JeiTJsalem, Feb. 11.

t61 2/12 Kissinger, Allon: departure, Tel
Aviv.

*62 2/12 Kisinger: arrival, Cairo.

+63 2/13 Kissinger, Sadat: remarks, Cairo,
Feb. 12.
64 2/13 Ingersoll: combined Yale-Harvard-
Princeton clubs.

*65 2/13 Kissinger: departure, Cairo.

t66 2/13 Kissinger: departure, Damascus.

*67 2/13 Kissinger: arrival, Tel Aviv.

+68 2/13 Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jeru-
salem.

*69 2/14 Kissinger, Allon: departure, Tel
Aviv.

+70 2/14 Kissinger: arrival, Aqaba.

* Not printed.

+ Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 20402

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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob-
lems involving your subscription will receive im-
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
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7U3

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1863

March 10, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S FEBRUARY 9-19 VISIT
TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND WESTERN EUROPE 281

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE ISSUES OF ENERGY AND TRADE
Address by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll 299

THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM AND U.S. OBLIGATIONS

AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 307

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MECHANISMS IN THE OVERALL OIL STRATEGY
Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 312

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

For sale by the Supeiintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication
approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (January 29. 1971).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. LXXII, No. 1863
March 10, 1975

I

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on tlie work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
Tlie BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Kissinger Visits the Middle East and Western Europe;
Meets With the Shah of Iran and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Secretary Kissinger left Washington Feb-
ruary 9 for a trip to the Middle East and
Western Europe and returned February 19.
Following are remarks by Secretary Kis-
singer and foreign leaders during the trip,
including u neivs conference held by Secre-
tary Kissinger and the Shah of Iran at
Zurich, and the text of a joint statement
issued following meetings betiveen Secretary
Kissinger and Soviet Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko at Geneva.

ARRIVAL, BEN GURION AIRPORT, FEBRUARY 10

Press release 59 dated February 11

Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon

We are delighted to receive Dr. Kissinger
and Mrs. Kissinger and their companions
on their official visit to this country, a visit
which was decided upon when I was in
Washington recently, when the Secretary of
State and Mrs. Kissinger accepted my invi-
tation to pay us an official visit. But as you
well know. Foreign Ministers today are less
fussy about the official side of visits and
protocol and so on, and I am sure that their
short stay with us will be used for some
political talks in which we shall be able to
exchange views to assess the situation to-
gether in our common effort to achieve peace
or at least some progress toward peace.

Welcome to this country. The floor is
yours, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mrs. Allon: I do
not quite know how to interpret the stress

on the official side of my visit, because I
cannot quite imagine what my previous
visits were. At any rate, it is always a great
pleasure to come and see my friends in Israel.
I am here to discuss with my friends — in
the spirit of cooperation and partnership
that has characterized our relationship —
what further progress can be made toward
peace in an area which has long needed it
and for a people that has long yearned for it.
I welcome the decision that was an-
nounced yesterday by the Israeli Cabinet
endorsing the step-by-step approach. The
United States, of course, is not committed to
any particular approach; it is committed to
rapid progress. We will work closely and
cooperatively and in a spirit of friendship
with our colleagues of the Israeli Cabinet.
We agree with them that the step-by-step
approach is likely to be the most productive.
We are prepared to explore other means and
other forums, if necessary, in order to make
rapid progress. But whatever we do, it will
be in a spirit of friendship, and with the
attitude that the survival and security of
Israel are a basic American concern.
Thank you.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER
AT JERUSALEM, FEBRUARY 11

Press release GO dated February 12

Foreign Minister Allon

Upon his arrival, Dr. Kissinger asked me
what was the difference between an official
visit and an ordinary visit. I must say I
had to think a little bit about it and even

March 10, 1975

281

ask for some advice from my colleagues in
the Foreign Office. And then we discovered
vi'hat should be the answer: First, in an
official visit there are no demonstrations.
Only when the shuttle diplomacy begins, we
still have some demonstrations here and
there. Secondly, from an official visit no-
body expects any results and then one can
confine himself to some preliminary talks,
clarifications, exploration, with a sufficient
excuse to go back home without claiming any
new miracle or any other achievement.

Nevertheless I do hope that even if we
have to expect demonstrations, that the sec-
ond round of the Kissinger trip to the Middle
East will take place as a result of this official
visit. I know that some of the demonstrators
■ — people whom I appreciate, many of thsm
I knew personally — were unhappy probably
with the results of the disengagement agree-
ments. Being a member of the former Cab-
inet, as some other of my colleagues were,
let me tell you that if anybody is to be
blamed for the disengagement agreements,
it's the Golda Meir Cabinet and not Dr.
Kissinger, because the terms of those two
agreements were accepted by the Cabinet
and were not forced upon us.

Whether they are good or not, I still think
that none of the parties concerned — we, the
Egyptians, and the Syrians — should regret
that those agreements, which I am sure
served equally the interests of both parties.
And we highly appreciated and still appre-
ciate the special contribution that Dr. Kis-
singer made in order to achieve those agree-
ments, which could be considered not only
as the reinforcement of the cease-fire but
also as the first step toward peace.

During the service of Henry Kissinger,
first as the head of the National Security
Council of his country and later on as Secre-
tary of State in his dual capacity, the rela-
tionship between our respective countries
which reached new peaks, new heights in
every aspect of our relations — on the bi-
lateral level, the economic aid, the military
supplies, political cooperation — and I would
like to exploit this opportunity in order to
express our thanks to the United States of

America, to the government, the Adminis-
tration, the Congress with its two Houses,
the people, and the press.

But sometimes the press is wrong, but this
can be tolerated. And of course all of us
remember very vividly the famous airlift
and even the unusual step that the American
Administration took by declaring a global
alert in a very grave situation during the
Yom Kippur war. What else can we ask
from a friendly government?

And I would like to tell you from first-
hand knowledge that Dr. Kissinger was one
of the architects, if not the architect, of the
new heights of relationship between our
countries. This does not mean that we have
to agree on every point, neither with Henry
and his colleagues nor even with the Presi-
dent of the United States. From the eight
months of my service as the Foreign Minis-
ter of this country, I can testify that in our
frequent meetings in the United States and
here, we didn't always agree.

But all our differences could be discussed
in the friendliest possible manner as well
as with complete candor and frankness ; and
I really hope that this fashion, these man-
ners of relationship, between a great country
and a small one — and as you know in my
view I don't think that greatness is always
related to size and wealth and strength ;
greatness is a qualitative aspect, and I am
inclined very modestly to believe that, al-
though we are small in size we are not small
in quality here and America, in spite of
being big, is really great in many aspects.

This is the sort of relationship we have
to nourish, we have to develop, while keep-
ing of course our freedom of argument and
our position and so on. Now, it is an open
secret that Dr. Kissinger will try his best
to find out whether there is any chance or
any hope to revive the political momentum
in our region. It is agreed between us that
nobody is looking for a permanent status
quo. All of us want movement — calculated,
carefully planned, not run amuck, neverthe-
less not to stand still, in a most responsible
way to search for peace, to leave no stone
unturned in our search for peace. And I

282

Department of State Bulletin

don't have to tell Henry Kissinger, who is
maybe a little younger than I am — but he
gathered a lot of experience — that the proc-
ess of peacemaking cannot be achieved as
quickly as the cooking of instant coffee.

And I discovered with his appearance in
the Geneva Conference that he masters also
the Arabic language. But in order to be
safe, I will translate an Arabic phrase into
English. That is an Arabic aphorism saying
that Allah mack sabisrn, iviz a mas Sahara
kaporo [sic], which means "God is on the
side of the patient; impatience is a sin"; and
I am sure that by patience we may gain our
ultimate goal.

There is also a Hebrew proverb saying:
Sop ma'aseh ve vemach shavat chila. In a
free translation I would have said: "Think-
ing, planning is done"; and everything we
are doing should be well planned and well
thought of beforehand. Nevertheless, I don't
believe it could be possible to make sure of
the positive result of a mission before the
mission stops. This would be .self-defeating.

It is impossible to embark on such a great
mission without taking some risks, one's
own risks, even one's own country's risks,
because I think this risk is part and parcel
of the peacemaking process, although all the
parties concerned should really do their best
to minimize the risk and to make the politi-
cal progress possible. We are being told that
diplomacy is the art of the possible. This is
an old saying, maybe out of date. It seems
to me that diplomacy today is the art of
achieving the impossible, or at least targets
which seem to be impossible to get at. And
this is the situation in which we live.

After 27 years, almost 28 years, of a state
of belligerency, with all the accumulation of
hatred and psychological reluctance on our
neighbors' side, it isn't an easy mission, par-
ticularly when there are forces inside the
region and outside the region who are doing
their best to encourage extremism across the
lines. And extremist ideas can never help
to achieve anything mutual, but some com-
promise which will serve all sides is the right
manner, and we trust Dr. Kissinger's inten-
tions. We trust his ability, and ever since
Nancy is around him, our confidence is even

greater than before, and even before it was
great enough.

I would like to conclude by saying that
one needs a very deep belief in the idea of
peace, not only as a necessity but as a con-
viction, as an integral element in our fate.
And I think, with all the difficulties that one
can see, he can also witness from a distance
a ray of hope, because I simply believe that
peace or at least progress toward peace is
needed, not only by us but also by our
neighbors.

And although we are talking now about
Egypt, we are willing to negotiate peace
treaties with each one of the neighboring
countries with no discrimination, to nego-
tiate without preconditions. And this is the
difference between real negotiations and an
attempt to impose dictates against the other
side. We all know, after many years of ex-
perience, that there will not be a military
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and we
should do our best to confine all the countries
in the area to political means, and this is
really the great duty and mission of Henry
Kissinger.

All Foreign Ministers who happen to serve
their countries in peril, in time of tension, in
the absence of peace, must maintain a cer-
tain degree of guarded optimism, even when
the situation looks desperate. It was a great
American President who accomplished great
accomplishments in his country — and also
probably committed some great mistakes — I
am referring to F.D.R., who said very right-
ly that there are no desperate situations,
there are people who get desperate of a
situation. As far as we Foreign Ministers
of the region — and you can deliver this
message to my counterparts across the lines
— we must not get desperate, because if we
get desperate, who is going to struggle for
peace? Pessimists are bound to lose hope.
Hope is needed as fuel in order to encourage
people to struggle for peace, to work for
peace.

Now ladies and gentlemen, let us raise our
glasses, for the health of the President of
the United States and the ever-great friend-
ship of our two countries. L'chaim. ["To
life."]

March 10, 1975

283

Secretary Kissinger

Ml". Foreign Minister, Mrs. Allon: I nearly
said "fellow members of the Cabinet," since
I am sure I have seen more of the Israeli
Cabinet than of our own. I would like to
express my great pleasure at being in a
country whose political disputes are rela-
tively tame, which has only one house of
Parliament and that is only comprised of
less than 150 members.

I know many of you are here for many
reasons. The distinguished members of the
opposition, to study the depths human de-
pravity can reach. The members of the
Israeli negotiating team — the Prime Minis-
ter, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and
the Chief of Staff — take very seriously what
the Foreign Minister said, that it is not
necessary for Israelis to agree with every-
thing that Americans say; and having read
your newspapers — and our Embassy is very
careful to send me a selection of all un-
favorable articles — I am aware of the fear
that the United States may be applying
"salami" tactics to Israel. Now, for those of
us who have had — I don't know whether
"privilege" is the right word — the experi-
ence, shall we say, of negotiating with the
Israeli negotiating team, the idea that Is-
raelis would be pushed back inadvertently
— without noticing it, so to speak, and
without obtaining a quid pro quo — is so
inconceivable that it requires almost no
discussion.

All of us on the American side are well
aware of the affection of your Chief of Staff
for any point, any territorial point, pos-
sessing any elevation whatsoever, and there-
fore withdrawals involving hills present
very special difficulties for American nego-
tiators even to mention.

So I want to assure Israelis present that
they should not feel an uncharacteristic lack
of confidence in their negotiators, who are
keeping us very honest indeed. But, speak-
ing seriously, I came to Israel in an official
capacity for the first time on the day that
the war ended. Indeed, the war had not yet
ended, and I had the pleasure then of meet-
ing men I grew to admire very much after-

ward, the former Chief of Staff, "Dado"
[David] Elazar, with whom I had the privi-
lege of working during the disengagement
agreement with Egypt and, of course, many
other senior leaders. And no one who met
Israel's leaders on that day can forget the
exhaustion and the relief and to some extent
the uncertainty of what would happen now
that this unbelievable effort was over, that
this terrible shock had been honorably
survived.

No one who was in Israel on that day
can ever doubt that there is no people in
the world that deserves peace more than the
people of Israel or could be more dedicated
to achieving it. Of course, given the special
relationship of friendship and affection that
exists between us and Israel, our disagree-
ments, when they occur, are in the nature of
family quarrels — loud and noisy — but we
always know when they start that they are
going to be settled.

And we always know that we are engaged
in a common effort — to bring peace to an
area and to a people that has suffered
throughout its history and that deserves noth-
ing so much as for once to live in recognition
of it by its neighbors and in safety for its
children. I agree with the Foreign Minister
that Israel, which was built on faith, is now
asked to undertake another act of faith.

I said once to a group in Washington, and
indeed I would say, if I did not want to jeop-
ardize his reputation, that it occurred at the
house of your Ambassador, that on the oc-
casion that the Foreign Minister visited
Washington, that I will never forget my visit
to his kibbutz, where I was taken around in
a very matter-of-fact way, and every square
yard has been paid for with lives or with
some suffering.

And therefore a decade and a half ago,
before I ever thought that I would be in any
official position, this reality of Israel was
very clear to me. And now the process of
peace requires another act of faith on the
part of all of us, because as we make peace
we have to balance the requirements of
physical security against the needs of good
faith and good will and recognition. And we
have to relate the tangible possession of ter-

284

Department of State Bulletin

ritory to the intangible necessities of legit-
imacy and acceptance and the desire for
peace. And that is a very difficult process.
And as the Foreign Minister said, in the
nature of things no one can possibly know
at each stage with certainty where the
balance is to be struck.

But one thing we do know for certain:
Serious people — as those of us who sit, if
I may say so, in comradeship around the
negotiating table — serious people can occa-
sionally have different views. Although I
regret to tell the assembled press that this
did not happen today — I don't know whether
now the Israeli Cabinet can survive a con-
fidence vote tomorrow — but they may differ
occasionally, and we have, and I am sui-e
we will again.

But one thing cannot happen: We will
not knowingly sacrifice Israel to the con-
siderations of great-power politics. What-
ever differences have occasionally arisen, or-
may arise again in the future, arise from the
fact that in a complex problem, serious people
may sometimes have a diflf'erent perspective.
They cannot arise from the fact that the
United States considers the security of
Israel expendable or a pawn in some game
of great-power politics.

Of course we have to take many factors
into account as well, because we all have
to survive in the same environment. And in
a world in which great powers sacrifice
small powers, the integrity of the large
powers, and ultimately their security, is
jeopardized as well. So we have embarked
today in a review of the considerations, the
categories, purposes, and the strategies in-
volved not just in another step, but involved
in a process toward that state of peace that
we both desire.

We share your aspirations for peace. And
we hope that we can in the not too distant
future look back to that day which I met
the Israeli leaders at the end of their difficult
war as the day when we began to turn
toward a period when mothers in Israel 7io
longer had to fear for the future of their
children and where therefore the peace of
the whole world became more secure. And
it is in this spirit that I would like to pro-

pose a toast to the President of Israel and to
the friendship of the United States and
Israel.

DEPARTURE, BEN GURION AIRPORT,
FEBRUARY 12

Press release 61 dated February 12

Secretary Kissinger

I wanted to thank the Foreign Minister
and the Israeli negotiating team — the Prime
Minister, all the other friends with whom we
discussed here — for what I consider very
constructive, very useful talks. We did not
attempt to reach any final conclusion on this
trip, but rather to explore the basic prin-
ciples and categories of a possible interim
settlement; and I will now go to Egypt, and
I will have similar discussions with the
Egyptian leaders.

The area needs progress toward peace.
All the peoples in the area need it. The United
States will do what it can to promote it,
and the talks here were a very useful and
important step in that direction.

Thank you.

Foreign Minister Allon

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for
your kind words. I, too, consider your visit
to this country as a very important one and
indeed very successful. We didn't expect too
much from the first move. Nevertheless, as
a preliminary move it was a very construc-
tive one.

I sincerely believe that an interim agree-
ment is badly needed by all the parties
concerned — by Israel, by Egypt — and I am
happy that this coincides also with the policy
of the United States of America. I can under-
stand that there may be different approaches
as to how this interim agreement should be
achieved and what should be the results of
it, but once we start we must stick to the
initiative, until we get positive results, with
great patience and good will on both sides.
I wish you a very successful trip to Egypt,
and come back as soon as you can.

March 10, 1975

285

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND
PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT, FEBRUARY 12 ^

Q. Is there going to be a statement?

President Sadat: Yes, Dr. Kissinger will
tell you.

Secretary Kissinger: The President and I
reviewed the whole situation. First we met
as delegations with Foreign Minister [Is-
mail] Fahmi, Under Secretary [Joseph J.]
Sisco, and Ambassador Eilts [Hermann F.
Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt]. After-
ward the President and I met alone for a
couple of hours for a detailed review of
every aspect of the situation. I think we have
made progress in clarifying the issues and
indicating the directions in which a solu-
tion should be found. And we will continue
our talks this evening, and I'm hopeful that
further progress will be made. In fact I'm
confident that further progress will be made.

Q. Do you expect a change in program
and to come back again in the coming few
days ?

Secretary Kissinger: Not in the coming
few days, but in the very near future.

Q. This will help your mission in Israel,
sir ?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have a mission
to any particular country. My mission is to
help bring peace to the area. And I find that
my talks with the President today were very
constructive in that direction.

Q. Are you optimistic now?

Secretary Kissinger: As I indicated, I
think we indicated the direction in which
progress can be made.

Q. You mean you are more hopeful than
before, Dr. Kissinger?

Q. Are yon satisfied, Mr. President?

President Sadat: Yes, I am satisfied. We
had very fruitful talks and then we shall

' Made to the press following their meeting at the
Barrage Residence, at Cairo on Feb. 12 (text from
press release 63 dated Feb. 13).

be resuming these talks because Minister
Fahmi was very kind to invite me for dinner
with Dr. Kissinger. [Laughter.]

Foreign Miriister Fahmi: It is my honor,
Mr. President.

Q. Mr. President, you seem a little hit
subdued today, not as happy as you were
before after some of these talks.

President Sadat: How can you reach this
conclusion?

Q. Well, we're reduced to that sometimes.

President Sadat: Not at all, not at all.
I'm very happy. As I told you, I am opti-
mistic.

Q. Mr. President, are you optimistic that
you ivill see an early tvithdraival of Israel
from the Sinai passes and from the oilfields?

President Sadat: Well, as Dr. Kissinger
said, we have made a survey for the whole
problem, and I think this is quite suf!icient
for the moment.

Q. Well, I wondered if your optimism
extended from something physical on the
ground in the way of tvithdrawal?

President Sadat: Well, I'm always opti-
mistic when I receive my friend Henry.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, is your visualization of
the next steps already made?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the basic prob-
lem is to bring peace to the entire area and
that is the fundamental problem. In reach-
ing that, there will undoubtedly be indi-
vidual steps, and I personally have some
ideas what these steps might be in the
context of an overall peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you mean one coun-
try at a time?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want
to speculate on how these various stages
might get carried out.

Q. Mr. President, do you feel that the
Israeli and Egyptian positions are recon-
cilable?

286

Department of State Bulletin

President Sadat: Well, you should ask Dr.
Kissinger this.

Q. Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm here because I
think they're reconcilable.

DEPARTURE, DAMASCUS AIRPORT, FEBRUARY 13

Press release 66 dated February 13

First of all I wanted to thank the Pres-
ident and the Foreign Minister for the very
warm and courteous reception that we have
had here in Damascus. We first of all re-
viewed the state of bilateral relations be-
tween Syria and the United States, which is
good and improving. We also reviewed in
very great detail all the elements of a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East and the
indispensable role of Syria in a final solution
of the problems of the Middle East.

The talks throughout were very friendly
and constructive. We agreed to stay in close
contact. The President and the Foreign
Minister invited me on the occasion of my
next visit to the Middle East in a few weeks'
time to visit Damascus, and I accepted with
great pleasure.

REMARKS AT JERUSALEM, FEBRUARY 13 2

Secretary Kissinger

I wanted to report to you that the Israeli
negotiating team and my colleagues and I
had a very good and constructive session
this evening. I reported to the Israeli nego-
tiating team about my visits to Cairo and
Damascus. I did not bring as a result of these
visits any concrete proposals, plans, or lines
but, rather, a continuation of the consider-
ations that were part of my exploratory
mission.

I plan to return to the Middle East by the
middle of March, and I will meet again with
the Israeli negotiating team tomorrow morn-

'■" Made following a working dinner with Prime
Minister Rabin (text from press release 68).

ing to prepare this next visit. The talks were
conducted in a very friendly atmosphere,
and I consider them fruitful and positive.

Foreign Minister Allon

I would like to thank the Secretary of
State for the candor and open way in which
he reported to us about his impressions
from his recent visits to Cairo and Damascus.
May I remind you that when I came back
from Washington, I expressed my hope that
the Secretary of State would be visiting the
Middle East around the dates that this trip
has been carried out. And I also expressed
my hopes that as a result of his exploration
in this short visit he will find it necessary
and desirable to come again for a further
eff'ort in order to achieve political progress.

I am very glad that Dr. Kissinger found
it possible to promise another visit to this
part of the world. Thank you for that, too.

ARRIVAL, AQABA, FEBRUARY 14

Press release 70 dated February 14

I want to say it is always a special pleasure
for me to see our friends in Jordan. I am here
to tell the King and Prime Minister Zaid
Rifai about my trip through the area, to get
their advice about how peace in the Middle
East may be promoted, and to discuss how to
strengthen the already very good bilateral
relations between Jordan and the United
States. I look forward very much to seeing
His Majesty.

Thank you very much.

ARRIVAL, RIYADH, FEBRUARY 15

Press release 72 dated February 18

Petroleum Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani

It's always a pleasure to welcome Secre-
tary Kissinger to this country and to ex-
change views with him in order to help
achieve peace in this area. We appreciate
his efforts and wish him the best of luck.

March 10, 1975

287

Secretary Kissinger

I would like to express my own great
pleasure at returning to Riyadh and to see
our old friends in Saudi Arabia. I will re-
port fully to His Majesty about the trip I
have now taken through the area and the
determination of the United States to con-
tribute to rapid progress toward peace in
the Middle East. We will also talk about
other problems, including the problems of
cooperation between consumers and produc-
ers and the American attitude of conciliation,
cooperation, and traditional friendship.

DEPARTURE, RIYADH, FEBRUARY 15

Press release 73 dated February 18

Secretary Kissinger

Really, I can record only that I reviewed
with His Majesty and his advisers the state
of negotiations toward peace in the Middle
East, and I listened with great interest to
the advice of His Majesty, that we take,
always, extremely seriously. We also re-
viewed bilateral relations and other matters
of common interest. The talks were
warm, friendly, and constructive; and my
colleagues and I are grateful for the recep-
tion we have had.

Petroleum Minister Yomani

Well, every time we receive our friend
Dr. Kissinger, he leaves with us more confi-
dence in his ability, his sincerity, and we
wish him good luck. We believe that it is
in the interest of the United States to create
peace in this area, and we believe that he
is doing his best to create that interest and
to maintain it.

ARRIVAL, BONN, FEBRUARY 15

Press release 75 dated February 18

I wanted to say how delighted I am to
have this opportunity to meet my friend and
colleague the Foreign Minister. I will re-

port to him and to the Chancellor about my
trip to the Near East and about the prospect
for further steps toward peace as I see them.
Naturally, we will also review German-
American relations and world problems in
general. I am not aware of any problems
that exist in the relationship between the
Federal Republic and the United States. So
it will be a meeting among friends who will
talk about how to make close relationships
even closer.

Q. Did you get the support of King Faisal
for your efforts?

Secretary Kissinger: I think Minister
Yamani said at the airport that the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia supported the ap-
proach that I am following.

REMARKS AT BONN, FEBRUARY 16 ^

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

The visit of the Secretary gave us an op-
portunity for an exchange of views on Middle
East developments. In these discussions it
became clear that our evaluations are in
agreement. The same applies to the situation
in the Mediterranean. It is natural that we
talked about the Cyprus situation. Other
topics this morning included the status of
discussions on CSCE [Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe] as well
as the status of MBFR [mutual and balanced
force reduction] negotiations. We were able,
which for us is not surprising, to agi'ee fully
on all these questions.

Secretary Kissinger

Both for the benefit of the American press
here and for the sake of German-American
relations, I will not inflict my German on
you, which the Foreign Minister maintains
is not German at all, but Franconian [laugh-
ter].

I would like to underline the remarks of
the Foreign Minister. We reviewed my trip

' Made to the press following a meeting at Schloss
Gymnich (text from press release 76 dated Feb. 18).

288

Department of State Bulletin

to the Middle East, the European Security
Conference, mutual force reductions, and the
situation in the Mediterranean with partic-
ular emphasis on Cyprus. And on all these
matters there was a complete unanimity of
view, and the discussions were conducted
in the warm and friendly spirit which has
characterized our relationship.
Thank you very much.

Q. Did you discuss the position of the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] ?

Secretary Kissinger: The American posi-
tion on the PLO is well known, and I am
obliged to repeat it at every press conference.
We have nothing to discuss with the PLO
until the PLO recognizes the existence of
Lsrael and of the relevant resolutions. At
that point we can think about the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the ques-
tion of German arms shipments to Turkey
in view of the American embargo?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is a matter
for the Federal Republic to decide. We dis-
cussed, rather, the political situation in the
eastern Mediterranean, and of course the
Administration's position on that matter
has been made abundantly clear.

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
recognizes that a final settlement in the
Middle East cannot be achieved without the
participation, cooperation, and possible guar-
antee of the Soviet Union, and I will talk
to Foreign Minister Gromyko this evening
in that spirit. We have both taken trips to
the area, and we will exchange ideas, and
we will do so from the attitude, certainly on
the American side, that good relations with
the Soviet Union are an essential aspect of
our policy.

Q. What role can Europe play in your
view in that part of the ivorld?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, I have
always been a very convinced believer in
the proposition that the United States and
Europe must cooperate closely and coordinate
their policies closely. One reason I stopped
in Bonn, and will stop in London and Paris,
is to inform our European colleagues of the
results of my trip. Coordinated policies do
not mean it has to be identical, and I think
that Europe can with its own influence and
with its own relations exercise a rule of
moderation and conciliation and at crucial
moments can use its influence to help bring
about a peaceful solution.

Thank you very much.

INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN TELEVISION (ZDF),
FEBRUARY 16

ARRIVAL, GENEVA, FEBRUARY 16

Press release 77 dated February 18

Q. Have you made progress in pursuit
of your policies in the Near East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that my trip
to the Middle East outlined the main posi-
tions with a much greater precision than I
had understood them before. It indicated
the difl[iculties, but it also indicated the pos-
sibilities, and therefore I shall return to
the Middle East within a few weeks with
hope that some progress can be made.

Q. Has your trip placed you in a good
position for your talk with Foreign Minister
Gromyko in, regard to improving relations
with the Soviet Union in the Middle East?

Press release 79 dated February 18

I would like to express my pleasure at
being in Geneva to review with Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko the state of U.S. -Soviet re-
lations and also the situation in the Middle
East. I agree with Foreign Minister Gromyko
that the state of U.S. -Soviet relations is of
great importance to the peace of the world,
and therefore the United States attaches
considerable importance to the relaxation of
tensions between the Soviet Union and the
United States and will continue to pursue
this policy with energy and conviction.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and I will
review the whole range of Soviet-American
relationships and will of course pay attention

March 10, 1975

289

to the Middle East, to which both of us have
paid visits in recent weeks, and we will no
doubt exchange impressions.
Thank you very much.

REMARKS AT GENEVA, FEBRUARY 17

PieKs release 81 dated February 18

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Now, we had lunch by the Secretary of
State of the United States. Before luncheon
we had a discussion. We also had a discussion
after lunch. You know that we also met for
discussions yesterday night. Many questions
were touched upon in the conversations, and
I believe that all of these questions are im-
portant. There were questions on which our
positions are close or coincide. I won't di-
vulge a secret, and I think the Secretary of
State will agree, that there were questions
on which our positions did not exactly coin-
cide. But we agreed by expressing the opinion
of our countries and in general the leader-
ship of our states that it is necessary to
work in the direction of narrowing the differ-
ences— on questions where these differences
exist, to work in the spirit of those relations
which have been established between the
Soviet Union and the United States. And the
United States and the Soviet Union have
covered a great distance in a positive di-
rection.

I must firmly say that the Soviet leader-
ship and the Soviet Government firmly pursue
the line which has been formed in relations
between our countries in recent times. In
this connection I would like to underline the
great importance of the Vladivostok meeting
between the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
U.S.S.R., Comrade Brezhnev, and the Presi-
dent of the United States, Gerald Ford. Of
course, you are aware that the Secretary
of State, Mr. Kissinger, actively partici-
pated in that meeting and I also had a little
bit to do there.

I would like to express my satisfaction
that our talks, this is our view, our discus-

sions here yesterday and today were fruit-
ful for the relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union ; and we are
convinced that for other states as well, and
from the point of view of the international
situation as well.

And in front of you, I would like to say
my thanks to Mr. Kissinger, the Secretary
of State, for the hospitality showed to us
today. I would like to take this opportunity
to convey my best wishes to the people,
citizens, of this wonderful city of Geneva
and to the citizens and to the people of
Switzerland and to the administration of
the canton and the Swiss Government for
their hospitality and the creation of good
conditions for our work.

Secretary Kissinger

I do not profess the oratorical skill of
my Soviet colleague. I therefore will confine
myself to confirming his evaluation of our
meeting. We deepened our understanding on
those issues where our views coincide; and
on those issues where our views did not
coincide exactly, we attempted to bring our
views into closer harmony.

The United States proceeds in these meet-
ings, which we consider a regular part of
our exchanges, from the assumption that the
United States and the Soviet Union have a
special obligation to preserve international
peace and therefore must be in close contact
on all major international issues that can
affect the peace of the world.

I also, on behalf of my colleagues, consider
these talks to have been fruitful, and I shall
report to the President that we are moving
within the spirit of the previous agreements.

The United States attaches very great im-
portance to the Vladivostok agreements, on
the implementation of which negotiations
have started here and which both our govern-
ments will endeavor to bring to conclusion
during this year.

I would also like to thank the city of Ge-
neva and the canton for having received us
here and for having the occasion for this
very useful meeting. Thank you very much.

290

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Mi: Gromyko, Mr. Brezhnev recently
complained that certain persons were offering
the Arabs a soporific in the form of a par-
tial settlement in the Middle East. Do you
have any idea who those certain persons are
and why he was complaining?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: He did not
mention any particular persons. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I asked the Foi-eign
Minister the same question. [Laughter.] I
offered to share in the condemnation of such
efforts. [Laughter.]

Foreign Minister G)0)nyko: So there is no
basis for criticizing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk about the
resuming of the Near East conference here
in Geneva and about dates?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will issue
a communique later today in which these
and related questions are addressed.

Q. This is tonight for the German tele-
vision?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you can read it
on German television this evening. Thank
you.

TEXT OF U.S.-U.S.S.R. JOINT STATEMENT
ISSUED AT GENEVA FEBRUARY 17

Press release 80 dated February 18

As previously agreed, a meeting between
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of
the United States of America and Assistant
to the President for National Security Af-
fairs, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of
the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet
Union] and Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR, took place on February 16 and 17
in Geneva.

They exchanged views on a number of
questions of bilateral American-Soviet rela-
tions, including the various negotiations cur-
rently in progress between them, and on
certain international issues of mutual in-
terest. Both sides emphasized their deter-
mination to adhere to the course of continu-

ing to improve Soviet-American relations in
accordance with existing understandings and
agreements of principle, which they firmly
believe are in the interest of the peoples of
the United States of America and the USSR
and of international peace.

Both sides stressed the great significance
of the agreement regarding the further limi-
tation of strategic offensive arms reached in
the course of the meeting between the Presi-
dent of the United States of America Gerald
R. Ford and the General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, L. L Brezhnev in No-
vember, 1974, in Vladivostok. On the basis
of this agreement, both sides intend to con-
tinue energetic efforts to work out an ap-
propriate long-term agreement this year.

It was noted that a great deal of progress
has been achieved at the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe. The two
sides stated that they will continue to make
active efforts jointly with the other partici-
pants to have the Conference successfully
concluded at an early date.

They assume that the results achieved
permit its conclusion at the highest level.

They also agreed that active efforts should
be made to achieve positive results in the
mutual reduction of forces and armaments
in Central Europe on the basis of the prin-
ciples referred to in the American-Soviet
communique of November 24, 1974.

In the course of the conversations, particu-
lar attention was given to the Middle East.
The two sides remain concerned over the
dangers persisting in the situation there.
They reaffirmed their intention to make every
effort to promote a solution of the key issues
of a ju!3t and lasting peace in the area on the
basis of UN Resolution 338, taking into
account the legitimate interests of all the
peoples of the area, including the Palestinian
people, and respect for the right to independ-
ent existence of all states in the area.

The two sides believe that the Geneva Con-
ference should play an important part in
the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East, and should resume its
work at an early date.

March 10, 1975

291

They exchanged views on Cyprus. Both
sides reaffirmed their firm support for the
independence, sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of Cyprus. They recognize the present
Cypriot Government as the legitimate gov-
ernment of Cyprus. Both sides continue to
consider that a just settlement of the Cyprus
question must be based on the strict imple-
mentation of the resolutions adopted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly
of the United Nations regarding Cyprus.

The talks were held in a business-like and
constructive atmosphere and both sides ex-
pressed their satisfaction with the results.

REMARKS AT LONDON, FEBRUARY 18

Press release 82 dated February 18

Secretary Kissinger

The Foreign Secretary, Prime Minister,
and I reviewed the trips that both sides have
been taking. We think that the British visit
to Moscow was extremely successful — a con-
tribution to the relaxation of tension within
the framework of allied friendship and sol-
idarity. I reported to our British friends
about my visit to the Middle East and our
plans for the future.

We also had an opportunity to review all
other international matters in a spirit of
friendship, cordiality, and agreement.

Thank you.

U.K. Foreign Secretary James Callaghan

It's always a great pleasure to have Dr.
Kissinger here. He's one of the world's great
statesmen, and he's been on a mission of
peace. I hope that his efforts meet with the
reward that the world needs and that cer-
tainly they deserve. We think that as a re-
sult of the efforts that are being made by
him — and we were able to discuss the Middle
East situation in some detail — that there is
good prospect for another step being taken.
That is certainly our desire and our inten-

tion, and we are working with the United
States, and with all others, in order to
achieve that.

As far as our visit to the Soviet Union was
concerned, I agree with Dr. Kissinger that
it has had the impact of strengthening the
policy of detente, which is in the interest
of all of us. I hope that it has reinforced
other efforts that are being made in other
directions. And I think as far as 1975 is con-
cerned, that we may well see some progress
in further relaxation of tension and in the
growing together of people whatever their
economic or political systems may be.

Q. Mr. Cullaghait, did you have the im-
pression in Moscow that the Russians would
cooperate with a step-by-step approach to
these )iegotiations?

Foreign Secretary Callaghan: Well, I think
Dr. Kissinger has talked to Mr. Gromyko
since I did. I think he could answer that
question better than me.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that the Soviet
Union will understand that any step toward
peace is in the interest of everybody. We have
always asserted that a final settlement will
require the cooperation and participation of
the Soviet Union, so these measures are not
considered incompatible by us.

Q. Mr. Callaghan, did you talk to the Sec-
retary about energy, in particidar the oil
price floor that the Secretary has proposed?

Foreign Secretary Callaghan: Yes, we've
had a number of conversations about this
particular subject in Washington, and this
time we haven't carried it very much further,
because not much progress has been made
beyond our talks in Washington.

Q. Generally does Britain go along ivith
this concept?

Foreign Secretary Callaghan: Of a price
floor? We're going to be very big producers
of oil ourselves by 1980, and we think thei*e
is a lot to be said for having some stability
in the market, especially when there is ex-

292

Department of State Bulletin

pensive oil being produced. So we would
want to examine this kind of proposal very
sympathetically.

Secretary Kissinger: I've got to maintain
my friendship with the Foreign Secretary
in case he becomes president of OPEC [Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries]. [Laughter.]

Q. Could Dr. Kissinger tell us his im-
pressions of Mrs. Thatcher [Margaret That-
cher, leader of the Conservative Party] ?

Secretary Kissinger: I have already stated
that I was impressed.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
AND THE SHAH OF IRAN, ZURICH, FEBRUARY 1 8 ^

Q. Is Iran prepared to play a role in the
Secretary' s step-by-step diplomacy? Specific-
ally, I have in mind supplyiyig oil to Israel,
should Israel be compelled to give up the
Sinai oilfields.

The Shah of Iran: Well, I think that I have
answered this question before by saying that
our policy is to sell oil to [remainder of
sentence inaudible]. Once the tankers are
loaded it doesn't matter where or to whom
the oil goes, because it is a strictly commer-
cial transaction for my country.

Q. So certainly you would be part of no
boycott of Israel, which seems to be growing
big?

The Shah of Iran: We have never really
boycotted anybody. It is not part of our pol-
icy. We think that politics and commerce
are separate. We have not taken part in the
first oil embargo, and we will not take part
in any other embargo. No embargo can work
anymore, because we have tremendous oil re-
serves in both Europe and other countries
of the world. I believe they have 90 days'
reserve, and today's wars cannot last more

* Held following a luncheon at the Bolder Grand
Hotel (text from press release 84 dated Feb. 19).

than three weeks. So I don't really believe
in that. But if it comes, we are not going to
put an embargo on oil.

Q. Your Majesty, you and the Secretary
discussed prices surely. What do you see as
a future price [inaudible] and Mr. Kissin-
ger's pla7i for a floor price on oil?

The Shah of Iran: We are going to go to
the OPEC meeting in Algiers very soon.
Anything I say before that meeting you will
hear about. What I want to say is that in my
opinion, for good or bad, the price of oil
has increased. If we consider inflation and
that the Western countries — or the indus-
trialized countries — are selling their goods
to us at about 35 percent more, and then,
with the devaluation of the dollar, in the
matter of fact of purchasing power a barrel
of oil corresponds today to about $7 or $8,
if you want my opinion. So the price of oil
has gone up.

Q. Excuse me, but that brings up indexing.
We are familiar with your position. Are you
and the Secretary getting together on a view
of the value of indexing?

The Shah of Iran: In principle he agrees
with me on the indexing of prices. The ques-
tion is a floor price for oil and also a floor
price for other commodities. But the other
commodities are 20 or 30, and oil is one. It
won't be easy to index it, but it can be done.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what ivas the main con-
cern between yourself and His Majesty?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know,
the relations between Iran and the United
States are extremely close ; and I think that
His Imperial Majesty and I have agreed that
they have probably never been better. There-
fore it was natural that as a result of my
tour to the Middle East I would inform His
Imperial Majesty of what the United States
is intending to do and to get the benefit of
his advice on those matters. It naturally gave
us an opportunity to review other issues
such as the general issue of energy and the

March 10, 1975

293

bilateral Iranian-American relations. We will
have a meeting in Washington of the Iranian-
U.S. Commission.

Q. Ihmtidible.]

The Shah of Iran: I am not one of those
to believe that the price of oil will go lower —

Q. Will go up, did you say?

The Shah of Iran: No, go lower. If you
force us to raise the prices by your inflation,
it might go up. But what will be the pur-
chasing power? I am not interested in raising
the price of oil. But if I have to go and buy
more expensive goods, what really concerns
me is to keep a con.stant purchasing power.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in context with His Maj-
esty's remarks about the decline of the dollar,
I understand the United States is planning
to do something about the dollar noic.

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it,
the value of the dollar has stabilized ; and we
are very interested in maintaining it. We
will do our best to do so.

Q. We have not seen it in Sivitzerland yet.

Secretary Kissinger: It will come here.
Everything comes here sooner or later.

Q. What, according to your ideas, are the
means of getting down inflation? For in-
stance, you buy products from industrial-
ized countries, but at the same time you are
paying much more. But ivhat is the way out?

The Shah of Iran: The way out is for you
people to check your inflation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoiv can one check this
inflation?

Secretary Kissinger: That is an extremely
complicated matter; but as you know, the
Administration is attempting to deal simul-
taneously with both inflation and recession,
and we agree with the concern of His Im-
perial Majesty about bringing inflation un-
der control and, above all, to have a fruit-
ful dialogue.

Q. Your Majesty, I am sorry, but ive did
not hear your ansiver about the possibility
of selling oil to Israel. Woidd you please re-
peat it?

The Shah of Iran: I said that when we sell
our oil and fill up the tankers in our ter-
minal ports we do not mind and do not care
where it goes.

Q. Woidd you be willing to play an active
role in promoting step-by-step diplomacy?

The Shah of Iran: I am not one of those
who loses his head very easily in believing
that he is a big deal, but for the little in-
fluence that we could eventually have, is to
see every possible way of defusing the pres-
ent, maybe explosive, situation that will
permit more meaningful and constructive
talks later.

Q. Your Majesty, do you believe that after
your meeting in Algiers the price of oil will
be higher?

The Shah of Iran: I can't say what will be
the result of that meeting. This meeting will
probably study what to do if the inflation in
Europe and elsewhere continues. And if our
purchasing power becomes less and less, we
will have to defend ourselves somehow.

Q. You see a direct link between infla-
tion and the price of oil that ivill be set? If
inflation goes higher, the pnce of oil could
go higher?

The Shah of Iran: If inflation goes on the
price of everything will get out of control.

Q. Your Majesty, have you discussed with
the Secretary recent reports that Diego Gar-
cia is to be built up as a naval position, in
vieiv of your disagreement ivith big poivers
moving in the Indian Ocean?

The Shah of Iran: I have spoken about it
before, but our principal first-choice policy
will be first to see the Persian Gulf and then
the Indian Ocean eventually free of outside
powers. That means nonriparian states. But
as long as some powers are there, we would

294

Department of State Bulletin

not only not object to the presence of the
United States but on the contrary we would
welcome it.

REMARKS AT PARIS, FEBRUARY 18 «

French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues

I have had the honor and pleasure of re-
ceiving the Secretary of State for a working
dinner. Unfortunately I was not able to
offer a dinner as sumptuous as the one he
gave for me in Washington. But I have told
him that I hope to meet him again soon with
Madame Kissinger in Paris in order to offer
him a reception comparable to the one he
arranged for me in Washington.

This evening we had a working dinner
that consisted of a detailed exchange of views
on a certain number of problems, problems
facing the United States, France, and the
entire Occidental world — the problem of en-
ergy, the problem of the CSCE. There is
also the problem of Cyprus, which occupied
us for quite some time. And we have of
course spoken of other important questions.
Throughout, the atmosphere was very cor-
dial, very frank. Mr. Kissinger will continue
this exchange tomorrow with the President.

Secretary Kissinger

First, I want to apologize that I do not
speak to you in French. While I understand
it well, I never speak it to civilized people
with my accent. I agree with everything that
the Foreign Minister has said. The discus-
sions covered a variety of subjects and were
carried out with great cordiality in a very
friendly atmosphere, and I considered them
extremely useful.

Q. What role is France going to play in the
energy crisis? Do you think that the con-
flict in the Middle East is going to he more
important in the future?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that France
has played a useful role in the energy crisis,
and we are always exchanging ideas about
the Middle East, and we are working for
the same objectives.

Q. In the Middle East conflict has France
for the next few years an important role?

Secretary Kissinger: France has pursued
an active policy in the Middle East. We have
always benefited from the advice that France
from time to time was able to give us, and in
turn we keep the French Government closely
informed about our activities.

REMARKS AT PARIS, FEBRUARY 19 «

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues

The Secretary of State has had a very
thorough conversation with the President
of the Republic. Most of the problems were
discussed; most of these indeed were those
we had already discussed yesterday. The
Secretary of State has brought a very de-
tailed report on the trip he has just made
through the Middle East and which he will
resume during the course of the month of
March.

The question of energy was treated, and
these discussions were carried on in the
spirit of Martinique and conform with de-
cisions taken at Martinique. We have made
good progress in the direction which we have
agreed to follow together.

Secretary Kissinger

I agree with the Foreign Minister that the
discussions were very interesting. We cov-
ered the whole agenda of Franco-American
relations. I reported to the President about
my recent trip and the prospects of another
step toward peace in the Middle East, and
we exchanged views about energy and the
preparation of the consumer-producer con-

^ Made to the press following a dinner at the Quai
d'Orsay (text from press release 87).

" Made to the press following a breakfast at the
Elysee Palace (text from press release 91).

March 10, 1975

295

ference which is going ahead satisfactorily,
and all the discussions were conducted, as
the Foreign Minister pointed out, in the spirit
of Martinique; that is, cooperation, frank-
ness, and friendship.

Q. Is the United States going to partici-
pate in the preparatory conference next
month?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that good
progress has been made in that direction.

ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
FEBRUARY 19

Press release 93 dated February 19

I will be reporting to the President in
about an hour.

The trip that I've just completed was de-
signed to explore the possibilities of another
step toward peace in the Middle East; to
exchange views with the Soviet leaders, For-
eign Minister Gromyko, about U.S.-Soviet
relations and the Soviet role in Middle East
negotiations; and to stay in close contact
with our allies in Europe both about the
prospects for peace in the Middle East —
which is of such great concern to them — as
well as about problems of energy and other
international affairs.

I believe we have made some progress
toward establishing a framework for nego-
tiation in the Middle East, and I plan to re-
turn there in a few weeks to see what can
be accomplished concretely. With respect to
the Soviet Union, we have always considered
our relationship central to the maintenance
of peace, and we will continue to stay in
touch with the Soviet leadership as we nego-
tiate another step in the Middle East and
also in the preparations for a final settle-
ment.

And of course the central element of our
foreign policy is close relationship with our
allies in Europe and Japan. I believe that my
visit to Bonn, London, and Paris has
strengthened that relationship. As you know,
I also had very fruitful talks with the Shah
of Iran.

Now I will report to the President.

U.S. Loan To Assist in Financing
of Bangladesh Fertilizer Plant

Following is an announcement issued by
the Agency for International Development
on February 13.

AID press release 75-12 dated February 13

The Agency for International Develop-
ment is lending $30 million to Bangladesh
under a joint internationally financed project
to help that country construct a urea fer-
tilizer plant, which is expected to have a
major impact on the agricultural sector.

The total cost of the joint fertilizer proj-
ect will be an estimated $249.4 million, in-
cluding $142.3 in foreign exchange costs. In
addition to the $30 million AID loan, the
balance of the foreign exchange will come
from: International Development Associa-
tion, $33.4 million ; Asian Development Bank,
$30 million; the United Kingdom, $18 mil-
lion; Iran, $12.4 million; Federal Republic
of Germany, $12 million; and Switzerland,
$6.5 million. Bangladesh will provide the re-
quired local currency costs for the project.

Increased use of fertilizer is critical to
Bangladesh's effort to produce more food to
feed its growing population because more
than half of the country's gross domestic
product and employment for more than 75
percent of the total labor force comes from
the agricultural sector. The agricultural sec-
tor also is the primary source of foreign
exchange.

The plant will have an annual capacity of
528,000 tons of urea and will more than
double the country's urea production capac-
ity, raising annual production capacity from
the present 450,000 tons to 950,000 tons. The
plant will be located in Ashuganj, about 36
miles northeast of Dacca on the bank of the
Meghna River, with rail and water transport
coimections to the country's important agri-
cultural areas. The plant will use natural gas
from the nearby Titas gasfield as feedstock
and fuel, and will provide jobs for about
1,200 persons, some of whom will receive
training in Bangladesh and abroad. Although
there are no statutory regulations in Bangla-

296

Deparfmenf of Stafe Bulletin

desh for industrial pollution, the plant will
be designed in accordance with European
and U.S. standards in respect to solid, liquid,
and gaseous emissions.

Although the loan proceeds will be avail-
able to finance purchases in many countries,
the proceeds probably will be spent for U.S.
goods and services. In addition, based on past
experience, AID expects that U.S. suppliers
will provide materials and services for the
project financed by some of the other lenders.

Besides the $30 million fertilizer loan, AID
made two other agricultural input loans to
Bangladesh within the past five months, a
$25 million loan last September and a $30
million loan in January. The U.S. Govern-
ment also has donated more than $500 mil-
lion in grants for economic assistance to
Bangladesh since that country achieved inde-
pendence in 1971.

The AID loan is to be repaid in dollars in
40 years, with an initial grace period of 10
years, during which no repayment of princi-
pal is due. Interest is payable at 2 percent
annually during the grace period and 3 per-
cent thereafter.

U.S. Loan to Egypt To Finance
Development Imports From U.S.

AID press release 75-11 dated February 13

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
and Ismail Fahmi, Egyptian Minister of For-
eign Affairs, on February 13 signed an agree-
ment under which the United States will
provide $80 million to the Arab Republic of
Egypt to finance essential imports from the
United States.

The $80 million loan is the first major
transaction under the $250 million economic
assistance program of the Agency for Inter-
national Development recently authorized by
the U.S. Congress for Egypt. The funds will
be used to finance imports of agricultural and
industrial equipment, spare parts, and other
essential commodities and related services
needed to reactivate and expand the produc-
tive capacity of the Egyptian economy. The
imports will contribute to increased indus-

trial output and to the social and economic
development of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

The loan is repayable over 40 years with
a 10-year grace period for repayment of the
principal and bears an interest rate of 2
percent per annum during the grace period
and 3 percent per annum thereafter.

The United States is already assisting
Egypt in several areas. AID has financed
U.S. participation in clearing the Suez Canal
and intends to provide assistance in the re-
construction of cities and towns along the
Canal as well as central development activ-
ities. In addition, 300,000 metric tons of
Food for Peace have already been authorized
this fiscal year at a cost of about $52.5 mil-
lion.

Representatives of the two governments
are meeting to develop a list of the imports
to be financed under the loan and the pro-
curement procedures to be followed.

U.S. Donates 50,000 Tons of Food
to CARE for Drought Areas in India

AID press release 7B-7 dated February 10

The Agency for International Develop-
ment announced on February 10 that the
United States through the Food for Peace
program is donating 50,000 metric tons of
food grain to the Cooperative for American
Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), for dis-
tribution in drought areas in India.

The grain, consisting of 25,000 tons of
soy-fortified bulgur and 25,000 tons of soy-
fortified sorghum grits, will be distributed
by CARE to Indians participating in a Food
for Work program in areas susceptible to
drought. Value of the grain, including ocean
freight, is about $16 million.

The Government of India hopes by pro-
viding jobs on public works projects to raise
incomes of rural families, as well as to create
new employment opportunities, and to in-
crease agricultural production.

Projects to be undertaken in the Food
for Work program will include watershed
development, pasture improvement, foresta-

March 10, 1975

297

tion, and soil conservation. CARE will focus
the programs in districts with largest num-
bers of small marginal farmers and landless
laborers.

This Food for Peace donation is part of a
continuing U.S. program to provide India
with food aid. In fiscal year 1974, the U.S.
Government donated 232,000 tons of food to
India, valued at $77.7 million, including
ocean freight. In fiscal year 1975, AID ex-
pects to provide a total of 265,000 tons of
food valued at $92 million, including the new
donation of 50,000 tons.

U.S. Makes Grant to Israel
for Purchase of U.S. Goods

AID press release T.'-6 dated January 28

John E. Murphy, Acting Administrator of
the Agency for International Development,
and Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to
the United States, on January 28 signed an
agreement providing $150 million to Israel
for the import of U.S. commodities.

Following the signing of the documents.
Acting Administrator Murphy expressed the
hope of the American people that "the people
of Israel will look on this agreement as
further indication of the U.S. continued con-
cern and commitment to a lasting peace in
the Middle East."

The grant is part of the $652 million au-
thorized by Congress to assist the nations
of the Middle East "in their efforts to
achieve economic progress and political sta-
bility, which are the essential foundations
for a just and durable peace."

The grant will be made available to Israel
in the form of credits for the purchase of
chemical products, agricultural products,
pharmaceuticals, textiles, metal products,
structural steel, agricultural implements,
computer hardware, manufacturing machin-
ery, electrical transmission equipment,
trucks, medical equipment, and other goods.

U.S. and Iran Agree in Principle
on Investment in U.S. Airline

Following is a joint U.S.-Iranian statement
regarding Iranian Government investment in
Pan American Airways issued at Washington
on February 16.

In recent weeks the Government of Iran
and Pan American World Airways Inc. have
sought agreement in regard to the possible
investment by the Iranian Government in
Pan American. The United States Govern-
ment has been informed of these develop-
ments and has been in consultation with both
Pan American and the Government of Iran
on this subject.

The United States Government and the
Government of Iran recognize that any final
agreement reached between Iran and Pan
American World Airways Inc. is subject to
approval by the United States Civil Aero-
nautics Board, using its normally applied
laws and regulations. It is also understood
that there be appropriate provisions in such
an agreement which would satisfy various
requirements of the United States Depart-
ment of Defense vis-a-vis Pan American.
Both Governments note that in entering into
such an arrangement, the Government of
Iran has no interest in controlling the man-
agement or operations of Pan American. For
its part, the United States Government has
no objection in principle to the proposed
agreement.

Both the United States Government and
the Government of Iran regard the fruitful
consultations they have had on this issue as
an expression of their close cooperation and
a further contribution to the strengthening
of their relationship.

Department of State
Imperial Embassy of Iran
16 February 1975
Washington, D.C.

298

Department of State Bulletin

The Global Economy: The Issues of Energy and Trade

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. higersoll '■

The President has had long personal expe-
rience with the concerns of Michigan and the
Detroit economic community. He has asked
me to emphasize today that this Admin-
istration knows that foreign economic policy
cannot be divorced from the domestic econ-
omy. Decisions bearing on your economic
well-being and on the general prosperity of
this nation will not be made without your
interests in mind. We — the Department of
State and the entire Administration — are
determined to blend the creativity and ex-
pertise of business into the policymaking
process.

We cannot succeed in a foreign policy that
dwells increasingly on economics without
your support and understanding. We cannot
afford a policy that does not succeed.

As a former businessman and still a mem-
ber of the Chicago Economic Club, I can
sympathize with and relate to your con-
cerns. I would like to discuss some of them
with you. But first let me turn to some spe-
cific economic problems, and opportunities,
facing this nation.

With so many aspects of the global econ-
omy experiencing severe stress, there are
scores of issues to be addressed. But I will
restrict my comments today to two issues
in the international economy of most imme-
diate concern to Detroit — energy and trade.

In 1974 we paid over $24 billion to other
nations for energy. This is three times what
we paid in 1973. The sudden mammoth drain
of real national wealth is central to our pres-

^ Made before the Economic Club of Detroit at
Detroit, Mich., on Feb. 18 (text from press release

74).

ent economic crisis. It contributes to infla-
tion, unemployment, and recession.

There are two essential issues in the
energy crisis: price and assured supply.
Both are of deep concern to us. But ulti-
mately the supply of energy, our economy's
lifeline, is of fundamental importance. It is
inconceivable that we might permit the eco-
nomic and military security of our nation to
become more dependent on foreign sources
of energy that are vulnerable to interruption
at any moment.

Our dependence on imported oil increased
from virtually none in 1950 to 35 percent in
1973. If this trend is permitted to continue,
we will be dependent on imported oil for fully
half our oil needs in the 1980's.

Let us have no illusions about the impact
of such growing dependence on imports on
the security and prosperity of this nation.
An oil embargo lasting less than six months
and at its worst reducing our supply of im-
ported oil by only 15 percent created severe
economic dislocations in this country. Imag-
ine the consequences if half our total oil
supply suddenly were to be denied.

The decision to reverse the trend of grow-
ing dependence can only become harder as we
become increasingly reliant on foreign
sources of energy.

The time for action on conservation has
arrived. In the next few weeks we must
reach agreement on a comprehensive na-
tional energy program. If Congress does not
agree with the Administration's program,
then it has the responsibility to set forth a
workable alternative of its own. We cannot
continue to attack one another; let us attack
the problem instead of one another.

March 10, 1975

299

International Energy Strategy

While much of the debate over energy has
concerned what we should do here at home,
we have proceeded internationally to orches-
trate and implement a far-reaching strategy.
This has been done without much public at-
tention. But it is one of the major foreign
policy accomplishments of the postwar era.

Last February at the Washington Energy
Conference, Secretary Kissinger defined our
overall approach: First to create unity
among the major consumers, then to take
the measures necessary to strengthen the
consumers' position, and finally — from the
position of unity and strength — to engage
the producers in the search for a long-term
solution. We have come a long way toward
meeting our objectives.

By November 1974 we had made signifi-
cant progress toward consumer unity and in
limiting our vulnerability to future em-
bargoes. The International Energy Agency
(lEA) was established, and consumer na-
tions reached an unprecedented agreement
to share oil supplies in future emergencies.
Each participating nation is committed to
build an emergency stock of oil. In case of
an embargo such as we saw in 1973, each
nation will cut its consumption by the same
percentage, and available oil will be shared.
An embargo against one will be an embargo
against all.

In his November speech in Chicago Secre-
tary Kissinger set forth a program to reduce
consumer weakness in the face of the oil
producers' new financial power and to pre-
pare for a dialogue with the producers.

In the past three months we have made
concrete progress:

— The International Energy Agency is
working to coordinate national conservation
programs and launch a massive campaign to
develop new sources of energy. The purpose
is to reduce our consumption of imported oil
and develop alternative sources so that there
will be significant downward pressure on
cartel fuel prices.

— And so that no single nation will bo
forced by balance-of-payments problems to
attempt to save itself at the expense of

others, we have agreed to establish in the
Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-
opei-ation and Development (OECD) a $25
billion financial safety net. This solidarity
fund will provide financing to those hardest
hit by payments deficits. It will safeguard
all the member nations against shifts, with-
drawals, or cutoffs of funds by the producers.

These measures give us considerably en-
hanced security in the present situation. But
we must look to the future as well — to the
long-term effort to develop an abundant and
reliable supply of energy. We must accept
the fact that energy from these new sources
will cost considerably more than that from
the old ones and will never compete in cost
of production with Middle Eastern oil.

The United States has proposed a floor
price on imported oil or similar mechanisms
to encourage and protect the investments re-
quired to help us meet our energy needs for
the next decade — oil from the continental
shelf, coal, and nuclear energy. If the price
of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries] oil drops on the market,
these new sources of energy will remain
competitive. The floor price, however, might
not be high enough to encourage the devel-
opment of more expensive sources of energy
such as oil and gas from coal, tar sands, and
shale. We have proposed the establishment
of a synthetic fuels consortium with govern-
mental investment or guarantees to develop
our energy sources for the eighties — and
beyond.

With the increased solidarity and security
achieved over the past 18 months, the
major consumers are now approaching a
crucial dimension of our international energy
program: negotiations with the producers.
It has long been clear to the Administration
that no solution to the energy problem is
possible without a cooperative dialogue be-
tween producer and consumer countries. It
has also been clear that no dialogue could
succeed unless the consumers had a position
of their own.

We now have an agreed consumer position
on a financial safety net and a common ap-
proach to conservation. We are working with

300

Department of State Bulletin

our lEA partners to forge a cooperative
framework to accelerate the development of
alternative energy sources. Hopefully, we
can achieve agreement on this element in
time to hold a preparatory meeting with the
producers late next month.

Business-Government Cooperation on Energy

But the best laid international plans will
be of no avail unless we can do what is re-
quired of us at home. In no other ai'ea is the
success of our foreign and domestic policy
more closely linked. We cannot ask other
major consumers to reduce their consump-
tion of energy unless we are prepared to do
so as well. Nor can we expect the oil pro-
ducers to respect our position in the nego-
tiations ahead unless we launch a serious
effort to develop new sources of supply.

There are legitimate differences about tac-
tics, but it is imperative that we get on with
a comprehensive program in the weeks
ahead.

Achieving our goal of an assured supply
of energy at a reasonable cost will require
the close cooperation of business and gov-
ernment. You can help assure that our re-
duced consumption goals are realized by pro-
ducing more energy-efficient cars. I note that
Detroit will be taking a major step toward
reducing gasoline consumption by spending
$5 billion over the next four years to make
smaller and lighter cars.

You can also make the investment deci-
sions which will channel our enormous re-
search and development resources toward
finding new methods of conservation.

And on the political front, business can
play a key role in persuading the Congress
and the American people of the urgency of
the problem we face.

Finally, we seek your participation in a
new diplomatic initiative.

During the past year the United States
has established Cabinet-level Joint Commis-
sions with Middle Eastern countries. Two of
these, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are of obvious
political and economic concern to us. The
government is a catalytic agent in this Joint
Commission undertaking.

A primary purpose of our Joint Commis-
sion activities is to bi'oaden with these coun-
tries our common interest in political and
economic stability. With improved standards
of health and education and better living
conditions, these governments should become
a force for peace and development in the
region. We expect they will want to tie their
future to the benefits gained by close asso-
ciation with Western societies.

The Joint Commissions obviously cannot
succeed without the active interest and par-
ticipation of the private sector. Government
can establish the political and economic
framework. It is up to you to seize the oppor-
tunity for trade and investment in the area.

A More Open World Trading System

If energy is the number-one challenge
posed to this nation by the global economy,
trade cannot be far behind. And trade is an
issue in which the business community has
an indispensable role to play.

Since 1972 our exports have more than
doubled, to nearly $100 billion. Last year
alone the value of American exports in-
creased by 38 percent — and this at a time
when our total economic output was begin-
ning to slow down. Our new level of exports
supports over 31/2 million American jobs.
Had there not been an increase in the cost
of imported oil, we would have shown an
unprecedented trade surplus of $14 billion
in 1974. These figures prove that this coun-
try is competitive in world markets.

I know that Detroit feels threatened by
automotive imports. It is true that in the
first 11 months of 1974 we imported $11
billion worth of automotive vehicles, parts,
and engines. But let us not lose sight of the
fact that our automotive exports for the
same period were over $7.4 billion, and trac-
tors accounted for an additional $1.36 billion
in exports.

I am confident that with freer trade and
the enormous investment you are now mak-
ing to decrease size and weight and increase
efficiency, American automobiles will soon
be able to meet the competition head-on any-
where in the world.

March 10, 1975

301

This test of trade requires a new approach
on the part of both government and business.
We must realize that foreign markets are
increasingly important to our economic well-
being. We must continue to seek export op-
portunities. And we must fashion an inter-
national trading system that will allow
American goods to compete worldwide on
equal terms.

An important milestone in realizing our
objective of a freer and more equitable in-
ternational trading system will be the multi-
lateral trade negotiations getting underway
in earnest this year.

We can now approach those negotiations
with confidence. The Trade Act of 1974
passed by the Congress in December gives
us the authority to further America's inter-
ests and the cause of interdependence by
helping to shape a more just and open trad-
ing system.

Much of the commentary to date on the
Trade Act has centered on controversial is-
sues such as Soviet emigration and prefer-
ences for OPEC countries. We should not let
these comments obscure the fact that the
Trade Act of 1974 is a tremendous step for-
ward in opening up the international trading
system. It provides real opportunities for the
American business community.

Equally important, that act specifically
calls upon the President to obtain the private
sector's advice on negotiating objectives and
bargaining positions. For example, 26 Indus-
try Advisory Committees have been formed
to act as a liaison between the government
and key American industries on trade mat-
ters. These committees include many promi-
nent members of the Detroit business com-
munity.

Objectives in Trade Negotiations

But what about your specific concerns and
objectives related to trade? How does this
Administration plan to address them?

First, we must work to lower existing
tariff barriers to American exports. Most
industrialized nations are facing substantial
balance-of-payments deficits due in large

part to the rising cost of their oil imports.
Unilateral attempts to erase these deficits by
raising trade barriers would only lead to a
general decline in trade and could prompt an
economic collapse on the scale of the 1930's.
An international economic crisis of this mag-
nitude would have obvious political reper-
cussions. It could divide the world into
fiercely competing blocs — consumer against
producer, "have" against "have-not."

Last May the major trading nations of
Europe, North America, and Japan joined in
the OECD in a formal pledge not to react to
the present crisis by raising new barriers to
trade.

When you consider the strained state of
economic relations among these nations as
recently as 1972, and the widespread domes-
tic pressures to respond to economic diffi-
culty with protectionism, this pledge must
be considered a foreign policy accomplish-
ment of major proportions.

As we succeed in reducing or eliminating
tariffs, nontariff barriers become a tempting
instrument for unilateral protective action.
The reduction of nontariff impediments to
trade is thus the second major objective of
our negotiating strategy.

We must assure that nontariff barriers
such as export subsidies, product standards,
and restrictive government procurement
rules do not place American goods at a com-
petitive disadvantage.

Third, the multilateral trade negotiations
will also address the issue of an interna-
tional safeguard mechanism to cushion the
impact of freer trade on severely affected
domestic industries and labor. We plan to
negotiate a new international code for this
purpose.

Fourth, we must insure access to the raw
materials our economy requires. The United
States is dependent on imports for 82 per-
cent of its bauxite, 93 percent of its nickel,
31 percent of its iron ore, and 100 percent
of its tin and platinum.

The oil cartel must not become a model
for global trade in other raw materials. Re-
stricted production and rigged prices will

302

Department of State Bulletin

only lead to stagnation of the global economy
on which all nations depend. The United
States, as one of the world's leading ex-
porters and importers of commodities, has a
uniquely flexible and vital role to play.

We ai'e beginning to study the problems
that arise when commodities are in short
supply and how we might best cope with
such situations in the future. At the same
time we understand and sympathize with the
concern of the exporting nations that the
boom-bust cycle of commodity prices must
be tempered.

In responding to the challenge of the
global economy, we have accepted interde-
pendence. We are looking outward. The es-
tablishment of floating exchange rates which
preclude foreign currencies from being
undervalued has proven to the American
people that our business and industry are
up to the challenge of the world market.

As the potential for international trade
develops, business and industry have a re-
sponsibility to help us design a coherent
trade policy and to get out and compete
wholeheartedly for the world market.

Role of the Department of State

Some of you may harbor unflattering im-
pressions of the State Department and may
be surprised, or even alarmed, to hear that
the State Department is playing a leading
role in meeting the new economic challenge
to our nation. I know, because when I trav-
eled overseas in the fifties and early sixties
I refused to contact our Embassies after
learning that they had little interest in busi-
ness or commercial operations. But I have
traveled extensively in the seventies and can
attest that this is no longer the case.

The State Department today is actively,
effectively, engaged in international economic
policy — in meeting the challenge of energy,
in formulating a coherent, comprehensive
policy on food and critical minerals, in en-
couraging American exports, and in provid-
ing services to American businessmen. We
are working to negotiate a freer world trad-

ing system and to build an economic and
political environment in which trade can
flourish and American industry can compete.
As further evidence of our interest in com-
mercial operations, Secretary Kissinger has
appointed Charles Robinson, a businessman,
as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Economics and politics have become in-
separable ingredients of international af-
fairs. Any breakdown in the world economic
order would have political consequences, at
home and abroad, of deep concern to all of
us. The State Department is determined to
improve its ability to deal with the global
economy, but we do not pretend to have a
monopoly on economic wisdom. This Admin-
istration and this Secretary of State are
acutely aware of the requirement to read the
business community into the foreign policy
process. I encourage you to join us in the
search for improved means to get our ideas
across and talk out our problems.

Nowhere is the interaction between inter-
national affairs and domestic concerns more
evident than in Detroit. With the distinc-
tions between national and international
problems becoming increasingly irrelevant,
I urge each of you to take a more active role
in the nationwide debate and foreign policy
discussions which alone can develop a broad
consensus on where we are going and how
we want to get there.

For many years Detroit was tarred with
the image of a city which cared primarily
about production lines and sales quotas. To-
day there can be no doubt that this city is
inseparably a part of the world community.
There are Detroit organizations concerned
with foreign policy— the Chamber of Com-
merce, the Detroit Committee on Foreign
Relations, your local universities — that de-
serve your support.

As part of our effort to make communi-
cation between the government and the pri-
vate sector more useful, I would like to ask
Russell Swaney [president of the Economic
Club] to select 10 members of the Detroit
Economic Club who will come to Washington
in March for a dinner with State Depart-

March 10, 1975

303

ment, Commerce, Treasury, and other Ad-
ministration officials to discuss international
economic problems. We want you to decide
on the agenda, to come armed with the
issues of concern to you, and to give us an
opportunity to exchange ideas on how we
can best come to grips with them. In an era
of shifting trade patterns and the energy
crisis, America must adapt to change and
learn to manage new realities.

The interdependence of the global econ-
omy has rendered obsolete the concept of
"fortress America." If reduced to this kind
of isolation we would occupy a prison, not a
fortress.

Our efforts to curb energy dependency do
not imply that the United States can, or
should, exist in an economic vacuum. We will
have to accept the inevitability of change,
adapt to new circumstances, and compete.
Our country has the capacity to insure that
change becomes change for the better, and
we in government know full well that we
will not solve our critical economic and trade
problems without your counsel and support.

Mildred Marcy To Be Coordinator
for International Women's Year

Deputy Secretary Ingersoll announced on
February 11 the assignment of Mildred
Marcy as Coordinator for International
Women's Year within the Department of
State. Ms. Marcy is on detail to the Depart-
ment from the U.S. Information Agency,
where she has been Deputy Director of the
Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, as
well as Women's Activities Adviser and Fed-
eral Women's Program Coordinator, since
September 1973. (For biographic data, see
press release 54 dated February 11.)

In announcing the appointment, Deputy
Secretary Ingersoll said: "I am establishing
in the Department of State the position of
Coordinator for International Women's Year
with the primary responsibility of heading
the Secretariat that will work with the Na-
tional Commission for International Women's
Year, soon to be appointed. In addition, the

Coordinator will maintain liaison with the
United Nations, other governments, and the
U.S. Center for International Women's Year,
and be responsible for coordinating the U.S.
participation in the Mexico City conference."

U.S. Makes Contribution to U.N.
for Women's Year Conference

USUN press release 205/corr.l dated December 30

The United States, acting through the
Agency for International Development, on
December 30, 1974, made a contribution of
$100,000 to the United Nations to help pay
the costs of the International Women's Year
Conference.

The United Nations has designated 1975
as International Women's Year. The year
will serve to emphasize three themes : equal-
ity for women, the role of women in develop-
ment, and the contribution that women can
make to world peace. A focal point of the
year will be a major U.N. governmental con-
ference to be held in Mexico City from June
23 to July 4, 1975. Sponsored by the U.S.
delegation in cooperation with the delega-
tions of a number of developing countries,
the proposal for a conference won over-
whelming support at the 25th session of the
Commission on the Status of Women in
January 1974. The Commission's decision
was endorsed at the spring session of the
Economic and Social Council.

U.N. funds for the conference are limited,
and an appeal has gone out to member gov-
ernments for voluntary contributions. In re-
sponse to this appeal and to help insure the
success of the conference. Senator Charles
H. Percy, a public member of the U.S. dele-
gation to the 29th General Assembly, an-
nounced in October that the United States
would make a $100,000 contribution to help
pay the costs of the conference.

In a brief ceremony December 30 at U.N.
Headquarters Ambassador Barbara M.
White, acting on behalf of Ambassador John
Scali, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, signed a letter authorizing

304

Department of State Bulletin

the $100,000 grant to the United Nations.
Ismet Kittani, Executive Assistant to U.N.
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, signed on
behalf of the Secretary General.

President Establishes Commission
on International Women's Year

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'

Establishing a National Commission on the
Observance of International Women's Year,
1975

There is increasing recognition of, and interest in,
the contributions of women to the national life of
this country in all its important aspects — cultural,
political, economic, and social. Significant progress
continues in advancing the rights and responsibili-
ties of women, in opening new opportunities, and
in overcoming political, legal, social, and economic
handicaps to which women have long been subject.
Americans must now deal with those inequities that
still linger as barriers to the full participation of
women in our Nation's life. We must also support
and strengthen the laws that prohibit discrimination
based on sex.

The United Nations General Assembly, by pro-
claiming 1975 as International Women's Year, has
offered us an exceptional opportunity to focus atten-
tion throughout the country on the rights and re-
sponsibilities of women. Presidential Proclamation
No. 4262 of January 30, 1974, called upon the Con-
gress and the people of the United States, interested
groups and organizations, officials of the Federal
Government and of State and local governments,
educational institutions, and all others who can be
of help to provide for the national observance of
International Women's Year with practical and con-
structive measures for the advancement of women
in the United States. ..

I have now determined that it would be in the
public interest to establish a National Commission
on the Observance of International Women's Year,
1975.

Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested
in me as President of the United States, it is
ordered:

Section 1. Establishment of a National Commis-
sion, (a) There is hereby established a National
Commission on the Observance of International
Women's Year, 1975.

'No. 11832; 40 Fed. Reg. 2415, Jan. 13. For re-
marks made by President Ford upon signing the
Executive order, see Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents dated Jan. 13, p. 29.

(b) The Commission shall consist of not more
than 35 members to be appointed by the President
from among citizens in private life. The President
shall designate the presiding officer, who may desig-
nate from among the members of the Commission
as many vice presiding officers as necessary.

(e) The President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives are invited to
designate two Members of each House to serve on
the Commission.

(d) The members of the Commission shall serve
without compensation, but shall be entitled to re-
ceive travel expenses, including per diem, in lieu of
subsistence as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703).

Sec. 2. Functions of the Commission, (a) The
Commission shall promote the national observance
in the United States of International Women's Year.
To this end, it will focus attention on the need to
encourage appropriate and relevant cooperative ac-
tivity in the field of women's rights and responsi-
bilities.

(b) The Commission shall take as its action
agenda the relevant parts of the resolution adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly proclaim-
ing 1975 as International Women's Year:

(1) To promote equality between men and women.

(2) To ensure the full integration of women in
the total development effort, especially by empha-
sizing women's responsibility and important role in
economic, social and cultural development at the
national, regional and international levels, particu-
larly during the Second United Nations Develop-
ment Decade.

(3) To recognize the importance of women's in-
creasing contribution to the development of friendly
relations and cooperation among States and to the
strengthening of world peace.

(c) The Commission shall keep itself informed of
activities undertaken or planned by various organi-
zations and groups in the United States in observ-
ance of the Year and shall consult with such groups
including the United States Center for Interna-
tional Women's Year.

(d) The Com.mission shall encourage the public
and private sectors to set forth objectives to be
achieved as part of the program observing Inter-
national Women's Year, as provided in the Presi-
dential Proclamation.

(e) The Commission shall, through close liaison
with appropriate Government agencies and their
public advisory committees, keep itself informed
about and make known to the public all major pro-
grams and special efforts during International
Women's Year which are supported by those agen-
cies.

(f) The Commission shall hold meetings at such
times and places as the presiding officer shall deter-
mine. It may assemble and disseminate information,
issue reports and other publications and conduct

March 10, 1975

305

such other activities as it may deem appropriate to
provide for effective participation of the United
States in the domestic observance of International
Women's Year.

(g) The Commission may establish, within the
limits of available funds, such subcommittees or
working groups as may be necessary for the fulfill-
ment of its tasks. The membership may include
persons not members of the Commission.

(h) The Commission shall conclude its work by
the end of the year 1975 and make a report to the
President within thirty days thereafter. The Com-
mission shall then be terminated.

Sec. 3. Assistance and Cooperation, (a) The Com-
mission may request any agency of the Executive
branch of the Government to furnish it with such
information, advice, and services as may be useful
for the fulfillment of the Commission's functions
under this Order.

(b) The agencies of the E.xecutive branch are
authorized, to the extent permitted by law, to pro-
vide the Commission with administrative services,
information, facilities and funds necessary for its
activities.

(c) The Commission may procure, subject to the
availability of funds, the temporary professional
services of individuals to assist in its work, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3109 of
Title 5 of the United States Code.

Sec. 4. Responsibilities of Government Depart-
ments. Each agency of the Executive branch shall
designate at least two persons, preferably a man
and a woman, to be responsible for planning and
implementation of projects and programs within
such departments and agencies for the domestic
observance of International Women's Year. Persons
so designated shall constitute membership of an
interdepartmental task force for International
Women's Year. The Department of State shall des-
ignate the presiding officer. The task force will
coordinate the activities undertaken by the Execu-
tive branch of the United States Government as
well as those undertaken by the Commission in the
domestic observance of International Women's Year.

M^^^ ^' ^^

The White House, January 9, 1975.

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed docujnents (such as
those listed beloiv) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
10017.

General Assembly

Report of the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament. A/9708. September 10, 1974. 50 pp.,
plus annexes.

United Nations Fund for Namibia. Report of the
Secretary General. A/9725. September 12, 1974.
11pp.

Permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Re-
port of the Secretary General. A/9716. September
20, 1974. 38 pp.

Violations of the Charter of the United Nations and
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council by the South African regime. Report
of the Special Committee on Apartheid. A/9780.
September 30, 1974. 23 pp.

Arbitrary laws and regulations enacted and applied
by the South African regime to repress the legiti-
mate struggle for freedom. Report of the Special
Committee on Apartheid. A/9781. October 2, 1974.
58 pp.

Economic cooperation among developing countries.
Report of the Secretary General. A/9760. October
16, 1974. 32 pp.

Effects of atomic radiation. Report of the U.N. Sci-
entific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-
tion. A/9632. October 18, 1974. 7 pp.

Aid to the Sudano-Sahelian populations threatened
with famine. Report of the Secretary General. A/
9737. October 23, 1974. 7 pp.

Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force
and of the United Nations Disengagement Ob-
server Force. Report of the Secretary General. A/
9822. October 30, 1974. 11 pp.

Program of action on the establishment of a new in-
ternational economic order. Progress of the United
Nations Emergency Operation. A/9828. November
6, 1974. 18 pp.

United Nations Educational and Training Program
for Southern Africa. Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral covering the period November 22, 1973-No-
vember 4, 1974. A/9845. November 25, 1974. 7 pp.

306

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

The International Energy Program and U.S. Obligations
as a Member of the International Energy Agency

Statement by Thomas O. Enders

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ^

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
appear before your committee to provide
testimony on that portion of the President's
energy proposals related to the International
Energy Program and our obligations as a
member of the International Energy Agency
(lEA).

Over the past year, the central objective
of our international energy policy has been
the development of a comprehensive frame-
work for consumer country cooperation.
These efforts had their formal beginning
with the Washington Energy Conference in
February 1974 and continued through the
work of the Energy Coordinating Group
set up at the time of the Washington Con-
ference. This group of 12 nations (the United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Canada,
Japan, and the United States) undertook to
develop a cooperative international action
program to deal with the world energy sit-
uation.

The result was the establishment, last
November, of the International Energy
Agency under OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development] aus-

' Presented to the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs on Feb. 13. The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

pices.- The Agency initially had 16 partici-
pating countries : Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Ire-
land, the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Austria, Turkey, Canada, the
United States, and Japan. In the period since
its formation. New Zealand has also become
a member and Norway has become an asso-
ciate member.

Throughout the negotiations which led to
the formation of the lEA, we pressed for a
common and comprehensive approach by con-
sumer countries to energy problems. From
the outset the United States has believed
that only through such an approach can we
hope to solve the world energy crisis. Last
year's oil embargo and the subsequent sud-
den massive increase of oil prices clearly
demonstrated the high cost of an uncoordi-
nated approach by consumer countries to
their growing dependence on imported oil.
Evidence of this cost was visible in the
scramble for oil at any price, in the serious
economic disruption in importing countries,
and in the threat to the political, economic,
and security cohesion of the industrialized
countries. Indeed, the independence of politi-
cal decision of the industrialized democracies
was put under a shadow by the oil embargo.
It became clear that if that independence, and
the integrity of the political, economic, and

- The Agreement on an International Energy Pro-
gram was signed at Paris on Nov. 18, 1974.

March 10, 1975

307

social systems of the West, are to be main-
tained, the energy crisis and the threat of
future oil embargoes had to be dealt with by
the cooperative action of the industrialized
democracies.

In order to avoid a recurrence of the un-
acceptable costs of the oil embargo, we and
our partners set as our first objective the
development of a capability to deal with
future supply interruptions in a cooperative
framework. The emergency program which
has emerged from these negotiations pro-
vides us with a safety net which would be in
place should a supply emergency develop in
the future. We and our partners have also
agreed on the need to develop a long-term
program to reduce the dependence of the
industrialized democracies on imported oil
through joint programs and efforts in the
fields of conservation and the development
of alternative energy supplies.

In addition to these efl'orts, which are
part of the International Energy Program
adopted by the International Energy Agency,
the major industrial countries have also de-
cided to create a financial safety net in the
form of a $25 billion solidarity fund for
mutual support in financial crisis.

Together, the International Energy Pro-
gram of the lEA and the financial solidarity
fund represent the first concrete steps in the
development of the cooperative consumer
approach to energy crisis issues which the
United States has sought from the outset.
In an energy picture which is largely grim,
these vital initiatives reassuringly stand out.
The security and well-being of the people of
the United States require that these initia-
tives be implemented and developed to their
full potential.

In view of the focus of today's hearing,
I wish to concentrate my statement on the
International Energy Program and its im-
plementation. This committee is, of course,
informed about the basic elements of the
emergency program. However, because this
program is central to the energy strategy
of the industrialized democracies, I would
like to review its main features. Under this
program lEA countries have agreed to under-
take three interrelated commitments:

— To build common levels of emergency
reserves, measured in terms of ability to
live without imports of petroleum for speci-
fied periods of time;

— To develop pre-positioned demand re-
straint programs which will enable them
in the event of a supply interruption imme-
diately to cut oil consumption by a common
rate; and

— To allocate available oil in an emergency,
both domestic production and continuing
imports, in order to spread the shortfall
evenly among the member countries.

Emergency Reserves and Demand Restraint

Emergency reserves are defined under the
program in terms of emergency self-suffi-
ciency; i.e., a country's ability to live with-
out imports for a given period of time. The
initial self-sufficiency target has been set
at 60 days but will be raised to 90 days
within three to four years. The targets can
be met by stocks, standby production facili-
ties, or by switching in an emergency from
oil to other energy sources.

In fixing the self-sufficiency targets, we
have sought to strike a reasonable balance
between the emergency needs of the members
of the lEA and the imposition of an un-
acceptably high .stockholding requirement
which would both be expensive and have an
undesirable impact on world oil prices. Emer-
gency stocks are defined as total stocks under
the OECD stock definition, minus those which
would be physically unavailable in even the
most severe emergency. Under this defini-
tion, present U.S. stocks equal more than
100 days of normal imports. All other IE A
countries now have emergency reserves
either in excess of or very near the 60-day
level. The lEA presently has under review
this stock definition to determine whether
it oft'ers an adequate degree of protection.

Each member country further agrees to
cut its consumption by a common percentage
during an emergency. Such reductions would
be triggered as supply shortfalls reach spe-
cific thresholds. In the event of a 7 percent
shortfall to the group as a whole, all coun-
tries would cut oil consumption by 7 percent.

308

Department of State Bulletin

Were supplies to fall by as much as 12 per-
cent, consumption would be reduced by 10
percent throughout the group. In the case
of a very severe or protracted crisis the
group can decide upon further emergency
measures, including additional demand re-
straint measures.

Allocation of Oil

The program of oil allocation w^ould come
into operation in either a general supply
emergency affecting the group as a whole
or in response to a selective embargo aimed
at one or more individual countries. The
mechanism would operate in this way: When
the supply shortfall reaches a preestablished
threshold, all countries will restrain demand
by a common rate and draw down emergency
supplies and share available oil so they can
all live for the same period of time at the
common agreed level of consumption. The
program responds to both a general supply
crisis and a selective embargo against one
or more participating countries. The inte-
grated mechanism would operate as follows :

Selective embargo. In the case of a selective
embargo, when one or more members lose
more than 7 percent of their oil consumption
but the group as a whole loses less than 7
percent of its total consumption, the em-
bargoed country absorbs its embargo loss
up to 7 percent of its consumption (this is
the self-risk element under the program) and
the other members share the shortfall beyond
7 percent among themselves on the basis of
consumption. For the United States and
Canada, the 7 percent loss can be applied to
our eastern regions since our domestic mar-
kets are not completely integrated.

General crisis. In the case of a general
crisis, as contrasted with a selective em-
bargo :

On the first level: When the group as a
whole loses between 7 and 12 percent of its
normal consumption:

— Each country restrains demand 7 per-
cent.

— The remaining shortfall is shared among
all members on the basis of imports.

— Countries draw upon emergency sup-
plies as necessary to maintain consumption
at 90 percent of normal levels.

On the second level : When the group as
a whole loses at least 12 percent of its normal
consumption :

— Each country restrains demand by 10
percent.

■ — The remaining shortfall is shared among
all on the basis of imports.

— Countries draw down their emergency
supplies as necessary to maintain consump-
tion at 90 percent of normal levels.

An important element of the program is
its strong presumption of action by the
group in facing a supply shortfall. The se-
quence of activation of the demand restraint
and allocation arrangements in the event of
a given cutback in supply is highly auto-
matic and can be reversed only by a very
strong majority of the participating coun-
tries.

Benefits for Participating Countries

The program contains a positive balance
of benefits and costs for the United States
as well as for the other participating coun-
tries. In summary, all members of the lEA
benefit from:

The program's deterrent effect. In demon-
strating our determination as a group to
face a possible supply interruption we lessen
its very likelihood, thus lessening the effec-
tiveness of oil as an economic and political
weapon.

Tangible evidence of political solidarity.
By agreeing in advance on our reaction to
and behavior in a future supply cutback we
greatly reduce the risk of conflict and strain
in our relationship should another embargo
be imposed.

A fair sharing of burdens among all
the participating countries. Those countries
with domestic production, such as the United
States and Canada, undertake to cut oil con-
sumption by a common percentage in the
event of an emergency whereas those coun-
tries with high import dependence, such as

March 10, 1975

309

Japan and much of Europe, bear a propor-
tionally greater share of the emergency
stockpiling requirement. Futhermore, the
psychological assurance of shared oil pro-
vides a strong incentive for them to actually
use these reserves.

Finally, all lEA members will benefit by
avoiding pressure on price during any fu-
ture crisis; the provisions for emergency
reserves, demand restraint, and sharing of
available oil should provide the necessary
protection against the chaotic situation and
irrational behavior which triggered soaring
prices during the last embargo.

In principle, U.S. domestic oil production
is available for international allocation under
the emergency program. In practice, how-
ever, only under the most extreme emergency
situation would the United States ever be
called upon to share any of its domestic
production with the other lEA countries.
We would of course be called upon to share
imports still flowing to the United States. In
the event of a selective embargo against the
United States which cut back our available
oil by more than 7 percent, we would receive
oil from the other member countries of the
International Energy Agency.

Oil Market Information System

The lEA member countries have also
agreed that the success of the Agency's work
requires a mechanism to assure that the
participating governments are sufficiently
informed regarding the operation of the
complex international oil market and the
activities of the international oil companies.
To this end, the International Energy Pro-
gram provides for a two-part information
system :

A general section which would include

data on the international oil market and the
operations of oil companies during noncrisis
periods; and

— A special section to provide the ad-
ditional information required for efficient
operation of the emergency program in a
period of crisis.

Both elements of the system will be de-

veloped in close consultation with the oil in-
dustry, to assure operation in a manner
which will guarantee the confidential nature
of the information made available and to
protect the proprietary nature of information
where required. In addition, care has been
taken not to reduce competition within the
industry and to observe the requirements
of U.S. antitrust and other laws. A frame-
work for consultations with individual com-
panies is also envisaged to handle the im-
plementation of the emergency program and
other problems that may arise from time
to time.

International Energy Agreement

The Agreement on an International Energy
Program shall remain in force for a period
of 10 years from the date of its entry into
force and will remain in force thereafter
until such time as the Governing Board [of
the lEA], acting by majority, should decide
its termination. There is a provision for a
general review of the agreement after May
1, 1980. Any participating country may with-
draw from the Agency upon 12 months'
written notice to the depositary government,
but not less than three years after the first
day of the provisional application of the
agreement.

Why an executive agreement and not a
treaty? The choice between the two alter-
native legal vehicles was influenced by what
our partners could do. Some of the original
members of the negotiating group informed
us that ratification of a treaty would require
up to four years — clearly too long in an
emergency when there is a high premium
on immediate action. With the group opting
for what in our practice is termed an execu-
tive agreement, it seemed to us inappropriate
to present the agreement as a treaty.

More than this, we felt that we were and
are on sound constitutional ground in agree-
ing to conclude an executive agreement
rather than a treaty for two reasons : First,
much of the Agreement on an International
Energy Program is authorized by legisla-
tion currently in force ; second, we have had
and have every intention of seeking the

310

Department of State Bulletin

fullest concurrence of the Congress by the
means of the adoption of implementing au-
thority, as we now do in the legislation on
whose behalf I am testifying today.

Legislative Requirements

I would like to refer now to the relation-
ship between title XIII of the Energy In-
dependence Act [S. 594] and the commit-
ments we have undertaken in the Agreement
on an International Energy Program. At
the present time, the agreement binds us
only provisionally ; that is, we are obligated
to apply it only to the extent that is not in-
consistent with existing legislation until we
give notice that the United States, having
complied with its constitutional procedures,
consents to be fully bound. It was our view in
negotiating the agreement that implementing
legislation would be both necessary and ap-
propriate before the United States could
agree to be bound by the full range of com-
mitments embodied in the International En-
ergy Program. Title XIII would, we believe,
provide us with the authority we need to
confirm, complete, and implement our com-
mitments.

Section 1304, and to some extent 1305,
provide the authority we need for the time
being to continue to fulfill the commitment
to maintain stocks or equivalent means of
insuring self-sufficiency in oil consumption
for at least 60 days in the event that imports
are cut off. As both the definition of stocks
and the number of days of self-sufficiency
required are reevaluated, title II of the En-
ergy Independence Act, which provides for
a national strategic petroleum reserve, is
also likely to be particularly relevant to our
obligations.

Sections 1306 and 1307 of the bill provide
the authority to fulfill our commitment to
develop contingent oil demand restraint
measures which could be implemented dur-
ing an emergency to cut consumption by the
amount required under the agreement.

Section 1311 provides the authority we
need to insure that the allocation among
lEA members required by the agreement
is carried out by requiring oil companies to

take action which may be necessary. The
members are agreed, however, that to the
extent possible oil companies should vol-
untarily make the adjustments required by
the agreement in a period of emergency
shortage under the close supervision of the
lEA. Section 1312 would authorize voluntary
agreements, with appropriate limitations
and safeguards, to enable oil companies to
prepare for and carry out this function in
an emergency without risk of liability under
the antitrust laws.

Section 1313 is intended to permit persons
to comply with mandates issued under au-
thority of title XIII without risking liability,
e.g., for violation of antitrust laws or for
breach of contract.

I have referred earlier to two other im-
portant aspects of the international energy
agreement : long-term cooperation in the field
of energy and the exchange of information on
the oil market. Sections 1312 and 1315 of
the bill support these objectives.

Certain elements of the authority provided
in the bill introduced by Senator Jack-
son would undoubtedly be useful in the imple-
mentation of U.S. obligations under the in-
ternational energy agreement. As I under-
stand it, however, this bill does not, and is
not intended to, cover all of our commitments
under that agreement. Therefore we are
strongly of the view that title XIII of S. 594
should be enacted.

Under the agreement, it is contemplated
that the participating countries, including
the United States, will bring the agreement
fully and definitively into force in accordance
with their respective constitutional and legal
procedures by May 1, 1975. It is of the high-
est importance that the United States meet
this deadline in order to maintain the mo-
mentum of international cooperation achieved
in the lEA and in order to demonstrate to
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries] that we are serious in our
efi'orts to meet the energy crisis. Accordingly,
I wish to express the earnest hope that the
Congress will act quickly and decisively to
grant the authority that will permit us to
move ahead in this critical international
endeavor.

March 10, 1975

311

The Role of Financial Mechanisms in the Overall Oil Strategy

Statement by Thomas O. Enders

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Biisiness Affair's '■

You have asked me to discuss the $25
bilHon financial solidarity fund which Secre-
taries Kissinger and Simon [Secretary of
the Treasury William E. Simon] proposed
last November. You also requested informa-
tion on IMF [International Monetary Fund]
facilities to recycle surplus oil revenues.

I will concentrate on the foreign policy
dimensions of these financial mechanisms
and relate them to our overall strategy on
the oil crisis. Assistant Secretary [for Inter-
national Affairs Charles A.] Cooper of the
Treasury, when he testifies next week, will
be the best source on technical questions. As
you know, he is representing us in Paris at
the discussions to draft the agreement estab-
lishing the $25 billion OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development]
facility.

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the
subsequent quadrupling of oil prices have
profoundly altered international economic
relations. In fact, they have given the world
economy its greatest shock since the Great
Depression of the thirties. Higher oil prices
have substantially reduced real income in
consuming countries, added significantly to
inflationary pressures, and presented a long-
run balance-of -payments adjustment prob-
lem of impressive magnitude.

'Presented to the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Feb. 14. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.

In response, the industrial nations have
shaped an integrated strategy. It has three
principal elements:

— To protect against a new embargo,
major consuming nations need to stockpile
more oil and agree on how to share oil in an
emergency. The new International Energy
Agency (lEA) now has such arrangements
virtually in place.

— For the long run, we have no alterna-
tive to reducing severely our dependence on
imported oil. This means joint action by oil-
consuming nations to conserve energy and
develop new energy sources. We are making
progress in this direction in the lEA frame-
work.

— For the short and medium term, we
must insure that consuming nations have
the balance-of-payments financing they need.
Such financing is not a permanent solution.
What it does is buy time. It tides us over
the disequilibrium period before energy con-
servation and development measures create
the necessary conditions for full adjustment
in the volume and price of oil imports.

These three elements are interrelated and
mutually reinforcing. Success of any one
depends in part on implementation of the
others. It does no good to agree on a con-
certed plan to withstand a new oil emer-
gency if at the same time we leave ourselves
exposed to sudden, predatory shifts of as-
sets by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] members. It does no
good to adopt a long-term policy to get the

312

Department of State Bulletin

oil price down through conservation and
development of alternative sources unless
industrialized countries can avoid financial
crisis while waiting for those programs to
take effect. And it does no good to protect
the consuming countries from financial crisis
through devices such as the financial safety
net unless we have a convincing strategy to
bring the price of oil down in the future;
for only if the price falls can the structure
of petrodollar debts now being built up be
stabilized and paid off.

Balance-of-payments financing also relates
directly to the health of the world economy
in terms of output and employment. Growth
of real GNP [gross national product] both
here and abroad is now in a period of decline,
and governments are taking measures to re-
flate their economies. They will be more suc-
cessful in their eff'orts to return to full
employment at moderate rates of inflation
if they have the assurance that balance-of-
payments deficits caused by higher oil prices
can be temporarily financed. The success of
renewed growth abroad will of course help
U.S. exports, and increased export sales will
in turn boost the recovery of the U.S. econ-
omy.

If we do not find ways to assure financial
security, we face these risks:

— Some of our trading partners may be
forced to seek immediate adjustment
through trade and payments restrictions.
This is the beggar-your-neighbor approach
which was so destructive in the thirties. It
is an illusion. Attempts to shift the distribu-
tion of an unavoidable aggregate deficit only
invite retaliation. They inevitably leave
everyone worse off.

— Some countries may attempt to balance
their oil deficits by reducing aggregate eco-
nomic activity and employment to intolerable
levels. The domestic economic pain resulting
is obvious. Less obvious but just as impor-
tant are the political repercussions. Eco-
nomic unrest often builds the power base of
extreme factions on both the right and left,
as we saw in the thirties. And recession in
one country means slower economic activity
in all.

— Some countries may seek to protect
their interests in special bilateral trade, pro-
viding inducements to attract OPEC funds,
or trying to bargain off access to oil for
industrial goods. These policies also would
be self-defeating; for other consuming coun-
tries would follow suit, and we would all end
up with less favorable investment and oil
terms.

Clearly there is no alternative to common
action by consumers. Before turning to what
this means for finance, we should be more
precise about the nature of the recycling
problem.

Nature of the Recycling Problem

One side of the coin is the vast accumula-
tion of funds by key OPEC nations. Their
current account surplus last year totaled $60
billion. Most observers expect the figure for
1975 to be of the same order. Beyond that,
the crystal ball gets cloudier.

Recently, there have been a number of
optimistic projections regarding the future
evolution of OPEC surpluses. Some estimates
indicate that the surplus peaked in 1974
and will disappear by 1980. I hope they are
right. To the extent that we act wisely they
will tend to be. To a certain extent, however,
the most optimistic forecasts assume away
the problem. They make some very critical
assumptions about the price of oil, the distri-
bution of OPEC production, and the growth
of OPEC imports. For example, press re-
ports have cited estimates in a Brookings
study called "Energy and U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy." It assumes that the OPEC govern-
ments' take will drop to $5.50 per barrel by
1976 if we think in 1973 prices. The average
price for the 1974-85 period is hypothesized
at roughly the same level. Finally, all coun-
tries but Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and
the United Arab Emirates are assumed to
spend their entire oil revenues on imports of
goods and services, regardless of the capaci-
ties of existing ports and internal distribu-
tion systems to handle such an enormous
increase in trade.

We can hope for such a result. But with

March 10, 1975

313

oil at $11, it would be wrong to base our
policy on such hopes. It is doubtful that the
oil price will drop by 50 percent within a
year. It is thus probable that OPEC as a
group will run substantial surpluses on cur-
rent account throughout this decade, reach-
ing balance-of-payments equilibrium only in
the 1980's. In any case, almost all of the
projections show substantial accumulations
over the next two-three years, which in it-
self is enough to cause us real problems.
The power of the petrodollar weapon is there,
whether the accumulation by 1980 is $300
billion or $500 billion.

In the aggregate, the OPEC investable
surpluses must return as capital flows to oil-
consuming nations. There is literally no-
where else for them to go. The distribution
of the return flow is, however, far from
optimal. There is no coincidence between the
most favorable investment markets from the
OPEC standpoint and the flnancing needs of
consuming countries. This is the essence of
the recycling problem. The investment strat-
egies of key OPEC countries are still very
conservative. The excess oil revenues go
mostly in liquid form to highly developed
capital markets. Forty billion dollars of the
$60 billion accumulated last year flowed to
the U.S., U.K., and Eurodollar markets.
Precious little went to the nations e.xperienc-
ing the worst balance-of-payments problems
as a result of the oil crisis. There is auto-
matic financing neither for developed coun-
tries considered less creditworthy nor for
those developing nations to which higher oil
prices have dealt a crippling blow.

Up until last summer, many thought that
the private market could set things right
without government intervention. In fact,
private financial markets have handled well
the major burden of the problem caused by
the disparity between OPEC investment
flows and oil importers' deficits. But it is not
reasonable to test their capacity in the face
of continued large surpluses. The banking
environment is not conducive to allowing
banks to carry the entire recycling task
without some backup or safety-net facility
of official financing.

In recent years, we have witnessed an ex-

pansion of bank credit which has left the cap-
ital-a.sset ratios of many institutions at low
levels. In addition, bad management and ex-
cessive foreign exchange speculation have
led to several well-publicized bank failures.
Under such circumstances, international
banks are hard pressed to use volatile short-
term deposits as a base for long-term lend-
ing. It would also not be prudent for them
to develop an excessive exposure in coun-
tries not considered creditworthy by tradi-
tional banking standards.

By last fall, it was apparent to us that
new multilateral approaches to balance-of-
payments financing were in order. Our anal-
ysis indicated the need for a three-track
approach. The first two involve expanded use
of the IMF. The third is the $25 billion
OECD facility. Let us turn first to the IMF.

IMF Recycling Facilities

In the IMF, we supported the establish-
ment last spring of a special oil facility. Its
purpose was to provide oil deficit countries
access to a special fund based on a formula
which took into account incremental oil defi-
cits and international reserve positions. Bor-
rowers must make necessary policy adjust-
ments to lower their financing needs. The oil
facility was financed by loans from oil pro-
ducers with a 7 percent interest i-ate and
seven-year repayment terms. The producers
in 1974 agreed to put over $31/2 billion on
call. So far, several developed countries,
notably Italy, and many underdeveloped ones
have made drawings totaling over $21/3
billion. The rest should be used shortly.

We always envisaged expanded IMF lend-
ing in 1975 as the first, and most important,
of the three financial tracks of our overall
oil strategy. For a number of reasons, how-
ever, we felt that an enlarged oil facility was
not the best way to go about this:

— As time goes on, simple incremental oil
deficits take on less and less meaning as indi-
cators of oil-related balance-of-payments
problems. This happens because adjustments
to higher oil prices takes place in all compo-
nents of the balance of payments, not just
in the oil portion of the trade account. For

314

Department of State Bulletin

example, some countries receive more OPEC
investments. Others are better able to ex-
pand exports to OPEC nations.

— Also, we felt that the IMF should use
its own large resources directly to provide
balance-of-payments financing rather than
using them, in effect, as collateral for bor-
rowing.

We therefore proposed that the IMF ex-
pand its lending through liberalization of its
lending in the so-called credit tranche. Most
other nations strongly supported, however,
an additional expansion of the oil facility. In
the end, a compromise was reached. The IMF
Interim Committee in mid-January agreed
on an enlarged oil facility for 1975. The
committee approved a figure of $6 billion
for its level, substantially less than earlier
talked about. At the same time, it was
agreed that the IMF would make greater use
of its normal lending resources in 1975 and
consider credit-tranche liberalization for
1976.

The oil facility will be of particular bene-
fit to the better-off of the less developed
countries, those who have some access to
private capital markets but need further
residual financing. We realized, however,
that its near-commercial terms were not ap-
propriate for the pooi'est developing coun-
tries. Secretary Kissinger therefore proposed
last November a second financing track for
these nations. It consisted of a special trust
fund to be set up under IMF management to
lend to them on highly concessional terms.
We envisaged major contributions to the
trust fund coming from oil producers, from
other countries in a strong reserve position,
and from the proceeds of sales of IMF
gold.

There is general agreement that some sort
of concessional arrangements in the IMF are
needed for the hardest hit developing na-
tions. For this purpose the Interim Commit-
tee has endorsed for 1975 the idea of a spe-
cial account of the oil facility which would
reduce the interest burdens of borrowings by
these countries from the facility. In addition,
our trust fund proposal is still being con-
sidered in this connection along with a num-
ber of similar concepts advanced by others.

Basic Approach of Financial Solidarity Fund

Contrary to many press reports, we never
visualized the financial solidarity fund as a
competitor of IMF recycling mechanisms.
Rather, it is a complement. We need to do
both. We proposed a fund for OECD nations
outside the IMF because of the vast magni-
tude of the sums involved. In addition, we
thought it very important to link access to
these funds with policies of consumer soli-
darity designed to improve the supply-and-
demand conditions for internationally traded
oil. As I see them, the key features of the
solidarity fund are the following:

— It is temporary. Its main purpose is to
enable and encourage consuming countries
to follow responsible policies both on the
domestic and the international plane while
waiting for basic energy policy decisions to
take effect. Borrowing from the facility will
be solidly conditioned on the pursuit of such
policies.

— It is not a giveaway program or an aid
fund. Rather, it is a mutual support facility.
Every member has the possibility of receiv-
ing support when needed in an amount at
least equivalent to its commitment to help
others. Lending will be on market-related
terms and on the basis of established criteria
regarding appropi'iate economic and energy
policies.

— Its purpose is not to create new capital
funds, but to reshuffle net flows of already
existing funds, which of course include the
large collective financial surplus of the oil
producers. Thus it is not a call on the real
economic resources available to consumers.

— It is not the first line of financing for
participating countries. We do not visualize
that a nation must be on the verge of bank-
ruptcy before obtaining access to the facil-
ity. Borrowing nations must have, however,
made a reasonable use of other available
sources of financing, including the IMF.

— It is structured so as to distribute risk
equitably among participating consuming
nations.

— It is subject to approval by Congress and
the legislatures of most other participating
countries.

March 10, 1975

315

In conclusion, I will try to answer the
specific questions you have raised about the
financial solidarity fund. You will realize,
however, that all the details have not yet
been worked out, although we expect final
agreement shortly in the ad hoc working
group of the OECD.

Fundraising Methods

The OECD ad hoc working group, which
is now preparing the draft agreement on the
facility, is considering the methods whereby
participants may finance their creditor obli-
gations. The Group of Ten Ministers sug-
gested in mid-January that the financing
methods might include direct contributions
and/or joint borrowing in capital markets.
They also agreed that, until the full estab-
lishment of the new arrangement, there
might also be temporary financing through
credit arrangements between central banks.
How each participating government finances
its contribution will hinge on its own legal
and political constraints. We feel, however,
that direct government loans to the facility
are cheaper and more efficient than the use
of joint government guarantees. Direct loans
also provide more operational flexibility.

Eligibility Requirements for Borrowing

The new mechanism is a financial safety
net. It is not the first source of external
assistance to which governments should
turn. The facility's governing board would
be expected to assure itself that a prospec-
tive borrowing government had already ex-
hausted readily available sources of financ-
ing. The board would of course have to use
its judgment in determining what was a
reasonable effort along these lines, given
existing circumstances and the seriousness
of the situation. The board would also expect
that the borrowing government was taking
reasonable, basic economic policy measures
to move toward long-term balance-of-pay-
ments equilibrium. We would expect the
board in reaching its judgments to look not

just at a borrowing country's oil deficit but
at its overall balance-of-payments position.
In addition, there would be a proscription
that nations putting on new trade and pay-
ments restrictions would not be eligible for
loans. Finally, and most importantly, bor-
rowing governments would have to show
that they are making a strong effort, in con-
junction with other IE A members, to con-
serve energy and develop new energy
sources.

When other participants consider a bor-
rower's request for a loan, they will normally
decide on the matter by a two-thirds major-
ity. Their decision will encompass whether
to grant the loan and, if so, what its terms
and conditions will be. The granting of a loan
beyond the amount of a country's original
quota in the facility will require a very
strong majority. A loan beyond 200 percent
of a member's quota will require a unani-
mous decision.

U.S. Contribution

The size of its quota in the facility will
determine a participating country's voting
power as well as its lending obligations and
right to borrow. Quotas will reflect the size
of different industrial countries' economies
and shares in international trade. In accord-
ance with these criteria, the U.S. share
ought to be between 25 and 30 percent. This
means the United States could conceivably
lend or borrow under the facility an amount
on the order of $7 billion.

Three aspects of the U.S. contribution
should be noted. First, the figure for a U.S.
share is a maximum which may or may not
be laid out depending on the extent to which
the facility is used. Ideally, of course, the
mere existence of the facility will inspire
enough confidence in capital markets so as
to minimize the need for recourse to it.
Second, funds are only laid out as borrowing
countries are able to gain approval for their
loan requests. Third, I would anticipate that
we would normally finance our direct contri-
bution to loans through borrowing in the

316

Department of State Bulletin

U.S. capital market. Our participation should
nivolve neither more taxes nor a drain on
Federal expenditures.

Role of Multinational Banks

The facility is designed to supplement
existing channels of international financing,
not to replace them. Private institutions will
find it easier to operate knowing that the
countries with which they deal have the
possibility of using the financial safety net.
Increased confidence will enhance the private
markets' role as a financial intermediary be-
tween savers and investors. The solidarity
fund will bolster the balance-of-payments
position of borrowing countries, reduce ex-
change risk, and enhance creditworthiness.
Private financial intermediaries underwrit-
ing deficit countries' loans will have more
insurance against possible default. They will
be more prepared to provide credits to these
countries than would otherwise have been
the case. In bi'ief, the solidarity fund should
help private markets perform their role more
eff"ectively and thus reduce the need for
further intergovernmental assistance meas-
ures. On the other hand the fund will not
finance or bail out private corporations that
have invested in the securities of a member
country.

Above all, the solidarity fund and our
other financial and energy proposals should
be viewed together as key parts in an over-
all strategy on the energy crisis. The inter-
relationships are explicit and vital. No cred-
itor nation will choose willingly to lend to a
borrowing nation which lacks a serious
energy policy. Conversely, no mechanism to
stabilize the financial impact of petrodollar
flows can be effective for long unless all of
the major consumer nations have efi'ective
energy programs to reduce their oil imports
in the short run and to bring down oil prices
in the medium term.

Finally, of course, we must recognize the
potential threat of petrodollars as a weapon
of foreign policy by the oil producers. Should
they choose, they may try to do with money

what they are doing with oil. We must be
prepared at least on a contingency basis.
Short-term central-bank swaps are among
the first line of defense against massive
short-term destabilizing shifts in oil pro-
ducer funds. But swaps must be quickly re-
newed. The OECD financial solidarity fund
gives industrial nations the means of defend-
ing themselves by reallocating financial flows
on terms which they themselves, rather than
the oil producers, determine.

Without financial independence for the
consuming countries, there can be no solu-
tion to the oil crisis.

U.S.-Poland Tax Convention
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford ^

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and
consent to ratification, the Convention be-
tween the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Polish
People's Republic for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Income as well as a
related exchange of notes.

I also transmit for the information of the
Senate, the report of the Department of
State with respect to this Convention.

The Convention was signed on October 8,
1974, during the visit to Washington of
Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek and
is the first income tax convention between
the two countries. The Convention is similar
to other income tax conventions recently
concluded by this Government and it is ex-
pected to encourage and support the growing
interest in bilateral trade and investment

^ Transmitted on Jan. 23 (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan.
27); also printed as S. Ex. A, 94th Cong., 1st sess.,
which includes the texts of the agreement, a related
exchange of notes, and the report of the Department
of State.

March 10, 1975

317

between the two countries. It provides rules
of tax jurisdiction, reduces or eliminates tax
liability in certain cases, ensures nondiscrim-
inatory tax treatment and provides for
administrative cooperation.

I recommend that the Senate give this
Convention and related exchange of notes
early and favorable consideration and give
its advice and consent to ratification.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, January 23, 1975.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Detente: Prospects for Increased Trade With War-
saw Pact Countries. Report of a special study-
mission to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
August 22 to September 8, 1974. House Committee
on Foreign Affairs. October 24, 1974. 52 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Report of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs together with opposing,
separate, supplemental, additional, and minority
views. H. Rept. 93-1471. October 25, 1974. 80 pp.

Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements.
Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
to accompany S. 3830. S. Rept. 93-1286. Novem-
ber 18, 1974. 14 pp.

An Act to Amend Tariff Schedules of the United
States. Message from the President of the United
States vetoing H.R. 6191, an act to amend the
tariff schedules of the United States to provide
that certain forms of zinc be admitted free of
duty, and for other purposes. H. Doc. 93-397.
November 26, 1974. 4 pp.

Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974.
Report, together with minority views, to accom-
pany S. 1988. S. Rept. 93-1300. November 27,
1974. 9 pp.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925. Report to accompany
Ex. J, 91st Cong., 2d sess. S. E.x. Rept. 93-35.
December 13, 1974. 7 pp.

Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and
Toxin Weapons. Report to accompany Ex. Q, 92d
Cong., 2d sess. S. Ex. Rept. 93-36- December 13,
1974. 5 pp.

Amended Text to Article VII of the 1965 Conven-
tion on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic. Report to accompany Ex. D., 93-2. S. Ex.
Rept. 93-37. December 13, 1974. 8 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Telescope and Associated Arti-
cles for Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope Project.
Report to accompany H.R. 11796. S. Rept. 93-
1355. December 14, 1974. 7 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the returr
of astronauts, and the return of objects launcher
into outer space. Opened for signature at Wash
ington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968
Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599
Ratification deposited: Canada, February 20, 1975

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civi
or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Marcl
18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAJ
7444.

SignatKfes: Czechoslovakia, Italy,

1975.

February 6

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitutioi
of the International Labor Organization. Adopte
at Geneva June 22, 1972.
Entered into force: November 1, 1974.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VIII of the convention o
facilitation of international maritime traffic, 196
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London, November 1'.
1973.'
Accepted by the President : February 13, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damag
caused by space objects. Done at Washingtoi
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entere
into force September 1, 1972; for the Unite
States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: Canada (with a declaration)
February 20, 1975.

Convention on registration of objects launched int
outer space. Opened for signature at New Yor
January 14, 1975.'
Signature : Canada, February 14, 1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, wit
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan
uary 1, 1975.'

' Not in force.

■ Not in force for the United States.

Et

318

Department of State Bulletii

Accession deposited: Swaziland (with reserva-
tions), January 20, 1975.

Nheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Wash-
ington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19,
1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1,
1974, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, February 20,

1975.
Accession deposited: Algeria, February 19, 1975.

BILATERAL

*Aalaysia

Agreement amending the air transport agreement
of February 2, 1970 (TIAS 6822). Effected by
exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur September
6, 1974, and February 5, 1975. Entered into force
February 5, 1975.

Jpper Volta

\.greement on general conditions for the employ-
ment of Peace Corps volunteers. Signed at Ouaga-
dougou February 6, 1975. Entered into force pro-
visionally February 6, 1975; enters into force
definitively on the date of ratification by Upper
Volta.

PUBLICATIONS

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on February 19 confirmed the follow-
ng nominations:

Mark "Evans" Austad to be Ambassador to Fin-
and.

Peter H. Dominick to be Ambassador to Switzer-
and.

Holsey G. Handyside to be Ambassador to the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., to be Ambassador to
Ethiopia.

Robert J. McCloskey, now Ambassador at Large,
;o be also an Assistant Secretary of State [for
ongressional Relations].

Elliot L. Richardson to be Ambassador to Great
Britain.

Wells Stabler to be Ambassador to Spain.

Department Releases 1975 Edition
of "Treaties in Force"

Press release 50 dated February 5

The Department of State on February 5 published
"Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1975."

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral rela-
tions of the United States with 162 countries or
other political entities and the multilateral relations
of the United States with other contracting parties
to more than 375 treaties and agreements on 89
subjects. The 1975 edition lists some 300 new
treaties and agreements including the revision of
the universal copyright convention; the agreements
with Japan on cooperation in the field of energy
research and development and the protection of
migratory birds; the agreement with Peru on the
settlement of certain claims; the agrreement with
India on Public Law 480 and other funds; the agree-
ments with Poland on cooperation in agricultural
trade and health; and the consular convention with
Belgium.

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are
arranged by country or other political entity and
the multilateral treaties and other agreements are
arranged by subject with names of countries which
have become parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and citations
to texts are furnished for each agreement.

This edition includes citations to volumes 1
through 12 of the new compilation entitled "Treaties
and Other International Agreements of the United
States of America" 1776-1949 (Bevans).

"Treaties in Force" provides information concern-
ing treaty relations with numerous newly independ-
ent states, indicating wherever possible the pro-
visions of their constitutions and independence
arrangements regarding assumption of treaty obli-
gations.

Information on current treaty actions, supple-
menting the information contained in "Treaties in
Force," is published weekly in the Department of
State Bulletin.

The 1975 edition of "Treaties in Force" (446 pp.)
is Department of State publication 8798 (GPO cat.
no. 89.14:975). It is for sale by the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, B.C. 20402 ($5.05).

V\arch 10, 1975

319

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catnJog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C.
20i02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany
orders. Prices shoivn below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Hong
Kong modifying tiie agreement of December 17,
1970, as amended and extended. TI.4S 7896. 2 pp.
aSc-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7896).

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Hong Kong.
TIAS 7897. 16 pp. SSt"-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7897).

Cooperation in the Field of Housing and Other
Construction. Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. TIAS 7898. 12 pp. 30^ (Cat.
No. 89.10:7898).

Cooperation in the Field of Energy. Agreement
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS
7899. 14 pp. 30(. (Cat. No. 89.10:7899).

Assistance to the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. Agreement with the United Nations De-
velopment Programme. TIAS 7900. 13 pp. 30('.
(Cat. No. 89.10:7900).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Roma:
TIAS 7901. 37 pp. SOt*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7901 i

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign
sistance Act of 1973. .Agreement with the Khm. i
Republic. TIAS 7902. 4 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. SO.lo;
7902).

Finance — Contribution to the Multi-Purpose Special
Fund. .Agreement with the Asian Developnn nt
Bank. TIAS 7903. 4 pp. 25c. (Cat. No. 89.10:79(i:;i

Finance— Rescheduling of Certain Debts. Agreem. iit
with Sri Lanka. TIAS 7904. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No
89.10:7904).

Cooperation in the Field of Energy Research aiu
Development. .Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7iHir)
15 pp. 40C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7905).

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Helicopters and Ko
lated Assistance. Agreement with Mexico. TIA:-

7906. 10 pp. 30('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7906).

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Helicopters and Ke
lated Assistance. Agreement with Mexico. TIAl

7907. 8 pp. 30c. (Cat. No. 89.10:7907).

Finance — Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certaii
Debts. Agreements with Chile. TIAS 7908. 60 pp
75?'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7908).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with th
Khmer Republic amending the agreement of Jul'
25, 1973 as amended. TIAS 7909. 9 pp. SOf*. (Cal
No. 89.10:7909).

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to February 17 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 50
of February 5, 54 of February 11, 59-61 of
February 12, 63, 66, and 68 of February 13,
and 70 of February 14.

No. Date Subje<t

*71 2/18 'Kissinger: departure, Aqaba, Feb. 15

72 2/18 Kissinger, Yamani: arrival, Riyadh,

Feb. 15.

73 2/18 Kissinger. Yamani: departure, Ri-

yadh, Feb. 15.

74 2/18 Ingersoll: Economic Club of Detroit.

75 2/18 Kissinger: arrival, Bonn, Feb. 15.

76 2/18 Kissinger, Genscher: Schloss Gym-

nich, Feb. 16.

77 2/18 Kissinger: interview on German tele-

vision, Bonn, Feb. 16.
*78 2/18 Kissinger: departure, Bonn, Feb. 16.

79 2/18 Kissinger: arrival, Geneva, Feb. 16.

80 2/18 U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement, Ge-

neva, Feb. 17.

81 2/18 Kissinger, Gromyko: remarks, Ge-

neva, Feb. 17.

82 2/18 Kissinger, Callaghan: remarks, Lon-
don.
*83 2/18 Kissinger: arrival, Zurich.
84 2/19 Kissinger, Shah of Iran: news con-
ference, Zurich, Feb. 18.
"85 2/19 Kissinger: arrival, Paris, Feb. 18.

86 2/19 Secretary's Advisory Committee on

Private International Law, Mar. 14.

87 2/19 Kissinger, Sauvagnargues : remarks.

Paris, Feb. 18.

*88 2/19 Advisory Panel on Music, Mar. 24-2.^.

*89 2/19 Advisory Panel on Academic Music.
Mar. 26.

*90 2/19 Advisory Panel on Folk Music and
Jazz, Mar. 27.
91 2/19 Kissinger, Sauvagnargues: remarks.
Paris.

'92 2/19 Kissinger: departure, Paris, Feb. l'.'
93 2/19 Kissinger: arrival, Andrews An
Force Base.

*94 2/20 U.S. and Portugal extend textile
agreement, Dec. 30, 1974.

*95 2/20 Northwest Fisheries .Advisory Com-
mittee, Mar. 13.

*96 2/20 Advisory Committee on International
Intellectual Property, Apr. 2.

*97 2/21 McCloskey sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Rela-
tions (biographic data).

*Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

320

Department of State Bullel

JNDEX March 10, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1863

Bangladesh. U.S. Loan To Assist in Financing
of Bangladesh Fertilizer Plant 296

Congress

Confirmations (Austad, Dominick, Handyside,

Hummel, McCloskey, Richardson, Stabler) 319

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 318

The International Energy Program and U.S.
Obligations as a Member of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (Enders) 307

The Role of Financial Mechanisms in the

Overall Oil Strategy (Enders) 312

U.S.-Poland Tax Convention Transmitted to
the Senate (message from President Ford) 317

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Austad, Dominick, Handyside,

Hummel, McCloskey, Richardson, Stabler) 319

Mildred Marcy To Be Coordinator for Inter-
national Women's Year 304

Egypt. U.S. Loan to Egypt To Finance Devel-
opment Imports From U.S 297

Energy

The Global Economy: The Issues of Energy

and Trade (Ingersoll) 299

The International Energy Program and U.S.
Obligations as a Member of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (Enders) .... 307

The Role of Financial Mechanisms in the

Overall Oil Strategy (Enders) 312

Ethiopia. Hummel confirmed as Ambassador 319

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Visits the Mid-
dle East and Western Europe; Meets With
the Shah of Iran and Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko (remarks by the Secretary
and foreign leaders; text of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
joint statement) 281

Finland. Austad confirmed as Ambassador. . 319

India. U.S. Donates 50,000 Tons of Food to

CARE for Drought Areas in India .... 297

Iran

Secretary Kissinger Visits the Middle East
and Western Europe; Meets With the Shah
of Iran and Soviet Foreign Minister Gro-
myko (remarks by the Secretary and for-
eign leaders; text of U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint
statement) 281

U.S. and Iran Agree in Principle on Invest-
ment in U.S. Airline (joint statement) . . 298

Israel. U.S. Makes Grant to Israel for Pur-
chase of U.S. Goods 298

Mauritania. Handyside confirmed as Am-
bassador 319

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Visits the
Middle East and Western Europe; Meets
With the Shah of Iran and Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko (remarks by the Secre-

tary and foreign leaders; text of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. joint statement 281

Poland. U.S.-Poland Tax Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 317

Presidential Documents

President Establishes Commission on Interna-
tional Women's Year (Executive order) . . 305

U.S.-Poland Tax Convention Transmitted to
the Senate 317

Publications

Department Releases 1975 Edition of "Trea-
ties in Force" 319

GPO Sales Publications 320

Spain. Stabler confirmed as Ambassador . . 319

Switzerland. Dominick confirmed as Ambassa-
dor 319

Trade. The Global Economy: The Issues of

Energy and Trade (Ingersoll) 299

Treaty Information

Current Actions 318

U.S.-Poland Tax Convention Transmitted to

the Senate (message from President Ford) 317

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Visits the Middle
East and Western Europe; Meets With the
Shah of Iran and Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko (remarks by the Secretary and
foreign leaders; text of U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint
statement) 281

United Kingdom. Richardson confirmed as
Ambassador 319

United Nations

United Nations Documents 306

U.S. Makes Contribution to U.N. for Women's

Year Conference 304

Name Index

Allon, Yigal 281, 285, 287

Austad, Mark "Evans" 319

Callaghan, James 292

Dominick, Peter H 319

Enders, Thomas 0 307, 312

Ford, President 305, 317

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 288

Gromyko, Andrei A 290

Handyside, Holsey G 319

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr 319

Ingersoll, Robert S 299

Kissinger, Secretary 281

Marcy, Mildred 304

McCloskey, Robert J 319

Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran . . 293

Richardson, Elliot L 319

Sadat, Anwar al- 286

Sauvagnargues, Jean 295

Stabler, Wells 319

Yamani, Ahmed Zaki 287, 288

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^//Hi^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1864

March 17, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 25 321

PRESIDENT FORD'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT

HOLLYWOOD, FLA., FEBRUARY 26

Excerpts From Transcript 333

UNDER SECRETARY SISCO INTERVIEWED ON
"MEET THE PRESS" 337

UNITED STATES OUTLINES OBJECTIVES FOR NEW ROUND

OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

Statement by Harald B. Malmgren 3U6

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. LXXII, No. 1864
March 17, 1975

The Department of State BULLETll
a weekly publication issued by ti
Office of Media Services, Bureau oi
Public Affairs, provides the public ani
interested agencies of the governmen
with information on developments i,
the field of U.S. foreign relations an
on the work of tlie Department am
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart'
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of February 25

Press release 103 dated February 25

Secretary Kissinger: We will go straight
to the questions. Mr. Davis [Spencer Davis,
Associated Press].

Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports coming from
Cambodia arid Viet-Nam are becoming very
bleak. One of your top aides estimates only
tivo more months of survival for Cam-
bodia if they do not receive supplemental
assistance. The question is: What good tvoidd
further supplemental assistance be when so
many billions in past assistance has not
helped; and, secondly, what is your apprais-
al on a new American peace initiative that
might stop the fighting ?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me first separate
the problem in Cambodia from the problem
in Viet-Nam. In Cambodia, we have an im-
mediate emergency. We have a situation
where, if a supplemental is not voted within
the next few weeks, it is certain that Cam-
bodia must fall because it will run out of am-
munition. Therefore the decision before us
is whether the United States will withhold
ammunition from a country which has been
associated with us and which, clearly, wishes
to defend itself. This is a serious responsi-
bility to take.

With respect to Viet-Nam, we are facing
a more long-term situation of the same or-
der. The long-term problem in Viet-Nam
is this : Throughout the period of the Ameri-
can involvement in Viet-Nam and during the
negotiations that were going on, it was never
suggested that Viet-Nam would be able to
stand by itself without American assistance ;
the argument at that time was to withdraw
American military forces and to enable Viet-
Nam, without assistance, to stand on its own.
There are many situations in the world which

have no outcome as long as there are neigh-
bors that continue to pursue aggressive de-
signs.

If you go around the world and ask
whether the United States can give support
only where there is a clear terminal point,
there will be many countries that will be in
the most severe jeopardy.

Now, in Cambodia the situation is im-
minently critical. In Viet-Nam, the situation
will be critical over a long period of time
if we do not give adequate support. If we
do give adequate support, then there is the
possibility of Viet-Nam defending itself.

With respect to negotiations, the United
States has engaged in, and is supporting
now, efforts at negotiations both in Cambodia
and Viet-Nam. It has been our experience,
however, that negotiations cannot be a sub-
stitute for a situation on the ground but that
they will reflect a situation on the ground.
And therefore we have urged the Congress
to look at the problem, recognizing the many
pressures to which they are exposed — rec-
ognizing that the American people may well
be tired of many years of exertions but
keeping in mind also that sometimes to give
in to the mood of the moment may lead to pro-
found regrets later on.

And I would also like to say that this
debate, which is a rather solemn one, should
be conducted without reference to motives —
which seems to become so much of a staple
of the Viet-Nam debate.

Lifting the Arms Embargo in South Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you a ques-
tion which appears to concern not only the
relations with the subcontinent of India but
the detente between the United States and

March 17, 1975

321

Russia, if you could put it in that context,
and that is the somewhat bitter criticism
that India has made at the decisioyi to lift
the lO-year'-old arms embargo out there and
the allegations that this ivoidd start an arms
race and the implication that you somehow
are guilty of bad faith in this whole thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are two
types of comments that have been made from
India. One is the comments of the Indian
Ambassador in Washington ; and the second,
the statement of the Foreign Minister of
India in the Indian Parliament. We believe
that the statement of the Foreign Minister is
restrained and statesmanlike and continues
the basis for the improving relationship that
has characterized Indian-American relations
in recent months. The statements made yes-
terday by the Ambassador are unacceptable.

Novi', with respect to the relationship be-
tween India and the United States, in a
speech in New Delhi last October I pointed
out that India, because of its size and its
position, has a special role in South Asia
which the United States recognizes.

I have also pointed out that the United
States has no interest and will not support or
engage in an arms race in South Asia.

We maintain both of these statements.
It seemed to us, however, that to maintain
an embargo against a friendly country with
which we have an allied relationship, while
its neighbor was producing and acquiring
nearly a billion dollars' worth of arms a
year, was morally, politically, and symbol-
ically improper.

I repeat, the decision to lift the arms em-
bargo does not mean that the United States
will engage in a massive supply of arms to
Pakistan or that the United States will en-
gage in arms deliveries that can affect the
underlying strategic balance. But it seemed
to us an anomaly to embargo one country in
the area, to be the only country in the world
to be embargoing this country, when its
neighbor was not exercising a comparable
restraint. But, even with this, we will not
engage in massive deliveries of arms.

And, secondly, we place great stress on
the improving relationship with India. We

maintain all the principles that we have as-
serted with respect to India, and we believe
that with wisdom and statesmanship on both
sides, the natural friendship between these
two great democracies can not only be main-
tained but be strengthened. This is certainly
our attitude.

Q. Are you goiyig to ask for the recall of
the Ambassador who made the unacceptable
remarks?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we will not ask
for his recall.

Consultations With Congress

Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent months the
Administration has been conducting foreign
policy in one toay, in one manner, and Con-
gress has been conducting foreign policy in
another. And wherever there appears to be
a conflict, Congress Visually wins. Hoio are
you adjusting to this reality?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is inherent
in our system that the Congress, having the
power of the purse, can impose its will. I
believe that in a conflict between the execu-
tive and the legislative neither side wins.
I believe, as I pointed out in Los Angeles
[on January 24], that it is imperative for a
new consensus to develop on American for-
eign policy because nobody wins these con-
flicts. The diflSculties have arisen for a
variety of reasons — the effects of Watergate,
the internal changes in the Congress, the
legacy of many years in which Congress feels
that perhaps the executive had been granted
too wide-ranging authority.

We are prepared to work out a new rela-
tionship with the Congress to avoid these
conflicts. We believe that is essential in the
national interest. And we believe that there
can only be an American foreign policy, not
an executive or a legislative foreign policy.

Q. I'd like to folloiv up. Are you prepared
to take Co)igress into your confidence on the
initiation of foreign policy from the outset,
or tvill you continue to put —

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. O'Leary [Jere-

322

Department of State Bulletin

miah O'Leary, Washington Star-News], I
think there is a misconception about the
degree of congressional consultation that has
previously taken place. Since I've become
Secretary of State, I have met in 17 months
— I've testified over 40 times before con-
gressional committees, met over 25 times
with congressional groups outside the formal
testimony and over 75 times with informal
congressional groups.

The difficulties exist, in part, because the
nature of congressional leadership has also
changed in the recent year so that the tra-
ditional relationship between the executive
and the legislative, exercised through the
organized leadership of the Congress, has
to be modified so that there is a more wide-
ranging consultation than previously. I'm
prepared to undertake this, and I have been
in touch with various congressional groups
and various senatorial groups asking for
their advice — with whom it is possible to
consult and in what manner — in order to
achieve this partnership.

The question of advance consultation is
easy. Of course we will do this.

In the past, my practice has been before
every trip to appear before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee and the House
Foreign Afi'airs Committee to tell them about
what I was planning to do and to report to
them within a week of my return. I recog-
nize that these forums are no longer suf-
ficient and that a wider range must be found.

I have been meeting regularly, for example
— I plan to meet regularly ; I've met twice —
with a group headed by Congressman
[Donald M.] Fraser that is particularly in-
terested in the problem of human rights.
But it is partly a question of congressional
organization as well. And I'm prepared, and
the Administration is prepared, to work
this out in a cooperative spirit and with the
attitude that "Of course we will consult
ahead of time." But there are also some mat-
ters that must be left to the executive, with
full knowledge of the Congress, but the
day-to-day tactics are very difficult to han-
dle by congressional decisions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I understood your

previous answer correctly, you were saying
that as long as North Viet-Nam coyitinues
its agressive policy, the United States should
give a billion or a billion and a half dollars
a year to South Viet-Nam and Cambodia
in aid in an open-ended way. One, is that
correct, and, two, tvhat woidd be the con-
sequences if Cambodia did fall, or if South
Viet-Nam did fall?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, I
made a distinction between the situation in
Cambodia and the situation in Viet-Nam.

In Cambodia, as I have pointed out, we
face an immediately critical situation. What
will be the consequences if Viet-Nam and
Cambodia did fall? It is a debate which has
been going on for a long time. I believe, and
the Administration believes, that if Viet-
Nam falls as a result of an American de-
cision to cut off its aid that this will have,
over a period of time, the most serious con-
sequences for the conduct of our foreign
policy. This will not be immediately apparent,
but over a period of years it must raise the
gravest doubts in the minds of many coun-
tries that have been associated with us, or of
many countries to which the threat cannot
be given a terminal date.

Middle East Diplomacy

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the
statement in an interview by Syrian Presi-
dent Asad that he would be willing to sign
a formal peace treaty is helpfid to your step-
by-step approach? And if I may just follow
that tip with one question, do you necessarily
exclude an additional step after the one that
you are about to leave on, on the Golan
Heights between Syria and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the statement
by Syria that it is willing to sign a peace
agreement with Israel is a major step for-
ward. I remember the first time I visited
Syria in December 1973, the newspapers re-
ported that the Secretary of State arrived
from occupied territory, "occupied territory"
at that time being Tel Aviv. So I think that
this is a hopeful sign.

With respect to negotiations between Syria

March 17, 1975

323

and Israel, we have always believed that a
peace, to be lasting, must involve all the
fronts and must involve a general settlement,
and I am certain that Israel shares this
view.

Cyprus Negotiations

Q. Mr. Kissinger, the United States has
been involved for some time now in the ef-
forts to achieve a settlement on Cyprus. Can
you tell us where you think those efforts are
now, and tvhat the possibilities are for re-
convening a negotiating session between the
two sides?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is important
to remember that the communal talks only
began effectively on January 14, so that
there were only three weeks of negotiations
before the aid cutoff to Turkey that led to
an interruption of these negotiations.

The United States strongly supports these
communal talks. The United States has of-
fered all the assistance it can to the parties
to bring about a settlement that all parties
can live with. We believe that progress is
possible. It is our impression, based on very
frequent exchanges, that it will be very
difficult for the United States to play a use-
ful role in Ankara as long as the aid cutoff
continues. And therefore we have urged the
Congress to give us the possibility to continue
these negotiations by suspending the aid cut-
off.

In addition, I have to stress that aid to
Turkey and the security of the eastern
Mediterranean transcends the Cyprus prob-
lem and that the security of the eastern Med-
iterranean is being jeopardized by the cutoff
of aid to Turkey.

But with respect to the Cyprus negotia-
tions, we favor the resumption of these
negotiations, with or without the resump-
tion of aid. We strongly support a settle-
ment, but our own influence is being weak-
ened by the aid cutoff.

Ethiopian Request for Assistance

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been some
reports that the request by the Ethiopian

Government for ammunition was on the point
of being accepted by the U.S. Government.
Can you comment on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I read an ar-
ticle today that said that tomorrow there will
be a meeting of the Washington Special
Action Group which will make a decision.
The Washington Special Action Group
doesn't make decisions. It analyzes options
and submits them to the President for con-
sideration.

The issue that is presented to us by the
Ethiopian request is that we have had a
military relationship with Ethiopia since
1953. The Eritrean rebellion or independ-
ence movement has been going on since 1962.
And the United States takes no position on
the merits of the particular conflict.

The problem that we have to decide is
whether a country whose military estab-
lishment has been based on American arms
should be cut off from support at the pre-
cise moment that it most needs it. It is a
difficult decision for us, and we have not
come close to making it. And tomorrow's
meeting is not to make a decision. To-
morrow's meeting is to sort out what the
issues are.

Mr. Kraft [Joseph Kraft, Field Enter-
prises syndicated columnist].

Proposals To Restrict Petroleum Imports

Q. Mr. Secretary, a major issue in the
various energy proposals that are being
surfaced now is that some of them propose
restrictnig imports by a tariff — imports of
petroleum — and others propose restricting
imports by a quota. From the foreign policy
standpoint, which of those two avenues does
the Department favor and why?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Depart-
ment has not been formally asked to take a
stand on the difference between a tariff and
a quota.

The basic position of the Department from
a foreign policy point of view is that con-
servation of a certain quantity is essential
in order to achieve the long-term objective
of our energy policy. And within the In-

324

Department of State Bulletin

ternational Energy Agency (lEA), the
United States has supported goals to which
it must make a major contribution that
would achieve those general objectives.

Obviously, as a member of the Cabinet,
I support the President's energy plan. I have
not personally studied the quota proposal,
and therefore I don't feel that I should com-
ment on that. Of the plans that I have seen,
at the time that they were being considered,
it seemed to me that the fee system seemed
the most efficient.

U.S. -Soviet Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions on U.S.-
Soviet relations. Are U.S.-Soviet relations
impaired by the breakdown of the trade
agreeme7it? And, secondly, are there new
obstacles to a SALT [Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Talks] agreemeyit in the verification
negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: The state of Soviet-
American relations is that in the political
negotiations that are now going on and in
the arms control negotiations that are going
on, progress is about what one would have
expected.

The SALT negotiations are in a very pre-
liminary phase, and therefore it is too early
to tell whether there are any unusual ob-
stacles. My impression is that they are go-
ing along in a normal way, but it is a little
too early to make a conclusive judgment.

The difficulty that is caused by the in-
terruption of the economic relationship, or
by the jeopardizing of the economic relation-
ship, is that the political relations must
carry a perhaps undue burden and that
therefore the incentives for restraint that
might otherwise exist in particular nego-
tiations are being weakened. So, in the long
term, I feel that the removal of the economic
pillar of our relationship cannot but weaken
the long-term trends of detente. In the im-
mediate present, it has not yet visibly hap-
pened.

Q. What are your plans for repairing the
damage?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have had

preliminary discussions with Members of the
Senate and the House to see what the con-
gressional attitude would be. I also had some
preliminary discussions with Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko when we met in Geneva. I
think we should move carefully and thought-
fully in order to avoid another misunder-
standing arising between the two branches
of our government and between our govern-
ment and the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a num-
ber of reports in recent weeks that you might
consider resigning by the end of the year to
avoid becoming a focal point of a partisan
debate as the '76 campaign gets underway.
Are these reports correct?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is a
permanent story that appears every year.
I believe that one's service should be tied
to the period in which one can be useful,
and that is a decision that has to be made
largely by the President. And I have not
made any such decision as these reports in-
dicate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported after
your recent meeting with Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko in Geneva that he raised the
possibility at this meeting of an accord to
limit arms to the Middle East. Are the Rus-
sians prepared to cooperate in restraining
the flow of arms to the Middle East? And if
so, are we going to talk to them about it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not be-
lieve that this report is exactly accurate.
But, in principle, the United States has been
willing to discuss the principle of a limita-
tion of the flow of arms into the Middle East.
Given the interconnection, however, of the
Arab world, one now would have to draw
the line rather widely, and one could not
confine the limitation of arms imports only
to the states neighboring Israel, but one
would have to include all the states that
could possibly transfer their arms into areas
where a confrontation might be possible.
But as part of a settlement, we would be pre-
pared to explore this, yes.

Q. What is the Russian view toward that
possibility?

March 17, 1975

325

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand the
Soviet view, they are prepared to discuss
this as part of an overall settlement. They
are not prepared to discuss it at the moment.

Southeast Asia and American Commitments

Q. Mr. Secretary, of the vast amount of
aid we have sent to Southeast Asia and our
own involvement, why woidd any country
in the world ever have grave doubts about
American commitments?

Secretary Kissinger: Because if the col-
lapse of Southeast Asia is caused by an
American decision to withhold aid under
conditions in which such a decision can have
only one outcome, the conclusion will be
inevitable that it was the United States
which has the responsibility. There is no
possible way that Viet-Nam can acquire the
arms that are needed to defend itself until
its economy has reached a point where per-
haps there is sufficient surplus from oil
income or other economic developments. And
there are many other countries in the world
that find themselves in analogous circum-
stances.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it reasonable to talk-
about any finite period of time — the three
years, for example, that has been suggested
by the Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: It is the second-best
course. Very often, in these exchanges be-
tween the executive and the legislative, one
is driven into positions which reflect the
best that may be attainable. There is an
argument that can be made that if aid is
contained for three years at a sufficiently
high level that at that period the economy
of Viet-Nam could develop to a point where
it would have enough surplus revenues to
pay for the import of arms by itself.

I have seen these arguments. They seem
plausible to me, and I would support them.
I must say, quite candidly, that the prefer-
able course is to go the route that I indicated.
But, if necessary, we will accept a three-year
term with adequate sums.

Question of Guarantees in Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were in Israel
on this last trip you said that Israel couldn't
be expected to give up its territory without
a quid pro quo. Did you come away from
your talks with President Sadat [of Egypt]
feeling that he acknoivledges this principle?

Secretary Kissinger: The fact that I am
returning to the Middle East indicates that
I believe there is a chance to implement this
principle, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on that, do
you think that it will be necessary for there
to be American guarantees for the next stage
of the disengagement?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The question
of an American guarantee can arise only in
connection with a final settlement and then
not as a substitute for a final settlement but
as a backup position to enhance the security
of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to folloiv that, if I may
briefly, do you have in mind something that
ivotdd have to be ratified by the Congress,
a treaty?

Secretar-y Kissinger: Well, I have not any
specific idea in mind, but it has been axio-
matic in all the discussions about peace in
the Middle East that a final settlement would
have to have some sort of a guarantee.
Some people have suggested a Soviet-Ameri-
can guarantee. Others have suggested a
Security Council guarantee. Others have
suggested a unilateral American guarantee.
All that I have suggested is that the United
States is studying the problem of what
guarantees would be adequate for a final
settlement, I repeat, not as a substitute for
the sense of security and justice of the
parties concerned but as a reinforcement of
it once the negotiation has been concluded.

It is inconceivable to me that there could
be any American participation in a guaran-
tee that did not have the full support of
the Congress of the United States. By what
means that is achieved would depend on the
nature of the guarantee and on the commit-

326

Department of State Bulletin

ments that it would involve. But there does
not yet exist an Administration position
either on the nature of the guarantee or on
the commitment, nor have we had any dis-
cussions with the Israeli Government. All
I indicated is that this is a subject we are
studying within our government, as we are
dutybound to do in the process of moving
toward a final peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you speak of a
quid pro quo, would that he expressed at
this step or at some future stage? And
secondly, would it he something directly
given to Israel hy Egypt or iyidirectly? And
indeed, if it's indirect, is that a quid pro
quo?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that
Israel has to be the judge of what it con-
siders an adequate arrangement. And that
is not for me to say at this moment. It
stands to reason that a settlement is not
possible until both sides are satisfied with it.
It is also clear that, Israel being a democ-
racy, any agreement that is made must have
visible parts that can be presented to the
Israeli domestic opinion and to the Israeli
Parliament.

What combination of direct and indirect
assurances will be given must be left to the
process of negotiation. But it goes without
saying that any settlement, to have any
meaning, must be acceptable to both parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you
back for a moment to the Viet-Nam prob-
lem and the grave douhts that you referred
to. You seem to he saying that it is more
important for the United States to enjoy
credibility abroad than to have credibility
at home.

Secretary Kissinger: No. I'm saying that
the security of the United States and the
security of the many countries in the world
that depend on the United States is a matter
of the gravest importance to the American
people as well. And I therefore believe that,
however painful the discussions, however
anguished the experiences, that the Ameri-
can people over a period of time will recog-

nize that this distinction cannot be made.

I am as subject to the correspondence as
many of the members of the Congress. It
is my belief that those who are responsible
for national policy are accountable not only
for the moment but for how it will look
several years from now. And three to five
years from now, when the consequences are
apparent, I believe that there will be no dis-
tinction between credibility at home and
credibility abroad.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a series of uncom-
pli7nentary remarks about yoii by former
associates of President Nixon, how do you
account for these comments? Do you think
it's a concerted effort? And what's your re-
action to what Mr. [William'] Safire and Mr.
{Charles W.] Colson have been saying about
you ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the two
individuals you mentioned represent differ-
ent phenomena. I don't believe it is a con-
certed effort. And in the case of one of them
I don't believe that what is being said to-
day is any different from what was being
said when we were colleagues. [Laughter.]

European Security Conference

Q. Mr. Secretary, when in Geneva you
talked with Foreign Minister Gromyko. You
talked abord the European Conference, too.
From here it looks as if the European Se-
curity Conference might he wound up this
summer, not so much because of the results
it will achieve but because many of the par-
ticipants are impatient now to wind it up.
I ivould like to ask •you what yottr view is
of the timetable. Is there any chance of any
firm link with progress in the MBFR [mutual
and balanced force reduction] talks?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is my impres-
sion that the overwhelming majority of our
European allies is opposed to having any
linkage between the European Security Con-
ference and the force reduction talks and
therefore this is not an issue that is likely
to arise.

March 17, 1975

327

As far as the timetable is concerned,
the United States favors — as do all the other
participants — an expeditious conclusion of
the conference. The issues have become so
abstruse and esoteric, reaching sometimes
such issues as the placement of a comma,
that it is hard to explain all of the issues
that are now before the conference. And I
wouldn't want to speculate in what month
there will be a conclusion. The United States
will support a rapid conclusion of the con-
ference.

Defense Agreements With Spain and Portugal

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up
to date on the U.S. base agreements with
Spain and Portugal? Are we being asked to
vacate Torre jon? And how do we stand with
the U.S. base in the Azores?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, these negotia-
tions are conducted, as you know, by the
new Assistant Secretary for congressional
liaison [Ambassador at Large Robert J.
McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congres-
sional Relations]. We have not been asked
to vacate any of the Spanish bases. And
therefore this report seems to us at least
premature. In fact, it seems to us inaccurate.
The discussion has concerned mostly what
sort of security assurances the United States
might give Spain in return for the continua-
tion of its bases in Spain.

With respect to the Azores, we have not
been asked to vacate the base in the Azores.
The agreement has not yet been renewed,
but under the agreement we can maintain our
base there until a new agreement has been
made or it is clear that no agreement can
be made.

Confidence in U.S. Commitments

Q. Could I just follow that up? The se-
curity arrangements that Spain is asking
for, is that the sort of thing that you mean
other countries will begin to doubt if an

American decision lets Viet-Nam and Cam-
bodia go "down the tube" ?

Secretary Kissinger: I was talking about
the general ability of other countries to rely
on the word of the United States or on the
ability of the United States to bring about
the security of those countries that rely on
it. This has serious consequences. I know
it is fashionable to sneer at the word "dom-
ino theory." I think this is a very grave
matter on which serious people have had a
divided opinion. And we've been torn apart
by the Viet-Nam war long enough. But I
do not believe we can escape this problem
by assuming the responsibility of condemn-
ing those who have dealt with us to a certain
destruction.

The answer to your question is, yes, this
is one of the things. But I was talking of
a more general problem.

Q. More specifically, the country that's
most often discussed in the context of Amer-
ican security is Israel. Do you think Israel
perhaps is exempt from this problem be-
cause of support in Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it is
appropriate for me to go around the world
asking which countries would be particularly
threatened by this attitude. I would say that
the questions that are now being asked can
be applied to almost any country as far as
terminal date is concerned, as far as the
end process is concerned. I do not want to
apply it to any particular country. And it is,
of course, clear that there has been a special
relationship between Israel and the United
States that can withstand strains that other
relationships might not be able to with-
stand. But it is not a trivial matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, within the spirit of
meaningfid detente, tvhy haven't you put
more pressure on the Russians and the
Chinese not to supply Hanoi so abundantly?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I am con-
stantly being asked, "Why don't we bring

328

Department of State Bulletin

pressure here, bring pressure there?" as if
the word "pressure" had a concrete signifi-
cance. When you ask about pressure, you
have to ask yourself what concretely the
United States can do, what is the "or else"
that we are threatening?

Secondly, it has been our policy through-
out not to turn these issues into public con-
frontations on the theory that countries can
go along more easily if it is not turned into
a public confrontation. I believe that the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China know what our view of this matter
is. I think it is also important to point out
that the scale of the North Vietnamese offen-
sive in the South is not only related to the
amount of arms that the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic are supplying, it is
also related to the fact that, now that there
is no longer any interdiction and that the
communications system has been improved
so enormously, almost the entire input into
North Viet-Nam can be moved rapidly to
South Viet-Nam together with all of the
stockpiles that existed at the end of the war.

Opposition to Discrimination

Q. Mr. Secretary, this morning in New
York City the Anti-Defamation League
charged that the Army Corps of Engineers is
using discriminatory practices by requiring
individuals applying for work on projects
in Arab co^intries to state their religion.
Would you comment on that and also state
ivhat the Administration's policy is and at-
titudes are on U.S. private investment in
Arab countries?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know about
this particular charge. And I do not know
about the particular practice of the Army
Corps of Engineers, which is a question
which should be addressed to the Defense
Department. I know, however, that the basic
policy of the Administration is totally op-
posed to discrimination in any form.

As far as the Department of State is con-
cerned, for which I am responsible, I know

that officers are assigned without regard
to race or religion and that we don't even
know their race or religion in making the
assignments.

With respect to the U.S. policy of invest-
ment in Arab countries, the United States
basically favors it. The United States is
strongly opposed to any discriminatory prac-
tices by the recipient countries as to the
firms that might do business. And we are
looking into the legal remedies that may
exist, together with whatever moral influence
we can bring to bear on the banking and
other communities to abolish discrimination,
which we consider reprehensible.

Q. Is the Chase Manhattan Bank one of
those corporations that are being looked into ?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not looking
into particular corporations. We are looking
into the general problem that has been
brought to our attention of discrimination
against particular firms or banking houses.
And we have not yet reached a conclusion
either as to the remedies that are available to
us or whether there are any particular of-
fending firms.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your earlier re-
sponses on the future of Indochina, you
dwelled mostly on South Viet-Nam. Is there
anything more hopefid that can be looked to
in Cambodia, apart from staving off collapse?

Secretary Kissinger: We would do our
utmost in Cambodia, if collapse can be
staved off, to promote a negotiation. And it
is diflficult to know whether such a negotia-
tion is possible. We have over the past year
made major efforts to promote a compromise
settlement, which it would be wrong to de-
tail now. We would continue these efforts,
but I will not make any misleading state-
ments as to what is possible. I am putting
the issue — whether the United States wants
to take the responsibility of cutting off am-
munition at this pai-ticular moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I didn't quite under-
stand your ansiver to Mr. Gwertzman's

March 17, 1975

329

[Bernard Gwertzman, New York Ti?nes]
question. Were you saying that the Congress
might nmv, indeed, take a harder look at
providing military aid to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to be
put into a position in which I am asserting
that the lessons of Viet-Nam are going to be
applied in any particular area. I see no
evidence that the Congress is applying a
harder look to aid to Israel now, and I am
not bringing these two matters into a re-
lationship.

International Energy Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you comment on
the foreign policy implications of the tariff
versus the quota, with particular reference
to the suggestion that one would be indis-
criminate and the other might be used
selectively?

Secretary Kissinger: I have really not
thought this particular issue through, and
I will make sure that our spokesman will say
something about it during the week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a related question: You
are reported at continuing cross purposes
tvith the Treasury Department on interna-
tional oil policy. Is there an "Administra-
tion" policy, or is it a "Kissinger" policy?
And is there going to be a consumer-pro-
ducer conference in March?

Secretary Kissinger: First, the speech that
I delivered— on I believe it was February
3— was done at the request of the President.
It was approved in all its particulars by the
President. It was gone over by the White
House officials that are responsible for eco-
nomic policy. It was gone over by the Assist-
ant Secretary of the Treasury— the Secre-
tary of the Treasury being out of the coun-
try, in England, on that particular weekend.
The speech on February 3 reflected the views
of the President and reflected the views of
the Administration.

Since then, and I have had occasion to
review this whole matter with the President
again this morning, there is no question
that the United States supports a guaranteed

price for alternative sources of energy.

Whether this price is achieved by subsidy
or by tariff or by some other method is a
matter for negotiation and is, indeed, a
matter which we would leave to the decision
of each country. And as far as the Depart-
ment of State is concerned, we have no par-
ticular interest in how this guaranteed price
is achieved, as long as it is achieved.

It is our conviction that without such a
guaranteed price there will not be a suffi-
cient investment in alternative sources— that
without an investment in alternative sources,
even if there is a break in prices temporarily,
that break in prices will only serve to in-
crease the dependence of the consumers on
the producers and make them even more
subject to a rapid increase in prices.

So the official policy of the Administra-
tion, the President's policy, is to have a
guaranteed price. The method by which this
price is achieved is to be left to each coun-
try and is a matter on which no final decision
has been taken in this country. But this is
a totally secondary issue.

The primary issue is whether the United
States favors a guaranteed price, and I can
only repeat: When it was proposed, it was
the policy of the President; and when it
is reiterated today, it is the policy of the
President. And therefore I don't know what
conflict you are talking about.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q. There ivere two other elements there.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. Excuse
me, I'm sorry, I didn't answer the question.

On the consumer-producer conference,
there will be another meeting of the lEA
early in March, in which we believe
that progress will be made on the alterna-
tive sources. Once this progress has been
achieved, we believe that the essential pre-
requisites for a preparatory meeting of con-
sumers and producers may be met, and we
therefore think that good progress is being
made toward a consumer-producer prepara-
tory meeting, if not in March, shortly after-
wards.

The press: Thank you very much.

330

Department of State Bulletin

President Ford Urges Rapid Action
on Assistance to Cambodia

Folloiving is the text of a letter dated
February 25 from President Ford to Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives.

White House press release dated February 25

February 25, 1975.

Dear Mr. Speaker: I wish to convey to
the House of Representatives my deep con-
cern over the present critical situation in
Cambodia. An independent Cambodia cannot
survive unless the Congress acts very soon
to provide supplemental military and eco-
nomic assistance.

Unless such assistance is provided, the
Cambodian army will run out of ammunition
in less than a month.

The Cambodian people are totally de-
pendent on us for their only means of
resistance to aggression. The Communist
forces now attacking have a constant, mas-
sive outside source of supply from the North
as has been demonstrated by their ability to
sustain the current heavy offensive.

If additional military assistance is with-
held or delayed, the Government forces will
be forced, within weeks, to surrender to the
insurgents.

The economic situation is almost as diffi-
cult. Refugees forced to flee their homes by
the Communists' repressive measures and
scorched-earth policies have poured into
Phnom Penh and other cities. Severe food
shortages are already beginning. If the Con-
gress does not provide for continued deliv-
eries of rice and other essential supplies,
millions of innocent people will suffer —
people who depend on us for their bare sur-
vival.

The Government of the Khmer Republic
has demonstrated on countless occasions its
willingness to negotiate a compromise politi-
cal settlement to bring peace to its tor-
mented land. It has been proven over the
past two years that the progressive cutbacks
of American support have only undercut the
possibilities of negotiation by encouraging

a ruthless enemy in the hope of obtaining a
total victory.

These are the harsh realities which the
Congress must bear in mind as it considers
the Administration's request for supple-
mental assistance to Cambodia.

It has been a basic policy of this Govern-
ment to give material support to friends and
allies who are willing and able to carry the
burden of their own self-defense. Cambodia
is such an ally.

This is a moral question that must be
faced squarely. Are we to deliberately aban-
don a small country in the midst of its life
and death struggle? Is the United States,
which so far has consistently stood by its
friends through the most difficult of times,
now to condemn, in effect a small Asian
nation totally dependent upon us? We cannot
escape this responsibility. Our national se-
curity and the integrity of our alliances de-
pend upon our reputation as a reliable part-
ner. Countries around the world who depend
on us for support — as well as their foes-
will judge our performance. It is in this spirit
and with this sense of responsibility, Mr.
Speaker, that I urge rapid and favorable
action on my request for additional assist-
ance to Cambodia.
Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford.

Honorable Carl Albert

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

U.S. Modifies Policy on Exports
of Arms to India and Pakistan

Department Statement '■

The United States has informed the Gov-
ernments of India and Pakistan that it has
ended today [February 24] its embargo on
the export of military equipment to those
countries and put into effect a policy under

' Read to news correspondents on Feb. 24 by
Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Press Relations.

March 17, 1975

331

which we will consider requests for arms
exports for cash on a case-by-case basis. Our
previous policy permitted only the export of
nonlethal end-items and spares and ammu-
nition for U.S.-provided equipment. In mak-
ing this modification, we are bringing U.S.
policy into line with that followed by other
major Western arms suppliers, such as the
British and French.

I should emphasize that this is a cash-only
policy; we are not planning to provide any
equipment on a grant military assistance
basis or on credit. In weighing any individual
expoi-t requests, we will take into account a
number of factors, including the high impor-
tance we attach to continued progress toward
India-Pakistan normalization, the effect of
any particular sale on the outlook for re-
gional peace and stability, the relationship
between U.S. sales and those of other ex-
ternal arms suppliers, and of course the
relationship of the request to legitimate de-
fense requirements and the level of arma-
ments in the region.

Our overall policy toward South Asia re-
mains exactly as Secretary Kissinger stated
on his trip to the region last fall : We have
no interest in upsetting the strategic bal-
ance in the subcontinent or resuming our
pre-1965 role as a major arms supplier to
the region. We do not intend to stimulate
an arms race. We attach the utmost im-
portance to continued reconciliation between
India and Pakistan and will do all we can to
encourage that process. We presently enjoy
very good relations with both India and
Pakistan, and we see no reason why this
should not continue to be the case.

U.S. To Provide Loan and Grants
for Syrian Development

AID Announcement, February 28

AID press release 75-14 dated February 28

The Agency for International Develop-
ment has agreed to lend Syria $20 million
under an agreement signed February 27.
The loan will help Syria increase its agricul-
tural production and accelerate its general
economic development. Most of the funds
will be used to buy American machinery,
equipment, and materials needed for agricul-
tural development, such as plows, harrows,
harvesters, irrigation equipment, earthmov-
ing machinery, and insecticides. The loan
is to be repaid in dollars in 40 years, with
an initial grace period of 10 years; interest
is payable at 2 percent annually during the
grace period and 3 percent thereafter.

Under an agreement signed the same day,
AID has agreed to make a grant of $4 mil-
lion to Syria for technical services and feasi-
bility studies in agricultural production,
irrigation, processing of agricultural prod-
ucts, mechanization of agriculture, and other
fields. AID has also agreed to make a $1
million grant to finance training in the
United States for Syrian graduate students
in such fields as agriculture, engineering,
medicine, geology, and irrigation manage-
ment.

Funds for the loan and grants come from
a special requirements fund for assistance
to the Middle East appropriated by Congress
in December 1974.

332

Department of State Bulletin

President Ford's News Conference at Hollywood, Fla., February 26

Follotving are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news con-
ference held by President Ford at Holly-
wood, Fla., on February 26.^

President Ford: Good morning. Will you
please sit down. First, let me express my
appreciation to the people of Florida for
their hospitality. It has been a pleasure
being- here, and I look forward to the rest
of the day.

Before answering questions, I have a short
prepared statement that I would like to
make at the outset. It reads as follows.

[At this point the President read a statement,
the text of which follows.]

"There have been reports in recent weeks
of attempts to discriminate on religious or
ethnic grounds against certain institutions
or individuals in the international banking
community.

"I want there to be no doubt about the
position of the United States. Such discrim-
ination is totally contrary to the American
tradition and repugnant to American princi-
ples. It has no place in the free practice of
commerce as it has flourished in this coun-
try and in the world in the last 30 years.

"Foreign businessmen and investors are
welcome in the United States when they are
willing to conform to the principles of our
society. However, any allegations of dis-
crimination will be fully investigated and
appropriate action taken under the laws of
the United States."

Mr. McDermott [John McDermott, Miami
Herald] .

Q. Mr. Presideyit, what was behind Dr. Kis-

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 3,
1975.

singer's recent observation that someday we
might have to go in and destroy the oil wells
of the Middle East? Do you envision such a
possibility ever happening?

President Ford: I do not recollect the pre-
cise statement that is attributed to the Sec-
retary. I suspect you are referring to the
oft-quoted statement about strangulation.

I have answered that question, as has the
Secretary, on a number of occasions. To be
repetitive at this point I think might only
increase speculation. The facts are that
there was an answer to a very hypothetical
question of the most extreme circumstances
and both the Secretary and I have indicated
our views on the subject.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Q. Mr. President, is what you call our
moral commitment to arm South Viet-Nam
and Cambodia open-ended, and what are you
doing specifically to bring the warring par-
ties to the peace table?

President Ford: Well, the commitment
that we have to the South Vietnamese and
the commitment that we have to some ex-
tent in Cambodia is one that we, as the
United States, agreed at the Paris peace
accords — that we would withdraw our forces
and that, hopefully, peace would be estab-
lished in Indochina.

Part of our commitment was that we
would — in the process or as the result of
the withdrawal of our own military per-
sonnel, we would continue to supply arms
on a replacement basis, and that commit-
ment was predicated on the willingness of
the South Vietnamese to fight aggression
from North Viet-Nam.

The South Vietnamese are fighting, are
trying to protect their country, and are seek-

March 17, 1975

333

ing to defend their country from invasion.
It seems to me that as we look back at our
participation in the Paris accords and the
promises that were made, as long as they
were willing to fight against aggression and
invasion, that we had an obligation to help
them with military equipment on a replace-
ment basis.

The situation there is one that I am will-
ing to negotiate with the Congress. I indi-
cated that if the Congress would join with
me we would make a firm and final decision
on a three-year basis to permit South Viet-
Nam to get over the current crisis that they
face. I think that would be a reasonable
solution. I am told that the South Vietna-
mese in a three-year period, with our mili-
tary and economic aid, would be able to
handle the situation.

Q. What about Cambodia?

President Ford: In Cambodia, the prob-
lem there is extremely critical. Unless there
is additional U.S. military aid as I have
recommended, the Cambodians will run out
of ammunition in a relatively short period
of time. I think that would be most un-
fortunate because if they are able between
now and the end of the dry season to main-
tain their national integrity — the present
government — there is a possibility of nego-
tiations that might end the war in Cambodia.

Q. Mr. President, your Hispanic adviser,
Fernando DeBaca, told the Miami Neivs yes-
terday that you have never formally re-
evaluated U.S. foreign policy toivard Cuba
since you became President. Are you in
the process of reevaluating the government's
position, and do you foresee any lifting of
economic and diplomatic sanctions toivard
Cuba in the immediate future?

President Ford: Very frequently in my
daily meetings with Secretary of State Kis-
singer we discuss Latin American policy,
including our policy toward Cuba. The policy
today is the same as it has been, which is
that if Cuba will reevaluate and give us
some indication of a change of its policy

334

toward the United States, then we certainly
would take another look. But thus far there
is no sign of Mr. Castro's change of heart,
and so we think it is in our best interest
to continue the policies that are in effect at
the present time.

Q. Mr. President, a number of responsible
Americans, including Senator Mansfield,
have expressed concern that we are selling
more a^ms than ever to more nations. We
now sell to Pakistan as well as India, to
Arab countries as ivell as Israel. What is
your credo in regard to arms sales? Is it
influenced by the state of the economy, and !
what do yoti say to those who say that stick
sales are immoral?

President Ford: First, let me be very
specific. The sale of U.S. military equipment
to any country is not predicated on trying
to help the U.S. economy. We do have a
policy of selling arms to other nations if
that country feels it has an internal security
problem ; and number two, if it is necessary
for one or any of the countries to maintain
their national integrity or security.

We believe that in many areas of the
world a proper military balance is essential
for internal as well as external security of
various countries. And where other nations,
such as the Soviet Union, do sell or give
arms to one country or another, if another
country feels that for its own security it
needs additional military equipment and has
the cash, then we feel that it is proper to
make a sale from the United States to that
country.

Q. Mr. President, your opening statement
seemed to imply that the United States was
planning some sort of action against the
Arab natioiis that have embargoed Jeivish-
oivned ba7iks. Could you be more specific?
What sort of thing might ice do in this
case, if the embargoes continue?

President Ford: All we have so far are
some allegations. I have asked the Depart-
ments of Justice, Commerce, and State to
investigate any allegations. The actual ac-

Department of State Bulletin

tion that would be taken will be forthcoming
from recommendations by those depart-
ments. They have not been placed on my
desk at the present time.

Q. Mr. President, you have referred to
the question of aid to Cambodia as a moral
one relating to the credibility of the United
States. But is the issue of credibility really
at stake when so many of those with ivhom
tve ivoidd want to maintain it criticized our
involvement in that area to begin ivith and
long urged us to get out before ive did?

President Ford: Are you referring, sir,
to other nations?

Q. Other nations, yes.

President Ford: I do not think we can
conduct American foreign policy on the basis
of what other nations think is in our best
interest. The United States has to predicate
its foreign policy on what it thinks is in
America's best interest.

Now, we respect the right of other nations
to be critical of what we do; but it is my
responsibility and, I think, the responsibility
of people in authority in the United States
to make decisions that are based on what
we think is good for America, and that is
the way it will be decided as long as I am
President.

Q. Mr. President, there has been a new
crop of reports in recent days about the pos-
sibility of Secretary Kissinger leaving office
this year to be succeeded by Ambassador
Elliot Richardson. Could you comment on
these reports, and specifically, do you ex-
pect Dr. Kissinger to remain in office at
least until November of next year?

President Ford: I happen to feel very
strongly that Secretary Henry Kissinger is
an outstanding Secretary of State, and he
and I have never discussed any change in
his responsibilities. I know of no plans of
any kind whatsoever on my part, or his
part, to change the responsibilities — the very
heavy and important responsibilities that
he has.

On the other hand, I recently submitted

the name of Elliot Richardson to be Ambas-
sador to Great Britain. I picked him because
I think he will do a first-class job there, and
he has been recently confirmed. And I am
confident when he goes to London he will
carry out those responsibilities in that job
in a very exemplary way.

Q. Mr. President, it is estimated by im-
migration officials here in south Florida that
there are up to 90,000 illegal aliens gain-
fully employed in southeast Florida alone.
It is also estimated that our unemployment
figure runs close to that amount. What is
your office doing to address itself to this
particidar problem?

President Ford: We have been trying to
strengthen the arm of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Department of
Justice, in order to handle in an appropriate
way the illegal alien problem.

Florida has a serious problem. California
has an equally serious problem. We are trying
to work with the Mexican Government, for
example, primarily out in the Western
states. We are fully cognizant of the ad-
verse impact that illegal aliens have on em-
ployment opportunities of American citizens,
but we are trying to stop the flow in. We
are seeking to send back illegal aliens as
quickly as possible under the laws of the
United States.

Q. Mr. President, in answering an earlier
question about Cambodia, you used the phrase
"the commitment that loe have to some ex-
tent to Cambodia," to distinguish it from
Viet-Nam. Just tvhat is our commitment to
Cambodia when at the time that the Ameri-
can troops ivent in there in 1970, people were
told that there was not going to be any long-
term commitment? Could you explain that,
sir?

President Ford: Cambodia is in a some-
what difi'erent situation from Viet-Nam.
Viet-Nam is involved in the Paris accords.
Cambodia was not, in an official way. So our
obligation, which I think is important, is that
they want to maintain their national integ-

March 17, 1975

335

rity and their security of their country
against outside forces.

The policy of this country is to help those
nations with military hardware, not U.S.
military personnel, where the government
and the people of a country want to protect
their country from foreign aggression or
foreign invasion.

This is, to a substantial degree, in post-
World War II the tradition of the United
States; and I think if people in a country
want to fight for freedom for their country,
to the degree that we can I think we ought
to expand freedom around the world.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

Joint State-Treasury-FEA Statement
on Protecting Energy Prices^

In response to continuing press inquiries,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Treasury, and the Federal Energy Adminis-
trator have asked that the following state-
ment he made public.

In the state of the Union message, the
President stated that to "provide the critical
stability for our domestic energy produc-
tion in the face of world price uncertainty,
I will request legislation to authorize and
require tariffs, import quotas, or price floors
to protect our energy prices at levels which
will achieve energy independence."

Such protection of U.S. domestic energy
prices is essential in order to achieve our
national energy goal of invulnerability to
economic disruption in 1985. Much of the
oil we import can be produced at very low
prices. Thus, the producers have the power
of undercutting U.S. producers of alternative
energy sources and disrupting U.S. efforts

'Issued on Feb. 26 (text from press release 106).

to become self-reliant in energy. If, for ex-
ample, the OPEC [Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries] were to cut the
price of oil from present high levels to $4
a barrel, it is estimated that U.S. import re-
quirements would rise from the present level
of 6'/-> million barrels per day to more than
20 million barrels per day in 1985. Domestic
production of oil would fall sharply below
present levels.

At such levels, a new embargo would de-
prive this country of many millions of jobs,
and possibly several hundred billion dollars
in GNP [gross national product].

A determination has not yet been made as
to what exact price level should be judged
likely to result in an unacceptable level of
U.S. dependence on imports, but it is clear
that we cannot permit imported oil to com-
pete with domestically produced energy in a
disruptive manner. The precise instrument
that would be used to implement this policy
has yet to be chosen, but the principle is
fundamental to our energy goals.

The efforts of this country to develop al-
ternative sources will benefit other consum-
ing countries as well as the United States,
because they will help bring down the price
of oil from current exorbitant levels. We
have the same interest in seeing other con-
suming countries develop their domestic en-
ergy resources rapidly. But it is also true
that consuming countries could offset each
others' eft'orts to bring down the price of
oil by restimulating consumption when prices
begin to fall. For this reason, all consuming
countries have an interest in adopting a com-
mon policy on the levels at which they will
protect prices of their domestic energy.
Under this approach, consuming countries
would adopt a common floor price or a com-
mon tariff. The United States is prepared
to adopt either mechanism. The United States
is currently seeking such an agreement,
which it believes essential to the solution of
the energy crisis.

336

Department of State Bulletin

Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Meet the Press"

Following is the transcript of an inter-
view with Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, on the NBC television
and radio program "Meet the Press" on
February 23. Interviewing Under Secretary
Sisco were Bernard Givertzman, New York
Times; Joseph Kraft, Field Enterprises syn-
dicated columnist; Henry L. Trewhitt, Balti-
more Sun; Richard Valeriayii, NBC News;
and Laivrence E. Spivak, "Meet the Press"
moderator.

Mr. Spivak: Our guest today on "Meet the
Press" is the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco. Mr. Sisco
has just returned from a trip to the Middle
East and Westeryi Europe ivith Secretary of
State Kissinger. We will have the first ques-
tions now from Richard Valeriani of NBC
News.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, is the United
States norv considering a mutual defense
treaty with Israel in order to guarantee
Israel's security and survival?

Mr. Sisco: No, it is not, Mr. Valeriani. I
think there has been a great deal of con-
fusion in the recent press reports. We are
focusing, as you know, on trying to achieve
an interim next step.

The question of guarantees has been
studied over the years, and any studies that
will be given to this matter will be in rela-
tion to an overall political settlement.

Mr. Valeriani: Isn't s^ich a treaty inevi-
table in the context of an overall settlement?

Mr. Sisco: Well, let me say this: There
is a great deal of confusion about this word
"guarantee." We have always thought that
the basic assurance that is essential in the
area is the actual agreement between the

parties. Any .study of guarantees, I think,
will be in the context not only of an overall
political settlement but also as supplemen-
tary and complementary to the agreement
itself.

We think the obligations that the sides
exchange with each other, we think the
agreement that is to be achieved based on
the November 1967 resolution, including the
question of borders, is something that has to
be negotiated between the two sides. So
that when one talks of guarantees, one has
to talk in terms of a supplement and a com-
plement to the actual agreement between the
parties.

Mr. Valeriani: Then you do 7iot rule out
an eventual defense treaty with Israel?

Mr. Sisco: I am saying that this is some-
thing which is quite far down the pike; it is
something that obviously we will want to
look at in the context of a political settle-
ment.

Mr. Gwertzman: Mr. Sisco, when Dr.
Kissinger retiirned from the Middle East he
said some progress had been made. What
ivas this progress?

Mr. Sisco: I think the essential progress,
Mr. Gwertzman, was in defining and devel-
oping the framework for negotiations on a
possible next step.

As you know, we explored this possibility
with all of the parties principally concerned,
and we will soon be returning to the area to
resume the process. I am, frankly, guard-
edly optimistic, because I think we are begin-
ning to see at least the parameters of this
problem.

Mr. Gwertzman: Specifically in Israel, Dr.
Kissinger said Israel would not have to give

March 17, 1975

337

up territories without a quid pro quo. Did Dr.
Kissinger get from Mr. Sadat in Egypt an
agreement that Egypt had to give something
to get something?

Mr. Siisco: Well, without getting into the
specifics of the various elements, I think
we came away with the feeling that there are
really two elements here. The question of
withdrawal, of course, has been emphasized,
as well as that there must be progress
toward peace, and we think that the desire
for withdrawal and the desire for pi'ogress
toward peace which has been emphasized on
one side and the other can be reconciled.
And for that reason I think that we can look
forward, hopefully, to moving this along.

Mr. Kraft: Mr. Sisco, I'd like to ask a
question that is a little bit off the Middle
East, though not entirely. Mr. [Vladimir S.J
Alkhimov, %vho is the Deputy Foreign Trade
Minister of the Soviet Union, gave a press
conference here in Washington the other day
in ivhich he said the Administration coiddn't
he trusted to keep its commitments. Does
that seem to you an appropriate thing for a
Soviet official to be saying here in Wash-
ington?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I saw that report, Mr.
Kraft. I would say this: I think if one looks
over the history of the commitments of the
United States since World War II, I think
the history is very clear. I think we have
undertaken specific commitments; I think
we have carried them out both definitively
as well as in good faith, and I obviously
would not agree with that statement.

Mr. Kraft: Do you think it was appropri-
ate for him to make it? Are you going to do
anything to indicate displeasure, for exam-
ple?

Mr. Sisco: I think I would just repeat
again, I would not agree with that statement.

Mr. Kraft: In the course of your trip, the
Secretary saw Mr. Wilson [Prime Minister
Harold Wilson of the U.K.] and Mr. Gro-
myko [Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei
A. Gromyko of the U.S.S.R.}. Did you get
any reports on the state of Mr. Brezhnev's

[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union^ political and per-
sonal health?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think the question of
health is fairly self-evident. Mr. Brezhnev
was very heavily involved in the entire Wil-
son visit. This was very clear to the entire
media, and as far as we know he is operat-
ing fully, as was evidenced by that particular
high-level exchange.

Mr. Trewhitt: To pursue Mr. Kraft's point
about the meeting ivith Foreign Minister
Gromyko, one got the impression that the
meeting was somewhat chilly. I wonder %vhat
you can say about the general state of de-
tente? Is detente in any way in jeopardy as a
result of the intervention of Congress?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think the bread-and-
butter issue between ourselves and the Soviet
Union is the question of the strategic balance.
The SALT Two [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] talks are proceeding. My hope is that
these will make progress. I think that is the
key element in the situation. These were very
good talks that we had with the Soviet Union.
Obviously the practical issues that were dis-
cussed are both delicate and difficult, but I
think, myself, that there is a very good
chance that we can deepen the relationship,
and I think the next few months in particu-
lar are important in relationship not only
to SALT Two but the whole question of the
European Security Conference as well as
the question of mutual balanced reduction
of forces, and these key areas of the Middle
East and Cyprus.

M): Trewhitt: How do you assess the
Soviet role in its attitude on the Middle East
— at what point must they come in, are they
u)ihappy about being dealt out at this point?

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Trewhitt, no peace in the
Middle Ea.st is possible in the long run with-
out the cooperation of the Soviet Union. The
reason why we are undertaking the kind of
"middleman" role that we are pursuing at
present is that this is the desire of the par-
ties, and we don't preclude the renewal of

338

Department of State Bulletin

the Geneva Conference in appropriate cir-
cumstances, and neither are we pursuing a
policy of excluding the Soviet Union in the
Middle East, because the reality is they are
there, they have interests, and we recognize
that if you are going to get a durable peace
they have got to be part of the process and
they have got to agree with it.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, may I ask you
this: There have long been many obstacles
to peace in the Middle East. What do you
now consider the major obstacles? Have they
changed any?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I feel that the objective
conditions in the area, in the aftermath of
the October 1973 war, actually have improved
the prospects for progress toward peace in
the Middle East. The reason why I say this
is this — that I think that both sides in the
aftermath of that war concluded that the
best alternative is the process of diplomacy
and the process of negotiations. The Arabs,
for example, did not feel that they needed
to go to the conference table with their heads
bowed as the result, for example, of the de-
feat during the 1967 war. I think the after-
math of the 1973 war proves that both sides
— regardless of the fact there are gaps to be
bridged and there are differences to be
bridged — that both sides continue to be com-
mitted to the diplomatic process, and I find
that is a huge plus in this situation.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, a recent Gallup
poll shoivs that 61 percent of the American
people who were polled said they thought
a war bettveen Israel and the Arabs is likely
this year. Based on your intimate knowledge
of the situation, do you think a war is likely
this year?

Mr. Sisco: War, of course, can never be —

Mr. Spivak: I said "likely."

Mr. Sisco: — precluded as a possibility.
I do not believe it is likely; and the reason
is, I am still hopeful that we can make prog-
ress on a step-by-step basis and I do not be-
lieve that the processes of diplomacy have
been exhausted and, moreover, as I read the
area — and I have now spent as many as 4

months of the last 12 in the Middle East—
I think both sides are sick and tired of war
and I think the diplomatic process that we are
seeing is a reflection of the desire of both
sides to try to get something done.

Mr. Spivak: Was there anything new and
especially encouraging from this trip that
you came away with?

Mr. Sisco: Nothing that one can cite as

new or decisive. I find it significant that both
sides want the process to continue, and as
long as each side wants the process to con-
tinue it means each feels there is still an op-
portunity to achieve something as a result
of dialogue.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, an Egyptian
magazine said this past week that another
Egyptian-Israeli agreement is already in the
bag. Is that report accurate?

Mr. Sisco: No, it is not. I wish it were, Mr.
Valeriani. It might .shorten this next trip
that we intend to take in the month of March.

Mr. Valeriani: What makes it so difficult?

Mr. Sisco: I think what makes it difficult is
that each side needs to try to meet at least
the minimal conditions and the minimal
terms of the other, and each side, Mr. Va-
leriani, is operating within what I would
consider to be a rather confined political
setting.

Mr. Valeriani: For example? What does
that mean?

Mr. Sisco: It means that both the leaders
in Israel as well as Egypt have to get the
kind of agreement that can be fully justified
before their own people. In the case of
Israel it has to be the kind of agreement that
can get through the parliamentary process.
In the case of Egypt, not only must this
agreement be supported by the Egyptian
people, I think it is important that what-
ever agreement is achieved have the broad
support in the Arab world as well.

Mr. Gwertzman: Following up on that,
how serious is the opposition of Syria to an
agreement between Egypt and Israel?

March 17, 1975

339

Mr. Sisco: Well, I have read reports of
this sort, Mr. Gwertzman, and let me say
this : The focus, as is evidenced from the
press, is on the Egyptian-Israeli aspect of
the problem. However, I would recall to you
that we went to every capital, that we feel
the question of an overall settlement involves
all of the fronts. We would like to make
progress wherever progress can be made,
but we are not excluding anyone or any as-
pect of the problem.

Mr. Gwertzman: But after the Egyptian-
Israeli agreement, presuming it is carried
out, do yon anticipate there coidd he an
Israeli-Syrian interim accord, or would all
sides then go to Geneva immediately?

Mr. Sisco: It is very difficult to speculate.
What we would do in these circumstances is
obviously to consult not only with Israel but
with the key Arabs as well, both in terms
of the process and where we could go from
there.

Mr. Kraft: Have the Syrians shoivn any
disposition to make concessions in the event
the Israelis moved a feio kilometers back
from the Golan Heights?

Mr. Sisco: We are exploring, of course,
all possibilities with both sides. The question
of concessions or conciliation or whether it
be on the Israeli side or the Syrian side — I
think one can't make this kind of a judgment
at this juncture. One would have to make
this kind of a judgment as the process con-
tinues.

Mr. Kraft: Would yon say, Mr. Secretary,
that the Israelis might be inissing the boat
by not exploring the possibilities for flexi-
bility in this area?

Mr. Sisco: Well, the Israelis have said,
and the leaders in Israel are on record as
saying, that they are prepared to try to
explore the possibilities of a peace agreement
across the board, so that it can't be said that
the Israelis have necessarily excluded any

particular front in terms of a peace agree-
ment.

Mr. Kraft: Is there any disposition, Mr.
Secretary, to move back at all from the Golan
Heights — five miles even?

Mr. Sisco: Again I would refer you to what
has been said publicly by the Israeli Prime
Minister in this regard and that is that
they have indicated a willingness to explore
what the possibilities are on all fronts as
it relates to a peace agreement. Now, let
me emphasize "a peace agreement."

Mr. Treivhitt: Mr. Secretary, just to clar-
ify a point, I take it you feel that it is quite
possible that an interim agreement might
call for a partial Israeli ivithdraival on the
Sinai Peninsula without a corresponding
ivithdrawal on the northern front with Syria.

Mr. Sisco: I haven't said that, Mr. Trew-
hitt. All I have said is that the focus at
this particular juncture is on the EgjT)tian-
Israeli aspect of it, but I would underscore
again that our discussions are not limited
to this; our discussions have included talks
with the Syrians as well as the Jordanians.

Mr. Treivhitt: And I woidd like to return
to Mr. Valeriani's original question if I
might . . . does the United States, in fact,
guarantee the continued existence of Israel
as a sovereign state?

Mr. Sisco: Well, the United States, of
course, has no formal treaty relationship
with the State of Israel. However, I think
our support over the years has been made
manifest, both on the basis of an ongoing
military assistance relationship as well as
the economic support, and I find no basic
change in the position of the Administration
in this regard. Our support continues.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, from time to
time there has been debate as to ivhether
the United States regards the security of
Israel as a vital American, interest and there-
fore could not and would not tolei'ate its

340

Department of State Bulletin

destruction. Can you tell lis ivhether we do
consider it a vital interest to the American
people?

Mr. Sisco: My answer would be affirmative.
We have been long the principal supporter
of the existence of the State of Israel and its
economic viability. We have played a major
role in the creation of the State of Israel,
and I think ever since the creation of the
State we have been its prime support, and
my answer to you would be affirmative.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the New York
Post indicated that you believe that the
United States is moving toward official rec-
ognition o/ the Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO). Do you think the United
States is likely at any time soon to officially
recognize the Palestinian Liberation group?

Mr. Sisco: 1 do not believe this, and I have
made no such statement, but to answer your
question —

Mr. Spivak: They said not that you made
the statement but that you have indicated
this.

Mr. Sisco: Neither is true. I will get to
your question here, Mr. Spivak. Insofar as
the PLO is concerned, we have made clear
that we cannot in good conscience recom-
mend any negotiations with the PLO as long
as the PLO fails to recognize the existence
of the State of Israel, and I see no evidence
that the PLO has any intention to do so in
the foreseeable future.

Mr. Spivak: Where does that put the PLO
as far as the Geneva Conference is concerned
then?

Mr. Sisco: When we convened originally
at Geneva, one decision was taken — namely,
that the question of any additional partici-
pants at that conference would be a deter-
mination to be made by the members of that
conference. In other words, the question of
the PLO would come up if and when any
Geneva Conference were reconvened, and it

would be a decision that would have to be
made by those present.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, you said here
that war cannot be precluded in the Middle
East, and President Ford and Secretary
Kissiyiger have emphasized repeatedly how
explosive the area is, how volatile the situ-
ation, and yet the Administration is pouring
billions of dollars of new weapons into the
area on both sides. Why?

Mr. Sisco: Well, let me say, first of all,
that insofar as our support on the military
side for Israel is concerned, I think it is
important that we maintain its strength.
Insofar as our arms sales to other parts of
the area — let's take first of all the gulf and
the Arabian Peninsula. I have heard it said
that we are doing this willy-nilly, on an
ad hoc basis.

This is not the case. I can recall the kind
of studies that we undertook on this whole
question of arms in this area in the aftermath
of the exodus of Great Britain. What con-
fronted us at that particular time was this:
Do we try to fill this kind of a void directly
or do we undertake a policy of helping those
who really have legitimate security inter-
ests and need the arms for self-defense pur-
poses? We concluded the way to proceed
in this area was to try to help in regional
cooperation. We see Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
these countries as elements of stability in
the area with legitimate self-defense needs.
And it is not a question of whether we pro-
vide arms, or no arms going into the area;
it is a question of whether we provide them
or others in circumstances where they per-
ceive a real danger.

Mr. Valeriani: Are you willing to go along
with a six months' moratorium on arms
shiprnents to the Persian Gulf as suggested
by Senator Kennedy?

Mr. Sisco: I have read the press report
this morning. Obviously I have not seen the
resolution itself, but I would only emphasize
that we feel that we are meeting a legitimate

March 17, 1975

341

concern of the countries in the area and these
are friends of ours — these are friends who
are trying to pursue a moderate course in
the circumstances.

M7'. Givertzman: Speaking of arms, has
the Administration decided to lift the em-
bargo against arms shipments to Pakistan?

Mr. Sisco: I expect an announcement on
this, Mr. Gwertzman, very soon, and let me
say that we have felt that a rather anoma-
lous situation has existed in the area where
one side has been getting arms from the
Soviets and has its own production capacity,
whereas the other side — an ally, I might add,
with whom we have a formal relationship —
has been denied this insofar as the United
States is concerned. The matter has been
under active consideration. I expect an an-
nouncement very soon.

Mr. Gwertzman: From what you are say-
ing, I assume the ansiver is ive will lift the
embargo. Do you think this will really dam-
age relations with India as the Indian
Government says it ivill?

Mr. Sisco: In my judgment it should not,
because I think we have explained this quite
thoroughly. We are not trying to balance
one side against the other in this situation.
We think that it is as much in India's in-
terest to have a relatively secure Pakistan
— to pursue the so-called Simla process, to
pursue the process of negotiation — as it is
in the interests of Pakistan itself.

Mr. Kraft: Speaking again of arms, the
White House keeps saying that the United
States has a commitment to South Viet-Nam
and on the basis of that commitment is push-
ing for this $300 million supplemental. What
is that commitment and when ivas that com-
mitment made — to ivhom and by whom and
when?

Mr. Sisco: Let me just say this about
South Viet-Nam, without getting into the
legal basis. I think that what is clear is
that we directly have gotten out of South

Viet-Nam insofar as our own personnel are
concerned. The question before us is : Do
we continue to support South Viet-Nam so
that it can continue to defend itself in cir-
cumstances where it continues to be under
threat? Our judgment is that this $300
million is needed to do this.

Mr. Treivhitt: Mr. Secretary, ive haven't
talked about oil at all. I ivill ask you ivhether
it is possible to settle the Middle East sit-
uatio7i politically tvithout a concurrent settle-
ment of the xvhole question of energy and
oil in the area?

Mr. Sisco: I think these are two separate
problems, Mr. Trewhitt. I think, obviously,
to the degree to which we can make progress
on the Arab-Israeli dispute this will help
the overall climate. But I think the oil ques-
tion has to be resolved on its merits. I think
it is important that the United States de-
velop its own independence and that it not
be vulnerable to outside sources, and we are
not interested in a confrontation between
the United States and the Arabs. We are
interested in a producer-consumer dialogue
that resolves the problem.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you have
ivorked pretty closely ivith Secretary Kis-
singer nmv for some time and have had an
opportunity to observe the reaction to the
recent attacks on him by Congress and the
press. What has been the effect on his power
and his infltience?

Mr. Sisco: I don't see any diminution
either of his power or his influence, Mr.
Spivak. For example, I spent the last two
weeks with him in the Middle East. I find
it very significant that both sides are very
anxious to have our Secretary of State con-
tinue this process. In fact, I will go further.
Both sides see Mr. Kissinger as the indis-
pensable element in these negotiations, and
I share this view.

Mr. Spivak: Thank you. Secretary Sisco,
for being with us today on "Meet the Press."

342

Department of State Bulletin

India-U.S. Science and Technology
Subcommision Meets at Washington

Joint Communique ^

The Science and Technology Subcommis-
sion of the India-U.S. Joint Commission held
its first meeting in Washington, January
27-29, 1975 to review ways and means to
expand and strengthen cooperation in these
fields between India and America. The dis-
cussions noted that joint collaboration in
scientific and technological fields could make
considerable contributions to a better life for
the peoples of both countries.

The meetings were chaired by Dr. B. D.
Nag Chaudhuri, Vice Chancellor, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi, and Dr. Dixy
Lee Ray, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Afl'airs. The Economic and
Commercial Subcommission met in Washing-
ton on January 20 and 21 and the Subcom-
mission on Education and Culture will meet
in New Delhi on February 3, 4, and 5, 1975.
These meetings are in preparation for the
meeting of the Joint Commission, chaired by
the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissin-
ger, and the Minister for External Affairs,
Shri Y. B. Chavan, to be held in Washington
on March 13-14, 1975.

In the discussions, the Subcommission
stressed the broad range of existing Indo-
U.S. scientific cooperation and reservoirs of
talent in science and technology in both
countries. As areas in which mutual cooper-
ation could produce the most effective re-
sults, the Subcommission decided to focus on
the broad fields of agriculture, energy,
health, electronics and communications, and
the environment. The Subcommission de-
cided to place special emphasis: In agricul-
ture, on efficient use of water in arid lands
and integrated pest control; in health, on
cooperative activities in fertility control and
communicable and infectious diseases ; and
in energy, on better utilization and conserva-
tion of energy and on the use of solar energy
in rural areas. Cooperative activities in elec-

tronics, communications, and protection of
the environment were also agreed upon.

The Subcommission agreed to explore
these areas of scientific cooperation through
appropriate national agencies and to prepare
concrete proposals for projects and related
activities before the March 13-14 meeting
of the Joint Commission. The Subcommis-
sion appointed team leaders in each broad
area and charged them to refine the specific
proposals for joint action developed in work-
ing groups at the Subcommission meeting.
These include exchange of information, data
and research reports, visits by technical ex-
perts, joint or complementary research, ex-
change of equipment and joint development
of prototypes.

The Subcommission also agreed that on-
going programs and cooperation in the fields
of exchange of scientists and information
systems should be reviewed in light of prior-
ities agreed upon by the Subcommission.

India-U.S. Education and Culture
Subcommission Meets at New Delhi

Report and Recommendations ^

The Indo-U.S. Sub-Commission on Edu-
cation and Culture, established in pursuance
of the Agreement between the United States
and India in October 1974, held its first
meeting in Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi, from
February 3-5, 1975, under the Co-Chairman-
ship of Shri G. Parthasarathi and Dr. Robert
F. Goheen.

The meeting reviewed the progress and
functioning of long-standing programmes
and arrangements and explored ways and
means by which the Sub-Commission could
augment and facilitate the interchange of
people, materials and ideas in education and
the arts, in order to broaden the areas of
mutual appreciation through collaboration

^ Released to the press at Washington on Jan. 29.
- Issued at New Delhi at the conclusion of the
meeting.

March 17, 1975

343

i

in the widest perspective. To this end, the
Sub-Commission recommended using the
resources available to enlarge and develop
the existing llow of exchanges by formulat-
ing a planned, flexible programme. The Sub-
Commission used a broad, general agenda,
while at the same time following up the
recommendations of the Indo-American Con-
ference on Academic Collaboration held in
January, 1974.

The Sub-Commission recognized the im-
portance of approaching its task from the
points of view of reciprocity as well as of
national needs and requirements, particu-
larly in view of the imbalance in the material
resources and the differences in the life styles
and systems of the two countries.

The Sub-Commission was conscious of the
need to stress international exchanges in a
world of interdependence where modern
communication helps in fruitful interaction
but also sometimes accentuates diff'erences.
It explored many new and constructive
areas of collaboration.

The Sub-Commission took note of the de-
cisions taken by the Sub-Commission on
Science and Technology. It was recognized
that there were areas of science and tech-
nology, particularly within the university
system, which should continue to be the
concern of this Sub-Commission.

The Sub-Commission submits the follow-
ing recommendations to the Joint Com-
mission:

1. Museimis

i) That a joint committee be set up to ex-
amine on a continuing basis different aspects
of museum activities, to recommend:

a) specific projects of cooperation such
as conservation and other scientific aspects
of the preservation of art objects;

b) seminars on such topics as science
museums, museums and the community, and
museums as educational resources ;

c) exchange of art objects on a loan basis,
and of museum personnel and experts who
could be associated in cataloguing the col-

344

lections in both public and private museums ;
d) exhibitions in each country on specific
themes such as pre-industrial agricultural
technology, and the history of industrial
technology.

ii) That the two Governments take all
necessary steps to pass legislation and en-
act procedures to eliminate illicit traffic in
antiquities and art objects.

2. Exhibitions

That exchange of large-scale "impact ex-
hibitions" be arranged with a view to en-
hancing mutual awareness and understand-
ing:

a) through coordinated presentations of
Indian culture, and traditional, contempo-
rary and folk art in major centres of the
United States preferably in conjunction with
a broad programme of related cultural ac-
tivities (performing arts, film showings, dis-
cussions), and

b) through a comparable presentation in
India of U.S. culture across a broad range of
fine arts, modern design, and folk art.

3. Performing Arts

That each side conduct a study of the op
portunities for wider exchanges in the per.
forming arts with a view to increasing the
range and improving the quality of ex-
changes, and present their studies to the
next meeting of the Sub-Commission. In
the meantime the building up of collections
of recordings and films through exchanges
should be encouraged.

4. Educational Technology and Mass Com-
m unication

i) That programmes of exchange of edu-
cational technology and educational material
such as films, audio-visual and T.V. ma
terial, video tapes be developed.

ii) That production and exchange of films
in areas of mutual interest, such as, edu-
cational films for use by medical students,
be encouraged.

Department of State Bulletir

iii) That the exchange of samples of sound
■broadcasting and T.V. programmes, on sub-
jects of mutual interest, such as health ed-
ucation, improvement of urban environment
and rehabilitation of physically handicapped
be encouraged.

iv) That a programme of exchanges of
short films of non-commercial nature and
documentaries and art films, produced by
different agencies in India and the United
States be encouraged.

v) That consideration be given to the
presentation of a series of high-quality In-
dian films on American TV and for non-
commercial screening.

vi) That the building up, in each country,
of a selection of full-length feature films
which will present a history of film as art
in the other country, be encouraged and that
means be explored for the wider showing
of such films.

5. Indo-American Textbook Programme and
Exchange of Scientific Journals

i) That the Indo-American textbook pro-
gramme be continued and be restored to its
former scope.

ii) That negotiations between the Indian
Government and American publishers to re-
duce the royalty charges be continued.

iii) That the two Governments assist in
making full runs of leading scientific jour-
nals more easily available to Indian libraries
and scholars, pending a long-term solution
of this problem through UNESCO [United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization].

6. Binational Seminars

That binational seminars be held covering
significant topics of common interest, with
the expectation that some of these would
lead to collaborative research. The following
topics were agreed to with the understanding
that at least two seminars will be held each
year:

i) Linkages of agriculture and education

March 17, 1975

ii) Museums as educational resources
iii) Educational technology
iv) Cultural influences on learning and
social development

v) Methods in history, old and new
vi) Medical pedagogy.

7. Scholarships and Visitorships

That existing programmes of grants,
scholarships, fellowships and visitorships
should continue and even be expanded sub-
ject to the availability of resources. Noting
that there is a growing need for support
of certain fields important to national de-
velopment and the advancement of mutual
understanding, the Sub-Commission recom-
mends consideration of an additional pro-
gramme, comprising the award of about 50
fellowships and 25 visitorships each year in
each direction. Each government would be
expected to arrange to meet the costs in its
own country.

8. Brain Drain

Having regard to the serious problem
posed to the manpower resources of India
by the loss of highly trained personnel, the
Sub-Commission urges that the question be
examined at the governmental level and
with academic institutions.

9. Implementation Machinery

That between meetings of the Sub-Com-
mission, members will continue to explore
other areas of collaboration and will func-
tion as advisory groups in their respective
countries. The Co-Chairmen will co-opt such
associates as may be necessary to ensure
follow-up action. A secretariat would be es-
tablished in Washington and in Delhi.

In due time the secretariat in each country
will also develop as information centres to
provide information about academic facilities
and resources in each country and to assist
in the exchange of documentation, particu-
larly articles, journals and other source ma-
terial and to help in the placement of
scholars.

345

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Outlines Objectives for New Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations

The opening negotiating session of the
Trade Negotiations Committee was held at
Geneva February 11-13. Following is a state-
ment made in the Committee on February 11
by Harald B. Malmgren, Deputy Special Rep-
resentative of the President for Trade Nego-
tiations.''

In his state of the Union message to the
U.S. Congress a few days ago, President
Ford observed that the world trade and
monetary structure, which provides markets,
energy, food, and vital raw materials for all
nations, "is now in jeopardy," and that "eco-
nomic distress is global."

Some argue that, in these difficult times,
a multilateral trade negotiation is inoppor-
tune. Rather than liberalization of trade, it
is argued, the answer to national problems is
to go it alone, with purely national solutions.
This tendency toward isolationism in some
quarters is a threat to the well-being of alt
the nations represented in this room today.

The present world economic distress is
temporary. But the work of this Trade Nego-
tiations Committee will result in changes in
the world's trading system that will last for
decades — long after this present state of
uncertainty has ended. Indeed, this current
economic uncertainty makes it imperative
for the nations of the world to work together
to solve their problems collectively. The
process of negotiation is needed not only to
establish a better structure for conducting
our trade relations in the future but to help
us manage our mutual relations now.

We should not delude ourselves ; we are at

' Ambassador Malmgren subsequently resigned to
return to private life.

346

a turning point. It is essential that we begin
serious negotiations now, move forward on
all fronts, and demonstrate both early prog-
ress and concrete achievement. The whole
world is watching.

In the Tokyo Declaration, Ministers set
the objective of achieving the "expansion
and ever-greater liberalization of world trade
and improvement in the standard of living
and welfare of the people of the world.'
This commitment remains as vahd today as
it was when we began our effort in Tokyo
My government stands by this commitment
and, indeed, by all the elements of the Tokyo
Declaration.

When we urged negotiation some time ago,
many of you agreed on the need for a new
effort, but asked us to obtain a mandate
first. Thanks to the Congress, we now have
our mandate— the Trade Act of 1974. At our
last meeting in July, I said that we expected
to have the trade bill "in hand" by October.
Admittedly, I never told you which hand ;
and I also admit that the concept of "in
hand," whether in the left hand or the right,
does not translate well into French. Be that
as it may, the final deliberations eluded oui
grasp for a while, but you will recognize that
the United States now has it in both hands,
We are ready for these negotiations.

Our Trade Act, of course, is only a struc-
ture of authorities and objectives, a struc-
ture that makes actions possible. So that
these actions will be effective, the executive
and the Congress have developed a new set

■ For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyc
on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement or
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see Bulletin of Oct. 8
1973, p. 450.

Department of State Bulletin

of working arrangements that will insure
that the Congress participates fully in our
efforts here. As evidence of this new team
effort, I have alongside me today members
of both our Senate and our House of Repre-
sentatives, including Senator [William V.]
Roth from the Committee on Finance; Mr.
[Al] Ullman, the new chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee; Mr. [William
J.] Green, the new chairman of the subcom-
mittee on international trade of the Ways
and Means Committee; and Mr. [Barber B.]
Conable, the ranking minority member of
that trade subcommittee. We believe this
new alliance of Congress and the executive
will provide sound and stable American trade
policy.

Broad Purposes of U.S. Trade Act

In the broadest sense, the purpose of our
Trade Act is to strengthen economic rela-
tions among all countries by building an open
and nondiscriminatory world trading system
— a system that fosters economic growth and
full employment in all countries, including
the United States. I hope that the countries
represented here today share our view that
we should solve our problems through mu-
tual efforts and through trade liberalization,
rather than through the imposition of new
restrictions or the retention of old ones.

The Trade Act of 1974 provides the U.S.
delegation to the multilateral trade negotia-
tions the ability to participate in the most
far-reaching round of trade negotiations so
far undertaken. We have unprecedented
tariff authority. More significant, for the first
time a U.S. delegation comes to international
trade negotiations with a mandate to attack
the problem of nontariff barriers. Our Trade
Act states that "the President is urged to
take all appropriate and feasible steps within
his power" to harmonize, reduce, or eliminate
nontariff barriers and other distortions of
international trade.

I want to call to your attention the fact
that this law reflects the feeling of many of
you about the problems of global develop-
ment. A fundamental element in our law is
a concern for using trade to promote the

economic growth of developing countries and
to expand mutual market opportunities be-
tween the United States and developing
countries. The Tokyo Declaration under-
scores the importance of these negotiations
to the economic progress of the developing
nations. Our continued commitment to that
declaration's statement of intent can now be
put into practice.

The Trade Act stipulates that one of its
purposes is "to provide fair and reasonable
access to products of less developed countries
in the United States market." This objective
takes concrete form, for example, in the pro-
vision for the United States to join other
developed countries in granting generalized
tariff preferences. The United States is mov-
ing quickly to implement its preference
scheme. This will be done in the broadest
possible manner to increase market access
in the United States for products of less
developed countries, beyond the very sub-
stantial market which these products already
have.

Some of the provisions contained in the
final text of the Trade Act relating to our
generalized system of preferences (GSP)
have been criticized. As President Ford noted
with regret when signing the act, some of
its provisions are rigid. He also declared his
intention to work out with the Congress any
necessary accommodations in a spirit of
compromise. On balance, we believe that our
preference system will be of major near-
term benefit to a great number of developing
countries. It will encourage these countries
not only to expand exports but to diversify
as well.

For every beneficiary developing country
we intend to reduce to zero the tariff on all
products that will be covered in our system.
Included in this product coverage will be a
broad range of manufactured and semi-
manufactured products, as well as selected
primary and agricultural products. Competi-
tive-need ceilings will protect the ability of
new industries in these countries to partici-
pate in our market on a preferential basis
and will especially help the least developed
countries. Thus, our preference system
should prove to be significant in assisting

March 17, 1975

347

the development efforts of many of the gov-
ernments represented in this room today.

Even more important to the developing
countries, however, is the authority con-
tained in the act for the United States to
enter into the current round of multilateral
trade negotiations. While GSP concessions
are voluntary and may be withdrawn at any
time, it is in these negotiations that lasting
reductions in tariff levels and other trade
restrictions can be obtained. If our negotia-
tions are successful, these reductions will
provide both the developed and the developing
world with the framework for increased
market access on a liberalized basis.

One of the most important directives in
our law is to seek the harmonization, reduc-
tion, and elimination of agricultural trade
barriers and distortions in conjunction with
the harmonization, reduction, or elimination
of industrial trade barriers and distortions.
While we have flexibility in how we obtain
this objective, it is a requirement for the
United States that agricultural trade be
liberalized if we are going to liberalize indus-
trial trade. Neither industry nor agriculture
can be negotiated in isolation if we are to
achieve significant progress.

One of the principal objectives of reducing
tariffs and attacking nontariff barriers in the
negotiations should be to obtain a more open
and orderly trading system for agricultural
products. The negotiation of such a system
requires more than the traditional emphasis
on export expansion. It requires giving full
weight to the mutual benefits of economic
interdependence in terms of economic effi-
ciency and growth, consumer welfare, and
good international relations.

In the past, given the extreme political
sensitivity of policies affecting farm income
and food prices, governments have generally
been unwilling to consider substantive trade
liberalization for fear that this would sig-
nificantly reduce their ability to achieve such
domestic objectives as the stabilization of
farm incomes and food prices. Recent events
throughout the world, however, have demon-
strated that no government can, over a long
period of time, isolate its internal markets
from world forces. Today no one questions

348

the need to develop multilateral understand-
ings on the use of trade measures during
periods of excess or inadequate food produc-
tion throughout the world.

As in the case of our legislation for the
Kennedy Round, the Trade Act of 1974 gives
a grant of five years of negotiating author-
ity. This should not be taken, however, as an
indication that the United States desires the
Tokyo Round to last until exactly January
3, 1980. I feel that we have begun a process
of continuous negotiation on a broad front
and that the negotiating process should not
be confined to one large burst of energy,
such as in each of the prior six tariff-nego-
tiating rounds. We should start now to nego-
tiate and work seriously, consolidating what
we can, when we can. We should aim to start
concluding trade agreements on specific sub-
jects as soon as they are ready. Our effort
should be an intensive one that yields con-
crete results, to prove to the world that this
work is not only real but timely.

The challenges we face are great. The
consequences of failure are even greater. I
urge the adoption of a work program that
brings early and significant results for all
countries participating in these negotiations,
developed and developing countries alike.

Reduction of Tariffs

The tariff-cutting authority in our man-
date is the largest, in percentage terms, that
has ever been delegated to U.S. negotiators.
I am pleased to announce to you that the
President has just submitted the entire U.S.
tariff schedule, with only a few technical
exceptions, to the International Trade Com-
mission.' The Commission, under law, must
give its advice on the economic effect of pos-
sible U.S. concessions on any tariffs. When
this domestic process is completed we will
be in a position to participate with others in
a very substantial reduction of the high
duties remaining in countries' tariff struc-
tures, as well as in significant reductions of
moderate tariffs and in the elimination of

' Section 171 of the Trade Act of 1974 renamed
the United States Tariff Commission as the United
States International Trade Commission.

Department of State Bulletin

many low duties. Reductions of 60 percent
.can be made in duties over 5 percent. Lower
duties can be eliminated entirely.

Under the Tokyo Declaration, we all
agreed that negotiations on tariffs should be
conducted on the basis of "appropriate for-
mulae of as general application as possible."
Over the next few months we should work
toward early agreement on such a general
formula for tariff reduction. We are prepared
to consider a broad range of negotiating
proposals. In the near future we intend to
table possible negotiating formulae.

If we are to fulfill the objectives of the
Tokyo Declaration, a general tariff formula
should result in a substantial reduction of
tariffs on the part of all participants. In our
view it is not necessary to agree at the out-
set on a target for the average overall reduc-
tion of tariff's. Averages can be very mis-
leading. Consequently, it might be better to
begin considering various negotiating for-
mulae with a view to agreeing on an accept-
able one. Such formulae, however, should
result in significant overall tariff reductions.
Surely, we should not aim at less than the
Kennedy Round; any lesser objective would
be regarded as a step backward, as indeed it
would be.

Let me also say that we favor, in principle,
a substantial linear reduction as the simplest,
fairest formula. If we were to contemplate a
deviation from this principle to provide for
deeper cuts at higher tariff levels, this would
create a need for additional elements of reci-
procity from our trading partners. Howevei-,
our law does not preclude such an approach.

Agreement on a tariff-negotiating for-
mula, which would generally cover all prod-
ucts, should not be difficult. We should move
ahead now to resolve the relevant issues:
Which countries will apply the general for-
mula? If the formula relates to existing
tariffs, what base rates and base dates will
apply to reductions? How will tariff cuts be
staged? How will exceptions be handled?
What tariff reductions will be made by coun-
tries not applying the general formula?
What procedures will apply to the participa-
tion of developing countries?

Work on tariffs will require careful joint

analysis and discussions before a negotiating
plan can be agreed. We propose that such a
tariff-negotiating plan be prepared by July 1.
Whatever plan may be adopted, the United
States intends to make maximum possible
use of its tariff-negotiating authority to
grant concessions on products of special
interest to the developing countries. In this
respect it would be helpful to continue iden-
tifying such products, drawing upon work
already begun in the preparatory stage of
the negotiations.

Dealing With Nontariff Barriers

In all areas of trade, nontariff barriers
have become relatively much more important
as tariffs have been reduced over recent
decades. Consequently it is absolutely essen-
tial to deal with these restrictions and other
distortions to trade if we are to successfully
liberalize trade and make the trading system
work more effectively.

Because of their heterogeneous nature, it
is not possible to devise a general solution to
nontariff barriers. Each category of I'estric-
tions must be dealt with separately. It is also
not possible to attack all of these restrictions
simultaneously.

We believe that, as a beginning, we should
select a few nontariff barriers for concen-
trated attention. The initial selections should
be comparatively important issues, of multi-
lateral interest, and of widespread applica-
tion, so that mutually advantageous agree-
ments might be negotiated without the ne-
cessity for offsetting concessions in other
areas. Fortunately, the preparatory work
has already produced candidates that easily
meet these criteria — standards, subsidies,
and government procurement practices.

Product standards and certification have
increasing importance for world trade. The
use of international, as opposed to regional
or national, standards can facilitate trade.
Certification requirements can also facilitate
trade provided they do not create unneces-
sary obstacles for foreign products.

After more than a year of concentrated
attention a working group of the Committee
on Trade in Industrial Products developed a

March 17, 1975

349

draft Code of Conduct for Preventing Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade, which has become
better known as the GATT Standards Code.
It contains a few important disagreements,
which need to be resolved. It also must be
determined whether problems of packaging
and labeling can adequately be handled under
its provisions. In addition, a review of its
applicability to agricultural products is
needed.

We propose that the draft GATT Stand-
ards Code be taken off the shelf and that
work be resumed at the earliest possible
date. We would hope that negotiations on
this code could be completed very shortly.
If countries were satisfied that this agree-
ment is mutually advantageous, we see every
reason to implement it prior to the conclu-
sion of the overall negotiations.

We believe the problems in this field will
grow rapidly. Our peoples demand new
health, safety, and quality standards every
day. We must quickly find means of coordi-
nation and cooperation in trade policy, or
many countries will face new, insurmount-
able difficulties. The time for action is now,
before the trouble grows.

Another candidate for early attention is
subsidies — export subsidies, domestic subsi-
dies that stimulate exports, and domestic
subsidies that result in import substitution.
Subsidy measures are increasingly used and
are not now subject to effective interna-
tional rules.

The 1960 GATT declaration dealing with
export subsidies is deficient in several re-
spects. It does not define what measures
constitute a subsidy; it applies only when
subsidies result in dual pricing; it relates
only to industrial products ; and it is adhered
to by only 17 countries.

Export subsidies may create difficult prob-
lems, not only in the markets of the country
importing subsidized goods but in export
markets where competitive subsidization in
such markets is a frequent occurrence.
Countervailing duties can be used to offset
subsidies on imported goods, but they are no
solution to the problem of competitive ex-
port subsidization in third-country markets.

We continue to believe that, if effective

rules were developed prohibiting the use of,
subsidies, any problems that countries might
have with respect to countervailing duties
would largely disappear. Nevertheless we are
willing to work on these related issues tO'
gether with a view to finding a satisfactory
solution and new rules of the road.

Restrictive government procurement praa
tices are as important and as widespread as
the problems of standards and subsidies. In
fact, this is perhaps the nontariff barrier
most frequently cited by American industry.
This issue does not appear to be quite ripe
for early focus in the multilateral trade nego-
tiations. Nevertheless we continue to believe
strongly that it should be dealt with in the
time frame of these negotiations and thai
we should soon decide on the appropriate
means to achieve major results in this field

There are additional areas that should re^
ceive early attention. We would hope, how-
ever, that we do not embark on too many oJ
them simultaneously so that the chances of
early success in any of them will be jeop
ardized.

Multilateral Safeguard System

An essential element of the new negotia
tions will be the development of an effectiv
multilateral safeguard system to ease th
impact of adjustment to import competition
The provisions and procedures of GAT']
article XIX, which were intended to serv
that purpose, have not proven satisfactory
Virtually every country has taken restric
tive action, both governmental and private
at some time to protect domestic producers
Only a few countries, however, have done s(
under article XIX. We will want to examine
experience with these present procedures ii
order to identify problems and weaknesses
and explore ways of correcting them.

While article XIX is a logical focal poin
for the examination, other provisions of th(
General Agreement under which countries
take restrictive safeguard actions are clearlj
relevant. We will want to explore the rela
tionship of these other provisions and meas
ures to the safeguard issue and, in particu-
lar, to the centi'al objective of facilitating

350

Department of State Bulletir

•.djustment to import competition. Also
clearly relevant are the many actions taken
unilaterally or bilaterally outside the GATT
framework. Thejexistence of these measures
indicates a weakness in the present system
that should be corrected. What is needed is a
more comprehensive system that will restore
multilateral discipline in this area.

The groundwork has been laid for a sys-
tematic examination of these issues. The
GATT Secretariat is conducting a survey of
measures countries take to protect against
injurious import competition and procedures,
international and domestic, under which such
actions are taken. The Secretariat is also
exploring the feasibility of providing in-
formation on experience under GATT safe-
guard provisions other than those of article
XIX and has prepared a very useful list of
issues that merit further consideration. We
look forward to participating in this exami-
nation and are confident that it will lead to
the development of a more effective system.

The critical need for early establishment
of such a system is obvious. As we prepare
for a further substantial liberalization of
world trade, participating countries must be
assured that a means is available to mod-
erate imports temporarily when this is neces-
sary to prevent injury to domestic producers.
They must also be assured, however, that the
system will be strict enough to prevent un-
necessary restrictive action by their trading
partners that would vitiate benefits achieved
in the negotiations.

Problems of Various Product Sectors

We believe that careful attention should
be given to the relationship of general nego-
tiating rules on tariffs, nontariff barriers
and safeguards to the particular problems of
various product sectors. This relationship is
of special significance in view of our legis-
lative mandate to obtain, to the maximum
extent feasible, competitive opportunities for
U.S. exports equivalent to opportunities in
U.S. markets for appropriate product sec-
tors. This does not necessarily mean that
negotiations must be conducted on a sectoral
basis. It does mean, however, that all trade

barriers and other trade distortions affecting
particular sectors must be taken into ac-
count in the negotiations.

We propose that an examination of par-
ticular product sectors be conducted as we
progress on the development of general rules
for tariffs, nontariff barriers, and other ele-
ments of the negotiations. The purpose of
such an examination or review would be to
determine whether the application of these
general rules would resolve the problems
peculiar to these sectors. An initial review
might be conducted in the summer and con-
tinued in the fall.

The preparatory work carried out on trop-
ical products has significantly advanced our
understanding of this sector. We feel
strongly that tropical products should be
given the special and priority attention by
developed countries called for in the Tokyo
Declaration. We anticipate that early and
steady progress can be made, building upon
the preparatory work already completed. We
would now welcome proposals from the de-
veloping countries on how the special and
priority attention to tropical products to
which we have all committed ourselves at
Tokyo might be given more concrete form.

Supply Access

All countries engaged in trade have an
interest in minimizing disputes over export
controls and other restrictions on access to
foreign supplies. If such disputes are not
resolved in an orderly manner, they lead to
retaliation, further restrictions, and the
shrinkage of world trade. However, while
most nations have a strong understanding of
the issues surrounding market access, there
is far less understanding of the issues sur-
rounding supply access and its i-elationship
to market access. Indeed, it is a relatively
new concern for many of us and even the
term "supply access" has different meanings
for different users of the phrase.

Trade libei-alization means a greater de-
pendence on imports. If a country liberalizes
and becomes more import dependent, how
can it know that supplies will be available in
time of need, when supplying countries may

March 17, 1975

351

be preoccupied with problems of their own?
In a similar vein, supplying countries cannot
turn the production of agricultural com-
modities and industrial raw materials on and
off in response to stop-go measures of con-
sumer countries and they cannot undertake
commitments of full production without
steady and secure access to markets.

At the recent World Food Conference, a
resolution was adopted calling for imple-
mentation of FAO [Food and Agriculture
Organization I Director Boerma's under-
taking on world food security, which calls
for international agreement on guidelines for
national stock policies on grains. Discussions
are at this moment underway to establish a
basis for negotiations among the major im-
porters and expoi-ters as a means to imple-
ment this undertaking. There are tough
trade-related questions that must be ad-
dressed. For example, when should reserves
be built up and when should they be drawn
down? Either action has a market effect, an
effect on food pi'ices, as well as on earnings
of farmers. And who should hold reserves,
and where? Questions of supply and market
access will also need to be considered in this
context.

It would seem clear that the first order
of business in examining the whole question
of supply access would be to begin an or-
ganized discussion of the topic whereby the
dimensions of the prol)lem might bo deter-
mined. One possible approach might be to
collect an inventory of concerns that differ-
ent nations have with respect to this issue,
along with any suggested proposals to deal
with the problem. It might also be useful at
some point to examine work being done in
other international organizations. In order
that these discussions be drawn together in
some meaningful manner, we might call
upon the GATT Secretariat to offer its good
services.

Reform of the Trading System

Our Trade Act recognizes that after six
rounds of multilateral negotiations we have
come to the point where it is imperative that
the reduction and elimination of specific bar-

352

riers be coupled with reform of the trading
rules. An expres.sed purpose of the act is to
bring about the reform of the trading system
as a whole, including the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. There are, in this con-
nection, a number of specific objectives out-
lined in our law. These include:

1. The revision of the GATT decisionmak-
ing procedures to more nearly refect the
balance of ecoriomic interests. This is a compli-
cated question, and we have no preconceived
notions. All of us share, I believe, the sense
of need for improving the provisions for
i-egular consultation among countries on
questions of mutual interest in international
ti-ade and on impi-oving the pi'ocedures for
the adjudication of disputes.

2. The revisioyi of some of the existing
rides in the GATT. I have already mentioned
the necessity of devising a new international
safeguard system that takes into account all
forms of import restraints that countries use
in response to injurious competition. Old and
difficult questions such as the treatment of
border adjustments for internal taxes should
be reexamined. The GATT rules on balance-
of-payments measures should be revised to
reflect actual practice. The principles of reci
procity and nondiscrimination must be
strengthened and expanded.

3. The extension of GATT rules to areas
7iot now adequately covered. In this connec-
tion, issues of supply access immediately
come to mind. As a large supplier and con
sumer, the United States is in a unique posi-
tion and is prepared to take a balanced view
of this question.

Multilateral Solutions

When these negotiations were opened in
Tokyo, it was agreed that they should in
volve as many countries as possible. We took
pains in the drafting of the Tokyo Declara
tion to make it clear that this negotiation is
composed of all those governments that are
willing to participate actively. Thei'e are
many countries I'epresented here that are
not members of GATT. It is therefore not a
GATT negotiation, although we have asked

Department of State Bulletin

the GATT Secretariat to assist us in our
work.

We believe that the door should remain
open — open to newcomers who may wish to
involve themselves in some or all of these
negotiations. We favor the widest possible
participation, with flexibility in our perspec-
tive of what roles newcomers could play,
from whatever part of the world they might
come.

As most of you know, the Trade Act re-
quires a number of domestic procedures on
our part. I have already referred to the ad-
vice of the International Trade Commission.
We must also receive the views of advisory
groups for industry, agriculture, and labor.
My own oflice must hold public hearings foi'
the purpose of obtaining views on particular
U.S. negotiating objectives. We have already
begun this complex process of consultation,
and it is moving expeditiously. This means
that the United States will be in a position
to go beyond general tariff formulae and
table specific tariff offers in the fall.

Work should begin immediately on devis-
ing and agreeing to a tariff-negotiating for-
mula. We should also begin at once to con-
duct negotiations on selected nontariff bar-
riers— standards, for example. Preliminary
discussions on safeguards should also be
started now, so as to begin serious work in
this area on the basis of the recent Secre-
tariat questionnaire and countries' replies.

Consistent with the Tokyo Declaration,
priority attention should be given to tropical
products.

In the summer, or perhaps in the fall, we
anticipate the need for a number of reviews
of both industrial and agricultural products
to consider negotiating objectives in various
product areas and what modifications might
have to be made in the general rules being
developed on tariffs and nontariff barriers so
as to achieve these objectives.

To monitor this broad effort, we believe
there should be a major review in July and
another major review, of all facets of our
work, toward the end of this year, perhaps
in late November.

The program that I have outlined is am-
bitious. However, with a will we can move
forward on all these fronts and show the
world that, despite these diflicult economic
times, we can find acceptable multilateral
solutions to the world's trading problems.
The United States has the requisite will. We
hope and trust that the rest of the nations
gathered here do also.

We must move forward now, in this year
of stress. If we do not have forward momen-
tum, we shall very likely slide backward, to
the collective damage of this trading system
that has served us so well in the past. As I
said earlier, the world is watching. Let us
not only begin; let us quickly demonstrate
some results.

March 17, 1975

353

THE CONGRESS

Department Stresses Urgency
of Assistance to Cambodia

Following is a statement by Philip C.
Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, made before the Sub-
committee on Foreign Assistance and Eco-
nomic Policy of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on February 24.^

I am very appreciative of this opportunity
to appear before this subcommittee in order
to discuss the situation in Cambodia and the
Administration's request for aid necessary
to assist the Khmer Government.

I would like to begin my brief statement
with a review of the situation in Phnom
Penh as it is today, in order that you may
have a clear picture of the gravity of the
situation necessitating the urgency and size
of the military and economic aid requests.
Militarily, the situation is more serious than
it has ever been since fighting began in 1970.
On January 1, the Khmer Communists began
their yearly dry-season offensive. Whereas
last year their attack on Phnom Penh was
the primary target and failed, this year they
have chosen the Mekong River corridor from
Phnom Penh to the South Viet-Nam border
as their primary objective. They have suc-
ceeded in seizing large sections of the river-
banks and, for the first time, have begun
using mines. The Cambodian Government is
determined to reopen this vital line of com-
munication, and we believe that it is capable
of doing so. It will, however, require time
and, meanwhile, ammunition supplies are
being used up once again at a considerably

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

higher rate per day than during the rainy
season.

While the Mekong has been the major
Khmer Communist objective, fighting has
raged all around Phnom Penh and particu-
larly to its northwest. Our Embassy has
informed us that casualties since January 1
have averaged about 1,000 per day for both
sides. Furthermore, attacks have continued
throughout Cambodia, where opposing forces
are in constant contact. Also, the insurgents
have this year launched more rockets at
Phnom Penh than ever before — over 500
during January alone. The latter attacks ai-e
of course indiscriminate, and the majority
of the victims are women and children.

To make the situation yet grimmer, the
economic plight of Cambodia is becoming
desperate. The entire economy has been com-
pletely disrupted by the war. This once rice-
exporting nation is now almost entirely de-
pendent on U.S. imports, and much of its
productive agricultural population is hud-
dling in government areas for protection. In
the last few months, our Embassy has noted
the beginnings of deterioration in the health
of the population, particularly in Phnom
Penh. As is clear from daily news reports,
this has now become a serious problem, with)
malnutrition spreading and, in some cases,
starvation. There is at this time sufficient
food in Phnom Penh; but rice is too costly
for the poor to buy and, to some extent,
there is a maldistribution of supplies. The
Khmer Government, together with U.S. and
international voluntary agencies and our
Embassy, has made ever-increasing efforts
on behalf of not only refugees but the entire
needy population ; but more is needed.

In the Administration's budget requests
for fiscal year 1975, we requested $390 mil-
lion for the Military Assistance Program

354

Department of State Bulletin

(MAP), $100 million for economic assist-
•iiice, including a contribution to the Cam-
bodia Exchange Support Fund and the Com-
modity Import Program, plus $77 million for
Public Law 480. Congress authorized a total
of $377 million for all kinds of assistance.
It divided this sum into $200 million for
MAP, $100 million for economic assistance,
and $77 million left for Public Law 480. In
addition, the President was authorized to
draw down $75 million of military stocks if
he deemed it essential. As of now, all of this
authority has been used. If no additional
authority is provided, ammunition will begin
to run out in about a month and food by
June — perhaps earlier if we run out of funds
for transportation, which has now become
very expensive because of necessary airlifts.

On January 28, the President requested
legislative release from the statutory ceilings
imposed under section 39 of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1974 and requested a supple-
mental of $222 million for MAP. Ninety per-
cent of the sum requested for MAP would
be spent on ammunition. This estimate, in
turn, is based on the high level of fighting
during the present dry season and assumes a
lessening of fighting beginning in May and
June. No extra funds have been requested
for economic assistance. Lifting of the over-
all ceiling of $377 million for Cambodia would
permit the additional flow of P.L. 480 food
to Cambodia. It is estimated that at least
$73 million more of P.L. 480 will be needed
for the remainder of this fiscal year.

We fully realize and appreciate the nat-
ural questions which arise in your minds and
those of the American people regarding the
need for such assistance to Cambodia at a
time of economic diflficulty in the United
States itself. However, Cambodia cannot be
viewed as an isolated spot of small import
to the United States. Rather, it must be
viewed in the larger context of Indochina,
which in turn affects Southeast Asia and
Asia as a whole, which, again, affects the
rest of the world. It is not to exaggerate to
say that the eyes of the world are on the

U.S. response to the needs of embattled
countries.

Our objective in Cambodia is to see an
early compromise settlement of the conflict.
The United States has been providing assist-
ance to Cambodia in the tradition of willing-
ness to help those who are willing to defend
themselves. Never have the Khmer requested
troops or advisers; only the wherewithal to
defend themselves. This we have given for
almost five years, and I do not believe that
we should consider providing inadequate re-
sources to a country that has depended on
us so heavily for so long in its own struggle
for survival.

The Cambodian Government since the
time of the Paris accords on Viet-Nam, which
called for the removal of all foreign troops
and noninterference in Cambodian affairs,
has again and again offered to enter into
discussions with its opponents without any
preconditions. The last such offer was made
immediately following last year's U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolution calling for nego-
tiations. The government in Phnom Penh
welcomed this resolution, which we also
strongly supported, and invited Secretary
General Waldheim to visit Phnom Penh. To
date, all efforts by the Government of Cam-
bodia to achieve negotiated settlement have
been rebuffed. The United States has sup-
ported these peace efforts publicly and in
bilateral efforts, also to no avail. We would
hope, however, that the opponents of the
present government will be brought to nego-
tiate once they realize that they are unable
to win a military victory. This realization,
however, will not come if the Cambodian
Government lacks adequate U.S. military
and economic assistance. As Prince Sihanouk
himself has stated, why should he negotiate
if the U.S. Congress is not going to give
sufficient aid to the Cambodian Government?
I note this remark of Prince Sihanouk's not
to irritate you, but as an illustration of the
effect of U.S. aid, or lack thereof, on the
prospects for peace through negotiation and
compromise in Cambodia and elsewhere.

March 17, 1975

355

In conclusion, 1 wish to stress once again
the extreme urgency of Cambodia's needs
for sufficient mihtary and economic assist-
ance. Only through this can that nation sur-
vive, can the Khmer Communists be con-
vinced that military victory is impossible,
and can a compromise solution through nego-
tiation be reached.

Department Discusses Food Aid
and World Food Security

Following is a statement bij Thomas 0.
Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic
and Business Affairs, sifbmitted to the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on
February 18.^

It is apparent that the task of achieving
world food security in the last quarter of the
century will be both more complex and more
compelling than hei'etofore.

Up until two years ago the world had sub-
stantial food reserves, nearly all of it held
in North America. Now we are down to pipe-
line levels, having adjusted to two successive
annual shortfalls in availabilities first by
drawing down stocks, then by significant
cutbacks in consumption in this country
(through livestock liquidation) and in a few
developing countries. At present there is no
more scope for adjustment without severe
hardship.

Current projections suggest that a small
statistical surplus in world grain supply and
demand is probable this year. But even if
realized, the resulting increase in stocks
would leave the world vulnerable to a new
grain shortfall.

Projected requirements for the medium
and long term are disquieting. To meet de-
mand generated by growing population and
economic growth, the World Food Confer-

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ence estimated, total food production will
have to continue to grow over the next 25
years at an average annual rate of 2V2 Pei'-
cent. While physically possible, sustained
production growth at this level will require
an extraordinary eff'ort in every country to
improve yields and bring new land into culti-
vation. It will require a particular achieve-
ment in developing countries, in which food
production is projected— even at the current
historically high annual rate of increase of
21/. percent— to lag well behind demand,
which will increase at 31/0 percent, widening
the gap in LDC [less developed countriesl '
food requirements from 25 million tons at
present to as much as 85 million tons in 1985.
Such a gap is far more than the developing
countries could conceivably purchase com-
mercially and far more than donors could
conceivably provide in food aid.

There has been much discussion about the
meaning of these projections, with some
arguing that the world is heading for a
Malthusian disaster, others that we can now
as in the past rely upon technological
changes, the stimulus to agricultural change
of higher relative prices for food, and efforts
to dampen population growth. I do not think
we can know now which of these competing
forecasts is closer to the truth, for the out-
come depends essentially on the actions j
which this country and others now take.'
But this much is clear: The penalty for cal-
culating wrong and doing too little to ac-
celerate world agricultural production will
be devastatingly harsh, far harsher thanj
the cost of doing too much. |

At Rome in November, Secretary Kissin-
ger laid out a three-point strategy for food
security, which, in its essentials, the World
Food Conference adopted. This strategy calls
for:

First, accelerated production in both de-
veloped and developing countries. In the
short and medium term, the major producing
countries like the United States can and
should expand output to meet shortfalls in
the developing world. But over time they

356

Department of State Bulletin

jhould not be expected to cover the projected
irap in LDC needs; to do so would require
enormous investment, the preemptive use of
scarce land and water, and multibillion-dollar
financing of food transfers. Rather, the focus
must be on raising production within the
LDC's themselves. In many cases this will
require a revolution in farm policy so that
agriculture can have priority access to scarce
resources and so that farmers have adequate
incentives to produce. It will also require
large-scale agricultural assistance — for re-
search, for infrastructure, for the improve-
ment of credit and distribution systems, for
such direct inputs as fertilizer and machin-
ery.

Action to meet these requirements is
underway. AID [Agency for International
'Development] fiscal year 1975 agricultural
assistance programs will total $676 million,
I up $391 million from the previous year. For
fiscal year 1976 we will propose $680 million.
At our proposal the IBRD, FAO, and UNDP
I International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development; Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation; U.N. Development Program] have
created a new Consultative Group on Food
Production and Investment with the purpose
of laying out a detailed strategy for LDC
agricultural development. The Consultative
Group will evolve a process of country exam-
inations so that needed farm policy changes
can be discussed in relation to agricultural
assistance inputs. In order to be sure that
tlio necessary supplies of the key input of
fertilizer are available over the next 25
years, we will shortly propose a far-ranging
world fertilizer policy. And we are concert-
ing with other major producing countries to
make sure that our productive capacity is
used to the fullest.

Second, development of an international
system of nationally held reserves. President
j Ford in his speech before the U.N. General
' Assembly last fall, two months before the
World Food Conference, committed the
United States to join in a worldwide effort to
negotiate, establish, and maintain such a

system. Secretary Kissinger spelled out its
basic elements at Rome.

An international grains reserve system
would insure all participants, developed
countries as well as developing, against an
interruption in the physical supply of grain,
against the financial burden of procurement
in times of shortage, and against the need
to make sharp adjustments in consumption,
as the United States did this past year. It
would also assure that the physical quanti-
ties of food required for food aid are actually
in place and available at reasonable prices.
In this sense a reserves agreement might
give priority claim to withdrawals for food
aid or emergency relief.

The United States has taken the initiative
in carrying out the effort to bring together
major importers and exporters to examine
this problem. I have in fact just returned
from a meeting held in London last week in
which the first step was taken toward reach-
ing a consensus on the framework for nego-
tiating on reserves and on its relationship to
the multilateral trade negotiations. Much
work lies ahead, but the effort is now under-
way.

Third, expanded food aid. For much of
this decade, while efforts to accelerate LDC
agricultural production get underway, food
aid will continue to be an essential element
in covering the gap in developing country
food needs. This is the meaning of the World
Food Conference resolution calling for an
annual commitment of 10 million tons of
food aid for three years. Present interna-
tional commitments are about 5 million tons
annually, including obligations under the
Food Aid Convention of the International
Wheat Agreement and to the World Food
Program. We support the World Food Con-
ference target.

It is clear that achievement of this target
is the responsibility not just of the major
food-producing countries but of all countries
with a high standard of living or substantial
liquid funds.

As for the United States, it is our inten-

Mareh 17, 1975

357

tion to sustain food aid at a high level. In
the last two years, the fact that P.L. 480 is,
under the terms of the act, a residual [after
domestic requirements, adequate carryover
stocks, and anticipated commercial exports]
has led to major distortions. In fiscal year
1974 the overall total was low, and the
country distributions thus skewed to reflect
the urgent requirements of a few nations at
war. This year the same residuality calculus
led to delays, although the final totals more
closely approximate an optimum program.

In looking to the future of P.L. 480 we
have to find some way to moderate this basic
problem of the past two years — that food
aid is most needed but least available when
world grain supplies are tight and prices
high.

The amendment to section 401 proposed
by the Administration and Senator Humph-
rey would make food aid less of a residual
than is now the case. The Secretary of
Agriculture could determine that some part
of exportable supply (including that needed
to meet commercial demands) should be used
to carry out the objectives of the P.L. 480
act.

Critics of this proposal say that its adop-
tion would expose us to a higher risk of
export controls in a short supply situation,
with P.L. 480 no longer there as an adjust-
able balancing item. But that risk should not
be exaggerated, nor should it be absolutely
determining. We cannot be serious about
feeding hungry and needy people if we are
ready to abandon or cut back our program
when demand is high.

Amendment of section 401 is the most
important change required to adapt P.L. 480
to the needs of this decade. But P.L. 480
will not serve its purpose unless it is funded
at a consistently high level so as to provide
a substantial, sustained commodity flow, at
least in the coming years. That is the inten-
tion of this Administration.

Mr. Chairman, let me add a word about
the controversy between "political" and
"humanitarian" uses of food aid.

Few would argue that our programs are
designed to achieve both ends. All the coun-

tries we assist with P.L. 480 are developing
all are relatively poor; all have deficienl
dietary standards; many are threatened with
disaster, either natural or through war; al
have major food needs.

The question, then, is not whether tc
choose between Korea and Pakistan, betweei
Viet-Nam and Cambodia, between Chile anc
India. The question is how to find a basis or
which our national interests can be servec
in each country. As we have seen this year
that requires a larger program, and Presi
dent Ford has budgeted at $1.47 billion com
modify costs.

However, food aid, Mr. Chairman, is onlj
part of food security; in the long run it i:
the less important part. In creating a regimi
of food security in the developing world-
through accelerated production, creation o
reserves, as well as food aid — our politica
and humanitarian interests converge. Foo(
security must be one of the fundamenta
objectives of both foreign and domestic pol
icy in this decade.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Detente. Hearings before the Subcommittee o
Europe of the House Committee on Foreign A]
fairs. May 8-July 31, 1974. 615 pp.

Briefing on Counterforce Attacks. Hearing befoi
the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Internationi
Law and Organization of the Senate Committe
on Foreign Relations. Secret hearing held o
September 11, 1974. Sanitized and made publi
on January 10, 1975. 56 pp.

United States Contributions to International Oi
ganizations. Communication from Acting Seen
tary of State transmitting the annual report o
United States contributions to international oi
ganizations for fiscal year 1973. November 2!
1974. H. Doc. 93-405. 102 pp.

Consular Convention With Bulgaria. Report to ac
company Ex. H. 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 93-38. Decern
ber 13, 1974. 7 pp.

U.X. Peacekeeping in the Middle East. Report t
accompany H.R. 16982. S. Rept. 93-1361. Deceir
ber 17, 1974. 3 pp.

Conference Report on Foreign Assistance Act o
1974. H. Rept. 93-1610. December 17, 1974. 53 pi

358

Department of State Bulletii

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York
June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959;
for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS
6997.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic, February 20, 1975.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.

Accession deposited: Egypt (with reservation),
February 28, 1975.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven-
tion on international civil aviation, as amended
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna
July 7, 1971. Entered into force December 19,
1974.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, December 30, 1974.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972."
Signature: Sweden, February 27, 1975.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter-
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Ap-
proved by the International Coffee Council at
London September 26, 1974. Open for signature
November 1, 1974, through March 31, 1975.'
Signatures: Denmark, December 18, 1974; United

States, January 15, 1975.
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, December 18,

1974.

Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done
at Oslo November 15, 1973.'
Ratification deposited: Norway, January 23, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971.'
Accession deposited: Mexico, February 20, 1975.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, February 20, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS
6839.

Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, February 26,
1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties,
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, Feb-
ruary 5, 1975.
Enters into force: May 6, 1975.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January
4, 1969.-"
Ratification deposited: Mexico, February 20, 1975.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June
23, 1969.'

Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, January 20,
1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre-
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force
January 1, 1975.°

Accession deposited: Malta (with a reservation),
January 30, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974,
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974,
with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Iraq, February 26, 1975.

BILATERAL

Jamaica

Agreement amending and extending the agreement
of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended
(TIAS 6357, 6915, 7720), relating to trade in
cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington February 20, 1975. Entered into force
February 20, 1975.

' Not in force.

■ Not in force for the United States.

March 17, 1975

359

Nicaragua

Agreement terminating the agreement of September
5, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7433, 7782), relating
to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange
of notes at Managua December 26, 1974 and
January 3, 1975. Entered into force January 3,
197.5.

Portugal

Agreement extending the agreement of November
17, 1970, as amended (TIAS 6980, 7336, 7805),
concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by
exchange of notes at Lisbon December 30, 1974.
Entered into force December 30, 1974.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement on guaranteed private investment.
Signed at Washington February 27, 1975. Enters
into force on the date of the note by which Saudi
Arabia confirms to the United States that the
agreement has been approved in conformity with
the applicable laws and procedures of Saudi
Arabia.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreements of February
21, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7572, 7573, 7571,
7981), relating to fishing operations in the north-
eastern Pacific Ocean, certain fisheries problems
in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean off
the coast of the United States, and fishing for
king and tanner crab. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington February 26, 1975. Entered
into force February 26, 1975.

Agreement amending the agreement of February
21, 1973, as amended (TIAS 7575, 7663), relating

to the consideration of claims resulting from dam-
age to fishing vessels or gear and measures tc
prevent fishing conflicts. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington February 26, 1975. Enter;
into force April 1, 1975.

Agreement on certain fishery problems on the higl
seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic
Ocean, with related letters. Signed at Washingtor
February 26, 1975. Entered into force Februarj
26, 1975, except that paragraphs 4 and 5 shal
enter into force April 1, 1975.

Agreement on certain fishery problems on the higl
seas in the western areas of the middle Atlanti
Ocean, as extended (TIAS 7981). Signed at Copen
hagen June 21, 1973. Entered into force July 1
1973. TIAS 7664.
Terminated: February 26, 1975, except for para
graph 3, which remains in force until April 1
1975.

Editor's Note

The Schedule of International Conferences,
which is published quarterly by the Office of
International Conferences, will no longer ap-
pear in the Bulletin. Interested individuals
and organizations may arrange to receive the
list on a regular basis. Requests should be
addressed to: Director, Oflice of International
Conferences, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20520.

360

Department of State Bulletii

INDEX March 17, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 186i

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 358

Department Discusses Food Aid and World

Food Security (Enders) 356

Department Stresses Urgency of Assistance

to Cambodia (Habib) 354

President Ford Urges Rapid Action on Assist-
ance to Cambodia (letter to the Speaker of

[ the House) 331

Cuba. President Ford's News Conference at

Hollywood, Fla., February 26 (excerpts) 333

Cyprus. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
ence of Febi-uary 25 321

Energy

Joint State-Treasury-FEA Statement on Pro-
tecting Energy Prices 336

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Ethiopia. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
ence of February 25 321

Europe. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-

• ence of February 25 321

Food. Department Discusses Food Aid and

World Food Security (Enders) 356

Human Rights. President Ford's News Con-
ference at Hollywood, Fla., February 26
(excerpts) 333

India

India-U.S. Education and Culture Subcommis-
sion Meets at New Delhi (report and recom-
mendations) 343

India-U.S. Science and Technology Subcom-
mission Meets at Washington (joint com-
munique) 343

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Under Secretary Sisco Inten'iewed on "Meet

the Press" 337

U.S. Modifies Policy on Exports of Arms to

India and Pakistan (Department statement) 331

International Organizations and Conferences.

United States Outlines Objectives for New
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
, (Malmgren) 346

Khmer Republic (Cambodia)

Department Stresses Urgency of Assistance
to Cambodia (Habib) 354

President Ford Urges Rapid Action on Assist-
ance to Cambodia (letter to the Speaker of
the House) 331

President Ford's News Conference at Holly-
wood, Fla., February 26 (excerpts) ... 333

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Middle East

President Ford's News Conference at Holly-
wood, Fla., February 26 (excerpts) . . . 333

Secretaiy Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Meet

the Press" 337

Pakistan

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Meet

the Press" 337

U.S. Modifies Policy on Exports of Arms to

India and Pakistan (Department statement) 331

Presidential Documents

President Ford Urges Rapid Action on .Assist-
ance to Cambodia 331

President Ford's News Conference at Holly-
wood, Fla., February 26 (excerpts) . . . 333

Syria. U.S. To Provide Loan and Grants for
Syrian Development 332

Trade. United States Outlines Objectives for
New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions (Malmgren) 346

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 359

U.S.S.R. Under Secretarv Sisco Interviewed

on "Meet the Press" 337

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Viet-Nam

President Ford's News Conference at Holly-
wood, Fla., February 26 (excerpts) ... 333

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 25 321

Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Meet

the Press" 337

Name Index

Enders, Thomas O 356

Ford, President 331, 333

Habib, Philip C 354

Kissinger, Secretary 321

Malmgren, Harald B 346

Sisco, Joseph J 337

Chec

k List

I
of Deparlment of State

Press

Releases February 24-March 2

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office of Press Relations, Department of State,

Washington

D.C. 20520.

No.

Date

Subject

t98

2/24

Kissinger: letter to OAU Secre-
tary General.

*99

2/25

U.S. and Jamaica extend textile
agreement.

noo

2/25

U.S. and Egypt extend textile
agreement.

*101

2/25

Richardson sworn in as Am-
bassador to Great Britain (bio-
graphic data).

*102

2/25

Hummel sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Ethiopia (biographic
data).

103

2/25

Kissinger: news conference.

tl04

2/26

U.S. -U.S.S.R. fisheries discussions.

*105

2/27

Austad sworn in as Ambassador
to Finland (biographic data).

106

2/26

State, Treasury, FEA joint state-
ment on energy prices.

*107

2/27

Frankel named Lincoln Lecturer.

tl08

3/1

Kissinger: combined sei-N'ice club
luncheon, Houston, Tex.

ited.

* Not prir

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. z0402

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Book

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
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U:

(^OV

7^.

/Fi,S

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1865

March 24, 1975

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: THE NEW OPPORTUNITY

Address by Secretary Kissinger 361

HUMANISM AND PRAGMATISM IN REFUGEE PROBLEMS TODAY
Address by Frank L. Kellogg 372

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT OF 1975
Statement by Under Secretary Robinson 378

THE LINK BETWEEN POPULATION AND OTHER GLOBAL ISSUES

Statement by Ambassador Scali
and Text of U.N. Population Commission Resolution 392

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside hack cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

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Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

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Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication
approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. LXXII, No. 1865
March 24, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the WJiite House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and tlie Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of t/ie Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

The United States and Latin America: The New Opportunity

Add7-ess by Secretary Kissinger

The foreign policy of the United States
has one overriding goal : to help shape a
new structure of international relations
which promotes cooperation rather than
force ; negotiation rather than confrontation ;
and the positive aspirations of peoples rather
than the accumulation of arms by nations.

Our relations with the Western Hemi-
sphere are central to this enterprise. The
United States and Latin America were born
out of the struggle against tyranny. Our
peoples are bound not only by geography
but by the common heritage of Western civili-
zation. We share a history of mutual sup-
port in times of trouble and the promise of
a new world of justice, peace, freedom, and
prosperity. With courage and imagination
we now have the opportunity to make inter-
American cooperation a pillar of the global
community which our era demands.

The discovery of America, more than any
other single event, ended the Middle Ages
and revolutionized the thought of mankind.
It drew man beyond what had come to seem
unchangeable to a new beginning, an escape
from the burdens of the past and from his-
tory itself.

A Brazilian epic poem of the 17th cen-
tury described the lure that beckoned the
Americas onward :

To open new paths never trod, never known

To push on despite obstacles through every zone

With the shield of one ocean at our backs
and the dream of another one before us,

' Made at Houston, Tex., on Mar. 1 before a
luncheon sponsored by service clubs and civic orga-
nizations (text from press release 108).

hope was always just a little farther along
the river, over the mountains, across the
plains and jungles. In the Old World a fron-
tier was a limit; in the New World it was
an opportunity.

Today's frontiers are not geographical,
but frontiers of human need and creativity.
To conquer them is even more important
than the adventures that shaped our past.

At the heart of our contemporary chal-
lenge is a new interdependence, both hemi-
spheric and global. Until recently. Western
Hemisphere economic relationships were
largely based on the exchange of raw materi-
als from Latin America for finished goods
from the United States. Today's interde-
pendence reflects a different balance. The
internationalization of production combines
technology, labor, and capital across na-
tional boundaries.

As a result, the Latin American countries
now need access to the U.S. market to sell
their manufactured goods as well as their
traditional exports. And Latin America's
markets are becoming as important to our
own continued growth as its raw materials —
as indicated by our trade surplus last year
of $1.2 billion.

As interdependence has grown within the
hemisphere, so have the hemisphere's links
to other parts of the world. Latin America
has developed important trading relation-
ships with other industrial nations and has
come to share certain political perspectives
with the Third World. The United States
prizes its traditional alliances with the in-
dustrialized democracies and maintains im-
portant political and economic relationships
with many less developed nations around the

March 24, 1975

361

world. Our generation has had to learn that
peace is indivisible; that our national well-
being is intimately tied to the well-being of
the rest of the globe.

The awareness of past achievement and
faith in common purposes led the United
States in 1973 to begin a new dialogue with
Latin America. We had three objectives:

— To promote with our friends a new spirit
of communication tempered by realism, ele-
vated by hope, and free of distrust, despair,
or resentment ;

— To find new ways to combine our efforts
in the political, economic, and social devel-
opment of the hemisphere ; and

— To recognize that the global dialogue
between the developed and less developed
nations requires answers that will be difficult
to find anywhere if we do not find them in
the Western Hemisphere.

For this hemisphere to which men fled
to escape from injustice has a special ob-
ligation to demonstrate that progress can
go hand in hand with respect for human
dignity, that cooperation among nations is
consistent with respect for national sover-
eigntj^ that the most powerful political
force on earth is the voluntary collabora-
tion of free peoples.

Any relationship as long and complex as
ours inevitably is haunted by the bitterness
and suspicions of old disputes. We must put
these legacies of our past behind us, for
a dialogue dominated by the endless refrain
of old grievances cannot prosper.

Despite temporary interruptions, the
United States is prepared to continue the
dialogue in a spirit of friendship and con-
ciliation. Next month I will make my first
visit to South America as Secretary of
State. Next week Assistant Secretary [for
Inter-American Affairs William D.] Rogers
will visit six countries in the region for pre-
liminary talks.

Let me now outline some of the issues
that will face us in these discussions. They
include, first, what the United States is

prepared to contribute to Western Hemi-
sphere cooperation ; second, what we ask
of Latin America; and finally, what we can
do together.

What We Must Ask of Ourselves

President Ford has asked me to reaflRrm
our commitment to a new relationship be-
tween the United States and Latin America
based on the principles of nonintervention,
the sovereign equality of nations, and mutual
respect among partners. Success will re-
quire a similar desire and attitude on the part
of the other countries of the hemisphere.

These principles will guide the U.S. ap-
proach to major issues that have risen be-
tween us — the status of the Panama Canal ;
the place of Cuba in the hemisphere; and
the various strands of our economic rela-
tions.

The Panama Canal. Since its opening, the
peoples of the world have looked on the Pan-
ama Canal as an important lifeline of com-
merce and international security. It is
essential that the canal remain open to the
ships of all nations on fair terms.

In acquiring the rights to build the canal,
the United States was granted exclusive con-
trol— the rights which it would possess and
exercise "if it were the sovereign" — over
a 10-mile-wide strip of Panamanian ter-
ritory from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In
the Canal Zone, we enforce U.S. laws, op-
erate commercial enterprises, and control
most of the deepwater port facilities that
serve Panama.

Over time, the nature of the U.S. presence
has come to be viewed by the people of Pan-
ama— and, indeed, by most of the rest of the
hemisphere — as an infringement upon their
national sovereignty and their principal re-
source : their country's strategic location.

Clearly, both Panama and the United
States have vital interests in the canal. The
challenge is to reconcile the security needs
of the United States with Panama's national
honor and sovereignty. Negotiations on this

362

Department of State Bulletin

problem have gone on intermittently for 11
years ; in the last year and a half they have
moved forward rapidly. We now believe that
an agreement on terms fair to all is pos-
sible.

We have made progress because each side
has recognized the essential needs and con-
straints of the other. The United States un-
derstands that a treaty negotiated in 1903
does not meet the requirements of 1975. We
are ready to acknowledge that it is reasonable
for Panama to exercise jurisdiction over
its territory and to participate in the op-
eration and defense of the canal. We are pre-
pared to modify arrangements which conflict
with Panamanian dignity and self-respect.

In turn we will expect Panama to under-
stand our perspective — that the efficient,
fair, and secure operation of the canal is
a vital economic and security interest of
the United States, that a new treaty must
provide for the operation and defense of
the canal by the United States for an ex-
tended period of time, and that a new treaty
must protect the legitimate interests of our
citizens and property in Panama.

A new treaty based on these principles
will make the United States and Panama
partners in the operation of the canal, pro-
tect the essential national interests of both,
and provide a secure arrangement for the
long term.

Serious problems remain to be resolved
in the negotiation. But we are confident that
they will be overcome if both parties con-
tinue to display the seriousness and mutual
understanding they have shown so far.

The Administration has been consulting
with the Congress as our negotiations have
proceeded. We will intensify these consul-
tations and discuss in detail the arrange-
ments which we envisage. A new treaty
which reflects the advice and consent of the
Senate and the full support of the American
people will be a concrete and significant dem-
onstration that with good will on both sides
cooperative solutions to the problems of the
Western Hemisphere are possible.

Cuba. In January 1962 the Organization
of American States determined that Cuba
had excluded itself from participation in the
inter-American community by its military
ties to the Soviet Union and its export of
revolution in the hemisphere. A year later
the United States imposed its own sanctions.
In 1964 the member nations of the OAS
agreed collectively under the Rio Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance to sever diplomatic
and trade relations with Cuba.

More than a decade has passed. The coun-
tries of Latin America have successfully
resisted pressure and subversion; nations
that in the early sixties felt most threatened
by Cuban revolutionary violence no longer
feel the menace so acutely. This situation
has generated a reconsideration of the OAS
sanctions and raised questions about the
future of our own bilateral relations with
Cuba.

Last September several Latin American
countries proposed a meeting to consider
lifting the collective sanctions. We agreed
that a consideration of the Cuban issue at
a meeting in Quito of the Foreign Ministers
of the Americas was appropriate. We deter-
mined to remain completely neutral in the
debate and abstained in the vote. Our guid-
ing principle then, as now, was to prevent
the Cuba issue from dividing us from our
hemispheric neighbors.

A majority voted to lift the collective
sanctions. But the Rio Treaty requires a
two-thirds vote, and the sanctions thus re-
main formally in force. The United States
considers itself bound by the collective will
as a matter of international law, and so
there can be no change in our bilateral re-
lations with Cuba as long as the OAS man-
date remains in force.

Since the Quito meeting, however, several
Latin American countries have announced
that they are prepared to resume trade with
Cuba. Also since the meeting at Quito, all
the OAS nations have tentatively agreed that
the Rio Treaty should be amended to per-
mit the lifting of sanctions by a majority

March 24, 1975

363

vote. Several of my Latin American col-
leagues have suggested that this agreement
in principle might be applied to the existing
Cuba sanctions. I will be consulting with
them with respect to this initiative during
my trip to South America with the attitude
of finding a generally acceptable solution.

If the OAS sanctions are eventually re-
pealed, the United States will consider
changes in its bilateral relations with Cuba
and in its regulations. Our decision will be
based on what we consider to be in our own
best interests and will be heavily influenced
by the external policies of the Cuban Govern-
ment.

We see no virtue in perpetual antago-
nism between the United States and Cuba.
Our concerns relate above all to Cuba's ex-
ternal policies and military relationships
with countries outside the hemisphere. We
have taken some symbolic steps to indicate
that we are prepared to move in a new
direction if Cuba will. Fundamental change
cannot come, however, unless Cuba demon-
strates a readiness to assume the mutuality
of obligation and regard upon which a new
relationship must be founded.

Economic Relations. Old political disputes
must not distract us from the long-term
challenge of the hemisphere — the common
effort to improve the lives of our peoples.

The expansion of trade and the establish-
ment of a new trading equilibrium are vital
to economic progress and development in
the hemisphere. As Latin American econo-
mies grow, so will opportunities for mutual
trade. As our own economy grows, we will
be able to buy more semiprocessed and manu-
factured goods from Latin America.

In the next few days the President will
take the first step to implement the preference
system established by the 1974 Trade Act.
We will announce the list of products on
which the Administration proposes to elim-
inate all import tariffs for developing coun-
tries for 10 years. Latin America, as the
most advanced developing region and the
one nearest the U.S. market, will be in the
best position to take advantage of these
preferences. The list will benefit nearly $1

billion worth of Latin American exports.

Among the economic issues affecting West-
ern Hemisphere relations none looms larger
than the transnational corporation. The
transnational corporation has a demonstrated
record of achievement as an efficient — and
indeed indispensable — source of technology,
management skill, and capital for develop-
ment. At the same time, the transnational
character of these corporations raises com-
plex problems of governmental regulation
and has aroused concern in Latin America
over the relation of their activities to do-
mestic political and economic priorities.

Most Latin American nations take the posi-
tion that the laws of the host country are
conclusive and that a foreign investor can-
not appeal to his own government for pro-
tection. The United States, on the other
hand, has insisted on espousing the cause
of U.S. investors when they are treated in
a way which violates international legal
standards. And the Congress has reflected
this view in such acts as the Hickenlooper
and Gonzalez amendments which cut off aid
in the event of nationalization without ade-
quate and timely compensation.

The two legal positions are not easily
reconciled. But the United States is pre-
pared to make a serious effort to find a mu-
tually acceptable solution which does not
prejudice the principles of either side. A
year ago in Mexico City, at our initiative an
inter-American working group was set up
to examine the problem.

The United States is prepared in the con-
text of this endeavor:

— To work out a new declaration of prin-
ciples to govern the treatment of trans-
national enterprises and the transfer of
technology;

— To develop intergovernmental mecha-
nisms to prevent and resolve investment dis-
putes and the problems between governments
that arise from them ;

— To fashion new modes of cooperation to
deal with conflicts of laws and jurisdiction
relating to transnational corporations; and

— To encourage private enterprise to make

364

Department of State Bulletin

its vital contributions to Latin America in
forms congenial to the economic and political
needs of the host countries.

We have in the past made significant
progress in these areas on a pragmatic case-
by-case basis. We should now seek more gen-
eral agreement as part of the new dialogue.
The working group, which was interrupted
by the postponement of the Buenos Aires
meeting, should resume its important work.
A mutually acceptable solution would go a
long way toward removing trade and in-
vestment conflicts from U.S. decisions re-
specting aid relationships with the host coun-
tries.

This is important because Latin American
sensitivity to the exercise of economic lever-
age has been finely honed by history. Ex-
perience has also demonstrated that auto-
matic sanctions — including the 1974 Trade
Act's denial of preferences to such OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] countries as Ecuador and Venezuela,
which did not join the oil embargo — are
almost always harmful. Automatic sanctions
allow no tactical flexibility. They present
other governments with a public ultimatum ;
by seeming to challenge the recipient's sov-
ereignty, they harden positions, encumber
diplomacy, and poison the entire relationship.

The Administration supports the purpose
of the various bills which have been intro-
duced into the Congress, including one by
your own Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen, to
modify the provisions of the Trade Act which
involve Venezuela and Ecuador. And it is
prepared to seek the modification of legisla-
tion requiring the automatic cutoff of aid.
But as a matter of political reality, a great
deal will depend on our ability to work
with the nations of Latin America on new
approaches which give practical assurance
of fair treatment. They must recognize
that congressional sanctions stem from per-
ceived injuries to legitimate interests.

As part of the new dialogue, the Adminis-
tration is prepared to develop new principles
and practices which may commend them-
selves to Congress as a better remedy than
automatic sanctions.

What Latin America Can Do

What do we have a right to expect from
Latin America?

In the past decade, progress in science,
industry, agriculture, and education has done
much to transform the continent. Economic
growth has been steady and sometimes spec-
tacular. Political institutions have adapted
to new social conditions and national tra-
ditions. A new sense of Latin American
unity has promoted an awareness of common
problems and opportunities.

We welcome the strength and self-con-
fidence that this evolution implies. We have
seen new leadership in Latin America and
new Latin American leadership in the inter-
national arena. Panamanian and Peruvian
soldiers serve with the U.N. peacekeeping
forces in the Middle East. Last December
the Andean countries, following a Peruvian
initiative, pledged themselves to limit the
acquisition of offensive weapons — an initia-
tive we support and encourage. Venezuela has
taken the lead in stimulating regional cooper-
ation by oifering oil revenues to the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDE) and the
Central American Bank for Economic In-
tegration. Working with Bolivia, Paraguay,
and Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil are
pooling their technology and resources to
harness the vast potential of the River Plate
Basin.

However, with these welcome initiatives
have come other less hopeful trends. The
United States is concerned by the growing
tendency of some Latin American countries
to participate in tactics of confrontation be-
tween the developing and developed worlds.
We accept nonalignment as a necessary,
largely positive force. We believe that the de-
veloped nations — and particularly the United
States as the most powerful industrial coun-
try— have a special obligation to be sensitive
both to the legacy of history and to the im-
peratives of change.

It is therefore ironic that some nations
seek to exact by confrontation what can only
be gained through cooperation and that
countries which once chose nonalignment to

March 24, 1975

365

protect themselves from blocs are now tend-
ing to form a rigid bloc of their own. In
doing so they obstruct the association with
the industrialized nations on which their
own economic and social progress ultimate-
ly depends. Such tactics are particularly
inappropriate for the Western Hemisphere
where they threaten to repudiate a long tra-
dition of cooperative relations with the
United States at the very moment when the
United States has dedicated itself to com-
mon progress.

As the most developed part of the Third
World, Latin American nations will in-
creasingly play roles in both the industrial-
ized and developing sectors of the globe.
They have a unique opportunity to foster
the mutual accommodation of these groups
globally.

To do so there is no better guidepost than
the declaration signed by all Western Hemi-
sphere nations in Mexico City last year : -

. . . peace and progress, in order to be solid and
enduring, must always be based on respect for the
rights of others, and the recognition of reciprocal
responsibilities and obligations among developed
and developing countries.

The temptation to blame disappointments
on the intrigues and excesses of foreigners
is as old as nations themselves. Latin Amer-
ica is perennially tempted to define its inde-
pendence and unity through opposition to
the United States.

The Latin American postponement of the
Buenos Aires meeting of Foreign Ministers,
ostensibly in reaction to the recent U.S.
Trade Act, is a case in point. Some Latin
American nations chose to read into this
legislation a coercive intent which did not
exist and asked for immediate remedies be-
yond the capacity of our constitutional proc-
esses to provide. As a result, the next step
in the new dialogue was delayed just when it
was most needed. The nations of America
face too many challenges to permit their
energies to be expended in such fruitless and
artificial confrontations.

" For a statement by Secretary Kissinger made
at the Conference of Tlatelolco at Mexico City on
Feb. 21, 1974, and text of the Declaration of Tlate-
lolco issued on Feb. 24, 1974, see Bulletin of Mar.
18, 1974, p. 257.

We do not expect agreement with all our
views but neither can we accept a new ver-
sion of paternalism in which those with
obligations have no rights and those who
claim rights accept no obligations. The
choice for the United States is not between
domination and indifl'erence. The choice for
Latin America is not between submission
and confrontation.

Instead, we should steer between those
extremes toward a new equilibrium. After
decades of oscillating between moods of eu-
phoria and disillusionment, between charges
of hegemony and neglect, it is time for the
United States and Latin America to learn
to work together, calmly and without con-
frontation, on the challenges to our common
civilization.

The United States does not seek precise
reciprocity. We recognize our special obli-
gations as the richest and most powerful
nation in the hemisphere. But experience
teaches that international problems cannot
be resolved by any one country acting alone,
or by any group of nations acting as an
exclusive bloc.

What We Must Do Together

With a new attitude, the nations of the
Western Hemisphere can dedicate themselves
to an agenda for the future. In the coming
months, the United States will make pro-
posals for such an agenda and present it
to its partners in various forums including
the meeting of the OAS General Assembly
this spring.

Today I shall confine myself to two criti-
cal areas : hemispheric development and food.

Hemispheric Development. In the past dec-
ade, Latin America's overall growth rate has
exceeded the economic targets of the Alliance
for Progress. The region has also made
greater progress than any other developing
area toward economic integration. The Cen-
tral American Common Market, the Carib-
bean Common Market, the Andean Pact, and
the Latin American Free Trade Association
have begun to translate abstract hopes into
realities. Nevertheless, Latin America's rel-
ative share of global trade has fallen. And

366

Department of State Bulletin

economic progress has been unevenly dis-
tributed, both within and among countries.

Some Latin American countries have only
recently begun the process of development.
As with poor countries everywhere, they re-
quire large amounts of concessional as-
sistance. The United States will continue to
contribute its share.

The Administration will ask Congress to
replenish the U.S. contribution to the Inter-
American Development Bank, both conces-
sional funds and ordinary capital. Assuming
other nations in the hemisphere are willing
to do their share, we will seek a U.S. con-
tribution as large as the last replenishment,
or $1.8 billion.

The proposal will be considered by the
House of Representatives subcommittee
whose chairman is the distingui.shed Henry
B. Gonzalez from San Antonio. Coupled with
the contribution of $755 million from 12
new members — European countries, Japan,
and Israel — and a $500 million trust fund
established by Venezuela, these fresh re-
sources to the IDB will give a major new
impetus to Western Hemisphere develop-
ment.

But because the poorest countries must
have first priority, concessional assistance
is available only in limited quantities to a
new and growing group of Latin American
countries that have reached an intermediate
stage of development. They have a diversi-
fied industrial sector, a significant consumer
class, and an increasing capacity to compete
in world markets. Their need for foreign
exchange is growing.

Therefore they require greater access to
the markets of the developed countries; for
exports are the chief source of their external
funds. To this end, the Trade Act and the
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva
are of great significance. As we have pledged
in our new dialogue, we will, in these negotia-
tions, work in close collaboration with the
countries of the Western Hemisphere.

But these countries also need investment
capital. Significant amounts of capital con-
tinue to flow to the intermediate countries
from the U.S. private sector through invest-
ment and from commercial bank lending.

But these countries could also benefit sub-
stantially from improved access to capital
markets.

While the U.S. long-term bond capital
market is the world's largest, few developing
countries have been able to borrow success-
fully in it. To ease this problem, the United
States has taken the initiative for a study
by the IMF [International Monetary Fund]
and World Bank Development Committee of
ways to promote the increased use of capital
markets by developing countries. These will
be neither aid programs nor recycling de-
vices but will facilitate independent access
to such markets. The United States is pre-
pared to explore ways in which it can be
helpful to those Latin American countries
with higher levels of income and credit
standing to move toward self-reliance.

The countries of Latin America, regard-
less of their stage of development, are vul-
nerable to violent swings in the prices of
their exports of raw materials. There is no
more critical issue of economic relations in
the hemisphere today than commodities
policy.

This issue has been extremely divisive in
the hemisphere, partly because our attitude
has been ambiguous. So let there be no doubt
about our views any longer. We strongly
favor a world trading system which meets
the economic needs of both consumers and
producers. Unilateral producer or unilateral
consumer actions must not determine the
equilibrium. A dialogue between them on
commodity issues is therefore essential. A
range of rich possibilities exists that can
make our new interdependence a vehicle for
more rapid and more equitable global de-
velopment.

The time has come for the countries of
the Western Hemisphere to consider to-
gether how commodity issues should be re-
solved. The United States pledges a serious
eff'ort to find a constructive solution which
does justice to the concerns of all parties.

Food. Let me turn now to a subject which
must command our cooperative efforts —
food, man's most basic need.

Latin America matches the United States
as a potential food-surplus region. Yet over

March 24, 1975

367

the past 15 years, Latin American agricul-
tural production has barely kept pace with
population. In an area rich in productive
land, malnutrition is rife. Most Latin Amer-
ican countries are net food importers. We
believe that with a concerted new effort,
agricultural production can exceed popula-
tion growth, adequate nutrition for all can
be achieved in this century, and Latin Amer-
ica can become a major food exporter.

The immediate need is to improve food
production. The United States proposes the
establishment of a hemisphere agricultural
consultative group under the Inter-American
Development Bank. Its goal should be to
generate annual production increases in the
range of 3 1 o to 4 percent, to be achieved
through:

— New investment in regional and na-
tional agricultural programs ;

— Integration of agricultural research
efforts throughout the hemisphere; and

— Adoption of improved national food and
nutrition programs.

The consultative group should also recom-
mend urgent steps to reduce the waste and
spoilage now consuming between 20 and 40
percent of total Latin American food output.

Agricultural research is a central element
in attaining adequate nutrition for all. But
too often research is unrelated to local needs
and efforts elsewhere.

To make research more adequately serve
local needs, we will assist the international
research centers in Mexico, Colombia, and
Peru to extend their projects and programs
to other countries in the hemisphere through
closer collaboration with national research
institutions.

To foster better exchange of agricultural
research information, we propose that a new
center be established for Latin America un-
der the auspices of the hemisphere consulta-
tive group and linked to the science informa-
tion exchange center of the Smithsonian In-
stitution in the United States.

The United States is prepared to join with
other countries and institutions to finance
the local extension efforts of the interna-

tional research centers and the information
exchange center.

Finally, we propose that the United States
and Latin America jointly establish and
finance research centers in nutrition and
food technology; that a new generation of
Latin American agriculturalists be trained
through internships and research in these
centers as well as in government and private
laboratories and institutions in both con-
tinents.

The Human Dimension

Our immediate economic, political, and
technological imperatives must not lead us
to neglect the human foundations of our
common progress, including the free ex-
change of ideas and the priceless cultural
heritage we share.

The discovery of America rekindled a be-
lief in mankind's perfectibility. Our strug-
gles for independence were among the first
modern assertions of the fundamental rights
of man. No part of the globe has shown a
greater commitment to democratic princi-
ples. The free flow of ideas is one of the
most powerful forces for both liberty and
progess. Drawing on this resource, can we
now fashion a common vision of the future?
What will life in the Americas be like in the
next century? The scientists, scholars, and
professionals of our countries should be ex-
changing ideas on the implications of cur-
rent trends in such areas as education,
health, and social change. Our governments
should stimulate the OAS to mobilize the
best minds and institutions of the hemi-
sphere in new programs to define our com-
mon future.

Last year in Mexico City, I described our
objectives in this hemisphere as follows:

Our common impulse ... is to fulfill the promise
of America as the continent which beckoned men to
fulfill what was best in them. Our common reality
is the recognition of our diversity. . . . Our common
task is to forge our historical and geographical links
into shared purpose and endeavor.

The United States continues to seek a
genuine dialogue with its neighbors on all

368

Department of State Bulletin

levels — multilaterally and bilaterally, within
or outside the OAS, with subregional groups
or individual states.

The dream of hope that has lifted the
Americas for almost five centuries must be
revitalized by our generation. We are enter-
ing another new world as strange and chal-
lenging as that found by the first settlers on
America's shores. With imagination, we can
build in this hemisphere the model of that
larger world community which must be our
ultimate goal.

As Victor Hugo once wrote, "The main
highway lies open. May America travel it,
and the world will follow."

U.S. -Saudi Arabian Joint Economic
Commission Meets at Washington

Joint Communique ^

The U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission
on Economic Cooperation, established in ac-
cordance with the Joint Statement issued by
Secretary of State Kissinger and Prince
Fahd on June 8, 1974, concluded its first
session. The Joint Commission meetings,
held in Washington February 26-27, 1975,
were chaired by Secretary of the Treasury
William E. Simon, Chairman of the U.S. side
of the Commission. The Saudi Arabian Dele-
gation was led by Minister Muhammad Ibn
Ali Aba al-Khail, Minister of State for Finan-
cial Aff'airs and National Economy.

High-level officials from the U.S. Depart-
ments of Treasury, State, Agriculture, Com-
merce, Health, Education and Welfare, In-
terior, and Labor, and from the National
Science Foundation also participated in the
talks. Members of the visiting Saudi Arabian
Delegation participating in the discussion in-
cluded officials from the Ministries of For-
eign Aff'airs, Commerce and Industry, Labor
and Social Aff'airs, Agriculture and Water,
and the Central Planning Organization, as
well as high-level Saudi representatives from

' Issued at Washington Feb. 27.

the Supreme Council of Higher Education,
the Faculty of Sciences, and the Institute of
Public Administration.

The members of the Commission ex-
changed views on the development of U.S.-
Saudi Arabian economic cooperation since
the visit of Secretary Simon last July to
Saudi Arabia for preliminary discussions on
economic cooperation. At that time, the Com-
mission initiated the activities of its four
working groups on Manpower and Education,
Science and Technology, Agriculture, and In-
dustrialization. Each of the joint working
groups has met several times to define areas
of potential economic cooperation and a num-
ber of U.S. technical experts and advisors
have visited Saudi Arabia and submitted re-
ports to the Saudi Arabian side of the Com-
mission. The Joint Commission discussed
further means of facilitating such continued
cooperation through the Joint Commission
framework.

In this regard the Commission was pleased
to note the signing on February 13, 1975, of
a Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA)
which establishes procedures for the furnish-
ing of mutually-agreed technical and advi-
sory services from the United States to Saudi
Arabia on a reimbursable basis. The TCA
should contribute significantly to the efficient
channeling of American technical know-how
to the Saudi Arabian national economy.

The Commission expressed its intention to
expand the Joint Commission Office in Ri-
yadh. This oflSce serves as the principal point
of coordination in Saudi Arabia for the de-
velopment and implementation of mutually-
agreed projects under the U.S.-Saudi
Arabian Technical Cooperation Agreement.
The U.S. component of this oflice, to be
known as the United States Representation
to the Joint Economic Cooperation Commis-
sion Oflice, plans to begin operating by the
middle of May 1975. The Saudi delegation
announced that it would also be adding to
the staff of its component of the Riyadh
Joint Commission Oflice in the near future.
Arrangements for accommodating these two
staffs are to be discussed in Riyadh in the
coming weeks.

March 24, 1975

369

The Commission noted with satisfaction
the signing by the Co-Chairmen of an OPIC
[Overseas Private Investment Corporation]
Investment Guaranty Agreement between
the two governments. The Agreement should
increase and broaden the interest of U.S.
private enterprise in participating in Saudi
Arabian economic development.

Industrialization and Trade

The Saudi delegation reaffirmed its inter-
est in acquiring U.S. technology through
U.S. business participation for the develop-
ment of major industrial projects in both the
hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon areas.

The Commission agreed on the desirability
of a broadly-based business council designed
to increase business cooperation between the
two countries and enhance the contribution
of U.S. business to Saudi Arabia's industrial
development. In view of the important role
of government in Saudi Arabia's develop-
ment, concerned Saudi Arabian Government
elements would join with private sector
interests in Saudi Arabia and the United
States as members of the Council. The Coun-
cil would identify for study projects which
appear feasible for joint ventures, note and
make recommendations on financial, fiscal,
or legal considerations bearing on coopera-
tive efforts, arrange business symposia and
visits in both countries, and be a center for
disseminating information on business oppor-
tunities in both countries.

The Saudi Arabian Government will con-
sider the possibility of organizing a group
of Saudi businessmen to visit the United
States within the next two months to meet
with United States business firms and groups.
The general purpose would be to increase the
communications between the two private
sectors. More specifically, the group would
discuss various industrial proposals and
projects.

The Commission noted with interest that
trade relations between the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the United States have
been developing at an accelerated rate. U.S.
exports to Saudi Arabia nearly doubled in
1971, increased by 40 7o in 1973, and nearly
doubled again in 1974, to $835 million. Ex-

pectations are that U.S. exports will continue
to grow progressively. It is anticipated that
U.S. exporters will play a significant role in
supplying equipment, machinery, technology
and services.

The Governments of the United States and
Saudi Arabia agreed that participation in
productive ventures in each other's econo-
mies should be mutually beneficial. They
recognize that activities of this type in
both countries would require close consulta-
tion to assure consistency with their national
policies and objectives. Consequently, they
agreed that each government would consult
with the other regarding significant under-
takings of this type.

The Commission agreed on the desirability
of United States Government technical as-
sistance in developing a statistical base for
development in Saudi Arabia. The American
side stated its readiness to send out teams
of experts in a number of principal statisti-
cal disciplines to assist the Saudi Arabian
Government in developing an effective statis-
tical capability.

The Commission heard reports and ex-
changed views on the current status of a
number of technical cooperation projects in
the fields of vocational training, higher edu-
cation, agriculture, water utilization and land
use, science and technology and statistics. A
summary of these follows :

Vocational Training

The Commission noted the series of rec-
ommendations by the American vocational
training team which visited Saudi Arabia
last fall. These recommendations, in support
of the implementation of Saudi Arabia's
five-year plan vocational training goals, in-
clude United States Government advisory
services in various fields of manpower de-
velopment.

Higher Education

It was agreed at the Commission meeting
to send an American team to evaluate the
academic and administrative structures of
the Saudi Arabian University system, as well
as the relationship of universities to high-
level professional and technical education.

370

Department of State Bulletin

A second action area to be explored will
involve U.S.-Saudi Arabian cooperation in
the following areas: broadened student and
faculty exchanges between the two coun-
tries; joint research projects, joint degree
programs; the establishment of junior col-
leges in Saudi Arabia; and the training of
academic, administrative, and technical per-
sonnel in Saudi universities.

Agriculture, Water Resources and
Land Use

The Commission discussed United States
Government technical services for joint agri-
cultural, water and land projects. Priority
was given to feasibility studies of major
agricultural areas in Saudi Arabia, a study
of the Central Research Laboratory and
Agriculture Training Center of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Water, and the establish-
ment of a desalination center and laboratory.

It was agreed that a four-man U.S. Gov-
ernment team would go to Saudi Arabia for
a two-month period to discuss and reach
agreement with Saudi Arabian counterparts
on a detailed program for implementing a
feasibility study for large agricultural areas,
such as Wadi Dawasir.

The Commission also approved the imme-
diate departure to Saudi Arabia of a research
management team to plan a research pro-
gram and determine organizational and man-
agement requirements for the Central Re-
search Laboratory and Agricultural Training
Center.

A U.S. Government proposal for the estab-
lishment of the desalination center will be
sent to the Saudi Arabian Government in
response to their request.

Projects in the areas of land management,
water utilization and a national data bank
would be implemented under the Technical
Cooperation Agreement. Further discussions
will be held immediately to decide on the
implementation of these proposals.

Science and Technology

It was agreed that a Saudi Arabian Na-
tional Center for Science and Technology
would be established to coordinate the

growth of science and technology in Saudi
Arabia and to support and fund mutually-
agreed upon program areas of interest to
Saudi Arabia. It was further agreed that an
initial United States Government team would
be sent to Saudi Arabia as soon as possible to
advise on the objectives and functions of the
Saudi National Center. Additional U.S. ex-
pert teams to follow will work with Saudi
Arabian experts to define the precise pro-
grams for the other agreed project areas.

Other Areas

The Saudi delegation requested technical
assistance over a limited period of time to its
Government's Department of Public Works.

The U.S. agreed to review the require-
ments of the Saudi Arabian Public Works
Department to determine the nature and ex-
tent of technical services desired.

Overall Assessment

The Commission expressed satisfaction
with the progress to date and considered the
discussions at its first meeting a major step
forward in the constructive development of
mutually advantageous economic relations.
With a view to keeping close track of the
Commission's efforts, the U.S. side decided
to establish an Action Group. The U.S. co-
ordinator will be Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, the Department
which is the U.S. coordinating agency for
the work of the Commission. The Saudi side
will consider a similar arrangement.

The action group and its Saudi counterpart
will be charged with monitoring progress
being made on a regular basis so as to insure
that program goals are being met and to
review and implement new proposals that
may be agreed upon. The Action Group on
the U.S. side will consist of representatives
from the Departments of Treasury and
State, and the following U.S. action agencies :
Agriculture, Commerce, Health, Education
and Welfare, Interior, Labor and the Na-
tional Science Foundation and other U.S.
Government agencies as may become appro-
priate. Both sides agreed to consider holding
the next Joint Commission meeting in Ri-
yadh, Saudi Arabia, in October 1975.

March 24, 1975

371

Humanism and Pragmatism in Refugee Problems Today

Address by Frank L. Kellogg

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs •

The tragedy is that positions like mine
have to exist at all. We've gone in this cen-
tury from "pax Britannica" thi'ough a war
to save the world for democracy, the League
of Nations, a second world war and its
Atlantic Charter, establishment of the United
Nations, adoption of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. We ought to be seeing
the spread of just and humane societies.
What we have is oppression, or at least
denial of freedom, in the totalitarian coun-
tries of right and left, conflict in Asia, tribal
violence in Africa, Israelis and Arabs in
long dispute in the Middle East, and — just
to come full circle — Catholics and Protes-
tants hard at it in Ireland, and Turks and
Greeks once again contentious in the Medi-
terranean.

Our J. William Fulbright — a Rhodes
Scholar by the way — has just retired after
30 years of statesmanship in the U.S. Senate.
He has described the situation as well as
I've heard it — incidentally, at Westminster
College in Missouri, where Winston Churchill
made his famous Iron Curtain speech :

It is one of the per\-ersities of human nature (Bill
Fulbright said) that people have a far greater
capacity for enduring disasters than for preventing
them, even when the danger is plain and imminent.

Our perversities, then, have created in our
time what some already have begun to call
the century of the refugee — not a 20th cen-
tury of human rights but the century of the
homeless and the persecuted. I've been in my
present post more than four years now, and

' Made at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge Uni-
versity, Cambridge, England, on Feb. 25.

during that period — despite large resettle-
ment program.s — we've never counted around
the world fewer than 5 to 6 million refugees
at any one time; it has gone all the way up
to 18 million. My colleagues who have given
their full careers to this work, and my read-
ing, tell me it has been the same since World
War II and before.

Dr. Kissinger, in his first speech as Secre-
tary of State, identified as the ultimate goal
of American foreign policy a world which
will protect the right of every man to free-
dom and dignity. Philosophers have begun
to talk about not four but five basic human
rights — life, justice, political freedom, reli-
gious freedom, and now the right to food. One
wonders whether there may not soon be a
sixth, the right to fossil fuel or at least to
energy. The point is that as life on our
planet becomes more complicated and our re-
sources less plentiful, instead of allowing old
animosities to continue to erupt and new ones
to flare, we are going to have either to set
the course of history again toward the cause
of human rights or ultimately we are going
to face the inevitability of really castastroph-
ic wars.

Even when mankind turns in this right
direction, it will be a long road. For the
foreseeable future and beyond, as I view it,
we are going to have masses of refugees in
any case.

Considering the state of the world, one of
the most unrealistic assessments at the
United Nations is that refugee problems are
temporary and that the mandate of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
need be extended only five years at a time.

372

Department of State Bulletin

Positions like mine, institutions like the
UNHCR and the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee for European Migration (ICEM), in
my opinion are going to have to be continued
in one form or another for years to come;
tliey are going to require more, not less, sup-
port from such agencies as the World Health
Organization (WHO), the World Food Pro-
gram (WFP), the U.N. Children's Fund
(UNICEF), the U.N. Development Program
(UNDP) , the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), and the others. And if
their programs are to succeed, they are going
to demand continued support not only from
countries like yours and mine with human-
itarian traditions but from those of the new-
rich nations not hitherto noted for com-
passionate interest in the dispossessed in
foreign lands. There is a work of persuasion
to be accomplished here.

Tradition of Humanitarianism

We are having our economic problems in
the United States as are you over here. Some
in my country are beginning to ask questions
about admission of refugees in a time of
unemployment and about the amounts of
expenditures overseas. Let me say at the
outset I am entirely confident that, come
what may, we Americans are going to con-
tinue to contribute our share in commodities
and money, to defend the right of freedom
of movement, to exert our share of leader-
ship in international humanitarian affairs.
From what I know of my country, majority
public opinion will have it no other way.

Let me talk about this for a minute — at
the risk of seeming to belabor the obvious.
We have been a nation of refugees from the
beginning. When the British took New Am-
sterdam from the Dutch in our early colo-
nial times, they found refugees there speak-
ing 14 different languages. Not long after
establishment of this college, when religious
persecution on this side of the Atlantic
brought our first settlers to New England —
the fact that they promptly began to perse-
cute each other is incidental — they estab-
lished a legend which is taught to every
American child : that the refugee Pilgrims

and the Puritans crossed the ocean in search
of the freedom they could find only in Amer-
ica.

Consider our Revolution. I have heard the
suggestion that, what with all the trouble-
makers you British got rid of, you might
well celebrate our July 4 Independence Day
on this island as your Thanksgiving Day.
Those renegades of yours — our Founding
Fathers — had practical reasons for cutting
the umbilical cord to King George's Eng-
land, but they were fired also by ideology,
the ideas which found expression in our
Declaration of Independence of 199 years
ago and our Bill of Rights. Their ideology
had its roots, of course, in the history of
this island and the philosophies of enlight-
ened thinkers of that era over here, especially
in England, France, Germany. So they were
in great part your doing, these American
notions of man's right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. From the beginning
we have insisted on them not just as the
rights of Americans but of all men. Presi-
dents have made this point repeatedly, from
Jefferson through Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin
Roosevelt, and John Kennedy, into the pres-
ent. Our churches teach it, most of them.
Humanitarian leaders espouse the cause.
Members of the American Congress continue
to insist on it, sometimes, as you may note
currently, to the jeopardy of our diplomatic
objectives and concepts of national security —
a broad problem to which President Ford
is giving serious attention.

There are other factors in this public
opinion equation which should not be over-
looked. There are our immigrants — nearly
50 million refugees and others over the years
— who, with their children and grandchil-
dren, form ethnic blocs alive to American
tradition and very prompt and forceful to
remind the government of its humanitarian
duty. There is among us, I sometimes feel,
a little of a sense of guilt at our affluence
in the face of human suffering abroad. There
seems to be in our ethos a special compassion
for the overseas dispossessed, to the point
that some Americans complain we do not
apply it equally to our underprivileged at
home.

March 24, 1975

373

Whatever the motivation of the individual,
Americans do open their purses when the
voluntary organizations make their appeals
for refugee assistance funds, and they do
exert pressure for government intervention,
financial or diplomatic, when refugee situa-
tions arise. A measure of magnitude of the
result is that our Congress, during the four
years of my own service alone, has provided
well over $1.2 billion for refugee programs —
programs which have helped support, re-
patriate, or resettle about 4 million persons
a year, plus nearly 10 million Bengalis in the
great subcontinent crisis of 1971-72.

I hope I do not give the impression I over-
look the materialism or other faults of our
modern society nor that I claim for my coun-
try any monopoly of virtue in humanitarian
matters. I am well aware that the fires burn
as bright or brighter elsewhere. I recognize
there are compassionate people, especially in
Western and Northern Europe, who with
their governments are regularly more gener-
ous than we to refugees, in terms of popula-
tion and resources. During conferences at
Geneva and elsewhere, I am privileged to
meet international leaders in humanitarian
afi'airs, and I note they come from diverse
societies in many parts of the world.

If I dwell on my country's role it is be-
cause of my conviction that the national tra-
dition I have discussed is of overriding
strength and, combined with our wealth,
size, and power, will keep thrusting us into
the forefront in humanitarian affairs. I dwell
on this also because, as I construe your in-
vitation, it is what you want me to talk about.

Policies and Concepts in Refugee Affairs

What, then, of U.S. policies and concepts
in refugee affairs — what of today's prob-
lems?

Given a more perfect world order, the
United States would prefer to leave refugee
assistance to the multinational organizations
and the voluntary organizations, paying our
fair share of the cost along the way and pro-
viding leadership as opportunity occurs. But

realism compels me to predict you will con-
tinue to see, for the foreseeable future, a
mix of U.S. support for UNHCR, ICEM, and
ICRC with unilateral operations such as our
U.S. Refugee Program, established in 1952
to assist escapees from Eastern Europe.

As I see it today, it would be politically
impossible for us to phase out the U.S. Refu-
gee Program. We are watching with in-
terest signs of modification of travel re-
strictions in that area, notably in Poland,
Romania, Czechoslovakia. But until there
is recognition in the Communist countries
of something at least approaching the full
right of freedom of movement, I doubt U.S.
domestic public opinion will stand for with-
drawal of our support of their refugees. Nor
will the aims of our foreign policy permit it;
for as Secretary Kissinger has made clear,
in seeking detente we have no intention of
abandoning our dedication to the cause of
human rights. The U.S. Refugee Program
annually is helping support 7,000 to 8,000
persons in countries of fir.st asylum and as-
sisting their resettlement in third countries;
it is also involved in the Soviet Jewish pro-
gram I'll be discussing in a minute. It has
been with us for 23 years and will be with
us, I expect, for quite a long time to come.

Those of you familiar with the American
political scene recognize that we are in the
midst of a mini-revolution in our national
legislature and in relations between the legis-
lative and executive branches of our govern-
ment. This isn't exactly new to me, for it has
been nearly three years since the Congress
took the bit in its teeth and instructed the
Department of State — specifically my ofllice
— to undertake a program to assist Israel in
its resettlement of Jews from the Soviet
Union. This was a political act reflecting
public opinion, expressing a defense of the
right of freedom of movement but, more
basically, humanitarian support for Israel it-
self. We've spent more than $85 million
since 1973 helping Israel develop its infra-
structure for reception of Soviet immigrants
— absorption centers, housing, medical train-
ing facilities — and in assistance, scholar-

374

Department of State Bulletin

ships, vocational training, care and main-
tenance, and the like for individual immi-
grants. And I expect we'll be spending many
millions more as time passes .

It is a program which has seen an inter-
esting development presenting a challenge to
the full international humanitarian commu-
nity. Some Soviet Jews have sought emigra-
tion to countries other than Israel, notably
my own, and some, having reached Israel,
have decided to move from there to the West.
This has resulted in concentrations of these
migrants in Rome, Brussels, Paris, West Ber-
lin. It has provoked efforts of the receiving
countries to restrict the flow. There are hu-
manitarian problems here, problems of prin-
ciple as well as the logistics of assistance,
which have us and others deeply concerned
and which are going to have to be solved.

A cardinal conviction of U.S. refugee pol-
icy supports the thesis that although assis-
tance to refugees is necessary in emergency
situations, these dole-type programs are in
fact secondary. It is central in these situa-
tions, beyond shelter and simple sustenance,
to secure the civil rights of refugees and,
above all, to work toward their rapid re-
patriation or resettlement. Prince Sadruddin
Aga Khan, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, has stressed these points on many
occasions. They are not especially new.
Whether instinctively or not, the Western na-
tions recognized them in the wake of World
War II. Had it not been for the successful
large-scale efforts in those years to repatriate
or resettle literally millions of displaced per-
sons, we would today have irredentist prob-
lems all over the place, in Asia as well as in
Europe. The lesson has been applied repeat-
edly since then — Hungary, Algeria, Czecho-
slovakia, the Sudan. India only three years
ago wisely insisted there could be no thought
of a permanent relief program for her flood
of refugees from what had been East Paki-
stan; we witnessed their dramatic return
to Bangladesh.

Contrast this with what has happened
elsewhere. Where you have longstanding in-
stitutionalized welfare programs without re-

patriation or resettlement, what you get is
a spinoff from the camps of hijacking and
terror — perpetuation of an intolerable threat
to peace.

It is a matter of great concern to us that
something of the kind may today be develop-
ing in Cyprus. For I repeat, it is basic that
continuing refugee situations, if allowed to
fester, put peace in jeopardy. Unless di-
plomacy, unless world opinion, can be brought
to focus on the proposition that humani-
tarianism and human rights should be central
in politics, that no matter how deeply their
plight is involved in the particular strife,
dispossessed masses of refugees must not be
allowed to become pawns in disputes — unless
we can bring this about, we are not going
to be able to turn the course of history
around.

To accomplish it will be uphill work. It
is a matter of attitudes of nations and
peoples, of the marshaling of world public
opinion. It may take another cataclysm or
two to set us firmly on the track. Meanwhile
men of good will can chip away at the chal-
lenge.

Accession to Refugee Convention

Let me conclude by discussing briefly an
American initiative in this area, an effort
to bring about wider acceptance of an impor-
tant human rights treaty — the Convention
and Protocol on the Status of Refugees.

The sad fact is that 24 years after the
convention was adopted at Geneva, eight
years after its 1967 protocol was opened for
signature, there still are more than 70 mem-
ber states of the United Nations which have
not acceded. This is a subject I had the op-
portunity to bring to the attention of jurists
and lawyers from 128 countries at the World
Peace Through Law Conference held at Abid-
jan, Ivory Coast, in August of 1973. The mat-
ter has been one of great concern to the High
Commissioner for Refugees; Prince Sad-
ruddin last summer appealed directly to 73
nonsignatory countries to start moving
toward accession.

March 24, 1975

375

In Washington, as a beginning, we have
begun to approach these countries through
their Chiefs of Mission, urging them to bring
the matter to the attention of their govern-
ments. I have talked thus far with the Am-
bassadors of Japan, Iran, Venezuela, Spain,
India, Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and
the Dominican Republic and will be talking
with others ; Mexico, Indonesia, Panama, are
on my initial list with more to come. It
is not a shotgun plan. We are concentrating
first on nations we believe will be most re-
ceptive and on Asia and Central America
because accessions are spottiest in these
areas.

The private sector World Peace Through
Law movement, which is centered in Wash-
ington and has influential members in most
of the nonsignatory nations, is working along
similar lines, not only to urge governments
to accede to the treaty but also to devise even
greater legal protection of refugees and their
rights. For example, World Peace Through
Law has established a select joint committee
with the International Law Association,
headquartered in London; the committee is
in the course of a two-year study of what
needs to be done.

We thus have three separate but coopera-
tive efforts directed toward the common ob-
jective— our own, that of the UNHCR in
the multilateral context, and the jurist and
lawyer approach on the local scene. We look
to governments and public opinion in those
nations which have long since acceded — in-
cluding the United Kingdom and all of West-
ern Europe — to support this efl'ort as op-
portunities arise.

The convention, with its protocol, estab-
lishes the legal rights of refugees which are
necessary to them if they are to cease being
refugees. It defines their protection, provides
for their asylum in the signatory countries.
It has been called the Refugee Magna Carta.
Extending its authority will take time. But
the strategy of the eff'ort, considering all
factors, has to be long range. The goal,
stated in simplest terms, is to work toward
entrenchment of civil liberties in interna-

tional law as deeply as they are entrenched
in the laws of our countries, yours and mine.
It is to gain such wide adherence and en-
forcement of the treaty that the hard-core
nations which do not accept concepts of free-
dom and dignity, or pay them only lipserv-
ice, will be isolated and thus exposed to the
pressures of world public opinion until they,
too, begin to mend their ways, to the ad-
vancement of the rights of man and the
cause of peace.

Secretary Regrets OAU Resolution
on Nominee for African Affairs Post

Following is the text of a letter dated Feb-
ruanj 23 from Secretary Kissinger to William
A. Eteki Mboumoua, Secretary General of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Press release 98 dated February 24

FEBRUARY 23, 1975.

Dear Mr. Secretary General: The text
of the "Consensus Resolution" of the OAU
Council of Ministers commenting upon the
nomination by the President of the United
States of Nathaniel Davis to the important
position of Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs has been brought to my at-
tention by press accounts.

The selection of senior officials for posts
in the United States Government is a func-
tion of American sovereignty. Unlike the
established procedures for accrediting Am-
bassadors for whom agrement is sought,
the selection of Assistant Secretaries of
State remains a purely internal, domestic
concern. The United States Government
would never comment publicly upon the
choices of other sovereign governments in
filling any of their public offices. Under
commonly accepted principles of international
decency it has the right to expect the same
of other governments, particularly of those
whom it has regarded as friends. You will
understand, Mr. Secretary General, the depth
of my dismay in learning from the press of

376

Department of State Bulletin

this unprecedented and harmful act of the
Council.

Ambassador Davis, as you know, is a bril-
liant career officer in our Foreign Service.
President Ford and I repose particular trust
and confidence in him. Indeed, he has served
with great distinction in high posts in our
public service under Presidents Kennedy,
Johnson and Nixon as Deputy Associate
Director of the Peace Corps, Minister to Bul-
garia, Ambassador to Guatemala, Ambas-
sador to Chile and as Director General of the
Foreign Service. He is not yet fifty years
old. The post to which he has been nomi-
nated by the President is one to which we
attach very great importance. Mr. Davis
was selected in order to give new impetus
and inspiration to our African policy. I have
full confidence in his ability to fill this vital
position with distinction. I am certain that
the African statesmen with whom he will
be dealing will learn to respect him as I do.

I cannot believe, Mr. Secretary General,
that the members of the Council were aware
that Ambassador Davis, while serving in the
Peace Corps under President Kennedy, trav-
eled widely in Africa, that he was a mar-
shal in the great 1963 Civil Rights March
in Washington led by Dr. Martin Luther
King, that he has served for periods total-
ing five years as an Assistant Professor at
Washington's leading black institution,
Howard University, and that he has devoted
many years of his spare time as a volunteer
worker among the disadvantaged black citi-
zens of Washington. I am truly saddened to
learn of the manner in which the Council
has besmirched the reputation of this out-
standing man who was selected precisely be-
cause we believed that he possessed the
breadth of view and the compassionate un-
derstanding for a new approach to this vital
position. To suggest that such a man has a
mission to "destabilize" Africa, a continent

with which we have enjoyed excellent rela-
tions and in whose development it is our
policy to assist is unacceptable and offensive.
(I might also add that the word "destabilize"
is one coined by a newspaper reporter, not
one ever used by any U.S. official to describe
our activities in any country.)

I would ask you to communicate to the
African heads of State at the earliest pos-
sible moment the text of this message in
order that the regret felt in the United
States over this unfortunate and unfair ac-
tion is well understood.

Secretary Deplores Terrorist Murder
of Consular Agent John Egan

Statement by Secretary Kissinger '

It is with the utmost regret that we have
learned of the murder of Consular Agent
John Patrick Egan at Cordoba in Argentina.
Mr. Egan met violent death at the hands of
a group of terrorists, a senseless and despi-
cable crime which shocks the sensibilities of
all civilized men. We are sure those respon-
sible will be found and brought to justice.

Mr. Egan was a loyal, dedicated citizen
who served his country quietly and effec-
tively. He joins the ranks of loyal Americans
who have laid down their lives in the line of
duty. This murder should again signal to the
community of civilized nations the necessity
of concerted and firm action to combat the
continuing menace of terrorism.

On behalf of my colleagues in the Depart-
ment of State and the Foreign Service, Mrs.
Kissinger and I extend deepest sympathy to
Mrs. Egan and other members of the family
on this loss to them and to ourselves.

Issued on Feb. 28.

March 24, 1975

377

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Foreign Policy Aspects
of Foreign Investment Act of 1975

Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs *

I welcome this opportunity to testify be-
fore you on S. 425, the Foreign Investment
Act of 1975, which provides for notification
by foreign investors of purchases of equity
shares in U.S. firms and gives the President
authority to screen and, at his discretion,
block investments which would result in a
foreigner acquiring beneficial ownership of
more than 5 percent of the equity securities
of a U.S. company.

Since other witnesses, including represen-
tatives of Treasury, Commerce, and SEC
[Securities and Exchange Commission], are
speaking to the technical aspects of the bill
and its implications for financial markets,
I will confine my remarks principally to the
foreign policy issues which it I'aises.

The traditional policy of the United States
has been to minimize the barriers to invest-
ment as well as to trade flows. Our own ac-
tions have reflected this, and we have taken
a leadership role in seeking broad accept-
ance of the benefits of the relatively unre-
strained movement internationally of goods
and capital. We were, for example, instru-
mental in the development of the Code of

' Made before the Subcommittee on Securities of
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban .A-fTairs on Mar. 4. The complete transcript
of the hearings will be published by the committee
and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.

Liberalization of Capital Movements by the
members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The
United States is currently working to for-
mulate within the OECD agreements to con-
sult regarding departures from national
treatment of foreign investors or the insti-
tution of incentives or disincentives for
foreign investment. Further, our commit-
ment to generally nonrestrictive treatment of
foreign investment is embodied in an ex-
tensive network of friendship, commerce,
and navigation (FCN) treaties.

Our policy of encouraging generally un-
restricted capital flows is soundly based in
economic theory and has in fact served us
and the world well. As a former Treasury
official expressed it, foreign capital "instead
of being viewed as a rival . . . ought to be
considered as a most valuable auxiliary, con-
ducing to put in motion a greater quantity of
productive labor and a greater portion of
useful enterprise than could exist without
it." That is as true now as when Alexander
Hamilton said it in 1791.

The Congress and we in the Administra-
tion are, however, quite properly concerned
regarding whether our information-gather-
ing capability and safeguards against abuses
are adequate in view of the potential that
has been created for greatly increased in-
vestment in U.S. industry in the years im-

378

Department of State Bulletin

mediately ahead. We are indeed faced with
:i new situation created by the accumulation
of massive investable reserves in the hands
of a relatively few oil-producing countries.
To what extent and in what way those gov-
ernments invest those reserves in the United
States is clearly a matter of urgent concern
both to the Congress and to the executive
branch.

We have, then, a need to move quickly
and decisively in three areas: (1) develop
an improved system for monitoring, on a
current basis, foreign investment flows into
U.S. industry; (2) design a system of over-
sight which gives the executive branch the
capability to assure that existing authority
to deal with abuses by particular foreign
investors is vigorously enforced and that any
gaps in such authority are promptly recog-
nized and steps taken to close them; and (3)
reach agreements with those foreign govern-
ments that are capable of making very sub-
stantial investments in U.S. industry that
they will consult with us before making ma-
jor investments in U.S. firms. The recently
completed Administration review of inward-
investment policy calls for effective action
in each of these areas.

Our policy review concluded that there
already exists extensive authority to require
reporting and to deal with abuses but that
it is scattered in various departments and
agencies and is not being efficiently used as
a base for a cohesive inward-investment pol-
icy. We now intend to establish a new cen-
tralized office and an interagency investment
board to assure the effective, coordinated
use of existing authority and, in the course
of providing continuous oversight, to de-
termine when and if new laws or regula-
tions are needed and initiate appropriate
action. (A benchmark survey of foreign in-
vestment in the United States is currently
being undertaken by the Treasury and Com-
merce Departments under the authority of
the Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974,
which the Administration strongly sup-
ported ; and that study will provide a neces-
sary and valuable updating of our informa-

tion on existing foreign investment.)

An essential feature of our proposed policy
is to seek agreement promptly from the
governments of major oil-exporting countries
that they will undertake to consult with us
in advance of any major investments in the
United States. We already have had clear in-
dications that those countries recognize our
legitimate concerns regarding the potential
for investments of a controlling nature in
U.S. firms by countries that are accumulating
large investable reserves. In certain instances,
such as the recent Iranian negotiations with
Pan Am, they have already informally sought
advance concurrence of the U.S. Government.

Once it is in place, the interagency invest-
ment board would be an appropriate vehicle
for developing the U.S. Government position
with regard to proposed investments on
which we had entered into prior consulta-
tions with foreign governments. The agree-
ment to consult would be reached bilaterally
between the United States and each of the
foreign governments concerned. While this
could be accomplished in various ways, the
Joint Commissions which have been formed
with a number of the oil-producing countries
would be one suitable forum for reaching
such agreements. The Joint Commissions
could then be used as a channel for informa-
tion regarding particular major investments
which are being contemplated.

I am confident that the steps that the Ad-
ministration now intends to take will ade-
quately safeguard the United States from
investments of an undesirable nature, while
at the same time not denying us the very
real and substantial benefits of relatively
unrestricted investment flows.

The Department of State is opposed to
S. 425 on the basis that it goes beyond what
is necessary to safeguard our national in-
terests from any undesirable foreign in-
vestments and might well have the effect of
discouraging investments which we would
find desirable. Moreover, it would call into
question our longstanding commitment to an
international system which provides for a
high degree of freedom in the movement of

March 24, 1975

379

trade and investment flows and would tend
to undermine our world leadership in this
area.

It must also be pointed out that the
"screening" provisions of this bill — that is,
those provisions which permit the President
to prohibit the acquisition by foreigners or
by U.S. companies controlled by foreigners
of more than 5 percent of most American
companies — violate approximately 15 of our
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navi-
gation.

These FCN treaties are designed to es-
tablish an agreed framework within which
mutually beneficial economic relations be-
tween two countries can take place. The ex-
ecutive branch has long regarded these treat-
ies as an important element in promoting our
national interest and building a strong world
economy, and the Senate, by ratification of
our FCN treaties, has supported this view.
To our benefit, the treaties establish a
comprehensive basis for the protection of
American commerce and citizens and their
business and other interests abroad, in-
cluding the right to prompt, adequate, and
efi'ective compensation in the event of na-
tionalization. However, the FCN treaties are
not one-sided. Rights assured to Americans
in foreign countries are also assured in equiv-
alent measure to foreigners in this country.
From the viewpoint of foreign economic
policy, the incentive for the FCN's was
the desire to establish agreed legal conditions
favorable to private investment. The heart
of "modern" (i.e., post-World War II) FCN
treaties — and those with our OECD partners
are generally of this type — is the provision
relating to the establishment and operation
of companies.

This provision may be divided into two
parts: (1) the right to establish and acquire
majority interests in enterprises in the ter-
ritory of the other party is governed by the
national-treatment standard, (2) the foreign-
controlled domestic company, once estab-
lished, is assured national treatment, and
discrimination against it in any way by rea-
son of its control by nationals of the foreign
cosignatory to the FCN treaty is not per-

missible. ("National treatment" means the
same treatment a country gives its own citi-
zens in like circumstances.) It is these two
aspects of many of the treaties which are in-
fringed upon by the bill before us.

It is important to note that the FCN
treaties do exempt certain areas from the
national-treatment standard in order to con-
form with laws and policies in existence when
the treaties were negotiated and in order not
to infringe upon other treaty obligations of
the United States or our national security in-
terests. Thus, specific exclusions from na-
tional treatment, while varying somewhat
from treaty to treaty, include communica-
tions, air and water transport, banking, and
exploitation of natural resources. Also, the
modern FCN provides that its terms do not
preclude the application of measures to fis-
sionable materials, regulating the produc-
tion of or traffic in implements of war or
traffic in other materials carried on directly
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment, or measures neces-
sary to protect essential security interests.
The provisions of S. 425, however, go far
beyond the necessary exceptions already per-
mitted to national treatment.

In summary, we are sympathetic with the
purposes of S. 425 and agree that safeguards
are needed to assure that the potential for
large-scale foreign investment, particularly
from the major oil-exporting countries, does
not pose a threat to U.S. national interests.
We are convinced, however, that many of
the safeguards already exist and that the
steps the executive branch is now planning
to take are a means of dealing eflfectively with
this issue while at the same time main-
taining our longstanding commitment to gen-
erally unrestrained investment flows. We are
confident that we can obtain agreement from
those governments accumulating massive in-
vestable reserves to consult prior to under-
taking major investments in the United
States, and we see no need for a general
screening requirement on foreign investment.
Thus, we oppose such a screening system,
which would mark a turn toward restriction
in U.S. investment policy.

380

Department of State Bulletin

Oepartment Reiterates Need To Cut
Dependence on Imported Oil

Following is a statement by Thomas 0.
Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic
and Business Affairs, submitted to the House
Com.mittee on Ways and Means on March 3.^

Press release 109 dated March 3

You asked me to discuss the interna-
tional aspects of the President's energy pro-
gram.

It is now more than 16 months since the
October embargo demonstrated that our
excessive dependence on imported oil carried
with it unacceptable vulnerability to manipu-
lation of our oil supply and oil prices.

Our international energy effort since the
Washington Conference of last February
has concentrated on the creation of a frame-
work of close consumer country cooperation.
Through this effort we seek to reduce and
eventually eliminate our vulnerability and to
establish a basis from which we can proceed
to a productive dialogue with the oil-pro-
ducing countries.

Our first objective was to obtain an imme-
diate reduction in our vulnerability to supply
interruptions. We have done this through
negotiation of the International Energy Pro-
gram, which commits the 18 countries in the
new International Energy Agency (lEA) to
build up emergency stocks and to take co-
ordinated demand restraint and oil-sharing
measures in the event of a new embargo.
This agreement provides for participants to
assist countries singled out for a selective
embargo, as we were in 1973; it provides
special protection for our east coast, which
is particularly dependent on imports and thus
vulnerable to an embargo.

We have also agreed in principle with the
main industrial countries on a financial
safety net to protect us against the eventual
exercise of the new power OPEC [Organiza-

' The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.

tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] is
acquiring over us — the power to make mas-
sive, destabilizing withdrawals of petrodol-
lars. This safety net— the $25 billion solidar-
ity fund in which the Administration will
shortly seek congressional authorization to
participate — is not an aid fund, but a lender
of last resort.

These efforts are, however, essentially
short-term insurance policies. The only long-
term solution to our problem of vulnerability
is to reduce, both individually and in coop-
eration with the other major industrialized
countries, our dependence on imported oil.
In this second phase of our effort, we seek to
reduce our consumption of imported oil and
to accelerate the development of alternative
sources, shifting the world supply-demand
balance for oil in our favor and thereby
bringing the price of oil down.

In February, the Governing Board of the
International Energy Agency reached agree-
ment on an lEA target of a reduction in oil
imports for the group as a whole of 2 million
barrels a day by the end of this year. On the
basis of the President's energy program, the
United States committed to save a million
barrels a day. This corresponds to our share
in group oil consumption, which is almost
exactly one-half. We have also agreed to fix
similar conservation objectives for 1976-77,
1980, and 1985.

There has been a great deal of question in
this country, Mr. Chairman, as to whether
we shouldn't give priority to getting our
economies going and look to conservation
only later.

It is true that a badly conceived program
of conservation could hurt employment. For
example, last year's embargo fell almost en-
tirely on the auto industry and its suppliers;
and this concentration, combined with the
lack of offsetting expenditures in other fields,
caused up to half a million people to lose
their jobs. But a well-designed conservation
program spreading the burden over the
range of our oil and gas consumption and
rebating the taxes raised need not have such
employment effects. Indeed, some of the con-
servation measures that we can take, such

March 24, 1975

381

as house retrofits to improve heating effi-
ciency and oil-to-coal conversion of utility
plants, will have a stimulative effect.

But the important thing to realize is that
we really have no choice. We must get the
economy going and launch conservation at
the same time. Consider what happens if we
don't. We are now importing 61/4 million
barrels a day of petroleum and products —
not really down from before the embargo —
in spite of high prices, the recession, and two
warm winters in a row. With our stagnant
oil production and falling natural gas pro-
duction, the demand for imports will increase
as the economy gets moving again, and with
a more normal or even a hard winter, that
increase will accelerate. We could be import-
ing as much as 9 million barrels a day by the
end of 1977. A new embargo then could cost
us 2 million jobs and some $40-$80 billion
in GNP.

It probably will take us until late 1977 to
get unemployment down from the current
8 million to 6 million. With our increasing
dependency on imported oil, Arab oil pro-
ducers will have the power to move us back
to 8 again in a few weeks' time. I do not
believe that Congress or the American people
will wish to see such power remain in the
hands of the oil producers.

The second main task in the lEA is the
development of a coordinated system of co-
operation in the accelerated development of
alternative energy supplies.

Why is it important to bring on alternative
sources, and why must we coordinate with
other consuming countries? In the case of
the United States, it will be impossible to
achieve our goal of substantial self-suffi-
ciency without a major development of alter-
native supplies. In the first instance, this
means that we must remove the constraints
which now make their development uneco-
nomic or impossible. That means that we
must start leasing the outer continental
shelf, change the status of Naval Petroleum
Reserve No. 4 in Alaska, improve the rate
structure of utilities so that new nuclear
plants again become economic, provide
greater incentives for gas and oil production,
deregulate oil and gas prices.

But we must also be concerned about
future price risks. All of the sources to be
developed in the United States will come in
at costs far above the 25 cents a barrel at
which oil can be produced in the Persian
Gulf. Investors can thus be exposed to the
risk of predatory pricing by OPEC. If, for
example, the price were to fall to $4 a barrel,
domestic U.S. production is estimated to fall
sharply from its 11 million barrels a day.
Consumption would be strongly stimulated,
and in 1985 the import requirement at such
a price level is estimated to exceed 20 million
barrels a day. At that level of dependence a
new embargo would cost us over 10 million
jobs.

We have the same interest in seeing other
consumers develop their alternative sources
rapidly as we do in developing our own ; both
shift the balance of demand and supply in
the market and help to bring current exorbi-
tant prices of oil down. We also want to be
sure that other countries do not nullify our
own efforts to bring on alternative sources
and cause the international price to drop by
restimulating their consumption when prices
begin to fall. Finally, no country has an inter-
est in investing heavily in high-cost energy
if others are wholly free to consume low-cost
energy when the price breaks, thus acquiring
a major advantage in international trade.

For these reasons, we believe that the
United States and all the consuming coun-
tries have an interest in a common policy to
protect and stimulate alternative supplies.
The specific elements of this policy are still
subject to negotiation, but the main elements
are:

— A general commitment to insure that
investment in conventional nuclear and fossil
fuel sources in our countries is protected
against possible future competition from
cheap imported oil. We would agree, in effect,
not to allow imported oil to be sold domes-
tically at less than a common minimum price.
This could be implemented through a com-
mon price floor or a common external tariff.
In the case of the United States, this com-
mitment would be implemented by authori-
ties which the President is seeking under

382

Department of State Bulletin

m\e IX of the Energy Independence Act of
i975.

— Creation of an international energy con-
sortium under which lEA countries wilHng
to contribute capital and technology could
participate in each other's efforts to stimu-
late production of energy, especially syn-
thetics and other high-cost fuels.

— A comprehensive energy research and
development program under which two or
more lEA countries would pool national ef-
forts on a project-by-project basis.

— Systematic and regular review of na-
tional energy programs against a set of com-
mon criteria which would permit an ex-
change of information and provide incentives
for vigorous efforts by all participating coun-
tries to meet our common objectives.

Mr. Chairman, there have been lots of
opportunities for false comfort since the oil
crisis began. Last summer a surplus of oil
emerged in the international market because
of seasonal factors and price resistance. We
got some undercover price cutting; a lot of
people told us that it was only a matter of
weeks before OPEC was finished. When the
market firmed in the winter and OPEC raised
the prices again, we found out that wasn't
the case.

With the recession, an easy winter, dis-
inventorying, and more price resistance, the
market is again soft and will be through
much of the summer. The heat will be on
OPEC to distribute the production cuts, and
we can hope for some more or less disguised
price cutting. But with the chances of a
hard winter after two warm ones, with our
determination to get the economy moving
again, with the decay in our natural gas posi-
tion, our oil import requirements will move
up very sharply in the future.

Now and again, some analysts say that
OPEC accumulations of surplus funds are
not going to be as big as we had originally
feared. Whatever the quality of these esti-
mates, and it is uneven, it is no real comfort
to know that OPEC is getting less invest-
ment assets because we are shipping more
goods to them thereby aggravating our in-
flation. Nor is it a comfort to know that by

1980 OPEC might have accumulated only
$300 billion rather than $500 billion in in-
vestments, since the possibilities of disrup-
tive movements of these funds are essen-
tially as great at the lower as at the higher
level.

The oil crisis will not simply go away, Mr.
Chairman. We must act to make it go away
by bringing our consumption of oil under
control at last, by developing our own energy,
and by working with other consuming coun-
tries so that they may do the same. Only
this way can we achieve our two essential
objectives, a substantial decrease in the
international price of oil and substantial U.S.
self-sufficiency in energy.

Department Discusses Developments
in Ethiopia

Folloiving is a statement by Edward W.
Mulcahy, Activg Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, made before the Subcom-
mittee on International Political and Mili-
tary Affairs of the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs on March 5.^

I am pleased at this opportunity to meet
with this subcommittee and to give an ac-
count of recent developments in Ethiopia.
As Acting Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs I have been deeply engrossed in the
subject for the past month, ever since heavy
fighting broke out in the Ethiopian Province
of Eritrea on January 31. I also have a
very personal interest in this subject since
I served at one time as consul in Asmara;
indeed, 25 years ago last month I opened
our consular post there.

The Province of Eritrea is distinguished
from the rest of Ethiopia primarily by the
foreign influences to which it has been sub-
jected. Although once at the heart of the
Ethiopian kingdom of Axum, from which
the present Ethiopian state is descended, its

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

March 24, 1975

383

location on the Red Sea has made it more
subject than the rest of Ethiopia to intru-
sion by non-Africans. Thus, Arabs, Turks,
Egyptians, Italians, and British have at var-
ious times occupied and ruled it. The Italians
vi^ere the first to name the province Eritrea,
after the Greek appellation for the Red
(Erythrean) Sea.

The Italians occupied what is now Eritrea
as a colony for nearly 50 years, and parts of
it even longer. They were evicted from all
of East Africa in 1941 by the Briti.sh dur-
ing the course of World War II. The British
administered the area until 1952, when the
United Nations established a federal rela-
tionship between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This
federal relation.ship was dissolved in 1962
when Eritrea became a province of Ethiopia.
The ethnic makeup of the province is im-
portant for an understanding of the pres-
ent situation. The population is divided,
roughly half and half, between Moslems
and Christians, about 1 million each. The
Christians, belonging chiefly to the Ethi-
opian Orthodox — sometimes called Coptic —
Church, live mainly on the high plateau in
the center, ranging up to nearly 8,000-foot
altitudes. The Moslems in the main in-
habit the lower slopes of the highlands and
the desert-like northern and coastal areas,
and consist of some six or seven major
ethnic and linguistic groups.

Following Eritrea's integration with Ethi-
opia and the end of the federal arrangement
in late 1962, the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) launched an armed resistance
against the central government. It was —
and still is — a predominantly, but not ex-
clusively, Moslem movement. Later, in 1966,
a new movement, the Popular Liberation
Forces (PLF), was formed. It is less heav-
ily Moslem, smaller than the ELF, and
appears to espouse a Marxist philosophy.
Until a few months ago when they agreed
to cooperate, the two movements remained
at loggerheads and sometimes have fought
each other. At any rate, the insurgency
began in late 1962 and has been going on
ever since, although rather sporadically until
the past few weeks. In spite of a once-large

official American presence in Eritrea— up
to 3,500 only a few years ago— Americans
were never molested, except for the acci-
dental killing of one serviceman and the
kidnapping of several oil exploration per-
sonnel and a missionary nurse last year.

In 1974, when a group of young officers
and enlisted men gradually took over con-
trol of Ethiopia, there seemed to be a
good chance that a political settlement could
be reached to the Eritrean problem. An
Eritrean, Gen. Aman Michael Andom, be-
came Prime Minister and his government
seemed disposed to take steps to ease Eri-
trean grievances against the central govern-
ment. However, Aman, who had gained the
confidence of the Eritrean people, was killed
in November; and therefore what oppor-
tunity existed at that time for improved
relations was lost. Subsequently eff"orts were
made by the new leadership in Addis Ababa
to get the negotiations started. The ELF-
PLF insisted on acceptance of independence
as a precondition to agreeing to sit down at
the negotiating table. This was unaccept-
able to Ethiopia. Fighting broke out on
January 31. The two sides seem quite far
apart now, with the Eritrean movements
insisting in their public statements on full
independence and the central government re-
fusing in its public statements to counte-
nance any breach of the country's territorial
integrity.

The United States has traditionally had
friendly, mutually beneficial relations with
Ethiopia and important interests there, in-
cluding the Kagnew communications station
established at Asmara since 1942, access to
Ethiopia's airfields and ports, and a poten-
tial market of 26 million people. We believe
that this longtime relationship is worth pre-
serving.

In recent years the strategic location of
Ethiopia, close to the Middle East oil sup-
plies and the Indian Ocean oil routes, has
become increasingly important. Protracted
instability in this second most populous
country in black Africa could have adverse
repercussions.

Moreover, the black African states do not

384

Department of State Bulletin

want to see the disintegration of Ethiopia,
it has always been one of their most re-
spected principles that the territorial integ-
rity of members of the Organization of
African Unity be respected, and not changed
by force of arms. They would be very criti-
cal of us if we were to withdraw our support
from the Ethiopian Government at this cru-
cial time. Some African states have, in fact,
already expressed to us in confidence their
deep concern for the present situation.

Pursuant to our military assistance agree-
ment with Ethiopia, which dates from May
1953, the Ethiopian army and air force have
been trained and equipped almost entirely
on American lines. In spite of this, the
United States has, ever since the outbreak
of the insurgency in 1962, consciously re-
frained from becoming directly involved in
this internal difficulty by precluding any
advisory effort in the operations. We do not
intend to become directly involved in the
present conflict.

Our security assistance to Ethiopia over
22 years has totaled approximately $200
million. In fiscal year 1974 the figure was
$22.3 million, of which $11.3 million was
grant assistance and $11 million in FMS
[foreign military sales] credits. Because of
congressionally imposed ceilings on MAP
[military assistance program] funds for
Africa and the competing requests of other
African friends, we have never been able to
be as responsive to Ethiopia's requests for
as high a level of military support as that
government would have liked.

For many years the Ethiopian Govern-
ment has agreed to our locating the impor-
tant Kagnew communications facility in
Asmara. Over the past two years, because
of improved communications technology, the
use of satellites, et cetera, we were able
gradually to phase down our once-large radio
facilities at Asmara and to reduce our per-
sonnel and dependents there to less than 200
at the start of this year. When serious con-
flict flared up a month ago we evacuated all
dependents and nonessential personnel. Cur-
rently, in addition to 44 uniformed and
civilian contract personnel remaining at

Kagnew, there are nine people at the Con-
sulate General in Asmara. In spite of the
greatly reduced staff, Kagnew is still being
maintained as a link in the worldwide naval
communications network. Except for minor
damage due to stray small-arms fire, Amer-
ican property has not been harmed ; nor has
any American citizen suffered injury. Out-
side Asmara, chiefly at mission stations
away from the combat areas, another
30-40 Americans can be found elsewhere in
Eritrea.

Just a few days after the serious fighting
erupted. President Nimeri of the neighbor-
ing Sudan extended his good offices to both
sides in the conflict, offering to mediate a
peaceful solution. While his efforts have
not met with any reported success because
the public positions of the two sides remain
far apart, the peacemaking effort is still
going forward. We would like to see a
peaceful settlement of the Eritrean problem,
for we believe that this is the only way to
achieve a lasting solution.

A little over two weeks ago the Ethiopian
Government, for whom we are the sole
source of ammunition and spare parts, re-
quested an emergency resupply of ammuni-
tion plus some nonlethal equipment and
offered to pay in cash for it. The request
is under active review. Since we received it
we have been studying it and refining it in
constant exchanges with the Ethiopian Gov-
ernment and our military mission in that
country.

Any abrupt cessation or reduction of aid
at this critical period could have a highly
unfavorable effect on our longstanding rela-
tions with the government of this strategi-
cally located country. As Secretary Kissinger
said [in a news conference on February
25], it would involve cutting off military
support to a country whose military estab-
lishment is based on American arms at the
precise moment when it needs it.

In our deliberations we have constantly
before us the larger political and moral
implications of our decision. If we say "yes,"
will it be seen in certain quarters as involve-
ment in the current internal situation? If

March 24, 1975

385

we say "no," will it be seen by others as
failure to help a traditional friend in an
hour of need?

The Ethiopian request is receiving thor-
ough high-level consideration by the agencies
concerned. As the Secretary mentioned re-
cently, no final decision has yet been taken.

Here in a few words, Mr. Chairman,
ladies, and gentlemen, I have tried to sketch
for you in only the broadest tei'ms some of
the main elements we see in the present diffi-
cult situation. I have tried also to underline
for you the extent to which these current
events are tending to strike close to home
for us in the United States because of our
long association with Ethiopia and our long
presence in Eritrea. We are seeking to pur-
sue a prudent policy that protects our over-
all interests.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that in the
committee's questioning we could defer any
discussion of delicate matters to an execu-
tive session.

Fourteenth Report of ACDA
Transmitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford '

To the Congress of the United States:

America's traditional optimism about the
manageability of human affairs is being
challenged, as never before, by a host of
problems. In the field of national security,
arms control offers a potential solution to
many of the problems we currently face. The
genius of the American people may be said
to lie in their ability to search for and find
practical solutions, even to the most difficult
of problems; and it is no accident that this
country has helped lead the world in the
quest for international arms control agree-
ments.

^Transmitted on Mar. 3 (White House press re-
lease) ; also printed as H. Doc. 94-64, 94th Cong.,
1st sess., which includes the complete text of the
report.

Safeguarding our national security re-
quires a dual effort. On the one hand, we must
maintain an adequate defense against poten-
tial great-power adversaries; for although
we are pursuing a positive policy of detente
with the Communist world, ideological differ-
ences and conflicting interests can be ex-
pected to continue. On the other hand, we
share with them, as with the rest of the
world, a common interest in a stable inter-
national community.

Over the past year, we have made con-
siderable progress in our arms control nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union. The Vladi-
vostok accord which I reached with Chair-
man Brezhnev will enable our two countries
to establish significant limits on the strategic
arms race and will set the stage for negotia-
tions on reductions at a later phase. The
U.S. and U.S.S.R. have, over the past year,
also reached agreement on the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty and on a limitation on
ABM deployments to one complex for each
country.

The negotiations being held at Vienna on
mutual and balanced force reductions in
Europe (MBFR), while they have not yet
produced conclusive results, are also an im-
portant endeavor to limit and reduce arma-
ments safely through mutual agreement. For
our part, we shall make every effort to
achieve such an outcome.

Even as we see some encouraging progress
in our relations with the Soviet Union, we
still face a growing danger in the potential
proliferation of nuclear weapons to more
countries. The U.S. will continue to seek
practical steps to avert this danger, while
pi-oviding the benefits of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.

The fourteenth annual report of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
which I herewith transmit to the Congress,
sets forth the steps which have been taken
over the past year to meet these and other
national security problems through arms
control.

Gerald R. Ford.
The White House, March 3, 1975.

386

Department of State Bulletin

Department Urges Passage of Bill Reimposing Full Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia

Following are statements presented to the
Subcommittee on hiternational Organiza-
tions and Movements of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs on February 26 bij Julius
L. Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs, and James J.
Blake, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri-
cayi Affairs.^

STATEMENT BY MR. KATZ

Thank you for this opportunity to appear
before your committee to discuss H.R. 1287,
a bill to halt the importation of Rhodesian
chrome. In my statement I propose to ad-
dress the question of the economic impact
of H.R. 1287, leaving to my colleague the
political aspects of the Rhodesian chrome
issue. My intention is to outline the economic
effects of the Byrd amendment during the
three years it has been in force and to dis-
cuss the possible economic impact of the
reimposition of full sanctions against Rho-
desia as proposed in H.R. 1287.

The Byrd amendment, which was enacted
at the end of 1971, had as a major objective
the lessening of U.S. dependence on the So-
viet Union as a source of chromium ore im-
ports. During the period before 1972, the
United States had depended on the Soviet
Union for about one-half of its metallurgi-
cal-grade chromite. We imported virtually
no chrome ore from Rhodesia from 1968
through 1971 inclusive, and no ferrochrome

'The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

before 1972. In 1971 the Soviet Union sup-
plied 41 percent of U.S. metallurgical chrome
ore imports.

Our imports of metallurgical-grade chro-
mite from the Soviet Union rose one-third
from 1971 to 1972; and the Soviet import
share increased to 58 percent in 1972, as
opposed to 9.3 percent for Rhodesia. Last
year, estimated chromite imports from the
Soviet Union were only slightly below the
level of 1971, and the Soviet import share
was 56 percent, up 15 percentage points
from 1971. Since 1972, our metallurgical-
grade chromite imports from Rhodesia have
remained steady at about 10 percent of total
U.S. imports of this material.

Meanwhile, total U.S. imports of metallur-
gical-grade chromite have decreased by al-
most 30 percent. Imports of Rhodesian chro-
mite seem to have replaced declining pur-
chases from third countries rather than dis-
placing imports from the Soviet Union. Since
1971, metallurgical-grade chromite imports
from Turkey and South Africa have in fact
fallen, and imports from Iran and Pakistan
have disappeared.

As this data indicates, Rhodesia has not
returned as a major source of metallurgical-
grade chromite for the United States during
the years following the passage of the Byrd
amendment. The level of Rhodesian chromite
exports to the United States in 1974 reached
only one-sixth of the level of the mid-1960's,
before sanctions were imposed. On the other
hand, Rhodesia has become a significant im-
port factor for ferrochrome. Rhodesian ex-
ports of high-carbon ferrochrome to the
United States rose from zero before the
enactment of the Byrd amendment to about

March 24, 1975

387

20 percent of U.S. imports in 1974 and about
8 percent of total U.S. con.sumption. Rho-
desian exports of low-carbon ferrochrome
have also increased, although they are con-
siderably lower relative to total U.S. con-
sumption.

One reason for the failure of Rhodesian
exports of metallurgical-grade chromite to
take a larger share of the U.S. market can
be found in the decision of the Rhodesian
government to reinvest mine profits in the
construction of a 350,000-ton ferrochrome
industry, with the intention of thereafter
exporting processed ferrochrome rather than
chrome ore. Ferrochrome, which is pro-
duced by a number of companies in the
United States, is also listed as a strategic
material for purposes of the U.S. stock-
piling program and is thus eligible for im-
port from Rhodesia under the Byrd amend-
ment. When the Byrd provision lifted sanc-
tions against strategic materials from Rho-
desia, Rhodesia concentrated on exporting
ferrochrome rather than chrome ore to the
United States.

The Soviet Union has exported virtually
no ferrochrome to the United States, either
before or since the enactment of the Byrd
amendment. The tariff on Soviet ferrochrome
is four to seven times the tariff applied to
non-Communist countries, a situation which
— given the non-MFN [most-favored-nation]
status of the Soviet Union — will continue to
make Soviet ferrochrome prohibitively ex-
pensive for American buyers. The major
import source of ferrochrome for the United
States last year was South Africa. Brazil,
Yugoslavia, Japan, and Sweden were also
major suppliers.

In terms of prices, the data would appear
to indicate that the market forces of supply
and demand have been the determining price
factors for metallurgical chrome ore, rather
than the absence or presence of Rhodesian
ore. The average value of all U.S. metal-
lurgical chrome ore imports in 1971 was $68
per content ton. Soviet ore, which is gen-
erally a higher grade ore, averaged $76.93
per ton; and Rhodesian ore, $71.14. In 1972,
all U.S. metallurgical chrome ore imports

388

averaged $65 per content ton, with Soviet'
ore averaging $73 and Rhodesian ore, $68.
The first half of 1973 .saw a drop in chrome
ore prices. Since that time they have risen,
responding to the very high demand in stain-
less steel production. We understand that
in recent contract negotiations both Turkish
and Soviet ore prices have risen sharply
again, although there appears to be some
doubt in the face of presently declining de-
mand as to whether the prices will be met.

The economic effects of the Byrd amend-
ment thus can be summarized as follows :

1. The amendment has not stimulated a
revival of Rhodesian chromite exports in
the quantities required by the U.S. ferro-
chrome indu-stry.

2. Rhodesian chromite, to the extent that
it has come into the United States, has re-
placed ore shipments from third countries —
i.e., Turkey, Iran, South Africa, and Pakistan
— rather than the Soviet Union.

3. The amendment has had the effect of
increasing our overall dependence for chrome
materials on fewer and less dependable
sources.

It is thus apparent that the Byrd amend-
ment has brought little or no real economic
benefit or advantage to the United States.
Similarly, we estimate that the economic co.'^t
which might be attributed to the reimposition
of a general embargo on imports from Rho-
desia would be quite small, when compared
with the impact of the macroeconomic cur-
rents which in fact determine the climate and
direction of the chrome and ferrochrome
markets. These currents have never shifted
as drastically as they have recently, with the
decline in world steel demand and the sharp
rise in energy costs.

It would be difficult to regard Rhodesia as
an indispensable supplier of chrome under
any circumstances. Rhodesia accounted for
about 10 percent of U.S. imports of metal-
lurgical-grade chromite in 1974 and only
5 percent of U.S. imports of all grades
of chromite. Rhodesian high-carbon ferro-
chrome represented about 20 percent of U.S.
imports (8 percent of U.S. consumption) ;

Department of Stale Bulletin

:r.w-carbon ferrochrome imports from Rho-
desia accounted for 8 percent of total im-
ports (and 2 percent of U.S. consumption).
Alternate sources exist for chrome ore, apart
from the Soviet Union; Turkey, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Iran, South Africa, and
others are capable of supplying chrome ores
to the United States.

In a tight market situation, of course, even
a relatively small volume of supply can be
an important price determinant. A cutoff of
Rhodesian chrome thus could contribute to
higher prices. How much higher depends on
two factors: (1) The degree to which Rho-
desian supplies are not replaced by supplies
from alternative sources, and (2) the extent
to which higher costs are passed through
in the per-unit costs of consumer goods, pri-
marily stainless steel products.

It has been estimated that a doubling of
the price of chromite and ferrochrome would
raise the price of stainless steel by 6 per-
cent and 10 percent respectively. It is doubt-
ful, however, that a cutback in chromite and
ferrochrome deliveries from Rhodesia,
amounting to about 12 percent of our im-
ported chromium content, will translate into
a doubling of chrome prices, especially in the
present softening economic situation.

There are substantial quantities of both
chromite and ferrochrome in the national
strategic stockpile which are excess to our
defense requirements and which could be
called on to cushion the impact of full trade
sanctions against Rhodesia. It is doubtful
whether such stocks will be required in the
near future. But they are available if Con-
gress should choose to authorize their dis-
posal to assist U.S. industry during the
transition period while it reestablishes its
alternative supply lines.

The general weakening of world steel de-
mand has taken considerable pressure off
the world chrome market. A 25 percent cut-
back in Japanese stainless steel production,
initiated at the end of last year, will re-
portedly continue into the second half of
1975. This situation has created an export-
able surplus of Japanese ferrochrome which
will be available to relieve shortages which

might develop during a short transition
period after full trade sanctions are imposed
on Rhodesia.

In the present economic situation, U.S.
industry should thus face a somewhat easier
task of adjusting to a cutoff of Rhodesian
supplies than would have been the case a
year ago. At the same time I should note
that, by failing now to repeal the Byrd
amendment, we will leave U.S. industry
vulnerable to a possible later cutoff of Rho-
desian supplies whether by internal changes
in Rhodesia, international action, or a later
reversal of congressional policy.

A final economic factor should be noted.
That is the good will that we risk of the
African states to the north of Rhodesia with
which we currently have some $5.9 billion
worth of trade. Furthermore, we have sub-
stantial investments in these same African
countries. They are also important sources
of supply for us for a whole range of stra-
tegic goods such as petroleum, uranium,
manganese, tin, rubber, tungsten, and dia-
monds, as well as foodstuffs such as coffee
and cocoa. Our open contraventions of the
U.N. sanctions have placed American busi-
nessmen at a disadvantage in their negotia-
tions with African countries in such matters
as resource development, investment, and
export opportunities.

STATEMENT BY MR. BLAKE

I am very pleased to have this opportunity
to appear before the subcommittee to dis-
cuss H.R. 1287, a bill to amend the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945 to halt
the importation of Rhodesian chrome. As you
know, the Byrd amendment has long been
a matter of concern to the United States in
the conduct of its foreign relations in Africa,
at the United Nations and in other interna-
tional forums, and in the overall context of
our record in observing international com-
mitments. At this time retention of the
amendment damages our country's efforts
to keep pace with fundamental changes, in
Africa and the world. Failure to keep pace

March 24, 1975

389

with these changes would not only invite
potentially longstanding difficulties for the
United States but also would be inconsis-
tent with a fundamental principle that we
have long respected and observed — the right
of all peoples to self-determination.

In 1974, the wave of independence in Af-
rica began to move again. In April, Portugal,
weary of war and newly mindful of the value
of freedom, made the decision to grant in-
dependence to its African colonial territories.
The world welcomed the independence of
Guinea-Bissau in September. Negotiations
have since led to the setting of dates for the
independence of Mozambique, in June, and
Angola, in November of this year. The United
States has welcomed these developments and
is seeking means of cooperation with the new
governments of these territories.

In Rhodesia, a minority consisting of 4
percent of the population decided in 1965
that it had the right to the vast preponder-
ance of the country's political power and
economic resources on the basis of race,
with little or no regard for the rights and
aspirations of the remaining 96 percent of
the population. Since then Ian Smith's regime
has persisted in its spurious, unrecognized
so-called "independence." Today, however,
there are signs that the ability of that regime
to maintain itself has been seriously weak-
ened as a result of changes in the area.

Mozambique, astraddle Rhodesia's links to
the sea, will achieve independence in a few
months' time under a government led by
FRELIMO [Liberation Front of Mozam-
bique] , a successful African liberation move-
ment allied for years with black Rhodesian
liberation movements.

The leaders of white Rhodesia's princi-
pal, all-important, and only remaining po-
litical ally, the Republic of South Africa,
are leading the way in urging the Smith
regime in Rhodesia to reach an acceptable
settlement with the majority of the Rhode-
sian people.

The African opposition to minority rule,
divided among themselves for more than 10
years, on December 8 announced their uni-
fication under the banner of a single orga-

nization inside and outside of Rhodesia, the
African National Council.

Interested and concerned nations on the
borders of Rhodesia, as well as the British,
whose sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia
the United States has never ceased to recog-
nize, have taken steps to encourage and facil-
itate a settlement, a peaceful accommodation
for the sharing of power between blacks and
whites in the country.

People of reason, even within the white
Rhodesian establishment, have begun to per-
ceive that a course set to try to preserve
white rule forever in Rhodesia is unrealis-
tic and can only result in violent tragedy.
(White immigration and emigration figures
continue to reflect that perception.)

There are also clear indications that the
Smith regime itself is beginning to realize
that the time for negotiations is at hand.
Although white officials, including Ian Smith
himself, continue to talk about not deviating
from "our standards of civilization" (white
Rhodesian shorthand for white rule), it is
nonetheless clear that considerable efforts
are underway within and without Rhodesia
to convene a constitutional conference in the
near future.

Our policy has in general kept pace with
events in southern Africa. We welcome the
coming independence of Mozambique and
Angola and are keeping in close touch with
the leaders of those countries. We have con-
tinued, in consultation with other interested
nations, to encourage efforts to bring about
a negotiated peaceful settlement in Rhodesia
providing for majority rule and acceptable
to the United Kingdom and to the rest of
the international community.

Consistent with that policy, the United
States supported the unanimous 1968 U.N.
Security Council vote establishing economic
sanctions against Rhodesia and subsequently
issued Executive orders implementing those
sanctions, which we enforce.

The sole exception to that policy, totally
inconsistent with it, is the Byrd amendment,
permitting the importation of Rhodesian
chrome and other minerals in violation of
sanctions. Secretary Kissinger has declared

390

Department of State Bulletin

:in a letter to Representative John Buchanan
lated February 8, 1974] that he is per-
sonally convinced that the Byrd amendment
is "not essential to our national security,
brings us no real economic advantages, and
is costly to the national interest of the
United States in our conduct of foreign rela-
tions." A few days after assuming the
Presidency, President Ford, through his
press spokesman, stated his full commit-
ment to repeal of the Byrd amendment.

African and other nations perceive the
Byrd amendment as clear and unequivocal
U.S. support for a sinking, oppressive, racist
minority regime. Support for the white
Rhodesian regime is inconsistent with the
historic American belief in the right of
peaceful self-determination, a constant ele-
ment in our policy throughout the long
period of decolonization not only in Africa
but also in the rest of the world. By retain-
ing legislation sharply at variance with an
international commitment that we made to
other nations we undercut our credibility
in advocating peaceful negotiated solutions
to other international problems.

The appearance of support for Ian Smith's
regime is also unrealistic in terms of long-
term American interests in Africa. The lib-
eration of southern Africa remains a prin-
cipal foreign policy objective of African
nations, in bilateral relations and in inter-
national forums. A country's position on
southern African issues is coming to be the
litmus test for African nations in deter-
mining the degree of their cooperation in
international forums. It may come to be an
element in determining trade relations. In
that context, a little more Rhodesian chrome
now does not equal in value other African
resources that we might have to forgo at
some future time if we do not pursue a
policy that keeps pace with change. In the
same sense, repeal of the Byrd amendment

now may be vital in assuring long-range
access to Rhodesian chrome for American
companies.

Mr. Chairman, committee members, final-
ly, I want to comment on the timeliness of
H.R. 1287, introduced on the first day of
the 94th Congress. Some have argued that
passage of a repeal bill at a time when
negotiations in Rhodesia may be imminent
is either unnecessary or unwise interference
in progress toward a settlement. I believe
the contrary to be the case.

The coming months, perhaps many
months, of negotiations will be a time when
Rhodesians of all colors will be called upon
to make concessions, to yield ground in an
effort to reach a settlement acceptable to
all participants. A normal trading relation-
ship with the rest of the world has always
been a primary objective of Rhodesia. Eco-
nomic sanctions have denied Rhodesia that
relationship. In doing so, they have given
Rhodesians a strong incentive to arrive at
a settlement. For the United States to fail
to pass the repeal bill at this time would be
to reinforce the Smith regime in its recalci-
trance. Retention of the amendment would
encourage the minority Rhodesian regime
to try to hold on to an unjust, unrealistic,
and increasingly dangerous way of life. By
repealing the amendment, the Congress
would tell the minority regime that the
American people do not support them in
their intransigence and that we believe that
the time for them to share power in their
country with the majority of the population
is long overdue.

Such a message from the Congress of the
United States, speaking for the American
people, would serve the U.S. national inter-
est in our relations with Africa. It would
also serve the cause of peace in southern
Africa. I therefore strongly urge passage of
H.R. 1287.

March 24, 1975

391

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Link Between Population and Other Global Issues

The 18th session of the U.N. Population
Commission ivas held at New York February
18-28. Folloiving is a statement made in the
Commission on February 20 by John Scali,
U.S. Represeyitative to the United Nations,
together ivith the text of a resolution adopted
by the Commission on February 28.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 11 dated Febniary 20

I am greatly honored to head the U.S.
delegation to this year's meeting of the Pop-
ulation Commission and thus to occupy the
position so recently filled with distinction
by my friend and colleague, Gen. William
H. Draper. General Draper was a true leader,
in my country and throughout the world com-
munity, in the field of population. The death
of this resolute pioneer is a tragedy for all
mankind. I wish to express my government's
deep appreciation for the moving statements
of condolence from so many of those who
worked with him as allies, and I promise
these will be made available to his family.

I do not possess the expertise on popula-
tion issues which so many of you have de-
veloped through years of participation in
the work of this Commission. But I can as-
sure you that I share General Draper's deep
commitment to the imperative need for more
and increasingly effective international ac-
tion in this highly important field. I agree
profoundly with the opening words in Presi-
dent Ford's message to the World Population
Conference in Bucharest, in which he said:

You are meeting on a subject that in the true
meaning of the word is vital to the future of man-

kind: How the world will cope with its burgeoning
population.

1 fully appreciate the immense scope of
the problem with which you are dealing, and
I am impressed by its direct relationship
with the other global issues of our time. It
is this relationship between your work and
that of the rest of the U.N. system which I
would like to discuss today.

Clearly, the most evident and compelling
linkage today is that between food and popu-
lation. Growing population is a principal
cause of the ever-growing global demand
for food. Whether millions face starvation
in the coming decades will depend not only
on our ability to raise food production to
new heights but also on our success in limit-
ing population growth to manageable levels.
This fundamental fact is forcefully asserted
in the Declaration on Food and Population
which thousands of individuals, including
myself, recently sent to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations.

The link between food and population is-
sues also was dramatized in an important
but little-publicized speech made at the Pop-
ulation Conference in Bucharest by the Dep-
uty Director General of FAO [Food and
Agriculture Organization], Mr. Roy Jackson.
He noted that there are now 1.3 billion
more people to be fed today than in 1954
when the first Population Conference was
held. He reminded us that over 400 million
people are already suffering from protein-
energy malnutrition and that rural under-
employment and mounting urban unemploy-
ment— fed by despairing millions who mi-
grate to the cities — have already reached
alarming proportions. Mr. Jackson made two

392

Deportment of Stote Bulletin

'najor points that are worth repeating here.
[ will quote them :

First, that action must be initiated 7iow to reduce
the rate of population growth if we are to have any
chance at all of meeting the world's food needs 25
years from now.

Second, while family planning and population
policy are matters for individuals and governments,
there is at the same time a clear need for interna-
tional action.

The World Food Conference at Rome
[November 5-16, 1974] acknowledged that
only through cooperative international ac-
tion can we effectively meet the world's food
needs of the future. It is equally clear, how-
.ever, that unless there is similar international
cooperation in controlling population growth
even our best efforts to raise food production
will be insufficient.

The lives of tens, perhaps hundreds, of mil-
lions are involved. If the populations of de-
veloping countries continue to grow at rates
reflected in the U.N. medium projection,
and despite the largest likely increase in
their food production, the cereal import re-
quirements of these countries will mount
from 24 million tons in 1970 to over 50 mil-
lion tons in 1985 and to more than 100 mil-
lion tons by the year 2000. Not only will the
astronomical cost of such quantities of grain
far exceed the ability of these developing
countries to pay, but there are no practi-
cable means now known to transport and de-
liver such a quantity of food.

I hope it will be possible for this Com-
mission to consider population policies and
programs by which those countries with
severe food deficits and high rates of popula-
tion growth can take the measures neces-
sary to keep their populations and food re-
sources in a favorable balance.

Developmental and Environmental Effects

Population issues also bear a direct re-
lationship to the success or failure of the
Third World's economic and social develop-
ment. Since the late 1950's it has become
increasingly clear that in a large number of
countries population growth has outpaced
their otherwise respectable levels of economic

March 24, 1975

growth. The imaginative development pro-
grams of Third World governments and the
hard work of their citizens have in many
cases not resulted in the improved standards
of living these efforts justified and which the
people had a right to expect.

For many countries the per capita in-
crease in income remains less than 2 per-
cent per year. In some nations, each year
actually brings a lower standard of living.
Most recently, the new and drastically higher
price of oil has generated an additional an-
nual balance-of -payments deficit for develop-
ing countries of some $20 billion, signifi-
cantly more than all the aid they receive
from all sources.

By 1980, it is possible that the poorest
500 million people in developing countries
may be living at levels of poverty even worse
than those they live in today. The gap be-
tween the aspirations and achievements of
these peoples may continue to widen, with
incalculable consequences for their nations'
social and political structures and for the
peace of the entire world.

Arguments as to whether economic devel-
opment or population control should be given
priority by the international community
seem to me to have all the relevance of the
controversy over which came first, the
chicken or the egg. We know that poverty
often leads to excessive population growth,
and we know just as certainly that excessive
population growth insures continued poverty.
Such a vicious cycle can be breached only
by simultaneous efforts on all fronts. Reduc-
tions in excessive population growth can
speed development, and more rapid devel-
opment can slow population growth.

The position of the United States has al-
ways been that population programs are
only a part of — but an essential part of —
economic and social development efforts.
After all, only 2 percent of global develop-
ment assistance goes to population programs.
That hardly indicates excessive emphasis on
this aspect of development. It may, in fact,
be too little.

The Plan of Action devised and agreed
upon by the World Population Conference
in Bucharest represents, in my view, one of

393

the U.N.'s most important achievements of
recent years.' Today nations around the
world are already engaged in considering
what measures they should take to put this
action plan into effect. In the United States,
we are reviewing our own population policies
and programs to see how we can best co-
operate with others in implementing the Plan
of Action. We are continuing to expand our
own national family planning service pro-
grams, and our country's fertility rates con-
tinue to decline. We have, in fact, been be-
low the replacement level of fertility for three
years now.

Already countries with 75 percent of the
peoples of the developing world have national
population programs in effect. Others are
moving toward the adoption of such pro-
grams. It is perfectly clear that as these pro-
grams succeed and expand, considerably in-
creased support will be needed for them
domestically, from the present donor coun-
tries, and from those which have more re-
cently become potential donors by reason of
their new wealth.

There is a tendency to think that the link
between population and environment is of
particular concern only to the industrial-
ized countries. Certainly, in these countries
population growth and increasing affluence
have led to urban concentration and indus-
trial expansion which can endanger the en-
vironment and the health of the inhabitants.
But environmental damage is not only a
scourge of the rich. Environmental protec-
tion is not a luxury which only the wealthy
can afford. The relationship between man and
his environment will fundamentally influ-
ence the quality of life at any stage of de-
velopment.

Consider, for instance, the many cases
where population pressure on limited arable
land has denuded the hillsides of trees and
contributed to destructive floods. Consider
the areas where an increasing concentration
of pastoral population and their flocks living
on the edges of deserts has destroyed trees
and herbage and opened the way to an ad-
' For an unofficial text of the World Population
Plan of Action, see Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1974, p.
440.

vance of the sands. Consider the nations
where dense and growing populations have
contaminated the soil, water, and air and
spread disease.

Finally, consider the ever-present danger
that the need to expand food production to
feed a growing population will in the end
further damage the land, that the intensi-
fied use of fertilizers will imperil the life of
lakes and streams, and that the widened use
of pesticides will threaten birds and other
wildlife.

Population and the Status of Women

In this International Women's Year, we
should recognize that the status of more than
half of the world's population, the female
half, is itself a major focus of world atten-
tion. The World Population Conference at
Bucharest rightly highlighted the vital inter-
action of population control, development,
and the status of women. The Plan of Action
puts it very simply:

Improvement of the status of women in the family
and in society can contribute, where desired, to
smaller family size, and the opportunity for women
to plan births also improves their individual status.

The Plan of Action has as one of its gen-
eral objectives :

To promote the status of women and expansion
of their roles, the full participation of women in
the formulation and implementation of socioeco-
nomic policy including population policies, and the
creation of awareness among all women of their
current and potential roles in national life.

We hope that this Commission, the Popula-
tion Division, the U.N. Fund for Population
Activities, and other active agencies will not
only consider the critical role which women
can play in furthering our efforts but that
they will themselves provide more important
roles for women in the administration and
execution of their programs at all levels.
I would hope also that in this year and in
the International Women's Year Conference
in Mexico City serious attention will be given
to measures needed to carry out the practical
recommendations of the World Population
Plan of Action for improvement in the status

394

Department of State Bulletin

of women. My delegation will submit a draft
■.■esoliition on this important subject for the
Commission's consideration.

It hardly seems necessary to note the con-
nection between the Commission's activities
and the situation of millions of children
around the world. The Executive Director
of the U.N. Children's Fund [Henry Labou-
isse] has noted that, "the first and the main
victims of the population explosion are chil-
dren." Under current conditions of popula-
tion growth, "it does not appear possible,"
he said, "for the governments and the people
of most of the developing countries ... to
provide the food, the health and welfare serv-
ices, and the education required in the fore-
seeable future for the ever-growing numbers
of young." Nothing can more effectively un-
derscore the urgent and overriding need for
progress in population control than the un-
dernourished and dying infants whose faces
and bodies we all see in the world's press
almost daily.

Population and the World Community

I have in my remarks emphasized the im-
portance of population issues to the Third
World not because this is uniquely their prob-
lem. On the contrary, it is an issue with
which we all must grapple. There is little
doubt, however, that it is the Third World
which will suffer first and suffer most from
excessive population growth. There is also
no doubt that only the nations of the Third
World can make the decisions necessary to
control their populations. The role of the
international community, including this Com-
mission, is to help governments assemble
the information they need to decide wisely,
and when they have made their decision, to
help them implement it.

Thirty years ago the United Nations was
created to preserve the world from the hor-
rors of yet another world war. In the suc-
ceeding years we have come to the realiza-
tion that world peace could not be long
maintained in a world half rich and half
poor. Thus, today the United Nations de-
votes nearly 90 percent of its resources to
economic and social development. The time

has come for us to take our thinking one
step further. We must now further acknowl-
edge that neither peace nor economic de-
velopment can long be maintained in a world
overwhelmed by unchecked population
growth. The United Nations, an organiza-
tion designed to deal with the threat of the
atomic bomb, must now learn to cope effec-
tively with the equally frightening threat of
the already armed and ticking population
bomb.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ""

The Economic and Social Council,

Recognizing that 1975 has been designated as
International Women's Year and the World Confer-
ence of the International Women's Year is sched-
uled from 19 June to 2 July 1975 in Mexico City,

Recalling that the World Population Conference
emphasized the interrelationships of population, de-
velopment, resources and the environment, and the
family, and that the World Population Plan of Ac-
tion adopted by the Conference and endorsed by the
General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session corre-
lates population factors with the status of women
and the role of women in development,

Further recalling that the World Food Conference
called on "all Governments to involve women fully
in the decision-making machinery of food produc-
tion and nutrition policies as part of total develop-
ment strategy" (E/5587, resolution VIII) and
adopted a resolution on the achievement of a desir-
able balance between population and food supply
(resolution IX), and that thus the influence of
socio-economic factors on the demographic process
as well as the important role of women were empha-
sized.

Noting the importance accorded to the integration
of women in development by the United Nations
Development Programme at its nineteenth session,
the United Nations Commission for Social Develop-
ment at its twenty-fourth session, the International
F'orum on the Role of Women in Population and
Development (February to March 1974), and the
Regional Consultations for Asia and the Far East
and for Africa on "Integration of Women in De-
velopment with Special Reference to Population
Factors" (May and June 1974, respectively), and
the Regional Consultation for Latin America on the
same subject to be held in April 1975,

Further noting that the General Assembly, in
resolution 3342 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, en-
titled "Women and Development" considered that

- Adopted by the Commission and recommended
to the Economic and Social Council on Feb. 28
(text from U.N. doc. E/CN.9/L.117/Rev.2).

March 24, 1975

395

further progress towards the full integration of
women in development should be assisted by positive
action from the United Nations system of organi-
zations,

Recognizing the findings of the Study of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Interrelationship of the
Status of Women and Family Planning (E/CN.6/
575 and Add. 1-3) presented to the Commission on
the Status of Women at its twenty-fifth session and
to the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-sixth
session and the implications of this interrelationship
not only for the health and well-being of individual
women but also for the social and economic progress
of nations,

Further recognizing that equal status of men and
women in the family and in society improves the
over-all quality of life and that this principle of
equality should be fully realized in family planning
where each spouse should consider the welfare of
the other members of the family, and recognizing
that improvement of the status of women in the
family and in society can contribute, where desired,
to smaller family size, and the opportunity for
women to plan births also improves their individual
status,

Convinced that the time has now come for action
to carry out the numerous important recommenda-
tions already agreed upon,

1. Urges United Nations bodies, Member States,
and relevant non-governmental organizations, in
observing International Women's Year and partici-
pating in the World Conference of the International
Women's Year to take all action appropriate to
ensure that the recommendations relating to the
status of women stated in the World Population
Plan of Action (E/5585, paras. 32, 41, 42, 43, 78)
and in resolutions IV, XII and XVII (E/5585, chap.
II) of the World Population Conference are imple-
mented; and in particular:

(a) To achieve the full participation of women in
the educational, social, economic, and political life
of their countries on an equal basis with men;

(b) To achieve equal rights, opportunities, and
responsibilities of men and women in the family
and in society;

(c) To recommend that women have the informa-
tion, education, and means to enable them to decide
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing
of their children in order to improve their indi-
vidual status;

2. Requests United Nations bodies, within their
fields of competence, including the regional com-
missions, in collaboration with Member States, in
the implementation of both short-term and long-
term population policies and programmes designed
to carry out the recommendations of the World
Population Plan of Action:

(a) To pay particular attention in the monitoring

of the progress being made in the implementation
of the World Population Plan of Action to the evolv-
ing status of women, keeping in mind the mutual
interaction among population factors, social and
economic development, and the status of women,

(b) To supply information to the Economic and
Social Council on the action taken pursuant to this
resolution.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement concerning liability for loss or damage
resulting from certain rocket launches in Canada
(Operation Tordo). Effected by exchange of
notes at Ottawa December 31, 1974. Entered into
force December 31, 1974.

Iran

Agreement on technical cooperation. Signed at
Washington March 4, 1975. Enters into force on
the date of an exchange of notes confirming
entry into force.

Agreed minutes for the second session of the
United States-Iran Joint Commission for Eco-
nomic Cooperation. Signed at Washington March
4, 1975. Entered into force March 4, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement concerning the provision by the United
States of four mobile interdiction systems for
use in curbing the illicit flow of narcotic sub-
stances through Mexico. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico February 24, 1975. Entered
into force February 24, 1975.

Saudi Arabia

Technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Riyadh
February 1.3, 1975. Enters into force after Saudi
Arabia has provided written notice to the United
States that the agreement has been officially
promulgated in Saudi Arabia.

Thailand

Agreement concerning payment to the United States
of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles
furnished under the military assistance program.
Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Janu-
ary 3 and 17, 1975. Entered into force January
17, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

396

Department of State Bulletin

NDEX March 2 A, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1865

Africa. Secretary Regrets OAU Resolution on
Nominee for African Affairs Post (letter to
OAU Secretary General) 376

Argentina. Secretary Deplores Terrorist Mur-
der of Consular Agent John Egan (state-
ment) . ■ • 377

Co n c rcss

Department Discusses Developments in Ethi-
opia (Mulcahy) 383

Department Discusses Foreign Policy Aspects
of Foreign Investment Act of 1975 (Robin-
son) • ■ 378

Department Reiterates Need To Cut Depend-
ence on Imported Oil (Enders) 381

Department Urges Passage of Bill Reimpos-
ing Full Sanctions Against Southern Rho-
desia (Blake, Katz) 387

Fourteenth Report of ACDA Transmitted to
the Congress (message from President
Ford). 386

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary
Regrets OAU Resolution on Nominee for
African Affairs Post (letter to OAU Secre-
tary General) 376

Disarmament. Fourteenth Report of ACDA
Transmitted to the Congress (message from
President Ford) 386

Economic Affairs

Department Discusses Foreign Policy Aspects
of Foreign Investment Act of 1975 (Robin-
son) . • • • 378

Department Urges Passage of Bill Reimpos-
ing Full Sanctions Against Southern Rho-
desia (Blake, Katz) 387

U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Economic Commis-
sion Meets at Washington (joint communi-
que) 369

Energy. Department Reiterates Need To Cut

Dependence on Imported Oil (Enders) . . 381

Ethiopia. Department Discusses Developments

in Ethiopia (Mulcahy) 383

Human Rights. The Link Between Population
and Other Global Issues (Scali, text of U.N.
Population Commission resolution) . . . 392

Latin America. The United States and Latin
America: The New Opportunity (Kissinger) 361

Population. The Link Between Population and
Other Global Issues (Scali, text of U.N.
Population Commission resolution) . . . 392

Presidential Documents. Fourteenth Report

of ACDA Transmitted to the Congress . . 386

Refugees. Humanism and Pragmatism in

Refugee Problems Today (Kellogg) . . . 372

Saudi Arabia. U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Eco-
nomic Commission Meets at Washington
(joint communique) • 369

Southern Rhodesia. Department Urges Pas-
sage of Bill Reimposing Full Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia (Blake, Katz) 387

Terrorism. Secretary Deplores Terrorist Mur-
der of Consular Agent John Egan (state-
ment) • 377

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 396

United Nations. The Link Between Population
and Other Global Issues (Scali, text of U.N.
Population Commission resolution). . . . 392

Name Index

Blake, James J 387

Enders, Thomas O 381

Ford, President 386

Katz, Julius L . . 387

Kellogg, Frank L 372

Kissinger, Secretary 361, 376, 377

Mulcahy, Edward W 383

Robinson, Charles W 378

Scali, John 392

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 3—9

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 3 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 98
of February 24 and 108 of March 1.

No. Date Subject

109 3/3 Enders: House Ways and Means
Committee.

*110 3/3 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life
at Sea, Mar. 26.

*111 3/3 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad-
visory Committee Meeting, Mar.
26.

*112 3/3 Harbridge House releases study
on U.S. international aviation
policy.

*113 3/4 Stabler sworn in as Ambassador
to Spain (biographic data).

*114 3/4 Advisory Committee on Interna-
tional Book and Library Pro-
grams, Apr. 10-11.

tll5 3/4 Kissinger, Ansary: remarks fol-
lowing meeting of U.S.-Iran
Joint Commission.

tll5A 3/4 U.S.-Iran Joint Commission joint
communique.

fllSB 3/4 U.S.-Iran agreement on technical
cooperation.

tll6 3/6 Kissinger: remarks, Cardiff,
Wales.

*117 3/7 Dominick sworn in as Ambassador
to Switzerland (biographic
data).

tll8 3/7 Kissinger: statement on Tel Aviv
terrorist incident. Mar. 6.

*119 3/7 Bill proposing public corporation
to govern East-West Center
presented to Hawaii legislature.
Mar. 6.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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U.S. government printing office

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^/uc

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXII

No. 1866

March 31, 1975

PRESIDENT FORD'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 6 (EXCERPTS) 397

U.S.-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION MEETS AT WASHINGTON

Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Minister Angary and Texts of

Joint Communique and Technical Cooperation Agreement J4.02

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES GOAL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

TO VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA

Statement by Assistant Secretary Habib 407

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in

the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII. No. 1866
March 31, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIX,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides tlie public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the Wliite House and tlie Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases ol
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information U
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department o/
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field at
international relations are also listed.

President Ford's News Conference of March 6

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news con-
ference held by President Ford in the Old
Executive Office Building on March 6.^

President Ford: Before we start the ques-
tions tonight, I would like to make a state-
ment on the subject of assistance to Cam-
bodia and to Viet-Nam.

There are three issues — the first, the fu-
ture of the people who live there. It is a
concern that is humanitarian — food for those
who hunger and medical supplies for the
men and women and children who are suf-
fering the ravages of war. We seek to stop
the bloodshed and end the horror and the
tragedy that we see on television as rockets
are fired wantonly into Phnom Penh.

I would like to be able to say that the kill-
ing would cease if we were to stop our aid,
but that is not the case. The record shows,
in both Viet-Nam and Cambodia, that Com-
munist takeover of an area does not bring
an end to violence but, on the contrary, sub-
jects the innocent to new horrors.

We cannot meet humanitarian needs unless
we provide some military assistance. Only
through a combination of humanitarian en-
deavors and military aid do we have a chance
to stop the fighting in that country in such
a way as to end the bloodshed.

The second issue is whether the problems
of Indochina will be settled by conquest or
by negotiation. Both the Governments of
Cambodia and the United States have made
vigorous and continued efforts over the last
few years to bring about a cease-fire and a
political settlement.

The Cambodian Government declared a

unilateral cease-fire and called for negotia-
tions immediately after the peace accords
of January 1973. It has since repeatedly ex-
pressed its willingness to be flexible in seek-
ing a negotiated end to the conflict. Its lead-
ers have made clear that they are willing
to do whatever they can do to bring peace
to the country.

The United States has backed these peace
eflForts. Ye-sterday we made public an out-
line of our unceasing efi'orts over the years,
including six separate initiatives since I
became President.-

Let me assure you : We will support any
negotiations and accept any outcome that
the parties themselves will agree to. As far
as the United States is concerned, the per-
sonalities involved will not, them.selves, con-
stitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

Yet all of our efforts have been rebuffed.
Peace in Cambodia has not been prevented
by our failure to offer reasonable solutions.
The aggressor believes it can win its objec-
tives on the battlefield. This belief will be
encouraged if we cut off assistance to our
friends.

We want an end to the killing and a ne-
gotiated settlement. But there is no hope of
success unless the Congress acts quickly to
provide the necessary means for Cambodia
to survive.

If we abandon our allies, we will be say-
ing to all the world that war pays. Aggres-
sion will not stop; rather, it will increase.
In Cambodia the aggressors will have shown
that if negotiations are resisted the United
States will weary, abandon its friends, and
force will prevail.

The third issue is the reliability of the
United States. If we cease to help our friends

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 10.

• See p. 401.

March 31, 1975

397

in Indochina, we will have violated their trust
that we would help them with arms, with
food, and with supplies so long as they re-
main determined to fight for their own fi-ee-
dom. We will have been false to ourselves,
to our word, and to our friends. No one
should think for a moment that we can walk
away from that without a deep sense of
shame.

This is not a question of involvement or
reinvolvement in Indochina. We have ended
our involvement. All American forces have
come home. They will not go back.

Time is short. There are two things the
United States can do to affect the outcome.
For my part, I will continue to seek a ne-
gotiated settlement. I ask the Congress to
do its part by providing the assistance re-
quired to make such a settlement possible.

Time is running out.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated
Press] .

Q. Mr. President, you wound up sajjing,
"Time is running out" in Cambodia. Can you
give us a}iy assurance that even if the aid
is voted it will get there in time? Is it stock-
piled and ready to roll, or ivhat is the situa-
tion?

President Ford: If we don't give the aid,
there is no hope. If we do get the necessary
legislation from the Congress and it comes
quickly — I would say within the next 10
days or 2 weeks — it will be possible to get the
necessary aid to Cambodia, both economic
assistance — humanitarian assistance — and
military assistance. I believe there is a hope
that we can help our friends to continue
long enough to get into the wet season ; then
there will be an opportunity for the kind of
negotiation which I think ofi'ers the best
hope for a peace in Cambodia.

Q. Mr. President, you say that there would
be a deep sense of shame in the country if
Cambodia should fall. If that ivould be the
case, .sir, can you explain ivhy there seems
to be such a broad feeling of apathy in the
country, and also in the Congress, toward

providing any more aid for either Cambodia
or South Viet-Nam?

President Ford: I believe there is a grow-
ing concern which has been accentuated since
we have seen the horror stories on television
in recent weeks — the wanton use of rockets
in the city of Phnom Penh, the children lying
stricken on the streets, and people under
great stress and strain, bloody scenes of the
worst kind.

I think this kind of depicting of a tragedy
there has aroused American concern, and I
think it is a growing concern as the prospect
of tragedy of this kind becomes even more
evident.

So, I have noticed in the last week in the
U.S. Congress, in a bipartisan way, a great
deal more interest in trying to find an an-
swer. And yesterday I spent an hour-plus
with Members of Congi-ess who came back
from a trip to Cambodia and South Viet-
Nam; and they saw firsthand the kind of
killing, the kind of bloodshed; and it had a
severe impact on these Members of Congi-ess,
some of whom have been very, very strongly
opposed to our involvement in the past in
Viet-Nam. And I think their impact will be
significant in the Congress as well as in the
country.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily
News].

Q. Mr. President, the question is raised
by many critics of our policy in Southeast
Asia as to why we can conduct a policy of
detente ivith the tivo Communist superpow-
ers in the world and could not follow a policy
of detente shoidd Cambodia and Soiith Viet-
Nam go Communist. Could you explain that
to us?

Presidott Ford: I think you have to under-
stand the difl:erences that we have with
China, the People's Republic of China, and
with the Soviet Union. We do not accept
their ideology. We do not accept their phi-
losophy. On the other hand, we have to rec-
ognize that both countries have great power
bases in the world, not only in population
but in the regions in which they exist.

398

Department of State Bulletin

We do not expect to recognize or to be-
lieve in their philosophies. But it is impor-
tant for us, the United States, to try and
remove any of the obstacles that keep us
from working together to solve some of the
problems that exist throughout the v^^orld,
including Indochina.

The Soviet Union and the People's Repub-
lic of China have supplied and are supplying
military assistance to South Viet-Nam and
Cambodia. We have to vi'ork with them to
try and get an answer in that part of the
world ; but at the same time, I think that
effort can be increased and the prospects
improved if we continue the detente between
ourselves and both of those powers.

Tom [Tom Brokaw, NBC News].

Q. Mr. President, putting it bhmtly,
wouldn't tve just be continuing a bloodbath
that already exists in Cambodia if we voted
the $222 million in assistance?

President Ford: I don't think so, because
the prospects are that with the kind of mili-
tary assistance and economic and humani-
tarian aid we are proposing, the government
forces, hopefully, can hold out. Now, if we
do not, the prospects are almost certain that
Phnom Penh will be overrun. And we know
from previous experiences that the over-
running of a community or an area results
in the murder and the bloodshed that comes
when they pick up and sort out the people
who were schoolteachers, the leaders, the
government officials.

This was told very dramatically to me yes-
terday by several Members of the Congress
who were there and talked to some of the
people who were in some of these communi-
ties or villages that were overrun.

It is an unbelievable horror story. And
if we can hold out — and I think the prospects
are encouraging — then I think we will avoid
that kind of massacre and innocent murder-
ing of people who really do not deserve that
kind of treatment.

Q. Mr. President, if I may follow up, as I
understayid it, the Administration's point is
that if we vote the aid that we will have the

possibility of a negotiated settlement, not
just the avoidance of a bloodbath. Is that
connect?

President Ford: That is correct, sir.

Q. And yet, just yesterday, as you indi-
cated in your statement, the State Depart-
ment listed at least six unsuccessful efforts
to negotiate an end to the war in Cambodia,
dating to the summer of 197.3, when Amer-
ican bombing stopped there. The Cambodian
Government was certainly stronger then
than it tvould be ivith just conceivably an-
other $220 million.

President Ford: Well, I think if you look
at that long list of bona-fide, legitimate nego-
tiated efforts, the best prospects came when
the enemy felt that it would be better off
to negotiate than to fight.

Now, if we can strengthen the government
forces now and get into the wet season, then
I believe the opportunity to negotiate will be
infinitely better, certainly better than if the
government forces are routed and the rebels
— the Khmer Rouge — take over and do what
they have done in other communities where
they have had this kind of opportunity.

Q. Mr. President, you said, sir, that if
the funds are provided that, hopefully, they
can hold out. How long are you talking
about? How long can they hold out? In
other ivords, hoiv lofig do you feel this aid
will be necessary to continue?

President Ford: Well, this aid that we
have requested on an emergency basis from
the Congress is anticipated to provide the
necessary humanitarian effort and the neces-
sary military effort to get them through the
dry season, which ends roughly the latter
part of June or the first of July.

Q. What effect do you think last night's
massacre in Tel Aviv ivill have on the cur-
rent Kissinger negotiations, and what advice
would you give to Israel to counteract such
terrorist attacks?

President Ford: Let me answer the last

March 31, 1975

399

first. I don't think it is appi'opriate for me
to give any advice to Israel or any other
nation as to what they should do in circum-
stances like that. I hope that the very ill-
advised action — the terrorist action — in
Israel, or in Tel Aviv, last night was abso-
lutely unwarranted under any circumstances.
I condemn it because I think it is not only
inhumane but it is the wrong way to try
and resolve the difficult problems in the Mid-
dle East.

I would hope that that terrorist activity
would not under any circum.stances destroy
the prospects or the possibilities for further
peace accomplishments in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that,
have you considered asking Israel to become
part of NATO?

President Ford: I have not.

Q. Mr. President, you sounded encouraged
about the prospect for Cambodian aid. Can
you give lis an estimate of what you think
the chances are noiv of it being passed?

President Ford: They are certainly better
than they were. I had a meeting this morn-
ing with Senator [John J.] Sparkman and
Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Clif-
ford Case. They want to help. They say the
prospects are 50-50. But if they are that, I
think we ought to try and make the effort
because I think the stakes are very, very
high when you involve the innocent people
who are being killed in Cambodia.

Q. May I follow up? If the Congress does
not provide the aid and the Lon Nol govern-
ment should fall, ivould the country be in
for any recrimination from this Adminis-
tration? Woidd we have another "loho lost
China" debate, for example?

President Fm-d: I first would hope we
get the aid and the government is able to
negotiate a settlement. I do not think — at
least from my point of view — that I would
go around the country pointing my finger at
anybody. I think the facts would speak for
themselves.

Q. Mr. President, from some of the re-

marks the Senators ivho met 7vith you today
made, they did not indicate that they were
quite in as much agreement as you have indi-
cated; but Senator Humphrey, for one,
asked, as part of a negotiated settlement that
you spoke of, if yon ivoidd be rvilling to
seek the orderly resignation of President
Lon Nol.

President Ford: I do not believe it is the
proper role of this government to ask the
head of another state to resign. I said in
my opening statement that we believe that
the settlement ought to be undertaken, and it
is not one that revolves around any one in-
dividual. And I would hope that some for-
mula— some individuals on both sides could
sit down and negotiate a settlement to stop
the bloodshed.

Q. Could I follow up? On that, are you
saying that the United States will support
any government, no matter how weak or
corrupt, in a situatipn like this?

President Ford: I am not saying we would
support any government. I am saying that
we would support any government that we
can see coming out of the present situation
or the negotiated settlement.

Q. Mr. President, out of the OPEC [Orgor-
nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries']
S7immit meeting in Algiers today came a
declaration that oil prices should be pegged
to inflation and the prices they have to pay
for the products they buy. Do you think this
kind of inflation-indexing system is fair?

President Ford: We are trying to organize
the consuming nations, and we have been
quite successful. I believe that once that
organization has been put together — and it
is well along — that we should sit down and
negotiate any matters with the producing
nations.

I personally have many reservations about
the suggestion that has been made by the
OPEC organization. I think the best way
for us to answer that problem is to be orga-
nized and to negotiate rather than to specu-
late in advance.

400

Department of State Bulletin

Summary of Negotiating Efforts
on Cambodia

Department Statement, March 5^

We have made continual and numerous
private attempts, in addition to our numer-
ous public declarations, to demonstrate in
concrete and specific ways our readiness to
see an early compromise settlement in Cam-
bodia.

— Throughout the negotiations that led
to the Paris agreement on Viet-Nam in
January 1973, the United States repeatedly
indicated — both in these negotiations and
through other channels — its desire to see
a cease-fire and political settlement in Cam-
bodia as well as in Viet-Nam and Laos. In
later discussions concerning the implemen-
tation of the Paris agreement, the United
States conveyed its ideas and its desire to
promote a negotiated settlement between the
Cambodian parties.

— A number of major efforts toward ne-
gotiation were made in 1973. By the sum-
mer of that year, these efforts were ex-
tremely promising. Just as they appeared
to be approaching a serious stage they were
thwarted by the forced bombing halt in
August that was legislated by the Congress.

— In October 1974, we broached the idea
of an international conference on Cambodia
with two countries having relations with the
side headed by Prince Sihanouk (GRUNK)
[Royal Khmer Government of National
Union]. We also discussed the elements of
a peaceful settlement. We received no sub-
stantive response to these overtures.

— In November 1974, we again indicated
with specificity our readiness to see a com-
promise settlement in Cambodia in which
all elements could play a role to a govern-

^ Initially distributed to news correspondents on
Mar. 5; also issued as press release 138 dated
Mar. 12.

ment with relations with the GRUNK. Our
interlocutors showed no interest in pursuing
the subject.

— In December 1974, we tried to facilitate
a channel to representatives of the Khmer
Communists through a neutralist country
with relations with the GRUNK. Nothing
came of this initiative.

— In December 1974 and early January
1975, we concurred in an initiative to open
a dialogue with Sihanouk in Peking. Siha-
nouk at first agreed to receive an emissary
but later refused.

— In February 1975, we tried to establish
a direct contact with Sihanouk ourselves. We
received no response.

— Also in February 1975, we apprised cer-
tain friendly governments with clear inter-
ests and concerns in the region, and with ac-
cess to governments supporting the GRUNK,
of our efforts to move the conflict toward a
negotiated solution and of the degree of flex-
ibility in our approach. They could offer no
help.

Unfortunately, none of these attempts
have had any result. The reactions we have
gotten so far suggest that negotiating pros-
spects will be dim as long as the Cambodian
Government's military position remains pre-
carious.

We are continuing to pursue our long-
stated objective of an early compromise set-
tlement in Cambodia. In this process we are,
and have been, guided by the following
principles :

1. The United States will support any
negotiations that the parties themselves are
prepared to support.

2. The United States will accept any out-
come from the negotiations that the parties
themselves will accept.

3. As far as the United States is con-
cerned, the personalities involved will not,
themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind
to a settlement.

March 31, 1975

401

U.S.-lran Joint Commission Meets at Washington

Tlie U.S.-lran Joint Commission met at
Washington March 3-i. Following are re-
marks made by Secretary Kissinger and Hn-
shang Ansary, Minister of Economic Affairs
and Finance of Iran, at a news conference
held on March h at the conclusion of the
meeting, together ivith the te.vts of the joint
communique of the Joint Commission and
the U.S.-lran agreemetit on technical cooper-
ation signed that day by Secretary Kissin-
ger and Minister Ansary.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
AND MINISTER ANSARY i

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Minister, on be-
half of the President and the U.S. Govern-
ment I would like to express our very great
gratification at the agreed minutes and the
technical cooperation agreement that w^e have
just signed.

The economic cooperation agreement be-
tween Iran and the United States that is
foreseen is the largest agreement of this
kind that has been signed between any two
countries. It represents an attempt to under-
line the interdependence to which both of
our countries have been committed, in which
the resources of the producers are combined
with the technological experience of some of
the consuming countries to enhance the de-
velopment and the progress of both sides.

It reflects also the very deep political bonds
that exist between Iran and the United
States.

The economic cooperation agreement fore-
sees projects on the order of $12 billion which

'Text from press release 115 dated Mar. 4, which
also Includes a transcript of the questions and
answers which followed.

will be completed or the negotiation for
which is in the process of being completed
or will be completed in the very near future.

Out of this economic cooperation we expect
that there will develop a trade between the
two countries, excluding oil, over the next
five years in the amount of $15 billion. These
projects will represent a major step forward
in the very vast scheme of development that
Iran has undertaken, and the United States
is happy that it can play its part in this
enterprise. It also reflects the conviction of
both sides that an expanding world economy
is in the interests of progress and peace.

I would like to express our appreciation
to my colleague the cochairman of the Com-
mission for the manner in which the nego-
tiations have been conducted. It was in an
atmosphere of friendship and understanding
and cooperation which we are certain will be
extended in the years to come.

I also would like to express on behalf of
the President how much he's looking forward
to the visit of His Imperial Majesty the
Shah in May.

Minister Ansary: Thank you, Mr. Secre-
tary. May I join you in expressing the grati-
fication and appreciation of the Iranian
team in the talks that we have had in the
course of the past two days in the second
session of our joint ministerial commission
for economic cooperation. We are extremely
pleased on our side that the outcome of these
negotiations is entirely satisfactory to both
sides. We have managed to reach agreement
on the use of the comparative advantages of
the two countries for the benefit not only of
our respective nations but also of the world
at large.

To your remarks, Mr. Secretary, I may
add that Iran is the first major oil-producing

402

Department of State Bulletin

country to go nuclear in a major way, and
one important aspect of the agreement that
we have reached on the areas of cooperation
between the two countries is of course the
readiness that has been expressed in prin-
ciple on the part of the Atomic Energy Or-
ganization of Iran to place orders for a large
number of nuclear power plants in the United
States.

Of the other agreements that we reached,
I think the most important in terms not
only of the development for our relations but
also of the problems facing the world today
is where this cooperation entails the pro-
duction of additional amounts of food and
agricultural products not only for the use of
domestic needs of Iran but also for the region
at large.

This includes also the development of a
center for agricultural technology that would
be used regionally by all the countries con-
cerned.

In addition to this, of course, it is highly
satisfactory to us that, the end result of
economic cooperation being increasing trade,
the amount envisaged in the agreement for
the exchange of commodities between the
two countries in the next five years is a
rather impressive figure of $15 billion that
the Secretary has just mentioned.

May I take the opportunity also, Mr. Sec-
retary, to express my appreciation and sin-
cere thanks for the opportunity that I had
to call on the President this morning and
for his support and encouragement in the
efforts that are being made by the two sides
for the development for our relations.

May I also thank you sincerely for all your
kindness, for your hospitality and for your
warmth, and for the constructive attitude
that at all times was clearly visible on your
personal side, for the attention that you ren-
dered personally to the development of our
negotiations, and for the tremendous con-
tributions of every distinguished member of
your party.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you. I would
like also to point out that all the nuclear

plants are under the safeguards that are
appropriate to signatories of the Nonprolif-
eration Treaty, which of course includes
Iran. And I also would like to underline the
point that my colleague has already made
about the importance we attach to the agri-
cultural development not only for Iran but
on a regional basis, and how much the United
States appreciates the efforts of Iran to use
some of its resources in the field of agricul-
tural development for increasing production
— food production — in the entire region.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 115A dated March 4

The U.S. -Iran Joint Commission completed its
second session in Washington on March 3-4, 1975.
The Iranian Delegation was headed by His Excel-
lency Hushang Ansary, Minister of Economic Affairs
and Finance, and the U.S. Delegation by the Secre-
tary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who are the
co-chairmen of the Commission. Other high officials
of both governments participated in the meeting.
The Joint Commission was established in Novem-
ber 1974 in order to broaden and intensify economic
cooperation and consultation on economic policy
matters.

During his visit Minister Ansary called on Presi-
dent Ford and conveyed to him the personal greet-
ings of His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah
Aryamehr of Iran. In his talks with President Ford
and other American leaders, Minister Ansary dis-
cussed the current world situation and reviewed
bilateral matters in the spirit of mutual respect
and understanding long characteristic of the rela-
tions between Iran and the United States. He met
with members of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives, journalists, and leaders of the American
business community.

The Commission reviewed the work done by its
five joint committees, which had met during January
and February, and approved a large number of
technical cooperation projects and development pro-
grams which had been recommended by the com-
mittees. The Commission concluded that the scope
for cooperation between the two countries for their
mutual benefit was almost unlimited.

In the light of the strong desire on the part of
the two sides to extend areas of mutual coopera-
tion, the Commission set a target of $15 billion in
total non-oil trade between the two countries during
the next five years.

March 31, 1975

403

Major Iranian development projects selected for
cooperation between the two countries include a
series of large nuclear power plants, totaling 8,000
electrical megawatts, with associated water desali-
nation plants; 20 prefabricated housing factories;
100,000 apartments and other housing units; five
hospitals with a total of 3,000 beds; establishment
of an integrated electronics industry; a major port
for handling agricultural commodities and other port
facilities; joint ventures to produce fertilizer, pesti-
cides, farm machinery, and processed foods; super
highways; and vocational training centers. The total
cost of these projects is estimated to reach $12
billion.

The Commission also recognized the special im-
portance of cooperation between the two countries
in the field of petrochemicals, and took note of
major projects under study for joint ventures be-
tween Iran and major companies in the United
States to produce petrochemical intermediates and
finished products for general use in Iran and for
export.

The Commission agreed that a joint business
council could play a very useful role in broadening
contact between the business sectors in both coun-
tries and in facilitating exchange of information
on business opportunities and agreed that such a
council should be established forthwith.

The Commission agreed that long-term investment
from each country in the economy of the other
should be on terms and conditions assuring mutual
benefit, subject to prevailing rules and regulations
in each country. The Commission also agreed on
the importance of public awareness of the nature
and objectives of the investment policies of the
two countries.

The two sides agreed to cooperate actively in the
development of the Iranian capital market and in
the establishment of Iran as a financial center for
the region. It was agreed that a financial confer-
ence should be held in Tehran before the end of the
current year, to which would be invited high officials
of the two governments as well as leaders of bank-
ing, insurance and other financial institutions.

Substantial progress was made toward conclusion
of an Agreement on Cooperation in the Civil Uses
of Atomic Energy. This Agreement will provide for
a broad exchange of information on the application
of atomic energy to peaceful purposes, and for
related tran.sfer of equipment and materials, in-
cluding enriched uranium fuel for Iran's power
reactors.

In order to facilitate exchange of technical spe-
cialists, the two co-chairmen signed a reciprocal
agreement for technical cooperation. Technical co-
operation projects were agreed upon in agriculture.

manpower, science and higher education, and health
ser\'ices.

The Commission agreed to emphasize scientific
programs in the fields of oceanography, seismic
studies, geological and mineral sun-eys, remote
sensing applications, and radio astronomy. In the
field of higher education and advanced study, the
Commission also agreed that the two governments
should increase exchanges and develop a network
of inter-institutional relationships.

The Commission noted that, concurrent with the
meeting of the Commission, agreement in principle
was reached between Iranian and U.S. private in-
terests on projects for production of graphite elec-
trodes, sanitary wares and trailers, and for estab-
lishment of a hotel chain in Iran.

It was agreed to hold the next meeting of the
Joint Commission in Tehran before the end of 1975.

Leader of the Iranian
Delegation

HUSHANG AnSARY

Leader of the United
States Delegation

Henry A. Kissinger

Minister of Economic The Secretary of State

Affairs and Finance

TEXT OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Press release 115B dated March 4

Agreement on Technical Cooperation Between
THE Government of the United States of
America and the Imperial Government of Iran

The Government of the United States of America,
and the Imperial Government of Iran,

Desiring to expand and strengthen their friendly
relations.

Confirming their mutual interest in the expansion
of economic cooperation between the two countries,

Recognizing the importance of technical coopera-
tion for the expansion of economic relations, and

Wishing to create the most appropriate condi-
tions for the development of technical cooperation,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake to develop
technical cooperation, on the basis of mutual respect
for sovereignty and noninterference in each other's
domestic affairs.

Article 2

Technical cooperation as mentioned in Article 1
shall cover a wide variety of economic activities

404

Department of State Bulletin

including industry, agriculture, social affairs, and
the development of infrastructure, and may take
the form of furnishing technical and training serv-
ices, advisory personnel and the supply of related
commodities and facilities, for the implementation of
joint projects, as may be mutually agreed between
the Contracting Parties.

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall adopt mutually
agreeable administrative, organizational and staff
arrangements to facilitate implementation of this
Agreement.

Article 4

The Contracting Parties or their agencies or
Ministries may enter into specific agreements to im-
plement technical cooperation described in Article 2.

Article 5

The implementation agreements described in
Article 4 will contain, inter alia, standard provisions
on:

A. Advance payment, as mutually agreed upon for
costs incurred in the technical cooperation described
in Article 2 including costs of project development,
program implementation, administrative and staff
support and project termination;

B. Privileges and immunities, when applicable, of
personnel assigned to engage in such technical co-
operation in the territoi-y of the other Contracting
Party; and

C. Claims arising from such technical cooperation.

Article 6

When requested by either Contracting Party, rep-
resentatives of both Contracting Parties shall meet
to review progress toward achieving the purposes
of this Agreement, and to negotiate solutions to any
outstanding problems.

Article 7

This Agreement shall be inapplicable to agree-
ments and transactions relating to the sale of de-
fense articles and services by the Government of
the United States to the Imperial Government of
Iran.

Article 8

This Agreement shall enter into force on the
date of an exchange of notes confirming this fact
between the Contracting Parties.

Article 9
This Agreement shall remain in effect for five

years from the date it enters into force, subject to
revision or extension, as mutually agreed, and may
be terminated at any time by either Contracting
Party by one hundred and eighty days' advance
notice in writing.

Done in Washington in duplicate on March 4,
1975, both originals being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of
America:

Henry A. Kissinger.

For the Imperial Government of Iran:

HUSHANG ANSARY.

U.S. and Spain Hold Fourth Session
of Talks on Cooperation

Text of Joint Communique ^

The fourth round of negotiations between
the delegations of Spain and the United
States concerning the 1970 Agreement of
Friendship and Cooperation took place in
Washington from March 10 to 13, 1975. The
Spanish delegation was chaired by the Under
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juan Jose
Rovira, and the American delegation was
headed by Ambassador-at-Large Robert J.
McCloskey.

The conversations in this Round included
further analysis of the first two points of the
agenda agreed upon in November; namely,
the nature of the defense relationship be-
tween Spain and the United States and how
this bilateral relationship could be coordi-
nated more closely with the Western defense
system. Central to the thinking of both
delegations was the concern that whatever
agreement results from these bilateral ne-
gotiations will complement existing security
arrangements in the Atlantic framework and
by so doing will strengthen Western defense
and promote the appropriate relationship
with that system, bearing in mind that all
partners should receive equal treatment.

'Issued on Mar. 13 (text from press release 140).

March 31, 1975

405

The delegations then addressed Item 3 on
the agenda which concerns the status of the
various facilities granted to U.S. forces in
Spain. The Spanish delegation began with
an exposition which assessed the changes
in global defensive strategy which have af-
fected U.S. forces in Spain since the begin-
ning of our bilateral defense relationship in
1953. The Spanish delegation presented its
views on Point 4 regarding the manner in
which Spain's defense needs could be at-
tained. The discussion of these items will
continue during the Fifth Round which will
begin on April 2 in Madrid.

As during past negotiating sessions, the
two delegations were able to agree in prin-
ciple on the value of the relationship which
has tied both countries together for the past
22 years. The benefits of improving this re-
lationship were recognized by both delega-
tions.

The Spanish Ambassador offered a recep-
tion for Ambassador McCloskey and the U.S.
delegation on Sunday, March 9th, and in
return, Ambassador McCloskey offered a
lunch on March 10th at the State Depart-
ment in honor of Under Secretary Rovira
and the Spanish delegation.

U.S. Approves Grant of Rice
for Cambodia

Following is a statement read to news cor-
respondents on March 4 by Robert Anderson,
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press
Relations.

The U.S. Government has today approved
a [Public Law 480] title II rice program of
up to 20,000 metric tons for Cambodia. U.S.
and international voluntary agencies such as
CARE [Cooperative for American Relief
Everywhere], Catholic Relief Services, World
Vision Relief Organization, and the Inter-
national Committee for the Red Cross will
distribute this rice to refugees and other
needy persons. In order to speed the rice
shipments to the refugees, the United States

will transfer title I loan rice currently stored
in Viet-Nam to the title II grant program.
This rice will be airlifted to the Khmer Re-
public as is the title I rice presently in Viet-
Nam.

This action, which has been under con-
sideration by the U.S. Government, is being-
taken now because the Communist dry
season offensive has aggravated the food
supply situation in the Khmer Republic and
has increased the number of affected refu-
gees.

U.S. Deplores Terrorist Incident
in Tel Aviv

Followiyig is a statemeyit by President Ford
issued on March 6, together with a statement
by Secretary Kissinger issued at London that
day.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated March 6

The act of terrorism which occurred last
night at Tel Aviv resulting in the tragic
loss of innocent lives should be strongly de-
plored by everyone. Outrages of this nature
can only damage the cause in whose name
they are perpetrated.

I extend my deepest sympathy, and that of
the American people, to the families of those
persons who have been killed as a result of
this senseless act.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 118 dated March 7

The Secretary deeply regrets the loss of
innocent life in this incident and extends pro-
found sympathy to all those affected.

We deplore all recourse to violence, which
is entirely contrary to all civilized norms
and to the search for a peace which will be
just and lasting for all the peoples of the
area.

406

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Goal of Military Assistance
to Viet-Nam and Cambodia

Statement by Philip C. Habib

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs *

I welcome the opportunity to appear before
you today. The House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee has been a thoughtful and construc-
tive participant in the evolution of U.S.
policy toward East Asia, and it is appro-
priate that early consideration of the new
and difficult situations in Viet-Nam and
Cambodia should take place here. In the
interim since this hearing was originally
scheduled, I visited Indochina briefly, ac-
companying a congressional delegation. I
found the experience illuminating, as I be-
lieve did your colleagues, and I will draw
on my observations there in my testimony
today. My opening remarks will be relatively
brief so that most of our time can be devoted
to your questions.

Two years ago in Paris we concluded an
agreement which we hoped would end the
war in Viet-Nam and pave the way for set-
tlements of the conflicts in Laos and Cam-
bodia. We felt the Paris agreement was fair
to both sides. From the standpoint of the
United States, the agreement in large meas-
ure met what had been our purpose through-
out the long period of our involvement in
Viet-Nam. It established a formula through
which the people of South Viet-Nam could

' Made before the Special Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on Mar. 6. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402.

determine their political future, without out-
side interference. U.S. forces were with-
drawn and our prisoners released. The Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam was left intact,
and the agreement permitted the provision
of necessary military and economic assist-
ance to that government.

The war has not ended in Indochina;
peace has not been restored. Only in Laos
have the contending parties moved from
military confrontation toward a political so-
lution. In Cambodia, the conflict is unabated
In Viet-Nam, after a brief period of relative
quiescence, warfare is again intensive and
the structure established by the Paris agree-
ment for working toward a political settle-
ment is not functioning. This is deeply dis-
appointing, but it is not surprising. The
Paris agreement contained no automatic
self-enforcing mechanisms. Although instru-
ments were established which could have
been effective in restricting subsequent mili-
tary action, the viability of those instru-
ments— and of the agreement itself — de-
pended ultimately on the voluntary adher-
ence of the signatories. Such adherence has
been conspicuously lacking in Hanoi's ap-
proach.

The Communist record in the last two
years, in sharp contrast to that of the GVN
[Government of Viet-Nam] and the United
States, is one of massive and systematic vio-
lations of the agreement's most fundamental
provisions. Hanoi has sent nearly 200,000

March 31, 1975

407

additional ti'oops into South Viet-Nam al-
though the introduction of any new forces
was expressly prohibited by the agreement.
Amply supplied by the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, Hanoi has
tripled the strength of its armor in the
South, sending in more than 400 new ar-
mored vehicles, and has greatly increased its
artillery and antiaircraft weaponry. The
agreement, of course, permitted only a one-
for-one replacement of weapons and mate-
rial. Hanoi has improved and expanded its
logistic system in the South and, drawing
on Soviet and Chinese support, has built up
its armament stockpiles — within the borders
of South Viet-Nam — to levels exceeding even
those which existed just prior to the Easter
offensive of 1972.

Hanoi has employed a rich variety of
tactics to undermine the mechanisms estab-
lished by the agreement for the purpose of
monitoring the cease-fire. It has, for ex-
ample, refused to deploy the jointly manned
military teams which were to oversee the
cease-fire. It has also refused to pay its
share of the support costs for the Inter-
national Commission of Control and Super-
vision, has not allowed the ICCS to station
teams in areas its forces control, and has
prevented, by delay and obfuscation, any
effective investigation of cease-fire viola-
tions.

Hanoi has been similarly obstructive on
the political front, breaking off all political
(and military) negotiations with the GVN,
which were a cornerstone of the agreement.
The South Vietnamese Government has re-
peatedly called for negotiations to be re-
sumed. Hanoi's response — reminiscent of its
position prior to the fall of 1972 — has been
to demand the overthrow of President Thieu
as a precondition to any talks. As you all
know, Hanoi has also failed to cooperate
with us and the GVN in helping to resolve
the status of American and other personnel
who are missing in action.

Finally, Hanoi has applied gradually in-
creasing military pressure, seizing territory
clearly held by the GVN when the agreement
was signed. More recently, beginning last
December 5, Hanoi embarked on a major

new offensive. Since that date it has over-
run six district towns and one provincial
capital and now threatens additional admin-
istrative and population centers.

Through its massive infiltration of men
and equipment since the cease-fire was
signed, Hanoi obviously has the ability to
conduct even more widespread and intensive
actions. Through its systematic sabotage of
the mechanisms set up by the agreement to
monitor violations of the cease-fire and from
the evidence of the past two months, it is
also clear that Hanoi intends to step up its
attacks. The aim of this new offensive clear-
ly is to force additional political concessions
from the GVN and to dictate a political
solution on Hanoi's terms or, if South Viet-
Nam proves unable to resist, to achieve out-
right military victory. In either case
the Paris agreement, and the progress
toward peace which it represented, is grave-
ly threatened.

The South Vietnamese have fought well,
indeed valiantly, against difficult odds. The
GVN still controls most of the territory it
held in January 1973, which of course in-
cludes the vast majority of the South Viet-
namese people, and it has done this without
direct U.S. military involvement and despite
sharply declining levels of U.S. assistance.
But the current North Vietnamese offensive
poses new dangers. Present levels of U.S.
military aid to South Viet-Nam are clearly
inadequate to meet them. We are unable to
replace, on the one-for-one basis permitted
by the agreement, the consumables essential
for South Viet-Nam's defense effort — am-
munition, fuel, spare parts, and medical
supplies. We are unable to provide any re-
placement of major equipment losses — tanks,
trucks, planes, or artillery pieces. Thus,
South Viet-Nam's stockpiles are being drawn
down at a dangerous rate ; and its ability to
successfully withstand further large-scale
North Vietnamese attacks is being eroded.
South Viet-Nam is even now faced with a
harsh choice: to husband its diminishing
resources and face additional battlefield
losses or to use supplies at a rate sufficient
to stem the tide — and risk running out at
an early date.

408

Department of State Bulletin

It is for these reasons that the President
has requested urgent congressional approval
of a $300 million supplemental appropria-
tion for military assistance for Viet-Nam.
This additional amount is the absolute min-
imum required, and it is needed now.

The Paris agreement also contained pro-
visions relating to Laos and Cambodia. The
signatories were enjoined to respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of those
countries and to refrain from using their
territory for military purposes. South Viet-
Nam and the United States have abided by
these strictures. Hanoi has not. North Viet-
Nam continues to use the territory of Laos
to send forces and war material to South
Viet-Nam and continues to station troops
in remote areas of that country. Neverthe-
less the contending Laotian parties were able
to establish a cease-fire — which is only in-
frequently broken — and to form a Provi-
sional Government of National Union.

As a result of these encouraging develop-
ments, our military presence in Laos has
been withdrawn (except of course for the
normal Defense attache office as part of our
diplomatic establishment) and we have been
able to reduce our military assistance to an
enormous degree. For example, during the
last fiscal year of widespread combat, fiscal
year 1973, U.S. military aid amounted to
$360 million. For fiscal year 1975, the figure
is $30 million.

Unfortunately, a similar evolution has not
occurred in Cambodia. North Viet-Nam con-
tinues to use the territory of Cambodia to
support its military operations in South
Viet-Nam and in addition gives material
assistance and advice in the military opera-
tions of Cambodian Communist forces. We
do not contend that Hanoi is the sole motive
force for the Cambodian insurgency. How-
ever, in its support and encouragement of
that conflict as well as in its own flagrant
abuse of Cambodian territory, Hanoi bears
a large measure of responsibility for the
continuation of the fighting there. That
fighting has recently intensified. Since Jan-
uary 1, Communist forces have stepped up
their attacks in the area near Phnom Penh.
At the same time they have increased their

pressure along the Mekong River between
Phnom Penh and the South Vietnamese
border, the capital's main supply route.
Cambodian forces have fought well, but they
are stretched thin in attempting to combat
this two-pronged off'ensive. And despite
stringent economies their supplies of ammu-
nition and fuel are dangerously low.

The intensified Communist attacks have
taken a heavy human toll, evident in even a
short visit to that country. Casualties are
running at more than 1,000 a day for both
sides — killed, wounded, and missing — and
the stricken economic life of Cambodia is
further weakened. At least 60,000 new ref-
ugees have been created, posing additional
strain on the resources and the administra-
tive capacity of the government.

The Cambodian Government does not seek
an end to the conflict through conclusive
military victory. Nor, however, does it wish
it to end in military victory by Communist
forces. The only logical and fair solution
is one involving negotiations and a compro-
mise settlement. To this end we welcomed
the resolution, sponsored by Cambodia's
neighbors and adopted by the last U.N.
General Assembly, calling for early negotia-
tions. The Cambodian Government has re-
peatedly expressed its readiness to negotiate,
without preconditions and with any inter-
locutor the other side may choose. We fully
support that position and have pledged to
do our utmost to facilitate such talks.

As you are aware, we have recently docu-
mented the eff'orts the United States has
already made to promote a negotiated settle-
ment in Cambodia — in 1973-74 and as re-
cently as February of this year.- Those
eff'orts, which included attempts to establish
direct contact with the Communists and
Sihanouk, have thus far been futile. The
Cambodian Communists have been adamant-
ly opposed to a negotiated settlement, and
we believe their attitude is unlikely to change
unless and until they conclude that military
victory is not possible. The first imperative,
therefore, and the aim of our military assist-

■See p. 401.

March 31, 1975

409

ance program in Cambodia is to maintain
a military balance and thereby to promote
negotiations.

Restrictions on our military and economic
aid contained in the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1974 make it impossible to accomplish
that goal. Both the $200 million ceiling on
military assistance and the $75 million draw-
down authorized from Department of De-
fense stocks have been largely exhausted as
a result of significantly intensified Commu-
nist offensive actions. In addition, Cam-
bodia also faces a serious impending food
shortage. Therefore, to meet the minimum
requirements for the survival of the Khmer
Republic, the President has asked the Con-
gress to provide on an urgent basis an
additional $222 million in military aid for
Cambodia and to eliminate the $200 million
ceiling. He has also asked that the $377
million ceiling on overall assistance be re-
moved, or at least that Public Law 480 food
be exempted from the ceiling.

In Viet-Nam we seek to restore the rough
military balance, now threatened by North
Vietnamese action, which permitted the
progress toward peace represented by the
Paris agreement and without which further
progress toward a lasting political solution
is unlikely to be found. Despite Hanoi's
flagrant violation of the Paris agreement,
we believe it remains a potentially workable
framework for an overall settlement and it
must be preserved. By redressing the de-
teriorating military situation in South Viet-
Nam our hope is that the momentum can
once again be shifted from warfare toward
negotiations among the Vietnamese parties.
In Cambodia also, only by maintaining the
defensive capability of government forces
can conditions be established which will per-
mit negotiations to take place.

For neither Viet-Nam nor Cambodia is
the provision of additional aid the harbinger
of a new and open-ended commitment for
the United States. Our i-ecord in Indochina
supports rather than contradicts that asser-
tion. We worked successfully with the South
Vietnamese in reducing and eventually elim-
inating our own direct military role, and

subsequently with both the South Vietnam-
ese and Cambodian Governments in achiev-
ing maximum economies and maximum
impact from our aid. Those efforts will
continue.

In previous testimony before this and
other committees of the Congress in behalf
of assistance for Indochina, I and other
Administration witnesses have attempted to
relate our policies and our programs there
to the broader purposes of the United States
in the world. For despite the agony of this
nation's experience in Indochina and the
substantial reappraisal which has taken
place concerning our proper role there, Indo-
china remains relevant to those broader for-
eign policy concerns. We no longer see the
security of the United States as directly,
immediately at issue. Nonetheless it remains
true that failure to sustain our purposes in
Indochina would have a corrosive effect on
our ability to conduct effective diplomacy
worldwide. Our readiness to see through to
an orderly conclusion the obligations we un-
dertook in Indochina cannot fail to influence
other nations' estimates of our stamina and
our determination. Thus we cannot isolate
the situation in Indochina from our other
and broader interests in this increasingly
interdependent world. To now weaken in
our resolve would have consequences inimi-
cal to those interests.

Finally, we cannot ignore another aspect
of our policy toward Indochina. In entering
into the Paris agreement, we in effect told
South Viet-Nam that we would no longer
defend that country with U.S. forces but
that we would give it the means to defend
itself. The South Vietnamese have carried
on impressively, as have our friends in Cam-
bodia, in the face of extreme difficulty. I do
not believe that we can walk away. Measured
against the sacrifices which we, and the
people of Indochina, have already offered,
the amounts which are now being requested
are not large. Nor, even in this time of
economic constraint, are they beyond our
ability to provide. They are, however, vital
to the restoration of conditions which can
lead to lasting peace in Indochina.

410

Department of State Bulletin

Department Discusses Situation
in Portugal

Following is a statement by Bruce Laingen,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on
Inter-national Political and Military Affairs
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on March IJ^.^

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before you and to discuss with you and your
colleagues the current situation in Portugal
and our interests there. Events of recent days
have dramatized again the complex period
of transition now facing Portugal, a proc-
ess that all Americans view with both sym-
pathy and concern.

Portugal is an old and valued friend with
whose people Americans have close and
friendly ties and whose people throughout
our hi.story have made their own unique
contribution to our society. It is a country
with whom we share many fundamental cul-
tural values. It is an important NATO ally
faced today with a staggering array of eco-
nomic and political difficulties.

Portugal's history, culture, and economy
are bound up inextricably with Western
Europe and the Atlantic community. We have
a strong interest in Portugal remaining true
to this heritage at the same time as it
quite naturally seeks to reaffirm and strength-
en with many other parts of the world the
historic associations which a dynamic Portu-
guese people have developed over their long
history.

The United States has an obvious interest
in NATO and therefore an interest in keeping
Portugal's ti-aditional ties to the Atlantic
community strong. We wish to encourage
Portugal, as a founding member of NATO,
to continue its role in Western defense

Since the armed forces overthrew the au-
thoritarian Caetano government on April
25 last year, Portugal has seen events of far-

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.' Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

reaching consequence in many fields. By call-
ing for constituent assembly elections, in-
viting a wide range of parties to participate,
and promising the establishment of democ-
racy, the provisional government has sought
to try to bridge the philosophical gap which
divided its predecessors from the majority
view of its NATO partners. In Africa, five
centuries of colonial role are being brought
to an end. By the end of this year, all of
the Portuguese territories in Africa will be
fully independent: Mozambique on June 25;
the Cape Verde Islands on July 5 ; Sao Tome
and Principe on July 12 ; and Angola on No-
vember 11. Guinea-Bissau became independ-
ent last September. This policy of swift
and peaceful transition of power in Africa
has been pursued vigorously despite serious
economic costs to the homeland. In the after-
math of President Spinola's forced resig-
nation on September 28, 1974, military par-
ticipation in the Cabinet was increased, al-
though the triparty (Communists, Socialists,
Popular Democrats) coalition in the pro-
visional government remained intact.

Portugal's announced intention to build
democratic institutions will continue to have
our support. We prescribe no models for
Portugal. Our interest is no more and no
less than the preservation of an atmosphere
in which the free will of the Poi'tuguese peo-
ple can be expressed.

For that reason we have welcomed the
steps taken by the provisional government
to develop a schedule of elections. This proc-
ess is to begin on April 12, when the people
of Portugal choose delegates for a constitu-
ent assembly to draft a future constitution,
and is expected to culminate later this year
in elections for a legislature and a President.
The April election will be the first formal
test of the relative appeal of the difi'erent
political parties now on the scene. The larg-
est appear to be the Socialists, the Commu-
nist-front Portuguese Democratic Movement,
the Communists, the Popular Democrats, and
the Christian Democrats/Center Social Dem-
ocrats.

The strongest political element in Portugal
today is the Armed Forces Movement itself.

March 31, 1975

411

which overthrew the Caetano government
last April and which has guided the develop-
ment of the country's economy and political
process since that time. The Movement is
on record as favoring broad participation in
free institutions of government, while em-
phasizing its intention to continue to guide
the course of political events through a
process of "institutionalization." That proc-
ess, meaning the role that the military will
continue to play in Portuguese politics, has
until the recent abortive coup been under
active discussion between the Movement and
the principal political groups now on the
scene. One effect of this coup attempt in
all likelihood will be to involve the Armed
Forces Movement for a much longer time and
more decisively in the political process than
might otherwise have been the case.

To reemphasize, we support Portugal's
own stated policy of transition to democratic
processes of government. We have made that
position consistently and firmly clear in all
our contacts with the present Portuguese
leadership, and we will continue to do so.

The economic assistance which the Con-
gress has appropriated is a further demon-
stration of U.S. support and has been warmly
welcomed by the Portuguese leadership. We
will maintain close contact with the Congress
on the question of future economic assist-
ance. We regard the assistance not as a per-
manent feature of our foreign policy toward
Portugal but, rather, as a way of demon-
strating our desire to help a close friend
and ally struggling with problems of eco-
nomic and .social transition.

For the current fiscal year, the Congress
has authorized a $25 million program of
economic assistance to Portugal and to its
present and former African territories. Of
that amount, $10 million was appropriated
under the continuing resolution which ex-
pired February 28. On the basis of that ap-
propriation, we have signed with the Portu-
guese Government two agreements totaling
$1.75 million: a $1 million loan for feasibil-
ity studies and $.75 million for grant techni-

cal assistance to provide needed consultants
and training to the Portuguese. We also are
prepared to authorize, subject to renewal
of the continuing resolution, a $7 million low-
cost-housing loan and $1.25 million for as-
sistance to the African territories. Our ex-
pectation is that most of this will go to the
Cape Verde Islands. We have also announced
a $20 million low-cost-housing investment
guarantee.

In the expectation that the full $25 million
will be appropriated, we have been dis-
cussing in general terms with the Portuguese
assistance in such additional areas as the
construction of prefabricated schools, grain
storage facilities, support for the water and
sewage systems of Lisbon, and constructioi
assistance at the new University of Lisbon.
The Portuguese have also indicated their
interest in technical assistance in the areas
of education, health, agriculture, and trans-
portation. We believe that assistance in these
areas reflects both the desires of the Por-
tuguese themselves and the expressed in-
terest of the American Congress and people
in tangible support for the efforts of the
Portuguese themselves to strengthen their
economy. With the cooperation of the Con-
gress, we hope to move ahead with this
program of economic assistance.

Let me finally touch briefly on the abor-
tive coup d'etat that took place this week in
Lisbon. The facts on this development are
not entirely in, but it is generally assumed
to have been inspired by concern over ex-
cessive leftist influence in the Armed Forces
Movement. In the process the ex-President,
General Spinola, sought refuge in Spain,
giving rise to a general assumption in Por-
tugal that he was involved, although that
remains unclear. In any event, the coup at-
tempt was small in scale and easily put
down and all of the principal political parties
have since issued statements condemning it
as antidemocratic and a serious threat to
the electoral process. The Armed Forces
Movement itself has announced a reorga-
nization, including the immediate establish-

412

Deportment of State Bulletin

ment of a Council of the Revolution with
broad executive and legislative powers.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have seen
reference to totally irresponsible statements
to the effect that the United States was some-
how involved in this attempted coup and the
even more regrettable statement that because
of Ambassador [Frank C] Carlucci's al-
leged role, his safety in Portugal could not
be assured.

For the record, I want our position to be
unmistakably clear. As the Department's
press spokesman said on March 12, the
United States — and that obviously includes
Ambassador Carlucci — had absolutely no in-
volvement in this affair. Any suggestions to
the contrary are malicious and contrary to
the facts. As to the safety of Ambassador
Carlucci, we have made clear to both the
Portuguese Ambassador here and the gov-
ernment in Lisbon that we expect that gov-
ernment to take every step necessary to in-
sure that nothing adversely affects the safety
of our Ambassador and his entire Mission.
I am glad to say that we have received the
assurance we have requested.

We have also reaffirmed, in the aftermath
of this aborted coup, that we continue to
welcome the prospects of free elections in
Portugal and would naturally regret any de-
velopment, from whatever quarter, that
would in any way interrupt this trend. In
this connection, we have noted the Portu-
guese Government's reiteration of its in-
tention to hold to the schedule of an election
campaign beginning March 20, leading to
constituent assembly elections on April 12.

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the outset of
my statement, these events of recent days
have quite naturally raised questions anew
as to the direction Portugal is going. Frankly,
we do not have all of the answers. After
nearly 50 years of authoritarian rule and a
decade and a half of political, economic, and
military tension over issues of decolonization,
it is not surprising that this transition period
is a difficult one. Quite clearly, this is a time
for both sympathy and sensitivity on the

part of all outside observers. I think I ex-
press, however, both the hope and the con-
fidence of the American Government and
people that this transition period will be
securely navigated and that the end result
will be a strengthening of the ties that
have for so long bound our two countries
together.

President Ford Vetoes Bill
Concerning Oil Import Fees

Message to the House of Representatives : *

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning H.R. 1767 without my ap-
proval. The purpose.s of this Act were to
suspend for a ninety-day period the author-
ity of the President under section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 or any
other provision of law to increase tariffs, or
to take any other import adjustment action,
with respect to petroleum or products de-
rived therefrom ; to negate any such action
which may be taken by the President after
January 15, 1975, and before the beginning
of such ninety-day period.

I was deeply disappointed that the first
action by the Congress on my comprehensive
energy and economic programs did nothing
positive to meet America's serious problems.
Nor did it deal with the hard questions that
must be resolved if we are to carry out our
responsibilities to the American people.

If this Act became law, it would indicate
to the American people that their Congress,
when faced with hard decisions, acted nega-
tively rather than positively.

That course is unacceptable. Recent his-
tory has demonstrated the threat to Amer-
ica's security and economy caused by our
significant and growing reliance on imported
petroleum.

' Transmitted on Mar. 4 (text from Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 10).

March 31, 1975

413

Some understandable questions liave been
raised since my program was announced in
January. I am now convinced that it is pos-
sible to achieve my import goals while re-
ducing the problems of adjustment to higher
energy prices. Accordingly:

— I have directed the Administrator of the
Federal Energy Administration to use exist-
ing legal authorities to adjust the price in-
creases for petroleum products so that the
added costs of the import fees will be equita-
bly distributed between gasoline prices and
the prices for other petroleum products, such
as heating oil. These adjustments for gaso-
line will not be permanent, and will be
phased out.

— To assist farmers, I am proposing a
further tax measure that will rebate all of
the increased fuel costs from the new import
fees for off-road farm use. This particular
rebate program will also be phased out. This
proposal, which would be retroactive to the
date of the new import fee schedule, will
substantially lessen the adverse economic im-
pact on agricultural production, and will re-
duce price increases in agricultural products.

These actions will ease the adjustment to
my conservation program in critical sectors
of the Nation while still achieving the neces-
sary savings in petroleum imports.

Some have criticized the impact of my
program and called for delay. But the higher
costs of the added import fees would be more
than offset for most families and businesses
if Congress acted on the tax cuts and rebates
I proposed as part of my comprehensive
energy program.

The costs of failure to act can be profound.
Delaying enactment of my comprehensive
program will result in spending nearly $2.5
billion more on petroleum imports this year
alone.

If we do nothing, in two or three years
we may have doubled our vulnerability to a
future oil embargo. The effects of a future
oil embargo by foreign suppliers would be
infinitely more drastic than the one we ex-
perienced last winter. And rising imports

will continue to export jobs that are sorely i
needed at home, will drain our dollars into
foreign hands and will lead to much worse
economic troubles than we have now.

Our present economic difficulty demands
action. But it is no excuse for delaying an
energy program. Our economic troubles came
about partly because we have had no energy
program to lessen our dependence on ex-
pensive foreign oil.

The Nation deserves better than this. I
will do all within my power to work with the
Congress so the people may have a solution
and not merely a delay.

In my State of the Union Message, I in-
formed the Congress that this country re-
quired an immediate Federal income tax cut
to revive the economy and reduce unemploy-
ment.

I requested a comprehensive program of
legislative action against recession, inflation
and energy dependence. I asked the Congress
to act in 90 days.

In that context, I also used the stand-by
authority the Congress had provided to ap-
ply an additional dollar-a-barrel import fee
on most foreign oil coming into the United
States, starting February 1 and increasing
in March and April.

I wanted an immediate first step toward
energy conservation — the only step so far to
reduce oil imports and the loss of American
dollars. I also wanted to prompt action by
Congress on the broad program I requested.

The Congress initially responded by adopt-
ing H.R. 1767 to take away Presidential
authority to impose import fees on foreign
oil for 90 days.

Although I am vetoing H.R. 1767 for the
reasons stated, I meant what I said about
cooperation and compromise. The Congress
now pledges action. I offer the Congress
reasonable time for such action. I want to
avoid a futile confrontation which helps
neither unemployed nor employed Amer-
icans.

The most important business before us
after 50 days of debate remains the simple
but substantial tax refund I requested for

414

Department of State Bulletin

,ndividuals and job-creating credits to farm-
ers and businessmen. This economic stimu-
lant is essential.

Last Friday, the majority leaders of the
Senate and House asked me to delay sched-
uled increases in the import fees on foreign
oil for 60 days while they work out the
specifics of an energy policy they have joint-
ly produced. Their policy blueprint differs
considerably from my energy program as
well as from the energy legislation now
being considered by the House Committee on
Ways and Means.

I welcome such initiative in the Congress
and agree to a deferral until May 1, 1975.
The important thing is that the Congress is
finally moving on our urgent national energy
problem. I am, therefore, amending my proc-
lamation to postpone the effect of the sched-
uled increases for two months while holding
firm to the principles I have stated. It is
also my intention not to submit a plan for
decontrol of old domestic oil before May 1.

I hope the House and Senate will have
agreed to a workable and comprehensive
national energy legislation.

But we must use every day of those two
months to develop and adopt an energy pro-
gram. Also, I seek a legislative climate for
immediate action on the tax reductions I
have requested. It is my fervent wish that
we can now move from points of conflict to
areas of agreement.

I will do nothing to delay the speedy en-
actment by the Congress of straightforward
income tax cuts and credits by the end of
this month.

Under present conditions, any delay in
rebating dollars to consumers and letting
businessmen and farmers expand, modern-
ize and create more jobs is intolerable.

I do not believe the Congress will en-
danger the future of all Americans. I am
confident that the legislative branch will
work with me in the Nation's highest in-
terests.

What we need now is a simple tax cut and
then a comprehensive energy plan to end our
dependence on foreign oil.

What we don't need is a time-wasting test
of strength between the Congress and the
President. What we do need is a shoiv of
strength that the United States government
can act decisively and with dispatch.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, March 4, 1975.

U.S. Alternate Governor of IBRD
and International Banks Confirmed

The Senate on February 19 confirmed the
nomination of Charles W. Robinson to be
U.S. Alternate Governor of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
for a term of five years, U.S. Alternate Gov-
ernor of the Inter-American Development
Bank for a term of five years and until his
successor has been appointed, and U.S. Alter-
nate Governor of the Asian Development
Bank.

March 31, 1975

415

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.N. Calls for Resumption of Cyprus Negotiations

Following are statements made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative John
Scali on February 27 and March 12, together
with the text of a resolution adopted by the
Council on March 12.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI, FEB. 27

USUN press release 15 dated February 27

The Council meets today to consider how
to revive and encourage movement toward
peace on Cyprus. To date, progress toward
this goal has not met the hopes and expecta-
tions of this Council when it endorsed the
talks between the two communities on the
island two months ago.

The efforts on Cyprus to achieve a mutu-
ally acceptable settlement are essentially the
responsibility of the parties themselves.
Nevertheless the Security Council has had
an important interest in encouraging them.
Thus, in July of last year, following the out-
break of fighting on the island, this Council
achieved a cease-fire, created a framework
for negotiations at Geneva, and established
principles to guide these talks. In August,
following the breakdown of these negotia-
tions, the Council endorsed contacts between
representatives of the two communities under
the auspices of the Secretary General and
his representative. We urged that those ne-
gotiations deal not only with immediate
humanitarian issues but with political prob-
lems as well.

In November, the General Assembly in
Resolution 3212 commended the discussions
between the representatives of the two com-
munities and called for their continuation
with a view to reaching freely a mutually
acceptable political settlement. The Assembly

416

emphasized that the future constitutional
system of Cyprus is the concern of the two
communities. The Security Council endorsed
this General Assembly resolution in Decem
ber. Finally, throughout the period in which
these talks have been conducted, the Secre
tary General, through his able representa
five in Nicosia, Ambassador [Luis] Weck-
mann-Munoz, has provided every encourage-
ment for their success.

These actions provide the basis for our
consideration of the present situation in
Cyprus. Having seen established a frame-
work in which a negotiated settlement is
possible, we regret any unilateral action such
as the announcement of a federal Turkish
state on Cyprus, which complicates the
Fearch for a resolution.

Thus, my government stated on February
13 that:

The United States regrets the action that has been
announced today. We support the sovereignty, inde-
pendence, and territorial integrity of the Republic
of Cyprus and have sought to discourage unilateral
actions by either side that would complicate efforts
to achieve a peaceful settlement. We believe that
any eventual solution to the CjTJrus problem must
be found through a process of negotiation, a process
which has been underway.^

P(

' The statement issued by the Department of State
on Feb. 13 continued as follows:

We have fully supported this process and were
instrumental in reestablishing the [Glafcos] Cleri-
des-[Rauf] Denktash talks, which we continue to
support. We had also hoped that we could give addi-
tional impetus to the negotiations by meetings be-
tween Secretary Kissinger and interested parties
during his present Middle Eastern trip. Regrettably,
however, events in recent weeks have made it im-
possible for these meetings to go forward as pre-
viously planned and have clearly reduced our ability
to influence the outcome. Nevertheless the United
States will continue to do its utmost to further the
process of negotiation.

Department of Stale Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger added on the same
day that the "United States continues to rec-
ognize the Government of Cyprus as the
legitimate Government of Cyprus" and that
"the United States will make every effort
to encourage a peaceful solution." -

We believe the Secretary General and his
representative on Cyprus have played and
ontinue to play a significant role in facili-
tating the efforts of those directly concerned
to achieve a peaceful settlement. We are
especially encouraged to note from the Sec-
retary General's statement of February 21
10 the Council that he is prepared to facili-
tate the continuation of the talks under new
conditions and procedures. This provides
egitimate hope for further progress. We
arge the Governments of Greece and Turkey
— two allies whom we value — and the Re-
jublic of Cyprus — with which we have had
i long and friendly relationship — to respond
jositively to the timely initiative of the Sec-
•etary General.

In our deliberations thus far, we have
)een impressed with the serious character
)f the debate which reflects a sober under-
;tanding of the complexity and delicacy of
he problems which confront the parties
md the Council.

The discussion in this chamber has gone
'orward in an atmosphere which demon-
strates recognition of the vital fact that
-here is no substitute for a realistic dialogue
A'hen the Security Council deals with the
;ritical problem of international peace and
security.

- The following statement by Secretary Kissinger
was issued at Jerusalem on Feb. 13:

The Department of State has today issued a state-
ment regretting the establishment of a Turkish
Cypriot federated state by unilateral action. I would
like to add to this statement that the United States
;ontinues to recognize the Government of Cyprus as
the legitimate Government of Cyprus and remains
iiommitted to the sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of Cyprus. The United States
has tried to encourage a peaceful negotiated settle-
ment and was instrumental in bringing about the
Slerides-Denktash talks. We regret some temporary
interruption in these talks.

We would like to stress that it is in the interest
Df all parties — two allies whom we value — to return
to the path of negotiation. The United States will
make every effort to encourage a peaceful solution
md to enable all parties to find a solution based on
justice and dignity and self-respect.

Informal consultations are being actively
pursued in the search for a resolution which
will encourage and further the settlement
process. The members of this Council can be
assured that the United States is prepared
to cooperate constructively in the efforts to
negotiate and formulate a resolution accept-
able both to members of the Council and to
the parties concerned.

I wish to reaffirm emphatically that the
interest of the United States is in a peaceful
negotiated solution guided by the principles
enunciated in this Council and in the Gen-
eral Assembly and based on justice, dignity,
and self-respect. We believe that such a so-
lution can only be achieved by free negoti-
ations between the parties, not by dictation
from the outside. We call on all concerned
to reaffirm their commitment to this ap-
proach and to rededicate themselves to such
a solution.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI, MARCH 12

USUN press release 21 dated March 12

My delegation joined in approving Reso-
lution 367 because from the outset we firmly
believed that the primary goal of the Secu-
rity Council should be to encourage the re-
sumption of talks between the two commu-
nities in Cyprus. Along with members of
this Council, other governments, and the
Secretary General, Secretary of State Kis-
singer devoted his personal efforts to con-
tribute to this objective.

Nearly a month ago, when our delibera-
tions began, a broad chasm separated the
parties. In the course of these strenuous con-
sultations, this chasm has narrowed but has
not been bridged completely. However, when
this was clear, eight delegations representing
a broad spectrum of the Council member-
ship, acting in cooperation with the Secretary
General, worked out a constructive compro-
mise. We all owe a deep debt of gratitude
to these eight delegations for their imagina-
tive, constructive, and courageous drafting
of yesterday which produced the positive
result before us.

All of us at this table can take satisfaction

^arch 31, 1975

417

in the seriousness and the sense of responsi-
bility which have generally characterized the
Council's efforts in the weeks just past. The
outcome, I believe, is a victory of patience
and reason and compromise over confronta-
tion.

As is frequently the case when an attempt
is made to bridge the gap between strongly
held views of contending parties, none of
the parties may be entirely satisfied with
our result. This is natural. At the same time,
no one has suffered a defeat.

We urge the parties to respond positively
and cooperatively to the initiatives the Sec-
retary General must take in pursuance of
today's resolution.

It now becomes the duty of each of us and
of the governments we represent to do our
utmost to help realize the progress which is
represented in the resolution we have passed.
We shall fulfill this duty by doing whatever
we can to promote the resumption of talks
between the communities — talks looking to a
peaceful resolution of the conflicts that have
afflicted the people of Cyprus during this
generation.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 3

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus in
response to the complaint submitted by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus,

Having heard the report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral and the statements made by the parties con-
cerned,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the crisis
in Cyprus,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular
resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which
it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212
(XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974,

Noting the absence of progress towards implemen-
tation of its resolutions,

1. Calls once more on all States to respect the
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and ur-
gently requests them, as well as the parties con-
cerned, to refrain from any action which might

^U.N. doc. S/RES/367 (1975); adopted by the
Council on Mar. 12 without a vote.

418

prejudice that sovereignty, independence, territoria
integrity and non-alignment, as well as from any at
tempt at partition of the island or its unificatioi
with any other country;

2. Regrets the unilateral decision of 13 Februar;
1975 declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprui
would become "a Federated Turkish State" as
inter alia, tending to compromise the continuatioi
of negotiations between the representatives of thi
two communities on an equal footing, the objectivi
of which must continue to be to reach freely a solu
tion providing for a political settlement and thi
establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutiona
arrangement, and expresses its concern over al
unilateral actions by the parties which have com
promised or may compromise the implementatioi
of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

3. Affirms that the decision referred to in para
graph 2 above does not prejudge the final politica
settlement of the problem of Cyprus and takes not
of the declaration that this was not its intention

4. Calls for the urgent and effective implementa
tion of all parts and provisions of General Assembl;
resolution 3212 (XXIX), endorsed by Security Coun
cil resolution 365 (1974);

5. Considers that new efforts should be under
taken to assist the resumption of the negotiation
referred to in paragraph 4 of General Assembl
resolution 3212 (XXIX) between the representa
tives of the two communities;

6. Requests the Secretary-General accordingly t
undertake a new mission of good offices and to tha
end to convene the parties under new agreed pro
cedures and place himself personally at their dis
posal, so that the resumption, the intensificatio
and the progress of comprehensive negotiations!
carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understandin:j
and of moderation under his personal auspices an;
with his direction as appropriate, might thereby b
facilitated;

7. Calls on the representatives of the two com
munities to co-operate closely with the Secretary
General in the discharge of this new mission o
good offices and asks them to accord personally i'
high priority to their negotiations;

8. Calls on all the parties concerned to refraii^
from any action which might jeopardize the nego 1
tiations between the representatives of the twiJ
communities and to take steps which will facilitatf
the creation of the climate necessary for the succes;
of those negotiations;

9. Requests the Seci-etary-General to keep th<
Security Council informed of the progress madt
towards the implementation of resolution 365 (1974)
and of this resolution and to report to it whenevei
he considers it appropriate and, in any case, before
15 June 1975;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter,

Department of State Bulletin

:l

United States Presents Guidelines for Remote Sensing
of the Natural Environment From Outer Space

The Legal Subcommittee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space met at U.N. Headquarters
February 10-March 7. Following is a state-
ment made in the subcommittee on February
19 by U.S. Representative Ronald F. Stoive,
who is Department of State Assistant Legal
Adviser for United Nations Affairs, together
with the text of a U.S. working paper.

STATEMENT BY MR. STOWE

USUN press release 10 dated February 19

I appreciate this opportunity to share with
the Legal Subcommittee the views of my
government on the legal aspects of remote
sensing of the natural environment of the
Earth from outer space. Diverse positions
on this subject have been expressed during
the past year by a number of states in this
subcommittee, in the General Assembly de-
bates, in the full Outer Space Committee,
and in the Working Group on Remote Sens-
ing. In addition, we have before us now two
draft texts, one introduced by Brazil and
Argentina and the other introduced by
France and the Soviet Union.

The United States has a number of views
rather different from those reflected in either
of those drafts, particularly with regard
to the present state of international law
relating to remote sensing, to the types of
problems which may remain to be resolved,
and above all, to the approach which the
international community should take toward
sensing of the natural environment in the
future. I would like to summarize the views
of the United States, to comment on a num-

ber of the issues which have been raised
by others, and to propose an alternative
conclusion which this subcommittee might
reach in its report to the Outer Space Com-
mittee. I would also recall the statement
given to the Working Group on Remote
Sensing by Leonard Jaffe, the U.S. Repre-
sentative to the third session of that work-
ing group, last February 25. ^ Copies of that
statement are available for any interested
delegations.

A preliminary question which can and
should be resolved with relative ease is, in
short: What are we talking about when we
use the term "remote sensing" in these discus-
sions? The United States, having launched
the remote sensing experiments from which
practical experience and data are currently
available to the international community,
initially spoke of remote sensing in terms
of Earth resources technology. However,
both the sensing capabilities of the experi-
ments undertaken and the experience we
have gained in the last two years have con-
vinced us that reference only to natural re-
sources is inadequate.

A more appropriate and meaningful def-
inition of "remote sensing" would also in-
clude environmental factors, and hence we
should speak of remote sensing of the nat-
ural environment of the Earth. This term
seems more useful for several reasons. First,
the experiments which we have undertaken
through what were called ERTS-1 [Earth
Resources Technology Satellite] and ERTS-
B, now renamed Landsat 1 and 2, reveal that

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1974, p. 376.

March 31, 1975

419

equally as important as potential resource
identification from outer space are the pos-
sibilities for land use analysis, mapping,
water quality studies, disaster relief, air and
water pollution detection and analysis, pro-
tection and preservation of the environment,
and many others. To address only one of
these potential uses is misleading. All states,
including especially developing countries,
have broad and sometimes urgent interests
in all of these uses.

To refer only to data about resources is
also technically unrealistic, because the same
data base which gives information about re-
sources gives information about all of these
other uses I have mentioned and more. To
inhibit access to data about one potential
use is to inhibit access to data about all
other such uses. The data interpretation
which takes place here on the ground after
the data are received from the satellite de-
termines the types of information which
will be elicited. There are no data from these
satellites which are peculiar to or which can
be restricted to Earth resources.

The concerns which some states feel about
their natural resources are evident and
should be addressed in our discussions. How-
ever, if we are to attempt to analyze the
legal aspects of such remote sensing, our fo-
cus and our attention must be broader than
just one particular element of that sensing.
It is our belief that reference to the concept
of remote sensing of the natural environ-
ment of the Earth may be a helpful step in
that direction.

Question of International Law

Agreement on definitions, however impor-
tant, would still leave a variety of funda-
mental and difficult substantive questions
which one or more members have posed to
this subcommittee. Among those questions,
even if not expressly asked, is : What is the
present state of international law relating
to remote sensing of the natural environ-
ment? I address this issue not because in
our view that law is uncertain or unsettled,
but rather because during the last year cer-

420

tain questions have been raised to what we
believe are the well-established provisions
of international law in this area. We do not
believe that these challenges are well founded
or that the change in law which they im-
plicitly propose would be desirable.

I refer in particular to the assertion that
Earth-oriented sensing activities from outer
space are not sanctioned by the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, which provides in part that:

Outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by
all States without discrimination of any kind, on a
basis of equality and in accordance with interna-
tional law ....

As my delegation pointed out at the last
session of the Legal Subcommittee, in our
view such remote sensing activities are
clearly within the scope of that treaty.

The negotiating history of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty indicates that primary interest
was evinced in the possibilities of using
space technology to improve certain capa-
bilities here on Earth. Certainly, one cannot
then reasonably infer that Earth-oriented
activities were not covered. Practice, too,
confounds such an assertion; for one need
not look far to realize that before, during,
and after the negotiation of the 1967 treaty,
which we all recognize as the basic authority
in this area, Earth-oriented space activities
were plentiful and well known.

Telecommunications and meteorological
satellites were much more common than and
equally as accepted as deep space probes.
For example, over 70 countries utilize the
U.S. meteorological satellite system on a
daily basis. That system is focused on the
Earth and sends back daily images of the
Earth's surface as well as its cloud cover.
The manned Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo
programs all contained widely publicized
and intensively studied experiments focusing
on the Earth, including its resources and
environment. I should mention here that
this acceptance continues to the present day
and that it applies specifically to remote
sensing. Fifty-two countries, including 17
members of this subcommittee, plus a num-
ber of international organizations have be-

Department of State Bulletin

i-ome party to international agreements
covering the open use of such remote sensing
data for their own interests. They have
chosen to do so for important reasons which
we must neither ignore nor discard in our
own analysis.

Benefits of Dissemination of Data

It has been suggested that remote sensing
of the natural environment is distinguish-
able from earlier activities because it alleged-
ly affects the Earth in a way that earlier
sensing did not. However, this argument
does not withstand serious scrutiny. Sensing
of the natural environment for resources,
mapping contours, air and water pollution,
Hand use, or any other purpose does not of
itself affect the Earth any more than a
■meteorological satellite changes or affects
the cloud formations it senses. If we are to
be serious about our work, we must discard
these facile arguments and come to grips
with the essence of the facts, including the
(genuine concerns which are before us.

Attempts to inhibit or even prohibit the
gathering and exchange and analysis of in-
formation about the Earth are misdirected in
that they will not solve what seem to be the
underlying concerns which generate them.
They are counterproductive, in that they
could, if pressed, undermine or eliminate the
potential for developing extraordinary new
benefits which can be meaningfully shared by
all peoples in all countries of the world.

An essential tenet of both the Brazilian-
Argentine and the French-Soviet drafts, as
we read them, appears to be the belief that
if each state would have a right to prohibit
the dissemination to third parties of data
about its territory, then each state would
be more secure and better off. We believe
that the majority of states, including es-
pecially the large number of developing
countries, will see the situation differently.
Their prime need is to identify what re-
sources they have. They will want equal ac-
cess to all information about their resources.
They will not want it available only to those
few countries which operate spacecraft,

which in our view would be the result of a
restrictive data-dissemination system. The
surest and perhaps the only reliable way to
protect states from being comparatively dis-
advantaged or discriminated against is to
insure that all states and all peoples have
as much opportunity to obtain that data as
does anyone else.

The total body of information and under-
standing about the world can grow at a
much greater rate with the cooperative
efforts of investigators throughout the world,
and that growth will benefit in particular
those states which do not have the financial
resources to carry on sophisticated sensing
programs themselves even within their own
territories.

The United States does not make this
point to defend our own interests. We expect
to have access to and to use data about the
natural environment of this Earth in any
case. We believe that it is strongly in the in-
terests of other states that we and other
collectors of this data share it rather than
being in effect asked not to.

Technical and Organizational Realities

Quite apart from the scientific or politi-
cal merits or disadvantages of a restrictive
dissemination system, such a system does
not appear either technically or economically
feasible ; and hence if such restrictions were
universally agreed the result could be the
complete negation of virtually any public
system for remote sensing of the natural
environment of the Earth. We have no capa-
bility to separate satellite images along the
lines of invisible political boundaries. If in
the future some technical means for doing
so were discovered, it is still highly im-
probable that the cost of applying it could
be brought down to the level at which it
would be economically feasible. As a prac-
tical matter — and in the end we must deal
with the practical realm — it makes little
sense to adopt a restrictive dissemination
system unless we are prepared to negate
the possibility of any internationally avail-
able source of remote sensing data. The

March 31, 1975

421

United States would oppose such a decision
and would consider it most unfortunate and
a great mistake if agreed to by others.

Finally, on this point I would note the
fact that limiting the data availability to con-
form to national boundaries, even if it were
feasible, would destroy many of the most
useful functions of satellite remote sensing
systems, functions including the study of
ecological systems, water systems, pollution,
soil moisture conditions, rift systems, and
vegetation and soil patterns, as well as most
other objectives of sensing systems such as
those undertaken by the Landsat experi-
ments. The most pressing need for such
satellite observations involves the acquisition
and analysis of large area and global data
in order to make it possible to deal with
problems which are inherently regional or
global in character.

I emphasize this fact in particular to illus-
trate the essential point that we cannot
constructively deal with the legal aspects of
remote sensing without remaining sensitive
at each step to the technical and organiza-
tional realities of this developing technology.
This interaction was recognized by the work-
ing group, by the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, and by the full Outer Space
Committee; and if we are to develop useful
and meaningful recommendations in this
forum, we must also integrate these consider-
ations into our analysis. This makes our task
more difficult, but this is an area of great
complexity and of great potential significance
to all of us. We are certainly equal to the
challenge.

Improvement of International Guidelines

The U.S. Government has undertaken a
thorough review of our position on the legal
aspects of remote sensing of the natural
environment and of our views regarding the
appropriate work of this subcommittee. At
the same time that we have no doubt that
such remote sensing and open availability
of data are sanctioned and encouraged by
the present provisions of applicable inter-
national law, we are also quite willing to

participate actively in efforts to examine
whether international arrangements and
guidelines can be improved.

With this in mind, we have prepared a
working paper containing a number of pro-
visions reflecting the substance of interna-
tional guidelines for remote sensing which
we would support in addition to those con-
tained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Such
guidelines might be endorsed by the General
Assembly and recommended to all states
engaged in remote sensing of the natural
environment.

We believe that after careful study others
will also agree that the approach we are
advocating will in the long run insure
greater benefits to all countries, regardless
of the level of their economic development,
will better protect those who fear that the
inevitable expansion of knowledge will some
how threaten them, and may well give us all
a valuable new tool to use in our shared
efforts to deal with international problem?
relating to the natural environment.

The working paper, which the United
States submits as a Legal Subcommittee doc-
ument, recognizes in particular the value of
international cooperation, whether bilateral
regional, or universal in scope. It is based or
the premise that all states are free withom
discrimination of any kind to carry out re
mote sensing of the natural environment anc
encourages the development of cooperation
particularly on the regional level, to help in-
sure that all states can share in benefit;
which may be derived from the use of thif
developing technology.

In addition, we believe that states which an
engaged in remote sensing programs such as
our Landsat experiments, or whatever op-
erational systems may grow out of such ex-
periments by the United States and others
should within their capabilities endeavor tc
assist others on an equitable basis to develof
an understanding of the techniques, potentia
benefits, and costs of remote sensing, in-
cluding the conditions under which they couk
be aft'orded. Such assistance might inchuU
enhanced opportunities to learn what data
are available, how to handle and interpret

422

Department of State Bulletin

sthose data, and how to apply the knowledge
gained to meet national, regional, and global
needs. Our reference to states engaged in
such programs includes all those states which
have developed and are utilizing capabilities
for data handling and analysis in addition to
those states which are operating the space
segment of such programs.

To enhance the ability of all states to
benefit from such remote sensing programs,
states which receive data directly from re-
mote sensing .satellites should publish cata-
logues or other appropriate listings of
publicly available data so that others can
learn what data they might obtain for their
own use.

States which receive data directly from
satellites designed for remote sensing of the
natural environment should insure that data
of a sensed area within the territory of any
other state are available to the sensed state
as soon as practicable and in any event as
soon as they are available to any state other
than the sensing state. Data acquired from
such satellites should be available to all in-
terested states, international organizations,
individuals, scientific communities, and
others on an equitable, timely, and nondis-
criminatory basis. As a part of this com-
mitment, the question of the allocation of
the costs of establishing and operating such
a system will at some point have to be ad-
dressed.

It is our view that, contrary to the fears
of some, an open and widely utilized system
of data dissemination will enhance rather
than undermine the ability of states to man-
age and control the natural resources within
their respective territories.

We believe that a careful analysis of
the nature and potential of systems for re-
mote sensing of the natural environment will
reveal that the interests of the international
community as a whole and individual states
in all areas of the world, regardless of their
degrees of development, will be best served
by extensive cooperation in a system or sys-
tems based on open data dissemination, an
approach to the use of this new technology
which we continue to follow and which is

surely in keeping with our common com-
mitment to the use of outer space in the
interests and for the benefit of all mankind.

TEXT OF U.S. WORKING PAPER =

Remote sensing of the statural environment
of the earth from outer space

United States working paper on the development
of additional guidelines

Possible preambular provisio7is

Recalling the provisions of the Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Reaffirming that the common interest of mankind
is sen-ed by the exploration and use of outer space
for peaceful purposes,

Considering that international co-operation in the
continuing development of technology enabling man-
kind to undertake remote sensing of the natural
environment of the earth from outer space may
provide unique opportunities for all peoples to gain
useful understanding of the earth and its environ-
ment,

Recognizing that the most valuable potential ad-
vantages to mankind from these technological de-
velopments, including among others presei-vation of
the environment and effective management and con-
trol by States of their natural resources, will depend
on the sharing of data and its use on a regional
and global basis.

Possible operative provisions

I. Remote sensing of the natural environment of
the Earth from outer space shall be conducted in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter, the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, and other generally accepted principles of
international law relating to man's activities in outer
space.

II. Satellites designed for remote sensing of the
natural environment of the Earth shall be regis-
tered with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations in accordance with the Convention on Regis-
tration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. States
shall as appropriate inform the Secretary-General
of the progress of such remote sensing space pro-
grammes they have undertaken.

III. Remote sensing of the natural environment
of the Earth from outer space should promote

= U.N. doc. A/AC./105/C.2/L. 103.

March 31, 1975

423

inter alia (a) international co-operation in the solu-
tion of international problems relating to natural
resources and the environment, (b) the development
of friendly relations among States, (c) co-operation
in scientific investigation, and (d) the use of outer
space for the benefit and in the interest of all man-
kind.

IV. States undertaking programmes designed for
remote sensing of the natural environment from
satellites shall encourage the broadest feasible in-
ternational participation in appropriate phases of
those programmes.

V. States receiving data directly from satellites
designed for remote sensing of the natural environ-
ment of the earth shall make those data available
to interested States, international organizations, in-
dividuals, scientific communities and others on an
equitable, timely and non-discriminatory basis. To
enhance the ability of all States, organizations and
individuals to share in the knowledge gained from
remote sensing of the natural environment from
outer space. States should publish catalogues or
other appropriate listings of publicly available data
which they have received directly from such remote
sensing satellites.

VI. States receiving data directly from such re-
mote sensing satellites shall ensure in particular
that data of a sensed area within the territory of
any other State are available to the sensed State
as soon as practicable, and in any event as soon as
they are available to any State other than the
sensing States. States owning such remote sensing
satellites shall facilitate the direct reception of data
from those satellites by other interested States
when technically possible and on equitable terms.

VII. States engaged in such remote sensing pro-
grammes shall within their capabilities endeavour
to assist on an equitable basis other interested
States, organizations and individuals to develop an
understanding of the techniques, potential benefits
and costs of remote sensing. Such assistance could
include the provision of opportunities to learn what
data are available, how to handle and interpret the
data, and, where appropriate, how to apply the
knowledge gained to meet national, regional and
global needs.

VIII. States should cooperate with other States
in the same geographical region in the use of data
from such remote sensing programmes, whether re-
gional or global in nature, to promote the common
development of knowledge about that region.

IX. States which undertake such remote sensing
programmes should encourage relevant international
organizations to which they belong to assist other
member States in acquiring and using data from
those programmes so that the maximum number of
States can share in potential benefits which may
result from the development of this technology.

424

United States Discusses Response
to the World Food Crisis

Statement by John Scali

U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Last November the nations of the world
joined together in Rome to pledge that
within one decade no child would go hungry,
no family would fear for its next day's bread,
and no human being's future would be
stunted by malnutrition.

In a recent statement the new Executive
Director of the World Food Council, Dr. John
Hannah, has described the awesome ob-
stacles we face in achieving our goal and
made a compelling case for urgent action
Today more than 10 percent of all of the
people on this earth, Dr. Hannah pointed out,
face chronic hunger. Although mass starva-
tion has been avoided, tens of thousands of
persons die annually from hunger or hunger-
related diseases. Many millions are never far
from famine.

Over the past year on many occasions I
have spoken to American audiences of the
critical food situation now facing the poorer
nations of the earth. I frankly noted the
political and economic difficulties our counti-y
would face in providing food aid at a time
when our traditional food surpluses had dis-
appeared, our own food prices were risirio-.
and our economy was in recession. Under
these new conditions, I said, our national
decision whether to provide substantial food
assistance would test the convictions of our
people and the vision of our leaders as it
never had in the past. Despite these prob-
lems, I remained confident that the United
States would meet this challenge and remain
true to its long heritage of generosity for
those in need.

Since I made these remarks, events have
justified my confidence. I am thus particu-
larly pleased to be able to report officially to
you that the U.S. Government has decided

' Made in informal consultation on the World
Food Council at U.N. Headquarters on Feb. 24
(text from USUN press release 13).

Department of State Bulletin

jn a food aid program for the current fiscal
year that represents the highest dollar level
ill the last 10 years and which includes ap-
proximately 2 million tons more food than
was programed last year.

The P.L. 480 budget this year provides
$1.47 billion to purchase agricultural com-
modities. With the addition of freight costs
the total value is $1.6 billion. We estimate
that this budget will purchase approximately
5.5 million tons of grain. At least 4 million
tons of this will be provided as outright
grants for humanitarian relief or made avail-
able under concessionary terms to those
nations most in need. In all, we will make
available between 850 and 900 million dollars'
worth of food assistance to those countries
most seriously affected by the current eco-
nomic crisis. Thus, 31 of these most seri-
ously affected nations will receive U.S. food
assistance totaling over $850 million in the
current fiscal year.

The scale of this year's American food aid
piogram is in keeping with the pledges made
by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger
to the 29th General Assembly, when they
promised that the value of American food
shipments to those in need would be in-
creased. The President was encouraged in
this difficult decision by members of the
American Congress and by concerned citi-
zens throughout our country. He has ordered
a food aid program which represents about
a 70 percent increase over last year's food
aid, raising the funding from $843 million to
$1.47 billion and, more important, raising
tlie amount of food provided by approxi-
mately 2 million tons. The task of shipping
such an enormous quantity of food before
the end of the fiscal year will be a large one.
We intend, however, to make a maximum
effort to solve any transportation problems.

The United States also intends to increase
its assistance for agricultural development
in the Third World. The Administration has
asked the U.S. Congress to provide $650 mil-
lion for aid in this area, thus raising our
total agricultural assistance program this
year to over $2.2 billion.

I hope our response to the food crisis will

draw new attention to the plight of those
nations in need and encourage others to join
in cooperative action to feed those still facing
hunger in the developing nations. Words and
paper promises will not feed the hungry.
Utopian programs will not fuel the faltering
economies of the world's poorest nations.
Only generous and concrete assistance from
all those in a position to give will serve to
meet the present crisis and to provide hope
for a better future.

In the months to come, the United States
will seek to work with all others who wish
to contribute in a concrete way to the reali-
zation of the goals set by the World Food
Conference. It is the intention of the United
States to continue to contribute its fair share
toward the global target of 10 million tons
of cereal food aid annually.

President Ford told the General Assembly
last fall that the United States would join
in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish,
and maintain an international system of food
reserves. The United States is already ac-
tively working to achieve that goal, both in
its cooperation with the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization on the International
Undertaking on World Food Security and
more recently in convening a meeting of
major grain importers and exporters to dis-
cuss the possible elements of effective re-
serves arrangements among these countries.
Domestically, we are continuing to encour-
age our farmers to produce at full produc-
tion levels, so that even in the current ab-
sence of international arrangements on re-
serves we can this year contribute our full
share to the availability of food worldwide.
Finally, the United States will continue to
provide a high level of assistance to agricul-
tural development in the Third World, and
we will work with other potential donors to
increase the flow of aid to agriculture
through both multilateral and bilateral chan-
nels.

As we move with other nations to imple-
ment the decisions of the World Food Con-
ference, we will give serious attention to the
important role which can be played by the
World Food Council itself. We look with

March 31, 1975

425

eager anticipation to the initial session of
the Council in Rome and are pleased that the
Secretary General has called this meeting
today to facilitate the June discussions. Mr.
President, I assure you the United States
stands ready to play a constructive role in
the important work of this Council.

J

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks
on Fisheries Issues

Press release 104 dated February 26

Discussions between the United States and
the Soviet Union on Middle Atlantic and
North Pacific fisheries issues which com-
menced February 3 were terminated on
February 26. Agreement was reached be-
tween the two countries on Middle Atlantic
problems, and a new agreement extending
previous arrangements was signed February
26 with some modifications. The new agree-
ment provides for stricter enforcement of
U.S. regulations relating to the taking of
U.S. continental shelf fishery resources and
strengthens measures aimed at minimizing
gear conflicts between Soviet mobile (trawl)
gear and U.S. fixed gear (lobster pots).

However, the United States and the Soviet
Union failed to reach agreement on issues
relating to the conservation of North Pacific
fishery resources and on ways of most effec-
tively reducing conflicts between U.S. and
Soviet fishermen with minimal impact on
the fisheries of both countries. Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., who headed the
U.S. delegation, expressed concern over the
continuing decline of fishery resources off
the U.S. Pacific coast and the urgent need
to implement measures to control overfishing.
He further expressed his keen disappoint-
ment over the failure to reach an agreement

426

that would protect and conserve resourcei
of special interest to U.S. fishermen.

Both countries agreed to extend to July
1, 1975, the former three agreements relat-
ing to crab fishing in the eastern Bering
Sea and arrangements to prevent gear con
flicts in the vicinity of Kodiak Island and
the fisheries of the northeastern Pacific
extending from Alaska south to California
and also agreed to meet again later this year.

The U.S. delegation included represent
atives from the Departments of State and
Commerce, the Coast Guard, and from state
governments and industry. The Soviet dele
gation was led by Vladimir M. Kamentsev,
Deputy Minister of Fisheries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972.^
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, March 12, 1975

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter-
national coffee agreement of 1968, as amended anc
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approvec
by the Intemational Coffee Council at Londor
September 26, 1974. Open for signature Novembei
1, 1974, through March 31, 1975."
Signatures: Brazil, January 6, 1975;" Guatemala

February 7, 1975;° Mexico," Rwanda," Januai-j

22, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24.
1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Colombia, March 3, 1975.

Protocol amending the single convention on nar-
cotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972."
Accession deposited: Colombia, March 3, 1975

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to inter\'ention on
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties;

k'

lie

' Not in force.

■ Subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance.

Department of State Bulletin

with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 19G9.
Enters into force May 6, 1975.

Rafificafion deposited: Monaco, February 24, 1975.
Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.
International convention on civil liability for oil
pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29,
1969.>
Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1974, with annex. Done at London November 1,
1974.1

Signature : Federal Republic of Germany (subject
to ratification), P^bruary 18, 1975.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the
United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accession deposited: Zaire, February 28, 1975.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973.'
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, March 10, 1975.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measui'ement of
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June
23, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Israel, February 13, 1975.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex-
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December
20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, ex-
cept for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which
entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, November 27,
1974.

Supplementary convention to extradition convention
of March 23, 1868. Signed at Washington June 11,
1884. Entered into force April 24, 1885. 24 Stat.
1001.

Agreement for the reciprocal application of article
1 of the extradition convention of March 23, 1868.
Effected by exchange of notes signed at Rome
April 16 and 17, 1946. Entered into force April
17, 1946; operative May 1, 1946. 61 Stat. 3687.
Terminated: March 11, 1975.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial con-
tribution for U.S. administrative and related ex-
penses for the Japanese fiscal year 1974 pursuant
to the mutual defense assistance agreement of
March 8, 1954. Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo May 10, 1974. Entered into force May 10,
1974.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul
February 26, 1975. Entered into force February
26, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of December
11, 1974, relating to cooperative arrangements to
-support Mexican efl'orts to curb the illegal traffic
in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico February 24, 1975. Entered into force
February 24, 1975.

Panama

Agreement amending the air transport agreement
of March 31, 1949, as amended (TIAS 1932, 2551,
6270), with memorandum of consultations. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Panama December
23, 1974, and March 6, 1975. Entered into force
March 6, 1975.

BILATERAL

Honduras

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Tegucigalpa March 5, 1975. Entered into
force March 5, 1975.

Italy

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18,

1973.

Ratifications exchanged : March 11, 1975.

Entered into force: March 11, 1975.
Extradition convention. Signed at Washington March

23, 1868. Entered into force September 17, 1868.

15 Stat. 629.
Additional article to extradition convention of March

23, 1868. Signed at Washington Januaiy 21, 1869.

Entered into force May 7, 1869. 16 Stat. 767.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' Not in force.

Confirmations

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the following
nominations:

William B. Bowdler to be Ambassador to the
Republic of South Africa.

Nathaniel Davis to be an Assistant Secretary of
State [for African Affairs].

Harry W. Shlaudeman to be Ambassador to
Venezuela.

March 31, 1975

427

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20/t02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
loo or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.

Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation.

Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics. TIAS 7910. 9 pp. SOf'. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7910).

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with -Austria amending and extending the
agreement of July 11, 1969. TIAS 7912. 22 pp. 40^'.
(Cat. No. 89.10:7912).

Principles of Relations and Cooperation. Agreement
with Egypt. TIAS 791.3. 9 pp. SOc*. (Cat. No. S9.10:
7913).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India.
TIAS 7915. 13 pp. SOc*. (Cat. No. S9.10:7915).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Switzerland.
TIAS 7916. 3 pp. 25^ (Cat. No. S9.10:7916).

Economic Assistance — Establishment of a Trust
Account. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 7918.
4 pp. 25(^. (Cat. No. S9.10:7918).

Tracking .Station. Agreement with Brazil. TI.A.S
7920. 9 pp. 30(-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7920).

Correction

The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call
attention to the following error which appears
in the February 3 issue:

p. 13J,, col. 2: The second-to-last paragraph
should read "... I will request legrislation to
authorize and require tariffs, import quotas,
or price floors . . . ."

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 10—16

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 10 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
104 of February 26, 115, 115A, and 115B of
March 4, and 118 of .March 7.

Subject

3/10 Schaufele appointed Inspector
General of the Foreign Service
(biographic data).

Kissinger, Bitsios: remarks, Brus-
sels, Mar. 7.

Kissinger: arrival, Aswan, Mar.

Kissinger, Sadat: remarks, .As-
wan, Mar. 8.

Kissinger: departure, Aswan,
Mar. 9.

Kissinger: arrival, Damascus,
Mar. 9.

Kissinger, Khaddam: toasts, Da-
mascus, Mar. 9.

Kissinger: departure, Damascus,
Mar. 9.

Kissinger, .AUon: arrival, Tel
-Aviv, Mar. 9.

Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.

Kissinger: arrival, Ankara, Mar.
10.

SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea)
working group on fire protec-
tion, .Apr. 4.

SOL.AS working group on design
and equipment, .Apr. 3.

Kissinger: remarks, Ankara, Mar.
10.

U.S. -Japan Scientific and Tech-
nical Cooperation Review Panel
established.

Kissinger: departure, .Ankara.

Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.

Kissinger: arrival, .Aswan.

Summary of negotiating eff'orts
on Cambodia, Mar. 5.

Handyside sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Mauritania (biographic
data).

U.S. -Spain joint communique.

Kissinger, Sadat: remarks,
.Aswan, Mar. 13.

Kissinger: departure, Aswan.

No.

Date

*120

3/10

tl21

3/10

tl22

3/10

tl23

3/10

fl24

3/10

tl25

3/10

tl26

3/10

tl27

3/10

tl28

3/10

tl29
tl30

3/10
3/11

"131 3/11

n32

3/11

tl33

3/11

*134

3/11

tl35

tl36

tl37

138

3/11
3/12
3/12
3/12

*139 3/13

140
tl41

3/13
3/14

tl42 3/14

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

428

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX March 31, 1975 Vol LXXII, No. 1866

Africa. Davis confirmed as Assistant Secre-
tary for African Affairs 427

Congress

Confirmations (Bowdler, Davis, Shlaudeman) 427

Department Discusses Goal of Military Assist-
ance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia (Habib) . 407

Department Discusses Situation in Portugal

(Laingen) 411

President Ford Vetoes Bill Concerning Oil
Import Fees (message to the House of Rep-
resentatives) 413

President Ford's News Conference of March
6 (excerpts) 397

U.S. Alternate Governor of IBRD and Inter-
national Banks Confirmed 415

Cyprus. U.N. Calls for Resumption of Cyprus

Negotiations (Scali, text of resolution) . . 416

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Bowdler, Davis, Shlaudeman) . . 427

Economic Affairs

President Ford's News Conference of March

6 (excerpts) 397

U.S. Alternate Governor of IBRD and Inter-
national Banks Confirmed 415

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Fisheries

Issues 426

U.S.-Iran Joint Commission Meets at Wash-
ington (Ansary, Kissinger, joint communi-
que, technical cooperation agreement) . . 402

Energy

President Ford Vetoes Bill Concerning Oil
Import Fees (message to the House of Rep-
resentatives) 413

President Ford's News Conference of March
6 (excerpts) 397

Food. United States Discusses Response to
the World Food Crisis (Scali) 424

Foreign Aid. U.S. Approves Grant of Rice for

Cambodia (Department statement) ... 406

International Organizations and Conferences.

U.S. Alternate Governor of IBRD and Inter-
national Banks Confirmed 415

Iran. U.S.-Iran Joint Commission Meets at
Washington (Ansary, Kissinger, joint com-
munique, technical cooperation agreement) 402

Israel

President Ford's News Conference of March

6 (excerpts) 397

U.S. Deplores Terrorist Incident in Tel Aviv

(Ford, Kissinger) 406

Khmer Republic (Cambodia)

Department Discusses Goal of Military Assist-
ance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia (Habib) 407

President Ford's News Conference of March 6

(excerpts) 397

Summary of Negotiating Efforts on Cambodia

(Department statement) 401

U.S. Approves Grant of Rice for Cambodia

(Department statement) 406

Portugal. Department Discusses Situation in

Portugal (Laingen) 411

Presidential Documents

President Ford Vetoes Bill Concerning Oil

Import Fees 413

President Ford's News Conference of March 6

(excerpts) 397

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 428

South Africa. Bowdler confirmed as Ambassa-
dor 427

Space. United States Presents Guidelines for
Remote Sensing of the Natural Environ-
ment From Outer Space (Stowe, text of
guidelines) 419

Spain. U.S. and Spain Hold Fourth Session of

Talks on Cooperation (joint communique) 405

Terrorism

President Ford's News Conference of March

6 (excerpts) 397

U.S. Deplores Terrorist Incident in Tel Aviv

(Ford, Kissinger) 406

Treaty Information

Current Actions 426

U.S.-Iran Joint Commission Meets at Wash-
ington (Ansary, Kissinger, joint communi-
que, technical cooperation agreement) . . 402
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Fisheries

Issues 426

U.S.S.R. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on
Fisheries Issues 426

United Nations

U.N. Calls for Resumption of Cyprus Nego-
tiations (Scali, text of resolution) .... 416

United States Discusses Response to the
World Food Crisis (Scali) 424

United States Presents Guidelines for Re-
mote Sensing of the Natural Environment
From Outer Space (Stowe, text of guide-
lines) 419

Venezuela. Shlaudeman confirmed as Ambas-
sador 427

Viet-Nam

Department Discusses Goal of Military Assist-
ance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia (Habib) 407

President Ford's News Conference of March

6 (excerpts) 397

Name Index

Ansary, Hushang 402

Bowdler, William B 427

Davis, Nathaniel 427

Ford, President 397, 406, 413

Habib, Philip C 407

Kissinger, Secretary 402, 406

Laingen, Bruce 411

Robinson, Charles W 415

Scali, John 416, 424

Shlaudeman, Harry W 427

Stowe, Ronald F 419

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